Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02004/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02004-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Algie King
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH FIL ., J 

United States C.0F!, ~f Appea\F Tenth C1reu1t 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

ALGIE KING, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

NOV 13 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-2004 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. CR-91-318-SC) 

Stephen R. Kotz, Assistant United States Attorney (Don J. Svet, 

United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Jeffrey J. Buckels, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for DefendantAppellee. 

Before LOGAN, HOLLOWAY and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 92-2004 Document: 010110148682 Date Filed: 11/13/1992 Page: 1 
The only issue in this appeal is whether a New Mexico state 

conviction for conspiracy to commit a violent felony is a conviction of a violent felony for purposes of the sentence enhancement 

provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). We hold that it is not, and 

therefore affirm the district court's judgment to that effect. 

After a jury trial, defendant Algie King was convicted of 

being a previously convicted felon in possession of a firearm, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g). Section 924 (e) (1) of the same 

title provides for a mandatory enhanced penalty of not less than 

fifteen years imprisonment for defendant if he "has three previous 

convictions ... for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, 

or both, committed on occasions different from one another." In 

this case, defendant's criminal history included New Mexico state 

court convictions for involuntary manslaughter and for aggravated 

battery, both conceded to be "violent felonies," and for conspiracy to GOmmit armed robbery. 1 The district court refused to 

accord the conspiracy conviction "violent felony" status for purposes of§ 924(e), finding that the elements required to prove a 

conspiracy in New Mexico--that the defendant and another person 

agreed together to commit an offense and that they intended to 

commit that offense--did not meet the statutory definition. See 

N.M. Unif. Jury Instr.--Criminal, No. 14-2810 (Michie 1986). The 

government has appealed. 

1 Defendant had another conviction for robbery in Tennessee in 

1955. The district court refused to consider this conviction for 

purposes of sentence enhancement, finding it to have been uncounseled and thus unconstitutionally obtained. The United States 

does not challenge that ruling. 

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The definition of "violent felony" for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924 is as follows: 

[T]he term "violent felony" means any crime punishable 

by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . 

that--

(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, 

or threatened use of physical force against the 

person of another; or 

(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, 

involves the use of explosives, or otherwise 

involves conduct that presents a serious potential 

risk of physical injury to another[.] 

Id. § 924(e) (2) (B). Because the issue is one of statutory interpretation, we review the district court's judgment de novo. 

United States v. Maines, 920 F.2d 1525, 1527 n.4 (10th Cir. 1990), 

cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 263 (1991). For purposes of§ 924(e), 

the courts do not inquire into the particular factual circumstances surrounding the past offenses. We look "only to the fact 

of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense." 

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990). This formal 

categorical approach was mandated by the Supreme Court to avoid 

"the practical difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual 

approach" to each prior conviction. Id. at 601. 

The only appellate decision to have considered a conspiracy 

conviction under§ 924(e) (2) (B) is United States v. Preston, 910 

F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1002 (1991). 

There the court ruled that the defendant's Pennsylvania state 

court conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery was indeed a 

"violent felony" under§ 924(e) for sentence enhancement purposes. 

The court reasoned that "Pennsylvania law requires that the crime 

that was the object of the conspiracy be defined for the jury. 

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Thus, the elements of criminal conspiracy to commit robbery ... 

subsume the elements of robbery, which is a violent felony for 

purposes of § 924 (e). '' Id. at 86 (footnote omitted). The court 

held that a conviction for conspiracy to commit a violent felony 

fell within the first of the two alternative definitions: that it 

"has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 

physical force against the person of another." 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e) (2) (Bl (i). Although the Third Circuit's interpretation 

may be proper under Pennsylvania law, we think that it is not a 

proper construction as applied to New Mexico law. 

To convict a defendant of conspiracy in New Mexico, the state 

must prove that the defendant and another person agreed together 

to commit a felony and that they intended to commit the felony. 

Although the crime forming the basis of the conspiracy must be 

explained to the jury, New Mexico law is clear that" [t]he overt 

act which constitutes the object of the conspiracy is no part of 

the crime of conspiracy; indeed, an overt act is not required, but 

the crime is complete when the felonious agreement is reached." 

State v. Leyba, 600 P.2d 312, 313 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979); see also 

State v. Jacobs, 701 P.2d 400, 404 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) ("It makes 

no difference to the conspiracy charge whether an aggravated burglary was proved or whether that charge was dismissed. The proof 

required was of an agreement to accomplish an unlawful purpose or 

a lawful purpose by unlawful means."); State v. Gilbert, 644 P.2d 

1066, 1070 (N .M. Ct. App. 1982) ( "It is the agreement constituting 

the conspiracy which the statute punishes."). Consequently, the 

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elements of the felonious object of the conspiracy are not subsumed within the elements of the conspiracy charge itself. Therefore, if a conspiracy to commit armed robbery is to be deemed a 

"violent felony" under § 924 '(e) (2) (B) (i), it must be on the basis 

of the elements of the conspiracy charge, not the underlying substantive offense. 

We thus consider whether a conspiracy charge "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 

against the person of another." Id. Clearly neither actual nor 

attempted use of force is required for conviction under conspiracy 

law; the object of conspiracy statutes is to make it unnecessary _ 

for law enforcement officials to wait for such acts to occur 

before intervening. Whether the intent to commit a violent felony 

constitutes a "threatened use of physical force" is more problematic . Read broadly, the formed intent of the conspirators does 

constitute a inchoate "threat" to both the impending target of the 

contemplated felony and to society as a whole. In this context, 

however, "threatened use of physical force" means both an intent 

to use force and a communication of that intent. Cf. Black's Law 

Dictionary 1480 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "threat" as 11 [a] communicated intent to inflict physical or other harm on any person 

or on property"). Because the crime of conspiracy in New Mexico 

is complete upon the formation of the intent to commit a felony, 

and does not require that any action be taken on that intent, the 

elements of a conspiracy to commit a violent felony do not _include 

the threatened use of physical force. We therefore hold that a 

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conspiracy conviction does not qualify as a "violent felony" under 

the first statutory definition of § 924 (e) (2) (B) (i). 

The second statutory definition of "violent felony" under 

§ 924 (e) (2) (B) (ii) defines it as a felony that "is burglary, 

arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise 

involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." In Preston, the Third Circuit; having 

determined that conspiracy fell within the subsection (i) definition, did not explicitly reach subsection (ii). In a footnote, 

however, the court stated that conspiracies to commit violent 

felonies "would appear to be included within subsection (ii), 

because they otherwise involve conduct that presents a serious 

potential risk of physical injury to another." Preston, 910 F.2d 

at 87 n.8. Declining to reach the question, the court noted that 

"Congress may have intended to limit subsection (ii) to property 

crimes." Id. An examination of the history of subsection (ii), 

however, as summarized by the Supreme Court in Taylor, illustrates 

that the reference to property crimes was added just before passage, and the primary purpose of the subsection was to expand the 

predicate offenses that could support an enhanced sentence. 

The version of subsection (ii) originally reported by the 

House Committee on the Judiciary read as follows: "(ii) involves 

conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury 

to another." Taylor, 495 U.S. at 586. Only just prior to enactment were the specific references to the property crimes added to 

the subsection, to make clear their inclusion as predicate 

offenses. Id. at 587. Thus, subsection (ii) is not limited to 

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property offenses, but rather includes them along with other violent crimes. We believe the Fourth Circuit was correct in holding 

that "the catchall, 'otherwise' clause of [subsection (ii)] must 

be limited in its application to offenses which, as defined, pose 

by their very nature a serious potential risk of injury to another." United States v. Headspeth, 852 F.2d 753, 759 (4th Cir. 

1988) . 

A strong argument can be made that a conspiracy to commit a 

violent felony presents a serious potential risk of physical 

injury to another, and is therefore itself a "violent felony" for 

purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Construing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), 

providing for an enhanced sentence if the offender used a deadly 

weapon while committing a "crime of violence," two circuits have 

determined that a conspiracy to commit such a crime creates a 

"substantial risk" of violence, and that therefore a conspiracy 

conviction may form the basis for a sentence enhancement in that 

context. United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1099 (5th Cir. 

1991), aff'd in pertinent part, 968 F.2d 433, 438 (5th Cir. 1992) 

(en bane); United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 403-04 (2d 

Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464, 1474 

n.11 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1006 (1987). 

Although we have not considered this precise issue previously, we do not write on a clean slate. In United States v. 

Strahl, 958 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992), we held that attempted burglary was not a violent felony for purposes of§ 924(e). This 

court rejected an argument that it involved conduct presenting "a 

serious potential risk of physical injury to another," within the 

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compass of§ 924(e) (2) (B) (ii). Following Taylor's categorical 

approach of focusing upon the statutory elements, rather than the 

specific conduct underlying the conviction, we stated that 

attempted burglary convictions could be for conduct that does not 

involve risk of physical injury; "these offenses do not necessarily present circumstances which create the high risk of violent 

confrontation inherent in a completed burglary." Strahl, 958 F.2d 

at 986. In so holding, this court cited legislative history of 

unenacted predecessor bills to that which contained § 924, that 

had explicitly included attempts to commit burglary as violent 

felonies. To the extent legislative history is relevant here, we 

note that those unenacted provisions also included conspiracy as a 

predicate offense, along with attempts. Id. (citing s. 52, 98th 

Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1984) and S. 1688, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 

(1982)). No reference to conspiracy, however, was included in the 

final version ultimately enacted . 

We followed Strahl in United States v. Permenter, 969 F.2d 

911 (10th Cir. 1992). Reviewing an argument that the defendant's 

attempted burglary presented a "serious risk of potential injury" 

within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2) (B) (ii), we stated: 

"In Strahl, however, we did not look beyond the relevant statutory 

language in discussing Mr. Strahl's prior conviction for attempted 

burglary in Utah, nor did we remand for further consideration of 

the attempted burglary conviction." Id. at 913. We then refused 

to go beyond the face of the statute, even to consider the accusations of actual conduct in the information charging the defendant 

with the attempted burglary crime. 

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} 

We believe these prior Tenth Circuit cases and the approach 

they articulate require us to look only to the elements of the 

conspiracy crime under New Mexico law. Because they "do not necessarily present circumstances which created the high risk of violent confrontation inherent in a completed [armed robbery]," 

Strahl, 958 F.2d at 986, the government's argument must fail under 

subsection (ii) as well. 

AFFIRMED. 

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