Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01226/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01226-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Karla Elizabeth Godinez Pino
Petitioner
Israel Felipe Lira Pino
Petitioner
Matilda Isabel Lira Pino
Petitioner
Israel Felipe Lira Saldana
Petitioner
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent
Elizabeth Pino Peralta
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1226

___________________________

Israel Felipe Lira Saldana; Elizabeth Pino Peralta; Matilda Isabel Lira Pino; Israel

Felipe Lira Pino; Karla Elizabeth Godinez Pino,

lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioners,

v.

Loretta E. Lynch, U.S. Attorney General,

lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent.

____________

Petition for Review of an Order of the

 Board of Immigration Appeals

____________

 Submitted: October 22, 2015

 Filed: April 28, 2016

____________

Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Israel Felipe Lira Saldana, his wife, Elizabeth Pino Peralta, and their children,

Matilda, Israel, and Karla, petition for review of a decision of the Board of

Immigration Appeals denying their applications for asylum, withholding of removal,

and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We conclude that the Board’s

Appellate Case: 15-1226 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/28/2016 Entry ID: 4393060 
decision was supported by substantial evidence, and we therefore deny the petition for

review.

I.

The petitioners are natives and citizens of Mexico. They entered the United

States in August 2011 and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief

under the Convention against Torture. The petitioners contend that members of the

Matazetas gang in Mexico will persecute them if they are returned to Mexico, because

the Matazetas believe that Elizabeth and her sister, Angelica Pino Peralta, were

romantically involved with members of a rival criminal organization known as Los

Zetas. In terms of the governing statutes, the petitioners asserts that the Matazetas

will persecute them based on their membership in a particular social group, and that

the Mexican government is unwilling or unable to control the Matazetas. See 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1).

At a hearing before an immigration judge, daughter Karla testified concerning

an incident that occurred in August 2011, in the state of Veracruz, while she resided

at the home of Elizabeth’s mother with Angelica, Angelica’s four children, and

Elizabeth’s brother. According to Karla, masked men armed with weapons entered

the house, assaulted Karla’s uncle, and asked where to find Angelica and “Chula,” a

nickname used by Elizabeth. The men mentioned former boyfriends of Angelica who

were members of the Zetas gang and sought information about the Zetas from the

women. The men threatened to rape and torture Angelica and Elizabeth when they

found them. According to Karla, the intruders took a seven-year-old son of

Angelica’s outside for “interrogation” and influenced him to tell a “commander” that

Elizabeth had dated a member of the Zetas. After this incident, Angelica (who had

been hiding in the home) and Karla fled the area and eventually traveled to the United

States. But the armed men returned later and abducted Karla’s uncle and

grandmother, who remain missing. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 15-1226 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/28/2016 Entry ID: 4393060 
When Elizabeth learned about the home invasion, she fled the country with

Israel and the other two children. Israel testified that he believed the family was being

targeted because of Angelica’s romantic relationship with a member of Los Zetas. He

said that a friend in Veracruz had called him after the family departed and said that

unidentified men had said they would kill anyone found in the petitioners’ home. 

Elizabeth reported hearing later from a friend in Mexico that she should “not come

back because they’re still looking for you.” 

The petitioners’ expert witness, Dr. Thomas Boerman, testified that drugtrafficking organizations are engaged in criminal activity throughout most of Mexico. 

He explained that the Matazetas claim “to be essentially nationalistic protectors of the

state of Veracruz and its population.” He opined in a declaration that the Mexican

government “is essentially powerless to contain” criminal organizations, and that

“once targeted, the gravity of the threat toward an individual does not diminish across

time.”

The immigration judge credited the testimony of the petitioners and Dr.

Boerman, but rejected the claims for asylum and withholding of removal on multiple

grounds. The Board affirmed the decision. The Board concluded that the petitioners

had not identified a particular social group that warranted protection under the statute,

because “the record does not sufficiently reflect that Mexican society would perceive

family members of someone who dated gang members as sufficiently separate or

distinct.”

The Board also found that the petitioners were not eligible for relief because the

source of the alleged harm was not the Mexican government or a group that the

government was unwilling or unable to control. The Board observed that Elizabeth’s

grandmother filed a police report about the home invasion, that the police continued

to investigate the incident, and that the government was “making attempts to control

criminals and drug traffickers.” The Board ruled alternatively that it was reasonable

-3-

Appellate Case: 15-1226 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/28/2016 Entry ID: 4393060 
for the family to relocate within Mexico, because Dr. Boerman’s testimony did not

establish that the Matazetas were a threat outside of Veracruz. Like the immigration

judge, the Board rejected the family’s claim for relief under the Convention against

Torture because they did not establish that the Mexican government would acquiesce

in torture.

We review the Board’s decision for substantial evidence on the record as a

whole, Menendez-Donis v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2004), and cannot

disturb its findings of fact “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to

conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502

U.S. 478, 481 & n.1, 483-84 (1992). Where the Board adopted the reasoning of the

immigration judge, we consider the two decisions together. Falaja v. Gonzales, 418

F.3d 889, 894 (8th Cir. 2005). 

II.

The Attorney General may grant asylum to aliens who are unwilling to return

to their home country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on

account of “membership in a particular social group.” See 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1). The petitioners argue that the Board erred by

considering the wrong proffered social group. They also challenge the Board’s

alternative reasons for rejecting their claims for relief.

The petitioners contend that they are members of a “particular social group”

defined as the Lira-Pino family, which consists of twelve persons related to Elizabeth

who lived in two households in Veracruz. One household includes the adult

petitioners and two of the children; the other household consists of the third child,

Karla, and the seven other relatives with whom she resided. The petitioners assert that

“family” is an established particular social group under the asylum statute, and that

the Board erred in ruling that they failed to allege persecution based on a protected

-4-

Appellate Case: 15-1226 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/28/2016 Entry ID: 4393060 
ground. The government responds that while the petitioners did say during the

administrative process that their proposed social group was “family,” they also

defined the group as “relatives of a person who had a romantic relationship with a

gang member,” and that the Board properly rejected a claim based on that proposed

social group.

The definition of the proffered particular social group in this case has been

something of a moving target. In oral argument before the immigration judge, counsel

for petitioners referred to a particular social group as “family” or “family members.” 

A.R. 276, 327, 524. Counsel also explained that the social group was based on

familial relationship to Angelica, who experienced an “actual romantic relationship

with two members of the Zetas,” and to Elizabeth, who had a “perceived relationship

with a Zeta.” A.R. 526. The immigration judge understood the claimed social group

to be “family members of Angelica who dated several Zeta members” or “family

members of women who date gang members.” A.R. 231-32. 

In their notice of appeal to the Board, the petitioners claimed a fear of

persecution based on membership in a particular social group defined as “the Peralta

family’s kinship with a family member who is an imputed associate of Los Zetas gang

and persecuted by a rival gang, the Matazetas.” A.R. 168. In their brief to the Board,

the petitioners argued that the immigration judge erred by defining the particular

social group as “family members of women who date gang members,” and urged that

the particular social group claimed was instead “the Pino family,” which they defined

as the two adults and three children who are petitioners in this appeal. A.R. 117-18. 

The Board’s decision then addressed the proposed social group of “family members

of someone who dated gang members.” In their brief to this court, the petitioners

assert that the Board was mistaken, and that the proposed social group is the “LiraPino family,” which they now define to include not only the five petitioners, but rather

the two “households” and twelve persons described above.

-5-

Appellate Case: 15-1226 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/28/2016 Entry ID: 4393060 
As the government appears to acknowledge, a fair reading of the record shows

that the petitioners did proffer to the Board their own specific “family” as a particular

social group underlying their claim for asylum. The Board, however, ruled only that

the group described as “family members of someone who dated gang members” was

not sufficiently separate or distinct to qualify as a particular social group under the

statute. 

We cannot tell whether the Board, in rejecting the proposed social group that

it described, meant to reject the petitioners’ specific family as well. Given petitioners’

contention that the Matazetas planned to kill all family and friends associated with the

Zetas, A.R. 95, a decision including one family of a friend of the Zetas as a protected

social group logically might require including all families of all friends of the Zetas. 

The Board elsewhere has rejected “family members” as a proposed social group when

threats affect members of numerous families in a society, as opposed to one family

uniquely, see Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 585 & n.2 (B.I.A. 2008), but the

Board did not articulate that rationale here. We do not know whether the Board

rejected petitioners’ family as a particular social group because it was part of a

broader group of families that the Board considered too diffuse or amorphous to

qualify, or whether the Board simply failed to analyze the right question.

The Supreme Court has emphasized that the decision whether a family

constitutes a “particular social group” is a matter that should be decided by the Board

in the first instance. Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186-87 (2006) (per curiam). 

The Board did not address the point directly in this case, and we thus cannot resolve

whether the petitioners have identified a particular social group under the statute.

The government contends, however, that if the Board should have considered

petitioners’ family as the proposed social group, then the Board’s ruling should be

upheld on alternative grounds. The Board ruled that petitioners were ineligible for

relief because they cited fear of persecution by private actors, not the Mexican

-6-

Appellate Case: 15-1226 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/28/2016 Entry ID: 4393060 
government, and did not show that the government was unwilling or unable to control

the private actors. The Board also concluded that it was reasonable for petitioners to

relocate to a different part of Mexico to avoid the feared harm. To prevail, the

petitioners must show that no reasonable adjudicator could have reached those

conclusions. 

These alternative grounds concern whether the petitioners established a wellfounded fear of “persecution” within the meaning of the asylum statute. Persecution

is harm inflicted either by the government or by persons or an organization that the

government is unwilling or unable to control. Valioukevitch v. INS, 251 F.3d 747, 749

(8th Cir. 2001). To establish persecution based on the conduct of private actors, an

applicant must show that the government either condones the conduct or is unable to

protect the victims. Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2005). Neither

difficulty controlling private behavior nor failure to solve every crime or to act on

every report is sufficient to meet the standard. Id.; see De Castro-Gutierrez v. Holder,

713 F.3d 375, 381 (8th Cir. 2013); Salman v. Holder, 687 F.3d 991, 994-95 (8th Cir.

2012); Suprun v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 1078, 1081 (8th Cir. 2006); Hasalla v. Ashcroft,

367 F.3d 799, 804 (8th Cir. 2004). Whether a government is “unable” to control a

private actor such that non-governmental actions constitute persecution “is a factual

question that must be resolved based on the record in each case.” Menjivar, 416 F.3d

at 921. Even where an alien shows a well-founded fear of persecution upon return to

his place of origin, moreover, the government can defeat a claim for asylum by

showing that the alien reasonably can relocate within his home country to avoid

persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(ii), (b)(3).

Petitioners contend that the Mexican government is unwilling or unable to

control the Matazetas gang. They cite the fact that police in Veracruz have not solved

the home invasion or the abduction of two relatives, and that police in the state of

Puebla declined to take action when petitioner Lira Saldana reported the crimes. 

These facts are insufficient to compel a conclusion in favor of petitioners. Petitioners

-7-

Appellate Case: 15-1226 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/28/2016 Entry ID: 4393060 
and their relatives did not report the home invasion or abductions to authorities in

Veracruz until one to two months after the incidents, A.R. 376, yet petitioners

acknowledged that police acted on their complaint and continued to investigate the

matter. A.R. 378-79. That police in Veracruz could not solve a crime committed by

masked men and reported well after the fact does not dictate a finding that the

government is unable to control persecution by the gang. Nor does the decision of

police in the state of Puebla to refer Lira Saldana back to police in the state of

Veracruz, A.R. 451, compel a finding of unwillingness or inability to control. The

offenses were committed in Veracruz, and the Board reasonably could determine that

police in Puebla simply directed petitioner to the correct jurisdiction.

Petitioners rely on the testimony of their expert to demonstrate an inability of

the Mexican government to control the Matazetas. Dr. Boerman testified that “when

you’ve got the kind of uncontrolled carnage that you see going on in Mexico,” it is

“clear that the government simply doesn’t have the capacity and/or [the] will” to

control criminal gangs. A.R. 494. According to Boerman, Mexico’s security minister

recently acknowledged that “40 percent of the country is really no longer under

government control,” and that “when it comes to public security and the capacity to

contain and control these groups who have essentially usurped the state in many

respects . . . , it’s becoming more clear that there’s questions about whether Mexico

is any longer a functioning state.” A.R. 495-96.

The government responds with evidence that the Mexican government has

dedicated substantial resources to controlling criminal organizations. More than 3,000

federal police officers were fired in August 2010 in an effort to purge official

corruption. A.R. 1050. In reaction to the Matazetas, after petitioners left the country,

the Mexican government deployed federal police and military troops to Veracruz,

A.R. 577, 1020, and reported a significant drop in violence in that area. A.R. 577. 

This is not to say that the Mexican government has eliminated criminal gangs or that

there is no difficulty in controlling these organizations. But a government that is

-8-

Appellate Case: 15-1226 Page: 8 Date Filed: 04/28/2016 Entry ID: 4393060 
“unable” to control criminal activity cannot mean anything and everything short of a

crime-free society; the standard is more akin to a government that has demonstrated

“complete helplessness” to protect victims of private violence. E.g., Salman, 687 F.3d

at 995; Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000). Inability to control private

actors is an imprecise concept that leaves room for discretion by the agency. Given

the documented efforts of the Mexican government to combat the private violence at

issue here, we are not prepared to say that no reasonable adjudicator could reach the

Board’s conclusion. See De Castro-Gutierrez, 713 F.3d at 381 (rejecting claim that

Colombian government was unable to control violence inflicted by the Revolutionary

Armed Forces of Colombia).

Important, too, is the Board’s conclusion that it was reasonable for petitioners

to relocate within Mexico to avoid a threat of persecution by the Matazetas. Veracruz

is the locus of gang activity perpetrated by the Zetas and Matazetas. Dr. Boerman, the

petitioners’ expert, characterized the Matazetas as a gang whose role was “to clean the

state of Veracruz from the scourge of the Zetas.” A.R. 496-97. Boerman testified that

the activity of the Matazetas was “concentrate[d] in the state of Veracruz,” and he did

not have “any information about their activity out of Veracruz.” A.R. 512. Although

Boerman adverted to the potential that 40 to 50 percent of Mexico is no longer under

government control, the implication of course is that 50 to 60 percent is under

government control, and Boerman himself suggested that the government has more

control in Mexico City (some 240 miles from Veracruz) and in the states of Oaxaca

and Puebla. A.R. 495, 521-22. This evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that

internal relocation was reasonable and could avoid persecution of petitioners.*

*

The dissent refers to evidence that a Mexican government official advised

petitioners to “get out of there immediately,” and construes the evidence to mean that

petitioners “were ‘under a big risk’” and should “leave the country for their safety.” 

This hearsay evidence concerned a telephone call placed by petitioner Lira Saldana’s

father to “a person who works in the government” while petitioner was still in the state

of Veracruz at the city of Xalapa. A.R. 444, 457-58. According to petitioner Lira

-9-

Appellate Case: 15-1226 Page: 9 Date Filed: 04/28/2016 Entry ID: 4393060 
The petitioners cite Boerman’s opinion that relocation would not be viable as

a safe strategy for repatriation in the long term. A.R. 504-05. Boerman’s opinion was

based in part on an assumption that Matazeta gang members had tracked the

petitioners to a point near the United States border and threatened them in an

anonymous telephone call to people who were housing petitioners. A.R. 362. The

immigration judge and the Board, however, reasonably found that the vague hearsay

evidence concerning this telephone call was insufficient to show that relocation was

unlikely to avoid persecution. Boerman also relied on the “intelligence capacity of

these kinds of organizations,” and an assumption that “corrupt officials” would

transmit data about petitioners to the Matazetas. A.R. 505. But on cross-examination,

Boerman admitted that he did not have specific knowledge about connections between

the Matazetas and government officials, and said that little was known about the

specifics of their possible affiliation with other criminal organizations. A.R. 510-12. 

We are not convinced that the evidence concerning risks to the petitioners in locations

outside Veracruz was so strong that it compelled a grant of relief by any reasonable

adjudicator. 

Because the Board permissibly rejected the petitioners’ claim for asylum, it

follows that petitioners did not meet the higher standard of proof for withholding of

Saldana, the government employee told petitioner’s father that they “could be under

a big risk” and “the best thing” to do was to “get out of there immediately.” A.R. 444. 

This evidence does not compel a conclusion that it would be unreasonable for

petitioners to relocate within Mexico if they left the state of Veracruz. 

The immigration judge’s finding that petitioner’s brother-in-law has not

suffered harm because he is “kind of in hiding away from Veracruz” is not

inconsistent with the Board’s finding that petitioners reasonably could relocate safely

within Mexico if they are away from Veracruz. Elizabeth testified that her brother

was “kind of hiding far away,” and when asked if he was “hiding,” she said, “Yes. 

Like, like away from Veracruz.” A.R. 371. Given that Elizabeth said the brother

“works in construction, like placing electric cables for lighting – lighting or in

construction on the roads,” id., the Board reasonably could understand the testimony

to equate “kind of hiding” with living away from Veracruz.

-10-

Appellate Case: 15-1226 Page: 10 Date Filed: 04/28/2016 Entry ID: 4393060 
removal. Ismail v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 970, 975 (8th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence

also supports the Board’s denial of relief under the Convention Against Torture. The

Convention provides for relief if it is more likely than not that the petitioners would

be subjected to torture if returned to Mexico, 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2), and that such

torture would be inflicted “with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.” 8

C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). “Acquiescence” requires prior awareness of the torture and

breach of a legal responsibility to intervene. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7); Garcia v.

Holder, 746 F.3d 869, 873-74 (8th Cir. 2014). Evidence concerning the Mexican

government’s efforts to combat criminal organizations in Veracruz and elsewhere was

sufficient to support the Board’s finding that the government was not likely to

acquiesce in any torture by the Matazetas.

* * * 

For these reasons, the petition for review is denied.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

The record indicates that Mexican authorities may be “unwilling and unable to

control” the Matazetas gang. See Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir.

2005) (asylum applicant must show government unwilling or unable to control

nongovernmental persecutors). Although one online news article reported that the

Mexican government had deployed police and troops to Veracruz to combat violence

by the Matazetas, the same article stated that a one month reduced murder rate in 2012

may have been a mere "blip" since "it's not uncommon for a couple of relative calm

months to interrupt an area's ongoing descent." The record also includes petitioner

Israel's testimony before the immigration judge that while he and his family were

hiding in Xalapa, a city about 100 kilometers from their home in Veracruz, a Mexican

government employee had advised his father that petitioners should "get out of there

immediately" because they were "under a big risk." 

-11-

Appellate Case: 15-1226 Page: 11 Date Filed: 04/28/2016 Entry ID: 4393060 
This record does not demonstrate that internal relocation in Mexico presents a

"reasonable" alternative for petitioners. See Hagi-Salad v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1044,

1047–49 (8th Cir. 2004) (explaining that relocation must be reasonable under 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.13(b)(3)). There is evidence here that a Mexican official advised petitioners to

leave the country for their safety. The immigration judge also found Israel's testimony

credible that the only reason his brother in law had not suffered harm in Mexico was

"because he is kind of in hiding." If petitioners were to attempt to relocate in Mexico,

they may have to hide to avoid persecution like the brother in law experienced. See

N.L.A. v. Holder, 744 F.3d 425, 442 (7th Cir. 2014) (petitioner could not safely

relocate since the reason her sister remained safe in Colombia was because she lived

in hiding, and "[i]t is an error of law to assume that an applicant cannot be entitled to

asylum if she has demonstrated the ability to escape persecution . . . by trying to

remain undetected"); Essohou v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 2006) (time

spent hiding in a village did not support the board's finding that the applicant could

reasonably relocate internally in Congo). 

For these reasons I dissent. The petition for review should be granted and the

petitioners' asylum claim should be remanded for full consideration.

______________________________

-12-

Appellate Case: 15-1226 Page: 12 Date Filed: 04/28/2016 Entry ID: 4393060