Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01043/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01043-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
Intervenor
National Whistleblower Center
Petitioner
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Respondent
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed November 22, 1999

No. 99-1002

National Whistleblower Center,

Petitioner

v.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission and

United States of America,

Respondents

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company,

Intervenor

Consolidated with

99-1043

---------

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, and Williams, Circuit

Judge.

USCA Case #99-1043 Document #481409 Filed: 12/03/1999 Page 1 of 4
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O R D E R

It is ORDERED, by the Court, on its own motion, that the

majority opinion and the judgment filed herein on November

12, 1999, be, and the same hereby are, vacated.

A future order will schedule further briefing and rehearing

after a member of the Court is randomly selected to replace

former Circuit Judge Wald as the third member of the panel.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY:

Robert A. Bonner

Deputy Clerk

A concurring statement of Chief Judge Edwards is attached.

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Edwards, Chief Judge, concurring: I concur in the Order

vacating the opinion and judgment issued on November 12,

1999, because, in retrospect, I fear that the original (now

vacated) majority opinion fails to address some critical issues

in this case. These issues were not the focus of the arguments during the first hearing before the court, so it is

unsurprising that they were lost in our haste to issue an

opinion before our colleague, Judge Wald, departed from the

court. However, in my view, the issues are too important to

ignore once uncovered; thus, I feel that this case must be

reheard.

The now vacated majority opinion is founded on the view

that petitioners were prejudiced by the Commission's abrogation of a substantive rule. After considering this matter

further, I find that there is good reason to believe that we

were mistaken in assuming that the Commission acted pursuant to a substantive, as opposed to a procedural, rule.

On August 5, 1998, the Commission published a statement

of Policy on Conduct of Adjudicatory Proceedings ("Policy")

in which it stated that licensing boards should grant extensions of time "only when warranted by unavoidable and

extreme circumstances." 63 Fed. Reg. 41,872, 41,874 (Aug. 5,

1998). The Commission subsequently invoked this new rule

in an order referring a petition filed by the National Whistleblower Center ("Center") to the Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board, stating that extensions of time should only be granted

if the petitioner can demonstrate "unavoidable and extreme

circumstances." Order Referring Petition for Intervention

and Request for Hearing to Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board Panel, CLI 98-14, reprinted in Joint Appendix ("J.A.")

23, 28 (Aug. 19, 1998).

There can be no doubt that the Commission's August 5,

1998, Policy adopted a new standard to govern requests for

extensions of time in proceedings of the sort here at issue. It

also seems clear that the new standard was intended to

modify the standards previously enunciated in 10 C.F.R.

s 2.711(a) and s 2.714(b)(1). And it is undisputed that the

Center had notice of the new standard for granting extensions of time. The Center additionally understood the thrust

of the Policy, for they objected to the new standard on the

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ground that it was contrary to the "good cause" standard

contained in 10 C.F.R. s 2.711(a). See Memorandum and

Order, CLI 98-15 (Aug. 26, 1998) reprinted in J.A. 60 (characterizing the Center's objections to the new standard as

articulated in the Commission's Aug. 19, 1998 referral order).

Given that the Commission adopted a new standard to be

applied in cases of this sort and that the Center had notice of

the new standard before the advent of the procedures here in

dispute, it matters a great deal whether the standard is

viewed as a new "substantive" or "procedural" rule. If, as

appears to be the case, the new standard is a procedural rule,

then it is exempt from the requirements of notice and comment under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

s 553(b)(A). See JEM Broad. Co. v. FEC, 22 F.3d 320 (D.C.

Cir. 1994).

It is no answer to say that the Commission was wrong to

construe "good cause" as "unavoidable and extreme circumstances." If this is a procedural rule, and if it does not

transcend the bounds of due process or violate some clear

statutory mandate, then the Commission is entitled to define

"good cause" as it sees fit. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear

Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Given that

latitude, it would be an oxymoron to say that "unavoidable

and extreme circumstances" is outside the realm of acceptable understandings of "good cause."

These issues were not properly aired during the first round

of briefs and arguments before this court. We would be

remiss, I think, to issue the mandate in this case without

considering the questions that are now apparent. I do not

believe that the Commission has waived the right to argue

the procedural/substantive issue, because the agency could

not have reasonably anticipated the position reached in the

first majority opinion. In short, the case must be reheard,

with a proper focus on the issues at hand.

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