Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-99004/USCOURTS-ca9-13-99004-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Allen Benson
Appellant
Kevin Chappell
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD ALLEN BENSON,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

KEVIN CHAPPELL, Warden, San

Quentin State Prison,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 13-99004

D.C. No.

2:94-cv-05363-

AHM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Alvin Howard Matz, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 5, 2017

Submission Vacated February 7, 2019

Resubmitted April 24, 2020

Pasadena, California

Filed May 1, 2020

Before: Consuelo M. Callahan, Carlos T. Bea,

and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Callahan;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Murguia

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2 BENSON V. CHAPPELL

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus / Death Penalty

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Richard

Allen Benson’s habeas corpus petition challenging his

California conviction and death sentence for murder and other

crimes.

Benson raised two certified claims on appeal: (1) that his

confessions should have been suppressed, and (2) that his trial

counsel was ineffective at sentencing. Reviewing under the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the panel held

that Benson did not show that the California Supreme Court’s

denials of his claims were unreasonable determinations of the

facts or contrary to clearly established federal law. 

Observing that – as Benson admits – he confessed after he

was given his Miranda warnings, acknowledged the

warnings, and waived them, the panel held that the California

Supreme Court reasonably determined that an officer’s

misstatement during Benson’s interrogation that there was

no death penalty in California did not prompt Benson’s

confessions; and that Benson did not show that his statements

were not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

The panel held that even if Benson were able to show that

trial counsel was ineffective in not fully investigating his

abuse as a child or his alleged organic brain injury, the

California Supreme Court could reasonably have determined

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 3

that any shortcoming in trial counsel’s investigation was not

prejudicial.

The panel granted a Certificate of Appealability on

Benson’s two uncertified issues and determined that the state

court reasonably rejected his claims that (1) his trial counsel

was ineffective at the guilt phase of the trial, and (2) the

prosecutor withheld material, exculpatory evidence. 

Concurring in the majority’s decision on the first certified

issue and on the uncertified claims, Judge Murguia dissented

fromthe majority’s opinion with respect to Benson’s penaltyphase ineffective-assistance claim. She wrote that significant

and readily-available evidence that Benson was subjected to

grotesque sexual and physical abuse, which was never

discovered by Benson’s lawyer and never introduced at the

penalty phase, has a substantial probability of convincing at

least one juror to vote for life rather than death, and that the

California Supreme Court’s conclusion to the contrary is

fundamentally unreasonable.

COUNSEL

Marcia A. Morrissey (argued), Santa Monica, California;

John R. Grele (argued), San Francisco, California; for

Petitioner-Appellant.

David F. Glassman (argued) and A. Scott Hayward, Deputy

Attorneys General; James WilliamBilderback II,Supervising

Deputy Attorney General; Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant

Attorney General; Gerald A. Engler, ChiefAssistant Attorney

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4 BENSON V. CHAPPELL

General; Xavier Becerra, Attorney General; Attorney

General’s Office, Los Angeles, California; for RespondentAppellee.

OPINION

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:

In 1986, Richard Allen Benson confessed to sexually

molesting two little girls and murdering the girls, their

mother, and their baby brother. He was tried and convicted

for murder and other crimes and sentenced to death. After his

conviction and sentence were affirmed and the California

Supreme Court had denied several habeas petitions, Benson

filed a federal habeas petition with the United States District

Court for the Central District of California. The district court

denied the petition and Benson has appealed.

On appeal Benson raises two certified claims: (1) his

confessions should have been suppressed, and (2) his trial

counsel was ineffective at sentencing because he failed to

investigate and present evidence of Benson’s severe physical,

sexual, and emotional abuse in early childhood. In addition,

Benson raises two uncertified claims: (3) trial counsel was

ineffective at the guilt phase in failing to impeach the state’s

case, and (4) the prosecutor withheld material and

exculpatory evidence (a claimpursuant to Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83 (1963)).

Because Benson’s claims are subject to review under the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),

28 U.S.C. § 2254, to be granted relief, he must show that the

California Supreme Court’s denials of his claims were

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 5

unreasonable determinations of the facts or contrary to clearly

established federal law. Benson has not done so. He

confessed after he was given his Miranda warnings,

acknowledged the warnings, and waived them. The

California Supreme Court reasonably determined that an

officer’s misstatement during Benson’s interrogation that

there was no death penalty in California did not prompt

Benson’s confessions. Furthermore, Benson has not shown

that his statements were not knowing, voluntary, and

intelligent. In addition, even if Benson were able to show

that trial counsel was ineffective in not fully investigating his

abuse as a child or his alleged organic brain injury, the

California Supreme Court could reasonably have determined

that any shortcoming in trial counsel’s investigation was not

prejudicial. Finally, we grant the Certificate of Appealability

on Benson’s two uncertified issues and determine that the

state court reasonably rejected Benson’s claims that (a) his

trial counsel should have impeached the government’s case,

and (b) the prosecutor withheld material, exculpatory

evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial

of the writ.

I. The Underlying Facts

 A. Benson’s Criminal Activities

There is overwhelming evidence that Benson deliberately

murdered Laura Camargo and her two-year old son, and

sexually molested her four-year-old and three-year-old

daughters, before brutally murdering both girls. He then set

the family’s home on fire and fled the scene.

The California Supreme Court’s opinion provides this

recitation of the underlying facts:

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6 BENSON V. CHAPPELL

On the evening of Saturday, January 4, 1986,

Laura Camargo set out to visit Barbara Lopez

and Katrina Flores. The three women were

close friends. Laura lived in Nipomo with her

children, Stephanie Camargo, age four,

Shawna Camargo, age three, and Sterling

Gonzales, age twenty-three months, in a

small, two-room shack that shared an

unattached bathroom with another unit. 

Barbara and Katrina lived with their children

in an apartment in Oceano, which was about

10 miles away. Just before Thanksgiving of

1985, defendant had moved into the

apartment; he was a jeweler by trade. Over the

following weeks, he became acquainted with

Laura and her children.

On the evening in question, Laura secured a

baby-sitter to care for Stephanie, Shawna, and

Sterling, and then obtained a ride to Oceano.

She socialized with Barbara, Katrina, and

defendant. Before long, she decided to return

home. Defendant arranged for a ride. Taking

measures to conceal his destination from

Barbara and Katrina, he accompanied Laura

to Nipomo, carrying with him a heavy

briefcase. As he later admitted, he “went out

there with the intention of doing something to

the kids.”

Around midnight, defendant and Laura

arrived at the shack, and the baby-sitter

departed. Shortly thereafter, defendant took

up a claw hammer he found in the shack,

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 7

apparently positioned himself behind Laura,

and repeatedly and violently struck her in the

head, as he subsequently acknowledged, “to

take her out.” Laura fell; defendant thought

she was dead; she gurgled loudly; he stuffed

socks into and over her mouth; she soon

expired. From that point on, he took pains to

make it appear to Laura’s neighbors that no

one was in the shack. He proceeded to

sexually assault Stephanie and Shawna.

Throughout Sunday, January 5, defendant

continued to molest the two girls. A number

of times that day, neighbors came by the

shack and the common unattached bathroom. 

More than once, Sterling coughed and cried;

more than once, defendant quieted the child.

After nightfall defendant—in words he later

used—“realized . . . that it was inevitable”: in

order to avoid discovery, he decided to kill

Sterling. Although he met with resistance

from the child as he attempted to smother and

strangle him to death, he finally succeeded. 

With Laura and Sterling dead, he found

himself in what he later described as “a

molester’s type of heaven”: in the paraphrase

of the police psychiatrist to whom he

confessed, “it was like being in heaven, and

being completely able to get what he wanted

with no interference.”

As Monday, January 6, approached, defendant

continued to molest Stephanie and Shawna.

At the same time, he began to consider

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8 BENSON V. CHAPPELL

whether he should kill the girls. As he later

described his thoughts: “I knew it couldn’t be

put off and uh, in the state of mind that I was

in at that time, the best thing, no I can’t say it

like that, the only option I had was to go

ahead and finish the job and uh, try to keep

from being implicated in it, okay. Uh, I had

trouble bringing myself to do it. . . . [A]nd uh,

you know, three, four times I set them up for

it and I, I just couldn’t do it. . . .” As the sky

began to lighten, however, defendant found

himself able to carry through. He took up a

heavy steel jeweler’s mandrel which he

carried in his briefcase; he repeatedly struck

Stephanie and Shawna in the head; seeing that

death did not come immediately, he seized the

claw hammer and used the instrument to

dispatch the children. As he subsequently

admitted, he killed Stephanie and Shawna,

and Laura and Sterling before them, “to

protect my freedom.” To cover his crimes, he

proceeded to start a fire in the shack. About 8

a.m., just before the flames began to rage, he

fled.

People v. Benson, 802 P.2d 330, 336–37 (Cal. 1990).

On Monday morning, January 6, 1986, Mike Owen

stopped by a liquor store in Nipomo. Benson approached him

and asked for a ride to Oceano. Owen agreed. Benson

retrieved his briefcase and was dropped off in Oceano just

after 8:00 a.m. At around this time, smoke was seen coming

from Laura’s home and the fire department was called. The

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 9

home was heavily damaged and charred. According to the

district court: 

Laura’s three children, Stephanie, Shawna,

and Sterling, were all dead, on the floor in the

middle of this room, which the fire had

heavily damaged. A lot of burnt and partially

burnt debris was under and around the girls’

bodies and on the floor of the second room. A

pink and black, wire-ribbed female corset was

next to Stephanie’s body.

A partially-burnt claw hammer was lying on

top of Stephanie’s shoulder. Petitioner’s ring

mandrel was lying next to Shawna. Another

hammer was hanging on the wall next to the

kitchen sink.

Investigators found pornographic magazines,

newspapers, and a photo album under the two

girls’ bodies. . . .

The arson investigator . . . examined the fire,

and determined someone had deliberately set

on fire the surface of a four foot wide pile of

magazines, paper goods, clothing, and toys, in

the middle of the children’s room next to and

underneath the bodies of Stephanie and

Shawna, allowing it to burn down into the

pile.

On Tuesday, January 7, Benson asked a friend of a friend,

K.S., for a ride to Los Osos, a town north of San Luis Obispo. 

K.S. agreed to give him a ride as far as San Luis Obispo,

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10 BENSON V. CHAPPELL

Benson picked up his belongings, and they left for San Luis

Obispo around 6:30 p.m. They drove to an apartment

complex where Benson got out and asked K.S. to wait while

he went inside. When Benson returned, he started gathering

his belongings, then he grabbed K.S. from behind, put a knife

to her throat, and ordered her to drive to Los Osos. K.S.

panicked and offered Benson her car. He rejected the offer

and “took out a cylinder with something like a needle sticking

out of it and told her it would kill her if he pricked her with

it.”

Benson made K.S. drive to a liquor store in San Luis

Obispo where he forced her to buy a bottle of whiskey and

pornographic magazines. They returned to the car and

Benson forced her to continue driving to Los Osos. When

they got there, Benson said he was on a mission to rescue a

family in Los Osos.1 They talked in the parked car for more

than an hour until Benson made a phone call. K.S. was

terrified of Benson, who remained within reach of her. 

Benson made K.S. drive to an abandoned house, where he

eventually got his things out of the car and went inside. K.S.

drove straight home to San Luis Obispo and called the police.

1

 The district court noted:

Petitioner claimed he knew a police officer in Los Osos

who had been suspended for molesting an 11 year-old

girl, and was producing and filming a home-made

pornographic movie in which he was forcing his wife

and two daughters to participate. Petitioner claimed he

had borrowed some pornographic magazines from the

policeman, and, under the guise of returning them, he

would go to the policeman’s house to rescue the two

girls.

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 11

Later that night, K.S. accompanied the police to the

abandoned house in Los Osos. The police went to the house

and arrested Benson. Benson was booked at around

11:30 p.m. on Tuesday, January 7, in connection with the

kidnaping of K.S.

On Wednesday, January 8, Benson’s parole agent, Felix

Martel, was notified of Benson’s arrest. Benson had four

prior felony convictions for abducting minors. Martel went

to the San Luis Obispo County Sheriff’s Office to discuss the

matter with detectives. He authorized the breaking of the

lock on Benson’s briefcase to conduct a parole search, and he

placed a parole hold on Benson. Law enforcement officers

spent Wednesday consolidating and reviewing the evidence

they had concerning the murders.2 On Thursday morning,

based on evidence pointing toward Benson as responsible for

the murders, the Sheriffs Office called someone with the

FBI’s Behavioral Science Unit to discuss how best to

approach a pedophile like Benson.

B. Benson’s Confessions

Detective Bolts and Investigator Hobson began

interviewing Benson in an office at the San Luis Obispo

County Detective Bureau around 11:00 a.m. on Thursday,

January 9, 1986. Benson was initially detained on a parole

hold based on his kidnaping of K.S. At the beginning of the

interview, Bolts read Benson his Miranda rights, and Benson

indicated that he understood his rights and waived them. A

portable transmitter in the room monitored the conversation

and relayed it to another room where other investigators

2 Benson had been interviewed briefly at his home on the afternoon

of January 6, 1986.

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12 BENSON V. CHAPPELL

could listen to, and record, the interview. All but the initial

one and one-half hour to two hours of the almost twelve-hour

interview was tape-recorded.

The officers initially focused on a charge of kidnapping

K.S. but then shifted their focus to the events that occurred at

Laura Camargo’s home in Nipomo. Bolts commented: “I

think we could perhaps start anew and talk about some things

that occurred Saturday night and talk some straight turkey.” 

Bolts continued, “I think you only realize too well that we

didn’t call you in here without having done our homework.” 

Benson responded that he had “known that for quite awhile”

and that, “as it looks right now, I’m a very suspected man.” 

The following colloquy ensued:

Hobson: What’s going through your head

right now Richard?

Benson: I don’t think you’d believe it.

Hobson: I’d like to believe it, try me. We sat

here with you all this time and that’s why

we’re still here with you, because we care

also.

Bolts: We’re caring, feeling, human beings

and we have compassion for a lot of things

and we’ve seen a lot worse, believe me, this is

not the end of the line by any means.

Hobson: Richard, if we didn’t care, we

wouldn’t be sitting here.

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 13

Benson: I don’t see, I don’t see how you can

say it’s not the end of the line.

Bolts: It’s not.

Benson: It is for me.

Bolts: Why? There’s no death penalty here.

Benson: That doesn’t matter.

Hobson: Wait a minute, before we talk about

that, we don’t know what happened in that

house . . . [.]

Bolts: Exactly. We know what kind of a

person Laura could be.

Hobson: Laura had a temper. We know that.

Maybe you were put into a position where you

had to make a choice.

Benson: It doesn’t matter what choices I had.

Hobson: Sure it does.

Benson: No, because nothing justifies the

outcome.

Hobson: Well, why don’t you tell us and let

us decide that.

Benson: The thing ot [sic] it is, I can’t.

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14 BENSON V. CHAPPELL

Hobson: Why?

Benson: I don’t know.

Hobson: You don’t know what?

Benson: I don’t know what happened.

Benson, 802 P.2d at 841 n.3.

Benson claimed he could not tell the officers what

happened because he could not remember. However, after

telling the officers a number of lies, Benson admitted he

committed all the murders and sexually molested Stephanie

and Shawna for 30 hours before he killed them. Benson’s

admissions were laced with inconsistencies about how and

why he committed the acts. The officers finally terminated

the interview around 11:00 p.m., returned Benson to jail, and

booked him on murder and other related charges.

Later that night, Benson was placed on “suicide watch”

and placed naked into a small empty cell with foam rubber

padded walls and a bare concrete floor—a so-called “rubber

room.” Id. at 346. He was told by a jailer that he would not

be released until he was cleared by “Mental Health.” Id.

On the morning of January 10, 1986, Dr. Gordon of the

Sexual Assault and Response Team visited Benson. 

Dr. Gordon testified that he told Benson that he was a doctor

and he advised him of his constitutional rights including the

right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. Dr. Gordon

stated that Benson agreed to talk to him and that Benson

proceeded to describe his sexual molestation of the two girls

in some detail.

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 15

On January 13, 1986, Bolts and Hobson interviewed

Benson for another three hours. Benson was again advised of

his Miranda rights and waived them. During the interview he

provided further details of the crimes. Near the end of the

interview, the following dialogue transpired:

Bolts: . . . [J]ust so that I’m clear, is there

something that we’ve said uh, as far as, you

know, threats that we’ve made to you,

promises or any promises of leniency,

anything that has caused you to tell us what

you’ve told us?

Benson: No. I’m surprised that that came up.

Bolts: Well, I, it’s something that uh, you

know, I’ve thought of, that maybe something

that we said you interpreted as some kind of

threat or promise or some . . .

Benson: You know what, if you guys started

whipping me with billy clubs right now, you’d

see me smile, so you know that’s not uh, a . . . 

now, no, you guys are good at your job, I

complimented you to your lieutenant about it

as a matter of fact, uh, I’m glad you are,

because it served in getting me off the street,

you know, I feel that in some sick twisted way

I helped a little, but you guys still . . . you did

your job.

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II. Judicial Proceedings

A. The Indictment and Appointment of Counsel

On January 14, 1986, Benson was arraigned. He was

charged in a 14-count complaint with murder, child

molestation, arson, and kidnapping. That afternoon he

appeared in court and was advised of his right to counsel. 

Although Benson initially said he did not want an attorney,

the court appointed counsel, and advised Benson that the

charges carried the possibility of the death penalty. After

conferring with counsel, when Benson was again asked

whether he wanted counsel, he responded:

I do desire counsel, your honor. It turns out,

in my interrogation with the deputies, I was

led to believe that, according to them,

California no longer had a death penalty. 

Because of that, we were just talking years,

not life. Because of that, I didn’t feel that the

expenditure of the court was warranted in

something that was inevitable to happen.

B. The Motion to Suppress

On February 26, 1987, the first day of trial, the court ruled

on Benson’s motion to suppress his confessions to the

officers. The court first rejected his arguments that:

(1) Benson’s arraignment had been delayed in order to elicit

incriminating statements; and (2) Benson was entitled to a

second Miranda warning when the subject of the questioning

changed from kidnapping to homicide.

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 17

Benson testified at his suppression hearing. Benson

explained that when Detective Bolts commented that there’s

“no death penalty here,” Benson thought Bolts meant that

“the death penalty was dormant in California, and that they

weren’t seeking the death penalty as far as what the

interview, what the case was going to.” When asked to

explain his response “that doesn’t matter” to Bolts’s

statement about the death penalty, Benson testified that “[a]t

the time, the incidents were very fresh and vivid in my mind,

and I was having a lot of trouble dealing with the whole

situation.” Benson further stated that his “primary thought

was nothing was going to change the effect of the people that

died. Nothing was going to bring them back.” When asked

why he gave information to the police, Benson testified that

“there’s no one answer to that.”

The judge carefully considered the possible impact on

Benson of Bolts’s indication that there was no death penalty. 

The judge noted that Benson “is very articulate, very wellspoken, seems to the Court having read this transcript, that

he’s an intelligent young man,” and that, by his own account,

he is experienced in the criminal justice system. The court,

having reviewed the transcript of the interrogation, opined

that Benson had been focusing on the horror of the situation

and did not rely on the officer’s statement. The judge also

noted the passage of time between the officer’s statement and

Benson’s eventual admission of what he had done. The judge

concluded that he was “persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt

that Mr. Benson’s statements were not coerced by promise of

leniency, but rather were made freely and voluntarily.”

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C. The Motion to Exclude Dr. Gordon’s Testimony

When Dr. Gordon was called as a witness, Benson’s

counsel moved to exclude Benson’s statements to Dr. Gordon

as involuntary. The district court described counsel’s

argument as follows:

the reason that Mr. Benson was so willing to

speak to Dr. Gordon was his desire to vacate

the - - what we have referred to as the rubber

room. And in an effort to get out of that

confinement, he was willing to open up and

speak to Dr. Gordon. That that was, in effect,

a ruse or a scam on behalf of the police in that

there was a suggestion that he would be

speaking to someone from Mental Health, and

that they substituted in that person’s stead

Dr. Gordon who came in and then proceeded

to ask and obtain - - ask questions and obtain

incriminating statements.

The trial court denied the motion to exclude and noted that it

seemed clear “that Mr. Benson was going through some

terribly draining emotional feelings,” and “that in his own

heart and mind he felt it was necessary to get this off of his

chest and to speak to somebody about it.”

D. The Guilt Phase

The guilt phase of the trial began on February 26, 1987,

and took less than four days. Defense counsel examined two

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 19

prosecution witnesses out of order in an attempt to show that

Benson was a regular drug user, but offered no affirmative

defense once the prosecution rested. Defense counsel told the

trial judge, out of the jury’s presence, that once Benson’s pretrial statements were admitted, their tactical decision was to

concentrate on the penalty phase because they thought the

result of the guilt phase was a foregone conclusion. On

March 4, a jury found Benson guilty of the charges.

E. The Penalty Phase

At the penalty stage, the prosecution presented the

kidnapping of K.S. as aggravating subsequent criminal

activity. They also presented Benson’s four prior felony

convictions. In 1971, when Benson was 24 years old, he was

convicted of committing a lewd and lascivious act on a nineyear-old girl he had kidnapped as she was walking down the

street. In 1975, Benson was convicted of kidnapping an

eight-year-old girl fromher bedroomwhere she was sleeping. 

In 1975, he was also convicted of lewd and lascivious acts on

a three-year-old girl that he had taken from her mother’s

house. In addition, in 1980, Benson was convicted of

kidnapping a four-year-old girl he had taken from her

bedroom while she was sleeping. As part of its case, the

prosecution played the tapes of Benson’s January 9 and

13 confessions in full for the jury.

The tapes revealed that Benson had made a number of

statements to the officers about how Laura had encouraged

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20 BENSON V. CHAPPELL

him to sexually abuse her daughters3and how his inhibitions

had been overcome by his use of methamphetamine.4

3 Benson stated that Laura encouraged him to molest the children,

possibly in return for payment of money. When asked what Laura would

allow him to do, Benson stated:

Anything that didn’t hurt them. You know, they were

too small for penetration or anything like that. 

Basically fondle, you know, and uh, I, you know,

what’s important . . . this is believe it or not kind of

funny, uh, I was the one that told her, you know what,

I don’t want any of this to come out to where it leaves

any lasting bad memories on the kids. And uh, she

goes, what do you mean and I says . . . if for some

reason, you know, they’re uncooperative, we drop it

and she goes, well, my kids will do what I tell them to. 

And I said, that is what I’m saying, you know, I don’t

want to talk, coerce or anything into something that

later they will, you know, and, uh, she goes, man,

you’re weird and uh, you know, I tell her that that was

right . . . .

4

In responding to questions about the pornography in his briefcase

and Laura encouraging him to molest her daughters, Benson commented:

Yeah, you know, and uh, the pictures have been what

has been keeping me out of trouble, okay, the only time

I have problems with this is when I do crank, okay,

needless to say, if I had any sense at all, I’d quit doing

crank. Alright, uh, I like doing crank. I don’t like the

end result, you know, and sometimes I get wired and

start thinking about little girls and stuff like this and

that’s when the briefcase comes in, you know, it keeps

me off the streets, okay. Uh, the only thing I can say is

it’s worked, you know, and I have cut back my use of

crank. Okay.

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 21

In response to the prosecution’s presentation, Benson’s

counsel called a number of witnesses to show that Benson

had a very difficult childhood and was addicted to drugs. 

Counsel called Benson’s brothers Dale Snow and Brad

Benson.5 Dale testified that, when he was one year old, he

was sent to live on a ranch near Petaluma run by Marjorie

Buchanan, and that all his brothers were also sent to the

ranch. Dale identified a photo of the brothers taken at Easter

at Aunt Grace’s home in San Francisco when Benson was

seven or eight. He described Aunt Grace as being “very

supportive of the family and instrumental in having holidays

for all of us.” Dale then testified that when he was ten, and

Benson nine, the brothers were returned to the custody of

their alcoholic father. Brad also testified that all the brothers

had lived on Marjorie Buchanan’s ranch until their father

instituted proceedings to have them returned to his custody. 

Neither Dale nor Brad offered any criticism of life on the

ranch in their testimony.

Both Dale and Brad described the difficulties of the

approximately three years they lived with their father before

the state removed them from his custody. They first went to

an apartment where their father, their “stepmother,” and their

sister lived. The district court noted that within weeks the

family was evicted, and for the next three years they lived “in

seedy, skid row hotels, houses, apartments and shanties,

including a converted chicken coop, never staying in any one

place more than a few months or the time it took for the

manager or landlord to realize that no rent was forthcoming.” 

The father, a chronic alcoholic, was always unemployed and

5

 To avoid confusion the brothers, Dale and Brad, are referred to by

their first names, and the petitioner, Richard Benson, is referred to by his

last name.

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22 BENSON V. CHAPPELL

looking for money. The boys continually attended different

schools, and worked at whatever odd jobs they could find. 

Dale and Brad testified that they were alcoholics and that

their brothers, Bill, David, and Teddy Joe were also

alcoholics.

The defense also called Benson’s sister, Sandra Bradley,

who testified that both their father and mother were

alcoholics and confirmed that when her brothers came to live

with them they “moved a great deal.” In three years she

attended three or four different schools.

Defense counsel had Grace Ehlig O’Brien, a retired high

school principal and teacher, testify that she remembered

Benson when he was in seventh grade for three-to-four

months before being sent to juvenile hall. She identified a

summary paragraph from Benson’s school records that read:

Boy told vice-principal and later grade

counselor that no one cared for him or wanted

to listen to his problems. He said that no one

believed him when he told the truth. He

wants to be with his brothers and sister. He

says he blames his parents for many of his

present problems and he feels quite strongly

about this.

The note concluded that Benson “[w]ants to be an electrician. 

Likes to take radios apart, likes reading, dislikes math.”

Counsel called Holmes R. Benson, Benson’s uncle, as a

witness. He testified that Benson’s father was an

alcoholic—who was secretive, unreliable, and would at times

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 23

ask for financial assistance.6 On cross-examination, Holmes

testified that he had arranged for Benson to get a job and

outfitted him“with the necessary welding equipment, helmet,

a jacket, gloves,” but he was employed only for three-to-six

months.

In addition, Mary Pat Degroodt, a chemical dependency

nurse who had worked with Dale Snow, testified that

alcoholism can run in families, that Benson was a member of

a dysfunctional family, and that she thought that he had a

chemical dependency.

Defense counsel recalled Officer Bolts to the stand to

testify that a person who knew Benson and had previously

testified, had told the officer: “[Benson] often goes up to

Katrina’s room long periods of time, stares [sic] out window. 

Often gets up, leaves early in a.m. [sic], does crank often dash

every day.”7

Dr. Gregory Hayner, a pharmacist at the Haight-Ashbury

Free Medical Clinic, testified that he had interviewed Benson

for two hours. Dr. Hayner expressed the opinion that at the

time of the murders, Benson was “very, very paranoid.” He

continued:

6

In addition, the defense called Mr. Gunville, a social worker with the

State of Washington, who testified that Benson’s father was an alcoholic

and had refused to address his alcoholism. He further testified that the

father had been in a documentary film about the homeless in Seattle.

7 Officer Bolts also testified that the person used “crank” to refer to

methamphetamine.

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24 BENSON V. CHAPPELL

And by the effects of the drug and lack of

sleep, being very disoriented and unable to

think very clearly, or really formulate many

cogent plans about what he was going to do at

any given time, and tended to react to the

situation at hand rather than acting out on a

set-out plan.

Dr. Hayner concluded that Benson’s ability to conform his

conduct to the requirements of the law was “definitely

impaired,” that he heard and saw things that were not there,

and that he was “suffering a toxic psychosis at the time due

to chronic intoxication with amphetamines.”

Dr. Gene Abel, a neurologist and psychiatrist and an

expert in sexual violence and the evaluation and treatment of

sex offenders, also testified for the defense. At counsel’s

request, Dr. Abel had first examined Benson in August 1986. 

Dr. Abel had reviewed approximately 280 pages of

information on various evaluations of Benson, had given

Benson a variety of tests, and had interviewed him for about

12-to-13 hours. Dr. Abel opined that Benson had a number

of psychiatric disorders, including paraphilia, which in his

case is a sexual deviation of pedophilia. He explained in

some detail that Benson’s ability to conform his behavior had

been impaired by his paraphilia.8In reviewing Benson’s

8 Dr. Abel explained that a person suffering fromparaphilia surrounds

himself with cognitive distortions.

“Molesting the child won’t hurt child.” That is a faulty

belief. “I can predict if I molest a child, which child

will be hurt in the future.” That is a faulty belief. That

isn’t true. “If I’m not using force, it’s no harm to the

child.” That’s a false belief. There are a variety of

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 25

records, Dr. Abel was very critical of the prior psychiatric

treatment of Benson, opining that when “talk therapy” failed

to help Benson to overcome his psychiatric problems, Benson

“should have been placed on a medication to eliminate his

arousal.”

Dr. Abel also opined that Benson had a drug dependency

with a variety of drugs, particularly amphetamines. He

explained that for Benson the effect of amphetamines “starts

from starting to feel good to misperceiving the realities of the

situation, feeling that you have skills that you do not have,

feeling that you have abilities that you do not have. You start

getting frightened and scared to what would be called

delirium.”

Dr. Abel admitted that, based on his prior convictions,

Benson was clearly dangerous and was likely to molest

children. However, because Benson was manipulative and

could “access children easily,” he didn’t “need to kill

somebody.” He opined that the murders were “out of

character” and the result of the combination of Benson’s

pedophilia and drug dependency.

Benson’s counsel also played a video of a program on San

Quentin from the television series, “Two on the Town,”

“which depicted the gas chamber, described how it operates,

explained how one sentenced to die is executed, and provided

background.”

The jury returned a verdict that the aggravating factors

outweighed the mitigating factors and fixed the penalty at

these cognitive distortions that the offender surrounds

himself with and begins to think and really believes in.

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death. The jury provided no written statement in support. 

Benson, 802 P.2d at 365. On April 30, 1987, Benson was

given the death sentence.

F. Direct Review

On appeal, the California Supreme Court struck two

witness-killing special circumstances, but otherwise

confirmed Benson’s conviction and death sentence. Benson,

802 P.2d at 366. The court reviewed the voluntariness of

Benson’s confession “independently in light of the record in

its entirety.” Id. at 343. It concluded that the trial court did

not err in denying the motion to suppress and that “the court

properly concluded that the confessions were voluntary

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 344. The California

Supreme Court concluded that even “[e]xamined de novo,

each of the [trial] court’s crucial determinations is sound.” 

Id. The court explained, first, “the police activity here was

clearly not coercive.” Id. “Second, Detective Bolts’s

comment about the death penalty did not constitute a

promise of benefit.”9Id. “Third, Detective Bolts’s comment

9 The court reasoned: “Hobson’s words effectively ‘withdrew’ the

remark. And as defendant himself conceded at the hearing, the remark

was not ‘renewed’: the officers ‘[n]ever again discuss[ed] the matter of the

death penalty with’ him.” Benson, 802 P.2d at 345.

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 27

about the death penalty did not operate as an inducement.”10

Id. at 345.

The California Supreme Court also rejected Benson’s

argument that his statements to Dr. Gordon should have been

suppressed. Reviewing the record de novo, the court agreed

with the trial court’s implicit determination that Benson’s

confession was voluntary. Id. at 346. It reasoned:

(1) “defendant was properly advised of, and effectively

waived, his Miranda rights - - nor does he claim otherwise”;

(2) “of crucial importance, the necessary element of coercion

10 The California Supreme Court explained:

On this record, it is difficult to conclude that the remark

was even a cause-in-fact of the confessions. To Bolts’s

observation, “There’s no death penalty here,” defendant

immediately responded, “That doesn’t matter.” The

evidence practically compels the inference that insofar

as the confessions were concerned, the comment in fact

“didn’t matter.” We recognize that the remark

preceded defendant’s confessions. The intervening

period of time, however, was not insubstantial. 

Moreover, temporal priority does not establish causal

force: it is a logical fallacy to reason post hoc ergo

propter hoc. In any event, the evidence simply does

not support an inference that the causal connection

between Bolts[’s] comment and defendant’s

confessions was more than “but for.” As explained

above, however, causation-in-fact is insufficient.

Again, it is true that defendant testified that he was

indeed induced to confess by the comment. But again,

the court clearly, albeit impliedly, found his testimony

lacking in credibility. Again, on this record we must

agree.

Benson, 802 P.2d at 345.

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28 BENSON V. CHAPPELL

on the part of the authorities is lacking”; (3) “there was no

promise or deception by the authorities”; and (4) “defendant

made his confession freely out of compunction.” Id.

at 346–47.

G. Post-Conviction Proceedings

Benson filed his first state habeas petition in January 1993

with the California Supreme Court. He argued that his

confessions to the police and Dr. Gordon were involuntary

based on “severe psychological, neurological and

developmental impairments.” He relied on psychologists and

psychiatrists who opined that Benson had brain damage

caused by “in utero toxin exposure, anoxia, head trauma, and

solvent inhalation,” as well as voluntary drug use, and also

head injuries from physical abuse and a near drowning

incident. Experts also asserted that Benson suffered fromdisassociative disorder and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. 

Dr. Abel, who testified on Benson’s behalf at trial,

supplemented his prior diagnoses and now opined that

Benson’s neurological and psychiatric impairments rendered

him an unreliable witness and that all of Benson’s statements

should be viewed skeptically.

In addition, the habeas petition alleged ineffective

assistance of counsel at the penalty phase based on counsel’s

failure to investigate and present evidence that Benson’s twoto-three years on the Buchanan farm were horrible, and that

Benson suffered from an organic brain injury. In support of

this claim, Benson alleged that on the Buchanan farm he and

his brothers were subject to sexual, emotional, and physical

abuse. He was beaten until bloody with various objects,

including a belt buckle, his hand was intentionally burned on

a stove, and soap and cayenne pepper were forced into his

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 29

mouth. Allegedly,Benson “developed psychotic behavior (in

response to the beatings), which, for example included his

withdrawing and becoming quiet, banging his head against

the wall, and eating dirt and live bugs.” The petition alleged

that Benson was “fondled, sodomized, beaten in the genitals,

given frequent and repeated enemas, and forced to perform

sexual acts with the farm animals.” The petition further

alleged that David, Marjorie Buchanan’s son, caused Benson

to be “fondled, sodomized, digitally raped, orally copulated,

forced to orally copulate David, raped with foreign objects

including a cattle prod and tied to a tree or a chair, molested,

and then left naked and tied for hours.”11 However, the

habeas petition also alleged that Benson had “no memory of

the torture, and sexual, psychological and emotional abuse he

suffered on the Petaluma farm.”

On May 12, 1994, the California Supreme Court denied

the habeas petition “on the merits,” with no further

explanation.

In February 2001, Benson filed a third habeas petition

with the California Supreme Court.12In this petition, Benson

argued his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because

he was not arraigned within 48 hours of his arrest as required

by County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). 

The court denied the petition on its merits without

explanation.

11 In addition, the petition asserted that David was a Boy Scout leader,

and in 1956, the year Benson left the farm, David was convicted of

sexually molesting members of a Boy Scout troop.

12 A second habeas petition was denied in August 1997, but none of

the claims asserted therein are at issue in this federal petition.

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III. District Court Proceedings

Benson filed his federal habeas petition with the United

States District Court for the Central District of California in

April 1997, and amended it in August 1997. After California

moved for summary judgment, Benson was allowed to file a

second amended petition. On February 28, 2013, the district

court issued a 373-page memorandum and order granting

summary judgment in favor of California and denying

Benson’s request for an evidentiary hearing.

Because Benson filed his habeas petition after April 24,

1996, the district court reviewed the petition under AEDPA’s

deferential standards. See Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S.

202, 207 (2003). Accordingly, relief is available only if the

last-reasoned state court decision was “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law,” or was “based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803–04 (1991). The district

court described the standard of review: where “a state court

adjudicates the merits of an issue without providing its

underlying reasoning, as it did here in the case of petitioner’s

four state habeas petitions, the federal court conducts an

independent review of the record to determine whether the

state court’s resolution of the issue constitut[es] an

objectively unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law.” It further noted that where a state court “has not

decided an issue, the federal court reviews that question de

novo.” However, it recognized that in Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011), the Supreme Court held that a

federal court may not grant relief just because it would have

reached a different conclusion; rather, a “state court’s

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 31

habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on

the correctness of the state court’s decision.” See also

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004).

A. The Admissibility of Benson’s Confessions

The district court first addressed Benson’s challenges to

the admissibility of his statements to Detective Bolts,

Investigator Hobson, and Dr. Gordon. Benson argued that the

tape recordings of his statements to Bolts and Hobson were

unreliable and inaccurate. The district court rejected this

contention, noting that Benson had identified no clearly

established federal law that required complete accuracy in

tape-recordings and transcriptions of uncoerced admissions. 

The district court found that “the California Supreme Court

could reasonably have concluded, on the record before it, that

petitioner’s claim here fails because, although petitioner has

pointed out numerous errors and omissions in the tapes and

transcripts, he has not identified any errors or omissions

which are materially prejudicial to him.”

Second, Benson claimed that his statements to Bolts,

Hobson, and Dr. Gordon were involuntary. The district court

noted that the California Supreme Court had found that

(1) Bolts’s statement (no death penalty) did not constitute a

promise of leniency, (2) Hobson’s following statement

effectively countered the death penalty statement,

(3) Benson’s testimony that Bolts’s comment induced him to

confess lacked credibility, and (4) Benson’s true motivation

for confessing was “a compunction arising from of his own

conscience.” Based on its review of the record, the district

court held that these findings were “reasonable in light of the

evidence presented in state court,” and were entitled to a

presumption of correctness under § 2254(e)(1). The court

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further found that Benson “[had] failed to rebut these factual

findings with any evidence at all, let alone evidence that is

‘clear and convincing.’” The court concluded:

All of this evidence supports the California

Supreme Court’s finding that police coercion

played no role in causing petitioner to make

his statements to Detective Bolts and

Investigator Hobson on January 9 and 13,

1986, or his statements to Dr. Gordon on

January 10 and 12, 1986. This court “cannot

conclude that there is no possibility that

fairminded jurists could agree with the state

court’s interpretation” of the record on this

issue.

Third, Benson asserted that his waiver of his Miranda

rights was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. In

rejecting this argument, the district court noted it was

undisputed that Benson had been read his Miranda rights

before the interviews and had agreed to speak. The court

further reasoned that the California Supreme Court could

reasonably have concluded that Benson’s waivers of his

Miranda rights were motivated by the same “compunction

arising from his own conscience.” The district court

concluded that the California Supreme Court could

reasonably have concluded that Benson’s waivers were

voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, particularly as Benson

“acknowledged that he understood his rights and expressly

stated that he waived them,” and “demonstrated during the

interviews that he had extensive, prior experience with law

enforcement.”

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Although Benson claimed his waivers were not knowing

due to his mental condition and incompetence, the district

court noted that none of his “experts’ declarations include an

opinion that petitioner’s waiver of Miranda rights was not

knowing or intelligent due to his mental condition or that he

was incompetent to waive those rights.” Accordingly, the

California Supreme Court could reasonably have concluded

that Benson’s proffer of “conclusory evidence was

insufficient to establish a prima facie case that his waiver of

Miranda rights was not knowing or intelligent.”

Fourth, Benson argued that the seven-day delay between

his arrest and his arraignment violated his Fourth Amendment

rights as set forth in McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 57, as well as

his rights to due process and counsel. He argued that the

delay tainted his confessions. The district court rejected this

claim and ruled that because Benson had been subject to a

parole hold, no clearly established federal law required

compliance with the 48-hour time frame set forth in

McLaughlin. Recognizing that there was no copy of the

parole hold in Benson’s file, the district court, nonetheless,

credited the 2002 deposition of Benson’s parole officer that

he had placed a parole hold on Benson.13

13 The district court commented:

[T]here is no affirmative evidence demonstrating that

Martel failed to place a parole hold on petitioner; in

fact, all of the affirmative evidence supports the

conclusion that Martel did place the parole hold when

he testified he did. The only “evidence” to which

petitioner points in support of the contrary contention is

the absence of a document from a file where it should

appear and Martel’s lack of an explanation for the

document’s absence. This is insufficient to justify the

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B. Incompetence

The district court also rejected Benson’s claim of

incompetence. The district court concluded that Benson’s

“claim he was actually incompetent to stand trial does not

survive review under [28] U.S.C. § 2254(d), and must be

DENIED. The full record establishes that he was unusually

focused and responsive, and was acutely aware of the

proceedings.”

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC) at the

Penalty Phase

1. Benson’s Childhood

In its memorandum order the district court reviewed the

relevant filings and then described Benson’s childhood. He

was the fourth child in a family of six boys and a girl. His

mother was a drug addict, and both she and his father were

alcoholics. Benson and his brothers were sent to live on a

farmnear Petaluma with a foster mother, Marjorie Buchanan. 

Life on the farm was represented at trial as relatively normal,

aside from the fact that the boys seldom saw their natural

parents. When Benson was nine years old, his father obtained

physical custody over him, and Benson and his brothers went

to live with his father and a stepmother in a motel in Long

further delay of this action that granting a stay under

Gonzalez [v. Wong, 667 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2011)]

would entail. Also weighing against the grant of a stay

is the fact that petitioner has apparently made no effort

until now to present the alleged new evidence to the

California Supreme Court even though he has had the

deposition transcript where the “evidence” appears

since 2002.

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 35

Beach. Within weeks the family was evicted, and for the next

three years they lived “in seedy, skid row hotels, houses,

apartments and shanties, including a converted chicken coop,

never staying in any one place more than a few months or the

time it took for the manager or landlord to realize that no rent

was forthcoming.” The father, a chronic alcoholic, was

always unemployed and looking for money. The boys

continually attended different schools, and worked at

whatever odd jobs they could find.

The district court noted:

The county protective services agency

sometimes intervened to remove the Benson

children from their father’s custody and place

them in various foster and group homes. Off

and on, the boys were reunited with their

father, only to be repeatedly split up and

placed in foster and group homes again. 

Finally when petitioner was 11 or 12, after

three years of sporadically living with their

father, the children were permanently taken

from their father, and they were never

together again as a family. All of the boys

turned to alcohol to escape from reality, but

Sandy [the daughter] did not.

Benson lived in group homes and institutions from age 11

onward and had difficulty adjusting to society. He began

drinking alcohol and using marijuana at age 15. He was

arrested a number of times for drunk driving and began using

amphetamines and barbiturates around age 18. He went to

junior high school in Los Angeles, and although he missed

the last three weeks of school because he was placed in

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36 BENSON V. CHAPPELL

juvenile hall, all of his grades were passing and some were

excellent. He told a school counselor that no one cared, no

one believed him, he wanted to be with his brothers and

sisters, and it was all his parents’ fault.

Benson was first arrested at age 10, and was first

committed to the California Youth Authority (CYA) at age

13. He was removed from one foster home after he engaged

in sexual activity with a younger female there. The district

court further noted that Benson also had molested a fouryear-old girl, but it was not reported to the authorities, he had

a number of window-peeping charges, and he was a

pedophile from age 14.

Between June 1967, when he was released from the CYA,

and his arrest in 1971, Benson had 13 run-ins with the law

and spent a year in custody. After his 1972 conviction,

Benson was confined at Atascadero State Hospital until 1974.

Due to his criminal activity and convictions, Benson was out

of custody for less than a year between 1975 and 1985.

2. Denial of Relief on IAC

The district court noted that trial counsel’s strategy at the

penalty stage had been to argue that Benson “was a ‘normal’

little boy on the Buchanans’ Petaluma farm, who was not

born evil, but was a poor child taken from a normal life at the

ranch and exposed to severe deprivation when his father took

him and his brothers away from the ranch.” The court then

reviewed the mitigating evidence that Benson contends

should have been presented including his predisposition to

mental illness, exposure to alcohol in his mother’s womb, the

physical, sexual, and psychological abuse inflicted on Benson

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 37

by the Buchanans, and his numerous serious and longstanding

mental deficiencies.

The district court nonetheless denied relief on Benson’s

IAC claim, reasoning:

Having before it, as it did, petitioner’s

complete social history and the psychiatric

diagnoses of Drs. Able [sic] and Foster, the

California Supreme Court could reasonably

have concluded that the additional

information provided in connection with

petitioner’s first state habeas petition would

have been insufficient to establish a

reasonable probability that at least one juror

would be persuaded to sentence petitioner to

life without parole instead of the death

penalty. Although petitioner’s current

account of his history is sordid and awful, his

crimes were heinous, and the aggravating

evidence presented by the prosecution was

also sordid. The state court could reasonably

have concluded that presenting petitioner as a

normal little boy who was removed from a

nurturing environment on the Buchanan farm

and exposed to severe deprivation while living

with his father might have benefitted

petitioner, and that such a person would be

more worthy of sympathy and a life sentence

than someone who was environmentally and

genetically damaged beyond rehabilitation

from the beginning.

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The district court distinguished the then-most-recent

Ninth Circuit case, Stankewitz v. Wong, 698 F.3d 1163 (9th

Cir. 2012). The court noted that unlike counsel in Stankewitz,

Benson’s counsel did present mitigating evidence,14and that

Benson had “committed four murders which, however

callous, were far from impulsive.” The district court

concluded that Benson’s claim of IAC at the penalty stage

“[did] not survive review under AEDPA.”

IV. Discussion

On appeal, Benson challenges four aspects of the district

court’s 373-page decision. The two certified issues are:

(1) whether Benson’s statements to the officers and

Dr. Gordon should have been suppressed, and (2) whether

Benson’s counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase

14 The court noted that the evidence included:

(1) that his mother was a prostitute and drug addict and

his father an alcoholic; (2) that he was placed into

foster care almost immediately after birth; (3) that his

natural mother visited him only once during the first

eight years of his life; (4) that upon reaching the age

nine, his father obtained physical custody and within a

few weeks of that Petitioner was forced to endure a

years-long travail of bouncing around skid row hotels,

shanties (including a chicken coop) and different

schools; (5) that he experienced chronic hunger (he was

forced to steal food); (6) that he was subjected to

periodic placements into foster and group homes;

(7) that petitioner and his several brothers all turned to

alcohol; and (8) that he was first arrested at age 10,

spent 4 of the 7 years between age 13 and 20 in the

custody of the CaliforniaYouthAuthority, started using

drugs at age 15, and between 1975 and 1985 was out of

prison for a total of less than one year.

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 39

because he failed to investigate and present evidence of

Benson’s “severe physical, sexual and emotional abuse in

early childhood at the hands of a foster family.” Benson also

raises two uncertified issues: (3) whether trial counsel was

ineffective at the guilt stage in failing to impeach the state’s

case, and (4) whether the prosecutor withheld material and

exculpatory evidence.15

A. Standard of Review

As the district court noted, and Benson concedes, his

federal habeas petition is reviewed under AEDPA, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Woodford, 538 U.S. at 210 (“Because respondent’s

federal habeas corpus application was not filed until after

AEDPA’s effective date, that application is subject to

AEDPA’s amendments.”). Accordingly, we can grant relief

only upon a showing that the state court decision was

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law,” or was “based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). The Supreme Court has directed that “review

under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the

state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits,” Cullen

v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011), and that “[a] state

court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes

federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could

disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.”

Richter, 562 U.S. at 101. Moreover, even “[w]here a state

15 We requested and received a responding brief from California. See

9th Cir. R. 22-1(f). We then accepted Benson’s oversized reply brief. We

now issue a Certificate of Appealability for these two issues and consider

the merits of Benson’s contentions. See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759,

773–74 (2017).

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40 BENSON V. CHAPPELL

court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the

habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there

was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Id.

at 98.

B. Benson’s Statements were Properly Admitted

The record shows, and Benson admits, that he was

advised of his Miranda rights prior to each of his police

interviews and he indicated that he understood those rights

and waived them. Nonetheless, Benson argues his statements

should not have been admitted because: (1) his confession

was tainted because he was not presented with the probable

cause which supported his arrest within 48 hours as required

by McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44; (2) his statements were not

voluntary because he relied on the officer’s statement that

there was no death penalty and the interrogations were

coercive; and (3) he has mental impairments which were

exacerbated by his use of drugs, necessitating the suppression

of his confessions. None ofBenson’s arguments merit relief.16

16 Benson also appears to advance as a separate argument that it was

clear error and an abuse of discretion for the district court not to hold an

evidentiary hearing. This argument fails in light of the Supreme Court

direction in Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, that review under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record in existence before the state court. Id.

at 181. Our review of the record shows that the district court considered

Benson’s evidence of mental impairment, was aware of the allegations

concerning the interrogation procedures, and rejected Benson’s

McLaughlin claim. Thus, it appears that all of Benson’s factual and legal

allegations that were before the state courts were also before the district

court, and we perceive no factual issue that required the district court to

hold an evidentiary hearing. Benson has not carried his burden of

showing that he was denied due process by the district court declining to

hold an evidentiary hearing.

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 41

1. Benson is not entitled to any relief under McLaughlin

a. Because a parole hold was put in place,

McLaughlin does not apply.

Benson gave multiple detailed confessions regarding the

murders. However, each of the confessions was made during

the period of time between Benson’s arrest for kidnapping on

January 7, 1986 and January 14, 1986, when he was arraigned

and presented with the probable cause for his arrest for the

first time. The Supreme Court ruled in County of Riverside

v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991) that an arrestee is

entitled under the Fourth Amendment to a hearing at which

he is presented with the probable cause of his arrest within

forty-eight hours of the arrest. Benson argues that his

confessions were tainted due to the delay in his arraignment.

Benson raised his McLaughlin claim in his third state

habeas petition, which was denied by the California Supreme

Court on February 28, 2001. Accordingly, he is entitled to

relief on this claim only if “there was no reasonable basis for

the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98.

A Fourth Amendment claim resulting from a McLaughlin

violation would be cognizable on habeas corpus review. 

Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1071–72 (9th Cir.

2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Bittaker v.

Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir. 2003). However, the

State argues that the 48-hour rule described in McLaughlin

does not apply to the Fourth Amendment rights of a parolee

who is held pursuant to a “parole hold.” Generally, a parole

hold authorizes a person suspected of violating his parole to

be detained while authorities investigate the alleged parole

violation. As we have already noted, Benson’s parole officer,

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42 BENSON V. CHAPPELL

Felix Martel, placed a parole hold on Benson immediately

after Benson’s arrest for the kidnaping.

Benson argues that evidence gathered since his trial calls

into question whether a parole hold was, in fact, put in place. 

In particular, he asserts that as early as 2002, in connection

with his third state habeas petition, the actual paper parole

hold could not be located. However, Benson’s parole officer

Martel testified at the initial suppression hearing in June

1986, and at his deposition on May, 2002, that he had placed

a parole hold on Benson on Wednesday, January 8, 1986.

Although the district court accepted the 2002 deposition

of Benson’s parole officer, the information in the deposition

is not properly before us. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)

(making clear that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted

unless the State court’s adjudication on the merits “resulted

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding”) (emphasis added). We have

held that Pinholster prohibits consideration of new evidence

“for the purpose of determining whether the last reasoned

state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established law or an unreasonable

determination of the facts.” Crittenden v. Chappell, 804 F.3d

998, 1010 (9th Cir. 2015). In other words, new evidence may

not be used to determine whether the California Supreme

Court’s decision was an unreasonable determination of the

facts before it. Accordingly, we are precluded from

considering the evidence.17

17 In any event the newly proffered evidence does not raise a material

issue of fact. All the affirmative evidence in Benson’s state court

proceedings shows that a parole hold was placed on Benson on

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 43

The existence of a parole hold obviated the Fourth

Amendment requirement that Benson be arraigned within

48 hours. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972),

the Supreme Court noted that “the State has an overwhelming

interest in being able to return the individual [on parole] to

imprisonment without the burden of a new adversary criminal

trial,” commended a two stage process,18

and recognized that

there is “typically a substantial time lag between the arrest

and the eventual determination by the parole board whether

parole should be revoked.” Id. at 485. In Pierre v.

Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Parole,

699 F.2d 471, 473 (9th Cir. 1983), we upheld a preliminary

probable cause determination held 21 days after parole was

suspended. Moreover, the California Supreme Court has

declined to require a probable cause hearing for a parolee

within ten days of arrest. People v. DeLeon, 399 P.3d 13 ,26

(Cal. 2017). McLaughlin therefore does not apply to

Benson’s situation, and there is no clearly established law that

a parolee subject to a parole hold must be presented with the

probable cause within 48 hours of his arrest.

Wednesday, January 8, 1986. Indeed, multiple documents that were

produced at the 2002 deposition confirm the parole hold. For example,

both an incident report written by Benson’s parole officer and a teletype

message sent to the sheriff’s office attest to the placing of a parole hold on

Benson. Benson’s presentation does not come near showing that the

California Supreme Court’s denial ofreliefwas “based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

18 The Supreme Court explained: “The first stage occurs when the

parolee is arrested and detained, usually at the direction of his parole

officer. The second occurs when parole is formally revoked.” 408 U.S. at

485.

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44 BENSON V. CHAPPELL

b. Even if McLaughlin applied, Benson’s

confessions would not be suppressed.

In Anderson, 232 F.3d at 1071, we held that the

appropriate remedy for a McLaughlin violation “is the

exclusion of the evidence in question—if it was ‘fruit of the

poisonous tree.’” We noted that this test “ensures that courts

will not suppress evidence causally unrelated to the Fourth

Amendment violation,” and “protects the arraignment right in

question by barring any exploitation of the delay that causally

produces a statement.” Id.

Here, Benson was detained late at night on Tuesday,

January 7, 1986, and he voluntarily confessed to the murders

and sexual assaults in disturbing and graphic detail to the

officers on January 9, 1986, within 48 hours of his detention. 

Thus, the “delay” of his arraignment until Monday, January

13, in no way created or influenced his first confession.

In addition, Benson’s assertion that the delay in his

arraignment was specifically to deny him counsel and thus

violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not

meritorious. Benson suggests that because his name was on

the lists of individuals to be taken to court for arraignment on

January 8, 9, and 10, and he was taken to the court on Friday,

January 10, but not arraigned, he was held for an improper

purpose. However, Officer Bolts explained that the “daily

prisoner transportation list” was created every morning by the

booking clerk and included the names of all those in custody

who have not yet appeared in court. Officer Bolts indicated

that Benson was transported to the court on Friday, January

10 and not arraigned, but did not know why. There is no

evidence in the record that the delay in arraignment was

designed to frustrate or prevent the provision of counsel. We

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 45

need not inquire further into the reasons for Benson not being

arraigned on Friday in terms of abridging his Fourth

Amendment rights because it is not causally related to his

prior confessions. Furthermore, as Benson points to no case

law indicating that a failure to arraign an individual within

48 hours represents a per se violation of that individual’s

Sixth Amendment right to counsel, there is no clearly

established law which compels a contrary result.

2. The California Supreme Court reasonably concluded

that Benson’s confessions were voluntary

Benson asserts that the confessions he made to Bolts and

Hobson were not “voluntary,” and that the state court’s

determinations that they were voluntary represented an

unreasonable determination of the facts. In his opening brief,

Benson claims that the “officers’ plan was to make

Mr. Benson believe they were dealing with him, but to not do

so – the exact type of ‘trickery’ that is impermissible when

leading one to believe in an inducement.”

The trial court held a suppression hearing regarding

Benson’s confessions, and the California Supreme Court

upheld the trial court’s decision not to suppress the

confessions. Before us Benson makes two arguments

regarding the voluntariness of the confessions. First, he

argues that the confession was coerced because of Detective

Bolts’s incorrect statement that “there is no death penalty

here.” Second, Benson argues that his mental defects

prevented him from being able to confess voluntarily. The

Supreme Court of California, after a review of the record,

determined that Benson’s confession was “voluntary beyond

a reasonable doubt.” People v. Benson, 802 P.3d at 345.

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46 BENSON V. CHAPPELL

In denying the motion to suppress the statements, the trial

court found that the police officers had not been coercive and

that their statement regarding the death penalty did not

function as an inducement. The trial court described the

interview as “totally aboveboard,” and noted that there was

“no mention of the degree of any charge pending . . . [or] an

implied promise of a reduced charge.” The trial court further

found that there had been no false promises. It found that

there was no deception, as “there’s no suggestion of different

treatment if Mr. Benson chose to make any confessions or

admissions” and no “implied promise of leniency.” The trial

court concluded that “Mr. Benson’s statements were not

coerced . . . but rather were made freely and voluntarily.”

The California Supreme Court, upon a full review of the

record, agreed and found that there was “[n]o coercion, no

harassment. To the contrary, [the police interview] was

strangely cordial and somewhat light, and not at all heavyhanded in the approach that was taken.” Benson, 802 P.3d at

344. The California Supreme Court also noted that there was

a “not insubstantial” period oftime between Detective Bolts’s

statement about the death penalty and Benson’s ultimate

confession, and that Benson’s statement “it doesn’t matter”

in response to Bolts’s comment “practically compels the

inference that insofar as the confessions were concerned, the

comment in fact ‘didn’t matter.’” Id. at 345.

In the case of a coerced confession, we have observed that

the “pivotal question . . . is whether the defendant’s will was

overborne when the defendant confessed.” United States v.

Miller, 984 F.2d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 1993). The California

Supreme Court was presented with evidence that Benson

understood the questions being asked of him and volunteered

a confession. Benson stated that the existence of a death

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 47

penalty “didn’t matter” and the interrogation was not

coercive. Benson testified that his “primary thought was

nothing was going to change the effect of the people that

died. Nothing was going to bring them back.” He noted that

there was “no one answer” to explain why he decided to

confess, and he indicated on several occasions that he felt

relieved by admitting his actions. The California Supreme

Court’s conclusion that Benson’s will was not overborne by

the misstatement about the law regarding the death penalty in

California was neither “an unreasonable application, of

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States,” nor “based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1)–(2).19

3. Benson has not shown that his mental condition

rendered his confession involuntary

Benson claims that he “suffers from diffuse organic brain

damage and frontal lobe damage which severely affects his

mental functioning.” He contends that these impairments

“create irrational belief systems and behavior,” and deny him

“the capacity to recall accurately the events that he

recounted.” He argues that the California Supreme Court, in

denying this claim, “unreasonably determined the facts, and

unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent.”

19 Benson’s argument that his confession to Dr. Gordon should have

been suppressed because he was misled by Dr. Gordon, or confused, also

fails because it is not compelled by the evidence. Benson admits that Dr.

Gordon properly introduced himself and advised him of his Miranda

rights. Thus, even if Benson was confused as to the purpose of Dr.

Gordon’s visit, this was not Dr. Gordon’s or the state’s fault.

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48 BENSON V. CHAPPELL

Benson raised this argument in his first habeas petition,

which the California Supreme Court, on May 12, 1994,

denied on the merits without further explanation. We review

the record to determine whether “there was no reasonable

basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S.

at 98.

Benson has not met this standard. The district court

carefully reviewed the evidence of Benson’s behavior during

pretrial proceedings and at trial, concluded that Benson “was

unusually focused and responsive, and was acutely aware of

the proceedings.” This determination is a fair reading of the

record of the state court proceedings. Benson was verbose

and elaborate in his confession providing excruciating

descriptions of how he molested the children and eventually

killed them. He did not simply agree to suggestions from the

police officers. Although Benson began his interview by

dissembling, after becoming caught in lies, he made detailed

confessions. Indeed, during the hearing on the motion to

suppress, Benson’s trial attorney did not argue that Benson’s

psychological state made him incapable of rendering a

voluntary confession.20 Further, none of the experts presented

to the California Supreme Court in Benson’s habeas filings

specifically opined that Benson’s neurological defects made

20 The district court noted in reviewing Benson’s participation in the

initial phases of his trial:

These passages make it clear petitioner was well-aware

of the nature of the proceedings against him. 

Significantly, in argument on the motion to suppress,

petitioner’s attorney made no argument that petitioner

was incompetent to render a voluntary confession, nor

did counsel suggest a doubt existed as to petitioner’s

competence to proceed with the hearing or with trial.

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 49

it likely that his confessions were false or otherwise made

Benson incapable of truthfully inculpating himself in a

confession.

We agree with the district court that it was reasonable for

the California Supreme Court to conclude that Benson was

aware of the nature of the proceedings against him, and that

he understood the consequences of his statements to the

officers.

C. Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective at the Penalty

Phase

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the

Supreme Court set forth the now well-established two-prong

test for ineffective assistance of counsel.

First, the defendant must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient. This requires

showing that counsel made errors so serious

that counsel was not functioning as the

“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the

Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant

must show that the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. This requires showing

that counsel’s errors were so serious as to

deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial

whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant

makes both showings, it cannot be said that

the conviction or death sentence resulted from

a breakdown in the adversary process that

renders the result unreliable.

Id. at 687.

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In addition to setting forth the Strickland two-prong test,

the Supreme Court has further directed that where a federal

habeas petitioner challenges his state trial counsel’s

performance, the question in federal court “‘is not whether a

federal court believes the state court’s determination’ under

the Strickland standard ‘was incorrect but whether that

determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher

threshold.’” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123

(2009) (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473

(2007)). Thus, our review of the state court decision on

ineffective assistance of counsel is “doubly deferential.” 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 190 (quoting Knowles, 556 U.S.

at 123).

The Supreme Court emphasized that federal courts should

defer to the state court’s decision. “Pinholster must

demonstrate that it was necessarily unreasonable for the

California Supreme Court to conclude: (1) that he had not

overcome the strong presumption of competence; and (2) that

he had failed to undermine confidence in the jury’s sentence

of death.” 563 U.S. at 190. The Court further commented on

the deference due counsel who “confronted a challenging

penalty phase with an unsympathetic client,” and held that

we, the Ninth Circuit, had “misapplied Strickland and

overlooked ‘the constitutionally protected independence of

counsel and . . . the wide latitude counsel must have in

making tactical decisions.’” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 193, 195

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

Accordingly, “[w]hen § 2254(d) applies, the question is

not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question

is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel

satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Richter, 562 U.S.

at 105.

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 51

1. The record does not compel a finding that counsel

was ineffective

Benson argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing

to investigate and then present evidence of the physical,

mental, and sexual abuse Benson endured at the Buchanan

ranch. He also claims that counsel should have investigated

whether he had an organic brain injury.

a. Counsel’s “failure” to investigate further

Benson’s childhood.

The strategy at trial was to humanize Benson, and to point

to at least one moment in time when Benson appeared happy,

normal, and relatable. Benson’s counsel presented a

photograph of Benson on the Buchanan farm: Benson was

nine years old, smiling, and bottle-feeding a calf. Defense

counsel then asked the question, “How did a little boy who

got from – that darling little boy in that photograph with the

bottle of milk feeding the calf – one wonders how did he get

from there to where we are today?” Counsel then described

the relative deprivation Benson experienced. Mitigating

evidence was presented that (1) Benson’s mother was a

prostitute and father an alcoholic; (2) he was placed into a

foster home immediately after birth; (3) there was hope for a

nice life due to his time on the Buchanan farm; (4) Benson

was ripped from the farm at age nine, and within weeks was

forced to endure a years-long travail of bouncing around

seedy hotels, shanties (including a chicken coop) and

different schools; (5) Benson experienced chronic hunger;

(6) Benson was placed periodically in other foster homes;

(7) Benson and his brothers turned to alcohol and drugs;

(8) Benson was first arrested at age 10 and between 13 and 20

was in and out of custody; (9) Benson was diagnosed with

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52 BENSON V. CHAPPELL

“early-onset pedophilia,” which made it difficult for him to

conform his behavior to social norms; and (10) Benson had

mental impairment due to drug use.

Benson now contends that the strategy used by Benson’s

trial counsel was deficient. He proffers evidence that life on

the Buchanan farm was far from idyllic. Evidence has come

to light indicating that Marjorie Buchanan beat Benson with

a rubber hose, willow tree branches, a belt, and a large

shovel. She held Benson’s hand to the stove, and punished

him by filling his mouth with cayenne pepper. She gave the

boys enemas of hot, soapy water. Her adult son would

routinely sexually abuse Benson and his brothers, and forced

Benson to do unnatural acts with animals. According to

Benson’s brother Bill, “[i]t happened so much that we all

thought it was normal.” The abuse allegedly led to strange

behavior: Benson would bang his head against the wall and

eat dirt, live bugs, and beetles. Benson was also hit on the

head repeatedly as a child and at one point nearly drowned. 

To deal with the abuse, the Benson brothers abused various

substances, including drinking cough syrup and sniffing glue

to the point of hallucinations. Dr. Jonathan Pincus who

examined Benson well after the trial, determined that Benson

evinces signs indicative of brain damage.

Benson argues that counsel should have been on notice to

investigate his time on the Buchanan farm. He points to a

February 1994 declaration by Dorothy Ballew, a private

investigator and the defense investigator for Benson in

1986–87. She stated that: (a) she was the only person on the

defense team to meet regularly with Benson; (b) she “realized

early on that many of his memories, especially of his

childhood, were inaccurate and incomplete”; (c) she

suspected trauma in Benson’s past; and (d) she had

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 53

“requested trial counsel’s assistance in pursuing specific

avenues of investigation and was met with no response or was

rebuffed.” Ballew asserted that she told trial counsel that

there “were several extremely important investigative tasks

that needed to be completed before commencing [the] penalty

phase,” but counsel did not request a continuance. Ballew

further asserted that when she interviewed Brad Benson,

“immediately after the penalty phase had begun,” he told her

that Marjorie Buchanan disciplined him and his brothers “by

putting red pepper in their mouths and beating them with a

rubber hose,” and that from the age of nine to twelve, he

(Brad) “was routinely sodomized by his older foster brother,

David Buchanan.” Ballew reported what Brad had told her to

trial counsel but he declined to request a continuance of the

penalty phase.

Benson also points to a December 1992 declaration by

Terry Kellogg, “a family systems therapist and Certified

Chemical Dependency Practitioner.” Kellogg stated that he

was contacted by Ballew in early 1987 and was retained by

trial counsel as an expert to testify at trial. Kellogg traveled

to Santa Barbara in March 1987 to consult with trial counsel. 

He informed counsel that he “was quite certain that

Mr. Benson had suffered significant physical and/or sexual

abuse in his formative years and advised him that further

investigation of Mr. Benson’s childhood was necessary if the

jury was to be provided an accurate picture of Mr. Benson’s

mental state at the time of the crimes.” Kellogg asked

counsel for an opportunity to meet with Benson, but counsel

denied the request, and seemed to ignore Kellogg’s

suggestions.

Reasonable minds could conclude that Benson’s trial

counsel’s decision not to investigate Benson’s life on the

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54 BENSON V. CHAPPELL

farm further was reasonable. Benson himself did not recall

the abuses he endured at the Buchanan ranch. Indeed,

Benson’s first habeas petition to the California Supreme

Court noted that Benson “[had] no memory of the torture, and

sexual, psychological and emotional abuse he suffered on the

Petaluma farm.” Dr. Gordon testified that Benson told him

that “until [Benson] was nine and a half years of age in that

first foster home (the Buchanan ranch), he had the nicest life

he has ever known.” Testimony from Benson’s siblings

corroborated Dr. Gordon’s report about Benson’s life on the

farm. Brad testified that he and his siblings were “displaced

from the farm” after their father won custody. Brad then

described his father’s alcoholism, the difficulties the family

experienced after their time on the farm, and his own

alcoholism. He further testified that when at age 15 he left a

home for boys where he was temporarily placed, “the only

thing . . . . I could think of was to return to the farm, to the

only woman that cared about me . . . Marjorie Buchanan.”21

Benson has provided no evidence that trial counsel was

informed that Benson was seriously abused at the Buchanan

ranch. The only mistreatment at the Buchanan ranch that trial

counsel appears to have been aware of was that Marjorie

Buchanan had disciplined the Benson boys with red pepper

and a rubber hose. The California Supreme Court could

reasonably have decided that such disciplinary measures did

not put trial counsel on notice that Benson had been tortured

during his stay on the Buchanan ranch, especially given the

21 According to Ballew’s declaration, when she spoke to Brad after

the penalty phase had begun, Brad mentioned that he had been sodomized

by David Buchanan, but apparently did not state that Benson also had

been sodomized.

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 55

countervailing evidence which indicated that his time at the

ranch was positive.

Furthermore, counsel had a reasonable explanation for

Benson’s aberrant behavior – Benson’s traumatic experiences

living with his alcoholic father after the age of nine. Thus,

with no suggestion from either Benson or his siblings that

Benson suffered trauma on the Buchanan ranch, counsel

cannot be faulted for not investigating a suspicion of

suppressed past trauma. Reasonable minds could conclude

that competent trial counsel would not have investigated

Benson’s treatment during his two-to-three-year stay at the

Buchanan ranch.22

This is not an instance in which trial counsel did not

proffer a defense at the penalty stage. Counsel called two of

Benson’s brothers and his sister to establish that they all had

endured horrible childhoods. Counsel called a retired high

school principal to testify that in junior high school Benson

was capable but misunderstood. Counsel called Benson’s

uncle and a social worker to testify that Benson’s father was

a secretive, unreliable alcoholic who refused to address his

alcoholism. Counsel called a pharmacist who testified that

Benson was “very very paranoid” and that his judgment was

compromised by his addiction to methamphetamine. Several

months before trial, counsel retained Dr. Abel who testified

that Benson had a number of psychiatric disorders, including

22 Although the defense investigator and the family systems therapist

stated in 1992 and 1994 that, in 1986, they thought “that Mr. Benson had

suffered significant physical and/or sexual abuse in his formative years,”

it does not appear that they focused on Benson’s two-and-a-half year stay

at the Buchanan ranch. In light of Benson’s and Brad’s favorable

testimony in 1986 concerning the Buchanan Ranch, there was little reason

fortrial counsel to investigate that period of Benson’s troubling childhood.

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paraphilia, that he had a drug dependency, and that he

generally did not need to kill. Counsel even recalled one of

the officers to support the argument that Benson was addicted

to methamphetamine at the time of the murder. In sum, trial

counsel presented a cogent theory supported by the testimony

of several witnesses against the imposition of the death

penalty

This defense, although unsuccessful, was a reasonable

strategy. Portraying Benson as a normal boy until he was

nine or ten seems just as likely, perhaps more likely, to tug on

the heart-strings of the jury as explaining that mental health

problems ran in Benson’s family and that he was mistreated

all his life rather than after he was nine and a half years old. 

Indeed, the suggestion that Benson’s perversion was a result

of a traumatic period in his childhood allowed for the

possibility that he could change, that he could reform. 

Arguing that Benson’s depravity emanated from sexual and

physical abuse throughout the entirety of his childhood, while

perhaps reducing a perception of his responsibility for his

actions, might also make it appear less likely that Benson

could change. This was a material concern in light of the

admitted evidence of Benson’s multiple prior abductions of

children. In addition, this approach would be slightly

inconsistent with counsel’s argument, through Dr. Abel, that

Benson did not need to kill and could conform his behavior

to acceptable standards if incarcerated for life.

Benson’s counsel’s efforts are clearly distinguishable

from those cases in which defense counsel have been found

ineffective at the penalty stage. See Rompilla v. Beard,

545 U.S. 374, 389 (2005) (“It flouts prudence to deny that a

defense lawyer should try to look at a file he knows the

prosecution will cull for aggravating evidence, let alone when

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the file is sitting in the trial courthouse, open for the

asking.”); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003)

(holding that “[c]ounsel’s decision not to expand their

investigation beyond [the pre-sentence report] fell short ofthe

professional standard that prevailed in 1989”); Porter v.

McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39–40 (2009) (per curiam) (holding

that counsel’s failure to investigate any evidence of Porter’s

mental impairment, family background, or military service

was not a reasonable professional judgment). Similarly, in

Stankewitz v. Wong, 698 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2012),

relief was based, in part, on counsel’s failure to hire “an

investigator or interview[ ] Stankewitz’s teachers, foster

parents, psychiatrists, psychologists or anyone else who may

have examined or spent significant time with him during his

childhood and youth.” Id. at 1171 (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted).

Benson’s trial counsel in 1986 investigated Benson’s

background and put on a comprehensive defense to the death

penalty. Perhaps different trial counsel might have employed

different tactics, but on this record we agree with the district

court that the “California Supreme Court could reasonably

have concluded that ‘the egregious nature of [Benson’s]

offenses’ and the sordid nature of the other evidence the

prosecution proffered in aggravation were sufficient to

‘overcome any alleged prejudice resulting from counsel’s

‘failure’ to introduce mitigating evidence.’”

b. Counsel’s failure to investigate organic brain

injury.

Benson also argues that his counsel was ineffective

because he did not investigate whether Benson suffered from

an organic brain injury. He points to a declaration by Terry

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Kellogg, the “family systems therapist” retained by Benson’s

attorneys, who stated that he advised Benson’s counsel to

look for symptoms of serious head injuries. Benson contends

that the neurological impairments were apparent because he

had difficulty in school, and his problems with concentration

and attention were “apparent to teachers, social workers and

probation officers.” Benson asserts that his neurological

impairment has been confirmed by subsequent testing:

Dr. Jonathan Pincus, a neurologist, stated in a declaration

dated January 7, 1993, that testing has confirmed that Benson

has organic brain injury.

Benson objects that “the jury never knew . . . that [he]

suffers from frontal and temporal lobe impairment [or]

corresponding neurological impairment.” Benson further

argues that the mitigating evidence which his trial counsel

failed to present is “explanatory mitigation . . . . [it] does

precisely what trial counsel in this case admitted he cannot do

– it explains crimes.” According to Dr. Pincus, Benson’s

“neurological damage in combination with the extreme abuse

and sexual abuse to which [he] was subjected as a child were

the cause of [his] bizarre sexual impulses. With the brain

damage he sustained after birth, [his] ability to control these

impulses is severely compromised and non-existent at times.”

However, the California Supreme Court could have

concluded that trial counsel was not on notice of organic

brain injury, and therefore not required to investigate it. The

only possible evidence of organic brain injury which was

known to Benson’s trial counsel was that (1) Benson had

trouble in school, and (2) a statement by Kellogg to the effect

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that counsel should look for a history of head injuries.23 But

Benson’s trial counsel had employed the aid of a mental

health expert, Dr. Gene Abel, a board certified psychiatrist.

According to his trial testimony, Dr. Abel examined

approximately 280 “pages of information regarding various

evaluations that [Benson] has had,” and met with Benson for

approximately twelve to thirteen hours. Dr. Abel also

administered “a variety of paper and pencil tests that he

completed when [Dr. Abel] wasn’t there talking with him.” 

Dr. Abel testified that he received Benson’s “medical records

from Atascadero and various other institutions in California

as part of [his] preparation for examining [Benson].” 

Dr. Abel diagnosed Benson with pedophilia and serious drug

dependency. He explained that Benson’s pedophilia should

have been treated with hormonal injections but was not. 

Dr. Abel explained that these disorders made it difficult for

Benson to conform his conduct to the requirements of the

law. Dr. Abel did not diagnose Benson with having

experienced severe head trauma.24

23 Kellogg’s declaration does not indicate his education. He describes

himself as a “family systems therapist and Certified Chemical

Dependency Practitioner.” He asserts that over the past 23 years he had

“treated literally thousands of patients, including hundreds of people

convicted of sex offenses,” has “created and consulted for sexual offender

treatment programs throughout the country,” and “lectured extensively at

continuing education seminars for mental health professionals.” The

record does not indicate that he is a neurologist, psychologist, or any other

kind of board certified professional.

24 In his 1992 declaration, Dr. Abel explained that after interviewing

Benson in 1986, he diagnosed Benson with depression. However, he did

not state in that affidavit that, after interviewing Benson in 1986, he

suspected that Benson had experienced organic brain injury.

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Accordingly, trial counsel was not on notice that further

examination of Benson with the specific goal to uncover

organic brain injury was necessary. This was not a case

where counsel failed to have the defendant examined by a

psychological professional. Quite the opposite. The

psychological professional who examined Benson, Dr. Abel,

testified for the defense, diagnosed Benson with a medical

disorder, and did not opine that Benson suffered a brain

injury. Indeed, trial counsel reported to Benson’s state

habeas counsel that “the mental health professionals . . .

retained for Mr. Benson’s trial did not report that Mr. Benson

suffered from organic brain damage,” and noted that had such

brain damage been reported, he “‘would have seized upon it’

and would have used the information at trial.”

The California Supreme Court could reasonably have

concluded that counsel did what investigation was necessary

in terms of organic brain injury. We are aware of no clearly

established law that shows otherwise.

2. The record does not compel a determination that

counsel’s performance, if ineffective, was prejudicial

The ultimate step in determining whether counsel’s

deficient performance prejudiced the defendant at the penalty

phase is reweighing the evidence in aggravation against the

totality of the mitigating evidence in order to determine

“whether there is a reasonable probability that absent the

errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the

balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not

warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695; see also Sears v.

Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 956 (2010); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534. 

Reasonable probability is a level that “undermine[s]

confidence in the outcome,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694;

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however, counsel’s deficient performance is not prejudicial

just because the court cannot “rule out” the possibility that

the sentencer would have imposed a life sentence instead of

the death penalty. Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 20, 27

(2009). Rather, “[t]he likelihood of a different result must be

substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).

Here, the record fully supports the California Supreme

Court’s implicit determination that counsel’s performance,

even if it were deficient, did not prejudice Benson. See

Richter, 562 U.S. at 98 (commenting “[a]s every Court of

Appeals to consider the issue has recognized, determining

whether a state court’s decision resulted from an

unreasonable legal or factual conclusion does not require that

there be an opinion from the state court explaining the state

court’s reasoning,” and holding that “[w]here a state court’s

decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas

petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief”).

Benson’s trial counsel presented the jury with evidence

that Benson’s aberrant behavior had been brought about by

his horrendous childhood, that he was unable to control his

pedophilia when he was high on amphetamines, and that he

had taken methamphetamine during the weekend in issue. 

Thus, much of the proffered evidence offered in the postconviction petition was cumulative. Benson’s childhood was

not just horrible after he was nine years old, but also horrible

between the ages of seven and nine. His pedophilia was not

just the consequence of an appalling childhood, but might be

partially genetic or due to in utero trauma.

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The proffered evidence in Benson’s post-conviction

petition included evidence of his sexual abuse while living at

the Buchanan farm. We have recognized that “[c]hildhood

sexual abuse can be powerful evidence in mitigation,

particularly when it is not an isolated event.” Wharton v.

Chappell, 765 F.3d 953, 977 (9th Cir. 2014). Absent the

considerable aggravating evidence,the proffered information,

including evidence of sexual abuse, might have made Benson

more sympathetic to the jury, but it also might have made

him seem less likely to be rehabilitated. Furthermore, the

information does not explain or justify Benson’s murder of

Laura and her three children, particularly as, according to

Benson, she was willing to indulge his pedophilia.

Moreover, the evidence in aggravation was damning. The

heinous nature of Benson’s crimes was overwhelming: killing

Laura, sexually abusing two little girls for a day before

murdering them, and killing a two-year old boy because he

cried (he could hardly have been a witness). In addition,

Benson had four prior felony convictions over a ten-year

period of time for abusing little girls, including two instances

in which he had taken the girls from their bedrooms when

they were sleeping. In this context, additional evidence of

Benson’s past abuse and possible genetic make up might not

have assisted his attorneys’ argument for a life sentence as

the evidence tends to suggest that Benson was not able to, and

never would be able to, control his pedophilia.

We do not fault the California Supreme Court for denying

Benson’s relief. To grant relief, we would have to conclude

that the California Supreme Court’s denial of relief was

unreasonable. Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 190; Knowles,

556 U.S. at 123. But, on this record, in light of Benson’s

horrific crimes, past felony convictions, and the mitigating

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evidence offered by trial counsel, we cannot conclude that

there is no reasonable argument that the additional

information would not have changed Benson’s conviction or

sentence. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 105.

Benson’s argument with respect to his organic brain

injury is similarly unavailing. According to Dr. Pincus, the

brain damage from which Benson suffers could lead to

difficulty in impulse control and rational thinking. But the

crime, as Benson himself described it in his confession, was

for the most part not “impulsive.” Benson did not kill the

Camargo family in a fit of rage. He killed Laura, and then,

over the course of the next day, proceeded to molest the two

daughters. He described killing the baby Sterling because he

wanted to quiet him to avoid detection. Benson described

hesitating before finally striking the killing blows on the two

little girls. After it was all over he attempted to cover up his

crime. He set the house on fire and fled. The crime was not

“impulsive”: it was deliberate, and took place over

approximately thirty hours. Benson has not shown that

evidence of neurological damage which gave rise to problems

with “impulse control” would have significantly aided his

showing for mitigation.

In sum, given the heinous nature of the crime and the

mitigating evidence presented by trial counsel, we cannot

conclude that it would have been unreasonable for the

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California Supreme Court to determine that the alleged

deficient performance of Benson’s trial counsel at the penalty

stage of his trial, did not prejudice Benson.25

D. Benson Has Not Shown that Trial Counsel Was

Ineffective at the Guilt Phase of the Trial

The first of Benson’s newly certified claims is that trial

counsel was ineffective at the guilt phase of the trial. Benson

supports his claim with a smorgasbord of assertions. He

argues that trial counsel should have: (1) further investigated

the officers’ conduct in soliciting his confession;

(2) presented expert opinions raising factual questions as to

the timing of Laura’s death, whether Stephanie was alive

when the fire began, and how Sterling died; (3) presented

evidence that a test performed several days after the weekend

revealed methamphetamine in Benson’s urine; (4) obtained

and presented evidence of the absence of semen on the girls,

and that Laura may have been breathing at the time of the

fire; (5) investigated whether Dr. Gordon had, in bad faith,

25 The dissent, focusing on the abuses Benson suffered during his stay

at the Buchanan Ranch, concludes that “no fair-minded judge objectively

reviewing the unintroduced mitigating evidence . . . could conclude, with

confidence, that the outcome would have been the same.” Dissent at 82. 

We, of course, disagree. As noted, the jury was presented with evidence

of Benson’s horrendous childhood, much of it occurring after he left the

Buchanan ranch, that Benson had multiple criminal convictions, including

several for kidnapping young children, that he was unable to control his

pedophilia when high on amphetamines, that he had taken amphetamines

during the weekend at issue, and that his abhorrent actions over that

weekend could not fairly be considered impulsive. Considering all the

evidence, the California Supreme Court could reasonably determine, with

confidence, that evidence that a portion of Benson’s childhood was

considerably more horrendous than initially presented would not have

changed the outcome.

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intentionally destroyed exculpatory evidence in a prior case

and had previously concealed evidence in violation of a court

order; and (6) investigated evidence that a witness had told

police she was at the Camargo residence on Sunday and that

Laura was alive. In addition, Benson argues that counsel

should have further investigated his impairments that

rendered his statements involuntary as that would have

undermined the credibility of his confession and made it less

likely that the jury would have convicted him or given him

the death penalty.

1. Benson has not shown that further investigation and

presentation of evidence could have affected the

conviction or sentence

Benson’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the

guilt phase cannot overcome the uncontroverted evidence that

he arrived at the Camargo home on Saturday night when

Laura and her children were alive, that nobody else was seen

entering or leaving the home on Sunday, and that on Monday

morning, when the home was found to be on fire and Laura

and her children dead, Benson was not there. Moreover,

Benson’s heavy ring mandrel, which had been used to strike

Laura and her daughters, was found at the scene, along with

pornography on which Benson’s fingerprints were found. 

Add to this Benson’s confession to sexually abusing the girls

and murdering Laura and her children, and trial counsel’s

decision to concentrate on the penalty phase of the trial was

certainly reasonable.

The assertion that trial counsel should have further

investigated the officers’ conduct leading to Benson’s

confession is not well taken. The matters Benson now

suggests deserve further investigation—the lack of the tape

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recording for the first two hours of interrogation, Benson’s

nine hours of equivocation, and the officers’ leading

statements and questions —were all thoroughly considered in

the litigation over the admission of Benson’s confessions. 

Even if the officers had engaged in some improprieties—and

there is nothing in the record to suggest they did—the

improprieties would be insignificant in light of Benson’s

detailed, disturbing confessions.

Furthermore, in light of the physical evidence and

Benson’s confession, the actual sequence of events during the

thirty hours that Benson was in the home is of little

consequence. Even accepting that Benson’s experts could

raise questions as to the timing of Laura’s death, whether

Stephanie was alive when the fire began, and how Sterling

died, those questions would not make Benson any less

responsible for the murders and the sexual abuse of the girls. 

Indeed, such presentations may have led a jury to conclude

that Laura and her children had suffered even more than as

described in the state’s case. Also, the contention that there

was an absence of semen on one of the daughters is not

particularly probative under these circumstances. Nor would

these factors necessarily undermine Benson’s narrative,

which was full of contradictions and inconsistencies based on

what he claimed he did, and did not, recall. Trial counsel

may reasonably have determined that contesting the grisly

details of the sexual abuse and murders, which would not

have exonerated Benson, might have weighed against the jury

sentencing him to life without the possibility of parole.

Even accepting that trial counsel did not obtain the lab

report indicating methamphetamine in Benson’s urine, and

should have done so, Benson has failed to show that this

deprived him of a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Trial

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counsel presented evidence and argued that Benson was high

on methamphetamine over the weekend, that

methamphetamine compromised his ability to think and

control his actions, and that the use of methamphetamine had

a lingering effect. Indeed, the state did not really contest that

Benson used methamphetamine. The lab report would have

been cumulative evidence.

2. Trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate

Dr. Gordon was not prejudicial

In a different case involving child molestation in the

Superior Court of San Luis Obispo, Dr. Gordon was found to

have participated in the destruction of evidence and to have

acted in bad faith.26 Accepting that the revelation of

Dr. Gordon’s prior misconduct was important information

which should have been turned over to the defense by the

state, it does not follow that trial counsel was ineffective. 

Although the evidence would have impeached Dr. Gordon’s

credentials, it would not have been evidence that

Dr. Gordon’s testimony as to what Benson said, or even his

impressions of Benson, were not sound. Critically, Benson

had already confessed his sexual abuse and the murders to the

officers before he met with Dr. Gordon and did so again after

his meeting with Dr. Gordon. Attempting to impeach

Dr. Gordon on the basis of his misconduct in an unrelated

proceeding might have been difficult and of minimal value,

suggesting that even if trial counsel should have discovered

Dr. Gordon’s judicial reprimand, the failure to do so was not

prejudicial. Moreover, we are not aware of any case where

26 The case was People v. Nurss, No. 13655 in the Superior Court of

California for the County of San Luis Obispo. The superior court’s order

stating that Dr. Gordon acted in bad faith was entered on July 29, 1986.

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counsel was deemed ineffective for failing to conduct a

thorough analysis of each of the cases in which a proffered

expert had previously testified. Benson has not shown that

the state courts’ refusal to entertain his ineffective assistance

of counsel claim based on Dr. Gordon’s alleged bias and

incompetence was unreasonable.

3. Benson’s allegation that trial counsel failed to

investigate the statement of a lay witness is not

persuasive

Benson’s assertion that a witness had told the police that

she was at the Camargo residence on Sunday and that Laura

was alive is of little weight when placed in context. It

appears that the alleged statement by a teenage neighbor was

known to trial counsel or should have been known to trial

counsel. The police had discounted the report because the

girl was “an airhead or something like that.” Moreover, any

trial testimony by the girl would have been undercut by

testimony from others who saw no signs of activity in Laura’s

residence on Sunday, the testimony of the forensic

pathologist that by Monday Laura had been dead for several

days, and Benson’s own statement that he had murdered

Laura on Saturday night. Accordingly, we agree with the

district court that “it would have served no purpose other than

to diminish the defense’s credibility to attempt to inject [the

girl’s] faulty memory into the proceedings to challenge the

prosecution’s case that petitioner committed the crimes, a

tactic defense counsel reasonably decided not to pursue in

any event.”

Given the murder of four persons, Benson’s confession,

and the lack of any suggestion that anyone other than Benson

was responsible for the murders, trial counsel reasonably

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could have concluded that further investigation into the

details of the underlying crimes and Dr. Gordon’s credentials

would not be in Benson’s best interest. Benson has not

shown that the state courts’ refusal to entertain his claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt stage of his trial

was an unreasonable determination of fact or contrary to

established federal law.

E. Benson has not shown that there was a prejudicial

violation of Brady

Benson’s second previously uncertified claim is that the

prosecution failed to disclose (1) information tending to

impeach Dr. Gordon, (2) a lab report showing that Benson

had methamphetamine in his urine three days after his arrest,

(3) that three witnesses had their pending criminal charges

reduced, and (4) officer notes showing that a teenage

neighbor visited Laura on Sunday. Benson raised these

claims in his first state habeas petition and the California

Supreme Court denied the habeas petition on the merits

without any explanation.

There are three components to a true Brady violation:

“[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused,

either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching;

that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either

willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” 

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). A Brady

violation is “material only if there is a reasonable probability

that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result

of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable

probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d

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1119, 1139 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Bagley,

473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).

1. The failure to disclose Dr. Gordon’s judicial

reprimand was not prejudicial

In a prior case involving child molestation,27 Dr. Gordon,

as part of the Sexual Assault Response Team, interviewed a

child who had allegedly been sexually assaulted. The

interview was taped, but the tape was destroyed. The court

determined that the tape recording had contained exculpatory

statements, and declared that it was “utterly unconvinced that

Dr. Gordon failed to recognize that the statement was

exculpatory at the time it was made.” In an order entered

approximately six months before Benson’s trial, the court

ruled that “law enforcement including Dr. Gordon, acted in

bad faith regarding the tape.”

The minute order meets the first prong for a Brady

violation. It tends to show that Dr. Gordon is an unreliable

witness who may obfuscate or lie in order to convict an

alleged sex criminal. On this record, we accept that the

prosecution did not bring the minute order to the attention of

Benson’s counsel, and that it was suppressed.28

27 See footnote 26, supra.

28 The state argues that there is “no evidence [the impeaching

evidence] was not available as part of the prosecution’s open file

discovery policy.” The state’s argument is not persuasive. Although the

state had an open file policy, Benson’s trial counsel reported that he

“made a strategic decision that [he] would not relieve the prosecution of

its obligation to provide discovery by inspecting the District Attorney’s

files themselves to determine whether they had been provided everything

to which they were entitled.” Moreover, while the information was

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Nonetheless, we affirm the denial of relief on the alleged

Brady violation. To set aside Benson’s conviction and

sentence, there must be a “reasonable probability” that

impeaching Dr. Gordon with evidence of his prior judicial

reprimand would have altered the jury’s “conclusion that the

aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating

circumstances.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700. Benson has not

made such a showing.

The evidence both of guilt and of aggravation was so

overwhelming that there is no reasonable probability of a

different result had Dr. Gordon’s testimony been impeached. 

The evidence of guilt included not only Benson’s confessions

to Bolts and Hobson but also the presence of his fingerprints

at the scene and evidence that he owned the steel jeweler’s

mandrel found at the home. The aggravating evidence is

similarly overwhelming. Dr. Gordon was tasked with

presenting forensic evidence of molestation, and he recounted

Benson’s description of his acts. But Benson also admitted,

in graphic detail, to the police officers his molestation of both

young girls as well as his killing of all four members of the

family. Thus, Dr. Gordon’s testimony was cumulative. 

Given the overwhelming nature of the aggravating evidence,

and that Benson’s confession to Dr. Gordon was not the only

evidence of molestation, it was reasonable for the California

Supreme Court to conclude that the conviction and sentence

would have been the same had Dr. Gordon been impeached

or his testimony excluded.

contained in a public record, we have held that under some circumstances,

this does not diminish the state’s obligation to produce documents under

Brady. Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2013). Here, the

record indicates that the information regarding Dr. Gordon was not

produced and that counsel would have used it if he had had it.

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2. Benson has failed to show that the suppression of the

lab report was prejudicial

Benson claims that the government withheld “a lab report

[which] indicated Mr. Benson had methamphetamine in his

urine three days after his arrest and during the time he was

being interrogated.” This is the whole of Benson’s argument. 

He does not explain why the report matters or how this

information could have been used at trial. That Benson had

been a drug addict and had used methamphetamine was not

in dispute. Benson’s counsel had presented evidence and had

argued at trial—without dispute by the state—that Benson

was under the influence of drugs over the weekend in

question. The inclusion of a lab report showing the presence

of methamphetamine in Benson’s urine three days after his

arrest would not have significantly added to the information

that was before the jury.

3. Benson has failed to show that the reduction of

pending charges against three witnesses had any

effect on his conviction or sentence

Benson argues that prosecutors failed to disclose criminal

charges against several lay witnesses and suggests that their

charges were subsequently reduced. The criminal records of

the witnesses were of marginal relevance because none of the

witnesses testified as to where Benson was or what he did

over the weekend in question. Benson does not indicate what

the defense would have accomplished with this information,

how it would have aided the defense at trial, or even that the

information was unknown to trial counsel. Benson has not

made the requisite showing of prejudice for relief on this

issue.

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4. Benson has not shown that the failure to disclose a

statement by a lay witness was prejudicial

Finally, Benson argues that the prosecution withheld

notes from a police officer indicating that a teenage lay

witness had stated that she visited Laura Camargo and her

three children on Sunday evening. Benson’s assertion that

the witness had told the police that Laura and the children

were alive on Sunday is of little weight when placed in

context. It appears that Benson knew of the statement

because during his discussion with the officers, he described

having heard that a teenage girl claimed that she had “talked

to Laura about 8:15 the night before the fire.” Benson

intimated to police that the girl should not be believed,

because she was a “champion airhead.”

Moreover, as noted, any testimony by the witness would

have been undercut by testimony from others who saw no

signs of activity in Laura’s residence on Sunday, the

testimony of the forensic pathologist that by Monday Laura

had been dead for several days, and Benson’s own statement

that he murdered Laura on Saturday night. Accordingly, we

agree with the district court that “it would have served no

purpose other than to diminish the defense’s credibility to

attempt to inject [the girl’s] faulty memory into the

proceedings to challenge the prosecution’s case that petitioner

committed the crimes, a tactic defense counsel reasonably

decided not to pursue in any event.”

In sum, on this record, even if some Brady materials were

withheld, Benson’s claim must be rejected because he cannot

show prejudice from the alleged non-disclosures. The

Supreme Court recently explained:

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74 BENSON V. CHAPPELL

Petitioners and the Government, however, do

contest the materiality of the undisclosed

Brady information. “[E]vidence is ‘material’

within the meaning of Brady when there is a

reasonable probability that, had the evidence

been disclosed, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” “A ‘reasonable

probability’ of a different result” is one in

which the suppressed evidence “‘undermines

confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” In

other words, petitioners here are entitled to a

new trial only if they “establis[h] the

prejudice necessary to satisfy the ‘materiality’

inquiry.”

Turner v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1885, 1893 (2017)

(internal citations omitted). Benson has failed to show a

“reasonable probability” that presentation of any or all of the

alleged suppressed materials—the prior judicial reprimand of

Dr. Gordon, the lab report, the witnesses’ criminal records,

and the teenage girl’s statement—would have changed his

conviction or sentence. Accordingly, even though the state

court denied Benson’s Brady claims without explanation, a

review of the record reveals sound reasons for the denial.

V. Conclusion

It has been over thirty years since Benson murdered Laura

and her toddler son and sexually abused and murdered her

two young daughters. He has been ably represented by his

counsel. After reviewing his conviction and sentence

pursuant to AEDPA, as we must, we affirm the district

court’s denial of Benson’s petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. The California Supreme Court reasonably could have

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determined that Benson’s confessions to the police should not

have been suppressed. Because Benson was a parolee subject

to a parole hold, his Fourth Amendment rights were not

violated by the delay in his arraignment. Benson’s additional

evidence concerning his background, mental problems, and

horrendous childhood do not compel a determination that he

did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights.

Similarly, the additional evidence of a predisposition to

mental illness, exposure to alcohol in his mother’s womb, and

physical, sexual, and psychological abuse inflicted on him

during the two-to-three years he lived at the Buchanan ranch,

does not compel a determination that he is entitled to relief

under AEDPA. In light of the fact that at the time of his trial

neither Benson nor his siblings informed counsel of any

abuses at the Buchanan ranch, there is no compelling

evidence that trial counsel’s performance was deficient. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Moreover, even if counsel’s

performance were deficient,reasonable jurists could conclude

that, in light of the defense offered by trial counsel, the

gravity of Benson’s offenses, and Benson’s prior offenses,

counsel’s errors were not “so serious as to deprive [Benson]

of a fair trial.” Id.

Finally, Benson’s claims that trial counsel was ineffective

at the guilt stage of the trial and that the prosecution withheld

materials do not merit relief. Benson’s confessions,

combined with all the circumstantial evidence that confirm

his responsibility for the murders and sexual abuse, render

trial counsel’s decision not to further contest guilt reasonable,

if not wise. Viewed in the light of the whole record, there is

no probability that production of the so-called Brady

materials would have produced a different result. See Turner,

137 S. Ct. at 1893.

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The district court’s denial of Benson’s petition for a writ

of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED.

MURGUIA, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting

in part:

I agree with the majority’s decision on the first certified

issue and on the uncertified claims. I cannot, however, join

the majority’s opinion with respect to Benson’s penalty-phase

Strickland claim. The California Supreme Court

unreasonably determined that Benson’s counsel provided

constitutionally adequate representation at the penalty phase. 

Even under AEDPA’s deferential standard, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d), Benson is entitled to penalty-phase relief.

Make no mistake, Benson’s crimes are brutal and

reprehensible. He senselessly murdered Laura Camargo and

her three young children—Stephanie, Shawna, and Sterling. 

He repeatedly sexually assaulted Stephanie and Shawna

before killing them. And he ruthlessly burned the bodies of

his victims to hide the crimes.

But whether or not Benson’s crimes are abhorrent does

not determine whether he is entitled to constitutionally

adequate representation. At the penalty phase of his trial,

Benson’s attorney had a professional duty to explain those

crimes, and the person who committed them, to the jury. 

Indeed, his counsel’s job—and that of any lawyer defending

a client facing the death penalty—was to explain what, in

Benson’s life, might have driven him to commit such heinous

acts so as to shed some amount of human light on his

behavior. This means, concretely, that Benson’s attorney was

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 77

duty-bound to investigate and present mitigating evidence

that could give the jury a reason to exercise some measure of

mercy for crimes that otherwise warrant none.

Significant evidence of that nature existed here. From

infancy until the age of nine, Benson was subjected to

grotesque sexual and physical abuse at the hands of his foster

family, the Buchanans. And although readily available, this

evidence was never discovered by Benson’s lawyer and was,

therefore, never introduced at the penalty phase of Benson’s

trial. Mitigating evidence of this magnitude clearly has a

substantial probability of convincing at least one of twelve

jurors to exercise mercy and vote for life rather than death. 

The California Supreme Court’s conclusion to the contrary is

fundamentally unreasonable.

I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.

I

Benson’s biological parents abandoned him at birth and

sent him to live with the Buchanan family on a ranch in rural

Petaluma, California. Each of Benson’s six brothers was

eventually sent to the ranch, which the boys referred to as

their foster home. Their foster parents, Marjorie Buchanan

and her husband Jack, ran the ranch. Marjorie’s son, David,

also lived on the ranch.

According to the declarations submitted by two of

Benson’s brothers, life on the Buchanan ranch was a veritable

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hell.1 All of the boys were physically, sexually, and

psychologically abused while living there. The physical

abuse was extreme. Marjorie beat at least one of the boys

every day. She beat them with a rubber hose, branches, and

a belt. She even hit Benson, at around the age of six, over the

head with a shovel. She would punish the boys by placing

their hands on a hot stove; filling their mouths with cayenne

pepper; and holding their heads underwater to stop their

crying. At least once, Marjorie held Benson’s head

underwater until he lost consciousness. Another time, as

punishment for leaving a gate open, Marjorie tied Benson’s

limbs spread-eagle across the gate and beat his genitals with

a rubber hose and ping pong paddle. Benson was seven or

eight years old at the time.

Jack, Marjorie’s husband, also beat the boys. He would

use the buckle-end of a belt to hit the children and would

“kick [Benson] in the head and ribs when [he] fell down

during a beating.” On one occasion, he beat Benson for so

long and so severely that Benson’s brother, William, feared

for Benson’s life.

According to his brothers, Benson was subjected to the

worst of the beatings. At times, Benson was beaten so badly

that he could not walk, nor could he go to school. After

beatings, Benson’s face and body would be so severely

bruised and swollen that his brothers were embarrassed to go

to school with him. Benson would withdraw and would

1 The evidence of Benson’s life on the ranch comes from declarations

from Benson’s brothers, Brad and William. These declarations were

presented to the California Supreme Court, but Benson was never afforded

an evidentiary hearing to further develop his penalty-phase Strickland

claim.

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BENSON V. CHAPPELL 79

refuse to speak after severe beatings. He would bang his head

against a wall and eat dirt and live bugs.

Benson and his brothers were also routinely sexually

abused on the ranch by David, their older “foster brother.” 

According to WilliamBenson, the sexual abuse “happened so

much that we all thought it was normal.” David would fondle

the boys and orally copulate them. He would take the boys

into a treehouse, away in a car, or tie them to a chair or tree

and sexually abuse them. He forced the boys to have anal

intercourse with him and inserted foreign objects into their

anuses, including an electric cattle prod.

In addition to sexual abuse, David forced the boys to

engage in bestiality and wanton torture of animals. He made

the boys put their penises in calves’ mouths and pigs’

vaginas. He would put the electric cattle prod in the cows’

throats and pigs’ rectums and turn the electricity on. He

made the boys watch as he sledgehammered animals to death,

and he would make the boys clean up the animals’ feces after

they were killed. He made the boys bite the testicles off

sheep and drink the animals’ blood. When the boys did not

comply, David would beat them.

2

Though it should have been, the jury was not informed of

all of these monstrous details regarding Benson’s life on the

ranch.

2Benson’s brothers’ declarations describe additional deviant acts that

occurred on the ranch—including forced enemas, forced sexual contact

with adults, and witnessing other acts of bestiality.

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II

In short, Benson’s childhood on the ranchwas remarkably

horrific. Benson’s counsel, nevertheless, failed to discover

the abuse despite being put on notice by a mental health

expert and his own investigator that physical and sexual

abuse—specifically, on the ranch—likely occurred during

Benson’s childhood.3 Counsel therefore failed in his duty to

perform a reasonable investigation, rendering his

performance at the penalty phase patently deficient. Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000); Andrews v. Davis,

944 F.3d 1092, 1108–10 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc). It was

unreasonable for the California Supreme Court to conclude

otherwise. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520–34 (2003);

Andrews, 944 F.3d at 1115–16.4

3 The majority errs when it suggests that the only abuse of which

Benson’s counsel was aware was that Marjorie “disciplined” the boys with

pepper and hit them with a rubber hose. Maj. Op. at 54. I assume,

although skeptically, thatthose punishments—specifically,filling a child’s

mouth with cayenne pepper and striking a child with a rubber

hose—would not trigger counsel’s duty to investigate that abuse more

thoroughly. But Benson’s counsel knew more than that. He also knew

that his mental health expert suspected Benson had been sexually abused

in the past and that Benson’s brother had been sexually abused by David,

who was later convicted of molesting children. Any reasonably competent

attorney aware of those two facts would have undertaken further

investigation of Benson’s relationship with David and, more generally, of

Benson’s life on the ranch.

4 Because Benson’s counsel failed in his duty to investigate, it is

irrelevant whether the strategy counsel adopted at the penalty phase was

reasonable. That is, counsel’s performance can still be deficient under

Strickland based on the failure to adequately investigate, even if the

strategy counsel ultimately settled on was superficially reasonable. 

Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521–22. The majority thus errs by crediting

counsel’s strategy. See Maj. Op. at 53–57. The relevant question is

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III

The admittedly more difficult question relates to

prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

694–96 (1984). Indeed, the question the California Supreme

Court had to answer—and the decision we review under

AEDPA for substantive unreasonableness—was whether

there was a “reasonable probability” that the omitted evidence

would have altered the outcome of the penalty phase. 

Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537. That is, whether there was a

reasonable probability that the omitted mitigating evidence

would persuade a single juror that—despite the violence and

suffering Benson inflicted on others—he should be sentenced

to life in prison rather than death. Id. The California

whether counsel’s investigation was reasonable under the circumstances. 

Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523; Andrews, 944 F.3d at 1111–16. 

Additionally, although Benson himself had no memory of the abuse

he suffered on the ranch, the Supreme Court has recognized that a client’s

representations, or lack thereof, do not excuse counsel’s investigatory

responsibilities. For example, a client facing the death penalty may be

“fatalistic or uncooperative,” but that does not relieve counsel of his

independent duty to investigate the client’s background. Porter v.

McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40 (2009) (per curiam). 

Simply put, counsel had a duty to investigate Benson’s life on the

ranch—not to make assumptions about what his life was like. Had

counsel fulfilled that duty, he would have discovered evidence of the

abuse Benson suffered. And any reasonably competent attorney would

have presented that mitigation evidence at the penalty phase.

Accordingly, Benson’s counsel had an independent duty to

investigate and—contrary to the majority’s inaccurate characterization of

the record, see Maj. Op. at 55 n.22—was sufficiently aware of facts

pointing to a probability that Benson had been severely abused on the

ranch, see supra note 3.

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Supreme Court concluded such a reasonable probability did

not exist. That determination is objectively unreasonable.

The question is not whether jurors, presented with the

evidence, would nonetheless have voted for death. Rather,

the question is whether the omitted evidence was of such a

magnitude that there was a reasonable probability the

outcome would have been different. See Buck v. Davis,

137 S. Ct. 759, 776 (2017) (applying Strickland’s prejudice

prong). No fair-minded jurist objectively reviewing the

unintroduced mitigating evidence in this case could conclude,

with confidence, that the outcome would have been the same. 

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. There is simply “too much

mitigating evidence that was not presented to now be

ignored.” Porter, 558 U.S. at 44 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

The majority’s most severe error is its conclusion that the

evidence of Benson’s life on the ranch was “cumulative” of

other mitigating evidence. Maj. Op. at 61, 64 n.25. Contrary

to the majority’s conclusion, the mitigating evidence actually

presented at the penalty phase pales in comparison to the

evidence of the suffering imposed on Benson at the ranch. It

is not a difference in magnitude, but a difference in kind. The

unintroduced mitigating evidence of unprovoked, grotesque

abuse inflicted on Benson as a child is precisely the type of

mitigating evidence that could have moved the jury to

sentence Benson to life in prison rather than death. See

Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535; Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370,

382 (1990); Andrews, 944 F.3d at 1116–18. It is the type of

evidence that “alter[s] the entire evidentiary picture,” and its

omission undermines confidence in the penalty phase verdict. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696; see Andrews, 944 F.3d at 1121.

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Given Benson’s attorney’s inadequate representation, the

jury that sentenced him to death was unable to fully evaluate

Benson’s moral culpability for his actions. Unless certain

crimes are beyond the reach of prejudicial error—or we view

jurors as immovable and incapable of exercisingmercy—then

the omission of the mitigating evidence here must be

considered prejudicial.

The aggravating factors in this case are substantial, to be

sure. But so, too, is the mitigating evidence that was not

introduced. Although I cannot say with certainty that the

penalty-phase result would have been altered had counsel

investigated and introduced evidence of Benson’s childhood

on the ranch, the evidence is sufficiently significant that my

confidence in the penalty is undermined. Any fair-minded

jurist would agree.

I respectfully dissent.

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