Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05177/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05177-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
S. D. Edmonds
Appellant
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Appellee
Public Citizen, Inc.
Amicus Curiae for Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 18, 2005 Decided August 9, 2005

No. 04-5177

S. D. EDMONDS

APPELLANT

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

(USDC) for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cv01294)

David K. Colapinto argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant. Mark S. Zaid and Roy W. Krieger entered

appearances.

Scott L. Nelson and Brian Wolfman were on the brief for

amicus curiae Public Citizen, Inc. in support of appellant.

H. Thomas Byron, III, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Peter

D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney, and Douglas N. Letter and Leonard Schaitman,

Attorneys.

USCA Case #04-5177 Document #911326 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 1 of 15
2

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and EDWARDS and

GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Sibel Edmonds filed a Freedom

of Information Act (FOIA) request for certain Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) records relating to the FBI’s decision to

terminate her employment. She also sought expedited

processing of that request. When the FBI failed to grant or deny

expedition, she obtained an order from the district court,

compelling expedited processing and directing the Bureau to

release all nonexempt documents by a specified date. The FBI

ultimately released a total of 346 pages. Concluding that

Edmonds “substantially prevailed” in her district court action,

we reverse the court’s determination that she was ineligible for

an award of attorney’s fees.

I

Edmonds worked as a contract linguist for the FBI between

September 2001 and March 2002. She alleges that she

“witnessed and reported to governmental authorities systemic

quality problems and breaches in security within the FBI’s

language division concerning translations relating to the FBI’s

counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence operations,” and that

she was terminated after her repeated “efforts to report these

problems.” Appellant’s Br. at 9. By letters dated April 19 and

April 29, 2002, Edmonds submitted FOIA requests for FBI

documents concerning herself, her security clearance, her

allegations of wrongdoing at the Bureau, and investigations of

persons related to her. Although she requested expedited

processing of her requests, the FBI did not release any

documents or make any determination regarding whether she

was entitled to expedited processing under the statute and

USCA Case #04-5177 Document #911326 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 2 of 15
3

1

Subject to exceptions and exemptions, FOIA requires that “each

agency, upon any request for records . . . , shall make the records

promptly available to any person.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). Except

in “unusual circumstances,” id. § 552(a)(6)(B)(i), an agency must

“determine within 20 days . . . whether to comply with such request

[and] immediately notify the person making such request of such

determination,” id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). As discussed infra, FOIA also

requires agencies to promulgate regulations “providing for expedited

processing of requests for records,” id. § 552(a)(6)(E)(i), and further

requires that such regulations ensure “that a determination of whether

to provide expedited processing shall be made, and notice of the

determination shall be provided to the person making the request,

within 10 days after the date of the request.” 5 U.S.C. §

552(a)(6)(E)(ii)(I).

associated regulations. Edmonds v. FBI, No. 02-1294, Order at

2 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2002) (“December 3, 2002 Order”).1

On June 27, 2002, Edmonds sued the FBI under FOIA,

seeking an order to require production of the requested

documents. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). On July 15, she filed

an amended complaint alleging a statutory right to expedited

processing of her FOIA requests and seeking an order directing

expedition. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-22. Thereafter, Edmonds moved

for partial summary judgment, asking the district court to order

the FBI to expedite the processing of her requests. Edmonds

relied on 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(i), which requires agencies to

promulgate regulations “providing for expedited processing of

requests for records” in certain circumstances, and on §

552(a)(6)(E)(iii), which provides that “failure by an agency to

respond in a timely manner” to a request for expedited

processing “shall be subject to judicial review.” The FBI

opposed the motion and cross-moved for a stay until April 1,

2003, under Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution

USCA Case #04-5177 Document #911326 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 3 of 15
4

2

FOIA permits a court to “retain jurisdiction and allow the agency

additional time to complete its review of the records” if the

“Government can show exceptional circumstances exist and the

agency is exercising due diligence in responding to the request.” 5

U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i). In Open America, the court held that

exceptional circumstances exist when an agency “is deluged with a

volume of requests for information vastly in excess of that anticipated

by Congress, . . . the existing resources are inadequate to deal with the

volume of requests within the time limits of subsection (6)(A), and .

. . the agency can show that it ‘is exercising due diligence’ in

processing the requests.” Open America, 547 F.2d at 616 (quoting 5

U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(c)).

Force, 547 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976).2

On December 3, 2002, the district court granted Edmonds’

motion for partial summary judgment and denied the FBI’s

motion for a stay. December 3, 2002 Order at 8. The court

concluded that Edmonds’ request “easily me[t] th[e] standard”

set by the Department of Justice’s FOIA regulation, which

provides for expedited processing in a “‘matter of widespread

and exceptional media interest in which there exist possible

questions about the government’s integrity which affect public

confidence.’” Id. at 6 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 16.5(d)(1)(iv)). On

December 16, the court ordered the FBI to “complete the

expedited processing of plaintiff’s FOIA request and provide

plaintiff with all documents as to which no exemption is being

claimed” by January 31, 2003. Edmonds v. FBI, No. 02-1294,

Order at 1 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2002). The court subsequently

extended the deadline to February 10. See Edmonds v. FBI, 310

F. Supp. 2d 55, 56-57 (D.D.C. 2004). 

On February 10, 2003, the FBI released 343 pages to

Edmonds, but advised the court that it was withholding another

1143 pages responsive to her FOIA request. The FBI then

moved for summary judgment, contending that the withheld

USCA Case #04-5177 Document #911326 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 4 of 15
5

documents were exempt from disclosure. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).

On July 24, the district court granted the FBI’s motion with

respect to all but three of the remaining pages. As to those

pages, the court asked the FBI to provide additional information

justifying withholding. See id. Thereafter, the FBI released the

three pages without being ordered to do so. See id.

On December 12, 2003, Edmonds filed a motion for

attorney’s fees relating to the December 16, 2002 order

requiring expedited treatment of her FOIA request, and to the

FBI’s release of the additional three pages. The district court

denied Edmonds’ fee motion, concluding that she had not

“substantially prevailed” on her FOIA claim, as required for fee

eligibility under the statute. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)

(providing that “[t]he court may assess against the United States

reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably

incurred in any case under this section in which the complainant

has substantially prevailed”). Edmonds now appeals from the

denial of her motion.

II

In Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia

Department of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598

(2001), the Supreme Court considered the attorney’s fees

provisions of the Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. §

3601 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 12101 et seq., which permit courts to award fees only to a

“prevailing party.” Id. §§ 3613(c)(2), 12205. The Court

rejected the plaintiffs’ contention, which it characterized as the

“catalyst theory,” that “a plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ if it

achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a

voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct.” Buckhannon, 532

U.S. at 601. Rather, the Court ruled, for a litigant to be a

“prevailing party,” there must have been a “judicially sanctioned

USCA Case #04-5177 Document #911326 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 5 of 15
6

3As a fallback, Edmonds “respectfully argues that Buckhannon

does not apply in FOIA” cases. Appellant’s Br. at 32. In light of our

disposition, Edmonds does not need a fallback argument; but if she

did, the contrary decision in OCAW would deprive this panel of the

authority to consider such an argument. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots

Ass’n, Int’l v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 838 F.2d 563, 565 n.3

(D.C. Cir. 1988).

change in the legal relationship of the parties.” Id. at 605.

“[E]nforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered

consent decrees,” the Court said, suffice to create such a change.

Id. at 604.

InOil,Chemical & Atomic WorkersInternational Union v.

Department of Energy (OCAW), this circuit extended the

holding of Buckhannon to the fee-shifting provision of FOIA.

288 F.3d 452, 454-57 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The OCAW court

concluded that “the ‘substantially prevail’ language in FOIA [is]

the functional equivalent of the ‘prevailing party’ language

found in” the statutes interpreted in Buckhannon. Id. at 455-56.

It “therefore h[e]ld that in order for plaintiffs in FOIA actions to

become eligible for an award of attorney’s fees, they must have

‘been awarded some relief by [a] court,’ either in a judgment on

the merits or in a court-ordered consent decree.” Id. at 456-57

(quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603).

Edmonds asserts that she satisfied the requirements of

Buckhannon and OCAW by obtaining partial summary judgment

on the question of expedited review, an order from the district

court directing release of nonexempt documents by February 10,

2003, and the actual release of 343 pages that day.3 She

contends that she further prevailed by ultimately obtaining the

release of the three additional pages. We review the district

court’s contrary determination, which rests on “an interpretation

of the statutory terms that define eligibility for an award,” de

USCA Case #04-5177 Document #911326 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 6 of 15
7

novo. National Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Department of Labor, 159 F.3d

597, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

III

The district court concluded, and the government argues on

appeal, that Edmonds was not a prevailing party because “a

court order requiring expedited processing does not rise to the

level of a ‘material alteration of the legal relationship of the

parties necessary to permit an award of attorney’s fees.’”

Edmonds, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 58 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S.

at 604 (internal quotation marks omitted). We disagree. Prior

to the December 16, 2002 order, the FBI was not under judicial

direction to produce any category of documents by any specified

date. Once the court issued that order, the Bureau was under

judicial direction to produce all nonexempt documents, first by

January 31 and then by February 10, 2003. The order thus

amounted to a “judicially sanctioned change in the legal

relationship of the parties.” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.

Thereafter, timely production of nonexempt documents by the

FBI could no longer be described as a “voluntary change in the

defendant’s conduct.” Id. at 600. To the contrary, the plaintiff

then had an “enforceable judgment,” id. at 607 n.9, and if the

defendant failed to comply, it faced the sanction of contempt.

1. The district court thought OCAW stood for the

proposition that the requirements of Buckhannon could not be

satisfied until there was a “judgment by the Court regarding the

legality of the government’s withholding of documents.”

Edmonds, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 58. That is incorrect. OCAW --

which did not involve FOIA’s expedited processing provision --

did hold that an August 23, 1999 order in that case “requir[ing]

that the Energy Department complete its record review in 60

days” did not materially alter the legal status of the parties. 288

F.3d at 458. But as the OCAW court described it, that order was

USCA Case #04-5177 Document #911326 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 7 of 15
8

quite different from the one issued by the district court in this

case. 

According to OCAW, “[b]efore August 23, the court had not

ordered the Energy Department to turn over any documents;

after August 23, the Energy Department still had no obligation

to do so.” Id. In the instant case, by contrast, the district court’s

December 16, 2002 order did not merely direct the FBI to

“complete its record review.” Id. Rather, it ordered the Bureau

to turn over all nonexempt documents by a date certain. After

the court issued that order (and the subsequent extension), the

FBI had a clear obligation to turn over such documents by

February 10. And the FBI did release 343 nonexempt

documents that day.

Even so, the government maintains that an order directing

expedited processing “does not meaningfully alter the legal

obligations between a FOIA requester and the government; it

merely allows one person to push aside the prior claims of

others and jump to the head of the line.” Appellee’s Br. at 10.

But whether or not an expedition order changes the

government’s obligations to the universe of all FOIA requesters,

there is no question that it changes the government’s obligations

to the plaintiff requester. Not only must the agency permit the

plaintiff to “jump to the head of the line” -- a meaningful

obligation in itself -- it must produce the documents by the

court-designated deadline. 

2. Nor is it correct to argue, as the government does, that a

party who obtains an expedition order has not “prevailed on the

merits of at least some of [her] claims.” Buckhannon, 532 U.S.

at 603 (quoting Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758

(1980)) (emphasis added). Unlike the OCAW order, which the

court described as a “scheduling order[]” that did not award the

plaintiff “judicial relief on the merits of [its] complaint,” 288

USCA Case #04-5177 Document #911326 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 8 of 15
9

4The judicial review provision referenced in the quotation grants

district courts “jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding

agency records and to order the production of any agency records

improperly withheld from the complainant.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B);

see Al-Fayed, 254 F.3d at 305.

F.3d at 458-59, expedited processing of a FOIA request is a

statutory right, not just a matter of court procedure. See AlFayed v. CIA, 254 F.3d 300, 304 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (treating a

plaintiff’s entitlement to expedited processing as a merits

question). 

FOIA’s expedited-processing provision, added by the

Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996,

requires each agency to “promulgate regulations . . . providing

for expedited processing of requests for records -- (I) in cases in

which the person requesting the records demonstrates a

compelling need; and (II) in other cases determined by the

agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(i). The same amendments

make the right to expedition judicially enforceable, stating that

“[a]gency action to deny or affirm denial of a request for

expedited processing pursuant to this subparagraph, and failure

by an agency to respond in a timely manner to such a request[,]

shall be subject to judicial review under paragraph (4).” Id. §

552(a)(6)(E)(iii).4 Thus, the district court order granting

Edmonds partial summary judgment and compelling production

of nonexempt documents by February 10 was not, as the

government suggests, a mere “procedural timing order.”

Appellee’s Br. at 25. Rather, it vindicated a statutory right that

Edmonds’ complaint expressly claimed, see Am. Compl. ¶ 21,

and granted her relief that she specifically sought, see id. ¶ 22.

In short, it provided the plaintiff with full relief “on the merits”

of her claim to expedited treatment.

We reject the government’s further suggestion that

USCA Case #04-5177 Document #911326 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 9 of 15
10

5Amicus curiae Public Citizen suggests that, even where a

plaintiff does not rely on FOIA’s expedited processing provision,

court-ordered disclosure of nonexempt documents can make the

plaintiff eligible for attorney’s fees. See Public Citizen Br. at 13 (“[A]

plaintiff who obtains an enforceable court order that . . . denies the

government’s request for an Open America stay to allow additional

time to respond, and that accordingly compels the government to

respond to her request on an accelerated basis, satisfies the

Buckhannon/OCAW standard for recognition as a prevailing party.”);

id. at 8 (“FOIA requesters, even in the ordinary case, [have] an

enforceable substantive entitlement to have their requests acted upon

as promptly as possible . . . .”). Because Edmonds does rely on the

statute’s expedited review provision, we have no need to address this

suggestion.

whatever benefit Edmonds obtained from expedited processing

was too insubstantial to entitle her to a fee award. See Oral Arg.

Tape at 21:30-:40. Plainly, there is value to obtaining something

earlier than one otherwise would. That is why people

commonly pay -- and delivery services commonly charge -- a

premium for next-day delivery of important documents. Cf.

H.R. REP. NO. 93-876, at 6 (1974) (report on the 1974 FOIA

amendments) (“[I]nformation is often useful only if it is timely.

Thus, excessive delay by the agency in its response is often

tantamount to denial.”). The 1996 FOIA amendments

underlined Congress’ recognition of the value in hastening

release of certain information, by creating a statutory right to

expedited processing and providing for judicial review of its

denial. When, pursuant to court order, the FBI finished

processing Edmonds’ request two months earlier than it would

have in the absence of the order, she vindicated that statutory

right.5

3. That the district court’s order vindicated Edmonds’ right

to expedited processing midway through the proceeding, rather

than at its end, is of no import. The government reads our

USCA Case #04-5177 Document #911326 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 10 of 15
11

opinion in Thomas v. National Science Foundation, 330 F.3d

486 (D.C. Cir. 2003), as foreclosing the award of attorney’s fees

based on a grant of partial summary judgment or a preliminary

injunction. But that is a misreading. What failed to suffice in

Thomas was “partial summary judgment [that] did not afford

appellees any concrete relief, beyond [a] mere legal

declaration”; what was necessary for a fee award, we said, was

a declaration that “requir[ed] some action . . . by the defendant.”

Id. at 493-94 (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, the

deficiency in the Thomas injunction was not that it was

preliminary, but that it did nothing more than “preserve[] the

status quo pending final adjudication of the case,” after which

it was vacated and its existence adjudged by this court to have

had no consequence. Id. at 493. The case was “easily

distinguishable,” we said, from those in which the “specific

relief granted . . . was concrete and could not be reversed.” Id.

Our recent decision in Select Milk Producers, Inc. v.

Johanns, 400 F.3d 939 (D.C. Cir. 2005), confirms this reading.

There, we rejected the government’s suggestion that Thomas

established a “per se rule that a preliminary injunction can never

serve as the basis for deeming a plaintiff a ‘prevailing party’”

under a fee-shifting statute. Id. at 946. “Rather,” we said,

“Thomas held that, in the particular circumstances of that case,

plaintiffs could not satisfy the ‘prevailing party’ requirement,

because the preliminary injunction at issue had not changed the

legal relationship between the parties.” Id. As we explained,

“Thomas did not suggest that, in a dispute such as the one [in

Select Milk], where a preliminary injunction effected a

substantial change in the legal relationship between the parties

and provided plaintiffs with concrete and irreversible relief,

plaintiffs could not be considered ‘prevailing parties.’” Id.

Edmonds’ eligibility for fees is consistent with Thomas and

Select Milk. Here, the plaintiff received not just a declaration of

USCA Case #04-5177 Document #911326 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 11 of 15
12

her right to expedited processing, but an order that “changed the

legal relationship between the parties.” Id. And unlike the

preliminary injunction in Thomas, the December 16, 2002 order

in this case “requir[ed] some action . . . by the defendant,”

Thomas, 330 F.3d at 493-94, and “provided plaintiffs with

concrete and irreversible relief,” Select Milk, 400 F.3d at 946.

Indeed, this is an easier case than Select Milk because there was

nothing “preliminary” about the order requiring the FBI to

release all nonexempt documents by February 10; on the

contrary, the order granted Edmonds a portion of the ultimate

relief she sought in her complaint. The government is thus

wrong in contending that “‘[t]his type of judicial decree is not

enough to warrant a fee award, because it represents not the end

but the means of the litigation.’” Appellee’s Br. at 17 (quoting

Thomas, 330 F.3d at 494) (internal quotation marks omitted). In

this case, expedited processing was not just the means but an

end sought by the plaintiff. See Role Models America, Inc. v.

Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 966 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (concluding that

a plaintiff that obtained an injunction allowing it to compete for

excess military property was a “prevailing party,” because the

injunction “gave [the plaintiff] the precise relief it sought”).

4. Finally, the government insists that Edmonds is not a

prevailing party because the December 16, 2002 order set a date

for disclosure (initially January 31, subsequently extended to

February 10) that was later than a deadline the FBI “had earlier

agreed to meet.” Appellee’s Br. at 2. In response to Edmonds’

motion for an order compelling expedited processing, the

government did send her a letter offering to “advance the release

date” for responsive documents to January 20, 2003 -- “in order

to moot out [the] Motion.” Letter from V. Mei to D. K.

Colapinto (Oct. 8, 2002). But Edmonds declined the offer,

advancing a counterproposal seeking, inter alia, the

government’s agreement to entry of a judicial consent decree a

and payment of attorney’s fees. Letter from Colapinto to Mei

USCA Case #04-5177 Document #911326 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 12 of 15
13

(Oct. 11, 2002). 

Thereafter, the government did not voluntarily proceed to

expedite the process and meet the proffered January 20 date. To

the contrary, it effectively withdrew its offer, filing a motion to

stay the proceedings until April 1 and representing to the court

that it would take until then to process Edmonds’ request. See

Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Partial Summ. J. & Cross Mot. for

Open America Stay at 3 (Oct. 23, 2002); C. Kiefer Decl. ¶¶ 45-

46 (Oct. 23, 2002). Accordingly, once the court granted

Edmonds’ motion and compelled production by February 10, the

government’s production on that date could not be regarded as

voluntary.

Still, the government sees Edmonds as having gamed the

system in a way that courts should prevent. Citing a 1976

opinion by Judge Friendly, the government complains that

granting attorney’s fees under these circumstances would

“create perverse incentives to litigate solely for the sake of a fee

award.” Appellee’s Br. at 16 (citing Vermont Low Income

Advocacy Council, Inc. v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.

1976)). In the government’s view, “Edmonds’ rejection of the

proffered January 20 date was not based on any principled

reason -- the avowed and only purpose of litigating the motion

was an effort to obtain attorneys’ fees.” Id. Edmonds begs to

differ. She insists that she declined to accept the offer primarily

because the government refused to agree to make it judicially

enforceable, a proviso she thought necessary in light of what she

describes as the government’s “prior failure to address her

expedited processing requests . . . and [its] prior misleading and

inconsistent statements . . . as to a possible release date.”

Appellant’s Reply Br. at 5-6. 

This dispute is beside the point. Indeed, it is ironic that the

government presses Judge Friendly’s opinion upon us, since in

USCA Case #04-5177 Document #911326 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 13 of 15
14

OCAW it successfully urged this court to reject that same

opinion -- which had reasoned (inter alia) that the government

should not be allowed to “abort any award of attorney fees by an

eleventh hour tender of the information requested” after

“developments made it apparent that the judge was about to rule

for the plaintiff.” OCAW, 288 F.3d at 456 (quoting Vermont

Low IncomeAdvocacy Council, 546 F.2d at 513). Accepting the

government’s view, the OCAW court read Buckhannon as

holding that “policy arguments could not carry the day because

the meaning of ‘prevailing party’ was clear.” Id. And in

Alegria v. District of Columbia, 391 F.3d 262 (D.C. Cir. 2004),

we similarly recognized that Buckhannon had given “short

shrift” to policy arguments about the impact its “judicially

sanctioned change” requirement would have on litigation

strategies. Id. at 265 (citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 607-08).

For that reason, we felt ourselves likewise obliged to give short

shrift to the Alegria plaintiffs’ policy argument that refusing to

permit fee awards for private settlements would lead to

unnecessarily protracted litigation. See id. at 269.

In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court determined that,

“[g]iven the clear meaning of ‘prevailing party’ in the feeshifting statutes, . . . Congress ha[s] not extended any roving

authority” to the courts to consider policy arguments in

determining eligibility for attorney’s fees. 532 U.S. at 610

(internal quotation marks omitted). There is nothing in

Buckhannon or our own cases that would permit us to assume

such a roving authority when the policy arguments are made by

the government, rather than the plaintiff. 

IV

We therefore conclude that Edmonds “prevailed” in her

FOIA action by obtaining court-ordered, expedited processing

of her request, which culminated in the release of 343

USCA Case #04-5177 Document #911326 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 14 of 15
15

nonexempt pages. Generally, “plaintiffs may be considered

prevailing parties for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on

any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the

benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit.” Farrar v. Hobby,

506 U.S. 103, 109 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted); see

Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489

U.S. 782, 790 (1989) (“[T]he degree of the plaintiff’s success in

relation to the other goals of the lawsuit is a factor critical to the

determination of the size of a reasonable fee, not to eligibility

for a fee award at all.”). The same holds true in FOIA cases,

given our determination that “the ‘substantially prevail’

language in FOIA [is] the functional equivalent of the

‘prevailing party’ language found in other statutes.” OCAW,

288 F.3d at 455-56. Accordingly, Edmonds is eligible for an

award of attorney’s fees whether or not she also substantially

prevailed by obtaining the release of an additional three pages,

and we need not decide that issue.

That is not the end of the matter, however. Our case law

makes clear that a FOIA plaintiff who “substantially prevail[s]”

becomes eligible for attorney’s fees; whether the plaintiff is

actually entitled to a fee award is a separate inquiry that requires

a court to consider a series of factors. See, e.g., Tax Analysts v.

DOJ, 965 F.2d 1092, 1093-94 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also 5

U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (providing that “[t]he court may assess .

. . reasonable attorney fees . . . in any case under this section in

which the complainant has substantially prevailed” (emphasis

added)). Because the district court found Edmonds ineligible for

fees, it did not address the second step of the inquiry, Edmonds,

310 F. Supp. 2d at 58 n.2, which both parties agree is not before

us. We therefore remand for the district court to consider that

question. 

Reversed and remanded.

USCA Case #04-5177 Document #911326 Filed: 08/09/2005 Page 15 of 15