Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-05740/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-05740-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eden Medical Center
Defendant
Ophelia Lee
Plaintiff
San Leandro Hospital Campus
Defendant
Sutter Health
Defendant
Sutter Health Affiliate
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OPHELIA LEE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

EDEN MEDICAL CENTER, SAN LEANDRO

HOSPITAL CAMPUS, SUTTER HEALTH

AFFILIATE and DOES 1 TO 20,

Defendant. /

No. C 08-5740 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This case arises from the termination of Plaintiff’s

employment with Defendant Eden Medical Center (EMC). EMC moves for

summary judgment on all the claims in Plaintiff Ophelia Lee’s First

Amended Complaint (FAC). Plaintiff opposes the motion. The matter

was taken under submission on the papers. Having considered all

the papers filed by the parties, the Court grants the motion for

summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

EMC is a 302-bed, not-for-profit hospital. Plaintiff is of

Chinese descent. In August, 2004, EMC hired Plaintiff as a per

diem Registered Nurse. Two months later, Plaintiff began working

for EMC as a regular, full-time nurse. Plaintiff’s employment with

EMC was governed by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement

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Plaintiff fails to submit admissible evidence to support her

allegations about discrimination and harassment. However, even if

Plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, her claims fail. 

Therefore, for the purposes of this motion, Plaintiff’s allegations

are considered as evidence.

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(CBA) between EMC and the California Nurses Association.

In July, 2006, Plaintiff was transferred to EMC’s

medical/surgical (M/S) unit, an acute care facility. Before her

transfer to the M/S unit, Plaintiff received good work evaluations

and was praised by patients’ families and colleagues. According to

Plaintiff,1

 on the M/S unit, she was ill-treated by charge nurse

Milagros Reynosa and other staff, who were of Filipino descent. 

The staff called Plaintiff “garbage,” and when Plaintiff asked

Reynosa for help, she called Plaintiff “stupid Chinese.” Reynosa

frequently changed Plaintiff’s patient assignments during her

eight-hour shift, taking away from Plaintiff the patients she had

treated and assigning different patients. Sometimes Reynosa

changed Plaintiff’s assignments five times in a day, but she did

not change the assignments of Filipino nurses. This increased

Plaintiff’s work load and increased the risk that Plaintiff would

make medical errors. Plaintiff complained about this harassment to

her direct supervisor, floor manager Rose Del Rosaria, who did not

act on Plaintiff’s complaints. 

On October 17, 2006, Plaintiff was placed on a performance

improvement plan due to two occurrences of improper medication

administration, Plaintiff’s difficulty in completing documentation

in a timely manner, and doctors’ complaints that it was difficult

to understand Plaintiff. The plan required Plaintiff to attend a

class to improve her English language skills. On December 7, 2006

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and on March 8, 2007, the plan was extended. 

On March 10, 2007, Plaintiff told Human Resource Director

Phyllis Weiss about the racial discrimination Plaintiff felt she

was experiencing on the M/S unit. According to Ms. Weiss,

Plaintiff complained that Ms. Del Rosaria referred her to an

English improvement class, extended her performance plan, treated

her disrespectfully by taking a call during their meeting, and

never complimented her although she complimented other employees. 

Later in March, 2007, Plaintiff complained to Ms. Weiss that Ms.

Del Rosaria was discriminating against her by changing her patient

assignments several times during one shift. Ms. Weiss investigated

this charge and found that the number of changes were not unusual

for an acute care unit which has multiple patients admitted and

released throughout the day and that Plaintiff’s patient

assignments had not been changed more than other nurses’

assignments.

On April 13, 2007, Plaintiff gave Ms. Weiss a letter stating

that Filipino nurses were discriminating against her on the basis

of her race by yelling for her instead of using the pager, by

making false calls for her, by calling her “garbage,” and by

laughing at her and humiliating her at the nursing station. In the

letter, Plaintiff also complained about the patient re-assignments

and stated that the nurses wanted to have other non-Filipino staff

fired. 

Also, on April 13, 2007, Plaintiff informed Veronica Bayduza,

EMC Administrator, that she had seen an individual named Tony Chen

stalking her. According to Plaintiff, Mr. Chen had worked with her

at a previous place of employment, he had been stalking and

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harassing her for years, she had reported this to the police and

she had a judicial restraining order against him. Plaintiff told

Ms. Bayduza that she thought Mr. Chen also was following Dr.

Jeffrey Silvers, a physician at EMC, because she had seen Dr.

Silvers in the traffic ahead of Mr. Chen. Both were riding

motorcycles. Plaintiff said she was concerned that Mr. Chen would

come to EMC to harass her or Dr. Silvers. Plaintiff gave Ms.

Bayduza copies of requests for restraining orders that Plaintiff

had filed against Mr. Chen. Plaintiff said she was not able to

serve these papers on Mr. Chen because she did not know his

address. 

Ms. Bayduza informed Ms. Weiss of Plaintiff’s statements and 

Ms. Weiss requested that Plaintiff meet with her. Plaintiff

repeated the same statements to Ms. Weiss. She added that Mr. Chen

had been stalking her for over nine years, even when she was on

vacation in Australia. Plaintiff repeated her concern that Mr.

Chen was now stalking Dr. Silvers and added that Dr. Silvers had

not been able to eat or leave his office for a week and had

cancelled a date with Plaintiff to go shopping in Oakland because

of his fear of Mr. Chen. She also said that Mr. Chen had prevented

Dr. Silvers from filing for a divorce. Plaintiff added that she

had been stalked by another man named Keeney Tawn. Plaintiff

provided Ms. Weiss with copies of documents she had written about

Mr. Chen and Mr. Tawn. Weiss Dec., Ex. D, Plaintiff’s request for

restraining order against Mr. Tawn, Ex. E, Plaintiff’s request for

restraining order against Mr. Chen, Ex. F, Plaintiff’s letter to

police regarding Mr. Chen stalking Dr. Silvers.

Upon investigation, Ms. Weiss found that Dr. Silvers was on

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vacation, knew nothing about Mr. Chen, never rode a motorcycle, was

married with no intention of filing for divorce and had not had any

communication with Plaintiff outside of work. 

As a result of her conversation with Plaintiff, Ms. Weiss

became concerned about Plaintiff’s mental fitness to work as a

nurse and asked Plaintiff to visit the EMC Occupational Health

Clinic for evaluation. Ms. Weiss placed Plaintiff on paid leave

pending additional information. Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr.

Scott Petersen of the EMC Occupational Health Clinic who found that

she was not fit for duty and referred her for a psychiatric

evaluation. Weiss Dec., Ex. C. 

On April 16, 2007, Dr. Chao Ho, Plaintiff’s primary care

physician, wrote a note stating that Plaintiff’s “physical and

mental health condition is normal, and she is eligible to work as

she is entitled to.” Weiss Dec., Ex. H. (In a declaration dated

July 31, 2009, Dr. Ho states that he is not trained or licensed as

a psychologist or mental health care provider, he did not perform

any psychological testing on Plaintiff, and his letter was based on

his general observation of Plaintiff.)

On April 16, 2007, Plaintiff gave Dr. Ho’s note to Ms. Weiss. 

Ms. Weiss informed Plaintiff that she must have a psychiatric

evaluation before she could return to work and Plaintiff agreed. 

On that same day, Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Boris Zhalkovsky,

a psychiatrist, and Dr. James Chessing, a consulting psychologist. 

In his report, Dr. Zhalkovsky stated that Plaintiff expressed

“strong delusional ideas and was under the very strong impression

that constantly she was followed and approached by a stranger. 

. . . According to the patient, this problem bothered her for a

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number of the past years; however, at the present time, this

problem became much worse . . .” Dr. Zhalkovsky noted that,

although Plaintiff denied any problems, her belief that she was

constantly being followed was very significant, to the extent that

she tried to obtain a restraining order to protect herself. Dr.

Zhalkovsky’s impression of Plaintiff was that she had a psychotic

disorder, manifested by strong paranoid delusions. He recommended

treatment with anti-psychotic medications. However, Plaintiff

refused treatment. Dr. Zhalkovsky opined that “it will be very

difficult for Miss Lee to work as a registered nurse if sufficient

treatment is not provided.” Weiss Dec., Ex. H.

 On a referral from Dr. Ho, Plaintiff saw psychiatrist Dr. Ian

Webber to determine whether she showed any evidence of a

psychiatric disorder. In his April 20, 2007 report, Dr. Webber

wrote, “From this psychiatric assessment there is no basis for

believing that Ophelia Lee has a substantive psychiatric disorder.” 

Plaintiff’s Ex. L. (At his deposition, Dr. Webber testified that

his conclusion was based on a one-hour meeting with Plaintiff, that

he was not asked to determine if she was fit for duty and would

need information from her employer to make such a determination. 

Webber Depo. at 9, 11, 13, 16-17, 26, and 50. Dr. Webber testified

that, when he wrote the report, he did not know about Plaintiff’s

stalking claims, and such information would have raised concerns. 

Webber Depo. at 41-42.)

On April 23, 2007, Plaintiff and Ms. Weiss met with a union

representative. They agreed that Plaintiff would be reevaluated by

a mental health care professional recommended by Dr. Ho and that

EMC would be permitted to share information with this doctor. Dr.

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Ho referred Plaintiff to Dr. Stuart Pickel, a psychiatrist. 

Plaintiff met with Dr. Pickel, but he withdrew because he felt

threatened by Plaintiff. Weiss Dec. ¶ 27. 

Thereafter, the parties agreed that Plaintiff would be

evaluated by Dr. Joshua Kirz, a psychologist. In his August 6,

2007 report, Dr. Kirz observed that Plaintiff, when not talking

about Mr. Chen or Mr. Tawn, was clear and coherent with little

evidence of psychiatric interference. He observed that Plaintiff’s

mood and affect were slightly agitated when she discussed Mr. Chen

or Mr. Tawn, but otherwise was within normal limits. Dr. Kirz

found that “Ms. Lee’s level of insight and judgment appeared

grossly intact as far as day-to-day life, but clearly impaired

regarding issues relating to Chen, Tawn, and some of her physician

colleagues. . . . She appears to have no insight that her beliefs

about these individuals may be inaccurate, despite being confronted

with factual information to the contrary.” Dr. Kirz’s diagnosis

was delusional disorder, persecutory type. Dr. Kirz concluded

that, because Plaintiff refused psychiatric treatment, her symptoms

were likely to wax and wane and “her psychiatric condition will

predictably continue to cause impairment at work. Further, her job

duties entail tasks critical to patient safety. For all of the

above reasons, she is not psychiatrically fit for duty.” Weiss

Dec., Ex. O. 

On September 13, 2007, Ms. Weiss sent Plaintiff a letter

informing her that Dr. Kirz had determined she was not fit for

duty, and that she would be placed on medical leave of absence

through December, 2007. Ms. Weiss also informed Plaintiff that she

could return to work if she was deemed fit for duty by Dr. Kirtz or

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a mutually agreed upon psychiatrist. 

On November 9, 2007, Plaintiff, without the agreement of EMC,

was evaluated by Dr. William Spivey, a psychologist. Dr. Spivey

noted that Plaintiff’s complaints of harassment on the job could be

true, as could her complaints about being stalked by a man. He

concluded that Plaintiff “has not demonstrated substantial evidence

that she suffers from a major psychiatric disorder.” Weiss Dec.,

Ex. Q. (At his deposition, Dr. Spivey testified that he did not

have sufficient information to make an evaluation of Plaintiff's

fitness for duty. Spivey Depo. at 9, 11.)

After giving Dr. Spivey’s report to Ms. Weiss, Plaintiff did

not communicate with Ms. Weiss or return Ms. Weiss’ telephone

calls. On January 10, 2008, Ms. Weiss sent Plaintiff a letter

stating that EMC would terminate her employment unless it received,

by January 18, 2008, a medical clearance for her to return to work,

or a request for an extension of her medical leave. Weiss Dec.,

Ex. R. Plaintiff did not respond to this letter. On January 18,

2008, EMC terminated Plaintiff’s employment. 

In her FAC, Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action:

(1) breach of implied contract of continued employment; (2) breach

of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) intentional

infliction of emotional distress; (4) wrongful termination in

violation of public policy; (5) breach of implied covenant not to

terminate except for good cause; (6) defamation; (7) violation of

California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov’t

Code §§ 12940(a), (b) and (j) for discrimination and harassment

based upon race and retaliation for complaining about the

discrimination and harassment; and (8) violation of FEHA, Cal.

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Gov’t Code § 12940(k) for failure to investigate and prevent

discrimination.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Defendant objects to some of the statements in Plaintiff’s

opposition, to many of the exhibits submitted with her opposition

and to the declaration of John Chow, submitted after Defendant

filed its reply. The Court has reviewed these evidentiary

objections and overrules them as moot. As discussed below, even

considering Plaintiff’s allegations as admissible evidence, her

claims fail..

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party’s evidence, if it is supported by affidavits or

other evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg,

815 F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

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are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods: 

The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element of its claim or defense to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d

1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000).

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an

absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

evidence negating the non-moving party’s claim. Id.; see also

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party’s case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

produce “specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists.” Bhan, 929

F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

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F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific

evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. LMRA Preemption

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s first, second and fifth

causes of action, which arise from an implied employment contract

between Plaintiff and EMC, and her third cause of action for

intentional infliction of emotional distress, are preempted by 

§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 

§ 185. Plaintiff does not address this argument in her opposition. 

Where there is a collective bargaining agreement between an

employer and a union, state law claims requiring interpretation of

the terms of that agreement are preempted by the exclusive federal

jurisdiction of the LMRA. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S.

202, 213 (1985); Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d

683, 689-90 (9th Cir. 2001). That a plaintiff has not framed his

or her complaint so that it explicitly refers to a collective

bargaining agreement will not defeat federal preemption. 

International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859

n.3 (1987); Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 237 (9th

Cir. 1990). Rather, if a plaintiff's claims are founded on rights

created by a collective bargaining agreement or are "'substantially

dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement'" and

can only be resolved by referring to the terms of a collective

bargaining agreement, they are preempted. Caterpillar Inc. v.

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987); Cook, 911 F.2d at 237. Even

state tort claims may be preempted by § 301, if the alleged torts

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arise from rights and duties created by a collective bargaining

agreement. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 211. However, tort claims

are not preempted when they allege a breach of duties and rights

existing independently of a collective bargaining agreement and the

factual inquiry necessary to resolve the claims does not "turn on

the meaning of any provision of a collective-bargaining agreement." 

Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407 (1988).

A. Contract Claims

Plaintiff’s contract claims allege an implied contract, based

on Defendant’s oral representations, actions and conduct, that

Plaintiff would be employed for an indefinite period, to continue

as long as she performed her job satisfactorily. Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant breached this implied contract by terminating her

without good cause and by forcing her to undergo invasive medical

examinations in retaliation for her attempts to report Defendant’s

illegal activity. 

Section 21 of the CBA provides that EMC shall not have the

right to discharge or discipline a covered employee except for just

cause and defines a grievance as any dispute over the

interpretation or application of the CBA, or any discharge or

suspension of an employee. Section 22 of the CBA provides an

employee grievance procedure. The issues raised in Plaintiff’s

contract claims concerning whether there has been a breach of

Plaintiff’s employment agreement or any implied covenants arise

under the just cause provision of the CBA and are subject to its

grievance and arbitration provisions. Because Plaintiff’s contract

claims require interpretation of provisions of the CBA, they are

preempted by the LMRA. Judgment will be granted in favor of

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Defendant on these claims.

B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)

Preemption of IIED claims by the LMRA depends upon whether the

CBA governs the offending behavior. Cook, 911 F.2d at 239-40. 

When the CBA governs the behavior, and the underlying claims are

preempted, the IIED claims relying upon them are also preempted. 

Id. In contrast, when the underlying claims are not preempted,

neither are the claims for IIED. Id.; Tellez v. Pac. Gas and Elec.

Co., Inc., 817 F.2d 536, 538-39 (9th Cir. 1987).

Plaintiff’s IIED claim is based upon EMC’s alleged breach of

her implied employment contract, ordering her to undergo counseling

without good cause and ignoring her pleas to end her co-workers’

discriminatory and harassing conduct. 

To the extent that the IIED claim is based upon the breach of

the employment contract or EMC’s requirement that Plaintiff undergo

psychiatric testing, it would also require interpretation of

Section 21 of the CBA, providing that EMC cannot discharge or

assess disciplinary action except for just cause. Therefore, this

part of the IIED claim is preempted by the LMRA.

State claims based upon discrimination are not preempted by

the LMRA. Detabali v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 482 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th

Cir. 2007). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff’s IIED claim rests

on discrimination, it is not preempted. However, this claim fails

for another reason.

The elements of a cause of action for IIED are (1) extreme and

outrageous conduct; (2) intended to cause or done in reckless

disregard for causing; (3) severe emotional distress; and

(4) actual and proximate causation. Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co.,

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Inc., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 593 (1979). The conduct must be so extreme

as to “exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized

community,” id., and the distress so severe “that no reasonable

[person] in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.” 

Fletcher v. Western Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 397

(1970).

As discussed below, Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence

of harassment, discrimination or retaliation sufficient to support

her claims under FEHA. Although Plaintiff has alleged conduct that

is inappropriate, she has not described outrageous conduct beyond

all bounds of what is accepted in a civilized society. Thus,

summary judgment on this claim will be granted in favor of

Defendant.

II. Defamation Claim

Plaintiff’s defamation claim alleges that Defendant made

statements to EMC staff and neighboring hospitals that she was

mentally unbalanced and unfit to be a nurse and, as a result of

these statements, Plaintiff’s reputation for honesty, integrity,

virtue and sanity was adversely affected so that it was impossible

for her to obtain subsequent employment. Plaintiff fails to submit

any evidence to support her allegations. At her deposition,

Plaintiff admitted that she did not know who made the alleged

defamatory statements. Ms. Weiss declares that she has discussed

the circumstances of Plaintiff’s leave of absence and termination

only with the evaluating physicians and their assistants, the

California Board of Registered Nurses and EMC management personnel

and counsel. 

Defendant argues that any communication Ms. Weiss made about

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Plaintiff’s mental health was privileged and, in the alternative,

that the statements are not actionable because they are true. In

her opposition, Plaintiff does not address whether the

communications were privileged, but argues that EMC’s statements

were false and were motivated by racial discrimination. 

Defamation consists of either libel or slander. Cal. Civ.

Code § 44. 

Slander is a false and unprivileged publication, orally

uttered, . . . which . . . tends directly to injure [a

person] in respect to his office, profession, trade or

business, . . . by imputing to him general

disqualifications in those respects which the office or

other occupation peculiarly requires . . . 

Cal. Civ. Code § 46. Libel is “a false and unprivileged

publication by writing [or] printing . . . which exposes any person

to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to

be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his

occupation.” Cal. Civ. Code § 45.

A defamatory statement is subject to a conditional privilege

if made 

[i]n a communication, without malice, to a person

interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or

(2) by one who stands in such relation to the person

interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing

the motive for the communication to be innocent, or 

(3) who is requested by the person interested to give the

information.

Cal. Civ. Code § 47(c). “Interested persons,” as defined by the

statute, are “a communicator and a recipient with a common

interest, although to be protected the communication must be one

‘reasonably calculated to further that interest.’” Cuenca v.

Safeway San Francisco Employees Fed. Credit Union, 180 Cal. App. 3d

985, 995 (1986). The privilege applies to job references requested

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by other employers, Neal v. Gatlin, 35 Cal. App. 3d 871, 87 (1973),

and to employers’ statements to its employees regarding the reason

for the termination of another employee, King v. United Parcel

Serv., Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 426, 440 (2007). The conditional

privilege is defeated by a showing of malice. Sanborn v. Chronicle

Publishing Co., 18 Cal. 3d 406, 413 (1976).

Ms. Weiss admittedly made statements about Plaintiff’s mental

health to EMC’s management and counsel and to the Board of

Registered Nurses. Because these parties are interested persons as

defined by the statute, Ms. Weiss’ statements were privileged and

are not actionable. Plaintiff asserts that other employers knew of

Defendant’s view of her mental health because she could not obtain

subsequent employment as a nurse. Even if this were true, it would

not defeat Ms. Weiss’ privilege to respond to requests for

references from prospective new employers. 

Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s statements about her

mental health were motivated by racial animus also fails. 

Plaintiff does not allege that Ms. Weiss harbored racial animus

against her. She alleges only that the Filipino staff on the M/S

unit harbored such racial animus. She does not present evidence,

or even argue, that the Filipino staff made the defamatory

statements. Therefore, there is no evidence that Defendant or any

of its employees made any statement about her mental health in an

effort to discriminate against her based on her race or national

origin. 

Because Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue of material

fact on her defamation claim, summary judgment on this claim will

be granted to Defendant.

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III. FEHA Claims

In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973),

and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248

(1981), the Supreme Court established a burden-shifting framework

for evaluating the sufficiency of plaintiffs' evidence in

employment discrimination suits. The same burden-shifting

framework is used when analyzing claims under FEHA. Guz v. Bechtel

Nat'l Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 354 (2000); Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace

and Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996). Within this framework,

plaintiffs may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by

reference to circumstantial evidence; to do so, plaintiffs must

show that they are members of a protected class; that they were

qualified for the position they held or sought; that they were

subjected to an adverse employment decision; and that they were

replaced by someone who was not a member of the protected class or

that the circumstances of the decision otherwise raised an

inference of discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (citing McDonnell Douglas and Burdine). Once

plaintiffs establish a prima facie case, a presumption of

discriminatory intent arises. Id. To overcome this presumption,

defendants must come forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for the employment decision. Id. at 506-07. If defendants

provide that explanation, the presumption disappears and plaintiffs

must satisfy their ultimate burden of persuasion that defendants

acted with discriminatory intent. Id. at 510-11. 

 In order to do so, plaintiffs must produce "specific,

substantial evidence of pretext." Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703

F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1983). To survive summary judgment,

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plaintiffs must introduce evidence sufficient to raise a genuine

issue of material fact as to whether the reason the employer

articulated is a pretext for discrimination. Id. "[I]n those

cases where the prima facie case consists of no more than the

minimum necessary to create a presumption of discrimination under

McDonnell Douglas, plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of

fact." Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir.

1994). 

A. Discrimination

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff fails to establish a

prima facie case of discrimination because she was not performing

competently on her job. However, Plaintiff provides sufficient

evidence of her competence to raise a disputed issue of fact. 

Defendant concedes that placing Plaintiff on administrative leave

and eventually terminating her were adverse employment actions. 

Plaintiff is in a protected class. Although Plaintiff has not

provided evidence that she was replaced by someone not in the

protected class, or other circumstances raising an inference of

discrimination, for this motion, the Court will assume an inference

of discrimination has been raised and Plaintiff has stated a prima

facie case of racial discrimination.

Defendant has established that it had a legitimate business

reason for placing Plaintiff on medical leave by submitting

psychological evaluations of her unfitness for duty based upon her

discredited claims, such as that she was being stalked by two men,

and that Dr. Silver was also being stalked by one of these men and

lived in fear of the stalker. Defendant also has established a

legitimate business reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment

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for failing to fulfill its legitimate requirement to obtain medical

clearance to return to work from an agreed-upon mental health

professional or to request an extension of her medical leave. 

Therefore, to survive summary judgment on her FEHA claim,

Plaintiff must submit specific, substantial evidence of pretext. 

She has failed to do so. 

Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Weiss lied to the evaluating

doctors about Plaintiff’s claims about the stalking of herself and

Dr. Silver. However, documents in Plaintiff’s handwriting

establish that she made such claims. See Weiss Dec., Exs. D, E,

and F. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant had decided to

terminate her employment on April 13, 2007, before receiving any

reports about her fitness for duty. However, she fails to submit

evidence in support of this contention. Plaintiff also argues that

pretext is shown by Defendant’s refusal to allow her to return to

work based on the positive reports she received from Drs. Ho,

Webber and Spivey. However, Defendant made clear to Plaintiff that

she must obtain a fitness-for-duty report from a mutually agreedupon mental health professional who was in possession of the facts. 

Therefore, this argument does not establish pretext.

Plaintiff has also failed to substantiate her claim that Ms.

Weiss instructed doctors to find Plaintiff mentally ill out of

racial animus or in retaliation for her April 13, 2007 letter. 

Although Ms. Weiss did describe Plaintiff’s behavior to the doctors

conducting Plaintiff's fitness-for-duty evaluation, the doctors

stated that input from the employer is necessary to perform a

reliable fitness-for-duty evaluation.

Because Plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of

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material fact that Defendant’s reason for terminating her

employment was pretextual, her discrimination claim under FEHA

fails. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this claim will

be granted.

B. Harassment and Failure to Investigate

California courts also apply federal decisions interpreting

Title VII to analyze FEHA racial harassment claims. Etter v.

Veriflo, 67 Cal. App. 4th 457, 464 (1999). A plaintiff may prove

racial harassment by demonstrating that an employer has created a

hostile or abusive work environment. Meritor Savings Bank v.

Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986). To prevail on a hostile

workplace claim premised on race, a plaintiff must show: (1) that

he or she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a racial

nature; (2) that the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) that the

conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of the plaintiff's employment and create an abusive work

environment. Vasquez v. County of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th

Cir. 2003). A plaintiff must show that the work environment was

abusive from both a subjective and an objective point of view. 

Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Whether the workplace is objectively hostile must be determined

from the perspective of a reasonable person with the same

fundamental characteristics as the plaintiff. Id. Although the

“mere utterance of an . . . epithet which engenders offensive

feelings in an employee” does not alter the employee’s terms and

conditions of employment sufficiently to create a hostile work

environment, “when the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory

intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’” such an environment exists. 

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Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67. Neither “simple teasing,” “offhand

comments,” nor “isolated incidents” alone constitute a hostile work

environment. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788

(1998). Further, “even if a hostile working environment exists, an

employer is only liable for failing to remedy harassment of which

it knows or should know.” Fuller, 47 F.3d at 1527. 

Plaintiff fails to provide evidence of conduct constituting

racial harassment sufficient to create a hostile work environment. 

She alleges stray remarks and offhand comments which do not rise to

the level of a hostile work environment. Furthermore, as soon as

Plaintiff informed Ms. Weiss of her view that the number of her

patient changes per shift was based on racial animus, Ms. Weiss

investigated and found that Plaintiff’s reassignments were typical. 

Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of

material fact on her claim of harassment based upon race. Summary

judgment will be granted in favor of Defendant on this claim. 

Furthermore, because Plaintiff has not supported her FEHA

claims of discrimination or harassment, her claim of Defendant's

failure to prevent discrimination and harassment fails as well. 

Summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendant on this

claim.

C. Retaliation

In order to establish a prima facie claim of retaliation under

FEHA, plaintiffs must prove that they engaged in protected

activity, their employer subjected them to adverse employment

action, and there was a causal link between the protected activity

and the employer's action. Iwekaogwu v. City of Los Angeles, 75

Cal. Appellant. 4th 803, 814 (1999). A causal link requires direct

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evidence of causation or a showing that the defendant knew of the

protected activity and that the temporal proximity between the 

protected activity and the adverse action was "very close." Clark

County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) (per

curiam); Maurey v. Univ. of Southern Cal., 87 F. Supp. 2d 1021,

1033 (C.D. Cal. 1999). Once plaintiffs establish a prima facie

case of retaliation, defendants have the burden of showing a

legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action. Scotch

v. Art Institute of California, 173 Cal. App. 4th 986, 1021 (2009). 

If defendants meet this burden, plaintiffs must then provide

evidence that the reason was pretextual. Id.

Plaintiff has established the first two requirements for a

retaliation claim. The letter she gave to Ms. Weiss complaining of

the allegedly discriminatory or harassing conduct of M/S unit staff

was a protected activity. Her placement on medical leave and

subsequent termination from employment are adverse employment

actions. However, Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence of a

causal link between the letter and Defendant's actions. 

Plaintiff gave the letter to Ms. Weiss on April 13, 2007. On

the same day, Plaintiff informed Ms. Weiss of her claims, including

that she and Dr. Silver were being stalked, that he was afraid of

the stalker and that she had been stalked by two men for over nine

years. This intervening event negates any inference that

Plaintiff's complaint caused the subsequent adverse action. Ms.

Weiss' request that Plaintiff be evaluated by a mental health

professional to determine whether she was fit for duty as a nurse

was reasonable given Plaintiff's claims. After a doctor in EMC's

Occupational Health Clinic evaluated Plaintiff, concluded she was

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not fit for duty, and referred her for a psychiatric evaluation, it

was reasonable for Ms. Weiss to place her on medical leave and

insist that she obtain a psychiatric evaluation before being

permitted to return to work. That the doctors that Plaintiff

consulted on her own disagreed with the evaluations of Drs.

Petersen, Zhalkovksy, Kirz is not evidence that Ms. Weiss'

insistence on Plaintiff's clearance for work by a mutually agreedupon mental health professional was unwarranted. The unrebutted

evidence shows that Defendant's termination of Plaintiff's

employment was based upon her failure to comply with Ms. Weiss'

request. 

Because Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case

of retaliation, summary judgment on this claim will be granted in

favor of Defendant. 

IV. Termination in Violation of Public Policy 

Under California law, the termination of an employee is

tortious when it violates a fundamental public policy. Tameny v.

Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 176 (1980); Gantt v. Sentry

Ins., 1 Cal. 4th 1083, 1090 (1992). A plaintiff must show that the

public policy is delineated in a constitutional or statutory

provision, or in administrative regulations that serve a statutory

objective. Green v. Ralee Engineering Co., 19 Cal. 4th 66, 79-80

(1998). The policy must inure to the benefit of the public rather

than merely serving the interests of the individual. Esberg v.

Union Oil Co., 28 Cal. 4th, 262, 272-73 (2002).

In her FAC, Plaintiff alleges that her wrongful termination

claim is predicated upon the policy expressed in California

Government Code §§ 8547-8547.12, the California Whistleblower

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Protection Act, in that Defendant retaliated against her for

bringing discriminatory practices to light. The Whistleblower

Protection Act protects state employees who report improper

governmental activity from retaliation. Cal. Gov't Code § 8547.2;

State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Sup. Ct., 45 Cal. 4th 963,

967 (2009). Plaintiff was not a state employee and, as indicated

above, she has failed to provide evidence that Defendant took any

action in retaliation for her April 13, 2007 letter. Absent any

retaliation by Defendant, any claim for wrongful termination based

on whistle blowing fails. See Esberg, 28 Cal. 4th at 273 (failure

to establish a statutory or constitutional violation precludes a

tortious discharge claim). Summary judgment will be granted in

favor of Defendant on the claim for wrongful termination in

violation of public policy.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is granted. Judgment shall enter in favor of Defendant. 

Each party shall each bear its own costs of action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 4, 2010 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OPHELIA LEE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

EDEN MEDICAL CENTER et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV08-05740 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on February 4, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Ophelia Lee

11 Belden Place, #506

San Francisco, CA 94104

Dated: February 4, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Ronnie Hersler, Deputy Clerk

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