Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00830/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00830-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Aaron Klein
Plaintiff
Kathleen Longwell
Defendant
Michael Musacco
Defendant

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AARON KLEIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

KATHLEEN LONGWELL, et al., 

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:15-cv-00830-LJO-MJS (PC)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION 

(ECF No. 11)

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

On June 26, 2015, the Magistrate Judge assigned to the case screened Plaintiff’s 

complaint and dismissed it for failure to state a claim, but gave leave to amend. (ECF 

No. 10.) Thereafter, Plaintiff filed objections to the screening order (ECF No. 11), which 

the Court construes as a motion for reconsideration.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) allows parties to file objections to 

nondispositive orders decided by a Magistrate Judge. “The district judge in the case 

must consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is 

clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Id.

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Similarly, Local Rule 303(c) allows parties to seek reconsideration by a District 

Judge of a Magistrate Judge’s pretrial rulings. Local Rule 303(c). The assigned District 

Judge shall review all such requests for reconsideration under the "clearly erroneous or 

contrary to law" standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Local Rule 303(f) (citing 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is detained at Coalinga State Hospital pursuant to the Sexually Violent 

Predator Act. He names as Defendants the following persons in their individual

capacities: (1) Kathleen Longwell, Ph.D., Psychologist for the Department of State 

Hospitals (“DSH”); and (2) Michael Musacco, Ph.D., Psychologist for DSH.

Plaintiff’s essentially alleges that evaluations conducted by Defendants in relation 

to his commitment proceedings erroneously relied on Plaintiff’s juvenile offenses. Plaintiff 

seeks to have Defendants removed from his case and requests independent evaluations 

and a new probable cause hearing.

B. Screening Order

The Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff’s request for new, independent 

evaluations and a new probable cause hearing attacked the very proceedings that led to 

his detention, and that no relief could be granted without invalidating Plaintiff’s detention. 

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005). Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 

1141 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge concluded that such claims are 

cognizable only in habeas corpus and may not be brought in a section 1983 action. 

C. Objections

Plaintiff claims that the screening order is in error because he does not seek to 

invalidate his commitment proceedings, but rather to correct underlying Due Process 

violations. He further claims that the Magistrate Judge erred in concluding that Plaintiff 

has been adjudicated a Sexually Violent Predator, when in fact his commitment 

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proceedings are ongoing. He presents further argument as to why Defendants’ 

evaluations were improper.

D. Analysis

Plaintiff’s complaint was unclear as to whether Plaintiff has been adjudicated a 

Sexually Violent Predator. To the extent he has, his claims represent an attempt to 

indirectly attach his detention and are Heck barred for the reasons stated by the 

Magistrate Judge. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994) (unless and until 

favorable termination of the conviction or sentence, no cause of action under section 

1983 exists); Huftile, 410 F.3d at 1141 (concluding that challenge to SVPA assessments 

would imply invalidity of civil commitment and therefore could only be brought in habeas 

corpus).

To the extent Plaintiff’s commitment proceedings are ongoing, the Court must 

abstain from addressing his claims. Under principles of comity and federalism, a federal 

court should not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings by granting injunctive 

or declaratory relief except under special circumstances. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 

(1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971). Younger abstention is required when: 

(1) state judicial proceedings are pending; (2) the state proceedings involve important 

state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford adequate opportunity to raise the 

constitutional issue. Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 

423, 432 (1982); Dubinka v. Judges of the Super. Ct., 23 F.3d 218, 223 (9th Cir. 1994).

Courts in this circuit have unanimously concluded that these principles likewise require 

the Court to abstain from interfering in civil proceedings to determine whether Plaintiff is 

a sexually violent predator. See, e.g., Mackenzie v. Holder, No. ED CV 13–08217–VBF–

JC, 2013 WL 8291434, at *2 (Nov. 27, 2013), and cases cited therein. Accordingly, the 

Court will abstain from addressing Plaintiff’s claim in this civil action while his 

commitment proceedings are pending.

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Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge did not clearly err in concluding that 

Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has not presented a basis for reconsideration

of the Magistrate Judge’s screening order. Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s objections (ECF No. 11), which the Court construes as a motion 

for reconsideration, are DENIED;

2. To the extent Plaintiff is able to cure the deficiencies noted herein and in 

the screening order, Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty 

(30) days of the date this order;

3. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, 

the action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to comply with a 

court order and failure to prosecute.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 16, 2015 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

4.

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