Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35266/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35266-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Institute of Cetacean Research
Appellant
Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha, Ltd.
Appellant
Toshiyuki Miura
Appellant
Tomoyuki Ogawa
Appellant
Sea Shepherd Conservation Society
Appellee
Paul Watson
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

INSTITUTE OF CETACEAN RESEARCH,

a Japanese research foundation;

KYODO SENPAKU KAISHA, LTD., a

Japanese corporation; TOMOYUKI

OGAWA, an individual; TOSHIYUKI

MIURA, an individual,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

SEA SHEPHERD CONSERVATION

SOCIETY, an Oregon nonprofit

corporation; PAUL WATSON, an

individual,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-35266

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-02043-

RAJ

ORDER AND

AMENDED

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 9, 2012—Seattle, Washington

Filed February 25, 2013

Amended May 24, 2013

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, A. Wallace Tashima

and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

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2 INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD

Order;

Opinion by Chief Judge Kozinski;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent

by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

SUMMARY*

Maritime Law

The panel reversed the district court’s orders denying a

preliminary injunction and dismissing certain claims in an

action under the Alien Tort Statute brought against

environmental activists by Japanese researchers who hunt

whales in the Southern Ocean pursuant to a permit issued

under the International Convention for the Regulation of

Whaling, art. VIII.

The panel held that the whalers stated claims for piracy,

defined under the United Nations Convention on the Law of

the Sea and the High Seas Convention as “illegal acts of

violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed

for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private

ship . . . and directed . . . on the high seas, against another

ship . . . or against persons or property on board such ship.” 

The panel held that “private ends” are not limited to those

pursued for financial enrichment and that “violence” extends

to malicious acts against inanimate objects.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD 3

Reversing the denial of the whalers’ motion for a

preliminary injunction, the panel held that they were likely to

succeed on the merits of their claims under three international

agreements: the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful

Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, the United

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the

Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing

Collisions at Sea. The panel held that there was a likelihood

of irreparable harm, and the balance of the equities and the

public interest favored the whalers. The panel held that the

district court abused its discretion in deferring to the

judgment of an Australian court because the United States

does not recognize Australia’s claims of sovereignty over

Antarctic waters. In addition, the unclean hands doctrine did

not apply. The panel remanded the case with instructions that

it be transferred to another district judge.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Smith

concurred in both the reasoning and the judgment of the panel

opinion, reversing the district court’s dismissal of the

whalers’ piracy claims, and its failure to grant them a

preliminary injunction. He dissented from the majority’s

decision to reassign the case to a different district judge.

COUNSEL

Martha Christie Helmer, John Neupert (argued) and James L.

Phillips, Miller Nash, LLP, Portland Oregon, for Appellants.

Rachel Eve Buker, Daniel P. Harris (argued) and Charles

Philip Moure, Harris & Moure, PLLC, Seattle, Washington,

for Appellees.

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4 INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD

ORDER

The opinion is amended as follows:

708 F.3d at

1106, Column

1, Lines 14–18

Replace <The district judge’s . . . highprofile case.> with <Panels have broad

discretion to reassign cases on remand

when they feel justice or its appearance

requires it. See United States v. Quach,

302 F.3d 1096, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The district judge has expressed strong

and erroneous views on the merits of

this high profile case. Without ourselves

reaching any determination as to his

ability to proceed impartially or

impugning his integrity, to preserve the

appearance of justice, we conclude

reassignment is appropriate. See Ellis v.

U.S. Dist. Court (In re Ellis), 356 F.3d

1198, 1211 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).>

Defendants-Appellees’ petition for rehearing en banc is

denied. See Fed. R. App. P. 35.

Paul Watson’s petition for rehearing en banc of our

April 1, 2013, order denying him leave to file a late

supplemental petition for rehearing en banc is also denied. 

See id. We are unpersuaded by Watson’s belated claim that

he and co-defendant-appellee Sea Shepherd developed

“divergent interests.” Watson had months to consider

whether his interests diverge from Sea Shepherd’s, yet claims

to have discovered only recently that they do. He does not

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INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD 5

explain how or why. His bald assurance that “serious

grounds exist[]” is too little, too late.

No further petitions for panel rehearing or rehearing en

banc may be filed.

OPINION

KOZINSKI, Chief Judge:

You don’t need a peg leg or an eye patch. When you ram

ships; hurl glass containers of acid; drag metal-reinforced

ropes in the water to damage propellers and rudders; launch

smoke bombs and flares with hooks; and point high-powered

lasers at other ships, you are, without a doubt, a pirate, no

matter how high-minded you believe your purpose to be.

Plaintiffs-Appellants (collectively, “Cetacean”) are

Japanese researchers who hunt whales in the Southern Ocean. 

The United States, Japan and many other nations are

signatories to the International Convention for the Regulation

of Whaling art. VIII, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716,

161 U.N.T.S. 74, which authorizes whale hunting when

conducted in compliance with a research permit issued by a

signatory. Cetacean has such a permit from Japan. 

Nonetheless, it has been hounded on the high seas for years

by a group calling itself Sea Shepherd Conservation Society

and its eccentric founder, Paul Watson (collectively “Sea

Shepherd”). Sea Shepherd’s tactics include all of those listed

in the previous paragraph.

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6 INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD

Cetacean sued under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1350, for injunctive and declaratory relief. The statute

provides a cause of action for “a tort . . . committed in

violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Cetacean argues that Sea

Shepherd’s acts amount to piracy and violate international

agreements regulating conduct on the high seas. The district

court denied Cetacean’s request for a preliminary injunction

and dismissed its piracy claims. We have jurisdiction over

the order denying the injunction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a). We also have jurisdiction to review the dismissal

of the piracy claims because the district court’s reasoning for

dismissing them is “inextricably intertwined with” its reasons

for denying the preliminary injunction. Smith v. Arthur

Andersen LLP, 421 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

I. DISMISSAL OF THE PIRACY CLAIMS

We review the district court’s dismissal of Cetacean’s

piracy claims de novo. Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine

Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008). “[T]he

definition of piracy under the law of nations . . . [is] spelled

out in the UNCLOS, as well as the High Seas Convention,”

which provide almost identical definitions. United States v.

Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 469 (4th Cir. 2012); see United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), art. 101,

Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; Convention on the High

Seas, art. 15, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S.

82. The UNCLOS defines “piracy” as “illegal acts of

violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed

for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private

ship . . . and directed . . . on the high seas, against another

ship . . . or against persons or property on board such ship.” 

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INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD 7

UNCLOS art. 101 (emphasis added); see also Convention on

the High Seas art. 15.

The district court’s analysis turns on an erroneous

interpretation of “private ends” and “violence.” The district

court construed “private ends” as limited to those pursued for

“financial enrichment.” But the common understanding of

“private” is far broader. The term is normally used as an

antonym to “public” (e.g., private attorney general) and often

refers to matters of a personal nature that are not necessarily

connected to finance (e.g., private property, private entrance,

private understanding and invasion of privacy). See

Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary 1969 (2d. ed. 1939) (defining

“private” to mean “[b]elonging to, or concerning, an

individual person, company, or interest”).

We give words their ordinary meaning unless the context

requires otherwise. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8–9

(2004); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:

The Interpretation of Legal Texts 69 (2012). The context

here is provided by the rich history of piracy law, which

defines acts taken for private ends as those not taken on

behalf of a state. See Douglas Guilfoyle, Piracy Off Somalia:

UN Security Council Resolution 1816 and IMO Regional

Counter-Piracy Efforts, 57 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 690, 693

(2008) (discussing the High Seas Convention); Michael

Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and

Strategic Theory for Naval Anti-Piracy Operations, 40 Vand.

J. Transnat’l L. 1, 32 (2007); see also Harmony v. United

States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844) (“The law looks to

[piracy] as an act of hostility . . . being committed by a vessel

not commissioned and engaged in lawful warfare.”). Belgian

courts, perhaps the only ones to have previously considered

the issue, have held that environmental activism qualifies as

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8 INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD

a private end. See Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Court of

Cassation] Castle John v. NV Mabeco, Dec. 19, 1986, 77

I.L.R. 537 (Belg.). This interpretation is “entitled to

considerable weight.” Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983,

1993 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). We

conclude that “private ends” include those pursued on

personal, moral or philosophical grounds, such as Sea

Shepherd’s professed environmental goals. That the

perpetrators believe themselves to be serving the public good

does not render their ends public.

The district court’s interpretation of “violence” was

equally off-base. Citing no precedent, it held that Sea

Shepherd’s conduct is not violent because it targets ships and

equipment rather than people. This runs afoul of the

UNCLOS itself, which prohibits “violence . . . against

another ship” and “violence . . . against persons or property.” 

UNCLOS art. 101. Reading “violence” as extending to

malicious acts against inanimate objects also comports with

the commonsense understanding of the term, see Webster’s

New Int’l Dictionary 2846, as when a man violently pounds

a table with his fist. Ramming ships, fouling propellers and

hurling fiery and acid-filled projectiles easily qualify as

violent activities, even if they could somehow be directed

only at inanimate objects.

Regardless, Sea Shepherd’s acts fit even the district

court’s constricted definition. The projectiles directly

endanger Cetacean’s crew, as the district court itself

recognized. And damaging Cetacean’s ships could cause

them to sink or become stranded in glacier-filled, Antarctic

waters, jeopardizing the safety of the crew.

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INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD 9

The activities that Cetacean alleges Sea Shepherd has

engaged in are clear instances of violent acts for private ends,

the very embodiment of piracy. The district court erred in

dismissing Cetacean’s piracy claims.

II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must

establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that

he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his

favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” 

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20

(2008). We review the district court’s denial of the

preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Harris v. Bd.

of Supervisors, L.A. Cnty., 366 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 2004). 

“A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it

based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a

clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Cooter &

Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990).

A. Likelihood of Success

Cetacean sought its injunction pursuant to three

international agreements: the Convention for the Suppression

of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation

(“SUA Convention”), art. 3, Mar. 10, 1988, S. Treaty Doc.

No. 101-1, 1678 U.N.T.S. 222, the UNCLOS and the

Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing

Collisions at Sea (“COLREGS”), Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.S.T.

3459, 1050 U.N.T.S. 18.

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10 INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD

1. The SUA Convention

The SUA Convention prohibits acts that endanger, or

attempt to endanger, the safe navigation of a ship. SUA

Convention art. 3. Cetacean presented uncontradicted

evidence that Sea Shepherd’s tactics could seriously impair

its ability to navigate. The district court nonetheless

concluded that, since Sea Shepherd has not yet disabled any

of Cetacean’s ships, it’s unlikely it would succeed in the

future. This was clear error. The district court overlooked

the actual language of the Convention, which prohibits

“endager[ing]” safe navigation. Id. This requires only that

Sea Shepherd create dangerous conditions, regardless of

whether the harmful consequences ever come about. See

Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary 843. As to whether Sea

Shepherd’s tactics actually are dangerous, the record

discloses that it has rammed and sunk several other whaling

vessels in the past. See Appendix.

The district court also erred by failing to recognize that

Sea Shepherd, at the very least, attempted to endanger the

navigation of Cetacean’s ships. An attempt is sufficient to

invoke the SUA Convention, even if unsuccessful. Sea

Shepherd’s repeated claims that its efforts are merely

“symbolic” and “employed so as to ensure maximum safety”

are disingenuous. How else can it explain that it has switched

to metal-reinforced prop-fouling ropes? Reinforced ropes

carry the same symbolic meaning as normal ropes, but they

are far more destructive. Nor does symbolism require Sea

Shepherd to bring its ships dangerously close to Cetacean’s. 

The district court’s conclusion that Cetacean wasn’t likely to

succeed on its SUA Convention claims rested on an

implausible determination of the facts and an erroneous

application of law; it was an abuse of discretion. United

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INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD 11

States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2009) (en

banc).

2. The UNCLOS

For the reasons explained above, Part I, supra, the district

court erred in its assessment of Cetacean’s UNCLOS piracy

claims, and consequently abused its discretion in assessing

the likelihood of success on these claims. See Cooter & Gell,

496 U.S. at 405.

3. The COLREGS

The district court did find that Cetacean is likely to

succeed on the merits of its claims under the COLREGS. The

COLREGS state obligatory and universal norms for

navigating ships so as to avoid collision. Crowley Marine

Services, Inc. v. Maritrans, Inc., 530 F.3d 1169, 1172–73 (9th

Cir. 2008). Sea Shepherd deliberately navigates its ships

dangerously close to Cetacean’s ships. The district court’s

finding that this is likely a violation of the COLREGS is

adequately supported by the record. See Hinkson, 585 F.3d

at 1251.

B. LIKELIHOOD OF IRREPARABLE HARM

The district court determined that “injury is possible, but

not likely,” even though it found that the projectiles Sea

Shepherd launches at Cetacean’s ships “are an obvious hazard

to anyone who [sic] they might hit” and that Sea Shepherd

navigates its ships “in such a way that a collision is highly

likely.” Sea Shepherd itself adorns the hulls of its ships with

the names and national flags of the numerous whaling vessels

it has rammed and sunk. See Appendix. The district court’s

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12 INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD

observation that Cetacean hasn’t yet suffered these injuries is

beside the point. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33

(1993). Cetacean’s uncontradicted evidence is that Sea

Shepherd’s tactics could immobilize Cetacean’s ships in

treacherous Antarctic waters, and this is confirmed by

common sense: A dangerous act, if committed often enough,

will inevitably lead to harm, which could easily be

irreparable. Harris, 366 F.3d at 766.

C. BALANCE OF EQUITIES

The district court correctly found that the balance of

equities favors Cetacean. As it noted, “[a]bsent an injunction,

the whalers will continue to be the victims of Sea Shepherd’s

harassment,” but “Sea Shepherd . . . points to no hardship that

it will suffer if the court imposes an injunction.”

D. PUBLIC INTEREST

“The public interest inquiryprimarilyaddresses impact on

non-parties rather than parties.” Bernhardt v. L.A. Cnty.,

339 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks

omitted). This is particularly the case where “the impact of

an injunction reaches beyond the parties, carrying with it a

potential for public consequences.” Stormans, Inc. v.

Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1139 (9th Cir. 2009). The primary

public interests at issue here are the health of the marine

ecosystem, Winter, 555 U.S. at 25–26; see also Earth Island

Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1177 (9th Cir.

2006), and the safety of international waterways.

Where a valid law speaks to the proper level of deference

to a particular public interest, it controls. See Golden Gate

Rest. Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 512 F.3d 1112, 1126–27

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INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD 13

(9th Cir. 2008). Our laws defining the public interest in

regards to whaling are the Whaling Convention Act and the

Marine Mammal Protection Act, both of which permit

whaling pursuant to scientific permits issued under the

Whaling Convention. 16 U.S.C. § 1372; 16 U.S.C. § 916c. 

Cetacean’s activities are covered by such a permit and thus

are consistent with congressional policy as to the marine

ecosystem.

Our laws also reflect a strong public interest in safe

navigation on the high seas. As already discussed, Sea

Shepherd’s activities clearly violate the UNCLOS, the SUA

Convention and the COLREGS. See Part II.A, supra. As

such, they are at loggerheads with the public interest of the

United States and all other seafaring nations in safe

navigation of the high seas.

The district court also considered the interest in keeping

U.S. courts out of the international political controversy

surrounding whaling. But enjoining piracy sends no message

about whaling; it sends the message that we will not tolerate

piracy. This is hardly a controversial view, as evidenced by

a joint statement from the United States, Australia, the

Netherlands and New Zealand condemning dangerous

activities in the Southern Ocean. Joint Statement on Whaling

and Safety at Sea from the Governments of Australia, the

Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United States: Call for

Responsible Behavior in the Southern Ocean Whale

Sanc tua ry (De c . 13, 2011), availabl e at

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/12/178704.htm. 

Refusing the injunction sends the far more troublesome

message that we condone violent vigilantism by U.S.

nationals in international waters.

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14 INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD

The district court also rejected Cetacean’s claims on

international comity grounds. While there is a public interest

in maintaining harmonious international relations, it’s not a

factor here. An Australian court has entered default judgment

against Cetacean, purporting to enjoin it from whaling in

Antarctic coastal waters over which Australia claims

sovereignty. The district court’s deference to Australia’s

judgment in that case was an abuse of discretion. Asvesta v.

Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 2009). To begin,

the district court misunderstood the Australian judgment,

which addressed the legality of Cetacean’s activities, not Sea

Shepherd’s. Whatever the status of Cetacean’s whaling under

Australian law, it gives Sea Shepherd no license to engage in

piracy. It is for Australia, not Sea Shepherd, to police

Australia’s court orders.

Additionally, comity applies only if the foreign court has

competent jurisdiction. Id. at 1011. But the United States

doesn’t recognize Australia’s claims of sovereignty over

Antarctic waters. See Note from U.S. Deputy Representative

to the United Nations, to Secretary-General of the United

Nations (Dec. 3, 2004); Note from Embassy of the United

States, to Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

(Mar. 31, 1995). By according comity to Australia’s

judgment, we would implicitly recognize Australia’s

jurisdiction, in contravention of the stated position of our

government. The conduct of foreign affairs is within the

exclusive province of the Executive, see United States v.

Hooker, 607 F.2d 286, 289 (9th Cir. 1979), and we must defer

to its views, see Willams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)

415, 420 (1839); cf. Mingtai Fire Ins. Co. v. United Parcel

Serv., 177 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999).

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INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD 15

E. UNCLEAN HANDS

An injunction is an equitable remedy. Winter, 555 U.S.

at 32. While the Winterfactors “are pertinent in assessing the

propriety of any injunctive relief,” id., traditional equitable

considerations such as laches, duress and unclean hands may

militate against issuing an injunction that otherwise meets

Winter’s requirements. Here, however, the district court

abused its discretion in denying the injunction based on

unclean hands. Seller Agency Council, Inc. v. Kennedy Ctr.

for Real Estate Educ., Inc., 621 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 2010).

The district court held that Cetacean’s hands are unclean

because, “[i]n flouting the Australian injunction, the whalers

demonstrate their disrespect for a judgment of a domestic

court.” Because neither the United States nor Japan

recognizes Australia’s jurisdiction over any portion of the

Southern Ocean, Cetacean owes no respect to the Australian

order. Moreover, the unclean hands doctrine requires that the

plaintiff have “dirtied [his hands] in acquiring the right he

now asserts, or that the manner of dirtying renders inequitable

the assertion of such rights against the defendant.” Republic

Molding Corp. v. B.W. Photo Utils., 319 F.2d 347, 349 (9th

Cir. 1963). Cetacean has done nothing to acquire the rights

to safe navigation and protection from pirate attacks; they

flow automatically from customary international law and

treaties. Nor is there anything remotely inequitable in

seeking to navigate the sea lanes without interference from

pirates.

* * *

The district court’s orders denyingCetacean’s preliminary

injunction and dismissing its piracy claims are REVERSED. 

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16 INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD

The preliminary injunction we issued on December 17, 2012,

Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation

Soc’y, 702 F.3d 573 (9th Cir. 2012), will remain in effect

until further order of this court. Panels have broad discretion

to reassign cases on remand when they feel justice or its

appearance requires it. See United States v. Quach, 302 F.3d

1096, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 2002). The district judge has

expressed strong and erroneous views on the merits of this

high profile case. Without ourselves reaching any

determination as to his ability to proceed impartially or

impugning his integrity, to preserve the appearance of justice,

we conclude reassignment is appropriate. See Ellis v. U.S.

Dist. Court (In re Ellis), 356 F.3d 1198, 1211 (9th Cir. 2004)

(en banc). The appearance of justice would be served if the

case were transferred to another district judge, drawn at

random, and we so order in accordance with the standing

orders of the Western District of Washington. The panel

retains jurisdiction over anyfurther appeals or writs involving

this case.

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INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD 17

Appendix

ER 279

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18 INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD

ER 281

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INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD 19

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting

in part:

I concur in both the reasoning and the judgment of the

panel opinion, reversing the district court’s dismissal of

Cetacean’s piracy claims, and its failure to grant Cetacean a

preliminary injunction. Even if one believes it is barbaric to

harvest whales for any purpose at the beginning of the 21st

century, as practiced by Cetacean, it is clearly permitted

under international law. See International Convention for the

Regulation of Whaling art. VIII, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716,

161 U.N.T.S. 74. Sea Shepherd’s piracy is not. See Maj. Op.

at 5–14.

However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s

decision to reassign this case to a different district judge. 

“We remand to a different judge only in unusual

circumstances or when required to preserve the interests of

justice.” United States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082, 1102

(9th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Quach, 302 F.3d 1096,

1103 (9th Cir. 2002)). Specifically, we employ a three-factor

test to determine whether to remand a case to a different

district judge:

(1) whether the original judge would

reasonably be expected upon remand to have

substantial difficulty in putting out of his or

her mind previously expressed views or

findings determined to be erroneous or based

on evidence that must be rejected, (2) whether

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20 INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD

reassignment is advisable to preserve the

appearance of justice, and (3) whether

reassignment would entail waste and

duplication out of proportion to any gain in

preserving the appearance of fairness.

Id.; see also Wyler Summit P’ship v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.,

235 F.3d 1184, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000).

Applying these factors, I see no basis for reassigning this

case. Our panel opinion is well-articulated, succinct, and

absolutely clear as to what is required of the district judge on

remand. Importantly, it leaves no room for any district judge

to “have substantial difficulty . . . putting out of his or her

mind previously expressed views.” Wolf Child, 699 F.3d at

1102. The Sea Shepherds are pirates. Period. No district

judge could fail to grasp the clarity and firmness of our

opinion.

Moreover, the “appearance of justice” does not require

reassignment. We have previously reserved reassignment for

only the most egregious cases.1 While the district judge

1

See, e.g., United States v. Working, 287 F.3d 801, 809–10 (9th Cir.

2002) (reassigning to different district judge where district court sentenced

defendant to one day in jail following conviction for assault with the intent

to commit first degree murder); Quach, 302 F.3d at 1103–04 (reassigning

where district court previously suggested that the defendant was

“fortunate” not to receive the death penalty, and where the court indicated

that had the government moved for a downward departure, it would have

denied the motion); United Nat. Ins. Co. v. R&D Latex Corp., 141 F.3d

916, 919–20 (9th Cir. 1998) (reassigning where district judge had “twice

granted summary judgment” to a party without articulating any reasons);

cf. Wyler Summit Partnership, 235 F.3d at 1196 (refusing to remand to a

different district judge even though district judge “adopted verbatim” one

party’s clearly biased proposed order); United States v. Waknine, 543 F.3d

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INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH V. SEA SHEPHERD 21

clearly erred in finding for the Sea Shepherds, there is

absolutely no evidence in this record to suggest that he did so

for an improper purpose, such as bias or prejudice.

Finally, because I do not believe “preserving the

appearance of fairness” requires reassignment, the majority’s

decision will necessarily “entail waste and duplication out of

proportion” to any benefits. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d at 1102. 

District judges, like circuit judges, occasionally make

mistakes. Where, as here, there is no reason to suspect that

the district judge will repeat those mistakes on remand,

reassignment is inappropriate.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to

reassign this case to a different district judge.

546, 560 (9th Cir. 2008) (refusing to reassign to a different district judge

despite commission of significant procedural errors).

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