Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-09506/USCOURTS-ca10-90-09506-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Aviation Administration
Respondent
William L. Marcy
Petitioner

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

WILLIAM L. MARCY, 

Petitioner, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

B ' l ED 1:· 1 ~ .. Unite.:i Srnu,~ Cou.rt of Appeals 

Tenth Cirroit 

JUN 2 6 1~91 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) No. 90-9506 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 

Respondent. 

) (Petition for Review of 

) Federal Aviation Ad.min-

) istration Order) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, SETH, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Petitioner William L. Marcy appeals the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) decision not to renew his certificate of 

authority (COA) to act as a designated engineering representative 

(DER) on behalf of the FAA. Pursuant to 49 u.s.c. app. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-9506 Document: 010110128190 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 1 
S 1355(a), 1 the FAA is authorized to designate properly qualified 

persons in the private sector to act as structural engineering 

representatives of the FAA for the purpose of examining and 

approving certain aircraft engineering data. See also 14 C.F.R. 

S 183.1; FAA Order 8110.37(5)(b). 

The COA, issued to a DER, is renewable yearly, "unless sooner 

terminated ... (4) Upon a finding by the Administration that the 

representative has not properly performed his duties under the 

designation; . or (6) For any reason the Administration 

considers appropriate." 14 C.F.R. § 183.15(c), (d)(4) and (6). 

Except for the year 1985, petitioner's certificate as a DER was 

renewed yearly from 1975 until he was denied renewal in January, 

1989. 

FACTS 

By letter dated December 21, 1988, petitioner was notified by 

Michael Borfitz (Borfitz), Supervisor of the Denver Aircraft 

Certification Field Office (ACFO), that his status as a DER was 

under investigation and his COA might not be renewed for 1989. 

R. Tab 5 at 1-2. In this letter, Borfitz indicated that 

petitioner could request a meeting regarding this investigation. 

1 49 u.s.c. app. S 1355(a) states in part: 

(T]he Secretary of Transportation may, ... delegate to 

any properly qualified private person, or to any 

employee or employees under the supervision of such 

person, any work, business, or function respecting (1) 

the examination, inspection, and testing necessary to 

the issuance of certificates under subchapter VI of this 

chapter, and (2) the issuance of such certificates in 

accordance with standards established by him. The 

Secretary of Transportation may ..• rescind any 

delegation made by him pursuant to this subsection at 

any time and for any reason which he deems appropriate. 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-9506 Document: 010110128190 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 2 
, 

Petitioner immediately availed himself of this offer, and met with 

Borfitz on December 22, 1988. No record of this meeting was made. 

On January 31, 1989, petitioner applied for renewal of his 

COA. On the same date, Borfitz notified petitioner by letter of 

seven specific areas of concern regarding petitioner's performance 

and attitude which precluded his renewal. The investigation 

centered on two main incidents wherein petitioner allegedly 

exceeded the bounds of his authority. Surrounding these incidents 

were allegations of argumentative and uncooperative behavior on 

the part of petitioner. Petitioner was asked to respond to these 

allegations in writing. R. Tab. 5 at 1. 

Petitioner supplied Borfitz with a thirteen-page letter 

addressing each ground in detail. On June 19, 1989, Borfitz 

notified petitioner that he had reviewed his response and 

concluded that his COA should not be renewed. In this same 

communique, petitioner was advised of his right to appeal the 

decision to Borfitz either orally or in writing. Borfitz stated 

that an oral appeal would be recorded. R. Tab 10 at 5. 

Petitioner submitted a written appeal to Borfitz which was denied 

by letter dated September 27, 1989. At this time, Borfitz 

informed petitioner that pursuant to FAA procedures, he could 

appeal this decision to Leroy Keith, Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, in Seattle, Washington (Keith). Borfitz again 

advised petitioner that this appeal to Keith could be either 

written or oral, but if he wished to make an oral appeal, he was 

required to give Keith three days advance notice so that 

arrangements for recording the meeting could be made. R. Tab 15 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-9506 Document: 010110128190 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 3 
at 2. Petitioner chose to make a written appeal by letter to 

Keith. On December 22, 1989, his appeal was denied, and he was 

notified by final FAA order that his authorization would not be 

renewed. R. Tab 20. 

In his petition for review, petitioner argues that (1) he was 

denied due process in the FAA decision not to renew his 

designation in that he was not afforded an evidentiary hearing, 

was not afforded an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the 

people the FAA claim had lodged complaints regarding his attitude, 

and was not fully informed of the specific incidents and 

complaints of uncooperative attitude which led to his nonrenewal, 

and (2) the FAA's decision regarding nonrenewal of his COA was not 

supported by sufficient evidence. We exercise jurisdiction under 

49 u.s.c. app. S 1486 and affirm. 

SCOPE OF REVIEW 

The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 sets forth the guidelines to 

be followed in seeking judicial review of an FAA decision. "The 

findings of facts by the Board or Secretary of Transportation, if 

supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 49 

u.s.c. app. S 1486(e); City of Pompano Beach v. FAA, 774 F.2d 

1529, 1539 (11th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence supporting the 

agency's findings exists if the record reveals "'relevant evidence 

[that] a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.'" Id. at 1540 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. 

NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). "[C]ircumstantial evidence in 

the record may contribute to the substantial evidence supporting 

an agency's findings .... [N]ot only must the agency's factual 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-9506 Document: 010110128190 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 4 
findings be supported by substantial evidence, but the agency's 

nonfactual analysis . and conclusion must also be reasonable 

and not arbitrary and capricious." City of Pompano Beach v. FAA, 

744 F.2d at 1540. 

"When courts review administrative agency decisions, they 

give great deference to agency determinations. . . • [T]he 

[agency's] decision will be upheld unless [it] failed to consider 

all relevant factors and articulate a rational connection between 

the facts found and the choice made." Action, Inc. v. Donovan, 

789 F.2d 1453, 1457 (10th Cir. 1986); see also Wilder v. Prokop, 

846 F.2d 613, 619 (10th Cir. 1988). 

DISCUSSION 

Due process requires, at a minimum, notice and an opportunity 

to be heard in a meaningful time and manner. Cleveland Bd. of 

Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985); Goldberg v. Kelly, 

397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970). In order to be entitled to procedural 

due process, petitioner must demonstrate that he is being deprived 

of a liberty or property interest by governmental action. Board 

of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Because we here 

conclude that petitioner was afforded all the process due in any 

event, we do not decide whether he possessed a protected property 

interest in his DER status. See Meder v. City of Oklahoma City. 

869 F.2d 553, 554 (10th Cir. 1989). 

Petitioner initially argues that he was denied due process 

because he was not afforded an opportunity for a hearing. In 

determining whether a full evidentiary hearing is required, the 

court must balance three factors: (1) the nature of the 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-9506 Document: 010110128190 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 5 
individual interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous 

deprivation and the probable value of additional procedural 

safeguards; and (3) the nature of the governmental interest 

involved. Rosewitz v. Latting, 689 F.2d 175, 177 (10th Cir. 

1982)(citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 

"The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can 

vary depending upon the importance of the interests 

involved .••• " Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 

(1971). In the present case, the record indicates that petitioner 

was offered multiple opportunities to fully present his case, 

orally and in writing, to Borfitz. He subsequently was offered 

two opportunities to present recorded oral appeals, once to 

Borfitz, R. Tab 10 at 5, and once to Keith, R. Tab 15 at 2. The 

record indicates that he waived both of these opportunities in 

favor of written appeals. Petitioner thus received adequate 

opportunity to respond, and an opportunity to make a recorded oral 

appeal to an impartial decisiorunaker. Whether he had exceeded the 

bounds of his authority was fully aired in the exchange of 

letters. Moreover, the determination that petitioner's 

argumentative attitude was sufficiently egregious to warrant 

nonrenewal is basically a judgment call, and we fail to see how an 

evidentiary hearing would have changed the outcome of this 

decision. Under these circumstances, the risk of erroneous 

deprivation was not great, see Rosewitz, 689 F.2d at 177, and the 

lack of a full evidentiary hearing did not violate petitioner's 

constitutional rights to due process. 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-9506 Document: 010110128190 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 6 
Next, we address petitioner's contention that he was not 

allowed to confront those "people in the FAA" who complained 

regarding his argumentative and uncooperative attitude. R. Tab 10 

at 5. This court has previously determined that a party is not 

necessarily entitled to "be present when others testified against 

[him], or to cross-examine those witnesses." Rosewitz v. Latting, 

689 F.2d at 178. Petitioner was given "clear notice" and an 

opportunity to present his version of the case to the 

investigating party and to appeal the decision to an impartial 

party. See id. at 177; see also Boston v. Webb, 783 F.2d 1163, 

1167 (4th Cir. 1986)(cross-examination not required where party 

given two opportunities to refute charges). 

Petitioner further argues that he was not given adequate 

notice of the specific complaints against him. We disagree. 

Because our discussion of this argument requires an examination of 

the evidence in the record supporting the FAA decision, in the 

interest of brevity and to avoid repetition, we join this issue 

with petitioner's question of the sufficiency of the evidence. 

FAA Order 8110.4, section 195(a)(4) states that "[a]ll 

Designated Engineering Representatives must: .. . (4) [p]ossess 

integrity, sound judgment, and a cooperative attitude." All of 

these qualities were called into question by the FAA in their 

decision not to renew petitioner's COA. In a letter dated 

December 23, 1988, from the manager of the Chicago Aircraft 

Certification Office to the manager of the Denver Aircraft 

Certification Office, it was stated that "Mr. Marcy ••. exhibits 

an unwillingness to represent the FAA and its viewpoint when said 

7 

Appellate Case: 90-9506 Document: 010110128190 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 7 
viewpoint differs from his .. [H]e continues his argument, 

expending considerable energy explaining why he feels something 

shouldn't be required ..•. [He] has a tendency to take policy 

and guidance or regulatory material out of context to support his 

own viewpoint." R. Tab 3 at 1. 

In his own responses to the FAA's concerns regarding his 

renewal, petitioner himself acknowledged that there had been 

numerous incidents where he had strongly disagreed with his FAA 

supervisors. He stated to Keith, in reference to some of the FAA 

engineers he had worked with, that "you would chuckle at some of 

the examples of ignorance I have encountered." R. Tab 17 at 5. 

In his responding letter of February 10, 1989, petitioner 

continued to stress his right to disagree and to "present 

reasoned, rational arguments and alternative interpretations of 

regulations." R. Tab 9 at 10-11. In his appeal letter to Borfitz 

dated August 11, 1989, petitioner admitted his knowledge that the 

FAA decision not to renew his designation was based on "two 

specific incidents, plus a background of no more than half a dozen 

additional projects on which there have been extensive discussions 

and disagreement with [the FAA]." R. Tab 13 at 1. In the same 

correspondence petitioner stated, "What you perceive as an 

argumentative and uncooperative attitude is my response to 

numerous instances of vague and often incorrect guidance and 

direction from the FAA." Id. at 2. He then proceeded to list 

twenty-two such instances which he perceived to be incorrect and 

worthy of argument. Id. at 2-4. 

8 

Appellate Case: 90-9506 Document: 010110128190 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 8 
.. Petitioner further stated, 

It is quite apparent that the real difference between us 

is perception of an uncooperative attitude: an 

unwillingness to accept supervisory direction without 

question, whether or not that direction is correct. You 

state that many FAA engineers have corroborated this. 

However, the FAA project officers have seldom, if ever, 

specifically stated that I was ordered to accept their 

direction .•.. In the future, when I cannot agree 

with the direction I receive from FAA project engineers, 

I will request that you submit the question to higher 

authority. 

Id. at 4. He also stated that he was willing to accept nonrenewal 

of his certification due to "insubordination, provided that it is 

explicitly stated that [his] professional and ethical integrity 

are not in question." Id. at 5. It is our view that the tone of 

these attempts to dissuade the FAA decision are, in themselves, 

indicia of an argumentative attitude. 

In petitioner's appeal letter to Keith dated November 6, 

1989, he acknowledged that his uncooperative attitude was the 

"principle issue" presented as reason for his nonrenewal. R. Tab 

17 at 4. In the same vein, petitioner referred to a letter he 

wrote to the ACFO in July, 1985, in response to his nonrenewal in 

that year, in which he stated his regret for his uncooperative 

attitude and his promise to correct the problem. Later in the 

same reference, he asserted that the allegations of uncooperative 

attitude were based upon "less than a dozen incidents out of more 

than 700 technical reports." Petitioner continued to argue that 

in all such incidents, "interpreted by the ACFO as an 

uncooperative attitude," the FAA failed to consider that 

petitioner expressed "the more correct view." Id. at 5. It is 

clear from petitioner's various responses that he was aware of the 

9 

Appellate Case: 90-9506 Document: 010110128190 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 9 
grounds upon which the FAA based its decision, and that he had 

sufficient notice and knowledge of the specifics of the problem. 

These admissions fatally dilute his contention that he was not 

notified of the FAA's concerns. Petitioner's own admissions 

provide meaningful evidence of his history of argumentative and 

uncooperative behavior. 

FAA Order 8110.37, the Designated Engineering Representative 

Guidance Handbook states, 

g. Designation Renewals. A DER's designation expires 

annually and must be either renewed or terminated for 

cause. The cause could be any of the following: 

(1) DER services are no longer needed by FAA, as 

evidenced by insufficient DER activity: 

(2) The DER becomes an employee of a DAS (ref. 

par. 9c): 

(3) The company terminates the DER's employment: 

or 

(4) Continued integrity is not found in the DER's 

work or communications. 

In addition to allegations that petitioner exhibited an 

argumentative and uncooperative attitude, the decision not to 

renew petitioner's certificate was based upon two main incidents 

in which the FAA claimed that petitioner exceeded the bounds of 

his authority in violation of agency regulations. In regard to 

the first incident, the FAA contended that petitioner approved 

electrical data on the installation of a "hot plate" (windshield) 

on a Cessna 402B aircraft, and further approved the hot plate for 

adequate visibility without actually examining the airplane's 

visibility. The FAA further asserted that these actions would 

have allowed the aircraft to fly into icy conditions without the 

10 

Appellate Case: 90-9506 Document: 010110128190 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 10 
proper determination of safety. Although admitting that he 

"inadvertently" checked the "approved" box rather than the 

"approval recommended" box on FAA Form 8110-3, petitioner 

continued to argue that the replacement of the windshield was a 

"minor" rather than a "major" modification and therefore his 

actions were within his realm of authorization. However, while 

disavowing willful intent, petitioner admitted that his report 

regarding this project was "poorly conceived and executed." R. 

Tab 14 at 2. 

The second incident cited by the FAA involved fatigue testing 

approval of a strut modification on Cessna 120 and Cessna 140 

aircraft. It is this incident which provoked the previously 

referenced letter from the manager of the Chicago ACFO regarding 

his problems in working with petitioner on this project. The 

record indicates that petitioner strongly disagreed with the 

Chicago ACFO regarding this matter and continued, for some time, 

to argue his point, both by telephone and letter. It is unclear 

whether this incident involved petitioner's approval of the actual 

fatigue testing or his disagreement with the need for the fatigue 

testing. This resolution, however, is not germane to our 

conclusion that once again petitioner refused to bend to the 

ultimate authority of the FAA, and continued to insist upon his 

own interpretation of the appropriate regulations. 

Petitioner was reinstated as a DER in 1986 following his 

agreement to correct his attitude problems. Substantial evidence 

supports the FAA's conclusions that petitioner failed to live up 

to this agreement, and therefore his problems had to be considered 

11 

Appellate Case: 90-9506 Document: 010110128190 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 11 
• "chronic and uncorrectable" creating a liability which defeated 

the FAA purpose in the DER program. R. Tab. 10 at 5. 

In conclusion, upon a thorough review of the record, it is 

our determination that the FAA's decision not to renew 

petitioner's DER status was supported by substantial evidence and 

was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The parties' respective 

requests for oral argument are DENIED. Petitioner's request for 

attorney's fees is DENIED. The final order of the FAA denying 

renewal of petitioner's designated engineering representative 

certificate of authorization is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Stephanie K. Seymour 

Circuit Judge 

12 

Appellate Case: 90-9506 Document: 010110128190 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 12