Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03024/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03024-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Howard R. Shmuckler
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 4, 2015 Decided July 7, 2015

No. 12-3024

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

HOWARD R. SHMUCKLER,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cr-00102-1)

Sandra G. Roland, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Tony Axam Jr., Assistant

Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Jay Apperson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for

appellee. On the brief were Ronald C. Machen, Jr., U.S.

Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Elizabeth Trosman, 

John P. Mannarino, Jonathan P. Hooks, and Lauren R. Bates,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, TATEL, Circuit Judge, and

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

USCA Case #12-3024 Document #1561195 Filed: 07/07/2015 Page 1 of 14
2

GARLAND, Chief Judge: A jury convicted Howard

Shmuckler on five counts of bank fraud and five counts of

possessing and uttering1 a counterfeit security with intent to

deceive. On appeal, Shmuckler challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting one of the counterfeit security counts. 

Because the government failed to present evidence from which

a reasonable jury could have found that the security (a check)

was counterfeit, we reverse the conviction on that count. We

reject, however, Shmuckler’s request that we remand the case

for an inquiry into jury selection.

I

Between August 2005 and March 2006, Shmuckler

deposited a number of checks that falsely listed him as the

payee, in amounts totaling over $1,358,000, into accounts

controlled by him and his wife. On July 16, 2010, a grand jury

returned a ten-count indictment, charging Shmuckler with five

counts of bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 1344, and

five counts of possessing and uttering a counterfeit security with

intent to deceive, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 513(a). The

ten counts were comprised of one count of bank fraud and one

count of possessing and uttering a counterfeit security for each

of five transactions. The case went to trial on December 5,

2011.

Count 8 of the indictment charged Shmuckler with

possessing and uttering a counterfeit check issued by a

1

See Oxford English Dictionary Online, http://www.oed.com

(defining “to utter” as “to pass or circulate (base coin, forged notes,

etc.) as legal tender”); 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 11 (1554-1555) (Eng.)

(criminalizing, as High Treason, the import of counterfeit money into

the Realm with “the intent to utter or make paiment withe the same

within this Realme”).

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3

commercial insurance agency, the Young Agency, on or about

October 18, 2005. In support of the charge, the government

introduced (inter alia) the testimony of Steven Hickey, the

accounting manager for the Young Agency. Hickey testified

that, on September 28, 2005, the Young Agency issued a check

for premium payments to American International Company in

the amount of $408,000. He further stated that, on October 19,

2005, SunTrust Bank contacted the Young Agency, advising

that the check was presented to the bank but did not clear

because SunTrust detected that the payee’s name on the check

“had been altered fraudulently” to “Howard R. Shmuckler.” 

12/6/2011 A.M. Tr. 38-42. The Young Agency then placed a

stop payment order on the check and issued a replacement check

to American International. The government also introduced into

evidence a copy of the genuine check as issued by the Young

Agency, and a copy of the check as deposited by Shmuckler.

The jury convicted Shmuckler on Count 8 and on one count

of bank fraud for the same transaction. It also convicted him on

four other counts of possessing and uttering a counterfeit

security and four other counts of bank fraud for transactions

involving other checks. On April 5, 2012, the district court

sentenced Shmuckler to concurrent sentences of 75 months’

imprisonment on each count. It imposed concurrent, five-year

terms of supervised release on the bank fraud counts and

concurrent, three-year terms of supervised release on the

counterfeit security counts. Finally, it ordered Shmuckler to pay

restitution, as well as a $100 special assessment on each count.

On appeal, Shmuckler challenges his conviction on Count

8. Although he does not challenge his convictions on the other

counts,2

 he requests that we remand the entire case to the district

2

The fact that Shmuckler’s prison sentence on Count 8 was set to

run concurrently with sentences for his convictions on the other counts

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court to inquire into whether there was misconduct in

connection with the selection of his jury. We address Count 8

in Part II and the jury issue in Part III.

II

Shmuckler contends that we must vacate his conviction on

Count 8 because it was the result of a prejudicial variance. 

Specifically, he maintains that the evidence introduced at trial

showed at most that the Young Agency check was forged -- that

is, “falsely altered,” 18 U.S.C. § 513(c)(2) -- while the

indictment charged that the check was counterfeit -- that is,

“falsely made or manufactured in its entirety,” id. § 513(c)(1). 

Although both sides briefed and argued this claim under the

framework of variance, Shmuckler’s claim is more readily

analyzed as an ordinary sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. 

A variance between a crime charged in the indictment and the

evidence introduced at trial “requires reversal of a conviction

only if the defendant suffered prejudice as a consequence.” 

United States v. Cross, 766 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing,

inter alia, Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935)). 

Here, if the evidence was insufficient to support Shmuckler’s

conviction for possessing and uttering a counterfeit check, that

alone would constitute sufficient prejudice to require reversal,

see id., and nothing would be added by calling the situation a

variance. Conversely, if the evidence was sufficient to support

that conviction, there was no prejudicial variance and hence no

ground for reversal. Both parties agree with this analysis. See

Oral Arg. Recording at 8:18-50 (defense counsel); id. at 32:14-

56 (government counsel).

does not affect our duty to review his challenge to that count. See Ball

v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985); United States v.

McLaughlin, 164 F.3d 1, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 

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Shmuckler preserved the sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue

for our review by filing the requisite motion for judgment of

acquittal in the district court. See 12/8/2011 Tr. 92-93; see also

United States v. Spinner, 152 F.3d 950, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(holding that “a ‘broadly stated’ motion for judgment of

acquittal ‘without specific grounds’ is ‘sufficient to preserve [a]

full range of challenges . . . to the sufficiency of the evidence’”

(quoting United States v. Hammoude, 51 F.3d 288, 291 (D.C.

Cir. 1995))). He has also raised the issue on appeal. We

therefore proceed to consider whether there was sufficient

evidence to conclude that the Young Agency check Shmuckler

deposited was counterfeit, without pausing over the parties’

dueling variance arguments. “[T]he relevant question is

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime” -- here, that the check was

counterfeit -- “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis omitted). 

Under 18 U.S.C. § 513, it is illegal to “utter[] or possess[]

a counterfeited security . . . [or] a forged security . . . with intent

to deceive another person, organization, or government.” 18

U.S.C. § 513(a). Section 513 defines a “counterfeited”

document as one “that purports to be genuine but is not, because

it has been falsely made or manufactured in its entirety.” Id.

§ 513(c)(1) (emphasis added). It defines a “forged” document

as one “that purports to be genuine but is not because it has been

falsely altered, completed, signed, or endorsed, or contains a

false addition thereto or insertion therein, or is a combination of

parts of two or more genuine documents.” Id. § 513(c)(2)

(emphasis added).3

3

The government argues that there is not a hard dichotomy

between “forged” and “counterfeited,” and that even when the

evidence shows only that a security was falsely altered, that can still

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Ordinarily, the difference between a “counterfeited”

security and a “forged” security should not matter because the

statute makes it a crime to possess (or utter) either one with

intent to deceive. Thus, if the government had charged

Shmuckler with possessing a counterfeit or a forged check, it

would have been entitled to prove either at trial.4

 But the

government did not charge Shmuckler with possessing a

counterfeit or a forged check. It simply charged him with

possessing a counterfeit check, full stop. “By the way the

government chose to frame [the] indictment,” it made a

counterfeit check “an essential part of the charge and limited the

bas[i]s for possible conviction” to the possession of such a

check. United States v. Leichtnam, 948 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir.

1991). Accordingly, the question before us is whether there was

support a conviction for a counterfeit security if “‘all the essential

information was falsified.’” Gov’t Br. 36-37 (quoting United States

v. Blakey, 960 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (11th Cir. 1992)). Whether or not

the government is correct, there is no evidence that all the essential

information on the Young Agency check was altered. As we recount

below, the only apparent difference between the check as issued and

as deposited is the payee information. Cf. Blakey, 960 F.2d at 999

(finding that a check had been counterfeited when it had been

transformed from a $5.00 check drawn in 1983, to a $35,000 cashier’s

check with a 1987 date and a false authorizing signature).

4

We use the disjunctive “or” for clarity, although such an

indictment would actually have charged the defendant in the

conjunctive to provide the defendant with sufficient notice of what he

had to defend against. Thus, the indictment would actually have

charged the defendant with possessing a counterfeit check and a

forged check. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL:

CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 227 (1997). The jury instruction

would then have permitted the jury to convict upon proof that the

defendant possessed either a counterfeit or a forged check. See United

States v. Baxter, 761 F.3d 17, 25 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2014); United States

v. Coughlin, 610 F.3d 89, 106 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 

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sufficient evidence for a rational juror to have concluded beyond

a reasonable doubt that the Young Agency check Shmuckler

deposited was counterfeit -- i.e., that it was a document “falsely

made or manufactured in its entirety,” rather than an otherwise

genuine document that was simply “falsely altered,” 18 U.S.C.

§ 513(c).

To prove that the check Shmuckler deposited was

counterfeit, the government might have introduced both that

check and the original check the Young Agency issued. If there

were in fact two different, physical checks, the jury could then

readily have concluded that the check Shmuckler deposited must

have been a different document, falsely made or manufactured

in its entirety. But the government did not introduce the actual

checks. It introduced only copies, Oral Arg. Recording at

21:01-32, and it is not possible to tell by comparing them

whether the deposited check was an alteration of the original or

an entirely new document, compare Gov’t Trial Ex. 64 (J.A. 32),

with Gov’t Trial Ex. 9E (J.A. 33). 

The government might also have sought to prove that the

check deposited by Shmuckler was counterfeit by calling

attention to aspects of that check that would have indicated its

counterfeit nature. Cf. Spinner, 152 F.3d at 958 (finding

insufficient evidence to sustain a firearms conviction where the

jury was left “without any testimonial guidance [to] determine[]

that the weapon satisfied the applicable statutory requirements”

(citing United States v. Meadows, 91 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 1996))). 

But the government did not do this either. Indeed, the only

obvious difference between the check copies is that one is made

out to American International Company and the other is made

out to Howard R. Shmuckler. That difference does not resolve

whether the discrepancy is due to forgery or counterfeiting.

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We are therefore left to consider the evidence that the

government did present to the jury. The only such relevant

evidence was the testimony of Steven Hickey. That testimony

does not help the government on this issue either.5 

Hickey repeatedly testified that the check with Shmuckler’s

name on it had been fraudulently “altered,” 12/6/2011 A.M. Tr.

38, which is the definition of forgery rather than counterfeiting,

see 18 U.S.C. § 513(c). The only difference that Hickey said he

observed in examining copies of the check issued by the Young

Agency and the one deposited by Shmuckler is the same

difference we observe: the changed payee name. See 12/6/2011

A.M. Tr. 40-41. Indeed, after Hickey told the prosecutor that

the “payee name had been altered,” id. at 38; see id. at 40, the

prosecutor asked whether “any other part of the check [had]

been altered.” His answer was “no.” Id. at 41.

The government draws our attention to Hickey’s testimony

that “[t]he original check was presented to the bank,” id. at 39. 

It maintains that this suggests that both the original, unaltered

check and the false check were presented to the bank, which

would in turn suggest that the false check was an entirely new

document. Gov’t Br. 36. But this takes Hickey’s statement out

of context. Hickey’s other testimony, both preceding and

following the statement cited by the government, indicates that,

5

In a footnote, the government argues that the jury could have

considered two other kinds of evidence: (1) testimony concerning

other counterfeit checks deposited by Shmuckler, and (2) testimony

“regarding a scam commonly referred to in the banking industry as the

‘Nigerian cashier’s check scam’ where individuals would create

counterfeit checks by ‘get[ting] a copy of a check and alter[ing] it.’” 

Gov’t Br. 34 n.17. None of this testimony, however, bears on whether

the Young Agency check (as opposed to some other check) was

counterfeit.

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when he used the term “original check,” he meant the “original

check that . . . had been fraudulently altered and presented for

payment to the bank,” 12/6/2011 A.M. Tr. 38, and not the

original check that had been issued by the Young Agency. In

context, he used the term “original check” to distinguish the

altered check from the “replacement check” that the Young

Agency issued after it stopped payment on the altered check, id.

at 38-39. The government’s reading of Hickey’s testimony is at

best speculative, and speculation cannot sustain a jury verdict. 

See United States v. Gaskins, 690 F.3d 569, 578 n.3 (D.C. Cir.

2012); United States v. Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082, 1085, 1088

(D.C. Cir. 1993). We therefore conclude that there was

insufficient evidence for a jury to find that the Young Agency

check was counterfeit and hence insufficient evidence to sustain

his conviction on Count 8.6

III

In this part, we address Shmuckler’s two jury-related

contentions.

A

Shmuckler first contends that the district court plainly erred

by failing to sua sponte conduct a hearing to inquire into a

matter that arose after his jury was selected. As a remedy, he

asks us to remand the case for such an inquiry.

Jury selection for Shmuckler’s trial took place on Friday,

December 2, 2011. One of the forty-five prospective jurors who

6

Shmuckler agrees, however, that the government did proffer

sufficient evidence that the checks underlying the other four counts of

the indictment were counterfeit rather than forged. Oral Arg.

Recording at 15:40-16:11.

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participated, Juror 1547, indicated during voir dire that he

worked “in an environment with a lot of attorneys and dealt with

legislation dealing with banking issues,” 12/2/2011 Tr. 40-41;

that he had daily contact with the Secret Service and U.S.

Capitol Police, id. at 45; and that he had a “very frustrating”

experience in which fraudulent checks were written on his bank

account, id. at 173-75. The district court denied Shmuckler’s

motion to strike Juror 1547 for cause, but Shmuckler later used

one of his peremptory strikes to knock the juror out of the jury

pool.

At the end of voir dire, the courtroom clerk called the

number of each prospective juror who had been selected for the

jury. Juror 1547, who had been struck, was not among them. 

Nonetheless, Juror 1547 ended up seated in the jury box, in a

seat that was supposed to be occupied by Juror 0514. After the

district court dismissed the panel -- instructing those who were

selected to report back to court on December 5 for the start of

the trial, and instructing those who were not selected to return to

the jurors’ lounge on their way out -- the prosecutor alerted the

district court to Juror 1547’s erroneous presence in the jury box. 

The district court then directed the courtroom clerk to call Juror

0514 (who had not reported to the jurors’ lounge on her way

out) and instruct her to be in court on December 5 for the start

of trial, and to call Juror 1547 and instruct him not to return to

court. 

As instructed, Juror 0514 reported to court for trial on

Monday, December 5. She was sworn in with the rest of the

jury and served without further incident. As also instructed,

Juror 1547 did not report and had no role in the trial. 

Shmuckler acknowledges that, because he did not raise a

timely objection or claim of juror misconduct with the district

court, our review must proceed under the plain error standard. 

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Shmuckler Br. 23; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993). This means that

Shmuckler has the burden of showing that there is “‘(1) error,

(2) that is plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial rights. If all

three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its

discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error

seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

judicial proceedings.’” United States v. Simpson, 430 F.3d

1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Johnson v. United States,

520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted)). In most cases, to affect the defendant’s substantial

rights, “‘the error must have been prejudicial: It must have

affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’” Id. at

1183-84 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734).7

Shmuckler maintains that the district court should have

recognized that it was required to hold a hearing to “determine

the circumstances of the switch and whether the circumstances

implicate juror bias.” Shmuckler Br. 24-27. Not so. Although

a hearing is ordinarily required to determine “the prejudicial

effect of uncontested misconduct,” district courts have “broad

discretion” to consider the “strength and seriousness of the

7

The government acknowledges that, ordinarily, claims that are

not timely raised in the district court are considered forfeited and

reviewed for plain error. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. It contends,

however, that the failure to timely raise a claim of juror bias should be

regarded as a waiver, precluding any appellate review at all. Gov’t Br.

14-16 (citing, e.g., United States v. Rowe, 144 F.3d 15, 20-21 (1st Cir.

1998) (holding that such a claim is “waived,” without distinguishing

between waiver and forfeiture)). But see Olano, 507 U.S. at 733

(“Waiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure

to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional

relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)). We do not address this contention because

Shmuckler’s claim fails even under the plain error standard.

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allegations” and decide how to investigate when it is not clear

that misconduct occurred at all. United States v. White, 116

F.3d 903, 929-30 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 

The person who was properly selected for the jury -- Juror

0514 -- did sit on the jury. The person who was mistakenly in

the jury box on the Friday before the trial began -- Juror 1547 --

did not. As Shmuckler recognizes, his theory that the juror mixup was not an innocent mistake, but rather part of some scheme

that involved Juror 0514, is based on speculation. See Oral Arg.

Recording at 4:03-09; see also id. at 3:02-4:01 (statement by

Shmuckler’s counsel offering “speculative scenarios” in which

Juror 0514 and Juror 1547 might have colluded; or in which

Juror 0514 might have attempted to avoid jury duty and, having

failed, then voted to convict Shmuckler to curry favor with the

government).8

 But “[d]efense ‘counsel’s unsubstantiated

suspicion’ does not, on its own, require the district court to

conduct jury questioning.” United States v. Gibson, 353 F.3d

21, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Thornton, 746

F.2d 39, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

B

Nearly a year after the jury announced its verdict against

him, and after he had noticed his appeal, Shmuckler filed a postjudgment motion in the district court seeking to interview Juror

0514 pursuant to Local Criminal Rule 24.2(b). Once a jury has

been discharged, that rule authorizes -- but does not require --

8

See also Shmuckler Br. 25, 27 (stating that “[t]he court and

parties did not know why or how the switch occurred,” and that, “[i]f

the switch was due to Juror 0514’s effort to evade serving as a juror,

conduct that is punishable as contempt, . . . [she] might have been

motivated . . . to convict based on a desire to curry favor with the party

responsible for prosecuting that contempt” (emphasis added)).

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the district court to grant such a request “for good cause shown.” 

D.D.C. CRIM. R. 24.2(b). The district court denied the motion

in a Minute Order, finding (inter alia) that Shmuckler failed to

show good cause because the facts he alleged “d[id] not

plausibly reflect possible misconduct.” Minute Order, United

States v. Shmuckler, No. 10-cr-00056 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 2013)

(J.A. 25). 

Shmuckler did not appeal that order. Instead, he filed a

motion in this court to remand the case so that he could refile his

Rule 24.2(b) motion with the district court, this time providing

more detail as to why it should be granted. In particular, he

suggested that he could “explain[] in greater detail the unusual

conduct during the impaneling of the jury.” Mot. to Remand 2,

United States v. Shmuckler, No. 12-3024 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 15,

2013) (J.A. 50). A special panel of this court directed the

parties to include a discussion of the motion in their merits

briefs. That motion is now before us. 

In the time between filing his motion to remand and filing

his merits briefs, Shmuckler seems to have changed tack. He

now argues that we should remand the case, not because he has

more detail to include in his interview motion, but because the

district court erred in concluding that he had failed to show good

cause in the first place. Compare Mot. to Remand 2, with

Shmuckler Br. 33. In light of the discussion above, we find both

tacks unavailing. The district court did not abuse its discretion

in finding that Shmuckler had failed to show good cause to

conduct an interview. Indeed, in his original motion, Shmuckler

did nothing more than describe the factual circumstances of the

seating of the jurors. See Mot. for Authorization, United States

v. Shmuckler, No. 10-cr-00056 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 2013) (J.A. 45-

46). Nor does Shmuckler now describe any more detail that he

wishes to add. See Mot. to Remand 2.

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IV

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Shmuckler’s

conviction on Count 8 and remand the case to the district court

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm

the district court’s judgment in all other respects and deny

Shmuckler’s request to remand for an inquiry into jury selection.

So ordered.

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