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Parties Involved:
Tedric Jameil Chin
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-11419

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 0:13-cr-60218-DTKH-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

TEDRIC JAMEIL CHIN, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(April 9, 2015)

Before MARTIN, ANDERSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM: 

Tedric Chin appeals his convictions and sentences for sex trafficking of a 

minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(1), and (b)(2). On appeal, Chin 

argues that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him was 

violated when the district court, under Federal Rule of Evidence 412, limited 

Chin’s cross-examination of victim-witness K.B. to exclude evidence that K.B. 

engaged previously in prostitution.1

 No reversible error has been shown; we 

affirm.

Chin was charged with sex trafficking of two underage girls, K.B. and S.M. 

Briefly stated, Chin’s theory of the defense was that he was “merely present” 

during K.B. and S.M.’s prostitution activities and that K.B. was the person who 

was actually directing her own prostitution business. In support of his theory, Chin 

sought, pursuant to Rule 412(b)(1)(C), to cross-examine K.B. about her past 

involvement in prostitution. 

 1 Chin also makes the following arguments on appeal: (1) the district court erred in instructing 

the jury (a) that Chin did not have to know his acts affected interstate commerce and (b) that 

Chin could be found guilty if he recklessly disregarded that K.B. and S.M. were under 18 years 

old; (2) Chin’s mandatory-minimum sentence was unconstitutional under Alleyne v. United 

States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), without a finding by the jury that Chin knew that S.M. was under 

14 years old; and (3) Chin’s below-guideline sentence was substantively unreasonable. Having 

reviewed the pertinent law and the record, we conclude that these arguments are without merit 

and warrant no further discussion. Thus, we focus our discussion only on the district court’s 

exclusion of evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 412.

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Following an in camera hearing (during which K.B. testified that she had, in 

fact, engaged in two instances of prostitution more than two years before she met 

Chin), the district court excluded evidence of K.B.’s prior acts of prostitution. The 

court concluded that the proposed evidence “simply indicates . . . a propensity or a 

willingness to engage in prostitution” and that the evidence was not pertinent to the 

charges against Chin. 

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s application of Rule 412. 

United States v. Culver, 598 F.3d 740, 749 (11th Cir. 2010). But, “[w]hether the 

exclusion of evidence violated a constitutional guarantee is a legal question 

reviewed de novo.” United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1209 n.24 (11th Cir. 

2009). 

Rule 412 provides that, in a “criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual 

misconduct,” the following evidence is inadmissible: “(1) evidence offered to 

prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or (2) evidence offered to 

prove a victim’s sexual predisposition.” Fed.R.Evid. 412(a). The district court 

may, however, admit “evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s 

constitutional rights.” Fed.R.Evid. 412(b)(1)(C). Rule 412(b)(1)(C) is “a narrow 

exception” to the “broad general principle” that evidence of a victim’s prior sexual 

history is inadmissible. Culver, 598 F.3d at 749. 

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In determining whether evidence is admissible under Rule 412(b)(1)(C)’s 

“narrow exception,” we start with the premise that a defendant has a right, under 

the Sixth Amendment, to confront witnesses against him. See id.; U.S. Const. 

amend. VI. “The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the 

defendant the opportunity of cross-examination.” United States v. BaptistaRodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1366 (11th Cir. 1994) (alteration omitted). Still, a 

“defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses is not without limitation.” Id. 

“[T]he Sixth Amendment guarantees only an opportunity for effective crossexamination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to 

whatever extent, the defense might wish.” United States v. Beale, 921 F.2d 1412, 

1424 (11th Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original) (quotations omitted). We have said 

that “[c]ross-examination of a government ‘star’ witness is important, and a 

presumption favors free cross-examination on possible bias, motive, ability to 

perceive and remember, and general character for truthfulness, but crossexamination must be relevant.” United States v. Phelps, 733 F.2d 1464, 1472 

(11th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). 

“The test for the Confrontation Clause is whether a reasonable jury would 

have received a significantly different impression of the witness’ credibility had 

counsel pursued the proposed line of cross-examination.” United States v. Taylor, 

17 F.3d 333, 340 (11th Cir. 1994). “A defendant’s cross-examination rights are 

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satisfied when the cross-examination permitted exposes the jury to facts sufficient 

to evaluate the credibility of the witness and enables defense counsel to establish a 

record from which he properly can argue why the witness is less than reliable.” 

Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d at 1371. “[O]nce there is sufficient cross-examination 

to satisfy the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, further questioning is 

within the district court’s discretion.” Taylor, 17 F.3d at 340. 

Chin has failed to demonstrate that his Sixth Amendment rights were 

violated when the district court excluded evidence about K.B.’s earlier acts of 

prostitution. First, Chin had ample opportunity to cross-examine K.B. and to

impeach K.B.’s credibility effectively.

2

 On cross-examination, K.B. admitted that 

she had lied to the police about several aspects of her involvement in the 

prostitution business. Chin’s lawyer was also able to highlight inconsistencies in 

K.B.’s testimony, including whether K.B. had paid a homeless woman to rent a 

motel room for her because she was underage. The district court acknowledged 

the effectiveness of K.B.’s cross-examination, commenting that K.B.’s attitude 

changed from being “demur” on direct examination to “indicating a degree of 

casualness or indifference” on cross-examination, which the district court thought 

gave the jury a different and perhaps more “accurate view” of K.B.’s approach and 

willingness to participate in prostitution. Based on this record, sufficient evidence 

 2 Contrary to Chin’s assertions on appeal, K.B. never testified -- either directly or indirectly --

that she had not considered prostituting herself until after she met Chin. 

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existed to enable Chin’s lawyer to argue properly that K.B. lacked credibility. And 

nothing evidences that the jury would have formed “a significantly different 

impression” about K.B.’s credibility had Chin been permitted to cross-examine 

K.B. about her past acts of prostitution. See Taylor, 17 F.3d at 340.

Moreover, evidence of K.B.’s earlier involvement in prostitution was not 

critical to Chin’s “mere presence” defense. K.B.’s testimony demonstrated that 

K.B. was already knowledgeable about the prostitution business. For example, 

K.B. testified that prostitution was prevalent in her neighborhood and that it was 

her idea to start telling men that they had to pay for sex. K.B. began managing 

S.M.’s prostitution activities, which included coaching S.M. on “how to be a girlie 

girl,” what to wear, and how to “keep [her]self up.” K.B.’s testimony also 

demonstrated that, at times, she and S.M. found clients, set up prostitution “dates,” 

and engaged in acts of prostitution without Chin’s involvement or instruction. In 

the light of K.B.’s trial testimony, the district court’s exclusion of evidence about 

K.B.’s prostitution history in no serious way hindered Chin’s ability to argue that 

he was “merely present” for K.B. and S.M.’s prostitution activities. 

Chin has failed to demonstrate a violation of his constitutional rights; the 

district court abused no discretion in excluding evidence of K.B.’s history of 

prostitution under Rule 412.

AFFIRMED.

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