Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04062/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04062-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Fredy Bosshard
Appellee
Lusag Ag
Appellee
Milton Wagstaff Motor Co., Inc.
Not Party
James R. Wagstaff
Appellant

Document Text:

.. FILED 

Uaited Stites C.OUtt of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT j L 16 1991 

FREDY BOSSHARD, an individual citizen 

and resident of Switzerland, 

Plaintiff-AppelleeCross-Appellant, 

LUSAG AG, a Swiss Corporation, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JAMES R. WAGSTAFF, an individual, 

Defendant-AppellantCross-Appellee, 

and 

MILTON WAGSTAFF MOTOR CO., INC., a 

Utah corporation, doing business as 

Wagstaff's House of Toyota, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 90-4062 

& 

90-4068 

(D.C. No. 87-C-1021G) 

(D. Utah) 

Before McKAY, SETH, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-4062 Document: 010110128880 Date Filed: 07/16/1991 Page: 1 
• 

assist the determination of these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cases are therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff Fredy Bosshard appeals from the district court's 

order granting a remittitur of damages found by the jury in this 

diversity action on the claim of interference with existing and 

potential economic relationships (No. 90-4068). Defendant 

James R. Wagstaff appeals the jury's verdict and several district 

court rulings (No. 90-4062). For the reasons that follow we 

affirm in 90-4062 and reverse and remand in 90-4068. 

Wagstaff argues in 90-4062 that the district court abused its 

discretion in denying his motion to dismiss under the doctrine of 

forum non conveniens. In reviewing the denial of a motion to 

dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, this court applies an 

abuse of discretion standard. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 

501, 508 (1947). The defendant bears the burden of proving both 

an alternative forum and that the case should be dismissed for 

forum non conveniens. Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156, 1160 

(2d Cir. 1978). 

In this case, Wagstaff agreed to be subject to process in 

Switzerland. This, combined with the fact that all but the 

defamation action could have been brought in Switzerland, is 

sufficient to prove that an alternative forum exists. See Piper 

Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 

Because an alternative forum is available, it is necessary to 

consider which forum, Utah or Switzerland, is the most convenient. 

In doing so, private interest factors must be balanced against the 

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Appellate Case: 90-4062 Document: 010110128880 Date Filed: 07/16/1991 Page: 2 
public interest factors which affect the convenience of the forum. 

de Melo v. Lederle Laboratories, 801 F.2d 1058, 1060 (8th Cir. 

1986). Although the plaintiff's choice of forum is usually 

entitled to deference, it is entitled to less deference when the 

plaintiff is foreign, because there is less reason to assume the 

plaintiff's choice of forum is a matter of convenience. 

454 U.S. at 255-56. 

Piper, 

Wagstaff contends that he meets his burden of showing that 

Switzerland is the appropriate forum because (1) Bosshard took 

inconsistent positions with regard to the $55,000.00 in this 

litigation and litigation in Switzerland; (2) Lusag dissolved 

after bankruptcy; (3) a key witness, Marianne Wyss, secretary of 

Lusag, was unavailable and only the summarized transcript of her 

testimony in the related Swiss case was available; (4) very few of 

Lusag's corporate records were available, because Bosshard claimed 

Swiss accountants refused to give him the records until he paid 

their bill; (5) Wagstaff had translation problems; (6) the 

district court was biased; and (7) the depositions of Hans Fischer 

and Gunther Schober were read to the jury. 

Wagstaff fails to show with any specificity how any of these 

factors affected trial of this case. The evidence presented at 

trial established conduct in Utah, Germany, Taiwan, and 

Switzerland. The district court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining Utah was the appropriate forum. 

Wagstaff next argues that the district court erred in 

applying Utah, rather than Swiss, law. The first time Wagstaff 

presented evidence of Swiss law was in support of his motion for 

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Appellate Case: 90-4062 Document: 010110128880 Date Filed: 07/16/1991 Page: 3 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The evidence he presented 

was a 1983 treatise on Swiss law. Because Wagstaff did not make a 

timely or sufficient showing of Swiss law, we conclude the 

district court did not err in applying Utah law. 

Wagstaff also argues that the district court erred in denying 

his motion to amend his counterclaim. Wagstaff sought to amend 

his counterclaim to indicate that Bosshard had converted the 

$55,000.00 loan for his own personal use. The district court 

determined there was no basis for amendment of the counterclaim. 

Rule lS(b) provides that leave to amend should be permitted 

so that the pleadings will conform to the evidence presented at 

trial. Disallowance of amendment is within the discretion of the 

district court. See Hardin v. Manitowoc-Forsythe Corp., 691 F.2d 

449, 456 n.6 (10th Cir. 1982). 

Nothing in the record indicates that a formal written motion 

to amend was ever made. Wagstaff, however, did orally request 

amendment at the close of trial. Even assuming an appropriate 

motion was made, nothing in the record supports an amendment to 

the counterclaim to add an issue of conversion. Accordingly, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to 

amend. 

Wagstaff's final argument involves the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting the jury's finding that he intentionally 

interfered with Bosshard's economic relations and defamed 

Bosshard. A person charged with interference with economic 

relations is potentially liable for the loss of benefits under the 

contract or for consequential losses for which the interference is 

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the legal cause. Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1006 (Utah Ct. 

App.), cert. denied, 776 P.2d 916 (1989). The district court 

found that the jury's damage award on the charge of intentional 

interference was speculative; therefore, the court granted 

Wagstaff's motion for a remittitur. Bosshard challenges the 

remittitur by cross-appeal. Because both Wagstaff and Bosshard's 

arguments involve the evidence supporting the intentional 

interference claim, we address their claims together. 

Our review in this case is limited. From the record on 

appeal, there is nothing to indicate that the district court 

allowed Bosshard to choose between accepting the remittitur or a 

new trial. It is well established that failure to offer the 

plaintiff this choice encroaches on the jury's right under the 

seventh amendment to determine damages. See O'Gilvie v. 

International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1447 (10th Cir. 1987), 

cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988); Higgins v. Smith Int'l., Inc., 

716 F.2d 278, 281 (10th Cir. 1983). The district court's error 

mandates remand for a new trial on the intentional interference 

claim or, alternatively, to allow Bosshard to accept the 

remittitur. We agree with Bosshard that sufficient evidence was 

introduced to support the jury's finding of liability and damages 

on the defamation claim. 

These are appeals from D.C. No. 87-C-1021G, the District of 

Utah. Wagstaff appeals in our number 90-4062 the jury verdict on 

the several claims against him, and the trial court's judgment. 

Wagstaff also appeals in 90-4062 evidentiary rulings and rulings 

on motions. We conclude there was no error in the evidentiary 

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rulings nor on the trial and pretrial motions. We also conclude 

there was no error in the judgment on the verdict except as to the 

cause or claim for intentional interference with contract and 

business relationships. 

Bosshard cross-appeals the remittitur ordered by the trial 

court on the jury verdict rendered on the cause or claim of 

Bosshard as to intentional interference with business relations 

and contracts. Bosshard asserts that it was error to so reduce 

the jury award on this claim. 

We must conclude, AND SO ORDER, that the judgment be REVERSED 

and REMANDED insofar as it ordered the remittitur on the verdict 

for intentional interference. On remand, Bosshard may either 

choose to accept the remittitur or request a new trial be held on 

the liability and damage issues on the intentional interference 

claim. The judgment is otherwise AFFIRMED. IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Entered for the Court 

Oliver Seth 

Circuit Judge 

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