Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cr-00019/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cr-00019-11/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jesus Ivan Rendon-Gutierrez
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

JAMES R. CONOLLY

Assistant United States Attorney

501 I Street, Suite 10-100

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 554-2700

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

JESUS IVAN RENDON-GUTIERREZ,

 Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:20-CR-00019-JAM

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

FINDINGS AND ORDER

DATE: April 14, 2020

TIME: 9:15 a.m.

COURT: Hon. John A. Mendez

This case was set for a change of plea on April 14, 2020, and moved to June 16, 2020, on the 

Court’s own motion, citing General Orders 611 and 612. ECF No. 41. To the extent it is needed, this 

stipulation supplements the basis for exclusion of time and requests the Court to exclude time under 

Local Code T4 as well, for the reasons set forth below.

On April 17, 2020, this Court issued General Order 617, which suspends all jury trials in the 

Eastern District of California scheduled to commence before June 15, 2020, and allows district judges to 

continue all criminal matters to a date after June 1. This and previous General Orders were entered to 

address public health concerns related to COVID-19.

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case.

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

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exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 

509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, and 617 require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice 

continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that 

the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the 

defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless 

“the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the 

ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 1

 The parties note that the Court has already 

designated a new date for the change of plea hearing. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

1 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020).

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STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 14, 2020, and then continued to 

June 16, 2020, at 9:15 a.m., on the Court’s own motion. 

2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to exclude time between April 14, 2020, 

and June 16, 2020, under Local Code T4, in addition to the exclusion of time applicable under General 

Orders 611, 612, and 617.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

includes law enforcement reports, photographs, as well as audio and video recordings. All of 

this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel or made available for inspection and 

copying.

b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with her client, review 

discovery, investigate evidence and potential avenues for case resolution. 

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 14, 2020 to June 16, 2020, 

inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] 

because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of 

the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest 

of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 

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4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: May 11, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ JAMES R. CONOLLY

JAMES R. CONOLLY

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: May 11, 2020 /s/ HANNAH R. LABAREE

HANNAH R. LABAREE

Assistant Federal Defender

Counsel for Defendant 

JESUS IVAN RENDON-GUTIERREZ

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED this 11th day of May, 2020.

 /s/ John A. Mendez

THE HONORABLE JOHN A. MENDEZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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