Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cr-00269/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cr-00269-29/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brent Douglas Cole
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

BRENT DOUGLAS COLE,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cr-00269-GEB

ORDER RE APPLICATION OF 

OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

ENHANCEMENT 

Defendant objects to the Probation Officer’s 

recommendation that he receive a two-level obstruction of justice 

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1(c). Probation recommends this 

enhancement be applied based on perjured trial testimony. (PSR &

17.) Defendant argues the “accusation that [he] was not truthful 

on the stand . . . is . . . unfounded and 

unsubstantiated . . . .” (Def.’s Mot. Correction of Pre-Sentence 

Report (“Mot.”) 24:1-5, ECF No. 134.)

The government rejoins that Defendant “has earned the 

two level increase . . . for obstruction of justice[,]” arguing 

in its sentencing memorandum and response to Defendant’s motion 

to correct the PSR:

[T]he jury’s verdict is a clear rejection of 

[Defendant’s] testimony as being neither true 

nor credible. 

. . . .

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Defendant testified that he . . . did 

not draw his weapon until the officers began 

shooting him first, and that his actions were 

in self-defense. He also testified that 

[Bureau of Land Management] Ranger Pultorak 

repeatedly threatened him during the traffic 

stop. This testimony was directly 

contradicted by Ranger Pultorak and 

[California Highway Patrol] Officer Hardin. 

Defendant also stated that Ranger Pultorak 

was wearing a brown poncho on the day of the 

shooting. Defendant provided a detailed 

description of the design and color of the 

poncho. He even remembered that the poncho 

had tassels at the bottom. Ranger Pultorak 

denied owning or wearing such an item on the 

day of the shooting.

More to the point, since his conviction 

defendant continues his narrative that he 

acted in self-defense, that Ranger Pultorak 

“gut shot” him first, that Ranger Pultorak 

threatened him during the traffic stop, that 

Ranger Pultorak lied etc. . . . This court 

may also consider defendant’s attempts to 

influence sentencing through his narrative in 

finding that defendant obstructed justice, if 

the court concludes that the narrative put 

forth by the defendant is false. USSG § 

3C1.1.

(Gov’t Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Correct PSR & Sentencing Mem. 

13:15-14:16, ECF No. 145.) 

The government is correct about Defendant’s perjurious 

trial testimony and his sentencing antics. For example, in 

Defendant’s filing docketed as number 147, he states: “[Pultorak] 

act[ed] in excess of his jurisdiction to seize property belonging 

to the defendant and others. If his concern had been defendant 

camping, he would have had him take his things. Defendant 

approached the officers because they were engaged in stealing his 

property . . . .” (Def.’s Reply to Gov’t Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for 

Transcript & Ancillary Services 11:14-24, ECF No. 147.)

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Further, in Defendant’s Motion for Correction of PreSentence Report, he states: 

There was only one motorcycle in the 

campsite. N.C.S.O. moved the Kawasaki into 

the camp after the shooting. The information 

as to the statements of Grass Valley dispatch 

is correct, but it was falsified [elsewhere, 

including] . . . at trial. The BLM log shows 

that Pultorak decided to impound the 

motorcycles before he called in.

(Def.’s Mot. 3.)

These statements evince that Defendant willfully 

attempted to obstruct the administration of justice by obviously 

lying and concocting a false story that he was within his rights 

when he confronted Pultorak and Hardin during what he appears to 

characterize as an illegal investigation. 

U.S.S.G. ' 3C1.1 states, in relevant part: 

If . . . the defendant willfully . . . 

attempted to obstruct . . . the 

administration of justice with respect to the 

. . . prosecution[] or sentencing of the 

instant offense of conviction, and . . . the 

obstructive conduct related to . . . the 

defendant’s offense of conviction . . . , 

increase the offense level by 2 levels.

Application Note 4 to this enhancement provides a nonexhaustive list of conduct to which it applies, which includes 

“committing . . . perjury[,]” and “providing materially false 

information to a judge.” 

“For perjury to be deemed obstruction, the . . . court 

must find that: ‘(1) the defendant gave false testimony, (2) on a 

material matter, (3) with willful intent.’” United States v. 

Castro-Ponce, 770 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United 

States v. Garro, 517 F.3d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008)). 

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Application Note 6 to this enhancement defines “material” as 

follows: “‘Material’ evidence, fact, statement, or information, 

as used in this section, means evidence, fact, statement, or 

information that, if believed, would tend to influence or affect 

the issue under determination.” 

Probation recommends the obstruction of justice 

enhancement be applied on the following basis: “The defendant 

took the stand at trial and was not truthful. The defendant lied 

to the jury, indicating he was fully compliant with the officers’ 

commands, and they (the officers) attacked him [without 

provocation]. Further, the defendant testified he acted out of 

self-defense.” (PSR & 17.) The referenced statement that 

Defendant “indicat[ed at trial that] he was fully compliant with 

the officers’ commands” does not accurately reflect Defendant’s 

trial testimony.

Defendant testified at trial that when he entered the 

area of the campsite, he told Ranger Pultorak he returned to 

retrieve his property. He testified that Pultorak removed his 

handcuffs and twirled them on his finger to taunt him. Defendant 

further testified that Pultorak asked him if he had any weapons 

and directed him to turn around. Defendant testified that he said 

he was armed, but responded: “I’m not turning around now.” 

Defendant also testified that after he informed Pultorak he was 

armed, Pultorak drew his weapon immediately and “gut shot” him. 

In essence, Defendant testified that was acting in self-defense 

and only fired his gun once he was shot.

The trial record establishes that Defendant gave 

willfully false testimony on the central issue in the case 

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whether he drew and fired his pistol in self-defense. Contrary to 

Defendant’s testimony, the trial record evinces that Ranger 

Pultorak and Officer Hardin were investigating reported stolen 

property located in the campsite when Pultorak heard rustling in 

the brush from an area where he did not expect a person to be. 

In response to that noise, Pultorak said: “Hello, police” twice. 

Defendant responded: “Yuh, it’s me, you dealt with me earlier; 

I’m just coming to get my stuff.” Pultorak asked Defendant, “Do 

you have any weapons?” Defendant said he was armed, and Pultorak 

told him to turn around. Defendant responded “I’m not turning 

around now,” and Defendant exposed his pistol as Defendant 

assumed what was characterized as a “bladed stance”; Pultorak saw 

Defendant’s right leg and foot move to Defendant’s rear, and his 

right hand head to his waistband where his gun was holstered;1

Pultorak was in the process of backing up away from Defendant and 

drawing his weapon when he felt a twinge in his left shoulder; 

Pultorak had been shot. 

CHP Hardin testified that he heard Defendant say, “Hey 

this is my camp, this is my gear. Don’t take my stuff.” Hardin 

heard Pultorak ask, “Are you armed?” and Defendant pulled his 

jacket back, revealing a gun in a holster. Hardin further 

testified that Pultorak pulled out his handcuffs and Defendant 

said, “You’re not putting those on me” and assumed a bladed 

stance, left hand out, right hand going toward his waist. 

Pultorak yelled at Defendant to “drop the gun, drop the gun,”

 

1 Defendant had a safety strap on his holster that secured his pistol in 

the holster. After he left his vehicle for the purpose of walking through the 

forest to reach the campsite, he unsnapped that safety strap, thereby readying 

his pistol for removal from his holster.

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backing away. Defendant held his stance and pointed the gun. As 

soon as Defendant extended his gun, Hardin heard a shot.

In response, both Pultorak and Hardin returned fire. 

Defendant fired multiple rounds, striking Pultorak in the left 

shoulder and Hardin in a leg.

Pultorak’s actions in attempting to detain Defendant 

during his and Hardin’s investigation concerning the reported 

stolen property were lawful under the circumstances, given 

Defendant’s conduct and demeanor and Pultorak’s stated concerns 

during the trial that the two other men whom had been with 

Defendant earlier may also have been approaching the campsite. 

See generally, Alexander v. Cnty. of L.A., 64 F.3d 1315, 1320 

(9th Cir. 1995) (discussing when pointing a weapon at and/or 

handcuffing a person is permissible to eliminate the possibility 

of an assault while officers are engaged in investigative 

functions).2

Here, the trial record makes evident that Defendant 

failed to obey the lawful directives Pultorak gave him, and 

Defendant violently resisted being detained so Pultorak and 

Hardin could continue with their investigation; Defendant was not 

acting in self-defense. I disbelieve Defendant’s trial testimony 

to the contrary. The falsity of Defendant’s testimony is further 

evidenced by the statement Defendant gave to law enforcement 

investigators while he was in hospitalized for medical 

 

2 Defendant raises a Second Amendment objection, indicating that Ranger 

Pultorak’s actions in attempting to detain him violated his right to bear 

arms, i.e. the gun he possessed. However, his right to bear arms was not at 

issue in this case; the issue is the reasonableness of Pultorak and Hardin’s 

actions in connection with their investigation of a crime. 

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treatment.3 In his June 16, 2014 interview, Defendant stated he 

was convinced Pultorak was going to shoot him so he pulled his 

firearm to make Pultorak back away from him. Defendant also 

stated in his interview that he “just freaked” and fired a total 

of six rounds. When asked during the interview if he thought it 

was wrong to shoot Pultorak and Hardin, Defendant replied, “yes.” 

Therefore, I find by a preponderance of the evidence 

that Defendant testified falsely at trial. See United States v. 

Armstrong, 620 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The sentencing 

judge need only find by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

defendant committed perjury.”). 

Further, I find by a preponderance of the evidence that 

Defendant’s false testimony was material in that if believed it 

would have affected the jury’s determination of his guilt, and 

that it was willful; his false testimony was not the “result of 

confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.” United States v. Jimenez, 

300 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2002). “Since [the trial record 

evinces] that [the defendant] was [not acting in self-defense], 

he could not have been mistaken regarding [that issue], and the 

question of whether he [acted in self-defense] was [a] central 

issue in this case”. United States v. Villasenor-Chavez, 560 F. 

App’x 653, 656 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming application of 

obstruction of justice enhancement). Defendant’s elaborate false 

testimony that Pultorak was wearing a brown, tasseled poncho at 

the time of the incident further demonstrates Defendant’s intent 

 

3 Defendant asserts he was under the influence of medication during this 

interview. However, Investigator Billingsley testified at trial that Defendant 

was lucid, appeared to understand the questions he was asked, never expressed 

any confusion, and did not indicate that his medication was affecting his 

memory of the incident. 

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in testifying falsely. He concocted a story to try to obtain a 

not guilty verdict. 

I also find by a preponderance of the evidence that 

Defendant has willfully continued to present his false version of 

events to me in an attempt to influence his sentencing, and that 

the false information is material. If believed, the false 

information would tend to affect Defendant’s sentence. 

For the stated reasons, a 2-level enhancement for 

obstruction of justice is applied. 

This order shall be appended to any copy of the PSR 

made available to the Bureau of Prisons in accordance with 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(c).

Dated: August 28, 2015

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