Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10268/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10268-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Monico Dominguez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MONICO DOMINGUEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-10268

D.C. No.

3:12-cr-00834-EMC-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Edward M. Chen, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 7, 2016

Submission Vacated July 12, 2016

Argued and Resubmitted December 10, 2019

Pasadena, California

Filed April 7, 2020

Before: Barry G. Silverman and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, 

Circuit Judges, and Michael M. Anello,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Silverman;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Nguyen

* The Honorable Michael M. Anello, United States District Judge 

for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel reversed a conviction of money laundering 

(18 U.S.C. § 1957); and affirmed the remainder of the 

judgment, which included convictions of Hobbs Act robbery 

(18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2), attempt to commit Hobbs Act 

robbery (18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2), conspiracy to commit 

Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)), and possession of 

a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)).

The panel held that the evidence was sufficient to 

support the conviction of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, 

where the evidence overwhelmingly showed that the 

defendant had the specific intent to commit the robbery and 

had taken a “substantial step” toward its completion—

arming himself with a handgun and driving to within about 

a block of a planned robbery with his accomplice, turning 

around only because he got ensnared in a fake crime scene.

In light of recent Supreme Court cases, the panel 

reiterated this court’s previous holding that Hobbs Act 

armed robbery is a crime of violence for purposes of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).

The panel held that when a substantive offense is a crime 

of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A), an attempt to commit that 

offense is also a crime of violence; and that attempted Hobbs 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 3

Act armed robbery is a crime of violence for purposes of 

§ 924(c) because its commission requires proof of both the 

specific intent to complete a crime of violence, and a 

substantial step actually (not theoretically) taken toward its 

completion. The panel explained that it does not matter that 

the substantial step is not itself a violent act or even a crime; 

what matters is that the defendant specifically intended to 

commit a crime of violence and took a substantial step 

toward committing it. The panel observed that the definition 

of “crime of violence” in § 924(c)(3)(A) explicitly includes 

not just completed crimes, but those felonies that have the 

“attempted use” of physical force as an element; and that it 

is impossible to commit attempted Hobbs Act robbery 

without specifically intending to commit every element of 

the completed crime, which includes the commission or 

threat of physical violence.

Because the panel determined that each of the 

defendant’s § 924(c) convictions is supported by a predicate 

crime of violence—completed and attempted Hobbs Act 

robbery, respectively—the panel did not reach whether 

conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is also a crime of 

violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).

Concurring in part and dissenting in part from Part V.B 

of the majority opinion, Judge Nguyen wrote that attempted 

Hobbs Act robbery plainly does not fit the definition of a 

crime of violence under the elements clause, § 924(c)(3)(A), 

because, as the majority acknowledges, attempted Hobbs 

Act robbery can be committed without any actual use, 

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

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4 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ

COUNSEL

Gene D. Vorobyov (argued), Law Office of Gene Vorobyov, 

San Francisco, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Vanessa Baehr-Jones (argued) and Susan B. Gray, Assistant 

United States Attorneys; Barbara J. Valliere, Chief, 

Appellate Division; Merry Jean Chan, Chief, Appellate 

Section, Criminal Division; David L. Anderson, United 

States Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office, Oakland, 

California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge:

On August 11, 2011, appellant Monico Dominguez and 

a man named Milton Fierro robbed the Garda Cash Logistics 

armored car warehouse in Santa Rosa, California. Wearing 

masks and armed with an AK-47 rifle and either a 9-

millimeter or a .45 caliber handgun, the two men snuck into 

the Garda warehouse. They pointed their guns at two guards, 

put them on the ground, tied their hands and feet with rope, 

and demanded access to the vault. The robbers made off with 

over $900,000 in cash and two guns belonging to one of the 

guards.

About a year later, Dominguez approached his friend 

Kevin Jensen and offered him $100,000 to participate in 

another Garda robbery, this time of a Garda armored car. 

When Jensen found out that the FBI was offering a $100,000 

reward for information about the previous year’s Garda 

robbery, he contacted the FBI and became a confidential 

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UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 5

informant. That’s how the FBI was able to thwart the second 

robbery before it was completed.

On August 6, 2012, Dominguez and Jensen drove toward 

the Garda warehouse intending to hold up an armored car. 

This time, Dominguez was armed with a .357 revolver. 

Tipped off by Jensen, the FBI and local enforcement officers 

staged a fake crime scene near the warehouse to make it 

difficult for a vehicle to get close to it. While en route to the 

warehouse, Dominguez received a phone call, after which 

Dominguez told Jensen they had to terminate the plan 

because of the unusual law enforcement activity near the 

Garda building. Dominguez drove to within about a block or 

so of the warehouse before turning around. Dominguez was 

arrested the following day and charged with Hobbs Act 

robbery of the Garda warehouse in 2011, attempted Hobbs 

Act robbery of a Garda armored car in 2012, possession of 

firearms in furtherance of both crimes, conspiracy, money 

laundering, and structuring transactions.

We hold today that the evidence was sufficient to support 

Dominguez’s conviction of attempted Hobbs Act robbery. 

The evidence overwhelmingly showed that Dominguez had 

the specific intent to commit the robbery and had taken a 

“substantial step” toward its completion − arming himself 

with a handgun and driving to within about a block of the 

planned robbery with his accomplice, turning around only 

because he got ensnared in the fake crime scene.

In light of recent Supreme Court cases, we also reiterate 

our previous holding that Hobbs Act armed robbery is a 

crime of violence for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). 

See United States v. Mendez, 992 F.2d 1488, 1491 (9th Cir. 

1993).

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6 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ

And, like the two other circuit courts that have 

considered the question, we hold that when a substantive 

offense is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(3)(A), an attempt to commit that offense is also a 

crime of violence. See United States v. Ingram, 947 F.3d 

1021 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d 

335 (11th Cir. 2018); Hill v. United States, 877 F.3d 717 (7th 

Cir. 2017). We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that 

attempted Hobbs Act armed robbery is a crime of violence 

for purposes of § 924(c) because its commission requires 

proof of both the specific intent to complete a crime of 

violence, and a substantial step actually (not theoretically) 

taken toward its completion. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d at 351. It 

does not matter that the substantial step—be it donning 

gloves and a mask before walking into a bank with a gun, or 

buying legal chemicals with which to make a bomb—is not 

itself a violent act or even a crime. What matters is that the 

defendant specifically intended to commit a crime of 

violence and took a substantial step toward committing it. 

The definition of “crime of violence” in § 924(c)(3)(A) 

explicitly includes not just completed crimes, but those 

felonies that have the “attempted use” of physical force as 

an element. It is impossible to commit attempted Hobbs Act 

robbery without specifically intending to commit every 

element of the completed crime, which includes the 

commission or threat of physical violence. 18 U.S.C. § 1951. 

Since Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence, it follows 

that the attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of 

violence.

I. Convictions and Sentence

Following his arrest, Dominguez was charged with 

eleven counts in connection with the 2011 robbery and the 

attempted 2012 robbery. The relevant counts are:

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UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 7

Count One: conspiracy to commit the 2011 robbery, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a);

Count Two: robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) 

and 2;

Count Three: possession of a firearm in furtherance of a 

crime of violence, namely the 2011 conspiracy (Count One) 

and robbery (Count Two), in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 924(c) and 2;

Count Four: money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1957 in the August 30, 2011 cash purchase of a HarleyDavidson motorcycle;

Count Eight: conspiracy to commit the August 6, 2012 

robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a);

Count Nine: attempted robbery on August 6, 2012, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2; and

Count Ten: possession of a firearm in furtherance of a

crime of violence, namely the 2012 conspiracy (Count 

Eight) and the 2012 attempted robbery (Count Nine).1

In his closing argument, the prosecutor argued that 

Dominguez had completed a “substantial step” toward the 

2012 attempted robbery, because he turned his car around 

only in response to law enforcement presence, not because 

he’d had a change of heart. Dominguez’s counsel did not 

object to the prosecutor’s arguments and, in his own closing, 

1 Dominguez was indicted on additional money laundering and 

structuring charges; however, Dominguez doesn’t argue any error in 

those convictions, so we do not reach them.

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8 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ

conceded (with his client’s consent) the defendant’s guilt of 

the attempted robbery.

The jury convicted Dominguez of Counts One through 

Ten in the indictment. The district court imposed a prison 

sentence totaling 384 months and one day: one day for 

Counts One, Two, and Four through Nine, to be served 

concurrently with each other; 84 months for Count Three, 

Dominguez’s first § 924(c) violation, to be served 

consecutively to that one-day term; and 300 months for 

Count Ten, Dominguez’s second § 924(c) conviction, to be 

served consecutively to all other sentences imposed.

II. Standard of Review

We review insufficient evidence claims de novo. United 

States v. Sullivan, 522 F.3d 967, 974 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, viewed “in 

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Nevils, 

598 F.3d 1158, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citation 

omitted).

We review de novo whether a criminal conviction is a 

crime of violence under § 924(c)(3). United States v. Begay, 

934 F.3d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 2019). “Where, as here, a 

party raises an argument for the first time on appeal, we 

generally review for plain error; however, we are not limited 

to plain error review when we are presented with a question 

that is purely one of law and where the opposing party will 

suffer no prejudice as a result of the failure to raise the issue 

in the trial court.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Here, whether Hobbs Act robbery, attempted 

Hobbs Act robbery, and conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act 

robbery are crimes of violence are pure questions of law, and 

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UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 9

the government, which has fully briefed the issue, suffers no 

prejudice. See id. at 1037–38.

We review for plain error Dominguez’s claim that the 

prosecutor misstated the law during closing argument, 

because Dominguez raises this issue for the first time on 

appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Joseph, 716 F.3d 1273, 

1276 (9th Cir. 2013).

III. Count Four: Money Laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1957)

Count Four charged Dominguez with money laundering, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957, for buying a motorcycle 

that he paid for in cash with money stolen in the robbery. 

The government concedes, and we agree, that this conviction 

must be vacated because the government failed to establish 

an essential element—namely, that the funds at issue passed 

through a financial institution. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957 

(defining “monetary transaction” as one “by, through, or to 

a financial institution”); United States v. Ness, 565 F.3d 73, 

78 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[I]n order to sustain a § 1957(a) 

conviction, a financial institution must have been 

involved.”). We reverse Count 4 of Dominguez’s 

conviction.2

IV. Count Nine: Attempted Hobbs Act Robbery 

(18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2)

Dominguez next argues that the government’s evidence 

is legally insufficient to establish that he took a “substantial 

step” toward completion of the August 2012 attempted 

robbery. Instead, he argues that he never got sufficiently 

2 We do not remand for resentencing because Dominguez’s one-day 

sentence for Count Four was to be served concurrently with his one-day 

sentences on Counts One, Two, and Five through Nine.

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10 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ

close to the intended target because he voluntarily turned 

around more than a block away from the warehouse.

We may consider Dominguez’s substantive argument 

only if we find that he did not waive it when his counsel, 

with Dominguez’s permission, repeatedly conceded 

Dominguez’s guilt of the attempted robbery. See, e.g.,

United States v. Bentson, 947 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 

1991) (rejecting defendant’s sufficiency claim after 

defendant’s counsel made binding admission in closing). For 

example, in his closing argument, defense counsel told the 

jury:

Monico Dominguez, my client, is guilty of 

Counts Eight and Nine. He is guilty. You can 

go ahead and fill out the Verdict Form that 

you’re going to get . . . This is not an easy 

thing to tell you . . . . but my client is 

authorizing me to do it because there really is 

no dispute.

Later, counsel told the jury:

Mr. Dominguez, my client, planned a very, 

very, very serious criminal act. He’s just 

admitted it to you now. He’s telling you to 

convict him of the August 2012 robbery, 

Counts Eight and Nine.

Even assuming counsel’s statements are not binding 

admissions, there is more than sufficient evidence in the 

record to support Dominguez’s conviction for attempted 

robbery. To sustain the conviction, the government must 

prove that (1) Dominguez had the intent to commit the 

robbery; and (2) Dominguez “took a substantial step toward” 

committing that robbery. United States v. Nelson, 66 F.3d 

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UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 11

1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 1995). First, Dominguez concedes, in 

his appellate briefing, that the government’s evidence of his 

intent to commit the August 2012 robbery is not subject to 

reasonable dispute.

Next, “[t]o constitute a substantial step, [Dominguez]’s 

actions must go beyond mere preparation, and must 

corroborate strongly the firmness of the [his] criminal 

intent.” Id. The government’s evidence obviously meets this 

burden. Dominguez organized the August 6, 2012 attempt, 

geared up by dressing in dark clothes and body armor, 

packed weapons, drove toward the targeted warehouse, 

confirmed the code to the lock on the warehouse where the 

armored car was to be stored after the robbery, and called off 

the plan only after being alerted by a co-conspirator of heavy 

law enforcement presence. These acts clearly manifest 

Dominguez’s specific intent to rob a particular place in a 

particular manner in the immediate future. See HernandezCruz v. Holder, 651 F.3d 1094, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011).

We are not persuaded by Dominguez’s argument that he 

did not take a substantial step toward the robbery because he 

turned around about a block away from the warehouse. This 

physical distance, he argues, is greater than the proximity of 

the would-be robbers in United States v. Buffington, 

815 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1987), and United States v. Still, 

850 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1988), cases where this court found 

that the evidence was insufficient to show that defendants 

had taken a substantial step. The reasoning in those cases, 

though, was not based on the defendants’ physical proximity 

to the location to be robbed; the analyses instead centered on 

whether the defendants had progressed far enough that, 

absent independent circumstances, they would complete the 

robbery. See Still, 850 F.2d at 610 (explaining that the “facts 

d[id] not establish either actual movement toward the bank 

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12 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ

or actions that are analytically similar to such movement”);

Buffington, 815 F.2d at 1303 (characterizing defendants’ 

conduct as “entirely tentative and unfocused”). 

Dominguez’s actions in, among other things, arming 

himself, driving toward the warehouse, and turning around 

only when he knew that there was a large police presence 

near the warehouse, are sufficient to allow a rational trier of 

fact to find the substantial step beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1164.

Alternatively, Dominguez argues that we should reverse 

his attempted robbery conviction because the prosecutor 

misstated the law during his closing argument. Specifically, 

the prosecutor explained the “substantial step” element to the 

jury by telling them that:

[A] “substantial step” means that if Mr. 

Dominguez had a change of heart, and he 

went out there, started driving out, and 

decided, “This is a bad idea. Somebody could 

get killed. I could get killed. This is a serious 

crime. I don’t want to do this,” and decided 

to turn around and go home, he would not be 

guilty of that step.

This description, Dominguez now says, improperly 

overlaps the “substantial step” requirement with 

Dominguez’s intent to commit the robbery, and so we should 

reverse his conviction. We are not persuaded. Assuming for 

the purpose of this discussion that the government erred, 

then any error did not prejudice Dominguez in light of (1) his 

counsel’s subsequent admission of Dominguez’s guilt; and 

(2) the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. 

See, e.g., Joseph, 716 F.3d at 1277 (explaining that reversal 

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UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 13

on plain error review requires, among other things, finding 

that the error affected defendant’s substantial rights).

There is no plain error in Dominguez’s conviction on 

Count Nine, and we affirm.

V. Counts Three and Ten—Possession of a Firearm in 

Furtherance of a Crime of Violence (18 U.S.C. § 924)

Dominguez argues, in supplemental briefing, that we 

must reverse his convictions for possession of a firearm in 

furtherance of a crime of violence, because the Supreme 

Court has now held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), the socalled “residual clause,” is unconstitutionally vague, and 

because none of his predicate crimes qualify as a crime of 

violence under § 924(c)(3)(A), the so-called “elements” 

clause. We disagree.

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) prescribes heightened criminal 

penalties for using or carrying a firearm “during and in 

relation to,” or possessing a firearm “in furtherance of,” any 

federal “crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.” In 

United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319, 2324 (2019), the 

Supreme Court held that a “crime of violence” is an offense 

that is a felony and “has as an element the use, attempted 

use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or 

property of another.” Id., quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). 

“Physical force” is “force capable of causing physical pain 

or injury,” and includes “the amount of force necessary to 

overcome a victim’s resistance.” Stokeling v. United States, 

139 S. Ct. 544, 553−55 (2019), citing Johnson v. United 

States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010)); see also Ward v. United 

States, 936 F.3d 914, 919 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining that our 

prior distinction between “substantial” and “minimal” force 

in the ACCA robbery context is no longer viable after 

Stokeling).

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14 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ

The question then is whether an alleged predicate crime 

meets the Johnson standard and thus qualifies as a crime of 

violence. See United States v. Watson, 881 F.3d 782, 784 

(9th Cir. 2018). We use the categorical approach to make 

that determination. Id. Under this approach, the sole focus 

is on the elements of the relevant statutory offense, not on 

the facts underlying the convictions. Id. An offense is 

categorically a crime of violence only if the least violent 

form of the offense qualifies as a crime of violence. Id.3 

Where two counts served as predicate offenses for a § 924(c) 

conviction, the conviction is lawful so long as either offense 

qualifies as a crime of violence. See United States v. Gobert, 

943 F.3d 878, 880 n.2 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Mendez, 

992 F.2d at 1491 (“[W]here a defendant has been convicted 

under a statute describing crimes of both violence and nonviolence, we need only find that the charged crime for which 

the defendant was convicted constitutes a ‘crime of 

violence.’”).4

Dominguez’s predicate crimes were violations of 

18 U.S.C. § 1951, which provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, 

delays, or affects commerce or the 

movement of any article or commodity in 

commerce, by robbery or extortion or 

3 18 U.S.C. § 1951 is a divisible statute, criminalizing both robbery 

and extortion, so we apply the modified categorical approach to 

determine which alternative formed the basis of Dominguez’s 

conviction. Descamps v. U.S., 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013). The indictment 

makes clear that the predicate crimes at issue are robbery, attempted 

robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery.

4 We reject Dominguez’s argument that we must first analyze 

whether conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence.

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UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 15

attempts or conspires so to do, or 

commits or threatens physical violence to 

any person or property in furtherance of a 

plan or purpose to do anything in 

violation of this section shall be fined 

under this title or imprisoned not more 

than twenty years, or both.

(b) As used in this section—

(1) The term “robbery” means the 

unlawful taking or obtaining of 

personal property from the person or 

in the presence of another, against his 

will, by means of actual or threatened 

force, or violence, or fear of injury, 

immediate or future, to his person or 

property, or property in his custody or 

possession, or the person or property 

of a relative or member of his family 

or of anyone in his company at the 

time of the taking or obtaining.

Dominguez’s first § 924(c) charge, Count Three of the 

indictment, charged him with possessing a firearm in 

furtherance of the 2011 Hobbs Act robbery and/or of 

conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery. Dominguez’s 

second § 924(c) charge, Count Ten, charged him with 

possessing a firearm in furtherance of the 2012 attempted 

Hobbs Act robbery and/or of conspiracy to commit Hobbs 

Act robbery.

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16 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ

A. Hobbs Act Robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951) is a 

“Crime of Violence”

We previously held in Mendez that Hobbs Act robbery is 

a crime of violence under the elements clause. Mendez, 992 

F.2d at 1491 (holding that robbery, as defined in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1951(b)(1), “indisputably qualifies as a crime of violence,” 

and noting that it contained an “element of ‘actual or 

threatened force, or violence’”); see also United States v. 

Howard, 650 F. App’x 466, 468 (9th Cir. June 24, 2016) 

(unpublished memorandum).

We are in unanimous company. All of our sister circuits 

have considered this question too, and have held that Hobbs 

Act robbery is a crime of violence under the elements clause. 

See United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 266 (4th Cir. 

2019); United States v. Jones, 919 F.3d 1064, 1072 (8th Cir. 

2019); United States v. Garcia-Ortiz, 904 F.3d 102, 106–09 

(1st Cir. 2018); United States v. Melgar-Cabrera, 892 F.3d 

1053, 1060–66 (10th Cir. 2018); United States v. Hill, 

890 F.3d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Fox, 

878 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Gooch, 

850 F.3d 285, 292 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Buck, 

847 F.3d 267, 275 (5th Cir. 2017); In re St. Fleur, 824 F.3d 

1337, 1340–41 (11th Cir. 2016). See also, e.g., United States 

v. Robinson, 844 F.3d 137, 141–44 (3d Cir. 2016).5

Dominguez nonetheless argues that Hobbs Act robbery 

is not a crime of violence under the elements clause because, 

he says, it may be committed “by placing a victim in fear of 

injury to some intangible economic interest.” Such “threats,” 

5 The Third Circuit does not apply the categorical approach in this 

context, but it has held that specific Hobbs Act robbery convictions 

qualify as crimes of violence under the elements clause.

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UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 17

he argues, would not require any use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of violent physical force.

Fear of injury is the least serious way to violate 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1951, and therefore, the species of the crime that we should 

employ for our categorical analysis. But even Hobbs Act 

robbery committed by placing a victim in fear of bodily 

injury is categorically a crime of violence under the elements 

clause, because it “requires at least an implicit threat to use 

the type of violent physical force necessary to meet the 

Johnson standard.” United States v. Guiterrez, 876 F.3d 

1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A defendant cannot put a 

reasonable person in fear of bodily harm without threatening 

to use ‘force capable of causing physical pain or injury.’” 

(citation omitted)); cf. United States v. Selfa, 918 F.2d 749, 

751 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that analogous federal bank 

robbery statute, which may be violated by “intimidation,” 

qualifies as crime of violence under sentencing guidelines).

We need not analyze whether the same would be true if 

the target were “intangible economic interests,” because 

Dominguez fails to point to any realistic scenario in which a 

robber could commit Hobbs Act robbery by placing his 

victim in fear of injury to an intangible economic interest. 

Cf. Gonzales v. Duenas- Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007) 

(explaining that, under the categorical approach, there must 

be a “realistic possibility” that a state would apply a state 

statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of 

a federal crime); Garcia-Ortiz, 904 F.3d at 107−08. 

Dominguez’s reliance on cases analyzing Hobbs Act 

extortion, or jury instructions generally describing how the 

statute may be violated, do not “point to . . . cases in 

which . . . . courts in fact did apply the statute in the special 

(nongeneric) manner for which he argues.” Duenas-Alvarez, 

549 U.S. at 193.

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18 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ

In Mathis, the Fourth Circuit rejected this precise 

argument:

We also observe that both Section 924(c) and 

Hobbs Act robbery reference the use of force 

or threatened use of force against “property” 

generally, without further defining the term 

“property.” . . . . And neither provision draws 

any distinction between tangible and 

intangible property. Thus, we do not discern 

any basis in the text of either statutory 

provision for creating a distinction between 

threats of injury to tangible and intangible 

property for the purposes of defining a crime 

of violence.

Mathis, 932 F.3d at 266. We agree with and adopt this 

reasoning.

Dominguez further argues that Hobbs Act robbery can 

somehow be “predicated on gross negligence or reckless 

conduct,” and so lacks the necessary mens rea to qualify as 

a crime of violence. Dominguez is wrong. We have 

previously held that “criminal intent—acting ‘knowingly or 

willingly’—is an implied and necessary element that the 

government must prove for a Hobbs Act conviction.” United 

States v. Du Bo, 186 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(citation omitted).

We reaffirm that Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of 

violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), and we affirm 

Dominguez’s conviction on Count Three.

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UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 19

B. Attempted Hobbs Act Robbery is a “Crime of 

Violence”

Because completed Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of 

violence under § 924, attempted Hobbs Act robbery is also a 

crime of violence. In so holding, we agree with the Seventh 

and Eleventh Circuits that, when a substantive offense would 

be a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), an 

attempt to commit that offense is also a crime of violence. 

There is no circuit court decision to the contrary. United 

States v. Ingram, 947 F.3d 1021, 1025–26 (7th Cir. 2020) 

(attempted Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); United States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d 

335, 351–53 (11th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. 

July 18, 2019) (No. 19-5267) (analyzing attempted Hobbs 

Act robbery); Hill v. United States, 877 F.3d 717, 719 (7th 

Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 352 (2018) (analyzing 

Illinois attempted murder; holding that “[w]hen a 

substantive offense would be a violent felony under § 924(e) 

and similar statutes, an attempt to commit that offense is also 

a violent felony.”) 6; cf. United States v. D.D.B., 903 F.3d 

684, 689–93 (7th Cir. 2018) (declining to apply Hill rule 

where state law did not require proof of intent for attempt 

conviction).

The reasons for this are straightforward. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(3)(A) explicitly includes as crimes of violence 

offenses that have as an element the “attempted use” or 

“threatened use” of force. In order to be guilty of attempt, a 

6 The Seventh Circuit analyzed whether attempted murder, in 

violation of Illinois law, was a violent felony under the Armed Career 

Criminal Act. We have held that the operative language of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) is identical to the portion of the elements clause at issue 

in this case. See United States v. Fultz, 923 F.3d 1192, 1194 n. 1 (9th 

Cir. 2019).

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20 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ

defendant must intend to commit every element of the 

completed crime. See, e.g., Nelson, 66 F.3d at 1042 (attempt 

conviction requires evidence that defendant intended to 

violate the statute). An attempt to commit a crime should 

therefore be treated as an attempt to commit every element 

of that crime. Hill, 877 F.3d at 719. “When the intent

element of the attempt offense includes intent to commit 

violence against the person of another, . . . . it makes sense 

to say that the attempt crime itself includes violence as an 

element.” Hill, 877 F.3d at 719.

Not so, argues Dominguez, because the “substantial 

step” required for an attempt conviction need not be itself 

violent. Since the elements of attempt are only an intent to 

commit the crime, along with a substantial step, Dominguez 

argues that attempt crimes contain no “element” of force. 

This argument would have us ignore his specific intention to 

commit a violent crime, as well as common sense. A 

criminal who specifically intends to use violence, and then 

takes a substantial step toward that use, has, by definition, 

attempted a violent crime, albeit an uncompleted one.

Moreover, adopting Dominguez’s approach in this case 

would be plainly inconsistent with our prior determination 

that “[t]he ‘attempt’ portion of [a] conviction does not alter 

our determination that the conviction is a crime of violence.

We have ‘generally found attempts to commit crimes of 

violence, enumerated or not, to be themselves crimes of 

violence.’” Arellano Hernandez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1127, 

1132 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Riley, 

183 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing cf. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101(a)(43)(U) (providing that an aggravated felony 

includes the attempt to commit the offense)).

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UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 21

We hold that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of 

violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). We affirm 

Dominguez’s conviction on Count Ten.

C. Conspiracy to Commit Hobbs Act Robbery

We do not reach whether Conspiracy to Commit Hobbs 

Act robbery is also a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1)(A) because we have determined that each of 

Dominguez’s § 924(c) convictions is supported by a 

predicate crime of violence—completed and attempted 

Hobbs Act robbery, respectively.7

VI.Conclusion

Dominguez’s conviction of money laundering in Count 

Four is REVERSED. The remainder of the judgment is 

AFFIRMED.

7 In answer to a judge’s question at oral argument, government 

counsel took the position that the mens rea required for attempted crimes 

and for conspiracy is identical. Two days later, counsel filed a 28j letter 

“to clarify” that the intent required for attempts and conspiracy is not the 

same. We acknowledge the good faith of counsel’s original answer and 

are thankful for the clarification. Although we look to the parties for 

help in determining the controlling law, we are not bound by the parties’ 

analyses, stipulations, or purported concessions. The law, as the saying 

goes, is what it is.

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22 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ

NGUYEN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 

in part:

A Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)—the “elements” clause—because 

it’s a felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use, 

or threatened use of physical force against the person or 

property of another.” But the same isn’t true for an 

attempted Hobbs Act robbery.

The categorical approach requires us to focus on the 

“least serious form” of criminal conduct necessary for a 

conviction. United States v. Gobert, 943 F.3d 878, 881 (9th 

Cir. 2019). Only “[i]f the least of the acts criminalized by [a 

given crime] would be a crime of violence under 

§ 924(c)(3)(A) . . . is [the crime] categorically a crime of 

violence under the elements clause.” United States v. Fultz, 

923 F.3d 1192, 1194–95 (9th Cir. 2019). Here, as the 

majority acknowledges, an attempted Hobbs Act robbery 

can be committed without any actual use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of physical force. Maj. Op. 6. Therefore, it 

plainly does not fit the definition of a crime of violence under 

the elements clause. Yet in a leap of logic, the majority 

nevertheless holds that “when a substantive offense is a 

crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), an 

attempt to commit that offense is also a crime of violence.” 

Id. at 6.

I respectfully dissent from Part V.B of the majority 

opinion.

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UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 23

I.

A.

To determine “whether a particular conviction satisfies 

the specified elements of a sentence-enhancement 

provision,” we apply the categorical approach. United States 

v. Piccolo, 441 F.3d 1084, 1086 (9th Cir. 2006). We “do not 

examine the facts underlying the prior offense, but look only 

to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the 

prior offense.” Id. (quoting United States v. CoronaSanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)). 

“The defendant’s crime cannot categorically be a ‘crime of 

violence’ if the statute of conviction punishes any conduct 

not encompassed by the statutory definition of a ‘crime of 

violence.’” United States v. Benally, 843 F.3d 350, 352 (9th 

Cir. 2016) (citing Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 

257 (2013)). Thus, a crime is categorically a crime of 

violence only “[i]f the least of the acts criminalized by [that 

crime] would be a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A).” 

Fultz, 923 F.3d at 1194–95.

Here, Monico Dominguez was convicted in Count Ten 

of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), possessing a firearm in 

furtherance of a crime of violence, namely, an attempted 

Hobbs Act robbery as charged in Count Nine. A “crime of 

violence” is defined as a felony that “has as an element the 

use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 

against the person or property of another.”1 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(3)(A).

1 The degree of “physical force” must be “violent,” defined as “force 

capable of causing physical pain or injury.’” United States v. Watson, 

881 F.3d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 

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24 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ

Attempted Hobbs Act robbery has two elements: 

(1) intending to commit a Hobbs Act robbery; and (2) taking 

a substantial step toward completing that crime. United 

States v. Soto-Barraza, 947 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2020).

Attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence 

because a substantial step toward completing a Hobbs Act 

robbery need not involve the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of physical force. Compare three examples:

1. A man stops an armored vehicle and 

shoots and injures the driver. But the 

driver escapes with the money.

2. A man intercepts an armored vehicle by 

standing in front of it with his gun pointed 

at the driver. He pulls the trigger, 

intending to strike and injure the driver, 

but the gun jams. The driver escapes with 

the money.

3. A man plans a robbery, buys the 

necessary gear, and drives toward the 

target, but returns home after seeing 

police in the vicinity.

Each scenario describes an attempted Hobbs Act 

robbery. In (1), the man uses physical force. In (2), the man 

attempts to use physical force. In (3), the man does not use, 

attempt to use, or threaten to use physical force, even though 

he intended to commit a robbery and took a substantial step 

559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010)). “Physical” force is “[f]orce consisting in a 

physical act”—as distinguished from “intellectual force or emotional 

force.” Johnson, 559 U.S. at 138–39.

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UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 25

toward committing it.2 This last scenario—a possible “least 

serious form” of attempted Hobbs Act robbery—shows that 

an attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime 

of violence under the elements clause.

B.

Nowhere in its opinion does the majority apply the 

categorical approach to attempted Hobbs Act robbery. 

Rather, the majority’s bare-bones analysis consists of several 

correct-but-irrelevant statements intermixed with illogical 

conclusions. The majority begins by pointing out that 

§ 924(c)(3)(A), the elements clause, “includes as crimes of 

violence offenses that have as an element the ‘attempted use’ 

or ‘threatened use’ of force.” Maj. Op. 19. This is 

definitionally correct. The majority then notes that, “[i]n 

order to be guilty of attempt, a defendant must intend to 

commit every element of the completed crime.” Id. at 19–

20. Again, a correct statement of law. But the majority then 

veers off track by concluding that “[a]n attempt to commit a 

crime should therefore be treated as an attempt to commit 

every element of that crime.” Id. at 20. That conclusion 

doesn’t follow as a matter of law or logic. There’s no legal 

basis to conclude from an attempt conviction that the 

defendant attempted to commit every element of the 

underlying crime. And there’s a logical gap: the majority 

conflates attempt and intent. Only by substituting 

2 We have already held that similarly aborted non-violent conduct 

constituted a substantial step toward committing robbery. See United 

States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming conviction 

for attempted bank robbery where defendant “was walking toward the 

bank, wearing a ski mask, and carrying gloves, pillowcases, and a 

concealed, loaded gun”).

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26 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ

“intended” for “attempted” does the majority’s analysis 

make sense.

Perhaps the majority’s disconnect stems from 

§ 924(c)(3)(A)’s use of the word “attempted.” At a glance, 

the “attempted use . . . of physical force” might appear to be 

synonymous with the intended use of physical force. Under 

this reading, all crimes in which a defendant intends to use 

physical force would qualify as crimes of violence. But that 

isn’t what § 924(c)(3)(A) plainly says or means. An 

“attempted use . . . of physical force” under § 924(c)(3)(A) 

refers to a defendant’s physical act of trying (but 

failing) to use violent physical force. Attempted, MerriamWebster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/attempted (defining “attempted” as “having been 

tried without success”). Further, the other two qualifying 

elements—using and threatening to use physical force—

obviously refer to acts. See Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox 

Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining, 

under the principle of noscitur a sociis, that terms must “be 

interpreted within the context of the accompanying words”). 

Even the majority recognizes, in its completed Hobbs Act 

robbery analysis, that the categorical approach requires us to 

compare the range of acts that the Hobbs Act criminalizes 

with the acts that render a crime violent under 

§ 924(c)(3)(A). See Maj. Op. 17 (explaining that “[f]ear of 

injury is the least serious way to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1951, 

and therefore, the species of the crime that we should employ 

for our categorical analysis”).

The majority then leaps to the conclusion that “[w]hen 

the intent element of the attempt offense includes intent to 

commit violence against the person of another, . . . it makes 

sense to say that the attempt crime itself includes violence as 

an element.” Id. at 20. But that’s not a correct statement of 

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UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 27

the law: attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not in fact 

“include[] violence as an element.” Id. at 20. As the 

majority concedes elsewhere in its opinion, attempted Hobbs 

Act robbery can be completed without any threatened use or 

attempted use of force. Id. at 6. The majority’s analysis 

therefore impermissibly bootstraps a defendant’s intent to 

commit a violent crime into categorizing all attempts of 

crimes of violence as violent crimes themselves. And it casts 

aside the categorical approach, which requires us to compare 

the acts proscribed by an underlying crime to the violent acts

enumerated in § 924(c)(3)(A). See Fultz, 923 F.3d at 1194 

(framing the inquiry as “whether the [enhancement] 

conviction could stand if it rested upon the ‘least of the acts 

criminalized’” (citation omitted)); Benally, 843 F.3d at 352 

(explaining that a crime can’t be a crime of violence if it 

“punishes any conduct not encompassed by the statutory 

definition” of a crime of violence).

The majority declares that a contrary analysis “would 

have us ignore [Dominguez’s] specific intention to commit 

a violent crime.” Maj. Op. 20. True, Dominguez’s attempt 

conviction means that he specifically intended to commit a 

violent crime. But that’s not relevant under the categorical 

approach. A crime of violence is one that “has as an element 

the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 

against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(3)(A). Nowhere in this definition is there an 

element of “intent to commit a violent crime.”

And it’s also irrelevant that “[a] criminal who 

specifically intends to use violence, and then takes a 

substantial step toward that use, has, by definition, attempted 

a violent crime, albeit an uncompleted one.” Maj. Op. 20. 

The question is not whether a defendant attempts a violent 

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28 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ

crime but whether the crime of attempt itself qualifies as a 

crime of violence.

The majority doesn’t address whether conspiracy to 

commit Hobbs Act robbery also is a crime of violence. Had 

it done so, it would’ve faced a dilemma: the government 

concedes that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is 

not a crime of violence,3 but the intent requirement for 

conspiracy is the same as for attempt. United States v. 

Espinoza-Valdez, 889 F.3d 654, 656 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding 

that the elements of a conspiracy are “(1) an agreement to 

accomplish an illegal objective, and (2) the intent to commit 

the underlying offense” (emphasis added) (citation 

omitted)). If conspiracy and attempt have the same intent 

requirement, how, under the majority’s approach, could the 

result be different? The majority doesn’t say.4

C.

I recognize that the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have 

held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence 

3 The government is correct. Conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act 

robbery requires that: “(1) two or more people agreed to commit a 

robbery . . . ; (2) the defendant had knowledge of the conspiratorial goal; 

and (3) the defendant voluntarily participated in trying to accomplish the 

conspiratorial goal.” United States v. Si, 343 F.3d 1116, 1123–24 (9th 

Cir. 2003). Merely agreeing to participate in a robbery is obviously less 

likely to involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 

force than a substantial step toward committing the robbery. See United 

States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233–34 (4th Cir. 2019).

4 The majority suggests that Arellano Hernandez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 

1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2016), and United States v. Riley, 183 F.3d 1155, 

1160 (9th Cir. 1999), stand in the way of my analysis. But nothing in 

those cases binds us here, especially given that they describe only a 

“general[]” approach. Riley, 183 F.3d at 1160.

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UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 29

under the elements clause. Unfortunately, their opinions 

suffer from the same flaws as the majority’s.

In United States v. Ingram, 947 F.3d 1021 (7th Cir. 

2020), the Seventh Circuit, like the majority here, failed to 

apply the categorical analysis. The court relied heavily on 

its conclusion in a prior case, Hill v. United States, that 

“‘[w]hen a substantive offense would be a violent felony

under § 924(e) and similar statutes, an attempt to commit 

that offense also is a violent felony’ so long as the attempt 

offense ‘requires proof of intent to commit all elements of 

the completed crime.’” Id. at 1026 (quoting Hill v. United 

States, 877 F.3d 717, 719 (7th Cir. 2017)). From there, the 

court reasoned that because the elements clauses of 

“§ 924(e) and § 924(c) use almost identical language,” Hill’s 

ruling should be extended to § 924(c). Id.

Like the majority, the Seventh Circuit viewed the 

“attempt[]” in § 924(c)(3)(A) as a stand-in for intent. That 

analysis not only misinterpreted the statute but also flouted 

the categorical approach. By focusing only on a defendant’s 

intent while attempting Hobbs Act robbery, the court failed 

to consider the “least serious form” of attempted Hobbs Act 

robbery.

The Eleventh Circuit took an overlapping but distinct 

approach. See United States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d 335, 

351–53 (11th Cir. 2018). It explained that “attempted Hobbs 

Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under 

§ 924(c)(3)(A)’s use-of-force clause because that clause 

expressly includes ‘attempted use’ of force.” Id. at 351 

(emphasis in original). The implication is that 

§ 924(c)(3)(A)’s use of “attempted” means that attempts are 

crimes of violence. But this wrongly equates the “attempted 

use . . . of physical force” language from § 924(c)(3)(A) with 

the crime of “attempt[ed]” Hobbs Act robbery from 

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30 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ

§ 1951(a). It would be nonsensical for § 924(c)(3)(A) to 

refer to the crime of attempt as an element of a crime of 

violence.

The Eleventh Circuit also observed that § 924(c)(3)(A) 

“equates the use of force with attempted force, and thus the 

text . . . makes clear that actual force need not be used for a 

crime to qualify” as a violent crime. Id. at 352. True, but 

that’s beside the point; a crime of violence must have as an 

element the attempted use of physical force, which is entirely 

different from one’s intent to use physical force.

Like the majority, the Eleventh Circuit did “recognize” 

that a substantial step toward Hobbs Act robbery need not 

involve a violent act. Id. at 352–53 (imagining “a robber 

could plan the robbery and travel with a gun to the location 

of the robbery but be caught before entering the store”). It 

dismissed the relevance of the scenario, reasoning that “the 

robber has attempted to use actual or threatened force 

because he has attempted to commit a crime that would be 

violent if completed.” Id. at 353. That’s simply wrong. The 

robber would have attempted to commit a violent crime 

because he intended to use force and he took a substantial 

step toward committing a robbery—not because he 

attempted to use physical force.

As Judge Pryor persuasively explained in a dissent from 

denial of rehearing en banc, “[i]ntending to commit each 

element of a crime involving the use of force simply is not 

the same as attempting to commit each element of that crime. 

By the alchemy of transmuting intent to commit each 

element into attempt to commit each element, the panel 

conjured the conclusion that anyone convicted of an attempt 

to commit a crime involving force must have been found 

beyond a reasonable doubt to have attempted to use force.” 

United States v. St. Hubert, 918 F.3d 1174, 1212 (11th Cir. 

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UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 31

2019) (Pryor, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 

banc). And she noted that the court’s own example proved 

that “an individual’s conduct may satisfy all the elements of 

an attempt to commit an elements-clause offense without 

anything more than intent to use elements-clause force and 

some act (in furtherance of the intended offense) that does 

not involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of such 

force.” Id.

No other circuit has tackled this issue. But the Fourth 

Circuit’s holding that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act 

robbery is not a crime of violence is relevant. See Simms, 

914 F.3d at 233–34. The court explained that, in order to 

“convict a defendant of [conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act 

robbery], the Government must prove only that the 

defendant agreed with another to commit actions that, if 

realized, would violate the Hobbs Act.” Id. “Such an 

agreement,” reasoned the court, “does not invariably require 

the actual, attempted, or threatened use of physical force.” 

Id. at 234. This reasoning applies with equal force to the 

crime of attempted Hobbs Act robbery. Comparing the act 

element of an attempt—a substantial step—with the 

qualifying act elements of a crime of violence leads to only 

one conclusion. Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not 

qualify as a crime of violence.

II.

Whatever intuitive appeal the majority’s position may 

have, the categorical approach compels the conclusion that 

attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of 

violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). I therefore dissent from the 

majority’s holding that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is a 

crime of violence, and I would reverse the conviction on 

Count Ten. I otherwise join in the majority opinion.

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