Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-01819/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-01819-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Seing Chao
Plaintiff
County of Shasta
Defendant
Deanne Elliot
Defendant
Tyler Finch
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEING CHAO,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SHASTA, a public entity; 

AGENT TYLER FINCH, of the Shasta 

County Interagency Narcotics Task 

Force; DEANNE ELLIOT; and DOES 1 

to 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:21-cv-01819-MCE-DMC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Through the present lawsuit, Plaintiff Seing Chao (“Plaintiff”) alleges that she 

sustained injuries as a result of the execution of a faulty search warrant obtained by the 

Shasta Interagency Narcotics Task Force, a collaborative effort to reduce narcotics 

within Defendant Shasta County (“County”). The Court previously granted with leave to 

amend a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint filed by the County. 

Plaintiff timely filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), dropping her original claims 

against the County relating to the use of force and the identification of marijuana and 

adding new claims for retaliatory prosecution against both the County and a new 

defendant, Deputy District Attorney DeAnne Elliott. The County and Ms. Elliot now move 

to dismiss those new claims as well. ECF Nos. 27, 32.1 For the following reasons, both

1 The County’s Motion is fully briefed, but Plaintiff failed to file an opposition to Ms. Elliot’s Motion. 

Case 2:21-cv-01819-DJC-DMC Document 34 Filed 02/01/23 Page 1 of 3
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Motions are GRANTED.2 

First, as a threshold matter, because Plaintiff chose not to replead the causes of 

action dismissed by way of the Court’s last order, those original claims are hereby 

DISMISSED with prejudice. Second, Plaintiff did not seek leave of the Court to add new 

claims or parties. The claims at issue here are thus improperly before the Court and 

subject to dismissal on that basis as well. Third, even if that were not the case, Plaintiff’s 

new claims are flawed as a matter of law because under the circumstances alleged: 

(1) prosecutors are classified as officers of the state as opposed to a county; and (2) 

they are entitled to absolute immunity. See Pekin v. Cnty. of San Benito, No. C05-05402 

HRL, 2008 WL 440581, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2008). Accordingly, both causes of 

action must be DISMISSED on this basis as well.

For the reasons set forth above, both Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 27, 32) are 

GRANTED with final leave to amend.3 Not later than twenty (20) days following the date 

this Memorandum and Order is electronically filed, Plaintiff may, but is not required to, 

file an amended complaint.4 If no amended pleading is timely filed, the causes of action 

2 On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 

all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 

41, 47 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require detailed 

factual allegations. However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief 

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

will not do.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal 

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to grant leave to 

amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory 

motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the 

amendment, [or] futility of [the] amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence 

Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to be 

considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). 

3 Having determined that oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court ordered the 

Motions submitted on the briefs pursuant to E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g). 

4 Plaintiff is permitted to re-plead the causes of action set forth in the SAC against the defendants 

already included. No new claims or parties shall be added absent further leave of Court. 

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dismissed by virtue of this Order will be deemed dismissed with prejudice upon no 

further notice to the parties. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 1, 2023

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