Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cr-00147/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cr-00147-12/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sarah Anderson
Defendant
Fabian Gomez
Defendant
Wendy Labuda
Defendant
William Owen
Defendant
Epifanio Ramirez
Defendant
Joaleen Rogers
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

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PHILLIP A. TALBERT

United States Attorney

JAMES R. CONOLLY

Assistant United States Attorney

501 I Street, Suite 10-100

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 554-2700

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

SARAH ANDERSON,

FABIAN GOMEZ,

EPIFANIO RAMIREZ,

WENDY LABUDA,

WILLIAM OWEN, 

JOALEEN ROGERS,

 Defendants.

CASE NO. 2:22-CR-147-WBS

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

FINDINGS AND ORDER

DATE: September 19, 2022

TIME: 9:00 a.m.

COURT: Hon. William B. Shubb

BACKGROUND

This case is set for a status conference on September 19, 2022. By this stipulation, the parties 

request that the Court continue the status conference to December 12, 2022, and to exclude time under 

Local Code T4, as well under the Court’s General Orders, for the reasons set forth below. 

On May 13, 2020, this Court issued General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the 

Eastern District of California “until further notice.” Under General Order 618, a judge “may exercise 

his or her authority to continue matters, excluding time under the Speedy Trial Act with reference to the 

court’s prior General Order 611 issued on March 17, 2020 . . . with additional findings to support the 

exclusion in the Judge’s discretion.” General Order 618, ¶ 6 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). In addition, any 

judge “may order case-by-case exceptions” to General Order 618’s provisions “at the discretion of that 

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Judge or upon the request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the 

extent such an order will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 

2020). This and previous General Orders were entered to address public health concerns related to 

COVID-19.

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 

509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 require specific supplementation. Ends-ofjustice continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his 

findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable 

unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that 

the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public 

and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption created “appreciable difficulty” for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-69; see 

also United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time 

following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). 

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The coronavirus poses a similar, albeit more enduring, “appreciable difficulty” to the prompt 

proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. Recently, the Ninth Circuit enumerated a “nonexhaustive” list of seven factors it found to be “relevant” in considering ends-of-justice Speedy Trial Act 

continuances “in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.” United States v. Olsen, --- F.3d ---, 2021 WL 

1589359 at *7 (9th Cir. Apr. 23, 2021). That non-exhaustive list includes: (1) whether a defendant is 

detained pending trial; (2) how long a defendant has been detained; (3) whether a defendant has invoked 

speedy trial rights since the case’s inception; (4) whether a defendant, if detained, belongs to a 

population that is particularly susceptible to complications if infected with the virus; (5) the seriousness 

of the charges a defendant faces, and in particular whether the defendant is accused of violent crimes; 

(6) whether there is a reason to suspect recidivism if the charges against the defendant are dismissed; 

and (7) whether the district court has the ability to safely conduct a trial. Id.

In light of the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding 

excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) 

(Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date for the status conference. United 

States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be 

“specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until 

December 12, 2022, and to exclude time between September 19, 2022, and December 12, 2022, under 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4]. 

2. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government is in the process of preparing discovery in this matter, which is 

voluminous. The discovery consists of hundreds of pages of investigatory reports, photographs, 

and video surveillance evidence. The government has communicated to defense counsel that it 

anticipates producing discovery within the next several days. All of this discovery will either be

produced directly to counsel or made available for inspection and copying.

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b) Counsel for defendants have met with their clients to discuss their respective 

cases. Defense counsel desire additional time to conduct investigation into the charges, the 

alleged roles of their respective clients, and to review discovery in this case once the government 

has produced all of it. Once that occurs, defense counsel will need additional time to discuss 

potential resolutions with their clients, prepare pretrial motions, and otherwise prepare for trial.

c) Counsel for defendants believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 19, 2022 to 

December 12, 2022, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), 

B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s 

request on the basis of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action 

outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

3. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: September 13, 2022 PHILLIP A. TALBERT

United States Attorney

/s/ JAMES R. CONOLLY

JAMES R. CONOLLY

Assistant United States Attorney

[Signatures continue on following page.]

Dated: September 13, 2022 /s/ DANIEL B. OLMOS

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DANIEL B. OLMOS

Counsel for Defendant 

SARAH ANDERSON,

Dated: September 13, 2022 /s/ DAVID D. FISCHER

DAVID D. FISCHER

Counsel for Defendant 

FABIAN GOMEZ

Dated: September 13, 2022 /s/ OLAF HEDBERG

OLAF HEDBERG

Counsel for Defendant 

EPIFANIO RAMIREZ

Dated: September 13, 2022 /s/ TASHA CHALFANT

TASHA CHALFANT

Counsel for Defendant 

WENDY LABUDA

Dated: September 13, 2022 /s/ JOHN R. MANNING

JOHN R. MANNING

Counsel for Defendant 

WILLIAM OWEN

Dated: September 13, 2022 /s/ TAMARA SOLOMON

TAMARA SOLOMON

Counsel for Defendant 

JOALEEN ROGERS,

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.

Dated: September 16, 2022

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