Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01337/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01337-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wesley Ira Purkey
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1337

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Wesley Ira Purkey, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: June 23, 2005

Filed: November 7, 2005

___________

Before ARNOLD, McMILLIAN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Wesley Purkey of the kidnapping, rape, and murder of

Jennifer Long, and sentenced him to death. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a), (g), 3559(d),

3591-3598. On appeal, Mr. Purkey raises myriad challenges to his conviction and

sentence. After careful review, we conclude that his arguments lack merit and

therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.1

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Jennifer Long, a sixteen year-old high school sophomore, disappeared in

January of 1998. On December 15, 1998, while in the Wyandotte County Jail

awaiting a Kansas state prosecution for the murder of eighty-year-old Mary Ruth

Bales, Mr. Purkey contacted Detective Bill Howard of the Kansas City, Kansas, Police

Department and offered to speak with him about a kidnapping and homicide that had

occurred earlier that year. Mr. Purkey told Detective Howard that he also wanted to

speak with an FBI agent about this crime because he wanted to spend his time in a

federal, rather than a state, institution. Detective Howard asked FBI Special Agent

Dirk Tarpley to go with him to meet with Mr. Purkey.

The next day, Mr. Purkey met with Detective Howard and Agent Tarpley. At

the beginning of the meeting, Mr. Purkey executed a form indicating that he

understood and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights. He then told the officers

that he was going to plead guilty in the Kansas case and was therefore willing to

confess to the kidnapping, rape, and murder of a Missouri woman, provided that he

could serve his state time in a federal penitentiary. Detective Howard and Agent

Tarpley informed Mr. Purkey that they could not make any promises but would take

whatever he had to say to the United States Attorney. After giving an account of the

kidnapping, rape, and murder of the victim (who was later identified as Ms. Long),

Mr. Purkey refused to cooperate further unless he received assurances from the United

States Attorney that his case would be federally prosecuted.

That afternoon, Detective Howard and Agent Tarpley met with Kurt Shernuk,

an Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Kansas. Although he was

skeptical of Mr. Purkey, Mr. Shernuk indicated that his office might be willing to

prosecute the case if Mr. Purkey fully cooperated with the investigators and provided

the location of the victim's remains and other evidence to corroborate his confession.

After meeting with Mr. Shernuk, Detective Howard and Agent Tarpley returned

to the Wyandotte County Jail to speak with Mr. Purkey. They told him that

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Mr. Shernuk wanted a body and would require full cooperation, but they did not make

Mr. Purkey any promises as to the sentence that he might receive. Mr. Purkey then

led Messrs. Tarpley and Howard to the crime scene and to the place where he claimed

to have discarded the victim's undergarments and jaw bone. He told the officers that

because he had taken extraordinary measures to dispose of the body, including

dismembering it with a chain saw and burning the remains, the victim's remains were

not recoverable.

More meetings occurred over the next several days. On December 17,

Detective Howard and Agent Tarpley again met with Mr. Purkey and, after being

reminded verbally of his constitutional rights, Mr. Purkey gave a detailed handwritten

confession. The next day, Detective Howard met with Mr. Purkey and, after

reminding him of his rights, conducted a photo lineup to see if he could identify the

victim. Without hesitation, Mr. Purkey identified Ms. Long. Agent Tarpley met with

Mr. Purkey three days later, and after being advised of his rights, Mr. Purkey

confessed again.

During the guilt phase of his federal trial, Mr. Purkey affirmed his statements

about the killing and dismemberment of Ms. Long, but he disavowed his previous

statements that he forced Ms. Long to travel with him from Missouri to his home in

Kansas. Instead, he stated that Ms. Long, who he said he thought was a prostitute,

voluntarily entered his truck and accompanied him to his home. He indicated that he

fabricated the kidnapping aspect of the confession to ensure that his actions would be

considered, and therefore prosecuted as, a federal crime. After deliberating briefly,

the jury returned a verdict of guilty.

During the penalty phase of the trial, the defense submitted and the court

instructed on twenty-seven mitigating factors. Mr. Purkey's primary mitigation

defense consisted of expert testimony indicating that he suffered brain damage that

resulted in diminished mental capacity. The government presented expert testimony

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to rebut this assertion and also produced evidence in support of six statutory and four

non-statutory aggravating factors.

After deliberating for eleven hours and ten minutes, the jury found the existence

of all six of the statutory aggravating factors: (1) that the death of Ms. Long occurred

during the commission and attempted commission of her kidnapping; (2) that

Mr. Purkey killed Ms. Long in an especially heinous, cruel, and depraved manner in

that the killing involved torture and serious physical abuse; (3) that the victim was

particularly vulnerable due to her youthful age of sixteen years; (4) that Mr. Purkey

had previously been convicted of an offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of

more than one year, involving the use, attempted use, and threatened use of a firearm

against another person; (5) that Mr. Purkey had previously been convicted of an

offense resulting in the death of a person for which a sentence of life imprisonment

was authorized by statute; and (6) that Mr. Purkey had previously been convicted of

two or more offenses punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than one year,

committed on different occasions and involving the infliction and attempted infliction

of serious bodily injury and death upon another person. The jury also found the

existence of three of the four non-statutory aggravating factors: (1) that the

government established loss and harm because of the victim's personal characteristics

as an individual human being and the impact of the death upon the victim's family; (2)

that the defendant had previously killed Mary Ruth Bales in a vicious manner in that

he repeatedly struck her in the head with a hammer until she died; and (3) that

Mr. Purkey had a substantial criminal history. The jury did not record any evidence

of its findings with regard to the mitigating factors. It then determined that

Mr. Purkey should be sentenced to death.

I.

We begin with Mr. Purkey's arguments pertaining to the district court's denials

of his pretrial motions. 

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The Honorable Sarah W. Hays, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

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A.

Mr. Purkey's primary argument on appeal is that the district court erred in

denying his motion to suppress his multiple confessions to the kidnapping, rape, and

murder of Ms. Long. He argues that the district court should have suppressed his

statements to Messrs. Tarpley and Howard because the statements were involuntary

and therefore obtained in violation of the fifth amendment to the Constitution. He

bases this argument on his assertion that the officers obtained the confessions through

a false promise, cf. United States v. Pierce, 152 F.3d 808, 812-13 (8th Cir. 1998),

namely, that if he cooperated with the government he would receive a life sentence in

a federal institution. As an alternative to suppression, Mr. Purkey moved to prohibit

the government from pursuing the death penalty. The district court also denied that

motion.

The core of Mr. Purkey's argument is that Detective Howard and Agent Tarpley

procured his confession by indicating that the Assistant United States Attorney had

accepted Mr. Purkey's alleged quid pro quo offer, that is, that Mr. Purkey would

confess to the crime and provide full cooperation in return for a life sentence in a

federal institution. Detective Howard and Agent Tarpley testified at the suppression

hearing that they never made this representation to Mr. Purkey. The district court,

adopting the discussion and conclusions in the report and recommendation of a

magistrate judge,2

 squarely rejected Mr. Purkey's version of the events. It found that,

"[d]uring all of the time the officers spent with Purkey on December 16, 1998, there

were no hints or suggestions made to Purkey ... that Purkey would get a life sentence

if he confessed. No one told Purkey that a life sentence would be recommended if he

confessed." The court inserted a footnote within this language to make explicit that

it found "the testimony of Special Agent Tarpley and Detective Howard more credible

than that of defendant Purkey" on the issue of whether Messrs. Tarpley and Howard

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told Mr. Purkey that the Assistant United States Attorney had agreed to give

Mr. Purkey a life sentence in the federal system in exchange for a full confession.

Finally, the court concluded that during the course of the investigation, "[n]o promises

were made to defendant Purkey in exchange for his confessions. While the defendant

was apparently surprised to find out that the death penalty was a potential sentence he

might receive, the officers did not mislead [the] defendant into believing that there

was no federal death penalty."

Because Mr. Purkey's challenges are to the district court's conclusions regarding

the facts underlying its decisions to deny his motions, we review the matter for clear

error. See United States v. Kilgore, 58 F.3d 350, 353 (8th Cir. 1995); see also United

States v. Heath, 58 F.3d 1271, 1275 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 892 (1995).

After a thorough review of the record, we cannot conclude that the district court

clearly erred in arriving at the credibility determinations and factual conclusions that

it reached. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of Mr. Purkey's motion to

suppress his statements and his motion to prohibit the government from seeking the

death penalty.

B.

Mr. Purkey also maintains that the district court erred when it denied his motion

to dismiss based on the alleged destruction of notes that Mr. Purkey asserts that he

took to document his conversations with Detective Howard and Agent Tarpley in

December of 1998. Mr. Purkey testified that these notes were destroyed by prison

staff during a "shakedown" of his segregation pod while he was incarcerated at

CCA(Corrections Corporation of America)-Leavenworth. He asserts that the

destruction of these notes constitutes a denial of due process and requires dismissal

of the indictment.

In United States v. Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,

501 U.S. 1258 (1991), we recognized that the "Supreme Court has held that the state's

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failure to preserve evidence does not constitute a denial of due process unless ...

comparable exculpatory evidence was not reasonably available to the defendant." Id.

at 463 (citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1984)). The district

court, adopting the discussion and conclusions of the magistrate judge, concluded that

Mr. Purkey's motion must fail because, among other shortcomings, Mr. Purkey could

not demonstrate that he was unable to obtain comparable exculpatory evidence by

other means. We review the matter to determine whether this conclusion was clearly

erroneous, cf. United States v. Weise, 89 F.3d 502, 504 (8th Cir. 1996), and we

conclude that it was not.

At best, these notes can be characterized as Mr. Purkey's account of his

conversations with Detective Howard and Agent Tarpley. They were neither

transcripts of the conversations nor were they attested to by Messrs. Howard or

Tarpley. They were simply Mr. Purkey's recollections of the conversations as

recorded shortly after each conversation concluded. Mr. Purkey had ample

opportunity to introduce comparable evidence in the form of his own testimony as to

the substance of the conversations. And, although these notes could have been read

into evidence to fill gaps in Mr. Purkey's recollection as to the content of those

conversations, see Fed. R. Evid. 803(5), Mr. Purkey's own testimony belied his

assertion of an incomplete recollection of the conversations. We can find no clear

error in the magistrate judge's observation that, "Despite Purkey's contention that he

needs these notes to assist him with remembering the details of the interrogations,

Purkey's testimony would suggest that he has no trouble remembering [those] details

... (at least until defense counsel reminded him that he should not remember)." Hence

the district court did not err in denying Mr. Purkey's motion to dismiss based on the

alleged destruction of his notes.

C.

Mr. Purkey also argues that the district court erred in denying his pretrial

motion asking the court to prohibit the government from seeking the death penalty

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because of two violations of the fifth amendment's indictment clause. First,

Mr. Purkey asserts that the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA), 18 U.S.C. § 3591-

3598, is facially unconstitutional because it vests the prosecution with unilateral

authority to seek the death penalty without ever taking the matter of whether the death

penalty is justified to the grand jury, see 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a). Second, he argues that

his prosecution ran afoul of the indictment clause because the government failed to

seek an indictment upon some of the necessary elements of the capital prosecution,

namely, the government's non-statutory aggravating factors and the issue of whether

the aggravating factors sufficiently outweighed any mitigating factors to justify a

sentence of death. Both of these are questions of law, and we therefore review them

de novo. See United States v. Koons, 300 F.3d 985, 990 (8th Cir. 2002); cf. United

States v. Roy, 408 F.3d 484, 491 (8th Cir. 2005).

In United States v. Allen, 406 F.3d 940, 949 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc), we

addressed the same facial challenge that Mr. Purkey now presents. There we

recognized that the FDPA does vest the prosecution with authority to charge

aggravating factors in a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, and does not

specifically require the government to bring those factors before the grand jury for

inclusion in the indictment. But because "nothing in the Act precludes the

government from also submitting them to the grand jury for inclusion in the

indictment," we rejected the contention that the FDPA was unconstitutional. Id.

Therefore, Mr. Purkey's facial challenge also fails.

To deal with Mr. Purkey's second challenge, we begin with a bit of background.

Under the FDPA, once the jury finds the defendant guilty of one of the offenses listed

in 18 U.S.C. § 3591, the trial proceeds to a separate phase – the sentencing or penalty

phase. In a homicide case, the jury must make three determinations in this latter phase

before it can impose the death penalty: First it must find, unanimously and beyond

a reasonable doubt, that the defendant acted with the requisite mens rea. See

18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2). Second, again unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt,

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it must find the existence of at least one statutory aggravating factor. See 18 U.S.C.

§§ 3592(c), 3593(d). If the above two requirements are satisfied, the jury must then

determine whether the aggravating factors, both statutory and non-statutory,

"sufficiently outweigh" the mitigating factors presented by the defendant to justify a

death sentence, "or, in the absence of a mitigating factor, whether the aggravating

factor or factors alone are sufficient to justify" that sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e).

Mr. Purkey maintains that because the jury is required to take this third step

before it may impose a sentence of death, the necessary elements for a capital

prosecution under the FDPA include all aggravating factors, including non-statutory

aggravating factors, and the weighing of aggravating factors versus mitigating factors.

He therefore contends that because his superseding indictment did not include nonstatutory aggravating factors or a determination that there exists probable cause to

believe that aggravating factors sufficiently outweigh mitigating factors so as to

justify a sentence of death, it falls short of what the fifth amendment requires. We

disagree.

"[T]he same facts that the Sixth Amendment requires to be proven to the petit

jury beyond a reasonable doubt in state and federal prosecutions must also be found

by the grand jury and charged in the indictment in federal prosecutions." Allen,

406 F.3d at 943. For that reason, Allen held that to comport with the fifth amendment

"at least one statutory aggravating factor and the mens rea requirement [must] be

found by the grand jury and charged in the indictment" in a prosecution under the

FDPA. Id. Mr. Purkey's superseding indictment satisfies both of these requirements.

The indictment must charge at least one of the statutory aggravating factors that

is ultimately found by the petit jury because "that is what is required to elevate the

available statutory maximum sentence from life imprisonment to death." Id. In other

words, including that factor in the indictment is required to make the defendant

eligible for the death penalty. See United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 299 (4th Cir.

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2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 608 (2004). We now make clear what Allen merely

implied: "There is no requirement that the indictment allege all of the factors that

might be weighed by the jury when deciding whether to impose a death sentence."

Higgs, 353 F.3d at 299. Non-statutory aggravating factors do not increase the

maximum punishment to which a defendant is subject. They are neither sufficient nor

necessary under the FDPA for a sentence of death. Their purpose is merely to aid the

sentencer "in selecting the appropriate sentence from the available options," id. at 298,

" 'on the basis of the character of the [defendant] and the circumstances of the crime,'

" id. (quoting Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994)).

Further, it makes no sense to speak of the weighing process mandated by

18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) as an elemental fact for which a grand jury must find probable

cause. In the words of the statute, it is a "consideration," 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e), – that

is, the lens through which the jury must focus the facts that it has found to produce an

individualized determination regarding "whether the defendant should be sentenced

to death, to life imprisonment without possibility of release or some other lesser

sentence." Id.

We thus conclude that Mr. Purkey's arguments based on the indictment clause

of the fifth amendment are without merit.

II.

Mr. Purkey next challenges the district court's for-cause exclusion of three

potential jurors who expressed reluctance to impose the death penalty. In Wainwright

v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 420, 424 (1985), the Supreme Court instructed that a potential

juror may be excluded for cause based on his or her views on capital punishment only

if those views would " ' prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties

as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. ' " (quoting Adams v. Texas,

448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)). We review a district court's removal of death-scrupled

venirepersons for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Nelson, 347 F.3d 701,

710-11 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 486 (2004); United States v. Ortiz,

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315 F.3d 873, 888 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1042 & 540 U.S. 1073

(2003).

Mr. Purkey first asks us to find error in the district court's removal of Margaret

Fox. He begins by inviting us to adopt the holding of the Tenth Circuit in United

States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1270 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S.

992 (2001), and review Ms. Fox's removal de novo because the court struck her solely

on the basis of her answers to a questionnaire. We do not agree, however, with

Chanthadara's implicit assumption that a district court's decision on the qualifications

of a juror is entitled to deference only because of that court's superior position to

assess a potential juror's demeanor and credibility. See id. at 1269-70. Other reasons,

such as respect for the trial process, "the expertise developed by trial judges," and the

desire to conserve judicial resources also underpin the fundamental principle that

"appellate courts are not to decide factual questions de novo, reversing any findings

they would have made differently." Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 145 (1986); cf.

Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-76 (1985); Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).

Accordingly, we decline this invitation to stray from the standard of review

established in our previous cases, which is whether the district court abused its

discretion. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by striking Ms. Fox. She

repeatedly indicated on the questionnaire that she had serious reservations about

capital punishment. When asked in question thirty-eight of the questionnaire to

describe her feelings about the death penalty, how strong those feelings were, and how

long she had held them, she wrote, "Within the last 50 years I've gained stronger and

stronger feelings against [the] use of the death penalty. I believe major criminals

should be punished, but taking away their lives should be left to God." Her responses

to questions thirty-six and thirty-seven, which asked about the effect that exposure to

books, articles, and movies about the death penalty had on her, also indicate that she

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"questioned that the death penalty should be used" and "question[ed] the right of the

courts to administer the death penalty."

Question thirty-nine, a multiple choice question, gave each juror an opportunity

to mark the choice that best described his or her feelings about the death penalty.

Three of the eight choices pertained to people with some degree of opposition to the

death penalty. They were as follows:

a. I am opposed to the death penalty, and I will never vote

to impose the death penalty in any case, no matter what the

facts.

b. I am opposed to the death penalty, and I would have a

difficult time voting to impose the death penalty.

c. I am opposed to the death penalty, but could vote to

impose the death penalty if I believed that the death penalty

was called for in light of the facts and law in the case.

Ms. Fox declined to indicate that she could vote to impose the death penalty by

selecting choice "c" and instead chose the ambiguous "b." When we consider this

response together with her other answers regarding her views on the death penalty, we

find sufficient evidence in the record from which the district court could conclude that

her views on the death penalty would " 'substantially impair the performance of her

duties as a juror in accordance with h[er] instructions and h[er] oath.' " Wainwright,

469 U.S. at 424 (quoting Adams, 448 U.S. at 45).

Mr. Purkey also argues that the court erroneously struck Willie Randle after

mishearing or incorrectly recollecting his responses during voir dire. During voir dire,

the government asked Mr. Randle whether he would "hold the government to a higher

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burden of proof than what is required under the law." He responded, "I think I

would." When the government next asked whether he would hold it to a higher

burden of proof than "beyond a reasonable doubt" he replied, "It has to be proof

without a reasonable doubt." Later, in granting the government's request to strike

Mr. Randle, the district judge declared, "My recollection is that he's holding the

government to a higher standard than the law provides."

Reviewing the cold record, it is difficult to divine exactly what Mr. Randle

meant when he replied that "[i]t has to be proof without a reasonable doubt." Although

those words of the transcript, taken literally, may indicate that Mr. Randle had agreed

to apply a burden equivalent to the one that the law actually imposes, the transcript

cannot provide any insight regarding Mr. Randle's intent in using the phrase "without

a reasonable doubt" instead of "beyond a reasonable doubt." This is why the Supreme

Court instructed in Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 426, that "deference must be paid to the

trial judge who sees and hears the juror." The trial judge, who had the opportunity to

observe the exchange, could have reasonably interpreted Mr. Randle's refusal to parrot

the words of the government and instead use the phrase "without a reasonable doubt"

as an affirmation of his earlier statement that he would hold the government to a

higher burden of proof than the law provides. Based on the colloquy between Mr.

Randle and the government, as well as the court's stated reason for its ruling, we

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by striking this potential

juror.

Finally, Mr. Purkey argues that the district court erred when it removed Gary

Danford for cause after he had been "rehabilitated." When questioned by the

government, Mr. Danford insisted that he would hold the government to a higher

burden of proof than reasonable doubt. But Mr. Danford reversed course under

subsequent questioning by Mr. Purkey's counsel and indicated that he would "follow

the law." The district court concluded that, "I think he has kind of made up his mind

what the standard is and that the standard he has decided upon is something different

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than what the law provides." Quite simply, the district court made a reasonable

judgment based on its impression of Mr. Danford's credibility as was its prerogative.

See Nelson, 347 F.3d at 710-11; United States v. Moore, 149 F.3d 773, 779-80 (8th

Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1030 & 1082 (1998). The record lacks adequate

grounds for us to conclude that the district court abused its discretion.

III.

Mr. Purkey also maintains that the district court erred in several respects during

the guilt phase of his trial.

A.

We begin with Mr. Purkey's contention that the district court erred by refusing

to allow certain evidence during the guilt phase of the trial. He asserts that the district

court erred in the following ways: by excluding the testimony of defense expert

Dr. David Preston; by refusing to allow Mr. Purkey to testify about how his father had

introduced him to prostitutes at an early age; and by refusing to permit crossexamination of Michael Speakman regarding his misconduct while he was

incarcerated at CCA-Leavenworth. "We review de novo the district court's

interpretation and application of the rules of evidence, and review for an abuse of

discretion the factual findings supporting its evidentiary ruling." United States v.

Smith, 383 F.3d 700, 706 (8th Cir. 2004). We may affirm on any ground supported

by the record, even if that ground was not relied on by the district court. See Bilal v.

Lockhart, 993 F.2d 643, 645 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 924 (1993). 

Dr. Preston, a nuclear medicine specialist, conducted positron emission

topography and magnetic resonance imaging testing upon Mr. Purkey and would have

testified that those tests revealed abnormalities within Mr. Purkey's brain. Mr. Purkey

intended to offer this testimony during the guilt phase of the trial to support both his

contention that he did not intentionally kidnap Ms. Long (because he thought she was

a prostitute and/or voluntarily accompanied him to his home) and to illuminate

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Mr. Purkey's state of mind when he confessed to Detective Howard and Agent

Tarpley. The district court concluded that "although Dr. Preston is qualified in the

field of nuclear medicine, he is not qualified to testify regarding defendant's state of

mind and actions at the time of the offenses or at the time that Mr. Purkey gave his

statements to the investigators."

We believe that the district court's conclusion was correct. Although we harbor

no doubt that Dr. Preston was qualified to testify regarding the results of the tests that

he conducted on Mr. Purkey, there is nothing in the record that indicates that he was

qualified to connect that testimony to the inquiry for which it was offered, namely,

Mr. Purkey's state of mind and actions either at the time of the offenses or when he

gave his statements to the investigators. Indeed, in neither the expert report nor the

offer of proof did Dr. Preston even attempt to tie the test results to Mr. Purkey's state

of mind on the specific occasions in question. When questioned by the government,

moreover, Dr. Preston admitted that the images produced by the tests could not predict

behavior and did not have a causal relationship to criminal behavior. There is

manifestly no error in the district court's decision to exclude Dr. Preston's testimony.

Mr. Purkey also argues that the court erred when it refused, in the guilt phase

of the trial, to allow him to testify that his father had introduced him to the use of

prostitutes during his boyhood. (The court did permit some testimony of this nature

in the penalty phase.) Mr. Purkey submits that this testimony would have provided

the jury with context to understand why he might have mistakenly believed that

Ms. Long was a prostitute. This, he argues, would have bolstered his defense that he

did not kidnap Ms. Long and that she willingly entered his car and traveled with him

from Missouri to Kansas. And, defense counsel argues, if the jury believed that

Mr. Purkey did not transport Ms. Long across state lines against her will and did not

do so with the intent to rape her, it could not have convicted him of kidnapping. But

we fail to see how the method by which Mr. Purkey was introduced to prostitutes

more than thirty years before his crime is relevant to explaining why he mistook a

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teenage schoolgirl for a prostitute, and we therefore uphold the district court's decision

to exclude the testimony.

Mr. Purkey also argues that the district court erred by refusing to permit him to

cross-examine Michael Speakman regarding Mr. Speakman's uncharged misconduct

while at CCA-Leavenworth. Mr. Purkey wanted to elicit this testimony to

demonstrate that a desire to avoid punishment for these uncharged acts might have

motivated Mr. Speakman to provide information and testimony for the prosecution.

He asserts that this denial deprived him of his sixth amendment right to confront an

adverse witness.

Mr. Purkey calls our attention to the Supreme Court's language in Davis v.

Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974), which recognizes that "the exposure of a

witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the

constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” Id. at 316-17. But this passage

does not suggest that a judge should be prevented from imposing limits of any sort on

defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. Delaware

v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). "On the contrary, trial judges retain wide

latitude ... to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns

about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness'

safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Id. We will not

reverse a trial court's decision to limit cross-examination absent a "clear abuse of

discretion and a showing of prejudice to [the] defendant." United States v. Love,

329 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2003).

Mr. Purkey has failed to demonstrate a violation of the confrontation clause.

To do so, he must show that a reasonable jury might have received a different

impression of the witness's credibility had Mr. Purkey's counsel been permitted to

pursue his proposed line of cross-examination. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680;

United States v. Drapeau, 414 F.3d 869, 875-76 (8th Cir. 2005). Here, Mr. Purkey's

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counsel conclusively demonstrated by other means that Mr. Speakman was driven to

testify by a desire for leniency. Mr. Speakman's testimony established that the

government had filed a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35,

requesting a reduction of Mr. Speakman's sentence. Mr. Purkey's counsel asked

Mr. Speakman, "Basically what you're trying to do is do your best to get a reduction

to your sentence?" Mr. Speakman replied, "I'd be lying if I said I was sitting here

being a good citizen." Mr. Purkey's counsel then asked, "Your sole point in being

here is to reduce the sentence that you received?" Mr. Speakman replied, "Yes,

ma'am." We have difficulty imagining how further testimony could have shown more

definitively that a desire for leniency played a significant part in Mr. Speakman's

willingness to testify. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

limiting cross-examination that would have further established that point.

B.

Mr. Purkey also submits that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury on

the elements contained in the kidnapping statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201. That statute

provides that a person commits the offense of kidnapping if he or she "unlawfully

seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for

ransom or reward or otherwise any person ... when – (1) the person is willfully

transported in interstate or foreign commerce." Id. This statute quite clearly requires

that the government prove that Mr. Purkey seized Ms. Long "for ransom or reward or

otherwise," id., which in this case was for the purpose of forcible rape. Mr. Purkey,

however, contends that the statute also requires that the government prove that he

transported Ms. Long across state lines for that same reason. He bases this contention

on the language of the statute that requires the defendant to have "willfully

transported," id., his or her victim. He submits that this phrase requires that the

kidnapper transport his or her victim with the intent to do something that the law

forbids. Cf. United States v. Gabaldon, 389 F.3d 1090, 1094-95 n.1 (10th Cir. 2004),

cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1688 (2005). He therefore maintains that the district court

erred by failing to give an instruction that required the government to prove not only

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that he seized the victim for the purpose of forcible rape but also that he transported

her across the state line for the purpose of forcible rape. This error is significant,

according to Mr. Purkey, because he argued as part of his defense that he transported

Ms. Long from Missouri to Kansas without the intent to rape. We will affirm if the

instructions correctly stated the law and fairly and adequately submitted the issues to

the jury. Cf. United States v. Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579, 593 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,

538 U.S. 1048 (2003).

The district court instructed the jury that in order to convict it had to find that

"the defendant unlawfully seized, confined, kidnapped, abducted, carried away or held

Jennifer Long;" that "the defendant did so for the purpose of the forcible rape of

Jennifer Long;" that "the defendant willfully, knowingly, and unlawfully transported

Jennifer Long across the state line from Missouri to Kansas;" and that "Jennifer Long

died as a result of defendant's actions." This instruction precisely tracked the statute's

ordering of the elements. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201. And, although the Eighth Circuit

Manual of Model Jury Instructions (Criminal) (2005) does not contain a recommended

instruction on kidnapping, the instruction given by the district court is consistent with

the recommended instructions for the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit, see Ninth Circuit

Manual of Model Jury Instructions (Criminal) § 8.95 (2003 ed.); Eleventh Circuit

Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) 49 (2003 ed.), as well as the instruction

recommended by the Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions § 84.

Cf. Eighth Circuit Manual of Model Jury Instructions (Criminal) 12.07A. We disagree

with Mr. Purkey's construction of the statute and therefore find no error in the district

court's instruction on the elements contained in § 1201.

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C.

In his last contention of error with respect to the guilt phase of his trial,

Mr. Purkey maintains that the district court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial

based on prosecutorial misconduct. He asserts that the government's efforts to call

attention to his tattoos that depicted, among other things, a Nazi swastika and symbols

of the Aryan Brotherhood unfairly inflamed the jury and deprived him of his right to

a fair trial. 

During the government's direct examination of its first witness, it displayed a

picture of Mr. Purkey standing shirtless with his tattoos visible. Due to a

misunderstanding between the prosecution and the defense, Mr. Purkey's counsel did

not have a chance to object before the government displayed the picture to the jury.

Mr. Purkey's counsel then objected to the picture's admission into evidence and that

objection was sustained. Three days later, during the government's cross-examination

of Mr. Purkey, the government again highlighted the tattoos. The prosecutor asked

Mr. Purkey whether Ms. Long observed his tattoos, including the "Nazi swastika"

tattoo, when she entered his vehicle or while she was, according to Mr. Purkey,

voluntarily kissing him while he had his shirt off. The government stated that it made

this inquiry to demonstrate the unreasonableness of Mr. Purkey's testimony that

Ms. Long voluntarily accompanied him to his home and consented to engaging in

foreplay with him. When defense counsel objected to this question, the district court

sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the government's questions

about Mr. Purkey's tattoos. The defense then asked the judge to declare a mistrial

based on the prosecution's referring to the tattoos after the district court had previously

sustained the objection regarding the picture showing the tattoos. The district court

denied that request.

"The test for reversible prosecutorial misconduct has two parts: (1) the

prosecutor's remarks or conduct must in fact have been improper, and (2) such

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remarks or conduct must have prejudicially affected the defendant's substantial rights

so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial." United States v. Hernandez, 779 F.2d

456, 458 (8th Cir.1985). Even assuming arguendo that the prosecutor's actions and

questions were improper, these actions nevertheless fail to constitute reversible error.

When determining whether the prosecutor's remarks and conduct so infected the trial

with unfairness that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial, we usually consider three

criteria: "(1) the cumulative effect of such misconduct; (2) the strength of the properly

admitted evidence of the defendant's guilt; and (3) the curative actions taken by the

trial court." Hernandez, 779 F.2d at 460. Here the cumulative effect of the

prosecutor's references to Mr. Purkey's tattoos was not significant. Although we do

not doubt that references of this sort can sometimes result in prejudice, the prosecution

referred to Mr. Purkey's tattoos only twice, cf. id., and only briefly at that. There was

also considerable evidence of guilt. Although he gave a somewhat different story at

trial, there was evidence that Mr. Purkey had confessed to the crime on multiple

occasions. Finally, the district court took prompt curative action. It sustained the

objections to the admission of the picture and to the questions regarding Mr. Purkey's

tattoos. After sustaining the latter objection, the court also instructed the jury to

disregard the questions. Cf. United States v. Uphoff, 232 F.3d 624, 625-26 (8th Cir.

2000). We therefore reject Mr. Purkey's contention that his assertions of prosecutorial

misconduct warrant reversal.

IV.

We move now to Mr. Purkey's assignments of error regarding the penalty phase

of his trial.

A.

Mr. Purkey makes several arguments relating to the district court's evidentiary

rulings. He asserts that the district court erred in the following ways: by refusing to

permit evidence that his wife had poisoned him; by excluding the testimony of

Dr. Mark Cunningham regarding Mr. Purkey's alleged fetal alcohol exposure; by

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refusing to permit the surrebuttal testimony of Dr. Stephen Peterson in response to the

testimony of Dr. Helen Mayberg; by limiting the impeachment of Dr. Park Dietz; and

by allowing the government to question Dr. Peterson regarding his views on the death

penalty.

"The Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA) erects very low barriers to the

admission of evidence at capital sentencing hearings." United States v. Lee, 274 F.3d

485, 494 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1000 (2002). In the sentencing phase,

"[i]nformation is admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing

admission of evidence at criminal trials." See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). One reason for

this more lenient standard is that it affords the defendant additional opportunities to

present mitigating evidence consistent with the Supreme Court's directive that to meet

constitutional requirements in capital cases " 'the sentencer ... not be precluded from

considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and

any circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence

less than death.' " Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (quoting Lockett

v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion)) (emphasis omitted).

But this does not mean that the defense has carte blanche to introduce any and

all evidence that it wishes. The trial court retains its traditional authority "to exclude,

as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the

circumstances of his offense." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.12 (plurality opinion). The

FDPA, moreover, invests the judge with the authority to exclude probative

information during the penalty phase if "its probative value is outweighed by the

danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury."

18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). We review the record to determine whether the district judge

abused the discretion entrusted to him by the FDPA, see United States v. Johnson,

223 F.3d 665, 674 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 829 (2001); United States

v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 397 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117 (1999),

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abrogated on other grounds in United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 310-

14 (2000), and we determine de novo the question of whether Mr. Purkey's

constitutional rights have been violated. See United States v. Washington, 318 F.3d

845, 854-55 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 884 & 899 (2003). Even if we

conclude that the district court erred, we cannot reverse or vacate a federal death

sentence on account of an error that is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See

18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(2); Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 402-05 (1999).

Mr. Purkey contends that the district court erred by refusing to allow evidence

that his wife, Jeanette Purkey, had poisoned him. Mr. Purkey wished to use this

evidence to demonstrate that because he was operating under the influence of poison

when he murdered the elderly Kansas woman or when he killed Ms. Long, his actions

took place while he was involuntarily intoxicated or, at the very least, in an altered

mental state. When he sought to introduce the evidence in the penalty phase (he also

sought to introduce this evidence in the guilt phase), he had no evidence that the

poison he allegedly received, rat poison, had any known effect on the mind. Also, his

wife's testimony as to whether she had poisoned him during the relevant time period

was equivocal at best. During the penalty phase, the government objected to the

evidence, asserting that for both of the above reasons the presentation of this evidence

was not relevant and would be a "big diversion" for the jury. The district court

agreed.

We cannot say that the district court erred in excluding this evidence. The

defense admitted that it had no evidence that rat poison has any psychological effects.

Therefore, this evidence could not have had any probative value to suggest that

Mr. Purkey's mind was operating under the poison's supposed influence when he

committed either of the two murders. A reasonable judge could conclude that this

evidence was both completely irrelevant to the purpose for which it was offered, cf.

Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.12 (plurality opinion), and, because of the scandalous and

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perplexing nature of the claim, had significant potential to confuse or mislead the jury.

Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c).

Mr. Purkey also asserts on appeal that this evidence also demonstrates his

difficult home life. Because he did not argue this below, we review for plain error,

see Lee, 274 F.3d at 493; United States v. Turner, 104 F.3d 217, 221 (8th Cir. 1997),

and find none. To begin, we note Ms. Purkey's benevolent, if misguided, motivation

for poisoning her husband by mixing the poison with his drugs: She asserted that she

was trying to scare him into abandoning his illegal use of drugs. This evidence might

demonstrate that Mr. Purkey had someone in his life who cared about his well being.

To the extent that this evidence could be construed as illustrating Mr. Purkey's

difficult home life, we note that the record is replete with evidence of the difficult and

dysfunctional environments in which Mr. Purkey has lived, and so we cannot

conclude that the omission of this additional evidence affected his substantial rights.

See Turner, 104 F.3d at 221. 

Mr. Purkey also contends that the district court erred by refusing to allow

Dr. Cunningham to testify to his opinion that Mr. Purkey suffered from fetal alcohol

exposure. The district court excluded the evidence because Mr. Purkey could not

adduce specific evidence that his mother drank during the time that she was pregnant

with him. Mr. Purkey's offer of proof does indicate, however, that had the court

permitted Dr. Cunningham to testify on this issue he would have brought forth

significant circumstantial evidence that Mr. Purkey suffered from this affliction. First,

there was evidence that Mr. Purkey's mother abused alcohol dating back to at least

1950. (Mr. Purkey was born in 1952.) Second, there was evidence that Mr. Purkey's

mother had two other children around the time of Mr. Purkey's birth, both of whom

died, one shortly before and one shortly after birth. This, according to

Dr. Cunningham, would have been consistent with those children's fetal alcohol

exposure. Third, Dr. Cunningham would have testified that Mr. Purkey's brain

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condition is consistent with his having suffered fetal alcohol exposure. We think that

Dr. Cunningham's testimony regarding Mr. Purkey's fetal alcohol exposure would

have provided probative mitigating evidence. Cf. Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825,

847 n.17 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 942 (2002). Given that and the

relaxed standard set forth by 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), we conclude that the district court

erred when it excluded this evidence simply because there was no direct evidence that

Mr. Purkey's mother drank while pregnant with him. 

Nevertheless, when we consider the record as a whole, we are satisfied that this

error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(2); Jones,

527 U.S. at 402-05; cf. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987); Chapman

v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). We are confident that the jury would have

reached the sentence that it did even if the court had admitted this evidence. See

Jones, 527 U.S. at 402; cf. Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1158-59 (8th Cir. 1997),

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1010 (1998). The district court admitted significant expert

testimony regarding Mr. Purkey's brain abnormalities and their impact on his mental

and emotional health. The jury was not, therefore, precluded from considering

Mr. Purkey's mental and emotional impairments as potential mitigating factors; it was

merely precluded from considering one of several possible explanations as to the

cause of these alleged impairments. And, although we recognize that a jury may be

more likely to believe that someone suffers from a problem if its cause is explained,

we nevertheless harbor no doubt that considering the minimal probative value of the

evidence and the overwhelming evidence and jury findings of serious aggravating

factors, its exclusion was harmless. Cf. United States v. Bernard, 299 F.3d 467, 487

(5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 928 (2003).

Mr. Purkey also assigns error in the district court's refusal to allow him to

impeach Dr. Park Dietz by inquiring into an error that the doctor made when testifying

in the case of Yates v. State, Nos. 01-02-00462/00463, 2005 WL 20416 (Tex. Ct. App.

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Jan. 6, 2005). When serving as an expert witness for the state in the Yates case,

Dr. Dietz erroneously testified that the facts of an episode of a television show on

which he consulted, "Law & Order," were very similar to those in Yates. In fact, no

such episode existed. Id. at *3-*4. Dr. Dietz, during a proffer session conducted

outside of the hearing of the jury in Mr. Purkey's case, freely admitted to the error that

he had made in the Yates trial. The district court, however, sustained the government's

objection to testimony about the error because it would "create[] confusion and [was]

collateral."

In response to Mr. Purkey's argument, the government asserts that the exclusion

of this evidence was proper under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. But that is not the

controlling law here. This is an FDPA case, and its evidentiary standard must govern.

See Lee, 274 F.3d at 494-95. Accordingly, we review this issue under the standard of

§ 3593(c), which provides for the exclusion of evidence "if its probative value is

outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or

misleading the jury." 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c); see Lee, 274 F.3d at 494.

Although one of the court's reasons, that the testimony would "create[]

confusion," is arguably consistent with a permissible reason under the FDPA, we

cannot conclude that the district court acted correctly when it refused to permit any

inquiry into Dr. Dietz's previous mistake. This testimony would have been relevant

to demonstrate the doctor's fallibility. Further, we cannot agree with the district court

that this testimony would have resulted in confusion. Dr. Dietz freely admitted that

he erred; that was not in dispute. The nature of Dr. Dietz's error, moreover, was not

unusually complex or confusing. Therefore we can find no reason to conclude that

the probative value of this testimony was "outweighed by the danger of creating unfair

prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury," 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c).

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We nevertheless conclude that the error was harmless. Mr. Purkey's crossexamination of Dr. Dietz was otherwise extensive. During that cross-examination,

Mr. Purkey was able to extract concessions from Dr. Dietz that he had made mistakes

in two other cases in which he had testified. And, although we do not doubt that the

excluded information would have provided a morsel of additional probative evidence

of Dr. Dietz's ability to err, given the otherwise extensive cross-examination that

allowed the defense to bring out his other errors, and the overwhelming number and

the nature of the aggravating factors found by the jury, we cannot conclude that the

absence of this additional information affected Mr. Purkey's substantial rights. See

18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(2); Jones, 527 U.S. at 402-05; Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 398-99; cf.

Bernard, 299 F.3d at 487; Sweet, 125 F.3d at 1158-59.

Mr. Purkey also maintains that the district court erred by denying his request

to allow Dr. Peterson to present surrebuttal testimony in response to the testimony of

Dr. Helen Mayberg. Dr. Mayberg's testimony was presented to rebut the conclusions

of the defense's experts regarding Mr. Purkey's alleged brain injuries. The defense

requested that it be allowed to introduce surrebuttal evidence pertaining to two of

Dr. Mayberg's conclusions: that Mr. Purkey could not have suffered significant brain

injuries in automobile accidents that occurred in 1968 and 1972, and that Mr. Purkey's

functioning as a "jailhouse lawyer" was inconsistent with the sort of brain damage

reported by the defense's medical experts.

The government argues that the court did not err in excluding this surrebuttal

testimony because Dr. Mayberg's rebuttal testimony did not raise a new matter. The

decision of whether to allow a party to present evidence in surrebuttal is generally

committed to the discretion of the trial court, see United States v. Wilford, 710 F.2d

439, 452 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1039 (1984), and surrebuttal is

typically thought appropriate only when new matters are raised in the rebuttal

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testimony, see United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 821 (4th Cir. 2000); cf.

Wilford, 710 F.2d at 452.

We do not think that the FDPA alters this standard. Cf. Barnette, 211 F.3d at

820-21. Although the FDPA dispenses with the rules governing the admission of

evidence during criminal trials, it is not sensible to read this statutory imperative as

also divesting the trial judge of his or her traditional authority to control the mode and

order of the interrogation of witnesses and the presentation of evidence. A contrary

reading would transform the FDPA sentencing hearing into an evidentiary mélee.

Even assuming that Dr. Mayberg's testimony that Mr. Purkey's work as a

"jailhouse lawyer" demonstrated his lack of significant brain damage presented a new

matter, thereby making surrebuttal appropriate, we cannot conclude that this putative

error provides an adequate ground for reversal. As mentioned previously, Mr. Purkey

presented a significant amount of testimony regarding his assertion that he suffered

from brain damage. This additional testimony would have, at best, offered only

marginal additional support for this defense. When we consider this fact combined

with the significant number and serious nature of the aggravating factors advanced by

the government and found by the jury, we cannot conclude that this error affected

Mr. Purkey's substantial rights. See 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(2); Jones, 527 U.S. at 402-

05; Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 398-99; cf. Bernard, 299 F.3d at 487; Sweet, 125 F.3d at

1158-59.

Finally, Mr. Purkey asserts that the district court erred by overruling his

objection to questions that the government asked on cross-examination of

Dr. Peterson, one of Mr. Purkey's expert witnesses. Specifically, Mr. Purkey's counsel

objected to the government's inquiry into Dr. Peterson's views on the death penalty.

Even under the traditional rules of evidence, "cross-examination regarding

potential bias of a witness is proper." United States v. Amerson-Bey, 898 F.2d 681,

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682 (8th Cir. 1990); see United States v. McCoy, 131 F.3d 760, 760-61 (8th Cir. 1997)

(per curiam). If Dr. Peterson strongly disfavored the death penalty, knowledge of that

would be relevant to the jury's evaluation of his credibility in testifying to factors that

could mitigate Mr. Purkey's sentence; " 'exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying

is a proper and important function of ... cross-examination,' " Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.

at 678-79 (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 316-17). To the extent that the FDPA alters this

rule, it relaxes it, see 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c); Lee, 274 F.3d at 495; a fortiori the district

court did not err in allowing the government to continue its line of inquiry into

Dr. Peterson's beliefs about the death penalty.

In addition to considering whether each of the evidentiary errors that we have

found is individually sufficient to require reversal, we have also considered, sua

sponte, what cumulative effect these errors might have had upon Mr. Purkey's

substantial rights. Cf. United States v. Steffen, 641 F.2d 591, 597-98 (8th Cir. 1981),

cert. denied, 452 U.S. 943 (1981). After careful review, we also conclude that the

errors, even when taken cumulatively, are harmless.

B.

Mr. Purkey next maintains that the district court erred by denying his motion

for allocution during the penalty phase of the trial; Mr. Purkey sought to make a

statement before the jury without being subject to cross-examination. Although

Mr. Purkey was permitted to address the district court before it imposed his sentence,

he argues that the court functionally deprived him of his right to allocution, because

it lacked any discretion to impose a sentence other than the one that the jury already

had recommended, see 18 U.S.C. § 3594. The district court's error, he maintains,

violated his constitutional rights, Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,

and the FDPA, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3592(a)(8), 3593(c). We disagree.

First, our circuit previously has recognized that the right to allocution does not

emanate from the Constitution. See United States v. Patterson, 128 F.3d 1259, 1260

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(8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); see also Barnette, 211 F.3d at 820; Hall, 152 F.3d at 396.

Therefore, even if Mr. Purkey were correct that the district court denied him the right

to allocution, the error would not be a constitutional one. 

Second, Mr. Purkey does not have a statutory right to make statements to a jury

during the penalty phase of an FDPA trial without being subject to cross-examination.

Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) requires that "[b]efore imposing sentence," the district court must

"permit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence."

The district court satisfied Rule 32 when it allowed Mr. Purkey to speak "before

imposing sentence." See Hall, 152 F.3d at 392. Although Mr. Purkey's allocution

could not have mitigated his sentence because it followed the jury's recommendation

of the death penalty, see 18 U.S.C. § 3594, nowhere does Rule 32 grant Mr. Purkey

a right to allocution before a jury; Rule 32 speaks only of "the court." We agree with

the Fifth Circuit that Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) should not be interpreted to entitle

Mr. Purkey to a right of allocution before the jury "when the plain language of the rule

does not dictate such an interpretation." Hall, 152 F.3d at 393; see also Barnette,

211 F.3d at 820. As for the FDPA, nowhere does it mention a right to allocution or

anything comparable; Mr. Purkey's claimed right on that ground therefore does not

exist.

C.

Mr. Purkey assigns several errors relating to the jury's special findings and

recommendation of his death sentence. We previously noted that, to recommend a

death sentence after determining that the defendant is eligible for such a sentence, the

jury must unanimously find that the statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors

"sufficiently outweigh" the mitigating factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e). For an

aggravating factor to enter into the jury's calculation, the government must establish

"the existence of such a factor ... beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at § 3593(c). The

standard for mitigating factors, however, is less rigorous. The jury may consider any

mitigating factor that at least one juror found proved "by a preponderance of the

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information." Id. at § 3593(c), (d). After the jury has completed its deliberations, it

must "return special findings identifying any aggravating factor ... found to exist." Id.

at § 3593(d).

Mr. Purkey first contends that the district court erroneously permitted the

prosecution to present the jury with duplicative aggravating factors, thereby skewing

the jury's balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors in violation of the eighth

amendment. Because Mr. Purkey challenges the constitutionality of allegedly

duplicative aggravating factors, we review the district court's decision de novo. Cf.

Cooks v. Ward, 165 F.3d 1283, 1289 (10th Cir. 1998).

Mr. Purkey's best case for duplication is that the nonstatutory aggravator for

"[s]ubstantial criminal history" mirrors the statutory aggravator for convictions of

"two or more offenses punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than one year,

committed on different occasions, involving the infliction and attempted infliction of

serious bodily injury and death upon another person." The convictions that the

government offered to support both aggravating factors were identical. 

We think that the Tenth Circuit is correct to conclude that the same facts can

support different inferences that form different aggravators. See Medlock v. Ward,

200 F.3d 1314, 1319 (10th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 882 (2000).

Otherwise the government would either have to choose one out of several possible

aggravating factors for each instance of a defendant's misconduct or pack into a single

aggravator multiple negative inferences that could be drawn from the misconduct and

then risk the jury's rejection of the aggravator due to disagreement over just one of the

inferences.

Even under the Tenth Circuit's standard, however, we agree with Mr. Purkey

that the nonstatutory aggravating factor duplicated the statutory one. The government

used the same set of convictions each time for the same purpose, namely to show the

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defendant's criminal history. The nonstatutory aggravating factor did refer to a fact

of Mr. Purkey's criminal history that went unmentioned in the statutory aggravating

factor, namely, that Mr. Purkey "shot Gregg W. Carlberg on or about August 3, 1980."

Even if this fact were enough to distinguish the two aggravators, though, it overlaps

with a separate statutory aggravating factor based on Mr. Purkey's conviction of "an

offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than one year, involving the

use ... of a firearm ... against another person," 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(2) – an aggravator

that went to the same history of illegal firearm use as did the shooting episode. 

Despite the duplication of aggravators in Mr. Purkey's case, we see no basis for

the constitutional infirmity of such factors. The Supreme Court has "never before held

that aggravating factors could be duplicative so as to render them constitutionally

invalid," Jones, 527 U.S. at 398 (plurality opinion), and we decline to do so when the

FDPA avoids arbitrary death sentences by requiring juries to weigh aggravating and

mitigating factors rather than to tally the factors on each side and declare a winner

based on sheer numbers. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e). But see United States v. Tipton,

90 F.3d 861, 899 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253 (1997); United States

v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1111-12 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1213

(1997). The district court's jury instructions bolster this view as applied to

Mr. Purkey's case: The district court ensured that the jury would not employ a tally

method of evaluating factors when it instructed the jury that "weighing aggravating

and mitigating factors ... is not a mechanical process. In other words, you should not

simply count the number of aggravating and mitigating factors. The law contemplates

that different factors may be given different weights or values by different jurors."

Of course, had the government introduced an invalid aggravating factor into the

jury's weighing process, then the government might have violated Mr. Purkey's rights

under the eighth amendment. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 232 (1992). But

Mr. Purkey asserts no such error here.

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Mr. Purkey next requests that our circuit reconsider its precedents that have

approved jury instructions mandating that a jury recommend a sentence of death

should it conclude, after balancing aggravating against mitigating factors, that the

former sufficiently outweigh the latter to justify imposition of a death sentence. He

recognizes that overruling those precedents would require the action of our en banc

court and that, as a panel of that court, we are required to give them effect. See United

States v. Provost, 969 F.2d 617, 622 (8th Cir. 1992). For our part, we believe that our

precedents are well-reasoned. See Nelson, 347 F.3d at 712; Ortiz, 315 F.3d at 900-01.

Finally, Mr. Purkey maintains that the FDPA requires juries to identify any

mitigating factor that at least one juror found to exist and that the district court

consequently erred by accepting the jury's verdict form. (The verdict form asked the

jury to record the number of jurors who found each mitigating factor to exist, and the

jury returned that portion of the form blank.) Because Mr. Purkey presents us with

a question of law by asking us to interpret the FDPA, we review de novo the district

court's refusal to order the jury to complete the mitigation portion of the verdict form.

See United States v. Storer, 413 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2005). 

In a prior case, we hinted that the FDPA does not mandate that jurors identify

the mitigating factors they find to exist, but we ultimately avoided deciding the

question. See United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 999 n.6 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing

Hall, 152 F.3d at 413). We conclude that in Paul we correctly, albeit tentatively,

construed the FDPA. Section 3593(d) specifically requires the jury to "return special

findings identifying any aggravating factor[s] ... found to exist," without any mention

of identifying such mitigating factors, and so requires no special findings with respect

to the latter. It is true that the jury's identification of proven mitigating factors

facilitates appellate review, especially when we have to evaluate the effect of any error

on the sentence that the jury recommended. Nevertheless, the jury's failure to identify

proven mitigating factors is entirely proper under the FDPA, and therefore the district

court did not err by accepting the jury's verdict form. 

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D.

In Mr. Purkey's last assignment of error, he argues that the district court erred

by denying his motion for a mistrial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct.

During the penalty phase of the trial, Mr. Purkey interrupted the government's crossexamination of a psychiatric expert for the defense, at which point the district court

excused the jury and Mr. Purkey gave voice to an additional comment that the

prosecutor interpreted as a threat against him. During the government's subsequent

cross-examination of a defense expert, who testified to the calming effects of

medication that Mr. Purkey was taking, the prosecutor asked the expert whether he

was "aware [that Mr. Purkey] threatened to run my head through yesterday in court,"

to which Mr. Purkey's counsel immediately objected. The district court sustained the

objection. Mr. Purkey contends that the prosecutor's question compromised the

fairness of the penalty proceedings.

Earlier in our opinion, we rehearsed the legal principles that guide our review

of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Cf. Jackson, 41 F.3d at 1233. Even if, as

Mr. Purkey claims, the prosecutor's question was improper, we conclude that the

question did not deprive Mr. Purkey of due process: Although the district court failed

to instruct the jury to disregard the prosecutor's question, it sustained defense counsel's

objection. Given that defense counsel did not request the court to give the jury a

cautionary instruction and that the question was brief and isolated, the district court's

curative action, combined with the overwhelming evidence of aggravating factors,

ensured that Mr. Purkey was not denied a fair penalty proceeding. See id. This

remains true even when we take into account any residual effect on the jury from the

instances of improper prosecutorial conduct that related to Mr. Purkey's tattoos and

occurred during the guilt phase of Mr. Purkey's trial. We therefore conclude that the

district court did not err when it denied Mr. Purkey's motion for a mistrial.

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V.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________

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