Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-05028/USCOURTS-ca10-92-05028-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Renaldo J. Gamble
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I L -"- iJ 

TENTH CIRCUIT United States ~rt of Ap~a\s 

RENALDO J. GAMBLE, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

Tenth Cu-cult 

MARO l 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-5028 

(N.D. Okla., No. 89-CR-101-B) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, Circuit Judge, Barrett, Senior Circuit Judge, and 

EBEL, Circuit Judge.** 

In this prose appeal, the petitioner is challenging the 

district court's denial of his writ of habeas corpus. Pursuant to 

a plea agreement dated October 10, 1989, the petitioner pleaded 

guilty to a single charge of conspiracy to possess with the intent 

to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine-base in violation of 

§§846, 841(a) (1), 84l{b) (1) {A) {iii), and 853. The petitioner was 

sentenced to 96 months imprisonment, to be followed by 60 months 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case , 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34{a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 92-5028 Document: 010110176485 Date Filed: 03/01/1993 Page: 1 
of supervised release. The petitioner appealed his sentence to 

this court, alleging that the United States Attorney had advised 

him that he would not receive a prison sentence in excess of four 

years . In our decision of October 29, 1990, we rejected the 

petitioner's appeal, concluding that the clear and unambiguous 

language of the plea agreement negated the petitioner's claim that 

the government had promised him any maximum sentence. See United 

States v. Gamble, 917 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir. 1990}. 

The petitioner subsequently filed this habeas action in the 

United States District Court for the Northern District of 

Oklahoma, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255. The petitioner alleged 

that his attorney instructed him to lie when asked by the trial 

judge whether he had been given any promises by the prosecution, 

and that this instruction amounted to ineffective assistance of 

counsel. The district court rejected the petitioner's claim on 

the grounds that it raised the same issue previously rejected by 

this court on direct review. On appeal, the petitioner argues 

that the district court misconstrued his habeas petition and 

should have granted him an evidentiary hearing. Because the 

petitioner failed to file a timely notice of appeal, however, we 

find that we are without jurisdiction to reach these claims. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the petitioner's appeal should be 

dismissed. 

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a} (1) requires a notice 

of appeal in a habeas proceeding against the United States to be 

filed within 60 days after the date of entry of the judgment or 

order appealed from. Rule 4(a) (5) permits the district court, 

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Appellate Case: 92-5028 Document: 010110176485 Date Filed: 03/01/1993 Page: 2 
upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, to extend the 

time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later 

than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by Rule 

4 (a ) (1 ) . 

Here, the district court entered its summary judgment order 

on September 23, 1991 and the petitioner filed his notice of 

appeal on January 27, 1992. Accordingly, the petitioner's appeal 

was filed beyond the 60-day period specified in Rule 4(a) (1 ). 

Since the petitioner never filed a motion to extend, his notice of 

appeal was thus untimely . 

The petitioner argues that the time for filing a notice of 

appeal should have been tolled because he was not informed of the 

1 district court's judgment until January 21, 1992. However, 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) states that "lack of notice 

of entry [of an order or judgment] by the clerk does not affect 

the time to appeal or relieve or authorize the court to relieve a 

party for failure to appeal within the time allowed." This rule 

"plainly charges the prospective appellant with the duty of 

following the progress of the action and advising himself when the 

court makes the order he wishes to protest." Lathrop v. Oklahoma 

City Housing Authority. 438 F.2d 914, 915 (10th Cir.) , cert. 

denied, 404 U.S. 840 (1971) (quoting Long v. Emecy, 383 F .2d 392, 

394 (10th Cir. 1967)). 

1 The petitioner argues that the court erroneously sent notice of 

the court's judgment to his former attorney who failed to forward 

the notice to him in jail. 

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While two narrow exceptions serve to limit the operation of 

Rule 77 (d ), neither of these exceptions are applicable in the 

i nstant case. First, an appellant who fails to receive notice of 

the entry of the district court's judgment may seek to vacate the 

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (1 ) on the 

grounds of excusable neglect. Senjuro v. Murray, 943 F.2d 36, 38 

(10th Cir. 1991); see Wallace v. McManus, 776 F.2d 915, 917 (10th 

Cir. 1985 ) ; Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 458 -59 (9th Cir. 1983 ) 

(en bane ) . Second, an appellant may file an untimely notice of 

appeal if the appellant's failure to notify himself of the entry 

of judgment was induced by the actions or statements of the court. 

Senjuro, 943 F.2d at 38; see Thompson v. INS, 375 U. S. 384, 385-

387 (1964); Stauber v. Kaiser, 810 F.2d 1, 1-2 (10th Cir. 1982 ) . 

In the instant case, the petitioner never filed a motion to vacate 

the district court's judgment under Rule 60(b) (1 ) and the one-year 

time limit on filing such a motion has elapsed. 2 Nor has the 

petitioner presented any evidence that he detrimentally relied on 

any statements or actions of the district court in failing to 

notify himself of the court's judgment. Thus, we conclude that 

2 Although the petitioner filed his notice of appeal within the 

one-year time limit required by Rule 60(b) (1), we do not believe 

we may treat this notice of appea l as a 60(b) (1) motion. In 

Mayfield v. United States Parole Commission, 647 F.2d 1 053 , 1055 

(10th Cir. 1981), we rejected the argument that a prose 

petitioner's notice of appeal should be treated as a motion for an 

extension of time. We stated that the rule governing such 

extensions "clearly demands judicial i nvolvement in the 

determination that excusable neglect does exist, whereas the 

acceptance of a notice of appeal for filing is a mere clerical 

function." Id. (quoting United States v. Lucas, 597 F. 2d 243, 

245 (10th Cir. 1979)). We believe the same reasoning applies in 

the instant case. 

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the petitioner's failure to learn of the judgment did not t oll his 

time for filing a notice of appeal. 

The new amendment to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 

4(a) (6) does not require a contrary conclusion. This amendment 

provides: 

The district court, if it finds (a) that a party 

entitled to notice of the entry of a judgment order did 

not receive such notice from the clerk or any party 

within 21 days of its entry and (b) that no party would 

be prejudiced, may, upon motion filed within 180 days of 

entry o f the judgment or order or within 7 days of 

receipt of such notice, whichever is earlier, reopen the 

time for appeal ... 

However, this amendment only governs those appeals which were 

pending on, or commenced after, December 1, 1991 . See Order 

of the Supreme Court, 111 S. Ct. 1011 (April 30, 1991). In 

the instant case, the 60-day period provided by Rule 4 (a ) (1 ) 

for the filing of a notice of appeal expired on November 22 , 

1991. After this date, petitioner's appeal was no longer 

pending. While the petitioner had an additional 30 days 

during which to revive his appeal by filing a motion to 

extend, he never filed such a motion. Consequently, the 

petitioner's appeal does not come within the purview of Rule 

4 (a) (6) as amended. 

We recognize that prose pleadings are to be interpreted 

liberally. See Haines v . Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); 

Hall v. Belman, 935 F . 2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). 

However, this rule may only be applied to remedy inartful 

pleading; it does not permit us to ignore the time 

constraints imposed by Rule 4(a). See Fed. R. App. P . 26(b) 

(court of appeals "may not enlarge the time for filing a 

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Appellate Case: 92-5028 Document: 010110176485 Date Filed: 03/01/1993 Page: 5 
notice of appeal"); Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 

312, 317 (1988) (requirements of Rule 4 may not be waived 

even under a liberal reading of the Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure). These time constraints are "mandatory 

and jurisdictional." Senjuro, 943 F.2d at 37 (10th Cir. 

1991) (quoting Browder v. Department of Corrections, 434 U.S. 

257, 264 (1978)). Accordingly, we conclude that the 

petitioner's notice of appeal was not timely filed and that 

his appeal must be dismissed. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

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