Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03184/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03184-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Trinidad Aranda-Hernandez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

... PUBLISH 

. FILED 

Unated States Court~ Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

AUG 3 0 1996 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

TRINIDAD ARANDA-HERNANDEZ, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 95-3184 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 94-10084-01) 

Timothy J. Henry, Assistant Federal Public Defender (David J. 

Phillips, Federal Public Defender, with him on the brief), Wichita, 

Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Brian R. Johnson, Special Assistant United States Attorney (Randall 

K. Rathbun, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), 

Wichita, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before ANDERSON, McKAY, and JONES,* Circuit Judges. 

JONES, Senior Circuit Judge. 

'Honorable Nathaniel R. Jones, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the 

Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 95-3184 Document: 01019280786 Date Filed: 08/30/1996 Page: 1 
I. 

Defendant Trinidad Aranda-Hernandez (hereinafter Aranda) 

appeals his conviction and sentence for illegal reentry into the 

United States after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 

We affirm. 

In 1984, Aranda was convicted of possessing marihuana with the 

intent to distribute and was subsequently deported to Mexico. 

After his deportation, Aranda returned to the United States. On 

August 2, 1994, Aranda was arrested and detained in Kansas by 

officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for 

illegally reentering the United States. Aranda was charged by 

Information with illegal reentry after deportation on August 5, 

1994. Aranda did not waive his right to indictment. 

At the detention hearing and arraignment, held August 15, 

1994, Aranda moved to dismiss the Information and requested a 

preliminary examination pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure 5(c) and 5.1. The magistrate concluded she did not have 

the authority to rule on Aranda's motion and referred the matter to 

the district court. Aranda remained in custody. 

On August 24, 1994, a grand jury returned an Indictment 

against Aranda on the same charge contained in the Information. 

The district court then dismissed as moot Aranda's motion to 

2 

Appellate Case: 95-3184 Document: 01019280786 Date Filed: 08/30/1996 Page: 2 
dismiss the Information and motion for a preliminary examination. 

On December 23, 1994, Aranda filed a motion to dismiss the 

Indictment based upon an alleged illegality in his deportation 

proceeding and another motion for a preliminary examination. 

Between the United States' response to Aranda's motions and 

the scheduled hearing, Aranda entered into plea negotiations. On 

January 30, 1995, Aranda entered a conditional plea of guilty, 

preserving for appeal the issues he raised in his pretrial motions. 

Aranda's plea was also conditioned on the determination of whether 

his 1984 conviction, which was the subject of his initial 

deportation proceeding, was an aggravated felony qualifying him for 

a sixteen- level sentencing guideline enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 

2L1.1. 

Aranda was sentenced on May 23, 1995. The district court 

determined that Aranda's past conviction was an aggravated felony 

which warranted the sixteen level enhancement. Aranda was 

sentenced to the statutory maximum sentence of 60 months. Aranda 

then filed this timely appeal. 

II. 

A. 

Aranda argues that the magistrate erred by not dismissing the 

3 

Appellate Case: 95-3184 Document: 01019280786 Date Filed: 08/30/1996 Page: 3 
Information filed against him because the government initiated his 

felony prosecution by information rather than by indictment. See 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 7 (a) (effectuating Fifth Amendment requirement 

that " [n] o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of 

a Grand Jury) . Aranda contends that until the Indictment was 

returned, the court had no jurisdiction to detain him. Aranda 

further alleges that in this district the United States has adopted 

the practice of charging by information then subsequent indictment, 

rather than by complaint, in order to subvert defendants' right to 

a preliminary examination, as provided for by 18 U.S.C. § 3060 and 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure S(c). Aranda claims that this 

charging practice, which allows the government to circumvent the 

preliminary examination requirement, violates his Fifth Amendment 

right to due process. We review these issues de novo. 

We first dispense with Aranda's contention that he was 

prosecuted improperly by information for an offense punishable by 

more than one year of imprisonment. Although Aranda was initially 

detained on the Information, he was indicted before a grand jury 

within the time permitted by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) 

(providing that an indictment must be filed against a defendant 

within thirty days of the defendant's arrest) . 

4 

Clearly, the 

Appellate Case: 95-3184 Document: 01019280786 Date Filed: 08/30/1996 Page: 4 
government did not violate Aranda's Fifth Amendment right to be 

prosecuted by indictment. 

Next, we address whether the district court violated the 

requirements of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 5(c) and 5.1 or 

Aranda's Fifth Amendment right to due process by failing to provide 

him with a preliminary examination. A defendant is entitled to a 

preliminary examination, unless waived, when charged with any 

offense, other than a petty offense, which is to be tried by a 

judge of the district court. 18 U.S.C. § 3060; Fed. R. Crim. P. 

5(c). If a defendant is in custody, the magistrate must schedule 

the preliminary examination within 10 days. 18 u.s.c. § 

3060(b) (1); Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(c). If, however, an indictment is 

filed against the defendant before the date scheduled for the 

preliminary examination, the examination should not be held. 18 

U.S.C. § 3060(e); Fed. R. CrimP. 5(c). A defendant who has been 

held in custody without receiving a preliminary examination and 

without being charged by the appropriate indictment or information 

should be discharged from custody without prejudice to the filing 

of further criminal proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § 3060 (d); Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 5(c); United States v. Taylor, 465 F.2d 1199 (lOth Cir. 

1972) . This remedy extends only to defendants who remain in 

custody without being properly charged. If an indictment has been 

5 

Appellate Case: 95-3184 Document: 01019280786 Date Filed: 08/30/1996 Page: 5 
returned and the defendant is subsequently convicted, the 

conviction will not be reversed for failure to hold the preliminary 

examination. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975); United 

States v. Bohrer, 807 F.2d 159, 161 (lOth Cir. 1986); Taylor, 465 

F.2d at 1199. There is no doubt that Aranda was denied a 

preliminary examination. Nevertheless, there is no relief this 

court can provide him for this departure from 18 U.S.C. § 3060(b) 

and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5 (c) . As dictated by 

Gerstein and Bohrer, a conviction may not be overturned for a 

failure of the district court to conduct a timely preliminary 

examination. We can only acknowledge the irregularity in the 

proceedings in Aranda's case. 

Further, we can provide no relief on Fifth Amendment due 

process grounds. Although the right to a preliminary examination 

is embodied in the United States Code and the Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, the right is not constitutional. Snow v. State of 

Oklahoma, 489 F.2d 278, 279 (lOth Cir. 1973). Due process attaches 

only to a right to a judicial determination of probable cause. 

Gerstein, 420 u.s. at 119. This judicial determination of probable 

cause may be in the form of a preliminary examination or it may in 

the form of an indictment; both are not required. Id. Therefore, 

once the Indictment was returned, Aranda's Fifth Amendment rights 

6 

Appellate Case: 95-3184 Document: 01019280786 Date Filed: 08/30/1996 Page: 6 
'·· had been satisfied, and there was no reason to hold the preliminary 

examination. Accordingly, we will not disturb Aranda's conviction 

on these grounds. 

B. 

We must next decide whether the district court erred in 

failing to dismiss the Indictment due to alleged violations of due 

process in the underlying immigration proceedings. We review this 

mixed question of law and fact de novo. United States v. MerazValeta, 26 F.3d 992 (lOth Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. 

Valdez, 917 F.2d 466, 468 (lOth Cir. 1990)). 

Aranda was deported in 1989 after being convicted for 

possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute. In early 1990, 

he was paroled back into the United States to work as an informant 

with the Drug Enforcement Agency. The government terminated 

Aranda's parole in 1992 and placed him in exclusion proceedings 

under section 236 of the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Aranda applied 

for asylum under section 208 of the INA and/or withholding of 

deportation under section 243 of the INA, claiming that he should 

be afforded protection as a member of a particular social group 

that has a well founded fear of persecution. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 

1253. Aranda described this social group as consisting of those 

7 

Appellate Case: 95-3184 Document: 01019280786 Date Filed: 08/30/1996 Page: 7 
persons who have worked as informants for drug enforcement agencies 

of the United States and who are in danger of being retaliated 

against upon return to their home country. 

The immigration judge rejected Aranda's asylum and withholding 

of deportation arguments, concluding that the INA's definition of 

social class did not embrace the social group of drug informants. 

The immigration judge additionally concluded that Aranda was 

ineligible for relief under either section 208 or 243 because he 

had been convicted of a felony that was now, in 1992, considered an 

aggravated felony under the terms of the INA. Aranda was then 

ordered excluded and apprised of his right to appeal to the Board 

of Immigration Appeals. Aranda reserved his right to appeal; 

however, when Aranda failed to file a timely notice of appeal 

within the ten days permitted, the decision of the immigration 

judge became final. 

After he was indicted for the present offense, Aranda moved to 

dismiss the indictment based upon irregularities in the underlying 

deportation proceedings. In his motion, Aranda contended that the 

immigration judge did not fully explain his rights to appeal and 

consequently deprived him of meaningful judicial review of the 

immigration proceedings. The district court denied the motion, 

finding that Aranda had "made no threshold showing that he was 

8 

Appellate Case: 95-3184 Document: 01019280786 Date Filed: 08/30/1996 Page: 8 
.. entitled to relief or suspension from deportation such that the 

alleged failure of the immigration judge to fully explain the 

defendant's rights made any difference in the outcome of the 

proceeding." Record, Vol. I at 3-4. 

The Supreme Court has held that when determinations made in 

the immigration hearing played a substantive role in the subsequent 

imposition of a criminal sanction, a meaningful review of the 

administrative proceeding must be provided. United States v. 

Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1987). In Mendoza-Lopez, the 

Court held that where defects in the deportation proceeding have 

effectively foreclosed direct judicial review of the deportation 

order, an alternative means of obtaining judicial review must be 

made available before the administrative order may be used to 

establish deportation conclusively as an element of· a § 1326 

offense (illegal reentry into the United States after deportation) . 

Id. 

We undertake a two-part inquiry when determining whether 

deportation has been established for the purposes of a § 1326 

conviction. We first examine whether the proceedings were 

fundamentally unfair, and second we determine whether the 

deportation hearing effectively foreclosed the defendant's right to 

a direct appeal. Meraz-Valeta, 26 F.3d at 998. In order to show 

9 

Appellate Case: 95-3184 Document: 01019280786 Date Filed: 08/30/1996 Page: 9 
fundamental unfairness, the defendant must demonstrate he was 

prejudiced. 

Aranda's position in this appeal is made confusing by the 

procedural posture of his challenge. Aranda does not directly 

challenge the 1989 deportation order. Instead, he contends that 

the immigration judge's refusal to hear his asylum and withholding 

of deportation claims during the 1992 exclusion proceedings 

deprived him of a challenge to his 1989 deportation order. We find 

no merit in his claims. 

Aranda cannot satisfy the second element of this test because 

the immigration judge apprised Aranda of his right to appeal at the 

end of the deportation hearing. See Aranda's Appendix C at 40 

(Transcript of Exclusion Hearing) . Aranda's failure to appeal 

cannot be attributed to the immigration judge. Nevertheless, 

Aranda argues that he was deprived of a right to an effective 

appeal because the immigration judge had refused to hear evidence 

on his theory of the case. Aranda argues that the immigration 

judge should have allowed him a continuance during which he would 

have had sufficient time to gather evidence and develop his theory 

of social group or class. 

Aranda has misconstrued the guarantee to review of the 

underlying immigration proceedings. The right to judicial review 

10 

Appellate Case: 95-3184 Document: 01019280786 Date Filed: 08/30/1996 Page: 10 
does not establish a right to an error-free immigration hearing. 

It grants a right to appeal if the immigration judge errs in 

construing the law or facts of the case. In his current appeal, 

Aranda argues that the immigration judge incorrectly applied the 

social group asylum standard. This is precisely the argument that 

Aranda should have raised to the Board of Immigration Appeals and 

then, if necessary, to the Fifth Circuit. Aranda waived his direct 

appeal, and now inappropriately seeks review of his immigration 

case in the Tenth Circuit. We will not engage in such review. 

Furthermore, Aranda would not be able to demonstrate that he 

was prejudiced by the court's barring his claim. Aranda asserted 

membership in the "social group" of law enforcement informants 

subject to persecution in their home countries. His theory, 

however, is not supported by case law; nor is it supported by the 

principles underlying the Act. Because we see no merit in Aranda's 

theory of relief under the INA, we cannot find that he was 

prejudiced by the immigration judge's refusal to consider this 

claim. The district court was correct in denying Aranda's motion 

to dismiss the Indictment. 

c. 

Finally, we determine whether the district court erred in 

11 

Appellate Case: 95-3184 Document: 01019280786 Date Filed: 08/30/1996 Page: 11 
) I ) !. 

applying the sixteen-level aggravated felony enhancement to 

Aranda • s base offense level. We review the district court • s 

interpretation of a sentencing guideline de novo. United States v. 

Blake, 59 F.3d 138, 139 (lOth Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. 

Johnson, 42 F.3d 1312, 1320 (lOth Cir. 1994)), cert. denied, 116 S. 

Ct . 58 0 ( 19 9 5) . 

The illegal reentry sentencing guideline provides a base 

offense level of 8 for illegal reentry into the United States. 

Subsection (b) provides the following: 

(b) Specific Offense Characteristics 

If more than one applies, use the greater: 

( 1) If the defendant previously was deported 

conviction for a felony, other than a 

involving violation of the immigration 

increase by 4 levels. 

after a 

felony 

laws, 

(2) If the defendant previously was deported after a 

conviction for an aggravated felony, increase by 16 

levels. 

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 (b). The commentary to this guideline cross 

references the aggravated felony definition found in the 

Immigration Act at 8 U.S. C. § 1101 (43) . Aranda's presentence 

report recommended the 16 level increase. 

Aranda objected to the sixteen-level increase on the ground 

that the 1990 effective dates of the aggravated felony amendments 

precluded consideration of his 1984 drug conviction as an 

12 

Appellate Case: 95-3184 Document: 01019280786 Date Filed: 08/30/1996 Page: 12 
aggravated felony. Specifically, Aranda alleged that it was not 

Congress• intent to classify drug felonies committed before 1990 as 

aggravated felonies. Second, Aranda contends that the retroactive 

application of the provision would violate his rights under the Ex 

Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. 

1. 

After thoroughly considering the legislative history, we 

conclude that Congress intended to include crimes committed before 

1990 in the application of the aggravated felony enhancement. 

Because Aranda illegally returned to the United States after the 

effective date of the new amendments, his past conviction for 

drugs, although occurring in 1984, was properly treated as an 

aggravated felony for purposes of the reentry statute. 

In 1988, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 

(ADAA) . Subtitle J of the ADAA made several amendments to the INA. 

The illegal reentry statute, 8 U.S. C. § 1326, was amended to 

differentiate between illegal reentry after a felony and illegal 

reentry after an aggravated felony. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 

1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7345(b), 102 Stat. 4181, 4471 (1988). 

Illegal reentry after a felony subjects a defendant to a maximum 

five year sentence, whereas illegal reentry after an aggravated 

13 

Appellate Case: 95-3184 Document: 01019280786 Date Filed: 08/30/1996 Page: 13 
A f l '-

felony carries a maximum fifteen year sentence. The applicability 

section of this amendment states: "the amendments made by 

subsection (a) shall apply to any alien who enters, or attempts to 

enter, or is found in, the United States on or after the date of 

the enactment of this Act. 102 Stat. at 4471. 

The definition of aggravated felony is found in the general 

definition section for the Immigration Act. See 8 U.S . C. § 

1101(43) (a). The ADAA amended this definition to include any drug 

trafficking crime as defined in section 924(c) (2) of Title 18, in 

the definition of aggravated felony. Pub. L. 100-690, § 7342, 102 

Stat. 4469. Still, a subsequent amendment to the definition 

appeared in Public Law 101-649, which amended certain provisions of 

the Immigration Act only. See Pub. L. 101-649, § 501, 104 Stat. 

5048. In this subsequent amendment, the definition of aggravated 

felony was again changed to include illicit trafficking in a 

controlled substance as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 802. Although the 

amendment in Public Law 101-649 did not become generally effective 

until 1990, the amendment provided the following: "The amendments 

made by subsection (a) shall apply to offenses committed on or 

after the date of the enactment of this act [November 1990] , except 

that the amendments made by paragraphs (2) and (5) of subsection 

(a) [the drug offense provision] shall be effective as if included 

14 

Appellate Case: 95-3184 Document: 01019280786 Date Filed: 08/30/1996 Page: 14 
a ., ' -.. 

in the enactment of section 7342 of the [ADAA]." Pub. L. 101-649, 

104 Stat. 5048 (emphasis added) . Based on this provision, the 

inclusion of illicit trafficking in a controlled substance in the 

definition of aggravated felony should be read as effective in 

1988. This means that only offenses which are non-drug-related 

must be committed after 1990 in order to be considered aggravated. 1 

Congress • statement that the aggravated felony amendments 

"shall apply to any alien who enters, attempts to enter, or is 

found in the United States on or after the date of the enactment of 

this Act" indicates Congress' intent to increase immediately the 

punishments for illegally reentering after an aggravated felony. 

Congress did not indicate that it wished the aggravated felony 

provision to apply only to aggravated felonies committed after 1988 

in either the amendment to the criminal provision or the amendment 

to the definition section. The 1990 amendment to the definition 

does mention an effective date of November 19, 1990, but that date 

applies only to those aggravated felony offenses that were not 

addressed by the ADAA in 1988. Aranda's offense does not fit into 

' In the recently decided case of United States v. Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d 998 (lOth Cir. 1996), 

this court ruled that the aggravated felony enhancement applied to a defendant who was "convicted 

in 1990 of a crime defined at that time as an aggravated felony," subsequently deported and then 

convicted for illegally reentering the United States after his deportation. Although the issue was 

argued by both parties, the court in Cabrera was not required to resolve the issue of whether the 

aggravated felony amendments apply to prior convictions which occured before the 1988 or 1990 ADAA 

amendments. 81 F.3d at 1000 n.2. We reach that issue today. 

15 

Appellate Case: 95-3184 Document: 01019280786 Date Filed: 08/30/1996 Page: 15 
that category, so this date does not affect our analysis. 

This circuit interpretation of the aggravated felony 

enhancement is in accord with other courts that have upheld the 

applicability of the aggravated felony enhancement to all past 

felonies. In United States v. Arzate-Nunez, the Ninth Circuit held 

that the proper inquiry is the definition of aggravated felony that 

existed at the time of the illegal reentry, rather than that which 

existed at the time the aggravated felony was committed. 18 F.3d 

730 (9th Cir. 1994). See also United States v. Ullyses-Salazar, 28 

F.3d 932, 938-39 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1367 

(1995). Similarly, in United States v. Troncoso, 23 F.3d 612, 614 

(1st Cir. 1994) and United States v. Forbes, 16 F.3d 1294 (1st Cir. 

1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 912 (1995) the First Circuit 

adopted the Board of Immigration Appeals' interpretation of the 

statute. The court agreed that: 

16 

For an alien reentering 

the United States on 

November 18, 1988 [the 

effective date of ADAA] , 

to be subject to these 

criminal penalties, the 

alien would need to have 

suffered a conviction and 

deportation before 

November 1988. It would 

be virtually impossible 

for an alien convicted of 

an aggravated felony to 

reenter or be found in 

the United States on the 

Appellate Case: 95-3184 Document: 01019280786 Date Filed: 08/30/1996 Page: 16 
•• 

date of enactment unless 

the definition of 

aggravated felony 

included conviction 

occurring before that 

date. 

Troncoso, 23 F.3d at 614 (quoting In Matter of A-A-, Interim Dec. 

3 1 7 6 ( B IA 19 9 2 ) ) . We are persuaded by the reasoning of these 

decisions and accordingly hold that the aggravated felony 

enhancement applies to all past aggravated felonies, regardless of 

the date committed. 

2. 

Finally, Aranda contends the even if the sentencing guideline 

does not violate the statute, it violates the Ex Post Facto Clause 

of the Constitution. We have recognized that the purpose of the Ex 

Post Facto Clause is "'to restrain legislatures and courts from 

arbitrary and vindictive action and to prevent prosecutions and 

punishment without fair warning.'" United States v. Gerber, 24 

F.3d 93 (lOth Cir. 1994) (quoting Devine v. New Mexico Dep't of 

Corrections, 866 F. 2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1988) ) . In order for a 

violation of the Clause to occur, a law must apply to "'events 

occurring before its enactment' " and must "'disadvantage the 

offender affected by it.'" Id. (quoting Miller v. Florida, 482 

17 

Appellate Case: 95-3184 Document: 01019280786 Date Filed: 08/30/1996 Page: 17 
• ._." t 

u.s. 423, 430 (1987)). 

This circuit has already concluded that this sentencing 

enhancement does not unlawfully apply to events occurring before 

its enactment, because the offense charged is the illegal reentry, 

not the aggravated felony. United States v. Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d 

998, 1001 (lOth Cir. 1996). See also United States v. Munoz-Cerna, 

47 F.3d 207 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Saenz-Forero, 27 F.3d 

1016 (5th Cir. 1994); Troncoso, 23 F.3d at 612. Although Aranda 

was disadvantaged by the increased sentence, "the penalties were 

unambiguous when he reentered the country." Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d 

at 1001. Aranda' s sentence did not violate the Ex Post Facto 

Clause. 

III. 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, Aranda's 

guilty plea was conditioned upon the outcome of his issues on 

appeal. Because Aranda has not prevailed on any of his claims, his 

guilty plea will stand. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district 

court's judgment of conviction and Aranda's sentence in their 

entirety. 

18 

Appellate Case: 95-3184 Document: 01019280786 Date Filed: 08/30/1996 Page: 18