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Parties Involved:
Thomas Egan
Appellant
United States Agency for International Development
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided August 31, 2004

No. 03-5267

THOMAS A. EGAN,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,

APPELLEE

–————

On Motion for Summary Affirmance

–————

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv2414)

–————

R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, filed the

motion for summary affirmance for appellee. With him on

the motion were Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, Claire

M. Whitaker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Osvaldo Luis

Gratacos, U.S. Agency for International Development.

Thomas A. Egan filed the opposition for appellant.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #03-5267 Document #845477 Filed: 08/31/2004 Page 1 of 7
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Before: SENTELLE, ROGERS, and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Plaintiff Thomas Egan appeals

from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor

of his former employer, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Egan brought suit contesting the Foreign Service Grievance Board’s dismissal of grievances he filed after leaving the Foreign Service. Because the

district court correctly determined that Egan’s lawsuit was

untimely under the Foreign Service Act, we affirm the district court.

I

Egan was a member of the Foreign Service and served as

an auditor in USAID’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG)

in Bangkok, Thailand during the mid-1990s. He resigned in

September 1996, alleging that his superiors had treated him

unfairly and had created a ‘‘stressful work environment TTT

within the Bangkok office.’’ Mem. from T.A. Egan to J.

Rush, Jr. (Sept. 27, 1996). Around that time he also accepted

a job in the private sector in Singapore, where he began work

on or about October 28, 1996.

On January 27, 1997, Egan filed four grievances with the

OIG, suggesting, among other things, that his resignation had

been involuntary. On March 20, 1997, the OIG rejected those

grievances, in part because it found that Egan had voluntarily

resigned. It made that finding based on the fact that Egan

had chosen the effective date of his resignation, had declined

an offer of reassignment to Washington, D.C., and had told

OIG employees that he already had a job offer in Singapore.

Letter from E.L. Mosley to T.A. Egan 3-4 (Mar. 20, 1997).

The OIG also informed Egan of his right to appeal its

decision to the Foreign Service Grievance Board (FSGB)

within 60 days. Id. at 4.

Egan did not appeal to the FSGB. Instead, over a year

and a half later he filed a second set of grievances with the

OIG, again contending that his resignation had been involunUSCA Case #03-5267 Document #845477 Filed: 08/31/2004 Page 2 of 7
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tary. Grievance from T.A. Egan to J. Rush, Jr. (Oct. 30,

1998). Specifically, Egan alleged that he had been ‘‘effectively TTT terminated from [his] position of employment by the

OIG’’ through ‘‘acts of duress, coercion, and misinformation.’’

Id. at 7-8. Egan requested multiple remedies, including

reinstatement, back pay, and allowances for the period of

separation. Id. at 9. On February 5, 1999, the OIG rejected

Egan’s second set of grievances, finding the grievances meritless. Letter from E.L. Mosley to T.A. Egan (Feb. 5, 1999).

It again reminded Egan that he had 60 days to file an appeal

with the FSGB. Id. at 2.

This time Egan did appeal, requesting, inter alia, promotion, reassignment to South Africa, and pay and allowances. Letter from T.A. Egan to FSGB at 5 (Mar. 22, 1999).

On April 6, 2000, the FSGB declined to hear Egan’s appeal.

It noted that, ‘‘because the principal focus of grievant’s

claim — that he has been constructively discharged without

the rights to which he was entitled — has already been

decided adversely to him[,] TTT he is estopped from raising

again that same issue.’’ Apr. 2000 FSGB Denial at 8. In

short, the FSGB concluded that the OIG’s March 20, 1997

decision on the issue of ‘‘the voluntariness of [his] resignation’’ had become controlling upon Egan’s failure to appeal,

and that both the OIG and FSGB were bound by that

decision. Id. at 9-10.

Although not required by law to file a petition for reconsideration before obtaining judicial review of the FSGB’s order,

see 22 C.F.R. § 910.1, Egan filed two such petitions. The

Board denied his initial request for reconsideration on August

9, 2000, finding that Egan had not submitted any newly

discovered or previously unavailable material evidence — the

standard for reconsideration under the FSGB’s regulations.

Aug. 2000 FSGB Denial at 3; see 22 C.F.R. § 910.1. In

response to a subsequent e-mail from Egan, the Board advised him that its regulations contained no provision for a

second petition for reconsideration. E-mail from B. Chessin

to T.A. Egan (Oct. 10, 2000). Egan nevertheless filed a

second request for reconsideration, which the Board denied

on June 5, 2001. June 2001 FSGB Denial.

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On November 20, 2001, Egan filed a complaint against

USAID in the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia, seeking review of the FSGB’s April 6, 2000 decision and of its August 2000 and June 2001 orders denying

reconsideration. The district court granted USAID’s motion

for summary judgment, finding that Egan’s complaint was

untimely because he had failed to file it within 180 days of the

FSGB’s final action, as required by section 1110 of the

Foreign Service Act, 22 U.S.C. § 4140. Egan v. Natsios, No.

01-2414, Mem. Op. & Order at 3-5 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2003).

Egan appealed to this court, and USAID now moves for

summary affirmance of the district court’s judgment.

II

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo. Information Handling Serv., Inc. v. Defense Automated Printing Servs., 338 F.3d 1024, 1031–32 (D.C. Cir.

2003). Summary judgment is appropriate only if ‘‘ ‘there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and TTT the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ’’

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986)

(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). Since this case reaches us on

a motion for summary affirmance, the appellee must also

‘‘demonstrate that the merits of [its] claim are so clear as to

justify expedited action.’’ Walker v. Washington, 627 F.2d

541, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Allen, 408

F.2d 1287, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

The district court granted summary judgment because it

found Egan’s complaint untimely under section 1110 of the

Foreign Service Act. That section provides:

Any aggrieved party may obtain judicial review of a final

action of the Secretary or the Board on any grievance in

the district courts of the United States TTT if the request

for judicial review is filed not later than 180 days after

the final action of the Secretary or the Board (or in the

case of an aggrieved party who is posted abroad at the

time of the final action of the Secretary or the Board, if

the request for judicial review is filed not later than 180

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days after the aggrieved party’s return to the United

States).

22 U.S.C. § 4140(a). There is no dispute that Egan filed his

November 2001 district court complaint more than 180 days

after the FSGB’s April 2000 decision and August 2000 denial

of reconsideration. Accordingly, judicial review of those orders is time barred unless some exception applies.

Egan contends that an exception does apply, namely the

exception set forth in section 1110’s parenthetical phrase,

which permits ‘‘an aggrieved party who is posted abroad at

the time of the final [FSGB] action’’ to file within 180 days

after he returns to the United States. Egan believes he

comes within this exception because, at the time of the FSGB

decision, he was ‘‘posted abroad’’ by his new private-sector

employer in Singapore.

A phrase like ‘‘posted abroad’’ can, of course, have several

meanings. In one context, it could refer to working at the

overseas office of a private employer. Indeed, in another

context it could mean mailing a letter from a foreign postbox.

But the only meaning that makes sense in the context of the

Foreign Service Act is working abroad for the Foreign Service. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529

U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (declaring that the ‘‘words of a statute

must be read in their context and with a view to their place in

the overall statutory scheme’’) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

The Foreign Service Act uses the term ‘‘post’’ on numerous

occasions, and each time it refers to a place where an

employee of the Service is stationed. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C.

§ 4022(a) (‘‘The Secretary shall establish foreign language

proficiency requirements for members of the Service who are

to be assigned abroad in order that Foreign Service posts

abroad will be staffed by individuals [proficient in the language].’’); id. § 4057 (‘‘The Secretary of State may from time

to time establish a list of places which TTT are to be classed as

unhealthful posts.’’); id. § 4081(1) (‘‘The Secretary may pay

the travel and related expenses of members of the Service

TTT including costs or expenses incurred for TTT proceeding

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to and returning from assigned posts of dutyTTTT’’). The

legislative history of the specific provision at issue here

confirms that interpretation. Both the Senate Report and

the House Conference Report on the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal years 1994 and 1995, which included

the relevant language amending section 1110, characterize the

amendment as requiring the ‘‘filing of judicial review of

Foreign Service Grievance Board decisions within 180 days of

final action by the Board, or in the case of employees at posts

abroad, within 180 days after the employee’s return to the

United States.’’ H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 103–482, at 181 (1994)

(emphasis added); S. REP. NO. 103-107, at 25 (1993) (same).

Both reports also make clear that the ‘‘employees’’ they are

referring to are ‘‘Foreign Service employees.’’ H.R. CONF.

REP. NO. 103–482, at 180; S. REP. NO. 103-107, at 24.

Egan notes that the Act specifically permits former members of the Service to file grievances, see 22 U.S.C. § 4132,

and argues that to interpret ‘‘posted abroad’’ to refer only to

those posted abroad by the government would render the

term ‘‘aggrieved party’’ in section 1110 meaningless as far as

former members are concerned. See id. §§ 4131(a)(1)(G),

4132 (describing the circumstances under which former Service members may file grievances); see also United States

Info. Agency v. Krc, 989 F.2d 1211, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

That is so, he says, because former Service members who are

aggrieved and living abroad would not be able to comply with

the section’s requirements. But this contention is plainly

wrong. Aggrieved former Foreign Service members would

still have 180 days from the date of the FSGB’s final decision

to file for review in district court. 22 U.S.C. § 4140(a).

Although they would not have the additional time that Congress has afforded members of the Service, 180 days is surely

sufficient time in which to file an appeal — even from

Singapore. And it is hardly surprising that Congress would

make allowances for the difficulties faced by current Foreign

Service employees stationed abroad, without making similar

provisions for those who have left government service.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Congress

intended the more generous time limits afforded those ‘‘postUSCA Case #03-5267 Document #845477 Filed: 08/31/2004 Page 6 of 7
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ed abroad’’ to apply only to members of the Foreign Service.

Because Egan was not a member of the Foreign Service

when the FSGB issued the orders from which he seeks to

appeal, the statute gave him only 180 days in which to file a

request for judicial review. Since Egan’s district court complaint came more than 180 days after the FSGB’s April 6,

2000 decision and August 9, 2000 denial of reconsideration, his

appeal from those orders was untimely.

This leaves only the appeal from the FSGB’s June 5, 2001

order denying Egan’s second request for reconsideration,

which would be timely — if that order were reviewable. But

it is not. As we said in Sendra Corporation v. Magaw:

‘‘While an agency’s first refusal to grant reconsideration may

be reviewable in limited circumstances, its denial of successive requests for reconsideration of the same decision are not.

Whether an agency should even respond to such entreaties is

‘committed to agency discretion by law,’ and therefore not

subject to judicial review.’’ 111 F.3d 162, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)); see also Schoenbohm v. FCC,

204 F.3d 243, 245, 250 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that an

agency’s denial of a request for reconsideration ‘‘is generally

nonreviewable unless the request TTT was based on new

evidence or changed circumstances’’).

III

Because Egan’s complaint was not filed within the statutory time limit, the district court properly concluded that

USAID was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of

law. The judgment of the district court is therefore

Affirmed.

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