Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01556/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01556-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gerald Fellows
Petitioner
J.D. Hartley
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERALD FELLOWS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

J.D. HARTLEY, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:08-CV-01556 OWW JMD HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY (30)

DAYS

Gerald Fellows (hereinafter “Petitioner”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition

for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation pursuant to a 1982 conviction for second degree murder with a firearm enhancement. 

The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a term of fifteen years to life in prison. (Pet. at 2; Answer at

1.)

Petitioner is not challenging his conviction in this instant action; rather, Petitioner challenges

the denial of his parole by the California Board of Parole Hearings (the “Board”), whom he appeared

before in 2006. Petitioner contends that the Board violated his constitutional rights when they

denied him parole. (Pet. at 3-6.)

On June 19, 2007, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the San

Bernardino County Superior Court challenging the Board’s denial of parole. (See Resp’t Answer Ex.

1.) The Superior Court issued a reasoned opinion denying the petition on September 7, 2007. (See

Resp’t Ex. 5.) 

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 1

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Petitioner also filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus with the California Court of Appeal

and the California Supreme Court. (Resp’t Answer Exs. 6, 8.) The California Court of Appeal

issued a summary denial of the petition on November 5, 2007. (Resp’t Answer Ex. 7.) The

California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition on June 18, 2008. (Resp’t Answer Ex. 9.)

On October 16, 2008, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus.1

Respondent filed a response to the petition on February 27, 2009 and Petitioner filed a

traverse on March 30, 2009. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner pled guilty in July 1985 to second degree murder. (Pet. at 2). As stated at the

parole hearing, the convictions pertained to a physical altercation between Petitioner and the victim

arising out of a monetary debt the victim owed Petitioner. (Pet. Ex. A, Tr. Parole Hearing, at 8-12.) 

The victim had been hired by Petitioner to do some work for apartments Petitioner was managing but

had failed to complete the work. Petitioner and the victim engaged in a verbal argument during a car

ride that escalated into a physical altercation once the car stopped. During this altercation, Petitioner

claims the victim hit him. Petitioner responded by knifing the victim. (Id.) Petitioner then enlisted

the help of his common law wife’s fourteen year old son to put the victim into the trunk. It is unclear

if the victim was alive at that point. Petitioner was forty-two years old at the time of the

commitment offense and had an extensive criminal history that began when he was sixteen years of

age. 

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

A person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court may petition a district court for

relief by way of a writ of habeas corpus if the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution at Avenal State Prison, which is located in Kings County. As Kings

Respondent admits that the petition was timely filed and that Petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies.

1

(Answer at 2.)

U.S. District Court

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County falls within this judicial district, 28 U.S.C. § 84(b), the Court has jurisdiction over

Petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (vesting concurrent

jurisdiction over application for writ of habeas corpus to the district court where the petitioner is

currently in custody or the district court in which a State court convicted and sentenced Petitioner if

the State “contains two or more Federal judicial districts”).

II. AEDPA Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed after the statute’s

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-327 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499

(9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is consequently

governed by its provisions. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003). Thus, the instant

petition “may be granted only if [Petitioner] demonstrates that the state court decision denying relief

was ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir.

2007) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)), overruled in part on other grounds, Hayward v. Marshall,

603 F.3d 546, 555 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71.

Title 28 of the United States Code, section 2254 remains the exclusive vehicle for

Petitioner’s habeas petition as Petitioner is in the custody of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation pursuant to a state court judgment. See Sass v. California Board of

Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-1127 (9th Cir. 2006) overruled in part on other grounds,

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 555. As a threshold matter, this Court must “first decide what constitutes

‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” 

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). In ascertaining what is “clearly

established Federal law,” this Court must look to the “holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the

Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Id. (quoting

Williams, 592 U.S. at 412). “In other words, ‘clearly established Federal law’ under § 2254(d)(1) is

the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court

renders its decision.” Id. Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court’s decision was

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“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” Lockyer,

538 U.S. at 72, (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas

court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the

Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538

U.S. at 72. “Under the ‘unreasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court

making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the State court's application of

clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the state court’s decision is contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle,

94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states, Ninth

Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court decision

is objectively unreasonable. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1072 (9th Cir. 2003) (“While only the

Supreme Court’s precedents are binding on the Arizona court, and only those precedents need be

reasonably applied, we may look for guidance to circuit precedents”); Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200

F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999) (“because of the 1996 AEDPA amendments, it can no longer

reverse a state court decision merely because that decision conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent on

a federal Constitutional issue . . . This does not mean that Ninth Circuit caselaw is never relevant to a

habeas case after AEDPA. Our cases may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining

whether a particular state court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court law, and

also may help us determine what law is ‘clearly established’”). Furthermore, the AEDPA requires

that the Court give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state court’s factual findings

are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A federal habeas court is bound by a state’s

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interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 2002).

The initial step in applying AEDPA’s standards is to “identify the state court decision that is

appropriate for our review.” Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005). Where more

than one State court has adjudicated Petitioner’s claims, a federal habeas court analyzes the last

reasoned decision. Id. (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991) for the presumption that

later unexplained orders, upholding a judgment or rejecting the same claim, rests upon the same

ground as the prior order). Thus, a federal habeas court looks through ambiguous or unexplained

state court decisions to the last reasoned decision to determine whether that decision was contrary to

or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107,

1112-1113 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the San Bernardino County Superior Court, the California Court of

Appeal, and the California Supreme Court reached the merits of Petitioner’s claims. As both the

California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s claims,

the Court looks through those decisions to the last reasoned decision; namely, that of the San

Bernardino County Superior Court. See Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 804. 

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

The petition for writ of habeas corpus contains four grounds for relief, all alleging that the

Board’s denial of parole implicated Petitioner’s right to due process of the law. In his first ground

for relief, Petitioner contends that the Board’s continuing reliance on his crime violates his due

process rights. Petitioner’s second ground for relief alleges that his due process rights were violated

as there was no evidence to support the Board’s denial. Petitioner claims in his third ground for

relief that California Penal Code section 3041 creates a liberty interest in parole. Lastly, Petitioner

contends that the Board failed to base its decision on the suitability criteria codified in California’s

regulations. As Petitioner’s claims center around the denial of parole and its implications for

Petitioner’s due process rights, the Court analyzes these grounds for relief together.

The Court analyzes Petitioner’s due process claims in two steps: “the first asks whether there

exist a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines

whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.’” Sass, 461

F.3d at 1127. The United States Constitution does not, by itself, create a protected liberty interest in

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a parole date. Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 17-21 (1981). Respondent argues that Petitioner

does not have a federally protected liberty interest in parole. (Resp’t Answer at 4.) The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that “[i]f there is any right to be release on parole, or to

release in the absence of some evidence of future dangerousness, it has to arise from substantive state

law creating a right to release.” Hayward, 603 F.3d at 555. The Ninth Circuit further recognized

that “[t]here is no general federal constitutional ‘some evidence’ requirement for denial of parole, in

the absence of state law creating an enforceable right to parole.” Id. at 559. The Hayward court’s

finding, that there exists no free standing federal due process right to parole or the federal right to

some evidence of current dangerousness, contained the consistent and continual caveat that state law

may in fact give rise to federal protection for those rights. As the Ninth Circuit later reiterated, “state

created rights may give rise to liberty interests that may be enforced as a matter of federal law.”

Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d 606, 609 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing Wilkinson v. Austin, 545

U.S. 209, 221 (2005)). The Pearson court found that, “Hayward necessarily held that compliance

with state requirement is mandated by federal law, specifically the Due Process Clause” as “[t]he

principle that state law gives rise to liberty interests that may be enforced as a matter of federal law is

long-established.” Id. 

The next question is whether California’s parole scheme gives rise to a liberty interest

enforced as a matter of federal law. The Ninth Circuit has definitively concluded that “California

has created a parole system that independently requires the enforcement of certain procedural and

substantive rights, including the right to parole absent ‘some evidence’ of current dangerousness.” 

Id. at 611 (citing Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562); see also Cooke v. Solis, 606 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir.

2010) (noting that “California’s ‘some evidence’ requirement is a component of the liberty interest

created by the parole system of that state”). The Ninth Circuit reiterated this finding, stating that

“‘California’s parole scheme give rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole. [citation]

That liberty interest encompasses the state-created requirement that a parole decision must be

supported by ‘some evidence’ of current dangerousness.” Pirtle v. California Bd. Of Prison Terms,

__ F.3d __, 2010 WL 2732888 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Consequently, the dispositive

inquiry that this Court must undertake, in determining whether the denial of parole comports with the

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requirement of federal due process, is “whether the California judicial decision approving the

governor’s [or parole board’s] decision rejecting parole was an ‘unreasonable application’ of the

California ‘some evidence’ requirement, or was ‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence.’” Hayward, 603 F.3d at 563 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)) (footnotes

omitted).

A. State Court Decision

The last reasoned decision by a State court was that of the San Bernardino County Superior

Court. The Superior Court upheld the Board’s denial, finding that there was a modicum of evidence

to support the Board’s finding that Petitioner was unsuitable for parole. (Resp’t Answer Ex. 5 at 3.) 

The Superior Court noted that the Board had relied solely on Petitioner’s lengthy criminal history

and the circumstances of the commitment offense, especially Petitioner’s enlistment of a fourteen

year old boy to dispose of the body, in finding Petitioner’s unsuitable. (Id. at 4.) 

The Court finds the analysis undertaken by the San Bernardino Superior Court to be an

unreasonable application of the California some evidence standard as articulated by the California

Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. As the Ninth Circuit recently observed in

Cooke:

Under California law, “the paramount consideration for both the Board and the

Governor” must be “whether the inmate currently poses a threat to public safety and

thus may not be released on parole,”[citation], and “the facts relied upon by the Board

or the Governor [must] support the ultimate decision that the inmate remains a threat

to public safety.

Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1214 (quoting In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, 1210, 1213 (2008)); see also

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(a) (“[I]f in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison,” the prisoner must be found unsuitable

and denied parole). The California Supreme Court held in Lawrence that, “[t]he relevant

determination for the Board and the Governor is, and always has been, an individualized assessment

of the continuing danger and risk to public safety posed by the inmate.” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th

at 1227 (noting that “mere recitation of the circumstances of the commitment offense, absent

articulation of a rational nexus between those facts and current dangerousness, fails to provide the

required “modicum of evidence” of unsuitability”). In setting forth the standard for federal habeas

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courts, the Ninth Circuit emphasized this principle, stating that “a reviewing court must consider

‘whether the identified facts are probative to the central issue of current dangerousness when

considered in light of the full record before the Board or the Governor.’” Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1214

(emphasis in original) (quoting In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1221). 

Here, the San Bernardino Superior Court’s decision only briefly mentions Petitioner’s current

dangerousness. The Superior Court’s decision is entirely devoid of any discussion or examination

pertaining to whether there is evidence to support a finding that Petitioner is currently dangerous. As

the California Supreme Court mandates “that current dangerousness (rather than the mere presence

of a statutory unsuitability factor) is the focus of the parole decision,” the State court’s decision to be

an objectively unreasonable application of the California some evidence standard. In re Lawrence,

44 Cal. 4th at 1210. 

B. Parole Board’s Decision

The finding that the State court’s decision was objectively unreasonable does not end a

federal habeas court’s inquiry. See Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 641 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 28

U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) in noting that a federal habeas court’s finding that state court’s decision is

contrary to established federal law does not end that court’s inquiry). A federal habeas court’s

“power to grant the writ of habeas corpus to a state inmate depends on his actually being ‘in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws ... of the United States.’” Id. Thus, Petitioner is only entitled

to habeas corpus relief if his due process rights were violated by a lack of evidence supporting the

Board’s denial of parole. 

As discussed in the Superior Court’s decision, the Board relied only on two factors to deny

Petitioner parole–namely, Petitioner’s commitment offense and his pre-incarceration criminal

history. (Pet. Ex. A at 61-62.) The Board may not rely on the circumstances of the commitment

offense as :

the aggravated nature of the crime does not in and of itself provide some evidence of

current dangerousness to the public unless the record also establishes that something

in the prisoner's pre- or post-incarceration history, or his or her current demeanor and

mental state, indicates that the implications regarding the prisoner’s dangerousness

that derive from his or her commission of the commitment offense remain probative

to the statutory determination of a continuing threat to public safety.

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In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1214; see also Pirtle, __ F.3d __, 2010 WL 2732888, *5 (quoting

Hayward, 606 F.3d at 562). 

The Lawrence court further held that even where the commitment offense was particularly

egregious, reliance on this immutable factor would violate a petitioner’s due process rights under

California’s regulations and statutes governing parole suitability where:

evidence of the inmate's rehabilitation and suitability for parole under the governing

statutes and regulations is overwhelming, the only evidence related to unsuitability is

the gravity of the commitment offense, and that offense is both temporally remote and

mitigated by circumstances indicating the conduct is unlikely to recur, the immutable

circumstance that the commitment offense involved aggravated conduct does not

provide ‘some evidence’ inevitably supporting the ultimate decision that the inmate

remains a threat to public safety.

In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1191 (emphasis in original). 

In Lawrence, the California Supreme Court found that a commitment offense occurring over

thirty years prior to the Governor’s denial of parole was no longer probative of the petitioner’s

current dangerousness. The Lawrence court found that the intervening twenty-four years in which

petitioner, now age sixty-one, had rendered “the unchanging factor of the gravity of petitioner’s

commitment offense” no longer probative of current dangerousness and therefore could not

constitute some evidence. Id. at 1226. 

Here, the Court finds that the intervening twenty-four years between the circumstances of the

commitment offense and the parole hearing has evidenced Petitioner’s extensive rehabilitative

efforts. As noted by the Board, Petitioner has “programmed commendably” in the intervening

twenty-four years. (Tr. Parole Hearing at 62). Petitioner has obtained his high school diploma and

completed three different vocations. (Id. at 62-63.) Petitioner volunteers as a tutor, which the Board

took as a sign of Petitioner reaching out to others and “taking part in other’s lives . . . obviously

thinking about other people.” (Id. at 63.) The Board noted that Petitioner had continuously without

interruption participated in Narcotics and Alcoholics Anonymous and completed in an abundance of

self-help programs, including anger management. (Id. at 22-24, 63) The Board further noted that

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Petitioner had a “basically violence free behavior in this institution.” (Tr. Parole Hearing at 62-63.) 2

Petitioner’s psychological evaluation was supportive of parole as the evaluator labeled him a low

risk of future violence under the heading of clinical presentation. (Id. at 32.) The evaluator noted

Petitioner presented as a low to moderately low risk of future violence under the heading of

management of future risks. (Id.) In sum, the Court finds that the circumstances of the commitment

offense are not probative towards Petitioner’s current dangerousness in light of Petitioner’s extensive

rehabilitative efforts and the temporal remoteness of the crime. As the Ninth Circuit stated, the

circumstances of the commitment offense “cannot, standing alone, constitute the requisite evidence

of current dangerousness,” as “there must be more than the crime or its circumstances alone to justify

the Board’s or the Governor’s finding of current dangerousness.” Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1214, 1216. 

The only other factor the Board relied on was Petitioner’s prior criminal misconduct, which is

even more attenuated in terms of length of time than the commitment offense. The same reasons

that rendered the commitment offense no longer probative are applicable to Petitioner’s preincarceration criminal misconduct. While Petitioner’s criminal history was extensive and included

two jail terms, at least one of which involved violence, “all of the information in a postconviction

record supports the determination that the inmate is rehabilitated and no longer poses a danger to

public safety.” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1226-1227. More importantly, the Board has failed to

articulate “a rational nexus between those facts and current dangerousness” and thus “fails to provide

the required “modicum of evidence” of unsuitability.” Id. Thus, viewed in light of the full record,

the Court finds that the Board’s decision was not supported by some evidence of current

dangerousness. See In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1221.

\\\

\\\

\\\

The Board noted that Petitioner received a serious disciplinary violation five years previously, in 2000, for mutual

2

combat. However, as stated by the Board, “You’ve explained that to this panel today, where basically you got hit over the

head with a punch, and that was again the only disciplinary violation.” (Tr. Parole Hearing at 64, 37-38.) The Court does

not find that the Board relied on this factor. This reading of the record is supported by the Superior Court’s failure to list

Petitioner’s disciplinary infraction as a factor relied upon by the Board.

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C. Appropriate Remedy

In the answer, Respondent contends that the appropriate remedy for a violation of Petitioner’s

due process right is a new review by the Board, citing to Benny v. United States Parole Commission,

295 F.3d 977, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2002) in support of this contention. (Resp’t Answer at 4.) The Ninth

Circuit has expressly rejected this argument, stating that, “[f]ederal courts have the latitude to resolve

a habeas corpus petition as law and justice require.’ [Citation] Ordering the release of a prisoner is

well within the range of remedies available to federal habeas courts.” Pirtle, __ F.3d __, 2010 WL

2732888, *8 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243); see also Burnett v. Lampert, 432 F.3d 996, 999 (9th Cir.

2005) (stating that federal courts “have a fair amount of flexibility in fashioning specific habeas

relief”); Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that federal habeas court is

vested with the largest power to control and direct the form of judgment to be entered); Milot v.

Haws, 628 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775

(1987)(“[F]ederal habeas courts have ‘broad discretion in conditioning a judgment granting habeas

relief’ and in ‘dispos[ing] of habeas corpus matters ‘as law and justice require’”). Furthermore, as

noted by the California Court of Appeal where “the prisoner was not lawfully in custody during the

nine years following his original parole date because the rescission of that date was not supported by

‘some evidence.’ [citation] The prisoner was therefore entitled to a credit of this unlawful custody

time against his three-year parole period.” In re Bush, 161 Cal. App. 4th 133, 144-45 (2008)

(emphasis added). Thus, the Court recommends that Petitioner be credited for the time he has

unlawfully served; namely, the time he has served as a result of the violation of his constitutional

rights.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, in accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMEND that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be GRANTED;

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgement for Petitioner;

3. Judgment be entered granting a writ of habeas corpus as follows: The Board shall find

Petitioner suitable for parole at a hearing to be held within 30 days of the order

adopting this decision, unless new evidence of his conduct in prison or change in

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mental status subsequent to the 2006 parole hearing is introduced and is sufficient to

support a finding that Petitioner currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to

society if released on parole. In the absence of any such new evidence showing

Petitioner’s current dangerousness, the Board shall calculate a prison term and release

date for Petitioner in accordance with California law. Further, if the release date

already has passed, Respondent shall, within ten (10) days of the Board's hearing,

release Petitioner from custody. With respect to his presumptive period of parole,

Petitioner is to be credited for any time that has lapsed since the release date

calculated by the Board or when a finding of suitability at the November 2006 parole

consideration hearing would have become final pursuant to California Penal Code

sections 3041(b) and 3041.2(a)), whichever is later.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Oliver W. Wanger, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the

court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 22, 2010 /s/ John M. Dixon 

hlked6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 12

Case 1:08-cv-01556-OWW -JMD Document 17 Filed 07/22/10 Page 12 of 12