Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-18-02695/USCOURTS-ca7-18-02695-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Thomas A. Censke
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 18-2695

THOMAS A. CENSKE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:16-cv-2761 — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 3, 2019 — DECIDED JANUARY 17, 2020

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and SCUDDER,

Circuit Judges.

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Prisoners face unique challenges 

when submitting legal filings. Non-prisoners often have access to electronic filing methods and, if not, can take their filings to the post office. But prisoners must use the prison’s 

mail system, where security concerns often cause the system 

to operate more slowly than standard mail. For legal filings, 

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timing can make all the difference, as it did for Thomas 

Censke. 

Censke placed his administrative complaint under the 

Federal Tort Claims Act in the prison’s mailbox with nine 

days to spare, but the government stamped it as received after 

the statutory deadline had passed. The question is which date 

counts—when Censke put it in the mail or when it arrived. 

The district court held that Censke’s claim was not filed until 

received, so it was untimely. We reverse and hold that the 

prison-mailbox rule applies to a prisoner’s administrative 

complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act and so it is filed 

upon being placed in the prison’s mail. 

I

Thomas Censke sought to bring a claim under the FTCA 

for injuries he says he suffered at the hands of prison guards 

in December 2013. He alleged that correctional officers and 

medical staff at the federal jail in Terre Haute, Indiana, physically abused him and then inadequately cared for his injuries, 

which included a concussion, nerve damage, and a herniated 

diaphragm. Before bringing his claim to court, Censke had to 

comply with the FTCA’s administrative notice requirements. 

The statute required Censke to give notice in writing to the 

Bureau of Prisons within two years of the incident. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2401(b). Notice could occur by sending a Bureau-provided form (shorthanded as SF-95) to the regional office in 

which the injury happened. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 14.2(a), 543.31. 

Bureau of Prisons regulations further provide that a complaint sent to the wrong office or agency will be transferred to 

the right one. See id. § 543.32(b). The Bureau considers claims 

filed when first received by any of its offices. See DEPARTMENT 

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No. 18-2695 3

OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, Program Statement 

1320.06: Federal Tort Claims Act (2003).

Censke struggled to present his administrative complaint. 

He moved prisons six times in the two years following the alleged incident and lost access to his legal materials while in 

transit. He also contends that prison staff ignored his requests 

for an SF-95 form. When he eventually got the form, he was 

being held at the federal facility in McCreary, Kentucky. 

Censke then asked McCreary staff for the address of the Bureau of Prisons’s North Central Regional Office, which oversees Terre Haute. Again, he says, the prison officials refused 

to help him.

On December 7, 2015, nine days before the end of the twoyear limitations period, Censke placed his SF-95 form in 

McCreary’s outgoing mail. (Censke swore in two affidavits 

that he placed the form in outgoing legal mail on that date, to 

be sent First Class. The government presented no contrary evidence at summary judgment.) Because he still did not know 

the regional office address, he sent it to the Bureau of Prisons’s

Central Office in Washington, D.C. The record does not reflect 

when Censke’s claim reached that office, but the Bureau 

stamped it as received at the North Central Regional Office on 

February 16, 2016—over two months after Censke put it in the 

mail. The Bureau denied the claim on the merits on April 22, 

2016. It did not mention timeliness. 

Censke then filed suit in the district court under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The government 

moved for summary judgment, arguing that Censke failed to 

present the claim within two years of the alleged December 

2013 incident. The government saw Censke’s claim as too late 

because the Bureau did not receive it in its regional office until 

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after the deadline had passed. But Censke, then proceeding 

pro se, was astute enough to argue (with admirable clarity) 

that his claim was timely under the prison-mailbox rule or the 

common-law mailbox rule (which provides a presumption of 

receipt for a properly addressed mailing, Hagner v. United 

States, 285 U.S. 427, 430 (1932)) or under equitable doctrines. 

Censke also asserted that, at the very least, there was a material dispute of fact as to when the Bureau’s Central Office first 

received his SF-95 form. 

The district court concluded that the mailbox rules did not 

apply to render Censke’s claim timely. The court also rejected 

Censke’s arguments for equitable tolling and delayed accrual 

and entered summary judgment for the government. 

On appeal we recruited counsel because Censke’s case 

presents a substantive and unresolved legal issue: whether 

the prison-mailbox rule applies to administrative filings under the FTCA. We hold that it does. 

II

In Houston v. Lack, the Supreme Court recognized the 

prison-mailbox rule: an inmate’s notice of appeal is deemed 

filed not when received by the court but rather when delivered to prison officials for mailing. 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). 

The Court began by observing that 28 U.S.C. § 2107, the statute governing civil appeals, required that the notice of appeal 

be filed within 30 days of the entry of judgment. See Houston, 

487 U.S. at 272. While § 2107 did not define “filing,” the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure did by making expressly 

clear that parties intending to appeal must “fil[e] a notice of 

appeal with the district clerk within the time allowed [by 

law].” FED. R. APP. P. 3(a); see also FED. R. APP. P. (4)(a)(1) 

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No. 18-2695 5

(requiring the same). Despite this clear prerequisite, the Court 

held that prisoners’ notices of appeal were filed upon being 

placed in the prison mail. What guided the Court’s reasoning 

was the reality that prisoners have “no control over delays between the prison authorities’ receipt of the notice and its filing, and their lack of freedom bars them from delivering the 

notice to the court clerk personally.” Houston, 487 U.S. at 273–

74. That reality provided sufficient basis to depart from the 

receipt-based rule applicable “in the ordinary civil case.” Id. 

at 273. 

In Houston’s wake, the prison-mailbox rule has been codified in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and applied 

to many legal filings in this court, the district court, and administrative appeals. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 25(a)(2) (codifying Houston); Edwards v. United States, 266 F.3d 756, 758 (7th 

Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (extending rule to Rule 59 motions); 

Chavarria-Reyes v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 275, 277 (7th Cir. 2016) (extending rule to appellate papers filed in immigration cases). 

Until now, though, we have not decided whether the rule applies to administrative complaints brought under the FTCA. 

The government points to Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43 

(1993), and urges us to decline Censke’s invitation to adopt 

the prison-mailbox rule. Under the government’s reading, Fex

stands for the proposition that the prison-mailbox rule cannot 

apply when a statute or regulation defines when a complaint 

is considered filed. The government says that the Department 

of Justice and Bureau of Prisons FTCA regulations provide 

the definition of filing, so the prison-mailbox rule is inapplicable. See 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (providing that a claim is presented when the federal agency receives the SF-95 form); id. 

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§ 543.32(a) (defining the filing date as the date on which DOJ 

or the BOP first received the claim). 

We cannot agree with such a broad reading of Fex. There 

the Supreme Court held that the prison-mailbox rule did not 

apply to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. See Fex, 507 

U.S. at 49–50. The Agreement allows a detainee to file a request for disposition on charges pending in another jurisdiction. See 18 U.S.C. app. 2 § 2. Article III of the Agreement provides that a prisoner under a detainer “shall be brought to 

trial within one hundred and eighty days after he shall have 

caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer ... written 

notice” of the request. Id. Confronted with the question 

whether the 180-day clock began when the detainee placed 

the letter in the prison mail system or when the prosecutor 

received it, the Court concluded that the Agreement was best 

read as requiring the latter. See id. at 49–50. The time-clock 

should begin when the state received the request, the Court 

reasoned, so that postal mishaps such as lost mail did not preclude the state from proceeding with a prosecution. See id. 

Some of our sister circuits have adopted the government’s 

reasoning and read Fex broadly. See, e.g., Longenette v. Krusing, 

322 F.3d 758, 765 (3d Cir. 2003) (applying the prison-mailbox 

rule to ownership claims in administrative forfeiture proceedings because “neither the statute nor the regulations require 

‘actual receipt’”); Smith v. Conner, 250 F.3d 277, 278–79 (5th 

Cir. 2001) (declining to apply the prison-mailbox rule to notice of appeal in an immigration case because Board of Immigration Appeals regulations defined filing as date of receipt); 

Nigro v. Sullivan, 40 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 1994) (declining to 

apply the prison-mailbox rule to inmate-complaint appeals 

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because regulations required receipt within established time 

limits). 

The Second Circuit reasoned along the same lines but endorsed a narrower understanding of Fex. When presented 

with exactly the circumstances here, that court concluded that 

the prison-mailbox rule does apply to administrative FTCA 

claims. In Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, the court acknowledged Fex but 

nevertheless “[saw] no difference between the filing of a court 

action and the filing of an administrative claim.” 171 F.3d 150, 

152 (2d Cir. 1999). The court found dispositive that the 

FTCA’s definition of filing as receipt came from only regulations—not the statute itself. See id. at n.1 (explaining that Fex 

precludes application of the prison-mailbox rule “when there 

is a specific statutory regime to the contrary”) (emphasis 

added). 

The shortcoming of the government’s reading (and the 

variations of it adopted by the other circuit courts) is that it 

sets Fex in unnecessary tension with Houston. In Houston, the 

Court applied the prison-mailbox rule after acknowledging 

that the text of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure expressly required filing with the district court clerk. See 487 

U.S. at 272–73. If Fex stands for the proposition that the 

prison-mailbox rule can apply only when there is no language 

providing a contrary definition of receipt, we would be left to 

question whether Houston’s reasoning remains good law. But 

the Court has explained that it does not overrule itself silently. 

See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson, 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). 

Put another way, we are hesitant to read Fex (which notably 

does not mention Houston) to cast doubt on the general principle that prisoners may, in the interests of justice, require different filing rules. 

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So, although we agree with the Second Circuit’s outcome, 

we travel a different path of reasoning—in no small part because we see Fex in narrower terms. The starting point for the 

Supreme Court in Fex was twofold: recognizing ambiguity in 

the Agreement on Detainer’s language and from there underscoring the pragmatic consequences—or, in the Court’s 

words, “the sense of the matter.” 507 U.S. at 49. In adopting 

the state’s reading of the Agreement that the clock started to 

run when the request was received—as opposed to the time 

of the mailing—the Court explained that it did so to avoid 

“the worst-case scenario” that “the prosecution will be precluded before the prosecutor even knows it has been requested.” Id. at 50. 

In light of Fex’s context, we do not read it to stand for any 

broad principle that the prison-mailbox rule can apply only in 

a regulatory void. This observation aligns with our precedent. 

In Chavarria-Reyes v. Lynch, we held that the prison-mailbox 

rule applied to notices of appeal filed in immigration matters. 

845 F.3d 275, 277 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Houston and explaining 

that “[w]e can’t see any reason why this rule would not apply 

to immigration”). In doing so, we parted ways with the Fifth 

Circuit, which based on its reading of Fex, came out the other 

way when answering the same question. See Smith, 250 F.3d 

at 278–79 (declining to apply the prison-mailbox rule because 

Board of Immigration Appeals regulations defined the filing 

date as date of receipt). 

Because administrative claims filed under the FTCA fall 

within Houston’s framework and do not implicate the concerns underpinning the Court’s reasoning in Fex, we hold that 

the prison-mailbox rule applies here. This result is on all fours 

with the rationale that guided the Court in Houston. 

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Recall, too, what happened here. Censke attempted repeatedly, over the course of several months, to acquire an SF95 form and the address for the appropriate regional office. 

After much effort, he was able to send his claim more than a 

week before the deadline expired. And yet the Bureau of Prisons took the position, at least until partway through this appeal, that it did not receive his claim until over two months 

later. Censke’s experience demonstrates that pro se prisoners 

face the same obstacles sending administrative forms as they 

do court documents. For both filings, “the pro se prisoner has 

no choice but to entrust the forwarding of his [filing] to prison 

authorities whom he cannot control or supervise[.]” Houston, 

487 U.S. at 271.

We would reach the same result even if we were to apply 

Fex’s balance-of-the-harms approach. In Fex, the Court concluded that the 180-day clock should start when the prosecutor received the request—otherwise, disastrous consequences 

would result if the request was lost in the mail. 507 U.S. at 49–

50. But here it is the prisoner who faces the stark consequence 

if his complaint is never received. He could be barred from 

bringing suit, no matter how meritorious his claim. 

On the other hand, the potential harm to the federal government is not so great as to tilt the scales in its favor. The 

FTCA’s administrative-presentment requirement has indisputable importance. It gives the agency “a fair opportunity to 

investigate and possibly settle the claim before the parties 

must assume the burden of costly and time-consuming litigation.” McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 111–12 (1993). To 

be sure, the application of the prison-mailbox rule could take 

away some of the agency’s time to investigate before the complainant is allowed to file suit. See 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(c). But that 

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result is less stark than the total preclusion of a state’s ability 

to prosecute a defendant—the scenario the Supreme Court 

confronted in Fex. Significantly, too, unlike in the context of 

the Interstate Agreement on Detainers present in Fex, this case 

involves no potential infringement by the federal government 

upon state interests.

III

In light of our holding that the prison-mailbox rule applies 

to Censke’s administrative claim under the Federal Tort 

Claims Act, we need not proceed further. Censke’s claim was 

timely filed. Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND for 

further proceedings. 

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