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Parties Involved:
Murlynn D. Ott
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

I 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPJsJte~~ ·~ odppealF 

Tenth Ct'r'(:uit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MURLYNN D. OTT, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

DEC 10 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-3075 

(D. Kan . No. 91-3333-S) 

(Criminal Case 

No. 90-40013-01) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, Circuit Judge, BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, and 

EBEL, Circuit Judge.** 

In this prose appeal, Appellant Murlynn Ott seeks habeas 

corpus relief from a federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S . C. 

§ 2255. On June 6, 1990, Ott pleaded guilty to a violation of 18 

u.s.c. § 1466(a) and (b), which prohibits selling or transferring 

obscene matter and receiving or possessing obscene matter with the 

intent to distribute. The district court sentenced him to thirty 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 92-3075 Document: 010110151618 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 1 
months imprisonment on the same day. Ott did not file a direct 

1 appeal from his conviction or sentence. 

On November 4, 1991, Ott brought this collateral attack on 

his sentence pursuant to§ 2255, contending that the sentencing 

court erred in computing his offense level. First, Ott alleges 

that the sentencing court erred both in increasing his offense 

level by two points pursuant to United States Sentencing Guideline 

§ 3Bl.l(c) for his leadership role in the offense and in failing 

to conduct an evidentiary hearing on this issue. Second, Ott 

asserts that the sentencing court erred both in refusing to reduce 

his offense level by two points under Sentencing Guideline§ 3El.1 

for acceptance of responsibility and in failing to grant an 

evidentiary hearing on this issue. We find no error, and 

accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of his habeas 

petition. 

I. LEADERSHIP ROLE 

Ott contends that the evidence was insufficient to support 

the sentencing court's decision to add two points to his offense 

level for his leadership role in a criminal activity under 

U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(c). He also asserts that the sentencing court 

1 We note that Ott's failure to take a direct appeal from his 

sentence potentially raises problems under United States v. Frady. 

456 U.S. 152 (1982). In Frady, the Supreme Court held that in 

order to raise an issue for the first time in a§ 2255 motion, the 

convicted defendant must show cause and actual prejudice. Id. at 

167. However, we need not address this issue because the 

government failed to raise it either below or on this appeal. 

Although we have the discretion to raise the issue sua sponte, 

here we choose not to do so. See Hines v. United States, 971 F.2d 

506, 509 (10th Cir. 1992). 

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erred in failing to conduct a hearing on this issue. We review 

under the clearly erroneous standard the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting a sentencing court's decision to enhance a 

defendant's offense level under U.S.S.G. 3Bl.l(c). United States 

v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1573 (10th Cir. 1991) (citations 

omitted), cert. denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 1190 (1992). 

Thus, we will not reverse the district court unless the court's 

finding was without factual support in the record, or if, after 

reviewing all the evidence, we are left with the definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been made. United States v. 

Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 

U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 3302 (1990). 

We cannot say that the sentencing court's decision to 

increase the defendant's offense level under§ 3Bl.l(c) was 

clearly erroneous. Section 3Bl.l(c) permits a two-point increase 

in the defendant's offense level if the defendant was a supervisor 

of a criminal activity. 2 A defendant may be deemed a supervisor 

for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(c) upon a showing that the 

defendant exercised any degree of direction or control over a 

2 U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.1 provides: 

Based on the defendant's role in the offense, increase 

the offense level as follows: 

(a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a 

criminal activity that involved five or more 

participants or was otherwise extensive, increase 

by 4 levels. 

(b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but 

not an organizer or leader) and the criminal 

activity involved five or more participants or was 

otherwise extensive, increase by 3 levels. 

(c) If the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, 

or supervisor in any criminal activity other than 

described in (a) or (b), increase by 2 levels. 

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subordinate in the criminal scheme. Morgan, 936 F.2d at 1574 

(citing United States v. Backas, 901 F.2d 1528, 1530 (10th Cir. 

1990), cert. denied, U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 190 (1990)). 

In the present case, the evidence is sufficient to show that 

Ott was a supervisor. The district court adopted as its findings 

the results of the United States Probation Officer's review of the 

obscene materials seized from Ott's business and residence as set 

forth in Ott's Presentence Report. One of the tapes seized from 

the defendant shows him directing the production of an obscene 

film. In the tape, Ott directs the action of the participants. 

We hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the sentencing 

court's finding that the defendant was a "supervisor" under 

§3Bl.l(c). 

We reject Ott's contention that his actions in directing the 

obscene film may not be considered in determining whether he was a 

supervisor of criminal activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1466. 

Ott correctly points out that, at the time he was sentenced, Tenth 

Circuit precedent required the sentencing court to focus on Ott's 

role in the offense rather than other relevant criminal conduct in 

making the leadership role determination under U.S.S.G. 

§ 3Bl.l(c). See United States v. Petit, 903 F.2d 1336, 1341 (10th 

Cir. 1990), cert. denied, u. s. 3 , 111 S. Ct. 197 (1990). 

3 We note that in United States v. Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1513 

(10th Cir. 1991), we reconsidered en bane the Pettit rule in light 

of the Novemb~r 1990 amendments to the Guideline commentary. 

After considering the amendments, we held unanimously that a 

sentencing court may consider relevant conduct other than that for 

which the defendant was convfcted in making the§ 3Bl.1 

determination. Saucedo, 950 F.2d at 1513 & n.8. However, to 

avoid ex post facto problems, we will apply the Guidelines in 

effect at the time Ott was sentenced on June 6, 1990. See id. at 

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' • However, we believe that, under the facts of this case, Ott's 

actions in producing the obscene film constitute part of the 

offense of possessing obscene materials with intent to distribute 

under§ 1466. While producing the tape, Ott simultaneously 

possessed it. The possession and the production cannot be 

separated. Thus, Ott necessarily possessed the tapes in violation 

of§ 1466(a) during the time he created them. 

We also reject Ott's claim that he cannot be a supervisor 

under U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(c) because the "participants" in the film, 

his common-law wife, Ms. Penfield, and a woman named Judy, are not 

criminally liable for a violation of§ 1466. Ott correctly points 

out that to impose a leadership enhancement on a defendant, the 

Guidelines require that the defendant have directed a 

"participant" who is criminally responsible for the offense. 

U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(c), comment n.1. However, Ott bases his argument 

on the faulty premise that Ms. Penfield and Judy are not 

criminally liable for the§ 1466 offense. By virtue of their 

participation in the production of the films, both women could 

have been charged with aiding and abetting Ott in possession of 

obscene material with intent to distribute under 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 

§ 1466. We therefore hold that the district court did not err in 

adding two points to Ott's offense level for his supervisory role 

in the offense. 

Nor did the district court err in failing to hold an 

evidentiary hearing as to whether the defendant was a supervisor 

1513-16. 

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of criminal activity. In arriving at the appropriate sentence 

within the Guideline standards, the judge may use any reliable 

source of information. United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 

1180 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 3302 

(1990). When there is a reason to question the reliability of the 

information made available to the judge, the Guidelines permit the 

district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id. (citing 

commentary to U.S.S.G. § 6Al.3). The Guidelines only require a 

hearing when necessary to resolve disputed sentencing factors. 

See U.S.S.G. § 6Al.3(b). Nothing in the Guidelines requires a 

sentencing court to conduct an evidentiary hearing where, as here, 

the defendant did not contest at the sentencing hearing the 

factual accuracy of the information considered. 4 We therefore 

hold that the sentencing court did not err in refusing to conduct 

an evidentiary hearing as to whether Ott was a "supervisor" within 

the meaning of§ 3Bl.l(c). 

II. ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY 

We review under the clearly erroneous standard the 

sentencing court's determination that Ott was not entitled to a 

two-point reduction in his offense level for acceptance of 

responsibility. United States v. Ross, 920 F.2d 1530, 1537 (10th 

4 Ott was afforded an opportunity to challenge any inaccuracies 

contained in the Presentence Report prior to sentencing. He did 

not allege any inaccuracies at that time, but merely challenged 

the legal conclusions derived from the facts alleged in the 

report. 

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I 

• Cir. 1990); United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 712 (10th 

Cir. 1990). The trial court's determination of whether a 

defendant has accepted responsibility is subject to great 

deference on review and should not be disturbed unless it is 

without foundation. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d at 712 (citing U.S.S.G. 

§ 3El.1, comment n.5). The defendant bears the burden of proving 

by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to the 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility. United States v. 

Whitehead, 912 F.2d 448, 450 (10th Cir. 1990). Moreover, the 

Sentencing Guidelines note that the sentencing judge is in a 

unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of 

responsibility and that the determination of the sentencing judge 

is therefore entitled to great deference on review and should not 

be disturbed unless it is without foundation. Id. at 451 (citing 

U.S.S.G. § 3El.1 comment n. 5). Given our deference to the trial 

court's assessment of credibility and the applicability of the 

clearly erroneous standard, the judgement of the sentencing court 

on this issue is nearly always sustained. Id. (citing United 

States v. Trujillo, 906 F.2d 1456, 1460 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. 

denied, U.S. , 111 S . Ct . 3 9 6 ( 19 9 0) . 

Applying this standard, we cannot say that the district court 

erred in refusing to reduce Ott's offense level by two points for 

acceptance of responsibility. Section 3El.1 provides for the 

reduction as follows: 

(a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition 

and affirmative acceptance of personal 

responsibility for his criminal conduct, reduce the 

offense level by 2 levels. 

(b) A defendant may be given consideration under this 

section without regard to whether his conviction is 

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based upon a guilty plea or a finding of guilt by 

the court or jury or the practical certainty of 

conviction at trial. 

(c) A defendant who enters a guilty plea is not 

entitled to a sentencing reduction under this 

section as a matter of right. 

The record clearly supports the district court's conclusion 

that Ott has not accepted responsibility for the crime. While it 

·, 

is true that Ott pleaded guilty to the crime, a guilty plea alone 

does not entitle the defendant to the reduction. Whitehead, 912 

F.2d at 450-51. The application notes to the Guidelines point out 

that although a guilty plea combined with a truthful admission of 

involvement in the offense constitute- significant evidence of 

acceptance of responsibility, "this evidence may be outweighed by 

conduct of the defendant that is inconsistent with such acceptance 

of responsibility." U.S.S.G. 3El.1, comment n.3. Ott's conduct 

has been inconsistent with an acceptance of responsibility. The 

Presentence Report indicates that Ott stated that he did not feel 

he was guilty of the offense and that he only pleaded guilty at 

the urging of defense counsel because it was the easiest way to 

escape the more serious crimes he was charged with in the original 

indictment, which was superseded by the indictment charging only 

the§ 1466 obscenity violation. Ott also blamed his former 

common-law spouse, Ms. Penfield, for his involvement in the 

criminal activities for which he was indicted. 5 Because the 

5 Ott continues to blame Ms. Penfield: in his Reply Brief for 

this appeal, he asserts that "because of the age difference 

[between the 32-year-old Ms. Penfield and the 60-year-old Ott] 

coupled with the psychological grip Ms. Penfield held on 

Appellant, he was unable to escape the enfluence [sic] responsible 

for his continued involvement in the offense." 

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I 

) 

appellant blamed his attorney and his common-law wife for his 

criminal actions, we hold that the sentencing court did not err in 

refusing to grant him a two-level reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility. 

Nor do we believe the district court erred in failing to hold 

an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Ott accepted 

responsibility. As we noted earlier in this opinion, Ott did not 

object to the factual accuracy of the Presentence Report at trial. 

Because there was no question as to the reliability of the report, 

we hold the sentencing court properly relied on it in refusing to 

reduce Ott's offense level for acceptance of responsibility. 

III. CONCLUSION 

We do not find the sentencing court's decision to increase 

Ott's offense level by two points for his leadership role in the 

offense to be clearly erroneous. Nor do we find to be clearly 

erroneous the sentencing court's refusal to reduce Ott's offense 

level by two points for acceptance of responsibility. We hold the 

sentencing court's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on these 

issues was not error. We therefore AFFIRM the district court's 

denial of the appellant's motion for a corrected sentence under 

§ 2255. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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