Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01062/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01062-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility
Defendant
Francis W. Davis
Plaintiff
Peterson
Defendant
T Valles
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANCIS W. DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS CORRECTIONAL

OFFICER PETERSON, 

Defendant.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-01062-AWI-NEW (DLB) PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN

CLAIMS, WITH PREJUDICE

(Doc. 15)

I. Findings and Recommendations Following Screening of Amended Complaint

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Francis W. Davis (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on August

14, 2006. On October 24, 2006, the court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint, with leave to amend, for

failure to state any claims upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint

on November 16, 2006.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

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dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a complaint only

if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with

the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether

the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of

the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey,

353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also

Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the

opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir.

2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.”

Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights

complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l

Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff is a state prisoner housed at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and

State Prison-Corcoran, where the events at issue in this action allegedly occurred. Plaintiff names

Peterson and T. Valles as defendants, and is seeking money damages and an injunction mandating

that he be allowed to make statues. 

1. Claims Against Defendant Peterson

Plaintiff alleges that on May 30, 2005, defendant Peterson punished him by confining him

to quarters for failing to report to work. Plaintiff alleges that he was punished for violating a prison

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rule before even being charged with violating a prison rule, and that defendant was not permitted

under the applicable regulations to confine him to quarters for failing to report to work. Plaintiff

alleges defendant’s action constituted retaliation, and a violation of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses

of the Fourteenth Amendment.

a. Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that defendant confined him to quarters in retaliation for the grievance and

lawsuit he filed against Correctional Officers Clark and Williams, and when he questioned defendant

about confining him to quarters, defendant stated, “That’s a little getback for Clark and Williams.”

(Doc. 15, 6:1.)

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to petition

the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.

1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65

F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance

a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). An

allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file a prison grievance is

sufficient to support claim under section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff’s allegations give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983 against defendant

Peterson for retaliation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

b. Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Peterson “harbored the malicious intent to harass and oppress”

him, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 15, 7:14.)

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials

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must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.

Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237,

1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of

confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to

a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the

alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official

must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane

conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. 

“[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-ofconfinement claim.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citation omitted). “Because

routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society,

only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently

grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted).

Plaintiff’s claim that confinement to quarters on May 30, 2005, constituted cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment is without merit. Plaintiff is a convicted prisoner

and the decision of defendant Peterson to confine him to his cell on May 30, 2005, does not rise to

the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.

c. Due Process Clause

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Peterson accused him of breaking a rule he did not break and

punished him without due process of law.

The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process of

law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to invoke the protection of the Due

Process Clause, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the

protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state

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28 “C status” inmates have broken prison rules and are being punished, and may be confined to quarters 1

during day room time. (Doc. 15, 8:17-19.)

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law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2393 (2005). The Due Process Clause itself does not

confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding “more adverse conditions of confinement.”

Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2393; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). Under state law, the

existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature

of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Liberty interests created by state

law are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995); Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff does not have a liberty interest in avoiding confinement to quarters, as the

deprivation complained of does not rise to the level of atypical and significant hardship. Sandin, 515

U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. at 2300; Myron, 476 F.3d at 718; see also May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565

(9th Cir. 1997) (convicted inmate’s due process claim fails because he has no liberty interest in

freedom from state action taken within sentence imposed and administrative segregation falls within

the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence) (quotations omitted); Resnick v.

Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff’s placement and retention in the SHU was within

range of confinement normally expected by inmates in relation to ordinary incidents of prison life

and, therefore, plaintiff had no protected liberty interest in being free from confinement in the SHU)

(quotations omitted). Without establishing the existence of a protected liberty interest, plaintiff may

not pursue a claim based on denial of procedural due process. Accordingly, plaintiff’s due process

claim fails as a matter of law.

d. Equal Protection Clause

Plaintiff was in the A1A privilege group, and alleges he should have been allowed to

participate in day room activities with the rest of the group. Plaintiff alleges that because other

inmates who were not on “C status” were allowed day room privileges, he was discriminated against

in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.1

///

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“The Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated

should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (citing

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). “‘To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation

of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the

defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon

membership in a protected class.’” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001)

(quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Intentional discrimination

means that a defendant acted at least in part because of a plaintiff’s protected status.” Serrano v.

Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396,

1404 (9th Cir. 1994)) (emphasis in original). 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint is devoid of facts supporting a claim that defendant Peterson

intentionally discriminated against him based on his membership in a protected class by treating him

differently than other similarly situated inmates. Inmates in privilege group A1A do not form a

protected group. Plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law. 

2. Claims Against Defendant Valles

Plaintiff alleges that on January 12, 2006, defendant Valles searched his cell, and confiscated

and destroyed two recycled art statues made from paper and bread. Plaintiff alleges that the prison

was on lock-down at the time and staff had been ordered to search every cell. 

a. Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Valles destroyed his two statues in retaliation for the

grievance and lawsuit plaintiff filed against Correctional Officers Williams and Clark. This is

sufficient to state a claim under section 1983 against defendant Valles for retaliation. 

b. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Valles’ action violated his rights under the Eighth

Amendment. Plaintiff’s claim is baseless. The destruction of plaintiff’s personal property in the

form of two statues, even if done intentionally and without justification, is not an “extreme

deprivation” rising to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. 

///

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Likewise, plaintiff’s allegation that his cell was searched on January 12, 2006, does not provide any

basis upon which to impose liability for violation of the Eighth Amendment.

c. Due Process Clause

Plaintiff alleges that the confiscation and destruction of his statutes violated his right to due

process. 

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of property without due

process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), and prisoners have a protected

interest in their personal property. Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). However,

while an authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under the Due Process Clause,

see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n.13 (1984) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455

U.S. 422 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985), “[a]n unauthorized

intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the

procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful

postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). 

Despite plaintiff’s attempt to argue otherwise, the destruction of his property by defendant

Valles was not “authorized” within the meaning of due process jurisprudence. Plaintiff failsto state

a claim for violation of the Due Process Clause. 

d. Equal Protection Clause

Although plaintiff alleges an equal protection claim against defendant Valles, plaintiff’s

amended complaint is devoid of any facts supporting a claim that defendant intentionally

discriminated against him based on his membership in a protected class by treating him differently

than other similarly situated inmates.

3. Violation of Penal Code 147

In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that both defendants violated California Penal

Code section 147, which sets forth the punishment for officers guilty of willful inhumanity or

oppression toward prisoners. 

A private right of action under a criminal statute has rarely been implied. Chrysler Corp. v.

Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979). Where a private right of action has been implied, “‘there was at

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least a statutory basis for interring that a civil cause of action of some sort lay in favor of someone.’”

Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 316 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79 (1975)). The court has

reviewed the penal statute in question and there is no indication that civil enforcement of any kind

is available to plaintiff. Cort, 422 U.S. at 79-80; Keaukaha-Panaewa Cmty. Ass’n v. Hawaiian

Homes Comm’n, 739 F.2d 1467, 1469-70 (9th Cir. 1984). Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a

claims upon which relief may be granted under state law based on the alleged violation of section

147.

4. Claim for Injunctive Relief

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) provides in relevant part, “Prospective relief in any civil action

with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of

the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any

prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than

necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to

correct the violation of the Federal right.” 

Assuming plaintiff prevails in this action, plaintiff is not entitled to an order mandating that

he be allowed to make statues. Plaintiff is proceeding on claims arising from the past actions of

defendants Peterson and Valles, and the order sought by plaintiff would not serve to correct the

violations which allegedly resulted from defendants’ actions.

C. Conclusion 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint states cognizable claims for relief against defendants Peterson

and Valles under section 1983 for retaliation, in violation of the First Amendment. However,

plaintiff’s amended complaint does not state any other cognizable claims for relief. Plaintiff was

previously given leave to amend, and the deficiencies in his claims are not capable of being cured.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. This action proceed on plaintiff’s amended complaint, filed November 16, 2006,

against defendants Peterson and Valles for retaliation;

2. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment, due process, and equal protection claims against

defendant Peterson be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim;

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3. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment, due process, and equal protection claims against

defendant Valles be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim;

4. Plaintiff’s claim for violation of Penal Code section 147 be dismissed, with

prejudice, for failure to state a claim; and

5. Plaintiff’s claim for an order mandating he be allowed to make statues be dismissed

and this action proceed as one for damages only.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 10, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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