Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03599/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03599-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Araceli Martinez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 05-3599

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Araceli Martinez,

 Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern 

District of Iowa.

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Submitted: March 13, 2006 

Filed: May 12, 2006

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Before COLLOTON, HEANEY and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Araceli Martinez pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute and aiding

and abetting the possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. On appeal,

Martinez challenges the determination of the district court1

 that Martinez was

competent and the district court’s denial of Martinez’s motion to recuse. We affirm.

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The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Magistrate Judge, United States District

Court for the Northern District of Iowa.

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I. BACKGROUND

Martinez was indicted for possession with intent to distribute and aiding and

abetting the possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. A guilty plea

hearing was conducted before a United States Magistrate Judge2

 on December 22,

2003. On January 16, 2004, the district court accepted the guilty plea in accordance

with the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. Martinez was released on

bond pending sentencing. In June 2004, the district court granted a motion for

continuance of the approaching sentencing hearing to allow Martinez’s attorney,

JoAnne Lilledahl, to obtain a mental health examination of Martinez because

Lilledahl was concerned about Martinez’s ability to assist in her own defense. Kirk

Witherspoon, Ph.D., a clinical and forensic psychologist, interviewed Martinez in

July 2004 to assess her current mental status. In August, a warrant was issued for

Martinez’s arrest for noncompliance with the conditions of her bond.

In January 2005, the magistrate judge granted Martinez’s pro se motion for

substitution of counsel, noting that Martinez was manipulative and “practiced an

amazing amount of deceit since she first entered the system” and that Martinez’s

deceit made it difficult for Lilledahl to represent her. On February 28, 2005, Martinez

filed a motion to withdraw guilty plea based, in part, on her alleged incompetence to

plead guilty. The hearing on her motion was scheduled for March 17, but Martinez

filed a motion seeking a continuance of the hearing to allow time for Dr. Witherspoon

to interview her a second time in order to offer an opinion on her mental competency

as of the date of the guilty plea hearing. The district court granted the motion, and

Dr. Witherspoon met with Martinez on March 25. On April 5, the magistrate judge

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granted the Government’s motion for a competency evaluation of Martinez. Michelle

Hoy-Watkins, Psy. D., a clinical and forensic psychologist and contract employee

with the United States Bureau of Prisons, conducted the court-ordered psychiatric

evaluation and submitted a report to the district court in July.

The district court held the hearing regarding Martinez’s motion to withdraw

guilty plea on August 9 and 10, 2005 (“August 2005 hearing”). The district court

heard from Martinez’s initial defense attorney, Lilledahl, as well as the two

psychologists who evaluated Martinez. Due to Lilledahl’s concerns about the

attorney-client privilege, Lilledahl testified only as to her standard practices in

representing criminal defendants. Lilledahl stated that if she thought a defendant was

under the influence of an illegal substance during a plea hearing, she would alert the

court that there was a problem with the proceeding. Lilledahl confirmed that she did

not alert the court in Martinez’s plea hearing or file an objection to the magistrate

judge’s report and recommendation that Martinez’s guilty plea be accepted.

Dr. Witherspoon testified that he met with Martinez for two hours in July 2004

and for two and a half hours in March 2005. Dr. Witherspoon found that Martinez

understood the criminal charge and the possible penalties and generally

comprehended the legal system. He testified that depression is common among

defendants facing extended incarceration and that Martinez suffered from “a major

depressive disorder with extreme anxiety, which chances are is a product itself of

posttraumatic stress, substance abuse tendencies, underlying personality disorder.”

Dr. Witherspoon also found that Martinez had a “tendency to be untruthful on

numerous occasions” and “may well have grown manipulative and deceitful to

survive in a hostile and abusive environment.” Dr. Witherspoon opined that Martinez

had been incompetent to plead guilty on December 22, 2003, and was incompetent

at the current time. 

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Dr. Hoy-Watkins testified telephonically that as part of the court-ordered

evaluation process of Martinez, she spoke with the prosecutor and current defense

counsel, reviewed the records from the case, and conducted three different types of

testing during her meetings with Martinez. Dr. Hoy-Watkins met weekly with

Martinez during the 30-day evaluation period for a total of more than four hours. Dr.

Hoy-Watkins opined that Martinez was feigning severe psychological symptoms.

She also found Martinez to be manipulative and deceitful based on the court records

and inconsistencies in the information Martinez supplied to others and to Dr. HoyWatkins. Dr. Hoy-Watkins concluded that Martinez had been competent at the time

of her guilty plea and was competent at present.

 Martinez filed a motion to recuse on September 2, 2005, asking Judge Reade

to recuse herself from the sentencing because of the appearance of partiality due to

Judge Reade’s law clerk, Teresa Baumann. Baumann served as the courtroom deputy

during the August 2005 hearing because the district court did not have a courtroom

deputy at that time as a result of a change in personnel. In her former position as

Special Assistant United States Attorney, Baumann had initiated the prosecution

against Martinez in October 2003. Baumann made no appearances in Martinez’s case

after December 8, 2003, when an Assistant United States Attorney replaced Baumann

in the case.

On September 7, 2005, the district court issued an order denying Martinez’s

motion to withdraw her guilty plea and an order denying Martinez’s motion to recuse.

Following a sentencing hearing on September 7 and 16, the district court sentenced

Martinez to 168 months of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. Martinez

appeals the district court’s determination that Martinez was competent when she pled

guilty and at subsequent court proceedings and the district court’s decision not to

recuse.

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Competency

We first address Martinez’s argument that the district court erred in holding

that Martinez was competent to enter a guilty plea on December 22, 2003, and

proceed with sentencing. The district court’s finding that a defendant is competent

is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Robinson, 253 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir.

2001). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support

it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Perry, 437 F.3d 782,

786 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573

(1985)).

Due process prohibits a defendant who is mentally incompetent from making

a valid guilty plea, United States v. Premachandra, 32 F.3d 346, 347 (8th Cir. 1994),

and from being convicted, United States v. Jimenez-Villasenor, 270 F.3d 554, 559

(8th Cir. 2001). A defendant is competent if she possesses a “sufficient present

ability to consult with [her] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational

understanding” and “has a rational as well as factual understanding of the

proceedings.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam);

Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993) (holding that the Dusky standard for

competency to stand trial applies equally to competency to plead guilty). 

In determining the defendant’s competency, the “district court may consider

‘numerous factors, including expert medical opinions and the court’s observation of

the defendant’s demeanor.’” United States v. Denton, 434 F.3d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir.

2006) (quoting Robinson, 253 F.3d at 1067). The district court concluded that

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Martinez was competent after considering the expert medical opinions of the two

psychologists, the transcript of the plea hearing on December 22, 2003, and the

court’s independent observations of Martinez in the courtroom during the August

2005 hearing. 

Contrary to the contention of Martinez, the district court did not clearly err in

crediting the opinion of Dr. Hoy-Watkins over that of Dr. Witherspoon. With respect

to Martinez’s competency to enter the guilty plea, the district court explained that Dr.

Witherspoon evaluated Martinez’s current mental state and extrapolated backward

to December 2003. The district court found the approach of Dr. Hoy-Watkins to be

more reasonable because not only did Dr. Hoy-Watkins consider her observations of

Martinez during their meetings and the results of the tests she administered to

Martinez, but she also carefully examined the December 22 plea transcript in arriving

at the opinion that Martinez was competent to plead guilty. Similarly, the district

court credited the opinion of Dr. Hoy-Watkins that Martinez currently was competent

for sentencing. Based on her testing of Martinez, Dr. Hoy-Watkins found that there

was minimal to no impairment in Martinez’s logical reasoning or her ability to assist

counsel and appreciate her legal situation. The district court’s reliance on one of two

competing competency opinions given by qualified experts was not clearly erroneous.

See United States v. Ameri, 412 F.3d 893, 899 (8th Cir. 2005); see also United States

v. Tucker, 243 F.3d 499, 506 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Where there are two permissible views

of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”

(quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574)). Moreover, even Dr. Witherspoon testified that

Martinez generally understood her legal situation and the criminal justice system. 

The district court also found that nothing occurred during the December 22,

2003, change of plea hearing to suggest that Martinez was not competent to enter a

guilty plea. Martinez argues that her hesitation in answering several questions asked

by the magistrate judge during the hearing evidences her incompetency. However,

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each time the magistrate judge indicated that Martinez hesitated, he repeated the

question to ensure that Martinez understood the terms of the plea agreement and the

consequences of pleading guilty. Martinez responded appropriately to indicate that

she understood, and she did not ask any questions of the magistrate judge.

Furthermore, the magistrate judge found at the change of plea hearing that Martinez

was fully competent to enter the guilty plea.

Finally, the district court considered its own observations of the defendant,

which can be as probative on the issue of competency as the testimony of a medical

expert. See Jimenez-Villasenor, 270 F.3d at 561. The court noted that Martinez

exhibited no unusual behavior at the August 2005 hearing. To the contrary, she was

relaxed, pleasant and smiling. She was responsive to the brief questioning by her

attorney and the prosecutor during the hearing. The district court also explained that

when the courtroom deputy inadvertently dialed a wrong number when attempting to

call Dr. Hoy-Watkins for her telephonic testimony, Martinez laughed along with

others in the courtroom. 

The district court explained in summary that Martinez’s attempts to portray

herself as incompetent were part of her “continuing pattern of dishonest and deceitful

behavior in order to avoid a prison sentence.” In light of the record viewed in its

entirety, the district court’s finding that Martinez was competent to enter her guilty

plea and be sentenced is not clearly erroneous.

B. Recusal

We next address Martinez’s contention that the district court erred in denying

the motion to recuse because Baumann’s service as courtroom deputy at the August

2005 hearing created an appearance of partiality. We review the denial of a motion

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to recuse for an abuse of discretion. Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 648 (8th Cir.

2002) (en banc). Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge “shall disqualify h[er]self in any

proceeding in which h[er] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Section

455(a) provides an objective standard of reasonableness. United States v. Poludniak,

657 F.2d 948, 954 (8th Cir. 1981). The issue is “whether the judge’s impartiality

might reasonably be questioned by the average person on the street who knows all the

relevant facts of a case.” Moran, 296 F.3d at 648 (quoting In re Kan. Pub. Employees

Retirement Sys., 85 F.3d 1353, 1358 (8th Cir. 1996)); see also Fletcher v. Conoco

Pipe Line Co., 323 F.3d 661, 664 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating that “disqualification is

required if a reasonable person who knew the circumstances would question the

judge’s impartiality, even though no actual bias or prejudice has been shown”

(quoting United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1324 (8th Cir. 1996))). Because a

judge is presumed to be impartial, a party seeking recusal bears the substantial burden

of proving otherwise. Denton, 434 F.3d at 1111.

In 2003, Baumann had presented Martinez’s case to the grand jury, signed the

indictment, represented the United States in the early pretrial phase of the

prosecution, and cross-examined Martinez at a suppression hearing. When Judge

Reade hired Baumann as a law clerk in July 2005, she assigned Baumann to work

exclusively on the civil docket and immediately screened her from the criminal

docket. In denying the motion to recuse, the district court explained that Baumann

“has not and will not have any involvement whatsoever with the undersigned’s

decisions in the case.” The mere presence of Baumann in the chambers of the district

court judge does not give rise to a reasonable question of impartiality. See Trammel

v. Simmons First Bank of Searcy, 345 F.3d 611, 612-13 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that

the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to recuse where the district

judge informed the parties that her law clerk, who was a friend of a party in the case,

had no involvement with the court’s handling of the case). The district court asked

Baumann to undertake the duties of courtroom deputy for the August 2005 hearing

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due to a staff shortage. Baumann served only ministerial functions in the courtroom

during the two-day hearing, including filling water jugs for counsel, placing phone

calls to interpreters and completing minute sheets for the proceedings. An average

observer who was informed of all the facts of Martinez’s case, including that

Baumann was screened from the case and performed only ministerial duties at the

hearing, would not reasonably question Judge Reade’s impartiality. We hold that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to recuse.

III. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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