Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00747/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00747-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jorge A. Alcantar
Petitioner
F. Foulk
Respondent

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JORGE A. ALCANTAR,

Petitioner,

v.

F. FOULK,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00747 LJO MJS (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent is represented by Ivan P. Marrs of 

the office of the Attorney General.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections 

pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Fresno, following 

his conviction by jury trial on September 29, 2011, for second degree murder, and 

enhancements including personally and intentionally discharging a firearm, and 

committing the murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (Clerk's Tr. at 710-13.) 

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Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of fifteen (15) years in state 

prison for the murder conviction, twenty-five (25) years to life on the firearm 

enhancement, and a consecutive ten (10) years on the gang enhancement. (Id.) 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District, on May 31, 2012. (Lodged Doc. 1.) The court affirmed the judgment on October 

1, 2013, but amended the sentence striking the ten (10) year gang enhancement 

sentence and instead imposing a minimum term of fifteen (15) years before Petitioner 

could be considered for parole. (Lodged Doc. 4, at 24, People v. Alcantar, 2013 Cal. 

App. Unpub. LEXIS 7097 (Oct. 1, 2013).) On December 20, 2013, the California 

Supreme Court denied review. (Lodged Docs. 5-6.) Petitioner did not seek collateral 

review of the petition in state court.

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on May 19, 2014. (Pet., ECF 

No. 1.) Petitioner presents two claims for relief in the instant petition. Petitioner alleges 

that there was insufficient evidence to support the gang enhancement, and that his due 

process rights were violated by the denial of the trial court to bifurcate the gang 

enhancement proceedings. (Id. at 4.) Respondent filed an answer to the petition on 

August 20, 2014. (ECF No. 15.) Petitioner filed a traverse on September 18, 2014. (ECF 

No 17.) The matter stands ready for adjudication.

II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 (TRIAL EVIDENCE)

A. THE SHOOTING

Summary

Abraham Leanos (Leanos) and Maciel were friends. Together, they 

walked to a liquor store to buy beer. Maciel was wearing a red outer 

garment, a shirt displaying a large image of a bulldog, and a Fresno State 

cap.[fn4]

FN4: A Fresno City Police Department detective was later asked to 

 

1The Fifth District Court of Appeal’s summary of the facts in its October 1, 2013 opinion is presumed 

correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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investigate Maciel's background and found no information that Maciel was 

a member of the Bulldog gang.

Defendant was in the liquor store with his girlfriend before Maciel 

and Leanos arrived. As a teenager, defendant had joined the Shelltown 

gang - an affiliate of the Sureno gang. The Surenos and Bulldogs are rival 

gangs. Whether defendant was still a member of the Shelltown gang at 

the time of the shooting was disputed at trial.

Defendant and his girlfriend were walking towards the exit of the 

liquor store as Maciel and Leanos entered. There was conflicting evidence 

as to what happened in the crucial seconds that followed.

However, it was undisputed that defendant raised his elbow at or 

near the time Maciel passed him near the store's exit (hereafter, the 

"elbow raise.") Defendant claimed he was merely placing a cigar in his 

mouth. The prosecution contended that defendant intended to bump 

Maciel as an inter-gang gesture of disrespect known as a "hit up."

Eventually, defendant shot and killed Maciel outside the liquor store.

Leanos's Testimony

Leanos testified at trial. Surveillance video from the liquor store 

was admitted into evidence and shown to Leanos during direct 

examination. The prosecutor asked Leanos why the video depicts him 

looking over his left shoulder at one point. Leanos testified that he was 

speaking with Maciel at the time. At this point, the only interaction between 

Leanos and defendant was defendant's "mugging" (i.e., "[l]ooking at you in 

a mad face").

Leanos testified that it appeared on the video that defendant was 

holding what looked to be a cell phone. The prosecutor asked whether 

defendant was "mugging" in the direction of the cell phone or towards 

someone in particular. Leanos replied, "Well, he was looking in our 

direction. You know, I — maybe he was — I don't know, but he was 

looking in our direction when I seen [sic] him."

The surveillance video shows defendant raising his left elbow as 

Maciel and Leanos pass by. Leanos had not observed the "elbow raise" 

that night, and saw it for the first time on the surveillance footage. He 

never saw defendant come into physical contact with Maciel.

The video then shows defendant begin to look over his left 

shoulder. Maciel looked back at defendant. Defendant "started say[ing] 

something" "[w]hen he stepped out the door." When asked what defendant 

said, Leanos testified: "He was like, 'What's up, Homie. You want some? 

Come here. Come here. You want some?' He just kept trying to egg us on 

to go outside." Maciel was still looking at defendant as he spoke. 

Defendant continued to look at Maciel and Leanos while walking 

backwards. Maciel then started walking towards defendant. Leanos 

testified that defendant made a gesture with his hand "kind of telling us to 

'come here.' " At or near the time of this gesture, defendant said, "[C]ome 

here."[fn5] Neither Maciel nor Leanos had said anything to defendant at 

this point.

FN5: The trial court described a gesture Leanos made while offering this 

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testimony as "using his right hand, his hand up in front of him, as if telling 

us to 'come here' waiving his fingers, motioning back toward his body in a 

'come here' motion."

Maciel and Leanos exited the store. Leanos walked out, hesitated, 

heard shots fired and ran back inside the store. He did so because he saw 

defendant "turning around - reaching." He told Maciel, "No. No. Don't go. 

Run." Leanos ran back inside the store. Maciel followed behind, but 

Leanos did not notice him initially. Maciel then fell to the floor and could 

not talk.

Abrego's Testimony

Defendant's girlfriend at the time of the shooting was Maria Abrego 

(Abrego). Prior to arriving at the liquor store, she and defendant ate pizza 

at a nearby restaurant. Defendant consumed one pitcher of beer. 

Afterwards, they went to the liquor store.

The prosecutor showed Abrego the surveillance footage, and she 

identified herself and defendant on the video. The prosecutor asked if she 

recalled defendant raising his left elbow as depicted in the video, and she 

responded, "No. I didn't see it...."

Once she and defendant exited the liquor store, they began to walk 

back towards the nearby pizza restaurant. The video depicts defendant 

raising his right hand, then walking away. Abrego turned back and saw 

"those two men" (i.e., Maciel and Leanos) coming out of the liquor store. 

She then said, "'Oh, they're going to come looking for a fight or 

something.' " She turned again, such that she could no longer see Maciel 

and Leanos. That is when she heard shots, became frightened, and 

crouched down. Defendant began running down the street, and she 

followed.

They ended up at defendant's house, and spent the rest of the 

evening there. She told a detective afterwards that defendant had said to 

her, "Don't worry. Everything is going to be fine. That happens 

sometimes."

Defendant's Testimony Regarding The Shooting[fn6]

FN6: Defendant's testimony from the prior trial was read into the record. 

What follows is a summation of defendant's testimony from both trials.

Defendant testified that he never said anything to "the victims" that 

night. Defendant testified that the "elbow raise" depicted in the video was 

him placing his cigar in his mouth. His girlfriend asked him what was going 

on and he replied, "Just ignore it. Just — nada. Don't listen" He then "kept 

on walking."

Defendant had testified that he did not bump Maciel intentionally, 

and he "didn't think" he had bumped Maciel at all. He never said anything 

to Maciel or Leanos and "wasn't even looking at them." Defendant had 

walked outside the store, and Maciel and Leanos came out afterwards. 

The "guy in the front" said, "What's up now, mother f[**]ker?" Defendant 

thought one or both of them were going to "beat" him "up." He told his 

girlfriend to hurry up, in Spanish. The "guy in front" ran after defendant, 

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with his left hand inside his pocket. Defendant believed the man had a 

knife or a gun. Defendant testified, "That is when I pulled out my gun and 

shot." He shot twice. He did not intend to kill, but he was scared and 

thought the man "was going to get" him.

B. POSTARREST

Search of Defendant's Apartment

Defendant was arrested the next night. The police searched his 

apartment. They located a holster and live ammunition under a refrigerator 

in the apartment. Defendant testified at the first trial that the gun he used 

to shoot Maciel went into the holster found under the refrigerator. One of 

the live rounds of ammunition had a "soft primer strike" on it. A police 

detective testified that soft primer strikes are caused when a round of 

ammunition is ejected from the chamber of a firearm without firing it.

Cell Phone Evidence

A cell phone was recovered from defendant's person when he was 

arrested. The cell phone had a number of text messages that were 

retrieved by law enforcement using computer software. The messages 

were transferred to a printout, which became an exhibit.

One incoming text message, dated March 20, 2011, at 10:45 a.m. 

read: "Sooo..whats going on? *Neon~Moon*" The next text message on 

the exhibit was a "sent message" (i.e., outgoing from defendant's phone), 

dated March 20, 11:31 a.m., which read: "I f[**]ked up"

Another incoming text message, dated March 20, 2011, at 12:13 

p.m. read: "Ur always doing sum stupid when ur drunk..why don't u stop 

drinking n spend more time with ur kids..just sayin [¶] *Neon~Moon*" An 

outgoing text message dated March 20, 2011, at 1:04 p.m., read: "I know. 

This time it might b [sic] to [sic] late"

In an outgoing text message dated March 20, 2011, at 4:46 p.m., a 

text message read: "Nada. Cuida bien a mis bebes." A police detective, 

who is a native Spanish speaker, translated the message as follows: "It 

says, 'Nada,' which means 'nothing.' 'Cuida bien amis [sic] bebes,' which is 

'Take good care of my kids' or 'babies.' "

Another outgoing text message dated March 20, 2011, at 9:07 was 

sent in Spanish. The police detective translated the message as, "'The 

police can find me with my phone on.... I'm going to turn it on from time to 

time.'"

Defendant's Phone Calls From Jail

A police detective testified that inmates of the county jail are given 

jail identification numbers referred to as a "JID." The detective was able to 

retrieve all calls made with defendant's JID and reviewed them. The 

parties stipulated to two translated transcripts of defendant's calls from jail 

on March 22, 2011, and August 3, 2011. Recordings of the two calls were 

played for the jury. The stipulated translation of the August 3, 2011, call 

between defendant and "ET" contains the following pertinent statements 

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by defendant:

"[Defendant]: Well what do you believe ... he told me, I talked to my lawyer 

and he told me to just tell the truth about what happened and well I didn't 

want to do nothing to them but [i]f they would have got me can you 

imagine what the both of them would have done to me. They would have 

f[**]kin' killed me right there.

"ET: Um.

"[Defendant]: I didn't do anything but defend myself ... no, no, no I didn't 

want to kill nobody. It was the last thing that ... that what more ... well I 

was left with no other.... [T]here was no other form. What else could I have 

done? If I would have run they would have caught me."

Later in the call, defendant said, "They would have put me nothing ... they 

would have f[**]kin' killed me between the both of them. And they say that 

I started all the shit I was on the damn phone. I didn't, I didn't even look at 

them or pay attention to them...."

"[Defendant]: I was walking, and I didn't even and he said that I hit him 

with my elbow. I put my damn cigar in my mouth and I didn't even ... and 

when they said something to me well I turned around because I said what 

do these f[**]kers want? And I turned around to see what the f[**]k they 

wanted. And they were ... I don't know what they were telling me but I just 

said "mmhha" all I did was do this with my hand like "mmhha" like [to say] 

go f[**]k yourself, right. I didn't pay attention to them. And that's when they 

came and well I went ... well there is the video. I got the f[**]k out of there 

....

"ET: Yes.

"[Defendant]: I was going to go into the pizzeria, but, but when they were 

coming behind me I said I had no other choice ya. I wait another minute 

and they would have gotten me there."

C. GANG EVIDENCE

Photographs

Photographs were taken from defendant's cell phone and entered 

into evidence, including Exhibits 77 and 79. Both defendant and the gang 

experts testified regarding the photographs, as detailed below.

Officer Castro's Testimony

Classification of Defendant as a Gang Member

Rudy Castro, a San Diego police officer, testified that he 

investigated defendant and validated him as a member of the Shelltown 

38 gang. Shelltown is considered a Sureno gang. Officer Castro testified 

that his criteria for validating defendant as a member of the Shelltown 38 

gang were: self-identification, tattoos, and prior arrests for gang-related 

offenses in association with other gang members.

Officer Castro stated that in "July of 28,"[fn8] defendant was 

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contacted by a police officer and claimed Shelltown gang membership and 

a moniker of "Flacco." A field interview report indicates that in January 

2007, defendant had "a 38 on his right ring finger." Officer Castro testified 

that defendant's tattoo reading "38" stood for "Shelltown 38 Street."

FN8: Presumably, a typographical error in the reporter's transcript.

Officer Castro also testified regarding defendant's association with 

known Shelltown gang members. Defendant had been contacted by law 

enforcement two or three times with a self-professed Shelltown gang 

member, Eduardo Murillo.

Officer Castro testified that defendant had been arrested for 

vandalism for spray painting "Shelltown 38" on a business in National City. 

He told the officer that he is an active member of Shelltown. Defendant 

last admitted gang membership in 2008.

Shelltown Gang's Predicate Offenses

Officer Castro testified regarding predicate offenses for the 

Shelltown gang.

In May 31, 2009, Shelltown gang member Cristobol Nare (Nare) 

was at a party, as was a Mr. Ochoa (Ochoa). Ochoa left the party and 

pulled into an intersection. Nare and two other individuals threw a brick 

through the window of Ochoa's vehicle. Nare and another individual went 

to the driver's side of Ochoa's vehicle and beat the victim. They displayed 

a handgun from the waistband, and stole a jacket and an iPod.

On December 22, 2009, three individuals were walking in the area 

of Shelltown. A couple "Hispanic males approached," and asked the 

individuals what they had in their pockets. One of the male suspects 

produced a knife and "wanted the property they had on them." As they 

were taking the property from the vicitim, the suspect "essentially" told 

them, "This is Shelltown." The suspect was arrested and identified as Joey 

Negrette, a Shelltown gang member.

In August 2010, Johnny Nava (Nava) and Orlando Aguilar (Aguilar) 

walked into a food store. Aguilar took some beer and attempted to leave 

without paying for it. A security guard confronted them at the door, and 

Nava said, " 'What are you going to do? This is Shelltown.' " Nava lifted up 

his shirt, showing a handgun to the security guard. They were arrested 

minutes later.

Exhibit 77

Officer Castro was shown Exhibit 77, a photograph depicting 

defendant and a female. He testified that defendant and the female were 

displaying gang hand signs in the photograph. He said that defendant was 

making a sign indicating the number "20." This was a gang-related symbol 

because the letters "S" and "T" are an abbreviation for "Shelltown" and "T" 

is the twentieth letter of the alphabet. Officer Castro did not know whether 

the Chargers played on the "file date" of the photograph, December 5, 

2010.

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Cross-Examination Regarding Defendant's Alleged "Move Out" 

from Shelltown Gang

The following colloquy occurred on cross-examination:

"[Defense counsel]: Do you know whether or not [defendant] was ever 

jumped out [of the gang]?

"[Officer Castro]: No.

"[Defense counsel]: Do you know how a person leaves a gang?

"[Officer Castro]: Either die or jump out or just move out; there are several 

different ways.

"[Defense counsel]: San Diego is how far from Fresno?

"[Officer Castro]: About eight hours.

"[Defense counsel]: Would you consider that a 'move out'?

"[Officer Castro]: Yes."

Detective Kyle Kramer's Testimony

Fresno City Police Detective Kyle Kramer (Kramer) testified as a 

gang expert for the prosecution. Detective Kramer validated defendant as 

a gang member. Detective Kramer located six jail classification 

questionnaires from 2000 to 2011, which indicate that defendant identified 

himself as a gang member. In five of the questionnaires, the identified 

gang was "San Diego Sureno." In the remaining questionnaire, the 

identified gang was simply, "Sureno."

Detective Kramer said that a tattoo of the words Shelltown and 

"what appears to be a shell," are indicative of gang membership. He 

continued to describe the remainder of defendant's tattoos as indicative of 

gang affiliation.

Exhibit 77

Detective Kramer was shown Exhibit 77. Detective Kramer 

described defendant's hand positioning as "putting up two fingers, and 

with the remaining thumb and the pinky and the ring finger ... forming ... a 

zero. The significance of that being signifying the number 20, being the 

letter T for Shelltown, and the female appears to be doing the same thing." 

Detective Kramer testified that the photograph's "file date" of December 5, 

2010, was evidence of recent gang affiliation or identification.

Exhibit 79

Detective Kramer was shown Exhibit 79, a photograph. He 

described the photograph as depicting a headstone of one, Martin Castro, 

Jr. Based on his conversations with an Officer Castro, Detective Kramer 

testified that Martin Castro, Jr., was a Shelltown gang member at the time 

of his death. On the headstone appears the number "192," which 

references the 19th and 20th letters of the alphabet.

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Gang Colors

Detective Kramer was asked whether there are any colors of 

clothing associated with Surenos, other than blue. Detective Kramer 

responded that he has seen the use of "all black clothing" for the purposes 

of "trying to get away from the primary color of blue" and to "blend in with 

the environment" "especially at nighttime." He also said that someone 

could wear the color black because they did not want to associate with 

gangs any longer.[fn9]

FN9: Officer Castro testified that gang members do wear black, but he 

"wouldn't say because someone is wearing black they are gang 

members." 

Sureno Gang's Predicate Offenses

The prosecutor acknowledged that there had already been 

testimony at trial regarding the Shelltown gang's primary activities. 

Nonetheless, because "Shelltown is a subset of Surenos" the prosecutor 

asked for an example of Sureno criminal activity in Fresno County. Kramer 

testified that Sureno activities in Fresno County included "drive-by 

shootings, possession of controlled substances and firearms, assault with 

deadly weapons, murders, things of that nature." He then identified 

specific crimes committed by Sureno gang members, including an assault 

with a deadly weapon on August 24, 2008; possession of a firearm on July 

20, 2006; attempted murder on March 31, 2009; and arson on November 

18, 2008.

Gang Culture Testimony

Kramer spoke about the importance of respect in gang culture, 

where a weak reputation will lead to frequent victimization and the 

eventual demise of a gang. Conversely, a gang that has achieved 

"respect" for being violent has a number of advantages. For example, 

individuals are less likely to speak to the police out of fear of violent 

retaliation by the gang.

In order to enhance their gang's respect and reputation for violence, 

rival gang members will physically or verbally challenge one another. 

These challenges are called "hit ups." They are intentional signs of 

disrespect, which demand a response. If the insulted gang member 

does not respond to the "hit up," it is a sign of weakness in gang culture.

A physical hit up can be one gang member bumping into a rival 

gang member. Examples of verbal hit ups include saying, "What's up? 

Come on," or "What's up essay [sic]?"

The prosecutor asked Kramer how shooting someone after a hit up 

would promote or further the Sureno gang. Kramer testified: "When you 

have these, the commission of these violent crimes, whether it be against 

somebody who is perceived to be a rival gang member, the status of the 

gang within the gang culture is enhanced. The violent reputation of the 

gang within the gang culture itself is enhanced. [¶] This does a couple of 

things. It instills fear really and intimidated [sic] not only the rival gangs, 

but the community that exists within that area where crime occurs; the 

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people who frequent the area, customers, residents, things of that 

nature.... The result of that being they're feared [sic], and ... not likely to 

cooperate with ... law enforcement. They're not likely to come testify in 

court. They are not even likely to call the police when they hear shots 

fired, or that somebody could potentially be the victim of a crime. That is ... 

what the benefit to the gang is."

Testimony Regarding Defendant's "Elbow Raise"

Kramer was shown the surveillance video from the night of the 

shooting. Kramer said that given Maciel's clothing, he would look like a 

Bulldog gang member to a Sureno. He testified that defendant's elbow 

raise was a physical hit up. He noted that defendant does not challenge 

Leanos in the video, but instead "goes right to and makes the contact with 

the one that is in all red."

Defendant's Testimony Regarding Gang Issues

Defendant testified he was not "gang banging" on the night of the 

shooting. He has had tattoos since he was a teenager that read: 

"Shelltown," "38," "Tres Ocho," and "SD." He also had a tattoo of three 

dots. Defendant testified that when he got the tattoos, they showed his 

commitment to the Shelltown gang. He did not have the tattoos removed 

because it would be expensive. He got the "Shelltown" tattoo when he 

was 17 or 18. At the time of trial he was 32.

Defendant acknowledged that he was previously a member of the 

Shelltown gang. At the previous trial, defendant testified that the shooting 

had nothing to do with his prior membership in a gang.

Defendant testified that the "elbow raise" depicted in the video was 

him placing his cigar in his mouth.

Defendant testified regarding Exhibit 77. He testified that he 

"believe[d]" that the photograph was taken December 5, 2010. Defendant 

was asked what he was doing with his fingers in the photograph and he 

replied, "That was an away Chargers game, and we just was — it was just 

victory; whatever you want to call it."

Amalia Gonzalez

Amalia Gonzalez is defendant's sister. She testified that she was 

the female depicted in Exhibit 77. She said that she has never been a 

member of "the Shelltown crew" and has never been a "gang banger."

She testified that defendant moved to Fresno to "be there" for his 

kids and to "get away from his gang." As far as she knew, defendant had 

"[n]othing to do with Shelltown" after he left San Diego.

Physical Evidence

When law enforcement searched defendant's apartment, they 

located San Diego Chargers paraphernalia, including a towel and multiple 

articles of clothing.

People v. Alcantar, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7097, *2-22 (Oct. 1, 2013).

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 

2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he 

suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. (Pet.) In 

addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Fresno County Superior Court, 

which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); 2254(a). 

Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over the instant action. 

B. Legal Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus 

filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 

114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed after the enactment 

of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by AEDPA provisions. 

Under AEDPA, a person in custody under a judgment of a state court may only be 

granted a writ of habeas corpus for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams, 529 U.S. at 375 n. 7. Federal habeas corpus 

relief is available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings if the 

state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

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1. Contrary to or an Unreasonable Application of Federal Law

A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "applies a rule that 

contradicts governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases" or "confronts a set of facts 

that [are] materially indistinguishable from [a Supreme Court case] but reaches a 

different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 

405-06). "AEDPA does not require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly 

identical factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied . . . The statute recognizes . . 

. that even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner." Panetti v. 

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The 

"clearly established Federal law" requirement "does not demand more than a ‘principle' 

or ‘general standard.'" Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 839 (2009). For a state 

decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under § 

2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court's prior decisions must provide a governing legal principle 

(or principles) to the issue before the state court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-

71 (2003). A state court decision will involve an "unreasonable application of" federal 

law only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 75-76 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 

409-10); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002). In Harrington v. Richter, the 

Court further stresses that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from 

an incorrect application of federal law." 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (citing Williams, 529 

U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks 

merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the 

correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 653, 664 (2004)). Further, "[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts 

have in reading outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Id.; Renico v. Lett, 130 S. 

Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010). "It is not an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been 

squarely established by this Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 

(2009) (quoted by Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786). 

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2. Review of State Decisions

"Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, 

later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the claim rest on the same 

grounds." See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This is referred to as the 

"look through" presumption. Id. at 804; Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 

(9th Cir. 2006). Determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an 

unreasonable legal or factual conclusion, "does not require that there be an opinion from 

the state court explaining the state court's reasoning." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. 

"Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas 

petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the 

state court to deny relief." Id. "This Court now holds and reconfirms that § 2254(d) does 

not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been 

‘adjudicated on the merits.'" Id. 

Richter instructs that whether the state court decision is reasoned and explained, 

or merely a summary denial, the approach to evaluating unreasonableness under § 

2254(d) is the same: "Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments 

or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court's decision; then 

it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments 

or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court." Id. at 786. 

Thus, "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion 

was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75). AEDPA "preserves 

authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could 

disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents." Id.

(emphasis added). To put it yet another way:

As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus relief from a federal 

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there 

was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.

Id. at 786-87. The Court then explains the rationale for this rule, i.e., "that state courts 

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are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions." Id. at 

787. It follows from this consideration that § 2254(d) "complements the exhaustion 

requirement and the doctrine of procedural bar to ensure that state proceedings are the 

central process, not just a preliminary step for later federal habeas proceedings." Id.

(citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977)).

3. Prejudicial Impact of Constitutional Error

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether 

the error had "a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 

verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 

U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (holding that the Brecht standard applies whether or not the 

state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness). Some constitutional 

errors, however, do not require that the petitioner demonstrate prejudice. See Arizona v. 

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 

(1984).

IV. REVIEW OF PETITION

A. Claim One: Insufficient Evidence to Support Gang Enhancement

Petitioner, in his first claim for relief, asserts that there was insufficient evidence to 

support his enhancement for committing the murder for the benefit of a criminal street 

gang. (Pet. at 4.)

1. State Court Decision

The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the Court of Appeal (Lodged 

Doc. 4.) and in a subsequent petition for review filed with California Supreme Court

(Lodged Doc. 6.) "[W]here there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a 

federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the claim 

rest on the same grounds." See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This is 

referred to as the "look through" presumption. Id. at 804. Since the Court of Appeal was 

the last court to issue a reasoned opinion on this issue, this Court “looks through” the 

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California Supreme Court decision to the reasoned analysis of the Court of Appeal. In 

the last reasoned decision denying Petitioner's claim, the appellate court explained:

ANALYSIS

I. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S 

TRUE FINDING ON THE SECTION 186.22, SUBDIVISION (b)(1) 

ENHANCEMENT

Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support 

the jury's true finding regarding the section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) 

enhancement. We disagree.

"When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, ' 

"[t]he court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the 

judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence ... 

such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond 

a reasonable doubt." ' [Citation.]" (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 

942.) Evidence is "substantial" when it is reasonable, credible and of solid 

value. (Ibid.) Substantial evidence may include circumstantial evidence 

and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. (Id. at p. 943.)

Section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) applies to individuals who 

commit a felony "for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with 

any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or 

assist in any criminal conduct by gang members." (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1). 

) In other words, it applies to "when a defendant has personally committed 

a gang-related felony with the specific intent to aid members of that gang." 

(People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 68 (Albillar).)

Thus, the provision has two prongs. The first prong is that 

defendant is convicted of a felony "committed for the benefit of, at the 

direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang." (Albillar, supra, 

51 Cal.4th at p. 67.) The second prong is a scienter requirement that the 

defendant committed the gang-related felony "'with the specific intent to 

promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members.'" (Id.

at p. 64.)

A. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE FIRST PRONG OF 

THE GANG ENHANCEMENT

Defendant relies on a number of cases for essentially the same 

proposition: that the elements of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) are not 

satisfied merely by evidence that a gang member committed a 

felony.[fn11] (See People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355 (Olguin); 

People v. Ochoa (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 650 (Ochoa); People v. Albarran

(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214 (Albarran); and People v. Ramon (2009) 175 

Cal.App.4th 843 (Ramon).) In other words, not all crimes committed by 

gang members are necessarily gang-related for purposes of subdivision 

(b)(1).

FN11: See appellant's opening brief at page 19 [arguing that Olguin 

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recognized as "plausible" the argument that a gang member's crime was 

committed for personal rather than gang-related reasons]; id. at p. 23 

[arguing that Albarran court "concluded that despite the evidence that the 

defendant was a gang member, the motive for the underlying crimes 'was 

not apparent from the circumstances of the crime.'"; id. at p. 24 [arguing 

that Ochoa reached same result as Albarran that gang membership alone 

could not sustain inference that crime was gang related despite expert 

witness's testimony to the contrary]; id. at pp. 24-25 [arguing that Ramon

court held "the mere fact that the individuals involved in the crime were 

gang members did not suffice to prove their criminal acts were carried out 

in order to promote their gang"].

It is true that a "gang enhancement cannot be sustained based 

solely on defendant's status as a member of the gang and his subsequent 

commission of crimes." (Ochoa, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 663.) But the 

jury's verdict here was supported by more. Not only was there evidence 

that defendant became a member of a gang and thereafter committed a 

crime, there was also evidence that the specific crime was gang-related.

At trial, the parties offered two competing theories as to the 

purpose of defendant's "elbow raise" near the time he passed Maciel in 

the store. Defendant contended that he was merely placing his cigar into 

his mouth. Conversely, the prosecution offered their expert's testimony 

that the "elbow raise" was in fact a "hit up" (i.e., gang challenge) directed 

to Maciel. The prosecution's suggested inference is reasonable, as we 

explain post.

In the surveillance video, Leanos does not appear to be wearing 

any red or any depictions of bulldogs. There appears to be no physical 

interaction between defendant and Leanos as they pass each other. It is 

only when defendant passes Maciel that physical interaction occurs.[fn12]

Defendant raised his elbow while passing Maciel, who was wearing red 

outerwear, a black shirt depicting a bulldog, and a California State 

University — Fresno[fn13] hat. This evidence gives rise to the inference 

defendant perceived Maciel to be a member of a rival gang.[fn14]

FN12: As Kramer testified, defendant does not challenge Leanos in the 

video, but instead "goes right to and makes the contact with the one that is 

in all red [Maciel]."

FN13: Fresno State's mascot is a bulldog.

FN14 Defendant argues that "[a]lthough Kramer testified that to a Sureno, 

Maciel would appear to be a Bulldog gang member, Maciel's apparel was 

equally consistent with being a fan ...." But simply raising alternative, 

innocuous explanations of the evidence is not enough to warrant reversal. 

(See People v. Lopez (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1028, 1072.) "Under the 

substantial evidence rule ... ' "if the circumstances reasonably justify the 

jury's findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the 

circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary 

finding." ' " (Ibid.)

Moreover, this contention ignores the fact Maciel's clothing was not 

the only evidence that defendant perceived Maciel to be a gang member. 

Defendant passed Leanos, apparently without incident, seconds before 

raising his elbow near Maciel. And, defendant did not kill Leanos.

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The evidence showed defendant was, at least at one point in his 

life, a member of the Shelltown gang, a subset of the Sureno gang. There 

was also evidence the Surenos and Bulldogs are rival gangs. Viewed 

together, this evidence gives rise to the inference defendant perceived 

Maciel to be a rival gang member and intentionally "hit" him "up."

When the inference supporting the judgment is reasonable, any 

contrary inferences are irrelevant.[fn15] (See People v. Kraft (2000) 23 

Cal.4th 978, 1058.) Moreover, the jury could have even accepted both 

sides' proposed inferences, and concluded that defendant's elbow raise 

was both a "hit up" and a manner of placing the cigar in his mouth.

FN15: Defendant testified that he was placing a cigar into his mouth. 

Additionally, one of the surveillance videos depicts him placing the cigar 

into his mouth near the time he passes Maciel.

Regardless, we draw whichever inference supports the judgment 

on appeal. (See People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 56, fn. 22.) Here, 

the judgment-supporting inference is that defendant intentionally raised his 

elbow in an act of hostility towards someone displaying a rival gang's color 

(red) and symbol (bulldog). We presume that inference is correct and that 

defendant did "hit up" Maciel in the seconds before the shooting. (See

People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 564 [on review, "we presume the 

existence of every fact in support of the verdict that reasonably could be 

inferred from the evidence"].)

Given that there was crime-specific evidence of gang-relatedness, 

Detective Kramer permissibly offered his opinion that a similarly-described 

hypothetical crime would be gang-related. (See People v. Xue Vang

(2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1052 ["[N]o statute prohibits an expert from 

expressing an opinion regarding whether a crime was gang related. 

Indeed, it is settled that an expert may express such an opinion."].)

On this topic, Detective Kramer testified that a post "hit up" 

shooting benefits the shooter's gang. He testified that, "[w]hen you have ... 

the commission of these violent crimes, whether it be against somebody 

who is perceived to be a rival gang member, the ... violent reputation of 

the gang ... is enhanced." This testimony was sufficient. "Expert opinion 

that particular criminal conduct benefited a gang by enhancing its 

reputation for viciousness can be sufficient to raise the inference that the 

conduct was 'committed for the benefit of ... a[] criminal street gang' within 

the meaning of section 186.22(b)(1)." (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 63. 

See also People v. Xue Vang, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1048.)

B. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE SECOND PRONG OF 

THE GANG ENHANCEMENT

Kramer's Opinion

Defendant argues Kramer's opinion that he "specifically intended to 

promote Surenos" lacks evidentiary support. This characterization of 

Kramer's opinion is inaccurate. Kramer testified as to how, hypothetically, 

[fn16] a post-"hit up" shooting would benefit the shooter's gang. We see 

no indication in the record that Kramer directly testified as to defendant's 

intent.

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FN16: A gang expert's testimony on this issue is frequently (and 

appropriately) offered with respect to a "hypothetical" crime with similar 

facts to the charged crime. (People v. Xue Vang, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 

1045, 1047-1048; In re Frank S. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1197. See, 

e.g., Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 63; People v. Morales (2003) 112 

Cal.App.4th 1176, 1197. Cf. People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 

946 ["'Generally, an expert may render opinion testimony on the basis of 

facts given "in a hypothetical question that asks the expert to assume their 

truth." '"])

Rather, Kramer offered an explanation of defendant's "elbow raise" 

based on his knowledge regarding gang culture and habits. And, contrary 

to defendant's apparent contention on appeal,[fn17] Detective Kramer was 

entitled to offer that explanation. (In re Frank S., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1196 [expert may testify to gang culture and habits].) "It is well settled 

that a trier of fact may rely on expert testimony about gang culture and 

habits to reach a finding on a gang allegation." (Ibid.) "'It is difficult to 

imagine a clearer need for expert explication than that presented by a 

subculture in which this type of mindless retaliation promotes "respect."'" 

(People v. Gonzalez, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 945.)

FN17: Defendant cites Ochoa's description of the relevant expert 

testimony in that case as doing "'"nothing more than [improperly] 

inform[ing] the jury how [the expert] believed the case should be decided,."

" (See Ochoa, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 662.)

There is an important difference between an expert's testimony that 

"a specific individual possessed a specific intent," and testimony that 

"give[s] meaning to the defendant's actions." (In re Frank S., supra, 141 

Cal.App.4th 1192, 1197-1198. Cf. People v. Xue Vang, supra, 52 Cal.4th 

at pp. 1045-1051.) Here, Detective Kramer offered one plausible 

explanation of defendant's elbow raise (i.e., that it was a gang "hit up"). He 

did not baldly assert that defendant had a particular intent.

Substantial Evidence of Intent

As we will explain, Kramer's testimony gave meaning to 

defendant's conduct and, in conjunction with the evidence of defendant's 

conduct itself, was sufficient to support the intent requirement of the gang 

enhancement statute.

"'[I]ntent is inherently difficult to prove by direct evidence. 

Therefore, the act itself, together with its surrounding circumstances must 

generally form the basis from which the intent of the actor may legitimately 

be inferred.'" (People v. Edwards (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1099.)" '[W]e 

routinely draw inferences about intent from the predictable results of 

action. We cannot look into people's minds directly to see their purposes. 

We can discover mental state only from how people act and what they 

say.'" (People v. Miranda (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 398, 411-412.) That is 

why we have recognized that "[p]roof of intent may be made by way of 

inferences from a defendant's volitional acts which are done with 

knowledge of the probable consequences ...." (People v. Pitts (1990) 223 

Cal.App.3d 606, 892-893.)

Detective Kramer's testimony went to the "predictable results" and 

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"probable consequences" of hitting up a rival gang member and then 

shooting them. The result is the gang's reputation for violence is elevated 

which enhances the gang's ability to commit future crimes.

There was also evidence that defendant acted with knowledge of 

those probable consequences. "Knowledge, like intent, is rarely 

susceptible of direct proof and generally must be established by 

circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences to which it gives 

rise." (People v. Buckley (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 489, 494-495.) Here, the 

evidence that defendant was, at a minimum, a former gang member gives 

rise to a reasonable inference that defendant was familiar with gang 

culture and knew of the probable consequences of a "successful" hit 

up.[fn18] Thus, "although no direct evidence showed defendant acted with 

the required knowledge ... there was substantial evidence from which a 

rational trier of fact could have found he in fact possessed such a mental 

state." (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 851, overruled on other 

grounds by Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13.)

FN18: Detective Kramer testified that this type of interaction between rival 

gang members occurs "quite often."

In sum, there is substantial evidence supporting all of the following: 

(1) defendant intentionally "hit up" Maciel; (2) that a "successful" hit up 

enhances a gang's reputation for violence and ability to commit future 

crimes; and (3) defendant was, at a minimum, a prior gang member, which 

gives rise to the inference that he knew the benefits of a "successful" hit 

up to a gang. This was sufficient because, as we noted earlier, a 

"defendant's intentional acts, when combined with his knowledge that 

those acts would assist crimes by fellow gang members, afford[s] 

sufficient evidence of the ... specific intent" required by section 186.22, 

subdivision (b)(1). (People v. Morales, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 1198-

1199.)

People v. Alcantar, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7097 at 22-34.

2. Legal Standards

a. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a criminal 

defendant from conviction "except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 

necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 

364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970); accord Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 

1274 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, a state prisoner who alleges that the evidence introduced at 

trial was insufficient to support the jury's findings states a cognizable federal habeas 

claim. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401-02, 113 S. Ct. 853, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203 

(1993). But the prisoner faces a "heavy burden" to prevail on such a claim. See Juan H., 

408 F.3d at 1274, 1275 n.13. Under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 

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2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979) (italics in original), the question is whether "any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt."

When determining the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court makes no 

determination of the facts in the ordinary sense of resolving factual disputes. See

Sarausad v. Porter, 479 F.3d 671, 678 (9th Cir. 2007). Rather, the reviewing court "must 

respect the province of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve 

evidentiary conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts by assuming 

that the jury resolved all conflicts in a manner that supports the verdict." See Walters v. 

Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 324, 

326. Thus, in determining the sufficiency of the evidence, "the assessment of the 

credibility of witnesses is generally beyond the scope of review." See Schlup v. Delo, 

513 U.S. 298, 330, 115 S. Ct. 851, 130 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1995); see also United States v. 

Lindsey, 634 F.3d 541, 552 (9th Cir. 2011); Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 957 (9th 

Cir. 2004) ("A jury's credibility determinations are . . . entitled to near-total deference 

under Jackson.").

While "'mere suspicion or speculation cannot be the basis for the creation of 

logical inferences,'" see Maass, 45 F.3d at 1358 (citation omitted), "'[c]ircumstantial 

evidence can be used to prove any fact, including facts from which another fact is to be 

inferred, and is not to be distinguished from testimonial evidence insofar as the jury's 

fact-finding function is concerned,'" Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(citation omitted). Furthermore, "to establish sufficient evidence, the prosecution need 

not affirmatively 'rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt.'" Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 

1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 

120 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1992)).

A state court's resolution of an insufficiency of the evidence claim is evaluated 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), not § 2254(d)(2). See Emery v. Clark, 643 F.3d 1210, 

1213-14 (9th Cir. 2011) ("When we undertake collateral review of a state court decision 

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rejecting a claim of insufficiency of the evidence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), . . . 

we ask only whether the state court's decision was contrary to or reflected an 

unreasonable application of Jackson to the facts of a particular case."); see also Long v. 

Johnson, 736 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2013) ("The pivotal question, then, is whether the 

California Court of Appeal . . . unreasonably applied Jackson in affirming Petitioner's 

conviction for second-degree murder."); Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 965 (9th Cir. 

2011). ("[T]he state court's application of the Jackson standard must be 'objectively 

unreasonable' to warrant habeas relief for a state court prisoner."); Juan H., 408 F.3d at 

1275 ("[W]e must ask whether the decision of the California Court of Appeal reflected an 

'unreasonable application of' Jackson and Winship to the facts of this case.") (citing 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).

Finally, in adjudicating an insufficiency of the evidence claim, a federal habeas 

court "look[s] to [state] law only to establish the elements of [the crime] and then turn[s] 

to the federal question of whether the [state court] was objectively unreasonable in 

concluding that sufficient evidence supported [the conviction]." See Juan H., 408 F.3d at 

1278 n.14 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16); Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 

(9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) ("The Jackson standard must be applied with explicit reference 

to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law.") (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

b. California Law Regarding Criminal Street Gang Enhancement

To establish a gang enhancement, the prosecution must prove two elements: (1) 

that the crime was "committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with 

any criminal street gang," and (2) that the defendant had "the specific intent to promote, 

further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members ...." Cal. Penal Code § 

186.22(b)(1).) "Not every crime committed by gang members is related to a gang." 

People v. Albillar, 51 Cal.4th 47, 60, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 415, 244 P.3d 1062 (2005). Even 

"when two or more gang members commit a crime together, they may be on a frolic and 

detour unrelated to the gang." Emery v. Clark, 643 F.3d 1210, 1214 (9th Cir. 2011) 

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(citing Albillar, 244 P.3d at 1072.)

The specific intent element of § 186.22(b)(1) does not "require[ ] that the 

defendant act with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist a gang; the statute 

requires only the specific intent to promote, further, or assist criminal conduct by gang 

members." Albillar, 51 Cal.4th at 67. This element "applies to any criminal conduct, 

without a further requirement that the conduct be apart from the criminal conduct 

underlying the offense of conviction sought to be enhanced." Id. at 66; see Emery v. 

Clark, 643 F.3d at 1215 (recognizing that Albillar "definitively interpreted § 186.22(b)(1)," 

"overruled" the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the statute, and that federal courts are 

bound by the California Supreme Court's interpretation).

Evidence that a crime would enhance a gang's status or reputation or that it would 

intimidate rival gangs or potential witnesses within the gang's territory, has been found to 

be sufficient to support a finding that the crime was "for the benefit of" the gang. See, 

e.g., People v. Garcia, 153 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1503-06, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 104 (2007).

3. Analysis

Petitioner presents two arguments as to why there was insufficient evidence to 

prove the enhancement. First, he contends that there was insufficient evidence that he 

was affiliated with a criminal street gang at the time of the offense. (Pet. at 4.) As 

described by the California Court of Appeal, there was significant evidence presented at 

trial that Petitioner was, at least at some point, a member of the Shelltown 38 gang, a 

subset of the Sureno gang. Petitioner had previously identified himself as a member of 

the Sureno gang to police officers over six times between the period between 2000 to 

2011, and he had a “38” tattooed on his finger, which the gang expert opined stood for 

the Shelltown 38 Street gang. He had associated with other members known to be in the 

gang, and was arrested for vandalism for spray painting a building with “Shelltown 38.”

There was ample evidence showing that Petitioner was a gang member. To the extent 

that Petitioner argues that he was no longer affiliated with a criminal street gang, or that 

evidence that he was associated with a gang at the time of the murder was based only 

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on speculation is without merit. 

As described, Petitioner had admitted to gang membership to the police six times 

between 2000 and 2011. The crime of conviction was committed in May 2011, less than 

a year after Petitioner last admitted gang affiliation. Petitioner did not present any 

intervening evidence that he had left or disassociated from the gang. The inference that 

Petitioner was still a member or associated with the gang was based on significant 

evidence and not on mere speculation alone. Viewing the evidence underlying 

Petitioner’s gang affiliation in a light most favorable to the prosecution, it was a 

reasonable inference that Petitioner was still a gang member at the time the incident 

occurred, and Petitioner’s first argument is without merit.

Petitioner’s second dispute is that there was not sufficient evidence to show that 

the crime was committed with the intent to benefit the criminal street gang. Petitioner 

argues that the only evidence that Petitioner “hit up” the victim was based on the 

testimony of the gang expert, and that Petitioner, as a former gang member, had no 

motive to “hit up” the victim or shoot him for the benefit of his former gang. 

The California Court of Appeal found, based on the gang expert’s hypothetical,

the plausible explanation of the elbow raise was a “hit up” and a challenge to a rival 

gang. The Court further found that the gang expert’s testimony gave meaning to 

Petitioner’s conduct, and, along with evidence of the actual conduct of Petitioner, there 

was sufficient evidence to show that the conduct in question was committed with the 

intent to benefit the gang. 

After explaining that intent is usually difficult to prove based on direct evidence 

alone, the state court looked at Petitioner’s actions with the knowledge of the probable 

consequences of the actions to create inferences establishing the proof of intent. The 

Court found that the expert’s testimony provided evidence that the predictable results 

and probable consequences of “hitting up” a rival gang member and then shooting them 

is that the gang’s reputation for violence would be elevated enhancing the ability of the 

gang to commit further crimes. As Petitioner had been a gang member for a long time 

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period, the expert opined that it was likely that Petitioner would have knowledge of the 

probable consequences of a gang “hit up.”

The gang expert's testimony provided sufficient evidence to support the 

conviction. "[T]o prove the elements of the criminal street gang enhancement, the 

prosecution may ... present expert testimony on criminal street gangs." People v. 

Hernandez, 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1047-48, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 880, 94 P.3d 1080 (2004).

Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support inferences that Petitioner, with a 

long history of gang involvement intentionally “hit up” the victim, that he knew that a 

successful hit up benefitted the gang’s reputation for violence and to commit further 

crimes, and therefore had the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in the gang’s 

criminal conduct. 

Under Jackson and AEDPA, the state decision is entitled to double deference on 

habeas review. There was sufficient evidence in the trial record, direct evidence and 

evidence from the gang expert, to deny Petitioner's challenge to the finding that the 

crime was committed in furtherance of the criminal street gang. There was no 

constitutional error, and Petitioner is not entitled to relief with regard to this claim.

B. Claim Two: Denial of Motion to Bifurcate Gang Enhancement

Petitioner, in his second claim for relief, asserts that his due process rights were 

violated by the trial court’s denial of the motion to bifurcate the gang enhancement from 

the prosecution of Petitioner’s substantive offenses. (Pet. at 4.)

1. State Court Decision

The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the Court of Appeal (Lodged 

Doc. 4.) and in a subsequent petition for review filed with California Supreme Court

(Lodged Doc. 6.) Since the Court of Appeal was the last court to issue a reasoned 

opinion on this issue, this Court “looks through” the California Supreme Court decision to 

the reasoned analysis of the Court of Appeal. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803-

04. In the last reasoned decision denying Petitioner's claim, the appellate court 

explained:

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THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION TO BIFURCATE

Defendant contends that the trial court's denial of his motion to 

bifurcate the gang enhancement from the substantive offense was 

erroneous and prejudicial. We disagree.

A trial court's bifurcation ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 

(See People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1048.) A trial court's 

discretion to deny bifurcation of a gang enhancement is broader than its 

discretion to admit gang evidence when no gang enhancement is charged. 

(Id. at p. 1050.)

Defendant argues that "the prosecut[ion's] entire theory was 

centered on the fact this was a gang offense motivated by gang rivalry that 

benefitted the Surenos and relied on gang evidence and expert opinion to 

do so." There is nothing wrong with what defendant describes.

There are multiple ways gang evidence is used at trial. Some uses 

are appropriate and others are not. For example, it is improper to 

introduce gang evidence to establish "the defendant has a criminal 

disposition and is therefore guilty of the offense charged." (People v. 

Williams (1997) 17 Cal.4th 148, 193.) But, it is not improper to introduce 

gang evidence to establish a defendant's motive. Even in cases where no 

gang enhancement is charged, "[e]vidence of the defendant's gang 

affiliation ... can help prove ... motive ... specific intent ... or other issues 

pertinent to guilt of the charged crime." (People v. Hernandez, supra, 33 

Cal.4th at p. 1049.) "[I]n a gang-related case, gang evidence is admissible 

if relevant to motive ... so long as its probative value is not outweighed by 

its prejudicial effect." (People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 193. See 

also People v. Funes (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1518.) Here, the gang 

evidence was used in a permissible manner: to establish motive and 

intent.

Defendant claimed he acted in self-defense when he shot Maciel. 

The gang evidence contradicted this theory. If defendant believed Maciel 

was a rival gang member and "hit" him "up" seconds before the shooting, 

the theory of self-defense becomes far less plausible. The prosecution 

was entitled to make this argument and present evidence supporting it. It 

was not inadmissible evidence of a defendant's criminal disposition, (see

Evid. Code § 1101), but rather evidence of motive and intent.

As noted above, there was also evidence introduced regarding 

"predicate offenses" of the Surenos and Shelltown gangs. There is no 

question that this evidence was relevant to the gang enhancement. (See § 

186.22, subd. (e).) However, as defendant points out, there was no 

evidence that he was involved in the predicate offenses identified by the 

gang experts. Thus, the predicate offense evidence had little probative 

value, if any, with respect to the second degree murder charge. But, 

defendant's noninvolvement in the predicate offenses also reduces the 

likelihood of undue prejudice. The evidence does not directly implicate 

prior criminal activity by defendant, and is therefore less likely to facilitate 

improper "criminal propensity" reasoning by the jury.

Ultimately, the question of whether the predicate offense evidence 

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would have been admissible in the absence of the gang enhancement is 

not dispositive. "Even if some of the evidence offered to prove the gang 

enhancement would be inadmissible at a trial of the substantive crime 

itself — for example, if some of it might be excluded under Evidence Code 

section 352 as unduly prejudicial when no gang enhancement is charged 

— a court may still deny bifurcation." (People v. Hernandez, supra, 33 

Cal.4th at p. 1050.) Here, the predicate offense evidence was not 

particularly inflammatory.[fn19] Moreover, it was not evidence "of offenses 

for which a defendant might have escaped punishment." (Id. at p. 1051.) 

To the contrary, there was no evidence defendant was implicated in the 

predicate offenses at all.

FN19: Detective Kramer's testimony regarding prior offenses by Sureno 

gang members was essentially limited to the name of the offender, type of 

offense (e.g., "assault with a deadly weapon"), applicable statute, and 

date of offense. Detective Kramer did not testify to any inflammatory 

details of the crimes.

Additionally, the court instructed the jury on the limited purposes for 

which the gang evidence could be considered. The court stated, "You may 

consider evidence of gang activity only for the limited purpose of deciding 

whether the defendant acted with the intent, purpose and knowledge that 

are required to prove malice aforethought and/or the gang-related 

enhancement charged." "[W]e presume the jury faithfully followed the 

court's limiting instruction." (People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 776.)

"Even if some of the expert testimony would not have been 

admitted at a trial limited to guilt, the countervailing considerations that 

apply when the enhancement is charged permitted a unitary trial." (People 

v. Hernandez, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1051.)

People v. Alcantar, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7097 at 34-38.

2. Analysis

The United States Supreme Court has not determined that a criminal defendant 

has a federal constitutional right to bifurcation. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 

565-66, 87 S. Ct. 648, 17 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1967) ("Two-part jury trials are rare in our 

jurisprudence; they have never been compelled by this Court as a matter of 

constitutional law, or even as a matter of federal procedure."); Marshall v. Lonberger, 

459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6, 103 S. Ct. 843, 74 L. Ed. 2d 646 (1983) (reaffirming Spencer). 

Therefore, a court may grant habeas relief based on a state court's decision to deny a 

motion for severance only if the joint trial was so prejudicial that it denied a petitioner his 

right to a fair trial. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 538-39, 113 S. Ct. 933, 122 L. 

Ed. 2d 317 (1993) (court must decide if "there is a serious risk that a joint trial would 

compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from 

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making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence"); Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 

1497, 1503 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The simultaneous trial of more than one offense must 

actually render petitioner's state trial fundamentally unfair and hence, violative of due 

process before relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 would be appropriate.") (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

Petitioner bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to federal habeas relief, 

Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2003), and must establish that prejudice 

arising from the failure to grant a severance was so "clear, manifest, and undue" that he 

was denied a fair trial. Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(quoting United States v. Throckmorton, 87 F.3d 1069, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 1996)). "In 

evaluating prejudice, the [federal habeas court] focuses particularly on crossadmissibility of evidence and the danger of 'spillover' from one charge to another, 

especially where one charge or set of charges is weaker than another." Davis, 384 F.3d 

at 638. Undue prejudice also exists "whenever joinder of counts allows evidence of other 

crimes to be introduced in a trial where the evidence would otherwise be inadmissible." 

Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 2000).

On habeas review, federal courts neither depend on the state law governing 

severance, Grisby, 130 F.3d at 370 (citing Hollins v. Dep't of Corrections, State of Iowa, 

969 F.2d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1992)), nor consider procedural rights to a severance given 

to criminal defendants in the federal criminal justice system. Id. Rather, the relevant 

question is whether the state proceedings satisfied due process. Id.; see also Cooper v. 

McGrath, 314 F. Supp. 2d 967, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2004).1

As the California Court of Appeal correctly observed, this case involved a 

Petitioner that committed crimes that were motivated by Petitioner's participation in a 

criminal street gang. The evidence produced at trial regarding the gang enhancement 

 

1

To the extent petitioner is arguing that the trial court abused its discretion under state law in 

denying his request for bifurcation, his claim is not cognizable in these federal habeas proceedings. 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68.

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was admissible and relevant to the other charged crimes. Specifically, the theory 

presented by the prosecution was that Petitioner physically “hit up” the victim to

challenge a perceived rival gang member. While evidence of predicate offenses of the 

gang were presented, no evidence was presented that Petitioner was involved in any of 

the predicate offenses, and therefore did not implicate prior criminal conduct by 

Petitioner which reduced the likelihood of undue prejudice. Finally, the court instructed 

the jury that it “may consider evidence of gang activity only for the limited purpose of 

deciding whether the defendant acted with the intent, purpose and knowledge that are 

required to prove malice aforethought and/or the gang-related enhancement charged.” 

(Lodged Doc. 4 at 24.)

The above factors mitigated the possibility of prejudice to Petitioner. Under the 

circumstances of this case, Petitioner has not established that the state trial court's 

refusal to bifurcate the gang enhancement charges at trial rendered his trial 

fundamentally unfair. Davis, 384 F.3d at 638. 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the state court rejection of his claim "resulted 

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Federal habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus be DENIED with prejudice. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned District Judge, 

pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) days after 

being served with the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation." Any reply 

to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

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objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 

834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 25, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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