Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-05042/USCOURTS-ca13-14-05042-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Higbie
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

RICHARD HIGBIE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee.

______________________ 

2014-5042

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:13-cv-00270-EJD, Judge Edward J. 

Damich.

______________________ 

Decided: January 14, 2015

______________________ 

DAMON MATHIAS, Schulman Mathias PLLC, of Dallas, 

Texas, argued for plaintiff-appellant. 

DOMENIQUE GRACE KIRCHNER, Senior Trial Attorney,

Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United 

States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued 

for defendant-appellee. On the brief were STUART F.

DELERY, Assistant Attorney General, ROBERT E.

KIRSCHMAN, JR., Director, STEVEN J. GILLINGHAM, Assistant Director, and MICHAEL P. GOODMAN, Trial Attorney. 

______________________ 

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2 HIGBIE v. US

Before LOURIE, REYNA, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge REYNA. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge TARANTO. 

REYNA, Circuit Judge.

Richard Higbie appeals the Court of Federal Claims’ 

dismissal of his claim for money damages against the 

United States Government for alleged breach of a confidentiality provision in an alternative dispute resolution 

agreement. The Court of Federal Claims determined that 

a purely non-monetary form of relief was available for any 

potential breach and, as a result, required Mr. Higbie to 

show the agreement could be fairly interpreted to contemplate damages. The Court of Federal Claims found 

that Mr. Higbie failed to make the required showing and 

dismissed his case for lack of jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. We agree that Mr. Higbie has not shown that the 

agreement in question can be fairly interpreted to contemplate money damages in the event of breach. As a 

result, the Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction 

under the Tucker Act. We therefore affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Mr. Higbie was employed as a Senior Criminal Investigator in the Dallas office of the Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security, a division of the United States State Department (“State Department”). In January 2009, Mr. Higbie 

contacted an equal employment opportunity (“EEO”) 

counsel to complain of alleged reprisal by the State Department for activity he had engaged in which he claimed 

was protected under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Mr. 

Higbie filed a formal complaint in April 2009 and submitted a request that his complaint be processed through the 

State Department’s alternative dispute resolution 

(“ADR”) program. The Government approved his case for 

mediation.

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HIGBIE v. US 3

During the lead up to the mediation, Mr. Higbie repeatedly inquired whether the mediation proceedings 

would be confidential. On several occasions, a State 

Department representative confirmed that they would be. 

According to Mr. Higbie, he was “purposefully negotiating” for confidentiality of the mediation by his repeated 

questions so as to prevent his supervisors from “using 

anything that occurred” during the proceedings against 

him in his employment. 

Three of Mr. Higbie’s supervisors, including Marian 

Cotter and Jeffrey Thomas, signed the mediation agreement that would govern the proceedings. That agreement 

included the following confidentiality provision:

Mediation is a confidential process. Any documents submitted to the mediator(s) and statements made during the mediation are for

settlement purposes only.

J.A. 127 (underlining in original). The parties did not 

resolve their dispute through mediation, and the EEO 

investigation continued. After the mediation, Ms. Cotter 

and Mr. Thomas provided affidavits to the EEO investigator, which are the basis for Mr. Higbie’s claim for breach 

of contract. In their affidavits, Ms. Cotter and Mr. Thomas discussed the nature and content of Mr. Higbie’s 

statements in the mediation proceedings and cast his 

participation in the proceedings in a negative light. 

In October 2011, Mr. Higbie filed suit in the Federal 

District Court for the Northern District of Texas, asserting numerous causes of action, including claims for retaliation and discrimination. Mr. Higbie’s complaint also 

included a claim for violation of the Alternative Dispute 

Resolution Act of 1996 (“ADRA claim”) arising out of the 

two affidavits, provided by Ms. Cotter and Mr. Thomas, to 

the EEO-assigned investigator. According to Mr. Higbie, 

the information obtained through the mediation process 

was governed by a strict confidentiality provision outlined 

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in the mediation agreement, and the disclosure of the 

affidavits constituted a breach of that provision. 

The State Department moved to dismiss the ADRA 

claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted because the ADRA statute does not provide for 

recovery of money damages for breach of a confidentiality 

agreement. The district court granted the motion and also

granted Mr. Higbie leave to file an amended complaint. 

Through amendment, Mr. Higbie removed his ADRA 

claim and, in its stead, alleged a claim sounding in contract for breach of the confidentiality provision. Mr. 

Higbie moved to transfer the newly added contract claim 

to the Court of Federal Claims. The district court granted 

the motion, leaving Mr. Higbie’s other claims pending 

before the district court. Mr. Higbie then filed a transfer 

complaint in the Court of Federal Claims. 

After the transfer, the Government moved in the 

Court of Federal Claims to dismiss Mr. Higbie’s complaint 

for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the mediation 

agreement did not meet the judicially-imposed requirement that the agreement in question be moneymandating. In opposing the motion, Mr. Higbie argued 

that all mediation agreements contemplate money damages for breach of confidentiality agreements. Mr. Higbie 

drew support from a single case from California dealing 

with money damages, a single state statute from Florida 

discussing money damages for breach of confidentiality in 

mediation, and a series of other cases having no relation 

to the award of money damages for breach of a confidentiality provision. 

The Court of Federal Claims found Mr. Higbie’s arguments unpersuasive. The court acknowledged the 

presumption that a damages remedy is available for 

breach of contract. Where a purely non-monetary remedy 

exists, however, the court explained that it can require a 

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HIGBIE v. US 5

plate monetary damages before it may exercise jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. Here, the court found the 

agreement in the dispute “clearly does not contemplate 

money damages,” nor does it “address anything remotely 

monetary.” Higbie v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 358, 364 

(2013). Further, it found that the non-binding authorities 

Mr. Higbie cited do not establish that money damages 

should be awarded for any breach of mediation confidentiality in this case. Id. at 365. Thus, the Court of Federal 

Claims concluded that Mr. Higbie had not met his burden

of showing the agreement could be fairly read to contemplate money damages, and dismissed his complaint for 

lack of jurisdiction.

Mr. Higbie appeals the dismissal of his complaint. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review a dismissal by the Court of Federal Claims 

for lack of jurisdiction de novo. Holmes v. United States, 

657 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 

I 

The Tucker Act confers jurisdiction upon the Court of 

Federal Claims over “any claim against the United States 

founded . . . upon any express or implied contract with the 

United States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2011). This 

jurisdictional provision operates to waive the sovereign 

immunity of the United States for claims premised on 

other sources of law, such as a contract or statute. United 

States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 290 (2009). The 

Tucker Act, however, does not create a substantive cause 

of action, and, as such, “a plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to 

monetary damages.” Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 

1167, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2005). While the separate source of 

law need not explicitly provide for enforcement through 

damages, liability is triggered only if the source can be 

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6 HIGBIE v. US

fairly interpreted as mandating compensation from the 

Government. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. at 290 (citation 

omitted). 

Contract law is a separate source of law compensable 

under the Tucker Act. See id. As with private agreements, 

when a government contract is breached, there is a presumption that a damages remedy will be available. Sanders v. United States, 252 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 

Typically, in a contract case, the presumption that money 

damages are available satisfies the Tucker Act’s moneymandating requirement. Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1314. 

The Government, however, has not consented to suit 

under the Tucker Act for every contract. Rick’s Mushroom

Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 

2008) (citations omitted). For instance, contracts that are 

entirely concerned with the conduct of parties in a criminal case, without a clear, unmistakable statement triggering monetary liability, do not invoke Tucker Act 

jurisdiction. Sanders, 252 F.3d at 1336. Express disavowals of money damages within a contract’s terms likewise 

defeat jurisdiction. Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1314. Tucker Act 

jurisdiction may also be lacking if relief for breach of 

contract could be entirely non-monetary. In such a case, it 

is “proper for the court to require a demonstration that 

the agreements could fairly be interpreted as contemplating monetary damages in the event of breach.” Id. at 

1315.

II

Mr. Higbie argues that he presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the mediation agreement can 

fairly be interpreted as contemplating monetary damages. 

To support his contention, Mr. Higbie purports to rely on 

(1) the terms of the contract itself; (2) negotiations in 

which he asked the government to confirm that the mediation would be confidential; and (3) instances of legislative and judicial support for awarding damages for breach 

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HIGBIE v. US 7

of a confidentiality provision. In an effort to show that the 

terms of the contract fairly contemplate money damages, 

Mr. Higbie cites portions of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s website, which recognize the 

importance of confidentiality to mediation, and congressional findings discussing the general benefits of ADR 

proceedings, such as efficiency at achieving settlements 

and reducing backlog in the federal courts. 

In response, the Government argues that there is no 

indication the terms of the mediation agreement contemplated money damages. Regarding Mr. Higbie’s requests 

that the Government confirm the confidentiality of the 

proceedings, the Government contends that Mr. Higbie 

has not shown that he contemplated money damages for a 

breach of the confidentiality provision, or that he communicated any such belief to the Government. Rather, according to the Government, the confidentiality provision 

in question appears to be nothing more than the standard 

clause that appears in all such mediation agreements. 

Relying on Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 

which deems inadmissible as evidence the “conduct or 

statements made in compromise negotiations,” the Government argues the appropriate, non-monetary remedy in 

such circumstances is exclusion of any improper disclosures from future proceedings. 

As a threshold issue, we must decide whether it was 

appropriate for the Court of Federal Claims to require Mr. 

Higbie to show that the agreement fairly contemplated 

monetary damages. While the agreement does not provide 

a monetary remedy, it does restrict the use of statements 

made during mediation to “settlement purposes only.” 

J.A. 27 (emphasis added). In other words, any statements 

made during the mediation must not be used for any 

purpose other than settlement. Thus, the agreement itself 

provides a remedy for the breach of the non-disclosure 

provision: exclusion of statements made during mediation 

from proceedings unrelated to the mediation. Per the 

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8 HIGBIE v. US

terms of the agreement, the affidavits of Ms. Cotter and 

Mr. Thomas could be excluded from the EEO investigation. The appropriateness of this remedy is consistent 

with Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which 

excludes the content of parties’ negotiations from other 

legal proceedings. This provision requiring the exclusion

of statements made during the mediation proceeding from 

any other proceeding is a purely non-monetary remedy 

provided by the agreement. It follows that the Court of 

Federal Claims did not err in imposing the requirement to 

show that the agreement could be fairly interpreted as 

contemplating money damages. Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1315.

Next, we consider whether Mr. Higbie has shown that 

the agreement can be fairly interpreted as contemplating 

money damages. On appeal, Mr. Higbie argues the terms 

of the agreement itself show that it contemplates money 

damages, but he does not point to a single provision in the 

agreement indicating money damages were contemplated. 

Having reviewed the agreement, we perceive no error in 

the Court of Federal Claims’ finding that it does not 

expressly contemplate money damages. As such, the 

terms of the agreement itself do not support the assertion 

that the agreement can be fairly interpreted to contemplate money damages.1 

1 In Cunningham v. United States, 748 F.3d 1172 

(Fed. Cir. 2014), a case neither party cited, this court 

considered breach of a confidentiality provision in a 

settlement agreement and found that the agreement was 

money-mandating. In Cunningham (as in Holmes), the 

agreement in question was a settlement agreement that 

created specific duties owed by the Government to that 

particular plaintiff, unlike this case where the agreement 

employs boilerplate common to agreements associated 

with similar mediation proceedings. The agreement in 

this case served to guide the mediation process, which in 

 

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HIGBIE v. US 9

Similarly, Mr. Higbie relies on his negotiations with 

the Government, without pointing to any communication 

in which it is apparent that either party contemplated the 

availability of money damages for breach of the agreement. Thus, the confidentiality discussions also do not 

support the assertion that the agreement contemplated 

money damages.

Finally, Mr. Higbie’s appeal to non-binding and inapplicable legal authority and governmental policy is unavailing. Mr. Higbie cited only non-controlling state law 

before the Court of Federal Claims and cites no case law

in his appeal brief before this court. The single statute he 

cites governs breaches in Florida. It is well-settled that 

state law generally does not govern disputes involving 

contracts to which the Government is a party. Prudential 

Ins. Co. of Am. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1295, 1298 (Fed. 

Cir. 1986). Additionally, the governmental policies on 

which Mr. Higbie relies show that confidentiality is an 

important component of the mediation process but do not 

speak to the remedy available for breach of confidentiality. Our applicable case law focuses on the existence of a 

money-mandating provision in the agreements involved in 

each dispute, not the principles which might be important 

in legal proceedings involving the Government and a 

private party. See, e.g., Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1315. In sum, 

Mr. Higbie fails to show that the mediation agreement 

involved in this dispute is money-mandating.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Federal Claims did not err in requiring 

Mr. Higbie to show that the mediation agreement could be 

the end was unsuccessful as the parties failed to reach 

settlement. Additionally, Mr. Higbie does not argue that 

the agreement creates any specific duty owed by the 

Government that applies particularly to him.

 

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10 HIGBIE v. US

fairly interpreted to contemplate money damages because 

non-monetary relief was available. Mr. Higbie has failed 

to make such a showing. The Court of Federal Claims 

correctly concluded that it does not have jurisdiction over 

Mr. Higbie’s case under the Tucker Act and, therefore, 

properly dismissed his claim for breach. 

AFFIRMED

Case: 14-5042 Document: 30-2 Page: 10 Filed: 01/14/2015
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

RICHARD HIGBIE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee.

______________________ 

2014-5042

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:13-cv-00270-EJD, Judge Edward J. 

Damich.

______________________ 

TARANTO, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I do not see a sufficient justification for excepting the 

confidentiality promise in the mediation agreement at 

issue from the strong general rule that contracts implicitly carry a damages remedy for their breach. In my view, 

the default damages remedy is available to Mr. Higbie if 

he proves entitlement to it, and the Court of Federal 

Claims therefore has jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. I 

would reverse the jurisdictional dismissal and remand for 

the parties to address the merits. Accordingly, I dissent

from the affirmance of the Court of Federal Claims’ judgment dismissing Mr. Higbie’s case for lack of jurisdiction. 

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2 HIGBIE v. US

A 

This court’s decision in Holmes v. United States, 657 

F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rested on its recognition of a 

principle long understood in contract law: “damages are 

always the default remedy for breach of contract.” United 

States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 885 (1996) (plurality opinion) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts 

§ 346, cmt. a (1981); 3 E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.8, 

p. 185 (1990)), cited in Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1314. That 

principle broadly applies to establish Tucker Act jurisdiction in contract disputes, even though contracts themselves often do not provide for damages relief: the default 

remedy from background law suffices. As Holmes stated, 

“[n]ormally[,] contracts do not contain provisions specifying the basis for the award of damages in case of 

breach. . . . [I]n a contract case, the money-mandating 

requirement for Tucker Act jurisdiction normally is 

satisfied by the presumption that money damages are 

available for breach of contract, with no further inquiry 

being necessary.” 657 F.3d at 1314 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted).

There is good reason to follow, rather than depart 

from, that well-established and broadly applicable default 

rule here. For one thing, strong adherence to background 

rules is especially important with contracts. In contract 

interpretation, “a court properly takes account of background legal rules—the doctrines that typically or traditionally have governed a given situation when no 

agreement states otherwise. Indeed, ignoring those rules 

is likely to frustrate the parties’ intent and produce 

perverse consequences.” US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 

569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1537, 1549 (2013) (citations 

omitted). 

More specifically, money damages are available as a 

remedy for breach of confidentiality provisions of contracts in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Youtie v. Macy’s 

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HIGBIE v. US 3

Retail Holding, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d 511, 523–27 (E.D. 

Pa. 2009) (holding that money damages were available for 

a breach of contract claim for violation of a confidentiality 

provision of an employment contract); Davidson v. Cao, 

211 F. Supp. 2d 264, 280–84 (D. Mass. 2002) (denying a 

motion to dismiss a breach of contract claim for money 

damages for violation of a confidential disclosure agreement); Doe v. Portland Health Centers, Inc., 782 P.2d 446, 

448–49 (Or. App. 1989) (denying a motion to dismiss a 

breach of contract claim for money damages for violation 

of a “patient confidentiality statement,” stating that “we 

do not agree that . . . damages [other than those for emotional suffering] are unavailable as a matter of law”). 

Doubtless there are complexities, but there appears to be 

nothing out of the ordinary or unexpected about the 

availability of monetary relief, where harm and damages 

are proved, for breach of confidentiality promises.

The limited case law on confidentiality commitments 

in mediation agreements seems to be in accord. E.g., 

Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist. v. Zhou, No. 09-03493, 2012 

WL 930998, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2012) (“This matter 

presently involves a contract provision that proceedings 

before a mediator be kept confidential. I conclude that 

the contract was breached, claimant Diana Zhou’s motion 

for summary judgment must be granted, she is entitled to 

nominal damages of $1, and at trial she may present 

evidence of actual damages.”); Bashaw v. Johnson, No. 11-

2693-JWL, 2012 WL 1623483, at *3–4 (D. Kan. May 9, 

2012) (“According to defendant, plaintiffs, after the mediation failed, violated the confidentiality agreement. . . . 

[Defendant] certainly [has] a plausible claim for damages 

stemming from the alleged breach.”). The government 

has not identified any on-point contrary authority.

B 

The default rule is not absolute, but I do not see a basis for an exception in this case. 

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4 HIGBIE v. US

1. As Holmes noted, one exception applies when “[a] 

contract expressly disavow[s] money damages.” Holmes, 

657 F.3d at 1314. But there is no such express disavowal 

in the agreement at issue here. Nor is there a sound basis 

for finding an implicit disavowal. 

The confidentiality provision declares that

“[m]ediation is a confidential process” and that “statements made during the mediation are for settlement 

purposes only.” J.A. 127 (underlining deleted). The 

government and the majority view this as providing

affirmatively for the “remedy” of exclusion from evidence. 

Even if that characterization is accepted, however, the 

provision cannot reasonably be taken to eliminate the 

default monetary remedy. The specification of the evidentiary “remedy” has a ready explanation that in no way 

implies ouster of the monetary remedy. After all, one 

familiar background principle is that the availability of 

monetary damages, where such damages are adequate, 

renders unavailable equitable relief, such as specific 

performance of the confidentiality/settlement-use-only 

promise.1 With that preference for legal remedies in the 

1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 359(1) (1981)

(“Specific performance or an injunction will not be ordered 

if damages would be adequate to protect the expectation

interest of the injured party.”); see also Texas v. New 

Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 131 (1987) (“[S]pecific performance

. . . [is] an equitable remedy that requires some attention 

to the relative benefits and burdens that the parties may 

enjoy or suffer as compared with a legal remedy in damages.”); Javierre v. Cent. Altagracia, 217 U.S. 502, 508 

(1910) (“[A] suit for damages would have given adequate 

relief, and therefore the appellee should have been confined to its remedy at law. . . . [T]he court would not 

undertake to decree specific performance . . . .”); Dow 

Chem. Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1334, 1345–46 (Fed. 

 

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HIGBIE v. US 5

background, it makes perfect sense for a contract to 

provide expressly for a non-monetary remedy to ensure its 

availability, without any implication that the new remedy 

is to be exclusive. The natural inference is that this kind 

of specified remedy supplements but does not supplant 

the default damages remedy. A fortiori for a provision 

that is not even worded as a “remedy” provision. 

If the new remedy, or other aspects of the contractual 

context, were somehow inconsistent with preserving the 

background rule, an implication of override might be 

warranted. Cf. United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 452 

(1988) (background presumption that Congress intends 

judicial review of agency action to be available is displaced when that presumption is contrary to a specific 

statutory scheme at issue). But there has been no such 

showing here. As indicated by the authorities allowing 

damages for mediation-confidentiality breach, and the 

absence of contrary authorities, the availability of a 

remedy of money damages—which must be proven, of 

course—appears to be consistent with the mediation 

context and the specific remedy of evidentiary exclusion. 

The government has not explained why there is any 

inconsistency.

Moreover, the government has not shown—it has not 

even meaningfully contended—that evidentiary exclusion 

will always, or even regularly, suffice to cure all normally 

compensable injuries from breach of confidentiality. It is 

easy to imagine reputational harms and even job-related 

harms, as well as increased costs of resolving the dispute 

that gave rise to the mediation. As to the latter, for 

example, Mr. Higbie might incur delay and expense from 

Cir. 2000) (“Because rescission is essentially an equitable 

remedy, it will not ordinarily be invoked where money 

damages—in this case damages for breach of contract—

will adequately compensate a party to the contract.”). 

 

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additional proceedings in the resolution of his discrimination claim because the EEO investigator, at an early 

stage, might have been influenced by knowledge of Mr. 

Higbie’s alleged stonewalling in the mediation. Sometimes, perhaps often, there will be no such harms. In that 

case, there should be no damages. But that is a merits 

judgment, not one about the general unavailability of 

monetary relief even for proven harm from breach of this 

kind of contract. 

2. This court has recognized an exception to Tucker 

Act jurisdiction for a contract claim based on “[a]n agreement ‘entirely concerned with the conduct of parties in a 

criminal case.’” Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1314 (quoting Sanders v. United States, 252 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); 

see Kania v. United States, 650 F.2d 264, 268–69 (Ct. Cl. 

1981). But that exception is not directly applicable to Mr. 

Higbie’s case, which has nothing to do with criminal law. 

And the expressed rationales for the exception do not 

justify creating a new exception applicable here. 

The criminal-case exception traces back to Kania. 

There, the Court of Claims considered whether an agreement not to prosecute made between an Assistant United 

States Attorney and a plaintiff was money-mandating. 

Kania, 650 F.2d at 266–68. The court held that it was 

not. Id. at 267. The court’s rationale was that the agreement did not evidence that the AUSA had authority to 

obligate payment by the government in the event of 

breach. Id. at 268. The court thought a demonstration of 

authority was essential in the criminal context because 

criminal cases were themselves outside the purview of the 

Court of Claims. Id. at 268–69. 

In Sanders, this court stressed the narrowness of the

criminal exception articulated in Kania, explaining that 

the Kania exception disrupts the normal presumption of 

money damages for breach of contract only “where the 

agreement is entirely concerned with the conduct of 

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HIGBIE v. US 7

parties in a criminal case.” Sanders, 252 F.3d at 1334; see 

id. at 1336. This court held that such an agreement could 

“theoretically, provide for monetary liability for breach

. . . . But such liability should not be implied, and could 

exist only if there was an unmistakable promise to subject 

the United States to monetary liability.” Id. at 1336. 

Sanders rested this distinctive presumption for the purely 

criminal context on Kania’s concern about the jurisdictional divide in criminal cases, noting that “the Supreme 

Court has made clear that claims for breach of plea 

agreements and other agreements unique to the criminal 

justice system should be brought in the courts in which 

they were negotiated and executed.” Id. at 1336. Importantly, Sanders retained the normal presumption of 

money damages for breach with regard to the vast majority of contracts, including those that intersect with criminal law but have some civil component. Id. at 1334. 

In light of these precedents, the criminal exception 

has no bearing here. Mr. Higbie’s mediation agreement

falls entirely outside of criminal law. And because mediation is not a legal setting foreign to this court’s docket, 

Mr. Higbie’s contract does not give rise to the jurisdictional concern animating Kania and Sanders.2

3. Outside the disavowal and criminal-case settings, 

it appears that only once, in Rick’s Mushroom Service, 

Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008), has 

this court held a contract not to carry the default mone2 The government has not argued that the jurisdictional issue here turns on whether the officials who 

entered into the agreement with Mr. Higbie lacked authority to obligate funds in the event of breach. Indeed, 

when asked at oral argument whether the officials had 

authority to obligate funds, the government responded 

that the issue of authority “go[es] to the merits of the 

case.” 

 

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8 HIGBIE v. US

tary remedy. But, as Holmes indicated, Rick’s involved a 

“unique cost-share agreement,” Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1315, 

and a broader rationale is not apparent. See Rick’s, 521 

F.3d at 1343. There is no reason to draw from Rick’s a 

lesson applicable to bar Mr. Higbie’s claim at the jurisdictional threshold.

Rick’s involved an agreement between the government and a waste facility: the government was to provide 

specifications detailing how the facility could be constructed and operated in a conservation-friendly manner; 

the facility—if it complied—was to be entitled to payments to help defray the facility’s costs. Id. at 1341, 1344. 

Under the agreement, the government provided specifications and paid the facility for following them. Nevertheless, the facility was sued by a third party for allegedly 

violating state and federal environmental laws, and the 

facility eventually settled. Id. at 1341–42. When the 

facility asked the government for indemnification, the 

government refused, and the facility then sued the government in the Court of Federal Claims. Id. at 1342. 

This court affirmed the jurisdictional dismissal of the suit. 

The parties, notably, did not contend that the contract 

itself was a source of substantive law that created a right 

to money damages. See generally Brief for PlaintiffAppellant, Rick’s, 521 F.3d 1338 (No. 07-5137), 2007 WL 

2734363; Brief for Defendant-Appellee, Rick’s, 521 F.3d 

1338 (No. 07-5137), 2007 WL 3264969; Reply Brief for 

Plaintiff-Appellant, Rick’s, 521 F.3d 1338 (No. 07-5137), 

2007 WL 4739079. As this court noted, “[the facility] d[id]

not point to a money-mandating source of law to establish 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) for its breach of 

contract claim. Instead, [the facility] attempt[ed] to rely 

on the [Contract Disputes Act] as the source of its substantive right to recover money damages and to establish 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2).” Rick’s, 521 

F.3d at 1343. 

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HIGBIE v. US 9

The absence of a straight contract-based contention 

fits with a rationale this court expressed in discussing one 

of the claims that the facility actually made; namely, the 

absence of authority to obligate funds in the government 

official that signed the agreement. The Anti-Deficiency 

Act prohibits procurement agencies and employees from 

“entering into a contract for future payment of money in 

advance of, or in excess of, an existing appropriation.” 

Hercules Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 427 (1996)

(citing 31 U.S.C. § 1341). In rejecting the facility’s related 

claim for equitable indemnification, the court stated that

“the contracting officer would have no authority under the 

ADA to enter into an indemnity agreement without an 

appropriation.” Rick’s, 521 F.3d at 1346. The government has not advanced such a rationale as a basis for the 

jurisdictional dismissal here. See supra note 2.

Perhaps a full understanding of the context in Rick’s 

would make clear the inconsistency of any monetary 

remedy with the statutory and regulatory regime under 

which the cost-sharing agreement was made in that case. 

But whatever the reach of Rick’s, I see no reason for 

extending its result to this case.

C 

It may well be that Mr. Higbie cannot succeed on his 

damages claim for breach of contract, or even that his 

current pleading is deficient. See, e.g., Sarsfield v. Cnty. 

of San Benito, No. 07-cv-02528 JF, 2010 WL 1929619, at 

*8–9 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2010) (holding that “[p]laintiff 

fail[ed] to plead, let alone show evidence of, cognizable 

damages he suffered as a result” of an alleged breach of 

the confidentiality provision of a mediation agreement). 

But that possibility—mentioned without suggestion as to 

its substantiality—goes to the merits of Mr. Higbie’s 

claim. Here, we are deciding only a threshold jurisdictional issue: whether Mr. Higbie is entitled to plead 

breach and seek money damages under the contract. 

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10 HIGBIE v. US

Because, in my view, the strong presumption that money 

damages are available for breach of contract answers this 

question in the affirmative, I respectfully dissent.

Case: 14-5042 Document: 30-2 Page: 20 Filed: 01/14/2015