Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-07046/USCOURTS-caDC-99-07046-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Virginia Flemmings
Appellee
Howard University
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 20, 1999 Decided December 14, 1999

No. 99-7046

Virginia Flemmings,

Appellee

v.

Howard University,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv02137)

Squire Padgett argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Jonathan G. Axelrod argued the cause and filed the brief

for appellee.

Before: Sentelle, Henderson and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

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Sentelle, Circuit Judge: Appellee Virginia Flemmings

filed suit against Howard University, her former employer,

for violating the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42

U.S.C. s 12101 et seq. (the "ADA"). Flemmings suffers from

vertigo and Meniere's disease, which in 1996 and 1997 first

substantially limited her ability to drive, then precluded her

from working at all. Although Flemmings was on medical

leave for most of the period in question, she claims that

Howard failed to reasonably accommodate her disability by

refusing her request for a revised schedule so that she could

car pool with her husband and son. Howard counters that,

for the time period at issue, Flemmings was not an otherwise

qualified individual with a disability as defined by the ADA,

and that even if she was, Howard did not fail to offer her a

reasonable accommodation.

The district court granted summary judgment for Flemmings and against Howard, finding that Flemmings was a

qualified individual as defined by the ADA and that the

revised schedule would not have presented an undue hardship

for Howard. Howard appeals that judgment. Because we

find that there was no date for which Flemmings has offered

evidence substantiating both an accommodatable disability

and a denial of accommodation, we vacate the district court's

grant of summary judgment for Flemmings, and order the

district court to issue an order granting summary judgment

for Howard.

I

Appellee was an administrative assistant to Dr. Janette

Dates, Dean of Howard's School of Communications. Her

responsibilities included making and screening phone calls,

writing and typing letters, handling the mail, filing, keeping

the Dean's appointment book, attending staff meetings, and

so forth. The Dean considered Flemmings a good employee,

although their relationship was strained after an incident in

September, 1996, when a visitor to the office accused Flemmings of rude behavior.

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In early November, 1996, Flemmings orally informed the

Dean that she was suffering from vertigo, that the condition

left her unable to drive to work, and that she needed to

change her schedule--from 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., with a onehour lunch break, to 8:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., without a lunch

break--so that she could car pool with her son and husband.

In a memorandum dated December 1, 1996, Flemmings reiterated in writing her need for this revised schedule, and

indicated that the accommodation would be temporary. The

Dean permitted Flemmings to work the revised schedule

through November and December, although sometimes she

gave appellee assignments at or near 4:00 p.m. which required her to work late.

On January 7, 1997, the Dean initiated a meeting with

appellee and Donald Rainey, Howard's Director of Employee

and Labor Relations, to discuss appellee's revised work

schedule. Rainey claims to have told appellee that she could

not unilaterally change her hours and that Howard was not

obligated to accommodate her without medical documentation

substantiating her need to leave work at 4:00 p.m. Appellee

maintains that Rainey told her only that she had to work a

regular 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. schedule, and that Howard did

not request medical documentation at that time. Regardless,

the day after the meeting with the Dean and Rainey, appellee

provided Rainey with a letter from Dr. Richard Lewis dated

December 20, 1996. In the letter, Dr. Lewis described

appellee as experiencing headaches, vertigo, and a sense of

imbalance; diagnosed her as suffering potentially from Meniere's syndrome; and suggested a course of treatment including medication, dietary changes, and physical therapy. The

letter did not discuss any limitations on appellee's ability to

work or her need, if any, for an accommodation from Howard.

Friday, January 17, 1997, was the last day that Flemmings

physically worked at Howard. She took vacation leave from

January 20 through February 3, 1997. On January 27, 1997,

she forwarded to the Dean a letter from Dr. Jerelle Copeland

diagnosing her with vertigo and migraine headaches exacerbated by work related stress and recommending a ninety-day

leave of absence. Howard granted appellee's request for

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medical leave. In April, 1997, Flemmings forwarded letters

from Drs. Lewis and Copeland documenting her continued

illness and recommending further medical leave through August, 1997. Again, Howard granted appellee's request.

Throughout this period, until August 16, 1997, Howard continued to pay Flemmings her full salary, deducting from her

available sick leave until it was exhausted.

On May 30, 1997, the Dean sent Flemmings a letter

requesting further documentation of her disability and suggestions for a reasonable accommodation. On June 9, 1997,

Flemmings provided Howard with another letter from Dr.

Copeland indicating that Flemmings was "not medically stable to return to work," and that Dr. Copeland could not

determine how long she would be so disabled. Flemmings

concedes that, as of June 9, her health had deteriorated to

such a degree that she was completely unable to work even

with an accommodation.

Despite appellee's inability to work, in a letter dated July 8,

1997, her attorney requested the modified 8:30 a.m. to 4:00

p.m. schedule or disability retirement. On July 24, 1997,

appellee sent a memorandum to Dates requesting advance

sick leave through August 31, 1997. In a letter dated August

11, 1997, Howard offered Flemmings a schedule of 8:30 a.m.

to 5:00 p.m. and indicated that this schedule was the only

accommodation Howard would provide. On September 29,

1997, Howard's attorney wrote a letter to Flemmings reiterating the previous offers of retirement or the 8:30 a.m. to

5:00 p.m. schedule, but stating that her employment had been

terminated because she had not returned to work. In a

subsequent letter dated October 15, 1997, the Dean also

informed Flemmings that her employment had been terminated effective September 29, 1997. In the only claim relevant to this appeal, Flemmings sued Howard University

under the ADA for failing to reasonably accommodate her

disability--Meniere's disease and vertigo.

On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court

granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The

court found that Flemmings was a qualified individual: Her

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job was not highly specialized, her job description did not

require a rigid 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. schedule, and she could

perform the essential functions of her job as an administrative assistant with a modified work schedule. The court then

found that providing Flemmings with an 8:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.

work schedule would not have presented an undue hardship

for Howard: Granting Flemmings' request would not have

required additional financial resources or impacted the overall

operation of the Dean's office, and the Dean could have

assigned late day work to another of her administrative

assistants.

In a second order, the district court recognized appellee's

claim that she would have worked from January 27 through

June 9, 1997, if Howard had given her the requested revised

work schedule, and that she would have taken sick leave from

June 9 through October 15, 1997. On that basis, the court

entered judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of

$16,524.73, representing the aggregation of the salary Flemmings would have earned had she worked from January 27

through June 9, offset by the amount Howard actually paid

her from January 27 through August 16, plus pre-judgment

and post-judgment interest. The court also ordered Howard

to reinstate Flemmings so that she might retire and to take

the necessary steps to provide Flemmings with retirement

benefits due her. Howard appeals the district court's judgment.

II

An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment

de novo, applying the same standard as governed the district

court's decision. See, e.g., Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671,

674 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate

when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In deciding whether

there is a genuine issue of material fact, the court must view

all evidence presented by the nonmovant as presumptively

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valid and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. See,

e.g., Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 579

(D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).

III

The ADA does not cover every individual with an impairment who suffers an adverse employment action. See, e.g.,

Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).

Instead, the ADA more specifically prohibits discrimination

by an employer "against a qualified individual with a disability because of" that disability. 42 U.S.C. s 12112(a). The

ADA explicitly defines "discrimination" as

not making reasonable accommodations to the known

physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified

individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the

accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the

operation of the business of such covered entity.

42 U.S.C. s 12112(b)(5)(A). Most pertinent for this case, the

ADA defines "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment

that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of" an individual, 42 U.S.C. s 12102(2)(A); and "reasonable accommodation" as including "job restructuring, parttime or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant

position, ... and other similar accommodations for individuals

with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. s 12111(9). Far from protecting

all impaired individuals from any sort of adverse employment

action, the ADA protects a much more narrowly defined class

of persons from particular types of discriminatory acts by

employers. Endeavoring to fit her circumstances with the

various statutory requirements, appellee maintains that she

was disabled because she could not drive, and that by refusing to give her a revised work schedule so that she could car

pool with her husband and son, Howard denied her a reasonable accommodation which would have allowed her to continue working. Howard's position is that, for the time period at

issue, appellee was not an otherwise qualified individual with

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a disability as defined by the ADA, and that even if she was,

Howard did not fail to offer her a reasonable accommodation.

Just last year, in Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156

F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc), this court addressed the

protocol for evaluating reasonable accommodation claims under the ADA. In that case, we held that a reasonable

accommodation claim is not subject to the familiar three-part

analysis of McDonnell-Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411

U.S. 792 (1973), "but has its own specialized legal standards."

Id. at 1288 (citing Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1186 (D.C. Cir.

1993). Aka adopted for ADA claims Barth's thorough analysis of the applicability of McDonnell-Douglas to such claims

in the Rehabilitation Act context. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1288,

1300-03; Barth, 2 F.3d at 1185-87. Barth, in turn, recognized three types of handicap discrimination claims, with

special standards of evaluation for each: (1) where the employer claims non-discriminatory reasons for its adverse employment action; (2) where the employer maintains that the

employee is not an otherwise qualified individual with a

disability, or that no reasonable accommodation is available,

so that the plaintiff falls outside the scope of ADA protection;

and (3) where the employer offers the affirmative undue

hardship defense for its actions. See id. at 1186.

The present case resembles both the second and third

Barth scenarios, in that Howard challenges appellee's claim

that she is protected by the ADA as a qualified individual

with a disability, and maintains that the revised schedule she

requested would have imposed an undue hardship. Applying

traditional burden of proof standards to the ADA's statutory

elements, as advocated by Aka and Barth for such cases,

appellee carries the burden of proving by a preponderance of

the evidence that she has a disability, but with a reasonable

accommodation (which she must describe), she can perform

the essential functions of her job. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1300-

01; Barth, 2 F.3d at 1186. Since Howard has invoked the

affirmative defense of undue hardship, Howard bears the

burden of establishing hardship based on several factors,

including the nature and cost of the proposed accommodation,

and the resources and circumstances of the employer in

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question. See 42 U.S.C. s 12111(10)(B) (listing the relevant

factors to be considered in evaluating undue hardship). Thus,

for appellee to prevail, she must prove her case, and Howard

must fail in its defense.

Appellee's case relies on a combination of two arguments of

law which give us pause. First, she claims that she was

disabled because vertigo and Meniere's disease prevented her

from driving, which she suggests is a major life activity.

Second, she contends that an employer's ADA accommodation

obligation extends to helping a qualified disabled employee

get to work in the first place. Driving was not one of her job

duties. Indeed, she does not dispute, and in fact adamantly

maintains, that she was fully capable of performing the duties

of her job once she got to work, despite her condition.

Instead, she only requested the revised schedule so that she

could car pool with her son and husband at times convenient

to them, rather than find some other means of getting to

work or prevail upon her family to make the change in

commuting schedule necessary to accommodate her.

While appellee's reading of the ADA is questionable, we

need not resolve these issues her case has raised, as her claim

lacks an even more fundamental element. An underlying

assumption of any reasonable accommodation claim is that

the plaintiff-employee has requested an accommodation which

the defendant-employer has denied. See Mole v. Buckhorn

Rubber Products, Inc., 165 F.3d 1212, 1217-18 (8th Cir. 1999);

Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 164-

65 (5th Cir. 1996). In the case before us, the parties have

agreed that the relevant time period is January 27 through

June 9, 1997; that is beginning with the date Flemmings

provided Howard with Dr. Copeland's letter, which she claims

substantiated her need for an accommodation, and ending

with the date at which Flemmings concedes that she was

wholly unable to work either with or without an accommodation, and thus fell beyond the scope of the ADA's protection.

During that period of time, the only accommodation Flemmings requested was a medical leave of absence, which

accommodation Howard readily granted. Flemmings maintains that she only requested medical leave because Howard

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denied her a revised work schedule, but nothing in the record

supports that allegation. The January 27 letter from Dr.

Copeland, as well as the April letters from Drs. Copeland and

Lewis, are explicit in recommending a medical leave of absence so that Flemmings could pursue treatment for her

condition, and say nothing about a revised work schedule.

Flemmings' requests for a revised work schedule were made

prior to January 27, when she had not substantiated her need

for any accommodation, and after June 9, when she concedes

she could not have worked anyway. Thus, even reading all

submitted evidence in the light most favorable for Flemmings, no reasonable jury could find that Howard denied her

a reasonable accommodation after she provided documentation substantiating her need for one.

Conclusion

The decision of the district court is reversed, and the case

remanded for the entry of summary judgment in favor of

Howard.

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