Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00437/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00437-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chris Aguilar
Plaintiff
General Motors Company
Defendant
General Motors LLC
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRIS AGUILAR, on behalf of himself and others 

similarly situated, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

GENERAL MOTORS LLC,

 Defendant.

1:13-CV-00437-LJO-GSA

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 

(Doc. 18)

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT TO PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Judges in the Eastern District of California carry the heaviest caseload in the nation, and this 

Court is unable to devote inordinate time and resources to individual cases and matters. This Court 

cannot address all arguments, evidence and matters raised by parties and addresses only the arguments, 

evidence and matters necessary to reach the decision in this order given the shortage of district judges 

and staff. The parties and counsel are encouraged to contact the offices of United States Senators 

Feinstein and Boxer to address this Court’s inability to accommodate the parties and this action. The 

parties are required to consider consent to a Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings in that 

the Magistrate Judges’ availability is far more realistic and accommodating to parties than that of U.S. 

District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill who must prioritize criminal and older civil cases.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Chris Aguilar (“Aguilar”) brought this purported class action for violations of the 

California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq., the California 

Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq., the Song-Beverly 

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Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly Act”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1791.1 and 1792, et seq., the 

Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“Magnuson-Moss Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 2303, et seq., and Cal. Comm. 

Code § 2313 against defendant General Motors LLC (“GM”) in this Court. Aguilar invokes this 

Court’s jurisdiction on the basis of federal question under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 

(“CAFA”). GM filed a motion to dismiss Aguilar’s original complaint for failure to state a claim for 

which relief can be granted, and Aguilar filed a first amended complaint. GM filed the instant motion 

to dismiss Aguilar’s first amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), 9(b), and 12(b)(6) for 

failure to state a claim. For the reasons discussed below, this Court GRANTS IN PART with leave to 

amend GM’s motion to dismiss Aguilar’s amended complaint. 

BACKGROUND

A. Background

The 2009 through 2012 GMC Acadia, Chevrolet Traverse, and Buick Enclave (“class 

vehicles”) share the Lambda crossover platform, including the same steering system. Aguilar claims 

that steering system in these vehicles is defective. Specifically, he claims that the steering defect 

causes steering system failure that results in steering wheel locking, loss of power steering while in 

motion, steering wheel instability, knocking, bumping or grinding noises while turning, and/or total 

steering wheel failure. The Acadia and Traverse are sold with a three-year/36,000 mile bumper-tobumper express written warranty, and the Enclave carries a five-year/50,000 mile bumper-to-bumper 

warranty. Each class vehicle also carries a five-year/100,000 mile “Drivetrain” express written 

warranty. 

On or around May 7, 2010, Aguilar purchased a 2010 Chevrolet Traverse from an authorized 

Chevrolet dealer in Clovis, California. 

On or around August 24, 2010, at approximately 8,935 miles, Aguilar took the vehicle to the 

Clovis dealership after experiencing vibrations and loud noises in the steering wheel and general 

instability in the steering column during the normal course of driving. The dealership replaced the CV 

joint band accompanying boot in an effort to repair the issue.

Aguilar experienced the same noises and took his vehicle to a different authorized Chevrolet 

dealership for repairs on or around October 14, 2010 at approximately 11,217 miles. The dealership 

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replaced the intermediate steering shaft.

Aguilar continued to experience the noises from the steering system, and brought his vehicle 

back to the dealership in Clovis on or around October 27, 2010 at approximately 11,796 miles. The 

dealership replaced the rack gear. 

On or around December 22, 2011, at approximately 30,489 miles, Aguilar again brought his 

vehicle to the Chevrolet dealership in Clovis. The repair order states that Aguilar complained of loud 

noises from the power steering, that the vehicle is pulling to the left when driving, and will cause the 

steering wheel to hesitate when turning. The dealership replaced the power steering pump and the 

power steering gear assembly. 

Aguilar alleges that his vehicle continues to suffer from the steering defect that results in loss 

of power steering, hard steering, forceful pulling to the left and right, and loss of steering control, as if 

the front end of the vehicle is floating or gliding while driving. Aguilar further asserts that GM merely 

replaces the defective steering system parts with the same defective components, and that the repairs 

are a temporary mask to ensure that the steering defect will manifest outside of the class vehicles’ 

express warranty period.

Aguilar purports to bring this action on behalf of a nationwide class of all individuals who 

purchased or leased a class vehicle manufactured or sold after July 10, 2009. Aguilar also proposes 

two California sub-classes of the nationwide class. The CLRA sub-class consists of members of the 

nationwide class who reside in California and are “consumers” within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code § 

1761(d). The implied warranty sub-class consists of members of the nationwide class who purchased 

or leased their class vehicles in California. Aguilar seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, class 

certification, compensatory, exemplary, statutory, and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and 

pre- and post-judgment interest.

B. Procedural History

On March 22, 2013, Aguilar filed his original complaint against GM and General Motors 

Company for violations of the CLRA, UCL, Song-Beverly Act, Magnuson-Moss Act, and Cal. Comm. 

Code § 2313. GM and General Motors Company filed a motion to dismiss Aguilar’s original 

complaint on May 17, 2013 for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. On June 4, 

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2013, Aguilar filed a first amended complaint against GM and General Motors Company. On June 18, 

2013, GM and General Motors Company filed the instant motion to dismiss Aguilar’s first amended 

complaint for failure to state a claim. On June 19, 2013, upon the stipulation of the parties, this Court 

ordered the dismissal of defendant General Motors Company. Aguilar filed an opposition on July 9, 

2013, and GM filed a reply on July 16, 2013.

DISCUSSION

Motion to Dismiss

A. Standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is a challenge to the sufficiency of 

the allegations set forth in the complaint. A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper where there is 

either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a 

cognizable legal theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In 

considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court generally accepts as true the 

allegations in the complaint, construes the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing 

the motion, and resolves all doubts in the pleader's favor. Lazy Y. Ranch LTD. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 

580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008).

To survive a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Ail. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability 

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. 

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a 

defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility for entitlement to 

relief” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed 

factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires 

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 

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not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). Thus, “bare assertions ... amount[ing] 

to nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements ... are not entitled to be assumed true.” 

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951. A court is “free to ignore legal conclusions, unsupported conclusions, 

unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” Farm 

Credit Services v. American State Bank, 339 F.3d 764, 767 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 

Moreover, a court “will dismiss any claim that, even when construed in the light most 

favorable to plaintiff, fails to plead sufficiently all required elements of a cause of action.” Student 

Loan Marketing Ass'n v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629, 634 (S.D.Cal. 1998). In practice, “a complaint ... 

must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to 

sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562 (quoting Car Carriers, 

Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)). 

To the extent that the pleadings can be cured by the allegation of additional facts, the 

plaintiff should be afforded leave to amend. Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern California 

Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).

B. Analysis

1. Failure to Disclose Causes of Action – CLRA and UCL

In his first and second causes of action, Aguilar alleges that GM violated the CLRA and the 

UCL’s fraudulent business practices prong in “knowingly and intentionally concealing material facts” 

from Aguilar and the purported class by “failing to disclose and concealing the defective nature of the 

steering system.” (Doc. 14, ¶¶ 82, 86, 103). Therefore, these claims sound in fraud. 

a. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)

“If the claim is grounded in fraud, the pleading of that claim as a whole must satisfy the 

particularity requirement of Rule 9(b).” Cardenas v. NBTY, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 984, 993 (E.D. Cal. 

2012) (citing Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009)). “[T]he Supreme Court 

of California has held that nondisclosure is a claim for misrepresentation in a cause of action for fraud, 

[and] it (as any other fraud claim) must be pleaded with particularity under Rule 9(b). Kearns, 567 

F.3d at 1127. Moreover, “[t]he Ninth Circuit has specifically held that Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading 

standards apply to claims for violations of the CLRA and UCL.” Id.at 992 (citing Kearns, 567 F.3d at

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1125). “Rule 9(b) demands that the circumstances constituting the alleged fraud be specific enough to 

give defendants notice of the particular misconduct so that they can defend against the charge and not 

just deny that they have done anything wrong.” Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1124 (quoting Bly-Magee v. 

California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations and ellipses omitted). 

“Averments of fraud must be accompanied by ‘the who, what, when, where, and how’ of the 

misconduct charged.” Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 

Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997)). “[A] plaintiff must set forth more than the 

neutral facts necessary to identify the transaction. The plaintiff must set forth what is false or 

misleading about a statement, and why it is false.” In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 

(9th Cir. 1994), superceded by statute on other grounds.

b. Duty to Disclose

“California courts have generally rejected a broad obligation to disclose[.]” Wilson v. 

Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2012). As relevant here, “a failure to disclose or 

concealment can constitute actionable fraud” where “the defendant had exclusive knowledge of 

material facts not known to the plaintiff” or where “the defendant actively conceals a material fact 

from the plaintiff[.]” Falk v. Gen. Motors Corp., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (citing 

LiMandri v. Judkins, 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 337 (1997)). However, “a manufacturer is not liable for a 

fraudulent omission concerning a latent defect under the CLRA, unless the omission is ‘contrary to a 

representation actually made by the defendant, or an omission of a fact the defendant was obliged to 

disclose.’” Wilson, 668 F.3d at 1141 (quoting Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., 144 

Cal.App.4th 824 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)). “A manufacturer's duty to consumers is limited to its warranty 

obligations absent either an affirmative misrepresentation or a safety issue.”

1

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Alienware Corp., 544 F.Supp.2d 964, 969 (N.D.Cal. 2008), aff'd, 322 Fed.Appx. 489, 493 (9th Cir.

2009). 

i. Material Facts

As relevant here, a manufacturer’s duty to disclose applies only to “material facts.” Falk, 

496 F. Supp. 2d at 1095. Aguilar advocates for the broader interpretation of “material facts” as facts 

 

1 Aguilar alleges that the defects manifested within the warranty period. The Court will address those arguments in the 

discussion of Aguilar’s warranty claims below.

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that, if they had been disclosed, would have resulted in a reasonable consumer behaving differently. 

Id. GM argues for a narrower view that, to be actionable, an omission must be of a fact that GM was 

obligated to disclose because of safety concerns. Daugherty, 144 Cal.App.4th at 835. Aguilar alleges 

that a steering defect resulting in the potential failure of power steering, pulling to the left and right, 

and loss of steering control while driving would be material to a reasonable consumer. Indeed, such 

faulty steering systems could lead to unsafe conditions for both drivers and passengers, especially at 

today’s highway speeds. Therefore, Aguilar’s allegations show that the alleged steering defect is a 

material fact under both the broader and the narrower interpretation. 

ii. Knowledge at the Time of Sale

“In order to give rise to a duty to disclose, a complaint must contain specific allegations 

demonstrating the manufacturer's knowledge of the alleged defect at the time of sale.” Donohue v. 

Apple, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 913, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (emphasis in the original). GM argues that 

Aguilar’s alleged facts fail to show that GM had knowledge of the steering defect at the time of sale of 

Aguilar’s vehicle. Whether Aguilar has demonstrated this “is a close question.” Id. 

Aguilar alleges that GM acquired its knowledge of the steering defect through sources 

unavailable to Aguilar and the class members, including pre-release testing data, earlier model year 

versions of the class vehicles equipped with similar steering systems, testing conducted in response to 

reported complaints, and aggregate data from GM dealers, such as early consumer complaints to GM 

through their dealers about the steering defect, dealer repair orders and high warranty reimbursement 

rates. Aguilar further argues that consumers only became aware of the steering defect after purchase or 

lease when they actually experienced the problem. When accepted as true for the purposes of this Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion, Aguilar’s material allegations suffice to show that GM had exclusive 

knowledge of the alleged steering defect. However, Aguilar’s allegations fall short of showing that

GM had acquired the knowledge by the time Aguilar purchased his vehicle. Compare, Falk, 496 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1096 (“The record of complaints to GM between 2003 and 2007 show that GM was clearly 

aware of a problem with its speedometers[.]”). 

Aguilar also offers as support a sampling of consumer complaints and online postings. 

However, because none of the samples is dated, they shed no light on whether GM had knowledge of 

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the steering defect at the time of sale. See, Baba v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2010 WL 2486353 at *5

(N.D. Cal. June 16, 2010) (“None of those postings or complaints, however, include(sic) any dates, and 

therefore shed no light on when HP knew of the alleged defects.”). In addition, Aguilar points to 

Technical Service Bulletins (“TSBs”) GM issued between February 2009 and February 2010 regarding 

noises associated with steering systems. However, Aguilar does not allege that the TSBs were issued 

for the class vehicles. Further, the TSBs as alleged by Aguilar only address sounds or noises rather 

than the functionality or safety of the steering system. See, Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 

980, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2010) aff'd, 462 F. App'x 660 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[P]laintiffs have not offered 

evidence sufficient to support a finding that the failure to start resulting from the ignition-lock defect 

presents a risk to safety such that the nondisclosure of such defect constitutes a material omission.”). 

Therefore, Aguilar’s allegation that GM had knowledge of the steering defect at the time of 

Aguilar’s purchase of his vehicle “is thus contradicted by the only factual assertions currently before 

the court.” Donohue, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 927. Because Aguilar has not sufficiently alleged that GM 

knew of the steering defect in the class vehicles at the time of sale of his vehicle, the Court GRANTS 

with leave to amend GM’s motion to dismiss Aguilar’s duty to disclose claims under the CLRA and 

the UCL.

2. Other UCL Claims

The UCL prohibits business practices which are unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent. Cal. Bus. & 

Prof. Code § 17200. Since Aguilar failed to establish that GM had a duty to disclose the steering 

defect, as discussed above, the Court limits its UCL analysis to the unlawful and unfair prongs. See, 

Berryman v. Merit Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 152 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1557 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“Absent a 

duty to disclose, the failure to do so does not support a claim under the fraudulent prong of the UCL.”); 

see also, Baba, 2010 WL 2486353 at *7 (“A duty to disclose under UCL requires the same showing as 

a duty to disclose under CLRA.”) (citing Falk, 496 F.Supp.2d at 1096).

i. Unlawful

The UCL “borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the 

[UCL] makes independently actionable.” Cel–Tech Commc'ns., Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 

20 Cal.4th 163, 180 (1999). Aguilar’s unlawfulness claim is premised on GM’s alleged violations of 

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the Song-Beverly Act, the Magnuson-Moss Act, and Cal. Comm. Code § 2313. As discussed below, 

Aguilar sufficiently states a claim for violation of the Song-Beverly Act against GM. However, 

Aguilar’s express warranty claims against GM are subject to dismissal. Nonetheless, taking Aguilar’s 

allegations as true, Aguilar adequately alleges that GM has acted unlawfully. Therefore, the Court 

DENIES GM’s motion to dismiss Aguilar’s claim for violation of the UCL’s prohibition of unlawful 

business practices.

ii. Unfair

California courts traditionally have applied a balancing test in analyzing claims under the 

UCL’s unfairness prong. Under this test, “the determination of whether a particular business practice 

is unfair necessarily involves an examination of its impact on its alleged victim, balanced against the 

reasons, justifications and motives of the alleged wrongdoer.” Motors, Inc. v. Times Mirror Co., 102 

Cal.App.3d 735, 740 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); see also, People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes Inc., 

159 Cal.App.3d 509, 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that a practice in California is unfair “when it 

offends an established public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, 

unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.”). In Cel–Tech, however, the California 

Supreme Court rejected that test for claims brought by competitors, and instead held that, “any finding 

of unfairness ... [must] be tethered to some legislatively declared policy.” 20 Cal.4th at 185. However, 

because Cel–Tech expressly limited its holding to competitor lawsuits, the appropriate test to 

determine whether a practice is “unfair” in a consumer case under California law remains uncertain. 

See, Lozano v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 735 (9th Cir. 2007) (“California’s unfair 

competition law, as it applies to consumer suits, is currently in flux.”). 

Because it has been used more widely and analyzed more thoroughly by California courts, 

this Court applies the traditional balancing test in this consumer claim. Here, Aguilar alleges that GM 

sold class vehicles with a steering defect that could result in serious safety issues to consumers. This 

defect could manifest, as it did in Aguilar’s vehicle, within the implied warranty period. Aguilar 

further alleges that, where the defect manifested within the express warranty period, GM merely 

replaced the steering components with the same defective parts to ensure that, when the defect again 

manifests, it will fall outside of the express warranty period. Taking these allegations as true, Aguilar 

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sufficiently alleges that such business practices by GM, if proven, are “unscrupulous or substantially 

injurious to consumers.” Casa Blanca, 159 Cal.App.3d at 530. Therefore, the Court DENIES GM’s 

motion to dismiss Aguilar’s claim for violation of the UCL’s prohibition of unfair practices.

3. Warranty Causes of Action

i. Breach of Implied Warranty under Song-Beverly Act

Aguilar claims that GM breached the implied warranty of merchantability under the SongBeverly Act by selling class vehicles that are not fit for their ordinary purpose of providing reasonably 

reliable and safe transportation because the class vehicles suffered from the steering defect at the time 

of sale and thereafter. GM argues that Aguilar’s Song-Beverly Act claim is untimely because the 

maximum duration of the implied warranty is one year after the purchase date.

The Song-Beverly Act was enacted “to regulate warranties and strengthen consumer 

remedies for breaches of warranty.” Keegan v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 929, 944 

(C.D. Cal. 2012). Under the Act, an implied warranty of merchantability guarantees that “consumer 

goods meet each of the following: (1) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract 

description; (2) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; (3) Are adequately 

contained, packaged, and labeled; (4) Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the 

container or label.” Cal. Civ.Code § 1791.1(a). “[T]he implied warranty of merchantability set forth 

in § 1791.1(a) requires only that a vehicle be reasonably suited for ordinary use. It need not be perfect

in every detail so long as it provides for a minimum level of quality.” Keegan, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 945 

(internal citation omitted). “The basic inquiry, therefore, is whether the vehicle was fit for driving.” 

Id. See, Carlson v. General Motors Corp., 883 F.2d 287, 297 (4th Cir. 1989) (“Since cars are designed 

to provide transportation, the implied warranty of merchantability is simply a guarantee that they will 

operate in a safe condition and substantially free of defects. Thus, where a car can provide safe, 

reliable transportation, it is generally considered merchantable.”). “California courts ‘reject the notion 

that merely because a vehicle provides transportation from point A to point B, it necessarily does not 

violate the implied warranty of merchantability. A vehicle that smells, lurches, clanks, and emits 

smoke over an extended period of time is not fit for its intended purpose.’” Keegan, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 

946 (quoting Isip v. Mercedes–Benz USA, LLC, 155 Cal.App.4th 19, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)).

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Here, Aguilar claims that the class vehicles are unfit for the ordinary use of driving due to a 

steering defect that can result in potential failure of power steering, pulling to the left and right, and 

loss of steering control during the normal course of driving. Such a defect would render a vehicle unfit 

for driving. 

Further, GM’s argument that Aguilar’s implied warranty claim is untimely lacks merit on its 

face. Aguilar has alleged that his vehicle experienced general instability in the steering column and 

vibrations in the steering wheel, along with noises, within one year of purchasing his vehicle. As other 

courts have recognized, “[w]hether a car provides a ‘minimum level of quality’ is not determined by 

the manner in which it is operating at the time of sale.” Cholakyan v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 796 

F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1243 (C.D. Cal. 2011). Aguilar also sought repairs for his vehicle for pulling to the 

left when driving and steering wheel hesitation when turning in December 2011, about nineteen 

months after purchasing his new vehicle. “A vehicle that operates for some time after purchase may 

still be deemed ‘unfit for ordinary purposes’ if its components are so defective that the vehicle 

becomes inoperable within an unacceptably short period of time.” Id.

Therefore, Aguilar has pleaded adequately a cause of action against GM for violation of the 

implied warranty of merchantability under the Song-Beverly Act. The Court DENIES GM’s motion to 

dismiss Aguilar’s third cause of action.

ii. Breach of Express Warranty 

In his fourth and fifth causes of action, Aguilar alleges that GM breached its express written 

warranty by extending the basic and Drivetrain warranties with the purchase or lease of each class 

vehicle, selling class vehicles with the steering defect, and “[r]efusing to honor the express warranty by

repairing or replacing, free of charge, the steering system or any of its components or programming 

and instead charging for repair and replacement parts.” (Doc. 14, ¶¶ 127, 137). Aguilar alleges no 

facts to show that GM ever charged him or any class member for repairs and parts during the express 

warranty period. In fact, Aguilar admits as much in his opposition: “Plaintiff does not allege that 

Defendant refused or charged to repair Plaintiff’s vehicle[.]” (Doc. 24, p. 22). 

In his opposition, Aguilar attempts to argue for the first time that GM breached its express 

written warranty by failing to “correct” the steering defect as guaranteed by the warranty. However, 

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“[i]n determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the 

complaint to a plaintiff's moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant's motion 

to dismiss.” Schneider v. Cal. Dep't. of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in 

the original). See also, 2 Moore's Federal Practice, § 12.34[2] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) (“The court 

may not ... take into account additional facts asserted in a memorandum opposing the motion to 

dismiss, because such memoranda do not constitute pleadings under Rule 7(a).”). “The focus of any 

Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal-both in the trial court and on appeal-is the complaint.” Id. Therefore, the 

Court declines to consider any new allegations made in Aguilar’s opposition at this time.

Because Aguilar fails to make sufficient allegations to show that GM breached its express 

written warranty, the Court DISMISSES with leave to amend Aguilar’s fourth and fifth causes of 

action under the Magnuson-Moss Act and Cal. Comm. Code § 2313, respectively.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, the Court

1. DISMISSES with leave to amend Plaintiff Chris Aguilar’s first cause of action 

under the CLRA, second cause of action under the UCL’s prohibition of 

fraudulent business practices, fourth cause of action under the Magnuson-Moss 

Act, and fifth cause of action under Cal. Comm. Code § 2313; and

2. DENIES Defendant General Motors LLC’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff Aguilar’s 

second cause of action under the UCL’s prohibitions of unlawful and unfair 

business practices and third cause of action under the Song-Beverly Act. 

Aguilar shall have one opportunity to file and serve a further amended complaint in an attempt to cure 

the deficiencies described herein. Any such further amended complaint shall be filed and served 

within 20 days of electronic service of this order. Defendant General Motors LLC no later than 20

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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days after service of the second amended complaint shall file a response thereto.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 25, 2013 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE DEAC_Signature-END:

66h44d

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