Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-23-09588/USCOURTS-ca10-23-09588-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Merrick B. Garland
Respondent
Temuri Gurchiani
Petitioner

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

TEMURI GURCHIANI, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, United 

States Attorney General, 

 Respondent. 

No. 23-9588 

(Petition for Review) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, EBEL, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Petitioner Temuri Gurchiani seeks this court’s review of a September 

29, 2023 order from the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). That order 

affirmed an Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) decision to deny Mr. Gurchiani’s 

application for asylum and withholding of removal and to order his removal 

from the United States. Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, we 

deny Mr. Gurchiani’s petition for review. 

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the 

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be 

cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

January 8, 2025

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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I 

A 

Mr. Gurchiani is a citizen of both Georgia and Russia. For decades, he 

split his time between the two countries. During much of 2022, he lived in 

border towns in Georgia and Russia to find work to help support himself, 

and his wife and two children, who live in Tblisi, Georgia. 

The events underlying this petition occurred in March 2022, when Mr. 

Gurchiani was working in Russia.1 Over the course of about six days, 

Russian police and military officials visited his workplace, asking him to 

join in the “‘special military operation’ in Ukraine.” RI.3. When Mr. 

Gurchiani declined to join the military efforts, these officials threatened 

him and used bats to beat him all over his body, causing extensive bruising 

and pain. 

About six months later, Mr. Gurchiani returned to Georgia. After a 

few weeks, in October 2022, he came to the United States via Turkey, 

entering this country without inspection. After being served with a notice 

to appear, he applied for asylum and withholding of removal based on the 

1 Shortly before then, Russia had invaded Ukraine. 

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threats and beatings he sustained in Russia for refusing to join in the 

military efforts in Ukraine.2

B 

Both asylum and withholding of removal require past or possible 

future mistreatment in another country. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (for 

asylum, requiring the applicant to be “a refugee”); id. § 1101(a)(42)(A) 

(defining “refugee” to require “persecution or a well-founded fear of 

persecution”); id. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (for withholding of removal, requiring 

“that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened”). On this point, Mr. 

Gurchiani’s application focused on the threats and beatings he faced in 

Russia for refusing to join in the invasion of Ukraine. Further, for both 

forms of relief, the mistreatment must be “on account of” or “because of” the 

applicant’s “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 

group, or political opinion.” Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (for asylum); id.

§ 1231(b)(3)(A) (for withholding of removal); see also id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) 

(for asylum, requiring one of these grounds “was or will be at least one 

central reason for persecuting the applicant”). We refer to this requirement 

2 Mr. Gurchiani initially also sought relief under the Convention 

Against Torture, see Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 

Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty 

Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113, but he no longer pursues that claim on 

appeal. We therefore do not address it further. 

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as “nexus.” See, e.g., Miguel-Peña v. Garland, 94 F.4th 1145, 1159 (10th Cir. 

2024) (“To show persecution or fear of persecution ‘on account of’ a protected 

ground, an asylum applicant must establish a ‘nexus’ between the alleged 

persecution and a protected ground.” (first quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); 

and then quoting Dallakoti v. Holder, 619 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir. 

2010))); Koffi v. Garland, No. 21-9535, 2021 WL 5710031, at *3 (10th Cir. 

Dec. 2, 2021) (similarly using “nexus” to refer to the analogous requirement 

for withholding of removal).3 On his application, Mr. Gurchiani alleged 

mistreatment based on political opinion and nationality.4

In May 2023, an IJ conducted a hearing at which Mr. Gurchiani—then 

appearing pro se—testified and provided evidence. That same day, the IJ 

issued an oral decision denying the application and ordering Mr. Gurchiani 

removed to either of his countries of citizenship—Russia or Georgia. 

 The IJ’s order denied the application on several grounds. Given how 

we decide this case, one requires discussion: a lack of nexus.5 In addressing 

3 Koffi is unpublished, but we rely on it for its illustrative use of the 

term “nexus” to refer to this withholding-of-removal requirement. See 10th 

Cir. R. 32.1(A) (“Unpublished decisions are not precedential, but may be 

cited for their persuasive value.”). 

4 Nowhere does Mr. Gurchiani’s application mention harms he may 

face if he were returned to Georgia. 

5 As to asylum and withholding of removal, the IJ also found Mr. 

Gurchiani “is not a credible witness and has not been able to provide 

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Mr. Gurchiani’s withholding-of-removal claim (though not his asylum 

claim), the IJ analyzed whether “the harm that he suffered back in Russia 

[wa]s on account of . . . a protected ground.” RI.105. The IJ found it was not. 

She considered two possible protected grounds: political opinion and 

membership in a particular social group (PSG).6 First, the IJ “f[ound] that 

the harm that [Mr. Gurchiani] suffered in Russia was not on account of a 

political opinion.” RI.105. Second, the IJ rejected the membership-in-a-PSG 

theory because she found Mr. Gurchiani “was not even conscripted; he was 

bullied,” meaning he could not be considered a member of a cognizable group 

related to evading military service. RI.105–06. Separately, the IJ “f[ound] 

that there is no evidence . . . that [Mr. Gurchiani] could be subject to harm 

in Russia just [for] being Georgian”—a reference to a third possible 

protected ground, nationality. RI.99. 

Ultimately, the IJ determined Mr. Gurchiani did not show nexus—

meaning he “failed to meet his burden of showing that any harm that he 

sufficient corroboration to corroborate his claims,” RI.101; his asylum claim 

fails because he must show harm in all countries of his nationality, and he 

focused only on Russia; he did not show past or likely future persecution; 

and he has not shown internal relocation within Russia would be infeasible. 

6 Mr. Gurchiani’s application did not raise membership in a PSG. The 

IJ appears to have raised this theory herself. 

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suffered in the past or will suffer in the future is on account of one of the 

protected grounds.” RI.106. 

C 

Mr. Gurchiani—now represented by counsel—appealed the IJ’s 

decision to the BIA. In a single-judge order, the BIA dismissed the appeal. 

The BIA first found, “to establish eligibility for asylum,” Mr. Gurchiani had 

“to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution in both Russia and

Georgia,” but Mr. Gurchiani had shown no such fear in Georgia. RI.4 

(emphasis added); see also RI.102–03. The BIA therefore concluded Mr. 

Gurchiani “is not []eligible for asylum.” RI.4. 

The BIA then turned to Mr. Gurchiani’s application for withholding 

of removal. It denied relief on several grounds. First, the BIA found “[t]he 

[IJ] correctly concluded that several beatings resulting in bruises and pain, 

but no serious injuries, and unspecified threats do not rise to the level of 

persecution under applicable precedent.” RI.4. It continued, “[F]orced 

conscription or punishment for evasion of military duty generally does not 

constitute persecution,” given governments’ general “right to require 

military service.” RI.4. Because Mr. Gurchiani had not established an 

applicable exception to that general principle, the BIA affirmed Mr. 

Gurchiani “did not establish past persecution on account of a protected 

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ground” and “is therefore not entitled to a presumption of a clear probability 

of future persecution.” RI.5 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i) (2022)). 

Second, the BIA agreed with the IJ that Mr. Gurchiani “did not 

establish a clear probability of future persecution in Russia or Georgia.” 

RI.5. In addition to finding insufficient evidence to establish that “clear 

probability” in either country, the BIA endorsed the IJ’s conclusion that Mr. 

Gurchiani “has not met his burden to show he could not reasonably relocate 

to another part of Russia”—another basis for rejecting his claim. RI.5. 

Third, and most centrally to our decision, the BIA addressed the IJ’s 

no-nexus findings. As to political opinion, the BIA found Mr. Gurchiani 

“ha[d] not challenged” the IJ’s findings on that ground “on appeal,” so it 

“deem[ed] this issue waived.” RI.6 n.3. As to membership in a PSG, the BIA 

found “the [IJ] did not clearly err in finding that the respondent was not 

forced to become a member of the Russian military”—the IJ’s basis for 

rejecting that claim. RI.5; see also RI.105–06. As to nationality, the BIA 

explained, “as found by the [IJ], the respondent has not testified to or 

provided any other evidence that he would be subjected to significant 

physical harm on account of his Georgian nationality if he were to return to 

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Russia.” RI.5. Thus, the BIA concluded, Mr. Gurchiani “is not eligible for 

withholding of removal.” RI.6.7

This timely petition for review followed. 

II 

On appeal, Mr. Gurchiani argues “[t]he BIA erred in three critical 

ways.” Op. Br. at 7. The first of these arguments concerns asylum. The 

second and third concern withholding of removal. We need not, however, 

reach the merits of these arguments because waiver is dispositive as to both 

forms of relief. First, we will explain the scope of our review. Second, we 

will show why Mr. Gurchiani’s failure to challenge the BIA’s no-nexus 

finding before this court is decisive as to withholding of removal. Third, we 

will explain why that failure in this case is also decisive as to asylum. 

A 

We first outline the scope of our review. “We review the BIA’s legal 

determinations de novo and its findings of fact for substantial evidence. 

‘Under a substantial evidence standard, factual findings are conclusive 

unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 

7 The BIA also rejected Mr. Gurchiani’s argument that the IJ hearing 

“lacked due process.” RI.6. Mr. Gurchiani’s opening brief does not raise that 

issue to this court, so we do not address it further. 

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contrary.’” Dallakoti, 619 F.3d 1264 at 1267 (citing and quoting Witjaksono

v. Holder, 573 F.3d 968, 977 (10th Cir. 2009)). 

“Where, as here, a single BIA member issues a brief order affirming 

the IJ’s decision, we review the order as the final agency determination and 

limit our review to the grounds relied upon by the BIA.” Htun v. Lynch, 818 

F.3d 1111, 1118 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing Uanreroro v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 

1197, 1203–04 (10th Cir. 2006)). But two exceptions bear mentioning. First, 

while the focus is on the BIA’s analysis, this court is “not precluded from 

consulting the IJ’s more complete explanation of those same grounds.” 

Orellana-Recinos v. Garland, 993 F.3d 851, 855 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting 

Uanreroro, 443 F.3d at 1204). Second, “this limitation on the grounds upon 

which we may rely to deny a petition for review is not applicable where, on 

remand, governing law would ‘“require[]” [the agency] to reach a “necessary 

result.”’” Zapata-Chacon v. Garland, 51 F.4th 1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 2022) 

(alterations in original) (quoting Gutierrez-Zavala v. Garland, 32 F.4th 806, 

810 (9th Cir. 2022)). “Put another way, we can avoid a remand if it would 

be futile.” Id. 

In addition to generally limiting our review to what the BIA decided, 

we also generally limit appellate review to what the parties present to us. 

“An appellant’s opening brief must identify ‘appellant’s contentions and the 

reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record 

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on which the appellant relies.’” Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 

(10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(a) (2006)8). This court 

“routinely ha[s] declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are 

inadequately presented, in an appellant’s opening brief.” Id. Litigants’ 

responsibilities to shoulder their burdens on appeal are no different in 

immigration cases. See, e.g., Addo v. Barr, 982 F.3d 1263, 1266 n.2 (10th 

Cir. 2020) (applying the same principle to find an immigration petitioner 

“has waived [an] issue”). Similarly, when a litigant “doesn’t respond to” the 

opposition’s “argument in his reply brief[,] . . . we treat any non-obvious 

responses he could have made as waived and assume the [opposition’s] 

analysis is correct.” Eaton v. Pacheco, 931 F.3d 1009, 1031 (10th Cir. 2019); 

accord United States v. A.S., 939 F.3d 1063, 1076 (10th Cir. 2019) (finding 

that “fail[ing] to interact with” a response brief’s arguments in both opening 

and reply briefs leaves this court “free to conclude that [the appellant] 

waived, at the very least, non-obvious arguments against the” response 

brief’s positions). 

B 

With these principles in mind, we first turn to Mr. Gurchiani’s 

arguments about the denial of his application for withholding of removal. 

8 This rule’s text has not changed since Bronson, but it is now located 

in a different subsection. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). 

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“[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the 

Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be 

threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, 

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1231(b)(3)(A). 

Mr. Gurchiani urges the BIA erred because, in his view, “the BIA’s 

understanding of a country’s right to conscript in relation to persecution is 

erroneous.” Op. Br. at 17 (heading capitalization omitted). And he argues 

“the BIA erred by applying an out-of-circuit standard to assess persecution.” 

Op. Br. at 21 (heading capitalization omitted). Both withholding-of-removal 

arguments thus concern the BIA’s conclusion that the beatings in Russia 

did not constitute persecution under applicable BIA and Tenth Circuit 

precedent. 

 The government urges this court to deny Mr. Gurchiani’s petition, 

contending “the Board’s findings concerning no nexus” are decisive as to his 

withholding-of-removal claim. Resp. Br. at 24–25. According to the 

government, “[n]one of Gurchiani’s arguments . . . address the . . . 

independent reasons for denying” that claim. Resp. Br. at 23. “His waiver,” 

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it argues, “fully disposes of his claim[] for withholding of removal.” Resp. 

Br. at 24.9

We must agree with the government that waiver is decisive in this 

case. Recall, the BIA found Mr. Gurchiani did not establish nexus for the 

alleged persecution in Russia. If that finding stands, Mr. Gurchiani’s 

petition cannot succeed, because a successful claim for withholding of 

removal requires the petitioner to show nexus to a protected ground. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). Because nexus is a factual question we typically 

review under the deferential substantial-evidence standard, Dallakoti, 619 

F.3d at 1267–68, we are especially disinclined to disturb those findings 

absent any challenge whatsoever. To succeed on appeal, therefore, Mr. 

Gurchiani needed—at least—to challenge the BIA’s no-nexus findings.10

9 The government argues Mr. Gurchiani waived arguments 

concerning several other BIA findings. See Resp. Br. at 23–26. Because, as 

we will explain, his nexus-related waiver is decisive, we need not consider 

whether he also waived any other arguments. 

10 Unpublished cases in this circuit and published cases in other 

circuits—which we cite as persuasive authority—reinforce this conclusion. 

See Asif v. Barr, 833 F. App’x 204, 209 (10th Cir. 2020) (finding a failure to 

“address or challenge the BIA’s no-nexus finding” means the petitioner “has 

waived any argument of error in that finding”); Koffi v. Garland, No. 21-

9535, 2021 WL 5710031, at *2–3 (10th Cir. Dec. 2, 2021) (finding the 

petitioner’s “failure to challenge the IJ’s” finding that he “had not 

established . . . nexus” “forecloses success” on his asylum and withholdingof-removal claims); Paz-Zaldivar v. Garland, No. 21-9571, 2022 WL 

3009925, at *3 (10th Cir. July 29, 2022) (finding, because the petitioner 

“does not challenge the agency’s finding that she failed to prove she was 

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He did not. Nowhere in Mr. Gurchiani’s opening brief do we find any 

discussion of the BIA’s no-nexus findings. We “decline[] to consider 

arguments” against these findings because any such arguments “[we]re not 

raised . . . in [Mr. Gurchiani]’s opening brief.” Bronson, 500 F.3d at 1104. 

Mr. Gurchiani’s reply brief does not engage with the government’s 

allegations regarding waiver. See Eaton, 931 F.3d at 1031 (confirming when 

a litigant fails to “respond to” the opposition’s “argument in his reply brief[,] 

. . . we treat any non-obvious responses he could have made as waived and 

assume the [opposition’s] analysis is correct”). Granted, this court’s 

“preservation doctrines function not as absolute constraints on our power to 

review but, rather, more like prudential norms. That is, ‘whether issues 

should be deemed waived is a matter of discretion.’” In re Syngenta AG 

MIR 162 Corn Litig., 61 F.4th 1126, 1182 (10th Cir. 2023) (quoting 

United States v. Walker, 918 F.3d 1134, 1153 (10th Cir. 2019)). But we 

see no principled reason to overlook waiver in this case, nor has Mr. 

targeted because of her gender or single-mother status,” “we have no reason 

to reach any of her remaining arguments” on asylum, which has a similar 

nexus requirement as withholding of removal); Riera-Riera v. Lynch, 841 

F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2016) (concluding, because the petitioner “has 

never identified, let alone argued, the ground on which he has been or would 

be persecuted[, t]his issue has been waived,” which “is dispositive of his 

asylum and withholding of removal claims”); Hernandez-Garcia v. Barr, 930 

F.3d 915, 919 (7th Cir. 2019) (similar). 

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Gurchiani suggested one.11 “Since the unchallenged . . . finding is, by itself, 

a sufficient basis for the denial of [relief], [Mr. Gurchiani’s] success on 

appeal is foreclosed—regardless of the merit of his [other] arguments . . . .” 

Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1390 (10th Cir. 1994). 

We therefore decline to reach the merits of Mr. Gurchiani’s arguments 

regarding withholding of removal. 

11 After the Supreme Court decided Loper Bright Enterprises v. 

Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024), this court ordered supplemental 

briefing because the government had argued for Chevron deference on one 

issue, see Resp. Br. at 34–51. It was only in his supplemental reply brief—

that is, his reply to the government’s arguments regarding Loper Bright—

that Mr. Gurchiani even acknowledged the government’s waiver-related 

arguments. See Supp. Reply Br. at 1–2. Given the importance of adversarial 

briefing and party presentation, that is too late for us to consider his waiverrelated arguments. 

Even if not too late, Mr. Gurchiani’s arguments are not persuasive. 

Mr. Gurchiani first observes “[t]he issues [he] raised in his opening brief 

are not waived.” Supp. Reply Br. at 1. Of course, the issues he actually 

raised are not subject to waiver, but he misses the central point: arguments 

concerning other issues—like nexus—are waived, and as we have discussed, 

that waiver is dispositive under the circumstances. See Resp. Br. at 21–26. 

Mr. Gurchiani then maintains he “has explained that applying an incorrect 

standard of law, as the BIA . . . did, warrants reversal.” Supp. Reply Br. at 

1. Even assuming the BIA applied an incorrect standard, Mr. Gurchiani has 

not challenged BIA’s dispositive no-nexus findings, meaning those findings 

must stand and relief must be denied in this case. 

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C 

1 

We now turn to Mr. Gurchiani’s asylum claim. To qualify for asylum, 

an applicant must show “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution 

on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 

group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (emphasis added). 

This basis for relief, like withholding of removal, requires that any 

persecution has a nexus to at least one of these five protected grounds. 

While these two claims’ elements are similar, a critical difference is 

the applicant’s burden. We have interpreted the withholding-of-removal 

standard to require applicants to “prove a ‘clear probability of persecution’ 

on account of a protected ground.” Rodas-Orellana v. Holder, 780 F.3d 982, 

987 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Karki v. Holder, 715 F.3d 792, 801 (10th Cir. 

2013)). Under this standard, the applicant must show “either past 

persecution in the proposed country of removal, or that ‘it is more likely 

than not that he or she would be persecuted’ on one of the specified grounds 

upon returning to the proposed country of removal.” Ritonga v. Holder, 633 

F.3d 971, 978 (10th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (quoting 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.16(b)(2) (2011)). 

Asylum, in contrast, requires “persecution or a well-founded fear of 

persecution on account of” a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 

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For that form of relief, “it need not be shown that the situation will probably 

result in persecution, but it is enough that persecution is a reasonable 

possibility.” Ritonga, 633 F.3d at 976 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 

U.S. 421, 440 (1987)). “The test for restriction on removal is ‘therefore more 

demanding than the “well-founded fear” standard applicable to an asylum 

claim.’”12 Id. at 978 (quoting Elzour v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th 

Cir. 2004)). The Supreme Court has concluded one could have the “wellfounded fear” required for asylum with only “a 10% chance of being shot, 

tortured, or otherwise persecuted,” Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440—far 

short of withholding of removal’s “more likely than not” standard. 

Because of asylum’s generally lower bar, we have frequently held “the 

‘failure to satisfy the burden of proof for asylum . . . necessarily constitutes 

a failure to meet the more stringent burden of proof for restriction on 

removal.’” Dallakoti, 619 F.3d at 1268 (quoting Ba v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d 

1265, 1271 (10th Cir. 2008)). In Dallakoti, we relied on that principle to 

reject a withholding-of-removal claim when an applicant failed to establish 

nexus as to asylum. Id. Logically, however, the converse is not true: simply 

12 This court uses “withholding of removal” and “restriction on 

removal,” the more recent statutory term, interchangeably. See Addo v. 

Barr, 982 F.3d 1263, 1265 n.1 (10th Cir. 2020). 

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failing to meet the withholding-of-removal standard does not automatically 

foreclose asylum relief. 

2 

We now show why, despite these different legal standards, Mr. 

Gurchiani’s failure to challenge the BIA’s nexus findings in the context of 

withholding of removal is also decisive as to his asylum claim. 

Recall, the BIA rejected Mr. Gurchiani’s asylum claim on one ground: 

he had not “demonstrate[d] a well-founded fear of persecution in both

Russia and Georgia”—instead focusing only on Russia. RI.4 (emphasis 

added). On appeal, Mr. Gurchiani challenges that conclusion, arguing 

asylum can be validly based on a well-founded fear in only one country of 

one’s nationality. See Op. Br. at 8–17. In addition to responding to that 

argument on the merits, the government contends Mr. Gurchiani’s abovedescribed waiver, including as to nexus, “resolve[s] his asylum claim.” Resp. 

Br. at 25. In reply, as to asylum, Mr. Gurchiani raises only the same 

argument raised in his opening brief, with no attention to waiver. See Reply 

Br. at 5–6. 

Because of Mr. Gurchiani’s failure even to discuss waiver, “we treat 

any non-obvious responses he could have made as waived.” Eaton, 931 F.3d 

at 1031. Unless some “[]obvious response[]” persuades us otherwise, we can 

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“assume” the government’s argument—that Mr. Gurchiani’s nexus-related 

waiver also disposes of the asylum claim—“is correct.” Id. 

No “[]obvious response[],” id., would likely succeed on this record. One 

perhaps “[]obvious response[]”—raised by Mr. Gurchiani’s counsel during 

oral argument, Oral Argument at 2:30–6:15—is that the BIA made its nexus 

findings only as to withholding of removal, not as to asylum. Recall, the 

withholding-of-removal bar is higher than the asylum bar. Concluding Mr. 

Gurchiani failed to meet the higher bar, his argument goes, cannot be 

dispositive as to whether he met the lower bar. 

Even this possible counterargument, though, falls short on the record 

before us. Mr. Gurchiani is correct that the BIA made no separate nexus 

findings as to asylum. See RI.4. But even assuming, as Mr. Gurchiani does, 

the difference in burden attends to the nexus requirement for each form of 

relief, we cannot disturb the BIA’s findings. The BIA did not rely on the 

higher withholding-of-removal standard to deny relief. Rather, its findings 

regarding nexus were grounded in the evidentiary record. And the record 

before the BIA, the agency found, could not support any nexus finding. RI.5, 

6 n.3. 

As to political opinion, the BIA “deem[ed] this issue waived” because 

Mr. Gurchiani “ha[d] not challenged” the IJ’s “determination” on that issue. 

RI.6 n.3. As to membership in a PSG, the BIA found no clear error in the 

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IJ’s finding “that the respondent was not forced to become a member of the 

Russian military,” which is decisive, as he therefore cannot be considered a 

member of any PSG related to evading military service.13 RI.5 (emphasis 

added); see also RI.105. And as to the nationality ground, the BIA agreed 

with the IJ that Mr. Gurchiani “has not testified to or provided any other 

evidence that he would be subjected to significant physical harm on account 

of his Georgian nationality if he were to return to Russia.” RI.5 (emphasis 

added). Mr. Gurchiani challenges none of these rulings on appeal. And 

importantly, these were absolute findings, meaning they do not depend on 

any difference in burden between the withholding-of-removal and asylum 

claims.14 Mr. Gurchiani’s standard-sensitive counterargument therefore 

13 Mr. Gurchiani has raised no separate theory concerning nexus to 

membership in a PSG for any feared future persecution. Recall, his 

application did not assert membership in a PSG as a ground for relief. His 

testimony during the IJ hearing described the basis of his feared 

persecution, but he raised no separate argument concerning nexus for any 

future persecution. And his appellate briefing raises no nexus-related 

arguments at all. 

14 Had the BIA tethered each nexus finding to the higher withholdingof-removal standard, then our conclusion may have been different. But it 

did not. Rather, the BIA’s ruling confirms Mr. Gurchiani could not have 

made a nexus showing on this record that would satisfy any standard, 

rendering the above-described difference between the asylum and 

withholding-of-removal standards immaterial for purposes of this case. 

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fails.15 Put differently, given the BIA’s absolute no-nexus findings, 

“governing law would ‘“require[]” [the agency] to reach a “necessary result”’” 

on this record: that Mr. Gurchiani’s asylum claim also fails for want of 

nexus. Zapata-Chacon, 51 F.4th at 1196 (alterations in original) (quoting 

Gutierrez-Zavala, 32 F.4th at 810). 

Recall, Mr. Gurchiani raised no nexus-related arguments in any of his 

appellate briefs. So if a better counterargument exists, it is “non-obvious.” 

Eaton, 931 F.3d at 1031. We thus agree with the government that the BIA’s 

no-nexus findings—unchallenged on appeal—are also decisive as to Mr. 

Gurchiani’s asylum claim, even if he did or would face persecution in 

Russia, Georgia, or both countries. For this reason, we decline to reach the 

merits of Mr. Gurchiani’s arguments regarding asylum.

15 We must “limit our review to the grounds relied upon by the BIA.” 

Htun v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 1111, 1118 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing Uanreroro, 443 

F.3d at 1203–04). Because the BIA did not “explicitly incorporate[] or 

reference[] an expanded version of” its reasoning regarding nexus from the 

IJ’s order, “our review extends no further.” Uanreroro, 443 F.3d 1197 at 

1204. We therefore do not consult the IJ’s nexus findings. But, even if we 

were to do so, we would reach the same conclusion. The IJ’s findings were 

similarly categorical. She found “the harm that he suffered in Russia was 

not on account of a political opinion.” RI.105 (emphasis added). She found 

Mr. Gurchiani “has failed to show that he was, in fact, even conscripted to 

the military service in Russia,” which is decisive as to membership in a PSG. 

RI.106 (emphasis added). And she found “there is no evidence, not even from 

the respondent’s own testimony, that he could be subject to harm in Russia 

just [for] being Georgian.” RI.99 (emphasis added). 

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III 

We DENY THE PETITION FOR REVIEW. 

Entered for the Court 

Veronica S. Rossman 

Circuit Judge 

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