Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-18-03073/USCOURTS-caDC-18-03073-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shane Browne
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 4, 2019 Decided March 27, 2020

No. 18-3073

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

SHANE BROWNE,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:17-cr-00241-1)

Michael F. Smith argued the cause for appellant. With him 

on the brief was Max F. Maccoby.

Patricia A. Heffernan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jessie K. Liu, 

U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, John P. Mannarino, 

and Stephen J. Gripkey, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: HENDERSON and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SENTELLE. 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellant, Shane 

Browne, was convicted of kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1201(a)(1) and unlawful possession with intent to distribute 

marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D). 

Browne now appeals that conviction, arguing that the offenses 

were improperly joined and challenging the district court’s 

failure to sua sponte sever the kidnapping charges from the 

drug charges and order separate trials. He also challenges the 

district court’s failure to sua sponte exclude certain evidence

and argues that the district court erred in refusing a specific jury 

instruction and relying on acquitted and unlitigated conduct at

sentencing. Finally, Browne raises a variety of claims that his 

trial attorneys were ineffective, violating his Sixth Amendment 

right to counsel.

For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court. Consistent with our usual practice, we remand 

the ineffective assistance of counsel claims to the district court 

to assess them in the first instance. 

I. BACKGROUND

According to the evidence at trial, on December 11, 2017, 

Browne ordered a Lyft from his apartment in Washington, 

D.C., to a motel in Aberdeen, Maryland. Before the ride began, 

Browne called the Lyft driver, Ulises Flores, to inquire whether 

he would be willing to complete a roundtrip. Flores agreed, but 

Browne never updated the trip in the Lyft app. During the 

drive, Flores overheard Browne on a phone call discussing 

email encryption and another person who was prepared to take 

over his “business” if anything should happen to him. J.A.

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132–33. Flores later testified that Browne smelled like 

marijuana when he entered the car. 

Once in Aberdeen, Browne directed Flores to a 

McDonald’s parking lot near the original destination. Because 

Browne never updated the trip in the Lyft app to reflect the 

roundtrip, Flores ended the trip when they arrived at the 

McDonald’s. After Browne got out of the car, Flores remained 

in the McDonald’s parking lot for over seventeen minutes. 

During that time, he got coffee, visited a restroom, cleaned his 

car, and called his wife. Flores initially told police that Browne 

had asked him to wait for five to ten minutes, but he testified at 

trial that Browne did not ask him to wait at all. 

Eventually, Browne returned to Flores’s car and placed a 

suitcase in the trunk. Flores got out of the car to confront 

Browne, but Browne shook Flores’s hand and asked Flores to 

drive him home. Flores refused, but Browne entered the car

anyway and Flores followed. Flores testified that, once in the

car, Browne put a gun to his head and told him to drive back to 

Browne’s apartment in D.C.

Flores recounted that Browne kept the gun next to his head 

for the entire drive. During this time, he again overheard 

Browne on his phone, this time letting someone know that 

“Ulises” was driving him home. J.A. 162–63. Although he did 

not use the Lyft app on the return trip, Flores was able to email 

Lyft while Browne was distracted and ask someone to call the 

police because he was “in trouble.” J.A. 164–65. When they 

arrived back at Browne’s apartment, Browne gave Flores $100

and retrieved the suitcase. 

Flores drove several blocks and then called Lyft again. 

While on hold with Lyft, he connected to OnStar and described 

the situation. The OnStar operator offered to call 911. Flores 

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initially refused but after a few minutes accepted the offer and 

spoke with police. He explained the incident and stated that he 

thought Browne was a drug dealer. 

Later that evening, police arrested Browne at his 

apartment. The officers noticed a strong smell of marijuana 

coming from Browne’s apartment, and Browne told them that 

he had been smoking marijuana. The police did not 

immediately search Browne’s apartment, but did search other 

areas of the apartment building looking for a gun or 

ammunition. 

The next day, after gathering more information and 

interrogating Browne, officers obtained and executed a search 

warrant for Browne’s apartment. In the apartment, police 

found a money counter, a heat sealer, drug paraphernalia, more 

than $35,000 in cash, and seven suitcases and other 

containers—some of which were filled with heat-sealed bags 

containing marijuana. In total, the police recovered 

approximately 78 pounds of marijuana in Browne’s apartment, 

but never found a gun in the apartment or the surrounding 

areas. 

On February 27, 2018, the government filed a superseding 

indictment, charging Browne with kidnapping in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 1201(a); using, carrying, possessing, and 

brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); unlawful possession with intent 

to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(D); kidnapping while armed in violation of D.C. Code 

§§ 22-2001, 4502; two counts of possession of a firearm during 

a crime of violence or dangerous offense in violation of D.C. 

Code § 22-4505(b); and assault with a dangerous weapon in 

violation of D.C. Code § 22-402. After a jury trial, Browne 

was convicted of federal kidnapping and unlawful possession 

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of marijuana with intent to distribute, but acquitted of all 

firearms charges. 

As the trial transcripts make apparent, in its Presentence 

and Investigation Report (“PSR”), the probation office 

calculated an adjusted offense level of 34 for the kidnapping 

conviction under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Specifically, 

it concluded that the base offense level for kidnapping is 32 and 

that a two-level increase could be applied if a dangerous 

weapon was used. It also calculated an adjusted offense level 

of 16 for the marijuana conviction. Based on this calculation, 

the Sentencing Guidelines imprisonment range was 151 

months to 188 months for the kidnapping conviction and 60 

months for the marijuana conviction. 

The district court ultimately sentenced Browne to 

concurrent terms of 176 months for kidnapping and 60 months 

for unlawful possession with intent to distribute marijuana. 

The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that 

Browne used a dangerous weapon in the kidnapping, despite 

the jury’s acquittal on all firearms charges. Based on this 

finding, the court increased the base offense level by two levels

as recommended in the PSR. In determining the final sentence, 

the district court also found that the kidnapping was in 

furtherance of Browne’s drug trafficking, which it concluded 

was an aggravating factor for the kidnapping. 

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Browne presents issues which he did not raise

at trial. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), “[a] 

plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered 

even though it was not brought to the [district] court’s 

attention.” To demonstrate plain error, the appellant must 

satisfy three requirements: “First, there must be an error that 

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has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned. Second, 

the error must be plain—that is to say, clear or obvious. Third, 

the error must have affected the defendant’s substantial rights, 

which in the ordinary case means he or she must ‘show a 

reasonable probability that, but for the error,’ the outcome of 

the proceeding would have been different.” Molina-Martinez 

v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016) (internal 

citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Dominguez 

Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004)). If all three conditions are 

satisfied, “the court of appeals should exercise its discretion to 

correct the forfeited error if the error ‘seriously affects the 

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 

725, 736 (1993)).

A. Joinder and Severance

First, Browne argues that the kidnapping and drug-related 

charges were improperly joined. At no time before or during 

trial did Browne object to the joinder of the charges or move 

for a severance. There is of course nothing inherently 

erroneous about including multiple charges in one indictment. 

“[An] indictment or information may charge a defendant in 

separate counts with 2 or more offenses if the offenses 

charged—whether felonies or misdemeanors or both—are of 

the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or 

transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a 

common scheme or plan.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a). 

Rule 8(a) is construed liberally, but we have emphasized 

it “is not infinitely malleable: it cannot be stretched to cover 

offenses . . . which are discrete and dissimilar and which do not 

constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.” United States 

v. Richardson, 161 F.3d 728, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In 

Richardson, we explained that “a ‘but for’ sequential 

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relationship” does not create a logical relationship between 

“offenses discrete and dissimilar on their faces.” Id. at 734. 

Such “[o]ffenses do not become logically related solely by way 

of an intervening arrest; that is, the fact that an intervening 

arrest brings preceding and succeeding offenses together 

temporally or precipitatively simply does not suffice to create 

the logical relationship contemplated by Rule 8.” Id. The 

analysis of whether the charges are properly joined “focuses 

solely on the indictment and pre-trial submissions,” not the 

evidence introduced at trial. United States v. Gooch, 665 F.3d 

1318, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Further, even if counts are 

properly joined, the district court retains discretion to sever 

them and order separate trials “[i]f joinder . . . appears to 

prejudice a defendant.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). 

Specifically, Browne argues that the superseding 

indictment does not depict the kidnapping and drug-related 

charges as one transaction. He asserts that, beyond the 

intervening arrest, there is no logical relationship between the 

sets of charges. He argues that despite his failure to move for 

severance, the district court erred because it did not sua sponte

sever the charges and order separate trials. We disagree.

From the discussion above, it is obvious that the question 

of severance of charges in an indictment is not one that presents 

a bright line jumping to the eyes of a trial judge and alerting 

him that he should immediately sua sponte save the defendant 

from himself by presenting a remedy he has not asked for in 

order to resolve a problem to which he has not objected. On 

the record, it was not plainly erroneous to conclude that the 

kidnapping and drug-related charges “are connected with or 

constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.” Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 8(a). After arriving at the McDonald’s in Aberdeen, Browne 

returned to Flores’s car and placed a suitcase in the trunk. 

According to the joint statement of the case, he then held Flores 

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at gunpoint as he directed Flores to drive him back to his 

apartment in Washington, D.C. J.A. 67. The next day, the 

police executed a search warrant at Browne’s apartment and 

“recovered approximately 78 pounds of marijuana, 

approximately $35,000 in currency, a cash-counting machine, 

and other items.” J.A. 68. When the officers executed the 

search warrant, “they found more than 40 pounds of suspected 

marijuana distributed among a number of items, including 

several suitcases. When the defendant went up to Maryland, 

he returned with a suitcase he had not had in his original 

possession.” Supplemental Appendix (“S.A.”) 2. Thus, unlike

the situation in Richardson, supra, the presence of suitcases 

during the kidnapping and at the apartment meant that it was 

not solely the but-for connection that brought the two charges 

together. Rather, the charges could be seen as connected by 

those common items and their evident utility in transporting 

marijuana. And trying the charges together was not so clearly 

prejudicial to Browne to warrant sua sponte “order[ing] 

separate trials of counts.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a).

As we stated earlier, there is no plain error here, and indeed 

we are not concluding that there was error at all in the district 

court’s failure to sua sponte sever Browne’s charges under 

Rule 8(a) or Rule 14.

B. Federal Rules of Evidence

Related to his severance argument, Browne attempts to 

demonstrate prejudice from the joinder by asserting that the 

introduction of the drug offense evidence before a jury also 

trying the kidnapping offense violated his rights under the 

Federal Rules of Evidence. In part, Browne notes that, even 

though he did not put on a defense against the unlawful 

possession of marijuana with intent to distribute charge, the 

government was allowed to introduce the 78 pounds of 

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marijuana recovered from his apartment. He asserts that 

introducing that evidence violated Rule 403 because it was 

more prejudicial than probative, Fed. R. Evid. 403; violated 

Rule 404 because it was introduced only to show his propensity 

towards criminal behavior, Fed. R. Evid. 404; and violated 

Rules 401 and 402 because it was irrelevant to the kidnapping 

charge, Fed. R. Evid. 401–402.

In light of our holding that there was no plain error in the 

failure to sever, however, the drug evidence was clearly 

relevant and admissible to prove that Browne unlawfully 

possessed marijuana with intent to distribute. Browne’s claim 

that he did not mount a defense to the marijuana charge does 

not change the calculus. He pleaded not guilty. The 

government was obligated to prove the charge beyond a 

reasonable doubt. The evidence introduced was relevant to that 

charge. There was no plain error in the joinder, and there was 

no plain error in the admission of the evidence. Rare indeed 

would the case be in which we would find plain error in a 

judge’s failure to sua sponte exclude evidence. Certainly, it is 

possible that such a case occurs from time to time, but this is 

not it. 

C. Jury Instruction 2.219

The joint proposed jury instructions included instruction 

2.219, titled “Impeachment by Proof of a Pending Case, 

Probation, or Parole–Witness.” J.A. 62–63. That instruction 

informs the jury that if a witness is “under investigation,” it 

may consider that fact in assessing “whether the witness has a 

bias in favor of one of the parties that may affect his/her 

willingness to tell the truth.” 1 Crim. Jury Instructions for D.C. 

Instruction 2.219 (Lexis ed. 2019). After reviewing the 

proposed jury instructions, the district court decided not to 

issue instruction 2.219 because it did not think that the 

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instruction applied to any witness. Neither party objected to 

the court’s decision at that time. Browne first raised the issue 

post-trial in a motion for a new trial, but the district court 

denied that motion. On appeal, Browne argues again that the 

district court erred when it struck instruction 2.219. 

Relevant to this issue, Flores is a native of El Salvador. He 

entered the United States on a visa in 2008 and stayed in the 

country after it expired. After he testified before the grand jury, 

Flores decided to participate in the U-Visa program, which 

allows a victim of a violent crime to obtain legal-resident status 

by cooperating in the prosecution of that crime. As part of the 

U-Visa program, a law enforcement agency must certify that 

the applicant is aiding an investigation of a crime, and the U.S. 

Customs and Immigration Service must conduct its own 

investigation to determine whether the applicant is eligible for 

a U Visa. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 214.14. At trial, Flores 

testified that he had begun but not yet completed his U-Visa 

application. 

Rather than issuing instruction 2.219, the court instead 

issued standard jury instructions related to witness credibility 

and potential for bias. The court instructed the jury: 

You alone are the sole judges of the credibility 

of the witnesses. You alone determine whether 

to believe any witnesses and the extent to which 

a witness should be believed. . . .

You may consider anything that in your 

judgment affects the credibility of any witness. 

For example, you may consider . . . whether the 

witness has any motive for not telling the truth 

. . . [and] whether the witness has any interest in 

the outcome of this case, or friendship or 

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hostility toward other people concerned with 

this case. . . . 

You should consider whether any 

inconsistencies are the result of different 

individuals seeing, hearing or recollecting 

things differently or the result of actual 

forgetfulness or the result of innocent mistake 

or the result of intentional falsehood. . . .

If you believe that any witness has shown him 

or herself to be biased for or against either side 

in this trial, you may consider and determine 

whether such bias or prejudice has colored the 

testimony of this witness so as to affect the 

desire and capability of that witness to tell the 

truth.

S.A. 126–28.

When presented with a motion for a new trial, the court 

has broad discretion to “vacate any judgment and grant a new 

trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 

33(a). As to the jury instructions, the general rule is that “[a]s 

long as a district judge’s instructions are legally correct[,] . . . 

he is not required to give them in any particular language.” 

Miller v. Poretsky, 595 F.2d 780, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 

Further, “jury instructions are not considered erroneous if, 

when viewed as a whole, ‘they fairly present the applicable 

legal principles and standards.’” Joy v. Bell Helicopter 

Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting 

EEOC v. Atl. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 879 F.2d 434, 436 (8th Cir. 

1989)). Again, because the omission of instruction 2.219 was 

not raised until after trial, we review for plain error. 

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At the core of Browne’s complaint, he is concerned that 

the court did not appropriately focus the jury’s attention on 

Flores’s potential for bias. See Comment to 1 Crim. Jury 

Instructions for D.C. Instruction 2.219 (Lexis ed. 2019) (noting 

that instruction 2.219 is appropriate if “the circumstances 

indicate that bias may exist”). Browne does not assert that the 

district court issued instructions that misstated the elements of 

the charged crimes or misstated the appropriate legal standard 

to be applied, for example. Instead, the gist of his concern is 

that the issued instructions did not single out Flores’s potential 

for bias resulting from his immigration status in the way that

instruction 2.219 would. See Miller, 595 F.2d at 788. But, as 

stated previously, “[a]s long as . . . [the] instructions are legally 

correct[,] . . . [the judge] is not required to give them in any 

particular language.” Id.

In this case, the issued instructions clearly focused the 

jury’s attention on the issues of witness credibility, bias, and 

motive to falsify testimony. Moreover, Browne has failed to 

cite any authority that affirmatively supports his argument that 

instruction 2.219 covers U-Visa applicants in the first place. 

Nor have we found any case stating that instruction 2.219 

applies to testimony from U-Visa applicants during our own 

review. Absent legal authority stating such, it is not clear that 

U-Visa applicants are even “under investigation” within the 

meaning of instruction 2.219. Accordingly, the court did not 

clearly or obviously err when it decided to strike the 

instruction. Therefore, Browne has failed to demonstrate that 

the district court committed plain error when it refused to 

exercise its discretion to grant a new trial based on the 

exclusion of instruction 2.219.

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D. Sentencing

During his sentencing hearing, Browne objected to the 

district court’s finding by a preponderance of the evidence that 

Browne had a gun during the kidnapping, arguing that it 

violated the Sixth Amendment and due process because the 

jury acquitted him of all gun-related charges. Similarly, 

Browne argues that the judge’s finding that the kidnapping was 

in furtherance of drug trafficking violates the Sixth 

Amendment and due process because this was uncharged and 

unlitigated conduct. 

Browne concedes that circuit precedent allows the district 

court to base its sentence on acquitted or uncharged conduct if 

it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the conduct 

occurred, United States v. Kpodi, 824 F.3d 122, 126 (D.C. Cir. 

2016), but he argues that this precedent violates the Sixth 

Amendment and due process, see Appellant’s Br. 43–44 (citing 

United States v. Bell, 808 F.3d 926, 929–30 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 

(Millett, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc)); see 

generally United States v. Norman, 926 F.3d 804, 811 (D.C. 

Cir. 2019) (noting criticism of reliance on acquitted or 

uncharged conduct at sentencing), cert. filed, No. 19-6589 

(Nov. 12, 2019); id. at 813–14 (Henderson, J., concurring) 

(defending soundness of precedent). Because Browne’s 

argument is at odds with the current state of the law, we cannot 

conclude that the district court erred when it considered 

acquitted and uncharged conduct in imposing Browne’s 

sentence.

Further, Browne argues that the finding that the 

kidnapping was in furtherance of drug trafficking was error 

because there was no evidence presented to support that 

finding. See Appellant’s Br. 42 (quoting United States v. 

Petlechkov, 922 F.3d 762, 770 (6th Cir. 2019) (“No evidence 

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cannot be a preponderance of the evidence.”)). Browne never 

objected to this second finding before or at sentencing. Thus, 

we review the court’s decision to base the sentence on that issue 

for plain error. 

Browne relies predominantly on Kpodi and United States 

v. Smith, 267 F.3d 1154 (D.C. Cir. 2001), to support this 

argument. Pre-trial, the district court in Kpodi ruled evidence 

inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) 

because it held that the “evidence, standing alone, did not 

support the Government’s inference that Kpodi fired a gun 

during the shootings or held a weapon while fleeing.” Kpodi, 

824 F.3d at 127. But at sentencing, the Kpodi court found that 

same evidence persuasive to support its “inference that Kpodi 

either fired a weapon, was holding a gun while fleeing or even 

participated in the . . . shooting.” Id. at 128. The district court 

then explicitly relied on that inference when determining the 

appropriate sentence. Id. at 127–28. Because the district court 

“switched course” between the evidentiary ruling and 

sentencing, we held that the district court’s reliance on that 

evidence at sentencing was clearly erroneous. Id. at 127.

In Smith, relying on uncharged conduct, the district court 

applied a three-level upward departure from the recommended 

sentence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Smith, 267 

F.3d at 1163. We noted that the district court specifically found 

that “the defendant’s commission of other crimes on persons or 

entities in the course of committing the offenses of conviction 

justified a departure.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

This court explained that “in order to satisfy due process such 

conduct must be proven by a[t] least a preponderance of the 

evidence.” Id. at 1165. We vacated the sentence because the 

district court sentenced the defendant “exactly as if he had 

actually been convicted of [the uncharged conduct]” and the 

government had failed to prove “under any standard of proof” 

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that the defendant could have been convicted of at least one of 

the uncharged crimes as it had failed to produce any evidence 

related to an element of that crime. Id. at 1165–66.

Unlike Kpodi, the court in this case never passed upon the 

admissibility of any evidence related to whether the kidnapping 

was in furtherance of drug trafficking. We are thus not faced 

with a situation in which the district court adopted conflicting 

views of the same evidence. Additionally, unlike Smith, we are 

not faced with a situation in which the district court relied on 

uncharged conduct to justify an upward departure from the 

Sentencing Guidelines. Instead, the district court found that the 

defendant’s drug trafficking was one of many aggravating 

factors on the kidnapping conviction and then imposed a 

within-guidelines sentence. Further, the district court’s 

inference that the kidnapping was in furtherance of Browne’s 

drug trafficking was entirely reasonable given the evidence 

before it. Accordingly, we hold that the court did not clearly 

or obviously err when it relied on that inference at sentencing.

E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Finally, Browne asserts a variety of ineffective assistance 

of counsel claims for the first time on appeal. He argues that 

his attorneys were ineffective in trial preparation, witness 

examination, and failing to raise the issues now raised in this 

appeal, including improper joinder, failure to sever, and 

admissibility of evidence. Perhaps most significantly, he 

argues that his Miranda rights were violated because the police 

continued to question him after he requested an attorney. 

To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 

Browne must first show that his counsels’ performance was 

deficient, meaning that “counsel’s representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland v. 

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Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). Second, Browne “must 

show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense,” 

id. at 687, meaning “there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different,” id. at 694. 

“When an ineffective-assistance claim is brought on direct 

appeal, appellate counsel and the court must proceed on a trial 

record not developed precisely for the object of litigating or 

preserving the claim and thus often incomplete or inadequate 

for this purpose.” Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 

504–05 (2003); see also United States v. Rashad, 331 F.3d 908, 

909 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting it is likely, “when a defendant 

asserts his sixth amendment claim for the first time on direct 

appeal, that the relevant facts will not be part of the trial 

record”). Thus, “this court’s ‘general practice is to remand the 

claim for an evidentiary hearing’ unless ‘the trial record alone 

conclusively shows’ that the defendant either is or is not 

entitled to relief.” Rashad, 331 F.3d at 909–10 (quoting United 

States v. Fennell, 53 F.3d 1296, 1303–04 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). 

The critical inquiry at this stage is whether the record 

conclusively demonstrates that Browne could not establish an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim if given the opportunity 

to do so on remand. See id. at 912.

Browne argues that the police continued to question him 

after he requested an attorney, thereby violating his Miranda

rights. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981). 

He alleges that his statements in response to those questions led 

to the search warrant, rendering that warrant invalid and 

necessitating the suppression of any evidence obtained from a 

search pursuant to it. Browne’s other ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims relate to his attorneys’ failures to challenge 

other deficiencies with the search warrant, argue the charges 

were improperly joined, request severance, advise about the 

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possibility of a blind plea on the marijuana charge, adequately 

prepare for trial, conduct sufficient witness examinations, seek 

evidentiary exclusions, advocate for proper jury instructions, 

and conduct a sufficient investigation into witness 

backgrounds. 

Because Browne has raised a colorable claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, we remand to the district 

court to develop a record and assess those claims in the first 

instance. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the various 

challenged rulings of the district court, and, consistent with our 

usual practice, we remand the ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims to the district court. 

So ordered.

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