Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01529/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01529-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of the Interior
Appellee
Yurok Tribe
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

YUROK TRIBE,

Appellant

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

Appellee

______________________ 

2014-1529

______________________ 

Appeal from the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals in 

No. 3519-ISDA, Administrative Judge Stephen M. Daniels.

______________________ 

Decided: May 8, 2015 

______________________ 

NATHANIEL NESBITT, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Washington, DC, argued for appellant. Also represented by 

CATHERINE EMILY STETSON, LACY RENEE LOGSDON. 

JOSEPH ASHMAN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for appellee. Also represented by JOYCE 

R. BRANDA, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., DONALD E.

KINNER. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, MOORE, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

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2 YUROK TRIBE v. INTERIOR

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

The Yurok Tribe (Tribe) appeals from the Civilian 

Board of Contracting Appeals’ (Board) dismissal for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

J.A. 2–3. Because the Tribe has not been awarded a 

contract, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

In 1975, Congress enacted the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), 25 

U.S.C. §§ 450–450n. The ISDA encourages Indian tribes 

to manage federally-funded programs by authorizing the 

government to enter into “self-determination contracts” 

with tribes under which a tribe agrees to administer a 

program and the government agrees to fund the program. 

Arctic Slope Native Ass’n, Ltd. v. Sebelius, 583 F.3d 785, 

788 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The statute directs the Secretary of 

the Interior, upon a tribe’s request, to enter into a selfdetermination contract for programs that the Secretary is 

authorized to administer. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(1). When a 

tribe wishes to enter into a self-determination contract,

also known as a Title I contract, it submits a proposal to 

the Secretary. Id. § 450f(a)(2). The Bureau of Indian 

Affairs receives and reviews proposals for the Secretary. 

The statute mandates that “the Secretary shall, within

ninety days after receipt of the proposal, approve the 

proposal and award the contract unless the Secretary 

provides written notification to the applicant” that the 

proposal does not meet certain statutory criteria. Id. 

Regulations governing the Bureau state that “[a] proposal 

that is not declined within 90 days . . . is deemed approved and the Secretary shall award the contract . . . 

within that 90-day period.” 25 C.F.R. § 900.18. In effect, 

if the Secretary does not timely respond to a Title I proposal, the proposal is deemed approved and the Secretary 

is directed to award a contract based on the terms of the 

proposal. 

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YUROK TRIBE v. INTERIOR 3

This case presents a request for a contract by the 

Tribe and a lack of response by the government. On 

October 12, 2011, the Tribe wrote a letter to the director 

of the Bureau’s Office of Self Governance stating that it 

was “submitting this letter of interest for program inclusion and funding under title I of the [ISDA].” J.A. 18. 

The letter set forth a request for approximately $5.5M in 

annual funding to support the Tribe’s Department of 

Public Safety, a request for $2M to fund facilities and

infrastructure for the Department of Public Safety, a 

request for approximately $1.5M in annual funding to 

support the Tribe’s Tribal Court, and a request for approximately $7.6M to fund facilities and infrastructure for 

the Tribal Court. J.A. 18–19. Attached to the 15-page 

letter was a Tribal Resolution authorizing the submission 

of a “Title I Compact Request.” J.A. 33.

On October 17, the Office of Self Governance sent an 

email to the Tribe stating that it did not “have authority 

to manage a Title I agreement.” J.A. 36. The email

copied individuals in the Bureau’s Office of Justice Services and stated that those individuals would need to be 

the primary contacts for a self-determination contract. Id. 

On October 28, the Office of Justice Services asked the 

Tribe “to clarify whether the Tribe is seeking a selfdetermination contract under Title I of the [IDSA] or, 

inclusion of programs and funding in a self-governance 

annual funding agreement under Title IV.” J.A. 41. The 

Office further stated that if the Tribe was “interested in 

submitting a proposal to enter into a self-determination 

contract, then [it should] contact the Office.” J.A. 41. On 

November 2, the Tribe wrote an email to the Office of 

Justice Services, regarding “availability tomorrow to 

meet . . . regarding our recent Title 1 request.” J.A. 42. 

The Tribe then wrote emails requesting to “follow up 

regarding the Yurok Tribe’s Title 1 request” on December 

27, 2011, and January 30, 2012. J.A. 46. 

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It is undisputed that the Bureau did not decline the 

proposal in the Tribe’s October letter within 90 days of 

receiving the letter. On February 1, 2012, the Tribe wrote 

a letter to the Office of Justice Services, stating that 

because the Bureau did not respond to the proposal set 

forth in the Tribe’s October letter, “the contract is deemed 

approved and the Tribe seeks to receive the requisite 

contract documents.” J.A. 49. On February 8, the Office 

of Justice Services wrote a letter to the Tribe stating that 

the intent of the Tribe’s October letter was unclear and 

did not meet the requirements of a self-determination 

contract proposal. J.A. 50–51. On February 15, the Tribe 

responded that because the Bureau did not timely decline 

the proposal, “[t]he Yurok Tribe demands the Secretary 

award forthwith the formal contract as required by section 900.18 and according to the terms of the Title I 

funding request.” J.A. 55. 

A year later, in March 2013, the Office of Justice Services received a letter from the Tribe titled “Claim for 

performance of Title I justice services contract pursuant 

to Contract Disputes Act.” J.A. 65. The letter referenced

the Tribe’s October letter, the Secretary’s failure to respond to the Tribe’s proposal within 90 days, and the 

deemed approval of the contract. J.A. 65. In response, 

the Office of Justice Services stated that the October 

letter was not a complete proposal, and that even if it 

were a proposal, the Secretary would have declined it. 

J.A. 67–73. 

The Tribe then filed the present appeal. J.A. 79. It 

alleged that because the Secretary did not decline the 

Tribe’s October 12 and February 15 letters, contracts with 

the terms set forth in the letters arose by operation of law

and that the Bureau had not performed under these 

“deemed contract[s].” Id. Accordingly, the Tribe requested that the Board “[o]rder the Bureau to enter into a Title 

I contract as proposed by the Tribe in the letters dated 

October 12, 2011, and February 15, 2012.” J.A. 80. 

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YUROK TRIBE v. INTERIOR 5

The Tribe also filed a parallel appeal with the Interior 

Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA). J.A. 99. The Tribe 

alleged that the Bureau’s inaction resulted in a deemed 

approval of the Tribe’s proposal and a valid and enforceable contract. J.A. 104. After filing its appeal with the 

IBIA, the Tribe requested a stay of that appeal pending a 

decision by the Board. J.A. 103. The Tribe argued that

the Board was the appropriate forum, but that it wanted 

to preserve the IBIA appeal in the event that the Board 

declined jurisdiction. Id. 

In the IBIA’s decision granting the Tribe’s request for

a stay, the IBIA considered its own jurisdiction. J.A. 105. 

It noted that to the extent the Tribe seeks to enforce a

contract or assert claims based on an awarded contract, 

the IBIA would not have jurisdiction. J.A. 105. The IBIA 

noted “that the ISDA regulations appear to distinguish 

between a proposal being ‘deemed approved,’ and the 

Secretary’s obligation, in such a case ‘to award the contract.’” J.A. 106 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 900.18; id. § 900.19 

(“Upon approval the Secretary shall award the contract . . . .”); cf. id. § 900.13 (“Does the contract proposal 

become part of the final contract? No, unless the parties 

agree.”)). The IBIA concluded that although the Tribe 

contended that a deemed contract had arisen by operation 

of law, the case appeared to present a pre-award dispute, 

and consequently the IBIA had jurisdiction. J.A. 107. 

After deciding it had jurisdiction, it granted the Tribe’s 

motion to stay. J.A. 107. 

Back in the Board appeal, the government moved to 

dismiss, arguing that no contract exists between the Tribe 

and the government. J.A. 93–100. It argued that the 

Tribe’s October letter was not detailed enough to constitute a contract proposal in the general sense and lacked 

specific details required for Title I proposals by 25 C.F.R. 

§ 900.8. J.A. 96–97. It also argued that even if the proposal in the Tribe’s October letter were deemed approved, 

the Bureau would not be obligated to fund the contract 

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6 YUROK TRIBE v. INTERIOR

because the Tribe requested money for programs that the 

government is not currently providing. J.A. 97–98. 

Finally, the government argued that the Board did 

not have jurisdiction to hear the Tribe’s appeal because it 

is not a post-award contract dispute. J.A. 98. It argued 

that the “Board has jurisdiction over ‘[Department of 

Interior] self-determination contracts’ and ‘disputes 

regarding an awarding official’s decision relating to a selfdetermination contract.’” J.A. 98 (quoting 25 C.F.R. 

§§ 900.215(a), 900.222 and 25 C.F.R. § 900.151(a)(l)). It 

noted that, in contrast, the “IBIA has jurisdiction over 

‘appealable pre-award decisions.’” J.A. 98 (quoting 25 

C.F.R. §§ 900.150(i), 900.152). It argued that the IBIA 

was the proper forum in which to determine whether the 

Bureau was required to award the contract under 

§ 900.18. J.A. 99.

The Board granted the government’s motion to dismiss. First, it determined that no proposal was deemed 

approved because the 90-day deadline was never triggered. It found that the “Tribe’s October 2011 letter is not 

clear in intent and lacks many of the details plainly 

required for a contract proposal by 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(2) 

and 25 CFR 900.8.” J.A. 5. It determined that the Bureau was not required to notify the Tribe of the missing 

details—despite a regulation that requires the Bureau to 

notify tribes of missing details within 15 days—because 

the letter did not make clear that the Tribe was proposing 

a Title I contract. J.A. 5; see 25 C.F.R. § 900.15(b). It 

further determined that even if the Tribe made its intentions clear at an in-person meeting after the Bureau 

asked for clarification, the October letter did not trigger 

the 90-day deadline for the Bureau to respond because the 

Tribe never clarified its intent in writing. J.A. 5–6. 

Second, the Board concluded that even if the Tribe’s 

letter was a Title I proposal, a contract could not have 

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YUROK TRIBE v. INTERIOR 7

ing the programs discussed in the October letter. J.A. 6. 

It read the statute and regulations as requiring selfdetermination contracts to “transfer from [the Bureau] to 

an Indian tribe programs, functions, services, or activities 

which the agency had been performing for the tribe, as 

well as funds necessary for performance.” J.A. 6. 

The Board dismissed the Tribe’s claim. Although it 

found that there was no contract, the Board dismissed for 

failure to state a claim rather than for lack of jurisdiction 

because it has jurisdiction where a plaintiff alleges the 

existence of a contract. J.A. 7 (citing Engage Learning, 

Inc. v. Salazar, 660 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). It 

did not, however, directly address the government’s 

alternative argument that this is a pre-award dispute 

that should be reviewed by the IBIA. 

The Tribe appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

41 U.S.C. § 7107(a)(1)(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(10). 

DISCUSSION

We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim de 

novo. Dehne v. United States, 970 F.2d 890, 892 (Fed. Cir. 

1992). 

I. The Tribe’s October Letter

The Board determined that the Tribe’s October letter 

was not a Title I proposal because it “is not clear in intent.” J.A. 5. We do not agree. The 15-page letter was 

entitled “Yurok Tribe Title I Request for the Yurok Department of Public Safety and the Yurok Tribal Court.” 

J.A. 18. The letter stated that the Tribe was submitting 

“this letter of interest for program inclusion and funding 

under Title I of the [ISDA].” J.A. 18. The letter detailed 

the particular request and why funds were needed. It was

accompanied by a tribal resolution as required by statute. 

And the Tribe sent a follow-up email to the Bureau, 

entitled “Yurok Tribe – Title 1 Request and Council Tribal 

Resolution.” J.A. 35. 

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8 YUROK TRIBE v. INTERIOR

None of the alleged deficiencies identified by the government demonstrate that the letter was not a Title I 

proposal. The government argues that the proposal was 

unclear because the Tribe sent it to the wrong office 

within the Bureau. The government does not explain 

which portion of the statute requires a tribe to send a 

Title I proposal to a particular office. And, in any event,

the Bureau itself forwarded the October letter to the 

correct office, which then communicated directly with the 

Tribe regarding the proposal. J.A. 36. The government 

argues that the letter was not a Title I proposal because it

used words that have legal significance in other types of 

contracts between tribes and the government. Even 

though the phrases “letter of interest,” “compact,” and 

“Annual Funding Agreement” may have legal significance 

for other types of tribal contracts, usage of these terms 

does not make the letter ambiguous when it identifies 

itself as a Title I proposal. The government argues the 

letter was not a Title I proposal because it did not include 

all of the details required for a proposal under § 900.8. 

The regulations speak precisely to this argument. The 

regulations require the Bureau to notify a tribe of missing 

details within 15 days. See 25 C.F.R. § 900.15(b). The 

Bureau did not do so here. Nothing the government 

complains of renders the letter ambiguous. Thus, deficiencies in an otherwise unambiguous request for a selfdetermination contract cannot excuse the government’s 

failure to act within the prescribed period. 

The Tribe’s October letter constituted a Title I proposal. As such, it triggered the 90-day deadline under the 

ISDA. Thus, we cannot affirm the Board’s dismissal on 

the first ground it found. 

II. Programs Includable in Title I Contracts

The Board determined that even if the October letter 

constituted a Title I proposal no contract could have 

arisen from it. J.A. 6. The Board held that a selfCase: 14-1529 Document: 46-2 Page: 8 Filed: 05/08/2015
YUROK TRIBE v. INTERIOR 9

determination contract can only cover programs that the 

Bureau is already providing. J.A. 6. It then determined 

that no contract could have been formed for the programs 

discussed in the Tribe’s October letter because the government is not currently administering those programs

for the Tribe. J.A. 6. We do not agree. 

Self-determination contracts are not limited to programs the government is currently providing. Section 

450f(a)(1) lists five categories of programs that can be 

included in a self-determination contract. Section 450f(a)(1)(B) permits self-determination contracts to 

be awarded for any programs “the Secretary is authorized 

to administer for the benefit of Indians under the Act of 

November 2, 1921.” (emphasis added). The language “is 

authorized to administer” plainly includes any program 

the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Health 

and Human Services could authorize under the Act of 

November 2, 1921. See 25 U.S.C. § 450b(i). There is no 

exclusion for programs that either Secretary “is authorized to administer” under the Act of November 2, 1921, 

but is not currently providing. Other language from 

§ 450f further supports this plain meaning. Section 450f(a)(1)(C) permits self-determination contracts to 

be awarded for all programs “provided by the Secretary of 

Health and Human Services under the Act of August 5, 

1954.” (emphasis added). The statute’s language reflects 

Congress’s deliberate choice. In the first instance, with 

regard to the Act of November 2, 1921, it used the broad 

“authorized to administer,” whereas with regard to the 

second Act, it used the more narrow “provided by.” We 

assume that Congress uses language carefully and purposefully. We thus must give weight to the distinction 

drawn by Congress in § 450f and will not read a limitation 

into § 450f(a)(1)(B) that self-determination contracts are 

limited to programs the government is currently providing. 

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Relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Los Coyotes 

Band of Cahuilla & Cupeño Indians v. Jewell, 729 F.3d 

1025 (9th Cir. 2013), the government argues that a selfdetermination contract cannot be awarded in this case. 

Los Coyotes, however, is factually distinct. There, the 

Ninth Circuit considered whether the Secretary properly

declined a contract on the basis that the Bureau was not 

providing the programs for which the tribe was requesting 

funding. Id. at 1028. Los Coyotes does not absolve the 

government’s inaction because it could have declined the 

proposal. 

Despite the clear authorization language of § 450f, the 

government claims that § 450b(j) prevents issuance of a 

self-determination contract in this case. Section 450b(j) 

defines “self-determination contract” as a contract “between a tribal organization and the appropriate Secretary 

for the planning, conduct and administration of programs 

or services which are otherwise provided to Indian tribes 

and their members pursuant to Federal law.” The government argues that the definition’s use of “otherwise 

provided” means that self-determination contracts are 

limited to programs the Bureau is already providing to 

the particular tribe in question. The provision, however, 

only indicates that a contract can encompass programs

that the government provides to tribes. The Tribe requested funding for law enforcement and court programs. 

The government provides these programs to other tribes. 

Oral Argument at 18:16–18:23, available at http://

oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2014-

1529.mp3. It appears that the government has awarded 

self-determination contracts that encompass these types 

of programs. And the government provides some funding 

for the Yurok Tribe’s law enforcement programs already 

pursuant to another contract with the Tribe. Section 

450b(j) does not prohibit the government from entering 

into an agreement with this Tribe for the requested 

funding. 

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YUROK TRIBE v. INTERIOR 

11

The government also asserts that §§ 450j-1(a)(1) and 

450f(a)(2)(D) limit self-determination contracts to programs that the government is currently providing. Section 450j-1(a)(1) states that “[t]he amount of funds 

provided under the terms of self-determination contracts 

entered into pursuant to this subchapter shall not be less 

than the appropriate Secretary would have otherwise 

provided for the operation of the programs or portions 

thereof for the period covered by the contract.” The 

government argues that because it is not providing the 

programs requested by the Tribe, the current funding 

level is zero and the government need not contract for any 

funding. Section 450j-1(a)(1), by its clear terms, sets a 

floor, not a ceiling, on the amount of money that a Tribe 

can receive in a self-determination contract. Section 450j1(a)(1) does not prohibit the government from including 

funding for the requested programs in a selfdetermination contract. Section 450f(a)(2)(D) authorizes 

the Bureau to decline a contract proposal where “the 

amount of funds proposed under the contract is in excess 

of the applicable funding level for the contract, as determined under section 450j-1(a).” The government argues 

that allowing the Tribe to receive funding in excess of the 

current funding level would render this section meaningless because it would prohibit the Secretary from declining proposals. This, however, is not a case where the 

Secretary declined the proposal under § 450f(a)(2)(D). 

The government’s discretion to decline a proposal is 

irrelevant to what programs can be included in a contract 

where the government fails to act. Neither section § 450j1(a)(1) nor § 450f(a)(2)(D) support the government’s claim 

that self-determination contracts are limited to funding 

for programs the government currently provides to the 

requesting tribe. 

The statutory language is clear: “The Secretary is directed, upon the request of any Indian tribe by tribal 

resolution, to enter into a self-determination contract . . . 

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12 YUROK TRIBE v. INTERIOR

to plan, conduct, and administer programs . . . which the 

Secretary is authorized to administer” and “shall, within 

ninety days after receipt of the proposal, approve the 

proposal and award the contract unless the Secretary 

provides written notification to the applicant” declining 

the proposal. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a). Because the government failed to respond to the Tribe’s proposal and the 

proposal covers programs that the Secretary is authorized 

to administer, the statute directs the Secretary to enter 

into a contract. We thus cannot affirm the Board’s dismissal on the second ground it found. 

III. Other Grounds to Affirm

Although we cannot affirm the Board’s dismissal on 

either of the grounds it found, a dismissal for failure to 

state a claim can be affirmed on any ground supported by 

the record. See AquaTex Indus., Inc. v. Techniche Solutions, 479 F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Accordingly, 

we affirm because this case presents a pre-award dispute 

that the Board cannot review.

Under the ISDA, there are two steps to creating a 

contract: approval and award. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(2)

(“[T]he Secretary shall, within ninety days after receipt of 

the proposal, approve the proposal and award the contract . . . .”). The regulations also recognize this distinction. 25 C.F.R. § 900.18 (“A proposal that is not declined 

within 90 days . . . is deemed approved and the Secretary 

shall award the contract . . . .”). It is undisputed that the 

Secretary did not decline the Tribe’s proposal within 90 

days of either the October or February letters, but it also 

did not award a contract. As the government argued 

below and in its supplemental briefing to us, this case 

presents a pre-award dispute. Because the Secretary has 

not yet awarded the Tribe a contract, the Board properly 

dismissed this case for failure to state a claim. Engage 

Learning, 660 F.3d at 1353.

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YUROK TRIBE v. INTERIOR 

13

The Tribe strains to argue that a contract has been 

awarded. The Tribe argues that a deemed approved Title 

I proposal “results in the award of a self-determination 

contract.” Appellant’s Supp. Br. at 1. It argues that 

approval and award are one in the same because the 

statute and regulations state that both must occur within 

90 days. Id. at 2–3 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(2); 25 

C.F.R. § 900.18). 

Even if the proposal was deemed approved after the 

Secretary failed to meet the 90-day deadline, however, the 

Secretary must still award a contract. That has not 

happened here, as demonstrated by the Tribe’s requests 

in this case. The Tribe prayed that the Board “[o]rder the 

Bureau to enter into a Title I contract,” J.A. 80, and asks 

us to remand the matter “for a determination of the terms 

of the deemed contract,” Appellant’s Br. at 37. These are 

requests for pre-award actions. 

In support of its argument that a contract arises as a 

matter of law, the Tribe points to two statements made by 

the Bureau. First, it identifies a letter from the Bureau in 

an unrelated case. In that letter, the Bureau stated that 

because a proposal was not declined within 90 days, the 

contract was deemed approved and it was not necessary 

for the contract to be signed to be effective. Appellant’s 

Supp. Br. at 3 (citing Del. Tribe of Indians v. Bureau of 

Indian Affairs, IBIA 02-65-A, at 10 (July 26, 2002), available at http://www.oha.doi.gov/IBIA/IbiaDecisions/isda/

20020726-0265a.PDF)). From this statement, the Tribe 

argues that a deemed approved contract is awarded by 

operation of law. In context, however, the Bureau’s 

statement in that case distinguishes between approval 

and award: 

The Tribe submitted a proposed [Consolidated 

Tribal Government Program] contract on or about 

June 1, 2000. As you know, the contract was not 

declined within 90 days. Accordingly, the contract 

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14 YUROK TRIBE v. INTERIOR

is deemed approved by operation of law. 25 

U.S.C. § 450f(a)(2) and 25 C.F.R. § 900.18. On 

November 29, 2000, the Contracting Officer sent 

an award letter on your contract and shortly 

thereafter the full amount of funds requested under the contract were disbursed to the Tribe (with 

the exception of contract support funds which you 

have been assured will be disbursed to the Tribe 

when available). Under these circumstances, it is 

not necessary for your contract to be signed to be 

effective. 

Del. Tribe, IBIA 02-65-A, at 10 (emphasis added). It was 

not the approval that resulted in the contract being 

effective, it was the award and payment. Here, there was 

no award or payment to the Tribe. Second, the Tribe 

points to a handbook published by the Departments of the 

Interior and Health and Human Services that states that

the “failure of agency personnel to act within the 90-day 

period . . . results in the award of a contract.” Appellant’s 

Supp. Br. at 4 (citing DOI/HHS INTERNAL HANDBOOK, at 

39). Even if such a statement were binding on the government, the handbook does not state that a contract 

arises by operation of law or that a contract is awarded 

automatically. Rather, the statement emphasizes the 

importance of responding to proposals within 90 days 

because if a proposal is not declined, the Secretary will be

required to award a contract. The use of the term “results” also indicates that the award occurs after, not 

concurrently with, the approval. Neither of these statements support the Tribe’s assertion that a deemed approved contract is awarded by operation of law. 

Even though the Board lacks authority to review this 

case as it is still a pre-award case, the Tribe is not without recourse. The Tribe’s case before the IBIA is pending 

and the Tribe acknowledges that the IBIA “retains jurisdiction over ‘pre-award decisions.’” Appellant’s Supp. Br. 

at 2. 

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YUROK TRIBE v. INTERIOR 

15

CONCLUSION

The dismissal of the Tribe’s complaint for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted is 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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