Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-19-14483/USCOURTS-ca11-19-14483-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pedro J. Burgos
Appellant
Sand Canyon Corp
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-14483

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 4:19-cv-00076-CDL

PEDRO J. BURGOS, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

SAND CANYON CORP, 

f.k.a. Option One Mortgage Company Inc., 

 Defendant - Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

________________________

(May 6, 2020)

Before GRANT, LUCK and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Appellant, Pedro Burgos (“Burgos”), appeals the district court’s order 

granting a judgment of dismissal for Appellee, Sand Canyon Corporation (“Sand 

Canyon”), on Burgos’s complaint alleging fraud; Georgia and Federal RICO

Racketeering; theft by deception; conspiracy to commit a crime; gross negligence; 

bad faith, malice, and willful misconduct; trespass against property; unjust 

enrichment; declaratory and injunctive relief; and an accounting. The claims 

revolve around Burgos’s allegation that Sand Canyon fraudulently assigned the 

security deed on his home to Wells Fargo (“Wells Fargo”) and that Wells Fargo

later wrongfully foreclosed on his home. 

Burgos initially filed an action in state court in 2013 but failed properly to 

serve Sand Canyon. However, the state court granted Burgos a default judgment 

against Sand Canyon that set aside the original security deed, the assignment to 

Wells Fargo, and the deed under power. Several years passed before Sand Canyon 

learned of the action and filed a motion in state court to set aside the default 

judgment due to lack of jurisdiction. Following a hearing in state court on May 1, 

2019, the state court entered an order setting aside the default judgment. 

Sand Canyon removed the case to federal district court. Initially, the district 

court remanded the case to state court, determining that the case was closed. The 

remand order also denied a Rule 11 motion filed by Burgos. Burgos appealed the 

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district court’s order denying his Rule 11 motion, and this court affirmed. See 

Burgos v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 786 F. App’x 231, 233 (11th Cir. 2019). 

Meanwhile, Burgos filed numerous motions in the district court, which the district 

court denied, and Sand Canyon filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court 

granted. After reviewing the record and reading the parties’ briefs, we affirm the 

district court’s judgment of dismissal.

I.

Burgos raises several claims on appeal. First, Burgos argues that the district 

court lacked federal jurisdiction because Article VI § 4 ¶ 1 of the Georgia 

Constitution and O.C.G.A. § 44-2-60 mandate that the Georgia Superior Court has 

exclusive jurisdiction over this case due to the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 

1652. Second, he contends that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 

based on the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, according to his interpretation of 

Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 126 S. Ct. 1735 (2006) (discussing exceptions 

to federal court’s jurisdiction in probate context). Third, he claims that removal to 

federal court was untimely and thus improper. Fourth, he argues that he stated a 

viable claim for a forged security deed because there was no witness to his 

signature on the security deed; rather, the security deed was witnessed after the 

fact. Sand Canyon responds by alleging that Burgos’s claims all lack merit, and 

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this court should dismiss his appeal based on frivolity pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 38.1

 Sand Canyon also requests that this court impose 

sanctions against Burgos and his attorney.2

 

II.

We review de novo whether the district court properly interpreted and 

applied the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to determine if diversity jurisdiction 

existed. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079, 1085 

(11th Cir. 2010). We also review de novo the district court’s order granting a 

motion to dismiss, applying the same standards utilized by the district court. 

Glover v. Liggett Corp., Inc., 459 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006). Generally, the 

scope of the review is limited to the four corners of the complaint. St. George v. 

Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002). To survive dismissal, the

factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 

1965 (2007). This requires “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully1 “If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed 

motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and 

single or double costs to the appellee.” Fed. R. App. P. 38.

2 Burgos’s attorney has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel based on an undisclosed 

conflict of interest. 

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harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 

1949 (2009) (citations omitted). Additionally, we review de novo the district 

court’s denial of Burgos’s motions to remand. See City of Vestavia Hills v. Gen. 

Fid. Ins. Co., 676 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2012).

III.

Burgos asserts on appeal that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 

determine his action against Sand Canyon. His proposed reasoning is misguided. 

Indeed, we conclude from the record that the district court properly determined it 

had jurisdiction over the complaint. The record clearly supports the district court’s 

finding that diversity jurisdiction exists: Burgos is a Georgia resident, Sand 

Canyon is a California corporation, and the amount in controversy exceeds 

$75,000. Moreover, we agree with the district court that Burgos’s arguments that 

his wrongful foreclosure/fraud/RICO action asserting in personam tort claims is 

somehow subject to the exclusive in rem jurisdiction of the Georgia state courts are 

unpersuasive. 

Burgos also asserts that the district court erred in determining that the 

removal was untimely and improper. Having reviewed the record, we agree with 

the district court that neither assertion has merit. A notice of removal must be filed 

“within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of 

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a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such 

action or proceeding is based.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). The record supports the

district court’s finding that Sand Canyon was not properly served with Burgos’s 

complaint until June 14, 2019, after Sand Canyon removed the action to federal 

court. Burgos contends that he previously attempted to serve the Georgia 

Secretary of State with the state court action pursuant to Georgia law. However, 

because Sand Canyon obtained a certificate to withdraw business in Georgia before 

this action was filed, service of process on the Georgia Secretary of State would 

have been proper if a copy of the process was also mailed to an officer of the 

withdrawn corporation at the mailing address provided by the company in its 

application for withdrawal. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1520(c). Because Burgos failed to 

do this, the attempted service was defective. See Howard v. Technosystems 

Consol. Corp., 536 S.E.2d 753, 756 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). 

A review of the record confirms that Burgos did not produce any evidence 

that process was delivered to Sand Canyon in 2013. The correct address for 

service of process was 6531 Irvine Center Drive, Irvine CA 92618. Burgos Aff. 

(Mar. 12, 2019) Ex. A, Letter from D. Sugimoto to Sec’y of State (Sept. 15, 2008)

(Doc. 1-5 at 34.) When Burgos originally filed his affidavit of service in state 

court in 2013, he presented evidence that he mailed the letter to Sand Canyon at 

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6351 Irvine Center Drive, Irvine CA 92618. Burgos Aff. (Apr. 5, 2013) Ex. A, 

Certified Mail Receipts (Doc. 1-3 at 92.) Thus, he mailed the process and 

complaint to the wrong address. When Sand Canyon moved to set aside the 

default judgment in state court, Burgos submitted another affidavit, admitting that 

he made an error when he handwrote the address but asserting that he typed the 

address correctly in a separate area of the envelope. Burgos Aff. ¶ 6 (Mar. 12, 

2019) (Doc. 1-5 at 30.) However, the district court found that Burgos did not 

present evidence to support this assertion, and he fails to do so on appeal as well.

Thus, based on our review of the record, we conclude that the district court 

correctly found that Sand Canyon was not properly served with the complaint in 

this action before Sand Canyon sought removal of the case from state court. The 

removal clock does not begin before service of official process, which did not 

occur here until June 14, 2019. Sand Canyon removed the action within thirty 

days of the state court’s order setting aside the default judgments and reopening the 

action; thus, the motion to remand was timely and proper. See Whitehurst v. WalMart, 306 F. App’x 446, 448 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (noting that there is 

nothing in the removal statute, or any other legal provision, that requires service of 

the complaint before a defendant files a notice of removal). 

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Burgos also challenges the district court’s order granting a judgment of 

dismissal for Sand Canyon. He claims that he stated a viable claim for a forged 

security deed based on his contention that the witness was not present in the room 

with him at closing when he signed the security deed and witnessed the deed after 

the fact. Burgos further alleges that Sand Canyon made a “fraudulent and forged 

assignment” of the security deed to Wells Fargo. Burgos Compl. 3 ¶¶ 3-4. He also 

contends that Sand Canyon committed fraud by making false representations to 

him “by virtue of the deed and assignment filed with the Superior Court.” Compl. 

4 ¶ 6, 5 ¶ 17. Additionally, Burgos asserts that Wells Fargo “wrongfully 

foreclosed” on the property that was secured by the deed. Id. at 3 ¶ 3; 4 ¶¶ 7-9 

(alleging that Sand Canyon breached the terms of the security deed by failing to 

give proper notice of default).

We conclude from the record that the district court correctly determined that 

Burgos did not support his claims with adequate evidence. First, Burgos admits

he signed the deed, and Georgia law is clear that for a deed to be enforceable, 

a witness need not be present at the signing. See Hooten v. Goldome Credit Corp., 

481 S.E.2d 550, 551 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (“Despite a statutory requirement that the 

signature of the maker of a deed must be attested by two witnesses, the

requirement relates only to the record ability of the instrument, and a deed may be

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valid between the parties without attestation.”) (citations omitted). Furthermore, 

Burgos does not point to any authority that a deed which is nonrecordable for lack 

of a proper witness is invalid and void. To the contrary, Georgia law is clear that 

an allegation that a deed was improperly witnessed “is insufficient to void the deed 

to secure debt, since a deed without attestation conveys the title as against the 

grantor and his heirs.” Budget Charge Accounts, Inc. v. Peters, 96 S.E.2d 887, 889 

(Ga. 1957). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed 

this allegation.

Burgos next claims that Sand Canyon made a fraudulent and forged 

assignment of the security deed to Wells Fargo, and he seeks relief against Sand 

Canyon on this ground. We agree with the district court that to the extent Burgos 

is attempting to challenge Sand Canyon’s assignment of the security deed to Wells 

Fargo, he has no standing. The assignment was a contract between Sand Canyon

and Wells Fargo. The proper party to bring a claim against Sand Canyon 

challenging the assignment would be Wells Fargo, the other party to the 

assignment. See Montgomery v. Bank of Am., 740 S.E.2d 434, 437 (Ga. Ct. App. 

2013). Accordingly, we conclude that Burgos fails to state a claim against Sand 

Canyon based on the assignment. 

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Burgos’s remaining claims are based on the alleged wrongful foreclosure by 

Wells Fargo, which is the assignee of the security deed and not a party to this 

action. Burgos alleges that Wells Fargo wrongfully initiated foreclosure 

proceedings even though it held no interest in the security deed. Burgos does not 

allege any facts to suggest that Sand Canyon was involved in the foreclosure 

proceedings. Rather, Burgos specifically alleges that Sand Canyon had no interest 

in the security deed at the time of the foreclosure and that Wells Fargo, not Sand 

Canyon, initiated and conducted the foreclosure proceedings. 

Hence, any claim by Burgos against Sand Canyon based on Wells Fargo’s 

foreclosure proceedings fails. “A plaintiff asserting a claim of wrongful 

foreclosure must establish (1) a legal duty owed to it by the foreclosing party, (2) a 

breach of that duty, (3) a causal connection between the breach of that duty and the 

injury it sustained, and (4) damages.” Dixon v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 824 

S.E.2d 760, 764 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019) (emphasis added) (quoting Canton Plaza v. 

Regions Bank, 732 S.E.2d 449, 454 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)). Burgos’s attempt to 

establish that Sand Canyon is the foreclosing party via agency principles is 

meritless. Thus, we conclude that Burgos cannot state a claim for relief against 

Sand Canyon on his wrongful foreclosure claim. 

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For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment of 

dismissal.3

 

AFFIRMED.

3 The motion for sanctions filed by Appellee is DENIED.

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