Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cr-00412/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cr-00412-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Valentino Johnson
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

VALENTINO JOHNSON, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 14-cr-00412-TEH 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO SEVER 

 

 This matter is before the Court on Defendant Valentino Johnson’s motion to sever 

the counts of his Superseding Indictment. (Docket No. 99). The Government responded 

(Docket No. 102), and Defendant timely replied (Docket No. 103). Oral argument was 

heard by the Court on April 20, 2015. After carefully considering the Parties’ written and 

oral arguments, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s motion to sever for the reasons set 

forth below. 

BACKGROUND 

The Parties are familiar with the factual background of this case from the 

evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress, which was held in December 2014. 

Accordingly, the Court provides only a brief summary of the facts.

On February 2, 2014, San Francisco Police Department officers responded to a 911 

call about a potential suicide at the residence of Luana McAlpine. Upon arrival, officers 

encountered McAlpine and Defendant, who was on parole and apparently staying at the 

house. After performing a parole search of the home, the officers found a handgun and 

arrested Defendant for felon in possession of a firearm. The Government alleges that it has 

traced this gun to that used by Defendant’s brother in a 2011 homicide, as well as a 2014 

burglary involving a friend of Defendant’s ex-girlfriend. 

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While in custody after his arrest, Defendant engaged in a number of jailhouse phone 

calls with McAlpine, with whom he had a sexual and romantic relationship. The 

Government alleges that during these calls, Defendant attempted to coerce McAlpine into 

giving false testimony about the possession of the gun. These conversations took place in 

February and March 2014, as well as January 2015.1

 

Defendant has been charged with two counts. Count One charges Defendant with 

being a felon in possession of a gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On this count, 

the Government seeks an Armed Career Criminal Enhancement. Count Two charges 

Defendant with obstruction of justice for tampering with official proceedings under 18 

U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). 

LEGAL STANDARD 

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow a court to sever counts in an 

indictment where the joinder of offenses “appears to prejudice a defendant . . . .” Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 14(a). To prevail on a motion to sever, a defendant must show that joinder is “so 

manifestly prejudicial that it outweigh[s] the dominant concern with judicial economy and 

compel[s] exercise of the court’s discretion to sever.” United States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 

479, 482 (9th Cir. 1982). Because “some prejudice is inherent in any joinder[,]” a 

defendant must show something more than simple prejudice. United States v. Vaccaro, 

816 F.2d 443, 448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). “It is well settled that defendants are not entitled to 

severance merely because they may have a better chance of acquittal in separate trials.” 

Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540 (1993). Nonetheless, there are three kinds of 

prejudice that may arise out of a joinder of offenses, and are considered in a motion to 

sever: (1) “the jury may consider that the defendant must be bad” because he is charged 

with numerous counts; (2) “inadmissible proof of one offense may be admissible through a 

 

1

 Although the January 2015 calls are not mentioned in the Superseding Indictment, the 

Government argues that they contain obstructive conduct that provides “context” for 

Defendant’s criminal behavior. 

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joined offense”; and (3) “the defendant may wish to testify on one count but not another.” 

United States v. Ragghianti, 527 F.2d 586, 587 (9th Cir. 1975). 

DISCUSSION 

Defendant contends that severance of the counts is necessary to ensure his right to a 

fair trial because: (1) joinder prejudicially precludes him from testifying in his own 

defense on the obstruction count because a combined trial would open him to crossexamination on the possession charge; (2) severance is warranted to prevent the jury from 

considering otherwise inadmissible evidence prejudicial to Defendant; and (3) absent 

severance, Defendant will be prejudiced by the cumulative effect of the two counts. The 

Court now addresses each of these arguments in turn. 

I. Defendant has identified important testimony that he may be precluded from 

giving if the counts are tried together. 

“If a defendant seeks severance because he wishes to testify on some counts and not 

others, he must show that (1) he has important testimony to give on some counts and (2) a 

strong need to refrain from testifying on those he wants severed.” United States v. Nolan, 

700 F.2d 479, 483 (9th Cir. 1983). 

A. Defendant identifies important testimony on the obstruction count. 

An individual commits obstruction where he “obstructs, influences, or impedes any 

official proceeding, or attempts to do so.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). An “official 

proceeding” is one that is before the United States federal government. Id. § 1515(a)(1). 

“In a prosecution for an offense under this section, no state of mind need be proved with 

respect to the circumstance . . . that the official proceeding . . . is before a judge or court of 

the United States.” Id. § 1512(g). Further, the prosecution does not need to show that a 

federal proceeding was “pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense.” Id. § 

1512(f). 

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Defendant claims that he has “important testimony” to provide regarding the 

obstruction count. Specifically, he intends to testify that he did not foresee a federal 

proceeding when he engaged in the allegedly obstructive phone calls, as he was only 

facing state charges in March 2014 when the calls were made. Mot. at 4. Defendant 

argues that this testimony is important because it negates the intent requirement for 

obstruction. Reply at 3. 

Relying on § 1512(g) and (f), the Government argues that it does not need to prove 

that Defendant foresaw a federal proceeding when he engaged in obstructive conduct in 

March 2014. Opp’n at 7-8. Instead, the Government contends, “it is sufficient if the 

eventual obstruction of the federal proceeding was a ‘natural and probable effect of the 

defendant’s conduct.’” Id. at 8 (citing United States v. Phillips, 583 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th 

Cir. 2009)). At oral argument, the Government explained that Defendant clearly foresaw 

some form of criminal prosecution, and the fact that he thought it would be a state 

prosecution instead of the instant federal prosecution is of no consequence. The 

Government appears to misunderstand § 1512(g) as it relates to the specific intent 

requirement of the obstruction charge. While the Government does not need to prove that 

Defendant knew the instant proceeding would be federal in nature, it must still prove that 

Defendant intended to obstruct this particular proceeding, rather than the state proceeding 

that was pending in March 2014. This distinction is made clear by case law. 

In United States v. Aguilar, the Supreme Court overturned the § 1503 obstruction 

conviction a defendant that lied to two FBI agents “who might or might not testify before a 

grand jury.” 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995), 597. The Supreme Court construed the intent 

element of § 1503, whose relevant language is substantially similar to the relevant 

language in § 1512(c)(2), to include a “nexus requirement,” as well as specific intent. Id.

at 600.2

 The nexus requirement requires “a relationship in time, causation, or logic” 

 

2

 While the Ninth Circuit has not yet expressly extended the “nexus” requirement to § 

1512(c)(2), this appears to be the prevailing trend of the appellate courts that have 

addressed this issue. See United States v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241, 250 (3d 2013) (compiling 

cases). 

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between the conduct and the judicial proceedings. Id. at 599. “In other words, the 

endeavor must have the ‘natural and probable effect’ of interfering with the due 

administration of justice.” Id. However, “if the defendant lacks knowledge that his 

actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding, he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct.” 

Id. “The action taken by the accused must be with an intent to influence judicial or grand 

jury proceedings; it is not enough that there be an intent to influence some ancillary 

proceeding, such as an investigation independent of the court’s or grand jury’s authority.” 

Id. For the present case, Aguilar counsels that it is not enough that Defendant intended to 

obstruct an ancillary proceeding; he must have intended to obstruct the proceeding that he 

is charged with obstructing. 

In ArthurAnderson LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005), the Supreme Court 

provided additional guidance where the proceeding is not pending when the obstructive 

conduct occurs. In that case, a manager was incorrectly found guilty of corruptly 

persuading a person to destroy records that were to be used in an SEC investigation. The 

Supreme Court ruled that the jury instructions improperly “led the jury to believe that it 

did not have to find any nexus between the ‘persua[sion]’ to destroy documents and any 

particular proceeding.” Id. at 707. In resisting the nexus requirement, prosecutors relied 

on § 1512(f)’s provision that the proceeding “need not be pending or about to be instituted 

at the time of the offense.” Id. The Court ruled: 

It is, however, one thing to say that a proceeding “need not be 

pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense,” 

and quite another to say a proceeding need not even be 

foreseen. A “knowingly . . . corrupt[t] persuade[r]” cannot be 

someone who persuades others to shred documents under a 

document retention policy when he does not have in 

contemplation any particular official proceeding in which 

those documents might be material. 

Id. at 708 (emphasis added). 

 The Government cites to United States v. Phillips, 583 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2009), 

for the proposition that a defendant does not have to foresee the federal nature of the 

proceeding, but need merely have engaged in conduct that naturally obstructed it. Opp’n 

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at 8. However, this reading of Phillips confuses the point. In that case, the Tenth Circuit 

upheld the conviction of a defendant under § 1512(c)(2) for disclosing the identity of an 

undercover sheriff to the subject of a federal grand jury investigation. 583 F.3d at 1264. 

The Court held that “§ 1512(c)(2) does not require that the defendant know of the 

existence of an ongoing official proceeding.” Id. (citing § 1512(f)(1)). “Rather, a 

conviction under the statute is proper if it is foreseeable that the defendant’s conduct will 

interfere with an official proceeding.” Id. Importantly, the appellate court determined that 

the evidence in that case “beg[ged] the inference that [the defendant] actually intended to 

obstruct the investigation into the methamphetamine trade in Dodge city - of which the 

federal grand jury proceedings were a necessary part.” Id. at 1265. It follows that while 

the defendant did not need to know that the proceeding was federal, he still needed to 

foresee its existence and intend to obstruct it. 

 The Government also cites to United States v. Binday, 993 F. Supp. 2d 365 

(S.D.N.Y. 2014). In Binday, the district court denied the defendant’s post-trial motion to 

set aside his conviction on an obstruction charge. Id. at 370. The defendant in that case 

had disposed of records relating to mail and wire fraud, and objected to his conviction on 

the basis that “there was no ‘nexus’ between his alleged obstructive conduct and an 

‘official proceeding,’ as required to convict him under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1).” Id. at 368. 

The district court rejected this argument, determining that “[t]he trial evidence established 

the requisite foreseeability and nexus,” because, in part, the defendant destroyed the 

relevant records “immediately after - and only after - learning that the FBI was 

investigating” him. Id. at 369. Consequently, the court found, “[t]he jury could have 

reasonably inferred from the evidence that [the defendant] acted with awareness that his 

conduct would obstruct a potential grand jury or court proceeding by rendering evidence 

unavailable for use against him.” Id. 

 Finally, the Government’s citation to United States v. Davis is unhelpful, as this 

case predates Aguilar and Arthur Anderson. 932 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1991). Even if this 

were not the case, the case does not support the Government’s position. The Ninth Circuit 

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in that case found that the “defendant shot [the witness] with the intent of preventing the 

communication to law enforcement officers of information concerning the commission of 

federal offenses.” Id. at 761. The court concluded: “Under § 1512, the United States was 

not required to prove the defendant knew he was tampering with a federal proceeding.” Id. 

But this is beyond dispute, as § 1512(g) provides that a defendant does not need to know 

about the federal nature of the proceeding with which he is interfering. This does not 

mean, however, that a defendant does not need to contemplate the existence of the 

particular proceeding that he is charged with obstructing. 

 The Government confuses the point by arguing that it does not need to prove that 

Defendant foresaw the federal nature of the proceeding he is charged with obstructing. 

The Government must still prove that Defendant foresaw, knew, or contemplated the 

particular proceeding that he is charged with obstructing. If Defendant testifies that he did 

not contemplate or foresee the instant proceeding, which he is charged with obstructing, he 

offers important testimony regarding the intent element of the obstruction count. 

B. Defendant demonstrates a strong need to refrain from testifying on the 

possession count. 

 Next, Defendant must show “a strong need to refrain from testifying” on the 

possession count. United States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 479, 483 (9th Cir. 1983). Defendant 

argues that his defense strategy on the possession charge is to put the Government to its 

burden, and make it prove Defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, without his 

testimony. Reply at 4. Defendant contends that the Government’s case is built largely 

upon circumstantial evidence, and that Defendant’s testimony would open him to crossexamination, offering the Government access to potentially incriminating evidence that it 

would not otherwise possess. Id. Specifically, he states that if he testifies in a joined trial, 

he will be open to cross-examination about his whereabouts on January 24, 2014, any 

interactions he may have had with his brother, and the contents of his cell phone. Id. 

In support of this argument, Defendant cites United States v. Ortiz, No. 11-cr-230-

DBH, 2012 WL 2919680 (D. Me. July 17, 2012). In Ortiz, the defendant was charged 

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with aiding and abetting a false statement in connection with the purchase of a firearm, as 

well as perjury. Ortiz, 2012 WL 2919680, at *1. Specifically, the defendant was charged 

with inducing another individual to claim on an ATF form that they were the purchaser of 

a handgun that belonged to the defendant. Id. Subsequently, the defendant lied to a 

federal grand jury by saying he never induced anyone to buy the gun for him. Id. The 

court granted the defendant’s motion to sever because his testimony regarding the intent 

element of the perjury charge was crucial to his defense, but absent severance, taking the 

stand to testify about the perjury charge would “undoubtedly open himself to questioning 

about the gun-purchasing charge” and he would “no longer be able to rely solely on the 

government’s asserted inability to prove beyond a reasonable doubt - without his testimony 

- the [gun-purchasing] charge.” Id. The court in Ortiz found that this was sufficiently 

prejudicial to warrant severance, and this Court agrees. 

 If the Court permits joinder, it forces Defendant to choose between defending 

against a crucial element of the obstruction charge, and asserting his constitutional right 

against self-incrimination. While the Government is correct that “[s]everance is not 

mandatory every time a defendant wishes to testify to one charge but to remain silent on 

another[,]” the Court finds that, within the specific context of this case and in combination 

with the other concerns discussed below, forcing Defendant to make such a decision 

presents undue prejudice that outweighs the present concern for judicial economy. See 

Nolan, 700 F.2d at 482. 

II. The jailhouse calls are admissible as to both counts. 

A. The jailhouse calls are probative of both counts. 

The jailhouse phone calls are indisputably relevant to the obstruction charge, as 

they document the allegedly obstructive conduct. Defendant argues, however, that the 

calls are not probative of Defendant’s possession count. The Court disagrees. 

As to the possession count, the allegedly obstructive conduct documented in the 

phone calls provides evidence of Defendant’s consciousness of guilt, which courts have 

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consistently found to be highly probative. See, e.g., United States v. Begay, 567 F.3d 540, 

552 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding evidence that defendant intimidated two government 

witnesses was admissible to show consciousness of guilt); United States v. Meling, 47 F.3d 

1546, 1557 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming district court’s determination that an attempt to 

intimidate witnesses is admissible to show “consciousness of guilt - second only to a 

confession in terms of probative value”); United States v. Gatto, 995 F.2d 449, 454 (3d 

Cir. 1993) (“It is well-established that evidence of threats or intimidation is admissible 

under Rule 404(b) to show a defendant’s consciousness of guilt . . . .”); United States v. 

Balzano, 916 F.2d 1273, 1281 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying general rule, in affirming trial 

court’s denial of motion to sever, that “evidence of a defendant’s attempts at intimidation 

of a witness is admissible to demonstrate a defendant’s ‘consciousness of guilt’ of the 

charges which were the subject of the witness’ testimony”); United States v. Fagan, 821 

F.2d 1002, 1007 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining that evidence of mail fraud is admissible in a 

trial for witness tampering to show motive, while evidence of witness tampering is 

admissible in a trial for mail fraud to show “guilty knowledge”). 

Defendant argues that these cases are inapposite, as they primarily involve witness 

intimidation. Reply at 6-7. But Defendant elevates form over substance, and the Court is 

not persuaded. While witness tampering might be less indicative of a guilty conscience 

than witness intimidation - a dubious premise - it nonetheless demonstrates a 

consciousness of guilt. Authority cited by Defendant does not provide otherwise. 

B. Any potential prejudice resulting from the calls can be minimized. 

The Court has listened to several of the portions of the jailhouse calls identified by 

the Government as containing obstructive conduct, and, for the most part, finds that these 

segments are not unduly prejudicial. While it is true that the phone calls, generally, 

contain sexually graphic, obscene, and inflammatory language, the Court is confident that 

much of the prejudicial nature of the calls can be minimized through careful editing. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides for the exclusion of evidence where its “probative 

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value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” As explained 

above, the conversations are highly probative of both counts. Consequently, where the 

Parties can minimize prejudice by appropriately editing the tapes and disclosing to the jury 

only relevant portions of Defendant’s conversations, the phone calls would be admissible 

in a joint or severed proceeding. 

III. The spillover effect of Defendant’s criminal history poses a danger of prejudice 

that can be minimized by the Court. 

A. The Court recognizes the danger of a spillover effect, but Defendant’s 

concerns are overblown. 

Defendant also argues that joinder of the possession and obstruction charges will 

cause the jury to improperly consider evidence of Defendant’s prior convictions when 

deliberating about the obstruction charge. Mot. at 6-7 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)). While 

there is some danger that evidence of Defendant’s criminal record could “spill over” into 

the jury’s consideration of the obstruction count, Defendant’s concern is overblown. First, 

evidence of Defendant’s previous felony conviction is probative of his obstructive conduct 

as it provides motive and intent. Second, if Defendant testified in the obstruction trial, the 

Government could impeach him about his criminal history under Rule 609. Finally, the 

Court can issue jury instructions, which in combination with a stipulation by the 

Government about Defendant’s criminal history, would cure any prejudice. 

To be sure, the danger of a “spillover effect” is a legitimate concern. In United 

States v. Nguyen, the Ninth Circuit noted: “All of the Circuit Courts seem to agree that 

trying a felon in possession count together with other felony charges creates a very 

dangerous situation because the jury might improperly consider the evidence of a prior 

conviction when deliberating about the other felony charges.” 88 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 

1986). However, the Nguyen court found severance necessary because the defendant’s 

criminal history was inadmissible as to the severed count. Id. That is not the case here; 

Defendant’s status as a felon would be admissible in an obstruction proceeding, even if 

Defendant decided not to testify, because it is probative of Defendant’s motive for 

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engaging in the obstructive conduct. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) (“This evidence may be 

admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive . . . .”). 

In another case, United States v. Lewis, the Ninth Circuit overturned a defendant’s 

murder conviction due to the “manifest prejudice from the [trial court’s] failure to sever 

the felon in receipt counts.” 787 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th Cir. 1986). Lewis cautioned: “The 

danger that a jury will infer present guilt from prior convictions cannot be ignored by the 

court in deciding whether to sever a charge that necessitates the introduction of other 

crimes evidence.” Id. at 1322. However, severance was appropriate because the appellate 

court found that the defendant’s prior convictions “were not particularly probative on the 

[separate] charge . . . .” Id. at 1322. Unlike in Lewis, Defendant’s prior convictions are

probative on the obstruction charge, as explained above. 

B. Curative jury instructions, alone, would be inadequate. 

The Government first responds to this spillover concern by asserting that jury 

instructions would cure the danger of prejudice. Opp’n at 13-14. The Court is wary of this 

approach, as the Ninth Circuit in Lewis made clear that felon in possession cases are 

viewed as uniquely vulnerable to the spillover effect, despite the issuance of jury 

instructions. Lewis, 787 F.2d at 1323. As the appellate court explained, “tell[ing] a jury to 

ignore the defendant’s prior convictions in determining whether he or she committed the 

offense being tried is to task human beings to act with a measure of dispassion and 

exactitude well beyond mortal capacities.” Id. 

Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has routinely expressed doubts about the adequacy of 

curative jury instructions in felon in possession cases. In Nguyen, the Ninth Circuit made 

clear that it “remain[s] skeptical ‘of the efficacy of such [curative] instructions no matter 

when they are given.’” Nguyen, 88 F.3d at 817 (quoting Lewis, 787 F.2d at 1322, and 

surveying cases recognizing the inefficiency of limiting instructions in felon in possession 

cases). Accordingly, while curative jury instructions alone might be sufficient in other 

contexts, the Ninth Circuit has strongly indicated that they would not be sufficient here. 

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C. A Government stipulation coupled with jury instructions would 

appropriately address any criminal history-related prejudice. 

The Government has also indicated its willingness to stipulate to Defendant’s 

criminal history in a joint trial, in a manner that discloses neither the nature of the crime 

nor the length of the sentence (except that the term exceeded one year). Opp’n at 11. The 

Ninth Circuit has held that this is sufficient to avoid manifest prejudice. United States v. 

Burgess, 791 F.2d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming denial of motion to sever a felon in 

possession charge where the parties entered into a stipulation regarding the felony such 

that “[n]either the nature of the crime nor the length of the sentence was disclosed”). 

Because some evidence of Defendant’s felony record is admissible as to both 

counts, and the prejudicial effect of this evidence on the jury’s consideration of 

Defendant’s obstruction charge can be minimized by stipulation combined with an 

appropriate jury instruction, the Court is confident that it could properly address the 

potential spillover effect regarding Defendant’s criminal history. 

However, because the Court has decided to sever the counts, the Parties should be 

mindful of how they can apply these considerations to the individual proceedings in order 

to minimize any remaining prejudice. 

IV. It is unlikely that the Court could prevent the spillover effect of the other 

possession-related evidence. 

Defendant next argues that other evidence proffered by the Government relating to 

the possession charge would be prejudicial in a joint proceeding. Reply at 9-11. The 

Court agrees. Specifically, Defendant refers to the Government’s expressed intent to put 

on evidence pertaining to: (1) a 2011 homicide where the same gun was allegedly used by 

Defendant’s brother; and (2) a 2014 burglary where bullets from the same gun were 

allegedly found at the home of a friend of Defendant’s ex-girlfriend. Id. at 9. At the 

hearing, the Government made clear that its evidence regarding the 2011 homicide will 

include testimony from the medical examiner that “dug the bullets out of the body.” In 

light of Defendant’s pending motion to compel discovery, (Docket No. 106), it has become 

clear that there will likely be a mini-trial surrounding the investigation of the 2011 

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homicide. The details of a murder investigation are of severely limited probative value to 

the obstruction charge, and provide the potential for substantial prejudice. While jury 

instructions might minimize the prejudicial effect of evidence relating to a homicide and 

burglary, the danger of such prejudice is most effectively cured through severance. 

V. Defendant would not be unduly prejudiced by the “cumulative effect” of 

multiple charges. 

Finally, Defendant contends that “the cumulative effect of the firearm possession 

and witness tampering count will cause a jury to infer prejudicially that Mr. Johnson 

possesses a criminal disposition.” Mot. at 10. The Court does not find this to be a 

convincing argument. Certainly, some prejudice always results from the joinder of counts. 

The Second Circuit noted in United States v. Smith that the disadvantage a defendant faces 

from being tried on joined counts is “not improbable, for, even when cautioned, juries are 

apt to regard with a more jaundiced eye a person charged with two crimes than a person 

charged with one.” 112 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1940). However, this inherent prejudice is 

not enough to require severance - otherwise, joinder would never be permissible. Instead, 

Defendant must explain why the cumulative effect of the charges in this case results in 

manifest prejudice that outweighs the dominant concern for judicial economy. United 

States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 479, 482 (9th Cir. 1982). 

In this regard, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that joinder potentially warrants 

severance where there is a substantial disparity between the evidence underlying the joined 

charges. Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1085 (9th Cir. 1998). For this reason, 

Defendant spends a portion of his motion arguing that the evidence for the obstruction 

charge is especially weak. The Court disagrees. The jailhouse calls, upon which the 

obstruction charge is based, reveal Defendant’s attempts to coerce and convince McAlpine 

to falsely recant her previous statements to police and claim that she owned the firearm in 

question, despite the fact that Defendant clearly states that he knows the gun does not 

belong to her. There is no “substantial disparity between the evidence” of the two counts 

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in this case, and Bean is therefore inapposite. Id. Accordingly, Defendant fails to make a 

showing of cumulative prejudice that warrants severance. 

CONCLUSION 

Defendant has successfully argued that joinder is so manifestly prejudicial in this 

case that it outweighs the concern for judicial economy. See Nolan, 700 F.2d at 482. 

Specifically, joinder would force Defendant to decide between offering important 

testimony on the obstruction count and avoiding self-incrimination on the possession 

count. Additionally, it has become apparent to the Court that the Parties intend to litigate 

the details of a 2011 murder investigation that is relevant to the possession count but poses 

a substantial danger of undue prejudice in connection with the obstruction count. For the 

foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s motion to sever. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 04/30/15 _____________________________________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge 

Case 3:14-cr-00412-TEH Document 111 Filed 04/30/15 Page 14 of 14