Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00058/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00058-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Susan Fitzpatrick
Plaintiff
Tyson Foods, Inc.
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUSAN FITZPATRICK, on behalf 

of herself and all others 

similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

TYSON FOODS, INC.,

Defendant.

No. 2:16-cv-00058-JAM-EFB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant Tyson Foods (“Defendant”) allegedly sold dog food 

unlawfully labeled as “Made in U.S.A.” that Plaintiff Susan 

Fitzpatrick (“Plaintiff”) purchased for her pet. Defendant moves 

to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) for 

failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Court grants 

Defendant’s motion with leave to amend.1

///

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for September 20, 2016.

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Court takes the following facts as true for purposes of 

this motion.

Plaintiff purchased Defendant’s dog treats, including 

“Chicken Grillers,” in 2014 and 2015. FAC ¶ 5. The products she 

purchased bore the label “Made in USA,” id. ¶ 6, despite the fact 

that the “Chicken Grillers” contained tapioca starch, an 

ingredient derived from a plant not commercially grown in the 

United States, id. ¶¶ 6–7. 

Plaintiff sued Tyson Foods on January 11, 2016, ECF No. 1, 

and filed her First Amended Complaint on May 16, 2016, ECF No. 

16. She seeks to represent herself and a class of similarly 

situated California residents who, prior to January 1, 2016, 

purchased Tyson Foods’ pet food products bearing a label 

indicating U.S.A. origin. FAC ¶ 17. Plaintiff brings two causes 

of action. In Count One, Plaintiff seeks relief under 

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) for unfair conduct in 

violation of the UCL and violation of California’s “Made in 

U.S.A.” law, Business and Professions Code § 17533.7. Id. ¶ 26–

29. In Count Two, Plaintiff seeks relief under the California 

Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) for violations of this 

statute, id. ¶ 30–38, specifically, California Civil Code 

§ 1770(a)(4) (deceptive representations or designations of 

geographic origin in connection with goods or services), Opp. at 

13. 

///

///

///

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II. OPINION

A. Judicial Notice

Defendant requests judicial notice of the original complaint 

filed in this matter, ECF No. 1, and three filings in Susan 

Fitzpatrick, etc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., Case No. 2:15-cv-02285-

TLN-KJN. The filings in the 2015 case are appropriate for 

judicial notice as they are proceedings within the federal 

judicial system and relate to the present matter. See U.S. ex 

rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 

F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing St. Louis Baptist Temple, 

Inc. V. FDIC, 605 F.2d 1169 (10th Cir. 1979)). The complaint 

filed on January 11, 2016, is already on the docket for this 

case. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s request for 

judicial notice.

B. Analysis

Defendant makes several arguments in support of its Motion 

to Dismiss. The Court first addresses the issue of whether the 

current or former version of Cal. Bus. & Pro. Code § 17533.7 

applies to Plaintiff’s claims. 

1. Amendment to § 17533.7 

Prior to January 1, 2016, it was “unlawful for any person, 

firm, corporation or association to sell or offer for sale in 

this State any merchandise on which merchandise or on its 

container there appears the words ‘Made in U.S.A.,’ ‘Made in 

America,’ ‘U.S.A.,’ or similar words when the merchandise or any 

article, unit, or part thereof, has been entirely or 

substantially made, manufactured, or produced outside of the 

United States.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17533.7 (2015). Last 

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year, the California legislature amended § 17533.7 to include the 

following exclusions: 

(b) This section shall not apply to merchandise made, 

manufactured, or produced in the United States that has 

one or more articles, units, or parts from outside of 

the United States, if all of the articles, units, or 

parts of the merchandise obtained from outside the 

United States constitute not more than 5 percent of the 

final wholesale value of the manufactured product.

(c)(1) This section shall not apply to merchandise 

made, manufactured, or produced in the United States 

that has one or more articles, units, or parts from 

outside of the United States, if both of the following 

apply:

(A) The manufacturer of the merchandise shows that it 

can neither produce the article, unit, or part within 

the United States nor obtain the article, unit, or part 

of the merchandise from a domestic source.

(B) All of the articles, units, or parts of the 

merchandise obtained from outside the United States 

constitute not more than 10 percent of the final 

wholesale value of the manufactured product.

(2) The determination that the article, unit, or part 

of the merchandise cannot be made, manufactured, 

produced, or obtained within the United States from a 

domestic source shall not be based on the cost of the 

article, unit, or part.

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17533.7 (2016) (subsections (d) and (e) 

omitted). In doing so, California shifted from a strict 

prohibition on domestic origin labeling to one that exempts 

sellers for selling products that were made in the United States 

but contain up to a certain percentage of foreign sourced 

components. 

Defendant argues that the current version of § 17533.7, 

effective January 1, 2016, should apply to Plaintiff’s claims. 

MTD at 10. Defendant contends that the prior version of the 

statute was repealed when the legislature amended the section and 

that, in the absence of a savings clause, no cause of action may 

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be brought under the former law. MTD at 14.

a. Applicable Law 

Plaintiff’s claims arise under California law and, as such, 

this Court is required to apply the law as it believes the 

California Supreme Court would apply it. See Gravquick A/S v. 

Trimble Navigation Intern. Ltd., 323 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2003). 

California courts generally construe statutes to operate 

prospectively unless the legislature clearly intends the statute 

to have retrospective effect. Tapia v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.

3d 282 (1991); Governing Board v. Mann, 18 Cal. 3d 819, 829 

(1977); Callet v. Alioto, 210 Cal. 65, 67 (1930). However, “the 

courts correlatively hold under the common law that when a 

pending action rests solely on a statutory basis, and when no 

rights have vested under the statute, ‘a repeal of such a statute 

without a saving clause will terminate all pending actions based 

thereon.’” Mann, 18 Cal. 3d at 829 (1970) (quoting S. Serv. Co., 

Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 15 Cal. 2d 1, 11–12 (1940)); see also

Younger v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 102, 109 (1978). “The 

justification for this rule is that all statutory remedies are 

pursued with full realization that the Legislature may abolish 

the right to recover at any time.” Mann, 18 Cal. 3d at 829 

(quoting Callet, 210 Cal. at 67–68). This common law principle 

is codified at California Government Code § 9606: “Any statute 

may be repealed at any time, except when vested rights would be 

impaired. Persons acting under any statute act in contemplation 

of this power of repeal.” Recently, California appellate courts 

have restated the principle: “[W]here ‘the legislature has 

conferred a remedy and withdraws it by amendment or repeal of the 

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remedial statute, the new statutory scheme may be applied to 

pending actions without triggering retrospectivity concerns.’”

Zipperer v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 133 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1023

(2005) (quoting Brenton v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 116 

Cal.App.4th 679, 690 (2004)) (emphasis added). Further, 

“legislative action can effect a partial repeal of an existing 

statute.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

In her Opposition, Plaintiff asserts that the pre-amendment 

statute should apply to her claims because the amendment was not 

a repeal. Opp. at 4. Ignoring the quoted language in Zipperer, 

which expressly articulates that either repeal or amendment

withdrawing the statutory remedy triggers the rule, Plaintiff 

argues that by leaving the original language in the statute and 

adding exceptions to the rule, the Legislature “d[id] not repeal 

anything.” Opp. at 4. Instead, she contends that the 

Legislature “create[d] a sort of safe-harbor provision that 

producers of mostly American-made products may take advantage of 

after January 1, 2016.” Opp. 4–5. Plaintiff casts the 

determinative question as “whether, in changing the law, the 

legislature has chosen to ‘take away the right of action 

itself.’” Opp. at 6 (quoting Zipperer, 133 Cal.App.4th at 1025).

Plaintiff essentially argues that because the California 

Legislature did not completely eliminate the private right of 

action for mislabeled “Made in U.S.A.” products, the amendment 

does not trigger the repeal rule.

Plaintiff is incorrect. The Legislature did take away the 

right of action itself: it took away the right of action against 

sellers whose products are made in the U.S.A. but comprised of

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ingredients sourced from outside of the U.S.A., up to a certain 

threshold. The Legislature need not repeal a statute in its 

entirety but may instead partially repeal a statute by taking 

away the right of action in certain situations, as it did here.

See Brenton, 116 Cal.App.4th 679 (finding that a new statute

excepting certain claims from the Anti-SLAPP Act effected an 

amendment or partial repeal of the Act); Mann, 18 Cal. 3d 819 

(finding that Health and Safety Code § 11361.7(b) impliedly 

repealed only those parts of Education Code § 13403(h) in 

conflict with the later enacted statute). 

The California Court of Appeal’s analysis in Zipperer is 

instructive. The pertinent claim in the Zipperer case arose 

under the Solar Shade Control Act, which created a statutory

private right of action for owners of solar collectors harmed by 

shade caused by trees on adjacent properties. Zipperer, 133 

Cal.App.4th at 1021. The Act also created an exemption provision 

that cities and counties could invoke, via ordinance, to 

foreclose action against them. Id. The defendant, the County of 

Santa Clara, had passed such an ordinance and claimed that it 

eliminated the plaintiffs’ cause of action, even though the 

plaintiffs alleged harm suffered prior to the ordinance’s 

passage. Id. at 1022. 

Applying the principles stated in Mann and its progeny, the

Zipperer court used four factors to determine whether the

ordinance eliminated the plaintiffs’ cause of action. For the 

first three factors, the court considered whether the plaintiffs’

claim was statutory (it was), whether their rights had vested 

under the statute (they had not), and whether the legislature had 

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eliminated the statutory remedy before a final judgment (it had). 

Id. at 1023–24. Lastly, the court considered the nature of the 

mechanism by which the right of action was eliminated. Id. at 

1024–25. The court recognized that the typical mechanism for 

such elimination is repeal or amendment of the remedial statute. 

Id. at 1024. However, the court noted that even without express 

words of repeal, 

[“]the effect is the same in so far as the application 

of the principles is concerned when the legislature by 

apt expression has withdrawn the right and remedy in 

particular cases, including all pending actions based 

thereon.” The critical point is that “the legislature 

may take away the right of action itself.” . . . [W]e 

look to the substance of the legislation—not its label— to determine whether it operates as a repeal. The 

pivotal issue is whether the legislation constitutes “a 

substantial reversal of legislative policy” that 

represents “the adoption of an entirely new philosophy” vis-à-vis the prior enactment.

Id. at 1024–25. (internal citations omitted); quoting Southern 

Service Co., Ltd., 15 Cal. 2d at 13; People v. One 1953 Buick, 57 

Cal. 2d 358, 363 (1962)).

The Zipperer court concluded that the exemption provision 

operated as a valid repeal method. Zipperer, 133 Cal.App.4th at 

1025. Even without any expressly repealing language, the 

“statutory authority for plaintiff’s action ha[d] been 

withdrawn,” removing “the right and remedy that otherwise would 

[have been] available to plaintiffs.” Id. (internal quotations 

and citations omitted). Although the provision merely exempted 

certain—but not all—defendants from the Act’s reach, the court 

found that this “legislative choice embodies ‘a substantial 

reversal of the legislative policy’ that underpins the remainder 

of the Act and an ‘entirely new philosophy’ concerning its 

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mandatory application to local jurisdictions.” Id. at 1025. The 

court held that the ordinance enacted under the exemption 

provision extinguished the statutory claim and thus the 

plaintiffs’ cause of action. 

Applying the four factors to the present matter, it is clear 

that the amendment to § 17533.7 similarly extinguished 

Plaintiff’s cause of action. First, her claim under § 17533.7 is 

statutory in nature. The amendment went into effect before final 

judgment in this case and before any rights vested, thus the 

second and third factors are satisfied as well.

Fourth, the Legislature used a “typical[]” mechanism to 

abolish the right of action: an amendment. See Zipperer, 133 

Cal.App.4th at 1024. Where, as here, the effect is the same, any

distinction between the labels “amendment” and “repeal” is 

immaterial. See, e.g., Younger, 21 Cal. 3d at 110–11 (holding 

that an “amendment” that eliminated a prior procedure for records 

repealed statutory authority for that procedure); Brenton, 116 

Cal.App.4th at 690 (concluding that a new section amending the 

Act to except certain claims from applicability of the 

statutorily conferred remedy applied to the pending case); Dep’t 

of Soc. Welfare v. Wingo, 77 Cal.App.2d 316 (1946) (“[T]he repeal 

of the statute without a saving clause before a judgment becomes 

final destroys the right of action. The same rule is applied to 

an amendment of a statute.”). Labels aside, the substance of the 

amendment constitutes a reversal of legislative policy. The 

California Legislature decided that something once unlawful is 

now permissible and has eliminated a cause of action. This

drastic change invokes the repeal rule. Plaintiff’s concerns 

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regarding legislative history, see Opp. at 7, are not relevant in 

this context: “[t]he only legislative intent relevant in such 

circumstances would be a determination to save this proceeding 

from the ordinary effect of repeal illustrated by such cases as 

Mann.” Younger, 21 Cal. 3d at 110 (1978). In the absence of a 

savings clause or savings implied by contemporaneous legislation, 

“no such intent appears.” Id.

In so holding, this Court joins the company of Judge Wu of 

the United States District Court for the Central District of 

California, who reached the same conclusion this past June. See

Rossetti v. Stearn’s Products, Inc., CV 16-1875-GW(SSx), 2016 WL 

3277295 (C.D. Cal. June 6, 2016). Plaintiff’s quibbles with the 

authority Judge Wu relied upon do not detract from the essential 

principles supporting that, and this, decision.

b. Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims

In her First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges facts to 

support her claims under the pre-2016 version of § 17533.7. FAC

¶ 27. Because her complaint does not include any allegations 

regarding the percentage of foreign sourced materials contained 

in Defendant’s products, see FAC ¶¶ 5–16, Plaintiff has failed to 

adequately allege a violation of the current version of 

§ 17533.7. The remaining issue is whether this failure also 

extinguishes Plaintiff’s more general UCL claim for unfair 

conduct, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq., and CLRA claim 

for deceptive representations of geographic origin, Cal. Civ. 

Code § 1770(a)(4). 

Neither party briefed this issue. Plaintiff makes no 

argument regarding the status of her CLRA and more general UCL 

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claims in the event that the amended statute applies to her case. 

Defendant seems to presume that a failure to state a claim under 

§ 17533.7 defeats all of Plaintiff’s claims. MTD at 5, 10; Reply 

at 1, 3. Defendant’s conclusion is not entirely obvious. A 

plaintiff may still have a cause of action under the UCL for 

unlawful OR unfair OR fraudulent practice; “a practice may be 

deemed unfair even if not specifically proscribed by some other 

law [(i.e., § 17533.7)].” Cel-tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A.

Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999). Additionally, 

the CLRA has its own list of proscribed conduct, Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 1770, and does not rely on § 17533.7 as a predicate offense

Nevertheless, the Court concludes that California’s safe 

harbor doctrine bars Plaintiff’s UCL and CLRA claims. The 

California Supreme Court addressed the safe harbor rule in 

relation to general UCL actions in Cel-tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. 

L.A. Cellular Tel. Co.:

Specific legislation may limit the judiciary’s power to 

declare conduct unfair. If the Legislature has 

permitted certain conduct or considered a situation and 

concluded no action should lie, courts may not override 

that determination. When specific legislation provides 

a “safe harbor,” plaintiffs may not use the general 

unfair competition law to assault that harbor. 

20 Cal. 4th at 182. Courts have applied the safe harbor rule in 

the CLRA context as well. See, e.g., Ebner v. Fresh Inc., 818 

F.3d 799, 805 (2016) (holding that, where defendant complied with 

federal and state labeling law, California’s safe harbor doctrine 

barred consumer’s claim that a cosmetics manufacturer’s label was 

deceptive and misleading in violation of UCL, CLRA, and False 

Advertising Law [(“FAL”)]); Barber v. Nestle USA, Inc., 154 F.

Supp. 3d 954 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that the safe harbor 

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doctrine barred Plaintiff’s UCL, CLRA, and FAL claims for

inadequate disclosures because the California Legislature chose 

to only require limited disclosures); Bourgi v. W. Covina Motors, 

Inc., 166 Cal.App.4th 1649, 1661 (2008) (holding that the CLRA 

action could not advance if the car repairs at issue qualified 

for the Vehicle Code’s safe harbor provision). 

The California Legislature amended § 17533.7 to prohibit 

domestic origin labels in some circumstances and not in others, 

evidently concluding that no action should lie in the latter 

situation. California’s safe harbor doctrine applies in this 

case and unless Plaintiff can plead facts actionable under the 

amended statute, her claims must be dismissed. Given this 

disposition, the Court need not address the merits of Defendant’s 

other arguments in support of its motion regarding the 

specificity required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), Plaintiff’s 

standing to seek injunctive relief, or the propriety of equitable 

relief. 

Although Plaintiff has already filed, dismissed, refiled, 

and amended her complaint in this case, this Order is the Court’s 

first ruling on the merits and it is not clear that further 

amendment would be futile. Plaintiff will therefore have one 

final opportunity to properly plead her claims. 

III. SANCTIONS

The Court issued its Order re Filing Requirements for Cases 

Assigned to Judge Mendez (“Order”) on January 11, 2016. ECF No. 

5-2. The Order limits memoranda in support of and in opposition 

to motions to dismiss to fifteen pages and reply memoranda in 

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support of motions to dismiss to five pages. The Order also 

states that violations of the page limit will result in 

monetary sanctions against counsel in the amount of $50.00 per 

page and that the Court will not consider any arguments made past 

the page limit. The Defendant’s Memorandum in support of its 

Motion to Dismiss is four pages longer than the page limit allowed 

by the Court, and the reply brief also exceeds the Court’s limit 

by four pages. Plaintiff’s Opposition is two and a half pages 

longer than the page limit. As such, the Court has not considered 

any arguments made after page fifteen of either memorandum and 

page five of Defendant’s reply. In addition, counsel for 

Defendant is ordered to pay $400.00 and counsel for Plaintiff is 

ordered to pay $125.00 in sanctions to the Clerk of the Court 

within five days of the date of this Order.

IV. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be filed within twenty 

days from the date of this Order. Defendant’s responsive 

pleading is due within twenty days thereafter. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 26, 2016

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