Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-07-07613/USCOURTS-ca4-07-07613-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Appleby
Appellant
Warden, Northern Regional Jail and Correctional Facility
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DAVID APPLEBY, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.  No. 07-7613

WARDEN, NORTHERN REGIONAL

JAIL AND CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

Respondent-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg.

John Preston Bailey, District Judge.

(3:05-cv-00087-JPB-JSK)

Argued: October 27, 2009

Decided: February 19, 2010

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and

AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer joined. Chief Judge

Traxler wrote a dissenting opinion.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Martin Patrick Sheehan, SHEEHAN &

NUGENT, PLLC, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellant.

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Robert David Goldberg, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL OF WEST VIRGINIA, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Darrell V. McGraw, Jr.,

Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

OPINION

AGEE, Circuit Judge:

David Appleby ("Appleby") appeals the judgment of the

United States District Court for the Northern District of West

Virginia, which dismissed his petition for a Writ of Habeas

Corpus (hereinafter "habeas petition") pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), this Court granted a

certificate of appealability on one issue. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

I. Background

Appleby was indicted in September 2001 in the Circuit

Court of Ohio County, West Virginia ("circuit court") for

Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, Third Offense

("Count I"), in violation of West Virginia Code §§ 17C-5-

2(d)(1)(A) and 17C-5-2(k), and Driving While Revoked for

Driving Under the Influence, Third Offense ("Count II"), in

violation of West Virginia Code § 17B-4-3(b).

Appleby entered a plea of guilty to both charges. During

the plea colloquy, the circuit court informed Appleby that, as

a consequence of his guilty plea, he could be imprisoned for

"a term of not less than one year nor more than three years"

each for Count I and for Count II. The court advised Appleby

that the one to three year sentences for each count could "run

consecutively so that your sentence then would be not less

then [sic] two nor more than six years." J.A. 285-86. The

court then accepted Appleby’s guilty plea as being entered

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"knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily," J.A. 291, and set

sentencing to take place approximately a week later.

The Ohio County prosecuting attorney then filed a Recidivist Information, which alleged that Appleby was "the same

person who has been five times previously convicted in the

State of West Virginia for crimes punishable by confinement

in a penitentiary, [and] should be sentenced to be confined in

the state correctional facility for life" pursuant to the West

Virginia recidivist statutes, West Virginia Code §§ 61-11-18

and 61-11-19 (the "West Virginia recidivist statutes").1 J.A.

192. The predicate offenses alleged in the Recidivist Information included a felony conviction of unlawful assault, in violation of West Virginia Code § 61-2-9(a); two felony

convictions of Driving While Revoked for Driving Under the

Influence, Third Offense, in violation of West Virginia Code

§ 17B-4-3(b); and two felony convictions of Driving Under

the Influence, Third Offense, in violation of West Virginia

Code § 17C-5-2(k). 

Before proceedings on the Recidivist Information began,

Appleby filed numerous motions with the circuit court,

including a motion to dismiss contending that the "offenses

alleged in the information do not form a basis for the State’s

request for a sentence of life." J.A. 300. This motion was

denied, but after obtaining new counsel, Appleby filed a second motion to dismiss, alleging multiple constitutional issues.

The circuit court held a hearing on the second motion to dismiss which it also denied. 

Appleby then petitioned the Supreme Court of Appeals of

1West Virginia’s recidivist statute directs that when "any person [is]

convicted of an offense punishable by confinement in the penitentiary,"

§ 61-11-19, and that "person [has] been twice before convicted in the

United States of a crime punishable by confinement in a penitentiary, the

person shall be sentenced to be confined in the state correctional facility

for life." § 61-11-18(c). 

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West Virginia ("WVSCA") for a Writ of Prohibition to prevent the recidivist proceedings from continuing or, in the

alternative, to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. Appleby

raised multiple constitutional and procedural issues in the

petition, including: "[S]hould Mr. Appleby have been given

notice of the State’s intention to have him sentenced as a

recidivist before his plea was accepted?" J.A. 386. The

WVSCA heard the petition on the merits, and ultimately

denied relief on all issues. The WVSCA held, in relevant part,

that because "the imposition of a life sentence is not ‘definite,

immediate and largely automatic,’" the recidivist proceedings

are a collateral consequence of a guilty plea and thus the "sentencing court need not advise a defendant about the habitual

offender law before accepting a guilty plea to a predicate

offense under that law." Appleby v. Recht, 583 S.E.2d 800,

808-09 (W. Va. 2002) (quoting Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent

Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1365-66 (4th Cir. 1973), and State v.

Elliott, 574 A.2d 1378, 1380 (N.H. 1990)). 

Proceedings on the Recidivist Information were then conducted in the circuit court. A jury verdict was returned finding

Appleby to be the same person who committed the predicate

crimes alleged. A sentencing hearing was held and a life sentence, with eligibility of parole after 15 years, was imposed in

October 2003. Appleby appealed the decision to the WVSCA,

but the petition for appeal was denied.2

Appleby then timely filed the habeas petition with the district court, contending that his guilty plea was "not voluntary

because he did not have a full understanding of the consequences of his guilty plea, in particular, Petitioner was not

told at his plea hearing that he faced the possibility of a life

sentence under the West Virginia recidivist statute." J.A. 942.

The Warden filed a motion to dismiss, which the magistrate

judge recommended be granted principally because the

WVSCA had found that a recidivist life sentence is a "collat2Appleby did not file a state habeas petition. 

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eral consequence of a plea, rather than a direct consequence"

citing the decision in Recht. J.A. 948. 

The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s Report

and Recommendation, and found, in relevant part, that "petitioner’s plea was done knowingly and voluntarily" because "a

valid guilty plea requires only that the defendant be advised

as to the ‘direct’ consequences of his plea," and "a recidivist

life sentence is a ‘collateral’ consequence of a plea." J.A. 966.

The district court held the WVSCA "determination was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law" and granted a motion to dismiss Appleby’s

habeas petition with prejudice. J.A. 966-67. 

Appleby timely appealed the district court’s order denying

his habeas petition. This Court granted a certificate of

appealability as to this issue: "Whether Appleby’s guilty plea

was knowing and voluntary, in light of the question whether

his sentence of life imprisonment was a direct or collateral

consequence of his guilty plea." J.A. 973. Our review is therefore limited only to the foregoing issue.3

II. Standard of Review

The decision of a district court on a matter of habeas corpus

relief is reviewed de novo and under the standards set forth in

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Bell v. Ozmint, 332 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir.

2003). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), if the issue on appeal was adjudicated in state court, as it was here, this Court 

may award habeas corpus relief on a claim that was

adjudicated on its merits in state court only if the

3On brief, Appleby argues three additional issues. However, because

"this court is empowered to consider only the ‘specific issue or issues’ set

forth in the certificate of appealability," we will not consider those issues.

See United States v. Linder, 561 F.3d 339, 344 n.6 (4th Cir. 2009). 

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adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States" or "resulted in

a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."

Cummings v. Polk, 475 F.3d 230, 237 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). 

In Bell v. Cone, the Supreme Court held that a state court’s

decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law "if the

state court applies a rule different from the governing law set

forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we

have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." 535

U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court’s decision is an "unreasonable application" of federal law "if the state court correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from our decisions but

unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case." Id.

However, "it is not the province of a federal habeas court to

reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions."

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). 

III. Collateral Consequence

A.

Appleby argues that his due process rights were violated

because the circuit court failed "to make certain that [he] had

a full understanding of the consequences of his guilty plea."

Appellant’s Br. 12. Specifically, Appleby contends that he

"was never told that by pleading guilty that he might be subject to a sentence in excess of the indeterminate consecutive

sentence of two to six years imprisonment." Appellant’s Br.

13. In sum, Appleby claims that "[t]he decision of the

[WVSCA] that Mr. Appleby had no right to have the likelihood he would have to face a life sentence as a recidivist

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explained to him as part of a plea of guilty is not reasonable."

Appellant’s Br. 21. 

The WVSCA held that the West Virginia analogue to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 "does not require a trial

court to advise a defendant concerning a possible recidivist

enhancement."4 Recht, 583 S.E.2d at 808. The WVSCA found

"further support in the recognition of the Fourth Circuit that

. . . ‘the defendant need not be advised of all collateral consequences of his plea,’" which are those that do not result in "a

definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range

of the defendant’s punishment." Id. (quoting Cuthrell, 475

F.2d at 1365-66). Because "[t]he State not only retains the

discretion to decide when to pursue recidivist sentencing (or

to decide not to so proceed), but the separate nature of the

recidivist proceeding[s] [also] requires the State to satisfy a

4Although both parties agree that the circuit court did not discuss the

possibility of future recidivist proceedings with Appleby, the WVSCA 

note[d] that the State says that it specifically informed Mr.

Appleby’s trial counsel that, if he was convicted, the State would

seek a recidivist sentence, and that discovery was apparently provided to Mr. Appleby that included a list of Mr. Appleby’s prior

convictions. We additionally note that at a bond hearing . . . the

Prosecuting Attorney told the trial judge, in the presence of Mr.

Appleby and counsel, "I do not believe that two to six is the maximum sentence he may be facing. And in fact, this Court has

often indicated that DUI three is an act of violence, and I contend

that there’s a possibility of a much steeper sentence . . . ." 

Recht, 583 S.E.2d at 809 n. 6. Appleby was at this hearing and presumably

heard this exchange. 

This Court has held that, even if neither the court nor defendant’s counsel "ascertained that [the defendant] understood the consequences of his

plea," if the defendant "in fact understood, the error was harmless,"

although the state has the burden of proving harmlessness. Bailey v. MacDougall, 392 F.2d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 1968). The Second and Eighth Circuits have held that it is sufficient that the defendant actually know of the

consequences of his plea, even if the court did not inform him. See United

States ex rel. Brooks v. McMann, 408 F.2d 823, 825-26 (2d Cir. 1969);

Kotz v. United States, 353 F.2d 312, 314-15 (8th Cir. 1965). 

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number of requirements," the WVSCA held that a recidivist

proceeding is a collateral, and not direct, consequence of a

guilty plea. Id. The WVSCA concluded that Appleby thus had

full understanding of the direct consequences of his plea, and

therefore his due process rights were not violated. The issue

before us is whether the WVSCA’s determination is contrary

to or an unreasonable application of applicable federal law, as

determined by the United States Supreme Court.

B.

In Recht, the WVSCA stated that 

"[g]uilty pleas are governed by Rule 11 of the West

Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is patterned after Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure." State v. Bennett, 370 S.E.2d 120, 123

(W. Va. 1988). In applying our Rule 11, we have

looked to the advisory committee’s note to federal

Rule 11. 

Recht, 583 S.E.2d at 807-08. The 1966 Amendments to the

Rule set out the requirement that, before accepting a guilty

plea, a judge must "determine that the defendant understands"

the consequences and provides a list of these consequences

which includes, among other things, "any maximum possible

penalty" and "any mandatory minimum penalty." FRCP

11(b)(1)(H) & (b)(1)(I). The notes to the 1974 amendments of

the Rule explain that 

the judge is not required to inform a defendant about

[additional consequences that might follow a guilty

plea, including additional punishment], though a

judge is free to do so if he feels a consequence of a

plea of guilty in a particular case is likely to be of

real significance to the defendant. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

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These amendments brought the Rule in line with the preexisting and longstanding principle that, before accepting a

guilty plea, a trial judge must ensure that the defendant is

fully aware of the relevant consequences of the plea. See, e.g.,

Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1927).

However, exactly which consequences are relevant beyond

the list articulated by the Rule remained undefined. Thus, it

was "clear that administration of [Rule 11] require[d] the

development of some limiting guide to define the nature of

the consequences of which a defendant must be advised so

that the requirements of the rule shall have been met." Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 948 (9th Cir. 1976).

The Supreme Court has emphasized that, because a defendant who enters a guilty plea forgoes "not only a fair trial, but

also other accompanying constitutional guarantees[,] . . . the

Constitution insists, among other things, that the defendant

enter a guilty plea that is ‘voluntary’ and that the defendant

must make related waivers ‘knowing[ly], intelligent[ly], [and]

with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and

likely consequences.’" United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622,

628-29 (2002) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,

748 (1970)). A defendant enters a guilty plea intelligently

when he is "advised by competent counsel, . . . made aware

of the nature of the charge against him, and there was nothing

to indicate that he was incompetent or otherwise not in control

of his mental faculties." Brady, 397 U.S. at 756. A guilty plea

is voluntary if "‘entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences’" of the plea. Id. at 755 (emphasis added) (quoting

Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir.

1957) (en banc), rev’d on confession of error on other

grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)). 

The Supreme Court has neither further defined the term

"direct," nor has it addressed whether recidivist proceedings

are a "direct" consequence of the plea within the meaning of

Brady.

5

 Therefore, we must decide whether the WVSCA’s

5Although the Supreme Court has not answered the question directly,

"[f]or the ‘clearly established’ prong to apply, the relevant Supreme Court

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determination that the West Virginia recidivist proceedings

are not a direct consequence of the plea is contrary to or an

unreasonable application of Brady. An examination of the

nature of the West Virginia recidivist statutes and proceedings, Supreme Court commentary on recidivist statutes generally, and the federal circuit court of appeals’ interpretation of

Brady lead us to the conclusion that it was not.

1.

In Recht, the WVSCA examined recidivist proceedings

brought pursuant to the West Virginia recidivist statutes, and

concluded those proceedings are of a "separate nature," and

thus a collateral consequence of the plea.6 After citing our

decision in Cuthrell that "the distinction between ‘direct’ and

‘collateral’ consequences of a plea . . . turns on whether the

result represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic

effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment," the Recht

Court addressed the state law basis of Appleby’s claim. 

Under West Virginia Code §§ 61-11-18 & 19, the

imposition of a life sentence is not "definite, immediate and largely automatic." The State not only

retains the discretion to decide when to pursue recidivist sentencing (or to decide not to so proceed), but

the separate nature of the recidivist proceeding

precedent need not be directly on point, but must provide a ‘governing

legal principle’ and articulate specific considerations for the lower courts

to follow when applying the precedent." Quinn v. Haynes, 234 F.3d 837,

844 (2000). The Court has done so in Brady. 

6Although the WVSCA cited Rule 11 and circuit court of appeals precedent, it did not cite Brady. However, "to avoid [the] pitfall of rendering

decision ‘contrary to’ federal law, [the] state court need not cite or even

be aware of relevant Supreme Court cases, ‘so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.’" Barbe v.

McBride, 521 F.3d 443, 456 n. 19 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)). 

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requires the State to satisfy a number of requirements, such as: (1) filing a written information; (2)

proving "beyond a reasonable doubt that each penitentiary offense, including the principal penitentiary

offense, was committed subsequent to each preceding conviction and sentence"; and (3) proving

beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury the identity of

the defendant.

Recht, 583 S.E.2d at 808 (internal citations omitted).

Moreover, West Virginia Code § 61-11-19 requires the

Recidivist Information be brought before the defendant is sentenced and within the same term of court "at which such person was convicted" or jurisdiction to impose the recidivist

sentence is lost. To the extent the issue before us involves

questions of West Virginia law, the determination of the

WVSCA is binding as to matters of interpretation of state law.

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. 

We agree with the WVSCA’s determination that recidivist

proceedings are of a "separate nature" for several reasons.

First, even if a defendant has committed the requisite predicate crimes, it is not a certainty that the recidivist information

will be filed. The decision to file the recidivist information is

soundly left to the prosecuting attorney’s discretion. W. Va.

Code § 61-11-19; see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,

281 (1980) ("It is a matter of common knowledge that prosecutors often exercise their discretion in invoking recidivist

statutes . . . ."). Because the recidivist information is filed

after the court accepts the defendant’s guilty plea, and

because the prosecuting attorney has the discretion to decide

whether to file it, the trial court cannot necessarily be

expected to have knowledge of the possibility. See United

States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 1963)

("[U]nsolicited advice concerning the collateral consequences

of a plea which necessitates judicial clairvoyance of a superhuman kind can be neither expected nor required."). 

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Second, if the prosecuting attorney decides to file the recidivist information, it must be timely and a separate proceeding

must be held and several additional elements must be proven.

The fact that each predicate offense was actually committed

and that the defendant is the person who committed these

crimes must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. W. Va.

Code § 61-11-19. If a jury is impaneled for the recidivist proceedings, that jury is completely distinct from that of the original proceeding. See George v. Black, 732 F.2d 108, 110-11

(8th Cir. 1984) (holding that a mandatory mental health commitment proceeding is not a direct consequence of the plea

because the "proceedings are completely distinct from the

original criminal proceedings and are conducted by a different

tribunal"). Thus, the nature of recidivist proceedings pursuant

to the West Virginia recidivist statutes verifies that those proceedings are not a "direct" consequence of the plea because

they are not "definite, immediate and largely automatic."7

2.

The view that West Virginia recidivist proceedings are of

a separate, indirect nature is bolstered by the Supreme Court’s

holdings and comments in decisions dealing with recidivist

statutes. The Court has, in multiple cases, noted the "distinct

nature" of recidivism proceedings. In Graham v. West Virginia, the Supreme Court noted the "distinct nature of the

issue [of recidivism]" and the fact that "it does not relate to

the commission of the offense . . . and therefore it may be

subsequently decided." 224 U.S. 616, 629 (1912); see also

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 244

(1998). The Court has consistently held that recidivism is not

7With due respect for the view expressed in the dissent, we note that the

dissent does not, and cannot, rebut the significant distinction of the West

Virginia recidivist proceedings as separate, independent, and discretionary

proceedings from the underlying criminal conviction. Consequently, the

recidivist proceedings are not, as a matter of law, a "definite, immediate,

and largely automatic" consequence of the guilty plea. 

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an element of the triggering crime, thus further emphasizing

the discrete nature of the two proceedings. E.g., AlmendarezTorres, 523 U.S. at 244 ("[T]o hold that the Constitution

requires that recidivism be deemed an ‘element’ of petitioner’s offense would mark an abrupt departure from a longstanding tradition . . . ."). 

In Oyler v. Boles, a decision also dealing with a challenge

to the West Virginia recidivist statutes, the Supreme Court

held that a defendant need not receive notice of impending

recidivist proceedings during the trial on the underlying triggering offense. Although it does not deal with precisely the

same issue at bar, Oyler is instructive. The Court held that

"the determination of whether one is an habitual criminal is

‘essentially independent’ of the determination of guilt on the

underlying substantive offense." Oyler, 368 U.S. 448, 452

(1962). Although a defendant must receive "reasonable

notice" of impending recidivism proceedings, the Oyler Court

emphasized that "due process does not require advance notice

that the trial on the substantive offense will be followed by an

habitual criminal proceeding." Id.; see also AlmendarezTorres, 523 U.S. at 243. It is clear from the Oyler decision

and others that the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized

the separate nature of recidivist proceedings, lending support

to the WVSCA’s determination that the proceedings are not

a direct consequence of a guilty plea within the meaning of

Brady.

The Recht Court appropriately referenced an opinion of

retired Justice Souter when sitting as a New Hampshire

Supreme Court justice:

The possible significance of a guilty verdict for purposes of the habitual offender act is a classic example of a conviction’s consequences that is collateral

in the sense that the consequence requires application of a legal provision extraneous to the definition

of the criminal offense and the provisions for senAPPLEBY v. WARDEN, NORTHERN REGIONAL JAIL 13

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tencing those convicted under it. Thus, we have consistently held that a sentencing court need not advise

a defendant about the habitual offender law before

accepting a guilty plea to a predicate offense under

that law.

Recht, 583 S.E.2d at 808-09 (quoting Elliott, 574 A.2d at

1380). 

3.

We find further support for the WVSCA’s decision in an

examination of circuit courts of appeals’ almost universally

identical interpretation of Brady. See Virsnieks v. Smith, 521

F.3d 707, 716 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[T]o a very limited extent, reference to lower court holdings may be evidence of a rule

mandated implicitly by the Supreme Court."); Hawkins v.

Alabama, 318 F.3d 1302, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003). The Fourth

Circuit and many of its sister circuits have defined the term

"direct" used by the Brady Court by focusing on a dichotomy

between "direct" and "collateral" consequences of a plea. See

Cuthrell, 475 F.2d at 1366; see also Wilson v. McGinnis, 413

F.3d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 2005); Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14,

17 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960,

965 (9th Cir. 2000); King v. Dutton, 17 F.3d 151, 152 (6th

Cir. 1994); United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1130 (3d

Cir. 1991); George v. Black, 732 F.2d 108, 110 (8th Cir.

1984); United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir.

1971) (en banc) ("We presume that the Supreme Court meant

what it said when it used the word ‘direct’; by doing so, it

excluded collateral consequences."). 

In defining the two terms, this Court in Cuthrell held that

"[t]he distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘collateral’ consequences of a plea, while sometimes shaded in the relevant

decisions, turns on whether the result represents a definite,

immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the

defendant’s punishment." Cuthrell, 475 F.2d at 1366; see also

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United States v. Bouthot, 878 F.2d 1506, 1511 (1st Cir. 1989).

The Ninth Circuit noted that "where the consequence is contingent upon action taken by an individual or individuals other

than the sentencing court . . . the consequence is generally

‘collateral.’" Littlejohn, 224 F.3d at 965. Courts have held that

collateral consequences of a plea include deportation, United

States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1982); the potential loss of federal benefits, United States v. Morse, 36 F.3d

1070, 1072 (11th Cir. 1994); the use of a conviction as an

aggravating circumstance in sentence for an unrelated charge,

King v. Dutton, 17 F.3d 151, 153 (6th Cir. 1994); the possibility of consecutive sentences, Wall v. United States, 500 F.2d

38, 39 (10th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); a subsequent mandatory

mental health commitment proceeding, George, 732 F.2d at

110; and the possibility of commitment for life as a sexually

dangerous person, Steele, 365 F.3d at 17. Furthermore, several circuit courts of appeals have explicitly held that possible

subsequent classification of the defendant as a recidivist if he

committed a future felony is a collateral, and thus not a direct,

consequence of a plea. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 66

F.3d 544, 551 (2d Cir. 1995); Salmon, 944 F.2d at 1130. But

see Berry v. United States, 412 F.2d 189, 191-92 (3d Cir.

1969) (holding that the fact that the defendant was ineligible

for parole because of his status as a recidivist was a consequence of which he must have been informed during the plea

colloquy). 

Although these circuit court decisions do not ultimately

determine whether the WVSCA misapplied Supreme Court

precedent, "these prior decisions can and indeed must guide

us in determining what constitutes an unreasonable application, under § 2254(d), of the rule that a guilty plea must be

knowing, intelligent and voluntary in order to be valid." Wilson, 413 F.3d at 199-200.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the WVSCA’s

holding that recidivist proceedings were not a direct conseAPPLEBY v. WARDEN, NORTHERN REGIONAL JAIL 15

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quence of Appleby’s guilty plea, and thus his plea was knowing and voluntary, was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of established federal law as determined by the

Supreme Court. Accordingly, the judgment of the district

court is 

AFFIRMED.

TRAXLER, Chief Judge, dissenting:

David Appleby pleaded guilty to two drunk-driving related

charges after being informed by the judge that the most he

could get would be six years. At sentencing the judge gave

him life imprisonment. Clearly established federal law

requires defendants to be informed of the direct consequences

of their decision to plead guilty, and the sentence for the

crime to which a defendant is pleading guilty is a direct consequence of that guilty plea. I therefore believe that the decision of West Virginia’s Supreme Court of Appeals was

contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by

the United States Supreme Court and that the district court’s

denial of Appleby’s habeas petition should be reversed.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

I.

A criminal defendant who pleads guilty waives many constitutional rights, "including his privilege against compulsory

self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to

confront his accusers. For this waiver to be valid under the

Due Process Clause, it must be an intentional relinquishment

or abandonment of a known right or privilege." McCarthy v.

United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (footnote and internal

quotation marks omitted). We may not presume a waiver to

be knowing and voluntary; the record must affirmatively demonstrate that the defendant had "a full understanding of what

the plea connotes and of its consequence." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969).

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The consequences of which the defendant must be aware

before pleading guilty are the "direct consequences" of the

plea. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts of appeal have generally

understood Boykin and Brady to mean that a defendant pleading guilty must be aware of the direct consequences of the

plea but need not be informed of the indirect or collateral consequences of a guilty plea. See United States v. Sambro, 454

F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam) ("We presume

that the Supreme Court meant what it said when it used the

word ‘direct’; by doing so, it excluded collateral consequences."); see also Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 715

(7th Cir. 2008) ("[A]lthough a defendant must be informed of

the direct consequences flowing from a [guilty] plea, he need

not be informed of collateral consequences."); Meyer v.

Branker, 506 F.3d 358, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2007) ("For a guilty

plea to be constitutionally valid, a defendant must be made

aware of all the ‘direct,’ but not the ‘collateral,’ consequences

of his plea."), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2975 (2008). 

The Supreme Court has yet to catalogue all of the consequences of a guilty plea that it views as direct or indirect, but

there can be no real dispute that one of the direct consequences of a guilty plea is the resulting sentence and that the

Constitution therefore requires that a defendant be informed

of the maximum sentence that could be imposed for the crime

to which he is pleading guilty. The Supreme Court said as

much in Boykin, and that has been the consistent view of the

circuit courts both before and after Boykin. See Boykin, 395

U.S. at 244 n.7 ("‘If these convictions [after a guilty plea] are

to be insulated from attack, the trial court is best advised to

conduct an on the record examination of the defendant which

should include, inter alia, an attempt to satisfy itself that the

defendant understands the nature of the charges, his right to

a jury trial, the acts sufficient to constitute the offenses for

which he is charged and the permissible range of sentences.’"

(emphasis added) (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. West v.

Rundle, 237 A.2d 196, 197-98 (Pa. 1968)); Burton v. Terrell,

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576 F.3d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 2009) ("[T]he Due Process

[Clause] require[s] that a defendant be advised and understand

the consequences of a guilty plea. With respect to sentencing,

this means that the defendant must know the maximum prison

term and fine for the offense charged." (footnote and internal

quotation marks omitted)); Trueblood v. Davis, 301 F.3d 784,

786 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Due process as interpreted by the

Supreme Court requires that a defendant be advised of the

consequences of pleading guilty. Not necessarily all the consequences, such as loss of the right to vote or of the right to

own a gun, or the effect on future sentences, but certainly the

maximum punishment that he faces if he is convicted in the

case at hand." (citations omitted)); United States v. Salmon,

944 F.2d 1106, 1130 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Due process requires

that a guilty plea be voluntary, that is, that a defendant be

advised of and understand the direct consequences of a plea.

The only consequences considered direct are the maximum

prison term and fine for the offense charged." (citation omitted)); see also Hart v. Marion Corr. Inst., 927 F.2d 256, 259

(6th Cir. 1991); Worthen v. Meachum, 842 F.2d 1179, 1182

(10th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Trujillo v. United States,

377 F.2d 266, 269 (5th Cir. 1967); Kotz v. United States, 353

F.2d 312, 314 (8th Cir. 1965).

That the maximum sentence is a direct consequence of a

guilty plea is important in this case because of the particular

way in which the West Virginia recidivist statute operates.

The statute does not authorize the imposition of a separate

sentence for one who is found to be a habitual offender, but

instead requires that the enhanced sentence be imposed on the

underlying triggering felony. See State ex rel. Jorgenson v.

Boles, 141 S.E.2d 139, 141-42 (W. Va. 1965) ("[N]o authority

existed to impose a separate sentence for the principal

offense. The life sentence imposed under the recidivist statute

is given for the conviction of the principal offense." (emphasis

added)). Thus, the life sentence that Appleby received was the

sentence for the drunk-driving charges to which he pleaded

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guilty. Appleby’s guilty plea therefore was not knowingly and

voluntarily made—he was informed before the plea was

accepted that six years was the maximum sentence he could

receive and was not informed that if the State elected to proceed under the recidivist statute, Appleby would be sentenced

to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.1

Given that federal law clearly establishes that the maximum

sentence is a direct consequence of a guilty plea, the state

court erred by applying the test circuit courts have developed

to distinguish the collateral consequences of a guilty plea

from the direct consequences of the plea. See, e.g., Cuthrell

v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir.

1973) ("The distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘collateral’ consequences of a plea, while sometimes shaded in the relevant

1

I should note that compliance with what I believe to be the requirements of Due Process—informing a defendant pleading guilty of the possibility of sentencing under the recidivist statute—ought not be as difficult

as the State suggests it would be, notwithstanding the fact that the State

might not always know at the time a guilty plea is entered whether the

defendant qualifies for enhanced sentencing under the recidivist statute. In

the federal system, the defendant’s prior record generally is not known

until the presentence report is prepared, after the defendant pleads guilty.

When a defendant’s prior record could have an effect on his sentence

range, we nonetheless require the district judge before accepting a guilty

plea to inform the defendant of the possibility of an enhanced sentence,

see, e.g., United States v. Hairston, 522 F.3d 336, 340 (4th Cir. 2008)

("[W]hile the district court at the time of the Rule 11 proceeding could not

have been certain about whether Hairston would qualify as an armed

career criminal, Rule 11 nonetheless required the court to anticipate the

possibility and explain to Hairston the sentence that would be applicable

if he had prior qualifying convictions."), and federal district courts have

not found this requirement too burdensome. State courts in West Virginia

should likewise be able to generally advise defendants of the possibility

of recidivist sentencing without much difficulty. As to this case, I note that

the possibility of a recidivist sentence was apparent from the indictment

itself, which alleges at least five prior driving-under-the-influence convictions for Appleby in West Virginia. The state trial court thus should have

known simply by looking at the indictment that Appleby was eligible for

sentencing as a recidivist. 

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decisions, turns on whether the result represents a definite,

immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the

defendant’s punishment."). While the Cuthrell standard provides a useful roadmap in cases where it is unclear whether

a particular consequence is direct or collateral, it cannot be

used to reclassify as collateral a consequence of a guilty plea

that the Supreme Court has already characterized as direct.

That is, even if West Virginia’s recidivist proceedings fail

every prong of the Cuthrell standard and therefore could be

categorized as collateral under Cuthrell, it does not matter,

because the Supreme Court has held that the maximum sentence is a direct consequence of a guilty plea. If the Supreme

Court had not spoken on the issue, then it would be proper to

apply the Cuthrell standard to resolve the question. But the

Supreme Court has spoken, and it has said that the maximum

sentence is a direct consequence of a guilty plea. This court

simply cannot apply a test of its own making to reach the

opposite conclusion.2

Appleby’s sentence may have been the product of a layered

and more complicated procedure than in the typical criminal

case, but the material facts are that Appleby was sentenced to

life on the charges to which he pleaded guilty after being told

that he could be sentenced to no more than six years. Clearly

established federal law requires that defendants be informed

2Moreover, even if it were proper to apply the Cuthrell standard, I do

not believe that Cuthrell compels us to characterize West Virginia’s recidivist proceedings as collateral. While a recidivist proceeding is perhaps

technically separate from the underlying criminal case, the recidivist proceeding is, in function and effect, little more than a continuation of the

original sentencing. And while the state prosecutor has discretion in deciding whether to seek a recidivist sentence in any given case, the resulting

sentence is automatic once the prosecutor decides to proceed under the

recidivist statute. See W. Va. Code. § 61-11-18(c) ("When it is determined

. . . that such person shall have been twice before convicted in the United

States of a crime punishable by confinement in a penitentiary, the person

shall be sentenced to be confined in the state correctional facility for life."

(emphasis added)). 

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of the maximum penalty to which their guilty plea exposes

them, and I am aware of no basis for excepting from this rule

recidivist sentences like the one at issue in this case.3 Appleby’s guilty plea therefore was not knowingly and voluntarily

made, and the state court’s decision rejecting his Due Process

claims "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C.A

§ 2254(d)(1) (West 2006); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 405 (2000) (explaining that a state court’s decision is

contrary to clearly established federal law "if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the

Supreme Court] on a question of law" or "confronts facts that

are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme

Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite"); Robinson

v. Polk, 438 F.3d 350, 355 (4th Cir. 2006) ("A state court

adjudication is an unreasonable application of federal law

when the state court . . . fails to apply the principle of a precedent in a context where such failure is unreasonable. . . ."

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

II.

Because I believe that the state court’s opinion rejecting

Appleby’s Due Process claim was contrary to clearly established federal law, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s

refusal to grant Appleby’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

3The Supreme Court rejected various constitutional challenges to West

Virginia’s recidivist statute in Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962), a preBoykin case. There was, however, no guilty-plea challenge in Oyler, and

the Court was not called upon to consider what kind of information must

be given to a defendant pleading guilty to a crime that makes him eligible

for sentencing as a recidivist. 

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