Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-00902/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-00902-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
JoAnne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Sarah J. Merlini
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SARAH J. MERLINI,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant. /

No. C 03-00902 SI

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY

FEES PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL

ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412

Now before the Court is plaintiff’s motion for the award of attorney fees pursuant to the Equal

Access to Justice Act (EAJA). 28 U.S.C. § 2412. The underlying action was heard by this Court and

concerned plaintiff’s challenge to an Administrative Law Judge’s final decision denying disability

benefits for a 1999 claim. Both parties’ papers included information related to a separate 2003 claim.

On February 7, 2005, this Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the 2003 claim, denied the

motion to dismiss the 1999 claim, and remanded the 1999 claim for further analysis regarding plaintiff’s

allegations of depression. 

In the present motion, plaintiff requests fees in the amount of $4,391.10 at the hourly rate of

$153.00 for a total of 28.7 hours. Defendant concedes that plaintiff is entitled to an award of fees but

contests both the rate and the hours billed. Having carefully considered the papers submitted, the Court

hereby GRANTS the requested fees in the amount of $4,391.10 based on 28.7 hours of work at the

hourly rate of $153.00, for the reasons set out below.

1. Hourly rate

Plaintiff requests an award of attorney fees at an hourly rate of $153.00. EAJA provides for

Case 3:03-cv-00902-SI Document 30 Filed 06/22/05 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

the award of “reasonable attorney fees” based upon “prevailing market rates.” 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(2)(A). The statute caps the hourly rate for attorney services at $125.00 unless the court

determines that a higher fee is justified by either a “special factor,” such as the limited availability of

qualified attorneys, or an increase in the cost of living. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). Fees exceeding

the statutory cap are awarded under the special factor standard at the discretion of the court when

specialized knowledge, skills, or experience is necessary to the litigation and comparable services

cannot be obtained at the statutory rate. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 572 (1998); Pirus v.

Bowen, 869 F.2d 536, 541-42 (9th Cir. 1989). If fees are submitted with cost of living adjustments, the

fee applicant bears the burden of justifying and documenting the hourly rate requested. Sorenson v.

Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). Cost of

living adjustments are calculated using the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) from

the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor. Increases are calculated from March

of 1996, when the statutory rate was set at $125 per hour. 

Counsel’s rate of $153 was calculated as of October 2004, the month in which work was

completed in the present case. The CPI-U at that time was 190.9. In March of 1996, the CPI-U rate was

155.7. Plaintiff accurately calculated the rate as adjusted for cost of living increases as follows:

(190.9/155.7) x 125 = 153. Accordingly, the cost of living increase is granted and attorney fees are

awarded at the hourly rate of $153.00.

2. Hours billed

Plaintiff requests compensation for 28.7 hours of work. Defendant objects to two elements of

the stated billing. First, defendant maintains that the time spent preparing the motion for summary

judgement was excessive. Specifically, defendant claims that the issues involved in the case were

“neither novel or complex,” and that the plaintiff erroneously argued that a 2003 ALJ decision was

reviewable. In support of this claim, defendant notes that this Court found that it did not have subject

matter jurisdiction over the 2003 claim and that the claim was barred by the Social Security Act.

Second, defendant argues that the Court should reduce the 2 hours billed for preparation of the EAJA

petition to 1 hour. 

Case 3:03-cv-00902-SI Document 30 Filed 06/22/05 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Hours billed must be reasonable and documented. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 437; see 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412 (d)(2)(A). When evaluating the reasonableness of hours billed, the court should take into

consideration factors including the amount involved in the claim, whether the fees are excessive,

redundant, or unnecessary, and the relationship between the fee awarded and the results obtained.

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437-39. 

In this case, plaintiff ultimately prevailed on the 1999 claim and the total amount of attorney fees

at stake is small. While the 2003 claim was not ripe for review, the confusion over the claim was

determined by the Court to be “primarily the fault of the defendant.” Feb. 7, 2005 Court Order at 5 n.2.

The Court held that while the plaintiff addressed only the 1999 claim in her original complaint, the

defendant’s decision to include evidence and testimony regarding the 2003 claim in the answer led the

plaintiff to discuss both claims in her motion for summary judgement in order to ensure that the 2003

claim would not be precluded at a later date. The Court then requested that the Social Security

Commissioner file separate administrative records for the 1999 and 2003 claims in all future

proceedings. Id. 

Given the nature of this Court’s previous findings regarding the 2003 claim, the 15 hours spent

in preparation of the summary judgement motion are justified. Likewise, the Court finds that 2 hours

is not an excessive amount of time to review billing records and to prepare an EAJA petition.

Accordingly, the Court will compensate plaintiff for the requested 28.7 hours.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees in the amount of $4,391.10,

based on the hourly rate of $153.00 for 28.7 hours. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 20, 2005 S/Susan Illston 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:03-cv-00902-SI Document 30 Filed 06/22/05 Page 3 of 3