Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-05402/USCOURTS-caDC-06-05402-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James K. Glassman
Appellee
Verla M. Wiley
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 16, 2007 Decided December 14, 2007

No. 06-5402

VERLA M. WILEY,

APPELLANT

v.

JAMES K. GLASSMAN,

CHAIRMAN OF THE BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv00975)

Leslie D. Alderman, III argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellant.

Diane M. Sullivan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor,

U.S. Attorney, and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney. R.

Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an

appearance.

Before: BROWN and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

USCA Case #06-5402 Document #1086333 Filed: 12/14/2007 Page 1 of 15
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Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.

Per Curiam: Appellant Verla Wiley, an African-American

woman, worked at the United States Information Agency

(“USIA”) from 1966 until her retirement in May 2005. In

October 1999, USIA was abolished and certain sections

reconstituted as the Broadcasting Board of Governors (“BBG”).

See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6531-6553. (For the remainder of this opinion,

appellee will be referred to as “BBG.”) 

During the time periods that are relevant to issues in this

appeal, appellant worked as an International Radio Broadcaster

in the English-to-Africa Branch of the Africa Division at Voice

of America, formerly a division of USIA. In April 1999, Ms.

Wiley and two other plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in District Court

against USIA, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

The plaintiffs claimed that they had been discriminated against

on the basis of their race and/or sex, subjected to a hostile work

environment, and retaliated against for engaging in activities

that were protected by Title VII. As of 2004, Ms. Wiley was the

only remaining plaintiff in the litigation before the District

Court.

____________________

The facts of this case have been described at length by the

District Court, see Kemi Southey-Cole v. Kenneth Y. Tomlinson,

Civ. A. No. 99-00975 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2006) (mem. op.); Kemi

Southey-Cole v. Kenneth Y. Tomlinson, Civ. A. No. 99-00975

(D.D.C. May 6, 2005) (District Court judge’s order adopting

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in full); Kemi

Southey-Cole v. Marc B. Nathanson, Civ. A. No. 99-00975

(D.D.C. May 26, 2004) (magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation), so appellant’s allegations need not be

recounted in detail here. On May 6, 2005, the District Court

granted appellee’s motion to strike Ms. Wiley’s retaliatory

USCA Case #06-5402 Document #1086333 Filed: 12/14/2007 Page 2 of 15
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harassment claim, as well as her claim of retaliation based on a

reduction in the amount of airtime that she was responsible for

producing. Striking appellant’s claims effectively dismissed

them, and we treat the District Court’s decision with respect to

these two claims as if it had granted a motion pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court

also granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment on all but

one of appellant’s remaining claims. Subsequently, on October

2, 2006, the District Court granted summary judgment to

appellee on Ms. Wiley’s remaining claim that she suffered

illegal retaliation when BBG forced her to use annual leave for

the time that she took to attend depositions related to this

lawsuit.

In this appeal, appellant claims that

1. she suffered discrimination and retaliation when

appellee failed to promote her to a GS-13 pay grade; 

2. she suffered discrimination and retaliation when

appellee refused to allow her to participate in the

managing editor rotation; 

3. she suffered retaliation when appellee retroactively

charged her annual leave for the time that she took to

attend depositions related to this lawsuit;

4. the District Court erred in granting appellee’s motion

to strike her retaliatory harassment claim; and 

5. the District Court erred in granting appellee’s motion

to strike her retaliation claim stemming from the

reduction in the number of minutes of airtime that she

was assigned to produce.

We affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment

to appellee on appellant’s first three claims. We reverse the

District Court’s decision to strike appellant’s last two claims,

but grant summary judgment to appellee on both.

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Standard of Review and Legal Standard for Title VII Claims

We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo. Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 447 F.3d 843,

849 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is appropriate only if

there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED.

R.CIV.P.56(c). “The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry

of determining whether . . . there are any genuine factual issues

that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because

they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). In

determining whether there are genuine factual issues in dispute,

we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party. Id. at 255. Insofar as we are treating the

District Court’s decisions to strike two of appellant’s claims as

dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6), “[o]ur standard of review under

Federal Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 is the same: de novo.” Wilson v.

Peña, 79 F.3d 154, 160 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

Under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973), Title VII discrimination claims are assessed pursuant to

a simple three-step framework:

First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the

preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of

discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving

the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant “to

articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

[action in question].” Third, should the defendant carry this

burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove

by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate

reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons,

but were a pretext for discrimination. 

Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53

(1981) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). To

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establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a claimant must

show that “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she

suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the unfavorable

action gives rise to an inference of discrimination.” Brown v.

Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1999). To establish a prima

facie case of retaliation, a claimant must show that (1) she

engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered a

materially adverse action by her employer; and (3) a causal

connection existed between the two. Id.; see also Burlington N.

& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414-15 (2006)

(finding that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision prohibits all

materially adverse actions, not merely those harms that are

specifically employment-related). In either situation, as the

Supreme Court has made clear, “[t]he burden of establishing a

prima facie case . . . is not onerous.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.

Indeed, just two years after Burdine was decided, the Court

emphasized, in strikingly clear terms, that

[t]he prima facie case method established in McDonnell

Douglas was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or

ritualistic. . . . Where the defendant has done everything

that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly

made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did

so is no longer relevant. The district court has before it all

the evidence it needs to decide whether the defendant

intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.

U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715

(1983) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In this

case, the District Court had before it hundreds of pages of

documents, testimony from various witnesses that was provided

during the investigation of appellant’s claims by BBG’s Office

of Civil Rights, and depositions taken after the lawsuit was filed.

So there is no doubt here that appellee aimed to “articulate[]

legitimate reasons for [the allegedly discriminatory or retaliatory

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actions] and proffered evidence in support of those reasons.”

George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 411 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Given

this record, we “need not address the Government’s contentions

that [appellant] failed to make out a prima facie case.” Id.

Rather, following the Court’s direction in Aikens, we will

“proceed to the ultimate question of discrimination vel non.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

First Claim: Failure to Promote to GS-13

Appellant claims that her failure to obtain a promotion to

the GS-13 level in 1997 and 1998 was the result of

discrimination based on her race and sex or retaliation for her

complaints to the BBG’s Office of Civil Rights. The District

Court held, in part, that appellant failed to establish a prima

facie case of discrimination, because she could not prove “that

anyone similarly situated was promoted when she was not.”

Kemi Southey-Cole v. Marc B. Nathanson, Civ. A. No. 99-00975

at 22 (D.D.C. May 26, 2004). The District Court applied an

erroneous legal standard in reaching this conclusion. Although

appellant certainly could have offered evidence of “similarly

situated” employees in support of her claim, she was not

required to offer such evidence in order to make out a prima

facie case. See Mastro, 447 F.3d at 850-51; Stella v. Mineta,

284 F.3d 135, 145-46 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 

Nevertheless, because we review the District Court’s

decision de novo, we conduct an independent evaluation of the

record to determine whether appellant offered sufficient

evidence to prove discrimination vel non. We hold that she did

not. The undisputed evidence in the record establishes that there

were only two ways for an employee in appellant’s situation to

obtain a noncompetitive promotion (other than career ladder

promotions) at BBG: (1) an impact promotion, which is based

on “exceptional ability exhibited by the employee”; and (2) an

accretion of duty promotion, pursuant to which a position is

reclassified at a higher grade “because the duties and

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responsibilities of the position have increased over a period of

time.” Supplemental Declaration of Donna S. Grace, Joint

Appendix (“J.A.”) 236. Only the second – “accretion of duty

promotion” – is at issue in this case.

Appellant offered virtually nothing to establish what her

original duties as a GS-12 International Radio Broadcaster had

been, what duties she was performing when she was denied a

promotion, and what responsibilities the GS-13 position

commonly entailed. Moreover, when BBG attempted to arrange

a desk audit, in which a job classification specialist would have

evaluated Ms. Wiley’s work responsibilities, Ms. Wiley refused.

Deposition of Verla M. Wiley (5/24/01), J.A. 842-43; Note to

the Record of Janet Davis (1/26/98), J.A. 1371. Rather, when

asked why she believed that she deserved a GS-13 promotion,

appellant testified, “I thought I was doing a great job . . . . I just

felt I deserved a 13.” Deposition of Verla M. Wiley (5/24/01),

J.A. 846. Although appellant attempts to compare herself to

Joseph DeCapua, another English-to-Africa employee who was

promoted to a GS-13 International Radio Broadcaster position,

her argument falls far short. There is clear evidence in the

record to indicate that DeCapua’s job responsibilities had grown

over time and that he had significantly greater responsibilities

than appellant did at the time of his promotion. See, e.g.,

Declaration of Fredrica B. Depew (11/9/01), J.A. 213;

Deposition of Barry Maughan (4/18/01), J.A. 1077-78;

Deposition of Joseph Anthony DeCapua (3/5/01), J.A. 916-18.

In sum, appellant failed to establish that she was denied a

promotion as a result of illegal discrimination or retaliation.

Appellant never proved that the duties and responsibilities of her

job had increased so as to warrant an accretion of duty

promotion. Without such evidence, appellant cannot prove that

the failed promotion was a pretext for either discrimination or

retaliation. 

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Second Claim: Nonparticipation in the 

Managing Editor Rotation 

During the time when Barry Maughan was Chief of the

English-to-Africa Division, he rotated the individuals who were

assigned to serve in the managing editor position. Appellant

claims she was denied the opportunity to participate in this

rotation because of illegal discrimination and retaliation.

The District Court erroneously found that appellant suffered

no adverse employment action as a result of her exclusion from

the managing editor rotation and, therefore, failed to make out

a prima facie case on this claim. An employment action may be

sufficient to support a claim of discrimination if it results in

“materially adverse consequences affecting . . . future

employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact

could find objectively tangible harm.” Forkkio v. Powell, 306

F.3d 1127, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Exclusion from the managing

editor rotation surely qualifies as an adverse employment action.

Maughan, who was appellant’s manager, testified that he

did not support appellant’s request for a GS-13 promotion in

part because she did not have any “supervisory duties” in her

current job. Deposition of Barry Maughan (4/18/01), J.A. 1088-

89. And Maughan acknowledged that the required “supervisory

duties” included “be[ing] able to carry out the functions of a

managing editor and senior editor.” Id., J.A. 1073. He also

testified that, “outside of being a senior editor, [managing editor

is] the most important function in the shop.” Id. Given this

testimony from appellant’s manager, it can hardly be said that

Ms. Wiley suffered no adverse employment action when she

was barred from participating in the managing editor rotation.

Even though appellant may have suffered an adverse

employment action, this, without more, is not proof of illegal

discrimination or retaliation. On the record here, it is obvious

and undisputed that the responsibilities of managing editor were

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time-consuming. See Declaration of Barry H. Maughan, J.A.

499-502. It is equally clear that, during the time period in

question, appellant, who was serving as Vice President of the

American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1812,

was very busy with union work. See Deposition of Verla Wiley

(6/6/01), J.A. 879-80; Deposition of Verla M. Wiley (5/24/01),

J.A. 817-20; Deposition of Barry Maughan (4/18/01), J.A. 1079,

1087-89. Appellant herself stated that she served in a managing

editor-type position at BBG in the 1980s for a show called

“Nightline Africa,” but had to stop after she became Vice

President of Local 1812 in 1990. Deposition of Verla M. Wiley

(5/24/01), J.A. 817-18. She responded in the affirmative when

asked, “And because you had more responsibilities as vice

president of the union, you couldn’t do that and be managing

editor, too?” Id. at 818. Appellant continued to hold the

position of Vice President of Local 1812 in 1996 and 1997,

when she sought to be included in the managing editor rotation.

Appellant does not claim that she was illegally

discriminated against on the basis of her union activities, nor

would such a claim be cognizable under Title VII. What is

noteworthy here is that appellant does not really contest

appellee’s contention that she was too busy with her union

duties to serve as managing editor. We therefore hold that

appellee offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

appellant’s nonparticipation in the managing editor rotation and

appellant failed to prove that this reason was merely a pretext

for discrimination or retaliation proscribed by Title VII. 

Third Claim: Retroactive Application of 

Annual Leave Policy

Appellant contends that she suffered unlawful retaliation

when she was retroactively charged annual leave for attending

witness depositions related to this lawsuit. In February 2001,

Ms. Wiley approached her then-supervisor, Rebecca

McMenamin, about taking “administrative leave” – paid leave

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that is not charged against an employee’s allotted annual leave

– to attend witness depositions. McMenamin responded via

email, indicating that administrative leave was unavailable in

such circumstances. Email from Rebecca McMenamin to Verla

Wiley et al. (2/14/01), J.A. 2077. That same day, appellant

discussed the administrative leave issue with William

Ohlhausen, Deputy General Counsel for BBG. Ohlhausen sent

an email the following day indicating that he was unable to

reach a conclusion as to whether administrative leave was

authorized in Wiley’s circumstances, and needed to research the

issue further. Email from William Ohlhausen to Verla Wiley et

al. (2/15/01), J.A. 61. Appellant continued attending

depositions.

On October 5, 2001, guidelines applicable to all Voice of

America employees were issued, delineating when employees

could use administrative leave in connection with Title VII

matters. Memorandum, J.A. 2113-14. These guidelines

prohibited employees from taking official time to attend

depositions other than their own. After this policy issued,

McMenamin emailed appellant to inform her that she would be

charged annual leave for the depositions she had previously

attended; McMenamin’s email noted that “[t]his policy indicates

there is no change from the guidance I first sent you on February

14th, 2001.” Email from Rebecca McMenamin to Verla Wiley

et al. (10/9/01), J.A. 2125. Appellant was subsequently charged

56 hours of annual leave for time she spent attending depositions

other than her own.

Appellant claims that BBG’s decision to retroactively

charge her annual leave was unlawful retaliation. As the District

Court found, however, appellant cannot overcome the

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for BBG’s decision to

charge her annual leave: No statute, regulation, or policy

authorized administrative leave for an employee in appellant’s

circumstances. In fact, during the time period at issue here,

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neither BBG’s internal Manual of Operations nor the Negotiated

Labor Management Agreement between Local 1812 and BBG

authorized administrative leave for employees in appellant’s

situation. BBG Manual of Operations, J.A. 1765-68;

Negotiated Labor Management Agreement, J.A. 1764.

Appellant can hardly claim retaliation when she has not shown

that she was entitled to paid leave. The October 2001 guidelines

may have clarified the situation, but they did not cause appellant

to lose anything to which she was entitled before the guidelines

were issued. Furthermore, McMenamin’s February 14, 2001

email to Ms. Wiley provided appellant with more than adequate

notice that an attempt to take such leave would likely be

unsuccessful. Appellant’s decision to continue attending

depositions after receiving Ohlhausen’s email was, in the words

of the District Court, “a calculated risk.” Kemi Southey-Cole v.

Kenneth Y. Tomlinson, Civ. A. No. 99-00975 at 16 (D.D.C. Oct.

2, 2006). “[N]o reasonable jury could infer retaliation from the

agency’s decision to comply with existing law and agency

agreements.” Id. at 22.

Fourth Claim: Retaliatory Harassment

The District Court granted appellee’s motion to strike

appellant’s claim for retaliatory harassment, primarily on the

grounds that it was raised for the first time in appellant’s

opposition to appellee’s motion for summary judgment. This

was error. The factual basis for appellant’s “new” claim was

substantially similar to the hostile work environment claim that

appellant had alleged in her original complaint, and BBG did not

demonstrate that allowing appellant’s claim would cause undue

prejudice. Therefore, this claim should not have been struck.

The real issue . . . is not whether legal theories may be

pleaded but whether the original theory may be discarded

or augmented and recovery had on some other theory. The

federal rules, and the decisions construing them, evince a

belief that when a party has a valid claim, he should recover

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on it regardless of his counsel’s failure to perceive the true

basis of the claim at the pleading stage, provided always

that a late shift in the thrust of the case will not prejudice

the other party in maintaining a defense upon the merits.

5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1219 at 281-83 (3d ed. 2004)

(footnote omitted); see also Alley v. Resolution Trust Corp., 984

F.2d 1201, 1207-08 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (allowing plaintiffs to add

an ERISA claim after motions for summary judgment had been

filed because there was no prejudice to the defendant). 

The District Court granted summary judgment to appellee

on appellant’s hostile work environment claim, and that

judgment has not been appealed. In addition to granting the

motion to strike appellant’s retaliatory harassment claim, the

District Court held, in the alternative, that insofar as appellant’s

retaliatory harassment claim was merely a variation of her prior

hostile environment claim, it lacked merit for the same reasons

that the hostile environment claim had failed. During oral

argument, appellant’s counsel conceded that Ms. Wiley could

not prevail on her retaliatory harassment claim unless she could

establish that the alleged harassment resulted in a hostile

environment. See Hussain v. Nicholson, 435 F.3d 359, 366

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that “[i]n this circuit, a hostile work

environment can amount to retaliation under Title VII”).

Because there is no claim here that the District Court erred in

granting summary judgment on appellant’s hostile environment

claim, appellant’s retaliatory harassment claim necessarily fails

as well. We therefore grant summary judgment for appellee on

this claim.

Fifth Claim: Reduced Airtime

The District Court granted appellee’s motion to strike

appellant’s final claim, i.e., that she suffered retaliation when

McMenamin reduced her airtime production from 17 minutes to

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13 minutes. The District Court struck this claim on the grounds

that appellant failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.

Appellant filed an informal complaint of discrimination,

withdrew it on August 27, 2002, and never filed a formal

complaint specifically listing her airtime claim.

The District Court erred in striking appellant’s claim,

because the reduced airtime allegation “could have reasonably

been expected to grow out of [appellant’s] earlier complaint.”

Weber v. Battista, 494 F.3d 179, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Hattie Baldwin, the Director of the

USIA’s Office of Civil Rights, wrote to appellant confirming

that her complaints of discrimination and retaliation had been

received, acknowledged, and consolidated. Letter from Hattie

P. Baldwin to Verla M. Wiley (5/14/98), J.A. 407-08. The

complaints that were accepted for processing included the denial

of “training for supervisory/managerial roles within the Branch,”

the denial of Wiley’s “input” on “programming and policy with

regard to office procedures and broadcasts,” and the denial of

“career advancement and promotional opportunities.” Id. at

408. The record thus makes it clear that the airtime claim was

“like or related” to the claims of discrimination and retaliation

raised in appellant’s original complaint. Weber, 494 F.3d at

184. “Therefore, we conclude [appellant] gave [BBG] an

opportunity to resolve her claim administratively before she

filed her complaint in district court.” Id. The claim was

properly before the District Court and should not have been

struck.

Although it cannot be said that appellant failed to exhaust

her administrative remedies, we nonetheless grant judgment to

appellee. The District Court effectively dismissed appellant’s

claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Rule 12(b) states that, if, on a motion to dismiss, “matters

outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the

court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment

USCA Case #06-5402 Document #1086333 Filed: 12/14/2007 Page 13 of 15
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1

 Rule 12(d), which went into effect on December 1, 2007 and

is titled “Result of Presenting Matters Outside the Pleadings,” states

that “[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside

the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the

motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.

All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the

material that is pertinent to the motion.”

and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be

given reasonable opportunity to present all material made

pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b).1

In this case, the District Court considered “matters outside the

pleading” in granting the agency’s motion to strike, and both

parties had a “reasonable opportunity to present all material

made pertinent” to the motion. The District Court, however, did

not convert what was ostensibly a 12(b)(6) motion to one for

summary judgment. Nonetheless, in these circumstances, this

court is free to characterize the District Court’s Rule 12(b)(6)

dismissal as a grant of summary judgment under Rule 56 and

affirm, so long as we are assured that both sides had a

reasonable opportunity to present evidence and there are no

genuine issues of material fact. See, e.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v.

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d 798, 805 (D.C.

Cir. 2006). Finding no merit in appellant’s claim, we will grant

summary judgment to appellee.

Appellant’s claim lacks merit because she failed to establish

that a reduction in airtime responsibilities constituted a

materially adverse action for the purpose of establishing a prima

facie case of retaliation. As noted above, “an employee suffers

an adverse employment action if he experiences materially

adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment or future employment opportunities

such that a reasonable trier of fact could find objectively

tangible harm.” Forkkio, 306 F.3d at 1131. Appellant offered

nothing to the District Court or to this court establishing that the

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reduction in her airtime production – from 17 minutes to 13

minutes – could affect her compensation, grade, or opportunity

for future advancement. 

Appellant has also failed to establish that “a reasonable

employee would have found the challenged action materially

adverse, which in this context means it well might have

dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a

charge of discrimination.” Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2415

(internal quotation marks omitted). Without such proof, there

can be no finding of unlawful retaliation. Actionable retaliation

claims are limited to those where an employer causes “material

adversity,” not “trivial harms.” Id. Appellant has failed to show

that the disputed reduction in airtime production was anything

other than a trivial harm, if that.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s grant of

summary judgment to appellee with respect to appellant’s first

three claims is affirmed. The District Court’s decision to strike

appellant’s last two claims is reversed, and summary judgment

is granted to appellee on those claims as well.

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