Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03077/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03077-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Maribel A. Guillen
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 10, 2008 Decided April 14, 2009 

No. 07-3077 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

MARIBEL A. GUILLEN, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 07cr00100-01) 

Tony Axam Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was 

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. 

Stratton C. Strand, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeffrey A. 

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, Florence 

Pan, and Ronald Wesley Sharpe, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

Before: GINSBURG, TATEL and BROWN, Circuit Judges. 

USCA Case #07-3077 Document #1175682 Filed: 04/14/2009 Page 1 of 10
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 Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG. 

 GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: As part of her agreement to 

plead guilty to one count of wire fraud, Maribel Guillen 

waived her right to appeal her sentence if it was within the 

range indicated by the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 

Guillen received such a sentence but appeals nonetheless, 

contending the waiver is not enforceable. We join the eleven 

other circuits with jurisdiction over criminal appeals in 

holding such waivers are generally enforceable. 

I. Background 

 Guillen entered into an agreement with the Government 

whereby she would plead guilty to one count of wire fraud, 

which she committed as part of a scheme to embezzle funds 

from her former employer. The agreement also provided she 

[W]aives the right to appeal her sentence or the 

manner in which it was to be determined 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742, except to the 

extent that (a) the Court sentences Ms. Guillen 

to a period of imprisonment longer than the 

statutory maximum or (b) the Court departs 

upward from the applicable Sentencing 

Guideline range. 

 Guillen duly pled guilty. During the plea colloquy, the 

court told Guillen “you would always have the right to take 

an appeal if you thought my sentence was illegal.” The court 

also explained the method it would use to sentence Guillen, 

which “start[s] with a presumption that [a sentence within the 

Guideline range] is reasonable.” Later in the hearing, the 

court said: 

USCA Case #07-3077 Document #1175682 Filed: 04/14/2009 Page 2 of 10
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I do want to talk about [the waiver provision]. 

As I understand this ... and this paragraph is a 

little bit different than the usual one, [Guillen] 

is giving up her right to appeal any sentence 

she receives unless I sentence her to a period 

longer than 20 years or unless I depart upwards 

from the guideline range. 

Then, in light of Guillen’s waiver, the court corrected its prior 

statement that Guillen “would always have the right” to 

appeal an illegal sentence. Guillen said she understood the 

waiver provision and the court accepted her plea. 

 The court later determined the applicable Guideline range 

was 15 to 21 months imprisonment. At a sentencing hearing 

the court considered Guillen’s arguments that she ought to 

receive a sentence below the Guideline range, but concluded a 

sentence within “the guideline range is reasonable and meets 

the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3553.” The court thereupon 

sentenced Guillen to the minimum Guideline sentence of 15 

months imprisonment and to two years of supervised release 

and ordered her to pay restitution. Guillen appealed the 

sentence. 

II. Analysis 

 Guillen first argues the district court erred insofar as it 

believed a sentence within the Guideline range was 

presumptively reasonable. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. 

Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007) (“[T]he sentencing court does not 

enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the Guidelines 

sentence should apply”). She further contends the district 

court imposed a sentence greater than necessary to 

accomplish the purposes of sentencing, contrary to 18 U.S.C. 

USCA Case #07-3077 Document #1175682 Filed: 04/14/2009 Page 3 of 10
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§ 3553(a) (“The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but 

not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of 

sentencing). We do not consider these arguments because, as 

explained below, we agree with the Government that Guillen 

validly waived her right to appeal a sentence within the 

Guideline range. 

 

A. General Validity of Pre-sentence Waivers 

 As the First Circuit has observed, “The basic argument 

against presentence waivers of appellate rights is that such 

waivers are anticipatory.” United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 

14, 21 (2001). Accordingly, Guillen argues a defendant 

cannot knowingly waive his right to appeal a sentence that 

has not yet been imposed. All eleven other courts of appeals 

with criminal jurisdiction (including the First) have rejected 

this argument and held such waivers are presumptively valid.∗

 

This court has enforced a waiver of the right to appeal a yetto-be-imposed sentence on two occasions, see United States v. 

West, 392 F.3d 450, 458-61 (2004); In re Sealed Case, 283 

F.3d 349, 355 (2002), but we have not yet determined 

“whether such waivers are valid as a general matter.” West, 

392 F.3d at 460-61. 

 

 

∗ See Teeter, 257 F.3d at 21; United States v. Monzon, 359 F.3d 

110, 116-17 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 

562 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 403 (4th 

Cir. 2000); United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 

1992); United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761, 763-64, (6th Cir. 

2001); United States v. Jemison, 237 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 2001); 

United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 871 (8th Cir. 1998); 

United States v. Nguyen, 235 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2000); 

United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325-26 (10th Cir. 2004) (en 

banc) (per curiam); United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1168 

(11th Cir. 1999). 

USCA Case #07-3077 Document #1175682 Filed: 04/14/2009 Page 4 of 10
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 We now agree with our sister circuits that such waivers 

generally may be enforced. A defendant may waive his right 

to appeal his sentence as long as his decision is knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary. An anticipatory waiver — that is, 

one made before the defendant knows what the sentence will 

be — is nonetheless a knowing waiver if the defendant is 

aware of and understands the risks involved in his decision. 

Cf. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748-49 (1970) 

(waiver of right to trial by jury); United States v. 

Cunningham, 145 F.3d 1385, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (waiver 

of right to counsel). If “the record [shows] that [the 

defendant] knows what he is doing and his choice is made 

with eyes open,” Cunningham, 145 F.3d at 1391 (internal 

quotation marks omitted), then the Court will enforce an 

anticipatory waiver. 

In addition, we note the right to appeal a sentence is a 

creature of statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742. It would make 

little sense to hold a criminal defendant, who may waive basic 

rights guaranteed by the Constitution, may not waive a right 

created by statute and hence revocable at will by the 

Congress. See Judiciary Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 826, 828. The 

defendant cannot be certain of the consequences of waiving 

his constitutional right to trial by jury or to be represented by 

counsel any more than he can be certain of the consequences 

of waiving his right to appeal his sentence. In each situation, 

he must evaluate the possibilities open to him and their 

associated probabilities and, with the help of counsel, choose 

the most favorable alternative. A defendant who waives trial 

by pleading guilty, for example, believes the sentence he is 

likely to receive as a result (with credit for accepting 

responsibility) is more attractive than facing the range of 

possibilities — from acquittal on all counts to conviction and 

the maximum sentence on all counts — discounted by their 

corresponding probabilities. Pleading guilty allows the 

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defendant to narrow the range of possible penalties. The 

calculation a defendant makes in waiving his right to appeal 

his yet-to-be-imposed sentence is fundamentally similar and 

ought not to be treated differently. 

Allowing a defendant to waive the right to appeal his 

sentence also gives him an additional bargaining chip to use 

in negotiating a plea agreement with the Government. See 

Teeter, 257 F.3d at 22. For example, the prosecutor might be 

willing to dismiss a count in exchange for the defendant’s 

waiver of his right to appeal his sentence. Indeed, in certain 

circumstances an agreement may not be possible if the 

defendant may not waive his right to appeal. Allowing the 

defendant to waive this right therefore improves the 

defendant’s bargaining position and increases the probability 

he will reach a satisfactory plea agreement with the 

Government. 

 

B. When a Pre-sentence Waiver is not Enforceable 

 By waiving the right to appeal his sentence, the 

defendant does not agree to accept any defect or error that 

may be thrust upon him by either an ineffective attorney or an 

errant sentencing court. Rather, the defendant waives his 

right to contest only a sentence within the statutory range and 

imposed under fair procedures; his waiver relieves neither his 

attorney nor the district court of their obligations to satisfy 

applicable constitutional requirements. Drawing upon the 

experience of sister circuits, therefore, we mention some 

circumstances that may lead a reviewing court not to enforce 

a pre-sentence waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Hahn, 359 

F.3d 1315, 1327 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam); 

Teeter, 257 F.3d at 25 n.9-n.10; United States v. Brown, 232 

F.3d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Michelson, 

141 F.3d 867, 872 n.3 (8th Cir. 1998). 

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Most obvious, a waiver should not be enforced insofar as 

the defendant makes a colorable claim he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel in agreeing to the waiver. See, e.g., 

Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327; Teeter, 257 F.3d at 25 n.9. If such a 

claim is upheld, it follows that, because the defendant’s 

attorney failed to ensure the defendant understood the 

consequences of his waiver, the waiver was not knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary. If, however “a defendant’s 

complaints of his counsel’s inadequacy plainly lack merit, a 

court cannot allow itself to be manipulated” into voiding a 

bargained-for waiver of the right to appeal. Cunningham, 145 

F.3d at 1392. 

 Nor should a waiver be enforced if the sentencing court’s 

failure in some material way to follow a prescribed 

sentencing procedure results in a miscarriage of justice. If, 

for example, the district court utterly fails to advert to the 

factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), then this court may disregard 

the waiver and consider the defendant’s argument that the 

district court imposed an unlawful sentence. In the same 

vein, a defendant does not waive his right to appeal a sentence 

that is unlawful because it exceeds the statutory maximum. 

See, e.g., Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327; Teeter, 257 F.3d at 25 

n.10; Michelson, 141 F.3d at 872 n.3. Finally, we note a 

waiver does not shield from review a sentence colorably 

alleged to rest upon a constitutionally impermissible factor, 

such as the defendant’s race or religion. See, e.g., Hahn, 359 

F.3d at 1327; Teeter, 257 F.3d at 25 n.9; Brown, 232 F.3d at 

403; Michelson, 141 F.3d at 872 n.3. 

 

C. Guillen’s Waiver is Valid 

 We turn now to Guillen’s claim her waiver of the right to 

appeal her sentence was not knowing, intelligent, and 

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voluntary. As with the validity of a defendant’s waiver of the 

right to counsel, our review is de novo. See Cunningham, 145 

F.3d at 1392. 

In this case, the transcript of the plea hearing 

demonstrates that Guillen’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, 

and voluntary. Guillen argues her waiver was not made 

knowingly because the district court initially said she “would 

always have the right to take an appeal if [she] thought [the] 

sentence was illegal.” As the Government points out, 

however, the court later corrected this statement in light of 

Guillen’s waiver. The court explained to Guillen she was 

waiving her right to appeal her sentence unless it was above 

the statutory maximum or was an upward departure from the 

Guideline range. Guillen then said she understood that, 

which leaves us with no reason to doubt Guillen’s waiver was 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 

 Guillen makes no argument that the district court failed 

to follow a prescribed sentencing procedure resulting in a 

miscarriage of justice. Instead, Guillen makes several 

arguments that have little relevance to our analysis. 

First, Guillen argues the district court voided the waiver 

agreement when it told her, at the end of the sentencing 

hearing, “You do have the right to take an appeal from this 

sentence. If you want to do so you should tell [your attorney], 

and you have to let him know within ten days.” This 

statement does not undermine the waiver agreement because 

it is correct; Guillen was entitled to appeal her sentence if it 

was above the statutory maximum or departed upward from 

the Guideline range. See United States v. Atterberry, 144 

F.3d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding similar comment 

about right to appeal sentence did not void waiver 

agreement). More important, a statement made at the 

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sentencing hearing could not have informed (or misinformed) 

Guillen’s decision to waive her right to appeal because that 

decision was made at the earlier plea hearing. See id. 

Next, Guillen argues she is entitled to appeal because she 

waived her right to appeal only under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 

not under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Unlike § 3742, however, § 1291 

does not give a criminal defendant a right to appeal. Rather, § 

1291 gives the circuit courts subject matter jurisdiction over 

final orders of the district courts, including sentencing orders, 

see Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1322. 

 Finally, Guillen argues her waiver should not be enforced 

because the district court impermissibly presumed any 

sentence within the Guideline range was reasonable. Here 

Guillen points to the district court’s statement at the plea 

hearing that it “starts with a presumption” that a sentence 

within the Guideline range is reasonable. But see Rita, 127 S. 

Ct. at 2465 (“sentencing court does not enjoy the benefit of a 

legal presumption that the Guidelines sentence should 

apply”). Guillen’s argument that the court impermissibly 

applied a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within 

the Guideline range is of the kind a reviewing court need not 

consider when the defendant has waived his right to appeal a 

sentence or the manner in which it was determined. As stated 

above, we will disregard a waiver agreement on account of a 

district court’s procedural error only if the error results in a 

miscarriage of justice; that the district court presumed any 

sentence within the Guideline range would be reasonable 

deprived Guillen of no element essential to a lawful sentence. 

Guillen points to three decisions holding it impermissible for 

a district court to presume a sentence within the Guideline 

range is reasonable. See United States v. Ross, 501 F.3d 851, 

853 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Conlan, 500 F.3d 1167, 

1169-70 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Wilms, 495 F.3d 

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277, 281-82 (6th Cir. 2007). Notably, however, none of these 

cases involved a defendant who had waived his right to 

appeal his sentence. 

From our review of the transcript of Guillen’s sentencing 

hearing, it is apparent the district court identified the correct 

Guideline range, considered the factors in § 3553(a), and 

chose a sentence within the Guideline range. Pursuant to the 

terms of the waiver agreement and the concomitantly limited 

scope of our review, we do not consider whether the district 

court erred by applying a presumption of reasonableness to a 

sentence within that range. Moreover, because we hold 

Guillen’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, we 

do not consider her arguments that the sentence was 

substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to 

give sufficient weight to her poor health, her personal history, 

and her cooperation with authorities. 

III. Conclusion 

 Guillen waived her right to appeal any sentence below 

the statutory maximum and within the Guideline range. She 

appealed anyway but advances no argument that would cause 

us to disregard her waiver: She makes no claim she received 

ineffective assistance of counsel and she has not shown that 

the district court worked a miscarriage of justice by failing to 

follow an essential procedure or relied upon a constitutionally 

impermissible factor in determining her sentence. We 

therefore enforce the waiver agreement and hold she waived 

her right to appeal her sentence. Her appeal is, accordingly, 

Dismissed. 

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