Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02466/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02466-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
High Plains Natural Gas Company
Appellant
Warren Petroleum Company
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

HIGH PLAINS NATURAL GAS COMPANY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

WARREN PETROLEUM COMPANY, 

a division of GULF OIL CORPORATION, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

. ) 

) 

) 

MAY 1 91999 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk · 

No. 87-2466 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CIV 85 0926 JC) 

Barry Bishop of Clark, Thomas, Winters & Newton, Austin, Texas, 

(James H. Russell, Jr. of Valdez, Russell, Read & Rivera, Santa 

Fe, New Mexico, with him on the briefs) for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Bradford c. Berge of Campbell & Black, P.A., Santa Fe, New Mexico, 

for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before ANDERSON, BRORBY, * and O'CONNOR. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

High Plains Natural Gas Company (High Plains), the buyer, 

* The Honorable Earl E. O'Connor, Chief Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 87-2466 Document: 01019957918 Date Filed: 05/19/1989 Page: 1 
filed suit for damages against Warren Petroleum Company (Warren), 

the seller, alleging Warren's failure to deliver marketable 

natural gas breached implied warranties of merchantability and 

fitness for a particular purpose and violated the Texas Deceptive 

Trade Practices Act (DTPA). Warren moved for summary judgment 

asserting the remedies sought by High Plains could not be awarded 

as a matter of law because the contract limits the remedies· for 

breach of contract to rejection of the natural gas or termination 

of the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in 

favor of Warren holding the contract's limitation of remedies 

provision precluded relief. 

granting summary judgment. 

disposition and Al'FIRM. 

High Plains appeals 

We agree with the 

the order 

trial court's 

High Plains asserts three errors for our review: (1) High 

Plains is entitled to pursue its claim for breach of implied 

warranty as the limitation of remedies provision does not modify 

the implied warranties; (2) the limitations of remedies clauses in 

the contract do not prohibit High Plains from pursuing its 

remedies under the DTPA; and (3) Warren breached its implied duty 

of ·good faith and fair dealing. 

The material facts are undisputed. High Plains operates a 

natural gas distribution system in northern Texas, buying gas and 

selling it to various commercial and residential customers. 

Warren operates a gas gathering system and extraction facility, 

buying gas from various producers, transporting the gas to its 

-2-

Appellate Case: 87-2466 Document: 01019957918 Date Filed: 05/19/1989 Page: 2 
plant, extracting from the natural gas various hydrocarbon 

products such as butane and pentane, and selling the "residue 

gas," in this case to High Plains. Warren's gas gathering system 

r operates on a vacuum principle which sucks the natural gas through 

its gas gathering system to its plant. When leaks occur' in the 

lines, gas does not escape, rather outside air is sucked into the 

line. As more air enters the line the heating content of the gas 

is reduced. As various hydrocarbon products are extractet from 

the natural gas, again the heating content of the gas is reduced. 

The heating content or quality of the residue gas fluctuates 

depending upon the condition of Warren's system and of :the amount 

of hydrocarbons extracted. 

High Plains and Warren first entered into a contr~ct in 1964 

j" ,t 

whereby High Plains agreed to buy, and Warren agreed t6 sell, the 

residue gas from Warren's McLean Plant .. In 1981, High Plains 

filed suit against Warren complaining of the quality of the 

residue gas it was receiving. This suit was compromised and 

settled in 1983. The settlement included amendments to the 

contract and the payment by Warren of a significant sum of money. 

The contract as amended, which is now before this court, 

contains provisions: (1) basing the price of the gas on its BTU 

content; (2) specifically providing there is no limitation upon 

the quality, quantity, number or kinds of products (hydrocarbons) 

that Warren could extract; (3) giving to High Plains the right to 

reject any residue gas which does not meet its quality 

-3-

Appellate Case: 87-2466 Document: 01019957918 Date Filed: 05/19/1989 Page: 3 
specifications; and (4) allowing High Plains to cancel the 

contract if its quality specifications are not met for 30 days. 

Finally, the contract provides "there shall be no other penalty to 

Warren" in the event the qua.li ty specifications of High Plains are 

not satisfied. 

The trial court ruled the contractual ·provisions limiting 

remedies for breach of contract apply to the implied warranti~s of 

merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose under the 

applicable portions of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). 

The trial court further held the limitation of remedies provision 

in the contract precluded High Plains' cause of action under the 

Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). 

The trial court granted Warren's motion for summary judgment as to 

all of High Plains claims. 

We review the grant of a summary judgment motion under the 

same standard employed by the trial court. Our review is de novo 

because a ruling 

determinations. See 

on the motion involves purely legal 

Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Kansas Gas and 

Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 796, 798 (10th Cir. 1988). 

issues under our diversity jurisdiction, we 

Texas. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 

Hopper, 751 F.2d 329, 332 (10th Cir. 1984). 

I 

In deciding these 

apply the law of 

(1938); Brady v. 

The Contractual Limitation of Remedies 

-4-

Appellate Case: 87-2466 Document: 01019957918 Date Filed: 05/19/1989 Page: 4 
On appeal, High Plains contends the trial court erred in 

using the contractual provisions limiting the remedies for breach 

of contract to exclude or modify all the implied warranties 

contrary to the u.c.c. provisions requtring conspicuous and 

~xplicit mention of merchantability for' modification of that 

warranty. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 2.316(b) (Vernon. 1968). 

We disagree. The trial court did not apply the contract 

provisions to exclude the implied warrantieJ, rather it applied 

the contract provisions to limit the remedies available if a 

breach of either warranty occurred. 

limit 

Next High Plains contends the contractual provisions may 

the remedies for breach of~ the contract, but those 

provisions fail to limit the remedies for breach of an implied ~- ,: 

warranty. We disagree. 

The trial court found the language in the contract limits 

High Plains to two remedies: (1) rejection of the natural gas, 

which is not of merchantable quality; and (2) cancellation of the 

contract if the supply of gas remains below merchantable quality 

for more than thirty days. The trial court based this decision on 

the following contract clauses: 

5. • •• Buyer shall 

residue gas that 

specifications •••. 

• • 8 • 

have 

does 

the 

. not 

8. • •• Should the BTU content 

delivered by Warren fall below 

-5-

right 

meet 

to reject any 

the following 

of the 

1,000 

residue gas 

per Mcf for a 

Appellate Case: 87-2466 Document: 01019957918 Date Filed: 05/19/1989 Page: 5 
continuous period of thirty (30) days •.• Buyer shall 

have the right to cancel this agreement, but there shall 

be no other penalty to Warren. 

Amendment to Gas Purchase Contract, ,1 5; Original Residue Gas 

Sales Contract, ~ 8 (emphasis added). The trial court further 

ruled the phrase emphasized above is an express agreement that 

rejection of the gas and cancellation of the contract are the sole 

remedies available to High Plains for lack of. merchantability of 

gas. Memorandum Opinion at 4. · We agree. 

Under the u.c.c. as enacted by Texas, remedies for breach of 

warranty may be limited, 1 and remedies may be substituted for 

those provided in the u.c.c. 2 The contract language clearly 

limits the remedy for breach of an implied warranty. The U.C.C. 

prescribes no statement or language in order to constitute a 

1 u.c.c. § 2.316 on modification of warranties states in part: 

Remedies for breach of 

with the prov1s1ons 

limitation of damages 

remedy (Sections 2-718 

warranty can be limited in accordance 

of this chapter on liquidation or 

and on contractual modification of 

and 2-719). (Emphasis added.) 

Tex. Bus & Com. Code Ann. § 2.316(d) (Vernon 1968). 

2 u.c.c. § 2.719 on limitation of remedies states in part: 

~l) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or 

1n substitution for those provided in this chapter and may 

limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable under this 

chapter, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the 

goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replacement 

of nonconforming goods or parts; and 

(2) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the 

remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it 

is the sole remedy. 

Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 2.719(a)(l) and (2) (Vernon 1968). 

-6-

Appellate Case: 87-2466 Document: 01019957918 Date Filed: 05/19/1989 Page: 6 
limitation of a remedy. Any language which manifests to the buyer 

as a reasonable person that the contract is entered into on the 

basis of a specified limitation of ~ remedy is sufficient. 5 

! Ronald A. Anderson, Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code§ 2-

1 

719:21, at 13 (3d ed. 1985)~ As said in the official commentary 

to § 2.719 of the U.C.C.: "Under this section parties are left 

free to shape their particular requirements and reasonable 

t 

agreements limiting or modifying remedies are to be given effect." 

Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 2.719, Uniform Commercial Code 

Comment ,1 1. The test is whether the plain meaning of the 

contract demonstrates an intent to limit the seller's liability. 

See Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781, 797-98 

(5th Cir. 1973) {applyihg Texas law). 

Looking at the clear and unambiguous language of the 

contra~t, -and in particular that language emphasized in paragraph 

eight, we conclude the contract clearly demonstrates an intent to 

limit the seller's liability under the contract. 3 We hold that 

the contractual provisions limiting remedies, in this case, apply 

to the remedies for breach of implied warranties. 

II 

The Application of the Texas 

Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act 

3 It is difficult to understand how there could be any implied 

warranties since the language of the contract seems to presuppose 

the. quality of the gas might not be as specified and under these 

circumstances the buyer could reject the gas and if the poor 

quality continued, it could cancel the contract. 

-7-

Appellate Case: 87-2466 Document: 01019957918 Date Filed: 05/19/1989 Page: 7 
High Plains asserts the trial court erred in finding the 

limitation of remedies clause in the contract was a complete 

defense to the claim under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act 

(DTPA). 4 The court reasoned the facts alleged in the DTPA claim 

were the same as the facts alleged in the breach of warranty 

claim. High Plains contends the limitation of remedies clause of 

the contract does not prohibit it from pursuing its statutory 

right of recovery under the DTPA. High Plains asserts the clear 

language of ~he "no waiver" provision of the DTPA prohibits the 

use of warranty disclaimers to preclude the right to bring an 

action under the DTPA. We frame the issue as whether the 

contractual provision limiting remedies for breach of the 

warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose 

is enforceable under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 

We first note that our task here is to interpret and apply 

the law of Texas as we believe the Texas Supreme Court would. 

Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 822 F.2d 908, 910 (10th Cir. 

1987), cert. denied, 108 s.ct. 699 (1988) (citing City of Aurora 

v. Bechtel Corp., 599 F.2d 382, 386 (10th Cir. 1979), and Symons 

v. Mueller Co., 493 F.2d 972 (10th Cir. 1974)). Counsel for the 

parties have cited us to no Texas authorities directly in point 

and we are able to find none. 

The DTPA is a statutory scheme designed to provide consumers 

with a remedy for deceptive trade practices without the burden of 

4 Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code Ann. § 17.41-17.63 (Vernon 1968). 

-8-

Appellate Case: 87-2466 Document: 01019957918 Date Filed: 05/19/1989 Page: 8 
proof and numerous defenses encountered in a common law fraud or 

breach of warranty action. Pope v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 

703 F.2d 197, 201 (5th Cir. 1983). The statute contains a laundry 

! list of twenty-four deceptive trade practices for which a consumer 

I 

may maintain an action. Sections 17.46(b) and 17.S0(a). ·The DTPA 

also provides an action may be commenced for the breach of an 

implied warranty or unconscionable activity. Section 17.50(a)(2), 

i 

(3). The cumulative remedies provision allows an action under the. 

DTPA and any other laws. Section 17.43. The statute contains a 

"no waiver" provision, which states in pertinent part, "[a]ny 

waiver by a consumer of the provisions of this subchapter [the 

DTPA] is contrary to public policy and is unenforceable and void." 

Section,: 17. 42. 5 

Texas' u.c.c. contains provisions allowing the effect of the 

u.c.c. ·to be varied by agreement, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 

l.102(b) (Vernon 1968); allowing a claim arising out of a brearih 

of an implied warranty to be discharged by written waiver, id. at 

§ 1.107; allowing the exclusion of implied warranties, id. at§ 

2.719(a)(l). 

The heart of this controversy is the "no waiver'' provision of 

5 The parties assume that High Plains is a "consumer" as 

defined in the DTPA, and that none of the various exceptions to 

the definition of a consumer contained in the DTPA apply. 

§ 17.42. These issues are not before us; nor were they developed 

in the pleadings or factually in the trial court. We therefore 

assume that High Plains is a "consumer" as that term is used in 

the DTPA. 

-9-

Appellate Case: 87-2466 Document: 01019957918 Date Filed: 05/19/1989 Page: 9 
the DTPA. 6 The issue before this court is an apparent conflict in 

Texas law. On the one hand there is the provision in the u.c.c., 

as enacted by Texas, which clearly provides that remedies for 

breach of warranty can be limited. Tex Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 

2.316(d) (Vernon 1968). 7 On the other hand we have the "no 

waiver" provision of the DTPA which provides "any waiver" of the 

provisions of the DTPA is unenforceable ~nd void. 

The first area of inquiry must be to determine whether or not 

the apparent conflict between the u.c.c. and the DTPA in fact 

exists. One possibility to be considered is that the DTPA 

repealed these portions of the u.c.c. by implication. We reject 

this possibility. Texas courts do not favor repeal by 

implication. Conley v. Daughters of the Republic, 106 Tex. 80, 

156 s.w. 197, 201 (1913). The Texas courts have furthermore 

adopted the rule that in the absence of an express repeal, where 

there is no positive repugnance between the provisions of the old 

and new statutes, each statute should be construed, if possible, 

to give effect to both statutes. Wintermann v. McDonald, 129 Tex. 

275, 102 S.W.2d 167, 171 (1937). Yet another reason for rejecting 

the possibility of the repeal by implication is the Texas u.c.c. 

itself. Section 1.104 provides that no part of it shall be deemed 

to be impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation if such 

6 "Any 

subchapter 

void •••. " 

1989). 

waiver by a consumer of the prov1s1ons of this 

is contrary to public policy and is unenforceable and 

Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.42 (West Pocket Part 

7 Supra note 1. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 87-2466 Document: 01019957918 Date Filed: 05/19/1989 Page: 10 
construction can be reasonably avoided. 

The other possibility to be considered is that the "no 

waiver" provision of the DTPA does not affect the rights created 

by§§ 2.316 and 2.719 of the u.c.c. to waive or exclude implied 

warranties· and to substitute remedies. This would seem to be the 

common sense approach as to rule otherwise would mean that an 

implied warranty could never be excluded, regardless of the 

circumstances. For example, a used car seller could insist that 

an old truck would likely break down and for that reason could not 

be suitable for buyer's purposes. The buyer could insist that he 

is willing to take the risk. To hold the implied warranties could 

not be excluded under these circumstances would be bizarre. 

The Texas courts have consistently held parties are free to 

limit or exclude implied warranties by contract under the U.C.C. 

regardless of the provisions of the DTPA. In 1982, the Supreme 

Court of Texas reversed a judgment under the DTPA for the 

purchasers of a house by giving effect to a disclaimer of the 

implied Wclrranty of fitness. G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 

392 (Tex. 1982). In 1983, relying on Robichaux, the Texas Court 

of Appeals concluded the ·"no waiver" provision of the DTPA does 

not make unenforceable or void a disclaimer of the warranties of 

merchantability and of fitness for a particular purpose. Ellmer 

v. Delaware Mini-Computer Systems, Inc., 665 S.W.2d 158, 160-61 

(Tex. Ct. App. - Dallas 1983). In 1987, ·the Texas Supreme Court 

judicially created a new implied warranty that repairs would be 

-11-

Appellate Case: 87-2466 Document: 01019957918 Date Filed: 05/19/1989 Page: 11 
performed in a good and workmanlike manner. Melody Home Mfg. Co. 

v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 352-54 (Tex. 1987). The court held 

this warranty could not be waived or disclaimed in the small print 

of a standardized contract and overruled Robichaux "to the extent 

that it conflicts with this opinion." Id. at 355. We read Melody 

Home as including within the DTPA laundry list a judicially 

created warranty, which cannot be waived. This decision is 

consistent with excluding an implied warranty created under the 

u.c.c., which is not part of the the DTPA laundry list. 

In McCrea v. Cubilla Condominium Corp. N.V., 685 S.W.2d 755 

(Tex. Ct. App. - Houston 1985), a condominium purchaser brought 

suit against the builder alleging breach of express and implied 

warranties and violations of the DTPA because the roof leaked. In 

addressing the claim that the disclaimer of warranties in the 

contract was unenforceable under the "no waiver" provision of § 

17.42 of the DTPA, the Texas Court of Appeals specifically held: 

"[W]hen a contract specifically states that no express or implied 

warranties are made, a cause of action for breach of express or 

implied warranties under the DTPA or contract law has been 

waived." Id. at 758. In Eppler, Guerin & Turner, Inc. v. 

Purolator Armored, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 

Dallas 1985), a Texas Court of Appeals held that a limitation of 

liability claimed was not void under the "no waiver'' provision of 

the DTPA and stated a contractual disclaimer or limitation of 

liability may bar a claim under the DTPA. See also Singleton v. 

LaCoure, 712 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. Ct. App. - Houston 1986), and 

-12-

Appellate Case: 87-2466 Document: 01019957918 Date Filed: 05/19/1989 Page: 12 
Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Young, 720 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Ct. App. 

Houston 1986). All of these cases seem consistent with t~e 

principle that in Texas, the u.c.c. and the DTPA can and do 

successfully coexist. 

Several Texas cases have drawn a distinction between a 

violation of the laundry list of deceptive practices and exclusion 

of warranties or limitation of remedies. For example in Hycel, 

Inc. v. Wittstruck, 690 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Ct. App. - Waco 1985), a 

jury found the seller had violated several subsections of the 

laundry list including misrepresentation under§ 17.46(b)(5). The 

seller argued it could not be liable for misrepresentation because 

the disclaimer involved allowed the seller to make changes in the 

specifications at any time without notice. The court held.the 

seller could not use the disclaimer to insulate itself from 

violations of the DTPA laundry list. Id. at 922. In Reliance 

Universal, Inc. v. Sparks Indus. Servs., Inc., 688 S.W.2d 890 

(Tex. Ct. App. - Beaumont 1985), the court stated the "no waiver" 

provision of the DTPA does not render contractual damages 

limitation clauses void and unenforceable in any and all cases. 

Id. at 892. However, the court distinguished the holding in this 

case f indin·g the contract language limiting damages was not 

enforceable where the jury found the defendant had misrepresented 

the quality of the goods, a violation of the DTPA laundry list. 

The court stated that if the case involved solely a breach of 

contract or breach of watranty, the allowance of a limitation of 

damages clause to defeat recovery would be "somewhat persuasive." 

-13-

Appellate Case: 87-2466 Document: 01019957918 Date Filed: 05/19/1989 Page: 13 
In Martin v. Lou Poliquin Enters., Inc., 696 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Ct. 

App. - Houston 1985), the court held that a limitation of 

liability clause may waive a party's right to recover for breach 

of contract but such a clause would not waive the right to 

recovery under the DTPA. For similar holdings see International 

Nickel Co. v. Trammel Crow Distribution Corp., 803 F.2d 150, 155-

56 (5th Cir. 1986); FDP Corp. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 749 

S.W.2d 569, 570-71 (Tex. Ct. App. - Houston 1988); Town East Ford 

Sales v. Gray,· 730 S.W.2d 796, 809 (Tex. Ct. App. - Dallas 1987); 

Donnelly Marketing v. Lionel Sosa, Inc., 716 S.W.2d 598, 603-04 

(Tex. Ct. App. Corpus Christi 1986); Metro Ford Truck Sales, 

Inc. v. Davis, 709 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tex. Ct. App. Fort Worth 

1986); NL Well Serv./Nl Industr., Inc. v. Flake Industr. Servs., 

Inc., 656 S.W.2d 584, 587 (Tex. Ct. App. - Fort Worth 1983). 

We therefore conclude that the Supreme Court of Texas, if 

deciding the issue presented, would hold that a contractual clause 

limiting the remedies for breach of an express or implied warranty 

created under the Texas u.c.c., is valid and enforceable and is 

not void and unenforceable under the "no waiver" provision of the 

DTPA. We likewise think it clear under Texas law that if there is 

a violation of the ''laundry list" under the DTPA then a limitation 

of remedies clause would be void and unenforceable under the DTPA. 

The trial court found a limitation of remedies clause under 

u.c.c. § 2-316 is a complete defense "to claims" under the DTPA 

"as long as the facts alleged in the DTPA claim are the same as 

-14-

Appellate Case: 87-2466 Document: 01019957918 Date Filed: 05/19/1989 Page: 14 
the facts alleged in the breach of warranty claim." We agree with 

this conclusion of law unless the party alleges~ violation of one 

of the deceptive practices in the laundry list of deceptive 

practices specified in S 17.46 of the DTPA. In the instant case 

High Plains did not specify any violation of the laundry list. As 

previously stated, High Plains grounded its claim on breach of 

contract and this is true in the complaint, the amended complaint 

and the pretrial. order. The pretrial order summarized the 

contested issue of law as "[w]hether Defendant [High Plains] 

violated the DTPA if it supplied gas which did not comply with the 

buyer's express demands." We do not read this as charging a 

violation of one or more of the deceptive practices specified in 

the "laundry list." We therefore agree with the trial court's 

conclusion that the contract limitation of remedies .clause was a 

complete defense to High Plains' claim under the DTPA. 

III 

Good Faith and Fair Dealing 

High Plains asserts the defendant Warren had a duty to act in 

good faith in performing under the contract and this duty should 

override the contractual provisions that limit High Plains 

remedies to rejection of the gas and cancellation of the contract. 

High Plains is arguing that Warren's failure to make improvements 

in its gas collection system "br_eached the implied covenant of 

good faith in preventing plaintiff [High Plains] from meeting its 

obligations· under the contract." 

-15-

Appellate Case: 87-2466 Document: 01019957918 Date Filed: 05/19/1989 Page: 15 
The trial court did not address this assertion in its ruling 

on Warren's motion for summary judgment as to all of High Plains' 

claims. In its response to Warren's motion for summary judgment, 

High Plains asserted that Warren had a good faith duty to perform. 

High Plains stipulated and agreed to the facts set forth in 

Warren's memorandum brief with two exceptions, which are not 

relevant herein. The agreed upon stipulation of undisputed 

material facts contains no facts which would support High Plain's 

· claim of breach of good faith and fair dealing by Warren. High 

Plains asserts Warren consciously decided to defer the needed 

improvements to its system. The stipulated facts do not suggest 

or support such a conclusion. 

The plain language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) mandates the 

entry of summary judgment against a party who fails to make a 

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear 

the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 322 (1986); Carey v. United States Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 

621, 623 (10th Cir. 1987). A party resisting summary judgment may 

not rely upon mere assertions but rather has the obligation to 

make a factual showing. High Plains failed to make any factual 

showing tending to support its assertion. The trial court 

properly granted summary judgment on the claim of breach of good 

faith. 

The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. 

-16-

Appellate Case: 87-2466 Document: 01019957918 Date Filed: 05/19/1989 Page: 16