Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-04102/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-04102-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sandra Esposito
Defendant
Robert A. Julian
Defendant
Garrett Malasky
Defendant
Henry Malasky
Plaintiff
Martin Malasky
Defendant
Basil Plastiras
Defendant

Document Text:

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HENRY MALASKY,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROBERT A. JULIAN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-04102-DMR 

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 13, 14

I. INTRODUCTION

In this case, pro se Plaintiff Henry Malasky sues his ex-wife, Sandra Esposito; his two 

adult sons, Martin Malasky and Garrett Malasky; and two attorneys, Basil Plastiras and Robert A. 

Julian, who represented his ex-wife and sons in connection with prior legal disputes with Plaintiff. 

Although the FAC makes only oblique references to those disputes, Plaintiff appears to seek 

redress for alleged wrongs by Defendants connected to the prior litigation. This is Plaintiff’s 

second attempt to challenge Defendants’ alleged wrongdoing in federal court. Defendants 

Plastiras and Julian now separately move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint (“FAC”). [Docket Nos. 13 (Plastiras’s Mot.), 14 (Julian’s 

Mot.).] The court held a hearing on December 22, 2016. For the following reasons, Defendants’ 

motions are granted and the FAC is dismissed with prejudice.

II. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the FAC, all of which are taken as true for 

purposes of this motion.1 Prior to 2010, Plaintiff was married to Defendant Esposito. The couple 

 

1 When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all 

of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 

(per curiam) (citation omitted).

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had three children, including Defendants Martin and Garrett Malasky (for clarity, the court refers 

to them as “Martin” and “Garrett”; together, the “sons”) and a daughter, Lucia Malasky. Plaintiff 

and Esposito owned a home in Tiburon, California (the “Tiburon house”). FAC ¶¶ 14-15. 

Plaintiff alleges that at some point during their marriage, he “and/or” Esposito “became personally 

obligated for the ‘parents’ share’ of certain student loans used” by the sons for their education, but 

that they were never obligated to pay the “‘students’ share’” of the student loans. The “students’ 

share” of the loans was owed solely by Martin and Garrett. Id. at ¶¶ 16-18 (emphases in original).

Plaintiff alleges that at some point prior to May 17, 2010, a “disgruntled attorney, 

Lippenberger,” started threatening to sue Plaintiff and Esposito for allegedly unpaid legal services 

and “claimed he would seize any equity in the Tiburon house and any other assets” of the couple. 

Id. at ¶ 19. On May 17, 2010, Esposito convinced Plaintiff to set aside some of the equity in the 

Tiburon house “as a funding mechanism to pay the ‘parents’ share’ of the student loans.” Based 

on Esposito’s representations, Plaintiff agreed to sign “promissory note(s) and deed(s) of trust” 

secured by the Tiburon house to the sons’ benefit as said “funding mechanism.” Id. at ¶ 20. 

Plaintiff now believes that Esposito “concealed her intent to have [P]laintiff pay money to [Martin 

and/or Garrett] as a ‘gift’ rather than as a funding mechanism” for the parents’ share of the student 

loans “and/or that [Esposito] coerced [P]laintiff to sign the promissory note(s) and deed(s) of trust 

based on the threats from Lippenberger and/or uncertainties in their financial futures.” Id. at ¶ 21. 

Plaintiff signed the promissory note(s) and deed(s) of trust in favor of Martin and Garrett on May 

17, 2010. Id. at ¶ 23. Only Plaintiff and Esposito signed the promissory note(s) and deed(s) of 

trust secured by the Tiburon house, and Plaintiff alleges that Martin and Garrett provided no 

consideration for the promissory note(s) and deed(s) of trust. Id. at ¶¶ 24, 25.

Esposito commenced divorce proceedings against Plaintiff on October 22, 2010 in Marin 

County Superior Court. The court approved a marital settlement agreement (“MSA”) between 

Plaintiff and Esposito on October 7, 2013. Id. at ¶¶ 27, 29. Pursuant to the MSA, Plaintiff 

received sole title to the Tiburon house and assumed the parents’ share of the sons’ student loans 

for which Plaintiff and Esposito were originally obligated. The agreement allowed Plaintiff to 

“challenge or contest the promissory notes” to Martin and/or Garrett “and/or other obligations 

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imposed” on Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 29-31. The MSA required Plaintiff to “create a method to fund 

the ‘parents’ share’ of the student loans different than the previously-created promissory note(s) 

and deed(s) of trust” secured by the Tiburon house, but “did not create any new obligation with 

respect to the funding mechanism related to the promissory note(s) or deed(s) of trust; did not 

create any obligation to pay on the ‘students’ share” of the students [sic] loans; and did not create 

any new ‘debt’ owed by [P]laintiff” to Martin and/or Garrett. Id. at ¶ 33. 

In accordance with the MSA, Plaintiff agreed to a separate funding mechanism with a third 

party to pay off the parents’ share of the student loans and began making payments to the third 

party. Given this separate funding mechanism, Plaintiff believed the promissory note(s) and 

deed(s) of trust secured by the Tiburon house were no longer necessary as an alternative funding 

mechanism. In January 2014, Plaintiff listed the Tiburon house for sale and asked the sons to 

release the promissory note(s) and deed(s) of trust securing the Tiburon house. Id. at ¶¶ 35-38. 

Plaintiff emailed his request to Martin and Garrett because he did not have their addresses. The 

sons never responded to Plaintiff’s request. Id. at ¶ 39.

Plaintiff alleges that he was in communication with Defendant Plastiras prior to the close 

of escrow on the Tiburon house. In a letter dated February 21, 2014, Plastiras informed Plaintiff 

that his office “represents the interests of Martin Malasky, Garrett Malasky and Lucia Malasky in 

connection with the collection of a Deed of Trust and Promissory Note signed by Henry Malasky 

on May 17, 2010.” Id. at ¶ 40. Plaintiff alleges that Plastiras “told the escrow officer and/or 

[P]laintiff that the sons . . . would release the notes and deeds of trust prior to close of escrow 

and/or the funds from the notes would be deposited in that attorney’s trust account until the 

disputes were resolved.” Id. at ¶ 40. However, “[j]ust before the close of escrow around April 4, 

2014,” Martin and Garrett “refused to release the previously-executed promissory note(s) and 

deed(s) of trust,” and instead demanded the escrow funds based on the promissory notes and deeds 

of trust. Id. at ¶ 42. After the close of escrow, Martin and Garrett received $70,005.48 in escrow 

funds “to which they had no legal claim.” Plaintiff alleges the escrow funds unjustly enriched the 

sons because “no ‘debts’ existed to obligate [P]laintiff for those funds and/or because [P]laintiff 

revoked the ‘gifts’ if any there were [sic]” to the sons prior to the close of escrow. Id. at ¶¶ 43, 44. 

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Based on Plastiras’s February 21, 2014 letter and other unspecified communications, 

Plaintiff alleges that he reasonably believed that Plastiras was representing Martin and Garrett. 

However, “[m]any months later,” Plastiras signed a declaration in state court in which he denied 

representing the sons and stated that he only represented Esposito. Id. at ¶ 41. 

Plaintiff alleges that Julian is an attorney who “has been acting as the debt collector for 

defendants . . .; as the debt collector for his law firm(s) as an alleged creditor(s); and/or as an 

alleged creditor himself.” Id. at ¶ 2 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff alleges that “[d]uring the past 

year,” Julian and/or his law firm “[has] been providing legal services to the other defendants in 

this amended complaint, apparently on a ‘pro bono’ (i.e. without charge) basis,” including 

Esposito, Martin, and/or Garrett. Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, “acting in concert, have attempted and are still attempting 

to collect alleged ‘debts’ from [P]laintiff by improper collection methods.” Id. at ¶ 47. He alleges 

that Defendants contend that the promissory notes and deeds of trust “resulted in ‘debts’ owed to 

[Martin and/or Garrett],” even though Plaintiff does not owe any debts to any of the defendants. 

Id. at ¶¶ 48, 49. He also alleges that Defendants seek to collect alleged debts “and/or attorney’s 

fees arising from alleged ‘debts’, in the California state courts by the use of the United States 

mail,” even though he does not owe any debts to any of the defendants. Id. at ¶ 7 (emphasis in 

original).

Plaintiff brings four claims for relief: 1) a Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 

15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. claim for “improper collection efforts”; 2) a claim for “RICO extortion,” 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968; 3) declaratory judgment regarding the terms of the MSA; 

and 4) declaratory relief “re: Retaliation.” Defendants Plastiras and Julian separately move to 

dismiss the FAC. Plastiras also moves in the alternative pursuant to Rule 12(e) for a more definite 

statement.

III. JUDICIAL NOTICE

In connection with his opposition to Plastiras’s motion, Plaintiff asks the court to take 

judicial notice of two documents. [Docket No. 24.] The documents purport to be Plastiras’s 

February 21, 2014 letter to Plaintiff (see FAC ¶ 40) and a February 28, 2014 email from Plastiras 

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to Plaintiff regarding proposed escrow instructions. Plaintiff asks the court to take judicial notice 

of the documents pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, which permits a court to “judicially 

notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . (1) is generally known within 

the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from 

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). He did not 

submit a declaration authenticating the two documents. Plastiras objects to the court taking 

judicial notice of these documents. [Docket No. 26 (Plastiras’s Objections).

2

] 

The court denies Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of the documents. They are 

unauthenticated and Plaintiff fails to identify which specific facts contained therein that he 

contends are “not subject to reasonable dispute.” Further, to the extent the contents of these 

documents are disputed, “such matters of controversy are not appropriate subjects for judicial 

notice.” Del Puerto Water Dist. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1234 (E.D. 

Cal. 2003).

The court sua sponte takes judicial notice of another proceeding involving similar parties 

that Plaintiff filed in the United States District Court, Western District of Texas. See Malasky v. 

Julian, et al., No. 16-cv-00445 SS (W.D. Tex., filed Apr. 27, 2016) (the “Texas Action”); see Fed. 

R. Evid. 201(c)(1) (“[t]he court . . . may take judicial notice on its own”). Federal courts may 

“take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if 

those proceedings have a direct relation to the matters at issue.” U.S. ex rel Robinson Rancheria 

Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). In the Texas Action, Plaintiff 

sued Defendants Julian, Esposito, Martin, and Garrett (but not Plastiras) for FDCPA and “RICO 

Extortion” claims, alleging facts nearly identical to those alleged here. See Malasky, No. 16-cv00445 SS, Docket No. 3 (Am. Compl.). On June 1, 2016, the court dismissed Plaintiff’s 

complaint and amended complaint without prejudice, holding that those pleadings “allege only 

 

2

Plastiras submitted a separate document entitled, “Objections to Plaintiff’s Evidence and 

Opposition to Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice.” This document violates Civil Local Rule 7-

3(c), which requires evidentiary and procedural objections to an opposition to be contained within 

the reply brief. However, Plastiras’s reply brief was only 7 pages. The court will consider 

Plastiras’s objections, because even if his reply brief had contained the objections, it would have 

stayed within the page limits. 

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opinions and conclusions and lack any basis for any factual theory of liability, damages, or any 

other relief in this case.” See id., Docket No. 12 (June 1, 2016 Order). The court also warned 

Plaintiff about the possibility of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions should he file “any 

other complaint in any other lawsuit in this Court,” noting that sanctions are available “when there 

is no basis of fact nor law in judgment and the pleadings are wholly frivolous.” Id.

The court also sua sponte takes judicial notice of another action brought by Plaintiff in 

California state court involving allegations related to those in the FAC. In April 2014, Plaintiff 

filed suit in Marin County Superior Court, alleging causes of action for unjust enrichment, fraud, 

and breach of contract/declaratory relief against Martin, Garrett, and Plastiras (the “California 

action”). [Docket No. 14-2 (Julian Decl., Nov. 9, 2016) ¶ 8, Ex. A (Malasky v. Malasky, et al., 

No. CIV1401290 (Compl.) (filed Apr. 4, 2014)).] In the California action, Plaintiff sought 

declaratory relief related to his dispute with his sons over the escrow funds received by them in 

connection with the promissory note and deed of trust. See id. Similar to the allegations in the 

FAC, Plaintiff alleged in the California action that he and Esposito sought to protect equity in the 

Tiburon house “by creating a promissory note and deed of trust in favor of [Martin and Garrett] 

knowing that [Martin and Garrett] had not given them anything in consideration for such note and 

deed of trust.” Id. at ¶ 9. His unjust enrichment cause of action was based on his allegations that 

as to the escrow funds, “Plaintiff . . . conferred a benefit upon [Martin and Garrett] to which they 

are not entitled (e.g. because of the lack of consideration for the May 2010 promissory note and 

deed of trust)” and that Martin and Garrett “have no right to the disputed funds.” Id. at ¶¶ 23, 24.

On September 5, 2014, the court sustained the sons’ demurrer to the complaint without 

leave to amend as to all of Plaintiff’s causes of action. Julian Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. B. In relevant part, 

the court sustained the demurrer to the unjust enrichment cause of action “on grounds it is based 

on allegations inconsistent with the express recital in the promissory note that states it was given 

‘For valuable consideration.’” As to the fraud cause of action, the court held that Plaintiff failed to 

allege “reasonable reliance and damages,” noting that “there appears to have been no true 

‘dispute’ concerning the sons’ entitlement to the $60,000 plus interest” in escrow funds. Id. On 

October 28, 2014, the court granted the sons’ motion for an award of attorneys’ fees as the 

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prevailing party and awarded them $50,541.50. Julian Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. C. The California Court of 

Appeal affirmed the lower court’s ruling on the demurrer and award of attorneys’ fees on April 28, 

2016. Id. at ¶ 14, Ex. F. The California Supreme Court denied review on July 13, 2016 and 

Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court in October 

2016, which apparently remains pending. Id. at ¶¶ 15, 16, Exs. I, J.

IV. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in 

the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). 

When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all 

of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 

(per curiam) (citation omitted), and may dismiss a claim “only where there is no cognizable legal 

theory” or there is an absence of “sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to 

relief.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 

2001)) (quotation marks omitted). A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged 

must demonstrate “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of 

a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (citing 

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 

2001), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 

2002).

As a general rule, a court may not consider “any material beyond the pleadings” when 

ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Lee, 250 F.3d at 688 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

However, “a court may take judicial notice of ‘matters of public record,’” id. at 689 (citing Mack 

v. S. Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)), and may also consider “documents 

whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which 

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are not physically attached to the pleading,” without converting a motion to dismiss under Rule 

12(b)(6) into a motion for summary judgment. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 

1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 

2002). The court need not accept as true allegations that contradict facts which may be judicially 

noticed. See Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987).

B. Motion for More Definite Statement

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) provides that “a party may move for a more definite 

statement of a pleading . . . which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably 

prepare a response.” Motions for a more definite statement are “viewed with disfavor” and rarely 

granted. Cellars v. Pacific Coast Packaging, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 575, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 

However, courts may require a more definite statement “when the pleading is so vague or 

ambiguous that the opposing party cannot respond, even with a simple denial, in good faith or 

without prejudice to himself.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). 

V. DISCUSSION

A. Plastiras’s Motion3

i. FDCPA Claim

Plaintiff’s first claim for relief is for violation of the FDCPA. The FDCPA prohibits a 

“debt collector” from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in 

connection with the collection of any debt” or “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or 

attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C §§ 1692e, 1692f. It also prohibits debt collectors from 

engaging in “any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any 

person in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. Plaintiff alleges that he 

does not owe any debt to any defendant related to any portion of the sons’ student loans or to the 

promissory notes and deeds of trust. FAC ¶ 57. He alleges that that Defendants’ actions “were 

not justifiable efforts to collect the ‘debts’ allegedly owed by [P]laintiff,” and that Defendants’ 

 

3

Plaintiff argues that Plastiras’s motion does not refer to the “amended complaint” and is 

therefore moot. Opp’n at 9. To the contrary, the motion seeks a dismissal of Plaintiff’s 

“Amended Complaint with prejudice.” Plastiras’s Mot. at 1.

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acts were “oppressive, threatening, and calculated to coerce and/or force [P]laintiff’s payment of 

the alleged (and disputed) ‘debts.’” FAC ¶ 59. The FAC does not identify a specific provision of 

the FDCPA that Plaintiff alleges Plastiras (or any other defendant) violated. 

At the hearing, Plaintiff was unable to identify the specific debt that Plastiras allegedly 

attempted to collect and conceded that he has not stated a claim under the FDCPA against 

Plastiras. Following the hearing, Plaintiff filed a document titled, “Supplemental Argument re: 

Motions to Dismiss,” in which he asserts that the debt at issue “includes the 2010 promissory 

notes signed by plaintiff and his exwife Sandy Esposito in favor of the two adult sons, Martin and 

Garrett Malasky.” [Docket No. 29 (Pl.’s Suppl. Brief).] This document, which was filed without 

leave of court, is improper. Plaintiff filed briefs in opposition to the motions to dismiss and had 

the opportunity to properly raise the arguments addressed in his supplemental brief. Nonetheless, 

in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the court will consider the arguments raised therein. 

As to Plaintiff’s belated attempt to identify the debt at issue, it is not clear whether Plaintiff 

is attempting to revive his FDCPA claim against Plastiras, which he has already conceded at the 

hearing. To the extent that he is, the attempt fails. Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim against Plastiras must 

be dismissed as inadequately pleaded for several reasons. First, the FAC fails to specify any

collection efforts Plastiras undertook and how any such efforts violate any provision of the 

FDCPA. The factual allegations in the FAC about Plastiras are as follows: Plastiras sent a 

February 2014 letter to Plaintiff in which he stated that his office represented the interests of the 

Malasky children with respect to the collection of the May 17, 2010 deed of trust and promissory 

note; Plastiras told the escrow officer and/or Plaintiff that the sons “would release the notes and 

deeds of trust prior to close of escrow”; and months after these events, Plastiras denied in a state 

court filing that he represented the sons. FAC ¶¶ 40, 41. Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s assertion that 

each of the defendants “have been, and are still seeking, to collect alleged ‘debts’ from [P]laintiff,” 

(FAC ¶ 7), it is not clear how any of the allegations specific to Plastiras relate to an attempt to 

collect any debt.

Next, Plaintiff contends that the escrow funds that the sons received as a result of the 

promissory note(s) and deed(s) of trust are the “debt” that Plastiras allegedly attempted to collect. 

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“As a threshold matter, a suit brought under the FDCPA must involve a ‘debt within the meaning 

of the statute.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Turner v. Cook, 362 

F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2004)). The FDCPA defines “debt” as

any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money 

arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, 

or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for 

personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such 

obligation has been reduced to judgment.

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). The statute “is limited in its reach ‘to those obligations to pay arising from 

consensual transactions, where parties negotiate or contract for consumer-related goods or 

services.’” Turner, 362 F.3d at 1227 (quoting Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, 

S.C., 111 F.3d 1322, 1326 (7th Cir. 1997), as the articulation of the “consensus judicial 

interpretation”). The escrow funds that are allegedly in his sons’ possession and which Plaintiff 

seeks to recover by this lawsuit are not a consumer debt that Plaintiff himself owes. Rather, 

Plaintiff alleges that the escrow funds are rightfully his and should be returned to him. These 

funds do not satisfy the standard set forth in either the statute or Turner. 

The FAC also fails to allege that Plastiras is a “debt collector” within the meaning of the 

FDCPA. To the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims under sections 1692e and/or 1692f, these 

provisions apply only to “debt collector[s]” as defined by the FDCPA. Schlegel v. Wells Fargo 

Bank, NA, 720 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2013). The term “debt collector” means: (1) “any person 

who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal 

purpose of which is the collection of any debts,” and (2) any person “who regularly collects or 

attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due

another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The FAC does not plead “factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference” that Plastiras is a debt collector within the meaning of the statute. 

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Finally, it appears that any FDCPA claim against Plastiras is time-barred. As discussed 

above, the only facts in the FAC specific to Plastiras occurred in 2014—Plastiras’s February 21, 

2014 letter to Plaintiff and pre-April 2014 communications about escrow. “An action to enforce 

any liability created by [the FDCPA] may be brought . . . within one year from the date on which 

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the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. Plaintiff did not file the present action until July 21, 

2016, over two years after the complained-of communications by Plastiras. 

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim against Plastiras is dismissed.

ii. RICO Claim

Plaintiff’s second claim for relief is titled, “RICO Extortion.” He alleges that “Defendants 

. . . have acted in concert and/or alone as part of the ‘enterprise’ noted herein; and have engaged in 

at least two (2) acts prohibited by 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1961-1968 (‘RICO’) during the last 10 years.” 

FAC ¶ 63. He alleges that the goals of the “enterprise” included Martin and Garrett’s receipt of 

the escrow funds; the prevention of “any state court trial from occurring so that [P]laintiff could 

not recover the funds received or seized” by the sons; to punish Plaintiff by making him liable for 

attorney’s fees payable to Attorney [Julian]; to retaliate against Plaintiff for his acts towards his 

children and/or Esposito during their marriage; and/or to extort funds from Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 64.

The FAC does not identify the RICO subsection that Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated, 

but it appears that Plaintiff seeks to proceed under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), the “RICO statute.” 

Section 1962(c) provides that it is “unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any 

enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct 

or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of 

racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 4 The elements of a 

 

4

18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) provides that it is unlawful 

for any person who has received any income derived, directly or 

indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through 

collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated 

as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States 

Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such 

income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any 

interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which 

is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign 

commerce. 

Section 1962(b) provides that it is unlawful 

for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through 

collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or 

indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is 

engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign 

commerce.

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civil RICO claim are “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering 

activity (known as ‘predicate acts’) (5) causing injury to plaintiff’s ‘business or property.” Living 

Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation 

omitted). 

As with Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim, his RICO claim must be dismissed as inadequately 

pleaded. “A pattern of racketeering activity . . . requires at least two predicate acts, which include 

‘any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, 

dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in [narcotics],’ that is an offense under state law ‘and

punishable by imprisonment for more than one year,’” United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 

1221 (9th Cir. 2004), modified, 425 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2005), as well as any act indictable under 

certain enumerated federal criminal statutes. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). It appears that Plaintiff alleges 

that Defendants have engaged in the predicate act of “extortion,” (see FAC ¶ 64), but the FAC is 

devoid of any facts supporting such an allegation, and it does not identify any other predicate act

or acts that form the basis of Plaintiff’s RICO claim. At the hearing, the only predicate act 

Plaintiff was able to identify was Plastiras’s alleged “lie” to Plaintiff about whether Plastiras 

represented Martin and Garrett. He was unable to identify any predicate offense that satisfies the 

RICO statute. In his supplemental brief, Plaintiff asserts that the 

“crimes” of Basil Plastiras include fraudulent inducement of 

plaintiff by way of the Feb. 2014 letter, the 2014 escrow 

instructions, and emails . . . to prevent plaintiff from taking steps to 

protect himself by impounding the disputed funds of about $70,000 

before the close of escrow (so the theft could occur); and aiding . . . 

the theft of $70,000 by the adult sons both before and after April 

2014.

Pl.’s Suppl. Brief at 2. He also lists a number of California Penal Code provisions, asserting that 

Plastiras is “both a principal and accessory” to the alleged theft of the escrow funds. See id. 

Plaintiff’s RICO claim remains deficient. The FAC does not allege that any of the defendants 

 

Neither section appears applicable here.

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committed one of the state law crimes defined as racketeering activity in section 1961(1)(A), and 

Plaintiff’s supplemental brief does not remedy this shortcoming. Neither common law fraud nor 

simple theft is a crime constituting a predicate act for purposes of establishing a pattern of 

racketeering activity. Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 653 (2008)

(“Congress chose to make mail fraud, not common-law fraud, the predicate act for a RICO 

violation.”); United States v. Napoli, 54 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds as 

stated in United States v. Genao, 343 F.3d 578, 584 (2d Cir. 2003) (“the crime of theft, standing 

alone, . . . is neither a federal crime listed in [18 U.S.C. §§ ] 1956 and 1961, nor one of the statelaw offenses that constitute RICO predicate acts”). See also Annulli v. Panikkar, 200 F.3d 189, 

200 (3d Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds in Forbes v. Eagleson, 228 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 

2000) (“if garden-variety state law crimes, torts, and contract breaches were to constitute predicate 

acts of racketeering (along with mail and wire fraud), civil RICO law, which is already a 

behemoth, would swallow state civil and criminal law whole.”). Therefore, the FAC fails to allege 

that Plastiras (or any other defendant) has engaged in a “pattern” of racketeering activity. See

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 481 (1985) (holding that the statutory language 

that a pattern “requires” rather than “means” two acts implies that “while two acts are necessary, 

they may not be sufficient” and noting that the legislative history “supports the view that two 

isolated acts of racketeering activity do not constitute a pattern.”).

The FAC also does not adequately allege an enterprise. The RICO statute defines 

“enterprise” as “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any 

union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). 

“[A]n associated-in-fact enterprise is ‘a group of persons associated together for a common 

purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.’” Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 552 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)). In addition to showing a 

common purpose, Plaintiff must show that there is “an ongoing organization, formal or informal,” 

and “that the various associates function as a continuing unit.” Id.; see Boyle v. United States, 556 

U.S. 938, 946 (2009) (“From the terms of RICO, it is apparent that an association-in-fact 

enterprise must have at least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those 

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associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the 

enterprise’s purpose.”). The FAC does not sufficiently allege facts supporting the assertion that 

Defendants formed an enterprise or function as a continuing unit. As to Plastiras specifically, the 

FAC does not allege that he “conducted or participated in the conduct of the ‘enterprise's affairs,’” 

as opposed to his own affairs. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993) (emphasis in 

original).

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s RICO claim must be dismissed.

iii. Claims for Declaratory Relief

Finally, Plastiras moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s third and fourth claims for declaratory 

judgment and declaratory relief. The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, 

provides in pertinent part:

In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of 

the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may 

declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party 

seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be 

sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a 

final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.

28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). “A declaratory judgment is not a theory of recovery . . . [§ 2201] “merely 

offers an additional remedy to litigants.” Flores v. EMC Mortg. Co., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1111 

(E.D. Cal. 2014) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Declaratory relief is appropriate “(1) 

when the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue, 

and (2) when it will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy 

giving rise to the proceeding.” Bilbrey by Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1470 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Plaintiff’s third claim states that there is an actual controversy “regarding [P]laintiff’s 

rights under the MSA and in regards to the alleged debts.” FAC ¶ 66. With respect to his fourth 

claim, Plaintiff alleges he seeks a “declaratory judgment as to the rights, duties and obligations of 

[P]laintiff and the defendants.” Id. at ¶ 70. These claims must be dismissed because the FAC 

does not allege any facts suggesting the existence of an “actual controversy” between Plaintiff and 

Plastiras. Further, at the hearing, Plaintiff confirmed that by these claims, Plaintiff seeks the relief 

sought in his FDCPA and RICO claims, rendering the declaratory relief claims duplicative and 

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unnecessary. See Mangindin v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 637 F. Supp. 2d 700, 707-08 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 

The third and fourth claims for relief are therefore dismissed.5

B. Julian’s Motion67

i. Res Judicata

Julian first argues that the FAC should be dismissed based on the doctrine of res judicata. 

He argues that the claims asserted here have already been adjudicated in the Texas action and are 

therefore barred. 

Res judicata bars litigation in an action if any of the claims were raised or could have been 

raised in a previous action. Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 

2001). A plaintiff “cannot avoid the bar of res judicata merely by alleging conduct by the 

defendant not alleged in his prior action or by pleading a new legal theory.” McClain v. Apodaca, 

793 F.2d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Simmons v. Am. Airlines, No. C-01-1074-JCS, 2002 

WL 102604, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2002) (following adjudication of discrimination claim, res 

judicata barred plaintiff from introducing slander claim arising from the same incident). 

Underlying the res judicata doctrine is the recognition that a plaintiff’s interests in a full and fair 

opportunity to be heard must be considered against the respect for a defendant’s efforts and 

expense in defending itself. Marin v. HEW, Health Care Fin. Agency, 769 F.2d 590, 594 (9th Cir.

1985). In addition to private interests, res judicata also serves important public interests, including 

“avoiding inconsistent results and preserving judicial economy.” Clements v. Airport Auth.of 

 

5

Plastiras also argues that he cannot be held liable for Plaintiff’s claims because his actions were 

privileged under California Civil Code § 47(b), which codifies the California litigation privilege. 

However, it is “well-settled that the California litigation privilege does not apply to federal causes 

of action, including FDCPA claims.” Oei v. N. Star Capital Acquisitions, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 

1089, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (collecting cases). Therefore, Plastiras’s motion to dismiss is denied 

on this ground.

6

Plaintiff argues that Julian’s motion should be denied as moot since the FAC was filed on 

November 8, 2016, and Julian’s motion was filed on November 9, 2016, before Julian was served 

with the FAC. Opp’n at 10. Plaintiff’s argument is without merit, since Julian’s motion is 

expressly directed at the FAC.

7

In connection with his motion, Julian submitted a declaration with 18 exhibits. [Docket No. 14-1 

through 14-3.] The court declines to convert this motion to a Rule 56 motion for summary 

judgment and thus will not consider these materials except as explained above in the section 

“Judicial Notice.”

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Washoe Cty., 69 F.3d 321, 330 (9th Cir.1995). 

The doctrine of res judicata is applicable when three requirements between the two actions

are present: (1) identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits in the first action, and (3) 

identity or privity between parties. United States v. Liquidators of European Fed. Credit Bank, 

630 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Tahoe–Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l

Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003)). Here, the Texas action was dismissed 

without prejudice. The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held that ‘a dismissal without prejudice is 

not a decision on the merits’ for the purposes of res judicata.” Oscar v. Alaska Dep’t of Education 

& Early Dev., 541 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Weinberg v. Whatcom Cty., 241 F.3d 

746, 750 (9th Cir. 2001) (“a dismissal without prejudice is not a decision on the merits and thus

lacks preclusive effect.”). Therefore, there was no final judgment on the merits. Julian argues that 

this rule “should be contextualized” since the dismissal order “uses such strong language so as to 

dissuade any further pleadings” and warned the Plaintiff about Rule 11 sanctions. Julian’s Mot. at 

7. However, he offers no authority for his apparent proposition that the character of a dismissal 

without prejudice may affect its preclusive effect. Accordingly, Julian’s motion to dismiss the 

FAC on the ground of res judicata is denied.

ii. FDCPA Claim

Julian moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim. The allegations about Julian in the FAC 

are sparse. Plaintiff alleges that Julian is an attorney who “has been acting as the debt collector for 

defendants . . .; as the debt collector for his law firm(s) as an alleged creditor(s); and/or as an 

alleged creditor himself.” FAC ¶ 2 (emphasis in original). He also alleges that “[d]uring the past 

year,” Julian and/or his law firm “[has] been providing legal services to the other defendants in 

this amended complaint, apparently on a ‘pro bono’ (i.e. without charge) basis,” including 

Esposito, Martin, and/or Garrett. Id. As with Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim against Plastiras, the FAC 

does not identify a specific provision of the FDCPA that Plaintiff alleges Julian violated.

Julian first argues that Plaintiff has not identified a debt within the meaning of the FDCPA. 

At the hearing, Plaintiff was unable to identify any specific debt that Julian allegedly attempted to 

collect in violation of the FDCPA, but contends in his supplemental brief that the escrow funds 

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that Martin and Garrett received are the “debt” that Plastiras allegedly attempted to collect. As 

discussed above, the escrow funds do not constitute a “debt” within the meaning of the FDCPA. 

Reading the FAC broadly in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, it is possible Plaintiff also contends 

that unspecified “attorney’s fees” and/or “defense costs by defendants” constitute the debt. See

FAC ¶¶ 7, 58. These allegations are unclear, but potentially refer to the October 28, 2014 award 

of attorneys’ fees to Martin and Garrett in the California Action. See Julian Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. C. 

The FAC is silent as to any attempt by Julian to collect this award from Plaintiff. Moreover, at 

least one court has held that such an obligation is not a debt within the meaning of the FDCPA. 

See Beal v. Himmel & Bernstein, LLP, 615 F. Supp. 2d 214, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that 

court-ordered obligation to pay attorneys’ fees “is not a consumer debt within the meaning of the 

FDCPA because it did not arise out of any consumer transaction in which he engaged.”).

Further, the FAC does not adequately allege that Julian is a “debt collector” within the 

meaning of the statute. As noted, the term “debt collector” means: (1) “any person who uses any 

instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which 

is the collection of any debts,” and (2) any person “who regularly collects or attempts to collect, 

directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 

1692a(6). The FAC alleges that Julian “is a ‘debt collector’ and/or an alleged ‘creditor’ within the 

meaning of the FDCPA,” (FAC ¶ 2), but this allegation is entirely conclusory and unsupported. 

Moreover, the FAC is silent about collection efforts specific to Julian, and does not specify any 

specific provision of the FDCPA it alleges he violated. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim as 

to Julian must be dismissed.

iii. RICO Claim

Julian next moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s RICO claim. For the same reasons discussed 

above, Plaintiff’s RICO claim as to Julian must be dismissed as inadequately pleaded. As to the 

RICO predicate acts committed by Julian, Plaintiff identified at the hearing Julian’s alleged “lies” 

about the promissory note(s), including his statement to three judges that the promissory note(s) 

were a “gift” to the sons. In his supplemental brief, Plaintiff asserts that Julian’s “crimes” include 

the “concealment and aiding of a cover-up of the April 2014 theft of $70,000 by the adult sons . . . 

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on at least 3 different occasions before 3 different courts (i.e. Marin County Superior Court; Calif. 

Court of Appeal; and US District Court in Texas).” Suppl. Br. at 2. As discussed in connection 

with Plaintiff’s RICO claim against Plastiras, these acts do not constitute predicate acts for 

purposes of establishing a pattern of racketeering activity.

Moreover, there are no facts alleged with respect to this claim that are specific to Julian. 

The claim is dismissed since Plaintiff fails to identify the RICO subsection that he alleges was 

violated; fails to identify sufficient predicate acts; fails to allege a pattern of racketeering activity; 

and fails to allege an enterprise.

iv. Claims for Declaratory Relief

Finally, Julian moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s third and fourth claims for declaratory relief. 

The facts alleged in the FAC do not suggest that an “actual controversy” exists between Plaintiff 

and Julian. Further, as discussed above, these claims are duplicative and unnecessary, as Plaintiff 

conceded at the hearing that he seeks the same relief sought in his FDCPA and RICO claims. The 

third and fourth claims for relief are therefore dismissed.

C. Leave to Amend

Under Rule 15(a), a court should grant leave to amend “when justice so requires,” because 

“the purpose of Rule 15 . . . [is] to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or 

technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A court may deny 

leave to amend for several reasons, including “undue delay, bad faith, . . . [and] futility of 

amendment.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).

As discussed above, the court questioned Plaintiff at the hearing about the bases for his 

FDCPA and RICO claims; specifically, the “debt” at issue in the FDCPA claims and the predicate 

acts required to establish a pattern of racketeering activity for purposes of the RICO claims. 

Plaintiff was unable to identify any facts to support these claims and his supplemental brief does 

not identify any new facts that would remedy the deficiencies in the claims. In dismissing the 

Texas action without prejudice, the court warned Plaintiff about the ramifications of filing any 

further complaint “when there is no basis of fact nor law in judgment and the pleadings are wholly 

frivolous.” June 1, 2016 Order. The FAC represents Plaintiff’s second attempt to plead his 

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FDCPA and RICO claims. Since it neither remedies the shortcomings of the complaint in the 

Texas action nor identifies any new facts that would support his claims, the court finds that further 

leave to amend would be futile. Plaintiff’s claims against Plastiras and Julian are therefore 

dismissed with prejudice.

D. Defendants Esposito, Martin Malasky, and Garrett Malasky

This matter was filed on July 21, 2016. On October 19, 2016, the court issued an Order to 

Show Cause, directing Plaintiff to show cause why this action should not be dismissed without 

prejudice for failure to serve the summons and complaint on Defendants within the 90-day 

deadline imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), among other things. [Docket No. 7.] 

On November 14, 2016, the court granted Plaintiff’s request for a 30-day extension to serve the 

FAC on all defendants, plus an additional three days due to service of the order by mail, with the 

deadline running from November 14, 2016. [Docket No. 18.] The new deadline for service of the 

FAC was thus December 19, 2016. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C) (if the last day of a time period 

specified in a court order falls on a Saturday, the period runs until the end of the next day that is 

not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday). Plaintiff has failed to serve Defendants Esposito, 

Martin Malasky, and Garrett Malasky by that deadline. Accordingly, the FAC is dismissed 

without prejudice as to those three defendants pursuant to Rule 4(m).

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Plastiras and Julian’s motions to dismiss are 

granted in part. Plaintiff’s FAC is dismissed with prejudice as to Defendants Plastiras and Julian. 

The FAC is dismissed without prejudice as to Defendants Esposito, Martin Malasky, and Garrett 

Malasky.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 29, 2016

______________________________________

DONNA M. RYU

United States Magistrate Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HENRY MALASKY,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROBERT A. JULIAN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 4:16-cv-04102-DMR 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on December 29, 2016, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by 

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Henry Malasky

2110 West Slaughter Lane

Suite 107-580

Austin, TX 78748 

Dated: December 29, 2016

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

Ivy Lerma Garcia, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable DONNA M. RYU

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