Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01711/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01711-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Adventure Lands
Appellee
John M. Krantz
Appellee
Judy A. Libel
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1711

___________

Judy A. Libel, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Adventure Lands of America, Inc.; * Southern District of Iowa.

John M. Krantz, *

*

Appellees. *

__________

Submitted: November 15, 2006

Filed: April 17, 2007

___________

Before RILEY, HANSEN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges. 

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

After being terminated from her employment with Adventure Lands of

America, Inc. (Adventure Lands), Judy A. Libel (Libel) filed a lawsuit against

Adventure Lands claiming violations under the Americans with Disabilities Act of

1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa

Code § 216, and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29

U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. Adventure Lands filed a motion for summary judgment, and

Appellate Case: 06-1711 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/17/2007 Entry ID: 3299634
1

The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa. 

2

John Krantz died on January 7, 2006, but, at all times relevant, served as

Adventure Lands’s CEO.

-2-

the district court1 granted the motion. Libel appeals the district court’s ruling.

Finding no error, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Adventure Lands, an Iowa corporation, owns and operates an amusement park,

a campground, and a hotel/convention center (Inn). John Krantz2

 served as Adventure

Lands’s CEO, and his son, Matthew Krantz, began serving as general manager of the

Inn in September 2002.

Libel worked as a sales and catering manager at the Inn from June 1997 until

November 2, 2002. Libel’s responsibilities included reserving hotel rooms; booking

conventions, weddings, and meetings; and making arrangements for food and

beverages for those events. Shortly after she began working at the Inn, Libel was

diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (M.S.).

The uncontroverted testimony of Matthew Krantz indicates Libel often made

mistakes at work, including failing to request menus in a timely fashion, selling more

rooms than available, failing to follow other procedures, giving rooms away for free,

and not charging the correct amount for events. Matthew Krantz viewed these

mistakes as weaknesses, and on November 2, 2002, he terminated Libel. During the

termination meeting, neither Matthew Krantz nor Libel discussed Libel’s medical

condition nor her insurance benefits.

Wellmark Blue Cross/Blue Shield (Wellmark) is Adventure Lands’s health care

provider. Daniel Bohner (Bohner), Adventure Lands’s controller, annually renews the

Appellate Case: 06-1711 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/17/2007 Entry ID: 3299634
3

Throughout her tenure, Libel was eligible to receive health care coverage under

a policy held by Adventure Lands. Libel had the option to continue that coverage for

up to eighteen months after her termination.

4

Originally, Libel also alleged age discrimination, but she later dismissed that

claim.

-3-

corporation’s health insurance policy. Denise Williams (Williams), an account

manager with Wellmark, testified she delivered the 2003 renewal quote for Adventure

Lands’s health insurance policy to Bohner’s attention at Adventure Lands’s corporate

office on November 1, 2002. According to the renewal documents, Adventure

Lands’s premiums were to increase from approximately $10,713 per month in 2002

to $13,799 per month in 2003. Williams testified she discussed Adventure Lands’s

insurance plan with Bohner, but never with John or Matthew Krantz.

On November 14, 2002, Libel met with Bohner to discuss severance benefits,

including vacation pay, Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA)

benefits, and profit sharing. On the same date, Libel also met with John Krantz. Libel

testified John Krantz told her that health insurance premiums increased over $500 per

person and he could not afford both of them–meaning Libel and himself.3

 John

Krantz, who at the time suffered from cancer, testified he never mentioned insurance

premiums when he met with Libel.

Arguing her M.S. was a reason for her termination, Libel filed suit against

Adventure Lands claiming disability discrimination under the ADA and ICRA, as well

as an ERISA violation.4

 Adventure Lands responded, filing a motion for summary

judgment, as well as a request to sanction Libel for her failure to respond to Adventure

Lands’s statement of undisputed facts in compliance with Local Rule 56.1.

Determining Libel failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1, the district court deemed

portions of Adventure Lands’s statement of undisputed facts admitted by Libel. The

district court also granted Adventure Lands’s motion for summary judgment. In

Appellate Case: 06-1711 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/17/2007 Entry ID: 3299634
-4-

granting summary judgment, the district court determined (1) Matthew Krantz alone

made the decision to terminate Libel, and (2) Libel established neither a prima facie

case of disability discrimination under the ADA or the ICRA, nor a prima facie case

of interference with prospective insurance benefits under ERISA. This appeal

followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Local Rule 56.1

Libel argues the district court erred in deeming certain facts admitted based on

her failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1. Local Rule 56.1 requires the party

opposing summary judgment to file a response to the moving party’s statement of

material facts, and provides, in pertinent part:

A response to an individual statement of material fact that is not

expressly admitted must be supported by references to those specific

pages, paragraphs, or parts of the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, admissions, exhibits, and affidavits that support the

resisting party’s refusal to admit the statement, with citations to the

appendix containing that part of the record. The failure to respond, with

appropriate citations to the appendix, to an individual statement of

material fact constitutes an admission of that fact.

S.D. Iowa R. 56.1(b) (emphasis added). 

In this case, Adventure Lands filed a statement of undisputed facts in support

of summary judgment. In opposition, Libel filed a response to Adventure Lands’s

statement of undisputed facts, as well as her own statement of undisputed facts.

Adventure Lands objected to Libel’s response claiming it violated Local Rule 56.1

because several of Libel’s responses consisted only of the word “denied” without

supporting citations, or short, unsubstantiated phrases as “[d]enied . . . because

[statements are] based upon only the testimony of interested witnesses.” In light of

Adventure Lands’s objection, Libel filed a motion for leave to amend her response.

Appellate Case: 06-1711 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/17/2007 Entry ID: 3299634
-5-

The district court granted Libel’s motion. Adventure Lands then objected to Libel’s

amended response, arguing Libel again failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1.

Adventure Lands also requested the district court deem as admitted each disputed fact

unsupported by citations. Libel filed a second motion for leave to amend her

response. The district court denied Libel’s second motion to amend and granted

Adventure Lands’s request to sanction Libel for her failure to comply with Local Rule

56.1.

We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s application of its local

rules. Nw. Bank & Trust Co. v. First Ill. Nat’l Bank, 354 F.3d 721, 725 (8th Cir.

2003). “The concision and specificity required by [S.D. Iowa] Local Rule 56.1 seek

to aid the district court in passing upon a motion for summary judgment, reflecting the

aphorism that it is the parties who know the case better than the judge.” Id. (citing

Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir. 1994)). “Local Rule 56.1

exists to prevent a district court from engaging in the proverbial search for a needle

in the haystack.” Id. Courts have neither the duty nor the time to investigate the

record in search of an unidentified genuine issue of material fact to support a claim

or a defense.

The district court gave Libel ample opportunity to correct the deficiencies in her

response to Adventure Lands’s statement of undisputed facts. Libel did not take full

advantage of this opportunity. Libel contends the facts of this case were clearly before

the district court in other documents including her brief and other supporting

documents and, thus, her failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1 should be excused.

The district court was not obliged to scour the record looking for factual disputes.

Therefore, the district court committed no abuse of discretion when it deemed

admitted Adventure Lands’s statements of undisputed facts where Libel’s responses

violated Local Rule 56.1.

Appellate Case: 06-1711 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/17/2007 Entry ID: 3299634
-6-

B. Summary Judgment

Libel contends the district court erred in granting Adventure Lands’s motion for

summary judgment. We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. Pope v. ESA

Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 1001, 1006 (8th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is proper if,

after viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most

favorable to the nonmovant, no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Pope, 406 F.3d at

1006.

1. Libel’s Termination

In granting Adventure Lands’s summary judgment motion, the district court

determined Matthew Krantz alone decided to terminate Libel. The district court

rejected Libel’s assertion that John Krantz, Matthew’s father and CEO of Adventure

Lands, made the decision to terminate her, finding Libel’s allegation was supported

by nothing other than her own conclusory statements. We agree. In fact, Libel

herself, in her deposition, states Matthew Krantz was the one who terminated her.

Other than Libel’s speculation, Libel’s only support for her assertion that John Krantz

made the decision to terminate her is a portion of John Krantz’s testimony, which

reads:

Q. Did [Matthew Krantz] say “I’m thinking of terminating her”?

A. I’m sure he did.

Q. What did you say?

A. That he was in charge, do as he sees fit.

Q. What was the last part?

A. “Do as you see fit.”

Q. Did you understand that he was effectively getting your approval?

A. Yes.

Q. And you didn’t object to terminating Judy?

A. No.

See Appellant’s App’x at 131-131A.

Appellate Case: 06-1711 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/17/2007 Entry ID: 3299634
5

We analyze disability discrimination claims under ICRA within the same

framework as claims brought under the ADA. See Fuller v. Iowa Dep’t of Human

Servs., 576 N.W.2d 324, 329 (Iowa 1998).

-7-

This testimony indicates Matthew Krantz decided independently to terminate Libel.

The testimony evidence does not reflect John Krantz either made the decision or used

Matthew as a conduit to terminate Libel. See Dedmon v. Stanley, 315 F.3d 948, 949-

50 n.2 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding an employer, under certain circumstances, can be

liable where the formal decision maker is not the person who harbored an unlawful

motive to terminate the employee). But, even if we could conclude from this colloquy

that John Krantz participated in Libel’s termination, the exchange does not show John

Krantz communicated to Matthew Krantz the view that Adventure Lands could not

afford to keep Libel employed because of rising insurance premiums. Nothing in the

record links Libel’s termination to the statements allegedly made by John Krantz to

Libel concerning insurance costs. Again, assuming the record linked Libel’s

termination to concerns of rising insurance costs, no evidence, direct or circumstantial,

links Libel’s termination to Libel’s M.S. and rising insurance costs. The district court

properly determined Matthew Krantz alone made the decision to terminate her.

2. ADA Claim5

In ADA cases, a plaintiff may survive a defendant’s summary judgment motion

in one of two ways, presenting either direct or inferential evidence of discrimination.

Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004) (citations and

quotations omitted). Direct evidence in this context is not the converse of

circumstantial evidence. Id. “Rather, direct evidence is evidence showing a specific

link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, sufficient

to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually

motivated the adverse employment action.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

However, if the plaintiff lacks direct evidence of discrimination, she must avoid

summary judgment by creating the requisite inference of unlawful discrimination

Appellate Case: 06-1711 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/17/2007 Entry ID: 3299634
6

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).

-8-

under the McDonnell Douglas6 framework. Id. Under this analysis, the employee

bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Kratzer v.

Rockwell Collins, Inc., 398 F.3d 1040, 1044-45 (8th Cir. 2005). The burden then

shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

employer’s actions. Id. If the employer articulates such a reason, the burden returns

to the employee to show the employer’s justification is a pretext. Id. To establish a

prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show she: (1) has

an ADA-qualifying disability; (2) is qualified to perform the essential functions of the

job, with or without a reasonable accommodation; and (3) suffered adverse

employment action. Id.

Here, Libel presented no direct evidence of discrimination. The record does not

indicate John Krantz terminated Libel, used Matthew Krantz as a conduit to terminate

Libel, or discussed any insurance cost-cutting matters or Libel’s M.S. condition with

Matthew Krantz. As a result, Libel failed to establish a specific link between her

termination and the alleged statements John Krantz made regarding Libel and the

insurance costs. Consequently, Libel cannot survive Adventure Lands’s motion for

summary judgment with proof of direct evidence.

Likewise, Libel cannot survive Adventure Lands’s summary judgment motion

with an inference of unlawful discrimination. In her appeal brief, Libel does not

challenge the district court’s finding that Libel failed to prove she has an ADAqualifying disability. Nor does Libel challenge the district court’s finding that she

could not perform the essential functions of her job, with or without a reasonable

accommodation. Consequently, Libel waived any challenge to these findings, and as

a result, she cannot survive Adventure Lands’s motion for summary judgment under

the McDonnell Douglas analysis.

Appellate Case: 06-1711 Page: 8 Date Filed: 04/17/2007 Entry ID: 3299634
7

Libel’s ERISA claim is based on alleged circumstantial evidence; Libel does

not claim the record shows direct evidence of intentional interference with prospective

insurance benefits. Therefore, we analyze Libel’s ERISA claim under the McDonnell

Douglas framework. See Kinkead, 49 F.3d at 456-57.

8

Libel further contends the district court erred in not finding a causal

connection, based on temporal proximity, between her termination and the arrival of

Adventure Lands’s insurance renewal package the day before she was terminated.

However, nothing in the record indicates Matthew Krantz knew about the package or

the information therein. Nor is there evidence in the record indicating Bohner (the

person to whom the package was delivered) or Williams (the account manager) talked

to John or Matthew Krantz about the insurance package and costs. Thus, the court

properly found no causal connection between Libel’s termination and the insurance

renewal package.

-9-

3. ERISA Claim

With respect to her claim of interference with prospective insurance benefits

under § 510 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1140, Libel can establish a prima facie case if she

demonstrates a causal connection between the likelihood of future benefits and an

adverse employment action. Kinkead v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 49 F.3d 454, 457 (8th Cir.

1995).7

Here, Libel cannot establish a prima facie ERISA case because no evidentiary

link exists between her termination and Adventure Lands’s insurance costs. There is

no evidence Matthew Krantz knew of Adventure Lands’s rising insurance costs or the

specifics of Libel’s insurance plan.8

 Nor is there any link between the statements John

Krantz allegedly made to Libel and Libel’s termination by Matthew Krantz. Without

this evidence, the court cannot justify a reasonable inference of retaliatory motive.

Consequently, Libel cannot survive Adventure Lands’s motion for summary

judgment.

Even assuming Libel established a prima facie case of discrimination under

ERISA, Adventure Lands provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Libel’s

Appellate Case: 06-1711 Page: 9 Date Filed: 04/17/2007 Entry ID: 3299634
-10-

termination, namely, failing to request menus on time, selling more rooms than

available, failing to follow other procedures, giving rooms away for free, and

charging incorrect amounts for events. These nondiscriminatory reasons for

terminating Libel would prevent a factfinder from concluding Libel demonstrated

Adventure Lands’s reasons for terminating her were pretextual. See Eckelkamp v.

Beste, 315 F.3d 863, 871 (8th Cir. 2002). Thus, Libel cannot survive Adventure

Lands’s motion for summary judgment.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the well-reasoned opinion and judgment of

the district court.

_______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-1711 Page: 10 Date Filed: 04/17/2007 Entry ID: 3299634