Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-01315/USCOURTS-caDC-13-01315-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
Respondent
Prairie State Generating Company LLC
Petitioner
Secretary of Labor
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 23, 2014 Decided June 26, 2015 

No. 13-1315 

PRAIRIE STATE GENERATING COMPANY LLC, 

PETITIONER

v. 

SECRETARY OF LABOR AND FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND 

HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION, 

RESPONDENTS

On Petition for Review of a Decision of the 

Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission 

Ralph Henry Moore, II argued the cause for petitioner. 

With him on the briefs was Patrick W. Dennison. 

Edward Waldman, Attorney, Mine Safety & Health 

Administration, argued the cause for respondents. With him 

on the brief was W. Christian Schumann, Counsel. John T. 

Sullivan, Attorney, Federal Mine Safety and Health Review 

Commission, entered an appearance. 

Before: HENDERSON and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge PILLARD. 

USCA Case #13-1315 Document #1559627 Filed: 06/26/2015 Page 1 of 25
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PILLARD, Circuit Judge: Coal powers almost 40% of the 

electricity used in the United States. Despite enormous safety 

advances in recent decades, underground coal mining remains 

one of the handful of the nation’s most dangerous jobs. Caveins, and dusts or gases that pose respiratory or explosion risks, 

are leading causes of harm to coal miners.1 Congress enacted 

the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977 

(the Mine Act) to protect America’s miners. The Mine Act 

subjects mine operators to substantial safety regulation, under 

rules generally applicable to all mines, as well as minespecific safety plans suited to the particular geologic 

conditions and the operator’s chosen mining system. 

Operators must propose mine-specific plans for the approval 

of the Secretary of Labor, who acts for those purposes 

through a district manager in the Mine Safety and Health 

Administration (MSHA). The Mine Act established the 

Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, an 

independent agency, to review operators’ challenges to 

citations and orders the Secretary imposes under the Act. 

Petitioner Prairie State Generating Company, LLC (Prairie 

State) challenges the Commission’s decision to sustain the 

Secretary’s citations against it for operating without approved, 

mine-specific plans for roof support and ventilation at Prairie 

 

1 See, e.g., U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Electric Power Monthly

Table 1.1 (May 2015), available at 

http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/pdf/epm.pdf; News Release, 

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, MSHA, Roof fall accidents remain a leading 

cause of coal mining injuries, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (July 2, 2014), 

available at

http://www.msha.gov/MEDIA/PRESS/2014/NR140702.asp;

Mining: Inputs: Occupational Safety & Health Risks, Ctr. for 

Disease Control & Prevention, 

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/programs/mining/risks.html (last visited 

June 1, 2015).

USCA Case #13-1315 Document #1559627 Filed: 06/26/2015 Page 2 of 25
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State’s underground coal mine at Lively Grove in southern 

Illinois. After extensive consultation over the terms of minespecific safety plans that would be suitable at Lively Grove, 

the MSHA district manager had declined to accept the final 

terms that Prairie State proposed. In order to create an 

opportunity to challenge the district manager’s plan-suitability 

decisions, Prairie State momentarily operated the mine 

without approved roof-support and ventilation plans and so 

incurred two citations, which it challenges here. 

The principal question before us is which standard the 

Commission should use when it reviews the Secretary’s 

citation of an operator for failure to follow an approved, 

mine-specific plan. The Secretary defends arbitrary-andcapricious review as appropriately deferential to his 

judgments because the Department of Labor is the agency 

charged under the Mine Act with expert policymaking 

discretion to evaluate and approve mine-specific safety plans. 

Prairie State, by contrast, argues for de novo review on the 

ground that the Secretary will not have carried his 

acknowledged burden to prove the basis for a citation unless 

he establishes, without the benefit of deference, the 

unsuitability of an operator’s proposed plan. Prairie State 

claims two further legal errors: First, that the Commission 

erred as a matter of law by not considering evidence that, 

Prairie State contends, is relevant notwithstanding that it was 

not submitted to the district manager when he decided plan 

suitability; and second, that the district manager erroneously 

relied on an MSHA Procedure Instruction Letter as a binding, 

across-the-board norm in derogation of his duty to make a 

case-specific judgment. Finally, Prairie State points out 

various ways in which, even if the suitability determinations 

were reviewed with deference, it believes the determinations 

were contrary to law and unsupported by substantial evidence. 

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We hold that that the Secretary’s judgments regarding the 

suitability of mine-specific safety plans are entitled to 

deference under the Mine Act, and reject the further claims of 

error. 

I. 

The Mine Act charges two separate agencies with 

complementary policymaking and adjudicative functions.2

 

The Secretary, acting through MSHA, sets regulatory 

standards of mine safety, conducts regular mine inspections, 

and issues citations and orders in response to violations. 29 

U.S.C. § 557a; 30 U.S.C. §§ 813, 814; Thunder Basin Coal 

Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 202-04 & n.5 (1994). The 

Commission, an adjudicatory body established as independent 

of the Secretary, reviews challenges to MSHA’s actions. 30 

U.S.C. §§ 815(d), 823. The Mine Act’s split-function 

approach contrasts with the more typical administrative 

structure, in which rulemaking and adjudication are 

performed within a single agency. See generally Martin v. 

Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 

151 (1991) (describing the analogous, split-function scheme 

under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act)); 2 

Charles H. Koch, Jr. & Richard Murphy, Administrative Law 

& Practice § 5:29 (3d ed.). The extra institutional separation 

the Mine Act provides reflects Congress’s concern that the 

 

2

 Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (1977), codified as amended at 

30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. The Mine Act amended the Federal Coal 

Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (the Coal Act), Pub. L. No. 91-

173, 83 Stat. 742 (1969), by extending the coverage of the existing 

regulatory regime to non-coal mines and strengthening its 

protections of miners. See United Mine Workers of Am., Int’l 

Union v. Dole, 870 F.2d 662, 666 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1989); S. Rep. No. 

95-181, at 9 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 3409.

USCA Case #13-1315 Document #1559627 Filed: 06/26/2015 Page 4 of 25
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adjudicatory function be institutionally independent of 

potential influence by the agency responsible for 

policymaking and enforcement decisions. See S. Rep. No. 

95-181, at 47 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 

3447 (“[A]n independent Commission is essential to provide 

administrative adjudication which preserves due process and 

instills much more confidence in the program.”). 

The Mine Act requires the Secretary, acting through an 

MSHA district manager assigned to one of the nation’s twelve 

mining districts, to negotiate mine-specific roof-support and 

ventilation plans with representatives of the companies that 

operate the mines. Congress decided that “individually 

tailored plans, with a nucleus of commonly accepted 

practices, are the best method of regulating such complex and 

potentially multifaceted problems as ventilation, roof control 

and the like.” Dole, 870 F.2d at 669 n.10 (quoting S. Rep. 

No. 95-181 at 25, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3425). As outlined 

below, the operators propose plans for the Secretary’s 

consideration that they believe are “suitable” to ensure 

adequate roof support and ventilation based on each mine’s 

unique geology and proposed mining system. 30 U.S.C. 

§§ 862(a), 863(o); see Mach Mining, LLC v. Sec’y of Labor, 

728 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). No mine may operate 

without an approved plan, and once the Secretary has 

approved a plan, its terms are enforceable as if they were duly 

promulgated regulations. 30 C.F.R. §§ 75.220(c), 75.370(d); 

see Dole, 870 F.2d at 667 & n.7; Zeigler Coal Co. v. Kleppe, 

536 F.2d 398, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (interpreting the 

predecessor Coal Act). 

The first step in the process of plan approval is for a mine 

operator to develop roof-support and ventilation plans it 

thinks are suitable, and to submit the plans to the district 

manager for his or her consideration. 30 C.F.R. §§ 75.220(a), 

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75.370(a); see 30 U.S.C. §§ 862(a), 863(o); Dole, 870 F.2d at 

668-69 & n.10. The operator must also provide proposed 

plans to the mine workers’ representative prior to submitting 

them to the district manager, so that the representative may 

make comments for the district manager’s consideration. 30 

C.F.R. § 75.370(a)(3), (b). The district manager evaluates the 

operator’s proposed plans (and miners’ comments) in 

accordance with the Secretary’s policy judgment, and in light 

of information about the prospective site and the agency’s 

accumulated knowledge and experience. See 30 U.S.C. 

§§ 862(a), 863(o); 30 C.F.R. §§ 75.220(a), 75.370(a); S. Rep. 

No. 95-181 at 25, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3425. If the district 

manager deems an operator’s proposed plan insufficient to 

ensure miners’ health and safety, he or she denies approval, 

explaining relevant concerns to the operator and giving the 

operator a chance to address the identified deficiencies. 30 

C.F.R. §§ 75.220(b), 75.370(c). The operator and the district 

manager then engage in a good-faith negotiation in an effort 

to formulate a plan with which they both are satisfied. Id. 

§§ 75.220(a), 75.370(a), (c)(2); see Sec’y of Labor v. Carbon 

Cnty. Coal Co., 7 FMSHRC 1367, 1371 (1985). The operator 

“ha[s] a role to play in developing plan contents, [but] [the 

Secretary] always retain[s] final responsibility for deciding 

what ha[s] to be included in the plan.” Dole, 870 F.2d at 669 

n.10; see 30 U.S.C. §§ 862(a), 863(o) (operators shall only 

adopt plans “approved by” the Secretary). In other words, 

“‘while the operator proposes a plan and is entitled . . . to 

further consultation with the Secretary over revisions, the 

Secretary must independently exercise his judgment with 

respect to the content of such plans in connection with his 

final approval of the plan.’” Dole, 870 F.2d at 669 n.10

(quoting S. Rep. No. 95-181 at 25, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 

3425). If a mine operates without an approved, mine-specific 

plan, the Secretary may issue citations, orders to withdraw 

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from the mine, civil fines, and criminal penalties. 30 U.S.C. 

§§ 814(a), (d), 815, 820. 

 The independent Commission is the administrative 

adjudicator under the Mine Act. 30 U.S.C. §§ 815, 823. A 

mine operator may appeal a citation issued by the Secretary to 

an administrative law judge, who conducts a hearing on 

behalf of the Commission in accordance with the 

Administrative Procedure Act. Id. §§ 815(d), 823(d)(1). At 

the hearing, the Secretary must support its citation by a 

preponderance of evidence in the record. See 5 U.S.C. 

§§ 554(c)(2), 556(d); Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102 

(1981) (interpreting “substantial evidence” under APA 

Section 556 to mean a preponderance of evidence). Based on 

the hearing and any related briefing, the ALJ makes findings 

of fact and either affirms, modifies, or vacates the Secretary’s 

decisions. 30 U.S.C. §§ 815(d), 823(d)(1). A mine operator 

may petition the Commission for discretionary review of an 

ALJ’s order. Id. § 823(a), (d)(2)(A). The Commission sits in 

Washington, D.C., and is comprised of five members, each 

appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the 

Senate, to a tenure-protected, six-year term. Id. § 823(a), (b). 

If the Commission denies review, the ALJ’s decision becomes 

final. Id. § 823(d)(1). A person affected by a Commission 

decision has a right to review in this court or the court of 

appeals for the circuit in which the alleged violation 

occurred.3

 Id. § 816(a)(1). 

 

3

 By contrast, anyone affected by the promulgation of a generally 

applicable rule may directly petition the Courts of Appeals for 

review; in those cases, the Mine Act does not call for administrative 

review by the Commission (or its ALJs). 30 U.S.C. § 811(d). The 

Secretary’s exercise of his general rulemaking authority is subject 

to deferential judicial review. Dole, 870 F.2d at 666-67.

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An operator may only commence mining under a plan the 

Secretary has approved, through a district manager, as 

“suitable.” 30 U.S.C. §§ 862(a), 863(o); 30 C.F.R. §§ 75.220, 

75.370. Sometimes, as in this case, an operator and district 

manager fail to reach agreement on suitable plan terms. The 

statute does not explicitly provide for administrative and 

judicial review of a district manager’s refusal to accept the 

operator’s proposed plan terms as suitable, but the Secretary 

and operators have developed a “technical citation” practice 

in order to enable review. See Mach Mining, 728 F.3d at 651-

54. An operator that wishes to challenge a district manager’s 

suitability decision momentarily commences operations under 

its preferred terms, without the requisite approval by the 

Secretary, prompting the Secretary to issue a technical 

citation that carries a nominal monetary penalty. Id. at 655-

56. The operator then appeals the technical citation to the 

Commission and, as appropriate, a federal court of appeals. 

The technical citation process is described in the Secretary’s 

policy manual. MSHA, Program Policy Manual Vol. V (Dec. 

2013, Release V-48), at 5.4

 

II. 

In 2008, Prairie State proposed to construct an 

underground coal mine at the Lively Grove site in southern 

Illinois. At Lively Grove, Prairie State prepared to use large, 

remote-controlled, continuous mining machines that take cuts 

into the coal seam, convey the cut coal back to be carted out 

 

4

 A 2006 amendment to the Mine Act codified the technical citation 

route to obtaining review in the face of disagreement over minespecific accident response plans, 30 U.S.C. § 876(b)(2)(G), but not 

with respect to disagreements regarding the suitability of roofsupport and ventilation plans, see Mach Mining, 728 F.3d at 655. 

The validity of the technical citation process is not at issue here. 

USCA Case #13-1315 Document #1559627 Filed: 06/26/2015 Page 8 of 25
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of the mine, and—once they have tunneled into the seam to a 

target depth—withdraw from the coal face so that miners can 

use roofbolts or other supports to secure the roof above where 

the coal was removed. Prairie State proposed to make 40-foot 

deep cuts into the seam, and to create openings 20 feet across 

and, at tunnel intersections, 68 feet in diagonal span. For 

ventilation, Prairie State proposed to use a “fishtail” 

ventilation system, which circulates fresh air into the mine 

and splits the air stream, ensuring fresher air to more mine 

areas than a single stream that travels further and, it claims, 

can carry contaminants within the mine. Prairie State’s 

position was that, with the fishtail system, ventilating 9,000 to 

12,000 cubic feet per minute of air would suffice, depending 

on the number of open crosscuts. 

Area geology around Lively Grove was known to the 

Secretary to present risks of roof falls and hazardous methane 

emissions. The district manager and his staff reviewed Prairie 

State’s submissions in this case, determined that Prairie 

State’s proposed plans were inadequate, and communicated 

their concerns to Prairie State along with suggested plan 

revisions. Over the ensuing year, Prairie State and the district 

manager traded written correspondence and engaged in more 

than thirty discussions regarding plan terms. They failed to 

reach agreement, however, on the issues of maximum 

permissible cut depth, tunnel entry width, diagonal span of 

tunnel intersections, and the adequacy of the ventilation 

system Prairie State proposed in the mine. The district 

manager declined to approve, at least at the outset in the 

absence of mining history at the site, cuts deeper than 20 feet, 

tunnel entries wider than 18 feet, and intersection diagonals 

longer than 64 feet. With respect to air quantities, the district 

manager called for ventilation of 20,000 to 25,000 cubic feet 

per minute—more than twice Prairie State’s proposed 

volume. In light of the district manager’s disapproval of 

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Prairie State’s proposed terms, Prairie State triggered 

technical citations regarding roof-support and ventilation 

plans, which it challenged before the Commission. 

The Commission assigned the citation challenges to an 

ALJ to conduct a hearing. The ALJ heard testimony on the 

merits of Prairie State’s claims. The district manager, along 

with the roof-support and ventilation specialists working 

under his supervision, testified on the Secretary’s behalf. 

Prairie State’s representatives and expert witnesses also 

testified. With the benefit of post-hearing briefing, the ALJ 

affirmed both citations in a written opinion. The ALJ made 

factual findings describing the plan proposal, evaluation, 

negotiation, and plan-suitability determinations at Lively 

Grove. 

The ALJ sustained the Secretary’s determination that 

Prairie State’s proposed plans were unsuitable. Over Prairie 

State’s objection, the ALJ held as a matter of law that plan 

suitability is appropriately assessed “in terms of the discretion 

of the district manager” under a “standard of review [that] 

incorporates an element of reasonableness.” 32 FMSHRC 

602, 608 (May 2010). The ALJ then rejected Prairie State’s 

assertion that the district manager’s discretion was 

impermissibly constrained by a Procedure Instruction Letter 

that the Secretary had issued outlining procedures for 

evaluating operators’ requests for extended cuts. The ALJ 

also excluded evidence about plans at other mines that Prairie 

State sought to introduce at the hearing on the ground that 

Prairie State had not submitted that evidence to the Secretary 

during plan negotiations. 

The Commission granted Prairie State’s petition for 

discretionary review and affirmed the ALJ on most issues. 

The Commission agreed with the ALJ’s determination that the 

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citations were subject to arbitrary-and-capricious review by 

the Commission and its ALJs because that standard 

“appropriately respects the Secretary’s judgment while 

allowing review for abuse of discretion, errors of law, and 

review of the record under the substantial evidence test.” 35 

FMSHRC 1985, 1990, 2013 WL 3947974 (July 2013) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Deference is warranted in 

this context, the Commission reasoned, because ALJs and 

Commissioners “are not always best-equipped to decide 

technical issues regarding ventilation and roof control,” and 

“are instead charged with deciding whether the district 

manager has made a fair and informed suitability 

determination.” Id. at 1989 n.6. One Commissioner 

dissented, stating that Commission precedent “ha[d] long held 

that the Secretary bears the burden of establishing that the 

operator’s plan . . . was unsuitable,” and that the ALJ had 

“short-circuited the [review] process by avoiding the 

threshold question of unsuitability,” “effectively replac[ing] 

the burden of proof with a deferential ‘review’ of the 

rationality of the District Manager’s negotiating position.” Id. 

at 1998-99 (Young, Comm’r, dissenting). 

The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s rulings regarding 

evidentiary exclusions, reliance on the Procedure Instruction 

Letter, and the merits of Prairie State’s challenges regarding 

cut depth, entry width, and diagonals. The Commission 

ordered a limited remand for the ALJ to explain her 

conclusion regarding ventilation. On remand, the ALJ 

provided further reasoning regarding the ventilation plan 

issue, and assessed a $200 penalty for Prairie State’s two 

technical citations. Prairie State again appealed to the 

Commission, which denied further review. Prairie State then 

timely petitioned this court.

 

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III. 

 We review the legal determinations of the Commission 

and its ALJs de novo and factual findings for substantial 

evidentiary support. 30 U.S.C. § 816(a)(1); Black Beauty 

Coal Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 703 

F.3d 553, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Sec’y of Labor v. Keystone 

Coal Mining Corp., 151 F.3d 1096, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 

We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, Mach 

Mining, 728 F.3d at 659; cf. Veritas Health Servs., Inc. v. 

NLRB, 671 F.3d 1267, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 2012), and accord 

“great deference” to the ALJ’s credibility determinations, 

Keystone Coal, 151 F.3d at 1107. 

A. 

The threshold question in this case concerns the standard 

under which the Commission and its ALJs review the 

Secretary’s plan-suitability determinations in the context of a 

challenge to a technical citation. We may assume, without 

deciding, that Chevron governs our consideration of that 

question, as Prairie State failed to contest the Secretary’s 

assertion that it does.5

 Because the Mine Act itself does not 

provide a definitive answer, see 30 U.S.C. § 815(d), we 

 

5 But see Steadman, 450 U.S. at 95 (“Where Congress has not 

prescribed the degree of proof which must be adduced by the 

proponent of a rule or order to carry its burden of persuasion in an 

administrative proceeding, this Court has felt at liberty to prescribe 

the standard, for it is the kind of question which has traditionally 

been left to the judiciary to resolve.”) (internal quotation marks & 

alteration marks omitted); Mach Mining, 728 F.3d at 647 

(sustaining without Chevron deference the Commission’s decision 

to apply a deferential standard of review to the Secretary’s approval 

of mine-specific plan-suitability determinations, citing Steadman). 

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consider it under Chevron’s second step, deferring to the 

Commission’s reasonable interpretation of the Act, see 

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 

U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 

The Commission has chosen to review the Secretary’s 

plan determinations deferentially, and the Mine Act allows 

that choice. It is well established that the Commission and the 

courts owe deference to the Secretary’s interpretation of the 

Mine Act and generally-applicable regulations promulgated 

thereunder. See, e.g., Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc. v. Fed. Mine 

Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 212 F.3d 1301, 1303 (D.C. 

Cir. 2000); Sec’y of Labor v. Cannelton Indus., Inc., 867 F.2d 

1432, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see generally 2 Koch & 

Murphy, Administrative Law & Practice § 5:29. The plans at 

issue here are sufficiently analogous to render reasonable the 

Commission’s approach. 

The Commission treats mine-specific safety plans as, in 

effect, contextually specific, mini regulations, similarly 

entitled to deference. The Senate Report supports the 

analogy. In discussing the Act’s requirement of mine-specific 

plans to govern certain safety issues, the Report stated that 

“[s]uch individually tailored plans, with a nucleus of 

commonly accepted practices, are the best method of 

regulating such complex and potentially multifaceted 

problems as ventilation, roof control and the like.” S. Rep. 

No. 95-181, at 25, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3425. Once the 

Secretary approves them, the provisions of a mine-specific 

plan are as binding as a generally-applicable, dulypromulgated rule. Dole, 870 F.2d at 667 & n.7; Zeigler, 536 

F.2d at 409. The Commission reasonably deemed the 

Secretary’s determinations regarding roof support and 

ventilation as worthy of deference, given that they entail caseby-case judgments in the field based on unique geological 

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conditions and mining systems—judgments that the expert, 

policymaking agency is charged with and better equipped to 

make. See id.; 30 U.S.C. §§ 862(a), 863(o). 

The statutory requirements of negotiation between the 

Secretary and an operator in the development of suitable, 

mine-specific plans, and the Mine Act’s provision for miners’ 

input during the plan-approval process, can be thought to play 

a role in the development of mine-specific plans akin to that 

of notice and comment in formal administrative rulemaking. 

Mine operators receive written notice of the reasoning and 

bases for the Secretary’s initial plan-suitability determinations 

and have multiple opportunities to respond with arguments 

and supplemental data. Carbon County, 7 FMSHRC at 1370-

71; 30 C.F.R. §§ 75.220, 75.370. Plan negotiations thus may 

reasonably be characterized as serving the same interests as 

notice and comment, albeit less formally: notice to affected 

parties, opportunities for such parties to develop the record by 

submitting factual and legal support, and improvement of the 

agency’s decisionmaking. See, e.g., Small Refiner Lead 

Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 547 (D.C. 

Cir. 1983). Prairie State objects that the Secretary has 

effectively imposed rules without the protection of notice and 

comment, but the Commission reasonably treated the plannegotiation process as giving operators adequate opportunity 

to frame the issues, have their views heard, and persuade the 

agency to make salutary changes. 

The Supreme Court’s treatment of the split-function 

structure created by the OSH Act, which closely parallels the 

Mine Act, also supports that analysis. See Martin, 499 U.S. at 

152-55. The OSH Act’s “administrative and judicial review 

procedures . . . are nearly identical to those in the Mine Act,” 

which is “hardly surprising since . . . the Mine Act’s review 

process was written to conform to the review process of the 

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OSH Act.” Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Chao, 300 F.3d 867, 872 

(D.C. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 

Martin, the Supreme Court distinguished the split-function 

occupational health and safety regime from the typical, 

unitary agency that uses adjudication as a policymaking tool, 

emphasizing that the independent OSH Review Commission 

lacks delegated power to make law and policy. 499 U.S. at 

154. The Court stated that “Congress intended to delegate to 

the Commission the type of nonpolicymaking adjudicatory 

powers typically exercised by a court in the agency-review 

context,” and that, “[u]nder this conception of adjudication, 

the Commission is authorized to review the Secretary’s 

interpretations only for consistency with the regulatory 

language and for reasonableness.” Id. at 154-55. 

Just as deference to the Secretary is warranted in the 

split-function administrative regime governing occupational 

health and safety, the institutional division and allocation of 

distinct functions under the Mine Act is fully consistent with 

limited, reasonableness review by the Commission of the 

Secretary’s plan-suitability determinations. This court, 

following Martin, has recognized that the considered position 

of the Secretary in issuing a citation for violation of a 

generally-applicable mine safety regulation and defending it 

before the Commission is an exercise of delegated lawmaking 

power, and so entitled to deference. “The Secretary’s 

interpretation before the Commission is ‘agency action, not a 

post hoc rationalization of it.’ And, ‘when embodied in a 

citation, the Secretary’s interpretation assumes a form 

expressly provided for by Congress,’ and is therefore ‘as 

much an exercise of delegated lawmaking powers as is the 

Secretary’s promulgation of’ a regulation.” Akzo Nobel Salt, 

212 F.3d at 1304 (quoting Martin, 499 U.S. at 157). 

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The Seventh Circuit, the only other federal court of 

appeals to have decided this issue, held that the process the 

Mine Act put in place for developing mine-specific plans is 

incompatible with de novo review of such plans by the 

Commission: 

[T]he process of approving a ventilation plan 

proposed by the mine operator . . . involves the 

formulation of a standard, not the enforcement of a 

standard. It requires the gathering of information by 

the mine operator and its presentation to the district 

manager, the manager’s examining and assessing that 

material and considering the views of the operator on 

the appropriateness of the plan. At bottom, it entails 

the exercise of the Secretary’s independent judgment 

as to the appropriateness of the plan to ensure the 

health and safety of the miners. There is, in other 

words, a congressional mandate that the Secretary 

exercise independent judgment that the plan 

safeguards those whom it is designed to protect. . . . 

[T]he Secretary’s role of approving the plan is not 

really an enforcement role susceptible to de novo 

review, but rather a role imbued with a legislative or 

policy-making dimension to ensure that the plan is 

reflective of the public interest in mine safety. 

Mach Mining, 728 F.3d at 657. In short, the process of 

developing mine-specific plans requires the Secretary, 

through the district manager, to engage in detail with mine 

operators and bring to bear expertise and experience. 

Whether the Act thus requires the Commission’s deferential 

review, as Mach Mining held, or at least permits it, as we 

conclude, deferential review appropriately respects the 

Secretary’s policymaking prerogative and ensures that his 

determinations are reasonable and adequately supported by 

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17 

the evidence. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. 

Ruckelshaus, 719 F.2d 1159, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 

We reject Prairie State’s argument that the Mine Act’s 

incorporation of APA procedures necessarily puts the onus on 

the Secretary to prove to the Commission de novo the 

unsuitability of Prairie State’s preferred, mine-specific safety 

plans. Prairie State conflates the burden of proof with the 

standard of review. The statute requires the Secretary to 

prove, by a preponderance of evidence, the bases of citations 

it issues. 30 U.S.C. § 815(d); 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(c)(2), 556(d); 

see Steadman, 450 U.S. at 102. In this case, the “order” of 

which the Secretary is a “proponent,” 5 U.S.C. § 556(d), is the 

technical citation, and the basis of that citation is that the 

operator mined without an approved, suitable plan, see 30 

U.S.C. § 814(a); 30 C.F.R. §§ 75.220(c), 75.370(d). That fact 

is not disputed here; the parties stipulated as much in order to 

trigger review. 

It does not follow from the Secretary’s burden under the 

APA to establish the grounds of a citation that the 

Commission must review de novo the Secretary’s underlying 

suitability determination. Consistent with the statute, the 

Commission has held that the Secretary’s burden is to 

persuade the Commission that the district manager did not 

abuse his discretion or act arbitrarily and capriciously in 

making his suitability determination, for instance by failing to 

examine relevant facts and draw reasonable conclusions. See, 

e.g., Sec’y of Labor v. Mach Mining, LLC, 34 FMSHRC 

1784, 1790 & n.13 (Aug. 2012). As discussed below, the 

Commission correctly held the Secretary to that standard in 

this case. 35 FMSHRC at 1989-90; see infra Section III-B. 

We accept the Commission’s approach as a permissible 

reading of the Mine Act. 

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Prairie State relies on our decision in Zeigler for the 

proposition that, in reviewing a technical citation for 

operating without an approved safety plan, the Commission 

must presume the suitability of Prairie State’s preferred plan, 

and so require the Secretary to establish its unsuitability. 

Zeigler held that mine-specific plan requirements are 

enforceable on the same terms as generally-applicable 

regulatory standards. 536 F.2d at 409. Prairie State draws 

from Zeigler’s observation that a ventilation plan “is not 

formulated by the Secretary, but is ‘adopted by the operator,’” 

id. at 406, a presumptive legal primacy for the operator’s 

plan: It is, in Prairie State’s view, “[i]nherent in the Zeigler 

holding is that it is the operator’s proposal that is being 

evaluated, not the Secretary’s,” and thus the district manager 

may impose no different requirements until the operator’s 

plan has been proved to be unsuitable, Petitioner Br. 22. But 

that language in Zeigler aimed primarily at quelling operators’ 

concerns that regulation through mine-specific plans might 

lead to “mine inspectors run riot,” using such plans as a 

means to evade the process for promulgating general rules on 

issues properly subject to general rulemaking by instead 

“simply insisting that newly formulated standards be included 

in one or another of the plans each operator must adopt.” 536 

F.2d at 406. No such end-run around the Mine Act’s general 

rulemaking is claimed here. Moreover, Zeigler recognizes, as 

do we, both the regulatory character of mine-specific plans, 

and the Secretary’s paramount control over and responsibility 

for mine-specific plans, which “must also be approved by the 

Secretary.” Id.; see also Dole, 870 F.2d at 669 n.10 (although 

the operator “ha[s] a role to play in developing plan contents, 

[the Secretary] always retain[s] final responsibility for 

deciding what ha[s] to be included in the plan”). 

The nub of the parties’ dispute is whether the 

Commission reasonably concluded that it owes deference to 

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the Secretary’s action in this kind of case, involving a 

challenge to a technical citation on the ground that the district 

manager unlawfully eschewed Prairie State’s preferred terms. 

The question is whether judgments about suitable roof support 

and ventilation in a particular underground mine—made by 

the specialized, on-the-ground official of the agency that 

Congress vested with policymaking authority over mine 

safety decisions—are entitled to deference, or whether a 

national administrative adjudicator independent of that agency 

should exercise its judgment on those issues afresh, without 

giving any special weight to the policymaking agency’s 

determinations. Given that suitability is a discretionary, 

contextual exercise of expert judgment regarding the 

safeguards needed to keep miners safe, established principles 

of administrative law support the Commission’s deference to 

the Secretary here. See, e.g., Martin, 499 U.S. at 154-56. 

We therefore hold that the standard of review applied by 

the Commission was at least a permissible one. 

B. 

Prairie State further contends that, even under deferential 

review, the Commission reversibly erred in sustaining the 

district manager’s decisions regarding cut depth, entry widths, 

diagonals, and ventilation. We disagree. 

1. 

Prairie State asserts that the Commission’s ALJ 

incorrectly refused to consider evidence Prairie State 

proffered about plans approved for other mines—information 

that it concededly had not submitted or cited to the district 

manager during the plan-development process. Prairie State 

contends that the ALJ incorrectly “limited the evidence that 

the District Manager should have considered to the specific 

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mine rather tha[n] what was readily available to him.” 

Petitioner Br. 34. It asserts that consideration of practices at 

other mines was necessary both to comport with the planapproval process and to be fair to operators who seek 

approval at new mines of practices already approved 

elsewhere. 

We note that, at least ordinarily, the information relevant 

to the Secretary’s decision will be that which was before the 

agency during the plan-development process. See, e.g., Camp 

v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (the “focal point” in 

arbitrary-and-capricious review is “the administrative record 

already in existence”); Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. 

v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (review is 

“limited to assessing the record that was actually before the 

agency”); James Madison Ltd. ex rel. Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 

F.3d 1085, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1996). There is no reason to 

believe that expecting operators ordinarily to bring probative 

information to the attention of the front-line agency decision 

maker would encourage them to engage in excessive, 

wasteful, and distracting tactics of bombarding the agency 

with immaterial information. 

We need not decide, however, whether the ALJ abused 

her discretion by declining to consider information that Prairie 

State did not cite in the plan-development process, because 

Prairie State has failed to explain how admission of such 

evidence at the review hearing might have changed the ALJ’s 

decision regarding the reasonableness of the Secretary’s plan. 

See, e.g., PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. 

Cir. 2004) (“If the agency’s mistake did not affect the 

outcome, if it did not prejudice the petitioner, it would be 

senseless to vacate and remand for reconsideration.”). Prairie 

State objects that the ALJ refused to consider “plans that were 

approved at other mines in District 8,” as well as “studies 

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21 

conducted in District 8 concerning the taking of 40-foot 

extended cuts.” Petitioner Br. 34. Prairie State does not, 

however, establish the comparability and pertinence of those 

other mines and studies. We therefore lack a basis on which 

to conclude that the proffered evidence might have shown that 

the plan-suitability determinations at Lively Grove were 

arbitrary or impermissibly inconsistent with determinations at 

other mines. Thus, assuming arguendo the ALJ abused her 

discretion by concluding that Prairie State could not rely on 

materials it failed to reference during plan discussions, we 

cannot say that such error harmed Prairie State. See PDK 

Labs., 362 F.3d at 799. 

2. 

Prairie State argues that the Commission erred by failing 

to reverse as arbitrary and capricious the Secretary’s cut-depth 

determination, which it contends should have authorized 

extended, 40-foot cuts immediately upon the opening of the 

mine. In particular, Prairie State contends that the district 

manager failed to make a mine-specific cut-length 

determination, instead unlawfully treating the cut-length 

guidance expressed in the Secretary’s internal Procedure 

Instruction Letter, No. I08-V-03 (eff. June 6, 2008), as an 

across-the-board, binding rule. That Letter defines as an 

“extended cut” any instance of continuing to dig into a 

working coal face more than twenty feet beyond the last row 

of permanent roof supports without stopping to place 

additional supports in the newly excavated area. J.A. 293. 

The Letter advises against approval of extended cuts until an 

operator has first begun mining with standard, 20-foot cuts, so 

that a new mine’s roof-support and ventilation needs can be 

evaluated under actual operating conditions before extended 

cuts are considered. J.A. 293-98; see Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. 

Sec’y of Labor, 589 F.3d 1368, 1371-73 (11th Cir. 2009). 

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Prairie State argues that, by following the Letter, the district 

manager failed to give mine-specific consideration to the 

merits of its request immediately to begin mining at Lively 

Grove with 40-foot cuts. 

The Commission appropriately concluded, based on the 

record, that the district manager fulfilled his obligation to 

make a mine-specific determination on maximum permissible 

cut length. The Letter was not an across-the-board, 

substantive requirement, but gave guidance for site-specific 

consideration of operators’ requests for extended cuts. See 

Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 589 F.3d at 1370-72. The district 

manager testified that he understood the Letter as counseling 

him “to look at developing a 20-foot [cut]” rather than a 40-

foot cut, J.A. 111, and that an operator “couldn’t get 40-foot 

cuts without going through [the Letter’s] evaluation process,” 

J.A. 112. That directive is consistent with the statutory 

requirement that the Secretary’s plan approvals be based on 

the conditions prevailing at particular mines. See 30 U.S.C. 

§§ 862(a), 863(o). Indeed, the thrust of the Letter is to ensure 

that operators and district managers have data from initial 

operating experience at a site to inform the decision about cut 

length appropriate to the mine. The Commission noted that 

the district manager considered evidence that the coal seam at 

Lively Grove was gassy and that starting with shorter cuts 

would allow better methane and dust control. 35 FMSHRC at 

1991-92. It concluded that, in applying the Letter, the district 

manager reasonably exercised informed discretion in light of 

the information available about mine-specific circumstances 

before the mine opened. Id. at 1994-95. We agree that the 

record supports that conclusion.6

 

 

6 See, e.g., J.A. 105-06 (hearing testimony from roof support 

specialist, on whom the district manager relied, regarding the 

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Prairie State similarly contends that the Secretary 

impermissibly applied a binding, across-the-board norm in 

refusing to approve Prairie State’s requested terms governing 

entry widths, diagonals, and ventilation. The district 

manager, in Prairie State’s view, engaged in “rote 

application” of “District-wide rules,” rather than tailoring the 

plan to the specific conditions prevailing at the mine. 

Petitioner Br. 41-42. Those contentions are not based on the 

Letter as such, as the relevant Letter guidance deals only with 

cut depth, but similarly assert that the district manager 

derogated from his statutory duty to make mine-specific 

suitability determinations. The record supports the 

Commission’s conclusion, however, that the district manager 

exercised discretion based on substantial evidence of safety 

and health considerations at Lively Grove.7

 

practice of starting with 20-foot cuts: “[Y]ou’re trying to make me 

sound like I’m implementing a rule or some sort of regulation. . . . I 

suppose if the mine wanted to address it in another fashion as to 

how they would best support that intersection and protect the miner 

operator in the making of that first cut, that we would certainly look 

at that.”); J.A. 109 (district manager’s testimony that he relied on 

the input of his specialists, inter alia, for information and analysis). 

Once the district manager observed the mine’s initial, safe 

operation with 20-foot cuts, he proceeded to authorize the requested 

extended cuts. 

7 See, e.g., J.A. 93 (roof support specialist’s testimony that starting 

with 18-foot entry widths was reasonable based on prior 

experience, but no suggestion that he interpreted that starting point 

as required across the board); J.A. 112 (district manager’s 

testimony that approving 18-foot entry width was his standard 

practice, but stating that his decisions were “based upon 

recommendations from” the specialists advising him, and never 

indicating he felt bound by any rule depriving him of discretion). 

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3. 

Finally, Prairie State argues that the Commission erred in 

upholding the Secretary’s plan-specific determinations 

regarding cut depth, entry width, diagonals, and ventilation on 

the ground that they were not supported by substantial 

evidence. We disagree. The Commission relied on testimony 

of the district manager and his technical team, as well as 

correspondence and other documentation concerning safety 

and health advantages of the plan terms the district manager 

deemed suitable regarding cut depth, entry width, and 

diagonals. See 35 FMSHRC at 1990-93; 32 FMSHRC at 604-

10 (ALJ findings and determinations).8

 On limited remand, 

the ALJ similarly based her findings regarding ventilation on 

sufficient evidence in the record, and the Commission denied 

further review. 35 FMSHRC 3272, 3274-75 (Oct. 2013).9

 

Prairie State’s other arguments that the Secretary’s 

determinations were arbitrary and capricious or contrary to 

law all lack merit. The Secretary did not ignore, as Prairie 

State asserts, certain alleged safety advantages of extended 

cuts. Rather, as noted above, the agency determined, in 

reasoned fashion and based on substantial evidence, that 

 

8 See, e.g., J.A. at 111 (district manager’s conclusion that 20-foot 

cut depths, 18-foot entry widths, and 64-foot diagonals would be 

safer than Prairie State’s proposed corresponding alternatives); J.A. 

103 (roof support specialist’s testimony that 20-foot cuts are safer). 

9 See, e.g., J.A. at 84 (ventilation specialist’s testimony that 40-foot 

cuts have different impact on ventilation and dust control than 20-

foot cuts). 

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extended cuts were not the safer, prudent practice that should 

initially be implemented at the mine.10 

* * * 

We deny the petition for review. 

So ordered. 

 

10 We note that three pages of Prairie State’s opening brief appear 

to be taken, virtually verbatim and without adequate attribution, 

from Commissioner Young’s dissent. Compare Petitioner Br. 24-

27, with 35 FMSHRC at 2001-02 (Young, Comm’r, dissenting). 

This court strongly disapproves of copy-and-paste argument. 

Extended quotation without quotation marks or appropriate citation 

amounts to misrepresentation to the court, see MODEL RULES OF 

PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c), and disservices the client. 

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