Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02106/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02106-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Susan C. Angelone
Plaintiff
Seyfarth Shaw LLP
Defendant

Document Text:

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28 1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

SUSAN C. ANGELONE,

NO. CIV. S-05-2106 FCD JFM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SEYFARTH SHAW LLP,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendant Seyfarth Shaw

LLP’s, (“Seyfarth Shaw”) motion for summary judgment or, in the

alternative, summary adjudication. Plaintiff Susan C. Angelone

(“Angelone”) opposes the motion. For the reasons set forth

below,1

 defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

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2 For the purposes of this motion, the court recounts

plaintiff’s version of the facts, except where otherwise noted. 

(Pl.’s Stmt. of Material and Disp. Facts in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot.

for Summ. J. (“PSDF”), filed February 7, 2007). Where the facts

are undisputed, the court refers to the parties’ statements of

undisputed facts. (See Pl.’s Response to Def.’s Separate Stmt.

of Undisp. Material Facts (“PRUF”), filed February 7, 2007;

Def.’s Response to Pl.’s Separate Stmt. of Material and Disp.

Facts in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“DRDF”), filed

February 23, 2007). 

3 Defendant objects to various pieces of evidence that

plaintiff presents in opposition to this motion. Much of the

evidence that defendant objects to is immaterial to the court’s

analysis of the motion. To the extent that the evidence is

relevant, the court declines to rule on defendant’s objections to

plaintiff’s evidence because, for the reasons stated herein, even

considering this evidence, it fails to raise a triable issue of

fact sufficient for plaintiff to withstand summary judgment.

2

BACKGROUND2

 Plaintiff commenced suit in this court on October 19, 2005. 

Her complaint states seven causes of action based upon her

employment with and eventual termination by defendant: (1)

violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, (2) violation

of the Age Discrimination Employment Act, (3) breach of contract,

(4) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing, (5) wrongful termination in violation of public policy,

(6) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (7)

negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Defendant Seyfarth Shaw hired plaintiff Susan Angelone as a

temporary paralegal in January 1999 in its Sacramento office.3

(DRDF ¶ 19). In March 2000, Defendant hired plaintiff as a

permanent legal secretary. (DRDF ¶ 20). Plaintiff was initially

assigned to assist two Seyfarth Shaw attorneys, David Tyra

(“Tyra”) and Sam McAdam (“McAdam”), and was later assigned a

third attorney, Steve Greene (“Greene”). (DRDF ¶¶ 6, 7, 10). In

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3

2000, plaintiff received positive performance evaluations from

Tyra and McAdam and was given a raise. (Pl.’s Decl., filed

February 6, 2007, Exs. 1-3). In 2001, McAdam and Greene gave

plaintiff generally positive reviews, with Greene noting only one

area in need of improvement. (Id., Exs. 5, 6). In contrast,

Tyra noted 21 areas where plaintiff’s performance required

improvement. (Id., Ex. 4) Tyra’s overall rating of plaintiff

was “requires some improvement.” (Id.). Nevertheless, plaintiff

received another raise. (Id., Ex. 7).

In January 2002, Angelone began suffering inflammatory and

painful arthritic symptoms, which were later diagnosed as

migratory polyarthritis. (PSDF ¶ 40; Declaration of Charles

Sutter, M.D., filed February 2, 2007, ¶¶ 11-13). Plaintiff began

a six-week disability leave on April 29, 2002. (DRDF ¶ 42). Her

leave was extended several times, for a total of more than eight

months, until plaintiff returned to work in January 2003. (DRDF

¶¶ 45, 47). Upon plaintiff’s return, her doctor restricted her

to a part-time work schedule of only five hours per day, with an

additional restriction of “limited standing at work.” (DRDF ¶

47; Sutter Decl., Ex. 1.) 

Defendant approved plaintiff’s part-time schedule and

assigned another employee, Anthony Musante (“Musante”), to assist

Plaintiff with her workload. (DRDF ¶¶ 48, 50). Plaintiff voiced

concerns, however, that Musante sometimes refused to assist her

with her workload and assisted other legal secretaries instead. 

(DRDF ¶ 53). 

In January and February 2003, Greene and McAdam completed

performance evaluations of plaintiff for the eight months

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4 Plaintiff objects to various pieces of evidence that

defendant presents in support of its motion. To the extent that

the evidence objected to by plaintiff is relevant, the court

finds that plaintiff’s objections are without merit.

4

preceding plaintiff’s disability leave. (Pl.’s Decl., Exs. 15,

16.) Both attorneys gave plaintiff positive evaluations, with

Greene noting only one area requiring improvement. (Id.). 

Plaintiff received a four-percent raise based upon these

evaluations. (Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 17.)

Gail Baum, the office administrator for the Sacramento

office, notified Angelone that she must return to work on a fulltime basis by the end of March 2003, or face termination. (DRDF

¶ 55). Plaintiff believed that Seyfarth Shaw’s policies, as

expressed in the employee handbook, allowed her a full year to

return to full-time status and raised this issue with Baum. 

(PSDF ¶ 56). Despite this dispute, plaintiff asked her doctor to

release her to full-time status, which he did on March 24, 2003,

with a restriction against prolonged periods of standing. (DRDF

¶ 59; Sutter Decl., Ex. 1.)

On March 21, 2003, plaintiff met with Baum, McAdam and

Greene to discuss appropriate accommodations for plaintiff’s

medical condition. (Def.’s Separate Stmt., of Undisp. Material

Facts (“DSUF”), filed December 21, 2006, ¶ 62). According to

defendant, McAdam and Greene both agreed to allow Plaintiff to

make a limited number of scheduled trips to their offices each

day.4 (Decl. of Samuel T. McAdam, filed December 21, 2006, ¶¶ 5,

6; Decl. of Gail Kristine Baum, filed December 21, 2006, ¶¶ 13,

14). Additionally a printer was provided next to plaintiff’s

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5 Plaintiff claims that Seyfarth Shaw offered her

satisfactory accommodations during this meeting, but that such

accommodations were not actually provided. (PRUF ¶ 36). 

Plaintiff does not specify what accommodations were not provided,

however. 

5

workstation and McAdam moved his files closer to plaintiff.5

(DSUF ¶ 38). Plaintiff states that Baum informed her “there was

a limit as to how much Seyfarth Shaw would do to accommodate”

plaintiff’s restrictions. (PSDF ¶ 61). 

Soon after plaintiff returned to full-time status, she was

reprimanded for making personal phone calls and violating the

dress code. (PSDF ¶ 67, 68). Plaintiff asserts these reprimands

were unwarranted, as other employees violated the dress code

without repercussion and that her personal phone calls were

related to treatment of her medical condition. (Id.; Pl.’s Decl.

¶¶ 65-67; Decl. of Sue Kyle, filed February 2, 2007, ¶ 6; Decl.

of Kirk Guthrie, filed February 2, 2007, ¶ 13).

In May 2003, an administrator from Seyfarth Shaw’s Chicago

office, Shirley Kitzmann (“Kitzmann”), interviewed employees in

the Sacramento office regarding Baum’s performance. (DRDF ¶ 73). 

During her meeting with Kitzmann, plaintiff raised a number of

issues, including her belief that Baum inadequately handled

accommodation issues. (Id.). Baum resigned her position within

days of Kitzmann’s meetings with the Sacramento employees and a

new office administrator, Rachel Miller (“Miller”), began work in

June. (PSDF ¶¶ 74, 75).

Plaintiff met with Miller in early July 2003 and informed

Miller of her medical condition, her walking restrictions, and

her belief that Baum had failed to accommodate these

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restrictions. (DRDF ¶ 76). Shortly after this meeting,

plaintiff provided Miller with a note from one of her doctors,

indicating plaintiff’s need to wear shoes designed for arthritic

patients. (DRDF ¶ 77; Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 18).

Plaintiff was assigned to work for a third attorney, Anna

Ngo Clark (“Clark”) in April 2003. (DRDF ¶ 72). In July and

August 2003, all three attorneys to whom plaintiff was assigned

completed performance evaluations of plaintiff. (Pl.’s Decl.,

Exs. 19, 20). While McAdam gave plaintiff an overall rating of

“meets expectations,” he noted that plaintiff was “defensive and

somewhat non-cooperative,” and that plaintiff’s “communication

and commitment to working as a team is an area that needs

improvement.” (Id., Ex. 19.) McAdam also suggested that

plaintiff move to another section of the office in order to

reduce the amount of walking she had to do. (Id.). Greene gave

plaintiff an overall rating of “meets expectations” and Clark

rated plaintiff as “exceeds expectations.” (Id., Exs. 19, 20). 

Neither Green nor Clark noted any areas in which plaintiff was

performing below expectations. (Id.). Plaintiff received

another raise in August 2003. (Id., Ex. 19.)

Sometime around August 2003, Clark asked plaintiff to make

numerous trips to her office. (DRDF ¶ 79). Plaintiff began

suffering more frequent symptoms of her arthritis and discussed

her medical condition with Clark. (Id.). Plaintiff informed

Miller of her conversation with Clark and Miller assured

plaintiff she would discuss plaintiff’s condition with Clark. 

(PSDF ¶ 80). Clark states that she first learned of plaintiff’s

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6 Plaintiff moves to strike the original declaration of

Rachel Miller on the grounds that the declaration did not contain

a statement that it was made under penalty of perjury. Defendant

responded by submitting an amended declaration of Rachel Miller

that does contain such a statement. The court finds that the

omission of this language from the original declaration was the

result of oversight and clerical error, which was then corrected

by the amended declaration. Therefore, plaintiff’s motion to

strike Miller’s declaration is DENIED.

7

standing restriction around this time. (Decl. of Ana Ngo Clark,

filed December 21, 2006, ¶ 4; DRDF ¶ 79). 

On November 5, 2003, plaintiff sent an email to Kitzmann,

discussing a recent complaint McAdam had made regarding

plaintiff’s handling of an assignment from him. (PSDF ¶ 82;

Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 21). Plaintiff complained to Kitzmann of

“favoritism” in the Sacramento office and specifically noted that

she felt she had been “singled out” since her return from

disability leave. (Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 21.) 

On November 24, Clark sent three emails to Miller,

complaining of plaintiff’s unresponsiveness to assignments. 

(DSUF ¶¶ 17, 18; Amended Decl. of Rachel Miller, filed February

7, 2007, ¶ 11; Decl. of Patricia Cullison, filed December 21,

2006, Exs. 22-24).6 Plaintiff was counseled by Miller regarding

these complaints and received a warning on December 19, 2003. 

(DSUF ¶ 19; Miller Decl. ¶ 12). Clark noted an improvement in

plaintiff’s performance following this counseling. (Clark Decl.

¶ 7). In March 2004, however, Clark again emailed complaints to

Miller regarding plaintiff’s handling of a request, and in April,

plaintiff was again “written up” for questioning an assignment

given to her by Clark. (DRDF ¶ 91; Clark Decl. ¶ 8; Cullison

Decl., Ex. 28). 

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On March 4, during a rearrangement of attorney offices,

plaintiff requested that Clark move into an office closer to her. 

(DRDF ¶ 83). Clark declined to move from her current office, but

offered to bring documents to plaintiff when necessary. (PSDF ¶¶

84, 85). Plaintiff contends that Clark did not bring documents

to her and instead continued to ask plaintiff to make trips to

Clark’s office. (PSDF ¶ 85). In April, Miller offered plaintiff

the opportunity to move her work station closer to Clark’s

office. (DSUF ¶ 44; Miller Decl. ¶ 18). Plaintiff sent an email

to Miller on April 8, declining that offer. (Id.; Cullison

Decl., Ex. 32). 

On April 2 and again on April 13, Plaintiff requested to be

transferred away from Clark and to another attorney with an

office closer to her work station. (PRUF ¶ 43; Cullison Decl.,

Ex. 33.) Miller denied both requests for reassignment, citing

defendant’s policy against transferring employees with ongoing

performance problems away from their current supervisors. (PRUF

¶ 43). 

In a May 21 email to Miller, Clark again complained of

plaintiff’s unresponsiveness, this time to a request to retrieve

certain files. (PRUF ¶ 26; Cullison Decl., Ex 36). In response

to this complaint, Miller again counseled plaintiff. (PRUF ¶

26). Plaintiff asserts that at the time of the request, she

explained to Clark that she was experiencing increased swelling

and pain, due to a building evacuation the previous day, and

asked Clark to seek other assistance in obtaining the files. 

(Id.). 

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On May 27, 2004, Plaintiff wrote to Brown, the managing

partner of the Sacramento office, regarding her restrictions,

requested accommodations, Clark’s complaints, and her requested

transfers from Clark. (DRDF ¶ 93). Plaintiff’s doctor also sent

a letter to defendant, requesting that plaintiff’s medical

condition be accommodated. (Id.). Brown responded to plaintiff

via email, informing plaintiff that such issues should be

discussed with Miller. (DRDF ¶ 94). On June 2, Miller called

plaintiff’s doctor to discuss plaintiff’s limitations. (DRDF ¶¶

95, 97).

Also on June 2, Miller called plaintiff into her office, and

gave plaintiff a “Final Warning” memo, dated May 26, 2004. (DRDF

¶ 99; Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 28.) The memo listed several of Clark’s

prior complaints, including the May 21 incident. (Id.). 

Plaintiff was informed that her employment would be terminated if

she refused work or gave resistance to her attorneys on work

requests. (Id.).

In July 2004, plaintiff again received performance

evaluations from the three attorneys to whom she was assigned. 

(Pl.’s Decl., Exs. 29-31). Two of plaintiff’s supervising

attorneys, McAdam and Fred Sanderson (“Sanderson”), gave

plaintiff an overall rating of “meets expectations.” (Id., Ex.

29, 30). McAdam’s evaluation does note plaintiff’s difficulty in

working with Clark, however, and references his own past

difficulties in working with plaintiff. (Id., Ex. 29). Clark

gave plaintiff an overall rating of “marginal” and noted numerous

areas of deficiencies. (Id., Ex. 31.)

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On August 30, Plaintiff asked a paralegal to assist her in

preparing subpoenas in order to complete an assignment from

Clark. (DRDF ¶¶ 105, 107). Clark had specifically told

plaintiff not to request assistance from a paralegal in

completing that particular assignment. (Clark Decl. ¶ 13). 

Plaintiff was terminated the next day, on September 1, 2004. 

(DRDF ¶ 110). Miller informed plaintiff she was being terminated

for insubordination. (Id.).

On October 18, 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the

California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) and

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). (Miller

Decl., Ex. A).

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis of its motion, and

identifying those portions of “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,” which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. at 324. Indeed,

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summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the

standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule

56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-289 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of

this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible

discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute

exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986),

and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

Id. at 251-52.

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

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claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” 

First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir.

1982). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and

all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Nevertheless, inferences are not

drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation

to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224,

1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S. Ct. at 1356.

ANALYSIS

I. Americans with Disabilities Act Claims

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The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §

12101, et.seq., prohibits an employer from discriminating

“against a qualified individual with a disability because of the

disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90

F.3d 1477, 1480 (9th Cir. 1996). To survive a motion for summary

judgment under the ADA, plaintiff must establish the following

elements of a prima facie case of disability discrimination:(1)

that she was a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2)

that she was a “qualified individual”; (3) that the defendant

terminated her, or otherwise unlawfully discriminated against her

in regard to the terms, conditions and privileges of employment;

(4) because of her disability. Americans with Disabilities Act

of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq.; See Nunes v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 1999).

The court applies the burden shifting approach set forth by

the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this approach, plaintiff must

first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. In doing

so, plaintiff may produce indirect evidence that gives rise to an

inference of discriminatory motive. See Transworld Airlines,

Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). 

Once plaintiff makes this initial showing, the burden shifts

to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for the adverse employment action. See EEOC v. Hacienda

Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1514 (9th Cir. 1989). The ultimate burden

of persuasion, however, remains with the plaintiff. Texas Dep’t.

of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 

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If the employer articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for the adverse employment action, the plaintiff must

demonstrate that the reason is a pretext for discrimination. The

plaintiff may demonstrate pretext in one of two ways: “(1)

indirectly, by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation

is unworthy of credence because it is internally inconsistent or

otherwise not believable, or (2) directly, by showing that

unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the employer.” 

Chuang v. Univ. of Calif. Davis, Board of Trustees, 225 F.3d

1115, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). The factual inquiry regarding

pretext requires a new level of specificity. Burdine, 450 U.S.

at 255. Plaintiff must produce specific and substantial evidence

that the defendant’s reasons are really a pretext for

discrimination. Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc.,

292 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A. Disability within the Meaning of the ADA

The ADA defines “disability” as “(A) a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major

life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an

impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). “In general, ‘substantially limited’

refers to the inability to perform a major life activity as

compared to the average person in the general population or a

significant restriction ‘as to the condition, manner, or

duration’ under which an individual can perform the particular

activity.” Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537, 539 (9th

Cir. 1997). 

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Defendant asserts that plaintiff was not legally disabled

and has not proffered sufficient evidence to establish a

disability within the meaning of the ADA. Plaintiff submitted

the declaration of her primary care physician, which indicates

that plaintiff suffers from migratory polyarthritis. (Sutter

Decl. ¶¶ 11-13). According to her doctor, plaintiff’s condition

limits her ability to walk or stand to thirty minutes at a time,

and on some days plaintiff might only be able to walk or stand

for as little as ten minutes. (Sutter Decl. ¶ 17.) Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission regulations include walking as

a major life activity, within the meaning of the ADA. 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(1). To the extent plaintiff was limited to merely a

half hour per day of walking, such a restriction on the duration

that plaintiff would be able to perform a major life activity

could be considered “significant.” Accordingly, plaintiff has

raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was

legally disabled under the ADA.

B. Qualified Individual

The ADA defines the second prong of the prima facie case,

“qualified individual,” as an “individual with a disability who,

with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the

essential functions of the employment position that such

individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 

Plaintiff has proffered evidence that she possessed the

requisite skills and qualifications for the position of legal

secretary and that she could, and did, perform the essential

functions of her job at the time of her termination. Defendant

argues that plaintiff was incapable of performing her job, and

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was thus not qualified within the meaning of the ADA, due to her

insubordination and poor attitude. 

Defendant relies heavily on a Seventh Circuit case, Hammel

v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 862-65 (7th Cir.

2005), for the proposition that a plaintiff’s poor performance

may preclude a finding that plaintiff was a qualified individual

capable of performing the essential functions of the employment

position. Assuming arguendo that this circuit would adopt the

same standard as applied in Hammel, the facts of that case are

distinguishable from the instant case. In Hammel, the plaintiff

had a history of poor performance, from the first day of his

employment through his termination, and was chronically deficient

in performing several tasks essential to his job. 

In the instant case, plaintiff has offered evidence that her

work performance remained satisfactory in many respects and that

she continually received positive evaluations from two of the

three attorneys to whom she was assigned. (Pl.’s Decl., Exs. 29,

30.) Defendant’s proffered evidence of plaintiff’s poor

performance is certainly relevant and appropriately considered as

evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory motive for any

adverse employment action, which may then be challenged by

plaintiff as pretext for a discriminatory motive. However, it is

not clear that such evidence should be used in the court’s

inquiry as to whether plaintiff was a “qualified individual,”

capable of performing the essential functions of her job.

Accordingly, plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether she was a qualified individual under

the ADA.

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C. Unlawful Discrimination Because of Disability

The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against a

qualified individual with a disability in regard to discharge of

the employee, or in regard to other terms, conditions and

privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Such prohibited

discrimination includes “not making reasonable accommodations to

the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise

qualified individual with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. §

12112(b)(5)(a). Plaintiff’s complaint can be broadly interpreted

as alleging four types of discriminatory actions: (1)

termination, (2) retaliation, (3)failure to accommodate, and

(4)creation of a hostile work environment. (Pl.’s Comp., filed

October 19, 2005, at ¶¶ 30, 34.) 

1. Termination because of disability

Both parties have admitted that plaintiff was terminated on

September 1, 2004. Plaintiff alleges that defendant terminated

her because of her disability. Defendant alleges that plaintiff

was terminated as the result of insubordination and poor

performance. 

a. Prima Facie Case

Plaintiff bears the initial burden of proffering evidence

that she was terminated because of her disability. Plaintiff

contends that defendant targeted plaintiff for termination as

soon as she returned from disability leave. Plaintiff relies on

her history of generally positive performance evaluations,

including the overall positive evaluations she received from

McAdam and Sanderson just one month before her termination as

evidence that her performance was satisfactory and that defendant

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had no reason to terminate her for poor performance. To

establish a discriminatory motive for her termination, plaintiff

relies primarily on the temporal proximity between the date when

Clark first learned of plaintiff’s limitations, in August 2003,

and the ensuing complaints lodged by Clark, starting in November

2003. 

Plaintiff first informed Clark of her medical condition, and

subsequent need for accommodations with respect to her walking

limitations, in August 2003. Clark had not been informed of

plaintiff’s medical condition prior to August. Plaintiff

discussed her inability to make numerous trips to Clark’s office

with both Clark and Miller at that time. Clark agreed to reduce

the number of trips plaintiff was asked to make. At least two of

the complaints lodged by Clark, however, were based, in part,

upon plaintiff’s refusal to leave her desk to deliver documents

or files. Plaintiff asserts that Clark continued to ask her to

perform tasks that required walking even on days that plaintiff

was suffering from arthritic flare-ups. In November 2003, within

three months of Clark learning of plaintiff’s medical condition,

Clark lodged her first emailed complaints regarding plaintiff’s

unresponsiveness. 

Plaintiff also notes the disparity between Clark’s

dissatisfaction with plaintiff’s work performance, and the

generally positive performance evaluations the plaintiff received

from her other attorneys. In July 2003, a month prior to Clark

learning of plaintiff’s limitations, all three of plaintiff’s

attorneys, including Clark, gave plaintiff positive performance

evaluations. The next August, just one month before her

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termination, plaintiff continued to receive satisfactory

performance evaluations from both McAdam and Sanderson, while

Clark rated plaintiff as “marginal.” 

b. Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason

As plaintiff has met her initial, minimal burden of showing

an inference of discriminatory motive in her disciplinary record

and eventual termination, the burden shifts to defendant to

proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff’s

termination. Defendant proffers evidence that plaintiff was

terminated due to insubordination, performance issues, and

attendance problems, many of which preceded her disability leave

and her assignment to Clark. (DSUF ¶¶ 8-31.) 

In July 2001, nine months before plaintiff commenced

disability leave, the three attorneys to whom plaintiff was

assigned completed performance evaluations of plaintiff. In

contrast to his 2000 evaluation, Tyra noted ten areas where

plaintiff required some improvement and eleven other areas where

she required significant improvement. (Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 4). 

Tyra also stated in his evaluation that he felt “unsupported” by

plaintiff, that she responded to his work requests by telling him

of her workload for her other attorneys, and that her personal

phone calls appeared excessive. (Id.).

Shortly after returning from her leave, plaintiff was

counseled for making excessive personal calls, violating the

firm’s dress code by wearing a sweat-suit, and walking out of

Baum’s office while being counseled. (DSUF ¶ 11.) 

In his August 2003 performance evaluation, McAdam did rate

plaintiff overall as meeting expectations; however, there were

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several categories where McAdam rated plaintiff as only

“marginal.” (Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 19). His evaluation also notes

that plaintiff sometimes took an argumentative tone with

attorneys and staff and that she needed improvement in working

with her coworkers. (Id.). 

On November 24, 2003, Clark sent three emails to Miller,

complaining of plaintiff’s unresponsiveness to assignments and

that plaintiff delayed completing tasks for Clark. Plaintiff was

counseled by Miller regarding these complaints and received a

written warning on December 19, 2003. Clark noted an improvement

in plaintiff’s performance following this counseling. In March

2004, however, Clark again emailed a complaint to Miller about

plaintiff’s refusal to print documents for Clark. In April,

plaintiff was again “written up” when she questioned a partner

about the propriety of Clark’s request for a hotel reservation. 

In a May 21 email to Miller, Clark once again complained of

plaintiff’s unresponsiveness, this time to a request to retrieve

certain files. In response to this complaint, Miller again

counseled plaintiff. 

On June 2, Miller called plaintiff into her office, and gave

plaintiff a “Final Warning” memo, dated May 26, 2004. The memo

listed several of Clark’s prior complaints, including the May 21

incident. Plaintiff was informed that her employment would be

terminated if she refused work or gave resistance to her

attorneys on work requests.

On August 30, Plaintiff asked a paralegal to assist her in

preparing subpoenas in order to complete an assignment from

Clark. Clark lodged a complaint, stating Plaintiff was

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specifically told not to request assistance from a paralegal in

completing that particular assignment. Plaintiff was terminated

the next day, on September 1, 2004. Miller informed plaintiff

she was being terminated for insubordination.

Defendant has provided sufficient evidence of a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff. 

Consequently, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to

rebut these proffered reasons as pretextual. 

c. Evidence of Pretext

Plaintiff contends that her disciplinary record and history

of poor work performance, based upon Clark’s complaints and

others, are unjustified and, therefore, a pretext for defendant’s

discriminatory motive. Plaintiff first challenges the complaints

and infractions noted prior to her assignment to Clark, including

Tyra’s negative review of plaintiff, and reprimands for dress

code violations and making personal phone calls. Tyra conducted

his 2001 performance evaluation approximately four months after

plaintiff complained that he made a derogatory comment about one

of his clients. Plaintiff asserts that Tyra’s negative review

was in retaliation for this complaint. Plaintiff also contends

the dress code policy was not uniformly enforced and that she was

reprimanded for wearing shoes necessary to alleviate her swollen

feet. In response to her reprimand for making excessive personal

phone calls, plaintiff states that at least some of her calls

were related to seeking treatment for her medical condition, and

therefore should not have been subject to any disciplinary

action. 

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The court finds this evidence insufficient to show pretext. 

Tyra wrote his evaluation more than four months after plaintiff’s

complaint about the derogatory comment. A claim of retaliation

based on temporal proximity is too attenuated to serve as

specific and substantial evidence of pretext. Plaintiff also

does not dispute that her sweat-suit did not violate the dress

code or that at least some of her personal phone calls were

unrelated to her medical care. Plaintiff has failed to offer

specific and substantial evidence that these reprimands were more

likely motivated by unlawful discrimination or that any of the

evidence proffered by defendant regarding her early history of

performance problems is unworthy of credence.

Plaintiff also argues that the complaints lodged by Clark

were not legitimately based on any actual deficiencies in

plaintiff’s work performance. Plaintiff contrasts Clark’s 2004

evaluation to the evaluations from her other two attorneys,

McAdam and Sanderson. While Clark gave plaintiff an overall

rating of only “marginal” and noted numerous areas of

deficiencies, the other two attorneys both gave plaintiff an

overall rating of “meets expectations.” However, McAdam’s

evaluation notes plaintiff’s difficulty in working with Clark and

references his own past difficulties in working with plaintiff. 

Accordingly, the court does not agree with plaintiff’s contention

that Clark’s 2004 evaluation was a complete aberration and is not

credible. 

Plaintiff also asserts that Clark’s complaints, from

November 2003 to plaintiff’s termination, were unjustified and

that plaintiff was, in fact, always performing adequately. In

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response to Clark’s complaint regarding the request for a judge’s

phone number, plaintiff asserts she was unable to locate the

information Clark requested and that she gave Clark another phone

number that she felt adequately responded to Clark’s request. In

response to Clark’s complaints regarding her refusal to print

documents, plaintiff asserts that her printer was not working on

the day Clark made her requests and that she asked Clark to print

the documents on her own printer. As to Clark’s May 21 complaint

that plaintiff refused to retrieve certain files for Clark,

plaintiff asserts that at the time of the request, she explained

to Clark that she was experiencing increased swelling and pain,

due to a building evacuation the previous day, and asked Clark to

seek other assistance in obtaining the files. 

The court finds these explanations insufficient evidence

that Clark’s complaints were pretextual. Plaintiff does dispute

that she engaged in the behavior complained of by Clark, or that

she sometimes refused requests from Clark without arranging for

another employee to assist her. She cites to no evidence that

the behavior complained of by Clark was accepted from other

employees. Instead she merely argues that she should not have

been reprimanded for it. 

Plaintiff also challenges the legitimacy of Clark’s

complaint regarding plaintiff’s inquiry to a partner before

making a hotel reservation requested by Clark. Plaintiff notes

that she had been praised by Clark before for “seeking

clarification,” and that the firm had recently adopted a new

policy regarding costs charged to clients. (See Pl.’s Decl., Ex.

25). Plaintiff was not “seeking clarification” from Clark,

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however. Instead, she was questioning Clark’s authority to incur

the charge. And plaintiff’s reliance on the cited policy is

unavailing, as the policy refers to costs in excess of $1,000,

and plaintiff does not contend that it was the amount of the

requested reservation that was at issue, but rather Clark’s

ability to make the reservation at all.

Finally, plaintiff challenges Clark’s final complaint

regarding plaintiff’s use of a paralegal to help prepare

subpoenas. It is true that plaintiff was told by defendant to

request help from other legal secretaries and administrative

staff when necessary. However, plaintiff was specifically told

not to request the help of a paralegal in the completion of this

specific task. Plaintiff did so, contrary to Clark’s direct

instructions. Plaintiff does not dispute that she requested help

from a paralegal as opposed to another member of the secretarial

or administrative staff. Nor does she dispute that Clark

instructed her not to request the paralegal’s help. 

Finally, plaintiff challenges the credibility of the memos

and other documentation contained in her personnel file, claiming

that some items were created after her termination or were

falsified all together. Such claims are without merit. 

Plaintiff is unable to cite to any evidence indicating that the

memos were created at a later date, other than her declaration

that she did not see certain items in her personnel file when she

reviewed it in May. (PSDF ¶ 103). Additionally, the fact that

some documents are printed with a heading for the firm’s San

Francisco office is unpersuasive, as defendant cites to evidence

that such headings are computer-generated templates available in

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all of defendant’s offices, rather than pre-printed. (Dep. of

Rachel Miller (“Miller Dep.”), Ex. 3 to Decl. of Daniel S. Weiss,

filed February 6, 2007, at 99:13-14).

Overall, the court finds the evidence proffered by plaintiff

to challenge her disciplinary record and history of poor work

performance does not meet the level of specific and substantial

evidence necessary to rebut defendant’s legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. Plaintiff’s

explanations for the various complaints lodged against her do not

contradict defendant’s evidence of an extensive and continuous

pattern of documented complaints regarding plaintiff’s work

performance, unresponsiveness, and insubordination. Plaintiff

has not proffered sufficient evidence to demonstrate that

defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is not credible,

or that unlawful discrimination was the more likely motivation

for her termination. As such, plaintiff has failed to meet her

burden of showing that defendant’s proffered reason is merely a

pretext for discrimination.

2. Retaliation for complaints regarding disparate

treatment and requests to be accommodated

In order to establish a prima facie case for retaliation in

violation of the ADA, plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she

engaged in a protected activity, (2) defendant subjected her to

an adverse employment action, and (3) there is a causal link

between the protected activity and the defendant’s action. See

Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187 (2003) (outlining

the elements of a prima facie case of ADA retaliation under a

burden-shifting analysis). 

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7 Plaintiff, in her opposition, attempts to argue that

her termination was also in retaliation for complaints she made

regarding derogatory and offensive comments made by Tyra and

others. (PSDF ¶¶ 21, 22). Even assuming that plaintiff could

show that the temporal proximity between plaintiff’s complaints,

made more than two years before her termination, was not too

attenuated, such complaints are irrelevant to a claim for

disability discrimination and retaliation under the ADA. 

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Plaintiff alleges she was wrongfully terminated because she

requested accommodations for her disability and lodged complaints

regarding disparate treatment after she returned from disability

leave.7

 Defendant contends plaintiff fails to establish a prima

facie case of retaliation, claiming that plaintiff was not

engaged in protected activity and is unable to show a retaliatory

motive for her termination. 

On November 5, 2003, plaintiff sent an email complaint to

Shirley Kitzmann, an administrator in the firm’s Chicago office. 

In her complaint, plaintiff states she felt “singled out” since

her return from disability leave, in addition to other

allegations of favoritism in the Sacramento office. (Pl.’s

Decl., Ex. 21). Additionally, her email alleges that in response

to plaintiff’s requests for assistance, Miller commented, “you

seem to have trouble doing your work.” (Id.) On May 27, 2004,

plaintiff also sent a letter to Brown, the managing partner of

the Sacramento office. (Cullison Decl., Ex. 40). In her letter,

plaintiff complains that defendant was not accommodating

plaintiff’s medical condition and that Clark’s complaints were

unfounded.

Defendant claims plaintiff’s complaints to Kitzmann and

Brown did not allege illegal discrimination and therefore were

not protected activity. The ADA prohibits discrimination because

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an “individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by

this chapter or because such individual made a charge” under the

ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). Plaintiff’s communications go beyond

the complaints of mere pettiness and favoritism that defendant

cites, and specifically state that she feels she has been singled

out and has been refused requested accommodations since her

return from disability leave. The acts complained of by

plaintiff could constitute discrimination under the ADA and

making good-faith complaints regarding such alleged

discrimination is protected activity. 

Defendant next contends that plaintiff has failed to

establish a retaliatory motive for her termination. In cases of

retaliation, temporal proximity between the protected activity

and the adverse employment action can be sufficient prima facie

evidence of discriminatory motive. See Brown v. City of Tucson,

336 F.3d 1181, 1187 (2003) (noting that “very close” temporal

proximity can be sufficient evidence of retaliatory motive in

certain cases). Defendant contends that the connection between

the complaints and the alleged retaliatory conduct is too

attenuated, citing to several cases where courts have found the

connection to be too remote when the complaints and retaliatory

conduct were separated by more than a few months. (Def.’s Mot.

for Sum. J., filed Dec. 21, 2006, at 17.) 

It is true that plaintiff’s termination came more than three

months after her complaint to Brown, and nearly a year after her

email to Kitzmann. However, plaintiff’s complaint to Kitzmann

preceded Clark’s first email complaint by only three weeks, and

the Final Warning memo that served as the basis for plaintiff’s

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termination was delivered to her just five days after her letter

to Brown. It is possible, under this timeline, that Clark’s

complaints were precipitated by the complaint to Kitzmann, and

the disciplinary action taken against plaintiff was accelerated

by the complaint to Brown.

Nevertheless, as discussed above, defendant has proffered a

legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for plaintiff’s termination. 

Namely, defendant terminated plaintiff based upon a pattern of

poor work performance and insubordination. Also as discussed

above, plaintiff is unable to cite to specific and substantial

evidence that the reason proffered by defendant is mere pretext. 

Especially in the context of her retaliation claim, plaintiff

proffers no evidence that Clark was even aware of plaintiff’s

communications to Kitzmann and Brown, nor any specific and

substantial evidence that Clark’s complaints were in retaliation

for those communications.

3. Failure to accommodate

Unlawful discrimination under the ADA includes “not making

reasonable accommodations to the known physical and mental

limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a

disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). In order to identify

and implement appropriate reasonable accommodations, employers

are required to engage in an “interactive process” with disabled

employees. Barnett v. U.S. Air, 228 F.3d 1105, 1111-14 (2000). 

Employers may not deny a reasonable accommodation absent a

showing that such an accommodation would pose an undue hardship

to the defendant. Id. However, employers are also not required

to provide the “best” accommodation possible – they are merely

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required to provide an adequate accommodation to enable the

employee to perform the position’s essential functions. 29

C.F.R. § 1630.9. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant failed to provide

reasonable accommodations when it denied her request to transfer

away from Clark, denied her request to have Clark move to another

office, and failed to limit the number of trips that plaintiff

was required to make to Clark’s office (Pl.’s Opp’n. to Def.’s

Mot. for Summ. J., at 12-13). Plaintiff further contends that on

some occasions when she requested assistance from other support

staff, such assistance was not provided. 

Defendant contends that it engaged in the interactive

process in good faith and provided plaintiff with several

reasonable accommodations that enabled her to perform the

essential functions of her job. Defendant extended plaintiff’s

medical leave multiple times after her initial request, for an

additional seven months of leave. When plaintiff returned to

work, defendant honored her doctor’s restriction and allowed her

to work a part-time schedule for more than two months. Prior to

plaintiff resuming a full-time schedule, Baum and plaintiff’s two

supervising attorneys met with plaintiff to discuss appropriate

accommodations. During that meeting plaintiff stated that she

was satisfied with the accommodations defendant offered. 

From July 2003 through May 2004, defendant had multiple

conversations with plaintiff regarding the adequacy of the

accommodations offered and whether other accommodations were

needed. As late as October 2003, plaintiff told defendant that

the accommodations currently offered were adequate. The evidence

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8 Plaintiff contends that on some occasions other staff

declined to assist her in performing her tasks, and that this

constitutes a failure to accommodate. (Pl.’s Opp’n., at 12-13) 

The ADA does not require an employer to assign other employees to

perform a disabled employee’s essential job duties. See, e.g., Robertson v. Neuromedical Ctr., 161 F.3d 292, 295 (5th Cir.

1998). The fact that defendant attempted to do so here, but that

on isolated occasions such assistance was not available, does not

render defendant liable under the ADA.

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reflects that plaintiff did not raise the issue of inadequate

accommodations again until March or April 2004. At that time

Clark offered again to limit plaintiff’s trips to her office,

Miller reiterated the availability of other staff to assist

plaintiff,8 and the parties discussed the feasibility of moving

Clark’s office or plaintiff’s workstation. It was only after

plaintiff declined to move her workstation, and when plaintiff

was facing another reprimand for complaints from Clark, that

plaintiff obtained a letter from her doctor and wrote to Brown to

complain of defendant’s refusal to transfer her away from Clark.

Defendant responded to plaintiff’s last request by calling her

doctor and discussing plaintiff’s limitations. The record

indicates that plaintiff made no further complaints regarding her

accommodations before she was terminated on September 1, 2004.

The court finds that defendant engaged in the interactive

process in good faith, providing plaintiff with several

accommodations that enabled her to perform the essential

functions of her job. In fact, in support of her other ADA

claims, plaintiff herself even relies on the fact that she was

able to perform her job’s essential functions adequately for her

other two attorneys with the accommodations that were offered. 

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9 Plaintiff argues in her opposition that moving her

workstation closer to Clark’s office would have moved her further

away from her other two attorneys. (PRUF ¶ 44) Plaintiff offers

no evidence that this concern was ever communicated to defendant. 

In fact, in the email plaintiff sent to Miller declining to move

her workstation, plaintiff indicated only that she would be

uncomfortable with her back to the hallway. (DSUF ¶ 44; Cullison

Decl., Ex. 32). Plaintiff’s uncommunicated concerns regarding

the overall effectiveness of the accommodation offered by

defendant are irrelevant to the question of whether defendant is

to blame for the break-down in the interactive process.

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Essentially, the crux of plaintiff’s failure to accommodate

argument relates to the impasse reached over how to address the

distance between Clark’s office and plaintiff’s workstation. 

Plaintiff suggested that Clark move her office to be closer to

plaintiff’s workstation. As an alternative, defendant offered to

move plaintiff’s workstation closer to Clark’s office. Plaintiff

declined this request.9 Plaintiff then requested a transfer away

from Clark. Defendant contends plaintiff’s requests to be

transferred away from Clark were not reasonable in light of

defendant’s policy against transferring employees away from their

supervising attorneys when there are ongoing performance issues. 

The court agrees with defendant that plaintiff’s request to

be transferred away from Clark was not a reasonable

accommodation. In U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391

(2002), the Supreme Court addressed the reasonableness of a

transfer accommodation that required the employer to violate an

established seniority system. Noting the advantages of a

consistent, uniform seniority system, and the undermining effect

that violations of such a system would have on employee

performance and loyalty, the Court found that in the typical run

of cases, an accommodation that requires the employer to violate

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10 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(d) (West 2007) (“[I]f such

individual rejects a reasonable accommodation, aid, service,

opportunity or benefit that is necessary to enable the individual

to perform the essential functions of the position held or

desired, and cannot, as a result of that rejection, perform the

essential functions of the position, the individual will not be

considered a qualified individual with a disability.”). 

32

such a system is not reasonable. The Court concluded that an

employer’s showing of a violation of the system can be, by

itself, sufficient to support summary judgment.

The policy that defendant had in place here has goals

similar to those embodied in a seniority system: by limiting

transfers when an employee has noted discipline and performance

issues, defendant’s policy encourages employees to rectify

problems, promotes stability and continuity in supervisory

assignments, and limits disruptions caused when other employees

are required to accept the transferred employees assignments. 

The Court in U.S. Airways noted that a plaintiff may still be

able to show that violating the policy would be reasonable in the

particular case, including evidence that the policy was violated

routinely or had numerous exceptions. Plaintiff, however, has

failed to make such a showing here. As such, requiring defendant

to violate its stated policy against transferring employees with

performance problems would not be reasonable in this case.

The court finds that any break-down in the interactive

process can be attributed to plaintiff’s declination of

defendant’s offer to move her to a work station closer to

Clark,10 her delay in informing defendant that the accommodations

being offered were inadequate, and her repeated failure to

suggest alternative reasonable accommodations. Additionally,

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plaintiff has failed to identify a reasonable accommodation that

defendant did not grant. To the contrary, defendant provided

plaintiff with several adequate reasonable accommodations, at

least one of which plaintiff declined.

4. Hostile work environment

Plaintiff also claims that the defendant created a hostile

work environment in violation of the ADA. (Pl.’s Comp., at ¶ 34;

Pl.’s Opp’n., at 22-23.) In support of this argument, plaintiff

characterizes Clark’s complaints and criticism of plaintiff as

“harassment.” Id.

The Ninth Circuit has not held that a hostile work

environment claim is actionable under the ADA. See Brown v. City

of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating “[o]ur

court has not yet held that such a claim exists, let alone what

its source in the statute may be. We decline to do so here.”). 

Plaintiff fails to cite to any case law indicating otherwise. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n., at 22-23.) 

However, assuming arguendo that the Ninth Circuit would

recognize a hostile work environment claim under the ADA,

plaintiff still fails to establish such a claim. Using the

standard applicable to a claim under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, plaintiff must show that defendant’s conduct

was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of

the victim's employment and create an abusive working

environment.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-

22 (1993). “Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to

create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment – an

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environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or

abusive – is beyond Title VII's purview.” Id.

Plaintiff has not alleged conduct that is sufficiently

severe and pervasive to support a finding of an objectively

hostile or abusive work environment. See Li Li Manatt, 339 F.3d

at 798 (holding that racial jokes, ridicule of plaintiff’s

accent, and act of pulling eyes back to imitate or mock the

appearance of Asians were insufficient to create a hostile

working environment); Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 307 F.3d

884, 893 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding no hostile work environment

where employee was told that he had “a typical Hispanic macho

attitude,” that he should work in the field because “Hispanics do

good in the field” and where he was yelled at in front of

others); Kortan v. Cal. Youth Auth., 217 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th

Cir. 2000) (finding no hostile work environment where the

supervisor referred to females as “castrating bitches,”

“Madonnas,” or Regina, and referred to plaintiff as “Medea”). 

Plaintiff references only defendant’s criticism of her job

performance. The court finds that no reasonable person would find

such criticism to be objectively abusive. Additionally, as with

her retaliation and discrimination claims discussed above,

plaintiff has failed to establish that defendant’s allegedly

abusive conduct was because of plaintiff’s disability instead of

defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory concerns regarding her

poor performance.

D. Plaintiff’s ADA Claims Fail

Plaintiff has not met her burden of establishing a causal

connection between her termination and a retaliatory or

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discriminatory motive. Additionally, plaintiff has failed to

offer sufficient evidence that defendant failed to accommodate

plaintiff’s disability. Finally, even assuming that a hostile

work environment claim would be actionable under the ADA, the

actions complained of by plaintiff do not rise to the level of

severe and pervasive conduct creating an objectively abusive

environment. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment on all of plaintiff’s ADA claims is GRANTED.

II. Age Discrimination in Employment Act

Plaintiff also claims defendant violated the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et

seq., when it offered plaintiff an open paralegal position, but

at a lower salary than plaintiff was earning at the time. 

Plaintiff refused the position. Plaintiff alleges that six

months later, defendant hired a younger woman for the same job at

a higher salary than that offered to the plaintiff. Plaintiff

was on disability leave at the time defendant hired the new

paralegal. 

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claim on the ground

that she has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, as

required by the ADEA. The ADEA requires a person seeking relief

to first file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the

alleged unlawful employment practice, or, if the aggrieved person

initially instituted proceedings with the state or local

administrative agency (such as the California Department of Fair

Employment and Housing (DFEH)), within 300 days of the alleged

unlawful employment practice. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)-(d). 

“Failure to file a charge within these required time limits

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generally prevents a person from litigating the claim.” Sanchez

v. Pacific Powder Co., 147 F.3d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1998). A

plaintiff may litigate incidents not listed in the original

administrative complaint only if the acts are of “discrimination

like or reasonably related to the allegations of the EEOC charge,

including new acts occurring during the pendency of the charge

before the EEOC.” Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482

F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1973). 

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the DFEH and the EEOC on

October 18, 2004, alleging discrimination based solely upon

disability. (Miller Decl., Ex. A.) In this complaint, plaintiff

contended she “was denied an accommodation and retaliated against

. . . due to [her] disability.” Id. Plaintiff failed to assert

that the alleged discriminatory acts were based upon her age. 

Id. In fact, the discriminatory acts alleged in plaintiff’s EEOC

complaint relate back only to September 2003 and do not include

the defendant’s hiring of another person for the open paralegal

position in June 2002. Id.

Plaintiff concedes in her declaration and her opposition to

the instant motion that her ADEA claim is not based upon her

termination – the same discriminatory act complained of in her

October 2004 EEOC claim – but, rather, is based upon defendant’s

hiring of another person for the paralegal job in 2002. This

event is not raised at all in plaintiff’s EEOC complaint. Her

failure to file an EEOC complaint asserting her age

discrimination claim bars her from litigating such a claim under

the ADEA. Additionally, even if plaintiff had exhausted her

administrative remedies, she has failed to establish a prima

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11 Furthermore, defendant offers evidence of a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason for the lower salary offered to

plaintiff, in that the pay scale for legal secretaries was

generally higher than that for paralegals at the time plaintiff

was offered the job. (Baum Decl. ¶ 5.) Defendant’s evidence

that the new paralegal was hired only after a new partner joined

the firm, bringing with him a class action lawsuit, also

indicates that the higher salary offered to the new paralegal was

more likely the result of an acute need to fill the position

immediately than a discriminatory motive against plaintiff. (Id.

¶ 9.) 

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facie case of age discrimination related to this event, as she

proffers no evidence that the offer of a lower salary or

subsequent hiring of a younger woman were because of plaintiff’s

age.11 Thus, defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiff’s ADEA claim is GRANTED.

III. Breach of Contract and Breach of the Implied Covenant of

Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Plaintiff brings claims for breach of contract and breach of

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff

does not dispute that her employment was at-will. (PRDF ¶¶ 1-4.) 

Nor does she dispute that no written agreement existed between

her and defendant for continued employment. (Id.) Instead,

Plaintiff asserts that her at-will employment status is

“immaterial” to her breach of contract and breach of implied

covenant claims. (Id.) 

Plaintiff contends that, despite her at-will status, she

retained the right not to be terminated for an illegal purpose or

reason. To the extent that such a right was violated, however,

plaintiff’s claim would be one for wrongful termination in

violation of public policy, or retaliation in violation of an

express statute, rather than a contractual breach. 

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A claim for a breach of an employment contract requires the

actual existence of a contract, either written and oral. Guz v.

Bechtel, 24 Cal.4th 317, 337 (2000) (stating summary judgment is

proper “where the undisputed facts negate the existence or the

breach of the contract claimed”). Plaintiff has failed to

proffer any evidence that her employment was governed by a

contract between her and defendant and was anything other than an

at-will employment relationship. Absent any such employment

contract, there can also be no breach of the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing. This covenant “exists merely to

prevent one contracting party from unfairly frustrating the other

party’s right to receive the benefits of the agreement actually

made.” Id. at 349 (emphasis in original). Therefore, the

covenant “cannot be endowed with an existence independent of its

contractual underpinnings” and “cannot impose substantive duties

or limits on the contracting parties beyond those incorporated in

the specific terms of their agreement.” Id. at 349-50 (internal

citations omitted). Defendant’s motion for summary judgment of

plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract and breach of implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing are GRANTED.

IV. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy

Plaintiff also brings a claim for wrongful termination in

violation of public policy. Plaintiff relies on the same facts

and arguments for this claim as she does for her ADA retaliation

claim. Namely, plaintiff contends she was terminated in

retaliation for complaints and accommodation requests she made to

Kitzmann and Brown and that such retaliation is in violation of

public policy.

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An employer's discharge of an employee in violation of a

fundamental public policy embodied in a constitutional or

statutory provision can give rise to a tort action. Barton v.

New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 4th 1200, 1205

(1996). In order to sustain a claim of wrongful termination in

violation of public policy, plaintiff must prove that her

dismissal violated a policy that is fundamental, beneficial for

the public, and embodied in a statute or constitutional

provision. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1256

(1994) (citing Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1095

(1992)). Under California law, terminating an employee because

of her disability or in retaliation for complaining of

discriminatory conduct is sufficient to support a claim for

wrongful termination in violation of public policy. See City of

Moorpark v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 4 th 1143, 1158-61 (1998).

As discussed above under plaintiff’s ADA claims, however,

plaintiff has failed to establish retaliatory motive for her

termination. Specifically, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a

causal connection between her termination and her accommodation

requests and complaints to Kitzmann and Brown. She has not

offered sufficient evidence to dispute defendant’s legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. Accordingly,

defendant’s motion for summary judgment of plaintiff’s claim for

wrongful termination in violation of public policy is GRANTED.

E. Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendant requests the court to grant summary judgment on

plaintiff’s claims for intentional and negligent infliction of

emotional distress. It contends plaintiff failed to establish

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sufficient evidence of outrageous conduct and that plaintiff’s

claims are barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the

Workers Compensation Act, Cal. Labor Code §§ 3601-02.

 “The elements of a cause of action for intentional

infliction of emotional distress are (1) outrageous conduct by

the defendant; (2) emotional distress; (3) severe emotional

distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional

distress.” Fisher, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 617 (quoting Molko v.

Holy Spirit Assn., 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1120 (1986)). Where

plaintiff establishes a viable claim for discrimination,

retaliation, or harassment under the ADA, a claim of intentional

infliction of emotional distress will usually also lie because,

by definition, a “harassment in the workplace is outrageous

conduct as it exceeds all bounds of decency usually tolerated by

a decent society.” See id. Emotional injuries arising from such

discrimination and harassment are by nature outside the scope of

the employment relationship and thus are not precluded by the

exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. 

Taylor v. Beth Eden Baptist Church, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1080

(N.D. Cal. 2003) (citing Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 131 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 575 (2003) (holding that exclusivity did not apply to

claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against

employer based on allegation that employer had retaliated against

plaintiff for refusing to fire female sales associate who

plaintiff's supervisor thought was unattractive). 

However, where the conduct complained of is a normal part of

the employment relationship, such as criticism of an employee’s

performance, then a disability or injury arising from that

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conduct remains within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workers’

Compensation Act. Cal. Lab. Code § 3601; Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire

Protection District, 43 Cal.3d 148, 160-61 (1987). Emotional

distress injuries fall within the exclusive remedy provision of

Section 3601 unless the basic conditions of Section 3600 are not

met and the employer’s conduct contravenes fundamental public

policy or exceeds the risks inherent in the employment

relationship. Livitsanos v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 744, 815

(1992).

Plaintiff has not established any viable claims for

discrimination, retaliation or harassment under the ADA. Just as

defendant’s complaints, criticisms and subsequent reprimands and

termination fail to rise to the level of a severe and pervasive

hostile work environment, such actions also fail to rise to the

level of outrageous conduct and are nothing more than those

experienced in the normal course of an employment relationship. 

Plaintiff’s opposition cites to no case law and points to no

evidence in support of her contention that defendant’s conduct

was sufficiently outrageous or that such conduct falls outside

the scope of the WCA’s exclusive remedy provisions. (Pl.’s

Opp’n., at 35:15-21.) Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s claims for intentional and

negligent infliction of emotional distress is GRANTED.

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12 Because summary judgment has been granted with respect

to all the claims set forth in the complaint, the court need not

separately address defendant’s motion with respect to plaintiff’s

claim for punitive damages. As plaintiff has no viable

substantive claim against defendant, she has no claim for any

damages against defendant.

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CONCLUSION12

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication is GRANTED. 

The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 2, 2007

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