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Parties Involved:
Vanessa Bailey
Appellant
John E. Potter
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 16, 2007 Decided March 9, 2007

No. 05-5454

VANESSA BAILEY,

APPELLANT

v.

JOHN E. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNITED

STATES POSTAL SERVICE,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cv02224)

Michael J. Kator argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant. Irving Kator entered an appearance.

Heather Graham-Oliver, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued

the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A.

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S.

Attorney. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered

an appearance.

USCA Case #05-5454 Document #1027249 Filed: 03/09/2007 Page 1 of 5
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Before: ROGERS, GARLAND and BROWN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from the denial,

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, of motions to enforce a

settlement agreement. We hold that because the district court

did not dismiss the underlying complaint in accordance with

FED.R.CIV.P. 58(a), the district court retained jurisdiction over

the motions to enforce the settlement agreement. Accordingly,

we reverse and remand the case to the district court.

I.

On September 17, 1998, Vanessa Bailey sued the Postal

Service pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1974, 42

U.S.C. §§ 2000e, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29

U.S.C. § 794, alleging discrimination based on race, sex, and

psychological handicap. On July 9, 2001, during jury selection,

the parties informed the district court that they had settled their

dispute. Under the terms of the settlement, the Postal Service

would pay Bailey $285,000 and Bailey would resign from her

position with the Postal Service within 60 days. The district

court accepted the settlement terms and stated: “The terms of

the settlement agreement have been put forward on the record,

the offer and acceptance. With that, the case will be dismissed.”

No separate order dismissing the case, however, was ever filed

and entered on the docket.

On September 28, 2001, Bailey filed a motion for

enforcement of the settlement agreement. The district court

referred the motion to a magistrate judge on January 30, 2002.

After various proceedings before the magistrate judge, he

referred the case to mediation, which failed. On September 26,

2005, after four years had passed, the district court ruled, sua

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sponte without briefing from the parties, that it lacked

jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and denied

Bailey’s (by now several) motions for enforcement. The district

court cited Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375

(1994), which holds that, at least where settlement was not

incorporated into the order of dismissal or there was not an

independent statutory basis for jurisdiction, the district courts

had no inherent power to enforce a settlement agreement. Id. at

381-82. Upon ruling that ancillary jurisdiction would not serve

the same purpose, as settlement agreements generally required

their own source of jurisdiction, the district court suggested that

Bailey might invoke diversity jurisdiction and move for

reconsideration or seek relief in the District of Columbia courts.

Again, no separate order dismissing the case was filed and

entered on the docket. Bailey appeals and our review is de novo.

See Loughlin v. United States, 393 F.3d 155, 162 (D.C. Cir.

2004).

II.

This court has jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, of “all

final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 1291. For a decision to be “final,” Rule 58(a)(1)

requires that “[e]very judgment and amended judgment must be

set forth on a separate document.” By requiring the filing and

entry on the docket of a separate document, Rule 58(a) is

designed to provide clear, automatic notice to litigants of when

final judgment has been entered and the period to appeal has

begun to run. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 384-85

(1978). It is to be “interpreted to prevent loss of the right of

appeal, not to facilitate loss.” Id. at 386. Where the court would

have jurisdiction of an appeal once a Rule 58(a) document was

filed and entered, a remand would be a pointless exercise in

which “[w]heels would spin for no practical purpose.” Pack v.

Burns Int’l Security Serv., 130 F.3d 1071, 1072 (D.C. Cir.

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1997); see United States v. Haynes, 158 F.3d 1327, 1330 (D.C.

Cir. 1998). 

Although the district court did not file and enter a separate

order of dismissal pursuant to Rule 58(a), this appeal is not

premature. The order of September 26, 2005 denying Bailey’s

motion for enforcement of the settlement agreement was

tantamount to a final judgment on her claims. The facts in the

instant case closely track those in Nix v. Billington, 448 F.3d 411

(D.C. Cir. 2006). Nix also involved a Title VII claim. There,

the district court denied the plaintiff’s request for a status

hearing on the remaining retaliation claims on the ground that it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction. This court held that because

the district court, in denying a status conference for lack of

jurisdiction, “disengaged itself entirely from the case,” id. at

415, its disengagement was “tantamount to a final judgment on

[the plaintiff’s] claims.” Id. So too here. The record indicates

that the district court denied Bailey’s motions to enforce the

settlement agreement because it believed that it had, after

accepting the terms of the parties’ settlement, previously

dismissed her complaint, and that the only thing that remained

of Bailey’s case were her motions for enforcement. In denying

the motions on subject matter jurisdiction grounds, the district

court disengaged itself from her case and, as in Nix, its

disengagement was “tantamount to a final judgment on

[Bailey’s] claims.” Id.

In fact, Bailey’s Title VII claims were still pending before

the district court on September 26, 2005. Although the district

court stated on July 9, 2001, upon learning of the parties’

settlement agreement, “[w]ith that, the case will be dismissed,”

no separate order of dismissal was ever filed and entered on the

docket. Because the district court did not issue the appropriate

order pursuant to Rule 58(a) dismissing the complaint, it

continued to have jurisdiction over Bailey’s case. Cf. Shaffer v.

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1

 The 2002 amendment to Rule 58 (at (b)(2)(B), providing a

judgment is entered when 150 days have run from the entry in the civil

docket under Rule 79(a)), took effect after the relevant time period in

this matter and would not affect Bailey’s appeal in any event because

no civil docket entry was made noting the dismissal of her case.

Veneman, 325 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Reed v. United

States, 891 F.2d 878, 880 (11th Cir. 1990). The district court’s

reliance on Kokkonen was therefore misplaced and we need not

address Bailey’s alternative argument that the district court erred

because there was an independent statutory basis for jurisdiction

under 39 U.S.C. § 409 (suits by and against the Postal Service).

Because a Rule 58 order of dismissal was never filed and

entered on the docket pursuant to FED. R. CIV P. 79 to indicate

the case had been dismissed, Bailey’s time to appeal never

commenced to run and her appeal is timely.1 The relevant entry

on the docket referred only to the fact that the case had settled

before selection of the jury and that the jury pool was

discharged. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case to the

district court.

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