Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-01139/USCOURTS-caDC-01-01139-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Clifton Power Corporation
Petitioner
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 12, 2002 Decided June 28, 2002

No. 01-1139

Clifton Power Corporation,

Petitioner

v.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,

Respondent

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Carolyn Elefant argued the cause for petitioner. With her

on the briefs was Paul V. Nolan.

Judith A. Albert, Attorney, Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission, argued the cause for respondent. With her on

the brief were Cynthia A. Marlette, General Counsel, and

Dennis Lane, Solicitor.

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Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, and Rogers and Garland,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Ginsburg.

Ginsburg, Chief Judge: Clifton Power Corporation petitions for review of an order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission imposing a civil penalty in the amount of

$15,000. Because the petition is incurably premature, we

dismiss it for want of jurisdiction.

I. Background

Clifton operates a hydroelectric power project on the Pacolet River in South Carolina. In 1991 the Commission issued a

Notice of Proposed Penalty against Clifton for failing to

install stream-flow monitoring equipment as required by a

condition of Clifton's license. See Clifton Power Corp., 54

F.E.R.C. p 61,339 (Mar. 13, 1991). An Administrative Law

Judge determined that the penalty of $148,000 proposed by

the staff of the Commission -- being $200 for each of 740

days of noncompliance -- was "grossly excessive" and reduced the fine to $15,000. Clifton Power Corp. 65 F.E.R.C.

p p 63,007, 65,039 (Oct. 29, 1993). The Commission rejected

several of the ALJ's findings and raised the penalty to

$122,100 -- or $165 for each of the 740 days. See Clifton

Power Corp., 69 F.E.R.C. p p 61,087, 61,345-46 (Oct. 26,

1994).

On review we upheld the Commission's finding that Clifton

had violated its license. See Clifton Power Corp. v. FERC, 88

F.3d 1258, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Clifton I). We vacated the

penalty of $122,100, however, because in rejecting the ALJ's

well-supported assessment of the appropriate sanction the

Commission had "neither met its responsibility of reasoned

decisionmaking nor considered the totality of the evidence."

Id. at 1271. On remand the Commission adopted the initial

decision of the ALJ and reinstated the proposed penalty of

$15,000. See Clifton Power Corp., 92 F.E.R.C. p p 61,263,

61,875 (Sep. 28, 2000). The Commission denied Clifton's

request for rehearing, 94 F.E.R.C. p 61,332 (Jan. 25, 2001),

but granted Clifton's request for a stay pending judicial

review, id. at p 61,338.

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On February 26, 2001 Clifton filed with the Commission a

second "Request for Rehearing and Reconsideration." On

March 20, 2001, with the second request still pending before

the Commission, Clifton filed the instant petition for judicial

review. Eight days later the Commission denied the second

request for rehearing. 94 F.E.R.C. p 62,275 (Mar. 28, 2001).

II. Analysis

Clifton asserts that the penalty of $15,000 violates the

mandate in Clifton I, fails to comport with the requirements

of the Small Business Regulatory Fairness Enforcement Act,

5 U.S.C. s 601 et seq., is otherwise arbitrary and capricious in

violation of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C.

s 706(2)(A), and denies it due process of law. The Commission responds that Clifton's second request for administrative

reconsideration, although submitted before Clifton had filed

its petition for judicial review, rendered the Agency's order

imposing the penalty non-final, and thereby ousted the court

of jurisdiction.

This court is ordinarily without jurisdiction to review an

agency action that is not final. See Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d

1081, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001); accord, Papago Tribal Util.

Auth. v. FERC, 628 F.2d 235, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (non-final

action not subject to review per s 313(b) of Federal Power

Act). A request for administrative reconsideration renders

an agency's otherwise final action non-final with respect to

the requesting party. See United Transp. Union v. ICC, 871

F.2d 1114, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Our cases make clear that a

petition seeking review of such a non-final action is not only

premature but incurably so: "subsequent action by the agency on a motion for reconsideration does not ripen the petition

for review or secure appellate jurisdiction." TeleSTAR, Inc.

v. FCC, 888 F.2d 132, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Instead, the

party that had sought administrative reconsideration may, if

reconsideration is denied, challenge that denial as well as the

agency's original order by filing a timely petition for review of

both orders. The time for filing the petition for review is

tolled until all proceedings before the agency have been

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completed. See ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S.

270, 284 (1987) ("timely petition for administrative reconsideration stay[s] the running of the Hobbs Act's limitation period

until the petition had been acted upon by the Commission").

When the Commission denied Clifton's first request for

rehearing in January, 2001, the Company had 60 days within

which to petition for judicial review. See 16 U.S.C. s 825l(b).

During that time Clifton had to choose "between rehearing

before the agency or immediate court review." Tennessee

Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 9 F.3d 980, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

Having chosen in February to return to the Commission,

Clifton could not seek judicial review until its request for

administrative reconsideration was resolved by the Commission on March 28. See id. at 980 ("It is well-established that

a party may not simultaneously seek both agency reconsideration and judicial review of an agency's order"). The present

petition, filed on March 20, before there was a final agency

action for the court to review, is therefore incurably premature, and we must dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction.

But stop: Clifton contends that the "unique provisions of

the FPA distinguish this case" from any we have dismissed

before as incurably premature. Section 313(a) of the FPA

provides that the Commission may modify or set aside any

order, even after a petition for judicial review has been filed,

"until the record in [the] proceeding shall have been filed in a

court of appeals," 16 U.S.C. s 825l(a); and section 313(b)

declares that "[u]pon the filing of [a] petition [the] court shall

have jurisdiction, which upon the filing of the record with it

shall be exclusive," id. s 825l(b). Taken together, these

provisions contemplate that the Commission and the court

will have concurrent jurisdiction over a matter from the time

a party petitions for judicial review until the Agency certifies

the record to the court, which the Agency must do within 40

days of the filing of the petition, per Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 17(a). Clifton argues that because the Commission is therefore free to modify its ruling for a time after a

petition for review has been filed, no useful purpose is served

by forcing the petitioner to wait until the Commission has

resolved its pending administrative requests.

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This argument is based upon an inaccurate understanding

of both s 313(a) and our cases.* This court has held already

that a petition lodged pursuant to 15 U.S.C. s 717r(b) -- a

provision of the Natural Gas Act identical in all relevant

respects to s 313 of the FPA -- must be dismissed if filed

prematurely. See Tennessee Gas, 9 F.3d at 981; see also

City of New Orleans v. SEC, 137 F.3d 638, 639 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (dismissing petition filed under similar provision of

s 24(a) of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act, 15

U.S.C. s 79x(a)). Nor is s 313 "unique" (or even unusual) in

authorizing an agency to revise its decision, even after a

petition for review has been filed, until such time as the

agency has filed its record with the reviewing court. See Act

of August 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-791, 72 Stat. 941 s 16

(1958) (amending s 313 and judicial review provisions of 37

other statutes to allow agencies to exercise concurrent jurisdiction). It is the petitioner's request for administrative

rehearing, not the agency's authority to reconsider a decision,

that renders the agency's decision non-final as to the petitioner and renders the previously-filed petition for judicial review

incurably premature. See Wade v. FCC, 986 F.2d 1433, 1434

(D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Wade's request for agency reconsideration

rendered the underlying action nonfinal, regardless of the

order of filing").

There is good reason to prohibit any litigant from pressing

its cause concurrently upon both the judicial and the administrative fronts: a favorable decision from the agency might yet

obviate the need for review by the court. See New Orleans,

137 F.3d at 639. Clifton would have the court receive its

petition, place the case on the docket, process the initial

submissions of all the parties, and entertain various preliminary motions while at the same time the petitioner under-

__________

* On the eve of oral argument, counsel for the Commission

advised the court that because Clifton seeks review of a penalty

assessment, s 31 of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. s 823b(d)(2)(B), "may

govern the procedures for petitioning for review instead of the

review provisions of section 313." We need not pass upon the

question, however, as we are without jurisdiction under either

provision.

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takes before the Commission to get further relief that would

make the case moot and our efforts supererogatory. See

TeleSTAR, 888 F.2d at 134 ("it is a pointless waste of judicial

energy for the court to process any petition for review before

the agency has acted on the request for reconsideration").

Those efforts may be multiplied many fold if the petitioner

moves the court for a stay of the agency's order pending

appeal -- which requires a panel of the court to conduct

within a few days a searching inquiry encompassing, among

other things, whether the petitioner is likely to prevail on the

merits of its case, see Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d

153, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The costs of exercising the judicial

power are simply too high to allow a litigant lightly to start

down, only opportunistically to abandon, the path of judicial

review, cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) ("federal

courts may exercise power only in the last resort and as a

necessity"); and the same "danger of wasted judicial effort

that attends the simultaneous exercise of judicial and agency

jurisdiction ... arises whether a party seeks agency reconsideration before, simultaneous with, or after filing an appeal or

petition for judicial review," Wade, 986 F.2d at 1434.

The Company raises four other arguments, each of which

we may reject in short order. First, Clifton contends that

the requirement of finality is merely a prudential consideration, with which we may dispense, rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite. Our cases flatly foreclose this argument, see

New Orleans, 137 F.3d at 639 (petition filed prematurely "will

be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction"), and it is of no help to

Clifton that the court once purported to waive this requirement, see TeleSTAR, Inc. v. FCC, 888 F.2d 132, 134 (D.C. Cir.

1989), because there now is no doubt that the questions of

jurisdiction cannot be pretermitted, see Steel Co. v. Citizens

for a Better Env., 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998).

Second, Clifton claims that the Commission's denial of its

second request for reconsideration "can be deemed as having

ripened Clifton's petition for review for jurisdictional purposes." Our precedent, however, makes clear that prematurity is an incurable defect: "even if the agency acts on the

administrative reconsideration motion before argument is

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heard on the judicial review petition," we must dismiss for

want of jurisdiction. New Orleans, 137 F.3d at 639.

Third, Clifton refers the court to certain arguments that it

presented in preliminary filings before this court, which arguments Clifton omitted from its briefs "due to page constraints." We will not countenance Clifton's attempt to circumvent the page limits, however, see Fed. R. App. P.

32(a)(B)(i), and we accordingly will not address any arguments that Clifton has not presented in its briefs, see Fed. R.

App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (requiring petitioner's brief to contain the

litigant's "contentions and the reasons for them").

Lastly, the Company contends that it "need not comply

with the jurisdictional prerequisites of seeking rehearing

under Section 313" because "this proceeding, although styled

as a petition for review, calls upon the court to invoke its

inherent powers of mandamus and enforcement to ensure

that the Commission has complied with its order" in Clifton I.

True it is that a "federal appellate court has the authority,

through the process of mandamus, to correct any misconception of its mandate by a lower court or administrative agency

subject to its authority." Office of Consumers' Counsel v.

FERC, 826 F.2d 1136, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Clifton falls far

short of making out its entitlement to a writ of mandamus,

however; the "remedy of mandamus is reserved for extraordinary circumstances in which the petitioner demonstrates

that his right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable," Byrd v. Reno, 180 F.3d 298, 302 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

Our decision in Clifton I instructed the Commission that it

may neither punish Clifton because other power projects

owned by the same licensee had violated the FPA, see Clifton,

88 F.3d at 1267, nor "refus[e] to consider record evidence

regarding Clifton's inability to pay," id. at 1267; and must

calculate any penalty according to the statutory factors set

out in 16 U.S.C. s 823b(c), see id. at 1271. The Commission's

decision to adopt the opinion of the ALJ, thereby reducing

the proposed penalty to $15,000 from $122,000, presumably

reflects the Commission's effort to follow those instructions.

In any event, Clifton falls far short of showing that "the writ

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is necessary to emend a clear error or abuse of discretion."

Philip Morris Inc. v. Venezuela, 287 F.3d 192, 198 (D.C. Cir.

2002).

III. Conclusion

Having determined that we are without jurisdiction to

consider Clifton's petition, and that Clifton is not entitled to a

writ of mandamus to enforce our mandate in Clifton I, we do

not address Clifton's arguments on the merits. For the

foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

Dismissed.

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