Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00803/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00803-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Fern L. Hudson
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

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 Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, 1

this matter was deemed suitable for decision without oral

argument. Local Rule 230(g).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FERN L. HUDSON No. 2:09-cv-00803-MCE-DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 

DOES 1-20, inclusive, 

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Fern L. Hudson (“Plaintiff”) seeks monetary relief

from the United States of America (“Defendant”) for claims

arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b),

et seq. (“FTCA”).

Presently before the Court is a Motion by Defendant to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss is granted.1

Case 2:09-cv-00803-MCE -DAD Document 27 Filed 02/19/10 Page 1 of 7
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 The factual assertions in this section are based on the 2

allegations in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint unless

otherwise specified.

2

BACKGROUND2

On June 14, 2008, Mrs. Fern Hudson, an 80-year-old woman,

suffered an injury while grocery shopping at the McClellan

Commissary at McClellan Air Force Base. Plaintiff alleges that

while standing at the checkout counter, a “bagger” or other

employee was moving an electric shopping cart. The cart struck

Plaintiff causing her right femoral shaft to shatter and throwing

her body to the floor where she struck her head. 

Plaintiff asserts that she timely filed an administrative

claim and upon denial, subsequently, filed suit in this Court

pursuant to FTCA procedure. 

STANDARD

Federal courts are presumptively without jurisdiction over

civil actions, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests

upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Lack of subject

matter jurisdiction is never waived and may be raised by either

party or the court at any time. Attorneys Trust v. Videotape

Computer Products, Inc., 93 F.3d. 593, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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3

Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by the district

court sua sponte: “Nothing is to be more jealously guarded by a

court than its jurisdiction.” In re Mooney, 841 F.2d. 1003, 1006

(9th Cir. 1988).

In moving to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(1), the challenging party may either make

a facial attack on the allegations of jurisdiction contained in

the complaint or can instead take issue with subject matter

jurisdiction on a factual basis. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen.

Tel. & Elect. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979); Mortensen

v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3rd Cir.

1977).

If the motion constitutes a facial attack, the Court must

consider the factual allegations of the complaint to be true. 

Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981);

Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. If the motion constitutes a factual

attack, however, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to

plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed material

facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for

itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Thornhill, 594 F.2d

at 733 (quoting Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).

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Case 2:09-cv-00803-MCE -DAD Document 27 Filed 02/19/10 Page 3 of 7
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4

ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s action should be dismissed

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it does not

satisfy the FTCA’s jurisdictional requirement that her injuries

be caused by a government employee. Plaintiff counters that the

Defendant should be liable for the bagger’s negligent actions. 

“The Federal Tort Claims Act waives the United States’

sovereign immunity for actions in tort.” Jerves v. United

States, 966 F.2d 517, 518 (9th Cir. 1992). Under the FTCA, the

federal government waives its sovereign immunity for those claims

arising out of: 

“the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any

employee of the Government while acting within the

scope of his office or employment, under circumstances

where the United States, if a private person, would be

liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of

the place where the act or omission occurred.” 

28 U.S.C. section 1346(b). However this general waiver of

sovereign immunity is subject to several restraints. See Terbush

v. United States, 516 F.3d 1125, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2008). “The

party who sues the United States bears the burden of pointing to

such an unequivocal waiver of immunity.” Holloman v. Watt, 708

F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984).

At issue in the instant case is the “independent contractor

exception,” which exempts the government from liability that

would otherwise result from “the exercise or performance or the

failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty

on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,

whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 

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5

28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). By definition, a federal agency or employee

“does not include any contractor with the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2671. “Federal law determines whether an individual

is a federal employee.” Autrey v. United States, 424 F.3d 944,

957 (9th Cir. 2005). However, “[c]ommon law agency principles

are also instructive in determining whether one is a contractor

or an employee.” Id. 

The Ninth Circuit has not definitively ruled on the role of

grocery baggers in regards to the FTCA. However, the Ninth

Circuit has held in the civil rights context held that a bagger’s

license to work was “not an employment contract but rather a

revocable grant of permission to work for customer tips.” 

Havekost v. United States Department of Navy, 925 F.2d 316, 317

(9th Cir. 1991). 

Sister Circuits have come to similar conclusions. The D.C.

Circuit has held that commissary baggers are not government

employees under the Federal Labor Standards Act. Waters v.

Rumsfeld, 320 F.3d 265, 268 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The Fifth Circuit

has also found that “baggers were not Army employees.” Mares v.

Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1068 (5th Cir. 1985). 

Plaintiff cannot dispute that the bagger who struck her,

Wantong Parson (“Parson”), was a government contractor. Parson’s

contract explicitly stated that Parson was “not an employee of

the commissary or Defense Commissary Agency” and was “not under

the supervision, direction, or control of any employee of the

Commissary.” Agreement, Robinson Exhibit B at ¶ 2. 

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6

Further, the factors dealing with Parson’s terms of

employment demonstrate that the federal government lacked an

authority to control and direct the daily performance of Parson’s

employment. “The critical test for distinguishing an agent from

a contractor is the existence of federal authority to control and

supervise the detailed physical performance and day-to-day

operations of the contractor.” Autrey, 424 F.3d at 956 (citing

Hines v. United States, 60 F.3d 1442, 1446 (9th Cir. 1995)). In

the instant case, the baggers at the McClellan Commissary are

supervised and directed by a Head Bagger, another independent

contractor elected by all other baggers. Robinson Declaration

¶ 7; Agreement at ¶¶ 10-12. The Head Bagger exercises his

authority to issue licenses to the baggers each year and to

supervise the baggers day-to-day operations. Robinson Dec. ¶¶ 7,

9. The Head Bagger establishes work schedules that the baggers

agree to abide by. Agreement at ¶ 11. The Commissary does not

pay the baggers, directly or indirectly, for their services. Id.

at ¶ 3. The baggers do not receive pension, health, or other

benefit plans or worker’s compensation. Id. at ¶ 6. Further,

the Agreement holds that the “[b]agger hereby assumes the entire

responsibility and liability for any and all damages to all

personal [sic] and property growing out of or resulting from the

execution of work provided for in this AGREEMENT, including that

resulting from the use of government furnished equipment.” Id.

at ¶ 8.

Plaintiff contends that the baggers are, in reality, still

government employees because they are bound by the rules and

regulations imposed by the government. 

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7

However the existence of such regulations is not dispositive. An

agent is not converted into an employee when the United States

implements “standards that are designed to secure federal safety

objections.” Hines, 60 F.3d at 1447. “[T]he ability to compel

compliance with federal regulation does not change a contractor’s

personnel into federal employees.” Id. Rather, “there must be

substantial supervision over day to day operations of the

contractor in order to find that the individual was acting as a

government employee.” Id. Here, the Commissary’s minor role in

instructing baggers to maintain personal hygiene, comply with

laws, and be respectful of guests and fellow employees, is hardly

the type of “substantial” control that warrants FTCA liability. 

Agreement at ¶ 12-14.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s cause of action under the FTCA

is dismissed without prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction (Docket No. 9) is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to

close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 18, 2010

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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