Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01301/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01301-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tri-Dam
Plaintiff
Randall Yick
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRI-DAM,

Plaintiff,

v.

RANDAL YICK,

Defendant.

1:11–CV–01301–AWI–SMS

ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

(DOCS. 36, 38)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Tri-Dam (“Tri-Dam”) and defendant Randal Yick (erroneously sued as Randall 

Yick) (“Yick”) have filed competing motions for summary judgment. For reasons discussed 

below, both Tri-Dam‟s and Yick‟s motions shall be denied.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are undisputed. Tulloch Reservoir, more commonly known as Lake 

Tulloch, is a man-made reservoir located near the city of Copperopolis, California. It is part of 

Hydroelectric Project No. 2067, known as the Tulloch Project. The Tulloch Project, a water 

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supply/power project constructed in the 1950s, is located along the Stanislaus River, mostly on 

private land in Tuolumne and Calaveras Counties. The Tulloch Project includes Tulloch Dam 

and Reservoir, Tulloch Penstock, Tulloch Powerhouse and Tulloch Switchyard. New Melones 

Reservoir, a part of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation‟s Central Valley Project, discharges directly 

into Tulloch Reservoir. Downstream of Tulloch Reservoir is Goodwin Dam, a diversion dam by 

which the Oakdale Irrigation District, South San Joaquin Irrigation District and Stock East Water 

District divert water to their respective districts. The reservoir has a normal maximum water 

surface elevation of 510 feet.

Tri-Dam, a cooperative venture of the Oakdale and South San Joaquin Irrigation 

Districts, owns and operates the Tulloch Project under a license issued by the Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission (FERC). FERC requires each licensee to obtain control over all lands 

needed for the operation and maintenance of a hydroelectric project and other project purposes, 

such as flowage, shoreline control and protection of environmental resources. Tri-Dam received 

an initial license from FERC‟s predecessor to construct and operate the Tulloch Project effective 

January 1, 1955, for a term ending December 31, 2004. Article 39 of this license gave Tri-Dam 

permission, with prior approval of FERC, for use of lands within the area defined as the “FERC 

Project Boundary.” For the Tulloch Project, this boundary encompasses an area of approximately 

1,619 acres and includes all land within a 515-feet elevation contour (five feet above the normal 

maximum water surface elevation) surrounding Tulloch Reservoir. Sixty-one percent of land 

within the FERC Project Boundary is privately owned, twenty-six percent of the land is owned 

by the Oakdale and South San Joaquin Irrigation Districts and twelve percent is owned either by 

the state or federal governments.

In 1993, Randal Yick purchased the real property at 6204 Bluffview Court in the Connor 

Estates development of Copperopolis (95228), originally described as Lot 49 of Connor Estates, 

Tract 479, Phase I, according to the official map filed for record on March 26, 1992, in Book 6, 

page 67 of the Subdivision Maps of the Calaveras County Records. Lot 49 is located on the 

waterfront of Tulloch Reservoir. At the time of Yick‟s purchase, the lot included a T-shaped 

floating dock that protruded partially into neighboring Lot 48, which was not (and has never 

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been) owned by Yick. In 1994 the developer installed a ramp between the seawall leading to the 

dock and the dock itself, extending the dock further into Tulloch Reservoir and Lot 48. The dock 

is below the 515-feet elevation contour surrounding Tulloch Reservoir and therefore within the 

FERC Project Boundary.

Lot 48 was purchased by Dennis and Elizabeth Moody, who sold the lot to Susan Larson 

(née Servidio) in 2002. Yick eventually brought an action against Larson in California superior 

court claiming adverse possession and prescriptive and implied easements to the portion of Lot 

48 over which his dock was positioned. Yick v. Larson, 2010 WL 19696 (Cal.App. 3 Dist. 2010) 

(unpublished), at *1. Following a bench trial, the superior court found against Yick on the 

adverse possession and prescriptive easement claims, but awarded Yick an implied easement to 

Lot 48. However, the court restricted the easement to the area underlying the dock when it was 

attached to the seawall and not as extended by the ramp. The court further refused to enjoin 

Larson‟s use of her own dock, as Yick requested, concluding Yick failed to prove Larson‟s dock 

interfered with the use of his dock. Id. at *2. Yick appealed and the Third District Court of 

Appeal affirmed. Id. at *2-*9.

In 2002, Tri-Dam developed Tulloch Reservoir‟s most current Shoreline Management 

Plan (“SMP”) in anticipation of obtaining a new license for the Tulloch Project. Observing the 

FERC license required Tri-Dam to obtain FERC approval for (1) actions that would in any way 

reduce the storage capacity of Tulloch Reservoir and (2) use of lands within the FERC Project 

Boundary, the SMP recognized there was considerable public interest for development of the 

Tulloch Reservoir shoreline and that some of this development could conceivably have only 

minor impacts on reservoir storage or project operations. Accordingly, the SMP expressed TriDam‟s need to approach FERC for general approval of minor development activities to facilitate 

such activities within the Project Boundary and avoid the need to obtain FERC approval for 

every individual development activity.

The SMP described the minor development activities for which Tri-Dam had requested 

FERC‟s approval. These activities encompassed, as relevant here, a “private facilities program,” 

which provided in pertinent part that (1) all parties desiring to construct, expand or rebuild a 

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private single family facility (including dock structures) within the FERC Project Boundary must 

obtain authorization from Tri-Dam prior to the initiation of excavation or construction and (2) all 

facilities must be constructed on the party‟s deeded waterfront lot for the purpose of providing 

private access for occupants of single family-type dwellings. The SMP also outlined an 

“encroachment” permitting scheme through which parties could apply for – and Tri-Dam would 

issue – permits authorizing a particular use or facility within the FERC Project Boundary. 

According to the SMP, all proposed development activities are subject to the requirement of 

obtaining an encroachment permit from Tri- Dam, and as a condition of obtaining an 

encroachment permit, facilities, including private facilities, must be fully contained within an 

applicant‟s property lines and may not cross private property lines.

On December 23, 2002, Tri-Dam filed an application with FERC for a new license, 

pursuant to sections 4(e) and 15 of the Federal Power Act (FPA, 16 U.S.C §§ 791 et seq.), to 

continue operation and maintenance of the Tulloch Project; the SMP was included as an exhibit 

to the new license application. On February 16, 2006, FERC issued a new license to Tri-Dam for 

a period of 39 years, 11 months subject to the terms and conditions of the FPA, which was 

incorporated into the license by reference. (Between 2004 and 2006, Tri-Dam operated the 

Tulloch Project under an annual license pending the disposition of its new license application.) 

Article 411 of this license approves the SMP. Article 413 gives Tri-Dam the authority to grant 

permission for certain uses and occupancies of project lands and waters, including noncommercial piers, landings and boat docks, without prior FERC approval, and continuing 

responsibility to supervise and control the uses and occupancies for which it grants permission. If 

a permitted use or occupancy violates any condition imposed by the license or by Tri-Dam, 

article 413 further gives Tri-Dam authority to take any lawful action necessary to correct the 

violation, including canceling the permission to use and occupy the project lands and waters and 

requiring the removal of any non-complying structures and facilities.

Tri-Dam filed this action against Yick on August 5, 2011. On September 9, 2011, TriDam filed its first amended complaint against Yick for violations of the FPA, FERC regulations 

and the SMP, seeking a permanent injunction prohibiting Yick from installing, possessing, or 

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maintaining property within the Tri-Dam Project Boundary (1) without seeking prior approval 

and obtaining a permit from Tri-Dam and (2) that is not in compliance with a permit obtained 

from Tri-Dam. Tri-Dam also sought an injunction requiring Yick to submit plans to Tri-Dam for 

removal of property installed without approval of Tri-Dam. On December 7, 2012, Tri-Dam and

Yick filed competing motions for summary judgments. On January 8, 2013, Tri-Dam filed its 

opposition to Yick‟s motion for summary judgment. Yick did not file an opposition to Tri-Dam‟s 

motion for summary judgment.

On February 26, 2013, this Court denied both motions for summary judgment but 

allowed the parties to file a second motion for summary judgment, requesting further briefing on 

issues including whether the superior court‟s grant of an implied easement to Yick over a portion 

of Lot 48 does or does no collaterally estop Tri-Dam from asserting rights to the same property, 

the effect of the parties‟ conflicting easements, and how the conflict, if any should be resolved. 

On March 24, 2013, Yick filed a second motion for summary judgment, and on March 29, 2013 

Tri-Dam filed a second motion for summary judgment along with a request for judicial notice. 

Yick filed an opposition to Tri-Dam‟s second motion on April 5, 2013. Tri-Dam filed an 

opposition to Yick‟s second motion on April 12, 2013. Yick replied to Tri-Dam‟s opposition on 

April 16, 2013. On April 19, 2013 Tri-Dam replied to Yick‟s opposition.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense – or the 

part of each claim or defense – on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant 

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving 

party bears the initial burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and 

identifying those portions of „the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,‟ which it believes demonstrate the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 

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S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “Where the non-moving 

party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only prove that there is an absence 

of evidence to support the non-moving party‟s case.” In re Oracle Corp. Securities Litigation, 

627 F.3d 376, 387 (2010) (citing Celotex, supra, at p. 325). If the moving party meets its initial 

burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to present evidence establishing the existence 

of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538. A court ruling on a motion 

for summary judgment must construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 

L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

IV. DISCUSSION

Tri-Dam has filed suit in federal court. However, the court will apply California state

property law to the issues presented. “[F]ederal courts, as a general rule, follow state law rather 

than federal law in resolving real property disputes.” Cortese v. US, 782 F. 2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 

1986). State law is used to resolve property disputes when issues such as interpretation of an 

easement arise. US v. Park, 536 F. 3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008). The issues raised in Tri-Dam‟s 

motion for summary judgment will first be discussed, and then the issues raised by Yick‟s 

motion for summary judgment will be considered.

A. Tri-Dam’s Arguments for Summary Judgment.

In Tri-Dam‟s second motion for summary judgment, Tri-Dam alleges that the 

adjudication of the property dispute between neighbors Yick and Larson does not collaterally 

estop Tri-Dam from enforcing its FERC license against Yick, Tri-Dam‟s permanent flowage 

easements give it the right to remove Yick‟s dock from the Project Boundary, and that Tri-Dam‟s 

earlier flowage easements are superior to Yick‟s implied easement. 

1. Tri-Dam’s claim of a right to require removal of Yick’s dock.

Tri-Dam contends it has the right to require Yick to remove his dock because the dock is 

below the 515 foot elevation contour of the Project Boundary, and is subject to the rules and 

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requirements of the SMP. Tri-Dam bases this right on two flowage easements it was granted 

prior to obtaining its first license. The easements, obtained in 1956 and 1957, grant Tri-Dam 

“Permanent easement rights. . . for the following uses and purposes:

(a) The right to permanently overflow, flood, and cover said hereinafter designated land with 

the flood, slack, or backwater created by the construction and operation of the Tulloch 

Dam across the Stanislaus River;

(b) The right to enter upon said land from time to time and clear, destroy, or dispose of any 

timber or other natural growth, and any obstructions, accumulations, trash, filth, and any 

other thing which would in any way interfere with the use of said reservoir, or the waters 

therein, or tend to render unsafe or unsanitary either the reservoir created by said Dam or 

the margin thereof;

(c) The right to ingress and egress from said lands for the purposes of aforesaid.”

See Exhibits A and B of Plaintiff‟s Request for Judicial Notice.

The extent of an easement “is determined by the terms of the grant, or the nature of the 

enjoyment by which it was acquired.” Cal. Civ. Code, §806. With an express easement, as in 

this case, the only interests that are transferred from the grantor to the grantee are the interests 

expressed in the grant and those necessarily incident to the interests. Pasadena v. CaliforniaMichigan Land & Water Co., 17 Cal. 2d 576, 579 (1941). Pasadena further held that a servient 

tenement could make any use of the land so long as that use does not unreasonably interfere with 

the easement. Id. at 579. Certain uses of lands that are restricted by easements are deemed to be

an unreasonable interference with the land, as a matter of law. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric 

Co. v. Hacienda Mobile Home Park, 45 Cal. App. 3d 519, 528 (1st Dist. 1975). Otherwise, the 

question of whether a particular use of the land by a servient owner constitutes unreasonable 

interference is generally a question of fact to be decided by the jury. Pasadena, 17 Cal. 2d 576, 

579. 

In this case, Tri-Dam has failed to present any evidence to suggest its easements give it 

the far reaching right to require Yick to remove his dock. Tri-Dam asserts Yick‟s dock is “an 

obstruction . . . or any other thing which would in any way interfere with the use of said 

reservoir, or the water therein . . ..” See Tri-Dam‟s second motion for summary judgment 12:2-3.

While this may be true of Yick‟s dock, Tri-Dam has not presented evidence that Yick‟s dock is 

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an “obstruction” or that the dock interferes, let alone unreasonably interferes, with the use of the 

reservoir.

Under these circumstances, Tri-Dam‟s second motion for summary judgment must be 

denied.

2. Tri-Dam’s claim that its flowage easements are superior to Yick’s implied 

easement.

Tri-Dam further claims that when there are two competing easements, the prior easement 

must prevail. This rule, however, requires context. The court in Pasadena addressed the issue of 

competing easements to a five foot wide strip of land occupied by underground water pipes. The 

court held that when two concurrent easements exist, the rights of the parties holding the 

easements are not absolute, but must be construed to allow reasonable enjoyment of both 

interests so long as it is possible. Pasadena, 17 Cal. 2d 576, 583. The court held that where 

reasonable use of the prior easement calls for the space occupied by the second easement, the 

paramount right prevails only when the two easements can no longer exist in harmony. Id, at

582. Additionally, Pasadena relied on Murphy Chair Co. v. American Radiator Co., which held 

that easements on the same land could both be used simultaneously, but the subsequent grant is 

subordinate if it interferes with the reasonable use of the prior easement. Murphy Chair Co. v. 

American Radiator Co., 172 Mich. 14, 28 (1912).

Tri-Dam has presented evidence that its easements were recorded prior to the granting of 

Yick‟s easements, showing that its easement is first and Yick‟s is subsequent. Tri-Dam showed 

that the first flowage easement obtained from the Mitchell family was recorded on October 8, 

1956 in Calaveras County, and that the second easement, obtained from Sanguinetti, was 

recorded on November 18, 1957 in Calaveras County. Yick showed that his easement was 

created on April 21, 2008, several decades after Tri-Dam‟s flowage easements had been 

recorded. If the two easements ever conflicted, Tri-Dam‟s easement rights would be paramount. 

However, Tri-Dam has not presented evidence that its easements require Yick‟s dock to be 

removed. Again, there is no evidence that Tri-Dam‟s reasonable use of its easement requires 

Yick to remove his dock or stop use of his easement. There is also no evidence that Yick‟s dock 

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unreasonably interferes with Tri-Dam‟s easements. Based on the forgoing, Tri-Dam‟s second 

motion for summary judgment cannot be granted.

B. Yick’s argument for summary judgment.

The only triable issue alleged in Yick‟s second motion for summary judgment is the issue 

of collateral estoppel. Yick alleges that his prior lawsuit against Larson in 2008 bars Tri-Dam 

from litigating this case. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, when an issue or fact of law 

has been previously decided and that fact or issue was necessary to the judgment, the prior 

decision may prevent relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a 

party to the first case. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). “The elements of . . . collateral 

estoppel are the same in California and federal courts.” Contasti v. City of Solana Beach, 2006 

WL 4109207 (S.D. Cal. 2012). In California, collateral estoppel requires proof of three 

elements. These elements include:

(1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous proceeding is identical to the 

one which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the previous proceeding resulted in a 

final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom collateral 

estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the prior 

proceeding.

Rodgers v. Sargent Controls & Aerospace, 136 Cal. App. 4th 82, 90 (1st Dist. 2006).

Yick argues that all issues regarding his dock and its protrusion over Lot 48 have already 

been decided in the state court case of Yick v. Larson. In that case, the court granted Yick an 

implied easement over Lot 48 and did not order removal of the entire dock, which Larson had 

sought. Yick now contends that this case is relitigating essentially the same issues. Tri-Dam, on 

the other hand, argues that the issue in the state action was to seek title or an easement over Lot 

48, which is a property right, and asserts that this action is to enforce the SMP and its prior 

easements over Yick‟s land. Yick has not shown that the issues in the state claim and this claim 

are identical.

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The Court agrees with Tri-Dam. Because the issues in the state action and this action are

not identical, Yick‟s collateral estoppel argument must fail and his second motion for summary 

judgment must be denied.

V. DISPOSITION

Based on the forgoing, the motion of plaintiff Tri-Dam for summary judgment is 

DENIED. The motion of defendant Yick for summary judgment is DENIED. The Court refers 

the case to the Magistrate Judge for a trial-setting conference.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 7, 2013 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE DEAC_Signature-END:

0m8i788

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