Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03059/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03059-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric Blackmon
Appellant
Tarry Williams
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-3059

ERIC BLACKMON,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

TARRY WILLIAMS,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 11 C 2358 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 2, 2015 — DECIDED MAY 24, 2016

____________________

Before POSNER, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. This appeal from the denial of a 

habeas corpus petition presents a thicket of procedural and 

substantive issues arising from a murder on the streets of Chicago. On the Fourth of July in 2002, Tony Cox was standing 

outside a restaurant when he was gunned down by two men. 

The gunmen fled, but two women driving cars near the scene 

saw the murder and the shooters’ faces. Not quite two months 

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later, both women independently chose petitioner Eric Blackmon’s photograph out of arrays, identifying him as the second 

shooter. They repeated those identifications at a live line-up 

and then again at trial. Primarily on the strength of their testimony, Blackmon was convicted of first-degree murder and 

sentenced to sixty years in prison.

Blackmon petitioned the state courts for post-conviction 

relief, arguing that his attorney was constitutionally ineffective because he failed to present certain eyewitness and alibi 

testimony, and in the alternative, that he was actually innocent. The state courts summarily denied relief. Blackmon then 

sought relief in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied Blackmon’s petition.

The record before us supports the conclusion that Blackmon’s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing 

to investigate the alibi witnesses and shows that the state 

court’s summary dismissal of the claim was unreasonable. But 

a “state court’s mistake in summarily rejecting a petition, i.e., 

without fully evaluating conflicting evidence on disputed factual issues, does not necessarily mean the petitioner is ultimately entitled to relief.” Mosley v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 838, 842 

(7th Cir. 2012). Because of that summary dismissal, the alibi 

witnesses have not yet been tested in any sort of adversary 

proceeding, and the record contains no evidence from Blackmon’s trial counsel as to what he did or did not do. Accordingly, we vacate the denial of the habeas petition and remand 

to the district court to assess whether Blackmon “is actually 

‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties 

of the United States.’” Id., quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

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No. 14-3059 3

I. Background

A. The Murder of Tony Cox

At about 4:30 p.m. on July 4, 2002, Tony Cox was shot and 

killed in front of a restaurant called Fat Albert’s located at 1143 

South Pulaski Road in Chicago. Though the various accounts 

of the shooting differ in some ways, the basic outline is relatively consistent, with one exception discussed below.

At the time of the shooting, Cox and Richard Arrigo, the 

owner of Fat Albert’s, were outside the restaurant with two 

other men. The first assailant shot Cox at least twice, and Cox 

fell to the ground. The second assailant then shot Cox twice 

more, and both men fled. The State’s theory is that Blackmon 

was the second shooter. Cox died from four bullet wounds to 

the head, each of which would have been fatal alone. The 

medical examiner recovered two bullets from Cox’s body, and 

a forensic scientist with the Illinois State Police later testified 

that those bullets had come from two different guns. 

Frencshun Reece and Lisa McDowell, the witnesses who 

would later form the core of the State’s case, saw Cox’s murder 

from their respective vehicles. Reece was stopped at a red 

light when she saw the first assailant shoot Cox twice. According to Reece, both assailants began to flee, but the second 

assailant turned back and shot Cox in the head again before 

running away. Reece pulled over and called the police, although Arrigo urged her to hang up and claimed he had already called. Reece remained at the scene to speak with police. Later that day, she viewed a photographic array and selected three pictures that “resembled” one or both of the assailants, though she made no definitive identification that 

day. Blackmon was not part of this first photo array. 

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McDowell was driving south when she stopped at a red 

light, about two car-lengths back from the intersection. She 

did not see the first two gunshots, but she looked over after 

hearing them and saw Cox lying on the ground, with Arrigo 

standing nearby. She then saw the two assailants approach 

Cox. One of them shot him twice more, and both men fled. 

McDowell also called 911 but did not remain at the scene, and 

she did not view photographs of possible suspects that day.

Arrigo, too, witnessed the crime. According to his account, 

he was locking the doors of his restaurant when he heard two 

gunshots. He turned and saw the second assailant shoot Cox 

twice and flee with the first. Like Reece, Arrigo remained at 

the scene and spoke to police, but he told them he had not 

recognized the shooters and could not identify them.

B. The Investigation

A few days into the investigation, a possible explanation 

for the shooting began to emerge. George Davis, also known 

as “Booney Black,” was the founder of the New Breed gang, 

of which Cox was a member. According to an “Investigation 

Time-Line” produced during discovery, police received a tip 

indicating that Davis had lent Cox money to start a drug corner but had ordered him killed when things went badly. There 

was also evidence suggesting that Arrigo, who was Davis’s 

friend, helped arrange the murder. The investigators found a 

message from Arrigo on Cox’s voicemail instructing Cox to 

meet him at the restaurant. Arrigo confirmed it was his voice 

on the recording but claimed not to remember leaving the 

message, and he denied arranging the murder. Cell phone 

records also showed that Arrigo had called Davis immediately after the shooting.

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No. 14-3059 5

Police also received information that two individuals nicknamed “Pride” and “Keno” may have killed Cox. “Keno” was 

the nickname of Michael Davis, the nephew of George Davis; 

“Pride” was the nickname of a man named Eric Bridges, who, 

like Cox, was a member of the New Breed gang.

At some point, the police began to focus on Eric Blackmon 

instead, though the record does not show how he became a 

suspect. The “Investigation Time-Line” mentions “Pride” and 

“Keno” but does not even mention Blackmon (whose nickname is or was “Forty”). The rest of the record provides little 

additional insight. A detective testified during grand jury proceedings that Blackmon and Cox were “members of the same 

street gang,” but the State’s counsel conceded at oral argument that no trial evidence supports this assertion. There was 

also testimony at trial that “family members” had verified 

Blackmon was “involved” in the murder, but the detective did 

not explain further and the “Investigation Time-Line” does 

not mention them.

Regardless, Blackmon did come under suspicion, and his 

picture was placed in a photo array that Reece, McDowell, 

and Arrigo all viewed in late August or early September, 

about two months after the shooting. Arrigo did not identify 

anyone from the photo array as one of the shooters. Reece and 

McDowell, however, both selected Blackmon’s photograph. A 

live line-up yielded the same results: Arrigo did not identify 

anyone, while both Reece and McDowell chose Blackmon, 

who was arrested and charged with Cox’s murder.

C. Blackmon’s Trial

At a bench trial in September 2004, the State presented the 

testimony of McDowell and Reece to prove that Blackmon 

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was the second shooter on July 4, 2002. McDowell testified 

that she was stopped in traffic on South Pulaski Road when 

she heard a gunshot. When she looked to her left, she saw “an 

Italian guy”—that is, Arrigo—and then watched as two men 

came around a building. One of the men, she testified, stood 

over a body lying on the sidewalk and then fired two more 

shots at the victim. She described that shooter as a black male, 

a “tall guy, maybe about six feet, slender build.” She testified 

that she saw the gunman’s face and identified Blackmon in 

court as the man she saw. McDowell said she had seen the 

shooter from about fifteen to sixteen feet away, and that after 

firing, both the shooter and the other man had run across Pulaski Road.

On cross-examination, Blackmon’s counsel tried to undermine the reliability of McDowell’s identification. For example, 

he elicited testimony that she had seen the shooter’s face 

straight-on for only about five seconds. McDowell also testified that as she watched the shooter running away, she had 

only a view of his profile in her car’s rearview mirror from 

about forty-five feet away. Counsel also emphasized that 

McDowell had not viewed the photo array until weeks after 

the incident, and he sought to draw out discrepancies in her 

testimony as compared to her previous statements. Nevertheless, McDowell did not waver on her identification.

Reece testified that she was stopped at a red light on Pulaski Road when she noticed a group of four men, three black 

and one white, gathered outside Fat Albert’s. She said that she 

had heard a noise she initially believed to be firecrackers. 

Then, she said, she saw one of the black men pull out a gun 

and shoot toward Cox’s head. Cox went down on his hands 

and knees, and when he tried to rise, the first man shot him 

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No. 14-3059 7

again “in his neck.” Reece testified that both assailants then 

“took off running,” but the second assailant returned, “came 

very close” to the victim, “pointed the gun directly into his 

eye,” and shot him. The second assailant then looked up at 

Arrigo, “shook his head,” and fled. Like McDowell, Reece 

identified Blackmon in court as the second shooter. 

Reece testified that she pulled over, called the police, and 

waited at the scene until they arrived. Several hours later, she 

went to the police station and viewed a photo array (the one 

without Blackmon’s picture). She testified that she did not “really” identify anyone then but admitted saying some of the 

photos “looked familiar.” According to the officer who administered the photo array, Reece also selected a third picture 

depicting a subject who had a hairstyle similar to one of the 

shooters. Near the end of August, Reece viewed another 

photo array, this time with Blackmon’s picture included. She 

testified that she had identified Blackmon as the second 

shooter from July 4 after viewing the second array based on 

the “bone protrusion” she could see through his shirt. On 

cross-examination, she elaborated that she had also identified 

Blackmon because he had “braids in his hair” and because he 

“looked like Michael Jackson.”

As he had with McDowell, Blackmon’s attorney attempted 

to discredit Reece’s identification. Reece said that she had seen

the shooting from about 130 feet away (though she testified 

that at some point she began driving, getting “so close that I 

can hit them with my car”) and had seen the second shooter’s 

face close up for only three seconds. The attorney also pointed 

out that the men in the photos Reece had selected on July 4 

did not look like Blackmon, although Reece maintained that 

she had chosen two photos that both resembled the first

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8 No. 14-3059

shooter, not the second. Blackmon’s attorney also attacked 

Reece’s identification by cross-examining Detective Gregory 

Jones, who administered the July 4 photo array. Jones testified 

that Reece had never said the second shooter looked like Michael Jackson, nor had she pointed out his bone structure. He 

also testified that Reece had not chosen two photographs that 

resembled the first shooter, as she claimed, but had in fact 

chosen two photographs “that resembled two of the individual offenders”—helpful to Blackmon because Reece conceded 

that neither subject resembled Blackmon.

Blackmon’s defense consisted of both alibi testimony and 

competing eyewitness testimony. To support his alibi, he offered testimony from two witnesses, Tomeka Wash and 

Selena Leavy. Wash testified that on July 4, 2002, she had 

hosted a barbecue in the lot across the street from her home. 

At about 1:00 p.m., she had seen Blackmon at the barbecue 

firing up the grill, and by 2:00 p.m., between twenty and forty 

people had arrived at the picnic, with guests coming and going throughout the afternoon. About half an hour before the

murder took place, Wash said, Blackmon was still at the picnic 

playing chess and barbecuing. She said that she stayed until 

10:00 p.m. that night and never saw Blackmon leave. According to Wash, she was close to Blackmon throughout the picnic 

and could see him “all the time.”

Leavy testified that she attended the same barbecue, arriving about 2:45 or 3:00 p.m. When she arrived, she saw Blackmon at the barbecue cooking and she said that at approximately 4:00 p.m., Blackmon had fixed her a plate of food. She

also said that between 3:00 and 4:00 or 4:30 p.m., Blackmon 

was at the picnic playing dominos or chess with his friends 

and that he never left the barbecue at any time between her 

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No. 14-3059 9

arrival and her departure around 8:00 p.m. Finally, she testified that Blackmon’s car did not leave the barbecue, either: the 

attendees had been using its radio for music and so presumably would have noticed if someone had driven it away.

On cross-examination, the prosecution brought out that 

Wash had two felony convictions and that Leavy was Blackmon’s cousin. The prosecution also emphasized that two 

years had passed since the barbecue; that Wash and Leavy 

claimed, somewhat improbably, to have kept Blackmon continuously in their sight for hours; and that guests had been 

coming and going throughout the picnic, presumably making 

it less likely that either woman could have kept track of a single guest without interruption.

In addition to the two alibi witnesses from the barbecue, 

the defense presented testimony from a competing eyewitness to the murder, Terrance Boyd. He testified that on July 4, 

2002, he and Cox planned to go drinking together. When he 

arrived on Pulaski, he saw Cox standing in the street and 

spoke with him. Boyd said that another man named “Booney” 

was also present, as was Eric Bridges. According to Boyd, Cox 

said he needed to talk to Eric, so Boyd walked away and 

turned the corner into an alley. He then heard gunshots and 

peered around the corner, where he saw Bridges shooting 

Cox. Boyd testified that he “trotted away,” fearing for his own 

safety, but returned once Bridges left the scene. He repeated 

that “Booney” had been present but initially did not remember seeing anyone else there. Later, Boyd said there may have 

been another “black person” present “at the curb, maybe coming from across the street,” but that he did not know who it 

was. He never mentioned Arrigo.

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On cross-examination, Boyd acknowledged his multiple 

prior convictions, including one for perjury. He admitted that 

he first came forward with his account of the shooting two 

years after the fact when he was seeking to “work a deal” with 

the U.S. Attorney in a federal case. The prosecution also emphasized the flaws in Boyd’s story. For example, Boyd testified he and Cox had been friends for ten years, but Boyd never 

checked on Cox after the shooting. Boyd also said that 

“Booney” ran away during the shooting, but the prosecution 

introduced testimony that George Davis had an “apparent 

disability with his left leg” and that he had “a hard time walking.” Further, Boyd testified that he had seen only Eric 

Bridges shoot Cox, but the other eyewitnesses described two 

shooters, and ballistics evidence showed that two different 

weapons were used.

The judge found Blackmon guilty of murder. He summarized the testimony and evidence before making explicit credibility determinations about the witnesses. He found McDowell and Reece credible and persuasive because they expressed 

confidence in their identifications, withstood extensive crossexamination, and told consistent stories despite having had 

no contact with one another. The judge rejected Boyd’s alternative version of the shooting, finding that his testimony had 

“less than zero credibility.”

The judge also rejected Blackmon’s alibi, finding Wash’s 

and Leavy’s stories to be highly unrealistic. He also noted that 

Wash’s credibility was undermined by her felony convictions, 

her testimony that she hosted the barbecue but knew only 

“the defendant and two other people,” and the fact that Leavy 

claimed to have spoken to Wash at the barbecue but Wash did 

not remember her being present. The judge also pointed out 

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No. 14-3059 11

that Leavy’s family ties to Blackmon were revealed only on 

cross-examination, calling that fact “interesting.” Based on his 

assessment of the evidence, the judge found Blackmon guilty 

of first-degree murder. He sentenced Blackmon to sixty years 

in prison. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. 

D. Collateral Proceedings

1. State Post-Conviction Proceedings and the Discovery of 

New Witnesses

Blackmon then petitioned for state post-conviction relief. 

He claimed his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 

by: (1) failing to investigate and call additional alibi witnesses 

from the barbecue; and (2) failing to call Arrigo as a trial witness. The state court summarily dismissed the petition, holding that the alibi witnesses’ testimony would have been cumulative, and that whether to call a witness like Arrigo was a 

matter of trial strategy.

The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. First, it found that 

Blackmon’s evidence did not demonstrate actual innocence, 

which in Illinois means total vindication or exoneration of the 

defendant. People v. Williams, 914 N.E.2d 641, 651 (Ill. App. 

2009). The court also agreed with the trial court that the alibi 

witnesses’ testimony would have been cumulative and held 

that neither that testimony nor Arrigo’s testimony was newly 

discovered, as required to state an actual innocence claim. See 

People v. Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d 941, 950 (Ill. 2009). Finally, the appellate court agreed with the trial court on the merits of the 

ineffective-assistance claims. It held that decisions regarding 

which witnesses to call are usually strategic and saw “no reason to set aside the usual deference to counsel’s trial strategy 

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12 No. 14-3059

under such circumstances ... .” The court did not separately 

address the failure to investigate those witnesses. The Supreme Court of Illinois denied Blackmon’s petition for leave 

to appeal.

Blackmon later discovered additional witnesses helpful to 

his case: Latonya Thomas and Lajuan Webb, who were both 

employees of a barber shop adjacent to the crime scene. Both 

were working the day of the shooting and signed affidavits 

with their observations of that day.

Thomas swore that on July 4, 2002, she was working when 

her attention was drawn to the street outside by what she believed to be fireworks. As she looked through the window, 

she saw the victim fall to the ground, and a man stepped into 

her line of sight and shot the victim as he tried to rise. At that 

point, Thomas crouched beside a chair but could still see what 

was going on outside. She said that she saw a second man 

whom she knew as “Pee” approach the victim and shoot him 

“several more times.” Both men then fled north. Thomas 

acknowledged that she had not previously spoken to the police but said she had feared for her safety. She was adamant 

that she could identify the shooters because she had “seen 

them both hanging out on the street around the salon countless times.” She testified that neither man was Blackmon, 

whom she has never met.

Webb swore that on July 4, 2002, he was also working 

when he heard five or six gunshots outside. He then saw two 

black men with guns run past the shop. Webb, too, said he 

had seen both gunmen in the neighborhood before the shooting and that neither one was Blackmon. Webb said he gave his 

name to a police officer who came to investigate the shooting, 

but no one ever contacted him for questioning.

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Based on these exculpatory affidavits, Blackmon sought 

leave to file a successive post-conviction petition in state 

court, arguing that Webb’s and Thomas’s testimony supported his actual innocence claim. He also re-asserted his 

claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to call Arrigo 

at trial. The state trial court denied his request, and Blackmon 

appealed.

The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed again. People v. Blackmon, No. 1-11-1908, 2013 WL 2145922 (Ill. App. May 14, 2013). 

It noted that Illinois law ordinarily contemplates only one 

post-conviction proceeding, but a showing of either cause and 

prejudice or actual innocence could overcome that bar. Id. at 

*5. “Where defendant seeks to relax the bar against successive 

post-conviction petitions on the basis of actual innocence, 

leave of court should be denied only where it is clear from a 

review of the successive petition and supporting documentation that, as a matter of law, defendant cannot set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence.” Id., citing People v. Edwards, 

969 N.E.2d 829, 836 (Ill. 2012). To establish a claim of actual 

innocence under Illinois law, a defendant must present evidence that is newly discovered, material, and not merely cumulative, and of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial. Id. The court concluded that 

the affidavits of Webb and Thomas could have been obtained 

long ago, stating that “any reasonable investigation would 

have included inquiries as to who was working at the salon at 

the time of the shooting” and that there “was no apparent obstacle to obtaining this information.” Id. at *6.

The court also held that Blackmon had not raised “the 

probability that it is more likely than not that no reasonable 

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14 No. 14-3059

juror would have convicted defendant in light of the new evidence,” concluding he had not set forth a colorable actual innocence claim. Id. at *7. The court focused on the following 

facts: (1) both Webb and Thomas waited nearly eight years to 

disclose their observations of the shooting; (2) Thomas 

viewed the incident while crouched behind a chair; (3) 

Thomas merely contradicted the credible testimony of 

McDowell and Reece; and (4) Webb did not even see the 

shooting take place. Id. at *6–7. Finally, the court rejected on 

res judicata grounds the claim that counsel should have called 

Arrigo to testify. Id. at *7. The Supreme Court of Illinois denied Blackmon’s petition for leave to appeal.

2. Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings

While the state courts were still considering Blackmon’s 

request to file a successive post-conviction petition, Blackmon 

filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. He 

asserted three distinct grounds for relief. Two were theories 

of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to present Arrigo’s testimony and the failure to investigate and call 

additional alibi witnesses. The third was a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence—that is, the 

Webb and Thomas affidavits.

The federal court held his petition in abeyance pending 

resolution of the state post-conviction proceedings. The petition was briefed after the state court proceedings ended, with 

Blackmon filing a supplemental memorandum that expanded 

on his earlier-asserted claims. The memorandum also suggested for the first time that his claim of actual innocence was 

meant not as a stand-alone ground for relief but as a “gateway 

claim” to an otherwise-defaulted theory of ineffective assistance of counsel and a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 

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83 (1963).1 Turning to the merits of those defaulted claims, 

Blackmon argued that his trial counsel was constitutionally 

ineffective by failing to conduct an adequate investigation of 

businesses near the crime scene, which would have led him to 

the exculpatory testimony of Webb and Thomas.

When the State filed its response to Blackmon’s § 2254 petition, it ignored the memorandum and Blackmon’s new characterization of the actual innocence claim as a “gateway” to 

an ineffective-assistance claim. Instead, it responded to the 

original § 2254 petition, limiting its analysis of Webb’s and 

Thomas’s testimony to the observation that federal habeas 

corpus law has not recognized freestanding claims of actual 

innocence.

The district court denied relief, concluding that the state 

court had not unreasonably applied the principles of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). United States ex rel. 

Blackmon v. Hardy, No. 11 C 2358, 2014 WL 3511497, at *2–3 

(N.D. Ill. July 16, 2014). The district court also upheld the state 

court’s rejection of the actual innocence claim, finding the 

analysis of the Thomas and Webb affidavits was reasonable. 

Id. at *4. We granted a certificate of appealability as to whether 

Blackmon’s trial counsel “was ineffective for failing to call an 

occurrence witness and numerous alibi witnesses.” We also 

instructed the parties to address whether Blackmon had defaulted any of his ineffective-assistance theories; whether he 

had demonstrated actual innocence excusing default; and 

 1

The purported Brady violation was based on the failure of the police 

to provide Blackmon with Webb’s contact information; Blackmon has not 

pursued that claim in this appeal.

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whether 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) applies to state court findings regarding actual innocence.

II. Analysis

We review de novo the district court’s decision denying habeas relief. Stitts v. Wilson, 713 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 2013). 

Blackmon is in state custody, so we review his claims under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Under § 2254(d), 

federal courts may not grant relief on any claim adjudicated 

on the merits by a state court unless the adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or 

“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the State court proceeding.”

Blackmon relies on the “unreasonable application” prong 

of § 2254(d)(1). Under this provision, a federal court may 

grant habeas relief if the state court correctly identified the 

governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s case law 

but unreasonably applied it to the facts of the petitioner’s case. 

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (citations omitted). 

This is a high standard: to grant relief, the state court’s decision must be objectively unreasonable, not merely incorrect. 

Id. at 520–21 (citations omitted); Badelle v. Correll, 452 F.3d 648, 

654–55 (7th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has warned that 

“even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s 

contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011); see, e.g., White v. Wheeler, 136 S. Ct. 456 

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No. 14-3059 17

(2015) (per curiam) (summarily reversing grant of habeas corpus relief for failure to extend sufficient AEDPA deference to 

state court’s determination).

This appeal also presents questions of procedural default, 

which we review de novo. Richardson v. Lemke, 745 F.3d 258, 269 

(7th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner must give the state an opportunity to correct alleged violations of federal rights by fairly 

presenting his claim through a full round of state court review. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844–45 (1999). The 

failure to do so results in procedural default. Id. at 848. Federal courts will not review a procedurally defaulted claim unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause for and prejudice 

stemming from that default, or, alternatively, that the denial 

of relief will result in a miscarriage of justice. Lewis v. Sternes, 

390 F.3d 1019, 1026 (7th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The 

miscarriage of justice exception “applies only in the rare case 

where the petitioner can prove that he is actually innocent of 

the crime of which he has been convicted.” McDowell v. Lemke, 

737 F.3d 476, 483 (7th Cir. 2013). To meet that standard, he 

must demonstrate, based on new, reliable evidence, that “‘ in 

light of new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. ’” Coleman v. Hardy, 628 F.3d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 2010), 

quoting House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537 (2006).

Procedural default is not jurisdictional. Trest v. Cain, 522 

U.S. 87, 89 (1997); see Canaan v. McBride, 395 F.3d 376, 382 (7th 

Cir. 2005). Rather, it is “an affirmative defense that the State is 

obligated to raise and preserve, and consequently one that it 

can waive.” Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d 505, 515 (7th Cir. 2004) 

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“As with any other right or defense, the State will waive procedural default by intentionally relinquishing its right to assert that defense,” either explicitly or implicitly. Id.

A. Procedural Default of Claims Based on Webb’s and 

Thomas’s Testimony

Blackmon argues that his trial counsel’s failure to locate 

and investigate Webb and Thomas, who worked in the barber 

shop, was one of several errors amounting to ineffective assistance. The State responds that Blackmon procedurally defaulted this claim by failing to raise it through one complete 

round of state court review. Blackmon contends in turn that 

the State implicitly waived its right to assert procedural default by failing to raise it in the response to his § 2254 petition 

filed in the district court.

Working our way backwards through these contentions, 

we first reject the argument that the State implicitly waived or 

forfeited the procedural default defense. Blackmon did not 

raise the failure to discover Webb and Thomas as a basis for 

his ineffective-assistance claim in the district court until he 

filed his supplemental memorandum, and the district court 

never ordered the State to respond to it. Under these unusual 

procedural circumstances, the State did not show “the intent 

to relinquish the defense that is the essence of true waiver.” 

Perruquet, 390 F.3d at 517 (finding no waiver where state had 

at most remained silent on procedural default issue). Nor 

would it be fair to hold the State to forfeiture where Blackmon 

introduced the claim so late.

Next, Blackmon procedurally defaulted this basis for his 

ineffective-assistance claim. To preserve a claim for federal 

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No. 14-3059 19

habeas review, a state prisoner must fairly present the operative facts and legal principles controlling the claim through a 

full round of state court review. Mulero v. Thompson, 668 F.3d 

529, 536 (7th Cir. 2012), quoting Smith v. McKee, 598 F.3d 374, 

382 (7th Cir. 2010). This rule requires that the factual and legal 

substance of the claim remain essentially the same when the 

petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies and moved 

on to federal court. Anderson v. Benik, 471 F.3d 811, 814–15 (7th 

Cir. 2006). With ineffective-assistance claims, we have held 

that a petitioner procedurally defaults individual claimed deficiencies when he does not fairly present them to the state 

courts, even if he presented an ineffective-assistance claim 

based on other alleged errors. See Mulero, 668 F.3d at 536.

Blackmon presented an ineffective-assistance claim 

through one full round of state-court review, but it was based 

on the other matters we discuss below. His second post-conviction petition included a claim based on the Webb and 

Thomas affidavits, but he framed that as a freestanding actual-innocence claim, not an ineffective-assistance claim. 

Thus, neither the legal nor the factual substance of the claim 

he now seeks to assert was before the state courts, meaning he 

has procedurally defaulted that claim.

We might nevertheless address the merits of Blackmon’s 

claim if he could show cause and prejudice or a miscarriage 

of justice—that is, “the conviction of an innocent person.” 

Hayes v. Battaglia, 403 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2005). He relies on 

the latter, arguing that the affidavits of Webb and Thomas 

constitute “new reliable evidence,” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 

298, 324 (1995), and that in light of that new evidence, it is 

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20 No. 14-3059

“more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him,” id. at 327.2

As noted above, Schlup requires Blackmon to show that 

“more likely than not, in light of the new evidence, no reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—

or, to remove the double negative, that more likely than not 

any reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt.” House v. 

Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006). The Schlup standard “is demanding and permits review only in the ‘extraordinary’ case.” Id., 

quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327; see also McQuiggin v. Perkins, 

133 S. Ct. 1924, 1936 (2013) (“We stress once again that the 

Schlup standard is demanding.”); Gladney v. Pollard, 799 F.3d 

889, 896 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The actual innocence gateway is narrow.”). Our function “is not to make an independent factual 

determination about what likely occurred, but rather to assess 

the likely impact of the evidence on reasonable jurors.” House, 

547 U.S. at 538, citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329. In applying this 

standard, we must consider all the evidence, both old and 

 

2 In assessing whether Blackmon satisfied the Schlup standard, the district court appears to have extended § 2254(d) deference to the state court’s 

resolution of Blackmon’s actual-innocence claim. We asked the parties to 

address whether 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) applies to state court findings regarding a claim of actual innocence. They agree that under these circumstances

it does not. In fact, the State relies on Sharpe v. Bell, 593 F.3d 372, 378 (4th 

Cir. 2010), which states that § 2254(d) “has no application in the context of 

a Schlup claim because it pertains only to a ‘claim that was adjudicated’ in 

state court.” State courts simply have no occasion to adjudicate Schlup

claims as such because those claims address only federal procedural obstacles to relief. In light of the parties’ agreement, we assume for the present appeal that no § 2254(d) deference is due to the state court’s resolution

of Blackmon’s actual innocence claim and review de novo the district 

court’s decision as to whether no reasonable juror would convict given all 

the evidence. Coleman v. Lemke, 739 F.3d 342, 349 (7th Cir. 2014).

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No. 14-3059 21

new, incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to 

whether it would necessarily be admitted at trial. Id., citing 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327–28. We then make a “probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do.” Id., quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329. 

The new evidence from Webb and Thomas does not meet 

this demanding standard for actual innocence. We recognize 

that the State’s case against Blackmon had important weaknesses: no physical evidence tied him to the murder, and the 

State introduced no evidence of a motive. But to counter, the 

State had matching independent identifications from Reece 

and McDowell. We have repeatedly recognized high rates of 

error in eyewitness identifications of strangers. United States 

v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2009); Raygoza v. Hulick, 

474 F.3d 958, 965 (7th Cir. 2007); Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 

301, 305 (7th Cir. 2003). But we have also recognized that those 

findings “have only limited application when multiple witnesses identify the same person.” Bartlett, 567 F.3d at 907; see 

also Morales v. Johnson, 659 F.3d 588, 601 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Each 

witness’s identification of Morales as the shooter corroborated 

the other’s testimony.”); United States v. Williams, 522 F.3d 809, 

812 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he number of identifications supplies 

valuable information. Even if the risk that any one identification would be mistaken is substantial, the risk that multiple 

witnesses would make the same error is smaller.”).3 Further-

 3 Certainly, there are situations in which multiple identifications are 

of limited value—if the eyewitnesses have contact with one another, for 

example, or if they make those identifications due to similarly suggestive 

police procedures. See Brandon Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where 

Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong 50–51 (2011) (noting that 36% of exonerees 

whose cases involved eyewitness identification were wrongly identified 

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22 No. 14-3059

more, some of the State’s criticisms of Blackmon’s defense evidence are well founded. Arrigo had shown himself unreliable (and possibly even involved in the murder). And the alibi 

witnesses’ testimony is fairly subject to the criticism that it 

was acquired years after the barbecue in question and purports to recount fairly specific details of an unremarkable 

gathering. See Woods v. Schwartz, 589 F.3d 368, 377 (7th Cir. 

2009) (rejecting claim of actual innocence based on alibi affidavits of family members that were prepared years after the 

murder and noted “with incredible particularity the most pedestrian details of that night,” even though “the night was like 

any other”). 

Webb and Thomas saw the shooters for no longer than 

Reece and McDowell (in fact, Webb did not even see them until they were already fleeing). Furthermore, they did not come 

forward until eight years after the murder, a substantial delay 

that could affect their memories and/or their credibility. See 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 332 (holding that “the court may consider 

how the timing of the submission and the likely credibility of 

the affiants bear on the probable reliability of that evidence”). 

 

by multiple eyewitnesses); Deborah Davis & Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Dangers of Eyewitnesses for the Innocent: Learning from the Past and Projecting into 

the Age of Social Media, 46 New Eng. L. Rev. 769, 807 (2012) (noting that 

“converging identifications seem particularly persuasive if one does not 

recognize that: (1) witnesses can influence one another, and (2) separate 

witnesses can each be affected by the same suggestive influences (such as 

suggestive police procedures)”). Blackmon has not attacked the police 

procedures, however, and nothing in the record suggests McDowell and 

Reece had any contact with one another before or while making their identifications.

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No. 14-3059 23

This sort of balance between inculpatory and exculpatory 

witnesses is not enough to meet the demanding Schlup standard for actual innocence. See, e.g., Smith v. McKee, 598 F.3d 374, 

388 (7th Cir. 2010) (two exculpatory eyewitnesses insufficient 

to counter state’s two inculpatory eyewitnesses); Hayes v. 

Battaglia, 403 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Suppose that the 

six alibi witnesses had been called. That would at best have 

produced a draw: six eyewitnesses identify Hayes as the culprit, six others exculpate him. That cannot establish that ‘no 

reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty 

of the underlying offense[.]’”); see also id. (“[p]roof of innocence must be considerably more than the proof required to 

establish prejudice” needed for ineffective assistance of counsel). Blackmon has not shown the miscarriage of justice 

needed to excuse his procedural default, so we do not consider the merits of the claim based on the testimony of 

Thomas and Webb.

B. Merits of the Remaining Ineffective-Assistance Claims

Blackmon asserts two non-defaulted bases for his claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): the failure to call Arrigo as a witness 

at trial, and the failure to investigate and present additional 

alibi testimony. The operative question is whether the state 

court reasonably applied the familiar two-pronged test of 

Strickland: (1) whether counsel’s performance “fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

688, and (2) whether counsel’s errors prejudiced the defendant, requiring him to show a reasonable probability that, but 

for those errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different, id. at 694; see also Allen v. Chandler, 555 F.3d 596, 600 

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24 No. 14-3059

(7th Cir. 2009). The state court found that counsel’s performance was not constitutionally deficient, so we must give 

AEDPA deference to that conclusion, upholding it so long as 

it is not objectively unreasonable. Badelle v. Correll, 452 F.3d 

648, 654–55 (7th Cir. 2006).

1. Richard Arrigo

We cannot disagree with the state court’s finding that the 

decision not to call Arrigo was a reasonable strategic decision. 

“The Constitution does not oblige counsel to present each and 

every witness that is suggested to him.” United States v. Berg, 

714 F.3d 490, 499 (7th Cir. 2013), quoting United States v. Best, 

426 F.3d 937, 945 (7th Cir. 2005). Rather, counsel need only investigate possible lines of defense and make an informed decision. Id. “If counsel has investigated witnesses and consciously decided not to call them, the decision is probably 

strategic.” Best, 426 F.3d at 945. Strategic decisions like these, 

so long as they are made after a thorough investigation of law 

and facts, are “virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 690.

Arrigo looks helpful at first glance. We must assume he 

would have supported Blackmon’s version of events by testifying that he saw the shooting and that Blackmon was not 

there. But Blackmon glosses over serious potential problems 

with that testimony. Arrigo had been caught lying to the police during the course of the investigation. He claimed that he 

did not have Cox’s phone number but later admitted that a 

voicemail on Cox’s cell phone featured his voice. His cell 

phone records showed he called Cox before the murder, and 

George Davis after it. Blackmon’s attorney could reasonably 

have concluded that putting Arrigo on the stand would do 

more harm than good. For example, a trier of fact might have 

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No. 14-3059 25

believed that Arrigo helped arrange the murder and sought 

to protect his co-conspirator. Arrigo’s testimony would also 

have undermined the defense testimony from Boyd, who 

claimed that Arrigo’s friend George Davis was present at the 

shooting. Arrigo consistently maintained that he did not recognize either shooter. Also, Boyd did not even remember seeing Arrigo at the scene. Blackmon’s attorney could reasonably 

have taken this into account as well. 

Blackmon argues that he can “overcome the presumption 

that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be 

considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 

quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955). He contends that the failure to call Arrigo was not strategic but was 

caused by counsel’s accidental failure to secure his attendance 

at trial. See Mosley v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 838, 848 (7th Cir. 2012) 

(presumption that strategic judgments are reasonable “applies only if the lawyer actually exercised judgment”). Blackmon relies on this exchange between counsel and the trial 

judge:

THE COURT: You’ve got two more witnesses?

[COUNSEL]: I have one for certain and I had 

spoken with another gentleman that was suppose[d] to be here but he’s a little—I don’t want 

to—

THE COURT: Okay.

[COUNSEL]: —characterize him in any 

fashion.

Blackmon argues that the most reasonable inference is that 

counsel was referring to Arrigo, who failed to show up. That 

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26 No. 14-3059

is one possible inference, but not the only one. Nothing in this 

exchange shows that the “gentleman” in question was Arrigo 

or that counsel failed to secure his attendance through inattention. The state court did not act unreasonably by finding 

that the decision not to call Arrigo was reasonable as a matter 

of strategy. In addition, given all the baggage Arrigo would 

have carried as a witness, we could not say that the failure to 

call him prejudiced Blackmon. That failure would not undermine confidence in the verdict.

2. Alibi Witnesses from the Barbecue

The alibi witnesses present a very different problem. As 

noted above, the decision not to call a particular witness is 

frequently strategic, insulated from attack on ineffective-assistance grounds. “An outright failure to investigate witnesses, however, is more likely to be a sign of deficient performance.” United States v. Best, 426 F.3d 937, 945 (7th Cir. 2005), 

citing Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91 (“strategic choices made after less than 

complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent 

that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation”). 

On this record, the State must concede, at least for purposes of this appeal, that counsel did not interview any of the 

additional alibi witnesses whom Blackmon identified, but the 

State argues it was enough that counsel “learned the substance” of their testimony from interviews with Blackmon 

and his family members. Blackmon’s affidavit, which the State 

cites for support, says only that Blackmon informed his counsel he was at the barbecue, that plenty of people could vouch 

for his presence, and that he eventually provided his counsel 

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No. 14-3059 27

with names, addresses, telephone numbers, and as much information as he could on potential alibi witnesses. This does 

not mean that counsel knew the substance of those witnesses’ 

testimony. Counsel had no way of knowing, for example, if 

any of the witnesses could definitively place Blackmon at the 

barbecue at 4:30 p.m. Such testimony could have provided 

Blackmon with a much stronger alibi. Nor does it appear that 

counsel or the state court considered the benefits of alibi testimony from disinterested witnesses who, as far as we know 

(and unlike Wash and Leavy, who did testify for Blackmon), 

had no family ties to Blackmon and no felony convictions. See 

Raygoza, 474 F.3d at 963 (noting that “witnesses both related 

and unrelated to Raygoza could have been called”); Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 634 (7th Cir. 2000) (testimony of additional alibi witnesses without criminal records “would have 

added a great deal of substance and credibility” to alibi).

Counsel’s failure to investigate undermines the state 

court’s analysis, which appears to assume that counsel knew, 

somehow, that the additional alibi witnesses would offer 

purely cumulative testimony. If counsel never learned what 

the witnesses would have said, he “could not possibly have 

made a reasonable professional judgment that their testimony 

would have been cumulative.” Mosley, 689 F.3d at 848; see also 

Campbell v. Reardon, 780 F.3d 752, 764 (7th Cir. 2015) (rejecting 

state court’s assumption that lawyer’s decision not to interview eyewitnesses was reasonable; proper inquiry was 

“whether the investigation supporting counsel’s decision” not 

to call the witnesses “was itself reasonable”). The unreasonableness of counsel’s failure to investigate is further bolstered 

by the significant potential benefits of obtaining alibi testimony from witnesses unimpaired by family ties to Blackmon 

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28 No. 14-3059

or prior convictions, another point the state court apparently 

did not consider.

The State also argues that the individual alibi witnesses 

would themselves have had vulnerabilities. That’s possible, of 

course, but counsel could not have known those vulnerabilities without doing at least some investigation of the witnesses 

and the testimony they could provide. There is also no indication he considered the effect all the witnesses might have 

had in combination, any individual weaknesses notwithstanding. See Raygoza, 474 F.3d at 964 (rejecting attorney’s decision not to call additional alibi witnesses where he “picked 

off” each witness based on potential vulnerabilities without 

considering the cumulative impact of their testimony). 

Strickland “permits counsel to ‘make a reasonable decision 

that makes particular investigations unnecessary.’” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 106, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. But the 

record provides no support to treat as reasonable a decision 

not to investigate furtherthe available alibi witnesses from the 

barbecue. Blackmon’s location at 4:30 p.m. was the pivotal issue for the defense. Additional disinterested and credible alibi witnesses could have made a significant difference in the 

viability of Blackmon’s defense, especially given the problems 

with the alibi witnesses who did testify. See Washington, 219 

F.3d at 631 (attorney’s failure to try to contact any witnesses 

besides one was ineffective, and state court’s decision to the 

contrary was an unreasonable application “of Strickland’s requirement that an attorney conduct a reasonable investigation 

in connection with his client’s case”). Nothing in the record 

shows that investigating those witnesses would have been 

“fruitless or harmful,” Campbell, 780 F.3d at 765, citing StrickCase: 14-3059 Document: 38 Filed: 05/24/2016 Pages: 45
No. 14-3059 29

land, 466 U.S. at 691, and the benefits could have been enormous. Just one witness might have been able to give Blackmon a true alibi. At a minimum, all of them could have bolstered his claim of being at the barbecue all afternoon. It is not 

reasonable strategy to leave such possible testimony unexplored under these circumstances. So even giving both counsel and the state court the substantial deference they are due 

under Strickland and AEDPA, respectively, the state court’s 

finding with respect to trial counsel’s performance was, on 

this record, unreasonable.

Finally, we must determine whether “there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The state court never reached the prejudice question, so we review de novo that prong of Strickland. 

See Sussman v. Jenkins, 636 F.3d 329, 350 (7th Cir. 2011), quoting Toliver v. McCaughtry, 539 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2008). “A 

reasonable probability is ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Mosley, 689 F.3d at 851, 

quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Unlike the more demanding Schlup inquiry, the issue here is not whether Blackmon is 

actually innocent, but instead whether he would have had a 

“reasonable chance” of acquittal absent counsel’s errors. Stanley v. Bartley, 465 F.3d 810, 814 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting also that 

“it needn’t be a 50 percent or greater chance”). In undertaking 

this inquiry, we must “consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury. A verdict or conclusion that is overwhelmingly supported by the record is less likely to have 

been affected by errors than one that is only weakly supported by the record.” Hough v. Anderson, 272 F.3d 878, 891 

(7th Cir. 2001), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696; see, e.g., 

Thomas v. Clements, 789 F.3d 760, 771–72 (7th Cir. 2015). 

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30 No. 14-3059

We begin there, with the weakness of the State’s case. No 

physical evidence tied Blackmon to the crime, nor did the 

State present any evidence of motive or connection between 

Blackmon and the victim. The only evidence connecting 

Blackmon to the murder was the eyewitness testimony of 

McDowell and Reece. That was enough to support the guilty 

verdict but is by no means ironclad. Neither witness saw the 

second shooter’s face for long, and both were strangers to 

Blackmon, increasing the danger of mistake. See United States 

v. Brown, 471 F.3d 802, 804 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Even under the 

best circumstances, the probability of erroneous identification 

of a stranger seen briefly is uncomfortably high.”), citing Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979), and Daniel L. 

Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory 88–137 (2001). As noted 

above, the two corroborating identifications help make mistakes less likely, but mistakes are certainly still possible where 

two eyewitnesses identify the same alleged perpetrator. Garrett, supra, at 50–51. And their confidence in their identifications (a point that impressed the trial judge in their favor) is 

not a reliable indicator of accuracy. See Newsome v. McCabe, 

319 F.3d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Psychological research has 

established that the witness’s faith is equally strong whether 

or not the identification is correct.”); Garrett, supra, at 63 (noting that almost all the eyewitnesses who testified at exonerees’ 

trials “expressed complete confidence at trial that they had 

identified the attacker”); see also Williams, 522 F.3d at 812 (discussing how witnesses’ memories realign over time to match 

earlier statements, so “trial testimony may reflect more confidence than is warranted”). 

Against this weak case for Blackmon’s guilt we balance the 

defense bolstered by several additional alibi witnesses, most 

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No. 14-3059 31

of whom are, as far as we know now, disinterested and unencumbered by prior convictions. See Washington, 219 F.3d at 

634 (“Rather than one direct alibi witness with a criminal record, Washington could have had three potentially more credible witnesses[.]”). Six of the seven new witnesses recall being 

at the barbecue at 4:30 p.m., when the murder occurred. Some 

of them specifically recall interacting with Blackmon at the 

picnic; all say they never saw Blackmon leave or noticed he 

was gone. At a casual gathering with people coming and going, it is perhaps unlikely that a single person could vouch for 

Blackmon’s continued presence there. But adding another 

witness who can say the same thing makes it less likely that 

Blackmon would have been able to slip away unseen long 

enough to commit the murder. Adding six such witnesses 

makes it less likely still, particularly when some of those witnesses can testify to actual interactions with Blackmon during 

the course of the afternoon, like Lashun Melton, who says she 

played cards with him sometime between about 4:00 and 6:00 

p.m., or Tiara Topps, who says she flirted with him sometime 

between about 3:00 and 6:00 p.m. In a large-group setting like 

this one, the collective weight of the other guests’ testimony is 

greater than the sum of their individual accounts.

The alibi witnesses’ testimony is not definitive, of course. 

Maybe they are honestly mistaken or even lying. It’s also possible that everyone who would testify that Blackmon was at 

the barbecue all afternoon missed seeing him leave during the 

critical window of time. No one can testify specifically to seeing him close to the critical time of 4:30 p.m., though Sheryce 

Crowder, the mother of Blackmon’s daughter, claimed she 

was near him all afternoon. All of the witnesses are vulnerable 

to attacks on their memory at this point. Many of them did 

not know until years after the barbecue that Blackmon had 

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32 No. 14-3059

been arrested for murder. At the time, they would have had 

no reason to consider the barbecue or Blackmon’s presence at 

it of any particular importance. 

These are fair criticisms. But to establish prejudice, Blackmon does not have to prove actual innocence; he does not 

even have to show that counsel’s errors more likely than not 

altered the outcome in his case. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 

86, 111–12 (2011), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 697; 

Campbell, 780 F.3d at 769; Raygoza, 474 F.3d at 963. He must 

show only a reasonable likelihood that the outcome would 

have been different—that is, a likelihood that is “substantial, 

not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112, citing Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 693. Given the weakness of the State’s case—the 

complete lack of any motive, the dearth of physical evidence, 

and the heavy reliance on the eyewitness identifications of 

two strangers who saw the killers for only seconds—we conclude that on this record, it is “substantially likely that [Blackmon] could have raised at least a reasonable doubt and had a 

different outcome at trial” if counsel had provided adequate 

representation. Thomas, 789 F.3d at 772.

With our § 2254(d)(1) analysis limited to the record that 

was before the state court, we conclude that the state court’s 

decision was unreasonable. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 

170, 181 (2011); Mosley, 689 F.3d at 841. We have recognized, 

however, that although the conclusion that a state court’s 

summary decision made on the basis of affidavits was an unreasonable application of federal law will often show the petitioner is entitled to relief, “it will not do so always and automatically.” Mosley, 689 F.3d at 853. As in Campbell and Mosley, 

the state court here summarily dismissed Blackmon’s petition 

for post-conviction relief. It never tested the truth of the alibi 

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No. 14-3059 33

witnesses’ affidavits through any form of adversarial process. 

“Having concluded that the affidavits and statements, if true, 

are sufficient to warrant habeas relief, we still have no factual 

findings on these questions to review, and the record”—

which contains no affidavit from defense counsel, for example—“is otherwise ambiguous.” Campbell, 780 F.3d at 772. Under these circumstances, “an evidentiary hearing is needed to 

develop the record on (1) the extent of counsel’s actual pretrial 

investigation and (2) what these witnesses would have said if 

called to testify at trial.” Id. Whether Blackmon is entitled to 

habeas corpus relief will depend on the outcome of that hearing and the district court’s factual findings. See id. at 772–73.4

We VACATE the denial of Blackmon’s petition for a writ 

of habeas corpus, and REMAND this matter to the district 

court for consideration of whether Blackmon is actually in 

custody in violation of the United States Constitution.

 4 We see no reason why Blackmon would not be able to call the salon 

witnesses, Latonya Thomas and Lajuan Webb, as witnesses in the evidentiary hearing on remand. We have explained why an independent claim 

of ineffective assistance based on their testimony has been procedurally 

defaulted (i.e., forfeited). Nevertheless, their testimony might well corroborate the testimony of the alibi witnesses from the barbecue and thus be 

relevant to the factual findings the district court will need to make at least 

on the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis.

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34 No. 14-3059

POSNER, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. I agree 

with the decision to remand this case, but not with the majority’s treatment of two critical potential witnesses for the 

petitioner, witnesses whom his lawyer failed to interview 

(or, so far as appears, failed even to attempt to interview), 

and by failing rendered ineffective assistance (I would prefer 

to say, provided inadequate professional assistance) to his 

client.

For a litigant to avoid being bound, as a litigant ordinarily is, by his lawyer’s mistakes, a petitioner for federal habeas 

corpus must establish “a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). The 

majority opinion in the present case finds that the petitioner 

has presented compelling evidence that he probably would

not have been convicted of murder had it not been for his

trial counsel’s indefensible failure to interrogate potential 

alibi witnesses, and that therefore the case should be remanded to allow him to put those (and perhaps other) witnesses on the stand.

But I don’t agree with the majority’s decision to exclude

from the remand a parallel inquiry into trial counsel’s failure

to interview employees of a hair salon that adjoined the restaurant in front of which the murder took place. They were 

potential trial witnesses who have signed affidavits that if 

accurate provide powerful evidence of the petitioner’s innocence. The majority rejects this claim of inadequate professional assistance because Blackmon failed to raise it in the 

state court (in contrast, he had raised, in state postCase: 14-3059 Document: 38 Filed: 05/24/2016 Pages: 45
No. 14-3059 35

conviction proceedings, the failure of trial counsel to interview the alibi witnesses). But such a forfeiture is excusable if

“it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would 

have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” 

had the jury been given the evidence that the defendant’s 

lawyer failed through negligence to uncover. Schlup v. Delo, 

513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995), so holds, and in House v. Bell, 547 

U.S. 518, 538 (2006), we read that although “the Schlup

standard is demanding and permits [federal court] review 

only in the ‘extraordinary’ case ... [it] does not require absolute certainty about the petitioner’s guilt or innocence. ... 

[His] burden at the gateway stage is to demonstrate that 

more likely than not, in light of the new evidence, no reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.”

The hair-salon employees’ evidence might not be enough 

to carry the day for Blackmon given this demanding standard; nor the alibi witnesses’ evidence; but together the two 

bodies of evidence constitute (in combination with other factors that I’ll discuss) a powerful showing that Blackmon is 

innocent. The majority is willing to allow both sets of witnesses—the alibi witnesses and the hair-salon witnesses—to 

testify on remand, but the hair-salon witnesses only conditionally: they may testify only to the extent that their testimony is relevant to the claim that Blackmon’s lawyer rendered ineffective assistance by failing to interview the alibi

witnesses. The majority concludes that Blackmon’s other ineffective-assistance claim—the claim based on trial counsel’s

failure to interview the hair-salon witnesses—must be dismissed because the evidence given by the hair-salon witnesses does not establish a sufficient probability of innoCase: 14-3059 Document: 38 Filed: 05/24/2016 Pages: 45
36 No. 14-3059

cence to excuse Blackmon’s forfeiture of that claim. I disagree, for reasons that I’ll explain.

Not until eight years after the murder did Blackmon obtain affidavits of the two employees of the hair salon, Latonya Thomas and Lajuan Webb, each of whom has submitted 

an affidavit that attests that the affiant was a witness to 

events surrounding the murder and that Blackmon was not 

one of the murderers. Though Webb did not see the shootings, immediately after hearing shots he saw two men he 

recognized run past the window of the salon holding guns. 

Neither man was Blackmon. Thomas, according to her affidavit, did see the shooting—and said she was sure that neither shooter was Blackmon.

Each of the affiants knew the shooters from the neighborhood, and “social-science studies do not suggest that 

people who have known one another for weeks or years are 

apt to err when identifying them in court.” United States v. 

Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2009). Thomas’s affidavit 

states that after hearing what she thought were fireworks 

she looked through the “large plate glass window in the

front of the salon,” saw the first man shoot the victim and 

the victim “fall to the ground in front of the business just 

south of the salon,” and then saw the second shooter approach the prone victim and shoot him “several more 

times.” She recognized this second shooter as “a man nicknamed ‘Pee’ (Real Name Unknown) who was in his late 

twenties.” She was “sure of the identity of the two men ... 

because I’ve seen them both hanging out on the street 

around the salon countless times.” Shown photographs of 

Blackmon, she said he wasn’t one of the shooters. Her statement that the second shooter was named “Pee” is consistent 

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No. 14-3059 37

with early investigative leads and with Terrance Boyd’s testimony, which I discuss further below, that a man named 

“Pride” (Eric Bridges) was the second shooter. “Pee” (that is, 

the letter “P” as it is pronounced when standing alone) 

could well be short for “Pride.”

Lajuan Webb’s affidavit is similar. He said he heard gun 

shots and then saw “two guys with guns ran past the barber 

shop.” He’d “seen those two guys that had the guns prior to 

the day of the shooting in the neighborhood near the barber 

shop” and Blackmon “was not one of the guys I seen running past the barber shop holding a gun.” He said the police 

had questioned him immediately after the shooting but had 

never followed up.

The hair-salon witnesses are more reliable than the state’s

two witnesses, who in a photo array, then in a line-up, and 

finally at trial, had identified Blackmon as the second shooter. Those witnesses had never met or seen the second shooter before the murder, while the hair-salon witnesses had 

seen both shooters before then, knew them, and were sure 

that neither was Blackmon. As for those witnesses’ failure to 

come forward with their testimony for years, Thomas explained that she “was fearful that those guys [the shooters] 

might have found out and tried to do something to me” had 

she spoken to police. Had she thought that Blackmon was 

one of the shooters and had been arrested, she would not 

have been fearful that the shooters (plural) would have tried 

to do something to her; she would have known that one of 

them had been caught and neutralized. (Webb said he 

hadn’t known that anyone had been arrested for the crime.)

The affidavits of the salon witnesses bolster the affidavits 

of the alibi witnesses on whom the majority opinion bases its 

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38 No. 14-3059

decision to remand the case. The alibi witnesses claim to 

have seen Blackmon at a barbecue around the time of the 

murder and did not see him leave during that time. And all 

but two of them neither had nor have any close connection 

to him and thus would have no reason to lie to protect him. 

But the hair-salon witnesses likewise had and have, so far as 

appears, no ties to Blackmon that might cause them to lie on 

his behalf. (It’s not known whether either of them had any 

criminal history that might undermine their affidavits.)

The two eyewitnesses to the murder on whom the government rests its case had previously identified Blackmon in 

a photo array and then in a line-up as the second shooter. 

Neither recognized the second shooter as someone they’d 

ever met. The photo arrays postdated the murder by nearly 

two months and were confusing, as they contained only 

black-and-white photos, thus concealing hair color, skin 

tone, and other facial features. One of the eyewitnesses testified that she’d seen the second shooter’s face for “maybe 

three” seconds, the other for five seconds “maybe.” Both had 

been distracted. They had been in their cars at the time, both 

with children—five between the two of them. One, a twelveyear-old, viewed the same photo array as the two grown-ups

but identified someone other than Blackmon as one of the 

shooters, and did not identify Blackmon as the other. Although one of the mothers had called 911 as she drove away 

from the murder scene, she testified that the police had not 

contacted her until more than a month after the shooting. 

One of the mothers testified that she’d told officers she’d

seen an Italian or Hispanic man (Richard Arrigo, discussed 

in the majority opinion) holding a gun in his hand, the other

that that man wasn’t holding a gun and that two black men 

were the shooters.

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No. 14-3059 39

No physical evidence tied Blackmon to the murder, and 

the state presented no evidence of a motive—and couldn’t 

even explain why he’d been included in the photo array in 

the first place. Though one detective said the police had received information about Blackmon’s involvement in the 

murder “from family members,” the family members were 

never identified and it isn’t even clear to whose family the 

detective was referring. The prosecution presented no evidence that Blackmon had known either the murder victim or 

the man who was identified by the 12-year-old as one of the 

assailants and is believed on the basis of additional evidence 

to have been the first shooter. Although the police had heard 

that the shooting was the result of a dispute among gang 

members, no evidence of that was presented at the trial—or

that Blackmon was a gang member.

Earlier I noted evidence pointing to Eric Bridges 

(“Pride”) as the second shooter. He belonged to the same 

gang as the murder victim. Neither of the state’s eyewitnesses was shown a photo of Bridges even though the police had 

learned four days after the murder that one of the shooters 

was called “Pride,” and Terrance Boyd told them before 

Blackmon’s trial that Bridges was the second shooter. Boyd 

testified that he’d met up with Tony Cox (the murder victim) 

on the day of the shooting because Cox had said he needed 

to discuss business with Bridges. Boyd said he left the two of 

them so that they could talk privately and walked into a 

nearby alley and while there he heard gunshots and “saw 

Eric Bridges shooting—shooting Tony” about twenty feet 

from where Boyd was standing. That the police didn’t show 

the state’s two eyewitnesses a photograph of Bridges was a 

remarkable investigative failure.

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40 No. 14-3059

The case is much like Schlup. Schlup had been convicted 

of murdering another prison inmate. The state’s evidence 

consisted of testimony by two corrections officers who had 

witnessed the killing. Schlup’s defense included a video 

showing him in the prison dining room, far from where the

murder took place, 65 seconds before the alarm was sounded. After the trial Schlup presented evidence that another

guard had seen him elsewhere in the prison right around the 

time of the murder, plus statements of numerous eyewitnesses to the murder who swore that Schlup had not committed it. The Supreme Court said that if the new statements 

were found to be reliable, “it surely cannot be said that a juror, conscientiously following the judge’s instructions requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, would vote to 

convict.” Schlup v. Delo, supra, 513 U.S. at 331.

And in Larsen v. Soto, 742 F.3d 1083, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 

2013), we read that “despite the Warden’s repeated arguments that a ‘swearing match’ between prosecution and defense witnesses is insufficient to satisfy Schlup, [he] never 

meaningfully explains how a jury faced with evidence from 

five different witnesses that a different person threw the 

knife could nonetheless have concluded that Larsen was 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If the fact that prosecution 

witnesses testified against the defendant at trial were sufficient to defeat any actual innocence claim, the Schlup doctrine would be meaningless. Indeed, Schlup itself is to the 

contrary.”

I agree with the statement in the majority opinion “that 

Blackmon’s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by 

failing to investigate the alibi witnesses and [that this] shows 

that the state court’s summary dismissal of the claim was 

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No. 14-3059 41

unreasonable.” And I agree that a “state court’s mistake in 

summarily rejecting a [habeas corpus] petition, i.e., without 

fully evaluating conflicting evidence on disputed factual issues, does not necessarily mean the petitioner is ultimately

entitled to relief.” Mosley v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 838, 842 (7th 

Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). So a hearing is necessary. But 

Blackmon’s fate should not depend entirely on the alibi witnesses. The evidence of the hair-salon witnesses is sufficiently reliable to justify a hearing about whether no reasonable 

juror would have convicted him had they heard those witnesses’ testimony, and such a ruling would forgive his having forfeited his claim of ineffective assistance by reason of 

his lawyer’s failure to interview the hair-salon witnesses before the murder trial. See Schlup v. Delo, supra, 513 U.S. at

331–32; Coleman v. Hardy, 628 F.3d 314, 318–23 (7th Cir. 

2010); Wolfe v. Clarke, 691 F.3d 410, 420–22 (4th Cir. 2012).

Ineffective assistance of counsel in regard to the potential 

hair-salon witnesses, forfeited because not urged by counsel

in the state court proceedings, is a constitutional error that 

can support a petition for habeas corpus. The failure of 

Blackmon’s trial counsel to locate and interview the two employees of the salon who had seen the murderers, recognized them, and were sure that Blackmon was not one of 

them, was a disastrous blunder given the paucity of evidence of his guilt. Counsel must have accepted the police 

reports (which stated that one person at the salon had been 

interviewed and had not seen the murder) uncritically; for

he failed to conduct his own investigation to discover 

whether anyone else had been in the salon. Although 

Blackmon’s new evidence should be subject to scrutiny on 

remand, he has made a strong showing that his lawyer’s

failure to find and interview the hair-salon witnesses fell beCase: 14-3059 Document: 38 Filed: 05/24/2016 Pages: 45
42 No. 14-3059

low the minimum standard of reasonable representation of a 

defendant charged with murder and greatly harmed Blackmon’s defense. Cf. Campbell v. Reardon, 780 F.3d 752, 767–72

(7th Cir. 2015); Mosley v. Atchison, supra, 689 F.3d at 848–49; 

U.S. ex rel. Hampton v. Leibach, 347 F.3d 219, 249–56 (7th Cir. 

2003); Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 629–32 (7th Cir. 

2000).

The Schlup standard “does not require absolute certainty 

about the petitioner’s guilt or innocence.” House v. Bell, supra, 547 U.S. at 538. Yet the evidence emanating from the 

hair-salon witnesses comes close. They knew the shooters

and say with certainty that neither one was Blackmon—

instead the second one probably was Eric “Pride” Bridges. 

The two hair-salon witnesses have no known connection—

family, business, social, political—to Blackmon and thus 

nothing to gain from lying to protect him. Compare Smith v. 

McKee, 598 F.3d 374, 388 (7th Cir. 2010); Hayes v. Battaglia, 

403 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2005).

The hair-salon witnesses’ affidavits, in combination with

the other evidence of Blackmon’s evidence that I’ve just 

summarized, would seem to outweigh the identification of

him as one of the shooters, months after the shootings, by

two unreliable eyewitnesses. Against this the majority opinion argues that “even if the risk that any one identification 

would be mistaken is substantial, the risk that multiple witnesses would make the same error is smaller.” Were this

true (as I doubt, because a witness may be influenced by a 

forceful, confident, yet thoroughly erroneous report by another witness of the same event), it still would do nothing to 

bolster the majority’s belief that the government’s eyewitnesses were more reliable than the hair-salon witnesses. For 

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No. 14-3059 43

there were two of them also—making them multiple witnesses, too, and the multiple was identical to that of the government’s witnesses. The majority opinion thus does nothing 

to enable us to distinguish the accuracy of the government’s 

eyewitnesses from that of the hair-salon witnesses—yet for

reasons explained earlier in this opinion the latter witnesses 

seem more credible than the former.

The majority opinion points out that the hair-salon witnesses did “not come forward until eight years after the 

murder, a substantial delay that could affect their memories 

and/or their credibility.” Could; but I imagine that witnessing a murder is the kind of experience that sticks with one 

for many years, especially when one recognizes the murderers.

In sum, the hair-salon witnesses’ evidence by itself, without regard to the alibi witnesses’ evidence, if found reliable

would entitle Blackmon to a new trial. And a remand to determine that reliability is essential, lest the alibi witnesses 

prove to be unconvincing on remand.

On this note I end my discussion of Blackmon’s appeal

with a plea to the majority to reconsider its brush off of the 

hair-salon witnesses. But I want in closing to mention some 

reservations that I have concerning terminology in the majority opinion. I do not criticize the majority for the terminology. It is taken from previous decisions, many of them 

Supreme Court decisions; it is not the invention of this panel. But legal language is a plague, much of which originates 

in Supreme Court opinions.

An example of what troubles me is the majority opinion’s 

numerous iterations of the phrase “actual innocence,” and its

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44 No. 14-3059

occasional invocations of the cognate term “actually innocent.” These phrases are misleading. A defendant is either

innocent or guilty. There is no separate state of being actually rather than just—just what?—innocent. So what work is 

“actual” or “actually” doing? None I think. Something in the 

legal genome causes lawyers and judges to want to speak in 

pairs, as in “arbitrary and capricious” and “clear and convincing.” Ask yourself: what does “arbitrary” add to “capricious” or vice versa, “clear” to “convincing” or vice versa, 

“actual” to “innocence.”

The history of the term “actual innocence” is revealing. 

Its remote origin is a famous article by Judge Henry Friendly, “Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal 

Judgments,” 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970). He argued that for 

collateral attacks (as by federal habeas corpus) on criminal 

convictions—attacks based for example on alleged federal 

constitutional violations in the state proceeding—to succeed

on a procedurally barred claim, generally the petitioner 

should be required to present evidence that he probably was 

innocent of the crime for which he had been convicted. 

Three justices of the Supreme Court adopted Judge Friendly’s suggestion in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986), 

where Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, added “factual” before “innocence.” The Court adopted this formulation, minus the “f,” to create the “actual innocence” exception to procedural default at issue in this case. See Murray v. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986). The term is understood to distinguish not having committed the crime of which one was 

charged from having been entitled to acquittal on some 

ground unrelated to the merits, such as lack of jurisdiction.

See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (“’actual 

innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insuffiCase: 14-3059 Document: 38 Filed: 05/24/2016 Pages: 45
No. 14-3059 45

ciency”). It would have been more accurate to say that some 

acquittals are based on the defendant’s having been found 

innocent of the crime or crimes with which he was charged, 

and others are based on reasons unrelated to guilt or innocence, such as lack of jurisdiction, violation of certain constitutional rights (for example, rights conferred by the Fourth 

Amendment), or expiration of the statute of limitations. Fair 

enough, but the adjectives “factual” and “actual” add nothing to the distinction. The Court should have stuck with “innocence,” dropping both adjectives.

Another familiar term in legal discourse that appears in 

the majority opinion in this case and that I would like to see 

purged is “procedural default,” a cumbersome alternative to 

“forfeiture.” The failure of a petitioner for federal habeas 

corpus to have given the state courts a chance to rule on the 

claim he seeks to vindicate in the habeas corpus proceeding

normally forfeits the right to press the claim in federal court. 

But the petitioner can be relieved of his forfeiture—as he 

should be in this case with regard to the hair-salon witnesses

irrespective of the fate of the alibi witnesses—if he has 

strong though not necessarily conclusive evidence of his innocence.

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