Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-03220/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-03220-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shawn Avant
Petitioner
Rick Hill
Respondent

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SHAWN AVANT, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

RICK HILL, 

Respondent. 

Case No. 13-cv-03220-YGR (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

INTRODUCTION 

Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief from his state convictions. The petition for 

such relief is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND 

Evidence presented at trial showed that in 2008, Petitioner attacked his girlfriend, 

Mary Burgess, with a metal rod, causing injuries to her hands, head, and shoulder. Such 

evidence included the testimony of Matthew Kurrle, a San Jose police officer. He testified 

at trial that Burgess1

, who was coherent and had good recall of the events, stated that 

 1 Burgess did not appear at the preliminary hearing and appeared at trial only after a 

warrant for her appearance had been executed. (Ans., Ex. 7A, Vol. 1 at 24-25.) At trial, 

she testified that she did remember she and Petitioner arguing and being angry with each 

other, (id. at 33.), but did not remember whether Petitioner broke her hand or whether she 

broke it when she fell in the mud on her way to a shelter, (id. at 28). 

Case 4:13-cv-03220-YGR Document 12 Filed 02/29/16 Page 1 of 11
2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Petitioner had hit her with a metal rod while saying, “I’m going to kill you.” (Ans., Ex. 

7A, Vol. 1 at 69-70.) 

In 2010, a Santa Clara County Superior Court jury found Petitioner guilty of assault 

with a deadly weapon and inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant, and found 

true an allegation that Petitioner had personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon in the 

commission of the assault. The trial court found true allegations that Petitioner had prior 

convictions. Consequent to these verdicts and findings, the trial court sentenced him to 

fourteen years in state prison. (Ans., Ex. 2 (State Appellate Opinion) at 1.) Petitioner was 

denied relief on state judicial review. This federal habeas petition followed. 

As grounds for federal habeas relief, Petitioner claims that (1) the admission of 

evidence of a prior conviction violated his right to due process; (2) the trial court violated 

his right to due process by instructing the jury on evidence of prior domestic violence; 

(3) defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance; and (4) there was cumulative error. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 

this Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody 

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a). The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the 

merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state 

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme] Court 

on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a 

set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–

Case 4:13-cv-03220-YGR Document 12 Filed 02/29/16 Page 2 of 11
3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant 

the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s 

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 

413. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes 

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” 

inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law 

was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Admission of Evidence of Prior Conviction 

The gravamen of this and the next two habeas claims is the admission and use of 

evidence of a prior conviction for domestic violence. 

The trial court admitted evidence, over a defense objection, that in 2007 Petitioner 

received a felony conviction in a Washington superior court for his third violation of a “no 

contact order.”2

 (Ans., Ex. 2 at 5.) Under Washington law, Petitioner’s offense qualified 

as an act of “domestic violence.”3

 (Id. at 7.) It also qualified as an act of domestic 

violence under California law according to the California trial court, which admitted the 

evidence under section 1109 of the Evidence Code (“Evidence of defendant’s other acts of 

domestic violence”). (Id. at 5.) 

Petitioner claims admission of this evidence was prejudicial and constituted 

impermissible character or propensity evidence. (Pet. at 7–9.) The state appellate court 

rejected these claims. First, it held that the trial court properly concluded that the 

 2 There was no testimony at trial regarding the prior conviction. It was, however, 

mentioned by the prosecutor and defense counsel in their closing arguments. (Ans., Ex. 2 

at 8, 9.) 

3 The Washington state superior court judgment reads in part as follows: “the court 

finds that the defendant has been charged with, arrested for, or convicted of a domestic 

violence offense.” (Ans., Ex. 2 at 7.) 

Case 4:13-cv-03220-YGR Document 12 Filed 02/29/16 Page 3 of 11
4 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Washington conviction “constituted a prior domestic violence conviction” under California 

law. (Id. at 12–13.) The court declared that “domestic violence” under California law 

includes such behavior as stalking, threatening, harassing, and even telephoning another 

person. (Id. at 12.) It further concluded that the trial court properly admitted the evidence 

under section 1109, a state statute specifically enacted to allow the admission of evidence 

of prior acts of domestic violence, an exception to the traditional rule against the admission 

of propensity evidence. (Id. at 10, 13.) It also found that the evidence was “not 

prejudicially more inflammatory than the conduct for which [Petitioner] was charged,” and 

that its admission did not involve an undue consumption of time. (Id. at 14.) 

Habeas relief is not warranted here because no remediable federal constitutional 

violation occurred. First, a petitioner’s due process rights concerning the admission of 

propensity evidence is not clearly established for purposes of review under AEDPA, the 

Supreme Court having reserved this issue as an “open question.” Alberni v. McDaniel, 

458 F.3d 860, 866–67 (9th Cir. 2006). Second, even if the evidence were prejudicial, the 

Supreme Court “has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly 

prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of 

the writ.” Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). Third, any claim 

that the state court erred in admitting the evidence under state law, or that the Washington 

conviction does not qualify as a conviction for domestic violence under California law, is 

not remediable on federal habeas review. The state appellate court’s ruling that the 

evidence was properly admitted and defined under state law binds this federal habeas 

court. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). 

Petitioner also contends that “domestic violence” is restricted by law to mean 

“abuse,” that is, “causing or attempting to cause bodily injury or placing another person in 

reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” (Pet. at 17.) This is incorrect. The 

state appellate court went to great lengths to explain that “domestic violence” includes acts 

other than abuse, e.g., stalking, threatening or even telephoning another person. (Ans., Ex. 

2 at 12.) It was reasonable for the state court to conclude that Petitioner’s conviction for 

Case 4:13-cv-03220-YGR Document 12 Filed 02/29/16 Page 4 of 11
5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

violating a no-contact order was greatly similar to this expanded version of “domestic 

violence.” Based on the foregoing, the state appellate court’s rejection of Petitioner’s 

claim was reasonable and is therefore entitled to AEDPA deference. Accordingly, this 

claim is DENIED. 

II. Jury Instruction on Prior Act Evidence 

The trial court limited how the jury could use the prior act evidence. It gave the 

following instruction, a modified version of CALCRIM No. 852 (“Evidence of Uncharged 

Domestic Violence”), which had been requested by the prosecutor and to which defense 

counsel did not object: 

The People presented evidence that the [Petitioner] committed domestic 

violence that was not charged in this case, specifically, proof of a prior 

conviction for a violation of a restraining order in 2007 in Washington 

State. You may consider this evidence only if the People have proved by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the [Petitioner] in fact committed the 

uncharged domestic violence. 

Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a different burden of proof 

from proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a 

preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that it is more likely than 

not that the fact is true. 

 

If the People have not met this burden of proof, you must disregard this 

evidence entirely. If you decide that the [Petitioner] committed the 

uncharged domestic violence, you may but are not required to conclude 

from that evidence that the [Petitioner] was disposed or inclined to commit 

domestic violence, and based on that decision, also conclude that the 

[Petitioner] was likely to commit and did commit Counts 1 and 2 as 

charged here. 

 

If you conclude that the [Petitioner] committed the uncharged domestic 

violence, that conclusion is only one factor to consider, along with all of the 

other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the [Petitioner] is 

guilty of Counts 1 and 2. The People must still prove each charge and 

allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. Do not consider this evidence for 

any other purpose. 

(Ans., Ex. 2 at 15.) 

Case 4:13-cv-03220-YGR Document 12 Filed 02/29/16 Page 5 of 11
6 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Petitioner claims this instruction violated his due process rights. First, he argues 

that the documentation of the prior conviction did not support an inference that he was 

likely to commit and did commit the acts for which he was charged. (Pet. at 18–19.) 

Second, he claims the instruction incorrectly stated the law when it failed to define 

“domestic violence.” (Id. at 19–21.) By extension, he then submits that the jury then was 

not allowed to consider whether a violation of a no-contact order falls within the definition 

of domestic violence. Third, he alleges that the instruction impermissibly lowered the 

burden of proof. (Id. at 21.) 

The state appellate court rejected these claims. Thus: it concluded that the trial 

court properly admitted the prior act evidence under section 1109. “The trial court 

properly found that [the documentary evidence] constitutes proof of a prior conviction for 

domestic violence which could support an inference that [Petitioner] had a propensity to 

commit domestic violence against a female cohabitant and therefore was likely to commit 

the charges against him.” (Ans., Ex. 2 at 16.) Also, it found proper the trial court’s 

instruction to the jury on how to weigh the evidence, and the failure to define “domestic 

violence” was harmless error. (Id. at 16.) 

Habeas relief is not warranted here. First, the state appellate court’s determination 

that the trial court properly admitted the evidence under state law binds this federal habeas 

court. Richey, 546 U.S. at 76. 

Second, the instruction made clear in the first line that “domestic violence” meant 

“violation of a restraining order”: “The People presented evidence that the [Petitioner] 

committed domestic violence that was not charged in this case, specifically, proof of a 

prior conviction for a violation of a restraining order in 2007 in Washington State.” (Ans., 

Ex. 2 at 15.) It would have been superfluous for the trial court to define “domestic 

violence.” 

Third, Petitioner’s claim that the instruction lowered the prosecution’s burden of 

proof is unavailing. The instruction permits, but does not require, the jury to consider 

evidence that Petitioner committed another offense. Because the instruction was 

Case 4:13-cv-03220-YGR Document 12 Filed 02/29/16 Page 6 of 11
7 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

permissive, the jury was not even required to consider such evidence. Rather, the jury was 

free to accept or reject such evidence, and even if it accepted such evidence as true, to give 

it any weight it chose. 

Additionally, nothing in the instruction lowered the prosecution’s burden to prove 

Petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The instructions themselves explicitly state 

that the prior act evidence “is not sufficient by itself” to prove Petitioner’s guilt. Rather, 

the prior act evidence was one factor to consider “along with all the other evidence,” and 

that the prosecutor still had the burden to prove each element of each offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. The Court must presume that the jurors followed the instructions and 

applied the proper legal standard. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987). 

Based on this record, it was reasonable for the state court to determine both that the 

trial court had no duty to define “domestic violence,” and also to determine that any error 

was harmless. Both determinations are entitled to AEDPA deference, and Petitioner’s 

claims are DENIED. Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2199 (9th Cir. 2015) (habeas relief 

under section 2254 is unavailable unless the harmlessness determination itself was 

unreasonable). 

III. Assistance of Counsel 

Petitioner claims defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to 

object to the admission of the prior conviction evidence on grounds that the conviction did 

not constitute domestic violence under section 1109. He also claims that counsel failed to 

object to the use of the modified jury instruction. (Pet. at 26.) 

The state appellate court did not address this claim in its written opinion. The claim 

was presented to the state supreme court, which summarily denied it. When presented 

with a state court decision that is unaccompanied by a rationale for its conclusions, a 

federal court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the 

state-court decision is objectively unreasonable. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 

(9th Cir. 2000). This review is not de novo. “[W]here a state court’s decision is 

unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by 

Case 4:13-cv-03220-YGR Document 12 Filed 02/29/16 Page 7 of 11
8 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011). 

The record shows that defense counsel objected to admission on grounds that the 

evidence was more prejudicial than probative; the prior conviction did not qualify as a 

felony conviction under California law; and the admission of such evidence violated due 

process under the state and federal constitutions. (Ans., Ex. 2 at 5–6.) However, neither 

counsel nor the court could remember whether he objected on grounds that the conviction 

did not qualify as an act of domestic violence under section 1109. (Id. at 6.) 

In order to prevail on a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, a habeas petitioner must 

establish two factors. First, he must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, 

i.e., that it fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing 

professional norms, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–68 (1984), “not whether 

it deviated from best practices or most common custom,” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (citing 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). “A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must 

apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide range’ of 

reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 104 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient 

performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome. Id. Where the defendant is challenging his conviction, the 

appropriate question is “whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, 

the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Id. at 695. “The 

likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 

U.S. at 112 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). 

The standards of both 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and Strickland are “highly deferential 

. . . and when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.” Id. at 105 (quotation and 

citations omitted). “The question [under § 2254(d)] is not whether counsel’s actions were 

Case 4:13-cv-03220-YGR Document 12 Filed 02/29/16 Page 8 of 11
9 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied 

Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id. 

Habeas relief is not warranted on petitioner’s claim that counsel should have 

objected on grounds that the prior conviction did not qualify as an act of domestic violence 

under California law.4

 Any objection would likely have been rejected. First, the trial court 

had rejected counsel’s assertions that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative, the 

prior did not qualify as a felony conviction under California law, and that its admission 

would violate due process. Petitioner has not shown that an objection on this fourth 

ground would have been sustained. The state appellate court’s ruling indicates that it 

would not. Second, the Washington judgment declared without equivocation that the 

crime was an instance of domestic violence. Petitioner has not shown that California law 

favors a different reading of the prior conviction under its laws. Again, the opinion of the 

state appellate court strongly contradicts any such assertion. Therefore, any objection by 

defense counsel would almost certainly have been denied. It is both reasonable and not 

prejudicial for defense counsel to forgo a meritless objection. See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 

F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Furthermore, any inquiry into whether it was deficient or prejudicial that defense 

counsel (allegedly) failed to object inevitably leads to this federal habeas court trying to reinterpret state law and second guess the state appellate court’s decision on state law. As 

stated above, this Court is bound by the state appellate court’s determination that the prior 

conviction qualified as an act of domestic violence under state law. 

Habeas relief is also not warranted on Petitioner’s claim that his Sixth Amendment 

rights were violated when counsel failed to object to the use of the modified jury 

instruction. His claim is that the instruction failed to define domestic violence. However, 

the instruction clearly tied “domestic violence” to the violation of the restraining order and 

 4 As noted above, counsel may have raised such an objection. No one, however, 

remembers him making one. 

Case 4:13-cv-03220-YGR Document 12 Filed 02/29/16 Page 9 of 11
10 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

the court had previously determined that the prior conviction constituted domestic 

violence. An objection would have been futile. It is both reasonable and not prejudicial 

for defense counsel to forgo a meritless objection. See Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1273. 

Upon an independent review of the record, the state court’s rejection of these claims 

were not objectively unreasonable. Also, Petitioner has not shown that there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief. The state court’s decision is therefore 

entitled to AEDPA deference. Accordingly, this claim is DENIED. 

IV. Cumulative Error 

Petitioner claims there was cumulative error. (Pet. at 24–25.) The state appellate 

court rejected this claim because there was no error by the trial court. (Ans., Ex. 2 at 17.) 

In some cases, although no single trial error is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant 

reversal, the cumulative effect of several errors may still prejudice a defendant so much 

that his conviction must be overturned. See Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 893–95 

(9th Cir. 2003). Where there is no single constitutional error existing, nothing can 

accumulate to the level of a constitutional violation. See Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 

939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Because Petitioner has not shown a single constitutional error, his cumulative error 

claim necessarily fails. The state court’s denial of the claim was therefore not 

unreasonable and is entitled to AEDPA deference. Accordingly, this claim is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION 

The state court’s adjudication of the claim did not result in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor 

did it result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Accordingly, the petition is 

DENIED. 

A certificate of appealability will not issue. Reasonable jurists would not “find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may seek a certificate of appealability 

Case 4:13-cv-03220-YGR Document 12 Filed 02/29/16 Page 10 of 11
11 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Respondents and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 29, 2016 

______________________________________ 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Case 4:13-cv-03220-YGR Document 12 Filed 02/29/16 Page 11 of 11