Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-16951/USCOURTS-ca9-09-16951-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Yamamoto -
Appellee
Furholdt
Appellee
Garrick Harrington
Appellant
D. Hicks
Appellee
R. R. Lowden
Appellee
M. E. Poulos
Appellee
A. K. Scribner
Appellee
L. L. Woods
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GARRICK HARRINGTON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

A. K. SCRIBNER; M. E. POULOS;

YAMAMOTO -; R. R. LOWDEN; L. L.

WOODS; FURHOLDT; D. HICKS,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 09-16951

D.C. No.

1:05-cv-00624-

OWW-GSA

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Oliver W. Wanger, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 6, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed May 7, 2015

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Diarmuid F.

O’Scannlain, and M. Margaret McKeown, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by

Judge O’Scannlain

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2 HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER

SUMMARY*

Prisoner Civil Rights

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district

court’s judgment, entered following a jury trial, in an action

arising from a lockdown imposed on African American

inmates at a California state prison.

Plaintiff, a Californian state prisoner, brought claims

under the Eighth Amendment for injuries he suffered related

to shower restrictions and under the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the race-based

classification of the lockdown.

Affirming with respect to the Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference to inmate safety claim, the panel held

that the district court’s jury instruction on that claim

essentially correctly restated the elements of the test outlined

in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), by requiring

knowledge of a “substantial risk of serious harm” and that a

defendant “disregarded that risk.” The panel held that

plaintiff was not entitled to urge liability based on

defendants’ constructive knowledge of the risk.

Reversing with respect to the equal protection claim, the

panel held that the district court’s jury instructions were

inconsistent with the requirements of strict scrutiny. The

panel held that the district court erred when it instructed the

jury that a prison’s obligations under the Eighth Amendment

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER 3

compete with its obligations under the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That error, which

absolved the prison officials of their obligation to

demonstrate that the race-based action was narrowly tailored,

violated the tenets of Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499

(2005), and was prejudicial.

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its

discretion by denying plaintiff appointed counsel.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge

O’Scannlain concurred in the panel’s analysis of plaintiff’s

deliberate indifference and appointment of counsel claims

and joined in the opinion and judgment to that extent. Judge

O’Scannlain dissented from the panel’s equal protection

analysis and concluded that the relevant jury instruction

appropriately incorporated deference to prison officials’

unique expertise.

COUNSEL

Allison B. Holcombe (argued), Abraham A. Tabaie (argued),

and Carol Alé, Los Angeles, California, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Jose Zelidon-Zepeda (argued), Deputy State Attorney

General; Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California;

Jonathan L. Wolff, Senior Assistant Attorney General;

Thomas S. Patterson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General,

San Francisco, California, for Defendants-Appellees.

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4 HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

This case arises from a lockdown imposed on African

American inmates at a California state prison after violent

incidents involving inmates and guards. Garrick Harrington

brought suit against prison officials under the Eighth

Amendment for injuries he suffered related to shower

restrictions and under the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment for the race-based classification of

the lockdown. A jury found against him on both claims.

We consider the interplay between the Supreme Court’s

teaching in Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005), that

strict scrutiny applies to claims challenging racial

classifications in prison, and the line of authorities, such as

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), that instruct courts to

give deference to correctional officials with respect to

constitutional claims involving prison regulations. We affirm

the judgment with respect to the Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference claim. We reverse with respect to the

equal protection claim because the jury instructions were

inconsistent with the requirements of strict scrutiny. That

error, which absolved the prison officials of their obligation

to demonstrate that the race-based action was narrowly

tailored, violated the tenets of Johnson and was prejudicial.

BACKGROUND

Early 2004 was a violent period at California State

Prison–Corcoran. In February and March, multiple violent

incidents occurred, each involving African American inmates

associated with gangs. Five more violent incidents occurred

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HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER 5

over the next two months, including riots involving white

inmates and inmates associated with certain “disruptive

groups,” which are groups of individuals who have formed an

alliance and act, often aggressively, at the direction of a

leader. Prison officials also reported receiving information of

a statewide risk that unidentified African American inmates

would attack prison staff.

In response, the prison instituted a lockdown on African

American inmates due “to multiple batteries on staff by

Blacks . . . coupled with information indicating a coalition of

Black inmates are plotting the murder of staff,” as was

explained in a Program Status Report, a weeklymemorandum

issued during periods of modified programming. That

lockdown was followed by a state of emergency lockdown

applicable to inmates of all races. As part of the emergency

action, the prison instituted shower restrictions that, among

other things, allowed inmates to wear only minimal

clothing—boxer shorts and shower shoes—and required them

to be handcuffed while being escorted to the shower. 

Eventually, the shower restrictions were lifted for all inmates

except African American inmates, including Garrick

Harrington, and members of the Northern Hispanic disruptive

group. An updated Program Status Report explained that,

amongst other things, “batteries on staff by various factions

of black inmates” were an “ongoing state-wide concern

indicating a mindset by this ethnic group to harm staff.” Over

time, the shower restrictions were eased for additional groups,

including older African American inmates. The state of

emergency ended, and the prison gradually lifted the

lockdown restrictions and returned to normal programming.

While the race-based shower restrictions were still in

place, Harrington—who was not involved in the violent

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6 HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER

altercations that led to the lockdown and was not associated

with a gang or disruptive group—requested that he be

permitted to walk to the showers wearing his governmentissued boots instead of the shower slippers, which he

described as “flimsy.” A correctional officer denied his

request, then escorted Harrington, who was handcuffed and

wearing shower slippers, to a shower on another floor, all the

while following behind without assisting him. Harrington

came upon a pool of water and testified that he heard a

correctional officer say, “It’s slippery there.” Harrington

slipped in the water, fell, and injured his back. Despite

treatments, his pain continues, requiring medication.

Harrington filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

several prison officials, alleging claims for deliberate

indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment and for

race discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. His repeated requests

for the appointment of counsel were denied, an issue he raises

again on appeal. The case proceeded to trial, where the jury

found for the prison officials. Harrington challenges the

verdict on the grounds that the jury was improperly instructed

on both of his constitutional claims.

ANALYSIS

I. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM

The Eighth Amendment claim centers on the jury

instructions on deliberate indifference. The court instructed

the jury that “[t]o establish deliberate indifference, the

plaintiff must prove that a defendant knew that the plaintiff

faced a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that

risk by failing to take reasonable measures to correct it.” 

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HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER 7

Before trial, Harrington proposed an additional “knowledge”

instruction that the court declined to give to the jury. After

the close of evidence, the court reviewed the proposed jury

instructions with the parties and gave them time to

independently review the instructions. Upon reconvening,

the court asked whether Harrington had any “corrections,

additions, deletions,modifications or objections.” Harrington

offered one change, unrelated to the deliberate indifference

standard.

During jury deliberations, the jury submitted two

questions to the court: “What is serious risk of injury? Please

define. Is the fact that the areas around all the showers are

always wet constituting [sic] a serious risk of injury?” 

Outside the presence of the jury, the court discussed several

cases in detail with the parties and concluded that none of the

cases defined “serious risk” (or, as the original instruction

had put it, “substantial risk”) in the context of an Eighth

Amendment claim. Harrington then noted that caselaw

supports the notion that “knowledge can be demonstrated of

the substantial risk simply because it was obvious”; counsel

for the defendants pointed out in response that the jury’s

inquiry did not pertain to knowledge. Upon the jury’s return,

the court gave supplemental instructions that the jury was “to

determine whether any defendant acted with deliberate

indifference to a known risk,” and that “[k]nown risk means

that the person who has the duty to protect from it has to have

knowledge that there is a known hazard or known danger of

serious harm.”

In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the Supreme

Court outlined the standard for Eighth Amendment liability

for acting with “deliberate indifference” to inmate safety. At

the outset, the Court rejected the “invitation to adopt an

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8 HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER

objective test for deliberate indifference.” Id. at 837. To

prove deliberate indifference, subjective recklessness is

required, that is, an official “cannot be found liable under the

Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions

of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must

both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he

must also draw the inference.” Id. Constructive notice does

not suffice to prove the requisite knowledge, but “[w]hether

a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial

risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual

ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence.” Id.

at 841–42.

The court’s original Eighth Amendment instruction

essentially restates the elements of the Farmer test by

requiring knowledge of a “substantial risk of serious harm”

and that a defendant “disregarded that risk.” The instruction

does not mention that such knowledge may be established by

circumstantial evidence, as did Harrington’s additional

proposed instruction. But the jury was not totally without

guidance on this point. The court gave a general instruction

on the definitions of circumstantial evidence and direct

evidence and stated, “You should consider both kinds of

evidence. The law makes no distinction between the weight

to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. It is

for you to decide how much weight to give to any evidence.” 

The court put no restrictions on Harrington’s ability to argue

that circumstantial evidence supported his claim. Harrington

was not entitled, as he argues here, to urge liability based on

constructive knowledge of the risk, a theory of liability the

Supreme Court explicitly rejected in Farmer. Id. at 841.

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HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER 9

The supplemental instructions delivered after the jury’s

questions about the meaning of “serious risk of injury” did

not introduce error. According to Harrington, the

supplemental instructions over-emphasized subjective

knowledge, thereby impermissibly “heightening” the

knowledge requirement. This argument is unpersuasive, as

Farmer clearly requires subjective knowledge. Id. at 837. 

The instruction stated that requirement correctly, and the

court did not abuse its discretion in repeating the standard in

response to the jury’s question. See Jazzabi v. Allstate Ins.

Co., 278 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that we

review the court’s decision whether to give a supplemental

jury instruction, and the formulation of that instruction, for

abuse of discretion).

Harrington’s argument misapprehends the significance of

the obviousness of a risk in a deliberate indifference calculus. 

Our cases support the proposition that obviousness of a risk

may be used to prove subjective knowledge, not that liability

may be based on constructive knowledge. See Lemire v. Cal.

Dep’t of Corr. &Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013)

(requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate “that the risk was

obvious or provide other circumstantial or direct evidence

that the prison officials were aware of the substantial risk” to

defeat summary judgment); Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d

1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that subjective awareness

“may be satisfied if the inmate shows that the risk posed by

the deprivation is obvious”). Although evidence of

obviousness may present a disputed fact to defeat summary

judgment, such evidence cannot be used to circumvent the

need for a jury instruction on Farmer’s subjective knowledge

requirement once a case reaches a jury.

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10 HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER

II. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM

The fundamental principle that prisoners are protected

from race discrimination is longstanding: “Prisoners are

protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment from invidious discrimination based on race.” 

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (citing Lee v.

Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam)). In Johnson,

the Supreme Court was unequivocal that strict scrutiny is the

proper standard of review for an equal protection challenge

to a race-based prison policy. 543 U.S. at 515. Similarly

well established is the role that deference to prison officials

plays in prison administration. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89; see

generally Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2010)

(emphasizing importance of deference instruction in Eighth

Amendment claim). The question we consider in this § 1983

case, in the context of the jury instructions on equal

protection, is the relationship between these principles when

race classifications collide with prison security concerns.

A. JURY INSTRUCTIONS

The court gave a trio of instructions related to

Harrington’s equal protection claim. It began with an

instruction on “Prisoner’s Claim Regarding Denial of Equal

Protection”:

Prisoners are protected from racial

discrimination by the Equal Protection Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution. On his equal protection

claim, the plaintiff must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that

defendants . . . acted with an intent or purpose

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HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER 11

to discriminate against the plaintiff, or against

a class of which the plaintiff is a member,

based on his race.

Intentional discrimination means that a

defendant acted at least in part because of the

plaintiff’s race.

The court then instructed the jury that “[t]he state may

take race-based action when necessaryto further a compelling

governmental interest,” if the action is “narrowly tailored to

serve such a governmental interest.” The court followed that

instruction by telling the jury that “[i]n considering whether

[the defendants] discriminated against plaintiff because of his

race, you should consider that defendants had a competing

obligation under the Eighth Amendment to ensure the safety

of prisoners, including protecting prisoners from each other

and/or maintaining institutional security. In considering these

factors, you should respect and give deference to the opinion

of prison officials in their adoption and execution of policies

and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve

discipline and to maintain internal security in a prison.”

Harrington challenges the latter instruction, which at trial

was denominated as “the Norwood instruction.”1 He argues

that its effect was to lessen the scrutiny that the jury applied

to the equal protection claim. Harrington’s proposed strict

scrutiny instructions did not mention or carve out deference.

1

In Norwood, which involved a claimed Eighth Amendment violation

for denial of outdoor exercise, the court endorsed an almost identical

deference instruction. 591 F.3d at 1066.

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12 HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER

After the court reviewed the Norwood instruction with the

parties and solicited their views, Harrington told the court

that he was “unclear” on this instruction because “that wasn’t

the strict scrutiny instruction.” Through his proposed strict

scrutiny instruction plus his response to the court on the

Norwood instruction, the court was on notice as to

Harrington’s position. Harrington did not waive this error. 

We review de novo whether the instruction misstates the law. 

If so, the error warrants reversal, unless it is harmless. Dang

v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 804–05 (9th Cir. 2005).

B. JOHNSONV.CALIFORNIA,RACIALCLASSIFICATIONS

AND NARROW TAILORING

The Supreme Court has recognized that “racial

classifications ‘threaten to stigmatize individuals byreason of

their membership in a racial group and to incite racial

hostility.’” Johnson, 543 U.S. at 507 (quoting Shaw v. Reno,

509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993)) (emphasis omitted). 

Consequently, racial classifications in prisons are

“immediately suspect” and subject to strict scrutiny, which

requires the government to prove that the measures are

narrowlytailored to further a compelling government interest. 

Id. at 509 (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642).

Johnson arose in the context of a California Department

of Corrections “unwritten policy of racially segregating

prisoners” each time they entered a new correctional facility. 

Id. at 502. Like the lockdown and restrictions imposed here,

the CDC attempted to justify the practice “to prevent violence

caused by racial gangs.” Id.

In reaffirming the strict scrutiny standard, the Court

reviewed its past cases, such as Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S.

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HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER 13

333 (1968) (per curiam), applying heightened review “in

evaluating racial segregation in prisons.” Johnson, 543 U.S.

at 506–07. It emphasized that “strict scrutiny is no less

important” where “prison officials cite racial violence as the

reason for their policy.” Id. at 507.

Significant to our case, the prison officials in Johnson

alleged that their judgments were entitled to the same

deference as the defendants in Turner. Id. at 509. The Court

rebuffed this effort, noting that Turner did not involve a racebased classification and had never been applied to racial

classifications. The reason is that “[t]he right not to be

discriminated against based on one’s race is not susceptible

to the logic of Turner. It is not a right that need necessarily

be compromised for the sake of proper prison

administration.” Id. at 510.

The Court went on to confirm its implicit holding in Lee:

“The ‘necessities of prison security and discipline,’ are a

compelling government interest justifying only those uses of

race that are narrowly tailored to address those necessities.” 

Johnson, 543 U.S. at 512 (citation omitted) (quoting Lee,

390 U.S. at 334). The bottom line is that prison security and

deference to prison authorities do not trump Johnson’s

narrow tailoring requirement.

We have not addressed previously the relationship

between strict scrutiny in a race discrimination equal

protection claim and the principle of deference to prison

officials that originated in cases involving Eighth

Amendment claims. In Norwood, we established that

“[p]rison officials are entitled to deference whether a prisoner

challenges excessive force or conditions of confinement.” 

591 F.3d at 1067. In Norwood, however, only Eighth

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14 HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER

Amendment claims were before the court. Tellingly, we

“express[ed] no view as to the race-based aspect of the

lockdowns” that were challenged, nor did we take a position

on “any potential Equal Protection claim.” Id. at 1066 n.1. 

This case requires us to consider precisely the questions left

unanswered in Norwood. We now conclude that even where

deference is owed to prison officials as to one claim in a suit,

such as an Eighth Amendment claim, the strict scrutiny

analysis of an equal protection claim does not

indiscriminately incorporate that deference. Nor do the

claims compete.

This approach is in keeping with the Supreme Court’s

observations on the more deferential test that Justice Thomas

would have applied in Johnson: “Justice Thomas takes a

hands-off approach to racial classifications in prisons,

suggesting that a ‘compelling showing [is] needed to

overcome the deference we owe to prison administrators.’ 

But such deference is fundamentally at odds with our equal

protection jurisprudence. We put the burden on state actors

to demonstrate that their race-based policies are justified.”

543 U.S. at 506 n.1 (citation omitted).

The district court accurately instructed the jury on the

elements of race discrimination and strict scrutiny. The jury

was told that the race-based action could be justified if it was

narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. 

So far, so good. But the follow-on instruction on deference,

which was specifically pegged to the race claim, basically

pulled the rug out from under the narrow tailoring

requirement. The instruction pitched the two claims as

competing against one another—“[i]n considering whether

defendants . . . discriminated against [Harrington] because of

his race, you should consider that defendants had a competing

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HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER 15

obligation under the Eighth Amendment to ensure the safety

of prisoners . . . .” It thus suggested that Harrington’s success

on the equal protection claim was in some way dependent on

the defendants’ loss on the Eighth Amendment claim. Then

the instruction took an even more devastating blow to the

narrow tailoring requirement by enshrining the “policies and

practices” of prison officials with broad deference rather than

putting the specific practices challenged here to the test of

narrow tailoring. In doing so, the court diluted the

requirements of strict scrutiny by introducing the notion that

the standard governing a race discrimination claim is in

equipoise with the deference owed to prison officials in an

Eighth Amendment context, even though the analysis for

each type of claim differs.

We conclude that the court erred when it instructed the

jury that the prison’s obligations under the Eighth

Amendment compete with its obligations under the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A

prisoner’s success on an equal protection claim is not

dependent on whether the government met its obligations

under the Eighth Amendment. In light of Johnson’s clear

direction, the court also erred by allowing the jury to defer

generally to officials when considering Harrington’s equal

protection claim, rather than assessingwhether the challenged

race-based actions were narrowly tailored.

Our analysis should not be read to mean that deference

plays no role in prisoners’ constitutional claims. Writing

with respect to First Amendment and right to marry

regulations in the prison context, the Supreme Court in

Turner explained: “Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of

prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would

seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems

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16 HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER

and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems

of prison administration.” 482 U.S. at 89. In a recent Fourth

Amendment case, the Court “confirmed the importance of

deference to correctional officials” in the context of

maintaining security and discipline in the jail. Florence v.

Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1515–16 (2012)

(citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). Likewise, in the Norwood

challenge to prison conditions relating to lockdowns and

outdoor exercise, we reiterated the importance of deference. 

591 F.3d at 1067.

But none of these cases involved claims governed by

strict scrutiny, which allows deference a limited role. See

Johnson, 543 U.S. at 509, 513 (rejecting the more deferential

Turner test as “too lenient a standard to ferret out invidious

uses of race”). In Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003),

superseded on other grounds by Mich. Const. art I, § 26,

deference played a role in assessing whether the

government’s asserted interest was compelling, but not

whether its actions were narrowly tailored to serve that

interest. The Supreme Court deferred to the University of

Michigan Law School’s expert “educational judgment that

[attaining a diverse student body] is essential to its

educational mission,” and thus was a compelling interest. Id.

at 328–29. Such an interest could justify the law school’s use

of race in admissions only if the means chosen to further that

interest were “specifically and narrowly framed to

accomplish that purpose.” Id. at 333 (quoting Shaw v. Hunt,

517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996)). Deference played no role in the

Court’s assessment of whether the law school’s use of race

was narrowly tailored. Id. at 333–43;see also Fisher v. Univ.

of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419–20 (2013) (“The

[government] must prove that the means chosen . . . are

narrowly tailored to that goal. On this point, the University

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HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER 17

receives no deference.”). The jury instructions here did not

differentiate how deference could properly inform the jury’s

consideration of the differing constitutional claims.2

Finally, we emphasize that penological interests may still

factor into the analysis of an equal protection claim. “The

‘necessities of prison security and discipline,’ are a

compelling government interest justifying only those uses of

race that are narrowly tailored to address those necessities.” 

Johnson, 543 U.S. at 512 (citation omitted) (quoting Lee,

390 U.S. at 334). Such interests properly inform whether

there exists a compelling interest, but they do not excuse the

narrow tailoring requirement.

C. PREJUDICE

Although we review the instructions as a whole, the

instructions here cannot be harmonized because the deference

instruction circles back to whether the prison discriminated

against Harrington because of his race. Although one

instruction recites strict scrutiny, the deference instruction

introduces a new and different standard. Taken together, the

overall effect of the instructions was misleading. See Dang,

422 F.3d at 804 (stressing that instructions “must not be

misleading”). The evidence was never put to the correct

2

In Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005), the Supreme Court

analyzed statutory rights under the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)–(2). The Court

relied on legislative history to determine Congress’s intended role for

deference in assessing whether a burden to a prisoner’s religious exercise

furthers a “compelling governmental interest” by the “least restrictive

means.” Cutter, 544 U.S. 709, 717, 722–23 (2005). As a statutory case,

Cutter does not inform our analysis of the constitutional claim presented

here.

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18 HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER

“narrow tailoring” test because the jury was told it should

defer to the judgment of prison officials on this score.

The prison officials argue that any claimed instructional

error is harmless because the verdict form reflects that

Harrington failed to establish that there was any racial

classification at all. This circular response simply skirts the

issue. The jury answered no to the following question: “On

Plaintiff’s equal protection claim, did any Defendant

intentionally discriminate against Plaintiff on account of his

race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” If the

answer was no, the defendants argue, then that was the end of

Harrington’s equal protection claim. But the jury gave this

answer after having been instructed that the strict scrutiny

standard governingwhetherthe defendants acted “in violation

of the Equal Protection Clause” could give way to the lesser

deference standard in evaluating the race claim. The flaw in

the instructions thus skewed how the jury would have

understood the verdict form. The error is prejudicial. See

Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2014)

(requiring for an error to be harmless that it be “more

probable than not that the jury would have reached the same

verdict had it been properly instructed”).3

III. DENIAL OF COUNSEL

It is well established that “[t]he decision to appoint

counsel in a civil suit is one of discretion and a district court’s

determination will be overturned only for abuse of that

discretion.” Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir.

3

It is unnecessary to determine whether, as Harrington argues, the

“reasonableness” defense on the verdict form constitutes reversible error

in light of our determination that the jury instructions were infirm.

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HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER 19

2014) (citing Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir.

2009)). The court must consider whether there is a

“likelihood of success on the merits” and whether “the

prisoner is unable to articulate his claims in light of the

complexity of the legal issues involved.” Id. Harrington’s

claims were relatively straightforward equal protection and

deliberate indifference claims. Despite his medical issues, he

articulated his claims well. He filed a pretrial statement,

motions, proposed jury instructions, and other substantive

documents, and engaged with opposing counsel and the court

throughout years of legal proceedings. Although there were

some tricky legal issues regarding the instructions,

Harrington spotted the key jury instruction issue that is the

subject of this opinion. Harrington served as the lead law

library clerk in prison, and the court commended him at trial

for presenting his case well. The court did not abuse its

discretion by denying him appointed counsel.

AFFIRMED as to Harrington’s Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference claim and the district court’s decision

not to appoint counsel. REVERSED, VACATED and

REMANDED as to Harrington’s equal protection claim. 

Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and

dissenting in part:

I concur in the Court’s analysis of Harrington’s deliberate

indifference and appointment of counsel claims and join in

the opinion and judgment to that extent. I must respectfully

dissent, however, from the Court’s equal protection analysis

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20 HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER

and conclude that the relevant jury instruction appropriately

incorporated deference to prison officials’ unique expertise.

I

In Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005), the

Supreme Court overturned a Ninth Circuit decision which had

expressly rejected the strict scrutiny standard for equal

protection claims against prison officials in favor of what the

Supreme Court referred to as the “deferential” Turner

standard, which asks whether the regulation was “‘reasonably

related’ to ‘legitimate penological interests.’” Id. at 504, 510

(quoting Tuner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). As the

Johnson Court emphasized throughout its opinion, the two

standards are fundamentally incompatible—the Turner

standard requires merely a reasonable relationship to

legitimate interests, while strict scrutiny requires “narrow[]

tailor[ing]” to a “compelling” interest. Id. at 505 (emphasis

added). Thus, Johnson established that when evaluating

equal protection claims against prison officials, strict, rather

than intermediate, scrutiny is the applicable test.

Our decision in Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062 (9th

Cir. 2010), does not address—and therebydoes not alter—the

appropriate tier of scrutiny to apply when analyzing Eighth

Amendment or equal protection claims. Rather, we instructed

that “[p]rison officials are entitled to deference whether a

prisoner challenges excessive force or conditions of

confinement.” Id. at 1067 (emphasis added).1

1 The majority is correct in its observation that Norwood specifically

addressed only Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims. Maj.

Op. at 13–14. The clear language of the opinion, however, describes the

application of deference in terms of the type of activity challenged, rather

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HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER 21

Here, as the majority acknowledges, the trial court

accurately instructed the jury to apply a strict scrutiny

analysis to Harrington’s equal protection claim. Maj. Op. at

14. The trial court then, as required by Norwood, instructed

the jury that prison officials are entitled to deference in their

evaluation and adoption of prison policies necessary to

maintain prison security and discipline—the very goals

identified in Johnson as compelling interests that might

justify race-based prison policies. 543 U.S. at 512.

According to the majority, this second instruction “pulled

the rug out from under the narrow tailoring requirement” by

suggesting that Harrington’s equal protection claim was

“competing” with the prison officials’ defense on the Eighth

Amendment claim. Maj. Op. at 14–15. Such a conclusion,

however, rests on the premise that deference to state officials

is necessarily incompatible with strict scrutiny analysis. See

Maj. Op. at 17 (“Although one instruction recites strict

scrutiny, the deference instruction introduces a new and

different standard.”). But the instruction’s reference to

“competing obligation[s]” simply reflects the reality that

prison officials are forced to balance conflicting

considerations—such as individual prisoner safety and the

safety and security of the prison as a whole—when crafting

prison policies.

Indeed, the Supreme Court has squarely rejected the view

that deference and strict scrutiny are incompatible,

than the alleged right violated, and thereby indicates that deference should

be afforded any time challenges are made regarding excessive force or

confinement conditions, regardless of whether the challenge alleges

deliberate indifference or an equal protection violation. As Harrington

challenges his conditions of confinement, Norwood, by its terms, applies.

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22 HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER

particularly in situations in which a certain group of state

officials is likely to have specialized knowledge. For

instance, in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005), the

Court analyzed a claim under the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc1(a)(1)–(2), which prohibits the government from imposing

a substantial burden on prisoners’ religious exercise unless

the burden furthers a “compelling governmental interest” by

“the least restrictive means”—the same strict scrutiny test

applied in the equal protection context. Id. at 712. In

conducting its strict scrutiny analysis, the Court explained

that it was appropriate to defer to prison officials’ expertise

when engaging in such strict scrutiny analysis. Id. at 722–23,

725 n.13.

Similarly, in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003),

superseded on other grounds by Mich. Const. art I, § 26, the

Court deferred to law school officials when evaluating

whether the school’s race-based admissions policy withstood

the scrutiny analysis required for equal protection claims. Id.

at 327–28. Specifically, the Court deferred to the officials’

unique ability to determine whether diversity was essential to

the law school’s educational mission and thereby qualified as

a compelling state interest. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court has

made clear that strict scrutiny and deference to state officials

are by no means incompatible, even in the equal protection

context.

The majority accurately quotes the crucial passage from

Johnson that rejects the Turner standard of review because

“such deference is fundamentally at odds with our equal

protection jurisprudence.” See Maj. Op. at 14 (quoting

Johnson, 543 U.S. at 506 n.1). But the passage must be read

in light of the opinion as a whole. In Johnson, the Court

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HARRINGTON V. SCRIBNER 23

rejected a lenient standard of review that fails to put the

burden on state officials to articulate a compelling reason for

engaging in race-based action—a standard that is necessarily

incompatible with strict scrutiny. Viewed in such context, the

passage simply identifies the inherent conflict between the

Turner standard and the strict scrutiny standard. Here,

however, there is no such inherent conflict in applying

deference within the strict scrutiny framework.

Rather, such a strict scrutiny standard can, and indeed,

under Norwood, must, accommodate a different form of

deference—one that acknowledges the expertise of prison

officials in crafting policies to promote prison safety and

discipline.

II

Because the trial court’s jury instructions accurately

integrate such deference into the strict scrutiny analysis

required by Johnson, I would affirm the jury’s verdict

rejecting Harrington’s equal protection claim and would

affirm the judgment in its entirety.

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