Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-03110/USCOURTS-caDC-13-03110-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Juan Melgar-Hernandez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 15, 2016 Decided August 9, 2016

No. 13-3110

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

JUAN MELGAR-HERNANDEZ, ALSO KNOWN AS TRISTE,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cr-00256-RMC)

Carmen D. Hernandez, appointed by the court, argued 

the cause and filed the briefs for appellant. 

Daniel J. Lenerz, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Elizabeth 

Trosman and Chrisellen R. Kolb, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: BROWN and SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SRINIVASAN.

SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge: Appellant Juan MelgarHernandez pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge under the 

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Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. On 

appeal, Hernandez raises several challenges to his conviction 

and sentence. We reject the bulk of those challenges, except 

that we remand the case to the district court for resentencing 

in light of a retroactive amendment to the Sentencing 

Guidelines.

I.

On November 1, 2011, a federal grand jury indicted 

Hernandez, along with sixteen other alleged members of the 

MS-13 gang in the Washington, D.C., area, on a charge of 

conspiracy to conduct and participate in an enterprise through 

a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of the Racketeer 

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.

§ 1962(d). MS-13 is one of the largest gangs in the United 

States, with over 10,000 members in at least twenty states, 

Mexico, and several Central American countries. Gang 

members regularly engage in criminal activity, including 

assaults, drug crimes, theft, and obstructing justice. The gang 

is organized into “cliques,” smaller groups operating in 

specific cities or regions. 

In the D.C. area, certain cliques came together to create 

an organization called “La Hermandad,” whose purpose was 

to allow clique leaders “to discuss gang rules and gang 

business, to resolve problems or issues involving the cliques, 

and to unite gang members.” Indictment at 5 (J.A. 35). The 

indictment alleged that Hernandez was a leader of MS-13’s 

“Las Uniones” clique between late 2009 and early 2010 and, 

in that capacity, helped form the La Hermandad organization. 

See id. at 5, 15 (J.A. 35, 45).

On March 8, 2013, Hernandez pleaded guilty to the 

RICO conspiracy charge pursuant to a plea agreement with 

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the government. Under the statute, in order to demonstrate a 

“pattern of racketeering activity,” the government must 

establish “at least two acts of racketeering activity” within a 

ten-year period. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). “Racketeering 

activity” includes, as relevant here, “any act or threat 

involving murder . . . which is chargeable under state law and 

punishable by imprisonment for more than one year,” as well 

as certain offenses involving controlled substances. Id. 

§ 1961(1). As part of his plea agreement, Hernandez admitted 

that he had committed two predicate acts of racketeering 

activity: (i) conspiracy to murder in violation of the common 

law of Maryland and Maryland Criminal Code §§ 1-202 and 

2-201, and (ii) conspiracy to distribute controlled dangerous 

substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.

In a written proffer submitted in support of his guilty 

plea, Hernandez stipulated to the underlying facts justifying 

his conviction. He acknowledged having been “one of the 

leaders of Hermandad” and having distributed between 2 and 

31⁄2 kilograms of cocaine between November 2009 and March 

2010. Gov’t Proffer of Proof in Supp. of Def.’s Guilty Plea

(Mar. 8, 2013) (S.A. 10, 16). With respect to the predicate act

of conspiracy to commit murder, Hernandez admitted he had 

a conversation in January 2010 with an unidentified man who

told Hernandez that the man’s father had been killed in El 

Salvador. Hernandez responded that “[w]e can arrange for 

someone to kill the son of a bitch [i.e. the perpetrator] from 

here . . . without you having to go to El Salvador.” Gov’t 

Resp. to Def.’s Sentencing Mem., Ex. 3 (Dec. 5, 2013) (J.A. 

148). He also told the man that he would send him a phone 

with which to communicate with an MS-13 leader in El 

Salvador about the proposed murder. See Gov’t Proffer (S.A. 

15). Several months later, Hernandez had a phone 

conversation with men in El Salvador during which one of the 

men asked Hernandez “who they were supposed to ‘hit.’” Id.

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(S.A. 16). Hernandez and the men discussed “the necessity of 

investigating the murder properly, and then sending two 

recruits (persons not yet jumped in to MS-13) to do the job”

of killing the person in El Salvador. Id. There is no 

indication that the murder ever took place.

In light of those admissions by Hernandez, the 

government recommended a sentencing reduction based on 

his acceptance of responsibility. On December 9, 2013, the 

district court sentenced Hernandez to 156 months of

imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised 

release.

II.

We first consider Hernandez’s challenge to the factual 

basis for his guilty plea. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure requires that, “before entering judgment 

on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a 

factual basis for the plea.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). The 

requirement aims to “protect a defendant who is in the 

position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the 

nature of the charge but without realizing that his conduct 

does not actually fall within the charge.” McCarthy v. United 

States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Hernandez argues that there was an insufficient 

basis for his guilty plea because Maryland law does not 

criminalize conspiracy to commit murder beyond the state’s 

borders (in El Salvador). We are unpersuaded.

In Maryland, conspiracy remains a common law crime. 

See Mitchell v. State, 767 A.2d 844, 852 (Md. 2001). Under 

state decisions, the “essence of a criminal conspiracy is an 

unlawful agreement” between “two or more persons to 

accomplish some unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a lawful 

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purpose by unlawful means.” Townes v. State, 548 A.2d 832, 

834 (Md. 1988). And importantly for our purposes, “the 

crime is complete when the unlawful agreement is reached, 

and no overt act in furtherance of the agreement need be 

shown.” Id. Accordingly, in the case of conspiracy to 

commit murder, “once the agreement to murder has been 

made, the crime is complete without any further action.” 

Grandison v. State, 506 A.2d 580, 617 (Md. 1986); accord 

Khalifa v. State, 855 A.2d 1175 (Md. 2004).

Here, it is undisputed that Hernandez entered into an 

agreement to commit murder during the phone calls with the 

unidentified man whose father had been killed in El Salvador. 

It is also undisputed that Hernandez participated in those 

conversations while in Maryland. See Gov’t Proffer (S.A. 15-

16). Under Maryland law, then, the crime of conspiracy was 

“complete” at the time Hernandez made the phone calls.

Grandison, 506 A.2d at 617. The unlawful agreement had 

been reached. Nothing more was required.

Hernandez challenges that conclusion on the ground that 

an agreement to commit murder outside the state’s borders is 

not a crime punishable under Maryland law. His argument 

relies on the concept of territorial jurisdiction, i.e., the notion 

that “an offense against the laws of the state of Maryland is 

punishable only when committed within its territory.” West v. 

State, 797 A.2d 1278, 1282 (Md. 2002) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Maryland adheres to the common law rule 

concerning territorial jurisdiction when some elements of a 

crime occur beyond state borders. Under that rule, Maryland 

courts have jurisdiction if the “essential element[]” of the 

offense takes place in Maryland. State v. Butler, 724 A.2d 

657, 662 (Md. 1999). 

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In this case, because Maryland does not require proof of

an overt act to establish a conspiracy, the “essential 

element[]” (indeed the only element) of the crime—the 

agreement to commit murder—took place in the state of 

Maryland. Hernandez’s conduct thus violated Maryland law 

under applicable principles of territorial jurisdiction,

notwithstanding the extraterritorial aim of the conspiracy. See 

1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 4.4 (2d ed. 

2015) (“[W]hen no overt act is required for the commission of 

conspiracy, it has been held that an agreement in state A to 

commit a crime in state B, is a conspiracy with its situs in 

state A.”).

It is immaterial that, under principles of territorial 

jurisdiction, the object of Hernandez’s conspiracy—murder in 

El Salvador—might not itself have been punishable in 

Maryland had it been carried out. Under Maryland law, the 

crime of conspiracy requires only an agreement “to 

accomplish some unlawful purpose.” Townes, 548 A.2d at 

834 (emphasis added). There is no requirement that the 

unlawful purpose itself be a crime punishable in Maryland. 

See Lanasa v. State, 109 Md. 602 (1909). In this case, it is 

readily apparent that the object of Hernandez’s conspiracy—

murder—is unlawful: it is undisputed that murder is illegal in 

both Maryland and El Salvador. See Md. Crim. Code § 2-

201; Código Penal [Penal Code] art. 128 (El Sal.). 

Hernandez’s agreement to commit that act therefore 

constitutes an agreement “to accomplish some unlawful 

purpose” for purposes of the crime of conspiracy under

Maryland law. Townes, 548 A.2d at 834.

We have no need to consider whether we would reach a 

different conclusion if the intended aim of the conspiracy 

were unlawful in Maryland but not in El Salvador, or 

unlawful in El Salvador but not in Maryland. See, e.g.,

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People v. Morante, 975 P.2d 1071, 1086 (Cal. 1999). We 

conclude here only that, when the object of an extraterritorial

conspiracy is unlawful in both Maryland and the jurisdiction 

in which it is to be carried out, entering into an agreement 

while in Maryland to commit that act violates Maryland law. 

Consequently, Hernandez’s guilty plea satisfied the 

requirements of Rule 11.

In light of our conclusion that the district court 

committed no error in accepting the factual basis for 

Hernandez’s guilty plea, we need not resolve the parties’ 

dispute about whether Hernandez preserved his factual-basis 

objection in the district court. Failure to raise an objection in 

district court ordinarily would result in the application of a 

more onerous standard of review from the defendant’s 

perspective—i.e., plain-error review rather than harmlesserror review. See United States v. Moore, 703 F.3d 562, 569 

(D.C. Cir. 2012). Because we find that the district court

committed no error in the first place, we need not decide 

whether to apply plain-error or harmless-error review. In 

either event, we would affirm.

III.

We next consider Hernandez’s challenges to his sentence.

The district court calculated Hernandez’s sentencing range 

under the Sentencing Guidelines to be 151 to 188 months. 

The court then sentenced him to 156 months of imprisonment 

to be followed by three years of supervised release. 

Hernandez contends that the district court committed 

procedural error at sentencing and that the sentence is 

substantively unreasonable. We reject both arguments.

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A.

Hernandez argues that the district court committed 

procedural error by failing to address the mitigating factors he 

presented at sentencing. Because Hernandez did not object to 

this alleged error in the district court, we review his claim for 

plain error. In re Sealed Case, 527 F.3d 188, 91-92 (D.C. Cir. 

2008). To prevail under that standard, Hernandez must 

establish that, “during the plea colloquy, (1) the District Court 

erred, (2) the error was clear or obvious, (3) the error affected 

his substantial rights, and (4) the error ‘seriously affected the 

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.’” Moore, 703 F.3d at 569 (quoting United States 

v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-36 (1993) (alteration omitted)).

In his sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing 

hearing, Hernandez presented a number of considerations 

which, he contended, warranted a below-Guidelines sentence. 

He argued, among other things, that the murder “conspiracy

was never actually consummated with the murder of anyone,”

Def.’s Sentencing Mem. at 7 (Nov. 25, 2013) (J.A. 109), and

that the drug-distribution conspiracy did not involve “the 

trafficking of large wholesale quantities” of drugs, id. at 13

(J.A. 115). He also emphasized certain personal 

characteristics, such as his young age when joining MS-13 

and his ostensibly low risk of recidivism. Id. at 16-17 (J.A. 

118-19). Hernandez argues that the district court failed to 

fulfill its obligation under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to consider 

“the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history 

and characteristics of the defendant” in determining his

sentence.

Our review calls for us to determine whether the district 

court “adequately explain[ed] the chosen sentence,” United

States v. Locke, 664 F.3d 353, 355 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal 

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quotation omitted), and “considered the necessary factors” 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 

985, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2010). It is clear from the record that the 

district court addressed the section 3553(a) factors at 

sentencing and took into account “the nature and 

circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

The district judge observed that Hernandez’s statements 

at sentencing and the fact of his guilty plea indicated “that he 

has developed respect” for the law. Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 36

(J.A. 186). She then specifically addressed the personal 

characteristics Hernandez had highlighted, noting that he “had 

alternatives,” had been “distracted from [the] purpose” for

which he had come to the United States and “distracted from 

his father,” and had ended up “toss[ing those goals] away in 

exchange for the gang.” Id. at 38 (J.A. 188). Additionally, 

the district judge observed that the predicate acts admitted by 

Hernandez “are all serious offenses and quite injurious to the 

community.” Id. at 35 (J.A. 185). She further emphasized the 

need to deter Hernandez from “future criminal conduct until 

such time as we’re confident that he won’t engage [in] any 

more [crimes] and to signal to others that his conduct has 

consequences.” Id. at 37 (J.A. 187). Ultimately, the 

mitigating considerations persuaded the district judge to 

impose a 156-month sentence, as opposed to a “higher 

sentence” closer to 180 months. Id. at 39-40 (J.A. 189-90).

In light of those statements, we reject Hernandez’s 

argument that the district court committed any procedural 

error—much less plain error—at sentencing. The court 

adequately explained the basis for the chosen sentence, and, 

in such instances, we generally presume that the judge 

adequately considered the relevant arguments. See Locke, 

664 F.3d at 358-59. Here, the district judge not only

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considered the mitigating circumstances Hernandez raised, 

but she also imposed a lower sentence in part because of 

them. The district court was not required under section 

3553(a) “to address expressly each and every argument 

advanced by the defendant.” Id. at 357; see United States v. 

Simpson, 430 F.3d 1177, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

B.

In addition to his procedural challenge, Hernandez also 

contends that the sentence imposed by the district court was 

substantively unreasonable. We review the “substantive 

reasonableness of a sentence under the abuse of discretion

standard even when no objection was raised in the district 

court.” Wilson, 605 F.3d at 1034. In doing so, we start from 

the understanding that, in this circuit, “a sentence that is 

within the Guidelines range is entitled to a presumption of 

reasonableness on appeal.” United States v. Kaufman, 791 

F.3d 86, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Hernandez’s 156-month 

sentence fell within the applicable Guidelines range and thus 

fits into that category.

In arguing that his sentence is substantively 

unreasonable, Hernandez invokes the same mitigating factors

he raised at sentencing, including, for example, his status as a 

first-time offender, his lack of direct involvement in violence, 

his young age when joining MS-13, and his dedication to his 

family. Several of those considerations, e.g., his status as a 

first-time offender, are already reflected in the applicable 

Guidelines range. Moreover, as explained, the district court 

considered the other personal characteristics and balanced 

them against the seriousness of the offenses and the need for 

deterrence. We “defer to the district court’s judgment when,” 

as here, “it has presented a ‘reasoned and reasonable decision 

that the § 3553(a) factors, on the whole, justified the 

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sentence.’” United States v. Ventura, 650 F.3d 746, 751 

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,

59-60 (2007)).

Hernandez also contends that his sentence is 

unreasonable because it results in unwarranted sentencing 

disparities between Hernandez and other members of MS-13 

who were indicted at the same time, several of whom directly 

participated in violent activity (unlike Hernandez) but 

received shorter sentences. Such disparities, however, stem 

from the varying Guidelines ranges applicable to defendants 

charged with and convicted of different offenses. 

Hernandez’s Guidelines range reflected personal factors such 

as his leadership role in MS-13 and history of involvement 

with the gang. We thus reject his argument that the sentence

imposed by the district court was substantively unreasonable.

IV.

Finally, Hernandez argues that the case should be 

remanded to the district court for resentencing in light of a

retroactive amendment to section 2D1.1 of the Guidelines. 

We agree.

Section 2D1.1 provides the framework for calculating the 

Guidelines range for numerous drug offenses. Hernandez’s 

offense level (and thus his Guidelines range) was based in 

part on that section because conspiracy to distribute drugs was 

one of the two predicate acts used to establish his RICO 

conspiracy conviction. Hernandez seeks to benefit from 

Amendment 782, promulgated in 2014, which generally 

reduced base offense levels under section 2D1.1 by two

levels. See U.S.S.G. Supp. to App’x C, Amd. 782 (effective 

Nov. 1, 2014). Although the amendment came after 

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Hernandez’s sentencing, the Sentencing Commission made

the amendment retroactive. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d).

The government argues that there nonetheless is no need 

to remand for resentencing in this case. The government 

relies on a Guidelines provision establishing that a retroactive 

Guidelines amendment warrants a “reduction in the 

defendant’s term of imprisonment” only if the amendment has 

“the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guidelines 

range.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). Here, the government 

explains, Amendment 782 does not have the direct effect of 

lowering Hernandez’s sentencing range. Although the 

government is correct that Amendment 782 would not directly 

lower Hernandez’s offense level (and hence his sentencing 

range), we still conclude that a remand for resentencing is 

warranted.

First, the reason Amendment 782 does not directly affect 

Hernandez’s sentencing range relates to the Guidelines’ 

grouping rules for multiple offenses. When a defendant

commits multiple offenses, the most serious offense provides 

the starting point for determining the Guidelines range. See

U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. That starting point is then adjusted to 

reflect the addition of other offenses, based on their 

seriousness. See id. Hernandez’s adjusted offense level for 

conspiracy to commit murder (36) exceeded his adjusted 

offense level for conspiracy to distribute controlled dangerous 

substances (31). The former accordingly served as the 

starting point for calculating his final offense level. The 

grouping rules called for adding one point for the drug 

conspiracy. See id. The resulting combined offense level 

(37) was then reduced by three levels for Hernandez’s 

acceptance of responsibility, giving rise to a final offense 

level of 34. Based on Hernandez’s status as a first-time 

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offender, that offense level resulted in a Guidelines range of 

151 to 188 months of imprisonment.

Applying Amendment 782 to Hernandez’s Guidelines 

calculation would not affect that range. The amendment

would lower Hernandez’s adjusted offense level for the drug 

conspiracy by two levels to 29. But the adjusted offense level 

for conspiracy to commit murder (36) would still serve as the 

starting point for his sentence. And the grouping rules would 

still add one point to account for the drug conspiracy, 

resulting in the same combined offense level (37) and the 

same final offense level (34) after the reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility. See id. Hernandez’s Guidelines

range would thus remain unchanged even if the amendment 

were applied. Ordinarily, as explained, that result would 

prevent us from remanding the case for resentencing. See id. 

§ 1B1.10(a)(2)(B).

We confront a unique situation here, however. 

Hernandez claims that the district court incorrectly applied a 

three-level upward adjustment for his leadership role in the 

drug conspiracy, resulting in an erroneous adjusted offense 

level of 31. He did not raise that alleged error in the district 

court, because, at the time, it would have had no effect on his 

final offense level (even if his challenge was successful). 

Specifically, without the three-level leadership adjustment, 

Hernandez’s adjusted offense level for the drug conspiracy 

would have been 28 instead of 31. The starting point for his 

Guidelines range would still have been his adjusted offense 

level for the murder conspiracy (36). Under the grouping 

rules, factoring in the drug conspiracy at an adjusted offense 

level of 28 would have had the same effect: one point would 

have been added to the starting level (36), resulting in the 

same combined offense level of 37. See id. § 3D1.4. 

Hernandez therefore had no reason to contest whether the 

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adjusted offense level for the drug conspiracy should have 

been 28 or 31.

With the promulgation of Amendment 782, however, the 

lower adjusted offense level for the drug conspiracy makes a 

difference. The amendment reduces Hernandez’s base 

offense level for the drug conspiracy from 28 to 26. Without 

the three-level leadership bump that Hernandez now contests, 

his adjusted offense level would remain 26. As before, the 

adjusted offense level for the murder conspiracy (36) would 

continue to serve as the starting point. But, unlike before, the 

combined offense level in that circumstance would be 36 

(instead of 37). That is because, under the grouping rules, no 

points are added to the adjusted offense level for the primary 

offense when the difference between the two offense levels

equals nine or more points. See id. After the reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility, Hernandez’s final offense level 

would be 33 (instead of 34), with a lower sentencing range of 

135 to 168 months.

In light of that potential effect, we conclude that 

resentencing is appropriate to enable Hernandez to challenge 

the application of the leadership adjustment in calculating his 

Guidelines range. Our decisions support giving a defendant

the opportunity to make sentencing arguments in comparable 

circumstances. In United States v. Whren, we held that,

“upon a resentencing occasioned by a remand . . . the district 

court may consider . . . such new arguments or new facts as 

are made newly relevant by the court of appeals’ decision.” 

111 F.3d 956, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Subsequently, in United 

States v. McCoy, 313 F.3d 561 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (en banc), we 

construed Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, which provides that, at sentencing, the court “may, 

for good cause, allow a party to make a new objection at any 

time before sentence is imposed.” We held that district courts 

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should consider at resentencing whether previously-unmade 

arguments fell within the “good cause” exception when the 

arguments were only contingently relevant before. We 

explained that parties at sentencing lack “reason to raise a 

doubly contingent objection for which the likelihood of any 

significance is remote.” Id. at 566 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Additionally, we observed, an “absolute 

requirement to raise all objections (regardless of the degree of 

relevance) is likely both to waste judicial resources and work 

injustice.” Id.

While those decisions involved sentencing arguments 

made relevant by an intervening judicial decision, as opposed 

to a retroactive Guidelines amendment, the concerns 

underlying those decisions lead us to conclude that Hernandez 

similarly should be permitted to argue that the leadership 

adjustment was erroneously applied in calculating his drug 

conspiracy offense level. At the time of Hernandez’s 

sentencing, the likelihood of that argument’s having any 

significance was “remote.” Id. The argument, however, was 

made “newly relevant” by Amendment 782. Whren, 111 F.3d 

at 960. In those circumstances, remand for resentencing is 

warranted. To rule otherwise would stand in considerable 

tension with the Sentencing Commission’s instruction that 

Amendment 782 is to be applied retroactively. It would also 

engender an incentive for defense lawyers to raise highly 

contingent objections in the district court, which would result 

in a waste of judicial resources in the long run.

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* * * * *

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Hernandez’s 

conviction but we vacate his sentence and remand the case to 

the district court for resentencing.

So ordered.

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