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Parties Involved:
Jack Clair Pixley
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

V . ) 

) 

JACK CLAIR PIXLEY, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Fl L . .J 

United States CO\. 'L of Appe~1' 

Tenth Circuit 

MARO 1 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 91-8075 

(D.C. No. 91-CR-052-lB) 

(D. Wyo. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and 

SAFFELS, Senior District Judge.** 

In a one count indictment, Jack Clair Pixley was charged with 

the unlawful possession of a firearm, namely a Hawes Sauer Western 

Marshal .44 magnum caliber revolver, which had previously affected 

interstate commerce, after he had been convicted of a felony, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) (1) and 924 (a) (2 ). Prior to 

trial, Pixley stipulated that in August, 1985, he had been convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one 

* 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purpose s of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** Honorable Dale E . Saffels, Senior District Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 91-8075 Document: 010110176494 Date Filed: 03/01/1993 Page: 1 
year and that the firearm he allegedly possessed affected int erstate commerce . 

A jury c onvicted Pixley of the crime charged and he was sentenced to imprisonment f or a term of 34 months, to be followed by 

a three-year period of supervised release, plus a special assessment o f $50. Pixley appeals his conviction and the sentence imposed thereon. The only issue raised on appeal is the sufficiency 

of the evidence. In this regard, counsel asserts that the evidence is insufficient to show that Pixley ever "possessed" the 

firearm in question. We disagree and therefore affirm. A brief 

recital of the evidence adduced at trial will put this issue in 

focus. 

The evidence adduced at trial was not greatly disputed, although the parties draw different conclusions therefrom. Pixley 

testified in his own behalf, and the gist of his testimony was 

that he knew that as a convicted felon he could not lawfully possess any firearm that had traveled in interstate commerce, and 

that, accordingly, he had very carefully avoided "possessing" the 

firearm here in question. Pixley testified that at no time did he 

ever physically touch the firearm here involved. Counsel contends 

that, such being the case, Pixley could not have "possessed" the 

firearm within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1) . Such is not 

our understandi ng of§ 922(g) (1 ). 

In March, 1991, Pixley and one Jim Albertson were both employed by the Laramie County Community College in Cheyenne, Wyoming, in the maintenance shop. Albertson learned that Pixley 

wanted to purchase a motor vehicle to take him to and from work 

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Appellate Case: 91-8075 Document: 010110176494 Date Filed: 03/01/1993 Page: 2 
and offered to sell Pixley his Ford van for $800 . Pixley wanted 

to buy the van, but did not have $800. It was agreed that if 

Pixley could find some item of personal property which could b e 

used as a down payment, the balance could be paid off at $100 per 

month. 

Pixley explained his efforts to purchase Albertson's van to 

his live-in companion, and she remarked that a friend of theirs 

who had stayed with them for a few days had left with her a .44 

magnum revolver in exchange for the hospitality he had received. 

Pixley's companion testified that until she informed him, Pixley 

did not know of the presence of the revolver in their residence. 

Pixley testified that when he learned of the revolver, his reaction was, "Let's trade it in for the van." 

The following morning, Pixley was picked up by a fellow employee, Rodger Oliver, who gave him a ride to work. Apparently it 

was agreed that Pixley would not carry the revolver to the car. 

In any event, it is undisputed that Oliver, whether he volunteered 

or was asked, carried the revol ver from Pixley's residence to 

Oliver's automobile. The two then drove to their place of employment, with the revolver on the console between Oliver and Pixley. 

Upon arriving at the college, Oliver carried the revolver from his 

vehicle to the maintenance shop, where Albertson worked, and 

placed it on a worktable, saying, "This is from Jack Pixley. 111 

Thereafter, Pixley went to Albertson's work station where, 

1 There apparently was some discussion between Oliver a nd 

Pixley while they were driving to work to the effect that Pixley 

might get "into trouble" if he took the firearm onto the premises. 

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after some discussion, Albertson agreed to accept the revolver as 

down payment on the van. The revolver lay on the worktable between the two as they then negotiated the price to be assigned the 

revolver. At that time and place, Albertson and Pixley agreed to 

credit Pixley with $165 toward the $800 purchase price, whereupon 

Albertson picked up the revolver and Pixley signed a written contract to pay the remainder of the purchase price of the van. 

As indicated, Pixley testified that he never physically 

touched the revolver, and the government's evidence did not show 

any physical touching. Accordingly, counsel's argument is, as 

indicated, that since Pixley never physically touched the revolver 

he could not be guilty of "possessing" the weapon. Such, however, 

is not the law. 

For the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1 ), a defendant "possesses" a firearm if he has either actual or constructive possession of the firearm. Actual possession of a firearm occurs when 

the person has physical control over it. Constructive possession 

of a firearm occurs when a person has the power to exercise dominion and control over it. Evidence of possession, be it actual or 

constructive, may be either direct or circumstantial, or both, and 

possession may be individually or jointly with another. United 

States v. Wright, 932 F.2d 868, 881 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 

S. Ct. 428, and cert. denied, sub nom. Kirby v. United States, 112 

s. Ct. 450 (1991); and United States v . McCoy, 781 F.2d 168, 171 

(10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Zink, 612 F.2d 511, 516 {10th 

Cir. 1980). 

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We believe that the evidence when viewed in the light most 

favorable to the government shows actual possession of the revolver by Pixley, but, at the very least, the evidence clearly 

shows constructive possession. Indeed, Pixley's testimony is itself sufficient to show actual possession, as well as constructive 

possession, and that such possession occurred in the Pixley residence, in the Oliver vehicle as he and Pixley drove to work, and 

as the revolver lay on Albertson's worktable as Albertson and 

Pixley negotiated the price to be assigned the revolver. 

Judgment affirmed. 

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Entered for the Court 

Robert H. McWilliams 

Senior Circuit Judge 

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