Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00331/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00331-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Randy Grounds
Respondent
A.D. Webb
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

A.D. WEBB, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

v. )

)

RANDY GROUNDS, Warden, ) 

 )

Respondent. )

)

 )

1:11-cv—00331–SMS-HC

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION

TO STAY THE PETITION PURSUANT TO

RHINES v. WEBER (Doc. 1)

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER THIRTY

(30) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF

SERVICE OF THIS ORDER TO WITHDRAW

PETITIONER’S UNEXHAUSTED CLAIMS

AND SEEK A KELLY STAY

INFORMATIONAL ORDER TO PETITIONER

CONCERNING DISMISSAL IF

UNEXHAUSTED CLAIMS ARE NOT

WITHDRAWN

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter has been referred to the

Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local

Rules 302 through 304. Pending before the Court is the petition,

which was filed on February 25, 2011, and Petitioner’s motion to

stay the action, which is part and parcel of the petition (Pet.

1-22.)

I. Screening the Petition 

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United

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States District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make

a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly

appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court....”

Habeas Rule 4; O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir.

1990); see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.

1990). Habeas Rule 2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all

grounds of relief available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts

supporting each ground; and 3) state the relief requested. 

Notice pleading is not sufficient; rather, the petition must

state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional

error. Rule 4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption;

O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d at 420 (quoting Blackledge v.

Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n. 7 (1977)). Allegations in a petition

that are vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible are subject to

summary dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th

Cir. 1990).

Further, the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas

corpus either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to

the respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the

petition has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule

8, 1976 Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43

(9th Cir. 2001).

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the

effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies to the petition. Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d

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1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Here, Petitioner, an inmate of the Soledad Correctional

Training Facility (CTF) serving a sentence of twenty-five years

to life imposed in the Kern County Superior Court for second

degree burglary with prior convictions, challenges on various

grounds his 2008 burglary conviction and sentence imposed on May

26, 2009. (Pet. 2, 23-51.) 

Petitioner raises the following claims: 1) insufficient

evidence of intent to commit a forgery at the time he entered the

Money Mart resulted in a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment

right to due process of law; 2) Petitioner could not have

intended to forge the check by passing it as genuine because the

check was unsigned and on its face was not likely to deceive; 3)

Petitioner could not have intended to forge the check upon

entering the Money Mart because as he possessed the check when

walking through the door, it was a genuine check; 4) Petitioner’s

trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to investigate

adequately and object to the absence (unavailability) of the

prosecution’s witness Jorge Ramirez, the person to whom the check

in question allegedly belonged, and to prevent the admission of

prejudicial hearsay (Pet. 41-44, 27); 5) Petitioner’s sentence

under the “Three Strikes Law” was “CONTRARY TO CLEARLY

ESTABLISHED FEDERAL LAW AS DETERMINED BY THE UNITED STATES

SUPREME COURT UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF THE CALIFORNIA CONTRACT LAW”

because in sentencing Petitioner on the basis of prior

convictions which had been grounded on guilty pleas entered in

1995 and 1993, the sentencing court failed to construe

Petitioner’s prior plea agreements properly according to

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California contract law, which would have shown that the

agreements “did not involve any plain or direct provisions for

the enhancement of 25 years to life.” (Pet. 33, 50, 46-50.) In

connection with his fifth claim, Petitioner also appears to

allege that the enhancement of his sentence for the prior

convictions violates his due process right to enforce the terms

of a plea agreement. (Pet. 47, 50.) Petitioner’s second and

third claims appear to be specific sub-claims of his first claim

concerning the insufficiency of the evidence of intent to commit

a forgery. 

II. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to challenge

collaterally a conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus

must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and

gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the

state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,

518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir.

1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by

providing the highest state court with the necessary jurisdiction

a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before

presenting it to the federal court, and demonstrating that no

state remedy remains available. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,

275-76 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir.

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court

was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the

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petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's

factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365

(1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9-10

(1992), superceded by statute as stated in Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362 (2000) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the

state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Hiivala v.

Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood, 133

F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United States

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275...(1971),

we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that

petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the

state courts in order to give the State the

"'opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged

violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some

internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are

to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be

alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting

claims under the United States Constitution. If a

habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary

ruling at a state court trial denied him the due

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,

he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state

court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule

further in Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir.

2000), as amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th

Cir. 2001), stating: 

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly

presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims

in state court unless he specifically indicated to

that court that those claims were based on federal law.

See, Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir.

2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan,

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this court has held that the petitioner must make the

federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing

federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding,

189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7... (1982), or the underlying

claim would be decided under state law on the same

considerations that would control resolution of the claim

on federal grounds, see, e.g., Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Crotts, 73 F.3d 

at 865.

...

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert

the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a

federal one without regard to how similar the state and

federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how

obvious the violation of federal law is.

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as

amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir.

2001).

Where none of a petitioner’s claims has been presented to

the highest state court as required by the exhaustion doctrine,

the Court must dismiss the petition. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478,

481 (9th Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to hold a mixed

petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims

has not been extended to petitions that contain no exhausted

claims. Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

A federal court cannot entertain a petition that is “mixed,”

or which contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982). A district court must dismiss a

mixed petition; however, it must give the petitioner the choice

of returning to state court to exhaust his claims or of amending

or resubmitting the habeas petition to present only exhausted

claims. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 510 (1982); Jefferson v.

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Budge, 419 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2005).

Here, Petitioner’s first three claims have been exhausted

because Petitioner specifically alleges, and provides

documentation confirming, that they have been presented to the

California Supreme Court, which has denied his request for

relief. (Pet. 61, 65-66.)

However, Petitioner admits that his fourth claim concerning

the ineffective assistance of counsel and his fifth claim

concerning the application of California’s “Three Strikes Law”

have not been fully presented to the California Supreme Court. 

(Pet. 3, 7, 27.) As to those claims, Petitioner alleges that

after the intermediate state appellate court denied his petition

for writ of habeas corpus on October 21, 2010, Petitioner then

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus raising them before

the California Supreme Court. (Pet. 27.) Thus, Petitioner

alleges that a state petition is pending before the California

Supreme Court. Reference to the official site for case

information from the California Appellate Courts reflects that

Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme

Court on December 2, 2010. No further information is available. 1

Accordingly, Petitioner has filed a mixed petition. 

Therefore, Petitioner’s choices would normally be either to

withdraw the unexhausted claims and proceed with only the

exhausted claims, or suffer dismissal, return to state court to

The Court may take judicial notice of facts that are capable of

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accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned, including undisputed information posted on official

web sites. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331,

333 (9th Cir. 1993); Daniels-Hall v. National Education Association –F.3d -,

2010 WL 5141247, *4 (No. 08-35531, 9th Cir. Dec. 20, 2010).

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exhaust the unexhausted claims, and then file another petition

here. 

III. Motion for Stay of the Petition 

In the first twenty-two (22) pages of the petition,

Petitioner moves to stay and hold in abeyance the present

petition.

A district court has discretion to stay a petition which it

may validly consider on the merits. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S.

269, 276 (2005); King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1138-39 (9th Cir.

2009). A petition may be stayed either under Rhines, or under

Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). King v. Ryan, 564

F.3d 1133, 1138-41 (9th Cir. 2009).

Under Rhines, the Court has discretion to stay proceedings;

however, this discretion is circumscribed by the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Rhines, 544

U.S. at 276-77. In light of AEDPA’s objectives, “stay and

abeyance [is] available only in limited circumstances” and “is

only appropriate when the district court determines there was

good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims

first in state court.” Id. at 277-78.

A petition may also be stayed pursuant to the procedure set

forth by the Ninth Circuit in Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th

Cir. 2003). Under this three-step procedure: 1) the petitioner

files an amended petition deleting the unexhausted claims; 2) the

district court stays and holds in abeyance the fully exhausted

petition; and 3) the petitioner later amends the petition to

include the newly exhausted claims. See, King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d

1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009). However, the amendment is only

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allowed if the additional claims are timely. Id. at 1140-41.

Here, because Petitioner admits that two of the claims are

unexhausted but makes no offer to withdraw the unexhausted

claims, the Court interprets Petitioner’s motion as primarily a

motion for a stay pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-

78 (2005).

A stay pursuant to Rhines should be available only in the

limited circumstances where it is shown that 1) there was good

cause for the failure to have first exhausted the claims in state

court, 2) the claim or claims at issue potentially have merit,

and 3) there has been no indication that the petitioner has been

intentionally dilatory in pursuing the litigation.

In view of the limited record before the Court at this stage

of the proceedings, it cannot be concluded that Petitioner’s

claims concerning the allegedly ineffective assistance of counsel

and unconstitutionality of Petitioner’s sentence are without

merit. Further, it does not necessarily appear that Petitioner

has been intentionally dilatory; although his two unexhausted

claims were not raised until the habeas petition was filed in the

California Supreme Court after October 21, 2010, Petitioner

appears to have attempted to educate himself concerning the law

and to rely on several “writ writers” during the period of time

between the affirmance of his conviction on appeal in August 2009

and the filing after October 2010 of the habeas petition now

pending before the California Supreme Court. 

With respect to good cause, Petitioner alleges that the

issues are not frivolous or without merit, and he has concerns

about the timeliness of his petition here. (Pet. 4, 7.) 

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Petitioner, who has a GED, read law in the prison library but

found the law too complex to understand. Petitioner relied on a

writ writer. After April 2010, Petitioner was transferred to a

different prison and lost his original petition; he then relied

on a second writ writer. (Pet. 6.) After October 2010,

Petitioner found a third writ writer, who filed the petition that

is now pending before the California Supreme Court. (Pet. 7.)

 The Supreme Court has not articulated what constitutes good

cause under Rhines, but it has stated that “[a] petitioner's

reasonable confusion about whether a state filing would be timely

will ordinarily constitute ‘good cause’ for him to file” a

“protective” petition in federal court. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408, 416 (2005). The Ninth Circuit has held that the

standard is a less stringent one than that for good cause to

establish equitable tolling, which requires that extraordinary

circumstances beyond a petitioner's control be the proximate

cause of any delay. Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661-62 (9th

Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit has recognized, however, that “a

stay-and-abeyance should be available only in limited

circumstances.” Id. at 661 (internal quotation marks omitted);

see, Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2008),

cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 2771, 174 L.Ed.2d 276

(2009) (concluding that a petitioner’s impression that counsel

had exhausted a claim did not demonstrate good cause). 

Here, Petitioner asserts that as a result of his high school

education, he had difficulty in understanding the law and had to

rely on other prisoners to help him. Further, it is assumed that

Petitioner is asserting ignorance of the exhaustion requirement

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at the pertinent time or times. However, these circumstances are

everyday realities in the lives of prisoners. If Petitioner’s

assertions are considered to qualify as good cause, then a Rhines

stay would be available in virtually every case in which a

petitioner was ignorant of the law or without counsel to

represent him with respect to discretionary, post-conviction

proceedings. This would run counter to the directions in Rhines

and Wooten that stays be available only in limited circumstances.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that because Petitioner has

not demonstrated good cause, Petitioner has not demonstrated his

entitlement to a stay under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78

(2005). 

The Court can stay the petition pursuant to Kelly v. Small,

315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003), by utilizing a three-step

procedure: 1) the petitioner must file an amended petition

deleting the unexhausted claims; 2) the district court will stay

and hold in abeyance the fully exhausted petition; and 3) the

petitioner will later amend the petition to include the newly

exhausted claims. See, King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th

Cir. 2009). However, the amendment is only allowed if the

additional claims are timely. Id. at 1140-41.2

Petitioner will be given an opportunity to withdraw the

fourth and fifth claims in his petition, which are unexhausted,

and to have the fully exhausted petition stayed pending

It is unclear whether Petitioner will have sufficient time to be able

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to exhaust his unexhausted claims. However, no statute of limitations

protection is imparted in a King/Kelly stay, nor are the exhausted claims

adjudicated in this Court during the pendency of such a stay. Further, the

undersigned is not making any determination at this time that Petitioner can

timely exhaust any claims prior to the expiration of the statute of

limitations.

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exhaustion of the other claims in state court. The Court must

dismiss the petition without prejudice unless Petitioner

withdraws the unexhausted claims and proceeds with the exhausted

claims in lieu of suffering dismissal.

IV. Disposition

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1) Insofar as Petitioner seeks a stay of the instant

petition pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, Petitioner’s motion for a

stay is DENIED; and

2) Petitioner is GRANTED thirty (30) days from the date of

service of this order to file a motion to withdraw the

unexhausted claims and to seek a stay of the fully exhausted

petition. In the event Petitioner does not file such a motion,

the Court will assume Petitioner desires to return to state court

to exhaust the unexhausted claims and will therefore dismiss the

entire petition without prejudice.3

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Petitioner is informed that a dismissal for failure to exhaust will not itself 3

bar him from returning to federal court after exhausting his available state remedies. 

However, this does not mean that Petitioner will not be subject to the one-year

statute of limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Although the limitations

period is tolled while a properly filed request for collateral review is pending in

state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), it is not tolled for the time an application is

pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172 (2001).

Petitioner is further informed that the Supreme Court has held in pertinent

part:

[I]n the habeas corpus context it would be appropriate

for an order dismissing a mixed petition to instruct an

applicant that upon his return to federal court he is to

bring only exhausted claims. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(a)

and (b). Once the petitioner is made aware of the exhaustion

requirement, no reason exists for him not to exhaust all potential

claims before returning to federal court. The failure to comply

with an order of the court is grounds for dismissal with prejudice.

Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(b).

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 489 (2000). Therefore, Petitioner is forewarned that

in the event he returns to federal court and files a mixed petition of exhausted and

unexhausted claims, the petition may be dismissed with prejudice.

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Dated: March 3, 2011 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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