Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-01038/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-01038-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
W. L. Muniz
Respondent
Raymond Wright
Petitioner

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYMOND WRIGHT,

Petitioner,

v.

W. L. MUNIZ,

Respondent.

Case No. 16-cv-01038-HSG (PR) 

ORDER ON INITIAL REVIEW; 

GRANTING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN 

FORMA PAUPERIS

Re: Dkt. No. 2

On March 1, 2016, petitioner, a former state prisoner, filed a pro se habeas petition

challenging the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR”) calculation 

of his release date. Petitioner reports that he was released from custody at Salinas Valley State 

Prison on May 11, 2015. The petition is now before the court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§2243 and Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. 

BACKGROUND

 According to the petition, in September 2011, petitioner was convicted in Los Angeles 

County Superior Court of possession of cocaine base for sale. Because this was his second strike 

under California’s Three Strikes Law, petitioner received a sentence of six years, to be served at 

80%.

The present petition does not challenge the validity of petitioner’s conviction or sentence. 

Rather, petitioner contends he was eligible for early release pursuant to an order issued on 

February 10, 2014 by the Three-Judge Court in Coleman/Plata v. Brown.

The Coleman/Plata actions are consolidated civil rights class actions pending in the United 

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United States District Court

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States District Court for the Eastern District of California.1 The Coleman class action concerns 

the constitutional adequacy of the mental health care provided to CDCR inmates and involves the 

class of seriously mentally ill persons in California prisons. The Plata class action concerns the 

constitutional adequacy of CDCR’s inmate medical health care and involves the class of state 

prisoners with serious medical conditions. The Three-Judge Court presiding over these class 

actions has issued various orders related to prison overcrowding and has required the State of 

California to undertake prison population reduction measures.

Petitioner contends that, pursuant to a February 10, 2014 order issued in the Coleman/

Plata actions, the CDCR was required to prospectively recalculate his release date so as to give 

him good time credits at 33.3%. He also contends that the order made him eligible for additional 

“milestone completion credits” for completion of rehabilitative programs. He asserts that the 

February 10, 2014 Coleman/ Plata order mandated his release on February 18, 2015.

DISCUSSION

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A 

district court considering an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall “award the writ or issue 

an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it 

appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2243. Summary dismissal is appropriate only where the allegations in the petition are 

vague or conclusory, palpably incredible, or patently frivolous or false. See Hendricks v. Vasquez,

908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990). 

As grounds for federal habeas relief, petitioner claims that the almost 3-month delay in his 

release violated his constitutional rights. Liberally construed, the claim appears arguably 

cognizable under § 2254 and merits an answer from respondent. See Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 

 

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Plata v. Brown, No. C 01-1351 TEH, a class action pending in this District, and Coleman v. 

Brown, No. 90-0520 LKK-DAD, a class action pending in the Eastern District. The Plata and 

Coleman class actions have been consolidated.

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United States District Court

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1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (federal courts must construe pro se petitions for writs of habeas 

corpus liberally).

However, petitioner does not appear to satisfy the requirement that he be “in custody” on 

the sentence he is attempting to challenge. The federal writ of habeas corpus is only available to 

persons “in custody” at the time the petition is filed. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2254(a); Carafas 

v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). This requirement is jurisdictional. Id. A petitioner who 

files a habeas petition after he has fully served his sentence and who is not subject to court 

supervision is not “in custody” for the purposes of this court’s subject matter jurisdiction and his 

petition may therefore be properly denied. See De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1146 (9th 

Cir. 1990). 

It also appears that the petition may be moot. Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution 

requires the existence of a “case” or “controversy” through all stages of federal judicial 

proceedings. This means that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff or petitioner “must have 

suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be 

redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 

(1990). An incarcerated convict’s (or a parolee’s) challenge to the validity of his conviction 

satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement, because the incarceration (or the restrictions 

imposed by the terms of the parole) constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and 

redressable by the invalidation of the conviction. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). Once 

the convict’s sentence has expired, however, some concrete and continuing injury other than the 

now-ended incarceration or parole—some “collateral consequence” of the conviction—must exist 

if the suit is to be maintained and not considered moot. Id. The rationale of Spencer v. Kemna

also applies where a petitioner seeks to challenge his sentence rather than his conviction. That is, 

a challenge to a prison sentence becomes moot once the sentence has been served unless the 

petitioner continues to suffer collateral consequences. See United States v. Palomba, 182 F.3d 

1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 1999). 

These apparent procedural problems should be addressed before the court reaches the 

merits of the claim raised in the petition. If the petition is procedurally-barred, the litigants and 

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court need not expend resources addressing the claim in the petition. Accordingly, pursuant to 

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases In The United States District Courts, 

respondent must either (1) move to dismiss the petition on procedural grounds, or (2) inform the 

court that respondent is of the opinion that a motion to dismiss is unwarranted in this case.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown,

1. Petitioner’s in forma pauperis application is GRANTED.

2. The Clerk shall mail a copy of this order and the petition with all attachments to the 

respondent and the respondent’s attorney, the Attorney General of the State of California. The 

Clerk shall also serve a copy of this order on petitioner. 

3. Respondent must file with the court and serve upon petitioner, within ninety-one (91)

days of this order, a motion to dismiss the petition or a notice that respondent is of the opinion that 

a motion to dismiss is unwarranted. If respondent files a motion to dismiss, petitioner shall file 

with the Court and serve on respondent an opposition or statement of non-opposition within 

twenty-eight (28) days of the date the motion is filed, and respondent shall file with the Court and 

serve on petitioner a reply within fourteen (14) days of the date any opposition is filed.

4. The motion will be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No hearing 

will be held on the motion. If respondent notifies the court that a motion to dismiss is unwarranted 

or if the motion to dismiss is decided against respondent, the court will then determine whether to 

require an answer to the petition.

This order terminates Docket No. 2.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

4/25/2016

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