Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06622/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06622-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cheryl Pliler
Respondent
Jason Martinez Vargas
Petitioner

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON MARTINEZ VARGAS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

CHERYL PLILER, )

)

Respondent. )

)

___________________________________ )

CV F 03-6622 OWW WMW HC

FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS RE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner was convicted in Kern County Superior Court of four counts of robbery. 

The jury also found the gang enhancements and personal firearm enhancements to be true.

The court sentenced Petitioner to serve a term of 29 years and 4 months in prison.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal for the Fifth

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Appellant District (“Court of Appeal”), which affirmed the judgment. Petitioner filed a

petition for review with the California Supreme Court, which the court denied.

On April 15, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Kern

County Superior Court. The court denied the petition on May 14, 2003, on the merits and

with a citation to In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 303-304 (1949).

On June 16, 2003, Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus with the

Kern County Superior Court. The court denied the petition on the merits and as successive

with a citation to In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 768 (1993). 

On August 4, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Court of

Appeal. The court denied the petition by way of a silent denial on August 28, 2003. On

September 23, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. The court denied this petition by way of a silent denial on June 30, 2004.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The court finds the Court of Appeal correctly summarized the facts in its opinion. 

Thus, the court adopts the factual recitations set forth by the Court of Appeal

LEGAL STANDARD

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or

laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams

v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of

his rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction

challenged arises out of the Kern County Superior Court, which is located within the

jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly, the court has

jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

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Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after

its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied,

522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9

th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107,

117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117

S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). 

The instant petition was filed on November 12, 2003, after the enactment of the AEDPA,

thus it is governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply

with respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court.

Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for

habeas corpus will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123

S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v.

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). 

“A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather, that

application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

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While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the

state court’s factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must

accept all factual findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1);

Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99,

116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9

th Cir. 1997). 

EXHAUSTION

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his

conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives

the state court the initial opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy,

455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9

th

Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state

court with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal

court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given

a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state

court with the claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct.

887, 888 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719

(1992) (factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court

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that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at

888; Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9

th Cir.1998). For example, if a petitioner

wishes to claim that the trial court violated his due process rights “he must say so, not only in

federal court but in state court.” Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. A general

appeal to a constitutional guarantee is insufficient to present the "substance" of such a

federal claim to a state court. See, Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 (1982)

(Exhaustion requirement not satisfied circumstance that the "due process ramifications" of an

argument might be "self-evident."); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct.

1074 (1996) (“a claim for relief in habeas corpus must include reference to a specific federal

constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts which entitle the petitioner to

relief.”).

If the California Supreme Court’s opinion is summary in nature, this court "looks

through" that decision and presumes it adopted the reasoning of thelast state court to have

issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n. 3, 111 S.Ct.

2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (establishing, on habeas review, "look through" presumption

that higher court agrees with lower court's reasoning where former affirms latter without

discussion); see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n. 7 (9th Cir.2000) (holding

federal courts look to last reasoned state court opinion in determining whether state court's

rejection of petitioner's claims was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law

under § 2254(d)(1)). 

DISCUSSION

1. Application of Section 12022.53(b) and 186.22(b)(1) as Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Petitioner contends that the imposition of a 13 1/3 year sentence enhancement under

Penal Code Section 12022.53(b) (enhancement for personal use of a firearm) and an

additional 10 year consecutive sentence under Penal Code Section 186.22(b)(1) (gang

enhancement) violates the Federal and State Constitutional prohibitions against cruel and

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1Claims regarding violations of the California Constitution are not cognizable on federal

habeas corpus. Title 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(a) authorizes federal courts to grant habeas corpus

relief only for violations of federal law. Accordingly, this court will address only Petitioner’s

federal Constitutional claim.

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unusual punishment. Respondent disputes this contention.1

This contention was raised and rejected on direct appeal, and the Court of Appeal was

the last court to issue a reasoned decision addressing it. In rejecting this contention, the

Court of Appeal cited and discussed Rummel v. Estelle 445 U.S. 263 (1980), and Solem v.

Helm, 463 U.S. (1983), and Harmelin v.Michigan, 502 U.S. 957 (1991). In Harmelin, 

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter, stated that a noncapital sentence

could violate the Eighth Amendment if it was “grossly disproportionate” to the crime, but

concluded that courts need not examine the second and third factors of intrajurisdictional and

interjurisdictional reviews discussed in Solem, unless “a threshold comparison of the crime

committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.” Id. at

1005. The Ninth Circuit, adopting Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Harmelin, now

refers to the test articulated as “the rule of Harmelin.” Andrade v. Attorney General of the

State of California, 270 F.3d 743, 756 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The majority of the justices in the Harmelin court agreed that outside capital

punishment, deeming a sentence cruel and unusual punishment is “exceedingly rare” due to

the lack of objective guidelines for terms of imprisonment. Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957, 964,

111 S.Ct. 2680 (1991). The threshold for such an inference of disproportionality is high. 

See, Id. at 1001, 111 S.Ct. at 2707 (Kennedy, J. concurring). Generally, so long as the

sentence imposed by the state court does not exceed statutory maximums, the sentence will

not be considered cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. United

States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 576 (9th Cir. 1990). 

In this case, the Court of Appeal found as follows:

As in Harmelin, we do not find that the sentence in this case leads to an

inference of gross disproportionality, and thus conclude there is no Eighth

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Amendment violation. The defendant in Harmelin was convicted of a single count of

possession of cocaine for sale and was sentenced to a term of life in prison without

the possibility of parole. Vargas was convicted of four counts of armed robbery for

the benefit of a criminal street gang. He was sentenced to prison for 29 years and 4

months and will be eligible for parole in approximately 25 years. Neither case

involved injury to another, although Vargas’ use of a handgun increased the potential

for injury.

Exhibit G.

This court finds Petitioner has presented nothing demonstrating that the Court of

Appeal’s decision “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). Accordingly, the court finds no basis for habeas corpus relief based on this

contention.

2. Sections 12022.53(b) and 186.22(b)(1) as violative of due process and equal protection

Petitioner contends that Penal Code Section 12022.53(b) (enhancement for personal

use of a firearm) does not rationally serve a legitimate state interest when it results in the

unreasonably disparate punishment of the same type of offenders whose only distinction is

the difference in their weapon of choice. He argues that this is more so where Section

12022.53 requires an unduly harsher sentence of ten more years regardless of whether the

firearm was discharged or injury occurred. Petitioner claims that the application of the

statute is irrationally harsh compared to other statutes covering the same conduct, and it’s

disparity becomes more apparent when Penal Code Section 186.22(b)(1) enters the equation.

Respondent disputes this contention.

This contention was addressed and rejected by the Court of Appeal on direct appeal. 

The Court of Appeal, the last court to issue a reasoned opinion on the contention, stated in

part as follows:

Nor does Vargas [fare] any better if we consider the merits of what it appears

he is arguing. The equal protection clauses of both the state and federal Constitutions

protect similarly situated individuals from disparate treatment by the state. (People v.

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Alvarez (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1114-1115.) Vargas makes no effort to inform

this court to what group he belongs or how he is treated unequally.

We can infer from his arguments that he asserts that other criminals who do

not use a gun while committing crimes are treated more leniently. However, Alvarez

rejected this argument, finding that there was a compelling state interest for treating a

defendant who used a gun differently from those who did not. (People v. Alvarez,

supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1116-1118.)

The mandatory nature of the enhancement, the claimed disproportionality

with other sentencing statutes, and the claimed discretion provided to the prosecutor

all do not implicate due process concerns. Moreover, each of these arguments has

been rejected in similar contexts. (People v. Zepeda [(20010], supra, 87 Cal.App.4th

[1183] at pp. 1214-1215 [§§12022.53 was not cruel and unusual because it was

mandatory in nature and did not consider mitigating factors]; People v. Martinez

[(1999)], supra, 76 Cal.App.4th [489] at p. 495 [§ 12022.53 recognizes gradations in

culpability since use of a firearm is punished less severely than discharge and

discharge causing great bodily injury]; People v. Gonzalez (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1,

14-18 [prosecutorial discretion in charging enhancement did not violate equal

protection clause and disproportionality does not cause the section to violate Eighth

Amendment].])

Nor is there any merit to Vargas’s due process challenge. Due process

requires fundamental fairness in the criminal procedures by which a defendant is

convicted of a crime. (United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal (1982) 458 U.S. 858, 872; 

Spencer v. Texas (1967) 385 U.S. 554, 563-564.) With the possible exception of the

argument that the statute presents the prosecutor with excess charging discretion,

Vargas does not identify any procedure that resulted in a conviction that was

fundamentally unfair. Instead, the focus is on the mantra that the length of the

sentence is unfair. A lengthy sentence does not mean that the procedure by which it

was imposed was fundamentally unfair. 

Exhibit G, 10-12.

The court finds that this analysis is a reasonable application of Supreme Court

precedent. The Supreme Court has held that the equal protection clause means “that no State

shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, which is

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of

Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254 (1985);

Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1997). The first step in any equal

protection analysis is to identify petitioner’s classification or group. Freeman v. City of

Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1995). Petitioner must show that the law has been

applied in a discriminatory manner on him or imposes different burdens on different groups. 

Id.; Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir. 1988). The second step requires the

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court to determine the level of scrutiny with which the court should review the statute. 

Freeman, 68 F.3d at 1187. Discrimination on the basis of race or national origin and

discrimination that affects fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. Clark v. Jeter, 486

U.S. 456, 461, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 1914 (1988).

In this case, Petitioner has done nothing to challenge the Court of Appeal’s findings

that he did not inform the court to which group he belongs or how he is treated unequally. 

Thus, there is no basis for further analysis regarding Petitioner’s equal protection claim.

Similarly, there is no basis for further analysis of Petitioner’s due process claim when

Petitioner has failed to identify any procedure in connection with his conviction that was

fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, the court must conclude that Petitioner has failed to

carry his burden of demonstrating that the Court of Appeal’s opinion “resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The court finds no basis for

habeas corpus relief based on this contention.

3. Application of Penal Code Section 186.22(b)(1)

Petitioner contends that the application of the Section 186.22(b)(1) criminal street

gang enhancement should be stayed in this case pursuant to Section 654, which prohibits

double punishment. This claim is not cognizable in the present petition. Habeas corpus

relief is not available to correct alleged errors in the state court's application or interpretation

of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480 (1991); Middleton

v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1084-85 (9th Cir.1985). Title 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(a) authorizes

federal courts to grant habeas corpus relief only for violations of federal law. Accordingly,

this contention presents no basis for habeas corpus relief.

4. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

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Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to object on the three

grounds discussed above. The court finds that this contention lacks merit. Because these

grounds lack merit, as set forth above, they cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel. Accordingly, the court concludes that this contention provides no basis for

habeas corpus relief.

5. Reference to Rejected Plea Bargain

Petitioner contends that the reference in the probation report and the prosecutor’s

statement prejudiced him during the sentencing proceedings. Specifically, Petitioner claims

that the introduction of this evidence violated Evidence Code Section 1153 and Penal Code

Section 1192.4. As set forth above, federal habeas corpus relief is not available to address

state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(a). Accordingly, this contention presents no

basis for habeas corpus relief.

6. Imposition of Additional Order in Resentencing

Petitioner contends that the court committed prejudicial error when, at resentencing,

it imposed a requirement that Petitioner would have to register as a criminal street gang

member immediately upon his release, pursuant to Penal Code Section 186.30. Petitioner

claims that his resulted in a violation of Penal Code Section 1170(d). Again, as set forth

above, federal habeas corpus relief is not available to address state law claims. See 28

U.S.C. Section 2254(a). Accordingly, this contention presents no basis for habeas corpus

relief. 

7. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel re Request for Line-Up

Petitioner contends that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective

assistance of counsel where his counsel failed to move for a live line-up. He claims that a

line-up of himself and his companions could have resulted in one of his companions being

identified as the person who personally used the firearm.

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established for

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the purposes of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Canales v.

Roe, 151 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9

th Cir. 1998.) In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel, the court must consider two factors. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344,

346 (9th Cir. 1994). First, the petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient,

requiring a showing that counsel made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as

the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The

petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness, and must identify counsel’s alleged acts or omissions that were not the result

of reasonable professional judgment considering the circumstances. Id. at 688; United States

v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's

performance is highly deferential. A court indulges a strong presumption that counsel's

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466

U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th

Cir.1994).

Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result ... would have been different," 466 U.S., at

694. Petitioner must show that counsel's errors were so egregious as to deprive defendant of a

fair trial, one whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The court must evaluate

whether the entire trial was fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s

ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1345; United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d

1356, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994).

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before

examining the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2074 (1984). Since the defendant must

affirmatively prove prejudice, any deficiency that does not result in prejudice must

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necessarily fail. However, there are certain instances which are legally presumed to result in

prejudice, e.g., where there has been an actual or constructive denial of the assistance of

counsel or where the State has interfered with counsel’s assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 692; United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S., at 659, and n. 25, 104 S.Ct., at 2046-2047, and n.

25 (1984). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the “unreasonable

application” prong of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Weighall v. Middle, 215

F.3d 1058, 1062 (2000). 

Petitioner raised this claim in his first habeas corpus petition before the Superior

Court, which rejected it as follows:

Petitioner has failed to state sufficient facts to show that he was entitled to a

“live” line-up and, even if he was, that his trial counsel had made moved [sic] for a

“live” line-up that (1) the court would have granted the Motion, (2) that the results of

the line would have been in Petitioner’s favor, (3) he would have obtained a better

result. Petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel failed/refused to make timely

objections is, therefore, an unsupported conclusory allegation which is insufficient to

support the claim for relief. In re Swain (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300, 303-304. As

Petitioner cannot show he was prejudiced by the failure of his trial counsel to make

this Motion, Petitioner has failed to make a prima facie case for relief.

Exhibit K, 3. Petitioner also raised this claim in his second petition before the Superior 

Court, which rejected it for failure to state a prima facie case and as successive. Exhibit M, 

3. This claim was raised in Petitioner’s habeas corpus petitions before the Court of Appeal 

and the California Supreme Court, which were denied with silent denials.

Petitioner now argues that a live line-up “could” have resulted in him not being

identified as the person who personally used a firearm, because the photo line-up only

resulted in a tentative identification of Petitioner. The court finds that this is pure

speculation, insufficient to support the finding of prejudice necessary to state a claim of

ineffective assistance claim. 

Accordingly, the court must conclude that Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of

demonstrating that the Superior Court’s opinion “resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

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the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The court finds no basis for habeas corpus relief based

on this contention.

8. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Re Sleeping During Critical Stages of Trial

Petitioner contends that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel because

counsel slept through portions of the prosecutor’s examination of adverse witness Frank

Gonzales. Petitioner claims that he had to jar counsel awake to get him to object to the

prosecution’s solicitation of testimony Petitioner considered to be irrelevant. Petitioner

further claims that upon awakening, counsel objected and acknowledged that he had been

asleep and had missed the question posed by the prosecutor.

The Superior Court rejected this contention on the merits in the first superior court

habeas corpus petition. The court found that Petitioner had failed to show that trial

counsel’s falling asleep prejudiced his case. Specifically, the court held in part as follows:

Petitioner has failed to state sufficient facts to show that his trial counsel’s

falling asleep prejudiced his case. Petitioner failed to submit any facts and/or

documentary evidence as to the specific number of times that counsel fell asleep,

during what portions of the trial he fell asleep, how long he was asleep, or how

specifically counsel’s falling asleep affected defense of Petitioner’s case. Petitioner,

therefore, failed to show as a demonstrable reality that had counsel not fallen asleep

the trial would have proceeded differently and that Petitioner would have received a

better result . While Petitioner makes a specific reference in the trial transcript to one

instance where counsel allegedly fell asleep, Petitioner fails to attach a copy of that

portion of the transcript, so the Court cannot make any determination as to the

circumstances surrounding this particular instance. As Petitioner failed to show he

was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s falling asleep to make this Motion, Petitioner

has failed to make a prima facie case for relief.

Exhibit K, 2. Petitioner raised this issue in his second habeas corpus petition before the 

Superior Court, which rejected for failure to state a prima facie case. Exhibit M, 3. He also 

raised it in his habeas corpus petitions before the Court of Appeal and California Supreme 

Court, which were denied with silent denials.

This court must agree with the Superior Court that Petitioner has failed to establish

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the second prong under Strickland, i.e., prejudice. This court must therefore conclude that

Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the Superior Court’s opinion

“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;”

or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Accordingly, the court finds no basis for habeas corpus relief based on this contention.

9. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel re Failure to Interview Witnesses

Petitioner contends that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel because

counsel failed to interview defense witnesses before calling them to testify. He claims that

this exposed him to defense witnesses giving damaging testimony that contradicted other

defense witness’s testimony, and was so contrary to the defense theory of the case that it

appeared that the witnesses were testifying falsely. Specifically, Petitioner argues that

although trial counsel proffered a defense theory that there was no firearm present during the

commission of the offense, counsel called as a defense witness Lee Estrada, who testified

that he had an inoperable firearm, and displayed it to the victims.

This contention was raised in Petitioner’s second Superior Court habeas petition, and

the court found that Petitioner failed to state a prima facie case. He also raised it in his

habeas corpus petitions before the Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court, which 

were denied with silent denials. This court agrees with the Superior Court. As Respondent

argues, Petitioner has not shown that defense counsel failed to interview Estrada before trial. 

Without establishing this fact, Petitioner cannot even begin to support his contention. 

Further, defense counsel may have had tactical reasons for calling Estrada, even if he knew

what his testimony would be. See United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied sub. nom., Dondich v. United States, 454 U.S. 1127 (1981) (difference in opinion as

to trial tactics does not constitute denial of effective assistance). Finally, there was

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overwhelming evidence in the form of testimony from the three victims that Petitioner was

the gunman. 

In light of the above, the court finds that Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of

demonstrating that the Superior Court’s opinion “resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, the court finds no basis for habeas corpus

relief based on this contention.

10. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel re Failure to Adequately Research the Law

Petitioner contends that he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance

of counsel because trial counsel failed to adequately research the law and applicable statutes

prior to sentencing. Petitioner claims that in his “mitigation statement,” counsel asked the

court to sentence Petitioner to both the 12022.53(b) and 186.22(b)(1) enhancements,

requesting that ten years be imposed, consecutively, under both statutes, along with a 5 year

consecutive term for a total of 25 years. Petitioner claims that had counsel adequately

researched Section 12022.5, he would have discovered that subdivision (j) prohibits

punishment under any other provision of law. Petitioner argues that it was not possible to

legally impose an additional consecutive 10 year sentence pursuant to Section 186.22(b)(1).

This contention was first raised in Petitioner’s second Superior Court habeas corpus

petition, and was rejected on the merits for failure to state a prima facie case. It was also

rejected by the Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court with silent denials. 

Petitioner’s contention lacks merit. At the time the crime was committed, Section

12022.53(j) provided in part as follows:

(j) . . . . When an enhancement specified in this section has been admitted or

found to be true, the court shall impose punishment pursuant to this section rather

than imposing punishment authorized under any other provision of law, unless

another provision of law provides for a greater penalty or a longer term of

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imprisonment.

On its face, Section 12022.53(j) does not, as Petitioner contends, prohibit punishment under

any other provision of law. Thus, Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim based

on that contention is without a factual basis. Accordingly, the court finds that Petitioner has

failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the Superior Court’s opinion “resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The court finds no basis for

habeas corpus relief based on this contention.

11. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel re Sufficiency of Evidence

Petitioner contends that he was deprived of his right to effective assistance of

appellate counsel because appellate counsel failed to raise a claim that there was insufficient

evidence to find personal use of a firearm. Petitioner argues that the evidence at trial was in

dispute as to whether Petitioner personally possessed a firearm, including evidence that

someone other than Petitioner may have possessed a firearm during the commission of the

crime. 

The issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was raised in Petitioner’s first

Superior Court habeas corpus petition and was rejected on the merits. The Superior Court

found that, “[a]s Petitioner failed to provide sufficient facts and/or documentary evidence

that he suffered any prejudice as a result of trial counsel’s action and failed to make prima

facie case as to any other issue raised in this Petition, Petitioner has failed to establish that

Appellate Counsel should have raised this issue on appeal.” Exhibit K, 3. The claim was reraised in the second Superior Court habeas corpus petition and was rejected on the merits and

as a successive claim. Exhibit M, 3. This claim was raised in the habeas corpus petitions

filed in the Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court and was denied with silent

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denials. Exhibit N at 4-C; Exhibit O; Exhibit P at 7; Exhibit Q.

Effective assistance of appellate counsel is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985). Claims of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are reviewed according to Strickland 's

two-pronged test. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9

th Cir.1989); United States v.

Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 847 (9th Cir.1986); See, also, Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct.

346, 353-54 (1988) (holding that where a defendant has been actually or constructively

denied the assistance of appellate counsel altogether, the Strickland standard does not apply

and prejudice is presumed; the implication is that Strickland does apply where counsel is

present but ineffective).

To prevail, Petitioner must show two things. First, he must establish that appellate

counsel's deficient performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under

prevailing professional norms. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct.

2052, 2064 (1984). Second, Petitioner must establish that he suffered prejudice in that there

was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, she would have

prevailed on appeal. Id. at 694. A "reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. The relevant inquiry is not what counsel could

have done; rather, it is whether the choices made by counsel were reasonable. Babbitt v.

Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9

th Cir.1998). The presumption of reasonableness is even

stronger for appellate counsel because he has wider discretion than trial counsel in weeding

out weaker issues; doing so is widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective

appellate assistance. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9

th Cir.1989). Appealing every

arguable issue would do disservice to the Petitioner because it would draw an appellate

judge's attention away from stronger issues and reduce appellate counsel's credibility before

the appellate court. Id. Appellate counsel has no constitutional duty to raise every

nonfrivolous issue requested by Petitioner. Id at 1434 n10 (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S.

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745, 751-54, 103 S.Ct. 3308 (1983)).

In the present case, Petitioner’s argument that there was conflicting evidence

regarding personal use of a firearm by Petitioner does not demonstrate that there was

insufficient evidence to support the finding. As Respondent argues, there was overwhelming

evidence that Petitioner was the gunman in the form of the testimony of the three victims. 

Therefore, Appellate Counsel was not ineffective in choosing not to raise this issue, and

Petitioner cannot show prejudice. 

Accordingly, the court finds that Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of

demonstrating that the Superior Court’s opinion “resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The court finds no basis for habeas corpus relief based

on this contention.

12. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel re Double Jeopardy

Petitioner contends that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective

assistance of appellate counsel because appellate counsel failed to argue that the imposition 

of consecutive sentences pursuant to Sections 186.22(b)(1) and 12022.53(b) violates double

jeopardy. Petitioner bases this contention upon his claim that Section 12022.53(b) prohibits

additional punishment under any other provision of law. This claim was raised in

Petitioner’s second superior court petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was denied on the

merits and as successive. The claim was raised in the Court of Appeal and the California

Supreme Court habeas corpus petitions, which were denied with silent denials. 

As explained above, Petitioner’s claim that Section 186.22(b)(1) precludes

punishment under any other section is incorrect. Therefore, there is no merit to Petitioner’s

contention that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this claim on appeal. 

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Accordingly, the court finds that Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating

that the Superior Court’s opinion “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The court finds no basis for habeas corpus relief based on this

contention.

13. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel re Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner contends that appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing

to raise a claim on appeal that trial counsel was ineffective as to grounds 7 through 10 above. 

This claim was raised in Petitioner’s second superior court habeas corpus petition and

rejected on the merits and as successive. Exhibit M, 3. This claim was raised in the Court of

Appeal and the California Supreme Court habeas corpus petitions, which were denied with

silent denials. 

As explained above, there is no merit to Petitioner’s contention that he received

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Therefore, there is no merit to Petitioner’s contention

that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this claim on appeal. Accordingly, 

the court finds that Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the

Superior Court’s opinion “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The court finds no basis for habeas corpus relief based on this

contention.

14. Due Process Based on Denial of Substitution of Counsel

Petitioner contends that he was denied his Constitutional right to due process because

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the trial court refused to substitute appointed counsel where a genuine conflict of interest

existed. Petitioner raised this claim in his first habeas corpus petition before the Superior

Court, which rejected it on the merits as follows:

The trial court has the discretion to deny a Marsden motion “in the absence of a

sufficient showing that a defendant’s right to counsel would otherwise be

substantially impaired.” People v. Walker, (1976) 18 Cal.3d 232, 238. A defendant

has the burden of proving a substantial impairment by demonstrating that counsel is

inadequate. People v. Young (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 959, People v. Marsden (1970)

2 Cal.3d 118. Petitioner merely states that there was a conflict of interest between

himself and counsel, but fails to present any facts and/or documentary evidence as to

what that conflict was or that the conflict presented a substantial impairment to the

defense of his case. Nor has Petitioner presented any facts and/or documentary

evidence that the Court was biased against him and knew that Petitioner would be

“railroaded” with his counsel. Petitioner’s claim that the Court abused its discretion

in denying the Marsden Motion is, therefore, an unsupported, conclusory allegation

that is insufficient to support the relief requested. In re Swain (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300,

202-304. 

Exhibit K, 4. Petitioner raised this contention in his second petition for writ of habeas corpus 

before the Superior Court, which rejected it on the merits and as successive. Exhibit M, 3. 

Petitioner raised this contention in his habeas petitions before the Court of Appeal and the

California Supreme Court, which were denied with silent denials. Exhibits 0 and Q. 

The denial of a motion to substitute counsel implicates a defendant’s Sixth

Amendment right to counsel and therefore is properly considered in a habeas proceeding.

Bland v. California Dep't of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1475 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S.

947, 115 S.Ct. 357 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th

Cir.2000). It is well settled that when a criminal defendant voices a seemingly substantial

complaint about counsel, the trial judge should make a thorough inquiry into the reasons for

the defendant's dissatisfaction. See id. at 1475-76; United States v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712,

716 (9th Cir.1990). The Sixth Amendment, however, guarantees effective assistance of

counsel, not a “meaningful relationship” between an accused and his counsel. See, Morris v.

Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14, 103 S.Ct. 1610 (1983). The ultimate inquiry in a federal habeas

proceeding is whether the petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. Schell

v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1024-25 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc). The habeas court considers

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whether the trial court's denial of or failure to rule on the motion "actually violated

[petitioner's] constitutional rights in that the conflict between [petitioner] and his attorney

had become so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication or other significant

impediment that resulted in turn in an attorney-client relationship that fell short of that

required by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 1026.

In his case, Petitioner claims that a conflict existed between he and his appointed

counsel. “To establish a sixth amendment violation based on a conflict of interest, a

defendant must show that (1) that counsel actively represented conflicting interests, and (2)

that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyers performance.” Cuyler v.

Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980). Petitioner must prove an actual conflict “through a

factual showing on the record.” Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 455 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Petitioner must also show that the conflict likely had an adverse effect on the representation. 

Here, Petitioner not explain what that conflict was. He does state that his appointed counsel

did not all ow him to participate in trial strategy and tactics, but this, even if true, does not

support a claim of deprivation of the right to counsel. A conflict over strategy is not a

sufficient conflict to warrant substitution of counsel. United States v. McKenna, 327 F.3d

830, 844 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,540 U.S. 941 (2003). Although Petitioner also claims that

trial counsel committed error that rise to the level of incompetence, Petitioner’s claims of

ineffective assistance have already been found meritless above.

Accordingly, the court finds that Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of

demonstrating that the Superior Court’s opinion “resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The court finds no basis for habeas corpus relief based

on this contention.

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15. Denial of Right to Counsel Based on Denial of Request for Continuance to Retain

Counsel

Petitioner contends that he was denied the right to counsel of choice where the trial

court denied his request for a continuance to retain counsel. This claim was raised in

Petitioner’s second habeas corpus petition before the Superior Court and rejected on the

merits for failure to state a prima facie case. It was raised in Petitioner’s habeas corpus

petitions filed in the Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court, which were denied

with silent denials.

In United States v. Garrett, 179 F.3d 1143, 1144-45 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit

explained as follows 

We write today to make it clear that when we review a district court's ruling

granting or denying a motion for a continuance the applicable standard of review is

abuse of discretion. This standard is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in

Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983) where the

Court stated that “broad discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of

continuances.” The Court wrote:

Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials.

Not the least of their problems is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers,

and jurors at the same place at the same time, and this burden counsels against

continuances except for compelling reasons. Consequently, broad discretion

must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances; only an unreasoning

and arbitrary ‘insistence upon the expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable

request for delay’ violates the right to assistance of counsel. Id. at 11-12, 103

S.Ct. 1610 (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11

L.Ed.2d 921 (1964)).

The court upheld the denial of a continuance on the eve of trial to allow newly obtained

counsel to prepare for trial. Garrett, 179 F.3d at 1147. 

The court finds that the state court’s denial of relief was a reasonable application of

controlling Supreme Court precedent, as set forth in Slappy. Petitioner has in no way

demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner’s request for a

continuance, a request made one day before jury selection was to begin. Accordingly, the

court finds that Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the Superior

Court’s opinion “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

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application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). The court finds no basis for habeas corpus relief based on this contention.

16. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner contends that he was deprived of the Constitutional right to due process,

because the prosecutor acted vindictively when Petitioner exercised his right to go to trial. 

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor threatened to file additional charges against Petitioner

and to re-charge previously dismissed charges, if Petitioner did not accept the plea offer. It is

undisputed that at sentencing, the prosecutor introduced as an aggravating circumstance the

fact of the failed plea bargain, and also asked the probation officer to file a supplemental

report referencing these facts. 

This issue was presented in Petitioner’s first habeas corpus petition before the

Superior Court, and rejected as follows:

Petitioner presented no facts or documentary evidence which support any of his

claims. Petitioner is obligated to state with particularity the facts on which relief is

sought and to attach reasonably available documentary evidence that supporting [sic]

his claim. People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474. Petitioner merely states

intended [sic] to “inflame the jury” and that as “punishment” for his rejection of the

plea the prosecutor “increased” the punishment and added charges. Therefore,

Petitioner’s claims are unsupported conclusory allegations that are insufficient to

support the relief granted [sic]. In re Swain (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300, 303-304. Further,

it appears that the conduct complained of should be contained in the trial transcript

and as such could have been raised on appeal. Matters which could have been, but

were not, raised on appeal are not cognizable on habeas corpus. In re Dixon (1953)

41 Cal.2d 756,759.

Exhibit K, 4. This claim was raised in the Court of Appeal and the California Supreme

Court petitions and was rejected with silent denials. Exhibits O and Q.

As Respondent argues, the alleged “threats” which Respondent made during plea

bargaining appear to be nothing more than constitutionally permissible incentives for plea

bargaining. Incentives for plea bargaining are not unconstitutional merely because they are

intended to encourage a defendant to forego constitutionally protected conduct. United States

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v. Narramore, 36 F.3d 845,847 (9th Cir. 1994), citing Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212

(1978).

In regard to Petitioner’s claim regarding the introduction of evidence regarding the

rejected plea bargain, the admissibility of evidence is a matter of state law and improper

admission of evidence does not usually violate the United States Constitution and is not

normally cognizable in federal habeas corpus. See, Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68, 112

S.Ct. 475, 480 91991). Nevertheless, there can be habeas relief for the admission of

prejudicial evidence if the admission was fundamentally unfair and resulted in a denial of

due process. See, Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1192 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510

U.S. 1191, 114 S.Ct. 1294 (1994). 

In this case, the admission of the evidence was non-prejudicial and did not violate

due process. As the Court of Appeal noted in rejecting Petitioner’s state statutory claim, the

information was provided to the trial court, which was certainly aware that the rejected plea

agreement should not be considered in sentencing. Exhibit G, 18. The recommended

sentence of the probation officer did not change because of the supplemental report which

referred to the rejected plea bargain. Id. The Court of Appeal concluded that the error was

non-prejudicial based on the following: 1) the trial court did not refer to the rejected plea

agreement at sentencing; 2) the court imposed a sentence considerably lower than that

recommended by the probation officer and requested by the district attorney; 3) in stating

facts in aggravation when imposing sentence, the trial court did not indicate that it viewed

the rejected plea as an aggravating factor. Id. It concluded that there was no basis to believe

that Petitioner’s sentence was increased on the basis of the trial court being aware that a prior

plea agreement had been rejected. Exhibit G, 18.

Accordingly, the court finds that Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of

demonstrating that the Superior Court’s opinion “resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

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the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The court finds no basis for habeas corpus relief based

on this contention.

Based on the foregoing, THE COURT HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the petition

for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED and that judgment be entered for Respondent.

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the assigned United States

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the

objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by

mail) after service of the objections. The court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s

ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 24, 2006 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:03-cv-06622-OWW -SMS Document 52 Filed 07/24/06 Page 25 of 25