Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01507/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01507-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Aviation Administration
Respondent
Jane F. Garvey
Respondent
Town of Stratford, Connecticut
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed June 11, 2002

No. 99-1507

Town of Stratford, Connecticut,

Petitioner

v.

Federal Aviation Administration and

Jane F. Garvey, Administrator,

Respondents

On Petitioner's Petition for Rehearing

---------

Before: Rogers and Garland, Circuit Judges and

Silberman, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

Silberman.

Silberman, Senior Circuit Judge: The Town of Stratford

petitions for rehearing, raising three concerns. The first

appears to relate to the timing of our decision. When the

case was originally argued in October 2000 we were taken

aback to learn that part of the property subject to the FAA's

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challenged approval of the Airport Master Plan was under

the Army's control and the Army had not yet taken actions to

dispose of the property. It seemed to us, accordingly, that

considerations of prudential ripeness suggested that we withhold our decision and opinion unless and until the Army

finally decided to release its portion of the property to be

used for the airport improvement. On October 10, 2000, we

issued an order holding the case in abeyance until such an

occurrence. The Army issued its decision on October 25,

2001, and, pursuant to our October 10 order, the parties

submitted supplemental briefs on ripeness as well as petitioner's standing, which also troubled us.

On April 5, 2002 (four months after the supplemental briefs

were submitted), we received a letter from a line attorney in

the Justice Department, presumably representing both the

Transportation and Defense Departments, enclosing a terse

memorandum from a Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army

indicating he was withdrawing the October 25, 2001 decision

for reevaluation. The Justice Department attorney suggested that, in accordance with our earlier concerns, we might

think the case no longer ripe and we might "place the case on

hold" until the Army issued another decision. Or, we could

dismiss the petition without prejudice, allowing Stratford to

refile if and when the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the

Army made up his mind and issued a new decision.

When we received this latest extraordinary letter from the

government's counsel the opinion was already in galleys--

scheduled to issue on April 9. We decided that prudential

concerns suggested that we ignore the latest twist in this

saga and simply let the opinion issue.

Now comes petitioner, who argued all along that the case

was ripe and who still maintains the case is ripe, to argue

that the case is ripe not for the reason we gave but for

another reason. We are utterly baffled; we cannot imagine

why anyone would petition the court for en banc review of an

issue decided in its favor; indeed, a party typically lacks

standing to challenge the reasoning of a tribunal that decides

in its favor. See, e.g., OXY U.S.A., Inc. v. FERC, 64 F.3d 679,

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689 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing Showtime Networks, Inc. v. FCC,

932 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). Be that as it may, since our

ripeness concern was a prudential one--we did not wish to

devote judicial resources when it might not be necessary--it,

obviously, was obviated once we had prepared our opinion.

Petitioner's second concern is our holding that it lacked

prudential standing to assert the FAA's alleged violation of

NEPA. Our opinion noted that petitioner did not assert any

environmental injury--such as traffic congestion leading to

increased pollution--that might give them standing. Petitioner insists that in its original brief it did refer generally to

"damage to surrounding wetlands." But it never explained

what it meant and in its supplemental brief the following

year, in which we had specifically directed the parties to

address issues of standing and ripeness, it never mentioned

an environmental injury. It is simply too late now to attempt

to supply that which petitioner explicitly was asked to show in

the fall of 2001.

Finally, and perhaps most surprising, petitioner asserts

that we erred in applying Chevron deference to the FAA's

interpretation of 49 U.S.C. s 47106(c). See Chevron U.S.A.

Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837

(1984). That statutory section requires the Secretary of

Transportation to obtain a certification from the Governor of

an affected state that "an airport development projection

involving the location of an airport or runway or a major

runway extension" will meet applicable air and water quality

standards. Furthermore, the Secretary himself, if he finds

that the project will have a significant adverse affect on the

environment, may approve the application only if there is no

possible and prudent alternative.

The government, claiming Chevron deference, interpreted

"location" of a runway not to apply to a minor runway shift

that kept the same compass bearing and produced no additional noise impacts. Paradoxically, petitioner also contended

in its reply brief that Chevron governed, but argued that the

FAA's interpretation failed Chevron step one. We concluded

that the word location was ambiguous and deferred to the

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Department's interpretation. Petitioner now points out, for

the first time, that the government's interpretation was

adopted, not by regulation or through adjudication, but in

litigation (although inferentially based on its Airport Environmental Handbook). Therefore, under Christensen v. Harris

County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), and United States v. Mead

Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221, 226-27 (2001), that interpretation is

only entitled to Skidmore "deference" not Chevron. See

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 132 (1944). Christensen had

been decided when petitioner's brief was filed, yet petitioner

ignored the case, and neither party ever called our attention

in a 28(j) letter to the intervening Mead decision's potential

impact on the case. (For that matter, the petition for rehearing does not acknowledge that petitioner not only neglected

to challenge Chevron's applicability before, but in fact relied

on it.)

We think it is too late--at the petition for rehearing

stage--for a party to raise a new question as to the proper

scope of judicial review. In any event, even granting more

limited Skidmore deference to the FAA, we think its interpretation of location is the better one.

Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is denied.

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