Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-06065/USCOURTS-ca8-07-06065-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hope P. Blumeyer
Appellant
David A. Sosne
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

______

No. 07-6065

______

In re: *

 *

Hope P. Blumeyer, *

 *

Debtor. *

 *

Hope P. Blumeyer, * Appeal from the United States

 * Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern

Appellant, * District of Missouri

 *

v. *

 *

David A. Sosne, Trustee, *

 *

Appellee. *

 *

______

Submitted: March 7, 2008

Filed: March 13, 2008

______

Before KRESSEL, Chief Judge, FEDERMAN and MAHONEY, Bankruptcy Judges.

______

KRESSEL, Chief Judge.

Appellate Case: 07-6065 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/13/2008 Entry ID: 3412382
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The Honorable David P. McDonald, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

2

 Hope has also filed for leave to expand the record on appeal. We deny this

motion as we find there are no grounds which justify expanding the current record,

especially to include events that occurred after the bankruptcy court’s decision. 

We note, however, that nothing in the expanded record would change our decision.

2

Hope Blumeyer appeals the decision of the bankruptcy court1 which denied her

motion to reconsider the denial of her motion to dismiss her case, set aside the

dismissal of Arthur Blumeyer’s bankruptcy case, set aside the denial of the statutory

trustee’s motion to dismiss Arthur’s case, and set aside the order approving the

trustee’s compromise and settlement and sale of assets in Arthur’s case.2

 We affirm.

Background

In February of 1994, Arthur Blumeyer was convicted of mail fraud, wire fraud,

conspiracy, and money laundering in connection with various companies involved in

the insurance business, including Bel-Aire Insurance Company. Bel-Aire and other

related companies are currently in receivership and Arthur is incarcerated in a federal

penitentiary. 

On March 23, 1998, Arthur filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the

Eastern District of Missouri. His wife, Hope Blumeyer filed her own Chapter 11

petition in Florida on June 8, 1998. Her case was transferred to the Eastern District

of Missouri. Both cases were converted to Chapter 7 cases and David Sosne was

appointed trustee in both cases. 

During the administration of the cases, the trustee agreed to sell Arthur’s and

Hope’s interests in Bel-Aire and its affiliated entities, and any claims they had against

the Missouri Department of Insurance to the department of insurance. On July 6,

1999, the trustee sought approval of this agreement. The statutory trustee, who was

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appointed by the Circuit Court of Cole County, then brought a motion which claimed

that the appointment of the statutory trustee divested Arthur from control of his assets

and the ability to file a bankruptcy case, arguing that the bankruptcy trustee could not

administer the estate. The bankruptcy court treated the statutory trustee’s motion as

one to dismiss the bankruptcy case. On August 4, 2003, the bankruptcy court denied

the motion. Neither Arthur nor Hope appealed this order. 

On June 16, 2004, the bankruptcy court granted the trustee’s motion to approve

a compromise and settlement with the department of insurance and a sale of estate

assets. On June 28, 2004, Arthur brought a motion to dismiss his bankruptcy case or

to stay the order which authorized the sale of estate assets. The bankruptcy court

denied this motion. Arthur appealed to the district court. His appeal was dismissed

for failure to pay the filing fee.

On September 12, 2006, the bankruptcy court dismissed Arthur’s case for

failure to pay the entire filing fee and for failure to file a complete set of schedules and

statements. The bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction to permit the trustee to

distribute the estate’s assets. 

On August 23, 2007, Hope filed a motion in her bankruptcy case to (1) set aside

the order of dismissal of Arthur’s case; (2) set aside the order in Arthur’s case which

denied the statutory trustee’s motion to dismiss; (3) set aside the order in Arthur’s case

which approved the compromise and settlement and authorized the sale of estate

assets; and (4) dismiss her bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy court denied her motion

on September 14, 2007. Hope filed a motion to reconsider on 

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The trustee has argued that Hope’s appeal is untimely because it was not

filed within ten days of the entry of the order denying Hope’s motion to reconsider,

as required by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a). However, we conclude that the motion

was timely because Monday, October 8, 2007, the tenth day after the entry of the

order, was a legal holiday. Therefore, it was excluded from the calculation of the

ten day period under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(a). Hope had until Tuesday, October

9, 2007 to file her appeal. 

4

September 24, 2007, which the bankruptcy court denied on September 27, 2007. She

appealed on October 9, 2007.3

 

Standard of Review

We review the bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear error and its

conclusions of law de novo. Debold v. Case, 452 F.3d 756, 761 (8th Cir. 2006); In

Re Vondall, 364 B.R. 668, 670 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2007). We review issues committed

to the bankruptcy court's discretion for an abuse of that discretion. In re Neal, 461

F.3d 1048, 1055 (8th Cir. 2006). The bankruptcy court abuses its discretion when it

fails to apply the proper legal standard or bases its order on findings of fact that are

clearly erroneous. Id. A decision to grant a motion to voluntarily dismiss a

bankruptcy case is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re Turpen, 244 B.R. 431, 433

(8th Cir. B.A.P. 2000). 

DISCUSSION

The Orders Entered in Arthur’s Case.

With the exception of the denial of Hope’s motion to dismiss her case, the

orders at issue in this appeal are all orders entered in Arthur’s case . We affirm the

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bankruptcy court’s denial of Hope’s motion to reconsider the orders entered in

Arthur’s case. There are many reasons why we reject Hope’s appeal from these

orders.

We are unclear whether Hope is attempting to appeal the old orders directly, the

order denying her motion for relief from those orders, or the order denying her motion

to “reconsider” the later order. First, the period for timely filing an appeal is 10 days

from the date of the entry of the judgment, order, or decree appealed from. See Fed.

R. Bankr. P. 8002(a). As to all of the orders in Arthur’s case, Hope’s appeals are

untimely. The denial of the dismissal of Arthur’s case, and the approval of the

compromise and settlement and sale of assets, and the dismissal of Arthur’s case

occurred in 2003, 2004, and 2006 respectively. The orders have long since become

final, and Hope may not appeal them years afterwards. Nor has she shown any

grounds for revisiting these orders under Rule 60, the only possible rule that could

apply.

Second, Hope has not demonstrated that she is an aggrieved party who has the

right to appeal the orders entered in Arthur’s case. The right to appeal is limited to

parties who are aggrieved in some appreciable manner by the judgment. A person is

aggrieved if the judgment bears directly and injuriously on his or her interests.

Because she has not demonstrated how the orders entered in Arthur’s case have

adversely affected her interests, Hope does not have the right to appeal these orders.

Third, Hope lacks standing to appeal the orders in Arthur’s case. Federal

jurisdiction is limited by Article III, § 2, of the U.S. Constitution to actual cases and

controversies. Therefore, the plaintiff must have standing to sue in order for a federal

court to have the power to hear and decide the case. See Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228

F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir. 2000). To show Article III standing, a plaintiff has the burden

of proving: (1) that she suffered an injury-in-fact; (2) a causal relationship between

the injury and the challenged conduct; and (3) that the injury likely will be redressed

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by a favorable decision. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61

(1992). An injury-in-fact is a harm that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual

or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. Hope has not demonstrated that she

has suffered an injury-in-fact with respect to the bankruptcy court’s decisions entered

in Arthur’s case. Thus, she does not have standing to seek relief from those orders

and may not appeal those orders. 

Fourth, Hope filed the motion to set aside the orders in Arthur’s case in the her

case when she should have filed the motion in his. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9004(b) requires

motions to include the correct title of the case and bankruptcy docket number.

Because Hope’s motion contained only the title and docket number for her case, it was

not filed in Arthur’s case. Therefore, we do not have a proper record the proceedings

in Arthur’s case. Nor are we certain that the parties in interest in Arthur’s case

received notice of Hope’s motion or this appeal. 

Finally, Hope has failed to show that the bankruptcy court erred with respect

to the orders entered in Arthur’s case. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its

discretion in dismissing Arthur’s case for failure to pay filing fees and for failure to

file complete schedules. It did not err in ruling that the appointment of the statutory

trustee did not divest the debtor of its assets and ability to file bankruptcy. It did not

abuse its discretion when it approved the compromise and settlement and sale of

assets. 

For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the bankruptcy court’s denial of Hope’s

motion to reconsider the bankruptcy court’s denial of her motion to set aside the

dismissal of Arthur’s case, the compromise and settlement and order of sale in

Arthur’s case, and the denial of the dismissal of Arthur’s case. 

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The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying the Debtor’s

Motion to Dismiss Her Bankruptcy Case.

To the extent that Hope’s appeal is from the bankruptcy court’s denial of her

motion to dismiss her case, we consider the bankruptcy court’s order final. See Stuart

v. Koch (In re Koch), 109 F.3d 1285, 1288 (8th Cir. 1997), Ladikav. Luker (In re

Ladika), 1998 WL 665579 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 1998). A debtor has no absolute right to

dismissal of a Chapter 7 case. In re Turpen, 244 B.R. 431, 434 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 2000).

In order to succeed in a motion to dismiss, the debtor must make a showing of cause

and demonstrate why dismissal is justified. Id. Even if the debtor can show cause,

the court should deny the motion if it prejudices creditors. Id. Courts generally

consider the following factors when ruling on a debtor's motion to dismiss: (1)

whether all of the creditors have consented; (2) whether the debtor is acting in good

faith; (3) whether dismissal would result in an prejudicial delay in payment; (4)

whether dismissal would result in a reordering of priorities; (5) whether there is

another proceeding through which the payment of claims can be handled; and (6)

whether an objection to discharge, an objection to exemptions, or a preference claim

is pending. Id. 

Given that Hope has waited until the proverbial eleventh hour to request

dismissal of her case that has spanned ten years, we conclude that the bankruptcy

court did not abuse its discretion in denying the debtor’s motion to dismiss her case.

Despite Hope’s best efforts to hinder the trustee’s collection and distribution of estate

assets, the trustee has finally succeeded in gaining approval of his amended final

report and proposed distribution. He is now poised to make a distribution to Hope’s

creditors who have waited a decade to receive payments on their debts. At this

juncture, it would not be in the best interests of creditors to dismiss Hope’s case. We

conclude that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hope’s

motion to dismiss her bankruptcy case. 

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CONCLUSION

The orders of the bankruptcy court are affirmed.

 

Appellate Case: 07-6065 Page: 8 Date Filed: 03/13/2008 Entry ID: 3412382