Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-03523/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-03523-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Francisco Jacquez
Respondent
Daniel Pina
Petitioner

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL PINA, 

Petitioner, No. CIV S-09-3523 MCE GGH P

vs.

FRANCISCO JACQUEZ, Warden, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Respondent.

 /

Introduction

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted in 1992 of first degree murder with a weapon by a

prisoner serving a 15-year-to-life sentence and received an indeterminate state prison life term

without the possibility of parole. Petition, p. 1; Motion to Dismiss, p. 1, Respondent’s Lodged

Document 1, Abstract of Judgment. Petitioner challenges his conviction on the following

grounds: 1) application of additional fee under Cal. Penal Code § 2085.5 (crime victim

restitution fine or order) as amended in 1994 violates ex post facto clause; 2) ineffective

assistance of counsel at sentencing on his restitution fine; 3) court exceeded statutory authority

by imposing $10,000.00 fine petitioner had no ability to pay; 4) his 15-year principal term must

be completed before a consecutive term may begin to run. See Petition.

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 Judicial notice may be taken of court records. Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 1

F.R.D. 626, 635 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126

(1981).

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Motion to Dismiss 

Respondent moves to dismiss the petition on the grounds that 1) it is successive

under 28 § 2244(b)(2), and 2) it was filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations pursuant to

28 U.S.C.§ 2244(d). Motion to Dismiss (MTD), pp. 1-8. In addition, respondent maintains

grounds one through three should be dismissed for a failure to state a cognizable federal claim. 

Id. at 9-10. As to ground four, respondent seeks to withdraw any contention within his motion

that this claim too was untimely and successive, stating that respondent did not fully understand

the nature of that claim when presenting the motion to dismiss. Reply, pp. 7-8. Instead,

respondent argues that petitioner in claim four is challenging the denial of parole suitability

hearing on his Los Angeles County conviction (the one that resulted in the 15-year-to-life

sentence) and thus does not even challenge the judgment of a state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a), and must be dismissed. Id. at 8. Alternatively, respondent contends this ground should

be summarily rejected as it is illogical and would be in the interest of judicial economy to do so. 

Id. Of course, it is not appropriate for respondent to make an argument in a reply paper that was

not advanced in his motion because petitioner is not accorded, thereby, the opportunity to oppose

the argument. However, in this instance, the court finds ground four to be so patently frivolous

that that claim will be dismissed summarily sua sponte. It is wholly nonsensical to insist that

petitioner should be granted a parole suitability hearing based on a 15-year-to-life sentence when

petitioner also remains separately sentenced to a life term without possibility of parole. 

Successive 

Respondent notes that petitioner filed a prior habeas challenge to the same

conviction and sentence in the federal district court in Pina v. Cambra, Case No. CIV-S-97-0704

MCE JFM P, a case of which this court takes judicial notice. See also, Resp. Lodged Doc. 21, 1

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copy of case docket for CIV-S-97-0704 MCE JFM P; respondent’s Lodged Doc. 22, Findings

and Recommendations, filed on May 27, 2003 in Case No. CIV-S-97-0704, recommending

denial on the merits; respondent’s Lodged Doc. 23, Order, filed on January 13, 2004, denying

habeas application and dismissing case. On March 20, 2006, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the

judgment of the district court in Case No. CIV-S-97-0704 in an unpublished opinion which

became the mandate of the court on May 5, 2006. Respondent’s Lodged Doc. 24. The petition

for a writ of certiorari in that case was denied in the United States Supreme Court on October 20,

2006. Respondent’s Lodged Doc. 25. 

A petition is successive, under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) where it “seeks to add a new

ground for relief,” or “if it attacks the federal court's previous resolution of a claim on the merits

...” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532, 125 S.Ct. 2648 (2005) [emphasis in original]. “[A]

‘claim’ as used in § 2244(b) is an asserted federal basis for relief from a state court’s judgment of

conviction.” Id., at 530, 125 S.Ct. at 2647. “A habeas petition is second or successive only if it

raises claims that were or could have been adjudicated on the merits.” McNabb v. Yates, 576

F.3d 1028, 1029 (9 Cir. 2009), citing Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 888 (9th Cir. 2008). th

Respondent contends that the instant petition is successive because petitioner knew the claims he

asserts herein at the time of his sentencing and “unjustifiably omitted” them from his prior

federal petition. MTD, p. 4. 

Petitioner protests that he is not herein attacking the district court’s previous

decision on the merits “in any broad sense.” Opposition (Opp.), pp. 1-2. Petitioner contends that

while two of his claims “have a connection to a sentencing aspect,” that a challenge to a court’s

authority may be raised on appeal for the first time when the claim is that the trial court exceeded

its statutory authority with regard to a restitution order, although he concedes that in a challenge

based on ability to pay, “procedural issues” under Cal. Govt. Code § 13967 are waived when not

raised in the trial court. Opp., p. 2. Thus, petitioner tries to frame his claim as not based on his

life without parole sentence or any claim that he is not able-bodied and unable to work for the

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 Existing law requires a person who is convicted of a felony, except as specified, to pay a 2

restitution fine, to be deposited in the Restitution Fund, of not less than $200, subject to the

defendant’s ability to pay, and not more than $10,000. In setting the amount of the restitution

fine, the court is required to consider certain relevant factors. 

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rest of his life in prison, but rather on whether the court exceeded its authority under Cal. Govt.

Code § 13967(a), when there was a requirement that above a $200 minimum, the trial court

failed to make an ability to pay finding before imposing a $10,000.00 fine. Id. Petitioner’s 2

claims are that application of a state statutory provision that the court must make an ability to pay

finding and failed to do so was the result of both ineffective assistance of counsel and trial court

error and that the application to him of a change in Cal. Penal Code § 2085.5 violates the ex post

facto clause because he is being charged a 10 percent administrative fee from his wages and trust

account when at the time of the imposition of the fine, when prior to 1994, any money collected,

including the administrative fee was charged against the fine amount still owed. Opp., pp. 2-15,

19-20. The court cannot reach the merits of any of petitioner’s first three grounds, however,

unless petitioner can show his petition is not successive (although should petitioner be able to

demonstrate that his claims are not successive, at that point the court could reach the question of

untimeliness as well as lack of colorability of the claims respondent has raised by his motion as

well). See MTD.

Although petitioner seeks to characterize his current claims as distinct from the

challenges he raised in his prior federal petition and avers that he is not challenging the

conviction itself by his claims regarding the restitution fine, respondent makes the point that the

fine imposed under Cal. Penal Code § 2085.5 was part of the 1992 judgment at issue. Reply, p.

4. Respondent notes the enactment of Cal. Penal Code § 1202.4, in 1983, which provides for

imposition of a fine where a criminal defendant is convicted of a felony and that such are

undisputedly considered by California to be part of a defendant’s conviction and sentence. 

Reply, p. 4, citing People v. Palomar, 171 Cal.App.3d 131, 133, 214 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1985) (state

legislature enacted comprehensive law in 1983 which increased fines authorized in criminal

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cases, adding Cal. Penal Code § 1202.4 providing for a restitution fine in any case where a

defendant is convicted of a felony); People v. Hong, 64 Cal. App.4th 1071, 1080, 76 Cal. Rptr.2d

23 (Cal. App.4th 1998) ( “A judgment includes a fine. A restitution fine is a fine.”) Nor does

petitioner specifically deny that the restitution fine, the imposition, manner and execution of

which form the basis of his first three claims, is a part of the sentence he received in 1992, which

conviction and sentence he has previously challenged in the action he brought in this court in

1997 and which has been adjudicated on the merits. Petitioner cites, inter alia, People v. Castro,

30 Cal. Rptr.2d 188 (1994), for the proposition that “a claim that a sentencing court has exceeded

its statutory power to impose a restitution fine may be raised for the first time on appeal.” See

Opp., p. 2. This finding concerning state law is not relevant to whether or not petitioner’s claim

regarding that issue is successive to his prior habeas petition in this court. As respondent

contends (Reply, p. 3), petitioner has cited to a number of out-of-circuit cases involving federal

prisoners seeking relief post-conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Those cases include: In

re: Goddard, 170 F.3d 435 (4 Cir. 1999) (appellate court determined that movant, having used th

his first § 2255 motion solely to reinstate his direct appeal right, did not need authorization to

proceed on second § 2255 motion); Shepeck v. United States, 150 F.3d 800, 801 (7 Cir. 1998) th

(finding that in applying §§ 2244 and 2255, “an order granting a § 2255 petition, and reimposing

sentence, resets to zero the counter of collateral attacks pursued”); United States v. Scott, 124

F.3d 1328 (10 Cir. 1997) (finding second § 2255 motion not to be successive because initial th

motion granted allowed him to pursue a direct appeal). Opp., p. 15. None of these dispositions,

however, demonstrate that petitioner’s present challenge to his restitution fine is not a collateral

attack upon the state court judgment that he has previously challenged in federal court and which

has been adjudicated. Petitioner claims that Vasquez v. Parrott, 318 F.3d 387 (2 Cir. 2003) and nd

James v. Walsh, 308 F.3d 162 (2 Cir. 2002), favor his position that the current petition is not nd

second or successive. Opp., pp. 16-17. In James, supra, at 168, a Second Circuit panel

determined that where petitioner alleged the incorrect application of credit for time served and a

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miscalculated conditional release date, petitioner was not arguing a claim that could have been

presented at the time when his first petition was presented and thus could not be found to be

second or successive under AEDPA’s gatekeeping provisions. In Vasquez, supra, at 389, another

Second Circuit decision, petitioner was found not to have filed a second or successive petition,

where in his initial § 2254 petition he sought release from custody, raising a claim that a delay in

adjudicating his direct appeal of his robbery conviction and sentence, still undecided in the state

courts after three years, violated due process and his minimum term would soon be reached. His

second petition, however, unlike the first, sought to set aside the conviction itself. The Vasquez

court concluded that because in the first petition petitioner “did not challenge the lawfulness of

his conviction,” the second petition, wherein he collaterally attacked the judgment of conviction

“did not count under the second or successive petition rule of § 2244” and thus was “not a second

petition not a second petition within the meaning of § 2244.” Vasquez, supra, 318 F.3d at 392. 

These cases do not help petitioner, however. (With respect to both petitioners James and

Vasquez, unlike petitioner herein, they each sought release from custody in each petition). 

Regarding James, supra, petitioner’s case is not analogous because unlike the petitioner therein,

the restitution fine that he challenges here was imposed and known to petitioner at the time of,

and part of, his sentencing and certainly by the time of his filing his prior federal petition. In the

case of Vasquez, supra, because, unlike petitioner herein, Vasquez had not collaterally attacked

the state court conviction and judgment pursuant to which he was held in custody in his initial

petition. 

Under Ninth Circuit Rule 22-3(a), “[i]f a second or successive petition or motion,

or an application for leave to file such an application or motion, is mistakenly submitted to the

district court, the district court shall refer it to the court of appeals.” This court cannot consider

the successive petition without prior authorization by the Ninth Circuit. Under 28 U.S.C. §

2244(b)(3)(A), leave must first be obtained from the court of appeals to file a second or

successive petition before petitioner can proceed in district court. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S.

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651, 656-657, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996). This is a jurisdictional requisite. Burton v. Stewart, 549

U.S. 147, 152, 127 S. Ct. 793 (2007); Cooper v. Calderon, 274 F.3d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 2001)

(once district court has recognized a petition as second or successive pursuant to § 2244(b), it

lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits). The district court has discretion to either transfer that

petition to the court of appeals or dismiss the petition. United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200

(4 Cir. 2003) (§ 2255 case); Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 139-140 (3 Cir. 2002). th rd

Respondent has argued (MTD, pp. 9-11; Reply, p. 6), inter alia, that petitioner’s claims regarding

the restitution fine do not satisfy the custody requirement for bringing a habeas petition; although

petitioner remains incarcerated, he is not seeking release from confinement with these claims. 

Bailey v. Hill, 599 F.3d 976, 981 (9 Cir. 2010) (concluding “that § 2254(a) does not confer

th

jurisdiction over a state prisoner’s in-custody challenge to a restitution order imposed as part of a

criminal sentence.”) Although this court may not reach the merits in this case, the undersigned

will recommend dismissal of grounds one through three, rather than a transfer of, the petition to

the Ninth Circuit because, on the face of it, petitioner’s claims are not cognizable. However,

should petitioner seek to proceed on these or other grounds regarding his previously challenged

1992 conviction/sentence, he is at liberty to seek authorization from the Ninth Circuit to do so

and in fact must obtain such authorization before the claims may be presented before this court.

Claim 4

As to ground four, as noted above, that claim does not arise from the 1992

conviction/sentence at issue herein and is otherwise frivolous and should be summarily dismissed

on that separate basis. The Article III case or controversy requirement “subsists through all

stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate ... The parties must continue to have a

personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit. This means that, throughout the litigation, the

plaintiff must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and

likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118

S.Ct. 978, (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted). To require an adjudication of

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parole eligibility on a conviction previous to an LWOP sentence is the quintessential situation

where the court could not award effective relief. Such an adjudication would be completely

academic.

Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondent’s April 2, 2010

(docket # 12) motion to dismiss the petition be granted as successive with regard to claims one,

two and three and summarily dismissed as to ground four.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: Jan. 4, 2011

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

____________________________________

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

pina3523.fr

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