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Parties Involved:
Evergreen America Corporation
Respondent
National Labor Relations Board
Petitioner

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 12, 2004 Decided April 2, 2004

No. 03-1129

EVERGREEN AMERICA CORPORATION,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO,

INTERVENOR

Consolidated with

03-1146

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application

for Enforcement of an Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

–————

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #03-1146 Document #813696 Filed: 04/02/2004 Page 1 of 21
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Steven M. Swirsky argued the cause for petitioner. With

him on the briefs were Elliot Jay Mandel and Michael F.

McGahan.

Ruth E. Burdick, Attorney, National Labor Relations

Board, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the

brief were Arthur F. Rosenfeld, General Counsel, John H.

Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong,

Deputy Associate General Counsel, and Frederick L. Cornnell, Jr., Supervisory Attorney.

Herzl S. Eisenstadt argued the cause for intervenor. With

him on the brief were Ernest L. Mathews, Jr. and John P.

Sheridan. Elizabeth A. Alexander entered an appearance.

Before: EDWARDS, GARLAND and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge: On June 20, 2002, the International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO (‘‘Union’’), filed

a representation petition with the National Labor Relations

Board (‘‘NLRB’’ or ‘‘Board’’), pursuant to Section 9(c) of the

National Labor Relations Act (‘‘Act’’), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)

(2000), seeking an election to become the exclusive bargaining

agent for Port Captains, Assistant Port Captains, and Port

Engineers employed by Evergreen America Corporation

(‘‘Evergreen’’ or ‘‘Employer’’). The Employer opposed the

proposed bargaining unit on the ground that the five persons

in the unit were managerial employees and therefore excluded from coverage under the Act. Following a hearing, the

Acting Regional Director issued a decision holding that the

disputed employees were not excluded managers and ordered

an election. See Evergreen Am. Corp., N.L.R.B. Case No. 22-

RC-12225 (Aug. 14, 2002) (‘‘Representation Decision’’), reprinted in Joint Appendix (‘‘J.A.’’) 541-60. The Employer

then sought review by the Board. A secret ballot election

was held on September 10, 2002, and the ballots were impounded pending a decision from the Board. On October 18,

2002, the Board denied the Employer’s request for review.

On November 15, 2002, after the ballots had been counted,

the Acting Regional Director certified the Union as the

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exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the

contested unit.

In order to obtain judicial review of the Board’s certification decision, Evergreen refused to recognize and bargain

with the Union. Evergreen also refused to provide information sought by the Union relating to existing employee benefit

plans. On January 9, 2003, the Union filed an unfair labor

practice charge with the NLRB. A complaint was then

issued, alleging that the Employer’s refusals to bargain and

furnish information violated sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act,

29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2000). The Employer filed an answer

admitting the refusal to bargain, but challenging the validity

of the Board’s certification. The Board subsequently granted

the General Counsel’s motion for summary judgment, holding

that the Employer had violated sections 8(a)(5) and (1) as

charged. See Evergreen Am. Corp., 338 N.L.R.B. 156, 2003

WL 1963885 (2003). Evergreen petitions this court for review of that order, and the Board cross-applies for enforcement.

The only issues on appeal are whether substantial evidence

supports the Board’s determination that the Port Captains,

Assistant Port Captains, and Port Engineers in the contested

bargaining unit are ‘‘employees’’ under the Act and whether

the Board’s determination is consistent with the Act. On the

record at hand, we find no basis upon which to overturn the

Board’s judgment. We therefore deny Evergreen’s petition

for review and grant the Board’s cross-application for enforcement.

I. BACKGROUND

The hearing on the representation petition included testimony from Chia-Lin Chen, Evergreen’s Junior Vice President

and Marine Department head, Charles Meng, an Assistant

Port Captain, Lie-Cheng Yang, a Port Captain, and Johnnie

Chen, Manager of the Marine Section. The facts elicited at

the hearing are largely undisputed. We reprint them here:

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a. Background

The Employer is a New Jersey corporation, with

its office located in Morristown, New Jersey. The

Employer is a general shipping agent for Evergreen

Marine Corporation (‘‘EMC’’), a company located in

Taipei, Taiwan that owns and operates approximately 50 ships used to transport cargo in containers for

its customers to various ports around the world. In

the New York City area, EMC’s ships berth at

Maher Terminal, a 400-acre terminal in Elizabeth,

New Jersey.

The Employer is responsible for the loading and

unloading of EMC’s vessels at Maher Terminal (‘‘the

Terminal’’). Neither the Employer nor EMC own

the Terminal. Rather, the Employer contracts with

the Terminal for terminal services, meaning that the

Terminal provides a berth for ships owned or chartered by EMC as well as stevedore services, meaning that the Terminal provides employees called

‘‘stevedores’’ to unload and load cargo. The stevedores are employees of the Terminal. Other shipping companies berth ships at the Terminal. Usually, three of EMC’s ships arrive at the Terminal each

week. After berthing in Elizabeth, the ship travels

to other ports in Europe or on the East Coast of the

United States, such as Baltimore or Savannah. On

any given day, the Employer stores two or three

thousand containers at Maher Terminal.

The five petitioned-for employees work in the

Employer’s Marine Section, which also includes a

section manager, an assistant manager and a general

staff person. The petitioned-for employees report to

the New York City Marine Section Manager who

reports to the Junior Vice-president who heads the

Marine Department. The Marine Department Junior Vice-President also supervises the Marine Section Manager in Salt Lake City and the Marine

Section Manager in Los Angeles. The Marine Department Junior Vice President reports to the Executive Vice-president for Marine and Logistics. In

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its organizational chart, the Employer designates

personnel at the level of Executive Vice-president

and above as ‘‘management.’’

b. The Port Captains

The parties have stipulated that the duties of the

Port Captains and the Assistant Port Captain are

the same. The Port Captains and Assistant Port

Captain are responsible for preparing a schedule for

unloading and loading the ship, preparing a plan for

loading its cargo, acting as a liaison between the ship

and the port, and monitoring the unloading and

loading of cargoTTTT

The Port Captains remain at the Employer’s Morristown office until a ship comes in. When a ship

arrives, they work in the terminal, monitoring the

loading and unloading of the ship. The Port Captain’s manager records when the Port Captain leaves

the office and returns from working in the terminal.

The Port Captains have their own desks in Morristown, but do not have individual offices at the Morristown facility. The Port Captains’ manager works

in the Morristown office where he usually remains.

The Port Captains must be available to management

by phone at all times. The Port Captains’ manager

testified that the Port Captains contact him throughout the day to ‘‘keep [him] informed’’ on situations.

The Port Captains’ manager testified that Port Captains can handle routine matters, but they consult

with him on non-routine matters or emergencies,

matters involving significant costs and matters not

covered by guidelines previously given to the Port

Captains. The Employer has issued detailed descriptions of the Port Captain’s functions, but concedes that these may not reflect actual practice. A

Port Captain cannot approve payment of checks by

the Employer’s accounting department. In a conflict between the Port Captain and the Ship Captain

or the Chief Mate, the ship personnel prevail.

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 i. Preparation of Prospect Reports

Approximately one week before a ship is scheduled to arrive at the Terminal, the Port Captain

compiles a projected schedule for the ship’s activity

at the Terminal, called a prospect report. The

prospect report includes the dates the ship will

berth, the estimated time of arrival, the estimated

time the ship will berth, the times that unloading

and loading, referred to as ‘‘cargo activity,’’ will

begin and finish, the total number of container

movements, the number of labor gangs ordered, the

hours they will work and the estimated time of

departure. Some of the information on the prospect

report is supplied from various departments within

the Employer. The Port Captain does not change

the ship’s overall schedule, which has been determined by the Employer’s Project Department and

cannot be changed without the agreement of the

Port Captain’s manager.

The Port Captain obtains the estimated time of

the ship’s arrival from the Project Department. It

generally takes three and one-half hours after the

ship arrives at the harbor to get to its berth in the

Terminal. The Employer advises the Port Captain

of the total number of containers to be unloaded and

loaded, or container ‘‘movements.’’

The Port Captain adds to the prospect report the

planned times that cargo activity will begin and end.

He also adds the estimated number of labor gangs

requested. He arrives at these figures by making

mathematical calculations. He is limited by the

ship’s overall schedule. Normally a ship is in port

for about 24 hours. He knows the number of containers that a crane can move within an hour. Pursuant to Terminal procedure, one labor gang works

with each crane. He knows the number of cranes

that can safely be operated on a ship. The number

of container movements and the length of time that

the ship will be berthed determine the number of

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labor gangs he requests. For example, a Port Captain may be told that a ship can be in port 20 hours

and will need 2,000 moves. He knows he must move

100 containers an hour and that a crane can move 25

moves per hours [sic], so he will figure on using four

cranes and four labor gangs to move the containers.

The Junior Vice-President testified that in scheduling cargo activity, the Port Captain takes into

account the start times of the stevedores, who start

at 7 or 8 AM, 1 PM or 7 PM. He testified that the

Port Captain tries to schedule cargo activity to avoid

paying overtime costs, and to use the stevedores

during the day when it is less expensive to pay them,

as opposed to at night. The Port Captain may

recommend that the Ship Captain speed up to arrive

in the Terminal at a time that is economical for

cargo activity.

The Port Captain’s manager reviews each prospect report. At the beginning of each week, the

Port Captain’s Manager contacts an administrator at

the Terminal to review with him the schedules of

EMC’s ships coming into the terminal that week.

After Terminal personnel learn the schedules of all

of its customers, a Terminal representative will contact the Port Captain to tell him how many cranes

and workers will be available for each ship. If the

Terminal advises that the number of stevedores is

different than that requested by the Employer, the

Port Captain will report this to his manager. If

there is a conflict in which two vessels owned or

chartered by EMC are scheduled to berth at the

same time, the Port Captain’s manager will decide

how many gangs are assigned to each vessel.

The number of gangs assigned to a ship is ultimately decided between the Terminal manager and

the Port Captain’s manager. Subsequently, if a ship

is behind schedule, the Port Captain may, in consultation with his Manager, request that the Terminal

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provide additional labor to shorten the period of

cargo activity.

 ii. Preparation of Stowage Plans

The process of loading cargo is termed ‘‘stowage.’’

Prior to the arrival of a ship, the Port Captain

prepares a stowage plan, which is a diagram showing

the placement of cargo to be loaded onto the ship.

In making the stowage plan, the Port Captain aims

to load the cargo efficiently, and to load the ship to

its maximum capacity while maintaining the ship’s

stability. The Port Captain starts with a computerized floor plan of the bays in the ship where cargo

can be stored. EMC’s ships have ten different floor

plans. The Port Captain looks at the previous stowage plan’s designation for the containers to be unloaded to determine what space will be available for

loading. He is told the weight of the cargo the ship

can handle. He contacts the Employer’s Export

Department to find out the size and weight of the

cargo to be loaded. The Employer generally uses

three sizes of containers. There may be oversized

cargo to be loaded onto the ship. The Port Captain

considers the sequence of ports in the ship’s route.

He plans to load heavier cargo at the bottom of the

ship. The Port Captain takes into account the number of cranes available at the port where cargo will

be unloaded. A Port Captain will spread out cargo

to conform with the positioning and number of

cranes at the destination port. The Port Captain

also considers whether cargo is hazardous. He must

follow federal regulations and the International Maritime Code in the manner these containers are handled. He must get approval from his manager if he

deviates from these guidelines. He learns from the

Employer whether containers must be kept refrigerated and therefore require access to electricity. The

Port Captain knows where electrical outlets are

located on the various ships. The Export Department advises him the day before the ship comes in if

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military containers will be loaded and if so, the

weight, size and destination of such containers.

The Employer gives the Port Captain specific

guidelines as to how space on the ship is to be used.

The Port Captain uses a computer to superimpose

onto the floor plan a diagram showing where containers going to the various ports will be placed. He

uses a hydrostatic table to evaluate the ship’s stability after cargo is loaded according to the stowage

plan.

If a ship will berth between 3:30 AM and 5:30 PM,

the Port Captain must complete the stowage plan

the night before the ship will berth. If the ship is to

be berthed after 5:30 PM, the Port Captain must

complete the plan before noon on that day. The

Port Captain submits the stowage plan to his manager, and to his manager’s supervisor for review.

The Port Captain must review the stowage plan with

the ship’s Chief Mate, who is in charge of the ship’s

cargo, to determine if it is in conflict with a previous

stowage plan.

 iii. Liaison Between Ship and Port

The Port Captain notifies the Coast Guard 96

hours before a ship arrives to advise the Coast

Guard of the ship’s estimated time of arrival and

departure. The Employer’s Junior Vice President

characterized this procedure as ‘‘routine.’’ If the

Coast Guard changes the ship’s schedule, then the

Port Captain must notify his manager. The Port

Captain must tell the Coast Guard the names of the

crew, and their date of birth, nationality and position

aboard ship. The Coast Guard usually performs a

safety inspection, during which the Port Captain is

present. During such an inspection, the Coast

Guard typically checks hazardous containers. If the

Coast Guard finds unsafe conditions on the ship, the

Port Captain will ask the Ship Master or Ship

Engineer [to] repair the condition. The Port CapUSCA Case #03-1146 Document #813696 Filed: 04/02/2004 Page 9 of 21
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tain may arrange for a surveyor, who is a licensed

marine engineer designated by the Employer to

inspect repairs. The Port Captain cannot authorize

a repair. If a repair cannot be completed before the

ship is scheduled to depart, the Port Captain will

contact his manager.

The Employer has contracted with various vendors to supply services to the ship while it is in port,

including a tugboat company to provide tugboats, a

piloting company to provide pilots to maneuver the

boat in the harbor, the Terminal to supply linemen

to tie the ship to the terminal, and a husbandry

agent to assist in clearing customs. The Marine

Department Junior Vice-President, or the Junior

Vice-President in conjunction with his supervisor,

determines with which vendor the Employer contracts. EMC has contracted with a bunker oil supplier to provide bunker oil. The Ship Captain determines the number of tugboats needed. Each ship

requires two pilots. EMC determines how much

bunker oil will be supplied.

The Port Captain arranges for tugboats, pilots,

linemen, a husbandry agent and bunker oil. These

contacts are, as one of the Employer’s witnesses

acknowledged, routine. If a Port Captain learns

that any vendor with whom the Employer has a

standing arrangement cannot meet the needs of a

particular ship, then the Port Captain notifies his

manager. The Junior Vice-President may consult

with the Port Captains as to the performance of the

various services with whom the Employer contracts.

The Port Captain communicates with the Ship

Captain. If the Ship Captain informs him that any

crew members need medical attention, the Port Captain works with his manager to arrange this. He

cannot arrange for medical attention on his own. If

a crew member is not able to rejoin the ship, the

Port Captain sees that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is contacted and advises his manUSCA Case #03-1146 Document #813696 Filed: 04/02/2004 Page 10 of 21
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ager of the change so that the manager can determine if a substitute crew member is needed. The

Ship Captain may tell the Port Captain that he

needs money, charts or maps.

iv. Monitoring Unloading and Loading

The Port Captain monitors the unloading and

loading of the ship by the stevedores. The Port

Captain does not supervise the stevedores who are

supervised by employees of the Terminal. There

was a conflict between the parties’ proffered evidence as to whether a Port Captain can, on his own,

hire a ‘‘reefer,’’ or refrigerator mechanic to assist in

unloading refrigerated containers.

The Port Captain brings any significant errors

involving unloading and loading to the attention of

his manager. He investigates unloaded damaged

containers and reports these to his manager. He

does not make the determination as to whether to

repair these containers. He has the discretion to

determine whether to load a damaged container.

The Port Captain may determine that time constraints do not permit loading all of the containers as

planned. In such a case, the Port Captain may

refrain from loading empty containers.

The Port Captain reports unusual incidents such

as a stowaway to his manager. There was testimony at the hearing about an incident where a crew

member did not show up at the ship’s scheduled

departure time. The Port Captain’s manager decided that the ship could not sail.

The Port Captains’ manager must approve any

significant change in the stowage plan made after he

has reviewed it. For example, if a customer asks for

change in number of containers to be loaded at a

particular port that will significantly impact upon the

weight of the ship’s cargo, then the Port Captain

must notify his manager, as well as the ship’s Chief

Mate. Or, if the Port Captain determines that the

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placement of a hazardous container pursuant to the

stowage plan results in a potential unsafe condition,

he consults with his manager to decide whether to

withhold the hazardous container.

The Port Captain evaluates the stability of the

ship with a hydrostatic table once the cargo has been

loaded. The Chief Mate may adjust the ballast, a

tank on the ship that can be filled with water to

balance the ship, in response to the way the vessel is

loaded or unloaded. The Port Captain may make a

recommendation concerning the ballast.

 v. Terms and Conditions of Employment

The Port Captain may sleep and take meals on the

ship while it berths. The Port Captain is entitled to

a meal allowance when his manager confirms that he

worked on a shift that entitles him to such allowance.

The Port Captain does not attend management

meetings. The Employer gives a gold lapel pin to

its managers. The Employer does not give the Port

Captains or the Assistant Port Captain these lapel

pins. A Port Captain cannot authorize a visitor to

board a ship, although his manager can give this

permission.

The Port Captain usually works over 40 hours

weekly. He does not get overtime pay. He does

not punch a time clock. If he works a weekend day,

he gets day off. If he works 24 hours straight

through during the week, he gets four hours off.

 vi. Education and Work Experience

The Employer requires the Port Captain to have

the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree in navigation.

The Employer prefers that a Port Captain have

experience as a ship captain.

b. The Engineer

The Engineer works in the Marine Section in the

Employer’s Morristown office until a ship arrives,

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when he goes to the Terminal to see if the ship

needs assistance with a mechanical problem. He

works with the Ship Engineer to repair the ship, and

may arrange for the purchase of parts or obtain the

assistance of a mechanic. He does not actually

perform a repair. He may communicate with the

Coast Guard about an engine room failure or deficiency. He is in charge of updating maritime engineering certificates and insuring that a ship has a

certificate of financial responsibility concerning pollution of the harbor. He reports to the Marine

Section Manager. He does not punch a time clock.

He has the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree in

engineering.

See Representation Decision, slip op at 3-13, J.A. 543-53.

Following the hearing, the Acting Regional Director issued

a decision on August 14, 2002, finding that the Port Captains,

Assistant Port Captains, and Port Engineers are not managerial employees. Id. at 13-18, J.A. 553-58. In reaching this

result, the Acting Regional Director concluded:

I find no evidence that Port Captains formulate the

Employer’s business policies. I note that Port Captains work under the supervision of their manager

on all but routine matters. The degree to which

their actions are reviewed is inconsistent with managerial status. The evidence reveals that they lack

the requisite discretion and judgment, independent

of the Employer’s established policies, necessary to

confer managerial status upon them.

Id. at 14-15, J.A. 554-55 (citing NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444

U.S. 672, 682-83 (1980)). The Representation Decision further held that,

[w]hile work that is based upon technical and professional competence must necessarily involve the exercise of discretion and judgment, technical and professional employees who exercise such discretion and

judgment are not necessarily managerial employees.

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General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857-58

(1974).

Id. at 14, J.A. 554. In the General Dynamics decision cited

in the Representation Decision, the Board held:

Work which is based on professional competence

necessarily involves a consistent exercise of discretion and judgment, else professionalism would not be

involved. Nevertheless, professional employees

plainly are not the same as management employees

either by definition or in authority, and managerial

authority is not vested in professional employees

merely by virtue of their professional status, or

because work performed in that status may have a

bearing on company direction. Likewise, technical

expertise in administrative functions which may involve the exercise of judgment and discretion does

not confer executive-type status upon the performer.

A lawyer or a certified public accountant working

for, or retained by, a company may well cause a

change in company direction, or even policy, based

on his professional advice alone, which, by itself,

would not make him managerial.

213 N.L.R.B. at 857-58. Finally, the Representation Decision

concluded that the Port Engineer’s ‘‘[m]ere exercise of discretion’’ did not endow him with managerial status. Representation Decision, slip op. at 18, J.A. 558. The Acting Regional

Director ordered an election in the disputed unit, id. at 18-19,

J.A. 558-59, and Evergreen filed a timely request for review.

On September 10, 2002, a secret ballot election was held,

but the ballots were impounded pending the resolution of the

Evergreen’s request for review. On October 18, 2002, the

Board denied Evergreen’s request for review. The impounded ballots were then opened on November 13, 2002, and it

was determined that the Union had received a majority of the

votes cast. On November 15, 2002, the Acting Regional

Director certified the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees. The Employer then filed a

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motion for reconsideration with the Board, which the Board

denied on January 8, 2003.

Evergreen refused to bargain with the Union, and the

Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board on

January 9, 2003. Evergreen filed an answer admitting its

refusal to bargain and attacking the validity of the Board’s

certification of the Union. On February 19, 2003, the NLRB

General Counsel filed a motion for summary judgment, to

which Evergreen responded by again challenging the validity

of the certification. On April 25, 2003, the Board issued a

Decision and Order granting the General Counsel’s motion

for summary judgment. The Board held that Evergreen

violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a),

by failing and refusing to recognize and bargain with the

Union and by failing and refusing to provide the Union with

information it sought from Evergreen. Evergreen, 2003 WL

1963885 at *3.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

In considering Evergreen’s petition for review, we must

ask whether the Board’s determination that the Port Captains, Assistant Port Captains, and Port Engineers are ‘‘employees’’ under the Act ‘‘has warrant in the record and a

reasonable basis in law.’’ Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d

757, 761 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns,

322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944). As the Supreme Court noted in

NLRB v. Yeshiva University, ‘‘we accord great respect to the

expertise of the Board when its conclusions are rationally

based on articulated facts and consistent with the Act.’’ 444

U.S. at 691. Under the Act, it is clear that ‘‘[t]he findings of

the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by

substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall

be conclusive.’’ 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2000). ‘‘Substantial evidence means ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ’’ MECO

Corp. v. NLRB, 986 F.2d 1434, 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). AdditionalUSCA Case #03-1146 Document #813696 Filed: 04/02/2004 Page 15 of 21
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ly, the court will uphold the Board’s decision upon substantial

evidence even if we would reach a different result upon de

novo review. See Perdue Farms, Inc., Cookin’ Good Div. v.

NLRB, 144 F.3d 830, 834-35 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In short, this

court reverses for lack of substantial evidence ‘‘only when the

record is ‘so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could

fail to find’ to the contrary.’’ Lakeland Bus Lines, Inc. v.

NLRB, 347 F.3d 955, 961 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting United

Steelworkers v. NLRB, 983 F.2d 240, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).

With this standard of review in mind, we turn to the principal

findings supporting the Board’s conclusion that the five employees are not managerial. We also address Evergreen’s

claim that the Board’s decision cannot be squared with Yeshiva.

B. The Managerial Exclusion

The Act only extends its protections and guarantees to

those workers who meet the statutory definition of ‘‘employee.’’ 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000). In NLRB v. Bell Aerospace

Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267 (1974), the Supreme

Court held that Congress intended to exclude from the protections of the Act all employees properly classified as ‘‘managerial.’’ Id. at 275. Employees are properly classified as

‘‘managerial’’ when they ‘‘formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer.’’ Id. at 288 (quoting Palace Laundry

Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 (1947)); accord

Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 682; Gen. Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B.

at 857. The Supreme Court has made it clear that ‘‘employees whose decisionmaking is limited to the routine discharge

of professional duties in projects to which they have been

assigned’’ are not managers under the Act. Yeshiva, 444 U.S.

at 690.

The Board’s finding that Port Captains, the Assistant Port

Captain, and the Port Engineer do not exercise managerial

discretion is clearly supported by substantial evidence in the

record as a whole and is consistent with the Act. The record

shows that, in all but the most routine tasks, the Port

Captains are tethered to the Section Manager. Assistant

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Port Captain Meng and Port Captain Yang testified, without

contradiction, that Port Captains follow strict policies and

guidelines in performing their jobs, with constant direction

from their manager.

Evergreen argues that the Board ignored evidence of Port

Captains’ discretion and authority over a ship’s regional

schedule. See Petitioner’s Br. at 16. The Employer points to

Junior Vice President Chen’s testimony that, under certain

circumstances, Port Captains may order extra gangs if needed. Hearing Tr. at 101, 178, 195-96. But Assistant Port

Captain Meng’s testimony established that the Employer’s

Project Department sets the ship’s schedule, and that circumstances requiring a change of schedule should be reported to

the manager. Id. at 270. Meng testified that he had never

ordered extra gangs, and that he would not do this ‘‘unless

[he had] the approval from the manager.’’ Id. at 386. Meng

also explained that, when a ship arrived behind schedule in

the late evening and was scheduled to sail early the next

morning, he had to consult with his manager about the

additional gangs necessary to get the ship out. Id. at 379-92.

The Section Manager’s close supervision of the Port Captains’ purported exercise of discretion in the ordering of extra

gangs was confirmed by Port Captain Yang’s testimony.

Yang testified that if two or more EMC ships unexpectedly

berth at the same time, the labor adjustments are made by

the manager in consultation with the terminal. Id. at 473-75.

Yang also stated that he never ordered extra gangs on his

own, and that the manager coordinated such tasks with the

terminal supervisor. Id. at 474.

The record clearly establishes that Port Captains do not set

a ship’s schedule – they merely administer it in consultation

with their manager. The Board considered the evidence that

Port Captains exercise some discretion over a ship’s schedule

and estimate the number of labor gangs needed. See Representation Decision, slip op. at 14-15, J.A. 554-55. However,

the Board reasonably concluded that this discretion is professional, not managerial. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B.

at 857-58.

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Evergreen also argues that the Representation Decision

failed to recognize the discretionary authority of Port Captains over stowage plans. See Petitioner’s Br. at 18. Both

Junior Vice President Chia-Lin Chen and Section Manager

Johnnie Chen testified that they need not approve the Port

Captain’s stowage plan before it takes effect, and that they

review the plan after the stowage is completed. Hearing Tr.

at 172, 490. But Meng’s testimony established that, in practice, Port Captains follow specific guidelines in the preparation and execution of stowage plans. Meng reports to the

manager after determining the location of reefers, which are

considered special cargo. The manager, not the Port Captain, determines whether a reefer mechanic should be hired in

such circumstances. Id. at 318. Meng also testified that

when a customer requests a major change in the stowage

plan, such as the shifting of 30 containers, he must report to

his manager, who must approve the change. Id. at 323-24.

According to Meng, Port Captains also receive instructions

for loading or discharging hazardous cargos. The manager,

not the Port Captain, decides when the hazardous cargo can

be shipped. Id. at 330. Meng also stated that Port Captains

are not authorized to fix any cargo problems without first

reporting them to the manager. Id. at 441.

The record therefore supports the Board’s finding that,

‘‘[a]s to the Port Captain’s function of making arrangements

for the ship in port TTT these functions are wholly routine and

therefore do not characterize a managerial employee.’’ Representation Decision, slip op. at 17, J.A. 557. Similarly, the

Board reasonably determined that the Port Engineer does

not exercise managerial discretion. Id. at 18. Nothing in

the testimony of the Junior Vice President or the Section

Manager undermines these conclusions.

We also reject the Employer’s argument that Yeshiva

compels reversal of the Board decision in this case. Yeshiva

held that a university’s full-time faculty members were managerial employees who were excluded from the protections of

the Act. The Employer contends that, pursuant to Yeshiva,

‘‘ ‘managerial employee’ TTT encompass[es] not just those who

have authority to formulate policies, or to act independently

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of them, but also those who represent management interests

by taking or recommending discretionary action that effectively implement those policies.’’ Petitioner’s Br. at 15 (emphasis in the original). Yeshiva says no such thing. The

Yeshiva decision acknowledges that the exercise of discretion

is among the factors to be weighed in determining management status. However, the Court goes on to say:

The controlling consideration in this case is that

the faculty of Yeshiva University exercise authority

which in any other context unquestionably would be

managerial. Their authority in academic matters is

absolute. They decide what courses will be offered,

when they will be scheduled, and to whom they will

be taught. They debate and determine teaching

methods, grading policies, and matriculation standards. They effectively decide which students will

be admitted, retained, and graduated. On occasion

their views have determined the size of the student

body, the tuition to be charged, and the location of a

school. When one considers the function of a university, it is difficult to imagine decisions more

managerial than these. To the extent the industrial

analogy applies, the faculty determines within each

school the product to be produced, the terms upon

which it will be offered, and the customers who will

be served.

Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 686.

The work of Port Captains, Assistant Port Captains, and

Port Engineers does not come close to satisfying Yeshiva’s

description of a ‘‘manager.’’ The record in this case makes it

clear that the Evergreen employees in question do not have

‘‘absolute authority’’ over anything – not even a ship’s schedule. These employees exercise professional discretion in a

few matters affecting the ships, but their decisions are closely

monitored by and subject to the direction of the Section

Manager. This is not analogous to the discretion exercised

by the university professors in Yeshiva.

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Finally, Evergreen argues that if the Union is allowed to

represent the Port Captains, Assistant Port Captains, and

Port Engineers, there will be a conflict of interest between

the contested Evergreen employees and terminal stevedores,

because the stevedores are represented by the same union as

the employees in this case. Petitioner’s Br. at 18. One

rationale for excluding managerial employees from the Act’s

coverage is ‘‘[t]o ensure that employees who exercise discretionary authority on behalf of the employer will not divide

their loyalty between employer and union.’’ Yeshiva, 444

U.S. at 687-88. Evergreen claims that Port Captains’ discretion over the number of stevedoring gangs used by Evergreen impacts the income of the stevedores, thus creating a

conflict of interest. Petitioner’s Br. at 18. This contention is

meritless.

The stevedores work for a different employer, Maher Terminal, and they are in a different bargaining unit. We are

aware of no authority, and Evergreen cites to none, supporting the proposition that such a purported cross-unit conflict

may be relied upon to defeat the representational rights of

employees who are not otherwise managers under the Act.

Indeed, in an analogous situation, the Board has held that the

potential for divided loyalty between inspectors and contractors working for two different employers did not render the

inspectors managerial, even though the inspectors would be

‘‘represented by the same union which represents the employees whose work they inspect.’’ Bechtel, Inc., 225 N.L.R.B.

197, 198 (1976).

In light of the record as a whole, the Board reasonably

rejected Evergreen’s claim that its Port Captains, Assistant

Port Captain, and Port Engineer are managerial employees.

Accordingly, the Acting Regional Director properly directed

the representational election leading to the Union’s certification. And the Board did not err when it determined that

Evergreen violated the Act in refusing to recognize and

bargain with the Union and in refusing to provide information

sought by the Union.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we deny Evergreen’s petition

for review and grant the Board’s cross-application to enforce

its order.

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