Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03095/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03095-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Anthony Studevent
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 5, 1997 Decided July 8, 1997 

No. 96-3095

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ROBERT ANTHONY STUDEVENT,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 95cr00175-01)

L. Barrett Boss, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued 

the cause for the appellant. A.J. Kramer, Federal Public 

Defender, and Frances H. Pratt, Attorney, were on brief.

Jeanne M. Hauch, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for the appellee. Eric H. Holder, Jr., United 

States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Thomas C. Black and 

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Harry R. Benner, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on 

brief.

Before: WALD, HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by 

Circuit Judge TATEL.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Robert A. 

Studevent (Studevent) appeals his 18-month sentence for 

bank fraud. He argues principally that the district court 

should have limited the "intended loss" attributed to his theft 

and forgery of checks under application note 7 to section 

2F1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or 

Guidelines) to an amount that was realistic or at least possible. In his view, the fact that he was enmeshed in a 

government sting and thus could have caused no actual loss 

should limit the amount of intended loss attributed to his 

crime. Studevent argues in the alternative that the district 

court misunderstood its authority to depart downward pursuant to application note 10 to section 2F1.1. We reject both 

assignments of error and affirm Studevent's sentence.

I. FACTS

In January 1995, Studevent gave Anthony Wallace, his 

employer at the time, a blank check he had stolen from a 

former employer. Wallace made out the stolen check for 

$28,759.97 and deposited it in his company's account. Studevent received $3,110.95 from the proceeds. As a result of 

that crime, a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent 

operating under the name "Bob Vieta" contacted Studevent 

through an acquaintance and offered to fence any further 

stolen checks Studevent could obtain.

Studevent did steal a number of additional checks. Studevent met with his FBI fence five times between April and 

July 1995 and sold him eleven stolen checks. The FBI agent 

told Studevent to whom to make out the checks and gave him 

a ballpark figure for the amount of each check. Studevent 

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decided the actual amounts and signed the checks. Including 

the one given to Wallace, the checks were made out for a 

total of $535,592.35. Studevent received $5,700 from the FBI 

agent for the eleven checks.

Studevent was arrested on July 6, 1995 and charged with 

one count of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 

2, five counts of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, 

eleven counts of possession of a forged security in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 513(a) and one count of obstruction of correspondence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1702. On December 6, 1995, 

Studevent pleaded guilty to a single violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1344. After the government and Studevent filed sentencing memoranda, the district court attributed an intended loss 

of $535,592.35 to Studevent's fraud and sentenced him to 18 

months' imprisonment, the bottom of the applicable Guidelines range. United States v. Studevent, Criminal Case No. 

95-0175, Memorandum and Order at 2-4 (D.D.C. May 30, 

1996) (Memorandum and Order), reprinted at Appellant's 

App. 139-41; Appellant's App. 146. The court declined to 

depart downward on the ground that the intended loss overstated the seriousness of the crime. Memorandum and Order 

at 4, reprinted at Appellant's App. 141.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Calculation of Loss

Guidelines section 2F1.1, which governs sentencing for 

various forms of fraud, ties a defendant's sentence to the 

amount of loss caused by his fraud. Application note 7 to the 

section explains that, "if an intended loss that the defendant 

was attempting to inflict can be determined, this figure will 

be used if it is greater than the actual loss." U.S.S.G. 

§ 2F1.1 application n.7. Studevent argues that intended loss 

should be limited to the loss that he realistically could have 

caused. Under his theory, the district court's loss calculation 

should not have included the checks he passed to the FBI 

agent because there was no possibility that those checks 

would be deposited and their rightful possessors defrauded 

and because there was no evidence that the accounts on which 

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1

In addition, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court's use of 

"economic reality" to limit the loss calculation for a fraud sentence. 

United States v. Dozie, 27 F.3d 95, 99 (4th Cir. 1994). The decision 

in Dozie, however, rested on application note 7's former reference 

to "probable or intended loss." Id.; see also United States v. 

Holiusa, 13 F.3d 1043, 1045-46 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing significance of "probable or intended loss" language). The term "probable" was deleted effective November 1, 1991. U.S.S.G. App. C, 

amend. 393. 

2The government asserts that the First, Second and Fourth 

Circuits also adopted this position in United States v. Haggert, 980 

F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1992), United States v. Agwu, 5 F.3d 614 (2d Cir. 

1993), and United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1321 (4th Cir. 1996), 

respectively. Haggert, however, addresses the separate question 

whether a sight draft is a loan application and thus comes within 

the exception under which actual rather than intended loss is used 

to calculate the sentence for a fraudulent loan application. Haggert,

980 F.2d at 12-13. Agwu discusses the mechanics of the loss 

calculation for stolen money orders on which no amounts are filled 

out and whether economic gain is the proper measure of loss. 

Agwu, 5 F.3d at 615. Williams focuses on whether the fraud at 

the checks were drawn were open and contained sufficient 

funds. We disagree.

Studevent relies principally on the Tenth Circuit's decision 

in United States v. Galbraith, 20 F.3d 1054 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 513 U.S. 889 (1994). In Galbraith, the Tenth Circuit 

held that "the loss [the] defendant subjectively intended to 

cause is not controlling if he was incapable of inflicting that 

loss" and accordingly concluded that the appropriate amount 

of loss to attribute to a defendant caught in a sting operation 

is zero. Id. at 1059; see also United States v. Santiago, 977 

F.2d 517, 526 (10th Cir. 1992). The Sixth Circuit has adopted 

the same position, holding that "intended loss must have been 

possible to be deemed relevant."1 United States v. Watkins,

994 F.2d 1192, 1196 (6th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. 

Khan, 969 F.2d 218, 221 (6th Cir. 1992). The Fifth, Seventh 

and Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, have decided that a 

defendant need not have been capable of inflicting the intended loss under Guidelines section 2F1.1.2 United States v. 

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Ismoila, 100 F.3d 380, 396 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The fact that the 

victims were not at risk for the charges above their credit 

limit is not dispositive."); United States v. Coffman, 94 F.3d 

330, 336 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting argument "that a loss that 

cannot possibly occur cannot be intended), cert. denied, 117 

S. Ct. 1425, 1426 (1997); United States v. Koenig, 952 F.2d 

267, 271-72 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[S]ection 2F1.1 only requires a 

calculation of 'intended loss' and does not require a finding 

that the intentions were realistic."). We agree with the Fifth, 

Seventh and Ninth Circuits on the issue.

As an initial matterand most importantlyapplication 

note 7 does not qualify "intended loss" in any way. See 

Ismoila, 100 F.3d at 396 ("plain language of comment 7 

makes clear" that "intent is critical" regardless of likelihood 

of success); United States v. Robinson, 94 F.3d 1325, 1328 

(9th Cir. 1996) (under "plain meaning reading" of application 

note 7, nothing "mandates that the defendant be capable of 

inflicting the loss he intends"). Application note 7 does state 

that intended loss should be used "[c]onsistent with the 

provisions of § 2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation, or Conspiracy)" 

and section 2X1.1 calls for a three-point reduction in offense 

level if the offense was not completed. Section 2X1.1 does 

not suggest, however, that intended loss should be limited by 

economic reality. Instead, section 2X1.1(a) refers to "any 

intended offense conduct" without qualification and application notes 2 and 4 to section 2X1.1 indicate that a defendant 

should be sentenced based on what he intended even if he did 

not succeed, if his intent can be determined with specificity 

and if the offense level for his intended conduct minus three 

points is greater than for his actual conduct.

The United States Sentencing Commission (Commission) 

currently is considering whether to add language to application note 7 regarding impossibility or economic reality. Sen-

___________________

issue was completed and thus whether the cross-reference to section 2X1.1 contained in application note 9 to section 2F1.1 applied. 

Williams, 81 F.3d at 1327-28. None of the three cases addresses 

whether intended loss should be limited by impossibility or improbability and the government identifies no other cases on point from 

those circuits. 

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tencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 62 Fed. Reg. 

152, 173 (1997) ("[T]he Commission invites comment on 

whether intended loss should be limited by concepts of 'economic reality' or impossibility, such as in a government sting 

operation...."). Unless and until it does so, however, the 

application note should be applied as written. See United 

States v. Smaw, 22 F.3d 330, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("We owe 

the Sentencing Commission's commentary on its own guidelines the same treatment as we afford 'an agency's interpretation of its own legislative rules.' " (quoting Stinson v. United 

States, 508 U.S. 36, 44 (1993))). We therefore decline to graft 

an impossibility or improbability limitation onto the Commission's intended loss provision.

Application note 10 to section 2F1.1 bolsters our reading of 

the plain language of application note 7. Note 10 authorizes a 

downward departure "where a defendant attempted to negotiate an instrument that was so obviously fraudulent that no 

one would seriously consider honoring it." U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 

application n.10. It would be unnecessary to authorize such a 

departure if the unlikelihood of success already limited the 

intended loss attributable to a defendant under application 

note 7. See Coffman, 94 F.3d at 336 (application note 10 

"implies that the unlikelihood of an actual loss does not affect 

the computation of the 'intended loss' ").

Our reading also accords with the general scheme of the 

Guidelines. One of the Guidelines' goals is to tailor punishment to a defendant's particular degree of culpability. See

U.S.S.G. subpart 1A3 ("Congress sought proportionality in 

sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity."). 

Limiting intended loss to that which was likely or possible, 

however, would eliminate the distinction between a defendant 

whose only ambition was to make some pocket change and 

one who plotted a million-dollar fraud. See Coffman, 94 F.3d 

at 336 (argument that intended loss is limited by impossibility 

"would, if accepted, irrationally erase any distinction in the 

severity of punishment between a defendant who tries to 

defraud his victim of $1,000 and a defendant who tries to 

defraud his victim of $1,000,000"). We recognize that in some 

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cases intended loss may drastically overstate the gravity of an 

offense. The Guidelines, however, already provide for that 

event: a sentencing court has the discretion to depart downward if it determines intended loss overrepresents culpability. 

See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 application n.10. Rather than, as Studevent proposes, sentencing for an intended loss of zero and 

departing upward on the ground of underrepresentation, it is 

more in keeping with section 2F1.1's design to sentence for 

the full amount of the intended loss and depart downward. 

See Coffman, 94 F.3d at 336-37 ("[T]he place for mitigation 

on the basis of a large discrepancy between intended and 

probable loss is, under the guidelines, in the decision whether 

to depart downward, rather than in the calculation of the 

intended loss.").

Studevent nevertheless urges us to conclude that a government sting is a special case in which, although actual loss is 

not possible, law enforcement officials can lure the target into 

committing himself to vast amounts of intended loss. His 

proposal to limit the use of intended loss in cases involving 

stings, however, finds no support in the Guidelines. With no 

language in the Guidelines to support a sting exception, we 

are guided by the principle that, "in the absence of clear 

evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [public officers] 

have properly discharged their official duties." United States 

v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 806 (1995) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 

U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)). In that regard, Studevent's description 

of the potential abuses of a sting seems particularly unconvincing given that he began to engage in check fraud before 

the government arrived on the scene and continued to play a 

significant role, including deciding the amount of each fraudulent check, after the sting was underway.

Studevent goes on to argue that the Guidelines in general 

and the theft and fraud sections in particular focus on actual 

loss. It is less than clear, however, that actual loss is a 

dominant principle of the Guidelines. The Guidelines are 

replete, for example, with provisions focusing on intent and 

mental culpability. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 application n.1 

("If the defendant did not cause the death intentionally or 

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3Although we decide as a matter of law that intended loss is not 

limited by impossibility or improbability, we note that even if we 

agreed with the Galbraith court's view of the law we would reach 

the same result. The victim in Galbraitha pension fund to which 

overvalued stock was to be soldwas a Potemkin institution fabricated by law enforcement officials. Galbraith thus never could have 

defrauded anyone. Studevent, on the other hand, stole checks from 

real entities and thus had real potential victims who could have 

been defrauded but for the intervention of the FBI. Accordingly, 

we would affirm Studevent's sentence even if Galbraith were correct as a matter of law. See Coffman, 94 F.3d at 337 ("But even if 

... [Galbraith and similar cases] were decided correctly, they 

would not carry the day for defendants."); United States v. Falcioni, 45 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1995) (distinguishing Galbraith on 

ground that Falcioni's intended victim actually existed); see also 

United States v. Sheets, 65 F.3d 752, 753-54 (8th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing Watkins, 994 F.2d at 1196, on ground that Sheets had 

actual victim and took all steps necessary for fraud to succeed). 

4Even if the status of the accounts (all of which were in the 

names of business entities) were relevant, there is nothing impossible or even improbable about their being open and containing 

adequate funds. Although the checks were facially bona fide and 

drawn on financial institutions of uncontested liquidity, to satisfy 

Studevent the government presumably would have to introduce 

knowingly, a downward departure may be warranted."); id.

§ 5K2.13 (authorizing downward departure on ground of "significantly reduced mental capacity"). In any event, the 

Guidelines-wide significance of actual loss is irrelevant. Studevent does not contest that application note 7 to section 

2F1.1 makes intended loss the pertinent figure.

We therefore conclude that intended loss under application 

note 7 to Guidelines section 2F1.1 is not limited to an amount 

that was possible or likely.3 Accordingly, the district court 

did not err when it ascribed to Studevent the full amount of 

the intended loss even though he was involved in a government sting. The district court also properly held Studevent 

responsible for the total amount for which the checks were 

written despite the absence of evidence that the victims' 

accounts were open and contained sufficient funds.4 AlUSCA Case #96-3095 Document #283295 Filed: 07/08/1997 Page 8 of 13
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though intended loss may not always be easy to calculate, 

here the defendant memorialized the amount of intended loss 

in writing to the penny and he may not benefit from the 

likelihood that his ability to inflict that loss was slim to nonexistent.

B. Other Issues

Studevent contends that the district court should have 

considered whether to grant him the three-point downward 

adjustment under Guidelines section 2X1.1 for uncompleted 

attempts. Section 2X1.1(b)(1) provides for a three-point decrease for an attempt "unless the defendant completed all the 

acts the defendant believed necessary for successful completion of the substantive offense." Studevent asserts for the 

first time on appeal that he was entitled to the adjustment. 

By not raising it below, he waived the point and we review 

only for plain error. See United States v. Foster, 988 F.2d 

206, 209 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 945 (1993).

The district court did not plainly err, if it erred at all, in not 

granting Studevent the downward adjustment sua sponte.

The adjustment does not apply if "the defendant completed 

all the acts the defendant believed necessary for successful 

completion of the substantive offense." U.S.S.G. 

§ 2X1.1(b)(1). In this case, Studevent stole the checks, filled 

them out and turned them over to the person he believed was 

a fence. By so doing, he completed all of the acts he thought 

he had to in order to complete the offense. Moreover, 

Studevent pleaded guilty to fraud, not to attempted fraud. It 

thus is not "more than obvious or readily apparent," United 

States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 n.14 (1985), that Studevent 

was entitled to the adjustment.

Finally, Studevent argues that the district court misunderstood its authority to grant him a downward departure under 

application note 10 to Guidelines section 2F1.1. That note 

____________________

evidence that, among other things, the accounts contained at least 

the amount of funds for which each check was written on or after 

the date on which it was written. We decline to impose such a 

burden on the government. 

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5We reject the government's contention that Studevent's failure 

to object to and seek clarification of the district court's ruling on his 

downward departure request means that the issue is not properly 

before us. It is the defendant's duty to elicit the district court's 

reasons for refusing to grant a downward departure and, in the 

absence of any indication of the court's actual decision process, we 

will assume that the court reached its decision for the right reasons. 

United States v. Pinnick, 47 F.3d 434, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("[T]he 

appellant, not us, has the initial responsibility to ensure that the 

district court explains its reasoning for the record."). In this case, 

however, the memorandum opinion states the district court's rationale for not granting a downward departure. Pinnick does not 

require Studevent to pester the court to regurgitate its rationale. 

states in relevant part that "[i]n a few instances, the loss 

determined under subsection (b)(1) may overstate the seriousness of the offense" and that "[i]n such cases, a downward 

departure may be warranted." U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 application 

n.10. While a sentencing court's "discretionary decision that 

the particular circumstances of a given case do not warrant a 

departure" is unreviewable, a refusal to depart is reviewable 

"if it rests on a 'misconstruction of [the court's] authority to 

depart.' "5 United States v. Pinnick, 47 F.3d 434, 439 (D.C. 

Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 1293, 

1296 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).

In Studevent's view, the district court mistakenly believed 

it could not grant the downward departure under application 

note 10 unless it could ascribe to him an amount of loss lower 

than the $535,592.35 in intended loss. In support of his 

position, he observes that the court commented that "the 

$535,000 figure does somewhat overstate the seriousness of 

Studevent's crimes" but then stated "[n]evertheless, there is 

no rational number to put on the loss other than the sum of 

the checks themselves." Memorandum and Order at 4, reprinted at Appellant's App. 141. Taken in context, however, 

the latter statement indicates not that the court misunderstood its authority but that it rejected Studevent's rationale 

for his request. Studevent based his request first and foremost on the ground that "it was the undercover agent who 

controlled Mr. Studevent's sentencing exposure by determinUSCA Case #96-3095 Document #283295 Filed: 07/08/1997 Page 10 of 13
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ing the amount of each check and the duration of the investigation." Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum at 5, United 

States v. Studevent, Criminal Case No. 95-0175 (D.D.C. 1996), 

reprinted at Appellant's App. 50. Thus, when it observed 

that there was no rational number for the losses other than 

the amount for which the checks were written, the court was 

simply responding to the factual argument Studevent had 

advanced in support of his request. To drive that point 

home, the court went on to observe that "[t]he investigation 

clearly was directed not only at gathering evidence against 

Studevent but also at discovering others who might have been 

involved" and was not unreasonably prolonged. Memorandum and Order at 4, reprinted at Appellant's App. 141. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court was aware of 

the nature of its authority to depart but found Studevent's 

request for the departure less than compelling.

For the foregoing reasons, Studevent's sentence is

Affirmed.

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TATEL, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 

part: I agree that the district court properly increased 

Studevent's offense level under subsection 2F1.1(b)(1) of the 

Guidelines to reflect intended loss. Because I believe the 

district court may have " 'misconstru[ed] ... its authority to 

depart,' " United States v. Pinnick, 47 F.3d 434, 439 (D.C. 

Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 1293, 

1296 (D.C. Cir. 1991)), under application note 10 of section 

2F1.1, however, I would remand for reconsideration of Studevent's request for a downward departure.

The district court found that its $535,592 loss determination 

"somewhat overstate[d] the seriousness of Studevent's 

crimes" but denied the departure request, at least in part, 

because "[n]evertheless, there [was] no rational number to 

put on the loss other than the sum of the checks themselves." 

United States v. Studevent, Crim. No. 95-0175, Memorandum 

and Order at 4 (D.D.C. May 30, 1996), reprinted in Appellant's App. 139-41. Unlike my colleagues, I doubt that the 

latter statement simply reflects the district court's rejection 

of Studevent's sentencing entrapment claim. In my view, it 

suggests instead that the district court may have believed 

that a downward departure under note 10 required an alternative loss figure. Having already determined that the loss 

under subsection (b)(1) overstated the seriousness of the 

offense, however, the question for the district court was 

whether Studevent's offense level warranted reduction to 

rectify the concededly imperfect fit between the loss calculation and his degree of culpability, not whether another dollar 

figure better described the loss.

The record suggests that the district court might have 

answered the correct question had it not felt limited by its 

inability to calculate an alternative loss figure. Reaching the 

correct result on the intended loss issue, the district court 

nevertheless appeared troubled by its implications for Studevent. At a presentencing hearing, the district judge asked 

defense counsel to "give [him] a vehicle" to distinguish the 

Government's authorities, stating, "I am not disinclined to 

what it is that you're proposing ... I will take all the help 

that you can give me." Tr. (Apr. 3, 1996) at 5. After being 

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"[f]orced to choose" between the views of our sister circuits, 

Memorandum and Order at 3, reprinted in Appellant's App. 

140, not only did the district court find that Studevent's 

intended losses "somewhat overstated" the gravity of his 

offense, but it also listed several factors which it apparently 

thought might warrant a departure, including the modest sum 

Studevent actually gained from his crimes. See Id. at 4, 

reprinted in Appellant's App. 141. Although I am not sure 

whether all the district court's concerns could serve as the 

basis for a note 10 departure, the great disparity between the 

intended and probable losses in this case certainly could. 

Especially because our ruling on the intended loss issue relies 

heavily on the analysis in United States v. Coffman, 94 F.3d 

330 (7th Cir. 1996)a case undecided when the district court 

considered Studevent's requestI would give the district 

court, freed from the need to calculate an alternative loss 

figure, an opportunity to reconsider whether Studevant's case 

warrants a departure.

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