Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-72668/USCOURTS-ca9-12-72668-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent
Milton Bladimir Rosales Rivera
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MILTON BLADIMIR ROSALES

RIVERA,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 12-72668

Agency No.

A200-156-835

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued July 9, 2015

Submitted March 10, 2016

Pasadena, California

Filed March 10, 2016

Before: William A. Fletcher, Richard A. Paez,

and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Paez

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2 ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH

SUMMARY*

Immigration

The panel granted Milton Rosales Rivera’s petition for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of

cancellation of removal based on its finding that his

conviction for perjury under California Penal Code § 118 was

a crime involving moral turpitude. 

The panel held that CPC § 118 is not a categorical CIMT,

and that it is divisible because it criminalizes two distinct

offenses, written and oral perjury. Applying the modified

categorical approach, the panel held that written perjury,

Rosales Rivera’s offense of conviction, is not a CIMT. The

panel noted that it focused solely on CPC § 118, and did not

consider the rest of the California state law perjury

framework.

COUNSEL

Nicole Henning (argued), Jones Day, Chicago, Illinois; Craig

Stewart, Jones Day, San Francisco, California, for Petitioner.

Jessica Dawgert (argued), Kristofer McDonald, Trial

Attorney, and Leslie McKay, Assistant Director, United

States Department of Justice, Office of Immigration

Litigation,Washington, D.C.; Joyce Branda, ActingAssistant

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH 3

Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, Civil

Division, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

At common law, a person could be convicted of perjury

“when, under oath, he wilfully and corruptly [gave] false

testimony on a material point in a judicial proceeding.” 

4 Wharton’s Crim. Law § 574, Westlaw (database updated

Sept. 2015); see also In re H—, 1 I. & N. Dec. 669, 670 (BIA

1943). Today, many states have adopted expanded

definitions of perjury that include false statements made in

depositions, declarations, and other non-judicial proceedings. 

California Penal Code section 118 is one such “general”

perjury statute. See 2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Crim. Law 4th

§§ 57, 60 (4th ed. 2012). California “supplement[s]” section

118 with several context-specific, or “special,” perjury

statutes, including Financial Code section 460 (prohibiting as

perjury intentional false statements in bank reports) and

Government Code section 1368 (prohibiting as perjury false

statements made by a public officer while taking the oath of

office). Id. § 60.

Within this complex framework, Milton Bladimir Rosales

Rivera, a citizen of El Salvador, pled no contest to a charge

under section 118.1 Later, in removal proceedings, the

1 California Penal Code section 118 has two subsections, but section

118(a) is the only subsection that describes a crime. Because the

underlying conviction records refer to Rosales Rivera’s conviction as one

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4 ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) ruled that this conviction was a crime

involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”) and therefore

disqualified Rosales Rivera from obtaining cancellation of

removal. The first issue in this proceeding is whether section

118 is categorically a CIMT. Because we determine that it is

not, we proceed to consider whether section 118 is divisible. 

We find that section 118 criminalizes two distinct offenses:

written and oral perjury. Finally, applying the modified

categorical approach, we hold that Rosales Rivera’s offense

of conviction—written perjury—is not a CIMT. We

therefore grant the petition for review and remand for further

proceedings.

We note that whether section 118 is a CIMT is a different

question from whether perjury, generally, is a CIMT. We

recognize that historically common law perjury was

considered to be a CIMT, but, as we will explain, both section

118 as a whole and the specific offense of written perjury

criminalize significantly more conduct than common law

perjury. Moreover, in focusing on section 118 alone, we

leave the rest of California’s perjury framework untouched. 

California’s special perjury statutes, for instance, have

distinct elements and therefore require an entirely separate

CIMT analysis from the one we undertake here.

I.

Rosales Rivera is a citizen of El Salvador who first came

to the United States in 2001. He has a son who is a United

States citizen. He admits he is present in the United States

under section 118, we refer to the statute throughout this opinion as

section 118.

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ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH 5

without having been admitted, paroled, or inspected by an

Immigration Officer, the basis for removal that the

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) cited in its

Notice to Appear. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Rosales

Rivera may be entitled to cancellation of removal under

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) due to his son’s citizenship, but

conviction of a CIMT would bar such relief. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1228b(b)(1)(C).

On December 14, 2011, in the County of San Bernardino

Superior Court, Rosales Rivera was charged with

“PERJURY—APPLICATION FOR DRIVER’S LICENSE”

in violation of California Penal Code section 118. He pled no

contest to the felony charge, and was sentenced to 180 days

in the county jail.

DHS initiated removal proceedings against Rosales

Rivera. The IJ ordered Rosales Rivera removed. In doing so,

she concluded that a conviction under section 118 “is clearly

a crime involving moral turpitude,” and therefore Rosales

Rivera was ineligible for cancellation of removal under

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). The BIA, citing to In re MartinezRecinos, 23 I. & N. Dec. 175 (BIA 2001), affirmed the IJ’s

decision. In summary fashion, it reasoned that Rosales

Rivera provided no arguments supporting a “realistic

probability” that California “would apply its perjury statute

to prosecute conduct which was not morally turpitudinous.” 

The BIA also noted that the criminal complaint indicated that

Rosales Rivera “committed his offense by providing false

information to the State of California when he applied for a

Driver’s License,” and that crimes with fraud as an element

are categorically CIMTs.

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6 ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH

Rosales Rivera timely filed a petition for review. 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). “We have no jurisdiction to review a

final order removing an alien on account of a conviction for

a crime involving moral turpitude. Nevertheless, we have

jurisdiction to review the [BIA’s] determination that [Rosales

Rivera’s conviction is], in fact,” a CIMT. MarmolejoCampos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2009) (en

banc) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)); see also 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(D).

II.

In Marmolejo-Campos, we established a two-step

framework for evaluating whether a conviction is

categorically a CIMT. 558 F.3d at 907–12. In the first step,

we must identify the elements of the petitioner’s statute of

conviction, reviewing de novo the BIA’s analysis. Id. at 907,

911.

The second step requires determining whether the

“petitioner’s offense” is a CIMT. Id. We employ the

categorical approach, as described below, to assess whether

a statute of conviction is a CIMT. Blanco v. Mukasey,

518 F.3d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 2008). To make this

determination, we “compare the elements of the statute of

conviction to the generic definition of a [CIMT to] decide

whether the conviction meets that definition.” CastrijonGarcia v. Holder, 704 F.3d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 2013). We

rely on our “own generalized definition of moral turpitude,”

which divides almost all CIMTs “into two basic types: those

involving fraud and ‘those involving grave acts of baseness

or depravity.’” Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 910 (quoting

Carty v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2005)).

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ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH 7

III.

In determining whether the statute of conviction fits

categoricallywithin our general definition of moral turpitude,

some deference to the BIA may be warranted. Ordinarily,

where “the [BIA] determines that certain conduct is morally

turpitudinous in a precedential decision, we apply Chevron2

deference regardless of whether the order under review is the

precedential decision itself or a subsequent unpublished order

that relies upon it.” Id. at 911. Otherwise, Skidmore3

deference applies. Id. at 909. Here, as noted above, the BIA

cited to a published decision, Martinez-Recinos, in which the

BIA stated without analysis that “the respondent’s aggravated

felony offense” under California Penal Code section 118 was

a CIMT. 23 I. & N. Dec. at 178. Nonetheless, we conclude

that the BIA’s decision does not warrant Chevron deference

because Martinez-Recinos provided no reasoned explanation

for its conclusion.

In Chevron, the Supreme Court contemplated an agency

engaging in the process of “informed rulemaking” by

“consider[ing] varying interpretations and the wisdom of its

policy on a continuing basis.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64. 

In the immigration law context, the Attorney General “vested

the BIA with power to exercise the ‘discretion and authority

conferred upon the Attorney General by law’ in the course of

‘considering and determining cases before it.’” I.N.S. v.

Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (quoting 8 C.F.R.

§ 3.1(d)(1) (1998)). Chevron deference applies to BIA

2 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837

(1984).

 

3

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).

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8 ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH

decisions because the BIA “gives ambiguous statutory terms

concrete meaning through [this] process of case-by-case

adjudication.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

We have limited Chevron deference to precedential BIA

decisions based on similar reasoning. The BIA issues

precedential decisions where it “intend[s] to issue an

interpretation of a statute it enforces.” Miranda Alvarado v.

Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g). 

There are, however, “rare instances” where we withhold

deference from precedential BIA decisions, including where

the BIA has “failed to provide an explanation for its action.” 

Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 916; see also Mellouli v.

Lynch, — U.S. —, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1989 (2015) (“Because

it makes scant sense, the BIA’s interpretation, we hold, is

owed no deference under the doctrine described in

Chevron[.]”).

This case presents such a “rare instance.” In MartinezRecinos, the BIA’s analysis focused on why section 118 is an

aggravated felony, without any explanation of why section

118 is a CIMT. 21 I & N. Dec. at 176–78. The only sentence

concerning section 118’s status as a CIMT is: “We concur

with the [IJ] that the respondent’s [conviction under section

118] is also a crime involving moral turpitude, which renders

him inadmissible . . . .” Id. at 178. The decision contains no

discussion of the elements required for a conviction under

section 118, nor any explanation of why section 118

constitutes a CIMT under the BIA’s definition or our

definition of moral turpitude. See id. Because the BIA did

not support its conclusion with any statutory interpretation or

reasoning, we accord no deference to Martinez-Recinos under

Chevron.

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ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH 9

Where Chevron deference does not apply in the CIMT

context, Skidmore deference does. Marmolejo-Campos,

558 F.3d at 909. Under Skidmore, “the measure of deference

afforded to the agency varies ‘depend[ing] upon the

thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its

reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later

pronouncements, and all those factors which give it the power

to persuade, if lacking the power to control.’” Id. (quoting

Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). Here, the BIA’s decision that

section 118 is a CIMT is not entitled to Skidmore deference

because, as we explained, the BIA in Martinez-Recinos

provided no reasoning whatsoever. See, e.g., CastrijonGarcia, 704 F.3d at 1211 (“declin[ing] to grant deference”

under Skidmore where there is “no analysis at all”).

IV.

A.

As explained above, under the categorical approach, we

must first interpret the statute of conviction to identify its

essential elements. Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 907. 

California Penal Code section 118 provides:

(a) Every person who, having taken an oath

that he or she will testify, declare, depose, or

certify truly before any competent tribunal,

officer, or person, in any of the cases in which

the oath may by law of the State of California

be administered, willfully and contrary to the

oath, states as true any material matter which

he or she knows to be false, and every person

who testifies, declares, deposes, or certifies

under penalty of perjury in any of the cases in

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10 ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH

which the testimony, declarations,

depositions, or certification is permitted by

law of the State of California under penalty of

perjury and willfully states as true any

material matter which he or she knows to be

false, is guilty of perjury.

As discussed below, infra Part V, section 118 criminalizes

both written and oral perjury. In the case of a defendant who

committed oral perjury, we have articulated the elements of

this offense as “a willful statement, under oath, of any

material matter which the witness knows to be false.” Chein

v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Cabe

v. Super. Ct., 63 Cal. App. 4th 732 (1998)). The model jury

instructions for section 118 explain that written perjury, by

contrast, requires only that the false statement be in writing

under penalty of perjury. See People v. Hedgecock, 51 Cal.

3d 395, 403–04 (Cal. 1990) (explaining that California Jury

Instruction—Criminal (“CALJIC”) No. 7.21 (1982) sets forth

the elements of written perjury). The requirements of

willfulness and materiality are common to both perjury

offenses. Cal. Penal Code § 118.

The word “willful” “simply means that the witness made

the allegedly perjurious statement with the consciousness that

it was false; with the consciousness that he did not know that

it was true and with the intent that it should be received as a

statement of what was true in fact.” People v. Tolmachoff,

58 Cal. App. 2d 815, 821 (1943); see also People v. Hagen,

19 Cal. 4th 652, 663–64 (1998); People v. Viniegra, 130 Cal.

App. 3d 577, 584 (1982). That the accused was not

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ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH 11

competent4to give a false statement is not a defense to a

charge of perjury under section 118. Cal. Penal Code § 122.

A statement is “material” if “the statement or testimony

‘might have been used to affect the [proceeding in or for

which it was made],’” or if “the statement could probably

have influenced the outcome of the proceedings.”5 People v.

Feinberg, 51 Cal. App. 4th 1566, 1575 (1997) (quoting

People v. Kobrin, 11 Cal. 4th 416, 420 (1995) (internal

brackets in original), and People v. Pierce, 66 Cal. 2d 53, 61

(1967)). For example, testimony may be material if it has a

tendency to impeach the credibility of a witness who testified

on a material issue, even if the testimony is unrelated to the

case itself. See People v. Gamble, 8 Cal. App. 3d 142, 146

(1970). It is not a defense to perjury that “the accused did not

know the materiality of the false statement made . . . . It is

sufficient that it was material.” Cal. Penal Code § 123.

People v. Darcy illustrates the breadth of the materiality

element. 59 Cal. App. 2d 342 (1943), disapproved of on

other grounds by Murgia v. Mun. Ct., 15 Cal. 3d 286 (1975). 

There, the defendant stated under oath before a deputy

registrar of voters that his name was Sam Darcy and that he

4 A trial witness may be disqualified if he or she is “[i]ncapable of

expressing himself or herself concerning the matter so as to be

understood,” or “[i]ncapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell

the truth.” Cal. Evid. Code § 701(a).

5 California courts have recognized that this definition of materiality

does not apply to all section 118 offenses. Hedgecock, 51 Cal. 3d at 405

(setting forth an alternate definition of materiality in “a perjury

prosecution based on the filing of a false [statements of economic interest]

or [campaign disclosure statement]” because “there is no ‘proceeding’ the

outcome of which could be influenced by the false verification”).

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12 ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH

was born in New York, even though his true name was

Samuel Dardeck and he was born in the Ukraine. Id. at 345. 

Darcy argued that it was immaterial whether he made false

statements about his name and place of birth, as he could

have registered to vote had he used his real name and given

his correct place of birth. Id. at 348–49. The court, however,

reasoned that the false statements were material because the

voting authorities were “prevented from examining the

father’s naturalization papers for the purpose of verifying

[Darcy’s] citizenship.” Id. at 349. Indeed, one’s name and

birthplace may serve “as a basis for an investigation of

qualifications of a person who registers,” including

citizenship. Id. In sum, even though Darcy would have been

allowed to vote had he given his true name and true

birthplace, his false statements under oath were material.

B.

Having identified the elements of the statute of conviction

in the first step, we move to the second step, where we use

the categorical approach to determine whether section 118 is

a CIMT. Almanza-Arenas v. Lynch, 809 F.3d 515, 521–22

(9th Cir. 2015) (en banc), opinion amended and superseded,

(9th Cir. Feb. 29, 2016); Mendoza v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1299,

1302 (9th Cir. 2010); Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzalez, 468 F.3d

1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Taylor v. United States,

495 U.S. 575 (1990)).

1.

Under the categorical approach, we compare “the

elements of the statute of conviction to the generic definition”

of moral turpitude to determine whether the “conduct

proscribed” by the statute of conviction “is broader than, and

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ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH 13

so does not categorically fall within, this generic definition.” 

Fernandez-Ruiz, 468 F.3d at 1163 (internal citation and

quotation marks omitted). The “issue is not whether the

[petitioner’s] actual conduct constitutes a crime involving

moral turpitude, but rather, whether the full range of conduct

encompassed by the statute constitutes a crime of moral

turpitude.”6

Id. (quoting Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales,

430 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 2005)). In other words, “the

key . . . is elements, not facts.” Descamps v. United States,

— U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013).

When performing a categorical analysis, the court “must

presume that the conviction ‘rested upon [nothing] more than

the least of th[e] acts criminalized,’ and then determine

whether even those acts are encompassed by the generic”

definition of moral turpitude. Moncrieffe v. Holder, — U.S.

—, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013) (quoting Johnson v. United

States, 559 U.S. 133, 137 (2010)) (alterations in original). 

There must be “a realistic probability, not a theoretical

possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct

that falls outside” the generic definition of moral turpitude. 

Id. at 1685 (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S.

183, 193 (2007)); see also Castrijon-Garcia, 704 F.3d at

1212.

2.

Crimes of moral turpitude are generally “of two types:

those involving fraud and those involving grave acts of

6 Because we compare section 118 with the generic definition of moral

turpitude, rather than with the federal offense of “perjury generally,”

18 U.S.C. § 1621, we need not engage in a comparison of § 1621 and

section 118.

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14 ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH

baseness or depravity.” Castrijon-Garcia, 704 F.3d at 1212. 

These two categories, however, are not exhaustive. Common

law perjury—lying under oath during a judicial

proceeding—has historically been regarded as a CIMT even

though it does not fit neatly into the two-part framework

described below. We conclude 1) that section 118 goes well

beyond common law perjury and 2) that it categorically

involves neither fraud nor grave acts of baseness or

depravity.

7

a.

At common law, a person committed perjury by giving

false testimony under oath. See United States v. Dunnigan,

507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993). Historically, and before the

development of the two-categoryCIMT approach, courts held

with little debate that common law perjury is a CIMT. See,

e.g., Masaichi Ono v. Carr, 56 F.2d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1932)

(“It is not to be doubted that the commission of perjury before

the immigration officials is a felony involving moral

turpitude.”); U.S. ex rel. Boraca v. Schlotfeldt, 109 F.2d 106,

108 (7th Cir. 1940) (“That perjury is a crime involving moral

turpitude, there can be no question, and the crime was

completed when she made the false statement under oath.”);

Wharton’s supra § 574 (explaining that a person committed

perjury at common law “when, under oath, he wilfully and

corruptly [gave] false testimony on a material point in a

judicial proceeding”). This conclusion recognizes the

implicit harm in obstructing justice and the formality inherent

in taking an oral oath in a judicial proceeding.

 

7

 The government does not argue that section 118 could be a CIMT on

some other basis.

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ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH 15

The conduct prohibited bysection 118 extends far beyond

the narrow meaning of common law perjury. Not only does

section 118 reach past false testimony in the courtroom to

non-case related lying, it also punishes lies where no oral

oath, with its requisite solemnity, was required of the speaker. 

Section 118 essentially creates a self-defining crime—

whenever a document must be signed under penalty of

perjury, the penalty of perjury applies. Thus, section 118

does not fit within the historical understanding of perjury and

cannot be deemed a CIMT on that basis. Nor, as we

demonstrate below, does it qualify as a CIMT under the

modern two-category approach.

b.

Non-fraudulent CIMTs generally involve base, vile, and

depraved conduct that shocks the public conscience.8 Turijan

v. Holder, 744 F.3d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2014). The “essence

of moral turpitude” is “evil or malicious intent.” GonzalezCervantes v. Holder, 709 F.3d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 2013)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Crimes with such a mens

rea “offend[] the most fundamental values of society.” 

Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 705 (9th Cir. 2012). 

“That an offense contravenes societal duties is not enough to

make it a [CIMT]; otherwise, every crime would involve

moral turpitude.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Only truly unconscionable conduct surpasses the threshold

of moral turpitude.” Id. at 708.

Examples of non-fraud CIMTs include “sex-related

offenses” that “necessarily inflict[] harm,” Gonzalez8 Neither the government nor Rosales Rivera addressed whether section

118 is a CIMT because it is base, vile, or depraved.

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16 ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH

Cervantes, 709 F.3d at 1267, 1269 (listing several), as well as

murder, rape, and incest, Robles-Urrea, 678 F.3d at 708. 

These and other non-fraudulent CIMTs “almost always

involve an intent to harm someone, the actual infliction of

harm upon someone, or an action that affects a protected class

of victim.” Castrijon-Garcia, 704 F.3d at 1207.

Section 118 encompasses conduct that does not qualify as

base, vile, and depraved behavior. That one need not be

competent to give the false statement demonstrates that not

all section 118 convictions result from “evil or malicious

intent.” See Cal. Penal Code § 122; Gonzalez-Cervantes,

709 F.3d at 1267. Similarly, the fact that lack of knowledge

as to the false statement’s materiality is not a defense to

conviction further demonstrates that not all conduct covered

by section 118 involves intent to harm someone. See Cal.

Penal Code § 123; Castrijon-Garcia, 704 F.3d at 1214. For

example, a witness may not know that her testimony, which

is unrelated to the case at issue, could impeach the credibility

of another witness who testified on a material issue. See

Gamble, 8 Cal. App. 3d at 146. Such a witness may be

convicted under section 118, even though the false statement

is not made with “evil or malicious intent.” Because section

118 does not require the very “essence of moral turpitude,” 

Gonzalez-Cervantes, 709 F.3d at 1267, it does not

categorically qualify as a non-fraudulent CIMT.

Furthermore, section 118 does not categorically “offend[]

the most fundamental values of society,” Robles-Urrea,

678 F.3d at 705, like murder, rape, incest, and harm-inflicting

sex-related offenses do. See id. at 708; Gonzalez-Cervantes,

709 F.3d at 1269. Unlike these crimes, perjury does not

necessarily involve “intent to harm,” “actual infliction of

harm,” or “an action that affects a protected class of victim.” 

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ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH 17

Castrijon-Garcia, 704 F.3d at 1213–14. Indeed, Darcy, who

gave a false birthplace and name when registering to vote and

was convicted of perjury in California, intended no harm,

inflicted no harm, and did not adversely affect a protected

class of victims. See Darcy, 59 Cal. App. 2d 342.

In sum, we conclude that section 118 is not categorically

a non-fraudulent CIMT.

c.

Although section 118 reaches beyond the narrow

definition of common law perjury and is not categorically a

non-fraudulent CIMT, it could categorically be a CIMT if it

required an intent to defraud or sounded in fraud. “A crime

involves fraudulent conduct, and thus is a crime involving

moral turpitude, if intent to defraud is either ‘explicit in the

statutory definition’ of the crime or ‘implicit in the nature’ of

the crime.” Blanco, 518 F.3d at 719 (quoting Goldeshtein v.

INS, 8 F.3d 645, 658 (9th Cir. 1993)).

First, the intent to defraud is not explicit in the statutory

definition of section 118, especially in light of Blanco. 

There, we held that California Penal Code section 148.9(a)

(false representation of identity to a peace officer “to evade

the process of the court, or to evade the proper identification

of the person by the investigating officer”) was not a CIMT. 

We explained that intent to defraud was not explicitly

required because the statute “require[d] only the knowing

provision of false information.” 518 F.3d at 719. Conviction

required “only that ‘the forbidden act [wa]s done deliberately

and with knowledge,’ and not that the individual act[ed] with

evil intent.” Id. (quoting Hirsch v. INS, 308 F.2d 562, 567

(9th Cir. 1962)). Similarly, intent to defraud is not required

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for conviction under section 118; it requires only that the

false statements have been made “deliberately and with

knowledge.” See id.; Tolmachoff, 58 Cal. App. 2d at 821

(explaining that a false statement under section 118 must be

made “with the consciousness that it was false” and “with the

intent that it should be received as a statement of what was

true in fact”); Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury

Instructions9(“CALCRIM”) 2640 (lacking any reference to

an intent to defraud). Because, like section 148.9(a), section

118 does not require proof of a “specific intent to defraud,”

see People v. Guasti, 110 Cal. App. 2d 456, 467 (1952), nor

of intent to “injur[e] another,” Darcy, 59 Cal. App. 2d at 348,

it does not explicitly require intent to defraud for CIMT

purposes. See Blanco, 518 F.3d at 719; cf. Goldeshtein,

8 F.3d at 648 (noting that this court has rejected the argument

“that evil intent exists if a conviction requires proof that a

defendant did a forbidden act ‘willfully’”); Hirsch, 308 F.2d

at 567 (holding that a federal statute prohibiting false

statements was not a CIMT because “the jury could convict

if it found that petitioner had ‘knowingly’ but without evil

intent, made a ‘false’ but not ‘fraudulent’ statement”).

The converse proposition underscores the rule. We have

held that particular statutes are CIMTs because the intent to

defraud is explicit in the statutory definition. See, e.g., De

Martinez v. Holder, 770 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 2014)

(holding thatArizona Revised Statutes section 13-2006(A)(1)

is a CIMT because it is committed by “assuming a false

identity with the intent to defraud another”); Planes v.

Holder, 652 F.3d 991, 992–93 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that

it was reasonable for the BIA to conclude that state

9 CALCRIM and CALJIC are alternative jury instruction sources in

California.

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convictions for “passing a bad check with intent to defraud”

and “possession of 15 or more access devices with intent to

defraud” were CIMTs). Section 118 contains no such

language. Thus, we conclude that intent to defraud is not

explicit in section 118.

Conviction under section 118 does require proof of

“intent that [the false statement] should be received as a

statement of what was true in fact,” Tolmachoff, 58 Cal. App.

2d at 821, but that requirement does not amount to an “intent

to defraud” in this context. That an accused’s lack of

knowledge as to the materiality of the false statement is not

a defense to section 118, Cal. Penal Code § 123, demonstrates

that section 118 punishes conduct that falls short of the “evil

intent” required for a fraud offense to qualify as a CIMT. 

Blanco, 518 F.3d at 719.

The next question is whether intent to defraud is “implicit

in the nature” of section 118. Blanco, 518 F.3d at 719. 

“[I]ntent to defraud is implicit in the nature of the crime when

the individual makes false statements in order to procure

something of value, either monetary or nonmonetary.” Id.

Because “[o]ne can act dishonestly without seeking to induce

reliance,” fraudulent intent only exists “when the individual

employs false statements to obtain something tangible.”10Id. 

10 As part of a string cite of cases in Blanco where the accused made

false statements to obtain tangible items, we referenced Zaitona v. INS,

9 F.3d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 1993), which dealt with driver’s licenses. 

Blanco, 517 F.3d at 719. The statute of conviction at issue there was

Michigan Compiled Laws section 257.324(1)(e), using a false name or

other false information “in an application for an operator’s or chauffeur’s

license.” Zaitona, 9 F.3d at 438. As we explain, such a statute is

distinguishable from section 118 because it requires proof of the tangible

item that the accused sought to obtain. In other words, a person could not

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Fraud is thus distinguishable from “mere dishonesty[]

because fraud requires an attempt to induce another to act to

his or her detriment.” Id.

Our opinion in Bisaillon v. Hogan provides an example of

where intent to defraud was not an explicit requirement for

conviction, but this court nevertheless held that the crime was

a CIMT. 257 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1958). There, conviction

under 18 U.S.C. § 1542 required “willfully and knowingly

mak[ing] any false statement in an application for passport

with intent to induce and secure the issuance of a passport

under the authority of the United States[.]” Id. at 436. We

held that § 1542 is a CIMT in part because it “requires the

presence of . . . intent to induce the issuance of the passports

under authority of the United States.” Id. at 438.11 Section

118, unlike § 1542, does not implicate intent to defraud

because it does not require “procur[ing] something of value.” 

Blanco, 518 F.3d at 719. Section 118 is thus overbroad when

compared to this category of implicit fraud-related crimes,

because it does not require for conviction proof of

“attempt[ing] to induce another to act to his or her detriment”

be convicted of a crime under the Michigan statute without having applied

for the license.

 

11 The government cites a Second Circuit case, Rodriguez v. Gonzales,

451 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam), which also held that § 1542 is a

CIMT.

The court reasoned that § 1542 “involves deceit and an intent to

impair the efficiency and lawful functioning of the government,” which

“alone is sufficient to categorize a crime as a CIMT.” Id. at 64. In

Blanco, however, we held that “[w]hen the only ‘benefit’ the individual

obtains is to impede the enforcement of law, the crime does not involve

moral turpitude.” 518 F.3d at 719; see also Latu v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d

1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2008) (same).

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ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH 21

or “to obtain something tangible.” Id. Thus, section 118 does

not fall within the category of CIMTs where intent to defraud

is implicit in the nature of the crime.

3.

There is “a realistic probability, not a theoretical

possibility, that [California] would apply [section 118] to

conduct that falls outside” all the established definitions of

moral turpitude. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1685. Once again,

the facts of People v. Darcy provide a compelling example. 

As an initial matter, Darcy’s conduct would not fall within

the narrow meaning of common law perjury, which, as noted

above, historically has been considered a CIMT. Further,

Darcy was convicted under section 118 even though he did

not commit a base or vile act, or one involving explicit or

implicit fraud. Providing a false name and birthplace when

one is entitled to vote without the false statements does not

implicate “intent to harm,” “actual infliction of harm,” or “an

action that affects a protected class of victims.” CastrijonGarcia, 704 F.3d at 1214. Darcy’s actions were therefore not

base or vile. Further, he was not convicted of an explicitly

fraudulent CIMT because section 118 does not contain an

element of intent to defraud. Finally, his actions contained no

implicit fraud, as he was not “attempt[ing] to induce another

to act to his or her detriment” or “obtain something

tangible.”

12 Blanco, 518 F.3d at 719. Because defendants

like Darcy are convicted under section 118 without these

essential elements, there is a “realistic probability” that

section 118 “would apply” to conduct that is not morally

turpitudinous. See Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1685.

 

12 The facts only indicate that Darcy was attempting to file an affidavit

of registration as an elector. See Darcy, 59 Cal. App. 2d at 345, 349.

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V.

Where, as here, a statute is not categorically a CIMT, we

may, in some circumstances, apply the “modified categorical

approach.” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281. “This approach is

available, however, only when the state statute of conviction

is ‘divisible,’ meaning it ‘lists multiple, alternative elements,

and so effectively creates several different . . . crimes.’” 

Chavez-Solis v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir.

2014)); see also Almanza-Arenas, 809 F.3d at 523 (holding

that “if the elements of the crime are alternative to each

other—not the mode or means of proving an element of the

crime—the statute is divisible”).13“If the state statute is

divisible, and the full range of conduct in the state statute is

not included in the federal offense, we may use the modified

categorical approach so long as one of the crimes included in

the statute is a categorical match for the federal generic

offense.” Rodriguez-Castellon v. Holder, 733 F.3d 847, 853

(9th Cir. 2013) (citing Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285).

A.

In Almanza-Arenas, we recently outlined the process for

determining whether a statute is divisible. 809 F.3d at

522–28. First, we examine the text of the statute to determine

whether it contains multiple crimes with distinct elements or

alternative means for accomplishing a single crime. Second,

we confirm our reading of the statute by looking to the

13 The question of section 118’s divisibility “requires neither factual

development nor agency expertise” and is properly analyzed by this court. 

Chavez-Soliz, 803 F.3d at 1012 n.10.

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ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH 23

conviction documents. Finally, we consider how state courts

have construed the statute of conviction.

Section 118 is divisible into two discrete offenses.14 At

step one, an examination of the statutory text suggests that

section 118 contains several offenses rather than alternative

means for committing perjury. First, an individual violates

section 118 by making a false, oral statement under oath. 

Cal. Penal Code § 118(a) (“Every person who, having taken

an oath that he or she will testify, declare, depose, or certify

truly before any competent tribunal, officer, or person . . .

willfully and contrary to the oath, states as true any material

matter which he or she knows to be false . . . is guilty of

perjury.”). Second, the statute criminalizes false, written

statements made under “penalty of perjury.” Id. (“[E]very

person who testifies, declares, deposes, or certifies under

penalty of perjury in any of the cases in which the testimony,

declarations, depositions, or certification is permitted by law

of the State of California under penalty of perjury and

willfully states as true any material matter which he or she

knows to be false, is guilty of perjury.”). Thus, the language

of section 118 defines two separate crimes of perjury.

The conviction documents in the administrative record

confirm this interpretation at step two. The documents

relevant to this inquiry include the “indictment, jury

instructions, plea colloquy, and plea agreement.” Descamps,

133 S. Ct. at 2281 n.2. This list is “merely illustrative, and

‘documents of equal reliability may also be considered.’”

Coronado v. Holder, 759 F.3d 977, 985 (9th Cir. 2014)

(quoting United States v. Snellenberger, 548 F.3d 699, 701

(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per curiam)).

 

14 The parties agree that section 118 is divisible.

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24 ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH

Here, the felony complaint used to charge Rosales Rivera

demonstrates that section 118 contains two separate offenses. 

Count 2 of the complaint charges Rosales River with “the

crime of PERJURY-APPLICATION FOR DRIVER’S

LICENSE” as “a person who testified, declared, deposed, and

certified under penalty of perjury . . . an application for a

California Driver’s License [and] did state as true a material

matter which he/she knew to be false.” This document makes

clear that Rosales Rivera was specifically convicted of

making a false representation on his driver’s license

application, rather than for an act of oral perjury.

Third, California courts have long recognized the division

in section 118. Hedgecock, 51 Cal. 3d at 404 n.1 (explaining

that “Penal Code section 118 prohibits both perjurious

testimony under oath (the elements are set forth in CALJIC

No. 7.20) and perjurious, signed declarations (covered by

CALJIC No. 7.21)”). The fact that separate jury instructions

exist for each of the two offenses in section 118 bolsters a

finding of divisibility. Compare CALJIC 7.20 (2005

Revision) (“Perjury Under ‘Oath’”) with CALJIC 7.21 (2005

Revision) (“Perjury Under ‘Penalty of Perjury’”). Notably,

to prove written perjury, the prosecution must show that the

statement was “delivered to another person . . . with the

specific intent that it be uttered or published as true,” an

element that is not required for perjury under oath. See

Collins v. Super. Court, 89 Cal. App. 4th 1244, 1247 (2001)

(explaining that “it is the finality of the writing and its

delivery . . . which constitutes an essential element of the

crime of perjury. This is to be distinguished from the giving

of false testimony before the judge, jury or tribunal

responsible for deciding the matter at issue. Such testimony

constitutes perjury when the words are spoken . . . .”).

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ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH 25

Our conclusion that section 118 is divisible finds further

support in the fact that an individual cannot violate the

statute’s two offenses simultaneously. See Rendon, 764 F.3d

at 1087 (describing two decisions that found statutes divisible

in part because “it was impossible for the state to allege and

the jury to find that the defendant violated the alternative

parts of the statute simultaneously”). Rather, making a false

statement under oath before a tribunal and making a written

false statement under penalty of perjury are separate offenses

that necessarily involve different conduct.

B.

Because section 118 is divisible, we apply the modified

categorical approach to determine “which alternative element

in a divisible statute formed the basis of the defendant’s

conviction.” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2293. This analysis

allows the court to “effectuate the categorical analysis when

a divisible statute, listing potential offense elements in the

alternative, renders opaque which element played a part in the

defendant’s conviction.” Id. at 2283. As we described when

considering section 118’s divisibility, Rosales Rivera pled no

contest to a felony complaint that charged him with written

perjury rather than oral perjury.

For the reasons discussed supra Part IV.B.2., the specific

offense of written perjury is not a CIMT. First, written

perjury criminalizes entirely different conduct than common

law perjury, which focused on false oral testimony given

under oath. Second, written perjury, like the general section

118, criminalizes conduct that is not base, vile, or depraved. 

Third, written perjury does not require proof of an intent to

defraud; in fact, conviction is proper even if the accused had

no knowledge that his false statement was material. And

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26 ROSALES RIVERA V. LYNCH

fourth, written perjury does not sound implicitly in fraud

because it does not require proof of intent to either induce

another to act to his detriment or obtain something tangible. 

Thus, under the modified categorical approach, Rosales

Rivera was not convicted of a CIMT.

VI. Conclusion

We hold that California Penal Code section 118

categorically is not a crime involving moral turpitude. We

also hold that section 118 is divisible into two separate

offenses—written and oral perjury—and conclude that under

the modified categorical approach, written perjury, which is

Rosales Rivera’s crime of conviction, is not a crime involving

moral turpitude. We take no position on California’s other,

context-specific perjurystatutes. Therefore, we grant Rosales

Rivera’s petition and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

Petition GRANTED and REMANDED.

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