Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_13-cv-00399/USCOURTS-alsd-1_13-cv-00399-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ben Bates
Defendant
Bill Mack
Defendant
William James Steele
Plaintiff
Frank Watts
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILLIAM JAMES STEELE, :

(AIS # 126537)

:

Plaintiff, 

: CIVIL ACTION 13-00399-WS-N

vs.

:

FRANK WATTS,

:

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, an Alabama prison inmate proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action was referred 

to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 

72(a)(2)(R), and is now before the Court on Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment (Docs. 24, 25, 27). For the reasons stated below, it is recommended 

that summary judgment be granted in favor of Defendant Frank Watts, and 

the claims presented by Plaintiff William James Steele be dismissed with 

prejudice. 

I. Summary of Allegations.

Following a robbery conviction in May of 2013, Plaintiff Steele was 

arrested and booked into the Marengo County, Alabama Detention Center 

(“Marengo Jail”) on June 5, 2013,1 and he was subsequently transferred to 

 1 Given that Steele was a convicted inmate at the time he was arrested and 

booked into Marengo Jail on June 5, 2013, his claims will be analyzed under the 

Eighth Amendment as a convicted inmate; however, “the standard for providing 

Case 1:13-cv-00399-WS-N Document 61 Filed 08/16/16 Page 1 of 26
Limestone Correctional Facility on June 18, 2013. (Doc. 27-1 at 3). This 

complaint arises from Steele’s incarceration at the Marengo Jail. In his brief 

complaint,2 Steele alleges that on June 16, 2013, he was housed in a cell 

without running water, and despite suffering from the human 

immunodeficiency virus (HIV), he was denied medical treatment. (Doc. 7 at 

5-6). Steele is suing the Administrator of the Marengo Jail, Frank Watts,3 for 

 

basic human needs to those incarcerated or in detention is the same under [the 

Fourteenth Amendment, for pretrial detainees or the Eighth Amendment, for 

convicted prisoners].” Evans v. St. Lucie Cnty. Jail, 448 F. App’x 971, 973 (11th Cir. 

2011).

2 Steele’s original complaint was docketed by this Court on August 5, 2013 

(Doc. 1), but has been superseded by his Amended Complaint (Doc. 7) which was 

filed pursuant to the Court’s August 6 and 26, 2013 orders (Docs. 3, 6) directing 

Plaintiff to file his complaint on the proper form for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. 

3 In his initial complaint, Steele named Frank Watts and Sheriff Ben Bates as 

defendants in this action. (Doc. 1). However, in Plaintiff’s superseding Amended 

Complaint, Sheriff Bill Mack was substituted for Sheriff Ben Bates as being 

responsible for the care of inmates and actions of employees at the Marengo Jail. 

(Doc. 7 at 5). However, prior to service of the complaint on Sheriff Bill Mack, Steele 

voluntarily dismissed Sheriff Mack from this action after acknowledging, “that Bill 

Mack was in fact the wrong Defendant.” (Docs. 38, 39, 40). To date, Frank Watts is 

the sole defendant in this action and is the only party to have been served with the 

complaint and to have appeared in the suit. (Docs. 24, 25, 27). 

The record does indicate that Steele sought to add a defendant, Correctional 

Officer Smith, to this action with the filing of his “Motion in Response to Magistrate 

Order or In the Alternative Leave to Amend Defendant’s [sic].” (Doc. 40). This 

motion consisted of a one sentence paragraph, which stated:

Plaintiff agrees with the Honorable Court that Bill Mac was in fact 

the wrong Defendant, the added Defendant Correction Officer Smith, 

because he was one of the Defendant[s] who personally handled my 

request slip trying to seek medical attention, also I would like to be 

continued as a Defendant Frank Watts.

(Id. at 1). Correctional Officer Smith, however, was never served with this action 

nor added as a defendant to this action due to Steele’s failure to sufficiently plead 

facts connecting a claim to Smith. 

While “pro se pleadings are held to a less strict standard than pleadings filed 

Case 1:13-cv-00399-WS-N Document 61 Filed 08/16/16 Page 2 of 26
these alleged Eighth Amendment violations and seeks monetary relief in the 

amount of $700,000.00. (Doc. 7 at 7). 

Defendant Watts has answered the complaint and filed a special report 

(Docs. 24, 25, 27), which the Court has converted into a motion for summary 

judgment (Doc. 57), and after a thorough review of the record, the Court finds 

the motion is ripe for consideration. 

II. Standard of Review.

Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty 

 

by lawyers and thus are construed liberally,” Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1252 (11th 

Cir. 2008), “a complaint [will not] suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s] devoid of 

‘further factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 

173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 

127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). Liability under § 1983 requires a causal 

link between the alleged constitutional violations and direct conduct of the 

defendant. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60-61, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 179 L. Ed. 2d 

417 (2011); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71, 375-77, 96 S. Ct. 598, 46 L. Ed. 2d 

561 (1976). Thus, Steele must allege sufficient facts showing a medical need put 

him at "a substantial risk of serious harm," that Correctional Officer Smith was 

subjectively deliberately indifferent to that risk, and causation. See Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-34, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994); see also 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (discussing the dismissal of a claim which lacks basis in 

law or fact). Plaintiff Steele fails to carry this burden, as he provides no facts or 

details related to any submitted form requesting medical attention during his June 

5-18, 2013 incarceration, including what medical need he suffered, what treatment

was sought, the time or date(s) he sought medical attention, or how long the need 

persisted. As such, any potential claims against Correctional Officer Smith are due 

to be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 

(2009) (To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, plaintiff much plead “factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.”); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

557, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (“Factual allegations must be 

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and must be a “‘plain 

statement’ possess[ing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”). 

Case 1:13-cv-00399-WS-N Document 61 Filed 08/16/16 Page 3 of 26
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 

(1986) ("The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the 

parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary 

judgment."); Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) 

("[S]ummary judgment is appropriate even if 'some alleged factual dispute' 

between the parties remains, so long as there is 'no genuine issue of material

fact.'").

The party seeking summary judgment has the initial responsibility of 

informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based 

upon the discovery instruments outlined in Rule 56(c), that there is no 

genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 

S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. 

for Bibb Cnty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007) ("The moving party bears 

the initial burden of showing the court, by reference to materials on file, that 

there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial."). 

Once this initial demonstration is made, the "responsibility then devolves 

upon the non-movant to show the existence of a genuine issue . . . [of] 

material fact." Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 

1993); see also Allen, supra, at 1314 ("'When a moving party has discharged 

its burden, the non-moving party must then "go beyond the pleadings," and 

show by its own affidavits, or by "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

Case 1:13-cv-00399-WS-N Document 61 Filed 08/16/16 Page 4 of 26
admissions on file," designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine 

issue for trial.'") internal citations omitted); see Comer v. City of Palm Bay, 

Fla., 265 F.3d 1186, 1192 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Once the moving party 

discharges its initial burden of showing that there is an absence of evidence 

to support the non-moving party's case, the non-moving party must specify 

facts proving the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial 

confirmed by affidavits, ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file.’”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Forbidding reliance upon pleadings precludes a party from 

"choos[ing] to wait until trial to develop claims or defenses 

relevant to the summary judgment motion." . . . This effectuates 

the purpose of summary judgment which "'is to pierce the 

pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is 

a genuine need for trial.'" . . . Thus, "mere general allegations 

which do not reveal detailed and precise facts" will not prevent 

the award of summary judgment upon a court's determination 

that no genuine issue for trial exists.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 592 (11th Cir.), cert. 

denied sub nom. Jones v. Resolution Trust Corp., 516 U.S. 817, 116 S. Ct. 74, 

133 L.Ed.2d 33 (1995); see also LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 

F.3d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1998) ("[The nonmoving party] must raise 

'significant probative evidence' that would be sufficient for a jury to find for 

that party."). In other words, there is no genuine issue for trial "[w]here the 

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

non-moving party[.]" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see Comer, 

Case 1:13-cv-00399-WS-N Document 61 Filed 08/16/16 Page 5 of 26
supra, 265 F.3d at 1192 ("Summary judgment is required where the nonmoving party's response to a motion is merely 'a repetition of his conclusional 

allegations' and is unsupported by evidence showing an issue for trial.").

In considering whether Watts is entitled to summary judgment in this 

action, the undersigned has viewed the facts in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiff Steele. Comer, supra, 265 F.3d at 1192 ("We view the evidence and 

all factual inferences raised by it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the 

non-moving party.").

The requirement to view the facts in the nonmoving party's 

favor extends only to "genuine" disputes over material facts. A 

genuine dispute requires more than "some metaphysical doubt 

as to the material facts." A "mere scintilla" of evidence is 

insufficient; the non-moving party must produce substantial 

evidence in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

Garczynski, supra, 573 F.3d at 1165 (internal citations omitted). In addition, 

"[t]here is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential 

argument that could be made based upon the materials before it on summary 

judgment." Resolution Trust Corp., supra, 43 F.3d at 599.

III. Analysis.

A. Defendant’s Immunity.

1. Sovereign Immunity. 

Plaintiff Steele alleges violations of the Eighth Amendment of the 

United States Constitution against Mr. Frank Watts pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 for his alleged failure to provide adequate medical care and sanitary 

Case 1:13-cv-00399-WS-N Document 61 Filed 08/16/16 Page 6 of 26
conditions at the Marengo Jail. (Doc. 7 at 5). Defendant has asserted the 

affirmative defense of sovereign immunity for the allegations against him in 

his official capacity. 

The Eleventh Amendment protects Defendant in his official capacity

from Steele’s claims. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 

465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984) (With some 

exceptions, "a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is 

named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment. This 

jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought." 

(citations omitted)); Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th 

Cir. 1998) ("[S]tate officials sued in their official capacity are []protected by 

the [Eleventh A]mendment." (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 

105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985))). In addition, "a state agency[] and a 

state official sued in his official capacity are not 'persons' within the meaning 

of § 1983, thus damages are unavailable..." Edwards v. Wallace Cmty. Coll., 

49 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State 

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989)). A sheriff 

and, by extension, his staff are considered departments of the state and are 

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Given that Watts nor the state 

of Alabama has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst 

State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 100; Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 

1525 (11th Cir. 1990), Steele may not sue Defendant Watts in his official 

Case 1:13-cv-00399-WS-N Document 61 Filed 08/16/16 Page 7 of 26
capacity.

2. Qualified Immunity.

Watts, however, is not absolutely immune from suit in his individual 

capacity, but is protected by qualified immunity, and Watts has raised such a 

defense. (Doc. 24 at 1). Qualified immunity protects government officials 

from liability for civil damages unless they violate a statutory or 

constitutional right that was clearly established at the time the alleged 

violation took place. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 

808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009); Amnesty Int'l, USA v. Battle, 559 F.3d 1170, 

1184 (11th Cir. 2009). "The purpose of [qualified] immunity is to allow 

government officials to carry out their discretionary duties without the fear of 

personal liability or harassing litigation, protecting from suit 'all but the 

plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law.'" Lee[ 

v. Ferraro], 284 F.3d [1188,] 1194 [(11th Cir. 2002) ](citation omitted) 

(quoting Willingham v. Loughnan, 261 F.3d 1178, 1187 (11th Cir. 2001)). 

Qualified immunity is a defense not only from liability, but also from suit. 

See Id.

"Under the well-defined qualified immunity framework, a 'public 

official must first prove that he was acting within the scope of 

his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts 

occurred.'" Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1250 (11th Cir. 2012) 

(quoting Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194). Once the official has done so, 

the burden shifts to the plaintiff to satisfy the following twopronged inquiry: (1) whether the facts that a plaintiff has shown 

make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether 

the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the 

defendant's alleged misconduct. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232, 129 S. 

Case 1:13-cv-00399-WS-N Document 61 Filed 08/16/16 Page 8 of 26
Ct. 808...The Supreme Court recently has made it clear that 

[courts] need not employ a rigid two-step procedure, but rather 

may exercise [their] discretion to decide "which of the two 

prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed 

first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." 

Id. at 236, 129 S. Ct. 808.

Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266, 272-73 (11th Cir. 2013). "Under controlling 

law, the plaintiff[] must carry [his] burden by looking to the law as 

interpreted at the time by the United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh 

Circuit, or [the highest court of the state from which the case arose]." Terrell 

v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 

284 F.3d 1188, 1199 (11th Cir. 2002).

The record evidence amply supports the determination that Watts was

acting within the scope of his discretionary authority as jail administrator at 

the time of the wrongful acts at issue, and Steele offers no evidence or 

argument to the contrary. Accordingly, the burden now shifts to Steele to 

show that Watts violated a constitutional right that was clearly established 

at the time the complaint arose. However, as discussed below, Steele fails to 

establish an Eighth Amendment violation. 

B. Eighth Amendment Claims.

The Eighth Amendment provides that, "[e]xcessive bail shall not be 

required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 

inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment's proscription 

against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits prison officials from 

exhibiting deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to an 

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inmate. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 

811 (1994). In DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 

189, 109 S. Ct. 998, 103 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1989), the Supreme Court summarized 

a state's constitutional responsibilities with regard to inmates:

[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him 

there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a 

corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety 

and general well-being. . . . The rationale for this principle is 

simple enough: when the State by the affirmative exercise of its 

power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him 

unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide 

for his basic human needs -- e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical 

care, and reasonable safety -- it transgresses the substantive 

limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due 

Process Clause.

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200 (citations omitted).

In order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must 

make both an objective and a subjective showing. In Sims v. Mashburn, 25 

F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 1994), the court delineated the objective and subjective 

portions of an Eighth Amendment claim as follows:

An Eighth Amendment claim is said to have two components, an 

objective component, which inquires whether the alleged 

wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a 

constitutional violation, and a subjective component, which 

inquires whether the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable 

state of mind.

25 F.3d at 983. To prevail on constitutional claims like the ones asserted by 

Plaintiff, he must prove that there was "a substantial risk of serious harm," 

that Defendant was subjectively deliberately indifferent to that risk, and 

causation. Hale, 50 F.3d at 1582; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-34.

Case 1:13-cv-00399-WS-N Document 61 Filed 08/16/16 Page 10 of 26
The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim inquires 

whether the alleged wrongdoing amounted to the infliction of "unnecessary 

pain or suffering upon the prisoner." LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 

1535 (11th Cir. 1993). This standard requires that the alleged deprivation be 

"objectively, 'sufficiently serious.'" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson 

v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1991)). The 

objective standard "embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, 

civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . . , but must be balanced 

against competing penological goals." LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1535 (quoting 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976) 

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

The subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim generally 

"inquires whether the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of 

mind." Sims, 25 F.3d at 983-84 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 

112 S. Ct. 995, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1992)). This component "follows from the 

principle that 'only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates 

the Eighth Amendment.'" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quotation and citation 

omitted). In prison conditions cases, the required state of mind for a 

defendant is "deliberate indifference" to an inmate's health or safety. Id. 

(citations omitted). In defining "deliberate indifference," the Supreme Court 

in Farmer stated:

We hold ... that a prison official cannot be found liable under the 

Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of 

Case 1:13-cv-00399-WS-N Document 61 Filed 08/16/16 Page 11 of 26
confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an 

excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both 

be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw 

the inference.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The Court concluded that the "subjective 

recklessness" standard of criminal law is the test for "deliberate indifference" 

under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 839-40. Under this test, there is no 

liability for "an official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should 

have perceived but did not . . . ." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. It is not enough 

that an inmate proves that the defendant should have known of the risk, but 

did not, as actual knowledge is the key. See, e.g., Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 

1480, 1491 (11th Cir. 1996). 

Having set forth the general legal principles relevant to Steele's 

claims, the undersigned now turns to the application of those legal principles 

to the facts before the Court.

1. Denial of medical care.

In order to demonstrate a denial of medical care in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment, Steele must prove the components described above.

Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976) ("The Eighth 

Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishments prohibits prison 

officials from exhibiting deliberate indifference to prisoners' serious medical 

needs."). To meet the objective element, Steele first must demonstrate the 

Case 1:13-cv-00399-WS-N Document 61 Filed 08/16/16 Page 12 of 26
existence of an "objectively serious medical need." Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 

1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). A serious medical need is "'one that has been 

diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious 

that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's 

attention.'" Id. (quoting Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 

1187 (11th Cir. 1994)). "In either of these situations, the medical need must 

be one that, if left unattended, pos[es] a substantial risk of serious harm." Id. 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

There can be no doubt that HIV constitutes a serious medical condition

or illness; however, Steele posits no facts indicating that he demonstrated the 

existence of a serious medical need at the time the complaint arose. Notably, 

the complaint is void of allegations that Steele suffered from any HIV 

symptoms (fever, headaches, muscle aches, rash, sore throat, etc.) that 

required treatment, medication, or examination during the limited days he 

was incarcerated at Marengo Jail; furthermore, Steele proffers no details or 

explanation of harm, injury, or worsening of his condition due to his failure to 

receive medical care during the two weeks he was incarcerated at the 

Marengo Jail. Instead, Steele’s claim is supported solely by allegations that 

the Marengo Jail has “no medical staff including doctors” and that the jail is 

incapable of providing the proper care necessary for a HIV patient. (Doc. 7 at 

4). See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 

1996) (“[C]onclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions 

Case 1:13-cv-00399-WS-N Document 61 Filed 08/16/16 Page 13 of 26
are inadequate to satisfy the nonmovant's burden."); Bennett v. Parker, 898 

F.2d 1530, 1533-34 (11th Cir. 1990) (A "conclusory allegation" cannot defeat 

summary judgment.). Consequently, Steele’s failure to identify any specific 

medical need that went untreated constitutes a failure to establish an Eighth 

Amendment violation.

Assuming arguendo, for purposes of this motion, that Steele had 

demonstrated an "objectively serious medical need,” Steele has failed to 

establish that Watts was deliberated indifferent to the need. Sims, 25 F.3d 

at 983-84 (Deliberate indifference entails acting “with a sufficiently culpable 

state of mind.”). Steele bears the burden of showing that Watts disregarded 

an excessive risk to Steele’s health. Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1245; Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 835 (“Eighth Amendment liability requires ‘more than ordinary lack 

of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.’”) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 

475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 89 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1986)). The record, 

however, is void of any such evidence.

As discussed above, Steele presents no evidence showing or facts 

indicating that Watts, or any officer, knew Steele was in need of medical 

treatment and denied him care. Contrarily, Watts presents evidence that 

indicates Steele clearly understood the method by which medical care was 

obtained at the jail and that Watts had no knowledge that Steele was in need 

of medical attention. 

Case 1:13-cv-00399-WS-N Document 61 Filed 08/16/16 Page 14 of 26
The record shows that, upon being booked in to Marengo Jail, Steele 

was screened and questioned regarding possible medical issues. (Doc. 27-3 at 

2). The intake screening form documents that Steele has health problems, 

but fails to disclose a specific medical condition, and Steele was cleared to be 

housed in general population. (Id.). Additionally, Steele was aware of how 

to request care in the jail as he was provided a document titled “Consent to 

Treatment,” which explains the medical and grievance polices at Marengo 

Jail (Doc. 25-4 at 2), and he had been arrested and booked into Marengo Jail 

at least eight previous times.4 (Docs. 25-3, 27 at 3). Despite this knowledge, 

the record lacks evidence that Steele ever submitted a request for medical 

care or a grievance form that he had been denied medical care.5 Watts avers, 

and Steele does not dispute, that 

 4 The record evidences Steele was booked into Marengo Jail on December 28, 

2011 through January 7, 2012, July 19-21, 2012, September 17-18 2012, October 7-8, 

2012, and in 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005. (Doc. 25-3 at 3-6; Doc. 27 at 3).

5 Steele makes the blanket statement in a single pleading that he “followed the 

sick-call procedures but was denied care.” (Doc. 5 at 1). However, the certified 

records from Marengo Jail and Defendant’s affidavit indicate no medical request was 

ever submitted by Steele. (Docs. 25, 27). Furthermore, the Court ordered Defendant 

to verify whether the Marengo Jail was “in possession of any records pertaining to 

medical care of Plaintiff” (Doc. 48), and Defendant Watts responded that he nor any 

employee at the Marengo Jail was in “possession any records pertaining to the 

Plaintiff’s medical care that were not produced as exhibits to Defendant’s Special 

Report brief,” this would include a request for medical attention or a grievance that 

a medical need had not been met. (Doc. 49 at 1). And while the Court looks at the 

facts in the lights most favorable to Plaintiff, see Harris v. Cowetta Cnty., 433 F.3d 

807, 811 (11th Cir. 2005), Steele fails to reveal necessary details about requesting 

medical care (for instance, when a request was submitted or even to specify the need 

for which he sought medical attention) that could overcome the record evidence. 

In fact, the only allegation made regarding the submission of a request for 

medical care is found in Steele’s response to the motion for summary judgment. In 

the pleading, Steele claims, in attempt to get treatment for gangrene on his right 

foot, he placed a sick call slip “in the window,” where Officer Smith and three other 

Case 1:13-cv-00399-WS-N Document 61 Filed 08/16/16 Page 15 of 26
Plaintiff has never made any verbal or written complaint 

to [him] regarding the allegations of [Steele’s] Complaint or 

Amended Complaint. [He has] not received a grievance from the 

Plaintiff regarding anything complained of in [Steele’s]

Complaint, either directly or through the appeal process. . . . 

Inmates at the Marengo County Detention Center interact with 

jail staff multiple times a day. Thus, Plaintiff had multiple 

opportunities to contact members of jail staff and file an Inmate 

Grievance Form. . . .

It is the policy of the Marengo County Sheriff’s Office to 

allow inmates incarcerated in the Marengo county Detention 

Center to request health care services at any time. Inmates may 

make a verbal request for any type of emergency services to any 

member of the Detention Center staff at any time. In any 

situation that might be an emergency, jail staff call 911. Jail 

staff are also instructed to transport an inmate in need of 

emergency medical care to the emergency room. An inmate in 

need of any type of service or attention that is not an emergency 

may complete a Request Slip for Medical Care and forward it to 

any member of the Detention Center staff. Requests for medical 

treatment are accepted by members of the Detention Center 

staff at any time. 

Plaintiff has not made a request for medical care to me 

and I have not received a Request Slip for Medical care from the 

Plaintiff. To my knowledge, Plaintiff does receive medical care 

as he brings prescription medication with him when he is 

booked into the Detention Center. 

(Doc. 27-1 at 4, 6-7). Thereby, the record confirms Watts has never 

personally denied a medical request to Steele and, in fact, affirmed he 

believed Steele possessed his personal HIV medications during his 

incarceration at the Marengo Jail. 6 (Doc. 27-1 at 8). Moreover, Steele’s 

 

officers were present. (Doc. 58 at 5). Notably, this incident has been the subject of a 

previously filed lawsuit, see Steele v. Langley, et al., 2:06-CV-486-MEF-[WO]. This 

medical need, thereby, is completely unrelated to the complaint at hand, which 

relates to violations occurring between June 5 and June 18 of 2013. Therefore, 

Steele’s responses relating to such are irrelevant to this report and recommendation. 

6 Correspondingly, Steele asserts that on June 17, 2013, he met with 

Defendant Watts and was informed that he would be transferred the next day to 

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response fails to dispute Watts’ assertions, except to argue that Watts, and 

the entire staff of Marengo Jail, “don’t understand nothing about HIV 

positive inmate[s].” (Doc. 58 at 4); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Steele 

stresses that intake medical screenings should be done by actual nurses or 

physicians, as “Marengo County Jail staff workers don’t have common 

knowledge or experience, or skill” required to properly perform such 

examinations. (Doc. 58 at 4). While Steele’s assertions may be entirely 

correct, they do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference and cannot 

overcome summary judgment. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 

604, 608 (11th Cir.1991) (Once movant succeeds in demonstrating the 

absence of material issues of fact, the burden is on nonmovant to establish, 

with evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine issue exists.)

Thus, the record is bereft of any details suggesting that Watts had 

knowledge of a serious medical need and disregarded the risk. See

Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116-17 (11th Cir. 1993) (On 

issues where the nonmovant bears the burden at trial, he must put “show 

that the record in fact contains supporting evidence, sufficient to withstand a 

directed verdict motion, which was ‘overlooked or ignored’ by the moving 

party” or “come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a 

directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency.”). 

 

Limestone Correctional Facility, which possesses a “special housing unit for HIV 

positive inmates.” (Doc. 58 at 5). At this meeting in Watts’ office, Correctional 

Officer Smith was told to locate all of “Steele’s property and medication” in 

preparation for the transfer. (Id.). 

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As such, the lack of pleaded facts and unsubstantiated allegations 

demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact related to this 

issue and that Defendant Watts is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on 

this claim.

C. Conditions of Confinement. 

The Eighth Amendment prohibits inhumane prisons, but does not 

require comfortable ones. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S. Ct. 

1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Prison conditions constitute cruel and unusual 

punishment only when they result in the "unquestioned and serious 

deprivation of basic human needs." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. "[B]asic human 

necessities include food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and 

personal safety." Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1511 (11th Cir. 1991) 

(cited in Collins v. Homestead Corr. Inst., 452 F. App'x 848, 850-851 (11th 

Cir. 2011)). "[T]o make out a claim for an unconstitutional condition of 

confinement, 'extreme deprivations' are required . . . ." Thomas v. Bryant 614 

F.3d 1288, 1304, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 

U.S. 1, 9, 112 S. Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992)). This requires establishing 

the challenged conditions pose “an unreasonable risk of serious damage to 

[the prisoner’s] future health or safety.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 

1289 (11th Cir. 2004). 

To demonstrate a violation of an Eighth Amendment right in a section 

1983 prison conditions action, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) "a 

Case 1:13-cv-00399-WS-N Document 61 Filed 08/16/16 Page 18 of 26
condition of confinement that inflicted unnecessary pain or suffering"; (2) "the 

defendant's deliberate indifference to that condition;" and (3) "causation." 

LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 

U.S. 1164, 114 S. Ct. 1189, 127 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1994) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). "The wrong in Eighth Amendment cases is the 

deliberate indifference to a constitutionally infirm condition; that wrong 

must, in turn, have been the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries." 995 

F.2d at 1538-39.

Steele claims his cell was without running water and a working toilet. 

(See Doc. 5 at 1; Doc. 7 at 5). It is unclear from the pleadings, however, 

whether or not these conditions lasted one day or for the twelve days he was 

held at Marengo Jail. Nonetheless, taking the allegations as true, for the 

entire duration of his confinement, such claims do not amount to a 

constitutional deprivation, as he fails to plead any facts suggesting he was 

ever denied water to drink or access to sanitary facilities (which would leave 

him subjected to uncleanliness, exposure to human waste, or unhygienic 

means of disposing of his bodily wastes).

The Eleventh Circuit has long recognized the right “not to be confined . 

. . in conditions lacking basic sanitation.” Chandler v. Baird, 926 F.2d 1057, 

1065-66 (11th Cir. 1991). Additionally,

every sister circuit (except the Federal Circuit) has recognized 

that the deprivation of basic sanitary conditions can constitute 

an Eighth Amendment violation. See Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 

840, 843 (7th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) ("[A]llegations of 

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unhygienic conditions, when combined with the jail's failure to 

provide detainees with a way to clean for themselves with 

running water or other supplies, state a claim for relief."); 

DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2001) 

("Exposure to human waste, like few other conditions of 

confinement, evokes both the health concerns emphasized in 

Farmer and the more general standards of dignity embodied in 

the Eighth Amendment"); Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 365 

(3d Cir. 1992) ("It would be an abomination of the Constitution 

to force a prisoner to live in his own excrement for four days. . . 

."), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by 

Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2000); Howard v. 

Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that "inmates 

are entitled to reasonably adequate sanitation" and finding 

Eighth Amendment violation where cell was "covered with . . . 

human waste"); Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 

836, 269 U.S. App. D.C. 210 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (recognizing 

"sanitation" as a "basic need" for prisoners protected by the 

Eighth Amendment); Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 609 (6th 

Cir. 1986) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from 

being . . . denied the basic elements of hygiene.") (quotation 

omitted); Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1126 (5th Cir. 

1986) ("[A] state must furnish its prisoners with reasonably 

adequate . . . sanitation . . . to satisfy [the Eighth Amendment's] 

requirements.") (quotation and alteration omitted); Hoptowit v. 

Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 784 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that the 

failure to provide "minimally sanitary" conditions "amounts to a 

violation of the Eighth Amendment"); Hawkins v. Hall, 644 F.2d 

914, 918 (1st Cir. 1981) (explaining that prison conditions "must 

be sanitary") (quotation omitted); Hite v. Leeke, 564 F.2d 670, 

672 (4th Cir. 1977) (recognizing that "the denial of decent and 

basically sanitary living conditions and the deprivation of basic 

elements of hygiene" can violate the Eighth Amendment) 

(quotation omitted); LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 

(2d Cir. 1972) ("Causing a man to live, eat and perhaps sleep in 

close confines with his own human waste is too debasing and 

degrading to be permitted.").

Epps v. Hein, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73906, *14-15 (S.D. Ga. June 6, 2016)

(quoting Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2015). 

With that said, however, courts have repeatedly refused to find Eighth 

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Amendment violations based on short term unavailability to functioning 

plumbing within one’s cell. See, e.g., Alfred v. Bryant, 378 F. App'x 977, 980

(11th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of Eighth Amendment claim based on 

confinement in cell for eighteen days without properly functioning toilet); 

Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 445-46 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that the 

plaintiff's constitutional rights were not violated during his four-day stay in a 

strip cell where the water was turned off because, among other things, he 

was given three meals a day with milk, and noting there were no allegations 

of injury); Wilson v. Timko, 972 F.2d 1348 [published in full-text format at 

1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18851], 1992 WL 185446, at *3 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(unpublished) (finding that the turning off of water which kept plaintiff from 

flushing his toilet or taking a shower for two and a half days did not result in 

the denial of basic needs as he was provided drinking water, among other 

things, every few hours); Toney v. Fuqua, CA 07-00079-CG-B, 2009 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 43036, 2009 WL 1451645, at *3 (S.D. Ala. May 20, 2009) 

(unpublished) (finding that turning off the water to plaintiff's cell for four 

days, among other things, did not violated the minimal civilized measure of 

life's necessities); Gross v. White, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65432, 2008 WL 

2795805, at *9 (M.D. Fla. July 18, 2008) (unpublished) (finding the complaint 

failed to state a claim based on plaintiff's allegations that, among other 

things, the water was turned off to his isolation cell for thirty-six hours, 

which was found to be a minor discomfort in light of the absence of 

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allegations that the prisoner was not deprived of food or liquids), aff'd, 340 F. 

App’x 527 (11th Cir. 2009). 

The pleadings are completely void of facts suggesting that Steele was 

deprived of water to drink or a bathroom to use, despite the inoperative 

plumbing in his cell. Contrarily, the undisputed record reflects that although 

Steele’s cell may have lacked a working toilet and running water, he had 

unrestricted access to the communal dayroom (located directly off his cell), its 

bathroom facilities, and outdoor recreation throughout the day (from 

approximately 9:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m.). (Doc. 27-1 at 5). Additionally, 

Steele was provided three hot meals a day, which included liquids to drink, 

and a daily shower. (Id. at 5-6). Thus, Steele’s alleged conditions do not rise 

to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.

Furthermore, Steele has not alleged that the deprivations caused him 

any injury. Thus, the allegations reflect only that Plaintiff was 

inconvenienced by not having immediate access to running water or a toilet 

in his cell (and may have had some discomfort - although none is specifically 

alleged). Thus, the claims do not permit the Court to draw a conclusion that 

Steele was deprived “of the minimal civilized measure to life's necessities” by 

the lack of water in his cell or defective plumbing. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 

(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). Plaintiff's 

allegations are insufficient to show that he was deprived of water or liquids 

to the point of sustaining an injury. LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1539-

Case 1:13-cv-00399-WS-N Document 61 Filed 08/16/16 Page 22 of 26
40 (11th Cir. 1993) (requiring that injury be connected to a defendant's 

deliberate indifference to the constitutionally infirm condition). Similarly, 

his allegations do not have the heft to show that he was deprived of 

sanitation to the point of being injured. Id. As pleaded, Steele's claims do 

not have the plausibility necessary for the Court to find that the lack of water 

and toilet in his cell caused a deprivation of a single human need. Rhodes,

452 U.S. at 349 ("Indeed routine discomfort is part of the penalty prisoners 

may pay for their offenses, and prisoners cannot expect the 'amenities, 

conveniences, and services of a good hotel.'"). The Court thus concludes that 

Steele’s allegations do not satisfy the objective component of establishing a 

conditions of confinement claim, and consequently Steele has failed to state 

an Eighth Amendment claim. 

Assuming arguendo that the lack of water and working toilet in his cell 

were considered objectively serious, the evidence is void that the named 

defendant was subjectively aware Steele faced a “substantial risk of serious 

harm” and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to 

abate it. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828, 834, 837. To the contrary, the record 

reveals, and Steele has not disputed, that he never made a verbal or written 

complaint to Watts regarding the conditions of his cell. (Doc. 27-1 at 4). Also, 

there are no filed grievances on record reporting the conditions of his cell. 

(Id.). Thus, Steele has failed to carry his burden of showing that Watts was 

subjectively aware that his cell lacked running water or a functioning toilet,

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much less that Steele faced a “substantial risk of serious harm” and 

disregarded that risk.7 As such, Steele fails to create a genuine issue of 

material fact on the question of whether or not Defendant Watts violated his 

right to constitutional conditions of confinement, and summary judgment is 

due to be granted to Defendant. Cf., Peterson v. Morin, 2:11-cv-176, 2012 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67771, *30-32 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2012) (Defendants’ 

summary judgment was denied where the defendants were made aware of 

the unsanitary conditions but failed to respond to grievances or provide 

necessary supplies to correct problems.). 

IV. Conclusion.

Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Defendant Watts’ 

motion for summary judgment be granted and that Plaintiff Steele’s action 

against Defendant Watts be dismissed with prejudice.8

 7 Although not pleaded, to the extent that Steele is suing Watts for violations 

based on the fact that Watts is the Marengo County Detention Center Administrator 

and responsible for the day-to-day management of the facility, his claims fail. Such 

a claim is rooted in the theory of respondeat superior, that is, that Watts, as a 

supervisor, is responsible for the prison staff’s actions. In order to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must establish a causal 

connection between the defendant's "actions, orders, customs, policies, or breaches of 

statutory duty and the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights." Frankum v. 

Chapman, 2009 WL 1118875, *3 (S.D. Ala. 2009) (citations omitted). As discussed 

above, Steele has not connected any claim to the actions or inactions of Watts, nor 

has Steele alleged any policy or custom at Marengo Jail which subjects inmates to 

unconstitutional conditions. Therefore, liability for an alleged constitutional 

violation cannot be established on the basis of a theory of respondeat superior, see 

Edwards v. Alabama Dep't of Corrs., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1255 (M.D. Ala. 2000) ("A 

theory of respondeat superior is not sufficient to support [a] § 1983 claim. . . ."), and 

Steele has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

8 In the alternative to dismissal of this action for the reasons stated above, this 

action is due to be dismissed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Section 1997e(e) 

Case 1:13-cv-00399-WS-N Document 61 Filed 08/16/16 Page 24 of 26
The instructions that follow the undersigned’s signature contain 

important information regarding objections to the report and 

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS 

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties 

in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this 

recommendation or anything in it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date 

of service of this document, file specific written objections with the Clerk of 

this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); S.D. Ala. GenLR 

72(c). The parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a]

party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations 

contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions 

of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district 

court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party 

was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal 

 

states that "No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, 

prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in 

custody without a prior showing of physical injury." 

Steele seeks monetary damages in the amount of $700,000.00. (Doc. 7 at 7). 

However, pursuant to § 1997e(e), Steele may not recover compensatory or punitive 

damages without a showing of actual injury, and his complaint fails to allege any 

suffered injury (see Docs. 1, 5, 7); thus, success of Steele’s claims is relegated to the 

possibility of recovering nominal damages only. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 

266-67, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1978) (Holding if plaintiffs were entitled to 

nominal damages for the violation, the damages should not exceed one dollar); Kyle 

v. Patterson, 196 F.3d 695, 697 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[N]ominal damages, of which $1 is 

the norm, are an appropriate means of vindicating rights whose deprivation has not 

caused actual, provable injury."). 

Therefore, Steele's action would be subject to dismissal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(e), and only Steele’s claim for nominal damages, typically in the amount of 

one dollar, would proceed if he could produce evidence of a constitutional violation.

Case 1:13-cv-00399-WS-N Document 61 Filed 08/16/16 Page 25 of 26
for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court 

may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 

11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific 

finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the 

objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection 

that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the 

Magistrate Judge is not specific. 

DONE this the 16th day of August 2016.

/s/ Katherine P. Nelson

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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