Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01681/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01681-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lance Maynard Gardner
Plaintiff
Vicki Hennessy
Defendant
Dennis Herrera
Defendant
Moore
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LANCE MAYNARD GARDNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

VICKI HENNESSY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-01681-EMC 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND

Docket No. 1

I. INTRODUCTION

Lance Maynard Gardner, an inmate at the San Francisco County Jail, filed this pro se civil 

rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint is now before the court for review under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A. This order requires Mr. Gardner to file an amended complaint to correct several 

pleading deficiencies. 

II. BACKGROUND

The complaint alleges the following about an event that occurred when Mr. Gardner was 

an inmate at the San Francisco County Jail in San Bruno, California: On April 18, 2017, inmate 

Greg Lubisch entered Mr. Gardner’s cell through the unlocked cell door and attacked Mr. Gardner 

without provocation for about 3-4 minutes. Among other things, Mr. Lubisch punched and 

slammed Mr. Gardner’s head into the floor. As a result of the attack, Mr. Gardner sustained a 

concussion and headaches over the next several months. Mr. Gardner alleges that the attack 

occurred and lasted 3-4 minutes because San Francisco Sheriff’s Deputy Moore (a) left the cell 

door unlocked, contrary to a policy that doors were to be locked at all times, and (b) was attentive 

to his computer screen rather than watching the inmates under his care. 

Case 3:19-cv-01681-EMC Document 9 Filed 08/01/19 Page 1 of 5
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

III. DISCUSSION

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner 

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any 

claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at 

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

The complaint has three problems. Leave to amend is granted so that Mr. Gardner may file 

an amended complaint that cures the deficiencies identified in this order.

First, Mr. Gardner has not linked several defendants to his claim. The complaint lists as 

defendants San Francisco Sheriff Vicki Hennessey, the City and County of San Francisco, and San 

Francisco City Attorney Dennis Herrera, but makes no allegations against any of these 

Defendants. In his amended complaint, Mr. Gardner must allege facts showing his entitlement to 

relief from each and every defendant who he proposes to hold liable on the claim. Mr. Gardner

must be careful to allege facts showing the basis for liability for each individual defendant. He 

should not refer to them as a group (e.g., “the defendants”); rather, he should identify each 

involved defendant by name and link each of them to his claim by explaining what each defendant 

did or failed to do that caused a violation of his constitutional rights. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 

F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) (liability may be imposed on individual defendant under § 1983 only 

if plaintiff can show that defendant proximately caused deprivation of federally protected right). 

If he wants to sue a supervisor, he must allege facts showing (1) personal involvement in the 

constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful 

conduct and the constitutional violation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Case 3:19-cv-01681-EMC Document 9 Filed 08/01/19 Page 2 of 5
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Mr. Gardner cannot hold the municipal defendants (such as Sheriff Hennessy in her official 

capacity and the City and County of San Francisco) liable in a § 1983 action simply because they 

employ the individual wrongdoers. There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, i.e. no 

liability under the theory that one is responsible for the actions or omissions of another, such as an 

employee. See Board of Cty. Comm'rs. of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Tsao v. 

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus, a claim would not be stated 

against the Sheriff or the municipality merely because they employed the alleged wrongdoers. 

Local governments, such as the City and County of San Francisco, are “persons” subject to 

liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where official policy or custom causes a constitutional tort. See

Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). To impose municipal liability under 

§ 1983 for a violation of constitutional rights, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that [the plaintiff] 

possessed a constitutional right of which [he] was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; 

(3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) 

that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” See Plumeau v. School 

Dist. #40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). For municipal liability, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts regarding the 

specific nature of the alleged policy, custom or practice to allow the defendant to effectively 

defend itself, and these facts must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See AE v. 

County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636-37 (9th Cir. 2012). It is not sufficient to merely allege that a 

policy, custom or practice existed or that individual officers’ wrongdoing conformed to a policy, 

custom or practice. See id. at 636-68. Leave to amend is granted so that Mr. Gardner may attempt 

to allege a Monell claim against the municipal entities listed as Defendants in his complaint. He 

must be careful to allege the specific policy, custom or practices of each municipal entity that he 

contends give rise to liability.

Second, Mr. Gardner does not allege whether he was a pretrial detainee or a convict at the 

time he was attacked. For a claim that a jail official has been deliberately indifferent to a risk to 

an inmate’s safety, a different legal standard applies if the inmate had been convicted than if the 

Case 3:19-cv-01681-EMC Document 9 Filed 08/01/19 Page 3 of 5
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

inmate was merely awaiting trial.1 In his amended complaint, Mr. Gardner must state whether he 

was a convict or pretrial detainee on April 18, 2017. 

Finally, Mr. Gardner has not alleged a § 1983 claim against inmate Lubisch, who allegedly 

attacked him. No facts are alleged to plausibly suggest that Mr. Lubisch was a state actor, which 

is a requirement for a § 1983 claim against him. If Mr. Gardner wishes to assert a state law claim 

(such as assault and battery) against Mr. Lubisch, he may do so but must allege that he is asserting 

a state law claim against Mr. Lubsich and invoke the court’s supplemental jurisdiction in his 

amended complaint by stating that he is bringing his action under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 as well as 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although Mr. Gardner is free to pursue a claim against Mr. Lubisch, the 

Court notes that suing an inmate for damages usually is an exercise in futility because the vast 

majority of inmates do not have any money to pay for a judgment, if a judgment is ever obtained 

 

1

If the inmate was a convict at the relevant time, his claim would arise under the Eighth 

Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, which has been interpreted to require that 

jail and prison officials take reasonable measures to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of 

other prisoners. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). The failure of prison officials 

to protect inmates from attacks by other inmates or from dangerous conditions at the prison or jail

violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, 

objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent 

to inmate health or safety. Id. at 834. A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows of 

and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety by failing to take reasonable steps to 

abate it. Id. at 837. If the inmate was a pretrial detainee at the relevant time, his claim would arise 

under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Jail officials may be liable under the 

Fourteenth Amendment for failure to protect a pretrial detainee from a risk of harm by other 

inmates. To state a claim that an individual officer failed to protect a pretrial detainee, a plaintiff 

must allege facts showing these elements: 

(1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the 

conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (2) Those 

conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious 

harm; (3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures 

to abate that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the 

circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk 

involved—making the consequences of the defendant's conduct 

obvious; and (4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused 

the plaintiff's injuries.

Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 

S. Ct. 831 (2017). 

Case 3:19-cv-01681-EMC Document 9 Filed 08/01/19 Page 4 of 5
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

against them. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff must file an amended complaint 

that complies with the directions in this order no later than September 13, 2019, and must include 

the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words AMENDED COMPLAINT on 

the first page. Plaintiff is cautioned that his amended complaint must be a complete statement of 

his claims. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“For 

claims dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend, we will not require that they be 

repled in a subsequent amended complaint to preserve them for appeal. But for any claims 

voluntarily dismissed, we will consider those claims to be waived if not repled.”) Failure to file 

the amended complaint will result in the dismissal of this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 1, 2019

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

Case 3:19-cv-01681-EMC Document 9 Filed 08/01/19 Page 5 of 5