Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02723/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02723-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Timothy Thomas Brantley
Petitioner
T. Felker
Respondent

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIMOTHY THOMAS BRANTLEY, No. CIV S-06-2723-DFL-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

T. FELKER,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is respondent’s motion to

dismiss (Doc. 5) the petition as untimely. Petitioner has filed an opposition and respondent has

filed a reply.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder on April 28, 1998, and sentenced

to life without the possibility of parole. On September 22, 1999, the California Court of Appeal

modified the judgment to reflect a conviction for second degree murder and remanded the case to

the trial court for re-sentencing. Ultimately, the case was reconsidered by the Court of Appeal

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This date gives petition the benefit of the mailbox rule of Houston v. Lack, 487 1

U.S. 266 (1988).

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and, on December 6, 2000, the original judgment and sentence were affirmed. Petitioner did not

seek further review following this decision. 

Petitioner filed five pro se state habeas petitions as follows:

1. Petition filed in Shasta County Superior Court on September 9, 2001 ;

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denied on September 26, 2001;

2. Petition filed in Shasta County Superior Court on November 9, 2001;

denied on November 27, 2001;

3. Petition filed in California Court of Appeal on December 31, 2001; denied

on January 3, 2002; 

4. Petition filed in the California Supreme Court on June 5, 2002; denied on

November 13, 2002; and

5. Petition filed in the California Supreme Court on January 18, 2005; denied

on January 4, 2006.

II. DISCUSSION

Federal habeas corpus petitions must be filed within one year from the later of:

(1) the date the state court judgment became final; (2) the date on which an impediment to filing

created by state action is removed; (3) the date on which a constitutional right is newlyrecognized and made retroactive on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Typically, the statute of limitations will begin to run when the state court

judgment becomes final by the conclusion of direct review or expiration of the time to seek

direct review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Where a petition for review by the California Supreme Court is filed and no

petition for certiorari is filed in the United States Supreme Court, the one-year limitations period

begins running the day after expiration of the 90-day time within which to seek review by the

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U.S. Supreme Court. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). Where no

petition for review by the California Supreme Court is filed, the conviction becomes final 40

days following the Court of Appeal’s decision, and the limitations period begins running the

following day. See Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2002). If no appeal is filed in the

Court of Appeal, the conviction becomes final 60 days after conclusion of proceedings in the

state trial court, and the limitations period begins running the following day.

The limitations period is tolled, however, for the time a properly filed application

for post-conviction relief is pending in the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). To be

“properly filed,” the application must be authorized by, and in compliance with, state law. See

Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000); see also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005)

(holding that, regardless of whether there are exceptions to a state’s timeliness bar, time limits

for filing a state post-conviction petition are filing conditions and the failure to comply with

those time limits precludes a finding that the state petition is properly filed). A state court

application for post-conviction relief is “pending”during all the time the petitioner is attempting,

through proper use of state court procedures, to present his claims. See Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d

1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). It is not, however, considered “pending” after the state postconviction process is concluded. See Lawrence v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___ (2007) (holding that

federal habeas petition is not tolled for time during which certiorari petition to the Supreme

Court was pending). Where the petitioner unreasonably delays between state court applications,

however, there is no tolling for that period of time. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). 

If the state court does not explicitly deny a post-conviction application as untimely, the federal

court must independently determine whether there was undue delay. See id. at 226-27. 

There is no tolling for the interval of time between post-conviction applications

where the petitioner is not moving to the next higher appellate level of review. See Nino, 183

F.3d at 1006-07; see also Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 2001). There is also no

tolling for the period between different sets of post-conviction applications. See Biggs v.

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Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003). Finally, the period between the conclusion of direct

review and the filing of a state post-conviction application does not toll the limitations period. 

See Nino, 1983 F.3d at 1006-07. 

In this case, petitioner filed an appeal with the California Court of Appeal, which

affirmed the judgment and conviction on December 6, 2000. Petitioner did not seek review by

the California Supreme Court. Therefore, the limitations period began to run the day after the

40-day period within which petitioner could have sought direct review in the California Supreme

Court, or on January 16, 2001. Thus, petitioner’s federal petition would have been due by

January 15, 2002, plus any appropriate statutory tolling for the time that petitioner’s state habeas

petitions were pending.

As to tolling, petitioner filed his first state habeas petition on September 9, 2001 –

236 days into the one-year limitations period. Respondent concedes that petitioner is entitled to

statutory tolling for the time (17 days) the first state habeas petition was pending. Respondent

argues, however, and the court agrees, that petitioner is not entitled to tolling for the period

between denial of the first state habeas petition and the filing of the second state habeas petition

because petitioner was not proceeding to the next level of the state court system. Therefore,

petitioner consumed another 43 days of the one-year limitations period before filing his second

state habeas petition. 

Respondent concedes that petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling for the time the

second state habeas petition was pending, as well as the time between the second and third

petitions, and the time the third petition was pending. The court agrees with this analysis

because petitioner was moving up the state court hierarchy from the second to third petitions and

there was no delay between these petitions. 

As to the fourth and fifth state habeas petitions, it is not necessary to address

respondent’s arguments concerning whether these petitions were properly filed and whether

petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling for the interval between petitions and the time they were

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pending in state court. Assuming that petitioner is entitled to tolling for these periods of time,

the instant petition would still be untimely. As of the filing of the second state petition, 279 days

of the one-year limitations period had elapsed, as discussed above. The fifth petition was denied

on January 4, 2006. Giving petitioner the benefit of statutory tolling for all of the time between

the filing of the second state petition and the denial of the fifth state petition, petitioner would

have had another 86 days after the denial of the fifth petition on January 4, 2006, within which to

file his federal petition. Petitioner, however, did not file the instant federal petition until

December 2006 – far in excess of the 86 days remaining in the limitations period. Therefore,

assuming that petitioner is entitled to the maximum amount of tolling arguably possible, the

instant petition is untimely and must be dismissed. 

While petitioner argues in his opposition that he is entitled to equitable tolling for

various reasons, he does not specify the dates for such tolling. In particular, petitioner does not

state how he diligently pursued his rights between January 2006 when his fifth state petition was

denied and December 2006 when the instant federal petition was filed. As of January 2006,

petitioner had nearly three months to prepare and file his federal petition but does not state why

he was unable to do so until December 2006. 

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 5) be granted; and

2. Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus be dismissed as untimely.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

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the right to appeal. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 24, 2007.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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