Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03112/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03112-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rodney Renard Goodall
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 1, 2000 Decided January 9, 2001

No. 99-3112

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Rodney Renard Goodall, a/k/a Goodoff,

a/k/a Grease,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00398-01)

Michelle Peterson, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.

J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Thomas S. Rees, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Wilma A.

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Lewis, United States Attorney, John R. Fisher and Thomas

J. Tourish, Jr., Assistant United States Attorneys.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Sentelle and Randolph,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Edwards, Chief Judge: The issue before the court on this

appeal is whether a sentencing court has discretion to accept

a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement with an agreed-upon sentence that falls outside of the

otherwise applicable Sentencing Guidelines range. Appellant

Rodney Goodall entered into just such an agreement. Facing

an eight-count indictment on various drug charges, Goodall

lodged a plea of guilty on one count of possession with intent

to distribute heroin. In his Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement,

he and the Government agreed to a sentencing range of 57 to

71 months. The District Court sentenced Goodall to 70

months.

In fixing Goodall's sentence, the District Court relied on a

Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") in which the probation officer calculated an applicable Sentencing Guidelines

range of 70 to 87 months. Citing the policy statement found

in s 6B1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the trial judge assumed that he could not accept a

sentence falling outside of the applicable 70-to-87-month

range. The judge also assumed that, pursuant to Rule

11(e)(4), he could not sentence Goodall to more than 71

months without allowing him the opportunity to withdraw his

plea. With both presumed constraints in mind, the judge

limited his consideration to a 70-to-71-month range, ultimately sentencing Goodall to what was perceived to be the

lowest legally permissible sentence, i.e., 70 months.

Goodall contends, and the Government agrees, that the

District Court was without authority to modify the parties'

plea agreement. In other words, the parties assert that the

trial judge had no authority to change the plea agreement's

sentence range from 57-71 months to 70-71 months. Goodall

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also contends, and the Government again agrees, that the

District Court erred in assuming that s 6B1.2 constrained the

court's authority to accept a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement

that embraced a sentence outside of the otherwise applicable

Guidelines range. We agree on both counts.

Both the Introduction to the Guidelines itself and the brief

introductory comments prefacing Chapter 6, Part B, state

that policy statements, such as s 6B1.2, are non-binding

"norms" to which courts may refer in deciding whether to

accept or to reject plea agreements. A District Court judge

certainly remains free to rely on the applicable Guidelines

range in determining whether to accept or reject a Rule

11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement. Section 6B1.2 does not compel

this, however. In this case, the trial judge assumed that he

could not accept a plea agreement with a 57-to-71-month

agreed-upon sentencing range, and, therefore, he also assumed that he could not sentence Goodall to a term below 70

months. This was error. We therefore vacate the District

Court's judgment and remand for resentencing consistent

with this opinion.

I. Background

Though we deal here with purely legal issues on which both

parties agree, we briefly set forth the facts to frame the

underlying legal claims. On November 17, 1998, a federal

grand jury handed down an eight-count indictment, charging

Goodall and four others with various counts of possession,

intent to distribute, and conspiracy to distribute heroin and

cocaine. Six months later, Goodall negotiated and entered

into a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement in which he consented

to plead guilty to count four of the indictment--unlawful

possession with intent to distribute heroin. The Government

agreed to dismiss the remaining seven counts. Critical for

present purposes, paragraph three of the plea agreement

provided:

Your client and the Government agree that a sentencing

range of 57 to 71 months is the appropriate sentence for

the offense to which your client is pleading guilty. The

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Government also agrees, pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1)(C) of

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to present this

plea agreement between the parties to the Court for its

approval.

Letter from Wilma A. Lewis, United States Attorney, to John

Beaman, Attorney for Defendant p 3 (May 12, 1999) (filed

May 13, 1999), reprinted in Appellant's Appendix ("App.") at

29. In keeping with Rule 11(e)(4), paragraph three also

explained that, if the judge refused to accept the plea agreement as written, Goodall would have the opportunity to

withdraw his plea. Id.

At the plea hearing, the prosecution informed the District

Court of an additional concession--namely, that the Government had agreed with defense counsel to recommend a sentence at the bottom of the 57-to-71-month range. Transcript

of Plea Hearing at 7-8 (May 13, 1999), reprinted in App. tab

A. The presiding judge acknowledged the concession, asking

Goodall, "you understand that both your lawyer and the

government lawyer will agree that although the range of this

plea agreement is from ... 57 to 71 months, they both agree

that the right sentence is the bottom end of that range of 57

months, right?" Id. at 8. The court added only, "if it's 59

months or 61 months or 71 months, if that is what I decide, it

will not make it possible for you to withdraw this guilty plea

as long as it is within the 57 to 71 months." Id. The

prosecution then made a factual proffer, to which Goodall

agreed. Id. at 12-14.

Sentencing took place two months later on July 30, 1999.

There, the District Court had the benefit of the PSR, in which

the probation officer had, based on interviews with Goodall,

calculated an applicable 70-to-87-month Guidelines range.

At sentencing, defense counsel did not contest those calculations, arguing instead that the court had already accepted,

and was therefore bound by, the 57-to-71-month range contained in the Rule 11(e)(1)(C) agreement. Transcript of

Sentencing at 3 (July 30, 1999), reprinted in App. tab B. The

trial judge, however, apparently relying on s 6B1.2 of the

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Guidelines, expressed concern that he had no discretion to

issue a sentence that was outside of the otherwise applicable

Guidelines range:

Well, that doesn't give me much discretion, does it? The

agreed range is 57 to 71 months, the guideline range is

70 to 87 months. The sentence I have to impose if I

accept the 11(e)(1)C [sic] plea is somewhere between 70

and 71 months.... I think the law makes it quite clear

that I can accept an 11(e)(1)C [sic] plea if it falls within

guidelines ranges and to the extent it falls within guidelines ranges unless there is a justifiable reason for a

departure downward. I have seen no application for a

downward departure, and I see no reason for a downward departure.

Id. at 3-4.

The prosecutor, in turn, argued that "proof problems" were

a "justifiable reason" for the court to accept a plea agreement

with a lower sentence. Id. at 4-6. The court again disagreed: "I read [s 6B1.2(c)(2)] and its use of the word 'depart'

to be a--to invoke all the law about departures.... I don't

see any of the standard reasons for departure if there's no

Koon ground that has been proffered here." Id. at 6-7.

Applying the overlapping 70-to-71-month range, the District

Court then sentenced Goodall to the lowest sentence it

thought possible--70 months. Id. at 14. The court never

gave Goodall a chance to withdraw his plea.

II. Analysis

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e) outlines federal

plea agreement procedures. At the time of sentencing in this

case, the Rule contemplated three different types of plea

agreements: (A) those in which the Government "move[s] for

dismissal of other charges"; (B) those in which the Government "make[s] a recommendation, or agree[s] not to oppose

the defendant's request, for a particular sentence, with the

understanding that such recommendation or request shall not

be binding upon the court"; and (C) those in which the

Government "agree[s] that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(A)-(C)

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(1999). Goodall and the prosecution entered into the third

type of plea arrangement.

Once a sentencing court rejects a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea

agreement, it must "on the record, inform the parties of this

fact, advise the defendant ... that the court is not bound by

the plea agreement [and] afford the defendant the opportunity to then withdraw the plea." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)

(1999); see also United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 676

(1997) ("This provision implements the commonsense notion

that a defendant can no longer be bound by an agreement

that the court has refused to sanction."). If, however, the

court accepts the agreement, it is binding on the court at

sentencing, and failure to abide by the terms of that agreement constitutes reversible error. See United States v. Ginyard, 215 F.3d 83, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam); see also

United States v. Cunavelis, 969 F.2d 1419, 1422 (2d Cir. 1992)

("The district court may accept or reject an (A) or (C) plea,

but it may not modify it.").

In the present case, Goodall's bargain with the Government

required the District Court to consider a sentence somewhere

between 57 and 71 months, with a recommendation from the

Government that it fall at the lower end of that range.

Goodall accepted the possibility that the District Court might

sentence him to 70 months. What he did not accept, however, was a sentencing at which the court considered only the

limited 70-to-71-month range, thereby foreclosing both the

Government's recommendation and the distinct possibility of

a sentence near the bottom of that range. By eliminating the

lower bulk of the range before considering the appropriate

sentence, the District Court modified Goodall's bargain and

impermissibly foisted an unanticipated, and clearly less favorable, term on appellant. See United States v. Mandell, 905

F.2d 970, 972-73 (6th Cir. 1990) (remanding for resentencing,

despite the fact that "the actual sentence fell within the

permissible range stated in the plea agreement, [because] it

was not arrived at by the method agreed upon").

Remand for resentencing in the present case begs the

larger question: Can the District Court, consistent with both

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Rule 11 and the Sentencing Guidelines, accept a Rule

11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement with an agreed-upon sentence that

falls outside of the applicable Guidelines range? Neither

Rule 11(e), nor the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in

general, sets forth criteria to guide a sentencing judge's

decision to accept or to reject a plea agreement. Sentencing

Guidelines policy statement s 6B1.2, however, provides that,

"[i]n the case of a plea agreement that includes a specific

sentence [Rule 11(e)(1)(C)], the court may accept the agreement if the court is satisfied either that: (1) the agreed

sentence is within the applicable guideline range; or (2) the

agreed sentence departs from the applicable guideline range

for justifiable reasons." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

s 6B1.2(c) (1998) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. The commentary to

s 6B1.2 says that "the court should accept ... a plea agreement requiring imposition of a specific sentence only if the

court is satisfied either that such sentence is an appropriate

sentence within the applicable guideline range or, if not, that

the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range for

justifiable reasons (i.e., that such departure is authorized by

18 U.S.C. s 3553(b))." U.S.S.G. s 6B1.2 cmt. The District

Court obviously thought that s 6B1.2 constrained its acceptance and/or application of Goodall's plea agreement. We

respectfully disagree.

The District Court is not alone in its reading of s 6B1.2(c).

By our count, two of our sister circuits have assumed, without

much analysis, that s 6B1.2 limits a sentencing court's discretion under Rule 11(e) to accept or to reject a plea agreement.

E.g., United States v. Carrozza, 4 F.3d 70, 87 (1st Cir. 1993);

Fields v. United States, 963 F.2d 105, 108 (6th Cir. 1992) ("A

sentencing judge could no longer be forced to abide by an

agreed to sentence where that sentence did not conform to

the Guidelines, as that would eviscerate their purpose.").

The remainder of the circuits to consider the question, however, have held that s 6B1.2 does not trump Rule 11(e)'s

otherwise permissive language. E.g., United States v.

Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Plea agreements

can retain their authority to bind the government, the defendant and the district court even when they provide for

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sentences that depart from the prescriptions of the guidelines."); United States v. Mukai, 26 F.3d 953, 956-57 (9th

Cir. 1994); Cunavelis, 969 F.2d at 1422; see also John M.

Dick, Note, Allowing Sentencing Bargains to Fall Outside of

the Guidelines without Valid Departures, 48 Hastings L.J.

1017, 1046-50 (1997) (discussing the inter-circuit disagreement).

Though both s 6B1.2 and its commentary speak in mandatory terms, we do not interpret those provisions in a vacuum.

Both the Introduction to the Sentencing Guidelines itself and

the introductory commentary to Chapter 6, Part B state that

Chapter 6 policy statements dealing with acceptance or rejection of plea agreements should not interfere with the Commission's ongoing study of courts' plea agreement practices

pursuant to Rule 11(e):

The Commission decided not to make major changes in

plea agreement practices in the initial guidelines, but

rather to provide guidance by issuing general policy

statements concerning the acceptance of plea agreements

in Chapter Six, Part B (Plea Agreements). The rules set

forth in Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e) govern the acceptance or

rejection of such agreements. The Commission will collect data on the courts' plea practices and will analyze

this information to determine when and why the courts

accept or reject plea agreements and whether plea

agreement practices are undermining the intent of the

Sentencing Reform Act. In light of this information and

analysis, the Commission will seek to further regulate

the plea agreement process as appropriate.... [T]he

guidelines create a norm to which courts will likely refer

when they decide whether, under Rule 11(e), to accept or

to reject a plea agreement or recommendation.

U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A4(c); see also id. ch. 6, pt. B, introductory

cmt. ("[T]he Commission shall study plea agreement practice

under the guidelines and ultimately develop standards for

judges to use in determining whether to accept plea agreements. Because of the difficulty in anticipating problems in

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selves to some degree experimental, substantive restrictions

on judicial discretion would be premature at this stage of the

Commission's work."). In light of this commentary, it is clear

that the Commission promulgated the policy statement in

s 6B1.2 to guide, not to constrain, courts in deciding whether

to accept or to reject a plea agreement. Were we to find

otherwise, there would be no plea practice for the Commission to study nor any data to inform future promulgation of

binding guidelines. The Commission did not intend s 6B1.2

to bind courts.

Our conclusion that s 6B1.2(c) does not constrain a court's

otherwise broad discretion to accept or to reject a plea

agreement is fortified by the 1999 amendments to Rule 11(e).

Under the current version of Rule 11(e)(1)(C), the prosecution

and defendant can agree that

a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate

disposition of the case, or that a particular provision of

the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement or sentencing factor is or is not applicable to the case. Such a

plea agreement is binding on the court once it is accepted

by the court.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(C) (2000). Thus, as now written, the

Rule plainly countenances agreed-upon sentences falling outside of the otherwise applicable Guidelines range. And the

Advisory Committee note makes clear that the 1999 amendments were meant only to clarify, not to substantively alter,

Rule 11(e)(1)'s previous incarnation: "As is the situation

under the current Rule, the court retains absolute discretion

whether to accept a plea agreement." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11

advisory committee's note (emphasis added).

Under our holding today, the District Court remains free to

consider the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range--both in

deciding on whether to accept an agreed-upon sentence and

in deciding on an appropriate sentence within an accepted

range. It is simply not compelled to do so.

The concurring opinion suggests that 18 U.S.C. s 3553(b)

appears to mandate a Guidelines sentence unless there is a

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justifiable basis for a departure under the Guidelines. This

attributes too much to s 3553(b), we think. The statute

merely says that the court must impose a sentence of the

kind and within the range referred to in the Guidelines.

Therefore, we must determine in any given situation what the

Guidelines say in order to know whether a sentence is of the

kind and within the range permitted. In other words,

s 3553(b), without more, tells us very little. When we turn to

the Guidelines, we find some very strong evidence as to how

this situation should be handled. Indeed, the Introduction to

the Sentencing Guidelines anticipates the precise issue that

we now face:

The Commission decided not to make major changes in

plea agreement practices in the initial guidelines, but

rather to provide guidance by issuing general policy

statements concerning the acceptance of plea agreements

in Chapter Six, Part B (Plea Agreements). The rules set

forth in Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e) govern the acceptance or

rejection of such agreements.... [T]he guidelines create

a norm to which courts will likely refer when they decide

whether, under Rule 11(e), to accept or to reject a plea

agreement or recommendation.

U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A4(c). This is not mere commentary

overriding a policy statement; this is an introduction to the

policy statement that explains what it means. And, as we

observe above, it is clear from what the Commission says that

the policy statement in s 6B1.2 was promulgated to guide,

not to constrain, courts in deciding whether to accept or to

reject a plea agreement. This conclusion is perfectly consistent with the result reached in United States v. Hooker, 993

F.2d 898, 900 (D.C. Cir. 1993), where we held that similar

prefatory language rendered certain Chapter 7 policy statements "merely advisory".

Having found that the District Court improperly believed

itself bound to the 70-to-87-month range, we must decide the

appropriate remedy. Unfortunately, it is not clear from the

record whether the District Court, by applying the 70-to-71-

month range, implicitly rejected the plea agreement without

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giving Goodall an opportunity to withdraw his plea, or whether, as seems more likely, the District Court accepted and then

impermissibly modified the agreed-upon range. If, as we

suspect, the District Court meant to accept the plea bargain,

but then modified the agreement in light of the PSR, it should

proceed immediately with resentencing, considering the whole

of the the 57-to-71-month range. If, however, the District

Court intended to reject the plea agreement, then Goodall

must be allowed to withdraw his plea.

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment and

remand to the District Court for resentencing consistent with

this opinion.

So ordered.

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Randolph, Circuit Judge, concurring: This case is an

oddity. When district judges accept plea agreements specifying a particular sentence below the Guidelines range, we

almost never review the cases on appeal--for two reasons.

One, the government and the defendant can be expected to be

happy with the disposition and to have no reason to appeal.

Two, neither the government nor the defendant may, in

general, appeal a sentence that falls within the bargained-for

range.1 See 18 U.S.C. s 3742(c). Only the district court's

mistake in modifying and accepting Goodall's plea agreement

brings the question to our attention--the question, that is,

whether a district judge may accept a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea

agreement specifying a sentence below the range set forth in

the Sentencing Guidelines.

This question cannot be answered without considering the

Sentencing Reform Act, and specifically 18 U.S.C. s 3553(b).

Because I believe that this provision requires more attention

than the majority opinion gives it, I write separately.

The Sentencing Guidelines, as issued by the United States

Sentencing Commission, are binding on the federal courts.

See 18 U.S.C. s 3551(a); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S.

36, 42 (1993); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 391

(1989). The Supreme Court so held on the basis of 18 U.S.C.

s 3553(b), which reads as follows:

The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and

within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) ["the

guidelines issued by the Sentencing Commission"] unless

the court finds that there exists an aggravating or miti-

__________

1 Defendants have four statutory grounds to appeal a sentence.

See 18 U.S.C. s 3742(a). Two of those grounds are foreclosed to

defendants like Goodall who enter into plea agreements under Rule

11(e)(1)(C) and receive a sentence within the bargained-for range.

See 18 U.S.C. s 3742(c)(1). Under 18 U.S.C. s 3742(a)(1), Goodall

is still permitted to appeal a sentence "imposed in violation of law."

I agree with the majority that Goodall's sentence was illegal because the district judge accepted the plea agreement and then

modified it. The judge's only choice was to accept or reject the

bargain outright. See United States v. Ginyard, 215 F.3d 83, 87

(D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. Veri, 108 F.3d 1311, 1314-15

(10th Cir. 1997).

gating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result

in a sentence different from that described.

18 U.S.C. s 3553(b) (emphasis added); see also Stinson, 508

U.S. at 42. On the face of it, s 3553(b) precludes a district

judge from imposing a sentence outside the Guidelines. Section 3553(b) does not instruct district courts merely to consult

the Guidelines for guidance on guilty pleas. If it did, I could

go along with the majority opinion's exploration of ambiguities in the Guidelines. But the statute directs the district

courts to sentence "within the range" for the "applicable

category of offense" and the "applicable category of defendant." 18 U.S.C. s 3553(a)(4) & (b). This language requires

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district courts to hand down the sentence specified for the

defendant's criminal history and the offense to which he pled

guilty, regardless of Guidelines commentary on guilty pleas.

Section 3553(b)'s "shall-unless" logical structure specifies

the sole occasion on which a district court may depart from

the Guidelines--failure of the Commission to consider adequately an aggravating or mitigating circumstance. See, e.g.,

United States v. Adonis, 891 F.2d 300, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

One might suppose that Goodall's guilty plea constituted just

such a mitigating circumstance. But we rejected that argument in United States v. Dukes, 936 F.2d 1281 (D.C. Cir.

1991), a case, like this one, presenting the question whether a

guilty plea is a circumstance the Commission adequately took

into account. We held that a "guilty plea, whether entered

pursuant to an agreement or not, does not qualify under 18

U.S.C. s 3553(b). It is a circumstance the Sentencing Commission did take into account," for instance in the reduction

for acceptance of responsibility. See 936 F.2d at 1282.

The Sentencing Commission's policy statement governing

plea agreements restates s 3553(b): "In the case of a plea

agreement that includes a specific sentence [Rule 11(e)(1)(C)],

the court may accept the agreement if the court is satisfied

either that: (1) the agreed sentence is within the applicable

guideline range [the 'shall' component of s 3553(b)]; or (2)

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the agreed sentence departs from the applicable guideline

range for justifiable reasons [the 'unless' component of

s 3553(b)]." USSG s 6B1.2(c), p.s. (Nov. 2000). Commentary interpreting this policy statement makes clear that justifiable reasons are only those "authorized by 18 U.S.C.

s 3553(b)." USSG s 6B1.2 cmt.

Thus, 18 U.S.C. s 3553(b) and policy statement 6B1.2(c)

forbid district judges to accept plea agreements specifying

sentences below the Guidelines range. The Commission explained: "A defendant who enters a plea of guilty in a timely

manner will enhance the likelihood of his receiving a reduction in offense level under s 3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility). Further reduction in offense level (or sentence) due

to a plea agreement will tend to undermine the sentencing

guidelines." USSG s 6B1.2 cmt. (emphasis added).

The majority opinion relies on introductory commentary

relating to "the Commission's ongoing study of courts' plea

agreement practices." Maj. Op. at 8. But Guidelines commentary can never justify ignoring the federal sentencing

statute. Absent some contrary--and superior--authority,

s 3553(b) requires the district courts to sentence plea defendants under the Guidelines. Cf. Stinson, 508 U.S. at 43, 45.

If Guidelines commentary cannot supersede s 3553(b),

what of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(C)? This portion of Rule 11

permits the government and defendant to 34agree that a

specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case, or that a particular provision of the

Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement or sentencing

factor is or is not applicable to the case.34 Since the Rule

permits the parties to agree that particular Guidelines provisions and factors are inapplicable, the parties can decide that

a Guidelines sentencing range will not apply. On its face,

then, Rule 11(e)(1)(C) conflicts with s 3553(b): the Rule

allows the sort of below-the-guidelines bargain Goodall obtained here.2 Cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 941

__________

2 It is possible to read Rule 11(e)(1)(C) more narrowly so that the

references to a specific guidelines range and the like merely entitle

a defendant to embody in the plea agreement certain fundamental

(7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Gilchrist, 130 F.3d 1131,

1134 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Aguilar, 884 F. Supp.

88, 91-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).

Given the conflict, we must turn to the 34supersession

clause34 in 28 U.S.C.A. s 2072(b): 34all laws in conflict with such

rules shall be of no further force or effect. The

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portion of Rule 11(e)(1)(C) dealing with the Guidelines was

added in 1999. Congress last amended s 3553(b) in 1998.

Under the supersession clause, the 1999 amendment to Rule

11(e)(1)(C) takes precedence.

Goodall entered his plea agreement in May 1999 and was

sentenced the following July. The amendment to Rule

11(e)(1)(C) permitting his below-the-Guidelines bargain did

not take effect until December 1, 1999. On remand, the

district court should consider whether to accept or reject

Goodall's plea in accordance with the present version of the

rule.

__________

assumptions, thereby creating in him the power to withdraw from

the plea if the district court does not employ those assumptions in

sentencing. But I believe that such a reading would be incorrect.

Before its amendment in 1999, the rule already permitted the

defendant to embody assumptions in the agreement that will bind

the district court. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3) ("If the court

accepts the plea agreement, the court shall inform the defendant

that it will embody in the judgment and sentence the disposition

provided for in the plea agreement."); 11(e)(4) ("If the court rejects

the plea agreement, the court shall ... afford the defendant the

opportunity to then withdraw the plea....").

USCA Case #99-3112 Document #567542 Filed: 01/09/2001 Page 15 of 15