Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00580/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00580-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Kirkland
Defendant
Carlos Lugo
Plaintiff

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28 1 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited.

Case No. C 05-0850-JF

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR STAY AND ABEYANCE

(JFEX1)

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CARLOS LUGO,

 Petitioner,

 v.

RICHARD KIRKLAND, Warden,

 Respondent.

Case Number C 05-0580 JF

ORDER1 GRANTING PETITIONER’S

MOTION FOR STAY AND

ABEYANCE

[Docket No. 46]

I. BACKGROUND

After a Monterey Superior Court jury convicted him of three counts of second-degree

robbery in violation of California Penal Code § 211 with the personal use of a firearm, Petitioner

Carlos Lugo (“Lugo”) was sentenced to nineteen years and four months in state prison in April,

2001. Lugo appealed his conviction and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal, in which he contended that his due process rights were violated

because the trial court: (1) failed to sever the robbery counts from gang murder charges; and 

(2) prejudicially erred when it instructed the jury on the definition of “accomplice.” The Court of

**E-filed 2/3/06**

Case 4:05-cv-00580-SBA Document 47 Filed 02/22/06 Page 1 of 9
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Case No. C 05-0850-JF

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR STAY AND ABEYANCE

(JFEX1)

Appeal affirmed the conviction and denied the petition on October 21, 2003. Thereafter, Lugo

filed a petition for review of both decisions in the California Supreme Court, which was denied

on November 28, 2003. 

On February 8, 2005, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Lugo timely filed a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus in this Court. The petition raises the same two claims Lugo exhausted in state

court. On December 19, 2005, Lugo filed a motion for stay and abeyance of the instant petition

so that he may exhaust state remedies as to newly discovered claims arising from his counsel’s

investigation into his conviction and sentence. Lugo seeks to raise three additional claims: 

(1) “the state withheld evidence of impeachment of its witness [Richard] Islas as to his leadership

position in a criminal street gang, suspected criminal activity and monetary compensation”; 

(2) “the state withheld evidence of impeachment of witness [Marina] Marquez as to her previous

statements and monetary compensation”; and (3) “the state withheld previous statements of a

potential alibi witness.”

On January 11, 2006, Respondent filed opposition to Lugo’s request for stay and

abeyance. Lugo filed a reply on January 16, 2006. The motion for stay and abeyance was taken

under submission without oral argument. 

Having considered the briefs and relevant evidence, the Court will grant the motion.

II. DISCUSSION

Lugo requests that the Court hold his fully exhausted petition in abeyance while he

returns to state court in order to exhaust state remedies for his three additional claims. 

Respondent argues that Lugo has not demonstrated “good cause” for his previous failure to

exhaust the three new claims. The Ninth Circuit has left open the question of whether the

standard articulated in Rhines v. Weber, 125 S.Ct.1528, 1535 (2005) or the standard established

in Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 988 n.11 (9th Cir. 1998) applies

to the situation in this case, i.e., where there is an exhausted petition pending, and a petitioner

seeks to litigate newly discovered unexhausted claims in state court. As the Ninth Circuit

explained, Rhines and Taylor apply to different types of petitions: “Rhines applies to stays of

mixed petitions, whereas [Taylor’s] three-step procedure applies to stays of fully exhausted

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2 Both Lugo and Respondent assume that the Rhines standard applies without

discussing Taylor.

3 The Ninth Circuit also developed a three-step procedure that gave district courts

the discretion to stay a “mixed petition.” Taylor, 134 F.3d at 986.

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Case No. C 05-0850-JF

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR STAY AND ABEYANCE

(JFEX1)

petitions and requires additional steps—the amendment of the original mixed petition and a

second amendment to add the newly exhausted claims. . . . Accordingly, we leave for another day

the question of whether the stay standard announced by the Supreme Court in Rhines applies to

our three-step stay-and-abeyance procedure.” Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2005).

Because the Ninth Circuit has not determined whether to apply Rhines or Taylor in cases

where a petitioner seeks stay and abeyance of a fully exhausted petition in order to exhaust

additional state claims, the Court will evaluate Lugo’s motion under both Rhines and Taylor.

2

See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Hickman, No. CIVS-00-2175FCDJFMP, 2006 WL 191950, at *4 n.4

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2006) (noting that because petitioner presented a fully exhausted petition

instead of a mixed petition, Rhines did not apply, and then finding “good cause” existed to stay

the petition assuming Rhines applied); Gonzalez v. Terhune, No. C 03-1565 TEH, 2006 WL

83054, at *16 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 12, 2006) (assuming, arguendo, that Rhines applied to a fully

exhausted petition); Hendrix v. Solis, No. 1:04CV06180AWI-TAG HC, 2005 WL 3591902, at *1

(E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2005) (applying Rhines in a case involving a fully exhausted petition);

Briscoe v. Scribner, No. CIVS04-2175FCDGGHP, 2005 WL 3500499, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21,

2005) (same).

Taylor stands for the proposition that a stay is appropriate where there is no intention on

the part of a petitioner to delay or harass and a stay will avoid piecemeal litigation.3 134 F.3d at

988 n.11. Additionally, a stay is appropriate “when valid claims would otherwise be forfeited.” 

Jackson, 425 F.3d at 659 (quoting Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2003)). Taylor

surely gives district courts discretion to permit amendment of an original fully exhausted petition

to include any newly exhausted claims. See Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 575 (9th Cir.

2000) (“Our precedent unequivocally authorizes district courts to stay fully exhausted federal

petitions pending exhaustion of other claims.”). For example, in Kelly, the Ninth Circuit

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Case No. C 05-0850-JF

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR STAY AND ABEYANCE

(JFEX1)

required a district court to consider the option of holding a fully exhausted petition in abeyance to

allow petitioner to exhaust new claims in state court before attempting to amend his federal

petition to include the newly exhausted claims. Jackson, 425 F.3d at 659.

In Rhines, the Supreme Court considered “whether a federal district court has discretion

to stay [a] mixed petition to allow the petitioner to present his unexhausted claims to the state

court in the first instance, and then to return to federal court for review of his perfected petition.” 

125 S.Ct. at 1531 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court held that stay and abeyance is

appropriate when the district court finds that: (1) there was good cause for the failure to exhaust

the claim; (2) the claim is not plainly meritless; and (3) there is no indication that the failure was

for purposes of delay. Id. at 1535. If a petition is not “plainly meritless” or used for “abusive

litigation tactics or intentional delay,” and the petitioner has “good cause” for the failure to

exhaust, “it likely would be an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a stay.” Id.

Regardless of whether Rhines or Taylor is applied in the instant case, the conclusion is

the same. Respondent asserts that Lugo fails to show “good cause” under Rhines because “the

factual predicate for these claims was known or should have been known to [Lugo] at the time he

filed his direct appeal and habeas petition in state court, for which he was assisted by appointed

counsel.” Specifically, Respondent asserts that Lugo lacks “good cause” under Rhines because

the “factual predicate” for Lugo’s new claims are “based on speculative accusations made by

[Lugo’s] newly hired habeas counsel about information that may have existed and was

supposedly not revealed to the defense.” Additionally, Respondent asserts that “there is no

explanation as to why this information, assuming it even exists, was not discoverable by defense

counsel at the time of trial.”

However, Lugo points out in his reply that “respondent’s entire argument hinges upon the

notion that [Lugo] knew of the factual predicates for any claims years ago. . . . It is really an

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ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR STAY AND ABEYANCE

(JFEX1)

argument that addresses the merits of the claims, not that there is no good cause to allow

exhaustion. As the Supreme Court noted in Rhines, those are separate questions.” Under Rhines,

the question before the Court is whether Lugo has shown: (1) there was “good cause” for the

failure to exhaust the claims; (2) the claims are not plainly meritless; and (3) there is no

indication that the failure was for purposes of delay. See Rhines, 125 S.Ct. at 1535. 

There is relatively little guidance as to what constitutes “good cause” under Rhines. The

Supreme Court held that the intentional use of “dilatory litigation tactics” is not “good cause.” 

Rhines, 125 S.Ct. at 1536 (Souter, J., concurring). The Supreme Court also stated in dicta that a

“petitioner’s reasonable confusion about whether a state filing would be timely will ordinarily

constitute ‘good cause’ for him to file in federal court.” Pace v. Diguglielmo, 125 S.Ct. 1807,

1813 (2005). The Ninth Circuit held that the “application of an ‘extraordinary circumstances’

standard does not comport with the ‘good cause’ standard prescribed by Rhines.” Jackson, 425

F.3d at 661-62.

Two California District Courts have issued published opinions interpreting “good cause”

under Rhines. In one case, which involved a mixed petition, the court analogized the “good

cause” prong to the showing of “cause” required to overcome a procedural bar. Hernandez v.

Sullivan, 397 F.Supp.2d 1205, 1206-07 (C.D. Cal. 2005). The court reasoned that “[t]o show

‘cause’ for a procedural default, a petitioner ordinarily must show that the default resulted from

an objective factor external to the petitioner which cannot fairly be attributed to him or her.” Id.

at 1207. The court held that there was not “good cause” because petitioner “ha[d] not shown that

his failure to exhaust his claims resulted from any external objective factor that cannot fairly be

attributed to him.” Id. In the other case, which involved a fully exhausted petition, the court

stated that “for a satisfactory showing of good cause, the court will simply require a prima facie

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ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR STAY AND ABEYANCE

(JFEX1)

case that a justifiable, legitimate reason exists which warrants the delay of federal proceedings

while exhaustion occurs.” Briscoe, 2005 WL 3500499, at * 2. 

Taking all of the available precedents into consideration, this Court concludes that Lugo

has shown a legitimate reason that warrants the delay of federal proceedings while he exhausts

his new claims in state court. Lugo has explained that the new claims he wishes to raise resulted

from “an investigation into his conviction and sentence that was only begun once he obtained

counsel two months ago.” Lugo filed his original petition pro se. It was only after Respondent

filed his answer that Lugo was able to secure counsel to examine his case and begin an

investigation. Prior to the investigation, Lugo’s appointed appellate counsel was limited to

issues apparent from the state court record. Lugo’s claim that “evidence of an alibi surfaced,

evidence of impeachment, and evidence that witness statements about whether two or three

persons were present at the robbery were uncovered” only after his present counsel commenced

his investigation is not unreasonable on its face. 

In Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit held that “a

federal court may deny an unexhausted petition on the merits only when it is perfectly clear that

the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim.” While Cassett applied to a mixed

petition, this Court applies it to a fully exhausted petition: if Lugo states “colorable” claims then

the claims are not “plainly meritless.” Because Lugo states claims that appear to be at least

“colorable,” they are not “plainly meritless” under the second prong of Rhines. Moreover, as

Lugo notes, Respondent has argued not that they lack merit, but only that Lugo has failed to

show “good cause” for stay and abeyance. 

Finally, there is no evidence that Lugo has sought stay and abeyance for the purpose of

delay in the instant proceedings. Because Lugo demonstrates “good cause” for his failure to

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4 Respondent further argues that the statute of limitations bars Lugo’s new claims.

However, even if “some or all of the new claims may be later found to be barred by the statute of

limitations [this] does not alter this [Court’s] finding.” Briscoe, 2005 WL 3500499, at *2. 

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Case No. C 05-0850-JF

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR STAY AND ABEYANCE

(JFEX1)

exhaust previously his three new claims, there is no reason not to stay this action while petitioner

exhausts his three new claims. Rhines, 125 S.Ct. at 1535 (holding that when petitioner has “good

cause” for the failure to exhaust, “it likely would be an abuse of discretion for a district court to

deny a stay”); Briscoe, 2005 WL 3500499, at *1-2 (finding “good cause” to allow petitioner to

stay his action pending exhaustion of six new claims).4

Even if Rhines does not apply, this Court reaches the same conclusion under Taylor. 

Pursuant to Taylor, a federal district court has discretion to hold a fully exhausted petition in

abeyance pending exhaustion of other claims. 134 F.3d at 987-88; see Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070;

Ford v. Hubbard, 305 F.3d 875, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2002); James v. Pliler, 269 F.3d 1124, 1126-27

(9th Cir. 2001). Granting a stay is appropriate where there is no intention on the part of the

petitioner to delay or harass and in order to avoid piecemeal litigation. Taylor, 134 F.3d at 988

n.11; see also Fetterly v. Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295, 1301-02 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that it was an

abuse of discretion for a district court not to stay an exhausted petition pending exhaustion of a

newly discovered claim). In the instant case, Lugo explained why he did not present the

unexhausted claims to the California Supreme Court earlier. As explained above, Lugo states

that the claims are based upon new evidence, and explains what that evidence is and why it was

not discovered earlier. 

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Case No. C 05-0850-JF

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR STAY AND ABEYANCE

(JFEX1)

III. ORDER

Good cause therefore appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Lugo’s motion for stay

and abeyance is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 3, 2006

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 05-0850-JF

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR STAY AND ABEYANCE

(JFEX1)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Plaintiff’s Counsel

John R. Grele 

Email: jgrele@earthlink.net 

Defendant’s Counsel

Pamela K. Critchfield 

Email: pamela.critchfield@doj.ca.gov 

Case 4:05-cv-00580-SBA Document 47 Filed 02/22/06 Page 9 of 9