Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01210/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01210-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marjorie Frey
Plaintiff
Sacor Financial Incorporated
Defendant

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Marjorie Frey, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Sacor Financial Incorporated, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-01210-TUC-CRP

ORDER 

 

 The Magistrate Judge has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the parties’ 

consent. See 28 U.S.C. ' 636(c). 

 Pending before the Court are: (1) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Case and to 

Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant (Doc. 5); (2) Plaintiff’s “Motion to Dismiss 

Defendants [sic]” (Doc. 8); (3) Plaintiff’s Motion for Hearing (Doc. 10); (4) Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13); and (5) Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Motion to Dismiss 

(Doc. 14). 

 As discussed below, Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) automatically 

terminated this action and, thus, all other motions are moot. 

BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed the instant action under the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act and the Fair Credit Reporting Act. (Doc. 1). In response, Defendant filed a 

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Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a 

claim, arguing inter alia, that Plaintiff’s action is foreclosed based upon a state court 

action in which Plaintiff was a named defendant. Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to 

Dismiss Defendant (Doc. 8), which appears to be a response to Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss. Thereafter, while Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss was still pending, Plaintiff 

filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) and a Motion to Amend her Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 

14). 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss seeks dismissal of this action “because of Plaintiff’s 

unforeseen medical circumstances.” (Doc. 13). In her Motion to Amend Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. 14), Plaintiff requests dismissal without prejudice to returning to court 

with an attorney in the event Plaintiff receives further contact or complaints from 

Defendant. She also states she “prays for peace from [Defendant]” and “Defendant wants 

peace from [Plaintiff] re court’s permission before filing against [Defendant] in [sic] 

future...With the above observation, Plaintiff and Defendant want the same conclusion– 

no contact with and from one another.” (Motion to Amend Motion to Dismiss, p. 1). 

Defendant reads Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend as “masquerad[ing] [as] a request for 

injunctive relief” and requests that the Court, instead, grant its pending Motion to 

Dismiss and enter dismissal with prejudice. (Response (Doc. 15), pp. 1-2). 

 Under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “the plaintiff may dismiss 

an action without a court order by filing...a notice of dismissal before the opposing party 

serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment....” Fed.R.Civ.P. 

41(a)(1)(A)(i). The Ninth Circuit has been clear that Rule 41 confers on the plaintiff 

an absolute right to voluntarily dismiss his [or her] action prior to service 

by the defendant of an answer or a motion for summary judgment. A 

plaintiff may dismiss his [or her] action so long as the plaintiff files a notice 

of dismissal prior to the defendant's service of an answer or motion for 

summary judgment. The dismissal is effective on filing and no court order 

is required.... The filing of a notice of voluntary dismissal with the court 

automatically terminates the action as to the defendants who are the 

subjects of the notice.... Such a dismissal leaves the parties as though no 

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action had been brought. 

American Soccer Co., Inc. v. Score First Enterprises, 187 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(quoting Wilson v. City of San Jose, 111 F.3d. 688, 692 (9th Cir. 1997)) (reversing district 

court’s order vacating voluntary dismissal); see also Pedrina v. Chun, 987 F.2d 608, 610 

(9th Cir. 1993) (the plaintiff’s filing of the notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) 

“closes the file”). Further, because the language of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) is unequivocal, 

the “‘absolute right’ for a plaintiff voluntarily to dismiss an action when the defendant 

has not yet served an answer or a summary judgment motion leaves no role for the court 

to play.” American Soccer Co., Inc., 187 F.3d at 1110. Therefore, in light of Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13), there is no role for this Court to play other than to ensure 

that the Clerk of Court terminates this action. See id. The Ninth Circuit has observed 

that such practice “does not prejudice defendants. If defendants ‘desire to prevent 

plaintiffs from invoking their unfettered right to dismiss actions under rule 41(1)(a) [they] 

may do so by taking the simple step of filing an answer.’” Id. at 1112 (quoting Carter v. 

United States, 547 F.2d 258, 259 (5th Cir. 1977)). 

 In her Motion to Amend Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff essentially seeks dismissal 

without prejudice. Rule 41(a)(1)(B) provides that: 

Unless the notice [of voluntary dismissal]...states otherwise, the dismissal 

is without prejudice. But if the plaintiff previously dismissed any federalor state-court action based on or including the same claim, a notice of 

dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits. 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(B). In light of Rule 41(a)(1)(B), Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss 

(Doc. 13) terminated this action without prejudice and renders Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Amend Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14) moot. 

 Likewise, as to Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief 

through her Motion to Amend Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14), Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. 13) automatically terminated this action and “leaves the parties as though 

no action had been brought.” American Soccer Co., Inc., 187 F.3d at 1110 (citation 

omitted) (emphasis added). Therefore, Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal cannot and does 

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not result in the imposition of injunctive relief or constrain the parties’ future conduct. 

 Defendant has also argued that Plaintiff should be declared a vexatious litigant. 

This Court has inherent power to enter pre-filing orders against vexatious litigants. 

Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty, Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2007). 

“‘[F]lagrant abuse of the judicial process cannot be tolerated because it enables one 

person to preempt the use of judicial time that properly could be used to consider the 

meritorious claims of other litigants.’” Molski, at 1057 (quoting De Long v. Hennessey, 

912 F.2d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.1990)). A key factor for consideration is whether 

Plaintiff’s action is harassing or frivolous in nature, which requires examination of: 

Plaintiff’s history of litigation, and in particular whether it entailed vexatious, harassing 

or duplicative lawsuits; Plaintiff’s motive in pursuing the litigation (i.e., whether she has 

an objective good faith expectation of prevailing); whether Plaintiff has caused needless 

expense to other parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their 

personnel; and whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect the courts and other 

parties. Molski, 500 F.3d at 1057-58 (citations omitted). Here, Defendant has argued 

that Plaintiff filed the instant action after an unsuccessful attempt to prevail on the same 

issues she raised as a defendant in state court. (See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and to 

Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant (Doc. 5)). The Ninth Circuit has cautioned that use 

of the Court’s inherent power to sanction vexatious litigants is “an extreme remedy that 

should rarely be used...because such sanctions can tread on a litigant's due process right 

of access to the courts.” Id. at 1057 (citations omitted). At this point, the record does not 

warrant entry of a vexatious litigant order. However, Plaintiff’s future conduct may 

expose her to such an order in addition to other sanctions. Thus, Plaintiff is advised that 

dismissal of the instant action without prejudice as required by Rule 41 does not mean 

she is free to file frivolous, meritless, duplicative, or harassing actions without 

consequence. 

 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, 

 IT IS ORDERED that, in light of Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) the Clerk 

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of Court is DIRECTED to enter dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Rule 

41(a)(1)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in light of Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal, all 

other pending motions (Docs. 5, 8, 10, 14) are DENIED as moot. 

 Dated this 27th day of August, 2014. 

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