Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01446/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01446-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Deere Company, a Delaware Corporation
Appellant
Stephen Brent Wheeler
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

STEPHEN BRENT WHEELER, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

ot.c o z ,gss 

ROBERT L. H<JECKER 

Clerk 

vs. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 86-1446 

JOHN DEERE COMPANY, a 

Delaware Corporation, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 82-1790) 

Joe A. Moore, Holladay, Tennessee (Jack B. Sellers and Jefferson 

D. Sellers of Jack B. Sellers Law Associates, Inc., Sapulpa, 

Oklahoma, with him on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Ronald M. Gott (Pauls. McCausland with him on the brief), of 

Gott, Young & Bogle, P.A., Wichita, Kansas, for DefendantAppellant. 

Before*MOORE and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and PARKER, District 

Judge. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable James A. Parker, United States District Judge for 

the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 86-1446 Document: 01019290765 Date Filed: 12/02/1988 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-appellee, Stephen Wheeler (Wheeler), lost his right 

arm when it became entangled in the vertical unloading auger of a 

John Deere Titan series model 7720 combine. He brought this 

diversity case under a strict products liability theory alleging 

the combine was unreasonably qangerous. Applying Kansas law to 

the evidence, a jury awarded Wheeler $2.3 million. Defendantappellant, John Deere Company (Deere), appeals from the judgment 

on the verdict. Deere asserts the district court improperly (1) 

admitted evidence of other accidents involving the Titan series 

combine, (2) admitted evidence of subsequent design changes in the 

machine, (3) charged the jury on the elements necessary to sustain 

the cause of action, and (4) denied Deere's motion for a directed 

verdict at the close of Wheeler's case-in-chief. Our jurisdiction 

arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse and remand for a new 

trial. 

Background 

In May 1981, Wheeler, then 21 years old, obtained employment 

as a truck driver with the Fenton Custom Combining Crew of 

Bristow, Oklahoma. Wheeler's employer, Larry Fenton, had been 

engaged in custom harvesting since 1973. Each spring, Fenton's 

crew departed with combines and grain trucks, and followed the 

wheat harvest through Oklahoma to Montana. 

Prior to September 14, 1981, Wheeler was not involved with 

the actual operation and machine maintenance of the combines. 

Aside from maintaining and driving the trucks, his duties were 

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Appellate Case: 86-1446 Document: 01019290765 Date Filed: 12/02/1988 Page: 2 
limited to fueling the combines and washing their windows. On 

September 14, 1981, the crew had just returned from the wheat· 

harvest and was in Leoti, Kansas, preparing the 7720 combine to 

harvest pinto beans. As part of the preparation, it was necessary 

to clean caked wheat and chaff from the combine's grain tank, 

vertical auger and sump. 

During the cutting process, wheat particles inevitably 

gathered moisture and clogged the machine's unloading system. 

Once the grain was cut, two horizontal augers stretching across 

the bottom of the tank moved it into a sump. The vertical auger 

then lifted the grain to a horizontal unloading spout above the 

tank. The spout pivoted and delivered the grain into a truck. 

The augers were engaged by shifting a lever on the floor of the 

cab. 

According to Fenton, the vertical auger on his 7720 combine 

was unable to completely clean the sump. Although after cutting 

he regularly attempted to clear the machine by continuing to run 

the unloading system, some accumulation remained. A cleanout door 

on the left side of the combine to the rear of the auger provided 

the only other means by which to rid the machine of excess wheat 

and chaff. 

After checking the trucks on the morning of September 14, 

Wheeler approached the combine. Fenton had removed the cleanout 

door. Wheeler observed Fenton reaching inside the opening about 

eight inches and digging clumped wheat from the vertical auger 

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with his hand. A combine operator for the crew, Steve Milner, was 

measuring the machines's hydraulic fluid. 

Subsequent to loosening the wheat, Fenton directed Milner to 

start the engine and engage the auger in an attempt to dislodge 

and eject the ~emaining buildup. Fenton and Wheeler stood back. 

When the clogging persisted, Fenton climbed into the tank to kick 

the wheat down into the sump. He instructed Wheeler to then dig 

the grain from the auger and sump if the unloading system could 

not throw it out. Milner had disengaged the auger, but kept the 

engine running. Without warning Wheeler, Fenton told Milner who 

was on the landing outside the cab to again engage the auger, 

which he did. Both Fenton and Milner were unaware that Wheeler at 

that moment had his arm extended into the auger and was removing 

wheat from it. Wheeler's right hand and arm were immediately drawn 

into the auger housing causing severe injury. As a result of the 

injury, a doctor amputated his entire arm. 

Before trial, Deere stipulated that it was feasible to design 

the vertical auger to include two smaller cleanout doors which 

would have prevented Wheeler's injury, rather than the one large 

door which allowed him to place his arm inside the machine. The 

parties also agreed that at the time of the mishap no caution or 

warning was present next to the vertical auger cleanout door on 

the 7720 combine. Instead, a caution decal was located 

approximately twenty-six inches behind the door and seventy inches 

above the ground. While the warning advised the operator to 

"[k]eep all shields in place," and "[d]isengage and shut off all 

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Appellate Case: 86-1446 Document: 01019290765 Date Filed: 12/02/1988 Page: 4 
engine and/or motor power before servicing or unclogging [the] 

machine," trial testimony indicated that it was impossible to 

completely unclog the combine without removing the cleanout door 

and engaging the vertical auger. 

Answering interrogatories, the jury assessed Wheeler's total 

damages at $3.1 million. It attributed 75% of the fault to Deere 

and 25% of the fault to Wheeler's employer, Larry Fenton, 

resulting in a $2.3 million verdict against the defendant Deere. 

I. 

Deere first challenges certain evidentiary rulings of the 

district court. At trial, the judge permitted the live testimony 

of five witnesses who lost portions of their right arms while 

clearing the augers on Titan series combines! The judge also 

allowed Wheeler to impeach Deere's expert with evidence of all 

twenty-four accidents involving the vertical auger on Deere 

combines, and admitted exhibits reflecting design changes in the 

7720 combine following Wheeler's accident. Deere assigns error to 

each of these decisions. 

Fed. R. Evid. 103 instructs that unless a substantial right 

of the objecting party is affected, any error in the admission or 

exclusion of evidence is harmless. Motive Parts Warehouse v. 

Facet Enter., 774 F.2d 380, 396 (lOth Cir. 1985). Consequently, 

we review the district court's evidentiary rulings by considering 

the record as a whole. Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 

716 F.2d 1322, 1326 (lOth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 u.s. 958 

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Appellate Case: 86-1446 Document: 01019290765 Date Filed: 12/02/1988 Page: 5 
(1984). The onus of establishing reversible error rests with the 

complaining party. K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss Int'l Corp., 763 F.2d 

1148, 1156 (lOth Cir. 1985). 

A. 

Both federal and Kansas law permit the introduction of 

substantially similar accidents in strict products liability 

actions to demonstrate "notice, the existence of a defect, or to 

refute testimony given by a defense witness that a given product 

was designed without safety hazards." Ponder v. Warren Tool 

Corp., 834 F.2d 1553, 1560 (lOth Cir. 1987). Before introducing 

such evidence, the party seeking its admission must show the 

circumstances surrounding the other accidents were substantially 

similar to the accident involved in the present case. Rexrode v. 

American Laundry Press Co., 674 F.2d 826, 829 n.9 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862 (1982); Julander v. Ford Motor Co., 488 

F.2d 839, 846-47 (lOth Cir. 1973). While this foundation may be 

laid in the presence of the jury, the preferable approach is for 

the trial judge to hold a hearing outside its presence. Rexrode, 

674 F.2d at 830. 

Whether accidents are substantially similar depends largely 

upon the theory of the case: "Differences in the nature of the 

defect alleged may affect a determination whether the accidents 

are substantially similar. • . • How substantial the similarity 

must be is in part a function of the proponent's theory of proof." 

Ponder, 834 F.2d at 1560 •. Evidence proffered to illustrate the 

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existence of a dangerous condition necessitates a high degree of 

similarity because it weighs directly on the ultimate issue to be 

decided by the jury. The requirement is relaxed, however, when 

the evidence of other accidents is submitted to prove notice or 

awareness of the potential defect. Exum v. General Elec. Co., 819 

F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Any differences in the 

accidents not affecting a finding of substantial similarity go to 

the weight of the evidence. Ja6kson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber 

Co., 788 F.2d 1070, 1083 (5th Cir. 1986). 

In this case, Wheeler obtained through discovery a list of 

twenty-four individuals injured by vertical unloading augers on 

Titan series combines. As part of his case-in-chief, Wheeler 

sought to present the live testimony of ten of those individuals 

to demonstrate the combine's ~angerous propensities. The trial 

judge permitted Wheeler to lay the foundation for five of the 

witnesses in chambers, but refused to hear the remaining five 

because of the cumulative nature of their proposed testimony. 

Prior to the questioning, the judge stated the criteria he felt 

necessary to establish the requisite similarity: 

Let me say, only criteria I'm going to ask is . that he would be identified as one who. sustained an 

injury and that he can demonstrate the nature of it; 

that injury occurred while he had his arm extended in 

the open auger, that is, the lower vertical auger or 

clean-out door; that he did so in the cleaning process 

and that while he was in that condition or position, the 

PTO [power take-off lever] was unexpectedly engaged, 

period. That's all I need to hear. That's all I think 

the jury needs to here in that that's the only thing 

that is of interest here as you would attempt to 

establish similar claims, which, in my view then, would 

be admissible as corroborative that such injuries will 

occur as long as the defendant's product operates as 

it's presently designed. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1446 Document: 01019290765 Date Filed: 12/02/1988 Page: 7 
Rec. vol. II at 399-400. The trial judge viewed Deere's proposed 

questions pertaining to the type and location of warning decals~ 

the circumstances under which the witness and others were working 

around the combines at the time of the respective mishaps, and the 

outcome of any claims against Deere, as totally irrelevant to the 

finding of substantial similarity. Rec. vol. II at 401-23. 

Perhaps the judge's view was unduly restrictive. His refusal 

to permit questions as to the type and location of warning decals 

may have been improper. Such inquiry certainly bears upon the 

dangerous condition of the various combines. But we are unable to 

state that his ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion. See 

Ponder, 834 F.2d at 1560. To be admissible, other accidents need 

only be substantially similar to the accident at issue, not 

exactly the same. Wheeler claimed the 7720 combine was 

unreasonably dangerous because of a defective design. After 

concluding that the five witnesses were injured in a manner 

similar to Wheeler, the trial judge rightly permitted them to 

testify because their accidents were probative of the alleged 

defect's existence. 

We do not believe, despite Deere's contra~y assertions, that 

the victims' live testimony before the jury was unduly 

prejudicial. Under Fed. R. Evid. 403, "relevant evidence may be 

excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice." We have stated on numerous occasions 

that "the exclusion of relevant evidence under Rule 403 is an 

extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly. The decision to 

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exclude (or admit) evidence under t~is rule is within the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and will not be reversed by this 

court absent a clear abuse of discretion." Romine v. Parman, 831 

F.2d 944, 945 (lOth Cir. 1987) (quoting K-B Trucking, 763 -F.2d at 

1155); see also United States v. Glover, 846 F.2d 339, 343 (6th 

Cir. 1988) ("if judicial self-restraint is ever desirable, it is 

when a Rule 403 analysis of a trial court is reviewed by an 

appellate triburial"). 

Each witness admittedly had a limb amputated. Nevertheless, 

the favored method of presenting evidence of other accidents is 

through the testimony of those familiar with such accidents. 

Johnson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 797 F.2d 1530, 1534 n.4 

(lOth Cir. 1986). Most evidence may lead to prejudicial 

conclusions. But rule 403 prohibits orily "unfair" prejudice. 

United States v. Williams, 816 F.2d 1527, 1532 (11th Cir. 1987). 

"Proof of other accidents, when offered in the form of testimony 

by persons who have had sudden or traumatic experiences, can be 

particularly forceful and effective. It will be entirely proper 

in such cases to receive not only testimony describing the 

physical facts, but also describing the experience of the witness 

•••• " D. Louisell & c. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 98 at 722 

(1977). Consequently, the trial judge did not err in allowing the 

live testimony of the five victims. 

Wheeler's use of other accidents to impeach Deere's expert, 

however, constitutes error. At trial, the expert stated on direct 

examination that Deere's tests and analyses of the Titan series 

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Appellate Case: 86-1446 Document: 01019290765 Date Filed: 12/02/1988 Page: 9 
combine revealed no safety hazards surrounding the vertical auger 

cleanout door. Rec. vol. IV at 43. On cross examination, Wheeler 

inqui~ed whether the expert was awar~ o~ the twenty-four accidents 

involving the cleanout door uncovered during discovery. Rec. vol. 

IV at 64-75. The first accident used to impeach the expert 

concerned a mechanic at the Evergreen Implement Company. The 

trial judge had made no finding regarding similarity. Deere 

promptly objected to the introduction of this first accident, 

asserting that it was not similar to Wheeler's mishap because it 

was a one-party accident involving belt slippage on the machine. 1 

The trial judge overruled the objection: 

Well, there was a document number seven [list of 

other accidents] ••• and I said reserve it for cross 

and he's fair cross to anyone who steps on and says, 

"I'm a design engineer." He's going to say that he 

doesn't know anything. I think the plaintiff is .at 

liberty to take the list to them. We will see what he 

knows about this lower auger. • • • I don't know what 

happened in each of them, but I did know what happened 

in ten of them. Five of them testified and you've got a 

list of twenty-one [sic] of them. The first time 

somebody steps up and says, "I'm a design engineer and I 

know something about this project" we'll run a test of 

his understanding at a similar time. If they are not 

similar you can clarify it but I think it's fair game 

for cross. 

Rec. vol. IV at 65-67. 

1 On appeal, Deere also argues that Wheeler's use of other 

accidents to impeach its expert was beyond the scope of direct 

examination. To preserve this alleged error for appeal, however, 

it was necessary, in the absence of plain error, for Wheeler to 

make a timely and proper objection. Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(l) 

directs that a party objecting to the admission of evidence must 

base the objection on specific grounds. The specific grounds for 

reversal of an evidentiary ruling on appeal must be the same as 

that raised at trial. United States v. Taylor, 800 F.2d 1012, 

1017 (lOth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 s. Ct. 123· (1987). 

Because Wheeler did not object on the ground that the impeachment 

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As earlier explained, evidence of other accidents is 

admissible to impeach testimony that a product was designed 

without safety hazards only if the ~roponent first shows that the 

accidents were substantially similar to the_accident presently at 

issue. The mechanic's accident about which Wheeler first 

questioned the expert was not one of those ten accidents 

previously found by the trial court to be sufficiently similar. 

Rather, the trial judge had yet to make a finding in that regard. 

Therefore, its admission to impeach the expert constituted error 

and, in effect, improperly shifted the burden of proving 

dissimilarity to Deere on redirect examination. Hale v. Firestone 

Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322, 1332 (8th Cii. 1985). The trial 

judge acknowledged the shifting of the burden when he told Deere 

"[i]f they are not simiiar you can clarify it." Rec. vol. IV at 

67. Moreover, the trial judge compounded the error when he 

allowed Wheeler to introduce, in addition to the mechanic's 

accident, twenty-three more accidents, thirteen about which the 

court knew nothing: "I don't know what happened in each of them, 

but I did know what happened in ten of them." Rec. vol. IV at 66. 

This error cannot be labeled as harmless. 

B. 

Aside from the admission of other accidents into evidence, 

Deere objected to the admission of certain exhibits reflecting 

with other accidents was beyond the scope of direct examinqtion, 

and we find no plain error, the point is waived. 

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design changes incorporat.ed into the vertical auger cleanout door 

after Wheeler's mishap. At the beginning of trial, the judge read 

to the jury the parties' stipulation concerning the feasibility of 

an alternative design: 

They have agreed that in 1979 when [the] John Deere 

Model 7720 combine was manufactured, it was 

technologically and economically feasible to design the 

vertical auger of the combine by incorporating a smaller 

rear door clean-out door, trimming the auger flighting 

and adding a second clean-out door on the front of the 

auger sump. Technological and economic feasibility of 

using a clean-out door reduced in size with the second 

door on the front of the auger sump housing would have 

prevented this accident. 

Rec. vol. I at 143. In a motion in limine, rec. vol. I at doc. 

45, and again in a pretrial conference, rec. vol. I at 54, 62-64, 

Deere contended that the stipulation made any evidence of 

subsequent design changes in the combine inadmissible. The trial 

judge disagreed. We agree with Deere on this point •. 

Because the question of whether to permit evidence of 

subsequent remedial measures in strict products liability actions 

depends upon policy considerations rather than relevancy, it is 

governed by state law in diversity actions. Moe v. Avions Marcel 

Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 469 U.S. 853 (1984). At the time of the accident in. 

question, Ran. Stat. Ann. § 60-451 (1983) stated: "When after the 

occurrence of an event remedial or precautionary measures are 

taken, which, if taken previously would have tended to make the 

event less likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent measures. 

is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in 

connection with the event." In Siruta v. Hesston Corp., 659 P.2d 

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799, 808-809 (Kan. 1983), a strict products liability.action, the 

Kansas Supreme Court held that where the defendant denies the 

feasibility of a de~ign change, subsequent remedial measures are 

admissible to show feasibility: 

Logically, when defendant manufacturer's experts 

have testified that a particular design change is not 

feasible, it would seem that evidence of the 

incorporation of plaintiff's suggested design change in 

a later product of the defendant manufacturer would be 

highly relevant and admissible to prove feasibility. 

• • • The defendant's expert ••• testified that such 

a design was not feasible. Under the circumstances, the 

trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the 

defendant's ••• subsequent design changes ••.• 

Siruta adheres to the general proposition that, unless 

controverted by the defendant, evidence of subsequent design 

changes to illustrate feasibility is inadmissible. 2 This result 

rests on the policy of encouraging manufacturers to make their 

products as safe as possible free from the fear that their 

remedial measures will be used against them at trial. This policy 

is consistent with Fed. R. Evid. 407. 

In this case, Deere objected to the admission of Wheeler's 

exhibit 8a, a photograph of a Titan series combine with the 

modified design and warning label offered to illustrate how the 

new design would operate, and exhibits 4a-e, Deere safety 

committee minutes reflecting Deere's knowledge of the machine's 

hazardous nature and describing activities and proposals prior to 

2 In 1986, the Kansas legislature codified this rule at Kan. 

Stat. Ann. § 60-3307 (Supp. 1987) (evidence of subsequent measures 

are admissible only "if offered to impeach a witness for the 

manufacturer or seller of a product who·has expressly denied the 

feasibility of such a measure"). · 

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the change. Rec. vol. I at 147-~9, 153-54. Notwithstanding 

Deere's objectioi and stipulation, however, the trial judge 

permitted Wheeler. to introduce the exhibits into evidence arid 

refer to them before the jury. Rec. vol. I at 152-53, 165. 

Under Siruta, the admission of exhibit 8a is reversible 

error. This error was compounded by allowing Wheeler to remark on 

the feasibility of the alternative design throughout the trial. 

See, ~., rec. vol. II at 290-96, 441. The prerequisite that 

feasibility must be controverted before evidence of subsequent 

remedial measures may be presented to the jury demanded the 

exclusion of exhibit Sa. Deere laid the groundwork for the 

exhibit's exclusion by stipulating to feasibility. The 

stipulation was the only evidence the jury should have heard 

relating to the design changes in the 7720 combine. See Rules of 

Evidence, 56 F.R.D. 183, 225-26 (1973) (advisory committee's notes 

to Fed. R. Evid. 407). 

The question of the admissibility of exhibits 4a-e is more 

troublesome. At trial, Wheeler offered the safety committee 

minutes to show Deere's knowledge of the 7720 combine's dangerous 

design. Rec. vol. I at 165. Deere objected to the minutes' 

introduction on the basis that they referred to the proposed 

modification of the cleanout door and warning decal, as well as to 

accidents other than Wheeler's. Rec. vol. I at 154. 

In Kansas, the imposition of liability upon a manufacturer 

for inadequately warning a consumer or user regarding the dangers 

associated with its ·product is dependent upon the manufacturer's 

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actual or constructive knowledge of the risk: "[T]he adequacy of. 

a warning is • . • judged und~r a reasonableness standard--even if 

the claim is made under the rubric of a strict products liability 

defect." Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1324-25 

(Kan. 1986). Consequently, the trial judge properly admitted 

those portions of exhibits 4a, b & d which refer to Deere's 

awareness of a possible problem and the need for a new warning 

decal placed directly next to the vertical auger cleanout door. 

This evidence is relevant to the issue of whether the combine's 

warning as it existed at the time of Wheeler's accident was 

adequate. 3 

The trial judge erred, however, in admitting exhibits 4c & e 

into evidence. Exhibit 4c discusses a proposed design change in 

the vertical auger cleanout door. Thus, it weighs directly upon 

the feasibility of Deere's remedial measures and is inadmissible 

as a result of the stipulation. Like exhibits 4a, b & d, exhibit 

4c may illustrate Deere's knowledge of a dangerous condition. But 

unlike the warning issue, knowledge, according to the Kansas 

Supreme Court, is irrelevant when the focus turns to the product 

itself: "In strict liability actions • we focus not on the 

reasonableness of a defendant's conduct but on the product, and we 

ignore the question of a manufacturer's actual or 

3 As part of its objection, Deere correctly noted that much of 

the information contained in the safety committee minutes was 

totally irrelevant to the issues in the present case. Rec. val. I 

at 154. Because the information may confuse the jury, on remand 

the trial judge should r~quire Wheeler to redact the impertinent 

material before permitting him to introduce exhibits 4a, b & d 

into evidence. 

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constructive knowledge of risk (as in a 'consumer expectations' 

d~sign defect case) •••• " Johnson, 718 P.2d at 1324. 

Finally, exhibit 4e does not refer to any proposed change in 

the warning decal or cleanout door, but instead refers to two 

accidents involving the Titan series combine and additional 

material irrelevant to this case. As explained in part I.A. of 

our analysis, the evidence of other accidents is inadmissible 

where the trial judge, as here, has failed to make a finding of 

substantial similarity. Therefore, the admission of exhibit 4e 

was also error. 

II. 

Next, we turn to Deere's complaints pertaining to the jury 

instruc~ions. Like the standard of review for evidentiary 

rulings, an error in jury instructions requires reversal "only if 

the error is determined to have been prejudicial~ based on a 

review of the record as a whole." Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 

888, 895 (lOth Cir. 1984). In considering the instructions, we 

"consider all the jury heard, and from the standpoint of the jury, 

decide not whether the charge was faultless in every particular, 

but whether the jury was misled in any way and whether it had 

understanding of the issues and its duties to determine these 

issues." Patty Precisions Prod. Co. v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 

846 F.2d 1247, 1252 (lOth Cir. 1988). The instructions as a whole 

need only convey a correct statement of the applicable law. Furr 

v. AT·& T Tech., Inc., 824 F.2d 1537, 1549 (lOth Cir. 1987). In 

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this instance, Deere challenges jury instructions twelv~, 

seventeen and eighteen. 4 We discuss each seriatim and conclude 

that the instructions adequately reflect Kansas law. 

A. 

Deere first asserts that instruction eighteen is·an incorrect 

statement of Kansas law. That instruction states: 

Simply said, each actor's fault, if any, is 

measured from his respective duty of care. The 

manufacturer has a strict duty of care in the design and 

production,_ including a duty to guard against injuri to 

ordinary and even negligent consumers. The consumer has 

a lower duty of care than the manufacturer but still has 

an ordinary duty of care. 

Rec. vol. I at doc. 62. Relying on Prentice v. Acme Machine & 

Supply Co., Inc., 601 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Kan. 1979), Deere concludes 

that because Wheeler chose to proceed only under a strict products 

liability theory, instructions which present negligence concepts 

to the jury are improper. Prentice admittedly supports Deere's 

position. Strict products liability in its purest form focuses 

exclusively on the product rather than the manufacturer's conduct. 

And if that decision were the sole statement on Kansas strict 

4 In its appellate brief, Deere also briefly mentions instruction 

nine which describes the theory behind the law of strict products 

liability. Although Deere now claims that the instruction was 

prejudicial, at trial defendant merely indicated "it's 

unnecessary." Rec. val. III at 115. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 provides 

that a party objecting to an instruction must state "distinctly 

the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection." Because 

instruction nine does not constitute patently prejudicial error 

and Deere·'s objection was general in nature, we decline to further 

review it. Moe, 727 F.2d at 924. 

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products liability law, we would indeed follow it. But much has 

changed since 1979. 

In Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 618 P.2d 788, 798 (Kan. 1980), 

the Kansas Supreme Court held that the concept of comparative 

fault applied to strict liability claims. Subsequently, in 

Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 634 P.2d 1127, 

1131 (Kan. 1981), the court held that "strict liability in tort 

does have a fault basis, therefore subjecting it to comparison 

with other fault concepts." These decisions were the bases for 

our analysis in Hardin v. Manitowoc-Forsythe Corp., 691 F.2d 449, 

455 (lOth Cir. 1982), wherein we noted that although difficult to 

rationalize, "it appears that Kansas in effect treats each kind of 

traditional tort liability as a departure from a defined duty 

whether that departure is in the nature of breach of warranty, 

routine neglect, failure to warn, or placing a defective and 

unreasonably dangerous product in the stream of commerce." 

Thereafter, in Prince v. Leesona Corp., 720 F.2d 1166, 1171 n.9 

(lOth Cir. 1983), a panel of this court, again interpreting Kansas 

law, delivered the footnote which instruction eighteen follows 

nearly verbatim.5 

5 Our countenance of instruction eighteen in this instance is not 

an endorsement of the use of appellate court dicta as jury 

instructions. The district court should cautiously and sparingly 

charge the jury with such language. As the Fifth Circuit aptly 

noted:. 

[W]hat an appellate Judge • . • says for the Court . • • 

does not mean· that such language may, or should, be used 

as a jury charge. It all depends on whether the words 

presumably chosen by one artificer [appellate judge] for 

others of presumed like skill [trial judge] communicate 

the applicable legal principles to those [jurors] 

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With the application of comparative negligence to strict 

liability, Kansas has decided to permit the jury to determine each 

actor's relative degree of fault. Before apportioning fault, 

however, it is necessary to define the respective duties. Thus, 

until the Kansas courts tell us otherwise, we cannot conclude that 

an instruction attempting to define those duties in a strict 

liability action is error. Moreover, we cannot consider 

instruction eighteen in a vacuum. The instructions considered as 

a whole properly outline the elements necessary to establish 

Deere's liability under Kansas strict products liability law. 6 

B. 

Deere next takes issue with instruction twelve concerning its 

duty to warn. That instruction reads: 

For a warning to be adequate, the content and 

placement of the warning must be of such a nature as to 

be comprehensible to the average user and convey a fair 

indication of the nature and extent of the danger to the 

mind of a user. If the content and placement of the 

attending, as it were, their-once-in-a-lifetime-lawschool-for-a-day. 

United States v. Williams, 365 F.2d 332, 335 (5th Cir. 1966). 

Because Kansas courts have not described the differing legal 

duties involved in strict products liability actions as 

comparatively "lower" or "higher," on remand the district court 

should simply define the actors' respective duties without stating 

that the duties differ in degree. 

6 Deere also contends that even assuming its conduct is relevant· 

under Kansas law, a manufacturer certainly has no duty to protect 

"even negligent consumers" against injury. We disagree. Despite 

the adoption of comparative negligence, a manufacturer may still 

be liable for a user's foreseeable misuse in Kansas, and 

instruction ten in this case so informed the jury. Under Kansas 

law, the term "misuse" may include negligence. See Siruta, 659 

P.2d at 822 (Schroeder, C.J., dissenting). 

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warning unreasonably m1n1m1zes the known dangers which 

exist, or gives false assurances to the consumer, then 

the warning is probably inadequate. 

Rec. vol. I at· doc. 62: Deere argues that the second sentence of 

the instruction is not supported by the evidence or Kansas law. 

Instead, defendant claims entitlement to an instruction consistent 

with Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 402A comment j (1965). 

Comment j states that a manufacturer is not required to warn where 

a product's dangers are generally known and recognized. 

Additionally, where an adequate warning is given, the manufacturer 

may assume it will be followed. 

Once again, however, Deere fails to read the instructions in 

their entirety. Instruction eleven specifically instructs the 

jury that "a product is not 'unreasonably dangerous' when its 

degree of danger is obvious and generally known or recognized; nor 

is it 'unreasonably dangerous' if the manufacturer has given 

adequate warnings • that sufficiently alert the user to the 

risk of danger in using the product." Rec. vol. I at doc. 62. 

Similarly, instruction fifteen informs the jury of the user's 

"duty to use a product in accordance with adequate instructions 

and warnings." Rec. vol. I at doc. 62. These two instructions 

read together sufficiently comply with Kansas law on the duty to 

warn. See Brooks v. Dietz, 545 P.2d 1104, 1108 (Kan. 1976) 

(adoption of§ 402A). 

Likewise, we believe that the evidence does support the 

second sentence of instruction twelve. Deere stipulated before 

trial that at the time of_Wheeler's accident, the 7720 combine did 

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not have a warning decal next to the vertical auger cleanout door, 

but had one further back on the machine. Rec. vol. I at 142. 

Wheeler testified that he was not aware of the warning prior to 

his injury. Rec. vol. I at 208. He and Fenton also testified 

that it was impossible to comply with the warning and fully clean 

the auger. Rec. vol. I· at 209, 268. There was cer~ainly 

sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to conclude that 

Deere's warning minimized the dangers associated with the vertical 

auger and gave false assurances. 

c. 

Third, Deere objects to the district court's refusal to 

instruct the jury as to Steve Milner's duty of care and to include 

him on the verdict form for comparative fault purposes. Under the· 

Kansas Workmen's Compensation Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-SOl(b) 

(1986), both Fenton and Milner were immune from suit. The Kansas 

Supreme Court has held, however, that "[u]nder the doctrine of 

comparative fault all parties to an occurrence must have their 

fault determined in one action, even though some parties cannot be 

formally joined or held legally responsible." Albertson, 634 P.2d 

at 1132. Accordingly, after defining Fenton's duty of care to 

Wheeler in instructions fourteen and sixteen, the trial judge 

presented instruction seventeen to the jury: "As it may apply in 

this case, the acts or omissions, if any, of Fenton's employee, 

Steve Milner, in causing or contributing to plaintiff's injuries, 

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should be attributed to Mr. Fenton when determining whether Fenton 

was negligent." Rec. val. I at doc. 62. 

Kahsas law permits the aggregation of other individuals' 

fault in calculating the percentage of fault attributable to a 

plaintiff. Prince, 720 F.2d at 1168 n.2. Whether the jury is 

allowed to aggregate fault and assign it to one person prior to 

delivering its verdict, or list each actor's respective percentage 

of culpability on a verdict form and await the trial judge's 

addition makes no difference to the suit's outcome. In this case, 

the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the law of 

negligence to be applied to the conduct of Fenton and Milner. We 

cannot assume that simply because only Fenton was listed on the 

verdict form the jury shirked its responsibility to consider 

Milner's fault and attribute it to Fenton prior to reaching a 

verdict. 

III. 

Lastly, Deere contends that the trial judge erred in denying 

its motion for a directed verdict at the close of Wheeler's casein-chief. Deere claims it is not liable as a matter of law 

because the combine possessed an adequate warning and was not more 

dangerous than would be expected by the ordinary consumer. This 

point is thin. Wheeler produced evidence sufficient to withstand 

Deere's motion. A directed verdict pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 

is proper "only if the proof is all one way or so overwhelmingly 

preponderant in favor of the movant as to permit no other rational 

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conclusion." J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. Crites, 851 F.2d 309, 311 

(lOth Cir. 1988). That certainly is not the case here. 

Before reaching the merits of this final issue, we note the 

appellate record fails to show that Deere renewed its motion for a 

directed verdict at the close of all the evidence, or moved for a 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict at the end of trial. 

Consequently, Deere has probably waived its right to challenge the 

sufficiency of the evidence on appeal: "[A] defendant's motion 

for a directed verdict made at the close of the plaintiff's 

evidence is deemed waived if not renewed at the close of all the 

evidence; failure to renew that motion bars consideration of a 

later motion for judgment n.o.v." 

F.2d 1452, 1455 (lOth Cir. 1987). 

Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817 

Nevertheless, for the benefit 

of the parties and district court on retrial, we shall reach the 

merits. 

In Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353, 361 (Kan. 1982), 

the Kansas Supreme Court adopted the "consumer expectations'' test 

in strict liability actions as enunciated in comment i of § 402A 

of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: "The article sold must be 

dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by 

the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary 

knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." In 

this instance, Wheeler's expert testified that the 7720 series 

combine was in his opinion more dangerous than the ordinary user 

would expect. Rec. vol. II at 304-05. Moreover, Deere's expert 

stated that it was reasonable for a person to clean the vertical 

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auger while the combine's engine was running. Rec. vol. IV at 

83-84. With regard to the adequacy of the warning, we have 

already noted that Deere stipulated to the absence of a warning 

directly next to the cleanout door, and that the warning which was 

present was impossible to comply with while cleaning the machine. 

Rec. vol. I at 142, 208-10, 267-68. In view of this evidence, it 

is crystal clear that the trial judge did not err in refusing to 

take this case from the jury, and we therefore sustain him on the 

denial of the directed verdict motion. 

IV. 

In sum, we conclude that the trial judge properly (1) 

permitted the live testimony of five individuals injured in 

accidents similar to Wheeler's mishap, (2) denied Deere's motion 

for a directed verdict based on the insufficiency of the evidence, 

and (3) instructed the jury on the elements of Kansas strict 

liability law. The trial judge erred, however, in allowing 

Wheeler to (1) impeach Deere's expert with other accidents which 

the judge had not previously found to be substantially similar, 

and (2) introduce exhibits reflecting Deere's subsequent design 

changes after Deere had stipulated to their feasibility. 

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and 

remand for a new trial. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

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