Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-mj-00196/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-mj-00196-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Jamar Picou
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

DAVID JAMAR PICOU,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:14-mj-00196-SAB-1

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT‟S MOTIONS

ECF NO. 33, 34, 35, 40

On October 1, 2015, Defendant David Jamar Picou (“Defendant”) filed three motions: a 

motion to dismiss, a motion to exclude expert witness, and a motion for discovery. (ECF Nos. 

33, 34. 35.) The motions were set to be heard on October 15, 2015.

On October 13, 2015, Plaintiff United States of America (“the Government”) filed 

oppositions to the motions. (ECF Nos. 36, 37, 38.) The same day, Defendant filed a motion to 

strike the opposition briefs. (ECF No. 40.) Also on the same day, the Government filed an 

opposition to the motion to strike. (ECF No. 41.)

The hearing on all four motions took place on October 15, 2015. Erin Snider appeared on 

behalf of Defendant. Bayleigh Pettigrew appeared on behalf of the Government. For the reasons 

set forth below, Defendant‟s motion to dismiss is granted, Defendant‟s motion to exclude the 

Government‟s expert witness is partially granted, Defendant‟s motion for discovery is denied as 

moot, and Defendant‟s motion to strike the Government‟s opposition briefs is granted.

Case 1:14-mj-00196-SAB Document 44 Filed 10/19/15 Page 1 of 10
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I.

BACKGROUND

The original criminal complaint in this action was filed on November 6, 2014. (ECF No. 

1.) The original criminal complaint raised two counts against Defendant: 1) for operating a 

motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, or a drug in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.23(a)(1), and 

2) for driving a motor vehicle with a driver‟s license suspended for driving under the influence, 

in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.2 and California Vehicle Code § 14601.2(a).

The criminal complaint alleges that on August 25, 2014 at approximately 2:55 p.m., 

Defendant was observed driving a white Ford Expedition with no visible registration and which 

appeared to traveling approximately 40 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone. Defendant 

was also observed passing over double yellow lines twice.

Ranger Jod Booker initiated a traffic stop. Ranger Booker immediately observed that 

Defendant‟s eyes were blood shot and hazy. When asked for his license, registration, and proof 

of insurance, Defendant informed Ranger Booker that the vehicle was recently purchased and 

registration was in process. Defendant further told Ranger Booker that his license had been 

taken from him because he failed to pay a speeding ticket in Nevada.

Ranger Booker contacted dispatch with Defendant‟s information and then approached the 

vehicle to see if Defendant‟s adult passenger, N.P., had a valid driver‟s license. Ranger Booker 

returned to his vehicle and learned that both Defendant‟s and N.P.‟s licenses were suspended. 

Ranger Booker approached the vehicle again to speak to N.P. and noticed the odor of alcoholic 

beverages. Defendant told Ranger Booker that he had been drinking around 9:30 a.m. and 10:30 

a.m. Ranger Booker told Defendant to step out of the vehicle and sit next to the patrol vehicle to 

run tests. Ranger Booker called for an additional unit for assistance, resulting in Ranger Tom 

Parrack‟s arrival.

A field sobriety test was administered, resulting in six of six clues of intoxication in the 

horizontal gaze nystagmus test, three of eight clues in the walk and turn test, and one of four 

clues in the one leg stand. Defendant consented to a breath test, which indicated that he had a 

blood alcohol concentration of 0.06%.

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While the breath test was administered, Ranger Parrack asked dispatch why Defendant‟s 

license was expired. Sequoia Kings County dispatch informed Ranger Parrack that Defendant‟s 

license was suspended for a failure to appear on a DUI charge.

On June 3, 2015, an Information was filed wherein the second count was changed from a 

violation of California Vehicle Code § 14601.2(a) (driving a motor vehicle with a driver‟s 

license suspended for driving under the influence) to a violation of California Vehicle Code § 

14601.1(a) (driving a motor vehicle with a driver‟s license suspended for other reasons).

On July 16, 2015, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. Defendant argued that the 

Government failed to preserve the dispatch tapes from the August 25, 2014 incident. Defendant 

argued that this failure to preserve evidence was significant, as Defendant was initially charged 

with driving a motor vehicle with a driver‟s license suspended for driving under the influence, 

and the dispatch tapes were the only evidence that Defendant had a prior DUI. The Court denied 

the motion, but admonished the Government for failing to preserve clearly relevant evidence.

On September 23, 2015, a Superseding Information was filed. The Superseding 

Information raises five charges against Defendant, 1) for operating a motor vehicle under the 

influence of alcohol, 2) for driving a motor vehicle while driver license is suspended, 3) failing 

to comply with the directions of a traffic control device, 4) operating a vehicle at a speed in 

excess of the speed limit, and 5) operating a motor vehicle without due care (tailgating).

Defendant argues that the extra charges added to the Superseding Information filed on 

September 23, 2015 violated Defendant‟s due process rights because they were raised in 

retaliation for Defendant‟s assertion of his right to file a motion to dismiss. Defendant further 

argues that the Government‟s expert witness fails to provide sufficient detail required under 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(2). Defendant further argues that the Government 

failed to produce calibration records for the speedometer used in Ranger Booker‟s patrol vehicle. 

Finally, Defendant argues that the Government‟s untimely oppositions to Defendant‟s motions 

should be stricken.

/ / /

/ / /

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II.

DISCUSSION

A. Defendant’s Motion to Strike the Government’s Oppositions

Defendant argues that the Government‟s oppositions should be stricken and disregarded 

because they are untimely. Local Rule 430.1(d) governs the briefing schedule for criminal 

motions, and states, in pertinent part:

(d) Opposition. The responding party shall file and serve an 

opposition brief and any accompanying affidavits or documentary 

evidence on all other parties within seven (7) days. A responding 

party who has no opposition to the granting of the motion shall 

serve and file a statement to that effect, specifically designating the 

motion in question. No party will be entitled to be heard in 

opposition to a motion at oral argument if that party has not timely 

filed an opposition to the motion. See L.R. 135.

In this case, Defendant‟s motions were filed on October 1, 2015. The Government‟s 

oppositions were filed on October 13, 2015—more than seven days after the filing of 

Defendants‟ motions.

In their opposition to Defendant‟s motion to strike, the Government argues that 

Defendant‟s motions were procedurally defective because Defendant‟s own motions were filed 

untimely. This argument fails for a number of reasons. First, the adage, “two wrongs do not 

make a right” applies here. Any procedural defect related to untimeliness with respect to 

Defendant‟s motions does not excuse the Government‟s own untimeliness. Second, the 

Government arguably waived any objection to the untimeliness of Defendant‟s motions, as the 

Government failed to raise the issue of the timeliness of Defendant‟s motions in the oppositions 

they filed on October 13, 2015. The Government did not raise any issue regarding the timeliness 

of Defendant‟s motions until after Defendant filed the motion to strike the Government‟s 

oppositions. Third, Defendant‟s motions were not untimely. Local Rule 430.1 provides that 

pretrial motions shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days after arraignment unless a different 

time is specifically prescribed by the Court. Arraignment has not yet occurred on the charges 

raised in the Superseding Information filed on September 23, 2015 and a different time has not 

been prescribed by the Court. Given the fact that Defendant‟s motion to dismiss challenged the 

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new charges raised in the Superseding Information filed on September 23, 2015, it would border 

on absurdity to consider the motion filed eight days after the Superseding Information was filed 

to be untimely. Defendant‟s motions were not untimely.

Furthermore, as the Court mentioned previously, even assuming that Defendant‟s 

motions were untimely, the Government is still required to comply with the Court‟s Local Rules 

regarding the briefing schedule and raise any procedural defects in Defendant‟s motions via a 

timely filed opposition. The Government failed in this regard on two counts: first, the 

Government did not file a timely opposition, and second, the Government did not even raise the 

issue of Defendant‟s untimeliness in their oppositions.

The Government states that it filed its oppositions on October 13, 2015 in “accord[ance] 

to the most recent motion schedule authorized by this Court, simply moving the dates forward.” 

This argument is unconvincing. While it is true that the Court set a specific motion briefing 

schedule for the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant on September 16, 2015 (see ECF No. 23), 

nothing in the Court‟s order indicates that the same briefing schedule applied to all future 

motions. Furthermore, “simply moving the dates forward” makes absolutely no sense in this 

context. The Court gave the Government fifteen (15) days to respond to Defendant‟s July 16, 

2015 motion to dismiss. Moving those dates forward and applying that same time frame to 

Defendant‟s October 1, 2015 motions would make the Government‟s opposition due on October 

16, 2015—the day after the hearing on the same motions. This would create a potentially absurd 

situation where oral argument on the motions would take place before the Government filed its 

opposition to the same motions. Obviously, the Government found this result to be absurd, as 

they filed their oppositions on October 13, 2015. Furthermore, the briefing schedule set by the 

Local Rules are designed to give the Court time to review the briefing prior to oral argument and 

the issuance of a ruling. The Government‟s assumptions regarding the briefing scheduling for 

Defendant‟s motions would give the Court no time whatsoever to review the briefing. The 

Court finds the Government‟s excuse without a plausible foundation. 

The Government has not asked the Court to consider its untimely filings under the 

excusable neglect standard. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(b)(1)(B). Regardless, the Court finds no 

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excusable neglect here, for the same reasons set forth above.1 The Court rejects the 

Government‟s excuse for failing to file their oppositions on time or at least requesting an 

extension of time to respond. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendant‟s motion to strike and 

the Government‟s oppositions will be disregarded.

B. Defendant’s Motion for Discovery

At the hearing on October 15, 2015, the Government indicated that it had produced all of 

the materials requested that were in the Government‟s possession and Defendant accepted that

written representation. Accordingly, the Defendant‟s motion for discovery will be denied as 

moot.

C. Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the Government’s Expert Witness

Defendant argues that the Government‟s expert witness should be excluded because the 

Government failed to provide sufficient detail in their disclosure notice to comply with the 

requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. At the hearing, in light of the 

government‟s initial expert disclosure the Court ordered the government to supplement it 

responses by providing the defendant with more detailed information regarding the expert 

witness‟ opinions, the bases and reasons for those opinions, and the witness‟s qualifications. 

Accordingly, the Court will partially grant Defendant‟s motion and order the Government to 

send Defendant an amended notice with the information discussed at the hearing by October 16, 

2015 at 10:00 a.m.

D. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Defendant argues that the new charges raised in the Superseding Information filed by the 

Government on September 23, 2015 should be dismissed. Defendant argues that these new 

charges were tacked on by the Government on the eve of trial in retaliation for Defendant filing a 

motion to dismiss. Defendant notes that this case was previously scheduled to go to trial on July 

24, 2015. Defendant sought and obtained a continuance of the trial date on July 16, 2015, eight 

 

1

 In addition, at the hearing, counsel for the Government advised the Court that she was out of the office when the 

motion was filed and did not return until Tuesday, October 6, 2015--in advance of the opposition deadline of 

October 8. Counsel had sufficient time then to either file the opposition or at a minimum seek relief from the 

deadline by asking for additional time to respond based upon the circumstances.

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(8) days before trial was scheduled to begin, and the Government made no indication that it was 

going to add additional charges against Defendant. Defendant argues that if the Government had 

no intention of pursuing additional charges on July 16, 2015, eight days before the originally 

scheduled trial, the inference is that Defendant‟s motion to dismiss filed in the interim triggered 

the Government‟s desire to pursue additional charges against Defendant.

“A prosecutor violates due process when he seeks additional charges solely to punish a 

defendant for exercising a constitutional or statutory right.” U.S. v. Gamez-Orduno, 235 F.3d 

453, 462 (9th Cir. 2000). A criminal defendant may establish prosecutorial vindictiveness by 

producing direct evidence of the prosecutor‟s punitive motivation or, alternatively, a criminal 

defendant is entitled to a presumption of vindictiveness if he or she can show that increased 

charges were filed because he or she exercised a statutory, procedural, or constitutional right in 

circumstances that give rise to an appearance of vindictiveness. U.S. v. Jenkins, 504 F.3d 694, 

699 (9th Cir. 2007). To establish a presumption of vindictiveness, a criminal defendant need 

only demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the government would not have brought the 

increased charges but for the defendant‟s exercise of his specific legal rights. Id. at 699-700. 

“The mere appearance of prosecutorial vindictiveness suffices to place the burden on the 

government because the doctrine of vindictive prosecution „seeks[s] to reduce or eliminate 

apprehension on the part of an accused‟ that she may be punished for exercising her rights.” Id.

at 700 (quoting United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1976)).

“Vindictiveness claims are, however, evaluated differently when the additional charges 

are added during pretrial proceedings, particularly when plea negotiations are ongoing, than 

when they are added during or after trial.” Gamez-Orduno, 235 F.3d at 462. “Although 

„prosecutorial conduct that would not have occurred but for hostility or a punitive animus 

towards the defendant because he has exercised his specific legal rights‟ violates due process in 

the pretrial setting as it does at other stages, [citation], in the context of pretrial plea negotiations 

vindictiveness will not be presumed simply from the fact that a more severe charge followed on, 

or even resulted from, the defendant‟s exercise of a right.” Id. (quoting United States v. 

Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1165, 1169 (9th Cir. 1982)).

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The additional charges were raised in the Superseding Information filed on September 

23, 2015, less than a month prior to the trial scheduled on October 19, 2015. While the Court 

acknowledges that prosecutors are given extra leeway during pretrial proceedings because the 

threat of increased or additional charges can be permissibly used as leverage in plea negotiations, 

see Gamez-Orduno, 235 F.3d at 462, it is notable that no plea negotiations took place 

immediately before or after the filing of the Superseding Information. According to Defendant, 

the last plea offer was extended by the Government in August 2015. No plea offer was extended 

after the Superseding Information was filed. Significantly, according to Defendant, the 

Government never suggested that the additional charges added in the September 23, 2015 

Superseding Information would be forthcoming if Defendant did not accept a plea. Accordingly, 

if the additional charges brought by the Government were a negotiation tactic, it was a poorly 

executed tactic.

Further distinguishing the facts here from Gamez-Orduno, there is no indication that the 

additional charges in the Superseding Information were added as a result of prosecutorial review 

or continuing investigation, as the information which served as the basis of the additional 

charges appears to have been known by the Government since the original criminal complaint 

was filed on November 6, 2014. Accordingly, the facts here are more comparable to the facts in 

U.S. v. Jenkins, 504 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 2007), where the evidence supporting the additional 

charges brought by the government was in the government‟s possession for an extended period 

of time, and presented the government with an open and shut case, yet the government did not 

decide to bring additional charges against the defendant until after the defendant exercised her 

right to testify at her trial on the other charges.

Looking at the circumstances as a whole, the Court finds that Defendant has 

demonstrated a “reasonable likelihood” of prosecutorial vindictiveness. There was no indication 

that additional charges were forthcoming in July 2015, when this case was eight days away from 

trial. There was no indication that Defendant was made aware that additional charges could be 

forthcoming as a negotiation tactic during plea bargaining. The record shows that the 

Government did not bring the additional charges until after Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. 

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Although the motion to dismiss was denied, the Court admonished the Government for allowing 

relevant evidence to be destroyed. Accordingly, the filing of additional charges against 

Defendant after the Court‟s admonishment of the Government did establish the “mere 

appearance” and hence the “reasonable likelihood” requirement of Jenkins. Jenkins, 504 F.3d at 

699-700.

Since Defendant has carried its burden in demonstrating a “reasonable likelihood” of 

prosecutorial vindictiveness, the burden shifts on the Government to present objective evidence 

which dispels the appearance of vindictiveness. However, the Government forfeited the 

opportunity to present such evidence by failing to file a timely opposition and failing to establish 

excusable neglect for their late filing. Accordingly, the Court has no choice but to grant the 

motion to dismiss the Superseding Information. The Government shall be permitted to proceed 

only on the charges raised in the prior Information.2

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that the Government‟s oppositions to 

Defendant‟s motions were untimely and the Government failed to establish excusable neglect for 

their late filing. Accordingly, the Court will disregard the Government‟s opposition. The Court 

further finds that the issues raised in Defendant‟s motion for discovery are moot based upon the 

parties‟ representations at the hearing. The Court finds that the Government‟s notice regarding 

its expert witness was deficient for the reasons discussed at the hearing. Finally, the Court finds 

that Defendant has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that the additional charges brought in 

the Superseding Information were brought in retaliation for the filing of Defendant‟s motion to 

dismiss and the Government forfeited their right to rebut Defendant‟s showing by failing to file a 

timely opposition.

/ / /

 

2 Although the issue was not addressed in the parties‟ briefing, it appears the proper remedy in cases involving 

prosecutorial vindictiveness is dismissal of the additional charges without prejudice to the Government‟s ability to 

pursue the older charges. In U.S. v. Jenkins, 504 F.3d 694, 698 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 

dismissal of the indictment with the additional charges without vacating the defendant‟s conviction on the other 

charges, which were in fact affirmed upon appeal. 

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Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant‟s motion to strike the Government‟s oppositions is GRANTED and the 

Government‟s oppositions to Defendant‟s motion for discovery, motion to 

exclude expert witness, and motion to dismiss are DISREGARDED;

2. Defendant‟s motion for discovery is DENIED AS MOOT;

3. Defendant‟s motion to exclude the Government‟s expert witness is PARTIALLY 

GRANTED. The Government shall provide Defendant with an amended notice 

with the additional information discussed at the hearing no later than October 16, 

2015 at 10:00 a.m.; and

4. Defendant‟s motion to dismiss the Superseding Information is GRANTED. The 

Government‟s September 23, 2015 Superseding Information is DISMISSED and 

this action shall proceed solely on the charges raised in the Information filed on 

June 3, 2015.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 19, 2015 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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