Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-01276/USCOURTS-caDC-04-01276-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
National Labor Relations Board
Petitioner
Palace Sports & Entertainment, Inc.
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 18, 2005 Decided May 31, 2005

No. 04-1261

PALACE SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT, INC.,

D/B/A ST. PETE TIMES FORUM,

 F/K/A TAMPA BAY ICE PALACE,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with

04-1276

On Petition for Review and 

Cross-Application for Enforcement of an 

Order of the National Labor Relations Board

Robert M. Vercruysse argued the cause for petitioner. With

him on the briefs was Gary S. Fealk.

David A. Fleischer, Senior Attorney, National Labor

Relations Board, argued the cause for respondent. With him on

the brief were Arthur F. Rosenfeld, General Counsel, John H.

Ferguson, Assistant General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong,

USCA Case #04-1276 Document #897193 Filed: 05/31/2005 Page 1 of 23
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Deputy Associate General Counsel, and Meredith L. Jason,

Attorney.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and EDWARDS and

GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge: Palace Sports & Entertainment,

Inc. (“Palace” or “the Company”) petitions for review of an

order of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or

“Board”), and the Board cross-applies for enforcement. On

charges filed by the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage

Employees, AFL-CIO (“Union”), the Board held that, in the

months following Palace’s assumption of operations at the St.

Pete Times Forum (“Forum”) in Tampa, Florida, the Company

committed various unfair labor practices in violation of § 8(a)(1)

and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (“Act”), 29 U.S.C.

§ 158(a)(1), (3) (2000). Specifically, the Board found that

Palace prohibited employees from conversing about the Union,

interrogated employees about their knowledge of union activity

and their communications with the Board, and threatened

employees if they cooperated with the Board or supported the

Union, all in contravention of § 8(a)(1). The Board also

concluded that the Company violated § 8(a)(1) and (3) by

disciplining and subsequently discharging a pro-union

employee, Peter Mullins. The Board issued an order requiring

the Company to cease and desist from its unlawful conduct and

to take certain affirmative remedial action, including the

reinstatement of Mullins with back pay. See St. Pete Times

Forum, 342 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 2004 WL 1701333 (July 27,

2004). The Company does not challenge most of the Board’s §

8(a)(1) findings; accordingly, we grant the cross-application to

enforce the portions of the Board’s order based on these

unchallenged findings of unfair labor practices. 

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Palace’s principal claim in this case is that the Board erred

in concluding that the employer’s discipline and later discharge

of Mullins violated the Act. Mullins was issued warnings for

violating the Company’s solicitation and harassment policies

during the course of his discussions with a fellow employee

about whether to join the Union. In evaluating this disciplinary

action, the Board relied on the framework approved in NLRB v.

Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 23 (1964), under which an

employer violates the Act, despite its good faith, by disciplining

an employee for misconduct arising out of a protected activity,

when it is shown that the misconduct did not in fact occur. The

Board concluded that Mullins did not in fact commit the

offenses for which he was disciplined. We conclude that these

findings are supported by substantial evidence. 

Months after he received the disciplinary warnings, Mullins

was discharged for making an improper remark during a

conversation with an employee of a vendor located in the

Forum. The Board ostensibly employed the framework set forth

in Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d

899 (1st Cir. 1981), to determine whether protected activity was

the motivating factor in Palace’s decision to fire Mullins. The

Board’s opinion on this point is hopelessly unclear, so we are

unable to discern the precise basis upon which the Board

concluded that Mullins’ discharge was unlawful. We therefore

remand the case to the Board so that it may revisit this issue. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Palace Sports & Entertainment, Inc. owns and operates

various sports and entertainment arenas, including the Palace of

Auburn Hills located near the Company’s headquarters in

Detroit, Michigan. In July 1999, the Company purchased the

Ice Palace in Tampa, Florida, an arena which has since become

known as the St. Pete Times Forum. Palace assumed various

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contractual obligations made by the previous owner, including

a contract with SMG, a company whose employees maintained

the facility and performed the work necessary to effectuate

conversions of the arena floor, e.g., from a hockey rink to a

concert venue. SMG had a labor contract with the Union.

When Palace purchased the Forum, it decided that it would

take control over the maintenance and conversion operations

itself instead of employing subcontractors like SMG. On June

30, 2001, when SMG’s contracts with the Forum and the Union

expired, Palace assumed the maintenance and conversion

operations for the arena. The Company hired some of SMG’s

former employees, including numerous Union officials, but it

did not recognize the Union. One of the employees Palace hired

was Peter Mullins, a mechanical engineer who had been on the

Union’s negotiating committee while he was employed by

SMG. After he was hired, Mullins and other pro-union

employees began soliciting union authorization cards. The

presence of this union activity at the Forum resulted in a number

of incidents involving the management of the Company, which

ultimately resulted in the filing of unfair labor practice charges

in this case.

On June 27, 2001, the Company posted a policy prohibiting

solicitation by one employee to another “while either is

working.” In response to some complaints from employees

regarding solicitation on behalf of the Union, Palace vice

president Sean Henry reviewed this no-solicitation policy with

employees at a meeting on July 18. He informed the employees

that solicitation in violation of the Company’s policy could

result in termination. During the course of the meeting, Henry

effectively promulgated a rule prohibiting any conversation

about the Union. Specifically, Henry told employees that they

could “talk about virtually anything” so long as they did not

solicit. But by “virtually anything” Henry excluded

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conversations about the Union, because he viewed any

discussion regarding the Union as solicitation.

In mid-July, operations manager Carson Williams asked

employee Thomas Roberts whether anyone had approached him

“about the union organization process.” After Roberts

responded that nobody had, Williams said, “I know if anyone

comes to you, you will let me know.” Also in mid-July,

employee George Freire spoke with a new employee and gave

him a union authorization card. The next day, Williams told

Freire “not to be discussing union issues on the clock or in the

building.”

Around November 20, 2001, Williams approached Roberts

and told him that he “didn’t like rumors” and wanted to clear

one up. He said that he had heard that Roberts had gone to the

NLRB to complain about him, and asked Roberts to explain his

action. Roberts answered that he did not know what Williams

was talking about, that he had not gone to the Board. Williams

then conceded that it might have been another employee with

the same name as Roberts who had complained to the Board, but

that “it would all come out and once it did” Williams “would

take care of it.” 

On June 18, 2002, Williams called Mullins to his office to

fix a problem with the building’s automation system. After the

problem was corrected, Williams commented that he would be

“lost” without Mullins, to which Mullins replied that he was not

planning on going anywhere. Williams then told Mullins that if

he “and the rest of the union supporters file for a new election,

then you are going to be terminated.” When Mullins responded

that he could not be fired for “doing something legal,” Williams

stated that the Company would terminate the leader “and then

the rest of you will get in line.” Mullins asked Williams who

had told him that, and Williams replied, “Sean Henry.”

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On July 11, 2002, less than a month after this conversation,

employee James Carpenter arranged to speak with Henry to

complain about Peter Mullins. According to Henry, Carpenter

reported that Mullins would not leave him alone, that he “is

always . . . talking to me and telling me the merits of the Union.”

Carpenter told Henry that initially this happened “three, four,

five times a week,” but that it was now “every time” he saw

Mullins. Carpenter further noted that he had told Mullins to

leave him alone “dozens of times.”

Henry referred the matter to the Company’s human

resources director, Beth Fields, and, the next day, Henry, Fields,

and Williams met with Carpenter. According to a memorandum

summarizing this meeting (signed by Henry, Williams,

Carpenter, and Carpenter’s supervisor), Carpenter reported

being “harassed and solicited” by Mullins. He specifically

reported the most recent incident, which had taken place in the

employee break room at 7:30 a.m. on July 11, before Carpenter

had clocked in but after Mullins began work at 7:00 a.m.

Carpenter related that he and another employee went to the

break room, where Mullins asked him why he would not join the

Union. Carpenter explained that he liked working for Palace

and that the Company had been good to him. Mullins told

Carpenter that the Union could negotiate a better raise for him,

but Carpenter responded that he was not interested and then left.

Carpenter reported that Mullins was always “‘antagonizing’”

him about joining the Union and confronts him “at least 3-5

times per week,” and that it was interfering with his work. 

Following this meeting, Carpenter prepared a written

statement, dated July 17, 2002, in which he stated that, “[f]or the

past couple of weeks,” he had been “stopped in the hallways”

and “inside the breakroom” by Mullins “about hav[ing] the

union back into this building,” and that he was “getting t[ir]ed”

of it. Carpenter’s statement recounted the July 11 break room

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incident, adding that he told Mullins before walking away, “I

don’t want to hear about it any more.”

There is no evidence that Carpenter again complained about

Mullins after July 11. On July 18, Fields, Henry, and Williams

interviewed Mullins regarding Carpenter’s complaints. Henry

testified that, at that meeting, Mullins stated that he had no idea

what Carpenter was talking about. Mullins asserted that

Carpenter was already a member of the Union and that he talked

to Carpenter about the Union only to answer Carpenter’s

questions. Henry also recalls that when he confronted Mullins

with Carpenter’s claim that he asked Mullins to stop “countless

times,” Mullins replied, “I don’t recall him ever asking me to

stop.”

In his own testimony, Mullins claimed that he never

initiated any conversations about the Union with Carpenter, but

rather that Carpenter would bring up the subject and was

“confused,” “afraid that . . . he was going to lose his job if he

supported the Union.” Mullins maintained that he never

intimidated or harassed Carpenter during these conversations.

Regarding the specific incident on July 11, Mullins recalled that

Carpenter “brought up the subject about how his father-in-law

had told him that he didn’t need a union.” Mullins responded,

“Well, James, you know, in a perfect world you don’t need a

union . . . [but we are] already making a lot less money since

Palace . . . eliminated the contract and, you know, we’re not

getting overtime after eight.”

For his part, Carpenter testified that Mullins had spoken to

him about bringing the Union back, and that he replied that he

wanted to give the Company a chance. Mullins replied, “Okay.”

A couple of weeks later, Mullins spoke with him again, and he

replied, “No. I don’t want it yet.” Carpenter testified that

Mullins continued to approach him “on several occasions.” He

explained that when he was in the break room before clocking

in and “when I’m going from one job to another job . . . he

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approaches me and stops and asks me about the Union.” On

those occasions, Carpenter told Mullins, “I don’t want to discuss

it right at this moment.” Carpenter denied initiating the

conversations as Mullins has claimed.

On July 25, 2002, Mullins was issued two disciplinary

warnings. The first was a written warning for violating the

Company’s solicitation policy on July 11, 2002. The warning

states that, while on work time, Mullins “asked an employee

why he would not join a labor union.” The second warning, a

final written warning, was for violation of the Company’s policy

against harassment. It explains that “[d]uring the months of

June and July 2002,” Mullins harassed an employee “in various

work areas at least 3 to 5 times a week even after the employee

being harassed asked [Mullins] to stop. The employee states

that [Mullins] has stopped him in his work area and in his

words, ‘intimidated’ him about joining a labor union while he

was on work time. The employee repeatedly asked [Mullins] to

stop talking to him about joining a labor union, but [Mullins]

continued.”

On October 2, 2002, Carpenter signed a union authorization

card. Mullins testified that Carpenter requested the card.

Carpenter admitted signing the card, but denied requesting it.

There is no evidence that Carpenter made any complaint on this

occasion. About three weeks later, the Union filed a petition for

a representation election.

On October 23, Mullins initiated a conversation with Alice

Castillo, an employee of a vendor located in the Forum. The

two were discussing a newspaper article regarding wages in

Florida when the conversation turned to whether wages in

Florida were lower than those paid in northern states.

According to Castillo, she asked Mullins what wages were in

other southern states like Alabama and Mississippi, in response

to which Mullins loudly called her a “Yankee bitch.” Mullins

denies making the remark. Castillo prepared a statement for her

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supervisor recounting the incident, and the statement was

ultimately forwarded to Palace officials.

Upon learning of the incident, Fields spoke with Castillo,

who repeated her allegation regarding the incident and stated

that “it had been going on for a long time and that she had just

had enough.” Mullins heard from a fellow employee that

Castillo was upset with him over something, and went to her to

apologize for anything he may have said that offended her.

On October 31, Henry, Fields, and Williams met with

Mullins. Mullins stated that he did not recall calling Castillo a

“Yankee bitch”; he also explained that he had apologized to her

for anything he may have said. Fields testified that she believed

Castillo, because Mullins had only stated that he “did not recall”

making the offensive statement. On November 3, Mullins was

discharged. Fields testified that the Company fired Mullins

because he “made inappropriate comments and his conduct was

inappropriate.”

B. The Board’s Decision

On the basis of the above evidence, a NLRB Administrative

Law Judge (“ALJ”) concluded that Palace violated § 8(a)(1) by:

(1) prohibiting conversations about the Union while permitting

conversations relating to other matters; (2) interrogating

employees about their knowledge of employee interest in the

Union and directing them to report the union activities of their

coworkers; (3) interrogating employees about their

communications with the NLRB and threatening reprisals if

employees cooperated with the Board; and (4) threatening

employees with discharge because of their support for the

Union.

Considering next the disciplinary warnings issued to

Mullins, the ALJ credited Mullins’ version of the events on July

11 and, accordingly, found that he did not solicit Carpenter. The

ALJ alternatively found that, even if Mullins did solicit

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Carpenter, Mullins did not violate the Company’s solicitation

policy, because Mullins talked with Carpenter while engaged in

nonwork activity. With respect to the harassment warning, the

ALJ credited Mullins’ assertion that he never approached

Carpenter and found that, even if he had, the encounters to

which Carpenter testified did not constitute harassment. Finding

that Mullins was disciplined while engaging in protected activity

for misconduct he did not commit, the ALJ concluded that

Palace violated § 8(a)(1) under the Burnup & Sims framework.

Without any further explanation, the ALJ found that Mullins

was warned for engaging in union activity, and thus concluded

that the warning also violated § 8(a)(3).

Turning to Mullins’ conversation with Castillo, the ALJ

credited Mullins’ testimony that he did not make any offensive

statement, finding that Castillo either misheard or

misunderstood his remark. The ALJ noted, however, that

because Mullins was not engaged in protected activity when he

committed the alleged misconduct, the Burnup & Sims

framework was inapplicable and, accordingly, the Company was

entitled to rely on its good-faith belief in Castillo’s version of

the incident.

Applying the Wright Line test for determining the

relationship, if any, between employer action and protected

employee conduct, the ALJ concluded that the General Counsel

had carried his burden of showing that Mullins’ union activity

was a substantial and motivating factor in Palace’s decision to

discharge Mullins. The ALJ next considered whether the

Company had carried its burden of showing that it would have

taken the same disciplinary action even in the absence of

Mullins’ protected activity. Evaluating the Company’s written

policies regarding “indecent conduct or language,” as well as the

only other documented incident in the record regarding such

behavior, the ALJ found that Palace had not satisfied its burden.

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The ALJ accordingly concluded that Mullins’ discharge violated

§ 8(a)(3).

After considering exceptions filed to the ALJ’s decision, the

Board affirmed the ALJ’s findings and conclusions. The Board,

however, specifically addressed Mullins’ discharge. The Board

ostensibly applied the Wright Line framework, agreeing first

with the ALJ that the General Counsel “made the required initial

showing that Mullins’ union activity was a substantial or

motivating factor in his discharge.” Proceeding to the question

of whether Palace had established that it would have discharged

Mullins even in the absence of his protected activity, the Board

noted that the Company had argued that “Mullins’ angry

outburst at Castillo created sufficient concern for Title VII

liability that it discharged him.” The Board then concluded that

Palace had “failed to show that it would have discharged

Mullins even in the absence of his union activity in order to

avoid the imposition of Title VII liability.” See generally Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §

2000e et seq. (2000). 

In reaching this judgment, the Board suggested that it would

have been “unreasonable” for Palace to discharge Mullins in

order to avoid Title VII liability. The Board reasoned as

follows:

The Supreme Court has held that a single, isolated comment

generally is not sufficient to justify the imposition of Title

VII liability. Clark[] County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532

U.S. 268, 271 (2001). Moreover, even where an employee

has been shown to have sexually harassed a co-worker,

Title VII does not necessarily require the employee’s

discharge, so long as the employer takes reasonable action

to protect the complainant from further harassment.

Baskerville v. Culligan International Co., 50 F.3d 428, 432

(7th Cir. 1995).

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Based on this understanding of Title VII law, the Board

concluded:

We recognize that employers have a legitimate interest in

preventing workplace sexual harassment and a correlative

obligation to respond when such incidents occur. In this

case, however, we find that the [Company] has not

established that it had reasonable grounds for determining

that it had to remove or discipline Mullins in order to avoid

liability under Title VII.

On this basis, the Board found that Palace’s “asserted Title VII

concerns” were pretextual.

In light of these conclusions, the Board ordered Palace to

cease and desist from engaging in the unlawful conduct it was

found to have committed or, in any like manner, interfering

with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their

rights under the Act. The Board also ordered Palace to offer

Mullins full reinstatement to his former job or a substantially

equivalent position, make him whole for any loss of earnings or

other benefits, and expunge any records of his disciplinary

warnings and discharge.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Unchallenged Findings of § 8(a)(1) Violations

Palace does not challenge the Board’s conclusions that it

engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of § 8(a)(1) in

prohibiting employee conversations about the Union while

permitting conversations relating to other matters, interrogating

employees about their knowledge of employee activity in

support of the Union and directing them to report the union

activities of their coworkers, interrogating employees about their

communications with the NLRB and threatening reprisals if

employees cooperated with the Board, and threatening

employees with discharge because of their support for the

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Union. Accordingly, we grant the Board’s application to

enforce the portions of its order that correspond to these

findings. Titanium Metals Corp. v. NLRB, 392 F.3d 439, 445

(D.C. Cir. 2004).

B. The Board’s Conclusion That the Warnings Were

Unlawful

Palace challenges the Board’s conclusion that it committed

unfair labor practices in violation of § 8(a)(1) and (3) by issuing

the disciplinary warnings to Mullins on July 25, 2002. Because

we conclude that the Board’s § 8(a)(1) finding is supported by

substantial evidence, and because Palace offers no persuasive

reason to believe that the additional finding under § 8(a)(3) had

any material effect on the order, we have no occasion to address

the latter finding. See Burnup & Sims, 379 U.S. at 22 (“We find

it unnecessary to reach the questions raised under § 8(a)(3) for

we are of the view that in the context of this record § 8(a)(1) was

plainly violated . . . .”); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 341

N.L.R.B. No. 111, 2004 WL 963353, at *1 n.2 (Apr. 30, 2004)

(“[W]e agree with the judge that [the] discharge violated Sec.

8(a)(1) of the Act. We therefore find it unnecessary to pass on

the judge’s finding that the discharge violated Sec. 8(a)(3),

because this additional finding would be essentially cumulative

with no material effect on the remedy.”), enforced, No. 04-1219,

U.S. App. LEXIS 6731 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 19, 2005) (per curiam).

Section 8(a)(1) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice

for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees

in the exercise of” their rights to organize, bargain collectively,

and engage in concerted activities. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).

Under the framework approved by the Supreme Court in Burnup

& Sims, an employer violates § 8(a)(1) by disciplining an

employee “if it is shown that the [disciplined] employee was at

the time engaged in a protected activity, that the employer knew

it was such, that the basis of the [discipline] was an alleged act

of misconduct in the course of that activity, and that the

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employee was not, in fact, guilty of that misconduct.” 379 U.S.

at 23. In such circumstances, the employer’s good-faith belief

that the misconduct occurred is no defense, for “[a] protected

activity acquires a precarious status if innocent employees can

be discharged while engaging in it, even though the employer

acts in good faith.” Id. In this case, the Board found that the

warnings violated § 8(a)(1) because Mullins did not in fact

engage in the misconduct for which he was disciplined.

The Board’s findings of fact are “conclusive” if “supported

by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.”

29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (2000). Because “[s]ubstantial evidence

means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion,” we will reverse for lack of

substantial evidence “only when the record is so compelling that

no reasonable factfinder could fail to find to the contrary.”

Resort Nursing Home v. NLRB, 389 F.3d 1262, 1270 (D.C. Cir.

2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). In making this

inquiry, we will not disturb the Board’s adoption of an ALJ’s

credibility determinations “unless those determinations are

‘hopelessly incredible,’ ‘self-contradictory,’ or ‘patently

unsupportable.’” United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. NLRB, 387 F.3d

908, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Applying these standards, it is clear that substantial evidence

supports the Board’s findings that Mullins did not engage in the

misconduct for which he was warned.

The Board, adopting the ALJ’s credibility determinations,

credited Mullins’ testimony regarding his encounters with

Carpenter in general, and their July 11 conversation in

particular. Accordingly, the Board found that, on July 11,

Mullins did not ask Carpenter “why he would not join a labor

union.” Rather, the Board accepted Mullins’ account that

Carpenter approached Mullins, mentioning that his father-in-law

had told him that employees did not need a union, and that

Mullins merely responded by giving reasons why the employees

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did need a union, referring to reductions in wages and benefits

since the Company became their employer. The Board also

accepted Mullins’ claim that he never approached Carpenter to

talk about the Union, but only discussed the subject when

Carpenter brought it up.

In crediting Mullins, the Board observed that there was “no

evidence contradicting” Mullins’ assertion that Carpenter was

already a union member, and also noted that Carpenter, though

called as a witness by the Company, did not testify about the

July 11 conversation, and thus failed to contradict Mullins’

account of it. St. Pete Times Forum, 2004 WL1701333, at *16.

The Board further cited numerous inconsistencies in Carpenter’s

statements, id. at *17-*18, and concluded that the fact that

Carpenter eventually signed a union authorization card in

October 2002 “casts serious doubt upon [Carpenter’s] assertion

that he informed Mullins that he was not interested in the Union

and supports Mullins’ testimony that Carpenter was ‘confused,’”

id. at *16.

Palace argues that the Board erred in crediting Mullins over

Carpenter. In particular, Palace argues that: (1) any

inconsistencies in Carpenter’s statements are at best minor and

based on an overly literal reading of those statements; (2)

Mullins’ statement that Carpenter was already a union member

at the time of alleged solicitations (June and July of 2002) is in

tension with the undisputed facts that Carpenter complained to

management about being solicited and that Carpenter signed an

authorization card in October 2002; and (3) because Carpenter

was undeniably a member of the Union at the time of his

testimony before the Board, he had no motivation to testify

falsely. See Br. of Pet’r at 14-15, 17-19. Although these are

plausible arguments for crediting Carpenter over Mullins, they

surely do not demonstrate that the Board’s contrary

determinations crediting Mullins are “hopelessly incredible,”

“self-contradictory,” or “patently unsupportable,” as our cases

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require. In short, we have no basis to overturn the Board’s

credibility determinations. 

Moreover, the Board alternatively found that even if it were

not to credit Mullins’ testimony, Mullins’ conduct nevertheless

would not have constituted violations of Palace’s solicitation

and harassment policies. Regarding the warning for soliciting

Carpenter on July 11, the Board concluded that even if Mullins

had solicited Carpenter during their conversation, this would not

have violated the solicitation policy because “he was engaged in

a nonwork activity.” St. Pete Times Forum, 2004 WL 1701333,

at *16-*17.

The Company’s solicitation policy prohibits solicitation by

one employee to another only “while either is working.” Id. at

*9. The policy further explains:

Working time is when an employee’s duties require that

he/she be engaged in work tasks. Working time does not

include an employee’s own time, such as meal periods,

scheduled breaks, time before and after a shift and personal

cleanup time. We believe that you should not be disturbed

or disrupted in the performance of your job.

Id. It is undisputed that Carpenter was not on working time

during his conversation with Mullins. Although Mullins began

work at 7:00 a.m. and the incident occurred at 7:30 a.m., the

Board found that Mullins’ duties “did not require that he be

engaged in work during the brief interval that he obtained

coffee.” Id. at *16. Palace argues that this finding was

erroneous because it is undisputed that Mullins was not on a

“scheduled break” at that time. Br. of Pet’r at 15-17. But, as the

Board noted, operations manager Williams testified that

employees like Mullins were permitted to “go into the break

room and get coffee and keep on going.” Tr. of NLRB

Proceedings at 527, reprinted in J.A. 134, 287. Moreover, the

Board noted that the disputed conversation consumed no more

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than 15 seconds, well within the amount of time it would take to

get a cup of coffee. St. Pete Times Forum, 2004 WL 1701333,

at *16. Accordingly, there is substantial evidence in the record

to support the Board’s conclusion that Mullins was engaged in

nonwork activity during his conversation with Carpenter. 

With respect to the second warning, for harassment of

Carpenter during June and July of 2002, the Board found that,

even if Mullins did initiate conversations with Carpenter to the

extent alleged by Carpenter, Carpenter’s testimony before the

Board did not establish that he was “harassed,” “intimidated,” or

approached after telling Mullins to stop the conduct cited by the

warning. This alternative finding is also supported by

substantial evidence.

As the Board noted, Carpenter made it clear that he did not

fear that Mullins would hurt him. Tr. at 416, J.A. 237.

Carpenter also testified that when Mullins approached him,

Mullins never physically restrained him; Carpenter would

simply tell Mullins that he did not want to discuss the matter and

would walk away. Id. at 415-16, J.A. 236-37. Indeed, neither

Carpenter nor any other witness cited any conduct by Mullins

that could reasonably be thought to constitute “intimidation.”

Regarding the warning’s only specific example of “harassment”

– the continued solicitation of Carpenter after he asked Mullins

to stop – the Board found that Carpenter made no such

unequivocal request until July 11. Carpenter’s July 17 written

statement and the notes of the July 11 meeting between

Carpenter and management refer only to one occasion after the

July 11 conversation on which Carpenter told Mullins that he

did not want to talk about the Union any further. See Summary

of 07/11/02 Meeting, reprinted in J.A. 97; 07/17/02 Statement

of Carpenter, reprinted in J.A. 98. In his testimony before the

Board, Carpenter stated that he told Mullins, “I don’t want [the

Union] yet,” “I don’t want to discuss it now,” and “I don’t want

to discuss it right at this moment.” Tr. at 409-10, J.A. 230-31.

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Carpenter never corroborated Henry’s assertion that Carpenter

reported telling Mullins to stop “dozens of times.” Accordingly,

the Board reasonably found that Carpenter did not tell Mullins

until July 11 not to talk to him about the Union. Thus, in light

of Mullins’ undisputed testimony that, after July 11, he did not

speak to Carpenter again until October 2002 (when Carpenter

signed the authorization card), substantial evidence supports the

Board’s finding that the harassment asserted as the ground for

the second warning never occurred.

Finally, there is no merit to Palace’s suggestion that,

because the Board concluded that Mullins did not solicit

Carpenter, Mullins therefore could not have engaged in

protected activity, a necessary element of a § 8(a)(1) violation

under the Burnup & Sims framework. See Br. of Pet’r at 14

n.11. There is no question that “employees’ right to discuss

self-organization among themselves” is protected under the Act,

see NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956),

and remains so regardless of who approaches whom and whether

the conversation constitutes “solicitation.”

On this record, the Board reasonably concluded that Palace

violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act by issuing the disciplinary warnings

to Mullins.

C. The Board’s Conclusion That the Discharge Was

Unlawful

Because Mullins’ conversation with Castillo did not itself

constitute protected activity, the Burnup & Sims framework for

finding § 8(a)(1) violations is inapplicable. It is therefore

irrelevant that the Board credited Mullins’ testimony that he did

not make any offensive remark to Castillo, unless the record

otherwise indicates that the employer acted pursuant to antiunion animus in firing Mullins. In other words, the issue here

is whether, by discharging Mullins, Palace “discriminat[ed] . . .

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to encourage or discourage membership in any labor

organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). 

In addressing the § 8(a)(3) charge, the Board treated this

case as one involving a question of “dual motivation,” i.e., a

case in which the employer defends against a § 8(a)(3) charge

by arguing that, even if an invalid reason might have played

some part in the employer’s motivation, the employer would

have taken the same action against the employee for a

permissible reason. The Board analyzes such claims under the

framework set forth in Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089. We

have explained that framework as follows:

Under the Wright Line test, the general counsel must first

show that the protected activity was a motivating factor in

the adverse employment decision. If this prima facie

showing is made, the burden shifts to the employer to

demonstrate that it would have made the adverse decision

even had the employee not engaged in protected activity.

Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 470 v. NLRB, 350 F.3d

105, 110-11 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

The ALJ clearly applied this framework in evaluating

Mullins’ discharge. After finding that the General Counsel had

made out a prima facie showing, the ALJ proceeded to evaluate

whether Palace had established that it would have discharged

Mullins even in the absence of his protected activity. St. Pete

Times Forum, 2004 WL 1701333, at *22. The ALJ noted that,

although Palace characterized Mullins’ remark as “sexual

harassment,” “there is no evidence of any sexual advance by

Mullins.” Id. at *23. The ALJ then discussed the Company’s

written policies prohibiting “indecent conduct or language,”

noting that the policies include a progressive disciplinary system

whereby “‘[t]ermination is the last step’” in the disciplinary

progression. Id. Finally, the ALJ found that, in the only other

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comparable disciplinary incident in the record, another

employee who used “vulgar and profane language towards

customers” was only warned after his first offense. This

employee was not fired until after a repeat offense. On this

record, the ALJ held that the Company had not met its burden

under Wright Line. Id. 

The Board, at the outset of its decision, announced that it

had “decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and

conclusions.” Id. at *1 (footnoted omitted). The Board then

went on to render its own opinion, employing a rationale to

support the finding of a § 8(a)(3) violation that is entirely

different from the rationale offered by the ALJ. It is therefore

unclear whether the Board opinion is intended to supplement or

displace the ALJ’s rationale in sustaining the § 8(a)(3) charge.

The Board agreed with the ALJ that the General Counsel had

made out a prima facie case. Id. That conclusion was justified:

the ALJ found that Mullins’ supervisors had threatened to fire

him if the Union filed for a new election, and Mullins was

indeed fired shortly after the Union filed. The Board also agreed

that Palace had failed to establish that it would have discharged

Mullins even in the absence of his union activity. Id. at *2.

However, in considering whether the Company had met its

burden under Wright Line, the Board focused almost exclusively

on Palace’s claim that it would face potential liability under

Title VII if it did not dismiss Mullins for his alleged offensive

statement to Castillo.

In following this approach, the Board stated that the ALJ’s

decision rested on a finding that Palace “failed to show that it

would have discharged Mullins even in the absence of his union

activity in order to avoid the imposition of Title VII liability.”

Id. (emphasis added). The Board’s characterization of the ALJ’s

decision is perplexing, because, although the ALJ did conclude

that there was “no evidence of any sexual advance by Mullins,”

the ALJ’s holding that Palace had violated § 8(a)(3) rested on

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findings that neither the Company’s “progressive disciplinary

system” nor the Company’s handling of “other documented

incident[s] regarding indecent conduct or language” could

explain Palace’s decision to fire Mullins. Id. at *23. The ALJ’s

analysis and concluding findings say nothing about Title VII.

Id. at *22-*23. Indeed, there is nothing in the ALJ’s opinion

even to suggest that Palace argued that the employer fired

Mullins in order to avoid the imposition of Title VII liability.

And Palace does not contend here that this affirmative defense

was specifically raised in the hearing before the ALJ.

Ignoring the ALJ’s stated grounds for finding a § 8(a)(3)

violation, the Board concluded that Palace had “not established

that it had reasonable grounds for determining that it had to

remove or discipline Mullins in order to avoid liability under

Title VII.” Id. at *2. The basis for this conclusion was the

Board’s view that Title VII liability would not arise from

Mullins’ single, isolated remark. Id. at *2 n.8. 

The problem here is that, in focusing on Title VII, the Board

misapplied Wright Line. The question under Wright Line is

whether the Company has established in fact that it would have

taken the same action in the absence of any anti-union animus.

It is not whether the Company has established that its actions

were “reasonable.” See Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio v.

NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[A]n employer

may discharge an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, or

no reason, so long as it is not for an unlawful reason.”); Meco

Corp. v. NLRB, 986 F.2d 1434, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (same).

The Board’s view that Palace was unreasonable in assuming that

failure to sanction Mullins might result in Title VII liability does

not, without more, indicate that Palace would not have fired

Mullins in the absence of anti-union animus. 

As noted above, the Board stated that it meant to affirm the

ALJ’s rulings, findings, and conclusions. But the Board’s

Wright Line analysis focuses solely on the Title VII issue and

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never addresses the ALJ’s evaluation of the Company’s written

policies and disciplinary practices. Therefore, we cannot be sure

to what extent the Board meant to incorporate the ALJ’s analysis

in those respects while merely rejecting any implication in the

ALJ’s decision that sexual harassment arises only in connection

with comments containing sexual advances.

In sum, we are unable to discern the precise basis upon

which the Board rested in reaching its conclusion that Mullins’

discharge violated the Act. The Board’s decision can be read in

at least three ways: (1) as concluding that the discharge was

unlawful because it was unnecessary to avoid the potential for

Title VII liability, and therefore substantively unreasonable; (2)

as finding that, because Palace’s Title VII concerns are so

unreasonable, and thus implausible, they must be a pretext for

discrimination; or (3) as adopting the ALJ’s finding that, in light

of Palace’s written policies and disciplinary practices, the

Company has not established that it would have discharged

Mullins even in the absence of his protected activity. Or, the

Board might have meant to say something else altogether. The

point is, we cannot tell. Because it is axiomatic that we may

review an agency’s order only on the reasoning supplied by the

agency in the order, see Williams Gas Processing - Gulf Coast

Co., L.P. v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1335, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943)), meaningful

judicial review requires us to remand the case to the Board for

clarification of its position on the § 8(a)(3) issue.

On remand, the Board should explain the precise reasoning

on which it means to rest its conclusion that Mullins’ discharge

violated the Act. The Board should specifically state which

portions of the ALJ’s analysis it adopts and which parts it

rejects. We also note that, although the ALJ appeared to

evaluate Mullins’ discharge solely under § 8(a)(3), using the

Wright Line framework, see St. Pete Times Forum, 2004 WL

1701333, at *23, the Board, without explanation, stated that it

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“agree[d] with the judge that [Palace] violated Section 8(a)(1)

and (3) when it discharged employee Peter Mullins,” id. at *1

(emphasis added). It is unclear whether the Board really meant

to find that Palace violated § 8(a)(1) when it fired Mullins and,

if so, on what grounds. The Board can address this issue on

remand.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we grant in part the Board’s

application for enforcement. We remand the case to the Board,

however, for clarification of its conclusion that Palace violated

the Act by discharging Mullins.

So ordered.

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