Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-04065/USCOURTS-ca10-89-04065-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Wells Edgar
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

M Y 21 1990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

DAVID WELLS EDGAR, also known as 

David Wayne Edgerly, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 89-4065 

(D.C. No. 88-CR-213S) 

(D. Utah) 

Before MCKAY, LOGAN, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

Defendant David Wells Edgar pleaded guilty to possession of 

cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 84l(a)(l). His plea was conditioned on his right to appeal the 

district court's denial of his motion to suppress twenty-two 

kilograms of cocaine found in the car he was driving. 

After a hearing on the suppression motion, the district court 

found the relevant facts as follows. Defendant was eastbound on 

Interstate-70 when he was stopped at a roadblock in Grand County, 

Utah, conducted by the Utah Highway Patrol and the Grand County 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-4065 Document: 01019970251 Date Filed: 05/21/1990 Page: 1 
Sheriff's Office to systematically check drivers' licenses and 

registrations. At the request of Officer Curt Brewer, defendant 

produced a California license in the name of David Wayne Edgerly 

and a California registration in the name of Antonio Alberto 

Manduro. Defendant told the officer that he was driving the car 

with Manduro's permission and was to meet Manduro in Vail, 

Colorado, for a ski holiday. Officer Brewer retuned the license 

and registration to defendant and asked him whether he was 

transporting alcohol, narcotics, weapons, or large sums of money 

in the vehicle. Defendant responded in the negative, and Officer 

Brewer then asked defendant for permission to search the vehicle 

for those items and specifically requested permission to search 

the trunk. Defendant responded, "That would be fine.'' III R. 18. 

The subseqent search of the trunk produced the cocaine at issue. 

The district court concluded that the roadblock stop was 

legitimate, as was the subsequent questioning, and that 

defendant's consent to the search was voluntary. Therefore, the 

district court denied the motion to suppress. Defendant raises 

these same issues on appeal. We affirm. 

I 

The Supreme Court has expressed approval of roadblocks for 

the purpose of verifying licenses and registrations in Delaware v. 

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979), and this circuit has repeatedly 

upheld their use, see,~, United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 

1389, 1392 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1054 (1988); 

United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 547 (10th Cir. 1985); United 

States v. Diaz-Albertini, 772 F.2d 654, 658 (10th Cir. 1985), 

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Appellate Case: 89-4065 Document: 01019970251 Date Filed: 05/21/1990 Page: 2 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822 (1987); United States v. Obregon, 748 

F.2d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Prichard, 645 

F.2d 854, 856-57 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1069 (1981). 

Defendant contends that the roadblock was pretextual, pointing to 

evidence that the officers exercised unbridled discretion in 

deciding which cars to stop. There was conflicting evidence on 

this point, however, and the district court found that cars were 

waived through the roadblock only when all available officers were 

occupied with the searches and arrests of defendant and a man from 

another vehicle. This finding is not clearly erroneous. 

II 

Defendant next argues that Officer Brewer's questions about 

narcotics constituted a seizure without reasonable suspicion of 

illegal activity. When a person has been detained by a law 

enforcement official for a legitimate purpose, further 

investigatory detention, short of an arrest, for a different 

purpose must be supported by the reasonable suspicion for an 

investigatory "stop" under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See, 

~, Corral, 823 F.2d at 1392-93 (suspicion of narcotics activity 

arose after roadblock stop). 

Determining whether an officer had an objectively reasonable 

and articulable suspicion of wrongdoing sufficient to justify a 

given intrusion necessarily turns on the facts and circumstances 

of each case. See United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 

(1989). We must determine "whether the officer's action was 

justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related 

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Appellate Case: 89-4065 Document: 01019970251 Date Filed: 05/21/1990 Page: 3 
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in 

the first place." Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. 

Assuming that Officer Brewer's brief series of questions 

invoked Fourth Amendment protections, we hold that they were 

justified by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant 

was involved in illegal activity. In addition to the fact that 

defendant was driving a car owned by someone else, Officer Brewer 

testified that although there was a pair of skis on top of 

defendant's car, the interior of the car was relatively barren and 

noticeably absent were other items he normally saw in skiers' 

cars. Officer Brewer also detected a strong odor of perfume or 

deodorizer which he thought could be used to mask the smell of 

something else. Officer Brewer also said defendant was 

conspicuously nervous during their encounter, refusing to remove 

his sunglasses or look at Officer Brewer. The district court 

thought these circumstances justi f ied Officer Brewer's brief 

questioning of defendant concerning illegal activities, and we 

agree. Cf. United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 891 (10th 

Cir. 1986) (officer's brief questions about narcotics put to men 

stopped at permanent immigration checkpoint justified by their 

hesitancy in answering previous questions, temporary license 

plate, and lack of luggage for supposed vacation). These same 

circumstances justified Officer Brewer's request to search the 

car, cf. United States v. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d 1127, 1128, 1130 

(10th Cir. 1985) (officer who stopped defendant for speeding and 

had suspicions based upon curious state of license and 

registration and strong smell of deodorizer could have requested 

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Appellate Case: 89-4065 Document: 01019970251 Date Filed: 05/21/1990 Page: 4 
• 

defendant for permission to search car). 

III 

Defendant's only challenge to his consent to the search is 

that it was tainted by an illegal detention. This argument must 

fail in view of our conclusion that there was no illegal 

detention, and the district court's finding that defendant's 

consent was voluntary is not clearly erroneous. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

James K. Logan 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-4065 Document: 01019970251 Date Filed: 05/21/1990 Page: 5