Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-03238/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-03238-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chris Edson
Defendant
Joseph Daniel Nevis
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH DANIEL NEVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHRIS EDSON,

Defendant.

No. 2:18-cv-03238-JAM-DMC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff Joseph Nevis (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action

(“Nevis II”) against Chris Edson (“Defendant”), on December 20, 

2018, alleging Defendant negligently operated the Amtrak train 

that struck and amputated Plaintiff’s legs. See Compl., ECF No. 

1. Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages. Id. Defendant moved 

for dismissal on December 18, 2019, arguing Plaintiff’s service 

was not timely and this lawsuit is duplicative of Nevis v. 

Rideout Memorial Hospital, et al, 17-cv-02295 (“Nevis I”). Mot., 

ECF No. 8. Plaintiff opposed Defendant’s motion. Opp’n, ECF No. 

9. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s 

Motion to Dismiss.1

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled 

for February 25, 2020.

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A discussion of the instant action’s procedural history 

would be incomplete absent a discussion of Nevis v. Rideout 

Memorial Hospital, et al, 17-cv-02295. The two cases are 

inextricably intertwined. Nevis I was filed on November 1, 2017. 

See Compl. 17-cv-02295 (“Nevis I Compl.”), ECF No. 1. Nevis I 

named, among others, Defendant’s employer, National Railroad 

Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”), and Doe Engineer, Conductor,

and Train Operators as defendants. See Nevis I Compl. at 1. 

After Plaintiff indicated he would not amend the complaint to 

name the Doe defendants, they were dismissed from Nevis I. See

Nevis I Joint Status Rep., ECF No. 9; Nevis I Status Pretrial 

Scheduling Order, ECF No. 11.

On February 23, 2018, during Nevis I’s discovery process, 

Defendant was identified as the engineer of Amtrak’s train. Mot. 

at 2. Nevis II was filed ten months later. See Compl. 18-cv03238 (“Nevis II Compl.”), ECF No. 1. But Defendant was not 

served in Nevis II until November 27, 2019—nearly a year after 

the case was filed. Mot. at 3. Meanwhile, the defendants in 

Nevis I filed motions for summary judgment. See Nevis I Defs.’ 

Mots. for Summ. J., ECF Nos. 66, 89, 90. Following the 

adjudication of those motions, negligence claims are all that 

remain in Nevis I. See Nevis I Hr’g Min., at ECF Nos. 82, 112. 

Included in Plaintiff’s remaining claim against Amtrak is the 

allegation that Defendant, as Amtrak’s engineer, was negligent in 

failing to maintain a proper lookout. See Tr. of Mot. Hr’g, at 

ECF No. 119.

Accordingly, the remaining claim against Amtrak in Nevis I 

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is the same as the claim against Defendant in Nevis II. Both 

allege Defendant negligently operated the Amtrak train that 

struck and injured Plaintiff.

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

“A federal court does not have jurisdiction over a defendant 

unless the defendant has been served properly under [Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure] 4.” Direct Mail Specialists v. Eclat 

Computerized Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Although courts flexibly interpret this rule, neither actual 

notice nor naming the defendant in the complaint is sufficient to 

provide personal jurisdiction without substantial compliance with 

Rule 4. Id. (citing Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir.

1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987)).

A party may move to dismiss a pleading based on insufficient 

service of process, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). Service of process 

is insufficient “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days 

after the complaint is filed . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 

Rule 4(m) “encourages efficient litigation by minimizing the time 

between commencement of an action and service of process.” 

Electric Specialty Co. v. Road and Rach Supply, Inc., 967 F.2d 

309, 311 (9th Cir. 1992) (addressing former Fed. R. Civ. P. 

4(j)). “Where service of process is insufficient, the court has 

broad discretion to dismiss the action or to retain the case but 

quash the service that has been made on defendant.” Cranford v. 

United States, 359 F. Supp. 2d 981, 984 (E.D. Cal. 2005).

However, if plaintiff has shown good cause for the failure 

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to effect service timely, plaintiff is entitled to a mandatory 

extension. Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 

2007). “At a minimum, ‘good cause’ means excusable neglect.” 

Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1991). “Good 

cause” for delay “generally means that service has been attempted 

but not completed, that plaintiff was confused about the 

requirements of service, or that plaintiff was prevented from 

serving defendants by factors beyond his control.” Hernandez v. 

Senegor, No. 2:11-cv-3248, WL 1966122 at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2013) 

(internal citation omitted). Inadvertent error or ignorance of 

governing rules alone will not excuse plaintiff’s failure to 

effect timely service. Wei v. Hawaii, 763 F.2d 370, 372 (9th 

Cir. 1985).

In addition to establishing good cause, Plaintiff may also 

be required to show: (a) the party to be served personally 

received actual notice of the lawsuit; (b) the defendant would 

suffer no prejudice; and (c) plaintiff would be severely 

prejudiced if his complaint were dismissed. Boudette, 923 F.2d 

at 756.

B. Analysis

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s failure to effect timely 

service is not in dispute. Opp’n at 4. Defendant was served 

nearly a year after the complaint was filed. Mot. at 3. And 

because Defendant challenged the sufficiency of service, 

Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing proper service. 

Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Plaintiff, in his opposition, fails to explain, let alone 

provide good cause, why he served Defendant 343 days after Nevis 

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II was filed. Plaintiff’s arguments regarding his change in 

counsel or attempts to serve Defendant via Amtrak’s counsel are 

neither persuasive or constitute good cause. See Opp’n at 4–5. 

The controlling facts are: Plaintiff’s current counsel took over 

in April 2019; Defendant was deposed by Plaintiff’s counsel on 

August 8, 2019; and Defendant was not served until November 27, 

2019. Opp’n at 4–6. Even assuming Plaintiff did encounter 

reasonable delays resulting from the change in representation

and Amtrak’s counsel’s refusal to accept service on behalf of 

Defendant, Plaintiff offers no explanation as to why he did not 

effect service during Defendant’s deposition in Nevis I. That

deposition took place four months after current counsel 

commenced representation—enough time to get up to speed. 

Plaintiff’s failure to effect timely service is, thus,

inexcusable.

In weighing whether to dismiss based on insufficient 

service of process or excuse Plaintiff’s delay, the Court 

considered the prejudice dismissal would work on the Plaintiff. 

As Plaintiff points out, if dismissed, the statute of 

limitations would prevent him from refiling this complaint. 

Opp’n at 6. But this ultimately results in little prejudice as—

by Plaintiff’s own admission—this suit is effectively identical

to the claim remaining against Amtrak in Nevis I. Opp’n at 12. 

Thus, Plaintiff’s ongoing negligence action against Amtrak 

substantially mitigates any harm resulting from dismissal of the 

instant action.

Accordingly, because Defendant was not properly served, and 

Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause to excuse his failure 

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to effect service timely, all claims against Defendant are 

dismissed.

III. ORDER

The Court GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 28, 2020

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