Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-16564/USCOURTS-ca9-09-16564-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Don Addington
Appellee
John Bostic
Appellee
Stephan Bradford

Mark Burman
Appellee
Robert Davison

Afshin Iranpour
Appellee
Douglas L. Mowery

US Airline Pilots Association
Appellant
US Airways, Inc.

Roger Velez
Appellee
Steve Wargocki
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DON ADDINGTON, individual 

resident of the State of Arizona

formerly employed by America

West Airlines, Inc. and presently

employed by its successor after

merger, US Airways, Inc.; JOHN

BOSTIC, individual resident of the

State of Arizona formerly

employed by America West

Airlines, Inc. and presently

employed by its successor after

merger, US Airways, Inc.; MARK

BURMAN, individual resident of the

State of Arizona, formerly

employed by America West  Airlines, Inc. and presently

employed by its successor after

merger, US Airways, Inc.; AFSHIN

IRANPOUR, individual resident of

the State of Arizona, formerly

employed by America West

Airlines, Inc. and presently

employed by its successor after

merger, US Airways, Inc.; ROGER

VELEZ, individual resident of the

State of Arizona, formerly

employed by America West

Airlines, Inc. and presently

employed by its successor after

merger, US Airways, Inc.; 

7997

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STEVE WARGOCKI, individual 

resident of the State of Arizona,

formerly employed by America

West Airlines, Inc. and presently

employed by its successor after

merger, US Airways, Inc.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

No. 09-16564 US AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, an

unincorporated association DC No.  representing the pilots in the CV 08-1633 NVW

employment of US Airways Inc., a OPINION

Delaware corporation,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

US AIRWAYS, INC., a Delaware

corporation; STEPHAN BRADFORD;

ROBERT DAVISON; DOUGLAS L.

MOWERY,

Defendants. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 8, 2009—San Francisco, California

Filed June 4, 2010

Before: A. Wallace Tashima, Susan P. Graber, and

Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tashima;

Dissent by Judge Bybee

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COUNSEL

Andrew S. Jacob, Polsinelli Shughart, PC, Phoenix, Arizona,

for the plaintiffs-appellees.

Lee Seham, Seham, Seham, Meltz & Petersen, LLP, White

Plains, New York, for the defendant-appellant.

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OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:

This case arose out of a bitter seniority dispute precipitated

by the merger of US Airways, Inc., and America West Airlines (“AWA”). Following the merger, the companies’ respective seniority lists had to be integrated to create a single list

for the merged airline. The US Airways, Inc., pilots (“East

Pilots”) and the AWA pilots (“West Pilots”), who were both

represented by the Air Line Pilots Association (“ALPA”),

began exploring methods of integration pursuant to ALPA’s

policy regarding mergers. The East Pilots generally had been

hired earlier and favored a strict date-of-hire system, while the

West Pilots sought a seniority system that would take into

consideration the relative pre-merger strength of their airline

over US Airways, Inc. Ultimately, the union submitted the

internal dispute to arbitration. 

Although it is common for a merger to raise the issue of

integrating seniority lists, this case contains an added wrinkle.

The East Pilots, who were dissatisfied with the seniority integration proposal ALPA arrived at through the union’s internal

arbitration, led a successful effort to decertify ALPA and

replace it with a new union, US Airline Pilots Association

(“USAPA”). Headed by an East Pilot, USAPA was constitutionally committed to pursuing date-of-hire principles, in contrast to ALPA, whose merger policy committed it to pursuing

the arbitrated seniority list.

Certain West Pilots brought this action against the newlycertified union alleging that USAPA breached its duty of fair

representation (“DFR”) by negotiating a contract that would

impermissibly favor the East Pilots at the expense of the West

Pilots. A jury found that the union had breached its DFR, and

the district court, after a bench trial on the remaining equitable issues, granted the West Pilot Plaintiffs an injunction

against USAPA. Addington v. US Airline Pilots Ass’n, 2009

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WL 2169164 (D. Ariz. July 17, 2009). USAPA contends,

inter alia, that the district court never had jurisdiction because

the West Pilots’ claim is not ripe. We agree.

BACKGROUND

In 2005, US Airways, Inc., and AWA merged to form a

single carrier called US Airways (or the “airline”). At the time

of the merger, ALPA was the collective bargaining representative for both the East Pilots and the West Pilots. Each group

had a separate collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”)

which was administered by each group’s Master Executive

Council. As with most mergers, an integrated seniority list

had to be created. The East Pilots were the bigger group —

about 5,100, compared to about 1,900 West Pilots — and

were generally hired before the West Pilots. The West Pilots

received more favorable wages under their CBA and, unlike

the East Pilots, no West Pilots were furloughed at the time of

the merger. 

The two merging airlines and ALPA entered into a Transition Agreement (“TA”), which incorporated by reference

ALPA’s Merger Policy. Under the TA, the carriers agreed not

to object to ALPA’s seniority integration proposal, provided

it did not result in certain additional costs. The seniority integration proposal could be implemented only as part of a single

CBA. The single CBA would require approval by the East

Master Executive Council, the West Master Executive Council, and a majority of each of the East and West pilot groups,

effectively giving each side a veto. Until the single CBA was

negotiated, with few exceptions, the TA placed a “fence”

between East and West operations, such that each would continue to operate under its respective CBA. 

Pursuant to the ALPA Merger Policy, the two pilot groups

began negotiating seniority integration, but to no avail. Under

the union’s Merger Policy, if negotiation and mediation

between the two sides fail, the issue is submitted to “final and

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binding” arbitration. The merged seniority list is then presented to the airline, and ALPA is to “use all reasonable means

at its disposal to compel the company to accept and implement the merged seniority list.” The arbitrated list is not subject to a separate ratification vote, but becomes part of the

single CBA, which is subject to member ratification. 

George Nicolau was selected to chair the arbitration panel,

pursuant to the Merger Policy. Arbitration commenced

between “the US Airways Pilot Merger Representatives and

the America West Pilot Merger Representatives.” In early

May 2007, the panel issued its award (the “Nicolau Award”).

A majority of East Pilots “strenuously objected” to the

Nicolau Award and opposed its implementation. The East

Pilot representatives sought to have ALPA prevent implementation of the Nicolau Award. ALPA unsuccessfully attempted

to get the two sides to reach a compromise. 

While the arbitration was pending, negotiations with the

airline progressed, and the airline proposed a comprehensive

CBA in May 2007. In late July 2007, the East Master Executive Council determined that the East Pilots would never ratify a CBA that incorporated the Nicolau Award. On August

15, 2007, the East Pilots withdrew their representatives from

the committee negotiating the new CBA with the airline, halting those negotiations. In late 2007, ALPA submitted the

Nicolau Award to the airline, which accepted the award on

December 20, 2007. 

In the meantime, several East Pilots began exploring the

possibility of forming a new union that would not implement

the Nicolau Award. They formed USAPA and, on November

29, 2007, the National Mediation Board certified a representation election. USAPA won the election and was certified as

the collective bargaining representative for the entire group of

pilots, East and West, on April 18, 2008. From the date the

East Pilots withdrew from negotiations until ALPA was

decertified, there were no further negotiations with the airline.

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USAPA adopted a constitution that established an “objective” of “maintain[ing] uniform principles of seniority based

on date of hire and the perpetuation thereof, with reasonable

conditions and restrictions to preserve each pilot’s un-merged

career expectations.” Under USAPA’s constitution, ratification requires a majority vote of the entire union membership,

such that each pilot group no longer has its own veto power.

Five months after certification, USAPA presented a seniority proposal to the airline. The proposal incorporated date-ofhire principles. Although the proposal contained some protections for West Pilots, it was not nearly as favorable to West

Pilots as the Nicolau Award. The airline had not yet

responded to the proposal when the district court entered its

permanent injunction. 

The airline has been forced to reduce flying because of economic considerations. The reductions have mostly hit the

western operations. Because of the continuing separate operations, approximately 175 of the 300 furloughs the airline had

announced by the time of trial were West Pilots. At the time

of trial, 140 West Pilots had been furloughed. Under a single

CBA incorporating the Nicolau Award, none of the West

Pilots would have been furloughed. 

Six individual West Pilot-Plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs”) filed this

hybrid action against USAPA and US Airways, seeking damages and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the

claims against the airline because the System Board of

Adjustment had exclusive jurisdiction over them. Addington

v. US Airlines Pilots Ass’n, 588 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1064 (D.

Ariz. 2008). Plaintiffs amended their complaint in the surviving DFR action, specifying that the claim was brought on

behalf of similarly situated West Pilots. The district court certified a class of West Pilots and set a bifurcated trial schedule.

After a jury trial on liability, the jury found that USAPA had

violated the DFR because it abandoned the Nicolau Award in

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favor of a date-of-hire list solely to benefit the East Pilots at

the expense of the West Pilots. 

After a bench trial on remedy, the district court ordered

injunctive relief, permanently enjoining and ordering USAPA

to (1) “Immediately, and in good faith, make all reasonable

efforts to negotiate and implement a single [CBA] with US

Airways that will implement the Nicolau Award seniority proposal . . .”; (2) “Make all reasonable efforts to support and

defend the seniority rights provided by or arising from the

Nicolau Award in negotiations with US Airways”; and (3)

“Not negotiate for separate [CBAs] for the separate pilot

groups . . . .” The district court denied USAPA’s post-trial

motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial.

USAPA timely appealed, and this court granted USAPA’s

unopposed motion to expedite this appeal.

DISCUSSION

[1] Although considerable time, effort, and expense have

been devoted to the merits of Plaintiffs’ DFR claim before

both this Court and the district court, we are without jurisdiction to address the merits of the claim unless it is ripe. See S.

Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of L.A., 922 F.2d 498, 502 (9th Cir.

1990). We review ripeness de novo. See Manufactured Home

Cmtys. Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir.

2005); Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1084

(9th Cir. 2003). If the claim before us is not ripe, we must dismiss. See S. Pac. Transp., 922 F.2d at 502. 

[2] No published case has expressly addressed when a

DFR claim based on a union’s negotiation of a CBA becomes

ripe. Thus, we apply the general principles underlying the

ripeness doctrine and take guidance from our decisions

regarding the related issue of when a DFR claim accrues for

statute of limitations purposes in the context of the administration of a CBA. We conclude that Plaintiffs’ DFR claim is

not yet ripe.

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[3] The ripeness doctrine rests, in part, on the Article III

requirement that federal courts decide only cases and controversies and in part on prudential concerns. See Maldonado v.

Morales, 556 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied,

130 S. Ct. 1139 (2010); W. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Sonoma

County, 905 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1990). The ripeness

inquiry is “intended to ‘prevent the courts, through avoidance

of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in

abstract disagreements.’ ” Maldonado, 556 F.3d at 1044

(quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967),

overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S.

99 (1977)). To determine whether a case is ripe, “we consider

two factors: ‘the fitness of the issues for judicial decision,’

and ‘the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.’ ” Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et

L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1211-12 (9th Cir. 2006) (en

banc) (per curiam) (quoting Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149).

Both factors militate in favor of finding this claim premature.

[4] A question is fit for decision when it can be decided

without considering “contingent future events that may or

may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.”

Cardenas v. Anzai, 311 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v.

Streich, 560 F.3d 926, 931 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.

320 (2009). “At the same time, a litigant need not ‘await the

consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief.

If the injury is certainly impending, that is enough.’ ” Id.

(quoting 18 Unnamed “John Smith” Prisoners v. Meese, 871

F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis in Streich)). 

[5] We conclude that this case presents contingencies that

could prevent effectuation of USAPA’s proposal and the

accompanying injury. At this point, neither the West Pilots

nor USAPA can be certain what seniority proposal ultimately

will be acceptable to both USAPA and the airline as part of

a final CBA. Likewise, it is not certain whether that proposal

will be ratified by the USAPA membership as part of a new,

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single CBA. Not until the airline responds to the proposal, the

parties complete negotiations, and the membership ratifies the

CBA will the West Pilots actually be affected by USAPA’s

seniority proposal — whatever USAPA’s final proposal ultimately is. Because these contingencies make the claim speculative, the issues are not yet fit for judicial decision. 

[6] We also conclude that withholding judicial consideration does not work a direct and immediate hardship on the

West Pilots. “To meet the hardship requirement, a litigant

must show that withholding review would result in ‘direct and

immediate’ hardship and would entail more than possible

financial loss.” Winter v. Cal. Med. Review, Inc., 900 F.2d

1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Cal. Dep’t of Educ. v. Bennett, 833 F.2d 827, 833-34 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also Am.

Trucking Ass’ns v. ICC, 747 F.2d 787, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984)

(finding no hardship where the policy statement the plaintiffs

challenged “neither impose[d] any obligation upon [the plaintiffs], nor in any other respect ha[d] any impact upon them

‘felt immediately . . . in conducting their day-to-day affairs’ ”

(quoting Toilet Goods Ass’n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164

(1967))). 

[7] Plaintiffs correctly note that certain West Pilots have

been furloughed, whereas they would still be working under

a single CBA implementing the Nicolau Award. It is, however, at best, speculative that a single CBA incorporating the

Nicolau Award would be ratified if presented to the union’s

membership. ALPA had been unable to broker a compromise

between the two pilot groups, and the East Pilots had

expressed their intentions not to ratify a CBA containing the

Nicolau Award. Thus, even under the district court’s injunction mandating USAPA to pursue the Nicolau Award, it is

uncertain that the West Pilots’ preferred seniority system ever

would be effectuated. That the court cannot fashion a remedy

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that will alleviate Plaintiffs’ harm suggests that the case is not

ripe.1

[8] Plaintiffs seek to escape this conclusion by framing

their harm as the lost opportunity to have a CBA implementing the Nicolau Award put to a ratification vote. Because

merely putting a CBA effectuating the Nicolau Award to a

ratification vote will not itself alleviate the West Pilots furloughs, Plaintiffs have not identified a sufficiently concrete

injury.2 Additionally, USAPA’s final proposal may yet be one

that does not work the disadvantages Plaintiffs fear, even if

that proposal is not the Nicolau Award.3

1The dissent asserts that “nothing would be gained by postponing a

decision, and the parties’ interest would be well served by a prompt resolution of the West Pilots’ claim.” Diss. op. at 8017 (internal alterations,

quotation marks, and citation omitted). To be sure, the parties’ interest

would be served by prompt resolution of the seniority dispute, but that is

not the same as prompt resolution of the DFR claim. The present impasse,

in fact, could well be prolonged by prematurely resolving the West Pilots’

claim judicially at this point. Forced to bargain for the Nicolau Award, any

contract USAPA could negotiate would undoubtedly be rejected by its

membership. By deferring judicial intervention, we leave USAPA to bargain in good faith pursuant to its DFR, with the interests of all members

— both East and West — in mind, under pain of an unquestionably ripe

DFR suit, once a contract is ratified. 

2Plaintiffs’ alleged hardship cannot instead be premised on any delay

caused by USAPA in reaching a single CBA. As the district court noted,

Plaintiffs abandoned their claim that USAPA is intentionally delaying

negotiation of a CBA. Addington, 2009 WL 2169164, at *22 (“During discovery, Plaintiffs retreated from any notion of deliberate delay on the part

of USAPA.”). The dissent’s assertion that “the absence of a CBA is itself

powerful evidence of a DFR violation,” Diss. op. at 8015, is therefore misplaced. Although absence of a CBA might be evidence of a DFR violation,

if the violation were based on deliberate delay by the union, it is not evidence of a union’s improper preference of one seniority system over

another. As demonstrated by ALPA’s similar difficulties in reaching a

CBA, the pilot groups, and individual pilots with their ratification/nonratification powers, are the major contributors to the absence of a CBA in

these circumstances. 

3We do not address the thorny question of the extent to which the

Nicolau Award is binding on USAPA. We note, as the district court recog8008 ADDINGTON v. US AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOC.

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[9] Although we do not hold that a DFR claim based on a

union’s promotion of a policy is never ripe until that policy

is effectuated, we conclude that, in this case, there is too much

uncertainty standing in the way of effectuation of Plaintiffs’

harm to warrant judicial intervention at this stage. Cf. Sergeant v. Inlandboatmen’s Union of the Pac., 346 F.3d 1196,

1200 (9th Cir. 2003) (examining Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act issue “in light of the well-established

federal policy of avoiding unnecessary interference in the

internal affairs of unions and according considerable deference to the interpretation and application of a union’s rules

and regulations”).4

Our conclusion that Plaintiffs’ claim is not ripe is consistent with our DFR decisions, which have found DFR violations based on contract negotiation only after a contract has

been agreed upon.5See, e.g., Williams v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 617

nized, that USAPA is at least as free to abandon the Nicolau Award as was

its predecessor, ALPA. The dissent appears implicitly to assume that the

Nicolau Award, the product of the internal rules and processes of ALPA,

is binding on USAPA. See Diss op. at 8021-22. 

4The dissent agrees with “the general rule that we evaluate the duty of

fair representation based on the fairness of the actual representation as

memorialized in the [CBA,]” but would hold that this “is an unusual case

and . . . an exception” to that rule. Diss. op. at 8015. As much as the dissent stresses the case-specific nature of our inquiry, however, there is no

disputing that this case would be the first time we allowed a DFR suit to

proceed in a collective bargaining/ contract negotiating context before the

CBA at issue was ratified. Such a departure from the norm would invite

parties to bring suit long before internal disputes have had a chance to

work themselves out. It would also force us in each case to decide —

without the benefit of hindsight that is enjoyed in statute of limitations

accrual cases — whether a union’s position is a mere announcement of a

bargaining position or the adoption of a permanent change in position.

Although the dissent believes that it is an easy question in this case, it will

not always be so. 

5Plaintiffs have identified only one case in which a court allowed a DFR

suit to proceed before a contract had been executed. See Mount v. Grand

Int’l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 226 F.2d 604, 608 (6th Cir. 1955). In

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F.2d 1321, 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1980) (involving suit for

breach of DFR in negotiating CBA brought after rules at issue

were adopted); Bernard v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 873 F.2d

213, 215 (9th Cir. 1989) (involving suit for breach of DFR

during negotiations brought after agreement between union

and employer was reached); Hendricks v. Airline Pilots Ass’n,

696 F.2d 673, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1983) (same). 

Indeed, the Supreme Court case that clarified that the DFR

was applicable during contract negotiations articulated its

holding in terms that imply a claim can be brought only after

negotiations are complete and a “final product” has been

reached. See Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S.

65, 78 (1991) (“[T]he final product of the bargaining process

may constitute evidence of a breach of duty only if it can be

fairly characterized as so far outside a ‘wide range of reasonableness,’ that it is wholly ‘irrational’ or ‘arbitrary.’ ” (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953))).

Notably, even in the cases on which Plaintiffs rely most

Mount, the union notified employees that it would negotiate a contract

amendment in direct opposition to a series of rulings that had been made

pursuant to the union’s internal policies. Id. at 605-06. The Sixth Circuit

held that the fact that the proposed contract had not been executed did not

make the plaintiff’s DFR action premature. Id. at 608. Mount, however,

contained only a cursory analysis of the ripeness issue, and we are not persuaded to apply its conclusion to this case. More recent cases have held

that a claim does not accrue when the union merely announces its intention to breach its DFR in the future. See Ramey v. Dist. 141, Int’l Ass’n

of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 378 F.3d 269, 279 (2d Cir. 2004)

(“[W]e do not require, or even permit, union members to bring a suit

against their union simply because the union has announced its future

intention to break its duty.”); Teamsters Local Union No. 42 v. NLRB, 825

F.2d 608, 615-16 (1st Cir. 1987) (“Knowledge of a party’s predisposition

to commit an unfair labor practice or suspicion that, when the moment is

opportune, the knife thrust will follow, is not enough to galvanize § 10(b).

The statute begins to run only when the impermissible act or omission —

the unfair labor practice — actually takes place.”). 

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heavily, the policy that the plaintiffs claimed injured them had

already been effectuated when the plaintiffs brought the

claim. See Ramey v. Dist. 141, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists &

Aerospace Workers, 378 F.3d 269, 275-76 (2d Cir. 2004)

(noting that airline had accepted union’s seniority system and

the plaintiffs had been furloughed as a result); Teamsters

Local Union No. 42 v. NLRB, 825 F.2d 608, 611 (1st Cir.

1987) (noting that shifts had been assigned according to

union’s seniority system). Although both the Ramey court and

Teamsters court concluded the claim accrued (for statute of

limitations purposes) before effectuation of the policy at

issue, see Ramey, 378 F.3d at 279-80 (holding that claim

accrued when union advocated seniority position to employer

during contract negotiations); Teamsters, 825 F.2d at 614-15

(holding that claim accrued when union announced to the

plaintiffs that they had been assigned to less desirable shift,

even though negotiations with employer regarding the seniority system that would dictate shift assignments occurred two

months later), the holdings are not as easily applied in our situation as plaintiffs urge.6

 In both Ramey and Teamsters, the

6

Indeed, we are hesitant to transplant a rule from cases analyzing claim

accrual for statute of limitations purposes to the ripeness context.

Although we have noted the relationship between the statute of limitations

and ripeness inquiries, see Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d

680, 687 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Determining when the cause of action accrues

is merely the corollary to the ripeness inquiry.”), there are key differences

in the posture of a case that presents a statute of limitations issue and one

that presents a ripeness issue. In a statute of limitations case, unlike a ripeness case, the injury has unquestionably culminated, and the issue is

whether the plaintiffs learned or should have learned of the injury so long

ago that it would no longer be fair to bring the suit. In deciding these

cases, courts often decline to identify a specific date on which the claim

accrued, instead identifying the “earliest” or “latest” date it could have

accrued, depending on whether the court determines the claim to have

fallen inside or outside the applicable statute of limitations. See, e.g.,

Gvozdenovic v. United Air Lines, Inc., 933 F.2d 1100, 1106 (2d Cir. 1991)

(concluding that claim was time-barred because it accrued “at the latest”

on the date the union ratified the allegedly violative agreement, which was

more than six months before filing). 

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unions argued that the plaintiffs’ claims had accrued more

than six months prior to filing, such that the cases were barred

by the statute of limitations. Ramey, 378 F.3d at 276; Teamsters, 825 F.2d at 614. In addressing whether the cases were

time-barred, each court was faced with the issue whether the

claim accrued when the union announced its intention to take

a negotiating position that would amount to a DFR breach (a

date that fell outside the six-month period) or when the union

actually advocated that position to the employer during negotiations (a date that fell within the six-month period). Ramey,

378 F.3d at 278-80; Teamsters, 825 F.2d at 614-15. The court

in each case found that the claim accrued at the later date.

Ramey, 378 F.3d at 279-80; Teamsters, 825 F.2d at 614-15.

Significantly, however, because the date the union advocated

its position in negotiations fell within the six-month period in

both cases, there would have been no need for the plaintiffs

to argue that the claim did not accrue until effectuation of the

policy. Moreover, because the seniority systems at issue

already had been effectuated in both cases, the courts simply

were not faced with the possibility of interfering in a union’s

internal conflict before the conflict manifested as concrete

injury to the plaintiffs. 

We also note in these cases the apparent absence of contingencies that stood between the union’s advocating to the

employer a position on a certain policy and the implementation of that policy. Neither Ramey nor Teamsters references

a ratification requirement, and in both cases the employer

seemed predisposed to follow the union’s proposal. In Teamsters, the court found accrual at the date the union communicated its adverse action to the employees. 825 F.2d at 614-15.

Although the negotiations that would result in that adverse

action had not yet been completed, the announcement was

definitive. Id. In Ramey, the underlying district court decision

indicates that the employer had already agreed to accept whatever seniority system the union proposed. See Ramey v. Dist.

141, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 2002

WL 32152292, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2002) (noting that the

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transition agreement in effect gave the union “complete control over the issue of seniority”). Because of these distinctions, we are not convinced that these cases, even if they were

binding on us, would require a finding of ripeness in the circumstances of the case at bench.7

Finally, we find instructive our cases analyzing accrual of

DFR claims that are based on a union’s alleged errors outside

the contract negotiation process.8 In the grievance context,

too, we have required that a final outcome be reached before

allowing a suit based on a union’s allegedly violative conduct

that led to the decision. See Kozy v. Wings W. Airlines, Inc.,

89 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 1996). In Kozy, an employee brought a

DFR claim alleging the union committed errors while repre7Plaintiffs correctly note that Ramey suggests a DFR claim can accrue

before implementation of the policy at issue. Analogizing to anticipatory

repudiation in a breach of contract case, the Ramey court noted that it

would be possible — but not required — for a claim to be brought when

a union unequivocally communicates its intention to breach its DFR, but

that for statute of limitations purposes, the claim did not accrue until “the

date on which performance was due, namely the date on which [the union]

advocated a position on the seniority issue to [the employer].” 378 F.3d

at 279-80. The court went on, however, to qualify its holding, recognizing

the requirement of likelihood of harm: 

Because we hold that [the union] has not met its burden to demonstrate

that plaintiffs reasonably should have known that the breach occurred

before January 28, 1999 [the date six months before filing date], we do not

address the difficult and unsettled question of how certain it must be that

harm will be caused by a union’s breach in order to trigger the statute of

limitations. We have held that the statute of limitations is triggered even

if it is not absolutely certain that a union member will be harmed by a

breach. However, we note that there must be some likelihood that a harm

will result from a union’s breach before a member may file suit. Otherwise, such claims would be unduly speculative. We caution district courts

to consider this issue in the future when faced with a suit brought after a

union breaches but before tangible harm is caused. 

Id. at 280 n.5 (citations omitted). 

8The DFR applies both to contract negotiation and contract administration. See O’Neill, 499 U.S. at 67. 

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senting him in a grievance hearing before an arbitrator. Id. at

638. We held that the claim had not accrued until the arbitrator’s written decision was issued. Id. at 639. We noted that 

There was, at one time, some indication in this Circuit that the employee ‘should know’ of his Union’s

errors in representing him at a hearing when he saw

the errors committed during the hearing, and that the

six-month [statute of limitations] period began to run

from that date even if the grievance board had not

yet rendered its final decision.” 

Id. at 640 (citing Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1509

(9th Cir. 1986)). However, we stated, Galindo resolved that

confusion, holding that a claim accrues for statute of limitations purposes only when the employee learns of the arbitrator’s award. Kozy, 89 F.3d at 640 (citing Galindo, 793 F.2d

at 1509). The holding in Galindo “recognize[d] that the arbitrator’s final decision could make the employee whole despite

the union’s errors, and that the arbitrator could change his

mind at any time prior to issuing a final and binding decision.” Kozy, 89 F.3d at 640 (citing Galindo, 793 F.2d at

1509). Similarly, in the context of negotiations toward a CBA,

the parties could shift positions until negotiations are complete, and the final agreement could be acceptable to Plaintiffs.

CONCLUSION

[10] For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Plaintiffs’

DFR claim is not ripe; therefore, the case is REMANDED to

the district court with directions that the action be DISMISSED. No costs to either side.

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BYBEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I agree with much of the majority opinion. I concur that, in

general, we should not decide duty of fair representation

(“DFR”) challenges until “after a contract has been agreed

upon.” Maj. Op. at 8009. In the typical case, the contract will

be the best evidence of fair representation or lack thereof. In

my view, however, the contract is not the sine qua non of

unfair representation, and the fact that a case could be more

ripe—in the sense that the issues could be more concrete,

more focused—is not evidence of the contrary proposition

that the case is not ripe. 

This is an unusual case and, in my view, an exception to the

general rule that we evaluate the duty of fair representation

based on the fairness of the actual representation as memorialized in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”). Here,

the absence of a CBA is itself powerful evidence of a DFR

violation. As set forth quite fairly in the majority opinion and

in a lengthy and careful opinion by the district court, the Air

Line Pilots Association (“ALPA”) was decertified and a new

union, the U.S. Airline Pilots Association (“USAPA”), certified precisely to frustrate implementation of the Nicolau

Agreement and to negotiate a CBA with U.S. Airways that

favors the East Pilots. As the district court found, “USAPA’s

sole objective in adopting and presenting its seniority proposal to the Airline was to benefit East Pilots at the expense

of West Pilots, rather than to benefit the bargaining union as

a whole.” Thus, “the terms of USAPA’s seniority proposal are

substantially less favorable to West Pilots than the Nicolau

Award” made through binding arbitration, an award that

“USAPA concedes that it will never bargain for.” It has been

nearly five years since the two airlines merged, and the pilots

are further from, not closer to, a CBA that reflects the interests of both pilot groups. Although a CBA would supply tangible evidence of a violation of the DFR, in this case, there

is sufficient evidence to consider the West Pilots’ complaint

without the CBA. The issues are concrete and were well

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developed in district court proceedings that included a jury

trial (for damages) and a bench trial (for equitable relief). I

would hold the case is ripe for decision and decide the appeal

on the merits.

I

The “basic rationale” of the ripeness doctrine “is to prevent

the courts, through premature adjudication, from entangling

themselves in abstract disagreements.” Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580 (1985). “Constitutional ripeness, in many cases, ‘coincides squarely with

standing’s injury in fact prong’ and ‘can be characterized as

standing on a timeline.’ ” Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d

1109, 1122 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Thomas v. Anchorage

Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000)).

Ripeness is a case-specific inquiry and does not lend itself to

broad, bright-line rules based on the type of claim asserted. In

Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et

L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006) (en

banc), we wrote that “[i]t is [ ] important to a ripeness analysis that we specify the precise legal question to be answered.

Depending on the legal question, the case may be ripe or

unripe. If we ask the wrong legal question, we risk getting the

wrong answer to the ripeness question.”

A

Getting the legal question right is critical. Two related

cases from the Supreme Court are particularly instructive

here. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984),

the Court held that a plaintiff’s challenges to the constitutionality of an arbitration and compensation scheme in the Federal

Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) would

not become ripe until the “[Environmental Protection

Agency] ha[d] considered data submitted by [the plaintiff] in

evaluating another application and an arbitrator ha[d] made an

award . . . .” Id. at 1020. The very next term, however, in

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Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., the

Court held that a similar constitutional challenge to FIFRA’s

arbitration provisions was ripe even though none of the thirteen plaintiffs was actually challenging an arbitration award.

473 U.S. at 579-82. Only one plaintiff—Stauffer Chemical

Company—had engaged in arbitration, and it sought to

enforce the award. None of the twelve other plaintiffs had

actually engaged in an arbitration under FIFRA, but they

alleged that they were “aggrieved by the threat of an unconstitutional arbitration procedure.” Id. at 579. The Court did

not dismiss any plaintiff’s claims on ripeness grounds: “One

does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury

to obtain preventive relief. If the injury is certainly impending, that is enough. Nothing would be gained by postponing

a decision, and the public interest would be well served by a

prompt resolution of the constitutionality of FIFRA’s arbitration scheme.” Id. at 581-82 (quotation marks and citations

omitted) (emphasis added).

What our decision in Yahoo! and the Court’s decisions in

Monsanto and Thomas make clear is that ripeness is a contextual and commonsense doctrine. If the unique circumstances

of a particular claim render it fit for decision, the claim is ripe.

I submit that this is a case in which “[n]othing would be

gained by postponing a decision, and the [parties’] interest[s]

would be well served by a prompt resolution of” the West

Pilots’ DFR claim. Id. at 582.

B

“[A] union breaches the duty of fair representation when its

conduct toward a member of the bargaining unit is arbitrary,

discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Marquez v. Screen Actors

Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 44 (1998). “The duty . . . is the quid

pro quo for the union’s right to exclusive representation; it

protects employees in the minority from arbitrary discrimination by the majority union.” Laborers & Hod Carriers, Local

No. 341 v. N.L.R.B., 564 F.2d 834, 839-40 (9th Cir. 1977).

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The majority describes three DFR cases from this circuit—Williams v. Pacific Maritime Association, 617 F.2d

1321 (9th Cir. 1980), Bernard v. Airline Pilots Association,

873 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1989), and Hendricks v. Air Line Pilots

Association, 696 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1983)—as “f[inding] DFR

violations based on contract negotiation only after a contract

has been agreed upon,” Maj. Op. at 8009. These cases are not

only distinguishable, but completely inapposite. First, none of

these cases even mentions ripeness. Together, Williams, Bernard, and Hendricks stand for the uncontroversial proposition

that a DFR claim can be brought after a CBA or finalized

seniority integration agreement has been completed. The issue

here, however, is whether a DFR claim must be brought after

a CBA or finalized seniority integration agreement, which

none of our cases cited by the majority even purports to

address.

Just as importantly, none of these cases addressed the “precise legal question” advanced by the West Pilots. In Williams,

“[t]he heart of the employees’ claim of unfair representation

[wa]s that the union breached its statutory duty to plaintiffs by

agreeing to the adoption of [certain] standards for deregistration.” 617 F.2d at 1328 (emphasis added). In Bernard, the factual situation was basically a mirror image of this case: the

merger of Alaska Air Group and Jet America became effective on October 1, 1987, and a seniority integration agreement

was completed less than a week later, on October 6, 1987. 873

F.2d at 215. The plaintiffs in Bernard sued immediately thereafter and were quickly granted preliminary injunctive relief,

which we upheld. Id. at 215, 219. Here, the West Pilots claim

to be aggrieved by the failure to pursue the memorialization

of an arbitration award in a finalized seniority integration

agreement, while in Bernard the claim was the opposite: an

agreement was memorialized almost immediately, without

taking into account a preexisting merger policy. Finally, in

Hendricks, plaintiffs argued that “the union [ ] breached its

duty of fair representation because [a contract] amendment

was arbitrary and discriminatory.” 696 F.2d at 677 (emphasis

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added). Like the theory in Williams, the plaintiffs’ theory in

Hendricks actually challenged a memorialized agreement and

was therefore not the “precise” legal theory advanced here.

The majority also cites Air Line Pilots Association v.

O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991) (“ALPA”), for the proposition

that “a claim can only be brought once negotiations are complete and a ‘final product’ has been reached.” Maj. Op. at

8010. With all due respect, this overstates what ALPA said.

ALPA said nothing about the ripeness doctrine. What the

Court said was that “[a]ny substantive examination of a

union’s performance . . . must be highly deferential, recognizing the wide latitude that negotiators need for the effective

performance of their bargaining responsibilities. For that reason, the final product of the bargaining process may constitute

evidence of a breach of duty . . . .” 499 U.S. at 78 (internal

citations omitted). The Court’s statement in ALPA only confirms what we already know: a CBA may be the best evidence

of satisfaction of or violation of the DFR. But the Court’s

equivocal “may constitute evidence” falls well short of confirming that “a claim can only be brought” once there is a

CBA.

None of these cases are relevant with respect to the ripeness

issue here. They stand for the noncontroversial proposition

that a DFR claim can be brought after a CBA has been completed. By contrast, the issue here is whether a DFR claim can

be brought prior to the completion of a CBA.

II

I agree with the majority that this case would be ripe if

USAPA and U.S. Air had entered into a CBA. That is not the

question that this case presents. We are asked whether our

Article III jurisdiction extends to a DFR claim based on a

union “constitutionally committed,” Maj. Op. at 8001, to

voiding a binding arbitration award and adopting a “date of

hire” seniority principle that plainly favors one side of a

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merger. When the question is posed in this way, I believe the

ripeness of the West Pilots’ claims becomes clear.

We employ a two-part test to determine whether a claim is

ripe for review, evaluating “(1) whether the issues are fit for

judicial decision, and (2) whether the parties will suffer hardship if we decline to consider the issues.” San Diego County

Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir.

2006). The issues raised by the West Pilots’ DFR claim are

straightforward, and the uncontested facts of this case make

clear that the issues involved are fit for decision on this

record.

The West Pilots’ DFR theory does not depend on any contingent future events such as the memorialization of a finalized CBA or seniority integration agreement. The district

court explained why the issues were fit for decision and the

parties will suffer hardship if we decline to consider the

issues:

The issues fit for decision are these: Whether

USAPA adopted and presented its seniority proposal

without any legitimate union objective, solely to

benefit East Pilots at the expense of West Pilots, and

if so whether the West Pilots are entitled to damages

and an injunction therefor . . . . USAPA concedes it

will never bargain for implementation of the Nicolau

Award. It is constitutionally hostile to doing so. The

Airline has accepted the Nicolau Award, expressing

no opposition to it, and the union has failed to show

any legitimate reason (or plausible future reason) for

abandoning it. Liability flows from the process and

aims of USAPA’s seniority position. The outcome of

negotiations is irrelevant. Without an injunction,

USAPA’s seniority position inevitably impairs the

collective bargaining process.

For this same reason, denying judicial review would

work a substantial hardship upon the parties, includ8020 ADDINGTON v. US AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOC.

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ing the Airline . . . . In addition to depriving the West

Pilots of legitimate representation, USAPA’s bargaining position leaves the Airline to decide between

a lack of a single CBA and an unlawful single CBA.

(Emphasis added).

I agree with the district court that, given the “precise legal

question” raised by the West Pilots, this case is “fit for decision.” As the district court correctly observed, given the constitutional commitment of USAPA to date-of-hire principles

—principles irreconcilably opposed to the compromise

embodied in the Nicolau Award—“the outcome of negotiations is irrelevant.” As a result, the question presented in this

case does not pivot on any “ ‘contingent future events that

may or may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur

at all.’ ” Maj. Op. at 8006 (quoting Cardenas v. Anzai, 311

F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2002)). The West Pilots’ claimed “injury is certainly impending, [and] that is enough.” United

States v. Streich, 560 F.3d 926, 931 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation

marks omitted). Instead, as the district court found, “USAPA

has misled the majority about its power to improve their

seniority prospects at the expense of the West Pilots. The will

of the East Pilots springs from a mistaken understanding of

the law and mismanaged expectations. If this is an impasse,

it is one USAPA has goaded on.” (Emphasis added). The

impasse is not evidence of the lack of ripeness of the West

Pilots’ claims. It is Exhibit A in their case—it is itself evidence of USAPA’s intractability on behalf of the East Pilots.

Again, as the district court found, “USAPA has made plain its

intent never to bargain for the Nicolau Award,” and time

appears to be on the side of the East Pilots.1 Under these circumstances, the West Pilots need not “await the consumma1Although the West Pilots are not claiming that USAPA has “deliberately” delayed completing a CBA, Maj. Op. at 8008 n.2, the majority notes

that West Pilots have been furloughed and that they would not have been

furloughed under the Nicolau Award, id. at 8007. 

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tion of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted).

When the East Pilots campaigned to decertify ALPA and

replace it with USAPA, a new union constitutionally committed to pursuing date-of-hire principles, a DFR claim by the

West Pilots would not have been ripe. As the Second Circuit

explained in Ramey v. District 141 International Association

of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 378 F.3d 269 (2d Cir.

2004), “a breach [of the duty of fair representation does not]

occur[ ] when a union announces an intention, even if it does

so unequivocally, to advocate against the interests of its members in the future.” Id. at 278. But when USAPA won the certification election and refused in practice to bargain for

implementation of the Nicolau Award, a previously

bargained-for award that the Airline had already accepted and

continues to accept, this was not the announcement of an

intention, but actual “act[ion] against the interest[s] of” the

West Pilots—the precise point at which, it seems to me (and

to the Second Circuit), a DFR breach occurs. Id. (“the breach

occurs when the union acts against the interests of its members”); see also Santos v. Dist. Council of New York City &

Vicinity of United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of

Am., AFL-CIO, 619 F.2d 963, 970-71 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding

that a union breached its duty of fair representation, and a

DFR claim began to accrue, at the time “appellants were

aware that the [union] was not proceeding in good faith to

seek enforcement of [an arbitration] award”).

The majority argues that this case will not be ripe until “the

airline responds to [USAPA’s seniority] proposal, the parties

complete negotiations, and the membership ratifies the CBA,”

Maj. Op. at 8007, but I respectfully disagree. Certainly this

case might be “riper” were plaintiffs to wait for these future

events, but when USAPA took the reins as the West Pilots’

union and refused to pursue the Nicolau Award, USAPA’s

promise moved from abstract disagreement to adjudicable

legal controversy. The future events cited by the majority are

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not likely to occur anytime soon, and plaintiffs will be harmed

all the while. In the words of the Thomas Court, “[n]othing

would be gained by postponing a decision . . . .” 473 U.S. at

582.

The ripeness inquiry is not concerned with whether a case

is as ripe as it possibly could be. Twelve of the plaintiffs in

Thomas had never even entered into FIFRA arbitration. Their

claims would have been riper had they undergone FIFRA

arbitration prior to joining with Stauffer in a challenge to

FIFRA’s arbitration procedures. Yet the Court noted these

plaintiffs’ “continuing uncertainty and expense” and

explained that “[o]ne does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief.” Id. at

581 (quotation marks omitted). No one disputes that the West

Pilots are now suffering, and will continue to suffer, “continuing uncertainty and expense” due to the seniority impasse.

They are entitled to have their claims heard.

I respectfully dissent.

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