Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01061/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01061-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Jose M. Ojeda
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE M. OJEDA, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner )

of Social Security, )

)

)

Defendant. )

 )

1:09cv01061 DLB

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S

SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jose M. Ojeda (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his applications for disability

insurance benefits and supplemental security income pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social

Security Act. The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were

submitted, without oral argument, to the Honorable Dennis L. Beck, United States Magistrate

Judge.

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS1

Plaintiff filed his application on January 3, 2005, alleging disability since August 8, 2004,

due to pain resulting from disorders of the spine. AR 16, 64, 65. After Plaintiff’s applications

References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate page

1

number.

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were denied initially and on reconsideration, he requested a hearing before an Administrative

Law Judge (“ALJ”). AR 42, 66-70, 74-78. On May 29, 2007, ALJ Stephen W. Webster held a

hearing. AR 47. He denied benefits on July 14, 2007. AR 10-23. The Appeals Council denied

review on April 23, 2009. AR 4-6. 

Hearing Testimony

On May 29, 2007, ALJ Webster held a hearing in Fresno, California. Plaintiff appeared

with his attorney, Rosemary Abarca. Vocational expert (“VE”) Tom Dachelet also appeared and

testified. An interpreter assisted during the hearing. AR 47.

Plaintiff testified that he was born in 1960 and lives with his wife and three children. AR

50-51. Plaintiff has a driver’s license and does not limit his driving, though he gets fatigued

when he drives a lot. His children also take him to where he needs to go. Plaintiff is able to care

for his personal needs though his wife does the cooking, cleaning and laundry and his children do

the dishes and work in the yard. AR 51-52. Plaintiff completed the fourth grade in Mexico and

cannot read or write in English. He can speak very little English. AR 53. 

Plaintiff watches television for an hour or two per day. He does not read because his

eyesight is poor due to his diabetes. AR 52. He visits friends and family and is able to attend

church. AR 53. 

Plaintiff testified that he has not worked since August 8, 2004. He has problems with

diabetes and an injury to his neck and back. Medication and a chiropractor help relieve the pain

in his neck, back and lower back “a little.” He had problems sitting and has to stand up when he

becomes numb. Plaintiff estimated that he could sit for about 15 to 20 minutes and could stand

for about 10 to 15 minutes. He can walk for a block or two. He thought the heaviest thing he

could lift was “a chair like this or something.” AR 53-55

Plaintiff testified that surgery has been recommended for his back. He has tried injections

in his neck and back but they did not help. Plaintiff tried to pick up a gallon of milk one week

ago and it caused him pain. He also has a condition called “drop foot” in both of his feet. The

toes on his right foot go numb. This affects his ability to walk because he doesn’t have good

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balance and it also affects his ability to stand because his lower back and feet get numb. AR 56-58.

Plaintiff did not believe that he could return to his prior job as a farm worker because he

has a lot of pain in his back and neck. His medications also make his stomach upset. AR 58.

For the first hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to assume a person of Plaintiff’s age,

education and experience. This person could lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds

frequently, and sit, stand and walk for six hours. This person would be precluded from overhead

reaching. The VE testified that this person could not perform Plaintiff’s past work but could

perform the positions of bagger, garment sorter and grader. AR 59-60.

For the second hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to assume that this person could lift 10

pounds on occasion and sit and stand at will. The VE testified that this person could perform a

reduced number of sedentary positions. AR 61.

The ALJ asked a third hypothetical, although the transcript states that the related

testimony is “inaudible.” AR 62. 

Medical Record

On August 9, 2004, Plaintiff was in a motor vehicle accident. When he arrived at the

emergency room, he complained of neck and low back pain. A lumbar spine x-ray revealed

minimal anterior wedging of L1 and a thoracic spine x-ray showed mild to moderate compression

deformity and anterior wedging of T11 associated with degenerative changes of T11/T12. AR

142. He was discharged later that night with diagnoses of hyperglycemia, cervical strain and left

flank contusion. Plaintiff was given a prescription for Vicodin and ordered to follow-up with his

physician for possible diabetes. AR 128-150.

An August 27, 2004, MRI of Plaintiff’s cervical spine showed right posterior focal

protrusion of the C6-7 disc with associated mild distortion of cord shape, bilateral foraminal

stenosis and mild circumferential bulging of discs C3-4, C4-5 and C5-6. AR 167-168

On December 8, 2004, Plaintiff was seen by Arturo Palencia, M.D, at Advanced Spine

Care & Pain Management. He complained of constant neck pain, worse on the left side, constant

left arm pain and constant back pain. He also complained of left leg pain and numbness. On

examination, Plaintiff appeared in moderate distress. Range of motion testing in his neck

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produced pain. He could stand and walk on his heels and toes. Range of motion testing in his

back produced pain and he had tenderness to palpation in his lumber spine. Compression test on

the bilateral wrists was positive in the left wrist consistent with carpal tunnel syndrome and he

had diminished sensation to pinwheel, bilateral C6 and C7 dermatomes. Range of motion in his

shoulders was within normal limits though he had obvious discomfort in the left shoulder. 

Lower extremity strength was 4/5 with mild low back pain and he had decreased sensation to

pinwheel on the right S1 dermatome and left L5 dermatome. Straight leg raising produced mild

to severe low back pain. Dr. Palencia diagnosed mechanical low back pain, mechanical neck

pain, left sacroiliitis, rule out various causes, myofacial pain syndrome, left upper extremity

radiculopathy, left chest wall pain, rule out rib fracture. He recommended an MRI and started

Plaintiff on muscle relaxants and pain medication. AR 151-154. 

On December 17, 2004, Plaintiff began treating with Alan P. Moelleken, M.D. Plaintiff

reported his pain level in his neck, left arm, back and both legs as an 8 out of 10. On

examination, Plaintiff’s gait was normal and he could heel and toe walk. He had diffuse

tenderness in his cervical spine and limited range of motion. He also had diffuse lumbosacral

tenderness and limited range of motion. Plaintiff had diminished sensation at left C5, C6, C7,

C8, L3, L4 and L5-S1. Plaintiff was hyperreflexic in his upper and lower extremities. Dr.

Moelleken reviewed the August 27, 2004, MRI and opined that the disc protrusion distorts his

spinal cord. He diagnosed cervical radiculopathy, cervical spinal cord compression, herniated

cervical diss and lumbar problems consistent with traumatic disc herniation. Dr. Moelleken

recommended an MRI and EMG/NCS studies of his upper and lower extremities. He also

directed Plaintiff to continue his conservative care with Dr. Palencia. AR 188-190.

A December 29, 2004, MRI of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine showed L5-S1 mild bilateral

lateral recess, left foraminal stenosis secondary to broad-based central annular bulge and

moderate facet arthropathy. It also showed mild to moderate bilateral facet arthropathy, L1-2

through L4-5 levels. AR 187. 

On January 10, 2005, Plaintiff saw Bradford Anderson, M.D., with complaints of

constant neck, low back and left arm pain. Plaintiff rated his pain as an 8 out of 10 and felt that it

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was rapidly worsening. Plaintiff was in mild distress. He had limited range of motion in his

neck and tenderness at the cervical paraspinal muscles on the right and the levator scapula

muscle and trapezius on the left. Plaintiff showed slight weakness on the left side compared to

the right. Dr. Anderson diagnosed degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine,

myofacial neck pain, lumbar facet arthritis and cervical foraminal stenosis. AR 170. 

Plaintiff returned to Dr. Moelleken on March 18, 2005. He reported that his neck, back,

arm and leg pain were worse and that the pain was severely affecting his quality of life. On

examination, Plaintiff had a somewhat more limited cervical and lumbar range of motion. His

examination was otherwise unchanged. Dr. Moelleken reviewed the EMG and noted that it was

abnormal and suggested a C6 and/or C7 radiculopathy on the left primarily and an S1

radiculopathy on the left. It also suggested bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. The MRI revealed

evidence of an L5-S1 annular disruption along with other pathology. Plaintiff was interested in

cervical epidural injections . AR 186. 

On April 4, 2005, Plaintiff underwent an Independent Medical Evaluation performed by

Brian Grossman, M.D. Plaintiff explained that he was on his way to work when he was involved

in a motor vehicle accident in August 2004. He reported that the pain in his low back was

moderate to severe and constant. The pain radiates down both legs and causes numbness and

tingling in his back. He also complained of pain in his neck and bilateral upper extremities. 

Plaintiff was in no acute distress. Range of motion testing in the cervical spine was full, though

he complained of pain at the limits of range of motion in all planes. Motor strength was 5/5 in

the upper extremities, with subjective loss of light touch sensation in a circumferential

distribution in the entire left arm. Head compression test resulted in radiating left arm pain and

numbness in the midline, as well as right and left posterolateral positions. Plaintiff’s gait

revealed a very noticeable left drop foot. He could heel and toe walk, but on left heel walking, he

appeared to be able to lift the forefoot only 1-2 cm off the floor. Range of motion testing in his

lumbar spine was normal, though he complained of pain. Motor strength testing in the lower

extremities was 5/5 with subjective decreased light touch sensation in a circumferential

distribution from the groin to the toes of both legs, more severe on the left than the right. 

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Straight leg raising was positive for back and radiating leg pain bilaterally at 60 degrees. Hip

range of motion was full but caused low back pain. Faber test caused increased low back pain

bilaterally. There was tenderness throughout his lumbar spine. AR 172-175.

Dr. Grossman diagnosed cervical strain, disc protrusion, C6-7, with stenosis, lumbar

strain, degenerative disc, L5-S1, with small central disc protrusion and annular tear with left

foraminal stenosis. Dr. Grossman noted that it is difficult to accurately assess the degree to

which the MRI findings are the cause of his symptoms because his examination reveals findings

that suggest that he is magnifying his symptoms and level of disability. Dr. Grossman opined

that Plaintiff could return to work with restrictions that would preclude lifting greater than 35

pounds, any more than occasional bending and stooping, and prolonged work overhead or work

requiring extreme or repetitive cervical range of motion. AR 176-179.

On April 11, 2005, State Agency physician John T. Bonner, M.D., completed a Physical

Residual Functional Capacity Assessment form. Dr. Bonner opined that Plaintiff could lift 20

pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, stand and/or walk about six hours and sit for about

six hours. Plaintiff could not perform left arm or leg forceful pushing or pulling or use hand or

foot controls. He could frequently climb ramps or stairs but could never climb ladders, ropes or

scaffolding. Plaintiff could frequently balance and kneel and could occasionally stoop, crouch

and crawl. Plaintiff could never perform overhead work with his left upper extremity and could

frequently handle, finger and feel with his left upper extremity. Plaintiff had to avoid

concentrated exposure to uneven terrain, heights and fast-moving equipment. AR 201-209. This

opinion was affirmed on August 5, 2005. AR 209. 

Plaintiff underwent his first epidural injection on April 19, 2005. He reported that it

decreased the pain initially. AR 184. 

Plaintiff returned to Dr. Moelleken on May 17, 2005. Plaintiff continued to complain of

neck and back pain. He had decreased sensation at left C5-C8 and left L3-S1. Straight leg

raising was positive for low back pain. Dr. Moelleken wanted to proceed with a second cervical

injection as the first helped decrease the pain. He also wanted to continue conservative treatment

and medication. Both Dr. Moelleken and Plaintiff wanted to avoid surgical options. AR 183. 

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On September 9, 2005, Plaintiff was seen at National Health Services, Inc., and

complained of neck and low back pain. He reported that the two injections did not provide any

remarkable relief and he rated his pain as a 7 out of 10. On examination, he had decreased range

of motion, tenderness, spasms, and restriction of segments C7-T2, T4-T6 and L1 and L2. 

Straight leg raising was positive bilaterally. Plaintiff was diagnosed with disc disease, segmental

dysfunction and radiculopathy. AR 235.

Plaintiff continued to complain of back and neck pain from September 15, 2005, through

June 12, 2006. AR 291-310.

Plaintiff also received treatment from National Health Services, Inc., for his hypertension

and diabetes. AR 214-255. Treatment notes dated April 26, 2007, indicate that Plaintiff’s

diabetes and hypertension were well controlled. AR 214. 

ALJ’s Findings

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of diabetes mellitus and a

history of motor vehicle accident with residual neck and back pain. AR 18. Despite these

impairments, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to

perform light work that precludes lifting and carrying more than 20 pounds occasionally, 10

pounds frequently, standing, walking or sitting for more than six hours and overhead lifting. AR

19-20. Based on the testimony of the VE, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform a

significant number of jobs in the national economy and was therefore not disabled. AR 22-23.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision

to deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations,

the Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial

evidence. 42 U.S.C. 405 (g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,”

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v.

Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at

401. The record as a whole must be considered, weighing both the evidence that supports and

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the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993,

995 (9th Cir. 1985). In weighing the evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must

apply the proper legal standards. E.g., Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). 

This Court must uphold the Commissioner’s determination that the claimant is not disabled if the

Secretary applied the proper legal standards, and if the Commissioner’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

 REVIEW

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that he is unable to engage in

substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42

U.S.C. § 1382c (a)(3)(A). A claimant must show that he has a physical or mental impairment of

such severity that he is not only unable to do her previous work, but cannot, considering his age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which

exists in the national economy. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The burden is on the claimant to establish disability. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th

Cir. 1990).

In an effort to achieve uniformity of decisions, the Commissioner has promulgated

regulations which contain, inter alia, a five-step sequential disability evaluation process. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)-(f), 416.920 (a)-(f) (1994). Applying this process in this case, the ALJ

found that Plaintiff: (1) had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of

his disability; (2) has an impairment or a combination of impairments that is considered “severe” 

(diabetes mellitus and a history of motor vehicle accident with residual neck and back pain)

based on the requirements in the Regulations (20 CFR §§ 416.920(b)); (3) does not have an

impairment or combination of impairments which meets or equals one of the impairments set

forth in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4; (4) cannot perform his past relevant work; but

can (5) perform a substantial number of jobs in the national economy. AR 18-23. 

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Here, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to (1) properly assess his neck and upper

extremity limitations; and (2) properly assess his testimony. 

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Neck and Upper Extremity Limitations

Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ improperly analyzed the opinions of Dr. Grossman

and Dr. Bonner in formulating his RFC. Specifically, he contends that the ALJ “parceled out

those portions of Dr. Grossman and Dr. Bonner’s opinion to fit his conclusions...” Opening

Brief, at 10.

RFC is an assessment of an individual’s ability to do sustained work-related physical and

mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis of 8 hours a day, for 5 days a

week, or equivalent work schedule. SSR 96-8p. The RFC assessment considers only functional

limitations and restrictions which result from an individual’s medically determinable impairment

or combination of impairments. SSR 96-8p. “In determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must

consider all relevant evidence in the record including, inter alia, medical records, lay evidence,

and ‘the effects of symptoms, including pain, that are reasonably attributed to a medically

determinable impairment.’ ” Robbins v. Social Security Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th

Cir.2006). An ALJ may rely upon the state agency physician’s findings as to claimant’s ability. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(c), 404.1527(f)(2)(i), 416.913(c), 416.927(f)(2)(i).

Here, the ALJ cited the opinions of both Dr. Grossman and Dr. Bonner in assessing

Plaintiff’s RFC. AR 21. He explained:

An orthopedic surgeon examined the claimant and determined he could return to

work with a limitation of lifting no more than 35 pounds and with no limitations assigned

to his abilities to perform sitting, standing or walking (Exhibit 4F, p. 7). The opinion of

the orthopedic surgeon indicates that claimant is limited to a range of medium work

activity. The state agency medical consultant determined that claimant was limited to a

range of light work activity that accommodated his neck pain by limiting his use of his

left upper extremity for reaching overhead (Exhibit 6F, pp. 2-8).

The claimant has provided no objective medical evidence or objective medical

opinion to rebut the opinion of the orthopedic surgeon or the state agency medical

consultant. A limitation to light work activity as a prophylactic measure would help

avoid the possibility of further strain or injury to the claimant and would likely enhance

his ability to perform work activity on a consistent and ongoing basis. 

AR 21.

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With regard to Dr. Grossman, Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ “mistook ‘independent

medical examiner’ to be an agreed medical examiner.” Opening Brief, at 10. He contends that

Dr. Grossman was a defense medical examiner in Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation action and

that his opinion “should be read in that light.” Opening Brief, at 10. Despite the labeling of the

report as an “Independent Medical Evaluation,” Plaintiff contends that it was a defense

examination because the report is directed to State Farm with no copies to other parties. 

Regardless of whether Dr. Grossman was a defense examiner or an agreed medical examiner, the

ALJ is not required to treat the examination and opinion differently based solely on that

distinction. Plaintiff cites Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv. to support his

argument that the ALJ has a duty to properly educate himself of the worker’s compensation

arena. Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv. , 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). That

case, however, dealt with an ALJ who incorrectly applied worker’s compensation terminology to

the Social Security analysis. It does not impose a classification of examining physicians based

on the nature of the worker’s compensation examination. In fact, the Ninth Circuit has

specifically rejected this position. See Batson v. Comm’r, 359 F.3d 1190, 1196, n. 5 (9th Cir.

2004) (rejecting Plaintiff’s contention that a doctor hired by a workers’ compensation insurance

company was biased “because we have held ‘the purpose for which medical reports are obtained

does not provide a legitimate basis for rejecting them.’ Lester, 81 F.3d at 830.”).

Plaintiff next argues that Dr. Grossman’s report does not support the RFC finding

because the ALJ did not address or account for Dr. Grossman’s limitation that precludes work

requiring extreme or repetitive cervical range of motion. Defendant contends that the ALJ’s RFC

finding that Plaintiff was precluded from performing overhead reaching accounts for Dr.

Grossman’s cervical range of motion limitations. The Court does not agree that a limitation to

overhead reaching with the upper extremities necessarily accounts for limitations in cervical

range of motion. Indeed, although Dr. Bonner attributes the overhead reaching limitation in part

to decreased neck range of motion, Dr. Grossman found pain in the limits of cervical range of

motion “in all planes.” AR 174, 204.

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Nonetheless, an ALJ may reject the uncontroverted opinion of an examining physician if

he provides “clear and convincing” reasons. Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir.1990);

Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir.1984). And like the opinion of a treating doctor, the

opinion of an examining doctor, even if contradicted by another doctor, can only be rejected for

specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Andrews

v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir.1995). 

Here, however, the ALJ did not explain why he rejected Dr. Grossman’s cervical range of

motion limitations. In fact, the ALJ didn’t even mention Dr. Grossman’s cervical range of

motion limitations. Instead, he describes his limitations as “lifting no more than 35 pounds and

with no limitations placed on siting, standing or walking.” AR 21. Although the ALJ need not

discuss all evidence in the record, the ALJ may not reject significant probative evidence without

explaining why. Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir.1984). 

Similarly, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to explain why he did not include certain

aspects of Dr. Bonner’s opinion in the RFC analysis. Dr. Bonner precluded Plaintiff from

performing left arm or leg forceful pushing or pulling or using hand or foot controls. AR 202. 

The ALJ again failed to mention these limitations and failed to explain why he rejected them. 

The ALJ’s failure to address why he dismissed certain aspects of Dr. Grossman and Dr.

Bonner’s opinions is especially problematic given the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could perform

light work. Light work is defined as:

Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or

carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very

little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or

when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg

controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you

must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light

work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional

limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) (emphasis added).

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The VE was not presented with any hypothetical that contemplated a preclusion from

pushing or pulling arm or leg controls.2

The ALJ’s treatment of the medical evidence in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC was

therefore not supported by substantial evidence and was not free of legal error. Remand will be

discussed at the end of this opinion.

B. Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly assess his testimony. 

In Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit summarized the

pertinent standards for evaluating the sufficiency of an ALJ’s reasoning in rejecting a claimant’s

subjective complaints:

An ALJ is not “required to believe every allegation of disabling pain” or other

non-exertional impairment. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir.1989). 

However, to discredit a claimant’s testimony when a medical impairment has been

established, the ALJ must provide “‘specific, cogent reasons for the disbelief.’” Morgan,

169 F.3d at 599 (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 834). The ALJ must “cit[e] the reasons why

the [claimant's] testimony is unpersuasive.” Id. Where, as here, the ALJ did not find

“affirmative evidence” that the claimant was a malingerer, those “reasons for rejecting the

claimant’s testimony must be clear and convincing.” Id.

Social Security Administration rulings specify the proper bases for rejection of a

claimant’s testimony. . . An ALJ’s decision to reject a claimant’s testimony cannot be

supported by reasons that do not comport with the agency’s rules. See 67 Fed.Reg. at

57860 (“Although Social Security Rulings do not have the same force and effect as the

statute or regulations, they are binding on all components of the Social Security

Administration, ... and are to be relied upon as precedents in adjudicating cases.”); see

Daniels v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 1129, 1131 (10th Cir.1998) (concluding that ALJ’s decision at

step three of the disability determination was contrary to agency regulations and rulings

and therefore warranted remand). Factors that an ALJ may consider in weighing a

claimant’s credibility include reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies in testimony or

between testimony and conduct, daily activities, and “unexplained, or inadequately

explained, failure to seek treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment.” Fair,

885 F.2d at 603; see also Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59.

Here, the ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s testimony to the extent it conflicted with his RFC

finding, explaining:

The claimant’s allegations about his limitations are inconsistent with the objective

medical opinions in the record and he has provided no objective medical evidence or

objective medical opinion to rebut those opinions. The claimant’s allegations about his

As noted in the section setting forth Plaintiff’s testimony, the third hypothetical was not transcribed.

2

Given the fact that the ALJ wholly failed to recognize Dr. Bonner’s pushing and pulling limitations, it is unlikely that

he propounded a hypothetical to the VE with such limitations.

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limitations are unreasonably extreme in light of the objective medical opinions in the

record and the visualized abnormalities in the MRI scans in the record. 

AR 21.

The ALJ therefore rejects Plaintiff’s testimony based on (1) the opinions of Dr. Grossman

and Dr. Bonner as to Plaintiff’s functional limitations; and (2) the objective medical evidence. 

The ALJ’s credibility analysis is improper. First, the ALJ erred in citing the opinions of

Dr. Grossman and Dr. Bonner. Differences of opinion, while relevant to the RFC finding, are not

a proper basis for rejecting a claimant’s testimony. Such differences are not contemplated by

SSR 96-7p or case law as proper factors in discrediting a claimant’s testimony. Certainly, in

almost all claims that reach the hearing level, there will be opinion evidence that contradicts the

claimant’s description of his abilities, and allowing an ALJ to cite opinion evidence would result

in the rejection of virtually all subjective testimony. 

This leaves the ALJ’s citation to the lack of objective medical evidence. While the ALJ

may consider objective evidence, it may not be the sole factor in discrediting a claimant’s

testimony. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Bunnel v. Sullivan, 947

F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir. 1991) (“If an adjudicator could reject a claim for disability simply

because claimant fails to produce medical evidence supporting the severity of the pain there

would be no reason for an adjudicator to consider anything other than medical findings.”)

Insofar as Defendant points to the ALJ’s finding that the record contained no evidence of

certain symptoms, this does not save the ALJ’s credibility analysis. The ALJ’s reference to a

lack of nerve root compression, etc., was made at the step 3 determination of whether Plaintiff’s

back impairment met or medically equaled section 1.04 of the Listing of Impairments. AR 19. 

The Court may not accept post hoc explanations, Barbato v. Comm’r, 923 F.Supp. 1273, 1276, n.

2 (C.D.Cal. 1996), and it may not speculate as to the ALJ’s findings, Lewin v. Schweiker, 654

F.2d 631, 634-35 (9th Cir. 1981). A reviewing court cannot affirm an ALJ’s decision denying

benefits on a ground not invoked by the Commissioner. Stout v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1054

(9th Cir. 2006).

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Therefore, the ALJ’s credibility analysis is not supported by substantial evidence and is

not free of legal error. 

C. Remand

Section 405(g) of Title 42 of the United States Code provides: “the court shall have the

power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying,

or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.”

In social security cases, the decision to remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings or

simply to award benefits is within the discretion of the court. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d

599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). “If additional proceedings can remedy defects in the original

administrative proceedings, a social security case should be remanded. Where, however, a

rehearing would simply delay receipt of benefits, reversal and an award of benefits is

appropriate.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Varney v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv., 859

F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir.1988) (“Generally, we direct the award of benefits in cases where no

useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings, or where the record has

been thoroughly developed.”). 

Here, the Court finds that additional proceedings can remedy the deficiencies cited above

and the action should therefore be remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the ALJ should

address all limitations set forth by Dr. Grossman and Dr. Bonner and conduct a proper credibility

analysis.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by

substantial evidence and is not free of legal error. The decision is therefore REVERSED and the

case is REMANDED to the ALJ for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Clerk

of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff Jose M. Ojeda and against

Defendant Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 22, 2010 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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