Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00656/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00656-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Vallejo
Defendant
Sean Kenney
Defendant
Joseph Kreins
Defendant
Eugene Moore
Plaintiff
Lisa Moore
Plaintiff
Vallejo Police Department
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LISA MOORE and EUGENE MOORE, 

individually and as cosuccessors in interest of 

decedent JEREMIAH EUGENE 

MOORE,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF VALLEJO, a public 

entity; CITY OF VALLEJO 

POLICE CHIEF JOSEPH KREINS, 

in his individual and 

official capacities; OFFICER 

SEAN KENNEY, individually; 

and DOES 1-20, individually, 

jointly, and severally,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-00656-JAM-KJN

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants City of Vallejo (“the City”), City of Vallejo 

Police Chief Joseph Kreins (“Chief Kreins”) and Officer Sean 

Kenney (“Officer Kenney”) (collectively “Defendants”) move to 

dismiss (Doc. #21) the first, second, fourth, fifth, sixth, and 

seventh causes of action in Plaintiffs Lisa and Eugene Moore’s 

(collectively “Plaintiffs”) First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc.

Case 2:14-cv-00656-JAM-KJN Document 27 Filed 10/17/14 Page 1 of 11
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#13).1 Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part 

for the reasons set forth below. 

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

According to the FAC, on or about October 21, 2012, at 

approximately 1:30 a.m., Vallejo Police Department officers 

(collectively “the officers”), including Officer Kenney, fatally 

shot Decedent Jeremiah Eugene Moore (“Decedent”) at his home. 

Before they arrived, the officers were informed that Decedent was 

suffering from developmental disabilities including an Autism 

Spectrum Disorder, mental illness, and/or emotional disturbance. 

Upon arrival, the officers found Decedent walking naked in front 

of his home without a weapon and posing “no significant or 

immediate threat” to the officers. The officers commanded 

Decedent to get on the ground, and when he did not the officers, 

including Officer Kenney, shot Decedent multiple times. 

Plaintiffs allege that the officers falsely reported that 

Decedent was threatening them with a gun inside his home when the 

officers shot him. 

Plaintiffs filed the FAC in April 2014 on their own behalf 

as well as co-successors in interest for their son, Decedent. 

The seven causes of action pled in the FAC are: (1) violation of 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§1983”) against Officer Kenney and Does 1-20; 

(2) violation of §1983 against the City, Chief Kreins, and Does 

1-20 based on municipal and supervisory liability; (3) violation

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled 

for August 20, 2014.

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of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act 

against the City; (4) violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 

against Officer Kenney, the City, and Does 1-20; (5) negligence 

against all Defendants; (6) assault and battery against Officer 

Kenney, the City, and Does 1-20; and (7) violation of California 

Civil Code § 51.7 against Officer Kenney, the City, and Does 1-

20. 

II. OPINION

A. Request for Judicial Notice

Both parties have submitted requests for judicial notice.

Generally, the Court may not consider material beyond the 

pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim. The exceptions are material attached to, or relied on by, 

the complaint so long as authenticity is not disputed, or matters 

of public record, provided that they are not subject to 

reasonable dispute. E.g., Sherman v. Stryker Corp., 2009 WL 

2241664 at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Lee v. City of Los 

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) and Fed. R. Evid. 

201).

Attached to their motion to dismiss is Defendants’ request 

for judicial notice of the Government Tort Claim filed by 

Plaintiffs in connection with this litigation. MTD at Exh. 1. 

Such a document is a matter of public record and is necessarily 

relied on by Plaintiffs in bringing their state law claims, and 

so the Court takes judicial notice of this document.

In their opposition, Plaintiffs request the Court take 

judicial notice of the following facts: (1) the City and Officer 

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Kenney have been named as co-defendants in nine civil rights 

cases; (2) between 2007 and 2012, there were thirteen fatal 

officer-involved shootings by Vallejo Police Department officers; 

and (3) the shooting of Decedent was the third fatal shooting 

involving Officer Kenney in a period of five months. Opp. at pp. 

9-10. 

Defendants dispute the reliability of the facts presented by 

Plaintiffs in their reply, as well as object to Plaintiffs’ 

introduction of new allegations for the first time in opposition 

to a motion to dismiss. The Court agrees with Defendants that 

the methodologies used for calculating these statistics and 

arriving at these facts are subject to reasonable dispute. The 

Court, therefore, denies Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice. 

B. Analysis

1. Section 1983 Claims Against Officer Kenney

Plaintiffs’ first cause of action alleges violations of 

§1983 based on the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to 

the United States Constitution. FAC ¶ 29. Defendants contend 

the first cause of action should be dismissed pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). MTD at pp. 6-9. Defendants 

argue there are insufficient factual allegations to support the 

claims. Defendants also contend the first cause of action should 

be dismissed to the extent it is based on the Fourteenth 

Amendment. MTD at pp. 9-10. 

a. Failure to State a Claim

Defendants argue that the allegations supporting the first 

cause of action are “completely devoid of any factual content.” 

MTD at p. 8. The Court disagrees. 

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A careful review of the FAC demonstrates that Defendants’ 

contention that the allegations are merely conclusory and 

“completely devoid” of underlying factual content is without 

merit. Plaintiffs allege very clearly that Decedent was disabled 

and the officers knew this fact. Yet, upon arriving at 

Decedent’s home at 2504 Alameda Street in the City of Vallejo on 

October 12, 2012, they failed to take this into account and 

unjustifiably shot Decedent multiple times while he was unarmed 

and naked, killing him. These are sufficient allegations of 

underlying facts, which taken as true, entitle Plaintiffs to 

relief. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss this claim.

b. The First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments

The briefs for both parties discuss the propriety of 

bringing the claims asserted in the first cause of action under 

the specific Amendments cited by Plaintiffs. 

The first cause of action brings claims on behalf of 

Decedent based on his rights to be free from (1) unreasonable 

searches and seizures; (2) excessive and unreasonable force in 

the course of arrest or detention; and (3) the use of unlawful 

deadly force. FAC ¶ 29. The FAC alleges these rights are 

secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The FAC further 

alleges violation of the right to be free from wrongful 

interference with familial relationships and the right to 

companionship, society and support as secured by the First, 

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

Defendants contend Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Fourteenth 

Amendment in relation to their claims brought on behalf of 

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Decedent is improper. MTD at pp. 9-10. It is true that the 

Fourth Amendment is the proper constitutional basis for the §1983 

claims on behalf of Decedent; the reference to the Fourteenth 

Amendment appears to be an unnecessary reference to the 

incorporation doctrine. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197-98 (2004); see also

Brockmeier v. Solano Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, CIV-S05-2090 MCE-EFBPS, 2006 WL 3760276, at *12 (E.D. Cal. 2006).

For the first time in their reply, Defendants raise the 

argument that the interference with familial relationship claim 

should be dismissed as asserted under the Fourth Amendment. 

Although untimely, the Court agrees the Fourth Amendment is an 

improper basis for Plaintiffs’ claim regarding interference with 

the familial relationship. The parents of a victim of an 

unlawful police killing have personal standing to claim 

deprivation of familial relationship under the substantive due 

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Moreland v. Las 

Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 159 F.3d 365, 371 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment, allows 

plaintiffs to bring claims for deprivation of or interference 

with familial relationship. Jarreau-Griffin v. City of Vallejo, 

2:12-CV-02979-KJM, 2013 WL 6423379, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2013).

Accordingly, the Court grants, without leave to amend, 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the first cause of action insofar 

as it asserts a claim on behalf of Decedent for violation of his 

rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and 

excessive or deadly force based on the Fourteenth Amendment and 

to the extent it asserts a violation of the right to be free from 

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interference with familial relationships under the Fourth

Amendment. See Jarreau-Griffin, 2013 WL 6423379, at *3-4; Arres 

v. City of Fresno, CV F 10-1628 LJO SMS, 2011 WL 284971, at *15-

16 (E.D. Cal. 2011). Otherwise, Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

this claim is denied. 

2. Section 1983 Claims Against the City and Chief 

Kreins

Defendants next contend Plaintiffs’ second cause of action 

against the City for liability based on Monell v. Department of 

Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), should 

be dismissed because it is “unsupported by any facts.” MTD at p. 

10. Plaintiffs respond that they have alleged sufficient facts 

to state a claim under Monell. Opp. at pp. 15-16. 

“The elements of a Monell claim are (1) plaintiff was 

deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality has a 

policy; (3) the policy amounts to deliberate indifference to 

plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the policy is the 

moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Howard v. 

City of Vallejo, CIV. S-13-1439 LKK, 2013 WL 6070494, at *3 (E.D. 

Cal. 2013) (citing Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 

(9th Cir. 2011)). “A custom or practice can be inferred from 

widespread practices or evidence of repeated constitutional 

violations for which the errant municipal officers were not 

discharged or reprimanded.” Hunter v. County of Sacramento, 652 

F.3d 1225, 1233 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Menotti v. City of 

Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005); Gillette v. 

Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1349 (9th Cir. 1992).

///

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The FAC alleges that before the incident underlying this 

action took place, policymakers at the City, including Chief 

Kreins, knew of instances in which Officer Kenney and other 

officers shot individuals who did not pose a threat, including 

victims who were disabled, knew the shootings were unlawful and 

outside the accepted law enforcement standards, and yet took no 

action to correct training programs or policies and procedures 

that allowed such shootings to take place. FAC ¶ 35. The FAC 

specifically alleges, that despite this information, the City 

took no action to adequately investigate, supervise, discipline, 

or train Officer Kenney or the other officers. Id. Furthermore, 

the FAC alleges that the actions of the officers in this case 

were carried out pursuant to customs and practices within the 

Vallejo Police Department, which are listed in detail in the FAC. 

FAC ¶ 36. The FAC alleges these failures and customs and 

practices “were a moving force and/or a proximate cause of the 

deprivations of Plaintiffs’” constitutional rights. FAC ¶ 39. 

The Court finds such factual allegations adequately allege a 

claim for Monell liability. The court’s decision in IDC v. City 

of Vallejo, 2:13-CV-1987 DAD, 2014 WL 2567185, at *1-2, 5-6 (E.D. 

Cal. 2014) (“IDC”), is instructive in that it involved a similar 

motion under analogous allegations. The IDC court denied the 

motion to dismiss brought by defendants, including the City of 

Vallejo. Id. The court found that a Monell claim was 

sufficiently pleaded based on allegations that the officers 

involved, including Officer Kenney, had engaged in repeated acts 

of excessive force, misconduct, and civil rights violations prior 

to the relevant incident, and that despite knowledge of this, the 

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City of Vallejo allegedly failed to take measures to prevent 

their repeated misconduct. Id. 

The Court finds the reasoning in IDC persuasive and denies 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the second cause of action. The 

Court also notes that Defendants do not attack the claim for 

supervisory liability against Chief Kreins in the second cause of 

action; thus, the Court does not address the claim. 

3. State Law Claims

Defendants contend Plaintiffs’ state law claims in the 

fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action should be 

dismissed because Plaintiffs have failed to comply with 

California Government Code § 945.4 (“§945.4”). MTD at pp. 16-18. 

Section 945.4 requires a potential plaintiff to file a 

written claim with a public entity before a suit for money or 

damages may be brought against it. The claim must include a 

“general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, 

damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of 

presentation of the claim.” Cal. Gov't Code § 910. 

Defendants direct the Court to the Government Tort Claim 

submitted by Plaintiffs to the City. MTD at p. 16. They contend 

this document describes factual circumstances consistent with a 

wrongful death claim. Defendants argue the state law causes of 

action for violation of California Civil Code § 52.1, negligence, 

assault and battery, and violation of California Civil Code §

51.7 are additional claims that “introduce a shift in theory from 

the factual scenario of a ‘wrongful death claim’” as stated in 

the Government Tort Claim submitted to the City. 

///

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The Supreme Court of California has addressed this 

requirement: 

The purpose of these statutes is “to provide the public 

entity sufficient information to enable it to 

adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if 

appropriate, without the expense of litigation.” 

Consequently, a claim need not contain the detail and 

specificity required of a pleading, but need only 

“fairly describe what [the] entity is alleged to have 

done.” As the purpose of the claim is to give the 

government entity notice sufficient for it to 

investigate and evaluate the claim, not to eliminate 

meritorious actions, the claims statute “should not be 

applied to snare the unwary where its purpose has been 

satisfied.”

Stockett v. Ass'n of California Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. 

Auth., 34 Cal. 4th 441, 446 (2004) (internal citations omitted)

(emphasis added).

The Government Tort Claim submitted by Plaintiffs was on a 

standard form created and provided by the City. In response to 

the form’s question, “What did City or employee(s) do to cause 

this loss, damage, or injury?” Plaintiffs responded “The police 

department shot our son while he was unarmed causing his death.” 

The Court finds Plaintiffs have “fairly described” what 

Defendants are alleged to have done. Stockett, 34 Cal. 4th at 

446. The claim submitted by Plaintiffs adequately notifies 

Defendants of the underlying factual allegations presented in the 

FAC. Defendants should have been able to effectively investigate 

the incident and should have reasonably expected possible claims 

for violation of constitutional rights (fourth cause of action), 

negligence (fifth cause of action), and assault and battery 

(sixth cause of action). Defendants’ arguments to the contrary 

are unpersuasive and the Court denies the motion to dismiss as to 

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these three claims.

As for the seventh cause of action for violation of 

Plaintiffs’ rights because of Decedent’s physical condition 

and/or disability, this claim is based on allegations not 

adequately included in the Government Tort Claim, and must be 

dismissed. There is no mention of Decedent’s disability or 

medical condition, which serves as the basis for that claim. 

Since amendment would be futile, the seventh cause of action is 

dismissed with prejudice. 

III. ORDER

The Court GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss the first cause of action but only insofar as it asserts 

a claim on behalf of Decedent based on the Fourteenth Amendment 

for violation of his rights to be free from unreasonable searches 

and seizures and excessive or deadly force and to the extent it 

asserts claims for violation of the right to be free from 

interference with familial relationships based on the Fourth 

Amendment. The Court also GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss the seventh cause of action.

The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion on all other grounds. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 17, 2014

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