Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00047/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00047-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Troy D. Brosious
Plaintiff
JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TROY D. BROSIOUS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., and 

DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, 1 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-00047-KJM-DAD 

ORDER 

 This matter is before the court on the motion by defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, 

N.A. (Chase) to dismiss plaintiff Troy D. Brosious’s complaint. (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 

No. 21.) Plaintiff opposes the motion. (Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 26.) Defendant has replied. (ECF 

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 Plaintiff identifies a number of Doe defendants. The Ninth Circuit has held that if a 

defendant’s identity is not known before the complaint is filed, a “plaintiff should be given an 

opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants.” Wakefield v. Thompson, 

177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gillespie v. Civiletti, 

629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)). Plaintiff is warned, however, that Doe defendants will be 

dismissed if “it is clear that discovery would not uncover the[ir] identities, or that the complaint 

would be dismissed on other grounds.” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gillespie, 

629 F.2d at 642). Plaintiff is also warned that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) is applicable 

to Doe defendants. That rule provides the court must dismiss defendants who have not been 

served within 120 days after the filing of the complaint unless good cause is shown. See Glass v. 

Fields, No. 09-00098, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97604 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011); Hard Drive 

Prods. v. Does, No. 11-01567, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109837, at *2–4 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 27, 2011). 

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No. 30.) The court finds the motion appropriate for decision without oral argument. As 

explained below, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part defendant’s motion. 

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff is the owner of real property located at 1875 Avenida Martina in 

Roseville, California (subject property). (Pl.’s First Am. Compl. (Compl.) ¶ 1, ECF No. 20.) 

Defendant is a national association engaged in mortgage related activities and is the servicer of 

the loan secured by the subject property. (Id. ¶¶ 1–3.) On October 24, 2005, a deed of trust 

(DOT) was recorded with the Placer County Recorder’s Office. (Def.’s Req. Judicial Notice, 

Ex. 1, ECF No. 23.)2 The DOT secured a $500,000 loan, encumbering the subject property. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges as follows. A notice of trustee’s sale was scheduled on July 11, 

2012, “but had been postponed month-to-month, thereafter.” (Compl. ¶ 10.) As of February 25, 

2013, the loan’s balance was $548,597.70. (Id. ¶ 11.) Defendant wrongfully “added to this 

principal approximately $115,000, increasing the principal to $664,517.61.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

alleges that defendant “induced” him to enter into a loan modification agreement with a loan 

balance of $664,517.61. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff further alleges that Chase “wrongfully incorporated 

into this amount fees and penalties which were not due under the terms of the loan, the loan 

payments for an approximate period of one year after plaintiff had already relinquished 

possession of the subject property to Chase, and payments that were made for [eleven months] 

under a certain Trial Plan process.” (Id. ¶ 12.) In doing so, plaintiff alleges Chase “has failed to 

account for payments being dully [sic] made per the Modification since April 1, 2013, by not 

deducting those payments from the correct balance . . . .” (Id. ¶ 14.) Rather, “Chase reported that 

no payments were made by [p]laintiff for those months.” (Id.) 

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 Defendant requests that this court take judicial notice of the DOT, recorded with the 

Placer County Recorder’s Office on October 24, 2005, as instrument number 2005-0142748. 

(ECF No. 23.) Plaintiff has not opposed. The court GRANTS defendant’s request because the 

DOT is a public record. See Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(“We may take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record . . . .”); accord Lam v. 

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 12-1434, 2012 WL 5827785, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2012) 

aff’d sub nom. Lam v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, No. 12-17753, 2015 WL 1088803 (9th Cir. 

Mar. 13, 2015). 

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Plaintiff commenced this action in the Placer County Superior Court on October 

27, 2014, alleging six claims: (1) equitable accounting; (2) declaratory relief; (3) conversion; 

(4) unjust enrichment; (5) reformation of modification; and (6) violation of California’s Business 

and Professions Code section 17200, et seq. (UCL). (See generally Original Compl., ECF No. 2.) 

Defendant removed the case on January 8, 2015, invoking this court’s diversity-of-citizenship 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (ECF No. 2 at 2.) Defendant then moved to dismiss 

plaintiff’s complaint based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 8 at 2.) On 

June 2, 2015, the court granted in part and denied in part defendant’s motion. (Order, ECF No. 

19.) The court dismissed with leave to amend plaintiff’s claims for equitable accounting, 

conversion, unjust enrichment, and reformation. (Id. at 4–8.) The court denied defendant’s 

motion as to plaintiff’s UCL claim. (Id. at 9–11.) The court also directed plaintiff to clarify 

whether there is a basis for a separate claim for declaratory relief. (Id. at 5.) 

Plaintiff filed the first amended complaint that is the subject of the instant motion 

on June 23, 2015. (ECF No. 20.) In it, plaintiff withdrew his claims for declaratory relief, 

conversion, unjust enrichment, and reformation of modification. (See id.) The amended 

complaint alleges two claims: (1) equitable accounting and (2) violation of the UCL. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD ON A MOTION TO DISMISS 

A federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction applies the substantive law of the 

state in which it is located, here California, and federal procedural rules. Erie R.R. Co. v. 

Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may 

move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A 

court may dismiss “based on the lack of cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts 

alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 

(9th Cir. 1990). 

Although a complaint need contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), to survive a motion to 

dismiss, this short and plain statement “must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 

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Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint must include something more 

than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” or “‘labels and 

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . . .’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Determining whether a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss 

for failure to state a claim is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on 

its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Ultimately, the inquiry focuses on the 

interplay between the factual allegations of the complaint and the dispositive issues of law in the 

action. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). 

In making this context-specific evaluation, this court “must presume all factual 

allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party.” Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). This rule 

does not apply to “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Papasan v. Allain, 

478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), quoted in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, to “allegations that contradict 

matters properly subject to judicial notice,” or to material attached to or incorporated by reference 

into the complaint. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Equitable Accounting 

 Defendant argues plaintiff’s equitable accounting claim should be dismissed 

because (1) the allegations do not establish a special relationship exists between plaintiff and 

defendant and (2) the allegations do not show an accounting is necessary. (ECF No. 22 at 5–7.) 

 An accounting claim is equitable in nature, designed to prevent unjust enrichment. 

Civic W. Corp. v. Zila Indus., Inc., 66 Cal. App. 3d 1, 14 (1977); Shkolnikov v. JPMorgan Chase 

Bank, No. 12-03996, 2012 WL 6553988, at *23 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2012). It “is a proceeding in 

equity for the purpose of obtaining a judicial settlement of the accounts of the parties in which 

proceeding the court will adjudicate the amount due, administer full relief and render complete 

justice.” Flores v. EMC Mortgage Co., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1119–20 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). However, “[a]n accounting will not be accorded with respect to a sum 

that a plaintiff seeks to recover and alleges in his complaint to be a sum certain.” Civic W. Corp., 

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66 Cal. App. 3d at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, “[a] suit for an accounting 

will not lie where it appears from the complaint that none is necessary or that there is an adequate 

remedy at law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Union Bank v. Superior Court, 

31 Cal. App. 4th 573, 594 (1995) (“There is no right to an accounting where none is necessary.”). 

 To bring a claim for accounting, a plaintiff must show (1) that a relationship exists 

between the plaintiff and defendant that requires an accounting; and (2) that some balance is due 

to the plaintiff that can only be ascertained by an accounting. See Teselle v. McLoughlin, 

173 Cal. App. 4th 156, 179 (2009); see also Fleet v. Bank of Am. N.A., 229 Cal. App. 4th 1403, 

1413 (2014) (“A cause of action for accounting requires a showing of a relationship between the 

plaintiff and the defendant, such a fiduciary relationship, that requires an accounting or a showing 

that the accounts are so complicated they cannot be determined through an ordinary action at 

law.”); accord Dahon N. Am., Inc. v. Hon, No. 11-05835, 2012 WL 1413681, at *12 (C.D. Cal. 

Apr. 24, 2012); Shkolnikov, 2012 WL 6553988, at *23. To have a right to an accounting, a 

plaintiff must also allege misconduct by a defendant. Union Bank, 31 Cal. App. 4th at 593–94 

(holding because “defendant has proven it engaged in no misconduct . . . , plaintiffs have no right 

to an accounting”). “[A] fiduciary relationship between the parties is not required to state a cause 

of action for accounting. All that is required is that some relationship exists that requires an 

accounting.” Teselle, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 179. As a California Court of Appeal observed, 

the nature of a cause of action in accounting is unique in that it is a 

means of discovery. An accounting is a species of disclosure, 

predicated upon the plaintiff’s legal inability to determine how 

much money, if any, is due. Thus, the purpose of the accounting is, 

in part, to discover what, if any, sums are owed to the plaintiff, and 

an accounting may be used as a discovery device. An action for 

accounting is not amenable to a motion for summary judgment or 

summary adjudication upon a showing that plaintiff does not 

possess and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence needed to 

compel the accounting, because the very purpose of the accounting 

is to obtain such evidence. 

Id. at 180 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

 Here, plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a claim for equitable accounting. First, 

while, as noted above, a fiduciary relationship is not necessary, plaintiff’s allegations do not 

explain why the parties’ relationship here suffices to state a claim for an accounting, especially, 

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when “courts often find, to the contrary, that a mortgagor-lender relationship does not suffice.” 

Saridakis v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 14-06279, 2015 WL 570116, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 

2015); Hon, 2012 WL 1413681, at *12 (“An accounting requires a relationship, but not 

necessarily a fiduciary relationship.”). 

 Second, the allegations do not explain why “the total amount of payments” made 

by plaintiff cannot “be ascertained without resort to accounting.” Shkolnikov, 2012 WL 6553988, 

at *23. The complaint alleges “[t]he amount due to plaintiff . . . is approximately $115,000” 

(Compl. ¶ 15), and an “accounting is necessary as there are various amounts that compose the 

$115,000 . . .” (id. ¶ 16). Despite the allegations that “accounting is necessary,” plaintiff goes on 

to list the specific transactions, with their corresponding amounts, which comprise the amount he 

seeks to recover. (Id. ¶¶ 18–24.) These allegations do not show “some balance due the plaintiff 

that can only be ascertained by an accounting” when plaintiff actually pleads the line items 

adding up to the balance. Teselle, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 179. Additionally, “there is nothing to 

suggest that the accounting is so complicated that Plaintiffs cannot ascertain the true sum owed 

through discovery in this action.” Cnty of Santa Clara v. Astra USA, Inc., No. 05-03740, 2006 

WL 2193343, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2006). 

 The court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s equitable accounting 

claim with leave to amend if plaintiff can do so consonant with Rule 11. Leave to amend is 

granted given plaintiff’s claim in his opposition brief that a lender-borrower relationship would 

suffice for purposes of stating an equitable accounting claim. (ECF No. 26 at 4–5.) In addition, 

he asserts he can allege facts “consistent with the case authority . . . .” (Id. at 6.) See Orion Tire 

Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 268 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2001) (even if not 

considered in determining the sufficiency of a complaint, “new” facts in plaintiff’s opposition 

papers can be considered by courts in deciding whether to grant leave to amend).

B. Defendant’s General Objection 

 While defendant does not specifically attack plaintiff’s second claim, it argues 

plaintiff’s first amended complaint “is a confusing collection of allegations, and it lacks a 

coherent narrative.” (ECF No. 22 at 3.) It reasons that “[g]iven the highly ambiguous and 

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disorganized nature of the [first amended complaint], it is impossible to decipher the bases of 

[p]laintiff’s causes of action.” (Id. at 4.) Accordingly, defendant urges this court to dismiss 

plaintiff’s entire complaint for not complying with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. (Id. at 4–

5.) Plaintiff counters, “[t]he [first amended complaint] more than sufficiently give [sic] defendant 

knowledge [sic] of the alleged wrongdoing in order for it to answer and conduct discovery.” 

(ECF No. 26 at 7.) 

 As the Supreme Court held in Twombly, Rule 8 does not require “detailed factual 

allegations,” 550 U.S. at 555, “but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Here, while plaintiff’s amended complaint is not 

an exemplary pleading, it gives defendant fair notice of the nature of the claims against it. The 

only remaining claim besides the equitable accounting claim is plaintiff’s UCL claim. (ECF 

No. 20 at 6–7.) In its prior June 2, 2015 order, the court addressed the sufficiency of the 

allegations of the UCL claim and found them sufficient to survive defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

(ECF No. 19 at 9–11.) See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983) (“when a court 

decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent 

stages in the same case”). Defendant presents no sound argument for the court now to depart 

from that decision. See United States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (“A court 

may have discretion to depart from the law of the case where: 1) the first decision was clearly 

erroneous; 2) an intervening change in the law has occurred; 3) the evidence on remand is 

substantially different; 4) other changed circumstances exist; or 5) a manifest injustice would 

otherwise result.”).

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part 

defendant’s motion. Plaintiff shall have twenty-one (21) days from the date of this order to file a 

second amended complaint consistent with this order. This order resolves ECF No. 21. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: September 2, 2015. 

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