Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-05145/USCOURTS-ca13-14-05145-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ronald Edward Pierce
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

RONALD EDWARD PIERCE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee.

______________________ 

2014-5145

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:14-CV-00105-NBF, Judge Nancy B. 

Firestone. 

______________________ 

Decided: January 28, 2015 

______________________ 

RONALD EDWARD PIERCE, of Squaw Valley, California, 

pro se. 

MICHAEL D. SNYDER, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department 

of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. 

With him on the brief were JOYCE R. BRANDA, Acting 

Assistant Attorney General, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

Director, and REGINALD T. BLADES, JR., Assistant Director. 

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2 PIERCE v. US

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, MOORE, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Ronald Edward Pierce appeals the United States

Court of Federal Claims’ determination that it lacked 

jurisdiction over his claims under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act, California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, and 

the Administrative Procedure Act. Because the Court of

Federal Claims correctly concluded that none of 

Mr. Pierce’s claims mandates monetary compensation by 

the federal government, we affirm. 

I 

On February 21, 2012, Mr. Pierce filed suit in the 

United States Tax Court, challenging a tax deficiency 

with the Internal Revenue Service. Mr. Pierce filed a 

second suit against the IRS after receiving a second notice 

of deficiency. In his second suit, Mr. Pierce selected 

Fresno, California as his preferred place for trial. 

Mr. Pierce alleged that he is disabled and thus asserted 

that he could not travel to San Francisco, California, for 

trial. 

Mr. Pierce’s suit was a regular tax case, not a small 

tax case. Only small tax cases are heard in Fresno. 

Accordingly, the trial was scheduled to be held in San 

Francisco. 

After receiving notice of the trial schedule, Mr. Pierce 

filed a motion to move the trial to Fresno. This motion 

was denied due to the classification of the case as a regular tax case. 

After this motion was denied, Mr. Pierce contacted the 

Tax Court’s Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

Officer, who instructed him to re-file his motion. This 

motion was granted, and the Tax Court rescheduled trial 

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PIERCE v. US 3

for February 3, 2014 in Fresno, and reclassified his case 

as a small tax case. 

After trial was rescheduled, Mr. Pierce informally requested a continuance of his case. He asserted that a 

continuance was necessary to accommodate his disability 

and for him to deal with the additional cases he had 

before the Tax Court. These requests were not granted, 

and Mr. Pierce subsequently sought help from the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of California 

and then the United States District Court for the Central 

District of California. After that failed, Mr. Pierce requested the Tax Court to take judicial notice that it was

allegedly not accommodating his disabilities. The Tax 

Court entered an order requiring Mr. Pierce to appear on 

the scheduled trial date and time. Mr. Pierce then filed a 

“Sworn Affidavit of Prejudice” asserting that the judge 

assigned to his case was not impartial. The Tax Court 

again entered an order requiring Mr. Pierce to appear on 

the scheduled trial date and time. In this order, the Tax 

Court warned Mr. Pierce that failure to appear could 

result in dismissal of his case. 

Mr. Pierce then filed the present suit in the Court of 

Federal Claims. Before the Court of Federal Claims, 

Mr. Pierce alleged that the Tax Court and the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of California 

failed to accommodate his disability in violation of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et 

seq., and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. 

Code § 51. Mr. Pierce also alleged that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, gives the Court of 

Federal Claims jurisdiction to review the decisions of 

other federal courts. The government filed a motion to 

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United 

States Court of Federal Claims for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. The Court of Federal Claims granted the 

government’s motion. Mr. Pierce appeals. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). 

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4 PIERCE v. US

II

The Court of Federal Claims has limited jurisdiction. 

It may only hear claims that are “against the United 

States” and “founded either upon the Constitution, or any 

Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the 

United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages 

in cases not sounding in tort.” The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1491(a)(1). 

The Tucker Act is “only a jurisdictional statute; it does 

not create any substantive right enforceable against the 

United States for money damages.” United States v. 

Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976); see also Wopsock v. 

Natchees, 454 F.3d 1327, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Accordingly, when determining whether the Court of Federal 

Claims has jurisdiction, we must consider “whether the 

source of substantive law can fairly be interpreted as 

mandating compensation by the Federal Government for 

the damages sustained.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 

U.S. 206, 216 (1983). 

None of Mr. Pierce’s claims fall within the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. His California 

Unruh Civil Rights Act claim is a state law claim which is 

“outside the scope of the limited jurisdiction of the Court 

of Federal Claims.” Sounders v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 

497 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Likewise, the ADA 

is not a money-mandating law. Searles v. United States, 

88 Fed. Cl. 801, 805 (2009). And his APA claim is outside

the Court of Federal Claims’ limited jurisdiction because 

“the APA does not authorize an award of money damages 

at all; to the contrary, section 10(a) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 

§ 702, specifically limits the Act to actions ‘seeking relief 

other than money damages.’” Wopsock, 454 F.3d at 1333 

(Fed. Cir. 2006). 

Because Mr. Pierce’s claims are not capable of mandating monetary compensation by the Federal GovernCase: 14-5145 Document: 12-2 Page: 4 Filed: 01/28/2015
PIERCE v. US 5

ment, we affirm the Court of Federal Claims’ determination that it lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Pierce’s case. 

AFFIRMED

No costs.

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