Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-05410/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-05410-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gregory N. Faulk
Petitioner
David Long
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY N. FAULK,

Petitioner,

v.

DAVID LONG, Warden,

Respondent.

___________________________________/

No. C-13-5410 EMC (pr)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Gregory N. Faulk filed this pro se action seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §

2254. In his petition, he contends that the state appellate court denied him due process and effective

assistance of counsel when it denied a defense request for additional funds to further investigate an

alleged instance of juror misconduct. The petition will be DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Crimes

The California Court of Appeal described the evidence regarding the crimes that led to the

conviction of Mr. Faulk of carjacking, unlawful taking of a car, and second degree burglary. 

In the fall of 2010, defendant was homeless and went to the Hayes

Mansion hotel in San Jose to look for shelter. There, he broke into the

spa on the property by making holes in the wall of the hotel gym, and

reaching in to unlock the door to the spa. When the hotel staff arrived

at the spa in the morning of September 4, 2010, they discovered

defendant inside. Defendant ran out of the spa and through the hotel

parking lot, eventually jumping a wrought iron fence into a

condominium or apartment complex.

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A few hours later, Huong Ho was at her parent’s condominium

complex to check her mail. She parked her Mercedes next to the

mailboxes. Ho tried to open her mailbox, but was unsuccessful. Ho

saw defendant standing near the mailboxes, and began talking to him.

Defendant told her he was the building manager and that he had a

master key to the mailboxes at his house. Defendant told Ho that he

would open her mailbox if she drove him to his house so he could get

his master key. Ho agreed, and defendant got into her car and gave Ho

directions of where to go. As Ho slowed down to stop her car where

defendant directed, defendant suddenly punched her in the eye, and

ordered her to get out of the car. Ho got out of the car, leaving her cell

phone, purse, and shoes in the car. Defendant sped away in Ho’s car. 

Ho called the police using a phone of a nearby resident. When the

police arrived, she gave a description of defendant, and the police

photographed the injury to her eye.

Defendant abandoned Ho’s car almost immediately after driving away. 

He then took a 1992 Toyota belonging to Trong Nguyen from 44

South Terrace Court. Defendant abandoned the Toyota in a parking

lot of a shopping center on Monterey Highway near Blossom Hill

Road. Defendant used money from Ho’s wallet to buy clothes at

Walmart and Walgreen’s. Defendant changed his clothes in the

bathroom of the Walmart and a nearby Taco Bell. Police later found

Ho’s wallet in the Taco Bell bathroom, and arrested defendant at a

nearby bus stop. Following his arrest, defendant’s blood tested

positive for methamphetamine.

Defendant testified in his own defense at trial. He essentially admitted

all of the alleged crimes; however, he claimed he never punched Ho,

and did not use any force in taking her Mercedes. In addition,

defendant said that Ho asked him if he could get her some

methamphetamine, and agreed to drive him to a location where he

could find the drug. The two then smoked methamphetamine together

in the car, and when Ho got out of the car to put her pipe into the

trunk, defendant slid into the driver’s seat and drove away in Ho’s car.

Defendant said when he took the car, there was no injury to Ho’s eye.

In addition to his own testimony, defendant called several witnesses at

trial who testified that he was not a violent person.

Resp. Ex. D, California Court of Appeal Opinion, pp. 1-3. 

B. Procedural History

Two trials were held. At the first trial, in May 2011, a jury found defendant guilty of

unlawful taking of a car (see Cal. Veh. Code § 10851) and second degree burglary (see Cal. Penal

Code §§ 459, 460), but deadlocked on the charge of carjacking (see Cal. Penal Code § 215). The

court found true the allegations that defendant had suffered three prior strike and serious felony

convictions (see Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(a)-(i), 1170.12). In July 2011, a second trial was held on

the carjacking charge, at which a jury found defendant guilty of carjacking. At sentencing in August

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 One definition of mad-dog is: “[t]o stare at someone steadily and provocatively; stare

someone down.” Dictionary of American Slang 333 (4th ed. 2007).

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2011, the court struck two of the prior conviction allegations and sentenced Mr. Faulk to 23 years

and eight months in prison. Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, p. 3. 

Mr. Faulk appealed. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of conviction. 

The California Supreme Court denied his petition for review. He then filed this action. The federal

habeas petition asserts that the California Court of Appeal’s denial of his request for further

investigative funds violated his federal constitutional rights. 

C. The Request For Investigative Funds

While the direct appeal was pending, Mr. Faulk’s appellate counsel applied to the California

Court of Appeal for $750 to hire an investigator to find and interview a juror to inquire about

potential juror misconduct. Appellate counsel declared that he had received a telephone call from

defense trial counsel, Casey Clift, who informed him of the following: (a) “the deputy district

attorney who tried the case spoke to some of the jurors outside the courtroom after the second trial;”

(b) Mr. Clift was not present; (c) the deputy district attorney later told Mr. Clift that “an unidentified

juror told her the juror saw Daniel St. Peter ‘maddogging’ the victim when the victim was on the

stand;” and (d) Daniel St. Peter was not in the courtroom, because of the exclusion order, except for

when he testified for the defense.” Resp. Ex. F at 3-4.1

 The application also provided the following

information: Appellate counsel had requested the trial court to unseal juror identity information, and

the trial court agreed to contact Juror No. 12 to obtain his consent or objection to release of his

identity. The juror had objected to a release of his identity; over the juror’s objection, the trial court

ordered the juror’s identity to be released with a protective order limiting its dissemination to

appellate counsel and an investigator/agent. Id. at 4. Appellate counsel had tried to contact Juror

No. 12 at the telephone number provided and received no answer. Appellate counsel had then

contacted a private investigator who said he was available to contact and attempt to interview Juror

No. 12 in 10 hours or less at an hourly rate of $75. Id. at 5. Appellate counsel thought the juror

might be trying to avoid contact, and thought a “professional investigator will be more efficient”

than appellate counsel in “resolving this investigation.” Id. 

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The California Court of Appeal granted the application for funds to hire the investigator, but

only approved fees up to $150. Id. at 18. 

The private investigator then unsuccessfully attempted to contact Juror No. 12. The

investigator unsuccessfully tried to contact the juror at the address and telephone number provided

by the superior court. Id. at 28. The investigator went to Juror No. 12’s home three times and left

his card three times, and eventually concluded that the juror had moved. The investigator called the

juror’s telephone number provided by the court and noted that it had been changed to an unlisted

number. The investigator did some research and found a possible cell phone number for the juror

that apparently belonged to the juror’s girlfriend. When reached at that cell phone number, the

juror’s girlfriend said they had moved, they had received the card, she thought the juror was going to

call the investigator, and she would pass on the investigator’s message for Juror No. 12 to call him. 

Five days later, the investigator called the cell number and spoke to the girlfriend again, and again

asked her to relay the message for Juror No. 12 to call him. Two weeks thereafter, the investigator

left a voicemail message on that cell phone number for Juror No. 12 to call him. In each attempted

contact, the investigator explained who he was and why he was calling. Juror No. 12 never

contacted the investigator. 

Appellate counsel then applied for an additional $500 to pay the investigator to continue his

efforts to contact Juror No. 12 by researching the juror’s new address and attempting to contact him

in person. Id. at 19-23.

The state appellate court denied the application for additional funds without explanation. 

Id. at 32. 

Mr. Faulk filed a petition for review of the denial of his application for investigator fees. 

Resp. Ex. G. In his petition for review, Mr. Faulk contended that the court of appeal’s denial of his

request for further funding had denied him his right to due process and effective assistance of

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 The issue sought to be investigated was juror misconduct based on the consideration of

extraneous evidence. There was no issue raised about Daniel St. Peter, who was the person the juror

claimed to have seen “mad-dogging” the victim while the victim testified. The inquiry would have

concerned Mr. St. Peter’s conduct as an audience member rather than his conduct as a trial witness. 

As a trial witness, Mr. St. Peter played a minimal role. Mr. St. Peter’s testimony took less than three

pages at the first trial, RT 261-264, and less than five pages at the second trial, RT 594-599, of the

700+ page trial transcript. He provided character evidence: he testified that he had worked with and

been a friend of Mr. Faulk for several years. He was of the opinion that Mr. Faulk was not a violent

person, and that opinion would not change if he knew that Mr. Faulk had punched and kicked

numerous holes in the walls at the Hayes mansion nor if he knew that Mr. Faulk punched a woman

in the face. 

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counsel by preventing him from investigating potential juror or spectator misconduct. Id. at 4.2 The

California Supreme Court denied the petition for review without explanation. Resp. Ex. G. 

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the petition concerns the

conviction and sentence of a person convicted in Santa Clara County, California, which is within

this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The Antiterrorism And Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) amended § 2254 to

impose new restrictions on federal habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the

claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the

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state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable

facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal

habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment

that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. “A federal habeas

court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application

of clearly established federal law was ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Id. at 409.

Mr. Faulk presented his claims in his petition for review to the California Supreme Court,

which rejected it without discussion. See Resp. Ex. G. “When a federal claim has been presented to

a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated

the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the

contrary.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784-85 (2011) (one-sentence order

denying habeas petition analyzed under §2254(d)); see also Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088,

1096 (2013) (order discussing state law claim but not federal claim rebuttably presumed to be

rejection on the merits and therefore subject to § 2254(d)). Mr. Faulk does not dispute that the

California Supreme Court decided his claim on the merits. 

V. DISCUSSION

A. There Is Not An Unexhausted Claim

Before turning to the merits of the petition, it is necessary to address Respondent’s argument

that state court remedies were not exhausted for one of the claims. Mr. Faulk’s federal petition

asserts that the California Court of Appeal’s denial of his funding request denied him due process

and effective assistance of counsel. Docket # 1 at 8. Respondent argues that state court remedies

have not been exhausted “for any claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.” Docket

# 6 at 5. The Court disagrees. 

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 Respondent presents his exhibits in an unusual way by attaching several different

documents under a single exhibit label. For example, Respondent’s Exhibit F has at least four

different documents pertaining to the funding application. Respondent’s method has the slight

advantage of grouping documents by subject matter but the substantial disadvantage of confusing

the user trying to cite to any particular document by exhibit letter. 

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Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas proceedings

either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state judicial remedies,

either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the highest state court

available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim they seek to raise in

federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). 

The first of the two petitions for review filed in the California Supreme Court fairly

presented the denial of effective assistance of counsel claim. After the California Court of Appeal

denied the request for additional funding, Mr. Faulk promptly petitioned the California Supreme

Court for review of that specific decision. See People v. Faulk, Cal. S. Ct. No. S205607. In that

petition, Mr. Faulk argued that the California Court of Appeal “denied appellant his right to due

process and effective assistance of counsel in denying him funding” for the investigator. See Resp.

Ex. G (petition for review) at 4.3

 That petition for review cited the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments, and urged that the “constitutional right to effective counsel under both the state and

federal constitutions also includes the right to reasonably necessary ancillary defense services.” 

Id. at 10. The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review without comment. Resp. Ex.

G. Several months later, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of conviction, and

Mr. Faulk petitioned the California Supreme Court for review of that decision. See People v. Faulk,

Cal. S. Ct. No. S208625. See Resp. Exs. D, E. The California Supreme Court denied that petition

for review without comment. Resp. Ex. E. The first petition for review (i.e., Case No. S205607)

fairly presented the denial of effective assistance of counsel claim to the California Supreme Court

and sufficed to exhaust the claim, even if the claim was not repeated in the second petition for

review. See generally Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 350 (1989) (“once the state courts have

ruled upon a claim, it is not necessary for a petitioner ‘to ask the state for collateral relief, based

upon the same evidence and issues already decided by direct review’”). State court remedies have

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been exhausted for the claims for denial of effective assistance of counsel and for a denial of due

process. 

Respondent’s non-exhaustion argument appears to presume that Mr. Faulk is arguing a

typical Strickland claim that his counsel performed incompetently. As this Court understands the

petition, however, Mr. Faulk does not fault counsel’s behavior and instead urges that the state

appellate court’s rejection of the funding request prevented him from receiving effective assistance

of counsel. The usual claim for denial of effective assistance of counsel is the familiar claim that

counsel failed to perform competently as discussed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984). The Supreme Court in Strickland explained the development of the principle that the right

to counsel includes the right to effective assistance of counsel, and explained that the right could be

impeded both by the defense attorney as well as by the Government. As to the latter, the

Government can “violate[] the right to effective assistance when it interferes in certain ways with the

ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct the defense,” e.g., by barring

attorney-client consultation during a recess, by barring summation at a bench trial, by requiring that

the defendant be the first defense witness, and by barring direct examination of defendant. Id. at 686

(collecting cases). This Court understands Mr. Faulk’s claim to be this less familiar sort of denial

of effective assistance of counsel claim, i.e., a claim that the Government has interfered with

counsel’s ability to provide effective assistance, and concludes that state court remedies have been

exhausted for that claim. This Court’s ability to identify the sort of claim Mr. Faulk makes says

nothing about the existence of the underlying right to counsel or the merits of the claim – those

matters are taken up in the next two sections. 

B. No Clearly Established Law Showing The Existence Of The Right

Mr. Faulk’s petition fails at the threshold because there is no “clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” which is a necessary predicate to

relief in any habeas case (such as this one) governed by the AEDPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Without the existence of clearly established Federal law, the state court’s adjudication of the claim

cannot be said to be contrary to or an unreasonable application of such law. See Carey v. Musladin,

549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006); see, e.g., id. at 76-77 (given the lack of holdings from the Supreme Court

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and the wide divergence of the lower courts on the issue of the potentially prejudicial effect of

spectators’ courtroom conduct, the state court’s determination that the petitioner was not inherently

prejudiced by spectators wearing buttons depicting the murder victim was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law); Varghese v. Uribe, 736 F.3d

817, 821 (9th Cir. 2013) (because there is no Supreme Court authority that squarely addresses

petitioner’s claim – that a criminal defendant’s rights to counsel and due process are violated when

the state court conditions his access to, and testing of, the prosecution’s limited evidence on the

disclosure of the test results to the prosecution – the state appellate court had no specific rule to

apply, so its decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court

precedent); Foote v. Del Papa, 492 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2007) (Nevada Supreme Court’s

rejection of petitioner’s conflict of interest claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law; although Supreme Court had held an irreconcilable

conflict between a defendant and his trial counsel may entitle him to new counsel, no Supreme Court

case had held an irreconcilable conflict between the defendant and his appointed appellate counsel

violates the Sixth Amendment).

First, Mr. Faulk’s claim arises in the context of a collateral attack on his conviction – he

sought funds to conduct and investigate post-conviction. The Supreme Court has never determined

that there is a constitutional right to state court collateral review of a conviction. In Case v.

Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965), the Supreme Court granted certiorari “to decide whether the

Fourteenth Amendment requires that the States afford state prisoners some adequate corrective

process for the hearing and determination of claims of violation of federal constitutional

guarantees.” Id. at 337. However, the Supreme Court ultimately did not decide the issue because,

after certiorari was granted, Nebraska enacted a statute providing a post-conviction remedy that

allowed for consideration of claims of the denial of federal constitutional rights. Id. The Supreme

Court determined that Nebraska’s new statute appeared to provide the sort of hearing at issue and

therefore remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the supervening statute. Id. The

resolution of Case thus shows that it was an open question at that time whether there was a

constitutional right to state court collateral review of a state court conviction. See generally Kyles v.

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Whitley, 498 U.S. 931, 932 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in order denying stay of execution)

(citing Case for the proposition that “the scope of the State’s obligation to provide collateral review

is shrouded in so much uncertainty”); Huffman v. Florida, 435 U.S. 1014, 1017 (1978) (Stevens, J.,

concurring in denial of certiorari) (citing Case in support of proposition that, although summary

reversal may have been appropriate on direct review of the conviction, and although the petitioner

may succeed in a federal habeas petition, it “does not follow” “that this Court has the power to

compel a State to employ a collateral post-conviction remedy in which specific federal claims may

be raised.”) No subsequent Supreme Court case has been located that resolves the issue left

undecided in Case. According to one authority, the Supreme Court never had occasion to revisit the

issue left open in Case because “after the Court’s decision in that case every State in the Union did,

in the exercise of reasonably deliberate speed, adopt an adequate State procedure that would be

available to a state prisoner seeking postconviction relief.” Richardson v. Miller, 716 F. Supp. 1246,

1252 (W.D. Mo. 1989). If there is no such constitutional right to collateral review, any error

committed by the state court in the course of collateral proceedings would not give rise to a federal

constitutional violation. 

Second, the Supreme Court has not held that a criminal defendant has a right to any counsel

on state court collateral review. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756-57 (1991) (no

constitutional right to counsel on appeal from a state habeas trial court judgment); Pennsylvania v.

Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“We have never held that prisoners have a constitutional right to

counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions, [citation], and we decline to so

hold today.”) That the Supreme Court still has not found a right to counsel on state habeas

proceedings was confirmed recently in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012), where the

Court decided not to decide the constitutional question. The lower court had addressed whether a

prisoner had a right to effective counsel in collateral proceedings which provide the first occasion to

raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Supreme Court opined: “This is not the

case, however, to resolve whether that exception exists as a constitutional matter.” Id. at 1315. 

Instead, the matter could be resolved under the procedural default doctrine, i.e., the “inadequate

assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s

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procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Id. Not only is there no Supreme

Court case establishing a right to counsel on collateral review, the habeas statute specifically

precludes relief based on the “ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State

post-conviction proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i).

Third, the right to appellate counsel has not been held to require that appellate counsel be

given the resources to investigate matters that cannot be presented in the direct appeal. The Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the effective

assistance of counsel on his first appeal as of right. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405

(1985). The constitutional right to appointed counsel extends “no further” than the first appeal as of

right. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). It thus does not include a right to counsel

for the pursuit of a discretionary state appeal, Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982), or

a right to counsel during the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, Ross

v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1974). 

Mr. Faulk’s circumstances simply do not implicate a problem with the first appeal as of right,

let alone a problem with the right to effective assistance of appellate counsel that the Supreme Court

has recognized. If facts were ever uncovered to support a juror misconduct claim, that claim could

not be presented on direct appeal because it would not be based on the trial court record, and Mr.

Faulk’s petition for review acknowledged that by claiming a “constitutional right to ancillary funds

to pursue habeas investigation.” Resp. Ex. G at 7. Since the juror misconduct claim he sought to

investigate could not be presented on direct appeal (because direct appeal was limited to the trial

court record), it cannot be said that the State “interfere[d]” with appellate counsel’s ability to

effectively represent Mr. Faulk on his first appeal as of right. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 

Similarly, since the juror misconduct claim Mr. Faulk wanted to investigate could not be presented

on appeal because it would be based on matters outside the record, (a) Mr. Faulk could not show

deficient performance by appellate counsel in not including in the appellate brief a potential juror

misconduct claim that was not supported by anything in the record on appeal, and (b) Mr. Faulk

could not show that there was a reasonable probability that, but for the denial of funding to

investigate juror misconduct, he would have prevailed on appeal. See Moormann v. Ryan, 628 F.3d

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1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2010) (deficient performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland test govern

claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel); see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285

(2000) (Strickland standard applies to filing of no-merits appeal brief). 

 The parties identify one U.S. Supreme Court case pertaining to funding in a criminal case: 

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). That case simply cannot be stretched far enough to

encompass the right Mr. Faulk asserts. Ake addressed the issue whether an indigent defendant who

had exhibited signs of severe mental illness had a right to psychiatric examination and assistance to

prepare a defense when his sanity was in question. The Supreme Court held that, “when a defendant

has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant

factor at trial, the Constitution requires that a State provide access to a psychiatrist’s assistance on

this issue if the defendant cannot otherwise afford one.” Id. at 74. The centrality of the defendant’s

mental state to the issues of his criminal culpability and punishment was critical to the Supreme

Court’s determination that the indigent defendant must be provided access to a competent

psychiatrist upon an adequate showing. See id. at 80-83. “[A]s in the case of the provision of

counsel,” the Supreme Court left “to the State the decision on how to implement this right.” Id. at

83. Ake would have to be greatly extended to apply to Mr. Faulk’s facts: Mr. Faulk’s potential claim

did not pertain to his guilt or the punishment to be imposed, did not pertain to any

sanity/competence at trial, and instead pertained to an investigation for a state court collateral review

proceeding. The question is not whether this Court might think Ake should be extended to cover any

funding request in any context, but rather whether the state court’s failure to do so was contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, Ake. The Supreme Court has made clear that a state court’s

failure to extend a Supreme Court rule to a new context does not support relief under § 2254(d)(1). 

“Section 2254(d)(1) provides a remedy for instances in which a state court unreasonably applies this

Court’s precedent; it does not require state courts to extend that precedent or license federal courts to

treat the failure to do so as error.” White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1706 (2014) (in capital case,

not objectively unreasonable for state court not to extend to penalty phase constitutional rule that

applies to guilt phase). 

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Mr. Faulk asserts that California Penal Code § 1241 contemplates that counsel will be funded

to represent a defendant on direct appeal as well as post-conviction proceedings beyond the direct

appeal. See Docket # 11 at 4. This argument does not help him because a state statute is not

“clearly established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

The existence of this statute and state court cases that Mr. Faulk believes establish a right to funding

of investigations in connection with state court habeas proceedings do not help him here because

federal habeas relief is not available for a misapplication of state law. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131

S. Ct. 859, 861-62 (2011). 

When the California Supreme Court considered Mr. Faulk’s claim that the denial of his

funding request deprived him of his rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel, there

was no “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), to apply to his claim. Without the existence of clearly established Federal

law, the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the claim cannot be said to be contrary to or an

unreasonable application of such law. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. at 76-77. Section

2254(d)(1) requires the denial of Mr. Faulk’s claim. 

C. Even If There Was Clearly Established Law, The California Supreme Court’s Rejection Of

Mr. Faulk’s Claim Would Not Have Been An Unreasonable Application Of Such Law

Even if there was clearly established law from the Supreme Court finding a federal

constitutional right to funds to investigate matters to present in a state collateral review petition –

which this Court has just explained there is not – the California Supreme Court’s rejection of Mr.

Faulk’s claim would not have been an unreasonable application of such law. The state appellate

court had approved some funds for an investigator to talk to a juror, and rejected additional funds

only after it was rather clear the juror did not want to talk to the defense or the defense investigator. 

At the time the state appellate court had the application for additional funds, the record had been

developed that (a) the juror had objected to the trial court releasing identifying information about

him to the defense, (b) Mr. Faulk’s appellate counsel had unsuccessfully tried to reach the juror in

one telephone call, (c) the private investigator had left his calling card on three personal visits to the

juror’s listed home address but received no response, (d) the private investigator had left three phone

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messages at the one cell phone number he had found but received no response from the juror. The

state court reasonably could have denied further funding in the belief that additional efforts to

contact the juror would be no more successful than the first seven efforts. 

Additionally, the application for funds cast doubt on whether the event sought to be

investigated had actually occurred, as the application stated that defense counsel’s recollection and

the record did not support the belief that the alleged “mad-dogging” spectator was in the courtroom

when the victim testified. The state court reasonably could have determined that any right to

investigative funds did not require the State to pay for further efforts by the defense to investigate an

event the defense did not believe occurred. 

D. No Federal Habeas Relief Is Available For Errors In The State Habeas Process

Separate and apart from the absence of clearly established federal law discussed in section B,

there is a second reason Mr. Faulk cannot obtain federal habeas relief: his claims are for an error in

the state habeas process. 

A person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court can obtain a federal writ of

habeas corpus only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). In other words, “it is only noncompliance with

federal law that renders a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal

courts.” Wilson v. Corcoran, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2010). Federal habeas relief is unavailable for

violations of state law or for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. 

See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. at 861-62.

Errors in the state post-conviction review process are not addressable through federal habeas

corpus proceedings. See Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 939 (9th Cir. 1998) (state judge’s refusal to

appoint counsel in second post-conviction relief proceeding might be a violation of Arizona law, but

does not constitute ground for a federal habeas claim because there is no constitutional right to an

attorney in a state post-conviction proceeding); Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir.

1997); Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 632 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997); Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d

26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (dismissing claim that state court’s delay of over a year in deciding

petitioner’s state post-conviction relief petition was in violation of his right to due process; “a

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4

 Examples of claims that may have been raised in a state habeas proceeding that are for

constitutional violations in the trial proceedings (and therefore are cognizable in a federal habeas

action) include a claim of a biased trial judge, a Brady claim, and a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel at trial. Examples of claims that may have been raised in a state habeas proceeding or are

based on a state habeas proceeding that are not for constitutional violations in the trial proceedings

(and therefore are not cognizable in a federal habeas action) include a claim that a petitioner was

denied counsel in the state habeas proceeding, a claim that there was a delay in the state habeas

proceeding, and a claim that the state habeas court erroneously excluded evidence. 

15

petition alleging errors in the state post-conviction review process is not addressable through habeas

corpus proceedings”); Kirby v. Dutton, 794 F.2d 245, 247 (6th Cir. 1986). Such errors do not

generally represent an attack on the prisoner’s detention and therefore are not proper grounds for

habeas relief. They instead generally pertain to the review process itself and not to the

constitutionality of a state conviction. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (claims of ineffective assistance

of state or federal post-conviction counsel not cognizable on federal habeas review); Franzen, 877

F.2d at 26 (delay in state habeas proceeding not addressable in federal habeas); Millard v. Lynaugh,

810 F.2d 1403, 1410 (5th Cir. 1987) (denial of hearing on state collateral proceedings not

addressable in federal habeas); see also Application of Gordon, 157 F.2d 659, 660 (9th Cir. 1946)

(allegation that state court decided appeal improperly not enough to state claim in federal habeas).

The rule that federal habeas courts cannot address errors in the state post-conviction

procedure (such as a state habeas proceeding) may appear confusing at first blush in light of the fact

that federal habeas courts routinely entertain claims that were presented in state court in a state

habeas petition. The critical dividing point for determining whether the claim is barred by the rule

in the preceding paragraph is whether the claim is of a constitutional violation at the underlying trial

and appeal or of an alleged constitutional violation in the state habeas proceedings. In a federal

habeas action, the former can be entertained but the latter cannot.4

 Although claims may arrive in a

federal habeas court after having been presented to state courts in state habeas petitions, the federal

court can entertain only those claims that pertain to the trial and appeal, but not to the state habeas

proceeding. The next step is to figure out whether Mr. Faulk’s claims are for violations in the trial

proceedings or for violations at the state habeas proceedings. 

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Mr. Faulk’s due process and denial of effective assistance of counsel claims are not

cognizable in a federal habeas action because as noted above, they are for errors occurring in

potential state habeas proceeding.

Mr. Faulk alleges that the California Court of Appeal wrongly denied him funding to

investigate a claim that he could present only in a potential state habeas petition. He wanted to

investigate potential juror misconduct and (if he found it) he would have had to present it in a state

habeas proceeding because the claim would have been based on materials outside the record on

appeal. See People v. Merriam, 66 Cal. 2d 390, 396 (Cal. 1967) (matters outside the record are not

generally reviewable on appeal), overruled on other grounds by People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d

864, 882 (Cal. 1975). The claim Mr. Faulk presents in his federal habeas petition goes to the

substance of the appellate court’s decision in connection with a potential state habeas proceeding,

not a claim on direct appeal. Mr. Faulk did not claim in the state court or here that his potential

juror misconduct claim was part of his appeal or intended to be presented on appeal. See

also Petition For Review (Resp. Ex. G) at 7 (urging that Mr. Faulk had a “constitutional right to

ancillary funds to pursue habeas investigation”). His claim asserts a mistake in the state habeas

proceedings, even if there was no state habeas petition on file at the time he requested funds to

investigate a claim he would have to present in a state habeas petition, if at all. Mr. Faulk does not

identify or allege a constitutional violation that occurred at his trial – indeed, to this day, he does not

know whether there was any juror misconduct at his trial.

There is no cognizable federal due process claim or denial of effective assistance of counsel

claim based on the state appellate court’s rejection of the funding request. 

E. A Certificate Of Appealability Will Not Issue

Mr. Faulk has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and this is not a case in which “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000). Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is DENIED. 

///

///

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VI. CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED on the merits. The Clerk shall close the

file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 2, 2015

_________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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