Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01899/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01899-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cathy
Appellee
Richard Demarest
Appellant
James Manspeaker
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

. FILED 

Ucured S!ttn Court of Appeals tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

SEP 5 .. 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

RICHARD DEMAREST, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

JAMES MANSPEAKER, Clerk of United ) 

States District Court for the ) 

District of Coloradoi and ) 

CATHY, Last Name Unknown, )° 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

RONALD BROOKS TIPPETT, ) 

) 

Defendant, ) 

) 

EDGAR LEE DURRE, ) 

) 

Movant-Appellant. ) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

RONALD BROOKS TIPPETT, ) 

) 

Defendant, ) 

) 

) 

RONALD REESE, ) 

) 

Movant-Appellant. ) 

No. 88-1899 

(D.C. No. 88-F-843) 

(D. Colorado) 

No. 88-1972 

(b.c. No. 87-CR-386) 

(D. Colorado) 

No. 88-1973 

(D.C. No. 87-CR-386) 

(D. Colorado) 

Appellate Case: 88-1899 Document: 01019897592 Date Filed: 09/05/1989 Page: 1 
IN THE MATTER OF GRAND JURY Y-87-1,) 

of the Subpoena of RONALD REECE, ) 

) 

Movant-Appellant. ) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

RONALD BROOKS TIPPETT, 

Defendant, 

ELIZABETH DURRE, 

Movant-Appellant. 

Submitted on the Briefs: 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 88-2782 

(D.C. Noo 88-Y-114) 

(D. Colorado) 

No. 88-2327 

(D.C. No. 87-CR-386) 

(D. Colorado) 

Richards. Dema.rest, Edgar ·tee Durre, Ronald L. Reece, and 

Elizabeth Durre, prose. 

Michael J. Norton, United States Attorney, and Douglas w._ Curless, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for the United 

States. 

Before LOGAN and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and COOK, District Judge. * 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

The issue presented in these consolidated appeals is whether 

appellants, who are incarcerated for criminal offenses, either in 

federal or state institutions, are entitled to witneas fees 

* The Honorable H. Dale Cook, Chief Judge, United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by 

designation. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1899 Document: 01019897592 Date Filed: 09/05/1989 Page: 2 
pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1821 for testifying in separate criminal 

proceedings before a federal court or grand jury. We hold that 

they are not, and therefore affirm the judgments from which these 

appeals were taken. 1 

In pertinent part, 28 u.s.c. § 1821 provides as follows: 

"(a)(l) Except as otherwise provided by law, a 

witness in attendance at any court of the United States, 

or before a United States Magistrate, or before any 

person authorized to take his deposition pursuant to any 

rule or order of a court of the United States, shall be 

paid the fees and allowances provided by this section. 

. . . 

(b) A witness shall be paid an attendance fee of 

$30 per day for each day's attendance. A witness shall 

also be paid the attendance fee for the time necessarily 

occupied ·in going to and returning from the place of 

attendance at the beginning and end of such attendance 

or at any time during such .attendance. 

• • • 

(d)(l) A·subsistence allowance shall be paid to a 

witness (other than a witness who is incarcerated) when 

an overnight stay is required at the place of attendance 

because such place is so far removed from the residence 

of such witness as to prohibit return thereto from day. 

to day. 

(4) When a witness is detairied pursuant to section 

3149 of title 18 for want of security for his 

appearance, he shall be entitled for each day of 

detention when not in attendance at court, in addition 

to his subsis~ence, to the daily attendance fee provided 

by subsection (b) of this section." 

Appellants contend that the plain language of subsections (a)(l) 

and (b) mandate the payment of attendance fees to a witness, 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1899 Document: 01019897592 Date Filed: 09/05/1989 Page: 3 
regardless of whether or not that person is incarcerated. They 

also point to the qualifying language regarding incarcerated 

individuals contained in subsection (d)(l) and argue that Congress 

would have included similar language in subsection (a)(l) or (b) 

had it intended to preclude prisoners from receiv_ing the fee. On 

its face, this is an appealing argument. 

We note, however, that there is another plausible reading of 

the statutory language and reason for the reference to 

incarceration in subsection (d)(l). When Congress referred to 

incarcerated witnesses in subsection (d)(l) it could have intended 

to clarify what was impliedly set forth in (d)(4)--that an 

individual incarcerated under the material witness statute, 18 

U.S.C. § 3144 (formerly 18 u.s.c. § 3149), is not to receive a 

subsistence allowance "in addition to his subsistence." 28 u.s.c. 

§ 1821(d)(4). 

Despite the unqualified wording of subsections (a)(l) and 

(b), strong evidence exists to support the view that Congress 

never intended§ 1821 to apply to individuals incarcerated for 

criminal acts. Since at least the year 1900, the Teasury 

Department has taken the position that imprisoned individuals, 

other than those detained as a material witness, are not entitled 

to witness fees. In re Witness Fees for Prisoner, 533 F. Supp. 

401, 403 & n.5 (E.D. Pa.) (citing 6 Dec. Comp. Treas. 588, 588 

(1900)), aff'd ~ curiam sub nom. In re Grand Jury Matter 

(Witness RW), 697 F.2d 103, 104 (3d Cir. 1982); Marchese v. United 

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Appellate Case: 88-1899 Document: 01019897592 Date Filed: 09/05/1989 Page: 4 
_states, 453 F.2d 1268, 1271 (Ct. Cl. 1972). 2 In 1970 and 1972, 

despite the existence of similar qualifying language regarding 

incarcerated individuals contained in the then-existing 

counterpart to current subsection (d)(l), 3 two different federal 

appellate courts ruled that§ 1821 did not entitle criminal 

inmates to witness attendance fees. Meadows v. United States 

Marshal, 434 F.2d 1007-(5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Marchese, 453 

F.2d at 1271. 

Six years after the Marchese decision, in 1978, Congress 

substantially reorganized§ 1821 into its current form. Nowhere 

in the express language of the revisions or in the legislative 

history did Congress indicate criminal inmates, other than 

material witnesses detained for want of security for his 

~ppea~ance, were entitled to a witness fee. Had Congress meant to 

change the existing judicial and administrative interpretations of 

§ 1821, it surely could have done so in more express terms. Cf. 

FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 437 (1986) ("When 

the statute giving rise to the longstanding interpretation has 

been reenacted without pertinent change, the 'congressional 

failure to revise or repeal the agency's interpretation is 

2 In addition to their statutory language arguments,- plaintiffs 

rely on Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973) 

(incarcerated material witnesses entitled to attendance fee for 

number of days detained during trial), to support their position. 

We agree with the In re Witness Fees court, for the reasons stated 

therein, that Hurtado is inapposite to the present case. See 533 

F. Supp. at 402-03. 

3 The incarceration provision of old § 1821 provided that 

"[w]itnesses ••• who are not in custody'' were entitled to a 

subsistence allowance. The other pertinent provisions of old 

§ 1821, including the attendance fee provisiont are substantially 

similar to current§ 1821, although significantly restructured. 

-sAppellate Case: 88-1899 Document: 01019897592 Date Filed: 09/05/1989 Page: 5 
persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by 

Congress.'" (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 275 

(1974)). Moreover, since the 1978 amendment, other courts have 

rejected the appellants' interpretation of§ 1821, United States 

v. Garmany, 762 F.2d 929, 933 n.2 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Grand 

Jury Matter, 697 F.2d at 104, as has the Department of Justice 

Regulations. See 28 C.F.R. § 21.4(d) (published May l, 1986) ("A 

witness in custody for purposes other than 18 u~s.c. 3149 [now 

§ 3144] is ineligible to receive the attendance and subsistence 

f~es provided by this section."). 

Other compelling reasons support the view that incarcerated 

prisoner witnesses should not receive fees for their appearances. 

First, Congress expressly stated that the 1978 revision of§ 1821 

was necessary because existing witness fees and allowances "no 

longer compensate[d] the average witness for the actual costs 

which witness service entails." H.R. Rep. No. 95-1651, 95th 

Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1979·u.s. Code Cong. & Ad. News 

4631. Beyond their loss of the very modest compensation they 

might receive from participating in prison job programs, prisoners 

generally do not incur financial·costs serving as a witness. They 

are transported at the expense of the government, accompanied by 

government-paid security personnel. Second, if inmates were to 

receive a $30 fee for every day they attend court to serve as a 

witness, which is much more than they make working in prison 

industries, it is not difficult to imagine the potential abuses 

that might result. There would be greater temptation to file 

suits and subpoena friends among inmates as witnesses, not only 

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Appellate Case: 88-1899 Document: 01019897592 Date Filed: 09/05/1989 Page: 6 
for the trip they would receive outside the prison, but for the 

profit from the witness fee. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Nos. 88-1899, 88-1972, 88-1973, 88-2782, 88-2327 -- Demarest v. 

Manspeaker. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

In my view, the majority mistakenly has relied upon 

congressional silence and upon the majority's own policy desires 

to abrogate the plain language of the statute. It is wrong to use 

the silence of legislative history to contradict or modify 

unambiguous text: "[C]ongressional silence, no matter· how 

'clanging,' cannot override the words of the statute." Sedima, 

S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.13 (1985). Moreover, 

although I do not quarrel with the majority's policy concerns, 

those arguments must be addressed to Congress rather than this 

court. We have no authority to modify the plain language of a 

statute based upon what we wished it said: "[N]o matter how unwise 

oi unsatisfactory the ••• [statutory provision], the 

Constitution. provides no license to impose ••• [other terms] we 

might think fair and just. That task belongs to Congress, not to 

us." Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 591 (1973). 

Accordingly, I dissent. 

The language of 28 u.s.c. S 1821 is clear and unambiguous. 

Subsection (a)(l) provides that "a witness in attendance at any 

court of the United States ••• shall be paid the fees and 

allowances provided by this section." {Emphasis added.) Nothing 

in the statute states that "a witness" excludes witnesses who 

happen to be prisoners. 

If there were any doubt as to whether "a witness" includes 

incarcerated witnesses, subsection (d){l) settles the matter. 

Appellate Case: 88-1899 Document: 01019897592 Date Filed: 09/05/1989 Page: 8 
That section provides that a witness who is not incarcerated is 

entitled to receive an additional subsistence allowance when the 

witness is required to stay overnight: 

A subsistence allowance shall be paid to a witness 

(other than a witness who is incarcerated) when an 

overnight stay is required at the place of attendance 

because such place .is so far removed from the residence 

of such witness as to prohibit return thereto from day 

to day. 

28 u.s.c. S 182l(d)(l) (emphasis added). 

Subsection (d)(l) necessarily assumes that the phrase "a 

witness" includes "a witness who is incarce~ated" beqause Congress 

felt it necessary in subsection (d)(l) expressly to carve out 

incarcerated witnesses from the phrase "a witness" when Congress 

did not want to include incarcerated witnesses. Thus the phrase 

"a wftness" contained in subsection (a)(l), which does not carve 

out incarcerate~ witnesses, likewise must include "a ~itness who· 

is incarcerated." No other reading is possible without ignoring 

the text's plain language or divorcing the statute's subsections 

from each other. 

Further, subsection (e) provides the one and only category of 

persons who are not entitled to receive witness attendance fees 

under subsection (a)(l) -- illegal ·aliens. 1 Thus, Congress 

plainly knew how to exclude expressly a class of persons from the 

1 28 u.s.c. S 182l(e) provides: 

An alien who has been paroled into the United States for 

prosecution, pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (8 u.s.c. 1182(d)(5)), 

or an alien who either has admitted belonging to a class 

of aliens who are deportable or has been determined 

pursuant to section 242(b) of such Act (8 u.s.c. 

1252(b)) to be deportable, shall be ineligible to 

receive the fees or allowances provided by this section. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1899 Document: 01019897592 Date Filed: 09/05/1989 Page: 9 
broad category of_ "witnesses" who are entitled to attendance fees, 

and Congress did so. But that exclusion did not encompass 

prisoners (other than, presumably, alien prisoners)o 

In response, the majority presents four arguments for its 

view that Section 1821 does not mean what it says. 

First, the majority contends that the reference to "a witness 

who is incarcerated" in subsection (d)(l) might refer only to a 

witness who is "detained" pursuant to the material witness statutedescribed in subsection (d)(4). 2 The problem with that argument 

is that subsection (d)(l) says nothing of the sort. Subsection 

(d)(l) does not mention the material witness statute, but rather 

refers to all witnesses who are "incarcerated." In contrast, 

subsection (d)(4) doe• refer specifically to the material witness 

statute and uses the narrower phrase "witness [~ho] is detained" 

rather than subsection (d)(l)'s broader phrase "witness who is 

incarcerated." Thus, there is no statutory indication that 

Congress· intended the reference to "a witness who is' incarcerated" 

in subsection (d)(l) to mean only "a witness [who] is detained" 

pursuant to the material witness statute described in subsection 

(d)(4). Indeed, the language of the two subsections indicates 

just the opposite. 3 

2 

3 

28 u.s.c. § 182l(d)(4) provides: 

When a witness is detained pursuant to section 3149 of 

title 18 for want of security for his appearance, he 

shall be entitled for each day of detention when not in 

attendance at court, in addition to his subsistence, to 

the daily attendance fee provided by subsection _(b) of 

this section. 

Moreover, the majority's view that subsection (d)(l)'s 

[Footnote continued ••• ] 

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Second, the majority relies upon the decisions of three 

circuit courts and the Court of Claims holding that prisoners are 

not entitled to witness fees. 4 However, none of those cases 

contains an analysis of the plain language of the statute or an 

explanation of why the unambiguous text should not be given 

effect. The district court's opinion affirmed by the Third 

Circuit, In re Witness Fees for Prisoner, 533 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. 

Pa.), aff'd sub~ In re Grand Jury Matter (Witness RW}, 697 

F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1982), at least mentioned the difficulty 

engendered by the language of subsections (d)(l) and (e). 533 

F. Supp at 402. But the district court in that case, although 

acknowledging that the "legislative history ••• is 

inconclusive," concluded nonetheless that "Congress did not intend 

·witness fees to be paid to prisoners.". Id. The court presented 

no justification for that conclusion. Moreover, the conclusion 

contradicts the Supreme Court's later teaching that, "[g]iven the 

[ ••• footnote continued] 

exclusion of "incarcerated" witnesses refers only to.witnesses who 

are "detained" under subsection (d)(4), produces an illogical · result under the literal terms of the statute. Under that view, 

subsection (d)(l)'s reference to "a witness" would include all 

prisoners except "detained" prisoners under Section 3149 (now 

.Section 3144), and thus most prisoners would be entitled to 

subsistence allowances in addition to attendance fees. It makes 

little sense to give subsistence allowances to ordinary prisoners 

when their subsistence needs already are being provided at 

taxpayer expense, and that result seems at odds with the policy benefits sought in the majority opinion. 

4 United States v. Garmany, 762 F.2d 929, 933 n.2 (11th Cir. 

1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. io62 (1986); In re Grand Jury Matter 

(WitnessRW}, 697 F.2d 103, 104 (3d Cir. 1982) (affirming In re 

Witness Fees for Prisoner, 533 F. Supp. 401, 403 (E.D. Pa. 1982)); 

Marchese v. United States, 453 F.2d 1268, 1271 (Ct. Cl. 1972); 

Meadows v. United States Marshal, 434 F.2d 1007, 1008 (5th Cir. 

1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1014 (1971). 

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Appellate Case: 88-1899 Document: 01019897592 Date Filed: 09/05/1989 Page: 11 
plain words of the statute," Congress' intent is "bes~ deter~ined 

. by the statutory language that it chooses." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. 

Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 n.13 (1985). 

Third, the majority asserts that Congress must have intended 

to adopt those other courts' interpretation of the statute because 

Congress has not substantively changed Section 1821 for many 

ye~rs: "Nowhere in the express language of the revisions [to 

Section 1821] or in the legislative history did Congress indicate 

criminal inmates were entitled to a witness fee." (Maj. Op. 

at 5; emphasis added.) But the majority disregards the fact that 

the "express language" of the statute already unequivocally 

entitles witnesses, with no exclusion of "incarcerated" witnesses, 

to obtain witness attendance fees. It is difficult to fault 

Congress for failing to revise what already is clear •. Again, 

"congressional silence, no matter how 'clanging,' cannot override 

the words of the statute." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 

u.s. 479, 496 n.13 (1985). 5 

5 The majority cites FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 

426, 437 (1986), but that case has little to do with this one. In 

Philadelphia Gear, Congress expressly adopted the FDIC's 

definition of a key term -- "deposit" -- that was contained in the 

FDIC 0 s organic statute. Unlike Philadelphia Gear, no 

administrative determination requiring special deference is 

involved here, and Congress has not changed Section 1821 to adopt 

the interpretation of an agency or court. Nor is this case like 

Merrill Lynchf Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 

353 (1982). In Curran, the Court held that an implied private 

right of action under the Commodity Exchange Act should be 

preserved when (1) Congress conducted a comprehensive 

reexamination and amendment of the Act and left intact the 

provisions under which numerous federal courts previously had 

implied a private right of action, and (2) the legislative history 

of the subsequent amendments indicated that Congress intended to 

preserve the private remedy. 456 U.Sc at 381-82, 384-88. Here, 

unlike the situation in Curran, the prior interpretation of the 

[Footnote continued ••• ] 

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Fourth, .the majority suggests that there are policy reasons 

militating against giving witness attendance fees to prisoners. 

The majority's concerns center on the fact that current attendance 

fees are higher than inmates' prison salaries, and consequently 

there is the potential for abuse. I do not dispute the legitimacy 

of those concerns, although I believe that district courts have 

the means -- such as taking testimony by telephone or through 

depositions, or by imposing appropriate sanctions on abusive 

parties -- to minimize the problem. But even if I were to agree 

that the statute as written is misguided, ihat is no reason to 

overturn it by judicial·fiat. The task of divining good policy 

"belongs to Congress, not to us." Hurtado v. United States, 410 

U.S. 578, 591 (1973). 6 

In conclusion, this is not an instance in which a statute 

produces an "unfathomabl'e" result and "can't mean what it says." 

Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., , 109 S. Ct. 1981, 

1895, 104 L. Ed. 2d 557, 565 (1989). Section 1821 is neither 

[ ••• footnote continued] 

statute by other federal courts flatly contradicts the statute's 

plain language (as opposed to extending it), and there is no· 

legislative history indicating that Congress intended to adopt 

those courts' interpretation. 

6 It would be interesting to know whether there are any other 

categories of witnesses, besides prisoners, whom the majority - would bar from receiving statutorily mandated fees and allowances. 

Can convicted crimirials sentenced to government-supported "halfway houses" receive them? Convicted criminals sentenced to 

probation? Parolees? Residents of government-supported mental 

institutions? Government employees? Minor children? The point 

is that the majority nowhere explains why prisoners are to be 

excluded from the statute when other persons in potentially analogous situations are not. The inherent difficulty in.making 

distinctions among categories of witnesses, especially in the face 

of an unambiguous, unrestricted statute, is itself a reason why 

the creation of those distinctions should be left to Congress. 

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internally inconsistent nor facially ambiguous. Under a plain 

reading of the statute, prisoners serving as witnesses are 

· entitled to attendance fees but not to subsistence allowances. 

That result is neither illogical nor irrational. There is no 

legislative history showing conclusively that the statute does not 

m~an what it says •. Consequently, I would reverse the district 

court 1 s· judgments in these consolidated appeals and would hold 

that prisoners, like other witnesses, are entitled to witness 

attendance fees under Section 1821. 

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