Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-01439/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-01439-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Martin D. Bitter
Respondent
Andrew Anthony Lynch
Petitioner

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW ANTHONY LYNCH,

Petitioner,

v.

MARTIN D. BITTER,

Respondent.

Case No. 13-cv-01439-JD 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

The Court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. Respondent 

filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it, and lodged exhibits

with the Court. Petitioner filed a traverse. The petition is denied.

BACKGROUND

A jury found petitioner guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, shooting at an occupied 

motor vehicle, and active participation in a street gang. People v. Lynch, No. A129440, 2012 WL 

3038536, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. July 26, 2012). He was sentenced to thirty years to life in prison. 

Id. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on appeal. Id. The California Supreme 

Court denied a petition for review. Resp. Exs. F, G. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in the California Supreme Court that was denied. Resp. Exs. H, I. 

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of the crime as follows:

There was evidence at trial of the following. Defendant was a 

Norteño street gang member. On the night of December 23, 2007, 

defendant was drinking beer and “hanging out” at his apartment 

with 15 to 20 people, many of them Norteños. Defendant told his 

girlfriend that he was “going to do business” and left the apartment 

with two other Norteños, Dominic Andino and Misael Gutierrez. 

The men, armed with a pistol and shotgun, drove for about 30 

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minutes looking for rival Sureño gang members. They went to 

Sureño territory and saw a parked car occupied by Latinos. 

Assuming the car occupants to be Sureños, defendant and Gutierrez 

approached the parked car as Andino waited in the Norteños’s car 

with the head lights extinguished and the engine running.

The parked car was occupied by a driver and two passengers, one in 

the front seat and one in the back. Enrique Lopez was the driver. 

Defendant went to the driver’s side of the vehicle as Gutierrez stood 

on the passenger’s side with a shotgun. Defendant tried to open the 

driver’s door and when he could not, ordered Lopez to open it. 

Lopez rolled down the window and defendant asked him if he was a 

Sureño. Defendant again tried opening the door and when it did not 

open, pointed a pistol at Lopez. Lopez unlocked the doors on both 

sides of the car.

Defendant opened the driver’s door and pointed the pistol at Lopez 

and Gutierrez opened the passenger’s door and pointed the shotgun 

at the passenger. Defendant demanded that Lopez lift his shirt and 

show defendant Lopez’s belt. Lopez said, “no, I don’t [got] 

nothing.” Gutierrez, referring to the passenger, asked defendant if 

he should “blow this mother fucker’s head off.” Defendant, while 

standing outside the car, then fired the pistol three or four times at 

Lopez, seated about a foot away inside the car.

Lopez was struck by two bullets. One bullet struck him in the 

shoulder and went out the back and another struck him in the 

abdomen and remained lodged there. Lopez was taken to the 

hospital where he had x-rays and other tests performed. The 

physician who treated Lopez decided not to remove the bullet 

lodged in the abdomen because he felt surgery can cause more 

damage than leaving a bullet in place. Lopez stayed overnight at the 

hospital for observation and was released the next day with a 

prescription for pain medication.

Lynch, 2012 WL 3038536, at *1.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the 

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication 

of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first 

prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual 

determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the first 

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clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by 

[the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the 

Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court authority, falling under 

the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the 

Supreme Court's decisions but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's 

case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be 

“objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination will 

not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state-court proceeding.” See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres v. 

Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, in conducting its analysis, the federal 

court must presume the correctness of the state court's factual findings, and the petitioner bears the 

burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

The state court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of the 

state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 

1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to 

consider the petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Nunnemaker at 

801-06; Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000).

The standard of review under AEDPA is somewhat different where the state court gives no 

reasoned explanation of its decision on a petitioner’s federal claim and there is no reasoned lower 

court decision on the claim. In such a case, an independent review of the record is the only means 

of deciding whether the state court’s decision was objectively reasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 

336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000). 

When confronted with such a decision, a federal court should conduct an independent review of 

the record to determine whether the state court’s decision was an objectively unreasonable 

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application of clearly established federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982.

DISCUSSION

As grounds for federal habeas relief, petitioner asserts that: (1) there was insufficient 

evidence to support the finding of “great bodily injury” to the victim and insufficient evidence to 

support petitioner’s conviction of shooting at an occupied vehicle; and (2) trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance by failing to request that the prosecutor’s investigator not sit at counsel’s 

table during trial, by failing to request a new trial after a juror informed the court about her 

disagreement with the verdict, and by failing to object to the prosecutor’s improper statements 

during closing argument.

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the 

victim suffered great bodily injury and that petitioner shot at an occupied vehicle.

Legal Standard

The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 

charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A state prisoner who alleges that the 

evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a 

rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt therefore states a constitutional claim, 

see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979), which, if proven, entitles him to federal habeas 

relief, see id. at 324. 

The Supreme Court has emphasized that “Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas 

proceedings . . . .” Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062, 2064 (2012) (per curiam) (finding 

that the Third Circuit “unduly impinged on the jury’s role as factfinder” and failed to apply the 

deferential standard of Jackson when it engaged in “fine-grained factual parsing” to find that the 

evidence was insufficient to support petitioner’s conviction). A federal court reviewing 

collaterally a state court conviction does not determine whether it is satisfied that the evidence 

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992). 

The federal court “determines only whether, ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most 

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favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Payne, 982 F.2d at 338 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

319). Only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 

has there been a due process violation. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d at 338.

Analysis

The California Court of Appeal reversed and denied the great bodily harm claim:

Defendant was convicted of violating section 246, which provides, 

as relevant here: “Any person who shall maliciously and willfully 

discharge a firearm at an ... occupied motor vehicle” is guilty of a 

crime. The evidence here establishes that defendant was standing 

outside a parked car with open doors when he shot the driver who 

was seated about a foot away inside the car. Defendant argues that 

the evidence suggests the gun was inside “the periphery of the 

vehicle” when he fired the gun and that he, therefore, did not 

discharge a firearm at a vehicle within the meaning of section 246. 

Defendant contends that it is the location of the firearm, not the 

shooter, that is dispositive, so that section 246 does not apply if the 

firearm extends into the vehicle.

The contention was recently rejected by the California Supreme 

Court in an opinion issued after defendant filed his opening brief on 

appeal. (People v. Manzo (2012) 53 Cal. 4th 880.) The defendant in 

Manzo was standing outside a parked car when he reached his arm 

into a vehicle and shot a passenger. (Id. p.885.) Our high court 

affirmed the conviction, finding that “the Legislature intended 

section 246 to apply to a person standing outside an occupied motor 

vehicle and shooting into it, even if the gun has crossed the plane of 

the vehicle.” (Id. at p. 883.) Defendant here, who was standing 

outside the vehicle when he fired shots into it, was properly 

convicted of violating section 246.

The evidence also supports the jury’s finding that defendant’s 

discharge of a firearm at a motor vehicle caused great bodily injury. 

(§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) Great bodily injury, within the meaning of 

the statute, “means a significant or substantial physical injury.” 

(Ibid., § 12022.7, subd. (f).) Lopez’s injuries meet this standard. 

Lopez was struck by two bullets, one that passed through his 

shoulder and another that remained lodged in his abdomen. Great 

bodily injury findings have been upheld where the victim suffered 

gunshot wounds similar to those suffered by Lopez. (People v. 

Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal. 3d 92, 106-108; People v. Mendias (1993) 

17 Cal. App .4th 195, 205-206.)

In arguing that Lopez did not suffer great bodily injury, defendant 

relies on the treating physician’s testimony that Lopez’s shoulder 

injury was without “significant” joint or muscle damage and that the 

abdominal wound did not damage internal organs. But a finding of 

great bodily injury does not require proof that the victim suffered 

“‘permanent,’ ‘prolonged’ or ‘protracted’ disfigurement, 

impairment, or loss of bodily function.” (People v. Escobar (1992) 

3 Cal.4th 740, 750.) Nor is the jury’s finding of great bodily injury 

undermined by the physician’s classification of the abdominal 

wound as “superficial.” The physician explained that he meant the 

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term in a technical sense to signify that the bullet did not penetrate 

abdominal structures. The term superficial was used as “a physical 

description of where the tract [of the bullet] itself was located,” not 

to minimize the injury. The physician clarified that the gunshot 

wound was “superficial to the abdominal cavity” but was not a 

superficial wound: “I think it’s hard to describe a gunshot wound as

a superficial wound.” The evidence, viewed as a whole, supports 

the jury's finding of great bodily injury.

Lynch, 2012 WL 3038536, at *2.

Petitioner has failed to show that the state court’s determination was an unreasonable 

application of Supreme Court authority. The victim was shot twice. One bullet lodged in the 

victim’s abdomen and it was too dangerous to remove, and the second bullet passed through the 

victim’s shoulder. The treating physician was clear that even though the victim’s internal organs 

were not damaged, he would not classify the wound as a superficial wound. Petitioner has failed 

to demonstrate that no rational juror could have reasonably found that the two gunshot wounds 

constituted great bodily injury.

The petitioner also has not shown that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find 

that he shot at an occupied vehicle. Petitioner argues that because he was standing so close to the 

vehicle the gun was inside the vehicle when he shot the victim; therefore, he was not outside the 

vehicle. As noted in the state court opinion, the California Supreme Court found in People v. 

Manzo, 53 Cal. 4th 880 (2012) that discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle can be committed

when the gun is inside the vehicle to satisfy California Penal Code section 246. Petitioner was 

found guilty of the same statute, thus the jury’s finding was proper in light of state law. To the 

extent petitioner argues that state law is incorrect, he is not entitled to relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 

502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991) (determinations of state law questions not the province of federal habeas 

review; habeas review limited to deciding whether conviction violated Constitution, laws or 

treaties of the United States). Petitioner has failed to meet the high standard for a sufficiency of 

the evidence claim, and there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction even though 

petitioner was standing close to the vehicle when he shot the victim. These claims are denied. 

II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Petitioner next contends trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request that the 

prosecutor’s investigator not sit at counsel’s table, by failing to request a new trial after a juror 

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informed the court about her disagreement with the verdict, and by failing to object to the 

prosecutor’s improper statements during closing argument.1

Legal Standard

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of 

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The benchmark for judging any 

claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning 

of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Id.

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, petitioner must 

establish two things. First, he must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that it 

fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s 

deficient performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. “A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

Prosecutor’s Investigator

Petitioner’s trial counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude prosecution witnesses from the 

courtroom. Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 440. The trial court excluded witnesses from either side 

except for the investigating officer. Reporter’s Transcript (“RT) at 576-77. Under state law, 

witnesses may generally be excluded from the courtroom, but not the investigating officer 

designated by the prosecuting attorney. People v. Gonzalez, 38 Cal. 4th 932, 950-51 (2006) 

(“[T]he deputy district attorney, the attorney for the People, could designate an officer or 

employee who was ‘entitled to be present.’”). Section 777 of the California Evidence Code 

provides as follows:

(a) Subject to subdivisions (b) and (c), the court may exclude from 

the courtroom any witness not at the time under examination so that 

such witness cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses.

 

1

These claims were denied without a reasoned opinion by the state court. This Court has 

conducted independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision was an 

objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Delgado at 982.

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(b) A party to the action cannot be excluded under this section.

(c) If a person other than a natural person is a party to the action, an 

officer or employee designated by its attorney is entitled to be 

present.

The investigating officer was allowed to be in the courtroom, pursuant to California law, 

so any additional motion or objection asserted by trial counsel would have been denied. See also 

United States v. Valencia-Riascos, 691 F.3d 938, 941-42 (9th Cir. 2012) (Due process does not 

prohibit an officer who was also the victim in the case from sitting at the prosecution’s table, as is 

permitted by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 615.) Trial counsel cannot be ineffective for 

failing to file a futile motion. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 1994). Even if trial counsel 

had been ineffective, petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice. Petitioner identifies no specific 

reasons why the presence of the investigating officer prejudiced him. This claim is denied.

New Trial Request

Nearly three months after the trial, a juror came to court to speak at petitioner’s sentencing. 

RT at 2916-18. The juror stated:

I am here today to speak my mind about my dissatisfaction with the 

outcome of the trial. The jury deliberation was very difficult for me 

because I felt the prosecution had failed to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt the case against [petitioner]. I tried my best to 

speak my mind and to compel the jury to look only at the facts and 

evidence. After 3 very tiring days of intense discussion, we were 

able to take a verdict of guilty of attempted murder off the table. 

However, many felt that in order to be comfortable with assault with 

a deadly weapon, we must find Andrew Lynch guilty of all the 

enhancement[s]. Regretfully I agreed. Since the trial I have been 

unable to be at ease with my decision. I feel that I swallowed my 

voice and didn’t stand behind my conviction. Because of that, I fear 

Andrew may experience the consequences of my inability to stand 

up for what I believe in. If I had to do [it] over again, I would not 

have agreed to finding him guilty of all the felony charges and 

enhancements.

My goal today is to apologize for my choices in the jury room and to 

request that the court will consider my statement here in determining 

the severity of [petitioner’s] sentence.

RT at 2917-18.

Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a new trial after 

the juror gave this statement. Petitioner does not specifically argue why he should have been 

entitled to a new trial. California Penal Code section 1181 provides nine distinct grounds for a 

new trial. The only grounds that possibly, and even then remotely relate to his argument are:

3. When the jury has separated without leave of the court after 

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retiring to deliberate upon their verdict, or been guilty of any 

misconduct by which a fair and due consideration of the case has 

been prevented;

4. When the verdict has been decided by lot, or by any means other 

than a fair expression of opinion on the part of all the jurors;

Cal. Penal Code § 1181. 

The juror’s statement would not warrant a new trial under either of these provisions. There 

was no indication of any misconduct by the jury or that the verdict was reached without a fair 

expression on the part of the jurors. It appears that this juror regretted her decision, but petitioner 

cites to no authority that would allow for a new trial in that circumstance. 

Had trial counsel raised a motion for a new trial it almost certainly would have been 

denied. The juror’s statements would likely not have been admissible for any motion for a new 

trial. “[L]ong-recognized and very substantial concerns support the protection of jury 

deliberations from intrusive inquiry.” Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987). Federal 

Rule of Evidence 606(b) and California Evidence Code section 1150(a), for example, prohibit the 

use of juror testimony to impeach a verdict when that testimony relates to intrinsic matters, i.e., 

the internal, mental processes by which the verdict was rendered. See id. at 116-27 (discussing 

Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)); People v. Cox, 53 Cal. 3d 618, 695-96 (1991) (discussing Cal. Evid. Code § 

1150(a)). In this case the juror was not describing any outside influences that affected 

deliberations, only her internal mental process. Because a motion for a new trial based on the 

juror’s statement would have been denied, counsel was not ineffective for failing to file such a 

motion.

Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the prosecutor 

made improper remarks regarding petitioner’s guilt during closing argument and improperly 

vouched for a witness. Petitioner identifies several pages of the transcripts from the prosecutor’s 

closing argument. RT, Vol. 23 at 4, 9-10, 24-33, 40. However, he does not specifically identify 

the improper remarks. After reviewing the prosecutor’s statements, the Court finds no 

improprieties. The prosecutor accurately described the evidence that had been presented and 

expressed no improper personal opinion of petitioner’s guilt. The prosecutor did not vouch for 

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any of the witnesses. Even assuming the prosecutor committed misconduct, petitioner has failed 

to show that trial counsel was deficient for failing to object or that petitioner was prejudiced. 

There was a great deal of evidence presented against petitioner and none of the prosecutor’s 

statements were so egregious that had trial counsel objected, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court unreasonably applied 

Supreme Court authority in denying these claims. Petitioner is not entitled to relief, and the 

claims are denied.

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED on the merits. A certificate of 

appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). This is not a case in which “reasonable 

jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 29, 2015

______________________________________

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW ANTHONY LYNCH,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARTIN D. BITTER,

Defendant.

Case No. 13-cv-01439-JD 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on September 29, 2015, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by 

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Andrew Anthony Lynch ID: AE-8344

SATF-CSP Facility

P.O. Box 5242

Corcoran, CA 93212 

Dated: September 29, 2015

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

LISA R. CLARK, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable JAMES DONATO

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