Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01907/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01907-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
John L. Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 09-1907

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

John L. Williams, 

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the 

Western District of Missouri.

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Submitted: November 18, 2009

 Filed: March 4, 2010

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Before MELLOY, BEAM and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

In 2007, John Williams and several co-conspirators carried out three bank

robberies in the Kansas City, Missouri area. Williams was eventually charged with

three counts of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), and three

counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence (viz., bank robbery), in violation

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of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).1

 Williams elected to go to trial, and the jury found him

guilty on all counts. 

The district court2

 sentenced Williams to 92 months’ imprisonment on each of

the bank robbery counts and ordered those terms to run concurrently. The court then

sentenced Williams to 84 months’ imprisonment on the first firearm count, which is

the statutory minimum for a § 924(c)(1)(A) offense if the firearm is “brandished,” see

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). And the court sentenced Williams to 300 months’ imprisonment

on each of the two remaining firearm counts, which is the statutory minimum for a

“second or subsequent conviction” under § 924(c)(1)(A), see § 924(c)(1)(C)(i). The

sentences on the firearm counts cannot run concurrently with any other sentence, see

§ 924(c)(1)(D)(ii), so the court ordered the 84-month sentence and both of the 300-

month sentences to run consecutively to the 92-month sentence and to one another,

resulting in a total term of 776 months’ imprisonment. Williams appeals, challenging

the overall sentence on procedural and substantive grounds.

Williams first argues that the district court committed significant procedural

error. In particular, Williams asserts that the court treated the advisory sentencing

guidelines as mandatory and failed to consider all of the factors set out in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a). See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (listing examples of

“significant procedural error,” including “treating the Guidelines as mandatory” and

“failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors”). Since Williams—who chose to discharge

his trial counsel and represent himself at sentencing—did not object to the district

court’s application of the guidelines or to the court’s consideration of the § 3553(a)

1

Technically, Williams was charged with aiding and abetting some of the

offenses. Because a person who aids and abets the commission of a federal offense

is punishable as a principal, 18 U.S.C. § 2, these details do not affect our analysis. 

2

The Honorable Ortrie D. Smith, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

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factors, we review only for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Phelps, 536 F.3d

862, 865 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 1390 (2009).

The record shows that Williams’s first argument is without merit. The district

court determined that the advisory sentencing guidelines range on the bank robbery

counts was 92 to 115 months. The court then noted that on the firearm counts,

consecutive sentences of 84 months, 300 months, and 300 months were required by

statute. See § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), (C)(i), (D)(ii). The court correctly acknowledged,

“[t]he only issue that I have any real discretion on is the guideline range sentence of

92 to 115 months.” That statement does not show that the district court felt bound to

sentence Williams within the guidelines range; just the opposite, the statement

confirms that the court understood the scope of its sentencing discretion with respect

to the bank robbery counts. An express statement confirming the court’s awareness

of its discretion to vary from the guidelines is not strictly necessary, as we have made

clear that “Booker, Rita, and Gall were hardly obscure decisions likely to have been

overlooked by federal sentencing judges, and we presume that district judges know

the law.” See United States v. Gray, 533 F.3d 942, 943 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). In any event, the context makes clear that the

district court used the words “only” and “real” to contrast the court’s broad discretion

with respect to the bank robbery counts and its limited discretion with respect to the

firearm counts, which carried mandatory minimum sentences prescribed by statute. 

The district court did not treat the guidelines as mandatory.

Turning to the district court’s discussion of the § 3553(a) factors, we have held

that a “mechanical recitation” of the factors is unnecessary, “particularly when a judge

elects simply to apply the advisory guideline range to a particular case.” United States

v. Zastrow, 534 F.3d 854, 855 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Todd, 521

F.3d 891, 897 (8th Cir. 2008)). Here, the need for a lengthy discussion was also

lessened by the defendant’s failure to make an argument regarding the appropriate

sentence. Williams not only failed to present “nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a

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different sentence,” he presented no reasons at all. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.

338, 357 (2007) (noting that where a defendant “presents nonfrivolous reasons for

imposing a different sentence, . . . the judge will normally . . . explain why he has

rejected those arguments”). Yet the record shows that the district court did in fact

address many of the § 3553(a) factors, including the nature and circumstances of the

offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for the sentence

imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct and to protect the public

from further crimes of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, and the need

to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among similarly situated defendants. See

§ 3553(a)(1), (2)(B), (2)(C), (3), (6). The court’s specific reference to these factors

does not mean that it failed to consider the others. See United States v. Molina, 563

F.3d 676, 679 (8th Cir. 2009). Thus, we conclude that Williams has failed to show

a significant procedural error, much less a plain error affecting his substantial rights. 

See Phelps, 536 F.3d at 865 (stating that “[u]nder plain error review, the defendant

must show: (1) an error; (2) that is plain; and (3) that affects substantial rights”).

Williams next argues that his overall sentence is substantively unreasonable. 

Specifically, Williams contends that the district court “did not adequately consider

whether the 57 years [684 months] already mandated by statute [on the firearm

counts] . . . was sufficient to meet the objectives of § 3553.” Ordinarily, “[w]e review

a defendant’s challenge to the district court’s weighing of the relevant factors for

abuse of discretion, regardless of whether the defendant made an after-the-fact

objection to the length of the sentence that the court imposed.” Molina, 563 F.3d at

679 (citing United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 2009)). 

Williams’s principal contention on this point—that the district court failed to

give adequate weight to the severity of the statutory minimum sentences for the

firearm counts—is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Hatcher, 501 F.3d

931 (8th Cir. 2007). There, we held that the severity of a “mandatory consecutive

sentence” for a § 924(c)(1)(A) offense is an improper factor that the district court may

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not consider when sentencing a defendant on related crimes of violence. Id. at 933-34. 

The holding in Hatcher comports with the decisions of other courts that have

considered the question. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 549 F.3d 119, 135 (2d Cir.

2008) (“[W]e conclude that a sentencing court is required to determine the appropriate

prison term for the count to which the § 924(c) punishment is to be consecutive; and

if the court reduces the prison term imposed for that underlying count on the ground

that the total sentence is, in the court’s view, too severe, the court conflates the two

punishments and thwarts the will of Congress . . . .”); United States v. Roberson, 474

F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[T]o use the presence of a section 924(c)(1) add-on

to reduce the defendant’s sentence for the underlying crime would be inconsistent

with Congress’s determination to fix a minimum sentence for using a firearm in a

crime of violence.”). And the holding in Hatcher has not been cast into doubt by Gall,

Kimbrough, Spears or any other intervening Supreme Court decision. See United

States v. Porrello, No. 08-2658, 2009 WL 3488428, at *1 (8th Cir. Oct. 30, 2009)

(unpublished per curiam) (rejecting the argument by Hatcher’s co-defendant that the

district court erred in resentencing him according to this court’s mandate, explaining

that “[after] Gall, a district court still abuses its discretion when it gives significant

weight to an improper factor”); see also United States v. Calabrese, 572 F.3d 362,

369-70 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming the Seventh Circuit’s continued adherence to

Roberson, without citing Gall, Kimbrough, or Spears), petition for cert. filed, 78

U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2009) (No. 09-446). Thus, in sentencing Williams on

the bank robbery counts, the district court was not permitted to give any weight to the

severity of the statutory minimum sentences for the firearm counts, and the record

shows that the district court properly refused to do so.

All that remains is to determine whether the total sentence on the bank robbery

counts is substantively reasonable. As we have noted, the district court sentenced

Williams to 92 months’ imprisonment on each of the bank robbery counts, the bottom

of the guidelines range, and ordered those terms to run concurrently. We accord this

sentence, and all others within the applicable guidelines range, a “presumption of

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substantive reasonableness on appeal.” See Molina, 563 F.3d at 679 (quoting Phelps,

536 F.3d at 869). Williams has not identified a plausible basis for overcoming that

presumption in this case. Applying the “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard,”

United States v. Papakee, 573 F.3d 569, 577 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S.

at 41), we are convinced that the sentence on the bank robbery counts is reasonable. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Williams’s overall sentence of 776

months’ imprisonment.3

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3

We note that Williams, who is represented by counsel on appeal, submitted a

pro se supplemental brief and a pro se supplemental reply brief. Although we granted

Williams permission to file a supplemental brief, “[i]t is typically not our practice to

consider pro se arguments where the defendant is represented by counsel,” United

States v. Moore, 481 F.3d 1113, 1114 n.2 (8th Cir. 2007). Nevertheless, we have

considered the arguments raised in Williams’s pro se briefs, and we conclude that they

are uniformly without merit. See United States v. Sanders, 341 F.3d 809, 822 n.2 (8th

Cir. 2003).

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