Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07194/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07194-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Continental Casualty Company
Appellant
Hartford Fire Insurance Company
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 11, 1997 Decided July 1, 1997 

No. 96-7194

CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY,

APPELLANT

v.

HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 94cv02335)

William D. Hopkins argued the cause for appellant, with 

whom Sean M. Hanifin, and James M. Lichtman were on 

the briefs.

William J. Bowman argued the cause for appellee, with 

whom David G. Leitch and James P. Ruggeri were on the 

brief.

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Before: SILBERMAN, RANDOLPH and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: In this insurance coverage dispute, 

Continental Casualty Company ("Continental") seeks to recoup from Hartford Fire Insurance Company ("Hartford") a 

portion of a settlement of a medical malpractice lawsuit 

against The Yater Medical Group and Dr. Howard Smith 

which were insured by the two companies during consecutive 

time periods. The district court granted summary judgment 

for Hartford upon concluding that no reasonable jury could 

find that the proximate cause of Dr. Smith's decision to 

deliver a baby prematurely was testing performed when 

Hartford's insurance policy was in effect. Continental contends that the district court ignored substantial evidence 

showing that negligence occurring during Hartford's policy 

period substantially contributed to the doctor's decision to 

deliver the baby prematurely, and failed to recognize that 

such negligence could, and in fact did, constitute a concurrent 

proximate cause of the injuries. We agree, and accordingly 

reverse and remand the case to the district court to determine the proper apportionment of liability for the settlement.

I.

Both Continental and Hartford issued medical malpractice 

policies to The Yater Medical Group ("Yater"), for which Dr. 

Howard Smith, an obstetrician, was a named insured. The 

policies covered consecutive periods of time and included 

different exposure provisions as well as different "other insurance" provisions. Continental issued both a primary policy 

and a separate excess policy for the period of January 1, 1981, 

to January 1, 1982. The primary policy limited coverage to 

$1 million per claim and $1 million in the aggregate for Yater 

and its insured physicians. The primary policy provided that 

Continental would

pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured 

shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because 

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1 The "other insurance" provision in Continental's excess policy 

provided that:

If, with respect to a loss covered hereunder, the insured has 

other insurance, whether on a primary, excess, or contingent 

basis, there shall be no insurance afforded hereunder as respects such loss; provided that if the applicable limit of liability 

of this policy is greater than the applicable limit of liability 

provided by the other insurance this policy shall afford excess 

insurance over and above such other insurance in an amount 

sufficient to give the insured, as respects the layer of coverage 

afforded by this policy, a total limit of liability equal to the 

applicable limit of liability afforded by this policy.

2 Hartford's "other insurance" provision provided:

If the Insured has other insurance against a loss covered by 

this policy, the company shall not be liable under this policy for 

of ... [i]njury arising out of the rendering or of failure to 

render, during the policy period, professional services....

(emphasis added). It did not contain an "other insurance" 

provision. The excess policy, however, which provided $10 

million coverage jointly to Yater and Dr. Smith over the 

limits of the primary policy, contained an "other insurance" 

provision that denied coverage if the insured had other insurance to cover a loss.1

Hartford's policy covered the eight-month period from May 

1, 1980, to January 1, 1981, which immediately preceded the 

Continental policy period. The limit of liability under Hartford's policy was $2 million for each medical incident and $2 

million in the aggregate. Hartford's policy provided that 

Hartford would pay on behalf of the insured

[a]ll sums which the insured shall become legally obligated 

to pay as damages because of injury, to which this insurance applies, to any person caused by a medical incident

which occurs during the policy period....

(emphasis added). The policy defined the term "medical 

incident" as "any act or omission in the furnishing of professional or dental services to any person...." Its "other 

insurance" provision included a pro rata limitation.2

The instant insurance coverage litigation arises from a 

medical malpractice action brought by Tracina Woods and her 

parents against Yater and Dr. Howard Smith, the obstetrician 

who delivered Tracina by cesarean section on February 19, 

1981, after monitoring her development in utero from the 

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a greater proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of

liability stated in the declaration bears to the total applicable 

limit of liability of all valid and collectible insurance against

such loss.

3 The Woods also sued the Washington Hospital Center, but 

later dropped the hospital as a defendant. 

4 Dr. Smith had placed Continental on notice years earlier 

when he first received a request for Mrs. Woods' medical records. 

early months of Mrs. Woods' pregnancy.3 The Woods alleged 

in their complaint that Dr. Smith had negligently delivered 

their baby prematurely and that, as a result, she had developed serious and permanent injuries, including cerebral palsy, 

spastic diplegia, and brain damage. The complaint also alleged that during his care and treatment of Mrs. Woods and 

the baby, Dr. Smith failed to take a thorough medical history, 

to conduct appropriate and careful physical examinations, to 

utilize appropriate laboratory and ancillary procedures, and to 

interpret accurately physical examinations and findings.

Shortly after the Woods filed their complaint, Yater gave 

notice of the action to Hartford. In response, Hartford 

informed Yater that it would join with Continental in providing a defense.4 Acknowledging that the Woods "may be able 

to tie in both liability and causation" during Hartford's policy 

period, Hartford agreed with Continental to pay 50% of the 

defense costs. Hartford also stated that if after the Woods' 

experts were deposed the Woods were "unable to tie in both 

liability and causation during [its] period of coverage," Hartford would "withdraw from paying any additional attorneys 

fees and related expenses and of course [would] not indemnify."

The undisputed evidence produced during discovery 

showed that Dr. Smith first saw Mrs. Woods as a patient on 

September 8, 1980. At that time, he confirmed that she was 

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5 Accordingly to Dr. Smith, an IUGR diagnosis signifies that 

the fetus is smaller than normal for its gestational age. It follows, 

as Continental explains, that in order to reach an IUGR diagnosis, a 

physician must estimate the age of the fetus; otherwise, there 

would be no "baseline" against which to compare the size of the 

fetus. 

6 Estriol is an estrogenic metabolite of estriodol, made by the 

fetus and the placenta, that is secreted into the blood. As gestational age increases, estriol levels should increase. The levels are 

measured in terms of nanograms per milliliter (NG/ML); a nanogram equals one billionth of a gram. 

pregnant and recorded her last menstrual period as May 2, 

1980, a date suggesting that the fetus was at least seventeen 

weeks old. Based on a pelvic examination, however, Dr. 

Smith found the size of the uterus to be consistent with a 12-

week fetus. Because Dr. Smith was unsure of Mrs. Woods' 

date of conception, he ordered a sonogram. The sonogram, 

which was performed two days later, indicated that the fetus 

was approximately six weeks old. The discrepancy between 

Mrs. Woods' menstrual period and the sonogram led Dr. 

Smith to have "concerns" about the pregnancy, particularly 

that Mrs. Woods was "small for [the] dates" and the fetus 

thus might suffer from Intrauterine Growth Retardation 

("IUGR"), a condition marked by lagging growth throughout 

the pregnancy.5 Nevertheless, Dr. Smith did not order any 

additional tests at that time, and provided routine prenatal 

care during three additional visits in 1980.

In January 1981, Dr. Smith ordered a second sonogram 

from which he concluded that there was a strong possibility 

that the fetus suffered from IUGR. Dr. Smith began to see 

Mrs. Woods with greater frequency, examining her on six 

occasions between January 9, 1981, and February 11, 1981, 

and ordering a third sonogram during this period. His 

concern about IUGR also led him to monitor Mrs. Woods' 

serum estriol level.6 Three samples collected on February 4, 

6, and 11 indicated a constant estriol level of 3.3 NG/ML. On 

February 13 there was a thirty percent drop to 2.3 NG/ML. 

Concerned that the fetus might be in jeopardy, Dr. Smith 

admitted Mrs. Woods to the Washington Hospital Center on 

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February 18 for additional monitoring and bed rest, so that 

he could deliver the baby "if there were other further reasons 

to be concerned regarding [IUGR]."

Upon her admission to the hospital, Dr. Smith directed Dr. 

Henry Sobel to perform a fourth sonogram and an amniocentesis. Dr. Sobel reported that the sonogram indicated the 

presence of a low level of amniotic fluid, which prevented the 

successful performance of the amniocentesis. "On the basis 

of the falling estriols and the decrease in the amniotic fluid," 

Dr. Smith concluded that "we, indeed, had [IUGR] and that 

this baby was very compromised and should be delivered the 

following morning." Believing that the fetus was approximately thirty-six to thirty-seven weeks old (i.e., three to four 

weeks short of full term), Dr. Smith delivered the baby by 

cesarean section on February 19, 1981. After birth, the baby 

experienced respiratory problems, and several years later, 

she was diagnosed as having cerebral palsy, spastic diplegia, 

and other physical disorders.

Expert evidence produced during discovery highlighted the 

parties' differing interpretations of the evidence. The Woods 

presented experts who disputed Dr. Smith's conclusion that 

the fetus was not developing properly and suffered from 

IUGR. In these experts' opinion, the baby's premature 

delivery caused her to develop cerebral palsy and other 

serious disorders. The experts identified a number of errors 

by Dr. Smith that led him to deliver the baby prematurely. 

First, because Dr. Smith failed to ascertain that Mrs. Wood's 

periods were irregular, he placed undue emphasis on the date 

of her last menstrual period in assessing fetal age. Second, 

given the conflicting signals as to fetal age provided by the 

last menstrual period, the initial sonogram, and a pelvic 

examination, as well as the fact that the best time to evaluate 

fetal age is early in the pregnancy, Dr. Smith should have 

taken additional steps early on to determine the age of the 

fetus with greater accuracy. This included ordering follow-up 

sonograms in the first month after Mrs. Woods' initial visit 

and carefully monitoring early "landmarks" in fetal development, such as the first detection of fetal heartbeat and fetal 

movement. Third, Dr. Smith erroneously concluded that the 

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fourth sonogram showed a low level of amniotic fluid corroborating an IUGR diagnosis. Fourth, in focusing on the falling 

estriol levels, Dr. Smith relied on an "insufficient basis" to 

perform an elective cesarean section.

Yater and Dr. Smith responded with their own expert 

evidence that the baby's injuries had nothing to do with Dr. 

Smith or the cesarean section, but instead resulted from a 

genetic defect, IUGR, or care provided after birth by the 

Washington Hospital Center. One expert opined that the 

baby's disabilities resulted from developmental problems in 

utero and that she suffered from IUGR, although he did not 

know with reasonable medical certainty the specific cause of 

the injuries. A second expert opined that the state of the 

placenta and umbilical cord, as well as the estriol levels and 

the baby's birth weight, indicated placental insufficiency and 

IUGR.

At the conclusion of discovery, defense counsel estimated 

that the insureds had no chance of winning at trial, and that 

the likely jury verdict would be between $6 and $10 million. 

Based on counsel's recommendation and Dr. Smith's request 

that the case be settled, Continental entered into a settlement 

agreement with the Woods for $4,127,554 on the day set for 

jury selection. Hartford had previously advised the district 

court that because in its view there was no coverage under its 

policy, it was withdrawing from the defense. Hartford therefore declined to participate in the settlement and Continental 

funded it in its entirety.

Continental sued Hartford for contribution to recoup a 

portion of the settlement funds, in the full amount of Hartford's $2 million policy limit, and for prejudgment interest. 

Upon consideration of the parties' cross-motions for summary 

judgment, the district court granted judgment for Hartford, 

ruling that no reasonable jury could find that Hartford was 

obligated to contribute to the settlement. Assuming that Dr. 

Smith performed substandard care in 1980 in determining the 

correct fetal age during Hartford's policy period, the district 

court found that "the 1981 serum estriol level and amniotic 

fluid readings," independent of the fetal age assessment, led 

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to Dr. Smith's decision to deliver the baby. The court 

concluded that because no medical conduct by Dr. Smith in 

1980 could have been a proximate cause of the baby's injuries, 

Hartford could not have been found liable to the Woods and 

hence it had no obligation to contribute to the settlement. 

Continental appeals.

II. 

Summary judgment should be granted when the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, 

show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 255 

(1986); Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 132 (D.C. 

Cir. 1996), cert. dismissed, 1997 WL 155,479 (1997). In other 

words, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate ... where 'the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could not return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party.' " Washington Post Co. v. 

United States Dept. of Health & Human Serv., 865 F.2d 320, 

325 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). 

Our review of the district court's grant of summary judgment 

is de novo. See Ambrosini, 101 F.3d at 132.

A.

Continental acknowledges that the district court properly 

defined the determinative issue regarding Hartford's liability 

to be whether any action by Dr. Smith during Hartford's 

policy period was a proximate cause of the baby's injuries, 

and that the issue of proximate cause must be resolved by 

determining the basis for Dr. Smith's decision to perform the 

cesarean section. Continental contends, however, that in 

concluding that Dr. Smith's actions in 1980 during Hartford 

policy period could not, as a matter of law, constitute a 

proximate cause of the baby's injuries, the district court 

ignored the substantial evidence in the underlying malpractice litigation that Dr. Smith's negligence in 1980 during the 

early months of the pregnancy substantially contributed to 

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7 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has observed that 

the "the concept of proximate cause in insurance contract actions is 

not identical with that concept in tort actions." Quadrangle Dev. 

Corp. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 645 A.2d 1074, 1077 (D.C. 1994) (citing 

COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 74:705 (Rev. ed. 1983)). 

nental further maintains that the district court erroneously 

failed to recognize that there could be, and in fact was, more 

than one proximate cause of the baby's injuries. Because 

there was more than sufficient evidence of Dr. Smith's negligence in 1980 during Hartford's policy period to go to a jury, 

Continental contends that Hartford is obligated to pay some 

portion of the settlement, and thus the district court erred in 

granting judgment for Hartford and should have granted 

judgment for Continental.

Under the law of the District of Columbia, proximate cause 

in insurance contract cases has been defined as follows:7

The proximate cause is the efficient cause, the one that 

necessarily sets the other causes in operation. The causes 

that are merely incidental or instruments of a superior or 

controlling agency are not the proximate causes and the 

responsible ones, though they may be nearer in time to the 

result.

Unkelsbee v. Homestead Fire Ins. Co., 41 A.2d 168, 171 (D.C. 

1945) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Boon, 95 U.S. 117, 130 

(1877)); see also Quadrangle Dev. Corp. v. Hartford Ins. Co.,

645 A.2d 1074, 1077 (D.C. 1994). The District of Columbia 

Court of Appeals has explained that proximate cause " 'is the 

dominant cause, not the one which is incidental to that 

cause....' " Quadrangle, 645 A.2d at 1077 (quoting Unkelsbee, 41 A.2d at 171). However, rather than viewing proximate cause as a single act or omission that is most immediately responsible for an injury, the Court of Appeals has 

stated that " 'where there is a concurrence of two causes, the 

efficient causethe one that sets the others in motionis the 

cause to which the loss is to be attributed....' " Id. (quoting

Frontis v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 242 A.2d 749 (Conn. 1968)). 

"[I]n considering what is the proximate and what [is] the 

remote cause of an injury, '[t]he inquiry must always be 

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whether there was any intermediate cause disconnected from 

the primary fault, and self-operating, which produced the 

injury.' " Unkelsbee, 41 A.2d at 171 (quoting Aetna Ins. Co.,

95 U.S. at 130 (quoting Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. 

Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469 (1876))).

We hold that the district court erred in ruling that a jury in 

the underlying medical malpractice litigation could not reasonably find that Dr. Smith's negligence in 1980 was a 

proximate cause of his decision to deliver Tracina Woods 

prematurely. Although, as the district court found, a jury 

could reasonably have found that Dr. Smith's interpretation 

of the serum estriol and amniotic fluid tests alone led him to 

perform the cesarean section, a jury also could reasonably 

have found that Dr. Smith's failure in 1980 to assess accurately the fetal age at the beginning of the pregnancy set in 

motion the course of events that led to the premature delivery in 1981. From his initial tests of Mrs. Woods in September 1980, because of his concern that Mrs. Woods was "small 

for [the] dates," Dr. Smith believed that the fetus might 

suffer from IUGR. Throughout the pregnancy, Dr. Smith 

remained concerned about the possibility of IUGR. Based 

upon the sonogram in January 1981, he concluded that there 

was a "strong possibility" that the fetus suffered from IUGR. 

In February 1981, the falling estriol levels and the decrease 

in amniotic fluid finally confirmed Dr. Smith's belief that the 

fetus suffered from IUGR and therefore had to be delivered 

immediately. In other words, the evidence would have supported a finding that Dr. Smith became concerned about 

IUGR in 1980 at the beginning of the pregnancy, and that his 

interpretations of all follow-up examinations were influenced 

by this concern. So viewed, because an IUGR diagnosis is, 

by definition, dependent on an assessment of fetal age, see 

supra n.5, Dr. Smith's interpretation in 1981 of the falling 

estriol and amniotic fluid levels as conclusively establishing 

IUGR was an intermediate cause, not "self-operating" and 

"disconnected" from, but intertwined with and dependent on 

his initial evaluation of the fetus in 1980. See Unkelsbee, 41 

A.2d at 171.

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The facts of the instant case are similar to those in Glacier 

Gen. Assurance Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 605 F. Supp. 126 

(D.D.C. 1985), where two companies had insured a doctor for 

consecutive policy periods, the doctor's alleged negligence 

spanned both policy periods, and the insurers settled the 

malpractice suit prior to a determination of liability or causation. Although the ultimate injury to the doctor's patient, the 

amputation of his legs, occurred during the second policy 

period, the parties "agree[d] that an earlier diagnosis [during 

the first policy period] ... might have prevented the amputation from becoming necessary." Id. at 128. Without pinpointing the period of time, the district court concluded "with 

some confidence that the conduct which proximately caused 

the injury ... overlapped the coverage period of both carriers." Id. at 129.

Here, by contrast with Glacier, the parties dispute whether 

a non-negligent assessment of fetal age during Hartford's 

policy period in 1980 might have prevented the premature 

delivery of the baby during Continental's policy period in 

1981. Hartford's experts say no, but according to the Woods' 

experts, and Hartford does not contest this fact, Dr. Smith 

was negligent in conducting his initial evaluation of Mrs. 

Woods in 1980. Due to the irregularity of Mrs. Woods' 

menstrual periods, Dr. Smith should have discounted the 

significance of Mrs. Woods' last menstrual period as an 

accurate indicator of fetal age. Because he was confronted 

with conflicting signals as to the age of the fetus, Dr. Smith 

also should have performed serial sonograms early in the 

pregnancy and paid closer attention to early fetal landmarks 

in order to confirm the actual age of the fetus. Had he taken 

these steps, the Woods' experts opined, Dr. Smith would have 

realized that the fetus was developing properly in utero, that 

Mrs. Woods was not "small for [the] dates," and that the fetus 

did not suffer from IUGR. Because Dr. Smith failed in 1980 

to take these steps, Dr. Smith was never able to get an 

accurate assessment of fetal age, and hence failed to rule out 

IUGR as a problem. In the opinion of the Woods' experts, 

the conduct that proximately caused the injuries thus overlapped both the Hartford and Continental policy periods.

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Given the parties' differing views of the doctor's conduct in 

1980, the difficulty for this court arises from the fact that 

there has been no final determination of the cause of the 

injury to the baby because Continental settled with the 

Woods prior to trial. Had Hartford denied that Dr. Scott 

was negligent at all, then it would be entitled to force 

Continental to prove that its insured was negligent, or at least 

that there be a trial on proximate cause. The parties, 

however, have litigated the coverage controversy as if the 

only issue to be decided is whether any of Dr. Smith's actions 

before January 1, 1981, was a proximate cause of the baby's 

injuries, and as if the complete record from which Hartford's 

liability is to be determined is the pleadings and discovery 

prior to settlement. Even though it is conceivable that a jury 

might reasonably have decided either way on proximate 

cause, given the manner in which the parties have litigated 

the coverage issue, it makes little sense for a new jury in the 

coverage case to speculate on how another jury would have 

decided the medical malpractice case. A jury would be asked 

to find facts without live testimony and little opportunity to 

reconcile any conflicts in testimony. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the question before the court is 

limited to whether the evidence available at the time of 

settlement could lead a reasonable jury to find that Dr. 

Smith's pre-1981 negligence was a proximate cause of the 

Woods' injuries. That is a question of law, and the answer is 

yes.

In relying on a portion of Dr. Smith's testimony suggesting 

that his actions in 1980 did not ultimately influence his 

decision to deliver the baby prematurely in 1981, the district 

court gave insufficient attention to the IUGR diagnosis. In 

response to a hypothetical question whether, if presented 

with the same circumstances except for gestational age, he 

would have delivered the baby even if he knew to a medical 

certainty that fetal age was twenty-six weeks, Dr. Smith 

testified, "[I]f this were the situation that presented itself at 

26 weeks ..., I would have made the same decision." The 

district court interpreted this testimony to mean that Dr. 

Smith's estimate of fetal age did not influence his decision to 

deliver. But this interpretation fails to take into account that 

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8 Hartford's contention that it is not obligated to contribute to 

the settlement because of the Woods' failure to comply with its 

notice requirements is meritless. Under the law of the District of 

Columbia, an insurer who defends an insured, "without a disclaimer 

of contractual responsibility and a suitable reservation of its rights, 

is foreclosed from thereafter taking refuge in the policy provisions 

exempting liability from coverage." National Union Fire Ins. Co. 

v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 384 F.2d 316, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see 

also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Children's Hosp. Nat'l 

Med. Ctr., 670 F. Supp. 393, 402 (D.D.C. 1987). Even if Hartford 

reserved the right to deny coverage, it did so only on the ground 

that there was no liability or causation during its policy period, not 

on late notice grounds. Therefore, because Hartford was, or should 

have been, aware of this ground at the time it assumed Dr. Smith 

and Yater's defense, see Children's Hosp., 670 F. Supp. at 402 

(citing Walker v. American Ice Co., 254 F. Supp. 736 (D.D.C. 1966)), 

Hartford has waived the right to raise late notice as a defense to 

coverage. 

a critical element of the hypothetical was the assumption that 

the fetus suffered from IUGR. Because Dr. Smith's diagnosis of IUGR was tied to his assessment of fetal age, the 

district court clearly erred in finding that Dr. Smith's response to this hypothetical demonstrated that fetal age was 

irrelevant to his decision to deliver prematurely.

Without contesting Dr. Smith's alleged negligence in 1980, 

Hartford points to Dr. Smith's testimony that, absent the 

falling estriol and amniotic fluid levels, he would not have 

performed the cesarean section on February 19, 1981. Notwithstanding that it was in Dr. Smith's interest to downplay 

the significance of his conduct during the early months of 

Mrs. Woods' pregnancy and any confusion he might have had 

as to the age of the fetus, accepting Dr. Smith's testimony as 

true, it does not negate the causative significance of his 

undisputed negligence in 1980. For purposes of Hartford's 

liability, the determinative question is not whether the evidence conclusively establishes that in the absence of the two 

test results in 1981, Dr. Smith would have performed the 

cesarean section, but whether Dr. Smith's suspicion in 1980 of 

IUGR was " 'the efficient cause, the one that necessarily set[ ] 

the other causes in operation,' " Unkelsbee, 41 A.2d at 171 

(citation omitted), which led him to perform the cesarean 

section on February 19, 1981. In view of the significance of 

the IUGR diagnosis to Dr. Smith's ultimate decision to deliver prematurely, a reasonable jury could find Dr. Smith's 

actions during Hartford's policy period was a proximate cause 

of his decision to deliver the baby prematurely.8

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B.

Having concluded, given the manner in which the parties 

have litigated the coverage issue, that there was dual coverage by Continental and Hartford of the injuries to the Woods' 

baby, the question remains of how to apportion the loss 

between the two companies. The determination would appear to turn on the "other insurance" provisions of the 

policies. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1981). While Continental's 

$1 million primary policy did not have an "other insurance" 

provision, its excess policy, with a $10 million ceiling, included 

an "other insurance" provision whereby the policy would only 

cover insurance liability "greater than the applicable limit of 

liability provided by the other insurance." Hartford's policy, 

with a $2 million ceiling, included an "other insurance" provision that Hartford "would not be liable for a greater proportion" of the loss than the limit of its policy to the aggregate 

limit of "all valid and collectible insurance."

Under District of Columbia law, where "other insurance" 

provisions in an excess insurance policy and a pro-rata policy 

can be reconciled to give effect to the intent of the contracting parties, the court will do so. Jones v. Medox, Inc., 430 

A.2d 488, 493-94 (D.C. 1981) (in banc). In other words, when 

more than one insurance policy covers an injury, a court 

should not impose its view of the appropriate apportionment 

of liability between the insurers but should "focus[ ] on the 

contractual provisions and the intent of the parties." Auger 

v. Tasea Inv. Co., 676 A.2d 18, 20 (D.C. 1996) (quoting Jones,

430 A.2d at 494). But see Glacier, 605 F. Supp. at 130-32 

(requiring equal contributions from two insurers, but not 

citing Jones). Because the parties have not briefed the effect 

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of the "other insurance" provisions on liability under the 

policies, nor addressed the issue in their cross-motions for 

summary judgment, we remand the case to the district court 

to determine the proper allocation of the settlement and rule 

on Continental's request for prejudgment interest.

Accordingly, we reverse the grant of judgment to Hartford 

and remand the case to the district court.

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