Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10122/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10122-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sergio Patrick Rodriguez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SERGIO PATRICK RODRIGUEZ, AKA

Javier Rodrigues,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-10122

D.C. No.

1:13-cr-00109-

LJO-SKO-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 8, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed June 24, 2015

Before: Barry G. Silverman, Ronald M. Gould,

and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Silverman

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2 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel reversed a conviction for attempting to interfere

with the safe operation of an aircraft, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(5) and (8), and remanded for resentencing

on a conviction for aiming a laser pointer at an aircraft, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 39A.

The panel held that there is insufficient evidence to

support the conviction under § 32(a)(5) and (8), which

required proof of both a willful attempt to interfere with an

aircraft and a reckless disregard for human life, where the

evidence showed that the defendant was attempting to see

how far his laser would go at night and aimed it at a

helicopter, but there is no evidence that he was trying to

interfere with the pilot.

The panel remanded for resentencing on the § 39A

conviction because the district court did not have the benefit

of this court’s decision in United States v. Gardenhire, 784

F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2015), and premised the sentence for the

§ 39A conviction, in part, on the fact that the defendant had

also been convicted of violating § 32(a)(5), (a)(8).

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. 

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UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ 3

COUNSEL

Carolyn D. Phillips (argued), Fresno, California, for

Defendant-Appellant.

Benjamin B. Wagner, United States Attorney, Camil A.

Skipper, Appellate Chief, Karen A. Escobar and Michael G.

Tierney (argued), Assistant United States Attorneys, Fresno,

California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge:

There ought to be a law against shining a laser pointer at

an aircraft. In fact, there is, and it’s punishable by up to five

years in prison, as appellant Sergio Rodriguez discovered for

himself. Rodriguez, his girlfriend, and their kids were fooling

around with a laser pointer one summer evening in the

courtyard of their apartment complex – trying to see just how

far it could go – and they shined it at overflying helicopters. 

Rodriguez was convicted of Aiming a Laser Pointer at an

Aircraft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 39A, and was sentenced

to the maximum sentence: five years in prison. Rodriguez

does not challenge that conviction.

He also was convicted of another crime stemming from

the same conduct – Attempting to Interfere with the Safe

Operation of an Aircraft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(5)

and (8). That crime requires proof of a willful attempt to

interfere with the operator of an aircraft, with either the intent

to endanger others or reckless disregard for human life. 

Rodriguez was charged with and found guilty of the reckless

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4 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ

variety, and for that offense, was sentenced to fourteen years

in prison.

The evidence clearly shows that Rodriguez was rightfully

convicted of aiming the laser pointer at a helicopter (§ 39A). 

However, there is insufficient evidence that he willfully

attempted to interfere with the safe flight of the helicopter

(§ 32(a)(5)). Rather, the evidence showed that he was

attempting to see how far his laser would go at night – a

stupid thing to do, yes, but there is no evidence that he was

trying to interfere with the pilot. Section 39A is designed for

knuckleheads like him. On the other hand, 18 U.S.C.

§ 32(a)(5) is designed for both the Osama bin Ladens of the

world – people trying to bring down a plane, intending to

cause harm – and those who are aware that their actions are

dangerous and could harm others, but just don’t care. The

failure to recognize this distinction is to fail to appreciate that

Congress saw fit to create two different crimes, one more

serious than the other, for two different types of offenders.

About a year after Rodriguez’s conviction became final

in district court, we decided United States v. Gardenhire,

784 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2015). On very similar facts – a case

in which another knucklehead aimed a laser pointer at a

passing airplane just for the fun of it – we held, for the

purposes of the applicable sentencing guidelines, that there

was no evidence “that Gardenhire acted recklessly when he

aimed his laser beam at the aircraft. The record is devoid of

evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, that

Gardenhire was aware of the risk created by his conduct.” Id.

at 1280.

We face a similar situation here. There’s no problem with

Rodriguez’s conviction for Aiming a Laser Pointer at an

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UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ 5

Aircraft, 18 U.S.C. § 39A. But his conviction under

18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(5), (a)(8), for Attempting to Interfere with

the Safe Operation of an Aircraft, required both proof of a

willful attempt to interfere with an aircraft, and proof of a

reckless disregard for human life. That conviction is not

supported by the evidence and must be reversed. Because the

district court did not have the benefit of Gardenhire and

because it premised the sentence for the § 39A conviction, in

part, on the fact that Rodriguez had also been convicted of

violating § 32(a)(5), (a)(8), we also remand for resentencing

on the § 39A conviction.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 25, 2012, at around 9:00 p.m., Air George – a

medical transport helicopter for the Valley Children’s

Hospital in Fresno, California – had just set out to pick up a

patient in Porterville. The helicopter was about 1,100 feet up,

flying at a speed of around 130 miles per hour. Five minutes

into the flight, the pilot noticed a “bright green flash inside

the cabin” that caused “everything in the cabin [to] light up.” 

A few seconds later, he saw the flash again, this time for a

slightly longer period of about two seconds. The flash caused

a glare inside the cabin that made it “difficult to see outside.” 

The pilot realized it was a laser. He located the spot from

which it was being shined at him in what appeared to be a zig

zag motion, reported the laser to air traffic control, and

continued on to Porterville.

Fresno Police Department pilot Kenneth Schneider and

Tactical Flight Officer George Valdez were on duty that night

in the department’s helicopter, Air-1, and responded to air

traffic control’s call. The pair began orbiting the area in

which Air George’s pilot saw the laser, flying approximately

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6 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ

60 miles per hour at an altitude of 500 feet. During one of the

orbits, a green laser hit the cockpit, creating a “big flare” and

“light[ing] up the entire cockpit.” Schneider and Valdez

continued orbiting in order to locate the laser. During that

time, the cockpit was struck approximately five or six more

times for around three to ten seconds each by a laser moving

in a circular motion.

Valdez described the intensity of the flashes as stronger

than a camera flash, “brighter than the high beams of a car

light by far,” and more like staring at the sun. Schneider

analogized it to putting a “high-intensity flashlight up to your

face and turning it on.” Although Valdez experienced

disorientation and an “after-image” during and directly after

the laser strike, he did not experience any lasting after-image

or other physical injury as a result of the strikes. Neither did

Schneider. Nevertheless, Valdez testified that the laser

interfered with his duties because part of his job is to help the

pilot locate and avoid hazards – such as radio towers, other

aircraft, and birds – and he was unable to carry out this duty

while the laser was hitting the cockpit. Schneider echoed

those concerns, stating that being lased impedes a pilot’s

ability to see his instruments inside the cabin and any hazards

outside. He stated that the laser prevented him from scanning

his instrument panels and looking out the left side of the

aircraft to make sure he kept Valdez on position to spot the

laser.

Once Schneider and Valdez pinpointed the laser’s

location, they directed ground units of the Clovis Police

Department to that spot. When Officers Christopher Peters

and Steve Cleaver arrived at the location to which Schneider

and Valdez had directed them, they saw Rodriguez and his

girlfriend Jennifer Coleman standing with several children

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UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ 7

and adults outside their apartment. Rodriguez was holding a

small cylindrical object in his hand. When Rodriguez saw the

officers, he ran towards his apartment. Peters caught him,

found the object in his pocket, took it out, and discovered it

was a laser. The laser had the following label: “Avoid

Exposure Laser / Light is Emitted from this Aperture /

Danger / Laser Radiation / Avoid Direct Eye Exposure / Max

Output Power < 5 milliwatts / . . . This product complies with

21 C.F.R. / Made in China.” Cleaver arrested Rodriguez.

At that point, Coleman told the officers they should

release Rodriguez because “she was the one who had the laser

and she was the one who was pointing it into the sky.” 

Cleaver separated Coleman from Rodriguez and she repeated

that “she was the one who was pointing [the laser] into the

sky . . . and that it wasn’t her fault that the helicopter flew in

front of the laser.” Cleaver then arrested Coleman. At that

point, Rodriguez “told [Cleaver] that [he] needed to release

Ms. Coleman because he [Rodriguez] was the one that was

shining the laser at the helicopter.”

Cleaver put Rodriguez and Coleman in the back of his

patrol vehicle. He then heard Rodriguez tell Coleman “not to

say anything else and that if she just told the Court that she

was just shining it into the sky, that they would only give her

a ticket.” Both Rodriguez and Coleman admitted to Cleaver

that they “s[aw] the laser reflecting off the helicopter.”

Following Rodriguez’s and Coleman’s arrest, the FBI

took over the case. A few weeks later, Coleman called

Special Agent Chet Johnston – who was in charge of the

investigation – to inquire about the return of property the

police had taken the night of her arrest. She and Rodriguez

had each received a letter from the Federal Aviation

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8 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ

Authority stating that the agency had determined the couple

had not broken any rules and that the matter was closed. She

believed the FBI investigation was closed as well. Johnston

told her the FAA was a separate entity and had no bearing on

the FBI’s criminal investigation.

During the ensuing conversation, Coleman told Johnston

that on the night in question, she had pointed the laser at the

sky multiple times to try to figure out how far the beam

would reach. While she pointed it at a tree, it may have

struck a helicopter a few times. She said she had been aware

there was a police helicopter in the area that night. She also

stated that she had allowed her children to play with the laser,

instructing them not to point it into anyone’s apartment and

to only point it into the sky. She apologized to Johnston and

said it was “a stupid thing to do.” The next day, Johnston met

Coleman and Rodriguez at their home. During their

conversation, Rodriguez told Johnston that on the night in

question, “he pointed the laser at a helicopter. He was aware

he struck it approximately four times. He said that he could

see and also hear the helicopter as it flew behind a tree, which

he was aiming for.”

Ultimately, Rodriguez and Coleman were charged with

conspiracy to interfere with the safe operation of an aircraft

with reckless disregard for human life, 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(5),

(a)(8), two counts of attempting to interfere with the safe

operation of an aircraft with reckless disregard for human

life, 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(5), (a)(8), and two counts of aiming a

laser pointer at an aircraft, 18 U.S.C. § 39A. At trial,

government expert Joshua Hadler, Chief Laser SafetyOfficer

at the National Institute of Standards and Technology,

testified that federal regulations prohibit the sale of lasers

stronger than five milliwatts. Both he and defense expert

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UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ 9

Samuel Goldwasser testified that they tested the laser

Rodriguez and Coleman had used and found that it had

approximately 65 milliwatts of power. Hadler testified that

a laser with that much power could cause after-image, flash

blindness, glare, and distraction, and could cause permanent

injury to the eye up to around 180 feet. He testified that in

order to illuminate the cockpit of a helicopter, a laser beam

would have to intersect the cockpit window. He also

estimated, based on the laser’s power and the altitude of the

helicopters, that the laser beam would have had a diameter of

three feet when it hit a helicopter at Air-1’s elevation on the

night of August 25, 2012, and about eleven feet when it hit

Air George.

Both Hadler and Goldwasser testified that it would be

impossible for even an experienced laser professional to tell

the laser was so powerful merely by observing it because

“[t]he human eye does not respond very well to measurement

of optical power.” Hadler testified that about 90 percent of

green lasers purchased in the United States are not in

compliance with federal regulations because they emit a

stronger beam than is allowed. He also testified that the

general public lacks awareness of that fact. Government

expert Leon McLin, Senior Research Optometrist and Vision

Scientist at the Air Force Research Laboratory, testified it

would take someone with a steady hand to be able to use a

laser to track an aircraft 500 feet up.

Rodriguez did not testify at trial, but Coleman did. She

testified that she purchased the laser on Amazon.com for

around $7.00 as a toy for her children. She said that as a

child, she had played with lasers she bought from ice cream

trucks. She said that on the night of August 25, 2012, the

couple’s two young daughters were playing with the laser,

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10 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ

shining it on the grass, the parking lot, and into other people’s

apartments. This stopped when two neighbors came out and

asked them not to shine the laser into their homes. Coleman

put the girls to bed. When she came out of the girls’ bedroom

about five or six minutes later, she saw a helicopter spotlight

outside her apartment, and then saw Officer Cleaver arrest

Rodriguez.

Coleman claimed that she did not know the laser beam

could reach a helicopter a mile or even a quarter mile away

and did not know that pointing the laser at a helicopter could

cause unsafe conditions for pilots because it could be

dangerous to their eyes. She said she did not know it was

against the law for someone to aim a laser at a helicopter. 

She said she had not read the entire warning label, but

acknowledged that she saw it and that she knew the laser was

very bright, in part because neighbors had complained about

it. She acknowledged she told her children not to point it at

anyone’s eyes because she knew it could be dangerous. She

stated, however, that she did not know the laser was “goingto-kill-you-dangerous, because theysell [lasers]to kids on the

ice cream[] [truck, so] how dangerous can [they be]?”

At the end of the government’s case and following the

close of the defense case, Coleman and Rodriguez moved for

judgments of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 29. They argued that there was insufficient

evidence they willfully attempted to interfere with the pilots’

operation of the helicopters with reckless disregard for human

safety. The court denied the motions.

The jury found both Rodriguez and Coleman guilty of

violating § 39A for aiming a laser pointer at Air-1, and

Rodriguez, alone, guilty of violating § 32(a)(5), (a)(8), for

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UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ 11

willfully attempting to interfere with the safe operations of

Air-1 in reckless disregard for human safety. It acquitted

them on all other counts.

On March 10, 2014, the district court sentenced

Rodriguez. Because Rodriguez’s two convictions arose from

the same conduct, the court grouped them together. See

U.S.S.G. §§ 3D1.1–3D1.3. After finding the intentional

endangerment enhancement of U.S.S.G. § 2A5.2(a)(1)

applied, the court sentenced Rodriguez to 168 months on his

§ 32(a)(5), (a)(8) conviction. The court also imposed a

concurrent term of 60 months, the statutorymaximum, for the

§ 39A conviction. Thus, the total sentence was fourteen years

in prison.

Rodriguez appeals his conviction for § 32(a)(5), (a)(8),

arguing that the government failed to prove he acted with the

requisite mens rea and that we must remand for resentencing

on his § 39A conviction because that sentence resulted from

his § 32(a)(5), (a)(8) conviction and sentence.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We review the district court’s ruling on a defendant’s

motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v.

Mendoza, 244 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2001). Evidence

offered to support a conviction is sufficient if, when “viewed

in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Odom,

329 F.3d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 (1979). “[E]vidence is

insufficient to support a verdict where mere speculation,

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12 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ

rather than reasonable inference, supports the government’s

case.” United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir.

2010) (en banc). “[A] ‘reasonable’ inference is one that is

supported by a chain of logic.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d

1262, 1277 (9th Cir. 2005).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Essential Elements of § 32(a)(5), (a)(8)

Before assessing whether the government presented

sufficient evidence to allow a rational factfinder to find

Rodriguez guilty of violating § 32(a)(5), (a)(8), we must first

identify the essential elements of that statute. Section

32(a)(5) prohibits “willfully . . . interfer[ing] with or

disabl[ing], with intent to endanger the safety of any person

or with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life,

anyone engaged in the authorized operation of [an] aircraft or

any air navigation facility aiding in the navigation of an[] [ ]

aircraft.” 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(5). The aircraft must be “in the

special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States or [be] any

civil aircraft used, operated, or employed in interstate,

overseas, or foreign air commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(1). 

Section 32(a)(8) prohibits attempting to violate § 32(a)(5). 

18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(8) (penalizing those who “willfully . . .

attempt[] or conspire[] to do anything prohibited under

paragraphs (1) through (7) of this subsection”).

As the district court properly recognized in its jury

instructions, § 32(a)(5), (a)(8) requires proof that 1) the

defendant willfully attempted to interfere with or disable a

person engaged in the authorized operation of an aircraft or

any air navigation facility aiding in the navigation of an

aircraft; 2) the defendant intended to endanger the safety of

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UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ 13

a person or acted with a reckless disregard for the safety of

human life; 3) the aircraft was in the special jurisdiction of

the United States or was a civil aircraft used, operated, or

employed in interstate commerce; and 4) the defendant took

a substantial step toward committing the crime. See United

States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 720 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n

attempt conviction requires evidence that a defendant

intended to violate the statute and took a substantial step

toward completing the violation.” (internal citation and

quotation marks omitted)).

As the district court also properly recognized in its

instructions, an act is done willfully if a defendant

intentionally acted with knowledge that his or her conduct

was unlawful. See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S.

184, 191–92 (1998) (citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S.

135, 137 (1994)).

A reckless disregard for the safety of human life has both

a subjective and an objective component. First, the defendant

must be aware of the risk his conduct created (here, that the

laser had the ability to blind or distract a pilot enough to

cause a crash). United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d

1140, 1145–46 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Albers,

226 F.3d 989, 994–95 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S.

1114 (2001). As the Supreme Court recognized in Farmer v.

Brennan, “[t]he criminal law[] [ ] generally permits a finding

of recklessness only when a person disregards a risk of harm

of which he is aware.” 511 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1994).

Second, the risk must be “‘of such a nature and degree

that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s

conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard

involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that

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14 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ

a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.’”

Albers, 226 F.3d at 995 (quoting Model Penal Code

§ 2.02(2)(c) (1985)). To put it succinctly, a defendant acts

recklessly when he “deliberately disregard[s] a substantial

and unjustifiable risk . . . of which [he is] aware.” Id.

Having identified the essential elements of a § 32(a)(5),

(a)(8) conviction, we next consider whether the government

adduced sufficient evidence to allow a rational trier of fact to

conclude that Rodriguez acted with the requisite mens rea.

B. The Government’s Evidence

Rodriguez does not dispute that the government adduced

sufficient evidence that he intentionally pointed the laser at

Air-1. Indeed, he admitted as much to both Officer Cleaver

and Special Agent Johnston and he does not appeal his § 39A

conviction. He argues, however, that the government did not

adduce any evidence that would allow a rational factfinder to

conclude either that he was willfully attempting to interfere

with the pilot’s operation of Air-1 or that he acted in reckless

disregard for the safety of human life. The government

contends that the evidence that Rodriguez intentionally and

repeatedly targeted the cockpit of Air-1, with a light he knew

to be dangerously bright is sufficient to allow a rational

factfinder to find Rodriguez guilty of violating § 32(a)(5),

(a)(8). The government argues that this evidence allows for

the rational inference that Rodriguez knew the risk posed to

the aircraft by the laser and therefore the finding that

Rodriguez both acted with reckless disregard for the safety of

human life and must have intended to interfere with the

pilot’s operation of the aircraft. The main problem with the

Government’s argument is Gardenhire, which was decided

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UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ 15

on April 30, 2015, a little over a year after Rodriguez was

convicted.

Gardenhire involved a defendant’s appeal of his sentence

following his conviction for violating § 39A by intentionally

lasing a Cessna jet and a police helicopter. Section 39A

prohibits “knowingly aim[ing] the beam of a laser pointer at

an aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United

States, or at the flight path of such an aircraft[.]” 18 U.S.C.

§ 39A(a). The district court found Gardenhire’s intentional

conduct in lasing the aircraft showed he had acted recklessly. 

It applied the reckless endangerment enhancement of

U.S.S.G. § 2A5.2(a)(2) to double Gardenhire’s base offense

level. Gardenhire, 784 F.3d at 1279–80. We reversed the

sentence, holding that “the bare admission that Gardenhire

intentionally aimed the laser [at an aircraft], knowing that it

was dangerous to shine the laser in someone’s eyes, does not

support the inference . . . that [Gardenhire] was aware of the

dangers to the aircraft from doing so,” and therefore could not

prove he had the subjective knowledge required for a finding

of recklessness. Id. at 1283.

The facts the government adduced in Gardenhire are

almost identical to the facts the government presented at

Rodriguez’s trial. Gardenhire, like Rodriguez, admitted to

the FBI that he intentionally tried to hit the aircraft with his

laser beam. Id. at 1280. The government claimed

Gardenhire, like Rodriguez, knew his laser was powerful

enough to reach the aircraft. Id. Moreover, Gardenhire, like

Rodriguez, knew the laser could be dangerous if shined

directly into someone’s eyes: his friend had told him “‘not to

shine the laser at anyone’s eyes because it would blind

people.’” Id. at 1281. We held that these facts were not clear

and convincing evidence Gardenhire had acted recklessly,

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16 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ

concluding that “[t]he record is devoid of evidence . . . that

Gardenhire was aware of the risk created by his conduct.” Id.

at 1280.

First, we reasoned, Gardenhire’s admission that he

intentionally tried to hit the aircraft “does nothing to show

that Gardenhire was aware that if he hit the jet, as intended,

he could blind or distract the pilot.” Id. Next, Gardenhire’s

knowledge that the beam had hit the aircraft “at most [ ]

evidences knowledge that he could succeed in striking the jet,

not awareness of the consequences of the beam strike – the

risk that the pilot could be blinded or distracted or the aircraft

otherwise endangered.” Id. at 1281 (emphasis added).

Finally, “knowing that a laser beam can cause blindness when

pointed directly at a person’s eyes is very different than

knowing that a laser beam can be distracting to pilots who are

both enclosed in a cockpit and at least 2,640 feet away.” Id. 

This is because the fact

[t]hat one knows that the laser is dangerous

when pointed directly in a person’s eyes does

not mean that one knows about the beam’s

ability to expand and refract, rendering it

particularly hazardous for pilots in an aircraft

miles away, or that the danger is heightened at

nighttime because the pilot’s eyes have

adjusted to the dark.

Id. at 1282.

We then examined other ways the government could have

proven Gardenhire was aware of the risk created by his

conduct. We looked to United States v. Naghani, 361 F.3d

1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 2004), and United States v. Gonzalez,

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UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ 17

492 F.3d 1031, 1032 (9th Cir. 2007), in which we held the

defendants’ intentional conduct alone, which caused chaos

onboard their respective commercial flights, was sufficient to

support a finding of reckless endangerment. We

distinguished those cases, however, because Naghani’s and

Gonzalez’s conduct obviously caused a risk of danger that

was immediately apparent to them. It was therefore

appropriate to find, based on the intentionality of their

conduct and the immediate and visible effects of their

behavior, that they were aware of the risk their conduct

created. See Gardenhire, 784 F.3d at 1282 (“Naghani acted

in very different circumstances, where the average person

would be immediately aware of the consequences of his

actions.”); id. at 1283 (“Gonzalez’s actions caused total chaos

onboard, supporting the logical inference that he was

subjectively aware of the risks of his threatening and violent

conduct.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The Gardenhire court held that, in contrast to Naghani

and Gonzalez, it would be inappropriate to conclude merely

from Gardenhire’s intentional conduct that he was aware of

the risk his lasing of the aircraft created because lasers do not

operate like normal beams of light. The risk created from the

lasing was therefore not immediately apparent to Gardenhire. 

See id. at 1283. As we explained,

“the farther away [a laser beam] gets from the

point of origin, the beam spreads out,” thus

increasing its hazardousness, a notion that is

counterintuitive, especially when one

considers that an ordinary light beam would

grow fainter. Additionally, the laser pointer is

particularly hazardous to an aircraft when the

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18 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ

beam is refracted off the cockpit glass, which

intensifies the light even more[.]

Id. at 1281 (quoting pilot’s testimony).

Because laser beams do not operate like regular beams of

light, we held, it would be inappropriate to conclude that

Gardenhire must have been aware of the risk created by

shining a laser at an aircraft absent a showing that similarly

situated defendants, or even average people, understand how

laser beams operate. Id. at 1283. We noted that, as in the

present case, the government had not “submit[ted] any

evidence of what even an average person would know about

the effects of aiming a laser beam at an aircraft.” Id. at 1281. 

For all of these reasons, we concluded, the government failed

to show Gardenhire acted recklessly. Rather, in applying the

reckless endangerment enhancement, “the district court [ ]

made the unsupported leap from deliberate and intentional

action to consciousness of risk.” Id.

Although Gardenhire is a sentencing case, its reasoning

controls the outcome of Rodriguez’s appeal because the facts

are almost identical and a finding of recklessness for purposes

of the § 2A5.2(a)(2) enhancement, like a finding of

recklessness for purposes of § 32(a)(5), requires proof that the

defendant is “aware of the risk created by his conduct.”1Id.

at 1283. Moreover, as noted, Gardenhire did not simply find

the evidence insufficient to prove the enhancement applied by

clear and convincing evidence. Rather, it held that the record

1 We recognize that Gardenhire may be in tension with the First

Circuit’s decision in United States v. Sasso, 695 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir.

2012), but we are, of course, obliged to follow our own precedents.

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UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ 19

was altogether “devoid of evidence.” Id. at 1280 (emphasis

added).

As in Gardenhire, the fact that Rodriguez intentionally

shined the laser at the helicopter, although enough for a

§ 39A charge, is not, in and of itself, sufficient to allow a

rational factfinder to conclude that Rodriguez acted with

reckless disregard for the safety of human life. Also as in

Gardenhire, the government adduced no evidence in

Rodriguez’s trial showing that the risks posed by lasers are

matters of common knowledge. Indeed, as the government’s

own expert, Joshua Hadler, testified, it is impossible for even

an experienced laser professional to tell a laser’s power

merely by observing it. Hadler also testified that the general

public is unaware that 90 percent of green lasers imported

into the United States are stronger than allowed by federal

regulations. For this reason, Rodriguez’s conduct cannot

accurately be compared to that of someone who shines a

bright spotlight through the windshield of passing cars: the

effect of bright lights on automobile drivers at night is a

matter of common knowledge.

As the government points out, Rodriguez’s running from

the police when they arrived at his apartment complex, hiding

the laser in his pocket, and telling Coleman to say she was

only flashing the laser at the sky evidences a consciousness

of guilt. That’s true: he was guilty of the crime of aiming a

laser at an aircraft and had every right to have a guilty

conscience. But his evasive conduct sheds no light, so to

speak, on whether he was trying to willfully interfere with the

safe operation of the aircraft with a reckless disregard for the

safety of human life, as opposed to less serious illegal

conduct.

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20 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ

C. Conclusion

Congress created § 39A in 2011 precisely because it

recognized that many people who point lasers at aircraft do

not do so with the mens rea required for a § 32(a)(5)

conviction. A House Report on the Securing Aircraft

Cockpits Against Lasers Act of 2011, the act that created

§ 39A, stated that

[s]ome perpetrators [of lasing aircraft] have

been charged under 18 U.S.C. § 32, relating to

the destruction of aircraft. However, this

provision requires the government to prove

willful interference and intent to endanger the

pilots. While this burden may be easily

established when a person attempts to

detonate a bomb onboard an aircraft or

attempts to overtake a member of the flight

crew, it is difficult to establish this same type

of intent for a laser incident, even if the effect

is actually to endanger the pilots. This bill

recognizes the obvious and inherent danger of

aiming a laser at an aircraft under any

circumstance, as long as the offender

knowingly aims the laser at the aircraft. The

penalty under section 32, 20 years, coupled

with having to prove specific intent to

interfere with, disable, or endanger the pilots,

seems to be a factor in multiple declinations

of prosecution under the current statute.

H.R. Rep. No. 112-11, at 2 (2011) (emphasis added).

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UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ 21

As is clear from this report, Congress created § 39A to

cover situations in which an individual’s conduct causes

unsafe flying conditions for pilots but prosecutors cannot

prove whether that person was intentionally trying to take the

aircraft down or whether they even understood the dangers

lasers pose to aircraft. Rodriguez’s case presents a perfect

example of such a situation. His conduct was dangerous and

cannot be condoned. He deserves a § 39A conviction and a

sentence that reflects the seriousness of his crime. However,

his conviction for violating § 32(a)(5), (a)(8) must be vacated. 

We therefore remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal and

we vacate his fourteen-year sentence. In light of Gardenhire,

and because Rodriguez’s statutory-maximum sentence for his

§ 39A conviction was a result of the court’s calculation of his

base offense level for § 32(a)(5), (a)(8), a conviction which

we have now reversed, we also remand for resentencing on

his § 39A conviction.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.2

2 Rodriguez waived his argument that we should remand his case to a

different district court judge by raising it for the first time in his reply

brief.

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