Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00120/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00120-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
D. G. Adams
Respondent
Yeng Xiong
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

YENG XIONG, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

D. G. ADAMS, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

Case No.: 1:10-cv-00120-OWW-JLT HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RE: 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

THE PETITION (Doc. 15) 

ORDER DIRECTING OBJECTIONS TO BE

FILED WITHIN TWENTY DAYS

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on

January 21, 2010. On June 14, 2010, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. 

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In Houston v. Lack, the United States Supreme Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner's notice of appeal is

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deemed filed on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court

clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 166, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The rule is premised on the pro se prisoner's

mailing of legal documents through the conduit of "prison authorities whom he cannot control and whose interests might be

adverse to his." Miller v. Sumner, 921 F.2d 202, 203 (9 Cir. 1990); see, Houston, 487 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. at 2382. The

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Ninth Circuit has applied the “mailbox rule” to state and federal petitions in order to calculate the tolling provisions of the

AEDPA. Saffold v. Neland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268-1269 (9 Cir. 2000), amended May 23, 2001, vacated and remanded on

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other grounds sub nom. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002). The date the petition is signed may be considered the

earliest possible date an inmate could submit his petition to prison authorities for filing under the mailbox rule. Jenkins v.

Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (9 cir. 2003). Accordingly, for all of Petitioner’s state petitions and for the instant federal

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petition, the Court will consider the date of signing of the petition (or the date of signing of the proof of service if no signature

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(Doc. 15). On July 16, 2010, Petitioner filed his opposition. (Doc. 16). On July 27, 2010,

Respondent filed a reply. (Doc. 17). 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

As mentioned, Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition as being filed outside

the one year limitations period prescribed by Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Rule 4 of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from

the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the

district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed Respondent’s to file a Motion to Dismiss in lieu of an Answer

if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) (using Rule th

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for th

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a Respondent can file a Motion to Dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)'s one year limitation period and failure to state a cognizable habeas claim. Because

Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is similar in procedural standing to a Motion to Dismiss for failure

to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default and Respondent has not yet filed a formal

Answer, the Court will review Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule

4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

appears on the petition) as the earliest possible filing date and the operative date of filing under the mailbox rule for

calculating the running of the statute of limitation. Petitioner signed the instant petition on January 21, 2010. (Doc. 1, p. 12).

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1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 th

(1997). The instant petition was filed on January 21, 2010, and thus, it is subject to the provisions

of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner's direct

review became final, pursuant to subsection (d)(1)(A). In a situation such as this, however, where

the petitioner is challenging a prison disciplinary action, the Ninth Circuit has held that direct review

is concluded and the statute of limitations commences, pursuant to subsection (d)(1)(D), when the

final administrative appeal is denied. Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9 Cir. 2003)(holding th

that the Board of Prison Term's denial of an inmate's administrative appeal was the “factual

predicate” of the inmate's claim that triggered the commencement of the limitations period); Shelby

v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9 cir. 2004)(holding that the statute of limitation does not begin to th

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run until a petitioner’s administrative appeal has been denied). 

In this case, Respondent has submitted documents establishing that Petitioner is serving an

indeterminate life sentence with the possibility of parole plus a one-year enhancement based on his

1992 conviction in the Merced County Superior Court for attempted murder. (Doc. 15, Ex. 1). The

petition alleges that Petitioner was found to have violated prison rules by battering another inmate

following a prison disciplinary hearing conducted on October 20, 2007. (Doc. 1, p. 27). Petitioner

was assessed the loss of 360 days of credits as a result. (Id., pp. 36-37). When Petitioner attempted

to exhaust his administrative remedies, his first level appeal was rejected for non-compliance with

procedures. (Id., p. 24). His appeal to the final level of review was rejected on March 11, 2008, for

failure to complete a second-level review. (Id.). 

Therefore, the limitations period commenced on March 12, 2008, the day after Petitioner was

informed that his final administrative appeal had been denied. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D),

Petitioner had one year from that day, or until March 11, 2009, absent applicable tolling, within

which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. As mentioned, Petitioner did not file his

federal petition until January 21, 2010, over ten months after the limitations period had expired.

Absent any applicable tolling, therefore, the petition is untimely.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2). A properly filed application is one that complies with the applicable laws and rules

governing filings, including the form of the application and time limitations. Artuz v. Bennett, 531

U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361 (2000). An application is pending during the time that ‘a California

petitioner completes a full round of [state] collateral review,” so long as there is no unreasonable

delay in the intervals between a lower court decision and the filing of a petition in a higher court. 

Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F. 3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds as recognized

by Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F. 3d 729 (9th Cir. 2008)(per curium)(internal quotation marks and citations

omitted); see Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193-194, 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006); see Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 220, 222-226, 122 S. Ct. 2134 (2002); see also, Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006

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(9th Cir. 1999). 

Nevertheless, there are circumstances and periods of time when no statutory tolling is

allowed. For example, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period of time between finality of an

appeal and the filing of an application for post-conviction or other collateral review in state court,

because no state court application is “pending” during that time. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006-1007. 

Similarly, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period between finality of an appeal and the filing of

a federal petition. Id. at 1007. In addition, the limitation period is not tolled during the time that a

federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 563 U.S. 167, 181-182, 121 S.Ct. 2120

(2001); see also, Fail v. Hubbard, 315 F. 3d 1059, 1060 (9th Cir. 2001)(as amended on December 16,

2002). Further, a petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling where the limitation period has already

run prior to filing a state habeas petition. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the

state petition was filed.”); Jiminez v. White, 276 F. 3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Finally, a petitioner

is not entitled to continuous tolling when the petitioner’s later petition raises unrelated claims. See

Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165, 1166 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Respondent’s documents establish that Petitioner filed the following state habeas corpus

petitions challenging the disciplinary decision: (1) filed in the Solano County Superior Court on June

3, 2008, and denied on August 11, 2008 (Doc. 15, Ex. 3, 4); (2) filed in the California Court of

Appeal on August 26, 2008, and denied on September 17, 2008 (Doc. 15, Ex. 5, 6); and (3) filed in

the California Supreme Court on December 9, 2008, and denied on January 21, 2009. (Doc. 15, Ex.

7, 8). 

Accordingly, the one-year statute would have commenced on March 11, 2008 and would

have continued to run until Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition on June 3, 2008, a period of

84 days. At that point, Petitioner would have had 281 days remaining on his 365-day limitation

period. Assuming, without deciding, that all three of Petitioner’s state habeas petitions were

“properly filed” within the meaning of the AEDPA and entitled Petitioner to statutory tolling for the

pendency of those petitions and the intervals separating them, the one-year period would have

commenced again the day following the California Supreme Court’s denial of Petitioner’s third

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habeas petition, i.e., on January 22, 2009. Petitioner would then have had 281 days within which to

file his federal petition. As mentioned, he did not file the instant petition until January 21, 2010. 

Therefore, the one-year period continued to run unabated for 281 days until it expired on October 30,

2009. 

In his opposition, Petitioner contends that the starting date for the one-year period is ninety

days after the denial of his appeal by the California Supreme Court. (Doc. 16, p. 2). According to

Petitioner’s reasoning, therefore, he had one year plus ninety days after the California Supreme Court

denied his third habeas petition on January 21, 2009 within which to file his federal petition. 

Petitioner is mistaken.

As mentioned previously, the one-year period normally commences ninety days after “the

date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the

time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887

(1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9 Cir.1999); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347 th

(8 Cir.1998). However, Petitioner is not challenging his original conviction; therefore, subsection th

(d)(1)(A) is not the starting date for the one-year period. Rather, as mentioned, when a challenge to a

prison disciplinary hearing is involved, the starting date is governed by subsection (d)(1)(D), i.e.,

“the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.” See Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066. Thus, the one-year period

commenced and expired as outlined above.

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Petitioner also contends that his administrative appeal was not final when it was rejected at

the director’s level of review because Petitioner could have sought further review by the Board of

Parole Hearings (“BPH”) within fifteen days. (Doc. 16, pp. 2-3). However, as Respondent correctly

points out, that aspect of a prisoner’s administrative appeal was repealed in 2004. Cal. Code Regs,

In Redd, the Ninth Circuit noted with sympathy the difficulty a California petitioner faces in challenging a prison

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administrative decision, which, in this State, can only be exhausted through the state habeas process: “We are sympathetic

to the concern that under our construction of § 2244(d)(1)(D), the statute of limitations began running at a time when

[petitioner] could not have presented his claim in federal court because the claim had not yet been exhausted.” Redd, 343

F.3d at 1083. Petitioner here was in a similar situation. However, nothing in either the federal statute or the Ninth Circuit’s

case law permits this Court to vary the date on which the one-year period commenced merely in order to accommodate

Petitioner’s difficult plight.

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tit. 15, §§ 2050-2057, 3084.7. Hence, the director’s level of review is now the final decision in the

prison administrative appeal process. In any event, even assuming Petitioner was correct, the

additional fifteen days of tolling would not make the instant petition timely under the AEDPA.

Therefore, unless Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling, the petition should be dismissed as

untimely. 

D. Equitable Tolling

The running of the one-year limitation period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) is subject to

equitable tolling in appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, __U.S.__, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2561

(2010); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct., 128 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9 Cir. 1997). The limitation th

period is subject to equitable tolling when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control

make it impossible to file the petition on time.” Shannon v. Newland, 410 F. 3d 1083, 1089-1090

(9th Cir. 2005)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “When external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: “(1)

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in

his way.” Holland, 2010 WL 2346549 at *12; Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct.

1807 (2005). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest

the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F. 3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)(citation

omitted). As a consequence, “equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases.” Miles, 187 F. 3d at

1107. 

Here, Petitioner has made no express claim of entitlement to equitable tolling and, based on

the record now before the Court, the Court sees no basis for such a claim. However, in his

opposition to the motion to dismiss, Petitioner implies that period of his confinement in the Security

Housing Unit (“SHU”) should be tolled, thus entitling Petitioner to tolling between the time when

his administrative appeal was denied and when his filed his first state habeas petition, a period of 84

days. (Doc. 16, p. 3). 

As mentioned, equitable tolling is only allowed in those rare circumstances when

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extraordinary circumstances beyond a petitioner’s control prevented him from filing his federal

petition even though the petitioner had been diligently pursuing his rights. Here, Petitioner’s has not

presented any evidence that his SHU confinement either constituted an extraordinary circumstance

or, if it were such an extraordinary circumstance, that it prevented him from timely filing his petition. 

Petitioner has neither alleged nor proven the dates upon which he was confined in the SHU, nor has

he presented any credible evidence that confinement in the SHU prevented him from preparing and

filing either his state habeas petitions or the instant petition. Indeed, it appears that Petitioner was

able to pursue some or all of his state habeas remedies while confined to the SHU. Moreover, in the

final analysis, it is not the 84-day interval between the denial of his last administrative appeal and the

filing of the first state habeas petition that is fatal to Petitioner’s claims. Rather, it is the 365-day

delay between the California Supreme Court’s denial of his last state petition and the filing of the

instant petition that has given rise to the timeliness issue. Petitioner does not contend that any or all

of this 365-day delay should be tolled on equitable grounds. Accordingly, the petition is untimely

and should be dismissed.

E. Failure To State A Cognizable Federal Habeas Claim.

Respondent next contends that the petition should be dismissed for failure to state a

cognizable habeas claim. Respondent argues that because Petitioner is not raising a claim that would

affect the fact or duration of his confinement, no habeas jurisdiction exists. The Court agrees.

A federal court may only grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner can show

that "he is in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A habeas corpus

petition is the correct method for a prisoner to challenge the “legality or duration” of his

confinement. Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991), quoting, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411

U.S. 475, 485 (1973); Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579, 128 S.Ct. 2096 (2006)(challenges to

the lawfulness of confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas

corpus); Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. In

contrast, a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the proper method for a prisoner to

challenge the conditions of that confinement. McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1991); 

Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499; Badea, 931 F.2d at 574; Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules

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Governing Section 2254 Cases. While the United States Supreme Court has not addressed whether a

challenge to a condition of confinement may be brought in habeas corpus, see Docken v. Chase, 393

F.3d 1024, 1028 (9 Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit has held that “habeas jurisdiction is absent, and a § th

1983 action proper, where a successful challenge to a prison condition will not necessarily shorten

the prisoner’s sentence.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9 Cir. 2003)(emphasis supplied). th

As mentioned previously Petitioner was sentenced on the attempted murder conviction to an

indeterminate term of life with the possibility of parole. In In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061

(2005), the California Supreme Court described the evolution of California’s differing treatment of

inmates sentenced pursuant to the determinate sentencing law (“DSL”) and those sentenced under

the indeterminate sentencing law (“ISL”) as follows:

For decades before 1977, California employed an “indeterminate” sentencing system for

felonies. The court imposed a statutory sentence expressed as a range between a minimum

and maximum period of confinement–often life imprisonment–the offender must serve. An

inmate’s actual period of incarceration within this range was under the exclusive control of

the paroleauthority...During most of this period, parole dates were not set, and prisoners had

no idea when their confinement would end, until the moment the parol authority decided they

were ready for release.

The DLS, adopted in 1976, largely abandoned this system....

Under the DSL, most felonies are now subject, in the alternative, to three precise terms of

years...The court selects one of these alternatives (the lower, middle, or upper term) when

imposing sentence...The offender must serve this entire term, less applicable sentence credits,

within prison walls, but must then be released for a further period of supervised parole....

However, certain serious offenders, including “noncapital” murderers (i.e., those murderers

not punishable by death or life without parole), remain subject to indeterminate sentences. 

These indeterminate sentencees may serve up to life in prison, but they become eligible for

parole consideration after serving minimum terms of confinement....

In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1077-1080 (citations omitted).

Effective January 1, 1983, the California legislature added new § 2933 to the state Penal

Code, which eliminated the prior credit-earning system and instituted a new system of “work-time”

credits for performance in work assignments and educational programs up to a maximum of one day

reduction in term for each day of performance. 70 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 49 (1987). However, § 2933

applies only to persons sentenced under Penal Code §1170. Persons convicted under § 1170 are

those convicted of an offense for which the specified sentence is one of three time periods of

imprisonment in state prison. Cal. Pen. Code § 1168. Accordingly, since Petitioner was not

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sentenced under § 1170, he is not entitled to the normal work-time credits under § 2933 that are

awarded to inmates serving determinate sentences.

Instead, Petitioner’s credit-earning is governed by state regulations. Section 2290(a) of Title

15 provides as follows:

“Life prisoners may earn post-conviction credit for each year spent in state prison. Postconviction credit for time served prior to the hearing at which a parole date is established

shall be considered at that parole consideration hearing. Thereafter, post-conviction credit

for time served since the last hearing shall be considered at progressive hearings. In no case

may post-conviction credit advance a release date earlier than the minimum eligible parole

date.”3

The suggested amount of post-conviction credit is “4 months for each year served since the date the

life term started.” Cal.Code.Regs., tit. 15, § 2290(c). The BPH may grant more or less than four

months depending on how much time the inmate’s “performance, participation or behavior”

warrants. Id. 4

In order, however, to fully appreciate the limitations of Petitioner’s credit-earning capacity as

a life prisoner, an explanation of how California’s parole system for life prisoners interacts with a

life prisoner’s credit-earning potential is necessary. A life prisoner’s “Minimum Eligible Parole

Date,” or “MEPD,” is the “earliest date on which an Indeterminate Sentence Law or life prisoner

may be legally released on parole.” See Cal. Code Regs., titl. 15, § 3000; see also Cal. Code Regs.,

tit. 15, § 2000(b)(67). The CDCR determines the MEPD. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2400. 

However, “[t]he length of time a prisoner must serve prior to actual release on parole is determined

by the [BPH].” Id. 

California law provides that, one year prior to a prisoner’s MEPD, a BPH panel shall meet

Title 15 of the Code of California Regulations § 2000(b)(3) defines a “life prisoner” as “a prisoner serving a

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sentence of life with the possibility of parole.” Life sentences may be imposed for, inter alia, attempted pre-meditated

murder. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2000(b)(3)(O). Here, Petitioner was sentenced to a life term for attempted pre-meditated

murder. (Doc. 15, Ex. 1). Accordingly, he falls within the provisions of this regulation vis-a-vis his credit-earning ability.

Although not critical to the Court’s analysis, it bears mentioning that the one-year sentence enhancement imposed

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at sentencing would be subject to § 2933's credit-earning potential because it is a determinate sentence. See Cal. Pen. Code

1170. Under California law, Petitioner would first serve the one-year determinate term on that enhancement before

commencing to serve his indeterminate life term. Cal. Pen. Code § 669; In re Monigold, 139 Cal.App.3d 485, 488, n. 2

(1983).

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with the prisoner and shall set a release date “unless it determines that the gravity of the current

convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or

offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of

incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.” 

Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a). Thus, the prisoner’s MEPD is the basis for the timing of the initial

suitability hearing.

Following a parole denial, the BPH “shall hear each case annually thereafter,” except that the

BPH may schedule a subsequent hearing up to five years “after any hearing at which parole is

denied” if the prisoner has been convicted of murder and the BPH finds “that it is not reasonable to

expect that parole would be granted at a hearing during the following years and states the bases for

the finding in writing.” Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(2). 

Following a finding of parole suitability for an inmate convicted of a murder committed on or

after November 8, 1978, the BPH sets a base term “established solely on the gravity of the base

crime, taking into account all of the circumstances of that crime.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §

2403(a). The BPH sets a base term by taking into account the “matrix” of suggested base terms,

circumstances in aggravation and mitigation, and adjustments for enhancements or other offenses. 

See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2403-2411. However, the BPH may impose a base term other than

one provided in the matrix “if justified by the particular facts of the individual case....” Id. Once a

base term is set, the BPH may consider awarding post-conviction credit to reduce the base term, up

to four months for each year served, depending on the prisoner’s performance, participation, and

behavior while in prison. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2400-2410.

California Penal Code § 190(a) mandates the application of good behavior credits by the

CDCR against the minimum term for first degree murder, i.e., twenty-five years, that is imposed by

statute for purposes of establishing the MEPD. In re Dayan, 231 Cal.App.3d 184, 188 (1991). 

However, nothing in the statute requires the BPH, or CDCR, to reapply those same credits to the

actual term it eventually sets for Petitioner’s sentence if, and when, it determines that Petitioner is

eligible for parole. Id.; see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2400 (“The [Department of Correction

and Rehabilitation’s] decisions pursuant to Penal Code §§ 2930 et seq. do not affect the [BPH’s]

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decision concerning post-conviction credit pursuant to these rules.”). Thus, in theory, if a prisoner

were determined to be parole eligible at the earliest possible time, credits might be of some use in

actually reducing the amount of time a prisoner served before his initial parole suitability hearing

was set. See People v. Rowland, 134 Cal.App.3d 1, 13-14 (1982). However, the question of

Petitioner’s actual release on parole will be determined only by the BPH, and no matter how much

time Petitioner has served, he will not be released until he has been found suitable for parole. Cal.

Pen. Code § 3041(b); Cal.Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281(a). 

Put simply, the credits that Petitioner is statutorily entitled to earn as a life prisoner can have

no direct impact upon the amount of time Petitioner must actually serve, unless and until the BPH

determines that he is suitable for parole and orders his release, if that time ever comes. Such credits

can only impact the establishment of the MEPD for purposes of scheduling a parole suitability

hearing date. Here, as Respondent correctly observes, as of 2007, when the prison disciplinary

hearing at issue was conducted, Petitioner had long ago passed his MEPD of August 6, 1999. (Doc.

15, Ex. 2, pp. 1-2). Indeed, by 2007, Petitioner had already had three prior parole suitability

hearings. (Id.). Accordingly, the fact that Petitioner was assessed a 360-day credit loss in 2007

would not have had any appreciable impact on his MEPD eight years earlier. Nor would it have any

effect at all on when, if ever, the BPH finally decides that Petitioner is suitable for release on parole

and actually sets a parole release date. 

As the Ninth Circuit has indicated, “habeas jurisdiction is absent, and a § 1983 action proper,

where a successful challenge to a prison condition will not necessarily shorten the prisoner’s

sentence.” Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 858. Here, it is patent that the credits Petitioner lost in his 2007

disciplinary hearing will not “necessarily shorten” his sentence. Thus, the Court cannot base its

habeas jurisdiction upon a credit-earning system that has only a theoretical impact on the duration of

Petitioner’s sentence. 

 Accordingly, as an additional basis for dismissal, the Court recommends that it lacks

jurisdiction to consider this petition because the claims do not challenge the legality or duration of

Petitioner’s confinement.

///

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RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss (Doc. 15), be

GRANTED and the habeas corpus petition be DISMISSED for Petitioner’s failure to comply with 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period and for failure to raise a cognizable habeas claim.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within twenty (20) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 3, 2010 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

9j7khi UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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