Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_09-cv-00605/USCOURTS-almd-3_09-cv-00605-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Louie Alexander
Plaintiff
Evening Shade Inc.
Defendant
Rick Haddock
Defendant
Penny Proffit Cleaners
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, EASTERN DIVISION

LOUIE ALEXANDER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 3:09cv605-MHT

) (WO)

EVENING SHADE INC., d/b/a )

PENNY PROFFIT CLEANERS, and )

RICK HADDOCK, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Louie Alexander, an African-American male,

brings claims for race discrimination and retaliation,

pursuant to Title VII (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 2000e to 2000e),

and § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42

U.S.C. § 1981), against defendants Evening Shade Inc.,

doing business as “Penny Proffit Cleaners,” and Rick

Haddock. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331

(federal question), § 1343 (civil rights), and § 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (Title VII). Penny Profit

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2

(incorrectly spelled by Alexander as Penny Proffit) and

Haddock now move for summary judgment on these claims.

For the reasons that follow, the motion will be denied in

part and granted in part.

I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any

affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Under

Rule 56, the court must view the admissible evidence in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw

all reasonable inferences in favor of that party.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

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1. In addition to Penny Profit, Haddock owns Vintage

Comfort, Inc., Haddock Corp. (d/b/a Auburn Automotive),

and Vision Collision Center, Inc. Auburn Automotive and

Vision Collision Center, Inc. are auto-repair businesses,

while Vintage Comfort owns the real estate upon which

(continued...)

3

II. BACKGROUND

Penny Profit is a dry cleaning business with various

branches throughout the State of Alabama. In September

2007, it hired Alexander in its Auburn branch to wash,

separate, sort, and bag clothes and transport them to and

from its Opelika branch. After completing his initial

training, Alexander began working 30 to 35 hours a week.

Alexander asserts that, soon after Haddock purchased

the business in March 2008, Haddock dramatically cut

Alexander’s hours: Alexander’s schedule was reduced to 20

to 25 hours a week in the months following Haddock’s

take-over, and, in the next year, he was assigned to work

fewer than 15 hours a week. He alleges that his hours

were reduced further when a white Penny Profit employee,

as well as white employees from Haddock’s other

businesses, began assuming his job tasks.1

 

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1. (...continued)

Haddock’s other businesses operate. 

4

Alexander also alleges that, under Haddock, working

hours for black employees were cut drastically, while the

hours for white employees remained unchanged, and that

whites were assigned to more favorable posts within the

store. Alexander states that only white employees were

scheduled to work at the front-counter cash register, a

position with a fixed schedule, while black employees

were forced to work “in the back” of the dry cleaning

plant, where the hours are dependent on the business’s

work-load. Pl.’s Br. at 4 (Doc. No. 37). He contends

that, consequentially, black employees consistently

received fewer hours than white employees. He also avers

that the racial division was apparent among the store’s

supervisors, and states that white supervisor Beth Taylor

“was hired to work in the back but is now working in the

front,” while black supervisor Sheika Dumas is “forced to

work in back.” Id. 

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After Alexander complained to Haddock about racial

discrimination in the workplace, Haddock issued him a

reprimand, charging him with incorrectly bagging clothes.

When Alexander continued to protest his treatment,

Haddock purportedly “continued to write [him] up.” Pl’s

Br. at 7. On July 8, 2008, Alexander filed a charge of

race discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC), alleging that Haddock “reduced the

hours for African American employees, which reduced their

wages,” while “white employees did not suffer a similar

hour reduction or wage reduction.” EEOC Compl. (Doc. No.

37-2). After the EEOC notified Penny Profit of its

investigation, Haddock increased Alexander’s hours to

approximately 15 a week; however, his hours were reduced

to less than 10 a week after the EEOC dismissed the

charge. Alexander states that, after he complained to

the EEOC, “he was harassed weekly and falsely accused of

wrongdoing by Haddock.” Pl’s Br. at 23. 

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Alexander, who continues to work at the dry cleaning

business, filed this lawsuit on June 29, 2009.

III. JURISDICTION

Penny Profit and Haddock contest the court’s

jurisdiction over Alexander’s Title VII claims, asserting

that Penny Profit does not fall within the statutory

definition of “employer,” and thus is not subject to suit

under Title VII. Title VII defines an employer as “a

person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has

fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of

twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding

calendar year.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Whether Penny

Profit constitutes an employer under the statute is a

“threshold jurisdictional issue” for the court to decide.

Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 961 (11th Cir. 1999).

The record here reflects that the Title VII claims

are properly before this court. The time sheets

submitted by Alexander show that, in 2009, Penny Profit

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employed at least 14 workers for 20 weeks or more during

the calendar year, and Alexander testified that at least

three employees who were not listed in the haphazard

collection of time cards worked full-time at the

business. This evidence is sufficient to support a

finding of jurisdiction. See Virgo v. Riviera Beach

Associates, Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1361 (11th Cir. 1994)

(finding Title VII’s jurisdictional requirement was

satisfied where “[n]ine employees are specifically

identified in the record, and many other positions are

described including the restaurant staff, maintenance

staff, housekeeper, and lounge staff.”).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Disparate Treatment

Alexander claims that he suffered race discrimination

in the terms and conditions of his employment, in

violation of Title VII and § 1981. These claims are

governed by the familiar burden-shifting scheme set forth

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under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,

802 (1973). See Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services, Inc., 161

F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998) (Title VII and § 1981

“have the same requirements of proof and use the same

analytical framework.”). Alexander may survive summary

judgment by establishing a prima-facie case that he was

(1) a qualified member of a protected class; (2) subject

to an adverse-employment action; and (3) treated less

favorably than a similarly situated individual outside

the protected class. See Wilson v. B/E/ Aerospace, Inc.,

376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004). Once Alexander

shows these elements, the burden shifts to Penny Profit

and Haddock to articulate a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for their actions. Id. Their

evidence should “allow the trier of fact rationally to

conclude that the employment decision had not been

motivated by discriminatory animus.” Texas Dept. of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257 (1981).

If Penny Profit and Haddock can articulate one or more

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non-discriminatory reasons, “then the presumption of

discrimination is rebutted, and the burden of production

shifts to [Alexander] to offer evidence that the alleged

reason ... is pretext for illegal discrimination.”

Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1087. 

Alexander has satisfied the first two prongs of his

prima-facie case. He is clearly a member of a protected

class, and there is little doubt that he suffered an

adverse-employment action, as a reduction in hours

results directly in a reduction in pay, which is

actionable under Title VII and § 1981. See Minix v.

Jeld-Wen, Inc., 2006 WL 2971654 at *3 (M.D. Ala. 2006)

(Thompson, J.) (“Employment decisions that alter

compensation are obviously tangible employment decisions,

and thus ‘a reduction in an employee's hours, which

reduces the employee's take home pay, qualifies as a

tangible employment decision.’”) (citations omitted).

Alexander’s time sheets demonstrate that he maintained,

on average, a 35-hour work week in the months before

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2. Haddock stated that Alexander is the only employee

in charge of bagging clothes and delivering them to the

Opelika branch, except on the days when Alexander “calls

in sick” and Haddock assigns the tasks to another

employee. Haddock Dep. at 37 (Doc. No. 37-8).

10

Haddock purchased Penny Profit in March 2008; by late

2009, Alexander worked fewer than 15 hours a week.

Where Alexander runs into difficulty is establishing

the third prong of his prima-facie case. In order to

establish circumstantial evidence of discrimination, a

plaintiff may demonstrate he has been treated less

favorably than a similarly situated individual outside

the protected class. However, because Alexander is the

sole individual employed in his particular position and

because he is the only one subject to the job’s specific

standards and responsibilities, he cannot rely upon a

comparator to show that his hours were reduced as a

result of his race.2

 See Wilson v. Alabama Dept. of Human

Resources, 2010 WL 1254319 at *4 (M.D. Ala. 2010)

(Thompson, J.) (“In order to constitute ‘similarly

situated’ employees, the individuals must have ‘(1) dealt

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with the same supervisor, (2) been subject to the same

standards, and (3) engaged in the same conduct without

such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that

would distinguish their conduct or the employer's

treatment of them for it.’”) (citations omitted).

Nevertheless, the methods of establishing a primafacie case “are flexible and depend to a large degree

upon the employment situation.” Wilson, 376 F.3d at

1087. See also Ralston v. Bell Aerospace Services, Inc.,

2010 WL 2403084 at *5 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (Thompson, J.)

(“[D]emonstrating a prima facie case is not onerous; it

requires only that the plaintiff establish facts adequate

to permit an inference of discrimination.”) (citations

omitted). Thus, the court examines whether Alexander has

presented any other evidence of disparate treatment that

would give rise to an inference of intentional

discrimination. See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555,

1562 (11th Cir. 1997) (“If a plaintiff fails to show the

existence of a similarly situated employee, summary

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judgment is appropriate where no other evidence of

discrimination is present.”).

 Alexander’s primary evidence of race discrimination

concerns the reduction in his working hours, and the

working hours of all black employees, after Haddock

purchased Penny Profit. He asserts that, while the hours

of other black employees were reduced generally after

Haddock’s takeover, his hours in particular decreased

significantly, because Haddock allowed white employees to

assume many of his job responsibilities. Addressing his

schedule change, Alexander testified that a white Penny

Profit employee and three white men who worked for

Haddock in his independent automotive businesses were put

in charge of Alexander’s regular tasks, including “the

laundry, the sorting of the clothes, and the assembling.”

Alexander Dep. at 33-34 (Doc. No. 37-7). At times, his

sole responsibility was “driving the clothes to Opelika.”

Id. at 34. Consequently, his working schedule decreased

from 35 hours a week to less than 10 hours a week, over

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the course of Haddock’s ownership. As for the other

black employees, Alexander points to time sheets

submitted before this court as evidence that Haddock “cut

the hours of all the black employees,” while the “white

employee[s’] hours stayed the same.” Pl.’s Br. at 3. 

Apart from his scheduling arguments, Alexander also

alleges that his supervisor, Taylor, discriminated

against him in the course of his employment--once when

she reprimanded him for “taking too long” during his

delivery to Opelika, and on another occasion when she

“cursed him out” in front of other employees. Alexander

Dep. at 69. Finally, Alexander contends that Haddock

refused to assign him to work as a cashier at the front

counter (which would have increased his weekly hours),

despite the fact that Alexander was capable of performing

the requisite duties.

Alexander’s evidence of disparate treatment is based

almost entirely on his own testimony; however, at this

stage in the litigation, the court accepts the

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3. Alexander offers a notarized deposition by Penny

Profit employee Renita Robinson, in which she attests

that Haddock “cut down on [Alexander’s] hours and give

[sic] it to the white [sic].” Doc. No. 37-13. Again,

this deposition does not suggest that Haddock was

motivated by racial animus in reducing Alexander’s hours.

14

allegations in the light most favorable to Alexander.

Nevertheless, Alexander’s factual assertions are not

sufficient to establish a prima-facie case of disparate

treatment. As to his principal allegation (that Haddock

purposely reduced his hours in favor of white employees),

it is evident from the company time cards that

Alexander’s hours decreased substantially in the year

after Haddock assumed ownership of Penny Profit; but

Alexander has failed to show any causal connection

between the reduction in hours and his race, that is,

there is nothing in the record to suggest that his hours

were cut because he was black, nor is there evidence that

other employees were given his tasks because they were

white.3

 There is also no evidence that white employees

were hired for the purpose of appropriating Alexander’s

tasks, and Alexander himself admits that both white and

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4. Alexander states that, after complaining to

Haddock about race discrimination, “Sheika, Vannie, and

Beth” were tasked with sorting clothes, a job originally

assigned to Alexander. Pl.’s Br. at 7. He also alleges

that he was no longer allowed to do the laundry during

his afternoon shifts, as “Sheika and Erica ... wash the

clothes in the morning.” Id. According to Alexander,

both Sheika and Vannie are black females. 

15

black employees began assuming his job responsibilities

under Haddock, negating any contention that only white

employees benefitted from Alexander’s reduction in hours.4

Furthermore, Alexander fails to make an adequate

showing that Haddock reduced the hours of only his black

employees. Alexander has ‘dumped’ a collection of time

sheets upon this court, asserting that they demonstrate

disparate impact. However, after reviewing the time

sheets, the court finds that this conclusion is not, in

fact, an obvious one. To the contrary, these company

records appear to demonstrate that the hours of all

employees, both black and white, decreased over the

relevant time period. Moreover, it is not the court’s

obligation to distill the evidence that Alexander has

provided in support of his claim. See Edwards v. Hyundai

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Motor Mfg. Alabama, LLC, 2009 WL 1257164 at *3 (M.D. Ala.

2009) (Thompson, J.) (“Parties may not, by the simple

expedient of dumping a mass of evidentiary material into

the record, shift to the Court the burden of identifying

evidence supporting their respective positions.”)

(citations omitted). The court “is under no obligation

to comb through [the evidence] to help a party meet its

burden under the law,” Bell Aerospace, Inc. V. U.S. Aero

Services, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1274 (M.D. Ala.

2010) (Thompson, J.), and the time sheets alone do not

substantiate a claim for disparate treatment. 

As to his allegation regarding Taylor, while she may

have treated Alexander with discourtesy, this treatment

is insufficient to support a finding of intentional

discrimination, when there is no other evidence of racial

animus. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,

523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (“Title VII does not establish “a

general civility code for the American workplace.”).

Finally, Alexander’s bare assertion that he was

discriminated against when Haddock refused to assign him

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to the cash register proves very little; Alexander does

not state that he was similarly situated to the white

employees who were allowed to work the cash register, and

the fact that both white and black employees have been,

and continue to be, assigned to the position defeats

Alexander’s claim of race discrimination. In short,

Alexander cannot demonstrate that he was the victim of

discrimination in the workplace, or that he received less

favorable treatment than comparable white employees.

However, even presuming Alexander has presented a

prima-facie case of race discrimination, the court

concludes that Alexander has failed to show that Haddock’s

proffered reason for reducing Alexander’s hours is mere

pretext. See Jackson v. State of Alabama State Tenure

Com’n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2005) (“In order to

show pretext, the plaintiff must ‘demonstrate that the

proffered reason was not the true reason for the

employment decision .... [The plaintiff] may succeed in

this either directly by persuading the court that a

discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer

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5. See Haddock Dep. at 39 (“Haddock: When I bought

the cleaners when I took over, 1,200 piece count [of

clothing] would be a pretty strong day .... Attorney: Now

what would be a strong day? Haddock: 800.”). 

18

or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered

explanation is unworthy of credence.”) (quoting Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)). Haddock asserts that after he

purchased Penny Profit, he reduced not only Alexander’s

hours, but the hours of all employees who were not in

management positions. See Haddock Dep. at 23 (Doc. No.

37-8) (“Everyone [at Penny Profit] is part-time, including

[Alexander], with the exception of two supervisors.”).

Penny Profit’s business faltered after Haddock acquired

ownership,5

 and Haddock testified that, once he “became

more familiar with the business,” he implemented “some

management efficiency changes,” id. at 24, by, for

example, reducing Alexander’s Opelika deliveries from two

a day to one a day to save gasoline and charging frontcounter workers with the tasks of sorting and tagging

clothes while they were helping customers, though these

responsibilities had originally been assigned to

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Alexander. Haddock also eliminated redundancies,

scheduling one person to work the cash register, rather

than the two employees who had traditionally done so.

Responding to Alexander’s assertions of bias, Haddock

stated that, as Alexander was able to complete his duties

in a 10-hour work week, it was unnecessary to schedule him

for additional shifts. 

Alexander has not demonstrated any “weaknesses,

implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or

contradictions in [Haddock’s] proffered legitimate

reason[],” so that a “reasonable fact-finder could find

[it] unworthy of credence.” Combs v. Plantation Patterns,

106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations

and citations omitted). Specifically, he has failed to

show that Haddock reduced his hours for any reason other

than purely as a money-saving measure. Alexander admits

that neither Haddock nor any other employee ever “said

anything of a racial nature” to him in the course of his

employment at Penny Profit, Alexander dep. at 70, and he

also testified that he has no additional evidence of

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discriminatory “treatment,” other than the record of his

reduced hours and his belief that white employees were

assuming his job responsibilities. Id. at 71.

Alexander’s conclusory assertion that Haddock was

motivated by animus is not, by itself, sufficient to

satisfy the evidentiary requirements of summary judgment.

See Howard v. BP Oil Co, Inc., 32 F.3d 520, 527 (11th Cir.

1994) (“[The plaintiff’s] bare assertion” of

discrimination “does not create any fact question for the

jury.”). 

Because Alexander is unable to show that Haddock

reduced his hours as a pretext to engage in

discrimination, summary judgment will be granted on his

disparate-treatment claim.

 

B. Disparate Impact

Alexander claims that Penny Profit and Haddock

“engaged in practices which seem neutral on their face,

but in effect have a disparate impact on the black

employees at [Penny Profit].” Pl.’s Br. at 21.

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Specifically, he argues that Haddock’s attempt to make the

business more efficient “impacted only the black

employees.” Id. In order to survive summary judgment,

Alexander must demonstrate that the “challenged employment

action or practice has a disproportionate adverse impact

on a category of persons protected by the statute.”

Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1117 (11th

Cir. 1993). This showing “usually focuses on statistical

disparities, rather than specific incidents, and on

competing explanations for those disparities.” Reeves v.

C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 807 (11th

Cir. 2010) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust,

487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988)). Once the plaintiff presents a

prima facie case, the employer has the burden of showing

“that ‘any given requirement [has] a manifest relationship

to the employment in question,’ in order to avoid a

finding of discrimination.” Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.

440, 446-47 (1982) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power, Co., 401

U.S. 424, 432 (1971)) (alteration in original). Again,

the plaintiff may still prevail, “if he shows that the

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6. Alexander also reiterates the factual allegations

set forth under his disparate-treatment claim, that is,

that white employees assumed his job responsibilities,

which resulted in a drastic reduction in his hours. As

these facts support only a claim for disparate treatment,

rather than disparate impact, the court does not repeat

its discussion of the merits of these allegations. 

22

employer was using the [business] practice as a mere

pretext for discrimination.” Id. at 447 (citing Albemarle

Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)).

The crux of Alexander’s claim concerns the disparate

impact of Haddock’s “efficiency” policy on black and white

employees; specifically, he asserts that, after Haddock

bought Penny Profit, blacks suffered reductions in their

work hours, while white schedules were unaffected. He

also alleges that, under Haddock, the front counter

cashiers “were mainly white,” black employees were forced

to work “in the back” of the dry cleaning plant, and a

black employee cashier was “wrongfully accused of stealing

and eventually quit her employment at [Penny Profit].”

Pl.’s Br. at 22.6

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7. Many of the time cards for the 2008 fiscal year

are indecipherable, and so the court referred primarily

to the 2009 cards in its review of the record.

8. In his deposition, Alexander names three black

employees who were allegedly dissatisfied with their

(continued...)

23

Alexander’s evidence falls far short of demonstrating

a “statistical disparity” in employment outcomes among

black and white employees. The time cards, relied on so

heavily by Alexander in his brief, do not actually show

that black employees’ hours were reduced, while white

employees’ hours stayed the same. What the cards do

reveal is that the weekly work schedule was reduced

generally for all employees, both black and white, over

the course of the 2008 and 2009 fiscal years.7

 Though

most other employees were working significantly more hours

than Alexander did (that is, upwards of 30 hours a week),

this fact alone does not suggest discrimination, as

Alexander was the only employee at the company in his

particular position. In sum, there is no statistical

indication (let alone evidence) that Haddock’s “efficiency

policy” had a negative impact only on black employees.8

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8. (...continued)

hours, but he admits that he never “talked with” the

employees about the problem. Alexander Dep. at 43-44

(Doc. No. 37-7). Of the employment records that were

discernable for these named employees, there is no

evidence that their hours decreased over the relevant

time period.

24

Likewise, Alexander’s anecdotal evidence does nothing

to advance his cause. Alexander asserts that the front

counter cashiers “were mainly white,” though his own

testimony fails to support this claim. He stated that,

before Haddock took over the business, one or two black

employees worked the front counter and that, after Haddock

bought Penny Profit, one black worked the front counter

But he also testified that there is currently a white

employee who works the first shift at the counter, and a

black employee who works the second shift. There is, in

fact, no indication that the number of black employees

working at the counter changed over the course of

Haddock’s ownership. As for Alexander’s allegation that

black employees are required “to work in the back” of the

plant, the only substantive evidence Alexander presents is

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9. See Alexander Dep. at 59 (“Attorney: Has Sheika

[Dumas] complained to you about the fact that she’s

working in the back? Alexander: No. Attorney: Have you

talked to her about any of these matters? Alexander:

No.”).

25

his testimony that white supervisor Taylor was transferred

from the back to the front counter, while black supervisor

Dumas was prohibited from working in the front of the

store. However, Alexander admitted that he never spoke to

Dumas about this issue, and it is clear from his testimony

that he has no first-hand knowledge concerning other Penny

Profit employees’ job allocations.9

 Finally, Alexander

alleges that he overheard a black employee complain that

she was being blamed for stealing money from the cash

register, when a white employee was responsible for the

theft. Even if this hearsay evidence was admissible, it

does not establish a pattern of unequal outcomes in the

workplace. 

Because Alexander is unable to establish a case of

disparate impact, summary judgment on this claim will be

granted.

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C. Retaliation

Alexander claims that Haddock (and Penny Profit,

through Haddock) retaliated against him, in violation of

Title VII and § 1981, by issuing unwarranted reprimands

and reducing his hours, after he submitted both an

internal complaint and an official complaint to the EEOC

for race discrimination. In order to establish a primafacie case of retaliation under both Title VII and § 1981,

Alexander may show that (1) he engaged in protected

activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse action; and

(3) there was a causal connection between the protected

activity and the adverse employment action. Crawford v.

Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008); Burlington

Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68

(2006)). An action is “materially adverse” if it might

dissuade “a reasonable worker from making or supporting a

charge of discrimination.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68

(quotation marks and citations omitted). See Gant v.

Kash’n Karry Food Stores, Inc., 2010 WL 3035960 at *2

(11th Cir. 2010) (applying the Burlington Northern

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10. See Alexander Dep. at 65-66 (“Attorney: Other

than that one write-up you talked about, do you claim

that there are any other times that Rick [Haddock] has

disciplined you or criticized your job performance

because of your race? Alexander: He called me [into]

the office on several occasions and just said that I was

not doing -- I'm not doing certain things like just stuff

that was not true, just like doing certain things, like

I was not bagging the clothes right. Attorney: Was this

before [or] after your complaint? Alexander: It was

after.”).

27

“materially adverse” element to both Title VII and § 1981

claims of retaliation).

Alexander asserts that, after he informed Haddock that

he believed his hours were being cut because of his race,

he received an unfounded “write up” for failing to bag

clothes correctly. Alexander Dep. at 61. Haddock

continued to discipline Alexander after he complained,

calling Alexander into his office on multiple occasions

and reprimanding him for failing to do his job properly.10

Alexander submitted a complaint for race discrimination

with the EEOC in July 2008, after Haddock was unresponsive

to his grievances. Alexander states that he received

additional hours during the EEOC investigation, but these

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28

were again cut after the EEOC dismissed the charge and

issued Alexander a “Right to Sue” notice. He also alleges

that soon after he submitted his complaint to the EEOC,

his supervisor, Taylor, advised him to search for another

job, informing him he was not going to receive additional

hours at Penny Profit. He alleges that each of these

incidents were in retaliation for engaging in protected

activity. 

Alexander’s testimony concerning the false write-up

and discipline he received from Haddock after complaining

about race discrimination creates a substantial question

of material fact as to whether Alexander suffered

retaliation, sufficient to overcome summary judgment.

“The antiretaliation provision seeks to prevent employer

interference with ‘unfettered access’ to Title VII's

remedial mechanisms.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68

(citation omitted). An employee faced with substantial

and repeated censure and harassment upon filing an nternal

complaint for race discrimination in the workplace--

undeniably protected behavior under Title VII--would be

Case 3:09-cv-00605-MHT-CSC Document 63 Filed 08/10/10 Page 28 of 30
11. Though Alexander also supports his retaliation

claim with testimony concerning the reduction in his

working hours and treatment by Taylor, his claim survives

summary judgment on the basis of Haddock’s disciplinary

practices, and so the court does not reach these

allegations. 

29

less likely to file a lawsuit in order to ameliorate the

problem, thus establishing material adverse action. And

as Alexander suffered such discipline immediately after

submitting his complaint to Haddock, the record

demonstrates a causal connection between the protected

behavior and the adverse action. 

In sum, as Haddock’s alleged disciplinary tactics

might well dissuade “a reasonable worker from making or

supporting a charge of discrimination,” Burlington, 548

U.S. at 68 (citations and quotation marks omitted),

Alexander’s claim of retaliation should proceed to trial.11

***

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

Case 3:09-cv-00605-MHT-CSC Document 63 Filed 08/10/10 Page 29 of 30
(1) The motion for summary judgment submitted by

defendants Evening Shade Inc. (d/b/a Penny Proffit

Cleaners) and Rick Haddock (doc. no. 30) is granted as to

plaintiff Louie Alexander’s claims for disparate treatment

and disparate impact.

(2) Judgment is entered in favor of defendants

Evening Shade Inc. (d/b/a Penny Proffit Cleaners) and

Haddock and against plaintiff Alexander, with plaintiff

Alexander taking nothing as to his disparate-treatment and

disparate-impact claims.

(3) Said motion for summary judgment is denied as to

plaintiff Alexander’s retaliation claim. This claim will

proceed to trial.

DONE, this the 10th day of August, 2010.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:09-cv-00605-MHT-CSC Document 63 Filed 08/10/10 Page 30 of 30