Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00134/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00134-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
F. Foulk
Respondent
Daniel Uriostegui
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL URIOSTEGUI, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

v. )

)

F. FOULK, ) 

 )

Respondent. )

)

 )

1:13-cv—00134-SKO-HC

ORDER DISMISSING STATE LAW CLAIMS

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND (Doc. 1)

ORDER TO PETITIONER TO SHOW CAUSE

IN THIRTY (30) DAYS WHY THE

PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED

FOR PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO

EXHAUST STATE COURT REMEDIES

(Doc. 1) 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), Petitioner has consented to

the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge to conduct

all further proceedings in the case, including the entry of final

judgment, by manifesting consent in a signed writing filed by

Petitioner on February 8, 2013 (doc. 5). Pending before the

Court is the petition, which was filed on January 25, 2013, and

transferred to this Court on January 29, 2013.

I. Screening the Petition 

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United

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States District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make

a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly

appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court....” 

Habeas Rule 4; O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir.

1990); see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.

1990). Habeas Rule 2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all

grounds of relief available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts

supporting each ground; and 3) state the relief requested. 

Notice pleading is not sufficient; the petition must state facts

that point to a real possibility of constitutional error. Rule

4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption; O’Bremski v. Maass,

915 F.2d at 420 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75

n.7 (1977)). Allegations in a petition that are vague,

conclusory, or palpably incredible are subject to summary

dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d at 491.

The Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus

either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to the

respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the

petition has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule

8, 1976 Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43

(9th Cir. 2001). A petition for habeas corpus should not be

dismissed without leave to amend unless it appears that no

tenable claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave granted. 

Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971).

Petitioner alleges he is an inmate of the High Desert State

Prison (HDSP) serving a sentence of thirty (30) years to life

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imposed on or about March 9, 2010, in the Merced County Superior

Court upon Petitioner’s conviction of attempted murder, shooting

at an occupied vehicle, and participating in a criminal street

gang. Petitioner raises the following claims concerning his

convictions: 1) instructing the jury pursuant to CALCRIM 4.00

concerning natural and probable consequences without explaining

the special circumstances that result in vicarious accomplice

liability for additional crimes violated Petitioner’s rights to a

jury trial and due process of law protected by the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments; 2) instructing the jury that a perpetrator

and an aider and abettor were equally guilty removed the intent

element from the jury’s consideration and violated Petitioner’s

federal right to a jury trial; 3) admission of the victim’s lay

testimony concerning Petitioner’s movement being a signal to

attack was erroneous and an abuse of direction; 4) the evidence

was insufficient to support the conviction of attempted murder,

which in turn violated Petitioner’s right to due process under

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; 5) the evidence was

insufficient to support the conviction of shooting an occupied

vehicle; 6) admission of improper gang expert testimony violated

Petitioner’s right to a jury trial, fair trial, and due process

in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments; and

7) Petitioner’s sentence on the third count concerning

participation in a criminal street gang should be stayed pursuant

to Cal. Pen. Code § 654.

II. Dismissal of State Law Claims 

Federal habeas relief is available to state prisoners only

to correct violations of the United States Constitution, federal

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laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

Federal habeas relief is not available to retry a state issue

that does not rise to the level of a federal constitutional

violation. Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. — , 131 S.Ct. 13, 16

(2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Alleged

errors in the application of state law are not cognizable in

federal habeas corpus. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 623 (9th

Cir. 2002); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The Court accepts a state court's interpretation of state law. 

Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d at 1389. In a habeas corpus

proceeding, this Court is bound by the California Supreme Court’s

interpretation of California law unless it is determined that the

interpretation is untenable or a veiled attempt to avoid review

of federal questions. Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 964

(9th Cir. 2001).

Here, Petitioner alleges in the third claim that admission

of lay opinion testimony was erroneous and an abuse of

discretion. (Pet., doc. 1, 20-22.) Petitioner cites only state

cases and characterizes the gravamen of the claim as a

misapplication of the rules applicable to lay opinion testimony.

It is well-settled that allegedly incorrect evidentiary

rulings are not a basis for federal habeas relief. Tinsley v.

Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir. 1990) (incorrect state court

evidentiary rulings, in and of themselves, cannot serve as a

basis for habeas relief unless federal constitutional rights are

affected), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1091, 111 S.Ct. 974 (1991).

Consequently, in § 2254 proceedings, a state prisoner may not

challenge an evidentiary ruling based on a violation of the

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state's evidence code because the state court's failure to comply

with a state evidentiary rule is generally irrelevant and is not

a sufficient basis for granting federal habeas relief. Jammal v.

Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Because the defect in Petitioner’s evidentiary claim results

from the nature of the claim and not from a dearth of factual

allegations, granting leave to amend would be futile. Therefore,

it will be ordered that the claim concerning an error in the

application of state evidentiary law be dismissed without leave

to amend.

Petitioner’s seventh claim that his sentence on the street

gang participation count should be stayed pursuant to Cal. Pen.

Code § 654 is also a claim based solely on state law. A claim

alleging misapplication of state sentencing law involves a

question of state law which is not cognizable in a proceeding

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See, Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S.

764, 780 (1990) (rejecting a claim that a state court misapplied

state statutes concerning aggravating circumstances on the ground

that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of

state law); Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d at 623 (dismissing as not

cognizable claims alleging only that the trial court abused its

discretion in selecting consecutive sentences and erred in

failing to state reasons for choosing consecutive terms); Miller

v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 1989) (dismissing as

not cognizable a claim concerning whether a prior conviction

qualified as a sentence enhancement under state law). 

Here, the defect in the claim stems from its essential

nature as a claim based solely on state law; thus, granting

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Petitioner leave to amend the claim would be futile. Therefore,

it will be ordered that the claim be dismissed without leave to

amend.

III. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to challenge

collaterally a conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus

must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and

gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the

state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,

518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir.

1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by

providing the highest state court with the necessary jurisdiction

a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before

presenting it to the federal court, and demonstrating that no

state remedy remains available. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,

275-76 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir.

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court

was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the

petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's

factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365

(1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9-10

(1992), superceded by statute as stated in Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362 (2000) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the

state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. 

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Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Hiivala

v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood,

133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United

States Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275...(1971),

we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that

petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the

state courts in order to give the State the

"'opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged

violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some

internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are

to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be

alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting

claims under the United States Constitution. If a

habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary

ruling at a state court trial denied him the due

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,

he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state

court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule

further in Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir.

2000), as amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th

Cir. 2001), stating: 

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly

presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims

in state court unless he specifically indicated to

that court that those claims were based on federal law.

See, Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir.

2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan,

this court has held that the petitioner must make the

federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing

federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding,

189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7... (1982)), or the underlying

claim would be decided under state law on the same

considerations that would control resolution of the claim

on federal grounds, see, e.g., Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Crotts, 73 F.3d 

at 865.

...

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert

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the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a

federal one without regard to how similar the state and

federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how

obvious the violation of federal law is.

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as

amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir.

2001). 

Where none of a petitioner’s claims has been presented to

the highest state court as required by the exhaustion doctrine,

the Court must dismiss the petition. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478,

481 (9th Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to hold a mixed

petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims

has not been extended to petitions that contain no exhausted

claims. Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

Petitioner contends he appealed his conviction to the state

appellate court, and that the California Supreme Court denied

review of Petitioner’s appellate claims. (Pet. 2.) He states

that he did not file any state petitions collaterally attacking

the judgment of conviction. (Id.) Petitioner does not submit a

copy of his petition for review filed in the California Supreme

Court. Further, Petitioner does not set forth at length the

claims that were raised before the California Supreme Court; he

instead refers the reader to “Attachment ‘A’,” which he

identifies as his statement of grounds raised in his direct

appeal of his conviction as well the grounds raised in the

present petition. (Id. at 2, 4-6, 8-25.) Attachment A reveals

that with respect to Petitioner’s claim concerning the improper

admission of gang expert testimony in evidence, he is raising in

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the present petition a claim or claims that the admission of the

gang testimony violated Petitioner’s right to a jury trial, fair

trial, and due process in violation of Petitioner’s rights under

the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 24.) 

Petitioner expressly states that he raised these constitutional

issues in the Court of Appeal. (Id.) 

Reference to the decision of the Court of Appeal, which is

appended to the petition, however, reflects that the court

addressed not constitutional issues concerning the gang expert

testimony, but rather only claims relating to the admissibility

and permissible scope of such testimony. (Id. at 57-63.) Such

claims appear to be grounded solely on state law and thus, would

not be cognizable in this proceeding pursuant to § 2254.

If Petitioner has not presented all of his claims to the

California Supreme Court, the Court cannot proceed to the merits

of those claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). However, it is

possible that Petitioner raised his constitutional claims

concerning the gang expert testimony in his petition for review

filed with the California Supreme Court but has not fully

informed the Court. Petitioner must inform the Court if these

constitutional claims have been presented to the California

Supreme Court, and if possible, provide the Court with a copy of

the petition filed in the California Supreme Court. 

IV. Disposition

According, is it ORDERED that:

1) Petitioner’s state law claims concerning the erroneous

introduction of lay witness testimony and a stay of a sentence

pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 654 are DISMISSED without leave to

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amend; and

2) Petitioner is ORDERED to show cause why the petition

should not be dismissed for Petitioner’s failure to exhaust state

remedies; Petitioner is ORDERED to inform the Court what claims

have been presented to the California Supreme Court within thirty

(30) days of the date of service of this order. 

Petitioner is INFORMED that failure to follow this order

will result in dismissal of the petition pursuant to Local Rule

110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 22, 2013 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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