Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00150/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00150-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nancy Nauman
Defendant
D. L. Runnels
Defendant
David Shaver
Plaintiff

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID SHAVER, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S- 05-0150 FCD GGH P

vs. ORDER & 

D. L. RUNNELS, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint on the grounds

that the action was filed in an improper venue, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3), and on the

ground that plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This action was transferred on December 8, 2004 from the Central District to

the Fresno Division of the Eastern District, defendants having averred that all defendants resided

in the Eastern District of California, and the Central District court noting that plaintiff’s

opposition, while addressing the motion substantively, failed to address the venue issue. The

Central District court, finding that venue in this matter “lies solely in the Eastern District....”

ordered the transfer of this case, but specifically did not reach any other ground of the pending

dismissal motion. See Order filed on October 22, 2004 in Central District Case No. 04-CV-0380

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DT MLG. The Fresno Division of the Eastern District directed the transfer of this case to the

Sacramento Division by order filed on January 24, 2005. This court will proceed to adjudicate

defendants’ motion on any remaining ground. 

First Amended Complaint

This action proceeds against the following defendants: (former Folsom State

Prison Warden) D. L. Runnels; Dr. Nancy Nauman; and N. Grannis. See Order filed in Central

District on April 29, 2004. Defendant Nauman, a psychiatrist, diagnosed plaintiff, on January 17,

2003, as suffering from a mental disorder with symptoms of schizophrenia and manicdepression. First Amended Complaint (FAC), p. 5. As a result of her diagnosis and in light of a

prior psychiatric diagnosis indicating that plaintiff has an antisocial personality disorder, among

other mental conditions, defendant Nauman recommended plaintiff’s placement on single cell

status. Id. Notwithstanding, two committees, the Folsom State Prison Unit One Classification

Committee (UCC), on May 6, 2003, and an Inter-disciplinary Treatment Team Committee

(ITTC), on December 19, 2003, both denied defendant Nauman’s recommendation that plaintiff

be placed on single cell status. Id. Plaintiff asserts that his Eighth Amendment right to adequate

medical care and treatment was thereby violated and that he has been subjected to cruel and

unusual punishment. FAC, p.5 and attachment. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Nauman was

present at the two committee meetings and failed to object to the committees’ decisions denying

plaintiff adequate medical care. Id. Although plaintiff sets forth no specific involvement by

defendant Runnels, plaintiff alleges that he violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to

adequate medical care. FAC, p. 3. Defendant Grannis violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

rights by denying his appeals. FAC, pp. 3 and attachment. Plaintiff also claims that his

Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process have been violated. Plaintiff seeks both

“immediate” injunctive relief, in the form of “temporary” placement on single cell status, and

money damages. 

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3

Motion to Dismiss 

Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss

A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) unless it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts consistent with his allegations which

would entitle him to relief. NOW, Inc. v. Schiedler, 510 U.S. 249, 256, 114 S. Ct. 798, 803 

(1994); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2232 (1984), citing Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102 (1957), Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d

1273, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 1993). Dismissal of the complaint, or any claim within it, “can be based

on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990);

see also Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). 

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of

the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.

Ct. 1848, 1850 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the

motion and resolve all doubts in the pleader’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421,

89 S. Ct. 1843, 1849, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). The court will “‘presume that general

allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’” NOW, 510

U.S. at 256; 114 S. Ct. at 803, quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.555, 561, 112 S.

Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992). Moreover, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than

those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596 (1972). A

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears beyond

doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him to

relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2232 (1984), citing

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt

Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981).

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4

The court may consider facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint. 

Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may disregard

allegations in the complaint if they are contradicted by facts established by exhibits attached to

the complaint. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d at 1267. Furthermore, the court is not

required to accept as true allegations that contradict facts which may be judicially noticed. 

Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486

U.S. 1040 (1988). The court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable

inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618,

624 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981). The court need not accept legal conclusions

“cast in the form of factual allegations.” Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981). 

A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an

opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F. 2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Discussion

Defendants contend that plaintiff has, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), failed

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because 1) he has no constitutional right to be

single celled in a state prison; 2) the failure to grant an inmate grievance does not rise to the level

of a constitutional violation; 3) plaintiff has failed to allege any injury as a result of defendants’

conduct; 4) plaintiff states no claim in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant

Runnels, who is apparently sued only as Acting Warden under a theory of respondeat superior

liability. 

Due Process

Generally, prison officials’ housing and classification decisions do not give rise to

federal constitutional claims encompassed by the protection of liberty and property guaranteed by

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S.

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Ct. 2701, 2705 (1972). A prisoner does not have a constitutional right to a particular

classification status. Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting

Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9, 97 S. Ct. 274, 279 (1976), wherein the Supreme Court,

in Footnote 9, explicitly rejected a claim that “prisoner classification and eligibility for

rehabilitative programs in the federal system” invoked due process protections, even where

inmate suffers “grievous loss”). The United States Supreme Court has held that liberty interests

protected by the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution arise only in connection with

matters pertaining to the imposition of “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S. Ct.

2293, 2300 (1995). Plaintiff has not set forth facts as to any defendant that demonstrate a

deprivation of due process in his having been denied single cell status. 

As to defendant Grannis, plaintiff’s complaints with respect to the denial of his

inmate appeals also fail, as prisoners do not have a “separate constitutional entitlement to a

specific prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003),

citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Even the non-existence of, or the

failure of prison officials to properly implement, an administrative appeals process within the

prison system does not raise constitutional concerns. Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1988). See also, Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993); Flick v. Alba, 932

F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1991). Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D.Ill. 1982) (“[A prison]

grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the

inmates. Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural

protections envisioned by the fourteenth amendment”). Specifically, a failure to process a

grievance does not state a constitutional violation. Buckley, supra. State regulations give rise to

a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution only if those

regulations pertain to “freedom from restraint” that “imposes atypical and significant hardship on

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. at

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1

 “[W]e recognize that States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests

which are protected by the Due Process Clause. See also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S.

369, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987). But these interests will be generally limited to

freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as

to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, see, e.g., Vitek, 445 U.S., at

493, 100 S.Ct., at 1263-1264 (transfer to mental hospital), and Washington, 494 U.S., at 221-

222, 110 S.Ct., at 1036-1037 (involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs), nonetheless

imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, supra. 

6

484, 115 S. Ct. at 2300.1

Eighth Amendment

In order to state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment based on

inadequate medical care, plaintiff must allege “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct.

285, 292 (1976). To prevail, plaintiff must show both that his medical needs were objectively

serious, and that defendants possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Wilson v. Seiter,

501 U.S. 294, 299, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991); McKinney v. Anderson, 959 F.2d 853 (9th Cir.

1992) (on remand). The requisite state of mind for a medical claim is “deliberate indifference.”

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4, 112 S. Ct. 995, 998 (1992). 

A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could

result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Indications

that a prisoner has a serious need for medical treatment are the following: the existence of an

injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or

treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily

activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain. See, e.g., Wood v. Housewright, 900

F. 2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing cases); Hunt v. Dental Dept., 865 F.2d 198, 200-01

(9th Cir. 1989). McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds, WMX Technologies v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

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In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994) the Supreme Court

defined a very strict standard which a plaintiff must meet in order to establish “deliberate

indifference.” Of course, negligence is insufficient. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, 114 S. Ct. at 1978. 

However, even civil recklessness (failure to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm

which is so obvious that it should be known) is insufficient. Id. at 836-37, 114 S. Ct. at 1979. 

Neither is it sufficient that a reasonable person would have known of the risk or that a defendant

should have known of the risk. Id. at 842, 114 S. Ct. at 1981.

It is nothing less than recklessness in the criminal sense))a subjective standard))

disregard of a risk of harm of which the actor is actually aware. Id. at 838-842, 114 S. Ct. at

1979-1981. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837,

114 S. Ct. at 1979. Thus, a defendant is liable if he knows that plaintiff faces “a substantial risk

of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at

847, 114 S. Ct. at 1984. “[I]t is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his

knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842, 114 S. Ct. at 1981. If the risk was

obvious, the trier of fact may infer that a defendant knew of the risk. Id. at 840-42, 114 S. Ct. at

1981. However, obviousness per se will not impart knowledge as a matter of law. 

Also significant to the analysis is the well established principle that mere

differences of opinion concerning the appropriate treatment cannot be the basis of an Eighth

Amendment violation. Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330 (9th Cir. 1996); Franklin v. Oregon,

662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).

Moreover, a physician need not fail to treat an inmate altogether in order to violate

that inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights. Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir.

1989). A failure to competently treat a serious medical condition, even if some treatment is

prescribed, may constitute deliberate indifference in a particular case. Id.

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Additionally, mere delay in medical treatment without more is insufficient to state

a claim of deliberate medical indifference. Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Com’rs, 766

F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 1985). Although the delay in medical treatment must be harmful, there is

no requirement that the delay cause “substantial” harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060, citing

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1339-1340 (9th Cir. 1990) and Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 998-

1000. A finding that an inmate was seriously harmed by the defendant’s action or inaction tends

to provide additional support for a claim of deliberate indifference; however, it does not end the

inquiry. McGuckin, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992). In summary, “the more serious the

medical needs of the prisoner, and the more unwarranted the defendant’s actions in light of those

needs, the more likely it is that a plaintiff has established deliberate indifference on the part of

the defendant.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1061. 

Superimposed on these Eighth Amendment standards is the fact that in cases

involving complex medical issues where plaintiff contests the type of treatment he received,

expert opinion will almost always be necessary to establish the necessary level of deliberate

indifference. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff alleges that

defendant Nauman, apparently a medical expert, after diagnosing him, recommended his

placement on single cell status several months prior to such an alleged recommendation having

been denied by prison committees, in the presence of defendant Nauman and without objection

by her. As noted, the court must accept plaintiff’s allegations as true on this motion to dismiss,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. at 740, 96 S. Ct. at 1850, and construe

them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, resolving all doubts in his favor. Jenkins v.

McKeithen, 395 U.S. at 421, 89 S. Ct. at 1849. Therefore, the court will recommend denial of

defendant’s motion as to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against defendant Nauman. As to

defendant Grannis, plaintiff, however, fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim.

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Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff alleges no direct involvement whatever by defendant Runnels in his

having been denied single cell status.

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions

of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v.

Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A

person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 

§ 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform

an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.

941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel

in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982). Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against defendant Runnels will be dismissed

with leave granted for plaintiff to amend.

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 Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978).

10

However, with respect to his claims for prospective injunctive relief, just as it is

not necessary to allege Monell2 policy grounds when suing a state or municipal official in his or

her official capacity for injunctive relief related to a procedure of a state entity, Chaloux v.

Killeen, 886 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1989), it follows that it is not necessary to allege the personal

involvement of a state official when plaintiffs are attacking a state procedure on federal grounds

that relates in some way to the job duties of the named defendant. All that is required is that the

complaint name an official who could appropriately respond to a court order on injunctive relief

should one ever be issued. Harrington v. Grayson, 764 F. Supp. 464, 475-477 (E.D.Mich. 1991);

Malik v. Tanner, 697 F. Supp. 1294, 1304 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). (“Furthermore, a claim for

injunctive relief, as opposed to monetary relief, may be made on a theory of respondeat superior

in a § 1983 action.”); Fox Valley Reproductive Health Care v. Arft, 454 F. Supp. 784, 786 (E.D.

Wis. 1978). See also, Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1985), permitting an

injunctive relief suit to continue against an official’s successors despite objection that the

successors had not personally engaged in the same practice that had led to the suit. However,

because a suit against an official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the state, policy or

procedure of the state must be at issue in a claim for official capacity injunctive relief. Haber v.

Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S. Ct. 358, 361-62 (1991). The court will recommend denial of

defendants’ motion to dismiss defendant Runnels (or his successor) in his official capacity on

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. 

Plaintiff’s Motion

Plaintiff has requested the appointment of counsel. The United States Supreme

Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent

prisoners in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In

certain exceptional circumstances, the court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991);

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). In the present case, the court

does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of

counsel will therefore be denied.

As for his accompanying request for “permanent/preliminary injunction,” which

the court construes as a motion for a preliminary injunction, defendants Nauman and Runnels

will be directed to file a response within 30 days. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s April 8, 2005 motion for the appointment of counsel is denied, and

2. Defendants Nauman and Runnels are directed to file a response to plaintiff’s s

April 8, 2005 motion for a preliminary injunction within 30 days. 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ August 5, 2004 motion to dismiss be granted in part and denied in

part as follows:

(a) granted as to plaintiff’s due process claims and these claims be dismissed;

(b) granted as to defendant Grannis and this defendant be dismissed;

(c) granted as to defendant Runnels, in his individual capacity only, and this

defendant be dismissed in his individual capacity;

(d) denied as to defendant Nauman on the Eighth Amendment claims only;

(e) denied as to defendant Runnels on the Eighth Amendment claims, in his

official capacity only, for prospective injunctive relief;

2. Defendants Nauman and Runnels be ordered to answer within 30 days of

adoption of these Findings and Recommendations, should that occur.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

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objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 7/29/05

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

shav0150.mtd

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