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Parties Involved:
Lyndell Lloyd Cox
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

Unite<! States Court of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Cfr-,iit 

TENTH CIRCUIT MAR 2 8 1990 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

LYNDELL LLOYD COX, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-6088 

(D.C. No. CR-88-225-T) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief *~udge, McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, and 

BRATTON, District Judge. 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Both parties waived oral argument, and hence the case has 

been submitted on the briefs. 

In a multi-count superseding indictment, Lyndell Lloyd Cox, 

and his brother, Clifford Wesley Cox, and others, were charged 

with various drug related offenses. On the day of trial, Cox, 

pursuant to a plea agreement with the government, pled guilty to 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** Honorable Howard C. Bratton, District Judge for the District of 

New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-6088 Document: 01019966731 Date Filed: 03/28/1990 Page: 1 
counts 1 and 16, in return for which, the government, inter alia, 

dismissed the remaining counts. 

Count 1 charged Cox and his brother, Clifford Wesley Cox, 

with conspiring with each other, and others, from September 1, 

1986 to and until August 11, 1988 to distribute methamphetamine, a 

Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 

84l(a)(l). Count 16 charged both Coxes with unlawfully making on 

August 3, 1988, a destructive device compound of ten sticks of 

Thermex Detagel with two blasting caps installed with lead wires 

leading to a battery charger which had not been registered in the 

National Firearm Registration and Transfer Record as required by 

Chapter 53, Title 26, United States Code, in violation of 26 

U.S.C. § 586l(f), the penalty for which is found in§ 5871. 

Some four months after changing his plea, Cox was sentenced 

to 20 years on his plea of guilty to count 1, and to 4 years, 4 

months on count 16, to run consecutively to the sentence imposed 

on count 1, plus supervised release for 3 years on each of counts 

1 and 16 to run concurrently and a special assessment of $100.00. 

The sentences were imposed under the Sentencing Reform Act of 

1984. Lyndell Cox appeals his sentences. 1 We affirm. 

On appeal, counsel advances two points: (1) Cox should have 

been sentenced under the statutory law predating the Sentencing 

Reform Act of 1984; and (2), in the alternative, Cox should be 

permitted to withd~aw his plea of guilty. We note that from the 

record before us neither of these matters was formally presented 

1 Appellant's brother, Clifford 

sentence by separate appeal. 

separate briefs have been filed. 

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Wesley Cox, also appeals his 

Each has his own counsel, and 

Appellate Case: 89-6088 Document: 01019966731 Date Filed: 03/28/1990 Page: 2 
to the district court. The general rule is that matters not 

presented to a district court may not be advanced for the first 

time on appeal unless they involve ''plain error." Neither of 

these matters involve ''plain error." 

At the time Cox withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a 

plea of guilty to counts 1 and 16, he was represented by counsel. 

At the time the district judge advised Cox that although he had 

previously declared the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 

unconstitutional, and therefore sentencing would be under the "old 

statutory provisions," other courts had declared the Act 

constitutional, and that a case was then pending before the 

Supreme Court on the issue of the constitutionality of the Act. 

The judge followed up this statement with a warning that should 

the Supreme Court uphold the constitutionality of the Act, he, 

Cox, could be resentenced under the Act. The gist of Cox's 

response in the district court was that he was aware of such possibility and still wanted to plead guilty to counts 1 and 16. 

When Cox came up for sentencing some four months after he 

changed his plea to one of guilty, the Supreme Court in Mistretta 

v. United States, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed. 2d 714 

(1989), had upheld the Act. At sentencing, there was no real 

suggestion that such should not be done pursuant to the Act, and 

the Guidelines, nor was there any hint that Cox wanted to withdraw 

his guilty plea. He apparently became dissatisfied after 

sentencing. 

The record does not support the suggestion that Cox, when he 

changed his plea, was "promised'' that he would be sentenced under 

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Appellate Case: 89-6088 Document: 01019966731 Date Filed: 03/28/1990 Page: 3 
statutory law predating the Act. 2 Rather, the gist of the 

district court's warning was that, depending on the resolution of 

the matter by the Supreme Court, Cox might well be sentenced, or 

even resentenced, under the Act. Under these circumstances, Cox 

had no right, constitutional or otherwise, to be sentenced under 

statutory law predating the Act. 

As stated, Cox never asked the district court to withdraw his 

plea of guilty. The request made in this court that he be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty is based on his belief that he 

was ''promised" that he would not be sentenced under the Act. That 

is not our reading of the record. 

Judgment affirmed. 

Entered for the Court 

Robert H. Mcwilliams 

Circuit Judge 

2 Even if Cox had been "promised" that he would be sentenced under 

the statutory law predating the Act, and in fact had been so 

sentenced, such would not foreclose resentencing under the Act. 

United States v. Kane, 876 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. 

denied, U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 173, 107 L.Ed. 2d 130 (1989). 

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Appellate Case: 89-6088 Document: 01019966731 Date Filed: 03/28/1990 Page: 4