Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02428/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02428-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Express Corporation
Defendant
Paul Johnson
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Paul Johnson, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Federal Express Corporation, 

Defendant.

No. CV-14-02428-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Defendant Federal Express Corporation has filed eight motions in limine. The 

Court and the parties discussed the motions at the final pretrial conference held on 

August 23, 2016. The Court enters the following rulings. 

 A. Defendant’s Motion in Limine 1. 

 Relying on Rule 404(b), Defendant seeks to exclude Pat Helm’s testimony that 

Defendant retaliated against him for complaining about improper employment practices. 

Defendant argues that Helm worked in Los Angeles – a separate district under a separate 

manager – and that his testimony therefore says nothing about Plaintiff’s claim that his 

supervisor, Raffi Arzoumanian, retaliated against him. Plaintiff responds that 

Arzoumanian was supervised by Carlos Valdivia and Glen Corbin, the same regional 

managers who supervised Helm’s manager, that both Plaintiff and Helm claim these 

regional managers were involved in their retaliation, and that Helm’s testimony is 

therefore relevant to prove motive and intent – a legitimate purpose under Rule 404(b). 

Case 2:14-cv-02428-DGC Document 138 Filed 08/24/16 Page 1 of 6
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 In the Ninth Circuit, “‘other act’ evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) if the 

following test is satisfied: (1) there must be sufficient proof for the jury to find that the 

defendant committed the other act; (2) the other act must not be too remote in time; 

(3) the other act must be introduced to prove a material issue in the case; and (4) the other 

act must, in some cases, be similar to the offense charged.” Duran v. City of Maywood, 

221 F.3d 1127, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2000). In employment discrimination cases, courts also 

consider not only whether “the same actors are involved in each decision,” but also the 

“temporal and geographical proximity, whether the various decisionmakers knew of the 

other decisions, whether the employees were similarly situated in relevant respects, [and] 

the nature of each employee’s allegations of retaliation.” Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 

584, 598-99 (6th Cir. 2012). Courts must further consider whether the evidence is 

admissible under Rule 403. Duran, 221 F.3d at 1133. 

 The Court concludes that these evaluations must, in this case, be made in the 

context of trial, when the Court will have a better understanding of the claims and 

defenses being presented to the jury. It is not clear to the Court at this time, for example, 

what role the regional managers played in the retaliation alleged by Plaintiff and Helm. 

Nor can the Court determine the degree of similarity between Helm’s allegation of 

retaliation and Plaintiff’s. During trial, the Court will be better equipped to consider 

relevant Rule 404(b) and 403 factors. For this reason, the motion in limine (Doc. 116) is 

denied. Because of the potentially prejudicial nature of Helm’s evidence, Plaintiff 

should not mention it to the jury until after the Court has ruled on its admissibility. 

B. Defendant’s Motion in Limine 2. 

 Defendant seeks to exclude Sue Apostoli’s testimony that Defendant retaliated 

against her for complaining about improper employment practices. Defendant argues that 

Apostoli worked in Palm Springs and Temecula – in a separate district under a separate 

manager – and that her testimony therefore says nothing about Plaintiff’s claim that 

Arzoumanian retaliated against him. Plaintiff again responds that Arzoumanian was 

supervised by the same regional managers as Apostoli’s manager, that both Plaintiff and 

Case 2:14-cv-02428-DGC Document 138 Filed 08/24/16 Page 2 of 6
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Apostoli claim these regional managers were involved in their retaliation, and that 

Apostoli’s testimony is therefore relevant to prove motive and intent. As with 

Defendant’s first motion, this decision must be made in the context of trial, when the 

Court will have a better understanding of the claims and defenses being presented to the 

jury. The motion in limine (Doc. 117) is therefore denied. Because of the potentially 

prejudicial nature of this evidence, Plaintiff should not mention Apostoli’s testimony to 

the jury until after the Court has ruled on its admissibility. 

C. Defendant’s Motion in Limine 3. 

 Defendant seeks to exclude Colene Garcia’s testimony that Defendant retaliated 

against her for filing an internal complaint. Defendant argues that Garcia worked in Los 

Angeles – in a separate district under a separate manager – and that her testimony 

therefore says nothing about Plaintiff’s claim that Arzoumanian retaliated against him. 

Plaintiff again responds that Arzoumanian was supervised by the same regional managers 

as Garcia’s manager, that both Plaintiff and Garcia claim these regional managers were 

involved in their retaliation, and that Garcia’s testimony is therefore relevant to prove 

motive and intent. As with Defendant’s first and second motions, this decision must be 

made in the context of trial. The motion in limine (Doc. 118) is denied. Because of the 

potentially prejudicial nature of this evidence, Plaintiff should not mention it to the jury 

until after the Court has ruled on its admissibility. 

 D. Defendant’s Motion in Limine 4. 

 Defendant seeks to exclude evidence regarding the hiring of Don Askew for a 

position in Las Vegas. Plaintiff asserts that Askew’s hiring was contrary to Defendant’s 

policy of hiring from within, was made at the suggestion of Corbin and Valdivia, and 

shows that Defendant applies its policies arbitrarily. Plaintiff confirmed during the final 

pretrial conference that the policy allegedly violated in the hiring of Askew is not at issue 

in this case. 

 As noted above, a consideration of other acts evidence requires the Court to 

address Rule 403. Duran, 221 F.3d at 1133. The Court finds this evidence – an alleged 

Case 2:14-cv-02428-DGC Document 138 Filed 08/24/16 Page 3 of 6
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

violation of a policy not at issue in this case, in a different office and region – to be only 

marginally relevant to Plaintiff’s claim. The Court finds that the marginal probative 

value of this evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue delay and 

wasting time. If this evidence is presented, Defendant will be required to present 

evidence regarding the process of hiring Askew that is entirely unrelated to this case and 

yet will consume valuable trial time. This motion in limine (Doc. 119) is granted. 

E. Defendant’s Motion in Limine 5. 

 The Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendant’s motion to preclude 

Bruce Chamberlain from testifying. Doc. 120. The Court will grant the motion with 

respect to Chamberlain’s testimony about Defendant’s alleged retaliation against him. 

Chamberlain’s internal complaint in 2003, and his failure to obtain a promotion in 2008, 

occurred before the events at issue in this case. Chamberlain worked in different offices 

from Plaintiff, in a different division, and had different managers. Plaintiff does not 

claim that any person in Chamberlain’s management chain was a part of Plaintiff’s 

management chain. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the 

requirements for admission under Rule 404(b) because the events are remote in time and 

not sufficiently similar to be probative of the motive and intent of Defendant’s managers 

– the purpose for which Plaintiff seeks to introduce the evidence. 

 The Court will deny the motion with respect to Chamberlain’s testimony that 

counseling is a precursor to discipline, and that most employees view it as disciplinary. 

The Court cannot conclude at this time that Plaintiff will be unable to satisfy Rules 602 or 

701 in presenting this evidence. Chamberlain’s more than 35 years with the company, as 

well as his management position, may qualify him to present such testimony. 

F. Defendant’s Motion in Limine 6. 

 The Court will deny Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Lee 

Burke. Doc. 121. Burke was a Senior Manager in El Paso. She testified that 

Arzoumanian discriminated against her and, after she filed an internal complaint in 2008, 

began to retaliate against her. She testified that his retaliation continued after she filed an 

Case 2:14-cv-02428-DGC Document 138 Filed 08/24/16 Page 4 of 6
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

EEOC complaint in 2009. This testimony concerns the same manager and management 

chain as Plaintiff, and similar allegations of retaliation. The Court finds that it satisfies 

the Ninth Circuit’s four-part test under Duran. Burke can provide sufficient proof for the 

jury to find that Arzoumanian engaged in the acts of retaliation, the relevant events are 

not too remote in time, the evidence addresses a relevant issues in the case – 

Arzoumanian’s motive and intent in his actions with respect to Plaintiff, and the alleged 

retaliation against Burke is similar to the alleged retaliation against Plaintiff. 221 F.3d at 

1133. The Court finds that Burke’s testimony is highly relevant and not substantially 

outweighed by the dangers identified in Rule 403. 

 Burke also testified that Arzoumanian, Valdivia, and Corbin have a routine 

practice of such retaliation, and that counseling is viewed as a disciplinary action among 

Defendant’s employees. Whether she can lay a proper foundation for such testimony 

under Rules 602 or 701 must be determined at trial.1

 

G. Defendant’s Motion in Limine 7. 

 Defendant seeks to exclude evidence that unnamed persons instructed some 

witnesses to falsify FAMIS 280 screens that relate to driver routes and productivity. 

Defendant contends that the testimony would lack foundation, constitute hearsay, and be 

nothing more than an attempt to smear Defendant. Plaintiff responds that witnesses will 

testify that specific managers – including Arzoumanian – directed them to change 

FAMIS 280 screens contrary to policy, and that he was subjected to counseling (which he 

claims is a form of discipline) for doing so. The Court cannot determine whether this 

testimony will satisfy foundation, hearsay, and relevancy requirements without hearing 

the testimony, and therefore denies the motion in limine (Doc. 122). 

 

1

 At the final pretrial conference, defense counsel asked the Court to preclude Burke from testifying about Arzoumanian’s alleged discrimination against her based on race, gender, sexual orientation, and age. The Court agrees that such testimony is likely irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. Burke can testify that she filed an employment-related complaint and that Arzoumanian retaliated against her, but, because Plaintiff has no 

remaining discrimination claim in this case, the Court sees no need to get into the irrelevant and potentially prejudicial forms of the alleged discrimination against Burke. If Plaintiff disagrees, he can raise this issue with the Court outside the hearing of the jury. 

Case 2:14-cv-02428-DGC Document 138 Filed 08/24/16 Page 5 of 6
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

H. Defendant’s Motion in Limine 8. 

 Defendant seeks to exclude the testimony of Joseph Durant, a long-time employee 

who left Defendant’s employ in 2003 – years before the first relevant events in this case. 

Plaintiff asserts that Durant will testify that hiring decisions are often made before the 

interview process, that certain managers believe they are above the policies, and that 

Defendant’s managers have been known to freeze employees out of their regions. In his 

affidavit, Durant describes hiring events that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. Doc. 136-

1 at 2. The Court will grant the motion in limine. Doc. 123. Durant’s testimony is too 

remote in time to be particularly probative, it does not involve any of Plaintiff’s 

managers, and it is not sufficiently similar to constitute probative evidence of 

Arzoumanian’s or his managers’ motive or intent. Duran, 221 F.3d at 1133. The Court 

also concludes, under Rule 403, that the marginal relevancy of this dated evidence is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, undue delay, and wasting 

time at trial. 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motions in limine are granted and denied as 

set forth above. 

 Dated this 24th day of August, 2016. 

 

Case 2:14-cv-02428-DGC Document 138 Filed 08/24/16 Page 6 of 6