Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02204/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02204-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Enserch Corporation
Appellee
Karen Goodwin
Appellant
Dianne Dudley Waugh
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH F I L E D 

United States Coμrt <?f Appeals 

IR THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Cll'C\llt 

FOR THE TEN'l'H CIRCUIT NOV 2 6 1991 

KAREN GOODWIN, as Special Administrator) 

of the Estate of Dianne Dudley Waugh, ) 

Deceased, ) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

ENSERCH CORPORATION, d/b/a Lone Star 

Gas Company, an operating division of 

Enserch Corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 88-2204 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. Bo. 87-121-C) 

Don Manners, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,· for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

David w. Edmonds, John R. Hargrave and Randy D. Witzke of Edmonds, 

Cole, Hargrave & Givens, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for DefendantAppellee. 

Before SETH, HOLLOWAY and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.* 

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge. 

* After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.S(c). The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 88-2204 Document: 010110097026 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-appellant Karen Goodwin (Goodwin) appeals a 

judgment entered for defendant-appellee Enserch Corporation 

(Enserch). This judgment followed the district court's order 

granting judgment for Enserch notwithstanding the verdict rendered 

for Goodwin. After the jury verdict in the wrongful death action 

in favor of Goodwin, the trial judge concluded that she had 

presented insufficient evidence to support a finding of negligence 

and granted the judgment n.o.v. The controlling issue in 

Goodwin's appeal is whether she presented sufficient direct and 

circumstantial proof to establish a prima facie negligence case, 

although she did not offer specific testimony on the appropriate 

conduct for a natural gas pipeline under the circumstances. 

We are convinced that the trial court erred in granting 

judgment n.o.v. because Goodwin presented sufficient evidence from 

which the jury could draw a reasonable inference of negligence, 

and additional proof on particular conduct required of the 

defendant Enserch was not mandated. Accordingly, we reverse and 

remand for entry of judgment on the verdict. 

I. BACKGROUND 

In February 1987, Dianne Dudley Waugh was living and working 

at a family tack manufacturing business in southeastern Oklahoma. 

Waugh recently had moved into a small building that served as the 

office for the business but that also was equipped and furnished 

as a living quarters. On February 28, 1987, an early morning fire 

occurred and there was substantial evidence that it followed a gas 

explosion; the defendant offered contrary evidence. Although she 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-2204 Document: 010110097026 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 2 
escaped, Waugh was severely burned. Waugh, age 29, died five days 

after the fire. 

As special administrator of her deceased sister's estate, 

Goodwin filed a wrongful death action in the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. The 

diversity action named as the defendant the operator of the 

natural gas pipeline, Enserch, doing business as Lone Star Gas 

Company (Lone Star). Goodwin's complaint essentially alleged that 

natural gas leaking from a transmission pipeline that, traversed 

the shop site had caused the explosion and that this resulted from 

negligence by the defendant in constructing, testing and 

inspecting its pipeline. IR. Doc. 2 (First Amended Complaint). 

During the jury trial, Enserch challenged the sufficiency of 

Goodwin's evidence. Enserch moved for a directed verdict pursuant 

to Rule S0(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the 

ground that Goodwin had not proved negligence. With the Enserch 

motion for a directed verdict pending, the district judge 

submitted the case to the jury on Goodwin's negligence theories. 

He instructed that Goodwin claimed that the gas company was 

negligent under four theories: 

One. In failing to construct the pipeline in such 

manner as to prevent leaks from occurring. Two. In 

failing to properly test and inspect the line for leaks. 

Three. In failing to properly test and inspect the 

[ethyl mercaptan], the odorant in the natural gas. And 

[f]our. In failing to prevent ethyl mercaptan from 

dissolving and failing to emit an odor to warn persons 

of leaks .... 

VI R. 738. 

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Goodwin and found 

damages in the amount of $725,000. 

3 

Accepting the verdict, the 

Appellate Case: 88-2204 Document: 010110097026 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 3 
district court denied Enserch's pending motion for a directed 

verdict. 1 Two days before the district court entered judgment, 

Enserch filed a motion for a judgment n.o.v. pursuant to Rule 

50(b). After entering judgment in favor of Goodwin, the trial 

judge granted the Enserch motion for judgment n.o.v. on the ground 

that Goodwin had not presented sufficient evidence of the standard 

of care required of the pipeline. In his order the district judge 

explained that Goodwin "presented either insufficient or no 

evidence concerning the duty, or standard of care, to which the 

defendant should be held in the construction, maintenance and 

inspection of its pipeline and in the odorization of its gas." 

2 IR. Doc. 15, at 4. 

On appeal, Goodwin contends that the trial court erred in 

granting judgment n.o.v.; that sufficient evidence was presented 

to show a breach of the high standard of care required to prevent 

the escape of gas, a highly dangerous commodity; that there was 

evidence to show the explosion was caused by such escape of gas 

from defendant's pipeline; and that there was evidence of 

negligence in the construction, testing and inspection of the 

pipeline. 

1 

The district court entered judgment for Goodwin in the amount 

of $795,414.53, and awarded post-judgment interest. The figure 

includes a total of $70,414.53 in prejudgment interest. 

2 

Summarizing the reasoning underlying the ruling, the district 

judge wrote: "The limited evidence presented about the condition 

of defendant's pipeline, and its repair and odorization policies 

and practices is insufficient to raise any factual issues which 

the jury could then determine to be negligence on the part of the 

defendant on the grounds alleged by the plaintiff." IR. Doc. 15, 

at 12. 

4 

Appellate Case: 88-2204 Document: 010110097026 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 4 
A. 

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE 

Standard of Review 

Applying the same standard that the trial court applied, we 

review de nova district court rulings granting or denying judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict. ~, Meyers v. Ideal Basic Indus., 

Inc., 940 F.2d 1379, 1383 (10th Cir. 1991); Rajala v. Allied 

Corp., 919 F.2d 610, 615 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. 

Ct. 1685 (1991). Thus, we test the evidence under the standard 

"'whether there is evidence upon which the jury could properly 

find a verdict for [the party against whom the motion is 

directed].'" Hurd v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 734 F.2d 495, 

498-99 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. 

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 2524, at 543 (1971)). In 

determining whether the evidence was sufficient, we apply the 

substantive Oklahoma law controlling a plaintiff's burden of 

proving negligence. See, e.g., Meyers, 940 F.2d at 1383. In 

reviewing the evidence, we must "view the evidence and all 

inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party," 

although the nonmovant's position "must be supported by more than 

a mere scintilla of evidence." Meyers, 940 F.2d at 1383. As 

instructed. by the Supreme Court, in reviewing the application 

below of Oklahoma substantive law we review the ruling de .IlQYQ.• 

Salve Regina College v. Russell, 111 S. Ct. 1217 (1991). 

B. Oklahoma Law Controlling Sufficiency of Evidence of 

Negligence 

1. Prima Facie Proof of Negligence 

Because the standard of review specifies a test for 

sufficiency of proof, we determine whether Goodwin presented a 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-2204 Document: 010110097026 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 5 
prima facie case of negligence. Under Oklahoma law, a plaintiff 

presents prima facie proof of negligence by establishing: (1) that 

the defendant owed a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury or 

other harm; (2) that the defendant breached, or failed properly 

to perform, the required duty; and (3) that the defendant's 

failure to perform the duty proximately caused injury or other 

harm to the plaintiff. ~, McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp .• 

Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 470 (Okla. 1987); Thompson v. Presbyterian 

Hosp .• Inc., 652 P.2d 260, 263 (Okla. 1982). If Goodwin presented 

sufficient prima facie proof, then the issue of negligence 

properly was a question for the jury to resolve. See, e.g., 

Towery v. Guffey. 358 P.2d 812, 814 (Okla. 1960) (reversing 

directed verdict for defendant because plaintiff established prima 

facie case of negligence); Julian v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 32 

P.2d 31, 37 (Okla. 1934) (reversing ruling that plaintiff's 

evidence was insufficient to go to jury where escaping gas from 

leaky pipeline caused explosion and resulting personal injuries). 

A showing by circumstantial evidence is a permissible method of 

proving breach of duty. See. e.g., Fletcher v. Meadow Gold Co., 

472 P.2d 885, 887 (Okla. 1970) ("essential elements of negligence 

are provabie by circumstantial evidence"); Safeway Stores, Inc. 

v. Fuller, 118 P.2d 649, 651 (Okla. 1941) ("primary negligence may 

be established by circumstantial evidence"); see also Nye v. Cox, 

440 P.2d 683, 685 (Okla. 1968) (explaining plaintiff may establish 

prima facie case of negligence through circumstantial evidence) 

(syllabus by the court). 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-2204 Document: 010110097026 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 6 
2. Legal Duty of Care of Natural Gas Pipelines 

As the district court instructed the jury, a business that 

handles natural gas is under a duty to exercise a high degree of 

care to prevent accidents. 3 

explained that 

The Oklahoma Supreme Court has 

a higher degree of care and vigilance is required in 

dealing with natural gas than in the ordinary affairs of 

life and business, and one who handles such a dangerous 

agency must use a degree of care to prevent damage from 

the escaping of gas which is commensurate with the 

danger which it is its duty to avoid. 

Margay Oil Corp. v. Jamison, 59 P.2d 790, 792 (Okla. 1936) 

(emphasis added). 4 

The standard of care for handlers of natural gas does not 

contain specific requirements. "While no absolute standard of 

duty can be prescribed, every reasonable precaution suggested by 

experience and the known danger of the escape of gas ought to be 

3 

Neither party has challenged the district court's 

instructions to the jury concerning negligence. The district 

court instructed the jury to apply the ordinary negligence 

standard: whether the defendant used "due care," or the degree of 

care that a "reasonably prudent person would have exercised," in 

proportion to the danger that the natural gas posed. VI R. 

740-41. The court charged that "natural gas is a dangerous 

product, and the defendant is charged with a duty of due care 

commensurate with such danger." Id. at 740. 

4 

See also, e.g., Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Colvert, 260 P.2d 

1076, 1079 (Okla. 1953) ("Natural gas is a dangerous commodity and 

a distributor of it is required to exercise a degree of care 

commensurate with the dangerous character of that which he is 

handling."); Julian, 32 P.2d at 37 (explaining that "those 

handling natural gas should be required to exercise such a degree 

of care and caution as is commensurate with its known danger"); 

Bellevue Gas & Oil Co. v. Carr, 161 P. 203, 206 (Okla. 1916) 

(explaining handlers of gas must "exercise a high degree of care 

and caution commensurate with the known or probable dangers" of 

gas). 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-2204 Document: 010110097026 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 7 
\ 

taken." Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Oklahoma Ry., 188 P. 331, 332 

( Okla . 19 2 0 ) . 

Oil & Gas Co.: 

As the Oklahoma Court held in Julian v. Sinclair 

The courts have always recognized the known dangerous 

character of natural gas and have carefully refrained 

from laying down a rule by which to measure the degree 

of care and caution to be exercised in the handling of 

said dangerous substance, and have adopted the policy 

that those handling natural gas should be required to 

exercise such a degree of care and caution as is 

commensurate with its known danger. Whether or not 

defendant exercised such care is an issue of fact which 

under proper instructions should be submitted to a jury. 

32 P.2d at 37 (emphasis added). 

In light of the evidence reviewed below and these 

authorities, we are convinced that there was no failure of proof 

by the plaintiff here. Under the cases, particularly Julian, it 

is clear that specific evidence of a standard of care resting on 

the defendant was not required. Indeed, in Julian there is no 

mention in the court's lengthy opinion of testimony on such a 

standard of care, and yet the court held the case should have been 

submitted to the jury. Julian says the courts have "carefully 

refrained from laying down a rule by which to measure the degree 

of care and caution required." Julian, 32 P.2d at 32. 

Moreover, the Oklahoma Court has said that "duties arise out 

of circumstances." Julian, 32 P.2d at 34. Here, Goodwin's proof 

showed the circumstances giving rise to the pipeline's duty to 

exercise a high standard of care defendant's control of a 

pipeline transporting gas under pressure in the vicinity of a 

residential structure. Completing the elements of a submissible 

case, the plaintiff presented evidence of breach of the pipeline's 

duty, the resulting explosion and damages. As in Julian, the 

8 

Appellate Case: 88-2204 Document: 010110097026 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 8 
ruling of the trial judge here that the evidence was deficient 

should be reversed. 

III. ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE 

A. Circumstances Surrounding the Fire 

The tack manufacturing business where Waugh, the deceased, 

lived and worked, was operating at the site of a former feed mill 

five miles south of Hugo, Oklahoma. The office-dwelling that 

burned was adjacent to a four-lane highway, U.S. 271, at the front 

of the property. Farther from the highway were barns, silos and a 

shop building in which the firm manufactured metal products. The 

six-inch transmission pipeline, which was carrying 190 pounds per 

square inch of natural gas, traversed the back of the property at 

a distance of approximately 460 feet from the office-dwelling 

where Waugh lived. IV R. 425; V R. 646; Plaintiff's Ex. 46. 

When Waugh moved into the office-dwelling5 a few weeks before 

the February 28, 1987, tragedy, the natural gas service line 

leading to the building was not connected. On January 5, Lone 

Star had attempted unsuccessfully to reinstate gas service to the 

building. A Lone Star employee had put gas into the line leading 

to the building, but the gas did not reach the building. The gas 

company employee explained to Waugh and Goodwin that he could not 

hook up gas service to the office-dwelling because water was 

blocking the line and he advised them to have the pipe replaced. 

5 

The building was a cinder-block structure with an attached 

wood frame addition. The cinder-block portion of the building 

contained a bathroom, rooms used primarily for storage, and a room 

that Waugh used as a bedroom. The frame addition contained a 

bathroom and an open office-kitchen-living area. 

9 

Appellate Case: 88-2204 Document: 010110097026 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 9 
After the gas company employee left, Goodwin smelled gas "very 

strongly" at the meter "riser," the location at which a gas meter 

would have been installed. 6 II. R. 156. Goodwin did not report 

the odor to the gas company. 

At approximately 7:30 a.m. on February 28, 1987, a Saturday, 

Waugh was talking by telephone with a friend, Cynthia F. Harrison. 

Both women left the line briefly to get cigarettes. At trial, 

Harrison recounted what occurred when the women resumed their 

conversation: 

Diane came back from getting her cigarettes, and I sat 

back down, and she said, "I'm back." And [her] voice 

faded away from the phone, as if she turned her head to 

light her cigarette, and then she started screaming, 

"Cindy, call somebody. There's a fire." And I wasn't 

for sure at first what she said to me, and I kept the 

phone to my ear, and I could hear, sounded like 

vibrations of her running, and then I knew something was 

wrong, and she was screaming, "Cindy, call somebody. 

There's a fire." 

V R. 639. 

Phillip A. Rozelle, a motorist on highway 271, noticed the 

burning building and stopped. He found Waugh attempting to keep 

warm with a small quilt as she sat on the ground beside the 

burning building. II R. 86. Rozelle quoted Waugh as saying, "I 

struck a match and lit a cigarette, and the whole north end of the 

house blew up." Id. at 87. 7 Waugh told Rozelle she could not 

6 

Witnesses referred to the meter site as the meter "riser." 

The gas meter site was on the side of the property farthest from 

the highway. The gas "riser" was approximately 355 feet from the 

office-dwelling. 

7 

Other trial witnesses 

accounts of her injuries. 

testified that Waugh related similar 

Waugh's sister, Goodwin, recalled that 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

10 

Appellate Case: 88-2204 Document: 010110097026 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 10 
understand what had happened; Waugh said that there was no gas 

service to the building and that she had smelled nothing. Id. 

Both the Choctaw County Sheriff, James Choate, and an agent 

of the State Fire Marshal, James M. Green, 8 testified that an 

explosion had occurred. III R. 239-40; IV R. 457. A man and a 

woman at a mobile home located near the office-dwelling reported 

hearing "two explosions" before the fire. II R. 85. Further, 

although the fire consumed the building, witnesses observed 

objects scattered from approximately 20 to 60 feet away: pieces of 

insulation; shards of glass; a window screen; the cushion from 

a day bed; a pen-and-ink sketch of a foal. II R. 84; III R. 

232, 239, 269-70, 271; IV R. 424, 428; see III R. 346-47. 

Having concluded that the unburned cushion could not have been 

blown through a window, Sheriff Choate decided that the only 

possible explanation was that an explosion had raised the roof. 

III R. 239-40. Choate could not determine what sort of explosion 

it was. Id. at 240. 

For the defendant pipeline, Bud Beemer, an employee of the 

(Footnote continued): 

at the hospital in nearby Hugo, Oklahoma, the injured woman had 

explained that "she went to light a cigarette and the whole place 

blew up." .II R. 148-49. An ambulance attendant, Kirk Tryon, 

testified that during the trip to an Oklahoma City hospital Waugh 

had said "something about being in the bathroom and lighting a 

cigarette, and it blew up." Id. at 130. 

8 

The record gives Agent Green's qualifications to testify 

about fires and explosions. As an agent of the State Fire 

Marshal, Green conducted investigations of the origins of fires at 

the request of local fire and police departments and others, 

including individuals and insurers. Prior to becoming an agent of 

the State Fire Marshal in 1984, Green had been a firefighter, the 

fire marshal of Idabel, Oklahoma, and a special arson investigator 

for a district attorney. 

11 

Appellate Case: 88-2204 Document: 010110097026 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 11 
Oklahoma Corporation Commission's Pipeline Safety Division, 

testified that, after finding what he considered neither visible 

evidence of leaks in the transmission pipeline nor damage 

consistent with an explosion, he concluded that a natural gas 

explosion did not cause the fire. V R. 646-47, 651-52. This 

issue went to the jury as a fact question and was apparently 

resolved against the pipeline. 

There was evidence of detection of gas in the vicinity of 

Waugh's office-dwelling just shortly after the accident. On the 

morning after the fire, the owner of the property, David w. 

Custer, smelled gas and observed bubbles in a water-filled hole 

around the gas meter "riser. II III R. 271, 272. Two days after 

the fire, Green, the state fire agent, observed bubbles in the 

puddle at the meter site appearing at a rate of about 21 per 

minute, and he smelled an odor of gas in the area. IV R. 442-43. 

On the day after the fire, a Lone Star crew testing for 

combustible gas in the ground at the plant site recorded a "slight 

reading of something" at several places in the vicinity of a 

driveway approximately 40 feet from the office-dwelling. III R. 

290. A Lone Star employee, Billy W. Tullos, observed the readings 

on an inst.rument called a combustible gas indicator ( 11 CGI 11 ) • Id. 

at 289-90. A CGI will detect combustible gases including natural 

gas, methane and any petroleum product. Id. 

Between a week and 10 days after the fire, Green conducted 

additional tests with an instrument that produced evidence of 

hydrocarbons or flammable materials in three locations at the fire 

scene. IV R. 443-45. The first location at which he obtained a 

12 

Appellate Case: 88-2204 Document: 010110097026 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 12 
positive reading on the instrument was a hole located about 40 

feet from the building that had been dug after the fire to repair 

a water line broken by the fire truck. Id. The second location 

at which Green obtained a positive reading was in the drain area 

at a water well house located about 129 feet from the 

office-dwelling. Id. at 425, 445. The third location at which 

the instrument registered a positive reading was at the gas meter 

"riser. 11 Id. 9 

There was evidence tending to show that Lone Star had been 

9 

There was further evidence bearing on the presence of gas at 

Waugh's office-dwelling. 

In late April or early May 1987, Waugh's mother, Virginia Lee 

Dudley, began smelling an odor of natural gas in the vicinity of 

the gas meter "riser." III R. 347-48. Because others in the 

family did not smell the odor, Dudley did not immediately report 

it to Lone Star. Id. at 348. However, Dudley continued to smell 

the gas odor, and she believed it became stronger. Id. at 348-49. 

In approximately mid-August 1987, Dudley reported the odor to Lone 

Star. Id. 349. 

In August 1987, Lone Star crews located and repaired leaks in 

the natural gas transmission line at four locations. Instruments 

detected four "grade three" leaks; Lone Star classified leaks in 

the category as posing no hazard. III R. 323-24. The crew dug 

the first of four holes at a location near a gas metering station. 

IV R. 379-80. At the first leak site, a member of the repair crew 

smelled "a little" gas before the hole was dug. See id. at 380. 

The crew found that gas was leaking at the first site from two 

clamps that previously had been installed to repair holes; they 

tightened one clamp and replaced the other. Id. at 380-81. The 

second leak site was located a distance of from 40 to 60 feet from 

the gas meter "riser." See id. at 398. At the second site, the 

crew replaced a clamp that was leaking gas. Id. at 383-84, 

398-99. The third leak site was located near the gas meter 

"riser." Id. at 386, 399. The crew found and repaired one hole 

in the pipeline at the third site. Id. at 387-88, 400. At the 

fourth leak site, the crew repaired a leak by installing a clamp. 

Id. at 388-89, 400-01. Crew members described the size of the 

holes in the pipeline as ranging from a pinhead to a pencil lead 

to a match head. Id. at 392, 398-99. 

A Lone Star crew returned to the shop site later in August 

1987 to investigate another report of a natural gas odor. IV R. 

403, 406. On a Saturday, a crew stopped a leak by greasing a 

valve at the meter location. Id. at 404-05. 

13 

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aware of a problem of leaks in the transmission pipeline for some 

time before the accident. Clamps were used to close off leaks. 

See IV R. 399. The testimony indicated that leaks in the 

transmission line in the vicinity of the office-dwelling had been 

repaired with clamps prior to the fire. Id. at 380-81. A 

pipeline employee described one of the clamps as a homemade type, 

used possibly 15 years earlier. See id. at 396. 

held: 

In deciding a negligence case under Oklahoma law, the court 

It is a question of fact for the jury (or here the 

court) as to whether the dangerous condition existed 

long enough so that in the exercise of ordinary care a 

reasonable person exercising reasonable care would have 

discovered and remedied the same. And this may be 

established by circumstantial as well as by direct 

evidence. 

Fleming v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 306, 309 (W.D. 

Okla. 1964). Moreover, there was sufficient evidence for an 

inference of a lack of maintenance· of the pipeline to avoid 

corrosion and leaks so that negligence could be found without 

prior notice of the leaks. See Stills v. Mayor, 438 P.2d 477, 482 

(Okla. 1968). 

On the other hand, there was some defense evidence of no gas 

leakage. ~he annual leak survey of the transmission line that 

Lone Star conducted in April 1987 indicated no gas leakage. III 

R. 320. Lone Star at the time was conducting leak surveys by 

having employees walk its pipelines carrying an instrument 

designed to detect gas above the ground. Id. at 320-21. Federal 

law required the company to inspect its pipelines annually. Id. 

at 322. A fact issue was presented for the jury and apparently 

14 

Appellate Case: 88-2204 Document: 010110097026 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 14 
the jury again found against the defendant pipeline, concluding 

that gas was present at the time of the accident and was the cause 

of the explosion. 

B. Expert Testimony on Cause of E:g>losion 

Goodwin linked the evidence about gas leaking from the 

pipeline to the fire through the opinion testimony of an expert 

witness. Goodwin's expert was Robert Stubbs, a consulting 

h . t 10 c em1.s . Stubbs testified that he believed "significant 

amounts" of the gas leaking from the transmission line migrated 

underground in the direction of the office-dwelling. IV R. 531. 11 

Stubbs said he believed that some of the gas followed the service 

line from the meter site to the building, and then collected under 

the slab foundation. Id. at 531. Stubbs testified that gas 

10 

At trial, Stubbs identified himself as a consulting chemist 

who specialized in accidents involving liquefied petroleum gas and 

natural gas. Stubbs' educational background included his 

receiving a bachelor of science degree from Iowa State University; 

his major field of study was chemistry and he was a physics minor. 

In addition, Stubbs had completed approximately 30 hours of 

graduate work in chemistry at Loyola University in Chicago. For 

approximately 13 years, Stubbs was a research and analytical 

chemist at the Institute of Gas Technology, which is a nonprofit 

educational and research institute founded by the gas industry. 

In addition, Stubbs conducted research at the Institute in the 

field of odorization of natural gases. As a self-employed 

consultant.since 1979, Stubbs' areas of specialty included odorant 

technology and the investigation of accidents involving gas fires 

or explosions. Stubbs said he had been involved in the 

investigations of from "several hundred" to possibly a thousand 

fires. 

11 

Stubbs estimated that gas probably was escaping from each of 

the smaller holes, which were described as being about the size of 

a pencil lead, at a rate of more than 300 cubic feet per hour. IV 

R. 505. Under Stubbs' calculations, gas could have been escaping 

from each of the larger holes, which were described as being about 

the size of match heads, at a rate of more than 1,300 cubic feet 

per hour. 

15 

Appellate Case: 88-2204 Document: 010110097026 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 15 
probably entered the building through a joint in the slab 

foundation and along utility lines. Id. at 531-32. 12 

Stubbs concluded that an explosion had preceded the fire. 

IV R. 497. Stubbs estimated that gas entering the office-dwelling 

at the rate of 100 cubic feet per hour, or less, could have caused 

a low-level, or minor, explosion. V R. 555; see id. at 548. 

Stubbs' testimony suggested that gas could have accumulated 

undetected in the building because the chemical odorant intended 

to serve as a warning could have been absorbed by the soil as the 

gas migrated underground. See IV R. 491-92, 495, 512. 

Stubbs testified that he believed the holes in the pipeline 

had existed on the date of the accident. Further, Stubbs said gas 

probably had been leaking for "several months before the 

accident." IV R. 504-05. Stubbs concluded that rusting or 

corrosion of the pipe in the relatively corrosive soil in the 

vicinity had caused the holes in the transmission line. Id. at 

502-03. 

12 

IV. CONCLUSION 

As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has held: 

all the plaintiff is required to do in order to 

establish his case is to make it appear to be more 

probaPle that the injury came in whole or in part from 

the defendant's negligence than from any other cause, 

and this fact may be established by circumstantial 

evidence and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn 

therefrom.' 

Green, the Agent of the State Fire Marshal, testified that a 

Lone Star official told him "that it was possible for gas to 

migrate underground and come up under concrete slabs and result in 

( an explosion, and that he would assist me in any way possible to 

[investigate] this explosion." IV R. 476. 

16 

Appellate Case: 88-2204 Document: 010110097026 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 16 
Pratt v. Womack, 359 P.2d 223, 225 (Okla. 1961) (quoting Covington 

Coal Prods. Co. v. Stogner, 72 P.2d 491, 492 (Okla. 1937) 

(syllabus by the court)). 

In light of the substantial evidence supporting plaintiff 

Goodwin's case, we hold that it was error to grant judgment 

n.o.v., depriving her of the jury verdict she had won. It is true 

that there were sharp conflicts in the evidence and that the 

defendant pipeline presented substantial evidence itself. 

Nevertheless, those fact questions were submitted to the jury. 

The instructions under which the jury decided the case are not 

challenged and they appear to cover adequately a negligence case 

of this sort in accord with Oklahoma law. 

It was for the jury to draw inferences from the direct and 

circumstantial evidence on the basic issues submitted, i.e., 

whether the circumstances shown created a duty resting on the 

defendant, whether there was a breach of this duty, and whether 

there were damages resulting therefrom. The evidence bearing on 

the circumstances of the operation of the natural gas pipeline in 

the proximity of the office-dwelling of Waugh was undisputed, and 

there was substantial evidence of leakage for some time from the 

defendant's pipeline of the highly dangerous gas, as well as the 

expert testimony for plaintiff Goodwin, which completed the making 

of a submissible case for the jury. The placing of a further 

burden of proof on the plaintiff by the trial judge, and the 

requirement of further proof of a specific standard of care, are 

not supported by the Oklahoma cases. 

17 

Appellate Case: 88-2204 Document: 010110097026 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 17 
Accordingly, the judgment entered notwithstanding the verdict 

is REVERSED and the cause is REM.ANDED with directions that the 

original judgment entered on March 23, 1988, on the verdict for 

the plaintiff-appellant, be reentered. 

18 

Appellate Case: 88-2204 Document: 010110097026 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 18