Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-07048/USCOURTS-ca10-91-07048-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
R. Michael Cody
Appellee
Bill Young
Appellant

Document Text:

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FILED 

United States Q>~rt ~f Appcab 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth C1rcu1t 

BILL YOUNG, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

vs. 

R. MICHAEL CODY, Warden, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

TENTH CIRCUIT AUG 2 8 1991 

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ROBERT L. HOECKER 

No. 91-7048 

(D.C. No. 90-595-C) 

( E. D. Okla. ) 

Clerk 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.** 

Petitioner-appellant Bill Young appeals from the denial of 

his habeas corpus petition and a certificate of probable cause. 

See 28 u.s.c. §§ 2254 & 2253. Petitioner was convicted in 1986 

and sentenced to ten years incarceration. He contends that the 

good time credit scheme in effect on the date of his offense 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** Respondent-appellee elected not to file a brief. After 

examining petitioner's brief and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 91-7048 Document: 010110133315 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 1 
violates equal protection. 1 A new good time credit scheme was 

enacted November 1, 1988, with full prospective application. 2 The 

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently determined that 

the new scheme could not be applied to the detriment of those 

convicted prior to its enactment because of the ex post facto 

clause. See Ekstrand v. State, 791 P.2d 92, 95 (Okla. Crim. App. 

1990). Consequently, Oklahoma now allows a prisoner to earn good 

time based on either the new scheme or the scheme in effect on the 

date of the offense, whichever is more favorable. Petitioner 

argues that he should be allowed to earn good time credits based 

on the most favorable parts of both schemes, an argument which has 

been rejected on state-law grounds by the Oklahoma Court of 

Crl.Dl . 1.·nal Appeals. 3 St a e t 1 M d P ex re. aynar v. age, 798 P . , 2d 628 

629 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990). Petitioner, however, claims that he 

has a constitutional liberty interest in maximizing good time 

credits under both schemes. See Petitioner's Brief (Form A-11) 

attach. at 7. 

The magistrate judge recommended that the case be dismissed 

summarily pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 

1 See 1981 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 56 (prior version of tit. 57, 

§ 224) & 1984 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 137 (prior version of tit. 57, 

§ 138). See also Ekstrand v. State, 791 P.2d 92, 94 (Okla. Crim. 

App. 1990) (discussing prior scheme). 

2 See 

Supp.). 

scheme). 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, §§ 138 & 224 (West 1991 Cum. 

See also Ekstrand, 791 P.2d at 94-95 (discussing current 

3 The argument received currency in Mahler v. State, 776 P.2d 

565 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989), but that opinion was withdrawn. See 

Mahler v. State, 781 P.2d 835 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989). 

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Appellate Case: 91-7048 Document: 010110133315 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 2 
Cases in the United States District Court. See R. doc. 4 at 2. 

The district court then rejected petitioner's objections to the 

magistrate's recommendation as untimely, and adopted the 

magistrate's recommendations. See id. doc. 5. 

In a statement notable for its overbreadth, the magistrate 

determined that "[p]etitioner's allegations raise matters relating 

to sentence and service of sentence, and such matters have been 

held to be questions of state law and thus, not cognizable under 

federal habeas corpus statutes." The magistrate judge then cited 

to Mason v. Anderson, 357 F. Supp. 672, 674 (W.D. Okla. 1973), an 

older district court case which deals with the "in-custody" 

requirement of§ 2254. The magistrate then distinguished 

petitioner's case from Spradling v. Maynard, 527 F. Supp. 398 

(W.D. Okla. 1981), because petitioner did not raise an ex post 

facto challenge. 

We affirm the district court's judgment insofar as it 

dismissed the liberty interest claim. We remand for greater 

development on the equal protection claim, for the magistrate and 

the district court did not have the benefit of a response by 

Oklahoma, and we decline to speculate concerning the purpose of 

the prior good time scheme. For the purpose of proceedings on 

remand, we note that the decisions of the United States Supreme 

Court and federal courts of appeals provide a fertile source of 

precedent. 

Petitioner first claims that he has been deprived of a 

liberty interest without due process of law because he cannot earn 

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Appellate Case: 91-7048 Document: 010110133315 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 3 
good time credits under both the old and new schemes. This claim 

must fail for lack of a federal or state provision creating a 

liberty interest in a good time credit system which would allow 

credits under both schemes. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 

(1983). No independent Constitutional liberty interest exists in 

a state's good time credit scheme. Id. at 467; Wolff v. 

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974); Brennan v. Cunningham, 813 

F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1987). While a state's creation of a good 

time credit system may implicate a liberty interest in that 

system, the State simply does not have a system which enables a 

prisoner to earn good time credits from the most favorable 

portions of both schemes. See Page, 798 P.2d at 629. 

Accordingly, no liberty interest has been infringed. 

Petitioner next contends that the older good time credit 

scheme violates equal protection because it provides for one day's 

credit for one day's work or schooling; two days' credit for one 

day's work (for Oklahoma State Industries, Private Prison 

Industries, or Agricultural Production) or vocational training; 

and three days' credit if one day's work is for the state, a 

county or a municipality. He contends that the scheme provides 

more credit for working on a state highway crew than participating 

in an educational or vocational program. He suggests that tying 

good time credits to the place worked results in identically 

situated prisoners earning different amounts of good time credits 

for the same work. Finally, he contends that his work as a 

mechanic at Oklahoma State Industries was rewarded with two days' 

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Appellate Case: 91-7048 Document: 010110133315 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 4 
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credit for each day worked, but that he only received day-for-day 

credit when he worked at the institutional garage. 

In this habeas corpus action, petitioner may rely only upon 

the facts of his own situation. Only some rational basis need 

support the state's decision to award good time credits based on 

the place of employment. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 

268-70 (1973). We recognize that petitioner has a heavy burden on 

this claim, see McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 

1991), but the record is barren on this issue and we decline to 

indulge in speculation. 

We GRANT petitioner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a), GRANT his motion for a certificate of probable 

cause, 28 U.S.C. § 2253, AFFIRM that portion of the district 

court's judgment denying relief on the liberty interest claim, 

VACATE the remainder of the judgment, and REMAND for further 

proceedings. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, and REMANDED. 

Entered for the Court 

Per Curiam 

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