Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00198/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00198-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
5.62 Acres of Land
Defendant
Landmark Title Assurance Agency
Defendant
Trust 18223-T
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

5.62 Acres of Land, More or Less, 

Situate in Santa Cruz County, State 

Arizona; Landmark Title Assurance 

Agency of Arizona, An Arizona LLC 

Under Trust 18223-T; et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-13-00198-TUC-JAS (BGM) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

 Currently pending before the Court are the Government’s Motion in Limine to 

Exclude Defendants’ After Sales and Listings (Doc. 71); Motion to Exclude Defendants’ 

Claim of Lost Profits (Doc. 72); Motion in Limine to Exclude Non-Compensable 

Severance Damages (Doc. 73); and Motion in Limine to Exclude Impact Opinions of 

Defendants’ Experts Peter Drake and Jim Sanders (Doc. 74) and Defendants’ Motion in 

Limine to Exclude the Testimony of Thomas Baker and Alternatively His Non-Expert 

Survey and Paired Sale Analysis of Cell Towers (Doc. 75); Motion in Limine to Exclude 

Any Evidence, Testimony or Argument Regarding Nominal Use (Doc. 76); and Motion 

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in Limine to Exclude Any Evidence, Testimony or Argument Regarding Title 8 U.S.C. § 

1357 (Doc. 77). 

Pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure, this matter 

was referred to Magistrate Judge Macdonald for Report and Recommendation. Oral 

argument was held on January 29, 2016, and the matter taken under advisement. Minute 

Entry 2/01/2016 (Doc. 112). The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court 

deny the motions. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 This case is one of several land condemnation cases filed in this district related to 

Government projects which include “construct[ing], install[ing], operat[ing], and 

maintain[ing] a border security tower, along with all necessary and related structures and 

roads, designed to help secure the United States border within the State of Arizona.” 

Compl. (Doc. 1), Schedule “B” – Public Purpose. The property that the Government 

seeks to condemn includes a perpetual tower site easement, perpetual road and utility 

easements, and a temporary construction easement. See Compl. (Doc. 1), Schedule “C” 

& Schedule “E.” The property at issue is located in Santa Cruz County, Arizona. See id.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

A. Expert Witness Testimony 

 Rule 702, Federal Rules of Evidence, governs expert witness testimony, and 

provides: 

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A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: 

 (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 

will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 

in issue; 

 (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 

 (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; 

and 

 (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the 

facts of the case. 

Fed. R. Evid. 702. Regarding the bases of an expert witness’s opinion testimony, Rule 

703, Federal Rules of Evidence provides: 

An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert 

has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular 

field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an 

opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be 

admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the 

proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their 

probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially 

outweighs their prejudicial effect. 

Fed. R. Evid. 703. 

 When an objection to an expert witness’s testimony is raised, the Court must act as 

a “gatekeeper” prior to permitting the jury to hear the evidence. Daubert v. Merrell Dow 

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993); Kumho 

Tire Co., Ltd v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). In 

performing its role as “gatekeeper” the Court is required to assess whether the witness is 

qualified to offer the opinions that he or she is espousing, and whether those opinions are 

relevant and reliable. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. at 2796; Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 

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at 141 & 152, 119 S.Ct. at 1171 & 1176. The proponent of the expert bears the burden of 

proving admissibility. Lust By and Through Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 

89 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 The Daubert court delineated a non-exhaustive list of factors for consideration by 

courts assessing expert witnesses. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94, 113 S.Ct. at 2796–97. 

This list includes (1) whether the theory or technique relied on by the expert witness can 

be and has been tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; 

(3) its known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether the theory or technique is 

“generally accepted” by the relevant scientific community. Id. This inquiry is a “flexible 

one.” Id. at 594, 113 S.Ct. at 2797. Furthermore, “[u]nlike an ordinary witness, . . . an 

expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions including those that are not based on 

firsthand knowledge or observation.” Id. at 592, 113 S.Ct. at 2796 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 

702 & 703). 

B. Eminent Domain 

 “The landowner [has] the burden of establishing the value of the property subject 

to condemnation.” United States v. 429.59 Acres of Land, 612 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir. 

1980) (citing United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 273, 63 S.Ct. 1047, 87 

L.Ed. 1390 (1943)). “When the government takes only part of a person’s property, and 

when the value of the remainder depreciates because of the proposed use on the 

condemned parcel, the owner is entitled to compensation both for that which is physically 

appropriated and for the diminution in value to the non-condemned property.” United 

States v. 33.5 Acres of Land, 789 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). 

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The landowner’s compensation for the diminution of value of the remainder of the 

property is referred to as “severance damages.” United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 

376, 63 S.Ct. 276, 281, 87 L.Ed. 336 (1943). “Severance damages are compensable only 

if the landowner incurs a direct loss reflected in the marketplace that results from the 

taking[.]” 33.5 Acres of Land, 789 F.2d at 1398. In determining fair market value, “[t]he 

highest and most profitable use for which the property is adaptable and needed or likely 

to be needed in the reasonably near future is to be considered[.]” Olsen v. United States, 

292 U.S. 246, 255, 54 S.Ct. 704, 708, 78 L.Ed. 1236 (1934); see also United States v. 

Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 630, 81 S.Ct. 784, 789, 5 L.Ed.2d 838 (1961) 

(referring to the “highest and best use” of the servient land). 

C. Just Compensation 

 “Just compensation for condemned property is measured generally by the fair and 

reasonable market value of the property or interest taken.” 429.59 Acres of Land, 612 

F.2d at 462. “Market value is the price which a reasonable seller who desires to sell but 

is not required to sell would demand for the property and the price which a reasonable 

buyer who desired to buy but was not required to buy would pay for the same, assuming a 

reasonable time for negotiations and explorations of alternatives. Id. (citations omitted). 

“In making that estimate there should be taken into account all considerations that fairly 

might be brought forward and reasonably be given substantial weight in such 

bargaining.” Olsen v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257, 54 S.Ct. 704, 709, 78 L.Ed. 1236 

(citations omitted). “Elements affecting value that depend upon events or combinations 

of occurrences which, while within the realm of possibility, are not fairly shown to be 

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reasonably probable should be excluded from consideration for that would be to allow 

mere speculation and conjecture to become a guide for the ascertainment of value—a 

thing to be condemned in business transactions as well as judicial ascertainment of truth.” 

Id. “[E]vidence of reasonable probability of uses [is] admissible and the weight of such 

evidence [is] to be considered by the trier of fact.” United States v. 174.12 Acres of 

Land, 671 F.2d 313, 316 (9th Cir. 1982). “Even if it were proper for a judge to determine 

the highest and best use, the finder of fact is free to determine the value of the property 

based upon an alternate use.” 87.98 Acres of Land, 2005 WL 2810641, *9 (citing 

Phillips v. United States, 243 F.2d 1, 3–4 (9th Cir. 1957)). “The guiding principle of just 

compensation is reimbursement to the owner for the property interest taken.” United 

States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633, 81 S.Ct. 784, 790, 5 L.Ed.2d 

838 (1961). “He is entitled to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property 

had not been taken. He must be made whole but is not entitled to more.” Olsen, 282 

U.S. at 255, 54 S.Ct. at 708. 

D. Appraisal Methodology 

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals “generally recognizes three appraisal 

methodologies in ascertaining fair market value: ‘(1) Comparable sales; (2) the income or 

capitalization of income; and (3) the reproduction cost at the time of taking, less 

depreciation.’” United States v. 99.66 Acres of Land, 970 F.2d 651, 655 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(citations omitted). “Courts occasionally allow valuation testimony on a fourth method 

called either the lot method or the developer’s residual approach.” Id. Additionally, in 

assessing the value of a property, “[w]hile the contract price of comparable land is 

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directly admissible to prove market value, offers to sell or purchase property are plainly 

inadmissible for that purpose.” United States v. 10.082 Acres of Land, Case No. CV-05-

00363-PHX-NVW, 2007 WL 962846, at *8 (D. Ariz. Mar. 27, 2007) (citing United 

States v. 10,031.98 Acres of Land, 850 F.2d 634, 637 (10th Cir.1988)); see also Sharp v. 

United States, 101 U.S. 341, 348, 24 S.Ct. 114, 48 L.Ed. 211 (1903) (affirming court’s 

refusal to allow Plaintiff to testify regarding offers he had received to purchase the 

property). “[I]f there are no comparable sales, then other methods must be resorted to in 

order to ascertain market value.” United States v. 100 Acres of Land, 468 F.2d 1261, 

1265 (9th Cir. 1972). 

E. Lost Profits

 “Since ‘market value’ does not fluctuate with the needs of condemnor or 

condmenee but with general demand for the property, evidence of loss of profits, damage 

to good will, the expense of relocation and other such consequential losses are refused in 

federal condemnation proceedings.” United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 

377–78, 66 S.Ct. 596, 599–600, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (citations omitted). “In respect of 

each item of property that value may be deemed to be the sum which considering all the 

circumstances, could have been obtained for it; that is, the amount that in all probability 

would have been arrived at by fair negotiations between an owner willing to sell and a 

purchaser desiring to buy.” Olsen, 292 U.S. at 257, 54 S.Ct. at 709. 

 . . . 

 . . . 

 . . . 

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III. ANALYSIS 

A. Government’s Motion in limine to Exclude Defendants’ After Sales and 

Listings

 The Government argues that Defendants’ appraisal expert witness Jim Sanders’s 

opinions should be struck to the extent that they inappropriately rely on listing data 

(offers-to-sell) and are not sufficiently similar or proximate to the subject property. 

Govt.’s MIL re After Sales and Listings (Doc. 71). As an initial matter, the Government 

argues that the “after” sales relied on by Mr. Sanders are not valid comparables because 

they are located in Cochise, not Santa Cruz, county. Id. at 10–12. The Government 

further argues that this data is also too remote in time as the sales range from 2005–2009. 

Id. Finally, the Government objects to Mr. Sanders’s reliance on listing data to indicate 

the value of the subject property. Id. at 13–14. Because such offers-to-sell are the basis 

for Mr. Sanders’s “after” opinion of value, the Government asserts that his opinion must 

be excluded as a matter of law. Id. at 16–17. At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel 

agreed that listing data are not an appropriate basis for value, but asserted that Mr. 

Sanders did not rely on listing data for that purpose. Plaintiffs further assert that the 

Government’s motion goes to weight, not admissibility. 

 As an initial matter, there is no serious challenge to Mr. Sanders’s qualification as 

an expert witness. As such, the Court finds that Mr. Sanders is a qualified expert in this 

case. The Court further finds that Mr. Sanders’s use of properties located in Cochise 

County rather than Santa Cruz County is without moment. Mr. Sanders sought to 

compare vacant ranch lands in Southern Arizona, and to that extent the properties relied 

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upon were appropriate. Furthermore, although the sales data seems temporally distant, 

whether or not there are more recent sales or Mr. Sanders has additional justification for 

his choice of sales, are issues that can be explored upon cross-examination. 

 Of greater concern, despite defense counsel’s assertion that Mr. Sanders did not 

rely on listing data to arrive at market value for the property, a review of Mr. Sanders’s 

report leaves this issue unresolved. See Defs.’ Response to MIL re Listing Data (Doc. 

85), Exh. “B.” To the extent that Mr. Sanders’s multiple regression analysis required 

additional data points in order to interpolate a result, and whether or not that was 

appropriate, or if he used listing data for another purpose entirely, are all subjects that can 

be explored upon cross-examination.1

 Additionally, the trial court may issue a limiting 

instruction to the jury, if it is deemed necessary. Ultimately, this Court recommends that 

the Government’s motion (Doc. 71) be denied, with leave to re-urge at trial. 

B. Government’s Motion in limine to Exclude Defendants’ Claim of Lost 

Profits

 The Government seeks to exclude any evidence of “lost profits,” including “lost 

rents” and “lost revenues,” by Defendants. See Govt.’s MIL re Lost Profits (Doc. 72). 

The Government claims that Defendants are not entitled to recover consequential 

damages as a result of this taking. As such, “even if the United States’ taking frustrated 

the Defendants’ plans to lease the tower site on their property, any ensuing losses are not 

compensable.” Id. at 6. The Government further states that “[l]osses personal to 

Defendants, or any landowner, are not part of just compensation.” Id. at 7. The 

 

1

 This list is meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive. 

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Government further asserts that Mr. Sanders’s analysis improperly takes into account the 

government’s demand for the subject property. Govt.’s Reply re MIL re Lost Profits 

(Doc. 99). 

 The Defendants assert that the prospect for a market rent on the land taken is 

“directly admissible on the question of just compensation[.]” Defs.’ Response re MIL re 

Lost Profits (Doc. 86) at 6. As such, contrary to the Government’s assertion, Defendants 

urge that they do not seek to recover business losses, but rather are using the lease 

information to establish the value of the property. Id. at 1. Defendants further point out 

that although the Government seeks to rely on properties adjoining cell towers for market 

valuation comparisons, it seeks to preclude the landowner from using the effect of cell 

tower leases in their calculation of the underlying land value. Id. at 7. 

 The Government relies on Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 

43 S.Ct. 437, 67 L.Ed. 773 (1923), as “the seminal contract takings ruling[.]” Govt.’s 

MIL re Lost Profits (Doc. 72) at 6. Omnia involved the condemnation of a “steel 

company’s entire production of steel plate for the year 1918.” Id. at 507, 43 S.Ct. at 437. 

The steel company had already entered into a contract with a private party for the 

purchase of a large quantity of steel plate, and could not fulfill that contract as a result of 

the taking. Id. The Court determined that the Government did not appropriate the 

contract, rather it rendered performance an impossibility. Id. at 511, 43 S.Ct. at 438. 

 Here, Defendants are not seeking payment for the contract or any potential 

contract, but rather are using the data to show that the market value of the land is greater 

than that suggested by the government. To the extent that enhanced value due to leases 

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would be assessed by a buyer of the property in an arms’ length transaction and is not 

wholly speculative, such information is appropriate. The Defendants cannot, however, 

rely on “an element of value which the government has created.” United States v. 

Weyerhaeuser Co., 538 F.2d 1363, 1367 (9th Cir. 1976) (“fair market value would not 

include that value arising from the government’s activity”). Thus, to the extent that the 

Government would be the only potential leasee of the property, it is inappropriate for the 

Defendants to use that lease to enhance the property’s value. See id. As such, the 

Government’s motion will be denied. To the extent necessary, the trial court can issue an 

appropriate limiting instruction. 

C. Government’s Motion in limine to Exclude Non-Compensable Severance 

Damages

 The Government asserts that “Defendants’ experts conflate this project (road and 

utility easements that will facilitate construction and operation of security towers) with 

the border fence project and other general activities being undertaken by the Border 

Patrol.” Govt.’s MIL re Non-Compensable Severance Damages (Doc. 73) at 5. As such, 

the Government argues that “[t]he jury in its determination of just compensation should 

not consider any diminution caused by the United States’ use of property acquired from 

other landowners.” Id. The Government stresses that the tower site project at issue in 

this case is separate and distinct from the border fence project and any impact on the land 

based upon the Government’s police powers. As such, these last are simply unrelated to 

this case. Defendants counter that their “case does not turn on a finding of damages 

caused by the Project outside the boundaries of the property[.]” Defs.’ Response re MIL 

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re Non-Compensable Severance Damages (Doc. 87) at 2. Rather, Defendants assert that 

the tower activity and location of the access road negatively impact their ability to 

redevelop the site. 

 It is well-established law that “the just compensation assured by the Fifth 

Amendment to an owner, a part of whose land is taken for public use, does not include 

the diminution in value of the remainder caused by the acquisition and use of adjoining 

lands of others for the same undertaking.” Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368, 372, 

45 S.Ct. 115, 117, 69 L.Ed. 328 (1924). Here, however, the border tower security project 

is completely within the bounds of the property at issue. As Defendants point out, there 

is no Campbell finding necessary. Moreover, to the extent that other factors inform the 

assessment of fair market value, they are admissible. The Government is only 

responsible for severance damages “if the landowner incurs a direct loss reflected in the 

marketplace that results from the taking[.]” 33.5 Acres of Land, 789 F.2d at 1398. The 

Court finds a jury instruction, however, will sufficiently protect the Government’s 

interests. As such, the Government’s motion (Doc. 73) is denied. 

D. Government’s Motion in limine to Exclude Impact Opinions of 

Defendants’ Experts Peter Drake and Jim Sanders

 The Government seeks to exclude the testimony of Defendants’ experts Peter 

Drake and Jim Sanders. See Govt.’s MIL re Drake & Sanders (Doc. 74). The 

Government argues that Mr. Drake’s opinions are merely speculative and based on 

assumptions, which warrant exclusion. Id. at 7–12. More specifically, the Government 

asserts that many of the issues that Mr. Drake identifies as “adverse impacts” of the 

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border security tower project, actually existed in the “before” condition of the property. 

Id. at 7–8. The Government further argues that Mr. Drake’s failure to appreciate the 

issues that impacted the “before” condition of the property, results in opinions regarding 

the “after” condition that are merely speculative. Id. at 7–12. As such, the Government 

asserts that Mr. Drake’s testimony should be excluded. Additionally, because 

Defendants’ appraisal expert Mr. Sanders relies on Mr. Drake’s report in forming his 

opinions, the Government argues that Mr. Sanders’s testimony should be excluded as 

well. Id. at 13–16. The Defendants assert that Mr. Drake is a highly qualified expert. 

Defs.’ Response re MIL re Drake & Sanders (Doc. 88) at 1–2. Defendants further assert 

that the opinions of Mr. Drake and Mr. Sanders properly assess the impact of the border 

security tower project on the landowners’ ability to develop the property for its highest 

and best use. Id. at 3–7. 

 The Court finds that Mr. Drake and Mr. Sanders are properly qualified as expert 

witnesses. The Court further finds that the Government’s motion goes to weight, not 

admissibility. To the extent that Mr. Drake’s assumptions do not account for impacts that 

exist in both the “before” and “after” or may be speculative, the Government may crossexamine him on those issues. Moreover, the presence of the tower, border patrol agents, 

or other equipment, and any negative impact stemming from that presence, even if 

strictly from an aesthetic point of view, would be items which a willing buyer would 

contemplate in valuing a property for purchase. Finally, to the extent necessary, the trial 

court can issue a limiting instruction to the jury. As such, the Court recommends that the 

Government’s motion (Doc. 74) be denied. 

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E. Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Preclude the Testimony of Thomas 

Baker, and Alternatively his Non-Expert Survey and Paired Sale Analysis 

of Cell Towers 

 Defendants seek to exclude the testimony of the Government’s appraisal expert 

Thomas Baker. First, Defendants assert that Mr. Baker’s reliance on older residential lots 

is misplaced, as the tract at issue is vacant land. Defs.’ MIL re Baker (Doc. 75) at 8–9. 

Additionally, in assessing the residential properties, Mr. Baker interviewed brokers and 

homebuyers and his report contains an assessment of the homebuyers “feelings” about 

the property. Id. at 8–12. Defendants further argue that Mr. Baker’s questions to the 

buyer were non-neutral. Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 101) at 4. Defendants assert that to the 

extent that Mr. Baker’s opinions are based on hearsay, they are inadmissible. Defs.’ MIL 

re Baker (Doc. 75) at 6. Defendants further allege that Mr. Baker was required to 

consider “willing sellers” in assessing market value, which he did not do. Id. at 11. 

Finally, Defendants’ assert that residential properties in proximity to a cell tower are not 

comparable to the vacant land under a border security tower that is at issue in this case. 

Id. at 12–13. 

 The Government asserts that Mr. Baker’s analysis is based on “sound appraisal 

methodology.” Govt.’s Response to MIL re Baker (Doc. 83) at 3. The Government 

further asserts that courts have permitted exceptions to hearsay testimony where it forms 

the basis of an appraiser’s opinion. Id. Mr. Baker has been an appraiser for over thirtysix (36) years and holds designations with the Appraisal Institute based on his experience 

with the valuation and evaluation of all types of real property, as well as his ability to 

provide services relating to residential property. Id. at 4. The Government argues that 

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“verification and market-participant interviews should not be excluded from the jury’s 

consideration under the theory that they are hearsay.” Id. at 6. The Government asserts 

that interviews with market-participants properly form the basis of an appraiser’s 

opinions and “verify data concerning market conditions and the circumstances of sales.” 

Id. at 7. The Government further asserts that Defendants’ objection goes to weight, not 

admissibility of Mr. Baker’s opinions. The Government also argues that Mr. Baker’s 

paired-sales analysis technique was an appropriate methodology to assess potential 

impact “a border security tower would have on the market value of vacant and residential 

land.” Govt.’s Response to MIL re Baker (Doc. 83) at 9. 

 The Court finds Mr. Baker is qualified to be an expert. The Government asserts 

that Mr. Baker’s reliance on market participants is proper. Govt.’s Response to MIL re 

Baker (Doc. 83) at 3. In support of this assertion, it provides excerpts from “The 

Appraisal of Real Estate, a leading text of the appraisal industry, recogniz[ing] this 

process as essential to appraisal practice.” Id. Here, Mr. Baker’s reliance on interviews 

with brokers is acceptable. To the extent that his reliance on interviews with buyers, 

without more, is questionable is an issue that can be explored by Defendants on crossexamination. The Court further finds that whether or not Mr. Baker’s paired-data 

analysis is unreliable based on the comparables chosen, also goes to weight, not 

admissibility. Again, any perceived deficiencies can be explored during crossexamination. Furthermore, the trial court can issue a limiting instruction, if necessary. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion (Doc. 75) is denied. 

 . . . 

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F. Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Exclude Any Evidence, Testimony or 

Argument Regarding Nominal Use 

 Defendants seek to exclude testimony of the Government’s appraisal expert 

Thomas Baker and retired Border Patrol Agent Shawn Palmer regarding the “minimum 

use of the estate condemned in this case.” Defs.’ MIL re Nominal Use (Doc. 76) at 1–2. 

Defendants appear to be concerned that certain testimony by Mr. Baker and Agent 

Palmer will be used by the Government to limit the “taking” at issue in this case, thereby 

reducing the “just compensation” due Defendants. See id. The Government asserts that 

“in order to value an easement in a federal condemnation proceeding, the fact finder must 

consider the actual impact on the land from the use of the easement.” Govt.’s Response 

to MIL re Nominal Use (Doc. 82) at 5–6. The Government goes on to assert that by 

attempting to exclude this evidence, “Defendants are preparing to argue that the jury must 

consider maximum injury to the remainder parcel due to the taking . . . without regard to 

the purpose or use for which the easements were taken.” Id. at 7. 

 Here, Defendants seek to preclude evidence of “nominal” use, even though the 

evidence the Government will introduce appears to have a “reasonable probability” of 

occurring. The Court finds that as such, Defendants’ arguments go to weight, not 

admissibility. If necessary, the trial court can issue a jury instruction to clarify the weight 

and/or propriety of such evidence. See 174.12 Acres of Land, 671 F.2d 313. The Court 

will deny Defendants’ motion (Doc. 76). 

G. Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Exclude Any Evidence, Testimony or 

Argument Regarding Title 8 U.S.C. § 1357 

 Defendants anticipate that: 

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[A]t the time of trial the United States will attempt to improperly devalue 

the land taken, and the remainder (442.78 acres) as follows: 

 1. The Property taken is valueless in the “before” condition 

because by statute the United States has already confiscated it for patrol 

purposes. 8 U.S.C. § 1357. 

 2. There can be no severance damages arising from the 

government’s project because the impacts of the project are already 

independently authorized by the 1357 Statute, or because of earlier 

consensual licensed or informal entry given by the Defendant to the United 

States. 

Defs.’ MIL re § 1357 (Doc. 77) at 2. Based on these assumptions, Defendants argue that 

mention of § 1357 will result in a Constitutional violation in light of the zero value of the 

land prior to the taking, thereby precluding compensation. See Defs.’ MIL re § 1357. In 

reply, Defendants analyzed a perceived reliance by the Government on § 1357, 8 U.S.C., 

as a constitutional due process and equal protection violation. The Government, 

however, does not intend to make either of the suggested arguments at trial. Defs.’ 

Response re MIL re § 1357 (Doc. 84). 

 In light of the Government’s averment that it will not make the arguments 

suggested by Defendants, the Defendants’ MIL re § 1357 is moot. Furthermore, the 

Court declines to order total exclusion of any mention regarding § 1357. Section 1357 

existed in the “before” condition, as well as in the “after,” and may be an issue properly 

considered by a “willing buyer” assessing the fair market value of the property. See 

Olsen, 282 U.S. at 255, 54 S.Ct. at 708. Furthermore, the trial court can issue a jury 

instruction to the extent necessary to limit the jury’s consideration of evidence regarding 

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§ 1357. Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendants’ motion (Doc. 77) be denied. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons discussed, supra, the motions in limine should be denied. The 

district court judge will then have discretion to issue the appropriate limiting instruction 

or entertain re-urging of appropriate motions at the time of trial. 

V. RECOMMENDATION 

 For the reasons delineated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Judge enter an order: 

 1) DENYING the Government’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Defendants’ 

After Sales and Listings (Doc. 71); 

 2) DENYING the Government’s Motion to Exclude Defendants’ Claim of 

Lost Profits (Doc. 72); 

 3) DENYING the Government’s Motion in Limine to Exclude NonCompensable Severance Damages (Doc. 73); 

 4) DENYING the Government’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Impact 

Opinions of Defendants’ Experts Peter Drake and Jim Sanders (Doc. 74) 

 5) DENYING Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Exclude the Testimony of 

Thomas Baker and Alternatively His Non-Expert Survey and Paired Sale Analysis of Cell 

Towers (Doc. 75); 

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 6) DENYING Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Exclude Any Evidence, 

Testimony or Argument Regarding Nominal Use (Doc. 76); and 

 7) DENYING Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Exclude Any Evidence, 

Testimony or Argument Regarding Title 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (Doc. 77). 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. '636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after 

being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to 

another party=s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If 

objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-13-00198-

TUC-JAS. 

 Dated this 4th day of February, 2016. 

Honorable Bruce G. Macdonald 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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