Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-00136/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-00136-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Edward Freeman
Plaintiff
Marshall Durbin Food Corporation
Defendant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAMES EDWARD FREEMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARSHALL DURBIN FOOD 

CORPORATION,

Defendant.

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Civil Action Number

2:15-cv-00136-AKK

MEMORANDUM OPINION

James Freeman’s second amended complaint, doc. 22,1 alleges claims under 

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), Title 

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Section 1981 of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, against Marshall Durbin Food 

Corporation (“Marshall Durbin”). The court has for consideration Marshall 

Durbin’s motion for summary judgment, which is fully briefed, docs. 29; 30; 31,2

and ripe for review. For the reasons stated below, the court concludes that the 

motion is due to be granted.

 1 This pleading appears on the docket sheet as “Amendedment of Complaint,” but the 

court will refer to this document as the “second amended complaint” for purposes of clarity.

2 Freeman filed a motion for leave to file a sur-reply. See doc. 32. The sur-reply 

rehashes the same arguments he made in his primary brief, and does not advance any new 

arguments. Still, because the court considered it — in large part to ensure that it considered all 

of Freeman’s contentions —, the court will grant the motion for leave.

FILED

 2016 Oct-20 PM 04:41

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is proper 

“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “Rule 56(c) mandates the 

entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, 

against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of 

an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the 

burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) 

(alteration in original). The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the 

absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to 

the non-moving party, who is required to go “beyond the pleadings” to establish 

that there is a “genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (internal citations and quotation 

marks omitted). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is 

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising 

from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress 

& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 244 (all 

justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor). Any factual 

dispute will be resolved in the non-moving party’s favor when sufficient competent 

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evidence supports that party’s version of the disputed facts. But see Pace v. 

Capobianco, 238 F.3d 1275, 1276-78 (11th Cir. 2002) (a court is not required to 

resolve disputes in the non-moving party’s favor when that party’s version of 

events is supported by insufficient evidence). However, “mere conclusions and 

unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary 

judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing 

Bald Mountain Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 863 F.2d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir. 1989)). 

Moreover, “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s 

position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that a jury could 

reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.

1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Summary

Marshall Durbin hired Freeman, who is African-American, male, and over 

forty years of age, on February 12, 2012, at its Jasper, Alabama poultry plant. 

Docs. 1-1 at 3–4; 26-2 at 13; 30 at 3. Freeman worked on the ninth (and final) spot 

of a deboning and marination line, which was physically located in the plant’s 

cooler. Doc. 26-1 at 14–15. Freeman worked approximately ninety percent of the 

time inside the cooler, id. at 29, which was technically part of the shipping 

department, id. at 14. Within two months of his hire date, Freeman sought “cooler 

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pay,” which is a premium of $0.25 per hour that “[e]very single person” in the

shipping department received. Id. at 26, 29. The nighttime superintendent that 

received Freeman’s request, identified only as “Big Hosea,” “told [Freeman] that 

he couldn’t do it,” explaining that there “was a difference between them working 

in the . . . shipping department and [Freeman] working in [the] marination 

[department].” Id. at 26.

Shortly after Freeman’s request, after paying Freeman an undisclosed sum

for his hours in the cooler, Big Hosea shortened the deboning and marination line 

to eight spots, obviating the need for any marination department employee to work 

inside the cooler. Id. at 25, 27–28. As a practical consequence, however, the 

change forced Freeman to perform the job duties of the eighth and his former ninth 

spot without additional pay. Doc. 26-1 at 25, 31. As Freeman put it: “I work at 

that substandard pay or they’re going to put me in here in retaliation. They’re 

going to take this eighth guy out and put me in there to do his job and do mine 

too.” Id. 

Approximately a month after the change, Freeman requested a transfer or 

promotion to the supply room, by submitting a written application to the Human 

Resources Clerk, Bibiana Benson. Id. at 22. Benson testified that she does not 

remember Freeman submitting an application but, if he did, she would have 

submitted it to Alisa Hall, HR Manager, who, in turn, would have sent the 

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application to the pertinent supervisor after ensuring that Freeman met the 

minimum criteria. Doc. 26-2 at 27–28. In any event, Marshall Durbin never 

interviewed Freeman, and instead filled the vacancy with a “white woman off the 

street.” Doc. 26-1 at 48, 57. Upset by this, Freeman requested a meeting with the 

plant manager Mark Dean and Alisa Hall, during which Freeman complained 

about the decision to select an outside candidate over a current employee like him. 

Id. at 22, 42. In response, Dean informed Freeman that the supervisor who made 

the decision told Dean that “nobody in the plant applied for the job.” Id. at 22. 

Freeman believes that the supervisor never received his application because

Benson or Hall “trashed” his application out of “hate.” Id. at 20, 22–23.

In August of 2012, Freeman requested arbitration forms from Benson and 

Hall, but refused to disclose which claims he sought to arbitrate. Id. at 17, 43–44. 

Freeman never received the forms. Id. at 17. A few weeks later, on August 28, 

2012, Marshall Durbin terminated Freeman pursuant to its absenteeism policy for 

accruing more than the maximum of 10 absence “points.” Doc. 26-1 at 15; doc. 

26-3 at 2. Freeman challenges the points tally or, alternatively, asserts that

Benson’s actions caused him to accrue over 10 points. Doc. 26-1 at 39, 54–55. 

For example, Freeman maintains that, on at least a few occasions, the “time clock 

wouldn’t clock [him] in,” id. at 39, that he received pay for some of the days on 

which the absentee calendar listed him as “absent,” id. at 48, and that Benson did 

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not allow him to work on some occasions to ensure that he accumulated absence 

points, id. at 17, 52; see also doc. 30 at 7, 9. Freeman contends that Marshall 

Durbin discharged him “because [he] was discriminated about getting [the supply 

room] job. And when [he] decided to take the issue further [i.e., by asking for an 

arbitration form], then [he] was terminated.” Doc. 26-1 at 43. 

B. Procedural History

After obtaining his right-to-sue letter, Freeman timely initiated this action, 

by filing an application under § 706(f) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e-5(f), for appointment of an attorney and authority to proceed in forma 

pauperis. See generally doc. 1. The court denied Freeman’s request for an 

attorney, conditionally granted the application to proceed in forma pauperis, and 

directed Freeman to file an amended complaint. See doc. 4 at 1, 4. Freeman 

timely filed an amended complaint, in which he alleged six claims: fraud (Count 

I); age discrimination (Count II); retaliation (Count III); racial discrimination 

(Count IV); hostile work environment (Count V); and wrongful termination (Count 

VI). See doc. 6.

Marshall Durbin subsequently moved for dismissal, or alternatively, for 

summary judgment, on the grounds that: (1) Freeman failed to plead his fraud 

claim with particularity; and (2) Freeman’s Title VII claims were time-barred, due 

to Freeman’s failure to (a) file a complaint within 90 days of receiving an EEOC 

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right-to-sue letter, and (b) file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged 

discriminatory conduct. Doc. 9. The court agreed that Freeman failed to state a 

claim for fraud. Doc. 12 at 2. As to Marshall Durbin’s second contention, because 

the judge previously assigned to this case had “treated [Freeman’s] application as a 

complaint in its order denying the appointment of counsel and allowing [Freeman] 

to proceed in forma pauperis,” the court concluded that Freeman had “timely filed 

his complaint.” Id. at 3. Nonetheless, the court agreed that many of Freeman’s 

claims fell outside the 180 day window allowed by Title VII3

: 

[Freeman] contends that Marshall Durbin engaged in (1) age 

discrimination when it did not pay him at the same rate as younger 

employees in April 2012, (2) racial discrimination when it declined to 

hire him for a supply room position and later hired a white female to 

fill the position in May or June 2012, and (3) disability discrimination 

by creating a hostile work environment when it refused to make a 

reasonable accommodation for his disability in June 2012. Doc. 1-1 

at 9. . . . All of these contentions occurred prior to August 24, 2012 —

the 180 day cutoff under Title VII — and, as such are untimely.

Id. at 3–4. Still, “because some of these incidents [formed] the basis for 

[Freeman’s] alleged protected activity,” the court found that Freeman could “rely 

on these acts to establish that he engaged in protected activity to support his 

retaliation claim.” Id. at 4. In summary, the court granted the motion as to Counts 

I, II, IV, and V, and denied the motion as to Counts III (retaliation) and VI

 3

 Freeman filed his EEOC charge on February 19, 2013. See doc. 1-1 at 3. The 180th 

day preceding that filing was August 24, 2012. Thus, any claims that occurred prior to that date 

are time-barred under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5-(e).

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(wrongful termination). Id. Freeman filed a motion for reconsideration, doc. 17, 

which the court denied, doc. 18. 

Freeman later filed a motion for leave to amend his pleadings, doc. 20, 

which the court granted, doc. 21. The second amended complaint sets forth the 

following claims: disparate treatment under the ADEA (Count I); retaliation 

(Count II); race discrimination under Title VII (Count III); wrongful termination 

under Title VII (Count IV); intentional deprivation of participation in an 

employment dispute resolution program under Title VII (Count V); and hostile 

work environment (Count VI). Doc. 22. The court addresses Marshall Durbin’s 

motion for summary judgment as to these claims, doc. 26, below.

III. ANALYSIS

Marshall Durbin correctly notes that the second amended complaint merely 

reiterates many of the claims this court previously dismissed. Doc. 29 at 4; see 

also doc. 12. Accordingly, the court will first address the timeliness of Freeman’s 

present claims. The court will then address the merits of any remaining claim(s).

A. Freeman’s Untimely Claims

Freeman concedes that the claims he asserts in the second amended 

complaint simply “reaffirm[]” claims this court previously dismissed (see doc. 12), 

with the exception of the fraud claim, which Freeman now recasts as a deprivation 

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of his right to arbitrate in violation of Title VII. See doc. 26-1 at 14.4 Indeed, 

Amended Count 1 restates previous Count 2, Amended Count 2 restates previous 

Count 3, and Amended Count 3 restates previous Count 4. See doc. 22 at 3–5. 

Amended Count 5 is a recast of previous Count 1, and states a new claim relating 

to his alleged deprivation of participation in Marshall Durbin’s arbitration 

program. See id. at 9–10. Finally, Amended Count 6, previous Count 5, restates 

and elaborates on his claim of a “hostile work environment.” See id. at 10.

As the court stated in its previous order of dismissal, these claims are 

untimely due to Freeman’s failure to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the 

events underlying those claims. See doc. 12 at 4. Moreover, even though Freeman 

has changed the legal vehicle through which he seeks recovery for the failure to 

allow him to arbitrate from common law fraud (old Count I) to Title VII (new 

Count V), the underlying events, which remain unchanged, still occurred prior to 

the 180-day cutoff of August 24, 2012. To get around the timeliness issue, 

Freeman argues that this “new” claim is not time-barred because Marshall 

Durbin’s arbitration policy “compelled [him] to remain bound by [that] agreement 

even after termination of employment.” Doc. 30 at 11 (emphasis added); see also

 4 When asked in deposition, “[w]hat claims do you think you bring in the [second] 

amended complaint,” Freeman responded: “I reaffirmed my original claim and altered the claim 

in regards to the company’s employment dispute program. I also brought — although I had 

presented it earlier, I don’t think I have filed it within the court about the hostile work 

environment.” Doc. 26-1 at 14.

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doc. 17 at 13, 16. This argument is unavailing, in part, because the record contains 

no evidence of actions or omissions by Marshall Durbin employees after 

Freeman’s request for arbitration forms in July of 2012 (such as giving Freeman 

the “run around” or directly refusing to give Freeman an arbitration form) that 

could support this claim. Moreover, the court cannot accept Freeman’s argument

that he can file an EEOC charge related to arbitration any time “after termination 

of employment,” as this period is too indefinite. Accordingly, Counts I, II, III, V, 

and VI are due to be dismissed as untimely.

B. Freeman’s Remaining Claim (Count IV)

The court turns next to the merits of Freeman’s sole remaining claim. In 

Count IV, Freeman states a Title VII claim regarding his termination. Because it is 

unclear whether Freeman is asserting racially discriminatory discharge or 

retaliatory discharge,5 the court will analyze the merits of both claims.

 5 Count IV states, in full:

The plaintiff contends that his discharge resulted from a racially discriminatory 

employment practice in violation of section 703(A)(1), Title Civil Rights Act of 

1964.

The defendants’ [sic] contends, however that the plaintiff’s employment 

was terminated because of his excessive absences. See, plaintiff’s exhibit ‘E’ 

(hand written attendance notification of the plaintiff provided by Ms. Bibiana 

Benson, Nightshift HR Supervisor).

To begin with, an accurate account of the plaintiff’s attendance record 

should have shown no more than four absences as of August 18th 2012. For 

example, the plaintiff’s pay was corrected for the absences listed on April 15th, 

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1. Racially discriminatory discharge

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “discharge any individual . . . 

because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Where, as here, Freeman is attempting to prove 

 

and April 23rd, 2012; and the tardiness listed on May 27th, 2012. See plaintiff’s 

exhibit ‘G’, pages 1–3.

In addition, the defendants’ attendance record credits the plaintiff with two 

(2) absences for June 19th, and June 20th, 2012, while under the same doctor’s 

slip.

Thus, after it was revealed that the plaintiff would be seeking more 

answers in regards to his having been deliberately by-passed for the 

promotional/job transfer opening of supply room clerk, through their arbitration 

system concerning employment resolutions, see plaintiff’s exhibit ‘A’; the 

plaintiff clearly became subjected to the arbitrary and capricious actions of the 

defendants’ [sic].

For when the plaintiff reported to work on August 21, 2012, with a 

doctor’s slip, he was forbidden to work because his doctor’s slip didn’t specify 

that he could work without restrictions. See, plaintiff’s exhibit ‘J’ at 3, 

(Attached). The plaintiff was sent home, by Ms. Biviana Benson. The same Ms. 

Benson, who allegedly lost the plaintiff’s application for promotion/transfer job 

opening for the supply room clerk. See defendants’ exhibit 1, page 1, lines 6–7.

When the plaintiff returned to work on August 22, 2012, with a doctors’ 

slip specifying that he could return to work “without any restrictions” he was 

again sent home by Ms. Benson, because his doctor’s slip did not cover August 

21, 2012. And until he was able to produce such a fraudulent excuse specifying 

that he was under a doctor’s care when he clearly was not, the plaintiff would be 

forbidden to work for the defendants’ [sic]. See, plaintiff’s exhibit ‘L’, pages 1–

2. The defendants’ insistence of this fraudulent doctor’s excuse was merely a ruse 

to cover-up their deliberate by-pass of the plaintiff’s request for the 

promotional/job transfer opening in the supply room. See, Wright v. West, 505 

U.S. 277, 296, Supreme Court (1992).

Doc. 22 at 5–8.

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intentional discrimination through circumstantial evidence,6 the court utilizes the 

McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), burden-shifting 

method of proof. Under this method, Freeman bears the burden of establishing a 

prima facie case of racial discrimination. See Burke-Fowler v. Orange County, 

Fla., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). If Freeman satisfies 

his initial burden, “then [Marshall Durbin] must show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action.” Id. (citation omitted). “If it 

does so, then [Freeman] must prove that the reason provided by [Marshall Durbin] 

is a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Id. (citation omitted). However, “[t]he 

ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that [Marshall Durbin] intentionally 

discriminated against [Freeman] remains at all times with [Freeman].” Springer v. 

Convergys Customer Mgmt. Group, Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007) 

(citation omitted).

a. Freeman cannot establish a prima facie case of race 

discrimination.

 6 The record contains no direct evidence of racial discrimination. When asked what 

Benson’s alleged manipulation of Freeman’s absentee points “[had] to do with [Freeman’s] 

race,” Freeman replied: “Well, you tell me what it has to do with it.” Defense counsel said, 

“I’m asking you.” Freeman replied: “I mean, why else would you do that?” Doc. 26-1 at 61. 

Later, when asked to identify the “racially discriminatory employment practice” Marshall Durbin 

engaged in with regard to his discharge, Freeman replied: “Yeah. Yeah. That I was terminated 

because I — I sought a promotion. And as a result of seeking that promotion, I was 

discriminated against further for — for seeking a second [i.e., meeting with Mark Dean and Alisa 

Hall] and third [requesting arbitration forms] resolution in regard to that. That’s my point.” Id. 

at 60.

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To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, Freeman must show 

that (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he 

was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) Marshall Durbin treated 

similarly situated employees outside of Freeman’s protected class more favorably. 

See Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008). Although Freeman 

can establish the first three elements, he cannot satisfy the fourth, as he has failed 

to identify any person outside of his protected class that Marshall Durbin failed to 

discharge who received more than 10 absence points.

b. Freeman’s claim also fails because he cannot rebut Marshall 

Durbin’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.

Alternatively, because “establishing the elements of the McDonnell Douglas 

framework is not, and never was intended to be, the sine qua non for a plaintiff to 

survive a summary judgment motion in an employment discrimination case, [and 

because] the plaintiff’s failure to produce a comparator does not necessarily doom 

the plaintiff’s case,” Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th 

Cir. 2011), the court will assume that Freeman can make a prima facie case. 

Therefore, the next step in the McDonnell Douglas framework is for Marshall 

Durbin to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Freeman’s 

discharge. See Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323. Marshall Durbin has met its 

burden through its contention that it discharged Freeman because of excessive 

absences. See Wills v. Postmaster Gen., 300 F. App’x 748, 752 (11th Cir. 2008) 

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(excessive absences are a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse 

employment action).

Consequently, the burden shifts to Freeman to prove that Marshall Durbin’s 

reason is pretext for unlawful race discrimination. See Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 

1323. Unfortunately, Freeman has failed to meet his burden. Even accepting as 

true Freeman’s assertion that he only accumulated 10 absentee points because 

Benson manufactured, or caused, some of the points in order to procure Freeman’s 

termination, Freeman’s claim fails for several reasons. First, as Freeman 

acknowledges, John Carden — not Benson — made the decision to discharge 

Freeman, see doc. 26-1 at 39, and Freeman has no reason to believe that Carden 

doubted the accuracy of the attendance records Benson presented to him, see id. at 

58. Second, even if Carden acted based on inaccurate attendance information that 

Benson created out of purported racial animus because, as Freeman puts it, “I 

mean, why else would [she] do that?,” doc. 26-1 at 61, Carden discharged Freeman 

pursuant to a good faith belief that Freeman had violated Marshall Durbin’s 

absenteeism policy. See Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 

1354, 1363 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1999) (“An employer who fires an employee under the 

mistaken but honest impression that the employee violated a work rule is not liable 

for discriminatory conduct.”); Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1540 (11th Cir. 

1989) (“The law is clear that, even if a Title VII claimant did not in fact commit 

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the violation with which he is charged, an employer successfully rebuts any prima 

facie case of disparate treatment by showing that it honestly believed the employee 

committed the violation.”); Smith v. Papp Clinic, P.A., 808 F.2d 1449, 1452–53 

(11th Cir. 1987) (“[I]f the employer fired an employee because it honestly believed 

that the employee had violated a company policy, even if it was mistaken in such 

belief, the discharge is not ‘because of race.’”). Third, Freeman has not presented 

any evidence that Carden “knew” or “suspected” that Benson had “manipulated” 

his absence points. Finally, Freeman must show more than just falsified 

attendance records because “[a] reason cannot be pretext for discrimination unless 

it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real 

reason,” Blue v. Dunn Constr. Co., Inc., 453 F. App’x 881, 884 (11th Cir. 2011) 

(emphasis in original). Unfortunately for Freeman, facts, rather than speculation or 

unfounded allegations that Carden must have acted because of Freeman’s race, are 

needed to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Cordoba v. Dillard’s, 419 

F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[U]nsupported speculation . . . does not meet a 

party’s burden of producing some defense to a summary judgment motion. 

Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact; instead, it creates a false issue, 

the demolition of which is a primary goal of summary judgment.”) (quoting 

Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 931–32 (7th Cir. 1995)) (ellipsis and 

emphasis in Cordoba, internal quotation marks omitted). Other than Freeman’s 

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own belief that race had to be the reason for his discharge, see supra note 6, the 

record simply contains no evidence of race discrimination.

In light of the foregoing, Marshall Durbin is entitled to summary judgment 

as to any claim of racially discriminatory discharge.

2. Retaliatory discharge

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Freeman must show that: (1) 

he engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) he suffered an adverse 

employment action; and (3) there is a causal relation between the two events. See 

Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting 

Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1021 (11th Cir. 1994)) (internal 

citations omitted). While Freeman unquestionably suffered an adverse 

employment action (termination), his claim fails because he did not engage in 

statutorily protected expression. The record is clear that Freeman complained 

about the decision not to select him for the supply room position, doc. 26-1 at 22,

and that he requested arbitration papers, id. at 43, presumably to challenge the 

decision. However, on both occasions, Freeman never mentioned discrimination. 

In fact, when he requested arbitration forms, Freeman never even suggested to 

Alisa Hall, Bibiana Benson, or any other person at Marshall Durbin that he 

believed discriminatory animus factored in the selection process. See id. at 17 (Q: 

“Did you tell Ms. Benson why you wanted an arbitration form? A: “No, I didn’t 

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tell her what I wanted it for.”); 43 (Q: “Did you tell Alisa Hall what claims you 

wanted to arbitrate?” A: “No. That wasn’t her business.”); id. (Q: “Did you tell 

Lynn Nolan what claims you wanted to arbitrate?” A: “That wasn’t her business.”); 

44 (Q: “Did you tell John Carden that you wanted to arbitrate?” A: “Nobody. I 

told nobody the claims I was going to arbitrate.”). Likewise, there is no evidence 

that Freeman suggested to Dean or Hall during the June 21, 2012 meeting that he 

believed race factored into the decision to select someone from outside the 

company for the supply room position. See also doc. 26-3 at 59–60 (“Admit . . . 

that you did not complain that race was a motivating factor in the decision to hire 

someone outside of the company” for the supply room position.”); 89–90 (“[N]o, I 

did not mention[] race.”). 

Freeman obviously had the right not to disclose why he wanted the 

arbitration forms or why he questioned the selection of an outside candidate 

instead of a current employee. However, in order to engage in statutorily protected 

activity, he must “oppos[e] any practice made an unlawful employment practice 

by” Title VII. EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000) 

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). Simply stating that a decision was unfair does 

not qualify, because “Title VII addresses discrimination . . . Title VII is not a 

shield against harsh treatment at the workplace . . . and an employer may fire an 

employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for 

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no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason.” Nix v. 

WLCY, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984) (quotations and citations omitted, 

emphasis in original).

Finally, even if the court found that Freeman’s request for arbitration papers 

or his questioning of the hiring decision is protected activity, his retaliation claim 

still fails because he has no evidence that the decision maker knew that he had 

engaged in such conduct. Specifically, John Carden, the supervisor who

discharged Freeman, doc. 26-1 at 39, was not present for Freeman’s June 21, 2012 

meeting with Mark Dean and Alisa Hall, id. at 42, and Freeman never told Carden 

he wished to arbitrate, id. at 44. Carden’s only involvement in Freeman’s 

termination was “simply his reliance on [the attendance points] information 

provided to him by Bibiana Benson.” Id. at 58. See McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 

1370, 1376 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 

590 (11th Cir. 2000)) (a retaliation claim “requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that 

‘the decision-maker[s] [were] aware of the protected conduct, and that the 

protected activity and the adverse action were not wholly unrelated’”) (alterations 

in original, some internal quotations omitted). In short, there is no evidence that 

Carden discharged Freeman in retaliation for any statutorily protected expression.

Accordingly, Marshall Durbin is entitled to summary judgment as to any 

claim of retaliatory discharge.

Case 2:15-cv-00136-AKK Document 33 Filed 10/20/16 Page 18 of 19
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IV. CONCLUSION

Because Counts I, II, III, V, and VI are time-barred, and because Count IV 

fails on the merits, Marshall Durbin’s motion for summary judgment is due to be 

granted, and Freeman’s claims dismissed with prejudice. The court will enter a 

separate order consistent with this opinion.

DONE the 20th day of October, 2016.

 

_________________________________

ABDUL K. KALLON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:15-cv-00136-AKK Document 33 Filed 10/20/16 Page 19 of 19