Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02780/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02780-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Antoinette Rose Florez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, Chief Judge, United States District

Court for the District of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2780

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Antoinette Rose Florez, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 9, 2004

Filed: May 27, 2004

___________

Before WOLLMAN, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, and COLLOTON, Circuit

Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Antoinette Rose Florez was convicted by a jury of aiding and abetting money

laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). She appeals, arguing that the district

court1

 erred in submitting a willful blindness instruction to the jury. We affirm.

Appellate Case: 03-2780 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/27/2004 Entry ID: 1771548 
-2-

I.

Florez’s ex-husband, Tyrone Crawford, engaged in an extensive real estate

fraud scheme. Florez became involved after Crawford’s bank accounts were canceled

and he was precluded from opening a bank account in his own name for one year. He

asked Florez to open an account in her name that he could use. Crawford testified

that Florez was concerned that he would do “something funny with the account.” She

nevertheless opened a second individual checking account at US Bank, solely in her

name, on November 21, 2001. She used Crawford’s address and phone number and

gave him control over the check book and bank card. He used the checkbook several

times, each time forging her name. Crawford enlisted Florez’s help only when

making large cash withdrawals, which had to be made in person.

The money laundering charge at issue involved a complex series of

transactions. Florez was involved only at the end of the transactions, when she

helped Crawford withdraw proceeds of the illegal transactions, equaling $100,000 in

cash. Crawford falsified paperwork to make it look like a particular house had been

sold and financed by a new mortgage. Crawford then sold his fictitious mortgage to

InterBay Funding for $115,095.52. InterBay wired the funds to the Florez bank

account on February 6, 2002. The same day the money was wired, Crawford drove

to Florez’s home and told her he wanted to withdraw $100,000 from the account. He

and Florez went to the bank together, and Florez asked to withdraw the $100,000 in

cash. The Bank told them the funds were not available at that time and said that they

would have to return the following day once the funds had been ordered. The next

day, before Florez and Crawford received the cash, the vault teller filled out a

currency transaction report form with them. As part of that process, she asked about

their occupations, to which both Crawford and Florez replied that they were

rehabbers. Two tellers then took them to a room, where they counted out the

$100,000 cash in 100-dollar bills. Florez placed the money in her purse, whereupon

guards escorted Florez and Crawford out of the bank. Florez handed the money to

Crawford, which he placed in the trunk of his car.

Appellate Case: 03-2780 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/27/2004 Entry ID: 1771548 
-3-

Later the same day, FBI agents interviewed Florez at her home. She told them

that she knew about the transfer and acknowledged that she had made the large

withdrawal, but she would not identify to whom she had given the money. Crawford

arrived at Florez’s home in his car while the agents were still there, but drove away

when he saw them. Crawford testified that he called Florez and that she told him the

agents were there for the money.

At Florez’s trial, the district court gave the jury the following willful blindness

instruction over a defense objection:

Now, the government may prove that the defendant, Antoinette Florez,

acted knowingly by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that this

defendant deliberately closed her eyes to what would otherwise have

been obvious to her. No one can avoid responsibility for a crime by

deliberately ignoring what is obvious. A finding beyond a reasonable

doubt of an intent of defendant, Antoinette Florez, to avoid knowledge

or enlightenment would permit a jury to find knowledge. Stated another

way, a person’s knowledge of a particular fact may be shown from a

deliberate or intentional ignorance or deliberate or intentional blindness

to the existence of that fact. It is, of course, entirely up to you as to

whether to find any deliberate ignorance or deliberate closing of the eyes

and any inferences to be drawn for any such evidence, if you find it.

You may not conclude that defendant, Antoinette Florez, had

knowledge, however, for [sic] proof of mistake, negligence, carelessness

or a belief in an inaccurate proposition.

The jury found Florez guilty of aiding and abetting the laundering of $100,000 under

18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). She was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment and

two years of supervised release and was ordered to make restitution in the amount of

$5,000.00.

Appellate Case: 03-2780 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/27/2004 Entry ID: 1771548 
-4-

II.

Florez argues that there was no evidentiary basis for the willful blindness

instruction and that it improperly reduced the government’s burden of proof. We

review the district court’s jury instructions for abuse of discretion and will affirm “[i]f

the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly and adequately submitted the issues to the

jury.” United States v. Lalley, 257 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001). “A willful

blindness instruction is appropriate when the defendant asserts a lack of guilty

knowledge, but the evidence supports an inference of deliberate ignorance.” United

States v. Gruenberg, 989 F.2d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Ignorance

is deliberate if the defendant was presented with facts that put her on notice that

criminal activity was particularly likely and yet she intentionally failed to investigate

those facts. United States v. Barnhart, 979 F.2d 647, 652 (8th Cir. 1992). We look

to whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the instruction, reviewing “the

evidence and any reasonable inference from that evidence in the light most favorable

to the government.” United States v. Hiland, 909 F.2d 1114, 1130-31 (8th Cir. 1990).

A willful blindness instruction is not appropriate if the evidence implies that

the defendant could only have had “either actual knowledge or no knowledge of the

facts in question.” United States v. Parker, 364 F.3d 934, 946 (8th Cir. 2004)

(citation omitted). The evidence is sufficient to support the instruction, however, if

a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had either

actual knowledge of the illegal activity or deliberately failed to inquire about it before

taking action to support it. See id. (citing United States v. Kellermann, 992 F.2d 177,

179 (8th Cir. 1993)). If, in light of certain obvious facts, reasonable inferences

support a finding that a defendant’s failure to investigate is equivalent to “burying

one’s head in the sand,” the jury may consider willful blindness as a basis for

knowledge. See Gruenberg, 989 F.2d at 974. We have previously noted that the

legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 1956, the statute at issue here, supports the

conclusion that Congress intended the knowledge requirements to include instances

of willful blindness. Lalley, 257 F.3d at 755. In addition, a jury cannot be led to

Appellate Case: 03-2780 Page: 4 Date Filed: 05/27/2004 Entry ID: 1771548 
-5-

convict the defendant improperly on a negligence standard where, as here, the

instruction states that the jury must not conclude that the defendant had knowledge

of criminal activity if it finds that she is simply careless or negligent. See Parker, 364

F.3d at 947 n.3.

The government had to prove that Florez knew that the financial transaction

involved “the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity.” We conclude that the

evidence taken as a whole was sufficient to support an inference that even if Florez

did not have actual knowledge that Crawford was using the bank account for illegal

activities, it was only because she chose not to investigate and effectively buried her

head in the sand. This is not a situation in which the jury could reasonably conclude

from the evidence only that Florez either had actual knowledge or no knowledge. See

Parker, 364 F.3d at 946. Crawford’s request that Florez withdraw $100,000 in cash

after a wire transfer that occurred the same day and Florez’s concern over Crawford’s

prior use of bank accounts provided sufficient evidence to support the instruction.

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 03-2780 Page: 5 Date Filed: 05/27/2004 Entry ID: 1771548