Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01680/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01680-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cliff Allenby
Defendant
Brian Cressler
Plaintiff
Audrey King
Defendant
Stephen Mayberg
Defendant
Tom Voss
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIAN CRESSLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

AUDREY KING, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:14-cv-01680-LJO-MJS (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

TO:

(1) DISMISS COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE 

TO STATE A CLAIM, 

(2) DIRECT CLERK’S OFFICE TO SEND 

HABEAS PETITION FORM, AND

(3) REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO FILE 

HABEAS PETITION OR NOTICE OF 

VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL WITHIN 

THIRTY DAYS 

(ECF NO. 4)

FOURTEEN (14) DAY OBJECTION 

DEADLINE

Plaintiff is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint is before the Court for 

screening.

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I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if 

the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

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III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is detained at Coalinga State Hospital (“CSH”). He names as Defendants 

the following persons in their official capacities: (1) Audrey King, Executive Director of 

CSH, (2) Cliff Allenby, Director of California Department of State Hospitals, (3) Tom 

Voss, Former Executive Director of CSH, (4) Pam Ahlin, Former Executive Director of 

CSH, and (5) Stephen Mayberg, former Director of California Department of Mental 

Health.

Plaintiff’s allegations may be summarized essentially as follows.

The Ventura County District Attorney filed a petition pursuant to California’s 

Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVPA”) alleging that Plaintiff required mental health 

treatment in an inpatient setting because Plaintiff was likely to commit sexually violent 

predatorial offenses if released into the community. The Ventura County Superior Court

adjudicated the petition and ordered Plaintiff be prohibited from taking part in outpatient 

treatment. Plaintiff is detained at Coalinga State Hospital pursuant to the Superior 

Court’s order. Plaintiff has been in Defendants’ custody pursuant to this order since 

2009.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are aware his confinement is excessively 

restrictive in relation to the purposes of the SVPA and that he has been irrationally 

denied the benefits of outpatient treatment. Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ 

assessments of whether Plaintiff was likely to commit sexually violent predatorial 

offenses if released into the community were based on an irrational and fraudulent 

assessment scheme. He points to various research studies and other articles purporting 

to demonstrate that recidivism rates for sexually violent predators are lower than 

perceived, that the assessment tools used by the State of California are unreliable, and 

that supervised release and outpatient treatment of sex offenders are as effective as, if 

not more effective than, civil detention in ensuring such offenders do not recidivate. 

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Plaintiff alleges that the assessment scheme and denial of outpatient treatment 

violate his Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural and substantive due process, 

adequate treatment, equal protection, and to be free from conditions that are excessively 

restrictive in relation to their purported purposes.

Plaintiff seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief preventing Defendants 

from maintaining custody of individuals detained pursuant to the SVPA until Defendants 

are able to provide them with outpatient treatment, as well as a declaration that the 

assessment methodology used is “irrational contrary to the Procedural Due Process 

rights within the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment.”

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Overview of Sexually Violent Predator Act

The SVPA, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 6600 et seq., provides for the civil 

commitment of “a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against 

one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a 

danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in 

sexually violent criminal behavior.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600(a)(1). The SVPA 

codifies a process involving several administrative and judicial stages to determine 

whether an individual meets the requirements for civil commitment. 

First, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and 

Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) screens inmates who may be sexually violent predators

at least six months prior to their scheduled release dates. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 

§ 6601(a)(1), (b). The screening is conducted in accordance with a structured screening 

instrument developed by the State Department of State Hospitals (“SDSH”). Cal. Welf. & 

Inst. Code § 6601(b). If CDCR and BPH determine that an individual “is likely to be a 

sexually violent predator,” CDCR refers the individual to the SDSH for a full evaluation. 

Id.

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The SDSH employs a standardized assessment protocol to determine whether a

person is a sexually violent predator under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601(c). If two 

SDSH evaluators, or in some circumstances, two independent evaluators, determine that 

the person has “a diagnosed mental disorder so that he or she is likely to engage in acts 

of sexual violence without appropriate treatment and custody,” the Director of SDSH 

forwards a request for a petition for commitment to the applicable county. Cal. Welf. & 

Inst. Code § 6601(d)-(h).

If the county’s designated counsel agrees with the request, a petition for 

commitment is filed in Superior Court. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601(i). “The filing of the 

petition triggers a new round of proceedings” under the SVPA. People v. Superior Court

(Ghilotti), 27 Cal. 4th 888, 904 (Cal. 2002). The petition is reviewed by a superior court 

judge to determine whether the petition “states or contains sufficient facts that, if true, 

would constitute probable cause to believe that the individual named in the petition is 

likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon his or her release.” 

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601.5. If so found, a probable cause hearing is conducted, at 

which the alleged predator is entitled to the assistance of counsel. Cal. Welf. & Inst. 

Code §§ 6601.5, 6602(a). If, at the hearing, no probable cause is found, the petition is 

dismissed. Id. However, if probable cause is found, a trial is conducted. Id.

At trial, the individual is entitled to the assistance of counsel, to retain experts or 

other professionals to perform an examination on his or her behalf, and to access all 

relevant medical and psychological records and reports. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 

§ 6603(a). Either party may demand a jury trial. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6603(a)-(b). 

The trier of fact must determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6604. “If the court or jury determines that 

the person is a sexually violent predator, the person shall be committed for an 

indeterminate term to the custody of [SDSH] for appropriate treatment and confinement 

in a secure facility designated by the Director of State Hospitals.” Id.

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Once committed, sexually violent predators must be reevaluated at least annually. 

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6604.9(a). The annual report must include consideration of 

whether the person “currently meets the definition of a sexually violent predator and 

whether conditional release to a less restrictive alternative, pursuant to Section 6608, or 

an unconditional discharge, pursuant to 6605, is in the best interest of the person and 

conditions can be imposed that would adequately protect the community.” Cal. Welf. & 

Inst. Code § 6604.9(b). If SDSH has reason to believe the person is no longer a sexually 

violent predator, it shall seek judicial review of the commitment. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 

§ 6605(c). If SDSH determines that conditional release or unconditional discharge is 

appropriate, it shall authorize the committed person to petition the court for conditional 

release or unconditional discharge. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6604.9(d). The committed 

person also may petition the court for conditional release without the recommendation or 

concurrence of SDSH. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(a).

The court may deny a petition for conditional release without a hearing if it is 

based on frivolous grounds. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(a). If the petition is not based 

on frivolous grounds, the court shall hold a hearing to determine “whether the person 

committed would be a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he 

or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior due to his or her diagnosed 

mental disorder if under supervision and treatment in the community.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. 

Code § 6608(g). The committed person has the right to counsel and the appointment of 

experts for the hearing. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(a), (g). The committed person 

bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, unless the SDSH’s 

annual reevaluation determines that conditional release is appropriate, in which case the 

State bears the burden of proof. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(k). If the court 

determines that the committed person would not be a danger while under supervision 

and treatment, the person shall be placed in a conditional release program for one year. 

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Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(g). Thereafter, the committed person may petition the 

court for unconditional discharge. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(m).

If, upon receiving a petition for unconditional discharge, the court finds probable

cause to believe that the committed person is not a danger to the health and safety of 

others and is not likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior if discharged, a 

hearing is conducted. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6605(a)(2). At the hearing, the committed 

person is entitled to the same constitutional protections afforded at the initial trial. Cal. 

Welf. & Inst. Code § 6605(a)(3). Either party may demand a jury trial. Id. The state bears 

the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the committed person remains a 

danger to the health and safety of others and is likely to engage in sexually violent 

criminal behavior if discharged. Id. If the petition is resolved in the committed person’s

favor, he is unconditionally released and unconditionally discharged. Cal. Welf. & Inst. 

Code § 6605(b). 

B. Claims Cognizable Only in Habeas Corpus

The exclusive method for challenging the fact or duration of Plaintiff’s confinement 

is by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 

(2005). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Such claims may not be brought in a section 1983 

action. Nor may Plaintiff seek to invalidate the fact or duration of his confinement 

indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the 

State’s custody. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81. A section 1983 action is barred, no matter the 

relief sought, if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of 

confinement or its duration. Id. at 81-82; Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994) 

(unless and until favorable termination of the conviction or sentence, no cause of action 

under section 1983 exists); Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 

2005) (applying Heck to SVPA detainees with access to habeas relief). 

Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief seek his release from custody so that he may 

participate in outpatient treatment in lieu of civil detention. While a claim for prospective 

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relief often does not call into question the validity of a plaintiff’s confinement, see

Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997), Plaintiff’s claims here directly challenge 

his custody. He may not bring these claims in a section 1983 action. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 

at 78.

Plaintiff’s claim that he is subjected to excessively restrictive conditions in 

violation of the Due Process clause also is barred. The excessively restrictive condition 

he challenges is his confinement itself. He cannot be granted relief on this claim without

invalidating his detention. Thus, he may not bring this claim in a section 1983 action. 

Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81-82.

Likewise, Plaintiff’s allegation that he was denied outpatient treatment in violation 

of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses clearly implicates the validity of his 

confinement. He does not seek outpatient treatment as a stand-alone mental health care 

claim; rather, he seeks outpatient treatment in lieu of civil detention. Again, success on 

this claim would invalidate Plaintiff’s confinement, and the claim therefore may not be 

brought in a section 1983 action. Id.

Finally, Plaintiff’s claim that the assessment methodology violated his Due 

Process rights, and his request for a declaration to that effect, are barred on the same 

ground. See Huftile, 410 F.3d at 1141 (concluding that challenge to SVPA assessments 

would imply invalidity of civil commitment and therefore could only be brought in habeas 

corpus). To the extent his claims are based on the use of the assessments in his civil 

commitment proceedings, they present a direct challenge to the validity of his 

confinement, and may not be brought in this action. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81. To the 

extent he attempts to assert due process rights in this assessment process itself, any 

claim as to the propriety of the assessments is so related to the civil commitment 

proceeding that success thereon would imply the invalidity of Plaintiff’s confinement:

absent the allegedly deficient assessments, no petition for commitment would have been 

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filed, and there would have been no basis for the Superior Court to proceed on the 

petition to civilly commit Plaintiff under the SVPA. Huftile, 410 F.3d at 1141. 

In sum, until Plaintiff’s civil detention has been “reversed on direct appeal, 

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make 

such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of 

habeas corpus,” Plaintiff is barred from bringing his claims under section 1983. Heck, 

512 U.S. at 487.

C. Prospective Relief from Future Assessments

Edwards leaves open the possibility for Plaintiff to seek prospective relief in a 

section 1983 action to prevent future injury caused by future assessments. 520 U.S. at 

648. However, Plaintiff has not specifically articulated such a claim. Moreover, even if he 

wishes to do so, his allegations would fail to state a cognizable claim. 

Plaintiff alleges the assessments violated his procedural and substantive Due 

Process rights. However, Plaintiff does not identify any process due to him, under the 

SVPA or otherwise, that was denied in the assessment process. Significantly, the 

assessments are not determinative of whether Plaintiff’s detention should continue. 

Rather, Plaintiff may petition the court for conditional release without the 

recommendation or concurrence of SDSH. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(a). Plaintiff’s 

continued detention is determined by a judge at a hearing in which Plaintiff has the right 

to counsel and to retain experts to rebut the State’s assessments. Cal. Welf. & Inst. 

Code § 6608. His ultimate release from commitment is determined by a judge or jury in a 

proceeding in which Plaintiff maintains the right to counsel and to retain experts, and the 

State bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 

§ 6605. The SVPA provides sufficient procedural mechanisms for Plaintiff to challenge 

the assessments, and to demonstrate that he no longer qualifies for civil detention. 

These protections are such that any flaws in the assessment process do not rise to a 

due process violation.

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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff’s claims, either directly or indirectly, challenge the validity of his 

confinement, a challenge which may be brought only in a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state any claims that are cognizable under section 

1983. To the extent Plaintiff could amend to seek relief that is not no so barred, his 

allegations fail to state a cognizable claim for the reason stated. These deficiencies are 

not capable of being cured through amendment. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-

13 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff should not be given leave to amend his section 1983 claims.

It is recommended that the Court direct the Clerk’s Office to provide Plaintiff with a 

habeas petition form, and that Plaintiff be permitted to file a habeas petition setting forth 

facts supporting his challenge to the fact and/or the duration of his confinement. 

Alternatively, if Plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue this action, he may file a notice of 

voluntary dismissal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 4) be dismissed for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted;

2. The Clerk’s Office be directed to send Plaintiff a habeas petition form; and 

3. Plaintiff be required to file a habeas petition or a notice of voluntary 

dismissal within thirty (30) days of the date of service of the order adopting 

these findings and recommendations.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 

fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, any 

party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a 

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen 

(14) days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 

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objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 

Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 

F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 3, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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