Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_03-cv-00464/USCOURTS-alsd-1_03-cv-00464-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Patrick N. Anderson
Plaintiff
City Of Mobile
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PATRICK N. ANDERSON, : 

: 

Plaintiff, : 

: 

v. : CIVIL ACTION 03-0464-M

: 

CITY OF MOBILE, : 

: 

Defendant. : 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action comes before the Court on Defendant City of

Mobile’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 25). The parties filed

written consent and this action has been referred to the

undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings and

order the entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §

636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73 (see Doc. 21). After

consideration, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED and this action

is DISMISSED.

Plaintiff Patrick N. Anderson brought this action on July

22, 2003 by filing a complaint that the City of Mobile had

defamed him, slandered him, and invaded his privacy by saying

that he is “mental [sic] retarded, crazy (insane), stupid,

dumb, and have [sic] aids” (Doc. 1, p. 1). Anderson has

asserted jurisdiction under the 5th Amendment to the U.S.

Case 1:03-cv-00464-M Document 29 Filed 06/28/05 Page 1 of 7
1This is the Court’s best understanding of Plaintiff’s assertion

of jurisdiction.

2

Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the

American Disabilities Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Doc.

1), the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 9th Amendments to the U.S.

Constitution, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, the Civil Rights Act

of 1871 (Doc. 8), and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (Doc. 28).1

The Court notes that this is the first of nine actions

filed by Plaintiff in this Court between July 2003 and January

2004, alleging similar claims against various Alabama

communities, officials, and related institutions. See

Anderson v. County of Mobile, CV-03-0467-CG-M; Anderson v.

Mobile County Health Dept., CV-03-0593-CG-B; Anderson v.

Bishop State Comm. College, CV-03-0595-CB-B; Anderson v. Dow,

CV-03-0713-CB-B; Anderson v. Bishop State Comm. College, CV04-0050-CG-L; Anderson v. City of Prichard, CV-04-0058-CG-M,

Anderson v. District Two, CV-04-0060-CG-M; Anderson v.

District One, CV-04-0061-CG-M.

The City of Mobile has filed a Motion to Dismiss this

action, asserting that Plaintiff has failed to show any basis

for jurisdiction in this Court (Doc. 25). Defendant further

asserts that Anderson has, at most, raised claims that are

more properly brought in the State courts.

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2The Court notes that the following discussion, beginning with

this paragraph, is lifted, almost verbatim, from an Order entered by

Chief Judge Granade in Anderson v. District Two, CV 04-0060-CG-M

(S.D. Ala. February 15, 2005) (Doc. 15, pp. 3-5).

3

Judge Butler of this Court recently considered a similar

motion in plaintiff’s action against Michael Dow, the Mayor of

Mobile.2 Anderson v. Michael Dow, CV-03-0713-CB-B. The

allegations in the Dow case are very similar to the

allegations in the instant case. Plaintiff alleged the

following in

the Dow case:

“[F]rom June 24, 2003 until the date the

complaint was filed, October 23, 2003,

Michael Dow, who is the mayor of Mobile,

Alabama, continually defamed the plaintiff

by

referring to plaintiff as a “homosexual[,]

a quoted-unquoted [ ] queer and/or fag.” 

In

addition, plaintiff alleges that Dow

“brainwash[ed] the Mobile County citizens

[by telling them] that the plaintiff lost

his Social Security Disability case which

is [still] pending. . . [and by telling

them] that [the plaintiff] know[s] this

very stupid idiot aka (Gloria brother

[sic]) and [that] this idiot is

[plaintiff’s] best friend . . . without

substantial evidence.”

Along with these factual allegations,

the complaint makes references to various

legal citations and propositions. For

instance, after setting forth the factual

basis for the complaint, the complaint

states that “[s]uch obscene speech and

Case 1:03-cv-00464-M Document 29 Filed 06/28/05 Page 3 of 7
4

fighting words long have no protection

under the first amendment;” “[t]he 1st

Amendment. . . do [sic] not require a

private figure plaintiff to prove actual

malice to recover damages for actual injury

caused by publication of a defamatory

falsehood;” “Michael Dow deprived the

plaintiff [sic] 5th Amendment rights in

reputation, the security of his reputation

or good name from the arts of detraction

and slander;” and “deprived the plaintiff

[sic] 4th Amendment right to privacy.” 

Plaintiff concludes his complaint with

a summary of the constitutional and

statutory grounds for his claim and with a

demand for damages. Plaintiff asserts that

Dow has violated his rights secured by the

First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments of the

United States Constitution and that he is

entitled to damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff seeks “non-economic compensatory

damages” in the amount of $5 million

dollars and punitive damages $10 million

dollars [sic] for a very actionable prima

facie slanderous defamation 

per se.”

Anderson v. Dow, CV-03-0713-CB-B, Doc. 14, February 26, 2005.

This court found that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking

in the Dow case. Id. The court reasoned as follows:

When a complaint seeks recovery under a

federal statute, it cannot be dismissed for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction unless

it is (1) “clearly immaterial and made

solely for the purpose of obtaining

jurisdiction” or (2) “wholly insubstantial

and frivolous.” Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.

678, 682-83 (1946). Whether a claim falls

under the former exception “turns on

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5

whether the complaint ‘really and

substantially’ invokes a dispute over

federal law.” Creel v. City of Atlanta,

399 F.2d 777, 778 (5th Cir. 1968). A claim

is “wholly insubstantial and frivolous” if

it is obviously without merit or if it is

foreclosed by prior Supreme Court

decisions. South Park Square, Ltd. v. City

of Jackson, 565 F.2d 338, 342 (5th Cir.

1977).

Subject matter jurisdiction is lacking

in this case under either of these

exceptions. First, there is no real and

substantial dispute of federal law. 

Plaintiff’s complaint can be read to assert

two state law claims–defamation and

invasion of privacy. Plaintiff has

attempted to transform these state law

claims into federal causes of action simply

by adding references to the federal

constitution and federal law to his

complaint. See Johnston v. Byrd, 354 F.2d

982 (5th Cir. 1965) (federal question

merely incidental even though complaint

alleged constitutional violations against

sheriff). Second, plaintiff’s

constitutional defamation and invasion of

privacy claims are

foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision

in Paul v. Davis, 425 U.S. 985 (1976),

which

held that a person's interest in

reputation alone, apart from some

more tangible interests such as

employment,” is not a protected

liberty interest within the

meaning of the due process

clause. To establish a liberty

interest sufficient to implicate

the fourteenth amendment

safeguards, the individual must

be not only stigmatized but also

stigmatized in connection with a

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6

denial of a right or status

previously recognized under state

law.

Smith v. Siegelman, 322 F.3d 1290, 1296

(11th Cir. 2003) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). [Footnote: While

plaintiff has alleged invasion of privacy

claims under the First, Fourth and Fifth

Amendments, rather than the Fourteenth

Amendment, he has asserted no facts to

demonstrate that he has been deprived of a

right protected by any of those

Amendments.] Plaintiff’s complaint alleges

that his reputation has been injured as the

result of the statements allegedly made by

defendant Dow. Such a claim, standing

alone, is not cognizable under federal law.

[Footnote: It should be noted that of the

three federal statutes invoked—§ 1981, §

1983 and § 1985–the only one that even

arguably might apply is § 1983, which

provides redress for the violation,

committed under color of state law, of a

constitutional right. As discussed above,

the complaint does not state a

constitutional violation and, therefore, is

not actionable under § 1983. Section 1981

prohibits discrimination in the making of

contracts which affect interstate commerce,

while section 1985 prohibits, inter alia,

conspiracy to deprive a person of civil

rights. The facts alleged do not involve

the making or enforcement of any contract,

nor do they give rise to any inference of a

conspiracy.]

Anderson v. Dow, CV-03-0713-CB-B, Doc. 14, February 26, 2005. 

Chief Judge Granade quoted Judge Butler’s decision

extensively, finding “that this Court lacks jurisdiction over

the instant case for the same reason jurisdiction was lacking

Case 1:03-cv-00464-M Document 29 Filed 06/28/05 Page 6 of 7
7

in Plaintiff’s suit against Michael Dow.” Anderson v.

District Two, CV-0060-CG-M (Doc. 15, p. 5). Chief Judge

Granade further held that “Plaintiff’s complaint asserts

only state law claims against Defendant. There is no real and

substantial dispute of federal law and Plaintiff’s claims are

wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” Id. With that finding,

the action was dismissed. 

After reviewing all pleadings of record, the Court finds

that Plaintiff’s claims in this action are, at best, tort

actions that are properly brought in the State courts. 

Anderson has failed to demonstrate any basis for federal

jurisdiction; as such, his claims are frivolous. 

Therefore, for the reasons set out above, Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED. 

Judgment will be entered by separate Order.

DONE this 28th day of June, 2005.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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