Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01565/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01565-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
J. Hartley
Respondent
Terry Myers
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRY MYERS,

Petitioner,

v.

J. HARTLEY, Warden

Respondent.

 /

1:09-cv-01565-OWW-SMS (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. 14]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

 BACKGROUND

In the instant petition, Petitioner challenges the Board of Parole Hearings’ (Board)

September 27, 2006 decision finding him unsuitable for release. 

On November 7, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Fresno

County Superior Court challenging the 2007 Board decision. (Exhibit 1, to Motion.) The

petition was denied on December 2, 2008. (Exhibit 2, to Motion.)

In December 2008, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. (Exhibit 3, to Motion.) The petition was denied on

January 8, 2009. (Exhibit 4, to Motion.) 

On February 22, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition in the California Supreme Court. 

(Exhibit 5, to Motion.) The petition was denied on July 15, 2009. (Exhibit 6, to Motion.)

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Petitioner filed the instant petition on September 4, 2009. On January 11, 2010,

Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss. (Court Doc. 14.) Petitioner did not file an

opposition. 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer

if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of

the state’s procedural rules. See e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990)

(using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White

v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review

motion to dismiss for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12

(E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a

response, and the Court should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533

F.Supp. at 1194 & n. 12. 

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C.

2244(d)(1)'s one-year limitations period. Therefore, the Court will review Respondent’s motion

to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118

S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant petition was filed on September 4, 2009, and thus, it is subject to

the provisions of the AEDPA. 

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The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection. 

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In a situation such as this where the petitioner is challenging a parole board

decision, the Ninth Circuit has held that direct review is concluded and the statute of limitations

commences when the final administrative appeal is denied. See Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d

1077, 1079 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that § 2241(d)(1)(D) applies in the context of parole

decisions and that the Board of Prison Term’s denial of an inmate’s administrative appeal is the

“factual predicate” of the inmate’s claim that triggers the commencement of the limitations

period). 

“Section 2254 ‘is the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a state prisoner in custody

pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petition is not challenging his underlying state

court conviction.’” Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-1127 (9th Cir.2006),

quoting White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir.2004). Under the AEDPA, an

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application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in

a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In the context of reviewing parole decisions,

due process requires that: 1) the inmate must receive advance written notice of a hearing, Pedro

v. Oregon Parole Bd., 825 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir.1987); 2) the inmate must be afforded an

"opportunity to be heard," Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1,

16 (1979); 3) if the inmate is denied parole, the inmate must be told why "he falls short of

qualifying for parole,” Id.; and 4) the decision of the Board must be supported by "some

evidence" having an indicia of reliability, Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,

455 (1985); Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir.1987). 

In the instant petition, Petitioner contends that the Board’s decision findings him

unsuitable for release on parole violated his federal rights. The Board’s 2006 decision became

final on January 25, 2007-120 days thereafter. (Exhibit 1, to Motion.) Therefore, the statute of

limitations began to run the following day on January 26, 2007, and was set to expire on January

25, 2008, absent applicable tolling. 

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is

tolled where a petitioner is properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled

during the intervals between one state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a

habeas petition at the next level of the state court system. 536 U.S. 214 (2002).

At the time Petitioner filed his first state habeas corpus petition on November 7, 2008, the

limitations period had already expired several months earlier. Consequently, Petitioner is not

entitled to statutory tolling for any of his state habeas petitions because they were all filed after

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the limitations period expired. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“[S]ection 2254 does not permit the reinitiation of the limitation period that has ended before the

state petition was filed”); Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003) (if first petition

filed after expiration of limitations period, “statutory tolling cannot save his claim”); Green v.

White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.2000) (Petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the

limitations period has already run). 

In addition, another 54 days expired after the California Supreme Court denied the

petition on August 12, 2009 to the filing of the instant federal petition on October 5, 2009. See

Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 644 (2005); Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 271 (2005); Nino v.

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the instant petition for writ of habeas

corpus is time-barred under § 2244(d). 

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1)

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department

of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541

(9th Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996), cert

denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to

tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac.

Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir.1993). 

To the extent Petitioner contends that the limitations should be equitably tolled until 

receipt of the transcripts on July 6, 2007, his claim is without merit. As discussed, the limitations

began to run on April 19, 2007-the date the Board decision became final, and the fact that

Petitioner received a copy of the transcripts just over two months thereafter (and well within the

limitations period) does not entitle him to equitable tolling, as it could not have been the cause of 

Petitioner’s untimeliness. The Court therefore finds no reason to equitably toll the limitations

period. 

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RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely be GRANTED; and

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to dismiss the action with prejudice.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within fourteen (14) after service of the objections. The Court will then review the

Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 3, 2010 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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