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Parties Involved:
City of Riverton
Appellee
Robert Harden
Appellant
Michael Hays
Appellee
Larry Prince
Appellee
James Waters
Appellee

Document Text:

.. . I LED 

United States Court of Ap~als 

Temh Circuit 

f="E B 2 8 1991 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

ROBERT HARDEN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

LARRY PRINCE, individually and in 

his official capacity as a 

Riverton City Police Officer; 

JAMES WATERS, individually and in 

his official capacity as a 

Riverton City Police Officer; 

MICHAEL HAYS, in his official 

capacity as Chief of Police of the 

Police Department of the 

City of Riverton, Wyoming; 

the CITY OF RIVERTON, WYOMING, 

a Wyoming municipal corporation, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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) No. 89-8035 

) (D. Wyo. No. C88-1020 J) 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN, Senior 

District Judge.** 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** The Honorable A. Sherman Christensen, of the United States 

District Court for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-8035 Document: 010110031033 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 1 
This is an appeal from a decision of the United States 

District Court for the District of Wyoming holding that the due 

process rights of plaintiff-appellant Robert Harden were not 

violated when a Riverton, Wyoming police officer transported him 

from Riverton to Kinnear, Wyoming, and left him there at 

approximately 1:30 in the morning. Although the facts in this 

case support a finding of negligence if not gross negligence on 

the part of the police officers, we cannot conclude on the record 

before us that defendants-appellees Larry Prince and James Waters 

behaved in a reckless manner with deliberate indifference to 

appellant's due process rights. We, therefore, affirm the 

judgment of the district court as to defendants Larry Prince and 

James Waters. 1 

1 It does not appear from our review of the briefs on appeal that 

plaintiff is challenging the district court's rulings as to the 

liability of the City of Riverton and Michael Hays under§ 1983. 

However, plaintiff listed the City of Riverton and Hays in the 

caption of his notice of appeal (although the body of the notice 

of appeal and the captions of the briefs filed on appeal suggest 

that the plaintiff did not intend to name Hays as an appellee). 

See R. Doc. 69. To the extent that plaintiff does challenge these 

rulings on appeal, we conclude that the rulings were correct. The 

City of Riverton is not liable under§ 1983 because nothing in the 

record suggests that "there is a direct causal link between a 

municipal policy or custom, and the alleged constitutional 

deprivation." City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 

(1989). For the same reason, the district court was correct in 

ruling against plaintiff on his§ 1983 claim brought against 

Michael Hays. Because plaintiff sued Hays only in his official 

capacity, the City of Riverton is the real party in interest as to 

that claim (and the claim was properly denied because there is no 

demonstrable link between a municipal policy or custom and the 

alleged constitutional violation). See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 

U.S. 159, 166 (1985). 

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Appellate Case: 89-8035 Document: 010110031033 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 2 
Facts 

On May 29, 1988, plaintiff stopped in Riverton to visit his 

half-sister, April Way, while on his way to Seattle, Washington. 

Plaintiff and Ms. Way went to the Cedar Bar in Riverton, and 

during the one to two hours that he spent at the bar, plaintiff 

consumed a considerable amount of alcohol. While at the bar, an 

altercation began between plaintiff and one or more other patrons. 

Apparently, the altercation continued outside the bar, at which 

time one of plaintiff's feet was broken in two places. 

Plaintiff made his way to the police station a few blocks 

away to complain of the incident. Both the police dispatcher and 

Riverton Police Sgt. Larry L. David recognized that plaintiff was 

in need of medical attention, and an ambulance was called to 

transport plaintiff to Riverton Memorial Hospital. Dr. Thomas H. 

Neitharnrner, an internal medicine specialist on call in the 

emergency room, treated plaintiff's injuries. Dr. Neitharnrner 

telephoned Dr. Charles Allen, an orthopedic surgeon, who 

recommended that Neitharnrner place a "sugartong splint 112 on 

plaintiff's injured foot. Neitharnrner placed the splint on 

plaintiff's foot and scheduled surgery (to be performed by Dr. 

Allen) for the following morning. Plaintiff was then taken to 

Room 109 of the hospital to spend the night. 

Plaintiff was extremely uncooperative from the time he 

entered the hospital, and he repeatedly demanded to be released. 

Defendants Larry Prince and James Waters, police officers with the 

2 A sugartong splint is "a loop of plaster cast material that 

extends from each side of the leg under the foot and is wrapped in 

an ace bandage." Dist. Ct. Op. at 14. 

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Appellate Case: 89-8035 Document: 010110031033 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 3 
Riverton Police Department, were called to the hospital on two 

separate occasions to quell the disturbances that plaintiff had 

caused. On the second occasion that Prince and Waters were called 

to the hospital, they found plaintiff sitting at the edge of his 

bed complaining that he wanted to leave Wyoming. 

In response to that request, the necessary paperwork for 

leaving the hospital against medical advice was prepared for 

plaintiff's signature. Dr. Allen was called at his home to inform 

him of plaintiff's desire to leave the hospital. Prince spoke 

with Dr. Allen, who told Prince that plaintiff should be permitted 

to leave as long as he signed the proper release forms. Prince 

did not ask Dr. Allen or anyone at the hospital about plaintiff's 

medical condition. The officers were not informed as to the 

condition of plaintiff's ankle and they assumed that he had 

suffered an injury to his ankle, which had been treated. 

Plaintiff signed the release form, and he asked Prince to 

promise to give him a ride. Plaintiff told Prince that he wanted 

transportation to California or to Jackson, Wyoming, which is a 

few hundred miles from Riverton. Those requests were refused. 

Prince asked plaintiff if he had any relatives in Riverton, 

and plaintiff erroneously answered "No." Neither Prince nor 

Waters knew that plaintiff had relatives in the area. Prince also 

asked plaintiff if he was staying with someone in the Riverton 

area; if he wanted to be taken to a motel; and if he wanted to go 

to the city jail to spend the night. Plaintiff answered "No" to 

each of those questions. Plaintiff also was not responsive to 

questions concerning the whereabouts of his truck. 

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Appellate Case: 89-8035 Document: 010110031033 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 4 
Prince then directed Waters to transport plaintiff to the 

nearest location west of Riverton where telephone services were 

available. Plaintiff requested that Officer Waters transport him 

to Kinnear, Wyoming, a small town approximately 15 miles west of 

Riverton. Kinnear has an ambulance service, a convenience store, 

and a volunteer fire department. However, none of those 

facilities was open at the time plaintiff was taken there. There 

were public pay telephones in Kinnear, and the city was a stopping 

place for bus service. 

An expert called by plaintiff testified as to the weather 

conditions at the nearest weather station in Lander, Wyoming. He 

testified that between 2:00 A.M. and 5:00 A.M. on the morning of 

May 30, the temperature was between 58° and 59° Fahrenheit and 

that the wind was blowing at approximately 9.2 miles per hour. 

The expert testified that the wind could have created wind chill 

conditions of approximately 10° Fahrenheit. The district court 

found that the plaintiff was inadequately dressed for the weather 

conditions at Kinnear. However, the district court found that 

Officer Waters did not notice the wind conditions at Kinnear. 

Further, there is no factual finding that the wind was actually 

blowing at Kinnear at the time Officer Waters dropped plaintiff 

off. Plaintiff's uncle testified that when he picked up Plaintiff 

in Kinnear, the temperature was 39° Fahrenheit and it was breezy. 

The district court made no explicit findings as to the actual 

weather conditions in Kinnear when plaintiff was dropped off. 

Plaintiff spent about 2-21⁄2 hours in Kinnear. During that 

time, he made three telephone calls to the 911 dispatcher, who was 

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Appellate Case: 89-8035 Document: 010110031033 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 5 
stationed at the Riverton Police Department. Plaintiff did not 

speak during either of the first two calls. During the third 

call, plaintiff told the dispatcher that he wanted the police 

officer who had transported him to Kinnear to pick him up. 

Plaintiff also stated, however, that there was no emergency and 

that he did not need an ambulance. The dispatcher then suggested 

that plaintiff could obtain a cab, using money ($90.00) that he 

had in his sock, and the dispatcher gave him the telephone number 

of the cab company. Plaintiff ignored that advice, but did call 

his uncle, who picked him up and found him to be "drunker than a 

'skunk,' 'paranoid,' 'scared,' and 'cold."' Dist. Ct. Op. at 8. 

Plaintiff's uncle then transported him to the hospital in Lander 

for treatment of his foot. When he arrived at the hospital, 

plaintiff had no splint on his ankle, which was "black, blue, and 

distorted." Dist. Ct. Op. at 8. Plaintiff maintains that he has 

suffered various emotional injuries as a result of this incident, 

including "sleep disturbances and night sweats." Dist. Ct. Op. at 

23. 

On July 19, 1988, plaintiff filed this action in the United 

States District Court for the District of Wyoming, alleging under 

42 u.s.c. § 1983 that Prince and Waters violated his substantive 

due process rights and that Prince and Waters violated Restatement 

(Second) of Torts§ 324 (1965), as incorporated by Wyoming tort 

3 law. 

3 

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on October 7, 1988, 

Section 324 provides: 

One who, being under no duty to do so, takes charge of 

another who is helpless adequately to aid or protect 

[Footnote continued ... ] 

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Appellate Case: 89-8035 Document: 010110031033 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 6 
adding the City of Riverton and Michael Hays, Riverton's Chief of 

Police, as defendants. The Amended Complaint included additional 

allegations that Waters had been inadequately trained and 

supervised in violation of the Due Process Clause. The Amended 

Complaint also alleged that Prince's and Waters' superiors 

violated the Due Process Clause by "provid[ing] implicit 

authorization, approval or knowing acquiescence to the 

transportation of intoxicated persons to rural settings where 

those persons were abandoned" and by following "a custom by which 

intoxicated persons were transported to rural settings and 

abandoned II Appellant's Br. at 6. Finally, the Amended 

Complaint added a second pendent claim under Wyoming tort law, 

based on Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 323 (1965). 4 Plaintiff 

[ ... footnote continued] 

4 

himself is subject to liability to the other for any 

bodily harm caused to him by 

(a) the failure of the actor to exercise reasonable 

care to secure the safety of the other while within the 

actor's charge, or 

(b) the actor's discontinuing his aid or 

protection, if by so doing he leaves the other in a 

worse position than when the actor took charge of him. 

Section 323 provides: 

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, 

to render services to another which he should recognize 

as necessary for the protection of the other's person or 

things, is subject to liability to the other for 

physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise 

reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if 

(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the 

risk of such harm, or 

(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's 

reliance upon the undertaking. 

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Appellate Case: 89-8035 Document: 010110031033 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 7 
sought compensatory and punitive damages, and the recovery of 

costs and attorney's fees. 

On agreement of the parties, the case was tried without a 

jury. After a four-day trial, the district court rejected all of 

plaintiff's§ 1983 claims. However, the district court ruled in 

favor of plaintiff on his pendent claim against Prince and Waters 

for negligence under Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 324. The 

court awarded $1,750 in damages for the exposure to the elements 

and for the pain and suffering endured by plaintiff as a result of 

the negligent conduct of Prince and Waters. 5 The district court 

rejected plaintiff's claim for punitive damages under Wyoming law, 

finding that Prince and Waters did not act "willfully, wantonly, 

or maliciously, or in conscious disregard of the plaintiff's 

rights." Dist. Ct. Op. at 43. 

On appeal, plaintiff raises the following issues: 

(1) whether defendants violated plaintiff's substantive due 

process rights and are liable under 42 u.s.c. § 1983, and 

(2) whether the district court erred in denying plaintiff's 

request for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Plaintiff has 

accepted the district court's findings of fact and has chosen not 

to submit the transcript of the hearing on appeal. 

Discussion 

In order to recover under 42 u.s.c. § 1983, plaintiff must 

show that the defendants' conduct constituted more than negligence 

5 The district court found plaintiff's total damages to be $2,500, 

but if found plaintiff 30% at fault so it reduced the damages 

awarded by $750. 

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Appellate Case: 89-8035 Document: 010110031033 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 8 
or even gross negligence, but that at a minimum it rose to an 

actual conscious awareness of a known serious risk to plaintiff's 

well being coupled with a conscious disregard of that risk. See 

Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1496 (10th Cir. 1990); 

Archuleta v. Mcshan, 897 F.2d 495, 499 (10th Cir. 1990). See also 

Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. 

denied, 111 s. Ct. 341 (1990) (suggesting that the deliberate 

indifference standard requires more than a showing of gross 

negligence). 

The district court found that "plaintiff ... failed to 

prove that the defendants ... acted willfully, wantonly, or 

maliciously, or in conscious disregard of the plaintiff's rights." 

Dist. Ct. Op. at 43. Although this statement was contained in the 

"Conclusions of Law" section as opposed to the "Findings of Fact" 

section, we view this as a factual finding. See Ostrander, 879 

F.2d at 588 & n.4. Thus, the best plaintiff can do is to argue 

that this statement conflicts with the recited facts, supra. 

While the facts suggest that the officers may have been negligent, 

or even grossly negligent, they do not mandate a finding that 

Officer Waters consciously disregarded a known risk of substantial 

harm to plaintiff's security when he dropped plaintiff off in 

Kinnear. Specifically, we note: (1) there is no finding as to the 

temperature in Kinnear when Officer Waters dropped plaintiff off 

that morning of May 30, but at the nearest weather station in 

Lander, it was approximately 59° Fahrenheit; (2) the district 

court found that at the time Officer Waters dropped plaintiff off, 

he was not aware of any wind so there is nothing in the record to 

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Appellate Case: 89-8035 Document: 010110031033 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 9 
• 

support the application of a wind-chill factor to the temperature 

when plaintiff was dropped off; (3) there is no finding that the 

officers believed that plaintiff was without money when they 

decided to transport him to Kinnear, and in fact he had $90; (4) 

the district court found that plaintiff was transported to Kinnear 

at his own request; (5) the district court found that the officers 

assumed that plaintiff's ankle had been treated and found that 

there was no evidence that the officers were aware that plaintiff 

had suffered a fractured ankle; (6) there were telephone and other 

emergency services in Kinnear; (7) the district court found that 

the attending physician believed that plaintiff could make a 

competent decision concerning his release; (8) there was no 

finding that the officers knew plaintiff was intoxicated at the 

time Waters left him in Kinnear, or that he was otherwise 

incapable of taking care of himself. The record does reflect that 

a number of hours had elapsed since plaintiff had been drinking in 

the bar; and (9) the district court found that, under the 

circumstances, plaintiff was not placed in a life threatening 

situation. 

The district court was in a far better position than we are 

to judge the credibility of the plaintiff and the defendants. We 

do note that at various times the court concluded that the 

plaintiff's version of the events was not credible. It was the 

duty of the district court to probe the defendants' state of mind, 

and, after four days of considering the evidence, the district 

court determined that the defendants had not acted in "conscious 

disregard of the plaintiff's rights." Because we are constrained 

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Appellate Case: 89-8035 Document: 010110031033 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 10 
• 

by the district court's factual findings as well as by the absence 

of a transcript upon which we could review these findings for 

clear error, we are unable to find that under these facts, 

plaintiff was deprived of his substantive due process rights under 

42 u.s.c. § 1983. Therefore, we must AFFIRM. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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