Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-03467/USCOURTS-ca8-09-03467-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Stevie Lavell West
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable John A. Jarvey, United States Judge for the Southern District

of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-3467

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

Stevie Lavell West, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 12, 2010

Filed: July 16, 2010

___________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

The district court1

 sentenced Stevie Lavell West to concurrent terms of 324

months for conspiring to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and

possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

He appeals, arguing that the district court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress,

(2) allowing the government to present false testimony, (3) applying a firearm

enhancement, and (4) sentencing with an inadequate explanation and improper

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reliance on the crack/powder ratio. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and

18 U.S.C. § 3742, this court affirms.

On May 29, 2008, officers stopped West for crossing a roadway mid-block

(jaywalking) and walking down the middle of a highway. An officer found crack

cocaine in his pocket and arrested him. West admitted to dealing crack and agreed to

be an informant. Officers arrested him months later after they decided he was no

longer cooperating.

The district court initially granted West’s motion to suppress because he did not

obstruct traffic by jaywalking, as required under Iowa Code § 321.328. On

reconsideration, the court denied suppression, finding probable cause for the stop

based on Iowa Code § 321.326, which requires walking on the left side of a highway.

At trial, co-conspirators testified to selling crack to West. They said that he

bought around 3.5 to 7 grams of crack almost daily for months at a time from 2004 to

2008. Another witness stated West began dealing crack in 2004. This dealing was

often “nonstop,” continuing until 2008. A jury found West guilty of conspiracy to

distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine and possession with intent to distribute

at least five grams.

At sentencing, a witness testified to seeing West with a gun twice before the

beginning date of the conspiracy. The district court found sufficient connection

between the firearm and the drug activity for a sentence enhancement. Calculating the

base offense level at 38 and a criminal history category of IV, the court sentenced

West to the minimum of a Guidelines range of 324 to 405 months.

West argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress

because the officers lacked probable cause for the stop. “This court reviews the

district court's findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions about probable

cause . . . de novo.” United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, 474 F.3d 1105, 1109 (8th

Cir. 2007).

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Committing a crime in an officer’s presence gives probable cause to seize the

person. United States v. Banks, 553 F.3d 1101, 1104 (8th Cir. 2009). The district

court found probable cause under Iowa Code § 321.326: “Pedestrians shall at all times

when walking on or along a highway, walk on the left side of such highway.” The

district court believed the officer who testified that West was “walking down the

middle of 13th Street.” Probable cause existed for the stop, and thus the district court

properly denied the motion to suppress.

West contends that the government knowingly or recklessly used false

testimony, violating due process. See United States v. Perkins, 94 F.3d 429, 432 (8th

Cir. 1996). This court reviews claims of constitutional error de novo. United States

v. Booker, 576 F.3d 506, 510 (8th Cir. 2008). But to preserve an error for appellate

review, the defendant must make a timely objection. United States v. Pirani, 406

F.3d 543, 549 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). “[F]or an objection to be timely it must be

made at the earliest possible opportunity after the ground of objection becomes

apparent, or it will be considered waived.” United States v. Carter, 270 F.3d 731, 735

(8th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). West requested a mistrial after the government’s

closing argument because of an alleged use of false testimony during witness

examinations. This objection, made after the district court had the opportunity “to

correct or avoid the mistake,” was not timely. See Puckett v. United States, 129 S.Ct.

1423, 1428 (2009); Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 751 (8th Cir. 1986)

(“motion for a mistrial, filed several days after the alleged error occurred and after the

presentation of evidence was concluded” did not preserve the error).

Accordingly, plain error review applies. United States v. Davis, 534 F.3d 903,

914 (8th Cir. 2008). “Under plain error review, the defendant must show: (1) an error;

(2) that is plain; and (3) that affects substantial rights.” United States v. Vaughn, 519

F.3d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 2008). “[W]e reverse for plain error only where the error

seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

Davis, 534 F.3d at 914 (quotation omitted).

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To prove use of false testimony, West must show that “(1) the prosecution used

perjured testimony; (2) the prosecution should have known or actually knew of the

perjury; and (3) there was a reasonable likelihood that the perjured testimony could

have affected the jury's verdict.” United States v. Bass, 478 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir.

2007). Merely inconsistent statements do not establish use of false testimony. United

States v. Martin, 59 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 1995). “[I]t is not improper to put on a

witness whose testimony may be impeached.” Perkins, 94 F.3d at 433. Compare

Bass, 478 F.3d at 951 (no due process violation where the witness told different

stories and defense counsel knew as much as government), with Napue v. Illinois, 360

U.S. 264, 265, 272 (1959) (holding due process violation where the prosecutor

promised the witness “consideration,” the witness testified the prosecutor promised

nothing, but the prosecutor did not correct the witness).

West claims that the witnesses contradicted their plea agreements by stating an

impossibly large amount of drug dealing. One witness testified that West’s drug

activity was more extensive than the witness admitted in his plea agreement. Another

witness did not mention West in the plea agreement but testified against him. The

government presented the plea agreements at trial, and defense counsel questioned the

witnesses about inconsistencies. “The jury is responsible for assessing the credibility

of witnesses and resolving conflicts in testimony, and its conclusions on these issues

are virtually unreviewable on appeal.” United States v. Thompson, 560 F.3d 745,

748–49 (8th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Coleman, 525 F.3d 665, 666 (8th

Cir. 2008) (“We have repeatedly upheld jury verdicts based solely on the testimony

of co-conspirators and cooperating witnesses.”). The district court did not err, let

alone plainly err, in denying West’s motion for a mistrial.

According to West, there is an insufficient connection between the gun and the

drug conspiracy to support a firearm enhancement. This court reviews a dangerousweapon enhancement for clear error. See United States v. Burling, 420 F.3d 745, 749

(8th Cir. 2005). A § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement applies if the government proves by

a preponderance of the evidence “that a weapon was present and that it is not clearly

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improbable that the weapon was connected with the criminal activity.” United States

v. Boyce, 564 F.3d 911, 916 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted); see

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, application note 3. A connection exists if the weapon was used

“during acts that were ‘part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan

as the offense of conviction.’” United States v. Savage, 414 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir.

2005), citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). In determining relevant conduct, the district

court “should consider the similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity of the

conduct.” United States v. Geralds, 158 F.3d 977, 979 (8th Cir. 1998); see also

United States v. Lange, 592 F.3d 902, 906 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Offenses are part of ‘the

same course of conduct’ when they are part of an ‘ongoing series of offenses.’”),

quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment. (n.9(A)).

At sentencing, a co-conspirator testified to seeing West with a firearm twice.

In February 2005, the witness was visiting a house to buy marijuana (but not from

West). West showed him a .22 caliber handgun. The same witness saw him wearing

a .380 caliber handgun in May 2005. (The witness was selling crack weekly to West

during this time period.) On neither occasion did the witness see West dealing drugs.

West claims it is clearly improbable that the gun was connected with the drug

conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Khang, 904 F.2d 1219, 1220–23 (8th Cir.

1990); United States v. Green, 889 F.2d 187, 189 (8th Cir. 1989).

In Khang, police made a controlled delivery of opium to Khang’s residence and

found a pistol in the closet. This court reversed the firearm enhancement because the

government stipulated that the gun had “no relationship to the crime to which Khang

pled guilty.” Khang, 904 F.2d at 1220. In Green, officers found drugs and an

unloaded .22 caliber handgun in Green’s house. Green testified that she had never

used the gun. This court affirmed the enhancement because she had the gun “in the

same place where she conducted drug transactions.” Green, 889 F.2d at 189.

The facts here are closer to Green. The witness saw the .22 in a house where

drug dealing occurred, albeit around two and a half years before the beginning of the

drug conspiracy in November 2007. West was, however, already dealing crack

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regularly in the same neighborhood during the time periods the witness saw him with

a gun. See Burling, 420 F.3d at 750 (district court may consider “relevant conduct

outside the conviction”); Savage, 414 F.3d at 967 (affirming firearm enhancement

where the defendant possessed a gun around six months before the beginning of the

offense of conviction while dealing the same drug as in the offense); see also United

States v. Anderson, 243 F.3d 478, 485 (8th Cir. 2001) (drug dealing that occurred

several years before the offense of conviction was relevant conduct). As the district

court found, it was not clearly improbable that the gun possession was “part of the

same course of dealing or pattern of activity with similar participants.”

West asserts numerous sentencing errors. This court determines first whether

the district court committed significant procedural error, “such as failing to calculate

(or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as

mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on

clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence –

including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

West claims the district court failed to explain adequately its decision to impose

a within-Guidelines sentence. He argues that the court treated him like a “drug

kingpin” and did not consider the racially disparate impact of the crack/powder

guidelines. A Guidelines sentence does not “necessarily require lengthy explanation.”

Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). The district court “followed the

proper procedure by first calculating the guidelines range, asking for departures,

considering the § 3553(a) factors, and imposing a sentence.” Vaughn, 519 F.3d at

806. The court considered West’s criminal history and “the need to avoid

unwarranted sentencing disparity.” The judge noted that “this is one of the most

significant [drug] conspiracies that I’ve seen since I’ve been a district judge.” The

court adequately explained its decision.

West objects that there was a sentencing disparity with his co-conspirators,

almost all of whom received less time. These witnesses cooperated with the

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government. Sentencing disparities based on cooperation are not unwarranted.

United States v. Crumley, 528 F.3d 1053, 1068 (8th Cir. 2008).

Finally, West contends that his sentence was substantively unreasonable

because it was based on the crack/powder ratio in the Guidelines. This court

“review[s] the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under the abuse-ofdiscretion standard considering the totality of the circumstances.” United States v.

Alvizo-Trujillo, 521 F.3d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted).

A within-Guidelines sentence, as here, may be presumed reasonable on appeal.

United States v. Guarino, 517 F.3d 1067, 1068 (8th Cir. 2009). A sentence based on

the Guidelines’ crack/powder ratio is not necessarily unreasonable. See Kimbrough

v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007) (holding that district court “may” consider

the crack/powder ratio); United States v. Roberson, 517 F.3d 990, 995 (8th Cir. 2008)

(Kimbrough does not require district courts to disregard the crack/powder ratio). The

district court discussed the crack/powder ratio at length. West has failed to show that

his sentence is unreasonable. See United States v. Otterson, 506 F.3d 1098, 1100 (8th

Cir. 2007).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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