Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01315/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01315-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tina Hornbeak
Respondent
Mianta McKnight
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MIANTA McKNIGHT, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

v. )

)

TINA HORNBEAK, Warden of )

Valley State Prison for Women,) 

 )

Respondent. )

)

 )

1:09-cv—0-1315-SKO-HC

ORDER TO PETITIONER TO SHOW CAUSE

WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS WHY THE

PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED

FOR PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO

EXHAUST STATE REMEDIES

(Doc. 1)

Petitioner is a state prisoner who is confined in Chowchilla

and proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter has been referred to

the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1) and Local

Rules 72-302 and 72-303. Pending before the Court is

Petitioner’s petition, which was filed on May 6, 2009, and

transferred to this Court on July 20, 2009. The petition concerns

the denial of Petitioner’s parole on September 10, 2007, by the

Board of Parole Hearings (Pet. 12.)

I. Screening the Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United

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States District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make

a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly

appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court....”

Habeas Rule 4; O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir.

1990); see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.

1990). Habeas Rule 2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all

grounds of relief available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts

supporting each ground; and 3) state the relief requested. 

Notice pleading is not sufficient; rather, the petition must

state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional

error. Rule 4, advisory committee notes, 1976 adoption;

O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d at 420 (quoting Blackledge v.

Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n. 7 (1977)). Allegations in a petition

that are vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible are subject to

summary dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th

Cir. 1990).

Further, the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas

corpus either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to

the respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the

petition has been filed. Advisory committee notes to Habeas Rule

8, 1976 adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43

(9th Cir. 2001).

II. Exhaustion of State Judicial Remedies 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to challenge

collaterally a conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus

must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

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The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and

gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the

state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,

518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir.

1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by

providing the highest state court with the necessary jurisdiction

a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before

presenting it to the federal court, and demonstrating that no

state remedy remains available. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,

275-76 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir.

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court

was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the

petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's

factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365

(1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9-10

(1992), superceded by statute as stated in Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362 (2000) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the

state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Hiivala

v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood,

133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United

States Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275...(1971),

we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that

petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the

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state courts in order to give the State the

"'opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged

violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some

internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are

to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be

alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting

claims under the United States Constitution. If a

habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary

ruling at a state court trial denied him the due

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,

he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state

court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule

further in Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir.

2000), as amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th

Cir. 2001), stating: 

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly

presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims

in state court unless he specifically indicated to

that court that those claims were based on federal law.

See, Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir.

2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan,

this court has held that the petitioner must make the

federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing

federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding,

189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7... (1982)), or the underlying

claim would be decided under state law on the same

considerations that would control resolution of the claim

on federal grounds, see, e.g., Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Crotts, 73 F.3d 

at 865.

...

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert

the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a

federal one without regard to how similar the state and

federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how

obvious the violation of federal law is.

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as

amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir.

2001). 

Where none of a petitioner’s claims has been presented to

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the highest state court as required by the exhaustion doctrine,

the Court must dismiss the petition. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478,

481 (9th Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to hold a mixed

petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims

has not been extended to petitions that contain no exhausted

claims. Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

Attached to the petition in this case is an order of the

Superior Court of the County of San Mateo denying a petition for

writ of habeas corpus filed by Petitioner. (Pet. 173-80.) 

However, Petitioner does not specifically describe the

proceedings in the state courts in which she exhausted her

claims. Therefore, upon review of the instant petition for writ

of habeas corpus, it appears that Petitioner has not presented

her claims to the California Supreme Court. If Petitioner has

not presented all of her claims to the California Supreme Court,

the Court cannot proceed to the merits of those claims. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). It is possible, however, that Petitioner

has presented her claims to the California Supreme Court and

simply neglected to inform this Court. 

Thus, Petitioner must inform the Court if her claims have

been presented to the California Supreme Court, and if possible,

provide the Court with a copy of the petition filed in the

California Supreme Court, along with a copy of any ruling made by

the California Supreme Court. Without knowing what claims have

been presented to the California Supreme Court, the Court is

unable to proceed to the merits of the petition.

///

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III. Order to Petitioner to Show Cause

Accordingly, Petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why the

petition should not be dismissed for Petitioner’s failure to

exhaust state remedies. Petitioner is ORDERED to inform the

Court what claims have been presented to the California Supreme

Court within thirty (30) days of the date of service of this

order. 

Petitioner is forewarned that failure to follow this order

will result in dismissal of the petition pursuant to Local Rule

110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 9, 2010 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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