Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02158/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02158-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Timothy Howard Delgado
Defendant
Susan Gardner
Defendant
Curtis Renee Jackson
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CURTIS RENEE JACKSON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

TIMOTHY HOWARD DELGADO et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-2158 AC (TEMP) P 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This 

proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned will dismiss this action because 

plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim for relief.1

SCREENING REQUIREMENT 

 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims 

that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 

 

1

 Plaintiff has consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636. (Doc. No. 4) 

Case 2:15-cv-02158-AC Document 6 Filed 04/11/16 Page 1 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2 

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). 

 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 

 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more 

than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual 

allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 

U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the 

allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 

738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all 

doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: 

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 

Case 2:15-cv-02158-AC Document 6 Filed 04/11/16 Page 2 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3 

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or 

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

 Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of 

their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 

holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); 

Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 

concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 

Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 

 In his complaint, plaintiff has identified California Deputy Attorney General Timothy 

Delgado and California Department of Justice Legal Analyst Susan Gardner as the defendants in 

this action. Plaintiff alleges that the defendants improperly accessed his medical records during 

the discovery phase of a separate civil rights action, which is pending in the Fresno Division of 

this court. See Case No. 1:13-cv-1679 SAB.2 In that civil rights action, plaintiff claims that 

Correctional Officer Mendenhall used excessive force against him and injured his neck. (Id.) 

According to plaintiff’s complaint in this civil rights action, Attorney Delgado asked 

plaintiff during his deposition to name the pain medications he is on and specify what dosages he 

takes. Plaintiff alleges that he could not recall the name of one of his pain medications, but 

Attorney Delgado told him that he could find the name in plaintiff’s records. Plaintiff maintains 

that he did not release his medical records to defendants or the California Department of Justice, 

or give authorization to his primary care physician or other prison officials to release his records. 

Nevertheless, plaintiff alleges that defendants accessed his records. In terms of relief in this civil 

rights action, plaintiff requests declaratory relief and monetary damages. (Compl. at 5-9 & Ex. 

A.) 

 

2

 “[A] court may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases.” United States v. Wilson, 

631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980). 

Case 2:15-cv-02158-AC Document 6 Filed 04/11/16 Page 3 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4 

DISCUSSION 

 The undersigned will dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a cognizable claim 

for relief. First, it is not clear what federal statutory or constitutional right plaintiff believes 

defendants have violated in this case. However, insofar as plaintiff seeks to bring an action under 

the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), there is no private right of 

action under HIPAA. United States v. Streich, 560 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Moreover, insofar as plaintiff seeks to bring an action based on a constitutional right to 

informational privacy, he waived any right to privacy he had in his medical records by putting his 

medical condition at issue in his excessive force lawsuit. See, e.g., Heilman v. Vojkufka, No. 

CIV S-08-2788 KJM EFB, 2011 WL 677877 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2011) (prisoner waives any 

constitutional right of privacy in his medical records when he places his medical condition at 

issue in a lawsuit); Frye v. Ayers, No. CIV S-99-0628 LKK KJM, 2009 WL 1312924 at *2 (E.D. 

Cal. May 12, 2009) (citing Barnes v. Glennon, No. 9:05-CV-0153 (LEK/RFT), 2006 WL 

2811821 at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2006) (“Although the release of the medical records was not 

pursuant to a discovery order or by consent, the release, nevertheless, did not violate Plaintiff’s 

constitutional right to privacy since medical conditions were at the heart of the argument 

presented by Plaintiff in his habeas corpus petition.”); Woods v. Goord, No. 01 CIV. 3255 

(SAS), 2002 WL 731691 at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2002) (“It is settled law that release of an 

inmate’s medical records in defense of litigation does not violate any right of the inmate when he 

has filed suit against prison officials.”); Ferrell v. Glen-Gery Brick, 678 F. Supp. 111, 112-13 

(E.D. Pa. 1987) (“[W]hen a party places his or her physical or mental condition in issue, the 

privacy right is waived”)). See also Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(prisoners “do not have a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in prison treatment 

records when the state has a legitimate penological interest in access to them.”); Cal. Code. Regs. 

tit. 15, § 3370(e) (“No case records file, unit health records, or component thereof shall be 

released to any agency or person outside the department, except for private attorneys hired to 

represent the department, the office of the attorney general....”). 

///// 

Case 2:15-cv-02158-AC Document 6 Filed 04/11/16 Page 4 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5 

Finally, plaintiff may not assert a damages claim against Attorney Delgado for conduct 

related to his litigation duties because he is entitled to absolute immunity for conduct that takes 

place during the performance of his official duties. Bly-Magee v. State of California, 236 F.3d 

1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Fry v. Melargno, 939 F.2d 832, 936 (9th Cir. 1991) (“If the 

government attorney is performing acts intimately associated with the judicial phase’ of the 

litigation, that attorney is entitled to absolute immunity from damage liability.”) (internal 

quotations omitted). In this case, plaintiff has not alleged that Attorney Delgado’s actions were 

unrelated to or outside of his official duties. 

In sum, for all of the foregoing reasons, the court will dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for 

failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. In addition, where, as here, it is clear that the 

complaint suffers from pleading deficiencies that plaintiff cannot cure by amendment, the court 

finds that dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint without leave to amend is appropriate. See Chaset v. 

Fleer/Skybox Int’l, 300 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (there is no need to prolong the litigation 

by permitting further amendment where the “basic flaw” in the underlying facts as alleged cannot 

be cured by amendment); Lipton v. Pathogenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(“Because any amendment would be futile, there was no need to prolong the litigation by 

permitting further amendment.”). 

CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 4) is denied; and 

2. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. 

DATED: March 14, 2016 

Case 2:15-cv-02158-AC Document 6 Filed 04/11/16 Page 5 of 5