Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01130/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01130-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Orlando Martinez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILE D 

United States Court of Appeal& 

Tenth circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

SEP O 7 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ORLANDO MARTINEZ, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Nos. 89-11301 

89-1138 

(D.C. No. 88-CR-240) 

(District of Colorado) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT2 

Before McKAY and SETH, Circuit Judges, and PARKER, 3 District 

Judge. 

These two appeals arise out of the same case. No. 89-1130 

arose pursuant to the defendant's prose notice of appeal for 

which he has filed a separate prose set of briefs. No. 89-1138 

arose pursuant to a notice of appeal filed on behalf of the 

defendant by the Federal Public Defender. The Federal Public 

1 In case number 89-1130, the court unanimously ordered that it 

be submitted on the briefs. Case number 89-1138 was argued by the 

Federal Public Defender. 

2 This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

3 Honorable James A. Parker, United States District Judge for 

the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-1130 Document: 010110041923 Date Filed: 09/07/1990 Page: 1 
' Defender filed briefs addressing issues in case No. 89-1138. The 

prose defendant addressed issues raised in both cases. 

Defendant was convicted on two drug counts. The first was 

for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and the 

second was for the possession of heroin with intent to distribute. 

On appeal, defendant's counsel raises two issues. The first issue 

challenges the trial court's admission of "other crimes or wrongs" 

evidence pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b). 

The second issue challenges the trial court's assessment of a twolevel increase for an aggravated role in the offense. 

Admission of Rule 404(b) Evidence 

Defendant was arrested in a vehicle operated by a Mr. Owens. 

When arrested, defendant was removed from the car and frisked. 

The arresting officer seized from his person $1,334 in currency, 

"Sno-seals" (used for packaging cocaine), balloons (used for 

packaging heroin), and baggies which were falling from his person 

onto the street. Additional paraphernalia were found on the seat 

of the car in plain view. A warrant authorized search of the 

vehicle produced 32.08 grams of heroin and 75.23 grams of cocaine 

from false-bottomed cans on the floorboard of the vehicle. The 

additional paraphernalia included gram weighing scales, a 

"Metalert" device used for valuing the quality of gold in jewelry, 

and documents establishing the defendant's possession and control 

of the vehicle. Of additional significance were items taken from 

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Appellate Case: 89-1130 Document: 010110041923 Date Filed: 09/07/1990 Page: 2 
.. 

the trunk including a bag and a sock each containing money and a 

man's gold and diamond ring. 

Over objection, the trial court admitted evidence of two 

transactions occurring a few days prior to the day of the arrest. 

In one transaction an undercover police officer testified that the 

defendant gave him one gram of cocaine in exchange for a VCR. The 

officer further testified that the defendant advised him at that 

time that defendant was more interested in trading cocaine for 

jewelry. The undercover officer also testified that a few days 

later defendant gave him three grams of cocaine in exchange for 

gold chains and at that meeting defendant reiterated his interest 

in rings and other jewelry. The government's stated reasons for 

the proffer of evidence of these two prior transactions was that 

they would tend to prove intent, identity, and operation. However, the limiting instruction given by the trial court to the 

jury stated that the prior acts could be used to show "state of 

mind or intent, motive, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Record, supp. vol. 9, at 144. 

In United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426 (10th Cir. 1985), 

we held that in order to admit Rule 404(b) evidence "the trial 

court must specifically identify the purpose for which such evidence is offered and a broad statement merely invoking or restating Rule 404(b) will not suffice." Id. at 1436. In this case the 

trial court did not rely on the purposes identified by the government for admitting the evidence. Instead, the trial court 

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Appellate Case: 89-1130 Document: 010110041923 Date Filed: 09/07/1990 Page: 3 
identified at least two additional possible purposes for the 

evidence in its instructions to the jury. We do not believe that 

the trial court was merely restating Rule 404(b). Thus, we do not 

hold that the trial court violated the Kendall rule. However, in 

giving its limiting instruction to the jury, the trial court went 

beyond the purposes relied upon by the government for including 

the evidence; and the trial court described each of the purposes 

it identified as independently fulfilling Rule 404(b). Thus, we 

hold that each of the purposes identified by the trial court in 

its limiting instruction must independently fulfill the 

requirements of Rule 404(b) under the facts of this case. 

With regard to the purposes of showing intent, absence of 

mistake, and identity, defendant argues that the prior transactions were not sufficiently similar to constitute signature 

transactions; and thus they did not fulfill these purposes under 

Rule 404(b). We conclude, however, that the record clearly supports the observation that these two prior transactions contained 

common characteristics with the charged transaction. Therefore, 

the evidence of the two prior transactions was proper for these 

three purposes under Rule 404(b). Huddleston v. United States, 

485 U.S. 681, 685-86 (1988). Testimony about the two earlier 

transactions clearly went to establishing the defendant's preferred method of dealing for jewelry. Jewelry was found as a part 

of the search in the case charged. Although not a large quantity, 

its presence in the trunk with other paraphernalia instead of on 

the hand of the defendant makes the requisite tie between the 

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Appellate Case: 89-1130 Document: 010110041923 Date Filed: 09/07/1990 Page: 4 
former acts and the case charged. In addition to the jewelry, the 

presence of the "Metalert" device used for valuing jewelry further 

strengthens the tie. We find no abuse in the trial court's decision to admit this evidence under Rule 404(b). We likewise find 

no abuse in the trial court's finding of no unfair prejudice under 

Rule 403. 

We also conclude that the record supports the trial court's 

decision to submit this evidence on the issue of intent. Although 

defense counsel stipulated that intent was not an issue, the government never acceded to that stipulation and was entitled to 

establish intent as a part of its case. Although the defendant 

stipulated concerning intent, he specifically contested that the 

drugs involved were his and insofar as the court is concerned, 

that puts the issue of intent squarely in the case. 

The use of the two prior transactions for the purpose of 

proving motive presents a much closer case. Defendant argues that 

the two transactions do not provide a motive for the charged 

transaction, but instead merely indicate that defendant had shown 

a willingness to possess and sell drugs. Defendant correctly 

points out that prior acts evidence is not admissible to prove 

predisposition or character. However, we hold that these prior 

acts prove a motive sufficiently strong to provide a proper 

purpose for admitting the prior acts. The two prior acts involved 

defendant trading drugs for a VCR and jewelry. In addition, 

defendant stated that he wished to trade drugs for jewelry in the 

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Appellate Case: 89-1130 Document: 010110041923 Date Filed: 09/07/1990 Page: 5 
future. We believe that these transactions do not merely show the 

defendant's character. Instead, these acts prove that defendant 

had a motive to exchange drugs for goods, preferable jewelry. 

In sum, we conclude that all the bases upon which the trial 

court permitted the jury to consider the other crimes' evidence 

were proper and that the trial court properly weighed the prejudice against the probative value. 

Two-Point Adjustment Under Sentencing Guidelines Section 3B1.l(c) 

Defendant next argues that the district court improperly 

applied section 3B1.l(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines to increase 

defendant's offense level by two levels. Defendant claims that 

there was insufficient evidence to conclude that he was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of any criminal activity. 

Defendant argues that he acted alone. We hold, however, that the 

evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that defendant supervised 

Mr. Owens, the driver, in the offense of conviction. That is sufficient to satisfy this section. United States v. Herrera, 878 

F.2d 997, 1000-02 (7th Cir. 1989). 

Defendant's Sixteen Additional Issues 

In his prose brief, defendant raises the following sixteen 

additional issues: 

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict defendantappellant of the crime charged. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1130 Document: 010110041923 Date Filed: 09/07/1990 Page: 6 
- 2. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendantappellant's motion to suppress and quash Detective Dunham's testimony pertaining to purchase of stolen property and selling 

cocaine. 

3. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendantappellant's motion to suppress impounding of vehicle and motion to 

return money and other personal property found on person. 

4. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendantappellant's motion to suppress first warrant. 

5. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendantappellant's motion to suppress both arrest warrants. 

6. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendantappellant's motion to suppress second warrant and failure to take 

defendant in front of magistrate. 

7. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendantappellant's motion to produce writ. 

8. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendantappellant's motion to suppress service of warrant entered. 

9. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendantappellant's motion for access to the law library. 

10. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendantappellant's motion to quash indictment. 

11. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendantappellant's motion alleging inadequate time to prepare motions for 

a proper defense. 

12. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendantappellant's motion requesting a copy of the grand jury transcript. 

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13. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendantappellant's motion alleging entrapment. 

14. Whether the trial court erred in not hearing the 

defendant-appellant's motion regarding the photographic identification. 

15. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendantappellant's motion to suppress paraphernalia. 

16. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendantappellant's motion challenging his detainment at the Federal 

Correctional Institution. 

We have reviewed appellant's prose brief and the record. We 

have done so with extra care, allowing for the fact that the 

prose appellant is not trained in law. We have therefore taken 

extra care to make sure that we consider the issues broadly to 

make sure that a lack of legal training has not caused the overlooking of a fairly presented issue. With that in mind, we conclude that none of the issues raised by the prose appellant 

presents an issue which rises to the level of reversible error. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-1130 Document: 010110041923 Date Filed: 09/07/1990 Page: 8