Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01029/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01029-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ken Clark
Respondent
Martin Ramirez
Petitioner

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTIN RAMIREZ,

Petitioner,

v.

KEN CLARK, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

1:06-CV-01029 OWW SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant

to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, following his

conviction by plea of guilty on January 25, 1987, to first degree murder in violation of Cal. Penal

Code § 187(a). See Respondent’s Answer to Petition (hereinafter “Answer”), Exhibit 1. On

May 9, 1988, Petitioner was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of twenty-five years to life

in state prison with the possibility of parole. Id. 

On August 4, 2004, Petitioner attended a subsequent parole suitability hearing before the

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California Board of Prison Terms (now the Board of Parole Hearings - “Board”). See Answer,

Exhibit 3. Petitioner participated in the hearing and was represented by counsel. Id. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the Board concluded Petitioner was suitable for parole. Id. at 47-52.

On December 18, 2004, after considering the parole decision of the Board, the Governor

reversed the Board’s decision and denied parole. See Answer, Exhibit 2. 

Petitioner sought relief in the state courts. He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the Los Angeles County Superior Court on February 15, 2005. The petition was denied in a

reasoned decision on April 25, 2005. See Answer, Exhibit 5. He then filed a habeas petition in

the California Court of Appeals on June 24, 2005. See Answer, Exhibit 6. That petition was

summarily denied on August 11, 2005. Id. Finally, he filed a petition for review in the California

Supreme Court on September 9, 2005; that petition was summarily denied on June 21, 2006. See

Answer, Exhibit 7.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on July 18, 2006, in the

United States District Court, Central District of California. The petition was transferred to this

Court on August 1, 2006. The petition challenges the Governor’s 2004 decision reversing the

Board’s grant of parole.

On January 22, 2007, Respondent filed an answer to the petition. Respondent concedes

Petitioner has exhausted his state remedies and the petition is timely. Petitioner filed a traverse

on April 27, 2007.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

On January 25, 1987, Petitioner invited his friend to assist him in committing a robbery.

They noticed two people standing next to a car in a parking lot. They approached the two

individuals whereupon Petitioner pulled out a gun and demanded money and the keys to the car.

The victims refused and a struggle ensued. Petitioner shot one of the victims twice, once in the

chest and once in the back; he shot the other victim once in the back. When Petitioner turned to

run, he tripped and fell. The victim who had been shot once ultimately obtained possession of the

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gun, and nearby witnesses restrained Petitioner until police arrived. Petitioner’s accomplice

escaped but was later apprehended. The victim who had been shot twice was transported to the

hospital where he was pronounced dead. The other victim survived.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries

v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5 th th

Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). 

The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its

provisions.

Petitioner is in custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to a state

court judgment. Even though Petitioner is not challenging the underlying state court conviction,

28 U.S.C. § 2254 remains the exclusive vehicle for his habeas petition because he meets the

threshold requirement of being in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. Sass v. California

Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-1127 (9 Cir.2006), citing White v. Lambert, 370 th

F.3d 1002, 1006 (9 Cir.2004) (“Section 2254 ‘is the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a th

state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petition is not

challenging his underlying state court conviction.’”).

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

70 (2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2254(d); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this

Court must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as

of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other

words, 'clearly established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or

principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

72, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S.

at 72. “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at

413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at

409. 

 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to

or involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the

states, Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a

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state court decision is objectively unreasonable. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9

th

Cir.2003); Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir.1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied,

537 U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003).

II. Review of Petition

A parole release determination is not subject to all the due process protections of an

adversary proceeding. Pedro v. Oregon Parole Board, 825 F.2d 1396, 1398-99 (9 Cir. 1987); see th

also Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12 (explaining that due process is flexible and calls for procedural

protections that particular situations demand). "[S]ince the setting of a minimum term is not part

of a criminal prosecution, the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding is not

constitutionally mandated, even when a protected liberty interest exists." Pedro, 825 F.2d at

1399; Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir.1987). In the state parole

context, the only process to which an inmate is entitled is: 1) the inmate must receive advance

written notice of a hearing, Pedro, 825 F.2d at 1399; 2) the inmate must be afforded an

"opportunity to be heard," Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16; 3) if the inmate is denied parole, the

inmate must be told why "he falls short of qualifying for parole,” Id.; and 4) the decision must be

supported by "some evidence" having an indicia of reliability. Superintendent, Mass. Correc.

Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir.1987).

“In Superintendent v. Hill, the Supreme Court held that ‘revocation of good time does not

comport with ‘the minimum requirements of procedural due process,’ unless the findings of the

prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record.’ 472 U.S. 445, 454

(1985), quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128. In

determining whether the “some evidence” standard is met, this Court need not examine the entire

record, independently assess the credibility of witnesses, or re-weigh the evidence. Id. Rather,

this Court must determine whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the

conclusion reached by the Governor. Id., citing Superintendent v. Hill, at 455-56. Although Hill

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involved the accumulation of good time credits, the same standard applies to parole, as both

situations “directly affect the duration of the prison term.” Id., citing Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of

Parole, 833 F.2d at 1390. 

In making a determination whether an inmate is suitable for parole, the parole board is

guided by the following regulations:

(a) General. The panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for

release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found

unsuitable for a denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.

(b) Information Considered. All relevant, reliable information available to the

panel shall be considered in determining suitability for parole. Such information shall

include the circumstances of the prisoner's social history; past and present mental state;

past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal misconduct which is

reliably documented; the base and other commitment offenses, including behavior before,

during and after the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any conditions of

treatment or control, including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may

safely be released to the community; and any other information which bears on the

prisoner's suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone may not firmly

establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding of

unsuitability.

15 Cal. Code Regs. §§ 2402(a) and (b).

In this case with regard to the procedural protections outlined in Greenholtz, Petitioner

was provided all that is required. Petitioner was given advance notice of the hearing, he was

represented by counsel at the hearing, he was granted an opportunity to submit materials for the

Board’s consideration and an opportunity to be heard during the hearing, and he was provided a

written decision explaining the Board’s reasons. See Answer, Exhibit 3. All of this information

was submitted to the Governor and considered in his decision. See Answer, Exhibit 2.

Petitioner, however, contends the Governor’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, and had

no evidentiary support. After reviewing the record, the Court finds that the state court rejection

of Petitioner’s claims was not unreasonable, because the Governor’s decision is supported by at

least “some evidence.” 

Title 15, of the California Code of Regulations, Section 2402(c) sets forth certain

negative factors which the Board would consider in determining whether Petitioner is suitable for

parole. 

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Section 2402(c) provides:

Circumstances Tending to Show Unsuitability. The following circumstances each 

tend to indicate unsuitability for release. These circumstances are set forth as general

guidelines; the importance attached to any circumstance or combination of circumstances

in a particular case is left to the judgment of the panel. Circumstances tending to indicate

unsuitability include:

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to be considered include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or

separate incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate

and calculated manner, such as an execution-style

murder.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated

during or after the offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which

demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for

human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very

trivial in relation to the offense.

(2) Previous Record of Violence. The prisoner on previous occasions inflicted or

attempted to inflict serious injury on a victim, particularly if the prisoner

demonstrated serious assaultive behavior at an early age.

(3) Unstable Social History. The prisoner has a history of unstable or tumultuous

relationships with others.

(4) Sadistic Sexual Offenses. The prisoner has previously sexually assaulted

another in a manner calculated to inflict unusual pain or fear upon the victim.

(5) Psychological Factors. The prisoner has a lengthy history of severe mental

problems related to the offense.

(6) Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct in

prison or jail.

15 Cal.Code Regs. § 2402(c). 

In reversing the Board’s decision, the Governor considered and found several factors

indicating unsuitability per § 2402(c). Primarily, the Governor relied on the circumstances of the

commitment offense itself. Pursuant to § 2402(c)(1)(A), the Governor noted that multiple victims

were attacked in the same incident. This finding is supported by the evidence, as Petitioner shot

two individuals in his attempt to commit a robbery. The Governor also found that the motive was

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very trivial in relation to the offense under § 2402(c)(1)(E). This finding is supported by the fact

that Petitioner killed someone and severely injured a second person for the purpose of obtaining

their wallets and car keys. 

The Governor also found Petitioner had engaged in negative behavior and misconduct

while incarcerated. Petitioner had been disciplined three times for serious misconduct, most

recently in 1991, and he had been counseled twice for minor misconduct, most recently in 2000.

Pursuant to § 2402(c)(6), the Governor properly relied on these circumstances as negative

indicators of suitability.

The Governor also found several positive factors in Petitioner’s background under

§ 2402(d). The Governor noted that Petitioner had participated in vocational and educational

programs; however, the Governor noted his participation was limited, but this was

understandable given Petitioner had lost his eyesight while incarcerated. See § 2402(d)(9).

Petitioner had also participated in and completed several self-help and therapy programs. Id.

Nevertheless, the Governor found Petitioner did not have realistic parole plans upon release. See

§ 2402(d)(8). He had no employment prospects or plans for vocational training toward future

employment. His plans consisted of relying entirely on his mother for support, transportation and

housing. Given this was the situation Petitioner was in when he committed his crime, this factor

was understandably important. 

It is apparent the Governor considered all relevant evidence in this case and carefully

balanced and assessed the various factors, and the findings were supported by at least “some

evidence.”

Petitioner also contends the Governor is relying solely on the immutable circumstances of

the underlying offense and his criminal history prior to incarceration. In Biggs v. Terhune, 334

F.3d 910, 916-17 (9 Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit stated that “[a] continued reliance in the future th

on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs

contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due

process violation.” Although a denial of parole initially can be justified by relying on the gravity

of the offense, over time, “should [the prisoner] continue to demonstrate exemplary behavior and

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evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date simply because of the nature of [his]

offense and prior conduct would raise serious questions involving his liberty interest in parole.”

Irons v. Carey, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 2027359 *5 (9 Cir. 2007), citing Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916. th

Nevertheless, in both Irons and Biggs, the Ninth Circuit upheld the denials of parole based solely

on the commitment offense. This was because in each of these cases the prisoner had not yet

served the minimum term of his sentence. Here, at the time the Governor reversed the Board’s

decision, Petitioner had only served 17 years of his 25 years-to-life sentence. Therefore, the due

process concerns noted in Biggs are not at issue in this case. Moreover, the circumstances of the

offense, while significant, were not the only reasons for the Governor’s decision. The Governor

also relied on Petitioner’s institutional misconduct and lack of realistic parole plans in denying

parole. 

Finally, Petitioner claims the Governor’s decision violated his plea agreement. Petitioner

argues he pleaded guilty with the understanding he would be paroled if the Board granted his

parole. He claims that article V, section 8(b) of the California Constitution, which authorizes the

Governor to review the Board’s recommendation, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause by

increasing his punishment. This claim has been rejected by the state and federal courts. Connor v.

Estelle, 981 F.2d 1032, 1033 (9 Cir.1992); In re Duarte, 143 Cal.App.3d 943, 951 (1983). The th

Governor’s review process does not increase the punishment for the offense; it merely changes

the identity of the official making the final determination. Johnson v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 964, 967

(9 Cir.1996). th

In light of the above, it cannot be said that the state court resolution of Petitioner’s claims

“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

///

///

///

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RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2. Judgment be entered in favor of Respondent.

This Findings and Recommendations is submitted to United States District Court Judge

Oliver W. Wanger, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-

304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after

service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 19, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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