Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-01164/USCOURTS-caDC-96-01164-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
Respondent
Jim Walter Resources, Inc.
Respondent
Secretary of Labor
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 28, 1997 Decided May 2, 1997

No. 96-1164

SECRETARY OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION AND 

JIM WALTER RESOURCES, INC.,

RESPONDENTS

On Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration

Robin A. Rosenbluth, Attorney, U.S. Department of Labor, 

argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the brief were J. 

Davitt McAteer, Acting Solicitor of Labor, and W. Christian 

Schumann, Counsel.

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Warren B. Lightfoot, Jr. argued the cause for respondents. 

With him on the brief was David M. Smith. J. Alan Truitt

and Norman M. Gleichman entered appearances.

Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Under the Federal Mine Safety and 

Health Act, violations of mine safety and health standards 

that contribute "significantly and substantially" to a coal mine 

hazard and that result from an "unwarrantable failure" of the 

mine operator to comply with applicable standards may lead 

to orders requiring mine operators to remove workers from 

unsafe areas. In this case, the Secretary of Labor petitions 

for review of a Federal Mine Safety and Health Review 

Commission decision holding that, in making "significantly 

and substantially" and "unwarrantable failure" determinations, mine inspectors must confine their assessments to 

conditions that violate health and safety standards and may 

not consider nearby nonviolative conditions. Because we 

conclude that the Commission's exclusion of nonviolative conditions from the "significantly and substantially" assessment 

is required by the plain language of the Mine Safety Act, we 

deny the Secretary's petition for review on this point. However, because the language of the "unwarrantable failure" 

provision is ambiguous, and because the Secretary, to whom 

we owe Chevron deference, permissibly interprets the Act to 

allow consideration of conditions that do not violate health 

and safety standards, we reverse and remand the unwarrantability portion of the Commission's decision.

I

The Mine Safety Act directs the Secretary of Labor or the 

Secretary's authorized representatives to inspect coal mines 

frequently. 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1994). If an inspection reveals a violation of mandatory mine health and safety regulations, the inspector issues a citation. Id. § 814(a). If the 

inspector determines that the violation is both "of such nature 

as could significantly and substantially contribute to the cause 

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and effect of a coal ... mine safety or health hazard" and 

"caused by an unwarrantable failure of [the mine] operator to 

comply with such mandatory health or safety standards," that 

finding must be included in the citation. Id. § 814(d)(1).

Mine operators cited for violations that both contribute 

"significantly and substantially" to a mine hazard and result 

from an "unwarrantable failure," and who receive another 

"unwarrantable failure" citation within ninety days receive 

what are known as section 814(d)(1) withdrawal orders. Id.; 

see also International Union, United Mine Workers v. 

Kleppe, 532 F.2d 1403, 1407 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Withdrawal 

orders require mine operators to remove most workers from 

the area affected by the cited violation until the violation is 

corrected. 30 U.S.C. § 814(d)(1). Once an operator receives 

a section 814(d)(1) withdrawal order, any "similar" violations 

lead automatically to additional withdrawal orders under section 814(d)(2). Id. § 814(d)(2). Mine operators receiving 

section 814(d)(2) withdrawal orders are not again measured 

against the more lenient section 814(d)(1) standards until 

subsequent inspections find no "similar" violations. Id.

Because the parties debate the precise meaning of section 

814(d), we quote its key provisions in full:

(1) If, upon any inspection of a coal or other mine, an 

authorized representative of the Secretary finds that 

there has been a violation of any mandatory health or 

safety standard, and if he also finds that, while the 

conditions created by such violation do not cause imminent danger, such violation is of such nature as could 

significantly and substantially contribute to the cause or 

effect of a coal or other mine safety or health hazard, and 

if he finds such violation to be caused by an unwarrantable failure of such operator to comply with such mandatory health or safety standards, he shall include such 

finding in any citation given to the operator under this 

chapter. If, during the same inspection or any subsequent inspection of such mine within 90 days after the 

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issuance of such citation, an authorized representative of 

the Secretary finds another violation of any mandatory 

health or safety standard and finds such violation to be 

also caused by an unwarrantable failure of such operator 

to so comply, he shall forthwith issue an order requiring 

the operator to cause all persons in the area affected by 

such violation ... to be withdrawn from, and to be 

prohibited from entering, such area until an authorized 

representative of the Secretary determines that such 

violation has been abated.

(2) If a withdrawal order with respect to any area in a 

coal or other mine has been issued pursuant to paragraph (1), a withdrawal order shall promptly be issued by 

an authorized representative of the Secretary who finds 

upon any subsequent inspection the existence in such 

mine of violations similar to those that resulted in the 

issuance of the withdrawal order under paragraph (1) 

until such time as an inspection of such mine discloses no 

similar violations. Following an inspection of such mine 

which discloses no similar violations, the provisions of 

paragraph (1) shall again be applicable to that mine.

Id. § 814(d).

Appellee Jim Walter Resources operates the Number 7 

coal mine in Birmingham, Alabama. Because at the time of 

the January 31, 1994 inspection at issue here Jim Walter 

Resources had already received a section 814(d)(1) withdrawal order, it would receive a section 814(d)(2) withdrawal order 

if an inspector found a health and safety violation "similar" to 

the violation which prompted the section 814(d)(1) order. 

During the January 31 inspection, the inspector found a large 

pile of combustible trash, including paper bags, oily rags, 

wooden pallets, and a five-foot wide cable spool in the mine's 

Number 3 entry. Mine safety and health regulations prohibit 

the accumulation of combustible materials in "active workings," that is, "any place in a coal mine where miners are 

normally required to work or travel." 30 C.F.R. §§ 70.2(b), 

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75.400 (1996). A heavy ventilation curtain ran across the top 

of the pile, dividing the pile into two parts. The bulk of the 

trash lay on the "inby" side of the curtainthe side closer to 

the mine's interior. A smaller quantity of trash, including 

paper bags, cardboard boxes, and a torn garbage bag containing sandwich bags and oily rags, lay on the "outby" side of 

the curtainthe side closer to the mine shaft and entrance. 

Issuing a citation for the entire pile of trash, the inspector 

found the accumulation both "significant and substantial" and 

the result of an "unwarrantable failure" to comply with health 

and safety standards.

Jim Walter Resources contested the citation. Following a 

hearing, an Administrative Law Judge ruled that only the 

small portion of trash on the outby side of the ventilation 

curtain violated the regulation because only that portion lay 

in active workings. Having so determined, the ALJ found 

that the outby violation was neither "significant and substantial" nor the result of an "unwarrantable failure."

Before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, the Secretary challenged the ALJ's "significant and 

substantial" and "unwarrantable failure" findings concerning 

the small outby pile as both legally erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence. Although not contesting the 

ALJ's finding that the large inby pile of trash was not a 

violation, the Secretary argued that the ALJ erroneously 

failed to consider the inby trash when evaluating the seriousness of the outby violation. By a 3-2 vote, the Commission 

affirmed the ALJ. According to the Commission, it would be 

"impermissibl[e] [to] use the Secretary's evidence as to the 

seriousness of nonviolative conduct [the inby trash] to establish that the violative conduct [the outby trash] was [significant and substantial]." Jim Walter Resources, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 18 F.M.S.H.R.C. 508, 511 (1996). For the 

same reason, the Commission ruled that "[t]he operator's 

conduct in permitting [the] non-violative accumulation cannot 

... support a finding of unwarrantable failure as to the 

violative accumulation." Id. at 512.

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In his petition for review, the Secretary advances the same 

arguments he made before the Commission: the Commission 

should have considered the inby materials in determining 

whether the violation contributed "significantly and substantially" to a mine hazard and resulted from an "unwarrantable 

failure"; and, even excluding the inby materials, the ALJ's 

findings are unsupported by substantial evidence. Because 

the Secretary's first argument challenges the Commission's 

interpretation of the Mine Safety Act, we proceed under the 

familiar standards of Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See 

Secretary of Labor ex rel. Bushnell v. Cannelton Indus., 867 

F.2d 1432, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (applying Chevron to interpretive dispute between Secretary of Labor and Federal 

Mine Safety and Health Commission). We ask first whether 

"Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 

issue," Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842; if so, the Commission, the 

Secretary, and this court must give effect to Congress's 

"unambiguously expressed intent." Id. at 842-43; Cannelton 

Indus., 867 F.2d at 1435. If "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," we ask whether the 

agency's position rests on a "permissible construction of the 

statute." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.

II

We begin with the Secretary's argument that in considering whether a violation contributes "significantly and substantially" to a mine hazard, decisionmakersinspectors, ALJs, 

and the Commissionmust take account of the seriousness of 

nearby conditions, even those not amounting to violations of 

health and safety standards. In making this argument, the 

Secretary emphasizes the word "contribute" in section 

814(d)(1), which provides that violations are significant and 

substantial if they are "of such nature as could significantly 

and substantially contribute to the cause and effect of a coal 

... mine safety or health hazard." 30 U.S.C. § 814(d)(1). 

According to the Secretary, the presence of the word "contribute" means that "factors in addition to the violation itself 

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should be considered in assessing the hazard created by the 

violation." Pet'r's Br. at 17.

We think the Secretary focuses on the wrong word in 

section 814(d)(1). As we read the statute, the critical words 

are "such violation is of such nature." A "significantly and 

substantially" finding may be made only after an authorized 

representative has found a "violation" of mine safety and 

health regulations. 30 U.S.C. § 814(d)(1). Having found a 

"violation," the representative must designate it significant 

and substantial if "such violation is of such nature as could 

significantly and substantially contribute to the cause or 

effect of a coal ... mine safety or health hazard." Id.

(emphasis added). The statute does not say "such violation in 

combination with other factors," nor does it say "such violation together with surrounding circumstances that do not 

violate health and safety standards." By focusing the decisionmaker's attention on "such violation" and its "nature," 

Congress has plainly excluded consideration of surrounding 

conditions that do not violate health and safety standards. 

Nonviolative surrounding conditions are not part of "such 

violation[s]," nor do they affect the "nature" of those violations. The Commission thus ruled that "[b]ecause section 

104(d)(1) expressly provides that [a significant and substantial] determination arises from the nature of a violation, the 

inby non-violative accumulation cannot support [a significant 

and substantial] designation as to the outby, violative accumulation." Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 18 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 511 

(citation omitted). Because the Commission did precisely 

what the statute unambiguously requires, we affirm its exclusion of the inby materials from the "significantly and substantially" calculation. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 ("If the 

intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for 

the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").

Having concluded that the Commission's interpretation follows from the plain language of section 814(d)(1), we have no 

need to consider the Secretary's policy and legislative history 

arguments. ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 

1987). Nor need we consider his claim that the Commission 

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failed to distinguish or overturn prior cases where, according 

to the Secretary, the Commission considered surrounding 

conditions when determining whether particular violations 

contributed "significantly and substantially" to mine hazards. 

For the record, however, we think the Secretary misinterprets the Commission's precedents. Although the Commission has considered nonviolative surrounding conditions, the 

cases cited by the Secretary do not speak to the issue before 

us today. The statute requires a decisionmaker, having 

found a violation, to make two additional findings: whether 

there is a "hazard" to which the violation might contribute; 

and, if so, whether the violation "significantly and substantially" contributes to that "hazard." 30 U.S.C. § 814(d)(1). 

When evaluating the first questionexistence of a "hazard"

the Commission does consider surrounding conditions. See, 

e.g., Cyprus Plateau Mining Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 16 

F.M.S.H.R.C. 1610, 1613-14 (1994) (considering "generally 

poor condition" of mine roof); Secretary of Labor v. Texasgulf, Inc., 10 F.M.S.H.R.C. 498, 501 (1988) (considering levels 

of methane surrounding violation); Secretary of Labor v. U.S. 

Steel Mining Co., 6 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1573, 1574 (1984) (finding 

no error when ALJ "evaluated the cited violation in terms of 

"continued normal mining operations' "). But when the Commission analyzes whether a particular violation "significantly 

and substantially" contributes to the "hazard," it considers, as 

it did here, only the particular violation's contribution. "[I]t 

is the contribution of a violation to the cause and effect of a 

hazard that must be significant and substantial." Texasgulf, 

10 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 500 (emphasis in original); see also 

Secretary of Labor v. Mathies Coal Co., 6 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1, 3 

(1984); Secretary of Labor v. Cement Div., Nat'l Gypsum Co.,

3 F.M.S.H.R.C. 822, 827 (1981) ("[A] violation "significantly 

and substantially' contributes to the cause and effect of a 

hazard if the violation could be a major cause of a danger to 

safety or health.").

Turning to the Secretary's alternative argument that, even 

excluding the larger amount of inby materials, the Commission's decision is unsupported by substantial evidence, we 

must uphold the Commission's factual determinations if on 

the record as a whole, "there is "such relevant evidence as a 

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reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the] 

conclusion.' " Chaney Creek Coal Corp. v. FMSHRC, 866 

F.2d 1424, 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see 30 U.S.C. 

§ 816(a)(1). An agency's conclusion "may be supported by 

substantial evidence even though a plausible alternative interpretation of the evidence would support a contrary view." 

Western Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 495 F.2d 145, 152 (D.C. Cir. 

1974) (citation omitted). Applying this highly deferential 

standard, we have no trouble concluding that the Commission's decision rests on substantial evidence. The small 

amount of outby trash consisted of a few paper bags, cardboard boxes, sandwich wrappers, oily rags, and part of a torn 

plastic garbage bag. Before the ALJ, the Secretary presented evidence of surrounding conditions, including the history of 

the mine's methane ignitions and face fires, and of the trash's 

combustibility. Excluding evidence of nonviolative conditions, 

the Commission concluded that the Secretary failed to prove 

that the small outby trash pile could "significantly and substantially" contribute to the cause or effect of a mine fire. 

Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 18 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 511. Although the Secretary's evidence may suggest that the neighboring inby trash enhanced the danger of fire, a reasonable 

factfinder could have concluded that the record contained 

insufficient evidence that this danger was markedly increased 

by the few additional outby items.

Underlying the Secretary's arguments, both statutory and 

evidentiary, is his concern that dangerous accumulations of 

trash outside active workings will go unchecked if the Commission's decision is allowed to stand. See, e.g., Pet'r's Pet. 

for Discretionary Review at 10. If collections of trash outside 

active workings can be both permissible and hazardous, the 

fault lies neither with the Mine Safety Act nor with the 

Commission's legal reasoning, but with the Secretary's combustible materials regulation, which forbids accumulations of 

combustible materials in active workings. 30 C.F.R. 

§ 75.400. The regulation does not prohibit such accumulations in inactive areas. We think concurring Commissioner 

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ate statutory purposes. However, if the Secretary sincerely 

believes the regulation is deficient, he should clarify its 

language through rulemaking, rather than ask the [decisionmaker] to rewrite the regulation by adjudication." Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 18 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 515 (Riley, Comm'r, 

concurring).

III

At oral argument, we asked the parties whether we would 

need to reach the second issue in this casethe Secretary's 

challenge to the Commission's ruling that the outby trash 

accumulation did not result from the operator's "unwarrantable failure" to comply with health and safety standardswere 

we to sustain the Commission's "significantly and substantially" ruling, as we now have. In a supplemental brief filed in 

response to our questions, Jim Walter Resources argues that 

the word "similar" in section 814(d)(2) means that section 

814(d)(2) withdrawal orders require both "significantly and 

substantially" and "unwarrantable failure" findings, and that 

our affirmance of the Commission's rejection of the Secretary's "significantly and substantially" finding therefore ends 

this matter. In his supplemental brief, the Secretary contends that we must resolve the "unwarrantable failure" issue 

because a section 814(d)(2) withdrawal order can rest on an 

"unwarrantable failure" finding alone:

Because under Section 104(d)(2) the Secretary must issue 

a withdrawal order if he finds a violation "similar to 

those that resulted in the issuance of [a] withdrawal 

order under [Section 104(d)(1)]," and because there is no 

requirement that the violation forming the basis for a 

Section 104(d)(1) withdrawal order be "significant and 

substantial," a withdrawal order under Section 104(d)(2) 

also may be issued on the basis only of a finding that the 

violation was an "unwarrantable failure."

Pet'r's Supp. Br. at 3 (brackets in original). The Commission 

agrees with the Secretary. Secretary of Labor v. Wyoming 

Fuel Co., 16 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1618, 1622 n.7 (1994) (stating in 

dictum "[i]f subsequent inspections of the mine reveal additional unwarrantable failure violations, withdrawal orders are 

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issued under section 104(d)(2) of the Act ...."); see also 

United Mine Workers v. FMSHRC, 768 F.2d 1477, 1478-79 

(D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating in dictum that "once a withdrawal 

order has been issued, any subsequent unwarrantable failure 

results in another such order") (emphasis in original).

We think the Secretary, to whom we owe Chevron deference, has the better reading of the statute. Section 814(d)(1) 

has two stepsa citation step and a withdrawal order step. 

For a citation under section 814(d)(1) to issue, an inspector 

must find a violation which is both "significant[ ] and substantial[ ]" and the result of an "unwarrantable failure." Once 

cited under section 814(d)(1), a mine operator will receive a 

withdrawal order if an inspector cites it for an "unwarrantable failure" violation within ninety days of the original citation. Unlike section 814(d)(1) citations, section 814(d)(1) 

withdrawal orders require no "significantly and substantially" 

findings. International Union, 532 F.2d at 1405-07. Because section 814(d)(2) refers to violations "similar to those" 

that led to the section 814(d)(1) withdrawal order, section 

814(d)(2) withdrawal orders likewise may issue on the basis of 

"unwarrantable failure" findings alone. We thus proceed to 

consider whether the Commission applied the proper legal 

standard when it concluded that the violation here did not 

result from an "unwarrantable failure."

On this issue, the parties' arguments echo their positions 

regarding the relevance of the nonviolative inby materials to 

the "significantly and substantially" assessment. In reaching 

its conclusion, the Commission held that it would be "impermissibl[e]" to use "evidence as to non-violative conduct to 

establish that ... violative conduct ... was unwarrantable." 

Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 18 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 512. The 

Secretary contends that the Commission's evidentiary ruling 

conflicts with the language of section 814(d)(1). According to 

the Secretary, the inby materials, even if not violative of 

health and safety standards, are relevant to determining 

whether the mine operator's outby violation results from an 

"unwarrantable failure."

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We begin again with the language of section 814(d)(1): 

inspectors must determine whether "such violation [was] 

caused by an unwarrantable failure of [the] operator to 

comply with such mandatory health or safety standards." 30 

U.S.C. § 814(d)(1). Reading this language just as it reads 

the "significantly and substantially" clause, the Commission 

argues that inspectors, in making unwarrantability assessments, must look only to the conditions that violate health 

and safety standards. Although this is certainly one way to 

read section 814(d)(1), because the "unwarrantable failure" 

clause differs critically from the "significantly and substantially" clause, the Commission's position is not the only reasonable interpretation. The "significantly and substantially" 

clause asks what effect the violation will have. By comparison, the unwarrantability clause asks what type of conduct 

caused the violation. Moreover, both the Secretary and the 

Commission interpret the words "unwarrantable failure" to 

require a culpability determination similar to gross negligence 

or recklessness. See, e.g., Emery Mining Corp. v. Secretary 

of Labor, 9 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1997, 2001 (1987) (construing unwarrantable failure as "aggravated conduct constituting more 

than ordinary negligence"); Pet'r's Br. at 29. Citing the 

Restatement (2nd) of Torts § 283 (1965), the Secretary argues that this negligence-based definition of "unwarrantable 

failure" requires consideration of surrounding circumstances. 

Id. ("[T]he standard of conduct to which [the actor] must 

conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man 

under the circumstances.") (emphasis added). In this case, 

for example, the Secretary claims that the ventilation curtain 

and vehicle tracks running across the trash pile and the large 

concrete blocks on top of the pile demonstrate that Jim 

Walter Resources knew of but ignored the trash accumulation. The Secretary argues, in other words, that the inby 

trash, although not violating health and safety standards, 

demonstrates negligence rising to unwarrantability.

Looking only to the text of section 814(d)(1), we cannot 

resolve this dispute between the Secretary and the Commissionboth interpretations find support in the statute's language. Because we discern no other meaning of section 

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814(d)(1) that clearly resolves the issue before us, we proceed 

to Chevron's second step. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 

Where, as here, the Secretary and the Commission disagree 

over the interpretation of the statute, we defer to the Secretary. Cannelton Indus., 867 F.2d at 1435.

Examining all relevant materialsstatutory language, legislative history, and legislative purpose, Chevron, 467 U.S. at 

859-64, 865we find the Secretary's construction of the Act 

reasonable. To begin with, the Secretary's interpretation is 

not inconsistent with the language of section 814(d)(1). Independent Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248, 

1257 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("[W]e defer to an agency's reasonable 

interpretation of a statute ... so long as it is not inconsistent 

with the unambiguously expressed congressional intent."). 

Because the "unwarrantable failure" clause, unlike the "significantly and substantially" clause, directs decisionmakers to 

consider the cause of the violation, the statute's language 

permits an interpretation that considers mine conditions beyond the violation itself, including conditions not themselves 

violating mine safety and health standards. The Secretary's 

expansive interpretation of section 814(d)(1) also finds support in the Act's legislative history. As the Secretary points 

out, Congress intended a broad reading of "unwarrantable 

failure," see S. Rep. No. 95-181, at 31-32 (1977), to accomplish 

the Act's purpose of protecting miners from health and safety 

hazards. See 30 U.S.C. § 801(a) ("[T]he first priority and 

concern of all in the coal ... mining industry must be the 

health and safety of ... the miner."). Our own cases confirm 

this broad reading of legislative history. We have "several 

times observed that the primary purpose of the Mine Safety 

Act was to protect mining's most valuable resourcethe 

miner[,] and that Congress intended the Act to be liberally 

construed to achieve this goal." Cannelton Indus., 867 F.2d 

at 1437 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Jim 

Walter Resources points to nothing in the Act's language or 

legislative history demonstrating that the Secretary's broad 

construction is contrary to the Act's purpose.

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IV

We deny the Secretary's petition for review on the "significantly and substantially" issue. With respect to the "unwarrantable failure" question, we grant the Secretary's petition 

for review, reverse the Commission, and remand for the 

Commission to determine whether, applying the Secretary's 

interpretation of the statute, the record contains sufficient

evidence of causation and culpability to support an "unwarrantable failure" finding.

So ordered.

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