Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_04-cv-01050/USCOURTS-almd-2_04-cv-01050-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tisha Dickson
Plaintiff
Labcorp
Defendant

Document Text:

1. Pursuant to an order dated September 15, 2005

(Doc. No. 22), Dickson’s claims for retaliation, hostilework environment, and violation of the Family Medical

Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2654, have been dismissed.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

TISHA DICKSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:04cv1050-T

) (WO)

LABCORP, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

Plaintiff Tisha Dickson, an African-American woman,

brings this lawsuit against defendant Laboratory

Corporation of America Holdings (“LabCorp”) under Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42

U.S.C.A. §§ 1981a, 2000e through 2000e-17) and the Civil

Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1981).1

 Dickson alleges

that she was terminated because of her race.

Jurisdiction over Dickson’s claim is proper under 28

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U.S.C.A. § 1331 (federal question), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343

(civil rights), and 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (Title

VII).

This case is currently before the court on LabCorp’s

motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that

follow, the court will deny the motion. 

I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under Rule 56,

the party seeking summary judgment must first inform the

court of the basis for the motion, and the burden then

shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate why summary

judgment would not be proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also Fitzpatrick v. City

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of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-17 (11th Cir. 1993)

(discussing burden-shifting under Rule 56). The nonmoving party must affirmatively set forth specific facts

showing a genuine issue for trial and may not rest upon

the mere allegations or denials in the pleadings. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e).

The court’s role at the summary-judgment stage is not

to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the

matter, but rather to determine only whether a genuine

issue exists for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In doing so, the court must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor

of that party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

II. BACKGROUND

The following facts are construed in Dickson’s favor

as the non-moving party: Dickson was hired by LabCorp as

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2. Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to defendant’s

motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 16), Deposition of

Tisha Dickson, pp. 39-42.

3. Defendant’s evidentiary submission in support of

motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 14), Deposition of

4

a courier and promoted to phlebotomist (patient service

technician) in July 2001.2

 On June 17, 2004, she and coemployee Ronnie Morgan were involved in an altercation.

Morgan, who is white, started yelling at Dickson. He was

close enough to her that he was spitting in her face and

his nose almost touched her. Dickson told Morgan to back

away from her on three occasions, the third time taking

a step back herself. When Morgan moved towards Dickson

after she had taken a step back, she said that she would

“knock [Morgan] out” if he did not “get out of [her]

face.” Morgan was pulled away from Dickson by another

employee and taken into another room to calm down. 

Dickson called the branch supervisor, Suzanne Brink,

and told Brink that she would “knock [Morgan] out” unless

management did something to change his aggressive

behavior.3

 Brink then called Human Resources Manager

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Tisha Dickson, pp. 68, 74, 83-85.

4. Id., Affidavit of Patrick Flanagan, ¶ 6.

5. Id., Deposition of Suzanne Brink, pp. 12-16.

6. Id., Deposition of Jacinda Elliot, pp. 22-24, 33.

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Patrick Flanagan to inform him that Dickson had

threatened to hit another employee. Flanagan asked Brink

to keep him posted on any developments.4

After Brink spoke with Flanagan, Morgan complained to

Brink that he felt intimidated by Dickson. Two

eyewitnesses gave oral statements confirming that Dickson

had threatened Morgan.5

 The next morning, Brink relayed

the details of the altercation to Jacinda Elliot,

Dickson’s immediate supervisor, who had been out of the

office the previous day. When Elliot and Dickson spoke

later that morning, Dickson stated that if Morgan did not

stay away from her she would “put him on his back.”6

 

Elliot and Brink then called Flanagan and gave a more

detailed report of the incident. Based on the

information relayed to him by Elliot and Brink, Flanagan

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7. Id., Affidavit of Patrick Flanagan, ¶¶ 8-10.

8. Plaintiff’s opposition to defendant’s motion for

summary judgment (Doc. No. 16), Deposition of Tisha

Dickson, pp. 93-94.

9. Id., Affidavit of Patricia Bandy, ¶ 9.

6

decided to terminate Dickson.7 Later that day, Dickson

was notified that she was terminated for violating the

workplace violence policy.8

 She was replaced by Christie

Thornton, who is white.9

LabCorp’s workplace violence policy provides, in

relevant part:

“POLICY

LabCorp maintains a ‘zero tolerance for

violence’ environment and will make

every effort to prevent violent

incidents from occurring. Violence, for

our purposes, includes but is not

limited to: physically harming another,

(shouting, harassment and intimidation)

that implies a threat of violence,

shoving, pushing, coercion, brandishing

weapons, and threats or talk of violence

that would include any communication of

violence.

“PROCEDURES

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10. Defendant’s brief in support of motion for

summary judgment (Doc. No. 14), Exhibit 4, Workplace

Violence Policy.

11. Plaintiff’s opposition to defendant’s motion for

summary judgment (Doc. No. 16), Affidavit of Patricia

Bandy, ¶ 7; Affidavit of Doris Cobb, ¶ 8.

12. Id., Deposition of Tisha Dickson, pp. 138, 141.

7

If any violence by an employee is

displayed in the workplace (or threats

of violence), that person may be subject

to immediate termination.”10

Prior to Dickson’s termination, several white employees

violated this policy during altercations with fellow

employees but were not terminated.

Morgan and Bill Gates, a white employee, were

involved in an altercation in which they threw objects at

each other while yelling. In response to the commotion,

Elliot came out of her office and told both employees to

calm down. Neither employee was terminated.11 On another

occasion, Marie Williamson, a white employee, told Morgan

that there would be a fight if Morgan did not leave her

alone. Williamson was not terminated.12 Morgan also

threatened to throw another employee down an elevator

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13. Id., Affidavit of Doris Cobb, ¶ 5. 

14. Id., Deposition of Tisha Dickson, pp. 141, 143.

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shaft during an argument. Elliot overheard that comment

and told Morgan that such a comment violated the

workplace violence policy. Morgan was not terminated.13

Finally, Morgan once yelled and spit at Kristy Thornton,

a white employee, while standing inches from her face.

Thornton told Elliot, who had not witnessed the incident,

that she would hit Morgan if Elliot did not tell Morgan

to leave her alone. Thornton was not terminated.14

III. DISCUSSION 

Under Title VII, it is illegal for an employer “to

fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or

otherwise discriminate against any individual with

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s

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15. Because Title VII and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 “have

the same requirements of proof and use the same

analytical framework,” the court will “explicitly address

the Title VII claim with the understanding that the

analysis applies to the § 1981 claim as well.” Standard

v. A.B.E.L. Servs., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998).

9

race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42

U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1).15

Because Dickson has not presented direct evidence of

discrimination, this case is governed by the familiar

burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas

approach, a plaintiff has the initial burden of

establishing a prima-facie case of unlawful employment

discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.

at 802; Young v. General Food Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 828

(11th Cir. 1988). If the plaintiff establishes a primafacie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to

rebut the presumption by articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment action.

Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir.

2000). The employer has the burden of production, not of

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persuasion, and thus does not have to persuade a court

that it was actually motivated by the reason advanced.

See, e.g., Texas Dep’t of Cmty Affairs v. Burdine, 450

U.S. 247, 253-55, 258 (1981); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.

at 802. 

Once the employer satisfies this burden of

production, “the presumption of discrimination is

eliminated and ‘the plaintiff has the opportunity to come

forward with evidence, including the previously produced

evidence establishing the prima facie case, sufficient to

permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the

reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons

for the adverse employment decision.’” Chapman, 229 F.3d

at 1024 (citations omitted). The plaintiff may meet this

burden by persuading the court that a discriminatory

reason more than likely motivated the defendant or by

demonstrating that the proffered reason for the

employment decision is not worthy of belief. Burdine,

450 U.S. at 256; see also Young, 840 F.2d at 828.

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LabCorp concedes for the purposes of this motion that

Dickson can establish a prima-facie case of

discriminatory discharge because: (1) she belongs to a

protected group, (2) she experienced an adverseemployment action, (3) LabCorp replaced her with someone

outside the protected class, and (4) she was qualified

for her job. Bogle v. Orange County Bd. of County

Comm’rs, 162 F.3d 653, 656-57 (11th Cir. 1998). LabCorp,

however, claims that it fired Dickson because her threat

to assault Morgan violated the workplace violence policy.

Although Dickson admits that she violated the

workplace violence policy, she responds that LabCorp’s

proffered non-discriminatory reason is pretextual because

several white employees at LabCorp violated the workplace

violence policy but were not terminated. See Pearson v.

Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth., 952 F.2d 1274, 1280 (11th

Cir. 1992) (holding that a plaintiff may prove

discriminatory termination by showing that employees

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outside a protected class committed similar disciplinary

violations, but were not disciplined). “To make a

comparison of the plaintiff’s treatment to that of

non-minority employees, the plaintiff must show that

[she] and the employees are similarly situated in all

relevant respects.” Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555,

1562 (11th Cir. 1997). “[T]he quantity and quality of

the comparator’s misconduct [must] be nearly identical to

prevent courts from second-guessing employers’ reasonable

decisions and confusing apples with oranges.” Maniccia

v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999). 

Dickson identifies four incidents, all involving

Morgan and another white employee, in which Morgan or the

other employee violated the workplace violence policy but

was not terminated: 

• The argument between Morgan and Gates that

escalated into thrown objects.

• Williamson’s threat to Morgan that she would hit

him if he did not leave her alone.

• Morgan’s threat to push an unidentified coworker

down the elevator shaft.

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• Thornton’s statement to Elliot that she would

hit Morgan if management did not stop his

behavior.

LabCorp first argues that Dickson’s comparator

evidence is irrelevant because Flanagan, the decisionmaker, did not know that Dickson was black. To be sure,

an employer cannot take an adverse employment action

“because of” an employee’s race if the decision-maker was

unaware of the employee’s race. See Brungart v.

BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 799

(11th Cir. 2000) (noting in the retaliation context that

a plaintiff cannot prove causal connection between an

adverse employment action and protected expression if the

decision-maker was not aware of the protected expression

when the adverse action was taken). However, the conduct

of supervisors who were not involved in a termination

decision can be relevant in determining whether

discrimination occurred. See Jones v. Bessemer Carraway

Med. Ctr., 151 F.3d 1321, 1324 n.5 (11th Cir. 1998).

(“Depending upon the circumstances of a case, evidence

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[involving] persons other than the final decisionmaker

may be important in some employment discrimination

litigation.”). This is particularly true where highlevel decision-makers base termination decisions on

information provided by an employee’s direct supervisor,

who is racially biased. For example, the racial bias of

a direct supervisor who reported misconduct to a

disciplinary committee, which ultimately terminated an

employee, is relevant if the supervisor previously had

failed to report similar conduct by employees outside a

protected classification. See Jones, 151 F.3d at 1323.

Likewise, even if a supervisor is not involved in a

decision to terminate an employee, that supervisor’s

racial bias is relevant when the actual decision-maker

bases the termination decision on performance reviews

written by the supervisor. See Herawi v. Ala. Dep't of

Forensic Sciences, 311 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1348 n.24 (N.D.

Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.). 

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Although Flanagan made the ultimate decision to fire

Dickson, his decision was based entirely upon information

conveyed to him by Elliot and Brink. Flanagan

acknowledges that he terminated Dickson because he was

informed by Brink and Elliot that Dickson threatened

another employee in violation of the workplace violence

policy. Essentially, in deciding whether to terminate

employees under the workplace violence policy, Flanagan

simply receives reports of altercations from supervisors,

determines if the conduct violates the workplace violence

policy, and terminates the offender if it does. Elliot

and Brink’s decisions to report an incident of workplace

violence is the critical factor in whether a particular

employee who has violated that policy is terminated.

Accordingly, the proper pretext inquiry here is Elliot

and Brink’s decision not to report similar conduct of

white employees to Flanagan. It is therefore necessary

to determine if the incidents that Brink and Elliot

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16. Although Elliot denies memory of any altercation

between Gates and Morgan, the affidavits of Bandy and

Cobb raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

Elliot witnessed both employees throwing objects at each

other.

16

failed to report are nearly identical to Dickson’s threat

of violence.

LabCorp offers several reasons why they are not.

First, LabCorp contends that no one in management was

aware of the threats of violence or acts of violence

attributed to the white employees. If the supervisors

were unaware that the white employees had violated the

workplace violence policy, they certainly could not have

known that discipline was warranted. Accordingly, the

incident involving Williamson is not nearly identical to

Dickson’s because no evidence suggests that Brink,

Elliot, or any other supervisor was aware of Williamson’s

threat. However, the evidence viewed in the light most

favorable to Dickson reveals that either Brink or Elliot

was aware of the incidents between Morgan and Gates,16

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Thornton and Morgan, and Morgan and the unnamed employee.

LabCorp contends that the incident involving Thornton

should not be considered because Thornton did not

threaten Morgan, but merely told Elliot that she would

assault Morgan. Although is not entirely clear why an

employer would wish to punish threats of violence made in

the heat of an argument but not those made after an

employee has sufficient time to reflect and “cool off,”

the court will not second-guess LabCorp’s decision to

distinguish between the two because the “quality” of the

conduct is different. See Maniccia, 171 F.3d at 1368.

Nonetheless, the Gates-Morgan encounter and Morgan’s

threat to throw another employee down an elevator shaft

remain. 

LabCorp contends that these two incidents are not

nearly identical to Dickson’s because Dickson admitted to

Brink and Elliot that she had threatened Morgan. LabCorp

relies on Abel v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir.

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2000), in which an employee who had been terminated for

theft attempted to compare herself to another employee

who had been accused of theft and not disciplined. The

court concluded that the misconduct was not nearly

identical because the plaintiff admitted the wrong-doing,

while her alleged comparator denied it. Id. at 1339.

Abel is readily distinguished from the case at bar

because the supervisor was not certain the comparator had

committed the theft, while Abel’s admission dispelled any

doubt that she was guilty. In contrast, Brink witnessed

the Gates-Morgan incident and Elliot overheard Morgan’s

threat to push a coworker down an elevator shaft.

Essentially, Dickson’s white coworkers were caught redhanded in their violations of the workplace violence

policy, so an admission was unnecessary. Only Dickson

had any need to admit her misconduct because supervisors

did not witness her threat to Morgan. While the court is

constrained to compare “apples to apples,” see Maniccia,

171 F.3d at 1368, distinguishing Dickson’s misconduct on

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17. The workplace violence policy states: “Prompt

and accurate reporting of all violent incidents, whether

or not physical injury has occurred, is required.”

Defendant’s brief in support of motion for summary

judgment (Doc. No. 14), Exhibit 4, Workplace Violence

Policy. Such an admonition is obviated by witnessing.

19

such grounds is patently unreasonable under the

circumstances.

LabCorp also argues that these two incidents are not

nearly identical because Dickson’s threat was reported to

Brink, while the other two incidents were not reported to

a supervisor. This distinction is without substance for

the same reason that Dickson’s admission is irrelevant:

the need to report conduct to a supervisor is superfluous

when the supervisor witnesses it. In fact, the workplace

violence policy’s reporting requirement is clearly

premised on the assumption that a supervisor did not

witness the act of violence.17 Although it is arguable

that a reasonable employer could deem Dickson’s threat to

be more “serious” because Morgan told his supervisor that

he was actually intimidated, Brink reported the incident

to Flanagan before she had spoken to Morgan. Thus,

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Dickson’s incident was treated differently before this

arguable distinction even came to the attention of her

supervisor. 

Finally, the incident between Gates and Morgan was

not a threat of violence, but an actual incident of

violence. Throwing objects at a coworker is a greater

danger to physical safety than mere threats of doing so.

The requirement that misconduct be “nearly identical”

cannot be taken too literally. For example, a completed

assault is not nearly identical to a threatened assault,

because one is more serious than the other. Nonetheless,

an employer would not be justified in punishing the less

serious conduct while ignoring the more serious offense.

Here, Dickson’s threat was reported while the actual

physical altercation between Morgan and Gates was not.

LabCorp has failed to adequately explain the reason for

this disparate treatment of white employees.

In sum, the evidence viewed in the light most

favorable to Dickson reveals that Elliot and Brink were

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aware of, and failed to report to Flanagan, similar

misconduct of white employees. LabCorp’s attempts to

distinguish the Morgan-Gates incident and Morgan’s

elevator-shaft threat from Dickson’s threat of violence

are beset by logical inconsistencies. Accordingly, the

court concludes that a reasonable fact-finder could find

that the different treatment was “because of” Dickson’s

race and LabCorp’s proffered reason is pretextual.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that

defendant Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings’

motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 12) is denied.

DONE, this the 18th day of October, 2005.

_____________________________ /s/ Myron H. Thompson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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