Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00023/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00023-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Matthew Cate
Defendant
John Does
Defendant
Jesse Galindo
Plaintiff
Gonzales
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESSE GALINDO,

Plaintiff,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:11-CV-00023-DLB PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

(DOC. 1)

RESPONSE DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

Screening Order

I. Background

Plaintiff Jesse Galindo (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner in the custody of the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff initiated this

action by filing his complaint on January 6, 2011. Doc. 1.

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or

1

Case 1:11-cv-00023-DLB Document 6 Filed 06/22/11 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

II. Summary of Complaint

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at California Correctional Institution (“CCI”) in

Tehachapi, California, where the events giving rise to this action occurred. Plaintiff names as

Defendants Matthew Cate, secretary of CDCR; warden Gonzales of CCI, and dentists John Does

1 and 2 of CCI.

1

Plaintiff alleges the following. On April 9, 2010, Plaintiff was seen by Defendant John

Doe 1, complaining of a mild toothache which became excruciating when Plaintiff ate hot or cold

foods. Defendant requested an x-ray. Defendant showed Plaintiff the x-ray and explained that

Plaintiff was suffering toothache due to a metal filling that touched a nerve at the root of the

tooth. Defendant advised Plaintiff to keep all food on the left side of the mouth to minimize

Plaintiff’s pain. Based on the incorporated exhibits, it appears that Plaintiff’s toothache stemmed

from a molar in the lower right portion of Plaintiff’s mouth. Compl. 27.

Plaintiff learned from Defendant John Doe 2 on June 1, 2010 that a root canal could

alleviate Plaintiff’s toothache. Defendant John Doe 2 explained that he was not permitted to

perform root canals on posterior teeth, and that Plaintiff’s only options were to extract the tooth

or continue to suffer pain. Plaintiff opted to have the tooth extracted.

Based on Plaintiff’s attached grievances which are specifically referenced and incorporated in the

1

complaint, it appears that John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 are the same individual, dentist A. Haggar. See Compl.29, 35.

As it is unclear at this juncture what Plaintiff intends, the Court will continue to treat the two Defendants as separate.

2

Case 1:11-cv-00023-DLB Document 6 Filed 06/22/11 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff complains that Defendant Cate implemented a dental service policy that violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights because it excluded root canals on posterior teeth as an available

treatment. Plaintiff contends that root canals can be performed, but only with prior approval

from the dental authorization review committee. Plaintiff complains that Defendant Cate failed

to properly train Defendants John Does 1 and 2. Plaintiff complains that Defendant Gonzales as

warden implemented this policy and is liable under the same theory as Defendant Cate.

Plaintiff contends deliberate indifference by all Defendants. Plaintiff requests as relief

monetary damages.

III. Analysis

The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. “The Constitution does

not mandate comfortable prisons.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quotation and

citation omitted). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate

indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting

Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). The deliberate

indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation

must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must “know[] of and disregard[]

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .” Id. at 837.

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060. “Under

this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the

inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official should have

been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no

matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175,

1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

3

Case 1:11-cv-00023-DLB Document 6 Filed 06/22/11 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants John Doe 1 or John Doe 2 for deliberate

indifference. Regarding John Doe 1, Plaintiff’s allegations do not demonstrate that Defendant

knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

Plaintiff has not alleged a sufficiently serious harm at the time Defendant John Doe 1 examined

Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s tooth pain was only mild during April of 2010. Additionally, Defendant

John Doe 1's failure to provide a root canal at the time of the incident does not rise to the level of

deliberate indifference. Plaintiff’s allegations amount at most to a difference of opinion

between a medical professional and a prisoner regarding the appropriate course of treatment,

which does not amount to deliberate indifference. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058.2

Regarding John Doe 2, Plaintiff’s allegations do not demonstrate that Defendant knew of

and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Defendant John

Doe 2's failure to provide a root canal does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. 

Plaintiff’s allegations amount at most to a difference of opinion between a medical professional

and a prisoner regarding the appropriate course of treatment, which does not amount to deliberate

indifference. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058.

Plaintiff names Defendants Cate and Gonzales based on their supervisory roles. The term

“supervisory liability,” loosely and commonly used by both courts and litigants alike, is a

misnomer. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. “Government officials may not be held liable for the

unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Id. at

1948. Rather, each government official, regardless of his or her title, is only liable for his or her

own misconduct.

When the named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between the

defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.

Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.

1978). To state a claim for relief under § 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege

some facts indicating that the defendant either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation

 Based on the submitted exhibits, it appears that Plaintiff received a filling during his visit with Defendant 2

John Doe 1. Compl. 28 29, 30.

4

Case 1:11-cv-00023-DLB Document 6 Filed 06/22/11 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated

or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional

rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642,

646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

1989).

Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants Cate or Gonzales. Plaintiff fails to

allege facts which indicate that Defendants personally participated in an allege constitutional

deprivation, knew of constitutional violations and failed to act, or promulgated or implemented a

policy that was so deficient as to be the moving force of a constitutional violation. Hansen, 885

F.3d at 646; Taylor, 880 F.3d at 1045.

IV. Conclusion And Order

Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable claims against any Defendants. The Court will

provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to file a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies

identified by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended

complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints).

If Plaintiff decides to amend, Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a), but must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional or other federal rights. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Although accepted as true, the

“[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . .

.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint,

Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567

(9th Cir. 1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded

pleading,” L. R. 220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original

complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567

(citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth,

114 F.3d at 1474.

5

Case 1:11-cv-00023-DLB Document 6 Filed 06/22/11 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;

2. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, with leave to file a

first amended complaint within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this

order; and

3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will dismiss this action for

failure to obey a court order and failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 22, 2011 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

6

Case 1:11-cv-00023-DLB Document 6 Filed 06/22/11 Page 6 of 6