Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cr-00096/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cr-00096-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Johnson
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION RE SENTENCING 

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

DENNIS LEWIS

Special Assistant U.S. Attorney

KIMBERLY A. SANCHEZ

Assistant United States Attorney

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401

Fresno, California 93721

Telephone: (559) 497-4000

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JAMES JOHNSON, 

Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:19-CR-231-NONE-SKO

 1:15-CR-96-NONE-SKO

STIPULATION TO CONTINUE

This case is set for status conference on March 30, 2020. On March 17, 2020, this Court issued 

General Order 611, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California scheduled to 

commence before May 1, 2020. This General Order was entered to address public health concerns 

related to COVID-19. 

Although the General Order addresses the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id.

at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

or in writing”).

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Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—the General Order requires specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances 

are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of 

justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a 

speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets 

forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice 

served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in 

a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Order excludes delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”

STIPULATION

Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, the United States 

Attorney for the Eastern District of California, and defendant, JAMES JOHNSON, by and through his 

counsel, hereby agree and stipulate to continue the sentencing hearing in this matter, which is currently 

set for March 30, 2020, until May 18, 2020. In support thereof, the parties stipulate that:

1. The Defendant, JAMES JOHNSON, is detained at the Fresno County jail. The government 

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has provided additional discovery and discussed a possible plea agreement with the 

defendant. Defense counsel has also made an additional discovery request and the parties 

are engaged in discussions as to how that may be fulfilled. That request also requires 

additional investigation/review to accomplish. 

2. As a consequence, the parties agree that agree that a continuance until May 18, 2020, at 

1:00pm is warranted. The parties expect that during that period the defense will have the 

opportunity to finalize discussions with the government concerning discovery and the plea 

agreement, and then discuss the same with the defendant. If the case is resolved in the 

intervening period, the parties will file a stipulation to vacate the status hearing and set a 

change of plea hearing. 

3. The parties stipulate that the period of time from March 30, 2020, through May 18, 2020, is 

deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) 

because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants’ request on the basis 

of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best 

interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: March 27, 2020

By:

MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ KIMBERLY A. SANCHEZ

KIMBERLY A. SANCHEZ

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: March 27, 2020 /s/ Jon Meyer____ 

JON MEYER

Attorney for Defendant

JAMES JOHNSON

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4 STIPULATION RE SENTENCING 

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O R D E R

IT IS ORDERED that the status hearing set for March 30, 2020, at 1 pm is continued until May 

18, 2020, at 1pm. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the period of time from March 30, 2020, through May 18, 

2020, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) 

because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants’ request on the basis of the 

Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the 

public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 27, 2020 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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