Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-00639/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-00639-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nay Aung
Defendant
S. Gates
Defendant
Edward David Jones
Plaintiff
M. Lorgoza
Defendant
Mariana Loterstein
Defendant
Gigi Matteson
Defendant
Marcus Smith
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD DAVID JONES,

Plaintiff,

v. 

MARIANA LOTERSTEIN, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:22-CV-0639-DJC-DMC-P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, ECF No. 27. 

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was 

initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. 

Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 

portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 

complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, 

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concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice 

of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 

1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity 

overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail 

to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening 

required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

 Plaintiff initiated this action with a pro se complaint filed on April 11, 2022. See

ECF No. 1. Plaintiff named four defendants: (1) Mariana Loterstein; (2) Nay Aung; (3) S. Gates; 

and (4) Marcus Smith. See id. On June 15, 2022, the Court issued an order addressing the 

sufficiency of Plaintiff’s complaint. See ECF No. 11. The Court concluded that Plaintiff’s 

complaint stated cognizable Eighth Amendment claims against Loterstein and Aung, but that 

Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim against Gates or Smith. See id. Plaintiff was afforded 

an opportunity to amend. See id. 

 Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint on July 7, 2022. See ECF No. 12. 

Before the Court could address the first amended complaint, Plaintiff sought leave to amend 

further. See ECF No. 13. On January 12, 2023, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to 

amend as unnecessary because Plaintiff had not yet amended as-of-right under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 15. See ECF No. 14. Plaintiff was given leave to file a second amended 

complaint as-of-right within 30 days and cautioned that, if no second amended complaint was 

filed, the action would proceed on the July 7, 2022, first amended complaint. See ECF No. 14. 

After receiving several extensions of time, Plaintiff timely filed his second amended complaint. 

See ECF No. 24. 

/ / /

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 In the second amended complaint, Plaintiff named the same four defendants as 

previously named – Loterstein, Aung, Gates, and Smith. See id. at 7-10. Plaintiff also named 

two new defendants – Gigi Matteson, the Warden at California State Prison – Solano (CSPSolano), and M. Lorgoza, Chief Executive Officer for health care at CSP-Solano. See id. 

Because the second amended complaint was filed as-of-right, leave of court to add new 

defendants was not required and the Clerk of the Court was directed to update the docket. See

ECF No. 26. In assessing the pleading's sufficiency, the Court concluded that the second 

amended complaint stated cognizable claims against Defendants Loterstein and Aung, but that the 

allegations as to the remaining defendants were deficient for failure to show a causal connection 

to a constitutional violation. See id. 

 Plaintiff filed the currently pending third amended complaint on June 17, 2024. 

See ECF No. 27. Plaintiff continues to name Loterstein, Aung, Gates, Smith, Matteson, and 

Lorgoza. See id. at 1, 8. 

B. Plaintiff's Current Allegations

 Plaintiff states that, after years of requesting medical treatment and delay, it was 

finally determined that he required emergency surgery. See id. at 3. According to this delay, he 

suffered significant injury and pain and nearly died. See id. 

 Defendants Loterstein and Aung 

 Loterstein and Aung were Plaintiff's primary care physicians at CSP-Solano. See

id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges these defendants failed to provide adequate medical treatment and 

delayed in providing treatment to Plaintiff's serious abdominal condition, leading to further injury 

and pain and suffering. See id. More specifically as to Defendant Loterstein, Plaintiff alleges 

that Loterstein was aware of various complications related to Plaintiff's conditions yet "voided the 

probable course surgery. . . ." Id. at 12. 

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 Defendant Smith

 Plaintiff claims that Defendant Smith, a prison nurse, was the first person he saw 

regarding his abdominal pain. See id. According to Plaintiff, Smith assured Plaintiff that he 

would be okay and provided Plaintiff with medication. See id. at 12-13. Plaintiff states that he 

saw Smith at a second visit where Plaintiff again reported severe pain. See id. Plaintiff adds: 

"Plaintiff believes that the date was the Friday before Smith was arrested." Id. at 13. 

 Defendants Matteson, Lorgoza, and Gates

 Defendant Matteson is alleged to have been the warden at CSP-Solano during the 

relevant time period of Plaintiff's medical treatment at that facility. See id. at 8. Defendant 

Lorgoza is claimed to have been the chief executive assigned to review of inmate health care 

grievances during the relevant time period. See id. Plaintiff states that Defendant Gates was at 

all relevant times the chief executive in charge of medical care at CSP-Solano. See id. at 9.

 Plaintiff alleges: "Supervisory staff, including Defendants G. Matteson, S. Gates, 

and N. Lorgoza, possess the power to order mental counseling or a transfer to a medical facility." 

Id. at 15. Plaintiff claims that, despite suffering mental anguish as a result of his worsening and 

untreated abdominal condition, he was never provided counseling. See id. Plaintiff adds that 

Gates was deliberately indifferent for denying Plaintiff's medical grievances, finding that the 

issue had been resolved because Plaintiff was being provided treatment. See id. at 22. Plaintiff 

claims Defendant Lorgoza is similarly responsible by failing to reach the merits of some of 

Plaintiff's medical grievances, which were screened on procedural grounds. See id. at 23. 

II. DISCUSSION

 The Court finds that Plaintiff's third amended complaint states sufficient facts to 

establish a plausible claim for relief against Defendants Loterstein and Aung. By separate order, 

the Court will direct service of process on these two defendants. The third amended complaint, 

however, as with the second amended complaint, fails to state sufficient facts to establish a claim 

for relief against Defendants Matteson, Lorgoza, Gates, or Smith. As to Defendant Smith, a 

prison nurse, the facts alleged do not allow for an inference that Smith was deliberately 

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indifferent. As to Matteson, Lorgoza, and Gates, who are alleged to be supervisory prison 

officials, Plaintiff does not allege facts showing these defendants' personal involvement with 

Plaintiff's medical care and the claimed delays in treatment. 

A. Defendant Smith

 Plaintiff's allegations as against Defendant Smith fail because Plaintiff does not 

assert facts from which the Court can draw a reasonable inference that Defendant Smith was 

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs. 

 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 

prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel 

and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 

511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . .embodies broad and idealistic concepts of 

dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 

(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. 

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with 

“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 

801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when 

two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such 

that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of 

inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 

official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 

 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious 

injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; 

see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health 

needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by 

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). An injury or illness is sufficiently serious if the failure to 

treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the “. . . unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled 

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on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); see 

also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). 

 Despite several amended pleadings and advisements from the Court on the 

applicable legal principles, Plaintiff's allegations as to Defendant Smith remain sparse. 

According to Plaintiff, Smith was the first medical professional Plaintiff saw relating to his 

abdominal condition. Plaintiff states that Smith assured him he would be okay and provided 

medication. These allegations do not allow for an inference that Smith was deliberately 

indifferent to a serious medical condition. To the contrary, the facts alleged indicate that Smith, a 

prison nurse, heard Plaintiff's complaints and provided some treatment. Given that Plaintiff has 

been provided with multiple opportunities to provide factual support for his Eighth Amendment 

claim against Smith and has failed to do so, further leave to amend is not warranted. 

B. Defendants Matteson, Lorgoza, and Gates

 Plaintiff's allegations against Defendants Matterson, Lorgoza, and Gates, who are 

all alleged to be supervisory prison officials are insufficient for two reasons. As to all three, 

Plaintiff fails to establish these defendants' personal involvement in Plaintiff's health care. 

Rather, Plaintiff's allegations stem from the notion that supervisory defendants are liable for the 

acts of subordinates. Second, as to Defendants Lorgoza and Gates, Plaintiff's claims stem 

primarily from their handling of Plaintiff's inmate grievances, which does not support a claim for 

relief. 

 1. Personal Involvement

 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 

employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no 

respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional 

violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. 

Supervisory personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation 

of constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may be liable even 

where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v. Cnty of San 

Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). A supervisory defendant may also be 

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liable where he or she knew of constitutional violations but failed to act to prevent them. See

Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; see also Starr v. Baca, 633 F.3d 1191, 1209 (9th Cir. 2011). 

 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such 

defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 

Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 

1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in 

civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 

Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 

official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 676 (2009). 

 It is clear that the basis of Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Matteson, Lorgoza, 

and Gates is a respondeat superior legal theory. Beyond Plaintiff's allegation that, as supervisory 

defendants, Matteson, Lorgoza, and Gates possess the power to order mental health counseling or 

a transfer to a medical facility, the third amended complaint contains no allegations showing how 

these defendants were personally involved in Plaintiff's health care at CSP-Solano. Again, 

Plaintiff has been repeatedly advised of the requirement that his claims be supported by 

allegations showing each named defendant's personal involvement. Thus, further leave to amend 

is not warranted. 

 2. Inmate Grievance Process

 Prisoners have no stand-alone due process rights related to the administrative 

grievance process. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Ramirez v. 

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is no liberty interest entitling 

inmates to a specific grievance process). Because there is no right to any particular grievance 

process, it is impossible for due process to have been violated by ignoring or failing to properly 

process grievances. Numerous district courts in this circuit have reached the same conclusion. 

See Smith v. Calderon, 1999 WL 1051947 (N.D. Cal 1999) (finding that failure to properly 

process grievances did not violate any constitutional right); Cage v. Cambra, 1996 WL 506863 

(N.D. Cal. 1996) (concluding that prison officials’ failure to properly process and address 

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grievances does not support constitutional claim); James v. U.S. Marshal’s Service, 1995 WL 

29580 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (dismissing complaint without leave to amend because failure to process 

a grievance did not implicate a protected liberty interest); Murray v. Marshall, 1994 WL 245967 

(N.D. Cal. 1994) (concluding that prisoner’s claim that grievance process failed to function 

properly failed to state a claim under § 1983). 

 Plaintiff claims Defendants Lorgoza and Gates are liable by way of their handling 

of Plaintiff's inmate grievances related to health care at CSP-Solano. However, as explained, 

above, Plaintiff has no right to a particular grievance result and there is no stand-alone 

constitutional claim based on the handling of inmate grievances. 

III. CONCLUSION

 Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be 

cured by amending the complaint, Plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of 

the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends as follows: 

 1. This action proceed on Plaintiff's third amended complaint as to his Eighth 

Amendment medical deliberate indifference claims against Defendants Loterstein and Aung only. 

 2. Defendants Matteson, Lorgoza, Gates, and Smith be dismissed with 

prejudice for failure to state a claim.

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of 

objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: August 27, 2024 

____________________________________ 

DENNIS M. COTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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