Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03013/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03013-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dante Sheffield
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 20, 2016 Decided August 12, 2016

No. 12-3013

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DANTE SHEFFIELD,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cr-00213-1)

William Francis Xavier Becker, appointed by the court, 

argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Lauren R. Bates, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Elizabeth 

Trosman and Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: MILLETT, Circuit Judge, and GINSBURG and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT.

Opinion concurring in part and concurring in the 

judgment filed by Senior Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

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MILLETT, Circuit Judge: A jury convicted Dante 

Sheffield of unlawful possession of 100 grams or more of 

phencyclidine (PCP) with intent to distribute, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(B)(iv). Based in part on its 

application of a career-offender enhancement, the district 

court sentenced Sheffield to 230 months in prison. 

Sheffield challenges both his conviction and sentence, 

arguing that the district court erred in (i) denying his motion 

to suppress the PCP discovered during the search of a car in 

which he was a passenger, (ii) refusing to suppress statements 

he made following his arrest but before he received his 

Miranda warnings, (iii) admitting evidence of a decade-old

drug conviction, (iv) denying his post-trial motion for 

independent testing of the drug evidence, and (v) applying the 

career-offender enhancement at sentencing. We affirm the 

judgment of conviction, but we reverse the district court’s 

imposition of the career-offender enhancement, vacate 

Sheffield’s sentence, and remand to the district court for 

resentencing.

I

A

On the evening of June 8, 2011, Metropolitan Police 

Department Detectives Christopher Smith and Michael 

Iannacchione, along with two other officers, were driving in 

an unmarked police car through the 2300 block of 11th Street,

N.W., in Washington, D.C. Detective Smith spotted Dante 

Sheffield, whom he and the other officers recognized from an 

earlier PCP investigation in the area. The officers then 

observed Sheffield and an unknown male enter a car with 

tinted windows. One of the officers told Detective Smith that 

“he wanted to at least make a contact just to see who the 

[un]identified * * * male was.” Supp. App. 7. Before they 

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did so, however, they witnessed the car “pull[] * * * slightly 

forward and ma[ke] a sharp left without using a turn signal 

into an alleyway[.]” Id. at 8. The officers followed closely 

behind the car, which then made a right turn out of the alley 

“without using its signal.” Id. At that point, the officers 

initiated a traffic stop.

All four officers approached the vehicle, two on each 

side of the car. After asking the occupants to roll down the 

windows because of the tinting, Detective Smith observed a 

woman, Brande Dudley, in the driver’s seat, Sheffield in the 

passenger seat, and the unknown male, Anthony Grant, in the 

rear seat. Detective Smith later testified that he had detected a 

“faint” but “fresh” smell of marijuana on the passenger side. 

Supp. App. 10. In addition, Smith noticed “numerous air 

fresheners all [over] the vehicle,” “on the top, the bottom, the 

back, the front, all over the car.” Id. After asking for 

Dudley’s license, the officers asked the three occupants to get 

out of the vehicle.

Officers then searched the inside of the vehicle. Upon 

unlocking and opening the armrest console, Detective 

Iannacchione was immediately met with “a strong chemical 

odor” and found an eight-ounce lemon juice bottle, “which 

through [their] investigation was consistent with that of 

storing and packaging of PCP in large quantities.” Supp. 

App. 11–12. Detective Iannacchione opened the cap and 

noticed “a strong chemical [odor] consistent with that of 

PCP.” Id. at 12. At that point, the officers placed all three 

individuals under arrest. 

Sheffield then asked Detective Smith “[w]hat are we 

getting arrested for?” Supp. App. 12. Smith responded that 

the arrest was for “[w]hat was in the car,” to which Sheffield

responded “[e]verything is mine.” Id. After another detective 

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began speaking privately with Brande Dudley, Sheffield 

“became more irritated and started yelling toward their 

direction for her not to say nothing, that they didn’t have a 

strong case, they got nothing on us, don’t say anything.” 

Hearing Tr. 15–16 (Sept. 16, 2011).

When the officers searched Grant incident to his arrest, 

they found a plastic bag in his right sock containing 

approximately 0.75 grams of marijuana.

B

1

The government indicted Sheffield on one count of 

unlawful possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or 

more of PCP, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B)(iv). Before 

trial, Sheffield filed motions to suppress the physical evidence 

of the PCP and his statements made during his arrest.

The district court denied Sheffield’s motions to suppress. 

First, the court held that Dudley’s two turns made without 

signaling gave the officers probable cause to believe she had 

committed a traffic violation. The court rejected Sheffield’s 

argument that the traffic violations were mere pretext for a

stop and search targeted at him because “the officers’ 

subjective motivations do not render unconstitutional a search 

that is otherwise justified by objective circumstances.” J.A. 

70. 

Second, the district court held that the search of the 

vehicle was lawful, citing inter alia “the smell of marijuana 

and the unusual number of air fresheners in the car[.]” J.A.

74. The court further held that the officers’ search of the 

locked armrest console was proper because there was a “‘fair 

probability’ that [the defendant] might have hidden additional 

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drugs not necessary for his current consumption in areas out 

of plain sight, including the trunk of a car” or an armrest

console. Id. at 75 (quoting United States v. Turner, 119 F.3d 

18, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). 

Third, with respect to Sheffield’s statements that 

everything in the car “is mine” and that “they [don’t] have a 

strong case, they’ve got nothing on us,” the district court ruled 

that Miranda warnings were not required for their admission. 

The court explained that the statements “were not made in 

response to a question posed by the officers, nor did the 

officers take any action to which defendant Sheffield’s 

response was required or expected.” J.A. 77.

The district court separately granted the government’s

motion to admit a record documenting Sheffield’s conviction 

in 2002 for possession with intent to distribute PCP, pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).

2

At trial, Detectives Smith, Iannacchione, and a third 

officer involved in the stop and arrest all testified to the 

circumstances of the traffic stop, the discovery of the PCP,

and Sheffield’s statements at the time of his arrest. In 

addition, the jury heard testimony from the law enforcement 

officials who transported, stored, and tested the PCP found in 

the car, including “two arresting officers, who observed and 

seized the lemon juice bottle at the scene of the traffic stop; 

three other officers who established the chain of custody of 

the lemon juice bottle, and detailed their handling, storage, 

and documentation of the evidence; and a DEA forensic 

chemist, who testified as to his testing of the PCP evidence.” 

J.A. 132. The jury learned that photographs were taken of the 

lemon juice bottle and that the quantity and weight of the 

liquid was measured. Id. In addition, the jury heard that, 

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because a DEA regulation prohibits the agency from 

accepting more than 28.35 grams of PCP for testing, Officer 

Joseph Abdalla “separated approximately one ounce of the 

drug evidence into a vial and gave it to [the DEA chemist]” 

for testing. Id. at 133. The remaining PCP was never tested, 

though it was introduced at trial. The jury subsequently found 

Sheffield guilty of possessing with intent to distribute 100 or 

more grams of PCP.

Following trial, Sheffield filed a “motion to test drugs not 

submitted to DEA.” J.A. 121. He argued that he wanted the 

test “to ensure that the drugs introduced at trial are the same 

drugs seized on June 8, 2011, and to ensure that the 

measurements performed by the Metropolitan Police are 

accurate.” Id. at 123. 

Treating it as a motion for a new trial in light of newly 

discovered evidence under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 33, the district court denied the motion. The court 

explained that testing the remaining liquid would not lead to 

new evidence that could produce an acquittal because (i) five 

officers “testified as to the smell, seizure, documentation, 

field testing, and storage of the drug evidence,” and Sheffield 

never argued that such testing was erroneous or that the 

witnesses were not credible, J.A. 136–137; (ii) measurement 

of the PCP six months after Sheffield’s arrest would 

“provide[] minimal probative value” because PCP evaporates 

over time, id. at 137; and (iii) testing the remaining PCP 

would not address whether the drugs presented at Sheffield’s

trial were the same drugs seized at his arrest, id. at 138.

Sheffield was sentenced to 230 months of imprisonment

and 96 months of supervised release. In calculating that 

sentence, the district court applied a career-offender 

enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 

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II

Sheffield first challenges the admission of the PCP

discovered during the search of the car. We decide de novo

whether the police had probable cause both to stop the car and 

to search it. See, e.g., United States v. Burroughs, 810 F.3d 

833, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2016). However, we review the district 

court’s fact findings for clear error, giving “due weight to 

inferences drawn from those facts and to the court’s 

determinations of witness credibility.” United States v. 

Brown, 334 F.3d 1161, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quotation 

marks omitted). 

A

Given the district court’s factual findings, we hold that 

the officers had probable cause to stop the car in which 

Sheffield was riding. “As a general matter, the decision to 

stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have 

probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has 

occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). 

Even minor violations of traffic law may justify a stop. See, 

e.g., id. at 808 (turning without signaling and speeding); 

United States v. Williams, 773 F.3d 98, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 

(failure to wear a seatbelt).

Here, the officers had probable cause to believe that the 

driver of the vehicle had violated a mandatory traffic 

regulation because the driver twice failed to signal a turn, in 

contravention of D.C. Municipal Regulations, Title 18 

§ 2204.3. Section 2204.3 provides that “[n]o person shall turn 

any vehicle * * * from a direct course or move right or left 

upon a roadway without giving an appropriate signal * * * if 

any other traffic may be affected by the movement.” In this 

case, the district court found that Dudley, the driver of the car 

in which Sheffield was riding, first “turn[ed] sharply into an 

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alley without using a turn signal,” and then after leaving the 

alley “ma[de] another right turn without a turn signal” when 

another car was behind her. J.A. 63, 69. Under Whren, those 

violations of D.C. traffic law provided probable cause to stop 

the vehicle, see 517 U.S. at 808–809, 819.

Sheffield does not deny that those traffic infractions 

occurred, but argues that their use by the police was mere 

pretext for the officers’ true motivation, which was to stop 

him. That no traffic citation was ever issued, Sheffield

argues, is “clearly indicative of the intent to target Dante 

Sheffield via this ever so slight traffic violation.” Pet. Br. 29.

Binding precedent forecloses that argument. The test for 

probable cause is an objective one, focusing on whether the 

stop was reasonable. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 811–813. 

Accordingly, “the constitutional reasonableness of traffic 

stops [does not] depend[] on the actual motivations of the 

individual officers involved,” even when those motivations 

are “admitted.” Id. at 813–814. 

That means that, contrary to Sheffield’s argument, 

“ulterior motives [cannot] invalidate police conduct that is 

justifiable on the basis of probable cause to believe that a 

violation of law has occurred.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 811; see 

also United States v. Washington, 559 F.3d 573, 575 (D.C. 

Cir. 2009) (traffic stop for running a stop sign was reasonable 

notwithstanding evidence of “aggressive traffic patrols” that 

“use[d] routine traffic stops to try to detect and prevent drug 

and gun crimes”). Indeed, in United States v. Bookhardt, 277 

F.3d 558 (D.C. Cir. 2002), we upheld a stop even though the 

officers did not have probable cause to stop the defendant for 

the reason they gave—that the defendant was driving with an 

expired license, id. at 564—because the officers as an 

objective matter did have probable cause to stop the defendant 

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for a reason they did not give—reckless driving, id. at 565–

566. 

Accordingly, the two undisputed signaling violations 

committed in front of the officers’ car provided an objectively 

reasonable basis for the officers to believe that the driver had 

violated the traffic laws, and that in and of itself provided

probable cause to stop Dudley’s car.

B

We likewise hold that, given the district court’s factual 

findings, probable cause existed to search the car after the 

stop. 

1

To begin with, the government argues that Sheffield lacks 

Fourth Amendment “standing” to challenge the search of the 

vehicle because he was just a passenger in a car that did not 

belong to him. But that argument is forfeited because the 

government failed to raise it in district court.

To be clear, Fourth Amendment “standing” is not really a 

“standing” inquiry at all. Ordinarily in federal cases, 

“standing” refers to the jurisdictional requirement that a 

plaintiff have a sufficient stake in the outcome of the case to 

be entitled to litigate it. See Susan B. Anthony List v. 

Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014). Standing, in that 

context, is a critical component of the Constitution’s case-orcontroversy requirement, and as such may not be waived or 

forfeited. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 

(2002) (“[D]efects in subject-matter jurisdiction require 

correction regardless of whether the error was raised in 

district court.”). 

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Fourth Amendment “standing,” by contrast, has nothing 

to do with jurisdiction. Fourth Amendment standing instead 

limits the assertion of Fourth Amendment rights to those who 

have an individualized expectation of privacy in the searched 

property: “[S]uppression of the product of a Fourth 

Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those 

whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those 

who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging 

evidence.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171–

172 (1969). In other words, “Fourth Amendment 

jurisprudence * * * does not countenance the assertion of 

another’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and 

seizures.” United States v. Caicedo-Llanos, 960 F.2d 158, 

161–162 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 

S. Ct. 2012, 2022 (2014) (“Fourth Amendment rights are 

personal rights which may not be vicariously asserted.”) 

(quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

So understood, Fourth Amendment standing is merely an

aspect of the substantive merits of a Fourth Amendment 

claim, inquiring whether the party invoking the Amendment 

has a privacy interest that was invaded. As the Supreme

Court has explained, it would serve no “useful analytical 

purpose to consider this principle a matter of standing, distinct 

from the merits of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim.” 

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138–139 (1978); see id. at 140

(The “definition of [Fourth Amendment] rights is more 

properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth 

Amendment law than within that of standing.”). 

As a non-jurisdictional principle of substantive law,

Fourth Amendment “standing” is subject to ordinary rules of 

waiver and forfeiture, as a number of circuits have held. See

United States v. Golson, 743 F.3d 44, 55 n.9 (3d Cir. 2014); 

United States v. Moss, 963 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1992);

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United States v. Price, 54 F.3d 342, 345–346 (7th Cir. 1995); 

United States v. Dewitt, 946 F.2d 1497, 1499 (10th Cir. 

1991); see also United States v. Gonzales, 79 F.3d 413, 419 

(5th Cir. 1996) (government forfeits Fourth Amendment 

standing argument where defendant provides facts in district 

court supporting an inference of standing and government did 

not raise the issue); United States v. Noble, 762 F.3d 509, 

527–528 (6th Cir. 2014) (government may forfeit Fourth 

Amendment standing argument, but appeals court may review 

argument for plain error).

Two decades ago, this court indicated otherwise, 

allowing the government to raise a Fourth Amendment 

standing objection for the first time on appeal. In United 

States v. Caicedo-Llanos, this court held that “we are 

powerless to rule on Fourth Amendment rights which do not 

belong to the parties before us,” 960 F.2d at 162. Two other 

circuits also ruled that Fourth Amendment standing could be 

raised for the first time on appeal. See United States v. 

Bouffard, 917 F.2d 673, 677 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. 

Smith, 621 F.2d 483, 489 n.3 (2d Cir. 1980).1

 

Since those decisions, the Supreme Court’s ruling in 

Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998), intervened and 

“expressly rejected” treating Fourth Amendment standing like 

jurisdictional standing, making clear that the question of a 

 1 The Eleventh Circuit appears to have had conflicting precedent on 

the issue. Compare United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 827 

n.18 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[S]ince the government declined to press 

this standing issue before the district court, we conclude that this 

issue has been waived.”), with United States v. Braithwaite, 709 

F.2d 1450, 1453–1454 (11th Cir. 1983) (addressing issue despite 

the government’s failure to “challenge [the defendant’s] standing to 

assert a violation of his fourth amendment rights at the district court 

level”).

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defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy must be 

analyzed like a substantive merits issue, id. at 87.

Carter thus confirms our jurisdiction to decide this case

on the merits because Fourth Amendment standing is merely 

a merits inquiry. Beyond that, the dispute over the 

government’s right to raise Sheffield’s “standing” argument

for the first time on appeal is of no practical consequence in 

this case. As Caicedo-Llanos recognized, defendants always 

bear the burden of establishing that the government violated a 

privacy interest that was protected by the Fourth Amendment, 

960 F.2d at 162. Here, Sheffield has failed in that task

because probable cause existed for the search.

2

 

2

While the Fourth Amendment generally requires the 

police to obtain a warrant for a search, motor vehicles are 

different both because of their mobility and the government’s 

extensive regulation of their use. See Pennsylvania v. Labron, 

518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (noting that an automobile’s “ready 

mobility” and its “pervasive regulation” justify an 

“automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 

requirement”) (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, 

officers generally may search a car if it “is readily mobile and 

probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband.” 

United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 567 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 

(quotation marks omitted). “If probable cause justifies the 

search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of 

 2 One other circuit has continued to hold that the government need 

not obey ordinary argument-preservation rules when it comes to 

Fourth Amendment standing, but has done so precisely because it is 

the defendant’s burden to establish the invasion of a protected 

expectation of privacy. See United States v. Paopao, 469 F.3d 760, 

764 (9th Cir. 2006).

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every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the 

object of the search.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 

825 (1982). 

In this case, the smell of marijuana, in conjunction with 

other evidence of drug use, provided probable cause to 

believe the vehicle contained drug contraband, which in turn 

supported a search of the car’s compartments. In United 

States v. Turner, 119 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1997), we held that 

“the smell of burnt marijuana emanating from the car, * * * 

pieces of torn cigar paper arrayed around [the defendant], and 

[a] ziplock bag of green weed material found on the floor 

behind [the] seat” justified a search “elsewhere in the car, 

including its trunk.” Id. at 20. Such evidence “establish[ed] a 

fair probability that [the defendant] might have hidden 

additional drugs not necessary for his current consumption in 

areas out of plain sight, including the trunk of the car.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted).

In this case, the district court found that one officer 

smelled the “faint” scent of “fresh marijuana,” and saw an 

abnormally large number of air fresheners throughout the car, 

which in the officers’ experience was consistent with efforts 

to disguise narcotics odors. J.A. 73. Finding no clear error in 

those fact findings, we hold that the officers had probable 

cause. See United States v. Ortiz, 669 F.3d 439, 445 (4th Cir. 

2012) (holding that “the presence of multiple air fresheners in 

[a] vehicle” was a relevant factor in establishing probable 

cause to search a vehicle). In addition, that evidence 

“establish[ed] a fair probability that [an occupant] might have 

hidden additional drugs not necessary for his current 

consumption in areas out of plain sight,” Turner, 119 F.3d at 

20, justifying the search of the armrest console. The district 

court therefore properly admitted the PCP evidence.

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III

Sheffield next challenges the admission into evidence of 

his statement to police officers at the time of his arrest that 

“[e]verything is mine” in the car and that “they [don’t] have a 

strong case, they’ve got nothing on us.” He argues that those 

statements should be suppressed because he had not yet 

received his Miranda warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 

U.S. 436 (1966). Because the statements were not made 

during an interrogation or in response to any police 

questioning, however, the protections of Miranda do not 

apply, and the statements were lawfully admitted.

“Miranda warnings are required where a suspect in 

custody is subjected to interrogation.” United States v. 

Vinton, 594 F.3d 14, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quotation marks 

omitted). Sheffield’s statements, however, were not made in 

response to any police “interrogation” within the meaning of 

Miranda. “Interrogation” is “either express questioning or its 

functional equivalent.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 

300–301 (1980). The functional equivalent of express 

questioning is “any words or actions on the part of the police 

(other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) 

that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 

incriminating response from the suspect.” Id. The words or 

coercive pressure must be “above and beyond that inherent in 

custody itself.” Id. at 300.

There is no dispute that Sheffield was not being 

questioned at the time of the statements. Rather, unrefuted 

testimony establishes that Sheffield himself started talking on 

his own, asking “[w]hat are we getting arrested for?” Supp. 

App. 12. Detective Smith responded not with a question, but 

with the matter-of-fact statement: “[w]hat was in the car.” 

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Id. Without anything further from the officers, Sheffield then 

declared: “Everything is mine.” Id. 

So too for Sheffield’s statement that “they [don’t] have a 

strong case.” He made that statement after another officer 

spoke to Brande Dudley in a separate conversation to which 

Sheffield was not even a party. 

Sheffield argues that the officer’s statement to Ms. 

Dudley that she would be taken back to the station and that 

she might lose her vehicle was intended to elicit a response 

from Sheffield. Pet. Br. 34. But such a commonplace 

explanation given to a third party, which was not made in a 

manner designed for Sheffield to even overhear, cannot 

amount to an interrogation of Sheffield. In United States v. 

Morton, 391 F.3d 274 (D.C. Cir. 2004), after officers arrested 

the defendant and while transporting her to the police station, 

the defendant “expressed concern over what would happen to 

her vehicle,” id. at 275. Officers said “her vehicle would be 

impounded,” that “she had been arrested for a serious 

charge,” and that “she might not be getting out as quickly as 

she thinks.” Id. In response, the defendant said “her lawyer 

would help her beat the charge, and when she did get out, she 

would be back down in the same area riding around with 

another gun that she kept at her home.” Id. at 276 (quotation 

marks omitted). We held that the officers’ statements—about 

impounding the vehicle, her arrest on a serious charge, and 

that she “might not be released as quickly as she thought—

were directly responsive to what Morton had said and were 

not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Id.

That same answer applies here, especially where one of

the officer’s statements was not even made to Sheffield. 

Instead, in both instances, it was Sheffield who “initiated the 

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conversation * * * and concede[d] that [the officer] did not 

ask h[im] any questions.” Morton, 391 F.3d at 276.

For those reasons, the statements were not the product of 

a custodial interrogation; no Miranda warnings were required; 

and the statements were properly admitted at trial.

IV

Sheffield argues that the district court improperly 

allowed the government to admit “other crimes” evidence 

under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Specifically, he 

objects to the jury being told that, “[i]n February 2002, 

Defendant Dante Sheffield was convicted of a possession with 

intent to distribute Phencyclidine, PCP in the District of 

Columbia Superior Court.” Supp. App. 52. We agree that the 

district court erred in admitting that evidence, but the error

was harmless.

We review the district court’s decision to admit evidence 

under Rules 403 and 404(b) for an abuse of discretion. See 

Henderson v. George Washington University, 449 F.3d 127, 

132–133 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Cassell, 292 F.3d 

788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

“Convictions are supposed to rest on evidence relevant to 

the crime charged, not on evidence of other, unrelated bad 

acts suggesting nothing more than a tendency or propensity to 

engage in criminality.” United States v. McGill, 815 F.3d 

846, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Consequently, Rule 404(b) 

prohibits the admission of “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or 

other act * * * to prove a person’s character in order to show 

that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance 

with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). However, such 

evidence may “be admissible for another purpose, such as 

proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

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knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). 

In addition to Rule 404(b)’s specific limitations on the 

admission of evidence of prior bad acts, “Federal Rule of 

Evidence 403 permits a court to exclude otherwise-relevant 

evidence ‘if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 

a danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading 

the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 

cumulative evidence.’” McGill, 815 F.3d at 880 (quoting

Fed. R. Evid. 403).

When it comes to evidence of prior drug dealings, we 

have recognized that “[a] defendant’s hands-on experience in 

the drug trade cannot alone prove that he possessed drugs on 

any given occasion.” United States v. Crowder, 141 F.3d 

1202, 1208 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1998). But “it can show that he 

knew how to get drugs, what they looked like, where to sell 

them, and so forth.” Id. Said another way, “[e]vidence of a 

defendant’s experience in dealing drugs * * * may be a 

‘brick’ in the ‘wall’ of evidence needed to prove possession.” 

Id. Thus, the type of evidence the government introduced 

here—that of Sheffield’s prior PCP dealing—would generally 

be permissible to show that Sheffield had the requisite 

knowledge and intent to possess and distribute the PCP the 

officers found in the armrest console. 

But even general rules have their limits, and “evidence of 

a prior conviction is subject to analysis under Rule 403 for 

relative probative value and for prejudicial risk of misuse as 

propensity evidence,” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 

172, 182 (1997). In this case, the Rule 404(b) evidence was a 

conviction that occurred a decade before the offense conduct 

at issue in this case. Moreover, by telling the jury only about 

the fact of a decade-old conviction, the evidence bore little 

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18

evidentiary relevance to the question of Sheffield’s 

knowledge in 2011 about such matters as how to acquire or to 

market PCP. Cf. Crowder, 141 F.3d at 1208 n.5. Under those 

circumstances, the staleness of this conviction reduces its 

probative value such that it is “substantially outweighed” by

the danger of unfair prejudice already inherent in the 

admission of prior-bad-act evidence. See United States v. 

Bigesby, 685 F.3d 1060, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (explaining 

that the “gap between [a] conviction and the [offense conduct] 

limited the conviction’s probative value”); United States v. 

Pettiford, 517 F.3d 584, 590 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting the risk 

of unfair prejudice inherent in “the admission of prior 

possession-with-intent-to-distribute evidence”).

3

“Wrongly admitted evidence, however, does not always 

compel reversal.” McGill, 815 F.3d at 886. The error is 

harmless if we “can say that the error did not affect the jury’s 

verdict.” United States v. Watson, 171 F.3d 695, 700 (D.C. 

Cir. 1999). While Sheffield has failed to make any argument 

regarding harmlessness, the burden here is on the government 

to show that its error “should not upset the trial court’s 

determination.” Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 410 

(2009); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 

(1993) (in a “harmless error” inquiry, “the Government * * * 

bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice”). 

 3 In a supplemental filing with this Court, the government offered 

United States v. McCarson, 527 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2008), as an 

example of a decision upholding the admission of a decade-old 

conviction for firearm possession under Rule 404(b). Gov’t 7/5/16 

Letter at 2. That opinion did not address the staleness of the 

conviction. See Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 

U.S. 157, 170 (2004) (“‘Questions which merely lurk in the record, 

neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not 

to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute 

precedents.’”) (quoting Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925)). 

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19

Admission of the stale conviction was harmless for three 

reasons. First, the bad-act evidence “was neither so dramatic 

nor compelling as to rivet the jury’s attention on [Sheffield’s] 

bad character[.]” United States v. Brown, 597 F.3d 399, 405 

(D.C. Cir. 2010). The evidence instead was a single-sentence 

paper admission, without any of details of the prior crime 

being aired before the jury.

Second, “the district court took caution to guard the space 

between the permissible and impermissible inferences by 

instructing the jury to consider the evidence only for its 

proper purpose.” United States v. Mitchell, 49 F.3d 769, 777 

(D.C. Cir. 1995). Here, the district court instructed the jury 

both after the earlier drug conviction was admitted at trial and 

during the final jury instructions that:

If you find that Mr. Sheffield was previously 

convicted of possession with intent to distribute 

PCP, you may use this evidence only for the limited 

purpose of determining whether the Government has 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Sheffield 

intended to possess [the] PCP found in this case 

knowingly and on purpose and not by mistake or 

accident.

You may not use this evidence for any other 

purpose. Mr. Sheffield is only on trial for the crimes 

charged. You may not use this evidence to conclude 

that Mr. Sheffield has a bad character or that he has a 

criminal personality. The law does not allow you to 

convict a defendant simply because you believe he 

may have done bad things not specifically charged as 

crimes in this case.

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20

Supp. App. 74–75. And during final jury instructions, the 

district court reiterated the purpose of the Rule 404(b) 

evidence:

You have heard evidence by way of a stipulation that 

Mr. Sheffield was previously convicted of 

possession with intent to distribute PCP. * * * You 

may use this evidence only for the limited purpose of 

determining whether the Government has proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Dante Sheffield 

intended to possess the PCP found in his case 

knowingly and on purpose and not by mistake or 

accident.

You may not use this evidence for any other 

purpose. Dante Sheffield is only on trial for the 

crime charged.

You may not use this evidence to conclude that the 

defendant has a bad character or that he has a 

criminal personality. The law does not allow you to 

convict a defendant simply because you believe he 

may have done bad things not specifically charged as 

crimes in this case.

Id. at 124. Absent evidence to the contrary, the jury is 

presumed to have followed that instruction, and Sheffield 

offers no such contradictory evidence. Brown, 597 F.3d at 

406. 

Third and finally, “[t]he most significant factor that 

negates the error’s impact is the weight and nature of the 

evidence against [the defendant].” United States v. Williams, 

212 F.3d 1305, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Here, the onesentence stipulation about an earlier drug crime “formed a 

small part of what was otherwise an overwhelming case 

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21

against” Sheffield, McGill, 815 F.3d at 886, and that amply 

evidenced his knowledge and intent. The jury heard (i) the 

officers’ testimony that Sheffield was a passenger in a car that 

contained PCP, (ii) testimony about Sheffield’s statement that 

“[e]verything is mine” in the car, (iii) Dudley’s testimony that 

Sheffield had earlier taken her car for 30–45 minutes and that 

there was no PCP in her car before then, and (iv) an extensive 

recounting of the transportation and testing of the PCP, see 

infra Part V. In addition, the jury heard legitimate Rule 

404(b) evidence that Sheffield dealt PCP in 2009, the 

admission of which Sheffield does not challenge. That Rule 

404(b) evidence bore on his motive, intent, and knowledge to 

deal in PCP. Taken together, all of that properly admitted 

evidence rendered harmless the mistaken admission of the

2002 conviction.

V

Turning to the post-trial stage of the proceedings, 

Sheffield challenges the district court’s denial of his motion 

for independent testing of the portion of the seized PCP that 

was not submitted to the DEA for analysis. The district court 

treated that as a motion for a new trial because the motion 

sought to challenge the jury finding that Sheffield was guilty 

of “unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally possess[ing] with 

intent to distribute” PCP in “the amount of * * * 100 grams or 

more,” J.A. 12, 120.

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for new 

trial for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Johnson, 

519 F.3d 478, 487 (D.C. Cir. 2008). A district court may 

grant a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence 

if (i) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (ii) the 

movant was diligent in attempting to procure the evidence; 

(iii) the evidence is material and not merely cumulative or 

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22

impeaching; and (iv) if admitted, the evidence would 

probably produce an acquittal. See United States v. Pettiford, 

517 F.3d 584, 591 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

The district court reasonably concluded that testing the 

remaining liquid in the lemon juice bottle was unlikely to 

produce an acquittal. The jury heard ample, detailed, and 

unrebutted testimony describing the transportation and testing 

procedures that were used for the PCP evidence admitted at 

trial, and thus jurors had a full opportunity to evaluate the 

reliability of the determination that the bottle contained PCP

and the amount. For example, the jury heard that, after the 

search of the car, one detective took photographs of the bottle 

of PCP, and another detective then “physically picked up the 

lemon juice bottle and placed it in a bag and transported it 

back to the narcotic and special investigations division for 

processing.” Supp. App. 41. At the police station, that 

detective gave the lemon juice bottle to Officer Joseph 

Abdalla, “the inhouse officer that processes liquid PCP when 

large amounts are seized.” Id. at 42. 

The jury also heard Officer Abdalla testify about how he 

tested and processed the PCP. He first photographed the 

lemon juice bottle and then conducted a field test by sticking 

a tester directly into the lemon juice bottle’s liquid, which 

came back positive for PCP. Trial Tr. 201–202 (Nov. 29, 

2011). Officer Abdalla then weighed the PCP using two 

different measurement techniques. Id. at 211–212. He 

determined that the lemon juice bottle contained 

approximately 195.9–198.7 grams of liquid. Supp. App. 96. 

Officer Abdalla next undertook “the remediation process,” in 

which he took “a bulk amount of the liquid * * * [and] 

remov[ed] one ounce from that bulk substance, plac[ing] it 

into a small glass vial and then * * * submitted [it] to the 

Drug Enforcement Administration chemist for analysis.” Id.

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at 85–86. Officer Abdalla explained that extracting out a 

single-ounce vial was necessary because the DEA lab would

not “accept any more than a one ounce sample from any 

seizure of PCP.” Id. at 87. 

After that, the jury heard testimony about the DEA’s 

testing process. Officer Abdalla gave the one-ounce vial to a 

detective, who placed it in a heat-sealed package for 

submission to the DEA lab. The detective placed the vial 

“into a secure evidence property box * * * where it [was] then 

* * * transported to [the] DEA lab for analysis.” Supp. App. 

48. At the DEA, Richard Isaacs, a forensic chemist, tested the 

liquid in the vial and determined that the vial contained 25.9 

grams of liquid that was 16.9% PCP. Isaacs also testified 

that, when he received the vial, the heat seal was intact.

Finally, at the beginning of trial, the remaining PCP was 

made available in the courthouse for Sheffield and his 

attorney to inspect. The lemon juice bottle was ultimately 

admitted into evidence, along with five photographs of the 

bottle, its contents, and its weight, all of which were taken the 

night of Sheffield’s arrest.

Notably, Sheffield did not challenge any of that 

testimony at trial. He never argued, for example, that the 

testing process was flawed, that those witnesses were not 

credible, or that the chain of custody was interrupted. 

The jury, in sum, considered the unrebutted “testimony of 

five Metropolitan Police Department officers who testified as 

to the smell, seizure, documentation, field testing, and storage 

of the drug evidence,” viewed “photographs of the lemon 

juice bottle and its contents that were taken shortly after the 

evidence was seized” that indicated “the weight of the liquid, 

its quantity, and the amount separated for DEA testing,” and 

heard “the testimony of the DEA forensic chemist who tested 

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24

the liquid sample and identified the liquid as PCP.” J.A. 136–

137. Given that extensive trial record addressing the handling 

and testing of the liquid found in the lemon juice bottle and 

the scientific determinations that it was PCP and of its 

amount, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

concluding that further testing of the remaining seven ounces 

of PCP had no realistic prospect of producing an acquittal. 

Other factors governing motions for a new trial reinforce 

the district court’s judgment. To begin with, the evidence 

Sheffield’s motion sought could have been obtained before 

the district court issued its judgment. Specifically, Sheffield 

could have sought independent testing of the PCP before trial,

but he did not. Resp. Br. 48. Furthermore, to the extent that 

Sheffield seeks to double check the measurements the various 

officers performed, those goals would not be served by testing 

the remaining seven ounces of liquid now because it is 

undisputed that “some of the remaining seven ounces of PCP 

[would have] evaporated over time despite being sealed in a 

plastic bottle and a heat-sealed evidence bag.” J.A. 129. 

Finally, Sheffield suggests that, under California v. 

Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984), the Due Process Clause 

requires that he be allowed to test the remaining PCP to 

maintain the “fundamental fairness” of the proceedings. 

Sheffield failed to make any due-process argument below, so 

we review for plain error. See United States v. Pryce, 938 

F.2d 1343, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1991). And Sheffield has offered 

no authority—let alone plain authority—for the proposition 

that a defendant has the right under the Due Process Clause to 

test drugs after failing to challenge the chain of custody or 

testing procedures during trial, or to avail himself of a pretrial testing opportunity.

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25

For all of those reasons, the district court did not abuse

its discretion when it denied Sheffield’s motion to test the 

PCP evidence.

VI

Lastly, Sheffield challenges the district court’s 

imposition of a sentence enhancement for being a career 

offender. The district court invoked a Sentencing Guidelines 

provision to increase Sheffield’s sentence based on a 

determination that he “ha[d] at least two prior felony 

convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled 

substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). Specifically, the 

government introduced evidence that Sheffield had previously 

been convicted of possession with intent to distribute PCP and 

attempted robbery in the District of Columbia. Applying the 

career-offender enhancement increased Sheffield’s Guidelines 

offense level from 26 to 37, which in turn moved his original 

Guidelines range of 92 to 115 months up to 360 months to life 

in prison. The district court ultimately sentenced Sheffield to 

230 months in prison.

Sheffield argues that the career-offender enhancement 

was erroneously applied because his attempted robbery 

conviction does not qualify as a crime of violence under 

Sentencing Guideline 4B1.1(a). Although we typically

review de novo a district court’s determination that a

defendant’s “conviction qualified as a crime of violence,” In 

re Sealed Case, 548 F.3d 1085, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2008), 

Sheffield did not raise this objection in the trial court. To 

prevail, then, Sheffield must demonstrate plain error by 

showing that (i) an error occurred; (ii) it was a plain, clear, or 

obvious error; (iii) the error affected Sheffield’s substantial 

rights; and (iv) the error also seriously affected the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See 

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Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). As the 

government now concedes, see Gov’t 7/5/16 Letter at 1, the 

district court’s application of the career-offender enhancement 

was plain error, and Sheffield is entitled to a new sentencing 

free from any such enhancement.

To be considered a career offender, Sheffield’s prior 

conviction for attempted robbery in the District of Columbia 

had to qualify as a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing 

Guidelines. The Guidelines define “crime of violence” as a 

state or federal offense that is punishable by imprisonment for 

a term exceeding one year, and that: “(1) has as an element 

the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 

against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, 

arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise 

involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 

physical injury to another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). The first 

clause is referred to as the “elements clause.” The “otherwise 

involves” portion of the second clause is known as the 

“residual clause.” See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 

1257, 1261 (2016).

Unfortunately, the district court never specified which 

clause of the “crime of violence” definition it believed applied 

to Sheffield’s attempted robbery conviction. Nor did the 

Presentence Report or the government’s sentencing 

memorandum. See Gov’t Sentencing Mem. ¶ 7. At the 

sentencing hearing, the district court stated only that “your 

2007 conviction for attempted robbery * * * qualifies you 

under the Guidelines as a career offender under the Guideline 

Section 4B1.1(b).” Sentencing Tr. 12.

The record, however, leaves only the residual clause as a 

possible basis for finding that attempted robbery constituted a 

crime of violence. That is because the government “carries 

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27

the burden of proving any facts that may be relevant in 

sentencing.” United States v. Price, 409 F.3d 436, 444 (D.C. 

Cir. 2005). The government, however, introduced no 

evidence into the district court record providing any basis for 

specifically determining that the attempted robbery was a 

crime of violence under the elements clause. The sentencing

occurred prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Descamps 

v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). Accordingly, the 

only way the district court could have classified Sheffield’s 

conviction for attempted robbery as a crime of violence would 

have been by reference to additional documentation—which

the Government admittedly did not submit. See In re Sealed 

Case, 548 F.3d at 1089–1090. By default, the only thing left 

for the district court to rely on was the residual clause.

The district court committed plain error by concluding 

that Sheffield’s attempted robbery conviction supported an 

enhanced sentence. In Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 

2551 (2015), the Supreme Court held that the identically 

worded residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act 

(“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), was unconstitutionally 

vague, 135 S. Ct. at 2563; see also Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1262–

1263. To be fair to the district court, we note that Johnson

came out after sentencing in this case. But “as long as [an]

error [is] plain as of * * * the time of appellate review * * *

the error is ‘plain’ within the meaning of [Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 52(b)].” Henderson v. United States, 133 

S. Ct. 1121, 1124–1125 (2013).4

While this case involves the Sentencing Guidelines rather 

than ACCA, the government agrees with Sheffield that 

Johnson’s rationale equally requires resentencing in this 

 4 We accordingly need not decide whether Sheffield’s conviction 

would in fact have qualified as a crime of violence at the time of 

sentencing.

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direct appeal. See Gov’t Supp. Br. 4 n.3 (“[T]he government 

has consistently conceded that the residual clause of the 

career offender guideline is unconstitutionally vague[.]”). 

That concession makes ample sense. This court has 

repeatedly noted that, because the language of the Guidelines 

and ACCA residual clauses are the same, “we apply the 

ACCA standard to determine whether an offense qualifies as 

a crime of violence under section 4B1.2.” In re Sealed Case, 

548 F.3d at 1089. That textual linkage did not change when 

the residual clause was held unconstitutional. The “grave 

uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime” 

and the “uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a crime 

to qualify as a violent felony,” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557–

2558, brood just as heavily over the Guidelines’ application as 

they did over the statute.

Furthermore, constitutional challenges may be brought 

against the Guidelines even though they are only advisory. 

See Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (2013). 

That is because the Guidelines “impose a series of 

requirements on sentencing courts that cabin the exercise of 

* * * discretion.” Id. at 2084. “Common sense indicates that 

in general, this system will steer district courts to more 

within-Guidelines sentences.” Id. 

So too with a constitutional vagueness challenge. Where 

the Guidelines “exert controlling influence on the sentence 

that the court will impose,” Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2085, an 

unconstitutionally vague Guidelines provision that has the 

effect of doubling or tripling a defendant’s sentence is 

constitutionally troublesome in its own right. Indeed, 

multiple courts of appeals have ruled that the Guidelines’ 

residual clause, like ACCA’s residual clause, is 

unconstitutionally vague, as the government has repeatedly 

conceded. See United States v. Pawlak, 822 F.3d 902, 911

USCA Case #12-3013 Document #1630041 Filed: 08/12/2016 Page 28 of 37
29

(6th Cir. 2016) (holding so explicitly); United States v. 

Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 2015) (same); United 

States v. Townsend, 638 F. App’x 172, 177–178 (3d Cir. 

2015) (same); see also United States v. Fields, 823 F.3d 20, 

33 (1st Cir. 2016) (noting the government’s concession); 

United States v. Martinez, 821 F.3d 984, 988 (8th Cir. 2016) 

(same); United States v. Maldonado, 636 F. App’x 807, 810

(2d Cir. 2016) (same); Ramirez v. United States, 799 F.3d 

845, 856 (7th Cir. 2015) (“proceed[ing] on the assumption 

that the Supreme Court’s reasoning applies to section 4B1.2 

as well”). But see United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 

1195 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding Peugh inapplicable to due 

process challenges). Given the breadth of authority from both 

the Supreme Court and other circuits, combined with the 

government’s concession in this case and others, the error was 

plain. See In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 851 (D.C. Cir. 

2009) (error can be plain despite a circuit split on the issue).

Finally, the district court’s plain error unquestionably 

affected Sheffield’s substantial rights. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 

734. Application of the career-offender enhancement 

dramatically increased Sheffield’s sentencing exposure. As 

the district court specifically mentioned, “[a]bsent this career 

offender adjustment,” Sheffield would have faced “a 

sentencing range of 92 to 115 months.” Sentencing Tr. 12. In 

other words, because of the enhancement, Sheffield was 

sentenced to double the top of the Guidelines range he 

otherwise would have faced. 

Nor can the increase be sustained on the alternative 

ground of relying on the “elements clause.” That clause 

requires a conviction to be based on a crime that “has as an 

element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 

force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). 

Importantly, “[i]n determining whether [a] crime is a violent 

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30

felony, we consider the offense generically, that is to say, we 

examine it in terms of how the law defines the offense and not 

in terms of how an individual offender might have committed 

it on a particular occasion.” Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 

137, 141 (2008). “The prior conviction qualifies as an ACCA 

predicate only if the statute’s elements are the same as, or 

narrower than, those of the generic offense.” Descamps, 133 

S. Ct. at 2281.

Under that test, D.C.’s attempted robbery statute is not

categorically a crime that “has as an element the use, 

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the 

person of another,” § 4B1.2. At the time Sheffield was 

convicted, D.C.’s “[a]ttempt to commit robbery” provision 

read: “Whoever attempts to commit robbery, as defined in 

§ 22-2801, by an overt act, shall be imprisoned for not more 

than 3 years or be fined not more than $500, or both.” D.C. 

Code § 22-2802. The robbery statute, in turn, defines the 

offense as: “by force or violence, whether against resistance 

or by sudden or stealthy seizure or snatching, or by putting in 

fear, * * * tak[ing] from the person or immediate actual 

possession of another anything of value[.]” Id. § 22-2801.

As the “stealthy seizure” clause indicates, D.C.’s robbery 

statute includes “offenses that fail to qualify as crimes of 

violence under section 4B1.2.” In re Sealed Case, 548 F.3d at 

1089. By the same token, the attempted robbery statute also 

“[is] not categorically [a] crime[] of violence,” as the 

government recognizes. Gov’t Supp. Br. 8; see also Mathis v. 

United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016) (“[I]f the crime of 

conviction covers any more conduct than the generic offense, 

then it is not an ACCA [offense]—even if the defendant’s 

actual conduct (i.e., the facts of the crime) fits within the 

generic offense’s boundaries.”).

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There is just one more wrinkle in this inquiry. The 

Supreme Court has allowed for a “modified categorical 

approach” to identifying crimes of violence for offenses that 

do not categorically satisfy the elements clause in those rare 

instances when that statutory offense is “divisible.” A statute 

is divisible if it “list[s] potential offense elements in the 

alternative, [and thus] renders opaque which element played a 

part in the defendant’s conviction.” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 

2283. Under that modified categorical approach to divisible 

statutes, a court can review certain types of documents to 

determine whether the particular crime that the defendant 

committed necessarily included an element of violence, 

within the meaning of ACCA or Guidelines § 4B1.1. See 

Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283–2284.

But D.C.’s attempted robbery statute is not divisible—

that is, it does not set out “multiple, alternative versions of the 

crime” that include both violent and non-violent elements. 

Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284. To be sure, this court has held 

that D.C.’s robbery statute is divisible because robbery may 

be accomplished “against resistance” or “by putting in fear,” 

or alternatively, “by sudden or stealthy seizure or snatching.” 

In re Sealed Case, 548 F.3d at 1089 (citing D.C. Code § 22-

2801).5 That means that a person can be convicted of 

committing either the violent version of robbery or the nonviolent, stealthy version of robbery. And if a defendant is

convicted of the violent version, the defendant has committed 

a crime that has as an element the use of physical force 

against the person of another for purposes of Sentencing 

Guideline § 4B1.1.

 5 This court’s determination that D.C.’s robbery statute is divisible

preceded the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mathis v. United 

States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), which cast additional light on when 

the modified categorical approach applies.

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The same cannot be said, though, of D.C.’s attempted 

robbery statute. That statute does not include those same 

alternative versions of the crime. “The elements of attempted 

robbery are that (1) the defendant committed an act which 

was reasonably adapted to the commission of the offense of 

robbery, (2) at the time the act was committed, the defendant 

acted with the specific intent to commit the offense of 

robbery, and (3) the act went beyond mere preparation, and 

carried the project forward to within dangerous proximity of 

the criminal end to be sought.” Robinson v. United States, 

608 A.2d 115, 116 (D.C. 1992). 

Thus, to convict a defendant of attempted robbery, D.C.

law requires a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt only 

that the defendant committed an act in furtherance of and with 

the specific intent to commit generic robbery, not any specific 

type of robbery (whether violent or stealthy). Nothing in the 

statutory text or case law requires a jury, in convicting a 

defendant of attempted robbery, to first find that the defendant 

committed one of multiple alternative elements, one of which 

is a crime of violence under the elements clause. Quite the 

contrary, attempted robbery is a loosely defined crime, with 

an expansive overt act requirement that is not tied to any 

specific type of robbery—violent or otherwise. Indeed, in 

Jones v. United States, 386 A.2d 308 (D.C. 1978), the D.C. 

Court of Appeals upheld a conviction for attempted robbery 

under D.C. law where the defendant had carefully planned a 

bank robbery, had “conducted a dry run,” was armed, “was 

proceeding toward the bank according to plan and was no 

further than four blocks away, turning back only when he 

heard police sirens and concluded that something had gone 

wrong.” Id. at 312–313. That conviction required no finding 

as an element of how the ultimate robbery might have been

committed in terms of violence or stealth.

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33

Because attempted robbery is an indivisible crime, we 

may not consult documents—such as the indictment or plea 

colloquy—to determine whether Sheffield’s offense qualifies 

as a crime of violence. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2254 (The 

modified categorical approach “is not to be repurposed as a 

technique for discovering whether a defendant's prior 

conviction, even though for a too-broad crime, rested on facts 

(or otherwise said, involved means) that also could have 

satisfied the elements of a generic offense.”). D.C.’s 

attempted robbery statute simply does not qualify as a crime 

of violence as a categorical matter. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. 

at 2281–2282.

In sum, the district court’s plain error under the residual 

clause affected Sheffield’s substantial rights because his 

sentence cannot be saved under the elements clause. The 

unlawfulness of his sentence necessarily affects the

fundamental fairness and integrity of his conviction. 

Sheffield is entitled to a resentencing without the careeroffender enhancement.

6

VII

We affirm Sheffield’s conviction, but vacate his sentence 

and remand for resentencing consistent with this decision.

So ordered.

 6 Last month, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Beckles v. 

United States, No. 15-8544, to decide whether Johnson applies to 

enhancements under Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.2. The 

government, however, has conceded that Sheffield is entitled to a 

new sentencing and has not requested that his case be held pending 

Beckles. We agree that disposition is appropriate. 

USCA Case #12-3013 Document #1630041 Filed: 08/12/2016 Page 33 of 37
SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment: I concur in the decision of the court,

and in much of what the court’s opinion has to say. On only two

points do I differ from the thinking of the majority. First, I do

not join the majority’s discussion in Part IV, concluding that the

district court “improperly allowed the government to admit

‘other crimes’ evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence

404(b).” Maj. Op. at 16.

 

As the majority recognizes, “[w]e review the district court’s

decision to admit evidence under Rules 403 and 404(b) for an

abuse of discretion.” Id. (citing Henderson v. George Wash.

Univ., 449 F.3d 127, 132-33 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v.

Cassell, 292 F.3d 788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). I see no abuse in

the present record. As the majority notes,

 we have recognized that “[a] defendant’s hands-on

experience in the drug trade cannot alone prove that he

possessed drugs on any given occasion.” United States v.

Crowder, 141 F.3d 1202, 1208 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1998). But “it

can show that he knew how to get drugs, what they looked

like, where to sell them, and so forth.” Id. Said another

way, “[e]vidence of a defendant’s experience in dealing

drugs * * * may be a ‘brick’ in the ‘wall’ of evidence

needed to prove possession.” Id. Thus, the type of

evidence the government introduced here—that of

Sheffield’s prior PCP dealing—would generally be

permissible to show that Sheffield had the requisite

knowledge and intent to possess and distribute the PCP the

officers found in the armrest console.

Maj. Op. at 17. 

By holding that the district court nonetheless erred in

admitting the evidence because, under Rule 403, “the staleness

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2

of [Sheffield’s 2002] conviction reduces its probative value such

that it is ‘substantially outweigh[ed]’ by the danger of unfair

prejudice already inherent in the admission of prior-bad-act

evidence,” id. at 18 (citing United States v. Bigesby, 685 F.3d

1060, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2012)), the majority impermissibly

replaces its judgment for that of the district court. See United

States v. Mathis-Gardner, 783 F.3d 1286, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2015)

(“Our review for abuse of discretion does not permit us to

‘substitute our judgment’ for that of the trial court, . . . so we

cannot decide the issue by determining whether we would have

reached the same conclusion.”). A Rule 403 balancing is, after

all, an evidentiary resolution. In reviewing a finding of fact, if

the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light

of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not

reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the

trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.” 

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985). 

I see no reason why any different analysis would apply to the

Rule 403 balancing, indeed the majority itself recognizes that

this question is committed to the discretion of the district judge. 

I would add that I not only do not understand how we can

properly reverse a balancing whose resolution is allocated to the

district court on nothing more than our differing opinion as to

the effect of “staleness,” but also do not share the majority’s

view that there is staleness. Therefore, of the four judges who

have viewed the question of the admission of this evidence, two

circuit court judges would, apparently in their discretion, not

have admitted it. The district court judge, charged with the

actual duty of deciding whether or not to admit it, decided to

admit it. And, finally, one of the circuit court judges supposed

to review the issue only for abuse of discretion would also have

admitted it.

USCA Case #12-3013 Document #1630041 Filed: 08/12/2016 Page 35 of 37
3

Differing from the majority, I would find no error at all in

the admission of the evidence and would deem it perfectly

consistent with the exception to Rule 404(b) recognized in such

cases as Crowder and with Rule 403. However, though the

majority perceives an error not apparent to me, they deem it

harmless. With that resolution, I join the majority’s disposition

on Sheffield’s merits appeal. 

I also differ from the majority with respect to the analysis

supporting its conclusion that there is plain error in the sentence. 

See Maj. Op. at 25-33. As I have stated on a prior occasion, “I

fear that this circuit is drifting toward a jurisprudence in which

there is no distinction between reviewing for ‘plain error’ and

simply reviewing to determine whether the district court erred.” 

United States v. Head, 817 F.3d 354, 362 (D.C. Cir. 2016)

(Sentelle, J., dissenting). As the majority notes, “the

government now concedes . . . the district court’s application of

the career-offender enhancement was plain error, and Sheffield

is entitled to a new sentencing free from any such

enhancement.” Maj. Op. at 26. Given the centrality of the

prosecutorial function to the power of the Article II executive,

I would simply accept that concession, vacate the sentence, and

remand. As that is the same result reached by the majority, I

concur in the judgment. However, I do not understand the need

to then proceed to analyze whether there is in fact “plain error”

or not in terms that seem to me to be potentially dangerous as

precedent.

Briefly put, I simply do not see any definition of “plain”

that requires an analysis based on a decision as to a different

statutory scheme–that is the sentencing guidelines as opposed to

the Armed Career Criminal Act–and as to which there was no

consensus among the circuits nor controlling authority from this

court or the Supreme Court.

USCA Case #12-3013 Document #1630041 Filed: 08/12/2016 Page 36 of 37
4

That said, in the end, I agree with the court’s judgment as

to both merits and sentencing issues, and I therefore concur.

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