Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-01221/USCOURTS-caDC-01-01221-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard J. Adams
Petitioner
Securities and Exchange Commission
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 22, 2002 Decided April 19, 2002

No. 01-1221

Richard J. Adams,

Petitioner

v.

Securities and Exchange Commission,

Respondent

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Securities and Exchange Commission

Marc B. Dorfman argued the cause for petitioner. With

him on the briefs was Arthur M. Schwartzstein.

Michele R. Vollmer, Senior Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, argued the cause for respondent. With

her on the brief were David M. Becker, General Counsel,

Richard M. Humes, Associate General Counsel, and Samuel

M. Forstein, Assistant General Counsel.

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Before: Sentelle and Rogers, Circuit Judges, and

Williams, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: Richard J. Adams petitions for

review of the denial of his application for attorneys' fees

under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 5 U.S.C.

s 504. The Securities and Exchange Commission ruled that

Adams's application was untimely because it was not filed

within 30 days of the "final disposition" of his adversary

adjudication as required by s 504(a)(2). The Commission

reasoned that although its EAJA regulations define "final" to

mean "final and unappealable," 17 C.F.R. s 201.44(b), because Adams was not aggrieved by the order of dismissal in

his favor, the order was "unappealable" at its issuance;

hence, there was no basis on which to conclude that the 30-

day filing deadline commenced only after the statutory 60-day

period for appeal had expired rather than immediately upon

the issuance of the order of dismissal. Adams contends that

the Commission has confused the issue of appealability in the

context of EAJA, with the underlying merits of an appeal. In

other words, regardless of whether the disposition giving rise

to the EAJA fee is specifically appealable, the EAJA filing

deadline should not expire in any case until 30 days after the

time for appeal under the relevant law of appealability, here

15 U.S.C. s 78y(a)(1), has expired or the appeal has been

completed. We agree, for the Commission's position involves

the awkward practice of requiring a case-by-case examination

of appealability contrary to the purposes of EAJA. Accordingly, we grant the petition to the extent of reversing the

denial of Adams's EAJA application; we remand the case to

the Commission to determine Adams's eligibility for fees.

I.

The Division of Enforcement of the Commission has pursued both judicial and administrative proceedings against

Adams. Beginning September 30, 1991, the Division filed a

civil injunctive action in the United States District Court for

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the District of New Jersey alleging that Adams and others

engaged in the fraudulent offer and sale at artificial prices of

securities in initial public offerings and manipulated the aftermarkets in those securities from January 1, 1987 to December

20, 1988 in violation of ss 5(a), 5(b), 5(c), and 17(a) of the

Securities Act of 1933, ss 10(b) and 15(c) of the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934, and Rules 10b-5, 10b-6, and 15c1-2

thereunder. SEC v. Graystone Nash, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 863,

868 (D.N.J. 1993), rev'd, 25 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 1994). Based on

a record limited by an order precluding Adams from presenting certain evidence because of his initial invocation of the

Fifth Amendment, the district court granted summary judgment to the Division and ordered both injunctive relief and

disgorgement in the amount of $60,565,581. Id. at 869-76.

The Third Circuit reversed on the ground that the district

court failed to consider the relevant factors in concluding that

preclusion was appropriate. SEC v. Graystone Nash, Inc., 25

F.3d 187, 193-94 (3d Cir. 1994). On remand, the district

court stayed the litigation pending resolution of the Division's

administrative proceeding, which was commenced prior to the

decision of the Third Circuit.

On April 21, 1994, the Commission instituted administrative

proceedings against Adams, pursuant to ss 15(b)(4) and (6) of

the Exchange Act. In re Graystone Nash, Inc., Admin. Proc.

File No. 3-8327, 1994 SEC LEXIS 1303 (Apr. 21, 1994). The

Commission denied Adams's motion to dismiss the administrative claims as time barred, but dismissed the proceedings

based on the district court's entry of an injunction. In re

Graystone Nash, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 35907,

Admin. Proc. File No. 3-8327, 1995 SEC LEXIS 1634, at *2-

*3 (June 28, 1995). An administrative law judge ("ALJ")

thereafter held an evidentiary hearing on the remaining,

independently alleged violations by the Division. In re Graystone Nash, Inc., 62 SEC Docket 671, Admin. Proc. File No.

3-8327, 1996 SEC LEXIS 3545, at *1-*3 (June 27, 1996).

The ALJ dismissed the proceedings on two grounds: first, as

time barred in light of an intervening decision by this court in

Johnson v. SEC, 87 F.3d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1996), holding that

the five-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C.

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s 2462 applied to such proceedings, and second, on the alternate ground that the Division failed to prove that Adams

violated the securities laws. In re Graystone Nash, 1996

SEC LEXIS 345, at *59. The Division appealed and the

Commission, on February 11, 1998, dismissed the administrative proceeding. The full main text of the Commission's

opinion stated:

On June 27, 1996, an administrative law judge dismissed proceedings that had been brought by our Division of Enforcement against Richard J. Adams. The law

judge based her dismissal on the decision in Johnson v.

SEC, 87 F.3d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1996), which held that 28

U.S.C. Section 2462 prohibited this Commission from

imposing a censure and a supervisory suspension in an

administrative proceeding because the proceeding had

been initiated more than five years after the conduct at

issue. It is undisputed that all of the conduct at issue

here occurred more than five years before the institution

of proceedings. The law judge further found that the

Division had not proved that Adams violated any section

of the securities laws, and used that finding as an alternative basis for her decision to dismiss. On July 30,

1997, we granted the Division's petition for review.

Although the Division vigorously disputes the law

judge's factual conclusions, it has decided not to seek

reversal of her decision in light of the Johnson decision

and the "current procedural posture of this case." In a

parallel proceeding in federal district court, the Division

is currently seeking an injunction against Adams based

on the same allegations as in this proceeding. We have

determined that, given the age of this case and that the

Division does not oppose dismissal, it is appropriate to

dismiss this matter. We intimate no view on the merits.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that this proceeding

be, and it hereby is, dismissed.

In re Adams, Exchange Act Release No. 39645, Admin. Proc.

File No. 3-8327, 1998 SEC LEXIS 208 (Feb. 11, 1998)

(footnotes omitted). No appeal was filed.

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On May 8, 1998, eighty-six days after the Commission

dismissed the administrative proceedings, Adams filed an

application for attorneys' fees pursuant to EAJA. The ALJ

rejected the Division's position that the fee application was

untimely, and found that Adams was entitled to attorneys'

fees because the Division's position at the hearing was not

substantially justified. In re Adams, Initial Decision Release

No. 176, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-8327 (Nov. 30, 2000). The

Division appealed and the Commission reversed, denying the

fee application as untimely because it was filed more than

thirty days after the final disposition of the agency adjudication, citing 5 U.S.C. s 504(a)(2) and the Commission's EAJA

regulations, 17 C.F.R. s 201.44(b). In re Adams, Exchange

Act Release No. 44205, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-8327, 2001

SEC LEXIS 736, at *3-*5 (Apr. 19, 2001). The Commission

noted that under s 25(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act,

15 U.S.C. s 78y(a)(1), only "a person aggrieved by a final

order of the Commission" has a right to appeal, and that

Adams had no standing to appeal because he was not aggrieved by the Commission's order of dismissal. In re

Adams, 2001 SEC LEXIS 736, at *5. Hence, in the Commission's view, the order of dismissal of February 11, 1998

constituted a final disposition under EAJA because it was

both final and unappealable, giving Adams only 30 days

thereafter to file an EAJA application. Concluding that

Adams's application was untimely, the Commission did not

reach the merits of Adams's entitlement to fees. Id. at *10

n.19.

II.

Under s 504 of EAJA, an agency shall award attorneys'

fees and costs to a prevailing party (other than the United

States) unless the agency's position was "substantially justified" if the requesting party submits an application "within

thirty days of a final disposition in the adversary adjudication." 5 U.S.C. s 504(a). An "adversary adjudication" is

defined to mean (i) a formal agency adjudication in which the

position of the United States is represented by counsel,

excluding adjudications as to rate making and licensing, (ii)

proceedings before agency boards of contract appeals, (iii)

agency hearings under the Program Fraud Civil Remedies

Act of 1986, 31 U.S.C. ss 3801-3812 (an administrative

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scheme similar to the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. ss 3729-

3733), and (iv) agency hearings under the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. ss 2000bb-2000bb-4. Id.

s 504(b)(1)(C). Section 504 does not define "final disposition." The Commission's EAJA regulations, however, provide that a fee application must be filed within 30 days of the

Commission's "final disposition," which it defines as the date

a decision or order becomes "final and unappealable, both

within the Commission and to the courts." 17 C.F.R.

s 201.44.

Adams's counsel, presumably reading these provisions of

the statute and the Commission's regulation together, concluded that Adams had 90 days in which he could file his

application for fees: 60 days for the time for appeal to expire

under s 25(a)(1) of the Exchange Act at which time the order

of dismissal would become final and unappealable and then 30

days from this now final and unappealable dismissal order to

file his fee application as provided in s 504(a)(2). Although,

in light of the Commission's "unappealability" rationale for

denying Adams's fee application, the parties devote nearly all

of their briefs on appeal to the question whether the February 11, 1998 order of dismissal was appealable by Adams, we

conclude that the case specific approach adopted by the

Commission is inconsistent with the purposes of EAJA and

unworkable in practice. First, however, we hold as a threshold matter that the meaning of "final disposition" in

s 504(a)(2) is ambiguous, but that Congress intended it to

mean final and not appealable. In so doing, we readily

acknowledge that the question is one of first impression, that

the statutory language and the legislative history are unhelpful on the precise question, and that EAJA precedent addresses only EAJA applications under s 2412 in connection

with judicial proceedings. Nevertheless, we conclude that

this guidance is relevant for two reasons: first, the underlying concerns that led the circuit courts of appeals (and

ultimately Congress) to conclude that the 30-day deadline

should not begin to run until the appeals process is completed

are also relevant in the administrative context, and second,

the Administrative Conference of the United States, and

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consequently the Commission, has adopted EAJA regulations

reflecting the clarification that Congress enacted in 1985 for

EAJA requests in judicial proceedings.

Prior to the 1985 reenactment of EAJA, s 2412 provided

that a party filing an application for fees in the court "shall,

within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to

the court an application for fees...." 28 U.S.C.

s 2412(d)(1)(B) (1980) (amended 1985). The circuit courts of

appeals differed as to whether the 30-day deadline for filing a

fee application commenced upon a final but appealable order

of the district court or not until the expiration of the time for

appeal or the completion of any appeal taken. In McQuiston

v. Marsh, 707 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth Circuit

held that the 30-day deadline commenced with the final order

of the district court, stating that " 'final judgement' should be

defined by its common usage in contexts such as 28 U.S.C.

s 1291, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 54." Id. at

1085. The Seventh Circuit, in McDonald v. Schweiker, 726

F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1983), disagreed, holding that the 30-day

period did not commence until after the appeals were completed. Id. at 314-16; accord Mass. Union of Pub. Hous.

Tenants, Inc. v. Pierce, 755 F.2d 177, 179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

Observing that the practical consequences of the Ninth Circuit's approach militated against its adoption, the Seventh

Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit's conclusion as short on

rationale, particularly as neither s 1291 nor Rule 4(a) refer to

a "final judgment." McDonald, 726 F.2d at 314-15. Noting

that other circuits had held that the fee application could be

filed after the completion of appellate proceedings, and concluding that "theirs is the better approach," the Seventh

Circuit also observed that Congress could clarify the matter if

it decided to reenact EAJA, which was due to expire in ten

months, on October 1, 1984, Pub. L. No. 96-481, Title II,

s 203(c), 94 Stat. 2327 (Oct. 21, 1980). McDonald, 726 F.2d

at 315. Congress responded by amending s 2412 to define

"final judgment" as "a judgment that is final and not appealable, and includes an order of settlement." Pub. L. No. 99-

80, s 2, 99 Stat. 185 (Aug. 5, 1985) (codified at 28 U.S.C.

s 2412(d)(2)(G)). The House Report states that the amendUSCA Case #01-1221 Document #672482 Filed: 04/19/2002 Page 7 of 15
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ment adopted the Seventh Circuit's approach in McDonald.

H.R. Rep. No. 99-120, at 18 (1985).

Unlike s 2412, however, the EAJA provision on agency

proceedings is unhelpful even after Congress's 1985 reenactment of EAJA, with amendments, in answering the question

whether the 30-day deadline for filing commences with a final

and appealable agency order or not until the appeal time has

expired or any appeal is completed. The only possibly relevant amendment to s 504 was the addition of the sentence:

When the United States appeals the underlying merits of

an adversary adjudication, no decision on an application

for fees and other expenses in connection with that

adversary adjudication shall be made under this section

until a final and unreviewable decision is rendered by the

court on the appeal or until the underlying merits of the

case have been finally determined pursuant to the appeal.

5 U.S.C. s 504(a)(2). This sentence, however, lends itself to

alternative readings: it can be read as presupposing the

existence of a timely filed fee application, meaning that the

fee application must be filed within 30 days of the final

agency order, with the only restriction being that when the

government files an appeal, the agency cannot act on the

application until the appeal is completed; or, the language

can be read as only reaffirming that no fees are appropriately

awarded pursuant to s 504 until the government's efforts to

appeal are completed, but leaving open the question of when a

disposition is final for purposes of the commencement of the

30-day deadline. Indeed, the latter reading is consistent with

the possibility that the 30-day filing period is a time limit and

not a window for filing, so that a fee applicant could file for

fees before there were either a final disposition or a final

judgment. See S. Rep. No. 96-253, at 21 (1979); H.R. Rep.

No. 96-1418, at 18 (1980); H.R. Rep. No. 99-120, at 18 n.26.

Compare Mass. Union of Pub. Hous. Tenants, 755 F.2d at

179 (citing McDonald, 726 F.2d at 314), with Melkonyan v.

Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 103 (1991).

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In light of Congress's adoption of its approach, the Seventh

Circuit's analysis of when EAJA's 30-day deadline begins to

run is highly relevant to understanding the meaning of "final

disposition" in s 504(a)(2). The Seventh Circuit made four

salient observations, all of which are applicable in agency as

well as judicial proceedings. First, the court stated that it

could not imagine that the government would be willing to

pay fees before the time after completion of all appeals or the

expiration of the time limitations for appeals. McDonald, 726

F.2d at 313. This would appear to be no less true in

administrative proceedings. Certainly, if the instant case is

representative, it is clear that the government would strongly

urge that its position was "substantially justified," a position

consistent with the government appealing when it can. Second, the Seventh Circuit noted the cost to the applicant of

having to file multiple fee applications--one following the

judgment in the district court and another following the

judgment from the court of appeals. Id. at 314. It is no less

true in cases arising in the administrative context that it

makes "more sense, at least from the claimant's viewpoint, to

be able to file a single application at the conclusion of all the

proceedings." Id. Even if EAJA may still allow the filing of

two applications by reading EAJA's 30-day period as not a

window for filing, but rather merely as a deadline for filing,

allowing the applicant to choose when to file does not disadvantage the government: "[G]iving the claimant a choice

whether to ask for fees after he wins in the district court or

after the appeal maximizes his welfare, at some cost perhaps

to the courts but none we can think of to the executive

branch." Id. at 314-15. Third, the Seventh Circuit rejected

as insignificant any judicial economy at the appellate level

that would result from requiring the fee application to be filed

within 30 days of the district court's final judgment, and

thereby allowing the fee award to be acted on in time to allow

an appeal from the fee award to be consolidated with the

appeal from the judgment. Id. at 314. The court noted, in

part, that "the judicial economy may be largely illusory if ...

the claimant is entitled in suitable cases to reimbursement of

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gous in agency proceedings; we find no evidence that appellate economy warrants an earlier application deadline in light

of the lost economy from multiple fee applications. Further,

appellate economy is built into the statutory scheme for fees

in administrative proceedings; ss 504(c)(1) and 2412(d)(3)

work in tandem so that the appeals court can award fees for

both the agency and court proceedings. See 5 U.S.C.

s 504(c)(1); 28 U.S.C. s 2412(d)(3). Fourth, the Seventh

Circuit took account of the fact that forcing a claimant to file

a fee application within 30 days of the final judgment of the

district court "delivers into the hands of the government a

potent, acknowledged, and from the standpoint of the policy

of [EAJA] perverse weapon for discouraging meritorious fee

applications." McDonald, 726 F.2d at 315. In McDonald,

the fee applicant had recovered only a "wretched pittance" in

Social Security benefits. Id. Her attorney thus faced the

dilemma of choosing between jeopardizing her reward by

filing a fee request to recover reasonable attorneys fees,

which raises the stakes for the government and hence makes

the government more likely to appeal, or foregoing a fee

application altogether. Id. Although Adams's attorney faces

no such quandary, the possibility of such a dilemma would as

a general matter appear no less likely when the government

can appeal an administrative proceeding than in a judicial

proceeding.

Additionally, the Administrative Conference of the United

States, to which Congress gave the task of consulting with

each agency to ensure adoption of "uniform procedures for

the submission and consideration of applications for an award

of fees," 5 U.S.C. s 504(c)(1), interpreted "final disposition" to

mean "final and unappealable." Model Rules for Implementation of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 51 Fed. Reg. 16,659,

16,662 (May 6, 1986). The Administrative Conference specifically noted that when the government can appeal a final

agency disposition and the time to file an appeal is longer

than 30 days, "[t]here is no point in requiring the applicant to

meet an arbitrary filing deadline of 30 days after issuance of

the decision if the agency will not consider the application"

until the time for an appeal has lapsed. Id. Although the

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Administrative Conference was aware that in most administrative proceedings covered by EAJA the government will be

unable to appeal its own decision, it nonetheless concluded

that:

While the same considerations will not apply in most

other agency proceedings, where the government will not

appeal, we believe the best approach is to modify the

definition of "final disposition" for all proceedings. This

will provide consistency among agency proceedings as

well as with court cases, and will avoid the confusion that

sometimes arises as to whether an application must be

filed with an agency to preserve rights even though some

portion of a case is being appealed to the courts.

Id. Although the Model Rule's use of "unappealable" is not

identical to "not appealable" in 28 U.S.C. s 2412(d)(2)(G), the

Administrative Conference clearly meant it to have the same

meaning and incorporate the same concepts. Because Congress gave the Chairman of the Administrative Conference

the task of overseeing the adoption by each agency of "uniform procedures," 5 U.S.C. s 504(c)(1); see H.R. Rep. No. 96-

1418, at 16, as EAJA is a law of general applicability, the

Conference's views warrant at the very least possible Skidmore deference. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.

218, 237-38 (2001); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,

140 (1944); see also Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 813 F.2d 283, 289

(9th Cir. 1987).

In our view, much as we concluded in Massachusetts

Union, 755 F.2d at 180, in adopting the Seventh Circuit's

analysis and holding in McDonald, the practical reasons

underlying the Seventh Circuit's defining "final" as unappealable for purposes of s 2412 in McDonald are both compelling

and applicable to "final dispositions" under s 504. That

Congress adopted the McDonald approach for applications in

judicial proceedings under s 2412 suggests that Congress

also agreed with the court's underlying reasoning, which is

equally applicable to fee applications in agency proceedings

under s 504. Additionally, the Administrative Conference

specifically concluded that the 30-day EAJA deadline that

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applies in agency proceedings should be analogous to the

30-day EAJA deadline that applies in judicial proceedings.

For these reasons, we conclude that "final" as used in

s 504(a)(2) means "final and unappealable."

The Commission interpreted the word "unappealable" in its

EAJA regulation to require a case-by-case determination as

to whether a party is aggrieved, and thus could file an appeal

that would withstand dismissal for lack of standing. In re

Adams, 2001 SEC LEXIS 736, at *5. Such an interpretation

is inconsistent with the underlying purposes of EAJA. The

Commission's regulation, ambiguous on its face, must be

construed to avoid inconsistency with EAJA. See Sec'y of

Labor, Mine Safety & Health Admin. v. W. Fuels-Utah, Inc.,

900 F.2d 318, 320 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Because EAJA is a

statute of general applicability and the Commission's regulations purport to interpret s 504, however, the usual deference

accorded to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations

does not apply. Cf. Contractor's Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Fed.

Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 199 F.3d 1335, 1339

(D.C. Cir. 2000). Instead, the court must determine the

meaning of "final disposition," and hence "unappealable," as

any question of law committed to the court for decision and

not the agency. Id. Additionally, the Commission's use of

"unappealable" is wholly derived from the Administrative

Conference's Model Rules. Recognizing that the Commission

could not appeal its own orders under 15 U.S.C. s 78y(a)(1),

the Commission did not adopt that part of the Model Rules

that addresses government appeals, but it did adopt the

Administrative Conference's definition of "final" as meaning

"final and unappealable." Equal Access to Justice Act Rules,

Proposed Rulemaking, 54 Fed. Reg. 11,961, 11,963 n.11 (Mar.

23, 1989); Equal Access to Justice Act Rules, Adoption of

Rules, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,050, 53,052 (Dec. 27, 1989) (codified at

17 C.F.R. s 204.44(b)). Thus, only after consultation with the

Chairman of the Administrative Conference, see 5 U.S.C.

s 504(c)(1), and ultimately consistent with the Administrative

Conference's Model Rule, did the Commission promulgate its

regulation that no application for EAJA fees is to be filed

until the agency's final order become "unappealable, both

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within the Commission and to the courts." 17 C.F.R.

s 201.44. In determining the meaning of "unappealable,"

then, the court is not restricted by the Commission's interpretation of the term in its regulation and must instead derive

the meaning of the word from EAJA itself. Nor is the court

required to interpret strictly the statutory deadline simply

because it is a jurisdictional prerequisite to government liability; defining the starting point of the deadline does not

expand government liability because "the amount of the fee

will not be affected and that is the important thing to the

public fisc." McDonald, 726 F.2d at 314.06.

Congress originally enacted EAJA with the purpose of

"expand[ing] the liability of the United States for attorneys'

fees and other expenses in certain administrative proceedings

and civil actions." H.R. Rep. No. 99-120, at 4. Realization of

this purpose necessarily requires an interpretation of the

procedural requirements of EAJA in a manner that is not

unduly confusing or misleading so that they are not a "trap

for the unwary." Myers v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 659, 670 (11th

Cir. 1990). As stated in the House Report adopting the

McDonald approach:

The court should avoid an overly technical construction

of these terms. This section should not be used as a trap

for the unwary resulting in the unwarranted denial of

fees.

H.R. Rep. No. 99-120, at 18 n.26. As the instant case

illustrates, the case-specific approach adopted by the Commission constitutes such a trap. The lack of clarity as to the

"appealability" of the Commission's order dismissing the administrative proceedings against Adams arises at several

levels: the basis of the Commission's order of dismissal is

ambiguous because it is unclear whether the dismissal was

with or without prejudice, and, even if the dismissal were

without prejudice, it is not obvious whether Adams would

nonetheless have been "aggrieved" under s 25(a)(1) of the

Securities Exchange Act. Consequently, Adams faced the

dilemma of when to file his application for fees. Unless he

filed two fee applications--an inefficient solution--Adams

faced the risk of filing either a possibly premature or timebarred fee application. This appears to be precisely the type

of confusion that the Administrative Conference and Congress sought to avoid. See id. at 7. A bright-line rule

eliminates the high potential for confusion resulting from

determining "appealability" on a case-by-case basis and appropriately avoids the practical problems that the Seventh

Circuit described. Under such a rule, applicants will have

fair notice of when the time to file an EAJA fee application

will expire. Thus, under a bright-line rule, even when an

appeal would be arguably nonjusticiable, as here, if the

governing statute relevant to the underlying agency proceeding allows an appeal generally, the underlying order should

be considered "appealable" and the 30-day deadline for filing

an EAJA fee application does not expire until 30 days after

the time to appeal has expired or the appeal has concluded.

The alternative, to require a case-by-case determination of

"appealability" based on a party's aggrievement, would pointlessly leave considerable uncertainty about when EAJA's 30-

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day deadline would expire and result in an unworkable rule

that requires the filing of multiple applications and unnecessary involvement of the courts on appeal.

For these reasons, we hold that s 504(a)(2) of EAJA is to

be interpreted as creating a bright-line rule, discernible by

looking at the category of order in question and the applicable

law of appealability. When a potential appeal exists under

the relevant statute, the time for appeal must lapse, or the

appeal be completed, before the 30-day deadline begins to

run. See Myers, 916 F.2d at 671-72, 674. Because Adams

could have potentially appealed the Commission's order of

dismissal pursuant to s 25(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange

Act, 15 U.S.C. s 78y(a)(1), the 30-day deadline did not begin

to run until 60 days following the order of dismissal had

lapsed.

Accordingly, we grant Adams's petition to the extent of

reversing the Commission's denial of his fee application as

untimely, and we remand the case to the Commission for a

determination of his eligibility for fees. Although we are

sympathetic to Adams's concern that "ten years of litigation

is enough," his EAJA application was not filed until 1998.

Our decision in 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453 (D.C. Cir.

1994), is not dispositive on the issue of whether the Division's

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position was "substantially justified," and the Commission

persuasively contends in its brief on appeal that a determination of eligibility requires review of a lengthy administrative

record that is best left to it in the first instance. See, e.g.,

Global Van Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 804 F.2d 1293, 1305 n.95 (D.C.

Cir. 1986); see also PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 52

F.2d 363, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The cases on which Adams

relies are not to the contrary, and Adams has not shown that

a remand would be futile. See George Hyman Constr. Co. v.

Brooks, 963 F.2d 1532, 1539 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

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