Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02087/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02087-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Hodges
Petitioner
David Runnels
Respondent

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD HODGES,

Petitioner, No. CIV-S-04-2087 MCE KJM P 

vs.

DAVID RUNNELS, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a California prisoner proceeding with an application for writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges convictions for forcible lewd acts

committed upon a child entered in the Superior Court of Solano County. Petitioner’s convictions

were entered following petitioner’s pleas of guilty. Petitioner is serving a sentence of 24 years’

imprisonment.

I. Standard For Habeas Corpus Relief

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal habeas corpus relief also is not available for any

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 In Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 1

held in a § 2254 action that “any independent opinions we offer on the merits of constitutional

claims will have no determinative effect in the case before us . . . At best, it is constitutional

dicta.” However, to the extent Bell stands for the proposition that a § 2254 petitioner may obtain

relief simply by showing that § 2254(d) does not preclude his claim, this court disagrees. Title

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) still requires that a habeas petitioner show that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution before he or she may obtain habeas relief. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71;

Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 773-75. 

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claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the

claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (referenced herein in as “§ 2254(d)” or “AEDPA”). See Ramirez v. Castro,

365 F.3d 755, 773-75 (9th Cir. 2004) (Ninth Circuit affirmed lower court’s grant of habeas relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after determining that petitioner was in custody in violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights and that § 2254(d) does not preclude relief); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003) (Supreme Court found relief precluded under § 2254(d) and therefore did

not address the merits of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim). Courts are not required to 1

address the merits of a particular claim, but may simply deny a habeas application on the ground

that relief is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (overruling Van Tran v.

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2000) in which the Ninth Circuit required district

courts to review state court decisions for error before determining whether relief is precluded by

§ 2254(d)). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show he is not precluded from obtaining relief

by § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). 

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The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1) are

different. As the Supreme Court has explained:

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to”

clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing

law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we

have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court

may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the

state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from

our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court does not apply a rule different from the

law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or unreasonably apply such law, if the state court simply

fails to cite or fails to indicate an awareness of federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002). 

The court will look to the last reasoned state court decision in determining

whether the law applied to a particular claim by the state courts was contrary to the law set forth

in the cases of the United States Supreme Court or whether an unreasonable application of such

law has occurred. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. dismissed, 538 U.S.

919 (2003). Where the state court fails to give any reasoning whatsoever in support of the denial

of a claim arising under Constitutional or federal law, the Ninth Circuit has held that this court

must perform an independent review of the record to ascertain whether the state court decision

was objectively unreasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). In other 

words, the court assumes the state court applied the correct law, and analyzes whether the

decision of the state court was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that law. 

It is appropriate to look to lower federal court decisions to determine what law has

been "clearly established" by the Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular

application of that law. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 1999).

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II. Arguments And Analysis

A. Failure To Hold Competency Hearing (Claim 1)

Petitioner argues that his Constitutional rights were violated by the trial court’s

failure to hold a hearing to determine whether petitioner was competent to plead guilty. Pet. at

13-39. Petitioner presented this claim to the California Court of Appeal on direct appeal and the

Court of Appeal addressed the claim in detail. See Answer, Ex. 12 at 2-7. Petitioner also raised

this claim before the California Supreme Court, id., Ex. 13 at 9-19, and the Supreme Court

summarily rejected petitioner’s claim. Id., Ex. 16. 

In his petition, petitioner fails to make any argument that his first claim is not

precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). However, in his traverse, petitioner suggests that the Court of

Appeal’s decision is contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375

(1966). Traverse at 9-10.

The import of Pate for purposes of this case is that the Supreme Court found that a

trial judge may not rely solely upon the demeanor of the defendant at court proceedings to

support a finding that a hearing regarding the defendant’s competency is not warranted. Id. at

383. Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that a competency hearing was not

required “must [have been] based entirely on the fact that . . . petitioner responded rationally at

the time of his plea.” Traverse at 9. But the Court of Appeal never mentioned any aspect of

petitioner’s demeanor at the time he pled guilty as a reason to uphold the trial court’s decision

not to hold a competency hearing:

In this case, there was no evidence that Hodges’s suicide attempts,

medication and/or general mental condition had any negative

impact whatever on his ability to understand the nature of the

criminal proceedings and rationally assist counsel in the conduct of

his defense. On the contrary, appointed counsel met with Hodges

on 13 separate occasions and discussed the case with him. She

discussed the prosecutor’s offer of a negotiated settlement with

him on six separate occasions. They also discussed the

consequences of his entering a plea. Counsel’s investigator met

with Hodges on three occasions. He appeared to understand the

discussion, and never said he did not. Hodges executed the change

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of plea form indicating he had discussed with counsel the 

“facts, merits, and possible defenses” of his case and understood

his rights, and the terms and consequences of his plea.

Answer, Ex. 12 at 7. 

Additionally, the facts concerning petitioner’s competency in Pate are quite

distinguishable from the facts of this case. There, evidence had been presented that the

defendant, Robinson, consistently acted irrationally, sometimes appeared vacant, was paranoid,

heard voices and hallucinated. Pate, 383 U.S. at 378-81. Robinson also had shot and killed his

18-month-old child. Id. at 381. At trial, four witnesses testified that Robinson was insane. Id. at

383. As suggested above, evidence presented in this case indicates that before petitioner pled

guilty, he suffered from alcoholism, “severe” depression and anxiety and had attempted to take

his own life three times. Answer, Ex. 2–part 2 (5/2/01 Hearing) at 7:4-12:17. While these

conditions and circumstances are all serious they do not demonstrate anything approaching the

level of mental disconnect demonstrated by Mr. Robinson.

Because petitioner has not shown he is not precluded from obtaining relief under

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) as to his first claim, his first claim should be rejected. 

B. Voluntary And Intelligent Nature Of Guilty Pleas (Claim 3)

Petitioner’s next claim is titled as follows:

If, in pleading “no contest,” petitioner agreed to a term of 24

years, his plea was involuntary and in violation of due process

under the United States Constitution, which requires for a

knowing and intelligent plea that the record of the plea

affirmatively show that defendant is aware of the direct penal

consequences of the plea.

Pet. at 43.

Petitioner asserts he did not in fact know that he was agreeing to 24 years’

imprisonment when he pled guilty. Pet. at 45. He presents his own affidavit in support of this

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 The affidavit is the last attachment to petitioner’s habeas petition. 2

 The transcript of petitioner’s November 14, 2000 plea proceeding is attached near the 3

end of petitioner’s habeas petition. 

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assertion. However, the assertion is belied by the record. At the May 16, 2001 sentencing 2

hearing, and before he was actually sentenced, petitioner’s new attorney acknowledged that the

parties had stipulated to a sentence of 24 years’ imprisonment. Answer, Ex. 2–part 1 (5/16/01

Hearing) at 3:2-5, 10-14. Although petitioner sought to withdraw his plea, he did so for the

stated reasons that it had not been “well advised” and there was a defense “that should have been

pursued.” Id. At no time during the hearing or before the hearing did petitioner indicate he did

not previously agree to the 24 year sentence and nothing suggests petitioner ever agreed to some

other sentence. 

Petitioner also argues that even if he agreed to a term of 24 years’ imprisonment

as part of his plea agreement, he must be allowed to withdraw his plea because the record of

petitioner’s guilty plea does not affirmatively show the agreed-upon term of imprisonment. Pet.

at 43. Under Boykin v. Alabama 395 U.S. 238, 243-244 (1969), it is clear that the record of a

guilty plea must show that the person who pled guilty was aware of the consequences of his plea. 

It cannot be argued that a term of imprisonment to be served by a criminal defendant pursuant to

his pleading guilty is not a “consequence” of his plea. 

During his plea proceedings it was made clear to petitioner that the maximum

punishment he could receive under the plea agreement was 24 years’ imprisonment. Answer, Ex.

1 at 66 (waiver of rights form). The record of the plea proceedings and any pre-plea proceedings

does not indicate petitioner was aware what his minimum term of imprisonment could be.3

As indicated above, petitioner’s counsel stated on the record at sentencing before

petitioner was sentenced that petitioner had previously stipulated to a sentence of 24 years’

imprisonment. Answer, Ex. 2–part 1 at 3:2-5, 10-14. Petitioner did not object to counsel’s

representation. Any violation of Boykin by the trial court’s failure at petitioner’s plea hearing to

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26 This declaration’s three pages are mis-labeled as Exhibits D, C and B. 4

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explicitly state on the record that petitioner would receive 24 years’ imprisonment by pleading

guilty thus was cured. 

For these reasons, and because petitioner has not shown he is not precluded from

obtaining relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), his second claim should be rejected. 

 

C. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

1. Failure To Obtain And Present Evidence Regarding Petitioner’s Incompetency

 (Claim 2)

Petitioner agues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by

failing to obtain and present evidence to the trial court that, petitioner asserts, would have

resulted in petitioner’s obtaining a hearing as to his competency to plead guilty and ultimately a

finding that petitioner was not competent to plead guilty. Pet. at 40-42. In support of this claim,

petitioner points to hospital records generated after petitioner attempted suicide in September

1999, which trial counsel never obtained. The records indicate that petitioner told medical

officials he had been suffering from “command hallucinations” for some unspecified period of

time. Pet., Ex. G at 1. Petitioner also provides the declaration of his mother in which she

indicates that on September 2, 1999, petitioner told her he heard voices that were telling him to

do bad things. Pet., Decl. of Marlene Luce. A few weeks later, petitioner also told his mother 4

that he heard the voice of his grandfather who had been deceased for over twenty years. Id. 

The Supreme Court has enunciated the standards for judging ineffective assistance

of counsel claims. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a defendant must

show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel's performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. To this end, the defendant must identify

the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional

judgment. Id. at 690. The court must then determine whether in light of all the circumstances,

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the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professional competent assistance. 

Id. Second, a defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice. Id. at 693. Prejudice is found where

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.; see also United States v. Murray, 751

F.2d 1528, 1535 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schaflander, 743 F.2d 714, 717-18 (9th Cir.

1984) (per curiam). 

Petitioner raised this ineffective assistance claim before the California Court of

Appeal in an application for writ of habeas corpus, Answer, Ex. 6 at 20, and the Court of Appeal

issued a reasoned opinion with respect to petitioner’s claim, which reads as follows:

Despite the fact that visual hallucinations were among the

numerous factors considered by the court in [Moore v. United

States, 464 F.2d 663, 665 (9th Cir. 1972)], equivocal evidence of

auditory hallucinations before September 1999 does not raise a

reasonable doubt about Hodges’s competence to stand trial

(inability to understand the proceedings or to assist in his defense)

in November 2000, when he pleaded no contest, or in May 2001,

when he tried to withdraw his plea. There was no evidence he had

such hallucinations at the time of trial, much less that they

“render[ed] him unable to attend to surrounding events and

conditions” (People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489, 501; compare

Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 516 [during trial defendant was

hearing voices of devil]). Thus it cannot be said that either of

Hodges’s attorneys was ineffective for failing to introduce that

evidence.

Answer, Ex. 12 at 12. Petitioner also filed a petition for habeas corpus with respect to this claim

in the California Supreme Court. Answer, Ex. 13 at 20-22. Petitioner’s habeas petition was

denied without comment. Answer, Ex. 15. 

As with petitioner’s first claim, petitioner makes no attempt in his habeas petition

to show that relief is not precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), nor does he do so in his traverse. 

Furthermore, nothing before the court suggests that the Court of Appeal committed the kind of

error necessary for petitioner to pass though the bar established by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Petitioner’s second claim should be rejected. 

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2. Sentencing Matters (Claim 4)

Petitioner asserts his trial counsel should have “made a record as to whether or not

there was a [plea] agreement for a specific term [of imprisonment].” Pet. at 48-50. As indicated

above, counsel did – at sentencing. Answer, Ex. 2–part 1 at 3:2-5, 10-14. 

Petitioner also claims that the counsel who prepared petitioner’s motion to

withdraw his plea was incompetent “by conced[ing] in [his] motion that petitioner agreed to a 24

year [prison] term. . .” Pet. at 49:20-27. Counsel can not be found incompetent on the record

before the court; in its totality the record shows petitioner did agree to a 24 year prison term.

For these reasons, and because petitioner has not shown he is not precluded from

obtaining relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), his final claim should be denied. 

III. Conclusion

For all of the forgoing reasons, the court will recommend that petitioner’s

application for writ of habeas corpus be denied.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a

writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within five days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 14, 2008.

1/hodg2087.157

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