Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03329/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03329-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Fred Allenbrand
Appellee
Attorney General of Kansas
Appellee
Gary D. Tebbets
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F IL .L.i J 

TENTH CIRCUIT United States Cou11, of Appeal, 

GARY D. TEBBETS, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

FRED ALLENBRAND and the 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

Tenth Cit"CU{t 

FEB 2 2 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER Clerk . 

No. 92-3329 

(D. Kan., No. 91-3100-S ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMEN'r* 

Before SEYMOUR, ANDERSON, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.** 

In this habeas corpus appeal, the prose petitioner is 

seeking a certificate of probable cause. The petitioner was 

arrested in January 1988 on charges of interfering with a police 

officer and criminal trespass. He was convicted four months later 

by the District Court of Johnson County, Kansas. The Kansas Court 

of Appeals overturned this conviction and the petitioner was 

retried in July 1989. A jury found the petitioner guilty of both 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case , r e s judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36 . 3 . 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal . See Fed. R. App. P . 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34 . 1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 92-3329 Document: 010110175841 Date Filed: 02/22/1993 Page: 1 
charges and he received concurrent prison sentences of 180 days on 

the interference charge and 90 days on the trespass charge. The 

petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the Kansas Court of 

Appeal and requested a free trial transcript on the ground of 

indigency . This request was denied and the petitioner's appeal 

was dismissed. Both the Kansas Supreme Court and the United 

States Supreme Court declined to review this dismissal. 

The petitioner filed this habeas corpus action in the United 

States District Court for the District of Kansas pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §2254. 1 The petitioner alleged that his convictions 

violated his constitutional rights to speedy trial, assistance of 

counsel, and due process. The district court dismissed the 

petitioner's contentions and refused to grant his request for a 

certificate of probable cause . Because we agree with the district 

court's conclusion that the petitioner's arguments are frivolous, 

we also decline to grant the petitioner's request for a 

certificate of probable cause and conclude that the petitioner's 

appeal should be dismissed. 2 

1 Although the petitioner had been released from jail at the time 

he filed his habeas corpus petition, he was still serving a 

one-year term of parole. Ac cordingly, the district court had 

jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner's suit. See Jones v. 

CUnningham, 371 U.S. 236 , 243 (1963 ) (parole constitutes custody 

within the meaning of the habeas corpus statute). 

2 Given our conclusion that the petitioner' s appeal should be 

dismissed, we need not reach the question of whether the 

respondents, Johnson County Sheriff Fred Allenbrand and the 

Attorney General of Kansas, are proper parties to this proceeding. 

The respondents contend that they are not proper parties because 

at the time the petitioner filed this action, his parole was being 

supervised by the City of Overland Park, not by Johnson County or 

the State of Kansas. 

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Title 28, United States Code, §2253 requires a petitioner to 

obtain a certificate of probable cause before appealing a final 

order in a habeas corpus proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §2254. 

Section 2253 provides that a certificate of probable cause may be 

issued either by the district court or the court of appeals. To 

receive a certificate of probable cause, a petitioner must "make a 

'substantial showing of the denial of [a] federal right.'" 

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983) (quoting Stewart v . 

Beto, 454 F.2d 268, 270 n . 2 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 

U.S .. 925 (1972)). A petitioner may satisfy this requirement by 

demonstrating that the denial of such a right is "debatable among 

jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a 

different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further. " Id. at 893 n.4 (quoting Gordon 

v . Willis, 516 F. Supp. 911, 913 (N.D. Ga. 1980)) (emphasis in 

original). In this case , we find that none of the petitioner's 

claims satisfy this standard. 

I . Right to Counsel 

Initially, the petitioner contends that he was denied his 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The petitioner advances three 

arguments in this regard. 

First, the petitioner contends that he was denied his counsel 

of choice when the trial court refused to permit him to proceed 

prose with the assistance of his friend, Gary Rickman. However, 

Mr. Rickman is neither trained in the law nor licensed to practice 

law. While the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel 

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includes the right to counsel of one's choice, United States v. 

Collins, 920 F . 2d 619, 624-26 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 

S. Ct. 2022 (1991), counsel means "an individual who is authorized 

to the practice of law," United States v. Grismore, 546 F.2d 844, 

847 (10th Cir. 1976); accord United States v. Thibodeaux, 758 F.2d 

199, 201 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Martin, 790 F.2d 1215, 

1218 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 448, 451 

(7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Kelley, 539 F.2d 1199, 1202-03 

(9th Cir. 1976). Accordingly, whether sought for the purpose of 

representation, or merely advice, "there is no colorable merit in 

the proposition that a criminal defendant is constitutionally 

vested with the right of assistance ... by a lay person." 

United States v . Cooper, 493 F.2d 473, 474 (5th Cir. 1974). 

Second, the petitioner contends that he was impermissibly 

convicted without counsel. As noted above, however, the 

petitioner informed the trial court that he wished to represent 

himself with the aid of Mr. Rickman. On the basis of the record 

before us, we hold that this insistence on proceeding prose with 

the assistance of a non-licensed attorney constituted a waiver of 

the petitioner's right to counsel . 

The petitioner argues that any such waiver was invalid 

because Kansas law requires a defendant to sign a written 

statement as a prerequisite to the waiver of counsel. See K. S.A. 

§22-3426. For purposes of the Sixth Amendment, however, Kansas 

law is not controlling . Under the Sixth Amendment, the question 

is whether the defendant's waiver of counsel was knowing and 

intelligent in light of the totality circumstances, taking into 

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account the defendant's background, experience, and conduct. 

United States v. Williamson, 806 F.2d 216, 220 (10th Cir. 1986). 

In this case, the record does not indicate whether the 

defendant was informed of his right to counsel. Ordinarily, no 

presumption can arise from a silent record that the accused 

knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. See Boykin v. 

Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 

506, 516 (1962); Williamson, 806 F.2d at 219. However, when an 

accused seeks to revisit an earlier conviction by means of a 

collateral proceeding, a presumption of regularity attaches to the 

prior conviction. Parke v. Raley, 61 U.S.L.W. 4007, 4010 (U. S. 

Dec. 1, 1992) (No. 91-719) . In such a case, the burden falls on 

the defendant to show that his waiver of rights was not knowing 

and intelligent. Id. Here, the petitioner has failed to point to 

any evidence suggesting that his waiver of counsel was not knowing 

and intelligent . Accordingly, we reject his claim that he was 

impermissibly convicted without counsel. 

Finally, the petitioner argues that the trial court should 

have appointed standby counsel. However, a defendant has no 

constitutional right to the appointment of standby counsel. 

United States v . Gigax, 605 F.2d 507, 517 (10th Cir. 1979). 

Rather, the appointment of standby counsel is within the "broad 

discretion of the trial court." .IsL.. In this case, the petitione r 

has failed to provide any evidence demonstrating that the trial 

judge abused his discretion . Accordingly, we conclude that the 

absence of standby counsel did not violate the petitioner's Sixth 

Amendment rights. 

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II. Speedy Trial 

The petitioner next contends that he was denied his right to 

a speedy trial. To determine whether a defendant has suffered a 

speedy trial deprivation, a court must balance four factors: the 

length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the defendant's 

assertion of his rights to a speedy trial, and the prejudice 

suffered by the defendant. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 

(1972). Applying these factors to the instant case, we conclude 

that the petitioner was not deprived of his right to a speedy 

trial . 

Although the time between the petitioner's arraignment and 

his second trial was 18 months , the bulk of this delay was 

attributable to the petitioner's decision to appeal the results o f 

his first trial. "It has long been the rule that when a defendant 

obtains a reversal of a prior, unsatisfied conviction, he may be 

retried in the normal course of events. " United States v. Ewell, 

383 U. S . 116, 121 (1966) (19-month delay did not violate 

defendant's right to speedy trial where delay was attributable to 

defendant's decision to appeal) . While the petitioner argues that 

the appeal itself was unnecessarily prolonged by the government's 

failure to file a timely response, there is no evidence that the 

government's conduct was "purposeful or oppressive . " Perez v. 

Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 253 (10th Cir. 1986). 

Additionally, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 

he was prejudiced by the 18-month delay. The petitioner was not 

in custody nor was he deprived of the use of any evidence. In the 

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absence of any other spectre of prejudice, "we have a great 

reluctance to find a speedy trial deprivation." Perez v. 

Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 256 (10th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, 

notwithstanding the fact that petitioner continuously asserted his 

right to a speedy trial, we agree with the district court's 

conclusion that the petitioner was not deprived of this right . 

III. Due Process 

The petitioner's final contention is that he was denied due 

process. Once again , the petitioner raises several arguments in 

support of this claim. 

First, the petitioner contends that he was denied his right 

to appeal because he was not provided with a free transcript of 

his second trial in the Johnson County District Court. In Griffin 

v . Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) , the Supreme Court held that the 

denial of a free transcript to an indigent defendant for purposes 

of a non-discretionary appeal violated due process. In the 

instant case, however, the Johnson County District Court found 

that the petitioner did not satisfy Kansas' standards of 

indigency. 3 Since the petitioner does not challenge these 

standards or the court's factual findings, we conclude that the 

denial of a free transcript did not constitute a violation of due 

process. 

Second, the petitioner contends that the trial judge held an 

3 Although the court had concluded on a previous occasion that the 

petitioner was indigent, the court found that the petitioner's 

financial status had changed since its prior ruling. 

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ex parte hearing with the prosecutor at which the judge quashed a 

subpoena issued to the prosecutor. The petitioner does not deny 

that the hearing was public but argues that it was invalid because 

he was not properly notified of its occurrence. However, the 

trial court found that the petitioner was properly notified of the 

subpoena hearing. Since the petitioner has failed to demonstrate 

that this finding is erroneous, we must accept this finding for 

purposes of the petitioner's habeas corpus petition. See 28 

U.S.C. §2254(d). Accordingly, we reject the petitioner's claim 

that the subpoena hearing was improper. 

Finally, the petitioner contends that the trial court 

impermissibly denied his motions to have the jury provided with a 

copy of the United States Constitution during its deliberations 

and to have the jury sworn to uphold the United States 

Constitution as the supreme law of the land. However, the 

petitioner has failed to show that he was prejudiced in any manner 

by the trial court's ruling. In the absence of a showing that a 

state court's procedural ruling was so prejudicial as to deprive a 

defendant of fundamental fairness, a federal court may not 

overturn the ruling on collateral review. Nicholas v. Sullivan, 

867 F.2d 1250, 1253 {10th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1112 

(1989). Accordingly, we conclude that the petitioner has failed 

to allege any cognizable due process violation. 4 

4 The petitioner also alleges that he was denied due process 

because the complaint was improperly filed, the trial court 

violated Kansas Supreme Court Rule No. 167, there was improper 

contact between a city witness and a member of the jury, there was 

improper joinder of his two criminal cases, the trial court 

refused to permit citation of United States Supreme Court case 

law, he was denied compulsory process, and the prosecution 

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Having found that the petitioner's claims are devoid of any 

merit, we deny the petitioner's request for a certificate of 

probable cause. Accordingly, we direct that the petitioner's 

appeal should be dismissed. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

violated a motion in limine prohibiting references to the 

petitioner's prior arrests. These claims were not timely 

presented nor considered below. Accordingly, we decline to 

consider these issues on appeal. See Farmers Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 

869 F.2d 565, 570 (10th Cir. 1989); Burnette v. Dresser Indus., 

Inc . , 849 F . 2d 1277, 1282 (10th Cir. 1988). 

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