Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-71907/USCOURTS-ca9-14-71907-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Maricarmen Garcia Arredondo
Petitioner
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARICARMEN GARCIA ARREDONDO,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 14-71907

Agency No.

A097-355-032

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted April 4, 2016

Pasadena, California

Filed May 27, 2016

Before: JEROME FARRIS, CARLOS T. BEA, and

MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

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2 ARREDONDO V. LYNCH

SUMMARY*

Immigration

The panel denied Maricarmen Garcia Arredondo’s

petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’

denial of her motion to reopen to rescind the in absentia

removal order entered against her. 

The panel held that Arredondo’s explanation regarding

why she failed to appear for her Immigration Judge hearing

was not inherently unbelievable or incredible, and that the IJ

and BIA thus erred in disregarding it. The panel held,

however, that even if true, Arredondo’s explanation did not

constitute the requisite exceptional circumstances sufficient

to grant a motion to reopen. As a matter of first impression,

the panel held that a car’s mechanical failure does not alone

compel granting a motion to reopen based on exceptional

circumstances.

COUNSEL

C. Ryan Fisher (argued) and Michael Willard Olson (argued),

Certified Law Students, University of California, Irvine

School of Law; Kathryn M. Davis, Law Office of Kathryn M.

Davis, Pasadena, California; and Peter Afrasiabi, One LLP,

Newport Beach, California, for Petitioner.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ARREDONDO V. LYNCH 3

Jeremy M. Bylund (argued) and Surell Brady, Trial

Attorneys, Office of Immigration Litigation; Keith I.

McManus, Senior Litigation Counsel; Benjamin C. Mizer,

Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division,

United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for

Respondent.

OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Maricarmen Garcia Arredondo petitions from

the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)

affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her motion

to reopen. We deny the petition.

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Arredondo applied for asylum and withholding of

removal in October, 2003. In response, the government

initiated removal proceedings. Arredondo filed an application

for cancellation of removal in November, 2003. At the

hearing in December, 2003, she conceded that she was

removable as charged. The IJ granted her application for

voluntary departure.

In March, 2006, Arredondo filed a motion to reopen

based on new evidence that her son “suffers from severe

deformity of his jaw and teeth and will require extensive

dental treatment, braces and care for several years,” and that

her family would therefore suffer exceptional hardship if she

was forced to leave the United States.

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4 ARREDONDO V. LYNCH

The BIA denied Arredondo’s 2006 motion to reopen.

Arredondo filed a petition for review, but the government

filed a motion to remand, which we granted. On remand to

the BIA, the government filed a non-opposition to the motion

to reopen. The BIA remanded to the IJ, who set a hearing for

February 2009, but Arredondo did not receive the mailed

notice and failed to appear, so was ordered removed. She then

filed a second motion to reopen in August, 2009 on the

grounds that she had advised the court of her new address in

2008, but the notice had been sent to her old address. The IJ

granted the motion to reopen, and in July 2010, set a hearing

for February 13, 2012. Arredondo again failed to appear, and

the IJ ordered her removed.

In May, 2012, Arredondo then filed the motion to reopen

now at issue. It argued that exceptional circumstances

prevented Arredondo from attending the hearing.

Arredondo’s declaration, stated that she left her house in

Riverside, California at 11:30 a.m. for her 1:00 p.m. hearing

in Los Angeles, but after driving for 25–30 minutes, she felt

a problem with her car’s power, felt some shaking, and saw

some vapor. She checked the temperature, which was high.

She exited the freeway. Her car had overheated. Because she

did not have a phone, she asked people on the street to

borrow theirs to call for help. Her husband and son did not

answer, but she reached a friend. Arredondo’s friend was not

available to drive her to court, but was able to find a

mechanic. The mechanic sent a tow truck, and Arredondo and

the car arrived at the mechanic’s shop at 2:00 p.m. The

mechanic said that he would charge $150 to $200 for a ride

to court, and that the car would not be ready until the next

day. Because Arredondo “did not have that money,” she

called her husband again, who finally answered. It was past

4:00 p.m. when he arrived, and they did not reach the court

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ARREDONDO V. LYNCH 5

until 6:30 p.m., after it had closed. Arredondo attached the

car repair bill to her declaration.

The IJ was unsatisfied with the declaration and ordered

Arredondo to submit (1) proof of payment of the car repair

bill, (2) an annotated copy of her telephone bill or other

evidence showing the calls she made that day, (3) an

explanation of why she had not returned her attorney’s call

before the hearing or called her attorney or the court on the

day of the hearing, (4) an explanation concerning why the

final repair bill is dated February 13, 2012, when she stated

the car would not be ready until the next day, (5) an

explanation of why Arredondo said she was on the 5 freeway

northbound in Corona, since the 5 freeway does not run near

Corona; and if she contends that she was actually on the 91

freeway, why she made the mistake in her first declaration;

and why she did not take the considerably shorter routes of

the 10 or 60 freeways.

Arredondo responded with a supplemental declaration.

She stated that as to the repair bill, she paid the full $480

amount in cash when she brought the car in. She had no

canceled check, credit card bill, or bank statement to provide

because she had borrowed the $500 in cash she had that day

to pay her attorney.

1 As to the phone bill, consistent with her

initial declaration’s statement that she had to borrow phones

from people on the street, she stated that she did not know or

keep in contact with those strangers, and so could not submit

their phone bills. As to why she failed to call her attorney or

the court on the day of the hearing, Arredondo stated that she

did not have their phone numbers with her.

1 Arredondo submitted no corroboration of the loan, such as a

declaration from the lender.

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6 ARREDONDO V. LYNCH

Arredondo did not address why she had not returned her

attorney’s phone calls in advance of the hearing. As to her

earlier statement concerning which freeway she had been

driving on, Arredondo acknowledged that she made a mistake

in her first declaration, and had in fact driven via the 91

freeway. She stated that she made the mistake in her earlier

declaration because she previously lived in Anaheim, and

used to take the 5 freeway to court from that location. She

stated that due to her greater familiarity with the 5 freeway

route, she took the 91 freeway to the 5 freeway even though

the other routes were shorter.

The IJ held that Arredondo’s explanations lacked

credibility. He thought it implausible that Arredondo would

exit the freeway rather than stopping at an emergency call

box on the freeway. He opined that Arredondo should have

submitted phone bills from the recipients of her calls. He

disbelieved that Arredondo paid for her car repair on the day

of the hearing, citingCalifornia Business & Professions Code

§ 9884.9(a) and 16 California Code of Regulations § 3353(a),

(c), which, according to the IJ, require car repair shops to

separately list the prices for parts, work, and tax.

2 While

Arredondo’s invoice, listed parts and work, it did not provide

a separate price for each. The IJ also found that the invoice

did not comply with 16 California Code of Regulations

§ 3356(a)(1), which requires car repair invoices to include the

2 The IJ wrote that “California law prohibits charging for a repair before

the repair is completed.” While the content of these provisions is

immaterial to our analysis and we accordingly do not construe them, the

cited code section and regulation only appear to say that a written estimate

must be provided before charges are incurred, not that mechanics cannot

accept payment before completion of the work.

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ARREDONDO V. LYNCH 7

dealer’s registration number. He therefore gave no weight to

the car repair invoice.

The IJ noted that Arredondo could have traveled from the

repair shop to court before the hearing was held, and should

have used her $500 in cash to do so instead of paying for her

car repair. Finally, the IJ noted that Arredondo had not

explained why she had not returned her attorney’s pre-hearing

calls, and opined that she could have used the mechanic’s

phone to locate the court’s phone number.

The BIA dismissed the appeal, holding that Arredondo

had not presented persuasive evidence to corroborate her

claim. And the BIA held that even were it to fully credit

Arredondo’s claims, theywould not demonstrate “exceptional

circumstances,” because she could have used her $500 in cash

to obtain transportation to court rather than pre-pay for her

car repair.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse

of discretion.” Sharma v. INS, 89 F.3d 545, 547 (9th Cir.

1996). The BIA abuses its discretion when its denial of a

motion to reopen is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”

Singh v. INS, 295 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Ahwazi v. INS, 751 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

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DISCUSSION

I. Standards Governing Motions To Reopen

An in absentia removal order may be rescinded “upon a

motion to reopen . . . if the alien demonstrates that the failure

to appear was because of exceptional circumstances.”

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i). “The term ‘exceptional

circumstances’ refers to exceptional circumstances (such as

battery or extreme cruelty to the alien or any child or parent

of the alien, serious illness of the alien, or serious illness or

death of the spouse, child, or parent of the alien, but not

including less compelling circumstances) beyond the control

of the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1). While the enumerated

examples are not exclusive, exceptional circumstances must

include a “similarly severe impediment.” Singh-Bhathal v.

INS, 170 F.3d 943, 947 (9th Cir. 1999). Additionally, “[t]his

court must look to the ‘particularized facts presented in each

case’ in determining whether the petitioner has established

exceptional circumstances.” Singh, 295 F.3d at 1040 (quoting

Singh v. INS, 213 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2000)).

“Because motions to reopen are decided without a

hearing, we generally require the Board to accept the

petitioner’s affidavits as true.” Limsico v. INS, 951 F.2d 210,

213 (9th Cir. 1991). Thus, in ruling on a motion to reopen, the

agency “must accept as true the facts stated in [the

petitioner’s] affidavits unless they are inherently

unbelievable.” Id.

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ARREDONDO V. LYNCH 9

II. Arredondo Has Not Demonstrated Exceptional

Circumstances.

While Arredondo’s explanation does not reveal great

sophistication, planning, or resources, it is not “inherently

unbelievable” or “incredible.” As such, the IJ and BIA erred

in disregarding it. See id. We therefore turn to the question of

whether Arredondo’s explanation, taken as true, constitutes

exceptional circumstances.

Traffic and trouble finding parking, standing alone, do not

constitute exceptional circumstances justifying a motion to

reopen. Sharma, 89 F.3d at 547 (rejecting the argument that

“exceptional circumstances” carries the same meaning as the

less stringent “reasonable cause” standard). We have not

previously decided whether a car’s mechanical failure

constitutes exceptional circumstances sufficient to grant a

motion to reopen. In Perez v. Mukasey, we expressly declined

to answer that question and held it open for resolution in an

appropriate case, although we noted that “a car’s mechanical

failure is generally an unanticipated occurrence which is

‘beyond the control of the alien.’” 516 F.3d 770, 774 n.2 (9th

Cir. 2008).

We now hold that a car’s mechanical failure does not

alone compel granting a motion to reopen based on

“exceptional circumstances.” The facts of this case

demonstrate why that is so. First, Arredondo left her home in

Riverside only 90 minutes before the scheduled start of her

hearing in downtown Los Angeles, and purposely took an

unnecessarily long route to court. Given the usual traffic

conditions in the Los Angeles area, this left little margin for

error. Then, when her car experienced mechanical failure,

Arredondo did not use the $500 she had to reach the court on

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10 ARREDONDO V. LYNCH

time, but instead had her car towed to a mechanic and prepaid for the repair.

She also failed to contact her lawyer or the court to

inform them of the problem.3 Because “the Board must

examine the totality of the circumstances” in determining

whether exceptional circumstances have been shown, CelisCastellano v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 888, 892 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citing Singh, 213 F.3d at 1052), we agree with the BIA, and

hold that mechanical failure coupled with decisions to leave

insufficient time to account for routine delays and to pay for

car repairs instead of transportation to court, does not

constitute exceptional circumstances. Such difficulties are

“less compelling circumstances” than the statutory examples

of “battery or extreme cruelty to the alien or any child or

parent of the alien, serious illness of the alien, or serious

illness or death of the spouse, child, or parent of the alien.”

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1). We agree with the reasoning of the

Fifth Circuit that “[t]he plain language of the statute indicates

that this is a difficult burden to meet.” Magdaleno de Morales

v. INS, 116 F.3d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding “that the

mechanical failure of the petitioners’ car on the way to the

hearing did not constitute exceptional circumstances” where

petitioners returned home instead of finding transportation to

the hearing and made only a cursory effort to contact the

court).

The totality of the circumstances also includes the merits

of Arredondo’s pending claim for relief when “the denial [of

3 Arredondo also failed to return her lawyer’s phone calls in the days

before the hearing. In fact, Arredondo and her lawyer had not been in

contact since a prior hearing held more than a year and a half before the

hearing in question.

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ARREDONDO V. LYNCH 11

a motion to reopen] leads to the unconscionable result of

deporting an individual eligible for relief.” Singh, 295 F.3d at

1040. However, Arredondo did not raise Singh or her pending

claim for relief as part of her argument below.4 And even if

she had, the basis of her motion to reopen, filed in 2006, was

that her son required close to five years of dental treatment.

That treatment should have been completed five years ago,

and her son is now 26 years old. Arredondo has raised no

other substantive basis for her motion to reopen. Thus, her

motion to reopen would fail even if she had raised Singh.

CONCLUSION

The petition is DENIED.

4 The closest Arredondo came to arguing Singh below was in her

opening brief to the BIA, which was submitted by counsel. It argued,

without citation to any authority, that the IJ “failed to address other

important factors about the case,” including Arredondo’s prior

appearances, her intention to appear, and her filing of her motion to

reopen. While this addressed Arredondo’s intention to appear, it did not

include a discussion of the merits of her case for relief from removal.

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