Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-24-10772/USCOURTS-ca11-24-10772-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Fineta Dumitru
Petitioner
Mario Dumitru
Petitioner
U.S. Attorney General
Respondent

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-10772

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

FINETA DUMITRU, 

MARIO DUMITRU, 

Petitioners, 

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Respondent.

____________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Agency No. A209-116-452

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-10772

Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Fineta Dumitru and her minor son1 seek review of the Board 

of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum and withholding of removal. 

Dumitru argues that: (1) the BIA and IJ erred in finding that the 

harm she and her family experienced in Romania did not rise to the 

level of persecution and that she did not demonstrate a wellfounded fear of future persecution; and (2) her former counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the proceedings before the IJ by failing to introduce a report related to country conditions in Romania

and before the BIA by failing to file a brief. The government responds that Dumitru’s arguments are unexhausted. After thorough review, we dismiss the petition for review.

We review our jurisdiction over a petition for review and 

other questions of law de novo. Clement v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 75 F.4th 

1193, 1198 (11th Cir. 2023); Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 

F.3d 1247, 1250–51 (11th Cir. 2006); Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 

577 F.3d 1341, 1350 (11th Cir. 2009); see Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 

598 U.S. 411, 413, 416–19 (2023) (holding that the exhaustion requirement in immigration cases is a claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional prerequisite). In considering a petition for review, we

1 Mario Dumitru, one of Fineta Dumitru’s sons, is a derivative beneficiary of 

Fineta’s asylum claim but did not file his own application for relief. 

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24-10772 Opinion of the Court 3

“shall decide [a] petition [for review] only on the administrative 

record on which the order of removal is based.” 8 U.S.C. § 

1252(b)(4)(A). 

In addition, we review only the BIA’s decision, unless the 

BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s decision or agreed with its reasoning. 

Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 403 (11th Cir. 2016). Consequently, we do not “consider issues that were not reached by the 

BIA.” Id. Applying this principle, we’ve held that we have jurisdiction to review a BIA order that ends a petitioner’s removal proceedings without reviewing the merits of the IJ’s decision, but in that

situation, we cannot review the merits of the IJ’s decision when the 

BIA did not; instead, we may only review the correctness of the 

BIA’s non-merits disposition. Clement, 75 F.4th at 1198. 

We may review a final order of removal only if a petitioner 

has exhausted all administrative remedies available as of right. 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). But even though the exhaustion requirement 

is a claims-processing rule, rather than a jurisdictional rule, SantosZacaria, 598 U.S. at 413, 416–19, it is generally applied when it has 

been asserted by a party, Kemokai v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 83 F.4th 886, 

891 (11th Cir. 2023). To exhaust a claim, a petitioner must raise the 

“core issue” before the BIA and “set out any discrete arguments he 

relies on in support of that claim.” Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 810 F.3d 

792, 800 (11th Cir. 2016), overruled on other grounds by Santos-Zacaria, 

598 U.S. at 415 n.2, 419–23 (2023) (quotations omitted). While a 

petitioner is not required to use “precise legal terminology” or offer 

well-developed arguments in support of his claims, he must 

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provide the BIA with sufficient information to enable it to “review 

and correct any errors below.” Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 779 

F.3d 1284, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted), overruled on 

other grounds by Santos-Zacaria, 598 U.S. at 415 n.2, 419–23 (2023). 

“Unadorned, conclusory statements do not satisfy this requirement, and the petitioner must do more than make a passing reference to the issue.” Jeune, 810 F.3d at 800 (quotations omitted). 

Here, we are unable to review Dumitru’s challenges to the 

agency’s findings that she failed to demonstrate past persecution or 

a well-founded fear of future persecution because they are not 

properly before us. For starters, Dumitru has failed to exhaust the 

persecution arguments she makes in her brief on appeal. While she 

included a one-sentence “[u]nadorned, conclusory statement[]” of 

an argument in her notice of appeal to the BIA, she failed to explain 

why the IJ allegedly erred in finding no past persecution and did 

not mention future persecution at all. This statement was insufficient to provide the BIA with meaningful notice and an opportunity to correct the alleged errors she now challenges in this 

Court. Id.; see Indrawati, 779 F.3d at 1297. And because the government raises exhaustion here, we can dispose of the petition on 

this basis alone. Kemokai, 83 F.4th at 891. 

But, in any event, even if Dumitru had exhausted these issues before the BIA, we are unable to review her arguments concerning past and future persecution because they challenge findings of the IJ that the BIA did not reach. Gonzalez, 820 F.3d at 403; 

Clement, 75 F.4th at 1198. Indeed, Dumitru’s brief in this Court 

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argues that the BIA erred in determining that she failed to demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. 

Notably, however, the BIA -- in affirming the IJ’s decision -- said 

only that Dumitru had failed to meaningfully challenge the IJ’s dispositive determinations. Thus, because we are limited to reviewing the BIA’s decision, we may only review whether the BIA correctly concluded that Dumitru failed to meaningfully challenge the 

IJ’s determinations -- an argument Dumitru has not made in her 

brief to this Court. Clement, 75 F.4th at 1198–99. Accordingly, Dumitru’s arguments concerning persecution are not properly before 

us for review, and we dismiss the petition as to this issue.

Similarly, Dumitru’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims 

are not properly before this Court either. It is well established that 

noncitizens have a right to effective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings. Gbaya v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 342 F.3d 1219, 1221 

(11th Cir. 2003). A noncitizen may raise an ineffective-assistanceof-counsel claim in his appeal to the BIA. See, e.g., Alhuay v. U.S. 

Att’y Gen., 661 F.3d 534, 542 (11th Cir. 2011). A noncitizen may also 

bring a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel before the BIA by 

moving to reopen his removal order. Dakane v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 399 

F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2005). 

Under Matter of Lozada, a petitioner seeking to establish an 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must (1) support the motion 

to reopen with an affidavit detailing the petitioner’s agreement 

with counsel and describing the ways in which counsel’s performance was defective; (2) inform counsel of the ineffectiveUSCA11 Case: 24-10772 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 01/15/2025 Page: 5 of 8
6 Opinion of the Court 24-10772

assistance claim and provide counsel with an opportunity to respond; and (3) specify that a complaint was filed with the appropriate disciplinary authorities, or, if no complaint was filed, indicate 

why not. 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639, overruled in part by Matter of Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710 (BIA 2009).2 We’ve held that the “BIA 

does not abuse its discretion by filtering ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims through the screening requirements of Lozada” and 

requiring at least substantial compliance with them. Gbaya, 342 

F.3d at 1223. 

In addition to substantially complying with Lozada’s procedural requirements, a petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the 

deficient performance. Dakane, 399 F.3d at 1274. “Where counsel 

fails to file any appeals brief in the context of an immigration proceeding, effectively depriving an alien of an appellate proceeding 

entirely, there is a rebuttable presumption of prejudice.” Id. at 

1274–75; but see id. at 1275 (concluding BIA did not err in finding 

presumption rebutted where petitioner failed to address prejudice 

and IJ’s decision had been based on adverse credibility finding as to 

crucial issue in case); see also Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639 (noting 

that its procedural requirements are needed to evaluate the substance of ineffective-counsel claims, and even where claim is that 

counsel was ineffective for failing to file a brief, the claimant must 

2 To the extent Matter of Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec at 727, overruled Lozada, we 

have adopted Lozada’s procedural requirements and they remain good law in 

this Circuit. See Dakane, 399 F.3d at 1274; Gbaya, 342 F.3d at 1222–23.

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address whether “former counsel ever agreed to prepare a brief on 

appeal or was engaged to undertake that task”). In the criminal 

context, we’ve declined to address ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 

claims on appeal when the record is not sufficiently developed. 

United States v. Curbelo, 726 F.3d 1260, 1267 (11th Cir. 2013).

In Santos-Zacaria, the Supreme Court held that petitioners 

are not required by § 1252(d)(1) to seek discretionary administrative review to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. 598 U.S. at 423–

31. It explained that § 1252(d)(1) requires exhaustion of remedies 

“available as of right,” and reopening and reconsideration are discretionary, so the statute “does not require a noncitizen to pursue” 

reopening or reconsideration to exhaust a claim. Id. at 424–25. The 

Supreme Court rejected the government’s argument that a motion 

to reconsider was required to exhaust claims that were not previously presented to the agency. Id. at 429 & n.9. There, the petitioner had argued that the BIA’s order contained impermissible 

factfinding, an argument that could not have been raised before the 

BIA issued its decision. Id.

Here, Dumitru failed to exhaust her claim that her prior 

counsel was ineffective before the IJ, because that claim could have 

been -- but was not -- raised in her appeal as of right to the BIA. 

Alhuay, 661 F.3d at 542. Moreover, this claim is outside the scope 

of our review because it rests on the consideration of materials --

including, for example, documents required by Lozada to set forth 

her allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel -- that are not 

part of the administrative record on which the order of removal is 

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based. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A). Therefore, we dismiss the petition 

as to that issue.

As for Dumitru’s claim that her prior counsel was ineffective 

before the BIA, that issue does not require exhaustion since it could 

not have been raised except in a discretionary motion to reopen. 

See Santos-Zacaria, 598 U.S. at 429–30 & n.9; but see id. at 430 n.10 

(declining to “address more generally” the obligation “to present 

specific issues . . . before the agency”). Nevertheless, this claim is 

not properly before us. Unlike the claim in Santos-Zacaria -- which

concerned an alleged error by the BIA where the facts were evident 

on the face of the BIA’s decision so the record was fully developed 

-- Dumitru’s ineffective assistance claim is an entirely new claim 

that requires extensive inquiry into facts. We see nothing in SantosZacaria that changed the requirement for Dumitru to develop the 

record of her ineffectiveness claim. Cf.Gbaya, 342 F.3d at 1222 (noting that one purpose of the Lozada requirements is to prevent the 

BIA from having to scour the record searching for possible instances of ineffective assistance of counsel). Finally, to the extent 

we construe Dumitru’s argument as a challenge to the BIA’s failure 

to grant sua sponte relief based on the ineffectiveness of Dumitru’s 

prior counsel, that argument would also fail because the BIA is entitled to deny claims that do not satisfy the procedural requirements of Lozada. Id. at 1223.

PETITION DISMISSED.

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