Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01002/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01002-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Larry M. McDonald
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

\ 

PUBLISH 

FILED 

Uaited Stares Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cirruit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

MAY 311991 

----------ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 90-1002 

) 

LARRY M. McDONALD, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

OR APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-159) 

John M. Hutchins, Assistant United 

Norton, United States Attorney; 

United States Attorney, with him on 

for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

States Attorney (Michael J. 

David M. Gaouette, Assistant 

the briefs), Denver, Colorado, 

Richard J. 

P.C., on the 

Supplemental 

Appellant. 

Banta (Shelley Gilman of Pozner Hutt Gilman Kaplan, 

Opening Brief; Larry w. McDonald, pro se, on the 

Opening Brief), Denver, Colorado, for DefendantBefore MOORE, SETH and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-1002 Document: 01019292971 Date Filed: 05/31/1991 Page: 1 
Mr. McDonald (Defendant) appeals his convictions of 

possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of 

cocaine base and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a 

drug trafficking crime. See 21 u.s.c. §§ 841(a)(1), 

841(b)(1)(B)(iii); 18 u.s.c. § 924(c)(1). 

Defendant assigns error 

court's allowance of expert 

to four matters: (1) the trial 

testimony; (2) the failure to give 

certain instructions; (3) the trial court's ex parte communication 

with a juror; and (4) the sufficiency of the evidence relating to 

the firearm charge. We affirm. 

I. Background 

Defendant was observed by police officers sitting in his car 

when two people approached the car and items were then passed 

between Defendant and the two persons. The police ran a license 

check and found there existed an outstanding arrest warrant for 

Defendant. The police then went to Defendant's car, asked 

Defendant his identity, and after confirming his identity arrested 

Defendant. 

The police then searched the car. This search revealed 6.7 

grams of base or rock cocaine found under the armrest; a singleedge razor blade found on a service tray located on the center 

hump of the automobile; a telephone beeper; and a loaded .357 

Ruger pistol found under the driver's seat. A search of Defendant 

produced $990 in cash and $20 in food stamps. 

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II. The Expert Testimony 

After testimony was introduced relating the basic facts as 

outlined above, the prosecution called an expert witness. The 

expert's credentials were substantial. He was one of the 

supervisors for the Denver Metro Crack Task Force. He possessed a 

bachelor's and a master's degree and had extensive training 

concerning cocaine and cocaine trafficking. He was in charge of 

investigating ninety per cent of the crack investigations 

performed by the Denver police since crack first was discovered in 

Denver in 1986. 

Counsel for Defendant objected to the testimony, stating: 

Basically, as I said, I have no problem with it, if 

this officer wants to testify from his experience. What 

he knows about how crack is packaged. Or how it's sold 

or anything like that. But if this is going to lead to 

this officer offering an opinion as to what all this 

means, then I strongly object. That's for the jury to 

decide. 

The trial court instructed the prosecution to proceed, taking one 

point at a time. 

The expert testified as to the significance of the quantity 

of the cocaine. He testified 6.7 grams was equal to about one 

quarter ounce; the average street sale dosage would be somewhere 

between an eight-hundredth of a gram and a tenth of a gram; and 

the normal dose sells for around $20. He testified the quantity 

possessed by Defendant was a lot larger than what would normally 

be considered as a dose. 

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The expert testified that people buying and selling crack 

cocaine commonly have single-edge razor blades in their possession 

in order to cut up the cocaine base into saleable or usable 

quantities. He testified crack is not sold in packages, but is 

commonly sold "just as rocks." 

The expert testified a great deal of money is involved in the 

crack business. Amounts of $990 are often encountered on street 

level dealers. The expert further testified that crack is 

commonly exchanged for food coupons. The expert testified street 

dealers frequently arm themselves to protect the merchandise and 

the money. Finally, the expert testified there is an ever 

increasing trend in the drug trade toward the use of pagers or 

beepers. Lookouts and runners utilize this method to communicate 

with the dealer. 

At the conclusion of this testimony, counsel for Defendant 

again objected, arguing "[i]t's intruding on the province of the 

jury. What he is basically saying is this man is guilty, not 

based on anything he observed or anything he knows about this 

particular case, but simply on suspicion and innuendo," and he 

requested a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion. 

Defendant now characterizes this evidence as a criminal 

profile and argues it was wrongly used as substantive evidence of 

guilt. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1002 Document: 01019292971 Date Filed: 05/31/1991 Page: 4 
What is "profile evidence"? Courts define it in varying 

terms such as an "informal compilation of characteristics often 

displayed by those trafficking in drugs," United States v. 

Campbell, 843 F.2d 1089, 1091 n.3 (8th Cir. 1988); "an 'abstract 

of characteristics found to be typical of persons transporting 

illegal drugs,'" United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 834 n.2 

(8th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); and "the collective or 

distilled experience of narcotics officers concerning 

characteristics repeatedly seen in drug smugglers," Florida v. 

Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 525 n.6 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 

A profile is simply an investigative technique. It is nothing 

more than a listing of characteristics that in the opinion of law 

enforcement officers are typical of a person engaged in a specific 

illegal activity. 

The common use of profile evidence is to make investigative 

stops. Courts have frequently upheld investigative stops based 

upon profile characteristics. See, ~' United States v. 

Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182 

(8th Cir. 1989). The case before us does not involve an 

investigatory stop, nor does it involve the issue of reasonable 

suspicion. 

Courts have condemned the use of profiles as substantive 

evidence of guilt. In United States v. Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 

F.2d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1983), the government introduced 

testimony from a customs inspector about the use and meaning of a 

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Appellate Case: 90-1002 Document: 01019292971 Date Filed: 05/31/1991 Page: 5 
profile. The court, while not prohibiting the use of a profile, 

warned against its use as substantive evidence of guilt. The 

court went on to affirm the conviction as the testimony was 

admitted purely for background material as to how and why 

Defendant was stopped and searched. In United States v. BeltranRios, 878 F.2d 1208, 1210 (9th Cir. 1989), the court criticized 

the use of profile evidence but affirmed the conviction as the 

testimony came in response to cross-examination by the defense. 

In United States v. Quigley, 890 F.2d 1019 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. 

denied, 110 s. Ct. 1163 (1990), the court condemned a conviction 

where profile evidence was used as substantive evidence of guilt; 

however, the court upheld the conviction as there was substantial 

other evidence showing guilt. 

Rather than focusing our inquiry upon defining and 

classifying evidence into categories of profile or non-profile, we 

believe the better approach is to commence our inquiry with an 

examination of the applicable rules of evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 

702 1 instructs us to admit specialized knowledge if it will assist 

the trier of fact in understanding the evidence. Rule 702 thus 

dictates a common-sense inquiry of whether a juror would be able 

to 

1 

understand the evidence without specialized knowledge 

Fed. R. Evid. 702 is quoted in its entirety: 

If scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 

the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 

qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 

of an opinion or otherwise. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1002 Document: 01019292971 Date Filed: 05/31/1991 Page: 6 
concerning the subject. 

In the case before us the evidence was . 1" d 2 spec1a 1ze . 

Defendant possessed 6.7 grams of rock cocaine. A person 

possessing no knowledge of the drug world would find the 

importance of this fact impossible to understand. The average 

juror would not know whether this quantity is a mere trace, or 

sufficient to pollute 1,000 people. 

The next items of evidence can best be described as a drug 

dealer's tools of trade: a single-edge razor blade, a pager or 

beeper, and a loaded pistol. Is the possession of these items 

something the jury can understand without the 

specialized knowledge? 

benefit of 

We observe the razor blade is at least circumstantial 

evidence suggesting Defendant possessed the means to cut the rock 

cocaine and thus intended to distribute. The possession of the 

remaining tools of the trade, the pager and the loaded pistol, are 

likewise circumstantial evidence. The proper inquiry concerning 

expert evidence is simply whether the jury is able to understand 

the evidence without the specialized knowledge that is available 

from the testimony of an expert witness. 

2 We realize the trial court never formally accepted the police 

officer as an expert witness. However, the court heard the 

witness describe his qualifications, including his specialized 

knowledge, education, skill and experience, and then allowed the 

witness to give opinion testimony. We therefore assume the 

witness was accepted as an expert witness by the trial court. 

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The $990 cash and $20 in food stamps were the next items of 

evidence to be considered. Why would someone have such a large 

quantity of money and food stamps upon his person? Without 

understanding the drug trade is a cash-and-carry business, and 

that both cash and food stamps are the medium of exchange in a 

drug transaction, the basic evidence would leave a juror puzzled. 

A jury could not understand the significance of this evidence 

without the particular background knowledge of how a drug dealer 

works. 

These are not subjects with which most jurors are familiar. 

We find other cases reaching a similar result. In United States 

v. Hoffman, 832 F.2d 1299, 1310 (1st Cir. 1987), expert testimony 

was allowed concerning the unique language of narcotics dealers. 

In United States v. Kusek, 844 F.2d 942, 949 (2d Cir.), cert. 

denied, 488 U.S. 860 (1988), the court allowed testimony 

concerning the use of codes by narcotics dealers. And in United 

States v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497, 501-02 (9th Cir.) cert. 

denied, 111 S. Ct. 363 (1990), the court allowed expert testimony 

concerning the discovery of a large amount of cocaine and the way 

it was concealed to be admitted on the issue of the defendant's 

intent to distribute cocaine. See also United States v. Espinosa, 

827 F.2d 604, 611-13 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 u.s. 968 

(1988), which involved the use of "stash pads" and "pay and owe 

ledgers." 

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The trial judge has broad discretion concerning the admission 

or exclusion of expert testimony. In reviewing this decision, we 

defer to the trial court and do not reverse unless there is an 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 535 

(lOth Cir. 1987), cert. denied 485 u.s. 908, 485 U.S. 991 (1988); 

United States v. Barton, 731 F.2d 669, 672 (lOth Cir. 1984). In 

the case before us, the basic facts were the amount of drugs and 

the possession of several items of personal property. The jury 

could not be expected to understand this evidence without 

specialized knowledge. We hold the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in allowing the jury to receive this evidence. We also 

observe the jury was given an instruction concerning the expert 

evidence that allowed them to accept or reject it. 

We emphasize our holding revolves about our determination 

that the expert testimony consisted of specialized knowledge to 

assist the jury in understanding the evidence. We think this is 

the proper test. The trial court must base its decision upon the 

applicable rules of evidence. We reserve the question of whether 

expert testimony regarding profiles is -- by itself -- substantive 

proof of crime to another day. But ~ United States v. Simpson, 

910 F.2d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1990) (proof that a person fits a 

profile without any other evidence of drug trafficking proves 

nothing). 

We asked the parties to brief the issues of the 

permissibility of commenting on the significance of the evidence 

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Appellate Case: 90-1002 Document: 01019292971 Date Filed: 05/31/1991 Page: 9 
found in the possession of Defendant and whether the expert 

testimony carries with it the obligation of a limiting 

instruction. In view of our decision approving of the admission 

of the expert testimony, and in view of the fact the trial court 

gave a proper instruction concerning the expert testimony by 

telling the jury it was free to accept or reject the testimony, we 

need not address these issues any further. 

III. The Ex Parte Juror Communication 

After the defense presented its final witness, the trial was 

recessed for the evening. As the defense witness was leaving the 

courthouse, federal agents arrested him on an outstanding warrant. 

The arrest was witnessed by one of defense counsel's investigators 

who testified at a hearing the following day that two specified 

jurors might have witnessed the incident. Both jurors were 

questioned by the trial court and denied witnessing anything 

unusual or even seeing the witness leave the courthouse. The 

proceedings were recessed and the judge instructed counsel to meet 

him in chambers. On the way to chambers the judge was stopped by 

one of the jurors just questioned. The judge described the 

encounter as follows: 

THE COURT: I have previously informed counsel on 

both sides, and now state on the record, that just after 

the last hearing in open court when we called two of the 

jurors in, that was Renee Ray, wasn't it, and Mr. 

Quentin Blakeslee, I believe, we called them into court, 

right after that when I came out to return to chambers, 

I walked past the jury room and Miss Ray asked if she 

could speak to me and came into chambers and closed the 

door and said she was concerned whether anybody in this 

case was a -- actually, her concern was as to Mr. Cole 

only at that time, whether Mr. Cole was a member of any 

gang. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1002 Document: 01019292971 Date Filed: 05/31/1991 Page: 10 
And I then -- then she told me, mentioned the word, 

"Crips," so I suppose she is concerned about whether he 

is a member of the Crips or Bloods. 

I told her that there is no evidence that anybody 

involved with this case is a member of any gang or 

related to any gang or that this matter was in any way 

gang-connected and told her that also that there is no 

evidence that the defendant is in any way connected with 

any gang activity. In this case. Or any other case. 

So, that's the best I could do under the 

circumstances, and you know it's just speculation on her 

part. So -- I think that cures any problem, but if you 

wish to go further into it with her, you can. 

Defense counsel responded as follows: 

MR. ROSENBLUM: No, Your Honor, I don't. I accept 

what the Court said and what I would like to do is 

simply for the purposes of preserving the record move 

for a mistrial at this point, and the reason I am moving 

for a mistrial is because I don't see how Miss Ray as an 

individual juror in this case, and then based on her 

input to the jury as a whole, can be fair and impartial, 

when she has this perhaps unfounded fear of gang members 

or retaliation in the case, whether it be Mr. Cole or 

Mr. McDonald or any other gang members, and, of course, 

the whole problem was precipitated by the fact that she 

was called into the courtroom in the first place. 

THE COURT: Well, you asked for that. 

MR. ROSENBLUM: I understand. I am going to get to 

that in a moment. The problem was precipitated by the 

fact that she was called into the courtroom in the first 

place at my request because of things that my 

investigator knows that she observed and thought the 

jurors might have observed also. 

But the problem emanates even further back than 

that, and that is the problem the two investigators, 

Huliani and Lindsey, made the arrest in the lobby of the 

courthouse in direct contravention to the Court's 

instructions, and so I think that that's where the 

problem emanates from, and I think it's a serious 

problem if the woman fears retaliation from gang 

members, and I move for a mistrial on that basis. 

When there is an improper ex parte communication between a 

juror and the trial judge prejudice is presumed and the burden is 

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on the government to show the communication did not prejudice the 

substantial rights of the Defendant. See Rushen v. Spain, 464 

u.s. 114, 118-20 (1983) (per curiam); Remmer v. United states, 347 

u.s. 227, 229-30 (1954); United States v. Day, 830 F.2d 1099, 

1103-04 (lOth Cir. 1987); United States v. Washita Constr. Co., 

789 F.2d 809, 820-21 (lOth Cir. 1986); United States v. de 

Hernandez, 745 F.2d 1305, 1310 (lOth Cir. 1984). However, if 

there is no objection at the time the alleged error occurs, then 

the matter is reviewed only for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 

52(b). A plain error is one which seriously affects the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 

Accordingly, the plain error exception to the contemporaneousobjection rule is used sparingly, and only to prevent a 

miscarriage of justice. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 

(1985). Ex parte communications with jurors fall within the 

confines of the plain error rule of Fed. R. Crim. P. 52. United 

States v. Diggs, 522 F.2d 1310, 1320-21 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. 

denied, 429 u.s. 852 (1976). Thus, if there is no objection to 

the ex parte communication, we review the communication only to 

decide if there is plain error. United States v. Mobile 

Materials, Inc., 871 F.2d 902, 918 (lOth Cir. 1989) (per curiam) 

(where trial counsel indicates he failed to object to a court's 

post trial admonitions to a jury, review is for plain error). 

Defendant argues the trial court's ex parte communication 

with the juror raises serious concerns about the integrity of the 

jury deliberations and the trial's fairness. Defendant also takes 

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issue with the judge's comment to the juror that the trial was not 

about street gangs. During the trial a police officer testified 

the Defendant told him he carried a gun for protection because he 

received threats from gang members. Defendant says the judge's 

comments amounted to an instruction to disregard evidence, and to 

ignore the possibility that Defendant carried a gun because he 

lived in a bad neighborhood. Because these arguments are raised 

for the first time on appeal, we apply the plain error standard in 

reviewing the trial record as a whole. See United States v. 

Kornegay, 885 F.2d 713, 719 (lOth Cir. 1989) (reviewing court 

considers trial record as a whole), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2179 

(1990); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 

We know an ex parte meeting between a judge and juror creates 

a situation "pregnant with possibilities for error." United 

States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 u.s. 422, 460 (1978). But 

we further note "[t]here is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one 

or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge 

about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal 

comfort or to some aspect of the trial." Rushen, 464 u.s. at 118. 

Experience teaches it is good practice for the trial judge to 

terminate a conversation as soon as it becomes clear what the 

juror wishes to discuss, and to hold a hearing later if necessary 

with all interested parties permitted to participate. ~' 

Remmer, 347 u.s. at 229-30. However, deviating from this 

preferred approach does not necessarily mean a trial is tainted by 

plain error that warrants granting a mistrial. ~, Rushen, 464 

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u.s. at 118-20 (ex parte communication between trial court and 

individual juror is not per se plain error); Day, 830 F.2d at 

1103-04 (brief and casual conversation between a juror and witness 

is not per se plain error); United States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507, 

516 (lOth Cir. 1979) ("well settled that the failure to provide a 

full evidentiary hearing into possible prejudice resulting from 

communications with jurors does not automatically require reversal 

or remand"). 

Summarizing the significant facts of the case before us, we 

find the trial court had an ex parte communication with a juror. 

A hearing was held and the trial court made full disclosure. The 

court gave defense counsel the opportunity to pursue the matter 

further, which was declined. Defense counsel made no objection to 

the ex parte communication or to the involved juror sitting and, 

in fact, specifically requested all thirteen jurors deliberate. 3 

These actions by defense counsel tend to show counsel felt no 

prejudice existed at that time. Defense counsel was not left in 

the dark as to what occurred. After reviewing the record, we do 

not believe the brief communication caused a miscarriage of 

justice and hold the communication was not plain error. 

We also disagree with Defendant's argument that the judge's 

statements to the juror were prejudicial to him. Defendant 

3 After being told about the communication and learning the juror 

was concerned about street gangs, defense counsel moved for a 

mistrial by challenging the juror's ability to be fair and 

impartial. The motion was denied. Defendant is not attacking 

denial of a mistrial on this basis on appeal. 

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contends on appeal that he was keeping his loaded gun under his 

car seat for self defense from gangs, and when the judge advised 

the juror, his defense was destroyed. 

Defendant misperceives what the trial court told the juror. 

The juror was advised there was no evidence that anyone connected 

with the case, including the Defendant and his witness, Mr. Cole, 

was "a member of any gang or related to any gang or that this 

matter was in any way gang-connected." This comment in no way 

harms Defendant's defense. 

Evidence showed Defendant told the arresting officers he had 

a weapon for protection from "threats from gang members." The 

defense introduced evidence the area where Defendant was arrested 

has gangs and some people carry weapons for protection. In 

closing, defense counsel argued that Defendant carried a weapon 

because he lives in a bad neighborhood. However, we again stress 

the record and charges clearly reveal Defendant was not on trial 

for any alleged involvement in street gangs. With this fact in 

mind, we reject Defendant's argument that the trial judge's 

comment prejudiced his case. 

The trial judge's remarks did nothing to lessen an 

explanation that Defendant carried a gun because he was afraid of 

gangs or lived in a bad neighborhood. The trial judge's statement 

merely clarified the fact that neither the Defendant nor his 

witness were before the court on gang-connected charges. 

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Alternatively, even if the trial judge's statements were 

misinterpreted by the juror, we still would reject Defendant's 

argument. The record contains overwhelming evidence of 

Defendant's guilt. Any error resulting from the trial judge's 

comment was harmless and we will not reverse. 

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Defendant filed a pro se brief where he argues the evidence 

was insufficient to sustain his conviction for carrying a firearm 

during or in relation to a drug trafficking crime. He says there 

was no evidence showing the weapon was readily accessible to him 

during the commission of the drug offense. 

The evidence was more than sufficient to sustain Defendant's 

conviction for carrying a firearm in connection with a drug 

trafficking crime. Defendant when arrested was sitting in the 

driver's seat of his car. There was a rock of 6.7 grams of crack 

cocaine under the center armrest to his right. The Defendant had 

$990 in cash and $20 in food stamps upon his person. Also found 

were the razor blade and pager. Defendant does not challenge the 

sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction on the drug 

charge. Under Defendant's seat was the loaded pistol with the 

butt pointing out for easy and quick access. Defendant knew the 

weapon was there. The case of United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 

1528, 1533 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 491 u.s. 909 (1989), where 

we said constructive possession is sufficient to sustain a firearm 

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possession conviction is dispositive of this issue. See also 

United States v. Martinez, 912 F.2d 419 (lOth Cir. 1990) 

(definition of carrying a weapon is not restricted to weapons 

carried on the person or in a pocket). 

v. Instructions 

Defendant, in a supplemental brief, raised two more issues 

concerning jury instructions. 

The trial court gave the jury a lesser included offense 

instruction that would allow the jury to convict if they 

determined Defendant merely possessed the rock cocaine. Defense 

counsel requested the jury be instructed that if they found him 

guilty of mere possession, they must find him not guilty of the 

weapons charge. 

The trial court refused stating the instructions clearly 

provided that to find Defendant guilty of the firearm charge they 

must find him guilty of a drug trafficking charge, which was 

defined. We agree. 

Defense has provided us with no authority and merely argues 

the instruction given "was contradictory." 

Defendant also requested the court to instruct the jury about 

the penalties involved. The trial court denied this request. 

Defendant offers us no authority to support his position. The 

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trial court properly instructed the jury that punishment was 

within the province of the statutes and the court and should not 

be considered in arriving at impartial verdicts. 

AFFIRMED. 

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