Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03010/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03010-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Davon M. Harrison
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 29, 1999 Decided February 22, 2000

No. 99-3010

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Davon M. Harrison,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00216-01)

Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Tony W. Miles, Assistant

Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Florence Pan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A. Lewis,

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U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman and

Darrell Valdez, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Williams, Sentelle and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: Appellant Davon M. Harrison

was convicted in a jury trial in the district court for unlawful

possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 922(g). He

appeals the denial of his motion for a directed verdict for

insufficiency of the evidence on two necessary elements of the

offense. Harrison stipulated to the two elements, but the

stipulations were not formally read to the jury. The prosecution offered no other evidence on those elements. We hold

that Harrison, by stipulating, waived his right to require the

government to introduce evidence on the stipulated elements.

We therefore affirm the conviction.

I. Background

At approximately 9:45 a.m. on May 25, 1998, Metropolitan

Police Department Officer Raymond Adams heard gunshots

coming from the direction of the 300 block of K Street, S.E.

He began to canvas the area, and drove by Davon Harrison

who was proceeding down the street in his wheelchair. Unsuccessful in his search, Officer Adams then returned to

Harrison and asked Harrison if he had a gun. He replied in

the affirmative. In his lap was a newspaper, which Adams

placed on the ground and unwrapped to find a .38 Colt

containing four empty shell casings and two live rounds.

Harrison was charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. s 922(g),

which prohibits anyone who has been convicted of a crime

punishable by a sentence exceeding one year from possessing

a firearm that has been transported in interstate commerce.1

__________

1 18 U.S.C. s 922(g) provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person ... who has been convicted

in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year ... to ... possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition....

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Before trial, the district court ordered the parties to submit

a joint pretrial statement including stipulations. The parties

filed a statement with the court which included stipulations of

two necessary elements of a s 922(g)(1) charge: (1) that the

firearm had been transported in interstate commerce and (2)

that the defendant had been convicted of a prior offense

punishable by a sentence of more than one year.

The exact language of the stipulations was:

IV. Stipulations

Stipulation as to Firearm; Movement in Interstate Commerce:

The parties agree that the pistol recovered in this case

was a firearm; that the firearm was shipped or moved in

interstate commerce.

Stipulation as to Prior Convictions ...

The parties agree that the defendant was previously

convicted for an offense carrying a potential penalty of

more than one year in case F-7372-95, in the District of

Columbia.

Following the stipulations was a list of a Harrison's prior

convictions.

Government counsel referred to the stipulations in his

opening statement:

[I]n this case the defense counsel and I have stipulated

that this gun did move through interstate commerce

because handguns are not manufactured in the District

of Columbia, and there is only one way that it could come

in the District, by crossing state lines. We've also

stipulated that Mr. Harrison has been convicted [of an

offense] carrying the possible punishment of over a year

in prison. So, what I have to prove to you is that Mr.

Harrison possessed the gun or the ammunition.

No objections were made to the opening statement. Defense

counsel's opening statement described "a case where Mr.

Harrison is being charged with a gun that he did not possess,

it was a gun that was not his."

As forecast, the trial focused on whether Harrison was in

possession of a firearm. The two stipulations were never

read to the jury, nor did the prosecution introduce any other

evidence regarding the stipulated evidence. Before closing

arguments, Harrison moved for a judgment of acquittal based

on the entire record, which was denied. When the prosecution referred to the stipulations during closing arguments,

defense counsel objected. At a subsequent bench conference,

defense counsel argued that the stipulations, never having

been introduced, could not provide proof of the elements,

although he admitted that the parties had agreed to the

stipulations. He claimed he had not raised the issue earlier

because he hoped to modify the language of the interstate

commerce stipulation to include the fact that guns are not

manufactured in the District of Columbia. The trial judge

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stated that the failure to raise this issue earlier could be

considered a waiver, and ultimately denied defense counsel's

motion for a directed verdict.

During jury instructions, the judge referred to the stipulation that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce:

During the trial you were told that the parties had

stipulated, this is had agreed to certain facts, namely that

the gun had travelled in interstate commerce. Any

stipulation of fact is undisputed evidence and you may

consider it undisputed evidence.

....

The parties have stipulated that the firearm which the

defendant allegedly possessed has travelled or been

transported in interstate commerce.

The judge did not give a similar instruction about the prior

conviction stipulation, but referenced the conviction by cautioning the jury that it "is just being presented to you as an

element of the crime. You are not to consider the fact that

the defendant had been convicted of an offense punishable by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year in any other

way.... [Y]ou're not to take any unfavorable impression of

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the defendant from the fact that this element of the crime is

here."

The jury found Harrison guilty. Harrison appeals, asserting that as a result of the prosecution's failure to read the

stipulations, there was insufficient evidence on the interstate

commerce and prior conviction elements to support the verdict of guilty and that his conviction must be reversed.

II. Discussion

A. Issue

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine as a matter of law whether "any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979); see also United States v. Harrington, 108 F.3d 1460,

1464 (D.C. Cir. 1997). At first, it might appear that the

standard of review could resolve this case: because the

stipulations were never formally read to the jury, they were

never in evidence (although the jury was aware of them);

there was no other evidence on the stipulated elements and

the jury could not have found them beyond a reasonable

doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Spinner, 152 F.3d 950, 956

(D.C. Cir. 1998). Our real inquiry, however, is whether,

considering the nature and purpose of the stipulations in this

case, Harrison should be able to challenge now the insufficiency of the evidence covered by those stipulations.

The government in this appeal presents two primary theories to support the validity of the verdict, in spite of its failure

to formally read the stipulations to the jury or introduce

other evidence. The first we can call the "deemed admitted"

theory. We have held that a technical failure to introduce

evidence that was presented to the trier of fact can be

overlooked in some cases. See, e.g., United States v. Barrett,

111 F.3d 947, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing United States v.

Bizanowicz, 745 F.2d 120, 123 (1st Cir. 1984), and United

States v. Stapleton, 494 F.2d 1269, 1270 (9th Cir. 1974)). The

government asks us to apply Barrett on the reasoning that

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the jury was clearly made aware of the stipulations through

the opening and closing statements and jury instructions.

The government's second theory is that any error in the

trial was harmless error. Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights

shall be disregarded," and the Supreme Court has stated that

"most constitutional errors can be harmless." Arizona v.

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991) (citations omitted). The

government claims that the error here was a failure to take

"the technical steps" needed to make the stipulations evidence.

We will not delve into the details of the government's

arguments on these grounds. Instead, we hold that Harrison

has, by stipulating, waived any right to contest the absence of

proof on the stipulated elements. This waiver theory of

stipulations has been addressed by a number of our sister

circuits, and although the government does not directly advance it in this case, it is necessarily raised by the nature of

the appeal. By failing to advance it explicitly, we could

perhaps construe the government's brief as having waived the

waiver theory argument, but we will reach the issue because

it is squarely presented by this case and was relied upon by

the trial court. See, e.g., United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v.

Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 445-49

(1993) (holding that an appellate court has discretion to

consider an issue not argued by the parties). As the Supreme Court stated in Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services,

Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991), "[w]hen an issue or claim is

properly before the court, the court is not limited to the

particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather

retains the independent power to identify and apply the

proper construction of governing law." Moreover, we do not

deem it unfair to the appellant to rely on this unargued

theory. The arguments made by the government, while not

squarely addressing the question in "waiver" terms, fairly

noticed the application of the theory, and the authorities cited

by the two parties clearly evidence an awareness of it.

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B. Waiver

The premise of the waiver theory is simple: Upon entering

into a stipulation on an element, a defendant waives his right

to put the government to its proof of that element. A

stipulation "constitutes '[a]n express waiver made ... preparatory to trial by the party or his attorney conceding for the

purposes of trial the truth of some alleged fact ... thereafter

to be taken for granted; so that the one party need offer no

evidence to prove it and the other is not allowed to disprove

it....' " Vander Linden v. Hodges, 193 F.3d 268, 279 (4th

Cir. 1999) (quoting 9 Wigmore on Evidence s 2588, at 821

(Chadbourn rev. 1981)). Because a defendant will often

stipulate to a prior conviction to keep the government from

introducing prejudicial details about prior crimes, see Old

Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174 (1997), a number of

cases have discussed the effect of a stipulation to elements of

a crime.

It is well settled that a defendant, by entering into a

stipulation, waives his right to assert the government's duty

to present evidence to the jury on the stipulated element.

See United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 223 (1st Cir. 1999);

United States v. Melina, 101 F.3d 567, 572 (8th Cir. 1996);

United States v. Mason, 85 F.3d 471, 472 (10th Cir. 1996);

United States v. Keck, 773 F.2d 759, 769-70 (7th Cir. 1985);

United States v. Houston, 547 F.2d 104, 107 (9th Cir. 1976)

(per curiam); see also Vander Linden, 193 F.3d at 279;

Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 392 (2d Cir. 1998);

Alamo v. Del Rosario, 98 F.2d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1938); 9

Wigmore on Evidence s 2591, at 824 (Chadbourn rev. 1981).

The only possible point of contention is whether a defendant

can contest the government's failure to read the stipulation

itself to the trier of fact. We conclude that a defendant

cannot.

In two cases directly on point, the Fifth and Eleventh

Circuits have held that a stipulation waives the government's

burden to introduce evidence on that stipulation, including a

reading of the stipulation itself: United States v. Hardin, 139

F.3d 813, 816 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 225 (1998),

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and United States v. Branch, 46 F.3d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1995).

Those cases closely resemble the case we consider today.

In Hardin, the defendant, like Harrison, was charged with

violating s 922(g), and stipulated to a prior conviction. Despite reference to the stipulation during voir dire and arguments, the stipulation was never read to the jury. See 139

F.2d at 814. The court concluded that "[the defendant]

waived his right to have the government produce evidence of

his felon status, including the stipulation itself" and thus had

"no legal or equitable basis to contest the government's

mistake." Id. at 816-17.

The Fifth Circuit reached the same result in Branch. The

defendant was convicted of bank fraud. He had stipulated

that a number of the financial institutions involved were

federally insured, a necessary element of the crime; but the

stipulation was never published to the jury. The court of

appeals affirmed on waiver grounds: "Once a stipulation is

entered, even in a criminal case, the government is relieved of

its burden to prove the fact which has been stipulated by the

parties. Appellant ... cannot now claim that the government

failed to offer evidence on an element to which he confessed."

Branch, 46 F.3d at 442 (citing United States v. Harper, 460

F.2d 705, 707 (5th Cir. 1972), and Poole v. United States, 832

F.2d 561, 565 (11th Cir. 1987)).

Two cases cited by appellant that appear at first glance to

be at odds with Hardin and Branch are, upon further examination, either reconcilable or unpersuasive. First, in United

States v. James, 987 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth

Circuit reversed a conviction for the complete failure to

introduce evidence on a stipulated element of the crime. The

record showed that the parties had agreed to a stipulation on

an aspect of the case, but the stipulation was not mentioned

to the jury nor placed in the record. The court on appeal

could not, therefore, have inferred that the stipulation was

sufficient to satisfy the element. See id. at 650-51. Although

the court further noted that "the stipulation was never entered into evidence or read to the jury" so that there was "no

fact in evidence that the jury could take as proved," id. at

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651, it is not clear to us exactly what distinction the court

meant to draw with this statement. Under the facts of that

case it did not matter because the stipulation was not available to review on appeal.

Second, in United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672 (4th Cir.

1996), the court's opinion includes language that appears to

require that a stipulation be read to the jury, but that

language is dicta. In general, the Muse court spoke approvingly of stipulations. But it also said that a stipulation

"waives the requirement that the government produce evidence (other than the stipulation itself) to establish the facts

stipulated to beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 678 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Clark, 993 F.2d 402, 406

(4th Cir. 1993)). Arguably, the italicized phrase contemplates

a formal reading to the jury of all necessary stipulations.

But that issue was not before the court. The stipulation was

read aloud in Muse (and in the case it cited for support), see

id. at 678; the actual issue was the propriety of a jury

instruction. See id. at 677. Therefore, while the Muse court

accurately described normal trial practice to include the

reading of stipulations, it had no occasion to consider the

situation before us today. See Hardin, 139 F.3d at 817

(holding that references to reading stipulations in Muse are

dicta); see also United States v. Jackson, 124 F.3d 607, 616-

17 & n.8 (4th Cir. 1997) (questioning the validity of Muse).

We previously commented on the waiver theory in United

States v. Gilliam, 167 F.3d 628 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 119

S. Ct. 2060 and 120 S. Ct. 118 (1999). In Gilliam, a defendant charged under s 922(g) did not concede the existence of

a prior conviction. Although the prosecutor told the trial

court he had a certified copy of a conviction, it was never

offered into evidence. We held, not surprisingly, that the

defendant did not "essentially stipulate" to the conviction

through his silence. Id. at 639. Although there was no

stipulation involved in Gilliam, we noted that the government

could have met its burden of offering into evidence proof of

every element of the charged offense by obtaining a stipulation or "a waiver by the defendant of his right to put the

government to its proof...." Id. We speculated that, in

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addition, the stipulation might need to be formally entered

into evidence. See id. (quoting James, 987 F.2d at 651). But

as the waiver issue was not presented by the facts, and where

no evidence of a prior conviction had been presented to the

jury, we concluded that the s 922(g) conviction must be

reversed. See id. at 640.

Harrison asserts that the government needed to introduce

the stipulations into evidence, relying, in part, on Gilliam.

He contends that his stipulations "did not waive his right to

put the prosecution to its burden of proof of every element of

the crime." Thus, he argues that he may contest the failure

to introduce the stipulations themselves as evidence. Harrison acknowledges that Hardin and Branch are in conflict

with his claim, but he fails to present a meaningful method of

distinguishing those cases.

The government's brief is confused on the applicability of

waiver to this case, misreading Gilliam to suggest that our

circuit would require necessary stipulations to be read despite

Gilliam's careful neutrality. For that reason, the government's brief does not directly advance the applicability of

waiver, although it discusses the theory. Of course, agreement or stipulation by parties as to the state of the law does

not bind us. See, e.g., Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products

Co., 308 U.S. 106, 114 (1939); NLRB Union, Local 6 v.

FLRA, 842 F.2d 483, 485 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

We conclude that there is little to be gained from holding

that a stipulation, which unarguably waives a defendant's

right to require the government to produce any evidence

regarding that stipulation, nevertheless fails to waive the

defendant's right to require that stipulation to be read to the

jury. Surely, the government's failure formally to read stipulations is not "wise trial practice." Hardin, 139 F.3d at 817.

Even if a defendant cannot challenge that error, the potential

for adverse consequences for the prosecution is great: the

jury may become confused and acquit a defendant for lack of

proof on a stipulated element, see id., and a complete failure

to enter the stipulations into the record at all will likely be

fatal, see James, 987 F.2d at 650-51. Publishing stipulations

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to the jury or moving to reopen upon an inadvertent failure to

do so is the proper course of action, one which produces a

complete record. However, nothing in either law or logic

compels us to reverse a conviction when the defendant enters

into a stipulation on an element and then seeks a windfall

from the government's failure to formally read the stipulation

to the jury.

Therefore, we join the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits and hold

that a defendant who stipulates to an element of an offense

waives his right to have the government put on evidence to

prove that element. Specifically, we hold that when Harrison

entered into the stipulations that the interstate commerce and

prior conviction elements of the s 922(g) charge were present, he waived his right to challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence on those elements, even though the government

failed to introduce any evidence on those elements. This

result retains a primary benefit of this type of stipulation:

when the element is a prior conviction, the defendant is

benefitted because potentially prejudicial facts about the prior

conviction will not be admitted. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at

185; Hardin, 139 F.3d at 817; Muse, 83 F.3d at 678. Furthermore, stipulations in general are helpful to both parties

because they narrow the scope of the trial to the real issues in

dispute. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 518

F.2d 420, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 392.

Today's holding, in addition to not condoning the government's conduct in this case, does not prevent a defendant

from including explicit language that a stipulation shall only

be valid if it is read to the jury. We do not find any such

requirement in the language of the stipulations in the record

in this case. In this respect, we are guided by the reasoning

of the Supreme Court in New York v. Hill, 120 S. Ct. 659

(2000). In Hill, the defendant claimed that his agreement to

a trial date outside the speedy trial period guaranteed by

applicable law did not serve as a waiver of his speedy trial

rights. The Court disagreed, noting this would make waiver

"turn on a hypertechnical distinction that should play no

part." Id. at 666. Instead, the Court reasoned that defense

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cient to act as a waiver. We similarly conclude that the

stipulations in the instant matter were sufficient to waive the

appellant's right to require the government to introduce any

evidence on the stipulated elements, including the stipulations.

III. Conclusion

We conclude that defendant's stipulation to the interstate

commerce and prior conviction elements of a s 922(g) charge

waived his right to contest the government's failure to introduce any evidence on those stipulations, including a failure to

read those stipulations to the jury. The stipulations were

filed with the district court, the jury was made aware of them,

and the jury found all of the elements to exist. Accordingly,

we affirm the judgment of the district court.2

__________

2 Harrison also appeals two evidentiary rulings and further claims

that the stipulations were not final. We have examined these

arguments and find them to be without merit.

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