Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03020/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03020-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Juan Brooke
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 10, 2002 Decided October 25, 2002

No. 01-3020

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Juan Brooke,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cr00190-01)

H. Heather Shaner, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the brief for appellant.

Michael C. Liebman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher and William

B. Wiegand, III, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

USCA Case #01-3020 Document #709947 Filed: 10/25/2002 Page 1 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Before: Henderson, Tatel, and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: In this appeal, defendant Juan

Brooke challenges the sentence he received after pleading

guilty to a drug conspiracy charge. At sentencing, the district court denied Brooke's request to depart downward from

the applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines range

based on his age and physical condition. Because the district

court properly understood the guidelines and its authority to

depart, and did not make clearly erroneous factual findings,

we affirm the court's decision not to grant the defendant a

departure.

I

On April 6, 2000, officers of the Metropolitan Police Department searched Brooke's apartment pursuant to a search

warrant. Upon entering the apartment, the officers found

Brooke in the bedroom, sitting on the bed. In his pants

pocket was a bag containing seventy individually-wrapped

packets of cocaine base, totaling 8.8 grams of the drug. On

the bed next to Brooke were three large plastic bags containing a total of 63 grams of cocaine base. After negotiation

with the government, Brooke waived indictment and pled

guilty to one count of violating 18 U.S.C. s 371, which proscribes conspiracies to commit offenses against the United

States, by conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to

distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. ss 841(a)(1)

and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).

Brooke's conviction, at the age of 82, was his third since

coming to the United States in 1980. In 1989, at the age of

70, he was convicted in federal district court of possession

with intent to distribute cocaine base. After serving 60

months in prison, Brooke was placed on supervised release.

In 1997, at the age of 78 and while on supervised release for

the 1989 conviction, Brooke was convicted in District of

Columbia Superior Court on cocaine-related charges. After

serving six months in prison, he was released on probation.

Brooke was still on probation at the time of the April 6, 2000

USCA Case #01-3020 Document #709947 Filed: 10/25/2002 Page 2 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

arrest that led to the sentence that is the subject of the

current appeal.

For a person with Brooke's criminal history, and with

credit for acceptance of responsibility, the amount of drugs

found on his person and on his bed would normally have

generated a guideline sentencing range of 121-151 months.

See Presentence Report p 50. In this case, however, the

government's agreement to charge Brooke with conspiracy

under 18 U.S.C. s 371, rather than with the substantive

offense of distribution under 21 U.S.C. s 841, dictated a

guideline sentence of only 60 months, the statutory maximum

for violations of s 371. See U.S.S.G. s 5G1.1(a) (providing

that where the statutory maximum is less than the minimum

of the applicable guideline range, the guideline sentence is the

statutory maximum).

After his plea, Brooke filed a sentencing memorandum with

the district court, seeking a downward departure from his

guideline sentence based on his age and physical condition.

Brooke's memorandum stated that he was 82 years old, and

that he had the following "serious physical infirmities": (1) a

"markedly swollen right knee" with "obvious joint effusions,

and tenderness and flexion of knee of only 6 degrees with

some pain"; (2) "stiffness in his hands and difficulty holding

objects"; (3) prior evaluations for "chest pains"; and (4)

"respiratory problems and arthritis." Def.'s Sentencing

Mem. at 3. Although the district judge told Brooke that "I

recognize I have discretion" to grant the requested departure,

Tr. at 22, he declined to do so and sentenced the defendant to

60 months' imprisonment.

II

In the ordinary case, a district court must impose a sentence falling within the applicable guideline range. See 18

U.S.C. s 3553(b); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92

(1996). A court may depart from the applicable range, however, if it "finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating

circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken

into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulatUSCA Case #01-3020 Document #709947 Filed: 10/25/2002 Page 3 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

ing the guidelines that should result in a sentence different

from that described." 18 U.S.C. s 3553(b). According to the

United States Sentencing Commission, the two departure

factors at issue here, age and physical condition, are "not

ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should

be outside the applicable guideline range." U.S.S.G. s 5H1.1

(age); U.S.S.G. s 5H1.4 (physical condition). Under the taxonomy set forth by the Supreme Court in Koon, such factors

are termed "discouraged factors." Koon, 518 U.S. at 95. As

the Court explained, where the departure factor at issue is a

discouraged factor, "the court should depart only if the factor

is present to an exceptional degree or in some other way

makes the case different from the ordinary case where the

factor is present." Id. at 96.1

Our standard for reviewing a district court's refusal to

depart downward from an applicable guideline range is by

now well settled. We may review such a decision only to

determine whether the sentence was imposed "in violation of

law" or "as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines." 18 U.S.C. s 3742(a)(1)-(2); see United States

v. Greenfield, 244 F.3d 158, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United

States v. Leandre, 132 F.3d 796, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United

States v. Sammoury, 74 F.3d 1341, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In

so doing, we must "accept the findings of fact of the district

court unless they are clearly erroneous," and "give due

deference to the district court's application of the guidelines

to the facts." 18 U.S.C. s 3742(e); see Greenfield, 244 F.3d

at 160.

A district court's refusal to depart based on the mistaken

belief that it lacks authority to do so constitutes an incorrect

application of the guidelines. Sammoury, 74 F.3d at 1344.

So, too, does a refusal to depart based on a clearly erroneous

factual finding that a circumstance warranting departure is

__________

1 See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. H, intro. comment. ("[A]lthough these

factors are not ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a

sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range, they may

be relevant to this determination in exceptional cases."); see also

U.S.S.G. s 5K2.0.

USCA Case #01-3020 Document #709947 Filed: 10/25/2002 Page 4 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

absent. Id. at 1344-45. However, "if the judge correctly

understood the Sentencing Guidelines and the evidence, knew

he could depart, and yet decided to stick to the guideline

range, there has been no incorrect application of the Guidelines ... and so the resulting sentence cannot be set aside."

Id. at 1343. In short, a "court's discretionary decision that

the particular circumstances of a given case do not warrant a

departure ... is not reviewable." United States v. Pinnick,

47 F.3d 434, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see United States v.

Draffin, 286 F.3d 606, 609 (D.C. Cir. 2002); United States v.

Washington, 106 F.3d 983, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

III

Brooke contends that the district court erred by failing to

grant him a departure under policy statements contained in

two sections of the Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual, s 5H1.1 and s 5H1.4. Cognizant of our standard of

appellate review, the defendant contends that the court failed

to grant a departure because it misunderstood the guidelines

and its authority to depart under those sections, and because

it made a clear error of fact regarding his physical condition.

We find to the contrary: The district court correctly understood the guidelines, expressly recognized its discretion to

depart, Tr. at 22, and made no clear factual errors.

A

The first section cited by the defendant is s 5H1.1, which is

entitled "Age" and provides:

Age (including youth) is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range. Age may be a reason to impose a

sentence below the applicable guideline range when the

defendant is elderly and infirm and where a form of

punishment such as home confinement might be equally

efficient as and less costly than incarceration. Physical

condition, which may be related to age, is addressed at

s 5H1.4....

U.S.S.G. s 5H1.1 (emphasis added). The district court restated this section verbatim during the sentencing hearing

USCA Case #01-3020 Document #709947 Filed: 10/25/2002 Page 5 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

and then proceeded to consider each of the three elements

italicized above. Tr. at 18-19.

There was, of course, no question that the 82-year-old

defendant was "elderly." Nor did the court dispute that the

defendant was "infirm."2 To the contrary, the court stated

that "I have gone through the medical records which you

have attached, as I've said, as to his age and his disabilities,

and I think his disabilities are there." Tr. at 7. Further, the

court accepted all of Brooke's specific representations regarding his disabilities:

The medical records here indicated ... that you have a

badly swollen right knee; that it's been indicated that it's

causing you terrible pain and suffering that has to be

drained constantly. You also are getting arthritis in

your hands and other joints. You have difficulty holding

objects. You've had respiratory problems and chest

pain.

Tr. at 19-20.

Nor did the court hold that these medical infirmities were

insufficient to permit a departure under s 5H1.1.3 Rather,

the problem the court discerned was with the third element of

s 5H1.1: that an alternative "form of punishment such as

__________

2 Referring to both s 5H1.1 and s 5H1.4, the court did state that

the "case law indicates that these sections do not permit a downward departure for elderly defendants who are in good health." Tr.

at 19. Contrary to the defendant's suggestion, however, the court

was not implying that Brooke was "in good health," but merely (and

correctly) reciting the elements of the two guideline sections. Indeed, the court's statement was little more than a paraphrase of the

defendant's own sentencing memorandum. See, e.g., Def.'s Sentencing Mem. at 2 ("s 5H1.1 does not permit a downward departure for

an elderly defendant in good health....").

3 At one point in the hearing, the court did refer to a requirement

of "extraordinary" physical impairment, and found that Brooke did

not meet it. Tr. at 19; see id. at 7, 21. The court's reference,

however, was not to s 5H1.1 but to s 5H1.4, which does contain the

word "extraordinary" and is discussed in the text below. At

another point, the court stated that Brooke's infirmity did not rise

home confinement ... be equally efficient as ... incarceration." The court concluded that home confinement would not

be effective in restraining the defendant's criminal conduct

because Brooke had a history of drug dealing in his home:

"[I]n your apartment, at least on two separate occasions,

you've been arrested and convicted of dealing drugs...."

Tr. at 20. And whether we regard the court's conclusion

about relative effectiveness as one of fact, which we may set

aside only for clear error, or simply as the court's rationale

for declining to exercise its discretion in Brooke's favor, which

we may not review at all, we have no warrant to reverse it.

See Sammoury, 74 F.3d at 1344; Pinnick, 47 F.3d at 439.

Brooke also contends that the district court erred in declining to depart under s 5H1.4, which applies to departures

USCA Case #01-3020 Document #709947 Filed: 10/25/2002 Page 6 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

based on "Physical Condition" and states in relevant part:

Physical condition or appearance, including physique, is

not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range.

However, an extraordinary physical impairment may

be a reason to impose a sentence below the guideline

range; e.g., in the case of a seriously infirm defendant,

home detention may be as efficient as, and less costly

than, imprisonment.

U.S.S.G. s 5H1.4 (emphasis added). As with s 5H1.1, the

court read the section verbatim at the sentencing hearing and

explained why it did not regard the section as warranting

departure. Tr. at 19. This time, however, the court concluded that Brooke's impairment was insufficient to qualify under

the section. Unlike s 5H1.1, s 5H1.4 requires not just "infirm[ity]" but "extraordinary physical impairment," and while

the court did not dispute the underlying facts of Brooke's

medical condition, it did not regard them as reflecting an

__________

to the "level under the case law for departing because of serious

physical impairments that would be exacerbated by incarceration...." Tr. at 21. Again, this was not a reference to s 5H1.1,

but rather to a potential ground for departure set forth in United

States v. Baron, 914 F. Supp. 660, 662-63 (D. Mass. 1995), and

discussed in Part III.B below.

USCA Case #01-3020 Document #709947 Filed: 10/25/2002 Page 7 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

extraordinary impairment. Tr. at 7, 19, 21. Although we are

uncertain whether the district court intended this conclusion

as a finding of fact (i.e., that Brooke's impairment was not

extraordinary by comparison to that of many other defendants),4 or as an expression of its rationale for declining to

exercise discretion (i.e., that the impairment was insufficiently

extraordinary to move the court to exercise its discretion in

Brooke's favor), our disposition of this appeal is again unaffected. If the former, the district court's conclusion was not

clearly erroneous in light of the medical evidence of record; if

the latter, the court's conclusion is unreviewable.

B

In addition to the errors Brooke alleges concerning

ss 5H1.1 and 5H1.4, he suggests that the district court

further erred in thinking itself without discretion to depart

unless the specific elements listed in those sections were

satisfied. Indeed, the court did repeatedly state that it did

not believe a departure was warranted under those sections.5

__________

4 The Supreme Court has suggested that a determination based

on such a comparison is one of fact, or is at least closely intertwined

with factual considerations. Cf. Koon, 518 U.S. at 100 ("What the

district court must determine is whether the misconduct that occurred in the particular instance suffices to make the case atypical.

The answer is apt to vary depending on, for instance, the severity of

the conduct, its timing, and the disruption it causes. These considerations are factual matters."). But even if such a comparison were

instead regarded as an application of the guidelines to the facts, we

would still owe the district court "due deference," 18 U.S.C.

s 3742(e), which on this kind of question would be substantial. Cf.

Koon, 518 U.S. at 98 ("[W]hether a discouraged factor nonetheless

justifies departure because it is present in some unusual or exceptional way, [is] ... determined in large part by comparison with the

facts of other Guidelines cases. District courts have an institutional

advantage over appellate courts in making these sorts of determinations, especially as they see so many more Guidelines cases than

appellate courts do.").

5 For example, the court stated that the "case law indicates that

these sections do not permit a downward departure for elderly

USCA Case #01-3020 Document #709947 Filed: 10/25/2002 Page 8 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

But the reason that the court's statements were couched in

terms of the elements of those sections was that the court

was responding to the defendant's own sentencing memorandum, which relied on those sections as the grounds for the

requested departure. See Def.'s Sentencing Mem. at 2. Accordingly, the court's conclusion that departure was unwarranted "under these sections" expressed nothing more than

its rejection of defendant's request premised on those sections. It did not reflect a belief that those were the only

possible grounds for departure.

The court's express consideration of additional grounds for

departure belies the claim that it thought itself constrained

by the two guideline sections. For example, exploring a

potential ground for departure not mentioned in s 5H1.4, the

court suggested that "perhaps" it could "depart where there

is serious physical impairment[ ] that can be exacerbated by

incarceration and cannot be adequately treated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons," citing a case from the District of

Massachusetts. Tr. at 19 (citing United States v. Baron, 914

F. Supp. 660 (D. Mass. 1995)). In the end, the court declined

to depart on that ground because it concluded that the

Bureau of Prisons could adequately treat Brooke's maladies

"at least ... as well as any other place can," Tr. at 21, a

factual finding that is not contradicted by anything in the

record.

The court also considered another rationale for departure

not contained in the cited guideline sections: that Brooke

would be vulnerable to physical abuse in prison. The district

court noted this court's holding, in United States v. Graham,

83 F.3d 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1996), that "to qualify for a downward

departure" on that ground, "a defendant's vulnerability must

be so extreme as to substantially affect the severity of the

__________

defendants who are in good health." Tr. at 19 (emphasis added).

In light of the sections' references to a defendant who is "infirm,"

s 5H1.1, or who has "an extraordinary physical impairment,"

s 5H1.4, the court's statement is accurate. Indeed, the defendant's

own sentencing memorandum made the same point. See Def.'s

Sentencing Mem. at 2, quoted supra note 2.

USCA Case #01-3020 Document #709947 Filed: 10/25/2002 Page 9 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

confinement, such as where only solitary confinement can

protect the defendant from abuse." Id. at 1481; see also

Def.'s Sentencing Mem. at 4 ("Defendant Brooke acknowledges that this departure is reserved for extraordinary situations...."). Concluding that Brooke was not "so [infirm] or

disabled" as to come within the terms of Graham, the district

court denied a departure on that basis. See Tr. at 22. And

whether we regard that conclusion as a finding of fact or as

an application of the rule of Graham to the facts of Brooke's

condition, see generally supra note 4, we have no cause to

overturn it.

The district court went on to consider still two more

departure possibilities, neither of which was even mentioned

in Brooke's own sentencing memorandum. First, it considered whether the defendant's advanced age alone warranted a

departure, concluding that "in this case, I do not see age as a

reason alone." Tr. at 21 (emphasis added). This was so, the

court explained, because the defendant's age did not appear

to serve as a deterrent to his continuing criminal conduct:

"Even though you're elderly, it's evident that you were a drug

dealer and that's what you decided to do when you were 70

years old and have kept it up." Id. at 22. The court had set

this point out in even greater detail at the outset of the

hearing:

What concerns me regarding his age ... is ... when he

was 70 he was convicted of unlawful possession with

intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base

here in this court. And then he was 78 and he was

convicted again in Superior Court. My concern is departing ... and letting him just, because of his age and

health concerns, go back to his apartment here, and it

seems he goes back to a drug life again. I don't know

how I protect society by just letting him out.

Tr. at 8. That explanation, which expressed the district

court's rationale for declining to exercise its discretion, is

unreviewable by this court.6

__________

6 We therefore have no occasion to consider defendant's suggestion that extreme age, even in the absence of infirmities or other

USCA Case #01-3020 Document #709947 Filed: 10/25/2002 Page 10 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Finally, the court sua sponte considered whether "an accumulation of all" of the factors present in Brooke's case

warranted the exercise of its discretion to depart. Tr. at 22;

see generally U.S.S.G. s 5K2.0, comment. ("The Commission

does not foreclose the possibility of an extraordinary case

that, because of a combination of such characteristics or

circumstances, differs significantly from the 'heartland' of

cases covered by the guidelines...."). Effectively addressing the question in terms of the statutory direction to determine whether factors unconsidered by the Sentencing Commission "should result in a sentence different from" that

specified by the guidelines, 18 U.S.C. s 3553(b), the court

concluded that the defendant's plea bargain had already

reduced his sentence to a level the court regarded as appropriate. See Tr. at 22. This expression of an additional

rationale for refusing to exercise the court's discretion is,

once again, unreviewable.

IV

The district court did not misunderstand the sentencing

guidelines or its authority to depart from the applicable

guideline range. Nor did it clearly err in finding the facts

relevant to a potential departure. The court did conscientiously explain to the defendant its rationale for declining to

exercise its discretion in his favor, but that is a decision this

court lacks authority to review. Accordingly, the judgment of

the district court is

Affirmed.

__________

considerations, would be sufficient to justify a departure. Cf.

United States v. Goff, 20 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing a

district court's grant of a departure for a 67-year-old defendant in

good health).

USCA Case #01-3020 Document #709947 Filed: 10/25/2002 Page 11 of 11