Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02868/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02868-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald Daye Storer
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2868

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Northern District of Iowa.

Donald Daye Storer, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 4, 2005

Filed: June 30, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, BOWMAN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Donald Storer pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The District Court determined that Storer had a prior

conviction involving the sexual abuse of a minor and sentenced Storer to 240 months'

imprisonment, the maximum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). Storer appeals

his sentence on two grounds. First, Storer asserts that the District Court erred in

determining that he had a prior conviction for purposes of the sentence enhancement

described in § 2252A(b)(2). Second, Storer asserts that the District Court erred in

failing to consider the federal Sentencing Guidelines in imposing his sentence. We

affirm the conclusion of the District Court regarding the prior conviction, but

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nevertheless remand for a resentencing that will be guided by United States v.

Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).

I. 

Storer was charged with possession of child pornography in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). He entered into a plea agreement, admitting that he

possessed a computer that he knew contained images of minors engaged in sexually

explicit conduct—including images involving a minor under the age of twelve.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2), Storer was subject to a term of imprisonment

of up to ten years unless the District Court determined that he had a prior conviction

under state law involving the sexual abuse of a minor, in which case Storer was

subject to a term of imprisonment of at least ten years but not more than twenty years.

The United States Probation Office prepared an initial Presentence

Investigation Report (PSR), which noted that Storer had been charged in Florida state

court with the felony of committing lewd and lascivious acts upon a child under

sixteen and had entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge. As recounted in the

PSR, Storer admitted to Florida law enforcement authorities that in December 1990,

he masturbated in front of a four-year-old girl, touched his penis to her vagina, and

ejaculated on her. In March 1991, the Florida state court made a finding of guilt in

Storer's case, but withheld adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence. Storer

was placed in a community control program for two years; the placement was later

modified to include sixty days in jail. 

According to the initial PSR, Storer's sentencing range as calculated under the

United States Sentencing Guidelines was forty-six to fifty-seven months'

imprisonment, based on a Total Offense Level of 23 and a Criminal History Category

of I. The government initially made no objection to the PSR. Following our decision

in United States v. Slicer, 361 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 90 (2004),

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Section 5G1.1(b) states: "Where a statutorily required minimum sentence is

greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required

minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence." 

2

The panel opinion in Mooney I was vacated by our Court en banc on August 6,

2004. 

-3-

however, the government objected to the PSR, arguing that Storer's nolo contendere

plea to the Florida lewd and lascivious charge qualified as a prior conviction for

purposes of § 2252A(b)(2)'s mandatory minimum sentence of ten years'

imprisonment. In response to the government's objection, the PSR was revised to

indicate that Storer's Florida nolo contendere plea was a prior conviction and that

Storer was subject to a mandatory ten-year minimum sentence of imprisonment

pursuant to § 5G1.1(b) of the federal Sentencing Guidelines.1

 Storer objected to the

revised PSR. After a hearing, the District Court concluded that Storer's Florida nolo

contendere plea was a prior conviction for purposes of § 2252A(b)(2) and that Storer

was subject to an imprisonment range under the statute of ten to twenty years'

imprisonment.

The District Court sentenced Storer on July 29, 2004, shortly after a panel of

our Court had issued its opinion in United States v. Mooney, No. 02-3388, slip op.

(8th Cir. July 23, 2004) (Mooney I). Mooney I held that the federal Sentencing

Guidelines were unconstitutional in their entirety under Blakely v. Washington, 124

S. Ct. 2531 (2004).2

 The District Court, acknowledging that Mooney I was the law

of the Circuit and that the federal Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional,

sentenced Storer to a 240-month term of imprisonment and a life term of supervised

release. The District Court also announced an alternative sentence of 120 months'

imprisonment in the event that the federal Sentencing Guidelines were later found to

be constitutional. 

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Storer appeals, arguing that the District Court erred when it found that his nolo

contendere plea to the Florida felony lewd and lascivious charge qualified as a prior

conviction for purposes of § 2252A(b)(2) and when it imposed his sentence without

regard to the federal Sentencing Guidelines. 

II. 

Storer first argues that the District Court erred when it found that his nolo

contendere plea to the Florida felony lewd and lascivious charge qualified as a prior

conviction necessary to trigger a sentence enhancement under § 2252A(b)(2).

According to Storer, his nolo contendere plea with adjudication withheld is not

considered a conviction under Florida state law and therefore should not be

considered a conviction under § 2252A(b)(2). We review the District Court's

interpretation of the statute de novo. Slicer, 361 F.3d at 1086.

Section 2252A(b)(2) provides that a defendant who has a "prior conviction

under . . . the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or

abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward" is subject to a term of

imprisonment of at least ten years but not more than twenty years. "Conviction" is

not defined for purposes of imposing this enhanced mandatory minimum sentence.

See 18 U.S.C. § 2256. Although Congress has not specified whether state or federal

law should be applied to define "conviction," absent a "plain indication to the

contrary, . . . it is to be assumed when Congress enacts a statute that it does not

intend to make its application dependent on state law. This is because the application

of federal legislation is nationwide and at times the federal program would be

impaired if state law were to control." Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S.

103, 119–20 (1983) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (superseded by statute

on other grounds); see also United States v. Ortega, 150 F.3d 937, 948 (8th Cir. 1998)

(noting that federal law governs the application of federal legislation absent clear

language to the contrary), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1087 (1999). 

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Although we have not specifically addressed whether a Florida nolo contendere

plea with adjudication withheld constitutes a prior "conviction" for purposes of a

sentence enhancement under § 2252A(b)(2)—we have defined "conviction" for

purposes of sentence enhancements for prior felony drug offense convictions under

21 U.S.C. § 841. In Slicer, 361 F.3d at 1087, we held that a defendant's prior guilty

plea to a Missouri felony drug offense, for which the defendant received a suspended

sentence, constituted a prior conviction for purposes of a sentence enhancement under

§ 841. In United States v. Franklin, 250 F.3d 653, 665 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 534

U.S. 1009 (2001), we similarly affirmed a sentence enhancement under § 841(a)(1)

that was based on a prior Missouri conviction that resulted in a suspended sentence,

noting that "Missouri law does not control the question of what constitutes a

'conviction' for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 841." Likewise, in Ortega, 150 F.3d at 948,

we held that a prior Missouri conviction that resulted in a suspended sentence was a

conviction under federal law for purposes of § 841. In each of these cases, the fact

that the state "conviction" was not treated as such under state law was not controlling.

We also find instructive the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that a plea of nolo

contendere in Florida state court that results in a finding of guilt with adjudication

withheld supports a sentence enhancement under § 841. See United States v.

Fernandez, 58 F.3d 593, 600 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Mejias, 47 F.3d 401,

404 (11th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Acosta, 287 F.3d 1034, 1036–37 (11th

Cir.) (holding that prior felony drug offense adjudication under New York's youthful

offender statute was prior conviction for sentence enhancement purposes under

§ 841), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 926 (2002). 

Because Congress provided no explicit language to the contrary in

§ 2252A(b)(2), we apply federal law to conclude that Storer's Florida felony offense

and nolo contendere plea, which resulted in a finding of guilt with adjudication

withheld, qualifies as a conviction for purposes of § 2252A(b)(2)'s mandatory

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minimum ten-year sentence of imprisonment. The District Court did not err in so

holding. 

III. 

Storer also argues that the District Court erred when it failed to consider the

federal Sentencing Guidelines in imposing his sentence. As noted above, Storer was

sentenced at a time when the federal Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional in

this Circuit. The panel opinion in Mooney I had been issued but had not yet been

vacated by our Court en banc. Consequently, the District Court correctly applied

Mooney I and imposed Storer's sentence with the understanding that the federal

Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has since issued

its opinion in Booker, in which it held that district courts, while no longer bound by

the federal Sentencing Guidelines, must nevertheless consult the Guidelines and take

them into account when determining a defendant's sentence. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at

767. "The now-advisory guidelines, when correctly applied, become a consideration

for the district court in choosing a reasonable ultimate sentence." United States v.

Mathijssen, 406 F.3d 496, 498 (8th Cir. 2005). Storer preserved this issue for our

review by raising a Blakely objection with the District Court at his sentencing

proceeding. 

It appears from the record that the District Court did not consider the federal

Sentencing Guidelines in imposing Storer's sentence. Although the District Court's

failure to consider the guidelines as required by Booker is understandable, it is

nevertheless error. An error that does not affect a defendant's substantial rights,

however, is harmless and is disregarded on appellate review. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a);

United States v. Haidley, 400 F.3d 642, 644–45 (8th Cir. 2005). As the beneficiary

of the error in this case, the government bears the burden of proving that the District

Court's failure to consider the federal Sentencing Guidelines did not affect Storer's

substantial rights and is therefore harmless error. United States v. Barnett, No.

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The District Court's determination of Storer's sentence did not implicate the

Sixth Amendment as described in Booker, since the District Court did not find facts

to sentence Storer under a mandatory sentencing guidelines scheme. To the contrary,

the District Court sentenced Storer under then-current law as announced in Mooney I,

which held that the federal Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional in their

entirety. 

-7-

04-3213, 2005 WL 1268831, at *3 (8th Cir. May 31, 2005); Haidley, 400 F.3d at 644.

Because the error is not of "constitutional magnitude,"3

 the government must "only

establish that no grave doubt exists as to whether the district court's failure to at least

consider the Guidelines" affected Storer's ultimate sentence. Barnett, 2005 WL

1268831, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted); Haidley, 400 F.3d at 645. If the

effect of the error is uncertain, the government has not met its burden to show the

error is harmless. See Haidley, 400 F.3d at 645. 

At the sentencing hearing, the District Court acknowledged that Mooney I

made the federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional in this Circuit and proceeded

to sentence Storer to 240 months' imprisonment—the statutory maximum under

§ 2252A(b)(2). The District Court also imposed an alternative sentence of 120

months' imprisonment—the statutory minimum under § 2252A(b)(2)—in the event

that the federal Sentencing Guidelines were found to be constitutional. The District

Court did not, however, indicate what sentence it would have imposed if the federal

Sentencing Guidelines were advisory. The government has pointed to nothing in the

record suggesting that the District Court would have imposed the same 240-month

sentence—or even the same alternative 120-month sentence—under an advisory

Guidelines system. Given the wide disparity in the length of the sentences that the

District Court imposed, we are left with grave doubt as to the sentence the District

Court would have imposed had it known that the federal Sentencing Guidelines were

advisory. Accordingly, the government has not carried its burden of proving that the

District Court's sentencing error was harmless, and we therefore reverse and remand

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The government essentially conceded at oral argument that Storer's case

should be remanded for resentencing "out of an abundance of caution," since the

District Court sentenced Storer without the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision

in Booker. 

-8-

for resentencing.4

 See United States v. Garcia, 406 F.3d 527, 529 (8th Cir. 2005)

(noting that the government did not satisfy its burden of proving harmless error when

the record did not show that the district court would have imposed the same sentence

under an advisory sentencing guidelines scheme); cf. United States v. Thompson, No.

04-3171, 2005 WL 1278535, at *2 (8th Cir. June 1, 2005) (per curiam) (holding that

error was harmless when the district court declared that it would impose the same

sentence in the event that the federal Sentencing Guidelines were found to be

unconstitutional in whole or in part); United States v. Hadash, No. 03-2180, 2005 WL

1250331, at *2 (8th Cir. May 27, 2005) (concluding that sentencing error was

harmless when the district court stated that it would impose an identical sentence if

a federal Sentencing Guidelines provision did not apply). Because we conclude that

the District Court's sentencing error was not harmless and we must therefore remand

for resentencing, we need not decide whether the sentence imposed by the District

Court was reasonable. See United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1018 (8th Cir.

2005). 

IV.

Storer's sentence is vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court for

resentencing in accordance with the principles laid down in Booker.

______________________________

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