Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00694/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00694-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robin Ali
Defendant
Manjit Kaur
Defendant
Lakhwinder Singh Lakha
Defendant
Shop N Save
Defendant
Jose Trujillo
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE TRUJILLO,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROBIN ALI d/b/a SHOP N SAVE,

Defendant.

_________________________________ _ /

Case No. 1:16-cv-00694-LJO-SKO

FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS THAT

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

DEFAULT JUDGMENT BE 

GRANTED IN PART

(Doc. No. 17)

OBJECTIONS DUE: 21 DAYS

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 7, 2016, Plaintiff Jose Trujillo (“Plaintiff”) filed a motion for default judgment 

against Defendant Robin Ali d/b/a Shop N Save (“Defendant”). No opposition to Plaintiff’s 

motion was filed. The Court has reviewed the motion and supporting documentation and 

determined that the matter was suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 

230(g). As such, the hearing on the motion was vacated. (Doc. 18.)

For the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion for 

default judgment be GRANTED IN PART in the amount of $2,227.95.

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On May 17, 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to Title III of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213; the California Unruh Act, California Civil 

Code § 51 et seq.; and California Health & Safety Code §§ 19955, 19959. (Doc. 1.) The 

complaint seeks an award of statutory damages, prejudgment interest on the damages, costs of 

suit, attorney's fees, and injunctive relief. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he requires the use of a 

wheelchair or cane for mobility (Doc. 1, ¶ 8), and the property that is the subject of this suit, Shop 

N Save (the “Property”), presents numerous architectural barriers that interfered with his ability to 

use and enjoy the goods, services, privileges, and accommodations offered at the facility (Doc. 1, 

¶ 10).

Defendants Lakhwinder Singh Lakha and Manjit Kaur (collectively “Messrs. Lahka and 

Kaur”), Trustees of the 2015 Lakha-Kaur Family Trust, were served with the Complaint on July 8, 

2016. (Docs. 6 & 7), and default was entered against Messrs. Lakha and Kaur on August 5, 2016. 

(Docs. 10 & 11.) Messrs. Lakha and Kaur were dismissed from the case on September 9, 2016. 

(See Doc. 14.)

Defendant Robin Ali d/b/a Shop N Save (“Defendant”) was served with the complaint on 

June 4, 2016. (Doc. 4). Despite having stipulated to an enlargement of the time in which to 

respond (Doc. 5), Defendant did not file a responsive pleading. (See Docket.) Plaintiff requested 

the Clerk of Court to enter default against Defendant on August 4, 2016, which was entered on 

August 5, 2016. (Doc. 9.) 

On October 7, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment against Defendant, which 

is currently pending before the Court. (Doc. 17.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) permits a court-ordered default judgment following 

the entry of default by the clerk of the court under Rule 55(a). It is within the sole discretion of 

the court as to whether default judgment should be entered. See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 

1092 (9th Cir. 1980). A defendant’s default by itself does not entitle a plaintiff to a court-ordered 

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judgment. See id. Instead, the Ninth Circuit has determined a court should consider seven 

discretionary factors, often referred to as the “Eitel factors,” before rendering a decision on default 

judgment. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). The Eitel factors include 

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of the plaintiff’s substantive claim, 

(3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action (5) the possibility 

of a dispute concerning material facts, (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and 

(7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the 

merits. See id. 

A plaintiff is required to prove all damages sought in the complaint. See Televideo Sys., 

Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1992). In addition, any relief sought may not be 

different in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

54(c). If the facts necessary to determine the damages are not contained in the complaint, or are 

legally insufficient, they will not be established by default. See Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 

980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992).

Finally, once the court clerk enters a default, the well-pleaded factual allegations of the 

complaint are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages. See Televideo Sys., 

Inc., 826 F.2d at 917.

B. Analysis

1. The Eitel Factors Weigh in Favor of Granting a Default Judgment

a. Prejudice to Plaintiff if Default Judgment is Not Granted

If default judgment is not entered, Plaintiff will effectively be denied a remedy until 

Defendant participates and makes an appearance in the litigation – which may never occur. 

Denying Plaintiff a means of recourse is, by itself, sufficient to meet the burden imposed by this 

factor. See, e.g., Philip Morris, USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 499 (C.D. 

Cal. 2003).

//

//

//

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b. Merits of Plaintiff's Substantive Claims and the Sufficiency of the 

Complaint

The next relevant Eitel factors include an evaluation of the merits of the substantive claims 

pled in the complaint as well as the general sufficiency of the complaint. In weighing these 

factors, courts evaluate whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim that supports the relief 

sought. See Danning v.Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978); see also DIRECTV, Inc. v. 

Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] defendant is not held to admit facts that are not 

well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Title III of the ADA provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the 

basis of disability” in places of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). “Discrimination”

is defined as a failure to remove “barriers . . . where such removal is readily achievable.” Id. at 

§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); see also Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 

2011) (en banc). Where a barrier’s removal is not “readily achievable,” a public accommodation 

must make its facilities available through “alternative methods if such methods are readily 

achievable.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v).

“To prevail on a Title III discrimination claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) [he or she] 

is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, 

or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public 

accommodations by the defendant because of her [or his] disability.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 

481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). Further, “[t]o succeed on an ADA claim of discrimination on 

account of one’s disability due to an architectural barrier, the plaintiff must also prove that: (1) the 

existing facility at the defendant’s place of business presents an architectural barrier prohibited 

under the ADA, and (2) the removal of the barrier is readily achievable.” Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn 

Rest., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1085 (D. Haw. 2000).

According to the complaint, Plaintiff “is substantially limited in his ability to walk,” “uses 

a wheelchair or cane for mobility,” and he is thus “physically disabled” as defined by the 

applicable California and federal laws. (Doc. 1, ¶ 8.) As a store, the Property is a facility of 

public accommodation, does not function as a residence, and its activity affects commerce. (Doc. 

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1, ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant owns, operates, or leases the Property; thus, she is 

allegedly liable for the Property’s compliance with the ADA. (Doc. 1, ¶ 7.)

Plaintiff visited the Property and alleges that Defendant failed to provide barrier-free 

access to the Property in the following ways: (1) the interior aisles lacked sufficient clear width; 

(2) the deli counter was too high and obstructed by furniture and other items; (3) the transaction 

counter was too high and obstructed by product displays; and (4) no accessible seating space. 

(Doc. 1, ¶ 10 (Plaintiff’s settlement with Messrs. Lakha and Kaur included injunctive relief for the 

other claims alleged in the Complaint).)

Plaintiff alleges that the removal of these architectural barriers is readily achievable, or 

alternatively, the services could have been made available through alternative methods that were 

readily achievable. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 21-22.) As these facts are taken as true regarding Defendant

following its entry of default, Plaintiff has met his burden of stating a prima facie Title III 

discrimination claim.

Pursuant to the Unruh Civil Rights Act, all persons are “entitled to the full and equal 

accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of 

every kind whatsoever.” Cal Civ. Code, § 51(b). Additionally, no business establishment of any 

kind whatsoever shall discriminate against any person in California on account of disability. 

Cal. Civ. Code, § 51.5. The Unruh Act also incorporates an individual’s rights under the ADA by 

reference, such that a violation of the ADA also constitutes a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights 

Act. Cal. Civ. Code, § 51(f). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant denied him full and equal 

accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges and services in a business establishment based 

on his disability. (Doc. 1, ¶ 38.) Further, because Plaintiff’s complaint properly alleges a prima 

facie claim under the ADA, Plaintiff has also properly alleged facts establishing the necessary 

elements for an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim.

California Health and Safety Code, § 19955, mandates that all public accommodations 

constructed in California comply with the requirements of California Government Code, § 4450. 

Pursuant to Section 4450, “all buildings, structures, sidewalks, curbs, and related facilities, 

construed in this state by the use of state, county, or municipal funds, or the funds of any political 

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subdivision of the state shall be accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities.” Cal. Gov. 

Code, § 4450(a). Additionally, non-exempt public accommodations constructed prior to July 1, 

1970, and later altered or structurally repaired, are required to comply with the same requirements 

of the California Health and Safety Code. Cal. Health & Safety Code, § 19959. 

For purposes of pleading his claim, Plaintiff incorporates his prior allegations regarding the 

barriers he encountered at the Property (Doc. 1, ¶ 42), and further alleges that the Property is a 

public accommodation “constructed, altered, or repaired in a manner that violates Part 5.5 of the 

Health and Safety Code or Government Code § 4450 (or both), and that the [Property] was not 

exempt under the Health and Safety Code § 19956” (Doc. 1, ¶ 45). Although substantially

boilerplate, this claim is sufficiently pled. See Loskot v. D & K Spirits, LLC, No. 2:10-cv-0684-

WBS-DAD, 2011 WL 567364 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2011) (noting that, although “plaintiff’s 

complaint is largely boilerplate, it is sufficient to support the requested relief” under the ADA for

purposes of default judgment). See also Gutierrez v. Leng, No. 1:14-CV-01027-WBS, 2015 WL 

1498813, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2015) (same).

While Plaintiff’s allegations in his complaint are generic as to all defendants, and 

Defendant is the only defendant remaining, defendants are jointly and severally liable for ADA 

violations in any of these capacities. See Botosan v. McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 

2000). Accordingly, Defendant alone may be held liable for Plaintiff’s counsel’s time, costs, and 

statutory damages. The complaint sufficiently states Plaintiff’s claim under Title III of the ADA, 

the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and California Health and Safety Code, § 19955, and there appears to 

be merit to the substantive allegations. As such, these Eitel factors weigh in favor of default 

judgment.

c. Sum of Money at Stake

The fourth Eitel factor, the sum of money at stake, weighs in favor of granting default 

judgment. Default judgment is disfavored when a large amount of money is involved or is 

unreasonable in light of the defendant’s actions. See Truong Giang Corp. v. Twinstar Tea Corp., 

No. C 06-03594-JSW, 2007 WL 1545173 at *12 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2007). Here, Plaintiff is 

seeking a default judgment in the amount of $4,956.50, which includes attorney’s fees and costs. 

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This is not a relatively large sum of money, nor does it appear unreasonable, subject to the 

deductions set forth below.

1

 

d. Dispute Concerning Material Facts

With regard to this factor, no genuine issues of material fact are likely to exist because the 

allegations in the complaint are taken as true, Televideo Sys., 826 F.2d at 917-18, and Defendant 

has submitted nothing to contradict the well-pled allegations in the complaint. Accordingly, this 

factor favors entry of default judgment.

e. Default due to Excusable Neglect

Defendant failed to file a responsive pleading or oppose Plaintiff’s motion for default 

judgment. The Court has no evidence before it establishing that Defendant’s failure to participate 

in the litigation is due to excusable neglect. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of granting default 

judgment.

f. Strong Policy Favoring Decision on the Merits

This factor inherently weighs strongly against awarding default judgment in every case. In 

the aggregate, however, this factor is outweighed in consideration of the other applicable factors 

that weigh in favor of granting default judgment.

2. Terms of the Judgment and Proof of Damages

While analysis of the Eitel factors supports a default judgment, the Court also considers the 

proof of the damages and the terms of the judgment sought by Plaintiff. 

a. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff’s complaint and motion for default judgment seek an injunction requiring 

Defendant to make several changes and accommodations at the Property. (Doc. 1, ¶ 10; Doc. 17-

1, 5:5-9). As the factual allegations in the complaint are taken as true, Plaintiff is entitled to 

injunctive relief as requested pursuant to both state and federal law. See Wander v. Kaus, 304 

F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Damages are not recoverable under Title III of the ADA – only 

 

1

Plaintiff requests statutory damages in the amount of $4,000.00 and attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of 

$7,206.50, for a total of $11,206.50. (Doc. 17, 10:12-14). Plaintiff further requests that this amount be subject to an 

offset of $6,250.00, the amount received in settlement with Messrs. Lakha and Kaur. Thus, the net monetary award 

requested by Plaintiff is $4,956.50.

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injunctive relief is available for violations of Title III.”).

b. Statutory Damages

The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides for, among other things, a minimum statutory 

damages amount of $4,000 per violation. Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a); Grove v. De La Cruz, 407 F. 

Supp. 2d 1126, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (the Unruh Act “provides for statutory damages up to a 

maximum of three times the actual damages but no less than $4,000 for each instance of 

discrimination”). A violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act. As such, 

Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to $4,000 in statutory damages pursuant to the California Civil 

Code § 52(a). (Doc. 1, ¶ 40.)

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts indicating that he visited the Property and 

encountered barriers that interfered with his ability to use and enjoy the goods, services, 

privileges, and accommodations offered at the Property. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 10-11.) Thus, Plaintiff is 

entitled to an award of $4,000 in statutory damages.

c. Attorney’s Fees and Costs of Litigation

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205, a party that prevails on claims brought under the ADA may 

recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, in the court’s discretion. California Civil Code, § 55,

also provides for attorney’s fees and costs for obtaining injunctive relief; section 54.3 provides 

fees for recovery of damages to enforce the “full and equal access” guaranteed to disabled persons 

by Section 54.1. 

Attorney’s fee awards are calculated using the lodestar method whereby the hours 

reasonably spent in the litigation are multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Ferland v. Conrad 

Credit Corp, 244 F.3d 1145, 1146-48 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit has explained the 

lodestar approach as follows:

The lodestar/multiplier approach has two parts. First a court determines the 

“lodestar” amount by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the 

litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. [See D’Emanuele v. Montgomery Ward & 

Co., Inc., 904 F.2d 1379, 1383 (9th Cir. 1990); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 

424,] 461 (1983)]. The party seeking an award of fees must submit evidence 

supporting the hours worked and the rates claimed. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. 

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A district court should exclude from the lodestar amount hours that are not 

reasonably expended because they are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise 

unnecessary.” Id. at 434. Second, a court may adjust the lodestar upward or 

downward using a “multiplier” based on factors not subsumed in the initial 

calculation of the lodestar. [Footnote omitted] See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 

898-901 (1984) (reversing upward multiplier based on factors subsumed in the 

lodestar determination); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n.9 (noting that courts may look 

at “results obtained” and other factors but should consider that many of these 

factors are subsumed in the lodestar calculation). The lodestar amount is 

presumptively the reasonable fee amount, and thus a multiplier may be used to 

adjust the lodestar amount upward or downward only in “‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’

cases, supported by both ‘specific evidence’ on the record and detailed findings by 

the lower courts” that the lodestar amount is unreasonably low or unreasonably 

high. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 

478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986) (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-901); Blum, 465 U.S. at 

897; D’Emanuele, 904 F.2d at 1384, 1386; Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 

879 F.2d 481, 487 (9th Cir. 1989).

Van Gerwin v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041,1045 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Here, Plaintiff seeks an award of $7,206.50 for total billable time spent on the case as well 

as $1,395 for costs and litigation expenses. (Doc. 17-1, pp. 8-10.) Specifically, Plaintiff requests 

(1) $3,810.00 for 12.7 hours of work expended by Tanya Moore, Esq., at an hourly rate of $300; 

(2) $1,403.00 for 12.2 hours spent by paralegal Whitney Law at an hourly of $115; and 

(3) $437.00 for 4.6 hours spent by paralegal David Guthrie at an hourly rate of $95. (Doc. 17-1, 

p. 10.) 

(i) Ms. Moore’s Time Expended and Hourly Rate

Regarding the number of hours expended by Ms. Moore, the Court finds that the amounts 

claimed by Plaintiff for certain tasks are reasonable; however, some of the time expended is 

unreasonable, duplicative, or inadequately documented and should be reduced. 

Numerous entries throughout the billing statement reflect time spent reviewing 

communications to and from the Court:

Date Activity Time Spent

05/17/2016 Reviewed Summons and civil new case 0.10 (6 minutes)

05/17/2016 Reviewed complaint 0.10 (6 minutes)

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06/10/2016 Reviewed Summons 0.10 (6 minutes)

06/30/2016 Reviewed Stipulation 0.10 (6 minutes)

07/12/2016 Reviewed Summons 0.10 (6 minutes)

08/04/2016 Reviewed Request 0.10 (6 minutes)

08/05/2016 Reviewed Clerk’s entry 0.10 (6 minutes)

08/05/2016 Reviewed Clerk’s entry 0.10 (6 minutes)

08/05/2016 Reviewed Clerk’s entry 0.10 (6 minutes)

08/10/2016 Reviewed Request 0.10 (6 minutes)

08/11/2016 Reviewed Order 0.10 (6 minutes)

09/09/2016 Reviewed notice 0.10 (6 minutes)

09/20/2016 Reviewed minute order 0.10 (6 minutes)

(Doc. 17-3, Exhibit B.) Total: 1.3 hours (78 min.)

When considering the time entries in total, the amount of time spent essentially reviewing 

the docket is unreasonable, particularly given the substance of the communications and docket 

entries.

On August 4 and 5, 2016, Ms. Moore recorded 0.40 hours (24 minutes) reviewing entries 

on the Court’s Electronic Case Filing (ECF) system consisting of the Request for Clerk to Enter 

Default filed by her office and the resultant entries of default by the Clerk. (Doc. 17-3, Exhibit B, 

p. 2 (four separate time entries); see Docs. 8-11.) Ms. Moore’s time of 24 minutes for review of a 

document her office prepared and filed, and for reviewing the resulting ECF notes of those 

transactions, is excessive. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34 (hours requested may be reduced 

where expenditure of time deemed excessive, duplicative, or otherwise unnecessary).

On June 10, 2016, and July 12, 2016, Ms. Moore recorded 0.20 hours (12 minutes) 

reviewing the “Summons” for unidentified parties. (Doc. 17-3, Exhibit B, p. 1 (two separate time 

entries); see Docs. 4, 6-7.) On August 10 and 11, 2016, Ms. Moore recorded 0.20 hours (12 

minutes) reviewing a request for continuance of the initial scheduling conference filed by her 

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office and the resultant 5-line minute order vacating and rescheduling the conference. (Doc. 17-3, 

Exhibit B, p. 2 (two separate time entries); see Docs. 12 & 13.) On September 9 and 20, 2016, 

Ms. Moore recorded 0.20 hours (12 minutes) reviewing the Notice of Voluntary Dismissal filed by 

her office dismissing Messrs. Lakha and Kaur and the resultant 4-line minute order directing the 

Clerk of Court to terminate those defendants. (Doc. 17-3, Exhibit B, p. 2 (two separate time 

entries); see Docs. 14 & 15.)

Reviewing the above-referenced documents should have taken only a few minutes, 

particularly considering Ms. Moore’s office had already billed for preparing the documents, the 

subsequent billing to review the documents that had been filed and recording that time is 

excessive. While reviewing automatic emails showing the occurrence of docket activity and 

reviewing short Court orders does take time, billing judgment must be exercised in the 

accumulation of billing entries of this type. Based on the activities recorded in reviewing routine, 

simple documents, the Court finds that only 0.50 hours (30 minutes) of the time expended on these 

activities is reasonable; thus, a reduction of 0.50 hours is warranted.

Further, the Court finds that the number of hours Ms. Moore billed in this case is not 

reasonable given the nature of this case and Ms. Moore’s experience in these types of actions. On 

May 11, 2016, Ms. Moore recorded 1.90 hours (114 minutes) preparing and finalizing the 

complaint, reviewing information gathered “during investigation,” and instructing her paralegal 

regarding “communications with the client re verification of the draft” and “preparations of all 

required documents for filing.” (Doc. 37-3, Exhibit B, p. 1.) Based upon the Court’s familiarity 

with the actions filed by Ms. Moore’s firm in this court, the Court is aware that this is basically a 

form complaint. The complaint filed in this action is nearly identical to complaints filed by Ms. 

Moore in dozens of other actions in this Court, with only the names of the parties and the 

allegations in paragraph ten changed to reflect the facts specific to this case. On May 11, 2016, 

paralegal Whitney Law also billed 0.50 hours drafting the complaint and reviewing supporting 

information. (Doc. 17-5, p. 1.) The Court finds that .5 hours of Ms. Moore’s time is sufficient to 

draft the complaint, given the additional time spent by Ms. Law, and will therefore deduct 1.40

hours from Ms. Moore’s time.

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Finally, on October 7, 2016, Ms. Moore spent 2.5 hours (150 minutes) preparing the 

motion for default judgment. (Doc. 17-3, Exhibit B, p. 3.) Ms. Law reported spending a total of 

4.2 hours (252 minutes) preparing the motion for entry of default judgment and supporting 

documents between October 5 and 7, 2014. (Doc. 17-5, pp. 2-3.) The motion for default 

judgment filed in this case is nearly identical to motions for default judgment filed by Ms. Moore 

in other actions before this Court. “Accordingly, the Court finds that one hour of Ms. Moore’s 

time and one hour of Whitney Law’s time is sufficient to prepare the motion.” Gutierrez v. Leng, 

No. 1:14-CV-01027-WBS-SKO, 2015 WL 1498813, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2015) (quoting 

Moore v. E-Z-N-Quick, No. 1:13-cv-01522-LJO-SAB, 2014 WL 1665034 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 

2014)). The Court will therefore deduct 1.5 hours from Ms. Moore’s time and 3.2 hours from Ms.

Law’s time.

With regard to the hourly rate to be charged, courts generally calculate these rates 

according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant legal community. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895. 

In general, courts use the rates of attorneys practicing in the forum district, here, the Eastern 

District of California, Fresno. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (1993); Davis v. Mason 

Cnty., 927 F.2d 1473, 1488 (9th Cir. 1991). The fee applicant bears the burden of producing 

sufficient evidence that the requested rates are commensurate “with those prevailing in the 

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and 

reputation.” Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11.

Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Moore specializes in representing plaintiffs in disability actions, 

and Ms. Moore’s declaration states she has filed and successfully prosecuted over 1,000 civil

rights actions, she has handled numerous litigation matters through trial, and has been practicing 

law for over fifteen years, of which seven has been spent specializing in disability access litigation 

. (Doc. 17-2, ¶¶ 7.) She usually bills at $400 per hour, but has reduced her hourly rate in this case

to $300. (Docs. 17-1, 8:23-25; 17-2, ¶ 8.) Ms. Moore asserts an hourly rate of $300 has been 

found reasonable for Ms. Moore’s work in other ADA cases in the Fresno division of this District, 

and should be awarded here. (Doc. 17-1, (8:19-23.) However, this Court, in a detailed opinion, 

previously deemed Ms. Moore’s hourly rate of $300 unreasonably high and instead found that “an 

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hourly rate of $250, the rate fixed by the Kalani court, is appropriate to compensate Ms. Moore for 

her time expended in this litigation based on her level of civil rights experience and expertise in 

ADA litigation.” Moore v. Chase, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-01178-SKO, 2016 WL 3648949, at *3 (E.D. 

Cal. July 7, 2016) (citing Kalani v. Statewide Petroleum, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-02287-KJM-AC, 2014 

WL 4230920, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2014)). Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiff be 

awarded the sum of $2,325.00 for work performed by Ms. Moore.2

(iii) Paralegal Rate and Time Expended

Plaintiff seeks compensation for 12.2 hours expended by paralegal Whitney Law at $115 

per hour, and 4.6 hours expended by paralegal David Guthrie at $95 per hour. (See Docs. 17-1, 

8:26-9:4; 17-5; 17-6.) Plaintiff refers the Court to Moore v. E-Z-N Quick, 2014 WL 1665034, for 

the proposition that courts in this district have determined that $115 per hour to be a reasonable 

rate. However, as the Court previously found in Moore v. Chase, Inc., the “prevailing hourly rates 

for paralegals in the Eastern District . . . [is] $75 per hour.” 2016 WL 3648949, at *3. “The Court 

will therefore apply an hourly rate of $75 for the time expended by Plaintiff's paralegals.” Id.

Regarding the number of hours expended by Ms. Law, the Court finds that the amounts 

claimed by Plaintiff for certain tasks are reasonable; however, some of the time expended is 

unreasonable, duplicative, or inadequately documented and should be reduced, as discussed above. 

Ms. Law’s total hours are therefore reduced by 3.2 hours, for a total of 9.0 hours. The Court finds 

the numbers of hours expended by Mr. Guthrie are reasonable. Accordingly, the Court 

recommends Plaintiff be awarded 13.6 hours of paralegal time expended at an hourly rate of $75

(9.0 hours for Ms. Sacks and 4.6 hours for Mr. Guthrie), for a total of $1,020.00.

(iv) Litigation Expenses and Costs

Plaintiff seeks to recover costs in the amount of $1,556.00. (Doc. 17-1, 9:5-6; Doc. 17-2, 

¶¶ 12-14.) In Section 12205 of the ADA, Congress authorized a district court, in its discretion, to 

allow the prevailing party other than the United States to recover a reasonable attorney's fee, 

including litigation expenses and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 12205. The statutory provisions of the ADA 

 

2

 This amount consists of the amount of time billed by Ms. Moore (12.7 hours) minus the court recommended 

reduction in time spent reviewing the docket (.5 hours) and spent in excessive or duplicative tasks (2.9 hours), for an 

adjusted time of 9.3 hours multiplied by Ms. Moore’s reduced hourly rate of $250 per hour. 

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provide direct authority for the award of expert witness fees as litigation expenses under the ADA. 

See Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). The costs here include expenses for 

the court filing fee, costs of service, and a fee for a pre-filing site inspection of the Property, which 

are compensable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205 and Lovell. 303 F.3d at 1058.

Plaintiff has presented an invoice for the pre-filing site inspection totaling $985.00. (Doc. 

17-3, Exhibit E.) Plaintiff’s expert identified a total of seven alleged barriers to Plaintiff’s full and 

equal access at the Property, as set forth in his Complaint. (See Doc. 1 at ¶ 10.) In Plaintiff’s 

settlement with Messrs. Lakha and Kaur, he obtained injunctive relief for three of those claims 

alleged at ¶ 10(a)-(c), and seeks injunctive relief against Defendant for the remaining four claims. 

(Doc. 17-1, 6:9-7:9 and n.1.) Because the time spent inspecting and reporting on three of the 

seven alleged barriers did not contribute to Plaintiff’s recovery from Defendant (see Doc. 17-1, 

6:9-7:9 and n.1.), the amount awarded for the pre-filing inspection will be reduced accordingly. 

See Martinez v. Longs Drug Stores, Inc., No. CIVS031843-DFL-CMK, 2005 WL 3287233 at *6 

(E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2005). The recovery for four out of seven claims, or 57% of the total, yields 

an award of $561.45 for the pre-filing site inspection.

Plaintiff’s overall litigation expenses and costs are compensable and should be awarded, 

subject to a $423.55 reduction to reflect the adjusted cost of the pre-filing site inspection. 

Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiff be awarded the sum of $1,132.95 for litigation 

expenses and costs.

d. Joint and Several Liability

In general, under both federal and California state law, liability among defendants for a 

successful plaintiff’s attorney’s fees is generally joint and several. Turner v. Dist. of Columbia 

Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 354 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (joint and several liability for attorney's 

fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for all non-fractionable claims against defendants); Cal. 

Trout, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 218 Cal. App. 3d 187, 212 (1990) (awarding attorney’s fees under Cal,

Code of Civ. Proc., § 1021.5, noting that liability for the fees among defendants was joint and 

several); Corder v. Gates, 947 F.2d 374 (district court did not err in refusing to apportion 

attorney’s fees among defendants in awarding fees under Section 1988).

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Under the ADA, prohibitions against discrimination apply to “any person who owns, 

leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). The 

express terms of the ADA hold a landlord and a tenant liable for noncompliance with the Act. 

Botosan, 216 F.3d at 832. In Botosan, the appellate court noted that the legislative history of the 

ADA supports this construction of the statute:

This [provision] makes it clear that the owner of the building which houses the 

public accommodation, as well as the owner or operator of the public 

accommodation itself, has obligations under this Act. For example, if an office 

building contains a doctor’s office, both the owner of the building and the doctor's 

office are required to make readily achievable alterations. It simply makes no 

practical sense to require the individual public accommodation, a doctor’s office for 

example, to make readily achievable changes to the public accommodation without 

requiring the owner to make readily achievable changes to the primary entrance to 

the building.

Similarly, a doorman or guard to an office building containing public 

accommodations would be required, if requested, to show a person who is blind to 

the elevator or to write a note to a person who is deaf regarding the floor number of 

a particular office.

The amendment also clarifies that entities which lease public accommodations are 

covered by the requirements of this title.

Botosan, 216 F.3d at 832 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(III), at 55-56 (1990), reprinted in 1990 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 478-79).

Here, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant and Messrs. Lakha and Kaur were in a landlordtenant relationship. (Doc. 17-1, 1:11-14.) As such, liability for failure to comply with the ADA is 

joint and several. To the extent Defendants had an agreement to allocate responsibility for 

compliance with the lease – of which there is no evidence before the Court – each Defendant still 

remains responsible for ADA compliance. Botosan, 216 F.3d at 832-34. As Defendants are 

jointly and severally liable for damages and fees awarded under the ADA, it is appropriate to 

award damages and attorney’s fees against Defendant despite that Messrs. Lakha and Kaur have

settled separately with Plaintiff. Furthermore, no apportionment of the attorney’s fees has been

sought as Defendant has defaulted and has failed to oppose Plaintiff’s motion for default 

judgment. 

//

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Additionally, courts have awarded attorney’s fees against one defendant for plaintiff’s 

counsel’s time spent litigating against another defendant. See Blackwell v. Foley, 724 F. Supp. 2d 

1068, 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Californians for Responsible Toxic Mgmt. v. Kizer, 211 Cal. 

App. 3d 961, 979 (1989)). Thus, in recommending an award of attorney’s fees against Defendant, 

the Court finds no basis to apportion the fees for Plaintiff’s counsel’s work spent litigating against 

Defendant only.

Finally, Plaintiff has requested that the damages and fees against Defendant be offset by 

the $6,250.00 settlement amount paid by Messrs. Lakha and Kaur. (See Doc. 17-1, 10:17-18.) 

Such an offset is appropriate where there is joint and several liability, and an offset of $6,250.00 is 

recommended. See generally Velez v. Roche, 335 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1042-43 (N.D. Cal. 2004) 

(offset may be awarded where settlement and award against which offset is sought were (1) for the 

same injury and (2) the injury is indivisible such that there is joint and several liability among the 

settling and non-settling defendants) (citations omitted).

e. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court recommends Plaintiff be awarded the following 

fees:

Professional Hourly Rate Hours Total

Ms. Tanya Moore $250 9.3 $2,325.00

Ms. Whitney Law $75 9.0 $675.00

Mr. David Guthrie $75 4.6 $345.00

Total Fees $3,345.00

Additionally, Plaintiff should be awarded $1,132.95 for the costs of suit, and $4,000 in 

statutory damages. Plaintiff also requests that Defendant be granted an offset in the amount of 

$6,250. Thus, the total award of damages, fees, and costs (including the offset) recommended is 

$2,227.95.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Based on consideration of the declarations, pleadings, and exhibits to the present motion, 

the Court RECOMMENDS that:

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1. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment should be GRANTED IN PART;

2. Judgment be entered in Plaintiff’s favor and against Defendant Robin Ali d/b/a 

Shop N Save;

3. Plaintiff be awarded statutory damages in the amount of $4,000; 

4. Plaintiff be awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,325.00 (9.3 hours at $250

per hour), paralegal fees in the amount of $1,020.00 (9.0 hours at $75 per hour and 

4.6 hours at $75 per hour), and costs of suit in the amount of $1,132.95; and

5. Defendant Robin Ali d/b/a Shop N Save be awarded a $6,250.00 offset for the 

settlement amount paid by Messrs. Lakha and Kaur, for a net award of $2,227.95.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this 

action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court's Local Rule 304. Within twenty-one 

(21) days of service of this recommendation, any party may file written objections to these 

findings and recommendations with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document 

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The 

district judge will review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district judge's order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 

F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 23, 2016 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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