Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-10058/USCOURTS-ca9-09-10058-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Beau Lee Lewis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 09-10058 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v.  3:04-cr-00217-PJH

BEAU LEE LEWIS,

OPINION Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 7, 2009—San Francisco, California

Filed July 20, 2010

Before: A. Wallace Tashima, Susan P. Graber, and

Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Graber

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COUNSEL

Allen M. Brabender, United States Department of Justice,

Environment and Natural Resources Division, Washington,

D.C., for the plaintiff-appellee.

Dean D. Paik, Rogers Joseph O’Donnell, San Francisco, California, for the defendant-appellant.

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Beau Lee Lewis appeals the district court’s decision to dismiss his indictment for violation of the Speedy

Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, without prejudice. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Defendant’s several felony convictions relate to an international conspiracy to smuggle protected wildlife into the

United States. This is Defendant’s third appeal; our earlier

opinions detail the underlying facts, which we need not repeat

here. United States v. Lewis, 349 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2003)

(per curiam) (“Lewis I”); United States v. Lewis, 518 F.3d

1171 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Lewis II”).

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In Lewis I, we identified a Speedy Trial Act violation

because of a 117-day period of pretrial delay from January 13

to May 9, 2000, and remanded for the district court to decide

whether dismissal should be with or without prejudice. 349

F.3d at 1121-22. On remand, the court considered only that

period of delay and decided that dismissal should be without

prejudice. After re-indictment and a second trial resulted in

the present convictions, Defendant appealed again. In Lewis

II, we reversed and remanded once more, because the district

court should have considered all periods of delay, not just the

period discussed in Lewis I. Lewis II, 518 F.3d at 1176.

Following the second remand, the case was reassigned to

another judge, who considered all periods of delay and

decided the remaining issues in two stages. First, in an order

dated December 10, 2008, the district court held that, “at

most, 145 days was not excludable” but that, if the court

“were permitted by the Ninth Circuit’s remand order to consider the § 3161(h)([6]) grounds for exclusion with respect to

the January 13, 2000-May 9, 2000 period, it would find that

117-day period is indeed excludable under § 3161(h)([6]).”

The court further stated that, “[i]f that were the case, then no

[Speedy Trial Act] violation would have occurred because

only 28 days would have passed untolled.” If the court were

“not permitted to revisit the 117-day period ruled on by the

Ninth Circuit, then [a Speedy Trial Act] violation would

indeed have occurred, warranting dismissal of the superseding

indictment, and this court is thus required to consider whether

or not the dismissal should be with or without prejudice.” The

district court then directed the parties to assume that 145 days

went untolled under the Speedy Trial Act and ordered them

to file briefs addressing whether the dismissal should be with

or without prejudice. 

The district court issued a second order on February 2,

2009, holding that the indictment should be dismissed without

prejudice. In its analysis, the court held that Defendant’s

offenses were “serious” under 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2), that the

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delays were not the result of neglect or bad faith, that penalizing the government by dismissing with prejudice is not warranted, and that the delay prejudiced Defendant only slightly.

Thus, finding “that three of the four factors favor the government, while one tips only slightly in Defendant’s favor,” the

district court dismissed the indictment without prejudice.

Defendant timely appeals.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court’s application of, and

questions of law arising under, the Speedy Trial Act. United

States v. George, 85 F.3d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1996); United

States v. Springer, 51 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 1995). We

review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to

dismiss an indictment without prejudice for a violation of the

Speedy Trial Act. United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 332

(1988). We review the district court’s findings of fact for

clear error. Id. at 337.

DISCUSSION

A. Excludable Periods of Delay

[1] The Speedy Trial Act generally requires that trial begin

within 70 days of a defendant’s indictment or first appearance

before a judicial officer, whichever occurs later. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(c)(1). If trial does not begin within the requisite time

period and the defendant moves for dismissal before trial, the

court must dismiss the indictment, either with or without prejudice. Id. § 3162(a)(2). But other provisions of the Speedy

Trial Act allow for tolling of the 70-day limit in specified circumstances. One such provision permits the district court to

exclude “delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the

filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on,

or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” Id.

§ 3161(h)(1)(D). Another provision excludes a “reasonable

period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a

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codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and no

motion for severance has been granted.” Id. § 3161(h)(6).1

[2] Section 3161(h)(7) excludes delays resulting from a

continuance when the court finds that the “ends of justice

served by taking [that] action outweigh the . . . interest of the

public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” The factors,

among others, that a court must consider in deciding whether

to grant a continuance under this section are:

(i) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance

in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a

miscarriage of justice.

(ii) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex,

due to the number of defendants, the nature of the

prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of

fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate

preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial

itself within the time limits established by this section.

. . . . 

(iv) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a case which, taken as a whole, is not so

unusual or so complex as to fall within clause (ii),

would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain

counsel, would unreasonably deny the defendant or

the Government continuity of counsel, or would

deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the

Government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of

due diligence.

1

In this appeal, Defendant does not dispute the propriety of trying him

jointly with his codefendants. 

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Id. § 3161(h)(7)(B).

For clarity, we will divide the contested periods of delay

into four parts.

1. May 6, 1999 - July 29, 1999

[3] The district court held that the period from May 6,

1999, through July 28, 1999, was excludable under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(7) because of the complexity of the case. A district

court must satisfy two requirements when it grants an “ends

of justice” continuance under § 3161(h)(7): “(1) the continuance must be specifically limited in time; and (2) it must be

justified on the record with reference to the facts as of the

time the delay is ordered.” United States v. Lloyd, 125 F.3d

1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and

brackets omitted). The court 

must conduct an appropriate inquiry to determine

whether the various parties actually want and need a

continuance, how long a delay is actually required,

what adjustments can be made with respect to the

trial calendars or other plans of counsel, and whether

granting the requested continuance would “outweigh

the best interest of the public and the defendants in

a speedy trial.”

Id. at 1269 (brackets omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(7)(A)).

[4] Defendant’s case was joined with those of several

codefendants, and there were ongoing investigations in Arizona and Texas. Id. Where defendants are properly joined for

trial, as here, the case’s complexity necessarily must be

assessed with reference to the joint trial. United States v. Daychild, 357 F.3d 1082, 1091 (9th Cir. 2004). This case

involved voluminous discovery, a large number of counts,

several defendants, ongoing investigations in other districts,

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and potential witnesses from other countries. We have upheld

“ends of justice” continuances because of complexity in similar circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Dota, 33 F.3d

1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that an “ends-of-justice

continuance may be justified on grounds that one side needs

more time to prepare for trial”); United States v. Butz, 982

F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that an “ends of justice” continuance is proper when a case is complex and

involves multiple “codefendants and multiple overt acts

occurring in [multiple] states,” and in which the complexity

“outweigh[s] the interests of individual defendants”).

[5] Defendant agrees that the case is complex, but argues

that a § 3161(h)(7) exclusion also must be analyzed separately

under § 3161(h)(6) for reasonableness. Defendant is correct.

Our precedent instructs us that, in order to attribute a codefendant’s excludable delay under § 3161(h)(7) to a defendant, the

delay must meet the reasonableness requirement of

§ 3161(h)(6)2. See United States v. Messer, 197 F.3d 330, 336

(9th Cir. 1999) (“The attribution of delay to a codefendant . . .

is limited by a reasonableness requirement . . . .”); Butz, 982

F.2d at 1381-82 (“To resolve Butz’s speedy trial claim, we

must determine whether the court properly granted the continuance and whether applying this excludable time to Butz

made the resulting delay reasonable.”).

[6] Relying on this premise, Defendant then asserts that the

2Although the Supreme Court has never held that a delay attributed to

a codefendant must be reasonable in order to exclude that time from a

defendant’s speedy trial clock, it has held that subsections of § 3161 may

need to be analyzed together before properly excluding a period of delay.

See Bloate v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1345 (2010) (holding that the time

granted to prepare pretrial motions is not automatically excludable under

§ 3161(h)(1), but may be excluded only when a court grants a continuance

based on appropriate findings under § 3161(h)(7)). Thus, our circuit’s precedent requiring that § 3161(h)(7) be read in conjunction with

§ 3161(h)(6) with regard to delays that are attributed to a codefendant

comports with Supreme Court precedent. 

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district court failed to make the required reasonableness finding for the period May 6, 1999, to July 29, 1999. Defendant

is mistaken. During the May 6, 1999, hearing, the district

court stated: “[I]t seems to the court that ninety days would

be a reasonable time frame to exclude time further . . . .” The

district court’s finding of reasonableness was not clearly erroneous. The court found that 90 days would be the “outer

boundary” of a reasonable delay for joinder, given the government’s diligent efforts to obtain the wildlife dealer’s presence

and the minimal prejudice to Defendant. Thus, we hold that

the period May 6, 1999, to July 29, 1999—less than 90 days

—was properly excluded from Defendant’s speedy trial clock.

2. July 29, 1999 - September 16, 1999

[7] The district court held that the period from July 29,

1999, through September 15, 1999, is excludable under both

§ 3161(h)(6) and 3161(h)(7). During this period, the government filed a second superseding indictment, which added two

codefendants to the case. “Generally speaking, defendants

jointly charged are to be jointly tried.” United States v. Escalante, 637 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980). Reasons for

jointly trying joined defendants include these: 

It would impair both the efficiency and the fairness

of the criminal justice system to require, in all these

cases of joint crimes . . ., that prosecutors bring separate proceedings, presenting the same evidence again

and again, requiring victims and witnesses to repeat

the inconvenience (and sometimes trauma) of testifying, and randomly favoring the last-tried defendants

who have the advantage of knowing the prosecution’s case beforehand. 

Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987). 

[8] Because Defendant was to be tried jointly with his

codefendants, the district court properly granted a continuUNITED STATES v. LEWIS 10347

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ance. An already complex case became more complicated

because of the additional defendants and the need to determine their counsels’ and the government’s readiness for trial.

Thus, this period meets the requirements for excludability

under § 3161(h)(7), but we also must determine whether this

delay was reasonable. 

[9] We “gauge the reasonableness of delay on a case by

case basis, given the fact-bound nature of the inquiry.”

Messer, 197 F.3d at 337 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the addition of two codefendants made the delay reasonable and, hence, excludable under § 3161(h)(6). 

Defendant complains that the delay deprived him of his

counsel of choice. Had the trial commenced when originally

scheduled, his original lawyer would have represented him.

Instead, Defendant was represented at trial by a different lawyer because the first lawyer had work obligations abroad. But

Defendant had an opportunity to go to trial with the first lawyer by severing his case from those of his codefendants. He

deliberately chose not to do so, knowing that trial would commence after the original lawyer was set to leave the country.

More importantly, Defendant fails to identify any actual prejudice that occurred as a result of being represented by other

counsel, who mounted a highly competent and vigorous

defense. Finally, Defendant has been represented by

appointed counsel throughout this case, and “the right to

counsel of choice does not extend to defendants who require

counsel to be appointed for them.” United States v. GonzalezLopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006); see also United States v.

Ensign, 491 F.3d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007) (same). 

Defendant next argues that he was prejudiced because the

delay gave the government time to secure Anson Wong, the

wildlife dealer, and Jeffrey Miller, a codefendant who eventually pleaded guilty, as witnesses against him. Defendant’s

arguments do not persuade us.

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Wong did not testify. Defendant could not have suffered

any actual prejudice as to him. 

[10] Miller did testify against Defendant, but we conclude

that the addition of his testimony, although prejudicial, did

not make the delay unreasonable. In United States v. Hall,

181 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1999), we held that the defendant suffered prejudice under the Speedy Trial Act when the court

granted extensions of time to the government for the “primary

purpose” of allowing the only codefendant—who eventually

testified against the defendant—to “pursue plea negotiations

with the government.” Id. at 1062. In spite of that prejudice,

however, we conclude that the six-week delay at issue here

was reasonable. First, there is no evidence that, here, the continuance was granted for the primary purpose of allowing

Miller to pursue plea negotiations with the government. More

importantly, this case involved several codefendants, most of

whom did not testify against Lewis. An extension of time

under these circumstances was reasonable because the importance of allowing Lewis’ codefendants time to prepare for

trial furthered the policy of favoring joint trials, see Marsh,

481 U.S. at 210, and, thus, outweighed any prejudice that may

have resulted from having one of those codefendants eventually decide to plead guilty and testify against Lewis.

3. September 16, 1999 - December 13, 1999

The district court held that this period of delay was excludable under § 3161(h)(6) and (7). We agree.

At a September 16, 1999 hearing, Defendant reiterated that

he would not file a motion to sever or any other motion. He

said that he was ready to try the case. Counsel for a codefendant, however, said that the codefendant would file pretrial

motions, including a motion to sever. The district court set a

hearing on those motions for a date four months later.

[11] It was reasonable for the court to delay trial in order

to allow the codefendant to file pretrial motions. Commencing

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trial four days later, as Defendant wished, would have prejudiced his codefendants and the government because they

would have had only one month of trial preparation since the

time of the second superseding indictment. Additionally,

because one of the codefendant’s pretrial motions was to be

a motion to sever, it would not have been an efficient use of

judicial resources to begin trial for the joined defendants, only

to have one or more codefendants severed. In short, it was

reasonable for the district court to delay the trial date in order

to give the codefendants and the government sufficient time

to prepare.

4. January 13, 2000 - May 9, 2000

[12] We held in Lewis I that the delay that occurred

between January 13, 2000, and May 9, 2000, was nonexcludable. We came to that conclusion after holding that the

only reason for the delay was a pending government motion

to present testimony by George Morrison, the special agent

who spearheaded the government’s investigation, nonsequentially. Lewis I, 349 F.3d at 1119-20. We did not revisit

that holding in Lewis II; rather, we remanded the case to the

district court in order to review all periods of delay, not just

the 117 days, when deciding whether to dismiss the case with

or without prejudice. 

The question now arises whether we are bound by our holding in Lewis I. The district court after the second remand suggested, and the government argues, that our analysis

concerning excludability was wrong.

“Law of the case is a jurisprudential doctrine under which

an appellate court does not reconsider matters resolved on a

prior appeal.” Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1488-89 (9th

Cir. 1997) (en banc). “The law of the case doctrine states that

the decision of an appellate court on a legal issue must be followed in all subsequent proceedings in the same case.” Caldwell v. Unified Capital Corp. (In re Rainbow Magazine, Inc.),

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77 F.3d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “[U]nder the ‘law of the case’ doctrine one panel of

an appellate court will not as a general rule reconsider questions which another panel has decided on a prior appeal in the

same case.” Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768, 771 (9th Cir.

1979).

[13] Law of the case is a discretionary doctrine: It “merely

expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen

what has been decided, not a limit to their power.” Messinger

v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912). That discretion, however, is limited. Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 155 (9th Cir.

1993). The prior decision should be followed unless: “(1) the

decision is clearly erroneous and its enforcement would work

a manifest injustice, (2) intervening controlling authority

makes reconsideration appropriate, or (3) substantially different evidence was adduced at a subsequent trial.” In re Rainbow Magazine, 77 F.3d at 281 (internal quotation marks

omitted). 

[14] None of those factors exists here. Our decision in

Lewis I is not clearly erroneous, intervening controlling

authority did not arise, and no additional (much less “substantially different”) evidence came to light. Therefore, we

decline to revisit Lewis I. This period of delay is nonexcludable.

5. Summary

The delay from May 6, 1999, to July 29, 1999, is excludable under § 3161(h)(7) because of the case’s complexity, and

that delay is reasonable under § 3161(h)(6).

The delays from July 29, 1999, to December 13, 1999, are

excludable under § 3161(h)(6) and (7). The delays were reasonably required to facilitate the efficient use of judicial

resources by enabling a joint trial and were justified by “the

ends of justice” because of the case’s complexity.

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The delays from January 13, 2000, to July 9, 2000, are nonexcludable, as Lewis I held.

B. Dismissal Without Prejudice

[15] While a Speedy Trial Act violation requires the dismissal of the indictment upon the defendant’s motion, 18

U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2), whether to dismiss with or without prejudice is left to the “guided discretion of the district court,”

Taylor, 487 U.S. at 334-35. The statute does not prefer one

remedy to the other. Id.

[16] The Speedy Trial Act sets forth three factors, “among

others,” that must be considered in deciding whether to dismiss with or without prejudice: “the seriousness of the

offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to

the dismissal; and the impact of reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice.” 18

U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The Supreme Court has held that the

phrase “among others” incorporates prejudice to the defendant. Taylor, 487 U.S. at 333-34.

Our role is not to substitute our judgment for that of the district court, but rather is to ensure that the district court “carefully consider[ed]” the statutory factors and “clearly

articulat[ed] their effect” in the case. Id. at 336. “[W]hen the

statutory factors are properly considered, and supporting factual findings are not clearly in error, the district court’s judgment of how opposing considerations balance should not

lightly be disturbed.” Id. at 337.

Here, the district court reviewed the statutory factors in

considerable detail, independent of the first judge’s earlier

analysis, made factual findings for the second time, and determined that the overall balance weighed in favor of dismissing

the indictment without prejudice for the second time. Defendant disagrees with the district court’s balancing of the statutory factors, but mere disagreement does not demonstrate an

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abuse of discretion. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine

Fisheries Serv., 422 F.3d 782, 793-95 (9th Cir. 2005) (per

curiam).

[17] First, in considering the seriousness of Defendant’s

offenses, the district court found that his offenses were “serious” or “very serious” because, among other things, the jury

convicted Defendant of several felonies that carried substantial penalties. Among those offenses were conspiracy, which

involved the cooperation of several parties, and smuggling

offenses that implicated international treaties and involved a

large number of protected animals. We agree with the district

court that Defendant’s offenses were serious: In the first trial,

the jury convicted Defendant of 17 felonies, each carrying a

maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment and a

$250,000 fine, and one felony (money laundering) carrying a

maximum penalty of 20 years’ imprisonment and a $500,000

fine. Those convictions rested on Defendant’s intentional

importation, for the purpose of resale, of six illegal shipments

of protected reptiles, containing 125 animals, many of which

died in transit. In the second trial, the jury found Defendant

guilty of a subset of six of the original felony counts, which

carried maximum penalties of five years each. Defendant’s

offenses are “serious” within the context of the Speedy Trial

Act and the standards established by courts that have

addressed this issue. See United States v. Kramer, 827 F.2d

1174, 1176-77 (8th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted) (holding that

crimes of bank fraud, punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment each, were a “serious offense” for Speedy Trial Act

purposes); United States v. Salgado-Hernandez, 790 F.2d

1265, 1268 (5th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted) (holding that

alien smuggling offenses, punishable by up to five years’

imprisonment each, were a “serious offense” for Speedy Trial

Act purposes); United States v. King, 664 F.2d 1171, 1173

(10th Cir. 1981) (holding that a potential prison sentence of

up to five years was “clearly serious”). 

[18] As to the second and third factors, the district court

found that the government and the court itself had acted in

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good faith. Their desire to facilitate the efficient use of judicial resources through a joint trial was genuine and reasonable. The case was complex and appropriately demanded

considerable preparation by all parties. The district court’s

findings are not clearly erroneous.

Finally, with respect to prejudice to Defendant, the district

court concluded that Defendant’s loss of his original trial

counsel was “significant,” but the court found that he did not

suffer any actual prejudice from his first lawyer’s departure.

The record supports that finding. Present counsel has represented Defendant since mid-2000, through two lengthy trials,

a substantial motions practice, and now three appeals. At no

time has Defendant complained about his present counsel’s

effectiveness or quality. Where Defendant himself identifies

no actual prejudice caused by the delay, the district court

properly found that this factor “tips only slightly in favor of

[Defendant].”

[19] The district court balanced the applicable statutory

considerations, made the requisite factual findings, and determined that the overall weight of the statutory considerations

favored dismissal without prejudice. “[T]he district court’s

judgment of how opposing considerations balance should not

lightly be disturbed.” Taylor, 487 U.S. at 337. We discern no

reason to overturn the district court’s dismissal of the indictment without prejudice. 

AFFIRMED. 

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