Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01011/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01011-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bruce Wayne Miller
Plaintiff
Robert Withrow
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRUCE WAYNE MILLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROBERT WITHROW,

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:14-cv-01011-SKO (PC)

FIRST SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING 

COMPLAINT, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, 

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 

UNDER SECTION 1983

(Doc. 1)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

First Screening Order

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff Bruce Wayne Miller, a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 

filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on June 27, 2014. The Court is required 

to screen Plaintiff=s complaint and dismiss the case, in whole or in part, if the Court determines it 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and 

courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 

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F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Pro se litigants 

are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their 

favor, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 2012); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010), but Plaintiff=s claims must be facially plausible to survive screening, which 

requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant 

is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. 

U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant 

acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II. Discussion

Plaintiff is a civil detainee at Coalinga State Hospital (“CSH”) in Coalinga, California, and 

he brings this action for monetary damages against Robert Withrow, the Medical Director at CSH. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Withrow refuses to stop the involuntary medication of Plaintiff, 

and he is accepting the “false diagnosis and lies” of unlicensed acting doctor Glenn Vega.1 (Doc. 

1, Comp., p. 2.) 

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must link the named defendants to the participation in the 

violation at issue. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 

1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Liability may not be imposed under a theory of 

respondeat superior, and there must exist some causal connection between the conduct of each 

named defendant and the violation at issue. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Lemire v. California Dep’t 

of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 

F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011), 

cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012). 

 

1

Plaintiff’s allegation that Dr. Vega is unlicensed is incorrect. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Glenn 

A. Vega, M.D., is currently licensed by the California Medical Board. Fed. R. Evid. 201; Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. 

Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2010).

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In general, as a civil detainee, Plaintiff is entitled to treatment more considerate than that 

afforded pretrial detainees or convicted criminals, Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931-32 (9th Cir. 

2004), and Plaintiff’s right to constitutionally adequate conditions of confinement is protected by 

the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315, 

102 S.Ct. 2452 (1982). A determination whether Plaintiff’s rights were violated requires 

“balancing of his liberty interests against the relevant state interests.” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321. 

Plaintiff is “entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals 

whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish,” but the Constitution requires only that 

courts ensure that professional judgment was exercised. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-22. 

While Plaintiff has a right to avoid the involuntary administration of antipsychotic 

medication in the absence of due process, the right is not unfettered and his intimation that he 

cannot be forcibly medicated is neither accurate under the law nor sufficient to support a viable 

claim for relief. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22, 110 S.Ct. 1028 (1990). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief against Defendant 

Withrow.

III. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any claims upon which relief may be granted under 

section 1983. The Court will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint.2 

Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th 

Cir. 2000). Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state 

what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s federal rights and liability 

may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of mere respondeat superior, 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-07 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 

132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 

omitted). Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey, 693 F.3d at 

 

2

Plaintiff filed a separate action against Dr. Vega on June 16, 2014. The two actions may be subject to future 

consolidation.

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907 n.1, and it must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading,”

Local Rule 220. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim 

under section 1983;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an 

amended complaint; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this 

action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 23, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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