Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06446/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06446-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Terry Lynn Culton
Petitioner
Gail Lewis
Respondent

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 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus and Respondent’s answer to the

petition.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRY LYNN CULTON

Petitioner,

v.

GAIL LEWIS, WARDEN

Respondent.

 /

CV F 03-6446 OWW DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial in the Kern County Superior Court of

possessing cocaine (Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 11350(a)), and one count of possessing narcotic

paraphernalia. (Id. § 11364.) Further, it was found true that Petitioner committed a felony while

released on bail (Cal. Pen. Code, § 12022.1.), he had a prior conviction for involuntary

manslaughter while using a firearm, (Cal. Pen. Code, §§ 192(b), 12022.5) and three prior

convictions for burglary (Cal. Pen. Code, § 450). Petitioner was sentenced to 11 years and four

months in state prison.

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Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on April 3, 2002. (Exhibit C,

attached to Answer.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. The petition was

denied on June 19, 2002. (Exhibit E, attached to Answer.)

On October 24, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Kern

County Superior Court. (Exhibit F, attached to Answer.) The petition was denied on November

22, 2002. (Exhibit G, attached to Answer.)

On December 9, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. (Exhibit H, attached to Answer.) The

petition was denied on January 15, 2003. (Exhibit I, attached to Answer.)

On January 27, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court, which was denied on September 17, 2003. (Exhibits J & K, attached to

Answer.)

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court on October 16,

2003, raising the following four claims for relief: (1) that his due process right was violated by

the exclusion of evidence of third-party culpability; (2) that his due process right was violated by

the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on third-party culpability; (3) that the evidence was

insufficient to support his conviction in count three of possessing rock cocaine; and (4) that his

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate third-party culpability and argue the

absence of officer safety in the suppression motion relating to counts one and two - the

possession of rock cocaine and narcotic paraphernalia. Petition at 5-6. 

The Court directed Respondent to file a response to the petition on January 30, 2004. 

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on April 5, 2004, arguing that the petition was a “mixed”

petition and that Claim 4 was unexhausted. On June 2, 2004, the Court issued a recommendation

that the motion to dismiss be granted. Petitioner filed objections on June 9, 2004, along with a

motion to withdraw the unexhausted claim and proceed with the exhausted claims only. 

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On June 16, 2004, the Court vacated the recommendation of April 5, 2004, granted

Petitioner’s request to withdraw the unexhausted claim (Claim 4), and recommended that

Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition be denied as the petition no longer contained

unexhausted claims.

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on October 13, 2004, and Petitioner filed a

traverse on November 1, 2004.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

October 29, 1999, Incident - Counts 1 and 2

On October 29, 1999, at about 4 a.m., Bakersfield Police Officer Christopher Campbell

and his partner officer Tim Brown were driving through the parking lot of the Tropicana Motel

when Paula Juarez summoned them to room 111. (RT 30-33; 37-38, 79-80.) Ms. Juarez told the

officers that a black male by the name of Donald, who was wanted by the police, had been at the

motel several times recently and was likely still in the vicinity. (RT 34-35.) Officer Brown

walked through the motel room to an interior courtyard area and officer Campbell drove to the

back of the motel. Officer Campbell observed someone matching the description walking away

from the motel. (RT 34-36, 80, 90.) After a chase, officers subsequently arrested Donald Seals,

who also went by the name of Donald Fields. (RT 34-36.) At around this same time,William

Lark Cooper was also arrested on an outstanding warrant. (RT 36-37.) Officers did not find or

seize any narcotics or paraphernalia from either male. (RT 40, 58, 80.) 

After making the arrests the officers returned to room 111 to ask Ms. Juarez whether the

Donald they had arrested was the same Donald she complained about. (RT 37, 91.) Officer

Brown knocked on the door and then he and officer Campbell entered the room where they

encountered Paula Juarez, Gloria Ortiz and Petitioner. (RT 38-39, 80-81.) Officer Brown

conducted a pat-down search of Petitioner and discovered a cylindrical tube of glass, burned at

one end, with a Brillo pad stuffed into one end, which he handed to officer Campbell. (RT 39-

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 There were no burn marks or cocaine base residue on the pipe and officer Campbell admitted he did not

know if the pipe had been used for smoking cocaine. (RT 63-65, 68, 84, 93.) 

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41, 43, 81-84.) Officers testified that the pipe was of the type commonly used to ingest cocaine

base.2 (RT 46-47.) 

Officer Brown subsequently discovered, in Petitioner’s left back pant pocket, a small

plastic baggie containing an off-white substance. (RT 47, 62, 85, People’s Exhibit 2.) In the

front pouch of Petitioner’s sweatshirt, officer Brown discovered a large chunk of an off-white

chunky substance consistent with rock cocaine base, which he handed to officer Campbell. (RT

86.)

Later, at the police station, officer Campbell weighed the substances. The first item was

.4 grams of suspected cocaine and the second was one gram of suspected cocaine. (RT 54-55.)

Officer Campbell subsequently placed the seized items in an evidence envelope booked them

into the police property room, after writing the name “Donald Fields” on it as the suspect from

whom the baggie was taken. (RT 47-48, 50, 63.) At trial, officer Campbell testified that he

wrote the wrong name on the baggie, and that the baggie had actually been taken from Petitioner. 

(RT 50-51.) Later analysis revealed the substances to be 0.28 grams and 0.94 grams of

substances containing cocaine base. (RT 147-153.) The examining criminalist was of the 

opinion the two rocks amounted to a usable quantity of cocaine base. (RT 149-151, 155-156.) 

November 1, 1999, Incident - Count 3

On November 1, 1999, Bakersfield Police Officer Joseph Dougherty was patrolling with

his partner, officer DeLeon, when they drove into the parking lot of the Tropicana Motel. (RT

95-96, 125-126.) Officer Dougherty observed Petitioner walking on the upstairs tier of the hotel

and then down the stairs, looking in the officer’s direction. (RT 97, 126.) Petitioner walked

down the stairs, looked in the officers’ direction and appeared to see them. (RT 98, 127.) When

at the bottom of the stairs, Petitioner continued to walk toward the officers until he passed

behind, what appeared to be an inoperable red pickup truck that was parked in a stall in the

parking lot. (RT 99, 127, 129.) Petitioner dipped his right shoulder, squatted down and then

stood up again. (RT 100-101, 134.) Officer Dougherty testified that this was a known area

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 Officer Dougherty admitted that, given the fact that the Tropicana Hotel was in a high crime area and

commonly known for drug trafficking, it was possible that the bag of cocaine could have been lying in the parking lot

before Petitioner went behind the truck. (RT 113-114.)

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commonly used for drug trafficking, and he thought that Petitioner might have been attempting to

dispose of drugs or drug paraphernalia. (RT 98-101, 129.) 

Officer Dougherty parked the patrol car and officer DeLeon made contact with Petitioner. 

(RT 101-102.) Petitioner reached into his pocket, and officer DeLeon told him not to do that. 

(RT 102-103.) Petitioner indicated that he had a box cutter in his back pocket, officer DeLeon

seized it with Petitioner’s permission. (RT 103, 128.) Officer Dougherty then noticed an open,

torn piece of a baggie next to the red pickup truck in the same area where Petitioner had stopped. 

(RT 104, 135-136.) Officer DeLeon picked up the baggie, which was between the stairwell and

the pickup truck. (RT 129.) The baggie contained two white rocks that were believed to be

cocaine base. (RT 104-105.) The substance was later found to weigh approximately two grams

of cocaine. (RT 141.) The officers later examined the box cutter and noticed a white powerdy

substance on it, which they believed to be cocaine. (RT 108-110, 132.) Neither officer observed

Petitioner actually holding the cocaine base and did not see him throw it. (RT 111-112, 128,

133.) The parties stipulated that no usable fingerprints were found on the baggie seized from the

parking lot of the Tropicana Motel on November 1, 1999.3 (RT 180.)

A criminalist later examined the substance and determined it to be 1.44 grams of a

substance containing cocaine base. (RT 172-173.) The criminalist was of the opinion that it was

a usable amount of cocaine base. (RT 173-174.) The criminalist also tested the residue found on

the blade of the box-cutter taken from Petitioner and determined that it contained cocaine base,

but it was not a usable quantity. (RT 153-156.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

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529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered

violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises

out of the Kern County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.

1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct.

1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant

petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

B. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus

will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade,123 S.Ct.1166 (2003) (disapproving of

the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1175 (citations

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omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual

findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115

S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day,

110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997).

C. Due Process Violation - Exclusion of Third-Party Culpability Evidence

Petitioner contends that trial court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence of the

third-party culpability. Specifically, Petitioner contends that the trial court violated his due

process rights because it excluded evidence that the drugs seized from him might have come

from Fields or Cooper. (Pet. at 5.)

Although the Supreme Court has not articulated a bright line test for determining when

the trial court must allow a defendant to introduce evidence of third-party culpability. The Ninth

Circuit has however held that where the proffered evidence simply affords a possible ground of

suspicion against a third party and does not directly connect that person with the actual

commission of the offense, that evidence may be excluded. See People of Territory of Guam v.

Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608, 615 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir.

1983). 

Petitioner’s claim fails. The state courts’ determination that the exclusion of evidence

that did not directly link a third party to the crime was not contrary to and did not involve an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. 

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 Because the California Supreme Court’s opinion is summary in nature, this Court "looks through" that

decision and presumes it adopted the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal, the last state court to have issued a

reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991)

(establishing, on habeas review, "look through" presumption that higher court agrees with lower court's reasoning

where former affirms latter without discussion); see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n. 7 (9th Cir.2000)

(holding federal courts look to last reasoned state court opinion in determining whether state court's rejection of

petitioner's claims was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law under § 2254(d)(1)). 

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 In rejecting Petitioner’s claim on direct appeal, the Court of Appeal held:

Contrary to [Petitioner’s] contention, the court did not apply the wrong

standard. The court properly exercised its discretion under [California] Evidence

Code 352. Defense counsel was unable to make an offer of proof linking the third

person to the actual perpetration of the crime. Defense counsel’s argument that

possession of drugs might have motivated Donald Fields to run from police, is

only relevant to issues of motive or opportunity. There was no evidence,

however, that Fields planted his drugs and paraphernalia on [Petitioner], or asked

[Petitioner] to hold them while he attempted to elude the police. Under Hall,

supra, the court made the appropriate inquiries and then properly exercised its

discretion in making its ruling. 

(Exhibit C, attached to Answer, at 14-15.)4

During trial, it was established that officer Campbell mistakenly wrote the name of

Donald Fields on the evidence envelope that contained the contraband seized from Petitioner in

the motel room. During examination, officer Campbell stated that Fields did not have any drugs

or drug paraphernalia on him. (RT 40.) 

As noted by the Court of Appeal, and set forth by Respondent, defense counsel attempted

to question officer Brown regarding why Fields was arrested:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Now, Officer Brown, the second subject that you were chasing

down the street with Officer Campbell who was running from you, did he match the description

of the individual that the female in room 111 gave you?

A. She didn’t give us a description other than a subject called Donald, a black male,

so with that brief, yes, he did.

Q. Oh, so she gave you no physical description.

A. That’s correct.

Q. Now, you observed Mr. Fields running and so you decided to go and arrest him?

[PROSECUTOR]: Objection, that’s beyond the scope of direct examination of this

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witness.

THE COURT: That’s overruled.

THE WITNESS: I am sorry, I - - 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You saw this person, this Mr. Fields running so based on that,

you decided to go and arrest him?

[PROSECUTOR]: Objection, relevant as to the basis of his decision to arrest him.

THE COURT: Sustained.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: What was this person, Mr. Fields, doing that drew your

attention?

[PROSECUTOR]: Objection, relevance.

THE COURT: Sustained.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: What did you end up arresting Mr. Fields for?

[PROSECUTOR]: Objection, beyond the scope of direct, and relevance.

THE COURT: I am sustaining it on relevance grounds.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Now, Mr. Field’s name appears on that evidence envelope,

does it not?

A. That’s correct.

Q. Okay. What did you arrest him for?

A. He was arrested for interfering and delaying and also providing false information.

Q. Okay. So, up until the time that - - the basis for arresting him for interfering or

delaying was the fact that he ran away from you; is that correct?

[PROSECUTOR]: Objection, relevance.

THE COURT: Sustained. [¶] I don’t want to hear any more on this general subject matter.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Did you have any reason to suspect Mr. Fields of having drugs?

[PROSECUTOR]: Objection, relevance.

THE COURT: Sustained.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Did you talk to Mr. Fields?

A. At - - after he had been arrested by the other officers.

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Q. Okay. Did you ask him why he ran?

[PROSECUTOR]: Objection, relevance

THE COURT: Sustained. [¶] Mr. Hamilton, let me be clear. It doesn’t matter; that man is

not on trial. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Now, isn’t it true that you didn’t contact [Petitioner] until after

you had arrested Mr. Fields?

A. That’s correct.

Q. Now, how about this third person, Mr. Cooper.

What was he arrested for?

[PROSECUTOR]: Objection, relevance.

THE COURT: Sustained.

(RT 89-91.)

Under California law, “evidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in

another person, without more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant’s

guilt: there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual

perpetration of the crime.” People v. Hall, 41 Cal.3d 826, 833 (1986). California’s rule does not

offend any fundamental principle of justice or unfairly prevent a defendant from defending

against the state’s charges. See Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d at 1455. 

In Perry, the Ninth Circuit rejected a claim that the California state trial court violated

defendant’s right to present a defense and due process rights by excluding evidence that another

man of similar appearance raped a woman in the same location one hour before the assault with

which the defendant was charged. Defendant sought to prove that both men were of similar

weight and height, had distinctively braided hair, and wore brown jackets and blue jeans. Id. at

1449. The court held that, absent substantial evidence directly connecting the third party with the

actual commission of the offense, the evidence was inadmissible because it simply afforded a

ground of suspicion against a third party. Id. The Ninth Circuit found it was “sufficiently

collateral and lacking in probity.” Id. at 1445. 

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The fact that officer Campbell wrote the wrong name on the contraband evidence seized

from Petitioner, was present before the jury. The trial court agreed that the determination of

whether the officer made a mistake was an issue for the jury to decide. (RT 164-165.) This was

the only piece of evidence that defense counsel had to support his theory that the contraband

belonged to Fields. Counsel’s argument that possession of drugs might have motivated Fields to

run from police, was only relevant to issues of motive or opportunity. There was no evidence

that Fields planted his drugs and paraphernalia on Petitioner, or asked Petitioner to hold them

while he attempted to elude the police. 

Both officers unequivocally testified that the cocaine and narcotic pipe were found on

Petitioner. Officer Brown conducted a pat-search of Petitioner and found a glass pipe in his

right-rear pant pocket, which Brown handed to Campbell for booking. Brown also found a small

plastic baggy containing .28 grams of cocaine base in Petitioner’s left-rear pant pocket, and a .94

grams of cocaine base in Petitioner’s front sweatshirt pocket, which Brown handed to Campbell

for booking into police evidence.

As Respondent submits, there was no link between the seized evidence and Cooper. In

fact, defense counsel never argued that Cooper, not Petitioner, was the person from whom the

drugs and pipe were found. Indeed, defense counsel conceded that the only evidence supporting

a connection between the seized evidence and a third-party was through Field’s name on the

evidence envelope. (RT 162-163.) However, the testimony unequivocally established that no

drugs or paraphernalia were found on Fields at all. (RT 40, 80.) Officer Campbell testified that

he made a mistake in writing Field’s name, instead of Petitioner’s name, on the envelope. (RT

50-51.) Defense counsel was fully capable of and did in fact cross-examine Campbell’s

credibility at trial. (RT 51.) The jury was aware of Campbell’s mistake, that Field’s was arrested

for resisting arrest and providing false information to a police officer, and Cooper was arrested

for an outstanding warrant. (RT 36-37.) 

Any evidence that Petitioner wished to submit before the jury merely went to potential 

“motive or opportunity” and did not represent “direct or circumstantial” evidence of the charged

offenses. Other than Field’s name on the envelope, Petitioner offered nothing more to link Fields

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 The court also stated that the evidence was subject to California Evidence Code § 352. 

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to the crimes. Therefore, it cannot be said that Petitioner’s due process rights were violated by

the exclusion of any third-party culpability evidence.

In his traverse, Petitioner claims that the trial court incorrectly applied the California’s

Supreme Court’s ruling in Hall, by requiring an initial threshold showing that the evidence was

admissible. Petitioner contends that Hall stands for the proposition that third-party culpability

evidence must always be admitted. Petitioner is mistaken. In Hall, the California Supreme Court

held that “evidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in another person,

without more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt: there must be

direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime.”5

People v. Hall, 41 Cal.3d at 826. As previously stated, the trial court’s exclusion of the proffered

evidence was based on the fact that counsel had not submitted an offer of proof of any direct or

circumstantial evidence linking either Fields or Cooper to possession of the drugs. Petitioner’s

contention to the contrary is rejected. Accordingly, the claim must be denied. 

D. Due Process Violation - Failure to Sua Sponte Instruct on Third-Party Culpability

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on a

third-party culpability defense.

A Petitioner whose claim involves the omission of an instruction "bears an especially

heavy burden," because an omission is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the

law. Reynolds v. Maddock, 1999 WL 354366, *3 (N.D. Cal. 1999). To demonstrate that the

omission of the jury instruction was a constitutional violation, Petitioner must demonstrate that

the omission “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” 

Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). A state trial court’s failure to give an instruction

must render the trial fundamentally unfair. See Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir.

1988). 

Whether the absence of a particular instruction violates the Constitution will depend upon

the evidence in the case and the overall instructions given to the jury. Duckett v. Godinez, 67

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F.3d 734, 745 (9th Cir. 1995). The court must examine the record to determine what instructions

were given, what instructions were refused, and whether the given instructions adequately

embodied the defendant’s theory. See United States v. Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d 1035, 1040 (9th

Cir. 1979). 

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim on direct appeal, the Court of Appeal held:

[A]ny failure to instruct on the theory of third-party culpability was

harmless. The jury was instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.90, that the

prosecutor had to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Defense

counsel argued this theory to the jury which rejected it. It is not reasonably

probable defendant would have received a more favorable result had the court

given an instruction on third-party culpability. 

(Exhibit C, attached to Answer, at 16.) 

As stated above under section C, the evidence at trial did not establish third-party

culpability. Rather, the evidence established that the cocaine and pipe were found on Petitioner’s

person, and beyond officer Campbell’s admitted mistake of placing the wrong name on the

evidence when submitted to the property room, there was no evidence presented to support

Petitioner’s theory that either Cooper or Fields possessed the cocaine and pipe. Defense counsel

did not make an offer of proof at trial regarding the relevancy of the questioning regarding the

basis of the officer’s arrest of Fields. (RT 161-162.) Counsel subsequently offered that the

relevancy was to support Petitioner’s defense theory that Fields, not Petitioner, was the person

from whom the drugs had been seized. (RT 162.) The court noted “this is the first time I’ve

heard of that defense.” The court responded that counsel still had not submitted a sufficient offer

of proof, but had merely disclosed his defense theory. (Id.) Defense counsel conceded the only

evidence supporting the theory was the fact that Donald Field’s name was on the envelope. (RT

163.) The court noted the only evidence thus far was that the drugs and paraphernalia were

seized from Petitioner’s person. The following exchange then occurred:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, that’s correct. What I wanted to get into

was whether or not there was any indicia of this person possessing drugs, and that

somehow not being reflected in the police report or being overlooked by the

officers for whatever reason.

[THE COURT]: Well, that’s not what you asked, and that’s not what you

are asking me to permit you to ask. You have - let me put it this way: At this

point, going into why the officers arrested or failed to arrest, whatever your theory

might be, persons other than [Petitioner], that evening, strikes me as irrelevant. 

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 As Respondent submits, the matter was collateral because testimony was already presented on why Fields

and Cooper were arrested: Fields was arrested for resisting arrest and providing false information, and Cooper was

arrested for an outstanding warrant. (RT 36-37.) 

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But even if it is somehow relevant, I do see it as collateral, and the fact that we are

spending more time now dealing with it tells me how collateral it is, and why it

would involve an undue consumption of time.6 

The officers’ performance in the field is not an issue that is going to this

jury. I do agree that – whether the officers made a mistake or not is a jury issue. 

All right.

(RT 164-65.) 

Although during closing argument, defense counsel argued that Fields may have

possessed the cocaine and pipe, as previously stated, there was no direct or circumstantial

evidence linking Fields to the actual perpetration of the crime. Counsel’s argument was based on

the officer’s mistake: “Could [the officers] have mistakenly recalled [the contraband] as coming

from Mr. Culton, instead of Mr. Fields?” (RT 220-21.) The issue at trial was mainly based on

officer credibility and it was apparent in the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument to the jury: “I am

going to ask you to reject completely [Petitioner’s] argument about how somehow the officers

forgot who they took the drugs from on October 29th, because Officer Campbell made a mistake

about the name he wrote on the envelope.” (RT 229.) The jury was properly instructed on

determining credibility issues, including the believability of witnesses (RT 197), discrepancies in

testimony (RT 198), willfully false witnesses (RT 198), and weighing of any conflicting

testimony. (RT 198-99.) 

In his traverse, Petitioner contends that the absence of the third-party culpability

instruction would lead the jury to believe that Petitioner bore the burden of proving third-party

liability beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner’s contention lacks merit. The jury was instructed

that the burden of proof on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (RT 190-

94.) The instruction informed the jury that it had to acquit if, after considering all the evidence, it

had a reasonable doubt whether Petitioner possessed the contraband. The trial court further

instructed that Petitioner’s failure to explain evidence against him did not relieve the prosecution

of its burden of proof. (RT 196.) The instructions viewed as a whole demonstrate there is no

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“reasonable likelihood” that the jury applied the instructions in a way which prevented

consideration of a defense theory that Fields or Cooper possessed the contraband. The jury was

free to accept or reject counsel’s unsupported argument that Fields possessed the contraband. As

such, it simply cannot be said that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on

third-party culpability.

E. Insufficient Evidence to Support Possession of Rock Cocaine

Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of

possession of rock cocaine (count 3).

The law on insufficiency of the evidence claim is clearly established. The United States

Supreme Court has held that when reviewing an insufficiency of the evidence claim on habeas, a

federal court must determine whether, viewing the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from

it in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could find the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 

Sufficiency claims are judged by the elements defined by state law. Id. at 324, n. 16. 

Here, the Court of Appeal found,

[Petitioner] acted with a consciousness of guilt as soon as he became

aware of the police. He then appeared to be disposing of something by the red

pickup truck. When [Petitioner] was contacted, the cocaine base was found in the

same area. The jury could reasonably infer that [Petitioner] knew he had the

cocaine base, and disposed of it when he saw the police. Cocaine base was found

where [Petitioner] made his dipping motion, and nearby where DeLeon detained

him. These factors are strong circumstantial evidence that [Petitioner] exercised

control over the cocaine. In addition, there was evidence that [Petitioner] was in

possession of a box cutter which had cocaine residue on it. Although entirely

circumstantial, the evidence was clearly sufficient to support the jury’s finding.

(Exhibit C, attached to Answer, at 17-18.)

As Respondent submits, in view of the state appellate court’s factual findings, along with

officers DeLeon and Doughterty’s testimony whose credibility was judged by the jury,

Petitioner’s consciousness of guilt, and the undisputed fact that Petitioner possessed – in his

pocket – a box cutter containing cocaine residue (RT 103, 132, 154), it cannot be said that no

rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner

possessed cocaine. The state courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an

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unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, the

petition for writ of habeas corpus must be denied. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the assigned United States

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-

304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after

service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 25, 2005 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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