Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05666/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05666-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dodur Ltd.
Defendant
Goes International, AB
Plaintiff
Zhou Ming
Defendant
Li Zhe
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER (No. 3:14-cv-5666-LB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

San Francisco Division

GOES INTERNATIONAL, AB, a corporation

Plaintiff,

v.

DODUR LTD., et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. 3:14-cv-05666-LB 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART THE DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF

PERSONAL JURISDICTION 

[Re: ECF No. 34]

INTRODUCTION

Goes International, AB is a Swedish company that created, copyrighted, and then distributed a

bubble-shooting video game called Bubble Bust! (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ECF No. 27, ¶¶

2, 5-8, 29.)1

 It sued Dodur Ltd. and its shareholders (and game developers) Li Zhe and Zhou Ming, all

residents of China, for copyright infringement, alleging that they copied Bubble Bust! and marketed

the “virtually identical” and infringing games Puzzle Bubble Free! and Puzzle Bubble Sea. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 3,

12-15.) The defendants moved to dismiss Goes’s initial complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction,

and Goes amended as a matter of right (adding fact allegations in its amended complaint that it took 

from Dodur’s declarations submitted in support of the first motion to dismiss). (Id.; see ECF No. 20.) 

The defendants again moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Motion, ECF No. 34.) The 

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ORDER (No. 3:14-cv-5666-LB) 2

court dismisses the individual defendants and denies the motion to dismiss Dodur.

STATEMENT

The fact allegations are from the FAC and from declarations that the parties submitted, including

the declarations of Wang Li Ming (the CEO of Dodur) and Mikael Makila (the CEO of Goes).

I. DISTRIBUTION OF BUBBLE BUST!

Goes “conducts a great deal of its business in California, including distributing its games almost 

exclusively through California businesses including Google Inc.’s Google Play and Apple Inc.’s App

Store.” (Id. ¶ 2.) Goes has “published” Bubble Bust! on the Apple App Store since January 2011 and

on the Google Play online store since September 2012. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 10.) 

From the release of Bubble Bust! to the present, Goes “directed more marketing efforts for Bubble

Bust! at the United States than any other country. Bubble Bust! has been downloaded over 2.5 million

times in the United States, generating substantial revenues from these downloads.” (Id. ¶ 2.) Goes

“earns advertising revenue from people downloading and playing Bubble Bust!” (Id.) Goes also “earns

money when players make in-game purchases of additional content or game perks.” (Id.) The

“advertising revenue comes almost exclusively from American companies.” (Id.) “Bubble Bust! has

derived significantly more revenue from the U.S. market than any other market, including China. . . .”

(Makila Decl., ECF No. 37-1, ¶ 52.) For example, during the period up to September 24, 2013, 76% of

advertising revenues came from U.S. players, according to AppFigures, which Goes “used to track our

revenue data for that period.” (Id. & Ex. 18.) “[T]his particular data is not available . . . postSeptember 24, 2013, but . . . from tracking the data on a continual basis . . . this trend of much more

U.S. revenue more or less continued.” (Id.) AppFigures also shows that approximately 40% of

revenue from in-game and premium-version purchases is from U.S. players. (Id. ¶ 53 & Exs. 19-20.)

Downloads are about 15% higher in China than in the U.S., but advertisers pay more for ad views

from players in the U.S. than from players in China. (Id. ¶ 54.) Thus players in the U.S. and other

affluent countries in Western Europe generate “significantly more revenue” than players in China.

(Id.) Goes “loses money” if players play an infringing game instead of Goes’s game. (FAC ¶ 2.) 

II. COPYING BUBBLE BUST! AND DISTRIBUTING THE INFRINGING GAMES

The defendants “distribute games through California distributors, including the Apple App Store.”

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ORDER (No. 3:14-cv-5666-LB) 3

(Id. ¶ 3.) Goes alleges that the games Puzzle Bubble Free! and Puzzle Bubble Sea were “copied nearly

in . . . [their] entirety directly from Bubble Bust!” (Id. ¶ 12.) The defendants “obtained access to

Bubble Bust! by downloading it from the Apple App Store prior to January of 2012.” (Id. ¶ 12.)

“Apple provides a host of tools . . . [and] support services and guidelines to third-party developers

who are licensed to provide applications through the App Store. Thus all applications for the Apple

App Store were built, in part, by Apple.” (Id. ¶ 60.) In a February 4, 2015 email, Li Zhe said that

Dodur’s former project manager in charge of the games copied Bubble Bust! “to cut his own work

load.” (Id. ¶ 26; Lesowitz Decl., ECF No. 37-6, ¶ 5 & Ex. 4.) (Dodur now disputes this, saying that it

created the games from scratch. (Wang Decl., ECF No. 34-1, ¶ 10.)) 

Goes contends that in January 2012 (for Puzzle Bubble Free!) and March 2013 (for Puzzle Bubble

Sea), the defendants infringed Goes’s copyright by “publishing and placing [the games] on the market

in the United States and in California through various websites including on the Apple App Store.”

(FAC ¶¶ 12-13, 56.) The defendants updated Puzzle Bubble Free! frequently to incorporate new levels

taken from Bubble Bust! (Id. ¶ 20.) By distributing the games and their updates worldwide (including

in the U.S. and California) via the App Store, the defendants “generated revenue from the game

through services including Google Inc’s Ad Mob.” (Id. ¶ 12.) Apple’s principal place of business and

its servers are in the Northern District of California. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 54.) 

Dodur was the listed developer for Puzzle Bubble Free! (Id. ¶ 12.) The listed developer for Puzzle

Bubble Sea was Li Zhe and later changed to Zhou Ming. (Id. ¶ 13.) Goes alleges “on information and

belief” that both distributed Puzzle Bubble Sea through developer accounts in their own names, not

through a corporate account. (Id.) Because Zhou Ming and Li Zhe are shareholders, project managers,

and the game developers, Goes alleges on information and belief that they approved Dodur’s decision

to upload the games to the Apple App Store. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) Dodur responds that they did not have

authority to make strategic decisions, which were made by a committee. (See, e.g., Li Decl., ECF No.

34-3, ¶ 10.) Dodur’s CEO confirms this position. (Wang Decl., ECF No. 34-1, ¶ 8.) The uploads were

to, and the downloads were from, Apple’s servers in the Northern District. (FAC ¶ 54.)

To distribute the game through the App Store, Goes alleges that Zhou Ming and Li Zhe “had to 

have agreed to the Apple developer license, stated they had the rights to distribute Puzzle Bubble Sea, 

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ORDER (No. 3:14-cv-5666-LB) 4

chosen which countries to distribute the game in, and received revenues directed to their private

accounts.” (Id. ¶ 13; see id. ¶ 60 (Apple’s requirements to offer an application through the App store).)

When uploading the games (as they did 33 times for versions of the games), the defendants selected the

countries where the games would be available for download, could have limited it to select countries or

excluded the U.S., and instead chose to include the U.S. (Id. ¶ 58.) According to Goes, one selects

worldwide distribution or specifies the countries. (Makila Decl., ECF NO. 37-1, ¶ 16.) Goes’s review

shows that the defendants uploaded Puzzle Bubble Sea in March 2013 for distribution to all countries

except China, which had no downloads in the first five months of distribution. (Id. ¶¶ 16-19.) More

specifically, Goes looked at download rankings for countries, saw that China had no ranking, and

concluded that the only logical explanation is that the person who uploaded games “unclicked” China

as a forum for distribution. (Id. ¶¶ 18-22.) According to Dodur, “worldwide” is the default setting, it

used the default, it was not asked to “include specific geographical areas,” and it released the games

initially in China too. (Wang Decl., ECF No. 34-1 at ¶¶ 35-36.) The interfaces that Dodur uses to

upload games and generate revenues are in Chinese. (Id. ¶ 37.) App developers must publish their

applications through Google and Apple because they “virtually have a monopoly.” (Id. ¶ 35.) Dodur

does not target specific geographic areas. (Id. ¶ 40.)

Goes complained to Apple about the infringement, and Apple removed the games from the App

Store on November 23, 2013. (FAC ¶ 21.) The games “are still widely available on other sites;” Goes

provides examples of (a) a site for an unauthorized distributor of Apple iOS games and (b) Google

Play in the form of an apparently early version of Puzzle Bubble Free! that is available for U.S.

players. (Id. ¶ 21; see Makila Decl., ECF No. 37-1, ¶¶ 23-24, 26-30 & Exs. 3-7; Lesowitz Decl., ECF

No. 37-6, ¶ 7) The defendants uploaded their games under a new name on the App Store in 2014, with

distribution limited to Asia; the distributor is “one Yu Zhao,” but “internally, the game still included

DODUR LTD’s logo and information.” (FAC ¶ 28.)

III. REVENUES TO DODUR FROM INFRINGING GAMES

Puzzle Bubble Free! and Puzzle Bubble Sea are free downloads. (Wang Decl. ¶ 24.) Revenue from

free games is from advertising and in-game (or in-app) purchases. (See id.) The games contain

advertisements that operate through Google’s AdMob and, “on information and belief, Apple Inc’s

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iAd and Yahoo! Inc’s Flurry.” (FAC ¶ 23.) Goes claims that the defendants receive revenue when

their games are played and “have reaped millions of dollars in profits through the infringement” of

Goes’s games. (Id.) Google and Yahoo! are both Delaware corporations with their principal places of

business in the Northern District of California. (Id. ¶ 24)

“On information and belief,” Goes alleges that via the App store, (1) Dodur’s infringing “games

were downloaded at least 15 million times” before Apple removed them, and (2) Dodur “distributed at

least 150,000 copies of Puzzle Bubble Free! to users in the United States” and “approximately 15,000

copies of Puzzle Bubble Free! to users in California.” (Id. ¶¶ 22, 55.) Goes elaborates:

On or about May 15, 2015, DODUR LTD. filed incomplete data in this case regarding the

number of downloads of Defendants’ Games. Even according to this incomplete data from 

Yahoo!’s Flurry service, it turns out that Defendants’ Games were downloaded more in the

United States and worldwide than PLAINTIFF initially estimated. For example, the Flurry data

indicates that Puzzle Bubble Free! was downloaded at least 49,477 times in the United States

from the Apple App Store [starting in June 2012, six months after release]; this represents

merely a minimum. However, the Flurry data does not include any data for downloads during the

first six months or so that Puzzle Bubble Free! was available for distribution on the App Store.

According to App Annie, a reliable third-party provider of data on application downloads that is

trusted in the industry, Puzzle Bubble Free! had a popularity ranking in the United States on the

App Store that was higher during the first six months of its release than during the period

thereafter. (App Annie provides reliable rankings of applications by downloads in a genre, but

does not provide the exact number of downloads of an application.) Also, applications tend to be

most popular during the time after initial release. Also, it is unclear how the Flurry data was

obtained: depending on how the data was obtained, it could have not included all U.S.

downloads even for the period that Flurry tracked. California accounts for approximately 12.2-

percent of the population of the United States.

(Id. ¶ 55 & n.3.) Goes extrapolates from this to reach its total of at least 150,000 downloads: 

It is undisputed that over 50,000 people in the U.S. downloaded Defendants’ Games starting in

June of 2012, which was six months after Puzzle Bubble Free! was released (Defendants

provided no data for the first six months). Accounting for the hard evidence that downloads were

higher in the U.S. during the first three months of distribution, and the unreliability of

Defendants’ data, total distribution is estimated to be over 150,000. 

(Opposition, ECF No. 37 at 10-11, citing FAC ¶ 55 and Makila Decl. ¶ 43 & Ex. 13.) Dodur responds

in part that the number of downloads is different than the number of people who download. (Wang

Decl. ¶ 8.) As to Puzzle Bubble Sea, Goes alleges, again on information and belief, that Dodur

“distributed approximately 3,000 copies of Puzzle Bubble Sea to users in the United States via the

Apple App Store” and “approximately 360 copies . . . to users in California.” (FAC ¶ 56.)

Goes alleges Dodur’s revenues on “information and belief.” For Puzzle Bubble Free!, Dodur

earned at least $35,000 in revenue in the United States: at least $27,000 in advertising revenues and at

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least $8,000 from in-game purchases. (Id. ¶ 57.) For Puzzle Bubble Sea, Dodur earned at least $1,000

in revenue in the United States: at least $750 from advertising revenues and at least $250 from ingame purchases. (Id.) Both games had at least four in-game purchases at prices ranging from $0.99 to

$3.99 through the Apple Store. (Id.) 

Dodur responds that Goes has no support for its figures, U.S. revenue was less than $2,200, and

U.S. downloads were 0.39% of worldwide downloads. (Wang Decl., ECF No. 34-1, ¶¶ 13, 32.)

Worldwide downloads were (1) 13,077,797 downloads of Bubble Free! from June 19, 2012 to May

12, 2015, and (2) 203,383 downloads of Bubble Sea from March 6, 2013 (the date it became

available) to May 12, 2015. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) Dodur estimates that China downloads are 88% of

worldwide user downloads: (1) 11,458,093 China downloads of Puzzle Bubble Free! from June 19,

2012 to May 12, 2015, and (2) 167,341 China downloads of Puzzle Bubble Sea from March 6, 2013 to

May 12, 2015. (Id. ¶¶ 21-23.) Dodur says that in-app purchases were available, but the revenue for all

of Dodur’s games was insignificant: $241.50 in 2012 and 2013. (Id. ¶ 24.) No in-app purchases are

attributable to Puzzle Bubble Sea. (Id.) Its revenue comes from advertising. (Id. ¶ 25.) Dodur only

tracks worldwide revenues (and not its U.S. revenues) from Puzzle Bubble Free! and Puzzle Bubble

Sea: its records show total worldwide revenue for both of $41,430.08 broken down as follows: (1)

$41,116.37 for Puzzle Bubble Free! from January 8, 2012 to May 12, 2015 and (2) $313.71 for Puzzle

Bubble Sea until May 12, 2015. (Id. ¶ 27.) Dodur used sampling methodologies to estimate the total

U.S. advertising revenues of slightly less than $2,200. (Id. ¶¶ 28-32.)

Goes objects to Dodur’s conclusions based on foundation (because Mr. Wang was not part of

Dodur at the time of the infringing activities), discrepancies in calculations, and reliability (due to a

flawed methodology). (Opposition, ECF No. 37 at 11-12 (citing Makila Decl., ECF No. 37-1, ¶¶ 12,

39-45); Objections, ECF No. 42.) Goes’s CEO opines (from experience working on applications that

generate ad revenue and from his review of industry data from trusted and reliable sources) that it is

unreasonable for an application that generates revenue from providers such as AdMob to generate less

than $100,000 from an application that received 13 million downloads. (Makila Decl., ECF No. 37-1,

¶ 39.) His review of the Wang Declaration shows 897 million playing sessions from roughly 13

million new users (an average of 69 sessions per user with a median length of 4.5 minutes). (Id. ¶ 40.)

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That means 310 minutes per average user (69 sessions x 4.5 minutes). (Id.) Based on playing the game

and his experience in the industry, it is reasonable to assume that the game displays 2 ads per minute.

(Id.) That is 310 minutes x 2 = 620 ads per user, which (based on the AdMob 92% fill rate in the

Wang Declaration) results in $1.04 million in total advertising revenue (based on average ad revenue

of 14 cents per 1,000 ad views = $.08 per user x 13 million = $1.04 million). (Id.) With 52,000 U.S.

users, that should be (even according to the “underreported data” from the Wang declaration) $8,320

(52,000 users x $.16). (Id. ¶ 41.) He analyzes metrics and concludes that revenue should be higher in

the first five months of the game’s release (where Dodur omitted – or does not have – data.) (Id. ¶¶

42-44.) He also asserts that Mr. Wang cannot extrapolate from Apple iAd data the revenues

attributable to in-app purchases. (Id. ¶ 45.)

Dodur objects to the Makila declaration as an improper opinion because Mr. Makila is not

qualified as an expert. (Reply, ECF No. 39 at 8.) 

The court overrules both parties’ objections: there is adequate foundation for the court to consider

the declarations (although the objections go to the weight that the court gives them).

Goes asked Dodur to stipulate to take jurisdictional discovery. (Lesowitz Decl., ECF No. 37-6, ¶

3.) Dodur responded that the number of downloads and the amount of revenue are not relevant to

whether there is personal jurisdiction. (Id.) At oral argument, Goes represented that the downloads in

the U.S. and worldwide (and presumably revenue) could be ascertained via third-party subpoenas.

IV. OTHER CONTACTS WITH THE FORUM

Goes alleges that Dodur marketed its games to the U.S. and targeted U.S. players. (FAC ¶ 62.)

Dodur had an English-language website (in addition to its Chinese-language website). (Id.) Both

games were playable in English, Chinese, or Japanese. (Id.) Dodur “provided online customer service

directed at the United States . . . [and] communicated directly with American consumers by providing

answers in English to questions posed in English by American consumers.” (Id.)

To upload the games to the Apple App store, the defendants had to appoint Apple as their agent

“in regards to marketing and delivery” of their games and thus “appointed a California corporation as

its agents to distribute Defendants’ Games within California and the rest of the United States.” (Id. ¶

59.) They agreed to submit to jurisdiction in California in any lawsuit with Apple regarding the

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games. (Id.) To offer an application through its App store, a developer must agree to the Apple iOS

Developer Program License Agreement with Apple and pay a $99 fee. (Id. ¶ 60.) “To further control

the applications offered through the App store, Apple provides third-party developers with review

guidelines, and conducts a review of all applications submitted for inclusion in the App store for

compliance with these documents.” (Id.)

Dodur’s infringing games generated revenues from Google, Inc.’s AdMob Service. (Id. ¶ 63.) To

use AdMob, the defendants had to agree to jurisdiction in California in any lawsuit with Google

regarding the games. (Id.) Similarly, Goes alleges “on information and belief” that the defendants

used Yahoo!’s Flurry service for marketing and research to generate advertising revenue and had to

agree to jurisdiction in courts located in San Francisco in any lawsuit over the terms of service with

Yahoo! (Id.) When the defendants entered into agreements for services with Apple, Google, and

Yahoo!, they warranted they did not infringe any third party’s intellectual-property rights, and they

agreed to indemnify Apple, Google, and Yahoo! “if these warranties of IP ownership were false (and

all such warranties were false).” (Id. ¶ 64.)

Advertisements to U.S. players of the defendants’ games were targeted to the U.S. market:

“[p]layers in the United States saw advertisements that were appropriate to American consumers[]

such as advertisements in English for American businesses and American products.” (Id. ¶ 65.) 

Dodur states online that it “specializes in the development of games in the United States, China,

Japan, and other markets.” (Id. ¶ 66.) The defendants frequently distribute applications through the

Apple App Store and Google Play; since the beginning of 2012 Dodur distributed at least 19

applications, Zhou Ming distributed at least four, and Li Zhe distributed at least seven. (Id. ¶ 67.)

Dodur declares that its employees all live in China and have never traveled to the United States.

(Wang Decl., ECF No. 34-1, ¶ 34.)

V. OTHER INFORMATION

At oral argument, the court asked whether – given the takedown of the games from the Apple App

Store – there was a negotiated solution (such as a stipulated judgment) that would give Goes a formal

mechanism to take down infringing copies of the games that might exist on other sites. Dodur said that

it would agree to that solution. Goes explained that it wanted to obtain data from all of Dodur’s sales

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and then brief whether it is entitled to damages calculated from Dodur’s worldwide revenues (as

opposed to damages from revenues attributable to U.S. customers). See Los Angeles News Serv. v.

Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 340 F.3d 926, 928 (9th Cir. 2003). Dodur said that it suspected that Goes

was no longer developing games.

At the hearing, the parties acknowledged that Dodur was assuming responsibility for the alleged

copyright infringement by declaring that the individually named defendants Li Zhe and Zhou Ming

(who no longer work at Dodur) had no independent authority to do anything without company

approval and have no ownership rights in the two infringing games. (Accord Wang Decl., ECF No.

34-1, ¶ 8, 10; Li Decl., ECF No. 34-3, ¶¶ 8-10; Zhou Decl., ECF No. 34-4, ¶¶ 8-10.) Goes said that it

named them to avoid a situation where the company blamed the individuals and said (essentially) that

the important thing was that the court find personal jurisdiction over Dodur. 

Dodur points out that Goes did not register Bubble Bust! within three months of publication.

(Motion, ECF No. 34 at 10-11, citing FAC ¶¶ 7-9, 12, 15 (publication and registration dates).) That

means that there are no statutory fees or damages under 17 U.S.C. § 412(2). (Id., citing 17 U.S.C. 

§ 412(2) (no award of statutory damages or attorney’s fees after “first publication of the work and

before the effective date of its registration, unless such registration is made within three months after

the first publication of the work”).) Dodur points out that Goes admits that Bubble Free! and Bubble

Sea are “virtually the same.” (Id. at 11, citing FAC ¶ 15.) Dodur asserts that as a result, statutory

damages and attorney’s fees are not recoverable for Bubble Sea either. (Id., citing Derek Andrew, Inc.

v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 700-01 (9th Cir. 2008).)

ANALYSIS

The defendants move to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(2). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d

1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008). “[T]he court may consider evidence presented in affidavits to assist in its

determination and may order discovery on the jurisdictional issues.” Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d

915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). The plaintiff “need only make a prima facie showing of personal

jurisdiction.” Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009);

Data Disc Inc. v. System Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977). The plaintiff cannot

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“simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint,” but uncontroverted allegations in the complaint

must be taken as true, and “[c]onflicts between the parties over statements contained in the affidavits

must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797,

800 (9th Cir. 2004). A prima facie showing means that “the plaintiff need only demonstrate facts that

if true would support jurisdiction over the defendant.” Unocal, 248 F.3d at 922. 

“The general rule is that personal jurisdiction over a defendant is proper if it is permitted by a

long-arm statute and if the exercise of that jurisdiction does not violate federal due process.” Pebble

Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “[B]oth the California

long-arm statute and Rule 4(k)(2) – what is often referred to as the federal long-arm statute – require

compliance with due process requirements.” Id. (citations omitted); accord Daimler AG v. Bauman,

134 S. Ct. 746, 753 (2014); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). Due process requires that the defendant

must have minimum contacts with the forum such that the assertion of jurisdiction in that forum

“‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at

1155 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945)).

There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general and specific. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754-

55. Goes does not assert general personal jurisdiction but instead asserts specific personal jurisdiction.

(See Opposition, ECF No. 37 at 16.) Goes does not argue that the defendants purposefully directed

their actions at California; instead it asserts that the defendants have “minimum contacts” with the

United States as a whole that subject them to personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(k)(2). (Id. at 16-26.) 

 “The exercise of Rule 4(k)(2) as a federal long-arm statute requires the plaintiff to prove three

factors:” (1) the claim against the defendants arises under federal law; (2) the defendants are not

subject to jurisdiction in any state’s court of general jurisdiction; and (3) exercising jurisdiction

comports with due process. Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1159; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). The first

factor is met: the claim is a federal copyright claim. The second factor is met too: the defendants are

foreign defendants who reside in China, and it is uncontested that they are not subject to jurisdiction

in any state’s court of general jurisdiction. Moreover, because proving lack of personal jurisdiction in

every state “could be quite onerous,” and because “it is the defendant, not the plaintiff, that likely

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possesses most of the information necessary to do so,” “[a] defendant who wants to preclude use of

Rule 4(k)(2) has only to name some other state in which the suit could proceed.” Holland Am. Line

Inc. v. Wartsila N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 461-62 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation omitted).

“[A]bsent any statement from . . . [Dodur] that it is subject to the courts of general jurisdiction in

another state, the second requirement of Rule 4(k)(2) is met.” Id. at 462.

The remaining factor is that the exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with due process.

Id. “The due process analysis under Rule 4(k)(2) is nearly identical to the traditional personal

jurisdiction analysis with one significant difference: rather than considering contacts between the . . .

[defendants] and the forum state, we consider contacts with the nation as a whole.” Id. (citing Pebble

Beach , 453 F.3d at 1159). “The inquiry whether a forum State may assert specific jurisdiction over a

nonresident defendant focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”

Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (quotation omitted). The Ninth Circuit employs a

three-part test to determine whether a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts to be subject to

specific personal jurisdiction:

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate

some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he

purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum,

thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;

(2) The claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s

forum-related activities; and

(3) The exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e.

it must be reasonable.

Washington Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The plaintiff has the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of the test. Id. The burden then shifts

to defendants to present a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Id.

I. PURPOSEFUL DIRECTION

The first prong requires a defendant to purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting 

business activities within the forum or purposefully direct activities toward the forum. See 

Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). Evidence of availment is

typically action taking place in the forum that invokes the benefits and protection of the laws in the

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forum. Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1155. Goes argues only purposeful direction in the form of actions

outside the forum aimed at the United States. (Opposition, ECF No. 37 at 18.) Indeed, courts analyze

tort claims—such as the copyright claim here—under the purposeful direction test. See Mavrix Photo,

Inc. v. Brand Techns., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011); LiveCareer Ltd. v. Su Jia Techn.

Ltd., No. C 14-03336-JST, 2015 WL 1448505, at * 3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2015).

Purposeful direction exists when a defendant commits an act outside the forum that was intended

to and does in fact cause injury within the forum. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984).

Under the “effects” test, the defendant must (1) commit an intentional act (2) expressly aimed at the

forum (3) that causes harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum. Washington

Shoe, 704 F.3d at 673 (quoting Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1228). The “‘effects’ test . . . focuses on the forum

in which the defendant’s actions were felt, whether or not the actions themselves occurred within the

forum.” Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1228. “However, referring to the Calder test as an ‘effects’ test can be

misleading. For this reason, we have warned courts not to focus too narrowly on the test’s third

prong–the effects prong–holding that ‘something more’ is needed in addition to a mere foreseeable

effect.” Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1156 (citation omitted).

It is undisputed that distributing infringing games is (if true) an intentional act. The parties dispute

whether Dodur’s acts were expressly aimed at the U.S. and whether Goes suffered jurisdictionally

significant harm in the U.S. See Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1229, 1231. 

A. Acts Expressly Aimed at the United States

Goes identifies the following acts by the defendants that were expressly aimed at the U.S.: 

(1) downloading Bubble Bust! from Apple’s App Store (housed on Apple’s U.S. servers); (2) using

Apple software to create a copy; (3) uploading the infringing games to the App Store for distribution;

(4) making the games available for distribution to U.S. consumers; (5) generating revenue from

U.S.advertising services; (6) agreeing to jurisdiction in California with Apple and Google for any

lawsuits involving the games; (7) agreeing to make Apple their agents for distribution and marketing;

(8) distributing a version of Puzzle Bubble Free! via the unauthorized distributor of Apple iOS 

games; and (9) taking steps to appeal to English speakers. (Opposition, ECF NO. 37 at 18-19.) 

The parties have not cited, and the court has not identified, a copyright case that addresses 

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definitively the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant whose only action

aimed at the U.S. is the distribution of a mobile application to consumers (including U.S. consumers)

who obtain it from U.S.-hosted websites such as the Apple App store. But based on Ninth Circuit

cases in the virtual and bricks-and-mortar worlds, the court thinks that the defendants’ acts of

distributing infringing games to U.S. consumers and generating revenue (and diverting consumers

from Goes’s games) are acts “expressly aimed” at the U.S. 

In Holland America, a purposeful-availment case, the Ninth Circuit found no specific jurisdiction

over a Finnish manufacturer responsible for a defective engine part that resulted in a fire on a cruise

ship in Haiti in part because (1) it sold no products directly into the U.S. market, (2) its holding

company’s web presence was passive and provided only information on products, and (3) its

“unspecified” advertisements in various marine publications “hardly constitute significant contacts.”

See 485 F.3d at 454, 459-62. Because the case involved only the introduction of a product into the

stream of commerce and other contacts with the U.S. that were “scant, fleeting, and attenuated,” the

court did not find nationwide jurisdiction. Id. at 462. The court contrasted cases where foreign

defendants had much more extensive contacts, such as defendants conspiring to bomb sites in New

York or an foreign insurer directly insuring hundreds of claims in the United States. Id. (citing Mwani

v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 364 F.3d

646, 651 (5th Cir. 2004)). Unlike Holland America, this case involves the intentional distribution of

infringing products in the United States to U.S. consumers.

Another national-contacts case is Pebble Beach, a trademark-infringement case, where the alleged

infringer ran a hotel in England without targeting any advertising toward U.S. consumers. 453 F.3d at

1153-54. The defendant operated a website with a .com domain name (as opposed to a .uk or .eu

domain name), hosted Americans at the hotel, and was a dual citizen who had worked in California

and knew about the famed golf course. Id. The court held that those extraterritorial acts were not

expressly aimed at the United States. Id. at 1159. In contrast to those attenuated connections, the

defendants distributed infringing products in the United States to U.S. customers for revenue.

At the hearing, Dodur argued that it was merely putting its products in the stream of commerce

and did not direct any acts to the United States. It cited Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of

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Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987). In Asahi, a Japanese tire-valve manufacturer sold its products to a Chinese

tire manufacturer, knowing its product would be incorporated in tires sold in the U.S. Id. at 106. Mere

“awareness” is not the substantial connection necessary to find minimum contacts. Id. at 112. Other

cases similarly hold that merely putting products into the stream of commerce is not action expressly

aimed at a forum. See, e.g., Holland America, 485 F.3d at 462. Dodur’s argument essentially is that

the only way to deliver its app to its targeted base (China) is via the App Store. And its selection of a

default of worldwide distribution is not purposeful direction because it does not involve “targeting”

activities (such as ads or marketing to U.S. customers) that one sees in Internet purposeful-direction

cases. (See Motion, ECF No. 34 at 22-23.) All it is doing, it says, is putting its product into the stream

of commerce the only way it can. (Id.) It points to the low revenue numbers as corroboration for its

point that it is not aiming its acts to the U.S. forum. 

The court thinks that Dodur is doing more than putting its product in the stream of commerce with

no acts aimed at the forum. The world-wide distribution here included U.S. customers and happened

not by an intervening decision of a distributor such as the Chinese tire maker in Asahi but instead by

Dodur itself. The allegedly infringing game is a copy of a Goes game popular with U.S. players, who

receive ads targeted to them. Goes receives revenue mainly due to U.S. players. It is significant that an

infringing game is being distributed in a marketplace that includes U.S. players, even if the means for

distribution is selecting the default of “worldwide” distribution. Dodur suggests (but does not say

overtly) that selection is passive, but according to Goes, one has to “select” default or country-specific

distribution (and thus necessarily include the U.S. by selecting the default). The court resolves any

conflicts in the declarations in Goes’s favor, see Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800, and concludes (on

this record) that the distribution of the games for commercial gain in the U.S. forum constitutes

purposeful direction. See Gucci America, Inc. v. Wang Huoquing, No. C 09-05969-JCS, 2011 WL

31191, at * 5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2011) (“Personal jurisdiction is appropriate where an entity is

conducting business over the internet and has offered for sale and sold its products to forum

residents.”), adopted, 2011 WL 30972 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2011). A contrary result might mean that

Goes would have no forum to challenge the alleged infringement of its U.S. copyrights. Cf. Zherebko

v. Reutskyy, No. C 13-00843 JSW, 2013 WL 4407485, at * 5 (N.D. Cal. August 12, 2013) (suggesting

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2

 The court does not base its holding on the presence of a forum-selection clause in the

defendants’ agreements with Apple and Google, the defendants’ English-language (at least in part)

website, the defendants’ other games, or distributing a version of Puzzle Bubble Free! via the

unauthorized distributor. The first fact is relevant for lawsuits about the agreements, but the court is not

convinced that it is relevant for the purposeful-direction argument that Goes advances here. The second

fact at best establishes that the defendants have a website that offers information that does not appear

to be targeted to a U.S. audience. Compare Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1159. After all, English is a

lingua franca. Goes’s declaration that it is uncommon for Chinese gaming culture to publish games in

English does not change the court’s conclusion. (See O’Young Decl., ECF No. 37-7, ¶ 5.) The third and

fourth facts are not relevant to the injury alleged here. See NuboNau, Inc. v. N.B. Labs, Ltd., No. C 10-

2631-LAB, 2012 WL 843503, at *4 (S.D. Cal. March 9, 2012).

ORDER (No. 3:14-cv-5666-LB) 15

the availability of an alternate forum); see also Doe v. Geller, 533 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1003 (N.D. Cal.

Feb. 4, 2008) (discussing application of U.S. copyright law extraterritorially and to cross-border

communications).2

 The court also thinks the amount of revenue is better addressed in the next section

about the extent of the harm. 

Dodur argues that Goes is a foreign company and “has no presence” in the U.S. Reply, ECF No.

39 at 10-11 (citing Zherebko, 2013 WL 3307485, at *3.) It elaborates that a plaintiff rarely claims

injury in a state other than its own state, and a corporation suffers harm in its place of business. (Id. at

11-12.) Zherebko involved a Ukrainian game developer’s lawsuit alleging copyright infringement and

breach of an oral contract by a European developer who distributed an infringing game through Apple

and Google. See 2013 WL 4407485, at *1. The plaintiff was not a California resident and did not

allege any ownership interest in a California business, ownership or lease of any property, or any bank

account or telephone listing. Id. at *3. The court held that absent indicia of residency in California

such as property ownership, voting registration, and place of business, the European developer’s acts

were not “expressly aimed” at any victim in California. Id. (“if the victim is not a resident of

California, even an intentional misuse of intellectual property is not ‘expressly aimed’ at California”)

(citing Love v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601, 609 n.4 (9th Cir. 2010)). 

Zherebko does not preclude this lawsuit. That case involved no ties to the forum California (other

than an allegation that disputes in connection with the game were subject to the jurisdiction and venue

of courts in Santa Clara County). Id. at *1. Unremarkably, the court held that there could be no injury

in the forum if the victim had no presence in it. By contrast, Goes points to its substantial business and

revenue in the United States generated from U.S. players. Zherebko’s citation to Love does not change

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the outcome either. Love said that the “expressly aimed” prong “can be met” where a plaintiff alleges

that the defendant individually targeted him by misusing his property on the defendant’s website for

the purpose of competing with the plaintiff in the forum. Love, 611 F.3d at 609 n.4 (citing Brayton

Purcell, 606 F.3d at 1129-30). It did not say “can only be met.”

Other cases support the conclusion that a plaintiff can sue for copyright infringement in a forum

where the plaintiff suffers injury to its business interests. For example, in Mavrix, a Florida company

with L.A. offices sued an Ohio-based celebrity-gossip website for copyright infringement for posting

the plaintiff’s photographs. See 647 F.3d at 1221-22. The court found specific personal jurisdiction in

the Central District of California based on the defendant’s interactive website with a large national

audience. Id. at 1230. The court observed that the focus of the effects test is where the injury is felt,

not where the actions took place. Id. at 1231. That determination can involve several factors, including

the interactivity of a defendant’s website, the geographic scope of the defendant’s commercial

ambitions, and whether the defendant individually targeted a plaintiff known to be a foreign resident.

Id. at 1229 (citing Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1156-58; Brayton Purcell, 606 F.3d at 1129; Panovision

Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1998); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130

F.3d 414, 417-20 (9th Cir. 1997)). The court concluded that the defendant used the plaintiff’s

copyrighted photographs as part of its exploitation of the California market for its personal gain,

including revenue from third-party advertisements targeting California visitors to its website. Id. at

1229-30. It did not matter that the plaintiff also suffered harm in Florida: “[o]ur precedents recognize

that in appropriate circumstances, a corporation can suffer economic harm both where the bad acts

occurred and where the corporation has its principal place of business.” Id. at 1231 (quotation

omitted). 

Here, the defendants allegedly copied Goes’s game and distributed infringing games to U.S.

players, resulting in roughly 50,000 undisputed downloads and (extrapolating from that number)

possibly 150,000 total downloads and resulting revenues. As in Mavrix, there is exploitation of the

forum market for commercial gain and resulting harm to the copyright holder. The defendants’ actions

are geared toward distribution of its allegedly infringing products to U.S. consumers via a U.S.

commercial platform. That also makes this case different from DFSB Kollective Co. v. Bourne, where

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there was no evidence connecting California consumers to the foreign defendant’s website that

permitted free illegal downloads of music. 897 F. Supp. 2d 871, 874-76 (N.D. Cal. 2012). It also is

different from cases that involve only website sales without any direct marketing to forum consumers.

See, e.g., NuboNau, Inc. v. NB Labs, Ltd., No. C 10-2631-LAB, 2012 WL 843503, at *3-*4 (S.D. Cal.

Mar. 9, 2012). It is different too from cases where the plaintiff creates the defendant’s contacts with

the forum. See id. (the plaintiff’s agents placed the two orders at issue).

The defendants nonetheless try to distinguish Mavrix (and similar cases involving non-resident

plaintiffs) as all involving at least some physical presence by the plaintiff in the forum. Reply, ECF

No. 39 at 12 (referring to brick-and-mortar stores, employees, offices, agents for service of process,

and payment of taxes). But stores are not just physical any more: they are virtual. And even in virtual 

marketplaces, acts can be and are aimed at the forum when the consumers are in the forum and the

revenues are earned (or diverted) in the forum. After all, the “effects test” focuses on “the forum in

which the defendant’s actions were felt, whether or not the actions themselves occurred within the

forum.” Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1228. The Mavrix court observed that the defendant’s “theory of

jurisdiction would allow corporations whose websites exploit a national market to defeat jurisdiction

in states where those websites generate substantial profits from local consumers.” Id. at 1231.

“[W]here individuals purposefully derive benefit from their interstate activities, it may well be unfair

to allow them to escape having to account in other States for consequences that arise predictably from

such activities; the Due Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a territorial shield to avoid

interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed.” Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v.

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1985) (quotation omitted)). 

B. Jurisdictionally Significant Harm

That does not end the inquiry because the “expressly aimed” requirement is a necessary but not

sufficient condition for jurisdiction. Id. In order to establish jurisdiction, a plaintiff also must show

that it suffered jurisdictionally significant harm in the forum, which here is the United States. Id.

First, it does not matter that Goes may also have suffered jurisdictionally significant economic

harm in other forums such as its principal place of business in Sweden. See Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1221-

22. Again, “[o]ur precedents recognize that in appropriate circumstances, a corporation can suffer

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economic harm both where the bad acts occurred and where the corporation has its principal place of

business.” Id. at 1231 (quotation omitted). “[J]urisdictionally significant harm may be suffered in

multiple forums.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

Second, as in Mavrix, the defendants allegedly interfered with the plaintiff’s copyright, resulting in

foreseeable economic harm in the U.S. in the form of revenues. Id. at 1231-32. The issue is whether

the harm is jurisdictionally significant. Id. at 1231 (quotation omitted). 

In Mavrix, the court concluded that the harm there was jurisdictionally significant. Id. at 1231-32.

The plaintiff Mavrix had 35 copyrighted photographs of the singer Fergie and her husband, the actor

Josh Duhamel, vacationing in the Bahamas. Id. at 1222. The defendant Brand was a “large media

entity” with a national audience that ran a celebrity gossip website that was “very popular.” Id. The

Mavrix court found that the republishing interfered with the exclusive ownership of the photos and

destroyed their market value, resulting in foreseeable economic loss, not only in Florida (Mavrix’s

principal place of business), but also in California. Id. at 1222, 1231. “A substantial part of the photos’

value was based on the fact that a significant number of Californians would have bought publications

such as People and Us Weekly in order to see the photos.” Id. at 1231-32. Brand’s “actions destroyed

this California-based value.” Id. at 1232.

Goes’s allegations of harm are not as compelling as those in Mavrix, where the defendant

published celebrity photos on a popular site that obviously and foreseeably destroyed publication

value in the California forum. And they differ in kind from the significant harm in Graduate Mgmt.

Admission Council v. Raju, where the defendant operated a website in India that sold copyrighted

questions from the GMAT test to customers around the world. 241 F. Supp. 2d 589, 590-91 (E.D. Va.

2003). The website in India targeted U.S. consumers, gave testimonials (three of the total six) from

U.S. consumers, and promoted the materials as allowing “American citizens and others to catch up

with [superior] test takers from ‘India, China, Korea, Japan, and Taiwan’ who . . . score better than

‘their American or European counterparts . . . because most of them have access to 100 percent of

unpublished previous questions. . . .” Id. at 598 (quoting promotional text). The court easily found acts

directed at the United States “with the manifested intent of engaging in business” within the United

States and thus found personal jurisdiction comporting with due process. Id. at 598-99. 

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Still, the court thinks that Goes has alleged enough. Dodur distributed infringing games in the

U.S., resulting in revenue generated from U.S. players, including revenue from ads targeted to that

U.S. audience. That is foreseeable economic harm in the forum. The dollar amounts may or may not

be relatively small compared to the destruction of value in Mavrix. Certainly the parties disagree and

attack each others’ methodologies. And both parties’ methodologies are imperfect because they are

based on extrapolations from data, sampling, or other proxies for damages. That said, the revenues

that Goes estimates are not inconsequential, and there is missing data for the first six months after

release of Puzzle Bubble Free! At this stage, the court resolves disputes about the damages in favor of

Goes and concludes that it made a prima facie showing that the infringing conduct caused a

jurisdictionally significant amount of harm in the United States.

C. The Individual Defendants

Dodur argues that the “fiduciary shield” doctrine prevents personal jurisdiction over the individual

defendants Li Zhe and Zhou Ming. (Motion, ECF No. 34 at 23.) Goes responds that they were

shareholders, the game developers, and the persons who necessarily uploaded the games through their

individual developer accounts, filled out the agreements, selected the countries for distribution, and

caused the distribution of the infringing games. (See Statement, supra.)

Under the fiduciary-shield doctrine, “a person’s mere association with a corporation that causes

injury in the forum state is not sufficient in itself to permit that forum to assert jurisdiction over the

person.” Davis v. Metro Prods., Inc., 885 F.2d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 1989). The employee’s contacts

must give rise to some identifiable theory of liability such that the employee’s contacts on behalf of

the corporate employer may justifiably be imputed to the employee. Matsunoki Grp., Inc. v.

Timberwork Oregon, Inc., No. C 08-040780 CW, 2009 WL 1033818, at *3 (N.D. Cal. April 16, 2009)

(citation omitted). The requirement is fulfilled if “a plaintiff shows that a corporate employee is the

moving, active, conscious force behind the infringing activity” by, for example, demonstrating that the

employee “directs, controls, ratifies, or participates in the infringing activity” or “acts as the guiding

spirit and the active directing hand in full charge of [the corporation’s] operations.” Id. at *3-*4

(quoting International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723, 728 (9th Cir. 1964)). 

As discussed at oral argument, Goes’s allegations about the employees’ roles were based on 

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“information and belief” and inferences. Dodur, in response, put forth uncontroverted evidence that

the employees did not act independently and acted instead at the corporation’s behest. The court

concludes that Goes did not show that the employees were the moving force behind the infringing

activity and thus did not make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction.

II. ARISING OUT OF FORUM-RELATED ACTIVITIES

For a claim to arise out of or relate to a defendant’s forum-related activities, it must be a result of

but-for causation: but for the defendant’s acts, a plaintiff is not injured. See Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d

1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995). The court concludes that the distribution of the application via the U.S.

platforms satisfies this test. See Live Career, 2015 WL 1448505, at *5; Zherebko, 2013 WL 4407485,

at *4.

III. REASONABLENESS

This prong of the test for specific jurisdiction provides that the exercise of jurisdiction must

comport with fair play and substantial justice. Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322. Similarly, the Fifth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause bars the exercise of personal jurisdiction in a forum so

inconvenient as to deny a defendant “fair play and substantial justice.” See 4A Charles A. Wright and

Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1068.1 (3d. ed. 2002); Cal. Prac. Guide: Fed. Civ. P.

before Trial § 3:33.11 (The Rutter Guide 2015) (citing Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas

Pension Fund v. Reimer Expess World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 945 (7th Cir. 2000)). 

To determine whether jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant comports with fair play and

substantial justice, a court considers seven factors: (1) the extent of the defendant’s purposeful

interjection into the forum’s affairs; (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) the

extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state; (4) the forum’s interest in adjudicating

the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy, (6) the importance of the

forum to the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief, and (7) the existence of an

alternative forum. Core-vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus., 11 F.3d 1482, 1487-88 (9th Cir. 1993). There is a

presumption of reasonableness when the first two prongs have been met, and a defendant thereafter

must present a “compelling case” that jurisdiction is unreasonable. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. 

First, the “extent of the purposeful injection” is analogous to the purposeful direction analysis. See 

Case 3:14-cv-05666-LB Document 51 Filed 08/26/15 Page 20 of 21
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER (No. 3:14-cv-5666-LB) 21

Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988); Zherebko, 2013 WL

4407485, at *4. The court finds that this element supports jurisdiction based on its analysis finding

purposeful direction. Second, the burden on the foreign defendants militates against jurisdiction. See

Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2002). Third, the court disagrees with the

defendants that a conflict with the sovereignty of China weighs against jurisdiction. Fourth, the forum

has an interest in providing redress for copyright holders who do business here. Fifth, this may be the

only forum for Goes, which addresses factors 5, 6, and 7.

In sum, the court concludes that Dodur has not presented a compelling case that jurisdiction is

unreasonable. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. The forum is not so inconvenient that it denies

Dodur “fair play and substantial justice”: after all, it purposefully injected itself into the forum by

distributing its products to U.S. consumers via an online platform.

* * *

The court makes these final observations. If it had been able to conclude that distribution in the

United States was truly incidental or accidental, the result would be different. And if the record

established the revenue streams more definitively as jurisdictionally insignificant, the result might be

different too. But given the resolution of disputed facts in favor of Goes, see Schwarzenegger, 374

F.3d at 800, and on this record, Goes has made a prima facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction

over Dodur based on Dodur’s contacts with the United States. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).

CONCLUSION

 The court grants the motion to dismiss the individual defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction

and denies the motion to dismiss Dodur. This disposes of ECF No. 34.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 26, 2015 ___________ ______________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:14-cv-05666-LB Document 51 Filed 08/26/15 Page 21 of 21