Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01471/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01471-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jesse Rouse
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1468

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Desmond Rouse, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

No. 04-1469 Appeals from the United States

___________ District Court for the

District of South Dakota.

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Garfield Feather, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

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___________

No. 04-1470

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Russell Hubbeling, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

No. 04-1471

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Jesse Rouse, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: December 16, 2004

Filed: June 8, 2005

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD and RILEY, Circuit

Judges.

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The HONORABLE LAWRENCE L. PIERSOL, Chief Judge, United States

District Court for the District of South Dakota.

2

The fifth victim was 20 months old at the time of the abuse and did not testify

at trial or at the evidentiary hearing.

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LOKEN, Chief Judge.

A jury convicted Desmond and Jesse Rouse and their cousins, Garfield Feather

and Russell Hubbeling, of aggravated sexual abuse of five nieces, then ages twenty

months to seven years. We affirmed the convictions on direct appeal, United States

v. Rouse, 111 F.3d 561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 905 (1997), reconsidering

100 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 1996), and subsequently affirmed the district court’s 1 denial

of Hubbeling’s motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Hubbeling v. United States,

288 F.3d 363 (8th Cir. 2002). On June 11, 1999, defendants filed this joint new trial

motion under Rule 33(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, citing as new

evidence recantations by the four victims who testified at trial and by a male child

witness. After a four-day evidentiary hearing and a second hearing to consider

defendants’ motion to submit the results of a polygraph examination, the district court

denied the motion for a new trial, finding the recantations not credible. Defendants

appeal. We affirm. 

I. New Trial Based on Recantations

At the hearing, the four victims2

 denied that their uncles had sexually abused

them, and the male witness denied seeing any abuse of his sisters and cousins. The

children said they had lied during pretrial interviews by a BIA investigator, an FBI

agent, and the prosecutor, and later at trial, because they believed that lying would

enable them to return home. The defense also presented two witnesses who testified

that the children had recanted beginning in 1996, and submitted videotapes of 1996

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and 1999 interviews by a defense expert, Dr. Ralph Underwager, during which the

children recanted. 

In response, the government called nine witnesses who testified that the

children had never denied that their uncles abused them. Foster parents Donna Jordan

and Julie Brown testified that the children never recanted while in their care after the

trial. Dr. Michaeleen Muhovich, R.R.’s counselor from 1994 to 1997, testified that

R.R. described in detail her uncles’ abuse of R.R. and her cousins, and never recanted

those statements. Mary Weber, L.R.’s and T.R.’s therapist at the Children’s Home

Society, testified that both girls talked about being hurt by their uncles and never

recanted those statements. Weber also said that the notes of J.R.’s therapist, now

deceased, reflect that J.R. admitted recanting to another counselor because she did not

want to talk about it and reaffirmed that the abuse actually occurred. Cheryl Fridel,

the family services counselor at a school in Wagner the children attended, testified

that J.R. asked for help in 1999 because she was afraid her uncles were coming home

for Christmas. J.R. said she was afraid of her uncles, and described how Uncle

Desmond would crawl into her bed and touch her private parts. Fridel had no prior

knowledge of the case at the time J.R. asked for help. On a separate occasion, J.R.

admitted to Fridel that R.R. had told J.R. and L.R. to lie to a social worker. 

In its Memorandum Opinion and Order denying a new trial, the district court

reviewed the hearing testimony in detail and found that the children’s recantations

were not credible. The children did not recant until they resumed having contacts

with their mothers and grandmother, who did not believe the abuse occurred and told

the children they missed the imprisoned men. In these circumstances, the court

found, “the combination of the influence from the unsupportive families, contact with

the defendants by telephone and letters, being made aware of the lengthy prison

sentences given to their uncles and having no outside support [after returning to their

homes], pressured the children to recant their truthful testimony about being sexually

abused by their uncles.” The court found the evidence from Dr. Underwager’s

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interviews not credible. In 1996, D.R.’s mother accompanied T.R. and D.R to the

interview with Dr. Underwager. The 1999 interviews took place after the children

were returned to their homes. Instead of recanting, R.R. told Dr. Underwager that

Uncle Jess did things to her that were not right. The district court found that Dr.

Underwager used suggestive questioning and told the children he was there to help

get their uncles out of prison. Finally, the court emphasized that the children’s trial

testimony “is supported by the medical evidence in the case, while their recantations

are not.” Our prior opinion summarized that powerful medical evidence and bears

repeating:

Dr. Kaplan [the pediatrician who examined the children] reported to

DSS his medical findings and what the children had said about sexual

abuse. J.R. told Dr. Kaplan, “Uncle Jess hurt me,” pointing to her left

labia; Dr. Kaplan found a recent bruise or contusion consistent with that

kind of abuse. L.R. had “a fairly acute injury” on the right side of her

labia majora which “really hurt her.” R.R. told Dr. Kaplan, “I have a

bruise where my uncle put his private spot,” and Dr. Kaplan found a

sagging vagina and a scar on her anus. Dr. Kaplan found that T.R. had

“obvious trauma and contusion . . . and very, very much tenderness” on

her labia majora; T.R. told him, “Uncle Jess hurt me there.” . . . 

. . . Dr. Robert Ferrell conducted a colposcopic examination of the

five victims. Dr. Ferrell found “very significant” damage to R. R.’s

hymenal ring and tearing in her anal area consistent with anal

intercourse. He noted a “whole constellation of findings” indicating

L.R. had been abused -- damage to her hymenal area, furrowing on

either side of her vagina, chronic irritation or trauma, and “clue cells”

that are “known to be sexually transmitted.” To Dr. Ferrell, a scar on J.

R.’s hymen where a tear had healed was an “important finding,” while

T. R.'s “hymenal ring was essentially gone,” the entire area was irritated,

and she had furrows in her vagina. Infant F.R. had “tearing and scarring

of the anal mucosa.”

Defendants’ medical expert, Dr. Fay, admitted that the reported

hymenal scarring on L. R., R. R., and J.R. “certainly . . . leads you to

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think about sexual abuse,” and that “a labial injury. . . is a very

significant finding” of abuse. In its rebuttal, the government called Dr.

Randall Alexander, a member of the Board of Governors of the National

Committee to Prevent Child Abuse. Dr. Alexander testified that it takes

considerable force to inflict labial injuries like those exhibited by three

of the victims. “It’s rare to see one [in young girls] and to see three of

them show up is just . . . rareness to the third power.”

United States v. Rouse, 111 F.3d at 565-66. We rejected a prior attempt to blame

these injuries on inter-child sexual activity. See Hubbeling, 288 F.3d at 367.

Defendants’ attempt at the hearing to explain away the injuries of T.R., J.R., and L.R.

as the result of previously unreported sexual abuse by a twelve-year-old male cousin

was equally unpersuasive.

We view with suspicion motions for new trial based on the recantation of a

material witness because “[t]he stability and finality of verdicts would be greatly

disturbed if courts were too ready to entertain testimony from witnesses who have

changed their minds, or who claim to have lied at the trial.” United States v. Grey

Bear, 116 F.3d 349, 350 (8th Cir. 1997). This skepticism “is especially applicable in

cases of child sexual abuse where recantation is a recurring phenomenon,”

particularly “when family members are involved and the child has feelings of guilt

or the family members seek to influence the child to change her story.” United States

v. Provost, 969 F.2d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1056 (1993). 

To receive a new trial, the movant must show that “the newly discovered

evidence is of such a nature that, in a new trial, [it] would probably produce an

acquittal.” United States v. Papajohn, 212 F.3d 1112, 1118 (8th Cir. 2000) (quotation

omitted). When the claim of newly discovered evidence is based on a recantation, the

district court must first determine whether the recantation is credible. In this regard,

“the real question . . . is not whether the district judge believed the recantation, but

how likely the district judge thought a jury at a second trial would be to believe it.”

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Grey Bear, 116 F.3d at 350. Our review of this credibility finding for clear error is

extremely deferential. See Grey Bear, 116 F.3d at 351. We review the denial of the

new trial motion for a clear abuse of discretion. See Papajohn, 212 F.3d at 1117-18.

After reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude that the district court’s

credibility findings are not clearly erroneous and the denial of the new trial motion

was not a clear abuse of discretion. By the time of the evidentiary hearing, the

children had been living with their mothers for at least two years, within walking

distance of their grandmother’s home. These women never believed the children’s

accusations, and testified on the defendants’ behalf at trial. The children knew their

grandmother and mothers missed the defendants. The children saw letters written by

the uncles from prison and spoke to the men by telephone. Family members drove

the children to interviews by Dr. Underwager, whose stated purpose was to free their

uncles from lengthy prison sentences. The district court’s finding that the

recantations were the product of family pressure and therefore not credible is

overwhelmingly supported by this record. Combined with the defendants’ failure to

refute the powerful medical evidence of abuse at trial, this finding fully justified the

court’s conclusion “that there is no reasonable probability that the recantations would

produce an acquittal if a new trial were held.” Accordingly, the district court did not

abuse its discretion in denying the defendants’ joint motion for a new trial.

II. Brady Issues

Defendants argue that the prosecution suppressed materially favorable evidence

from the defense in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). First, they

claim that the government suppressed notes taken by the children’s foster parent,

Donna Jordan, relying on an FBI agent’s pretrial 302 Report saying, “Donna Jordan

. . . made notes when the children have told her things and those notes will be made

available at a later date.” Defendants argue they never received these notes, despite

the prosecutor’s statement at trial that any notes would have been produced as “302

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type material.” This claim was not presented to the district court. The defendants

failed to prove that the notes ever existed. Moreover, Jordan testified that the

children never denied that abuse occurred, in which case her notes would have

corroborated the claims of abuse. Thus, defendants can only speculate that the notes

might have contained material exculpatory information. On this record, defendants

failed to establish a Brady violation, much less plain error by the district court. See,

e.g., United States v. Keltner, 147 F.3d 662, 673 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S.

1032 (1998). 

Second, defendants argue that the government suppressed its knowledge that

the children were testifying falsely at trial. The district court rejected this contention

based on its finding that the children’s recantations were not credible. We agree. A

finding that the children did not testify falsely at trial refutes a claim that the

government knew the testimony was false. See United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d

886, 891 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1208 (2004). Finally, defendants

argue that the government became aware of the children’s post-trial recantations

before the defense, and its suppression of this information allowed “a significant level

of unfairness . . . to seep into these proceedings.” Any knowledge gained by the

prosecution after the trial is irrelevant to a Brady claim. See United States v. Kern,

12 F.3d 122, 126 (8th Cir. 1993). In any event, the record neither provides a factual

basis for this assertion nor establishes any prejudicial unfairness.

III. The Guardian Ad Litem’s Testimony

Defendants argue that the district court erred in permitting Eva Cheney, the

children’s court-appointed guardian ad litem, to testify at the hearing on the motion

for new trial. Defendants contend that attorney Cheney’s testimony without a waiver

by the children violated the attorney-client privilege because Cheney told them she

was their lawyer and served as their lawyer during the trial. The district court

overruled this objection on the ground that “the Court’s intention was to create a

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guardianship for purposes of the trial . . . . As far as the Court was concerned then and

now, there was no attorney/client relationship established.” Whether an

attorney/client relationship existed is a finding of fact we review for clear error. See

State v. Catch The Bear, 352 N.W.2d 640, 645-46 (S.D. 1984). On this record, the

district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous. In addition, defendants fail to

identify any testimony by Ms. Cheney that disclosed a confidential communication

protected by the privilege.

Defendants further argue that Ms. Cheney’s testimony violated 18 U.S.C.

§ 3509(h)(2), which provides in relevant part that “[a] guardian ad litem shall not be

compelled to testify in any court action or proceeding concerning any information or

opinion received from the child in the course of serving as a guardian ad litem.” This

ground was not asserted in the district court, so our review is for plain error. See

Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 877 (8th Cir. 2004). The district court appointed

Ms. Cheney guardian ad litem pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3509(h)(1), a statute that

authorizes such an appointment “to protect the best interests of the child.” Though

Cheney was subpoenaed to testify at the evidentiary hearing, defendants fail to

identify any portion of her testimony that was “compelled” within the meaning of

§ 3509(h)(2), nor have they established that her testimony was against “the best

interests of the child[ren].” Thus, there was no plain error.

 

IV. The Polygraph Evidence

Defendants argue that the district court erred when it refused to consider the

results of a September 1999 polygraph test tending to support the hearing testimony

of D.R., a male child family member, that his trial testimony consisted of made-up

lies about what happened. The district court held an evidentiary hearing to determine

whether this scientific evidence meets the reliability standards of Daubert v. Merrell

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The court’s approach was consistent with our decisions following the Supreme

Court’s observation in United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 309 (1998), that

“there is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable.” See United States

v. Jordan, 150 F.3d 895, 899-900 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1010 (1999).

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Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).3

 Weighing the conflicting testimony

of the polygraph examiner and the government’s polygraph expert, the court found

that the test did not meet the standards of any “accepted polygraph testing procedure,”

that the circumstances surrounding the examination “further undermine its

reliability,” and therefore that “the polygraph evidence in this case is not reliable

enough to determine the truthfulness of D.R.’s testimony.” 

On appeal, defendants argue at length that the court misapplied the Daubert

standards as they relate to polygraph testing. We do not believe the district court

abused its discretion in declining to consider the polygraph evidence for the reasons

stated. But in any event, the court was the ultimate fact-finder regarding the

credibility of D.R.’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing. The court learned the

results of the polygraph testing at the Daubert hearing and found it unreliable. Thus,

the court’s Daubert ruling was at most harmless error -- had the court admitted the

polygraph results under Daubert, this unreliable evidence would not have altered the

court’s finding, based on hearing D.R.’s live testimony at the evidentiary hearing, that

the child’s recantation was not credible.

V. Conclusion

Finally, defendants argue that alleged cumulative errors, including the

contentions raised and rejected on direct appeal, see Rouse, 111 F.3d at 566-73,

warrant a new trial. This contention is without merit. There was no error at these

post-trial motion proceedings, and we decline to reconsider our earlier rulings.

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Accordingly, the district court’s February 10, 2004 order denying defendants’ joint

motion for a new trial is affirmed.

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