Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03138/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03138-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Thomas Fields
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed June 12, 2001

No. 99-3138

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Thomas Fields, a/k/a Woozie,

Appellant

Consolidated with

No. 99-3139

On Appellee's Petition for Rehearing

---------

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Ginsburg and Tatel,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: In United States v. Fields, 242 F.3d

393 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Fields I"), issued on March 13, 2001,

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the sentences of defendants Thomas "Woozie" Fields and

Bernard "Tadpole" Johnson were vacated and the case was

remanded to the District Court for resentencing. The Government now petitions for rehearing, claiming that Fields I

misapplied Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), in

holding "the jury was required to find beyond a reasonable

doubt that defendants were responsible for the quantity of

drugs attributed to them for purposes of determining their

base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines." Government's Pet. for Reh'g at 1. We agree that there is some loose

language in Fields I which can be read to exceed the bounds

of the Supreme Court's holding in Apprendi. We therefore

grant the Government's petition for rehearing so that we may

clarify the court's holdings in Fields I.

* * * *

In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that, "[o]ther than

the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 490. Therefore, as we held in

Fields I, it "follows that drug quantity is an element of the

offense where a factual determination of the amount of drugs

at issue may result in a sentence that exceeds a maximum

sentence prescribed in the applicable statute." 242 F.3d at

395 (emphasis in original). Apprendi therefore applies to

sentences predicated on drug quantity where progressively

higher statutory maximums are triggered by findings of

progressively higher quantities of drugs. Id. at 396; In re

Sealed Case, No. 00-3057, 2001 WL 409116, at *2 (D.C. Cir.

Apr. 24, 2001). Thus, as noted in Fields I, in drug cases

charged under 21 U.S.C. ss 841 and 846, where the prescribed statutory maximum depends upon the amount of

drugs involved, before a defendant can be sentenced to a

higher statutory maximum, "the Government must state the

drug type and quantity in the indictment, submit the required

evidence to the jury, and prove the relevant drug quantity

beyond a reasonable doubt." 242 F.3d at 396.

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Fields I goes awry in suggesting that Apprendi also applies

to a Sentencing Guidelines enhancement that results in a

sentence within the statutory range. For example, Fields I

states that "[t]he Government was required to convince the

jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants possessed enough of a controlled substance for the District Court

to adjust the base offense level to 38," id. at 397, and that

"the issue of leadership [role] must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable

doubt." Id. at 398. These passages overstate the holding of

Apprendi. As this court recently has held, Apprendi does

not apply to sentencing findings that elevate a defendant's

sentence within the applicable statutory limits. See In re:

Sealed Case, 2001 WL 409116, at *2-*3. In other words,

Apprendi does not apply to enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines when the resulting sentence remains within

the statutory maximum. This understanding of Apprendi is

shared by our sister circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Caba,

241 F.3d 98, 101 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Jackson,

240 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Garcia,

240 F.3d 180, 182-84 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v.

Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 862-63 (3d Cir. 2000); United States

v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121

S. Ct. 1152 (2001); Talbott v. Indiana, 226 F.3d 866, 869-70

(7th Cir. 2000). Any language to the contrary in Fields I is in

error and is not the law of this circuit.

With these legal principles in mind, we will now reconsider

our application of the law to the facts in Fields I.

* * * *

The Government concedes that, under Apprendi, the District Court committed plain error in this case in imposing life

sentences on the drug conspiracy count in the absence of jury

findings as to drug quantity. The Government claims, however, that in assessing whether this constituted reversible error

under the plain error doctrine,"[t]he right question" is whether there was "overwhelming proof" that defendants' crimes

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involved 50 or more grams of cocaine base, or 1 kilogram or

more of phencyclidine ("PCP") mixture, or at least 1,000

kilograms of marijuana. Government's Pet. at 10. The

Government is right as to the amounts of drugs required by

statute to authorize a life sentence, but wrong in its claim that

the District Court relied on "overwhelming proof" that the

conspiracy involved these amounts.

As noted in Fields I, defendants Fields and Johnson were

convicted on 40 and 16 counts, respectively, including convictions for Narcotics Conspiracy (Count 1), RICO Conspiracy

(Count 3), and kidnaping, gang rape, and attempted murder

(Counts 12-18). At defendants' sentencing hearing, the District Court adopted the calculations in the Presentence Investigation Report ("PIR"), as well as the Government's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and found that

"well above" a preponderance of the evidence demonstrated

that 1,670 grams of crack cocaine, 11,388 grams of PCP, and

3,490 kilograms of marijuana were "directly attributable to

defendant Thomas Fields." United States v. Fields, Crim.

No. 98-071-01, Mem. Op. at 16 (D.D.C. Oct. 8, 1999). The

District Court also found that 1,670 grams of crack, 11,328

grams of PCP, and 2,182 kilograms of marijuana were "reasonably foreseeable and part of jointly undertaken activity by

defendant Johnson, and therefore are appropriately attributable to him." United States v. Johnson, Crim. No.

98-071-06, Mem. Op. at 8 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 1999). The life

sentences imposed on defendants were predicated on these

calculations. It is undisputed, however, that these drug

quantities were never proven to a jury beyond a reasonable

doubt; indeed, most of the asserted quantities are not based

on any concrete proof. While the jury verdict form required

specified findings that defendants distributed specific quantities of controlled substance in connection with Count 2 (Continuing Criminal Enterprise), the jury deadlocked on this

count in the case of both defendants. In short, the jury did

not make any finding at all as to the amount of drugs

involved, let alone a finding that defendants possessed, beyond a reasonable doubt, enough of a controlled substance to

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impose a life sentence under 21 U.S.C. s 841. The life

sentences therefore contravened Apprendi.

Though the District Court erred in imposing the life sentences based on drug quantity, neither defendant objected at

trial to the failure to submit drug quantity to the jury. At

sentencing, defendants objected only on the grounds that the

calculations were speculative and based on trial testimony of

various individuals who had entered into agreements with the

Government. Hence, as noted in Fields I, our review is for

plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Wolff,

195 F.3d 37, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1999). We may exercise our

discretion to correct an error pursuant to Rule 52(b) only

when an "error" is "plain" or "obvious" under current law,

affects substantial rights, and seriously affects the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997); United

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-35 (1993).

The Government argues that, although the life sentences

imposed on defendants based on drug quantities resulted in

plain error, no relief is warranted because the error did not

affect defendants' substantial rights. We disagree. The

Government maintains that the District Court correctly determined that the quantity of drugs involved exceeded the

amount required under the applicable provision of

s 841(b)(1). However, the Government has no good basis

upon which to rest such a claim. The District Court relied

heavily on the imprecise testimony of various witnesses who

were cooperating with the Government. In its petition for

rehearing, the Government once again points to this testimony as well as admissions from Fields that he "made a living

selling crack," sold or supplied marijuana to ten named

individuals, "worked selling marijuana four to five days a

week," and "had no idea how much marijuana he had sold."

Government's Pet. at 10 n.4. Apart from this vague testimonial evidence, the only other "evidence" to which the Government can point is that provided by a DEA chemist who

testified to the chemical analysis of approximately 7 grams

(i.e., .007 kilograms) of cocaine base and over twenty kilograms of marijuana that had been seized in the case. Id.

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This evidence is far from "overwhelming proof" that defendants' crimes involved the drug quantities necessary to trigger a life sentence under 21 U.S.C. s 841(b)(1)(A). And

given the gravity of the sentence and the lack of any "overwhelming" evidence to support it, we have no basis for

concluding that the error did not "seriously affect[ ] the

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469-70.

* * * *

The Government argues, in the alternative, that defendants

should not prevail under the plain error standard, because the

life sentence on the RICO conspiracy count was a "statutorily

available sentence" under Apprendi. In support of this claim,

the Government cites United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556,

577 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Parker v. United

States, 121 S. Ct. 834 (2001), amended on reh'g, 244 F.3d 367

(5th Cir. 2001), in which the court held that even if a 10-year

sentence on a marijuana count was unlawful under Apprendi,

there was no plain error warranting reversal where the

defendant was not challenging a greater 324-month concurrent sentence on another count. The decision in Meshack

was based on the court's conclusion that the defendant would

receive no meaningful benefit from having his infirm sentence

vacated, because he would not serve less time as a result of

resentencing, and no collateral consequences would flow from

the court's failure to correct the sentence. 244 F.3d at 368.

The "concurrent sentence" thesis enunciated in Meshack is

premised on the fact that, quite apart from the infirm sentence, there was an unchallenged and longer concurrent

sentence on a different count. In this case, the Government

asserts that, because the District Court could have sentenced

defendants to life based on the jury conviction for armed

kidnaping, defendants' challenges to the life sentences imposed on the drug conspiracy count do not warrant reversal

for plain error. In other words, the Government says that,

by finding defendants guilty of Racketeering Act 21, which

alleged an armed kidnaping under the D.C. Code, the jury

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found all of the facts needed to make life a statutorily

available sentence as to the RICO conspiracy count.

The problem with the Government's argument is that,

although it is true that the District Court imposed concurrent

life sentences on the RICO conspiracy count, there is no clear

finding by the trial court that it intended to impose life

sentences under RICO for Racketeering Act 21 (i.e., armed

kidnaping). Indeed, the Government does not suggest otherwise. The Government's entire argument rests on the claim

that there is a possibility of a life sentence on the RICO

conspiracy count, because of the defendants' convictions for

armed kidnaping.

The Government may be correct that life is a "statutorily

available sentence" on the RICO conspiracy count; but this is

a far cry from Meshack, which involved a concurrent sentence

based on known and uncontested grounds. In this case, we

cannot comprehend the District Court's basis for the life

sentences on the RICO conspiracy count and "[w]e will not

permit our result to be guided by idle speculation as to the

sentence that might be imposed by the district court on

remand." United States v. Jones, 235 F.3d 1231, 1238 (10th

Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Bradford, No. 99-3018,

2001 WL 363912 (8th Cir. Apr. 13, 2001). Accordingly, we

remand to afford the District Court the opportunity in the

first instance to recalculate the defendants' sentences in a

manner consistent with our decision here and in Fields I. On

remand, the Government will be free to argue to the District

Court that life sentences should be imposed on the RICO

conspiracy count premised on the defendants' convictions for

armed kidnaping.

* * * *

With respect to leadership enhancement, the Government

is correct that Fields I incorrectly holds that Apprendi

applies to enhancements based on role-in-offense findings

under the Guidelines. A finding of leadership role can raise a

defendant's offense level under the Guidelines and the resulting sentence; it cannot, however, elevate that sentence above

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the applicable statutory maximum. Indeed, the Guidelines

themselves recognize as much. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual s 5G1.1 (1998). Thus, a leadership enhancement based on a role-in-offense finding is not a "fact that

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed

statutory maximum." See, e.g., United States v. Gallego, No.

97-5293, 2001 WL 369783, at *4 (11th Cir. Apr. 13, 2001);

Caba, 241 F.3d at 101; Jackson, 240 F.3d at 1249.

* * * *

In sum, Fields I is clarified as indicated above. The case is

hereby remanded to the District Court for resentencing

consistent with this opinion.

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