Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-02070/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-02070-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mohamed Abdalla
Petitioner
Stu Sherman
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), Petitioner has consented to the 

jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all 

further proceedings in the case, including the entry of final 

judgment, by manifesting Petitioner’s consent in a writing signed by 

Petitioner and filed on January 16, 2015. Pending before the Court 

is the petition, which was filed on December 29, 2014. 

I. Screening the Petition

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the 

effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

MOHAMED ABDALLA,

 Petitioner,

v.

STU SHERMAN, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:14-cv-02070-BAM-HC

ORDER DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WITHOUT LEAVE 

TO AMEND FOR FAILURE TO STATE FACTS 

WARRANTING RELIEF (DOC. 1), 

DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE

OF APPEALABILITY, AND DIRECTING

THE CLERK TO CLOSE THE ACTION

Case 1:14-cv-02070-BAM Document 6 Filed 01/28/15 Page 1 of 7
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of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies to the petition. Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 

1499 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing ' 2254 Cases in the United States 

District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make a 

preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The 

Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears 

from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is 

not entitled to relief in the district court....@ Habeas Rule 4; 

O=Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990); see also

Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990). Habeas Rule 

2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all grounds of relief 

available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts supporting each 

ground; and 3) state the relief requested. Notice pleading is not 

sufficient; rather, the petition must state facts that point to a 

real possibility of constitutional error. Rule 4, Advisory 

Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption; O=Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d at 420 

(quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977)). 

Allegations in a petition that are vague, conclusory, or palpably 

incredible are subject to summary dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 

908 F.2d at 491.

Further, the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to the 

respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition 

has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule 8, 1976 

Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 

2001).

A petition for habeas corpus should not be dismissed without 

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leave to amend unless it appears that no tenable claim for relief 

can be pleaded were such leave granted. Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 

13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971).

Here, Petitioner, an inmate of the California Substance Abuse 

Treatment Facility at Corcoran, California, alleges that he is 

serving an indeterminate sentence of twenty years to life imposed in 

the Stanislaus County Superior Court on December 10, 1992, for 

second degree murder. Petitioner complains of the decision of 

California’s Board of Parole Hearings (BPH), made on August 9, 2013, 

denying Petitioner’s request for advancement of his parole hearing. 

(Pet., doc. 1 at 1, 21.) Petitioner challenges Proposition 9, also 

referred to as Marsy’s Law, which after Petitioner’s conviction

amended Cal. Pen. Code § 3041.5 and resulted in the lengthening of 

the period between Petitioner’s parole suitability hearings from a 

previous maximum of three years to five years. Petitioner alleges 

that Proposition 9 constitutes a bill of attainder and thus violates 

Article I, sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution. Petitioner seeks 

immediate release. (Id. at 5, 15.) 

II. Bill of Attainder

Petitioner contends that Proposition 9 was passed with the 

intent to impose increased punishment on an identifiable class of 

persons convicted of murder without the benefit of a judicial trial.

Art. I, § 9, applicable to Congress, provides that “(n)o Bill 

of Attainder... shall be passed.” Art. 1, § 10, applicable to the 

states, provides that “(n)o State shall... pass any Bill of 

Attainder....” The key features of a bill of attainder are that the 

law 1) legislatively determines guilt, and 2) inflicts punishment 

upon an identifiable individual, and 3) does so without the 

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protections of a judicial trial. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. 

Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468-69 (1977). Three inquiries are required 

to determine whether a statute inflicts punishment: 1) whether the 

challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of 

legislative punishment; 2) whether the statute, “viewed in terms of 

the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to 

further nonpunitive legislative purposes”; and 3) whether the 

legislative record “evinces a congressional intent to punish.” 

Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 

U.S. 841, 846–47 (1984) (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473, 475–476, 

478). 

Here, Petitioner has not alleged facts that could establish 

that as to Petitioner, Proposition 9 is a bill of attainder. 

Petitioner’s guilt of second degree murder, the commitment offense, 

was determined at a judicial trial. (Doc. 1, 1-2.) Further, 

Petitioner is serving an indeterminate life sentence; regardless of 

when his future parole suitability hearings are held, his sentence 

remains the same. Thus, Proposition 9 did not inflict punishment. 

Accord, Down v. Haviland, no. 2:09–cv–2794 TLN EFB P, 2013 WL 

3745460, at *9, n.4 (E.D.Cal. July 15, 2013) (unpublished); Booker 

v. Swarthout, no. 2:11–cv–0050 KJM DAD P, 2012 WL 4364238 at *6 

(E.D.Cal. Sept. 20, 2012) (unpublished); Campo v. Swarthout, no. 

2:11–cv–1622 LKK DAD P, 2012 WL 4364268, at *5 (E.D.Cal. Sept. 20, 

2012) (unpublished), adptd. Campo v. Swarthout, 2013 WL 5962930 

(E.D.Cal. Feb. 11, 2013).

Petitioner has not cited any decision of the United States 

Supreme Court supporting his claim that Proposition 9 imposed 

additional punishment for his crime. There is no constitutional or 

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inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released 

before the expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of 

Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 

2104, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979). Petitioner cites United States v. 

Brown, 381 U.S. 337 (1977), which held that a statute making it a 

crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as the officer of 

a labor union was a bill of attainder because it imposed punishment 

on easily identifiable members of a class. However, the intent to 

impose criminal punishment that was evident in Brown is lacking 

here. Petitioner also cites Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603

(1960), in which the Court found that a law withdrawing Social 

Security benefits from aliens ordered deported on certain grounds 

did not constitute a bill of attainder because there was no 

intention to impose a punishment. Petitioner’s case authority does 

not warrant a different result in the present case. 

In summary, the state court decided that Proposition 9 did not 

constitute a bill of attainder. (Doc. 1 at 44, 38, 41.) In view of 

the clearly established federal law set forth above, the state 

court’s decision was not objectively unreasonable. It was not 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(a). 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011).

Petitioner has not alleged facts that point to a real 

possibility of constitutional error and that would thus entitle him 

to relief in this proceeding.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim will be dismissed. 

The defect in Petitioner’s claim stems not from a dearth of 

factual allegations, but rather from the admitted circumstances of 

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Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. Thus, Petitioner could not 

allege a tenable claim of a bill of attainder if leave to amend were 

granted.

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the petition without leave 

to amend.

III. Certificate of Appealability

Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the Court of Appeals 

from the final order in a habeas proceeding in which the detention 

complained of arises out of process issued by a state court. 28 

U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 

(2003). A district court must issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. 

Habeas Rule 11(a). 

A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant 

makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

' 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, a petitioner must show that 

reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have 

been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented 

were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 336 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000)). A certificate should issue if the Petitioner 

shows that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether: (1) 

the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 

right, and (2) the district court was correct in any procedural 

ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). 

In determining this issue, a court conducts an overview of the 

claims in the habeas petition, generally assesses their merits, and 

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determines whether the resolution was debatable among jurists of 

reason or wrong. Id. An applicant must show more than an absence 

of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith; however, the 

applicant need not show that the appeal will succeed. Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338. 

Here, it does not appear that reasonable jurists could debate 

whether the petition should have been resolved in a different 

manner. Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right. 

Accordingly, the Court will decline to issue a certificate of 

appealability.

IV. Disposition

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that:

1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED for

failure to allege facts that would warrant relief in a proceeding 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254; and 

2) The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability; 

and

3) The Clerk is DIRECTED to close the action because dismissal 

terminates it in its entirety. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 28, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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