Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01610/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01610-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jamal Atalla
Petitioner
John Kramer
Respondent
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
Respondent

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jamal Atalla,

Petitioner, 

vs.

John Kramer, District Director of United

States Citizenship and Immigration

Services, and United States Citizenship

and Immigration Services,

Respondents. 

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No. CV 09-01610-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses (Doc.

103).

I. Procedural Background

On May 5, 2002, Petitioner filed an application for naturalization. U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) interviewed him in 2004, 2006, and

2008. On September 10, 2008, USCIS denied Petitioner’s naturalization application

based on a finding of lack of good moral character. On October 9, 2008, he

administratively appealed the naturalization denial. On April 7, 2009, USCIS affirmed

the denial based on a finding of lack of good moral character. On August 4, 2009,

Petitioner filed the present action.

An evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s naturalization application was held on April

5, 6, 7, and 8, 2011. On June 20, 2011, the Court entered judgment granting Petitioner’s

application. (Doc. 99.) On July 5, 2011, Petitioner moved for award of attorneys’ fees

Case 2:09-cv-01610-NVW Document 119 Filed 12/15/11 Page 1 of 7
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and related expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412. (Doc. 103.) On July 20, 2011,

Petitioner filed a memorandum and documentation supporting his application, seeking

$219,261.00 for fees and $13,078.18 for non-taxable costs. (Doc. 104.) 

II. Legal Standard

Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412:

Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to

a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . .

incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort),

including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or

against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action,

unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially

justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The “position of the United States” refers to both “the

position taken by the United States in the civil action” and “the action or failure to act by

the agency upon which the civil action is based.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D). 

The party seeking fees has the burden of establishing that he is a prevailing party,

the fee application was submitted within 30 days of final judgment in the action and was

supported by an itemized statement, and, if an individual, his net worth did not exceed

$2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B),

(d)(2)(B). Love v. Reilly, 924 F.2d 1492, 1494 (9th Cir. 1991). “Once a party’s eligibility

has been proven, an award of fees is mandatory under the EAJA unless the government’s

position is substantially justified or special circumstances exist that make an award of

fees unjust.” Id. at 1495. The government bears the burden of proving the special

circumstances or substantial justification exception to the mandatory award of fees under

the EAJA. Id.

Petitioner’s fee application was timely filed. He has filed an affidavit stating that

his net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time he filed this action. Respondents do

not dispute that Petitioner is a prevailing party and do not contend that special

circumstances make an award unjust.

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III. Analysis

A. Respondents’ Position Was Not Substantially Justified.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), “substantially justified” means “justified in

substance or in the main,” “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person,”

and having a “reasonable basis both in law and fact.” Comm’r v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 158

(1990); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988); Shafer v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067,

1071 (9th Cir. 2008). “Substantially justified means . . . more than merely undeserving of

sanctions for frivolousness.” Pierce, 487 U.S. at 566. 

Respondents’ position was that Petitioner lacked good moral character because he

had given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit. See 8

U.S.C. § 1101(f). For an applicant’s false testimony to preclude a finding of good moral

character under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(6), “the testimony must have been made orally and under

oath, and the witness must have had a subjective intent to deceive for the purpose of

obtaining immigration benefits.” Ramos v. INS, 246 F.3d 1264, 1266 (9th Cir. 2001). 

During this action, Respondents conceded that donating to an organization does not make

one a “member of or associated with” the organization.

Respondents contend that their position prior to and during litigation was

substantially justified because they believed Petitioner “knowingly associated with

terrorist organizations,” failed to volunteer any information about his connection to the

Global Relief Foundation (“GRF”) until he was questioned specifically about the GRF

during his first naturalization interview, and failed to voluntarily disclose the full extent

of his involvement with the GRF. In other words, Respondents claim their position was

justified by the fact that when Petitioner completed his unsworn naturalization application

in 2002, he did not identify GRF in response to a question asking for the name of each

group that he had ever been a member of or associated with although he did indicate that

he had traveled to Azerbaijan in 2000. But in 2004, during his first naturalization

interview, Petitioner responded to questions about GRF and disclosed that he knew

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GRF’s chairperson, donated money to GRF, collected donations for GRF, assisted GRF

in establishing a medical clinic in Azerbaijan, and talked with GRF’s chairperson by

telephone every couple of months or so. Failure to volunteer information before the first

interview does not justify taking the position that Petitioner lacked good moral character

because he had given false sworn oral testimony with a subjective intent to deceive for

the purpose of obtaining immigration benefits.

Therefore, Respondents have not met their burden to prove the substantial

justification exception to the mandatory award of fees under the EAJA.

B. The Fee Award Should Not Be Capped at $75,000.

Petitioner’s counsel, Osborn Maledon, agreed it would not seek to collect from

Petitioner fees incurred in excess of $75,000. Respondents contend that because

Petitioner’s obligation to pay was capped at $75,000, he has not “incurred” more than

$75,000 in fees reimbursable under 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A). 

“It is well-settled that an award of attorneys fees [under EAJA] is not necessarily

contingent upon an obligation to pay counsel. . . . The presence of an attorney-client

relationship suffices to entitle prevailing litigants to receive fee awards.” Nadarajah v.

Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 916 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ed A. Wilson, Inc. v. GSA, 126 F.3d

1406, 1409 (11th Cir. 1997)). However, there must be an express or implied agreement

that the fee award will be paid to the legal counsel. Id.; Ed A. Wilson, 126 F.3d at 1409. 

It is undisputed that Osborn Maledon has an attorney-client relationship with

Petitioner and that the fee award will be paid to Osborn Maledon. Therefore, the fee

award will not be capped at $75,000.

C. Petitioner Is Not Entitled to an Enhanced Fee Award.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A), Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870,

876-77 (9th Cir. 2005), and Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6, the applicable statutory maximum

hourly rates under the EAJA, adjusted for increases in cost of living, are $172.24/hour for

work performed in 2009, $175.06/hour for work performed in 2010, and $179.51/hour for

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See http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0000000039 (last

visited on Dec. 12, 2011). 

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work performed in the first half of 2011.1

 Under § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii), fees may be

awarded in excess of the applicable statutory maximum hourly rate if the Court

determines that a higher fee is justified because of a “special factor, such as the limited

availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved.” 

The burden rests on Petitioner to demonstrate his entitlement to higher fees. See

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Winter, 543 F.3d 1152, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008). 

He must prove that (1) the attorney possesses distinctive knowledge and skills developed

through a practice specialty, (2) those distinctive skills were needed in the litigation, and

(3) those skills were not available elsewhere at the statutory rate. Id. at 1158; see also

Nadarajah, 569 F.3d at 912. 

Petitioner does not contend that his Osborn Maledon attorneys possessed

distinctive knowledge and skills developed through a practice specialty, those distinctive

skills were needed in the litigation, and those skills were not available elsewhere at the

statutory rate. Even if Petitioner’s attorneys specialized in immigration law, the practice

of immigration law is not classified as a specialty generally justifying enhanced hourly

rates under § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). Thangaraja, 428 F.3d at 876; Nadarajah, 569 F.3d at

913. Petitioner would need to further establish that his attorneys possessed some

distinctive knowledge or specialized skill necessary to litigating this case. But he

contends only that the requested fee amount, based on hourly rates in excess of the

adjusted EAJA rates, is reasonable and justified because “(1) there is a shortage of

qualified attorneys willing to handle a full trial in the district court of a naturalization

decision based on the good moral character provisions of the federal immigration laws

and (2) among those attorneys willing to try cases in district court, the hourly rates

charged are comparable to the rates requested by [Petitioner].” (Doc. 115 at 7.) 

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Willingness to try cases in court at the EAJA hourly rate is not equivalent to having

distinctive knowledge or specialized skill developed through a practice specialty and

necessary to litigate a particular case, and general observations about the willingness of

qualified attorneys are not sufficient to establish an exception under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). See Love, 924 F.2d at 1496-97; Natural Resources Defense Council,

543 F.3d at 1161-61. 

D. Time Entry Objections.

The Court has considered Respondents’ objections to specific time entries and

expenses and overrules all but one of them. The time entry objections fall into a few

categories. The most frequent objection is “inadequate description.” Many of the

descriptions are sparse. However, in light of the narrative as a whole and the Court’s

familiarity with the extensive proceedings, they are sufficient to conclude that they

properly pertain to this case and are reasonable. Other objections, sometimes

characterized as “clerical tasks,” relate to conferences and giving direction to

subordinates working on the case. Such conferences and directions are essential to

division of labor and are proper. Such entries as “consider deposition,” which means

reading the deposition, are sufficient and the tasks are necessary. Even a lawyer must

sometimes organize her file, which cannot be delegated to a clerical employee, because

the lawyer knows how to organize her file, so that objection is overruled. In considering

these objections the Court considers that the narratives need not disclose strategies or

attorney thought processes, especially because this case is on appeal.

Petitioner’s objection to $4,861.60 in photocopying charges will be sustained, as it

is not shown that the charges are actual outside expenses incurred. Respondents’

suggestion of $1,861.60 will be allowed instead.

Therefore, fees will be awarded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412 at the applicable

statutory maximum hourly rates under the EAJA, adjusted for increases in cost of living,

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for all of the time requested, in the total amount of $116,643.24. Non-taxable costs will

be awarded in the amount of $10,078.18.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and

Expenses (Doc. 103) is granted in the amount of $126,721.42 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk enter judgment in favor of Petitioner

Jamal Atalla, M.D., against Respondents John Kramer, District Director of United States

Citizenship and Immigration Services, in his official capacity, and United States

Citizenship and Immigration Services for attorney fees and non-taxable costs in the

amount of $126,721.42, plus interest at the federal rate until paid.

DATED this 14th day of December, 2011.

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