Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-13-04096/USCOURTS-ca2-13-04096-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
International Business Machines Corporation
Appellee
Alfred J. Noll
Appellant

Document Text:

13‐4096‐cv

Noll v. International Business Machines Corp.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term, 2014

(Argued: October 8, 2014      Decided: May 21, 2015)

Docket No. 13‐4096‐cv

‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐x

ALFRED J. NOLL,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

‐ v.‐

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES

CORPORATION,

Defendant‐Appellee.

‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐x

Before: JACOBS, SACK, and DRONEY, Circuit Judges.

Alfred J. Noll appeals from the judgment of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York (Baer, J.), granting summary

judgment in favor of International Business Machines Corp. (“IBM”). Noll

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contends that IBM refused to reasonably accommodate his deafness when it

declined to caption all the videos and provide transcripts of all the audio files

that are hosted on its corporate intranet, in violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act and the New York State Human Rights Law.  We conclude that

(I) IBM reasonably accommodated Noll by providing American Sign Language

interpreters capable of translating intranet files, and (II) in light of this

accommodation, Noll has no claim that IBM failed to engage him in an

interactive process.  Affirmed.

Judge Sack dissents in a separate opinion.

EUGENE FELDMAN (Michael A.

Schwartz, Disability Rights Clinic, Syracuse

University College of Law, Syracuse, New

York, on the brief), Law Office of Eugene

Feldman, Hermosa Beach, California, for

Plaintiff‐Appellant.

WILLIS J. GOLDSMITH (Karen Rosenfield,

on the brief), Jones Day, New York, New

York, for Defendant‐Appellee.

DENNIS JACOBS, Circuit Judge:

Alfred J. Noll, a software engineer, sued his employer for disability

discrimination, alleging that International Business Machines Corp. (“IBM”) did

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not accommodate his deafness by arranging that all video files stored on its

corporate intranet be captioned when posted and that all audio files likewise be

posted with transcripts.  Noll asserts claims under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112, and the New York State Human

Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, and appeals from the judgment

of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Baer,

J.), dismissing those claims on summary judgment.  The district court held that

IBM reasonably accommodated Noll by providing American Sign Language

(“ASL”) interpreters capable of translating files at Noll’s request and that, in light

of this accommodation, Noll has no claim that IBM failed to engage him in an

interactive process.

On appeal, Noll argues (I) that the district court overlooked portions of the

record creating a factual dispute about the effectiveness of ASL interpreters (and

hence, whether they were a reasonable accommodation), and (II) that IBM is

liable for failure to engage in an interactive process regardless of whether it

provided reasonable accommodation.  We affirm.

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BACKGROUND

Noll, who is deaf, has worked as a software engineer at IBM since 1984,

enjoying consistently positive performance reviews.  In performing his work,

Noll uses several accommodations provided by IBM, including on‐site and

remote ASL interpreters, as well as measures described as “communication

access real‐time translation (‘CART’), internet based real‐time transcription, and

video relay services.”  Noll is active on behalf of IBM employees who are deaf

and hearing‐impaired, and helped develop many of the company’s

accommodations for that group.

IBM maintains a corporate intranet for its approximately 440,000

employees worldwide.  Content ranges from official management messages to

educational and training resources to such personal material as employees’

vacation photos.  The intranet hosts a huge volume of video and audio files in a

number of locations, and thousands of files are continuously being uploaded.

IBM’s Media Library alone stores over 46,000 video files (and over 35,000 audio

files), of which only about 100 videos are captioned.

From 2003 to 2008, Noll frequently asked the Persons with Disabilities

program manager at IBM for captioning of particular intranet videos or

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transcripts of audio files.  On these occasions, IBM typically provided Noll with

transcripts (of both video and audio files) rather than on‐screen captioning.

However, the process of obtaining transcripts was imperfect: although transcripts

were generally made available within five days of Noll’s request, they

occasionally took longer, and links to transcripts were sometimes broken.

During the relevant period, Noll also had access to ASL interpreters who

provided real‐time translation services, either on‐site or remotely, for intranet

content as well as for live meetings.  The process by which IBM employees at the

Poughkeepsie office (where Noll worked) could request and get ASL interpreters

was coordinated by Noll.

Noll, who is fluent in ASL, regularly used the interpreters when he

attended live meetings, and found them to be effective.  Noll disliked using ASL

interpreters for videos because he found it “confusing and tiring” to look back

and forth between the video and the interpreter.

Noll filed this action on August 15, 2012, alleging that IBM discriminated

against him on the basis of his disability, in violation of the ADA and the

NYSHRL, by refusing to provide the accommodation he demanded: that, at the

time they are posted, all intranet videos be captioned and all audio files have

5

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transcripts.  Following discovery, IBM moved for summary judgment on June 18,

2013, arguing, among other things, that (1) the accommodations it provided‐‐

including ASL interpreters‐‐were plainly reasonable, and (2) Noll’s request that

all videos be captioned and all audio files be transcribed was prima facie

unreasonable.  The district court granted IBM’s motion on the ground that IBM

reasonably accommodated Noll by providing ASL interpreters.  The court also

rejected Noll’s claim that IBM failed to engage in an interactive process,

reasoning that such a claim cannot be maintained if the employer provided

reasonable accommodation.

On appeal, Noll argues that (I) the district court ignored evidence in the

record creating a genuine dispute about the effectiveness of IBM’s

accommodations, and (II) an employer’s failure to engage in an interactive

process suffices for a disability discrimination claim, even if reasonable

accommodation was made.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment.  Mario v.

P & C Food Markets, Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 763 (2d Cir. 2002).  Summary judgment

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must be granted if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “[I]n

assessing the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any

material fact, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual

inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.”

Chambers v. TRM Copy Centers Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1994).  A genuine

issue of material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law” and as to which “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

I

The ADA and the NYSHRL require an employer to afford reasonable

accommodation of an employee’s known disability unless the accommodation

would impose an undue hardship on the employer.  42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A);

N.Y. Exec. L. 296(3)(a).  To maintain a claim under either statute, an employee

must show that: “(1) [he] is a person with a disability under the meaning of the

ADA; (2) an employer covered by the statute had notice of his disability; (3) with

reasonable accommodation, [the employee] could perform the essential functions

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of the job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused to make such

accommodations.”  McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., Inc., 583 F.3d 92,

97 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Graves v. Finch

Pruyn & Co., Inc., 457 F.3d 181, 184 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006) (“A claim of disability

discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law . . . is governed by

the same legal standards as govern federal ADA claims.”).  The only issue

disputed in this case is whether IBM has refused to provide reasonable

accommodations.  Noll concedes that IBM provided him with transcripts and

ASL interpreters, but argues that those accommodations were unreasonable.  

The reasonableness of an employer’s accommodation is a “fact‐specific”

question that often must be resolved by a factfinder.  See Wernick v. Fed. Reserve

Bank of N.Y., 91 F.3d 379, 385 (2d Cir. 1996).  But in a case such as this, in which

the employer has already taken (or offered) measures to accommodate the

disability, the employer is entitled to summary judgment if, on the undisputed

record, the existing accommodation is “plainly reasonable.”  Id.  In other words,

the plain reasonableness of the existing accommodation ends the analysis.  There

is no need to engage in further burden‐shifting to consider whether the

employee’s requested accommodation would have been reasonable.  See U.S.

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Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400‐02 (2002); Borkowski v. Valley Cent.

School Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 137‐38 (2d Cir. 1995).

A reasonable accommodation is one that “enable[s] an individual with a

disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position . . .

[or] to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment.”  29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(o)(1)(ii), (iii).  Noll does not dispute that the accommodations provided

enabled him to perform the essential functions of his position.  Noll’s claim is

that immediate access to all video and audio postings on IBM’s intranet was a

benefit or privilege of employment, like a parking space, health insurance, or a

locker.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (“The obligation to make reasonable

accommodation applies to all services and programs provided in connection

with employment, and to all non‐work facilities provided or maintained by an

employer for use by its employees[,] . . . [including] employer provided

cafeterias, lounges, gymnasiums, auditoriums, transportation and the like.”).  We

will assume that is so for the purpose of this appeal.1

    

     1 Noll seizes on a single sentence to argue that the district court deemed

IBM’s accommodations sufficient because they enabled him to perform his job,

and that the court thus failed to consider whether full access to the intranet was a

benefit or privilege of employment.  We disagree.  The district court, which cited

and quoted the relevant language of 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(o), clearly considered

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Reasonable accommodation may take many forms, but it must be effective.

Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400 (“It is the word ‘accommodation,’ not the word

‘reasonable,’ that conveys the need for effectiveness.  An ineffective ‘modification’

or ‘adjustment’ will not accommodate a disabled individual’s limitations.”); see

also Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 139.  At the same time, employers are not required to

provide a perfect accommodation or the very accommodation most strongly

preferred by the employee.  29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (“[Although] the preference of

the individual with a disability should be given primary consideration[,] . . . the

employer providing the accommodation has the ultimate discretion to choose

between effective accommodations, and may choose the less expensive

accommodation or the accommodation that is easier for it to provide.” (emphasis

added)); cf. Fink v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Personnel, 53 F.3d 565, 567 (2d Cir. 1995)

(“[The Rehabilitation Act] does not require the employer to provide every

accommodation the disabled employee may request, so long as the

benefits and privileges.  In any event, the decisive analysis does not turn on a

distinction between work‐related intranet content, such as educational or training

videos, and more informal or personal content.

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accommodation provided is reasonable.”).2

  All that is required is effectiveness.

The summary judgment record establishes that IBM provided Noll with

several accommodations.  He had access to ASL interpreters, received transcripts

upon request, and could view certain videos (such as the CEO’s Annual

Broadcast) with captioning.  Noll argues that the transcripts were inadequate

because they were occasionally subject to delays (though most were provided

within five days), and that captioning appeared on only a few of IBM’s videos.

While there may be disputes of fact as to the timeliness and adequacy of those

accommodations, there is no dispute that the ASL interpreters were available to

Noll whenever he wished to view a video or access an audio file,3 and that they

translated in real‐time.  They were available both on‐site and remotely.  And Noll

himself helped coordinate interpreter requests (including selection of individual

     2 “[U]nless one of those subtle distinctions [between the ADA and the

Rehabilitation Act] is pertinent to a particular case, we treat claims under the two

statutes identically.”  Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 272 (2d Cir. 2003).

     3 Noll objects that although ASL interpreters were provided on demand,

they were not provided until video or audio files had already been posted.  That

is an odd objection.  The relevant question is whether there was appreciable

delay between when Noll wanted to access a video or audio file and when he

received such access through an interpreter.  There is no evidence that such a

delay ever occurred: qualified interpreters were available, either on‐site or

remotely, on demand.

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interpreters) at IBM’s Poughkeepsie office, where he worked.  There is no

evidence that the interpreters were unqualified or failed to translate fully and

accurately.  Noll concedes that he regularly used interpreters for work meetings

at IBM and found their services to be effective.

Noll nevertheless insists that there is a genuine question of material fact as

to the effectiveness of ASL interpreters for intranet videos.  First, Noll cites his

own deposition testimony that he found ASL interpreters to be “not as effective”

as captioning.  No genuine material question is raised by that testimony because

the law requires an effective accommodation, not the one that is most effective for

each employee.  Moreover, a pure legal conclusion‐‐whether ASL interpreters

were effective‐‐is entitled to no weight at summary judgment. See Patterson v.

Cnty. of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 219 (2d Cir. 2004).  

Second, Noll cites his affidavit, which says he could not “simultaneously

watch the interpreter and the video” because it was “too confusing and tiring [to

switch] back and forth between the interpreter and the screen.”  Although we

credit Noll’s assertion that it was “tiring and confusing” to divide his visual

attention between interpreters and his screen, this disadvantage does not render

interpretive services ineffective.  A person who is deaf necessarily receives

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auditory information from the other senses (principally, sight); so it can be

expected that many accommodations of deafness‐‐ASL interpretive services as

well as captioning‐‐will tax visual attention to some degree.4

  An accommodation

for deafness therefore cannot be rendered ineffective by the need to divide visual

attention, without more.  Cf. Fink, 53 F.3d at 567 (“[The reasonable

accommodation requirement] does not require the perfect elimination of all

disadvantage that may flow from the disability.”).  We do not doubt that the

need to split visual focus was a disadvantage that likely tired or annoyed Noll.

We hold nevertheless that, in this case, the disadvantage did not render IBM’s

accommodations ineffective.5

     4 According to Noll’s own expert, Dr. Jeff B. Pelz, persons with deafness

who watch captioned videos use their peripheral vision to rapidly “sample”

information from the video and the captions.  Dr. Pelz opines that this technique

is very difficult with transcripts (which, unlike captions, do not provide

information in real time), but does not address ASL interpretation (which, like

captions, does provide real‐time information).  Likewise, the affidavit from Dr.

Paul K. Miller addresses the limitations of transcripts, but does not address the

effectiveness of real‐time ASL interpretation.

     5 The dissent acknowledges that a reasonable accommodation need not

eliminate all disadvantage stemming from disability, but then says that a trial is

needed to decide whether ASL interpreters constitute any mitigation at all.

Dissenting Op. at 5.  The record confirms the obvious conclusion that Noll’s only

objection is that ASL interpretation is not optimal and does not obviate all

disadvantage of deafness.  

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Our holding is reinforced by two considerations.  First, the term

“reasonable accommodation” is defined by regulation to include “the provision

of qualified readers or interpreters.”  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii).  Per se rules are

unreliable in the disability context, so ASL interpretive services may not always

constitute a reasonable accommodation.  But according to the regulations,

interpreters are a common form of reasonable accommodation.  See 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630 app. (“Part 1630 lists the examples, specified in title I of the ADA, of the

most common types of accommodation that an employer or other covered entity

may be required to provide.”).

Second, Noll concedes that ASL interpreters were effective for live business

meetings.  There is no evidence that live meetings were somehow less visually

demanding or that Noll had to shift his eyes a shorter distance.  At meetings, just

as with videos, Noll would need to watch the interpreter while simultaneously

looking elsewhere to observe the facial expressions and gestures of the speaker,

identify who was speaking, and follow any visual aids.  Noll does not explain

why an accommodation that was effective in the one context was ineffective in

the other.  At the summary judgment stage, Noll was required to adduce

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evidence of a decisive difference.6

  He has not done so.

Circumstances can be conceived in which the provision of interpreters

would be less obviously reasonable, or even plainly unreasonable, as when

technical material cannot be fully and accurately communicated by ASL.  See U.S.

E.E.O.C. v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, 620 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 2010)

(noting the lack of a “one‐to‐one correspondence” between ASL and English).

And not every person who is deaf or hard of hearing is able to understand ASL.

Logistical constraints arising out of the job itself might also make ASL

interpretation infeasible or unwieldy.  But a record would be required to

document such extraordinary circumstances.

     6 The dissent speculates that attending a meeting does not engage “the same

visual and cognitive processes as watching a video,” Dissenting Op. at 6, and

assumes (oddly) that the visual and cognitive challenges are less (rather than

greater) in the meeting context.  There is, however, no evidence of such a

difference anywhere in the record.  Although the nonmoving party is entitled to

have inferences drawn in his favor at summary judgment, such inferences must

be supported by record evidence.  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (“[T]here is no issue

for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury

to return a verdict for that party.” (emphasis added)).  Of course, the moving

party bears the burden of showing an absence of material fact in the first place.

Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1‐800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004).  IBM

satisfied that burden by showing that the same ASL interpreters Noll considered

effective for meetings were provided for videos.

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In this case, Noll was fluent in ASL, and there is no evidence that the

interpreters IBM provided were unqualified or that the use of interpreters was

somehow inconsistent with Noll’s position as a software engineer.  Noll’s sole

objection‐‐that he had to look back and forth between an interpreter and his

screen‐‐did not, without more, make that accommodation unreasonable.7

Because we affirm on this basis, we do not consider IBM’s alternative

argument that Noll’s proposed accommodation was prima facie unreasonable.

II

“To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be

necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with

the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(o)(3).  Noll contends that IBM failed to engage in such a process, and

advances an argument that this failure gave rise to an independent cause of

     7 The dissent argues that “what works for some or even most individuals

with similar disabilities may not work for all.”  Dissenting Op. at 6.  However,

Noll’s sole objection to ASL interpreters is that he has to look back and forth, and

that is a disadvantage that is inherent in the nature of that (sufficient)

accommodation.

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action.8

  We disagree.

“The ADA envisions an ‘interactive process’ by which employers and

employees work together to assess whether an employee’s disability can be

reasonably accommodated.”  Jackan v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Labor, 205 F.3d 562, 566

(2d Cir. 2000) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)); see also Lovejoy‐Wilson v. NOCO

Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 218‐19 (2d Cir. 2001).  At the same time, we have

held that “failure to engage in an interactive process does not form the basis of an

ADA claim in the absence of evidence that accommodation was possible.”

McBride, 583 F.3d at 100‐01.  That is because “the ADA imposes liability for . . .

discriminatory refusal to undertake a feasible accommodation, not mere refusal

to explore possible accommodations where, in the end, no accommodation was

possible.”  Id. at 100.  

We conclude that the corollary is also sound: the ADA imposes no liability

for an employer’s failure to explore alternative accommodations when the

     8 Noll argues variously that (1) IBM’s failure to engage in an interactive

process was unlawful given its failure to reasonably accommodate him, and

(2) IBM was required to engage in an interactive process regardless of whether it

provided reasonable accommodation.  Because we conclude, for reasons already

discussed, that IBM reasonably accommodated Noll, we need only address the

second argument.

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accommodations provided to the employee were plainly reasonable.  The point

of engaging in an interactive process is to “discover[] a means by which an

employee’s disability could have been accommodated.”  McBride, 583 F.3d at

101.  As our sister circuits have concluded, the interactive process is not required

when the end it is designed to serve‐‐reasonable accommodation‐‐has already

been achieved.  See Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000)

(“To hold employers liable for the failure of an interactive process regardless of

whether a reasonable accommodation was made would not serve the underlying

purposes of the ADA, and would, contrary to our own precedent, elevate the

ADA’s interactive process requirement to an end in itself.”); Hohider v. United

Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 193‐94 (3d Cir. 2009); Walter v. United Airlines,

Inc., 232 F.3d 892, 2000 WL 1587489, at *5 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table

opinion).  Because IBM provided reasonable accommodation to Noll, any failure

to engage in an interactive process‐‐even if supported by the record‐‐did not give

rise to a discrimination claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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