Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02706/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02706-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nathan Daniel Coccimiglio
Petitioner
Charles DeRosa
Respondent

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Nathan Daniel Coccimiglio, )

)

 Petitioner, )

) 

v. ) CV 04-2706 PHX MHM (VAM)

)

Charles DeRosa, Warden, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 )

 Respondent. )

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

Nathan Daniel Coccimiglio ("petitioner") filed a pro se

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

Petitioner presents one claim for relief in the petition. (Doc.

1 at p. 5). Respondent filed a response in opposition to the

granting of habeas relief. (Doc. 8). Petitioner filed a reply

to the response. (Doc. 9).

BACKGROUND

On December 12, 2001, petitioner was transferred to federal

custody from state custody pursuant to a writ. (Doc. 3 at

Exhibit 1). He was sentenced by the United States District Court

in Utah to a prison term of 46 months on August 16, 2002 as a

result of his convictions for possession of a firearm by a person

using or addicted to a controlled substance, unlawful possession

of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun and possession of stolen

firearms. (Id.). 

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On August 20, 2002, petitioner was returned to state custody

in Utah and was sentenced by the state court on September 4,

2002. The sentences for his state convictions were ordered to

run concurrently with one another and "any other federal

charges." (Doc. 3 at Exhibit 2).

On September 15, 2002, according to respondents, the U.S.

Marshal's Service "mistakenly" brought petitioner to FCI Florence

to begin his federal sentence. They note that petitioner should

have remained in state custody in Utah "because he was initially

arrested by [Utah] authorities which had never relinquished his

custody ..." (Doc. 8 at pp. 2-3). Upon realizing their error in

taking petitioner into federal custody, petitioner was returned

to state custody on January 16, 2003, to complete his state

sentence. (Doc. 3 at Exhibit 4). 

On August 5, 2003, petitioner was paroled from state custody

and picked up by the U.S. Marshal's Service on a federal

detainer. (Doc. 3 at Exhibit 4). According to respondent,

petitioner began receiving credit toward service of his federal

sentence from that date. (Doc. 8, Exhibit B at pp. 2-3). 

However, this date does not appear on the Inmate History record. 

(Doc. 8 at Exhibit A). The Inmate History seems to indicate

petitioner came into federal custody on October 7, 2003 and this

date is also reflected on Doc. 8, Exhibit B at p. 1. 

DISCUSSION

In his habeas petition, petitioner raises the following

claim:

Credit for time spent after sentencing has been denied

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Petitioner states that he was paroled from state custody on

October 17, 2003. (Doc. 1 at p. 5; Doc. 3 at p. 2). Petitioner

has presented Exhibit 9 to support this date as the date of his

release from state custody. Conversely, petitioner's Exhibit 4

attached to Doc. 3 shows that his date of computation to be August

5, 2003. The October 17, 2003 date is also supported by

Respondent's Exhibit A. Therefore, it would appear that petitioner

was given credit back to August 5, 2003. However, respondent does

not explain if this was for time spent in FCI Florence or some

other time frame. In short, the respondent's documents do not

match up.

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in violation of my rights of Due Process of Law under

the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

Petitioner further elaborated by stating:

On November 3, 2001 I was charged with Utah state

charges in Davis County, Utah.

On December 12, 2001 I was arraigned in federal

District Court on unrelated charges.

On August 16, 2002 I was sentenced for the federal

charges.

On September 4, 2002 I was sentence[d] for the charges

in the State of Utah, Davis County "concurrently with

each and any other federal charges."

On October 17, 2003 I was paroled from the state prison

to the federal Bureau of Prisons.

The federal Bureau of Prisons has refused to credit me

with any federal time while I was serving my state

sentence concurrently with my federal sentence.

(Doc. 1 at p. 5).

It is not in dispute that petitioner received no credit

toward service of his federal sentence for any time spent in

custody prior to August 5, 2003.1

 Petitioner asserts that his

right to Due Process of Law was violated when the Bureau of

Prisons ("BOP") failed to give him credit for the time spent in

state custody. Petitioner argued to the BOP that he was entitled

to credit for two distinct time frames: (1) Dec. 12, 2001 to

August 19, 2002 (from the time he first came into federal custody

through sentencing and return to the state) and (2) January 25,

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2003 through October 6, 2003 (from his return from FCI Florence

to the date he was paroled from state custody). (Doc. 3 at

Exhibits 3 and 5). In his habeas petition, petitioner argues he

should receive credit for September 4, 2002 (state sentencing) to

October 7, 2003 (date committed to BOP). (Doc. 3 at p. 8, lines

18-22). In short, petitioner now appears to have abandoned his

claim to time spent in federal custody prior to his federal

sentence.

In response, respondent argues that petitioner is not

entitled to have time spent in state custody prior to August 5,

2003, credited toward service of his federal sentence. 

Respondent also asserts that any time spent in federal custody

pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum (the period

from December 12, 2001 through August 19, 2002) does not entitle

petitioner to credit toward service of his federal sentence

because a prisoner in federal custody under such circumstances is

considered merely "on loan" to the federal authorities, and state

jurisdiction over him still obtains. Because petitioner's state

sentence was ordered to run concurrent with his federal sentence,

petitioner presumably received credit toward his state sentence

for all time spent in federal custody. 

This court has jurisdiction to consider pre-sentence custody

credit determinations by the BOP via a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S.

329, 335 (1992). Although such review is "very limited" it may

review the BOP's computation of credit for time served and

whether the BOP has erroneously interpreted a relevant statute. 

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Wilson, 503 U.S. at 335. 

18 U.S.C. § 3585, cited prominently by both parties, states:

(a) Commencement of sentence. - A sentence to a term of

imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is

received in custody awaiting transportation to, or

arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at,

the official detention facility at which the sentence

is to be served.

(b) Credit for prior custody. - A defendant shall be

given credit toward the service of a term of

imprisonment for any time he has spent in official

detention prior to the date the sentence commences - 

(1) as a result of the offense for which

the sentence was imposed; or

(2) as a result of any other charge for

which the defendant was arrested after the

commission of the offense for which the

sentence was imposed;

that has not been credited against another sentence. 

In United States v. Warren, 610 F.2d 680, 684-85 (9th Cir.

1980), the Ninth Circuit court held:

Determination of priority of custody and service of

sentence between state and federal sovereigns is a

matter of comity to be resolved by the executive

branches of the two sovereigns. Normally, the

sovereign which first arrests an individual acquires

priority of jurisdiction for purposes of trial,

sentencing, and incarceration. However, the sovereign

with priority of jurisdiction ... may elect under the

doctrine of comity to relinquish it to another

sovereign.

Here it is established by the record, and neither party

disputes, that petitioner was first arrested on state charges. 

He was in state custody when he was transferred to federal

custody on an ad prosequendum writ on unrelated federal charges. 

Under the doctrine enunciated in Warren, the state of Utah was

the "sovereign" with "priority of jurisdiction." See Thomas v.

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Brewer, 923 F.2d 1361, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that

transfer pursuant to a federal writ of habeas corpus ad

prosequendum from state custody does not interrupt state

jurisdiction over the prisoner, the prisoner is merely considered

to be "on loan.").

Seen in this light, Utah had "priority" over petitioner for

purposes of serving the state sentence. The mere fact that

petitioner spent some time in federal custody prior to

commencement of his federal sentence does not alter this fact. 

See Thomas, 923 F.2d at 1366-67. Thus, petitioner did not begin

service of his federal sentence until he was received into

federal custody after Utah paroled him upon completion of his

state sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a); see also Del Guzzi v.

United States, 980 F.2d 1269, 1270 (9th Cir. 1992). In addition,

the fact that the judge at petitioner's state sentencing may have

directed that the state prison term run concurrently with the

federal sentence has no bearing on when federal custody commences

for purposes of determining the starting date of the federal

sentence. See Del Guzzi, 980 F.2d at 1270 ("Although the state

judge stated that Del Guzzi's [concurrent state] sentence 'may be

served in the federal prison,' and 'recommended that he be

transported on the first available transportation,' his authority

was limited to sending Del Guzzi to state prison to serve his

state sentence. Accordingly, his federal sentence did not begin

until ... he was received at the federal prison [after release

from state custody]."). 

Here, as noted by respondent, there is no evidence that the

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state sentencing judge or Utah authorities even tried to have

petitioner transferred to federal custody to serve his state

sentence "concurrently" with the federal sentence. The plain

language of 18 U.S.C. § 3585 states that a prisoner is not

entitled to have any time spent in custody prior to commencement

of his federal prison term credited toward service of the federal

sentence if that time was "credited against another sentence." 

 Petitioner cites, prominently, the District Court case of

Cozine v. Crabtree, 15 F.Supp.2d 997 (D.Ore. 1998), to support

his claim. However, this case is distinguishable on the facts

and law because in that case "the United States had primary

jurisdiction over Cozine at the time sentence was imposed, with

no other pending convictions or sentences to serve." Cozine, 15

F.Supp.2d at 1020. In the case at bar, state proceedings against

petitioner commenced prior to federal proceedings (although

petitioner was sentenced on the federal charges first). Thus,

unlike the prisoner in Cozine, primary jurisdiction remained with

the state of Utah and not the federal government up until

petitioner was paroled from state custody. See Warren, 610 F.2d

at 684-85. 

All time spent by petitioner in custody prior to August 5,

2003, was credited toward service of his state sentence for

crimes unrelated to the crimes for which he was sentenced under

federal law. The BOP's refusal to credit such time toward

service of his federal prison sentence was not contrary to law. 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be denied.

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This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is

immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

Any notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of

the District Court's order and judgment. The parties shall have

ten (10) days from the date of service of this Report and

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections. 

Thereafter, the parties shall have ten (10) days within which to

file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge

will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo

consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver

of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in

an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

Report and Recommendation.

DATED this 27th day of October, 2005.

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