Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-05-04178/USCOURTS-ca10-05-04178-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joshua Chad Beckstead
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

September 5, 2007

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOSHUA CHAD BECKSTEAD,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 05-4178

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Utah

(D.C. No. 2:04-CR-115-02-BSJ)

Mary C. Corporon, Corporon, Williams & Bradford, P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah,

for Defendant-Appellant Joshua Chad Beckstead. 

Diana Hagen, Assistant United States Attorney (Stephen J. Sorenson, United

States Attorney, with her on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for

Plaintiff-Appellee United States of America. 

Before HARTZ, EBEL and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.

EBEL, Circuit Judge.

In this direct criminal appeal, Defendant-Appellant Joshua Beckstead

challenges four convictions and a twenty-year sentence resulting from his

involvement with a methamphetamine lab. Among other things, Beckstead claims

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2

that the Government denied him due process because officers seized and

immediately disposed of the methamphetamine lab pursuant to standard police

department policy. The department’s policy was developed in response to the

dangers generally presented by methamphetamine labs and the chemicals

associated with them. But Beckstead argues that by destroying this evidence,

officers deprived him of any opportunity to test the lab for fingerprints which

might have eliminated him as the lab’s operator, and deprived him of the ability

to challenge the amounts of chemicals seized. Those weights helped determine

the length of Beckstead’s sentence. Because Beckstead has failed to show that

the police officers acted in bad faith when they destroyed this potentially

exculpatory evidence, we conclude the Government did not deny Beckstead due

process. Having jurisdiction to consider this appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)

and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reject this challenge, as well as Beckstead’s other

appellate arguments, and AFFIRM his convictions and sentence. 

I. BACKGROUND

The evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the

Government, see United States v. Torres-Laranega, 476 F.3d 1148, 1157 (10th

Cir. 2007) (reviewing sufficiency of evidence supporting conviction), petition for

cert. filed, (U.S. May 22, 2007) (No. 06-11907), established the following:

Beckstead bought 500 grams of iodine and some ephedrine from the friend of a

friend in January 2004. A few weeks later, he bought 8,000 pills, or 480 grams,

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3

of ephedrine from the same person. These ingredients can be used to manufacture

methamphetamine. In fact, the amount of iodine Beckstead purchased, combined

with other ingredients, could produce 166.67 grams of methamphetamine, while

the amount of ephedrine Beckstead purchased could produce 240 grams of

methamphetamine. 

On February 9, 2004, two police officers saw Beckstead and a woman leave

an apartment building, get into a black car and apparently drive away. The

officers were at the apartment complex investigating an anonymous tip about a

methamphetamine lab. Acting on that tip, officers found such a lab in apartment

number nine, which was rented by Beckstead’s former girlfriend, Ray Lynn

Morris. In addition, officers found 1,233.2 grams of red phosphorus, as well as

other chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine. With this amount of red

phosphorus, an individual could, if he had enough of the other required

ingredients, manufacture 1,233.2 grams of methamphetamine. During a search of

Morris’ apartment, officers also found Beckstead’s driver’s license in one of the

bedrooms. 

As officers were leaving the apartment, after disassembling the lab, they

saw the car in which Beckstead had earlier driven away, parked again in the

apartment complex’s parking lot. In that car, which was registered to Beckstead’s

parents, officers found additional components for a methamphetamine lab. 

The United States indicted both Beckstead and Ray Lynn Morris’ father,

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21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) makes it “unlawful for any person knowingly or 1

intentionally . . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to

manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance.” Methamphetamine

is a controlled substance. See 21 U.S.C. § 812, Schedule III (a)(3). And 21

U.S.C. § 846 provides that “[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit

any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as

those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the

attempt or conspiracy.” 

In addition, 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(1) makes it unlawful for “[a]ny person [to]

knowingly or intentionally . . . possess[] a listed chemical with intent to

manufacture a controlled substance except as authorized by this subchapter.” List

I includes “a chemical specified by regulation of the Attorney General as a

chemical that is used in manufacturing a controlled substance.” 21 U.S.C.

§ 802(34). Red phosphorus and pseudoephedrine are list I chemicals, see 21

U.S.C. § 802(34)(K); 21 C.F.R. § 1310.02(a)(25), while iodine is a list II

chemical, 21 U.S.C. § 802(35)(I). 

4

Kevin James, on four charges: 1) attempting to manufacture fifty grams or more

of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846; and possessing

2) pseudoephedrine 3) red phosphorus and 4) iodine with the intent to

manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(1). 

1

Beckstead filed a motion to dismiss based on the Government’s destruction

of the evidence. In that motion, Beckstead argued, apparently pursuant to

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984), that the Government acted in bad

faith. The district court denied that motion, implicitly finding that the

Government did not act in bad faith. 

James pled guilty and testified against Beckstead at his trial. James, who

had been staying at his daughter’s apartment for a few days at the time officers

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Such an offense involving fifty grams or more of methamphetamine would 2

have ordinarily carried a sentence of not less than ten years, nor more than life in

prison. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). However, because Beckstead had a

prior drug-related conviction, among others, he was subject instead to a sentence

of not less than twenty years, nor more than life imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). 

It was actually employees of Envirosolve who disposed of the lab. 

3

(continued...)

5

discovered the methamphetamine lab, testified that it was Beckstead and several

other individuals who were operating the lab in Ray Lynn Morris’ apartment. 

A jury convicted Beckstead of all four charges. Pursuant to 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A), Beckstead’s conviction on count one subjected him to a

mandatory minimum twenty-year sentence because he had a prior conviction for

operating a methamphetamine lab. The presentence report (“PSR”) provided for 2

a higher advisory guideline sentencing range of between 360 months and life

imprisonment. At sentencing, however, the district court concluded that a

sentence below that guideline range was warranted and instead imposed the

statutory mandatory minimum twenty-year sentence. Beckstead now appeals both

his convictions and sentence. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence

Beckstead argues that the Government deprived him of due process because

officers immediately seized and destroyed the methamphetamine lab components

and related chemicals found at Morris’ apartment and in Beckstead’s car.3

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(...continued) 3

Envirosolve is a private company contracted to clean up and dispose of such labs

seized by police. The company’s employees, however, acted only at the specific

direction of police officers. Under these circumstances, we will treat the

destruction of the methamphetamine lab as the government action necessary to

support a due process claim. Cf. Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1041,

1056-57 (10th Cir. 2002) (declining to treat child therapist and clinical director of

privately operated sexual abuse treatment center as state agent for purposes of due

process claim challenging Government’s failure to preserve evidence). The

Government does not argue that we should do otherwise. 

The Government has a duty to preserve evidence if its exculpatory value is 4

“‘apparent’” and it is “‘of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to

obtain comparable evidence of other reasonably available means.’” United States

v. Gomez, 191 F.3d 1214, 1218-19 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Trombetta, 467 U.S.

at 488-89); see also Bullock, 297 F.3d at 1056. For the most part, however,

Beckstead argues only that the evidence destroyed in this case is potentially

exculpatory, requiring Beckstead to prove the Government acted in bad faith in

destroying it. To the extent Beckstead is also arguing that it was apparent–before

officers destroyed the methamphetamine lab in this case–that it was exculpatory

evidence, we reject that assertion. 

6

Beckstead contends that by destroying this potentially exculpatory evidence,

officers deprived him of any opportunity to test the lab for fingerprints which

might have eliminated him as the lab’s operator, and deprived him of the ability

to challenge the amounts of chemicals seized. 

To establish that the Government deprived him of due process by

destroying potentially exculpatory evidence, Beckstead must show both that

1) the evidence destroyed was potentially exculpatory and 2) the government

acted in bad faith in destroying it. See United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 4

910-11 (10th Cir. 1994). For purposes of this appeal, we will assume that the

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It is not necessarily obvious that the fingerprints on the lab equipment and 5

the weight of precursor chemicals would be potentially exculpatory. Even if

Beckstead had been able to test the lab components and had not found his

fingerprints on them, that does not mean that he was not associated with the lab. 

And if Beckstead found other people’s fingerprints on the lab, that again would

not necessarily exonerate him. There were many people besides Beckstead in and

out of the apartment. And James testified that Beckstead had been operating the

lab with several other people. 

As for the amount of chemicals seized, the jury found that Beckstead had

attempted to manufacture at least fifty grams of methamphetamine. The amount

of red phosphorus police reportedly seized in Morris’ apartment would have made

at least that much methamphetamine. It is the weight of the red phosphorus that

Beckstead vigorously disputes. Nevertheless, there was also testimony that

Beckstead, several weeks earlier, had purchased ephedrine and iodine from a

friend of a friend. These chemicals, completely apart from the red phosphorus

seized with the lab, would have also supported the jury finding that Beckstead had

attempted to manufacture at least fifty grams of methamphetamine. 

7

destroyed evidence was potentially exculpatory and will consider here only

whether the Government acted in bad faith when officers destroyed it. 

5

“[U]nless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police,

failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due

process of law.” Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988); see also Snow

v. Sirmons, 474 F.3d 693, 716 (10th Cir. 2007).

[W]henever potentially excuplatory evidence is permanently lost, courts

face the treacherous task of divining the import of materials whose

contents are unknown and, very often, disputed. Part of it stems from

our unwillingness to read the fundamental fairness requirement of the

Due Process Clause as imposing on the police an undifferentiated and

absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of

conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution. We

think that requiring a defendant to show bad faith on the part of the

police both limits the extent of the police’s obligation to preserve

evidence to reasonable bounds and confines it to that class of cases

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8

where the interests of justice most clearly require it, i.e., those cases in

which the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence

could form a basis for exonerating the defendant.

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57-58 (quotations, citations omitted); see also Illinois v.

Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547-48 (2004) (per curiam); Snow, 474 F.3d at 716. 

We review the district court’s determination that the Government did not

act in bad faith for clear error. See Gomez, 191 F.3d at 1219. Beckstead bears

the burden of establishing that the Government acted in bad faith. See Bohl, 25

F.3d at 913. 

The presence or absence of bad faith necessarily turns on the Government’s

knowledge of the evidence’s potentially exculpatory value. See Youngblood, 488

U.S. at 56 n.*. Generally, however, destroying the evidence according to “an

established procedure,” as the Government did here, “precludes a finding of bad

faith absent other compelling evidence.” Gomez, 191 F.3d at 1219 (quotation

omitted). 

This court considers several factors in determining whether the Government

acted in bad faith, see Bohl, 25 F.3d at 911-13:

1) Did the Government have explicit notice that Beckstead believed the

methamphetamine lab and its chemicals were exculpatory? See id. at 911. In this

case, the Government appears to have destroyed this evidence before Beckstead

had an attorney or any opportunity to notify government officials that the lab and

its chemicals were potentially exculpatory. Cf. id. (noting Government “was

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9

explicitly placed on notice that [the defendants] believed” the evidence was

potentially exculpatory where defendants sent the government numerous letters to

that effect); United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1993)

(determining Government was on notice that lab equipment was potentially

exculpatory where, during pre-seizure investigation, defendant’s parole officer

and the lab’s landlord reported that the business operating the lab claimed it was

for legitimate scientific purposes; and after seizure, but before the Government

destroyed the evidence, Government agents were again told lab equipment was set

up for legitimate purposes and was structurally incapable of producing

methamphetamine). In this case, while Beckstead admittedly did not have much

of an opportunity to notify the Government that this evidence was potentially

exculpatory, neither did the Government destroy it in the face of a contrary

request from Beckstead to preserve it, see Bohl, 25 F.3d at 911. 

2) Is Beckstead’s claim that this evidence is potentially exculpatory

conclusory, or is it “instead . . . backed up with objective, independent evidence

giving the government reason to believe that further tests on the [destroyed

evidence] might lead to exculpatory evidence”? Id. In this case, Beckstead’s

arguments are conclusory. He does not point to any other, independent evidence

that would have suggested to the Government, at the time it destroyed this

evidence, that further testing of the methamphetamine lab might produce

exculpatory evidence. Cf. Cooper, 983 F.2d at 931 (holding destruction of lab

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10

equipment, in the face of evidence corroborating the potentially exculpatory

nature of that equipment, obtained from sources other than the defendants, was in

bad faith). 

In fact, the evidence the Government had at the time it destroyed this

evidence was just to the contrary. The samples officers took of the chemicals

found with the lab indicated they were precursors to methamphetamine

production. Officers also found some methamphetamine with the lab. When

discovered, officers recognized the equipment as a methamphetamine lab. 

Officers photographed the lab pieces before and after they were disassembled, and

documented the pieces of lab equipment they found. From those photographs, a

Government expert testified that the lab, as constructed, was capable of producing

methamphetamine. Further, the Government did try, apparently unsuccessfully,

to obtain fingerprints from the lab equipment before it was destroyed. Moreover, 

even if, as he argues, Beckstead’s fingerprints were not on the lab components

found in the apartment, that fact alone would not necessarily exculpate him. See

Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145, 1161 (10th Cir. 2003) (addressing whether

destroyed fingerprints were potentially exculpatory). 

Given what officers knew at the time they destroyed the methamphetamine

lab, they would not have had objective “reason to believe that further tests on the

[destroyed evidence] might lead to exculpatory evidence.” Bohl, 25 F.3d at 911. 

3) Did the Government still have the ability to control the disposition of

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the evidence at the time Beckstead indicated that the methamphetamine lab and

its chemicals might be exculpatory? See id. at 912. Beckstead has not asserted

any evidence indicating that this was the case here. Rather, it appears that the

Government destroyed the evidence before Beckstead raised the possibility that it

was exculpatory. 

4) Was the evidence disposed of central to the case? See id. The answer to

this inquiry is clearly yes. The lab found in Morris’ apartment and the lab

equipment found in Beckstead’s car were central to Beckstead’s conviction for

attempting to manufacture methamphetamine; and the red phosphorus seized at

Morris’ apartment presumably would have supported the jury’s finding that

Beckstead attempted to manufacture over fifty grams of methamphetamine, as

well as providing the basis for Beckstead’s conviction for possessing red

phosphorus. See generally United States v. Donaldson, 915 F.2d 612, 614 (10th

Cir. 1990) (noting Youngblood’s analysis also applies to sentencing proceedings). 

5) Does the Government offer any innocent explanation for its failure to

preserve the evidence? See Bohl, 25 F.3d at 912. Clearly it does. Officers and

Envirosolve technicians testified that they removed and destroyed the lab and its

chemicals in this case pursuant to the police department’s standard policy. This

policy is based upon the significant dangers that such a lab and the chemicals

associated with it present. For example, Officer Wersland testified at a pretrial

evidentiary hearing that the fumes in a trash bag used as a vent for a

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12

methamphetamine lab could kill a person, should the bag rupture. And many of

the chemicals associated with the production of methamphetamine are

combustible, toxic or corrosive, and very dangerous. 

Beckstead does not dispute this evidence. Instead, he asserts that the

Government could, nevertheless, have carefully preserved the evidence. The fact

that the Government could preserve the evidence, however, is not dispositive. 

The same was true in Trombetta, where officers destroyed breath samples used to

support drunk driving charges, even though it was “technically feasible” for

police to preserve those samples. See 467 U.S. at 481-83. The Supreme Court,

nevertheless, concluded that officers’ destruction of this potentially exculpatory

evidence “in accord with their normal practice” did not amount to bad faith, and

therefore did not deprive the defendant of due process. See id. at 486-89. 

Considering Bohl’s factors, we conclude that the officers in this case did

not act in bad faith when they destroyed the components of the methamphetamine

lab and the chemicals found with it. Officers were acting pursuant to the

department’s standard policy, and there is no evidence suggesting that they were

otherwise acting in bad faith. 

Our conclusion mirrors decisions by other courts in similar cases. In

United States v. Heffington, 952 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1991), for example, the Ninth

Circuit rejected a similar Youngblood claim because the police had destroyed a

methamphetamine lab “in compliance with ‘departmental procedures.’ This

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13

routine disposal of the evidence was apparently not the product of any realization

that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant. Significantly,

[the defendant] does not claim that the government knew that any test would

exonerate him.” Id. at 281 (quotations, alterations omitted). 

And in other circumstances, the Supreme Court, as well as this court, has

similarly rejected Youngblood claims where the Government destroyed

potentially exculpatory evidence pursuant to standard policy. See Fisher, 540

U.S. at 545, 547-49 (rejecting due process claim where Government, acting in

good faith and pursuant to “normal police procedures,” destroyed cocaine seized

during traffic stop ten years earlier); United States v. LaVallee, 439 F.3d 670,

697, 699 (10th Cir. 2006) (rejecting due process claim where Bureau of Prisons

destroyed videotape two years after it was created, pursuant to the Bureau’s

policy, and there was no indication that the Bureau was acting in bad faith when it

did so); Gomez, 191 F.3d at 1217, 1219 (rejecting due process claim where

Government destroyed most of the marijuana it had charged Gomez with

possessing, pursuant to the Government’s “ordinary statutory procedures”). See

generally Bohl, 25 F.3d at 912-13 (noting that “courts have held that the

government does not necessarily engage in bad faith conduct when the destruction

of evidence results from a standard procedure employed by the governmental

department or agency regarding the disposal of like evidence, at least when there

is adequate documentation of the destroyed evidence”).

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In this case, undisputed evidence indicates that the Government destroyed

the methamphetamine lab pursuant to an established and routinely followed

department policy. Beckstead fails to present any evidence that suggests that the

Government, in this particular case, was nevertheless acting in bad faith when it

destroyed the lab and its related chemicals. The district court, therefore, did not

err in rejecting Beckstead’s due process argument. See United States v. Ward,

182 Fed. Appx. 779, 783-86 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (reaching same

conclusion in similar case), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 422 (2006). 

B. Fourth Amendment issues

Beckstead next asserts two Fourth Amendment challenges to his

convictions. He argues that officers unlawfully searched both 1) his former

girlfriend Morris’ apartment and 2) his car, which was parked outside Morris’

apartment. 

The district court denied Beckstead’s pretrial motion to suppress. When

reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this court views the evidence in the

light most favorable to the Government. See United States v. Mitchell, 429 F.3d

952, 958 (10th Cir. 2005). 

We accept the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly

erroneous. The credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given

evidence, and the reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence fall

within the province of the district court. However, the ultimate

determination of reasonableness [of the search] under the Fourth 

Amendment is a question of law that we review de novo.

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In his reply brief, Beckstead asserts that the district court’s ruling on 6

standing was unclear. But that does not appear to be the case. During a hearing

on Beckstead’s motion to suppress, the district court stated “I don’t think either

Beckstead or [his co-defendant] has standing.” In a later hearing, the district

court reiterated that Beckstead “wasn’t there. He’s not a tenant in the apartment. 

He can’t complain about the actions of the officers. It isn’t his apartment.” And

in an unsuccessful motion to renew his suppression motion, Beckstead

acknowledged that the district court had denied his first suppression motion “for

lack of standing.” 

15

Id. (quotations, citations omitted). 

1. Search of Beckstead’s former girlfriend’s apartment

The district court denied Beckstead’s motion to suppress the evidence

officers found when they searched Morris’ apartment, holding that Beckstead

lacked standing to challenge that search. On appeal, however, Beckstead does not

even address his standing to challenge this search until his reply brief. 

6

It is our general rule . . . that arguments and issues presented at such a

late stage are waived. . . . [T]he reasons for our rule are two-fold: First,

to allow an appellant to raise new arguments at this juncture would be

manifestly unfair to the appellee who, under our rules, has no

opportunity for a written response. Secondly, it would also be unfair

to the court itself, which, without the benefit of a response from

appellee to an appellant’s late-blooming argument, would run the risk

of an improvident or ill-advised opinion, given our dependence as an

Article III court on the adversarial process for sharpening the issues for

decision.

Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotations, alterations

omitted); see also Stump v. Gates, 211 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting this

court ordinarily does not permit appellant to raise new issues for the first time in

his reply brief because it “robs the appellee of the opportunity to demonstrate that

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This is also true of Beckstead’s argument, asserted for the first time in his 7

reply brief, that the district court erred in refusing to permit Beckstead to reassert

his suppression motion, based upon newly discovered evidence. 

16

the record does not support an appellant’s factual assertions and to present an

analysis of the pertinent legal precedent that may compel a contrary result”). By

failing to address this issue until his reply brief, Beckstead has waived it. See 7

United States v. Cantley, 130 F.3d 1371, 1377-78 (10th Cir. 1997) (affirming

district court’s decision to deny suppression motion because appellant did not

dispute on appeal district court’s conclusion that he lacked standing to challenge

the search at issue). And because “[i]t is fundamental law that a person desiring

to have evidence suppressed must first show that he has standing to object to the

search,” we need not further address his challenges to the constitutionality of the

search of his former girlfriend’s apartment. United States v. Deninno, 29 F.3d

572, 576 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Cantley, 130 F.3d at 1377-78.

Even if we were to address the merits of the district court’s standing

determination, however, it would not warrant relief. A “person has standing only

to challenge the violation of his own Fourth Amendment rights.” United States v.

Ladeaux, 454 F.3d 1107, 1112 (10th Cir. 2006). “Fourth Amendment rights are

personal, and, therefore, a defendant cannot claim a violation of his Fourth

Amendment rights based only on the introduction of evidence procured through

an illegal search and seizure of a third person’s property or premises.” United

States v. DeLuca, 269 F.3d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). 

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17

The relevant question presented here is whether Beckstead “manifested a

subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched and whether society is

prepared to recognize that expectation as objectively reasonable.” United States

v. Valdez Hocker, 333 F.3d 1206, 1208-09 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). 

It is Beckstead’s “burden of demonstrating that he had a personal Fourth

Amendment interest that was implicated by the search . . . .” United States v.

Jones, 213 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th Cir. 2000). The district court concluded that

Beckstead did not have standing to object to the search of the apartment. We

review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and the court’s legal

conclusions de novo. Valdez Hocker, 333 F.3d at 1208.

Beckstead argues that he met his burden of proof in light of the evidence

presented at the pretrial suppression hearing that one of the two officers who

approached Morris’ apartment to investigate the anonymous tip about the

methamphetamine lab saw Beckstead leave that apartment, and because officers

found Beckstead’s driver’s license in the apartment. In addition, there was

evidence that Beckstead’s co-defendant James told officers that Beckstead had

brought the methamphetamine lab to Morris’ apartment the previous night, and

James referred to Beckstead as Morris’ boyfriend. That evidence is insufficient

for Beckstead to establish that the officers’ search of Morris’ apartment

implicated Beckstead’s Fourth Amendment rights. At most, this evidence

established only that Beckstead had previously been to Morris’ apartment. But

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In his appellate reply brief, Beckstead asserts, without any record citation, 8

that evidence presented at trial established that he had a reasonable expectation of

privacy in Morris’ apartment. Because Beckstead renewed his motion to suppress

at trial, we will also consider trial evidence in ruling on the propriety of the

district court’s decision denying Beckstead’s pretrial motion to suppress. See

United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1065 (10th Cir. 1993); see also United States

(continued...)

18

there is no indication he was living there or had spent an occasional night there. 

Cf. Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1042 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding individuals

who were living in residence when a nonconsensual search occurred had

reasonable expectation of privacy there); United States v. Thomas, 372 F.3d 1173,

1176 & n.1 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that overnight guests and even social guests

who do stay overnight have reasonable expectation of privacy, but a person

present at another’s home to conduct a business transaction does not have a

reasonable expectation of privacy), modified on other grounds by United States v.

Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 717-18 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 542 (2006). 

Even Beckstead’s leaving the methamphetamine lab there is insufficient to

establish that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in Morris’ apartment, let

alone an expectation that society is prepared to recognize as objectively

reasonable. See United States v. Zermeno, 66 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 1995)

(holding that “mere fact that [the defendant] stored contraband at the

. . . residence is insufficient to establish that he had a legitimate expectation of

privacy there”). Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Beckstead’s

suppression motion. 

8

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(...continued) 8

v. Humphrey, 208 F.3d 1190, 1203 (10th Cir. 2000). Here, however, the evidence

presented at trial concerning Beckstead’s reasonable expectation of privacy in

Morris’ apartment was conflicting. James testified that Morris and Beckstead

were dating at the time of the search, and that Beckstead was then living at the

apartment. See United States v. Higgins, 282 F.3d 1261, 1270-71 (10th Cir.

2002) (considering defendant’s expectation of privacy at the time the search

occurred). But Morris testified, to the contrary, that Beckstead had never lived at

her apartment, although he had “spent a couple of nights” there when he was

dating her. Nevertheless, according to Morris, her romantic relationship with

Beckstead had ended in December 2003, while the search at issue here did not

occur until February 9, 2004. Beckstead’s mother corroborated that Beckstead

and Morris were no longer dating, although she did not specify when that

relationship ended. In denying Beckstead’s renewed motion to suppress, the

district court had to reconcile that conflicting testimony. Because there was

evidence presented at trial that supported the district court’s previous factual

finding that Beckstead lacked standing to challenge the search of Morris’

apartment, the district court did not err in denying either motion to suppress. 

See United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1364-65 (10th Cir. 1984); see also

Jones, 213 F.3d at 1259. 

The evidence at trial was further conflicting as to whether Beckstead was

present in Morris’ apartment the night before the search. Morris testified that she

did not see Beckstead in her apartment that night. But James testified instead that

Beckstead was at the apartment the night preceding the search, “cooking”

methamphetamine. Even if the district court found, as the jury did, that

Beckstead had been present in Morris’ apartment “cooking” methamphetamine

the night preceding the search, that alone would not have established that

Beckstead had a legitimate expectation of privacy in Morris’ apartment. Cf.

Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 85, 88-91 (1998) (holding individual present in

another’s home only to conduct business transaction, including one involving

illicit drugs, had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the home).

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2. Search of Beckstead’s car

Beckstead also asserts that officers violated the Fourth Amendment when

they searched his car, found in the parking lot outside Morris’ apartment, without

a warrant. In his opening brief, Beckstead only mentions the car search in two

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section headings, a single sentence in the brief’s summary, and two phrases in

arguments otherwise challenging the search of Morris’ apartment. He makes no

specific argument challenging the car search anywhere in the body of his opening

brief. Nor does he assert any law in support of a Fourth Amendment challenge to

the car search. “It is insufficient merely to state in one’s brief that one is

appealing an adverse ruling below without advancing reasoned argument as to the

grounds for appeal.” Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1547 (10th

Cir. 1995). Because Beckstead failed to brief this issue adequately in his opening

brief, he has waived it. See Stump, 211 F.3d at 533; Gross, 53 F.3d at 1547. 

Even if we addressed the merits of his Fourth Amendment challenge to the

search of his car, however, that argument does not warrant relief. The district

court upheld this search under the “automobile exception” to the Fourth

Amendment’s warrant requirement. Under that exception, officers possessing

probable cause to believe a car contains contraband may search the car without

first obtaining a search warrant. See United States v. Brooks, 438 F.3d 1231,

1241 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392

(1985)). “The rationale for the automobile exception is based on both the

inherent mobility of cars (as it is often impracticable to obtain a warrant before a

car can be driven away) and the fact that there is a reduced expectation of privacy

with motor vehicles.” United States v. Mercado, 307 F.3d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir.

2002). 

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In this case, when the officers looked into Beckstead’s car, they saw

glassware which could be used to manufacture methamphetamine. Further, the

officers had just discovered a methamphetamine lab in a nearby apartment, after

receiving an anonymous tip. That anonymous tip had also included additional

information indicating that there was a black Pontiac matching the description of

Beckstead’s car that was involved with the lab. And when officers first

approached the apartment, Beckstead’s car had been parked in front of the

apartment where officers found the lab. All of these facts were sufficient to give

officers probable cause to believe there was contraband in Beckstead’s car. See

United States v. Ledesma, 447 F.3d 1307, 1319 (10th Cir. 2006) (considering

totality of circumstances to determine officers had probable cause to search under

automobile exception). Their warrantless search of Beckstead’s car, therefore,

did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 

Beckstead asserts that, under the circumstances of this case, officers had

time to obtain a warrant before searching the car because it was parked when they

discovered it. But that fact is of no moment: 

Although the automobile exception is based in part on exigency, ‘the

justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once

the car has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon a reviewing

court’s assessment of the likelihood in each particular case that the car

would have been driven away, or that its contents would have been

tampered with, during the period required for the police to obtain a

warrant.’

United States v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523, 1528 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Michigan

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v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (per curiam)). Therefore, the district court

did not err in denying Beckstead’s motion to suppress the evidence discovered in

his car.

C. Expert testimony

Beckstead next challenges Officer Daniels’ testimony concerning his

involvement in the weighing of three packages of red phosphorus found in a safe

in Morris’ apartment. He specifically asserts that admitting this testimony, which

Beckstead argues was hearsay, violated the Confrontation Clause and several

rules of evidence, as well as depriving him of due process. 

Generally, this court reviews a district court’s decision to admit evidence

for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Mares, 441 F.3d 1152, 1154 (10th

Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3048 (2007). “[A]nd our review of decisions

to admit evidence over hearsay objections is especially deferential.” United

States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1165-66 (10th Cir. 2005).

On direct examination, Daniels testified that he weighed the three packages

of red phosphorus. On cross-examination, however, Daniels testified that he was

unsure whether he or another officer had physically removed those packages from

the apartment. In response to defense counsel’s question as to which officer

weighed the packages, Daniels testified that “It was either myself or Jason

Richman. We were the only ones that would be gloved up and suited up and able

to touch those.” Defense counsel objected:

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[O]n cross-examination the officer just indicated that he isn’t sure if he

weighed the objects found in the safe or not, or whether someone else

weighed the objects found in the safe or not, and he is not sure if he is

the one who weighed it and looked at the scales and saw the results.

Based on that, Your Honor, I would suggest that the evidence is not

competent evidence, that it is simply hearsay that the packages weighed

what Exhibit 5 [which listed the evidence officers seized at the crime

scene] says they weighed, and I would move to strike his testimony as

to weight and move to redact that portion of Exhibit 5.

The court reserved its ruling on that objection. 

On redirect-examination the following day, Daniels clarified his testimony

by stating that he was part of the weighing process and he was able to see the

weights registered on the scale when they were weighed. And it was that

information that was recorded on Government’s Exhibit 5. 

On recross-examination, Daniels further explained that, while he did not

recall whether it was him or another officer that physically carried the three

packages to the table to be weighed, once the packages were at the table, “me and

him are the ones that do the weighing and sampling and nobody else.” Daniels

further indicated that he could not “tell you who set [each package] on the scale. 

I can tell you that I saw the weights on the scale. I can’t tell you who said to the

person, it weighs this much, but we both stand there and we both weigh them and

we both sample them. I was there during the process when they were weighed.” 

Beckstead argues that, even if Daniels “was present and saw the weight

measurement,” “[t]here is still such ambiguity regarding the phosphorus, where it

came from, how it got on the scale, how it was measured, and whether the weight

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included packaging, that the testimony of the weight taken in this makeshift

destruction facility is simply not competent.” We disagree. Daniels eventually

clarified any confusion. The district court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion

in refusing to strike this testimony.

D. Imposition of statutory mandatory minimum twenty-year

sentence. 

Beckstead argues that the district court’s imposition of the statutory

mandatory minimum twenty-year sentence violated United States v. Booker, 543

U.S. 220 (2005). Because Beckstead objected to the mandatory minimum

sentence in the district court, we review it de novo. See United States v.

Bustamante, 454 F.3d 1200, 1202 (10th Cir. 2006). This court has previously

held that “Booker . . . does not apply to statutory minimum sentences.” United

States v. Harris, 447 F.3d 1300, 1307 (10th Cir. 2006); see also United States v.

Ramirez, 479 F.3d 1229, 1255 (10th Cir. 2007). Beckstead acknowledges this

authority and seeks only to preserve this issue for further appeal. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Beckstead’s convictions and

sentence.

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