Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca1-14-01932/USCOURTS-ca1-14-01932-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States
Appellee
Jermaine Whindleton
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit 

No. 14-1932 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. 

JERMAINE WHINDLETON, 

Defendant, Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE 

[Hon. Nancy Torresen, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Lynch, Thompson, and Kayatta, 

Circuit Judges. 

J. Hilary Billings, Assistant Federal Defender, for 

appellant. 

 Renée M. Bunker, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom 

Thomas E. Delahanty II, United States Attorney, was on brief, for 

appellee. 

August 10, 2015 

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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Jermaine Whindleton appeals his 

fifteen-year sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Under the Armed Career 

Criminal Act ("ACCA"), a defendant convicted under § 922(g)(1) 

faces a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years if he or she 

has three previous convictions for "a violent felony or a serious 

drug offense." Id. § 924(e). Whindleton concedes that one of his 

prior convictions qualifies as an ACCA predicate, but challenges 

on appeal the other two convictions identified by the district 

court. 

We must resolve, first, whether Whindleton's prior 

conviction for Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance under New 

York Penal Law § 220.39(1) qualifies as a "serious drug offense." 

Second, we must resolve whether Whindleton's prior conviction for 

Assault with a Dangerous Weapon under Massachusetts General Laws 

ch. 265, § 15B(b), qualifies as a "violent felony." Precedent 

informs our resolution of the former and mandates the latter. 

Since we conclude that both of the challenged convictions qualify 

as ACCA predicate offenses, we affirm Whindleton's sentence. 

I. 

 Whindleton was arrested after using the barrel of a 

shotgun to strike Christopher Frey in the head during an argument 

in June of 2012 over a drug debt that Frey owed to Whindleton. 

Whindleton was later indicted for "knowingly possess[ing] . . . a 

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Mossberg, Model 500B, 16 Gauge shotgun" after having been convicted 

of four felonies in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). 

Specifically, Whindleton had been previously convicted of 

(1) Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree in 

New York in 2005; (2) Assault in the Second Degree in New York in 

2006; (3) Assault with a Dangerous Weapon ("ADW") in Massachusetts 

in 2009; and (4) Possession with Intent to Distribute in 

Massachusetts in 2009. 

 A conviction for being a felon in possession of a 

firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), requires the 

defendant to possess a firearm after any one felony conviction. A 

jury found Whindleton guilty "of possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon" on April 9, 2014. 

An enhanced sentence under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), 

requires the defendant to violate § 922(g) after three prior 

convictions for a "violent felony" or a "serious drug offense," as 

these terms are defined by the statute. If the ACCA applied to 

Whindleton's criminal history, he faced a mandatory minimum 

sentence of fifteen years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). If not, he 

faced a maximum sentence of ten years. Id. § 924(a)(2). 

 At sentencing, Whindleton conceded that his 

Massachusetts conviction for Possession with Intent to Distribute 

qualified as a "serious drug offense." Over Whindleton's 

objection, the district court concluded that Whindleton's New York 

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conviction for Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third 

Degree also qualified as a "serious drug offense," and that 

Whindleton's Massachusetts conviction for ADW qualified as "a 

violent felony."1 As a result, the district court imposed the 

mandatory minimum sentence under the ACCA of 180 months, or 15 

years. 

II. 

 Section 922(g)(1) prohibits any person who has been 

convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 

exceeding one year from shipping, possessing, or receiving 

firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The ACCA increases the mandatory 

minimum sentence for this crime to fifteen years if the defendant 

has three prior convictions for "a violent felony or a serious 

drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one 

another." Id. § 924(e)(1). In this case, Whindleton argues that 

the district court erred when it concluded that his conviction for 

Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree 

qualified as a "serious drug offense," and that his conviction for 

ADW qualified as a "violent felony." 

 Whether a prior conviction qualifies as an ACCA 

predicate offense is a legal question we review de novo. United 

                                                            

1 The district court also concluded that Whindleton's New York 

conviction for Assault in the Second Degree did not qualify as a 

"violent felony." The government has not challenged this 

determination on appeal. 

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States v. Carrigan, 724 F.3d 39, 48 (1st Cir. 2013). We employ a 

categorical approach, under which "we may consider only the 

offense's legal definition, forgoing any inquiry into how the 

defendant may have committed the offense." United States v. 

Holloway, 630 F.3d 252, 256 (1st Cir. 2011); see also United States 

v. Bryant, 571 F.3d 147, 157 n.7 (1st Cir. 2009) (applying the 

same approach to controlled substances offenses). 

The categorical approach is "modified" if the defendant 

was convicted under a statute which "sets out one or more elements 

of the offense in the alternative." See Descamps v. United States, 

133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013). Under the modified categorical 

approach, the court may "consult a limited class of documents . . . 

to determine which alternative formed the basis of the defendant's 

prior conviction." Id. If these documents do not identify the 

basis of the defendant's prior conviction, the court must ensure 

that "each of the possible offenses of conviction would qualify 

[as an ACCA predicate]." Holloway, 630 F.3d at 257. 

A. New York Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance 

 Whindleton first argues that the district court erred in 

concluding that his 2005 conviction for Criminal Sale of a 

Controlled Substance in the Third Degree under New York Penal Law 

§ 220.39(1) qualifies as a "serious drug offense" under the ACCA. 

The ACCA defines a "serious drug offense" as "an offense under 

State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing 

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with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance 

. . ., for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or 

more is prescribed by law." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).2 

 A person violates New York Penal Law § 220.39(1) "when 

he knowingly and unlawfully sells . . . a narcotic drug." New 

York defines "sell" to mean "to sell, exchange, give or dispose of 

to another, or to offer or agree to do the same." N.Y. Penal Law 

§ 220.00(1) (emphasis added). Since Whindleton's record of 

conviction does not specify on what theory he was convicted, we 

must ensure that any form of the conviction would qualify as a 

"serious drug offense" under the ACCA. See Holloway, 630 F.3d at 

257. Whindleton argues that his conviction does not qualify as a 

"serious drug offense" since an offer to sell does not "involv[e] 

manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to 

manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance."3

                                                            

2 The ACCA also defines a "serious drug offense" as "an offense 

under the Controlled Substances Act . . ., the Controlled 

Substances Import and Export Act . . ., or chapter 705 of title 

46, for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more 

is prescribed by law." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(i). This 

definition is not relevant to this case. 

3 We note that the 2004 Drug Law Reform Act, which applied to 

defendants who committed their crimes after January 13, 2005, 

lowered the maximum sentence for Class B drug crimes to nine years. 

See 2004 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 738 §§ 36, 41 (McKinney) (codified at 

N.Y. Penal Law § 70.70(2)(a)(i) (2005)); see also People v. Utsey, 

855 N.E.2d 791, 793 & n.5 (N.Y. 2006). The 2009 Drug Law Reform 

Act then made that reduced sentence available to individuals 

convicted of Class B drug crimes before 2009 in certain 

circumstances. See 2009 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 56, pt. AAA, § 9 

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We have previously held that, "[b]y using 'involving,' 

Congress captured more offenses than just those that 'are in fact' 

the manufacture, distribution, or possession of, with intent to 

distribute, a controlled substance." United States v. McKenney, 

450 F.3d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 2006). The definition of a "serious 

drug offense" also "'encompass[es] . . . offenses that are related 

to or connected with such conduct.'" Id. at 43-44 (quoting United 

States v. King, 325 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2003)). 

 For example, in McKenney, we held that a defendant's 

conviction for "conspiracy to violate a state controlled 

substances law by agreeing to possess with intent to deliver 

cocaine" qualified as a "serious drug offense" under the ACCA. 

Id. at 40. There was no argument that the defendant did, in fact, 

possess cocaine with intent to deliver, or that the defendant even 

took an overt step in that direction. Id. at 42-43 nn. 6 & 8. 

Nevertheless, we held that "the conspiracy standing alone was 

sufficient." Id. at 42-43 n.8. We explained that "the 

relationship between the inchoate offense of conspiracy and its 

object -- its entire purpose -- is plainly close enough that a 

                                                            

(McKinney) (codified at N.Y. Crim. Proc. § 440.46); see also United 

States v. Calix, No. 13-582, 2014 WL 2084098, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 

13, 2014). Whindleton makes no argument that New York's subsequent 

sentencing reforms for drug offenses should affect his case, and 

so we do not consider the issue further. Cf. McNeill v. United 

States, 131 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 n.1 (2011); Rivera v. United States, 

716 F.3d 685 (2d Cir. 2013), Calix, 2014 WL 2084098; United States 

v. Jackson, No. 13-142, 2013 WL 4744828 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2013). 

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conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute is, under the ACCA, 

an offense 'involving . . . possessing with intent to . . . 

distribute.'" Id. at 45 (alterations in original). 

 Whindleton concedes, as he must, that courts have 

"interpreted the ACCA's language to include conspiring or 

attempting to manufacture, distribute, or possess with intent to 

distribute drugs" as well as "aiding and abetting the distribution 

of drugs." See, e.g., McKenney, 450 F.3d at 45 (conspiracy); King, 

325 F.3d at 115 (attempt); United States v. Madera, 521 F. Supp. 

2d 149, 152 (D. Conn. 2007) (accessory liability). But, he 

maintains, "an offer to provide drugs is simply not the equivalent 

of either a conspiracy, attempt, or aiding and abetting." 

 We understand Whindleton's argument to be that an offer 

to sell is farther removed from its object than these inchoate 

crimes.4 We have said that "[n]ot all offenses bearing any sort 

of relationship with drug manufacturing, distribution, or 

                                                            

4 We are not persuaded by Whindleton's argument that the statute 

of conviction must fit perfectly within one of these categories of 

inchoate crimes to qualify as a "serious drug offense" under the 

ACCA. This argument is foreclosed by McKenney, in which we 

explained that our inquiry is simply whether the statute at issue 

is sufficiently "related to or connected with" distributing, 

manufacturing, or possessing with intent to distribute or 

manufacture a controlled substance such that it "involv[es]" the 

same. See 450 F.3d at 43-44 (quoting King, 325 F.3d at 113); see 

also United States v. Gibbs, 656 F.3d 180, 185-86 (3d Cir. 2011). 

The inchoate crimes of conspiracy, attempt, and aiding and abetting 

are examples of qualifying statutes, but not an exclusive list of 

possibilities. 

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possession with intent to manufacture or distribute will qualify 

as predicate offenses under the ACCA." McKenney, 450 F.3d at 45. 

Critically, "[t]he relationship must not be too remote or 

tangential." Id. 

 Other circuits, considering this question for different 

statutes, have concluded that offers to sell controlled substances 

are sufficiently "related to or connected with" drug distribution 

to qualify as serious drug crimes. In Texas, for example, the 

delivery statute was violated by "a person knowingly or 

intentionally offer[ing] to sell what he states is a controlled 

substance." United States v. Vickers, 540 F.3d 356, 365 (5th Cir. 

2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Texas law 

did not require the defendant to "have any drugs to sell or even 

intend ever to obtain the drugs he is purporting to sell." Id. 

The Fifth Circuit nevertheless concluded that the Texas conviction 

qualified as a "serious drug offense" under the ACCA. Id. at 366. 

The Fifth Circuit explained that "[t]he expansiveness of the word 

'involving' supports that Congress was bringing into the statute's 

reach those who intentionally enter the highly dangerous drug 

distribution world." Id. at 365. 

 Joining the Fifth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit held that 

"knowingly offering to sell drugs is a 'serious drug offense' under 

the ACCA." United States v. Bynum, 669 F.3d 880, 886 (8th Cir. 

2012). The Eighth Circuit rejected the defendant's assertion that 

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the offer "must be 'genuine, made in good faith, or be accompanied 

by an actual intent to distribute a controlled substance' to 

'involve' drug distribution." Id. at 887. "[S]o long as [the] 

defendant has intentionally made an offer to sell a controlled 

substance, he or she has 'intentionally enter[ed] the highly 

dangerous drug . . . marketplace as a seller.'" Id. (third and 

fourth alterations in original) (quoting Vickers, 540 F.3d at 365-

66). 

 Under the New York statute at issue in this case, a 

defendant can be convicted of offering to sell a controlled 

substance even if the offer is not accepted, and even if the 

defendant does not yet possess the controlled substance. See 

People v. Mike, 706 N.E.2d 1189, 1191 (N.Y. 1998); see also People 

v. Samuels, 780 N.E.2d 513, 516 (N.Y. 2002). "However," the New 

York Court of Appeals has explained, "in order to support a 

conviction under an offering for sale theory, there must be 

evidence of a bona fide offer to sell -- i.e., that defendant had 

both the intent and the ability to proceed with the sale." Mike, 

706 N.E.2d at 1191. 

 These two requirements for a bona fide sale more closely 

align the offer to sell a controlled substance with its ultimate 

distribution. While there need not be proof that the offer was 

accepted, there must be proof that the defendant intended to 

proceed with the sale. See id. A fraudulent offer, "'such as 

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when one offers to sell the Brooklyn Bridge,'" lacks the intent to 

consummate the sale and so would not suffice. Pascual v. Holder, 

723 F.3d 156, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting United 

States v. Savage, 542 F.3d 959, 965 (2d Cir. 2008)). And, while 

there need not be proof that the defendant already possessed the 

controlled substance, there must be proof that he or she had the 

ability to proceed with the sale. See Samuels, 780 N.E.2d at 516; 

Mike, 706 N.E.2d at 1191. A conviction would not stand without 

proof that the "defendant had the ability to procure the 

[controlled substance] he purportedly offered to sell." See Mike, 

706 N.E.2d at 1190-91 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

 Like our sister circuits, we conclude that an offer to 

sell a controlled substance -- like an attempt to sell or a 

conspiracy to sell -- is necessarily related to and connected with 

its ultimate goal, the distribution of controlled substances. We 

reject any requirement that the defendant already possess the 

controlled substance or that the offer be accepted.5 It is 

                                                            

5 The Second and Third Circuits have held that New York Penal Law 

§ 220.39(1) is analogous to the federal crime of attempted 

distribution, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and so qualifies as an 

aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act. 

Pascual, 723 F.3d at 158-59; Berroa v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 523 F. 

App'x 913, 917-18 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). "Without doubt," 

the Second Circuit reasoned, "an offer to sell drugs -- made with 

the intent and ability to carry out the transaction -- is both a 

'substantial step' and an 'overt act' in the attempted sale of a 

controlled substance." Pascual, 723 F.3d at 159. We need not 

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sufficient in this case that the defendant entered "the drug 

marketplace" with the intent and ability to proceed with the sale 

of a controlled substance if his or her offer were accepted. 

 Whindleton argues that this conclusion stretches the 

definition of a "serious drug crime" too far. According to 

Whindleton, "[s]uch an expansive reading of the ACCA undermines 

the categorical approach mandated for determination of qualifying 

predicates," and "do[es] harm to the cannon [sic] of strict 

construction of criminal statutes, or the rule of lenity." "Under 

such a standard," he contends, "the mere possession of any drug, 

regardless of quantity, is 'related to or connected with' 

possession with intent to distribute." 

 While the term "involving" may be expansive, it is not 

limitless.6 McKenney, 450 F.3d at 45. We hold today only that an 

offer to sell under New York law -- requiring the intent and the 

ability to proceed with a sale -- sufficiently "involv[es]" the 

                                                            

decide in this case whether New York Penal Law § 220.39(1) 

necessarily entails a substantial step under attempt liability 

since such a step is not required to bring the statute within the 

definition of "involving" in the ACCA. 

6 Whindleton suggests that the expansive interpretation of the 

word "involving" in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) "raises issues of 

constitutional vagueness." To the extent that Whindleton seeks to 

challenge § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) as void for vagueness, we consider 

the argument insufficiently developed and, thus, waived. See 

United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). 

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distribution of drugs to qualify as a "serious drug offense" under 

the ACCA. 

B. Massachusetts Assault with a Dangerous Weapon 

 Whindleton next argues that his 2009 conviction for ADW 

under Massachusetts General Laws ch. 265, § 15B(b), does not 

constitute a "violent felony" under the ACCA. The ACCA defines 

the term "violent felony" as "any crime punishable by imprisonment 

for a term exceeding one year . . . that": 

(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, 

or threatened use of physical force against 

the person of another; or 

(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, 

involves use of explosives, or otherwise 

involves conduct that presents a serious 

potential risk of physical injury to another 

. . . . 

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). In this case, the district court 

concluded that Whindleton's ADW conviction qualified as a "violent 

felony" under the ACCA's so-called "Force Clause," the first clause 

of the definition, and the so-called "Residual Clause," the catchall provision in the second clause after the enumerated offenses. 

The Supreme Court has recently invalidated the Residual 

Clause as unconstitutionally vague. Johnson v. United States, 135 

S. Ct. 2551 (2015). That issue has dropped out of our case.7 

                                                            

7 In Johnson, the Court explained that, "[b]y combining 

indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a crime with 

indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the crime to qualify 

as a violent felony, the residual clause produces more 

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Whindleton does not challenge the constitutionality of 

the Force Clause after Johnson. The Supreme Court specified that 

its decision in Johnson "does not call into question application 

of the Act to the four enumerated offenses, or the remainder of 

the Act's definition of a violent felony." Id. at 2563. We focus 

on whether Whindleton's conviction for ADW "has as an element the 

use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against 

the person of another," such that it qualifies as a "violent 

felony" under the ACCA's Force Clause. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Our precedent answers the question. 

The Massachusetts ADW statute is violated by "[w]hoever, 

by means of a dangerous weapon, commits an assault upon another." 

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 15B(b). The Massachusetts common law 

recognizes two theories of assault: attempted battery and 

threatened battery. Commonwealth v. Porro, 939 N.E.2d 1157, 1163 

(Mass. 2010).8 Battery, in turn, has been defined as "harmful [or] 

                                                            

unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause 

tolerates." 135 S. Ct. at 2558. Recognizing the impact of Johnson 

on cases pending on direct review, see Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 

U.S. 314, 328 (1987), the government has declined to pursue any 

argument based on the now-invalidated Residual Clause. 

8 Under the attempted-battery theory, the government must prove 

that "the defendant 'intended to commit a battery, took some overt 

step toward accomplishing that intended battery, and came 

reasonably close to doing so.'" Porro, 939 N.E.2d at 1163 (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Melton, 763 N.E.2d 1092, 1096 (Mass. 2002)). Under 

the threatened-battery theory, the government must prove that "the 

defendant engaged in conduct that a reasonable person would 

recognize to be threatening, that the defendant intended to place 

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offensive touching[]." See Commonwealth v. Burke, 457 N.E.2d 622, 

624 (Mass. 1983). As such, the crime of simple assault has been 

held to encompass attempted or threatened touching if offensive. 

See United States v. Martinez, 762 F.3d 127, 138 (1st Cir. 2014). 

"The crime of [ADW] adds one additional element, namely, that the 

assault was perpetrated by means of a dangerous weapon." 

Commonwealth v. Melton, 763 N.E.2d 1092, 1096 (Mass. 2002). 

 This circuit has already held that a defendant's ADW 

conviction "clearly satisfies" the ACCA's Force Clause. United 

States v. Am, 564 F.3d 25, 33 & n.9 (1st Cir. 2009). In Am, we 

quoted the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court as holding that 

"'[a]n assault is defined as either an attempt to use physical 

force on another, or as a threat of use of physical force.'" Id. 

at 33 (quoting Commonwealth v. Gorassi, 733 N.E.2d 106, 110 (Mass. 

2000)). "By its terms," we explained, "the Massachusetts statute 

at issue, which criminalizes 'an assault upon another' by 'means 

of a dangerous weapon' 'has as an element the use, attempted use, 

or threatened use of physical force' as required by ACCA." Id. 

(citations omitted).9

                                                            

the victim in fear of an imminent battery, and that the victim 

perceived the threat." Id. 

9 In Am, we also rejected the defendant's pro se argument that 

the mens rea for Massachusetts ADW was insufficient to qualify as 

a crime of violence. 564 F.3d at 33-34. The Massachusetts ADW 

statute "is a general intent crime and requires either intentional 

and unjustified use of force upon another person or the 

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 Generally, "a ruling of law by a panel of this court is 

binding upon subsequent panels." Arecibo Cmty. Health Care, Inc. 

v. Puerto Rico, 270 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 2001). An exception to 

the doctrine of stare decisis applies if "[a]n existing panel 

decision [is] undermined by controlling authority, subsequently 

announced, such as an opinion of the Supreme Court . . . ." United 

States v. Rodriguez-Pacheco, 475 F.3d 434, 441 (1st Cir. 2007) 

(first and second alterations in original) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 Whindleton challenges "the continuing vitality" of our 

holding in Am based on the Supreme Court's decision in another 

critical ACCA case named Johnson v. United States. In Johnson, 

the defendant had been convicted under Florida's battery statute, 

which could be violated by "any intentional physical contact, no 

matter how slight," such as a tap on the shoulder without consent. 

559 U.S. 133, 138 (2010) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). The Court held that "the phrase 'physical force' [in 

the ACCA] means violent force -- that is, force capable of causing 

                                                            

'intentional commission of a wanton or reckless act . . . causing 

physical or bodily injury to another.'" Id. at 34 (alteration in 

original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Ford, 677 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 

(Mass. 1997)). We held that, "under either of these two theories, 

[the state] had to show that Am acted intentionally." Id. 

Whindleton has not argued on appeal that this conclusion was 

incorrect or that any intervening precedent requires us to revisit 

our holding regarding the mens rea of the Massachusetts ADW 

statute. 

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physical pain or injury to another person." Id. at 140. Because 

the Florida statute could be satisfied by physical force that did 

not amount to violent force, the Court held that a conviction under 

it did not qualify as a violent felony under the Force Clause. 

See id. at 139-43, 145. 

 Whindleton argues that Johnson undermines the holding of 

Am "[s]ince assault, even with use of a dangerous weapon, is based 

upon either an attempted or threatened battery that may be 

accomplished by a mere touching." After careful review, we 

conclude that Johnson in no way undermines Am, and we remain bound 

by its holding. See United States v. Chanthachack, 483 F. App'x 

580, 580 (1st Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Am as controlling 

precedent after Johnson). 

 It is critical that the statute at issue here is Assault 

with a Dangerous Weapon. The statute can be understood as having 

two elements: the attempted or threatened battery (simple assault) 

and the use of a dangerous weapon. See Melton, 763 N.E.2d at 1096. 

Whindleton's argument focuses solely on the first element. Namely, 

Whindleton argues that assault is either attempted or threatened 

battery; that battery can be accomplished by mere touching; and 

that, ergo, a defendant can be convicted of assault for attempted 

or threatened offensive touching, which is insufficient for a 

violent felony after Johnson. This was, in fact, the logic of 

Martinez, in which we held that simple assault did not qualify as 

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a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines. See 762 

F.3d at 137-38. But, this case involves the additional element 

that the assault must be accomplished "by means of a dangerous 

weapon." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 15B(b). Cf. United States v. 

Dancy, 640 F.3d 455, 467-69 (1st Cir. 2011) (distinguishing Assault 

and Battery on a Police Officer from Assault and Battery due to 

the additional element). 

 "To support a conviction under § 15B, the Commonwealth 

must show that the threat of harm was by means of a dangerous 

weapon." Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 458 N.E.2d 777, 781 (Mass. 

App. Ct. 1984). Under Massachusetts law, a dangerous weapon can 

be "dangerous per se" or "dangerous as used." Commonwealth v. 

Tevlin, 741 N.E.2d 827, 833 (Mass. 2001). The first category 

consists of "instrumentalit[ies] designed and constructed to 

produce death or great bodily harm." Id. (alteration in original) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The second 

category consists of objects that, "as used by the defendant, [are] 

capable of producing serious bodily harm." Id. (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Logically, the harm threatened 

by an assault is far more violent than offensive touching when 

committed with a weapon that is designed to produce or used in a 

way that is capable of producing serious bodily harm or death. As 

a result, the element of a dangerous weapon imports the "violent 

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force" required by Johnson into the otherwise overbroad simple 

assault statute. 

 Following this reasoning, a Massachusetts Appeals Court 

in Commonwealth v. Clark, 10 N.E.3d 670, 2014 WL 2776858 (Mass. 

App. Ct. June 20, 2014) (unpublished opinion), held that ADW 

necessarily entails violent force due to the nature of a dangerous 

weapon. See id. at *1. There, the Massachusetts Appeals Court 

analyzed whether a conviction for ADW qualified as a "violent 

crime" under Massachusetts' version of the ACCA.10 Id. Citing Am 

with approval, the court held that "[a]ll the crimes encompassed 

in [the ADW statute] are violent crimes under the [Massachusetts 

ACCA] force clause." Id. The court focused on the dangerousweapon element and explained that, "[b]ecause the weapon has to be 

capable of producing serious bodily harm or be designed and 

constructed to produce death or great bodily harm, every attempted 

battery or immediately threatened battery with this type of weapon 

is either an attempted use or threatened use of physical force 

that is capable of causing pain or injury." Id. 

                                                            

10 The equivalent of the ACCA's Force Clause in the Massachusetts 

statute defines a "violent crime" as "any crime punishable by 

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that: (i) has as 

an element the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical 

force or a deadly weapon against the person of another." Mass. 

Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 121; see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 10G. 

The term "physical force" in the Massachusetts statute "means 

'violent or substantial force capable of causing pain or injury.'" 

Clark, 2014 WL 2776858, at *1 (citation omitted). 

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 Our court has previously relied on similar logic to find 

that Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon ("ABDW") qualifies 

as a violent felony under the now-invalid Residual Clause. See 

United States v. Hart, 674 F.3d 33, 40-44 (1st Cir. 2012). In 

Hart, we stressed that ABDW must "be perpetrated by means of a 

dangerous weapon." Id. at 44. We held that, in light of 

Massachusetts' definition for a dangerous weapon, "'logic dictates 

that ABDW ineluctably poses a serious potential risk of physical 

injury' because the defendant effected the touching with an 

instrument designed to cause, or wielded an object in a manner 

capable of producing, serious bodily harm." Id. 42-43 (quoting 

United States v. Glover, 558 F.3d 71, 81 (1st Cir. 2009)). 

Accordingly, we held that ABDW was a violent felony under the 

Residual Clause even if AB was not. Compare Holloway, 630 F.3d at 

260-62 (holding that AB does not categorically qualify under the 

Residual Clause), with Hart, 674 F.3d at 44 (holding that ABDW 

does). Like in Hart, ADW can be a violent felony under the Force 

Clause, even if simple assault is not, by virtue of the additional 

dangerous-weapon element. 

 This conclusion is further supported by the Tenth 

Circuit's decision in United States v. Ramon Silva, 608 F.3d 663 

(10th Cir. 2010), issued after Johnson. There, the Tenth Circuit 

considered a New Mexico statute, which defined aggravated assault 

as "'unlawfully assaulting or striking at another with a deadly 

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weapon.'" Id. at 669 (quoting N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-3-2(A)). The 

defendant argued that a conviction under this statute did not 

qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA since the statute could 

be violated by "'engaging in conduct with a deadly weapon that 

causes the victim to believe he or she was about to receive a 

battery,'" id., which is similar to the threatened-battery theory 

of assault in Massachusetts. 

"Applying Johnson," the Tenth Circuit concluded that 

this theory of assault qualified as a violent felony under the 

Force Clause of the ACCA.11 Id. at 670. The court explained: 

Purposefully threatening or engaging in 

menacing conduct toward a victim, with a 

weapon capable of causing death or great 

bodily harm, threatens the use of "force 

capable of causing physical pain or injury" in 

two different ways. The conduct "could always 

lead to . . . substantial and violent contact, 

and thus it would always include as an 

element" the threatened use of violent force. 

And the conduct "could at least put the victim 

on notice of the possibility that the weapon 

will be used more harshly in the future, 

thereby constituting a threatened use of 

force." 

 

                                                            

11 Citing Am, the Tenth Circuit also rejected the argument that 

the conviction for apprehension-causing aggravated assault lacked 

the necessary mens rea since it was a "general intent crime." 

Ramon Silva, 608 F.3d at 672-73. "[T]he crime requires proof that 

a defendant purposefully threatened or engaged in menacing conduct 

toward a victim, with a weapon capable of producing death or great 

bodily harm." Id. at 674 (emphasis deleted). The Tenth Circuit 

concluded that "this intentional conduct threatens the use of 

physical force against the person of another, and therefore 

qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA." Id. 

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Id. at 672 (alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also 

United States v. Rede-Mendez, 680 F.3d 552, 558 (6th Cir. 2012) 

(noting that "the use of a deadly weapon may transform a lesser 

degree of force into the necessary 'violent force'"). 

 Finally, dicta in Johnson assumed that an assault and 

battery with a dangerous weapon was a "violent felony." The 

Supreme Court noted that "[w]hen the adjective 'violent' is 

attached to the noun 'felony,' its connotation of strong physical 

force is even clearer," and quoted Black's definition of "violent 

felony" as "[a] crime characterized by extreme physical force, 

such as murder, forcible rape, and assault and battery with a 

dangerous weapon." Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140-41 (emphasis added). 

 For these reasons, we conclude that Johnson does not 

overrule our holding in Am that the Massachusetts statute for ADW, 

"which criminalizes 'an assault upon another' by 'means of a 

dangerous weapon,' 'has as an element the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of physical force'" as required by the ACCA's Force 

Clause. 564 F.3d at 33 (citations omitted).12 

                                                            

12 We note that this circuit has held that a conviction for ABDW 

"does not have as an element" the intentional use of physical (i.e. 

violent) force, and so does not qualify as a "crime of violence" 

under a different (but similarly worded) statute, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 16(a). United States v. Fish, 758 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2014) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). But whether Fish's holding 

should inform our analysis of the ACCA is a point we need not 

decide today, as the defendant has not developed, or even expressly 

asserted, any argument that Massachusetts's ADW fails to qualify 

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III. 

 We affirm Whindleton's sentence under the ACCA. 

                                                            

as a violent felony under the ACCA because it lacks any requirement 

that the use or threat be intentional. 

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