Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01433/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01433-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent
Slinger Drainage, Inc.
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 18, 2001 Decided January 30, 2001

No. 99-1433

Slinger Drainage, Inc.,

Petitioner

v.

Environmental Protection Agency,

Respondent

On Petition for Review of Orders of the

Environmental Protection Agency

Gary R. Leistico argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioner.

Scott J. Jordan, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the

brief was Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Sentelle and Randolph,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

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Edwards, Chief Judge: Slinger Drainage Inc. ("Slinger")

seeks review of a final decision of the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA's") Environmental Appeals Board.

Slinger is in the business of installing drainage tile, and in

this capacity used a Hoes Trenching Machine to install 26,000

linear feet of drainage tile over a 50-acre area. As a result,

the EPA filed an administrative complaint against Slinger

alleging that Slinger violated s 301(a) of the Clean Water

Act, 33 U.S.C. s 1311(a) (1994), by failing to secure a permit

before discharging pollutant into wetland as required under

s 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. s 1344. The Administrative Law Judge found Slinger liable as alleged and

assessed a Class II civil penalty of $90,000; the Appeals

Board affirmed both the finding of liability and the penalty.

In re: Slinger Drainage, Inc., CWA Appeal No. 98-10 (Sept.

29, 1999), reprinted in Joint Appendix 39. Whatever the

substance of Slinger's claims, this court has no jurisdiction to

reach the merits in this case, because Slinger's notice of

appeal was untimely.

In the case of an assessment of a Class II civil penalty, a

party may obtain judicial review "by filing a notice of appeal

in such court within the 30-day period beginning on the date

the civil penalty order is issued." 33 U.S.C. s 1319(g)(8)(B).

The Supreme Court has explained that "[j]udicial review

provisions ... are jurisdictional in nature and must be construed with strict fidelity to their terms.... This is all the

more true of statutory provisions specifying the timing of

review, for those time limits are, as we have often stated,

'mandatory and jurisdictional,' ... and are not subject to

equitable tolling." Stone v. Immigration and Naturalization

Serv., 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995) (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins,

495 U.S. 33, 45 (1990)). Under 33 U.S.C. s 1319(g)(8)(B),

Slinger had 30 days to file its notice of appeal beginning on

the date the order issued. As a statutory provision defining

the timing of review within a judicial review provision, this

30-day period is jurisdictional.

The parties disagree on when the Appeals Board issued its

order. Slinger asserts that the order issued on Thursday,

September 30, 1999; the EPA argues that the order issued

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on Wednesday, September 29, 1999. For the purpose of

assessing our jurisdiction, we assume, without deciding, that

Slinger is correct and the order issued on Thursday, September 30, 1999. Even accepting this assumption, however,

Slinger's notice of appeal was not timely.

33 U.S.C. s 1319(g)(8)(B) specifies that the period for filing

a notice of appeal runs for 30 days beginning on the day the

order issues. This provision does not, however, indicate any

rules regarding the treatment of weekend days, holidays, or

other potential exceptions. As a result, we look to Federal

Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(a), which provides that Saturdays and Sundays are counted within the filing period, unless

the last day of the period falls on a Saturday or Sunday. In

particular, Rule 26(a) directs that we "[i]nclude the last day of

the period unless it is a Saturday, Sunday [or] legal holiday."

Under this provision, the court must include intermediate

Saturdays and Sundays in computing the 30-day period.

Thus, starting with the date Slinger asserts the order issued,

Thursday, September 30, 1999, the 30-day period ended on

Friday, October 29, 1999. Slinger filed its notice of appeal to

this court on Monday, November 1, 1999--outside the legal

time for filing its notice of appeal.

At oral argument Slinger asserted that Rule 26(a) governs

how the 30-day period is computed. Were this the case, we

would "[e]xclude the day of the act, event, or default that

begins the period." Fed. R. App. P. 26(a). Thus, under Rule

26(a), we would not include the day the order issued, which

would mean that the 30th calendar day fell on Saturday,

October 30, 1999. Under this calculation, the 30th day for

filing a notice of appeal would have been Monday, November

1, 1999, the day that Slinger filed.

Rule 26(a), however, does not apply when Congress has

specified a particular method of counting in the statute itself

and there is no indication of a contrary congressional intention. This was evident in United Mine Workers of America

v. Dole, 870 F.2d 662, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1989), where the court

found that Rule 26(a) applied to the requirement in the Mine

Act, 30 U.S.C. s 811(d) (1994), that a petition challenging a

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new standard be filed "prior to the sixtieth day after such

standard is promulgated." The court explained that, because

the cited statute made "no separate provision for the computation of time," "Congress intended its time periods to be

computed in accordance with the federal rule." United Mine

Workers, 870 F.2d at 665. The court also noted the "continuing vitality" of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Union

National Bank v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38, 40-41(1949), namely,

"that the federal rules of procedure can be relied on for

interpreting a statutory time period in the absence of any

more statute-specific provisions or indication that Congress

did not intend the rules to apply." United Mine Workers,

870 F.2d at 665 n.2.

In this case, in contrast, the statute currently before us

clearly establishes a separate provision for the computation of

time: a person may obtain review by filing "within the 30-day

period beginning on the date the civil penalty issued." 33

U.S.C. s 1319(g)(8)(B) (emphasis added). And there is nothing to suggest that Congress did not intend precisely what it

said in the statute. As a result, Slinger's notice of appeal was

not timely, and this court has no authority to hear the merits

of its claim. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

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