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Parties Involved:
Nolan McSwain
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

p~;;GINAL 

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01[0I1=00MUS a • 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 2 5 1995 

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CATHY A. CATTERSON, CLERK 

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, CA No. 93-50852 

DC No. CR-92-00075-AH(EE 

NOLAN MCSWAIN, M E M O R A N D U M* 

Defendant-Appellant. 

I 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Central District of California 

A. Andrew Hauk, Judge, Presiding 

Argued and Submitted January 9, 1995 

Pasadena, California 

BEFORE: CANBY and NOONAN, Circuit Judges, and KING,** 

District Judge 

Nolan McSwain appeals his convictions for possession of 

cocaine with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 

841(a)(1), and for conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. § 846. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 

and we affirm. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may 

not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as 

provided by Ninth Cir. R. 36-3. 

The Honorable Samuel P. King, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation. 

 Case: 93-50852, 01/25/1995, ID: 2722722, DktEntry: 37, Page 1 of 4
I. PROBABLE CAUSE 

We review de novo the district court's decision to deny 

McSwain's motion to suppress. United States v. Clark, 31 F.3d 

831, 834 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. filed (Dec. 5, 1994)(No. 

93-30093). Contrary to McSwain's assertion, the context in which 

McSwain visited the Chino Hills residence shows that the 

magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that the 

supporting affidavit established probable cause. McSwain met two 

known drug traffickers at the airport and brought them to the 

Chino Hills residence. He then returned there after visiting a 

location where other verified drug activity occurred. "Under the 

totality of the circumstances, there [was] a fair probability that 

contraband or evidence of a crime" would be found at the Chino 

Hills location. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 

(1983)). The district court thus did not err in denying McSwain's 

motion to supress the evidence seized at the Chino Hills 

residence. 

II. EXCUSING THE JURORS 

The law of the case doctrine "precludes a court from reexamining issues previously decided by the same court," and is 

applicable to co-defendants convicted in the same trial when the 

appeal of one co-defendant is decided before another codefendant's appeal. United States v. Schaff, 948 F.2d 501, 506 

(9th Cir. 1991). McSwain and his co-defendant Dennis Lee Curry 

were jointly tried. On appeal, Curry raised the issue of whether 

the district court erred by excusing the two jurors. This court 

decided that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

PA 

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removing the two jurors. United States v. Curry, No. 93-50570, 

unpublished memorandum disposition (9th Cir. Oct. 18, 1994). 

Being bound by Curry, we reject McSwain's challenge to the removal 

of the jurors. 

III. THE USE OF ALTERNATES 

A. Did Using the Alternates Harm McSwain? 

McSwain's co-defendant also raised on appeal the issue of 

whether the court erred in substituting the two alternates for the 

removed jurors. This court concluded that the district court did 

err by using the two alternates, because Curry himself did not 

consent to the use of the alternates. The court went on to hold, 

however, that the error did not prejudice Curry. See id. 

McSwain contends that we are not bound by Curry, because in 

Curry we applied a plain error standard. McSwain argues that the 

plain error standard is inapplicable to him because McSwain's 

attorney objected to the use of alternates. A difference in 

standards of review does not dictate a different result, however. 

We must still affirm if the error was harmless. United States v. 

Gonzales-Rincon, 36 F.3d 859, 866 (9th Cir. 1994). In Curry's 

appeal, we held that Curry had not shown that use of the 

alternatives caused him prejudice. McSwain has similarly shown no 

prejudice. The error in employing the alternate jurors was 

accordingly harmless. 

B. Double Jeopardy 

McSwain raises the additional argument that he was twice put 

in jeopardy by the jury substitution. This argument is without 

merit. Although McSwain is correct that jeopardy attaches 

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when the jury is first sworn, "the protection of the Double 

Jeopardy Clause by its terms applies only if there has been some 

event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original 

jeopardy." Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984), 

(citing Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lyndon, 466 U.S. 294, 

308-310 (1984)); see also United States v. Trigg, 988 F.2d 1008 

(9th Cir. 1993) (substituting alternates after jury impaneled does 

not violate double jeopardy). There has been no double jeopardy. 

IV. THE SENTENCE 

McSwain concedes that the district court properly sentenced 

him to life under United States v. Liguori, 5 F.3d 435 (9th Cir. 

1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 738 (1994), but argues that Liguori 

was wrongly decided. A three judge panel cannot reverse Ninth 

Circuit precedent. United States v. Garza, 980 F.2d 546, 555 (9th 

Cir. 1992). 1 

AFFIRMED. 

1 McSwain also argued that if we reversed, he could not be 

retried because to do so would put him twice in jeaopardy. We 

need not reach this issue. But see United States v. Harmon, 632 

F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir. 1980). 

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