Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02814/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02814-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dominic R. Jackson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 09-2814

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Dominic R. Jackson,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Eastern

District of Arkansas.

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Submitted: April 13, 2010

 Filed: July 8, 2010

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Before BYE, BEAM and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

A jury found Dominic Jackson guilty of possession of crack cocaine and

marijuana with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),

conspiracy to possess crack cocaine, powder cocaine, and marijuana with the intent

to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and possession of a

firearm in furtherance of these drug crimes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924. The

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The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Arkansas.

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district court1

 sentenced Jackson to 300 months’ imprisonment. Jackson appeals,

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND 

During the last week of October 2005, a confidential police informant

purchased crack cocaine from the occupants of a one-bedroom house in Little Rock,

Arkansas. Agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

(“ATF”) determined that the house was leased to Elias Rhodes and Peter Robinson.

After gathering more information, the ATF agents obtained a search warrant for the

house. 

At 7:30 a.m. on November 3, 2005, ATF agents arrived at the house to conduct

surveillance before executing the search warrant. They noticed a red Chevrolet

Caprice parked in the backyard of the house. The agents entered the house at 9:00

a.m. and found Jackson sleeping on a couch in the living room and Rhodes in the

bathroom. The agents found a bag of marijuana underneath a cushion of the couch

where Jackson had been sleeping and two loaded firearms hidden in a second, nearby

couch. On an entertainment center, the agents discovered bags of crack cocaine,

powder cocaine, and marijuana, two digital scales, a box of plastic sandwich bags,

keys, and a yellow aerosol can. The aerosol can had a false bottom, which the agents

unscrewed to reveal more bags of crack cocaine. The agents also found a large brick

of marijuana in the corner of the living room. In the bedroom, the agents found

another brick of marijuana, twenty-nine bags of marijuana, three bags of powder

cocaine, two boxes holding more than $1,000 in cash, and an Arkansas Department

of Health appointment reminder slip addressed to Jackson. All of the drugs that the

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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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agents recovered from the house, except the large bricks of marijuana, were packaged

in fold-top plastic sandwich bags, which were knotted at the end. 

During the search, an ATF special agent read Jackson his Miranda2 rights, and

Jackson agreed to speak with the agent. Jackson claimed that he did not live at the

house, but he admitted that he had been coming to the house every day for the last

three weeks to smoke marijuana. Jackson told the agent that the red Chevrolet

Caprice parked in the backyard was his and that there was marijuana in it. The agents

matched a set of keys found on the entertainment center to Jackson’s car, which they

then searched. In the front seat of Jackson’s car, the agents found two bags of

marijuana. Under the passenger seat, they discovered a yellow aerosol can, similar

to the one found on the entertainment center in the house. Like the can in the house,

this can had a false bottom, which an agent unscrewed to reveal four bags of

marijuana and two bags containing multiple rocks of crack cocaine. Like the drugs

found in the house, the drugs in Jackson’s car were packaged in fold-top plastic

sandwich bags that were knotted at the end. In total, the agents seized seventy-one

grams of crack cocaine, 227 grams of powder cocaine, and 4.234 kilograms of

marijuana from the house and Jackson’s car. 

A federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Jackson with (1)

possession of fifty grams or more of cocaine base with the intent to distribute; (2)

conspiracy to possess fifty grams or more of cocaine base with the intent to distribute;

(3) conspiracy to possess 200 grams of powder cocaine with the intent to distribute;

(4) possession of less than five kilograms of marijuana with the intent to distribute;

(5) conspiracy to possess less than five kilograms of marijuana with the intent to

distribute, and (6) possession of a firearm in furtherance of the drug crimes. The case

proceeded to trial before a jury.

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At the trial, Robinson testified that he did not live at the house but that he had

co-signed the lease so that Rhodes would have a place to live. Robinson

acknowledged that he knew Rhodes and Jackson and had been to the house many

times. According to Robinson, Jackson began living at the house three or four weeks

before the agents executed the search warrant. Robinson saw “a lot of traffic” going

to the house, and he testified that people were visiting the house to buy drugs from

Rhodes and Jackson. In fact, Robinson brought a friend to the house to buy

marijuana. During his frequent visits to the house, Robinson said he had observed

bags of marijuana and crack cocaine, digital scales, and one of the firearms found

during the search. 

ATF Special Agent David Oliver also testified at trial. Agent Oliver provided

details about the confidential informant buy, the execution of the search warrant, and

the seizure of the drugs and firearms. In particular, Agent Oliver stated that the crack

cocaine and marijuana found in Jackson’s car were packaged in the same manner as

the drugs inside the house and that the drugs in Jackson’s car constituted distributable

amounts. Agent Oliver testified that bags of marijuana the size of those found in the

yellow aerosol can in Jackson’s car were often sold for $10 to $25 each and that

individual rocks of crack cocaine the size of those in the can were commonly sold for

$20 to $40.

Jackson moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of the Government’s

evidence, and the district court reserved ruling on the motion. The district court

submitted the case to the jury, and the jury found Jackson guilty on all six counts.

Jackson renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal. The district court denied the

motion and sentenced Jackson to a total term of 300 months’ imprisonment. 

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II. DISCUSSION

Jackson argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for judgment

of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find that he possessed

the drugs, conspired to possess the drugs, or possessed the firearms in furtherance of

these crimes. We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment

of acquittal. United States v. Coleman, 584 F.3d 1121, 1125 (8th Cir. 2009), cert.

denied, 559 U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 1752 (2010). “In conducting this review, we consider

the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and draw all reasonable

inferences in the Government’s favor.” Id. “The jury is responsible for assessing the

credibility of witnesses and resolving conflicts in testimony, and its conclusions on

these issues are ‘virtually unreviewable on appeal.’” United States v. Thompson, 560

F.3d 745, 748-49 (8th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Morris, 327 F.3d 760, 761 (8th

Cir. 2003)), cert. denied, 558 U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 329 (2009). “[W]e will reverse a

conviction only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Coleman, 584 F.3d at 1125.

To convict Jackson of possession of crack cocaine and marijuana with the intent

to distribute, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that Jackson

knowingly possessed the drugs and (2) that he intended to distribute the drugs. See

United States v. McClellon, 578 F.3d 846, 854 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S.

---, 130 S. Ct. 1106 (2010). In his brief, Jackson admits that he knew that crack

cocaine and marijuana were in the house, but he contends that the Government did not

prove that he had possession of the drugs. 

It is well established that possession can be either exclusive or joint. See United

States v. Sanders, 341 F.3d 809, 816 (8th Cir. 2003). It can also be either constructive

or actual. Id. “[A]n individual has constructive possession of contraband if he has

ownership, dominion or control over the contraband itself, or dominion over the

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premises in which the contraband is concealed.” McClellon, 578 F.3d at 854 (quoting

United States v. Cruz, 285 F.3d 692, 697 (8th Cir. 2002)). 

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, showed that

Jackson lived in the house where the agents found large amounts of crack cocaine,

powder cocaine, and marijuana. There was evidence that people were buying drugs

from Jackson and Rhodes at the house. In the room where Jackson was sleeping,

agents discovered large quantities of drugs, drug-packaging materials, two digital

scales, and two firearms. The agents also found significant amounts of drugs and cash

in the bedroom, along with an Arkansas Department of Health appointment reminder

slip addressed to Jackson. Furthermore, Jackson’s car was parked outside of the house

on the day the agents executed the search warrant, and the agents found the key to

Jackson’s car in the living room. “[M]ere presence [in a house where contraband is

located] is not sufficient to support a conviction for possession.” United States v.

Boyd, 180 F.3d 967, 979 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Dunlap, 28 F.3d

823, 826 (8th Cir. 1994)). However, there was evidence that Jackson lived at the

house, dealt drugs there, and that his personal belongings were in the rooms where the

agents found drugs and drugs paraphernalia. This was sufficient for a reasonable jury

to conclude that Jackson had dominion or control over the drugs. See Cruz, 285 F.3d

at 698-99, and cases cited therein.

Even if this evidence alone were not sufficient, a jury could reasonably

conclude that Jackson had dominion and control over the marijuana and crack cocaine

found inside his car. See United States v. Walker, 393 F.3d 842, 847 (8th Cir. 2005).

The drugs in Jackson’s car were packaged in the same manner as the drugs inside the

house, and several of the bags of drugs in Jackson’s car were hidden in a yellow

aerosol can with a false bottom, similar to the one found inside the house. A jury

could reasonably conclude that Jackson’s residence at the house and possession of the

marijuana and crack cocaine in his car showed his dominion or control over the

similarly-packaged marijuana and crack cocaine inside the house. Drawing all

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reasonable inferences in the Government’s favor, we hold that a reasonable jury could

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson knowingly possessed the drugs.

Jackson concedes that if the evidence was sufficient to prove that he possessed the

drugs, it was also sufficient for a jury to conclude that he had the intent to distribute

the drugs. Accordingly, we affirm Jackson’s convictions for possession of crack

cocaine and marijuana with the intent to distribute. 

Jackson next argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his

convictions for conspiracy to possess marijuana, crack cocaine, and powder cocaine

with the intent to distribute. To convict Jackson, the Government must prove beyond

a reasonable doubt (1) that two or more people reached an agreement to possess the

drugs with the intent to distribute; (2) that Jackson voluntarily and intentionally joined

the agreement; and (3) that at the time Jackson joined the agreement, he knew its

essential purpose. See Coleman, 584 F.3d at 1125. The Government is not required

to prove an express agreement. United States v. Jiminez, 487 F.3d 1140, 1146 (8th

Cir. 2007). Instead, it need only establish a tacit understanding between the alleged

co-conspirators, which may be shown through circumstantial evidence. Id. Because

conspiracies often entail secrecy, the agreement between co-conspirators must

frequently be established through “inference[s] from the surrounding circumstances.”

Id (quoting United States v. Cabrera, 116 F.3d 1243, 1245 (8th Cir. 1997)).

Nevertheless, the Government must “offer enough evidence to prove a defendant’s

connection to a conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Lopez, 443

F.3d 1026, 1028 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 

In his brief, Jackson attacks each piece of evidence individually and argues that

it alone is not sufficient to prove a conspiracy; however, we must consider the entirety

of the evidence to determine if it was sufficient to uphold the convictions. United

States v. Roberson, 439 F.3d 934, 941-42 (8th Cir. 2006). Jackson relies primarily on

United States v. Jensen, 141 F.3d 830 (8th Cir. 1998) to support his argument. In

Jensen, we concluded that “evidence of mere buyer/seller exchanges” was not

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sufficient to prove a conspiracy. Id. at 834. Here the evidence establishes more than

a buyer/seller relationship between Jackson and Rhodes. The evidence certainly was

sufficient to show that Jackson knew that marijuana, crack cocaine, and powder

cocaine were being distributed from the house where he had been living with Rhodes.

As previously discussed, there was also evidence that people went to the house to buy

drugs from Jackson and Rhodes. The presence of distributable amounts of drugs in

Jackson’s car that were packaged in the same manner and in a similar container as the

drugs inside the house further shows that Jackson and Rhodes had an agreement to

possess the drugs with the intent to distribute them. See Roberson, 439 F.3d at 942.

Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that

Rhodes and Jackson had an agreement to possess the drugs with the intent to

distribute, that Jackson voluntarily and intentionally joined the agreement, and that he

knew its essential purpose. Thus, we affirm Jackson’s convictions for conspiracy to

possess the drugs with the intent to distribute them.

Finally, in his brief, Jackson concedes that if we find that there was sufficient

evidence that he possessed the drugs, we should also find that there was sufficient

evidence that he possessed the firearms in furtherance of the underlying drug offenses.

Jackson expressly states that “the only way this [c]ourt should address the [sufficiency

of the evidence to support the possession of the firearms in furtherance of the drug

offenses] is if it has found . . . insufficient evidence to support the verdict on [c]ounts

one and four,” the counts addressing possession of the drugs. Since we have already

concluded that there was sufficient evidence to find that Jackson possessed the drugs,

we need not address the possession of the firearms further. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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