Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_00-cr-00872/USCOURTS-azd-3_00-cr-00872-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vernon Austin
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

UNITED STATES of AMERICA, )

) No. CR 00-872 PCT RCB

Plaintiff/Respondent, ) CIV 03-708 PCT RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

VERNON AUSTIN, )

)

Defendant/Movant. ) )

On June 16, 2003, Movant Vernon Austin filed an Amended Motion

to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255. Am. Mot. (doc. # 63). The Court denied that motion on the

merits on January 5, 2005, but granted Austin leave to file a

motion for permission to file a second amended § 2255 motion. 

Order (doc. # 80). On February 17, 2005, Austin filed a motion for

leave to amend (doc. # 86), which was granted in part and denied in

part on July 14, 2005. Order (doc. #90). Austin was granted leave

to file a second amended § 2255 motion, but was limited to raising

only one issue-- whether his counsel was constitutionally

ineffective for failing to call an expert witness at trial. Id. 

Case 3:00-cr-00872-RCB Document 94 Filed 11/10/05 Page 1 of 7
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1

 Under Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by the

district court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

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Currently pending before the Court are Austin's July 28 motion

asking the Court not to limit argument to one issue (doc. # 91),

and Austin's October 11 motion to compel his ex-trial counsel to

provide copies of the trial transcript to him (doc. # 92). 

I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

As a preliminary matter, the Court now perceives that it would

lack subject matter jurisdiction over any further § 2255 motions by

Austin, unless such a motion was first authorized by the Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.1 Since the enactment of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") in April

1996, a prisoner may file a second or successive § 2255 motion only

after first obtaining authorization from a panel of the appropriate

court of appeals. 28. U.S.C. § 2255 ("A second or successive

motion must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of

the appropriate court of appeals . . ."). Under these provisions,

an applicant seeking to file a second or successive application

under § 2255 must first "move in the appropriate court of appeals

for an order authorizing the district court to consider the

application." See §§ 2244(b)(3)(A), 2255. If these conditions

have not been met, the AEDPA requires the district court to dismiss

any second or successive § 2255 motions. See United States v.

Fisher, 264 F. Supp. 2d 468, 469-70 (N.D. Tex. 2003); United States

v. Alvarez-Ramirez, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1266-67 (C.D. Cal. 2001);

United States v. Wood, 110 F. Supp. 2d 348, 348-49 (M.D. Pa. 2000).

Because Austin's first amended § 2255 motion was filed after

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the AEDPA, and was decided on the merits, the motion he now seeks

to file would be deemed a successive petition. Therefore, Austin

must seek permission to file, not from this Court, but from the

Ninth Circuit. Unless such permission is granted by the Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Court would remain without

jurisdiction to consider a second amended § 2255 motion. Indeed,

it would appear that the Court did not have jurisdiction to allow

Austin leave to file a second amended § 2255 motion in its July 14

order.

Therefore, pursuant to Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the Court's July 14 order (doc. # 90) is modified so

that Austin's Motion for Leave to Amend (doc. # 86) is denied in

its entirety. Furthermore, as the Court would lack jurisdiction

over a second § 2255 petition, Austin's July 28 motion (doc. # 91)

is denied.

II. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Although the Court would lack jurisdiction over a second §

2255 motion, and should therefore deny Austin's present motion on

that basis, it will nevertheless discuss why Austin's present

motion would be denied on the merits.

The Court would construe Austin's motion as a motion for

reconsideration of the Court's July 14 order. The decision to

grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is left to the sound

discretion of the trial court. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah

County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). Such

motions are disfavored and, absent exceptional circumstances, are

generally only appropriate "if the district court (1) is presented

with newly discovered evidence; (2) committed clear error or the

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initial decision was manifestly unjust; or (3) if there is an

intervening change in controlling law." Id.

First, Austin has not raised any newly discovered evidence. 

Instead, he argues that the trial transcript, which was not

previously in his possession, may "uncover facts" that he was

unable to recall when preparing his first amended § 2255 motion. 

Mot. (doc. # 91) at 1. However, this does not merit

reconsideration of the Court's July 14 order (doc. # 90), because

the trial transcript is not newly discovered evidence. Although

Austin may believe that having possession of the trial transcript

may allow him to better articulate his claims, the Court had access

to the transcript and reviewed all relevant portions thoroughly

before resolving Austin's amended motion. Even if Austin had a

copy of the trial transcript before him now, the Court would have

no more substantive information than it did previously. Therefore,

reconsideration of the Court's July 14 order would not be warranted

on the basis of newly discovered evidence.

Second, the Court did not commit clear error when it partially

denied Austin's motion for leave to amend. In order to prove that

the Court committed clear error, Austin must demonstrate that the

Court’s action fell clearly outside the bounds of its authority. 

McDowell v. Calerdon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1256 (9th Cir. 1999). If the

propriety of the Court’s judgment is a debatable question, there is

no clear error and the motion to reconsider is properly denied. 

Id. In the instant case, Austin sought to include in his second

amended § 2255 motion a claim that his trial counsel was

constitutionally ineffective for failing to determine whether the

victim had Lysol or hair spray in her system at the time of death--

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2

 Austin's motion also alludes to the possibility of asserting

a claim based on United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir.

2005) (en banc). In Ameline, however, the Ninth Circuit simply

applied Booker on direct review. Id. at 1074. Ameline did not

create the basis of any new claim that would be judicially cognizable

on collateral review.

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an issue that was already raised in his first amended § 2255

motion. Mot. (doc. # 86) at 5; Am. Mot. (doc. # 63) at 4. That

issue was fully briefed, and was decided on the merits. See Am.

Mot. (doc. # 63) at 4; Resp. (doc. # 65) at 6; Order (doc. # 80). 

As such, the Court acted within the bounds of its authority, and

there was no manifest injustice in its decision to partially deny

Austin's motion for leave to amend. Indeed, the motion should have

been denied in its entirety based on the AEDPA's limitations on

successive petitions. Therefore, the Court did not commit clear

error, and reconsideration of its July 14 order would not be

warranted on that basis.

Finally, Austin's motion is not based on an intervening change

in controlling law that would bear on the Court's July 14 order. 

Rather, Austin asks the Court to consider claims challenging the

constitutionality of his sentence based on United States v. Booker,

160 L. Ed. 2d 621, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).2 Mot. (doc. # 91) at 1-

2. Although Booker was decided after Austin's first petition was

denied, Austin failed to subsequently raise any Booker claims in

his February 17 motion for leave to amend (doc. # 86). Booker, 160

L. Ed. 2d 621, 125 S. Ct. 738. Even had he done so, such a claim

could not be heard on collateral review, because the Ninth Circuit

has recently held that "Booker is not retroactive, and does not

apply to cases on collateral review where the conviction was final

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3

 Needless to say, a copy of the trial transcript could prove

beneficial to Austin should he choose to pursue this matter through

the proper course by seeking the Ninth Circuit's authorization to

file a second § 2255 motion.

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as of the date of Booker's publication." United States v. Cruz,

No. 03-35873, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 19901, at *3-6 (9th Cir. Sept.

16, 2005) (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)). Here,

Austin's conviction became final on October 18, 2002, well before

Booker was published. See Mandate (doc. # 56). As there has been

no intervening change in controlling law that could form the basis

of a judicially cognizable claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and no

other bases for reconsideration are present, Austin's July 28

motion (doc. # 91) would accordingly be denied on the merits. 

III. MOTION TO COMPEL

It has come to the Court's attention that Assistant Federal

Public Defender Jeffrey A. Williams has apparently failed to

provide a copy of the trial transcript to Austin as instructed by

the Court's order of July 14, 2005.3 Mot. to Compel (doc. # 92);

Order (doc. # 90). That order required Williams to file with this

Court a notice of sending the trial transcript to Austin, which was

to include the date such transcript was sent. More than three

months have passed since the entry of that order, and no such

notice has been filed. The Court takes notice of the record in

this case as establishing Williams' noncompliance with its order of

July 14 (doc. # 90). 

Accordingly, the Court will grant Austin's motion to compel

his ex-trial counsel to provide copies of the trial transcript to

him. Counsel shall provide that transcript within 15 days.

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IT IS ORDERED that Austin's motion that the Court not limit

argument to one issue (doc. # 91) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED modifying the Court's July 14 order

(doc. # 90) so that Austin's Motion for Leave to Amend (doc. # 86)

is DENIED in its entirety.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Austin's motion to compel his extrial counsel to provide copies of the trial transcript (doc. # 92)

is GRANTED. Petitioner's ex-trial counsel, Jeffrey A. Williams,

shall send a copy of the transcript of Petitioner's trial on July

19-21, 2001 to Petitioner Vernon Austin, # 18377-051, United States

Penitentiary, P.O. Box 7000, Florence, Colorado 81226, within

fifteen (15) days from the entry of this order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jeffrey A. Williams shall file with

this Court a notice of sending the trial transcript to Petitioner. 

Such notice shall include the date such transcript was sent.

DATED this 9th day of November, 2005.

Copies to counsel of record, pro se petitioner, and Jeffrey A.

Williams, Assistant Federal Public Defender, District of Arizona,

850 W. Adams Street, Suite 201, Phoenix, Arizona 85007.

Case 3:00-cr-00872-RCB Document 94 Filed 11/10/05 Page 7 of 7