Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56501/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56501-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Steven L. Contursi
Appellee
Donald Kagin
Appellee
Rare Coin Wholesalers
Appellee
William Swoger
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM SWOGER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

RARE COIN WHOLESALERS; STEVEN

L. CONTURSI; DONALD KAGIN,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-56501

D.C. No.

8:09-cv-00903-

CJC-AN

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 4, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed October 8, 2015

Before: MILAN D. SMITH, JR., and N. RANDY SMITH,

Circuit Judges, and JOAN H. LEFKOW,

*

 Senior District

Judge.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

* The Honorable Joan Humphrey Lefkow, Senior District Judge for the

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by

designation.

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2 SWOGER V. RARE COIN WHOLESALERS

SUMMARY**

Coins / Discovery

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment

in favor of Rare Coin Wholesalers in an action brought by a

coin expert seeking compensation for his expertise on a rare

coin known as a “Brasher Doubloon.”

The coin expert’s claim for relief depended upon the

accuracy of his assertion that he had provided to Rare Coin

Wholesalers proof that their Coin was the first legal-tender

gold coin struck pursuant to an Act of Congress.

The panel held that the Coin was not, as the coin expert

theorized, legal tender pursuant to An Act Regulating Foreign

Coins, and For Other Purposes, ch. 5. 1 Stat. 300 (1793). The

panel concluded that the coin expert could not recover

because he had not provided the information he alleged he

was required to provide pursuant to the parties’ agreement. 

The panel also held that the coin expert did not satisfy the

requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), and, accordingly, the

district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the coin

expert’s request for a continuance to conduct discovery.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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SWOGER V. RARE COIN WHOLESALERS 3

COUNSEL

Richard P. Herman (argued), Law Office of Richard P.

Herman, Newport Beach, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Armen R. Vartian (argued), Law Offices of Armen R.

Vartian, Manhattan Beach, California, for DefendantsAppellees.

OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant William Swoger appeals from the

district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

Defendants-Appellees Rare Coin Wholesalers, Steven L.

Contursi, and Donald Kagin (collectively, Appellees). 

Appellees owned a rare coin known as a “Brasher Doubloon.” 

Swoger offered to sell Appellees information that would

prove that their coin was the first legal-tender coin struck

pursuant to an Act of Congress. Swoger divulged the

information, but Appellees refused to pay him, and Swoger

filed suit.

In due course, Appellees moved for summary judgment. 

After that motion had been fully briefed, Swoger moved to

continue oral argument in order to depose a witness. The

district court denied Swoger’s motion. On summary

judgment, the district court concluded that as a matter of law,

Appellee’s Brasher Doubloon was not legal tender, that

Swoger’s information was without value, and that Swoger

could not prevail on any of his claims. Accordingly, the

district court granted summary judgment to Appellees.

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4 SWOGER V. RARE COIN WHOLESALERS

Swoger appeals both the discovery ruling and the grant of

summary judgment. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Ephraim Brasher was a goldsmith in late eighteenthcentury New York. He minted several coins known as

Brasher Doubloons, which command a high price in today’s

numismatic market. All Brasher Doubloons display an eagle

on one side of the coin, but one such coin differs from all the

others in that Brasher countermarked his initials on the breast

of the eagle rather than on its wing. That coin, formerly

owned by Appellees, is the subject of this case. The parties

agree that Swoger is an expert concerning coins like the

Brasher Doubloons. In the course of his research, Swoger

became convinced that Appellees’ coin—the “Punch on

Breast” Brasher Doubloon (Coin)—was the first legal-tender

coin in the United States.

Swoger informed Appellees that he had information that

would prove that their Coin was “the first United States Coin

issued for circulation, and was issued . . . under authority of

[a]n Act of Congress.” The Act in question (Act) was An Act

Regulating Foreign Coins, and For Other Purposes, ch. 5, 1

Stat. 300 (1793). Swoger offered to sell this information to

Appellees for money. The complaint described the ensuing

negotiation as follows:

In February of 2009, Plaintiff contacted

Defendant Kagin. Negotiations began in

which Plaintiff informed him that the

information that Plaintiff had would prove

that Defendants Kagin and Contursi’s coin

was indeed the first legal tender coin to be

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SWOGER V. RARE COIN WHOLESALERS 5

struck pursuant to an Act of Congress to

circulate in the United States. . . . Defendant

Kagin contacted Plaintiff and advised him that

they thought this information was worth

$250,000.00. Plaintiff then advised

Defendant Kagin that he thought the

information was worth $500,000.00.

The parties agreed to meet at a trade show to conclude

negotiations. At the trade show on April 3, 2009, Kagin

allegedly insisted that Swoger provide the proof behind his

theory. Swoger informed Appellees that the Act provided for

Spanish and Spanish colonial coins to pass at 27.4 grains per

dollar. That would require a 15 dollar gold piece like the

Brasher Doubloon to weigh 411 grains. Swoger informed

Appellees that because their Coin weighed 410.5 grains, it

must have been struck “pursuant to the Act.” Appellees

refused to pay Swoger for this information.

Swoger brought five claims against the defendants, styled

respectively as claims for quantum meruit, fraud, breach of

contract, constructive trust, and misappropriation of trade

secrets. Throughout the litigation, Swoger took the position

that the agreement required him to prove the Coin was the

first legal-tender gold coin struck pursuant to an Act of

Congress. The viability of each of Swoger’s claims depended

upon the accuracy of this premise.

Discovery originally closed on November 26, 2010. 

However, Appellees sold the Coin in December 2011. 

Accordingly, on October 18, 2012, the district court permitted

Swoger to depose persons involved in the sale, including

Steven Contursi. On May 24, 2013, Appellees moved for

summary judgment. Swoger, however, had yet to depose

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6 SWOGER V. RARE COIN WHOLESALERS

Contursi. Accordingly, on June 19, 2013, just four days

before the scheduled date of oral argument, Swoger moved

for a continuance. The district court denied his motion.

On summary judgment, Appellees argued that each of

Swoger’s claims required him to prove that he had provided

information proving that the Coin was legal tender under the

Act, and that he had not done so. In opposition, Swoger

provided an affidavit explaining once again his theory that the

Coin “was THE FIRST LEGAL TENDER GOLD COIN

STRUCK PURSUANT TO AN ACT OF CONGRESS TO

CIRCULATE IN THE UNITED STATES.”

The district court granted summary judgment. The

district court determined that the Act applied only to foreign

coins, and that Appellees’ Coin, which was struck in New

York, could not have been legal tender under the Act. The

district court also found that all of the information Swoger

had provided to Appellees was already known or otherwise

publicly available. This appeal followed.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction over Swoger’s appeal pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s grant of

summary judgment de novo. Hexcel Corp. v. Ineos

Polymers, Inc., 681 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir. 2012). A

district court’s refusal to continue a hearing on summary

judgment pending further discovery is reviewed for an abuse

of discretion. Tatum v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco,

441 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006).

A party is entitled to summary judgment if the “movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

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SWOGER V. RARE COIN WHOLESALERS 7

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the burden of

establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The

court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to

the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences in the

non-movant’s favor. Clicks Billiards Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc.,

251 F.3d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001).

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment

Each of Swoger’s claims for relief depended upon the

accuracy of his assertion that he had provided to Appellees

proof that their Coin was the first legal-tender gold coin

struck pursuant to an Act of Congress. For example, in his

claim for quantum meruit, Swoger alleged that he offered to

“prove that [their] coin was indeed the first legal tender coin

to be struck pursuant to an Act of Congress to circulate in the

United States.”

The Act provided that certain “foreign gold and silver

coins shall pass current as money within the United States,

and be a legal tender for the payment of all debts and

demands.” 1 Stat. at 300. It further specified which

countries’ coins qualified, at what weights, and for how much

value in American denominations. Id. On its face, the Act

did not mention domestic goldsmiths like Brasher, let alone

authorize them to mint gold coins. Therefore, the Coin was

not, as Swoger theorized, legal tender struck pursuant to the

Act. Accordingly, Swoger could not recover because he had

not provided the information he alleged he was required to

provide pursuant to the parties’ agreement.

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8 SWOGER V. RARE COIN WHOLESALERS

On appeal, refining a theory he first advanced in response

to summary judgment, Swoger argues that whether the Coin

was legal tender is irrelevant. Under this theory, because the

Coin was struck to conform to the weight specified in the Act

for Spanish doubloons, using the gold from Spanish

doubloons, it “did not need to be weighed, and could be used

in commerce as a $15 coin.” The claims that Swoger brought

in his complaint, however, rely on the premise that he gave

Appellees information sufficient to prove that the Coin was

legal tender—not merely that it was commonly used as a

store of value. That a coin was used as a medium of

exchange does not make it legal tender. “[C]ongress is vested

with the exclusive exercise of the . . . power of coining

money and regulating the value of domestic and foreign

coin.” The Legal-Tender Cases, 110 U.S. 421, 448 (1884). 

Swoger has provided no authority for the proposition that

Congress exercised that power with respect to Appellees’

Coin. Therefore, Appellees were entitled to summary

judgment as a matter of law.

II. Discovery Ruling

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56(d) provides that

if a party opposing summary judgment “shows by affidavit or

declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts

essential to justify its opposition, the court may: (1) defer

considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain

affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any

other appropriate order.” Swoger filed his opposition without

providing any such affidavit or declaration.

Two weeks after he filed his opposition, however, Swoger

filed a “request” that summary judgment be continued so that

he could depose Contursi. At that point, the summary-

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SWOGER V. RARE COIN WHOLESALERS 9

judgment motion had been fully briefed and oral argument

was pending in four days. The district court denied Swoger’s

request, holding that Swoger had “not been diligent in

pursuing discovery and [had] not shown good cause to justify

a continuance at this stage in the proceedings.” The court

reasoned that more than seven months had passed since it

reopened discovery to permit Swoger’s deposition of

Contursi, during which time trial had twice been continued to

accommodate Swoger’s discovery requests. The court also

observed that since the primary issue on summary judgment

was a pure question of law, further depositions were unlikely

to be helpful.

Swoger did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 56(d). 

He failed to identify what specific facts a deposition of

Contursi would have revealed that would have precluded

summary judgment. Indeed, he could not identify such facts,

because whether Appellees were entitled to summary

judgment turned on a pure question of law: the legal status of

Appellees’ Coin. Accordingly, the district court did not

abuse its discretion by denying Swoger’s request for a

continuance. See Tatum, 441 F.3d at 1100.

CONCLUSION

All pending motions are denied as moot. The district

court’s decision is AFFIRMED.

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