Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00981/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00981-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gateway Unified School District
Defendant
Kendall Lynn
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENDALL LYNN

Plaintiff,

v.

GATEWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 

and DOES 1-50, inclusive,

Defendants.

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Case No. 2:10-CV-00981 JAM-CMK

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Gateway 

Unified School District’s (“Defendant”) Motion for Attorney’s Fees

(Doc. #80). Plaintiff Kendall Lynn (“Plaintiff”) and Plaintiff’s 

former counsel, Robert E. Thurbon (“Thurbon”) oppose the motion. 1

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1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision 

without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for May 2, 2012.

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is the former Director of Information Technology for 

Defendant. Plaintiff, an African-American, was dismissed from his 

position on August 19, 2009. After his termination, on August 26 

or August 27, 2009, Plaintiff, without permission, downloaded 

39,312 emails from Defendant’s server – the server contained the 

emails of every employee in the entire school district for at least 

four months. Of those 39,312 emails, 115 were relevant to 

Plaintiff’s case. On October 12, 2009, Plaintiff forwarded some of 

the emails to his attorney, Thurbon. Thurbon took possession of 

the electronic emails and had them loaded onto his office computer

in June 2010; Thurbon used those emails for Plaintiff’s case and 

for litigation concerning Judy Thulin (“Thulin”), another client.

On December 7, 2011, this Court held a hearing on Defendant’s 

Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment. In its Motion 

to Dismiss, Defendant argued that Plaintiff and Thurbon should be 

sanctioned by a dismissal for using the ill-gotten emails. The 

Court denied the Motion to Dismiss, but it disqualified Thurbon 

and it forbade Plaintiff from introducing any evidence about the 

contents of the emails (Doc. #64). The Court denied Defendant’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment. Id. Before the Court is Defendant’s 

Motion for Sanctions (Doc. #80). Plaintiff and Thurbon separately 

oppose the motion (Docs. # 84, 83, respectively).2

 

2 Defendant filed Objections to Briefs and Evidence (Doc. #86) 

arguing that the briefs were untimely as to the Court’s Pre-Trial 

Scheduling Order (Doc. #14) because Thurbon’s opposition was 

thirty-three minutes late and Plaintiff’s opposition was ninety 

minutes late. The Court denies Defendant’s objections and will 

decide the motion on the merits. Defendant also renews its hearsay 

objection to the James Fruuen Deposition based on FRE 804(b)(1) and 

Kirk v. Raymark, Inc., 61 F.3d 147, 164 (3d Cir. 1995). The Court 

again sustains the objection. See Second Am. Mem. & Order (Doc. 

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II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

1. Attorneys’ Fees

The Court has “inherent power” to sanction for discovery 

violations. Mark Indus., Ltd. v. Sea Captain’s Choice, Inc., 

50 F.3d 730, 732 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court has discretion to 

discipline for willful abuse of the judicial process or bad 

faith conduct. Id. “For purposes of imposing sanctions under 

the inherent power of the court, a finding of bad faith does not 

require that the legal and factual basis for the action prove 

totally frivolous; where a litigant is substantially motivated 

by vindictiveness, obduracy, or mala fides, the assertion of a 

colorable claim will not bar the assessment of attorney's fees.” 

Id. (internal quotations omitted).

B. Claims for Relief

1. Attorneys’ Fees as Sanctions

Defendant argues Plaintiff and Thurbon stole the emails, 

potentially committing state and federal violations, as well as 

ethical violations. Defendant contends that Plaintiff and 

Thurbon’s conduct has caused delay and resulted in increased 

litigation and attorneys’ fees for Defendant. Defendant asks the 

court to award $53,555.00 in attorneys’ fees as sanctions for 

Plaintiff and Thurbon’s conduct.

 

#64) at 15:8-16. Finally, Defendant argues that all documents 

filed by Thurbon should be stricken for failing to comply with 

Local Rule 131(b), (c), & (d). Though Thurbon used the attorney 

log-in name and password for his law partner, Jacqueline McHaney

(“McHaney”), he provides proper identification per Local Rule 

131(a) so the Court is not concerned about misuse of Thurbon’s or 

McHaney’s signature. Accordingly, the Court overrules Defendant’s 

objection to documents filed by Thurbon.

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Plaintiff and Thurbon filed separate oppositions. Plaintiff 

argues that he made a copy of the email server to preserve evidence 

and protect himself; he was not acting in bad faith. Plaintiff 

further argues that he was already sanctioned because the emails 

are excluded and he lost his counsel of choice. Finally, Plaintiff 

contends that awarding attorneys’ fees would not vindicate the 

judicial process or benefit the court, but rather, would act as a 

windfall for Defendant.

Thurbon argues that as a preliminary matter, this Court lacks 

jurisdiction because the Court’s December 7, 2011 order has been 

appealed. Thurbon further argues that it would be more efficient 

for the Court to consider the motion for sanctions after the Ninth 

Circuit issues its decision. In the alternative, Thurbon contends 

that none of his conduct was in bad faith because the emails were 

public records, Plaintiff was preserving records, and Thurbon did 

not violate any ethical or legal obligations by utilizing the 

emails in Plaintiff’s litigation.

a) Jurisdiction

Contrary to Thurbon’s assertions, the Court is permitted to 

consider a motion for attorney’s fees despite an appeal. 

Masalosalo by Masalosalo v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 955, 

956-57 (9th Cir. 1983)(holding that the district court retains the 

power to award attorneys’ fees after the notice of appeal from the 

decision on the merits has been filed). Accordingly, the Court has 

jurisdiction to hear the instant motion.

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b) Bad Faith

“The district court's authority to impose sanctions under its 

inherent powers is broad, but not limitless.” Mendez v. Cnty. of 

San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1131 (9th Cir. 2008). “Before 

awarding sanctions under its inherent powers[,] the court must make 

an explicit finding that counsel's conduct constituted or was 

tantamount to bad faith.” Id. (internal citations omitted). A 

finding of bad faith may be appropriate when, among other things, a 

party engages in behavior that has the effect of “delaying or 

disrupting the litigation or hampering enforcement of a court 

order.” Id. at 1131-32. The “bad faith requirement sets a high 

threshold.” Id. at 1132.

Both Plaintiff and Thurbon argue that they did not act in bad 

faith when Plaintiff downloaded the emails from Defendant’s server 

and when Thurbon used the emails for Plaintiff’s and Thulin’s 

litigation. 

Both Plaintiff and Defendant analogize this case to Ashman v. 

Solectron Corp., 2008 WL 5071101 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 1, 2008). In 

Ashman, an employment case, the plaintiff, Ashman, accessed the 

defendant’s internal emails and other documents to bolster his EEOC 

complaint. 2008 WL 5071101 at *2. Ashman, similar to the instant 

plaintiff, argued that he was not acting in subjective bad faith 

because he was trying to preserve evidence. Id. at *3. The court 

held that “[w]hile Ashman’s claim that he was trying to preserve 

evidence may tend to show that he did not act with subjective bad 

faith, Ashman is bound by the same discovery rules as any other 

litigant. Discovery self-help is not a protected activity.” Id. 

The court sanctioned Ashman by requiring him to return all of the 

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defendant’s documents within his possession, and the court barred 

him from using or referring to any privileged content within the 

documents. Id. at *4. However, the court allowed Ashman to use 

any document produced by Defendant during the normal course of 

discovery. Id. The court also ordered Ashman to be responsible 

for the expenses incurred by the defendant in connection with 

making the instant motions. Id. Finally, the court found that 

disqualification of Ashman’s counsel was not appropriate. Id. 

Here, the Court has already found that Plaintiff and Thurbon 

acted in bad faith for downloading the emails and unlike the court 

in Ashman, this Court sanctioned them by disqualifying Thurbon and 

forbidding Plaintiff from introducing any evidence about the 

contents of the emails, even though those emails are public records 

and if Plaintiff had properly engaged in discovery, he could have 

utilized them in this litigation. See Cal. Pub. Records Act, Cal. 

Gov. Code §§ 6250-6270. Forbidding the emails, which arguably 

could help Plaintiff’s case, in addition to disqualifying his 

counsel of choice, are severe enough sanctions for Plaintiff. 

Similarly, the Court’s disqualification of Thurbon is a sufficient

sanction for Thurbon. Though Defendant argues that Thurbon 

violated professional codes of conduct and penal rules, the Court 

has already considered that behavior and imposed disqualification 

as a sanction. “If sanctions are warranted by th[e] circumstances, 

the court should not waiver in imposing them. In so doing, 

however, the court must be meticulously aware that this precarious 

balance can only be maintained if the sanctions are justly 

imposed.” Matter of Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 

1986). Because the Court has already sanctioned Plaintiff and 

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Thurbon, it has sufficiently punished them for their behavior and 

there is need to impose the sanction of attorneys’ fees as well. 

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above,

Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 22, 2012

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