Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00740/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00740-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Thomas Cumpston
Defendant
Ane Deister
Defendant
El Dorado Irrigation District
Defendant
George Osborne
Defendant
David Powell
Defendant
Scott Shewbridge
Plaintiff
George Wheeldon
Defendant

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1 See Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order, filed August

18, 2005, as amended by the court’s Memorandum and Order of

September 12, 2006.

2 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

See E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

SCOTT SHEWBRIDGE,

NO. CIV. S-05-0740 FCD EFB

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

EL DORADO IRRIGATION DISTRICT,

a municipal corporation; ANE

DEISTER, DAVID POWELL, THOMAS

CUMPSTON, GEORGE WHEELDON,

GEORGE OSBORNE,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendants’ motion to

modify the pretrial scheduling order1 (“PSO”) to permit the

filing of a dispositive motion on defendants’ affirmative defense

of res judicata.2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). Plaintiff opposes the

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3 Pursuant to the court’s order of September 12, 2006,

granting plaintiff’s motion to modify the pretrial scheduling

order to permit certain depositions beyond the discovery

deadline, the court continued the dispositive motion deadline to

December 1, 2006, the final pretrial conference to March 9, 2007

and trial to May 22, 2007. At the March 9, 2007 final pretrial

conference, the court confirmed the May 22, 2007 trial date,

provided the instant motion was not granted. (Docket #47.)

2

motion, arguing defendants cannot demonstrate good cause for

their requested relief since defendants failed to raise the

defense in their previous motion for summary judgment, and

plaintiff would be prejudiced by modification of the PSO, as the

dispositive motion deadline has long passed and trial is set to

commence next month.3

For the reasons set forth below, the court DENIES

defendants’ motion. Defendants have not diligently sought the

instant relief, and as such, they cannot demonstrate the

requisite “good cause” to modify the PSO to permit a further

dispositive motion.

BACKGROUND

Defendants raised their defense of res judicata for the

first time in the joint pretrial conference statement filed on

February 23, 2007. As the defense presented a legal issue for

the court’s determination, the court informed defendants at the

final pretrial conference, held March 9, 2007, that they needed

to raise the defense via a dispositive motion, not a motion in

limine at trial. However, the dispositive motion deadline passed

on December 1, 2006, and the court previously warned the parties

in the PSO, filed August 18, 2005, that it would “look with

disfavor upon dispositional motions . . . presented at the Final

Pretrial Conference or at trial in guise of motions in limine.” 

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4 Plaintiff alleged claims against defendants for 

(1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds defendants

retaliated against plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment

rights and terminated him without sufficient due process and (2)

conspiracy to violate plaintiff’s civil rights. (Compl., filed

April 15, 2005.) The court dismissed plaintiff’s wrongful

termination in violation of public policy claim by order of

September 22, 2005.

3

(PSO at 4.) In that regard, the court specifically stated in the

PSO that:

The parties are cautioned that failure to raise

a dispositive legal issue that could have been tendered

to the court by proper pretrial motion prior to the

dispositive motion cut-off date may constitute waiver

of such issue.

(Id.) The court reminded defendants of these provisions and

instructed them that in order to raise the defense, they must

move to modify the PSO to permit the filing of a further motion

for summary judgment. Defendants now make said motion. 

Previously, defendants timely filed a motion for summary

judgment, moving for judgment in their favor as to all of

plaintiff’s claims against them.4 On December 19, 2006, the

court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion; the

court granted defendants’ motion with respect to plaintiff’s

Section 1983 claim for violation of his procedural due process

rights but denied defendants’ motion with respect to plaintiff’s

Section 1983 claim for violation of plaintiff’s First Amendment

rights and conspiracy to violate said rights. (Mem. & Order,

filed Dec. 19, 2006.) As to plaintiff’s due process claim, the

court found that plaintiff received adequate due process;

plaintiff received prior notice of his termination, and he was

given an opportunity to respond to the termination in a Skelly

hearing and appeal before the EID Board. (Id. at 20-22.) As to

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5 Defendants alleged the defense in their answer filed

September 29, 2005, stating in their “Tenth Affirmative Defense -

Res Judicata:” “That the plaintiff is barred from recovery in

this action because the precise issues raised in this complaint

have already been litigated and a judgment has been entered.”

4

plaintiff’s First Amendment claim, the court concluded that it

could not find, on the evidence presented, that plaintiff’s

speech was not protected, and assuming it was protected,

plaintiff proffered evidence sufficient to raise triable issues

of fact as to whether he was terminated in retaliation for his

speech against defendant El Dorado Irrigation District (“EID”)

and the individual defendants. (Id. at 10-19.) Defendants did

not raise their affirmative defense of res judicata5 as a basis

for summary judgment with respect to either plaintiff’s due

process or First Amendment claims.

STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b), a PSO

“shall not be modified except upon a showing of good cause.” The

court may modify the pretrial schedule “if it cannot reasonably

be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” 

Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir.

1992) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, advisory committee’s notes

(1983 amendment)). The “good cause” standard primarily focuses

upon the diligence of the party requesting the amendment. 

“Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party

opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to deny

a motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s

reasons for seeking modification.” Id.

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6 The relevant facts describing these proceedings are set

forth in the court’s December 19, 2006 summary judgment order and

therefore are not repeated here. 

5

ANALYSIS

Defendants waited until the final pretrial conference to

assert that plaintiff’s First Amendment claim (and corollary

conspiracy claim) are barred by the doctrine of res judicata,

thereby providing defendants with a complete defense to this

action and obviating the need for a trial. Defendants argue

plaintiff could have been brought these claims in the

administrative proceedings wherein he challenged his

termination,6 and as such, plaintiff is precluded by the doctrine

of res judicata from litigating these claims herein. Relying on

Miller v. County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1994) and

the recent decision of Holcombe v. Hosmer, 477 F.3d 1094 (9th

Cir. 2007), defendants argue this court must give preclusive

effect to the administrative decisions in this case, which even

if unreviewed by the state court, may nonetheless be given

preclusive effect because the administrative agency (EID) acted

in a judicial capacity, it resolved disputed issues of fact

properly before it, and the parties had an adequate opportunity

to litigate the issues. Miller, 39 F.3d at 1032-34 (holding that

the unreviewed Santa Cruz County Civil Service Commission’s

decision sustaining the deputy sheriff plaintiff’s termination

barred the plaintiff’s Section 1983 action because the

administrative proceedings were conducted with sufficient

safeguards to be equated with a state court judgment [namely, the

aforementioned so-called “fairness” requirements of judicial

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6

capacity, resolution of factual issues, and opportunity to

litigate were met]); accord Holcombe, 477 F.3d at 1097-99

(applying Nevada state law and holding that the former highway

patrol officer plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim, alleging she was

terminated in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment

rights, was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the

claim could have been raised in the administrative personnel

proceedings challenging her termination which were later upheld

by the Nevada state court).

Defendants assert that they did not raise these issues in

their motion for summary judgment because they were not “ripe”

for adjudication at that time. At the time of the motion for

summary judgment, defendants maintain that based on plaintiff’s

deposition testimony, they believed plaintiff disputed the

fairness of the administrative proceedings (in terms of the

“Miller” inquiries), and that plaintiff’s testimony would be

sufficient to raise triable issues of fact sufficient to deny

defendants judgment on their res judicata defense. However,

defendants contend that plaintiff stipulated to certain facts in

the joint pretrial conference statement which established their

entitlement to relief on the defense. Specifically, defendants

contend plaintiff failed to dispute “any shortcoming pertaining

to the Skelly procedures,” including whether “EID failed to act

in a judicial capacity, . . . failed [to] resolve the disputed

issues of fact properly before it, or whether the parties were

given an adequate opportunity to litigate.” (Mot. to Mod. PSO,

filed Mar. 14, 2007, at 7-8.) As such, defendants argue their

res judicata defense only became ripe after the preparation of

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7 Defendants did not specify in their answer what forum

the issues were litigated nor what specific “judgment” barred the

instant action. See supra fn. 5.

7

the joint pretrial conference statement.

The court does not agree. As plaintiff emphasizes in his

opposition to the motion, plaintiff did not raise any issues with

respect to the administrative proceedings in the joint pretrial

statement because the court dismissed his due process claim in

its entirety in the summary judgment order. (Mem. & Order, filed

Dec. 19, 2006.) Because plaintiff had no viable due process

claim, he correctly did not raise or discuss issues pertaining to

the adequacy of his administrative hearings. Moreover, in light

of the court’s admonitions in its PSO regarding dispositive

motions, plaintiff justifiably believed that the defense of res

judicata was, having not been raised by defendants in their

motion for summary judgment, waived. See North Pacifica, LLC v.

City of Pacifica, 366 F. Supp. 2d 927 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (finding

defendant, who raised its Miller-based res judicata defense for

the first time at the damages phase of trial, waived the

defense).

Thus, defendants cannot “blame” plaintiff for their failure

to raise the res judicata defense earlier. Indeed, the court

cannot discern any basis for defendants’ failure to raise the

defense in their motion for summary judgment, as, at a minimum,

an alternative basis for granting judgment in defendants’ favor. 

Defendants asserted the defense in their answer filed in

September 2005 based presumably7 on the administrative

proceedings which occurred between November 2003 and April 2004. 

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8

Defendants were thus well aware of the facts giving rising to

this defense, if they existed at all, at the time of the filing

of their summary judgment motion. The court can only conclude

that defendants believed that triable issues existed which would

prevent an award of summary judgment in their favor. In light of

the court’s PSO, they should have known the defense thereafter

would be foreclosed.

Moreover, defendants have now raised a legal question that

had to be decided by a dispositive motion which was required to

be heard by December 1, 2006 per the PSO. Indeed, the PSO, in

place since August 2005, warned defendants that any failure to

file a dispositive motion by the deadline may be deemed a waiver

of an issue, and that the court would look with disfavor on

dispositive motions raised for the first time at the final

pretrial conference or in the guise of a motion in limine.

Additionally, “case law indicates that a party who ‘delay[s]

too long’ in asserting a preclusion argument may lose the

defense.” North Pacifica, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 929 (citing Moore’s

Fed. Prac.-Civ., § 131.50[1]); see also Kern Oil & Refining Co.

v. Tenneco Oil Co., 840 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1988). Relying on

Kern Oil, in North Pacifica, the court, in finding waiver of the

defense, emphasized that while the defendant listed preclusion as

an affirmative defense in its answer, “its allegation was

conclusory and failed to provide clear notice of the particular

nature of the preclusion argument now advanced” and the defendant

waited “until more than a year after the earlier proceedings to

which it attributed preclusive effect” to raise the Millerpreclusion argument. 366 F. Supp. 2d at 930. The same is true

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8 The court also notes, for purposes of Rule 16 as well

as for waiver principles generally, that plaintiff would be

prejudiced by the assertion of this defense at this late juncture

in the case, where the dispositive motion deadline passed on

December 1, 2006 and trial is set for next month. 

9

here. Defendants’ res judicata allegation simply stated: “That

the plaintiff is barred from recovery in this action because the

precise issues raised in this complaint have already been

litigated and a judgment has been entered.” (Answer, filed Sept.

29, 2005.) And, defendant waited approximately two years to

assert the defense. 

Given this undue delay, the court cannot find good cause to

grant defendants’ motion under Rule 16(b); defendants’ lack of

diligence precludes modification of the scheduling order to

permit a further dispositive motion. Additionally, regardless of

Rule 16(b)’s requirements, the court otherwise finds, similar to

the court in North Pacifica, that it is appropriate to deem

defendants’ res judicata defense waived. 366 F. Supp. 2d at 930.

This conclusion is buttressed by the purposes

underlying the preclusion rules, namely, 

conserving judicial resources and protecting

parties from the expense and vexation of 

relitigating issues that another party 

previously has litigated and lost.

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted.) Thus,

defendants’ delay undermines the purposes behind the preclusion

rules by “wasting resources of the parties and the Court.” Id.8

Under these circumstances, either based on Rule 16(b), the

court’s admonitions in the PSO or pursuant to case law, the court

must deny defendants’ request to file a further dispositive

motion on its res judicata defense.

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion

to modify the PSO is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 DATED: April 30, 2007

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