Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-13-04431/USCOURTS-ca2-13-04431-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jamell Sellers
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee USA

Document Text:

13‐4431‐cr

United States v. Sellers                             

   

1 In the 

2 United States Court of Appeals 

3 For the Second Circuit 

4

5 August Term, 2014

6 No. 13‐4431‐cr

7 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

8 Appellee,

9 v.

10 JAMELL SELLERS,

11 Defendant‐Appellant.

12

13 Appeal from the United States District Court

14 for the Eastern District of New York.

15 No. 12‐cr‐643 ― Sterling Johnson, Jr., Judge.

16

17

18 ARGUED: DECEMBER 9, 2014

19 DECIDED: APRIL 27, 2015

20

21

22 Before: CABRANES, LOHIER, and DRONEY, Circuit Judges.

23

24

25

26

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page1 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐2‐ 

1 Appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court

2 for the Eastern District of New York (Johnson, J.), sentencing Jamell

3 Sellers principally to fifteen years’ imprisonment for violating 18

4 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  The district court imposed a statutory mandatory

5 minimum of fifteen years after concluding that Sellers was an armed

6 career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), part of the Armed Career

7 Criminal Act (“ACCA”).    We hold that Sellers’s drug conviction

8 under New York law that resulted in a youthful offender

9 adjudication does not qualify as a predicate conviction under the

10 ACCA.  Therefore, the ACCA mandatory minimum does not apply.

11 Accordingly, we REMAND to the district court for resentencing.  

12

13

14 BARRY D. LEIWANT, Federal Defenders of New

15 York, Inc., Appeals Bureau, New York, NY, for

16 Defendant‐Appellant.

17 ALIXANDRA E. SMITH (Jo Ann M. Navickas, on the

18 brief) Assistant United States Attorneys, for

19 Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the

20 Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for

21 Appellee.

22     

23 DRONEY, Circuit Judge:

24 Jamell Sellers was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment

25 for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition under

26 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) of the Armed

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page2 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐3‐ 

Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”).1 1     Judgment was entered on

2 November 20, 2013, in the United States District Court for the

3 Eastern District of New York (Johnson, J.).   

4 Sellers contends that the application of the ACCA was error,

5 arguing that his 2001 state conviction for criminal sale of a

6 controlled substance does not qualify as one of the “three previous

7 convictions” necessary to apply the ACCA because he was

8 adjudicated as a youthful offender (“YO”) for that offense under

9 New York law.  See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).  Therefore, he appeals his

10 sentence of the ACCA’s statutory mandatory minimum of fifteen

11 years’ imprisonment.  

12 We hold that a drug conviction under New York law that was

13 replaced by a YO adjudication is not a qualifying predicate

14 conviction under the ACCA because it has been “set aside” within

                                              

1 Sellers was also sentenced to four years of supervised release and a $100 special

assessment.  

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page3 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐4‐ 

1 the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) and New York law.  

2 Accordingly, we REMAND to the district court for resentencing.  

3 BACKGROUND

4 An indictment was returned on October 9, 2012, in the U.S.

5 District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging that on

6 September 11, 2012, Sellers possessed a firearm and ammunition and

7 had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of

8 imprisonment exceeding one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

9 § 922(g)(1).  Sellers had been arrested by two New York City police

10 officers responding to a 911 call that a man with a handgun was

11 standing in front of a building in Brooklyn.  The officers saw a man

12 who fit the description in the 911 call and, as he began walking away

13 from them, saw the handgun in his pants.  Sellers was arrested, and

14 a loaded Taurus 9 mm semiautomatic pistol was seized.   

15 On May 16, 2013, Sellers moved for a ruling by the district

16 court that he would not be sentenced under the ACCA if he were to

17 plead guilty.  Violations of § 922(g)(1) are punishable by a maximum

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page4 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐5‐ 

1 sentence of ten years, and there is no mandatory minimum.    18

2 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).    However, the ACCA imposes a fifteen‐year

3 mandatory minimum sentence if a person violates § 922(g)(1) and

4 has “three previous convictions by any court referred to in section

5 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or

6 both, committed on occasions different from one another.”    Id.

7 § 924(e)(1).  Sellers argued that he did not qualify as an armed career

8 criminal because one of his three prior criminal convictions – from

9 when he was 17 years old – had been replaced by a YO adjudication

under New York law. 10 2

11 The Government opposed Sellers’s motion, contending that

12 resolution of the ACCA issue was premature.  The Government also

13 argued that Sellers was an armed career criminal because Sellers’s

                                              

2 Sellers pled guilty in 2001 to criminal sale of a controlled substance on school grounds

in violation of New York Penal Law § 220.44.  After his guilty plea, he was adjudicated a

YO under New York law and sentenced to five years’ probation.   In 2004, Sellers was

convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance, and his term of probation was

revoked.  Sellers was resentenced to sixteen months’ to four years’ imprisonment for his

2001 conviction.   

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page5 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐6‐ 

1 YO adjudication for the drug offense was not excluded from

2 consideration as a “previous conviction” under the ACCA.   

3 On June 7, 2013, at a status conference three days before trial

4 was to begin, the district court declined to rule on the ACCA issue,

5 reasoning that doing so would “place the court in a position of

6 negotiat[ing]” with the parties.  Appellant App. 47.  Sellers then pled

7 guilty that day to the one‐count indictment without a plea

8 agreement. During the plea colloquy, Sellers acknowledged that

9 (1) he had two prior felony convictions and (2) he had a third

10 conviction that resulted in a New York YO adjudication and did not

11 qualify as a conviction under the ACCA. Sellers was informed by

12 the district court that if he was found to have three qualifying

13 convictions, the ACCA would trigger the statutory mandatory

14 minimum of fifteen years and a maximum of life in prison. After

15 Sellers stated that he understood, the district court accepted Sellers’s

16 plea.

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page6 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐7‐ 

1 The Pre‐Sentence Report (“PSR”) calculated Sellers’s

2 Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) range to be 168

3 to 210 months based on a Criminal History Category V and a total

4 offense level of 31, which included upward adjustments due to his

5 ACCA status.    Because of the ACCA’s statutory mandatory

6 minimum, the PSR concluded that the Guidelines range increased to

7 180 to 210 months.  See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).   

8 Sellers filed objections to the PSR, including the portions of

9 the PSR which adopted the Government’s position that the statutory

10 mandatory minimum of fifteen years under the ACCA applied.

11 Sellers also disputed his points calculation for Criminal History V,

12 arguing that no points should be assigned for the YO adjudication,

13 and thus his Criminal History Category should be IV instead of V.

14 He also disputed the application of a Sentencing Guidelines offense

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page7 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐8‐ 

level enhancement for ACCA‐sentencing under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4. 1 3

2 Sellers advocated for a Guidelines range of 57 to 71 months’

3 imprisonment. In response, the Government argued that his 2001

4 conviction satisfied the ACCA and also should be counted under the

5 Guidelines for determining his Criminal History Category and for

6 applying the offense level enhancement.

7 On October 17, 2013, the district court sentenced Sellers to the

8 ACCA statutory mandatory minimum of fifteen years’

9 imprisonment, concluding that the ACCA applied to Sellers

10 notwithstanding his YO adjudication.  Sellers once again objected to

11 the ACCA mandatory minimum and the effects of the ACCA

12 determination on his Guidelines calculation.

13 Judgment was entered on November 20, 2013, and Sellers filed

14 a timely notice of appeal on the same day.

                                              

3 “A defendant who is subject to an enhanced sentence under the provisions of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e) is an armed career criminal.”    U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(a).    Sellers’s offense level

increased from 24 to 33 based on that enhancement. Id. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B).  

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page8 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐9‐ 

1 DISCUSSION

2 We consider two issues on this appeal.    First, we determine

3 the requirements for a prior conviction for a “serious drug offense”

4 to qualify as a “previous conviction” under the ACCA.  Second, we

5 evaluate Sellers’s YO adjudication for his drug offense in New York

6 to decide whether it was a “previous conviction” that would qualify

7 as an ACCA predicate conviction.   

8 I. Standard of Review  

9 The burden is on the government to prove the existence of a

10 qualifying conviction when seeking a sentencing enhancement

11 under the ACCA.   United States v. Rosa, 507 F.3d 142, 151 (2d Cir.

12 2007).  “The questions of what documents a district court may rely

13 on to determine the nature of a prior conviction and of the scope of a

14 district court’s authority to make factual findings are questions of

15 law, which we review de novo.”    Id. (internal citations omitted).  

16 Likewise, “[w]e review de novo questions of law relating to a district

17 court’s application of the ACCA.”    See United States v. Brown, 629

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page9 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐10‐ 

1 F.3d 290, 293, 294 (2d Cir. 2011) (reviewing de novo whether the

2 defendant’s prior conviction constitutes a “violent felony” for ACCA

3 purposes).    We review for clear error the “district court’s factual

4 findings regarding the nature of the prior offense.”  Id. at 293.

5 II. Qualifying Convictions Under the ACCA

6 The first question is what prior convictions qualify as

7 “previous convictions” under the ACCA.    “As in all statutory

8 construction cases, we begin with ‘the language itself [and] the

9 specific context in which that language is used.’”  McNeill v. United

10 States, 131 S. Ct. 2218, 2221 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting

11 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)).   

12 Here, the relevant gateway to the application of the ACCA is

13 the violation of the felon in possession of a firearm statute, 18 U.S.C.

14 § 922(g)(1).   See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).   The single predicate conviction

15 necessary for a violation of § 922(g)(1) is a conviction “in any court

16 of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page10 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐11‐ 

1 year.”    Id. § 922(g)(1).    However, a “crime punishable by

2 imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” is further defined in 18

3 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) as excluding “[a]ny conviction which has been

4 expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or

5 has had civil rights restored.”    Id. § 921(a)(20).    Thus, § 922(g)(1)

6 excludes certain prior felony convictions.

7 Once the elements of § 922(g)(1) have been satisfied, the

8 ACCA’s increased mandatory minimum period of fifteen years’

9 imprisonment applies if the defendant has three prior convictions

10 for violent felonies or serious drug offenses.    Id. § 924(e)(1).    The

11 ACCA, in describing the three prior convictions necessary for its

12 application, states that they must be “previous convictions by any

13 court referred to in section 922(g)(1),” thus adopting the § 922(g)(1)

14 definitional reference to § 921(a)(20), including its exclusions.  

15 The Government argues, however, that the phrase “referred to

16 in section 922(g)(1)” in § 924(e)(1) modifies “any court” rather than

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page11 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐12‐ 

1 “three previous convictions.”    According to the Government,

2 § 924(e)(1)’s cross reference to § 922(g)(1), therefore, means only that

3 the serious drug offense or violent felony must be a conviction in a

4 domestic court rather than a foreign court, and that § 921(a)(20)’s

5 definition of a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term

6 exceeding one year” – with its exclusions – does not apply. We find

7 this argument unpersuasive.  

8 Because § 922(g)(1) does not define “any court,” the

9 Government’s proposed construction would leave the cross

10 reference in § 924(e)(1) with no useful purpose.    In order to give

11 meaning to § 924(e)(1)’s cross reference, we conclude that the phrase

12 “referred to in section 922(g)(1)” modifies “three previous

13 convictions” in § 924(e)(1).    See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S.

14 528, 538‐39 (1955) (“It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every

15 clause and word of a statute . . . .” (internal quotation marks

16 omitted)).  Accordingly, the convictions necessary for applying the

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page12 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐13‐ 

1 ACCA invoke the further definition of “crime[s] punishable by

2 imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” in § 921(a)(20), which

3 excludes certain convictions, including those that have been “set

4 aside.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20); see United States v. Parnell, 524 F.3d 166,

5 169 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“Convictions that are ‘set aside’ are

6 expressly exempted from the calculation of defendant’s previous

7 convictions under the ACCA . . . .”).  

8 This application of the definition in § 921(a)(20) to “previous

9 convictions” in § 924(e)(1) follows the approach taken by the Fourth

10 and Ninth Circuits. See United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379, 1382

11 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Section 924(e) thus incorporates the definition of

12 ‘crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,’

13 found in section 921(a)(20), and its exclusion of any conviction for

14 which the defendant’s civil rights have been restored.”); United

15 States v. Clark, 993 F.2d 402, 403 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[T]o bring a

16 defendant under the provisions of § 924(e) the government must

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page13 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐14‐ 

1 show . . . the convictions are of the type referred to in

2 § 922(g)(1) . . . . That section refers to conviction in any court of ‘a

3 crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,’ a

4 term in turn defined in . . . 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).” (emphasis

5 added)).  

6 As mentioned above, predicate convictions in § 924(e)(1) must

7 be either a “violent felony” or a “serious drug offense” as defined in

8 § 924(e)(2).    The Government also contends that even if the

9 definitional language in § 921(a)(20) (and its exclusions) applies to

10 the ACCA, it applies only to a “violent felony” and not a “serious

11 drug offense.” The Government points out that § 924(e)(2)(B)

12 includes as part of its definition of a “violent felony” “any crime

13 punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . .” –

14 the language also found in § 922(g)(1) and § 921(a)(20) – while a

15 “serious drug offense” as defined in § 924(e)(2)(A) does not include

16 this language.    However, the repetition of the phrase “crime

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page14 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐15‐ 

1 punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” in the

2 definition of “violent felony” in § 924(e)(2)(B) and its absence in the

3 definition of “serious drug offense” in § 924(e)(2)(A) does not

4 demonstrate that Congress intended to make the cross reference in

5 § 924(e)(1) to § 922(g)(1) (and to § 921(a)(20) and its exemptions)

6 inapplicable to “serious drug offense[s].”   

7 The specific definition of “serious drug offense” states that a

8 prior drug conviction qualifies only if it was a federal or state

9 conviction “for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten

10 years or more is prescribed by law.”  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(i), (ii).  

11 Congress chose to count only more serious drug offenses with

12 maximum statutory imprisonment terms of ten years or more as

13 qualifying ACCA predicates.    Repeating § 922(g)(1)’s one‐year

14 language in § 924(e)(2)(A)’s “serious drug offense” definition would

15 have contradicted Congress’ choice to count only those drug

16 offenses with at least ten‐year maximum statutory penalties.  

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page15 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐16‐ 

1 Applying § 921(a)(20)’s exclusions of certain prior felony convictions

2 to “serious drug offense” is consistent not only with the plain

3 language of the statute, but also with this statutory framework.  

4 Therefore, we conclude that a conviction for a serious drug offense

5 that is excluded under § 921(a)(20) is not a qualifying conviction

6 under § 924(e)(1).  

7 III. A Conviction That Is “Set Aside”

8 The next issue is whether Sellers’s New York YO adjudication

9 rendered his prior guilty plea to the underlying drug offense a

conviction that has been “set aside” under § 921(a)(20).4 10     The

11 language of that section provides that a prior offense does not

12 qualify as a conviction if it “has been expunged[] or set aside” or the

13 offender “has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored.”    18

                                              

4 As Sellers points out, the Government is raising for the first time the issue of whether

the YO adjudication “set aside” his conviction based on its effect under New York law.  

“Arguments raised for the first time on appeal are deemed waived.”  Millea v. Metro‐N.

R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 2011).  “But appeals courts may entertain additional

support that a party provides for a proposition presented below.”  Eastman Kodak Co. v.

STWB, Inc., 452 F.3d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 2006).  Because the issue is purely legal and does

not bear on facts specific to Sellers’s conviction, we decline to consider the argument

waived.  See Greene v. United States, 13 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994).    

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page16 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐17‐ 

1 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).    This provision exempts from the ACCA

2 otherwise qualifying convictions.  See Logan v. United States, 552 U.S.

3 23, 31‐32 (2007) (discussing the § 921(a)(20) exemptions in the

4 context of ACCA‐enhanced sentencing).    We conclude that under

5 New York law, Sellers’s YO adjudication for a drug offense operates

6 to “set aside” his prior drug conviction because (1) § 921(a)(20)

7 specifically requires the district court to apply state law in making

8 that determination and (2) New York law deems such YO

9 adjudications to “set aside” convictions and does not consider YO

10 adjudications predicate convictions for sentencing enhancements in

11 New York State courts.

12 A. Section 921(a)(20)

13 1. The Meaning of “Set Aside”

14 Section 921(a)(20) sets out four ways an otherwise qualifying

15 conviction is excluded from consideration as a predicate conviction

16 under the ACCA: expungement, pardon, setting the conviction

17 aside, or restoration of civil rights.    18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).    “Each

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page17 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐18‐ 

1 term describes a measure by which the government relieves an

2 offender of some or all of the consequences of his conviction.”  

3 Logan, 552 U.S. at 32.  

4 Two of the four exclusions are relevant in the analysis here:

5 setting aside and expunging a prior conviction.  “Set aside” means

6 to “annul or vacate” a judgment or an order.  Black’s Law Dictionary

7 1580 (10th ed. 2014).  By contrast, “expunge” means to “remove from

8 a record,” and “expungement of record” is the actual “removal of a

9 conviction . . . from a person’s criminal record.”  Id. at 702.  

10 We have previously recognized differences in the treatment of

11 convictions that are “set aside” and convictions that are expunged.  

12 A “set aside” conviction, unlike an expunged conviction, “does not

13 eliminate all trace of the prior adjudication and allows consideration

14 of youthful offender adjudications in later proceedings[.]”    See

15 United States v. Matthews, 205 F.3d 544, 548 (2d Cir. 2000); see also id.

16 at    546, 548 (holding that defendant’s New York YO adjudication

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page18 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐19‐ 

1 “simply ‘set aside’” his prior conviction but did not “expunge” the

2 conviction for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2); see also United States v.

3 Cuello, 357 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2004) (describing Matthews’s

4 conclusion that a YO adjudication was not an “expunged”

5 conviction for the purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 because “New York’s

6 youthful offender law evinced an intent only to ‘set aside’ a

7 conviction for the purposes of avoiding stigma, rather than to erase

8 all record of the conviction or to preclude its future use by courts”).  

9 While a “set aside” conviction may still be considered for certain

10 purposes because it has not been fully expunged, see, e.g., Matthews,

11 205 F.3d at 548‐49, it is nonetheless excluded from consideration as a

12 predicate conviction under the ACCA, see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20),

13 because of the particular language of that definitional statute.  

14 2. The Requirement To Apply State Law

15 Section 921(a)(20) is explicit in requiring district courts to

16 apply state law in evaluating prior state convictions.    Section

17 921(a)(20) states that “[w]hat constitutes a conviction of [a crime

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page19 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐20‐ 

1 punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year] shall be

2 determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which

3 the proceedings were held” and that “[a]ny conviction which has

4 been . . . set aside . . . shall not be considered a conviction for

5 purposes of this chapter.”  18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).  

6 This language in § 921(a)(20) distinguishes our treatment of

7 New York YO adjudications as potential ACCA predicate

8 convictions from that of our earlier decisions that analyzed the

9 impact of such adjudications under another federal criminal statute

10 and the Sentencing Guidelines.  

11 We previously held, for instance, that a New York YO

12 adjudication qualifies as a “prior conviction for a felony drug

13 offense [that] has become final” under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) and thereby

14 increases the statutory mandatory minimum for certain drug

15 offenses.    United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 194‐95 (2d Cir.

16 2004).  Although in Sampson we reviewed the New York YO statutes

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page20 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐21‐ 

1 to determine the practical impact of a YO adjudication, we applied

2 federal law to determine whether a prior New York felony drug

3 conviction replaced by a YO adjudication constituted a “final”

4 felony drug offense under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).    See id. at 194‐95

5 (discussing 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(44), 841(b)).    Unlike 18 U.S.C.

6 § 921(a)(20), however, neither 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) nor the definition of

7 “felony drug offense” in 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) excludes otherwise

8 qualifying convictions that have been “set aside” under state law.  

9 The ACCA’s incorporation of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)’s

10 exclusion for convictions “set aside” under state law also warrants

11 treating New York YO adjudications differently in the ACCA‐

12 predicate conviction context than in our previous decisions

13 interpreting certain provisions in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.  In

14 United States v. Matthews, we held that a prior New York YO

15 adjudication should be counted in determining the defendant’s

16 criminal history under U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1 and 4A1.2.  Matthews, 205

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page21 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐22‐ 

1 F.3d at 546, 548‐49.  Sentencing Guideline 4A1.2(j) specifically states

2 that only prior convictions that have been “expunged” will not be

3 counted in making a criminal history determination, and an

4 application note to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 expressly states that prior

5 convictions that have merely been “set aside” should be counted.

6 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n.10.    We held that New York convictions

7 replaced by YO adjudications were not “expunged” and therefore

8 should be counted under the Guidelines in calculating the

9 defendant’s criminal history.    Matthews, 205 F.3d at 548.    We

10 concluded that although “New York courts do not use youthful

11 offender adjudications as predicates for enhanced sentencing . . .  

12 [that] does not restrict federal courts from taking them into account

13 when imposing sentences under the Guidelines.”  Id.  

14 Similarly, in United States v. Driskell, we held that an

15 attempted murder conviction that was replaced by a New York YO

16 adjudication constituted an “adult conviction” for calculating a

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page22 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐23‐ 

1 defendant’s criminal history under U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1 and 4A1.2(d).  

2 United States v. Driskell, 277 F.3d 150, 151, 157‐58 (2d Cir. 2002).  As

3 in Matthews, the relevant Guidelines provisions for calculating

4 criminal history did not exclude convictions that had been “set

5 aside” under state law.  

6 In United States v. Cuello, a felon‐in‐possession sentencing

7 appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), we also held that a prior New

8 York controlled substance conviction later replaced by a YO

9 adjudication should be counted as a prior felony conviction in

10 determining a base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1.  Cuello, 357

11 F.3d at 164‐65, 168‐69.    We observed that an application note to

12 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 indicated that the district court should look to state

13 law to determine whether a conviction for an offense committed

14 prior to age 18 is “classified as an adult conviction.”    Id. at 165

15 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. n.5 (2003), now appearing in U.S.S.G.

16 § 2K2.1, cmt. n.1 (emphasis omitted)).  We held that, although New

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page23 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐24‐ 

1 York did not label a YO adjudication an “adult conviction,” New

2 York nonetheless functionally treated the defendant’s YO

3 adjudication as such for the purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 because the

4 defendant was tried and convicted in an adult forum and served his

5 sentence in an adult prison.  Id. at 168‐69.  Notably, however, as in

6 Matthews and Driskell, the relevant Guidelines did not provide that

7 such convictions would be excluded from consideration if state law

8 provided that they be deemed “set aside.”  

9 Finally, in United States v. Parnell, we concluded that a district

10 court should consider a New York YO adjudication that replaced an

11 attempted burglary conviction when applying the Career Offender

12 Guideline enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, because the attempted

13 burglary conviction qualified as a “prior felony conviction” under

14 that section of the Guidelines.    Parnell, 524 F.3d at 170‐71.    We

15 specifically distinguished the ACCA definition of qualifying

16 convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), which excludes convictions

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page24 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐25‐ 

1 that have been “set aside,” because that definition applied only to

2 the ACCA and not to the Career Offender Guideline.    Id. at 170.  

3 Thus, we held that U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2 (the definitional

4 section for the Career Offender Guideline), which do not exclude

5 “set aside” convictions, allow district courts to consider YO

6 adjudications when calculating the number of prior felony

7 convictions for purposes of the Career Offender Guideline

8 enhancement.  Id. at 170‐71.  

9 Because the ACCA specifically excludes prior drug

10 convictions that have been “set aside” and requires district courts to

11 apply state law in making that determination, Sampson, Matthews,

12 Driskell, Cuello, and Parnell are inapposite here.    We must follow

13 New York law to determine whether Sellers’s conviction has been

14 “set aside” or whether it qualifies as a predicate conviction under

15 the ACCA.  18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(20), 924(e)(1).  

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page25 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐26‐ 

1 B. Youthful Offender Adjudication Under New York

2 Law

3 Under New York law, the adjudication of “youthful offender”

4 may be available to convicted defendants alleged to have committed

5 their crimes when they were at least 16 and less than 19 years old.  

6 See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 720.10(1), (2), 720.20(1).  “Courts have

7 the discretion to designate an eligible convicted defendant a

8 ‘youthful offender’ if ‘in the opinion of the court the interest of

9 justice would be served by relieving the eligible youth from the onus

10 of a criminal record . . . .’” Cuello, 357 F.3d at 165 (alteration in

11 original) (quoting N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 720.20(1)).  

12 As the Government correctly points out, a conviction is

13 therefore a prerequisite to a YO adjudication.  See N.Y. Crim. Proc.

14 Law § 720.20(1). But “[a] youthful offender adjudication is not a

15 judgment of conviction for a crime or any other offense.”  N.Y. Crim.

16 Proc. Law § 720.35(1).    The New York Court of Appeals has

17 interpreted a YO adjudication as replacing the underlying

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page26 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐27‐ 

1 conviction.  See People v. Calderon, 588 N.E.2d 61, 67 (N.Y. 1992) (“As

2 the youthful offender law makes clear, the youthful offender finding

3 is substituted for, and becomes, in essence, the conviction of the

eligible youth[.]” (emphasis added)).5 4   Accordingly, although Sellers

5 pled guilty to a drug related offense prior to his YO proceedings,

6 after his YO finding and the imposition of his YO sentence, under

7 New York law, the YO adjudication replaced Sellers’s prior

8 conviction.  See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 720.10(4)‐(6).

9 The effect of the YO adjudication in the New York courts is

10 controlling when determining the status of Sellers’s conviction “in

11 accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings

                                              

5 Under New York law, a sentence following a YO adjudication can be modified, but the

YO adjudication can be revoked only under limited circumstances.    See People v. Gary

O’D., 461 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66 (App. Div. 1983) (holding that while New York law “permits

the court to revoke the sentence of probation and to impose an amended sentence,” the

court was “not empowered to convert a youthful offender adjudication into a judgment

of conviction” (internal citation omitted)).  Under New York law, revocation is possible

only if the YO adjudication was obtained through fraud or deceit.    See Calderon, 588

N.E.2d at 67 (“[A]bsent evidence of fraud or misrepresentation there is no inherent

power in the court to revoke a youthful offender finding once the proceeding is

terminated by entry of judgment, nor is any such power granted by statute.“); People v.

Allen A., 860 N.Y.S.2d 19, 20 (App. Div. 2008).  

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page27 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐28‐ 

1 were held.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).    In New York, once a court

2 determines a person is a youthful offender, the court “must direct

3 that the conviction be deemed vacated and replaced by a youthful

4 offender finding.”    N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 720.20(3) (emphasis

5 added); see also N.Y. Penal Law § 60.02 (describing a youthful

6 offender finding as “substitut[ing] for a conviction”).  As previously

7 explained, “set aside” in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) means to “annul or

8 vacate,” and here the plain language of N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law

9 § 720.20(3) uses “vacated.”    The plain language of both 18 U.S.C.

10 § 921(a)(20) and N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §  720.20(3) therefore indicates

11 that under the law of New York, a YO adjudication is a conviction

12 that has been “set aside” or “vacated.”  

13 The effect New York courts give to a YO adjudication in

14 subsequent state prosecutions further supports excluding Sellers’s

15 YO adjudication as an ACCA‐predicate conviction.    Although in

16 New York YO adjudication records are still available to New York’s

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page28 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐29‐ 

1 department of corrections and community supervision and

2 probation departments, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 720.35(2), and New

3 York courts may consider YO adjudications when evaluating

4 criminal history and in parole and bail determinations, see Cuello,

5 357 F.3d at 166 (examining the YO adjudication scheme), New York

6 law also provides that YO adjudications may not be used as

7 predicates for sentencing enhancements, including for “multiple

8 offender sentencing,” which is similar to the ACCA.    People v.

9 Meckwood, 980 N.E.2d 501, 502 (N.Y. 2012); People v. Kuey, 631 N.E.2d

574, 576 (N.Y. 1994). 10 6

11 For these reasons, we hold that Sellers’s YO adjudication

12 under New York law is not a predicate conviction under the ACCA.

                                              

6 Our only sister court to address the issue, the First Circuit, concluded that “it was not

blatant error for the sentencing court to take [a defendant’s] juvenile adjudication into

consideration for the purpose of applying the ACCA” because “juvenile adjudications

[under Massachusetts law] are not ‘set aside’ for the purpose of imposing sentence in

later criminal proceedings.” United States v. Ellis, 619 F.3d 72, 75 (1st Cir. 2010) (per

curiam).  As discussed above, New York treats YO adjudications differently, and we are

bound to give effect to New York’s treatment of YO adjudications here.

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page29 of 30
UNITED STATES V. SELLERS

‐30‐ 

1 CONCLUSION

2 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a prior drug

3 conviction that has been “set aside” under New York law is not a

4 predicate conviction under the ACCA.  We further hold that a New

5 York youthful offender adjudication “set[s] aside” a defendant’s

6 underlying conviction as a matter of New York law.  Thus, Sellers’s

7 youthful offender adjudication under New York law does not

8 qualify as a “previous conviction[] . . . referred to in section

9 922(g)(1)” under the ACCA.  See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).  The district

court erred in imposing the ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence.7 10   

11 We REMAND to the district court for resentencing.  

                                              

7 Because we hold that Sellers was not an armed career criminal subject to the statutory

mandatory minimum of § 924(e)(1), we note that Sellers is also ineligible for the  

enhancement he received under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4, which applies to defendants who are

subject to enhanced sentences under the ACCA.  See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(a).

Case 13-4431, Document 69, 04/27/2015, 1493885, Page30 of 30