Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03594/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03594-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Justin Robert Minervini
Petitioner
USA
Respondent

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff,

v.

Justin Robert Minervini, 

Defendant/Movant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CV 18-03594-PHX-DLR (MHB)

CR 17-01577-PHX-DLR

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. RAYES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Defendant/Movant Justin Robert Minervini, who is confined in the Federal

Correctional Institution-Safford in Safford, Arizona, has filed a pro se Motion Under 28

U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody.

(CV 18-03594 (“CV”) Docs. 1, 6; CR 17-01577 (“CR”) Doc. 49.) Plaintiff United States of

America (the “government”) filed a Response to the Motion, and Movant filed a Reply. (CV

Docs. 19, 20.)

BACKGROUND

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Movant pleaded guilty to Distribution of Child

Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2), 2252(b)(1), and 2256. On June 18,

2018, the Court sentenced Movant to a 97-month term of imprisonment followed by lifetime

supervised release.

In his § 2255 Motion and supplement, Movant alleges five grounds for relief. (CV

Docs. 1, 6.) In Ground One, Movant alleges his sentencing counsel was “ineffective for not

Case 2:18-cv-03594-DLR Document 21 Filed 03/09/20 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

 objecting to the restrictive conditions that are in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3).” In

Ground Two, Movant claims his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the substantially

unreasonable sentence of lifetime supervision. In Ground Three, Movant asserts his counsel

was ineffective for not asking for a sentence below the agreed-upon sentencing range, based

on Movant’s psychosexual evaluation. In Ground Four, Movant argues that his counsel was

ineffective for advising him to plead guilty. And, in Ground Five, Movant contends that his

counsel was ineffective for failing to object “to the five-level enhancement.” (Docs. 3, 1, 6.)

DISCUSSION

In its Response, the government argues that Movant’s claims are either barred or

meritless. Thus, the government contends that Movant’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or

Correct Sentence be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim for denial of the

Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective

assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The

benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness is whether counsel’s conduct so

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the proceeding cannot be

relied upon as having produced a just result. See id.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Movant must satisfy a two

prong test, demonstrating: (1) deficient performance, such that counsel’s actions were outside

the wide range of professionally competent assistance, and (2) that Movant was prejudiced

by reason of counsel’s actions. See id. at 686-90. “Failure to satisfy either prong of the

Strickland test obviates the need to consider the other.” Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805

(9th Cir. 2002). Indeed, it is unnecessary for a federal court considering a habeas ineffective

assistance claim to address the prejudice prong of the Strickland test if the petitioner cannot

establish incompetence under the first prong. See Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737

(9th Cir. 1998). Similarly, a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as the result of the alleged

deficiencies. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1470 &

Case 2:18-cv-03594-DLR Document 21 Filed 03/09/20 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

n.3 (9th Cir. 1995) (approving district court’s refusal to consider whether counsel’s conduct

was deficient after determining that petitioner could not establish prejudice).

There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable assistance. See Strickland at 689-90. “A fair assessment of attorney performance

requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct

from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. Review of counsel’s performance is

extremely limited. Acts or omissions that “might be considered sound trial strategy” do not

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. The prejudice component “focuses on the

question whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or

the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993).

A. Ground One

In Ground One, Movant alleges his sentencing counsel was “ineffective for not

objecting to the restrictive conditions that are in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3).”

Specifically, Movant argues that the Court improperly imposed a special restrictive condition

of release that prohibits Movant from being in the presence of, or having contact with,

children under the age of 18, including his own children. Movant contends the record “is

bereft of any evidence that suggested defendant was a threat to his future children or any

other child.” Movant also objects to the Court’s no alcohol restriction.

A “district court has broad discretion in setting conditions of supervised release,

including restrictions that infringe on fundamental rights.” United States v. Bee, 162 F.3d

1232, 1234 (9th Cir. 1998). A court “may order a special condition of supervised release that:

(1) is reasonably related to the crime, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the

purposes of supervised release, including deterrence, protection of the public, and treatment

of the offender; (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary;

and (3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing

Commission.” United States v. Gnirke, 775 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(d)). “‘The

Case 2:18-cv-03594-DLR Document 21 Filed 03/09/20 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

touchstone of reasonableness is whether the record as a whole reflects rational and

meaningful consideration’ of the relevant factors.” Id. at 1168 (Smith, J., concurring)

(quoting United States v. Rudd, 662 F.3d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir. 2011)).

As relevant to the instant claim, the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) listed

the following special conditions in its Recommendation section:

You must not be in the company of or have contact with children who you

know are under the age of 18, including your own children. Contact includes,

but is not limited to, letters, communication devices, audio or visual devices,

visits, or communication through a third party.

The no child contact special condition is needed as the defendant’s offense was

related to abusive sexual contact of a child who was under the age of 18.

***

You must not use or possess alcohol or alcoholic beverages.

(CR Doc. 38.) Similarly, at the sentencing hearing, the Court stated:

The defendant shall comply with the following special conditions:

***

Next, you must not be in the company of or have contact with children who

you know are under the age of 18, including your own children. Contact

includes, but is not limited to, letters, communication devices, audio or visual

devices, visits, or communications through a third party.

The reason: The no child contact special condition is needed as your offense

was related to abusive sexual contact of a child who was under the age of 18.

***

And finally, you must not use or possess alcohol or alcoholic beverages.

(CR Docs. 50, 41.)

As noted by the government, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in United States v. Wolf

Child, 699 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2012) is instructive in this case. In Wolf Child, the court held

that a condition of supervised release preventing the defendant from interacting with his own

daughters implicated the “fundamental right to familial association” and thus infringed on

a “particularly significant liberty interest.” Id. at 1087. While such conditions are not

automatically invalid, the district court must follow an enhanced procedural requirement: the

court “must support its decision to impose the condition on the record with record evidence

Case 2:18-cv-03594-DLR Document 21 Filed 03/09/20 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 It is not clear if Movant also objects to the special condition limiting his contact with

minors that are not his own children. This condition, however, is common in child

pornography cases and has been upheld by the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Bee,

162 F.3d 1232, 1235 (9th Cir. 1998) (“By prohibiting Bee from having contact with children

and from loitering near places primarily used by children, the district court properly

exercised its broad discretion in setting the terms and conditions of supervised release.”);

United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008).

- 5 -

that the condition of supervised release sought to be imposed is necessary to accomplish one

or more of the factors listed in § 3583(d)(1) and involves no greater deprivation of liberty

than is reasonably necessary.” Id. at 1090 (emphasis in original).

On this record, it appears that the district court did not make the findings necessary

to justify the special condition related to Movant having no contact with his own children as

required by Wolf Child – justifying the special condition based on the offense committed.

The government argues as justification for the special condition that, at the time, Movant had

no children and Defendant did not object; Movant’s statements included that he was attracted

to very young children and his collection of child pornography included a depiction of a sex

act with a girl under age 2; and Movant stated that he had sexual fantasies about children.

However, there is no evidence in the PSR or the supplemental Psychosexual Evaluation that

Movant has ever sexually abused a child, or indicating that he would try to abuse his current

or future children, or that he would be a danger to his current or future children once released

from prison. (CR Doc. 38.)

Although this Court takes no position on whether the application of this special

condition is warranted under the circumstances, given the district court’s apparent failure to

conduct the enhanced individualized analysis as required by Wolf Child regarding the special

condition as applied to Movant’s own children, the Court finds that an objection to the

special condition by counsel may have affected the outcome of the sentencing proceeding.

This is sufficient to establish prejudice under Strickland.

1

Similarly, although “[m]oderate consumption of alcohol does not rise to the dignity

of our sacred liberties,” United States v. Betts, 511 F.3d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 2007), there were

Case 2:18-cv-03594-DLR Document 21 Filed 03/09/20 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

no allegations indicating any inappropriate alcohol or drug use, that a drinking played a role

in the crime, or any prior history of substance abuse recited in the PSR or Psychosexual

Evaluation. There appears to be no basis in the record to conclude that the restriction

imposed “bears a reasonable relationship to rehabilitating the offender, protecting the public,

or providing adequate deterrence.” Id. at 878.

Again, although this Court takes no position on whether the application of the no

alcohol restriction is warranted under the circumstances, the Court finds that an objection to

this restriction by counsel may have affected the outcome of the proceeding. See Betts, 511

F.3d at 877-81 (finding that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed an

alcohol abstention condition where neither alcohol nor drugs played a role in the defendant’s

offense and the defendant had no history of alcohol or drug abuse); United States v. Napier,

463 F.3d 1040, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 2006). This is sufficient to establish prejudice under

Strickland.

Accordingly, the Court will recommend that this matter be remanded to the district

court for reconsideration and possible resentencing only with respect to the special restrictive

conditions of release related to Movant having no contact with his own children and

Movant’s no alcohol restriction.

B. Grounds Two and Three

In Ground Two, Movant claims his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the

substantially unreasonable sentence of lifetime supervision. In Ground Three, Movant asserts

his counsel was ineffective for not asking for a sentence below the agreed-upon sentencing

range, based on Movant’s psychosexual evaluation.

Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and their plain language will generally be

enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. See United States v.

Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by United States

v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2007). The right to collaterally challenge a

conviction or sentence is statutory, and a knowing and voluntary waiver of a statutory right

is enforceable. See United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 1993). The

Case 2:18-cv-03594-DLR Document 21 Filed 03/09/20 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

only claims that cannot be waived are claims that the waiver itself was involuntary or that

ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the waiver involuntary. See Washington v.

Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a plea agreement that waives the

right to file a federal habeas petition is unenforceable with respect to an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver).

“Collateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are

characterized as falling outside [the category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims

challenging the validity of the plea or the waiver] are waivable.” United States v. Cockerham,

237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001); see Williams v. United States, 396 F.3d 1340, 1342

(11th Cir. 2005) (Joining the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits in holding that

“a valid sentence-appeal waiver, entered into voluntarily and knowingly, pursuant to a plea

agreement, precludes the defendant from attempting to attack, in a collateral proceeding, the

sentence through a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing.”).

In addition, a defendant’s right to challenge any sentencing errors may be explicitly

waived. See United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1991) (declining to

consider defendant’s claim that the district court had misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines

because defendant had waived his right to appeal in his plea agreement and he was sentenced

in accordance with the terms of that agreement). When a waiver specifically includes the

waiver of the right to appeal a sentence, then it also waives the “right to argue ineffective

assistance of counsel at sentencing.” United States v. Nunez, 223 F.3d 956, 959 (9th Cir.

2000).

In his written plea agreement, Movant agreed to waive

any right to file an appeal, any collateral attack, and any other writ or motion

that challenges the conviction, an order of restitution or forfeiture, the entry of

judgment against the defendant, or any aspect of the defendant’s sentence,

including the manner in which the sentence is determined, including but not

limited to ... motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2255 (habeas petitions) ...

. This waiver shall result in the dismissal of any appeal, collateral attack, or

other motion the defendant might file challenging the conviction, order of

restitution or forfeiture, or sentence in this case. This waiver shall not be

construed to bar an otherwise-preserved claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel or of “prosecutorial misconduct” (as that term is defined by Section

II.B of Ariz. Ethics Op. 15-01 (2015)).

Case 2:18-cv-03594-DLR Document 21 Filed 03/09/20 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

(CR Doc. 22, 42.) Further, Magistrate Judge David K. Duncan held a change-of-plea hearing,

found that Movant’s guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily made, and recommended that

the guilty plea be accepted. (CR Doc. 21, 26, 53.) The record reflects that no objections were

filed, and the district court accepted the recommendation of the magistrate judge, as well as,

Movant’s guilty plea.

In the plea agreement, the parties stipulated, in pertinent part, that “the defendant’s

sentence shall be between 97-121 months of imprisonment,” and that “upon release from

imprisonment, the defendant shall be placed on a lifetime term of supervised release.” (CR

Doc. 42, 22.)

At the change-of-plea hearing, the magistrate judge explained that the plea agreement

provided for a sentence between 97-121 months, and explained that this meant that the

district court would have to sentence Movant to no less than 97 months and no more than 121

months, and Defendant stated he understood. (CR Doc. 53 at 13-14.) The magistrate judge

explained supervised release, and stated that the plea agreement provided that the supervised

release term for Movant would be for his lifetime. (CR Doc. 53 at RT 12/17/17 8-9, 13.)

Movant stated he had no questions regarding anything that the magistrate judge had advised

him about sentencing. (CR Doc. 53 at 15.)

After the magistrate judge reviewed the factual basis in the plea agreement with

Movant, he entered his plea after affirming he had enough time to speak with his lawyer, that

he was satisfied with his lawyer’s work, understood the guilty plea proceedings, and had no

questions. (CR Doc. 53 at 6, 21-22.) The magistrate judge found that Movant knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily entered his guilty plea, and that he was competent to do so. (CR

Doc. 53 at 22.)

Thereafter, in accordance with the plea agreement, the Court sentenced Movant to a

total of 97 months’ imprisonment followed by a lifetime term of supervised release. (CR

Doc. 50.) Because Defendant’s sentence was consistent with the plea agreement, he

effectively waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence, and thus to assert ineffective

assistance of counsel at sentencing. See Bolinger, 940 F.2d at 480; Nunez, 223 F.3d at 959.

Case 2:18-cv-03594-DLR Document 21 Filed 03/09/20 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

Accordingly, he has waived his right to bring the claims alleged in Grounds Two and Three

of his § 2255 Motion. The Court will recommend that Movant’s claims as alleged in Grounds

Two and Three be denied.

C. Ground Four

In Ground Four, Movant argues that his counsel was ineffective for advising him to

plead guilty. Specifically, Movant claims that counsel “failed to investigate the facts,” and

states that “[t]here is not one shred of evidence that FRI agents downloaded illegal images”

from his computer as it was “impossible” for agents to do so. Movant states that “[p]eer to

peer file sharing does not equal distribution.”

Initially, the Court notes that beyond his disappointment with the plea process,

Movant fails to support his failure-to-investigate claim with any specific facts or evidence

from the record or otherwise. Cursory allegations that are purely speculative cannot support

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir.

1994) (“Conclusory allegations [of ineffective assistance of counsel] which are not supported

by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”); Stein v. U.S., 390 F.2d 625,

627 (9th Cir. 1968) (“[i]t is well-established that mere conclusory allegations are not

sufficient to warrant relief under a § 2255 motion”). 

In any event, as reflected in the factual basis set forth in the plea agreement and

change-of-plea hearing, as well as, the presentence report, (CR Docs. 38, 42, 53), a Federal

Bureau of Investigations (FBI) agent conducted an investigation on the BitTorrent network,

a file-sharing method used to efficiently share large volumes of computer files. The agent

downloaded illegal images of children July 20, 2016; July 27, 2016; August 23, 2016; and

October 17, 2016. The agent identified an internet service provider (IP) address for each of

the four download dates and traced it back to Movant’s residence in Surprise, Arizona. The

IP provider was Cox Communications, headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.

On November 2, 2016, a search warrant was executed by Phoenix Police Department

detectives and FBI agents on Movant’s residence. Movant admitted he had file-sharing

software that he used to obtain child pornography files. Movant reported he first saw child

Case 2:18-cv-03594-DLR Document 21 Filed 03/09/20 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

pornography seven years earlier and had sought to obtain the files since. Movant explained

the websites he used to find torrent files which contained child pornography files and internet

search terms, such as “pthc” and “r@ygold,” used to locate child pornography files. The

defendant admitted the youngest child he had viewed involved in child pornography was an

infant. The agents and detectives recovered approximately 656 image files and three video

files of child pornography.

Movant’s conclusory statements regarding “not one shred of evidence” and “peer to

peer file sharing” are insufficient to establish that trial counsel was deficient for failing to

investigate, or to show that there is a reasonable probability that had counsel conducted such

an investigation, counsel would have advised Movant differently. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474

U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (When the alleged error of counsel is the failure to investigate, “the

determination whether the error ‘prejudiced’ the defendant by causing him to plead guilty

rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would

have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea.”). Movant’s mere

disagreement with the FBI’s findings is not sufficient.

Thus, the Court will recommend that Movant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim

alleged in Ground Four be denied.

D. Ground Five

In Ground Five, Movant contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object

“to the five-level enhancement under § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B).” Movant states that “a five-level

enhancement was improperly applied” resulting in an improper sentencing calculation.

Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B), a defendant is subject to a five-level

enhancement if he “distributed [child pornography] in exchange for any valuable

consideration, but not for pecuniary gain.” The Application Note further explains that

“‘distribut[ion] in exchange for any valuable consideration’ means the defendant agreed to

an exchange with another person under which the defendant knowingly distributed to that

other person for the specific purpose of obtaining something of valuable consideration from

Case 2:18-cv-03594-DLR Document 21 Filed 03/09/20 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

that other person, such as other child pornographic material, preferential access to child

pornographic material, or access to a child.” § 2G2.2 cmt. n.1.

In United States v. Halverson, 897 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 2018), the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit articulated its test for finding whether the enhancement

applied: (1) the defendant agreed to an exchange with another person; (2) the defendant

knowingly distributed child pornography to that person; (3) for the purpose of obtaining

something of valuable consideration; and (4) the valuable consideration came from that

person. Id.

Similarly, in United States v. Oliver, 919 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2019), the Sixth Circuit

found that in order to apply the five-level enhancement under amended § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B), the

government must show that the defendant: (1) agreed––either explicitly or implicitly––to an

exchange with another person under which (2) the defendant knowingly distributed child

pornography to that other person (3) for the specific purpose of obtaining something of

valuable consideration (4) from that same other person. Id.

Here, Movant claims that the government failed to submit sufficient evidence of his

intent to distribute pornographic materials and argues that the enhancement was improperly

applied. Movant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the application

of the five-level enhancement on this basis.

Assuming deficient performance for counsel’s failure to object, the Court finds no

resulting prejudice. As set forth in the presentence report, even if no five-level enhancement

would have been imposed pursuant to § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B), the offense level would be 32 and

the range would be 121-151 months – much higher than the negotiated range of 97-121

months set forth in the plea agreement. Further, Movant was actually sentenced at the lowest

end of the negotiated range – 97 months – well below the range of 121-151 months Movant

would have been subject to without the five-level enhancement.

Accordingly, finding no resulting prejudice, the Court will recommend that Movant’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleged in Ground Five be denied.

Case 2:18-cv-03594-DLR Document 21 Filed 03/09/20 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will recommend that Movant’s Motion to Vacate,

Set Aside, or Correct Sentence be granted in part and denied in part as set forth in this

Recommendation.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Movant’s Motion Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (CV Docs.

1, 6; CR Doc. 49) be GRANTED in part DENIED in part. The Court recommends that

Ground One be granted in that this matter be remanded to the district court for

reconsideration and possible resentencing only with respect to the special restrictive

conditions of release related to Movant having no contact with his own children and

Movant’s no alcohol restriction. The Court recommends that the remaining portion of

Ground One, if any, be denied and dismissed with prejudice. The Court further recommends

that Grounds Two, Three, Four, and Five be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that as to the grounds for relief that this Court

has recommended be denied, a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma

pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of

the denial of a constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result

in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further

Case 2:18-cv-03594-DLR Document 21 Filed 03/09/20 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure

timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order

or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 9th day of March, 2020.

Case 2:18-cv-03594-DLR Document 21 Filed 03/09/20 Page 13 of 13