Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03017/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03017-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ion Cornel Popa
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 30, 1999 Decided September 17, 1999

No. 98-3017

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Ion Cornel Popa,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cr00306-01)

Evelina J. Norwinski, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was

A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Anthony S. Barkow, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher and Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Before: Ginsburg, Sentelle, and Randolph, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: A jury convicted Ion Cornel Popa

of making anonymous phone calls with the "intent to annoy,

abuse, threaten, or harass any person," in violation of 47

U.S.C. s 223(a)(1)(C). Popa appeals, arguing that the statute

is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to his

conduct, which involved calls to the office of the United States

Attorney. Because we agree that the statute, as applied to

Popa's conduct, violates the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, we reverse his conviction on that

ground and therefore need not resolve his claim that the

statute is unconstitutionally overbroad.

I. Background

Popa is a political refugee from Romania. He has resided

in the United States since 1986. Between April 10 and May

9, 1997 he made seven telephone calls from locations in

Virginia to the office of the U.S. Attorney for the District of

Columbia, Eric Holder. In the two calls that were recorded

Popa refers to Mr. Holder as "a criminal, a negro," a "criminal with cold blood," and a "whore, born by a negro whore,

[who] became chief prosecutor of Washington, D.C." He also

claims that Holder "violated ... our rights." In the most

nearly lucid passage on the tapes, Popa says:

Eric Holder is a negro. Is a negro. Which is a criminal.

He make a violent crime against me, violating the rights

in court of the white people. [Inaudible] negro. He's

negro. Eric Holder. Criminal.

Popa was charged with violating 47 U.S.C. s 223(a)(1)(C),

which makes it a crime, punishable by a fine and up to two

years' imprisonment, to:

make[ ] a telephone call or utilize[ ] a telecommunications

device, whether or not conversation or communication

ensues, without disclosing [one's] identity and with intent

to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the

called number or who receives the communications.

Popa moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that

"this type of speech directed at a public official ... is entitled

to First Amendment protection." He argued that his derogatory references to Holder are not punishable as "fighting

words," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572

(1942), and that the court should give s 223(a)(1)(C) strict

scrutiny in determining its constitutionality, see Cohen v.

California, 403 U.S. 15, 26, 91 (1971).

The district court denied Popa's motion. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court held that the statute is constitutional on its face because it "regulates potentially expressive

conduct to serve the compelling interest of protecting people

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from often frightening and annoying telephone harassment"

and its "intent requirement ... renders it narrowly tailored

to serve this interest." The court did not respond to Popa's

claim that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to his

conduct.

Popa, whom the court found competent to stand trial,

testified that he lacked the intent required to violate

s 223(a)(1)(C) because an acquaintance with whom he was

staying had plied him with liquor, made him read Ku Klux

Klan literature, and threatened to turn him out into the street

if he refused to make the calls. The court instructed the jury

that in order to convict Popa they had to find beyond a

reasonable doubt that he "had the intent to annoy, abuse,

threaten or harass any person at the number called." The

court defined those terms as follows:

To annoy means to irritate, to bother, to make someone

angry by repeated action; to abuse means to use insulting, coarse or bad language about or to someone; to

threaten means to make an expression of one's intention

of hurting or punishing or destroying the other person;

and, fourth, to harass means to trouble, to worry or

torment.

After less than an hour of deliberation the jury found Popa

guilty. The district court sentenced him to time served,

which was nearly nine months.

II. Analysis

On appeal Popa again argues that s 223(a)(1)(C) is unconstitutional both as applied and on its face. Whether the

Government has infringed a defendant's rights under the

First Amendment is, of course, a question of law, which we

would normally review de novo. See United States v. Doe,

968 F.2d 86, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The Government agrees

that we should entertain Popa's facial challenge de novo but

claims that, because he neither argued to the district court

nor testified at trial that his speech was political in nature, we

should not reach his as applied challenge, see Henderson v.

Lujan, 964 F.2d 1179, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1992), or should review

it only for plain error, see United States v. Spriggs, 102 F.3d

1245, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In this the Government errs with

regard to both the facts and the law.

Plaintiff's pretrial motion was adequate to preserve his as

applied challenge for appeal because, even if it did "not state

explicitly the grounds upon which [it was] made," it did

"contain facts and arguments that [made] clear the basis of

[his] objections." United States v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 1292,

1294 (D.C. Cir. 1982); accord United States v. Daniels, 770

F.2d 1111, 1114-15 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bailey standard not

demanding); see also United States v. Mitchell, 951 F.2d

1291, 1297-98 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Specifically, Popa's motion

presents the relevant facts, namely, that he made comments

critical of a public official; and it sets out the legal arguments

at the base of his objection, namely, that his use of epithets

did not render his speech unprotected and that the district

court should apply strict scrutiny.

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Although the district court did not address the as applied

challenge, it denied Popa's motion in no uncertain terms.

Popa was therefore under no obligation to seek rehearing, to

raise the issue again at trial, or to request jury instructions

on the protection of political speech. See United States v.

Madoch, 149 F.3d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Although [the

defendant] failed to renew an objection [based upon Miranda] ... at the time the government introduced [her

statements] at trial, the district court's clear ruling on [her]

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motion in limine is sufficient to preserve the issue for

appeal"); United States v. Mejia-Alarcon, 995 F.2d 982, 986

(10th Cir. 1993). In addition, Popa did testify in essence, if

not in terms, that his speech was political in nature.* Accordingly, we review that claim de novo.

A. Level of Scrutiny

Popa contends his conviction was based upon "the expressive content of his speech," that is to say, that there "was no

conduct, separate from his communication, that would have

caused his conviction." Therefore, he says, we should give

strict scrutiny to the law as applied.

The Government, on the other hand, contends that

s 223(a)(1)(C) is content neutral and therefore that we should

apply intermediate scrutiny. First, because the prohibition

applies by its terms "whether or not conversation or communication ensues," the Government reasons that the statute

cannot be viewed as making punishment depend upon the

content of the defendant's speech. Second, s 223(a)(1)(C)

focuses not upon how the speech affects the listener, which

would clearly turn upon the content of that speech, but rather

upon the intent of the speaker; and the intent of the speaker,

the Government argues, is not the same as the content of his

speech even if the content may, as in this case, be evidence

from which a jury can infer the speaker's intent. In support

of its argument, the Government cites a decision of the

Second Circuit holding that a similar Connecticut statute

__________

* Popa said he called Holder to complain about an event in 1992

during which "two Afro-American police officers [were] dispatched"

in response to his call complaining that he had been "threatened by

an Afro-American." Popa said that the officers "came after me and

beat me up." (The Government itself introduced in evidence a

letter that Popa wrote to Holder while awaiting trial in which he

referred to this event and stated that whites beaten by blacks "do

not get any justice.") Popa also testified that he called Holder to

complain about the Government's actions in a pending case against

him for making threats to an employee of a bank; he claimed the

Government had "fail[ed] to give me in advance what government

witnesses are against me."

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"[c]learly ... regulates conduct, not mere speech. What is

proscribed is the making of a telephone call, with the requisite intent and in the specified manner." Gormley v. Director, Conn. State Dep't of Probation, 632 F.2d 938, 941-42

(1980) (emphasis in original).

Even if, as the Government maintains, s 223(a)(1)(C) "is a

generally-applicable regulation directed at conduct," it does

not follow that the statute is content neutral. As Popa notes,

s 223(a)(1)(C), unlike the Connecticut statute challenged in

the Second Circuit, applies only if the person makes the call

"without disclosing his identity." This at least appears to

make the prohibition depend upon the content of the call.

See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 345

(1995) (requirement that literature designed to influence voters in election contain name and address of persons responsible for documents "is a direct regulation of the content of

speech"); cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.

449, 462 (1958).

In the end, however, we need not decide whether

s 223(a)(1)(C) is content based. For accepting the Government's argument that any incidental restriction s 223(a)(1)(C)

places upon speech in a particular case is content neutral, we

would--as the Government suggests--apply intermediate

scrutiny, see Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,

652 (1994), and the statute, as applied to Popa, does not

survive even that less searching inquiry.

B. Narrow Tailoring

In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court

held that for cases in which " 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct," id. at

376, a government regulation passes intermediate scrutiny if:

[1] it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] the

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doms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of

that interest.

Id. at 377. Popa claims only that s 223(a)(1)(C) fails the

fourth part of the O'Brien test.

The Supreme Court has explained that the fourth part is

satisfied so long as the substantial government interest promoted by the regulation "would be achieved less effectively

absent the regulation." Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 662.

In O'Brien, the Court upheld a statute that prohibited the

burning of draft cards because it "perceive[d] no alternative

means that would more precisely and narrowly assure the

continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates

than a law which prohibits their wilful mutilation or destruction." 391 U.S. at 381. In Turner Broadcasting, the Court

upheld the "must-carry" law, which required cable television

systems to carry local broadcast stations on some of their

channels in order to preserve the economic viability of broadcast stations for the 40 percent of American households

without cable. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S.

180, 215-16 (1997). The cable systems argued that the law

was too broadly drawn because it permitted a few hundred

network affiliates to opt for "must-carry" treatment even

though their economic viability was not threatened. Nonetheless, the Court held that number "insufficient to render

must-carry 'substantially broader than necessary to achieve

the government's interest.' " Id. at 217.

In determining whether the incidental restriction

s 223(a)(1)(C) places upon speech "is no greater than is

essential to the furtherance of [an important governmental]

interest," we need consider only the "annoy, abuse, ... or

harass" forms of the intent element.* Popa argues that the

Government's interest in protecting individuals from annoying, abusive, and harassing phone calls would be equally well

served if the statute did not encompass "public or political

__________

* There is no evidence in the record to support a claim that Popa

made the phone calls with the intent to threaten and Popa does not

argue that the intent to threaten component needs to be drawn

more narrowly.

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discourse [intended to] 'irritate,' 'bother,' 'insult,' etc." As

Popa correctly points out:

The statute sweeps within its prohibitions telephone calls

to public officials where the caller may not want to

identify [him]self other than as a constituent and the

caller has an intent to verbally "abuse" a public official

for voting a particular way on a public bill, "annoy" him

into changing a course of public action, or "harass" him

until he addresses problems previously left unaddressed.

Recall that Popa testified he called Holder's office, among

other things, to complain about having been assaulted by

police officers and about the prosecutor's conduct of a case

against him.

The Government responds that s 223(a)(1)(C) is already

narrowly drawn because it contains a "stringent specific

intent requirement." Certainly the statute would be broader

still if it required only a general intent--if, for example, it

penalized making an anonymous phone call that had the effect

of annoying, abusing, or harassing the recipient of the call.

That s 223(a)(1)(C) is not as broad as it could be, however,

does not suggest that it is as narrow as it must be to pass

intermediate scrutiny.

The Government also argues that calls such as Popa's can

impede its undoubted interest in "operational efficiency."

United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513

U.S. 454, 473 (1995). There is, however, no evidence that

Popa's seven phone calls over the course of a month in any

discernable way impeded the efficiency of the U.S. Attorney's

office. Indeed, we can safely say the Government's interest

in efficiency "is simply not implicated on the facts before us,"

which entail the brief distraction of the clerical staff who

answered Popa's calls. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407

(1989) (if "interest asserted by the State is ... not implicated

... we need not ask whether O'Brien's test applies").

Moreover, the Government never even suggests that its

interest would be less effectively furthered by a statute

applicable only to callers who did not intend to engage in

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public or political discourse. Instead, it argues that Popa's

calls had no political content; we reject that position because

complaints about the actions of a government official were a

significant component of his calls. In the alternative, the

Government notes that "[p]olitical motivations simply do not

insulate someone from criminal liability for violating contentneutral, generally-applicable, conduct-regulating statutes."

True enough, but such statutes are still subject to intermediate scrutiny. And unlike the interests implicit in the Government's hypotheticals--which involve killing an abortionist and

giving false testimony at a criminal trial, in each case to

advance a political cause--the governmental interest at stake

here is no less effectively furthered by a statute that gives a

pass to those who intend in part to communicate a political

message.

In sum, we agree with Popa that the statute could have

been drawn more narrowly, without any loss of utility to the

Government, by excluding from its scope those who intend to

engage in public or political discourse. Indeed, the Government itself, quoting United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783

(3d Cir. 1978), describes the interest furthered by

s 223(a)(1)(C) as the "important interest 'in the protection of

innocent individuals from fear, abuse or annoyance at the

hands of persons who employ the telephone, not to communicate, but for other unjustifiable motives.' " Id. at 787. In

other words, as Popa notes, the Government's "asserted

interest is limited to protecting individuals from noncommunicative uses of the telephone," such as tying up

someone's line with a flood of calls, each of which is terminated by the caller as soon as it is answered. Punishment of

those who use the telephone to communicate a political message is obviously not "essential to the furtherance of that

interest." Hence the statute fails the fourth part of the

O'Brien test. 391 U.S. at 377.

Finally, unlike the proffered alternatives to the must-carry

law in Turner Broadcasting, the alternative to s 223(a)(1)(C)

that Popa suggests is substantially "less intrusive on a speaker's First Amendment interests." 520 U.S. at 217-18. Under the statute as written, and as the jury in this case was

instructed, no protection whatsoever is given to the political

speech of one who intends both to communicate his political

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message and to annoy his auditor--an auditor who might be

his elected representative or, as here, an Officer of the United

States appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate--from whom the speaker seeks redress.

* * *

The jury was instructed that it could convict Popa if it

found beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the "intent to

annoy, abuse, threaten or harass any person at the number

called." Because the jury delivered a general verdict, we

cannot know which intent the jury concluded Popa had when

he made the phone calls. Insofar as the intents to annoy, to

abuse, or to harass were implicated, the statute fails intermediate scrutiny as applied to Popa's conduct; insofar as the

jury may have found an intent to threaten, there is no

evidence to support the finding. We therefore vacate Popa's

conviction.

C. Overbreadth Challenge

Popa also challenges the constitutionality of s 223(a)(1)(C)

on the ground that the statute is overbroad on its face. This

he has standing to do. See Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S.

576, 581 (1989) ("The First Amendment doctrine of substantial overbreadth is an exception to the general rule that a

person to whom a statute may be constitutionally applied

cannot challenge the statute on the ground that it may be

unconstitutionally applied to others"). To prevail upon such a

challenge, however, especially in a case involving conduct as

well as speech, the overbreadth of the statute "must not only

be real, but substantial," in relation to the legitimate coverage

of the statute. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615

(1973). For the overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine" to

be applied "sparingly and only as a last resort." Id. at 613.

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not always followed

the "rule that a federal court should not extend its invalidation of a statute further than necessary to dispose of the case

before it." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491,

502 (1985); see, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,

487 n.2 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing cases in which

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the Court resolved the overbreadth challenge instead of the

as applied challenge). In Brockett the Court distinguished

between a case in which "an individual whose own speech ...

may validly be prohibited ... challenge[s] a statute on its

face" and one in which "the part[y] challenging the statute

... engage[s] in protected speech that the overbroad statute

purports to punish." 472 U.S. at 503-04. In the latter case

the Court concluded that, because there is "no want of a

proper party to challenge the statute, [and] no concern that

an attack on the statute will be unduly delayed or protected

speech discouraged," the reviewing court should declare the

statute "invalid to the extent that it reaches too far, but

otherwise [leave it] intact." Id. at 504.

In this case, as we have seen, Popa engaged in protected

speech that s 223(a)(1)(C) purports to punish. Therefore,

pursuant to Brockett, having vacated Popa's conviction because the statute is unconstitutional as applied to his conduct,

we shall not go on to inquire whether the statute is overbroad

and, if so, whether it is susceptible to a limiting construction.

See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n.24 (1982).

III. Conclusion

As applied to the conduct at issue in this case, 47 U.S.C.

s 223(a)(1)(C) violates the First Amendment. The judgment

of the district court is therefore

Reversed.

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Randolph, Circuit Judge, concurring: I do not agree with

the government that s 223(a)(1)(c) "is a generally-applicable

regulation directed at conduct." Brief for Appellee at 18. A

hang-up call could, I suppose, be characterized as conduct

only. So too perhaps calls consisting only of a grunt or a

moan. Nonetheless, in general, telephones are devices for

communicating and this statute regulates how telephones may

be used for that purpose. The acts of picking up the phone

and dialing are conduct. The act of speaking on the phone is

also a form of conduct but it still is "speech." Whether the

caller is exercising his "freedom of speech" depends on what

he says and why. A blackmail attempt, a bomb threat, a

fraudulent promise, a kidnapper's demands--all are communications, but none are protected by the First Amendment.

Partly this is because of history; partly it is because of the

consequences of such communications. To characterize anonymous telephone calls intended to annoy or harass as "conduct" rather than speech is to confuse the analysis.

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