Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02838/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02838-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joshua D. Baker
Appellant
Marcia Bruner
Appellee
Eric Chisom
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2838

___________

Joshua D. Baker, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Eric Chisom, Drew County Deputy * Eastern District of Arkansas.

Sheriff, in His Official and Individual *

Capacities; Marcia Bruner, Drew *

County Deputy Sheriff, in Her *

Individual and Official Capacities, *

*

Defendants - Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: February 14, 2007

Filed: August 28, 2007

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

LOKEN, Chief Judge.

Early on August 15, 2002, Joshua Baker was arrested for traffic violations after

leading police on a late-night, half-mile chase. While awaiting arrival of the arresting

officer at the Drew County Jail, Deputy Sheriff Marcia Bruner handcuffed Baker’s

right arm to a bench and watched as Deputy Sheriff Eric Chisom choked Baker from

behind and tasered him in the back of the head. After Chisom was convicted of third

degree battery, Baker sued Chisom, Bruner, and other County defendants under 42

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1

The HONORABLE J. LEON HOLMES, Chief Judge of the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

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U.S.C. § 1983, asserting claims of excessive force, deliberate indifference, failure to

train and supervise, and failure to maintain adequate County policies. In September

2004, on the eve of trial and with defendants' motion for summary judgment pending,

Baker moved for a voluntary non-suit. On October 12, 2004, the district court granted

Baker a non-suit as to defendants Chisom and Bruner. The court denied a non-suit

and dismissed all claims against the other County defendants with prejudice. 

On September 22, 2005, Baker filed a second action, asserting the same claims

against Chisom and Bruner. Unlike his first complaint, the second complaint

specifically named Chisom acting “in his official and individual capacities” and

Bruner acting “in her individual and official capacities.” The district court1

 dismissed

the individual capacity claims as time-barred and the official capacity claims on the

merits. The court also dismissed a state law tort claim added in Baker's First

Amended Complaint. Baker appeals all three rulings. We affirm.

I. The Individual Capacity Claims.

The applicable state law statute of limitations governs § 1983 claims. See

Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 484 (1980). Baker's claims against

Chisom and Bruner in their individual capacities are subject to the three-year

Arkansas statute of limitations. Morton v. City of Little Rock, 934 F.2d 180, 182 (8th

Cir. 1991). If an Arkansas plaintiff files a timely action and then “suffers a nonsuit,”

he “may commence a new action within one (1) year.” Ark. Code. Ann. § 16-56-126.

We apply that savings statute to § 1983 claims. Whittle v. Wiseman, 683 F.2d 1128,

1129 (8th Cir. 1982). Baker filed this action three years and six weeks after the

August 2002 incident. Thus, unless tolled, the individual capacity claims are timebarred. Only causes of action pleaded in the non-suited action are tolled by the oneAppellate Case: 06-2838 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/28/2007 Entry ID: 3345729
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year savings statute. Dillaha v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 23 F.3d 1376, 1377-78 (8th Cir.

1994). 

A plaintiff may assert § 1983 claims against a public official acting in his

individual capacity and in his official capacity. For many reasons, including exposure

to individual damage liability and the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity, these

are different causes of action. “[T]he distinction between official-capacity suits and

personal-capacity suits is more than a mere pleading device.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.

21, 27 (1991) (quotation omitted). 

This brief background brings to the fore an issue this court has often considered

-- when has a plaintiff properly asserted § 1983 claims against a public official acting

in his individual capacity. We have repeatedly stated the general rule: “If a plaintiff’s

complaint is silent about the capacity in which [he] is suing the defendant, we interpret

the complaint as including only official-capacity claims.” Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty.

Coll., 72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995); see Nix. v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th

Cir. 1989). “If the complaint does not specifically name the defendant in his

individual capacity, it is presumed he is sued only in his official capacity.” Artis v.

Francis Howell N. Band Booster Ass'n, Inc., 161 F.3d 1178, 1182 (8th Cir. 1998). 

Baker's first complaint named as defendants “ERIC CHISOM; MARCIA

BRUNER; LARON MEEKS, Individually and in his Capacity as Sheriff of Drew

County; and DREW COUNTY QUORUM COURT MEMBERS [naming the nine

members], in their Official Capacities and in their Individual Capacities.” The County

defendants other than Chisom and Bruner filed an Answer “in both their individual

and official capacities.” The same defense counsel then filed separate Answers by

Chisom and Bruner but only in their official capacities. Some months later, all

defendants moved for summary judgment. They argued, in part, that Chisom and

Bruner were sued only in their official capacities and therefore “[n]one of the

defendants named in their individual capacities had any personal involvement in the

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subject incident.” Without responding to this contention, Baker moved to voluntarily

non-suit the complaint without prejudice. Defendants objected to a non-suit “without

first resolving the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,” noting they had

incurred litigation time and expense.

The district court dismissed Baker's claims against the other County defendants

with prejudice because Baker failed to submit evidence refuting their motion for

summary judgment or even a statement of material facts in dispute. However, the

court granted Baker's non-suit motion and dismissed the claims against Chisom and

Bruner without prejudice, explaining: 

The undisputed facts establish that Chisom committed battery against

Baker, and that Bruner observed the battery but did nothing to stop it.

Had Baker not filed a motion for voluntary non-suit, the Court would

have given Baker the opportunity to amend the complaint to make it

clear and unambiguous that he was suing Chisom and Bruner in their

individual capacities, and the Court would have continued the trial date

. . . to avoid any prejudice to Chisom and Bruner. The Court would not

have entered a judgment in favor of Chisom and Bruner that would have

barred Baker’s claims against them. . . . Chisom and Bruner will not be

prejudiced by a dismissal.

When his first complaint was dismissed without prejudice, Baker had ten months in

which to file individual capacity claims against Chisom and Bruner within the threeyear statute of limitations. Instead, he waited eleven months. The district court

granted summary judgment and dismissed the individual capacity claims as timebarred, rejecting Baker's contention that the claims are timely under the one-year nonsuit savings statute. 

On appeal, Baker argues that his first complaint adequately named Chisom and

Bruner in their individual capacities because the substantive paragraphs included a

reference to Chisom and Bruner as “individual Defendants” and prayed for

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Baker argues that the Eighth Circuit “holds a lonely position” on this issue and

urges us to adopt the “flexible approach” of other circuits. This argument must be

addressed to the court en banc.

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“exemplary damages” that may not be recovered in an official capacity suit. But our

cases require more than ambiguous pleading. See Andrus ex rel. Andrus v. Arkansas,

197 F.3d 953, 955 (8th Cir. 1999) (“specific pleading of individual capacity is

required”); Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999)

(“only an express statement that [public officials] are being sued in their individual

capacity will suffice”); Murphy v. State of Arkansas, 127 F3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 1997)

(“a clear statement that officials are being sued in their personal capacities” is

required). A “cryptic hint” in plaintiff’s complaint is not sufficient. Egerdahl, 72 F.3d

at 620. 

The caption of Baker's first complaint named ten other County defendants “in

their Official Capacities and in their Individual Capacities.” The caption was silent

as to the capacities in which Chisom and Bruner were named. The body of the

complaint contained no “clear statement” or “specific pleading” of individual

capacity, only allegations that were, at most, “cryptic hints.” Defendants made their

interpretation of the complaint crystal clear. Chisom and Bruner filed separate

Answers only in their official capacities, and defendants' motion for summary

judgment argued that no individual capacity claims had been asserted against Chisom

and Bruner. Baker did not contest this assertion. The district court in granting nonsuit observed that it would have allowed Baker “to amend the complaint to make it

clear and unambiguous that he was suing Chisom and Bruner in their individual

capacities.” In these circumstances, we agree with the district court that Baker's first

complaint did not include the requisite clear statement that Chisom and Bruner were

being sued in their individual capacities. Therefore, the one-year savings statute did

not apply, and these claims were properly dismissed as time-barred.2

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After Doe, at least one panel has favorably cited the “clear statement” rule of

Egerdahl and Nix, though without discussing this issue. Larson v. Kempker, 414 F.3d

936, 939 (8th Cir. 2005).

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Baker next argues that Doe v. Cassel, 403 F.3d 986 (8th Cir. 2005), implicitly

overruled our Egerdahl line of decisions. This contention is without merit. In Doe,

we applied recent Supreme Court decisions and held that “[t]he only permissible

heightened pleading requirements” in § 1983 suits against individual defendants “are

those contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” or in federal statutes. 403

F.3d at 989. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules provides that each complaint shall

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim.” Requiring an “express statement”

that a defendant is sued in his or her individual capacity is consistent with this Rule.

More than twenty years ago, Chief Judge Donald Lay provided Eighth Circuit

practitioners with a clear and simple statement that satisfies this pleading requirement.

Rollins by Agosta v. Farmer, 731 F.2d 533, 536 n.3 (8th Cir. 1984). That instruction

was not a heightened pleading requirement in 1984 nor is it today.3

Finally, Baker argues that equitable tolling should be applied to avoid the time

bar because the district court acknowledged that its dismissal order in the first case

may have “contributed to the confusion.” A plaintiff must be “reasonably diligent”

to be entitled to equitable tolling of an applicable statute of limitations. Stracener v.

Williams, 137 S.W.3d 428, 431 (Ark. App. 2003). Here, as we have explained, Baker

was not the least bit diligent. He allowed the last ten months of the initial three-year

limitations period to expire despite repeated warnings -- by defendants' pleadings, by

the district court's dismissal order, and by controlling Eighth Circuit precedent -- that

his first complaint failed to assert claims against Chisom and Bruner in their

individual capacities. The district court properly declined to apply equitable tolling.

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On appeal, Baker primarily argues that he presented sufficient evidence of

official capacity liability because the County had no policies regarding the use of

choke holds and tasers. This theory would not likely survive our recent en banc

decision in Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, 486 F.3d 385, 392-93 (8th Cir. 2007).

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II. The Official Capacity Claims.

Baker's complaint in the second action asserted the same official capacity

claims against Chisom and Bruner that were asserted against all defendants in the first

action. In the first action, the district court granted summary judgment and dismissed

these claims against the other County defendants with prejudice. The doctrine of res

judicata or claim preclusion bars relitigation of a § 1983 claim if the prior judgment

was a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, and

if the same cause of action and the same parties or their privies were involved in both

cases. Murphy v. Jones, 877 F.2d 682, 684 (8th Cir. 1989). 

A suit against a government official in his or her official capacity is “another

way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Monell

v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978). “[T]he real party in

interest in an official-capacity suit is the governmental entity and not the named

official.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25. The doctrine of res judicata bars a plaintiff from

suing a succession of public officials on the same official-capacity claim. See

Micklus v. Greer, 705 F.2d 314, 317 (8th Cir. 1983); Young v. City of St. Charles, 34

Fed. Appx. 245 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1035 (2002). In the first action, when

the district court issued a final order dismissing on the merits the official-capacity

claims against the other County defendants, it resolved the merits of the officialcapacity claims against all defendants, even if the court did not make this clear in

granting a non-suit and dismissing all claims against Chisom and Bruner without

prejudice. Thus, Baker's official-capacity claims against Chisom and Bruner are

barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We need not consider whether the district court

properly dismissed those claims on the merits.4

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III. The Pendent State Law Claim.

Finally, Baker argues that the district court erred in dismissing with prejudice

his state law claim for “conduct of another person that would constitute a felony under

Arkansas law.” Ark. Code. Ann. § 16-118-107. After Baker filed his amended

complaint asserting this claim, Chisom and Bruner moved for summary judgment

dismissing “Plaintiff's Complaint.” Neither defendants' nor Baker's motion papers

addressed this claim, except for Baker's assertion in his disputed fact statement “that

Chisom's conduct amounted to felonious conduct” even though Chisom was convicted

of a misdemeanor, third degree battery. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-203. 

The district court granted defendants' summary judgment motion and dismissed

the entire complaint without discussing the state law claim. Having dismissed all

federal claims, the court had discretion to dismiss this pendent state law claim without

prejudice. However, because the state law claim arose out of the same core of

operative facts, and because Baker failed to defend that claim or to urge that it be

dismissed without prejudice, the district court did not commit plain error or abuse its

discretion in exercising its supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 to

dismiss this late-filed pendent claim with prejudice. See Ivy v. Kimbrough, 115 F.3d

550, 552-53 (8th Cir. 1997). 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur fully in parts I and II of the Court’s judgment and opinion but dissent

with respect to part III. 

Although our circuit’s current precedent mandates the outcome the Court

reaches in parts I and II, I write separately to express my concern about the Eighth

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Among the exceptions are Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531

(8th Cir. 1999) and Artis v. Francis Howell N. Band Booster Ass’n, Inc., 161 F.3d

1178 (8th Cir. 1998). Because these cases have applied our bright-line presumption

to § 1983 cases not involving Eleventh Amendment immunity, I believe that they are

controlling as to the instant case.

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Circuit’s judicially-created suggestion that “section 1983 litigants wishing to sue

government agents in both capacities should simply use the following language:

‘Plaintiff sues each and all defendants in both their individual and official capacities.’”

Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting Rollins by Agosta v.

Farmer, 731 F.2d 533, 536 n.3 (8th Cir. 1984)). Since Nix, this suggestion has

mutated into a bright-line presumption that “[i]f a plaintiff’s complaint is silent about

the capacity in which she is suing the defendant, we interpret the complaint as

including only official-capacity claims.” Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d

615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995). This presumption had its genesis in Nix based upon our

perception of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(a) and the Eleventh Amendment’s

limitations on federal court jurisdiction. Rule 9(a) provides, “[i]t is not necessary to

aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued . . . except to the extent required to show

the jurisdiction of the court.” Coupled with the observation that “[t]he Eleventh

Amendment presents a jurisdictional limit on federal courts in civil rights cases

against states and their employees,” Nix concluded that “Rule 9(a) appears to require

Nix to make a capacity stipulation in the complaint.” Nix, 879 F.2d at 431. A close

inspection of the cases in which we have required litigants to specify the capacity in

which a defendant is being sued have, with few exceptions, involved state actors

arguably entitled to an Eleventh Amendment immunity defense.5

As at least one other circuit has pointed out, the logic laid out in Nix supporting

our presumption may be faulty in its premise. See Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 59-

60 (4th Cir. 1995). Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, Eleventh Amendment

immunity is not “jurisdictional in the sense that it must be raised and decided by [a]

Court on its own motion.” Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 515 n.19 (1982).

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Also unlike subject matter jurisdiction, a party entitled to sovereign immunity may

waive it. See Grand River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Beebe, 467 F.3d 698, 701 (8th

Cir. 2006). While the operation of Rule 9(a) in § 1983 cases with Eleventh

Amendment issues may be debatable, it appears that Rule 9(a) has no express

application in cases like this one, where the defendants cannot assert Eleventh

Amendment immunity. See N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham County, 547 U.S. 189

(2006) (noting that the Supreme Court “has repeatedly refused to extend sovereign

immunity to counties”). The overwhelming majority of our sister circuits uniformly

take a different approach to capacity-pleading issues, see Powell v. Alexander, 391

F.3d 1, 22 & n.25 (1st Cir. 2004) (adopting the “course of proceedings” test used in

the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits),

and our rule seems to be swimming against recent currents from the Supreme Court

regarding notice pleading, see Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-14

(2002); Doe v. Cassel, 403 F.3d 986, 989 (8th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that

Swierkiewicz has abrogated Eighth Circuit § 1983 heightened pleading requirements).

With respect to part III of the Court’s opinion, I respectfully dissent. In my

view, dismissal of the state law claim with prejudice is an abuse of discretion where

the movants did not address the state law claim in their summary judgment motion and

the district court was similarly silent on the claim. “It is well settled the party seeking

summary judgment must first identify grounds demonstrating the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact.” Robinson v. White County, 459 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2006)

(quotation and alteration omitted) (reversing the district court’s dismissal of state law

claims because the party seeking summary judgment failed to identify grounds

demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to those

claims and the district court failed to articulate a basis for dismissing those claims).

In Ivy v. Kimbrough, the district court did address the state law claims at issue there

when it concluded that there was no evidence to support them or the § 1983 claims,

which relied on the same core facts. 115 F.3d 550, 553 (8th Cir. 1997). Here, I do not

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The parties neither briefed nor argued Arkansas immunity issues.

7

I am not convinced that plain error review is appropriate here where the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment failed to address the state law claim at all

and where they only requested “the summary dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint,”

without clearly requesting that the dismissal be with prejudice. The nonmoving party

should not have a duty to “preserve” an issue that the moving party has not

specifically put at issue. 

8

Although Baker would have faced a statute of limitations issue with respect to

the state law claim, he also might have had recourse to tolling of the limitations

period. See Ragland v. Alpha Aviation, Inc., 686 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Ark. 1985). 

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find it particularly relevant that the state law claim at issue “arose out of the same core

of operative facts” as the federal claims because the federal claims were dismissed on

limitations and immunity grounds, and it is not clear that an immunity analysis under

Arkansas law would reach the same result.6

 

Even assuming that we should review this issue under a plain error standard,7

the movants here failed to meet their predicate burden of establishing their entitlement

to summary judgment on the state law claim, and the district court’s dismissal of that

claim with prejudice leaves Baker worse off for having pled the claim in federal

court.8

 See Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 481 F.3d 619, 627 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Under [the

plain error] standard, a verdict should be reversed only if the error has prejudiced the

substantial rights of a party and would result in a miscarriage of justice if left

uncorrected.”). 

Under these circumstances, I would direct the district court to dismiss the state

law claim without prejudice.

______________________________

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