Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-19-03153/USCOURTS-ca7-19-03153-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kittrell Freeman
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

Nos. 19-2928 & 19-3153 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

NAPOLEON JACKSON and KITTRELL FREEMAN, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

____________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 18-cr-00804 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MAY 13, 2020 — DECIDED JUNE 17, 2020 

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Does an air freshener hanging from 

a rearview mirror obstruct the driver’s clear view? A Chicago 

police officer believed that, in this case, it did. That officer 

pulled over Napoleon Jackson and his passenger Kittrell Freeman for violating a provision of the Chicago municipal code 

prohibiting any object obstructing the driver’s clear view 

through the windshield. Officers subsequently recovered 

three firearms from the vehicle and Jackson and Freeman 

Case: 19-3153 Document: 32 Filed: 06/17/2020 Pages: 11
2 Nos. 19-2928 & 19-3153 

were each charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by 

a felon. Jackson and Freeman moved to suppress the evidence 

for lack of probable cause to conduct the traffic stop based on 

their argument that the officer erroneously believed that there 

could not be anything hanging from the rearview mirror, regardless of whether it obstructed the driver’s view. The district court denied the motion, finding that an officer could reasonably conclude that the air freshener obstructed the clear 

view and thus supported probable cause to conduct a traffic 

stop. Jackson and Freeman both pleaded guilty while preserving their rights to appeal the suppression ruling. 

Though the district court couched its analysis in terms of 

probable cause, all that is required for a traffic stop is reasonable suspicion. Even so, because the officer had an articulable 

and objective basis for suspecting that the air freshener obstructed Jackson’s clear view in violation of the city municipal 

code, the stop was lawful. The district court correctly denied 

the motion to suppress and we affirm the judgment. 

I. Background 

On September 18, 2018, Napoleon Jackson was driving on 

the southside of Chicago, along with Kittrell Freeman as a 

passenger, when Chicago Police Officer Melissa Petrus observed an object hanging from Jackson’s rearview mirror that 

appeared to be an air freshener. The two cars were facing each 

other across a multilane road and when Jackson turned left 

and crossed in front of Officer Petrus, who was on patrol with 

Officers Sodtez and De La O, she confirmed that the object 

was indeed a tree-shaped air freshener hanging from the rearview mirror. Officer Petrus turned and followed Jackson’s car 

for about four blocks while she ran his license plate through 

LEADS, a law enforcement database. Officer Petrus then 

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Nos. 19-2928 & 19-3153 3

pulled Jackson over to conduct a traffic stop because Jackson 

was in violation of a city ordinance regarding the obstruction 

of the driver’s clear view. Specifically, Officer Petrus cited 

Jackson for violating section 9-40-250(b) of the Chicago municipal code, which prohibits driving a motor vehicle “with 

any object so placed in or upon the vehicle as to obstruct the 

driver’s clear view through the windshield, except required 

or permitted equipment of the vehicle.” MCC § 9-40-250(b). 

During the traffic stop, the officers discovered a fully 

loaded rifle wedged between the front passenger’s seat and 

the door. Officers also recovered two loaded handguns from 

underneath the driver’s seat. Jackson and Freeman were both 

arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a firearm 

by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

Both defendants moved to suppress the firearms, arguing 

that Officer Petrus lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a 

traffic stop based solely on observing the air freshener hanging from the rearview mirror. Further, the defendants argued 

that Officer Petrus mistakenly understood the law to prohibit 

“anything” hanging from the rearview mirror and thus could 

not have reasonably believed Jackson committed a traffic violation. 

The district court held an evidentiary hearing, at which 

Officer Petrus was the only witness. Officer Petrus testified 

that when she saw Jackson’s vehicle across the street from her, 

she saw an “object hanging down from his rearview mirror” 

that “appeared to be some sort of air freshener.” Jackson then 

turned in front of the officers’ vehicle and Officer Petrus was 

“able to confirm that there was a [sic] air freshener hanging 

from his rearview mirror, and I knew that there were two occupants in the car.” Officer Petrus turned and followed 

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4 Nos. 19-2928 & 19-3153 

Jackson, where she could see “the air freshener hanging down 

from his rearview mirror as well as a black box in front of the 

-- of the mirror in the windshield.” She did not know what the 

black box was at the time. 

Officer Petrus activated her emergency lights “in order to 

conduct the traffic stop because he was in violation of a city 

ordinance” for “obstruction of driver’s view.” Jackson pulled 

over and all three officers exited their patrol car and approached Jackson’s vehicle. Officer Petrus approached the 

driver’s side, Officer De La O approached the passenger’s 

side, and Officer Sodtez went to the back of the vehicle. As 

Officer Petrus approached the driver’s door, she noticed the 

air freshener hanging down from the rearview mirror and noticed that the black box appeared to be a GPS device. Upon 

approaching the driver’s door, Officer Petrus told Jackson 

that he “can’t have anything hanging from there [the rearview 

mirror].” She then pointed to the gear shifter and explained 

to Jackson that there were other places that he could hang his 

air freshener. According to Officer Petrus, the air freshener 

was “hanging by his face,” not depressed against the window, 

and was “shaking.” The tree-shaped air freshener was estimated to be approximately 4.7 inches by 2.75 inches. 

The municipal code, however, does not prohibit simply 

“anything” hanging from the rearview mirror, only any object 

that obstructs the clear view of the driver. At the suppression 

hearing before the district court, the defendants pressed Officer Petrus on her understanding of the pertinent municipal 

code provision. Officer Petrus testified that at that time she 

believed the law to be that a driver “cannot have anything obstructing the driver’s view” and that she “believed what he 

[Jackson] had hanging there obstructed the driver’s view; 

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Nos. 19-2928 & 19-3153 5

therefore, I conducted a traffic stop for said violation.” She 

explained that if her “verbiage was off” when she first spoke 

to Jackson, “it was not in ill faith” but rather because they 

were “on a busy street” and “his demeanor was making [her] 

nervous,” so she was “trying to calm him” and “trying to gain 

control of the situation.” Officer Petrus also noted that she 

wrote Jackson a citation for the correct traffic violation. 

At the end of the hearing, the district court recognized that 

our decision in United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 633 F.3d 608 (7th 

Cir. 2011), “governs this case” and holds that this type of air 

freshener is enough justification to pull the car over. In addition, the court found Officer Petrus “to be very credible.” The 

district court, therefore, denied the defendants’ motions to 

suppress. Jackson and Freeman both pleaded guilty pursuant 

to conditional plea agreements under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2), which preserved their rights to appeal 

the suppression ruling. The district court sentenced Jackson 

to twelve months and one day in prison, which was later reduced to nine months’ imprisonment, and sentenced Freeman 

to sixty months’ imprisonment. Neither Jackson nor Freeman 

appeal their sentences. 

II. Discussion 

Jackson and Freeman press two arguments on appeal, one 

legal and one factual. They first contend that the traffic stop 

was unlawful because Officer Petrus based it on an unreasonable mistake of law. Failing that, they assert that the district 

court erred because it did not determine whether the air freshener in this case constituted a “material” obstruction. We employ a mixed standard of review for motions to suppress, reviewing questions of law de novo and factual findings for 

clear error. United States v. Haldorson, 941 F.3d 284, 290 (7th 

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6 Nos. 19-2928 & 19-3153 

Cir. 2019). The government bears the burden of proving by a 

preponderance of the evidence that reasonable suspicion supported the traffic stop. United States v. Peters, 743 F.3d 1113, 

1116 (7th Cir. 2014). 

The Fourth Amendment permits officers to conduct a traffic stop “when a law enforcement officer has ‘a particularized 

and objective basis for suspecting the particular person 

stopped of criminal activity.’” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 

393, 396 (2014) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 

417–18 (1981)); United States v. Rodriguez-Escalera, 884 F.3d 

661, 667–68 (7th Cir. 2018) (“To pull a car over for a brief investigatory stop, a police officer must have ‘at least [an] articulable and reasonable suspicion’ that the particular person 

stopped is breaking the law.”). Though the defendants argue 

that Officer Petrus lacked probable cause to stop the vehicle—

and the district too assessed whether probable cause existed—a routine traffic stop is “more analogous to a so-called 

‘Terry stop’ ... than to a formal arrest.” Rodriguez v. United 

States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015) (quoting Knowles v. Iowa, 

525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998)). Thus, reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation provides a sufficient basis to justify a traffic stop. 

“Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the 

evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable 

cause.” Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1187 (2020) (quoting 

Navarette, 572 U.S. at 397); see also United States v. Sokolow, 

490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). Even the reasonable belief that a driver 

committed a minor traffic infraction will support a stop. Garcia-Garcia, 633 F.3d at 612. “This is an objective standard, 

based upon the facts available to the officers at the moment of 

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Nos. 19-2928 & 19-3153 7

the seizure.” United States v. Ruiz, 785 F.3d 1134, 1141 (7th Cir. 

2015).

Before turning to the reasonable suspicion analysis, we 

begin with the defendants’ contention that Officer Petrus’s 

mistake of law renders the stop unconstitutional, regardless 

of its reasonableness. They argue that she was mistaken because she incorrectly believed that it was against the law to 

have “anything” hanging from the rearview mirror, which is 

based on Officer Petrus’s initial statement to Jackson as she 

approached his vehicle. But this does not tell the whole story. 

At the suppression hearing, Officer Petrus admitted that her 

“verbiage was off” initially because she was simply trying to 

calm Jackson down and gain control of the situation. She clarified, however, that at the time of the stop, she “believed [the 

law] to be you cannot have anything obstructing the driver’s 

view.” And, indeed, Officer Petrus wrote Jackson the correct 

citation and even included the handwritten notation “obstruction of driver’s view” on the ticket. The district court 

found Officer Petrus to be “very credible,” testified “honestly,” and was not “lying about anything,” including her understanding of the law. We must defer to the district court’s 

credibility determinations, unless clearly erroneous. Haldorson, 941 F.3d at 290. 

Even though there was no mistake of law here, more importantly for our purposes, it does not matter what Officer 

Petrus subjectively believed the language of the municipal 

code violation to be at the time of the stop. Because the reasonable suspicion inquiry is an objective standard, “[t]he officer’s subjective motivations for stopping and detaining a 

suspect are not relevant to the reasonableness inquiry.” 

United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1012 (7th Cir. 2011). We 

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8 Nos. 19-2928 & 19-3153 

take the facts known to Officer Petrus and apply those to the 

law as written, not as expressed—correctly or incorrectly—by 

Officer Petrus to Jackson during the stop. It would be a different matter only if Officer Petrus had been subjectively mistaken about the law and Jackson had not in fact violated any 

law at all. In that case, then, we would ask whether the mistake of law was objectively reasonable, still without regard to 

“the subjective understanding of the particular officer involved.” Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 66 (2014); see also 

United States v. Stanbridge, 813 F.3d 1032, 1037 (7th Cir. 2016) 

(“[A] police officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of law can 

provide reasonable suspicion for a seizure.”). 

Turning to the task at hand, we ask ourselves two questions to determine whether the traffic stop was lawful: first, 

what facts were known to Officer Petrus at the time she 

stopped the vehicle? And second, based on those facts, would 

a reasonable officer conclude that Jackson had committed a 

violation of the law, namely, that the air freshener obstructed 

his clear view through the windshield? 

At the suppression hearing, Officer Petrus testified that 

she first observed an “object hanging down from [Jackson’s] 

rearview mirror,” which she then confirmed was an air freshener after Jackson turned and crossed in front of her vehicle. 

Officer Petrus further testified that the air freshener was 

“hanging by his face” and “shaking,” as opposed to stationary 

and depressed against the windshield. The air freshener was 

tree-shaped and approximately 4.7 inches by 2.75 inches at its 

longest and widest points. A similarly sized and shaped air 

freshener was admitted into evidence at the hearing, as well 

as video recordings from Officer Petrus’s body-worn camera 

of the traffic stop and a copy of the traffic ticket she issued to 

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Nos. 19-2928 & 19-3153 9

Jackson that day. Furthermore, Officer Petrus testified that 

she did not consider the GPS device on Jackson’s windshield 

an obstruction because at the time she stopped Jackson, she 

could not determine whether, given its relative position, the 

device actually obstructed his line of sight. 

We encountered nearly identical facts in Garcia-Garcia, 

where an Illinois state trooper patrolling I-55 saw an air freshener hanging from the rearview mirror of Garcia-Garcia’s 

minivan as he drove by the trooper. 633 F.3d at 610. “The air 

freshener was tree-shaped, approximately five inches by 

three inches at its widest points, and bright pink and white in 

color.” Id. The state trooper believed Garcia-Garcia to be in 

violation of an Illinois statute that “prohibits a driver from 

operating a vehicle ‘with any objects placed or suspended between the driver and the front windshield, rear window, side 

wings or side windows immediately adjacent to each side of 

the driver which materially obstructs [sic] the driver’s view,’” 

and initiated a traffic stop. Id. (quoting 625 ILCS 5/12–503(c)). 

The stop led to various charges for violating immigration 

laws, and Garcia-Garcia moved to suppress all evidence and 

statements obtained as a result of the traffic stop. Id. at 611. 

Garcia-Garcia’s argument on appeal was the same as is the 

defendants’ here, that “no reasonable officer could have believed that this air freshener constituted a material obstruction, and that [the trooper] made a mistake of law in believing 

that any obstruction of a windshield would violate Illinois law 

when only a material obstruction is prohibited.” Id. at 611–12. 

Based on the suppression hearing testimony, “[t]he facts 

known to [the trooper], then, included the presence of an air 

freshener of the size we described [five inches by three 

inches], hanging in the driver’s line of vision as shown in the 

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10 Nos. 19-2928 & 19-3153 

photographs.” Id. at 614. We held that these facts justified the 

warrantless stop because an officer could reasonably conclude that the air freshener “posed a material obstruction” 

and violated Illinois law. Id. at 614, 615–16. That brings us to 

one important distinction, however. The Illinois law at issue 

in Garcia-Garcia prohibits a “material[]” obstruction, whereas 

the Chicago municipal code at issue here prohibits the obstruction of the driver’s “clear view.” Compare, 625 ILCS 5/12-

503(c), with MCC § 9-40-250(b). This is where the defendants’ 

second challenge fails—there was no need for the district 

court to determine, or Officer Petrus to testify to, whether 

Jackson’s air freshener constituted a material obstruction because that is not an element of the law that he was believed to 

have violated. 

We commented in Garcia-Garcia that “air fresheners may 

(or may not) constitute material obstructions depending on 

their size, their position relative to the driver’s line of vision, 

and whether they are stationary or mobile.” 633 F.3d at 615. 

The same is true for whether an air freshener, or any object for 

that matter, constitutes an obstruction of the driver’s clear 

view through the windshield. The reasonable suspicion determination is fact-intensive and fact-dependent; each case presents a different set of facts and circumstances that courts 

must carefully examine in light of the law alleged to have 

been violated. In this case, Officer Petrus articulated specific 

facts, described above, that could lead an officer to reasonably 

believe that Jackson’s air freshener obstructed his clear view 

through his windshield in violation of section 9-40-250(b) of 

Chicago’s municipal code. That reasonable belief is all that is 

necessary to justify the traffic stop. 

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Nos. 19-2928 & 19-3153 11

III. Conclusion 

Though not every object hanging from a rearview mirror 

necessarily obstructs a driver’s clear view through the windshield, an objective review of the record evidence establishes 

that Officer Petrus had reasonable suspicion to believe that 

Jackson’s tree-shaped air freshener obstructed his clear view 

in violation of the traffic code. The stop was therefore constitutional and we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment. 

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