Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-04209/USCOURTS-ca8-04-04209-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lloyd Louis Engler
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-4209

___________

United States of America, *

*

 Appellee, *

* Appeal From the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Lloyd Louis Engler, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: June 21, 2005

Filed: September 2, 2005

___________

Before MELLOY, HEANEY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

Lloyd Louis Engler was convicted on two counts of attempt to manufacture and

aid and abet the attempt to manufacture methamphetamine (mixture), one count of

possession and aiding and abetting possession of five grams or more of actual (pure)

methamphetamine with the intent to distribute, and one count of managing property

for the purpose of manufacturing methamphetamine. The district court1

 sentenced

Engler to 121 months imprisonment for each count, five years of supervised release,

and a $2,000 fine, with sentences to run concurrently. Engler appeals, challenging

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United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 728 (2005). 

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the sufficiency of the evidence and claiming that he was sentenced in violation of

Booker2

 and the Sixth Amendment. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On July 16, 2003, officers executed a search warrant on Engler’s farm after

receiving information that there was a methamphetamine lab on the premises. Burn

sites, containing the remnants of past cooks, including punctured Coleman fuel cans,

were found on the property. Officers seized 8.1 grams of pseudoephedrine, stripped

lithium batteries, starter fluid, drain opener, and Mason jars containing Coleman fuel

in a camper parked on the property. A propane tank with a blue-green tinted brass

fitting, suggesting contact with anhydrous ammonia, was near the camper. The

officers also found a purse containing the photo ID of Bonnie Bailey and mail

addressed to Bailey in the camper. 

On October 13, 2003, officers again conducted a search of Engler’s farm.

Officers found 3.76 grams of a methamphetamine mixture and a tube and lighter on

Engler’s person. In the kitchen of Engler’s farmhouse, the officers found an

eyeglasses case containing nine individual gem bags of methamphetamine mixture

totaling 7.86 grams. In a kitchen drawer, the officers found a large bag labeled

“Bonnie’s gem bags,” which contained more small plastic baggies. Similar packaging

material was also found in the bedroom where Bailey was staying. A purse in the

dining room contained pseudoephedrine pills, lithium batteries, and $410. In the

garage furnace, officers found punctured cans of starting fluid. More items associated

with the manufacture of methamphetamine, including tin foil, coffee filters,

containers of acid, Coleman fuel, a propane torch, and thermoses of anhydrous

ammonia were found in the machine shed. The remnants of a methamphetamine cook

were found in a Coleman cooler in the shed.

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Bailey’s conviction and sentence form the basis for her appeal, see United

States v. Bailey, No. 05-1026.

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Engler was charged with two counts of attempt to manufacture and aid and abet

the attempt to manufacture methamphetamine (mixture), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§

841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 846; possession and aiding and abetting possession of

5 grams or more of actual (pure) methamphetamine with the intent to distribute, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B); and managing property for the

purpose of manufacturing methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856. Engler

was tried jointly with Bonnie Bailey.3

At trial, Addie Bunting testified that she was addicted to methamphetamine,

and used it daily in 2002. She testified that Engler prepared to cook

methamphetamine several times in her presence. She saw Engler purchase

pseudoephedrine pills and strip lithium batteries in preparation for cooking

methamphetamine. Engler then went away to “cook” in the machine shed, the attic

of the house, or another location on the farm. He later returned with

methamphetamine to share. Bunting also testified that Engler and Bailey sometimes

sold methamphetamine. 

Leland Davis testified that he used methamphetamine with Engler and Bailey

five to ten times on the farm and purchased methamphetamine from Bailey. Davis

made arrangements to cook methamphetamine on the farm on two occasions,

producing a total of 9.5 grams of methamphetamine. In exchange for allowing the

cook to take place on the property, Davis gave Engler half of the methamphetamine

from each cook. Engler made similar arrangements with others who cooked

methamphetamine on the property. Davis testified that he saw evidence of other

cooks on the farm, but did not witness these other cooks. A third witness, Luke

Koehn, worked for Engler on the farm and used methamphetamine with Engler and

Bailey on a daily basis. Koehn estimated that he cooked methamphetamine with

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Bailey at the farm about fifty times during 2002 and 2003. He saw Bailey cook

methamphetamine from beginning to end about twenty five times in various locations,

including the machine shed. Koehn testified that Engler would receive 1 to 2 grams

of the methamphetamine produced in return for allowing the cook on his property.

Koehn also testified that he saw the remnants of other cooks on the property. 

The jury convicted Engler on all charged counts. He was sentenced to 121

months of imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and fined $2,000. This

appeal followed. 

ANALYSIS

I. Sufficiency of Evidence

Engler challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented to support his

conviction on two counts: aiding and abetting the attempt to manufacture

methamphetamine on or about July 16, 2003, and possession and aiding and abetting

the possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute on or about October 13,

2003. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury verdict, we

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and ask whether a

reasonable jury could have found the elements of the charged offense beyond a

reasonable doubt. United States v. McDougal, 137 F.3d 547, 553 (8th Cir. 1998).

After carefully reviewing the record, we find that there was sufficient evidence

presented to support a conviction for aiding and abetting the manufacture of

methamphetamine on July 16, 2003. 

The testimony at trial showed that Engler received a portion of the

methamphetamine produced in exchange for permitting methamphetamine cooks on

his property. Engler also produced and sold methamphetamine himself. A reasonable

jury could conclude that Engler knew his property was being used for

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The jury convicted Engler only of possession with intent to distribute five

grams or more of actual methamphetamine, resulting in an offense level of 26. See

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methamphetamine manufacture, benefitted from the manufacture, and assisted the

production that took place on July 16, 2003 by making his property available for this

production. See United States v. Bertling, 370 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding

sufficient evidence to deny minor participant status to defendant who assisted in

cooks, and allowed her home to be used for manufacture of methamphetamine ). 

Evidence was also sufficient to support the conviction for possession of

methamphetamine with intent to distribute. During the October 13, 2003 search of

the Engler farm, officers found 3.76 grams of methamphetamine on Engler.

Methamphetamine packaged for distribution was found in the main residence on the

kitchen counter in an eyeglasses case. Engler argues that this methamphetamine

belonged to Bailey. The eyeglasses case, however, was on a kitchen counter in the

residence Engler owned. Additional testimony that Bailey did not wear eyeglasses

suggests that the case, and its contents, were in Engler’s possession. The

methamphetamine was individually packaged in small gem bags, allowing the jury

to infer that it was intended for individual distribution. Witnesses also testified that

Engler sold and shared methamphetamine with them. A jury could reasonably infer

from these facts that Engler possessed the methamphetamine found and intended to

distribute it. 

II. Sentencing Issues

Finally, Engler argues that he was sentenced in violation of the Sixth

Amendment, because he was sentenced on the basis of a drug quantity not found by

the jury or admitted by the defendant. At sentencing, the court found that Engler was

responsible for quantities of methamphetamine and pseudoephedrine in excess of

those found by the jury.4

 As a consequence, the court found that the appropriate

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USSG § 2D1.1 (c)(7). The court based Engler’s sentence on 0.93 grams of actual

methamphetamine, 170.10 grams of methamphetamine mixture, and 39.20 grams of

pseudoephedrine. 

5

The original transcript erroneously indicated that the alternate sentence was

120 months. This has been corrected, and we are satisfied that the district court’s

alternate sentence was 121 months. 

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offense level was 30, and the corresponding guidelines range was 97 to 121 months,

and imposed a guidelines sentence of 121 months. Engler properly objected at

sentencing to the court’s use of facts not found by a jury, citing Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 549

(8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). The court declined to find the guidelines unconstitutional,

but indicated that a sentence based on the court’s discretion, considering the factors

listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), would also be 121 months.5

 The court’s use of these

drug quantity findings in a mandatory guidelines system was error. See Pirani, 406

F.3d at 550. The government therefore bears the burden of showing that this error

was harmless. The government can meet this burden because the court stated that an

alternate sentence based on the court’s discretion would be identical to the sentence

actually imposed. See United States v. Archuleta, 412 F.3d 1003, 1006 (8th Cir.

2005). Although Engler objects to the use of judge-found facts in this alternate

sentence, this is not a Sixth Amendment violation in the context of an advisory

guidelines system. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764-65. 

While we agree that the government has met its burden of proving that the

Booker error is harmless, we pause to note our concern with the district court’s

process of arriving at the alternate sentence. The court’s alternate sentence was not

accompanied by any discussion of the statutory factors or their relationship to the

sentence imposed. Even after Booker, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) requires the district court

to state its reasons for the imposition of a particular sentence. For years this court has

emphasized the importance of this principle:

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In the interest of judicial economy, we urge sentencing courts to refer to

the facts of each case and explain why they chose a particular point in

the sentencing range. In addition to informing the defendant and public

why the sentencing court picked a particular sentence, the court’s

explanation ‘provides information to criminal justice researchers’ and

‘assists the Sentencing Commission in its continuous reexamination of

its guidelines and policy statements.’ We believe tailored explanations

by sentencing courts will preclude many appeals and pointless remands.

See, e.g., United States v. Dumorney, 949 F.2d 997, 998 (8th Cir. 1991) (citations and

quotations omitted). 

To a defendant, the sentencing proceeding is perhaps one of the most important

and grave life moments. It is the time that a person is faced with the prospect of

confinement for many years in a federal prison, often followed by an extended period

of supervised release. Given the Supreme Court’s clarification of what considerations

should guide sentencing decisions, we consider it a very small burden upon the

district court to explain its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and their impact on

the sentence imposed. It ought not be the job of this court, nor the defendant, to

attempt to divine the motivation of the district court at sentencing in the penumbra

of the record.

We are aware that the lack of reasons accompanying Engler’s alternate

sentence no doubt is a result of the considerable uncertainty at the time of sentencing

regarding the effect of Blakely on the guidelines, and do not fault the district court

in this case.

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CONCLUSION

After reviewing the entirety of the record, we are satisfied that Engler’s

conviction was sufficiently supported by the evidence, and the Booker error in this

case was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm Engler’s conviction and sentence.

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I concur in the judgment of the Court and all parts of the opinion except for that

part of the opinion expressing concern that the district court’s “alternate sentence was

not accompanied by any discussion of the statutory factors or their relationship to the

sentence imposed.” Supra p. 6. In my opinion, the sentencing record as a whole

reflects that the district court adequately complied with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). 

The Court is certainly correct that “[e]ven after Booker, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)

requires the district court to state its reasons for the imposition of a particular

sentence.” Supra p. 6. Also after Booker, “[t]he appropriate guidelines range . . .

remains the critical starting point for the imposition of a sentence under § 3553(a).”

United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1016 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005). There is no

question that the district court announced, in open court, how it arrived at Engler’s

guidelines range. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). Further, when the district court

pronounced its initial guidelines sentence, it referred to the nature and circumstances

of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant. See 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a)(1). In other places during Engler’s sentencing, the concepts of drug

addiction and treatment, § 3553(a)(2)(D), the seriousness of the offense, §

3553(a)(2)(A), and the kinds of sentences available, § 3553(a)(3), were discussed.

I readily concede that the district court did not repeat these points when it pronounced

the alternative discretionary sentence, but such an exercise would have been

redundant. Indeed, Engler did not challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the district

court’s statement of reasons for the sentence imposed. 

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After Booker, it is especially critical that a sentencing court provide a

statement of reasons for its sentence when the sentence involves a guidelines

departure or when the court varies from the appropriate advisory sentencing

guidelines range based on one or more of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). This

approach reflects the fact that many of the § 3553(a) factors are accounted for by the

sentencing guidelines, see 28 U.S.C. § 994 (setting forth considerations for the

Sentencing Commission in establishing sentencing guidelines), as well as the fact that

a “sentence imposed . . . consistent with the now-advisory guidelines . . . is generally

indicative of reasonableness.” United States v. Shannon, 414 F.3d 921, 924 (8th Cir.

2005). Of course, when a party makes a specific argument for a departure or

variance, the district court should provide specific reasons for its ruling on that

argument to facilitate appellate review. 

______________________________

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