Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-02360/USCOURTS-ca7-09-02360-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Keith Collins
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-2360

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KEITH COLLINS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 03 CR 80—Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.

ARGUED APRIL 1, 2010—DECIDED MAY 10, 2010

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and BAUER and

HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted appellant

Keith Collins of possessing crack cocaine with intent to

distribute it and of conspiring to do the same. Collins

argues that the district court erroneously denied his

motion to suppress the evidence against him, that evidence of his gun ownership and certain cocaine sales

should not have been admitted against him at trial, and

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that the district court should have granted a mistrial.

Also, when Collins was sentenced, the district court quite

reasonably believed that it could not consider the

disparity between the sentencing guidelines for crack

cocaine and powder cocaine when imposing sentence.

The parties agree that the Supreme Court’s decision in

Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), requires a

remand for resentencing. We affirm Collins’ convictions

but remand his case to the district court for resentencing under Kimbrough.

The Facts

Based on information that Collins was involved in

cocaine distribution, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and Chicago Police Department began

surveillance of Collins and his alleged co-conspirator

Gregory McNeal. During that surveillance on January 24,

2003, DEA Special Agent William Warren radioed that

he had observed Collins leave McNeal’s residence and

place a large plastic bag of what he thought was crack

cocaine inside a black Ford Mustang driven by Collins’

girlfriend Rokesha Johnson. The officers promptly arrested

Collins and searched the Mustang, discovering a bag

containing 673 grams of crack cocaine behind the driver’s

seat. A search of Collins revealed another small bag of

crack cocaine. Upon questioning by Agent Warren,

Collins confessed that he and McNeal had conspired to

process and distribute crack cocaine over the past

several months, and he admitted placing the cocaine in

the Mustang. Collins also stated that he was delivering

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No. 09-2360 3

the smaller bag of cocaine for sale to a nearby customer.

Collins was indicted for possessing more than 50 grams

of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and with conspiracy to do the same, with the conspiracy alleged to

have occurred between approximately August 2002 and

the day of Collins’ arrest.

Before trial, Collins moved to suppress the evidence

seized in the course of his arrest. At the hearing on that

motion, Agent Warren testified that he had set up surveillance in an unmarked car approximately 50 yards south

of the home where McNeal cooked the crack cocaine. To

aid in his surveillance, Warren used a pair of binoculars

and a camera with a telephoto lens. Warren was in

regular contact with other law enforcement officers

via radio, but he was the only individual with an unobstructed (but distant) view of Collins at the critical moments.

Warren testified that on the day in question, he

observed Collins leave McNeal’s house carrying a large

brown paper bag. Collins walked to the passenger side

of the Mustang, opened the passenger door, and pulled a

clear plastic bag from inside the paper bag. Warren testified that, despite his distance from Collins, he recognized

the substance inside the bag as crack cocaine. Collins then

leaned into the passenger compartment of Johnson’s

Mustang, placed the plastic bag inside, closed the door,

and walked away. According to Warren, Collins was at

the Mustang for approximately a minute, and the bag

of cocaine was visible for only a few seconds.

Warren took photographs of these events as they occurred, but he did not take any photograph showing

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Collins holding the plastic bag of cocaine. His photographs show Collins approaching the Mustang with a

large paper bag, leaning inside the Mustang, and then

walking away with the paper bag. Chicago police officer

Andrew Marquez, who was aiding in the surveillance

that day, corroborated Warren’s statements, however,

testifying that Warren had radioed seeing Collins place

a bag of cocaine into the Mustang. The defendants did

not offer any conflicting testimony in the suppression

hearing. The district court found Agent Warren’s

account of events credible and denied Collins’ motion.

The case against Collins then proceeded to trial. Collins

and McNeal were tried jointly, but because Collins’

confession had implicated McNeal, the case was tried

before two juries simultaneously. During the trial, one

jury sometimes needed to be excused from the courtroom during the presentation of evidence inadmissible

against the defendant whose case it was considering.

During the government’s case-in-chief, the bag of crack

cocaine was admitted into evidence, and Agent Warren

testified regarding the events surrounding Collins’ arrest

and confession. Warren also testified that firearms and

ammunition were recovered from Collins’ residence.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Johnson testified against

Collins, stating that she had dated Collins from

June 2002 to the time of his arrest and that she had seen

him sell cocaine approximately every other day during

that time. Johnson explained that on the day of Collins’

arrest, he had asked her to drive to McNeal’s residence.

When she arrived there, Collins came to the passenger

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No. 09-2360 5

side of her Mustang with a brown paper bag, opened the

passenger door, and placed a bag of crack cocaine in the

back passenger compartment. Johnson also testified that

Collins kept a gun under his mattress at home and that

he had used a gun to shoot at a rat in an alley. Collins

rested without calling any witnesses or presenting

any evidence.

Because Collins and McNeal were tried jointly but to

different juries, two sets of closing arguments were

given, one to each jury. The closing arguments in Collins’

case were first. His jury then began its deliberations

while closing arguments were made to McNeal’s jury.

Before the closing arguments in McNeal’s case concluded, Collins’ jury sent a note to the judge asking to

see a copy of a police report, if it had been admitted

into evidence, and requesting a list of the exhibits that

were admitted into evidence. The district judge responded that the report had not been admitted into

evidence and that an exhibit list would be provided

once McNeal’s closing arguments had concluded. A short

time later, before the promised exhibit list was made

available, Collins’ jury informed the court that it had

reached its verdict.

Around this time, Collins’ counsel realized that some

exhibits that had been admitted into evidence—a map

and photographs of a car similar to Johnson’s Mustang—had not been provided to the Collins jury for use

during its deliberations. The defense had used these

exhibits to challenge Warren’s credibility, arguing that they

showed that Warren had significantly understated the

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distance from which he had conducted his surveillance

and that Collins could not have simply leaned inside

the two-door Mustang without moving the passengerside seat out of the way. Collins moved for a mistrial.

The court denied the motion, noting that the jury

knew how to request any exhibits it wished to review

and that the jury was aware that a list of exhibits would

be provided later that day. The court then received

the jury’s verdict, which found Collins guilty on

all charges.

Collins later filed a post-trial motion renewing his

motion to suppress in light of the evidence presented

at trial and again requesting a new trial because not

all of the admitted evidence was made available to the

jury. The court denied the motion.

At sentencing, the district court determined that the

applicable crack cocaine Guidelines range for Collins’

offense was 188 to 235 months. The court also observed

that the range was much higher than it would have

been if Collins had been charged with conspiracy to

distribute the same amount of powder cocaine. Collins

argued that the court could take this sentencing

disparity into account when determining a reasonable

sentence. The district judge disagreed: “I don’t believe

it’s really an open issue in this circuit . . . for me to take

that disparity into account in imposing a sentence. The

Seventh Circuit has essentially said that since Booker . . . .”

(This statement at the time of Collins’ sentencing in

late 2005 anticipated our decision in United States v.

Miller, 450 F.3d 270, 275-76 (7th Cir. 2006), which barred

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No. 09-2360 7

Most cases with Kimbrough issues have been resolved long 1

before now, but this appeal is actually Collins’ second direct

appeal from his conviction. This second appeal was allowed

after Collins prevailed on his post-conviction claim that his

first appellate counsel provided only ineffective assistance.

See United States v. Collins, 510 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2007).

district courts from mitigating the 100-to-1 powder-tocrack ratio because that ratio in the Guidelines reflected

Congressional policy. The Supreme Court’s decision in

Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108 (2007), abrogated that holding in Miller and held that sentencing

courts are not obliged to follow the 100-to-1 ratio when

imposing sentences in crack cocaine cases.) Accordingly,

the district court declined to take the Guidelines

disparity into account and sentenced Collins to a belowGuidelines sentence of 144 months in prison. Collins

now appeals his conviction and sentence.1

Analysis

I. The Motion to Suppress

Collins first argues that the district court erred by

denying his motion to suppress and by crediting Agent

Warren’s testimony. Warren was the only law enforcement officer who claimed to have seen Collins with the

incriminating bag of cocaine, so probable cause for Collins’

arrest (and the suspicion for the stop of Johnson’s Mustang) depended on Warren’s credibility. To challenge

Warren’s credibility, Collins points out, among other

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things, that none of the photographs actually show him

with the plastic bag of cocaine, and he argues that

Warren was too far away to recognize the substance in

the bag. The government argues that Warren’s use of

binoculars and a camera with a telephoto lens enabled

him to observe the rather large bag of cocaine even at a

distance, and that Warren’s failure to photograph

Collins with the cocaine was explained by the camera’s

slow mechanism and the fact that he was juggling the

camera, the binoculars, and two radios.

We review a district court’s factual determinations on

a motion to suppress for clear error. United States v.

Burnside, 588 F.3d 511, 516-17 (7th Cir. 2009), citing United

States v. Mosby, 541 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2008). Particular

deference is given to credibility determinations, which

will not be disturbed unless “completely without foundation.” United States v. Salyers, 160 F.3d 1152, 1162 (7th

Cir. 1998), citing United States v. Ferguson, 35 F.3d 327, 333

(7th Cir. 1994). Finding the facts can be very difficult in

cases like this, and appellate courts add little to the

task, even if the trial court has credited testimony

that might seem improbable at first. Unless the trial court

has credited testimony that is contrary to the laws of

nature or so internally inconsistent or implausible on

its face that no reasonable factfinder would credit it, we

defer to the trial court’s finding. See United States v.

Cardona-Rivera, 904 F.2d 1149, 1152 (7th Cir. 1990).

We cannot conclude that the district court’s credibility

assessment completely lacked foundation. Our review

of the proverbial cold record indicates that some aspects

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No. 09-2360 9

of Warren’s testimony seem unlikely, such as his apparent ability to identify crack cocaine at a great distance. Yet his uncontradicted testimony did not rise

to the level of impossibility. Although Warren observed

the crack cocaine at a substantial distance, his vision

was aided by binoculars or his camera’s telephoto lens.

Furthermore, much of Warren’s story was corroborated

by his photographs, as well as the testimony provided

by Johnson and Officer Marquez.

The record shows that the district judge fully understood the issue and gave close attention to the evidence.

Taken as a whole, the record reveals a difficult question

of credibility that the district judge ultimately resolved

in the government’s favor. Collins and the other defendant offered no evidence contradicting Agent Warren’s

testimony. There are at least two plausible interpretations of the record, and the district court’s choice of the

interpretation Collins disfavors did not amount to clear

error. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,

574 (1985) (“Where there are two permissible views of

the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them

cannot be clearly erroneous.”); United States v. SainzPreciado, 566 F.3d 708, 713 (7th Cir. 2009), quoting United

States v. Hatten-Lubick, 525 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2008).

II. Evidence of Firearm Possession

Collins objects to the government’s introduction of

evidence that he possessed and used (for the mundane

purpose of shooting at a rat in an alley) two handguns

and ammunition. Collins argues that this evidence was

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10 No. 09-2360

unfairly prejudicial and should have been excluded

under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.

Under Rule 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if

it is so unfairly prejudicial that it will cause the jury to

decide the case on an improper basis rather than on the

evidence. See United States v. Pulido, 69 F.3d 192, 201

(7th Cir. 1995), quoting United States v. Vretta, 790 F.2d

651, 655 (7th Cir. 1986). Because Collins did not object to

this evidence at trial, we review only for plain error. We

could reverse only if exclusion of the evidence “probably

would have resulted in an acquittal.” United States v.

Rangel, 350 F.3d 648, 650 (7th Cir. 2003), citing United States

v. Krankel, 164 F.3d 1046, 1052 (7th Cir. 1998). Plain

error review poses a particular challenge for Collins’

Rule 403 argument because he must show that the

evidence was so “obviously and egregiously prejudicial”

that the trial court should have excluded it even without any request from the defense. See United States v.

LeShore, 543 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2008).

Collins cannot overcome the obstacle posed by the plainerror standard of review. The evidence regarding his

possession of guns and ammunition was only slightly

prejudicial, if at all. The trial testimony indicated only

that Collins owned guns, one of which he had used to

shoot at a rat. Furthermore, Collins’ counsel elicited

testimony on cross-examination indicating that Collins

possessed the guns legally. Millions of Americans lawfully possess and use firearms, and they have a constitutional right to do so. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128

S. Ct. 2783, 2799 (2008). This testimony was relevant, see,

e.g., United States v. Rhodes, 229 F.3d 659, 661 (7th Cir. 2000),

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No. 09-2360 11

In passing, Collins’ brief makes a perfunctory mention of the 2

need for Rule 403 analysis of this evidence, but he did not

develop that argument. As we have said numerous times,

(continued...)

citing United States v. Wyatt, 102 F.3d 241, 248 (7th Cir.

1996), and it was not so prejudicial as to have met the

plain-error standard. The government did not use this

evidence in an unfair manner, such as to show that

Collins was a danger to the community, though it

pointed out that guns are tools of the drug trafficking

trade. See Anderson v. Sternes, 243 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th

Cir. 2001) (concluding that a court would be “hard

pressed” to find unfair prejudice where, “in discussing

the weapons during trial and in closing argument, the

government focused only on its theory about the

relevance of the weapons; the government did not

argue that Anderson was a bad person because he kept

guns”). The admission of this evidence against Collins

was not so prejudicial as to constitute plain error.

III. Evidence of Crack Cocaine Sales

Collins also objects to Johnson’s testimony that, during

the course of their relationship, she observed him sell

crack cocaine on numerous occasions. Collins initially

objected to this testimony on the grounds of a lack of

foundation and the difficulty of cross-examining Johnson.

On appeal, Collins raises a new objection that this testimony constituted evidence of prior bad acts made inadmissible by Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). As a result 2

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12 No. 09-2360

(...continued) 2

undeveloped arguments are deemed waived on appeal.

E.g., United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991).

of defendant’s shift in the argument, our review is for

plain error. United States v. Wynn, 845 F.2d 1439, 1442

(7th Cir. 1988), citing United States v. Laughlin, 772 F.2d

1382, 1392 (7th Cir. 1985).

Collins has not shown plain error. First, the bulk of the

cocaine sales that Johnson described—those that took

place between August 2002 and the time of Collins’

arrest—occurred during the time frame of the charged

conspiracy and are not “prior bad acts” as that term is

understood. Cf. United States v. Macedo, 406 F.3d 778, 792

(7th Cir. 2005) (applying Rule 404(b) analysis to evidence of drug sales made nine years before charged

offense). Rather, these sales were evidence of the very

drug distribution conspiracy with which Collins was

charged. Rule 404(b) did not apply. E.g., United States

v. Alviar, 573 F.3d 526, 538 (7th Cir. 2009) (“When evidence is embraced by the conspiracy in the indictment,

the court need not resort to Rule 404(b) analysis.”);

United States v. Watts, 535 F.3d 650, 659-60 (7th Cir. 2008)

(rejecting defendant’s Rule 404(b) challenge to evidence

of defendant’s acts in furtherance of conspiracy as bordering on frivolous). Johnson’s testimony about these sales

was properly permitted.

Johnson’s testimony about drug sales during her relationship with Collins also included cocaine sales in

June and July of 2002, shortly before the first specific

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No. 09-2360 13

date of the charged conspiracy. Even if these sales might

have been subject to Rule 404(b) analysis, and even if their

admission might have been plainly erroneous (which

we doubt), we could not conclude that this testimony

prejudiced Collins. The evidence of Collins’ guilt—the

crack cocaine itself, Agent Warren’s testimony, Johnson’s

testimony corroborating Warren’s testimony and implicating Collins in the conspiracy, and Collins’ own

confession—was overwhelming. As a result, even if this

portion of Johnson’s testimony might have been admitted

in error, it was merely cumulative. Its exclusion would

not have made an acquittal probable. See Rangel, 350 F.3d

at 650.

As a final note, in the course of his Rule 404(b) argument,

Collins complains that nothing explicitly connected any

of these drug sales with the charged conspiracy. Even if

we were to construe this as an argument that Johnson’s

testimony lacked a proper foundation, we note that “no

rule of evidence requires a ‘foundation’ ” and that the

rules of evidence generally make all relevant evidence

admissible. A.I. Credit Corp. v. Legion Ins. Co., 265 F.3d

630, 637-38 (7th Cir. 2001). This evidence of Collins’ active

crack cocaine distribution during and just before the

time of the alleged conspiracy was relevant to show his

involvement in the conspiracy. It is theoretically possible

that Collins’ sales observed by Johnson were entirely

separate from his admitted conspiracy with McNeal, but

that theoretical possibility did not prohibit admission of

this evidence.

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14 No. 09-2360

IV. Motion for Mistrial

Collins argues that the district court erred when it

denied his motion for a mistrial after it was discovered

that the map and photographs of a Mustang resembling

Johnson’s car were not provided to the jury during its

deliberations. Without every defense exhibit readily

available to the jury, Collins contends, the jury was

unable to consider properly his arguments challenging

Agent Warren’s credibility. We review the denial of Collins’ motion for an abuse of discretion. United States v.

Magana, 118 F.3d 1173, 1183 (7th Cir. 1997), citing United

States v. Best, 939 F.2d 425, 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1991)

(en banc).

The district court acted reasonably by denying the

motion for a mistrial. Generally, a mistrial is appropriate when an event during trial has a real likelihood

of preventing a jury from evaluating the evidence fairly

and accurately, so that the defendant has been deprived

of a fair trial. See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 538 F.3d

718, 727 (7th Cir. 2008), citing United States v. Danford, 435

F.3d 682, 686 (7th Cir.2006). When deciding whether a

mistrial is warranted because admitted evidence was

not provided to the jury, “a new trial is required if there

is a reasonable possibility that a party is prejudiced by

the district court’s failure to provide certain exhibits to

the jury, even if the exhibits are properly admitted.”

Deicher v. City of Evansville, 545 F.3d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 2008).

It is possible, of course, to imagine some circumstances

in which even the inadvertent omission of certain

evidence from the jury room could plausibly have such

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No. 09-2360 15

an effect. Based on the facts of this case, however, we

are confident that the omission of these exhibits did

not prejudice Collins by impeding the jury’s ability to

consider fairly and accurately the information contained

in them.

Absent some special circumstance, a failure to make an

exhibit available to a jury during deliberations is no

cause for a mistrial, particularly when the trial was short

and the information is such that it “should be fresh in

the jurors’ minds.” Deicher, 545 F.3d at 545, citing United

States v. Guy, 924 F.2d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 1991). Collins’ trial

was relatively short, making it unlikely that the jury

had forgotten over time that these particular exhibits

had been admitted at trial. Collins’ counsel had discussed the exhibits during closing arguments, which had

served to refresh the jurors’ memories earlier that same

day. And it is not as if the missing exhibits contained

information that the jury could not readily recall without

the aid of the exhibits themselves. The map was used to

argue that Agent Warren’s testimony was unreliable

because he had actually observed Collins from a greater

distance than he had described. The pictures were used

to argue that Warren’s account of events was incomplete

(and therefore unreliable) because he never mentioned

that Collins had moved the Mustang’s front passenger

seat to place the cocaine in the car’s rear passenger compartment. The absence of either exhibit from the jury

room did not prevent the jury from considering these

common sense arguments so as to deny Collins a fair trial.

The general rule stated in Deicher and Guy does not

apply when a district court fails to provide admitted

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16 No. 09-2360

evidence to the jury in an evenhanded manner. See

United States v. Salerno, 108 F.3d 730, 745 (7th Cir. 1997);

United States v. Hofer, 995 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1993);

United States v. Samples, 713 F.2d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1983).

The cases Collins cites only reflect this exception. In

Deicher, for example, the judge had provided the jury

with information supporting the defendant’s theory

but had refused to allow the jury to review an exhibit

that supported the plaintiff’s contrary theory. 545 F.3d

at 544. Similarly, in United States v. Garza, the district

court had allowed the jury to review a letter admitted

into evidence regarding the terms of a plea agreement

but had refused to permit the jury to review seven

defense exhibits calling that letter’s accuracy into question. 574 F.2d 298, 300 (5th Cir. 1978). Here, however,

there is no concern that the evidence provided to the

jury reflected only the government’s theory of the case.

No evidence was admitted to contradict the photographs. The excluded map was a government exhibit, and

for obvious reasons, the government introduced no

evidence calling that map into question. Thus, the questions of fairness and balance in Garza and Deicher are

simply not present in this case. The district court did not

abuse its discretion by denying Collins’ motion for a

mistrial.

V. Sentencing

Finally, the parties agree that resentencing is necessary

because the district court believed that it could not take

into account the disparity between the Sentencing GuideCase: 09-2360 Document: 31 Filed: 05/10/2010 Pages: 17
No. 09-2360 17

lines advisory ranges for powder and crack cocaine

when determining Collins’ sentence. Legal developments

after Collins’ sentencing revealed that the district court

erred, not through any fault of its own, but by following

or anticipating this court’s decisions before the Supreme

Court’s decision in Kimbrough authorized district courts

to consider the disparity when exercising their discretion

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 552 U.S. at 108. Because

Collins raised the sentencing disparity at sentencing,

and because we cannot determine with any certainty

whether the district court would have sentenced Collins

differently if it had been aware of its discretion under

Kimbrough, a remand for resentencing is warranted. See

United States v. Padilla, 520 F.3d 766, 774 (7th Cir. 2008)

(remanding crack cocaine sentence for reconsideration under Kimbrough).

We AFFIRM Collins’ convictions and REMAND his case

to the district court for resentencing.

5-10-10

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