Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-22-04055/USCOURTS-ca4-22-04055-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Keshaun Turner
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-4055

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

ROBERT KESHAUN TURNER,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at 

Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge. (1:20-CR-00350-TDS-1)

Argued: September 24, 2024 Decided: December 4, 2024

Before THACKER, HARRIS, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Harris wrote 

the opinion, in which Judge Thacker and Judge Quattlebaum joined.

ARGUED: Ryan M. Prescott, PRESCOTT LAW, PLLC, Clemmons, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Laura Jeanne Dildine, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Daniel A. Harris, CLIFFORD & 

HARRIS, PLLC, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, United 

States Attorney, Margaret M. Reece, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:

Robert Keshaun Turner pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm

after the police seized a gun from a car in which Turner was sitting. On appeal, Turner

first challenges the denial of his motion to suppress the gun on Fourth Amendment grounds. 

Finding no Fourth Amendment violation, we affirm Turner’s conviction. With respect to 

his sentence, Turner argues that inconsistencies between the supervised-release conditions 

announced at his sentencing and those in his written judgment constitute error under United 

States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020). Again, we disagree and conclude no Rogers 

error was committed. But because Turner’s criminal history score concededly was 

miscalculated, resulting in a too-high Sentencing Guidelines advisory range, we vacate 

Turner’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

I.

A.

The events underlying this case unfolded over a roughly two-day period in Durham, 

North Carolina. During the evening of June 1, 2020, the brother of the defendant, Robert 

Keshaun Turner, notified local law enforcement that his handgun, a black and gray Ruger 

Model SR45, was missing from its usual place in a lockbox in his bedroom. When Officer 

David Flores responded, Turner’s brother reported that the gun had been stolen by Turner, 

the only other person with knowledge of the gun and access to its location. Turner’s brother 

also advised that Turner was involved with the Folk Nation street gang, which was in 

conflict with another gang at the time. Flores presented this information to a state 

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magistrate judge, who issued a warrant for Turner’s arrest. In the process, Flores also 

learned that Turner was a felon and a validated gang member.

The next night, Flores responded to a carjacking report in which the victim alleged 

that Turner pointed a black and gray Ruger Model SR45 handgun at him and threatened to 

shoot unless he gave Turner the keys to his car. Flores sought a second arrest warrant for 

Turner, but while he was en route to the magistrate judge, the victim informed law 

enforcement that Turner had returned his vehicle. Finding that the matter required further 

investigation, the magistrate judge declined to issue a second warrant.

At around 2:00 a.m. on June 4, 2020 – less than 27 hours after the carjacking report, 

and approximately two days after the initial theft of the gun – Flores responded to a shotsfired call at an EZ Mini Mart. Flores was familiar with the location, having previously 

responded to calls reporting gunshots, heavy gambling, and gang activity in that area. 

When Flores arrived, other police officers were already on the scene, and Flores parked his 

patrol car a short distance away. From that point forward, his activities were captured by 

his body-worn camera.

As Flores approached the store, he recognized Turner sitting in the driver’s seat of 

a stationary black Buick. After verifying Turner’s name, Flores asked Turner to exit the 

vehicle, then handcuffed and arrested him on his outstanding warrant. Flores asked Turner 

if there was anything on his person or in the vehicle about which law enforcement should 

be aware; Turner replied that there was not. Flores proceeded to frisk Turner, finding no 

weapons or contraband. He then placed Turner in the back of his patrol car.

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By the time Flores returned to the black Buick – roughly two minutes after first 

taking Turner into custody – Flores’s immediate supervisor, Corporal Peterson, was

already searching the vehicle. Flores joined the search and, shortly thereafter, Peterson 

found a firearm in the glove compartment. Flores later confirmed that the gun in the black 

Buick was the gun stolen from Turner’s brother.

B.

Turner was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession of a stolen firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(j). He moved to suppress the handgun, arguing that the officers’ warrantless search 

of the black Buick violated the Fourth Amendment. The government opposed, arguing 

that two Fourth Amendment warrant exceptions – the search-incident-to-arrest exception 

and the automobile exception – each applied and independently justified the search.

At the suppression hearing, Officer Flores testified as to the events described above. 

The district court credited Flores’s account, which was corroborated by the footage from 

his body-worn camera that was admitted as evidence. See United States v. Turner, No. 

1:20CR350-1, 2021 WL 2435609, at *1 (M.D.N.C. June 15, 2021). The district court then 

denied Turner’s motion to suppress, holding that the search of the car in which Turner was 

sitting was a lawful search incident to arrest. Id. at *4. In a thoroughly reasoned opinion, 

the court applied the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), 

explaining that it allows for a warrantless search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of a 

recent occupant so long as “it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the 

crime of arrest.” Turner, 2021 WL 2435609, at *3 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 351). This 

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“reasonable to believe” standard, the court found, is a “less demanding standard than 

probable cause.” Id.; see also id. at *3 n.2. And based on all the facts and circumstances 

of which Officer Flores was aware at the time of the search, the district court concluded 

there was “at least a reasonable belief that Turner’s vehicle contained evidence of the 

larceny of the firearm” for which Turner was arrested “such that the search of the vehicle 

incident to arrest was permissible” under Gant. Id. at *4. 

C.

After his motion to suppress was denied, Turner pleaded guilty to possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon but reserved his right to appeal the denial of his suppression 

motion.

At sentencing, the district court adopted a Sentencing Guidelines advisory range of 

46 to 57 months’ imprisonment. That Guidelines range was based on an offense level of 

19 and seven criminal history points, which put Turner in criminal history category IV. 

Though the parties had initially debated the proper offense level, they ultimately agreed 

with the district court’s determination, endorsing all parts of its calculation. The court 

sentenced Turner to a within-Guidelines term of imprisonment of 57 months, to be 

followed by three years of supervised release. As relevant here, Turner’s sentence included 

four special conditions of supervised release. 

Turner timely appealed. His counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there were no meritorious grounds for appeal. After 

reviewing the record, this court appointed new counsel for Turner and directed 

supplemental briefing on three issues: the denial of Turner’s motion to suppress; the 

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consistency of the district court’s oral pronouncement of supervised-release special 

conditions with the written judgment; and the calculation of Turner’s advisory Sentencing 

Guidelines range, especially with respect to Turner’s criminal history score.

II.

A.

We begin with Turner’s suppression motion. When, as here, a district court denies 

a motion to suppress, we review the court’s “legal conclusions de novo and its factual 

findings for clear error, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government.” United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 142 (4th Cir. 2018). Having 

undertaken that review, we agree with the district court that the warrantless search of the 

black Buick was justified by the search-incident-to-arrest exception as set out in Gant and

did not violate the Fourth Amendment.1

 The district court correctly denied Turner’s 

suppression motion, and we therefore affirm Turner’s conviction.

1.

Warrantless searches – like the search of the vehicle in which Turner was sitting 

when he was arrested – are “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,” subject to

“only a few specifically and well-delineated exceptions.” Turner, 2021 WL 2435609, at 

1 Accordingly, and like the district court, see Turner, 2021 WL 2435609, at *4, we 

need not consider the government’s alternative argument under the automobile exception 

to the warrant requirement, which allows for a search of a “readily mobile” vehicle if there 

is probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of any criminal activity. 

See United States v. Baker, 719 F.3d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 2013) (describing automobile 

exception). 

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*2 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). Among those exceptions is 

one for searches incident to arrest. As relevant here, that exception authorizes a warrantless 

vehicle search “when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest 

might be found in the vehicle.” Gant, 556 U.S. at 343 (2009) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

2

 

Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has articulated the precise quantum of 

proof necessary to satisfy Gant’s “reasonable to believe” standard. But as the district court 

observed, our cases “indicate that [‘reasonable to believe’] is a less demanding standard 

than probable cause.” Turner, 2021 WL 2435609, at *3. We made that point most clearly 

in United States v. Baker, 719 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2013), contrasting the Gant searchincident-to-arrest exception with the automobile exception. The automobile exception, we 

explained, is in some ways the broader of the two, allowing police officers to “search a 

vehicle for evidence of any crime, not just the crime of arrest” as permitted by Gant. Id.

at 319. But there is a catch: Under the automobile exception, police may search only “on 

a showing of probable cause,” rather than the “mere reasonable belief” that will justify a 

search incident to arrest under Gant. Id. (emphasis added); see also United States v. Davis, 

997 F.3d 191, 201–02 (4th Cir. 2021) (considering the Gant “reasonable to believe” 

2 Gant permits a warrantless search of a vehicle incident to arrest in only one other 

circumstance: “when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the 

passenger compartment at the time of the search.” 556 U.S. at 343; see Baker, 719 F.3d at 

317. The parties agree that this prong of the search-incident-to-arrest exception does not 

apply here. See Turner, 2021 WL 2435609, at *3 n.1.

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standard after first finding an absence of probable cause under the automobile exception).

3

 

Our precedent may not conclusively define Gant’s “reasonable to believe” standard, in 

other words, but it does treat that standard as requiring something less than probable cause.

Like the district court, we think that is the most sensible reading of Gant. Most 

obviously, if the Supreme Court in Gant had intended to set the bar at probable cause, then 

it could have just said so; “probable cause” is an often used and well-understood Fourth 

Amendment term of art, and its absence from Gant’s search-incident-to-arrest analysis is 

conspicuous. United States v. Edwards, 769 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 2014) (Gant Court’s 

“choice of phrasing” suggests a standard “less demanding” than probable cause); see 

Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, South Carolina, 376 F.3d 292, 298 n.3 (4th Cir. 2004) 

(“[C]arefully considered language of the Supreme Court . . . generally must be treated as 

authoritative.”). Moreover, Gant permits a vehicular search incident to arrest when it is 

“reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the 

3 As the district court noted, there is a different context in which our precedent 

equates “reason to believe” with “probable cause.” See Turner, 2021 WL 2435609, at *3 

n.2. Under Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), police may enter a suspect’s home 

to execute an arrest warrant if there is “reason to believe the suspect is within.” Id. at 603. 

And in United States v. Brinkley, 980 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2020), we held that this standard 

requires a showing of probable cause that the suspect will be home when the police enter. 

Id. at 384–86. But “it does not follow,” as the district court explained, “that the formulation 

of ‘reasonable to believe’ in Brinkley applies equally in the context of vehicle searches 

pursuant to Gant.” See Turner, 2021 WL 2435609, at *3 n.2. While Brinkley is based 

largely on the “special protections that the Fourth Amendment affords the home,” 980 F.3d 

at 386, vehicles are afforded a significantly lesser expectation of privacy, South Dakota v. 

Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976), and Gant’s “reasonable to believe” standard derives 

expressly from “circumstances unique to the vehicle context,” Gant, 556 U.S. at 343; see 

Turner, 2021 WL 2435609, at *3 n.2. Turner does not argue otherwise on appeal, agreeing 

that Brinkley is inapplicable to warrantless vehicle searches under Gant.

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vehicle.” Baker, 719 F.3d at 317 (quoting Gant, 555 U.S. at 343) (emphasis added). While 

that formulation is not used consistently throughout the opinion, see Gant, 555 U.S. at 351, 

its prominence further suggests that the Gant Court had in mind a level of suspicion lower 

than probable cause. Cf., e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (defining 

probable cause as “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found 

in a particular place” (emphasis added)). 

Finally, there is a more practical point. As the district court explained, see Turner, 

2021 WL 2435609, at *3 n.2, because the automobile exception allows for a warrantless 

search of a vehicle for any contraband or evidence on a showing of probable cause, reading 

Gant also to require probable cause would render its search-incident-to-arrest exception 

largely redundant. That result would be especially odd because Gant is at pains to 

distinguish the two doctrines. Gant, 556 U.S. at 347; see United States v. Vinton, 594 F.3d 

14, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Presumably, the ‘reasonable to believe’ standard requires less 

than probable cause, because otherwise Gant’s evidentiary rationale would merely 

duplicate the ‘automobile exception,’ which the Court specifically identified as a distinct 

exception to the warrant requirement.”).

For all these reasons, we agree with the district court that Gant’s “reasonable to 

believe” standard can be satisfied with something less than probable cause. That 

conclusion aligns with the approach taken by our own precedent and with the views 

expressed by our sister circuits, see Edwards, 769 F.3d at 514; United States v. Rodgers, 

656 F.3d 1023, 1028 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011); Vinton, 594 F.3d at 25, and we think it is most 

faithful to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gant. 

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2.

We need go no further today in explicating Gant’s “reasonable to believe” standard 

– considering, for instance, how it relates to the “reasonable suspicion” standard associated 

with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Cf. Vinton, 59 F.3d at 25 (comparing Gant’s 

“reasonable to believe” standard to the “reasonable suspicion” standard); Brinkley, 980 

F.3d at 395–96 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (discussing Supreme Court’s use of “reasonable 

suspicion,” “reasonable belief,” and “reason to believe” in Terry and other contexts). That 

is because we agree with the district court in a second respect: Whatever the precise 

contours of Gant’s “reasonable to believe” standard, that standard is met here.

As the district court emphasized, at the time of Turner’s arrest at the EZ Mini Mart 

for theft of a firearm, Officer Flores was very familiar with Turner’s activities and 

circumstances over the past two and a half days. Turner, 2021 WL 2435609, at *4. In 

investigating the original theft on June 1, Flores personally took the report of Turner’s 

brother, learning that Turner was involved in a street gang that was potentially engaged in 

a gang conflict. The next night, Flores responded to a carjacking call and discovered that 

Turner had apparently stolen his brother’s gun for personal use, rather than for a quick sale 

or trade, and was already putting it to work. And then the night after that, Flores came 

upon Turner moments after a shots-fired call, in an area known for gang activity – again, 

during a period when Turner’s gang was reportedly at odds with another gang. 

Under those circumstances, we agree with the district court that it was eminently 

reasonable for Flores to believe that Turner was likely armed – if only for self-defense –

while he was sitting in the black Buick at the EZ Mini Mart just after reported gunfire. It 

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was also reasonable for Flores to believe that Turner was armed with the same stolen gun 

he had reportedly used just the night before in an apparent carjacking. And because Turner 

was not carrying a gun on his person – Flores’s frisk had turned up nothing – the car in 

which Turner was sitting became the most likely place for Turner to have stowed a readily 

accessible weapon. Under Gant, that is enough to permit a search of the passenger 

compartment of the black Buick incident to Turner’s lawful arrest on the outstanding 

warrant for theft of a gun.4

 Accordingly, the district court correctly denied Turner’s motion 

to suppress.

B.

We next consider Turner’s sentence and his claim that the district court committed 

an error under United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), when it entered in his 

written judgment certain special conditions of supervised release that differed from those 

announced at sentencing. We review the consistency of the district court’s oral sentence 

and the written judgment de novo. Rogers, 961 F.3d at 296.

4 During the suppression hearing, Turner argued to the district court for the first time 

that even if Officer Flores had a reasonable belief that the stolen gun would be found in the 

black Buick, Corporal Peterson, who participated in the search and found the gun in the 

glove compartment, did not. Turner, 2021 WL 2435609, at *5. The district court rejected 

that argument, reasoning that even apart from Peterson’s intervention, the gun inevitably 

would have been discovered by Flores during his own lawful search of the car. Id. We do 

not understand Turner to have challenged this ruling on appeal. In any event, we see no 

error in the district court’s application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. See United 

States v. Bullette, 854 F.3d 261, 265 (4th Cir. 2017) (describing inevitable discovery 

doctrine).

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Rogers and its progeny “require a district court to orally pronounce all discretionary 

conditions of supervised release at the sentencing hearing.” United States v. Mathis, 103 

F.4th 193, 197 (4th Cir. 2024). However, “a district court may satisfy its obligation to 

orally pronounce discretionary conditions through incorporation.” Rogers, 961 F.3d at 299. 

The district court here did just that. It imposed four special conditions of supervised 

release, each of which was included in the sentencing recommendation provided in the 

Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) compiled by the United States Probation Office.

At Turner’s sentencing hearing, the district court incorporated the conditions as set forth in 

the PSR, after confirming that defense counsel had reviewed them with Turner and had no 

objection. J.A. 159–160. Those special conditions – the conditions laid out in the PSR 

and incorporated at Turner’s sentencing hearing – are a word-for-word match with those in 

Turner’s written judgment. That is enough to satisfy the dictates of our Rogers decision.

Turner nevertheless faults the district court for going further than was required and 

reading aloud the special conditions from the PSR, so that each discretionary condition was 

announced “in open court with the defendant present.” Rogers, 961 F.3d at 299 (cleaned 

up) (describing optimal practice). In so doing, the district court deviated ever so slightly 

from the language in the PSR and written judgment – which, according to Turner, amounts 

to a Rogers error. 

We disagree. Not every inconsistency between a written judgment and an oral 

pronouncement is reversible Rogers error. Mathis, 103 F.4th at 197. The “written 

judgment does not have to match perfectly with the oral pronouncement,” and only a 

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“material discrepancy” between the two violates the Rogers line of cases. Id. We see no 

such discrepancy in either of the two special conditions challenged by Turner.

The first, as incorporated at the sentencing hearing and written in the judgment, 

requires Turner to “cooperatively participate in a substance abuse treatment program, 

which may include drug testing and inpatient/residential treatment, and pay for treatment 

services, as directed by the probation officer.” J.A. 169 (emphasis added). In reading that 

condition aloud at sentencing, the district court informed Turner of his obligation to 

“cooperatively participate in a substance abuse treatment program, which may include drug 

testing and inpatient and residential treatment, and to pay for those services as directed by 

the probation officer.” J.A. 159 (emphasis added). We cannot see – and Turner has not 

explained – how referring to the treatment services already listed as “those services” 

instead of as “treatment services” materially altered the nature of this condition.

So too with the second challenged condition. As written in the incorporated PSR 

and the judgment, the condition states that Turner shall not “associate with or be in the 

company of any Folk Nation/Gangster Disciples gang member/security threat group 

member,” J.A. 169; as stated orally in court, the condition states that Turner shall not 

“associate with or be in the company of any gang member, including the Folk Nation or 

Gangster Disciples gang, or security threat group,” J.A. 160. Aside from simply quoting 

the two formulations of the condition, Turner has not identified any inconsistency with 

which he takes issue, let alone explained how it could be material. Moreover, Turner never 

responded to the government’s argument that any difference is immaterial because the two 

formulations can plausibly be read to proscribe the same conduct. See Mathis, 103 F.3d at 

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197 (“[S]ome difference between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment is 

permitted when the government has offered an explanation for the alleged inconsistency to 

which the defendant has not responded.”). We thus readily conclude that there is no 

material discrepancy as to this condition either.5

 

The Rogers rule is an important one, protecting the right of a defendant to be present 

when sentenced and facilitating sometimes meritorious objections to discretionary 

conditions of supervised release. See Rogers, 961 F.3d at 296, 298. But it was never 

intended to be an empty formality or a trap for district court judges who go beyond 

incorporation to provide an additional layer of protection to the defendants they are 

sentencing. Turner has identified no “material discrepancy” between his oral sentence and 

written judgment, Mathis, 103 F.4th at 197, and it follows that there is no Rogers error 

here. 

C.

We must nevertheless vacate Turner’s sentence and remand for resentencing 

because, as the government concedes, Turner’s criminal history score was improperly 

calculated, leading to the adoption of an advisory Guidelines sentencing range that was 

higher than it should have been.

5

 At oral argument, Turner’s counsel acknowledged that the differences between the 

written judgment and oral pronouncement did not seem to be material. We appreciate 

counsel’s candor, and we recognize that he briefed the Rogers issue at our court’s 

instruction.

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At the sentencing hearing, the parties agreed that Turner’s criminal history score 

was seven, placing him in criminal history category IV and resulting in a Guidelines range 

of 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment. That was a mistake. One of Turner’s criminal history 

points was assigned for a 45-day sentence imposed in 2011, nine years before the current 

conviction. See U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1(c), 4A1.2(e) (assigning, as a general rule, one criminal 

history point for a sentence of less than 60 days imposed within 10 years of the instant 

offense). But because Turner was under 18 when his 45-day sentence was imposed, it 

should have been counted in his criminal history only if it was imposed within five years 

of the instant offense, see id. § 4A1.2(d)(2)(B), which it was not. The parties now agree 

that Turner’s criminal history score should have been six, not seven; his criminal history 

category III, not IV; and his Guidelines sentencing range 37 to 46 months’ imprisonment, 

not 46 to 57.6

Although Turner raised objections to the calculation of his offense level at 

sentencing, he never objected to the calculation of his criminal history score. Our review 

is thus for plain error only. United States v. McLaurin, 764 F.3d 372, 388 (4th Cir. 2014); 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). But the government, with forthrightness we appreciate, concedes 

6 The government also calls to our attention that Turner may be eligible for an 

additional two-level reduction in his criminal history category due to the recent retroactive 

Amendment 821 to the Sentencing Guidelines. Turner, for his part, argues that there are 

additional errors in his Guidelines calculation, though the government contends those 

arguments have been waived. We leave these issues for the district court to assess in the 

first instance at resentencing. We express no view as to the ultimate calculation of Turner’s 

advisory sentencing range or any sentencing enhancement or reduction not discussed in 

our opinion. See United States v. Evans, 90 F.4th 257, 264 n.5 (4th Cir. 2024).

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that the error here was plain, that it affected Turner’s substantial rights, and that we should 

correct the error now. See Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 201 (2016) 

(“[T]he court’s reliance on an incorrect range in most instances will suffice to show an 

effect on the defendant’s substantial rights.”); Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 

129, 145 (2018) (“In the ordinary case, as here, the failure to correct a plain Guidelines 

error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights will seriously affect the fairness, integrity, 

and public reputation of judicial proceedings.”). We agree and, accordingly, vacate 

Turner’s sentence and remand so that he may be resentenced under a correctly calculated 

advisory sentencing range.

III.

For the reasons given above, we affirm Turner’s conviction, vacate Turner’s 

sentence, and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED

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