Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-01333/USCOURTS-ca10-93-01333-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gasko
Appellee
K. Gregg
Appellee
Ben Griego
Appellee
Frank Gunter
Appellee
Lou A. Hesse
Appellee
Irving G. Jaquez
Appellee
Mark McKenna
Appellee
Frank Miller
Appellee
Denise Neal
Appellee
Nolan Renfrow
Appellee
George Sullivan
Appellee
Vernon Templeman
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH F1 I L E D 

tJnltcxt Statll CJonrt t)f ApJ3•lt• 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Teftt,h Olreult. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

VERNON TEMPLEMAN I 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

FRANK GUNTER, MR. GASKO, GEORGE 

SULLIVAN, LOU A. HESSE, FRANK 

MILLER, MARK MCKENNA, NOLAN 

RENFROW, DENISE NEAL, IRVING G. 

JAQUEZ, BEN GRIEGO, and CAPTAIN 

K. GREGG, all in their official 

and individual capacity, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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~'a g a \994 

ROB~~'r 4 NOECKER '~"'1., ""~---

No. 93-1333 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. NO. 93-Z-198} 

Submitted on the brief:* 

Vernon Templeman, pro se. 

Before MOORE, ANDERSON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Vernon Templeman, a prisoner at Colorado's Centennial 

Correctional Facility, brought this civil rights action under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Templeman claims that Colorado Department of 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 93-1333 Document: 01019282984 Date Filed: 02/02/1994 Page: 1 
Corrections ("DOC") officials denied him due process and equal 

protection of the laws when they regressively transferred him from 

general population to administrative segregation in October, 1992. 

The district court accepted the magistrate judge's recommendation 

that the complaint be dismissed, apparently under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(d). The magistrate judge concluded that Templeman has no 

liberty interest in his prison classification, prison employment, 

or continued earned time, good time, or sentence commutation 

credits. The magistrate judge also concluded that the DOC had 

followed required state procedures, and that Templeman's claims of 

bias and denial of equal protection were vague and conclusory. 

Although we follow different reasoning on several claims, we 

affirm the district court's dismissal of Templeman's complaint. 

BACKGROUND 

According to Templeman, he was in administrative segregation 

for seven years, from 1984 until 1991, when he was transferred to 

maximum security/general population. Templeman received several 

benefits in general population that he did not receive while in 

administrative segregation, including earned time credits, good 

time credits, sentence commutation review credits, and a prison 

job. While in general population, Templeman received positive 

cellhouse evaluations, remained employed, and generally fulfilled 

the criteria for continued general population status. 

In October, 1992, Centennial began transferring its general 

population inmates to other prisons or to administrative segregation. Templeman first appeared without notice before a special 

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Warden's Classification Committee·, which decided that he should be 

regressively transferred to administrative segregation because of 

a history of escapes, extreme violence, recent code convictions 

for alcohol, and threats to kill the President. 

Soon after the special committee hearing, Templeman received 

notice of an administrative segregation hearing. A single officer 

conducted the hearing, despite Templeman's request for a threemember panel. The hearing officer ordered that Templeman be 

transferred to administrative segregation, and the order was 

upheld in an administrative appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

Section 1915(d) permitted the district court to dismiss 

Templeman's complaint if it was "frivolous." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 

Plausible factual allegations are not frivolous under section 

1915(d) even if they lack evidentiary support. Hall v. Bellmen, 

935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (lOth Cir. 1991); see also Shabazz v. Askins, 

980 F.2d 1333, 1335 (lOth Cir. 1992) (explaining that section 

1915(d) dismissal is inappropriate if factual allegations are 

plausible). If the facts do not support an "arguable" claim, however, the court may dismiss the complaint. McKinney v. Oklahoma, 

925 F.2d 363, 365 (lOth Cir. 1991); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 

490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) (explaining that section 191S(d) permits 

dismissal if the claim is "based on an indisputably meritless 

legal theory"). We must affirm the district court's dismissal 

unless the court abused its discretion. See Denton v. Hernandez, 

112 S. Ct. 1728, 1734 (1992). 

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I. Due Process 

A. Administrative Segregation 

The Due Process Clause guarantees due process only when a 

person is to be deprived of life, liberty, or property. Changing 

an inmate's prison classification ordinarily does not deprive him 

of liberty, because he is not entitled to a particular degree of 

liberty in prison. See Meachum v. Fane, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) 

(explaining that the Due Process Clause does not protect a 

prisoner against transfer to another prison, even if more 

restrictive). However, Templeman argues that Colorado laws and 

regulations entitle him to remain in the general population unless 

he has met certain criteria, and therefore the state cannot 

deprive him of his liberty in the general population without 

giving him due process of law. See Kentucky Dep't of Corrections 

v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463 (1989) (noting that explicit 

mandatory language in state law can create liberty interests); 

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 469-71 (1983) (explaining that 

state statutes and regulations may create protected liberty 

interests if they substantively limit official discretion) . 

We disagree that Colorado laws and regulations entitle 

inmates to remain in the general population absent certain con~ 

duct. DOC Regulation 600-2 says that a transfer to administrative 

segregation "shall be ordered in the sound exercise of discretion 

by the classification officer or committee." DOC Reg. 600-2 

, 6(a) (1). The regulation does list several "incorrigibility 

factors" that the classification officer or committee may 

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consider, but the list is not exhaustive and includes "[a]ny other 

reasons of similar magnitude deemed sufficient by the classification officer or committee." Id. ~ 6(a) (1) (g). Templeman also 

cites a memo listing eight types of conduct that "could cause 

consideration for placement in administrative segregation." 

Appellant's Br. Ex. I. Like the regulation, the memo does not 

limit official discretion to consider other factors. The other 

regulations cited by Templeman, CCF 600-1 and CCF 650-1, do not 

specify any criteria for placing inmates in administrative 

segregation, but deal only with procedural requirements and refer 

to other regulations. We therefore conclude that Colorado has not 

given Templeman a liberty interest in his prison classification. 

B. Benefits Lost in Administrative Segregation 

1. Earned Time 

The DOC awarded Templeman earned time credits while he was in 

the general population, but the DOC's policy is that inmates in 

administrative segregation are ineligible for earned time credits. 

Templeman argues that state law requires awarding him earned time 

credits if he satisfies the statutory criteria. The earned time 

statute generally makes earned time credits discretionary. Colo. 

Rev. Stat. § 17-22.5-302(1) ("[E]arned time ... may be deducted 

from the inmate's sentence .... ");see also Renneke v. Kautzky, 

782 P.2d 343, 344-45 (Colo. 1989) (en bane) (explaining that under 

current statutory scheme, expressed in section 302(4), that the 

DOC has broad discretion to award or withdraw earned time 

credits) . However, Templeman points out that a subsection of the 

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earned-time statute apparently makes awards of earned time mandatory in his case because he was sentenced for crimes that occurred 

between July 1, 1979, and July 1, 1985. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 

§ 17-22.5-302(3) ("[T]he department shall review the performance 

record of the inmate and shall grant, consistent with the 

provisions of this section, an earned time deduction .... "). 

Denying mandatory earned time credits would deprive Templeman of a 

liberty interest because the credits move forward his mandatory 

date of release on parole. See Williamson v. Jordan, 797 P.2d 

744, 747-48 (Colo. 1990) (en bane); Bynum v. Kautzky, 784 P.2d 

735, 739 (Colo. 1989) (en bane). 

However, even the apparently mandatory subsection only 

requires an award of earned time credits if the inmate has met 

certain criteria. The DOC has reasonably concluded that inmates 

in administrative segregation do not meet those criteria, such as 

"substantial and consistent progress in ... [g]roup living, 

including housekeeping, personal hygiene, cooperation, _social 

adjustment, and double bunking." See Colo. Rev. Stat. 

§ 17-22.5-302(1) (b). As we have already explained, the DOC 

officials had discretion to put Templeman in administrative 

segregation. Once there, Templeman did not meet the criteria for 

receiving earned time. Therefore the defendants have not depr~ved 

Templeman of any earned time to which he was entitled. 

2. Good Time 

Templeman similarly complains that he has been denied good 

time credits by the move to administrative segregation. Unlike 

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the earned time statute, the good time statute clearly makes good 

time awards to Templeman discretionary. The applicable section 

says that the DOC may withhold "good time earnable in subsequent 

periods of sentence, but not yet earned, for conduct occurring in 

a given period of sentence." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 17-22.5-301(4). 

Denying Templeman good time credits by moving him to administrative segregation therefore did not deny him any liberty interest. 

3. Prison Work Assignment 

Templeman also lost his prison job when he was transferred to 

administrative segregation. He does not identify any statute or 

regulation that entitles him to a prison job. Without such a 

statute, prisoners do not have a constitutional right to employment. See Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 998 (lOth Cir. 1991); 

Ingram v. Papalia, 804 F.2d 595, 596-97 (lOth Cir. 1986). 

Depriving Templeman of his job by putting him in administrative 

segregation therefore did not deprive him of liberty or property. 

4. Sentence Commutation 

Finally, Templeman complains about losing statutory clemency 

credits while in administrative segregation. The governor has 

complete discretion to commute sentences. Colo. Rev. Stat. 

§ 16-17-101. Furthermore, the regulation governing eligibility 

for consideration does not make sentence commutation credits 

mandatory. In fact, the regulation specifically states that 

inmates in administrative segregation are not eligible for 

consideration. DOC Reg. 150-2. Templeman therefore is not 

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entitled to statutory clemency credits and was not deprived of any 

liberty interest by being denied the opportunity to earn those 

credits while in administrative segregation. 

C. Procedural Requirements 

Templeman complains that the prison administrators violated 

several procedural requirements in the process of assigning him to 

administrative segregation. He claims that the defendants gave 

him no notice of an initial hearing before a special classification committee, that the notice of a subsequent hearing did not 

specify the grounds for administrative segregation as required by 

regulation, that a single officer rather than the required threemember panel conducted his administrative segregation hearing, and 

that his classification officer was not impartial. 

Since Templeman was not deprived of any liberty to which he 

was entitled, no particular process was constitutionally due or 

required, regardless of state law. Nor does denying process, however mandatory under state law, itself deny liberty. See Olim v. 

Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983) ("Process is not an end in 

itself. Its constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive 

interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim of 

entitlement."); Doyle v. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n, 998 F.2d 1559, 1570 

(lOth Cir. 1993). Because Templeman had no liberty interest in 

remaining in the general population, the Constitution did not require any particular process at all, even if state law did. 

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II. Equal Protection 

Templeman claims that he was not treated the same as 

similarly situated inmates when he was transferred to administrative segregation. The magistrate judge rejected this equal 

protection claim because Templeman had offered only "conclusory 

allegations, unsupported by allegations of fact." Recommendation 

at 10; see also Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 902 (lOth Cir. 

1986) (per curiam); Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1332-33 (lOth 

Cir. 1981). In his objections to the magistrate's 

recommendations, however, Templeman offered many examples and 

affidavits of other inmates with similar records who were 

progressively transferred rather than regressively transferred. 

Nevertheless, we affirm the district court's dismissal of 

Templeman's equal protection claim because Templeman could not 

possibly prevail on the alleged facts. He does not claim that the 

defendants treated him differently because of any suspect 

classification. He therefore must prove that the distinction 

between himself and other inmates was not reasonably related to 

some legitimate penological purpose. See Turner v. Safley, 482 

U.S. 78, 89 (1987) ("(W]hen a prison regulation impinges on 

inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is 

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."); City of 

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr .. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 

As we explained above, classification decisions are discretionary. Even though the regulations offer a list of criteria to 

consider, DOC officials must weigh the various criteria and whatever else seems relevant in making the qualitative judgment how to 

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classify an individual inmate. Despite Templeman's allegations, 

it is "clearly baseless" to claim that there are other inmates who 

are similar in every relevant respect. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. 

Not only might the DOC classify inmates differently because of 

slight differences in their histories, but they also might 

classify inmates differently because some still seem to present 

more risk of future misconduct than others. Templeman's claim 

that there are no relevant differences between him and other 

inmates that reasonably might account for their different 

treatment is not plausible or arguable. 

We therefore AFFIRM the district court's dismissal of 

Templeman's complaint. 

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