Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03726/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03726-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ernest D. Shields
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-3726

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ERNEST D. SHIELDS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:11-cr-00440-1 — Rubén Castillo, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 29, 2014 — DECIDED JUNE 15, 2015

____________________

Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Ernest D. Shields was arrested 

following a brief police chase and charged with possession 

of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) 

and 924(e)(1). Prior to trial, Mr. Shields filed, and the district 

court denied, a motion to suppress the evidence obtained at 

the time of his arrest as well as a motion to dismiss the 

indictment on the ground that § 922(g)(1) violated the 

Constitution of the United States. At a hearing three days 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
2 No. 13-3726

before trial, Mr. Shields requested a continuance to allow 

him to file two past-due reply briefs and to arrange for two 

additional witnesses. The court denied these requests. After 

trial, a jury found Mr. Shields guilty, and the district court

imposed the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence.

Mr. Shields now appeals, setting forth six claims of error. 

Because the district court correctly decided each 

controverted issue, we affirm its judgment.

I

BACKGROUND

A.

At approximately 8:00 p.m. on January 10, 2011, Officers 

Craig Coglianese and David Bachler of the Chicago Police 

Department were on patrol in an unmarked police vehicle. 

The officers observed Mr. Shields’s parked SUV partially 

blocking a crosswalk, in violation of Chicago Municipal 

Code § 9-64-110(c). The officers stopped their vehicle parallel 

to Mr. Shields’s SUV.

Officer Coglianese exited his vehicle, approached 

Mr. Shields, who was sitting in the driver’s seat of his SUV, 

and asked for his driver’s license. After handing 

Officer Coglianese his driver’s license, Mr. Shields 

voluntarily exited the SUV and, at the officer’s request, 

walked toward the rear of the vehicle with Officer 

Coglianese. During this time, Officer Bachler had exited the 

driver’s seat of the police vehicle and had walked around to 

its front.

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
No. 13-3726 3

When Mr. Shields reached the rear of the vehicle, he did 

not stop to talk to the police officers, but instead fled east 

down an adjacent street. Officer Coglianese gave chase to 

Mr. Shields. When Mr. Shields turned left down an alley, the 

officer followed and saw Mr. Shields pull a firearm out of his 

right coat pocket. Shortly thereafter, Officer Coglianese 

caught up to Mr. Shields and pushed him to the ground. 

Officer Bachler arrived in the police vehicle after one or two 

minutes, and the officers placed Mr. Shields in handcuffs. 

The officers rolled Mr. Shields over and discovered a loaded 

six-shot .22-caliber revolver on the ground. It was the same 

firearm that Officer Coglianese had observed Mr. Shields 

remove from his pocket.

The officers placed Mr. Shields in the back of their police 

vehicle, and Officer Coglianese read Mr. Shields his Miranda

rights. Thereafter, Officer Coglianese asked Mr. Shields, 

“Why are you running with a gun?”1 Mr. Shields responded, 

“I shouldn’t have had that weapon on me.”2 At the police 

station, Officer Coglianese gave Mr. Shields a ticket for 

blocking the crosswalk. Mr. Shields then was taken to the 

hospital for treatment for a cut over his left eye that he 

sustained during the arrest.

B.

On June 22, 2011, a grand jury indicted Mr. Shields for 

possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

1 R.143 at 163.

2 Id.

 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
4 No. 13-3726

§§ 922(g) and 924(e)(1). The indictment thus listed both the 

substantive crime and sentencing provision under the

Armed Career Criminal Act. In due course, Mr. Shields filed 

a motion to suppress the firearm and his statements 

following his arrest. In that motion, he maintained that the 

traffic stop was illegal, that the police had conducted an 

illegal search, and that his statement to the police was 

involuntary. At an evidentiary hearing on this motion, 

Officers Coglianese and Bachler testified about their 

encounter with Mr. Shields. Corey Flournoy, an acquaintance 

of Mr. Shields who was parked down the street at the time, 

also testified.

Following the hearing, the district court denied the 

motion. The court first determined that the officers acted 

within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment in conducting 

the traffic stop because they had probable cause to believe 

that Mr. Shields had committed a traffic offense by blocking 

the crosswalk. Rejecting Mr. Shields’s contention that the 

officers illegally searched him after pulling him from his 

vehicle, the court found that Mr. Shields had presented 

“absolutely no evidence that” he was pulled out of the car by 

the officers.3 The court went on to note that Mr. Shields’s 

flight provided the officers with probable cause to arrest him 

for knowingly resisting or obstructing the performance of a 

police officer in violation of 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a).4 With regard 

3 R.60 at 9.

4 The statute provides:

A person who knowingly resists or obstructs the performance by one known to the person to be a peace of-

 

(continued...)

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
No. 13-3726 5

to the discovery of the firearm, the court determined that 

“[t]he uncontroverted evidence from the suppression 

hearing establishe[d] that the officers found the gun in plain 

view after Shields was legally arrested following a traffic 

stop that was reasonable in duration.”5 Finally, the court 

concluded that Mr. Shields did not establish that his 

statements following his arrest were involuntary.

Mr. Shields filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the 

alternative, a request that the court reopen the suppression 

hearing to allow Mr. Shields to testify. The next day, 

Mr. Shields filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the 

ground that the statute violated the Second Amendment of 

the Constitution. The Government filed its responses to 

Mr. Shields’s motions on March 8, 2013. Mr. Shields did not 

file a reply for either motion by the March 15, 2013, deadline.

At a subsequent hearing, Mr. Shields asked for a 

continuance of the trial so that he could have more time to 

file his replies. He stated that he needed more time because 

his counsel was involved in a separate trial that was “pushed 

ficer, firefighter, or correctional institution employee of 

any authorized act within his or her official capacity 

commits a Class A misdemeanor.

720 ILCS 5/31-1(a).

Chicago Municipal Code § 9-64-230 provides that violating § 9-64-110(c) “shall be a civil offense punishable by fine, and 

no criminal penalty, or civil sanction other than that prescribed 

in this Code, shall be imposed.”

5 R.60 at 9.

 

(...continued)

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
6 No. 13-3726

into an inconvenient spot” and because he was trying to 

arrange for two witnesses.6 The court denied the request, 

stating that it was too late to ask for more time to file the 

replies and that it was too close to trial to grant a 

continuance. The court specifically noted that Mr. Shields 

had not filed a request for an extension of the reply deadline 

and that it was only three business days from trial.

Mr. Shields then filed a motion to dismiss the indictment 

on the ground that federal jurisdiction could not be 

established beyond a reasonable doubt. He maintained that 

the Government could not establish the requisite interstate 

commerce nexus. The district court denied the motion.

The jury trial commenced on March 25, 2013, and lasted 

three days. On the second day of trial, Mr. Shields stipulated 

that he had “been at some time before January 10, 2011 

convicted of a felony punishable by imprisonment for a term 

exceeding one year.”7 The Government offered no additional 

evidence at trial of Mr. Shields’s prior convictions.

The district court instructed the jury that “the 

government must prove...three...elements beyond a 

reasonable doubt: No. 1, the defendant knowingly possessed 

a firearm. No. 2, at the time of the charged act, the defendant 

was a felon. And, No. 3, the firearm had been shipped or 

transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”8 The jury 

6 R.142 at 2.

7 R.144 at 3.

8 R.145 at 48.

 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
No. 13-3726 7

found Mr. Shields guilty of possession of a firearm by a 

felon.

C.

The presentence report (“PSR”) calculated that 

Mr. Shields had a total offense level of 33 and a criminal 

history category of VI, resulting in a guidelines range of 235 

to 293 months’ imprisonment. It also noted that Mr. Shields 

had three prior violent felony convictions and therefore was 

subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years 

under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)(1).

At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Shields, appearing pro se,9

objected to the PSR on several grounds. He first stated that 

two of his convictions did not qualify for the ACCA 

enhancement. Second, Mr. Shields argued that his 

mandatory minimum sentence violated Alleyne v. United 

States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), because his three prior felony 

convictions were not submitted to the jury. Finally, 

Mr. Shields argued that he received a letter that indicated 

9 After trial but before his sentencing hearing, Mr. Shields filed a “Notice 

of Termination,” which stated that he “reject[ed], refute[d] and den[ied]

[his counsel’s] ineffective/incompetent counsel and legal determination.”

R.108 at 1. Mr. Shields continued by stating that his counsel’s “alleged 

authority is hereby abrogated, quashed and terminated, for cause, due to 

[his] fraudulent acts and omissions of malfeasance.” Id. Mr. Shields’s 

counsel subsequently filed a motion to withdraw, which the court granted after holding a hearing. On appeal, Mr. Shields does not challenge the 

district court’s decision to allow him to proceed to sentencing without 

counsel.

 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
8 No. 13-3726

that his civil rights were restored and that, consequently, the 

underlying offense could not serve as the basis of a 

sentencing increase.10 The district court rejected all of 

Mr. Shields’s arguments and sentenced him to the fifteenyear mandatory minimum, followed by a five-year term of 

supervised release.

Mr. Shields now appeals his conviction and his sentence. 

He makes six claims.11 We will address each in turn.

II

DISCUSSION

A. Failure to Prove Prior Convictions 

Mr. Shields contends that, in accordance with recent 

Supreme Court precedent, his three prior convictions had to 

be proved to the jury. He also maintains that the criminal 

process against him was flawed from the beginning because 

the indictment recited not only the substantive crime of felon 

in possession of a firearm, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), but 

also the statutory sentencing enhancement for three prior 

felony convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). In his view, 

the recitation of this latter provision obligated the 

Government to prove before the jury not only the 

10 A court may not consider a conviction for purposes of the ACCA if the 

defendant’s civil rights have been restored. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).

11 Although Mr. Shields styled his brief as raising seven distinct arguments, we address together his contentions that the Government offered insufficient evidence to prove his three prior convictions and that 

his prior convictions needed to be proved to the jury.

 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
No. 13-3726 9

substantive offense of conviction (possession of a firearm by 

a felon) but also the existence of each conviction. 

Alternatively, he submits that the Government 

constructively amended the indictment by proving only the 

§ 922 offense.

We cannot accept the view that § 924(e)(1), on its own, 

provides a substantive element of the offense that must be 

submitted to the jury. In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 

523 U.S. 224 (1998), the Supreme Court held that prior 

convictions are sentencing factors that could be determined 

by the court and that need not be proved to a jury. See id. at 

246–47. More recently, the Court held that any fact that 

increases the mandatory minimum sentence is an element of 

the offense that must be submitted to a jury. See Alleyne, 133 

S. Ct. at 2155. But, in crafting that rule, the Court explicitly 

declined to revisit Almendarez-Torres. See id. at 2160 n.1.

Mr. Shields nevertheless argues that Almendarez-Torres

now conflicts with the Court’s more recent decision in 

Alleyne. Although we have said that “Almendarez-Torres is

vulnerable to being overruled,” we also have noted that only 

the Supreme Court can overrule its prior decisions. United 

States v. Elliott, 703 F.3d 378, 381 n.2 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

United States v. Browning, 436 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir. 2006)). 

Accordingly, unless the Court acts, we are bound to follow 

Almendarez-Torres. See United States v. Boswell, 772 F.3d 469, 

478 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Zuniga, 767 F.3d 712, 718 

(7th Cir. 2014). Mr. Shields’s prior felony convictions 

therefore were not substantive elements of his offense and 

did not need to be proved to the jury in order to support his 

fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence.

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
10 No. 13-3726

The fact that the indictment recited § 924(e)(1) does not 

alter this conclusion. Including a sentencing provision, such 

as § 924(e)(1), in an indictment does not transform a 

sentencing factor into a substantive element. “Under Rule 

7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a miscitation 

such as the reference to § 924(e) is harmless error and cannot 

be grounds for dismissing the indictment or reversing the 

conviction unless the defendant is misled by the erroneous 

reference and prejudiced thereby.” United States v. Lowe, 860 

F.2d 1370, 1381 (7th Cir. 1988).12 Mr. Shields does not 

contend that he was misled or otherwise prejudiced by the 

reference to the sentencing provision. Indeed, Mr. Shields’s 

pretrial motions indicate that he was fully aware of the 

substance of the pending charges.13

Finally, Mr. Shields submits that, by including the 

§ 924(e)(1) enhancement in the indictment, the Government 

constructively amended the indictment by only offering

evidence to prove one felony. “A constructive amendment of 

an indictment occurs when the evidence at trial ‘goes 

beyond the parameters of the indictment in that it 

establishes offenses different from or in addition to those 

12 See also United States v. Quintero, 872 F.2d 107, 111 (5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting the defendant’s argument after noting that the defendant did “not 

even allege that he was misled or that he did not receive adequate notice 

of the charges against him” and finding that there was “no evidence in 

the record that [the defendant] was misled by the surplusage”).

13 See United States v. Lowe, 860 F.2d 1370, 1381 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that 

it was “apparent from the content of Lowe’s numerous pretrial motions 

that the indictment created no such notice problem for him or his counsel”).

 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
No. 13-3726 11

charged by the grand jury.’” United States v. Phillips, 745 F.3d 

829, 832 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Pigee, 197 

F.3d 879, 886 (7th Cir. 1999)). The alleged amendment must 

be sufficiently different such that it would be impossible to 

know whether the grand jury would have indicted for the 

crime actually proved. See id. Here, because the inclusion of 

the sentencing provision in the indictment did not create a 

separate offense, there can be no constructive amendment. 

Simply stated, the Government presented evidence to prove 

that Mr. Shields committed the offense set forth in the 

indictment: it proved that he previously was convicted of a 

felony and that he possessed a firearm that had travelled in 

interstate commerce.

B. Motion to Suppress

Mr. Shields submits that the district court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress. He contends that, prior to 

his running away from the police officers, he had not been 

seized and was not under arrest. Furthermore, he submits 

that the parking violation is not an offense that would 

support his arrest in the alley. The Government takes a 

distinctly different view of the matter. It submits that the 

officers undertook a legal traffic stop supported by probable 

cause: Mr. Shields was committing a traffic offense by 

parking in a crosswalk in violation of the Chicago Municipal 

Code. In the Government’s view, the violation justified a 

valid Terry investigative stop. The Government further 

maintains that, because Mr. Shields’s running away 

obstructed the performance of their duty, the officers had 

probable cause to chase and apprehend him. It contends that 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
12 No. 13-3726

the flight also gave them adequate reasonable suspicion to 

undertake a Terry investigative stop.

1.

We begin by setting forth the settled principles that must 

guide our analysis. When we review a district court’s denial 

of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s 

finding of historical facts for clear error. See United States v. 

Tyler, 512 F.3d 405, 409 (7th Cir. 2008). Legal determinations, 

such as the existence of a seizure and probable cause, are 

reviewed de novo. See id.

The Fourth Amendment protects “against unreasonable 

searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. In analyzing 

this important constitutional protection, we have recognized 

that there are three basic categories of police-citizen 

interactions:

The first category is an arrest, for which the 

Fourth Amendment requires that police have 

probable cause to believe a person has 

committed or is committing a crime. The 

second category is an investigatory stop, which 

is limited to a brief, non-intrusive detention. 

This is also a Fourth Amendment “seizure,” 

but the officer need only have specific and 

articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a 

reasonable suspicion that a person has 

committed or is committing a crime. The third 

category involves no restraint on the citizen’s 

liberty, and is characterized by an officer 

seeking the citizen’s voluntary cooperation 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
No. 13-3726 13

through non-coercive questioning. This is not a 

seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment.

United States v. Johnson, 910 F.2d 1506, 1508 (7th Cir. 1990) 

(citations omitted). 

As this formulation makes clear, not every police encounter implicates the Fourth Amendment. A seizure within the 

meaning of the Fourth Amendment takes place if, in view of 

all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable 

person would not believe that he was free to leave. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991); accord United States v. 

Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002). In determining whether a 

reasonable person would believe that he was free to leave or 

whether, instead, the encounter amounts to a seizure, we 

consider such factors as: 

(1) whether the encounter occurred in a public 

place; (2) whether the suspect consented to 

speak with the officers; (3) whether the officers 

informed the individual that he was not under 

arrest and was free to leave; (4) whether the 

individuals were moved to another area; (5) 

whether there was a threatening presence of 

several officers and a display of weapons or 

physical force; (6) whether the officers deprived the defendant of documents she needed 

to continue on her way; and (7) whether the officers’ tone of voice was such that their requests would likely be obeyed.

United States v. Johnson, 680 F.3d 966, 975 n.4 (7th Cir. 2012) 

(quoting United States v. Barker, 467 F.3d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
14 No. 13-3726

2006)). We also have considered “whether police indicated to 

the person that she was suspected of a crime or was the 

specific target of police investigation.” United States v. 

McCarthur, 6 F.3d 1270, 1276 (7th Cir. 1993).

The distinction between a consensual encounter, which 

does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, and an 

investigative stop, which does implicate the constitutional 

guarantee because it constitutes a seizure, is often difficult to 

discern. On one hand, the Supreme Court has recognized 

that “mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure.” 

Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434; see also United States v. Childs, 277 

F.3d 947, 950 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (noting that police may 

approach persons and ask questions “provided that the 

officers do not imply that answers...are obligatory”). 

Accordingly, “law enforcement officers do not violate the 

Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on 

the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is 

willing to answer some questions, [or] by putting questions 

to him if the person is willing to listen.” Childs, 277 F.3d at 

950 (alteration in original) (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434). 

A mere request for identification does not change a 

voluntary stop, which is outside the purview of the Fourth 

Amendment, into an investigatory stop. See Bostick, 501 U.S. 

at 437 (“As we have explained, no seizure occurs when 

police...ask to examine the individual’s identification... .”); 

INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) (explaining that a 

request for identification by itself does not constitute a 

seizure under the Fourth Amendment). These principles do 

not change when an individual is seated in an automobile. 

See, e.g., United States v. Douglass, 467 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir.

2006) (holding that “the officers’ stance on either side of [the 

defendant’s] car [did not] convert the encounter into a 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
No. 13-3726 15

seizure because he still could have declined to answer their 

questions and driven away”).

Our decision in Tyler illustrates the distinction between 

consensual encounters and investigatory stops. In Tyler, we 

concluded that the defendant would not have believed that 

he was free to leave, even though “the encounter took place 

on a public street and the officers did not draw their 

weapons or (at least initially) lay hands on Tyler,” because 

the officers “told him he was violating the law, took his 

identification from him and retained it while they ran a 

warrant check, and told him he could not leave until the 

warrant check was completed.” 512 F.3d at 410. We relied on 

our precedents addressing whether a defendant is seized 

when he is approached by officers at an airport or train 

station. In those cases, we had held that a defendant is seized 

“[w]here the officers told the defendant he was under 

investigation for carrying drugs or retained possession of his 

identification, travel documents, and/or luggage.” Id. We 

contrasted such a situation from “[w]here the officers only 

generally identified themselves as narcotics investigators 

and immediately returned the defendant’s identification and 

travel documents.” Id. We concluded that “[a] reasonable 

person would not feel free to walk away after being 

confronted by two police officers and told he was 

committing a crime in the officers’ presence.”14 Id. at 410–11.

14 Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 (1983) (plurality opinion) (holding 

that a suspect was seized when narcotics agents told him “that he was 

suspected of transporting narcotics, and asked him to accompany them 

to the police room, while retaining his ticket and driver’s license and 

without indicating in any way that he was free to depart”).

 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
16 No. 13-3726

The Supreme Court has characterized a traffic stop as a 

form of an investigative stop. See Rodriguez v. United States, 

135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (“A seizure for a traffic violation 

justifies a police investigation of that violation. A relatively 

brief encounter, a routine traffic stop is more analogous to a 

so-called ‘Terry stop’ than to a formal arrest.” (alterations 

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Navarette v. 

California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (“The Fourth 

Amendment permits brief investigative stops—such as the 

traffic stop in this case—when a law enforcement officer has 

a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the 

particular person stopped of criminal activity.” (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–

22 (1968))). In contrast to a consensual encounter, “[a] traffic 

stop for a suspected violation of law is a ‘seizure’ of the 

occupants of the vehicle and therefore must be conducted in 

accordance with the Fourth Amendment.” Heien v. North 

Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014).

2.

Our colleague in the district court, viewing the totality of 

the circumstances, concluded that this encounter was more 

properly characterized as a seizure. In the district court’s 

view, the officers approached the vehicle, and Mr. Shields, 

because they believed that he was in the process of 

committing an offense against the Chicago Municipal Code 

by parking his vehicle in a cross walk. In the court’s view, 

the officers had undertaken to confront him about a specific 

violation of the law and, had that process, already initiated 

by the officers, not been interrupted by Mr. Shields’s flight, 

that specific confrontation would have taken place.

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
No. 13-3726 17

We agree with the district court’s determination. As 

Mr. Shields admitted in his motion to suppress, the officers 

effectuated “a stop to issue a parking ticket.”15 After 

recognizing the parking violation, the officers stopped their 

vehicle, approached Mr. Shields, asked for his license, and 

asked him to walk to the back of the vehicles. When 

Mr. Shields fled the scene, the officers still were in 

possession of his license. In view of all the circumstances 

surrounding the encounter, a reasonable person in 

Mr. Shields’s position would not believe that he was free to 

walk away from the officers. 

Because the officers believed that Mr. Shields was in the 

process of committing a parking offense, they had, at a 

minimum, reasonable suspicion to believe that the law was 

being violated. To support an investigatory stop, “officers 

need only ‘reasonable suspicion’—that is, ‘a particularized 

and objective basis for suspecting the particular person 

stopped’ of breaking the law.” Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 536 

(quoting Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687). “The standard takes 

into account the totality of the circumstances—the whole 

picture.” Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Because Mr. Shields does not dispute that 

he violated the Chicago Municipal Code by parking in the 

cross walk, the officers clearly had an objective basis to 

believe that he was violating the law. See United States v. 

Choudhry, 461 F.3d 1097, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that 

15 R.41 at 3; see also id. at 4 (“Ernest Shields had complied with all reasonable requests and the reason for the police to approach and detain 

him had ended.”).

 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
18 No. 13-3726

a parking violation is sufficient to support an investigatory 

stop).

Ultimately, the officers had probable cause to arrest 

Mr. Shields after they seized him following his flight down 

the alley. An arrest may be supported by probable cause that 

the arrestee committed any offense, regardless of the crime 

charged or the crime the officer thought had been 

committed. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153–56 

(2004); United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1021 n.3 (7th 

Cir. 2011). Probable cause exists if a reasonable officer would 

believe “that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is 

about to commit an offense,” based on the “facts and 

circumstances within the officer’s knowledge.” Michigan v. 

DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). “Probable cause is a fluid 

concept based on common-sense interpretations of 

reasonable police officers as to the totality of the 

circumstances at the time of arrest.” United States v. Breit, 429 

F.3d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 2005).

The officers were aware of several facts that would allow 

a reasonable officer to believe that Mr. Shields committed an 

offense. First, Mr. Shields’s decision to run from the officers 

constituted another violation of law because he was 

interfering with the performance of their duty to investigate 

and, if appropriate, hold him accountable for the earlier 

violation. See 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a).16 Second, once 

Officer Coglianese saw Mr. Shields remove a firearm from 

his pocket, he had probable cause to believe that Mr. Shields

had violated Illinois’s statutory prohibition then in force 

16 See supra note 4.

 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
No. 13-3726 19

against carrying firearms.17 See 720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4) 

(prohibiting, with limited exceptions, the carrying of “any 

pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm”); cf. 

United States v. Price, 328 F.3d 958, 960 (7th Cir. 2003) (“In a 

situation, like the one here, where officers see a gun upon 

approaching a person, they certainly have ‘reasonable 

suspicion’ to restrain that person without violating Terry.”).

3.

In summary, the officers had at least reasonable 

suspicion at the time of their initial encounter with 

Mr. Shields and acquired additional bases for probable cause 

when Mr. Shields fled and removed the firearm from his 

pocket. Finally, at the time of their justifiable seizure in the 

alley, the weapon was in plain sight and clearly subject to 

seizure incident to the arrest. The district court, therefore, 

was on solid ground in denying Mr. Shields’s motion to 

suppress.

17 This court’s decision, subsequent to Mr. Shields’s arrest, that the prohibition on the carrying of firearms in public was unconstitutional, see 

Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012), does not alter our 

probable cause analysis, see Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37–38 

(1979) (“A prudent officer, in the course of determining whether respondent had committed an offense under all the circumstances shown 

by this record, should not have been required to anticipate that a court 

would later hold the ordinance unconstitutional.”).

 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
20 No. 13-3726

C. Brady Claim

Mr. Shields contends that the Government withheld 

evidence, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 

(1963), by failing to disclose a lawsuit filed in 2004 against 

the City of Chicago and twenty-six police officers, including 

Officer Coglianese. He submits that the information 

following an investigation, presumably conducted in 

response to that lawsuit, might have included exculpatory 

information and, at a minimum, be suitable for 

impeachment purposes. Mr. Shields did not raise the alleged 

Brady violation before the district court; we therefore review 

the claim for plain error. See United States v. Mota, 685 F.3d 

644, 648 (7th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, “the alleged Brady

violation must be an obvious error that affected [the 

defendant’s] substantial rights and created ‘a substantial risk 

of convicting an innocent person.’” Id. (quoting United States 

v. Daniel, 576 F.3d 772, 774 (7th Cir. 2009)).

To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must “show 

that (1) the [Government] suppressed evidence, (2) the 

evidence was favorable to the defense, and (3) the evidence 

was material to an issue at trial.” United States v. Villasenor, 

664 F.3d 673, 683 (7th Cir. 2011). Evidence is suppressed 

when “the prosecution fail[s] to disclose the evidence in time 

for the defendant to make use of it” and “the evidence was 

not otherwise available to the defendant through the exercise 

of reasonable diligence.” Ienco v. Angarone, 429 F.3d 680, 683 

(7th Cir. 2005). Although the Government has an affirmative 

duty to learn of and to disclose any favorable evidence, the 

defendant bears the burden of establishing a Brady violation 

by offering more than mere speculation or unsupported 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
No. 13-3726 21

assertions that the Government suppressed evidence. See 

United States v. Jumah, 599 F.3d 799, 808–09 (7th Cir. 2010).

Mr. Shields has failed to demonstrate that any evidence 

was suppressed by the Government. The lawsuit, and its 

settlement, have been publicly available since 2004. See 

Quarles v. City of Chicago, No. 1:04-cv-03753 (N.D. Ill. filed 

June 1, 2004). Mr. Shields could have accessed the settlement 

at any point before the suppression hearing and trial 

through the exercise of due diligence. See United States v. 

Walker, 746 F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that the 

defendant “never even asked the South [Holland] Police 

Department to provide him with the evidence”); United 

States v. White, 970 F.2d 328, 337 (7th Cir. 1992) (recognizing 

that, among other considerations in finding no Brady

violation, the defendants “had access to the bankruptcy file 

from which Center extracted and photocopied the notes he 

turned over to the government”).

Indeed, the record makes clear that Mr. Shields was able 

to obtain both the complaint and the settlement before the 

end of trial. In his motion for a new trial, Mr. Shields noted 

that “Officer Coglianese was part of a similar story in 

another case, which became the subject of a civil rights law 

suit.”18 Even at sentencing, he expressed his dissatisfaction 

with his trial counsel’s decision “not to bring [the prior 

lawsuit] up in court,” noting that “[s]he could have brought 

that up to the jurors to say, hey, I got a case similar like my 

18 R.100 at 6. Cf. United States v. White, 970 F.2d 328, 337 (7th Cir. 1992) 

(noting that the defendants introduced at trial “the very documents they 

accuse the government of ‘suppressing’”).

 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
22 No. 13-3726

client.”19 Given that the documents were publicly available 

and that Mr. Shields admittedly had accessed them, we 

cannot conclude that they were suppressed under Brady.

Mr. Shields notes that he does not focus solely on 

documents that were contained in the public record. He 

submits that the Government had access to the “underlying 

materials and evidence of alleged crimes committed by” 

Officer Coglianese.20 But a bare assertion that the 

prosecution suppressed evidence, without more, is not 

sufficient to prove a Brady violation. See Jumah, 599 F.3d at 

809. Mr. Shields does not point to any specific evidence that 

was suppressed by the Government. Instead, he theorizes 

that, following the filing of the claim, the police department 

initiated an investigation during which it created documents 

that show that Officer Coglianese did in fact plant evidence 

on the plaintiff. There is no reason to think that Mr. Shields’s 

speculation is accurate. See United States v. Andrus, 775 F.2d 

825, 843 (7th Cir. 1985) (denying request for discovery of 

personnel files for law enforcement witnesses because there 

was no suggestion that the personnel files actually contained 

favorable evidence).

Furthermore, if Mr. Shields had some basis for his belief 

that Officer Coglianese’s file contained evidence that could 

be used for impeachment purposes, “he could have 

requested that the district court undertake a review in camera

of the Government’s files.” Jumah, 599 F.3d at 809 (citing 

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 n.15 (1987)). “Such a 

19 R.146 at 28.

20 Reply Br. 5.

 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
No. 13-3726 23

review is the accepted procedure for resolving legitimate

doubt about the existence of undisclosed material and one 

that balances the defendant’s important need for access to 

potentially relevant material with the Government’s valid 

interest in protecting confidential files and the integrity of 

pending investigations.” Id. at 810 (emphasis added). Here, 

we have nothing but speculation. Accordingly, we cannot 

conclude that the Government committed a Brady violation.

D. Motion to Continue

Mr. Shields also contends that the district court erred in 

denying his motion to continue the trial to allow him to file 

replies in support of the pending motions and to locate two 

witnesses. We will reverse the district court’s denial of a 

motion for a continuance only for an abuse of discretion and 

upon a showing of actual prejudice. United States v. Price, 520 

F.3d 753, 760 (7th Cir. 2008).

A district court should consider several factors when 

ruling upon a motion to continue, including 

(1) the amount of time available for 

preparation; (2) the likelihood of prejudice 

from denial of the continuance; (3) the 

defendant’s role in shortening the effective 

preparation time; (4) the degree of complexity 

of the case; (5) the availability of discovery 

from the prosecution; (6) the likelihood a 

continuance would have satisfied the movant’s 

needs; and (7) the inconvenience and burden to 

the district court and its pending case load.

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
24 No. 13-3726

United States v. Crowder, 588 F.3d 929, 936 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting United States v. Miller, 327 F.3d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 

2003)). These factors are not exhaustive, and the district 

court is in the best position to determine their relative 

weight at the time the continuance is requested. See id. “The 

party requesting the continuance should identify the specific 

risk of prejudice, because a court may properly deny a 

motion to continue that is based wholly on ‘vague and 

conclusory’ statements.” Id. (quoting United States v. Robbins, 

197 F.3d 829, 846 (7th Cir. 1999)).

We cannot conclude that the district court abused its 

discretion in denying Mr. Shields’s motion for a continuance. 

Mr. Shields requested the continuance three business days 

before the start of trial. He had waited, moreover, until after 

the filing deadline had passed before requesting that the 

court grant him additional time to reply. After noting that 

Mr. Shields had not filed a motion requesting an extension, 

the district court reasonably explained that it was “way too 

late” to request an extension or a continuance.21 See Blue v. 

Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 698 F.3d 587, 594 (7th Cir. 

2012) (noting that “courts have an interest in keeping 

litigation moving forward and that maintaining respect for 

set deadlines is essential to achieving that goal”).

Similarly, the district court did not err in determining 

that Mr. Shields had enough time to prepare for trial. The 

record indicates that Mr. Shields’s counsel filed an 

appearance approximately three months before trial. The 

case was not particularly complex, as Mr. Shields concedes, 

21 R.142 at 2.

 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
No. 13-3726 25

and the trial lasted only three days. Given these 

circumstances, Mr. Shields had adequate time to prepare. See

United States v. Bush, 820 F.2d 858, 860–61 (7th Cir. 1987) 

(holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying a continuance when the defendant had three 

months to prepare for a simple case, with one defendant, in 

a trial that lasted three days).

Nor has Mr. Shields made a convincing argument that he 

has suffered prejudice by the lack of additional time to 

prepare. Mr. Shields’s vague allegations that additional time 

would have resulted in a more vigorous defense are 

insufficient to establish the prejudice necessary to overturn 

the district court’s determination. See Crowder, 588 F.3d at 937

(holding that the defendant could not “rely on vague and 

conclusory statements about his abstract need for more time 

to review the evidence”). Mr. Shields suggested that he was 

attempting to get two witnesses “in line.”22 He contends that 

the district court erred by not inquiring into the identity of 

the additional witnesses. But it appears that, had the district 

court asked Mr. Shields for the names of the witnesses he 

sought, he would have been unable to provide them. Indeed, 

Mr. Shields was unable to identify the witnesses that he was 

seeking either in his briefs or at oral argument. Instead, he 

submits that the witnesses may have been Flourney, who 

testified at the suppression hearing, and Kelly Quarles, who 

filed the above mentioned lawsuit against the City of 

Chicago. Without a clearer explanation of the witnesses 

sought and the prejudice that Mr. Shields faced from the 

inability to obtain their testimony, we cannot conclude that 

22 R.142 at 2.

 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
26 No. 13-3726

Mr. Shields was prejudiced by the court’s denial. Cf. United 

States v. Aviles, 623 F.2d 1192, 1197 (7th Cir. 1980) (noting that 

“the contention that the appellant did not call additional 

witnesses for any reason other than his own trial strategy is 

unsupported by the record”); United States v. Walker, 621 F.2d 

163, 168 (5th Cir. 1980) (“In moving for a continuance based 

on the unavailability of witnesses, a movant must show that: 

‘due diligence has been exercised to obtain the attendance of 

the witness, that substantial favorable evidence would be 

tendered by the witness, that the witness is available and 

willing to testify, and that the denial of the continuance 

would materially prejudice the defendant.’” (quoting United 

States v. Miller, 513 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1975)).

E. Consideration of Prior Convictions Under the ACCA

Mr. Shields contends that the district court erred in 

considering two of his prior convictions when sentencing 

him under the ACCA. Specifically, he submits that the 

district court should not have considered his prior 

convictions for aggravated battery and residential burglary 

because his civil rights had been restored.

Under § 924(e)(1), a defendant convicted of possessing a 

firearm following three prior violent felony convictions must 

be sentenced to a mandatory fifteen-year minimum sentence. 

Convictions for which a defendant’s civil rights have been 

restored are excluded from consideration. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 921(a)(20). The defendant bears the burden of proving that 

his rights were restored by a preponderance of the evidence. 

United States v. Foster, 652 F.3d 776, 793 (7th Cir. 2011). To 

meet his burden, a defendant must prove that his rights to 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
No. 13-3726 27

vote, hold public office, and serve on a jury were restored, 

and the restoration document must not warn about a 

lingering firearms disability. See Buchmeier v. United States, 

581 F.3d 561, 564, 566 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc). We review de 

novo whether a district court erred in sentencing a 

defendant under the ACCA, “except to the extent that the 

alleged error implicates a factual finding, which we review 

for clear error.” Foster, 652 F.3d at 792 (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Shields testified that he 

received a letter in 2003 stating that his civil rights were 

restored. We have recognized, however, that a defendant 

cannot meet his burden by relying on a vague recollection 

that he received a letter restoring his civil rights. See id. at 

793. Mr. Shields did not present the letter to the district 

court, nor has he provided it on appeal. The only other 

evidence to which Mr. Shields points in order to support his 

claim that his civil rights were restored is the PSR. The PSR 

indicates that his aggravated battery and residential 

burglary sentences were discharged on May 9, 2002.23 But 

the discharge of Mr. Shields’s convictions does not, on its 

own, establish that his civil rights were restored. See 

Buchmeier, 581 F.3d at 564–65 (analyzing discharge letter to 

determine if defendant’s civil rights were restored). 

23 In his brief, Mr. Shields attempts to place the burden of proving 

whether a prior conviction qualifies under the ACCA on the 

Government. Mr. Shields invites our attention to the discharge language 

in the PSR and concludes that the Government did not prove that the 

prior convictions were “convictions” for the purposes of sentencing. As 

we stated above, however, it is the defendant, and not the Government, 

who must prove that his rights were restored.

 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
28 No. 13-3726

Accordingly, Mr. Shields has not carried his burden, and 

therefore the court did not err in considering his prior 

convictions for sentencing under the ACCA.

F. Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)

Finally, Mr. Shields contends that § 922(g)(1) violates his 

right to bear arms under the Second Amendment of the 

United States Constitution. He relies on the Supreme Court’s 

decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), 

and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010), as 

well as our decision in Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th 

Cir. 2012).

The Supreme Court has recognized that the Second 

Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear 

arms for his personal defense. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. The 

Court noted, however, that nothing in its opinion “should be 

taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the 

possession of firearms by felons.” See id. at 626.24

Applying Supreme Court precedent, we have 

acknowledged that some categorical bans on firearm 

possession are constitutional. See United States v. Skoien, 614 

F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Indeed, in United 

States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2010), we addressed 

the exact question presented here: whether the prohibition of 

24 Accord McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“We made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast 

doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as prohibitions on the 

possession of firearms by felons... . We repeat those assurances here.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

 

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29
No. 13-3726 29

firearm possession by a convicted felon under § 922(g)(1) is 

constitutional. We concluded that keeping firearms out of 

the hands of violent felons is an important objective, and, 

because the defendant was a violent felon, applying 

§ 922(g)(1) to the defendant was substantially related to that 

objective. See id. at 693.

Because Mr. Shields was convicted of three violent 

felonies, applying § 922(g)(1) here is substantially related to 

the Government’s important interest in keeping firearms 

away from violent felons. We thus conclude that § 922(g)(1) 

is constitutional as applied to Mr. Shields.

Conclusion

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

Case: 13-3726 Document: 44 Filed: 06/15/2015 Pages: 29