Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01243/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01243-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lexmark International, Inc.
Appellee
MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC
Appellant
Ricoh Americas Corporation
Appellee
Xerox Corporation
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS, LLC,

Appellant

v.

RICOH AMERICAS CORPORATION, XEROX 

CORPORATION, LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL, 

INC.,

Appellees

______________________ 

2016-1243

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2014-

00538.

______________________ 

Decided: February 13, 2017

______________________ 

 VIVEK GANTI, Hill Kertscher & Wharton LLP, Atlanta, 

GA, argued for appellant. Also represented by STEVEN G.

HILL. 

 JON WRIGHT, Sterne Kessler Goldstein & Fox, PLLC, 

Washington, DC, argued for appellees. Also represented 

by MICHAEL D. SPECHT, RICHARD M. BEMBEN. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

Case: 16-1243 Document: 38-2 Page: 1 Filed: 02/13/2017
2 MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge NEWMAN. 

Opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part filed by 

Circuit Judge O’MALLEY. 

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.

MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC appeals the decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board” or 

“PTAB”), on Inter Partes Review, that claims 1–8 of 

MPHJ’s U.S. Patent No. 8,488,173 (“the ’173 Patent”) are 

invalid on the grounds of anticipation or obviousness.1 

On appellate review, we affirm the Board’s decision.

To determine the validity of a patented invention, the 

meaning and scope of the claims are first determined. See 

Smiths Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Vital Signs, Inc., 183 F.3d 

1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[T]he first step in any validity analysis is to construe the claims of the invention to 

determine the subject matter for which patent protection 

is sought.”). As ratified by the Supreme Court in Cuozzo 

Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016), 

when unexpired patents are reviewed by the Board, the 

claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation 

consistent with the specification and the prosecution 

history, from the viewpoint of persons skilled in the field 

of the invention. 

BACKGROUND

The ’173 Patent, entitled “Distributed Computer Architecture and Process for Document Management,”

describes a system and method that “extends the notion of 

copying from a process that involves paper going through 

a conventional copier device, to a process that involves 

paper being scanned from a device at one location and 

1 Ricoh Ams. Corp. v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., No. 

IPR2014-00538, 2015 WL 4911675, (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 

2015) (“Bd. Op.”).

 

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MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 3

copied to a device at another location.” ’173 Patent, col. 5, 

ll. 51–55. The ’173 Patent calls its invention a “Virtual 

Copier” (“VC”) whose purpose is “to enable a typical PC 

user to add electronic paper processing to their existing 

business process.” ’173 Patent, col. 5, ll. 47–50. The 

patent states that its VC replicates an image “using a 

single GO or START button, to do a similar operation in 

software so that the image gets seamlessly replicated into 

other devices or applications or the Internet.” ’173 Patent, col. 6, ll. 38–43. Patent Figure 28 illustrates various 

input devices and destinations, moving by software

through the virtual copier:

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4 MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 

The challengers, Ricoh Americas Corporation, Xerox 

Corporation, and Lexmark International, Inc. (collectively, “Petitioner”), requested Inter Partes Review of claims 

1–8, all of the ’173 Patent claims, in accordance with 35 

U.S.C. § 311 et seq. The PTAB instituted review, construed the claims, conducted a hearing, and held the 

claims unpatentable based on several prior art references. 

The PTAB found claims 1–8 anticipated by the Xerox 

Network Systems Architecture General Information Manual dated April 1985 (“XNS”) and the XNS features in 

Xerox 150 Graphic Input Station Operator and Reference 

Manual dated January 1985 (“GIS 150”). The PTAB also 

found claims 1–8 anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 5,513,126 

to Harkins, and/or obvious in view of the combination of 

Harkins and U.S. Patent No. 5,818,603 to Motoyama. On 

this appeal MPHJ argues that the Board incorrectly

broadly construed the claims and that on the correct 

narrow claim construction the claims are neither anticipated nor obvious.

System claim 1 and method claim 4, the independent 

claims, were deemed representative:

1. A system capable of transmitting at least one of 

an electronic image, electronic graphics and electronic document to a plurality of external destinations including one or more of external devices, 

local files and applications responsively connectable to at least one communication network, comprising:

at least one network addressable scanner, digital 

copier or other multifunction peripheral capable of

rendering at least one of said electronic image, 

electronic graphics and electronic document in response to a selection of a Go button;

at least one memory storing a plurality of interface protocols for interfacing and communicating;

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at least one processor responsively connectable to 

said at least one memory, and implementing the 

plurality of interface protocols as a software application for interfacing and communicating with the 

plurality of external destinations including the 

one or more of the external devices and applications,

wherein one of said plurality of interface protocols 

is employed when one of said external destinations is email application software;

wherein a second of said plurality of interface protocols is employed when the one of said external 

destinations is a local file;

wherein a plurality of said external destinations is 

in communication with said at least one network 

addressable scanner, digital copier or other multifunction peripheral over a local area network;

wherein at least one of said external destinations 

receives said electronic image, electronic graphics 

and electronic document as a result of a transmission over the at least one communication network;

a printer other than said at least one network addressable scanner, digital copier or other multifunction peripheral;

wherein, in response to the selection of said Go 

button, an electronic document management system integrates at least one of said electronic image, electronic graphics and electronic documentusing software so that said electronic image, electronic graphics and electronic document gets 

seamlessly replicated and transmitted to at least 

one of said plurality of external destinations;

wherein at least one of said electronic image, electronic graphics and electronic document is proCase: 16-1243 Document: 38-2 Page: 5 Filed: 02/13/2017
6 MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 

cessed by said at least one network addressable 

scanner, digital copier or other multifunction peripheral into a file format, and wherein a plurality 

of said external destinations are compatible with 

said file format without having to modify said external destinations; and

wherein upon said replication and seamless 

transmission to at least one of said external destinations, said electronic image, electronic graphics 

and electronic document is communicable across a 

network to at least three other of said external 

destinations, and is optionally printable by said 

printer.

’173 Patent, col. 86, ll. 9–63. MPHJ states that the 

claimed “seamless” transmission requires a one-step 

operation without human intervention, and that this 

system is not shown in the prior art. 

For method claim 4, MPHJ emphasizes the provision 

for “interfacing between at least one of said scanner, 

digital copier or other multifunction peripheral and email 

application software” in claim section (d), and argues that 

this means that the operation from scanner to email 

destination occurs in a single step. Claim 4 states: 

4. A method of managing at least one of an electronic image, electronic graphics or electronic document comprising the steps of, in any order:

(a) transmitting a plurality of any of said electronic image, electronic graphics or electronic document from a source address to a plurality of 

external destinations including one or more of external devices, local files and applications responsive to said source address using at least one 

communication network;

(b) rendering said plurality of any of said electronic image, electronic graphics or electronic docuCase: 16-1243 Document: 38-2 Page: 6 Filed: 02/13/2017
MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 7

ment by a network addressable scanner, digital 

copier or other multifunction peripheral located at 

said source address;

(c) communicatively linking said scanner, digital 

copier or other multifunction peripheral with said 

plurality of said external destinations via application-level interface protocols;

(d) interfacing between at least one of said scanner, digital copier or other multifunction peripheral and email application software using a first of 

said interface protocols;

(e) interfacing between at least one of said scanner, digital copier or other multifunction peripheral and a local file using a second of said 

interface protocols;

(f) communicating over a local area network between said at least one of said scanner, digital 

copier or other multifunction peripheral and said 

plurality of said external destinations;

(g) transmitting a first electronic image, electronic 

graphics or electronic document from said at least 

one of said scanner, digital copier or other multifunction peripheral to at least one of said external 

destinations where at least a portion of said 

transmitting of step (g) occurs by communicating 

via Internet, and using one or more of said interface protocols;

(h) integrating via at least one processor communicatively coupled with said at least one of said 

scanner, digital copier or other multifunction peripheral, a second electronic image, electronic 

graphics or electronic document so that said second electronic image, electronic graphics or electronic document gets seamlessly replicated and 

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8 MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 

transmitted to at least one of said plurality of said 

external destinations;

(i) processing via said at least one processor said 

plurality of any of said electronic image, electronic 

graphics or electronic document into a uniform file 

format, wherein said plurality of said external 

destinations are compatible with said format 

without having to modify said external destinations; and

(j) seamlessly transmitting said first or second 

electronic image, electronic graphics or electronic 

document over said network from a first external 

destination to another of said external destinations.

’173 Patent, col. 87, l. 10–col. 88, l. 20. MPHJ stresses 

that “seamless” transmission means that “no user intervention is needed” between copying and destination. 

MPHJ Br. 16. MPHJ states that it is “irrelevant . . . 

[w]hether intermediate components exist between the 

scanner and application software.” MPHJ Br. 17.

The PTAB construed the claims as including scanning 

and emailing, whether in separate steps or in a single 

step, with or without user intervention by human or by 

machine. On this construction, the PTAB invalidated the 

claims.

Claim Construction

MPHJ states that the terms “interfacing” and “Go 

button” represent a single-step operation, and that the 

PTAB erred in construing the claims as not limited to 

single-step operation. 

The PTAB construed “interfacing” to mean “making a 

direct or indirect connection between two elements so 

they can work with each other or exchange information.” 

Bd. Op. 15. MPHJ argues that “interfacing” requires 

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direct single-step transfer from the scanner or other 

peripheral device, to email or the Internet or other destination, and that the ’173 Patent’s system “is direct because it excludes additional user intervention beyond 

initiating the process.” MPHJ Br. 17. MPHJ describes 

the Xerox prior art system as “drag and drop” in two 

steps. Responding to these arguments, the Board held

that “nothing limits an ‘interface’ to a connection between 

two components.” Bd. Op. 15. 

MPHJ argued similarly that the term “Go button” in 

the claims requires “an operation that begins a process 

and requires no further action from the user to complete,” 

Prelim. Resp. at 14, and is implemented by the claim term 

“application” as “a discrete software program executable 

on an operating system for the purpose of accomplishing a 

task.” Id. at 7–11. The Board ruled that the claims are 

not limited to a single-step transfer from scanner to email 

or other destination, and found the claims anticipated by 

the button in the XNS system that “can initiate a scan in 

one step and send a document via email in another.” Bd. 

Op. 24–25.

MPHJ states that a passage from the ’173 Patent 

“leaves no doubt that the scope of the ‘GO button’ is a 

single function that permits copying a document and 

integrating it into a software application (e.g., third party 

software) in one step.” MPHJ Br. 20. That passage 

states:

VC extends the notion of a copier, which simply 

replicates the image of an original document onto 

another piece of paper using a single GO or 

START button, to do a similar operation in software so that the image gets seamlessly replicated 

into other devices or applications or the Internet.

’173 Patent, col. 46, ll. 36–40. MPHJ states that “seamlessly” means an automatic transfer in one step. HowevCase: 16-1243 Document: 38-2 Page: 9 Filed: 02/13/2017
10 MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 

er, the Board held that the specification and claims do not 

require only a single-step operation.

MPHJ argues that its claim interpretation is supported by and required by its Provisional Application No. 

60/108,798 (“the ’798 Provisional”), citing two statements 

in the Provisional on “one step” operation using a single 

button:

Patent: The IMAGinE Virtual Copier Interface: A 

Simple Method of Presenting to a User the Complex Operation of Copying Files or Electronic Images to and from Digital Imaging Devices and/or 

Software Applications in One Step.

’798 Provisional at 7. The Provisional states:

The IMAGinE Virtual Copier can copy paper from 

a physical device directly into a third-party software application in one step. Using other applications, such as Visioneer’s Paperport or Xerox’s 

Pagis, the user must first “import” or scan paper 

into the capture application and then drag or direct the output to another location. With the IMAGinE Virtual Copier, a single button (the Go 

button) directly copies paper from a scan-like device (either a copier with a scan attachment or a 

scanner) and places it within the third-party application.

’798 Provisional at 6. MPHJ argues that these statements “expressly limited the scope of the invention” to a 

one-step copying and sending process, MPHJ Br. 14, and 

that the claims cannot reasonably be construed as the 

separate steps of copying and sending. MPHJ states that 

such prior art was distinguished in the ’798 Provisional.

Petitioner points out that the statements in the ’798 

Provisional on which MPHJ now relies were omitted from 

the final application. MPHJ responds that these omitted 

sections were not explicitly disclaimed, and therefore that 

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MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 11

they are part of the prosecution history and are properly 

relied on to explain and limit the claims, even if the 

passages do not appear in the issued patent.

We agree that a provisional application can contribute 

to understanding the claims. See Trs. of Columbia Univ. 

in New York v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. 

Cir. 2016) (looking to the provisional application for 

guidance as to claim construction); Vederi, LLC v. Google, 

Inc., 744 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (same). In this 

case, it is the deletion from the ’798 Provisional application that contributes understanding of the intended scope 

of the final application. 

We conclude that a person of skill in this field would 

deem the removal of these limiting clauses to be significant. The ’173 Patent in its final form contains no statement or suggestion of an intent to limit the claims to the 

deleted one-step operation. Neither the specification nor 

the claims state that this limited scope is the only intended scope. Instead, the ’173 Patent describes the singlestep operation as “optional.”

The ’173 Patent’s abstract states, “[t]he system and/or 

method is software that manages paper so that it can be 

electronically and seamlessly copied in and out of devices 

and business applications with an optional single-step 

operation.” The ’173 Patent specification states, “I have 

further determined that it is desirable to enable software 

that manages paper so that it can be electronically and 

seamlessly copied in and out of devices and business 

applications (such as Microsoft Office, Microsoft Exchange, Lotus Notes) with an optional single-step Go 

operation.” ’173 Patent, col. 3, ll. 35–39.

These statements that single-step operation is “optional” accord with the change from the ’798 Provisional 

to the final patent. A person skilled in this field would 

reasonably conclude that the inventor intended that 

single-step operation would be optional, not obligatory.

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We affirm the Board’s claim construction as not limited to single-step operation of copying and transmitting.

Anticipation

The Board found the claims anticipated by the Xerox 

XNX system and also by the Xerox-owned Harkins patent. 

Petitioner’s expert Dr. Melen explained that the Xerox 

GIS 150 is “an XNS system element which uses XNS

protocols to communicate with other devices and services 

on the internet.” Melen Decl. 28 (citing XNS at 122). The 

XNS reference states that “[t]he Xerox 150 scanner uses 

this model in providing scanned image service to XNS 

users,” and that the XNS system “enables a user to digitize a hardcopy image by scanning it at the scanner.” XNS 

at 122. “The digitized image (in RES [Raster Encoding 

Standard]) may be sent to a specific file in a File Service 

for storage, or to a Print Service for printing . . . .” Id. 

The XNS reference states that scanned documents can be

“distributed with XNS mail, edited at a workstation, or 

sent to any device that is directly or indirectly connected 

to the internet (including remote facsimile machines).” 

XNS at 125. 

MPHJ did not dispute that “the GIS 150 does support 

scanning to a file, a file server, and it does support scanning to a print server.” Hr’g Tr. at 30:24–31:2. MPHJ 

argued that the Xerox system scans to email only in two 

steps. Id. at 35:22–36:11. The Board found that “XNS 

discloses scanning and distribution of documents [in] two 

steps,” Bd. Op. 25, and that these steps include direct or 

indirect connection. On the Board’s correct construction

that claims 1 and 4 are not limited to a single-step operation, the Board’s finding of anticipation by the XNS 

system is supported by substantial evidence and is sustained.

The Board also found anticipation by the Harkins patent, owned by Xerox, which shows a network “having 

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MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 13

interconnected printers, scanners, facsimile devices or file 

servers.” Harkins, col. 5, ll. 32–col. 6, ll. 36. The record 

states that Harkins relates to the XNS System. Harkins 

describes “a method for a sender to automatically distribute information to a receiver on a network using devices 

(such as printers and facsimile machines) and communication channels (such as electronic mail) defined in a 

receiver profile.” Harkins, col. 4, ll. 40–46. The Board 

found that “Harkins discloses both scanning and email 

transmission,” and “discloses a plurality of interface 

protocols.” Bd. Op. 35. The Board credited Petitioner’s

expert witness’ testimony that Harkins inherently discloses employing email protocols to transmit email. Bd. 

Op. 35–36. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s 

finding that Harkins contemplates the same sequential 

scanning and transmission as discussed for the XNS 

system, and anticipates the ’173 Patent’s claims as construed by the Board.

Other Claim Terms

MPHJ also argues that the Board erred in its constructions of the claim terms “application” and “rendering.” The Board construed “application” as it did in 

separate IPR proceedings on a related patent with the 

same specification and different claims. We discern no 

error in adopting this construction. 

The Board did not construe “rendering.” MPHJ argues that the Board misapplied the prior art by finding 

that “the claims do not preclude rendering from occurring 

after the ‘electronic image’ is transmitted.” Bd. Op. 34. 

MPHJ states that the “rendering” step must be “performed by the network addressable scanner, digital 

copier, or other multifunction peripheral.” MPHJ Br. 24. 

According to MPHJ, “a proper construction of ‘rendering’ 

would tie this operation to the scanner/copier,” MPHJ Br. 

37, for “[i]t is technically impossible for a scanner to 

transmit a document before it has a chance to render that 

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14 MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 

document.” MPHJ Br. 23. The Petitioner does not disagree. However, the Petitioner states that Harkins shows 

“rendering” performed by the fax machine when the 

electronic document is transmitted; thus Petitioner argues that MPHJ’s proposed definition of “rendering” does 

not avoid anticipation.

The Board found that “Harkins teaches that the recipient of a document may set up a ‘profile describing the 

preferred form (facsimile, electronic mail, voice mail, hard 

copy, color or black, file server, etc.) and service (the 

specific printer, facsimile machine etc.) documents should 

take to be rendered.’” Bd. Op. 34. The Board held that no 

claim limits “rendering” to single-step operation. Substantial evidence supports the finding that Harkins shows 

rendering of electronic documents.

We have considered MPHJ’s additional arguments, 

and deem them unpersuasive of reversible error in the 

Board’s conclusion of anticipation. 

Obviousness

As an alternative ground, the PTAB invalidated 

claims 1–8 on the ground of obviousness. The PTAB 

combined the Motoyama reference with Harkins, citing

Motoyama for its teaching of the connection of devices 

such as copiers, printers, and fax machines, to an office 

network. Bd. Op. 37. Motoyama states that different 

machines communicate with each other according to 

different protocols, and describes a “control/diagnostic 

system” that includes a database of communication protocols for various network machines. Motoyama, col. 1, ll.

41–43; col. 1, ll. 47–58.

Although MPHJ argued at trial that a person of ordinary skill would not have combined Harkins and Motoyama, this argument is not pressed on appeal. On our 

sustaining the Board’s finding of anticipation, we do not 

decide the Board’s alternative ruling of obviousness.

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MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 15

CONCLUSION

The ruling of invalidity of claims 1–8 of the ’173 Patent is

AFFIRMED. 

Case: 16-1243 Document: 38-2 Page: 15 Filed: 02/13/2017
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS, LLC,

Appellant

v.

RICOH AMERICAS CORPORATION, XEROX 

CORPORATION, LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL, 

INC.,

Appellees

______________________ 

2016-1243

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2014-

00538.

______________________ 

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting 

in part.

I agree that the Board correctly construed the term 

“anticipation” in U.S. Patent No. 8,488,173 (“the ’173 

patent”). I would find, though, that the Board misconstrued the terms “Go button” and “interfacing” to permit 

the use of manual intervention to render and transmit a 

scanned document. See Ricoh Ams. Corp. v. MPHJ Tech. 

Invs., LLC, No. IPR2014-00538, 2015 WL 4911675, at *1, 

*10–22 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2015). Under the construction 

of the disputed claim terms comporting with this limitation, I would affirm the Board’s finding that claims 1–3 

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2 MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 

are anticipated, but reverse its finding that claims 4–8 

are anticipated. From the majority’s conclusions otherwise, I respectfully dissent.

BACKGROUND

A. The ’173 Patent

The ’173 patent is titled “distributed computer architecture and process for document management.” In short, 

the ’173 patent “manages paper so that it can be electronically and seamlessly copied in and out of devices and 

business applications . . . with an optional single-step 

operation.” ’173 patent, at Abstract. The ’173 patent 

describes the invention in terms of a system, software, 

and processes for implementing a “Virtual Copier” (“VC”). 

The VC “[i]n its simplest form . . . extends the notion of 

copying from a process that involves paper going through 

a conventional copier device, to a process that involves 

paper being scanned from a device at one location and 

copied to a device at another location.” Id. col. 45, ll. 48–

53. The patent covers copying of both physical and electronic paper. See, e.g., id. col. 6, ll. 46–48 (“This GO 

button can copy paper, whether physical or electronic, 

from one device and or application to another device 

and/or application.”). 

On November 13, 1998, Laurence Klein, the named 

inventor of the ’173 patent, filed Provisional Patent App. 

No. 60/108,798 (“the ’798 provisional application”). The 

’798 provisional application is incorporated by reference 

into the ’173 patent. Id. col. 1, ll. 14–16. 

Independent claims 1 and 4 of the ’173 patent are at 

issue on appeal. The dependent claims rise and fall with 

the independent claims. 

Claim 1 reads: 

A system capable of transmitting at least one of 

an electronic image, electronic graphics and elecCase: 16-1243 Document: 38-2 Page: 17 Filed: 02/13/2017
MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 3

tronic document to a plurality of external destinations including one or more of external devices, local files and applications responsively connectable 

to at least one communication network, comprising:

at least one network addressable scanner, digital 

copier or other multifunction peripheral capable of 

rendering at least one of said electronic image, 

electronic graphics and electronic document in response to a selection of a Go button; 

. . . 

at least one processor responsively connectable to 

said at least one memory, and implementing the 

plurality of interface protocols as a software application for interfacing and communicating with 

the plurality of external destinations including 

the one or more of the external devices and applications, 

. . . 

wherein one of said plurality of interface protocols 

is employed when one of said external destinations 

is email application software; 

. . . 

wherein, in response to the selection of said Go 

button, an electronic document management system integrates at least one of said electronic image, electronic graphics and electronic document 

using software so that said electronic image, electronic graphics and electronic document gets 

seamlessly replicated and transmitted to at least 

one of said plurality of external destinations . . .

Id. col. 86, ll. 9–50 (emphases added). Claim 4 is a method claim, and the relevant limitations recite: 

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4 MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 

A method of managing at least one of an electronic 

image, electronic graphics or electronic document 

comprising the steps of, in any order:

. . . 

(c) communicatively linking said scanner, digital 

copier or other multifunction peripheral with said 

plurality of said external destinations via application-level interface protocols; 

(d) interfacing between at least one of said scanner, digital copier or other multifunction peripheral and email application software using a first of 

said interface protocols . . . 

Id. col. 87, ll. 11–27 (emphases added). 

B. Prior Art References

The Board instituted inter partes review based on 

three prior art references: (1) Xerox Corporation, Xerox 

Network Systems Architecture General Information Manual, Apr. 1985 (“XNS”) (with inherent features evidenced 

by GIS 150, Xerox Corporation, Xerox 150 Graphic Input 

Station Operator And Reference Manual 150, Jan. 1985 

(“GIS 150”)); (2) U.S. Patent No. 5,513,126 to Harkins 

(“Harkins”); and (3) U.S. Patent No. 5,818,603 to Motoyama (“Motoyama”). 

i. XNS

The XNS manual discusses computer networking, 

particularly in the context of integrated office systems 

and document management. XNS “provides information 

on the standards and protocols that comprise the architecture” of Xerox Network Systems. J.A. 413. XNS also 

describes “document management,” which involves creating, capturing, replicating, and printing electronic or 

paper documents at the office. J.A. 416. XNS discloses a 

“Graphic input station” (“GIS”) as one networked device 

in its “Graphic input model.” “The Xerox 150 scanner 

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MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 5

uses [the Graphic input] model in providing scanned 

image service to XNS users.” J.A. 520.

The GIS 150 manual describes the inherent capabilities of the Xerox 150 scanner. The GIS 150 manual 

discloses a “START button” that “causes the 150 GIS to 

begin scanning. . . . After scanning is complete the image 

is automatically sent to the selected destination, and the 

display will flash SENDING while transmission is taking 

place.” J.A. 633. The GIS 150 manual also states that 

“[t]here can be a maximum of five destinations from 

which to choose. The destination device can be either a 

file server or a print server.” J.A. 738. Scanned documents can be “distributed with XNS mail, edited at a

workstation, or sent to any device that is directly or 

indirectly connected to the internet (including remote 

facsimile machines).” J.A. 523. The GIS 150 manual

discloses scanning a document and sending it to some 

electronic repository, and XNS discloses accessing the 

repository and emailing the documents to an external 

destination in two steps.

ii. Harkins

Harkins discloses a Xerox network “having interconnected printers, scanners, facsimile devices or file servers.” Harkins, col. 5, ll. 47–48. The invention enables a 

sender to “automatically distribute information to a 

receiver on a network using devices (such as printers and 

facsimile machines) and communication channels (such as 

electronic mail)” defined by a receiver’s user profile. Id. at 

Abstract. Similar to XNS, Harkins teaches scanning a 

document and transmitting it directly to a local file.

Harkins also teaches transmitting a document to an 

external device or application that renders the document 

in the manner specified by the recipient’s user profile. Id.

col. 10, ll. 37–45. To initiate the transmission, the sender 

of a document “select[s] a document from document source 

45 (e.g. report 34) and move[s] it to [the desired] commuCase: 16-1243 Document: 38-2 Page: 20 Filed: 02/13/2017
6 MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 

nication channel.” Id. col. 10, ll. 56–63. The manual 

intervention of the sender is what the parties refer to as 

“Harkins’s drag-and-drop operation.”

iii. Motoyama 

Motoyama relates to communicating with and monitoring, diagnosing, and controlling machines—including a 

facsimile machine or different copiers—using multiple 

communication protocols. J.A. 37. It is undisputed that 

Motoyama discloses some of the claim limitations at issue, 

including “at least one memory” and “at least one processor.” 

C. Procedural History

On March 25, 2014, Ricoh Americas Corporation, Xerox Corporation, and Lexmark International Corporation, 

Inc. (collectively, “Appellees”) petitioned for inter partes

review, challenging all ’173 patent claims for anticipation 

by both XNS and Harkins, and obviousness over Harkins 

in view of Motoyama. The Board instituted on all asserted grounds and construed several terms, including “Go 

button,” “interfacing,” and “application.” MPHJ appeals

these constructions. 

The Board found claims 1–8 to be anticipated by both 

XNS and Harkins. The Board also held claims 1–8 unpatentable over the combination of Harkins and Motoyama for obviousness. MPHJ appeals these determinations.

DISCUSSION

“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4), we have jurisdiction to 

review the Board’s final written decisions in IPRs.” Shaw 

Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 

1293, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We review the Board’s factual findings for substantial evidence and its legal conclusions de novo. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 

(Fed. Cir. 2000). “Substantial evidence is something less 

than the weight of the evidence but more than a mere 

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MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 7

scintilla of evidence.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1331 

(Fed. Cir. 2012). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 

1294 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. 

NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

A. Claim Construction

When reviewing the Board’s claim construction, “[w]e 

review underlying factual determinations concerning 

extrinsic evidence for substantial evidence and the ultimate construction of the claim de novo.” TriVascular, Inc. 

v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting 

In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1280

(Fed. Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC 

v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016)). “[C]laim construction in 

IPRs is not governed by Phillips. Under Cuozzo, claims 

are given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, not necessarily the correct 

construction under the framework laid out in Phillips.” 

PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, 

LLC, 815 F.3d 734, 742 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). 

i. “Go Button”

The term “Go button” is used in claim 1 of the ’173 patent and its dependent claims. The Board construed “Go 

button” to mean “an operation that begins a process.” J.A. 

12. MPHJ proposes adding the following language to the

Board’s construction: “and requires no further action from 

the user to complete.” MPHJ Opening Br. at 18. 

MPHJ’s construction precludes manual or user intervention to render a scanned document or to transmit it to 

an external destination. Instead, both “rendering” and 

transmission must take place in direct response to the 

selection of the “Go button,” in a single step. Under 

MPHJ’s construction, selecting the “Go button” must be 

both necessary and sufficient to “render” the document to 

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8 MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 

be copied, and rendering must take place before any 

transmission of the document to an external destination.

Relatedly, MPHJ argues that the Board erred in applying the “rendering” limitation of claim 1 which reads, 

“at least one network addressable scanner, digital copier 

or other multifunction peripheral capable of rendering at 

least one of said electronic image, electronic graphics and 

electronic document in response to a selection of a Go 

button.” ’173 patent, col. 86, ll. 15–19 (emphases added). 

According to MPHJ, the Board erred because, under its

interpretation, the scanner, copier, or other multifunctional peripheral does not need to perform the “rendering”; instead, the “rendering” can take place as a result of 

a “drag-and-drop” operation, requiring a second step. 

MPHJ also argues that, under the Board’s interpretation, 

transmitting the document can take place before rendering it.

Appellees assert that, absent lexicography or disavowal, we should not depart from the plain meaning of 

the term “Go button.” See Thorner v. Sony Comput. 

Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

“The standards for finding lexicography and disavowal 

are exacting.” GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 

750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014). To act as a lexicographer, a patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of 

the disputed claim term” and “clearly express an intent to

redefine the term.” Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Appellees also argue that 

claim 1 merely requires a device “capable of rendering” a 

document and does not require actual rendering. Appellees contend that, even if “rendering” is limiting, claim 1 

broadly requires both “rendering” and transmission in 

response to the selection of the “Go button,” but does not 

require the two actions to occur in a particular order or in 

a single step.

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Claim 1 requires “a selection of a Go button” and then 

further specifies what happens in response to “the selection of said Go button”; in effect, claim 1 requires

(1) rendering an electronic document in response to a 

selection of a “Go button,” and (2) integrating the electronic document so that it is replicated and transmitted to 

an external destination in response to the same selection 

of the “Go button.” Thus, the antecedent basis for “the 

selection” requiring transmission is “a selection” requiring 

rendering. While I agree with Appellees that the claims 

do not appear to require a particular order between 

“rendering” and transmission, that is where my agreement with Appellees ends with respect to the claim terms. 

The central dispute over these terms is whether, regardless of order, both “rendering” and “transmi[ssion]” 

must take place (1) in a single step, and (2) without 

manual intervention. The language of the ’173 patent 

and the ’798 provisional application, incorporated by 

reference into the ’173 patent, provides guidance on this 

point. See Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 

F.3d 1359, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using statements in 

the provisional application to guide claim construction); 

Vederi, LLC v. Google, Inc., 744 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 

2014) (same); Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State 

Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining 

that a provisional application incorporated by reference is

“effectively part of the host document as if it were explicitly contained therein.”). The majority acknowledges that a 

provisional application may contribute to understanding 

the claims. Maj. Op. at 11. 

In explaining the function of the VC and “Go button” 

in comparison to “other applications” in the prior art, the 

’798 provisional application states: 

The IMAGinE Virtual Copier can copy paper from 

a physical device directly into a third-party software application in one step. Using other applicaCase: 16-1243 Document: 38-2 Page: 24 Filed: 02/13/2017
10 MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 

tions, such as Visioneer's Paperport or Xerox's 

Pagis, the user must first “import” or scan paper 

into the capture application and then drag or direct the output to another location. With the IMAGinE Virtual Copier, a single button (the Go 

button) directly copies paper from a scan-like device (either a copier with a scan attachment or a 

scanner) and places it within the third-party application.1 

J.A. 1819 (emphases added). The emphasized words 

indicate that copying and transmission both take place in 

response to only the selection of the “Go button.” Further, 

this passage makes distinctions between “other applications” in the prior art requiring manual intervention and 

the claimed VC. The ’798 provisional application additionally supports the single-step nature of the operation 

by stating that the purpose of the patent “is to protect our 

new ‘Go’ operation that designates a single-step copying 

function for copying . . . between disparate digital imaging 

devices.” J.A. 1818 (emphasis added). In addition, the 

’798 provisional application describes the user’s experience as “Patent: The IMAGinE Virtual Copier Interface: A 

Simple Method of . . . the Complex Operation of Copying 

Files . . . in One Step.” J.A. 1820 (emphasis added). 

The ’173 patent specification reiterates this notion, 

stating that the “VC extends the notion of a copier, which 

simply replicates the image of an original document onto 

another piece of paper using a single GO or START but1 The ’798 provisional application also explains that 

the “Go button” can be used to directly copy paper “from a 

third-party application directly to a printer, and makes 

sure that the image is translated into the proper format 

(either Windows GOI or proprietary image language) for 

outputting to a printer device (standard Windows printer 

or specialty RIP printer).” J.A. 1819.

 

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ton, to do a similar operation in software so that the 

image gets seamlessly replicated into other devices or 

applications or the Internet.” ’173 patent, col. 46, ll. 36–

40 (emphases added). The ’173 specification also explains 

that the VC “will accomplish all translations between 

device and applications automatically and seamlessly.” 

Id. col. 7, ll. 3–5; col. 47, ll. 1–3; col. 70, ll. 37–39 (emphasis added). The ’173 patent uses the terms “automatically” and “seamlessly” in describing the action of the VC 

and “Go button” throughout the specification. In addition, 

the ’173 patent explains that “[t]he virtual copy operation 

can be cancelled prior to its completion by calling the

Cancel method.” Id. col. 78, ll. 58–63. The “Go button” 

therefore triggers a process that is carried out to completion unless it is cancelled.

I conclude that these statements collectively rise to 

the level of clear and unmistakable disavowal of claim 

scope. Disavowal requires that “the specification makes

clear that the invention does not include a particular 

feature.” SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 

In support of its construction, the majority argues 

that the patentee “deleted” the single-step nature of the 

operation from the ’173 patent. Maj. Op. at 11. I disagree 

with this characterization. Not only does the ’173 patent 

in fact make repeated references to a single-step operation, but the ’173 patent specification incorporates in full

the ’798 provisional application, including all of the 

statements the patentee made about the single-step nature 

of the VC invention. Despite the majority’s assertions to 

the contrary, the incorporation of these statements is 

significant for understanding the intended scope of the 

claims. In fact, by incorporating the ’798 provisional 

application, the patentee did the opposite of deleting any 

references to a single-step operation.

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The majority also contends that the ’173 patent’s use 

of the term “optional” in two places in the specification, 

when referring to the “single-step Go operation,” makes 

irrelevant the clear indications in the ’798 provisional 

application and in the ’173 patent that the patentee 

intended to claim a single-step operation in which the 

patentee has disavowed the use of manual intervention 

between use of the “Go button” and the rendering and 

transmission of a document to an external destination. 

See Maj. Op. at 11. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion. First, Appellees failed to brief the meaning of the 

term “optional” in the ’173 patent, instead arguing generally that the ’798 provisional application and the ’173 

patent merely describe some single-step embodiments, 

and that MPHJ failed to point to any “language of exclusion . . . to suggest that the patentee intended to preclude 

multi-step rendering and transmitting in response to the 

Go button.” Appellees Br. at 39–40. As I have explained 

above, I disagree with Appellees’ argument on this issue 

based on the clear language of the ’173 patent, including 

the incorporated statements from the ’798 provisional 

application. Second, it is not clear in either instance 

whether the term “optional” is intended to modify “singlestep” rather than the “operation” itself. Read in the 

context of the entirety of the specification, the more 

logical conclusion is that the term “optional” modifies the 

entire term “single-step operation,” meaning that implementing the operation is optional, not that how the operation, once implemented, works is optional. Third, 

nowhere do the claims themselves use “optional” language, or, indeed, any language inconsistent with the 

conclusion that the patentee has disavowed manual 

intervention. The majority further fails to explain how an 

“optional” single-step Go operation comports with the 

repeated references to the “seamless” and “automatic” 

operation of the “Go button” in the ’173 patent. 

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MPHJ explains correctly that the claim language requires a “multifunction peripheral” to be “capable of 

rendering” a document in response to the selection of the 

“Go button.” Given that the ability to render must exist, 

“rendering” cannot be read out of the claim just because 

an actual rendering need not take place. In addition, both 

parties agree that “rendering” and transmission to an 

external destination must occur “in response” to the 

selection of the “Go button.” For these reasons, I find that 

the proper construction of “Go button” is “an operation 

that begins a process and requires no further action from 

the user to complete.” Claim 1 therefore excludes the use 

of a “drag-and-drop” operation to complete the rendering 

and transmission process.

ii. “Interfacing”

MPHJ also argues that the Board misconstrued “interfacing,” found in claims 4–8 of the ’173 patent. The 

Board construed this term to mean “making a direct or 

indirect connection between two elements so they can 

work with each other or exchange information.” J.A. 15. 

According to MPHJ, the Board erred because the broadest 

reasonable interpretation of “interfacing” is “making a 

direct or indirect connection between two elements so 

they can directly work with each other or directly exchange information.” MPHJ Opening Br. at 9 (emphases 

added). 

MPHJ asserts that the Board’s construction erroneously captures indirect communications between a scanner and an email system comprised of the intervening 

manual steps of accessing a previously-scanned document 

and loading it into an email as an attachment. In support, MPHJ cites to the inter partes review oral hearing, 

in which counsel for MPHJ recited the ’798 provisional 

application’s statement that, “using other applications 

such as Visioneer’s PaperPort or Xerox’s Pages, which are 

prior art systems, the user must first import or scan 

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14 MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 

paper into a capture application and then drag and direct 

the output to another location.” J.A. 367, l. 25–J.A. 368, l. 

4. In addition, MPHJ notes that the ’798 provisional 

application provides an express definition of the VC 

interface: 

The IMAGinE Virtual Copier Interface: A Simple 

Method of Presenting to a User the Complex Operation of Copying Files or Electronic Images to 

and from Digital Imaging Devices and/or Software 

Applications in One Step. 

J.A. 1820 (emphases added). 

As with the “Go button” term discussed above, I conclude that MPHJ has met its burden to show prosecution 

history disclaimer and lexicography as to this term. 

When the specification distinguishes the prior art, the 

invention should not be construed to encompass the prior 

art features. See SciMed, 242 F.3d at 1341 (“Where the 

specification makes clear that the invention does not 

include a particular feature, that feature is deemed to be 

outside the reach of the claims of the patent, even though 

the language of the claims, read without reference to the 

specification, might be considered broad enough to encompass the feature in question.”). Appellees’ only real 

argument in response to MPHJ on this point is their 

contention that MPHJ’s construction is improper because 

it is not based on statements explicitly in the ’173 specification. Because the ’798 provisional application was 

incorporated in full into the ’173 specification, however, 

this argument is unavailing. 

For these reasons, “interfacing” and “Go button” 

should be construed consistently, such that, as to both 

terms, MPHJ has disclaimed manual user intervention 

and additional steps before a document is both rendered 

and transmitted.

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iii. “Application”

The terms “application” or “applications” appear in all 

claims at issue. Claim 1 recites “implementing the plurality of interface protocols as a software application for 

interfacing and communicating with the plurality of 

external destinations including the one or more of the 

external devices and applications.” ’173 patent, col. 86, 

ll. 23–27. The Board construed “application” as follows:

[A] program, or group of programs, which operate

together in a system to perform a function or functions, and the programs can be stored in a variety 

of places on a variety of devices, and operate in a 

distributed manner. An application may include 

software and hardware and performs a function or 

functions.

J.A. 10–11. MPHJ asserts that “application” should be 

construed as “a discrete software program executable on 

an operating system for the purpose of accomplishing a 

task.” MPHJ Opening Br. at 31. In suggesting a narrower construction than the construction adopted by the 

Board, MPHJ contends that “applications” must be separate and discrete.

Appellees respond that MPHJ’s construction is not the 

broadest reasonable interpretation of “application,” and I 

agree. The specification offers several examples of an 

“application,” including: “Lotus Notes, Microsoft Exchange, the Internet, or an electronic filing system.” ’173 

patent, col. 6, ll. 61–63. Notably, the internet is not “a 

discrete software program executable on an operating 

system for the purpose of accomplishing a task.” In 

context, this specification passage reads that: 

The power of Virtual Copier is the fact that the 

[source] can be a physical device . . . or an application (e.g. Lotus Notes, Microsoft Exchange, the Internet, or an electronic filing system). The 

Case: 16-1243 Document: 38-2 Page: 30 Filed: 02/13/2017
16 MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 

[destination] can also be a physical device . . . or 

an application (e.g. Lotus Notes, Microsoft Exchange, the Internet, or an electronic filing system).

Id. col. 6, ll. 60–66 (emphases added). Even the list of 

potential sources of the document, not just the destinations, includes the internet. 

Based on the plain language of the specification, I 

concur with the majority that MPHJ’s proposed construction is improper. Appellees correctly note that MPHJ’s 

construction also improperly excludes a distributed architecture. The ’173 patent teaches that the VC “engine 

object layer and the engine may be optionally located in a 

distributed environment on different machines, servers, 

and the like.” Id. col. 67, ll. 62–64. The terms “distributed component interaction” and “distributed environment” 

are used throughout the specification. See, e.g., id. col. 65, 

l. 4; id. col. 66, ll. 13–14; id. col. 67, ll. 27–36. Adopting 

MPHJ’s construction would exclude embodiments where 

the VC application is distributed across various devices, 

contrary to the language of the patent. MPHJ’s construction, requiring that an “application” be discrete, is also 

contrary to its argument that the specification requires 

different source and destination applications. 

B. Anticipation

“Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 is a question of 

fact, while obviousness under § 103 is a question of law 

based on underlying findings of fact.” Kennametal, Inc. v. 

Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 

2015). What the prior art discloses is a factual inquiry. 

Para-Ordnance Mfg., Inc. v. SGS Imps. Int’l, Inc., 73 F.3d 

1085, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Where our claim construction differs from that of the Board, we determine questions of anticipation and obviousness under our claim 

construction. See, e.g., In re Man Mach. Interface Techs. 

LLC, 822 F.3d 1282, 1287–89 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

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i. Anticipation by XNS2

a. XNS Anticipates Claims 1–3 

The Board found that XNS anticipated claims 1–3 because XNS teaches a “‘Go button’ or START button of GIS 

150 [that] can initiate a scan in one step and send a 

document via email in another.” J.A. 24–25. MPHJ 

claims that, under its construction of “Go button,” rendering and transmission must be performed in response to

the same selection of the “Go button.” XNS does not 

disclose this concept, according to MPHJ. Appellees 

assert that the Board correctly found that XNS discloses 

that the GIS 150 scanner has a “START button” that is 

capable of scanning a document and sending it to a file 

service for storage, or a printer service for printing.

There is no dispute that XNS discloses document distribution by email after a rendering step. Additionally, I 

conclude that both rendering and transmission to a file 

server take place in response to a single selection of a “Go 

button” in XNS. 

MPHJ does not really dispute these conclusions. Instead, MPHJ argues that, even if XNS discloses use of a 

single-step process for sending a document to a file service 

or printer service, it does not anticipate claim 1 because 

XNS employs a second step with manual intervention to 

access email as an external source. 

2 As a threshold issue, the Board held that XNS 

and GIS 150 constituted an “application” under its broad 

construction. As I would affirm the Board’s construction 

of “application,” and MPHJ does not dispute that XNS 

(including GIS 150) meets the “application” limitation 

under the Board’s construction, I would affirm the Board 

in this respect.

 

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18 MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 

A system practicing claim 1 must have an external 

destination that may be “email application software.” 

Based on claim 1’s clause, “wherein one of said plurality 

of interface protocols is employed when one of said external destinations is email application software,” MPHJ 

asserts that email must be a possible external destination. Otherwise, MPHJ claims that the Board would be 

reading that “wherein” language out of the claim.

The Board did not expressly resolve whether email 

application software is a required destination because it 

determined that claim 1 does not even require a single 

step. Appellees contend that claim 1 does not require the 

external destination to be email application software, 

because the language to which MPHJ points is merely 

conditional: “when one of said external destinations is 

email application software.” ’173 patent, col. 86, ll. 28–30

(emphasis added). Appellees therefore assert that this 

“wherein” clause is a conditional, non-limiting, nonspecific clause that does not narrow the claim. Under this 

reasoning, Appellees assert that MPHJ’s anticipation 

argument fails even if MPHJ is correct in asserting that 

claim 1 requires a single-step operation. Appellees are 

correct on this point.

“As a matter of linguistic precision, optional elements 

do not narrow the claim because they can always be 

omitted.” In re Johnston, 435 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 

2006). The determination of whether a “wherein” clause 

imposes a limitation in a claim must be determined on a 

case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Griffin v. Bertina, 285 F.3d 

1029, 1033–34 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding that a “wherein” 

clause limited a claim where the clause gave “meaning 

and purpose to the manipulative steps” of the claim); Tex. 

Instruments Inc. v. ITC, 988 F.2d 1165, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 

1993) (holding that “[a] ‘whereby’ clause that merely 

states the result of the limitations in the claim adds 

nothing to the patentability or substance of the claim.” 

(citation omitted)).

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MPHJ fails to meet its burden on this issue. First, 

MPHJ asserts that the ’798 provisional application supports the position that email application software is a 

required external destination: “a single button (the Go 

button) directly copies paper from a scan-like device 

(either a copier with a scan attachment or a scanner) and 

places it within the third-party application.” J.A. 1819. 

This statement notably does not reference email application software, and email application software is not mentioned elsewhere in the ’798 provisional application. 

There is no indication that the “wherein” clause limits 

this claim by stating a restriction that was “an integral 

part of the invention” based on the specification and 

prosecution history. See, e.g., Hoffer v. Microsoft Corp., 

405 F.3d 1326, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 

Furthermore, the “wherein” limitation at issue is conditional; it explains that a specific protocol is used when 

one of said external destinations is email application 

software. Under the broadest reasonable interpretation of 

claim 1, the limitations in the “wherein” clause would not 

apply because email application software is not required 

to be the external destination in all embodiments. 

Thus, I would find that rendering and transmission to 

a file server do take place in response to the selection of 

the “Go button” in XNS, and that email application software is not a required external destination in claim 1. I 

would therefore affirm the Board’s finding that XNS 

anticipates claim 1 and its dependent claims. 

b. XNS Does Not Anticipate Claims 4–8 

Unlike claim 1, claim 4 does not recite a “Go button” 

and the “interfacing” limitation of claim 4 requires interfacing between a “multifunction peripheral and email 

application software.” The Board found MPHJ’s argument, that XNS does not disclose the “interfacing” limitation because the GIS 150 scanner does not “interface” 

with email application software, to be unpersuasive. 

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20 MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 

XNS does not teach interfacing the GIS 150 scanner 

with the separate email system described in the XNS 

architecture. Instead, the GIS 150 scanner can only 

communicate a scanned document to a file server or a 

print server. As XNS does not teach single-step interfacing between the GIS 150 scanner and the separate email 

system of XNS, I would find that XNS does not meet the 

“interfacing” limitation, and therefore, does not anticipate 

claims 4–8 of the ’173 patent. 

ii. Anticipation under Harkins

a. Harkins Does Not Anticipate Claims 1–3 

The Board held that the Harkins user interface discloses the “Go button” of claim 1 because it allows a user

to select a document to scan. The Board also held that 

“rendering” and “transmitting” can occur separately, and 

the claim language did not preclude rendering from 

beginning with a “drag-and-drop” step, such as that 

disclosed in Harkins.

According to MPHJ, the Board found anticipation of 

claim 1 by Harkins because its construction of “Go button” 

and understanding of “rendering” did not preclude a 

manual step of digitally moving documents residing in a 

repository, even though the repository is “unrelated to the 

scanner/copier.” MPHJ disputes this finding, because it is 

not consistent with MPHJ’s narrower proposed claim 

construction. Under MPHJ’s construction, MPHJ asserts 

that the multifunction peripheral cannot be both the 

device that renders the document and the device that 

receives a transmitted document.

Appellees respond that Harkins anticipates the ’173 

patent even under MPHJ’s construction of “Go button,” 

because the “drag-and-drop” operation of Harkins initiates the process of transmitting the document to the 

recipient associated with the communication channel. 

Harkins, col. 10, ll. 56–59. When the document arrives, 

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MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 21

Appellees assert that it is rendered according to the 

recipient’s profile without requiring further action from 

either the sender or the recipient. Id. col. 10, ll. 37–47

(explicitly teaching that a profile describes the form and 

service “documents should take to be rendered”). Appellees argue that Harkins’s “drag-and-drop” operation 

requires no further action from the user to both transmit 

and render. 

The “capable of rendering” limitation of claim 1 requires “at least one network addressable scanner, digital 

copier or other multifunctional peripheral capable of 

rendering” a document. ’173 patent, col. 86, ll. 15–16 

(emphasis added). Claim 1 requires that “a plurality of 

said external destinations is in communication with said 

at least one network addressable scanner, digital copier or 

other multifunction peripheral over a local area network.” 

Id. col. 86, ll. 34–37 (emphases added). The external 

destination must receive the document after transmission 

over a communication network. Id. col. 86, ll. 44–50. 

Appellees argue that the ’173 patent uses a fax machine as an example of a multifunction peripheral, and 

therefore Harkins anticipates because it teaches that a 

user may invoke the “drag-and-drop” operation to transmit and automatically render the document according to 

the user’s pre-established profile, using a fax machine. 

Harkins, fig. 28 (“MULTI-FUNCTIONAL PERIPHERAL 

(i.e. FAX)”). 

The language of claim 1 requires that an external destination is in communication with a multifunction peripheral over a local area network. Appellees’ argument 

therefore fails because the language of the claim makes 

clear that a single fax machine cannot be both the device 

that renders the document and the external destination 

device that receives a transmitted document. 

The ’173 patent teaches a “Go button” that renders 

and transmits a document to an external destination in a 

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22 MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 

single step, without the need for manual intervention 

such as the “drag-and-drop” taught in Harkins. Harkins 

therefore does not anticipate the “Go button” limitation of 

claim 1 and its dependent claims. 

b. Harkins Does Not Anticipate Claims 4–8 

With respect to claim 4, the Board rejected MPHJ’s 

argument that the scanner and email application are not 

“interfacing” in Harkins, because Harkins teaches that 

scanned documents are stored in an intermediary location 

before they are emailed.

MPHJ argues that Harkins does not satisfy the “interfacing” limitation of claim 4 and its dependent claims 

because Harkins teaches moving previously-scanned 

documents using simple operations, not interfacing a 

scanner to email application software. MPHJ asserts that 

the language of the ’798 provisional application essentially requires more than permitting a user to “drag-anddrop” a previously scanned document to a new location.

Appellees assert that Harkins discloses “interfacing” 

because the user can interact with the Harkins UI to 

automatically distribute a document over the network, 

including email. There is no dispute that one of the 

destinations available to the user in the “drag-and-drop” 

operation of Harkins is “electronic mail.” Rather, Appellees argue that the Harkins “drag-and-drop” operation is 

actually itself a single step that results in both the “rendering” and transmission of a digital scan to an external 

destination. 

The “interfacing” limitation at issue reads “interfacing 

between . . . [a] multifunction peripheral and email application software using a first of said interface protocols.” 

’173 patent, col. 87, ll. 27–29 (emphasis added). The use 

of the word “between” in this limitation strongly suggests 

that the “multifunction peripheral” cannot also be the 

“email application software,” given that there is no indicaCase: 16-1243 Document: 38-2 Page: 37 Filed: 02/13/2017
MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 23

tion that either of these entities can interface with itself. 

Because “multifunction peripheral” and “email application 

software” must be distinct, I conclude that Harkins does 

not anticipate claim 4. Though Harkins discloses a single 

“drag-and-drop” operation, as discussed above, this operation need not result in both “rendering” and transmission.

Because Harkins does not meet the “interfacing” limitation of claim 4, I would reverse the Board’s finding of 

anticipation of claims 1–8 under Harkins. 

c. Obviousness in Light of Harkins and Motoyama

The Board found claims 1–8 to be obvious in light of 

Harkins in view of Motoyama. On appeal, MPHJ challenges the Board’s application of its claim construction 

and anticipation findings to its obviousness determination.

The petition used Motoyama solely to address the 

storage of protocols in memory: 

Motoyama explicitly discloses a database storing a 

plurality of communication protocols used for 

communicating with a variety of networked machines. It would have been obvious to a [person of 

ordinary skill] at the time of the invention to include the database storing a plurality of communication protocols disclosed by Motoyama in the 

“multimedia device information system or network” disclosed by Harkins.

J.A. 195. Motoyama does not teach concepts, such as a 

form of “Go button” or “interfacing,” that would be impacted by reversal of the Board’s claim construction 

rulings on these terms. Obviousness, therefore, is dependent on agreement with the Board’s decision that 

Harkins anticipates the challenged claims. Because

Harkins does not anticipate claims 1–8 of the ’173 patent, 

I would reverse the Board’s finding of obviousness. 

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24 MPHJ TECH. INVS. v. RICOH AMERICAS CORP. 

CONCLUSION

I conclude that the Board misconstrued the terms “Go 

button” and “interfacing” by finding that those terms 

encompassed the use of manual intervention to render 

and transmit a scanned document. But I concur with the 

majority that the Board properly construed “application.” 

Under these constructions, XNS does anticipate claims 1–

3 of the ’173 patent, but does not anticipate claims 4–8. 

As Harkins does not anticipate claims 1–8 of the ’173 

patent, I would reverse the Board’s obviousness determination. I would therefore affirm in part and reverse in 

part the Board’s judgment in this IPR.

Case: 16-1243 Document: 38-2 Page: 39 Filed: 02/13/2017