Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01796/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01796-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dent Wizard International Corporation
Appellee
Curtis Francois
Appellee
Craig Morgan
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1796

___________

Craig Morgan, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Curtis Francois; Dent Wizard * [UNPUBLISHED]

International Corporation, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: October 14, 2005

Filed: March 2, 2006

___________

Before BYE, BEAM, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Craig Morgan sued his employers claiming overtime violations under the Fair

Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. The district court held the

employers were exempt from the FLSA's overtime provisions as "motor private

carriers." 49 U.S.C. § 31502(b)(2). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In April 1998, Craig Morgan began working as a commissioned paintless dent

repair (PDR) technician for Gandalf, LTD, an Ohio limited liability company. Curtis

Francois, a resident of St. Louis, Missouri, allegedly had an ownership interest in

Gandalf, as did Paul Thomas, an Ohio resident. In June 2001, Gandalf sold some or

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all of its assets to Dent Wizard International Corporation. After the transfer, Morgan

continued to work for Dent Wizard, traveling to customers' locations in a companyowned truck to repair dents in the exteriors of automobiles using various PDR tools

and equipment. Morgan lived in Carriere, Mississippi, but frequently worked about

thirty miles away at the Mannheim Auto Auction of Greater New Orleans in Slidell,

Louisiana, as well as at several other locations in and around New Orleans, Louisiana.

In April 2003, Morgan sued Francois, Thomas, Gandalf, and Dent Wizard in

federal district court in Ohio alleging all four were employers required to comply with

the FLSA's overtime laws and regulations. Morgan further alleged from April 1998

through the date of suit he regularly worked more than forty hours a week, and the

defendants failed to maintain accurate records of his actual hours of work or pay him

overtime. The Ohio district court severed Morgan's claims against Francois and Dent

Wizard and transferred them to Missouri, retaining jurisdiction over the claims against

Thomas and Gandalf. After initially finding a portion of Morgan's claims time-barred

by the applicable statute of limitations, see 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (setting forth a threeyear limitations period for willful FLSA violations and a two-year limitations period

for all other violations), the Ohio district court granted Gandalf and Thomas summary

judgment on Morgan's remaining claims concluding the employers were "motor

private carriers" under the Motor Carrier Act and therefore exempt from the FLSA's

overtime provisions. Shortly thereafter, the Missouri district court granted Francois

and Dent Wizard summary judgment on the same grounds. Morgan filed timely

appeals of both decisions.

In this appeal, Morgan contends, inter alia, the district court erred when it

determined he transported his employers' property (i.e., the PDR tools) in interstate

commerce. More specifically, he contends the district court should have considered

his supplemental affidavit of September 3, 2004, in which he asserted none of the

PDR tools he transported to and from work sites were owned by his employers. The

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district court refused to consider the supplemental affidavit concluding it contradicted

Morgan's earlier affidavit and statements he made in a deposition.

We review the district court's interpretation of the FLSA and the Motor Carrier

Act de novo. Braswell v. City of El Dorado, Ark., 187 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 1999).

"We review the district court's exclusion of evidence in a summary judgment motion

for abuse of discretion." Yates v. Rexton, Inc., 267 F.3d 793, 802 (8th Cir. 2001).

The FLSA's overtime requirements do not apply to "any employee with respect

to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and

maximum hours of service pursuant to the provision of section 31502 of Title 49."

29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1). The Motor Carrier Act allows the Secretary of Transportation

to set the "qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of . . . a motor

private carrier, when needed to promote safety of operation." 49 U.S.C.

§ 31502(b)(2). The Motor Carrier Act defines a "motor private carrier" as

a person other than a motor carrier, transporting property by motor

vehicle when--

(A) the transportation is as provided in section 13501 of this title;

(B) the person is the owner, lessee, or bailee of the property being

transported; and

(C) the property is being transported for sale, lease, rent, or bailment or

to further a commercial enterprise.

49 U.S.C. § 13102(13). The transportation "provided in section 13501" is interstate

travel. See 49 U.S.C. § 13501(1)(A) ("The Secretary and the Board have jurisdiction

. . . over transportation by motor carrier . . . between a place in [] a State and a place

in another State."). There is no dispute Morgan engaged in interstate travel between

Mississippi and Louisiana as part of his job. See 29 C.F.R. § 782.7(b)(1) ("Highway

transportation by motor vehicle from one State to another, in the course of which the

vehicles cross the State line, clearly constitutes interstate commerce under both [the

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FLSA and the Motor Carrier Act]."). There is also no dispute Morgan transported

property, that is, the PDR tools, to further a commercial enterprise. See, e.g.,

Friedrich v. U.S. Computer Servs., 974 F.2d 409, 417 (3d Cir. 1992) (recognizing

tools, parts, and equipment transported by field engineers to perform service work on

computer hardware constituted "property" under the Motor Carrier Act); Turk v.

Buffets, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1255, 1261 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("The transportation of

defendant's repair equipment and spare parts across state lines to service its restaurants

meets the statutory definition."). 

Morgan disputes, however, that his employers are the owners of the PDR tools

he transported. Morgan averred in his supplemental affidavit "[s]ome of my PDR

tools were given to me by Defendants when I first began my employment with them.

. . . None of the tools that I transported to and from work sites in my truck, while I was

working for Defendants, was a tool owned by either Defendant." App. at 48

(emphasis added). In an earlier affidavit, Morgan stated he "repaired the dents and

'dings' in the metal exterior of automobiles[] using tools, equipment and supplies

provided to me by Defendants." Id. at 50 (emphasis added). The district court refused

to consider the supplemental affidavit concluding it contradicted his earlier affidavit

without explanation. See Camfield Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361,

1364-65 (8th Cir. 1983) (recognizing a party can not "create a genuine issue" of fact

to avoid summary judgment by filing an affidavit contradicting his earlier testimony,

unless the apparent contradiction is adequately explained).

The Sixth Circuit recently addressed this very same issue in Morgan's appeal

from the adverse judgment in the Ohio district court. The Sixth Circuit stated:

Morgan contends the district court abused its discretion in this matter

because his corrected affidavit is not contradictory, but explanatory.

Indeed, the corrected statement, that the PDR tools were given to Morgan

by defendants, is not necessarily inconsistent with his original statement

that the tools were provided to him by defendants – especially when the

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two statements are read, as they must be for purposes of defendants'

summary judgment motion, in the light most favorable to Morgan. Until

the clarifying statement was filed, Morgan's original statement that the

tools were provided to him by defendants begged the question whether

ownership passed to Morgan at that time. . . . Considering this

chronology, both the timing and contents of Morgan's proffered

clarification, whether ultimately deemed truthful or not, are certainly

understandable and facially legitimate. Read in the light most favorable

to Morgan, the corrected statement genuinely appears to illuminate or

clarify his original statement. It is not necessarily contradictory or even

inconsistent and does not necessarily suggest prevarication. The district

court's contrary conclusion demonstrates that it erroneously viewed both

plaintiff's original affidavit and the corrected affidavit in the light most

favorable to the defendants, rather than to the nonmovant. The district

court's disallowance of the correction as contradictory thus represents a

misapplication of the law governing summary judgment assessment of

the record. This misapplication of the law represents an abuse of

discretion.

Morgan v. Gandalf, Ltd., No. 05-3189, 2006 WL 238321, *7 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2006)

(unpublished decision) (internal citations omitted).

We agree with this aspect of the Sixth Circuit's analysis, and therefore also

conclude the district court abused its discretion when it refused to consider the

supplemental affidavit on the ground it contradicted Morgan's earlier affidavit.

The district court also refused to consider Morgan's supplemental affidavit on

the ground the affidavit contradicted a deposition Morgan gave seven days after

signing the supplemental affidavit. After comparing the deposition testimony with the

supplemental affidavit, we still conclude the district court abused its discretion in

refusing to consider Morgan's averment his employers were not the owners of the

PDR tools. Some of the statements in Morgan's deposition again merely address the

provision of the tools, and not the controlling issue whether ownership passed to

Morgan or remained with his employers at that time. Other statements in which

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1

Pending before the court is an unopposed motion to strike certain portions of

appellees' brief, which we grant, and an opposed motion to sanction appellant's

counsel, which we deny.

-6-

Morgan purports to admit the PDR tools were "company property" rather than his own

are ambiguous. For example, we can infer from the record some PDR tools were

commonly referred to as "Dent Wizard" tools because that was their brand name, such

as referring to a camp stove as a Coleman® stove. Thus, Morgan's affirmative answer

when asked the question whether he was transporting "Dent Wizard tools and

equipment" does not necessarily constitute an admission Dent Wizard owned the

tools. This ambiguity in the record is compounded by the fact neither Dent Wizard

or Francois submitted any documentation (i.e., a depreciation schedule for tax

purposes) establishing their ownership of the tools in question, which, it seems, either

could have easily done if, in fact, the tools were not Morgan's.

After reviewing the entire record in the light most favorable to Morgan, as we

must for summary judgment purposes, e.g., Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th

Cir. 2004), we conclude there is still a genuine fact issue regarding the actual

ownership of the tools in question. Since we are reversing on this issue, it is

unnecessary to address Morgan's remaining claims. 

We reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment and remand for

further proceedings.1

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