Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03771/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03771-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Euka Wadlington
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Charles R. Wolle, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3771

___________

Euka Wadlington, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Southern District of Iowa.

United States of America, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: September 12, 2005

Filed: November 14, 2005 

___________

Before RILEY, LAY, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Euka Wadlington (Wadlington) was sentenced to life imprisonment for

conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine and crack

cocaine, and for attempted distribution of crack cocaine. On appeal, this court

affirmed the conviction and sentence. United States v. Wadlington, 233 F.3d 1067,

1072 (8th Cir. 2000). Wadlington then filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct

his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court1

 denied the motion.

Wadlington appeals, arguing (1) he is actually innocent, and (2) his sentence is

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invalid under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). We affirm the section

2255 motion denial.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Wadlington’s Trial and Direct Appeal

Because the facts of this case are set forth in an earlier opinion addressing

Wadlington’s direct appeal, see Wadlington, 233 F.3d at 1072-73, we only summarize

them here. Wadlington was indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possess with

intent to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine, and for attempted distribution of crack

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). At trial, the government

argued that from 1990 to 1998 Wadlington was the leader of a drug organization

supplying cocaine and crack cocaine to individuals in Clinton, Iowa. Over ten

government witnesses related similar accounts of buying or receiving drugs from

Wadlington, selling those drugs and giving Wadlington the proceeds, observing

Wadlington sell drugs to others, transporting drugs in laundry detergent boxes from

Chicago to Clinton for Wadlington, and watching Wadlington cook crack cocaine and

distribute it to others for sale.

The jury also heard evidence concerning Wadlington’s attempted distribution

of crack cocaine in late 1998. Mark Thomas (Thomas), a government informant,

testified he made several recorded telephone calls to Wadlington and introduced him

to an undercover agent posing as a drug dealer. During conversations with the agent,

Wadlington admitted he had been dealing drugs with Thomas for ten years. Thomas

arranged for Wadlington to sell one kilogram of cocaine to the agent. On November

13, 1998, Wadlington arrived as planned at a hotel to meet the agent for delivery of

the drugs, and he was arrested. No drugs were found during a search of Wadlington’s

person or vehicle. Following Wadlington’s arrest, he remarked some of his

acquaintances “must be talking,” and asked, “Is Mark Thomas in custody, or is he

working with you also?” 

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The jury found Wadlington guilty of both the conspiracy to distribute and

attempted distribution charges. Wadlington was sentenced to life imprisonment and

10 years’ supervised release for each count, to be served concurrently. Following an

unsuccessful direct appeal, Wadlington petitioned this court for rehearing, arguing

for the first time his sentence was invalid under Apprendi, because a specific

threshold drug quantity was neither alleged in the indictment nor proven to the jury

beyond a reasonable doubt. We denied the petition for rehearing.

B. Wadlington’s Section 2255 Motion

Wadlington then filed his motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asserting six

grounds for relief, claiming, inter alia, (1) he is actually innocent of the crimes

charged, and (2) his sentence was imposed in violation of Apprendi. Wadlington

later supplemented his motion with affidavits from four individuals: Terrance Hood

(Hood), Romaine Dukes (Dukes), Charles McMasters (McMasters), and Jesse Puckett

(Puckett). Wadlington argued the affidavits constituted newly discovered evidence

supporting his claim of actual innocence. The affidavits of Hood, Dukes, and

McMasters attempt to discredit the trial testimony of Hood and Tyrone Redmond

(Redmond), whereas Puckett’s affidavit speaks to Wadlington’s lack of involvement

with drugs after Wadlington’s release from jail in the early 1990s.

At trial, Hood testified about Wadlington’s leadership role in the Clinton

conspiracy. Hood identified other conspiracy members and testified he observed

Wadlington cook crack cocaine at the homes of female acquaintances in Clinton and

remove cocaine from a detergent box. Hood also testified (1) Wadlington supplied

him and others with drugs for resale, and (2) Hood began selling drugs for

Wadlington at the age of fourteen. Hood also testified being physically abused and

electrically shocked by Wadlington for making mistakes with the drug money. In

contrast to his trial testimony, Hood’s affidavit states Wadlington never supplied him

with drugs or physically abused him. Hood also claims his false accusations at trial

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were coerced by government agents who told him he could avoid a life sentence only

by implicating Wadlington. 

The affidavits of Dukes and McMasters both attack Redmond’s trial testimony.

At trial, Redmond testified he first began selling cocaine through Wadlington, and

repeatedly transported drugs from Chicago to Clinton for Wadlington, in exchange

for money. Dukes’s affidavit alleges that between August 1999 and April 2001,

while Dukes and Redmond were incarcerated in federal prison, Dukes confronted

Redmond for testifying against Wadlington and said Redmond knew Wadlington was

not involved in the Clinton drug conspiracy. According to Dukes’s affidavit,

Redmond denied testifying against Wadlington. Similarly, McMasters’s affidavit

alleges that in early 1999 Redmond stated the government wanted information about

Wadlington, and Redmond and McMasters could get a reduction in their sentences

if they made something up about Wadlington.

The district court denied Wadlington’s motion. In rejecting Hood’s affidavit,

the court noted recantations are “viewed with suspicion” and found no evidence the

government knew or should have known Hood’s trial testimony was false. The court

further held Puckett’s affidavit did not constitute new information, reasoning

Wadlington failed to explain why Puckett’s testimony could not have been presented

at trial. Finally, the court concluded the affidavits of Puckett, Dukes, and McMasters

did “little to diminish other evidence at trial linking Wadlington to the drug

conspiracy.” Thus, the court held Wadlington failed to demonstrate his actual

innocence. With regard to Wadlington’s Apprendi claim, the court ruled

Wadlington’s sentence was not unconstitutional because the rule announced in

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), which applied Apprendi, was not a

watershed rule of criminal procedure and thus did not apply to cases on collateral

review. 

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Following its denial of Wadlington’s petition, the district court granted

Wadlington’s request for a certificate of appealability on (1) whether Wadlington is

actually innocent, and (2) whether Blakely applies to cases brought under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Actual Innocence Claim

We review de novo the district court’s denial of Wadlington’s section 2255

motion and will affirm if the motion, files, and record conclusively show Wadlington

is not entitled to relief. See Von Kahl v. United States, 242 F.3d 783, 787 (8th Cir.

2001). An actual innocence claim is “not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a

gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred

constitutional claim considered on the merits.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315

(1995) (quotation omitted). To establish a valid claim of actual innocence,

Wadlington must “support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable

evidence . . . that was not presented at trial,” and demonstrate “it is more likely than

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new

evidence.” Id. at 324, 327. This standard is strict; a party generally cannot

demonstrate actual innocence where there is sufficient evidence to support a

conviction. See Johnson v. United States, 278 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting

McNeal v. United States, 249 F.3d 747, 749-50 (8th Cir. 2001)).

Wadlington urges this court to apply a modified test, set forth in English v.

United States, 998 F.2d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1993), given “the newly discovered

evidence involves a claim of perjury by prosecution witnesses.” Under this test,

Wadlington must “prove any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could

have affected the judgment of the jury.” Id. (citations omitted). Before we may

employ this relaxed standard, however, Wadlington must show (1) the testimony was

in fact perjured, and (2) the prosecutor knew or should have known of the perjury at

the time the testimony was presented. Id. (citation omitted). Because we conclude

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While the district court based its rejection of Hood’s affidavit in part on its

recollection of Hood’s testimony five years earlier, the court’s failure to hold an

evidentiary hearing to evaluate Hood’s new testimony was not an abuse of discretion.

See Etheridge v. United States, 241 F.3d 619, 622 (8th Cir. 2001) (standard of

review). An evidentiary hearing is not necessary where, as in this case, the district

judge observed the demeanor and credibility of the witness at trial or is otherwise

thoroughly familiar with the record of the case. See Provost, 969 F.2d at 619. 

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Wadlington fails to establish his right to relief under either standard, we affirm the

district court.

Applying the strict standard, we conclude Wadlington has failed to demonstrate

his actual innocence. First, the four witness affidavits do not entitle Wadlington to

appellate review of his otherwise barred claims. With regard to Hood’s affidavit, we

agree with the district court that recantations of testimony generally are viewed with

suspicion. See United States v. Provost, 969 F.2d 617, 619 (8th Cir. 1992).2

Furthermore, Hood’s affidavit does not establish Wadlington’s actual innocence. The

affidavit does not recant Hood’s entire trial testimony; rather, it leaves intact Hood’s

testimony on Wadlington’s possession of drugs, and the identity and involvement of

other conspiracy members. Additionally, although relevant and material, Hood’s

testimony was not central to Wadlington’s conviction. See Cox v. Burger, 398 F.3d

1025, 1031 (8th Cir. 2005). Multiple witnesses testified at trial and corroborated

Hood’s testimony regarding Wadlington’s criminal activities. Wadlington’s own

statements to law enforcement further corroborated Hood’s testimony and supported

the convictions.

For similar reasons, we conclude Wadlington’s remaining affidavits, two of

which attack the trial testimony of Redmond, do not constitute “new reliable

evidence” making it “more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

convicted [Wadlington].” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327. With regard to Dukes’s

affidavit, we agree with the district court there may be a number of reasons why

Redmond allegedly denied testifying against Wadlington, none of which would bear

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Wadlington’s direct appeal was submitted to this court on May 9, 2000, and

Wadlington’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on December 1, 2000.

Wadlington, 233 F.3d at 1072. In the interim, the Supreme Court announced its

Apprendi decision on June 26, 2000.

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on Wadlington’s actual innocence. Finally, McMasters’s affidavit regarding

Redmond’s testimony is, at best, impeachment evidence and does not exonerate

Wadlington. Together, the affidavits simply do not extinguish the abundance of other

evidence linking Wadlington to the Clinton drug conspiracy. 

Wadlington fares no better under the modified test. Even if Wadlington could

demonstrate Hood’s and Redmond’s trial testimony were perjured–a claim rejected

by the district court and a conclusion we also are hesitant to reach–Wadlington does

not demonstrate the government knew or should have known of the alleged perjury

at the time the testimony was presented. Because Wadlington fails to establish his

actual innocence, we affirm the district court on this issue. 

B. Apprendi and Blakely Claim

Wadlington next argues his life sentence violates both Apprendi and Blakely

because the district court’s findings of drug quantity were not charged in the

indictment or submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the

district court erred by increasing Wadlington’s sentence to life imprisonment based

upon its findings. While Wadlington’s direct appeal was pending, the Supreme Court

announced its decision in Apprendi.

3

 Wadlington first raised his Apprendi claim in

a petition for rehearing to this court and again on a petition for writ of certiorari to the

Supreme Court, both of which were denied. Wadlington reasserted his Apprendi

claim on collateral review in his section 2255 motion. The district court refused to

consider Wadlington’s argument, stating Apprendi was not applicable to cases on

collateral review. Wadlington now argues the district court erred because Apprendi

was decided before his case was “final” and the court thus was required to apply

Apprendi’s holding retroactively to his case. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,

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During sentencing, Wadlington only challenged the reliability of the

government’s evidence relating to drug quantities attributable to him. Such “a

sufficiency-of-proof objection [does] not preserve a claim of Apprendi error.” United

States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 550 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citing United States v.

Diaz, 296 F.3d 680, 683 n.4 (8th Cir. 2002)). 

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328 (1987) (holding a new rule for conducting criminal prosecutions must be applied

retroactively to all cases “pending on direct review or not yet final”); United States

v. Ross, 279 F.3d 600, 608 (8th Cir. 2002) (same).

While the chronology of Wadlington’s direct appeal and Apprendi complicates

this claim of error to some degree, we conclude the district court should have

considered Wadlington’s Apprendi claim, given Wadlington’s case was “not yet

final” when Apprendi was announced. Apprendi was decided nearly six months

before this court announced its decision in Wadlington’s direct appeal, and the

Apprendi rule should have been applied retroactively to Wadlington’s case. Supra

n.3. See, e.g., United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002). We thus proceed to

review Wadlington’s claimed error. Wadlington concedes this issue was not

preserved during sentencing, and we agree.4

 Therefore, we review for plain error.

See Diaz, 296 F.3d at 683. 

Before we may correct an error not raised below, “there must be (1) error,

(2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If all three conditions are met,

[we] may then exercise [our] discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the

error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997); see also

Pirani, 406 F.3d at 550. Here, the district court committed error by imposing a

sentence greater than the maximum of twenty years authorized by the facts found by

the jury, and “the error is plain, that is, clear or obvious, at this time.” Id.; see, e.g.,

Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468 (“[W]here the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly

contrary to the law at the time of appeal[,] it is enough that an error be ‘plain’ at the

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time of appellate consideration.”). Having satisfied the first two elements, we

proceed to apply the remainder of this standard of review. 

In Cotton, the Supreme Court analyzed whether the indictment’s failure to

include any allegation regarding drug quantities was plain error in violation of

Apprendi. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631-32. Skipping to the final prong of the plain-error

test, the Court held “even assuming [the defendants’] substantial rights were affected,

the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings,” given the existence of “overwhelming” evidence regarding the

conspiracy’s involvement with the calculated drug quantity. Id. at 632-33.

We reach a similar conclusion in this case. Here, the evidence presented at trial

overwhelmingly supported the district court’s adoption of the presentence

investigation report’s conclusion that Wadlington was responsible for transacting

more than eighteen kilograms of cocaine with regard to the conspiracy charge.

Furthermore, Wadlington received a life sentence for the attempted distribution

conviction, to be served concurrently with his life sentence for the conspiracy charge.

Thus, even if we were to accept Wadlington’s Apprendi argument with respect to the

conspiracy conviction, his life sentence on the attempted distribution conviction

would remain unchanged. See United States v. Blade, 336 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir.

2003) (holding indictment’s failure to allege minimum drug amounts did not affect

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings given the

overwhelming evidence of drug quantity and existence of additional life sentences).

Because the district court’s error does not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of the judicial proceedings, Wadlington is not entitled to

resentencing. 

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Wadlington’s section 2255

motion.

______________________________

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