Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-23-30751/USCOURTS-ca5-23-30751-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Glenn E. Diaz
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-30751

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Glenn E. Diaz, 

Defendant—Appellant. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:21-CR-179-1 

______________________________

Before Jones, Barksdale, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

With his friends’ help, Glenn Diaz obtained loans from now-defunct 

First NBC Bank (“FNBC”) using fabricated documents and phony 

transactions. A jury convicted him of bank-fraud and money-laundering 

offenses. Diaz now raises evidentiary, sentencing, and restitution-based 

challenges on appeal. We see no error and thus affirm. 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 21, 2025

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 23-30751

2

Diaz challenges two of the district court’s evidentiary rulings, 

claiming that they violated various constitutional rights. But the record cuts 

against him. The district court justifiably limited the extent to which he could 

cross-examine William Bennett. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. And the court

followed applicable law in prohibiting evidence and argumentation about 

FNBC’s negligence. See United States v. Kreimer, 609 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir. 

1980). See also Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 362–63 (2014).

Diaz next challenges the length of his sentence. Yet the district court 

calculated his base offense level correctly.1

 The record reveals that Diaz was 

indifferent to loan repayment and that FNBC’s ability to collect was 

speculative. So it was appropriate to use a non-zero intended-loss calculation 

without deducting collateral value. See United States v. Goss, 549 F.3d 1013, 

1017–18 (5th Cir. 2008). See also United States v. Henderson, 19 F.3d 917, 928 

(5th Cir. 1994). And we see no problem with basing that calculation on loss 

stemming from conspiracy-related conduct. See United States v. Reinhart, 

357 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 2004). The court also did not commit clear error

in applying the “sophisticated means” enhancement. See United States v. 

Valdez, 726 F.3d 684, 695 (5th Cir. 2013).

Lastly, Diaz challenges the amount he owes in restitution. But the 

district court read the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act correctly. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3664(j)(1). Republic Credit One LP wasthus entitled to restitution. 

And the court did not err in basing Diaz’s total restitution amount on the 

conduct underlying his conspiracy conviction. See United States v. Chaney, 

964 F.2d 437, 451–52 (5th Cir. 1992).

_____________________

1 Diaz waived one issue at oral argument—whether the district court was permitted 

to increase his offense level based on the amount of “loss” he “intended” to cause. See 

Oral Arg. 12:57–13:47. We thus refrain from addressing that issue here.

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No. 23-30751

3

We affirm.

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