Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01078/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01078-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Annette Marie Canania
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-1078

___________

United States of America, * 

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * 

*

Annette Marie Canania, * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Appeals from the United States

No. 07-1329 District Court for the 

___________ Eastern District of Missouri. 

United States of America, * 

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * 

*

Gerald Robinson, * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: November 15, 2007

Filed: July 14, 2008 (Corrected: 07/30/2008)

___________

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1

The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

2

Heet is the brand name of a fuel additive which is designed for use as a gas-line

antifreeze and water remover. It is also commonly used in the manufacture of

methamphetamine. 

-2-

Before MELLOY, BRIGHT, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Annette Marie Canania and Gerald Robinson were convicted of one count of

conspiracy to possess pseudoephedrine knowing it would be used to manufacture

methamphetamine and two counts of possession of pseudoephedrine knowing it would

be used to manufacture methamphetamine, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). The

district court1

 sentenced Canania and Robinson to 240 and 220 months imprisonment,

respectively. From their sentences, they appeal. Their cases are now consolidated on

appeal. We affirm.

I.

In December of 2003, officers with the St. Louis County Multi-Jurisdictional

Drug Task Force obtained consent to search the residence of Julie Friend. Therein,

the officers found methamphetamine and numerous items related to the use and

manufacture of methamphetamine. Friend became an informant for the officers and

provided them information about the involvement of Canania and Robinson in the sale

and manufacture of methamphetamine. Friend was a “shopper” for Canania. A

“shopper” is a person who obtains precursors, such as: cold tablets from which

pseudoephedrine could be derived; lithium batteries; fish tank hoses; windshield

washer solvent; and Heet.2

 Wearing a hidden recording device, Friend delivered some

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pseudoephedrine pills to Canania. Law enforcement officers observed Friend enter

Canania and Robinson’s residence at 2230 Hood Street, St. Louis, Missouri, with the

pills and exit without the pills. Based upon this investigation, the officers sought and

obtained a search warrant for the Hood Street home. 

When officers executed the search warrant, they seized: cold tablets; lithium

batteries; fire extinguishers; an oxygen tank from which the valves had been removed

(which can be used to manufacture anhydrous ammonia); 1.5 grams of

methamphetamine; sandwich bags; glass jars; snorting tubes; a bottle of pure

ephedrine; a smoking pipe; coffee filters (hidden in the air ducts); cotton swabs; paint

thinner; windshield wiper fluid; .22 caliber ammunition; and a .22 caliber pistol. The

pistol was seized from the bedroom shared by Canania and Robinson. At the time of

the seizure, Robinson was asleep on the same bed where the pistol was found. 

During the search, the officers also noticed that there was fire damage throughout the

basement. 

Despite the fact that many of the above listed items were seized from the

kitchen counters and from on top of the bed in their bedroom, Canania and Robinson

denied any knowledge of the items seized from their home. They suggested that

previous tenants must have left the items. Likewise, they denied any involvement in

causing the fire damage in the basement of the home. 

Approximately two months later, on February 17, 2004, law enforcement

officers observed Ronald Hartge purchase two boxes of cold medicine under

suspicious circumstances. They followed Hartge from the store, and he agreed to

cooperate with them when he realized they were following him. Hartge consented to

a search of his vehicle and his residence, and he admitted that he previously had

attempted to manufacture methamphetamine but was not successful. As part of his

agreement to cooperate with law enforcement, Hartge identified residences which he

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knew to have a connection to the sale or manufacture of methamphetamine. While

doing so, he pointed out the home of Canania and Robinson as a place

methamphetamine was manufactured or sold. Hartge agreed to be wired with a hidden

recording device and went to the home of Canania and Robinson. While at the home

and while being recorded, Hartge agreed to bring Canania and Robinson cold pills to

be used to manufacture methamphetamine. Hartge later returned to the residence and

delivered the requested cold pills to Canania and Robinson. Hartge also purchased

methamphetamine from Canania and Robinson. Officers then obtained and executed

a second search warrant for the Hood Street home of Canania and Robinson. During

the execution of the search warrant, the officers found and seized methamphetamine,

cold pills, and other substances used to manufacture methamphetamine. Canania and

Robinson denied any knowledge of these items, just as they had following the first

search. 

In January of 2006, Canania and Robinson were indicted for methamphetaminerelated offenses, and warrants were issued for their arrest. When officers attempted

to serve the arrest warrants, they discovered that Canania and Robinson no longer

lived at the Hood Street residence. In February of 2006, law enforcement officers

with the St. Louis County Multi-Jurisdictional Drug Task Force learned that Heather

Thompson, a confidential informant for another law enforcement agency, knew

Robinson and could deliver cold pills to him for use in the manufacture of

methamphetamine. By then, Robinson was again living at 2230 Hood Street.

However, he was sharing the residence with a man named Lee Westfall, not Canania.

On February 13, 2006, Thompson made a controlled delivery of cold tablets to the

2230 Hood Street residence while wearing a hidden recording device. Just prior to

Thompson’s entry into the residence, Robinson was observed entering the residence

with a briefcase. When Thompson entered the residence, Westfall indicated to

Thompson that Robinson was inside the house, but Thompson did not see Robinson.

Westfall gave Thompson a gram of methamphetamine in exchange for 10 boxes

containing 48 cold tablets in each box. 

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Immediately thereafter, a third search warrant was obtained and executed on the

home. Once again, methamphetamine, cold pills and other paraphernalia were seized

from the residence. Specifically, officers seized: a notepad containing a crude

formula for “ice,” which is the base form of methamphetamine; an unloaded shotgun

found beside the bed; a digital scale inside a wallet, along with coffee filters and one

of Robinson’s business cards; powder residue on the scale; the ten boxes of cold

tablets taken to the residence by Thompson just prior to the execution of the search

warrant; other cold tablets; empty cold pill boxes; a jar of blue pill binder; Heet; a

bottle of lye; 0.99 grams of methamphetamine packaged for sale in three plastic bags

which were located inside Robinson’s briefcase; iodine; camp fuel; an acid generator;

and a fire extinguisher. Additionally, the officers noted red stains in the basement

believed to be caused from the production of iodine crystals, which are necessary to

the manufacture of methamphetamine. 

Following their arrests, Canania and Robinson were indicted and tried for one

count of conspiracy to possess pseudoephedrine knowing it would be used to

manufacture methamphetamine, three counts of possession of pseudoephedrine

knowing it would be used to manufacture methamphetamine, and one count of

possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense. At trial, the

testimony of Friend, Hartge, and Westfall, as well as the evidence obtained during the

three searches was introduced. The jury convicted Canania and Robinson of one

count of conspiracy to possess pseudoephedrine knowing it would be used to

manufacture methamphetamine and two counts of possession of pseudoephedrine

knowing it would be used to manufacture methamphetamine. The jury acquitted the

pair of the firearms charge and of the third count of possession of pseudoephedrine

knowing it would be used to manufacture methamphetamine. 

 

Friend, Hartge, and Westfall, who had charges pending, were sentenced after

the trial of Canania and Robinson, but prior to the sentencing hearing of Canania and

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Robinson. On September 27, 2006, Hartge was sentenced to four years probation. On

November 15, 2006, Westfall was sentenced to 80 months in prison. On November

16, 2006, Friend was sentenced to four years probation. 

On December 14, 2006, the district court conducted the sentencing hearing of

Canania and Robinson. With regard to the Guideline range adopted by the district

court, Canania objected to the two-level firearm enhancement, the three-level role in

offense enhancement and the denial of the two-level reduction for acceptance of

responsibility. Her objections were overruled. Canania’s Guideline range was 262

to 327 months with a maximum statutory term of 60 years (720 months). Canania was

sentenced to 240 months imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The

district court sentenced Canania below the Guideline range, noting that it wanted to

avoid disparity between Canania and Robinson’s sentences, as well as giving

consideration to Canania’s history of being a victim of abuse and her long history of

drug addiction. 

The district court conducted Robinson’s sentencing hearing on the same date

and calculated Robinson’s Guidelines range to be 188 to 235 months imprisonment.

Robinson objected to the quantity of methamphetamine attributed to him and the twolevel enhancement for firearm possession. His objections were also overruled.

Robinson then sought a downward variance from the Guidelines range arguing that:

he and Canania manufactured the methamphetamine to feed their own addictions and

they made very little money; he was an otherwise law-abiding citizen who worked

hard as a carpenter; he was 59 years old; he had arthritis; and, due to his age and

arthritis, he would be particularly vulnerable to abuse in prison. The court declined

to sentence Robinson below the Guideline range and imposed a sentence of 220

months in prison and two years supervised release. From their sentences, Canania and

Robinson appeal. 

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II.

On appeal, Canania argues that the district court erred in: (1) imposing a

two-level firearms enhancement pursuant to the 2005 United States Sentencing

Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 2D1.1(b)(1); (2) applying a three-level

enhancement for her supervisory role pursuant to USSG § 3B1.1(b); (3) denying

her request for a two level reduction for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to

USSG § 3E1.1(a); and (4) imposing an unreasonable sentence. Robinson argues

that the district court erred in the following ways: (1) imposing the two-level

firearm enhancement pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1); (2) refusing to grant his

request for a downward variance because he was not given a leadership role

enhancement, resulting in an unreasonable sentence; (3) failing to properly weigh

the factors pertaining to the nature and circumstance of the offense in refusing to

grant his request for a downward variance, resulting in an unreasonable sentence;

and (4) failing to consider or give appropriate weight to relevant factors such as his

age, disability and disparity in sentence among co-conspirators in refusing to grant

his request for a downward variance, resulting in an unreasonable sentence. 

III.

“We review a district court’s interpretation and application of the Guidelines

de novo and its factual findings regarding enhancements for clear error.” United States

v. Gillispie, 487 F.3d 1158, 1162 (8th Cir. 2007). See United States v. Gall, 128 S.

Ct. 586, 587 (2007) (improper calculation of Guidelines range is procedural error).

We do not find that the trial court clearly erred in determining that the pistol

hidden in the bed shared by Canania and Robinson was connected to the drug offenses

of which they were convicted. If it is “not ‘clearly improbable that the [pistol] was

connected with the [drug offenses,]’” then the district court did not clearly err in

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giving the defendants the two-level increase in offense level pursuant to Guidelines

section 2D1.1. United States v. Bell, 477 F.3d 607, 614 (8th Cir. 2007); accord

United States v. Peroceski, No. 07-1336, 2008 WL 819082, at *3 (8th Cir. Mar. 28,

2008) (clarifying that government bears burden of proving defendant is subject to

sentencing enhancement by establishing it is not clearly improbable that firearm was

connected to drug offense). Firearms serve as the ‘tools of the drug trade’ by

‘providing protection and intimidation,’ therefore firearms and drug offenses are often

related and “result in reciprocal offense characteristic enhancements.” Id. at 615

(quoting United States v. Linson, 276 F.3d 1017, 1019 (8th Cir. 2002)). The

testimony established that the .22 caliber pistol was well within the reach of a person

lying in the bed and drug paraphernalia was scattered all over the bed at the time the

gun was seized. Both Canania and Robinson lived in the residence, slept in the bed

where the gun was located, and participated in the possession of the paraphernalia and

precursors, as well as the manufacture and sale of methamphetamine. Canania and

Robinson were both aware of the presence of the gun in the bedroom. Hence, they

were both in possession of the firearm. 

Robinson’s brother testified that he gave Robinson the gun several years before

it was seized in order for Robinson to “reblue” the gun. However, there were no

rebluing materials in the house, and a firearms expert testified that the gun did not

need to be reblued because the gun’s finish was in excellent condition. While it is

well settled that the “mere presence of a firearm cannot support the enhancement,” the

district court should apply the enhancement unless it is “clearly improbable that the

weapon was connected with the offense.” Gillispie, 487 F.3d at 1162 (citing USSG

§ 2D1.1, comment n. 3.). 

We cannot say that it was clearly improbable that the pistol in this case was

connected with the drug operation. This is especially true in light of the proximity of

the paraphernalia and drugs to the gun, the condition of the gun’s finish and the

absence of rebluing materials in the house. Much of the evidence of manufacture of

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methamphetamine was seized from the same room as the gun, and drugs and drug

paraphernalia were found on the very bed where the gun was located.

Methamphetamine manufacturing items found on the bed included: denatured

alcohol; pseudoephedrine pills; a glass vile containing powder; a box of “Bronch-eze,”

an ephedrine-like substance; a mason jar; a Pyrex dish with residue on it; a dish

containing a lithium battery; boxes of antihistamines and decongestants; syringes;

marijuana; the 599 pseudoephedrine pills delivered by Julie Friend; and another 479

pseudoephedrine pills. Next to the bed, officers found: a glass vile containing

methamphetamine; additional pseudoephedrine pills; a smoking pipe; cotton swabs;

paint thinner; and windshield wiper fluid. 

To determine that a gun was connected to the drug activity, the district court

may find a temporal and spatial relationship between the defendants, the criminal

activity, and the firearm. United States v. Newton, 184 F.3d 955, 958 (8th Cir. 1999).

 The government established such a relationship between Canania and Robinson, their

drug activities, and the firearm located in their bedroom. We also note that the jury’s

acquittal of Canania and Robinson of the firearms charge does not preclude the district

court from applying the section 2D1.1(b)(1) two-level enhancement. United States

v. Eberspacher, 936 F.2d 387, 389 (8th Cir. 1991). We find that the trial court did not

err when it applied the Guidelines section 2D1.1 firearm enhancement to Canania and

Robinson.

IV.

Canania next argues that the district court erred in imposing a three-level

enhancement for her supervisory role in the conspiracy pursuant to section 3B1.1(b),

which provides that when a defendant “was a manager or supervisor (but not an

organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants, or

was otherwise extensive,” the offense level should be increased by three levels.

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USSG § 3B1.1(b). We review the district court’s decision to apply an upward

adjustment in the offense level pursuant to USSG § 3B1.1 for clear error. United

States v. Mata-Peres, 478 F.3d 875, 877 (8th Cir. 2007). 

We cannot find that the district court clearly erred in determining that Canania

had a managerial or supervisory role in the conspiracy. Canania does not dispute that

the conspiracy involved more than five people. Further, Canania was the person who

ran the business aspect of the conspiracy, while Robinson was the “cook.” Canania

recruited the co-conspirators to obtain the cold pills and other items to be used to

manufacture the methamphetamine. She then continued to cultivate relationships with

the co-conspirators. Canania determined the amount of methamphetamine each coconspirator would receive in exchange for his or her procurement of cold pills and

other precursors. After she bargained with the co-conspirators, Canania then did all

the prep work on the cold pills to ready them for the final methamphetamine “cook”.

While Canania tended to the business end of the operation during the day,

Robinson worked at his regular job as a carpenter. When Robinson arrived home

from work, Canania would give him the prepped pseudoephedrine pills and then

Robinson would take the prepped pills to another location to “cook” the

methamphetamine. When the “cook” was complete, Robinson returned to their home

with the final product. Canania then determined how much methamphetamine they

could keep for their own use, how much they would sell and how much was to be used

to pay the people who procured the cold pills for use in the manufacture of the

methamphetamine. Based on the evidence, the district court did not clearly err by

imposing the three-level enhancement to Canania’s offense level based on its finding

Canania played a managerial or supervisory role in this operation. See United States

v. Zimma, 299 F.3d 710, 724 (8th Cir. 2002) (Evidence suggested managerial or

supervisory role enhancement where defendant assisted in cooking methamphetamine,

directed procurement of significant amount of ephedrine pills, and taught others how

to set up methamphetamine lab).

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V.

Canania next argues that the district court erred in denying her request for a

two-level decrease in her offense level based on acceptance of responsibility pursuant

to Guidelines section 3E1.1. We review a denial of a reduction for acceptance of

responsibility for clear error on the part of the district court. United States v. Johnson,

474 F.3d 515, 521 (8th Cir. 2007). The burden was on Canania to show that she

“clearly demonstrated” acceptance of responsibility under section 3E1.1. United States

v. Spurlock, 495 F.3d 1011, 1014 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 687 (2007). “The

Guidelines suggest several factors a district court may consider in deciding whether

to grant an acceptance of responsibility reduction including: (1) whether the

defendant truthfully admitted the conduct comprising [her] offense; (2) whether [s]he

voluntarily surrendered to authorities promptly after the commission of the offense;

and (3) the timeliness of [her] conduct manifesting acceptance of responsibility.”

Johnson, 474 F.3d at 521 (citing USSG § 3E1.1 comment. (n.1)). 

A district court’s factual determination of the defendant’s entitlement to an

offense level decrease for acceptance of responsibility is “entitled to great deference,

and we will reverse it only if it is so clearly erroneous as to be without foundation.”

Spurlock, 495 F.3d at 1014. The two-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility

is not intended to be applied when a defendant puts the United States to its burden of

proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, then expresses remorse

upon conviction at jury trial. USSG § 3E1.1 comment. (n. 2). Canania argues that she

should have been given the two-level decrease because her attorney told the jury in

opening statements that the only charges she denied involvement in were the firearm

charge and witness tampering charge. Even a plea of guilty is no guarantee of a

reduction for acceptance of responsibility. See United States v. Miller, 951 F.2d 164,

165 (8th Cir. 1991) (guilty plea did not guarantee reduction for acceptance of

responsibility; district court properly denied reduction despite defendant’s professed

regret). At sentencing, the government submitted a written list to the district court

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that documented all the ways Canania tried to minimize or deny her involvement in

the offenses prior to her sentencing, all of which were disproved in the course of the

trial. Despite the fact that the drug paraphernalia was located on her kitchen

countertops, in her bedroom, and on top of her bed, Canania stated that she had no

idea where the drug paraphernalia in her home came from and suggested to law

enforcement that it must have been left there by previous tenants. The testimony of

co-conspirators was sufficient to establish that Canania was not only aware of the

presence of the drug paraphernalia in her home, she was running the

methamphetamine manufacturing operation and participating in the preparation of

cold pills for use in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Although she denied

involvement in all counts until her attorney conceded her involvement in the drug

charges at trial, it was only after her conviction that she admitted some of her illegal

conduct. We cannot say that the district court clearly erred in denying Canania a

reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 

VI.

Canania and Robinson argue that their sentences were unreasonable for a

variety of reasons. We review the reasonableness of the district court’s sentences for

abuse of discretion. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597 (“Assuming that the district court’s

sentencing decision is procedurally sound, the appellate court should then consider the

substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion

standard.”). The United States Supreme Court determined that the Guidelines are

advisory, United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005), but should serve as the

“starting point” for the district court’s sentence. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S.

Ct. 558, 574 (2007) (quoting Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596). In reviewing the sentences of

Canania and Robinson, we determine whether the district court’s sentencing decision

was reasonable considering the totality of the circumstances. United States v.

Gillmore, 497 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 921 (2008). 

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Further, a sentence below or within the Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable

on appeal. Id.

Canania argues that the 240 month sentence imposed upon her by the district

court was unreasonable in light of: (1) the sentences of her coconspirators and

codefendants; (2) her lack of prior criminal history; (3) her psychiatric problems; and

(4) the abuse she suffered as a child . However, we find no abuse of discretion in the

district court’s sentencing determination. The district court concluded that Canania’s

culpability and role in the offense was greater than that of Robinson, who received a

sentence within his Guidelines range, and Friend and Hartge, both of whom pled

guilty and cooperated with the government both during the investigation and at trial.

Further, the district court in fact did afford Canania a downward variance and

sentenced her to a below-Guidelines sentence, in an effort to somewhat equalize her

sentence with that of Robinson, whose culpability most closely resembled her own.

We find that the district court properly considered the section 3553(a) factors,

including: the nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and characteristics

of the defendant; and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among

defendants with similar records and conduct.

Robinson also argues that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence

in his case and erred in refusing to grant a downward variance from his Guidelines

sentence. Robinson’s 220 month sentence was within the Guidelines range of 188 to

235 months imprisonment. Specifically, Robinson argues that because he was not

given a leadership role enhancement, the district court erred in considering his role as

a factor in denying his request for a downward variance. Such consideration fits

squarely within the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) factor of “nature and circumstances of the

offense” and is appropriate. See United States v. Wills, 476 F.3d 103, 110 (2d Cir.

2007) (“18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) provides a natural and necessary basis for placing the

actions of an individual defendant in the broader context of the crime he or she

committed [and] requires consideration of the ‘nature and circumstances of the

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offense’”). The district court stated that, because Robinson was not given an offense

level increase for his role in the offense, it would decline to grant a downward

variance from his Guidelines sentence. We cannot say that the district court abused

its discretion in making such a determination in applying the section 3553(a)(1) factor

of the nature and circumstances of the offense. 

Additionally, Robinson argues that the district court should not have considered

his drug addiction and the impact of his actions on other people in denying his request

for a downward variance. The evidence considered by the district court established

that: all the women associated with this case lost custody of their children as a result

of their involvement with methamphetamine; Robinson provided methamphetamine

to his coworkers prior to their departure to the job sites and throughout the work day,

resulting in a dangerous work environment; and a fire resulted in the basement of the

home he shared with Canania due to cooking methamphetamine. Although Robinson

argues that the record does not support his long use of drugs, his argument conflicts

with the admissions he made to the probation officer during his presentence report

interview. Robinson reported using marijuana at a young age and using

methamphetamine for several years prior to his arrest. We do not find that the district

court erred in considering the section 3553(a)(1) factors of Robinson’s history and

characteristics. 

Like Canania, Robinson also argues that the district court should have granted

a downward variance because of the sentences received by his codefendants and

coconspirators. However, Robinson overlooks the distinctions the district court noted

between his conduct and that of the cooperating witnesses who testified against him.

Friend and Hartge received probation after: providing information as confidential

informants; wearing hidden recording devices to assist the government in obtaining

evidence of criminal conduct; admitting their involvement very early on; and

providing substantial assistance by testifying at trial. “Disparity in sentences between

a defendant who provided substantial assistance and one who provided no assistance,

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. . . is not ‘unwarranted.’” United States v. Gallegos, 480 F.3d 856, 859 (8th Cir.

2007). Westfall only joined the conspiracy after the first two search warrants were

executed, but he did not act as a confidential informant. There is no evidence of his

involvement prior to the indictment of Canania and Robinson. Westfall received an

80 month sentence. Comparatively, Westfall was a minor participant in the

conspiracy. See United States v. Plaza, 471 F.3d 876, 880 (8th Cir. 2006) (district

court not required to impose identical sentences on both defendants when there is a

disparity in participation and history). Further, Canania, who was considered to have

a supervisory role, received a greater sentence than Robinson. Therefore, Robinson’s

argument that the district court failed to consider the section 3553(a)(6) factor of

unwarranted sentence disparities fails because the conduct and records of the

codefendants and coconspirators are not sufficiently similar to that of Robinson to

trigger a finding of an unreasonably disparate sentence. Id.

Robinson also argues that he should be granted a downward variance based on

his age and disability. At sentencing, Robinson urged the district court to grant him

a downward variance from the Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months to a term of

imprisonment of 78 months. In support of his request for a downward variance,

Robinson argued the following factors: (1) he is 59 years old; (2) he has been a lawabiding citizen for the past 35 years; (3) he was a hard worker with little education or

training; (4) he broke his back 25 years ago and has arthritis, but still works as a

carpenter and roofer; (5) his intelligence and mental condition; and (6) his

vulnerability in prison. When we review a defendant’s sentence to determine whether

it is unreasonable with regard to the application of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), we apply a

“deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 591. We give “due

deference” to the decision of the district court that the section 3553(a) factors justify

and support the degree of any variance from the Guidelines range. United States v.

Lehmann, 513 F.3d 805 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597) 

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The record does not establish that Robinson’s age, past or present physical or

psychological health, or his intelligence make him particularly vulnerable in a prison

environment. Robinson failed to establish that he suffered from any extraordinary

physical or mental impairment. Through the date of Robinson’s arrest, he was

actively engaged in physical labor through his work as a carpenter, and the evidence

does not establish a sudden decline in his physical abilities or mental health condition

after his arrest. Likewise, prior to his arrest, he was engaged in the chemical

manufacture of methamphetamine, which requires at least a basic understanding of

certain chemical reactions and belies his professed intellectual insufficiency. While

the facts would have supported an upward departure, the district court declined to

apply an upward departure for Robinson’s supervisory role as the “cook” of the

conspiracy. Indeed, the district court considered all the above factors, including its

leniency in declining to impose an upward departure, in denying Robinson’s request

for a downward variance. Based on the totality of the circumstances and the district

court’s stated justifications, we do not find that the district court abused its discretion

in denying Robinson’s request for a downward variance. See Lehmann, 513 F.3d at

808 (post Gall, we now examine substantive reasonableness of sentence by

considering “totality of the circumstances” and strength of stated justification,

reviewing district court’s decision for abuse of discretion). 

VII.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

 

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, concurring.

Bound by Supreme Court and Circuit precedent, I reluctantly concur with my

colleagues in affirming Canania’s and Robinson’s convictions and sentences. I write

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separately to express my strongly held view that the consideration of “acquitted

conduct” to enhance a defendant’s sentence is unconstitutional.

In this case, the jury acquitted both Canania and Robinson of possessing a

firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking conviction. Nevertheless, at sentencing,

the district court judge enhanced both of their sentences pursuant to U.S.S.G. §

2D1.1(b)(1) for “possessing” a firearm in connection with a drug offense because it

was not “clearly improbable that the weapon was connected [to their] offense[s].”

United States v. Gillispie, 487 F.3d 1158, 1162 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing U.S.S.G. §

2D1.1(b)(1), cmt. n.3). And so, under the guise of “judicial discretion,” we have a

sentencing regime that allows the Government to try its case not once but twice. The

first time before a jury; the second before a judge. 

Before the jury, the Government must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

But if it loses on some counts, that matters little. Free of the Federal Rules of

Evidence, most constitutionally-imposed procedures, and the burden of proving any

critical facts beyond a reasonable doubt, the Government gets the proverbial “second

bite at the apple” during sentencing to essentially retry those counts on which it lost.

With this second chance at success, the Government almost always wins by needing

only to prove its (lost) case to a judge by a preponderance of the evidence.

See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986) (due process generally

satisfied when Government proves a sentencing enhancement by a preponderance of

the evidence). Permitting a judge to impose a sentence that reflects conduct the jury

expressly disavowed through a finding of ‘not guilty’ amounts to more than mere

second-guessing of the jury – it entirely trivializes its principal fact-finding function.

But no less significant, this judicial fact-finding deprives a defendant of adequate

notice as to his or her possible sentence. This state of affairs is unfair, unjust and I

believe plain unconstitutional. Though the Government might have “won” everyone

and everything else – the defendant, the jury system, the Constitution – loses.

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In the last decade, the Supreme Court re-affirmed the jury’s central role in the

criminal justice system. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Ring

v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); United

States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Rather than pretending as if these cases were

never decided, we federal judges should acknowledge their clear implication: A judge

violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights by making findings of fact that either

ignore or countermand those made by the jury and then relies on these factual findings

to enhance the defendant’s sentence. Cf. United States v. Mercado, 474 F.3d 654, 658

(9th Cir. 2007) (Fletcher, B., J., dissenting) (“Reliance on acquitted conduct in

sentencing diminishes the jury’s role and dramatically undermines the protections

enshrined in the Sixth Amendment.”); United States v. Faust, 456 F.3d 1342, 1349

(11th Cir. 2006) (Barkett, J., specially concurring) (“I strongly believe . . . that

sentence enhancements based on acquitted conduct are unconstitutional under the

Sixth Amendment, as well as the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”);

United States v. Ibanga, 454 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536 (E.D. Va. 2006) (Kelley, J.)

(“Sentencing a defendant to time in prison for a crime that the jury found he did not

commit is a Kafka-esque result.”) (footnote omitted), vacated by, 2008 U.S. App.

LEXIS 6980 (4th Cir. Apr. 1, 2008); United States v. Pimental, 367 F. Supp. 2d 143,

153 (D. Mass. 2005) (Gertner, J.) (“To tout the importance of the jury in deciding

facts, even traditional sentencing facts, and then to ignore the fruits of its efforts

makes no sense – as a matter of law or logic.”).

I also believe that the use of “acquitted conduct” to enhance a sentence violates

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As I noted above, the consideration

of “acquitted conduct” undermines the notice requirement that is at the heart of any

criminal proceeding. A defendant should have fair notice to know the precise effect

a jury’s verdict will have on his punishment. It cannot possibly satisfy due process

to permit the nullification of a jury’s not guilty verdict, with respect to any given

charge, by allowing a judge to thereafter use the same conduct underlying that charge

to enhance a defendant’s sentence. It is not unreasonable for a defendant to expect

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that conduct underlying a charge of which he’s been acquitted to play no

determinative role in his sentencing. Otherwise, a defendant can never reasonably

know what his possible punishment will be. In determining guilt or innocence, the

jury thus serves not only as a fact-finder but as a means of providing a defendant with

notice as to his possible punishment. And a judge’s subsequent use of “acquitted

conduct” all but eviscerates this latter notice function.

In short, the unfairness perpetuated by the use of “acquitted conduct” at

sentencing in federal district courts is uniquely malevolent. The rationale offered is

that judges who consider “acquitted conduct” at sentencing are doing so merely as part

of exercising their constitutionally-sanctioned sentencing discretion. But that

explanation merely obfuscates the reality in which federal district court judges are

often acting as automatons – mechanically enhancing sentences with “acquitted

conduct” pursuant to the now “advisory” Sentencing Guidelines. 

And so, in effect, the Guidelines, with respect to “acquitted conduct,” remain

very much mandatory. Neither the Fifth nor Sixth Amendments should tolerate such

a practice. But it is not this mechanical adherence to the Guidelines which makes

unconstitutional the use of “acquitted conduct” to enhance a defendant’s sentence.

That practice is best understood as an artifact of nearly twenty years of mandatory

sentencing guidelines. In my view, the Constitution forbids judges–Guidelines or no

Guidelines–from using “acquitted conduct” to enhance a defendant’s sentence because

it violates his or her due process right to notice and usurps the jury’s Sixth

Amendment fact-finding role.

Because I believe the inclusion of “acquitted conduct” to fashion a sentence is

unconstitutional, I urge the Supreme Court to re-examine its continued use forthwith.

Absent its intervention, I fear the courts of appeals will again refuse to recognize the

full import of Apprendi and its progeny. Cf. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586

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3

I should note that the Sixth Circuit recently heard en banc arguments in United

States v. White (05-6596) on the constitutionality of enhancing sentences with

“acquitted conduct.”

4

What might the man on the street think? Recently, the Washington Times

reported that federal prosecutors have asked for a sentence of 40 years in the case of

Antwuan Ball (United States v. Antwuan Ball (05-CR-IOO(1)-RWR D.D.C.)), the

purported leader of a large criminal conspiracy in Washington, D.C., despite the fact

that a jury had acquitted him of every charge except a $600, half-ounce, hand-to-hand

crack cocaine deal seven years ago. See Jim McElhatton, A $600 drug deal, 40 years

in prison; Acquitted of murder, convicted of drug deal, Antwuan Ball faces a decadeslong sentence, WASHINGTON TIMES, June 29, 2008 (available at:

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jun/29/a-600-drug-deal-40-years-inprison/?page=1 (last accessed July 3, 2008)). The article notes that the prosecutors’

request is based “partly on charges that were never filed or conduct the jury either

rejected outright or was never asked to consider.” Id. After learning of the

prosecutors’ request, one of the jurors, a retired economist at the U.S. Department of

Agriculture, who had served about eight months on the Ball jury, wrote U.S. District

Judge Richard W. Roberts as follows:

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(2007) (reversing the court of appeals for failing to follow Booker’s command to give

significant deference to the sentencing decisions of district court judges).3

 And as a

consequence, defendants will continue to receive unfair punishments for years to

come. 

The federal courts are just emerging from their experience with mandatory

Guidelines – a failed experiment – that for nearly twenty years resulted in an untold

number of defendants receiving excessive and unfair sentences, that we now know

were unconstitutional. By continuing to permit federal judges to consider “acquitted

conduct” at sentencing, we needlessly repeat our mistake of wrongly depriving

individuals of their freedom. I wonder what the man on the street might say about this

practice of allowing a prosecutor and judge to say that a jury verdict of ‘not guilty’ for

practical purposes may not mean a thing.4

 

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It seems to me a tragedy that one is asked to serve on a jury, serves, but

then finds their work may not be given the credit it deserves. We, the

jury, all took our charge seriously. We virtually gave up our private

lives to devote our time to the cause of justice, and it is a very noble

cause as you know, sir. We looked across the table at one another in

respect and in sympathy. We listened, we thought, we argued, we got

mad and left the room, we broke, we rested that charge until tomorrow,

we went on. Eventually, through every hour-long tape of a single drug

sale, hundreds of pages of transcripts, ballistics evidence, and photos, we

delivered to you our verdicts. 

What does it say to our contribution as jurors when we see our verdicts,

in my personal view, not given their proper weight. It appears to me that

these defendants are being sentenced not on the charges for which they

have been found guilty but on the charges for which the District

Attorney’s office would have liked them to have been found guilty. Had

they shown us hard evidence, that might have been the outcome, but that

was not the case. That is how you instructed your jury in this case to

perform and for good reason.

May 16, 2008 Letter from Juror #6 to The Honorable Richard W. Roberts, available

at: http://video1.washintontimes.com/video/docs/letter.pdf (last accessed July 3,

2008).

And this was a comment from someone who was more than just the man on the street.

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