Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-23-12601/USCOURTS-ca11-23-12601-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Aurora Cruises and Travel, LLC
Appellant
Nadejda Jastrjembskaia
Appellant
inCruises, LLC
Appellee
inGroup International, LLC
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12601

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

NADEJDA JASTRJEMBSKAIA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

INCRUISES, LLC, 

INGROUP INTERNATIONAL, LLC, 

f.k.a. inCruises International, LLC,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12601

D.C. Docket No. 0:22-cv-61704-DMM

____________________

Before WILSON, LAGOA, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In this diversity action, plaintiff Nadejda Jastrjembskaia’s 

amended complaint alleged Florida law claims against two

defendants, inCruises, LLC (“inCruises”) and inGroup 

International LLC (“inGroup”). Jastrjembskaia appeals the district 

court’s (1) dismissal of her amended complaint without prejudice 

for lack of personal jurisdiction over the two defendants and (2) its 

order denying her subsequent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

59(e) motion for leave to amend and for jurisdictional discovery

and closing the case. After review, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

A. Original Complaint

Plaintiff Jastrjembskaia, a Florida resident, owns Aurora 

Cruises and Travel, LLC (“Aurora”), a travel agency.1 Aurora 

specializes in high-end worldwide cruises and caters to “the 

Russian-based cruise population and the Russian diaspora cruise 

population.” 

Jastrjembskaia, represented by counsel, filed this diversity 

action against the defendants asserting state law claims of 

1 Originally Aurora was a plaintiff too but has not appealed. Thus, our opinion 

refers to only plaintiff Jastrjembskaia. 

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23-12601 Opinion of the Court 3

defamation, civil conspiracy, and a violation of Florida’s Deceptive 

Unfair Trade Practices Act. According to the plaintiff, inCruises is 

a travel club that sells memberships in California, Florida and 

Washington, and its members (also referred to as partners) work as 

independent contractors recruiting additional members. Plaintiff 

Jastrjembskaia alleged that, after she claimed that inCruises was a 

“pyramid scheme,” the defendants conspired with their partners to 

publish false reports on social media websites and throughout the 

Russian cruise community that inCruises had successfully sued her 

for defamation in Russia.

Jastrjembskaia’s original complaint alleged that: (1) 

defendant inCruises is a foreign limited liability company 

incorporated, organized, and formed in Delaware, with its 

headquarters and principal place of business in Puerto Rico; and (2) 

defendant inGroup is a foreign limited liability company 

incorporated, organized, and formed in Puerto Rico, with its 

headquarters and principal place of business in Puerto Rico. 

Prior to service, the district court sua sponte ordered the 

plaintiff to file an amended complaint to cure jurisdictional defects 

in the original complaint. The district court explained that the 

complaint failed to properly allege the parties’ citizenship, 

including plaintiff Jastrjembskaia’s domicile and the citizenship of 

the individual members of the limited liability companies. 

B. Amended Complaint

Plaintiff Jastrjembskaia filed an amended complaint, which 

alleged that: (1) she is domiciled in Florida and is the only member 

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-12601

of Aurora; (2) Michael Hutchinson is domiciled in Puerto Rico and 

is the only member of inCruises; and (3) Hutchinson and Francisco 

Codina, who are both domiciled in Puerto Rico, were the only 

members of inGroup. The amended complaint also alleged that: 

(1) inCruises was organized in Delaware; (2) inGroup was 

organized in Puerto Rico; and (3) the defendants were registered to 

do business in Florida and had registered agents in Florida. The 

plaintiff attached 86 pages of posts from the Russian social media

site VK.com. 

C. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended 

complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) 

and 12(b)(6). Pertinent to this appeal, the defendants moved to 

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), arguing the amended complaint failed 

to allege facts establishing personal jurisdiction over the 

defendants. For purposes of general jurisdiction, the defendants 

pointed out the amended complaint’s allegations established that 

neither defendant was organized in or had a principal place of 

business in Florida. 

For purposes of specific jurisdiction, the defendants 

contended that the amended complaint did not allege any facts 

satisfying Florida’s long-arm statute. The purportedly defamatory 

statements were allegedly made on a Russian social media 

platform. Importantly, the amended complaint did not allege that 

(1) any of the relevant events occurred in Florida, (2) any individual 

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23-12601 Opinion of the Court 5

accessed the purportedly defamatory material in Florida, or (3) the 

defendants took any action in Florida. 

Plaintiff Jastrjembskaia’s response did not address the 

defendants’ arguments that the district court lacked personal 

jurisdiction. Notably, the plaintiff did not ask for leave to amend 

to cure any jurisdictional deficiencies, and she did not attach a 

proposed second amended complaint. Rather, after arguing that 

each count of her amended complaint stated a claim, 

Jastrjembskaia stated that if any of the three counts were 

inadequately pled and her claims dismissed, she “should be allowed 

to amend [her] pleadings.” 

Plaintiff Jastrjembskaia also urged the district court to 

convert the defendants’ motion to dismiss to a motion for 

summary judgment. Jastrjembskaia attached to her response: (1) 

her 15-page declaration describing the defendants’ scheme to use 

their partners to spread allegedly defamatory social media posts 

about suing Jastrjembskaia in Russia; and (2) 427 exhibits, mostly 

of social media posts in Russian and translated to English,

encompassing over 2000 pages. However, Jastrjembskaia did not 

give any indication that these attachments established personal 

jurisdiction over the defendants. 

D. March 9, 2023 Dismissal Order For Lack of Personal 

Jurisdiction

On March 9, 2023, the district court granted the defendants’ 

motion to dismiss on the sole ground that the plaintiffs’ amended 

complaint failed to allege a basis for the court to assert personal 

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jurisdiction over the two defendants. The district court noted that 

the plaintiff did not explain why she “failed to respond to 

Defendants’ personal jurisdiction arguments, or provide the Court 

with any other case law or argument as to why this Court has 

personal jurisdiction over Defendants.” The district court 

dismissed the amended complaint without prejudice against both 

defendants but did not close the case. 

On March 28, 2023, the district court ordered the plaintiff to 

show cause as to why the case should not be closed. The order 

warned that a failure to respond would result in the case being 

dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute and/or failure 

to comply with court orders. 

E. Plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) Motion for Leave to Amend

In response, Jastrjembskaia filed a motion to alter the district 

court’s March 9, 2023 dismissal order, citing Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 15(a) and 59(e). Jastrjembskaia argued that her 

amended complaint alleged sufficient facts relevant to establishing 

personal jurisdiction, such as that the defendants were registered in 

Florida as foreign limited liability companies, sold memberships in 

Florida, and targeted and harmed her and Aurora as “Floridians.” 

Jastrjembskaia complained that the district court had ignored her 

declaration and the 427 exhibits attached to her response to the 

motion to dismiss. 

Jastrjembskaia also asserted she should be allowed to amend 

her amended complaint. In support of her motion, Jastrjembskaia 

also filed a second declaration with 108 exhibits attached. 

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According to Jastrjembskaia’s second declaration, these exhibits 

included information from online databases, social media profiles, 

and publicly available business information that indicated 

(1) inCruises’s sole member Hutchinson and some of its executives 

and partners lived in Florida, (2) inCruises advertised, recruited, 

and held promotional events in Florida, and (3) inCruises had a

small office in Florida. 

Jastrjembskaia also requested 90 days of jurisdictional 

discovery and leave to amend her amended complaint under Rule 

15(a)(2). She planned to “supplement the causes of action” and 

“expand[] with numerous facts,” but she did not elaborate or attach 

a proposed amended complaint. She also did not explain what 

additional jurisdictional facts she needed in discovery. 

The defendants opposed the plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) motion on 

multiple grounds. Among other things, the defendants pointed out 

Jastrjembskaia’s failure (1) to submit a proposed amended 

complaint, as required by the district court’s local rules, and (2) to 

request leave to amend before the scheduling order’s March 10, 

2023 deadline for amendments. Jastrjembskaia replied that Rule 

59(e) did not require her to submit a proposed amended complaint, 

which would be premature before jurisdictional discovery. 

F. Denial of Rule 59(e) Motion

On August 2, 2023, the district court denied Jastrjembskaia’s 

Rule 59(e) motion and closed the case. The district court reiterated 

that it had granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction because the plaintiff had failed to 

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“substantively respond” to the defendants’ arguments and her 

amended complaint’s “allegations concerning minimum contacts

appeared to be sparse.” 

The district court denied Jastrjembskaia’s request for leave 

to amend for three reasons. First, “and foremost,” she failed to 

attach a proposed second amended complaint, in violation of Local 

Rule 15.1. The district court explained that this failure made it 

“nearly impossible” to determine whether amendment would be 

futile. And Jastrjembskaia did not “explain why jurisdictional 

discovery would be helpful.” 

Second, the district court concluded amendment would be 

futile because, even after “sifting through Plaintiffs’ exhibits,” it 

was “not obvious how Plaintiffs can establish personal jurisdiction 

over these foreign Defendants.” The district court stressed that the 

allegedly defamatory statements were not aimed at Florida, the 

connection between the defendants and the individuals making the 

statements was not clear, and Jastrjembskaia did not explain how 

the statements arose out of the defendants’ business dealings in 

Florida. The district court also noted that registration to do 

business in Florida did not establish consent to personal jurisdiction

in Florida. 

Third, the district court pointed out that the new claim in 

the plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) motion that Hutchinson (defendant 

inCruises’s sole member) resides in Florida “call[ed] into question 

whether there is complete diversity” and raised “serious questions” 

about the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 

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23-12601 Opinion of the Court 9

Plaintiff Jastrjembskaia, now pro se, timely filed a notice of 

appeal in her name only. 

On November 6, 2023, while this appeal was pending, 

Jastrjembskaia filed in the district court a pro se motion for relief 

from the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

60(b). The district court denied Jastrjembskaia’s Rule 60(b) motion 

on November 29, 2023. Jastrjembskaia did not file a notice of 

appeal as to this ruling.

II. SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW

Jastrjembskaia’s notice of appeal designated only the district 

court’s August 2, 2023 order denying her Rule 59(e) motion for 

leave to amend and closing the case. However, Jastrjembskaia’s 

pro se appeal brief, liberally construed, also attacks the merits of the 

district court’s underlying March 9, 2023 order dismissing her 

amended complaint without prejudice for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. 

As a threshold matter, we observe that the district court’s 

March 9, 2023 order is nonfinal because it did not dismiss the action 

or indicate that further amendment was not possible, and the 

district court subsequently ordered Jastrjembskaia to show cause 

as to why the case should not be closed. See Czeremcha v. Int’l Ass’n 

of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, 724 F.2d 1552, 1554-55 

(11th Cir. 1984). Nonetheless, the March 9, 2023 order is within 

the scope of our appellate review. First, it is apparent from the 

record that Jastrjembskaia intended to appeal the March 9, 2023 

order. See Nichols v. Ala. State Bar, 815 F.3d 726, 730-31 (11th Cir. 

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10 Opinion of the Court 23-12601

2016) (explaining that we liberally construe Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 3’s requirements where it is apparent from the 

record the pro se appellant intended to appeal orders not specified 

in the notice of appeal). 

Second, Jastrjembskaia’s appeal of the district court’s August 

2, 2023 final order brought up for review all preceding nonfinal 

orders, including the March 9, 2023 order, that produced the final 

judgment. See Mickles on behalf of herself v. Country Club, Inc., 887 

F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2018); Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(4). 

However, to the extent Jastrjembskaia also challenges the 

district court’s November 29, 2023 order denying her Rule 60(b) 

motion, we lack appellate jurisdiction to review this claim. 

Jastrjembskaia filed her Rule 60(b) motion after she filed her notice 

of appeal, and she did not file a separate notice of appeal as to the 

November 29, 2023 order denying that motion. See Green v. Union 

Foundry Co., 281 F.3d 1229, 1233 (11th Cir. 2002). A pro se

appellant’s brief may substitute as a separate notice of appeal when 

it is filed within the time prescribed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a), which is 30 days in this civil case. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 4(a); Finch v. City of Vernon, 845 F.2d 256, 259-60 (11th Cir. 1988). 

But Jastrjembskaia’s appellate brief was filed on January 22, 2024, 

more than 30 days after the entry of the district court’s November 

29, 2023 order. 

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for lack of 

personal jurisdiction, accepting the allegations in the complaint as 

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true. SkyHop Techs., Inc. v. Narra, 58 F.4th 1211, 1222 (11th Cir. 

2023). We review for an abuse of discretion both the denial of a 

Rule 59(e) motion and the denial of a Rule 15(a) request for leave 

to amend. Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1343 n.20 

(11th Cir. 2010). We review de novo a district court’s legal 

conclusion that an amendment would be futile. SFM Holdings, Ltd. 

v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 2010). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Dismissal of Amended Complaint for Lack of Personal 

Jurisdiction

“A plaintiff seeking the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 

a nonresident defendant bears the initial burden of alleging in the 

complaint sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of 

jurisdiction.” United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th 

Cir. 2009). A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by alleging 

sufficient facts or presenting sufficient evidence to “defeat a motion 

for directed verdict,” and the district court must accept the facts 

alleged in the complaint as true. Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. 

Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 855 (11th Cir. 1990) (quotation 

marks omitted). 

In determining whether personal jurisdiction exists, a 

district court sitting in diversity generally undertakes a two-step 

inquiry. Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 626 (11th 

Cir. 1996). First, the court must determine whether the plaintiff 

has alleged sufficient facts to subject the defendant to the forum 

state’s long-arm statute. Id. Second, if the state’s long-arm statute 

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12 Opinion of the Court 23-12601

is satisfied, the court must then determine whether exercising 

jurisdiction comports with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 

Process Clause. Id.; see also Del Valle v. Trivago GMBH, 56 F.4th 

1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2022). Both steps must be satisfied for a court 

to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. 

Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990).

Here, our analysis starts and ends with the first step—

Florida’s long-arm statute. The reach of Florida’s long-arm statute 

is a question of Florida law, and federal courts are required to 

construe the long-arm statute as the Florida Supreme Court would. 

Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1274. Florida’s long-arm statute recognizes both 

specific and general jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. See

Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)-(2). For the reasons that follow, we reject 

Jastrjembskaia’s claims that she sufficiently alleged facts making a 

prima facie showing of either specific or general jurisdiction. 

B. General Jurisdiction

Under Florida’s long-arm statute, a nonresident is subject to 

general jurisdiction by “engag[ing] in substantial and not isolated 

activity” in Florida, regardless of whether the plaintiff’s claims 

arose from that activity. See Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2); Louis Vuitton 

Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir. 2013). 

Because Florida Statutes § 48.193(2) extends to the limits of 

personal jurisdiction imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s 

Due Process Clause, the inquiry becomes whether the exercise of 

jurisdiction is within “constitutional bounds.” Carmouche v. 

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23-12601 Opinion of the Court 13

Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc., 789 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2015)

(quotation marks omitted). 

A court can exercise general jurisdiction over foreign 

corporations without offending due process when the 

corporations’ contacts with the forum state are “so continuous and 

systematic as to render them essentially at home” there. Goodyear 

Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) 

(quotation marks omitted). “[O]nly a limited set of affiliations with 

a forum will render a defendant amenable to all-purpose 

jurisdiction there,” primarily a company’s state of incorporation or 

principal place of business. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 

(2014) (involving a limited liability company). 

Absent these affiliations, a corporation may be subject to 

general jurisdiction only in “exceptional” cases, such as when its 

operations in a state are so significant that they effectively render 

the corporation at home in that state, or constitute the 

corporation’s “principal, if temporary, place of business.” 

Carmouche, 789 F.3d at 1204-05 (quotation marks omitted). 

However, under Florida law, a “foreign corporation’s registration 

to do business and appointment of an agent for service of process 

in Florida” does not amount to “its consent to general jurisdiction 

in the Florida courts.” Waite v. All Acquisition Corp., 901 F.3d 1307, 

1321 (11th Cir. 2018). 

Here, Jastrjembskaia’s amended complaint alleged that 

defendant inCruises was organized in Delaware and defendant 

inGroup was organized in Puerto Rico, establishing that neither 

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14 Opinion of the Court 23-12601

defendant was organized in Florida. And the amended complaint 

did not allege either defendant’s principal place of business, much 

less allege that the defendants’ principal place of business was in 

Florida. See Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 137.

Further, the amended complaint did not allege any facts 

suggesting this was an “exceptional” case. The amended 

complaint’s sole allegation about the defendants’ operations in 

Florida was that defendant inCruises “sells memberships for cruise 

trips with Seller of Travel registrations in . . . Florida under 

[Florida’s] Seller of Travel regulations.” This connection is not “so 

substantial” as to effectively render the defendants “at home” in 

Florida. See Carmouche, 789 F.3d at 1204. This is particularly true 

given that the amended complaint alleged inCruises sold cruise trip 

memberships in this manner in several states. 

Finally, while the amended complaint alleged that both 

defendants were registered to do business in Florida and had 

registered agents in Florida, Florida law provides that such 

allegations are insufficient to establish general jurisdiction under 

Florida’s long-arm statute. See Waite, 901 F.3d at 1321. 

C. Specific Jurisdiction

Florida’s long-arm statute provides for specific personal 

jurisdiction when a defendant “engages in any of nine enumerated 

acts, as long as the cause of action arises from that act.” SkyHop 

Techs., 58 F.4th at 1223, 1227-28; Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a). 

Jastrjembskaia relies on § 48.193(1)(a)(2), which provides that 

nonresidents submit themselves to jurisdiction in Florida by 

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“[c]ommitting a tortious act within this state.” Fla. Stat. 

§ 48.193(1)(a)(2). For purposes of § 48.193(1)(a)(2), a nonresident 

defendant need not be physically present in Florida, so long as the 

tortious act performed outside the state causes injury within 

Florida. Del Valle, 56 F.4th at 1272-73. 

A nonresident defendant commits the tortious act of 

defamation in Florida for purposes of § 48.193(1)(a)(2) when he 

makes “allegedly defamatory statements about a Florida resident 

by posting those statements on a website,” provided that the posts 

containing the statements are “accessible and accessed” in Florida. 

Internet Sols. Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 1203, 1206 (Fla. 2010)

(emphasis added); see also SkyHop Techs., 58 F.4th at 1228

(explaining that for tortious acts involving communication, the 

nonresident defendant’s communications must be made into 

Florida).

Here, Jastrjembskaia’s amended complaint alleged that: 

(1) the defendants conspired with their partners to publish false 

statements about her, translated into Russian, by posting those 

statements “on social media sites” and “throughout the Russian 

cruise community and among the Russian diaspora in general”; 

(2) posting the defamatory statements to social media allowed the

statements to “be easily forwarded and shared,” and the 

defamatory statements were “widely disseminated in blogs, 

podcasts, and otherwise published and posted on various websites 

on the Internet”; and (3) the “social media posts caused [her] to lose 

business, revenue and clients.” 

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These allegations, accepted as true and reasonably 

construed, establish at most that the allegedly false statements 

about Jastrjembskaia were accessible in Florida. Notably absent, 

however, is any allegation that the allegedly false statements were 

accessed in Florida, which is also required for specific jurisdiction 

under § 48.193(1)(a)(2). See Internet Sols., 39 So. 3d at 1216. The 

social media posts attached to the amended complaint were from 

a Russian social media site, and the amended complaint does not 

allege that these posts were made into Florida or accessed by 

anyone in Florida. See id.; SkyHop Techs., 58 F.4th at 1228. 

In sum, Jastrjembskaia’s amended complaint failed to allege 

facts establishing either general or specific personal jurisdiction

over the defendants under Florida’s long-arm statute. Thus, we 

need not proceed to the due process analysis in the second step. See

Sculptchair, Inc. 94 F.3d at 626; Madara, 916 F.2d at 1514. 

While not determinative, we note that despite these obvious 

pleading deficiencies, Jastrjembskaia’s response to the defendants’ 

motion to dismiss did not address personal jurisdiction or request 

leave to amend her complaint to allege a sufficient basis for 

personal jurisdiction. And the 427 exhibits attached to her response 

did not clearly indicate that the district court had personal 

jurisdiction over the defendants. Under the circumstances, the 

district court did not err by dismissing the amended complaint 

without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction.

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D. Denial of Rule 59(e) Motion Seeking Leave to Amend 

Under Rule 15(a), leave to amend “shall be freely given 

when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The same liberal 

amendment standard set forth in Rule 15 applies to a Rule 59(e) 

motion seeking leave to amend a complaint. Spanish Broad Sys. of 

Fla. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 376 F.3d 1065, 1077 (11th Cir. 

2004). Under this standard, leave to amend “must be granted 

absent a specific, significant reason for denial,” such as undue 

prejudice to the opposing party or futility of amendment. Id. 

Southern District of Florida Local Rule 15.1 provides that a 

party moving to amend a pleading must “attach the original of the 

amendment to the motion.” S.D. Fla. R. 15.1. We afford “great 

deference” to a district court’s interpretation of its local rules and 

review its application of local rules for an abuse of discretion. Mann 

v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 2009). The party 

challenging a district court’s reliance on its local rules bears the 

burden of showing the district court made a clear error of 

judgment. Id.

1. Denial of Leave to Amend 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

Jastrjembskaia’s Rule 59(e) motion requesting leave to amend her 

amended complaint. See Jacobs, 626 F.3d at 1343 n.20. 

Jastrjembskaia’s counseled motion failed to comply with the local 

rule requiring a plaintiff to attach a proposed amendment to her 

request to amend. Moreover, Jastrjembskaia’s motion did not 

specifically articulate what she sought to include to correct the 

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18 Opinion of the Court 23-12601

amended complaint’s jurisdictional deficiencies. Instead, her Rule 

59(e) motion made only vague references to supplementing her 

causes of action and expanding “with numerous facts,” which 

prevented the district court from evaluating the utility of any 

additional amendment. Jastrjembskaia has not shown the district 

court made a clear error of judgment by applying Local Rule 15.1

or by relying on it as one of its reasons for denying her request to 

amend her amended complaint. See Mann, 588 F.3d at 1302. 

When the defendants pointed out her failure to attach a 

proposed amendment, Jastrjembskaia replied by stating, without 

any elaboration, that it would be premature to propose an 

amendment before she was permitted jurisdictional discovery. But

again, Jastrjembskaia did not explain why such discovery would be 

helpful or what additional information she was seeking to obtain. 

Therefore, we cannot say that the district court erred in denying 

Jastrjembskaia’s request for leave to amend her amended 

complaint.

2. Futility of Amendment

The district court also did not err in determining that 

amendment would be futile. An amendment is futile when the 

complaint as amended would still be subject to dismissal. Chang v. 

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 845 F.3d 1087, 1094 (11th Cir. 2017). 

Here, Jastrjembskaia’s Rule 59(e) motion did not point to any 

additional facts she could plead to sufficiently establish a prima facie

case of personal jurisdiction over the defendants. 

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Jastrjembskaia’s Rule 59(e) motion argued that attachments 

to her second declaration demonstrated that the district court had 

general jurisdiction pursuant to § 48.193(2) of Florida’s long-arm 

statute. The Rule 59(e) motion pointed to exhibits indicating that 

defendant inCruises was registered as a foreign limited liability 

company in Florida and had an address in Florida. But, for the 

reasons already discussed in Section IV.B, these facts do not 

demonstrate that the defendants are subject to general personal 

jurisdiction in the state. 

Alternatively, the Rule 59(e) motion contended that the 

attachments to her first declaration, filed in opposition to the 

motion to dismiss, demonstrated that the district court had specific 

jurisdiction either (1) under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2) because the 

defendants committed the tortious act of defamation in Florida or 

(2) under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1) because the defendants 

engaged in business in Florida. 

As for the defendants’ alleged defamatory acts, the Rule 

59(e) motion did not contain any claim, or point to any 

attachments to either declaration showing, that the allegedly 

defamatory statements posted to social media websites were 

actually accessed in (as opposed to accessible in) Florida. As already 

discussed, without such an allegation of fact, the plaintiffs could not 

satisfy § 48.193(1)(a)(2) of Florida’s long-arm statute. See Internet 

Sols., 39 So. 3d at 1216; SkyHop Techs., 58 F.4th at 1228.

For the first time on appeal, Jastrjembskaia cites two 

attachments, Exhibits 207 and 389, as evidence that three Florida 

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20 Opinion of the Court 23-12601

residents engaged with the allegedly defamatory posts on social 

media websites. However, neither exhibit established that the 

named individuals are Florida residents.2 

In any event, Jastrjembskaia’s Rule 59(e) motion did not 

point the district court to Exhibits 207 and 389, or any of the other 

attachments, as evidence that Florida residents had accessed the 

allegedly defamatory statements, and the district court was not 

required to scour all 427 exhibits (more than 2000 pages) searching 

for such evidence. See Chavez v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 

1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that district courts are not 

required “to mine the record, prospecting for facts” a party 

overlooked). Thus, Jastrjembskaia’s Rule 59(e) motion did not 

propose to cure that jurisdictional deficiency in the plaintiffs’ 

amended complaint, discussed above in Section IV.C.

As for the defendants’ engaging in business activity in 

Florida, the Rule 59(e) motion listed various business activities—

the defendants were registered to do business in Florida, recruited, 

advertised, and held events in Florida, had a network of 

2 In a belated effort to remedy this problem, Jastrjembskaia’s reply brief 

includes links to three Facebook profiles as “proof” that the three named 

individuals are Florida residents. Her reply brief states that these individuals 

would give “testimonials” confirming their Florida residence and that they 

viewed the posts. But because Jastrjembskaia did not present this information 

to the district court, it is not in the record on appeal, and we do not consider 

it. See Welding Servs., Inc. v. Foman, 509 F.3d 1351, 1357 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating 

that we “ordinarily do not review materials outside the record on appeal as 

designated by Fed. R. App. P. 10(a)”).

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23-12601 Opinion of the Court 21

members/partners in Florida, had an address in Florida, and had 

some top executives living and working in Florida. But those 

activities alone would not satisfy the requirements for specific 

personal jurisdiction. 

Specific personal jurisdiction under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)

requires “connexity” or a causal connection “between the 

defendant’s activities in Florida and the plaintiff’s cause of action.” 

Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252, 1260 n.7 (Fla. 2002); see also

SkyHop Techs., 58 F.4th at 1227-28. Florida courts have said that 

connexity requires a direct or substantial connection between the 

plaintiff’s cause of action and the defendant’s business activities in 

Florida. Citicorp Ins. Brokers (Marine), Ltd. v. Charman, 635 So. 2d 

79, 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). Without this “connexity,” a 

defendant’s business activities in Florida are “irrelevant.” Banco de 

los Trabajadores v. Moreno, 237 So. 3d 1127, 1137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 

2018).

Jastrjembskaia has never claimed that any of the three 

counts in her amended complaint “arose out of” the business 

activities listed in her Rule 59(e) motion. Although Jastrjembskaia 

asserted that she suffered harm in Florida, the allegedly defamatory 

statements were made on social media websites, concerned a 

Russian court action, and were not directly connected to the 

defendants’ business activities in Florida, which primarily related

to promoting and selling travel club memberships in the state. 

Accordingly, amending her complaint to allege these business 

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22 Opinion of the Court 23-12601

activities would not have established specific jurisdiction over the 

defendants pursuant to § 48.193(1)(a)(1). 

Consequently, Jastrjembskaia has not shown that the district 

court erred in determining that amendment would be futile or that 

the district court otherwise abused its discretion in denying her 

Rule 59(e) motion for leave to amend her amended complaint.

3. Denial of Request for Jurisdictional Discovery

For similar reasons, we discern no abuse of discretion in the 

district court’s denying Jastrjembskaia’s request for jurisdictional 

discovery. See Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., Ltd., 178 F.3d 1209, 1214 n.7 

(11th Cir. 1999) (concluding a district court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying the plaintiff’s post-dismissal request for 

jurisdictional discovery when the plaintiff did not diligently pursue 

such discovery and “failed to specify what [he] thought could or 

should be discovered”). 

Jastrjembskaia did not articulate a need for jurisdictional 

discovery in her response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss

based on lack of personal jurisdiction. Instead, she sought 

jurisdictional discovery for the first time in her Rule 59(e) motion, 

which was nearly two months after the defendants filed their 

motion to dismiss. Thus, Jastrjembskaia failed to diligently pursue 

jurisdictional discovery, despite having had an opportunity to do 

so. Additionally, she failed at any point to indicate why 

jurisdictional discovery would be useful, how it would allow her to 

obtain the jurisdictional information needed to submit a proposed 

second amended complaint, or even what information she was 

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seeking. Under these circumstances, it was not an abuse of 

discretion to deny Jastrjembskaia’s post-dismissal request for 

jurisdictional discovery. See Posner, 178 F.3d at 1214 n.7. 

V. CONCLUSION

The district court properly dismissed Jastrjembskaia’s 

amended complaint without prejudice for failure to allege a 

sufficient basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over the 

defendants. Jastrjembskaia has not shown that the district court 

abused its discretion in denying her subsequent Rule 59(e) motion 

for leave to amend and for jurisdictional discovery or that the 

district court erred in its determination that further amendment 

would be futile. 

AFFIRMED.

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