Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00005/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00005-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dependable Auto Shippers, Inc.
Defendant
Michael Mosso
Plaintiff

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 A copy of the original state court complaint is not on the 1

docket in this case (1:07-cv-00005-OWW-NEW).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Michael Mosso,

Plaintiff,

v.

Dependable Auto Shippers,

Inc.,

Defendant.

1:07-cv-00005-OWW-NEW

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (Doc.

17)

I. Introduction.

This case concerns damages to plaintiff Michael Mosso’s

(“Mosso”) 1973 Chevrolet Camaro by defendant Dependable Auto

Shippers, Inc. (“DAS”) while in transit from Michigan to

California. Before the court for decision is DAS’s motion to

dismiss Mosso’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).

II. Background.

Mosso filed his original complaint in state court. On 1

December 29, 2006, DAS removed the case to this Court on federal

question grounds under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate

Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. § 14706, et seq.) (“Carmack Amendment”). 

DAS filed a motion to dismiss on December 29, 2006, on the

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grounds that Mosso’s original complaint violated the Carmack

Amendment by seeking relief that was unavailable, which included

damages exceeding $250 and attorney’s fees. By stipulation of

the parties and court order, DAS’s motion to dismiss was

withdrawn effective June 13, 2007.

On July 2, 2007, Mosso filed his FAC, which includes the

following allegations. DAS or its agents agreed to transport

Mosso’s 1973 Chevrolet Camaro (“Camaro”) from Michigan to

California. Mosso’s Camaro sustained damage during transit from

Michigan to California, including theft of a DVD player, an oil

stain on the driver’s side of the car, a scratched front wheel

well, and the bottoming out of the driver’s side rear corner

panel. DAS drove the Camaro approximately 175 miles without

authorization. DAS also concealed the original bill of lading to

induce Mosso to believe DAS had not damaged the Camaro. The FAC

seeks general damages in excess of $20,000 plus pre-judgment

interest, costs, and attorney’s fees pursuant to the bill of

lading. Attached to the FAC is what appears to be a one-page

bill of lading listing damages to a black, 1973 Chevy Camaro.

On July 17, 2007, DAS filed a motion to dismiss Mosso’s FAC. 

On August 13, 2007, Mosso filed his opposition to DAS’s motion. 

DAS did not file a reply brief.

III. Legal Standard.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a

motion to dismiss may be made if the plaintiff fails “to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.” The question before the

court is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail,

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rather, it is whether the plaintiff could prove any set of facts

in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. See

Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). “A complaint

should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Van Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d

977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002).

In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court

“accept[s] all factual allegations of the complaint as true and

draw[s] all reasonable inferences” in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th

Cir. 1999); see also Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979, 983

(9th Cir. 2002). A court is not “required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

IV. Discussion.

DAS seeks to dismiss Mosso’s FAC to the extent it seeks

damages in excess of $250 and attorney’s fees. DAS contends that

damages in excess of $250 and attorney’s fees are not recoverable

under the Carmack Amendment. DAS maintains damages are

recoverable for the actual value of the shipped item or $250 when

the value of the item is not declared on the bill of lading. DAS

also maintains attorney’s fees are not recoverable under the

Carmack Amendment and are not provided for in the contract at

issue. 

Mosso contends he is entitled to damages exceeding $250 and

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attorney’s fees. In support of his position, Mosso maintains DAS

offers valuation coverage to its customers when its shipping

services are purchased. Mosso purchased valuation coverage when

he contracted for shipment service from DAS. According to Mosso,

this valuation coverage provides him with up to $50,000 in

coverage. Mosso made a claim with DAS for damages to the Camaro

immediately after the car arrived. Mosso also maintains

attorney’s fees are recoverable in this case pursuant to the

terms of the bill of lading.

A. Overview of the Carmack Amendment.

“The Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act

establishes motor carrier liability for the actual loss or injury

to the property a carrier transports.” Campbell v. Allied Van

Lines Inc., 410 F.3d 618, 620 (9th Cir. 2005). “The Carmack

Amendment preempts many state and common law claims against

carriers in an effort to create a national scheme of carrier

liability for goods damaged or lost during interstate shipment.” 

Id. 

The controlling provision applicable here is 49 U.S.C. §

14706. Section 14706 provides in relevant part

(a) General liability.--

(1) Motor carriers and freight forwarders.--A

carrier providing transportation or service

subject to jurisdiction under subchapter I or

III of chapter 135 shall issue a receipt or

bill of lading for property it receives for

transportation under this part. That carrier

and any other carrier that delivers the

property and is providing transportation or

service subject to jurisdiction under

subchapter I or III of chapter 135 or chapter

105 are liable to the person entitled to

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recover under the receipt or bill of lading.

The liability imposed under this paragraph is

for the actual loss or injury to the property

caused by (A) the receiving carrier, (B) the

delivering carrier, or (C) another carrier

over whose line or route the property is

transported in the United States . . . when

transported under a through bill of lading

and, except in the case of a freight

forwarder, applies to property reconsigned or

diverted under a tariff under section 13702.

Failure to issue a receipt or bill of lading

does not affect the liability of a carrier. A

delivering carrier is deemed to be the carrier

performing the line-haul transportation

nearest the destination but does not include a

carrier providing only a switching service at

the destination.

(c) Special rules.--

(1) Motor carriers.--

(A) Shipper waiver.--Subject to the

provisions of subparagraph (B), a carrier

providing transportation or service

subject to jurisdiction under subchapter

I or III of chapter 135 may, subject to

the provisions of this chapter (including

with respect to a motor carrier, the

requirements of section 13710(a)),

establish rates for the transportation of

property (other than household goods

described in section 13102(10)(A)) under

which the liability of the carrier for

such property is limited to a value

established by written or electronic

declaration of the shipper or by written

agreement between the carrier and shipper

if that value would be reasonable under

the circumstances surrounding the

transportation.

(B) Carrier notification.--If the motor

carrier is not required to file its

tariff with the Board, it shall provide

under section 13710(a)(1) to the shipper,

on request of the shipper, a written or

electronic copy of the rate,

classification, rules, and practices upon

which any rate applicable to a shipment,

or agreed to between the shipper and the

carrier, is based. The copy provided by

the carrier shall clearly state the dates

of applicability of the rate,

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classification, rules, or practices.

(d) Civil actions.--

(1) Against delivering carrier.--A civil action

under this section may be brought against a

delivering carrier in a district court of the

United States or in a State court. Trial, if

the action is brought in a district court of

the United States is in a judicial district,

and if in a State court, is in a State through

which the defendant carrier operates.

(2) Against carrier responsible for loss.--A civil

action under this section may be brought

against the carrier alleged to have caused the

loss or damage, in the judicial district in

which such loss or damage is alleged to have

occurred.

(3) Jurisdiction of courts.--A civil action under

this section may be brought in a United States

district court or in a State court.

(4) Judicial district defined.--In this section,

“judicial district” means--

(A) in the case of a United States district

court, a judicial district of the United

States; and

(B) in the case of a State court, the

applicable geographic area over which

such court exercises jurisdiction.

(e) Minimum period for filing claims.--

(1) In general.--A carrier may not provide by

rule, contract, or otherwise, a period of less

than 9 months for filing a claim against it

under this section and a period of less than 2

years for bringing a civil action against it

under this section. The period for bringing a

civil action is computed from the date the

carrier gives a person written notice that the

carrier has disallowed any part of the claim

specified in the notice.

(2) Special rules.--For the purposes of this

subsection--

(A) an offer of compromise shall not

constitute a disallowance of any part of

the claim unless the carrier, in writing,

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informs the claimant that such part of

the claim is disallowed and provides

reasons for such disallowance; and

(f) Limiting liability of household goods carriers to

declared value.--

(1) In general.--A carrier or group of carriers

subject to jurisdiction under subchapter I or

III of chapter 135 may petition the Board to

modify, eliminate, or establish rates for the

transportation of household goods under which

the liability of the carrier for that property

is limited to a value established by written

declaration of the shipper or by a written

agreement.

(2) Full value protection obligation.--Unless the

carrier receives a waiver in writing under

paragraph (3), a carrier's maximum liability

for household goods that are lost, damaged,

destroyed, or otherwise not delivered to the

final destination is an amount equal to the

replacement value of such goods, subject to a

maximum amount equal to the declared value of

the shipment and to rules issued by the

Surface Transportation Board and applicable

tariffs.

(3) Application of rates.--The released rates

established by the Board under paragraph (1)

(commonly known as "released rates") shall not

apply to the transportation of household goods

by a carrier unless the liability of the

carrier for the full value of such household

goods under paragraph (2) is waived, in

writing, by the shipper.

 B. Attorney’s Fees.

DAS cites Accura Sys., Inc. v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 98

F.3d 874 (5th Cir. 1996) and PolyGram Group Distribution, Inc. v.

Transus, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1454 (N.D. Ga. 1997), for the

proposition that attorney’s fees are not recoverable under the

Carmack Amendment. 

DAS also maintains the contract at issue does not contain a

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provision for attorney’s fees. In support of its position, DAS

attached to its motion to dismiss three copies of the front-side

of a single bill of lading. In his opposition to DAS’s motion,

Mosso attached as Exhibit “D” the “Contract Terms and Conditions”

(“BOL Terms”), which are printed on the reverse side of DAS’s

bill of lading. Paragraph 14 of the BOL Terms provides: 

This Contract shall be governed by Title 49 U.S.C. §

14706 and the laws of the State of Texas where Title 49

is silent. Any action related to this Contract must be

brought in the federal court having jurisdiction in and

for Mesquite, Texas or the state court in Mesquite, Texas

in the event the federal court lacks jurisdiction.

Shipper waives trial by jury. Shipper waives all claims

against Carrier if actual written notice of the claim to

Carrier is not made within 60 days of the date of the

incident giving rise to the claim, and any civil action

related to this Contract is waived if not made within 2

years of the date the Carrier gives written notice of

denial of any part of the claim specified in the notice.

In any dispute regarding this Contract, the prevailing

party shall be entitled to payment by the losing party of

all attorneys’ fees, legal fees, and court costs

associated with the dispute. (Emphasis in original).

The last sentence of paragraph 14 of the BOL Terms clearly

indicates the prevailing party in a dispute under the contract is

entitled to attorney’s fees. “The bill of lading operates as

both the receipt and the basic transportation contract between

the shipper-consignor and the carrier, and its terms and

conditions are binding.” EF Operating Corp. v. American

Buildings, 993 F.2d 1046, 1050 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Texas & P.

Ry. Co. v. Leatherwood, 250 U.S. 478, 480-83 (1919)). DAS’s

claim the contract at issue does not provide for attorney’s fees

is meritless. As the BOL Terms clearly entitle DAS or Mosso to

attorney’s fees if either is a prevailing party, the inquiry

becomes whether § 14706 preempts paragraph 14’s attorney fee

provision.

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 The court’s opinion in Accura does not indicate the 2

relevant state law provision that the district court relied upon

to award attorney’s fees to the plaintiff.

9

Section 14706 does not provide for attorney’s fees. 

Neither Accura, PolyGram, nor any other case interpreting § 14706

addresses the validity of attorney’s fees provisions included

within a bill of lading. PolyGram involved damages arising out

of the delivery of sound recordings to a music store that was

under construction. PolyGram, 990 F. Supp. at 1456-58. PolyGram

addressed whether attorney’s fees and costs were recoverable

under a Georgia statute. The relevant state statute provided

that expenses of litigation, including attorney’s fees, were

allowable if the defendant acted in bad faith, was stubbornly

litigious, or caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and

expense. Id. at 1460. The court concluded, with little

analysis, that attorney’s fees and costs sought under a Georgia

statute were not recoverable because they are preempted by the

Carmack Amendment. Id.

Accura involved damages to specially coated aluminum

building materials that were shipped from Texas to California. 

Accura, 98 F.3d at 876. Accura was awarded damages and

attorney’s fees for damages to the building materials. Id. 

Relying on Strickland Transp. Co. v. American Distrib. Co., 198

F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1952), the court held attorney’s fees

authorized by state law are not recoverable in Carmack Amendment

actions. Accura, 98 F.3d at 877. In Strickland, however, 2

attorney’s fees were sought under Article 2226 of the Revised

Civil Statutes of Texas. Strickland, 198 F.2d at 547.

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The cases that recognize the availability of attorney’s fees

in Carmack Amendment cases arise under the attorney’s fee

provision found in 49 U.S.C. § 14708, which only applies to

damage or loss to “household goods” while in transport. See,

e.g., Campbell v. Allied Van Lines Inc., 410 F.3d 618 (9th Cir.

2005); Drucker v. O’Brien’s Moving and Storage Inc., 963 F.2d

1171 (9th Cir. 1992); Yakubu v. Atlas Van Lines, 351 F. Supp. 2d

482 (W.D. Va. 2004); Nichols v. Mayflower Transit, LLC, 368 F.

Supp. 2d 1104 (D. Nev. 2003). 

Section 14708(d) specifically provides for an award of

attorney’s fees to a shipper if three requirements are met. 

These cases do not provide any guidance for two reasons. First,

§ 14708(d) specifically provides for attorney’s fees, whereas §

14706–the provision under which this case arises–is silent

regarding attorney’s fees. Second, § 14708 applies only to

“household goods.” Household goods means

personal effects and property used or to be used in a

dwelling, when a part of the equipment or supply of such

dwelling, and similar property if the transportation of

such effects or property is–

(A) arranged and paid for by the householder,

except such term does not include property

moving from a factory or store, other than

property that the householder has purchased

with the intent to use in his or her dwelling

and is transported at the request of, and the

transportation charges are paid to the

carrier by, the householder; or

(B) arranged and paid for by another party.

49 U.S.C. § 13102(10). By definition, an automobile is not a 

household good because it is not a personal effect or personal

property “used in a dwelling.” Mosso does not argue the Camaro

is a household good. 

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Attorney’s fees were awarded in factually similar case,

Caspe v. Aaacon Auto Transport, Inc., 658 F.2d 613 (8th Cir.

1981), where the court affirmed the district court’s award of

attorney’s fees in a Carmack Amendment case to a shipper whose

Cadillac was damaged while being transported from California to

Iowa. The district court, however, awarded the shipper

attorney’s fees under the court’s inherent powers under Alyeska

Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), because

“the defendant’s conduct was most vexatious.” Caspe, 658 F.2d at

617-18. Caspe provides little guidance because the court awarded

the shipper attorney’s fees pursuant to its inherent powers

rather than under a state statute or contract provision. 

Here, Mosso seeks attorney’s fees pursuant to the attorney’s

fee provision in BOL Terms paragraph 14, and not pursuant to a

state statute. The cases DAS cite stand for the proposition that

a shipper cannot recover attorney’s fees pursuant to a state

statute in a proceeding brought under § 14706. As the cases

described above do not prevent the parties from contractually

providing for attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a

Carmack Amendment dispute, and the BOL Terms are binding on the

parties, EF Operating Corp., 993 F.3d at 1050, DAS’s motion to

dismiss Mosso’s FAC to the extent it seeks attorney’s fees is

DENIED.

C. Damages in Excess of $250.

The Carmack Amendment permits a carrier to establish rates

for the transportation of property (other than household goods)

under which the liability of the carrier is limited to a value

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established by a written or electronic declaration of the shipper

or by written agreement between the carrier and shipper if the

value would be reasonable under the circumstances surrounding the

transportation. 49 U.S.C. § 14706(c)(1)(A).

DAS has attempted to limit its liability to Mosso under §

14706 through paragraph 8 of the BOL Terms. Paragraph 8 provides

Carrier shall in no event be liable for acts of God, acts

of Public Authority, acts of public enemy, acts of

Shipper, or inherent vice. Shipper agrees that the

liability of the carrier for loss or damage to the

Vehicle is limited to a maximum of $250.00 per shipment,

pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 14706.

Carrier’s limit of liability is $250.00 unless valuation

coverage is purchased prior to Carrier’s possession.

Valuation coverage is available at an additional charge

at the time of booking with a maximum coverage up to the

Actual Cash Value of the Vehicle or $50,000.00, whichever

is less and is subject to a $100.00 deductible. Any

claim for loss or damage must be noted on the condition

report at the time of delivery and actual notice of the

loss must be made, in writing to Dependable Auto

Shippers, 3020 East Hwy 80, Mesquite, TX 75149, and

marked “ATTENTION CLAIMS”. In the event of paid total

loss, the Carrier has the right to salvage.

If Shipper requires the Carrier to assume greater

liability, Shipper must declare a higher value (“Actual

Cash Value”), in writing on this document prior to

shipment (see Form A, below). Shipper will pay in

advance additional charges for valuation coverage

commensurate with the higher declaration of the Actual

Cash Value. Failure to declare a higher “Actual Cash

Value” and to pay the additional charges associated

therewith, in advance, will serve to limit Carrier’s

liability for any damage or loss to the Vehicle to

$250.00.

_______________________________________________________

Form A: The Actual Cash value of the vehicle is hereby

declared by the shipper to be $______. The Shipper may

elect to pay, in advance, additional charges for

valuation coverage. Valuation coverage on the vehicle

shall be in the amount not to exceed the Actual Value

of the vehicle or a maximum of $50,000, which ever is

less.

_______________________________________________________

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(Emphasis in original). 

Additionally, the front-side of the bill of lading states

If Shipper does not enter the Actual Cash Value on Form

A and pay additional charges for valuation coverage in

advance of shipment, the $250.00 limitation of

liability pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 14706, shall apply. 

All claims are subject to a $100 deductible. Carrier

does not guarantee delivery on any particular schedule.

(Emphasis added). 

As previously mentioned, “[t]he bill of lading operates as

both the receipt and the basic transportation contract between

the shipper-consignor and the carrier, and its terms and

conditions are binding.” EF Operating Corp. v. American

Buildings, 993 at 1050. “As a contract, it is subject to general

rules of construction under contract law.” Id. “[A]s a contract

of adhesion between the carrier and shipper, it is strictly

construed against the carrier.” Id. (citing Interocean S.S.

Corp. v. New Orleans Cold Storage & Warehouse Co., Ltd., 865 F.2d

699, 703 (5th Cir. 1989).

Here, the front-side of the bill of lading and the third

paragraph of BOL Terms paragraph 8 indicate if the Shipper does

not enter the Actual Cash Value on Form A and pay additional

charges for valuation coverage in advance of shipment, the

$250.00 limitation of liability pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 14706

shall apply. 

Form A, however, was not completed. This oversight,

according to DAS, limits its liability to $250. This argument

fails. For DAS to limit its liability to $250, Mosso must (1)

fail to enter the Actual Cash Value on Form A, and (2) fail to

pay additional charges for valuation coverage. Here, Mosso did

not complete the Actual Cash Value in Form A, but he did pay for

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valuation coverage. A letter from DAS indicates valuation

coverage was purchased. The letter further indicated that “[t]he

liability of DAS is limited to $250.00, unless you have purchased

Valuation coverage at an additional cost.” 

The only sentence that appears to limit DAS’s liability is

the first sentence of the third paragraph of BOL Terms paragraph

8, which provides “[i]f Shipper requires the Carrier to assume

greater liability, Shipper must declare a higher value (“Actual

Cash Value”), in writing on this document prior to shipment (see

Form A, below).” However, this sentence must not be read in

isolation, but in conjunction with the subsequent sentences found

in the third paragraph of BOL Terms paragraph 8. As a contract

of adhesion between the carrier and shipper, it is strictly

construed against the carrier. EF Operating Corp., 993 F.2d at

1050. DAS’s motion to dismiss Mosso’s FAC to the extent it seeks

damages in excess of $250 is DENIED.

V. Conclusion.

DAS’s motion to dismiss Mosso’s FAC to the extent it seeks

damages in excess of $250 and attorney’s fees is DENIED on both

grounds. DAS shall file an answer within the time period

prescribed under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(a)(4).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 18, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

474bb4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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