Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00058/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00058-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Charles Joseph Haydostian
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES JOSEPH HAYDOSTIAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security

Defendant.

Case No. 1:15-CV-00058-EPG

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S 

SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Charles Joseph Haydostian (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of the final decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying his

application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) pursuant to Title II of the Social Security 

Act. The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted without 

oral argument to the Honorable Erica P. Grosjean, United States Magistrate Judge.1 Upon a 

review of the administrative record, the Court finds the ALJ’s decision is proper and is supported 

by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Accordingly, this Court affirms the agency’s 

determination to deny benefits and denies Plaintiff’s appeal.

///

///

 

1 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. (Doc. 6 and 7).

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II. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff filed an application for DIB in September 2011, alleging a disability onset date of 

December 1, 2009.

2 AR 180. His application was denied initially in January 2012 and on 

reconsideration in July 2012. AR 122, 128. A hearing was conducted before Administrative Law 

Judge John Cusker (“ALJ”) on January 9, 2013. AR 32-62. On May 31, 2013, the ALJ issued a 

decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. AR 16-30. Plaintiff filed an appeal of the decision 

with the Appeals Council. AR 5-7. The Appeals Council denied his appeal, rendering the order 

the final decision of the Commissioner. AR 1-3.

Plaintiff now challenges that decision, arguing that the ALJ erred by: (1) relying on 

nonexamining physicians over treating and examining physicians without an adequate basis, (2) 

finding the Plaintiff not credible, and (3) not including all of Plaintiff’s impairments in the 

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) determination. 3(Doc. 15, pgs. 6-8). Plaintiff argues that 

the Court should reverse and award benefits to Plaintiff. In the alternative, Plaintiff contends the 

case should be remanded for further administrative proceedings. In opposition, Defendant argues

that the ALJ: (1) properly found Plaintiff not entirely credible, (2) properly evaluated the medical 

opinion evidence, and (3) properly did not account for unsupported limitations in the RFC 

assessment. (Doc. 26, pgs. 5-12).

A. Plaintiff’s Testimony

Plaintiff testified that he attended school through the tenth grade, and took a high school 

proficiency examination. AR 37. After receiving six months vocational training as a welder, he 

went on to work as a structural steel fitter for 15 years. AR 37. After December 2009, the alleged 

onset date, Plaintiff worked part time doing other odd jobs at work sites for his employer because 

his pain prevented him from doing his welder work. AR 38-39.

Plaintiff testified that he cannot stand for more than short periods because his feet swell and 

become numb. AR 41-42. It is also difficult for him to grasp and lift things with his left hand and 

 

2 References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate page number.

3 Residual functional capacity captures what a claimant “can still do despite [his or her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 

416.945. “Between steps three and four of the five-step evaluation, the ALJ must proceed to an intermediate step in 

which the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity.” Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1151 n. 2 

(9th Cir. 2007).

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arm. AR 42. He has difficulty bending and can only lift 15 pounds. AR 43, 45. He cannot reach 

overhead or outward repeatedly with his left arm. AR 46. The fingers of his left hand “curl up” 

into a fist after 20 minutes of use. AR 48. He experiences pain on the left side of his head, face, 

and neck. AR 44. In response to pain and dizziness he spends seven to eight hours lying down 

during the day. AR 43-44. Plaintiff testified he cannot afford to see a doctor. AR 42, 49. He has 

sought no treatment and taken no medication, including over-the-counter medication, since 

January 2012. AR 40, 50-51. Plaintiff received unemployment insurance until December 2012. 

AR 50.

B. Medical Record

The entire medical record was reviewed by the Court. However, only evidence that relates 

to the issues raised in this appeal is summarized below.

i. Medical Treatment History

On October 2009, just before the alleged onset date of December 2009, CT scans showed 

Plaintiff had acute and chronic sinusitis. AR 261. Starting in September 2009, Plaintiff received 

primary care treatment from Patrick Brauner, M.D. AR 271. Dr. Brauner prescribed Plaintiff 

narcotic medications for complaints of facial pain. AR 270. Dr. Brauner referred Plaintiff for 

sleep studies in May 2010 but he refused the services. AR 267. Dr. Brauner also referred Plaintiff 

for a neurological examination regarding his complaints of facial pain. AR 264. On August 4, 

2010, Plaintiff requested that Dr. Brauner write a note to put him on temporary disability, but Dr. 

Brauner refused until the results of the neurological examination were back. Plaintiff became 

angry, and Dr. Brauner stopped treating Plaintiff. AR 264, 284.

On August 24, 2010, Madhav Suri, M.D., performed a neurological examination (on 

referral from Dr. Brauner) to evaluate Plaintiff for complaints of left facial pain and left arm pain. 

AR 285-88. He diagnosed Plaintiff with “left facial pain, atypical, suggestive of left trigeminal 

neuralgia atypical facial pain.” AR 284. On September 3, 2010, nerve conduction studies showed 

abnormal results of median nerve entrapment at the wrists, left greater than the right. AR 289-90.

In October 2010, Ernest Yamamoto, M.D., who had been treating Plaintiff for allegations 

of facial pain, reported Plaintiff was non-compliant with medications and Dr. Yamamoto said he

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would no longer serve as Plaintiff’s physician. AR 343-45. In November 2010, Dr. Suri declined 

to prescribe Plaintiff narcotics Plaintiff had requested based on Dr. Brauner’s recommendation 

that other medications should be considered. AR 284. From November 2010 to July 2011, 

Plaintiff saw Michael Castillo, M.D., periodically for complaints of facial pain and he received 

medication refills. AR 328-29, 331, 334, 341-42.

Plaintiff’s last medical treatment was in January 2012, when he went to the hospital with 

facial and left arm pain and requested medication refills. AR 362. Physical examination findings 

at that time were unremarkable. AR 363-64.

ii. Consultative Examiner, Dr. Portnoff, Ph.D.

On November 18, 2011, Lance A. Portnoff, Ph.D., performed a consultative psychological 

examination. AR 348-52. Plaintiff reported that he felt depressed about his health and did not like 

to be around people. AR 349. Dr. Portnoff diagnosed a depressive disorder, NOS, with anxious 

features, and methamphetamine abuse in full sustained remission. AR 351. He found that Plaintiff 

demonstrated adequate concentration, persistence, and pace with appropriate thought content and 

intact memory. AR 349-50. Dr. Portnoff opined that Plaintiff was capable of performing simple 

and repetitive tasks. AR 351. He further opined Plaintiff had moderate limitations in his ability to 

accept instructions from supervisors, interact with the public, maintain regular attendance, 

complete a normal workday or workweek, and deal with the stress encountered in a competitive 

work environment. AR 351-52.

iii. Consultative Examiner, Dr. Wagner, M.D.

On December 14, 2011, Roger Wagner, M.D., performed a consultative internal medicine

examination. AR 355-59. Plaintiff only indicated problems with facial and arm pain, and the

examiner observed that Plaintiff previously had sinus surgery. AR 355, 357. Dr. Wagner 

diagnosed left ulnar side fourth and fifth finger pain and numbness, and left facial pain possibly 

consistent with trigeminal neuralgia, AR 359. Dr. Wagner assessed a normal range of motion 

with full motor strength in the bilateral extremities, including the left elbow, AR 356-57. The 

doctor recorded that he was able to touch Plaintiff’s face without any difficulty, AR 359. Dr. 

Wagner opined Plaintiff had no exertional or postural limitations except that he should avoid 

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climbing or balancing on ladders or scaffolds given his reported history of vertigo. AR 359. He 

further opined Plaintiff had no manipulative limitations involving his right (dominant) hand, but 

he was limited to frequent manipulative activities with the left hand.

iv. State Agency Medical Evaluators

On December 15, 2011, G. Ikawa, M.D., a State agency physician, reviewed the evidence

and opined Plaintiff could sustain simple repetitive tasks with limited public contact. AR 72-74.

On June 27, 2012, Anna M. Franco, Psy.D., reviewed the evidence and affirmed Dr. Ikawa’s 

opinion regarding Plaintiff’s mental abilities. AR 105-107.

On January 11, 2012, Martha A. Goodrich, M.D., a State agency physician, reviewed the 

evidence of record and opined Plaintiff had no exertional limitations, but he was limited to 

occasionally crawling and climbing ladders, ropes and scaffolds. AR 70-72. Dr. Goodrich further 

opined Plaintiff was limited to gross and fine manipulation with the left upper extremity and 

needed to avoid exposure to vibration, and in particular, he was limited to occasionally using 

vibratory hand tools with either upper extremity. AR 71-72. On June 20, 2012, State agency 

physician L. Bobba, M.D., reviewed the evidence and endorsed Dr. Goodrich’s opinion. AR 103-

105. 

III. THE DISABILITY DETERMINATION PROCESS

To qualify for benefits under the Social Security Act, a plaintiff must establish that he or 

she is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less 

than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). An individual shall be considered to have a 

disability only if:

. . . his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he 

is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering his age, 

education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful 

work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work 

exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy 

exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

To achieve uniformity in the decision-making process, the Commissioner has established 

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a sequential five-step process for evaluating a claimant’s alleged disability. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1502(a)-(f). The ALJ proceeds through the steps and stops upon reaching a dispositive 

finding that the claimant is or is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a)(4). The ALJ must consider 

objective medical evidence and opinion testimony. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.

Specifically, the ALJ is required to determine: (1) whether a claimant engaged in 

substantial gainful activity during the period of alleged disability, (2) whether the claimant had 

medically-determinable “severe” impairments,

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(3) whether these impairments meet or are 

medically equivalent to one of the listed impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1, (4) whether the claimant retained the RFC to perform his or her past relevant work,

and (5) whether the claimant had the ability to perform other jobs existing in significant numbers 

at the regional and national level. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f).

Using the Social Security Administration’s five-step sequential evaluation process, the 

ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not meet the disability standard. AR 19. In particular, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act though 

September 30, 2015. AR 21. Further, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since December 1, 2009, the alleged onset date. AR 21. The ALJ identified

“history of left ulnar side fourth and fifth finger pain and numbness, status post-surgery; history 

of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, with left greater than the right; trigeminal neuralgia; 

depressive disorder, not otherwise specified (NOS) with anxious features; and a history of 

methamphetamine use, in sustained full remission” as severe impairments. AR 21. The ALJ also

determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1. AR 22.

Based on a review of the entire record, the ALJ determined that:

[Plaintiff] has the [RFC] to perform work at all exertional levels, 

but is limited to occasionally crawling and climbing ladders, ropes, 

or scaffolds. He is also limited to frequent gross and fine 

 

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“Severe” simply means that the impairment significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic 

work activities. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).

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manipulation with the left upper extremity, and must avoid 

concentrated exposure to vibration; specifically he is limited to 

occasionally using vibratory hand tools with either upper extremity. 

In addition, he is capable of sustaining simple repetitive tasks with 

limited public contact.

AR 23.

Based on this RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work. 

AR 26. However, the ALJ found that because there were a significant number of other jobs in the 

national economy which Plaintiff could perform, he was not disabled. AR 26.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision 

to deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations, 

this Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial 

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner's 

decision to determine whether: (1) it is supported by substantial evidence, and (2) it applies the 

correct legal standards. See Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); 

Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). 

“Substantial evidence means more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Thomas 

v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). It is “relevant evidence which, considering the 

record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.

“Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports 

the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld.” Id.

V. DISCUSSION

A. The ALJ’s Assessment of the Medical Opinions is Supported by Substantial

Evidence.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly considered the medical evidence regarding 

Plaintiff’s impairments. Specifically, Plaintiff is challenging the ALJ’s reliance on nonexamining 

physicians over examining and treating physicians. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly relied 

on the opinion of non-examining sources and did not address the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating 

physicians. (Doc. 15, pg. 7).

Defendant contends that the ALJ’s assessment of the medical analysis is supported by 

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substantial evidence and that the ALJ properly provided reasons for the weight accorded to the 

medical opinions. Specifically, Defendant argues that the ALJ did not discuss treating physician 

opinions because there were no treating physician opinions and in relying on the nonexamining 

opinions, the ALJ adopted the most restrictive physical opinion findings in the record and 

adequately accounted for Plaintiff’s impairments. (Doc. 16, pgs. 8-11).

1. Legal Standards for Medical Opinions

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are offered by 

treating, examining, or non-examining (reviewing) professionals. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 

F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 2001); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, 

more weight is given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a greater opportunity to 

know and observe the patient as an individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir.

1996).

An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical 

professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. In contrast, a 

contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be rejected for “specific and 

legitimate” reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. While a treating professional's opinion is generally 

accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted by an examining professional's opinion (when 

supported by different independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews 

v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995), citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 

(9th Cir. 1989). The regulations require the ALJ to weigh the contradicted treating physician 

opinion, Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2001), except that the ALJ need not give it 

any weight if it is conclusory and supported by minimal clinical findings. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 

F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999) (treating physician's conclusory, minimally supported opinion 

rejected); see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. 

The opinion of an examining physician is, in turn, entitled to greater weight than the 

opinion of a non-examining physician. Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990); 

Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1984). As is the case with the opinion of a treating 

physician, the Commissioner must provide “clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting the 

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uncontradicted opinion of an examining physician. And like the opinion of a treating doctor, the 

opinion of an examining doctor, even if contradicted by another doctor, can only be rejected for 

specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 

F.3d at 830. 

The opinion of a non-examining physician may constitute substantial evidence when it is 

“consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record.” Thomas, 278 F.3d 

at 957. Such independent reasons may include laboratory test results or contrary reports from 

examining physicians, and Plaintiff's testimony when it conflicts with the treating physician's 

opinion. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831, citing Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751–55.

2. The ALJ’s Findings

When evaluating Plaintiff’s mental impairments and the doctor’s opinion evidence, the 

ALJ states as follows:

These findings are based upon and consistent with the opinion of 

State agency consultant, Anna M. Franco, Psy.D., who opined the 

claimant had the exact same limitations in a Psychiatric Review 

Technique Form dated June 27, 2012. I accord great weight to the 

opinion of Dr. Franco because it is supported by and consistent with 

the medical evidence, including the consultative psychological 

examination report, which showed [Plaintiff] demonstrated 

adequate concentration, persistence, and pace with appropriate 

thought content and in an intact memory. 

AR 22 (citations omitted).

G. Ikawa, M.D., a State agency consultant, reviewed the evidence, 

and opined the claimant was able to sustain simple repetitive tasks 

with limited public contact....I accord the most weight to [Dr. 

Franco and Dr. Ikawa’s] opinions because they are supported by 

and consistent with the record, including the findings and opinion 

of [consultative psychological examiner] Dr. Portnoff. Further, 

considering the lack of any mental health treatment, these opinions 

more than adequately accounts [sic] for his mental impairments. 

AR 25 (citations omitted).

When evaluating Plaintiff’s physical impairments and the doctor’s opinion evidence, the 

ALJ states as follows:

No treating physician has provided an opinion regarding 

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[Plaintiff’s] residual functional capacity, but Dr. Wagner, who 

examined [Plaintiff], opined [Plaintiff] had no exertional or postural 

limitations except for his ability to climb or balance on ladders or 

scaffolds. He further opined [Plaintiff] had no manipulative 

limitations involving his right [dominant] hand, but was limited to 

frequent manipulative activities with the left. I accord weight to this 

opinion because it is generally consistent with the record, including 

the unremarkable examination findings, and lack of consistent 

treatment. The opinion is also consistent with abnormal nerve 

conduction studies and left ulnar side pain and numbness.

...Martha A. Goodrich, M.D., a State agency medical consultant, 

reviewed the evidence of record, and opined [Plaintiff] had no 

exertional limitations, but was limited to occasionally crawling and 

climbing ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. Dr. Goodrich further opined 

[Plaintiff] was limited to frequent gross and fine manipulation with 

the left upper extremity and needed to avoid exposure to vibration, 

in particular, he was limited to occasionally using vibratory hand 

tools with either upper extremity. L. Bobba, M.D., another State 

agency medical consultant, reviewed the evidence and endorsed this 

opinion....I accord the most weight to their opinions because the 

evidence, including the report and opinion of Dr. Wagner support 

them. These opinions are also consistent [with] other medical 

findings, and with the lack of continuing treatment.

AR 24 (citations omitted).

3. Analysis

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff did not adequately brief the issue of whether the ALJ 

properly considered the treating physicians’ opinions. Plaintiff’s counsel makes a general 

argument consisting of three paragraphs with general references to the medical record in the 

opening brief (Doc. 15, pg. 7), but only develops the argument by citing to specific treating 

physician records in the reply, after the Commissioner filed its opposition. This is improper as 

the Commissioner has not been given an opportunity to address Plaintiff’s arguments. See, Indep. 

Towers of Washington v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). (“Our circuit has repeatedly admonished that we cannot manufacture 

arguments for an appellant and therefore we will not consider any claims that were not actually 

argued in appellant's opening brief. Rather, we review only issues which are argued specifically 

and distinctly in a party's opening brief.”); See also Provenz v. Miller, 102 F. 3d 1478, 1483 (9th

Cir. 1996) (raising new issues and submission of new facts in reply brief is improper if other 

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party is not allowed to respond) cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997). 

Notwithstanding the lack of argument on this issue until the reply brief, the Court is not 

persuaded by Plaintiff’s arguments. The ALJ is not required to comment on every detail in every 

report. As noted in Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-1395 (9th Cir. 1984), “[t]he 

Secretary . . . need not discuss all evidence presented to her. Rather, she must explain why 

‘significant probative evidence has been rejected.’” An ALJ may reject a medical opinion that 

includes “no specific assessment of [the claimant's] functional capacity” during the relevant time 

period. Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir.1995). Likewise, an ALJ can disregard a 

medical report that does “not show how [a claimant's] symptoms translate into specific functional 

deficits which preclude work activity.” Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 601 

(9th Cir.1999); see also Meanel, 172 F.3d at 1114 (ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion that 

failed to explain the extent or significance of a condition).

Here, the crux of Plaintiff’s argument is that the ALJ improperly evaluated the medical 

record because he failed to consider the treating physicians’ opinions. However, Plaintiff does not 

identify, nor has the Court found, any treating physician opinion. “Medical opinions are 

statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect 

judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, 

diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental 

restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a)(2). The only medical evidence in the record from Plaintiff’s 

treating physicians are treatment records. While some of these records indicate that Plaintiff had 

chronic pain, median nerve entrapment at the wrist, arm pain, and left facial pain, e.g., AR 270, 

287, 376, they offer no opinion concerning Plaintiff’s actual ability to function.5 AR 24, 25. See 

Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir.1993) (“The mere existence of an impairment is 

insufficient proof of a disability.”). Moreover, no treating physician has opined Plaintiff is totally 

 

5 The Court notes Plaintiff’s claim that the “record is replete with [Plaintiff’s] treating physicians’ diagnosis of 

chronic facial pain and left arm pain.” (Doc. 17, pg. 2) However, while a review of the exhaustive list of citations 

provided by Plaintiff substantiated this in part, it also provides a string of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints to treating 

physicians accompanied by statements tending to support the ALJ’s credibility determination, such as: “treatable pain 

in upper extremities via wrist splint” (AR 283); sinus surgery found “no local cause for his facial pain” (AR 285);

“patient presents with left facial pain....A CT...was unremarkable for a neurological cause for pain” (AR 287); and 

Plaintiff declines treatment. AR 288.

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disabled from all employment. See Matthews, 10 F.3d at 680 (in upholding the Administration's 

decision, the Court emphasized: “None of the doctors who examined [claimant] expressed the 

opinion that he was totally disabled.”). 

Nevertheless, it is apparent from the ALJ’s decision that he considered Plaintiff’s 

treatment records when rendering his decision. For example, when referencing Plaintiff’s claims 

of pain in his left upper extremities and face the ALJ stated “[t]reatment reports reveal abnormal 

nerve conduction studies....(exhibits [AR 283; 297-298])....[Plaintiff] has also alleged suffering 

from left facial pain (see Exhibits [AR 283, 285; 355]).” AR 23-24. These references are 

primarily to the record provided by Plaintiff’s own treating physician Dr. Suri. AR 283, 297-298, 

285. The ALJ, in addressing Plaintiff’s credibility, states that there is “not much evidence of 

treatment” for these impairments. AR 24. He then cites directly to Plaintiff’s treating physician 

records including those from Advanced Medical Imaging, AR 261-262; Dr. Brauner, AR 264-

281; Dr. Suri, AR 283-290; various labs, progress and treatment notes, AR 292-346; and 

Plaintiff’s ER visit in January 2012, AR 362-389.

Further, when giving weight to the nonexamining and examining physicians, the ALJ 

noted their opinions are consistent with the record. For example, when giving weight to Dr. 

Wagner, the ALJ noted his opinion “is generally consistent with the record, including the 

unremarkable examination findings (see Exhibit [AR 375-376]), and lack of consistent treatment. 

AR 24. The opinion is also consistent with abnormal nerve conduction studies (see Exhibits [AR 

283; 297-298]) and left ulnar side pain and numbness (see Exhibit [AR 359]).” AR 24. Here 

again, the ALJ specifically refers to records of Plaintiff’s treating physicians to support his 

conclusion. AR 375-376, 283, 297-298. 

Moreover, it is apparent that the examining and nonexamining physicians also relied on 

Plaintiff’s treatment record when formulating their opinions. For example, Dr. Wagner 

acknowledges Plaintiff’s facial and left arm pain. AR 355-356. He then references Plaintiff’s 

history of sinus surgery and recent nerve conduction studies and electromyograms which are 

contained in the treatment records of Dr. Suri. AR 359, 283. Dr. Goodrich, when explaining how 

and why the evidence supports her conclusion, refers to Plaintiff’s history of ulnar nerve 

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transpositions and ongoing symptoms in the ulnar nerve distribution. AR 71. This is also 

consistent with Dr. Suri’s reports. AR 287. 

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in relying on the opinions of nonexamining 

physician over examining physicians when evaluating his physical impairments. The Court again 

advises Plaintiff that he did not address this issue thoroughly in his opening brief. 6

Notwithstanding, the physical impairment limitations identified by the nonexaming physicians 

were more restrictive that those identified by the examining physicians, and thus most favorable 

to Plaintiff. For example, Dr. Goodrich opined Plaintiff had the same limitations as did Dr. 

Wagner with the additional postural limitation of occasionally climbing ropes, limited 

manipulative use of Plaintiff’s left hand, and environmental limitation of occasional use of 

vibratory hand tools with either upper extremity. AR 71-72. The ALJ incorporated these 

limitations into the RFC. AR 23.

Given the above, the ALJ properly discussed Plaintiff’s treatment records when 

determining the impact Plaintiff’s impairments had on his RFC and when according weight to the 

opinions of examining and nonexamining physicians. AR 23. Therefore, the ALJ’s interpretation 

of the medical evidence is supported by substantial evidence.

B. The ALJ’s Credibility Determination was Proper.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by improperly considering lack of treatment as a basis 

for an adverse credibility finding. (Doc. 15.) The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ provided 

other valid bases for finding Plaintiff not credible and his credibility determination was proper. 

(Doc. 16.) A review of the record reveals that contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the ALJ provided 

clear and specific reasons, which are supported by the record as a whole for his credibility 

determination.

1. Legal Standards for Credibility Determination

A two-step analysis applies at the administrative level when considering a claimant’s 

credibility. Treichler v. Comm. of Soc. Sec., 775 F. 3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). First, the 

 

6 We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim, particularly 

when, as here, a host of other issues are presented for review. United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th 

Cir.1991) (per curiam).

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claimant must produce objective medical evidence of his or her impairment that could reasonably 

be expected to produce some degree of the symptom or pain alleged. Id. If the claimant satisfies 

the first step and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony 

regarding the severity of his or her symptoms only if he or she makes specific findings and 

provides clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Id.; Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 

493 (9th Cir. 2015); SSR 96-7p (ALJ’s decision “must be sufficiently specific to make clear to 

the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s 

statements and reasons for that weight.”). Factors an ALJ may consider include: 1) the applicant’s 

reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements or other inconsistent testimony; 2) 

unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course 

of treatment; and 3) the applicant's daily activities. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282. Work records, 

physician and third party testimony about the nature, severity, and effect of symptoms, and 

inconsistencies between testimony and conduct also may be relevant. Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 

119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997).

In this case, following consideration of the evidence and an in-person hearing, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause 

some of the alleged symptoms,” but that Plaintiff’s statements concerning “the intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible.” AR 25. This finding 

satisfied step one of the credibility analysis. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281-82.

As noted above, because the ALJ did not find that Plaintiff was malingering, he was 

required to provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony. Brown –

Hunter, 806 F. 3d at 493; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283-84; Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. When there is 

evidence of an underlying medical impairment, the ALJ may not discredit the claimant’s 

testimony regarding the severity of his or her symptoms solely because they are unsupported by 

medical evidence. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1991); SSR 96-7. Moreover, 

general findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and 

what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints. Brown-Hunter, 806 F. 3d at 493.

///

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2. The ALJ’s Findings

The ALJ highlighted the following examples of inconsistent and unsupported allegations 

that undermine Plaintiff’s credibility;

[Plaintiff] testified to only being able to lift 15 pounds, but the 

record evidence, which shows a normal range of motion with full 

motor strength in the bilateral extremities, does not support this 

limitation. [Plaintiff] also reported his ability to bend was “affected’ 

but that is not consistent with the record, which shows he was very 

easily able to bend over at the waist and take off shoes without any 

difficulties....

Further detracting from the credibility of his allegations is the lack 

of consistent treatment. For instance,... he has not received any 

treatment, including prescription or over the counter medication, 

since January 2012. In addition, [Plaintiff] testified to receiving 

unemployment benefits until December 2012 and in order to 

receive said benefits, he certified he was ready and able to work up 

until his benefits ended, which is in direct conflict with the 

allegation he has been unable to work since December 1, 2009. 

Furthermore, the record shows he worked part-time subsequent to 

the alleged onset date as well.

AR 26 (citations and quotations omitted).

3. Analysis

Plaintiff argues that because he was unable to afford treatment, the ALJ improperly relied 

on his lack of consistent treatment as a basis for discrediting his testimony. However, Plaintiff’s 

treatment history was not the only basis the ALJ relied on to support his decision. Instead, the 

ALJ relied on (1) objective evidence, (2) inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s statements, (3) Plaintiff’s 

prior work history, in addition to the lack of consistent treatment. AR 26. A review of the record 

reveals that the ALJ’s credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence.

First, the ALJ correctly found that the objective medical evidence failed to support and 

was not consistent with Plaintiff’s allegations. For example, in December 2011, during a

consultative examination with Dr. Wagner, Plaintiff exhibited normal range of motion and full 

motor strength in the bilateral extremities. AR 357-358. This is in direct conflict with Plaintiff’s 

allegations that he is unable to lift more than 15 pounds with his left hand. AR 43. Additionally, 

Dr. Wagner found that Plaintiff had normal grip strength bilaterally, which also is in direct 

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conflict with Plaintiff’s allegations of difficulty gripping items with his left hand. AR 42.

Plaintiff’s testimony that he has to slowly bend over and get back up is contradicted by Dr. 

Wagner’s observation that Plaintiff is “very easily able to bend over at the waist and take off 

shoes without any difficulty.” AR 45, 356-357. Further, Plaintiff’s reports of continued left arm 

and facial pain are unsupported by a comprehensive examination performed in January 2012,

which is unremarkable except for Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and an old left elbow 

deformity. AR 375-376. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (The ALJ may 

consider lack of objective evidence in their credibility analysis); Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1434

(inconsistencies between the record and medical evidence supports a rejection of a claimant’s

credibility); Chaudhry v. Astrue, 885 F.3d 661, 672 (9th Cir. 2012). See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 

(objective medical evidence can be used in determining credibility; inconsistencies in evidence 

will support a rejection of credibility); SSR 96-7p (objective medical evidence is a useful 

indicator to assist in making a reasonable conclusion about credibility and the ability to function).

Second, the ALJ notes inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s own reports. Plaintiff admitted to 

receiving unemployment benefits until December 2012, which required Plaintiff to certify he was 

ready and able to work. AR 24, 26, 50, 61. An ALJ may rely on ordinary techniques of credibility 

evaluation such as prior inconsistent statements, and other testimony by the claimant that appears

less than candid. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). See Smolen, 80 F. 3d 

at 1284 (An ALJ may consider a claimant’s inconsistent statements). Thus, this is a valid reason 

to reject Plaintiff’s testimony.

Third, the ALJ references Plaintiff’s prior work history as inconsistent with his pain 

allegations. Plaintiff worked part time as a steel fitter through January 2011, over a year after the 

alleged onset date, at levels close to substantial gainful activity. AR 38, 235, 192. See Burton v. 

Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir.2001) (as part of credibility assessment, the ALJ 

considered claimant's work history and his admission that he left his job for reasons other than his 

alleged impairment); Bray v. Commissioner of Social Security Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (“In reaching a credibility determination, an ALJ may weigh inconsistencies between 

the claimant's testimony and his or her conduct, daily activities, ... among other factors.”).

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Finally, the ALJ relies on Plaintiff’s lack of consistent treatment as a basis for finding him

less than credible. AR 24. Plaintiff argues this was improper because he was unable to afford to 

go to the doctor or obtain medication. AR 42, 49, 257-58. An ALJ is permitted to consider lack of 

medical treatment in assessing credibility. Burch, 400 F.3d at 681. But, “[d]isability benefits may 

not be denied because of the claimant's failure to obtain treatment he cannot obtain for lack of 

funds.” Orn v. Astrue (9th Cir. 2007) 495 F.3d 625, 638 (citing Gamble v. Chater, 68 F.3d 319, 

321 (9th Cir. 1995)). The Court has reviewed the record and notes there is ambiguity in Plaintiff’s 

allegations of inability to afford treatment. AR 283, 285, 288. However, the Court need not 

determine whether rejecting Plaintiff’s credibility based on conservative treatment was proper 

because the ALJ provided other valid bases for his credibility determination. See eg., Batson v. 

Commissioner of Social Security, 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding ALJ’s 

credibility determination even though one reason may have been in error).

Here, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons outlined above that are supported by 

substantial evidence to conclude Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony was not credible. The 

ALJ clearly identified what testimony he found not credible and what evidence undermined 

Plaintiff’s complaints. Brown-Hunter, 806 F. 3d at 493; Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. It is not the role of 

the Court to re-determine Plaintiff’s credibility de novo. If the ALJ’s finding is supported by 

substantial evidence, the Court “may not engage in second-guessing.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. 

Although evidence supporting an ALJ’s conclusions might also permit an interpretation more 

favorable to the claimant, if the ALJ’s interpretation of evidence was rational, as it was here, the 

Court must uphold the ALJ’s decision where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation. Burch, 400 F.3d at 680-81. Accordingly, the ALJ’s credibility determination was 

proper.

C. The ALJ Properly Determined Plaintiff’s RFC

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination failed to account for Plaintiff’s acute 

and chronic sinusitis. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that because medical evidence of this 

medically determinable condition was presented, the ALJ had a duty to consider it, in 

combination with his other impairments, in the determination of his RFC. (Doc. 15, pg. 8, Doc. 

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17, Pgs. 4-5).

Defendant contends that Plaintiff did not allege disability on the basis of sinusitis or 

purport any impact it had on his facial pain. Defendant further argues that the ALJ’s finding of 

trigeminal neuralgia as a severe impairment, and his consideration of Plaintiff’s alleged left facial 

pain in his RFC assessment sufficiently addressed this issue. (Doc. 16, pgs. 11-12). Finally, 

Defendant points out that Plaintiff was represented by counsel who never raised this issue during 

the administrative hearing.

1. Legal Standards for a RFC Determination

In determining the RFC, the ALJ must consider limitations imposed by all of a claimant's 

impairments, even those that are not severe, and evaluate “all of the relevant medical and other 

evidence,” including the claimant's testimony. SSR 96-8p. However, if Plaintiff makes “no 

allegation of a physical or mental limitation or restriction of a specific functional capacity, and no 

information in the case record that there is such a limitation or restriction, the adjudicator must 

consider the individual to have no limitation or restriction with respect to that functional 

capacity.” SSR 96-8p.

There is no dispute that Plaintiff did not raise his sinusitis during the administrative 

proceedings. Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to address his chronic sinusitis regardless 

of whether he raised the issue because the diagnosis was in the medical record. AR 261. The 

Ninth Circuit has held that “at least when claimants are represented by counsel, they must raise all 

issues and evidence at their administrative hearings in order to preserve them on appeal.” Meanel, 

172 F.3d at 1115, as amended (June 22, 1999). See Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 807 F.2d 

759, 767 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that, “[a]s a general rule, we will not consider issues not 

presented before an administrative proceeding at the appropriate time”); see also Mills v. Apfel, 

244 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding waiver due to failure to raise issue at hearing before ALJ, as 

opposed to the Appeals Council).7

 

7

In Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 147 L.Ed.2d 80 (2000), the Supreme Court held that a 

Social Security claimant’s failure to present an issue to the Appeals Council does not waive judicial review of that 

issue but specifically deferred ruling on whether a claimant must exhaust issues before the ALJ prior to seeking 

judicial review. See id. at 107, 112. The First Circuit explained that “[t]he impact of a no-waiver approach at the 

Appeals Council level is relatively mild; at the ALJ level it could cause havoc, severely undermining the 

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2. The ALJ’s Findings

During the January 2013 hearing, the ALJ asked Plaintiff what he was unable to do after 

his alleged disability date. Plaintiff answered the pain limited his ability to lift and carry heavy 

steel. AR 39. The ALJ and Plaintiff then discussed Plaintiff’s treatment and medication history. 

AR 40. The ALJ questioned Plaintiff about his daily activities. Plaintiff reported being able to 

shower and bathe himself, prepare simple meals, do the laundry, go shopping, and do some 

housework. AR 40-41. Plaintiff then discussed pain and numbness in his feet, and the pain and 

limitations in his upper extremities. AR 41-42, 42-43. Plaintiff’s counsel then asked the following 

questions regarding his facial pain and Plaintiff gave the following responses:

Q: Now, in terms of your head, what part of your head do you have 

the pain?

A: My whole left side, my eye and my head all down the back of 

my neck.

Q: How often do you have that?

A: Every day.

Q: Does it affect your ability to function?

A: I have trouble keeping a thought or thinking.

Q: Do you mean concentration?

A: Yeah.

AR 44-45.

Q: The pain in your face, you said it’s on your left side?

A: Yes.

Q: And does it move or radiate into any other part of your body?

A: No, it’s in my head.

Q: Is it triggered by anything? Or strike that. Does it ever go away, 

the pain in your face?

 

administrative process.” Mills, 244 F.3d at 8. 

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A: No, no.

Q: Is there anything that –

A: It gets worse.

Q: How does it get worse?

A: Like the worst toothache you ever had. I mean it just – I stop 

everything and I just sit there and just rock and it just hurts.

Q: What causes it to get worse?

A: I don’t know, I –

Q: You’re not sure?

A: No.

Q: If you –

A: When I would wear my teeth and they would push up on my 

gums, it makes my eye hurt and then my eye will water.

Q: How do you think it started, the problem with your face?

A: When I got my teeth pulled, I think.

AR 48-49. Plaintiff’s counsel did not raise the issue of his sinusitis during the hearing. Left facial 

pain in general was the focus of the testimony elicited during the hearing. 

3. Analysis

While the ALJ did not expressly mention Plaintiff's sinusitis, it is clear from the ALJ's 

consideration of all of the medical evidence in the record and all of Plaintiff's symptoms that the 

ALJ considered the impact of Plaintiff’s facial pain on his RFC. The ALJ rendered his RFC 

determination “after careful consideration of the entire record,” which included medical evidence 

of Plaintiff's sinusitis, and he “considered all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms 

can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other 

evidence.” 

The medical record as a whole does not clearly reflect that Plaintiff suffers from 

limitations caused specifically by sinusitis. While there is a diagnosis of and limited references to 

acute and chronic sinusitis, there are no medical records reflecting complaints of or treatment for 

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sinusitis. AR 261, 270, 306. Rather, the record contains multiple references to left facial pain, 

which both Dr. Wagner and Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Suri, note is suggestive of left 

trigeminal neuralgia. AR 359, 284, 287. The ALJ identified trigeminal neuralgia to be among 

Plaintiff’s severe impairments AR 21. It is apparent from the lack of mention in the treating 

records that Plaintiff’s sinusitis did not affect his ability to function. 

Further, if Plaintiff was alleging disability due to his chronic sinusitis, he had an 

obligation to raise the issue during the administrative proceedings to provide the Commissioner 

with the opportunity to consider and address the issue. “Counsel are not supposed to be potted 

plants at administrative hearings. They have an obligation to take an active role and to raise issues 

that may impact the ALJ’s decision while the hearing is proceeding so that they can be 

addressed.” Solorzano v. Astrue, No. ED CV 11-369-PJW, 2012 WL 84527, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 

10, 2012). See Harshaw v. Colvin, 616 F. App’x 316 (9th Cir. 2015)8(existence of some evidence 

in the medical records not sufficient to have put the ALJ on notice); Meanel, 172 F.3d at 1115 

(claimants represented by counsel must raise all issues and evidence at administrative hearings to 

preserve them on appeal). 

Here, Plaintiff did not provide any notice to the Commissioner that he was alleging he was 

limited in his ability to work due to acute and chronic sinusitis, only that he was experiencing 

facial pain, which the ALJ addressed in his decision by recognizing the diagnosis of and possible 

functional limitations posed by trigeminal neuralgia. Based on the record, the ALJ adequately

considered Plaintiff’s sinusitis in his RFC determination. Moreover, the ALJ did not err by failing 

to specifically address Plaintiff’s acute and chronic sinusitis as Plaintiff did not raise the issue 

during the administrative proceedings.

VI. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, this Court 

DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social 

 

8 Unpublished dispositions and orders of the Ninth Circuit issued on or after January 1, 2007 may be cited to the 

courts of this circuit in accordance with FRAP 32.1. 9th Cir. R. 36-3(b).

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Security. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Carolyn 

W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security and against Plaintiff, Charles Joseph 

Haydostian.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 1, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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