Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01989/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01989-13/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vicki Estrada
Plaintiff
Patricia Goodman
Plaintiff
Kim Williams-Britt
Plaintiff
iYogi, Inc.
Defendant

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

VICKI ESTRADA, PATRICIA 

GOODMAN and KIM WILLIAMSBRITT on behalf of themselves 

and all others similarly

situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

IYOGI, INC., a New York 

Corporation, 

 Defendant.

CIV. NO. 2:13-01989 WBS CKD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF 

CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs brought this putative class action against 

iYogi, Inc. (“iYogi”), alleging defendant violated the Telephone 

Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (“TCPA”), by employing 

aggressive sales tactics to get customers to renew their 

subscriptions to iYogi and placing calls to consumers regardless 

of whether they had refused the offer or previously asked that 

defendant not call. Presently before the court is plaintiffs’

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motion for preliminary approval of the class action settlement. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

iYogi is a technical support company that offers remote 

computer services to millions of individuals worldwide. 

Consumers sign up for a year-to-year flat fee service plan. 

Plaintiffs Vicki Estrada, Patricia Goodman, and Kim WilliamsBritt allege they received several calls to their cellphones from 

iYogi soliciting them to renew their service plans. 

Plaintiffs contend defendant violated three provisions 

of the TCPA. The first provision makes it “unlawful for any 

person within the United States . . . to make any call (other 

than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior 

express consent of the called party) using any automatic 

telephone dialing system . . . to any telephone number assigned 

to a . . . cellular telephone service.” 47 U.S.C. 

§ 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). The second provision makes it unlawful to 

place more than one telephone call within a twelve-month period 

to persons whose cellular telephone numbers are listed on the 

national do-not-call registry. Id. at § 227(c)(5); 47 C.F.R. § 

64.1200(c), (e). The third provision prohibits the making of 

unsolicited robocalls utilizing an artificial or prerecorded 

voice to cellular phones without first obtaining the call 

recipients’ prior express consent to do so. 47 U.S.C. 

§ 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(1)(B). 

Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit on behalf of a putative 

class of consumers in the United States who are iYogi subscribers 

or former subscribers whom iYogi called on their cellphones. 

Plaintiffs now seek preliminary approval of the parties’ 

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stipulated class-wide settlement, pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 23(e). 

II. Discussion 

Rule 23(e) provides that “[t]he claims, issues, or 

defenses of a certified class may be settled . . . only with the 

court’s approval.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). “Approval under 23(e) 

involves a two-step process in which the Court first determines 

whether a proposed class action settlement deserves preliminary 

approval and then, after notice is given to class members, 

whether final approval is warranted.” Nat’l Rural Telecomms.

Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 525 (C.D. Cal. 2004) 

(citing Manual for Complex Litig., Third, § 30.41 (1995)). 

This Order is the first step in that process and 

analyzes only whether the proposed class action settlement 

deserves preliminary approval. See Murillo v. Pac. Gas & Elec. 

Co., 266 F.R.D. 468, 473 (E.D. Cal. 2010). Preliminary approval 

authorizes the parties to give notice to putative class members 

of the settlement agreement and lays the groundwork for a future 

fairness hearing, at which the court will hear objections to (1) 

the treatment of this litigation as a class action and/or (2) the 

terms of the settlement. See id.; Diaz v. Trust Territory of 

Pac. Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that a 

district court’s obligation when considering dismissal or 

compromise of a class action includes holding a hearing to 

“inquire into the terms and circumstances of any dismissal or 

compromise to ensure that it is not collusive or prejudicial”). 

The court will reach a final determination as to whether the 

parties should be allowed to settle the class action on their 

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proposed terms after that hearing. 

The Ninth Circuit has declared a strong judicial policy 

favoring settlement of class actions. Class Plaintiffs v. City 

of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992). Nevertheless, 

where, as here, “the parties reach a settlement agreement prior 

to class certification, courts must peruse the proposed 

compromise to ratify both [1] the propriety of the certification 

and [2] the fairness of the settlement.” Staton v. Boeing Co., 

327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003).

The first part of this inquiry requires the court to

“pay ‘undiluted, even heightened, attention’ to class 

certification requirements” because, unlike in a fully litigated 

class action suit, the court “will lack the opportunity . . . to 

adjust the class, informed by the proceedings as they unfold.” 

Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997); see

Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The parties cannot “agree to certify a class that clearly leaves 

any one requirement unfulfilled,” and consequently the court 

cannot blindly rely on the fact that the parties have stipulated 

that a class exists for purposes of settlement. See Windsor, 521 

U.S. at 621-22 (stating that courts cannot fail to apply the 

requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)). 

The second part of this inquiry obliges the court to 

“carefully consider ‘whether a proposed settlement is 

fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable,’ recognizing that 

‘[i]t is the settlement taken as a whole, rather than the 

individual component parts, that must be examined for overall 

fairness . . . .’” Staton, 327 F.3d at 952 (quoting Hanlon, 150 

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F.3d at 1026); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (outlining class 

action settlement procedures).

A. Class Certification 

A class action will be certified only if it meets the 

four prerequisites identified in Rule 23(a) and additionally fits 

within one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b). See

Ontiveros v. Zamora, Civ. No. 2:08-567 WBS DAD, 2014 WL 3057506, 

at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 7, 2014); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b). 

Although a district court has discretion in determining whether 

the moving party has satisfied each Rule 23 requirement, see

Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979); Montgomery v. 

Rumsfeld, 572 F.2d 250, 255 (9th Cir. 1978), the court must 

conduct a rigorous inquiry before certifying a class, see Gen. 

Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982); E. Tex. 

Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403–05 (1977). 

1. Rule 23(a) Requirements

Rule 23(a) restricts class actions to cases where: 

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all 

members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of 

law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or 

defenses of the representative parties are typical of 

the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the 

representative parties will fairly and adequately 

protect the interests of the class. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).

a. Numerosity 

Under the first requirement, “[a] proposed class of at 

least forty members presumptively satisfies the numerosity 

requirement.” Avilez v. Pinkerton Gov’t Servs., 286 F.R.D. 450, 

456 (C.D. Cal. 2012); see also, e.g., Collins v. Cargill Meat 

Solutions Corp., 274 F.R.D. 294, 300 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (Wanger, 

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J.) (“Courts have routinely found the numerosity requirement 

satisfied when the class comprises 40 or more members.”). Here, 

plaintiffs estimate the proposed class will contain approximately 

189,000 members. (See Pls.’ Mot. at 9 (Docket No. 74).) This 

easily satisfies the numerosity requirement.

b. Commonality

Commonality requires that the class members’ claims 

“depend upon a common contention” that is “capable of classwide 

resolution--which means that determination of its truth or 

falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of 

each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 

Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011). “[A]ll questions of fact 

and law need not be common to satisfy the rule,” and the 

“existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual 

predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts 

coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.” Hanlon, 

150 F.3d at 1019.

The proposed class includes “[a]ll individuals who are 

iYogi subscribers or former subscribers in the United States to 

whom iYogi or any agent or affiliate of iYogi made or attempted 

to make outbound calls (including but not limited to subscription 

renewal calls) to a telephone number assigned to cellular 

telephone service from September 23, 2009 until November 18, 

2013.” (Pls.’ Mot. at 8.) Like the named plaintiffs, the class 

would be comprised of individuals alleging that an iYogi employee 

or agent called their cellphones to convince them to renew their 

subscription in violation of the TCPA. Due to their common legal 

contentions, the proposed class meets the commonality 

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requirement. 

c. Typicality

Typicality requires that named plaintiffs have claims 

“reasonably coextensive with those of absent class members,” but 

their claims do not have to be “substantially identical.” 

Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. The test for typicality “is whether 

other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action 

is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, 

and whether other class members have been injured by the same 

course of conduct.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 

508 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).

The putative class members allege a simple set of facts 

that are essentially identical to those alleged by the named 

plaintiffs. The class injury for all class members was the 

aggravation and nuisance of receiving unsolicited and harassing 

telephone calls and the money paid to wireless telephone carriers 

for the receipt of such calls. Such injury was caused by the 

same conduct of iYogi. (See First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) at 1.) 

Plaintiffs seek the remedy of statutory damages, which would 

presumably be the same award for each individual injury. (See

id. at 10, 13.) While there could conceivably be nuances with 

respect to a class member’s experiences with iYogi or costs from 

receiving a call, class members’ claims appear to be reasonably 

coextensive with those of the named plaintiffs. The proposed 

class therefore meets the typicality requirement. 

d. Adequacy of Representation

To resolve the question of adequacy, the court must 

make two inquiries: “(1) do the named plaintiffs and their 

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counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members 

and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the 

action vigorously on behalf of the class?” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 

1020. These questions involve consideration of a number of 

factors, including “the qualifications of counsel for the 

representatives, an absence of antagonism, a sharing of interests 

between representatives and absentees, and the unlikelihood that 

the suit is collusive.” Brown v. Ticor Title Ins., 982 F.2d 386, 

390 (9th Cir. 1992).

First, there do not appear to be any conflicts of 

interest. The named plaintiffs’ interests are generally aligned 

with the putative class members. The putative class members 

suffered a similar injury as the named plaintiffs, and the 

definition of the class is narrowly tailored and aligns with the 

named plaintiffs’ interests. See Windsor, 521 U.S. at 625–26 

(“[A] class representative must be part of the class and possess 

the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class 

members.”); Murillo, 266 F.R.D. at 476 (finding that an 

appropriate class definition ensured that “the potential for 

conflicting interests will remain low while the likelihood of 

shared interests remains high”).

The settlement agreement provides for an incentive 

award of $1,000 to each of the named plaintiffs, to be paid 

separate from and in addition to the class recovery of $40 per 

class member. An incentive award of $1,000 to each of the named 

plaintiffs does not on its face appear to create a conflict of 

interest. The Ninth Circuit has specifically approved the award 

of “reasonable incentive payments” to named plaintiffs. Staton, 

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327 F.3d at 977–78. Moreover, courts have generally found that 

$5,000 incentive payments are reasonable. Hopson v. Hanesbrands 

Inc., Civ. No. 08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL 928133, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 

Apr. 3, 2009) (citing In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 

454, 463 (9th Cir. 2000); In re SmithKline Beckman Corp., 751 F.

Supp. 525, 535 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Alberto v. GMRI, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 

652, 669 (E.D. Cal. 2008)). Here, the proposed award amount of 

$1,000 per representative is significantly lower than $5,000 

payments found to be reasonable and proportionate to the recovery 

of other class members.

The second prong of the adequacy inquiry examines the 

vigor with which the named plaintiffs and their counsel have 

pursued the common claims. “Although there are no fixed 

standards by which ‘vigor’ can be assayed, considerations include 

competency of counsel and, in the context of a settlement-only 

class, an assessment of the rationale for not pursuing further 

litigation.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1021.

Plaintiffs’ counsel states that he and his colleagues

at Edelson PC “are experienced members of the plaintiffs’ bar who 

have built their practice litigating similarly complex consumer 

class actions, including many under the TCPA.” (Balabanian Decl. 

¶ 17 (Docket No. 74-2).) Further, plaintiffs’ counsel states he 

has “already dedicated substantial resources to the prosecution

of this Action . . . and will continue to do so throughout the 

Action’s pendency.” (Id. ¶ 18.) The court finds no reason to 

doubt that plaintiffs’ attorney is qualified to conduct the 

proposed litigation and assess the value of the settlement.

In addition, plaintiffs’ counsel seems to have 

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seriously considered the risks of continued litigation in 

deciding to settle this action. For instance, he recognized that

if the case were to proceed to trial, defendant would likely 

assert several “potentially dispositive defenses”: 

For example, on the issue of consent, there is no 

dispute that iYogi collected the phone numbers for the 

calls at issue directly from its customers at the time 

they subscribed to its remote support services. To 

that end, iYogi will also likely raise the defense that 

it was in a direct relationship with the Settlement 

Class Members and that their provision of their 

cellular phone numbers is therefore enough to 

constitute consent.

(Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) Plaintiffs’ counsel also acknowledged that iYogi 

would undoubtedly challenge a motion for class certification and 

appeal any judgment in favor of the class, further delaying 

recovery. (Id. ¶ 27.) At this stage, the court agrees that 

these factors weighed in favor of settlement. The named 

plaintiffs and their counsel appear to be prepared to prosecute 

the action vigorously on behalf of the class.

2. Rule 23(b)

An action that meets all the prerequisites of Rule 

23(a) may be certified as a class action only if it also 

satisfies the requirements of one of the three subdivisions of 

Rule 23(b). Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 512 (9th 

Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3), 

which provides that a class action may be maintained only if (1) 

“the court finds that questions of law or fact common to class 

members predominate over questions affecting only individual 

members” and (2) “that a class action is superior to other 

available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 

controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

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a. Predominance

“Because Rule 23(a)(3) already considers commonality, 

the focus of the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry is on the 

balance between individual and common issues.” Murillo, 266 

F.R.D. at 476 (citing Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022); see also

Windsor, 521 U.S. at 623 (“The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry 

tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to 

warrant adjudication by representation.”).

The class members’ contentions appear to be similar, if 

not identical. Again, although some nuances among the class 

members’ allegations could exist, there is no indication that 

those variations are “sufficiently substantive to predominate 

over the shared claims.” See id. Accordingly, the court finds 

that common questions of law and fact predominate over the class 

members’ claims. 

b. Superiority

Rule 23(b)(3) also requires a showing that “a class 

action is superior to other available methods for fairly and 

efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) 

(3). It sets forth four non-exhaustive factors to consider in 

making this determination:

(A) the class members’ interests in individually 

controlling the prosecution or defense of separate 

actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation 

concerning the controversy already begun by or against 

class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability 

of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the 

particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in 

managing a class action.

Id. The parties settled this action prior to certification, 

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making factors (C) and (D) inapplicable. See Murillo, 266 F.R.D. 

at 477 (citing Windsor, 521 U.S. at 620). Class members might 

have an interest in individually controlling prosecution given 

that recovery through settlement will amount to a $40 award 

whereas the TCPA provides statutory damages of $500 per call 

received or, at most, $1,500 if defendant’s conduct is found to 

be willful. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), (c)(5)(B). However, 

the costs of pursuing litigation individually would be 

substantially higher, especially considering that the TCPA does 

not provide for payment of attorney fees. Id. There is also 

always the risk that defendant will prevail at trial and 

plaintiffs will recover nothing. As a result, class members’

interest in pursuing individual suits is likely low. The court 

is unaware of any concurrent litigation already begun by class 

members regarding TCPA violations by defendant.

1 Objectors at 

the fairness hearing may reveal otherwise. See Alberto, 252 

F.R.D. at 664. At this stage, the class action device appears to 

be the superior method for adjudicating this controversy.

3. Rule 23(c)(2) Notice Requirements

If the court certifies a class under Rule 23(b)(3), it 

“must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable 

under the circumstances, including individual notice to all 

members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Rule 23(c)(2) governs both the form and 

content of a proposed notice. See Ravens v. Iftikar, 174 F.R.D. 

 

1 Plaintiffs have informed the court that there were 

separate actions filed by other clients of Edelson PC against 

iYogi on claims unrelated to this action. (Pls.’ Mot. at 7.) 

Those matters have been settled on an individual basis. (Id.)

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651, 658 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 

417 U.S. 156, 172–77 (1974)). Although that notice must be 

“reasonably certain to inform the absent members of the plaintiff 

class,” actual notice is not required. Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 

1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).

The settlement agreement provides that the settlement 

administrator, Epiq Class Action & Claims Solutions, Inc., will 

provide notice to the class via e-mail. (Pls.’ Mot. at 23-24; 

Settlement Agreement ¶ 7.1 (Docket No. 74-1).) If an e-mail 

bounces back or is otherwise undeliverable, the settlement 

administrator will re-send the email one time. (Settlement 

Agreement ¶ 7.1.) The e-mail will direct class members to the 

settlement website. (Id.) The parties supplied the full notice,

(Settlement Agreement Ex. D), and claim form, (id. at Ex. A), 

which will be available on the settlement website. 

The notice explains the proceedings; defines the scope 

of the class; informs the class member of the claim form 

requirement and the binding effect of the class action; describes 

the procedure for opting out and objecting; and provides the time 

and date of the fairness hearing. The content of the notice 

therefore satisfies Rule 23(c)(2)(B). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(c)(2)(B); see also Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 

F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Notice is satisfactory if it 

‘generally describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient 

detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and 

to come forward and be heard.’” (quoting Mendoza v. Tucson Sch. 

Dist. No. 1, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352 (9th Cir. 1980)).

Plaintiffs contend that e-mail will “be particularly 

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effective in this case given that e-mail was one of the primary 

means by which iYogi communicated with its customers, and each 

customer that registered for iYogi’s services was required to 

provide a valid e-mail address to do so.” (Pls.’ Mot. at 23-24; 

Balabanian Decl. ¶ 20 (Docket No. 74-2).) The reliance on e-mail 

alone is not generally the best form of notice, especially given 

that the parties do not have any process in place for correcting 

out-of-date e-mail addresses. However, given defendant’s history 

of using email to contact customers and the fact that it would 

likely be prohibitively expensive to provide notice to such a 

large class through other means, the court is satisfied that this 

system is reasonably calculated to provide notice to class 

members and is the best form of notice available under the 

circumstances. 

B. Preliminary Settlement Approval

After determining that the proposed class satisfies the 

requirements of Rule 23, the court must determine whether the 

terms of the parties’ settlement appear fair, adequate, and 

reasonable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2); Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 

1026. This process requires the court to “balance a number of 

factors,” including: 

the strength of the plaintiff’s case; the risk, 

expense, complexity, and likely duration of further 

litigation; the risk of maintaining class action 

status throughout the trial; the amount offered in 

settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the 

stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of 

counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; 

and the reaction of the class members to the proposed 

settlement.

Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. Many of these factors cannot be 

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considered until the final fairness hearing, so the court need 

only conduct a preliminary review at this time to resolve any

“glaring deficiencies” in the settlement agreement before 

authorizing notice to class members. Ontiveros, 2014 WL 3057506, 

at *12 (citing Murillo, 266 F.R.D. at 478).

At the preliminary stage, “the court need only 

‘determine whether the proposed settlement is within the range of 

possible approval.’” Murillo, 266 F.R.D. at 479 (quoting

Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616, 621 n.3 (7th Cir. 1982)). 

This generally requires consideration of “whether the proposed 

settlement discloses grounds to doubt its fairness or other 

obvious deficiencies, such as unduly preferential treatment of 

class representatives or segments of the class, or excessive 

compensation of attorneys.” Id. (quoting W. v. Circle K Stores, 

Inc., Civ. No. 04-0438 WBS GGH, 2006 WL 1652598, at *11-12 (E.D. 

Cal. June 13, 2006)). Courts often begin by examining the 

process that led to the settlement’s terms to ensure that those 

terms are “the result of vigorous, arms-length bargaining” and 

then turn to the substantive terms of the agreement. See, e.g.,

West, 2006 WL 1652598, at *11-12; In re Tableware Antitrust 

Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2007) 

(“[P]reliminary approval of a settlement has both a procedural 

and a substantive component.”).

1. Negotiation of the Settlement Agreement

The parties represent that the settlement is the result 

of arms-length settlement negotiations, including a private 

mediation before the Honorable Morton Denlow (ret.) of JAMS 

(Chicago). (Balabanian Decl. ¶ 8); see La Fleur v. Med. Mgmt. 

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Int’l, Inc., Civ. No. 5:13-00398, 2014 WL 2967475, at *4 (N.D. 

Cal. June 25, 2014) (“Settlements reached with the help of a 

mediator are likely non-collusive.”). Plaintiffs’ counsel stated

that the settlement was reached after “months of continued and 

often contentious settlement discussions.” (Balabanian Decl. ¶ 

22.) He declares he took into account the uncertain outcome and 

risks of litigation, particularly the delay often inherent in 

class actions. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) Moreover, the parties had begun 

formal discovery and that also informed the decision to settle. 

(Pls.’ Mot. at 5.) In light of these considerations, the court 

finds no reason to doubt the parties’ representations that the 

settlement was the result of vigorous, arms-length bargaining. 

2. Amount Recovered and Distribution 

In determining whether a settlement agreement is 

substantively fair to the class, the court must balance the value 

of expected recovery against the value of the settlement offer. 

See Tableware, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1080. This inquiry may involve 

consideration of the uncertainty class members would face if the 

case were litigated to trial. See Ontiveros, 2014 WL 3057506, at 

*14.

The TCPA provides for damages of $500 “for each such 

violation” of the statute or, at most, $1,500 if defendant’s 

conduct was willful. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), (c)(5)(B). In

contrast, the settlement would provide each class member with $40 

in cash, which is only eight percent of the available damages 

under the TCPA. In addition, the settlement agreement requires 

class members to take the affirmative step of opting in to 

receive the $40 payment. Class members must submit a claim form 

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through the settlement website; by downloading the form from the 

website and submitting it by mail to the settlement 

administrator; or by calling a toll free number or writing to the 

settlement administrator to request a hard copy claim form. 

(Settlement Agreement ¶ 6.1.) The agreement also requires class 

members to take the affirmative step of opting out if they do not 

wish to be part of the settlement class. (Id. ¶¶ 1.29, 1.30, 

8.1.) Class members who do not request to be excluded will 

release defendant from their TCPA claims. (Id. at ¶ 1.28.) 

Therefore, there is a risk that some members of the class will 

opt into the judgment by default, thus releasing defendant, but 

get no recovery simply because they fail to timely return the 

claim form. 

While the settlement agreement provides class members 

with only a small percentage of the possible recovery and 

contains a potentially unfair opt-in/opt-out requirement, there 

are many uncertainties associated with pursuing litigation that 

justify this recovery. As discussed above, plaintiffs’ counsel 

has testified that there are two “potentially dispositive” 

defenses that iYogi could assert with respect to customers’ 

consent and there are risks of significant delay if defendant 

challenges a motion for class certification or any final judgment 

in favor of plaintiffs. (Balabanian Decl. ¶¶ 26-27.) In 

addition, there is no assurance the class will recover the full 

amount of damages even if it prevails at trial “given iYogi’s 

financial condition and limited insurance coverage.” (Id. ¶ 27.) 

In light of the uncertainties associated with pursuing 

litigation, the court will grant preliminary approval to the 

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settlement because it is within the range of possible approval. 

Murillo, 266 F.R.D. at 479 (quoting Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 

616, 621 n.3 (7th Cir. 1982)). 

3. Attorney’s Fees

If a negotiated class action settlement includes an 

award of attorneys’ fees, that fee award must be evaluated in the 

overall context of the settlement. Knisley v. Network Assocs., 

312 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002); Monterrubio, 291 F.R.D. at 

455. The court “ha[s] an independent obligation to ensure that 

the award, like the settlement itself, is reasonable, even if the 

parties have already agreed to an amount.” In re Bluetooth 

Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011).

The settlement agreement provides that plaintiffs’ 

counsel will apply to the court for a fee award of up to 

$300,000, to be paid by defendant separate and apart from the 

recovery of the class. (Settlement Agreement ¶ 10.2.) Defendant 

may oppose plaintiffs’ petition for the fee award. (Id.) If the 

court does not approve, in whole or in part, the fee award, it 

will not prevent the settlement agreement from becoming effective 

or be grounds for termination. (Id.)

In deciding the attorney’s fees motion, the court will 

have the opportunity to assess whether the requested fee award is 

reasonable, by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number 

of hours counsel reasonably expended. See Van Gerwen v. Gurantee 

Mut. Life. Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000). As part of 

this lodestar calculation, the court may take into account

factors such as the “degree of success” or “results obtained” by 

plaintiffs’ counsel. See Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 

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879 F.2d 481, 488 (9th Cir. 1988). If the court, in ruling on 

the fees motion, finds that the amount of the settlement warrants 

a fee award at a rate lower than what plaintiffs’ counsel 

requests, then it will reduce the award accordingly. The court 

will therefore not evaluate the fee award at length here in 

considering whether the settlement is adequate. However, the 

fact that the attorney’s fees will not detract from the class 

members’ recovery militates in favor of approving the settlement 

agreement. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for 

preliminary certification of a conditional settlement class and 

preliminary approval of the class action settlement be, and the 

same hereby is, GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 

(1) Defendant shall notify class members of the 

settlement in the manner specified under section VII of the 

settlement agreement;

(2) Class members who want to receive a settlement 

payment under the settlement agreement must accurately complete 

and deliver the claim form to the settlement administrator no 

later than sixty (60) calendar days after the last day for notice 

to be provided under section V and VI of the settlement 

agreement;

(3) Class members who want to object to or comment on 

the settlement agreement must deliver written objections to 

plaintiffs’ counsel and defendant’s counsel, and must file such 

objection with the court, no later than sixty (60) calendar days 

after the last day for notice to be provided under section VII of 

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the settlement agreement. Written objections must be filed and 

postmarked no later than the objection deadline. The objection 

must include: (a) the name and case number of the action, 

Estrada, et al. v. iYogi, Inc., Case No. 2:13-CV-01989 (E.D. 

Cal.); (b) the class member’s full name and current address; (c) 

the email address the member used in connection with purchasing 

an iYogi subscription; (d) a signed declaration that he/she 

believes himself or herself to be a member of the settlement 

class; (e) the specific grounds for the objection; (f) all 

documents or writings that the member desires the court to 

consider; and (g) a statement regarding whether the class member 

or class member’s counsel intend to appear at the Fairness 

Hearing. Any class member who files and serves a written 

objection, as described in this paragraph, may appear at the 

fairness hearing, either in person or through personal counsel 

hired at the class member’s expense, to object to the settlement 

agreement.

(4) Class members who fail to object to the settlement 

agreement in the manner specified above shall be deemed to have 

waived their right to object to the settlement agreement and be 

forever barred from making any such objections (whether in this 

action or any other action or proceeding).

(5) Class members who want to be excluded from the 

settlement must, within sixty days after the last day for notice 

to be provided, submit a request for exclusion indicating (a) the 

name and case number of the action, Estrada, et al. v. iYogi, 

Inc., Case No. 2:13-CV-01989 (E.D. Cal.); (b) the name, address, 

and telephone number of the person requesting exclusion 

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(including the telephone number allegedly called by defendant); 

and (c) a statement to the effect that “I/We hereby request to be 

excluded from the proposed Settlement Classes in Estrada, et al. 

v. iYogi, Inc., Case No. 2:13-CV-01989 (E.D. Cal.).” Requests 

must be in writing, signed by the person seeking exclusion, and 

postmarked or received by the end of the opt-out period. 

(6) The class is provisionally certified as a class of 

all individuals who are iYogi subscribers or former subscribers 

in the United States to whom iYogi or any agent or affiliate of 

iYogi made or attempted to make outbound calls (including but not 

limited to subscription renewal calls) to a telephone number 

assigned to cellular telephone service from September 23, 2009 

until November 18, 2013. (Settlement Agreement ¶ 1.35.) 

Excluded from the class are the judges presiding over the action 

and members of their families; defendant; all persons who 

properly execute and submit a timely request for exclusion; all 

persons whose claims against defendant have been fully and 

finally adjudicated and/or released; and the legal 

representatives of any excluded persons. 

(7) Plaintiffs Vicki Estrada, Patricia Goodman, and Kim 

Williams-Britt are conditionally certified as the class 

representatives to implement the parties’ settlement in 

accordance with the settlement agreement. The law firm of 

Edelson PC, through Jay Edelson, Rafey S. Balabanian, Benjamin H. 

Richman, and Courtney C. Booth, is conditionally appointed as 

class counsel. Plaintiffs and Edelson PC must fairly and 

adequately protect the class’s interests.

(8) The parties agree that Epiq Class Action & Claims 

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Solutions, Inc. will serve as the settlement administrator. 

(9) If the settlement agreement terminates for any 

reason, the following will occur: (a) Class certification will be 

automatically vacated; (b) plaintiffs will stop functioning as 

class representatives; and (c) this action will revert to its 

previous status in all respects as it existed immediately before 

the parties executed the settlement agreement.

(10) All discovery and pretrial proceedings and 

deadlines are stayed and suspended until further notice from the 

court, except for such actions as are necessary to implement the 

settlement agreement and this Order.

(11) The fairness hearing is set for January 25, 2016

at 2:00 p.m., in Courtroom No. 5, to determine whether the 

settlement agreement should be finally approved as fair, 

reasonable, and adequate.

(12) Based on the date this Order is signed and the 

date of the fairness hearing, the following are the certain 

associated dates in this settlement:

(a) Defendant shall send e-mail notice within 28

days after entry of this Order;

(b) Pursuant to Local Rule 293, plaintiffs shall 

file a motion for attorney’s fees no later than 28 days prior to 

the final fairness hearing;

(c) The last day for class members to file a 

claim, request exclusion, or object to the settlement is 60 days 

after the date on which notice is provided;

(13) The parties shall file briefs in support of the 

final approval of the settlement no later than January 11, 2016.

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(14) In the case that the fairness hearing be 

postponed, adjourned, or continued, the updated hearing date 

shall be posted on the settlement website. 

Dated: October 6, 2015

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