Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03267/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03267-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Homer Flint
Appellant
Louis W. Sullivan
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

PUBLISH Unitm States C{)urt of Ap~&b Tcnt.'l Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DEC 0 9 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

90-3267 

HOMER FLINT 1 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, M.D., 

Secretary of Health and Human 

Services of the United States, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) On Appeal From The 

) United States District Court 

) For The District Of Kansas 

) (D.C. Civil No. 89-4105-R) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Kenneth M. Carpenter, Carpenter, Chartered, Topeka, Kansas, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Janet Braggs, Assistant Regional Counsel, Department of Health and 

Human Services, Kansas City, Missouri (Lee Thompson, United States 

Attorney, D. Brad Bailey, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Topeka, Kansas, on the briefJ Frank v. Smith III, Chief Counsel, 

Region VII, Department of Health and Human Services, Kansas City, 

Missouri, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before HOLLOWAY and SETH, Circuit Judges, and DUMBAULD, District 

Judge*. 

SETH, Circuit Judge. 

*Honorable Edward Dumbauld, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-3267 Document: 01019323428 Date Filed: 12/09/1991 Page: 1 
Claimant Homer Flint appeals from the district court's order 

of July 31, 1990 affirming the Secretary of Health and Human 

Services' decision to deny claimant's application for social 

security disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security 

Act, 42 u.s.c. § 401, et seq. He contends that the Secretary 

erred in finding that he was not under a disability during an 

insured period. Specifically, he argues that the Secretary's 

decision applied incorrect legal standards and was not supported 

by substantial evidence. Second, he claims that even if his 

current disability was not diagnosed until 1987 its inception can 

be traced back to a period when he had "insurance". 

The controversy in this case centers on the date of the onset 

of claimant's disability. Homer Flint was born on August 30, 

1947. Between October 24, 1967 and October 14, 1970 he served as 

an Army medical corpsman completing tours of duty in Vietnam and 

France. He testified that he saw extensive combat during his tour 

in Vietnam. Claimant was discharged in 1972 due to a military 

determination of unfitness and drug abuse. 

After discharge from the Army, claimant struggled with 

alcohol and drug dependency. The record demonstrates that he 

worked short-term jobs in 1972 and 1973 but was unable to hold a 

steady position due to his addictions. He spent some time in 

prison for burglary charges in 1972 and 1973. 

From July 23, 1973 to November 9, 1973 and from April 4, 1974 

to July 30, 1974, Flint participated in "The Patrician Movement," 

a substance abuse and vocational rehabilitation program. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3267 Document: 01019323428 Date Filed: 12/09/1991 Page: 2 
Patrician Movement reports indicate that claimant's heavy drug use 

began in Vietnam. The reports state that Flint continued to abuse 

drugs while in the program and after discharge. He was discharged 

from the Patrician Movement, however, because he was able to 

maintain steady employment during a work release phase of the 

program. 

Between 1976 and 1979, Flint was incarcerated in Texas for 

additional burglary charges. In 1980, he worked for approximately 

ten months in assembly line work. The administrative law judge 

{ALJ) found this to be his last relevant work experience for 

purposes of insurance under the Social Security Act. 

In Homer Flint's application for disability benefits, filed 

on February 11, 1987, he stated that his disability was the result 

~ of post-traumatic stress disorder, stomach problems and tinnitus. 

He initially alleged that his disability began in October 1981. 

He later amended his application to allege an onset date of 

"sometime in 1980--no later than 9/30/80" after the Social 

Security Administration informed him that his insured status under 

the Act expired on September 30, 1980. 

Claimant's application was denied initially and again upon 

reconsideration. He requested and received a de novo hearing 

before an ALJ. On August 31, 1988, the ALJ issued a decision 

finding that Flint's disability did not occur while he was insured 

under the Act. On October 25, 1988, Flint filed a request for 

review to the Appeals Council of the Social Security 

Administration. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3267 Document: 01019323428 Date Filed: 12/09/1991 Page: 3 
The Appeals Council granted the request. In a February 8, 

1989 letter, the Council informed claimant that it planned to rule 

that the ALJ erred in finding the last date of coverage under the 

Act was September 30, 1980. According to the Appeals Council the 

last day of coverage under the Act was March 1, 1977. Flint was 

informed that absent new and material evidence or pertinent legal 

argument, the Appeals Council would find that he was not disabled. 

Flint was given twenty days to submit such evidence or further 

written statements as to facts or law. Two responses were 

submitted. 

On February 27, 1989, Flint filed a "Request for Review of 

Hearing Decision/Order." It stated: "(m]y disability and 

resulting long term hospitalization prevents me from obtaining and 

\. maintaining substantial gainful employment, and that this has been 

the case since my return from Vietnam." (The hospitalization 

referred to Flint's admission to the Veteran's Administration 

Hospital in Topeka, Kansas in 1987.) An accompanying letter was 

sent to the Social Security Administration by Flint's recently 

retained counsel requesting a thirty-day extension to submit 

additional evidence. On March 27, 1989, an addendum to Flint's 

request for review was sent. It stated in part: 

"The claimant asserts that the medical 

evidence establishes that he has been under a 

disability is (sic) defined in 20 CFR 

404.1520(E) since it (sic) least 1-29-87 due 

to a condition and its complications which 

existed in a latent state before March 31, 

1987 (sic)." 

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Appellate Case: 90-3267 Document: 01019323428 Date Filed: 12/09/1991 Page: 4 
I 

~ 

We assume he meant March 31, 1977, the date the Appeals Council 

referred to as his last date of insurance, not March 31, 1987. 

On May 1, 1989, the Appeals Council issued its final decision 

rejecting claimant's application for disability benefits. It 

found as follows: 

"1. The claimant alleged his disability 

commenced on September 30, 1980. 

"2. The claimant last met the disability 

insured status requirements on March 31, 

1977. 

"3. The c.laimant's insured status had expired 

prior to his alleged onset date of 

disability. 

"4. The claimant was not under a disability 

as defined in the Social Security Act, as 

amended, at any time through March 31, 

1977, his date last insured." 

This became the final decision of the Secretary which was upheld 

by the district court. 

Our review of the Secretary's determination is limited. It 

is well established that "the findings of the Secretary as to any 

fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive 

II . . . . 42 u.s.c. § 405(g); see also Bernal v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 

297, 302-03 (lOth Cir.). "Substantial evidence is such evidence 

that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the 

conclusion reached by the Secretary." Pacheco v. Sullivan, 931 

F.2d 695, 697 (lOth Cir.). Substantial evidence requires "more 

than a scintilla but less than a preponderance." Campbell v. 

Bowen, 822 F.2d 1518, 1521 (lOth Cir.). 

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Appellate Case: 90-3267 Document: 01019323428 Date Filed: 12/09/1991 Page: 5 
To qualify for disability insurance benefits under the Act, a 

claimant must meet the insured status requirements, be less than 

65, and be under a "disability". Under 42 u.s.c. § 423(d): 

"(1) The term 'disability' means--

"(A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which can be expected to result in 

death or which has lasted or can be expected 

to last for a continuous period of not less 

than 12 months; ••. 

. . . . 

"(2) For purposes of paragraph (l)(A)--

"(A) An individual shall be determined to 

be under a disability only if his physical or 

mental impairment or impairments are of such 

severity that he is not only unable to do his 

previous work but cannot, considering his age, 

education, and work experience, engage in any 

other kind of substantial gainful work which 

exists in the national economy •••• " 

In determining whether a claimant is eligible for disability 

benefits, the Secretary applies a sequential five-step process. 

See Reyes v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 242, 243 (lOth Cir.). The burden of 

proof initially rests on the claimant to show that he is disabled. 

Once such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the Secretary to 

show that claimant can perform jobs existing in the national 

economy. See Ray v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 222, 224 (lOth Cir.). 

In Homer Flint's application for benefits, both the ALJ and 

the Appeals Council found that Flint failed to prove that he was 

disabled during an insured period. Flint does not contest the 

March 31, 1977 date for termination of his insured status. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3267 Document: 01019323428 Date Filed: 12/09/1991 Page: 6 
9 

Instead, he challenges the Secretary's reliance on the lack of 

medical records during the insured period to deny benefits. He 

states that a finding of disability can be based on claimant's 

subjective testimony concerning the onset of his post-traumatic 

stress disorder, Veterans Administration Hospital reports from 

1987 diagnosing Flint's condition and an objective reading of the 

earnings reports. 

While we agree with claimant that retrospective diagnosis and 

subjective testimony can be used to diagnose a physical or mental 

condition, this type of evidence alone cannot justify an award of 

benefits. In Potter v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv., 905 

F.2d 1346 (lOth Cir.), we recently addressed an application for 

disability benefits by a claimant suffering from multiple 

sclerosis which was diagnosed four years after her insured status 

expired. We affirmed the Secretary's denial of benefits even 

though the claimant introduced numerous retrospective opinions 

diagnosing her disease. We stated that "the relevant analysis is 

whether the claimant was actually disabled prior to the expiration 

of her insured status. A retrospective diagnosis without evidence 

of actual disability is insufficient." Id. at 1348-49 (citations 

omitted). See also Blankenship v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 1116, 1123 (6th 

Cir.). ("Subjective complaints of pain or other symptoms may 

support a claim of disability. However, these complaints must be 

evidenced by an underlying medical condition •••• ") 

After carefully reviewing the record, it is apparent that the 

ALJ and Appeals Council recognized the need for some evidence of 

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Appellate Case: 90-3267 Document: 01019323428 Date Filed: 12/09/1991 Page: 7 
.: • 

an actual disability during the period that claimant maintained 

insured status. The subjective testimony of the appellant and 

objective medical evidence after 1987 was considered and rejected 

because it was not substantiated by evidence in the record 

pertinent to the insured period. The only evidence from the 

1970's in the record, the Patrician Movement records and the 

probation reports, shows that Flint had a serious drug problem but 

also shows that he was willing to work and was able to obtain 

employment. We agree with the district court that a reasonable 

mind viewing all the evidence would support the conclusion of the 

Secretary. 

Appellant's second argument to the Appeals Council and to 

this Court is that claimant's post-traumatic stress disorder was 

not diagnosed prior to March 31, 1977 because it existed in a 

latent state. The Appeals Council rejected this argument finding 

that "while the onset of the claimant's impairments may be 

traceable to events which occurred during a period of coverage, 

there is no evidence to suggest that the claimant experienced 

disabling effects of these impairments during the relevant 

period." Claimant argues to this Court that the reason his 

disease was not found to be disabling during the relevant period 

is that prior to 1980, post-traumatic stress disorder was not 

officially recognized by the American Psychiatric Association. 

The existence or absence of a diagnosis with a name for a 

physical or mental condition is a significant medical 

consideration. However, again it must be stated that the issue is 

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Appellate Case: 90-3267 Document: 01019323428 Date Filed: 12/09/1991 Page: 8 
the existence of a disability at a particular time and nc.::-. t::: -.: 

identification of a cause. 

There is substantial evidence in this record to support a 

denial of disability benefits, and no deviation from established 

legal standards. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas is AFFIRMED. 

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