Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01596/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01596-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cindy S. Johnson
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and F.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties consented to proceed before a United States

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Magistrate Judge, and by an April 27, 2006 order, this action was assigned to United States Magistrate Judge Lawrence J.

O’Neill for all further proceedings.

In the absence of Ms. Johnson’s opposition, this Court carefully reviewed and considered the entire record 2

to determine whether the Government’s alternative motions to dismiss and for summary judgment were well supported.

Omission of reference to an argument, document, or paper is not to be construed to the effect that this Court did not consider

the argument, document or paper.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CINDY JOHNSON, CASE NO. CV F 05-1596 LJO

Plaintiff, DECISION ON GOVERNMENT’S

ALTERNATIVE MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND

vs. FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Doc. 16.)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

 /

INTRODUCTION

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In this post office slip and fall action, defendant United States of America (“Government”) seeks

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of, or alternatively summary judgment on, plaintiff Cindy S. Johnson’s

(“Ms. Johnson’s”) claims on grounds that Ms. Johnson failed to timely file this action after

administrative claim denial. Ms. Johnson filed no timely papers to oppose the Government’s alternative

motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. This Court deemed the Government’s alternative motions

submitted on the pending record and vacates the December 15, 2006 hearing, pursuant to this Court’s

Local Rule 78-230(c), (h). For the reasons discussed below, this Court GRANTS the Government 2

summary judgment on grounds that Ms. Johnson failed to timely file this action within six months of

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denial of her administrative claim. 

BACKGROUND

Denial Letter

Ms. Johnson claims that on December 21, 2001, she fell and was injured at the Coalinga post

office. On December 4, 2002, the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) received an administrative

claim filed by Ms. Johnson’s attorneyRalph C. Smith (“Mr. Smith”). USPS sent Mr. Smith by certified

mail its March 31, 2004 letter (“claim denial”) to deny Ms. Johnson’s claim. The claim denial stated

in pertinent part:

As to the incident at issue, an investigation of this matter failed to establish a negligent

act or omission on the part of the U.S. Postal Service or its employees. While we regret

any injury that may have occurred, we cannot accept legal liability for these alleged

damages. Accordingly, the claim is denied.

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) and 39 C.F.R. 912.9(a), if dissatisfied with the

Postal Service’s final denial of an administrative claim, a claimant may file suit in a

United States District Court no later than six (6) months after the date the Postal Service

mails the notice of that final action. Accordingly, any suit filed in regards to this denial

must be filed no later than six (6) months from the date of the mailing of this letter,

which is the date shown above. (Italics in original.)

The certified mail receipt for the claim denial indicates that Mr. Smith’s office received it on April 5,

2004. 

Ms. Johnson’s Complaint

On December 16, 2005, Ms. Johnson filed her complaint to initiate this slip and fall action

against the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680.

The complaint states: 

More than six months before this action was instituted, the claim set forth herein was

presented to the United States Postal Service. Said agency having failed to make a final

disposition of the claim within that time, plaintiff deems such failure to be a denial

thereof.

The complaint appears to allege claims of failure to warn of a slippery floor and negligence to create a

dangerous condition. The complaint alleges that Ms. Johnson suffered physical and emotional injuries.

/ / /

/ / /

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DISCUSSION

Motion To Dismiss And Summary Judgment Standards

For Limitations Defense

A limitations defense may be raised by a F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or by summary

judgment motion. Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9 Cir. 1980); see Avco Corp. v. th

Precision Air Parts, Inc., 676 F.2d 494, 495 (11 Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1037, 103 S.Ct. 450 th

(1982). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss may raise the limitations defense when the statute’s

running is apparent on the complaint’s face. Jablon, 614 F.2d at 682. If the limitations defense does

not appear on the complaint’s face and the trial court accepts matters outside the pleadings’s scope, the

defense may be raised by a motion to dismiss accompanied by affidavits. Jablon, 614 F.2d at 682;

Rauch v. Day and Night Mfg. Corp., 576 F.2d 697 (6 Cir. 1978). If the limitations defense is not th

apparent on the complaint’sface and the motion to dismiss is not accompanied by acceptable affidavits,

an appropriate summary judgment motion may be employed. Jablon, 614 F.2d at 682. 

A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless

it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his/her claim. Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99 (1957). A motion to dismiss based on a limitations defense

may be granted only if the complaint’s assertions, read with required liberality, would not permit the

plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled. Jablon, 614 F.2d at 682. 

F.R.Civ.P. 56(b) permits a party against whom a claim is asserted to seek “summary judgment

in the party’s favor upon all or any part thereof.” Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists

no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

F.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348,

1356 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9 Cir. 1987). th

The purpose of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and assess the proof in order to see

whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586, n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 1348;

International Union of Bricklayers v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9 Cir. 1985). th

F.R.Civ.P. 56(e) requires a party opposing summary judgment to “set forth specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if

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appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.” “In the absence of specific facts, as opposed to

allegations, showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial, a properly supported summary judgment

motion will be granted.” Nilsson, Robbins, et al. v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1545 (9 Cir. th

1988). When a summary judgment motion is unopposed, a court must “determine whether summary

judgment is appropriate – that is, whether the moving party has shown itself to be entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Anchorage Associates v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3 Cir. 1990). rd

A court “cannot base the entry ofsummary judgment on the mere fact that the motion is unopposed, but,

rather must consider the merits of the motion.” United States v. One Piece of Real Property, etc., 363

F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). A court “need not sua sponte review all of the evidentiary materials th

on file at the time the motion is granted, but must ensure that the motion itself is supported by

evidentiary materials.” One Piece of Real Property, 363 F.3d at 1101.

As discussed below, the Government’s summary judgment motion is well supported, and the

Government has met its summary judgment burden to demonstrate that the FTCA limitations period bars

Ms. Johnson’s action in that she failed to file this action within six months of March 31, 2004 claim

denial.

FTCA Limitations Period

An action can be brought against the Government only to the extent that it waives its sovereign

immunity. Blackburn v. United States, 100 F.3d 1426, 1429 (9 Cir. 1996); Valdez v. United States, 56 th

F.3d 1177, 1179 (9 Cir. 1995). The FTCA waives the Government’s sovereign immunity to a suit for th

personal injuries caused by an “employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office

or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the

claimant in accordance with the law of place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. §

1346(b)(1); Washington v. United States, 868 F.2d 332, 333 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 992, 110 th

S.Ct. 539 (1989); see 28 U.S.C. § 2674.

28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (“section 2401(b)”) sets forth the limitation period to commence an FTCA

action:

A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented

in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or

unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or

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registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was

presented.

Regarding section 2401(b), the United States Supreme Court has explained:

Section 2401(b) . . . isthe balance struck by Congress in the context of tort claims

against the Government; and we are not free to construe it so as to defeat its obvious

purpose, which is to encourage the prompt presentation of claims. . . . We should regard

the plea of limitations as a “meritorious defense, in itself serving the public interest.” .

. .

We should also have in mind that the [FTCA] waives the immunity of the United

States and that in construing the statute of limitations, which is a condition of that

waiver, we should not take it upon ourselves to extend the waiver beyond that which

Congress intended. . . . 

United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 1117-1118, 100 S.Ct. 352, 357 (1979) (citations omitted.)

The Government notes that section 2401(b) establishes two limitations periods in that a claimant

is required to file: (1) an administrative claim with the proper federal agency within two years after a

claim accrues; and (2) a district court action within six months after the agency’s final denial of the

administrative claim. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals so construes section 2401(b):

Section 2401(b) establishes two jurisdictional hurdles, both of which must be

met. See Claremont Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 896 (9 Cir. 1969); Schuler th

v. United States, 628 F.2d 1999 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per curiam). A claim must

be filed with the agency within two years of the claim’s accrual, and the claimant must

file suit within six months of administrative denial of the claim. If either requirement is

not met, suit will be time barred.

Dyniewicz v. United States, 742 F.2d 484, 485 (9 Cir. 1984). th

Section 2401(b) requirements are “jurisdictional,” and the “government may not be equitably

barred from asserting jurisdictional requirements.” Burns v. United States, 764 F.2d 722, 724 (9 Cir. th

1985).

The Government contends that Ms. Johnson failed to meet section 2401(b)’s second timing

requirement to file this action within six months of USPS’ March 31, 2004 claim denial. The

Government points out that Ms. Johnson filed this action on December 16, 2005, nearly 21 months after

USPS’ claim denial. 

The Government is correct. Although the face of Ms. Johnson’s complaint reveals that she filed

this action well beyond section 2401(b) six-month limitations period, the complaint appears to allege

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This Court finds summary judgment is the proper procedure to determine the limitations issue in light of 3

the complaint’s apparent allegation that USPS did not dispose finally of Ms. Johnson’s claim and this Court’s consideration

of matters outside the pleadings’ scope, for instance, the USPS claim denial. 

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that USPS did not “make a final disposition of the claim” within six months of Ms. Johnson’s

presentation of her claim to USPS. The undisputed facts reveal that USPS received Ms. Johnson’s

administrative claim on December 4, 2002 and denied it with its March 31, 2004 claim denial. Ms.

Johnson inexplicably delayed to December 16, 2005 to file this action to render it untimely and subject

to summary judgment despite her apparent unsupported allegation that USPS had not acted on her

administrative claim.3

Notice Of Final Claim Denial

The Government argues that USPS’ March 31, 2004 claim denial complied with 28 C.F.R. § 14.9

(“section 14.9") which requires that final denial of an FTCA administrative claim: (1) be in writing; (2)

be sent to the claimant, his/her attorney or legal representative by certified or registered mail; (3) include

a statement of reasons for denial; and (4) include a statement that if the claimant is dissatisfied the

agency’s action, he/she may file a federal court suit no later than six months after the date of the

notification’s mailing. Here, the written claim denial was sent by certified mail to Mr. Smith, and stated

that USPS investigation “failed to establish a negligent act or omission” by USPS or its employees and

that if dissatisfied, “a claimant may file suit in a United States District Court no later than six (6) months

after the date the Postal Service mails the notice of that final action.” (Italics in original.) The claim

denial satisfied section 14.9. See Hatchell v. United States, 776 F.2d 244, 246 (9 Cir. 1985) (denial

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letter which stated claim was denied, reasons for denial and that suit must be brought within six months

satisfied section 14.9, and absence of the word “final” is irrelevant.)

Lastly, the Government contends that USPS engaged in no conduct to lead Ms. Johnson or Mr.

Smith to believe that USPS continued to consider Ms. Johnson’s claim. The Ninth Circuit has held that

“when an agency denies a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act in accordance with the procedure

required by applicable regulations, such a decision constitutes a final decision for purposes of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2401(b) unless either (a) [t]he claimant files with the agency a [t]imely amended claim pursuant to 28

C.F.R. § 14.2(b), or (b) [t]he agency leads the claimant reasonably to believe that it is still actively

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considering the original claim.” Woirhaye v. United States, 609 F.2d 1303, 1305 (9 Cir. 1979). Here, th

there is no evidence that Ms. Johnson pursued an amended claim or that USPS lead Ms. Johnson and/or

Mr. Smith to reasonablybelieve that it activelyconsidered Ms. Johnson’s claim after the March 31, 2004

claim denial. USPS properly notified Ms. Johnson that it denied her claim. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court:

1. GRANTS the Government summary judgment on grounds that Ms. Johnson failed to

timely file this action within six months of denial of her administrative claim;

2. DIRECTS this Court’s clerk to enter judgment in favor of defendant United States of

America and against plaintiff Cindy Johnson and to close this action; and

3. VACATES all pending dates, including the June 4, 2007 pretrial conference and June 25,

2007 trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 5, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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