Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01616/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01616-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shaun Joseph Ruff
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

2

 The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1616

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Shaun Joseph Ruff, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: September 28, 2006

Filed: January 9, 2007

___________

Before RILEY and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges, and KYLE,1

 District Judge.

___________

KYLE, District Judge.

Shaun J. Ruff pled guilty to conspiring to distribute cocaine and marijuana. He

now appeals, challenging two rulings of the district court2

 at sentencing. We affirm.

Appellate Case: 06-1616 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/09/2007 Entry ID: 3265927
-2-

I. BACKGROUND

On six occasions between July and December 2002, Ruff sold marijuana and

cocaine to a confidential informant and to undercover police officers. He drove his

Chevrolet Blazer to each of the drug sales. Law enforcement expended $9,985 in

controlled buy money to purchase the drugs. The buy money was supplied by the

Iowa Division of Narcotics Enforcement (“Iowa DNE”). On December 12, Ruff was

arrested. At the time of his arrest, law enforcement seized Ruff’s Blazer, $1,476 in

currency found on his person, a small amount of marijuana, and other personal items.

Ruff was charged with conspiracy to distribute 500 or more grams of cocaine

and marijuana and, on September 30, 2003, he executed a plea agreement admitting

the charged offenses. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Ruff agreed “to pay restitution,

as ordered by the Court, for controlled buy money expended during the investigation.”

Ruff also agreed to forfeit his Blazer, as well as items seized from his person and

residence upon arrest. The plea agreement provided that the restitution would “be

paid to the Clerk of Court for eventual disbursement to the Iowa Division of Narcotics

Enforcement.” 

At sentencing, Ruff requested that the district court offset the value of the

forfeited Blazer and currency against the restitution order. The district court denied

the request and Ruff appealed to this Court. We reversed and remanded, instructing

the district court that “[i]f Ruff can establish the Iowa DNE received any forfeiture

funds [it] shall modify the restitution order to prevent double recovery by the Iowa

DNE.” United States v. Ruff, 420 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2005).

During the pendency of Ruff’s appeal, Judge Reade hired Special Assistant

United States Attorney (SAUSA) Teresa Baumann as a law clerk. Baumann had

handled Ruff’s prosecution during her tenure as an SAUSA. On January 14, 2006,

Ruff moved for Judge Reade’s recusal based upon Baumann’s prior involvement in

his prosecution. On January 25, 2006, the district court denied the motion and stated

Appellate Case: 06-1616 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/09/2007 Entry ID: 3265927
3

Judge Reade hired Baumann as a law clerk in July 2005.

-3-

that Baumann had been screened from the court’s criminal docket and would not be

involved in its decisions in the instant case. It also stated that Baumann would not be

present in chambers during Ruff’s sentencing.

On January 27, 2006, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the

restitution issue. On February 2, 2006, it denied Ruff’s request to reduce the

restitution owed to the Iowa DNE and determined that “there is no evidence the Iowa

DNE received, either directly or indirectly, funds derived from the forfeiture of

Defendant’s property. The forfeiture funds went to the [Bear Creek Narcotics] Task

Force, except for funds retained by the United States Marshal or sent to the federal

government’s asset forfeiture fund. Therefore, there is no danger of double recovery

on the part of the Iowa DNE on account of the court’s restitution order.” This appeal

followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Recusal

We first address Ruff’s contention that the district court erred when it denied

his motion for recusal. The denial of a motion to recuse is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 648 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc). A judge

must recuse when his or her “impartiality might reasonably be questioned by the

average person on the street who knows all the relevant facts of a case.” Id. at 648

(quoting In re Kan. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 85 F.3d 1353, 1358 (8th Cir. 1996));

28 U.S.C. § 455(a).

We have already had occasion to consider – and reject – Ruff’s argument. In

United States v. Martinez, 446 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 2006), the defendant sought Judge

Reade’s recusal because Baumann3

 had assisted in Martinez’s prosecution while she

Appellate Case: 06-1616 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/09/2007 Entry ID: 3265927
-4-

was an SAUSA and had “presented Martinez’s case to the Grand Jury, signed the

indictment, represented the United States in the early pretrial phase of the prosecution,

and cross-examined Martinez at a suppression hearing.” Id. at 883. Judge Reade

denied Martinez’s motion and this Court affirmed, holding that “[a]n average observer

who was informed of all the facts of Martinez’s case, including that Baumann was

screened from the case and performed only ministerial duties at the [sentencing]

hearing, would not reasonably question Judge Reade’s impartiality.” Id.

Ruff attempts to distinguish Martinez by demonstrating that Baumann’s

involvement in his prosecution was more extensive than her involvement in

Martinez’s prosecution. This is a distinction without a difference, however, because

Baumann was screened from the case and did not discuss it with Judge Reade.

Furthermore, in the instant case, Baumann did not perform ministerial functions at the

hearing, as she did in Martinez. Instead, Baumann was absent from the Judge’s

chambers on the day of the hearing. An average observer, informed of these facts,

would not reasonably question Judge Reade’s impartiality.

 Ruff also contends that Chief Judge Loken’s concurring opinion in Ruff’s first

appeal suggests that Baumann’s employment as Judge Reade’s law clerk created the

appearance of impartiality. Chief Judge Loken urged the district court to investigate

what appeared to be potentially illegal attempts by the government to collect financial

penalties on Ruff’s restitution obligations. See Ruff, 420 F.3d at 776-77 (Loken, C.J.,

concurring).

On remand, the district court noted, and Ruff concedes, that Chief Judge

Loken’s concerns were not directed at Baumann, but at a different prosecutor. The

district court also held a meeting in chambers, attended by the United States Attorney

for the Northern District of Iowa and Ruff’s counsel, and determined that no

Appellate Case: 06-1616 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/09/2007 Entry ID: 3265927
4

The details of this meeting were set forth in an April 19, 2006 letter from Judge

Reade to Chief Judge Loken. The United States has moved to supplement the record

on appeal to include this letter. An appellate court may supplement the record to

include “anything material to either party [that] is omitted from or misstated in the

record by error or accident . . . .” Fed. R. App. P. 10(e)(2)(c). This letter is material

to the record because it fully describes the district court’s actions in response to Chief

Judge Loken’s concerns; accordingly, we grant the motion to supplement the record.

-5-

wrongdoing had occurred.4 We conclude that an average observer informed of these

facts and of Baumann’s lack of involvement in this case could not reasonably question

Judge Reade’s impartiality.

B. Forfeiture Offset

Ruff next argues that the district court erred in denying his request to offset the

restitution amount with the proceeds from the confiscated items. Ruff made this same

argument in his initial appeal; we concluded that “the bar against double recovery

should operate in the context of this case to preclude the Iowa DNE from recovering

an amount greater than the agency expended on controlled drug buys in Ruff’s case.”

Ruff, 420 F.3d at 775. Accordingly, we held that on remand, “[i]f Ruff can establish

the Iowa DNE received any forfeiture funds, the district court shall modify the

restitution order to prevent double recovery by the Iowa DNE.” Id. at 776. On

remand, the district court determined that the Iowa DNE did not receive any of the

proceeds from the confiscated items, a finding we review for clear error. United

States v. Williams, 359 F.3d 1019, 1020 (8th Cir. 2004). 

There is no reason to conclude, and Ruff does not contend, that the district court

clearly erred when it found that the Iowa DNE did not receive any of the proceeds

from the confiscated items. Rather, Ruff contends that the Iowa DNE should have

received a portion of the proceeds from the confiscated items and that these proceeds

should offset his restitution obligation. Ruff presents two arguments in support of this

contention: 1) the Iowa DNE is, in essence, the same entity as the Task Force, and 2)

Appellate Case: 06-1616 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/09/2007 Entry ID: 3265927
-6-

if the Iowa DNE and the Task Force are separate entities, federal law mandates that

a portion of the forfeited property be given to the Iowa DNE. Neither argument is

persuasive.

Ruff argues that the Iowa DNE and the Task Force are the same entity because

certain Iowa DNE agents are members of the Task Force and receive training from the

Task Force. This argument was presented to – and rejected by – the district court.

The district court concluded that the Task Force had a separate budget from the Iowa

DNE and that the executive board that oversees the Task Force is composed of a DEA

agent, an Iowa DNE agent, and several police chiefs and county sheriffs from the

surrounding area. Given these facts, it was not clearly erroneous for the district court

to conclude that the Task Force and the Iowa DNE are distinct entities and that the

forfeited property provided to the Task Force should not offset Ruff’s restitution

obligations to the Iowa DNE.

Ruff also argues that federal law requires that the Iowa DNE be paid a portion

of the funds from his forfeited property because it “had significant participation in the

law enforcement effort” leading to his arrest. Ruff did not present this argument to

the district court and raises it for the first time here. In the context of a criminal

proceeding, we review arguments not presented to the district court for plain error.

United States v. Willis, 433 F.3d 634, 637 (8th Cir. 2006). “Under the plain error

standard, we will only reverse obvious errors which affect a defendant’s substantial

rights and seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” United States v. Hart, 397 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations

omitted). 

21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(3) provides that “[t]he Attorney General shall assure that

any property transferred to a State or local law enforcement agency . . . (A) has a value

that bears a reasonable relationship to the degree of direct participation of the State or

local agency in the law enforcement effort resulting in the forfeiture . . . and (B) will

Appellate Case: 06-1616 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/09/2007 Entry ID: 3265927
-7-

serve to encourage further cooperation between the recipient State or local agency and

Federal law enforcement agencies.” It is not “obvious” that this statute confers on

Ruff either substantive rights or the ability to challenge the distribution of the forfeited

property. Instead, it directs the Attorney General on the proper allocation of forfeiture

funds between federal and state or local law enforcement agencies. Accordingly, we

conclude that the district court did not plainly err in denying Ruff’s request to offset

the restitution amount with the forfeiture proceeds.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the decision of the district court.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-1616 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/09/2007 Entry ID: 3265927