Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06556/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06556-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City Of Fresno
Defendant
Holly Louen
Plaintiff
Brian Twedt
Defendant

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOLLY LOUEN, ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

FRESNO POLICE OFFICER BRIAN )

TWEDT; THE CITY OF FRESNO, )

CALIFORNIA, )

 )

Defendants. )

)

) 

No. CV-F-04-6556 REC SMS

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S

RULING OF JANUARY 20, 2006. 

(Doc. 74)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR ABSTENTION

PENDING RESOLUTION OF

PARALLEL STATE COURT

ACTION. (Doc. 85)

On April 17, 2006, the Court heard Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s Ruling of January 20,

2006, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Abstention Pending Resolution of 

Parallel State Court Action. Upon due consideration of the

written and oral arguments of the parties and the record herein,

the Court DENIES the motions, as set forth herein. 

I. Background

A. Alleged Conduct

The facts as alleged in the Complaint are as follows. 

Plaintiff Holly Louen contends that Defendant Brian Twedt, an

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officer with the Fresno Police Department, has engaged in a

series of threatening and intimidating acts against her. At some

point prior to the alleged threats and intimidation, Plaintiff

lodged an internal affairs complaint against Mr. Twedt.

On March 7, 2004, Mr. Twedt followed Plaintiff’s vehicle on

his motorcycle, eventually passing her on a section of the road

that provided for one lane of traffic in that direction. On

March 16, 2004, Mr. Twedt, on his motorcycle, approached

Plaintiff and her mother, in front of the mother’s home, and

shined his headlights at them for several minutes while he revved

his engine. During both incidents, Mr. Twedt was wearing his

Fresno Police Department uniform and riding his department-issued

motorcycle.

Plaintiff also alleges that, while off-duty, Mr. Twedt

falsely reported that Plaintiff rear-ended his vehicle, verbally

assaulted Plaintiff at the gate of her residential community,

deliberately refused to proceed through an intersection on a

green light to impede Plaintiff and her husband, cut off

Plaintiff at the gate of her property, recklessly accelerated in

reverse out of his driveway while Plaintiff was present, and

prevented Plaintiff from parking at her son’s school. Plaintiff

alleges that policy of the City of Fresno (the “City”) ratified

Mr. Twedt’s misconduct. 

B. The State Court Action

On May 6, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Injunction

Prohibiting Civil Harassment in Fresno County Superior Court. On

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June 30, 2004, the court found after a trial that Plaintiff had,

by clear and convincing evidence, established the following: 

1. On February and March of 2003, Mr. Twedt attempted to annoy

Plaintiff by interfering with the movement of her vehicle.

2. On March 7, 2004, Mr. Twedt attempted to harass or annoy

Plaintiff by following her and passing her in a one lane

area on a police motorcycle.

3. On March 16, 2004, Mr. Twedt tried to annoy Plaintiff by

shining his police motorcycle lights in the direction of

Plaintiff and her mother for several minutes.

4. On March 26, 2004, Mr. Twedt impeded Mr. Louen, Plaintiff’s

husband, in a nearby intersection by sitting through an

entire green signal, then speeding through the yellow

signal, which prevented Mr. Louen from proceeding.

5. On April 27, 2004, Mr. Twedt impeded Plaintiff’s entry to

her neighborhood.

6. On April 30, 2004, Mr. Twedt impeded Plaintiff at an

intersection by sitting through an entire green signal and

speeding off through the yellow signal, which prevented

Plaintiff from entering the intersection on the green

signal. Minutes afterward, Mr. Twedt exited his vehicle and

walked “quickly and aggressively” toward Plaintiff’s

vehicle, which was stopped behind him. He then yelled at

Plaintiff, using “foul language.”

7. Mr. Twedt’s acts comprised a “knowing, willful course of

conduct” that annoyed and harassed Plaintiff and served no

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legitimate purpose.

Mot. for Abstention Ex. C (“Reporter’s Transcript” 3:3-5:7).

On January 7, 2005, Mr. Twedt appealed the trial court’s

decision to the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District. 

C. This Action

On November 15, 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint for

damages and declaratory relief in this Court. The Court referred

all appropriate pretrial matters in the case to Magistrate Judge

Sandra M. Snyder pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 636(b) and Local

Rules 72-302(c)(1) and 72-303. On November 4, 2005, the

Magistrate Judge ordered Plaintiff to undergo a mental

examination. This order was memorialized in a written order on

December 22, 2005. Pursuant to Plaintiffs’ request, the

Magistrate Judge permitted the proceedings to be tape recorded. 

Plaintiff did not ask to have counsel present during the

examination.

On December 2, 2005, the date for which the mental

examination was scheduled, Plaintiff’s counsel arrived with

Plaintiff at least fifteen minutes after the agreed-upon starting

time. Plaintiff’s counsel asked Dr. Harold L. Seymour, who was

scheduled to conduct the examination, to attempt to complete it

anyway. Dr. Seymour discovered that Plaintiff’s counsel intended

to be present for the examination. Dr. Seymour refused to

proceed with Plaintiff’s counsel present because doing so would

violate standards and practices of clinical interviewing. 

Plaintiff’s counsel refused to allow Plaintiff to undergo the

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examination without his presence.

On December 20, 2005, the City filed its Motion for

Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Court Order, based on

Plaintiff’s failure to undergo the examination as ordered. 

Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that neither she nor

Plaintiff’s counsel had violated any court order. At oral

argument on January 20, 2006, the Magistrate Judge imposed

sanctions in the amount of $2,500, stayed until the conclusion of

this case. The Magistrate Judge memorialized its findings in a

written order on February 24, 2006.

On January 28, 2006, Plaintiff filed its Objection to

Proposed Sanctions Order and Alternative Application for

Reconsideration of January 20, 2006 Ruling. The Magistrate Judge

deemed this to be a motion for reconsideration by the district

judge of a magistrate judge’s ruling pursuant to Rule 72(a) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 72-303(c). 

The City and Mr. Twedt opposed the Motion for Reconsideration. 

On March 14, 2006, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Abstention

Pending Resolution of Parallel State Court Action based on the

doctrines of Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United

States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S. Ct. 1236, 47 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1976). 

Both the City and Mr. Twedt also opposed the Motion for

Abstention.

II. Motion for Reconsideration

A. Standard of Review

According to Local Rule 72-303, a district judge upholds a

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magistrate’s ruling on a referred matter unless it is “clearly

erroneous or contrary to law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

The “clearly erroneous” standard applies to a magistrate

judge’s findings of fact. Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr.

Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 124

L. Ed. 2d 539 (1993). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when

although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing [body] on

the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed.” Id. at 622.

The “contrary to law” standard, on the other hand, allows

independent, plenary review of purely legal determinations by the

magistrate judge. FDIC v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 196

F.R.D. 375, 378 (S.D. Cal. 2000); Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc.,

975 F.2d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1992).

B. Magistrate Judge’s Imposition of Sanctions

Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge’s decision to

impose sanctions was contrary to law because the Magistrate Judge

had never issued an order prohibiting Plaintiff’s counsel to

attend the examination. Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate

Judge issued sanctions because Plaintiff’s counsel attended the

examination, but that no order of the Court or procedural law

prohibits his attendance. Defendants contend that Plaintiff was

sanctioned for failing to undergo the examination, not simply

because counsel attempted to attend. The Court agrees with

Defendants.

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Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a

court to sanction a party who “fails to obey an order to provide

or permit discovery, including an order made under . . . Rule 35,

. . . .” In her order of December 22, 2005, the Magistrate Judge

ordered that Plaintiff submit to the examination on December 2,

2005.

The ordered examination did not take place as scheduled. 

The reason the examination did not occur is that Plaintiff’s

counsel insisted on being present during the examination. It

appears that the first time Plaintiff’s counsel made known to

anyone that he intended to attend was when he and his client

arrived at the examination location, which was at least fifteen

minutes after the scheduled start time. Regardless of the merits

of Plaintiff’s contention that counsel did not violate an order

by showing up at the examination, it cannot be disputed that

Plaintiff failed to comply with the Magistrate Judge’s order that

the Plaintiff undergo the examination that day. 

The more apt question appears to be whether Plaintiff was

justified in failing to complete the examination according to the

Magistrate Judge’s order, given her counsel’s insistence that he

attend. The Magistrate Judge held that Plaintiff’s counsel had

the “responsibility to inform the Court that you intended to go

or to ask if you could go . . . .” Transcript of Oral Argument

at 17:3-4, 43:10-17 (“[I]t was your obligation to bring it up.”). 

The Magistrate Judge also took into account that Plaintiff and

Plaintiff’s counsel arrived at least fifteen minutes late. 

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Transcript of Oral Argument at 17:8-13. The Magistrate Judge

based her conclusion on Plaintiff’s counsel’s extensive

experience attending examinations (Transcript of Oral Argument at

43:18-20) and the weight of federal authority against the

practice (Transcript of Oral Argument at 14:3-7, 43:11-16). She

concluded that counsel should have known that leave of the court

was required.

Rule 35 is silent as to who may attend a mental examination. 

Tirado v. Erosa, 158 F.R.D. 294, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Though

district courts have granted requests that counsel attend

examinations, no court has held that a party has an absolute

right to have an attorney present. Id.; see Zabkowicz v. W. Bend

Co., 585 F. Supp. 635, 636 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (permitting attorney

to attend to ameliorate the risk that an “unsupervised

examination could easily be transformed into a de facto

deposition”). Plaintiff does not cite, nor is the Court aware

of, any authority permitting an attorney to attend an examination

in the absence of an affirmative court order to that effect. 

Holland v. United States, 182 F.R.D. 493, 495 (D.S.C. 1998) (“The

weight of federal authority, however, favors the exclusion of the

plaintiff's attorney from a Rule 35 examination absent a

compelling reason.”). Plaintiff asked for and received

permission to record the examination on audiotape. Plaintiff

never requested permission for counsel to attend and the

Magistrate Judge did not allow for his attendance.

The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly

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interpreted the federal law requirement that an attorney who

wishes to attend a Rule 35 examination may do so only on the

basis of a court’s order. Here, the Magistrate Judge ordered

that Plaintiff attend an examination and allowed only that the

examination be tape recorded. 

Given the Magistrate Judge’s correct interpretation of the

law, her finding that Plaintiff violated this order by failing to

attend the examination at the prescribed date and time was not

clearly erroneous. The Magistrate Judge found, based on

Plaintiff’s counsel’s experience with this type of cases, that he

had a responsibility to inform the Court of his intent to attend. 

Plaintiff’s counsel’s eleventh-hour request to attend, followed

by his refusal to allow the examination to proceed, violated the

Magistrate Judge’s order that Plaintiff submit to the

examination. Accordingly, sanctions under Rule 37 are

appropriate. 

C. Scope of Examination

Plaintiff takes issue with the Magistrate Judge’s order 

that Plaintiff appear for an Independent Mental Examination

(“IME”). Plaintiff objects on the ground that the original order

of December 22, 2005, called only for a “question and answer

session,” not a full-day examination. Order re: Independent

Medical Examination 2:15-16. Plaintiff argues that the scope of

the examination was not “before the Court” on January 20, 2006,

when the Magistrate Judge ordered the more-thorough IME. The

Magistrate Judge, Plaintiff argues, in ordering the IME, levied a

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discovery sanction that exceeded her powers under Rule 37 and

violated Plaintiff’s due process rights.

Under Rule 35, a court may order a person to undergo a

mental examination when a mental condition is “in controversy”

but “only on motion for good cause shown.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

35(a). These predicates

are not met by mere conclusory allegations of

the pleadings – nor by mere relevance to the

case – but require an affirmative showing by

the movant that each condition as to which

the examination is sought is really and

genuinely in controversy and that good cause

exists for ordering each particular

examination.

Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 118, 85 S. Ct. 234, 13 L.

Ed. 2d 152 (1964)).

In its motion for sanctions, Plaintiff requested that the

Magistrate Judge order Plaintiff to submit to a full-day IME,

including a “diagnostic interview with psychosocial history, a

[Personality Assessment Inventory] and a memory performance

test.” Mot. for Sanctions 6:12-14. In its opposition to the

motion, Plaintiff argued against the expanded battery of tests. 

Opp’n to Mot. for Sanctions 6:4-22.

At oral argument on the motion for sanctions, the Magistrate

Judge explained her reasons for ordering the expanded IME. The

Magistrate Judge reviewed Plaintiff’s deposition testimony,

finding that Plaintiff’s accounts of her level of mental distress

varied from answer to answer. Transcript of Oral Argument at

36:8-37:18. The Magistrate Judge noted that at one point in her

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deposition Plaintiff said the level of stress that she feels

today is “heightened” compared to how she felt in 2000. 

Transcript of Oral Argument at 37:2-7. The Magistrate Judge

pointed out that in response to another question, Plaintiff

stated that the stress has now lessened. Transcript of Oral

Argument at 37:10-13. 

The Magistrate Judge also stated that she accepts Dr.

Seymour’s opinion in his letter of December 5, 2005, regarding

the best manner in which to proceed with a future mental

examination. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38:21-25; see

Weakley Decl. in Supp. of Mot. for Sanctions Ex. E. This letter

was not before the Magistrate Judge when she initially ordered

the examination. The Magistrate Judge also found that the stress

that Plaintiff might face in undergoing the IME would not be

excessive. Transcript of Oral Argument at 39:6-10.

At no point during oral argument or in the subsequent

written order did the Magistrate Judge indicate that she ordered

the IME as a discovery sanction or otherwise to punish Plaintiff. 

Rather, the Magistrate Judge reviewed intervening circumstances

and evidence that had come to light since she ordered the initial

examination. The Magistrate Judge properly decided “on motion

for good cause shown” that a full-day IME was proper under Rule

35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court finds that

in ordering the IME the Magistrate Judge has not acted in a

manner contrary to law and has not made findings that are clearly

erroneous.

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“‘The Colorado River doctrine is not technically an 1

abstention doctrine,’ Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 867 n. 4 (9th

Cir. 2002); therefore, a district court’s decision declining to

exercise federal jurisdiction pursuant to Colorado River is more

properly referred to as a stay or dismissal, as the case may be.”

Smith v. Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist., 418 F.3d 1028, 1032

(9th Cir. 2005).

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III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Abstention/Colorado River Stay1

Plaintiff asks the Court to stay its proceedings pending a

resolution of the pending state court appeal. In Colorado River

Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.

Ct. 1236, 47 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1976), the Supreme Court enunciated a

theory by which federal courts could refuse to exercise their

jurisdiction based on “considerations of ‘wise judicial

administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial

resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.’” Id. at

817. Federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation

. . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” Id. Because of

this obligation, a federal court may decline to hear cases under

its jurisdiction “‘only in the exceptional circumstances where

the order to the parties to repair to the State court would

clearly serve an important countervailing interest.’” Moses H.

Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 14, 103 S.

Ct. 927, 74 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1983) (quoting Colorado River, 424

U.S. at 813). 

A stay under Colorado River is only appropriate where a

parallel state proceeding exists that is “substantially similar”

to the federal action. Nakash v. Marciano, 882 F.2d 1411, 1416

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(9th Cir. 1989). A district court abuses its discretion if it

grants a stay under Colorado River and “there is any substantial

doubt” as to whether “the parallel state proceeding will end the

litigation.” Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 12 F.3d 908,

913 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 428)

(Ninth Circuit’s emphasis). This rule stems from the Supreme

Court’s “concern for the prompt and final resolution of all

disputed issues.” Id. (citing Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.

Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 277, 108 S. Ct. 1133, 99 L. Ed. 2d

296 (1988)). In Intel, the Ninth Circuit held that the district

court abused its discretion by staying the federal action because

the state action would only resolve all of the issues in the

federal action if certain contingencies materialized. Id. If,

for instance, the state court in that case were to overturn an

arbitration award at issue, then the case would necessarily

return to federal court. Id.

Here, the state case is substantially different from this

case. It is true that central facts are similar: both cases

involve Mr. Twedt’s alleged harassment of Plaintiff. The parties

and the claims in the two cases, however, are different. In the

state court action, Plaintiff sought only injunctive relief under

California’s civil harassment statute, Civil Procedure Code

section 527.6. Mot. for Abstention Ex. B at 1. The only

Defendant in that action is Mr. Twedt. Id. On the other hand,

this case is a federal civil rights action, combined with statelaw tort claims, in which Plaintiff requests damages and

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declaratory relief. Furthermore, Plaintiff is now suing the

City, which was not involved in the state action, along with Mr.

Twedt. Plaintiff does not contend that the state case will

necessarily resolve all of the claims in this case. Rather, she

concedes that the federal civil rights claims in this case, as

well as the presence of another Defendant, will create a host of

unique issues. Plaintiff admits that, if the state court verdict

is affirmed, this Court will only have to determine “issues of

color of law, municipal liability, and damages” resulting in a

trial that “could easily be only a third as lengthy as presently

estimated.” Mot. for Abstention 5:16-19. Because the state

trial court has already decided in Plaintiff’s favor, there is a

substantial possibility that Plaintiff will prevail,

necessitating further proceedings in this Court. Plaintiff has

not addressed whether a state court finding in Mr. Twedt’s favor

would terminate this litigation. In any event, because

substantial doubt exists as to whether resolution of the state

court suit will resolve all of the issues of the federal suit,

stay under Colorado River is inappropriate.

IV. Stay of Declaratory Relief Claims under Brillhart

Plaintiff argues that, because this case contains claims for

declaratory relief, a stay is proper under the principle

enunciated in Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 62 S.

Ct. 1173, 86 L. Ed. 1620 (1942). “[W]hen a party requests

declaratory relief in federal court and a suit is pending in

state court presenting the same state law issues, there exists a

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presumption that the entire suit should be heard in state court.” 

Chamberlain v. Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 1361, 1366-67 (9th

Cir. 1991) (citing Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495). The Ninth

Circuit has interpreted the Supreme Court’s holding as follows:

The pendency of a state court action,

however, does not of itself require a

district court to refuse declaratory relief

in federal court. In deciding whether to

grant such relief in a particular case, the

Supreme Court has counseled district courts

to 

ascertain whether the questions in

controversy between the parties to

the federal suit, and which are not

foreclosed under the applicable

substantive law, can better be

settled in the proceeding pending

in the state court. This may

entail inquiry into the scope of

the pending state court proceeding

and the nature of defenses open

there. The federal court may have

to consider whether the claims of

all parties in interest can

satisfactorily be adjudicated in

that proceeding, whether necessary

parties have been joined, whether

such parties are amenable to

process in that proceeding, etc.

Chamberlain v. Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir.

1991) (quoting Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495).

It is readily apparent to the Court that this case is as

poor a candidate for a stay under Brillhart as it is for a

Colorado River stay. This is so because the parties and

substantive law at issue in the state and federal cases are

different, and at best, the state case can only partially resolve

the claims in the federal case.

In any event, the Brillhart rationale would only support a

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stay of the declaratory relief claims, not the claims for money

damages. Chamberlain, 931 F.2d at 1367. A district court does

not abuse its discretion when it retains a declaratory relief

cause of action, along with claims for money damages, to avoid

piecemeal litigation. Id. at 1367-68. Regardless of whether the

Court were to stay on this ground, a large portion of the case —

the claims for damages — would remain in federal court. Thus,

avoidance of piecemeal litigation counsels against staying the

claims for declaratory relief pending the resolution of the state

case. The Court declines to stay this case under Brillhart.

ACCORDINGLY:

1. Plaintiff is sanctioned $2,500.00 for failure to comply with

a court order.

2. The sanctions are stayed until the conclusion of this case.

3. As soon as is practicable, Plaintiff shall appear for an

Independent Mental Examination with Dr. Harold L. Seymour.

4. The parties shall either stipulate to a date and time for

the examination or arrange a scheduling conference with

Magistrate Judge Snyder to do so. 

5. The examination will be audio-recorded.

6. No third party, including counsel, may attend the

examination.

7. Plaintiff’s Motion for Abstention Pending Resolution of

Parallel State Court Action is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 18, 2006 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

810ha4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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