Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03304/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03304-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chris Ballmer
Appellant
David Bayouth
Appellee
Bernard Hentzen
Appellee
Billy Q. McCray
Appellee
Mark F. Schroeder
Appellee
Tom Scott
Appellee
The Board of County Commissioners of Sedgwick County, Kansas
Appellee

Document Text:

• 

, . : ll t ijf Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 'l'tnth e!rcuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT AP~ " 1991 

CHRIS BALLMER, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ) 

OF SEDGWICK COUNTY, KANSAS, TOM SCOTT, ) 

MARK F. SCHROEDER, DAVID BAYOUTH, ) 

BERNARD HENTZEN, BILLY Q. McCRAY, ) 

individually and as members of the ) 

Board of County Commissioners of ) 

Sedgwick County, Kansas, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-3304 

(D.C. No. 87-1414-K 

(Dist. of Kansas) 

Before SEYMOUR, BARRETT and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

Chris Ballmer ("Ballmer") appeals from an order of the 

district court granting summary judgment in favor of the Board of 

County Commissioners of Sedgwick County, Kansas, in their official 

and individual capacities ("defendants"). 

Ballmer was hired as Sedgwick County Appraiser in September, 

1985. Also in 1985, the Kansas Legislature adopted legislation 

requiring statewide mass reappraisal. Ballmer's duties as county 

* 

be 

for 

res 

This Order and Judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-3304 Document: 010110031715 Date Filed: 04/02/1991 Page: 1 
appraiser included supervising the reappraisal of property in 

Sedgwick County in accordance with the new legislation. 

On June 17, 1987, at a board meeting, the defendants voted, 

inter alia, to relieve Ballmer of his supervisory role in the 

reappraisal effort. On July 15, 1987, again at a board meeting, 

the defendants asked Ballmer to resign; when he refused, the 

defendants fired him. An administrative hearing on Ballmer's 

termination began on June 27, 1989, but was continued. Ballmer 

subsequently withdrew from the post-termination administrative 

process. 

Ballmer filed this action on July 27, 1987, alleging that the 

defendants had deprived him, without due process of law, of 1) his 

constitutionally protected property interest in his county 

appraiser position, and 2) his constitutionally protected liberty 

interest in his freedom to take advantage of future employment 

opportunities. 

On May 5, 1988, the district court granted Ballmer's motion 

for partial summary judgment on Ballmer's deprivation of property 

claim. Thereafter, the defendants moved for summary judgment on 

Ballmer's liberty and property claims. As to the property claim, 

the defendants moved the district court to set aside its earlier 

order granting Ballmer partial summary judgment and instead grant 

them summary judgment by virtue of both a change of law and 

additional facts. 

On October 13, 1989, the district court withdrew its 

1988, order and granted the defendants' motion for 

judgment. The court determined that: 1) Ballmer's 

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May 5, 

summary 

liberty 

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interest claim was insufficient because he had failed to pursue to 

conclusion his post-termination administrative remedies; and 

2) Ballmer's property interest claim was insufficient because he 

had received actual notice of his proposed termination and was 

provided with an adequate hearing. 

On appeal, Ballmer argues that: 1) the district court's 

findings of fact are irrelevant and not supported by the record; 

2) material questions of fact exist about whether he received 

constitutionally adequate notice of his firing; 3) he did not 

waive his liberty interest claim when he dismissed his posttermination administrative appeal; and 4) he did not receive a 

constitutionally sufficient pre-termination hearing. 

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we must examine the 

record to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact 

remains, and, if not, whether the substantive law was correctly 

applied by the district court. Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich 

Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319 (10th Cir. 1987). Ruling on a 

motion for summary judgment involves purely legal determinations 

by the district court and our review is de novo. Missouri Pacific 

Railroad Co. v. Kansas Gas & Electric Co., 862 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 

1988). 

We have carefully reviewed the record in this case and hold 

that the district court did not make "findings of fact," as 

alleged by Ballmer, but instead relied on relevant undisputed 

facts in making its determination. We also hold that the court 

properly applied the relevant substantive law. Thus, we AFFIRM, 

substantially for the reasons set forth in the district court's 

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Memorandum and Order of October 13, 1989, which is attached 

hereto. 

-4-

Entered for the Court: 

James E. Barrett, 

Senior United States 

Circuit Judge 

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nLED 

U.S. DISlRICT COURT 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTR:f1i~T~R,~ KAtlSAS 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF .KANSAS' 

CHRIS BALI.MER, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIOHERS 

OF SEDGWICK COUNTY, KANSAS; and 

TOM SCOTT, MARK F. SCHROEDER, . 

DAVID BAYOUTH, BERNARD HENTZEN, 

and BILLY Q. McCRAY, Individually 

and as Members of the Board of 

County Commissioners of Sedgwick 

County, Kansas~ 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

__________________ ) ) 

·oc1 13 3 11 rH '89 

RALPH L. DELOACH 

11 _C-'i,ERI'.~ , , 

BY U· :.,,.1~t/?•.v ~li~!..:'./ 1 

_. AT WICHITA, S. 

No. 87-1414-K 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

The former county appraiser of Sedgwick County, Kansas, Chris 

Ballmer, brought the present action pursuant to 42 u.s.c. § 1983, 

contending that the circumstances of his termination violated his 

due process rights under the Fourtee'nth Amendment. The plaintiff 

asserts both liberty interest and property interest depriva.tions. 

The defendants are the Board of Commissioners of Sedgwick County, 

und the individual commissioners. 

on May 5, _1988, this court granted partial _summary judgment 

to the plaintiff, finding that the circumstances surrounding his 

termination were a violation of du& process. The defendants have 

now moved for summary judgment on both the liberty interest and 

property intere~t-claims advanced by the plaintiff. Oral argument 

on the defendants'. motion was held on October 2, 1989. For the 

reasons stated below, the court withdraws its order of May 5, 1989, 

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and concludes that summary judgment must be granted on behalf of 

the defendants. 

Plaintiff Ballmer was hired as· Sedgwick County Appraiser on 

September 26, 1985. In 1986, Ballmer hired Torrey Baird as 

reappraisal coordinator of Sedgwick County. (Def. 112.) Ballmer 

and Baird had previously worke·d together in New Mexico. (Pl. Ex. 

E, ,is.) . 

In 1985, the Kansas. Legislature adopted legislation requiring ·-····· -. . -.. .. .. ~ -.... . statewide mass reappraisal. Under this ·reappraisal effor~, the 

state Property Valuation Division (PVD) was given the I . 

responsibility _ 1:;_Q _ pr~s..cr~Q~ __ the timetables and guidelines for-:--· -

reappraisal. 

! 

,.-. :~ ·: ... Th4:! individual county appraisers were given the · 

responsibility of actually performing t;ne reappraisal. (Def. 1 6.) 

On January 15, 1987, ·aallmer submitted to PVD a revised . . . .• • - . :- ~- ... • . -~ .. .. ,. . . ~-- -= . . : .. 

reappraisal plan for Sedgwick County. The initial plan provided ·--- ·-· _. , ..... . ··- .. . .. .. a projected budget of $3,610,000 for the reappraisal program in 

- Sedgwick County. The revised plan increased the projected cost of 

reappraisal to $7,417,804. (Def. 1 18.) Although the plan 

submitted by Ballmer to PVD stated that the increased budget "has 

been established for the reappraisal program in Sedgwick County," 

(Def. Ex. E, at 11), in fact, . the revised plan had not been 

submitted to the board for its review or approval. (Def. 1 18.) 

George Donatello, the reappraisal coordinator for PVD, has - I . . .. . .. 

testified that while the agency .. had no formal requirement that 

revised plans receive the prior approval of the boards of 

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. ornrnissioners for the various counties, the failure to do so wouid 

resent a severe problem. (Def. 1 19.) 

On February 9, 1987, Ballmer and Baird met with several PVD 

fficials, including Donatello, in Topeka. Donatello expressed 

oncern that a great amount of money was being spent on reappraisal 

in Sedgwick County with little to show for it. PVD officers also 

xpressed concern over the poor public relations between the 

· ppraiser' s Off ice and .. the .. Board of County Commissioners in 

Sedgwick County~ When the PVD officials di~cussed the problems the 

PVD anticipated with reappraisal in Sedgwick County, Ballmer became 

defensive and threatened litigation •. (Def. 1 20, Ex. KK.) 

on March ~8, the board approved the budget increase for the. 

1987 reappraisal program. (Def. Exs. G, H.) On April 9, defendant 

Commissioner David Bayouth requested .. .that Ballmer submit . weekly 

written status:reports on the reappraisal effort and monthly oral 

reports at regularly scheduled board meetings. (Def. 1 23.) Also 

during April 1987, a meeting was held in defendant Commissioner 

Mark Schroeder's office to discuss public statements made by Baird 

I 

concerning . the _PVD. At the meeting were Ballmer, Baird, Schr·oeder, - . 

County counselor Robert Arnol4, . and Acting County Manager Gerard 

Harrison. It ~as agreed that Baird should not make any future 

public statements ·without clearing them through Ballmer first. 

(Def. 1 24.) 

~ 

on April 14, the PVD manager of systems and standards and the 

PVD field operations manager travelled to Wichita to investigate 

the progress of the Sedgwick County reappraisal program. The PVD 

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officers met with Ballmer and Baird, as to expressed doubts about 

the methodology used in the Sedgwick County program. In a memo to 

PVD reappraisal coordinator Donatello, the PVD officials wrote that 

Ballmer "views our concerns as the typical Neanderthal reaction to 

an orientation we are incapable of comprehending." (Def. Ex. EE.) 

On May 24, the Wichita Eagle-Beacon published an article on 

reappraisal in Sedgwick County written by staff writer Alissa 

Rubin. · (Def. Ex. I.) . The front-page article discussed the 

possible failure of the appraiser's office ·to meet the deadl~ne for 

reappraisal, t_he controversy over Ballmer' s management of the 

office, and .the possible necessity of hiring a private consultant- - - . • .. 

to - assist in the reappraisal program. One unidentified county · 

official is quoted as describing the appraiser's off ice as "a 

portrait. of confusion ; :.~ . .• a -classic study of a department out of 

.. 

control. 11 • •. , ·-The: -article also ·contains responsive statements by 

Ballmer, who is quoted as stating that 

· 1 think we made the right . choice in doing· [the 

reappraisal] in-house. Possibly people are right, we 

didn't have quite the control we should, but it's a 

learning process and it's taken this long to get there. 

But now we're getting that control of the job and it's 

exciting, it's fun to do this. . __ _ _ 

The article also states that Ballmer "said that while the schedule 

is tight," he believed it could be accomplished by the Dec~mber 31, 

1988 deadline. 

on June 8, Chief Commissioner Tom Scott, Counselor Arnold, and 

County Director of Economic Development . Kim Dewey travelled to 

Topeka to meet · with PVD officers. The · PVD officers-stated that 

Ballmer•s management style would not produce a successful 

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completion ot the reappraisal project. They told the Sedgwick 

county officers that the PVD was prepared to petition the state 

Board of Tax Appeals to take over control of the reappraisal 

program in the county, unless the county make certain changes. In 

order to avoid a PVD tak~over . of the program, the county officers 

were told that, at a minimum, they would have to terminate Baird 

and hire an outside contractor to perform the commercial and 

industrial reappraisal. (Def. 1 29.) The PVD recommended CAMA 

Te chnology, Inc. as an outside contractor~ 

On June 17, the board held a regularly scheduled meeting in 

which it unanimously approved a motion requiring Ballmer to -· .. terminate Baird. · While all of the commissioners agreed it was 

necessary to terminate Baird, Commissioner Bayouth also expressed 

his belief that .the situation required the removal of Ballmer as 

.. - well. · Bayouth stated during the meeting that - - · · 

I just want- to make one comment. After listening to all 

of you, I still feel, and I know that everything that I 

do in my store or my business, everything that goes wrong 

is my fault, you understand? I take that responsibility; 

and I feel . that everything that is going on in the 

Appraiser's Office is Mr. Ballmer•s responsibility, and 

it is his •tault. · ••• He has known about it. I've 

talked · to him also in my office, and we discussed this 

same thing months and months and months ago, and he has 

made no changes. Even though he may feel he is right, 

obviously, we don't agree with him. 

(Def. Ex. J, at 21.) 

Ballmer was present at the meeting and given an opportunity j 

to speak. He repeated his belief that "the reappraisal is on track 

and will be completed, 11 but agreed to terminate Baird . ... (Id.) The 

board then approved a motion to deprive Ballmer "of any 

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responsibility for the Sedgwick County reappraisal effort." 

at 22.) 

(.I.d..i., 

On June 24, the board authorized CAMA Technology to conduct an 

evaluation of the reappraisal effort in Sedgwick County. (Def. 

1 32.) A working draft· of ·the CAMA report was given to Director 

of Economic Development Dewey on July 9. On the same day, Dewey 

discussed the working draft of the report with Alissa Rubin of the 

Eagle-Beacon. (Def. 11 33, 34.) 

On July 10, the Eagle-Beacon ran a front-page article by Rubin 

entitled "Reappraisal Plan Called Ill-Conceived.'' (Def. Ex. II~) 

The article includes a statement of the unfavorable review of __ 

Ballmer•s management of the appraiser's office contained in the 

CAMA report. Referring to the . board's earlier approval of the 

consultation contract with CAMA, the article noted that 

(a) majority of the ·commissioners said- if the 

consultant's report indicated that problems in the 

program were due not only to its poor management by 

Baird, but also to poor planning by Ballmer, they would 

be prepared to fire him. 

In addition, the article reported the statement of Commissioner 

Bayouth made on July 9 that "he expected there would be an 

executive session at [the July 15) commission meeting to discuss 

whether to fire Ballmer." 

The article also quotes Ballmer stating that he did not 

believe there was "any problem with the plan the way we were 

.t 

working on it," and stating his beli~f that the outside 

consultation was unnecessary. 

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Prior to the July 15 board meeting, Ballmer hired an attorney 

' to represent him. He also began to remove, copy, and then replace 

documents from the files of the Courity Appraiser's O(fice. {Def. 

i 11.) 

At the July 15 hearing~ the board formally received a copy of 

the CAMA report· · and heard an oral statement by Ed Hayes, the 

president of CAMA Technology. Hayes reported that the reappraisal 

project in Sedgwick County was behind schedule and over budget. 

Although only about 4\ of the reappraisal work had been completed, 

approximately one quarter of the budget for the project had been 

expended. (Def. Ex. M, Minut~s, p. 15.) Hayes concluded that the -

~ 

Sedgwick County _reappraisal effort "will be a disaster; you won't 

finish, and what gets done will probably be of poor quality." 

(Minutes, p • . 1a·. ·)- . 

Following the completion • •· of Hayes• · statement, the. 

commissioners questioned him for several minutes. Commission 

Chairman Torn Scott then asked Ballmer if he wished to respond. 

Ballmer stated that he had received the CAMA report earlier that 

morning and had not "had a chance to really study the report." 

However, he stated that "I have scanned it and · listened to the 

report he delivered to you today [and] I do have problem~ with some 

of the things that have been said." {Def. Ex. M, Minutes, p. 27.) 

Ballmer then discussed the issues raised by Hayes involving the ~ 

reappraisal effort I s budget, the gee-processing and mapping system, 

the collection of land data, the development of new. reappraisal 

plans, and the training of staff personne~. Ballmer I s remarks 

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occupy two and a half pages ot the single-spaced, typewritten 

minutes of the .hearing. (Def. Ex. M, at 27-29.) 

At the conclusion of Ballmcr's remarks, the board voted to 

recess into executive session, which Ballmer was asked to attend. 

(Def. Ex. M, at 3 O. ) During the executive session, Ballmer was .. 

asked whether he would resig~. When he refused, he was excused 

from the session. (Pl. Response, Ex. E, at 1 7.) 

Following the executive session, the board entertained a 

motion by Commissioner David Bayouth to terminate Ballmer. After 

the motion was seconded, Chairman Scott asked Ballmer whether he 

had anything to ·say before the board voted. (Def. Ex. M, at 31.) -

Ballmer responded that he did not. The defendants contend that 

during the executive session, Ballmer told the commissioners that 

his attorney ha~ told him to request a hearing pursuant to K.S.A. 

19- 431 in the event he was terminated. ( Def. Ex. O, 1 3 • ) The. 

plai~tiff contends that this occurred in the open hearing rather 

than the execu~ive session, but does not controvert the statement 

itself. (Pl. Ex. E, 1 7.) The board unanimously accepted the 

motion to terminate Ballmer. 

An administrative hearing on- Ballmer•s termination was 

,• 

commenced on June 27, 1989 before the PVD Acting Director. The 

hearing was adjourned without resolving the dispute, and the matter 

was indefinitely continued. Both parties blame the other for the ~ 

delay in the ·hearing process. However, the record clearly 

indicates that the postponement of the hearing was the desire of 

both parties. The county requested an order of continuance due to 

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the illness of Robert Arnold, the County Counselor. (Def. Ex. R, 

at 5.) Ballmer•s attorney did not object to the requested 

continuance, but rather, joined in - it, stating that the hearing 

should be delay·ed 90 days in order not to be "unduly ambitious. 11 

. - (Id. at 7.) Citing the difficulty in preparation for the hearing 

and the present ~itigation, aallmer•s attorney stated that he would 

have requested a_ continuance of the final hearing II indepen_dent of 

Mr. Arnold's health." (Id, at 8.) 

On October ~6, 1987, Ballmer•s attorney wrote a letter to the 

PVD office in Topeka, stating: 

Chris Bai°lmer does hereby dismiss his administrative 

appeal proceedings which are pending pursuant to K.S.A. 

19-431. We intend to pursue the pending civil rights 

action. 

(Def. Ex. · s • ) 

A fact dispute exists between the parties over the nature of 

. . ---- the methodology used by Ballmer in the county reappraisal program: 

The defendants generally contend that Ballmer utilized a 

"sequential" reappraisal scheme, which had little chance of timely 

achieving the goals of reappraisal. Ballmer contends that he never 

used a straight·sequential plan, and that criticisms of the program 

remain invalid. · 

Summary judgment is proper, where the plead~ngs, depositions, 

answers to i~terrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 

affidavits, if · any, show there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion 

for summary judgment, the court must examine all e~ldence in a 

" 

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light most favorable to the opposing party. McKenzie v, Hercy 

Hospital, 854 F.2d 365, J67 (10th Cir. 1988). The party moving for 

summary judgment must demonstrate·· its entitlement to summary 

judgment beyond a reasonable doubt. Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas 

co., 754 F.2d 884, 885 (10th cir. 1985). The moving party need not 

disprove plaintiff's claim; it need only establish that the factual 

allegations have ·no legal significance. Dayton Hudson Corp. v, 

Macerich Real Estate Co,, 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1987). 

In resisting a motion for summary judgment, the opposin~ party 

may not rely upon mere allegations or denials contained in its 

pleadings or briefs. Rather, the nonmoving party must come forward -

with specific facts showing the presence of a genuine issue of 

material fact for trial and significant probative evidence 

supporting the allegation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its burden 

under Rule 56(c), the party opposing summary judgment must do more 

than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the 

material facts. "In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party 

must come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec, Indus, Co,. Ltd. v, 

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 

56(e)) (emphasi~ in Matsushita). One of the principal purposes of 

the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually 

~ ' 

unsupported claims or defenses, and the rule should be interpreted 

in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose. Celotex Corp, 

v . Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 

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A. Liberty Interest 

Plaintiff Ballmer bases the present 42 u.s.c. § 1983 action, 

in part, upon an alleged violation . of his liberty interest. 

Ballmer contends that the defendants have injured his reputation 

through the cornrn~nication of damaging and incorrect information. 

The concept of liberty recognizes two particular interests of 

a public employee: (1) a protection of his good name, reputation, 

honor, and inte_gri ty; and ( 2) the freed~m to take advantage of 

other employment opportunities. Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 

794 (10th Cir. 1988); Garcia v. Board of Educ., 777 F.2d 1403, 1418 

(10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 814 (1986); Miller v. City 

of Mission, Kan-., 705 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1983). 

termination of a public employee 

When the 

is accompanied by public dissemination of the reasons for 

dismissal, and those reasons would · stigmatize the 

employee I s . reputation or foreclose future employment 

opportunities, due process requires that the employee be 

provided with a hearing at which he may test the validity 

of the proffered grounds for dismissal. 

Meder v. City of Oklahoma city, 869 F.2d 553, 554 (10th cir. 1989) 

(quoting Miller, 705 F.2d at 373). 

The defendants present several arguments in favor of their 

motion for summary judgment on Ballmer•s liberty interest -claim. 

Two of these arguments share a common element. The defendants 

argue, first, that Ballmer does not present a valid liberty ~ 

interest claim because he cannot demonstrate the falsity of the 

stigmatizing information reflected in the CAMA report, which the 

county adopted in terminating Ballmer. Second, they contend that 

11 

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allrner is entitled to nominal damages only, since Ballmer would 

ave been terminated in any event. Both arguments depend upon the 

efendants• assertion that the CAMA report is truthful and 

ccurate, and that Ballmer has failed to prove the opposite. 

The defen·dants argue - that Ballmer has not identified any 

xpert witnesses who dispute the findings of the CAMA report, and 

that the only evidence offered on this point is the affidavit of 

Ballmer himself. · The defendants argue that the affidavit of 

Ballmer is insufficient to raise a genuine fact issue as ~o the 

truth of the stated reasons for Ballmer•s termination, and they 

condemn Ballmer•s affidavit attacking the CAMA report as "mere -·· 

co~clusory allegations." (Def. Memo; at 17, 19.) 

The defendants• argument must be rejected. The affidavit of 

Ballmer (Pl. Ex. E) is not · conclusory, but offers a detailed 

rejection of the truthfulness· of the stated grounds for his 

termination, including the truthfulness of the CAMA report. The 

affidavit and the attached answers to interrogatories assert 

specific facts which controvert the truthfulness of the reasons 

given for Ballmer•s termination. The failure of Ballmer to cite 

other evidence on the issue in unimportant. Evidence offered by 

a party opposing a motion for summary judgment is deemed true and 

all reasonable inferences must be drawn in his favor. Windon Third 

Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 805 

i 

F.2d 342, 346,(lOth Cir. ~986), cert, denied, 480 U.S. {1987). 

However, while the factual arguments advanced by the 

defendants must be rejected, the court concludes that the liberty 

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1) 

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... 

interest claim advanced by Ballmer is insufficient as a matter of 

law. Plaintiff Ballmer possessed an opportunity, which he did not 

exercise, to clear his name through the use of the hearing provided 

pursuant to K.S~A. 19-431. K.S.A. 19-431 provides suspended or 

terminated county appraisers with the right to request a hearing 

before the director of PVD. In the course of the hearing, the 

director is authorized under the statute to "make inquiry as to all 

facts connected with such suspension or termination." 

While there is a strong presumption against the waiver of 

fundamental constitutional rights, nevertheless due process rights 

may be waived where the waiver is done in an informed manner.- -

Pitts v. Board of Educ., 869 F.2d 555, 557 (10th Cir. 1989). In 

the present case, K.S.A. 19-431 established a procedure under which 

the plaintiff could receive a hearing on his termination, and 

repudiate the ch~rges against him. However, the plaintiff elected 

to pursue the matter solely through the present litigation, rather 

than through the completion of the procedures accorded to him under 

state law. 

Plaintiff Ballmer makes two arguments in his brief on the 

present issue •. · First, he argues that a post-termination hearing 

cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a name-clearing hearing. 

The Tenth Circuit, however, has explicitly rejected such a rule. 

In Rankin v. Independent School Dist. No. I-3, 876 F.2d 838, 842 ,. 

(10th Cir. 1989)~ the court held ~hat a name-clearing hearing may 

satisfy the requirements of due process, even though it occurs 

after the stigmatizing information has been published. 

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Ballmer's second argument must also be rejected. He contends 

that the K.S.A. 19-431 hearing could not have satisfied due process 

because of its .delay. He argues that in October, 1987, when the 

matter would have been heard, new appraisal personnel had been 

appointed and new apprai~al procedures instituted. A favorable 

determination at the hearing, he argues, would have been 

meaningless since it would have been impossible for him to return 

to work, readopt the procedures used during his previous tenure, 

and hope to accomplish the appraisal project within the established 

deadline. 

However, the record clE!arly indicates that the delay in -

obtaining the hearing occurred not simply through the acquiescence, 

I 

but through the ·active encouragement, of Ballmer. · Ballmer made no 

objection ·to the county's July 27 request for a continuance, and 

indeed independently joined in the request;- ·-asking for a 

postponement of 90 days. H~ving given active support and 

encouragement to the delay of the K.S.A. 19-431 hearing, the 

plaintiff may not be heard now to argue that that delay deprived 

him of due process. 

More importantly, Ballmer•s argument sim~li. ilsses the point. 

Ballmer argues that by October, 1987, substantial changes in the 

appraiser's office had occurred which made his reappointment to the 

position moot. He ~ontends that bf that date, his reappointment 

was impossible as a practical matter. But the present issue 

involves Ballmer•s claim for damage to his liberty interest, not 

the deprivation · ot his property interest in the employment itself. 

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., 

It is the damage to Ballmer•s name and reputation that are at issue 

in his liberty interest claim, and the K.S.A. 19-431 hearing could 

have addressed that question quite as well as the present 

litigation. Whether or not his reappointment as Sedgwick County 

Appraiser remained possible as a practical matter, the opportunity 

to clear his name remained. · Ballmer• s decision to ignore that 

opportunity is fatal to his liberty interest claim. 

In oral argument, Ballmer argued that an exhaustion of 

administrative remedies should not be a .. requirement for . a due 

process action. · But this argument is to mistake the nature of the 

requirement. In rejecting a similar argument in Pitts, the Tenth _ 

Circuit noted that the point is 11ot that the public employee "must 

exhaust his claim before he has a federal cause of action; rather, 

unless state 1a·w fails to afford [him] adequate process, he has no 

federal constitutional claim to begin with." 869 F.2d at 557. 

Thus in Pitts the court found that the plaintiff public school 

teacher, by waiving an administrative hearing, had deprived his 

employer school board of "the opportunity to provide him with due 

process, and [therefore) gave up his right to test the correctness 

of the board's· decision." Id. 

B. Property Interest 

Subseque~t to its order filed on May 5, 1988, the court has 

had the opportunity to further add~ess the due process rights of 

public employees in Dernstein v. Benson, 714 F.Supp. 481 (D. Kan. 

1989). In Dernstein. the court recognized that whil~ ·due process 

does not req~ire _ an elaborate hearing prior to the te.rrnination of 

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a public employee, it does require that the employee be given "oral 

or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the 

employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the 

story." 713 F.Supp. at 495 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v, 

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545 (1985)). 

In its May 5, 1988 memorandum order, the court found that 

Ballmer had a property interest in his continued employment as 

county appraiser. This finding remains valid, and is not 

challenged by the defendants in their present motio~. Howev~r, the 

defendants seek a reconsideration of the court's conclusion that 

Ballmer had been deprived of due process to the damage of that 

property interest. After further review, and with the presentation 

of additional facts in the present motion, the court concludes that 

' this earlier conclusion was not correct and must be withdrawn. 

The · conclusion in the May 25 order that the defendants had 

violated Ballmer•s due process rights was based upon two 

considerations. First, the court found that Ballmer had not 

. received adequate notice of the possibility of termination at the 

July 15, 1987 board hearing, or notice of the nature of the charges 

against him. The court noted that mere rumors or suspicious 

circumstances are insufficient to constitute actual notice • . See, 

~, Okeson v. Tolley School Dist. No. 25, 760 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 

1985), rev' d on other grounds, 766 F.2d 378 

# (8th Cir. 1985). 

However," it is now clear that plaintiff Ballmer did receive 

actual notice - of his proposed termination at the July 15 Board 

meeting. The record indicates that prior to June, 1987, both PVD 

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./ 

and county ·officials - had expressed concern over the status of, and 

the methods used in, the Sedgwick County reappraisal effort. In 

the June 17 meeting which Ballmer attended, at least one of the 

defendant commissioners expressed his belief that Ballmer should 

be terminated, in addition to Baird, his immediate subordinate. 

During the course of the meeting, Baird was terminated and Ballmer 

was stripped of the authority to conduct the reappraisal effort in 

Sedgwick County. After the June meeting, a front-page newspaper 

article appeared which discussed the controversy over reappraisal 

in Sedgwick county and the possible termination of Ballmer at the 

next board meeting. In addition to a discussion of the possibletermination of Ballmer, the article included a summary of the CAMA 

Report findings and statements by Ballmer rejecting the existence 

of "any problem" with the reappraisal effort. 

Faced with this controversy, Ballmer undertook actions to 

protect his position. He hired and consulted with an attorney on 

the matter, a fact not brought out in the earlier motion for 

partial summary judgment by the plaintiff. Ballmer also began to 

remove and copy documents from the appraiser's off ice. His 

attorney made recommendations to Ballmer) on what he should do in 

the event he was terminated at the July 15 meeting. Thus, Ballmer 

did possess actual notice of the likelihood of his termination at 

the July 15 meeting, and sought to prevent it. 

# 

In addition, while Ballmer was not presented with the detailed 

information contained in the final draft of the CAMA .Report until 

immediately prior to the July 15 meeting, it is apparent that 

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,, 

Ballmer had notice of the essence of the charges being made against 

him. The CAMA Report repeated, though in greater detail, earlier 

cri ticisrns of the reappraisal program in Sedgwick County: the 

delays in the program, the "sequential II methodology used by 

Ballmer, the program's budget, the gee-processing and mapping 

system used in the program, the collection of land data, and the 

training of staff personnel. All of these were issues with which 

Ballmer, as Sedgwick County Appraiser, was intimately familiar and 

had defended in previous meetings with PVD··officials. And all were 

addressed by Ballmer in his oral remarks to the commission members 

prior to the e~ecutive session at the July . 15 hearing. 

The finding of a due process deprivation in the court's May 

5, 1988 order was also based upon the conclusion of the court that 

Ballmer did not receive an adequate opportunity to respond to the 

charges against him. In reaching this conclusion, the court 

recognized that while "Ballmer was entitled to something less than 

a full hearing prior to his termination, he was entitled to more 

that the simple question, 'Do you have anything to say before we 

take a vote?'" (Slip op. at 9.) 

While this was the extent of the opportunity to speak accorded 

I 

to Ballmer after the executive session, a review of the full course 

of the board meeting indicates that Ballmer was not deprived of-the 

opportunity to present his side of the controversy. As noted ~ 

earlier, prior to the adjournment to executive session, Ballmer 

orally responded to the issues raised in the CAMA ~eport and in 

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•. U/82) 

.J 

Hayes• statements to the board. Ballmer•s response was detailed 

and lengthy. 

Here, plaintiff Ballmer was not terminated out of the blue, 

and was not terminated for reasons that he did not know. See 

Seibert v. Oklahoma. ex rel. Univ. of Okl. Health Sciences Center, · 

867 F.2d 591, 599 (10th Cir. 1989). And he was given an 

opportunity to "piesent his side of the story." Loudermill, 470 

U.S. at 542; Seibert, 867 F.2d at 599. 

Therefore, the court concludes that summary judgment against 

the plaintiff's property interest claim is warranted. Because the 

court has also concluded that summary judgment must also be granted_ 

against the plaintiff's liberty interest claim, it is unnecessary 

to address the issues of good faith and qualified immunity raised 

in the defendants• . motion. 

IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED this / 3 d3y of October, 1989, 

that the order of the court of May 5, 1988 is withdrawn, and ~hat 

the defendants• motion for summary judgment is hereby granted. 

~ -

v c,,{_ i./tA-L{ e-L-1 

PATRICK F. KELLY, JUDGE 

,# 

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