Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00074/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00074-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joshua Earl Beck
Petitioner
Mike Evans
Respondent

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This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition,

and the lodged documents in support of Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSHUA EARL BECK, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

MIKE EVANS, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:06-CV-00074 AWI LJO HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. #8]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Stanislaus, following his conviction by

jury trial on February 7, 2003, of auto theft, burglary, and attempted auto theft. Petitioner was

sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of 50 years to life in state prison. 

Petitioner appealed the conviction to the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate Distirct

Case 1:06-cv-00074-AWI-LJO Document 11 Filed 06/28/06 Page 1 of 6
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U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 2

(hereinafter “5th DCA”). On April 14, 2004, the 5th DCA affirmed the conviction. Petitioner then

filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. On June 23, 2004, the California

Supreme Court summarily denied review.

On January 24, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in this

Court. The petition raises the following two claims: 1) “Use of juvenile prior adjudications to

increase the length of sentence violates principle announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey”; and 2)

“Use of juvenile prior adjudications to increase the length of a sentence violates federal equal

protection principles.”

On May 17, 2006, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as being filed outside the

one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitioner did not file an

opposition.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s

one-year limitations period. Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in procedural

standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default

and Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to

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U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 3

dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on January 24, 2006, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended,

§ 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In this case, the petition for review was denied by the California Supreme

Court on June 23, 2004. Thus, direct review concluded on September 21, 2004, when the ninety

(90) day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court expired. Barefoot v. Estelle,

463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir.1999); Smith v. Bowersox,

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U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 4

159 F.3d 345, 347 (8th Cir.1998). Petitioner had one year until September 21, 2005, absent applicable

tolling, in which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

As previously stated, the instant petition was filed in this Court on January 24, 2006.

However, the petition was dated August 24, 2005. In Houston v. Lack, the Court held that a pro se

habeas petitioner's notice of appeal is deemed filed on the date of its submission to prison authorities

for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266,

276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The Ninth Circuit has applied the rule to assess the timeliness of

federal habeas filings under the AEDPA limitations period. Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222,

(9th Cir. 2001), citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). Here, it is

presumed that Petitioner presented his habeas petition to prison authorities on August 24, 2005, the

date he signed his petition. In support of this presumption, Petitioner has provided a copy of his mail

log highlighting three mailings to the district court on September 21, 2005.

However, Respondent argues that Petitioner did not in fact submit the instant petition to

prison authorities on August 24, 2005, and that the mail log does not reflect the submission of the

instant petition. Respondent’s arguments are persuasive. First, Petitioner does not aver that he

handed his petition to prison authorities on a date prior to the actual filing date. Second, the Court

notes that the mail log submitted by Petitioner with his petition is dated November 22, 2005.

Therefore, it is impossible that the instant petition could have been submitted prior to that date, and

therefore, is not one of the mailings recorded in the mail log for the date September 21, 2005, or any

other date prior to November 22, 2005. Second, Petitioner filed two other petitions in the district

court. See Beck v. Evans, 1:05-CV-1216 OWW TAG HC; Beck v. Evans, 1:05-CV-1217 AWI

WMW HC. Those petitions were also dated August 24, 2005, yet they were filed on September 27,

2005. Those petitions are nearly verbatim to the instant petition but they did not contain the same

attachments including, for obvious reasons, the November 22, 2005, mail log. Respondent has

submitted a complete mail log for Petitioner documenting incoming and outgoing mail at Salinas

Valley State Prison from May 13, 2004, through April 4, 2006. See Lodged Document No. 5. The

outgoing mail log records only one mailing to the district court from Petitioner after November 22,

2005, and prior to the actual filing date of January 24, 2006. This occurred on January 20, 2006, four

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U.S . District Court

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days prior to the actual filing. Therefore, the Court agrees with Respondent and concludes that

Petitioner submitted his habeas petition to prison authorities on January 20, 2006. As this date is four

months after the limitations period expired, the instant petition is untimely and barred by the statute

of limitations.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court recently held the statute of limitations is tolled where a

petitioner is properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals

between one state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the

next level of the state court system. 122 S.Ct. 2134, 2135-36 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183

F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); Welch v. Newland, 267 F.3d

1013, 1016 (9th Cir.2001) (“tolled period includes intervals between the disposition of a state court

petition and the filing of a subsequent petition at the next state appellate level”); Patterson v.

Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that the "AEDPA's one-year grace period is

tolled during the pendency of properly filed state petitions challenging the judgment or claim at

issue."); cf. Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir.2001) (Court found no tolling between

consecutive filings at the same level); Lewis v. Mitchell, 173 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1061 (C.D. Cal.2001)

(holding that the interval between a motion for sentence modification in the state superior court and

a habeas petition in the superior court was not tolled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)).

In this case, Petitioner did not file any post-conviction collateral challenges with respect to

the pertinent judgment or claim in state court. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to any statutory

tolling.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) that

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department of Veteran Affairs,

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498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998), citing

Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814

(1997). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Pace, 544 U.S.

408; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th

Cir.1993). 

Petitioner does not argue that the limitations period should be equitably tolled and the Court

finds no reason to do so. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling and the petition

remains untimely. 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be

GRANTED and the habeas corpus petition be DISMISSED with prejudice for Petitioner’s failure to

comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. 

Within fifteen (15) days (plus three days if served by mail) after being served with a copy,

any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to

the objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail)

after service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 28, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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