Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03130/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03130-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Delonta A. Reeves
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 18, 2009 Decided November 10, 2009 

No. 07-3130 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

DELONTA A. REEVES, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 06cr00114-01) 

Joseph R. Conte, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause and filed the brief for appellant. 

April E. Fearnley, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. 

Taylor, U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Roy 

W. McLeese, III, Assistant U.S. Attorney. 

Before: ROGERS, TATEL and BROWN, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN. 

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Opinion concurring in part filed by Circuit Judge

ROGERS. 

BROWN, Circuit Judge: Delonta Reeves challenges the 

district court’s decision to impose a two-level enhancement 

for obstruction of justice under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

(U.S.S.G. or Guidelines) § 3C1.1 and its refusal to grant a 

third level of reduction for acceptance of responsibility under 

§ 3E1.1(b). Reeves also argues he was deprived of the 

effective assistance of counsel. We affirm. 

I 

These are the relevant facts. In March 2006, Reeves was 

charged with unlawfully possessing cocaine base and 

intending to distribute it. After he was released on his own 

recognizance, the government dismissed the charges on April 

27, but they were reinstated, along with other charges, by a 

grand jury indictment on May 2. The district court set a June 

5 arraignment date for the new charges. The Clerk’s Office 

issued a “Criminal Notice”—which was sent to Reeves and 

his counsel—specifying the time, date, and location of the 

arraignment and directing counsel to make sure Reeves would 

be present. On June 5, Reeves did not appear. Counsel said 

he had spoken with Reeves and informed him of the 

arraignment, but did not know where he was. The court 

issued a bench warrant. 

Nothing was heard from Reeves until he was arrested for 

another narcotics offense eleven months later. The bench 

warrant was executed and Reeves was returned to the district 

court on May 21, 2007, and arraigned on the charges from the 

May 2, 2006 indictment. 

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On August 24, 2007, Reeves pled guilty to count two of 

the indictment, unlawful possession with intent to distribute 

five grams or more of cocaine base. The plea agreement 

obligated the government not to seek any increase in Reeves’ 

offense level based on conduct that occurred prior to the 

execution of the agreement; and to recommend reduction of 

Reeves’ offense level by two levels, under U.S.S.G. § 

3E1.1(a), and by an additional third level, under § 3E1.1(b), 

for acceptance of responsibility. The agreement made clear 

“the Court is not bound by . . . the parties’ determination of 

the applicable Guidelines range, or other sentencing issues.”

At sentencing, the district court accepted, without 

objection, the facts set forth in the presentence report (PSR) 

as its findings of fact, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A), 

including the recitation of Reeves’ failure to appear at his 

arraignment and being “a fugitive for approximately 11 

months.”1

 Based on this conduct, the district court increased 

Reeves’ offense level by two levels for obstruction of justice 

under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Nonetheless, because Reeves had 

promptly pled guilty after being re-arrested, the court reduced 

Reeves’ offense level by two levels for acceptance of 

responsibility under § 3E1.1(a). Finally, the government 

moved for an additional third level of reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1(b). The court 

denied this request, ruling that Reeves’ acceptance of 

responsibility was insufficiently timely “in light of his almost 

one-year fugitive status after he failed to appear for a 

proceeding before this court.” The court calculated the 

resulting Guidelines range to be seventy-eight to ninety-seven 

 

1

 The PSR was filed under seal. Insofar as we refer to information 

derived from the PSR, it is unsealed to the limited extent referenced 

in this opinion, although the full document shall remain physically 

withheld from public review. See United States v. Parnell, 524 

F.3d 166, 167 n.1 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 

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months, and imposed a sentence of seventy-eight months’ 

imprisonment and forty-eight months’ supervised release. 

II 

Reeves challenges the district court’s Guidelines 

calculation. He points out that while he was out on his own 

recognizance, the criminal complaint against him was 

dismissed. Although he subsequently was indicted by a grand 

jury and was set to be arraigned on those new charges, he 

argues he never was under a court order to appear at this 

arraignment and therefore could not have obstructed justice 

within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. For the same 

reason, he argues he deserved the third level of reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1(b). Lastly, Reeves 

argues his counsel was ineffective because he failed to inform 

the court that the initial criminal complaint had been 

dismissed and that Reeves had not been under a court order to 

appear at his arraignment. 

We review only for plain error because in the district 

court, Reeves challenged the court’s Guidelines calculation 

solely on the basis of his plea agreement, arguing the 

enhancement for obstruction of justice was barred because the 

obstructive conduct occurred prior to the plea, not on the 

ground that the court had never ordered him to appear at his 

arraignment. See In re Sealed Case, 527 F.3d 188, 191–92 

(D.C. Cir. 2008). 

To establish plain error, the defendant must show, among 

other things, “a reasonable likelihood that the sentencing 

court’s obvious errors affected his sentence.” United States v. 

Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1994). “The standard of 

‘reasonable likelihood’ is somewhat more relaxed in the area 

of sentencing than it is for trial errors, since ‘a resentencing is 

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nowhere near as costly or as chancy an event as a trial.’” 

United States v. Gomez, 431 F.3d 818, 823 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 

(quoting Saro, 24 F.3d at 288). 

A 

 Reeves first argues the district court erroneously imposed 

a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice. U.S.S.G. 

§ 3C1.1 provides: 

If (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, 

or attempted to obstruct or impede, the 

administration of justice with respect to the 

investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the 

instant offense of conviction, and (B) the obstructive 

conduct related to (i) the defendant’s offense of 

conviction and any relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely 

related offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels. 

 “Obstructive conduct can vary widely in nature, degree 

of planning, and seriousness” and “the conduct to which this 

enhancement applies is not subject to precise definition.” 

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.3; see also Stinson v. United States, 

508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) (“commentary in the Guidelines 

Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative 

unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is 

inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that 

guideline”). 

 

 An enhancement under § 3C1.1 “is only appropriate 

where the defendant acts with the intent to obstruct justice.” 

United States v. Henry, 557 F.3d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

Where conduct is “directly and inherently obstructive”—that 

is, where the defendant engages in “behavior that a rational 

person would expect to obstruct justice”—the court may infer 

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an intent to obstruct justice and need not make a separate 

finding of specific intent. Id. Reeves, having proffered no 

“evidence that he acted without any subjective motivation to 

obstruct justice,” id., places undue reliance on Application 

Note 4 in the Commentary, which provides a “non-exhaustive 

list of examples” of obstructive conduct, including “willfully 

failing to appear, as ordered, for a judicial proceeding.” 

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(e) (emphasis added). He argues he 

could not have willfully obstructed justice because he was not 

under a court order to appear at his arraignment. We need not 

decide whether Reeves was, in fact, formally ordered to 

appear at his arraignment because although the violation of a 

court order would be sufficient, it is not necessary to find 

willful obstruction. 

The district court was permitted to infer Reeves intended 

to obstruct justice if his conduct was “directly and inherently 

obstructive.” Henry, 557 F.3d at 646. It was. Because no 

party objected, the court properly accepted the facts set forth 

in the PSR as its findings of fact pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 

32(i)(3)(A). The PSR stated, “Court records reflect that 

Reeves failed to appear for an arraignment hearing on June 5, 

2006, resulting in the issuance of a Bench Warrant. On May 

19, 2007, he was detained on a new offense . . . . Thus, 

Reeves was a fugitive for approximately 11 months.” The 

court’s docket sheet also reflected that Reeves failed to 

appear at his arraignment, see Minute Entry (Jun. 5, 2006), 

and that he was re-arrested and returned on the bench warrant 

eleven months later, see Minute Entry (May 21, 2007). 

Failing to appear at an arraignment, and remaining at large for 

nearly a year, is inherently obstructive because a rational 

person would expect such conduct to obstruct justice. See 

Henry, 557 F.3d at 646. Indeed, Reeves’ conduct impeded 

the administration of justice by making it impossible for the 

government to prosecute him until the authorities expended 

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the time and resources necessary to re-arrest him. Thus, the 

court did not err—much less plainly err—by inferring Reeves 

acted willfully. 

Finally, even if the district court had not been entitled to 

infer Reeves’ obstructive intent from his conduct alone, the 

evidence nonetheless established he acted willfully. A 

defendant willfully fails to appear at a judicial proceeding 

when he has “knowledge of the requirements placed upon 

him by the court” and “conscious[ly] deci[des] to ignore its 

mandate.” United States v. Monroe, 990 F.2d 1370, 1376 

(D.C. Cir. 1993). On the date of the scheduled arraignment, 

Reeves’ counsel stated he had spoken with Reeves and had 

informed him of the time and date of the arraignment. And 

the “Criminal Notice” issued by the Clerk’s Office, 

announcing the time and date of the arraignment, indicates it 

was sent to Reeves. Reeves submitted no evidence, and made 

no argument, controverting this proof of his knowledge. 

Thus, regardless of whether Reeves was under a court order 

to appear at his arraignment, he acted willfully by failing to 

appear and remaining at large until being re-arrested eleven 

months later.2

 

2

 The concurrence misreads Monroe, claiming “Monroe requires 

more” than a defendant’s conscious decision not to appear at a 

judicial proceeding he knows he must attend in order to establish 

willful obstruction. Conc. op. at 2. Not so. In Monroe, we referred 

favorably to United States v. Teta, 918 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1990), 

and United States v. Perry, 908 F.2d 56 (6th Cir. 1990). We noted 

that Teta’s “failure to appear [at his arraignment] was willful, 

‘because he knew the requirements and yet voluntarily and 

intentionally failed to appear.’” Monroe, 990 F.2d at 1376 (quoting 

Teta, 918 F.2d at 1334). We noted that Perry’s decision to 

“disobey[] an explicit instruction” from the court to keep an 

appointment “was ‘enough’ to find an obstruction of justice.” Id.

(quoting Perry, 908 F.2d at 59). But because Monroe had not 

received notice of her arraignment until the day after the hearing 

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B 

 

Reeves next argues the district court erroneously declined 

to grant a third level of reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 provides: 

(a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance 

of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense 

level by 2 levels. 

(b) If the defendant qualifies for a decrease under 

subsection (a), the offense level determined prior to 

the operation of subsection (a) is level 16 or greater, 

and upon motion of the government stating that the 

defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation 

or prosecution of his own misconduct by timely 

notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of 

guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid 

preparing for trial and permitting the government and 

the court to allocate their resources efficiently, 

decrease the offense level by 1 additional level. 

Although the timeliness of a defendant’s acceptance of 

responsibility “is a consideration under both subsections,” 

generally, “the conduct qualifying for a decrease in offense 

level under subsection (b) will occur particularly early in the 

case.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) cmt. n.6. This is because a 

reduction under subsection (b) is only warranted where the 

defendant has “notified authorities of his intention to enter a 

 

took place, we held her “failure to appear cannot . . . be labelled 

‘willful,’ as she could not have ignored a mandate that she had not 

received.” Id. Here, because Reeves did receive and ignore the 

court’s mandate, his failure to appear was intentional and may 

properly be labeled “willful.” 

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plea of guilty at a sufficiently early point in the process so 

that the government may avoid preparing for trial and the 

court may schedule its calendar efficiently.” Id. Ultimately, 

because “[t]he sentencing judge is in a unique position to 

evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility,” the 

district court’s determination “is entitled to great deference on 

review.” Id. n.5. 

The district court reasoned that a two-level reduction 

under subsection (a) was warranted because “[o]nce he ended 

his fugitive status . . . [Reeves] very promptly and clearly 

demonstrated an acceptance of responsibility.”3

 But the court 

held it would be inappropriate to grant an additional one-level 

reduction under subsection (b) because “in light of his almost 

one-year fugitive status after he failed to appear for a 

proceeding before this court,” his acceptance of responsibility 

was insufficiently timely. The court explained that Reeves’ 

obstructive conduct caused “an expenditure of funds and 

effort” by the government “to apprehend the defendant and to 

start the process again.” Reeves challenges this conclusion on 

the same ground he challenges the enhancement for 

obstruction of justice. He argues the district court should 

have ignored the eleven-month period in which he was a 

fugitive because, during that time, he was not under a court 

order to appear. As discussed above, the district court 

 

3

 The Commentary instructs, “[c]onduct resulting in an 

enhancement under § 3C1.1 . . . ordinarily indicates that the 

defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct. 

There may, however, be extraordinary cases in which adjustments 

under both §§ 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may apply.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. 

n.4 (emphasis added). Neither party has challenged the district 

court’s conclusion that this was an “extraordinary” case in which an 

enhancement under § 3C1.1 could coexist with a reduction under § 

3E1.1. Thus, we express no view on the soundness of the court’s 

conclusion. 

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properly held Reeves willfully obstructed justice; thus, the 

court did not plainly err in concluding that Reeves’ 

acceptance of responsibility, which did not occur until after 

he was re-arrested for another crime, was insufficiently timely 

to warrant a reduction under subsection (b). 

Finally, a word of caution about what we do not hold. 

Prior to 2003, the decision whether to grant a third level of 

reduction under § 3E1.1(b) was vested solely in the judiciary. 

See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) (2003). The passage of the 

PROTECT Act in 2003 amended the guideline by making the 

application of subsection (b) depend on the government filing 

a motion requesting the reduction. See Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 

401(g)(1)(A). Here, both parties have assumed that even after 

the government moved for the reduction, the district court 

retained discretion to deny it. This issue appears to have 

divided those circuits that have considered it. Compare 

United States v. Deberry, 576 F.3d 708, 710 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(“Subsection (b) confers an entitlement on the government: if 

it wants to give the defendant additional credit for acceptance 

of responsibility . . . it can file a motion and the defendant will

get the additional one-level reduction in his offense level.”) 

(emphasis in original), with United States v. Stacey, 531 F.3d 

565, 567 (8th Cir. 2008) (“When determining if a third level 

of reduction is warranted [under subsection (b)], the court’s 

inquiry should be ‘context specific,’ and should consider the 

timeliness of the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.”), 

and United States v. Sloley, 464 F.3d 355, 360 (2d Cir. 2006) 

(“[U]nder the new version [of § 3E1.1(b)] both the court and 

the government must be satisfied that the acceptance of 

responsibility is genuine.”). Because Reeves has not argued 

the district court lacked discretion to deny the reduction even 

after the government moved for it, we do not address the issue 

or resolve it. See Doe v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 

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875 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (argument not raised 

on appeal is waived). 

C 

 Finally, Reeves argues his counsel was constitutionally 

ineffective because he failed to inform the district court that 

the initial criminal complaint against Reeves had been 

dismissed and that Reeves had not been under a court order to 

appear at his arraignment. To prevail on a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, “[t]he defendant bears the 

burden of proving that his lawyer made errors ‘so serious that 

counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by 

the Sixth Amendment’ and that counsel’s deficient 

performance was prejudicial.” United States v. Geraldo, 271 

F.3d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). “In this circuit, 

when an appellant makes an ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim for the first time on appeal, we generally remand for a 

fact-finding hearing, at which the district court can explore 

whether alleged episodes of substandard representation reflect 

the trial counsel’s informed tactical choice or a decision 

undertaken out of ignorance of the relevant law.” United 

States v. Mouling, 557 F.3d 658, 668–69 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). There are “two 

exceptions to this general practice: when the trial record alone 

conclusively shows that the defendant is entitled to no relief, 

and the rare exception when the trial record conclusively 

shows the contrary.” Id. at 669 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

The record conclusively shows defense counsel did not 

perform deficiently because any argument that Reeves did not 

act willfully merely because he had not been ordered by the 

court to appear at his arraignment would have been meritless. 

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The district court based its enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 

3C1.1, not on a finding or assumption that Reeves had 

violated a court order, but on Reeves’ “failure to appear and . 

. . fugitive status for close to one year.” Because this conduct 

was inherently obstructive, the court was permitted to infer 

Reeves’ willfulness, and therefore it would have been futile to 

argue Reeves lacked the subjective intent to obstruct justice 

based on the lack of a court order. In any event, such an 

argument would have been easily rejected. Willfulness under 

§ 3C1.1 is established simply by showing the defendant had 

knowledge of his obligation to attend the judicial proceeding 

he missed. See Monroe, 990 F.2d at 1376. Here, not only did 

the evidence establish Reeves knew of his arraignment on 

June 5, 2006, but he has not even argued to the contrary. 

Thus, counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to make a 

meritless argument; and, likewise, the absence of such 

argument caused Reeves no prejudice. A remand is 

unnecessary. 

III 

 For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment 

and sentence are 

Affirmed. 

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ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part: In United States

v. Henry, 557 F.3d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir. 2009), the court held

with regard to the enhancement of a sentence for obstruction of

justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, that:

[A]lthough a court ordinarily may rely on the willing

commission of conduct that, objectively viewed, tends to

obstruct justice, such an objective standard serves only as

a proxy of the actual subjective intent required by the

Guideline. Where conduct is directly and inherently

obstructive, the court may infer an intent to obstruct justice.

But where the evidence shows such a proxy is not reliable

and the defendant did not have the required intent, an

enhancement is not warranted.

The court thus adhered to the longstanding holding of

United States v. Monroe, 990 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1993), that

the word “willful” in U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 “‘requires that the

defendant consciously act with the purpose of obstructing

justice.’” Id. at 1376 (quoting United States v. Thompson, 962

F.2d 1069, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). In Henry, this court held that

there was no need for a separate finding of intent to obstruct

justice when a defendant engaged in conduct that is inherently

obstructive — “that is, behavior that a rational person would

expect to obstruct justice,” 557 F.3d at 646 — at least where “no

evidence is proffered to show non-obstructive intent,” id. at 647.

Today the court holds that Reeves willfully obstructed

justice in either of two ways. First, his failure to appear for his

arraignment was conduct that is inherently obstructive; the

conduct demonstrates willful obstruction in the absence of any

showing by Reeves of non-obstructive intent. Op. at 5–7. In the

alternative, Reeves possessed knowledge of the arraignment and

failed to attend, thus meeting the Monroe standard that a

defendant be aware of a court requirement and consciously act

to ignore it. Op. at 7. But, as this court recognized in Henry,

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557 F.3d at 646, Monroe requires more. Reeves must not

simply ignore the court’s mandate, he must act “with the

purpose of obstructing justice,” Monroe, 990 F.2d at 1376

(internal quotation omitted). 

There is no evidence of Reeves’ obstructive intent other

than the inference to be drawn from his inherently obstructive

conduct. Yet, for its alternative holding, the court expressly

disclaims reliance on the inherently obstructive conduct. See

Op. 7. That alternative holding appears to find willful

obstruction from knowledge alone, yet in Henry this court

reiterated what Monroe made clear: “although this [court’s

precedent] has sometimes been interpreted as a signal that the

specific intent to obstruct justice is not necessary under § 3C1.1

. . . such an interpretation is in tension with the Guidelines” and

the requirement that “‘the defendant consciously act with the

purpose of obstructing justice.’” Henry, 557 F.3d at 647

(quoting Monroe, 990 F.2d at 1376). While that willfulness may

be inferred from inherently obstructive conduct in the absence

of non-obstructive intent, see id., knowledge alone cannot

provide the basis for a determination of the intention to

“willfully obstruct” justice. Otherwise, without the inference of

inherently obstructive conduct, every failure to appear for a

known court appointment would nonetheless constitute an

obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1, contrary to the

requirements of that Guideline. See Henry, 557 F.3d at 647.

Accordingly, I do not join the court’s alternative holding, which,

in any event, is dictum unnecessary to resolve this appeal.

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