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Parties Involved:
Ernest Jenkins
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11186

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ERNEST JENKINS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cr-00273-LSC-JHE-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11186

Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Ernest Jenkins appeals his sentence of 33 months’ imprisonment, an upward variance from the guideline range of 4 to 

10 months, imposed following the revocation of his probation. Jenkins argues that the district court abused its discretion in imposing 

the sentence because it is greater than necessary to serve the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors considering Jenkins’s personal mitigating characteristics, including his health issues.

We generally review sentences imposed upon revocation of 

probation for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Mitsven, 

452 F.3d 1264, 1266 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that this is the 

standard of review for a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release, which we treat “essentially the same” as a sentence imposed upon probation revocation). An appellant generally 

preserves a substantive reasonableness challenge for appeal by advocating for a lesser sentence than what the district court imposed, 

which is sufficient to bring to the district court’s attention his view 

that a longer sentence is greater than necessary. Holguin-Hernandez 

v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766-67 (2020). The party who challenges the sentence bears the burden of showing that it is unreasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and the 

§ 3553(a) factors. United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 936 (11th Cir. 

2016).

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23-11186 Opinion of the Court 3

If a defendant violates a condition of probation, the district 

court may, after a hearing and consideration of the § 3553(a) factors 

to the extent that they are applicable, continue the defendant on 

probation or revoke probation and resentence him. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3565. The “overarching” instruction to sentencing courts in 

18 U.S.C. § 3553 is that any sentence, whether within the guideline 

range or through a variance, must be sufficient but not greater than 

necessary to comply with the purposes listed in § 3553(a)(2). Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); 

see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (stating that whether 

a sentence falls inside or outside the guideline range, the district 

court must consider the § 3553(a) factors). The proper factors as 

set out in § 3553(a) include the nature and circumstances of the offense, the personal history and characteristics of the defendant, the 

seriousness of the crime, the promotion of respect for the law, just 

punishment, adequate deterrence, and protection of the public 

from further crimes of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2). 

The court must also consider the applicable guideline range, any 

pertinent policy statements from the Sentencing Commission, the 

need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities between similarly 

situated defendants, and the need to provide restitution to any of 

the defendant’s victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7). 

A court imposes a substantively unreasonable sentence only 

when it (1) fails to consider relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor significant 

weight, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment by balancing the 

proper factors unreasonably. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11186

1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015). A district court must evaluate all the 

§ 3553(a) factors, but the weight accorded to each factor is within 

the sound discretion of the district court. United States v. 

Ramirez-Gonzalez, 755 F.3d 1267, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2014). Under 

the abuse-of-discretion standard, even as to a substantial variance, 

we will not reverse a sentence unless we are “left with the definite 

and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error 

of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated 

by the facts of the case.” United States v. Johnson, 803 F.3d 610, 

618-19 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court has specifically rejected the idea that an 

extraordinary justification is required for a sentence outside the 

guideline range. Gall, 552 U.S. at 47. But “a major variance does 

require a more significant justification than a minor one—the requirement is that the justification be sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 

1196 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted).

The Sentencing Guidelines provide that a sentence imposed 

upon revocation of probation should sanction primarily the defendant’s “breach of trust” for failing to abide by the conditions of 

the court ordered supervision, while also accounting for, “to a limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and the 

criminal history of the violator.” U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, Pt. A, intro. comment. 3(b). We, however, have “consistently held that the policy 

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23-11186 Opinion of the Court 5

statements of Chapter 7 are merely advisory and not binding.” 

United States v. Silva, 443 F.3d 795, 799 (11th Cir. 2006).

Here, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in varying upward to a 33-month sentence because it was 

within its discretion to give greater weight to the nature and circumstances of Jenkins’s violations, including his claim that he was 

not complying with his electronic monitoring requirements because he had to supervise his minor son and that this claim was

discovered to be false. Additionally, it was within the district court’s 

discretion to determine that the upward sentence was necessary to 

sanction Jenkins’s breach of the court’s trust. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, 

Pt. A, intro. comment. 3(b); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); Ramirez-Gonzalez, 755 F.3d at 1272-73. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s sentence of 33 

months’ imprisonment.

AFFIRMED.

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