Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-55763/USCOURTS-ca9-14-55763-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brian C. Mulligan
Appellant
Eric Rose
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIAN C. MULLIGAN, an individual,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JAMES NICHOLS, an individual; JOHN

MILLER, an individual; THE CITY OF

LOS ANGELES, an entity; TYLER

IZEN, an individual; LOS ANGELES

POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE, a

corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-55278

D.C. No.

2:13-cv-00836-

RGK-VBK

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding

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2 MULLIGAN V. NICHOLS

BRIAN C. MULLIGAN, an individual,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ERIC ROSE, an individual,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-55763

D.C. No.

2:13-cv-08298-

SVW-AGR

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 7, 2016

Pasadena, California

Filed August 29, 2016

Before: Richard R. Clifton and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit

Judges and Frederic Block,* Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Clifton

* The Honorable Frederic Block, Senior U.S. District Judge for the

Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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MULLIGAN V. NICHOLS 3

SUMMARY**

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment

and judgment entered following a jury trial in an action

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law by Brian

Mulligan who alleged, among other things, that Los Angeles

police officers together with City of Los Angeles officials and

the police officers’ union retaliated against him for exercising

his First Amendment rights.

Mulligan was injured in an altercation with two police

officers and subsequently filed an administrative claim

against the City of Los Angeles, alleging that the officers had

acted unlawfully. The police officers’ union, allegedly with

assistance from City officials, responded by accusing

Mulligan of being a drug abuser and of having acted

aggressively toward the officers. The episode attracted

publicity, and Mulligan lost his job with Deutsche Bank. 

The panel held that the statements allegedly made by

defendants against Mulligan were not sufficiently adverse to

support a claim of First Amendment retaliation. The

defendants did not make any decision or take any state action

affecting Mulligan’s rights, benefits, relationship or status

with the state. Nor could Mulligan show the loss of a

valuable governmental benefit or privilege. The panel

concluded that although Mulligan’s reputation was

undoubtedly damaged by the increased media attention,

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 MULLIGAN V. NICHOLS

which eventually resulted in the loss of his job, such

reputational harm is not actionable under § 1983 unless it is

accompanied by some more tangible interests.

The panel held that the district court did not err by

granting summary judgment to defendants on Mulligan’s

state law negligence claim. The panel held that the causal

relationship between the allegedly negligent pre-force

conduct of police officers and the later use of force was too

attenuated. The panel affirmed the district court’s evidentiary

rulings excluding evidence: (1) that Mulligan was not

ultimately charged with any crime for his conduct on the

night on the incident; and (2) that one of the officers involved

in the incident had previously been accused of on-duty sexual

assault. Finally, the panel held that once the jury had found

that the officers did not act unlawfully, there was no basis for

the negligent-supervision claim against the City.

COUNSEL

Jennifer Mira Hashmall (argued) and Louis R. Miller, Miller

Barondess LLP, Los Angeles, California, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Jules S. Zeman (argued), McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP,

Los Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellee James

Nichols.

Blithe Smith Bock (argued), Deputy City Attorney; Amy Jo

Field, Assistant City Attorney; Michael N. Feuer, City

Attorney; Office of the Los Angeles City Attorney, Los

Angeles, California; for Defendants-Appellees City of Los

Angeles and John Miller.

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MULLIGAN V. NICHOLS 5

Alexander H. Cote (argued), Amos A. Lowder, Angela M.

Machala, and David C. Scheper, Scheper Kim & Harris LLP,

Los Angeles, California, for Defendants-Appellees Los

Angeles Police Protective League, Tyler Izen, and Eric Rose.

OPINION

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:

The First Amendment of the Constitution protects citizens

from attempts by government officials to chill their speech.

One question presented by this case is whether that same

constitutional guarantee also requiresthose officials to remain

silent when accused of misconduct, lest they risk liability for

unlawful retaliation. We conclude that it does not.

Plaintiff Brian Mulligan was injured in an altercation with

two Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers.

Mulligan filed an administrative claim against the City of Los

Angeles, alleging that the officers had acted unlawfully. The

police officers’ union, the Los Angeles Police Protective

League (LAPPL), allegedly with assistance from City

officials, responded by accusing Mulligan of being a drug

abuser and of having acted aggressively toward the officers.

Because he was a prominent business executive connected

with the entertainment industry, the episode attracted

publicity, and Mulligan lost his job.

Mulligan brought 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state-law claims

against the City, LAPD officers James Nichols and John

Miller, the LAPPL, and LAPPL officials Tyler Izen and Eric

Rose. He presented claims based both on his initial

interactions with the LAPD officers and on the subsequent

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6 MULLIGAN V. NICHOLS

publicity, which Mulligan contended constituted unlawful

retaliation against him for exercising his First Amendment

rights.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of

Defendants on the unlawful retaliation claim and on

Mulligan’s claim that the LAPD officers acted negligently.

Mulligan’s other claims proceeded to trial, and the jury found

in favor of Defendants on all issues that were before it. 

Judgment was entered for Defendants. Mulligan appeals on

several grounds. We affirm.

I. Background

The events behind this lawsuit began on May 15, 2012. 

The parties intensely dispute what happened that night, but

they agree that LAPD officers Nichols and Miller first

encountered Mulligan near the entrance to OccidentalCollege

in the Eagle Rock area of Los Angeles. The officers

responded to 911 calls reporting that a man fitting Mulligan’s

description was acting erratically. After taking Mulligan back

to his car in a nearby street, the officers transported and

checked Mulligan into a motel.1

Mulligan left the motel later that night. On the streets near

the motel, he once again encountered Officers Nichols and

Miller. The parties’ accounts as to what happened next were

very different. Mulligan testified that he tried to flee from the

1 The precise reason why the officers took Mulligan to the motel is one

of the facts about which the parties disagree. Mulligan asserts that he was

taken to the motel against his will. The officers testified at trial that

Mulligan, who appeared disoriented, asked them to take him to the motel

to “sleep it off.”

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MULLIGAN V. NICHOLS 7

officers as soon as he caught sight of them. The officers

followed, chasing him and blocking his escape. They then hit

him in the face with a baton, jabbed his back, and slammed

his face into the asphalt.

The officers testified, in contrast, that they found

Mulligan running down a street near the motel while

screaming and attempting to open locked cars. They then

pursued Mulligan, who continued fleeing despite their

repeated calls for him to stop. Mulligan then began charging

at the officers, forcing Miller to use his baton to subdue him.

With the help of a third officer, they managed to handcuff

Mulligan and called an ambulance to take him to a hospital.

The incident and Mulligan’s subsequent administrative

claim against the City attracted significant media attention.

Mulligan was at the time an executive with Deutsche Bank

and had formerly been chairman of Fox Television and cochairman of Universal Pictures. The officers’ police report

was leaked to news outlets, which published stories that

included the allegation that Mulligan was under the influence

of drugs at the time of the incident. The media pressure

intensified on October 15, 2012, when the LAPPL issued a

press release accusing Mulligan of being a frequent user of

bath salts.2 The press release included a leaked tape of a

conversation between Mulligan and an officer of the Glendale

Police Department that took place on May 13, two days

2

“Bath salts” is the popular term for a type of synthetic stimulant with

similar effects to amphetamines and cocaine. Drug Enforcement Agency,

Bath Salts or Designer Cathinones (Synthetic Stimulants),

http://www.dea.gov/druginfo/drug_data_sheets/Bath_Salts.pdf (last

visited, August 22, 2016) (available at https://perma.cc/9MVH-V5XM).

Bath salts have serious side effects, including agitation, insomnia,

paranoia, delusions, and panic attacks. Id.

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8 MULLIGAN V. NICHOLS

before the Eagle Rock incident. In the conversation, Mulligan

admitted to having used bath salts approximately twenty

times. Because of the press release and associated negative

media coverage, Mulligan lost his job at Deutsche Bank.

Mulligan filed his complaint in federal district court

against the City, Officers Nichols and Miller, the LAPPL, and

Tyler Izen, the LAPPL’s president, in February 2013. He

alleged that the City, LAPPL, and Izen had retaliated against

him for exercising his First Amendment right to file an

administrative claim against the City. He also alleged

excessive force claims under both Section 1983 and

California law, as well as state-law assault and battery, false

imprisonment, police negligence, and negligent supervision

claims against the officers and the City. A separate complaint

alleging a substantively identical retaliation claim against

Eric Rose, the LAPPL’s publicist, was filed in November

2013.

Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The

district court granted summaryjudgment to Defendants on the

retaliation claim, concluding that Mulligan had not

demonstrated the existence of retaliatory intent.3 The district

court also granted summary judgment for Defendants on the

false imprisonment and police negligence claims. Summary

judgment was denied on the negligent supervision, excessive

force, and assault and battery claims.

3 The complaint against Rose was assigned to a different district judge,

who dismissed that claim based on issue preclusion following the entry of

summary judgment on the retaliation claim in the first action. The

dismissal of the complaint against Rose is also challenged in this appeal.

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MULLIGAN V. NICHOLS 9

The court bifurcated the trial, such that the first phase

would cover the excessive force claim, while the second

phase would cover the negligent supervision claim and

damages. As noted above, the jury found in favor of

Defendants in the first phase of the trial, which the district

court concluded made the second phase unnecessary.

Mulligan presents several arguments on appeal. First, he

contests the district court’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of Defendants on his First Amendment retaliation

claim. Second, he argues that the district court erred in

granting summary judgment to Defendants on his claim that

the officers’ use of force against him was negligent. Third, he

challenges two of the district court’s evidentiary rulings

during the excessive force phase of the trial. Finally, he

contends that the district court erred in not proceeding to the

second phase of the trial, involving his negligent supervision

claim.

II. First Amendment Retaliation Claim

Mulligan alleges that the City, LAPPL, Izen, and Rose

4

retaliated against him for the exercise of his First Amendment

rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mulligan contends

that the accusations by the LAPPL that he was a regular user

of bath salts, along with the accompanying media leaks of the

4 Mulligan’s appeal of the dismissal of his action against Rose rests

entirely on his contention that summary judgment should not have been

entered against him on the retaliation claim in the first lawsuit. He does

not dispute the application of issue preclusion in the second lawsuit if the

summary judgment was proper. Because we hold that the summary

judgment was properly granted, we also hold that Mulligan’s separate

retaliation suit against Rose was properly dismissed. We will not discuss

the action against Rose separately.

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10 MULLIGAN V. NICHOLS

police report of the incident and the tape of his conversation

at the Glendale Police Department, in which he admitted to

his past bath salts use, constituted a smear campaign meant to

deter him from proceeding with his legal claim against the

officers and City. He also alleges that the City actively

participated in that campaign, making the LAPPL and its

officials joint state actors. We conclude that the facts alleged

by Mulligan do not give rise to a cognizable claim of First

Amendment retaliation.

To state a claim for First Amendment retaliation against

a government official, a plaintiff must demonstrate that

“(1) he engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) as

a result, he was subjected to adverse action by the defendant

that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from

continuing to engage in the protected activity; and (3) there

was a substantial causal relationship between the

constitutionally protected activity and the adverse action.”

Blair v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 608 F.3d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 2010).

It is uncontested that Mulligan’s decision to file a claim

against the City is worthy of constitutional protection.

Ordinarily, the adverse retaliatory actions complained of

by plaintiffs are “‘exercise[s] of governmental power’ that are

‘regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature’ and have

the effect of punishing someone for his or her speech.” Id. at

544 (alteration in original) (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S.

1, 11 (1972)). But that is not the situation here. Instead, the

essence of Mulligan’s claim is that the City and LAPPL

chilled his right to speak freely by engaging in speech of their

own that significantly damaged his reputation and ultimately

caused him to lose his job.

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MULLIGAN V. NICHOLS 11

Retaliation claims involving government speech warrant

a cautious approach by courts. Restricting the ability of

government decisionmakers to engage in speech risks

interfering with their ability to effectively perform their

duties. It also ignores the competing First Amendment rights

of the officials themselves. The First Amendment is intended

to “preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which

truth will ultimately prevail.” McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct.

2518, 2529 (2014) (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters

of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)). That marketplace of ideas

is undermined if public officials are prevented from

responding to speech of citizens with speech of their own. See

Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136 (1966) (“The interest of the

public in hearing all sides of a public issue is hardly advanced

by extending more protection to citizen-critics than to

legislators.”).

In accordance with these principles, we have set a high

bar when analyzing whether speech by government officials

is sufficiently adverse to give rise to a First Amendment

retaliation claim. In Gini v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police

Department, 40 F.3d 1041, 1043–44 (9th Cir. 1994), the

plaintiff alleged that she had lost her federal job as a result of

allegedly defamatory statements made by a city police officer

to her federal superiors following her filing of an Internal

Affairs complaint. We affirmed the dismissal of her

retaliation claim against the city. Id. at 1045. We noted that

an act of defamation by government officials was insufficient

to create a right to a remedy under the First Amendment in

the absence of “state action affecting [a plaintiff’s] rights,

benefits, relationship or status with the state.” Id. Similarly,

in Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 875 (9th Cir.

1998), which involved a claim by a police officer against his

government employer, we held that “[m]ere threats and harsh

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12 MULLIGAN V. NICHOLS

words” are not ordinarily sufficient to constitute an adverse

employment action for purposes of a First Amendment claim.

As we stated in Nunez, “[i]t would be the height of irony,

indeed, if mere speech, in response to speech, could constitute

a First Amendment violation.” Id.

As was the case in Gini and Nunez, the accusations and

media leaks by the LAPPL and its leadership are not enough

to demonstrate a constitutional violation. The Defendants in

this case did not “make any decision or take any state action

affecting [Mulligan’s] rights, benefits, relationship or status

with the state.” Gini, 40 F.3d at 1045. Nor can Mulligan show

“the loss of ‘a valuable governmental benefit or privilege.’”

Nunez, 147 F.3d at 875 (quoting Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d

1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 1992)). Although Mulligan’s reputation

was undoubtedly damaged by the increased media attention,

which eventually resulted in the loss of his job, such

reputational harm “is not actionable under § 1983 unless it is

accompanied by ‘some more tangible interests.’” Gini,

40 F.3d at 1045 (quoting Patton v. Cty. of Kings, 857 F.2d

1379, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988)).5

5 We note that we do not understand Gini and Nunez to stand for the

proposition that speech by government officials can never give rise to a

claim of First Amendment retaliation in the absence of a loss of tangible

rights or government benefits. See Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d

968, 975–76 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that Nunez does not create “an

exclusive, category-based limitation on the kind of retaliatory action that

is actionable under the First Amendment,” nor does it mean that “the

government is allowed to take severe retaliatory actions . . . because those

actions do not result in the loss of a valuable governmental benefit or

privilege”). Indeed, we recognize that “[i]nformal measures, such as ‘the

threat ofinvoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion, persuasion,

and intimidation,’ can violate the First Amendment also.” White v. Lee,

227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v.

Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963)).

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MULLIGAN V. NICHOLS 13

Our decision in Mendocino Environmental Center v.

Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283 (9th Cir. 1999), is not to

the contrary. There, we concluded that evidence that police

officers had made false accusations of criminal activity

against members of an environmental activist group was

sufficient to justify a First Amendment claim by the group’s

members. Id. at 1302–03. The accusations in Mendocino were

made in the context of a police investigation and contributed

to arrests and search warrants aimed at the activists. Id. at

1289–91. That was speech that did more than simply damage

the plaintiffs’ reputation, it also intimated that punishment

would imminently follow.

The approach we take here and have taken in the past is

consistent with the views of other circuits. The circuit courts

that have considered the issue have required plaintiffs

alleging government retaliation that takes the form of speech

to meet a high threshold. For example, the Fourth Circuit has

held that in situations “where a public official’s alleged

retaliation is in the nature of speech,” a citizen’s First

Amendment rights are not violated “in the absence of a threat,

coercion, or intimidation intimating that punishment,

sanction, or adverse regulatory action will imminently

follow.” Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 687

(4th Cir. 2000). Other circuits have adopted similar tests. See,

e.g. Goldstein v. Galvin, 719 F.3d 16, 30–31 (1st Cir. 2013);

Hutchins v. Clarke, 661 F.3d 947, 955–57 (7th Cir. 2011); XMen Sec., Inc. v. Pataki, 196 F.3d 56, 68–71 (2d Cir. 1999).

Mulligan argues that the emphasis we and other courts

have placed on defendants’ free speech rights is mistaken

because, in his view, public officials do not possess any First

Amendment rights worthy of protection. We disagree. That

viewpoint would cripple the ability of state actors to play a

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14 MULLIGAN V. NICHOLS

part in public discourse. It is well established that public

employees and officials retain rights to free speech. See, e.g.

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006) (“[P]ublic

employees do not surrender all their First Amendment rights

by reason of their employment.”); Blair, 608 F.3d at 545

(“[W]e assume all of the Board members have a protected

interest in speaking out and voting their conscience on the

important issues they confront.” (emphasis in original)).

Mulligan also directs our attention to the decision of the

Sixth Circuit in Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 1998).

In that case, the court held that a rape victim who had

criticized the police investigation of her rape had a cognizable

retaliation claim after the county sheriff responded to her

criticisms by releasing “highly personal and extremely

humiliating details” of the rape at a public press conference.

Id. at 676. We need not decide now whether we agree that the

First Amendment would permit a retaliation claim based on

the disclosure of deeply private personal details like those at

issue in Bloch, because Mulligan’s claim does not remotely

rise to the same level. Although his taped admission of

previous bath salts use was undoubtedly embarrassing,

statements made as part of a conversation voluntarily entered

into with a police officer, without any promise of

confidentiality, are not of the same degree of constitutional

magnitude as the retaliatory conduct in Bloch, which the

Sixth Circuit concluded implicated the plaintiff’s

fundamental privacy rights. Id. at 686.6

6 The City and LAPPL also argue in their briefs that summary judgment

was proper for the reason that Mulligan’s claim solely involves the

conduct of the LAPPL, a private actor, and is therefore not actionable

under Section 1983. The City separately argues that even if the LAPPL

and its officers unlawfully retaliated against Mulligan, the City itself could

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MULLIGAN V. NICHOLS 15

III. Police Negligence Claim

Mulligan next contends that the district court erred in

granting summary judgment to Defendants on his state-law

claim that Officers Nichols and Miller acted negligently in

their use of force against him. In light of the jury verdict in

favor of the officers at trial, Mulligan does not argue that the

officers’ use of force was itself negligent, but he asserts that

the officers’ conduct prior to the specific acts that involved

force violated California law. We review the district court’s

grant of summary judgment de novo. Hawn v. Exec. Jet

Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2010).

Under California law, negligence liability “can arise if the

tactical conduct and decisions leading up to the use of deadly

force [by law enforcement] show, as part of the totality of

circumstances, that the use of deadly force was

unreasonable.” Hayes v. Cty. of San Diego, 305 P.3d 252, 254

(Cal. 2013). Thus, negligence claims under California law

encompass a broader spectrum of conduct than excessive

force claims under the Fourth Amendment. Cf. Billington v.

Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[E]ven if an

officer negligentlyprovokes a violent response, that negligent

act will not transform an otherwise reasonable subsequent use

of force into a Fourth Amendment violation.” (emphasis in

original)).

Mulligan asserts that the officers’ decision to take him to

the motel against his will was sufficient to create a triable

not be held responsible under the rules established in Monell v.

Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Because

we conclude that the conduct at issue was not a violation of Mulligan’s

constitutional rights, we do not address these alternative arguments.

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16 MULLIGAN V. NICHOLS

issue of material fact as to whether the officers’ pre-force

conduct was negligent. We disagree. Even “viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable” to Mulligan for

purposes of summary judgment, Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1155,

Mulligan has failed to demonstrate a sufficiently close causal

link between the officers’ decision to take him to the motel

and their eventual use of force. In Hayes, the California

Supreme Court held that the pre-deadly-force theory of

negligence liability was applicable to the decision of police

officers to enter a residence with knowledge that a potentially

suicidal man was in the house. Hayes, 305 P.3d at 254.7

Immediately afterwards, the officers shot and killed the man,

who had walked toward the officers carrying a knife. Id.

The causal relationship in this case between the allegedly

negligent pre-force conduct and the later use of force is far

more attenuated. The events at the motel took place

significantly earlier in time and in a different location than

the later altercation between Mulligan and the officers.

California law does not support the existence of negligence

liability in these circumstances. We therefore affirm the

district court’s grant of summary judgment.

7 The California Supreme Court did not address whether decisions

before non-deadly force can be actionable negligence, but addressed this

issue only in the context of “deadly force.” See, e.g. Hayes, 305 P.3d at

263 (“Our response to the Ninth Circuit’s question on an issue of state

law, as restated by this court, is this: Law enforcement personnel’s tactical

conduct and decisions preceding the use of deadly force are relevant

considerations under California law in determining whether the use of

deadly force gives rise to negligence liability.” (emphasis added)).

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MULLIGAN V. NICHOLS 17

IV. Evidentiary Rulings

Mulligan challenges the district court’s exclusion of two

pieces of evidence during the trial of his excessive force

claims. A district court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for

abuse of discretion. McEuin v. Crown Equip. Corp., 328 F.3d

1028, 1032 (9th Cir. 2003). We conclude that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the contested

evidence.

Mulligan first argues that the district court erred in

excluding evidence that he was not ultimately charged with

any crime for his conduct on the night of the incident. The

evidence was excluded as irrelevant. In Mulligan’s view, the

evidence was relevant in that it contradicted the officers’

allegations that Mulligan had been acting violently and had

been attempting to break into locked cars before he was

detained. The district court did not abuse its discretion under

the circumstances. Even assuming that there was some

marginal relevance to the evidence, it was properly excluded

under Rule 403 because “its probative value [was]

substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . confusing the

issues, misleading the jury, [or] undue delay.” Fed. R. Evid.

403. Any probative value here was minimal given that many

factors inform a prosecutor’s decision to press charges other

than whether the events being investigated actually occurred.

A contrary approach might motivate a prosecutor to pursue a

criminal charge simply to avoid an inference to that effect. 

Moreover, any probative value was outweighed by the

possibilities that a jury unfamiliar with prosecution practices

may have been confused as to the significance of the lack of

charges against Mulligan or that substantial trial time might

have been taken up by a digression into the prosecutor’s

decision-making process.

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18 MULLIGAN V. NICHOLS

Mulligan also contends that the district court erroneously

excluded evidence that Officer Nichols had previously been

accused of on-duty sexual assault. It was not an abuse of

discretion for the district court to exclude that evidence,

either. The allegations against Nichols had nothing to do with

the excessive force claim at issue in the trial. Evidence of

prior bad acts is not admissible except to show “motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,

absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid.

404(b)(2). The accusations that Nichols had sexually

assaulted vulnerable women involved conduct distinct from

the excessive force allegations at issue in Mulligan’s case.8

V. Negligent Supervision Claim

Mulligan finally argues that the district court erred in not

proceeding to trial on his negligent supervision claim against

the City. The district court acted properly in not proceeding

to the second phase of the trial. Once the jury had found that

the officers did not act unlawfully, there was no basis for a

claim against the City that those officers had been negligently

supervised.

8 Mulligan has filed a motion for judicial notice of a felony complaint

against Officer Nichols arising from the same conduct that was the subject

of the sexual assault allegations. The complaint was filed on February 16,

2016, more than two years after the trial concluded. It could not have been

considered by the district court at the time it made its evidentiary

determinations, so we deny the motion. We do not have reason to consider

whether the fact of a felony complaint filed prior to trial would have been

admissible.

 Case: 14-55763, 08/29/2016, ID: 10103596, DktEntry: 72-1, Page 18 of 19
MULLIGAN V. NICHOLS 19

VI. Conclusion

We affirm the judgments of the district court. The

statements allegedly made against Mulligan as joint state

actions by the LAPPL were not sufficiently adverse to

support a claim of First Amendment retaliation.

Consequently, the district court’s grant of summary judgment

for that claim was proper. Similarly, the district court did not

err in its decisions regarding Mulligan’s police negligence,

excessive force, and negligent supervision claims.

AFFIRMED.

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