Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01276/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01276-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
James Alan McQueed
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES ALAN MCQUEED

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-1276-KJN

ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff James Alan McQueed moves to remand this case for further administrative 

proceedings pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) in light of a subsequent favorable 

disability determination by defendant Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). (ECF 

No. 18.) The Commissioner has opposed the motion, and plaintiff subsequently filed a reply 

brief. (ECF Nos. 19, 20.) After carefully considering the parties’ written briefing, the court’s 

record, and the applicable law, the court DENIES plaintiff’s motion. 

BACKGROUND

In October 2012, plaintiff filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and 

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI, respectively, of the Social 

Security Act (“Act”), alleging that he had been disabled as of October 31, 2010. (AT 19.) After 

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plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, plaintiff requested a hearing 

before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), which took place on September 8, 2014, and at 

which plaintiff, represented by an attorney, and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. (AT 19, 36-

84.) Thereafter, on January 8, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision finding plaintiff not disabled. (AT 

19-30.) 

In that January 8, 2015 decision, the ALJ found, inter alia, that plaintiff suffered from

severe impairments, including a left forearm desmoid tumor, but that plaintiff did not meet or 

equal a Listing, and retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a limited range 

of light work, including additional restrictions involving his left upper extremity. (AT 21, 23-24.) 

Based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was unable to perform his past 

work, but could perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. 

(AT 28-29.) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not been under a disability, as 

defined in the Act, from October 31, 2010, plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date, through 

January 8, 2015, the date of the ALJ’s decision. (AT 30.)

The ALJ’s January 8, 2015 decision became the final decision of the Commissioner after 

the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review on April 15, 2015. (AT 1-3.) On June 

5, 2015, plaintiff then filed this action in federal district court to seek judicial review of the 

Commissioner’s final decision. (ECF No. 1.)

During that same time period, plaintiff also filed a new application for disability benefits, 

alleging an onset date of January 9, 2015. On August 21, 2015, the Commissioner granted that 

application at the initial level, finding that plaintiff became disabled on January 9, 2015, the day 

after the date of the previous unfavorable ALJ decision. (ECF No. 18-1.) Based on that 

subsequent favorable disability determination, plaintiff seeks a sentence six remand, which the 

Commissioner opposes.

DISCUSSION 

Sentence six of section 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) provides, in part, that the court may “at any 

time order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of Social Security, but only 

upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the 

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failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding....” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a sentence six remand is appropriate “where a 

subsequent, approved disability application had an onset date that was close in time to the denial 

under review and where it was unclear from the record whether the two decisions were 

reconcilable.” Nguyen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 489 Fed. App’x 209, 210 (9th Cir. Dec. 

28, 2012) (unpublished) (citing Luna v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1032, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2010)).

The parties disagree as to the import of the Ninth Circuit’s Luna decision. The 

Commissioner contends that when the underlying facts and procedural history of Luna are

considered, Luna cannot be read to hold that a subsequent favorable decision by itself, and 

without consideration of underlying evidence, necessarily requires a sentence six remand. 

Plaintiff disagrees. However, the court need not resolve the parties’ dispute in this case. Even 

assuming, without deciding, that a subsequent favorable decision by itself could constitute new 

and material evidence, remand is not warranted in this case, because the record before the court 

shows that the two decisions at issue are reconcilable.

In rendering the challenged January 8, 2015 decision in this case, the ALJ had considered 

plaintiff’s medical records through approximately September 4, 2014. (AT 33-35.) Thereafter, 

on August 4, 2015, as part of the adjudication of plaintiff’s second application, state agency 

physician Dr. George Spellman found that there had been a change in medical circumstances 

since the ALJ’s January 8, 2015 decision, because the medical evidence showed that the desmoid 

tumor was now persistent (and in fact, progressive) despite antineoplastic therapy, and was 

affecting function with demonstrable weakness. (ECF No. 19-1.) As such, Dr. Spellman opined 

that plaintiff met Listing 13.04(B).1 (Id.) In setting forth his opinion, Dr. Spellman relied on 

medical records from March 2015 to June 2015, specifically noting that when a March 30, 2015 

MRI was compared to an August 27, 2014 MRI, the tumor had increased in size despite prior 

surgery, chemotherapy, radiation, and medication. (Id.) Therefore, substantial evidence in the 

record before the court supports the Commissioner’s determination that there had been a material

 

1

Listing 13.04(B) requires a soft tissue sarcoma that is persistent or recurrent following initial 

anticancer therapy. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, § 13.04(B). 

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change in medical circumstances after the ALJ’s January 8, 2015 decision. 

To be sure, at an initial glance, it may seem peculiar that a claimant could be deemed not 

disabled on one day and disabled the next. Indeed, in some cases, such findings would be

troublingly inconsistent and may require further clarification. However, in other cases, such as 

this one, such findings are plainly attributable to harmless administrative expediency, which 

ultimately worked in the claimant’s favor. Here, Dr. Spellman relied on medical records from 

March 2015 to June 2015 to support his finding that plaintiff met a Listing. Instead of parsing out 

exactly when after the ALJ’s January 8, 2015 decision plaintiff’s condition became disabling 

(whether in March 2015, April 2015, or May 2015, etc.), it appears that the Commissioner simply

generously assessed plaintiff’s disability onset date as January 9, 2015, which was the day after 

the prior unfavorable decision and also the disability onset date alleged by plaintiff in his second 

application. While this may have been a somewhat imprecise approach, resulting in the 

appearance of an inconsistency, such lack of precision ultimately did not prejudice plaintiff. 

Consequently, the court finds that the two decisions are reconcilable on the record before 

the court, and no sentence six remand is warranted. 

Finally, plaintiff suggests that if the court denies his motion for a sentence six remand, 

plaintiff should be permitted an opportunity to move for a sentence four remand. In a single 

sentence in the opening brief, plaintiff contends that “it is evident there are other issues in this 

case, such as the ALJ’s failure to give any reasons for rejecting the consultative psychologist’s 

opinion that Plaintiff would have severe difficulty managing work stress and his failure to order a 

consultative examination to determine Plaintiff’s physical limitations.” (ECF No. 18 at 5-6.)

The court declines plaintiff’s invitation to give him a second bite at the apple. The court’s 

scheduling order required plaintiff’s brief in support of his motion for summary judgment and/or 

remand to set forth all of his legal claims along with “argument separately addressing each 

claimed error.” (ECF No. 7.) Any request to modify the scheduling order was required to be 

made by written motion. (Id.) Here, no motion to modify the scheduling order was made, and 

the court never authorized bifurcated briefing as to issues pertaining to sentence four and sentence 

six remands. Thus, plaintiff was required to adequately raise and substantively argue all issues in 

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his opening motion, regardless of the type of relief requested. Indeed, nothing prevented plaintiff 

from raising alternative arguments as to different types of remand. Instead, plaintiff substantively 

briefed only the issues pertaining to a sentence six remand, and made only the most cursory of 

reference to potential issues that may warrant a sentence four remand. Because plaintiff failed to 

argue those issues with any specificity in his briefing, any such issues are waived. See Carmickle 

v. Comm’r, 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for a remand pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is 

DENIED. 

2. The final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is AFFIRMED and 

judgment is entered for the Commissioner.

3. The Clerk of Court shall close this case.

This order resolves ECF Nos. 18 and 19. 

Dated: August 9, 2016

 

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