Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02265/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02265-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alonso Miranda-Hernandez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FI LED 

Uoitcd States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Ci,-::u i:: 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN JO 1991J 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

v . 

ALONSO MIRANDA-HERNANDEZ, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 88-2265 

(D.C. No. CR 88-172-JB-2) 

(D. New Mexico) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, MCWILLIAMS, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

Alonso Miranda-Hernandez appeals his conviction on five 

counts, all related to a single drug transaction. He was 

sentenced to concurrent five-year terms for conspiracy to 

distribute, possession with intent to distribute, and distribution 

of more than 500 grams and less than 5 kilograms of cocaine. He 

was also sentenced to concurrent five-year terms for carrying a 

firearm during a drug ~trafficking offense and for being an illegal 

alien in possession of a firearm, these sentences to run 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-2265 Document: 01019961717 Date Filed: 01/30/1990 Page: 1 
consecutively with the sentences for the drug trafficking. We 

conclude, as defendant argues, the convictions for both 

distribution and possession with intent to distribute violate the 

Double Jeopardy Clause. We also conclude the trial court 

correctly instructed the jury on the weapon carrying count, and 

contrary to defendant's argument, we find the evidence sufficient 

on the remaining counts. Accordingly, we reverse in part and 

affirm in part. 

Defendant's conviction arose out of a transaction brokered by 

Raymond Andrew Baca, a codefendant, in which Mr. Baca, Santana 

Meraz, another codefendant, and defendant were to sell 2 kilograms 

of cocaine unwittingly to an undercover drug agent, Jesus Gallo. 

The conviction of Mr. Meraz has been affirmed ·by another panel of 

this court, and in the interest of judicial economy, we attach and 

adopt that panel's order and judgment setting forth the key 

evidence and reasoning for disposition. We shall discuss only 

those issues independently raised by Mr. Miranda-Hernandez. 

Citing United States v. Olivas, 558 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 434 U.S. 866 (1977), the government concedes the 

trial court erred in imposing separate sentences on the counts of 

possession with intent to distribute and distribution which arose 

from the same transaction. The parties agree that we should 

remand the case to the district court for resentencing; therefore, 

we need dwell no further on this issue. 1 

1Defendant also points out, and the government agrees, the 

Judgment and Commitment Order contains a clerical error. It 

indicates that Mr. Miranda-Hernandez was convicted of violating 21 

U.S.C. § 845(b}(A}(l}, a crime for which he was not indicted. The 

district court can easily correct that error as well. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 88-2265 Document: 01019961717 Date Filed: 01/30/1990 Page: 2 
I 

' 

The conviction for carrying a firearm du~ing the course of a 

drug trafficking transaction arose from the incidents at the 

Safeway parking lot. 2 The evidence disclosed the presence of a 

semiautomatic pistol under the seat of Mr. Miranda-Hernandez' car 

at the time defendant was assisting in the display of cocaine to 

Agent Gallo. The government was unable to show the gun was on the 

person of Mr. Miranda-Hernandez, but it was placed on the 

passenger side of the vehicle, and defendant was standing on that 

side when the display occurred. Defendant now contends the 

court's Instruction 14 improperly allowed the jury to use evidence 

the guri was "transported" by Mr. Miranda-Hernandez as evidence he 

"carried" the weapon, contrary to our holding in United States v. 

Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 

109 S. Ct. 3197 (1989). 3 

The government responds that counsel for Mr. 

U.S. 

MirandaHernandez failed to object to the instruction; therefore, he 

cannot now raise the issue on appeal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 30. The 

government's contention is not fully accurate. 

Counsel for Mr. Miranda-Hernandez did object to the 

questioned instruction (Instruction 14), but he did not raise the 

issue now pursued on appeal. Instruction 14 states: 

The meaning of the word "carries," as used in 18 u.s.c. 

§ 924(c)(l), also means "transports" or "possesses." 

You will be instructed on the meaning of possession, 

actual and constructive, and that instruction applies to 

firearms as well as cocaine. 

2see page 3-4 of the attached Order and Judgment. 

3cardenas was decided long after this case was tried; therefore, 

the trial court did not have the benefit of our thinking. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 88-2265 Document: 01019961717 Date Filed: 01/30/1990 Page: 3 
I 

At trial, as near as we can tell from the record, counsel objected 

only that it was improper to link firearms and cocaine in the same 

definition. 4 

incorrectly 

No objection was asserted that the instruction 

equated "carrying" with "transporting." We, 

therefore, conclude defendant failed to comply with Rule 30 

because he did not distinctly state "the matter to which that 

party objects and the grounds of the objection." The issue, thus, 

was not preserved for appeal. 

Having thus concluded, we note the court in Cardenas assumed 

without deciding a similar failure to object was not fatal to 

airing the propriety of the instruction on appeal. Accordingly, 

believing ourselves now bound to do so, we shall proceed likewise. 

If Instruction 14 were · taken in the abstract, it could be 

read to suggest the confusion decried in Cardenas. 5 When 

Instruction 14 is read with Instruction 20, 6 however, we do not 

believe the jury was mislead about the statutory meaning of the 

word "carry." By combining the two instructions, the jury was 

4see Vol. III at 449 and 456. 

5whether Cardenas is apposite is even conjectural. The 

instructions in that case and this are not the same. In the 

former, the court stated: "the word ·carry' includes when [sic] a 

defendant in possession of a firearm transports the firearm or 

causes the firearm to be transported." In the instant case, the 

court stated: "the word ·carries' ••• also means 'transports' 

or 'possesses.' You will be instructed on the meaning of 

possession •••. " While it would have been preferable to avoid 

usage of the word "transports," we think the court em~hasized the 

element of possession as a necessary corollary to "carrying" 

within the meaning of the statute. The court did not leave the 

jury with the notion that "carrying" and "transporting" were 

virtually synonymous. 

6Instruction 20 defined the concepts of actual and constructive 

possession. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 88-2265 Document: 01019961717 Date Filed: 01/30/1990 Page: 4 
told, in effect, that it must find the defendant was in actual or 

constructive possession of the firearm to meet the statutory test 

of carrying. When these instructions are read together, they make 

clear that the defendant could not be convicted of the offense by 

merely transporting the firearms as he now contends. 

We have examined the record and conclude the evidence is 

sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction. To the extent the 

issue is the same, we adopt the court's conclusions in Meraz. 

In addition to the arguments also raised by Mr. Meraz, Mr. 

Miranda-Hernandez contends the evidence does not support his 

conviction of possessio~ with intent to distribute because tie did 

not know that the cocaine was in the trunk of his car. That 

contention is belied by his own actions. Defendant's giving the 

key to the trunk to Mr. Meraz so that the latter could show the 

cocaine to Mr. Gallo, when coupled with defendant's poking holes 

in the bags so Mr. Gallo could sample the contents, is strong 

circumstantial evidence of his knowledge. 

Defendant contends the evidence of the drug trafficking 

conspiracy is insufficient because the only witness to the 

conspiracy, Ms. Geiger, could not speak Spanish, so she could not 

have understood the conversations between defendant and Mr. Meraz. 

A rational jury, however, could have inferred from the evidence 

which the government established that there had been an agreement 

between defendant, Mr. Meraz, and Mr. Baca to sell cocaine to Mr. 

Gallo. 

Challenging the sufficiency of the evidence of his actual 

possession of a firearm, defendant contends he should not have 

-5-

Appellate Case: 88-2265 Document: 01019961717 Date Filed: 01/30/1990 Page: 5 
been convicted of possessing a firearm as an illegal alien. As we 

noted in United States v. Medina-Ramos, 834 F.2d 874, 876 (10th 

Cir. 1987), constructive possession is sufficient to support the 

charge, and there was ample evidence of defendant's constructive 

possession of the gun. The evidence that defendant had a gun 

within easy reach while he was engaged in displaying cocaine to a 

prospective buyer is sufficient to support the carrying charge. 

The judgment on counts relating to possession with intent to 

distribute and distribution is REVERSED and REMANDED for 

resentencing, 

AFFIRMED. 

and the judgment on the remaining counts is 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

-6-

Appellate Case: 88-2265 Document: 01019961717 Date Filed: 01/30/1990 Page: 6