Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00204/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00204-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arnold Betschart
Plaintiff
Gordon Trucking Incorporated
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARNOLD BETSCHART,

Plaintiff,

v.

GORDON TRUCKING, INCORPORATED,

Defendant.

1:08-CV-00204-OWW-GSA

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

DENYING DEFENDANT GORDON

TRUCKING, INC.’S MOTION TO

STRIKE (Doc. 8) 

1. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Gordon Trucking (“Gordon Trucking”) moves to

strike portions of Plaintiff Arnold Betschart’s (“Betschart”)

complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f); alleging it contains

numerous factual allegations which are immaterial and irrelevant

to plaintiff’s claims, and which unnecessarily and prejudicially

expand the potential scope of litigation in this case. In his

complaint, Betschart alleges employment discrimination due to age

under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) 29 U.S.C.

§ 623 et seq. and California Fair Employment and Housing Act

(“FEHA”) Cal. Gov’t. Code. § 12940 et seq., employment

discrimination due to disability under the Americans with

Disability Act (“ADA”) 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq. and FEHA Cal.

Gov’t. Code. § 12940 et seq., violation of the Employment

Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) 29 U.S.C. § 1140, and

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alleges a wrongful adverse personnel action claim against public

policy. Betschart opposes the motion to strike on grounds that

certain allegations are relevant. Oral Argument was heard on

July 21, 2008. 

2. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Betschart filed his complaint on February 2, 2008. (Doc. 1,

Compl.) On March 31, 2008 Gordon Trucking filed a Motion to

Strike. (Doc. 8, Mot. Strike.) Betschart filed an initial

Opposition to the Motion to Strike on May 2, 2008. (Doc. 12,

Opp’n.) Betschart then amended his Opposition to the Motion to

Strike on May 2, 2008. (Doc. 13, Am. Opp’n.) Gordon Trucking

replied to the Opposition on May 12, 2008. (Doc. 14, Reply.)

B. Factual History

Arnold Betschart is a United States citizen and resident of

California, born on March 25, 1948. (Compl. ¶ 6.) Betschart

alleges on June 6, 2007, he was involuntarily terminated by

Gordon Trucking after employment with Gordon Trucking for a total

of over 18 years. (Id.)

Betschart alleges Gordon Trucking Incorporated is a

corporation with its headquarters in the State of Washington,

with a work location in Turlock, California which is a judicial

district of this Court, and additionally, is where Betschart was

employed at the time of his involuntary termination from

employment. (Compl. ¶ 7.) 

Betschart alleges there was a gap in his total employment

with Gordon Trucking. He alleges he worked for Gordon Trucking

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for a period from August 8, 1988 as California Director of Sales

and subsequently Director of Operations in Washington until April

15, 1994, when he resigned due to family reasons and moved back

to California. (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 9, 10.) On February 13, 1995,

Betschart was rehired to be Director of Regional Operations for a

new terminal in Turlock, California. (Compl. ¶ 11.) He worked

there until May 31, 2006, when he was involuntarily moved into a

position as director of maintenance/operations. (Compl. ¶ 12.) 

Betschart later was terminated on June 6, 2007. (Compl. ¶ 20.)

1. Allegations of Age Discrimination

Betschart alleges in February 2001, he won a significant

work achievement award from Target Corporation for the year 2000,

and was invited to an awards dinner. (Compl. ¶ 28.) Betschart

was willing to stop a planned vacation to go but was told by a

Gordon Trucking executive “At your age and your longevity, you

don’t need to go.” (Id.) Betschart alleges this is a markedly

different stance from that Gordon Trucking has taken toward other

employees who have won this same award, as they have consistently

been allowed to go to the awards dinner at Gordon Trucking’s

expense, and have been flown to it on the corporate jet. (Id.) 

Betschart claims he was discriminated against by an

involuntary change of his company position on May 31, 2006. 

(Compl. ¶ 12.) He learned of this change when Steve Gordon,

Chief Operating Officer of Gordon Trucking who is in his 30s,

stated to the non-driving staff in Turlock: “It is time for the

old guys to step down and let the younger employees take charge.” 

(Compl. ¶ 13.) When Betschart responded with “Watch the old guy

stuff,” Steve Gordon replied “It’s time for the senior management

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to step aside and allow the younger employees to take charge.” 

(Id.) Betschart was then replaced as director of regional

operations by an employee who was in his 30s. (Id.) 

Betschart alleges discrimination occurred in September 2006,

when he found out his prior position’s compensation was lost. 

(Id.) Although, his base salary remained the same, he lost the

additional incentive package he had previously been eligible for

and had received. (Compl. ¶¶ 12, 15.) 

Additionally, in May 2007, Betschart alleges he was assigned

a younger “consultant” who questioned Betschart about when

Betschart would retire. (Compl. ¶¶ 16, 17.) The following

month, Betschart was terminated and his job was given to the

“consultant,” who was approximately 33 years old. (Id.)

Betschart was terminated on June 6, 2007. Two younger

executives told Betschart they were going to have a cup of coffee

with him at Starbuck’s. (Compl. ¶ 20.) There, he was informed

of his termination, and that possession of his company car was

immediately revoked. (Id.) The two executives drove Betschart

home, where they required him to immediately clean out his

company car in his driveway in full view of his family and

neighbors. (Id.) Betschart was told to return later to work to

pick up his belongings. (Id.) When he returned, he was not

allowed to go back to his office, and was given his already boxed

up belongings. (Id.)

Betschart alleges he received a positive performance review

for the period from 2003 into 2004 which supported a 2005 bonus. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 22, 23.) He alleges in June/July 2006, shortly after

being moved into the new position, he received a slightly more

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negative performance review. (Compl. ¶ 24.) Finally, upon

termination on or about June 6, 2007, Betschart alleges he

received a very negative performance review for the period from

June 2, 2006 through June 1, 2007. (Compl. ¶¶ 25, 26.) This was

Betschart’s first performance evaluation in his new position, and

Betschart was given no time to correct any perceived alleged

deficiencies, as he was terminated. (Compl. ¶¶ 25, 26.)

Betschart received no warning letters or any type of

progressive discipline prior to his termination. (Compl. ¶ 27.) 

He alleges he was shocked he was being terminated and believed

the termination made no sense based on his pay raises over the

years, long service to the company, lack of any progressive

discipline, lack of any warning concerning termination, and

positive feedback he had received over the years. (Id.) 

2. Allegations of Disability Discrimination

Additionally, Betschart alleges disability discrimination. 

Among other things, Betschart claims Gordon Trucking

discriminated against him due to the high cost of the healthcare

his family required. Gordon Trucking paid most medical costs for

Betschart, his wife, and his stepson through the health plan it

provided. (Compl. ¶ 29.)

 In 1994, Betschart had heart surgery. (Compl. ¶ 30.) He

alleges when he came back to work, Larry Gordon, President and

CEO of Gordon Trucking, stated to someone in Betschart’s presence

that he had to hire Betschart back because “he had spent 50-plus

grand for Betschart’s health expenses, and he needed to get his

money back.” (Id.)

In 2004, Betschart had hip replacement surgery. (Compl. ¶

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31.) He alleges after returning to work on two occasions he was

asked by company executives whether the other hip would be done,

too. (Compl. ¶¶ 32, 33.)

In 2005, Betschart’s wife was diagnosed and began treatment

for ongoing and continuous skin cancer. (Compl. ¶ 34.) 

Additionally, between September 2005 and Betschart’s termination,

Betschart’s wife had six dental surgeries and an endoscopy. 

(Id.) Betschart also alleges Gordon Trucking knew Betschart’s

stepson, who is 11 years old, has cerebral palsy. (Id.) 

Betschart alleges during conversation post May 31, 2006, his

supervisor made comments about the prohibitive cost of the

medical procedures his wife required.

Betschart further alleges he was discriminated against

because of his own physical disability. He alleges starting in

1990 when Betschart went up to work for Gordon Trucking at its

Pacific, Washington headquarters, various management persons

working for Gordon Trucking, teased Betschart calling him

“Chester” on numerous occasions in relation to the disability in

his left hip. (Compl. ¶ 36.) Betschart alleges this was a

reference to a disabled character in the television show

“Gunsmoke” who limped with an artificial leg. (Opp’n 12).

In or about 1997 or 1998, Betschart went on a company

hunting trip and was slow in getting around due to his hip. 

(Compl. ¶ 37.) He alleges the president of Gordon Trucking made

a reference to Betschart’s disability, and thereafter, Betschart

was never invited again on company hunting trips, though they

continued to occur regularly. (Id.)

Betschart alleges on January 25, 2006, he was teased and

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taunted by top company managers about his inability to run across

a street. (Compl. ¶ 38.) 

3. ANALYSIS

A. Motion To Strike Legal Standard

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for a

motion to strike documents or portions of documents other than

pleadings. Rule 12(f) provides that “redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matters” may be “stricken from any

pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). A motion to strike is limited

to pleadings. See Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d

880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). However, a “motion to strike”

materials that are not part of the pleadings may be regarded as

an “invitation” by the movant “to consider whether [proffered

material] may properly be relied upon.” United States v. Crisp,

190 F.R.D. 546, 551 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (quoting Monroe v. Bd. of

Educ., 65 F.R.D. 641, 645 (D. Conn. 1975) (“[A] motion to strike

has sometimes been used to call to courts’ attention questions

about the admissibility of proffered material in [ruling on

motions].”) (citations omitted)).

Motions to strike are disfavored and infrequently granted. 

See Pease & Curran Refining, Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F.

Supp. 945, 947 (C.D. Cal. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by

Stanton Road Ass’n v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir.

1993). Such motions should be granted only where it can be shown

that none of the evidence in support of an allegation is

admissible. See id.

B. Stale Acts and the Continuing Violations Doctrine.

Defendant Gordon Trucking moves to strike certain

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allegations from the factual allegations section of the

complaint. Specifically, Gordon Trucking wants stricken all

facts and issues alleged to have occurred before Betschart’s

recent reemployment date on February 13, 1995. This includes,

but is not limited to, allegations of Betschart’s over 18 years

of service to Gordon Trucking, Betschart’s heart surgery in 1994,

and Betschart being called “Chester” by co-workers. 

Additionally, Gordon Trucking wants stricken all factual

allegations for which the right to relief has expired under

applicable statute of limitations. This includes, allegations of

Betschart receiving an award in 2001, Betschart being called

“Chester” by co-workers, Betschart’s hunting trip experience, and

all other factual allegations which were not themselves timely

filed within applicable statute of limitation filing periods.

Betschart’s complaint alleges causes of action under the

ADEA, ADA, FEHA, ERISA, and adverse termination against public

policy. Gordon Trucking’s assertion that factual allegations

should be stricken from the complaint is addressed by the

“continuing violations doctrine” which originally was applied to

Title VII discrimination claims, but has been expanded to apply

to ADEA, ADA and FEHA claims.

Under a Title VII unlawful employment practice

discrimination suit, a claim may arise from either a discrete act

or a hostile environment. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,

536 U.S. 101, 111-12 (2002). A discrete act consists of an

unlawful practice that “occurred” on the day it “happened.” Id.

at 110. Discrete acts alone are each enough to constitute the

basis for a claim, but must be brought within an applicable

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statute of limitations time period, or they will be nonactionable. Id. at 113. Under the “continuing violations

doctrine,” these time-barred claims remain non-actionable, but

they may be admitted as relevant admissible background evidence

if other related claims are brought in a timely manner. Id.;

Lyons v. Eng., 307 F.3d 1092, 1111 (2002). Examples of discrete

acts include “termination, failure to promote, denial of

transfer, or refusal to hire.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114. 

Conversely, a hostile environment is comprised of separate acts

which collectively constitute a single unlawful employment

practice arising from the cumulative effect of the multiple acts. 

Id., at 117-18 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)); see also

Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2175

(2007). If a plaintiff can establish at least one act

contributing to a hostile environment claim occurred within the

charge filing period, and the plaintiff timely files on that act,

then the entire period of the hostile environment, may be

considered by the court for liability determination. Morgan, 536

U.S. at 117. This consideration allows all acts contributing to

the hostile environment to be actionable and admissible as

evidence, including acts that would otherwise be time-barred. 

Id. at 117-18.

Although Morgan, was a Title VII case, the continuing

violations doctrine is applied when considering an ADEA, ADA or a

California FEHA case. See Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 675

(9th Cir. 1997) (ADEA); Douglas v. Cal. Dept. of Youth Auth., 271

F.3d 812, 822 (9th Cir. 2001) (ADA); Brown v. City of Tucson, 336

F.3d 1181, 1189 (2002) (ADA); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,

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 “‘Immaterial’ matter is that which has no essential or 1

important relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses

being pleaded.” Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 1382, at 706-07 (1990).

 “‘Impertinent’ matter consists of statements that do not 2

pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question.”

Wright & Miller, supra note 1 § 1382, at 706-07.

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328 F.3d 1165, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003) (FEHA); Richards v. CH2M

Hill, Inc., 26 Cal.4th 798, 812-24, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 (2001)

(FEHA); Accardi v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. App. 4th 341, 321, 21

Cal.Rptr.2d 292 (Cal. App. 1993) (FEHA).

Gordon Trucking incorrectly argues that all allegations of

discrimination pertaining to time periods prior to any applicable

statute of limitations period are time-barred stale allegations,

and therefore, they are immaterial and impertinent , and as 1 2

such, they should be stricken under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(f). Gordon Trucking contends ample case law

supports this argument. This misrepresentation is confirmed by

the absence of case law to support this contention. 

Gordon Trucking further argues Betschart’s most recent

employment period is the only relevant time period. Gordon

Trucking contends any prior time period, including prior work

history, has no bearing on discrimination charges arising from

the more recent period. Gordon Trucking argues that facts prior

to Betschart’s rehiring on February 13, 1995, even if proven

true, are immaterial and impertinent and therefore, are

superfluous historical allegations that should be properly

stricken according to Fantasy Inc. V. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524,

1527 (9th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds by 510 U.S. 517,

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(1994); see e.g. Healing v. Jones, 174 F. Supp. 211, 220 (D.

Ariz. 1959). Gordon Trucking argues the “gap” in employment

periods makes discovery of facts alleged to occur prior to

February 13, 1995, work material and undue prejudice because

these facts unnecessarily broaden the scope of discovery. Gordon

Trucking asserts “[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is

to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from

litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior

to trial . . . .” Sidney-Vinstein, 697 F.2d at 885. 

However, according to Morgan, an employee fired and then

later rehired by the same company, is not limited to presenting

evidence from only the most recent employment period. See

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 112 (citing United Airlines Inc. v. Evans,

431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977)). The employee may present acts from

the first employment period as relevant background evidence to

support a timely filed discrete act discrimination claim arising

out of the second employment period. Id. A discriminatory act

from a first employment period which was not made the basis of a

timely charge is merely an unfortunate historical event with no

present legal consequences when separately considered. However,

it may constitute relevant background evidence in a proceeding in

which the status of a current practice is at issue. Morgan, 536

U.S. at 112 (citing Evans, 431 U.S. at 558).

Gordon Trucking incorrectly asserts in its reply that

Betschart cites no cases which deal with discrete acts of

discrimination during a “first tour of duty.” Additionally,

Gordon Trucking inaccurately asserts stale discrete acts are not

allowed as background evidence. Betschart cites Evans, 431 U.S.

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at 558 (1977). In Evans, an airline stewardess was unlawfully

forced to resign due to her marriage in 1968 and was later

rehired four years later in 1972 with a complete loss of

seniority. Evans, 431 U.S. at 553. This stewardess claimed the

forced resignation could be asserted beyond the applicable

statute of limitations time period because the loss of seniority

was a continuing effect which kept the original claim alive from

the first employment period into the second employment period. 

Evans, 431 U.S. at 556-57. The Supreme Court in Evans, ignored

the gap in employment and found the forced resignation was a nonactionable discrete act and therefore time-barred. Evans, 431

U.S. at 558. However, the Supreme Court in Morgan, found the

forced resignation “may constitute relevant background evidence

in a proceeding in which the status of a current practice is at

issue”. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 112 (quoting Evans, 431 U.S. 553,

558 (1977)); see also Lindemann & Grossman, Employment

Discrimination Law, CH. 26.II.B.3.b. (“[T]ime-barred employment

actions may be offered as ‘background’ evidence to support timely

claims by employees.”).

Like the employee in Evans, Betschart attempts to present

evidence of discrimination from his first employment period. 

Betschart was not employed by Gordon Trucking for approximately

one year compared to the four year gap in Evans. The time of the

gap between Betschart’s employment periods is less than the gap

in Evans, which strengthens the argument for a finding of

relevance for factual allegations from Betschart’s first

employment period.

1. Factual Allegations Similar to Those Gordon Trucking 

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 As opposed to an act constituting part of a hostile 3

environment which “typically comprises a succession of harassing

acts, each of which ‘may not be actionable on its own.’ In

addition, a hostile work environment claim ‘cannot be said to

occur on any particular day.’ In other words, the actionable

wrong is the environment, not the individual acts that, taken

together, create the environment.” Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. 2175;

(quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115-116).

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Moves to Strike Constitute Relevant Background Evidence

Fed. R. Civ. P. 21(b) extends the scope of discovery to all

information that is relevant and not privileged. Additionally,

under Rule 21(b), relevant information does not need to be

admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 

2. Assessment of the Stale Evidence for Relevance 

a. ADEA Claim

Under the ADEA, a civil action alleging age discrimination

may not be brought until sixty days after an ADEA charge is filed

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). 29

U.S.C. § 626(d). The charge must be filed within 180 days after

the alleged unlawful practice occurred. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1). 

Betschart alleges in his complaint that he filed a charge with

the EEOC in a timely manner, but has not clearly stated when he

filed his charges with the EEOC, and what was included in those

charges. The most recent act of alleged discriminatory conduct

in Betschart’s claim is Betschart’s termination which occurred on

June 6, 2007, which Betschart alleges was within the 180 day

charge filing period. Termination of employment is considered a

discrete discrimination act as it “occurred” on the day it 3

“happened.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114. Thus, it appears

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Betschart’s underlying actionable ADEA claim is based upon this

discrete act of discrimination. Betschart further alleges that

prior to his termination, Gordon Trucking engaged in ongoing and

continuous age discriminatory behavior which included Betschart’s

involuntary transfer and demotion on June 6, 2006. According to

the continuing violations doctrine, although Betschart’s alleged

involuntary transfer and demotion may fall outside the EEOC’s 180

day filing period, and are therefore, non-actionable; either of

these allegations may be used as relevant and admissible

background evidence to show prior discriminatory actions by

Gordon Trucking, to support Betschart’s actionable alleged

discrete act of discriminatory termination. 

b. ADA Claim

In California, under the ADA, Plaintiff is allowed 300 days

from an act of discrimination to file charges alleging disability

discrimination with the EEOC if he first files charges with the

California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”). 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 1170,

1176 (9th Cir. 2000). He may file a claim either ninety days

after receiving a right-to sue letter from the EEOC, or 180 days

after the EEOC had received the charges. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5. 

Betschart alleges in his complaint that he filed a charge with

the EEOC in a timely manner, but has not clearly stated when he

filed his charges with the EEOC, or what was included in those

charges. The parties have not clarified what events are within

the statute of limitations period. Depending on the timeline of

when he filed with the EEOC, and what charges were included, his

non time-barred claims may include his termination on June 6,

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2007, his transfer on May 31, 2007, or his alleged payment

discrimination in September 2006. If these are found to be

discrete discrimination acts, then prior allegations of

disability discrimination may constitute relevant admissible

background evidence supporting any of these timely discrimination

claims. Prior disability discrimination allegations include

Betschart being called “Chester” from 1990 through 2000, his

alleged hip-related teasing on the company hunting trip in 1997

or 1998, and his alleged teasing about his inability to quickly

cross a street in 2006. Additionally, discrimination directed

towards Betschart’s family member’s disabilities may also

constitute relevant background evidence as it still falls under

applicable ADA statutes as “disability discrimination.” If any

of these untimely acts are found not to support a discrete act

claim, but rather constitute part of a timely hostile environment

claim, then pursuant to the continuing violations doctrine, these

acts may be untimely, but may still be actionable as evidence of

a hostile environment.

c. FEHA Claim

Under FEHA, a plaintiff must file disability or age

discrimination charges with either the DFEH or the EEOC within

one year of the date of the alleged unlawful act. Cal. Gov’t

Code §12960(d). Plaintiff then has one year to file a claim

after the DFEH issues a right-to-sue notice. Cal. Gov’t Code

§12965(d)-(e). Betschart has not clarified when he filed his

charges with the DFEH, aor what was included in those charges. 

Depending on the timeline of his filing, and what was included in

the charges, his non time-barred claims may include among other

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things, his termination on June 6, 2007, his transfer on May 31,

2007, his alleged payment discrimination in September 2006, and

his discussion about his wife’s health post May 31, 2006. If any

non time-barred alleged acts are found to be discrete

discrimination acts, then time-barred discrimination acts may be

relevant admissible background evidence. Such acts may include

Betschart’s alleged teasing by Gordon Trucking management about

his age on such occasions as when Betschart was called “Chester”

from 1990 through 2000, his alleged hip-related teasing on the

company hunting trip in 1997 or 1998, his alleged teasing about

his inability to quickly cross a street in 2006, and any other

disability discrimination directed towards Betschart based on his

own, or his family member’s disabilities. Additionally, company

policies that discriminated against him because of his age such

as Betschart’s involuntary transfer and demotion on June 6, 2006

may constitute background evidence of a discrete act

discrimination claim. If any of the timely claims are based on

hostile environment discrimination, then pursuant to the

continuing violations doctrine, these prior untimely acts of

discrimination may be actionable as part of that hostile

environment. 

d. Conclusion for ADEA, ADA and FEHA Claims

Whether ADA, ADEA, or FEHA violations which occurred prior

to Betschart’s first employment period are admitted as background

evidence to support a discrete act discrimination claim, or are

admitted as part of an actionable hostile environment claim, any

of these allegations are more than reasonably calculated to lead

to the discovery of admissible evidence under Rule 26(b) as they

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allege previous discriminatory actions by Gordon Trucking against

Betschart. The continuing violations doctrine as applied by the

Supreme Court in Morgan, clearly establishes that discrimination

acts not filed upon within the statute of limitations period are

time-barred and non-actionable. However, these acts may still

constitute admissible relevant background evidence to support a

timely filed discrimination claim based upon a discrete act. 

Additionally, these otherwise stale claims are actionable if they

can be shown to be part of a timely filed hostile work

environment claim. These allegations are not superfluous,

immaterial, or impertinent and do not broaden the scope of

discovery beyond what the law permits. Betschart’s allegations

concerning discriminatory acts which were not themselves timely

filed within applicable statute of limitations periods will not

be stricken. 

In Evans, the Supreme Court ignored a gap in employment when

it applied the continuing violations doctrine and found

discriminatory acts from an employee’s first employment period

could be introduced as background evidence for later

discrimination claims arising from the second employment period. 

Acts occurring before Betschart’s more recent employment period,

although non-actionable, are more than reasonably calculated to

lead to admissible evidence under Rule 21(b), just as the Supreme

Court in Evans, found similar facts to be admissible relevant

background evidence to support other timely filed discrimination

claims. Betschart’s allegations concerning discriminatory acts

which occurred prior to February 13, 1995 will not be stricken. 

The motion is DENIED.

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 Section 510 of ERISA provides in part “It shall be 4

unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel,

discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary

for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the

provisions of an employee benefit plan, . . . or for the purpose

of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such

participant may become entitled under the plan . . . .” 29

U.S.C. § 1140.

 If the primary nature of the right sued upon in a wrongful 5

termination action is personal, the one-year statute of

limitations period set forth in California Code of Civil

Procedure section 340, is applied. Burrey, 159 F.3d at 396. If

primary nature of the right sued upon is considered to be of

fundamental public importance, protected or guaranteed either by

statute or the Constitution, and not the financial or economic

loss from the termination of employment, then the two-year

statute of limitations set forth in the California Code of Civil

Procedure section 339 may be applied. Id.

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e. ERISA Claim

ERISA section 510 provides no statute of limitations so the 4

most analogous state law limitations period must be applied. 

Burrey v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 159 F.3d 388, 396 (9th Cir. 19980

(citing Felton v. Unisource Corp., 940 F.2d 503, 510 (9th Cir.

1991). “[T]he most analogous state law claim [to a 510

violation] [is] wrongful termination against public policy or

retaliatory discharge.” Id at 512. In California, one of two

statutes of limitations may govern a wrongful termination

action. Id. Any of Betschart’s claims and supporting factual 5

allegations which were timely filed within the applicable

California statute of limitations period are actionable. 

However, the Ninth Circuit has found the doctrine of

continuing violations does not apply to claims based on the

Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), because the

ERISA statute requires a plaintiff’s knowledge to be measured

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from the earliest date on which the breach was known, and the

continuing violations doctrine would eliminate this actual

knowledge requirement. See 29 U.S.C. § 1113(a)(2); Pisciotta v.

Teledyne Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1326, 1332 (9th Cir. 1996) citing

Phillips v. Alaska Hotel & Rest. Employees Pension Fund, 944 F.2d

509 (9th Cir. 1991). Therefore, unlike ADA, ADEA, and FEHA

claims, factual allegations pertaining to the period of time

prior to the ERISA statute of limitations period may not be

relevant to the ERISA claim. They are time-barred and nonactionable, and do not constitute admissible background evidence

under the continuing violations doctrine. 

However, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require no

heightened standard beyond notice pleading for employment

discrimination suits. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S.

506, 514 (2002). Notice pleading is defined by Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) which states “a pleading which sets forth

a claim for relief must contain a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relied”. See

also Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dept., 530 F.3d 1124, 1127

(9th Cir. 2008). Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(e)(1) states “[N]o technical form is required.” Requiring

facts alleged in a complaint be relevant to all causes of action

in a complaint, or that each factual allegation be paired up to

the cause of action it is relevant to would undermine the notice

pleading requirements set forth in tFheed e ral Rules of Civil

Procedure. Facts in a complaint are often relevant to one cause

of action, but not another in the encompassing complaint. 

Historical factual allegations pertaining to the period of

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time prior to Betschart’s recent employment period, are relevant

to the ADA, ADEA and FEHA causes of action. Similarly,

historical factual allegations concerning time periods falling

outside the ADA, ADEA, and FEHA statute of limitations are

relevant to these causes of action. Gordon Trucking’s motion to

strike acts either occurring before Betschart’s recent employment

period, or occurring outside of applicable statute of limitations

periods is DENIED.

C. Allegations Concerning Betschart’s Association With Disabled

Immediate Family Members

1. ADA Discrimination

Gordon Trucking also moves to strike Betschart’s allegations

of ADA discrimination based on disabilities experienced by his

wife and stepson because they are scandalous, irrelevant,

impertinent, and prejudicial to Gordon Trucking. Gordon Trucking

asserts that an ADA claim may be based only on discrimination

against a claimant’s own disability. Gordon Trucking cites the

ADA’s language which states “no covered entity shall discriminate

against a qualified individual with a disability because of the

disability of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. §12112(a) (2008). 

However, Gordon failed to read or cite further in the ADA statute

which states “[T]he term ‘discriminat[e]’ includes . . .

excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a

qualified individual because of the known disability of an

individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a

relationship or association.” 42 U.S.C. §12112(b)(4) (2008)

(emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit has found the “qualified

individual” making an ADA claim need not have a disability

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himself. Bates v. United Parcel Service, 465 F.3d 1069, 1082

(9th Cir. 2006). In Bates, the Ninth Circuit held section 12112

(b)(4) “[p]rotects qualified individuals who do not themselves

have disabilities...” Bates,465 F.3d at 1082. Betschart claims

Gordon Trucking terminated him to avoid paying medical bills for

Betschart’s wife and stepson. This expense avoidance is a

recognized form of ADA discrimination. See Dewitt v. Proctor

Hosp., 517 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2008) (court found held ADA and

ERISA claims were valid when they were based on alleged

discriminatory termination by an employer not wanting to pay

medical costs incurred by the plaintiff’s husband); see also Le

v. Applied Biosystems, 886 F. Supp. 717, 720 (N.D. Cal. 1995)

(Where an employer who terminated an employee to avoid payment of

medical benefits for the employee’s daughter’s liver transplant

was found to violate the ADA). Gordon Trucking’s assertion that

an ADA claimant must allege discrimination based on the

claimant’s own disability is incorrect. Gordon Trucking conceded

at oral argument that its position on this claim is incorrect,

and thus, it has abandoned this claim. Gordon Trucking’s motion

to strike allegations based on disabilities experienced by

Betschart’s wife and stepson in violation of ADA is DENIED.

2. FEHA Discrimination

Similar to its ADA requirements assertion, Gordon Trucking

asserts Betschart’s allegations of discrimination based on

disabilities experienced by his wife and stepson, are

superfluous. Gordon Trucking cites the California Government

Code which states

It shall be an unlawful employment practice . . . For

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an employer, because of . . . disability . . . of any

person, to refuse to hire or employ the person or to

refuse to select the person for a training program

leading to employment, or to bar or to discharge the

person from employment or from a training program

leading to employment, or to discriminate against the

person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment.

Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a) (West 2008). 

Pursuant to this statue, Gordon Trucking asserts FEHA

disability discrimination may not be claimed unless the claimant

experiences the disability it is based upon. Again, as with the

ADA claim, Gordon failed to read or cite the entire statute. 

California Government Code Section 12926(m)states “[D]isability

...includes a perception that the person has any of those

characteristics or that the person is associated with a person

who has, or is perceived to have, any of those characteristics.” 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(m) (West 2008). Additionally, California

Administration Code states: “It is unlawful for an employer or

other covered entity to deny employment benefits to, harass, or

intimidate any applicant or employee because the employer or

other covered entity disapproves generally of the applicant’s or

employee’s association with individuals because they are in a

category enumerated in the Act.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2 § 7287.9

(2008). Clearly Section 7287.9 protects claimants who do not

themselves have disabilities. Gordon Trucking conceded at oral

argument that its position on this claim is incorrect, and thus,

it has abandoned this claim. Gordon Trucking’s motion to strike

based on allegations based on disabilities experienced by

Betschart’s wife and stepson in violation of FEHA is DENIED.

3. Wrongful Termination

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 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4)(ADA), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(m) 6

(FEHA); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2 § 7287.9 (FEHA).

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A claim for wrongful termination in violation of public

policy (“Tameny Claim”) is an exception to an at-will employment

agreement and may only be based upon public policy which is

specifically expressed in a constitutional or statutory

provision. Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 1064, 130

Cal.Rptr.2d 892 ( 2003) (“[The] public policy exception to the

at-will employment rule must be based on policies ‘carefully

tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in

constitutional or statutory provisions . . . .’”) (quoting Silo

v. CHW Med. Found., 27 Cal. 4th 1097, 1104, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 698

(2002)); see also Stevenson v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 4th 880,

894, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 (1997). This “tethering” of public

policy to a specific provision avoids judicial policymaking and

ensures that parties have adequate notice of the conduct that

will subject them to tort liability. Stevenson, 16 Cal. 4th at

889. Gordon Trucking asserts because Betschart is alleging

discrimination based on his family members’ disabilities and not

his own, Betschart’s ADA and FEHA disability discrimination

allegations have no statutory basis. As discussed above, there

are statutory provisions explicitly describing the prohibited

conduct addressing allegations of discrimination due to

association with disabled individuals. Betschart’s Tameny claim 6

is properly “tethered” to statutory provisions. Gordon

Trucking’s motion to strike factual allegations supporting a

wrongful termination in violation of public policy due to lack of

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statutory basis is DENIED.

4. CONCLUSION

Defendants motion to strike is DENIED in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 28, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

bb4ed UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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