Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03214/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03214-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Justice
Respondent
Angela D. McCurry
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ANGELA D. MCCURRY,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Respondent

______________________ 

2014-3214

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. AT-4324-13-0506-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: May 15, 2015

______________________ 

ANGELA D. MCCURRY, Stockton, AL, pro se.

MELISSA BAKER, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by JOYCE R.

BRANDA, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., STEVEN J.

GILLINGHAM. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, O’MALLEY, and WALLACH, Circuit 

Judges.

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2 MCCURRY v. DOJ

PER CURIAM.

Angela D. McCurry (“McCurry”) appeals the decision 

of the Merit System Protection Board (“Board”) denying 

her request for corrective action against the Office of the 

Solicitor General (“OSG”) for discrimination in violation of 

the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployments 

Rights Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 

(“USERRA”) (codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–33). Because 

we find that the Administrative Judge (“AJ”) did not fail 

to timely apprise McCurry of her burden of proof and did 

not err by declining to exercise jurisdiction over her nonUSERRA claims, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

McCurry is a veteran of the United States Naval Reserve, receiving an honorable discharge from service on 

July 13, 1996. She also has a Juris Doctor degree from 

Thomas M. Cooley Law School, though she is not licensed 

to practice law. McCurry applied for a position as a 

paralegal specialist with OSG under four vacancy announcements, and was one of four applicants selected to 

interview for the position. The agency chose not to select 

any of the four interviewees for the position, and instead 

re-advertised the position under a different announcement number. McCurry did not re-apply for the position 

once it was re-advertised. 

McCurry filed a complaint challenging OSG’s decision 

on August 15, 2011. In February 2013, the Office of 

Special Counsel (“OSC”) informed McCurry that it intended to take no action on her complaint and proceeded 

to close the file. On April 24, 2013, McCurry filed the 

appeal with the Board which is at issue here. McCurry 

alleged that the OSG’s decision not to select her for the 

paralegal specialist position constituted discrimination in 

violation of USERRA because the agency improperly 

considered her status as a veteran in its selection process. 

McCurry also alleged that the agency committed prohibitCase: 14-3214 Document: 27-2 Page: 2 Filed: 05/15/2015
MCCURRY v. DOJ 3

ed personnel actions by discriminating against her on the 

basis of her race and age, by passing over an applicant 

with veteran status without providing proper notice, and 

by failing to inform her in the notice of non-selection that 

no one was selected for the paralegal specialist position. 

In response to her allegations, the AJ issued an initial 

order finding that the appellant had made nonfrivolous 

allegations of jurisdiction. The AJ conducted a telephonic 

prehearing conference on February 20, 2014, during 

which the AJ instructed McCurry of her burden of proof 

under USERRA and Sheehan v. Department of Navy, 240 

F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2001), and explained to McCurry that 

the Board did not have jurisdiction over her claims of 

discrimination that were unrelated to her veteran status. 

Finally, the AJ asked the parties to outline the evidence 

and witnesses they intended to offer at the hearing the AJ 

scheduled to address McCurry’s USERRA claims. These 

notices were confirmed in a February 21, 2014 order 

summarizing the February 20 conference. The AJ then 

held a video-teleconference hearing on February 25. At 

the hearing, the parties were permitted to introduce 

evidence, testify, and question witnesses. 

The AJ issued an initial decision on March 4, 2014, 

denying McCurry’s request for corrective action under 

USERRA. McCurry v. Dep’t of Justice, No. AT-4324-13-

0506-I-1, 2014 M.S.P.B. LEXIS 1302 (March 4, 2014) 

(“Initial Decision”). The AJ detailed the testimony of 

Candy Lubin, Supervisor of the Research and Publications Unit at OSC and a member of the panel who interviewed the applicants, and William Dziwura, Acting 

Executive Director at OSC during the time of the application process. Id. at *5–15. Lubin and Dziwura testified 

that McCurry’s veteran status played no role in the 

selection process, and that the agency decided to cancel 

and relist the paralegal specialist vacancy announcement 

because the Principal Deputy Solicitor General decided to 

seek more qualified applicants from a larger applicant 

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4 MCCURRY v. DOJ

pool. Id. at *6–8. The AJ found the testimony of Lubin 

and Dziwura to be “exceedingly credible,” id. at *14, and, 

in light of McCurry’s “evasiveness” and “nonresponsive 

answers,” the AJ “seriously question[ed] [McCurry’s]

credibility.” Id. at *11. The AJ concluded that neither a

“test” given to McCurry during her interview, a sentence 

in an email from Dziwura to supervisors referring to 

McCurry as the “Vet,” nor the content of her non-selection 

notice sufficiently evidenced “that the agency harbored 

hostility or animosity towards veterans in general or the 

appellant’s status as a veteran in particular.” Id. at *15.

McCurry filed a timely petition for review of the Initial Decision with the Board. McCurry v. Dep’t of Justice, 

121 M.S.P.R. 383, at *5 (July 23, 2014) (“Final Decision”). 

McCurry argued that the AJ prejudiced her by failing to: 

(1) provide information regarding her burden of proof 

under USERRA until the February 20, 2014 telephone 

conference, (2) find discriminatory animus in the Dziwura 

email, and (3) correctly accept her proffered evidence. Id.

at *6. The Board first concluded that the AJ properly 

informed the parties of their burdens under USERRA at 

the telephone conference, and provided the parties with 

the opportunity to submit evidence and argument prior to 

the close of the record. Id. at *7–8. The Board then 

agreed with the AJ that the Dziwura email, when read in 

context, identified McCurry’s veteran status merely to 

show that the appropriate consideration would be given to 

her entitlement to a veterans preference. Id. at *9. The 

Board further determined that McCurry failed to submit 

any other evidence demonstrating that she met her initial 

burden of proof under USERRA and Sheehan. Id. at *9–

11. Finally, the Board concluded that the AJ did not 

abuse his discretion in failing to allow evidence that, 

according to McCurry, was not mentioned in a February 

21 summary of the February 20 prehearing conference. 

Id. at *11–12. The Board thus denied the petition for 

review and affirmed the Initial Decision. 

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MCCURRY v. DOJ 5

McCurry filed a timely notice of appeal with this 

Court on September 22, 2014, and we have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) (2012).

ANALYSIS

Our review of the Board’s decisions is limited by statute. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). We only set aside the Board’s 

actions, findings, or conclusions that are:

(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 

otherwise not in accordance with law;

(2) obtained without procedures required by law, 

rule, or regulation having been followed; or

(3) unsupported by substantial evidence . . . . 

Id. Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” McLaughlin v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 353 

F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

On appeal, McCurry alleges that the AJ erred by failing to provide her with a sufficient opportunity to submit 

evidence and argument in support of her USERRA claim. 

Although McCurry concedes that the AJ informed the 

parties of their respective burdens during the February 20 

telephone conference and reiterated those burdens in the

February 21 order, she argues that the AJ failed to “proffer[] [any] evidence or facts from the record to support and 

demonstrate how the administrative judge provided the 

petitioner with an opportunity to submit evidence and 

argument . . . .” Appellant Br. at 12. In particular, 

McCurry argues that, as of February 21, the applicable

discovery deadlines for submission of evidence and argument had passed, making the February 21 order “of no 

effect.” Id. at 13. McCurry also alleges that the four days 

between the date of the February 21 order and the February 25 hearing did not comply with the requirements of 5 

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6 MCCURRY v. DOJ

C.F.R. § 1201.51 (2014). McCurry further claims that the 

Board erred by concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over 

her prohibited personnel practices (i.e., non-USERRA) 

claims, arguing that 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3), 1221(a) justify 

the Board’s jurisdiction. And, finally, McCurry contends

that the Board erred by not addressing all allegations 

made in her petition for review. 

The government, in response, first notes that McCurry does not challenge the Board’s substantive determinations, merely raising procedural arguments. Regarding 

McCurry’s claim that the AJ failed to provide sufficient 

opportunity to submit evidence, the government argues 

that none of the evidence McCurry submitted as of the 

February 25 hearing was rejected as untimely—the AJ 

only rejected (as untimely) evidence McCurry attempted 

to enter after the record had been closed. The government also claims that McCurry has failed to demonstrate 

that she was prejudiced by the timing of the February 20 

instructions. The government next argues that the Board 

complied with 5 C.F.R. § 1201.51, which sets the minimum number of days between the date of the petitioner’s

receipt of a hearing notice and the eventual hearing, not 

the number of days between receipt of USERRA instructions and the hearing. The government also asserts that 

the AJ performed a thorough evaluation of the evidence 

and the Board considered all relevant objections. Finally, 

the government claims that neither 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3) 

nor 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a) would justify the Board’s jurisdiction over McCurry’s non-USERRA claims. 

We agree with Board’s disposition of McCurry’s 

claims. USERRA creates a burden-shifting framework for 

demonstrating that an employer discriminates on the 

basis of military service. Sheehan, 240 F.3d at 1012. 

Under this framework:

The procedures established by precedent require 

an employee making a USERRA claim of discrimCase: 14-3214 Document: 27-2 Page: 6 Filed: 05/15/2015
MCCURRY v. DOJ 7

ination to bear the initial burden of showing by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the employee's 

military service was “a substantial or motivating 

factor” in the adverse employment action. . . . If 

this requirement is met, the employer then has 

the opportunity to come forward with evidence to 

show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 

employer would have taken the adverse action 

anyway, for a valid reason.

Id. at 1013 (internal citations omitted). Within this 

framework, the Board has determined that: 

an administrative judge must inform an appellant 

who files a USERRA petition for remedial action, 

or raises a violation of USERRA as an affirmative 

defense, of the USERRA burden and methods of 

proof identified in Sheehan, and must provide the 

parties with an opportunity to submit evidence 

and argument to meet the USERRA burden and 

methods of proof. 

Matz v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 91 M.S.P.R. 265, ¶ 9 

(2002). 

McCurry does not dispute that the AJ provided the 

parties with instructions regarding the “burden and 

methods of proof identified in Sheehan.” Id. McCurry 

instead argues that the AJ failed to “provide the parties 

with the opportunity to submit” the necessary evidence to 

meet these burdens. Id. We agree with McCurry that the 

timing of the AJ’s notice is troublesome, at least for pro se 

petitioners such as McCurry. The AJ informed the parties of their burdens under USERRA and Sheehan during 

the February 20 prehearing conference. The AJ also

included the same instructions in the February 21 order 

detailing the topics discussed during the prehearing 

conference. Thus, notice was provided only four days

before the February 25 hearing and after discovery deadlines had passed. On the same day that the AJ informed 

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8 MCCURRY v. DOJ

McCurry of her burdens under USERRA and Sheehan, 

the AJ also appeared to require McCurry to identify all 

witnesses and exhibits she would present during the 

hearing. This rendered the substantive value of the AJ’s 

notification almost meaningless. 

Regardless of the problematic nature of the timing of 

the AJ’s notice, we nevertheless conclude that the Board 

properly upheld the AJ’s denial of McCurry’s request for 

corrective action. The AJ eventually allowed the parties 

to submit evidence and objections until the February 25

hearing, notwithstanding any deadlines in prior discovery 

orders. This curative approach somewhat mitigates any 

prejudice that transpired due to USERRA and Sheehan 

notice occurring after the close of discovery. Although the 

AJ rejected some evidence proffered by McCurry during 

the prehearing conference, the AJ rejected that evidence 

because it was duplicative with exhibits already in the 

record. The only other indication in the record that the 

AJ rejected evidence introduced by McCurry involved 

evidence received on March 3, 2014, after the AJ closed 

the record following the February 25 hearing. See 5 

C.F.R. § 1201.58 (2014) (“When there is a hearing, the 

record ordinarily will close at the conclusion of the hearing. When the judge allows the parties to submit argument, briefs, or documents previously identified for 

introduction into evidence, however, the record will remain open for as much time as the judge grants for that 

purpose.”). And the AJ determined that this evidence 

introduced post-hearing was not new and material evidence unavailable prior to the close of the record. The AJ 

thus acted within his discretion by refusing to consider 

the March 3 evidence. 

Despite the opportunity to explain both to the Board 

and this court what evidence she would have proffered or 

what discovery she would have conducted if provided with 

notice of her burdens at a more appropriate time, McCurry points to nothing demonstrating that the AJ’s lack of 

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MCCURRY v. DOJ 9

timely notice prejudiced her. This failure to demonstrate 

any prejudice is especially relevant in light of the AJ’s 

decision to keep the record open through the hearing and 

to consider her post-hearing evidentiary submissions. 

McCurry thus fails to demonstrate that either the timing 

of the February 20 instructions or the exclusion of any of 

the proposed evidence prejudiced her sufficiently to warrant remand. See Abrams v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 306 

F. App’x 602, 604–05 (Fed. Cir. 2009). We therefore hold 

that the AJ allowed McCurry to submit evidence and 

objections sufficient to meet her burden under USERRA 

and Sheehan, and that McCurry failed to demonstrate 

any prejudice due to the timing of the USERRA and 

Sheehan notice. 

We also conclude that McCurry’s reliance on 5 C.F.R. 

§ 1201.51 is inapposite. Section 1201.51(a) states that 

“[t]he hearing will be scheduled not earlier than 15 days 

after the date of the hearing notice unless the parties 

agree to an earlier date.” McCurry does not argue that 

the Board erred by setting the hearing for less than 15 

days after the date she received a hearing notice; she 

instead argues that the Board erred by having the hearing within 4 days of when she received notice of her 

burden under USERRA and Sheehan. These are two 

different notices, and 5 C.F.R. § 1201.51(a) does not 

address the timing of notice of a party’s burden under 

USERRA and Sheehan with regard to the date of the 

hearing. 

We further hold that the Board appropriately found 

that it did not have jurisdiction over McCurry’s nonUSERRA racial and age discrimination claims. McCurry 

points to 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3), 1221(a) in support of the 

Board’s jurisdiction over her claims. Section 1221(a) 

permits an employee to seek corrective action from the 

Board “as a result of a prohibited personnel practice 

described in § 2302(b)(8) or § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i).” Section 

1214(a)(3) further describes when an employee can seek 

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10 MCCURRY v. DOJ

corrective action from the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a). 

Similar to § 1221, an employee may only seek corrective 

action pursuant to § 1214(a)(3) “for a prohibited personnel practice described in § 2302(b)(8) or § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) . 

. . .” Sections 2302(b)(8) and (b)(9), however, involve

personnel actions taken in response to whistleblowing 

activities, and McCurry does not present any whistleblowing allegations. Sections 1214(a)(3) or 1221(a), therefore, 

cannot justify the Board’s jurisdiction over her nonUSERRA claims. And, as we have previously noted, “the 

Board does not have jurisdiction under USERRA to adjudicate claims unrelated to discrimination against a petitioner based on military status,” and the petitioner must 

identify a separate statutory source for the Board’s jurisdiction over the non-USERRA discrimination claims. 

Swidecki v. Dep’t of Commerce, 431 F. App’x 900, 903 

(Fed. Cir. 2011); Metzenbaum v. Dep’t of Justice, 89 

M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 15 (2001); cf. Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S.

___, 133 S. Ct. 596, 603-04 (2012) (holding that a federal 

employee who claims that an agency violated one of the 

antidiscrimination statutes listed in 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(1) 

should seek judicial review in district court, not the 

Federal Circuit, even though the action was appealable to 

the Board); Conforto v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 713 F.3d 

1111, 1119–20 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that, even in light 

of Kloeckner, the Federal Circuit retains jurisdiction over 

appeals from Board decisions dismissing a discriminatory 

conduct claim for lack of jurisdiction). 

Finally, we hold that the Board did not err by failing

to consider McCurry’s arguments made in her petition for 

review. McCurry claims that the Board “simply ignored” 

her explanations as to why the AJ’s factual determinations were incorrect on certain points. The Board, however, carefully reviewed the AJ’s analysis of the evidence 

presented. Final Decision, at *9–12. And as the Board 

correctly noted, many of the AJ’s conclusions derived from 

credibility determinations and observations of the deCase: 14-3214 Document: 27-2 Page: 10 Filed: 05/15/2015
MCCURRY v. DOJ 11

meanor of witnesses. The Board must give such determinations significant deference. Haebe v. Dep’t of Justice, 

288 F.3d 1288, 1300–01 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The Board 

therefore carefully reviewed the evidence considered by 

the AJ, including the AJ’s justifications for excluding 

some proffered evidence, and affirmed the AJ’s determination. On this basis, the Board did not err in its review

of McCurry’s petition for review. 

CONCLUSION

Because the AJ informed McCurry of her burden of 

proof under USERRA and allowed her to present evidence 

sufficient to meet that burden, and because the Board 

fully considered McCurry’s arguments made in her petition for review, we affirm the Board’s decision denying 

McCurry’s request for corrective action pursuant to 

USERRA. And because the Board correctly determined 

that its jurisdiction under USERRA did not extend to 

McCurry’s claims for discrimination on bases other than 

military status, we affirm the Board’s dismissal of

McCurry’s non-USERRA claims for want of jurisdiction.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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