Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01167/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01167-11/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Kirkland
Respondent
Marcus Anthony Powell
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCUS ANTHONY POWELL,

Petitioner, No. 2:05-cv-01167 ALA HC

vs.

RICHARD KIRKLAND, ORDER

Respondent.

 /

Marcus Anthony Powell (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding with counsel, has

filed an application in this Court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). He

challenges a conviction entered in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of

Sacramento on January 4, 2002. After a jury found Petitioner guilty of first degree murder,

attempted murder, and attempted robbery, he was sentenced to 84 years to life in prison. 

Petitioner contends that his Constitutional rights were violated because he was denied effective

assistance of counsel and the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s

verdict. For the reasons set forth below, his application is DENIED.

I

The following statement of facts is taken from the opinion of the California Court of

Case 2:05-cv-01167-ALA Document 32 Filed 06/27/08 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), the findings of the state court are presumed to be correct 1

unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner has not rebutted the state court’s

finding under this standard.

2

Appeal:1

Vernon Youngblood testified that on May 1, 1999, he and

Kenneth Hann hung out at Hann’s home in the G Parkway

neighborhood of Sacramento. Going out to buy whiskey, they met

Alysa, a friend of Youngblood, who invited them to come to her

house later. After rolling a marijuana joint for later use, they went

to Alysa’s house.

Along with Alysa and others, Youngblood and Hann

started drinking, smoking, and passing around the joint. They

smoked half the joint, then put it aside to save it.

Later, more people arrived, including defendant.

Youngblood heard people refer to defendant as “Baby Insane”; he

also heard defendant address people as “cuzz” and “[l]occ,” which

Youngblood took to be gang references.

The people there, including defendant and Youngblood,

jointly partook of the remaining marijuana. Youngblood asked

defendant about getting more. Defendant asked how much;

Youngblood said $10 worth.

Defendant, Youngblood and Hann left together. After

walking a few blocks, defendant asked the others to give him their

money so he could go get the marijuana. Youngblood refused.

Defendant then offered to bring the supplier back to where they

were.

Defendant returned five minutes later with another AfricanAmerican male, who said they could not complete the transaction

there because there were too many police around. They all walked

toward an alley.

At the head of the alley, defendant demanded the money

from Youngblood. Youngblood asked to see the marijuana first. 

Defendant said: “Break yourself; give me all your money. We

ain’t playing.” He pulled a silver gun from behind his back.

Youngblood looked at Hann, then defendant. He heard a boom

and saw Hann fall.

Youngblood then saw defendant pointing the gun at him. 

He saw a spark and heard a boom. Defendant shot him in the

chest, damaging his liver and diaphragm. Defendant and his

companion fled.

Ruth Rodriguez, who lived on El Limon Court in the G

Parkway neighborhood, was standing with a friend just after

midnight on G Parkway when she heard two gunshots right in front

of her across the street. She saw two young African-American

males running from the spot and a third person falling to the

ground. One runner was wearing a black jacket, the other purple.

After falling, Hann lay on the ground; Youngblood could

not rouse or lift him. Hann later died of his wound.

Case 2:05-cv-01167-ALA Document 32 Filed 06/27/08 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

Youngblood made his way to his godmother’s house,

where Sacramento Police Officers Matthew Young and Art Smith

found him around 1:37 a.m. on May 2. According to Officer

Young, Youngblood was upset and excited, but coherent. He said

“Baby Insane” shot him. Youngblood described “Baby Insane” as

an African-American male, about 18 years old, shorter than his

own height of five feet, 10 inches, wearing blue and black

clothing, and proceeding on foot. He also said “Baby Insane” went

to “Luther” High School and “claimed” 24th Street Crips. 

(Youngblood did not remember saying these things. He recalled

however, that he overheard defendant telling others about his gang

membership.)

That night defendant’s 15 year-old brother, Calvin Barnes,

and his maternal aunt, Cynthia Moore, were at home. Around 1:30

a.m., defendant came in with another African-American male. 

Defendant asked Cynthia and another aunt if either could give his

friend a ride. He told Cynthia there had been a shooting “in the

G,” at least one person was dead, and the defendant needed to get

his folks out of there.

Defendant’s mother, Patrice Moore, returned home around

2:00 a.m. Defendant was on the phone. Patrice told him to take

his friend out of the house. Shortly afterward, Michael Edwards, a

member of defendant’s gang, arrived; Patrice told him to take both

defendant and his friend away.

Defendant’s family had been aware that defendant was

involved in gangs. His mother, his aunt, and his brother knew he

had recently gotten the numbers “2” and “4,” representing the 24th

Street Crips, tattooed on his arms. His aunt and his brother knew

of his gang moniker “Baby Insane.” His aunt knew he socialized

with gang members who identified themselves by the color blue.

Defendant’s brother, Calvin Barnes, testified that defendant

had said he started in a gang at age 13. Sometime before the

crimes, Barnes had heard defendant and other gang members talk

about killing “slobs” (i.e., members of rival gangs) in the G

Parkway area. Barnes had also seen defendant shoot a chrome gun

with a black handle. (Barnes admitted he had sometimes lied to

his aunt, but denied that he had lied to the police or at trial.)

Sacramento Police Sergeant William Tanton and

Sacramento County Probation Officer Brian Casteel, who had gone

to the crime scene, arrived at defendant’s home just after defendant

had left with Michael Edwards. Casteel knew defendant was on

juvenile searchable probation. He also knew defendant and

Michael Edwards belonged to the 24th Street Garden Blocc [sic]

Crips, Edwards being known as “Insane” and defendant as “Baby

Insane.” In a search of defendant’s room, Tanton and Casteel

found an envelope bearing defendant’s name and graffiti saying

defendant was “Baby Insane.”

Interviewed by Sacramento Police Detective Jeffrey

Gardner, Edwards admitted he was known in the gang as “Insane.”

He identified defendant as a fellow gang member. He told

Gardner he had gotten a call from defendant in the early morning

Case 2:05-cv-01167-ALA Document 32 Filed 06/27/08 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

of May 2, 1999, asking him for a ride. Edwards met defendant and

his companion, who had recently rejoined the gang. Defendant

said he had shot two “fools” or “slobs” who had flashed gang

signs; defendant called this “[doing] his business.” (As we discuss

below, Edwards refused to testify at trial despite a grant of use

immunity. His statements to Gardner were then admitted through

Gardner’s testimony for the limited purpose of supporting the

testimony of the prosecution’s gang expert.)

Sacramento Police Detective Adlert Robinson testified as

an expert witness on gangs. He identified the 24th Street Crips

and the Garden Blocc [sic] Crips as the same gang, one which

claimed the color blue; the 24th Street Crips are a subset of the

Garden Blocc Crips, a south Sacramento gang. In May 1999, the

Garden Blocc Crips’ main criminal activities were selling

narcotics, committing assaults with deadly weapons, murder,

kidnapping, drive-by shootings, and car theft. Two Garden Blocc

Crips had recently been convicted of such crimes, one of assault

with a firearm, the other of attempted murder. Defendant was a

“validated” member of the gang (i.e., known to the police as such),

based on his tattoos, his habit of associating with validated Garden

Blocc Crips, his admission of gang membership to relatives, his

gang nickname, and his history of arrests for crimes listed in

section 186.22. 

Robinson testified that gang members demand “respect”

and will retaliate for any perceived disrespect, such as flashing

rival gang signs, by means up to and including gunplay. Crips

refer to Bloods, members of the main rival gang, as “slobs.” The

phrase “break yourself” means to turn over your money, to make

yourself broke.

Robinson also testified as to certain writings found in

defendant’s room during the probation search. He opined that the

were “personal notes” or rap lyrics, in either case showing

defendant’s identification with his gang and his determination to

commit crimes on its behalf.

Finally, Robinson was presented with hypotheticals derived

from Youngblood’s and Edwards’s differing stories about the

crimes. He was asked whether under those scenarios the crimes

were committed for the benefit of defendant’s gang and with the

specific intent to promote its criminal activity. He opined that

either scenario would show that intent.

The defense presented three witnesses to impeach the

credibility of prosecution witnesses. Sacramento County Sheriff’s

Deputy Dan Donelli testified that he arrested Vernon Youngblood

and others for a robbery at Sunrise Mall in June 2000. Sacramento

County Sheriff’s Deputy Brant Santin testified that witnesses

identified Youngblood as one of the robbers despite his denial. 

Finally, Patrice Moore testified that her son Calvin Barnes is a

habitual liar.

(Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. No. 4.)

Case 2:05-cv-01167-ALA Document 32 Filed 06/27/08 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, and attempted

robbery. The jury also made a special finding that the crimes were committed “for the benefit

of, at the direction of or in association with a criminal street gang, to wit, Garden Blocc [sic]

Crips, with the special intent to promote, further and assist in criminal conduct by gang members

. . . .” (Rep.’s Rep.’s Augmented Tr. on Appeal, Trial Tr. from Oct. 18, 2001.)

II

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), federal habeas

corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits by a state court

unless its adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if its decision contradicts the governing law

set forth in a Supreme Court decision, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06

(2000)).

A federal court may grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus if the state

court identified the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but

unreasonably applied it to the facts of the case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal court,

however, “may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411; see

also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in

Case 2:05-cv-01167-ALA Document 32 Filed 06/27/08 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

its ‘independent review of the legal question’, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court

was ‘erroneous.’”).

A federal court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the

state court judgment. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Avila v.

Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002)). Where the state court reaches a decision on the

merits, but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal court must independently

review the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is available under section 2254(d). 

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). This review is not de novo. It must be

conducted with the deferential standard of review that is mandated by AEDPA. Delgado, 223

F.3d at 982. For those of Petitioner’s claims for which a state court has provided a reasoned

decision, this Court will follow the last reasoned decision rule. For all others, this Court will

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the California Supreme

Court’s decision to deny the petition was reasonable.

III

Petitioner contends that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective

assistance of counsel at his trial. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme

Court enunciated the standard that must be applied in reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel. First, a petitioner must show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688. To this end, a

petitioner must identify the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of

reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 690. The court must then determine whether in light of

all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of

professional competent assistance. Id.

Second, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. Id. at 693. Prejudice is found

where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

Case 2:05-cv-01167-ALA Document 32 Filed 06/27/08 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 In the Answer, Respondent addresses only one of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of 2

counsel claims: that the allegation that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to object to the

admission of Mr. Edwards’s testimony. Petitioner, however, asserts that trial counsel should

have objected in three discrete instances. Petitioner exhausted these claims in state court.

Therefore, this Court may properly address all three of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claims. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999) (holding that

exhaustion of state remedies in a federal habeas corpus petition is satisfied by completing one

full round of review at the state level).

7

In his application, Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in the following

respects:

(1) Counsel did not object to the trial court’s ruling that the witness, Mr. Edwards, would

be put on the stand despite the court’s knowledge that he would refuse to testify;

(2) Counsel did not object to “the prosecution’s intended use of [Mr. Edwards’s]

invocation of his rights against petitioner [sic] to support its claim that the crimes at issue were

gang related”; and

(3) Counsel did not object to the prosecution’s use of Mr. Edwards’s out-of-court

statement to the police to support an expert’s testimony, and the prosecutor’s assertion in closing

arguments that the crime was gang-related.

(Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus App. V ¶ 3.)2

A

The prosecution called Mr. Edwards as a witness. Mr. Edwards initially invoked his

Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself before he took the stand, on the advice of his

counsel. The trial court granted Mr. Edwards use immunity. Therefore, the court concluded that

he had no right to refuse to testify. When Mr. Edwards took the stand, he refused to answer any

of the prosecution’s questions. He was held in contempt. The prosecution referred to Mr.

Edwards’s refusal to testify in his closing argument to support the Government’s theory that the

crime was gang-related. The Prosecutor stated, referring to defense counsel’s closing argument:

Oh, [defense counsel] mentioned Michael Edwards. He

said, what if Michael Edwards didn’t want to commit perjury by

telling you what he told Officer Edwards [sic].

How about this? What if Michael Edwards didn’t want to

testify because he knows he would have screwed his buddy? How

about that? How about that? Which do you think is more

Case 2:05-cv-01167-ALA Document 32 Filed 06/27/08 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

plausible?

(Rep.’s Rep.’s Augmented Tr. on Appeal, Trial Tr. from Oct. 4, 2001.)

Petitioner maintains that his trial counsel should have objected to the calling of Mr.

Edwards as a witness because he was forced to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in front of

the jury. Petitioner also asserts that counsel should have objected to the prosecutor’s reference

to Mr. Edwards’s refusal to testify in closing arguments. There is no reasoned state court

decision on this issue in this matter. Therefore, this Court must conduct an independent review

of the record.

In order to evaluate whether the state court unreasonably applied the Strickland standard,

federal courts often examine trial counsel’s performance in light the facts of the case and the

state law relevant to counsel’s alleged inferior performance. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539

U.S. 510, 536 (2003) (finding trial counsel’s performance deficient in part for failing to present

expert testimony that would have been admissible under Maryland state law); Stenson v.

Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 889-890 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that counsel was not ineffective

because the theory of the case that the petitioner desired his counsel to follow relied on evidence

that would not have been admissible under state law). In the instant matter, this Court must look

to the relevant California law to assess whether trial counsel should have lodged the objections

that Petitioner alleges.

 Under California law, it is improper to call a witness who has a valid Fifth Amendment

claim of privilege during a trial, when the prosecution or court has reason to know that the

witness’s intention is to invoke his or her right not to incriminate himself. People v. Lopez, 71

Cal. App. 4th 1550, 1554 (1999) (citing People v. Mincey, 2 Cal. 4th 408, 441 (1992)). 

However, the court in Lopez held that “where a witness has no constitutional or statutory right to

refuse to testify, a different analysis applies. Jurors are entitled to draw a negative inference

when such a witness refuses to provide relevant testimony.” Id. (emphasis in original). Courts

have found the holding in Lopez to apply in instances where the court has granted use immunity

to a plaintiff under section 1324 of the California Penal Code, as the trial court granted to Mr.

Case 2:05-cv-01167-ALA Document 32 Filed 06/27/08 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Section 1324 details the process by which a witness who invokes their Fifth 3

Amendment right to remain silent may be granted immunity and thus compelled to testify.

 The trial judge explained to Mr. Edwards and his counsel that Mr. Edwards could not 4

be prosecuted for anything he said on the stand, and, therefore, he had no federal constitutional

or statutory right to refuse to testify. (Rep.’s Augmented Tr. on Appeal, Trial Tr. from Oct. 15,

2001.)

9

Edwards. See, e.g., People v. Fernandez, No. F045958, 2005 WL 2660057, at *8-15 (Cal. App. 3

5th Dist. October 19, 2005) (holding that a witness who refused to testify after having been

granted immunity under section 1324 was properly called before the jury so that they could

witness the refusal; that negative inferences drawn from the refusal to testify were permissible).

Here, Mr. Edwards had no Fifth Amendment privilege to invoke, because he was granted

use immunity from the trial judge under California Penal Code section 1324. Therefore, Mr.

Edwards also had no right to refuse to testify. Accordingly, the trial court correctly allowed the 4

prosecution to call Mr. Edwards as a witness. Lopez, 71 Cal. App. 4th at 1554. Because the jury

is permitted to draw negative inferences from Mr. Edwards’s refusal in this instance, the

prosecutor did not engage in misconduct when he referenced Mr. Edwards’s silence in his

closing arguments. Id. Accordingly, defense counsel’s failure to object was reasonable, as the

trial court did not err. Therefore, trial counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective

standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.

B

Mr. Edwards made statements to Detective Gardner prior to trial. The prosecution called

Detective Gardner to testify about those statements to provide a basis for Detective Robinson’s

expert opinion. The trial court instructed the jury that they were to consider Mr. Edwards’s

statements for the limited purpose of laying a foundation for Detective Robinson’s opinions, but

not for the truth of those statements. The prosecutor asked Detective Robinson to express his

opinion about hypothetical situations drawn from Mr. Edwards’s statements. Detective

Robinson concluded that had the crime occurred as the prosecutor described, such crimes should

Case 2:05-cv-01167-ALA Document 32 Filed 06/27/08 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Detective Robinson testified that the reason this crime should be considered gang 5

activity is as follows:

[Y]ou have two Crip gang members holding up an individual, and

that’s what gang members do. That’s one way they -- that’s one of

the things they do to make their money.

They do it for a couple of reasons: Make their money; two,

it bolsters their reputation. Like I said earlier, the more crazier

[sic] the crime, the more serious the crime, the more their

reputation is bolstered.

(Rep.’s Augmented Tr. on Appeal, Trial Tr. from Oct. 11, 2001.)

10

be considered to have occurred for the benefit of, direction of, and association with a gang.5

Peititioner argues that his trial counsel should have objected to the admission of Mr.

Edwards’s statements to Detective Gardner, and to Detective Robinson ’s testimony regarding

the robbery and shooting of Kenneth Hann and Vernon Youngblood. He asserts, citing

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004), that the introduction of the statements violated

his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 

In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held that out-of-court testimonial

statements are not admissible at trial unless the court finds that the witness is presently

unavailable to testify in person, and the defendant had adequate opportunity to cross-examine

prior to trial. Id. The California Superior Court provided a reasoned decision on this claim. It

concluded:

Petitioner’s Crawford claim is without merit. Petitioner

claims Edwards’s statements were admitted as hearsay and

Edwards was not subject to cross-examination. However,

Edwards’s statements were not admitted for the truth of the matter

asserted. The trial court instructed the jury: “Officer Gardner has

testified as to certain statements made by Michael Edwards to him

in 1999. That testimony was offered for a limited purpose and

must not be considered by you for any purpose other than the

limited purpose for which it was introduced. Specifically,

Detective Robinson rendered an expert opinion, and relied on

certain information, including the statements made by Michael

Edwards to Officer Gardner in 1999, in formulating that opinion. 

You may consider those statements only for the purpose of their

being part of the basis of Detective Robinson’s opinion. However,

none of the statements of Michael Edwards are being admitted for

the truth of the matter asserted therein.” Crawford addressed the

issue of the admission of hearsay testimony, which by definition is

an out-of-court statement that is offered for the truth of the matter

asserted. (See Evid. Code, § 1200(a).) In Petitioner’s case,

Case 2:05-cv-01167-ALA Document 32 Filed 06/27/08 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

Edwards’s statements were not admitted for the truth of the matter

asserted and therefore were not hearsay. Instead, they were

offered for the non-hearsay purpose of supporting Robinson’s

expert opinion. Expert opinions may be based on evidence that is

not necessarily itself admissible so long as the material is

reasonable relied on by experts in the field in forming opinions. 

(People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th [sic] 605, 618.) Since

Petitioner has cited no authority to support his claim that Crawford

precludes the use of out-of-court statements as the basis for an

expert opinion, there is no valid reason for granting the petition.

(Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. No. 10) (emphasis in original).

The Superior Court’s finding that the admission of Mr. Edwards’s statement did not

violate Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights under the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Crawford was

reasonable. The statement in Crawford, as here, was made to a police officer. Crawford, 541

U.S. at 38-41. But, the witness’s statement in Crawford was introduced at trial for the purpose

of a factual finding. Id. at 40. There, the defendant’s wife, Sylvia, “did not testify because of

the state marital privilege”. Id. The state then “sought to introduce Sylvia’s tape-recorded

statements to the police as evidence that the stabbing was not in self defense.” Id. Crawford is

readily distinguishable. In the instant matter, Mr. Edwards’s statements were introduced as a

foundation for hypothetical questions presented to Detective Robinson. The trial court instructed

the jury that they were not to consider Mr. Edwards’s statements for the truth of the matter

asserted. Detective Robinson was requested to express his opinion that, had the crimes been

committed as described in the hypothetical, they could reasonably be seen as gang activity. The

Superior Court, in denying Petitioner’s state habeas corpus claim, acted reasonably in deciding

that Edwards’s statements were not inadmissable under Crawford because they were not offered

for the truth of the matter asserted.

 The Superior Court’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of

Crawford or Strickland. Thus, this claim is without merit. Since the trial court did not err, there

was nothing to which trial counsel should have objected. Therefore, trial counsel’s failure to

object to the introduction of Mr. Edwards’s statements, and Detective Robinson’s testimony did

not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 

C

Case 2:05-cv-01167-ALA Document 32 Filed 06/27/08 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

For example, Petitioner asserts that the prosecution relied on Mr. Edwards’s statement 6

to Officer Gardner to argue that this was a gang crime. (Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus App. V ¶ 3.)

The prosecutor’s argument is supported by the testimony of Calvin Barnes. Mr Barnes testified

that Petitioner was a member of the 24th Street Crips gang and that he called Mr. Edwards to

pick him up on the night of the crime. Mr. Barnes’s testimony is also corroborated by the

testimony of Petitioner’s aunt and mother. They testified that Petitioner arrived at home that

night with a friend and that they were aware that Petitioner was a member of a gang.

12

In his closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the alleged crimes were gang-related.

He argued that Petitioner enlisted the help of a fellow gang member. He also asserted that

Petitioner’s mother was upset because she did not want gang activity brought into her house. 

Petitioner argues that counsel should have objected to these assertions on the ground that they

relied on Mr. Edwards’s statements to Detective Gardner. There is no reasoned state court

decision regarding this contention. Therefore, this Court must conduct an independent review of

the record to determine whether it is a viable claim.

Each of the prosecutor’s statements are supported by the evidence in the record.6

Because the prosecution did not rely solely on Mr. Edwards’s statement, there was nothing to

which defense counsel should have objected. Therefore, trial counsel’s performance did not fall

below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 

 Therefore, the California Supreme Court was reasonable to deny Petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claims. As set forth above, upon independent review of the record and

review of the last reasoned decision for those claims which the state courts have provided

reasoned decisions, this Court is unable to find that Petitioner’s trial counsel’s performance fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688.

IV

 Mr. Powell also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of

murder, attempted murder, and robbery, as well as the finding that these crimes were gang

related.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects the accused against

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the

Case 2:05-cv-01167-ALA Document 32 Filed 06/27/08 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

13

crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). There is sufficient

evidence to support a conviction if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “[T]he dispositive

question under Jackson is ‘whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 982-983 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318). A petitioner in a federal habeas corpus proceeding “faces a

heavy burden when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence used to obtain a state conviction

on federal due process grounds.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005). In

order to grant the writ, the habeas court must find that the decision of the state court reflected an

objectively unreasonable application of Jackson and Winship to the facts of the case. Id. at 1275.

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged by a state prisoner in federal habeas corpus

proceedings, a federal court must review the entire record. Adamson v. Ricketts, 758 F.2d 441,

448 n.11 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Jackson,443 U.S. at 318 (explaining that in federal habeas

corpus proceedings, federal courts have a duty to review the underlying facts for an insufficiency

of the evidence claim as they do for claims relating to an alleged involuntary confession).

It is the province of the jury to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence,

and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 

If the trier of fact could draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, the reviewing court will

assign the inference that favors conviction. McMillan v. Gomez, 19 F.3d 465, 469 (9th Cir.

1994). “The relevant inquiry is not whether the evidence excludes every hypothesis except guilt,

but whether the jury could reasonably arrive at its verdict.” United States v. Dinkane, 17 F.3d

1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

A federal court must determine the sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the substantive

elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16.

Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claim was brought to the California Supreme

Court on direct appeal. The Supreme Court denied review. The California Court of Appeal

Case 2:05-cv-01167-ALA Document 32 Filed 06/27/08 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

14

provided the last reasoned decision. It held as follows:

We first consider defendant’s contention that the evidence was

insufficient to support the judgment. We note first that this claim

depends on his contentions that much of the evidence, specifically

Edwards’s police interview and Detective Robinson’s expert

testimony so far as it has relied on Edwards’s statements, should

have been excluded. As we explain below, we find that all of this

evidence was properly admitted. Considering that evidence along

with the rest, we find it amply sufficient to support the jury’s

verdict as to all counts and enhancements. Defendant does not

argue otherwise.

But even if Edwards’s interview and the expert testimony

in question had been excluded, we would still find the remaining

evidence sufficient under the substantial-evidence standard of

review. Even without the evidence to which defendant objects,

there can be no dispute on this record that defendant and his

companion murdered Kenneth Hann and attempted both to murder

and to rob Vernon Youngblood, that defendant’s companion

personally used a firearm to murder Hann, and that defendant

personally used a firearm to attempt to murder and rob

Youngblood, causing him great bodily injury. Moreover, the

testimony of Youngblood and defendant’s family members

established his gang ties independently of Edwards’s statements or

Detective Robinson’s expert opinion. It is true that the defense

offered evidence to impeach Youngblood and defendant’s brother

Calvin Barnes, but the jury evidently found both credible and we

cannot reweigh that finding.

(Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. No. 4).

Upon conducting an independent review of the record, the Court finds that the California

Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Jackson and Winship because the evidence is

sufficient to uphold the jury’s verdict that Petitioner is guilty of murder, attempted murder and

robbery, as well as its conclusion that the crimes were gang-related. Detective Robinson

testified that had the crime been committed as presented to him in the hypothetical, it could be

considered gang activity. The victim, Petitioner’s family, and several police officers testified

that Petitioner was a gang member. This testimony is sufficient to establish that Petitioner’s

crime was gang-related. Moreover, Vernon Youngblood, one of the victims, testified that he saw

“Baby Insane (Petitioner’s gang name) point a gun straight at [him], and [he saw] a big spark

and heard a boom and [his] ears started ringing.” (Rep.’s Augmented Tr. on Appeal, Trial Tr.

from Oct. 3, 2001.) The Court concludes that the evidence was sufficient to persuade a rational

juror that Petitioner was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Case 2:05-cv-01167-ALA Document 32 Filed 06/27/08 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

15

Accordingly, Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a) is DENIED.

///

DATED: June 27, 2008

/s/ Arthur L. Alarcón

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

Sitting by Designation

Case 2:05-cv-01167-ALA Document 32 Filed 06/27/08 Page 15 of 15