Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-74216/USCOURTS-ca9-13-74216-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent
Elton Yadimir Mendoza Rizo
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ELTON YADIMIR MENDOZA RIZO,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH,

Respondent.

No. 13-74216

Agency No.

A099-907-845

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

November 20, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed January 14, 2016

Before: Milan D. Smith, Jr. and N. Randy Smith, Circuit

Judges, and Shira Ann Scheindlin,*

 Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Scheindlin

* The Honorable Shira Ann Scheindlin, Senior District Judge for the

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by

designation.

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2 RIZO V. LYNCH

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel denied a petition for review of the Board of

Immigration Appeals’ denial of asylum, concluding that the

Board’s remand to the immigration judge for proceedings

related to voluntary departure did not deprive this court of

jurisdiction over the petition, but this court lacked jurisdiction

to review petitioner’s unexhausted asylum claim, and the

manner in which the IJ conducted removal proceedings did

not deprive petitioner of due process. 

The panel clarified that Pinto v. Holder, 648 F.3d 976,

980 (9th Cir. 2011) remains good law following Abdisalan v.

Holder, 774 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), and this court

has jurisdiction to review a petition where all substantive

matters judicially reviewable by this court have been

finalized, and the only pending matter concerns voluntary

departure — itself a form of removal, the granting or denial

of which this court lacks jurisdiction to review pursuant to

8 U.S.C. § 1299c(f).

The panel held that petitioner’s asylum claim was

unexhausted because his statements to the Board failed to

meaningfully apprise it of the basis for his appeal. 

The panel further held that although the IJ conducted the

removal hearing in an aggressive manner, the IJ did not

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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RIZO V. LYNCH 3

violate petitioner’s due process rights during the removal

hearing.

COUNSEL

Stephanie Rice (argued), Samantha L. Amato, Hardy Law

Group, Reno, Nevada; Ian Silverberg, Law Offices of Ian

Silverberg, Reno, Nevada, for Petitioner.

Craig Alan Newell (argued) and Jeffrey J. Bernstein, Joyce R.

Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and Carl

McIntyre, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration

Litigation, Civil Division, Washington,D.C.,forRespondent.

OPINION

SCHEINDLIN, District Judge:

Elton Yadimir Mendoza Rizo, a native and citizen of

Nicaragua, petitions for review of a decision by the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial of his

application for asylum and denying Rizo’s due process claim

with regard to his removal proceedings before the

Immigration Judge (“IJ”).1 The government argues that Rizo

is not currently subject to a final order of removal, as the BIA

remanded Rizo’s case to the IJ for further proceedings that

1 Rizo also asked the BIA to reverse the IJ’s denial of his application for

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”). Because Rizo has not asked us to review those claims in his

briefing for this appeal, we do not discuss those issues. See Rizk v. Holder,

629 F.3d 1083, 1091 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011).

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remain pending, and that this court therefore lacks

jurisdiction to review his claims.

We disagree. Because the BIA remanded Rizo’s case to

the IJsolely for proceedings related to voluntary departure, he

is subject to a final order of removal reviewable by this court.

Because Rizo’s asylum claim was not meaningfully

exhausted before the BIA, this court lacks jurisdiction to

review it. Finally, Rizo has failed to demonstrate that the

manner in which the IJ conducted the removal proceedings

violated his due process rights. For these reasons, the petition

is denied.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Rizo’s father, a general prosecutor for the Constitutional

Liberty Party in Nicaragua, was murdered by Sandinista

political opponents in Nicaragua in 2001. Rizo spent several

years in hiding with his mother and brother (also a

Constitutional Liberty Party member), before his brother fled

to the United States in 2005. Rizo fled Nicaragua and entered

the United States as an unaccompanied minor on April 25,

2007. On September 28, 2009, at the age of twenty, Rizo filed

an I-589 Application for Asylum. Rizo was issued a notice to

appear for removal proceedings by the Department of

Homeland Security on December 9, 2009, after he canceled

his asylum interview.

Rizo’s removal hearing occurred on February 9, 2010.

Rizo conceded to the charge of removability, but sought relief

in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection

under the CAT — or, in the alternative, voluntary departure.

Rizo presented both himself and his brother as witnesses;

both were aggressively cross-examined by the IJ. The IJ

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RIZO V. LYNCH 5

found that Rizo’s asylum claim was untimely and that he did

not have a well-founded fear of persecution, including future

persecution, should he return home. Voluntary departure was

granted.

On November 16, 2011, Rizo filed a timely notice of

appeal to the BIA appealing the IJ’s decision and charging

the IJ with violation of his due process rights, due to the

aggressive manner in which the IJ conducted the hearing. The

BIA rejected petitioner’s appeal of the IJ’s decision. In its

decision, the BIA determined that Rizo had not meaningfully

challenged the IJ’s disposition of his asylum claim on appeal.

The BIA found no merit in Rizo’s due process claim, as he

had shown neither error nor prejudice.

Rizo’s case was remanded to the IJ solely for proceedings

related to the granting of voluntary departure. This appeal

followed.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court has jurisdiction to review “a final order of

removal,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252, defined as “the order” of the IJ

“concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering

deportation.” Id. § 1101(a)(47)(A). “The order” then becomes

“final upon the earlier of”: “(i) a determination by the Board

of Immigration Appeals affirming such order; or (ii) the

expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek

review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.”

Id. § 1101(a)(47)(B).

The factual findings underlying the BIA’s determination

of eligibility for asylum are reviewed to determine whether

those findings are supported by substantial evidence. See,

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e.g., Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir.

2014). Challenges to IJ proceedings on due process grounds

are reviewed by this court de novo. See, e.g., Jimenez-Angeles

v. Ashcroft, 291 F.3d 594, 599–600 (9th Cir. 2002). 

DISCUSSION

A. Rizo Is Subject to a Final Order of Removal

Our precedent dictates that Rizo petitioned for review

from a final order of removal. The IJ’s decision was an order

of removal: after denying Rizo’s claims for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT, the IJ

granted a period of voluntary departure with an alternate

order of removal to Nicaragua. This order of removal then

became final when the BIA affirmed the IJ’s disposition of

Rizo’s claims. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B).

The BIA’s remand to the IJ did not affect the finality of

the order of removal, as the IJ’s only role on remand was to

provide certain necessary advisals regarding voluntary

departure, and grant Rizo a new voluntary departure period.

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

Responsibility Act of 1996 explicitly deprives us of

jurisdiction to review an agency’s disposition of a petitioner’s

request for voluntary departure. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(f).

“Accordingly, the BIA’s decision denying asylum,

withholding of removal, and CAT protection but remanding

to the IJ for voluntary departure proceedings is a final order

of removal . . . .” Pinto v. Holder, 648 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir.

2011).

The government, however, submits that this case is

controlled by our recent decision in Abdisalan v. Holder,

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RIZO V. LYNCH 7

774 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 2014). In that case, we held that a

decision by the BIA cannot be a final order of removal until

all administrative proceedings have concluded, even if the

BIA decision finalizes certain claims while remanding others

to the IJ for further proceedings. Id. at 526. Abdisalan

resolved a tension between two decisions of this circuit, Go

v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011) and Li v. Holder,

656 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2011). In Go, we held that there was

no final order of removal — and we therefore lacked

jurisdiction — until all administrative proceedings before the

IJ had concluded. 640 F.3d at 1051–52. In Li, we held that

there was a final order of removal as to an asylum claim when

the BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of said claim, even when

other issues were remanded to the IJ for further proceedings.

656 F.3d at 904. Abdisalan closed this split in our circuit’s

law in favor of Go, holding that “when the [BIA] issues a

decision that denies some claims but remands any other

claims for relief to an [IJ] for further proceedings . . . the BIA

decision is not a final order of removal with regard to any of

the claims.” 774 F.3d at 520.

Today, this court clarifies our holding in Abdisalan —

and holds that Pinto remains the law of the Circuit.2 As we

have recognized elsewhere, “[o]ur [] en banc decision in

Abdisalan v. Holder does not disrupt our line of cases holding

that a remand by the BIA to an IJ solely to consider voluntary

departure does not affect the finality of the BIA’s decision for

purposes of our review.” Solano-Rivera v. Holder, 599 Fed.

App’x 271, 271 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). In this

2 Under the facts of the Abdisalan case, we specifically declined to

“revisit our rule [set forth in Pinto] that the BIA’s decision is a final order

of removal when it remands for consideration of voluntary departure but

denies all other forms of relief.” Abdisalan, 774 F.3d at 526 n.8.

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case, as in Pinto, the court is presented with a petition where

all substantive matters judicially reviewable by this court

have been finalized. The only pending matter concerns

voluntary departure — itself a form of removal, the granting

or denial of which we are powerless to review by

congressional mandate. See 8 U.S.C. § 1299c(f).

The concerns we expressed in Adbisalan are therefore

completely absent: there is no “mixed BIA decision”

finalizing the negative disposition of certain claims for relief

while remanding other claims that could yet lead to relief

from deportation. 774 F.3d at 524. There is no threat that the

order of removal could become final at multiple points in

time. See id. When the BIA remanded Rizo’s claim to the IJ,

Rizo was subject to the single, final order of removal

contemplated by Congress and confirmed by this court in

Abdisalan. See id. at 526 (“These agency interpretations shed

further light on what the text of the statute already implies:

in a case like Abdisalan’s, there is only one final order

of removal, and when the BIA remands to the IJ, that order

is not ‘final’ until administrative proceedings have

concluded.”). Any concerns regarding the efficient utilization

of this court’s limited resources are also ameliorated. The

complete portfolio of issues capable of being reviewed by this

court is finalized, even if non-reviewable administrative

matters regarding voluntary departure remain pending.

Abdisalan did not overturn Pinto, and does not disturb

Pinto’s holding that a BIA remand for further proceedings as

to voluntary departure does not affect the finality of an

otherwise-final order of removal. We have jurisdiction over

Rizo’s petition for review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we may

review the merits of his petition.

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RIZO V. LYNCH 9

B. Rizo’s Claims Fail

1. Asylum

This court lacks jurisdiction over Rizo’s asylum claim, as

the BIA correctly determined that he had failed to

meaningfully challenge the IJ’s denial of asylum on appeal.

Rizo’s brief before the BIA contains only two sentences

regarding the IJ’s denial of asylum, which reads:

[I]t is also respectfully submitted that the

Respondent did present a case of a wellfounded fear of persecution on the basis of

imputed political opinion, and that the

evidence of the brutal killing of his father and

of other families who were involved in similar

political activity, clearly supports a wellfounded fear of persecution, and certainly not

a “hysterical” fear, as was stated by the [IJ].

The government presented no evidence of

changed conditions.

This conclusory statement does not apprise the BIA of the

particular basis for Rizo’s claim that the IJ erred; it merely

asserts that the IJ erred. Such a submission does not

meaningfully challenge the IJ’s decision on appeal.

Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 820–21 (9th Cir.

2003).3 Furthermore, Rizo failed to challenge the IJ’s finding

3

In Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, this court instructed that the petitioner is

required to set forth the basis for challenging the IJ’s decision.

It should be clear whether the alleged impropriety in the

[IJ] decision lies with the [IJ’s] interpretation of the

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that Rizo’s asylum application was time-barred, stating only

that “[i]f the court finds that the Respondent’s arguments in

support of the late filing of the I-589 are not compelling, then

it is respectfully submitted that the Respondent did make out

a prima facie case of eligibility for withholding of removal.”

Because Rizo failed to meaningfully challenge the IJ’s

disposition of his asylum claim on appeal, he failed to

exhaust his asylum claim below — and this court therefore

has no jurisdiction to review that decision. See Abebe v.

Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per

curiam) (holding that claims raised, but then not pursued, in

briefing to the BIA are not properly exhausted).

2. Due Process

Rizo contends his initial removal proceeding violated his

right to due process because the IJ “exceeded his bounds as

a neutral arbiter and usurped the role of opposing counsel” in

aggressively questioning both Rizo and Rizo’s witness while

testifying. The BIA rejected Rizo’s claim.

facts or his application of legal standards. Where a

question of law is presented, supporting authority

should be included, and where the dispute is on the

facts, there should be a discussion of the particular

details contested.

339 F.3d at 820 (alteration omitted) (quoting Toquero v. INS, 956 F.2d

193, 195 (9th Cir. 1992)). If the petitioner does not specify what errors the

IJ made, the BIA would be “left to reconstruct the IJ proceedings, infer

factual error without knowledge of what precise error is complained of,

and build the legal analysis from only general statements of legal

conclusion.” Id. at 821.

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We will reverse the BIA’s decision on due process

grounds only if the underlying IJ proceeding was “so

fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from

reasonably presenting his case.” Platero-Cortez v. INS,

804 F.2d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 1986). Importantly, a mere

showing that the IJ was unfriendly, confrontational, or acted

in an adversarial manner is not enough to meet this burden.

See, e.g., Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1072 (9th

Cir. 2003); Perez-Lastor v. INS, 208 F.3d 773, 782 n.9 (9th

Cir. 2000); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 (IJ empowered to

“interrogate, examine, and cross-examine” witnesses). Even

if a removal hearing was conducted in a fundamentally unfair

manner, a “petitioner must show prejudice, which means that

the outcome of the proceeding may have been affected by the

alleged violation.” Zolotukhin v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 1073,

1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and alteration

omitted).

Rizo’s due process rights were not violated by the IJ.

While the record indicates that the IJ conducted Rizo’s

removal hearing in an aggressive manner, the IJ did not deny

him a fair hearing. Rizo was permitted to testify on his own

behalf, was permitted to present the testimony of an

additional witness (the only other witness he proffered), and

was permitted to submit additional documentary evidence.

Furthermore, Rizo’s counsel never suggested — either in his

brief before the BIA, or at the IJ hearing itself — that the IJ

had obstructed counsel’s ability to represent his client. Rizo

was able to reasonably present his case. We therefore affirm

the BIA’s dismissal of Rizo’s due process claim.

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CONCLUSION

We hold that Pinto v. Holder remains good law after our

decision in Abdisalan v. Holder, and that Rizo was therefore

subject to a final order of removal when the BIA remanded

his case to the IJ for proceedings related solely to voluntary

departure. Rizo’s due process rights were not violated by the

IJ during the removal hearing.Rizo’s remaining asylum claim

fails for non-exhaustion. Rizo’s petition for review is denied.

PETITION DENIED.

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