Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02017/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02017-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sam A. Andrade
Appellant
Secretary of Health and Human Services
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH FILL.U 

United Stat.es Court of Appeal! Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 11 1993 

TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

SAM A. ANDRADE, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

Clerk 

No. 92-2017 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CIV 90-430 M/RWM) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Gary J. Martone, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Don J. Svet, United States Attorney, Gayla Fuller, Chief Counsel, 

Region IV, and Christopher Carillo, Assistant Regional Counsel, 

Office of the General Counsel, United States Department of Health 

and Human Services, Dallas, Texas, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before BALDOCK and SETH, Circuit Judges, and BABCOCK,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable Lewis T. Babcock, District 

District Court for the District of 

designation. 

BABCOCK, District Judge. 

Judge, United States 

Colorado, sitting by 

Appellate Case: 92-2017 Document: 010110170340 Date Filed: 02/11/1993 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1 . 9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellant Sam A. Andrade (claimant) appeals from an order of 

the district court affirming the Secretary of Health and Human 

Services' decision that claimant is not entitled to disability 

benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 416(i) and 423 , or to supplemental security income (SSI) 

benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1381a. Claimant argues that substantial evidence does not 

support the Secretary's determination that his mental impairment 

did not limit his ability to work. Claimant also argues that the 

Secretary either incorrectly categorized his past relevant work or 

applied an incorrect legal standard in determining that he could 

return to his past relevant work. We disagree with claimant's 

second argument, but agree with his first. Therefore, we affirm 

in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions. 

Claimant was a self-employed general contractor in New Mexico 

from August 1974, until May 1987. Claimant's duties, however, 

were not limited to those typically performed by a general 

contractor: because he owned a small business, he also functioned 

as a plumber and manual laborer at times. He claims that physical 

and mental limitations, including epilepsy, a heart condition, and 

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problems with his right a:an, rendered him disabled as of July, 

1987. He also claims to be disabled from a mental impai:anent. 

Claimant's applications for benefits were denied both 

initially and upon reconsideration at the administrative level . 

The applications and documentary evidence were then reviewed de 

novo by an administrative law judge (ALJ). After conducting a 

hearing, the ALJ dete:anined that claimant was not disabled because 

he retained the capacity to perfo:an his fo:aner job as that job is 

perfo:aned in the national economy. The Appeals Council denied 

claimant's request for review. The ALJ's decision, therefore, 

became the final decision of the Secretary. The district court 

upheld the ALJ's decision. 

Our review of the Secretary's decision is limited to "whether 

his findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record 

and whether he applied the correct legal standards." Emory v. 

Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1092, 1093 (10th Cir. 1991). The '" [f]ailure 

to apply the correct legal standard or to provide this court with 

a sufficient basis to dete:anine that appropriate legal principles 

have been followed is grounds for reversal.'" Byron v. Heckler, 

742 F.2d 1232, 1235 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting Smith v. Heckler, 707 

F.2d 1284, 1285 (11th Cir. 1983)). Additionally, we must reverse 

if the Secretary's findings are not supported by substantial 

evidence. Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Substantial evidence is "'such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as 

(quoting Broadbent v . 

adequate to support a conclusion. '" 

Harris, 698 F.2d 40_7, 414 (10th 

1983) (further citation omitted)). 

3 

Id. 

Cir. 

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To prove a disability, a claimant must establish a "medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected 

to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last 

for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 

U.S.C. §§ 1382c(a) (3) (A) & 423(d) (1) (A). Social security 

regulations specify that a five-step sequential analysis must be 

used to evaluate a claim for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520 & 416.920; see also Williams 844 F.2d at 750-52 

(providing explanation of the five steps). At issue in this 

appeal is step four, which requires examination of whether 

physical or mental impairments prevent a claimant from continuing 

past relevant work. 

I. Claimant's Alleged Mental Disability 

Claimant argues that the ALJ's decision regarding the extent 

of his depression is unsupported by the record. Specifically, 

claimant maintains that his severe depression substantially limits 

his residual functional capacity, and that the ALJ' s conclusion 

otherwise is not supported by substantial evidence. Residual 

functional capacity represents the capacity of the claimant to 

perform work, despite mental or physical impairments. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1545(a) & 416.945(a) (residual functional capacity assesses 

"what you can still do despite your limitations"). The ALJ 

evaluated claimant's residual fun.ctional capacity as part of the 

fourth step of the disability analysis. See id. §§ 404.1520(e) & 

416. 920 (e) . 

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The evidence of claimant's depression in this case consisted 

of his testimony at the hearing before the ALJ, along with letters 

and hand-written treatment notes, which are mostly illegible, from 

claimant's physician. Claimant complained of depression and 

suicidal thoughts. He also admitted to crying spells, feelings of 

worthlessness, and withdrawing from people when he felt bad. 

Claimant testified that he had been treated on a weekly basis for 

depression by Dr. Jaramillo since August 1988 (four months before 

the hearing). Administrative R. at 81. Claimant stated that he 

saw Dr. Jaramillo for an individual session once a week, and for a 

group session twice a week. Id. In addition, Dr. Jaramillo gave 

claimant a shot every week to, in claimant's words, "help me 

mentally with my chemical imbalance." Id. at 80. Claimant added 

that Dr. Jaramillo said he would need the shots "for a year or 

so." Id. Regarding the effectiveness of Dr. Jaramillo's 

treatment, claimant explained that the treatments helped a lot, 

but shortly after the shots and group sessions he would start to 

fee l bad again. Id. at 83. 

At the hearing, claimant's attorney submitted a letter from 

Dr. Jaramillo which described claimant as "totally mentally 

disabled," and suggested claimant follow "an intense 

psychochemotherapeutic treatment program ... for at least 3-6 

months. " Id . at 239. Sometime after the hearing, the attorney 

submitted a letter from Dr. Jaramillo, written in December 1988, 

which assessed claimant as having "major depression with 

incongruent thoughts." Id. at 261. The letter also stated that 

claimant complained that he was overwhelmed and not sleeping, and 

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that he felt "enormous stress and conflicts related to his legal 

issues of his old business." Id. The record contains a final 

letter from Dr. Jaramillo, written July 12, 1989, that states 

"[claimant] appears to continue to suffer a mental disability. 

His last visit occurred on February 24, 1989, and he was still in 

distress. [Claimant] has not continued with therapy due to a 

financial hardship." Id. at 271. 

The ALJ found that it was unclear from the record whether 

claimant's depression was expected to continue for twelve months. 

Although the ALJ recognized that Dr. Jaramillo diagnosed claimant 

as totally mentally disabled, the ALJ found that there was "no 

other reference in [Dr. Jaramillo's] reports regarding 

claimant's inability to perform work. In 

reported in November and December 1988 

fact, Dr. Jaramillo 

that the claimant was 

feeling overwhelmed due to certain legal problems." Id. at 44 . 

The ALJ concluded that "[i)n view of this evidence, an inference 

can be drawn that claimant's mental problems are largely, if not 

all , situational in nature, leading to a conclusion that any 

symptomatology will subside once his legal problems do so." Id. 

We conclude that the ALJ did not give proper consideration to 

claimant's alleged mental impairment. When a record "contains 

evidence of a mental impairment that allegedly prevented claimant 

from working, the Secretary [is] required to follow the procedure 

for evaluating the potential mental· impairment set forth in his 

regulations and to document the procedure accordingly. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404 . 1520a." Hill v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 972, 975 (10th 

Cir. 1991); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a (for parallel 

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regulations applicable to claims for SSI benefits). And, of 

course, the Secretary must also comply with all applicable 

procedures mandated by the statute. See. e.g., 42 u.s.c. 

§ 421 (a) (2) (disability detenninations must be made in accordance 

with pertinent statutory provisions and applicable regulations of 

the Secretary). From the record it appears that the ALJ complied 

with the social security regulations, but not with the statutory 

requirement to make every reasonable effort to ensure that a 

qualified psychologist or psychiatrist completes the residual 

functional capacity assessment. See 42 U.S.C. § 421(h). 

Section 421(h) of Title 42 provides that 

[a] n initial detennination ... that an individual is 

not under a disability, in any case where there is 

evidence which indicates the existence of a mental 

impainnent, shall be made only if the Secretary has made 

every reasonable effort to ensure that a qualified 

psychiatrist or psychologist has completed the medical 

portion of the case review and any applicable residual 

functional capacity assessment. 

This provision applies to claims for SSI benefits and for 

disability insurance benefits. Hill, 924 F.2d at 974. Thus, when 

the record contains evidence of a mental impainnent, the Secretary 

cannot detennine that the claimant is not under a disability 

without first making every reasonable effort to ensure that a 

qualified psychiatrist or psychologist has completed the medical 

portion of the case review and any applicable residual functional 

capacity assessment. 

In this case, when claimant first applied for benefits, he 

did not allege a mental impainnent. On November 16, 1988, about 

one month before his hearing with the ALJ, claimant filed forms 

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describing his recent medical treatment and medications. These 

forms indicated that Dr. Jaramillo had been treating claimant with 

an intense psychochemotherapeutic treatment program since August 

of 1988. At the hearing on December 20 , 1988, claimant explained 

his severe depression and treatment program to the ALJ. At that 

time, claimant also submitted a letter from Dr. Jaramillo, as well 

as more forms which indicated he was still seeing Dr. Jaramillo . 

Sometime after the hearing, claimant's attorney submitted 

additional letters and treatment notes from Dr. Jaramillo. 

Because the record contained no evidence of claimant's mental 

impairment until shortly before the hearing with the ALJ, none of 

the disability determinations prior to the ALJ's determination 

considered whether claimant's mental impairment rendered him 

disabled. The ALJ, thus, was in the position of making the 

initial determination of whether claimant was disabled in light of 

his alleged mental impairment. 

Social security regulations specify that a special procedure 

must be followed when evaluating a mental impairment. Se~ 20 

C.F . R. §§ 404.1520a & 416.920a . Part of this procedure entails 

recording pertinent information on a standard document. Id. 

§§ 404.1520a (d) & 416.920a(d). When a claimant's severe mental 

impairment does not meet a listed mental impairment, the standard 

document must include an assessment of the residual functional 

capacity. Id. §§ 404 . 1520a(c) (3) & 416.920a( c ) (3) . The document 

must be completed at the "initial, reconsideration, administrative 

law judge hearing, and Appeals Council levels. " Id. 

§§ 404.1520a(d) & 416.920a(d) . At the initial and reconsideration 

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levels, the document must be completed and signed by a medical 

consultant. Id. §§ 404.1520a(d) (1) & 416.920a(d) (1) . The ALJ, 

however, may complete the document without the assistance of a 

medical advisor. Id. §§ 404 . 1520a(d) (1) (i) & 416.920a(d) (1 ) (i). 

When the issue of a mental impairment arises for the first time at 

the ALJ hearing level, the ALJ may choose to remand the case to 

the State agency for completion of the document and for a new 

disability determination. Id. §§ 404.1520a(d) (1) (iii) & 

416 . 920a (d) ( 1) ( iii) . 

Here, there is no evidence in the record that a qualified 

psychiatrist or psychologist assessed claimant's residual 

functional capacity. Likewise , there is no evidence that the ALJ 

made any effort to ensure that a qualified psychiatrist or 

psychologist completed the appropriate reports and residual 

functional capacity assessment . Instead, as allowed by the 

regulations, the ALJ appears to have completed the standard 

document , including the residual functional capacity assessment, 

without the assistance of. a medical consultant . 

In a previous case , this court found "no error in the fact 

that the case review and [residual functional capacity assessment] 

were completed by the ALJ without the assistance of a mental 

health professional . " Bernal v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 297, 302-03 (10th 

Cir. 1988) . Our conclusion in Bernal was based on three 

considerations. First, we found no absolute duty under 42 u.s.c. 

§ 421(h) for the Secretary or the ALJ to have a psychologist or 

psychiatrist complete the medical portion of the case review and 

the residual functional capacity assessment . Bernal, 851 F.2d at 

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302. Second, the record lacked any evidence seriously challenging 

the ALJ's assessment of Mr. Bernal's residual functional capacity 

or the ALJ's conclusion regarding the severity of Mr. Bernal's 

mental impairment. Id. And, third, "Mr. Bernal was not 

prejudiced by the ALJ's actions" because "the ALJ's decision was 

amply supported by the medical reports and the record." Id. 

In this case, however, we cannot conclude that substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ's decision regarding the extent of 

claimant's mental impairment . The ALJ found that there was no 

reference in the record to claimant's inability to perform work, 

other than the diagnosis in Dr. Jaramillo's letter of September 

1988 that claimant is "totally mentally disabled." In another 

section of his decision, however, the ALJ recognized that Dr. 

Jaramillo's notes of November 22, 1988, described claimant as 

unable to work. Additionally, Dr. Jaramillo's notes of November 

3, 1988, make some reference to a limitation on claimant's ability 

to work. However, as with the majority of Dr. Jaramillo's 

handwritten notes, this reference of November 3 is not completely 

legible. We cannot conclude from these illegible treatment notes, 

or from any part of the record, that substantial evidence supports 

the ALJ's finding that the record does not refer to claimant's 

inability to perform work. Neither can we conclude that 

substantial evidence supports the finding that claimant's mental 

problems are "largely, if not all, situational in nature." 

Although Dr. Jaramillo reported that claimant complained he felt 

overwhelmed from legal problems related to his business, nothing 

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in the record shows that claimant's legal problems were the 

primary cause of his depression. 

In Bernal, we did not "delineate the boundaries of the duties 

imposed under section 421(h) .... " Bernal, 851 F.2d at 302 . 

And, we do not, by this decision, attempt to define the phrase 

"every reasonable effort." We hold only that, based on the 

particular circumstances of this case, the ALJ abused the 

discretion afforded to him by the regulations, 20 C. F.R. 

§§ 404.1520a & 416.920a, by assessing claimant's residual 

functional capacity without making any effort to obtain the 

assistance of a mental health professional. Accordingly, we 

remand this case for proper consideration of claimant's alleged 

mental impairment. 

II. Challenge to Social Security Ruling 82 - 61 

A claimant capable of performing past relevant work is not 

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. See 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404 . 1520(e) & 416 . 920(e) . The claimant bears the burden 

of proving his or her inability to perform past relevant work. 

See Ray v . Bowen, 865 F. 2d 222, 224 (10th Cir. 1989). 

In this case, to determine whether claimant could perform his 

past relevant work, the ALJ applied the policy of the Social 

Security Administration, set forth in Social Security Ruling 82-61 

(S . S.R. 82-61). That ruling define·s past relevant work as the 

claimant's ability to perform either "1. [t]he actual functional 

demands and job duties of a particular past relevant job; or 2 . 

[t]he functional demands and job duties of the occupation as 

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generally required by employers throughout the national economy . " 

S.S.R. 82-61. 

At the hearing, claimant provided the following information 

about his previous job as a self-employed general contractor. He 

testified that the exertional requirements of the job were very 

heavy. He explained that in addition to performing the usual 

d~ties of a general contractor, he helped perform the construction 

as well. In claimant's words, he did "everything, climbing and 

everything to do with the construction from the bottom up." 

Administrative R. at 73 . Clai mant stated that most of the time he 

served as his own foreman. When he was busy building more than 

one house, he hired someone to help him. Claimant reiterated that 

most of the time he "did it all." Id. at 85. 

The ALJ found that "[a]lthough the claimant may have 

performed the actual labor in his past work, he also performed 

essentially all of the duties" of a general contractor as that job 

is generally performed. Id. at 46. Noting that the Dictiona:r:y of 

Occupational Titles 

generally requiring 

describes the job of general contractor as 

only light work, the ALJ concluded that 

claimant retained the capacity to perform the job of a general 

contractor ~s that job is generally performed in the national 

economy. 

Claimant argues that S.S.R. 82-61 does not authorize the ALJ 

to consider only the lighter duties· of his past job; rather, when 

considering whether claimant could perform his job as it is 

performed in the national economy, the ALJ must categorize 

claimant's occupation in a way that reflects all significant 

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aspects of claimant's particular past job--particularly that he 

performed carpentry and plumbing in addition to the usual duties 

of a general contractor. Alternatively, he argues that S.S .R. 

82-61 is altogether incorrect and should not be followed. 

We reject claimant's alternative argument that S.S.R. 82-61 

should not be followed. As claimant points out, social security 

rulings do not carry the force and effect of law. See Walker v. 

Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 943 F.2d 1257, 1259 (10th Cir. 

1991) . They are entitled to deference, however, because "they 

constitute Social Security Administration interpretations of its 

own regulations and the statute which it administers." Id. at 

1259-60 . We defer to social security rulings unless "they are 

plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the [Social Security] Act." 

Id. at 1260. Claimant fails to establish that S.S.R. 82-61 is 

either plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the Social Security 

Act. 

This court has previously held that a claimant could return 

to her past relevant work, even though her former job was no 

longer available. Jozefowicz v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1352, 1356 

(10th Cir. 1987). We looked to whether the claimant could "still 

do the type of job she did in the past." ~ (noting "a 

claimant's past work is the 'type' of work previously performed." 

(citing Tillery v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 601, 602 (10th Cir. 1983)). 

Several other circuits have concluded that the phrase past 

relevant work includes a claimant's particular past relevant job, 

as well as the~ of work claimant performed . in the past, as 

that work is generally performed in the national economy. See 

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Martin v. Sullivan, 901 F.2d 650, 653 (8th Cir. 1990) (following 

the test stated in S.S.R. 82-61 and noting that the First, Second, 

Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have all 

rejected the argument that "a claimant who cannot perfonn a 

particular past relevant job cannot perfonn his past relevant 

work"); see also Villa v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 794, 798 (9th Cir. 

1986) (claimant must prove inability to return to former type of 

job, not just to specific prior job); DeLoatche v. Heckler, 715 

F . 2d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1983) (same); Orlando v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 

209, 215-16 (7th Cir. 1985) (adopting S.S.R. 82-61). We find no 

basis upon which to reject S.S.R. 82-61's interpretation of the 

phrase past relevant work. Therefore, claimant bears the burden 

of proving his inability to return to his particular fonner job 

and to his fonner occupation as that occupation is generally 

perfonned throughout the national economy. 

The only remaining issue is whether the ALJ correctly 

categorized claimant's occupation as a general contractor, as that 

position is defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. The 

ALJ may rely on the Dictionary's job description for claimant's 

job category as "presumptively applicable to a claimant's prior 

work." Villa, 797 F.2d at 798 ; accord DeLoatche, 715 F.2d at 151; 

see also 20 C. F.R. § 404 . 1566(d) (1) (authorizes administrative 

notice of reliable job information found in the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles). However, a claimant "may overcome the 

presumption that the Dictionary's entry for a given job title 

applies to him by demonstrating that the duties in his particular 

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line of work were not those envisaged by the drafters of the 

category." Villa, 797 F.2d at 798 . 

Claimant maintains that his occupational category must 

reflect the actual demands--including, plumbing and carpentry--of 

his past job. Claimant's burden, however, is to demonstrate he 

cannot return to his former type of work, and not just to his 

previous job. S.S.R. 82-61. Therefore, it is not enough to show 

that plumbing and carpentry were part of claimant's particular 

job: claimant must show that these demands are among the job 

duties of his type of job as that job is generally performed. 

Thus, claimant must show that "the duties of his prior job were 

sufficiently distinct from the duties of a [general contractor] as 

described in the Dictionacy to constitute a different line of 

work." Villa, 797 F.2d at 798. We see no evidence that claimant 

made this showing. We find that the record supports the ALJ's 

conclusion that claimant was primarily a general contractor, even 

though his particular job involved some actual labor. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and 

REMANDED for further consideration of claimant's alleged mental 

impairment, in accordance with this opinion. Claimant's capacity 

to return to his previous occupation should also be reevaluated on 

remand, if claimant's alleged mental impairment is found to limit 

his residual functional capacity. 

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