Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03104/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03104-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Leon Depp
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 17, 2000 Decided June 23, 2000

No. 99-3050

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Ellis Williams,

Appellant

Consolidated with

Nos. 99-3104 & 99-3108

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(98cr00090-01)

(98cr00090-02)

(98cr00090-04)

---------

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Edward C. Sussman, appointed by the court, H. Heather

Shaner, appointed by the court, and Gregory L. Poe, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellants. With them on the briefs was A. J. Kramer, Federal

Public Defender.

Jean W. Sexton, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S.

Attorney. Asuncion C. Hostin, Assistant U.S. Attorney,

entered an appearance.

Before: Williams, Randolph, and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: In the District of Columbia,

taxicabs must be inspected every six months. A sticker

affixed to the windshield signifies that the vehicle has passed

inspection. The three defendants in this appeal had worked

as motor vehicle inspectors at one of the District's inspection

stations. While so employed they engaged in a conspiracy to

sell inspection stickers to taxicab drivers and others. A jury

found one of the defendants guilty of receiving a bribe in

violation of federal law, and another guilty of conspiring to

receive a bribe. The third defendant entered a guilty plea to

receiving a bribe, while reserving the right to challenge the

district court's jurisdiction on appeal. The so-called jurisdictional question raised by all three defendants is the first

question we will take up.

I

The statute cited in the indictments sanctions any "public

official" who--

directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives,

accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value

personally or for any other person or entity, in return for

(A) being influenced in the performance of any official

act; ... or (C) being induced to do or omit to do any

act in violation of the official duty of such official or

person.

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18 U.S.C. s 201(b)(2)(A), (C). Enacted in 1962, the statute

applied to District officials through the following language:

"the term 'public official' means ... an officer or employee or

person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any

department, agency or branch of Government thereof, including the District of Columbia...." 18 U.S.C. s 201(a)(1).

The defendants maintain that Congress's acquiescence in a

bribery statute, enacted by the D.C. Council in 1982, effectively repealed s 201's applicability to District officials. The

local bribery statute, introduced as part of the District of

Columbia Theft and White Collar Crimes Act, D.C. Law

4-164, uses language similar to s 201(b) and applies only to

public servants of the District of Columbia. See D.C. Code

ss 22-711(6), 22-712. Pursuant to the District of Columbia

Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub.

L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) (the "Home Rule Act"), the

mayor signed the bill including the new bribery provision, and

the Council forwarded the statute for review by Congress.

See D.C. Code s 1-233(c)(1) (procedures for review by Congress). The bill became law when Congress allowed the

requisite time period to elapse without taking action.

Though retaining ultimate legislative authority over the

District, Congress delegated certain specific legislative powers to the D.C. Council in the Home Rule Act. Among the

explicit limitations on the Council is that the Council may not

"enact any act, or enact any act to amend or repeal any Act of

Congress, ... which is not restricted in its application exclusively in or to the District." D.C. Code s 1-233(a)(3). The

district court held that this limitation barred the Council from

putting before Congress a provision that would repeal the

local portion of a nationally-applicable statute such as s 201.

We too agree that s 201 continues to apply to District

officials, but for a different reason.

Unless there is "clear and manifest" evidence that the 1982

local bribery provision repealed the relevant portion of s 201,

the federal bribery statute stands as enacted. Posadas v.

National City Bank of N.Y., 296 U.S. 497, 504 (1936); see

Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1050, 1063 n.8 (D.C.

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Cir. 1999); United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 944 (D.C.

Cir. 1985). The fact that the D.C. law covers " 'some or even

all of the cases provided for by [the prior act]' " is not a basis

for finding a repeal. Posadas, 296 U.S. at 504 (quoting Wood

v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 342, 362-63 (1842)). It is

not uncommon for laws to be cumulative. Local criminal laws

may cover the same offenses as federal criminal laws. "In

the absence of some affirmative showing of an intention to

repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by

implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable." Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974).

The local bribery statute and the federal statute are not

irreconcilable. They are instead quite consistent. They both

prohibit the same conduct by District employees; the only

significant difference between them is that the maximum

penalty for the federal offense is up to 15 years of imprisonment while the District offense carries a maximum of 10

years' imprisonment. The defendants therefore do not spend

much time trying to convince us that the two statutes cannot

stand together. They rely instead on a 1981 Senate committee report on a criminal code reform bill that was never

enacted. See S. Rep. No. 97-307, at 432 (1982). Among

other things, the bill would have replaced 18 U.S.C. s 201(b)

with a new provision that excluded District of Columbia

public servants. The bill responded to the D.C. Council's

concurrent efforts to revise the D.C. criminal code, including

the enactment of the bribery provision now found in section

22-712. The defendants tell us that one of the D.C. Council's

objectives in enacting its own bribery provision was "to

consolidate and clarify" the District of Columbia criminal

laws. Brief for Appellants at 26, quoting Report by D.C.

Council's Committee on the Judiciary, June 1, 1982, Bill No.

4-133. This, the defendants say, amounts to "clear and

manifest" evidence of an implied repeal.

We are unpersuaded. As far as the D.C. Council is concerned, we cannot find any intent to repeal: at the same time

it sent the local bribery provision up to Congress, the Council

sent up legislation expressly repealing fifty-eight other statutes--three of which appeared in the same chapter as the

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new bribery provisions. See Theft and White Collar Crimes

Act of 1982, D.C. Law No. 4-164, s 602(a)-(fff), Act No.

4-238. As far as Congress is concerned, a report by one

Congressional committee on a bill that was never enacted

counts for very little. If the question of repealing s 201 as it

applied to District officials ever explicitly came before Congress there is no compelling reason why Congress would have

chosen repeal. When Congress enacted another bribery provision in 1984, it explicitly covered District officials. See 18

U.S.C. s 666(d). Retaining s 201 as enacted might seem

desirable to Congress, if only because this gives the United

States Attorney the option of filing in either the local courts

or the federal courts. That is an option the United States

Attorney enjoys with respect to many offenses, particularly

those dealing with drugs. See United States v. Mills, 964

F.2d 1186, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc). Federal court has

sometimes been the venue of choice because federal sentences

are higher. See id. Furthermore, the District's bribery

provision became law not because Congress acted, but because Congress failed to act. Whether any member of the

Senate or House paid attention to the question of repealing

s 201 is impossible to know. Still less is there clear and

manifest evidence that a majority of the members of both

houses considered their inaction a vote for repeal.1

Because the statutes are not irreconcilable and there is no

convincing evidence that the later act was intended as a

substitute, we hold that a repeal by implication did not occur.

See Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503.

II

The jury found one of the defendants--Daryl Johnson--

guilty of selling a motor vehicle inspection sticker, in violation

__________

1 Congress has amended s 201 twice since 1982, when the District's bribery statute took effect, but it never took the opportunity

to exclude District officials from the statute's coverage. See Pub.

L. No. 99-646, s 46(a)-(1), 100 Stat. 3592, 3601-04 (1986); Pub. L.

No. 103-322, tit. XXXIII, ss 330011(b), 330016(2)(D), 108 Stat.

1796, 2144, 2148 (1994).

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of 18 U.S.C. s 201(b)(2). Johnson filed motions for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial, contending that there was

insufficient evidence to convict him on the bribery charge

either as a principal or as an aider and abettor, a contention

he renews on appeal. The district court denied the motions.

Viewing the evidence most favorably to the government, as

we must, see United States v. Clark, 184 F.3d 858, 863 (D.C.

Cir. 1999), leads to the conclusion that on November 6, 1997,

while working as a vehicle inspector for the District, Johnson

sold inspection sticker T217137 to Mohammed Dashtizadeh

for approximately $70.00. Prem Randhawa, a taxicab driver,

asked Kamal, a body shop repairman, to fix the grille on his

cab so that it would pass inspection. Kamal told Randhawa

that the grille could not be fixed but that he could arrange for

a person known as Mr. Mo to pass inspection in Randhawa's

cab. Randhawa went to see Mr. Mo and paid him $150.00 to

take the car to be inspected. Mr. Mo later returned the cab

to Randhawa with a sticker on it. The parties stipulated that

government agents removed sticker T217137 from Randhawa's taxicab.

The middleman, Mohammed Dashtizadeh, testified about

his role in the transaction. Dashtizadeh said that he knew of

Randhawa and was able to identify him in court. When

asked how they knew each other, Dashtizadeh recounted that

his friend Kamal had phoned him regarding the grille on

Randhawa's taxicab. Kamal sent Randhawa to Dashtizadeh

to obtain an inspection sticker. Dashtizadeh testified that he

sold a sticker to Randhawa for $150.00. The sticker, Dashtizadeh reported, must have come from either Johnson or

Banks because those were the only two inspectors from whom

he purchased stickers. (Dashtizadeh began purchasing inspection stickers in late 1997 and purchased a total of four or

five stickers from Johnson.)

To establish the identity of the inspector who sold the

sticker to Dashtizadeh, the government introduced the paperwork used during the inspection process. Johnson's initials

on the sign-out log indicate that sticker T217137 was in his

possession on the day the corresponding inspection card was

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printed for inspection of a taxicab. Johnson's custody of

T217137 is further confirmed by the lane report for that day

which lists him as the stickerman--the person who affixes the

sticker to the windshield--and by his signature on the sticker

inventory log. In addition, the government produced the

inspection card for sticker T217137 which lists Brooks as the

entrance booth inspector, co-defendant Depp as the lane

inspector, and Johnson working the exit booth as the stickerman. While each of these records points to Johnson as

having custody of sticker T217137, none of them even lists

Banks.

Johnson views the evidence as insufficient to support the

verdict because the government never established directly

that he sold the sticker to Dashtizadeh. How, he asks, could

the jury decide that he, rather than Banks, sold the sticker

without direct proof? The answer is through circumstantial

evidence. The sort of direct evidence Johnson thinks was

needed was not needed. As the Supreme Court has said,

"direct evidence of a fact is not required. Circumstantial

evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain,

satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence." Michalic v.

Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325, 330 (1960); see also

United States v. Fadayini, 28 F.3d 1236, 1239-40 (D.C. Cir.

1994). Those who have tried criminal cases are familiar with

this example of the power of circumstantial evidence: if you

go to bed on a winter's night and the ground is clear and you

wake up the next morning and see snow on the ground, you

have circumstantial evidence that it snowed last night. The

circumstantial evidence here, while not that powerful, leads us

to conclude that, with respect to Johnson, "any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (1979). It is true that Dashtizadeh's testimony left

open the possibility that Banks was the seller. But a rational

juror could see this possibility as remote indeed in light of

evidence we have discussed and, at all events, it is settled that

the government's evidence need not "foreclose every conceivable premise inconsistent with guilt." United States v. Carter, 522 F.2d 666, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

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III

Defendants Ellis Williams and Leon Depp challenge the

district court's calculation of the relevant conduct attributable

to them for their roles in the bribery scheme. They complain

that the court failed to make specific findings concerning

when they joined the conspiracy and attributed bribe amounts

to them that were not reasonably foreseeable in furtherance

of jointly undertaken criminal activity. The district court

held, and the government now argues, that Depp and

Williams are responsible for all bribes taken after they began

working at the inspection station, in 1991 and 1992 respectively.

Under the Sentencing Guidelines, bribery of a public official carries a base offense level of ten, which is increased

when the offense involves multiple bribes or amounts more

than $2,000. See U.S.S.G. s 2C1.1. When calculating the

number and amount of bribes involved, the sentencing court

may consider all relevant conduct attributable to the defendant. In the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity,

this includes any acts and omissions of others in furtherance

of the jointly undertaken criminal activity that were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. See U.S.S.G. s 1B1.3.

Applying this standard, the district court held that Depp and

Williams were accountable for the bribes taken by the other

inspectors because those actions were both in furtherance of

jointly undertaken activity and reasonably foreseeable to

them. Accordingly, the court held Williams responsible for

payments totaling between $40,000 to $70,000 and Depp for

payments between $70,000 to $120,000.

The court based its determination, which we review for

clear error, see United States v. Pinnick, 47 F.3d 434, 437

(D.C. Cir. 1995), on the assumption that Depp and Williams

began participating in the bribery scheme as soon as they

began working at the inspection station. Instead of identifying specific facts to establish that their involvement began at

that time, the court relied on the fact that the "conspiracy ...

started back in the '80s" and required the cooperation of

other inspectors to make it work. With respect to Depp, the

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court found it significant that "there was never any indication

that he was not involved from the beginning." From this, the

court inferred--unreasonably, we think--that both must have

joined the scheme quite soon after starting work at the

station. That inference is without an evidentiary basis. For

one thing, the record shows that not all of the inspectors at

the inspection station were involved in the conspiracy. It is

possible that Williams and Depp waited some time before

opting to join in. The district court's conclusion was thus

improper in the absence of particularized findings demonstrating that Williams and Depp joined the conspiracy soon

after their employment began. See United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (requiring that

sentencing court make individualized findings on whether

actions were reasonably foreseeable to defendant); United

States v. O'Campo, 973 F.2d 1015, 1022-26 (1st Cir. 1992)

(finding that cocaine sales by coconspirators before defendant

joined conspiracy were not "relevant conduct" for sentencing).

Nevertheless, as applied to Williams, the district court's

erroneous determination is harmless. The court held

Williams responsible for bribes taken as of 1992. Williams

maintains the evidence established his involvement began no

earlier than 1994. Even if Williams is correct, and we

subtract the bribe amounts from 1992 to 1994, Williams is still

accountable for more than $40,000. The district court relied

on figures submitted by the probation officer and the government, both of whom put the total amount at more than

$49,000. Eliminating bribes taken before 1994 only reduces

the total amount by about $4,700. Had the district court

included only bribes taken after Williams is known to have

joined the scheme, the total would still have been more than

$44,000. Because the district court's error made no difference to its relevant conduct determination, resentencing of

Williams is unwarranted.

As to Depp, the error is not inconsequential. The district

court used a conspiracy period from 1991 through the indictment in 1998. At the sentencing hearing, Depp disputed the

length of this period, contending the evidence establishes his

involvement only as of February 1996. Refusing to shorten

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the conspiracy period, the court held Depp responsible for

bribes valued at the low end of the $70,000 to $120,000

range--calculating the total as $70,065 but conceding that the

government's figure of $86,325 was largely credible. If we

recalculate the amount without bribes taken from 1991

through 1995 the total figure is significantly reduced. The

reduction for bribes provided by just one individual (Otoo) to

Johnson alone, even crediting Depp's objections, amounts to

at least $24,500. Given the potential for such a substantial

reduction, a remand for a new assessment of Depp's relative

conduct is necessary. In making that reassessment, the

district court may rely on either of the two methods the

government presented for calculating relevant conduct--the

testimony of the inspectors' customers or the extrapolation

from a sampling of illegal stickers. It may not, however,

decide that Depp's participation in the scheme began at the

same time as his employment without the support of particularized findings.

The case is remanded with respect to Leon Depp for

resentencing. In all other respects, the judgment of the

district court is affirmed.

So ordered.

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