Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03143/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03143-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lee M. Ayers
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 27, 2005 Decided November 8, 2005

No. 04-3143

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

LEE M. AYERS,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cr00324-01)

Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was A. J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S.

Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Roy W. McLeese,

III, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON and

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

USCA Case #04-3143 Document #930582 Filed: 11/08/2005 Page 1 of 6
2

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Chief Judge: Defendant Lee Ayers was

convicted by a jury of unlawful possession of a firearm by a

felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal he

challenges his sentence, which was imposed after the Supreme

Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004),

but prior to its decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct.

738 (2005). The district court, aware that the United States

Sentencing Guidelines were vulnerable after Blakely, imposed

a sentence of 53 months, near the low end of the applicable

guidelines range (51-63 months), and announced an alternative

but identical sentence “should the guidelines be struck down and

ruled unconstitutional in their totality.” Ayers anticipated the

actual result in Booker and, believing the record did not contain

all the evidence relevant to a non-guidelines sentence, asked that

he be permitted to supplement the record with additional

mitigating evidence, which request the court denied.

Ayers challenged under the Sixth Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States the mandatory enhancement of

his sentence (a two-level enhancement of his base offense level

under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4) for a stolen firearm) based upon

facts not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of

the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker, the Government now

concedes the district court’s constitutional error. The

Government argues, however, that the error was harmless in that

it can show “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error

complained of did not contribute to the [sentence] obtained.”

See United States v. Coumaris, 399 F.3d 343, 351 (D.C. Cir.

2005) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967))

(alteration in original); cf. United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764,

767 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (where defendant did not preserve

constitutional error, review is for plain error and defendant must

show prejudice). Under Booker, the error “is the mandatory use

USCA Case #04-3143 Document #930582 Filed: 11/08/2005 Page 2 of 6
3

of the Guidelines enhancement, not the fact of the

enhancement.” Coles, 403 F.3d at 769 (quoting United States v.

Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 458 (2d Cir. 2005)).

The Government argues the record establishes beyond a

reasonable doubt that the district court’s error was harmless

because the district court announced an identical alternative

sentence “in the event the Guidelines were invalidated.” Ayers

counters that the record is inadequate to discharge the

Government’s heavy burden because 

there is no indication in the record that the sentencing

judge complied with Booker’s requirement that she

consider the advisory Guidelines range as only one of

many factors to be considered in fashioning an

appropriate sentence that furthers the congressional

sentencing goals as set forth in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a).

The Supreme Court, in the remedy portion of its decision in

Booker, not only rendered the Guidelines advisory rather than

mandatory by invalidating 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1) & 3742(e);

it also preserved the remainder of the Sentencing Reform Act of

1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., including the sentencing factors

set out in § 3553(a). See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764-68; Coles,

403 F.3d at 766. As the Second Circuit has recognized,

therefore, “without the mandatory duty to apply the Guidelines,

consideration of the other section 3553(a) factors ‘acquires

renewed significance.’” United States v. Lake, 419 F.3d 111,

114 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d

103, 111 (2d Cir. 2005)).

Although the announcement of an identical alternative

sentence might establish harmless error on a different record, in

this case we are not certain beyond a reasonable doubt that the

district court, when announcing its alternative sentence,

USCA Case #04-3143 Document #930582 Filed: 11/08/2005 Page 3 of 6
4

understood its obligation to consider the factors in § 3553(a).

The district court did not explain why its alternative sentence

matched its guidelines sentence; rather, the judge said only “I

see no reason to change [from the sentence under the

Guidelines].” This by itself might not give rise to a reasonable

doubt, but there is more. In his sentencing memorandum, Ayers

requested, “If the Court intend[ed] to impose an indeterminate

sentence, either ignoring the guidelines completely or using

them as advisory only,” that it order the probation office 

to prepare a new presentence report aimed at an

indeterminate sentence and continue the scheduled

sentencing hearing so that [Ayers would] have a full

opportunity to present appropriate mitigating evidence,

consistent with the dictates of 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“No

limitation shall be placed on the information

concerning the background, character, and conduct of

[a defendant] which a court of the United States may

receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an

appropriate sentence”). 

Mitigating evidence would have been relevant, of course, to the

court’s analysis under § 3553(a). That the district court denied

this request informs our interpretation of the alternative sentence

it imposed and leaves us in doubt as to whether the court

considered the other sentencing factors in § 3553(a) together

with the Guidelines in formulating its non-guidelines sentence.

Cf. United States v. Porter, 417 F.3d 914, 917-18 (8th Cir. 2005)

(district court’s imposition of alternative sentence “as if Blakely

would apply” deemed “too cryptic” to conclude it “contemplated

an advisory guidelines system under which it was required to

consider the advisory guideline range as one factor among

others listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)”). 

When the district court does not exercise its discretion to

USCA Case #04-3143 Document #930582 Filed: 11/08/2005 Page 4 of 6
5

grant a sentence outside the guidelines range and the defendant

does not object to the district court’s failure to explain its

reasoning on the record, we begin our review with the

presumption “that the district court knew and applied the law

correctly.” See United States v. Pinnick, 47 F.3d 434, 439-40

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 927

F.2d 489, 491 (9th Cir. 1991)). Therefore, we ordinarily

presume a district court imposing an alternative non-guidelines

sentence took into account all the factors listed in § 3553(a) and

accorded them the appropriate significance. See, e.g., United

States v. Haire, No. 02-3009, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15158

(D.C. Cir. July 22, 2005). In this case, however, that

presumption is rebutted by the district court’s unexplained

denial of Ayers’ request to enter additional mitigating evidence

specifically for the court’s use in determining his non-guidelines

sentence. 

The Government seeks to avoid this conclusion on the

ground that the district court had an opportunity to consider all

relevant mitigating factors because, at the sentencing hearing,

before it announced its alternative non-guidelines sentence, the

court asked whether the defendant had anything to add. As we

have seen, however, Ayers had previously objected to the

adequacy of the record to support an indeterminate sentence. In

response to the district court’s question, therefore, he

understandably said he had nothing to add to his “written

filings.” The district court did not take this “opportunity” to

reconsider its rejection of the defendant’s proffer. 

Because Ayers preserved his objection to his sentence and

because the Government has failed to show that mandatory

application of the Guidelines was harmless, we vacate Ayers’

sentence and remand this case to the district court for

resentencing consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in

Booker. Compare Coumaris, 399 F.3d at 351 (vacating sentence

USCA Case #04-3143 Document #930582 Filed: 11/08/2005 Page 5 of 6
6

and remanding for resentencing when mandatory use of

Guidelines not shown to be harmless), with Coles, 403 F.3d at

767 (applying plain error standard and remanding record for

district court to determine whether “there would have been a

materially different result, more favorable to the defendant, had

the sentence been imposed in accordance with the post-Booker

sentencing regime”).

So ordered. 

USCA Case #04-3143 Document #930582 Filed: 11/08/2005 Page 6 of 6