Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01278/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01278-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Daniel Spitzer
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-1278

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DANIEL SPITZER,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 10 CR 651 — James B. Zagel, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 8, 2016 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 10, 2016

____________________

Before POSNER, EASTERBROOK, and HAMILTON, Circuit 

Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Daniel Spitzer pleaded guilty 

to ten counts of mail fraud, confessing liability for a scheme 

that took in about $106 million—all of which Spitzer promised to invest for his clients’ benefit—but returned only $72 

million or so to investors. Less than $30 million ever was invested. The remainder was used, after the fashion of Ponzi 

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2 No. 15-1278

schemes, to pay earlier investors, or was siphoned off by 

Spitzer and others.

The presentence report calculated a Guideline range of 

292 to 365 months’ imprisonment, which flowed from an offense level of 40 and a criminal history category I. The base 

offense level was 7. See U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(a)(1). A loss of approximately $34 million added 22 levels, and the existence of 

more than 250 victims added a further six. The PSR proposed two levels for use of sophisticated means, two because 

Spitzer personally took more than $1 million out of the kitty, 

and another four because Spitzer claimed to have acted as an 

investment adviser. Take three off for acceptance of responsibility, and the result is level 40.

At sentencing, Spitzer’s lawyer contested this calculation 

by asking that the loss be reduced to account for the fact that 

more than $70 million was returned to investors, some of 

whom were made whole, and $30 million of the $106 million 

was invested (at least for a time). But as $34 million represents investors’ net loss, it is hard to see how any further reduction could be taken. See United States v. Walsh, 723 F.3d 

802, 807–09 (7th Cir. 2013). The loss for Guidelines purposes

might have been reduced if some of the $34 million had been 

attributable to financial markets, rather than fraud, but 

Spitzer did not attempt to show how investors would have 

fared if the funds had been operated as he promised.

Some investors got out without injury, and redemption 

requests were honored until near the end when the funds 

ran out of money, but Spitzer conceded that he owes restitution of some $34 million to 458 specific persons, which made 

it hard to contest the enhancement for 250 or more victims. 

He also conceded drawing more than $1 million for himself 

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No. 15-1278 3

and claiming to be an investment adviser, and the elaborate 

details through which the scheme was operated attest to sophisticated means. The district judge stated that he agreed 

with the calculation in the PSR and sentenced Spitzer to 300 

months’ imprisonment.

In this appeal, Spitzer does not contest the calculation of 

the Guideline range. Nor does he contend that a 300-month 

sentence is unreasonable, given that range. Spitzer also does 

not contend that, in selecting the 300-month sentence, the 

judge failed to address his principal arguments for a shorter 

term or overlooked any of the factors in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a). 

Instead, the sole appellate argument is that the judge did not 

explain in more detail why he agreed with the PSR’s conclusion that offense level 40 applies. Yet as Spitzer does not contend that the PSR is wrong in any of the steps that gets the 

offense level to 40, it is hard to see why an abbreviated judicial explanation could be error. A judge who agrees with the 

PSR’s calculations can say so, without the need to repeat or 

re-rationalize them; the adoption of the PSR means that it 

speaks for the court as well as the staff. See, e.g., United 

States v. O’Doherty, 643 F.3d 209, 219 (7th Cir. 2011).

The task of determining the right sentence, given the 

statutory factors, demands more judgment than the task of 

calculating the offense level, which in a case such as this is 

close to mechanical. That is why we require the judge to 

evaluate, on the record, the defendant’s substantial arguments for lenience. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 429 

F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Ramirez-Fuentes, 703 

F.3d 1038, 1047–49 (7th Cir. 2013). By contrast, a simple 

statement of agreement with the PSR shows why the judge 

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approves the offense level that has been explained in the 

PSR: the judge thinks that the staff got it right.

And what would be the point of a remand? Since Spitzer 

does not now contend that his offense level is less than 40, 

all a remand could do would be to produce empty words en 

route to an inevitable outcome.

AFFIRMED

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