Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-04185/USCOURTS-ca8-04-04185-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mary Ann Turner
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

 The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-4185

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Mary Ann Turner, also known as * Northern District of Iowa.

Mary Ann Vlazny, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 25, 2006 

Filed: April 27, 2006

___________

Before RILEY, MAGILL, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Mary Ann Turner (Turner) pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine after

having been convicted of a felony drug offense, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 844(a)

and 851 (Count 1); and possessing pseudoephedrine knowing it would be used to

manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) (Count 2). In

December 2004, the district court1

 sentenced Turner to concurrent prison terms of 24

months (the statutory maximum) on Count 1 and 71 months on Count 2 (which had

Appellate Case: 04-4185 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/27/2006 Entry ID: 2038005
-2-

a Guidelines range of 57-71 months). “[I]n its discretion” and “after consideration of

the [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] factors,” the court pronounced an identical alternative

sentence in the event the Guidelines were later found to be unconstitutional. On

appeal, Turner’s counsel moved to withdraw and filed a brief under Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Turner filed a pro se supplemental brief. We

reject their arguments for the reasons discussed below.

First, in light of Turner’s sworn statements at her change-of-plea hearing, we

see no reason to doubt the validity of her guilty plea. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431

U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of

verity.”). Second, sentencing on the basis of admitted drug quantities and a prior

felony drug conviction does not result in a Sixth Amendment violation. See United

States v. Alvarado-Rivera, 412 F.3d 942, 946 n.3 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (drug

quantity), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1096 (2006); United States v. Torres-Alvarado, 416

F.3d 808, 810 (8th Cir. 2005) (prior conviction). Third, Turner is not entitled to

plain-error relief for erroneous sentencing under a mandatory Guidelines scheme,

because–given the identical alternative discretionary sentence announced–the record

does not establish a reasonable probability that the district court would have imposed

a more favorable sentence under advisory Guidelines. See United States v. Booker,

543 U.S. 220, 233-37, 245, 258-59 (2005); United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 550-

54 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 266 (2005). Fourth, the sentence,

which was at the top of the Guidelines range, was not unreasonable: the district court

stated it had considered the section 3553(a) factors, and we see nothing in the record

to rebut the presumption of reasonableness arising from a sentence within the advisory

Guidelines range. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 261-62; United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d

716, 717-18 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 840 (2005).

As to the remaining arguments, the district court did not err in declining to

credit Turner for jail time served on a related pending state charge, see United States

v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 331-37 (1992) (18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) credit is computed by

Appellate Case: 04-4185 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/27/2006 Entry ID: 2038005
-3-

Attorney General rather than district court), in not recommending placement at the

prison facility Turner requested, see 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (“The Bureau of Prisons

shall designate the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment.”), or in denying selfsurrender or furlough in the absence of exceptional circumstances, see 18 U.S.C.

§ 3143(a)(1), (b)(1), and § 3145(c); and any ineffective-assistance claim should be

raised in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding, see United States v. Hughes, 330 F.3d 1068,

1069 (8th Cir. 2003).

Having reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,

80 (1988), we find no other nonfrivolous issue. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment,

and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 04-4185 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/27/2006 Entry ID: 2038005