Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03216/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03216-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John T. Anderson
Appellant
U.S. Bancorp
Appellee
U.S. Bancorp Middle Management Change in Control Severance Pay Program
Appellee
U.S. Bancorp Severance Administration Committee
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3216

___________

John T. Anderson, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

U.S. Bancorp, a Delaware corporation; *

U.S. Bancorp Middle Management *

Change In Control Severance *

Pay Program; U.S. Bancorp Severance *

Administration Committee *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: February 13, 2007

Filed: April 24, 2007

___________

Before RILEY, MELLOY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Appellant, John T. Anderson, appeals from the order of the district court1

granting summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bancorp, U.S. Bancorp Middle

Management Change in Control Severance Pay Program and the U.S. Bancorp

Severance Administration Committee ("the Committee"), with respect to Anderson's

Appellate Case: 06-3216 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302018
-2-

claim for severance benefits under the U.S. Bancorp Middle Management Change in

Control Severance Pay Program ("the Plan") pursuant to the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1132(a)(1)(B). The district court

found that the Committee's determination that Anderson was discharged for cause

from his position of employment with U.S. Bancorp and thus was not eligible for

severance benefits was not an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

I.

The factual setting for the present action is succinctly summarized in this

Court's opinion in a related case, Johnson v. U.S. Bancorp Broad-Based Change in

Control Severance Pay Program, 424 F.3d 734, 736 (8th Cir. 2005):

Around the time of [Anderson's] termination, U.S. Bancorp was

involved in a merger with Firstar Corporation. U.S. Bancorp, in an effort

to retain a number of valued employees in the face of the uncertainty

caused by the pending merger, offered certain of them a severance plan

(the "Plan") providing for severance pay in the event they were

terminated as a result of the merger. The Plan provided that employees

terminated for "Cause" would not receive severance pay under the Plan.

Cause was defined in relevant part as follows:

[G]ross and willful misconduct during the course of employment ...

including, but not limited to, theft, assault, battery, malicious destruction

of property, arson, sabotage, embezzlement, harassment, acts or

omissions which violate the Employer's rules or policies (such as

breaches of confidentiality), or other conduct which demonstrates a

willful or reckless disregard of the interests of the Employer or its

Affiliates ... Circumstances constituting Cause shall be determined in the

sole discretion of [U.S. Bancorp].

Employees who were terminated without cause within twenty-four

months of the merger were eligible for severance payments of up to the

equivalent of 104 weeks' salary.

Appellate Case: 06-3216 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302018
-3-

Anderson was a long time employee of U.S. Bank, a subsidiary of U.S.

Bancorp, and was a participant in the Plan. Anderson was employed as a lead

financial analyst in the Consumer Banking and Payment Services division of U.S.

Bank. His supervisor was Mark Fields. A separate division of U.S. Bank, the

Business Line Reporting & Planning Division, was headed by Kathy Ashcraft.

Ashcraft's subordinates included Lynn Sato, Jason Albeck, and Burcin Iz.

In 2002, following the U.S. Bancorp/Firstar merger, Anderson had

conversations with Iz and Albeck hinting that Anderson was privy to information as

to personnel changes and modification of responsibilities in both the division in which

Anderson worked and Ashcraft's division. These comments were reported to Ashcraft

who became concerned because Anderson's comments implied that he indeed

possessed knowledge of Ashcraft's confidential, planned personnel changes within her

division. Ashcraft suspected that such information had been improperly obtained

from her individual computer files, specifically an organization chart contained in a

folder in the Corporate Analysis and Planning ("CAP") drive of the U.S. Bank

document management system. The CAP drive of the U.S. Bank document

management system included personal folders for Ashcraft and other employees that

were labeled with the employee's name. Under the U.S. Bank system, such folders

were not password protected or otherwise secure and could be accessed by certain

other U.S. Bank employees, including Anderson.

Ashcraft notified Jenny Morgan, an employee in the Human Resources

Division, who instituted an investigation. The Information Security Department

examined Ashcraft's computer files and was able to determine the last individual to

access each of Ashcraft's personal files. These included: John Anderson who last

accessed the 2002 Consolidated Salary Reconciliation File (the "salary file"), Nancy

Johnson who last accessed a 2002 Performance Goals File and other personal files,

and, Lynn Sato, who last accessed Ashcraft's Final Merit and Incentive File.

Appellate Case: 06-3216 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302018
-4-

On April 19, 2002, Morgan called Anderson and left a voicemail message

advising that she "needed to talk to him about the files that had been inappropriately

accessed in the Ashcraft folder." Anderson returned the call later that day. According

to Morgan's handwritten notes of the conversation, when asked if the file had anything

to do with Anderson's normal business and transactions, Anderson responded "no."

When asked why he accessed the file, he responded "just tried to see if I could access -

did & then close (sic) right away." Anderson told Morgan that he did not talk to

anyone about the information contained in the salary file. Morgan's notes were

transcribed later producing a version of the conversation which included the

following:

Q: Does the information that you accessed have anything to do with your

normal course of business or anything that you would have needed to

access in a project you were working on? 

A: No, there are other files that are used for what I do, but none of these.

(The files in the Ashcraft folder). 

Q: Why did you access this file? 

A: Just tried to see if I could access it. I did and then closed it right

away. 

Q: Did you copy/forward/print this information or talk to anyone about

what you accessed? 

A: No, I didn't talk to anyone about it. 

Anderson later told Morgan that he would have answered differently if he had

known that he was going to be terminated for accessing the document.

Ashcraft and Morgan concluded that Anderson had violated company policies

by accessing Ashcraft's file. U.S. Bancorp's Computer and Information Security

Appellate Case: 06-3216 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302018
-5-

Policy provides: "all of your computer access is on a need-to-know basis and is

limited to the information required to perform your job." U.S. Bancorp's

confidentiality policy provides: "The use of any information stemming from your

employment shall be restricted to that which is absolutely necessary for the legitimate

and proper business purposes of U.S. Bancorp." On April 3, 2002, Anderson was

tendered a notice of termination by Morgan, which stated as the basis of the

termination: "You have engaged in unethical conduct by violating U.S. Bancorp Code

of Conduct."

On June 21, 2002, Anderson submitted, through counsel, a letter making a

claim for severance benefits alleging that he was wrongfully terminated based on an

inadequate investigation by Morgan. Anderson denied accessing any file containing

confidential and proprietary information or that his actions constituted "cause" as

defined in the Plan. He stated that "he had conversations with employees regarding

only well known integration issues." Anderson admitted that he had accessed the

salary file in the Ashcraft folder, but stated that the file was "indirectly related to one

of his job responsibilities."

The Severance Administration Committee consisted of DeeAnn Neri, a senior

vice president in the Human Resources Department, Edward Caillier, a human

resources employee; and, Diane Thoromsgaard, a senior manager in the trust division.

Thoromsgaard was not present at the meeting during which Anderson's initial claim

was denied.

The Committee considered Anderson's attorney's letter of June 21, 2002, as a

claim for benefits under the Plan, and denied Anderson's claim on August 26, 2002,

by letter. The Committee concluded that the termination was for cause within the

meaning of the Plan because: (1) Anderson's access to the salary file in the Ashcraft

folder was without authorization or a business purpose and Anderson had admitted the

same; (2) Anderson disclosed employee information obtained from the accessed file

Appellate Case: 06-3216 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302018
-6-

to others in violation of the U.S. Bancorp confidentiality policy; (3) Anderson was not

truthful in his statements to Morgan that he did not disclose accessed information to

others; and (4) Anderson's conduct violated policies requiring integrity and proper use

of company resources.

Anderson appealed the Committee's decision by letter from his attorney to the

Committee dated October 11, 2002. In this appeal letter Anderson admitted accessing

the salary file but stated that he had a business purpose for doing so and denied that

the salary file contained individual salary figures. He stated that he made a mistake

in initially stating to Morgan that he did not need access to the salary file to perform

his job duties. Anderson also denied disclosing the acquired information to anyone

else. 

In this letter, Anderson requested that the Committee provide him with

documents including his entire personnel file, documents as to other similarly situated

employees who had been terminated or denied severance benefits during the preceding

five years, a copy of the salary file accessed by Anderson, and documents showing the

salary file to be classified. Anderson also requested permission to speak to specified

U.S. Bank employees.

Anderson supplemented his appeal by way of an additional letter on February

4, 2003, after U.S. Bancorp provided Anderson the opportunity to interview

employees. In this letter, Anderson submitted to the Committee certain factual

stipulations which he had elicited from U.S. Bank. He further submitted argument

with respect to the Committee's findings that Anderson had improperly disclosed

information, that he had accessed an Ashcraft file containing individual salary data,

and that Anderson's accessing the salary file was sufficient cause for termination.

The Committee denied Anderson's appeal by letter dated March 21, 2003. The

Committee conceded that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that Anderson

Appellate Case: 06-3216 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302018
-7-

accessed the organizational chart file or that he had shared confidential information,

as the Committee had previously concluded. However, the Committee upheld its

finding that Anderson was terminated for cause based upon his unauthorized access

of the salary file. The Committee noted in support of its conclusion: Anderson's

statements to Morgan that he had no business reason for accessing the file and that he

did so simply to see if he could access the file; his statement that he would have

answered differently if he had known that termination would follow; and his inability

to "describe with specificity the business purpose he claims he had to access the

document." 

U.S. Bank employee Nancy Johnson was also terminated for accessing the

Ashcraft files without permission and without a business purpose. She brought an

ERISA action against the Committee and prevailed before the district court. On

appeal, this Court found that the Committee reasonably interpreted "cause" to include

knowing and willful violations of U.S. Bancorp's computer security policy and that

the Committee reasonably exercised its discretion in applying uncertain terms of the

Plan. Johnson, 424 F.3d at 739. The Court also held that substantial evidence

supported the Committee's determination that Johnson's actions in accessing

Ashcraft's files constituted a knowing and willful violation of the computer security

policy. Id.

II.

Anderson brought an action in the district court pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§

1132(a)(1)(B), alleging that the Committee's action constituted an abuse of discretion

and a breach of its fiduciary duty. The district court found that the Committee had

discretionary authority under the terms of the Plan and that, accordingly, an abuse of

discretion standard applies. Applying this standard, the district court concluded that

the Committee did not abuse its discretion in finding that Anderson accessed the

computer file in question without permission and without a business purpose. In this

Appellate Case: 06-3216 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302018
-8-

regard, the Court noted that Anderson did not assert that he had a business purpose for

accessing the file until his appearance before the Committee, despite earlier

questioning by Morgan. 

In light of Johnson the district court found that "the Committee's interpretation

of the term 'cause' in the Plan as including Anderson's access of Ashcraft's file, was

reasonable." The district court noted that the Plan includes as gross or willful

misconduct "acts or omissions which violate the Employer's rules or policies (such as

breaches of confidentiality)." Accordingly, the district court found that "because

Anderson had violated the Computer and Information Security policy, his termination

was for cause, was reasonable and therefore not an abuse of discretion." The district

court granted summary judgment for the Committee.

III.

This court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo,

viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Smith v.

United TV, Inc., 474 F.3d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir. 2007). "We also review de novo the

district court's determination of the appropriate standard of review under ERISA."

Phillips-Foster v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 302 F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir. 2002).

As pertinent to this appeal, Anderson asserted in the district court a claim for

breach of fiduciary duty pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1104 and a claim under 29 U.S.C. §

1132(a)(1)(B) seeking judicial review of the denial of benefits under the ERISA plan.

The district court correctly dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty claim as "29 U.S.C.

§ 1104 cannot independently support a claim of fiduciary duty. Section 1132(a)

provides the exclusive causes of action for claims by ERISA plan participants and

beneficiaries seeking to enforce rights under an ERISA plan." Sahulka v. Lucent

Techs., Inc., 206 F.3d 763, 768 n.9 (8th Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted).

Appellate Case: 06-3216 Page: 8 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302018
-9-

An administrator's decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion where the

plan in question gives the administrator "discretionary authority to determine

eligibility for benefits." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115

(1989); Pralutsky v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 833, 837 (8th Cir. 2006) ("Where

the plan reserves discretionary authority to the plan administrator, we apply a

deferential standard of review, considering whether the administrator abused its

discretion."). The parties agree that under the Plan, U.S. Bancorp has discretionary

authority to determine eligibility. 

U.S. Bancorp's Plan gives the Committee full discretion to "interpret and

administer the terms and conditions of the Plan, decide all questions

concerning the eligibility of any persons to participate in the Plan, [and]

grant or deny benefits under the Plan," (Appellant's App. at 35), so the

district court was required to review the Committee's interpretation of the

Plan for abuse of discretion. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115; King v.

Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 414 F.3d 994, 999 (8th Cir. 2005) (en

banc). 

Johnson, 424 F.3d at 738. 

Nevertheless, Anderson contends that a less deferential standard should have

been applied by the district court in this case. 

A plan administrator's decision will be afforded less deference if a

claimant presents "material probative evidence demonstrating that (1) a

palpable conflict of interest or a serious procedural irregularity existed,

which (2) caused a serious breach of the plan administrator's fiduciary

duty to [the claimant]." Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1160 (8th

Cir. 1998). A plaintiff must also "show that the conflict or procedural

irregularity has 'some connection to the substantive decision reached.'"

Id. at 1161 (quoting Buttram v. Cent. States, S.E. & S.W. Area Health &

Welfare Fund, 76 F.3d 896, 901 (8th Cir. 1996)).

Appellate Case: 06-3216 Page: 9 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302018
-10-

The need to show a serious breach of fiduciary duty "presents a

considerable hurdle for plaintiffs." Barnhart v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of

Am., 179 F.3d 583, 588 n.9 (8th Cir. 1999) (citations and quotations

omitted). In order to prevail the claimant must offer evidence which

causes "serious doubts as to whether the result reached was the product

of an arbitrary decision or the plan administrator's whim." Id., at 589

(quoting Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F3d 1246, 1250 (8th Cir. 1998)). 

Phillips-Foster, 302 F.3d at 795. When these two tests are satisfied the court will

apply a "sliding scale" approach, under which, "'the evidence supporting the plan

administrator's decision must increase in proportion to the seriousness of the conflict

or procedural irregularity.'" Id. (quoting Woo, 144 F.3d at 1162).

In this case, Anderson argues that both a "palpable conflict of interest" was

present as well as procedural irregularities. Anderson asserts that the conflict of

interest was two-fold. First, a conflict of interest was presented by virtue of the fact

that U.S. Bancorp would pay any severance benefits awarded, thus the fund is self

funded, and, second, the Committee included employees of the Human Resources

department of U.S. Bank, the department which had, at the least, approved Anderson's

firing.

We have recognized that "when an entity funds a plan and is also the plan

administrator there is a rebuttable presumption of a palpable conflict of interest,"

Tillery v. Hoffman Enclosures, Inc., 280 F.3d 1192, 1197 (8th Cir. 2002), and, in this

case, the Committee has not articulated any "ameliorating circumstances" to rebut this

presumption. See Schatz v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 220 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir.

2000).

 

Anderson speculates that since Committee members worked in the U.S. Bank

Human Resources department they would be reluctant to find that no cause existed for

Anderson's termination, an action which was presumably approved by that

Appellate Case: 06-3216 Page: 10 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302018
-11-

department, thus creating a conflict of interest. However, we know of no authority

which would support Anderson's contention that a "palpable" conflict of interest was

created by this situation and Anderson provides no proof that the relationship had a

tangible or perceptible impact upon the impartiality of the members of the Committee.

We believe that the mere fact of the cited employment relationship is not sufficient to

support a finding of a conflict of interest. See Brandis v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.

Corp., 47 F.3d 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1995) (employee can serve a dual role as employee

and plan fiduciary) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3)); see also Barnhart v. UNUM Life

Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 583, 588 (8th Cir. 1999) ("ERISA itself contemplated the use of

fiduciaries who might not be entirely neutral"). Further, the Committee members dual

status does not present the type of personal conflict of interest which has been found

to warrant consideration of less deferential review. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Aetna Life

Ins. Co., 128 F.3d 1263, 1265 (8th Cir. 1997) (claim reviewers paid incentives and

bonuses based upon criteria that included "claim savings").

As to procedural irregularities, Anderson asserts that the Committee failed to

engage in a meaningful dialogue with Anderson, seek additional information from

Anderson, and specify for Anderson what information would be adequate to secure

benefits. 

We find that the district court's determination that no serious procedural

irregularity existed is supported by the record. Similarly, and in line with this finding,

we conclude that any conflict of interest created by U.S. Bancorp funding the

severance plan administered by a committee composed of its employees did not cause

a "serious breach of the plan administrator's fiduciary duty." See Woo, 144 F.3d at

1160; see also Barnhart, 179 F.3d at 589 (to show serious breach of administrator's

fiduciary duty caused by a conflict of interest, conflict of interest must be shown to

have a connection with the substantive decision reached). 

Appellate Case: 06-3216 Page: 11 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302018
-12-

Every employee benefit plan shall provide understandable written notice to a

participant whose claim has been denied setting forth the specific reasons for the

denial and afford reasonable opportunity for a full and fair review by the fiduciary of

the decision denying the claim. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133. After consideration of

Anderson's claim for severance benefits, the Committee indeed provided written

notice setting forth the basis for the denial of the claim. Further, the notice advised

Anderson as to the procedure to be followed in order to appeal the decision. Anderson

availed himself of the appeal opportunity. He was represented by counsel throughout

and was repeatedly permitted to present evidence to the Committee in support of his

claim. Anderson was furnished with all documents requested as well as information

as to terminations and denials of severance benefits by U.S. Bank over the five year

period specified by Anderson. Anderson, through his attorney, was afforded the

opportunity to interview U.S. Bank employees, per his request. Further, there is no

indication in the record that any affidavit, written statement, document, or other item

proffered by Anderson to the Committee was refused and the Committee's appeal

decision indicates that it considered all submissions. 

Anderson points to the failure of the Committee to specify, for Anderson's

benefit, what information could be submitted which would cause the Committee to

sustain his appeal. However, Anderson was clearly aware of the fact at issue: whether

he had a legitimate business reason to warrant his accessing Ashcraft's salary

reconciliation file. Anderson attempted to convince the Committee that his admitted

action was required in order for him to "perform his job." Notably, Anderson was

never prevented from presenting to the Committee the statement of his supervisor or

his own statement specifying the particular project in which he was engaged, which

necessitated his accessing the 2002 salary reconciliation file. However, Anderson did

not do so. Significantly, the Committee, after considering submissions provided

through Anderson's counsel, reversed itself as to three of the four original grounds

upon which Anderson's claim was denied. 

Appellate Case: 06-3216 Page: 12 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302018
-13-

Mere disagreement with the Committee's decision is not enough. See Tillery,

280 F.3d at 1197 ("It is not enough simply to show the plan administrator did not act

in the sole interest of the claimant. The plan administrator's fiduciary duties extend

to everyone covered by the plan, and an administrator who fails properly to investigate

a claim breaches its fiduciary duty to all beneficiaries by granting benefits to

unqualified claimants.").

We conclude that Anderson has failed to show that a breach of the Committee's

fiduciary duty occurred. See Woo, 144 F.3d at 1160. The circumstances of this case

are dissimilar to those circumstances where we have found either a serious procedural

irregularity or a serious breach of the plan administrator's fiduciary duty. Janssen v.

Minneapolis Auto Dealers Benefit Fund, 447 F.3d 1109, 1113 (8th Cir. 2006) (no

meaningful review by plan trustees where decision was reached without adequate

information and Plan failed to explain to claimant the plan provisions upon which its

decision was based); Harden v. Am. Express Fin. Corp., 384 F.3d 498, 499-500 (8th

Cir. 2004) (plan administrator misled claimant as to records which were part of the

administrative record being considered); see Tillery, 280 F.3d at 1196 (plan

administrator's failure to provide timely notice of the denial of benefits recognized as

a serious procedural irregularity); Morgan v. Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters &

Eng'rs Pension Plan, 287 F.3d 716, 722-23 (8th Cir. 2002) (trustees of pension plan

violated plan provisions by withholding relevant information from claimant prior to

appeal hearing; trustees denied claim based upon their own "preconceptions and

personal observations").

Under the circumstances of this case, we find that there exists no "serious

doubts as to whether the result reached was the product of an arbitrary decision or the

plan administrator's whim," which would warrant a less deferential standard of review.

Barnhart, 179 F.3d at 589 (quoting Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246, 1250 (8th

Cir. 1998)). Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in reviewing the

Committee's decision under an abuse of discretion standard.

Appellate Case: 06-3216 Page: 13 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302018
-14-

IV.

Anderson contends that the Committee abused its discretion by withholding

severance benefits from him. Under the abuse of discretion standard "we consider

whether the administrator abused its discretion – that is, whether its interpretation of

the plan was reasonable, and whether its decision was supported by substantial

evidence." Pralutsky, 435 F.3d at 838. Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla

but less than a preponderance." Schatz, 220 F.3d at 949. "If the decision is supported

by a reasonable explanation, it should not be disturbed, even though a different

reasonable interpretation could have been made." Cash v. Wal-Mart Group Health

Plan, 107 F.3d 637, 641 (8th Cir. 1997). "We do not, however, substitute our own

weighing of the evidence for that of the administrator." Farley v. Arkansas Blue Cross

Blue Shield, 147 F.3d 774, 777 (8th Cir. 1998). In this review, we consider only the

evidence that was before the Committee when the claim was denied. Id.

"The Plan provided that employees terminated for 'Cause' would not receive

severance pay under the Plan." Johnson, 424 F.3d at 736. This court has already

determined that the Committee could reasonably interpret "Cause" to include:

 "violations of U.S. Bancorp's policies forbidding an employee to 'access

data that you are not authorized to access,' and requiring an employee to

'[e]nsure that all of your computer access is on a need-to-know basis and

is limited to the information required to perform your job,' at least where

such violations are knowing and willful." 

Id., at 739. 

Accordingly, the issue before the Committee was whether Anderson had

knowingly and willfully violated U.S. Bancorp policy by accessing the salary file

without permission or an adequate job related reason. The Committee's decision that

Appellate Case: 06-3216 Page: 14 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302018
-15-

Anderson knowingly and willfully violated these policies is supported by substantial

evidence.

When first asked about his accessing of the file, Anderson made statements to

Morgan that could be reasonably construed as admitting that he had accessed the file

without authorization and without a job related purpose. Morgan's notes reflect that

Anderson told her that he opened the file simply to see if he could do so. He later told

Morgan that he would have answered differently if he had known that it was going to

"lead to this." 

Although Anderson submitted to the Committee that he was mistaken when he

initially denied having a business reason for accessing the file, he never identified for

the Committee's benefit the project in which he was engaged that would have required

access to the file. As in Johnson it was reasonable for the Committee to take into

account Anderson's admissions and his failure to assert a lack of knowledge as a

defense in concluding that he acted knowingly and willfully, as opposed to

unintentionally, in accessing the file. See id. at 739-40.

In summary, the Committee considered the results of the investigation ordered

by Ashcraft, but also afforded Anderson ample opportunity to present additional

information. The Committee complied with Anderson's requests for documents,

information, and access to employees. Through the claim and appeal process,

Anderson conceded that he had deliberately accessed the 2002 salary reconciliation

file, although he had asserted that he had a legitimate need to do so. The Committee

conducted a full and fair review, and its finding that Anderson was terminated for

cause is supported by substantial evidence.

V.

 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-3216 Page: 15 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302018