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Parties Involved:
Gerardo Ramirez-Alvarado
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-14696

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-00093-ODE-JSA-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

GERARDO RAMIREZ-ALVARADO, 

a.k.a. Cesar Orlando Alvarado,

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(June 8, 2015)

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, MARCUS, and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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In 2014, officers from the Douglasville, Georgia police department arrested 

Gerardo Ramirez-Alvarado on charges of shoplifting. A few days later, an 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer interviewed him. During the

interview, he admitted that he had illegally entered the United States for the fourth 

time in 2012.

Ramirez-Alvarado later pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry by an 

aggravated felon, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) & (b)(2). In sentencing him 

for that crime, the district court calculated his advisory guidelines range as 77 to 96 

months imprisonment. It then varied downward and imposed a 72-month sentence. 

Ramirez-Alvarado contends that his downward variance sentence was 

substantively unreasonable — that the court did not go low enough. The thrust of 

his argument is that he should have gotten some credit for freely admitting his date 

of reentry to ICE officials. But for his honesty, Ramirez-Alvarado argues, he 

might have been found to have “commenced” his illegal reentry offense in 2014, 

his “encounter” date of reentry, as opposed to 2012, his actual date of reentry. If 

that were the case, his advisory guidelines range would have been significantly 

lower — 37 to 46 months instead of 77 to 96 months — because two of his prior 

convictions would not have received criminal history points, and he would have 

received only a 12-level, as opposed to a 16-level, enhancement under United 

States Sentencing Guidelines § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)

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(explaining that certain prior convictions are not scored if the resulting sentence 

was imposed too many years before the defendant “commenced” his instant 

offense of conviction); id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (providing that, if a defendant 

previously was deported after having been convicted of a felony that is a “crime of 

violence,” he receives a 16-level enhancement if the conviction was scored and a 

12-level enhancement if it was not); United States v. Castrillon-Gonzalez, 77 F.3d 

403, 406 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that, for purposes of calculating a defendant’s 

criminal history score, “the commencement of the crime of being ‘found in’ the 

United States [under 8 U.S.C. § 1326] is at the point of entry”). He also argues 

that the district court failed to consider that the low end of his advisory guidelines 

range (77 months) was much higher than the 24-month sentence that he had 

received for a previous illegal reentry conviction, and that his personal history and 

characteristics merited a shorter sentence. 

We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse of 

discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 

(2007). Under that deferential standard, we will vacate a sentence “only if[] we are 

left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear 

error of judgment in weighing the [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] factors by arriving at a 

sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of 

the case.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) 

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(quotation marks omitted). The party challenging a sentence has the burden of 

showing that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the entire record, the 

§ 3553(a) factors, and the substantial deference afforded sentencing courts. United 

States v. Langston, 590 F.3d 1226, 1236 (11th Cir. 2009). 

Ramirez-Alvarado’s 72-month sentence is substantively reasonable. For 

starters, it is a below-guidelines sentence. Because we ordinarily expect withinguidelines sentences to be reasonable, see United States v. Asante, 782 F.3d 639, 

648 (11th Cir. 2015), that fact alone is a strong indicator of the sentence’s 

reasonableness. Equally to the point, the sentence was not the product of a clear 

error in judgment. The district court considered the advisory guidelines range, 

treated it as advisory, and varied downward based on the fact that “old” 

convictions “trigger[ed] a very large adjustment in the calculation of the guideline 

range.”1

 It did not vary downward as much as Ramirez-Alvarado would have 

liked, however, because it determined that a shorter sentence (such as the 24-

month sentence that he previously received for the same crime) would not 

adequately deter him from illegally entering the country a fifth time. The court

also determined that a shorter sentence would not adequately account for the fact 

that he had committed multiple crimes each time he had entered the United States, 

 1 In a way, then, the district court did give Ramirez-Alvarado credit for being honest with 

ICE. Of course, his real reward was not receiving an obstruction of justice enhancement. See

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. 

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including burglaries of private residences, burglary of a motor vehicle, multiple 

thefts, driving without a license, and driving under the influence. RamirezAlvarado has failed to meet his burden of showing that his downward variance 

sentence is unreasonably long in light of the § 3553(a) factors and the facts of his 

case. 

AFFIRMED.

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