Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-96-99026/USCOURTS-ca9-96-99026-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dora B. Schriro
Appellee
Robert Douglas Smith
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT DOUGLAS SMITH,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

DORA B. SCHRIRO, Warden,

Arizona, Department of

Corrections,

Respondent-Appellee.

Nos. 96-99025

96-99026

10-99011

D.C. No.

CV-87-00234-RMB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 17, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed February 4, 2016

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Stephen Reinhardt,

and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Reinhardt;

Concurrence by Judge Schroeder;

Special Concurrence by Judge Reinhardt;

Dissent by Judge Callahan

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2 SMITH V. SCHRIRO

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The panel reversed Arizona state prisoner Robert Douglas

Smith’s death sentence in a case to which the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act does not apply, and

remanded to the district court with instructions to grant the

writ of habeas corpus and return the case to the state court to

reduce Smith’s sentence to life or natural life.

The state court determined on remand that Smith was not

intellectually disabled at the time of the offense and trial

under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which held

that the execution of intellectually disabled criminals

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the

Eighth Amendment. 

The panel held that because the state court’s factual

determination is not fairly supported by the record, a

presumption of correctness does not apply. Judge Reinhardt

would hold (section II.C.2) that deference is not due for the

additional and independent reason that the state court

rendered its finding that Smith was not intellectually disabled

under a constitutionally impermissible legal standard. 

Reviewing the record de novo, and considering Smith’s

intellectual functioning test scores and his history of

significantly impaired adaptive behavior, the panel found that

Smith satisfied by clear and convincing evidence the two

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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SMITH V. SCHRIRO 3

substantive prongs of Arizona’s definition of intellectual

disability both prior to the age of eighteen and at the time of

the crime.

Judge Schroeder concurred in all of Judge Reinhardt’s

opinion except section II.C.2.

Specially concurring, Judge Reinhardt wrote to convey

his serious concerns regarding the constitutionality of

Arizona’s Atkins statute.

Dissenting, Judge Callahan wrote that the majority

reaches its conclusion that Smith was not intellectually

disabled when he committed the murder by disregarding the

findings of the state courts, denying those courts the

deference they are due, and expressing supreme confidence

in its own ability to detect past intellectual disability despite

substantial conflicting evidence and the fact that Smith is not

now intellectually disabled.

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4 SMITH V. SCHRIRO

COUNSEL

S. Jonathan Young (argued), Williamson & Young, P.C.,

Tucson, Arizona; Ralph E. Ellinwood, Ellinwood, Francis &

Plowman LLP, Tucson, Arizona, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Jeffrey L. Sparks (argued), Assistant Attorney General,

Capital Litigation Section, Mark Brnovich, AttorneyGeneral,

Robert E. Ellman, Solicitor General, Jeffrey A. Zick, Chief

Counsel, Capital Litigation Section, Phoenix, Arizona, for

Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:1

This case, to which the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) does not apply, returns to us

following remand to the Arizona state court to conduct an

Atkins evidentiary hearing. After that hearing the state trial

court denied Smith’s Atkins claim, and the Arizona Court of

Appeal and Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. The district

court then found Smith’s Atkins claim without merit and

denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We now hold

that Smith is intellectually disabled under Atkins, and we

reverse.2

1

Judge Reinhardt’s opinion is the opinion of the court except for Section

II.C.2. in which neither Judge Schroeder nor Judge Callahan joins.

2 Because we grant relief on the Atkins claim, we find it unnecessary to

reach Smith’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

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SMITH V. SCHRIRO 5

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

In 1982, Robert Smith was convicted in Arizona state

court of kidnapping, sexual assault, andmurder and sentenced

to death. Lambright v. Stewart, 167 F.3d 477, 479 (9th Cir.

1999), reh’g granted, vacated, 177 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 1999),

rev’d, en banc, 191 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 1999). On June 20,

2002, the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.

304 (2002), holding that the execution of intellectually

disabled criminals constitutes “cruel and unusual

punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.4 Under

Atkins, if Smith was intellectually disabled at the time he

committed the crime or at the time of his trial, he may not be

executed. We suspended federal habeas proceedings, ordered

supplemental briefing and remanded to the state court to

determine whether Smith was intellectually disabled and thus

ineligible for execution under Atkins.

The Pima County Superior Court reopened discovery and

held a two-day evidentiary hearing on October 29 and

November 1, 2007. The court heard testimony by Dr.

Thomas Thompson, a neuropsychologist and prescribing

psychologist selected by Smith, who opined that there is a

very high probability that Smith was intellectually disabled at

the time the crime was committed in 1980. The court also

heard testimony from Dr. Sergio Martinez, a psychologist

3 Because the lengthy factual and procedural history of this case is

known to the parties and set forth in prior opinions, we recount only those

portions directly relevant to the issues discussed herein.

 

4

 Although both the parties and prior opinions in this case use the term

“mental retardation,” we employ the term “intellectually disabled.” See

Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014). We use “mental

retardation” only when quoting material employing that term.

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6 SMITH V. SCHRIRO

selected by the State, who stated that there is a high degree of

probability that Smith was not intellectually disabled in 1980. 

The parties entered numerous exhibits into evidence,

including the deposition transcripts of twelve lay witnesses

who described their observations of Smith as a child or young

adult.

Following the hearing, the Pima County Superior Court

found on March 27, 2008, that Atkins did not preclude

Smith’s execution. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied

special action relief later that year, Smith v. Kearney, No. 2

CA-SA 2008-0019, 2008 WL 2721155 (Ariz. Ct. App. July

11, 2008), and the Arizona Supreme Court denied Smith’s

petition for review. In September 2010, we remanded this

case to the district court for the limited purpose of

considering Smith’s Atkins claim. The district court denied

the claim in December 2012. Smith timely appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. 

Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2011). We

review de novo the federal district court decision denying

Smith’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. Alvarado v. Hill,

252 F.3d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001).

Because Smith filed his federal habeas petition prior to

AEDPA’s April 24, 1996 effective date, pre-AEDPA

standards govern our review even though Smith filed

amended petitions subsequent to AEDPA’s effective date. 

See Sivak, 658 F.3d at 905 (applying the pre-AEDPA

standard of review where initial petition was filed prior to

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SMITH V. SCHRIRO 7

AEDPA’s effective date and amended petitions were filed

following AEDPA’s enactment); Robinson v. Schriro,

595 F.3d 1086, 1099 (9th Cir. 2010) (same); see also Lindh

v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997) (holding that Congress

intended AEDPA to apply “only to such cases as were filed

after [AEDPA’s] enactment”).

Under pre-AEDPA law, state court factual findings are

entitled to a presumption of correctness, subject to eight

exceptions enumerated in the previous version of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). Sivak, 658 F.3d at 905–06. Among the exceptions

to the rule regarding a presumption of correctness is the

following: the state court’s “factual determination is not fairly

supported by the record.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8). Because

the parties agree that whether Smith is intellectually disabled

is a question of fact, we assume for purposes of this opinion

that such is the case.5 The presumption of the correctness

also does not apply if the factual determination is based on

the application of constitutionally impermissible legal

principles. Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1551 n. 4 (10th

Cir. 1991).

5 The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held that the question of whether a

person is intellectually disabled under Atkins constitutes an issue of fact. 

See Walker v. Kelly, 593 F.3d 319, 323 (4th Cir. 2010); Maldonado v.

Thaler, 625 F.3d 229, 236 (5th Cir. 2010). The Nevada, Pennsylvania,

and Tennessee Supreme Courts have held that the question is instead a

mixed question of law and fact. Ybarra v. State, 247 P.3d 269, 276 (Nev.

2011); Commonwealth v. Crawley, 924 A.2d 612, 615 (Pa. 2007); State

v. Strode, 232 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tenn. 2007). We have not yet decided the

issue in our Circuit, but have held in a separate context that the question

of intellectual disability is a mixed question of law and fact. See Gregory

K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir. 1987) (whether

student was intellectually disabled, as defined by state regulations, for the

purpose of the federal Education for All Handicapped Children Act is a

mixed question of law and fact).

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B. Legal Standard Governing Determination of

Intellectual Disability Under Arizona Law

In 2001, one year before Atkins was decided, the Arizona

legislature enacted a statute prohibiting the execution of

intellectually disabled persons and creating a process by

which capital defendants are evaluated for intellectual

disability. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02 (2001), 2001

Ariz. Sess. Laws, Ch. 260, § 2; State v. Grell (Grell I),

66 P.3d 1234, 1240 (2003). Under the version of the statute

in effect at the time of Smith’s Atkins hearing in 2007, the

procedures for evaluating a defendant were automatically

triggered upon the State’s filing a notice of intent to seek the

death penalty. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02(B) (2006),

as amended by 2006 Ariz. Sess. Laws, Ch. 55, § 1.

6 The

statute provides that the burden of proving intellectual

disability lies with the capital defendant who must prove his

disability by “clear and convincing evidence.” Ariz. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02(G).

The Arizona statute defines “mental retardation” as

containing three elements: (1) “significantly subaverage

general intellectual functioning” and (2) concurrent

“significant impairment in adaptive behavior,” (3) “where the

onset of the foregoing conditions occurred before the

defendant reached the age of eighteen.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 13-703.02(K)(3). “Significantly subaverage general

6 Section 13-703.02 was subsequently renumbered as § 13-753. 2008

Ariz. Sess. Laws, Ch. 301, § 26. In 2011, the statute was amended to

substitute the term “intellectual disability” for “mental retardation.” Ariz.

Sess. Laws 2011, Ch. 89, § 5. Unless otherwise stated, all references to

§ 13-703.02 are to the version in effect at the time of Smith’s Atkins

evidentiary hearing.

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SMITH V. SCHRIRO 9

intellectual functioning” is defined as “a full scale

intelligence quotient [IQ] of seventy or lower.” Ariz. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02(K)(5). “Adaptive behavior” is defined

as “the effectiveness or degree to which the defendant meets

the standards of personal independence and social

responsibility expected of the defendant’s age and cultural

group.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 13-703.02(K)(1).

Under Arizona’s procedures for determining intellectual

disability, the court appoints a prescreening psychological

expert to determine the defendant’s IQ “using current

community, nationally and culturally accepted intelligence

testing procedures.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02(B). If

the expert determines that the defendant’s IQ is above 75,

“the notice of intent to seek the death penalty shall not be

dismissed on the ground that the defendant has mental

retardation.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02(C). If the IQ

score is 75 or less, however, the court will appoint additional

experts in consultation with the parties to prepare reports

regarding whether the defendant is intellectually disabled. 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02(D), (E). If at this point all

IQ test scores are above 70, the defendant remains eligible for

the death penalty. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02(F).

If the testing demonstrates that the defendant’s IQ score

is equal to or less than 70, however, the court holds a hearing

at which “the defendant has the burden of proving mental

retardation by clear and convincing evidence.” Ariz. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02(G). Under Arizona law, “[c]lear and

convincing evidence is that which may persuade that the truth

of the contention is ‘highly probable.’” In Re Neville,

708 P.2d 1297, 1302 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc). A determination

by the court that the defendant’s IQ is 65 or below

“establishes a rebuttable presumption that the defendant has

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10 SMITH V. SCHRIRO

mental retardation.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02(G). 

However, “‘[t]he presumption of mental retardation based on

the IQ scores vanishes . . . if the State presents evidence that

calls into question the validity of the IQ scores or tends to

establish that [the] defendant does not otherwise meet the

statutory definition of mental retardation.’” State v. Boyston,

298 P.3d 887, 895 (Ariz. 2013) (quoting State v. Arellano,

143 P.3d 1015, 1019 (Ariz. 2006)); see Arellano, 143 P.3d at

1018 (“A rebuttable presumption, however, ‘vanishes when

the state provides contradictory evidence.’” (citation

omitted)). “‘At that point, the IQ scores serve as evidence of

mental retardation, to be considered by the trial court with all

other evidence presented.’” Boyston, 298 P.3d at 895

(quoting Arellano, 143 P.3d at 1019).

Smith did not have the benefit of this procedural

framework at the time of his trial because the trial took place

nearly twenty years before the procedural framework’s

adoption. The Arizona Supreme Court has held that in cases

presenting Atkins claims in such a post-trial posture, courts

should use Atkins as a guide and apply the pre-trial

procedures of § 13-703.02 to the extent practical. As the

Arizona Supreme Court explained in a capital case predating

the passage of § 13-703.02,

We recognize that the procedures set forth in

section 13-703.02 are not applicable in Grell’s

case, as section 13-703.02 did not take effect

until after Grell’s sentencing. Moreover, the

procedures contemplated by section 13-

703.02 are pre-trial procedures, triggered

when the State files its notice of intent to seek

the death penalty. The trial court should use

Atkins as a guide and should, insofar as is

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SMITH V. SCHRIRO 11

practical in the post-trial posture of this case,

follow the procedures established in [Ariz.

Rev. Stat.] section 13-703.02.

Grell I, 66 P.3d at 1241 (footnote omitted); accord Arellano,

143 P.3d at 1017 (“[Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703.02] applies to

all capital sentencing proceedings, including post-conviction

proceedings brought to determine whether a defendant meets

the statutory definition of mental retardation.”).

C. Presumption of Correctness

As an initial matter, we must determine whether a

presumption of correctness applies to the state court’s factual

determination that Smith was not intellectually disabled at the

time of the offense and trial. We conclude that it does not. 

As discussed in section II.C.1, we hold that the state court’s

factual determination is not entitled to deference because it is

“not fairly supported by the record.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8). 

Also, as explained in section II.C.2, Judge Reinhardt would

hold that deference is not due for the additional and

independent reason that the Pima County Superior Court

rendered its finding that Smith was not intellectually disabled

under a constitutionally impermissible legal standard.

1. The State Court’s Factual Determination Is

Not Fairly Supported By the Record

Our case law provides some guidance for determining

when the exception codified at § 2254(d)(8) applies. Where

the record is ambiguous, a state court’s factual determination

is “fairly supported by the record” within the meaning of

§ 2254(d)(8). Palmer v. Estelle, 985 F.2d 456, 459 (9th Cir.

1993); see Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 85 (1983). 

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Where the great majority of the evidence strongly points

against the state court’s finding, however, the finding is not

fairly supported. We have held that a factual determination

is not fairly supported by the record even if it is supported by

some evidence and other evidence is equally consistent with

both the state court’s conclusion and a contrary conclusion,

so long as the record as a whole “strongly suggests” a

different conclusion. See Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463,

473–76 (9th Cir. 1997).

This standard must also be read in the context of the

Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct.

1986 (2014). In Hall, the Court emphasized that, in death

penalty cases where a defendant’s intellectual functioning is

a close question, the defendant “must be able to present

additional evidence of intellectual disability . . . .” Id. at 2001. 

In fact, in these situations, the court must not “view a single

factor as dispositive” given the complexity of intellectual

disability assessments. Id. Therefore, a court reviewing the

whole record as required by the standard at issue must

consider all indications of a defendant’s intellectual disability

and may not discard relevant evidence.

Here, we do not defer to the state court’s ultimate

conclusion that Smith was not intellectually disabled because

it lacks fair support in the record as a whole.7 Nor do we

defer to the state court’s weighing of the evidence where its

7 The mere fact that the record contains contrary opinions by two expert

witnesses does not render it ambiguous. Once we look behind each

expert’s conclusion and consider the evidence on which he relies, it

becomes clear that the great majority of the evidence strongly reinforces

Dr. Thompson’s opinion and that Dr. Martinez’s contrary conclusion lacks

even fair evidentiary support.

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SMITH V. SCHRIRO 13

decisions to discount certain evidence similarly lack fair

evidentiary support or result from legal error.8 The evidence

in this case overwhelmingly supports our conclusion that

Smith satisfied both substantive prongs of intellectual

disability—significantly subaverage general intellectual

functioning and significant impairment in adaptive

behavior—both prior to age eighteen and at the time of the

crime.

a. Application of Atkins

The state trial court correctly concentrated its analysis on

whether Smith was intellectually disabled at the time of the

offense and the ensuing trial. In Atkins, the Court identified

two rationales supporting its holding. First, concentrating on

the time of the offense, the Court recognized that

intellectually disabled offenders are less culpable for their

crimes. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317; see also Hall, 134 S. Ct. at

1992–93. Specifically, the Court noted that there is reason to

doubt whether either justification it had previously

recognized as a basis for the death penalty—retribution and

deterrence—applies to intellectually disabled offenders. 

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318–19. These individuals, the Court

explained, suffer from impairments leaving them with

8 When a state court’s decision to discount certain evidence constitutes

a factual determination, we may apply § 2254(d)(8) to determine whether

deference is due. See Carriger, 132 F.3d at 473–76, 478 (applying

§ 2254(d)(8) to reject the state court’s ancillary factual determination that

a witness lacked credibility and holding, based in part upon our decision

to credit that witness’s testimony, that the petitioner had satisfied the

Schlup “miscarriage of justice” standard); see also Schlup v. Delo,

513 U.S. 298, 314 (1995). Where a state court’s decision to discount

certain evidence results from legal error, the presumption of correctness

does not apply. See Sivak, 658 F.3d at 905.

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“diminished capacities to understand and process

information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and

learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to

control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others,”

making them more likely to act on impulse rather than

premeditation, and as followers rather than leaders. Id. at

318. These limitations diminish the individual’s relative

culpability for the crime, and, consequently, the retributive

justification of the death penalty. See id. at 319 (“[T]he

severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily depends

on the culpability of the offender.”); see also Hall, 134 S. Ct.

at 1992 (“No legitimate penological purpose is served by

executing a person with intellectual disability.”). They

likewise limit the death penalty’s deterrent effect, because

these impairments “also make it less likely that [intellectually

disabled offenders] can process the information of the

possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control

their conduct based upon that information.” Atkins, 536 U.S.

at 320.

The Court’s second rationale concentrates on a

defendant’s trial in light of the heightened risk that

“[m]entally retarded defendants in the aggregate face a

special risk of wrongful execution” because they are less able

to effectively participate in their own defense for the purpose

of making “a persuasive showing of mitigation.”9Id. at

320–21; see also Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1993. Because the

9 Because it applies equally to the time of the crime and trial, the

constitutional right announced in Atkins is unlike the rights provided by

Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) (right to not to be tried while

legally incompetent), and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409–10

(1986) (right not to be executed while insane), which attach, respectively,

to the time of trial and execution.

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SMITH V. SCHRIRO 15

rationales underlying the right announced in Atkins

concentrate on the time the crime was committed and the

ensuing trial, we hold that a defendant comes within the

protection of Atkins if he can demonstrate that he was

intellectually disabled during either of these periods.10

Consequently, a defendant’s present condition is relevant

only to the extent that it is probative of his condition during

the relevant periods.

The defendant must, of course, qualify under the third

prong as well. The onset of the mental disability must have

occurred before he reached the age of eighteen.

We turn now to why the record does not fairly support the

state court’s determination that Smith was not intellectually

disabled. In order to do so, we must examine the evidence

under the two substantive elements of the Arizona statute, and

determine whether the evidence as a whole strongly points to

the conclusion that the two statutory conditions existed at the

time of the crime or trial, and whether the onset of each

condition occurred prior to age eighteen.

10 Many states expressly recognize that Atkins applies to individuals who

may be deemed intellectually disabled at the time the crime was

committed or at trial. See, e.g., Smith v. State, No. 1060427, 2007 WL

1519869, at *8 (Ala. May 25, 2007); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-618(b); Del.

Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(3)(c); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-131(c); Pizzuto

v. State, 202 P.3d 642, 653, 654 (Idaho 2008); Chase v. State, No. 2013-

CA-01089-SCT, 2015 WL 1848126, at *3 (Miss. Apr. 23, 2015); S.D.

Codified Laws § 23A-27A-26.1; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(b); Ex

parte Cathey, 451 S.W.3d 1, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Wash. Rev.

Code § 10.95.030(2).

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b. Significantly Subaverage General

Intellectual Functioning

“‘Significantly subaverage general intellectual

functioning’ is the touchstone for proving [intellectual

disability] and means ‘a full scale intelligence quotient [IQ]

of seventy or lower.’” State v. Grell (Grell III), 291 P.3d

350, 352 (Ariz. 2013) (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-

753(K)(5)).11

It must be manifested before age eighteen,

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02(K)(3), and at the time of

the crime or trial, see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317–21.

1. Intellectual Functioning Prior to Age

Eighteen

Smith took the Otis Intelligence Scale Test in April 1964

and again in October of that year, when he was fifteen years

old, receiving scores of 62 and 71, respectively. The score of

62 Smith received the first time he took the test is the more

relevant of the two scores in light of Dr. Thompson’s

unrebutted testimony that Smith’s second test score of 71 was

inflated by the practice effect of having taken the same test

just several months earlier. Dr. Thompson explained that

under the practice effect, a person scores higher on a test

when it is readministered within a short period of time

because he has become familiar with the test. Arizona courts

and the most current clinical guidelines recognize the practice

effect. See State ex rel. Thomas v. Duncan, 216 P.3d 1194,

1195 n. 4 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (“The practice effect occurs

when a person performs better on a test because he or she has

 

11 The version of the statute in effect at the time of Smith’s evidentiary

hearing uses an identical definition. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-

703.02(K)(5).

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SMITH V. SCHRIRO 17

taken it before.”); id. at 1198 (stating that “a defendant may

argue that the practice effect impacted the results” of

successive IQ tests); Am. Ass’n of Intellectual and

Developmental Disabilities, Intellectual Disability 38 (11th

ed. 2010) [hereinafter AAIDD 11th ed.] (describing research

showing the artificial increase in IQ scores when the same

instrument is readministered within a short time interval, and

stating that established clinical practice is to avoid

administering the same intelligence test within the same year

to the same individual because it will often lead to an

overestimation of the examinee’s true intelligence); Am.

Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of

Mental Disorders 37 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V]

(identifying the practice effect as a factor capable of affecting

test scores).

Under the Atkins framework Arizona later adopted,

Smith’s IQ score of 62 would entitle him to a presumption of

intellectual disability. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-

703.02(G). The State, however, “present[ed] evidence that

calls into question the validity of the IQ scores or tends to

establish that [the] defendant does not otherwise meet the

statutory definition of mental retardation.” Boyston, 298 P.3d

at 895 (quoting Arellano, 143 P.3d at 1019). Specifically, the

State points to the results of IQ test scores administered by

Drs. Thompson and Martinez in 2005 and 2007, on which

Smith received scores of 89, 91, and 93. These scores

demonstrate that Smith is not presently intellectually

disabled, and, in the absence of IQ scores documenting

Smith’s IQ at the time the crime was committed, raise an

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18 SMITH V. SCHRIRO

inference that he may not have been disabled at that time.12

Accordingly, “[t]he presumption . . . based on the IQ scores

vanishes” and we weigh the evidence as if no presumption

had existed. Id. (quoting Arellano, 143 P.3d at 1019)).13

In any event, the Otis test scores remain highly probative

of Smith’s condition prior to age eighteen. The State asserts

that the tests are unreliable, and points to Dr. Thompson’s

testimony on cross-examination that by 1964 the Otis tests

had not been “normed” against the current population for

forty years, and that he had not seen the raw data from

Smith’s Otis tests or any information regarding the conditions

under which those tests were administered. Although the lack

of contemporary norming may call into some question the

accuracy of the test results, Dr. Thompson gave

uncontroverted testimony that, due to the Flynn Effect, this

would only have caused Smith’s scores to be overstated. The

basic premise of the Flynn effect is that because average IQ

scores increase over time, a person who takes an IQ test that

 

12 Given the substantial time between the commission of the crime and

the IQ tests administered by Drs. Thompson and Martinez, this inference

is not particularly strong. Moreover, as discussed below, substantial

evidence demonstrates that Smith’s IQ did in fact fall below the threshold

necessary to demonstrate significantly subaverage general intellectual

functioning at the time the crime was committed.

13 While the standard for overcoming the statutory presumption of

intellectual disability is not particularly clear, the general rule in Arizona

suggests it is low. Cf. State v. Lewis, 340 P.3d 415, 420 (Ariz. Ct. App.

2014) (“[A]s with other rebuttable presumptions, the presumption of

continued incompetence ‘disappears entirely upon the introduction of any

contradicting evidence and when such evidence is introduced the existence

or non-existence of the presumed [incompetence] is to be determined

exactly as if no presumption had ever been operative.’” (quoting Sheehan

v. Pima Cnty., 660 P.2d 486, 489 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982))).

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has not recently been normed against a representative sample

of the population will receive an artificially inflated IQ score. 

See James R. Flynn, Tethering the Elephant: Capital Cases,

IQ, and the Flynn Effect, 12 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 170,

173 (2006) [hereinafter Flynn Effect]. This is because IQ

scores are based on a normal distribution curve, and thus an

individual’s score is meaningful only in relation to the scores

of the other people who took the same test. See J.C. Oleson,

The Insanity of Genius: Criminal Culpability and Right–Tail

Psychometrics, 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 587, 598 (2009). 

When correcting for the Flynn Effect, “[t]he standard practice

is to deduct 0.3 IQ points per year (3 points per decade) to

cover the period between the year the test was normed and

the year in which the subject took the test.” Flynn Effect,

supra, at 173. The AAIDD recognizes the existence of the

Flynn Effect and recommends correcting for the age of norms

in outdated tests. AAIDD 11th ed., supra, at 37; see also Am.

Ass’n on Mental Retardation, Mental Retardation: Definition,

Classification, and Systems of Supports 56 (10th ed. 2002)

[hereinafter AAMR 10th ed.]. The Fourth and Eleventh

Circuits have also recognized the existence of the Flynn

Effect. See Walker v. True, 399 F.3d 315, 322–23 (4th Cir.

2005) (reversing district court due to its failure to consider

“relevant evidence” of the Flynn effect); Holladay v. Allen,

555 F.3d 1346, 1358 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[A]ll of the scores

were on WAIS tests, which may have reflected elevated

scores because of the Flynn effect.”).14 Without referring to

14 Courts have taken a range of approaches with regard to the Flynn

effect. Some courts have gone beyond the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits

by mandating its application to defendants’ IQ scores. See Thomas v.

Allen, 614 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1281 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (“A court must also

consider the Flynn effect and the standard error of measurement in

determiningwhether a petitioner’s IQ score falls within a range containing

scores that are less than 70.”); United States v. Parker, 65 M.J. 626, 629

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20 SMITH V. SCHRIRO

the Flynn effect by name, we too have adjusted IQ scores

based on out-of-date norms. Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1312 n.

2. Here, we conclude that, in light of Dr. Thompson’s

uncontroverted testimony regarding the impact of the Flynn

Effect, Smith’s score of 62 on the outdated Otis test renders

it highly probable that his IQ at the time of the test was lower

than 62, well below the cutoff for demonstrating

“significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning”

under Arizona law.

The record does not fairly support the state court’s

determination to afford the Otis test little weight and discount

Dr. Thompson’s opinion to the extent that he relied on the

(N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2007); People v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. Rptr.3d

529, 558-559 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005), overruled on other grounds (“In

determining [a petitioner’s] IQ score, consideration must be given to the

so-called Flynn effect”). Other courts have left to the trial court’s

discretion whether to apply the Flynn Effect. See State v. Burke, No.

04AP-1234, 2005 WL 3557641, at *13 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2005)

(“We conclude that a trial court must consider evidence presented on the

Flynn effect, but, consistent with its prerogative to determine the

persuasiveness of the evidence, the trial court is not bound to, but may,

conclude the Flynn effect is a factor in a defendant’s IQ score.”). Still

other courts have rejected use of the Flynn Effect. See Bowling v.

Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361 (Ky. 2005) (neither the Flynn effect nor

standard margins of error properly are considered); Howell v. State,

151 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2004); Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 273

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“We have previously refrained fromapplying the

Flynn effect, however, noting that it is an ‘unexamined scientific concept’

that does not provide a reliable basis for concluding that an appellant has

significant sub-average general intellectual functioning.”); In re Mathis,

483 F.3d 395, 398 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2007) (“The Flynn Effect . . . has not been

accepted in this Circuit as scientifically valid.”).

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test.15 Although Dr. Thompson and Dr. Martinez each noted

that additional information regarding the administration of the

test would enhance its validity, neither witness concluded that

the test results were invalid in the absence of such

information. More fundamentally, we decline to disregard

the Otis tests on the basis that Smith is unable to proffer the

same level of detailed evidence regarding their administration

as is available for recent tests administered by courtappointed psychologists. Like most states, Arizona places the

burden on a defendant raising an Atkins claim to demonstrate,

inter alia, significantly subaverage general intellectual

functioning [meaning an IQ of 70 or below] occurring before

the age of eighteen. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02(K)(3),

(5). It is highly unlikely, however, that the people

administering an IQ test to a child would ever anticipate the

use of that test in an Atkins proceeding, and at the time of

Smith’s tests the constitutional right provided by Atkins did

not even exist. Consequently, records of childhood IQ tests

will rarely include the detailed information collected for IQ

tests administered under court supervision to adjudicate a

defendant’s Atkins claim. To discount what may be the only

evidence of subaverage general intellectual functioning prior

to age eighteen on this ground would effectively deny the

protection afforded by Atkins to individuals who are

substantially older than eighteen years old, or whose trials

predate Atkins, because it would render their intellectual

disability nearly impossible to prove. Given the evidentiary

15 The state court also noted that expert testimony regarding Quantitative

Electronencephalography (QEEG) testing on Smith, which it held

inadmissible, played a role in Dr. Thompson’s opinion that Smith’s

functional limitations were related to his frontal lobe dysfunction. 

Because testimony regarding the QEEG testing played a non-essential and

limited role in Dr. Thompson’s conclusion, his opinion cannot be

discounted on this basis.

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challenges so often arising from the retrospective nature of

Atkins claims, the Eighth Amendment requires that courts

apply a more relaxed standard when determining the

reliability of evidence documenting childhood onset of

intellectual disability. Here, there is no indication that Smith

was malingering when he took the Otis tests. Accordingly,

although they do not provide a presumption of intellectual

disability under Arizona law, we find that Smith’s first Otis

test score nonetheless “serve[s] as evidence of mental

retardation, to be considered by [this] [C]ourt with all other

evidence presented.’” Boyston, 298 P.3d at 895 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

We hold the first Otis test score reliable for the additional

reason that it is consistent with Smith’s contemporaneous

poor academic performance. Under Arizona law, evidence of

poor academic performance is evidence of subaverage

intellectual functioning. Williams v. Cahill ex rel. Cnty. of

Pima, 303 P.3d 532, 540 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (“[W]hen no

childhood IQ tests were performed, subaverage intellectual

functioning before the age of eighteen properly may be

inferred from other evidence of intellectual functioning, such

as school performance.”). Here, the evidence

overwhelmingly demonstrates that Smith performed

exceedingly poorly in school, scoring in the 2nd to 5th

percentiles on the Stanford Achievement Test at age fifteen,

placing him five to seven years below his age level and three

to five years below grade level. Smith’s school transcripts

reveal that he received nearly all “Ds” and “F’s” in his

academic subjects, and that his education did not progress

beyond the eighth grade, after which he dropped out of

school. The State does not contest the validity of these

records. Melva Jane Box, Smith’s older sister, testified that

Smith was held back in all his grades, was placed in special

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SMITH V. SCHRIRO 23

education class for slow learners, and was even transferred to

a special school “because he couldn’t learn.” Charles

Caperton, one of Smith’s childhood neighbors, similarly

testified that Smith was placed in special education classes. 

Taken together, Smith’s Otis test scores and poor academic

performance overwhelmingly demonstrate that Smith

experienced significantly subaverage general intellectual

functioning prior to the age of eighteen. The state court’s

determination to the contrary does not find fair support in the

record.

2. Intellectual Functioning at the Time of

the Crime and Trial

The more fundamental question in this case is whether

Smith continued to suffer from subaverage intellectual

functioning at the time of the crime and trial. The only

evidence to the contrary is the IQ test scores conducted by Dr.

Thompson and Dr. Martinez decades after the trial. Thus, the

question is the relative weight that can fairly be given to the

pre-crime and post-crime test scores insofar as they provide

evidence determinative of Smith’s intellectual functioning at

the time of the crime and trial, and whether the record fairly

supports the state court’s conclusion that Smith did not

experience significantly subaverage general intellectual

functioning at that crucial time.

We begin by noting that the subsequent administration of

IQ tests by Drs. Thompson and Martinez was substantially

more remote from the period of Smith’s crime than the

administration of the Otis test scores: twenty-five and twentyseven years after the crime, in the former case, compared to

sixteen years in the latter. Accepting each set of test scores

as valid measures of Smith’s IQ at the time the tests were

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administered, this discrepancyrenders more probable Smith’s

assertion that his IQ at the time of the crime approximated the

IQ reflected in his first Otis test score rather than his more

recent, higher scores.

The key issue, however, is the strength of Smith’s

evidence demonstrating the probability that his significant

gains in IQ score occurred after, rather than before, his

incarceration. Dr. Thompson testified that improvements in

IQ score similar to those attained by Smith are possible for

individuals like Smith whose cognitive problems stem from

environmental factors rather than physical injury and who are

later given appropriate antidepressant medication and placed

in a structured environment. Certainly, Smith adduced

substantial evidence of a horribly abusive and impoverished

upbringing supporting Dr. Thompson’s opinion: he was

routinely brutalized by his stepfather, and was subjected to

extreme verbal and emotional abuse by his mother,

interspersed with neglect and periods of outright

abandonment. According to Box, Smith’s stepfather would

beat him with “whatever was closest . . . . a belt, a stick, a

coat hangar,” and also molested him. Martha Gau, Smith’s

younger half-sister, similarly testified that Smith’s stepfather

would tell him “he was good for nothing and would never

amount to anything,” and would kick him and whip him with

both ends of a belt; she recalled finding Smith’s bedsheets

covered in blood following one particularly serious beating

when he was about twelve or thirteen years old. Caperton

saw Smith beaten with a belt “pretty regularly,” and

witnessed one beating involving use of a two-by-four. 

Smith’s mother frequently left the children alone at a time

when Smith was still young enough to be using a high chair. 

On one occasion when she was actually present, Smith’s

mother engaged in extra-marital foreplay in the front seat of

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SMITH V. SCHRIRO 25

her car while Smith sat in the backseat. On another, after the

children failed to adequately clean the dishes, she sent them

outside with bowls on their heads to pick weeds from the yard

while other children from the neighborhood gathered around

them and laughed. As a result of this upbringing, Dr.

Thompson opined, Smith became intellectually disabled with

frontal lobe abnormalities.16

As evidence that IQ scores can improve following the

commission of the crime in situations similar to Smith’s, Dr.

Thompson cited robust data demonstrating that the use of

antidepressants (which Smith took while incarcerated) can

significantly increase brain functioning over time, noted that

other death row inmates have attained improved functioning

while incarcerated, and provided an anecdote of a patient who

achieved a twelve point gain in IQ score after receiving

medication for just four months. As evidence that his level of

16 The state court committed legal error when it discounted Dr.

Thompson’s opinion that Smith’s abusive upbringing contributed to his

intellectual disability, which was manifested by poor test scores and

grades, and instead adopted the state’s theory that Smith’s abusive

upbringing itself caused his poor academic performance but that he was

not intellectually disabled. The state’s theory misapprehends Arizona’s

definition of intellectual disability, which centers on indicators such as

low IQ scores and impaired adaptive behavior and not the purported

etiology of these indicators. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02(K)(1),

(3), (5). Simply stated, while the specific cause of intellectual disability

is significant with regard to whether the condition is static or mutable, the

threshold question whether an individual is intellectually disabled is

answered simply by the presence of impaired functioning regardless of its

purported cause. See AAIDD 11th ed., supra, at 59–61 (describing

intellectual disability as arising from cultural-familial factors, biological

factors, or a combination of the two, and stating that “[b]ecause

[intellectual disability] is characterized by impaired functioning, its

etiology is whatever caused this impairment in functioning.”).

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functioning improved over the course of his incarceration,

Smith adduced testimony from multiple witnesses describing

dramatic improvements in the quality of the letters he sent

from prison. Gau testified that letters Smith sent her at the

beginning of his incarceration were virtually unintelligible,

but that over the following years his writing had improved

“100 percent,” explaining that “it was like a totally different

person was writing it.” Martha Hight, Smith’s aunt by

marriage, similarly described Smith’s early letters from

prison as partially unintelligible, and noted improvements in

the letters he sent in later years. Smith also received tutoring

while in prison. Ronald Labrecque, who worked for the

Department of Corrections from 1986 until 1997, supervised

Smith’s work on maintenance jobs over an eight year period. 

Labrecque also tutored Smith, helping him with his reading

and providing him reading materials such as working

manuals, and described witnessing a “vast improvement” in

Smith’s reading ability over this time. Smith received

additional help from Ed Schad, a fellow inmate, who would

get books for Smith from the prison library and have him read

them. None of this evidence is refuted by the State.

For his part, although disagreeing with Dr. Thompson’s

ultimate conclusion, Dr. Martinez agreed with several of his

key premises. Dr. Martinez testified that significant IQ gains

are possible, and acknowledged that Smith’s IQ gains were

not without precedent. He also agreed with Dr. Thompson’s

characterization of prison as a “structured environment.” 

More significant, Dr. Martinez testified that improved

functioning is unlikely to occur in the absence of training and

educational opportunities (which Smith received in prison

from Labrecque and Schad), and stated that there was no

indication Smith received any such opportunities prior to the

time of the crime. This strongly reinforces, and renders

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highly probable, Smith’s assertion that the improvement in

his functioning did not occur until after the crime was

committed. For all of these reasons, we hold that the state

court’s determination that no evidence explains whether the

finding of Smith’s low childhood IQ could be extrapolated to

the time of the crime and trial lacks even fair support in the

record.

Dr. Martinez also relied on reports summarizing three

Rule 11 competency evaluations Smith underwent in 1981,

each of which found Smith competent to stand trial. He

specifically cited the conclusion of one evaluator, Dr.

LaWall, that Smith “probably functions in the average range

of intelligence.” Dr. Thompson described the Rule 11 reports

as an unreliable assessment of intelligence because they are

“very superficial,” and “very subjective.” He explained that

because the reports focus on competency, they comprise

estimates of a subject’s functioning based only on a brief

interview, involve little review of the subject’s history,

and—more important—include no quantitative assessment of

his IQ. Dr. Thompson’s critique is consistent with Arizona

law and highly persuasive, and Dr. LaWall’s assessment of

Smith’s intelligence carries little weight. See Ariz. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 13-703.02(K)(5) (determining whether an individual

suffers from significantly subaverage general intellectual

functioning requires a quantitative assessment of IQ). The

State adduces no other evidence of improved academic

performance or other indicia of increased intellectual

functioning prior to the commission of the crime. 

Accordingly, viewing the record as a whole, we hold that Dr.

Martinez’s conclusion is not fairly supported by the record. 

Because the remaining evidence supporting the state court’s

conclusion is minimal, we hold that its conclusion that Smith

failed to satisfy the intellectual functioning prong of

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Arizona’s intellectual disability definition at the of the crime

and/or trial is not fairly supported by the record. We hold

instead that the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that

Smith experienced significantly subaverage general

intellectual functioning at that dispositive time.17

17 The State’s citation to cases describing intellectual disability as a

static condition does not alter our conclusion, Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,

323 (1993); Moormann v. Schriro, 672 F.3d 644, 649 (9th Cir. 2012);

State v. Arellano, 143 P.3d 1015, 1020 (Ariz. 2006). Moorman and

Arellano each rely on Heller, which cites a 1985 report for the proposition

that intellectual disability “is a permanent, relatively static condition.” 

Heller, 509 U.S. at 323 (citing Samuel J. Brakel et al., The Mentally

Disabled and the Law 37 (3d ed. 1985)). Thus, all of this case law relies

on a single study that substantially predates developments in the clinical

understanding of intellectual disability as a fluid condition subject to

change. See Am. Ass’n on Mental Retardation, Mental Retardation:

Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 1, 5 (9th ed. 1992)

[hereinafter AAMR 9th ed.] (“With appropriate supports over a sustained

period, the life functioning of the person with mental retardation will

generally improve.”); id. at 18 (“Mental retardation begins prior to age 18

but may not be of lifelong duration.”); Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic

and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 47 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter

DSM-IV] (“Mental Retardation is not necessarily a lifelong disorder.

Individuals who had Mild Mental Retardation earlier in their lives

manifested by failure in academic learning tasks may, with appropriate

training and opportunities, develop good adaptive skills in other domains

and may no longer have the level of impairment required for a diagnosis

of Mental Retardation.”); AAIDD 11th ed., supra, at xiii (“ID is no longer

considered entirely an absolute, invariant trait of the person.”). This

contemporary clinical understanding necessarily informs the law on

intellectual disability. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1993 (2014)

(stating that legal definitions ofintellectual disability “are informed by the

work of medical experts”). In addition, unlike the record in this case,

none of the cases on which the State relies involves an evidentiary record

containing extensive expert testimony describing intellectual disability as

a condition that is neither fixed nor static where (as in Smith’s case) it is

influenced by environmental factors rather than an underlying medical

condition.

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Moreover, to hold otherwise would contravene the

fundamental principles the Supreme Court recently laid out

for the benefit of the federal courts and the state judiciary in

the landmark case of Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). 

In that case, the Court made it clear that a determination of

intellectual disability requires, at least in questionable cases,

the consideration of significant relevant evidence, not simply

a measurement of an IQ test at a particular point in time. 

Here, the premise on which the state court’s decision as to

intellectual disability is based is that the IQ tests taken at a

critical time–the time prior to Smith’s 18th year–must be

discounted in large part because, at the time they were taken,

the procedures used for such tests were not adequately

recorded and the information regarding the administration of

such tests was no longer available. This test evidence was not

only critical to the initial IQ determination when Smith was

15 but also to the ultimate determination of his intellectual

disability at the time of the crimes. To discount the reliability

of the tests on such grounds is little different from failing to

consider, or excluding, crucial evidence that is not only

highly relevant to the principal questions at issue but is

indeed critical to arriving at a fair and just answer to the

question whether Smith is eligible for capital punishment.

Hall reminds us that “the death penalty is the gravest

sentence our society may impose,” 134 S. Ct. at 2001, and

that imposing this “harshest of punishments on an

intellectually disabled person violates his or her inherent

dignity as a human being,” id. at 1992. Given these stakes,

Hall warns that we must not make judgments in haste as to

whether a person has an intellectual disability, but rather must

consider all the “substantial and weighty evidence” in cases

that present close questions. Id. at 1994. Put differently, we

cannot risk making the protections of Atkins a nullity by

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executing a person with an intellectual disability without

giving him the “fair opportunity to show the Constitution

prohibits [his] execution.” Id. at 2001. The state court’s

decision in Smith’s case takes that risk. By discounting

Smith’s early IQ tests even though they were the type used at

the time and even though they are the most likely evidence

that an intellectually disabled defendant of Smith’s age could

present in order to prove his condition, the state court judge

rendered the protection for the intellectually disabled

established by Atkins effectively meaningless, which is

precisely what the Court sought to avoid in Hall. Such a

decision, by removing highly probative evidence of a

person’s intellectual disability in a death-penalty case, not

only violates the individual defendant’s right but also

“contravenes our Nation’s commitment to dignity and its duty

to teach human decency as the mark of a civilized world.” Id.

c. Significantly Impaired Adaptive Behavior

“‘Adaptive behavior’ means the effectiveness or degree

to which the defendant meets the standards of personal

independence and social responsibility expected of the

defendant's age and cultural group.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 13-703.02(K)(1). Courts applying this prong must conduct

“an overall assessment of the defendant’s ability to meet

society’s expectations of him.”18State v. Grell (“Grell II”),

18 Although state courts generally construed Atkins as imposing no

binding definition of impaired adaptive behavior, the Supreme Court held

in Hall that states must comply with elements of the clinical definition

about which there exists a national consensus. 134 S. Ct. at 1998–99. 

Because Arizona’s definition of adaptive behavior is far more restrictive

than the clinical definition, Williams, 303 P.3d at 548 (Eckerstrom, P.J.,

dissenting), and because a national consensus exists with regard to this

aspect of the clinical definition, see Concurring Opinion of Reinhardt, J.,

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135 P.3d 696, 709 (Ariz. 2006) (en banc); accord Boyston,

298 P.3d at 895.

Although there is scant case law applying this prong, we

find the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Grell III,

291 P.3d 350 (Ariz. 2013), highly instructive. In Grell III,

the State stipulated that the capital defendant demonstrated

significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning but

contested the impairment of his adaptive behavior. Id. at 352. 

Independently reviewing the evidentiary record, the court

proceeded to hold that Grell had also demonstrated significant

deficits in adaptive behavior, and reduced his death sentence

to natural life. Id. at 351, 357.19 As evidence of significantly

Arizona’s definition may well be violative of the rules established in Hall,

and unconstitutional for that reason. Because Hall was not decided until

after the state court had rendered its decision denying Smith’s Atkins

claim, however, Smith had no opportunity to make this argument before

the state court and the state had no opportunity to respond. In such

circumstance, we might remand to allow the state court to consider the

more recent Supreme Court decision, although we express no view on that

question. Here, however, we need not apply Hall in light of our

conclusion that Smith clearly satisfies even Arizona’s more onerous

standard.

19 Due to the unique procedural posture of the case, the Grell III court

applied

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-751(C). Under this statute, a defendant may

present evidence at the penalty phase of mitigating circumstances, which

must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. We note that the

Grell III court applied a lower standard of proof than governs Smith’s

claim, but nonetheless regard the case as a useful guidepost demonstrating

the Arizona Supreme Court’s approach to the adaptive behavior prong. 

Grell III contains the Court’s most extended analysis on this element and

identifies numerous attributes supporting a finding of significantly

impaired adaptive behavior.

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impaired adaptive behavior, the court considered, inter alia,

Grell’s grade school records showing that he had been placed

in special education classes; lay witness testimony describing

him as highly impulsive, unable to understand social cues of

children his own age, and largely unable to use the few social

skills that he had; expert testimony describing Grell’s

tendency to act more like children several years younger, and

noting his impulsiveness and poor communication skills; and

testimony from teachers and administrators who observed

that Grell was impulsive, inattentive, and unable to

communicate effectively. Id. at 353–55. Grell also adduced

testimony from members of the special education team at his

elementary school stating their conclusion that Grell was

intellectually disabled. Id. at 353. A psychologist opined that

the consistency of Grell’s poor social functioning and

behavioral problems demonstrated the presence of intellectual

disability, because problems arising solely from antisocial or

personality disorders would vary over time. Id. at 354. Grell

also presented the expert testimony of an educational

psychologist who concluded that

[g]iven the facts of [Grell’s] low intellectual

functioning, his inability to learn from his

mistakes, his reduced capacity in

communication, socialization and self-help

skills, and his significant history of special

education, followed by failure and dropping

out of school and, in the absence of significant

parental support and guidance, his subsequent

serious entanglement with the criminal justice

system, it is clear at this point that Shawn

Grell is a person who has mental retardation.

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Id. at 355. The court additionally noted Grell’s history of

running away from home, committing crimes, his inability to

hold jobs, and his general immaturity. Id. at 356. Reviewing

this evidence, the court concluded that Grell had

demonstrated significant deficits in adaptive behavior,

notwithstanding evidence of his limited ability to adapt. Id.

at 357.

The record in this case paints a remarkably similar picture

of Smith, demonstrating consistent traits, beginning in

childhood and continuing through the time of the crime, that

the Grell III court held established impaired adaptive

behavior. See id. at 354 (consistency of behavioral problems

indicates a root cause of intellectual disability, rather than

antisocial or personality disorders). Like Grell, Smith had a

“significant history of special education, followed by failure

and dropping out of school.” See id. at 355. Specifically,

Smith was held back in all his grades, placed in special

education classes, subsequentlytransferred to a special school

for children unable to learn, and dropped out after the eighth

grade, by which time he was already sixteen years old. These

facts are consistent with other testimony providing further

evidence of Smith’s poor intellectual functioning during his

childhood. Box testified that as a child, Smith had trouble

learning and struggled to grasp the rules even of simple

children’s games like tag and marbles. Betty Ruth Knight,

another former neighbor and the mother of Smith’s fifth wife,

Beth Lewis, stated that as a child Smith “always looked like

he was just lost.”

Smith had poor social skills. According to Delores Elaine

Long, one of Smith’s childhood neighbors, as a child Smith

was unable to interact with, play with, or carry on a

conversation with other children. See Grell III, 291 P.3d at

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34 SMITH V. SCHRIRO

353 (“[Grell] could not understand social cues that children

his age should understand, and was largely unable to use the

few social skills that he had.”). Hight testified that as a young

adult Smith lacked any social life, and Gerald Lambright, the

cousin of Smith’s co-defendant Joe Lambright, described

Smith as a “loner.” Other evidence reveals Smith’s

impulsiveness. Smith’s mother reported that psychiatrists

who treated him during his childhood concluded Smith had

problems with impulsiveness, which would likely continue

throughout his life. The presentence report also describes

Smith’s impulsiveness, stating that he “responds to external,

social stimuli on a very concrete level, living basically from

day to day and acting on impulse to a great degree.” See id.

at 353–55 (noting Grell’s impulsiveness); Atkins, 536 U.S. at

318 (stating that intellectually disabled people “often act on

impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan”).

Smith’s communication skills were similarly stunted.

Hight testified that, as an adult, Smith had difficulty forming

sentences and correctly pronouncing words; for example, he

would say “weekie days” when referring to “weekdays.” Gau

and Hight each described receiving nearly incomprehensible

letters from Smith during the early period of his

incarceration. See Grell III, 291 P.3d at 354–55 (stating that

Grell was “unable to communicate effectively” and noting

“his reduced capacity in communication”).

As in Grell III, a lay witness familiar with intellectual

disability concluded that Smith was intellectually disabled. 

Here, Hight stated that she believed Smith to be intellectually

disabled, based on her comparison of Smith to her own

intellectually disabled sister. See id. at 353 (Grell identified

as intellectually disabled by special education staff

experienced with other disabled children). Although she was

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not an expert, Hight’s testimony, based on her personal

experience, is highly probative of Smith’s adaptive behavior. 

See Arellano, 143 P.3d at 1020 (discussing the relevance of

lay witness testimony regarding adaptive behavior).

Other evidence indicates that Smith did not possess the

skills necessary to take care of his own needs. Hight

described Smith as lacking basic hygiene, unable to sit at the

table or eat properly, and unable to take care of himself

without assistance. Labrecque testified that he was forced to

reprimand Smith on one occasion over his sloppiness, body

odor, and infrequent bathing. See Grell III, 291 P.3d at 355

(“Dr. Keyes’ investigation revealed that Grell’s family

viewed Grell as ‘somewhat incapable of caring for many of

his own needs . . . .’ He concluded that Grell’s record

confirmed his adaptive deficits, as illustrated by his lifelong

inability ‘to conform his behavior to the expected standards

of his social and same aged peers.’”).

The evidence in this case includes many additional

parallels to the evidence presented in Grell. Smith tormented

his younger half-sister, sexually abusing her at a young age:

when he was twelve, Smith was severely punished after

persuading Gau to play “doctor” when she was five years old,

and when Gau was nine Smith, then sixteen, brought her out

to the garage and forced her to perform oral sex on him. 

Smith made repeated attempts to run away from home after

which he was jailed for vagrancy. He frequently got into

trouble for criminal activity, including numerous arrests. 

Hight testified that Smith was unable to hold a job, which she

attributed to his inability to “comprehend what a normal

person . . . would be able to interpret.” The record reveals

that Smith cycled through more than 100 short-term jobs over

a period of sixteen years, which Dr. Thompson described as

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evidence of multiple adaptive impairments.20 Smith also

functioned very immaturely as an adult. Long testified that

Smith got along well with the children of Beth Lewis,

Smith’s fifth wife, because he related to them as a child rather

than as an adult: “[H]e was a lot mentality [sic] like they

were. I mean, like instead of being a dad figure, he was kind

of like they were.” Gerald Lambright testified that, as an

adult, Smith was immature, had difficulty interacting with

adults his own age, would frequently mimic Donald Duck

when he spoke at all, and preferred to interact with children.21

Labrecque characterized Smith’s emotional maturity as

resembling that of a twelve to fourteen year-old even a

number of years after he had committed the crimes. Multiple

medical records appended to Smith’s presentence report

describe Smith in his late teens and early twenties as

possessing an “immature personality” and exhibiting

“immature behavior.” As the Grell III court found, this

behavior indicates significant impairment in adaptive

behavior under Arizona law. See id. at 356–57 (stating that

tormenting other children, running away from home,

committing crimes, an inability to hold jobs, and immaturity

are among the elements of a mental history that “by itself,

provides strong evidence that [an individual] suffered a

‘significant impairment’ in the ability to ‘meet[ ] the

standards of personal independence and social responsibility

expected’ of him.” (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-

753(K)(1), (3))).

20 Dr. Martinez attributed Smith’s inability to hold jobs in part to Smith’s

impulsivity, itself an indicator of impaired adaptive behavior. See Grell

III, 291 P.3d at 353–55; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.

 

21 The presentence report lists “Duck” and “Crazy Duck” as aliases for

Smith.

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Additional evidence of Smith’s impaired adaptive

behavior not present in Grell makes Smith’s impaired

adaptive behavior even clearer. Charles McCarver, who lived

in Smith’s apartment complex and worked with Smith

repossessing cars, gave testimony describing an incident in

which McCarver’s ex-girlfriend Penny jokingly told Smith

that he could “have” their son because Smith and his wife

were having difficulty conceiving their own child. Following

this conversation, Smith called McCarver to say that Penny

had told him he could have McCarver’s son. McCarver

adamantly refused. Undeterred, Smith showed up at

McCarver’s home expecting to take the boy, changing his

mind only after seeing how happy the child was with

McCarver. Smith’s absurdly literal interpretation of

McCarver’s joke that he would “give” Smith his son vividly

demonstrates Smith’s malformed social and communication

skills and his general inability to navigate his social world.22

22 The record does not fairly support the state court’s decision to

discount Hight’s testimony that Smith resembled her intellectually

disabled sister on the sole ground that it was inconsistent with testimony

by McCarver and a second lay witness, Sidney LeBlanc, who lived in

Smith’s apartment building and drove trucks for the same company as

Smith. We credit Hight’s testimony because, among these witnesses, only

she had firsthand experience with someone diagnosed with intellectual

disability. See Grell, 291 P.3d at 353; Arellano, 143 P.3d at 1020. More

important, testimony by McCarver and LeBlanc does not contradict

Hight’s assessment of Smith as intellectually disabled. McCarver’s

testimony, as recounted above, strongly reinforces the conclusion that

Smith was intellectually disabled. LeBlanc’s explanation that he and

Smith held a large number ofshort-term jobs as a result of their “footloose

and fancy free” transient lifestyle, is at least as suggestive of traits

indicating intellectual disability as of the standard of adaptive behavior

expected of Smith’s age and cultural group. Accordingly, we find the

state court’s determination that McCarver and LeBlanc were more

credible witnesses than Hight is not fairly supported by the record.

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Smith’s mother, Sylvia Scott (Joe Lambright’s wife),

Gerald Lambright, and the presentence report all described

Smith as a follower, a trait the Supreme Court has identified

as an indicator of impaired adaptive behavior. Gerald said

that Smith would do whatever Joe told him to do, adding that

“it was almost like the guy could not think for himself.” See

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 (“in group settings [intellectually

disabled people] are followers rather than leaders”). The

presentence report describes Smith as having a “borderline

personality,” which is also probative of Smith’s condition at

the time of Smith’s crime and trial.23

Moreover, Smith demonstrated a lifelong inability to

make informed decisions regarding his own safety and

welfare. Specifically, Smith was described as having poor

judgment as a child and engaging in dangerous behavior

without awareness of its risks. As an adult, Smith accepted

dares to run across the highway in front of an oncoming truck

and climb to the top of a radar tower hundreds of feet tall,

where he dangled himself by his arms. He would sometimes

23 Dr. Thompson testified that he found this assessment in the

presentence report credible notwithstanding the lack of evidence regarding

the author’s level of training because, in his experience working with the

Department of Corrections, the probation and parole officers who wrote

such reports had experience with prisoners and diagnostic evaluations that

provided them a reasonable basis from which to determine whether an

individual has low or borderline cognitive functioning and because the

report’s findings are corroborated by substantial evidence of Smith’s

impaired mental functioning. We agree that the report constitutes

probative lay witness testimony of Smith’s disability. See Arellano,

143 P.3d at 1020. Accordingly, and in light of the foregoing discussion

of the limitations of the Rule 11 reports, we find the state court’s

determination to afford the Rule 11 reports greater weight than the

presentence report, and its critique of Dr. Thompson’s contrary

conclusion, lacks fair support in the record.

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go up on the top of buildings where carpentrywork was being

performed and jump along the beams and rafters without any

safety harness. On one occasion while in prison, Smith took

a walk along the edge of the roof of a two-story building,

earning a rebuke from Labrecque. Such reckless behavior,

apparently undertaken without any comprehension of the

risks involved, further demonstrates Smith’s inability to meet

the expected standards of personal independence.

Although Dr. Martinez viewed Smith’s ability to date

women as evidence of his adaptive abilities, that testimony is

clearly of little worth. The only evidence of Smith’s romantic

life is his five failed marriages, the details of which paint a

picture inconsistent with Dr. Martinez’s assessment. Smith’s

first three marriages lasted a cumulative total of nineteen

months. The presentence report notes that Smith beat his

fourth wife, threatened her life, enjoyed tying her up and

pretending to rape her, and on other occasions forced her to

submit to anal intercourse against her will. Smith married

Beth Lewis, his fifth wife, in November 1980, shortly before

his arrest. According to Lewis, at one point she decided to

end their relationship and Smith became very angry; he

grabbed a gun and, shaking it in front of her, said “You want

to end it? I can end it for us.” Afraid for her life, Lewis said

that she would “do anything.” After contemplating this offer,

Smith decided the pair should get married. That same

evening, Smith pushed Lewis into the backseat of her car and

tore off her pantyhose. Lewis said she began screaming and

crying and begged Smith to stop, which he did, leading her to

conclude that “[s]o he didn’t actually I guess rape me.” 

Following this encounter, Smith drove by Lewis’s home on

several occasions and waved a pistol at her; the couple

married a short time later. We fail to see how Smith’s serial

marriages, at least some of which involved death threats as

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well as incidents of simulated and actual sexual assault,

exhibit the “standards of personal independence and social

responsibility expected of the defendant's age and cultural

group.” Rather, they further demonstrate the adaptive

impairments affecting this and so many other areas of Smith’s

childhood and adult life.

Testimony by Dr. Thompson and Dr. Martinez indicating

that Smith possessed some adaptive skills does not alter the

conclusion that it is highly probable that Smith experienced

significant impairment in adaptive behavior at the relevant

times. The evidence that Smith exhibited limited adaptive

abilities is substantially outweighed by evidence of more farreaching adaptive impairments. We note, moreover, that

Arizona law does not mandate a complete absence of

adaptive strengths. See Grell III, 291 P.3d at 357 (“The

record also contains some indications of Grell's limited ability

to adapt. Although this evidence makes our decision difficult,

a diagnosis of mental retardation, as statutorily defined, does

not require a complete absence of adaptive skills.”).

Nor do we regard the Rule 11 reports as inconsistent with

our conclusion. As the Supreme Court and our own Court

have held, the ultimate conclusions stated in these

reports—that Smith understood the difference between right

and wrong, and was competent to stand trial—are not

inconsistent with intellectual disability. See Atkins, 536 U.S.

at 318 (“Mentally retarded persons frequently know the

difference between right and wrong and are competent to

stand trial.”); Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803,

810 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Incompetence and mental

retardation are overlapping but distinct categories. Many

retarded individuals are still competent to stand trial.”),

abrogated on other grounds by Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct.

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696 (2013). Nor, for that matter, is Dr. LaWall’s finding that

Smith had a personality disorder with antisocial features

inconsistent with our conclusion regarding impaired adaptive

behavior, especially in light of Smith’s immaturity and

childlike conduct. See Grell III, 291 P.3d at 354, 356 (citing

expert testimony that “[i]f Grell had a mere conduct or

personality disorder . . . he would have committed acts that

were simply against the rules and deviant . . . , rather than

acting, as he did, in ways that were embarrassing or

immature,” and noting that antisocial personality disorder is

not inconsistent with intellectual disability); Brumfield v.

Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2280 (2015) (“[A]n antisocial

personality is not inconsistent . . . with intellectual

disability.”).

The vast majority of the evidence strongly points to the

conclusion that Smith was unable to “meet[] the standards of

personal independence and social responsibility expected of

[his] age and cultural group,” both before the age of eighteen

and at the time of the crime. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-

703.02(K)(1). Accordingly, we conclude that the state

court’s determination that Smith’s pre-arrest life did not show

significant impairment in adaptive behavior is not fairly

supported by the record.

In sum, we conclude that under § 2254(d)(8) the clear

weight of the evidence overcomes the presumption of

correctness attaching to the state court’s finding that Smith

was not intellectually disabled, as well as the state court’s

ancillary factual determinations necessary to its ultimate

conclusions. Specifically, we have found that the grounds on

which the state court discounted Dr. Thompson’s testimony

lack fair support in the record and are the product of legal

error.

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2. The State Court Applied an Unconstitutional

Standard of Proof

The state court’s factual determination is not entitled to

deference for a separate and independent reason. The Pima

County Superior Court found Smith was not intellectually

disabled by applying an incorrect and unconstitutional legal

standard, a question of law we review de novo.

As the Tenth Circuit has recognized in pre-AEDPA cases,

a state court’s factual determination rendered under a

constitutionally impermissible legal standard is not entitled to

a presumption of correctness. See Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d

1546, 1551 n. 4 (10th Cir. 1991) (“The initial inquiry must be

whether the Utah court made its fact findings under the

correct legal standard of competency. It is elemental that fact

finding made under an erroneous view of the governing law

cannot be presumed correct. Only after concluding that a state

court used the proper standard does a habeas court turn to the

issue of the presumption of correctness.”); accord Walker v.

Att’y Gen for Oklahoma, 167 F.3d 1339, 1345 (10th Cir.

1999) (“Mr. Walker’s competency was determined under a

constitutionally impermissible standard of proof. Such a

determination is not entitled to a presumption of

correctness.”).24

24 The dissent in Lafferty contended that the majority erred by inserting

an additional, preliminary step in its review of the state court’s factual

determination, contrary to the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

949 F.2d at 1558–59 & nn. 2–3 (Brorby, J., dissenting). The majority is

clearly correct. Because a factual determination rendered under an

erroneously inflated and unconstitutional legal standard does not resolve

the question of whether the same answer obtains under the correct lower

standard, the factual determination rendered cannot be said to constitute

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In the section of the Pima County Superior Court’s

decision entitled “Burden of Proof,” the court described the

legal standard governing Smith’s Atkins claim.

25 The court

subsequently analyzed the evidence, after which it set forth its

ultimate finding in the final section of its opinion. It

concluded that “the circumstances described at the hearing do

not point to mental retardation with any degree of certainty.” 

(Emphasis added.) A court’s recitation of the proper

governing legal standard does not insulate its holding from

habeas review where the record demonstrates that the court

actually applied an unconstitutional standard. See Sears v.

Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 952 (2010) (per curiam) (“Although the

court appears to have stated the proper prejudice standard, it

did not correctly conceptualize how that standard applies to

the circumstances of this case.” (footnote omitted)). Here,

because the state court made no other mention of the correct

legal standard, and because its analysis provides no indication

that the court actually applied the correct legal standard rather

than the standard employed when it applied the law to the

facts, its boilerplate statements in the introductory “Burden of

Proof” section are of no force or effect.

a valid finding. Where a state court has made no valid finding, there is

nothing to which a presumption of correctness may attach.

25 In its introductory statement regarding the standard of review, the state

court stated that Smith had the burden of proving his Atkins claim by clear

and convincing evidence. It added that, due to the unique procedural

posture of the case, it would also apply the preponderance of the evidence

standard applicable to Rule 32 proceedings, and that its decision would be

the same under that lower standard. The body of the opinion did not fulfill

that promise, however, but, rather, the court concluded after reviewing all

the evidence that it did not meet a “certainty” standard.

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Under Arizona law, the “anydegree of certainty” standard

applied by the Pima County Superior Court is more akin to

the “reasonable doubt” standard than the clear and convincing

standard mandated by Arizona’s Atkins statute, which

requires only that the issue under consideration be “highly

probable.” See State v. King, 763 P.2d 239, 243, 246 (Ariz.

1988) (reversing trial court for providing erroneous jury

instructions, and explaining that “[t]he instruction now before

us utilized the term ‘certainty’ in defining the clear and

convincing standard . . . . We believe that ‘certainty’ is truer

to the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt than to the

‘highly probable’ meaning of the clear and convincing

standard.”).

To be sure, “[a] state’s misapplication of its own laws

does not provide a basis for granting a federal writ of habeas

corpus.” Roberts v. Hartley, 640 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir.

2011). A state’s Atkins procedures present a special case,

however. “‘[B]ecause Atkins reserved for the states the task

of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional

restriction’ prohibiting the execution of the intellectually

disabled, ‘federal courts conducting habeas review routinely

look to state law . . . in order to determine how Atkins applies

to the specific case at hand.’” Williams v. Mitchell, 792 F.3d

606, 612 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Black v. Bell, 664 F.3d 81,

92 (6th Cir. 2011)). Stated differently, Atkins leaves to the

states the task of developing appropriate procedures to

enforce the constitutional right, but constitutionalizes the

procedures the state creates. Consequently, where a state

court analyzing an Atkins claim fails to follow binding state

law, its decision does not simply violate state law, but also

violates the Eighth Amendment right provided by Atkins and

the violation is therefore cognizable by a federal habeas court. 

Id. (“[W]here a state-court decision is ‘contrary to’ clearly

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SMITH V. SCHRIRO 45

established state supreme court precedent applyingAtkins, the

decision is ‘contrary to Atkins’ for purposes of habeas

review” under AEDPA); see also Black, 664 F.3d at 97

(“[B]ecause Atkins defers to the individual states to set out

the standard for a defendant to qualify as mentally retarded,

the [state court’s] misinterpretation of [the state supreme

court’s decision] is contrary to Atkins.”).

Here, the “certainty” standard applied by the state trial

court was plainly contrary to the clear and convincing

standard required by Arizona’s statute and adopted by its

supreme court. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02(G);

Grell II, 135 P.3d at 701 (“The statute places on ‘the

defendant . . . the burden of proving mental retardation by

clear and convincing evidence’ in the pretrial hearing.”

(alteration in original) (quoting § 13-703.02(G))). 

Accordingly, the standard of proof applied by the state trial

court was not simply contrary to state law but was also

unconstitutional under Atkins, see Williams, 792 F.3d at 612;

Black, 664 F.3d at 97, and, accordingly, the state court’s

findings are not due any deference. See Lafferty, 949 F.2d at

1551 n. 4; Walker, 167 F.3d at 1345.

There is another reason the standard of proof applied by

the state trial court is unconstitutional, and would be even if

it were consistent with state law: a “certainty” standard of

proof transgresses the limits of the state’s authority to craft

appropriate procedures to enforce Atkins and, in so doing,

encroaches on the substantive constitutional right. In

reaching this conclusion, it is not necessaryto determine what

standard of proof the federal Constitution requires, but rather

only whether the Arizona court applied a standard it forbids.

Cf. Schriro v. Smith, 546 U.S. at 7–8 (state Atkins procedures

may, “in their application, be subject to constitutional

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challenge,” but the state must first have an opportunity to

apply them).

In Atkins, the Supreme Court did not announce a specific

standard of proof governing claims of intellectual disability. 

Instead, the Court, citing Ford v. Wainwright, stated that it

was “leav[ing] to the States the task of developing

appropriateways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon

[their] execution of sentences.” 536 U.S. at 317 (quoting

Ford, 477 U.S. at 405, 416–17). This did not leave the states

unchecked discretion in determining such procedures,

however. Rather, to be constitutional, a state’s procedures

must constitute “appropriate ways to enforce the

constitutional restriction.” Id. (emphases added) (quoting

Ford, 477 U.S. at 416). The Court’s citation to Ford

reinforces this view. In Ford, a majority of the Court found

Florida’s specific procedures for determining the sanity of a

condemned prisoner constitutionally inadequate. See Ford,

477 U.S. at 413; see also id. at 418 (plurality opinion); id. at

424–25 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment); id. at 427 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the result

in part and dissenting in part).

When the natural operation of a state’s procedures for

rendering factual determinations transgresses a substantive

constitutional right, those procedures are unconstitutional. 

See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 239–44 (1911). It is

elementary that the “natural operation” of applying a

heightened standard of proof can determine the outcome of

litigation, and thus the availability of a constitutional right. 

See id. at 244 (stating that “we must consider the natural

operation of the statute here in question”). As the Supreme

Court has recognized, it is often impossible to ascertain

disputed facts with absolute certainty. Victor v. Nebraska,

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511 U.S. 1, 14 (1994). Consequently, “the trier of fact will

sometimes, despite his best efforts, be wrong in his factual

conclusions.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970)

(Harlan, J., concurring). “The function of a standard of proof

. . . is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of

confidence our society thinks he should have in the

correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of

adjudication.’” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)

(quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 370 (Harlan, J.,

concurring)). As a result, “[t]he standard [of proof] serves to

allocate the risk of error between the litigants.” Addington,

441 U.S. at 423; see Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 362

(1996) (“The ‘more stringent the burden of proof a partymust

bear, the more that party bears the risk of an erroneous

decision.’” (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health,

497 U.S. 261, 283 (1990))).

Atkins claims present a heightened risk of an erroneous

factual conclusion. Unlike factual determinations in which

the basic issue is whether a fact occurred—for example,

whether a defendant actually committed the act of which he

is accused—determinations like intellectual disability, which

depend upon psychiatric diagnosis, turn on an expert’s

interpretation of the meaning of various facts. Cf. Addington,

441 U.S. at 429. As the Supreme Court explained in rejecting

the argument that the Constitution requires use of a

reasonable doubt standard in the context of civil commitment

proceedings, the unique nature of psychiatric diagnosis

renders factual determinations uniquely unsusceptible to

certainty.

The subtleties and nuances of psychiatric

diagnosis render certainties virtually beyond

reach in most situations.The reasonable-doubt

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standard of criminal law functions in its realm

because there the standard is addressed to

specific, knowable facts. Psychiatric

diagnosis, in contrast, is to a large extent

based on medical “impressions” drawn from

subjective analysis and filtered through the

experience of the diagnostician. This process

often makes it very difficult for the expert

physician to offer definite conclusions about

any particular patient. Within the medical

discipline, the traditional standard for

“factfinding” is a “reasonable medical

certainty.” If a trained psychiatrist has

difficulty with the categorical “beyond a

reasonable doubt” standard, the untrained lay

juror—or indeed even a trained judge—who

is required to rely upon expert opinion could

be forced by the criminal law standard of

proof to reject commitment for many patients

desperately in need of institutionalized

psychiatric care.

. . .

We have concluded that the reasonable-doubt

standard is inappropriate in civil commitment

proceedings because, given the uncertainties

of psychiatric diagnosis, it may impose a

burden the state cannot meet and thereby erect

an unreasonable barrier to needed medical

treatment.

Id. at 430–32 (citations omitted). Similar concerns also arise

in other contexts requiring psychiatric diagnosis. See Ford,

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477 U.S. at 426 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring

in the judgment) (sanity); Cooper, 517 U.S. at 365, 369

(competency).

The concern espoused in Addington regarding the

inherent imprecision of psychiatric determinations of mental

illness for the purpose of civil commitment applies with even

greater force to psychiatric determinations of intellectual

disability under Atkins.

26 Unlike civil commitment

proceedings, which inquire into whether an individual is

presently mentally ill and poses a danger to himself or others,

the age of onset element of Atkins claims requires a

retrospective analysis of the individual’s childhood capacity

that may be years or, as in this case, even decades removed

from the time of trial. Moreover, in cases like this, in which

the trial predates Atkins and Petitioner’s claim arises for the

first time on habeas, the determination of mental condition at

the time of commission of the crime may occur not at trial but

rather decades afterwards. Smith’s case illustrates the

difficulties that inhere in such an inquiry: as discussed below,

records detailing the administration of childhood IQ tests are

unavailable, and lay witnesses untrained in psychology are

asked to share distant recollections of Petitioner’s behavior as

a child and young adult. Certainty is thus even less attainable

26 It is of no consequence to the analysis that Addington and Atkins

involve different burdens of proof than the case at bar, because the focus

here is on the effect of the standard of proof. Under Addington, a state

desiring the civil commitment of an individual must demonstrate that he

suffers from mental illness, whereas under Atkins an individual seeking to

avoid execution by the state must demonstrate intellectual disability. In

both situations, the determination heavily relies upon psychiatric opinion,

and thus in both situations a standard of proof requiring “any degree of

certainty” as defined by Arizona law will often render it impossible for a

party to carry its burden. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 432.

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and a certainty standard is even less constitutionally

acceptable in such cases.

Further compounding the likelihood of error in Atkins

claims is the fact that the overwhelming majority (85 percent)

of individuals with intellectual disability fall into the “mild”

category, for whom the likelihood of misdiagnosis is

particularly acute. As young children such individuals are

often indistinguishable from children without intellectual

disability, and as adults they can acquire social and vocational

skills adequate for minimum self-support. DSM-IV 43; see

also AAIDD 11th ed., at 47 (“Individuals with [intellectual

disability] typically demonstrate both strengths and

limitations in adaptive behavior.”). In fact, Daryl Atkins

himself maintained that he was only “mildly mentally

retarded.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308. However, Atkins applies

equally to all intellectually disabled individuals irrespective

of the degree of their disability.

Not only are Atkins claims uniquely susceptible to

erroneous factual determinations, but they occur in a

context—capital punishment—requiring a heightened degree

of certainty that the decision is not erroneous. “Because the

standard of proof affects the comparative frequency of . . .

erroneous outcomes, the choice of the standard to be applied

in a particular kind of litigation should, in a rational world,

reflect an assessment of the comparative social disutility of

each.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 371 (Harlan, J.,

concurring). The Supreme Court’s repeated holdings that

capital cases require a heightened degree of certainty that the

punishment is lawful make clear its determination that the

social “disutility” of a wrongful execution outweighs the

“disutility” of errors favoring defendants. See Gilmore v.

Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 342 (1993) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment

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requires a greater degree of accuracy and factfinding than

would be true in a noncapital case.”); Ford, 477 U.S. at 411

(plurality opinion); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604–05

(1978) (plurality opinion) (“[The] qualitative difference

between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of

reliability when the death sentence is imposed. . . . When the

choice is between life and death, [a heightened risk of

wrongful execution created by a state statute] is unacceptable

and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments.”); Woodson v. North Carolina,

428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion). Accordingly,

where, as in Atkins, the Eighth Amendment renders a class of

individuals categorically ineligible for execution, the

procedures used to determine whether a defendant falls into

that class may not allocate nearly all of the risk of an

erroneous determination to the defendant.

By requiring Smith to demonstrate with a “degree of

certainty” that he is intellectually disabled, the Arizona court

disregarded this fundamental rule. Simply stated, the court

took the highly unusual step27of allocating nearly the entire

risk of an erroneous determination to Smith. That the factual

determination in question concerned an issue for which

certainty may be unattainable, cf. Addington, 441 U.S. at

429–32, and a penalty for which a greater degree of reliability

27 Only Georgia applies a more onerous standard, requiring proof of

intellectual disability beyond a reasonable doubt. By contrast, every other

state to establish a standard of proof imposes a more relaxed standard than

the state court applied here. In addition to Arizona, only four

states—Colorado, Delaware, Florida, and North Carolina—apply even a

clearly convincing standard, and the remaining twenty-two states

imposing the death penalty and the federal government apply a

preponderance standard. Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1365 n. 1

(11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Barkett, J., dissenting).

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is required, see, e.g., Gilmore, 508 U.S. at 342; Lockett,

438 U.S. at 604–05 (1978) (plurality opinion), renders the

constitutional violation even more clear. Like the Alabama

statute in Bailey, the standard of proof applied by the Pima

County Superior Court in this case transgresses a substantive

constitutional right by accomplishing indirectlywhat the state

may not do directly: the execution of individuals who are

intellectually disabled under Atkins. See Bailey, 219 U.S. at

239 (“It is apparent that a constitutional prohibition cannot be

transgressed indirectly by the creation of a [procedural rule]

any more than it can be violated by direct enactment.”);

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. Because it impairs the substantive

right, the state court’s “certainty” standard of proof is not an

“appropriate way[] to enforce the constitutional [protection]”

mandated by Atkins. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317. In short, the

Constitution forbids requiring a defendant to demonstrate

intellectually disability with “any degree of certainty.”28

Because the Pima County Superior Court made its finding

that Smith is not intellectually disabled by applying an

incorrect and unduly onerous legal standard, its ultimate

factual determination is not consonant with the Eighth

Amendment. A finding that is made pursuant to the wrong

legal standard is not a finding at all. Accordingly, the state

court’s application of an unconstitutional standard of proof

provides an independent and alternative ground for denying

its determination a presumption of correctness.

28 Because Smith satisfies the lower “clearly convincing” standard

required by Arizona’s Atkins statute, it can be assumed without deciding

that the statutory standard is constitutional. However, many of the

concerns expressed here apply to the clear and convincing standard as

well.

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D. Whether Smith is Intellectually Disabled

Having determined that the state court’s determination is

not entitled to a presumption of correctness, we must review

the record de novo to determine whether Smith has

demonstrated intellectual disability by clear and convincing

evidence, as required by Arizona law. For all the reasons set

forth in Section II.C.1, we hold that he has. Considering

Smith’s intellectual functioning test scores and his history of

significantly impaired adaptive behavior, as we must under

Atkins and Hall, we find that the record in this case

overwhelmingly demonstrates that Smith satisfied the two

substantive prongs of Arizona’s definition of intellectual

disability both prior to age eighteen and at the time of the

crime. Specifically, Smith’s Otis test score of 62, combined

with his poor academic performance, clearlydemonstrates the

childhood onset of his significantly subaverage general

intellectual functioning. The record further demonstrates

that, consistent with Dr. Thompson’s testimony, Smith also

experienced this condition at the time of the crime:

improvement in Smith’s intellectual functioningdid not occur

until after his incarceration in a structured environment, when

he began receiving appropriate antidepressant medication as

well as tutoring from Labrecque and Schad. The many

parallels between Smith’s life and that of the capital

defendant in Grell, including Smith’s stunted communication

skills, lack of personal care skills, severe immaturity, and

inability to maintain employment and personal relationships,

reveal his significant impairment in adaptive behavior as a

child and at the time of the crime, as does his general lifelong

inability to navigate his social world.

There can be no doubt that the crime in this case was truly

horrific. The Constitution, however, regards intellectually

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54 SMITH V. SCHRIRO

disabled defendants as less morally culpable for their crimes,

and for this reason prohibits their execution. Atkins, 536 U.S.

at 316; Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1992. Viewing the record as a

whole, we find that Smith has demonstrated by clear and

convincing evidence significantly subaverage general

intellectual functioning existing concurrentlywith significant

impairment in adaptive behavior, and that both conditions

were manifested prior to age eighteen and at the time Smith

committed the capital offense. The overwhelming weight of

the evidence compels this result. Smith is intellectually

disabled and may not be executed. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316;

Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1992. Accordingly, we reverse Smith’s

death sentence and remand to the district court with

instructions to grant the writ as to his capital sentence.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is reversed. We

remand with instructions to grant the writ with respect to the

penalty phase and return the case to the state court to reduce

Smith’s sentence to life or natural life.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment and

concurring in part:

I concur in all of Judge Reinhardt’s opinion except

Section II.C.2.

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REINHARDT, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:

Obviously, I concur entirely in the majority opinion. I

write this special concurrence only because I feel compelled

to conveymy serious concerns regarding the constitutionality

of Arizona’s Atkins statute. The issue before us is not limited

to the case of Robert Smith. Rather, the constitutional

infirmity of Arizona’s statute creates a recurring problem

with potentially far-reaching consequences: Arizona has

executed 15 inmates since Atkins,

1

and 124 inmates remain on

its death row, the eighth highest number of any state.

2 As

detailed below, if presented with the issue, I would likely

hold that in light of Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014),

both substantive prongs of Arizona’s intellectual disability

statute—governing “intellectual functioning” and “adaptive

behavior”—violate the Eighth Amendment because they

permit the execution of individuals whom Atkins deems

categorically ineligible for capital punishment.3

In Atkins, the Supreme Court cited the clinical definition

for intellectual disability, but did not make clear that this

 

1 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Prisoners executed under civil authority

in the United States, by year, region, and jurisdiction, 1977-2014” (Dec.

10, 2014).

2 This figure is current as of July 1, 2015. See Death Penalty

Information Center, Death Row Inmates by State,

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-deathrow-year?scid=9&did=188#state (last visited Jan. 12, 2016).

 

3

 The third element of the Arizona statute requires that the onset of the

intellectualfunctioning and adaptive behavior deficits occur before the age

of eighteen. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02(K)(3) (2006); Ariz. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 13-753(K)(3) (2015). There is no reason to believe that this

element is in itself unconstitutional.

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definition was binding on the states. In Hall, however, the

Court held that states must comply with elements of the

clinical definition about which there exists a national

consensus. Because both of Arizona’s substantive prongs are

more restrictive than the clinical definition, and because a

national consensus exists with regard to the pertinent

elements of the clinical definition, Arizona’s statute is in all

likelihood unconstitutional.

A. The Supreme Court Embraces the Clinical

Definition of Intellectual Disability

In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–16, (2002), the

Supreme Court identified a “national consensus” against

executing the intellectually disabled, gleaned from its survey

of states passing legislation exempting the intellectually

disabled from the death penalty and the consistency of the

direction of such legislative change. The Court defined

“mental retardation” by citing two clinical definitions, one

from the ninth edition of the American Association on Mental

Retardation’s (AAMR) Mental Retardation: Definition,

Classifications, and Systems of Support (9th ed. 1992)

[hereinafter AAMR 9th ed.], and a second from the fourth

edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA)

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th

ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. Id. at 309 n. 3. The AAMR

defines intellectual disability as characterized by two clinical

elements: (1) “significantly subaverage intellectual

functioning,” (2) “existing concurrently with related

limitations in . . . adaptive skill areas,” which must “manifest

[themselves] before age 18.” AAMR 9th ed., supra, at 1. 

The DSM-IV similarly defines intellectual disability as

consisting of (1) “significantly subaverage general

intellectual functioning,” (2) “accompanied by significant

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limitations in adaptive functioning,” where “[t]he onset . . .

occurs[s] before age 18 years . . . .” DSM-IV, supra, at 41. 

The Court noted that the states’ “statutory definitions of

mental retardation are not identical, but generally conform to

the clinical definitions” set forth by the AAMR and APA. 

Atkins, 536 US. at 317 n. 22.

Atkins did not expressly state whether it was establishing

a substantive definition of intellectual disability as a matter of

federal law. The Court explained that “[t]o the extent there

is serious disagreement about the execution of mentally

retarded offenders, it is in determining which offenders are in

fact retarded.” Id. at 317. Citing Ford v. Wainwright,

477 U.S. 399 (1986), the Court explained that it “le[ft] to the

State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce

the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of

sentences.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S.

at 405, 416–17) (first alteration added). Because the cited

sections of Ford address only procedural issues, and say

nothing regarding the substantive definition of insanity, a

straightforward reading of the Court’s statement is that it

leaves to the states the determination of procedural issues

only. Stated differently, under this reading of Atkins, the

Court did not leave to the states the task of defining

intellectual disability, but merely the task of determining

procedures capable of use in identifying intellectually

disabled persons. Because a majority of the Court in Ford

found Florida’s specific procedures for determining the

sanity of a condemned prisoner inadequate “to achieve even

the minimal degree of reliability required for the protection

of any constitutional interest,” it is reasonable to conclude

that a state’s discretion in even this area is similarly

circumscribed. 477 U.S. at 413; see also id. at 418 (plurality

opinion); id. at 424–25 (Powell, J., concurring in part and

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concurring in the judgment); id. at 427 (O’Connor, J.,

concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part).

Nevertheless, courts generally interpreted Atkins to mean

that the Supreme Court did not establish a substantive

definition of intellectual disability, and instead included the

substantive definition of intellectual disability as among the

tasks left to the states. See Moorman v. Schriro, 672 F.3d

644, 648 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court in Atkins did

not define mental retardation as a matter of federal law.”);

Williams v. Cahill ex rel. Cnty. of Pima, 303 P.3d 532, 543

(Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (“[E]very other state court that has

addressed the issue has determined or implied that Atkins

allows the states to define mental retardation without strict

adherence to the clinical standards. Of the thirty-three states

that still permit use of the death penalty, courts in

twenty-three have stated or implied that Atkins did not define

mental retardation, but instead left that task to individual

states.”).

In Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014), however, the

Court held that, contrary to what the state courts and our own

court had thought, Atkins set forth a substantive definition of

intellectual disability encompassing those aspects of the

clinical definition about which a national consensus exists. 

See id. at 1993 (“The question this case presents is how

intellectual disability must be defined in order to implement

these principles and the holding of Atkins.”); id. at 1999

(“The clinical definitions of intellectual disability . . . were a

fundamental premise of Atkins.”); see also Van Tran v.

Colson, 764 F.3d 594, 612 (6th Cir. 2014) (“In Hall, the

Court reasoned that the Constitution requires the courts and

legislatures to follow clinical practices in defining intellectual

disability.”). In Hall, the Court held unconstitutional

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Florida’s use of a strict IQ score cut-off of 70 without taking

into account the test’s margin of error, known as a “standard

error of measurement” or “SEM,” because this approach

deviated from the clinical definition embraced in Atkins, and

because a national consensus existed with regard to this

aspect of the clinical definition. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2000; see

id. at 1997–98 (finding a consensus against using a strict IQ

score cut-off of 70 without considering the margin of error

because such a practice is mandated by nine states at the

most, and because all but one of the state legislatures to have

considered the issue after Atkins and whose law has been

interpreted by its courts have foregone use of a strict cut-off

of 70).

The Court concluded that although Florida’s statute

appeared facially consistent with Atkins, the Florida Supreme

Court had interpreted the provision more narrowly, rendering

it inconsistent with Atkins and thus unconstitutional. Id. at

1994, 2000. Specifically, the Court stated that the Florida

Supreme Court had held that an individual with an IQ score

above 70 does not have an intellectual disability and is barred

from presenting any other evidence to this effect, contrary to

the medical community’s views that IQ scores are inherently

imprecise and should be considered in light of their margin of

error. Id. at 1994–95. The Court explained that “IQ test

scores should be read not as a single fixed number but as a

range” taking into account the test’s inherent imprecision, and

that “an individual’s score is best understood as a range of

scores on either side of the recorded score.” Id. at 1995. The

Court thus held that “when a defendant’s IQ test score falls

within the test’s acknowledged and inherent margin of error,

the defendant must be able to present additional evidence of

intellectual disability, including testimony regarding adaptive

deficits.” Id. at 2001.

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1. Arizona’s Definition of Intellectual

Functioning is Unconstitutional

While surveying other states’ approach to assessing the

intellectual functioning prong of intellectual disability, the

Hall Court questioned the constitutionality of Arizona’s

method for determining IQ scores under Atkins but did not

purport to decide the issue. Id. at 1996–97. The version of

Arizona’s statute in place at the time of Smith’s evidentiary

hearing, like the current version of the statute, includes a hard

IQ cut-off score of 70, and precludes a defendant from

presenting additional evidence of intellectual disability if all

of his or her IQ test scores are above 70. Ariz. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 13-703.02(F) (2006); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-

753(F) (2015). However, Arizona’s statute also instructs

courts to “take into account the margin of error for the test

administered.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02(K)(5)

(2006); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-753(K)(5) (2015). Thus,

like Florida’s statute, Arizona’s statute appears constitutional

on its face. However, as in Hall, Arizona’s highest court has

given the statute an unconstitutional construction. In State v.

Roque, 141 P.3d 368, 402–03 (Ariz. 2006) (en banc), the

Arizona Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s contention

that his test score be considered in light of the test’s margin

of error, explaining that “the [intellectual disability] statute

accounts for margin of error by requiring multiple tests.” 

This approach to accounting for the margin of error—using

multiple tests without taking into consideration the margin of

error for each test administered—is expressly foreclosed by

Hall. Rather, under Hall, a state must apply the margin of

error—meaning the range of scores likely to represent the

subject’s actual IQ—to every test administered. See Hall,

134 S. Ct. at 1995–96 (“Even when a person has taken

multiple tests, each separate score must be assessed using the

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SEM . . . . [B]ecause the test itself may be flawed, or

administered in a consistently flawed manner, multiple

examinations may result in repeated similar scores, so that

even a consistent score is not conclusive evidence of

intellectual functioning.”). Thus, as in Hall, the state’s

highest court has interpreted a facially constitutional statute

to unconstitutionally exclude application of the SEM to each

individual IQ test administered. Because Arizona’s Supreme

Court construes the statutory requirement to consider a test’s

margin of error in a manner directly contrary to that required

by Hall, it renders unconstitutional the IQ provision of

Arizona’s statute—the intellectual functioning prong of

intellectual disability.

2. Arizona’s Definition of Adaptive Behavior is

Unconstitutional

Although Hall did not address the second requirement for

intellectual disability—limitations in adaptive behavior—its

reasoning applies to this clinical element with equal force. 

Where states fail to abide by the clinical definition of

“adaptive behavior” set forth in Atkins and adopted by a

national consensus of states, they violate the Eighth

Amendment just as they do in the case of intellectual

functioning because they permit the execution of individuals

whom Atkins deems ineligible for capital punishment. Hall,

134 S. Ct. at 2001. In short, under Hall, if a state defines

adaptive behavior more narrowly than the clinical definition,

and if the clinical definition has been adopted by a national

consensus of states, that prong likewise runs afoul of the

Eighth Amendment. Such is the case with Arizona’s

statutory definition of “adaptive behavior,” as construed by

its Supreme Court. The only difference is that here the

constitutional violation is even clearer.

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a. A National Consensus Exists With Regard

to the Clinical Definition

As in Hall, to determine whether a national consensus

exists within the context of the Eighth Amendment, courts

look to “‘objective indicia of society’s standards.’” Id. at

1996 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005)). 

To do so, we must consider the number of states that

“implement the protections of Atkins by” following the

clinical definition of adaptive behavior, id., either expressly

by statute or by judicial interpretation, see Roper, 543 U.S. at

564 (deeming as evidence of a national consensus those states

prohibiting the juvenile death penalty “by express provision

or judicial interpretation”), including in this figure those

states that have abolished the death penalty, see Hall, 134 S.

Ct. at 1997. As further evidence of a national consensus,

courts also consider the direction and consistency of the

change in how states have defined adaptive behavior since

Atkins was decided. See id. at 1997–98. If a court determines

that such a consensus exists, it proceeds to the next step and

determines whether, in its independent judgment, a state’s

definition of adaptive behavior is constitutional or

unconstitutional. Id. at 2000.

There exists a clear national consensus in favor of using

the clinical definition of adaptive behavior. Only four states

including Arizona define “adaptive behavior” in non-clinical

terms.

4 A fifth appears to require no showing of impaired

adaptive behavior at all, and in nine states the definition of

adaptive behavior is unclear. Because nothing in the nine

states’ statutes or case law suggests that courts in those states

 

4 A complete list of states referenced in this section and accompanying

authorities is provided in Appendix A.

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define adaptive behavior in non-clinical terms, the result is

that only five, or at the very most fourteen, states can be said

to permit the use of a non-clinical definition to analyze

adaptive behavior under Atkins.

In contrast, thirty-six states prohibit use of a non-clinical

definition of adaptive behavior in determining whether an

individual is intellectually disabled under Atkins. These

include the nineteen states that have abolished the death

penalty, and one that has suspended its use. See id. at 1997

(counting among the national consensus those states that have

abolished the death penalty, and one that has suspended its

use). In addition, sixteen states expressly require use of the

clinical definition, either by statute or by interpretation of the

courts. See Roper, 534 U.S. at 564. The thirty-six states

prohibiting use of a non-clinical definition of adaptive

behavior far exceed the number of states the Supreme Court

has required to establish a national consensus. See Atkins,

536 U.S. at 313–15 (30 states prohibit the death penalty for

the intellectually disabled); Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (30 states

prohibit juvenile execution).

As in Hall, it is not simply the aggregate numbers that

determine the existence of a national consensus but also the

“[c]onsistency of the direction of the change.” 134 S. Ct. at

1997–98 (comparing the number of states that since Atkins

have passed legislation setting a strict IQ score cutoff at 70

with the number of states to either abolish the death penalty

or pass legislation allowing defendants to present additional

evidence of intellectual disability when their IQ test score is

above 70 but within the margin of error). Since Atkins was

decided, only one state has passed legislation defining

adaptive behavior in non-clinical terms. During the same

period, six states abolished the death penalty legislatively, a

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court invalidated the death penalty in a seventh, and six other

states passed legislation mandating use of the clinical

definition, either as expressly stated in the state’s statute or as

interpreted by the courts. Since Atkins, “no state that

previously [defined adaptive behavior in clinical terms] has

modified its law” to mandate a non-clinical definition. Id. at

1998.

Having determined that a national consensus of states

forbids use of a non-clinical definition, as indicated by the

number of states taking this approach and the consistency of

the direction of change, the final step in a court’s inquiry is to

apply its own independent judgment to the constitutionality

of Arizona’s definition of adaptive behavior. See id. at

1999–2000.

b. Arizona’s Definition is Narrower than the

Clinical Definition

The two clinical definitions cited in Atkins and endorsed

by a national consensus—the ninth edition of the AAMR and

the DSM-IV—define impaired adaptive behavior as the

existence of deficits in two or more skill areas among a list of

ten or eleven total such areas.5 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n. 3. 

5 The ten adaptive skill areas enumerated in the ninth edition of the

AAMR are communication, self-care, home living, social skills,

community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics,

leisure, and work. AAMR 9th ed., supra, at 1, 5, 38. The DSM-IV sets

forth a nearly identical list of eleven skill areas, consisting of

communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of

community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work,

leisure, health, and safety. DSM-IV, supra, at 41. See John H. Blume et

al., Of Atkins and Men: Deviations from Clinical Definitions of Mental

Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 18CornellJ.L.&Pub. Pol'y 689, 691

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These deficits in themselves have been clinically deemed

sufficient to show the impairment of adaptive skills generally. 

Other measures may, from a clinical standpoint, be under or

over-inclusive, but in any event they fail to meet the clinically

recognized requirements of Atkins and Hall. Courts generally

reach the adaptive behavior prong only in the case of

individuals who demonstrate an IQ of 70 or below, a score

limited to about 2.3% of the population. AAMR 9th ed.,

supra, at 37. When the individuals who meet the intellectual

functioning prong are evaluated for impairment of adaptive

skills under the Atkins clinical standards, only about 1% of

the general population actuallysatisfies that standard and thus

meets the clinical definition of intellectual disability. Am.

Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of

Mental Disorders 38 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V]. In

short, it is this 1% who are deemed to be intellectually

disabled and thus under the constitution ineligible for the

death penalty.

Arizona’s means of determining impairment of adaptive

behavior differs from the nationally agreed upon clinical

definition even more substantially than does its IQ provision. 

Unlike the nationally approved clinical means of determining

impaired adaptive behavior, which requires limitations in

only a minority of established skill areas, Arizona assesses

such limitations generally by examining on an overall basis

“the effectiveness or degree to which the defendant meets the

standards of personal independence and social responsibility

expected of the defendant’s age and cultural group.” Ariz.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02(K)(1) (2006); Ariz. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 13-753(K)(1) (2015).

(2009) (describing the clinical criteria set forth in the AAMR and DSM-IV

as “virtually identical”).

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66 SMITH V. SCHRIRO

Arizona courts interpret the state’s statutory provision in

a manner that is entirely different than that required by Atkins

and Hall. See State v. Grell, 135 P.3d 696, 709 (Ariz. 2006);

accord State v. Boyston, 298 P.3d 887, 895 (Ariz. 2013). In

Grell, the defendant asserted that he had satisfied the adaptive

behavior prong of Arizona’s statute by demonstrating deficits

in two of the eleven areas listed in the DSM-IV. Grell,

135 P.3d at 709. Rejecting Grell’s claim that compliance

with the DSM-IV, which Hall makes clear is the

constitutionally required standard, satisfies the Arizona

statute, the Arizona Supreme Court held that

The defense claims to have clearly shown that

Grell has deficits in two of the eleven areas

listed in the DSM–IV and therefore has

mental retardation. The DSM–IVdefinition of

mental retardation, however, while similar in

overall meaning, is not the same as the

[Arizona] statutory definition. The statute

requires an overall assessment of the

defendant’s ability to meet society’s

expectations of him. It does not require a

finding of mental retardation based solely on

proof of specific deficits or deficits in only

two areas.

135 P.3d at 709 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 

Construing the Arizona statute, the Grell Court then found

that the defendant had failed to demonstrate a significant

impairment in adaptive behavior. Id.

Thus, as construed by the Arizona courts, Arizona’s

means of determining impairment of adaptive behavior is not

simply different than the clinical means required by Hall: it

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SMITH V. SCHRIRO 67

specifically rejects the Supreme Court’s clinically based

substantive standard; it is substantially more restrictive than

the constitutionally required standard; and, it fails to cover

numerous individuals deemed to be suffering from impaired

adaptive behavior under the Constitution. Williams, 303 P.3d

at 548 (Eckerstrom, P.J., dissenting) (“Arizona’s [adaptive

behavior] statutory requirements substantially narrow the

class of persons who are defined as mentally retarded when

compared with the class of those who would be clinically

defined as such”). This is because, unlike the nationally

approved clinical standard, which requires deficits only in a

minimal number of adaptive skill areas, Arizona’s definition,

as interpreted by Arizona state courts, requires that

impairments be considered globally and determined on an

overall basis, regardless of the specific limitations that

compel an individual’s classification as adaptively impaired

under the constitutionally required clinical standard.

Arizona’s standard departs from the clinical standard in

two fundamental ways. First, it requires deficits in both of

two general areas: social responsibility and personal

independence. By contrast, an individual evaluated under the

clinical definition need not manifest deficits in both of these

or any other general areas, so long as he demonstrates deficits

in at least two of a number of skill areas. Thus, individuals

who demonstrate “significant limitations in . . . adaptive

behavior” under the AAMR or DSM-IV standards based on

factors other than overall social responsibility and personal

independence (which are not discreet skill areas under either

standard) will fail to satisfyArizona’s less inclusive standard. 

The Arizona standard ignores the heterogeneous nature of

adaptive behavior and imposes a one-size-fits-all definition

that excludes many individuals falling under the clinical

definition. See AAMR 9th ed. 13 (“[T]here is no one way

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68 SMITH V. SCHRIRO

that defines ‘retarded’ performance. Every person with

mental retardation will differ in the nature, extent, and

severity of their functional limitations . . . . The current

definition reflects this fact by requiring the presence of

limitations in two or more of a variety of adaptive skill areas

but does not require any one single limitation or any specific

combination of limitations.”).

The second way in which Arizona’s standard diverges

from the clinical definition is that it, unlike the clinical

definition, includes an “overall assessment of the defendant’s

ability to meet society’s expectations of him.” Grell,

135 P.3d at 709. This means that a court may conclude that

even an individual demonstrating adaptive deficits in the

required areas of personal independence and social

responsibility nevertheless does not meet the adaptive

behavior prong under the Arizona statute because he has

adaptive strengths in certain areas that outweigh adaptive

deficits in others. This distinction is critical, because the

clinical definition recognizes that adaptive weaknesses may

coexist alongside adaptive strengths, and requires that

adaptive skills be assessed independently of each other to

prevent strengths in certain areas from outweighing

weaknesses in others. See AAMR 9th ed. 6 (“Specific

adaptive limitations often coexist with strengths in other

adaptive skills or other personal capabilities”); id. at 7 (“[A]n

individual may have a strength in a particular adaptive skill

area (e.g., social skills) while having difficulty in another

skill area (e.g. communication); and . . . an individual may

possess certain strengths within a particular specific adaptive

skill, while at the same time having limitations within the

same area (e.g., functional math and functional reading,

respectively).”). Because Arizona’s statutory definition of

impaired adaptive behavior, as defined by its courts, is under-

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inclusive and would not cover numerous individuals who

would be deemed to suffer from impaired adaptive behavior

under the nationally recognized clinical definition, I believe

that the Arizona statute, when properly before a federal court,

will in all likelihood be held to be unconstitutional.

Although the professional manuals cited in Atkins are no

longer the most current versions, the same conclusion is

equally likely with respect to the more recent editions. 

Although Atkins cites the 9th edition of the AAMR and the

DSM-IV, see 536 U.S. at 308 n. 3, Hall cites the DSM-V and

the eleventh definition of the American Association of

Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD)

(formerly the AAMR) (11th ed. 2010), see 134 S. Ct. at 1994,

1995, 2000, 2001. Each of the editions cited in Hall retains

the essential premise and characteristic of the clinical

definition cited in Atkins and rejected by the Arizona

Supreme Court: an individual must demonstrate deficits in

only a number of skill areas among a larger list, deficits are

not required in any specific listed categories, and adaptive

deficits in certain categories are sufficient and need not be

balanced against or outweighed by strengths in other areas.6

See Williams, 303 P.3d at 547 n. 12 (Eckerstrom, P.J.,

dissenting) (“[T]he revised AAIDD definition [of adaptive

behavior] is not a meaningful departure from either the

DSM–IV criteria or the AAMR’s prior definitional standard

set forth in Atkins.”); Chase v. State, 171 So. 3d 463, 471

(Miss. 2015) (“The [AAIDD and DSM-V definitions of

intellectual disability] have not materially altered the

diagnosis of intellectual disability [cited in Atkins] but have

provided new terminology.”); United States v. Williams,

6 The relevant portions of each professional manual’s definition of

adaptive behavior are set forth in Appendix B.

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70 SMITH V. SCHRIRO

1 F.Supp.3d 1124, 1146–47 (D. Hawaii 2014). Most

important, the Arizona Court of Appeals strongly questioned

Atkins and expressly rejected the more recent version of the

clinical elements, holding that Arizona is not bound by the

AAIDD’s clinical guidelines because, under Grell, Arizona’s

definition of adaptive behavior differs from the clinical

definition. Williams, 303 P.3d at 541.

As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the Arizona

court denied Smith’s Atkins claim by applying a likely

unconstitutional statute. An example of how that

unconstitutional statute works in practical effect is that with

respect to Smith, the Arizona court made no assessment as to

whether he met any two of the specific ten or eleven elements

listed in Atkins or any of the three domains or elements

referred to in Hall but instead relied on the state’s “overall

assessment of [his] ability to meet society’s expectations of

him” which the Arizona Supreme Court found to be the

requirement prescribed in the Arizona statute. This is directly

contrary to the substantive clinical standard required by

Atkins and Hall. Finally, in this respect, it appears evident

that, properly assessed, Smith qualifies as intellectually

disabled under both the initial and updated medical standards.

As in this case, the right announced in Atkins may be all

that stands between an intellectually disabled defendant and

an unconstitutional execution. However, Arizona’s statutory

scheme, as interpreted by its courts, severely erodes that

right. Given the gravity of this issue and the likelihood that

it will arise in future cases, the Arizona legislature would do

well to amend its statutory scheme to bring it within the

boundaries of the Eighth Amendment.

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SMITH V. SCHRIRO 71

Appendix A

I. States that retain the death penalty and define

“adaptive behavior” in non-clinical terms.

State Citation

1 Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–753(F);

State v. Grell, 135 P.3d 696, 709

(Ariz. 2006).

2 Texas Tex. Health & Safety Code

§ 591.003(1); Ex parte Briseno,

135 S.W.3d 1, 8–9 (Tex. Crim. App.

2004).

3 Utah Utah Code Ann § 77–15a–102.

4 Washington Wash. Rev. Code

§ 10.95.030(2)(d).

II. States that retain the death penalty but which do not

require any showing of impaired adaptive behavior.

State Citation

1 Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-6622(h), 76-

12b01(i); State v. Maestas, 298 Kan.

765, 783 (Kan. 2014).

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72 SMITH V. SCHRIRO

III. States that retain the death penalty in which the

definition of “adaptive behavior” is unclear.

State Citation

1 Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 18-1.3-1101(2).

2 Georgia Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-131(a)(3).

3 Indiana Ind. Code § 35-36-9-2; Pruitt v.

State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 108 (Ind.

2005).

4 Louisiana La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., art.

905.5.1(H)(1)(b).

5 Montana Montana has no Atkins statute and

no cases defining adaptive behavior.

6 New

Hampshire

New Hampshire has no Atkins

statute and no cases defining

adaptive behavior.

7 South

Carolina

S.C. Code Ann.

§ 16-3-20(C)(b)(10); Franklin v.

Maynard, 588 S.E.2d 604, 605–06

(S.C. 2003).

8 South

Dakota

SDCL § 23A-27A-26.2.

9 Wyoming Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-301(a)(iii).

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Kansas, New Hampshire, and Wyoming have not carried out

any executions in decades.7 Colorado has carried out only

one execution since 1977, and Montana and South Dakota

have each carried out three;8however, none of these cases

appears to have involved a claim raising the Atkins-Hall

issue. These states’ definitions thus deserve little weight. 

See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1997; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.

IV. States that have abolished the death penalty.9

1. Alaska

2. Connecticut

3. Hawaii

4. Iowa

5. Illinois

6. Massachusetts

7. Maryland

8. Maine

9. Michigan

10. Minnesota

11. Nebraska

12. North Dakota

13. New Jersey

14. New Mexico

15. New York

16. Rhode Island

7 D e a t h P e n a l t y I n f o r m a t i o n C e n t e r ,

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/5741 (last visited July 31, 2015).

 

8

Id.

9 Death Penalty Information Center, States With and Without the Death

Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-pen

alty (last visited July 20, 2015).

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74 SMITH V. SCHRIRO

17. Vermont

18. Wisconsin

19. West Virginia

In addition, Oregon has suspended its death penalty and has

executed only two individuals in the past 40 years. Hall,

134 S. Ct. at 1997. Oregon does not define “adaptive

behavior” by statute and Oregon courts have not considered

the issue.

V. States that retain the death penalty but utilize the

clinical definition of “adaptive behavior.”

State Citation

1 Alabama Lane v. State, No. CR-10-1343,

2013 WL 5966905, at *5 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2013).

2 Arkansas Jackson v. Norris, 615 F.3d 959,

961–62 (8th Cir. 2010).

3 California In re Hawthorne, 35 Cal.4th 40,

47–48 (Cal. 2005); Campbell v.

Superior Court, 159 Cal. App. 4th

635, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).

4 Delaware Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11

§ 4209(d)(3)(d)(1).

5 Florida Hodges v. State, 55 So.3d 515,

534 (Fla. 2010).

6 Idaho Idaho Code Ann. § 19-

2515A(1)(A).

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SMITH V. SCHRIRO 75

7 Kentucky Bowling v. Commonwealth,

163 S.W.3d 361, 369–70 & n. 8

(Ky. 2008).

8 Missouri Mo. Ann. Stat. § 565.030(6).

9 Mississippi Chase v. State, No. 2013-CA01089-SCT, 2015 WL 1848126, at

*1–6 (Miss. 2015).

10 North

Carolina

N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A2005(a)(1)b.

11 Nevada Ybarra v. State, 247 P.3d 269,

273-74 & n. 6 (Nev. 2011).

12 Ohio State v. Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303,

305 (Ohio 2002).

13 Oklahoma Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21

§ 701.10b(A).

14 Pennsylvania Commonwealth v. Hackett,

99 A.3d 11, 27 (Pa. 2014).

15 Tennessee State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180,

203-04 (Tenn. 2013).

16 Virginia Va. Code Ann.

§ 19.2–264.3:1.1(A); Walker v.

Kelly, 593 F.3d 319, 323 & n.2

(4th Cir. 2010).

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76 SMITH V. SCHRIRO

VI. States that have passed legislation since Atkins

defining adaptive behavior in non-clinical terms.

State Citation

1 Utah Utah Code Ann. § 77–15a–102

(West 2003).

VII. States that have abolished the death penalty since

Atkins.

State Citation

1 Connecticut 2012 Conn. Pub. Acts no. 12–5.

2 Illinois 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/119-1

(West 2011).

3 Maryland Md. Code Ann. Correc. Servs.

§§ 3–901 et seq. (Lexis 2008).

4 Nebraska Neb. Laws. L.B. 268 (2015).

5 New Jersey N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11–3(b)(1)

(West Supp. 2007).

6 New

Mexico

N.M. Stat. § 31-18-14 (2009).

The New York Court of Appeals invalidated New York’s

death penalty under the State Constitution in 2004. People v.

LaValle, 817 N.E. 2d 341 (N.Y. Ct. 2004). The legislature

has not voted to reinstate it.

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SMITH V. SCHRIRO 77

VIII. States that have passed legislation since Atkins

mandating use of the clinical definition of adaptive

behavior.

State Citation

1 California Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 1376(a)

(West Supp. 2003); In re

Hawthorne, 35 Cal.4th 40, 47–48

(Cal. 2005).

2 Delaware Del. Code Ann. tit. 11

§ 4209(d)(3)(d)(1) (2002).

3 Idaho Idaho Code Ann. § 19-2515A(1)(A)

(2003).

4 Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. § 174.098.7 (2003); 

Ybarra v. State, 247 P.3d 269,

273-74 (Nev. 2011).

5 Oklahoma Okla. Stat. Ann. § 701.10b(A)

(2006).

6 Virginia Va. Code Ann. § 19.2–264.3:1.1(A)

(2003); Walker v. Kelly, 593 F.3d

319, 323 & n.2 (4th Cir. 2010).

In 2014, Louisiana amended a 2003 statute that had been

judicially construed as adopting the clinical definition, and

codified a new definition that uses clinical language from the

DSM-V but which has not yet been construed by courts. See

La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 905.5.1(H)(1) (2003)

(amended 2009, 2014); State v. Williams, 22 So.3d 867,

880–81 & n. 10 (La. 2009); Brumsfield v. Cain, 744 F.3d 918,

924 (5th Cir. 2014), overruled on other grounds (citing State

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78 SMITH V. SCHRIRO

v. Dunn, 41 So.3d 454, 459 (La. 2010)); La. Code Crim. Proc.

Ann. Art. 905.5.1(H)(1)(b) (2014).

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Appendix B

Manual Definition of Intellectual

Disability

Measurement Definition of Adaptive Skills

AAMR 9thed.

“Substantial limitations inpresent functioning. . . .characterized by[1] significantly subaverageintellectual functioning,[2] existing concurrentlywith related limitations . . .adaptive skill areas”

1

“limitations in two or more of thefollowing applicable adaptive skillareas”

2

“communication, self-care, home living, social skills,community use, self-direction, health and safety,functional academics, leisure, and work.”

3

AAMR 10thed.

“characterized by[1] significant limitationsboth in intellectualfunctioning and [2] inadaptive behavior asexpressed in conceptual,social, and practicaladaptive skills.”

4

“performance that is at least twostandard deviations below themean of either (a) one of thefollowing three types of adaptivebehavior: conceptual, social, orpractical, or (b) an overall scoreon a standardized measure ofconceptual, social, and practicalskills.”

5

“the collection of conceptual, social, and practicalskills that have been learned by people in order tofunction in their everyday lives.”• Conceptual skills: “Language (receptive and

expressive), Reading and writing, Moneyconcepts, Self-direction”

• Social skills: “Interpersonal, Responsibility, Selfesteem, Gullibility (likelihood of being tricked or

manipulated), Naiveteé, Follows rules, Obeyslaws, Avoids victimization”

• Practical skills: “Activities of daily living (eating,

transfer/mobility, toileting, dressing), Instrumentalactivities of daily living (meal preparation,housekeeping, transportation, taking medication,money management, telephone use), Occupationalskills, Maintains safe environments”

6

SMITH V. SCHRIRO 79

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Manual Definition of Intellectual

Disability

Measurement Definition of Adaptive Skills

AAIDD 11thed.

“characterized by[1] significant limitations inboth intellectualfunctioning and [2] inadaptive behavior asexpressed in conceptual,social, and practicaladaptive skills.”

7

“performance that isapproximately two standarddeviations below the mean ofeither (a) one of the followingthree types of adaptive behavior:conceptual, social or practical or(b) an overall score on astandardized measure ofconceptual, social, and practicalskills.”

8

“the collection of conceptual, social, and practicalskills that have been learned and are performed bypeople in their everyday lives.”• Conceptual skills: “language; reading and writing;

and money, time and number concepts”

• Social skills: interpersonal skills, social

responsibility, self-esteem, gullibility, naiveteé(i.e. wariness), follows rules/obeys laws, avoidsbeing victimized, and social problem solving

• Practical skills: activities of daily living (personal

care), occupational skills, use of money, safety,health care, travel/transportation,schedules/routines, and use of the telephone”

9

DSM-IV “[1] significantly

subaverage generalintellectual functioning . . .that is accompanied by[2] significant limitations inadaptive functioning”10

“significant limitations in adaptivefunctioning in at least two of thefollowing skill areas”11

“communications, self-care, home living,social/interpersonal skills, use of communityresources, self-direction, functional academic skills,work, leisure, health, and safety”12

80 SMITH V. SCHRIRO

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Manual Definition of Intellectual

Disability

Measurement Definition of Adaptive Skills

DSM-V “a disorder . . . that

includes both[1] intellectual and[2] adaptive functioningdeficits in conceptual,social, and practicaldomains.”

“at least one domain of adaptivefunctioning–conceptual, social orpractical–is sufficiently impairedthat ongoing support is needed inorder for the person to performadequately in one or morel lifesettings at school, at work, athome, or in the community.”13

“Without ongoing support, the adaptive deficits limitfunctioning in one or more activities of daily life, suchas communication, social participation, andindependent living, across multiple environments,such as home, school, work, and community.”Adaptive functioning deficits result in a “failure tomeet developmental and socio-cultural standards forpersonal independence and social responsibility.”14“Adaptive functioning involves adaptive reasoning inthree domains: conceptual, social, and practical.”• Conceptual domain: competence in memory

language, reading, writing, math reasoning,acquisition of practical knowledge, problemsolving, and judgment in novel situations, amongothers.”

• Social domain: “awareness of others’ thoughts,

feelings, and experiences; empathy; interpersonalcommunication skills; friendship abilities; andsocial judgment, among others.” 

• Practical domain: learning and self-management

across life settings, including personal care, jobresponsibilities, money management, recreation,self-management of behavior, and school andwork task organization, among others.”15

SMITH V. SCHRIRO 81

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 1. AAMR 9th ed., at 1, 5.

 2. Id. 3. Id. at 5, 38. 4. AAMR 10th ed., at 39. 5. Id. at 13, 14. 6. Id. at 14, 42, 198. 7. AAIDD 11th ed., at 221. 8. Id. at 43. 9. Id. at 217, 218, 222, 224. 10. DSM-IV, at 41. 11. Id. 12. Id. 13. Id. at 38. 14. DSM-V, at 33. 15. Id. at 33, 37.

82 SMITH V. SCHRIRO

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SMITH V. SCHRIRO 83

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The one thing everyone appears to agree on is that Smith

is not intellectually disabled.

1 When tested in 2005 the

experts found that he had an IQ of between 87 and 93, well

within the low-average to average range of intellectual

ability. Yet despite this fact, the majority reverses because it

is certain that Smith was intellectually disabled in 1980 when

he murdered Sandy Owen. The majority reaches this

conclusion by disregarding the findings of the state courts,

denying those courts the deference they are due, and

expressing supreme confidence in its own ability to detect

past intellectual disability despite substantial conflicting

evidence and the fact that Smith is not now intellectually

disabled. Accordingly, I dissent.

The majority recognizes that although Smith filed his

federal habeas petition prior to the effective date

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA), the state court factual findings are entitled to a

presumption of correctness.2 Nonetheless, the majority

1 As does the majority opinion, I use the term “intellectually disabled”

rather than “mentally retarded” except where the term is used in quoted

material.

 

2

 Under pre-AEDPA law:

We review the district court’s decision to grant habeas

relief de novo. We review de novo questions of law and

mixed questions of law and fact, whether decided by

the district court or the state courts. The district court’s

factual findings are reviewed for clear error. We

therefore accept its findings “absent a definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” State

court factual findings are entitled to a presumption of

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84 SMITH V. SCHRIRO

concludes that the state court’s factual determination is “not

fairly supported by the record.” Op. 11. The majority is

wrong as an objective review of the record discloses ample

evidence to support the Arizona courts’ determination that

Smith did not sustain his burden of showing that he was

intellectually disabled in 1980.

Section II C 2 of Judge Reinhardt’s “opinion” also

contains his view—for which there is no concurrence—that

the Arizona courts applied an “unconstitutional standard of

proof.” This argument is based on an unreasonable reading

of the trial court’s decision and a failure to give the state

courts’ decisions the deference they are due. Judge

Reinhardt’s opposition to the death penalty in Section 2 C of

his opinion is neither the ruling of this panel nor of the Ninth

Circuit.

I. The Record Adequately Supports the

Determination that Smith Failed to Show He Was

Intellectually Disabled at the Time of the Murder

and His Conviction.

The majority boldly asserts that the finding that Smith has

not shown that he was intellectually disabled at the time of

the murder and his trial is not fairly supported by evidence. 

Op. 11. The majority recognizes, as it must, that there was

conflicting evidence, but argues that “once we look behind

each expert’s conclusion and consider the evidence on which

correctness, subject to eight exceptions enumerated in

the previous version of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal

citations omitted).

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SMITH V. SCHRIRO 85

he relies,” the majority of the evidence supports a finding of

intellectual disability. Op. 12 n. 7. This is not a fair reading

of the record.

A. The Record

1. The Underlying Crime and Prior Judicial Proceedings

In our 1999 en banc opinion affirming the denial of

Smith’s first federal habeas appeal, we described the crime as

follows:

Lambright and Smith were traveling across

the country with Lambright’s girlfriend,

Kathy Foreman. Smith was troubled by the

fact that while Lambright and Foreman had

intercourse in his presence, he did not have

anybody along to satisfy him. For his part,

Lambright thought that he “would like to kill

somebody just to see if he could do it.” [State

v. Lambright], 138 Ariz. [63,] 66 [(1983)]

. . . . They decided that both desires could be

fulfilled, and they set out with Foreman to

find a victim. They found Sandy Owen and

kidnaped her. Smith raped her on the way to

a mountain site where they all got out of the

car and Smith raped Owen again as Lambright

and Foreman had intercourse. What happened

next was that Smith began choking Owen, and

Lambright declared that she must be killed. 

So, “Lambright took Foreman’s knife out of

its sheath and began stabbing the victim in the

chest and abdomen, twisting the knife around

inside of her. Smith held one of the victim’s

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86 SMITH V. SCHRIRO

arms while she was being stabbed, and

Foreman held the other arm.” Id. at 67. . . . 

After that, “Smith unsuccessfully tried to

break Ms. Owen’s neck by twisting her head. 

Then Lambright, Foreman or both began

cutting deeply into the victim’s neck with the

knife. . . . The victim remained alive, and was

at least semiconscious, as she attempted to

raise herself up on one arm. Lambright

picked up a large rock and hurled it at her

head. Foreman testified that as he threw the

rock he yelled ‘Die, bitch.’” Id. The three

then drove off in a celebratory mood, playing

the piece “We Are the Champions” as they

went. See id. Once caught, the trio’s song

changed. Foreman turned state’s evidence,

was given immunity, and testified against her

erstwhile lover and his friend. Lambright

confessed, but deemed Smith to be the worst

of the three. Smith, too, confessed, but he

dubbed Foreman and Lambright as the real

killers.

In 1982, an Arizona jury convicted Robert Douglas Smith of

first-degree murder, kidnaping, and sexual assault. Schriro

v. Smith, 546 U.S. 6 (2005). He was given the death penalty.

Smith’s appeals and post-conviction proceedings proved

unavailing. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002). It

was not until after the Supreme Court had denied him relief,

that around 2004 Smith alleged for the first time that he was

intellectually disabled and thus pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia,

536 U.S. 304 (2002), could not be executed. See Schriro v.

Smith, 546 U.S. 6 (2005). In December 2005, we entered an

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SMITH V. SCHRIRO 87

order suspending Smith’s federal proceedings and directing

his counsel “to pursue state proceedings in Arizona to

determine whether the state is prohibited from executing the

petitioner in accordance with Atkins.” Smith v. Schriro, No.

96-99025 (Dec. 12, 2005). The Arizona Superior Court, Pima

County, held extensive proceedings concerning Smith’s

intellectual disability before issuing its opinion on March 27,

2008.

2. The Evidence Concerning Intellectual Disability

In 1964, when Smith was 15, he took the Otis IQ test and

received scores of 62 and 71. The state court found that the

“Otis test was developed in approximately the 1920’s and

was outmoded at the time it was reportedly given to [Smith]

in 1964.” More importantly, “[t]here is no evidence

concerning the qualifications of the persons administering the

tests, whether an appropriate protocol was followed, the

specific circumstances of [Smith] at the times of the tests, or

any of the other information required to determine the

validity of these school record entries.”

Moreover, by this time, Smith’s dysfunctional and

abusive childhood had already had an effect on his education. 

At age 15 he scored in the 2nd to 5th percentiles on the

Stanford Achievement Test, placing him seven years below

his age level. Moreover, his school transcripts reveal that he

received nearly all “Ds” and “Fs” in his academic studies. 

Indeed, Smith dropped out of school when he was 16.

Between the time he left school at the age of 16, and his

arrest some 15 years later in 1980, Smith had many jobs, a

number of unstable relationships, and frequent changes of

residence. The state court found that those who knew Smith

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88 SMITH V. SCHRIRO

stated that “he was one of a group of young men which

included his co-defendant, Joe Lambert, SidneyLeBalanc and

Charles McCarver, who lived together, worked together, and

traveled together at various times during the 1970’s.” The

state court found that the evidence from the 1970’s showed

that Smith was a full participant in his adult life. It found that

Smith:

worked as a diesel mechanic, garage

mechanic, car repossessor, truck driver, cable

installer and apartment maintenance provider,

among other things. While Defendant held a

large number of jobs, he was consistently

employed. Defendant’s last employer

indicated, in a form attached to Defendant’s

pre-sentence report, that Defendant worked

for approximately four months as a mechanic

employed to maintain and repair equipment,

that he received a raise after three months,

that his work was rated “satisfactory” for job

performance, work skills and attendance, and

“excellent” for cooperation with

employer/supervisor and other employees,

and that he would be considered for reemployment.

Smith’s friend, LeBlanc, who sometimes worked for the

same employer as Smith, stated that Smith had difficulties

with paperwork and written tests, as opposed to hands-on or

mechanical tasks. Similarly, Robert Lebrecque, a former

maintenance man with the Arizona Department of

Corrections, who worked with Smith for about eight years

after he began serving his prison term, commented that

although Smith “was a little slow at the beginning . . . [i]f I

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SMITH V. SCHRIRO 89

showed him how to do something, I only had to show him

once.” Lebrecque recalled that Smith could read, “but

seemed to have a hard time understanding what the written

words meant.”3

Smith was married five times in approximately 15 years. 

The state court, however, noted that while Smith “made poor

choices in partners and had great difficultly maintaining

relationships with women, this fact can be explained as

arising from his loveless childhood just as well as it can be

viewed as an indicator of the limitations of mental

retardation.” Smith’s last marriage, which was entered into

between the time of the offense and his arrest, “showed

promise of being quite different from the others despite two

incidents of violence in the relationship.” His fifth wife had

known Smith since childhood. During this marriage Smith

worked as a truck driver and performed dry-wall and other

work in the apartment complex. His wife did not work

outside the home and Smith supported her and her three

children, for whom he was a loved, active father figure.

After he was arrested, the pre-sentence report

characterized Smith as having a “borderline mentality.” The

state court, however, gave this description little weight

because the “experience of this probation officer is unknown,

and there was no indication that he had training as a

psychologist or other mental health professional that would

3 Lebrecque further noted that because of Smith’s “lack of basic gradeschool academic skills, and his short stature, Lebrecque initially thought

his maturity level was that of a 12 to 14 year old.”

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90 SMITH V. SCHRIRO

provide the expertise required for any diagnostic

observations.”4

 

4

 The state court further explained:

The pre-sentence report contains detailed descriptions

of the offense, including a recitation of information

obtained from written statements of Defendant to the

court and his statements to law enforcement officers. 

Information concerning Defendant’s social, marital,

educational, religious, and employment history, was

also apparently obtained primarily from Defendant. 

The pre-sentence report does not mention any difficulty

in obtaining this information from Defendant. The

section entitled “Physical and Mental Health,” while

noting Defendant’s depression, “very poor self

concept,” sexual issues, drug abuse and early

psychiatric treatment, did not mention mental

retardation. The references to retardation were two. In

the “education” section, the pre-sentence report writer

stated: “Appended records indicate that intelligence

tests administered during his eighth grade year revealed

an IQ of 71, indicating that he is borderline but

educable.” The “Evaluation Summary” includes the

following sentence: “His borderline mentality probably

makes him an easy person to manipulate and somewhat

of a follower in social situations.” Defendant’s socalled “borderline mentality” is not mentioned as a

mitigating circumstance - - in fact, the pre-sentence

report noted that, “In view of the defendant’s known

history and the circumstances of the instant offense, the

Court may feel that there are no applicable mitigating

circumstances.” It is at least as likely that the

“borderline” language in the Evaluation Summary

section simply reflected the pre-sentence report writer’s

knowledge of the 1964 IQ test referenced in the school

records, as that the pre-sentence report writer based the

comment on an analysis of Defendant’s history and

characteristics grounded in the appropriate expertise. 

There simply is no way to know.

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In addition, two mental health professionals, Dr. Martin

Levy and Dr. John LaWall, performed Rule 11 evaluations of

Smith in 1982 for purposes of his criminal trial proceedings. 

Both found Smith to be competent. Dr. Levy noted that

Smith was neatly dressed and displayed logical, coherent

thought.5 Dr. LaWall also noted that Smith “was neat and

cooperative, and his mood somewhat depressed, with

somewhat blunted affect.” Dr. LaWall’s report indicated that

Smith was oriented to time, place, and person, with intact

memory, and there was “no evidence of any disturbance of

the form or content of his thinking whatsoever.” Dr. LaWall

indicated that Smith “probably functions in the average range

of intelligence,” but probably has a personality disorder with

both passive-aggressive and antisocial features.

3. The Post-2005 Evaluations

After our 2005 order, proceedings were commenced in

the Arizona Superior Court, Pima County, for the sole

purpose of complying with our order that the state court

determine whether Arizona was prohibited from executing

Smith in accordance with Atkins. The Superior Court noted

that the burden was on Smith “to prove the claim of mental

retardation by clear and convincing evidence” and that both

parties acknowledged that the court was “bound to follow the

decision of the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Grell

(Grell II), 212 Ariz. 516, 521, 135 P.3d 696, 701 (2006) in

this regard.”

Smith was subjected to testing and evaluations by experts

retained by both Smith and Arizona. Testing in August 2005

5 Smith apparently complained of memory problems, but there was no

evaluation for organic brain syndrome or seizure disorder.

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by Dr. Sergio Martinez, Arizona’s expert, resulted in a

finding that Smith “had an IQ score of 93 on the WAIS-III

and a score of 89 on a second test, the Slosson Intelligence

Test - Revised, within the low-average to average range of

intellectual ability.” Testing by Dr. Thomas Thompson,

Smith’s expert, utilizing a different appropriate testing

instrument, the Reynolds Intellectual Assessment Scale with

subtests, resulted in a finding that Defendant, at the time of

the testing, had a score of 93. Thus, both experts agree that

as of 2005 Smith was not intellectually disabled.

Dr. Thompson, however, was of the opinion that there

was a “high probability” that Smith “was mentally retarded

at the time the crime was committed in 1980, but that his

functioning has improved as a result of his stable, structured

prison life and appropriate medication.” Dr. Thompson relied

heavily on the Otis test scores from 1964, the Stanford test

scores, early grades and recollections by relatives and others

concerning Smith’s childhood and early adolescence. Dr.

Thompson appeared “to view mental retardation as a fluid

condition responsive to any number of changes in a patient’s

environment, nutrition, and physical, mental and emotional

health.” He considered Smith’s low test scores, low grades,

lack of social skills and other deficits as valid indicators of

mental retardation.

When asked about evidence of Smith’s intellectual

disability in 1980, Dr. Thompson referred to the 1964 IQ tests

and noted that the presentence evaluation indicated that he

functioned in a borderline range. However, when informed

of the two Rule 11 evaluations by Drs. Levy and LaWall, he

acknowledged that he would have expected retardation to

have been noted in their reports.

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Dr. Thompson described Smith’s life after he left school

as “characterized by instability in employment, personal

relationships and residence, and showed signs of impulsivity

and deficits of adaptive functioning, all characteristic of

mental retardation.” Nonetheless, he acknowledged that

Smith “seemed to have some qualitative independent living

skills.”6

In contrast, Dr. Martinez, after giving Smith IQ tests and

meeting with him, testified that there was a high degree of

probability that he was not retarded at the time of the offense. 

He agreed that increases in intellectual functioning could

occur within a highly enriched learning environment, but that

a 30-point increase in IQ was unlikely and he did not view

prison as an enriching environment.

4. The Arizona Superior Court’s Decision

On March 27, 2008, the Arizona Superior Court issued a

19-page ruling that Smith had failed to show that he was

intellectually disabled at the time of his trial and that Arizona

was therefore not precluded by Atkins from executing him.

The court first held that the parties agreed that the burden

to prove intellectual disability was on Smith, pursuant to

Grell II, 212 Ariz. at 521. However, in view of the

procedural differences between Grell II and Smith’s case, the

6

In reference to Smith’s prior 1970 hospitalization and diagnosis for

personality disorder with psychotic features, Dr. Thompson

“acknowledged that this disorder included features described as

‘inadequate and immature,’ and that this condition included anxiety and

depression which could display the impulsivity causing the job changes

and relationship issues characterizing Defendant’s early adulthood.”

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court “considered the evidence under the preponderance of

evidence standard applicable to Rule 32 proceedings.” The

court held that Smith had failed to show that he was entitled

to relief under either the clear and convincing evidence

standard or the preponderance of evidence standard.

The trial court expressed serious concerns with Dr.

Thompson’s perspective. It noted that his view of “mental

retardation as a fluid condition responsive to any number of

changes in a patient’s environment, nutrition, and physical,

mental and emotional health,” was not necessarily consistent

“with the definition of mental retardation provided by

Arizona law, and the procedures by which mental retardation

is to be determined under A. R. S. § 13-703.02.”7 The court

further noted that Dr. Thompson placed considerable weight

on the 1964 IQ tests and the pre-sentence report’s indication

of Smith’s “borderline functioning.” It also observed that Dr.

Thompson gave little weight to Smith’s ability to live on his

own for 15 years between the time he left school and the

murder. The court concluded that Dr. Thompson’s “analysis

does not permit a finding, with any degree of accuracy, of

Defendant’s level of ‘general intellectual functioning’ either

 

7

 The state court commented:

The State . . . contends that the family dysfunction and

abuse, faulty nutrition, depression and anxiety rather

than mental retardation contributed to the low test

scores, low grades and other signs. In other words, the

defense viewis that Defendant’s early difficulties cause

his retardation, and that he got better in prison. The

prosecution’s perspective is that Defendant’s

dysfunctional background and other mental health

problems rather than mental retardation caused the

factors pointed to by Dr. Thompson as diagnostic of

retardation.

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SMITH V. SCHRIRO 95

before the age of 18, or in the period 1980–82.” Thus, his

evaluation “does not support the conclusion that during the

pertinent time period, Defendant was mentally retarded.”

The Superior Court recognized that Smith’s

“dysfunctional family and troubled early life undoubtedly

affected his circumstances in an adverse way,” and that he

likely “has suffered from clinically cognizable conditions

probably including a personality disorder.” However, the

circumstances “do not point to mental retardation with any

degree of certainty.” Based on all the evidence the Superior

Court found that:

Defendant has failed to meet his burden of

showing that he was mentally retarded at the

time of the offense and trial in this case. 

There was insufficient evidence from which

this Court could find that Defendant exhibited

“significantly subaverage general intellectual

functioning” during the period of the offense

and his trial. While unorthodox and unstable,

Defendant’s pre-arrest life did not show

“significant impairment in adaptive behavior”

existing concurrently with the deficit in

general intellectual functioning. In the

absence of adequate information concerning

the early Otis IQ tests, and in view of the

alternative explanations for his early school

and social deficits, Defendant failed to show

the onset of mental retardation before the age

of 18. The Court therefore FINDS that the

State of Arizona is not precluded, on Atkins

grounds from executing Defendant.

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5. The Arizona Court of Appeals’ Opinion

Smith appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals, which

unanimously affirmed the Superior Court. Smith v. Kearney,

No. 2CA-SA-2008-0019, 2008 WL 2721155 (Ariz. App. Jul.

11, 2008). It noted that the trial court “had considered the

evidence under the applicable clear-and-convincing standard

as well as under the lesser burden of a preponderance of the

evidence standard that applies to post-conviction

proceedings.” The appellate court reviewed the evidence and

the Superior Court’s decision noting that the trial court had

found: (a) Dr. Thompson’s opinion was based on an approach

to defining mental retardation that was inconsistent with the

requirements of Arizona law; (b) lay witness Martha Hight’s

opinion that Smith was mentally retarded was inconsistent

with the testimony of witnesses who had lived with Smith in

the 1970’s; and (c) Smith’s own written statements were

“lengthy, neatly written, logical, detailed, structured and

coherent.” The appellate court concluded that the Superior

Court had carefully considered all the evidence and

“exercised its discretion in resolving conflicts in the evidence,

in assessing the reliability of the test results, and credibility

of the witnesses, and in weighing evidence.” The court

concluded that it had no basis for interfering with the

Superior Court’s discretionary judgments or for re-weighing

the evidence.8

6. The District Court’s Order Denying Habeas Relief

Following the conclusion of his state court proceedings,

Smith renewed his proceedings in the United States District

8 The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied Smith’s petition for

review.

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Court for the District of Arizona. In a 21-page order issued

on December 3, 2012, the court found that Smith’s Atkins

related claims were without merit.

The court recognized that because Smith filed his initial

federal habeas petition prior to AEDPA’s effective date, preAEDPA standards applied. Accordingly, the court reviewed

de novo mixed questions of law and fact as well as pure

questions of law. See Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086,

1099 (9th Cir. 2010). However, the court held, citing

Robinson, that the state court factual findings were entitled to

a presumption of correctness, subject to eight exceptions

enumerated in the previous version of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).9

 

9

 The district court listed the exceptions as:

(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not

resolved in the State court hearing;

(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State

court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;

(3) that the material facts were not adequately

developed at the State court hearing;

(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject

matter or over the person of the applicant in the State

court proceeding;

(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State

court, in deprivation of his constitutional right, failed to

appoint counsel to represent him in the State court

proceeding;

(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair and

adequate hearing in the State court proceeding; or

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The district court, citing Marshal v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422,

432 (1983), held that before it could reject a state court’s

factual determination it would have to conclude “that the state

court’s findings lacked even fair support in the record.” It

further determined that whether Smith “is mentally retarded

is a question of fact.”

The district court noted that Smith did not dispute that the

state court’s finding as to intellectual disability was entitled

to a presumption of correctness.10 The district court

(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process

of law in the State court proceeding;

(8) or unless . . . the Federal court on consideration of

[the relevant] part of the record as a whole concludes

that such factual determination is not fairly supported

by the record.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994).

10 Smith nonetheless sought de novo review for at least one of four

grounds: “(1) an inadequate factfinding procedure by the state court;

(2) the failure to adequately develop material facts at the state court Atkins

hearing; (3) the failure to provide Petitioner a full, fair and adequate

hearing; and (4) a violation of Petitioner’s due process rights.” The

district court rejected Smith’s claim to a right to funding for a Positron

Emission Tomography (PET) scan and his assertion that he was entitled

to jury determination on mental retardation. The majority opinion does

not discuss either of these claims. Rejecting Smith’s other grounds, the

district court noted that the “state court provided a lengthy period of time

for Petitioner to prepare for the Atkins hearing and authorized Petitioner’s

expert of choice, his initial diagnostic testing requests, investigative

resources, and numerous depositions of lay witnesses.” It noted that

Smith “identifies nothing to support a finding that the state court’s

factfinding procedures were inadequate, that material facts were left

undeveloped, that the state court failed to provide a full and fair hearing,

or that his due process rights were violated. Accordingly, the district court

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concluded that there was ample evidence in the record to

support the state court’s conclusion that Smith had failed to

establish either “subaverage general intellectual functioning”

or “significant impairment in adaptive behavior” before the

age of 18. In particular, the district court agreed that the 1964

Otis tests were unreliable and entitled to little weight. It

noted that the record was “devoid of any evidence concerning

the testing, including the raw test data, identification of the

administrators and their qualifications, or the protocols

followed.” Moreover, both Drs. Thompson and Martinez

testified that the Otis test was outdated when administered to

Smith in 1964 and would not be used today to determine an

individual’s IQ.

The district court further commented:

[A]s noted by the state court, the evidence

presented at the hearing indicated it is just as

likely that Petitioner’s poor school

performance and unstable lifestyle was the

result of a severely dysfunctional upbringing

and personality disorder as it was mental

retardation. Petitioner led a transient lifestyle,

frequently changing employment and

residences, but many of his jobs (such as

being a mechanic, a cable installer, and a

truck driver) required at least a minimal

degree of intellectual functioning. Although

witnesses agreed that Petitioner is not “book

smart,” he learns quickly when shown how to

do something. In addition, the record

found that Smith had not overcome the presumption of correctness on any

of these grounds.

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supports a finding that Petitioner began living

an independent life after dropping out of

school at age 16 and was not dependent on

others to function in his daily life.

The district court concluded that Smith had not overcome the

presumption of correctness that attached to the state court’s

finding that he was not intellectually disabled at the time of

the offense.

B. Analysis

The majority does not question the adequacy of the state

court’s proceedings. Instead, invoking the eighth exception

enumerated under the 1994 version of § 2254(d), it concludes

that the state court’s findings are “not fairly supported by the

record.” Op. 11. This is simply wrong. An objective review

of the conflicting evidence reveals that there is substantial unrefuted evidence supporting the state court’s determination

that Smith was not intellectually disabled in 1980. The

majority’s preference for Dr. Thompson’s perspective does

not justify its setting aside all the evidence—including

portions of Dr. Thompson’s testimony—that supports the

determinations by the state court and the district court that

Smith has not demonstrated that he was intellectually

disabled in 1980.

First, the majority cannot deny that as of 2005, Smith was

not intellectually disabled. Even Dr. Thompson’s test

indicated that Smith had an IQ of 93. Thus, this case is

relatively unique in that the courts are required to determine

whether a person who now is clearly not intellectually

disabled, was intellectually disabled some 25 years earlier

when he committed a murder and was tried. The fact that

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Smith was not intellectually disabled in 2005, gives rise to at

least a presumption that Smith was not intellectually disabled

in 1980.

Second, the evidence supporting the majority’s

determination is inherently problematic. Smith’s 1964 IQ

tests, his poor performance on the Stanford achievement tests,

and his poor grades could be signs of intellectual disability. 

But the test administered in 1964 was out-moded and there is

nothing in the record as to how the test was administered. 

Also, by the time that the test was administered, Smith had

failed in school, and there is nothing to suggest that he made

any effort to perform well on the test.11 Moreover, there is

substantial evidence that Smith had difficultywith the written

word, which indicates that his written test results were likely

to underrate his intelligence.

Other than the test scores and his academic performance,

the evidence of Smith’s alleged intellectual disability is

primarily the testimony of lay witness Martha Hight who

compared Smith to her sister who had been diagnosed as

intellectually disabled. However, the trial court found that

her statement “was inconsistent with the testimony of others

who lived with [Smith] at or near the same period of time in

the 1970’s.”

There was evidence, as the majority notes, of Smith’s

horrendous childhood. That his stepfatherfrequentlybelittled

him and beat him. That his mother frequently ignored her

11 Dr. Martinez testified as to the importance of an awareness of an

individual’s behavior during an assessment. He noted that in a groupadministered test you don’t have the ability to “directly assess how the

individual is doing, whether they’re paying attention or not.”

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children and was promiscuous in front of them. See Op.

24–25. This upbringing, the majority notes, led Dr.

Thompson to opine that Smith “became intellectually

disabled with frontal lobe abnormalities.” Op. 25.

But it is Dr. Thompson’s view of intellectual disability

“as a fluid condition responsive to any number of changes in

a patient’s environment, nutrition and physical, mental and

emotional health” that renders his diagnosis problematic. If

a person’s mental ability is fluid, if it can change in response

to changes in the person’s environment, nutrition, and

physical, mental and emotional health, then by definition,

even assuming that Smith was intellectually disabled in 1964,

when he was 16 years old, he was not necessarily disabled in

1980, when he committed the murder.

Critically, by 1980, Smith had lived independently for 15

years, had been married a number of times, and had held

numerous jobs. This inherently raises questions as to

whether, assuming that Smith was intellectually disabled in

1964, the subsequent improvement of his mental ability was

due to his living alone away from his oppressive family for

15 years, as Dr. Martinez suggests, or to his being in prison

from 1980 to 2005, as Dr. Thompson suggests. Smith’s

independent life from 1964 to 1980 is strong circumstantial

evidence that by 1980 he was not intellectually disabled, even

if he had been intellectually disabled in 1964.

In addition, Dr. Thompson’s perception of intellectual

disability is in tension with Arizona’s definition. Arizona’s

statute assumes that a person’s intellectual ability is relatively

stable. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02(K)(3). In fact,

the statute requires that the onset of intellectual disability be

before an individual is 18 years of age. Dr. Thompson’s

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approach begs the question of whether Smith was

intellectually disabled as defined by Arizona when he was 16,

or only suffered from “frontal lobe abnormalities” that

affected his performance but cleared up once he was in a less

toxic environment. It is not clear that the alleged “frontal

lobe abnormalities” resulted in “significant subaverage

intellectual functioning” or caused “significant impairment of

adaptive behavior” as required by the Arizona statute. See

A. R. S. § 13-703.02 (K).

In any event, the critical issue here is not whether Smith

was intellectually disabled in 1964, but in 1980. Dr.

Martinez’s perspective that Smith was never disabled is

certainly supported by the 2005 IQ tests. Dr. Thompson’s

suggestion that Smith was disabled in 1980 depends first on

a determination that Smith was disabled in 1964 and second

on the acceptance that prison rather than 15 years of living

alone, explains Smith’s present IQ level. However, as noted,

Smith’s ability to live on his own for 15 years from 1964 to

1980 is strong evidence that even if Smith had developed

“frontal lobe abnormalities” as a result of his horrendous

childhood, they had dissipated by 1980. Moreover, this

conclusion is supported by the fact that the two doctors who

examined Smith for competency to stand trial for the murder

in 1980 failed to detect any signs of intellectual disability. 

Even Dr. Thompson admitted that he would have expected

the doctors to note some sign of intellectual disability.

In sum, there is substantial—if not overwhelming—

evidence to support the state court’s determination that Smith

had failed to demonstrate that he was intellectually disabled

in 1980. Indeed, the majority does not really try to refute this

evidence. Instead, it explains at length why it prefers Dr.

Thompson’s perspective to that of Dr. Martinez. But that is

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not the proper inquiry. The question is whether the state

court’s factual determination is “fairly supported by the

record.” Marshal, 459 U.S. at 432. Perhaps if all the

conflicting evidence could be explained away, the majority’s

approach might be acceptable. But the evidence remains

obstinate in support of the state court’s determinations: Smith

is not now intellectually disabled, he lived independently for

15 years before he committed the murder, and the doctors

who examined him for competency in 1980 failed to detect

any signs of intellectual disability. Moreover, although Dr.

Thompson offers an explanation for how Smith’s mental

ability could change over time, his own theory cannot

pinpoint when Smith overcame his alleged initial intellectual

disability. The factual record fully supports the state court’s

determinations that Smith failed to carry his burden, and that,

accordingly, he was not intellectually disabled in 1980.

In addition, the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Hall v.

Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014), supports the denial of relief. 

The Supreme Court was critical of Florida’s over-reliance on

the measurement of an IQ test.12It concluded that

“[i]ntellectual disability is a condition, not a number.” 134 S.

 

12 The Court explained:

Florida’s rule disregards establishedmedical practice in

two interrelated ways. It takes an IQ score as final and

conclusive evidence of a defendant’s intellectual

capacity, when experts in the field would consider other

evidence. It also relies on a purportedly scientific

measurement of the defendant’s abilities, his IQ score,

while refusing to recognize that the score is, on its own

terms, imprecise.

134 S. Ct. at 1995.

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Ct. at 2001. It held that courts “must recognize, as does the

medical community, that the IQ test is imprecise.13Id. The

Supreme Court concluded:

Florida’s rule is in direct opposition to the

views of those who design, administer, and

interpret the IQ test. By failing to take into

account the standard error of measurement,

Florida’s law not only contradicts the test’s

own design but also bars an essential part of a

sentencing court’s inquiry into adaptive

functioning. Freddie Lee Hall may or may

not be intellectually disabled, but the law

requires that he have the opportunity to

present evidence of his intellectual disability,

including deficits in adaptive functioning over

his lifetime.

Id.

Here, Smith had precisely this opportunity. He had a full

“opportunity to present evidence of his intellectual disability,

 

13 The Court continued:

This is not to say that an IQ test score is unhelpful. It

is of considerable significance, as the medical

community recognizes. But in using these scores to

assess a defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty, a

State must afford these test scores the same studied

skepticism that those who design and use the tests do,

and understand that an IQ test score represents a range

rather than a fixed number.

134 S. Ct. at 2001.

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including deficits in adaptive functioning over his lifetime.” 

Id. However, the state courts and the district court concluded

that the evidence did not show that he was intellectually

disabled in 1980. It is the majority and Dr. Thompson who

cling to the 1964 test results. But other evidence such as

Smith’s 2005 IQ test results, his living independently on his

own for 15 years before the murder, and the failure of the

doctors who examined Smith for mental competence in 1980

to detect any sign of intellectual disability, strongly support

the state court’s determination.14

Accordingly, because the district court’s denial of Smith’s

petition should be affirmed, I dissent from the majority’s

opinion.

14 Finally, it should be noted that the Supreme Court in Hall considered

the Arizona’s statute and suggested that it passed constitutional muster.

Arizona’s statute appears to set a broad statutory cutoff

at 70, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–753(F) (West 2013),

but another provision instructs courts to “take into

account the margin of error for a test administered.” Id.

at § 14–753(K)(5). How courts are meant to interpret

the statute in a situation like Hall’s is not altogether

clear. The principal Arizona case on the matter, State v.

Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 141 P.3d 368, (2006), states that

“the statute accounts for margin of error by requiring

multiple tests,” and that “if the defendant achieves a

full-scale score of 70 or below on any one of the tests,

then the court proceeds to a hearing.” Id. at 403.

134 S. Ct. at 1996.

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II. The Arizona Courts Applied the Appropriate

Standard of Proof.

A. The Superior Court’s Use of the Words “with any

degree of certainty” Does Not in Any Way Suggest

that it Applied an Inappropriate Standard of

Proof.

Despite the lack of any concurrence, Judge Reinhardt

includes in his opinion an argument that the Arizona courts

applied an unconstitutional standard of proof. Section IIC.2,

pages 42–52. Accordingly, I offer the following rebuttal to

his inaccurate accusations.

1. The State Court and District Court Decisions

As noted, the Arizona Superior Court held extensive

hearings and admitted considerable evidence as to whether

Smith was intellectually disabled at the time of his trial. It

agreed with the parties that the burden to prove intellectual

disability was on Smith, pursuant to Grell II, 212 Ariz. 515. 

However, in view of the procedural differences between Grell

II and Smith’s case, the court “considered the evidence under

the preponderance of evidence standard applicable to Rule 32

proceedings.” The court held that its decision was the same

under this lower standard.

After carefully considering all the evidence, the Superior

Court concluded:

Although Defendant’s dysfunctional family

and troubled early life undoubtedly affected

his circumstances in an adverse way, and

while it is likely Defendant has suffered from

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clinically cognizable conditions probably

including a personality disorder, the

circumstances described at the hearing do not

point to mental retardation with any degree of

certainty. The Court has carefully considered

all of the testimony presented at the hearing,

and has reviewed and considered all of the

exhibits received in evidence at that

proceeding. Based on all of the evidence, the

Court FINDS that Defendant has failed to

meet his burden of showing that he was

mentally retarded at the time of the offense

and trial in this case. There was insufficient

evidence from which this Court could find

that Defendant exhibited “significant

subaverage general intellectual functioning”

during the period of the offense and his trial. 

While unorthodox and unstable, Defendant’s

pre-arrest life did not show “significant

impairment in adaptive behavior” existing

concurrently with the deficit in general

intellectual functioning. In the absence of

adequate information concerning the early

Otis IQ tests, and in view of the alternative

explanations for his early school and social

deficits, Defendant failed to show the onset of

mental retardation before the age of 18. The

Court therefore FINDS that the State of

Arizona is not precluded, on Adkins grounds,

from executing Defendant.

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior

Court. It noted that the trial court “had considered the

evidence under the applicable clear-and-convincing evidence

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standard as well as under the lesser burden of a

preponderance of the evidence that applies to post conviction

proceedings . . . and concluded that under either standard

Smith had failed to establish he was mentally retarded at the

time of the offense and at trial.”

Similarly, the district court denied Smith’s petition. It

noted that although Smith did not “identify deficiencies in the

state court’s ruling,” he contended that his proffered evidence

“overwhelmingly established the subaverage intellectual

functioning and adaptive skills prongs of Arizona’s mental

retardation test as of the time of the offense in 1980.” The

district court rejected this contention. It noted that Smith did

not dispute that the 1964 Otis tests were unreliable, and

commented that “the evidence presented at the hearing

indicated it is just as likely that Petitioner’s poor school

performance and unstable lifestyle was the result of a

severelydysfunctional upbringing and personality disorder as

it was mental retardation.” The district court concluded that

there was “ample evidence in the record to support the state

courts’ conclusion that Petitioner failed to establish either

‘subaverage general intellectual functioning’ or ‘significant

impairment in adaptive behavior’ before the age of 18.” 

Accordingly, he had “not overcome the presumption of

correctness attached to the state court’s finding that he was

not mentally retarded.” Moreover, in denying a certificate of

appealability the district court found “that reasonable jurists

could not debate its resolution of Petitioner’s Atkins-related

claims,” and that “[t]he question of whether the state court

erred in finding that Petitioner was not mentally retarded

under Arizona law is not debatable among jurists of reason.”

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2. Discussion

In light of the unanimous perspective of the Arizona trial

and appellate courts and the district court, how does Judge

Reinhardt conclude that the Superior Court applied an

unconstitutional standard of proof? His concurrence does so

by first disbelieving the state courts’ statements that the

Superior Court applied the preponderance of the evidence

standard. Second, the concurrence ignores the court’s factual

findings and misconstrues the Superior Court’s statement that

“the circumstances described at the hearing do not point to

mental retardation with any degree of certainty.” See Op. 43. 

Thus, the concurrence takes five words from the trial court’s

decision out of context and then gives them an improper

definition. By attacking this incorrect definition, the

concurrence, in essence, argues that the death penalty cannot

be constitutionally applied.15

Both the Superior Court and the Arizona Court of

Appeals stated that the Superior Court applied the lesser

preponderance of the evidence standard. The concurrence

dismisses their considered opinions in a footnote arguing that

the body of the Superior Court’s opinion “did not fulfill that

promise, however, but, rather, the court concluded after

reviewing all the evidence that it did not meet a ‘certainty’

standard.” Op. 43 n.25. This is wrong on a number of levels.

The concurrence takes “with any degree of certainty” out

of context, endows it with a incorrect meaning and then

argues that the stilted meaning it has conjured up is

15 Although Judge Reinhardt specifically addresses the constitutionality

of the Arizona death penalty statute in his separate concurrence, its spirit

clearly informs his concurrence set forth in the majority opinion.

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unconstitutional. But, considering the factual evidence in this

case, an objective jurist must admit to the lack of some

precision in an evaluation of Smith’s intellectual ability in

1980. On the one hand, there are the Otis IQ tests from 1964

and Dr. Thompson’s testimony that Smith’s intellectual

disability was not a constant. On the other hand, both Dr.

Thompson and Dr. Martinez agreed that by 2005 Smith was

not intellectually disabled, and there is evidence that for some

15 years after dropping out of school, and before committing

the murder, Smith lived independentlyand was not dependent

on anyone. Thus, given that Smith had the burden to prove

an intellectual disability, the Superior Court reasonably

concluded that he had failed to do so, even by a

preponderance of the evidence. In other words, the evidence

as presented by Smith did not “point to mental retardation

with any degree of certainty.” Both the Arizona Court of

Appeals and the District Court agreed.

But the concurrence eschews the trial court’s intent and

suggests that “the ‘any degree of certainty’ standard . . . is

more akin to the ‘reasonable doubt’ standard than the clear

and convincing standard mandated by Arizona’s Atkins

statute, which requires only that the issue under consideration

be ‘highly probable.’”16 Op. 44. In support of this assertion,

the concurrence cites a 27-year old Arizona case that

involved a jury instruction. State v. King, 763 P.2d 239 (Ariz.

1988). This case, which affirmed placing the burden on the

defendant to prove insanity, disapproved defining “clear and

convincing evidence” as evidence that “is certain, plain to the

16 Of course, this argument is only relevant if one ignores the trial

court’s determination, affirmed by the state court of appeals, that Smith

had failed to demonstrate an intellectual disability by the preponderance

of the evidence.

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understanding, unambiguous, and convincing in the sense that

it is so reasonable and persuasive as to cause you to believe

it.” Id. at 241. The court held that “the better instruction

would inform a jury that clear and convincing evidence is

evidence that makes the existence of the issue propounded

highly probable.” Id. at 244.

In Smith’s proceedings, no court used the definition of

clear and convincing evidence disapproved in King. Indeed,

our precedent requires that we presume that the state judges

know and follow the law. See Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d

1029, 1043 (9th Cir. 2007). We have further held that we

should not lightly disregard the trial court’s determinations. 

Id. In Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 315 (1991), the

Supreme Court held “[w]e must assume that the trial judge

considered all this [mitigation] evidence before passing

sentence. For one thing, he said he did.” Thus, we have no

basis for finding that the Superior Court did not apply the

preponderance of the evidence standard that it said it did (and

which the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed) or that the

Superior Court somehow applied “certainty” in a waythat has

been improper in Arizona since King was decided in 1988.

Furthermore, even if there were some ambiguity in the

Superior Court’s decision—which there is not—we would

still have to construe any ambiguity in the language in the

state court’s favor. See Woodford v. Visciotti,. 537 U.S. 19,

24 (2002) (“This readiness to attribute error is inconsistent

with the presumption that state courts know and follow the

law”).17Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated that we

17 Although Woodford concerned review under AEDPA, the Supreme

court indicated, citing Parker, 498 U.S. at 314–16, and other cases, that

the presumption that state courts know and follow the law was established

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should not “demand a formulary statement” by state courts. 

Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 9, (2002) (per curiam) (an

AEDPA case, but citing a pre-AEDPA decision, Lowenfield

v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, (1988), in support of its admonition). 

Thus, the concurrence’s approach goes against both Supreme

Court and Ninth Circuit case law when it not only construes

the trial court’s clear language as ambiguous, but then

interprets the ambiguity as reflecting an unconstitutional

standard.

The concurrence then proceeds to argue that Atkins

proceedings are different. “Consequently, where a state court

analyzing an Atkins claim fails to follow binding state law, its

decision does not simply violate state law, but also violates

the Eighth Amendment right provided by Atkins and the

violation is therefore cognizable by a federal habeas court.” 

Op. 44. Again relying on its stilted definition of “certainty,”

the concurrence asserts:

Here, the “certainty” standard applied by the

state trial court was plainly contrary to the

clear and convincing standard required by

Arizona’s statute and adopted by its supreme

court. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-

703.02(G); Grell II, 135 P.3d at 701 (“The

statute places on ‘the defendant . . . the burden

of proving mental retardation by clear and

convincing evidence’ in the pretrial hearing.”

(quoting § 13-703.02(G)) (alteration in

original)). Accordingly, the standard of proof

applied by the state trial court was not simply

before the enactment of AEDPA and thus applies to pre-AEDPA cases. 

Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24.

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contrary to state law but was also

unconstitutional under Atkins, see Williams,

2015 WL 4079430, at *4; Black, 664 F.3d at

97, and, accordingly, the state court’s findings

are not due any deference. See Lafferty,

949 F.2d at 1551 n. 4; Walker, 167 F.3d at

1345.

But this is not right. First, as noted, the state court

applied the less demanding preponderance of the evidence

test. Second, there is nothing in either the trial court’s

decision or the state appellate court’s memorandum

disposition that suggests that either court defined “certainty”

in a way that violated King, 736 P.2d 239. Third, Grell II,

which the majority cites, affirms that Smith had the burden of

proving mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence. 

Fourth, a review of the record in this case fully supports the

Superior Court’s factual determination that Smith had failed

either by clear and convincing evidence or a preponderance

of the evidence to show that he was intellectually disabled at

the time of the crime and his trial. Cherry-picking words

from the trial court’s decision and then giving them an

incorrect meaning does not undermine the clear logic of the

decision as affirmed by the state appellate court.

Perhaps aware that its first argument is less than

persuasive, the concurrence offers a second argument: that

“the standard of proof applied by the state trial court is

unconstitutional.” Op. 45. Again, based largely on its

incorrect definition of “certainty,” the concurrence asserts

that “a ‘certainty’ standard of proof transgresses the limits of

the state’s authority to craft appropriate procedures to enforce

Atkins and, in doing so, encroaches on the substantive

constitutional right.” Op. 45.

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This argument appears, in essence, to be an argument

against the constitutionality of the death penalty. The

majority claims that it does not “need to determine what

standard of proof the federal Constitution requires,” but “only

whether the Arizona court applied a standard it forbids.” Op.

45. It posits that “[w]hen the natural operation of a state’s

procedures for rendering factual determinations transgresses

a substantive constitutional right, those procedures are

unconstitutional.” Op. 46. The concurrence argues that “[i]t

is elementary that the ‘natural operation’ of applying a

heightened standard of proof can determine the outcome of

litigation, and thus the availability of a constitutional right.”18

Op. 46.

The concurrence next objects to the death penalty based

on the “inherent imprecision of psychiatric determinations of

mental illness.” Op. 49. Citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.

418, 430–32 (1979), it comments: “[a]s the Supreme Court

explained in rejecting the argument that the Constitution

requires use of a reasonable doubt standard in the context of

civil commitment proceedings, the unique nature of

psychiatric diagnosis renders factual determinations uniquely

unsusceptible to certainty.” Op. 47. The concurrence posits

that when, as in this case, the determination of an individual’s

intellectual ability at the time of the crime is not made until

years after the crime, certainty is “even less attainable and a

18 The concurrence’s authority for these assertions is a 1911 Supreme

Court opinion, Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), which held that

an Alabama statute that created a presumption of intent to injure violated

the 13th Amendment.

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certainty standard is even less constitutionally acceptable in

such cases.”19 Op. 49–50.

The concurrence concludes with the assertion that capital

punishment requires a “heightened degree of certainty.” Op

50. Accordingly, “where, as in Atkins, the Eighth

Amendment renders a class of individuals categorically

ineligible for execution, the procedures used to determine

whether a defendant falls into that class may not allocate

nearly all of the risk of an erroneous determination to the

defendant.” Op. 51. It reasons that by requiring Smith to

demonstrate with a “degree of certainty” that he was

intellectuallydisabled, the Arizona court allocated “nearlythe

 

19 In footnote 26, the concurrence asserts:

It is of no consequence to the analysis that Addington

and Atkins involve different burdens of proof than the

case at bar, because the focus here is on the effect of the

standard of proof. Under Addington, a state desiring

the civil commitment of an individual must demonstrate

that he suffers from mental illness, whereas under

Atkins an individual seeking to avoid execution by the

state must demonstrate intellectual disability. In both

situations, the determination heavily relies upon

psychiatric opinion, and thus in both situations a

standard of proof requiring “any degree of certainty” as

defined by Arizona law will often render it impossible

for a party to carry its burden. See Addington, 441 U.S.

at 432.

Again, this argument is based on the concurrence’s misinterpretation of

the trial court’s decision. Deciding whether a person has carried his

burden ofshowing an intellectual disability may well be difficult, but here

the state court carefully did so. Indeed, it is telling that the majority

attacks the decision by giving the words “any degree of certainty” a

meaning that they do not have.

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entire risk of an erroneous determination to Smith.” Op. 51. 

Thus, according to the concurrence, because “the factual

determination in question concerned an issue for which

certainty may be unattainable . . . and a penalty for which a

greater degree of reliability is required . . . [,] the

constitutional violation [is] even more clear.” Op. 51–52.

Judge Reinhardt is certainly entitled to his opinion, but it

is not the opinion of the panel or of the Ninth Circuit. The

concurrence is clearly contrary to the position of the Arizona

Supreme Court. State v. Grell (Grell III), 135 P.3d 696, 702

(Ariz. 2006) (en banc) (“We find no constitutional bar to

imposing the burden of proving mental retardation on the

defendant.”). The concurrence cites no Ninth Circuit case to

support its perspective. And it is not supported by any

decision by the United States Supreme Court, which denied

certiorari in Grell II (Grell v. Arizona, 127 S. Ct. 2246

(2007)), and accepted certain provisions of Arizona’s

proceedings in Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1996–97.

In sum, the assertion that the Arizona courts applied an

unconstitutional standard of proof fails first because it

misconstrues the Arizona Superior Court’s decision, and

ignores the ruling of the Arizona Court of Appeals, contrary

to both Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent. See

Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24; Parker, 498 U.S. at 315; Lopez,

491 F.3d at 1043 (stating “there are ways to construe the state

court’s ruling that would not make it ‘clearly untenable,’ and

we are therefore bound by the state courts’ interpretation and

application of its own procedural rules.”). The second arrow

in the concurrence’s quiver—that there is not sufficient

certainty to impose the death penalty on Smith—similarly

lacks support from either the Supreme Court or the Ninth

Circuit, as Arizona’s placement of the burden on the

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defendant to prove his intellectual disability has not been

disturbed in the eight years that have passed since the Arizona

Supreme Court decided Grell II in 2007.

III. Conclusion

The district court’s denial of the Smith’s petition should

be affirmed because an objective review of the extensive

record reveals that there is substantial evidence, if not

overwhelming evidence, that Smith failed to meet his burden

of showing that he was intellectually disabled in 1980–82,

when he murdered Sandy Owen and was tried, convicted and

sentenced. At a minimum, this conclusion is compelled by

the undeniable facts that: (a) Smith in 2005 had an IQ

between 87 and 93; (b) Smith lived independently and

supported himself for 15 years after he dropped out of school

and before the murder; and (c) the doctors who examined

Smith in 1980 to determine his competency to be tried found

no signs of intellectual disability. Furthermore, Dr.

Thompson’s approach of considering intellectual ability to be

fluid, while allowing for Smith’s alleged intellectual

disability to dissipate, offers no assurance as to when it did

so. The state courts took Smith’s claim of intellectual

disability seriously, and gave his assertions and the evidence

full consideration. An objective review of this record will not

support a finding—and certainly not a finding by this court on

review of a state habeas petition—that Smith met his burden

of showing that he was intellectually disabled in 1980. I

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would affirm the district court’s denial of Smith’s petition20

and I therefore dissent.

20 I would also affirm the district court’s holding that Smith has failed

to demonstrate cause to overcome his procedural default of his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. His invocation of Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.

Ct. 1309 (2012) fails because he has not demonstrated ineffective

assistance of counsel in his first state post-conviction proceeding, and

even if he did, this would not excuse Smith’s new counsel from raising

ineffective assistance of trial counsel in Smith’s second state postconviction proceeding. Moreover, Smith has not shown a reasonable

probabilitythat he received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. 

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Smith’s other

arguments are unavailing. He fails to demonstrate the existence of a

conflict of interest pervading the Pima County Public Defender’s Office;

the state habeas court’s denial of a psychological exam does not provide

cause for his procedural default; and to the extent that his claim was not

covered by Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860–61 (2002), the state

court’s application of its post-conviction waiver rule is adequate and

independent.

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