Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-73258/USCOURTS-ca9-11-73258-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Railroad Administration
Respondent
Ray H. LaHood
Respondent
Joseph C. Szabo
Respondent
U.S. Department of Transportation
Respondent
United Transportation Union
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION,

Petitioner,

v.

ANTHONY FOXX,

*

 U.S. Secretary of

Transportation; U.S. DEPARTMENT

OF TRANSPORTATION; JOSEPH C.

SZABO, Administrator of the Federal

Railroad Administration; FEDERAL

RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION,

Respondents.

No. 11-73258

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Railroad Administration

Argued and Submitted

December 3, 2013—Pasadena, California

Filed May 8, 2014

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, John T. Noonan,

and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Schroeder

* Anthony Foxx is substituted for his predecessor, Ray H. LaHood, as

Secretary of Transportation. Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

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2 UNITED TRANSP. UNION V. FOXX

SUMMARY**

Federal Railroad Administration

The panel denied a petition for review of a decision of the

Federal Railroad Administration, and upheld the FRA’s

conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the

Union Pacific Railroad Company had authority under a

collective bargaining agreement to designate terminals for a

new service the railroad had instituted in California.

The FRA concluded it lacked jurisdiction to resolve the

dispute between the Railroad and the United Transportation

Union because it did not have the statutory authority to

interpret collective bargaining agreements.

The panel held that the FRA can review an agreement to

determine what the designated terminals are, but it cannot

interpret the agreement to decide how the terminals shall be

designated. The panel held that the parties’ dispute regarded

interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, and it

was therefore governed by the resolution procedures of the

Railway Labor Act and beyond the adjudicatory powers of

the FRA.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED TRANSP. UNION V. FOXX 3

COUNSEL

Lawrence M. Mann (argued), Alper & Mann, PC, Bethesda,

Maryland, for Petitioner.

Joy K. Park (argued), Trial Attorney, Robert S. Rivkin,

General Counsel, Paul M. Geier, Assistant General Counsel

for Litigation, and Peter J. Plocki, Deputy Assistant General

Counsel for Litigation, United States Department of

Transportation, Washington, D.C.; Michael T. Haley, Acting

Chief Counsel, Thomas J. Herrmann, Assistant ChiefCounsel

for Safety Law, Rebecca S. Behravesh, Colleen A. Brennan,

and Matthew T. Prince, Trial Attorneys, Federal Railroad

Administration, Office of the Chief Counsel, Washington,

D.C., for Respondents AnthonyFoxx, United States Secretary

of Transportation; et al.

OPINION

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

The United Transportation Union petitions for review of

a decision of the Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”)

that the agency lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the

Union Pacific Railroad Company had authority under the

Collective Bargaining Agreement to designate terminals for

a new service the railroad had instituted in California. The

Union had contended that terminals could be designated only

through negotiations, while the Railroad had taken the

position that after negotiations failed, the Agreement

authorized it to designate terminals unilaterally on a trial

basis.

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4 UNITED TRANSP. UNION V. FOXX

The FRA concluded it lacked jurisdiction to resolve the

dispute because it did not have statutory authority to interpret

collective bargaining agreements. The Union does not

disagree with that principle of law, but contends that in this

case, “interpretation” of the Agreement was not required

because a cursory “review” establishes that the new terminal

is not a designated terminal.

The Collective Bargaining Agreement is unquestionably

relevant. Congress has attempted to clarify that the

designation of terminals is to be determined by collective

bargaining agreements, 49 U.S.C. § 21101(1); H.R. Rep. No.

95-1176, at 9 (1974), and this intent has been incorporated in

the FRA Agency policy, see 49 C.F.R. § 228, Appx. A

(2012). Given the positions of the parties in this case, the

Union can prevail in the dispute only if the Railroad’s

interpretation of the Agreement is rejected. We therefore

agree with the FRA that the dispute is outside the purview of

the FRA’s authority. The FRA can review an agreement to

determine what the designated terminals are, but it cannot

interpret the agreement to decide how the terminals shall be

designated. Disputes over how an agreement should be

interpreted are governed by a different statute. Because this

is a dispute regarding interpretation of the Collective

Bargaining Agreement, it is governed by the procedures of

the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) for disputes requiring

“interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of

pay, rules, or working conditions.” 45 U.S.C. § 151a; see

also id. §§ 152–6. We therefore deny the petition for review.

BACKGROUND

This dispute over designating terminals has significance

because under the railroad safety laws, known as the Hours of

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UNITED TRANSP. UNION V. FOXX 5

Service Laws (“HSL”), if an employee is released from work

for more than four hours at a designated terminal, the

employee is not on duty. If an employee is released at a place

other than at a designated terminal, the employee is on duty. 

49 U.S.C. § 21103(b)(5)–(6). These are provisions of the

HSL that the FRA administers. See id. at § 103(g).

The HSL are intended to ensure that employees have

adequate rest to perform their work, and therefore on-duty

hours are limited. Id. at § 21103. To accomplish this, the

HSL calculates duty time with reference to when the

employee begins and is released from duty. On-duty time

begins when an employee reports for duty and ends when an

employee is released from duty. Id. at § 21103(b)(1). It is

common practice in the railroad industry, however, to release

employees from duty at a terminal different from the one at

which they begin their service day. The HSL thus includes

provisions indicating whether time spent after such a release

is calculated as on duty or off duty. Id. at § 21103(b)(5)–(6). 

Specifically, an employee is on duty when released for “[a]n

interim period available for rest at a place other than a

designated terminal . . . [and a]n interim period available for

less than 4 hours rest at a designated terminal.” Id. As a

result, in order to determine whether an employee is on or off

duty after release, it must first be determined whether the

terminal of release was a “designated terminal.”

The concept of “designated terminal” has always been

critical, but the term was not originally defined. In the 1970s,

a circuit split developed, with this court holding that the

designation was controlled by the collective bargaining

agreement. See United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa

Fe Ry. Co., 525 F.2d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 1975) (defining

“designated terminal” as a terminal designated as the home or

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6 UNITED TRANSP. UNION V. FOXX

away-from-home terminal “in or under collective bargaining

agreements”). Under the view of the Eighth Circuit, on the

other hand, the “designation” was effectively placed within

the control of the employer. See United States v. St. LouisSan Francisco Ry. Co., 572 F.2d 1224, 1228–29 (8th Cir.

1978) (defining “designated terminal” as a place where

suitable food and lodging are available for employees).

Congress attempted to resolve the problem in 1978 by

amending the statute to define “designated terminal” as “the

home or away-from-home terminal for the assignment of a

particular crew,” 49 U.S.C. § 21101(1), with accompanying

legislative history noting that “such locations shall be

determined by reference to collective bargaining agreements

applicable to particular crew assignments,” H.R. Rep. No. 95-

1176, at 9. The FRA’s Statement of Agency Policy and

Interpretation explains that a designated terminal is a terminal

designated “in or under a collective bargaining agreement”

and, further, that it must have “suitable facilities for food and

lodging.” 49 C.F.R. § 228, Appx. A.

This dispute originated in early 2010 when the Union

Pacific Railroad Company submitted notice to the United

Transportation Union that the Railroad was planning to

establish a new rail service between Big Rock/Wash and Sun

Valley, California. The notice to the Union quoted a relevant

portion of the Collective Bargaining Agreement that provided

for negotiations:

An individual carrier may establish

interdivisional service in freight or passenger

service, subject to the following procedure.

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UNITED TRANSP. UNION V. FOXX 7

Section 1 - Notice

An individual carrier seeking to establish

interdivisional service shall give at least

twenty days’ written notice to the organization

of its desire to establish service, specify the

service it proposes to establish and the

conditions, if any, which it proposes shall

govern the establishment of such service.

. . . .

Section 3 - Procedure

Upon the serving of a notice under Section

1, the parties will discuss the details of

operation and working conditions of the

proposed runs during a period of 20 days

following the date of the notice. If they are

unable to agree, at the end of the 20-day

period, with respect to runs which do not

operate through a home terminal or home

terminals of previously existing runs which

are to be extended, such run or runs will be

operated on a trial basis until completion of

the procedures referred to in Section 4

[Arbitration].

The Union and the Railroad did meet, but were unable to

come to an agreement as to the terminals. The Union, in May

of 2011, asked the FRA Administrator to issue an order to

prevent the Railroad from taking “illegal unilateral action” to

create a terminal at Big Rock/Wash. The Union took the

position that the designated terminal could be established

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8 UNITED TRANSP. UNION V. FOXX

only by agreement between labor and management. The

Union was concerned that the proposed terminal was located

in a remote location without food or lodging.

The FRA then contacted the Railroad for its position, and

the Railroad responded that the terms of the Collective

Bargaining Agreement stated that, if negotiations failed, the

Railroad could begin service on the new line. The FRA

concluded, however, that resolution of the dispute required

interpretation of the Agreement which the FRA lacked the

authority to do. Its letter decision concluded that such a

dispute over interpretation had to be governed by the

resolution procedures authorized in the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 151

et seq.

There is no serious disagreement that under the statutory

provisions of the HSL and the provisions of the Collective

BargainingAgreement, the parties were expected to designate

the terminals through collective bargaining negotiations. 

This is confirmed by the actual conduct of the parties in

entering into negotiations. If they had agreed on terminals,

the FRA would have been in a position to review the

Collective Bargaining Agreement to determine whether the

hours laws were being complied with.

Since the parties did not agree on any designated

terminals, however, the Union has not asked the FRA simply

to “review” the Collective Bargaining Agreement to see what

terminals were negotiated. It has asked the Administrator, in

effect, to declare that absent any agreement as to the Big

Rock/Wash terminal, it cannot be treated as a designated

terminal. If it is not treated as a designated terminal, then all

crew time at Big Rock/Wash is on-duty time. The underlying

issue is therefore what the Collective Bargaining Agreement

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UNITED TRANSP. UNION V. FOXX 9

requires in the absence of an agreement by the parties as to

the designated terminal.

The position of the Railroad is that under the terms of the

Collective Bargaining Agreement the Railroad can designate

a terminal on an interim basis pending arbitration. The

Agreement itself is not crystal clear. The question before us,

however, is not whether the Railroad’s interpretation of the

Agreement is the correct interpretation. The question before

us is whether the FRA was correct that the underlying issue

is one of interpretation of the bargaining agreement. We have

little difficulty in determining that it is.

We reach this conclusion without having to consider any

issue as to the degree of deference owed the FRA concerning

the application of the HSL or its own jurisdiction. The

underlying dispute is a contractual dispute. It is one which

the provisions of the RLA are designed to resolve. 45 U.S.C.

§ 151a (“The purposes of the chapter are . . . to provide for

the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out

of . . . the interpretation or application of agreements covering

rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.”); see also Elgin,

J. & E.R. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722–25 (1945)

(describing the RLA’s dispute resolution procedures). The

Supreme Court has long recognized that those provisions are

mandatory, and may not be bypassed. Andrews v. Louisville

& Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 322–24 (1972); Slocum

v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 242–44 (1950).

The Union, nevertheless, contends that our decision

nearly 40 years ago in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.

supports their view that the FRA can interpret collective

bargaining agreements to determine how a terminal is to be

designated. That case was decided before Congress enacted

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10 UNITED TRANSP. UNION V. FOXX

Section 21101 to define “designated terminal.” Our court

held that the term refers to terminals designated pursuant to

a collective bargaining agreement. Our court was interpreting

the statute, however, not the terms of an agreement. It is true

that, according to its brief in that case, the government’s

position as to how the statute should be interpreted was

formed after the government attorneys had reviewed both the

legislative history and a multitude of collective bargaining

agreements. The government has never taken the position,

however, that the FRA interprets collective bargaining

agreements.

The record in this case reflects that the FRA has

consistently taken the position that its duty is to enforce the

HSL and not to interpret collective bargaining agreements to

determine whether the agreements have been violated. The

position of the Union in this case is fundamentally that the

Railroad violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement in

unilaterally establishing a designated terminal; the position of

the Railroad is that it has not violated the contract. The FRA

correctly determined that this is fundamentally an issue of

contract interpretation beyond its adjudicatory powers.

Petition for review DENIED.

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