Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02532/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02532-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dee Adams
Respondent
Matthew Swanson
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW SWANSON,

Petitioner,

 v

DEE ADAMS, in his capacity as

Warden of the Corcoran State

Prison,

Respondent. /

No C 06-2532 VRW

 ORDER

On March 26, 2003, after a court trial, petitioner was

found guilty in the Superior Court of the State of California in

and for the County of Santa Clara of lewd or lascivious acts on a

child under fourteen, lewd or lascivious acts on a child age

fourteen or fifteen, oral copulation with a minor, annoying or

molesting a child and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. 

On June 12, 2003, the court sentenced petitioner to a term of

fifteen years, eight months. 

On October 18, 2004, the California Court of Appeal,

Sixth Appellate District affirmed the judgment and, on January 12,

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2005, the California Supreme Court denied review. Resp’t Ex 11,

13; Doc # 13. On April 10, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, raising

unexhausted claims. Ex 14, Doc # 13. On April 11, 2006,

petitioner filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus

under 28 USC § 2254 and a concurrent application to hold the

petition in abeyance while petitioner litigated unexhausted claims

in state court. Doc ## 1, 2. The court granted the abeyance

petition and on November 29, 2006, the California Supreme Court

denied the petition pending before it. Ex 15; Doc ## 3, 13. 

Petitioner then filed the instant amended federal petition. Doc #

4. 

Per order filed on January 30, 2007, the court found that

the petition, liberally construed, stated cognizable claims under §

2254 and ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas

corpus should not be granted. Doc # 8. Respondent filed an answer

on May 30, 2007 and petitioner submitted a traverse on July 26,

2007. Doc ## 11, 17.

I

The court of appeal summarized the facts of the case as

follows:

Defendant was a longtime friend and neighbor of Andy

M * * * [who] was confined to bed and required a great

deal of personal care. Defendant, along with many of

Andy’s family members, took turns taking care of Andy. 

Andy’s nephew, victim 1, began taking an interest in his

uncle's care in early 1995, toward the end of victim 1’s

seventh grade year, when victim 1 was 12 years old. 

Defendant was 25 years old at that time, 13 years older

than victim 1. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Victim 1 testified that one day soon after he had

begun caring for Andy, he and defendant watched a

pornographic movie while seated next to each other in

Andy’s room. Andy was present but he was on a ventilator

and slept most of the time. While defendant and victim 1

watched the movie they each masturbated themselves. Then,

on his own initiative, victim 1 masturbated defendant and

defendant reciprocated. Similar conduct occurred two or

three times before the end of victim 1’s seventh grade

year and continued into the summer. Defendant had wanted

victim 1 to perform oral sex but victim 1 refused. The

reciprocal masturbation almost always involved

pornographic movies and often included the use of alcohol

or marijuana. Defendant told victim 1 that defendant

could get into a lot of trouble for what they were doing. 

At the beginning of victim 1’s eighth grade year, he

and defendant began performing oral sex on each other as

well as masturbating each other. Victim 1 explained that

defendant had asked him repeatedly to have oral sex and

that victim 1 finally gave in. The two had sexual

contact about one to two times per month during victim

1’s eighth grade year. The oral sex occurred on five or

six occasions during the school year and three or four

times during the following summer. During victim 1’s

first year in high school in 1996, he and defendant had

weekly sexual encounters involving either mutual

masturbation or oral sex. The same activity continued

with gradually decreasing frequency until victim 1

graduated. There were only one or two instances that

occurred after graduation. Victim 1 turned 18 on July

22, 2000, after he had graduated from high school. 

After victim 1 graduated from high school he began

an intimate relationship with another man and told

defendant he no longer wanted to engage in sexual acts

with him. In spite of this, defendant made at least two

unwanted sexual advances toward victim 1, grabbing his

buttocks and crotch. The last such incident occurred on

February 14, 2002, when victim 1 was 19 years old. Victim

1 reported these incidents to the police on February 15,

2002. In the course of reporting defendant’s most recent

conduct, victim 1 also revealed their sexual history,

going back to their first sexual contacts when victim 1

was 12 years old. 

Victim 2 was victim 1’s younger brother. He began

caring for Andy around 1998, when victim 2 was about 14

years old. Victim 1 was then about 16 years old and had

become less involved in Andy’s care. At trial victim 2

denied that he had had any sexual contact with defendant

and denied that defendant had ever masturbated in his

presence. However, during the investigation that

followed victim 1’s report to the police, victim 2

described defendant as the type of uncle who let him

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“drink beer and watch pornos” on “numerous” occasions. 

He also said that defendant would masturbate in his

presence while watching pornographic movies in Andy’s

room. He reported that beer drinking and pornographic

movie watching occurred about 15 times during the

preceding year (February 2001-February 2002) when victim

2 was 16 to 17 years of age and that about two-thirds of

the time defendant masturbated himself while watching the

movies. 

When the police interviewed defendant, he admitted

having engaged in mutual masturbation with victim 1

beginning when victim 1 was about 14 or 15 years old. 

When asked how many times this conduct took place,

defendant stated “I don’t know if it was every Saturday

night, or every Friday night, or, or once a month. I,

just whenever I was asked to go over there by [victim

1].” Defendant explained that victim 1 “suggested it a

lot.” The interviewer asked him if it was more than once

or less than a hundred and defendant responded, “More

than, less than, I would say, thirty.” Defendant

explained that the conduct often took place at Andy's

house, although some occurred at defendant’s home. The

conduct usually included alcohol and pornographic movies. 

Defendant said that when victim 1 was about 15 and a

half or 16 years old defendant stopped going to Andy’s

house regularly and only went there when Andy called him

to come over. Defendant stopped his regular visits

because Andy had a nurse, Joe, who began taking Andy and

victim 1 on excursions. They would go to the movies or

to San Francisco to “peep booth shows, and, and all that

stuff.” Defendant felt hurt and betrayed. He saw victim

1 very little during this time, only at family

gatherings. He began coming around to Andy’s again after

the nurse left, about the time of victim 1's 18th

birthday. Defendant confirmed that after high school,

victim 1 began having intimate relationships with other

men, which took him away from defendant. This caused

defendant to miss victim 1. He said he loved victim 1. 

“I mean, not as in lovers, but as in ... [] ... [] Love

the guy, okay?” 

When asked if he ever had oral sex with victim 1

defendant responded, “Yeah, after he was 18.” Defendant

said victim 1 had initiated the oral sex. He explained

that he and victim 1 engaged in mutual oral sex three or

four times before victim 1 told him he did not want to do

it anymore. 

People v Swanson, No H026109, slip op at 2-4 (Cal Ct App Oct 18,

2004) (Ex 11, Doc # 13).

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United States District Court

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II

A

A federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.” 28 USC § 2254(d). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the]

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams v Taylor, 529 US 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the

‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id at 413.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also

be unreasonable.” Id at 411. A federal habeas court making the

“unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was

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“objectively unreasonable.” Id at 409.

The only definitive source of clearly established federal

law under 28 USC § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the

dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Id at 412; Clark v Murphy, 331 F3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir

2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the

Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and only

those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. Id.

B

Petitioner raises three claims for relief: (1) the trial

court’s application of California Penal Code section 803(g)

violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States

Constitution; (2) the trial court violated petitioner’s due process

rights by admitting petitioner’s statement to police, which

petitioner argues was obtained in violation of Miranda v Arizona,

384 US 436 (1966); and (3) the trial court violated petitioner’s

right to a jury trial by imposing consecutive terms based on

factual findings made by the court and not the jury.

1

Petitioner’s first argument, based on Stogner v

California, 539 US 607 (2003), is that California Penal Code

section 803(g)——a 1993 enactment which extended the statute of

limitations for certain sex crimes to one year from the date the

crime was reported to a California law enforcement

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agency——unconstitutionally revives a cause of action that could not

otherwise have been prosecuted. 

In Stogner, the defendant was indicted in 1998 for sexrelated child abuse committed between 1995 and 1973. 539 US at

609. Without then-new California Penal Code section 803(g),

California could not have prosecuted Stogner, as the statutes of

limitations on his alleged crimes had long since run. Id at 609-

610. The Supreme Court held that, “a law enacted after expiration

of a previously applicable limitations period violates the Ex Post

Facto Clause when it is applied to revive a previously time-barred

prosecution.” Id at 632-33. Accordingly, the Supreme Court

invalidated Stogner’s indictment. Id at 633. 

Here, in rejecting petitioner’s Stogner-based argument,

the court of appeal stated: 

Stogner distinguished between statutes that extend

the statute of limitations, and those that attempt to

revive them. “Even where courts have upheld extensions

of unexpired statutes of limitations * * *, they have

consistently distinguished situations where limitations

periods have expired.” * * * In the present case,

defendant was charged with crimes committed as far back

as January 1, 1995. Section 803(g) became effective on

January 1, 1994 * * *, a full year before defendant is

alleged to have committed the first of the crimes

charged. Defendant’s risk of prosecution for the crimes

was never unfairly revived because the enactment of

section 803(g) before he committed the crimes put him on

notice that he was subject to prosecution within a year

of when his victims reported the molestation. In this

case, unlike Stogner’s, section 803(g) operates only as

an extension of the statute of limitations for the crimes

charged and is constitutional as applied to defendant. 

People v Swanson, slip op at 14, Doc # 13.

The court of appeal’s holding comports with the Ninth

Circuit’s opinion in Renderos v Ryan, 469 F3d 788 (9th Cir 2006),

in which the court rejected the petitioner’s Stogner-based argument

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that § 803(g) violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by impermissibly

reviving the limitations period. Id at 793. The court

distinguished the Stogner case on the basis that, in Stogner, “the

amendment in question became effective after the statute of

limitations had already expired,” whereas in Renderos’s case §

803(g) was enacted while the limitations periods were still

running. Id at 794-95. The Ninth Circuit also stated that the

application of § 803(g) to Renderos did not work “manifest

injustice” because there was no retroactive effect, as the original

limitations period had not yet expired. Id at 795. Renderos also

could not claim prejudice because he had notice and fair warning

that he could still be prosecuted under § 803(g), even though the

shorter limitation periods would soon expire. Id at 795-96.

For the reasons set forth in Renderos, the court of

appeal did not misapply clearly established Supreme Court precedent

in rejecting petitioner’s challenge to § 803(g), nor did its

decision involve an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28

USC § 2254(d). 

2

Petitioner next claims that admission at trial of his

confession violated his Miranda rights. Petitioner argues that he

had never been arrested before and he had no experience in the

criminal justice system and that the police did not explicitly ask

him whether he waived his Miranda rights. Thus, petitioner argues,

the totality of the circumstances shows that he did not waive his

Miranda rights. Petitioner did not raise this argument at the

state appellate level, but he did make Miranda-based objections at

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the preliminary hearing and in the trial court. Both the

preliminary hearing judge and the trial judge reviewed the tapes of

petitioner’s interrogation and concluded that petitioner had

validly waived his Miranda rights.

When determining whether a waiver of Miranda rights has

occurred, two conditions must be satisfied. “First, the

relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense

that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than

intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have

been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right

being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon

it.” Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412, 421 (1986). “Only if the

‘totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation’

reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of

comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights

have been waived.” Id (citations omitted).

In United States v Labrada-Bustamante, the Ninth Circuit

upheld the validity of a waiver of Miranda rights, even though the

defendant in that case did not speak English and was a Mexican

national unfamiliar with the United States justice system. 428 F3d

1252, 1259 (9th Cir 2005). The defendant was advised of his rights

in Spanish and stated nothing in response except that he understood

his rights. Id at 1257-58. The interrogating agent made no

threats or promises during the interview. Id at 1258. The Ninth

Circuit held that the district court’s finding that the defendant

knew and understood his rights was not “clearly erroneous” in light

of the totality of the circumstances. Id at 1259. 

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Here, in finding petitioner’s waiver of Miranda rights

valid, the trial court reviewed the videotape of petitioner’s

police interview and used the totality of the circumstances test. 

Ex 3 at 57-58; Doc # 13. The court saw no indication of police

deception, coercion, or intimidation. Id. “Each right was

separately and clearly indicated to the defendant. The defendant

acknowledged he understood each right, no indication that there was

any language barrier.” Id at 58. The court also found no

indication of any intellectual impairment or impairment due to

drugs, alcohol or pain. Id. The court stated that “the

defendant’s willingness to answer questions was readily apparent”

and that there was no lapse of time between the advisement and the

beginning of questioning. Id. Based on all these findings, the

court determined that, under the totality of circumstances

approach, petitioner’s waiver of his Miranda rights was effective

and adequate. Id. As previously noted, this issue was not

presented to the court of appeal on direct appeal. 

The court’s finding that petitioner validly waived his

Miranda rights was not contrary to, and did not involve an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent. 28 USC § 2254(d). Nor did it involve an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Id. 

3

Petitioner’s final contention is that imposition of

consecutive sentences violated his constitutional right to a jury

trial. Petitioner relies on Blakely v Washington in making this

argument. 542 US 296 (2004). This contention fails for two

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reasons: (1) petitioner waived his right to a jury trial and the

waiver encompassed the sentencing determination; and (2) even

without the waiver, petitioner’s argument would not prevail because

the court of appeal’s decision is in accord with a recent

California Supreme Court decision and is not an “unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law” within the meaning

of § 2254(d). 

Respondent cites Wright v Craven for the proposition

that, “where a defendant waives a jury trial he is deemed to have

consented to a trial of all the issues in the case before the court

sitting without a jury.” 412 F2d 915, 918-19 (9th Cir 1969). In

Wright, the defendant was convicted of selling heroin with two

prior felony convictions. Id at 916. The Ninth Circuit held that

by waiving the right to a jury trial as to the heroin charge, the

defendant also “waived jury consideration of the prior convictions

charged.” Id at 919. Although there is little recent law and none

directly on point, it was reasonable for the court of appeal to

hold that when petitioner waived his right to a jury trial, he

waived his right to a jury determination of all the issues in the

case, including those that formed the basis of the trial court’s

sentencing decision.

Furthermore, petitioner’s reliance on Blakely is

misplaced. In Blakely, the defendant pleaded guilty and, based on

the facts admitted in his plea, faced a maximum sentence of fiftythree months. Id at 298. Under then-current Washington law, the

judge could not have sentenced the defendant to a longer prison

term without finding “substantial and compelling reasons”

justifying such a departure. Id at 299. The judge sentenced the

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defendant to ninety months based on his finding that the defendant

had acted with “deliberate cruelty.” Id at 300. The Supreme Court

ruled that the sentence violated the Sixth Amendment because the

judge had inflicted punishment that the jury’s verdict alone did

not allow. Id at 304. The Supreme Court also specifically stated,

as relevant here, that Sixth Amendment concerns are not implicated

where the judicial factfinding does not involve facts that “pertain

to whether the defendant has a legal right to a lesser sentence.” 

Id at 309 (emphasis in original). In petitioner’s case, one of the

factual findings made by the court in its guilt determination was

also a basis for the imposition of consecutive sentences. Under

Blakely’s dictum, the court of appeal’s affirmance of petitioner’s

sentence is constitutionally permissible. 

In rejecting petitioner’s argument, the court of appeal

stated that “the constitutional concerns expressed in Blakely are

not applicable to consecutive sentencing” because “consecutive

sentences may be imposed based solely upon the facts underlying the

guilty verdict.” People v Swanson, slip op at 17; Doc # 13. One

of the trial court’s bases for imposing consecutive sentences was

that “each count reflects the same crime with the same victim on

separate events.” Id at 15; Doc # 13. Petitioner had admitted as

much to the police. Ex 2 at 43-46, 53-55; Doc # 13. The court of

appeal held that the trial court’s additional finding of a breach

of trust did not implicate Blakely because the judge had “already

found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the facts necessary to sentence

the defendant for the crimes with which he was charged.” People v

Swanson, slip op at 18; Ex 13. The appellate court also reasoned

that the California discretionary sentencing law “does not create a

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presumption favoring concurrent terms nor does it establish a

‘statutory maximum’ term for multiple felony convictions.” Id. 

Rather, the statutory language “provides direction in those rare

instances where a court fails to direct the manner in which

multiple terms are to be served.” Id. 

The court of appeal’s decision finds strong support in

the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v Black,

41 Cal 4th 799 (2007)(“Black II”), holding that the Blakely line of

cases does not apply to the imposition of consecutive terms under

state law. In Black v California, 127 S Ct 1210 (2007), the

Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded Black back to the

California Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Cunningham

v California, 127 S Ct 856 (2007). In Cunningham, the Supreme

Court held that California’s determinate sentencing law violated

the defendant’s right to a jury trial because it assigned to the

trial judge, not the jury, authority to find by a preponderance of

the evidence facts that subjected the defendant to an elevated

upper term sentence. 127 S Ct at 860. 

In Black II, announced post-remand from the United States

Supreme Court, a jury had found the defendant guilty of three

counts of sexual abuse and the judge sentenced the defendant to

consecutive prison terms. 41 Cal 4th at 806-07. As an initial

matter, the California Supreme Court stated that California does

not have a presumption in favor of concurrent sentences. Id at

822. Instead, “the requirement that concurrent sentences be

imposed if the court does not specify how the terms must run merely

provides for a default in the event the court fails to exercise its

discretion.” Id. The court distinguished imposition of the upper

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term from consecutive terms. In imposing the former, “the court

must set forth on the record facts and reasons, including the

ultimate facts that the court deemed to be circumstances in

aggravation.” Id (quotations and citations omitted). In imposing

the latter, the court needs to refer to “the primary factor or

factors that support the decision,” but “no factual findings are

required.” Id (quotations and citations omitted). The California

Supreme Court held that “the determination whether two or more

sentences should be served [consecutively] is a sentencing decision

made by the judge after the jury has made the factual findings

necessary to subject the defendant to the statutory maximum on each

offense and does not implicate the defendant’s right to a jury

trial on facts that are the functional equivalent of elements of an

offense.” Id at 823. 

The court finds merit in the reasoning of Black II and in

the court of appeal’s decision in this matter, both of which

concluded that Sixth Amendment concerns are not implicated by the

imposition of consecutive sentences. While the law in this area is

not entirely settled at the federal level post-Blakely, the court

of appeal’s decision to uphold the consecutive sentences is not

contrary to, and did not involve an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law. 28 USC § 2254(d). Nor was the

court’s decision based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts. Id. 

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III

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk shall enter judgment in favor

of respondent and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Judge

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