Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-16-60106/USCOURTS-ca5-16-60106-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent Cross-Petitioner
Remington Lodging & Hospitality, L.L.C.
Petitioner Cross-Respondent

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-60106

REMINGTON LODGING & HOSPITALITY, L.L.C., 

 Petitioner Cross-Respondent

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 

 Respondent Cross-Petitioner

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application 

for Enforcement of an Order of the 

National Labor Relations Board

Before DAVIS, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:

Remington Lodging & Hospitality, LLC (“Remington”) petitions for 

partial review of a National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or the “Board”) 

order finding that it violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor 

Relations Act (“NLRA”). The Board cross-petitions for enforcement of the 

order. For the reasons set out below, we DENY Remington’s petition for partial 

review and ENFORCE the order.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 27, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-60106 Document: 00513853422 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/27/2017
No. 16-60106

2

I.

We have jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to Sections 10(e) and 

(f) of the NLRA.1 “We review the NLRB's legal conclusions de novo and its 

‘factual findings under a substantial evidence standard.’”2 “‘Substantial 

evidence is that which is relevant and sufficient for a reasonable mind to accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere scintilla and less 

than a preponderance.’”3 “In making this determination, ‘we may not reweigh 

the evidence, try the case de novo, or substitute our judgment for that of the 

NLRB, even if the evidence preponderates against the NLRB's decision.’”4

“‘Only in the most rare and unusual cases will an appellate court conclude that 

a finding of fact made by the NLRB is not supported by substantial evidence.’”5

II.

Remington challenges two of the Board’s findings. Because these two 

findings are unrelated, we discuss each separately and in turn. 

A.

Remington is a hotel management company that, in December 2011, was 

hired to manage the Hyatt Regency Long Island hotel (the “Hyatt” or the 

“Hotel”). The Hotel, at the time, outsourced its housekeeping department to a 

staffing company called Hospitality Staffing Services (“HSS”). It was also one 

of the poorest performing Hyatt-branded properties, in terms of guestsatisfaction scores, in the United States.

 

1 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)—(f). 2 Flex Frac Logistics, L.L.C. v. N.L.R.B., 746 F.3d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Sara Lee Bakery Grp., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 514 F.3d 422, 428 (5th Cir. 2008)).

3 Id. at 207—08 (quoting El Paso Elec. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 681 F.3d 651, 656 (5th Cir. 

2012)) (alteration omitted). 

4 Id. at 208 (quoting El Paso, 681 F.3d at 656—57) (alterations omitted). 

5 Ibid. (quoting Merchants Truck Line, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 577 F.2d 1011, 1015 n.3 (5th 

Cir. 1978)) (alteration omitted).

 Case: 16-60106 Document: 00513853422 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/27/2017
No. 16-60106

3

Upon taking over as property manager, Remington decided to terminate 

the Hotel’s contract with HSS, consistent with its general preference to directly 

employ its employees. Meanwhile, the Hotel’s guest-room component score –

which serves as the primary indicator of housekeeping effectiveness and is 

measured against an average benchmark of 50 – continued to decline. In 

March, it was 20.4. In April, it was 6.0. In May, it was 8.3. And in June, it was 

1.1.

On June 28, 2012, Remington contacted HSS about re-outsourcing the 

Hotel’s housekeeping department, citing the aforementioned scores and 

unrelated financial considerations. On August 16, 2012, Remington and HSS 

executed a new outsourcing agreement (“the 2012 HSS contract”), which took 

effect on August 21, 2012. On February 12, 2016, the Board held that the 2012 

HSS contract was motivated, at least in part, by anti-union animus and that it 

therefore violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA. 

Remington challenges this finding on both factual and legal grounds. We 

begin with the law. Section 8(a)(1) states that employers may not “interfere 

with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed” by 

the NLRA.6 Section 8(a)(3) states that employers may not discriminate “in 

regard to hire or tenure of employment . . . to encourage or discourage 

membership in any labor organization.”7 Although the protections of Section 

8(a)(3) and Section 8(a)(1) “are not contemporaneous, a violation of [the former] 

constitutes a derivative violation of [the latter].”8

Where, as here, Section 8 allegations turn on employer motivation, they 

are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework first established in 

N.L.R.B. v. Wright Line, a Division of Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.

 

6 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). 

7 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). 8 Metro. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 460 U.S. 693, 698 n.4 (1983).

 Case: 16-60106 Document: 00513853422 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/27/2017
No. 16-60106

4

1981), and approved by the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Transportation 

Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400—01 (1983), abrogated in part on other 

grounds, Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Department of 

Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 276—77 (1994).9 Pursuant to this 

framework, the initial burden rests with the General Counsel to show, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the employer undertook an adverse 

employment action motivated, at least in part, by anti-union animus.10 The 

burden then shifts to the employer to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

that it would have taken the adverse action “regardless of any [anti-union] 

animus.”11 An employer who would have taken the same action regardless of 

any anti-union animus has not violated Section 8. 

Remington argues that in order to violate Section 8(a)(3), the General 

Counsel must produce evidence that the employer’s “discrimination in fact 

caused or resulted in a discouragement of union membership” which, in this 

case, the General Counsel failed to do. That requirement, however, is

completely inconsistent with our precedent. We have held that Section 8(a)(3) 

“makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against employees . . . for 

the purpose of discouraging membership in a labor organization.”12 The 

General Counsel need not prove discouragement as a matter of fact. 

 

9 N.L.R.B. v. Arkema, Inc., 710 F.3d 308, 320—21 (5th Cir. 2013); see MCPC Inc. v. 

N.L.R.B., 813 F.3d 475, 487—90 (3d Cir. 2016) (distinguishing Wright Line from the 

framework established in N.L.R.B. v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 23 (1964)); Shamrock 

Foods Co. v. N.L.R.B., 346 F.3d 1130, 1135—36 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (same). 

10 Ahearn v. Jackson Hosp. Corp., 351 F.3d 226, 238 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Trans. 

Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. at 399—403); Poly-Am., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 260 F.3d 465, 488 (5th Cir. 

2001) (internal quotations omitted). 11 Arkema, 710 F.3d at 321.

12 New Orleans Cold Storage & Warehouse Co. v. N.L.R.B., 201 F.3d 592, 599–600 (5th 

Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). 

 Case: 16-60106 Document: 00513853422 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/27/2017
No. 16-60106

5

Now on to the facts. Remington argues that the Board’s finding that the

2012 HSS contract violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) is not supported by 

substantial evidence. Having reviewed all of evidence, we disagree. 

Jose Vega, a union activist, began visiting the Hotel in April 2012, and 

union activity commenced shortly thereafter. Nina Palacios, a Remington 

housekeeper, testified that in May 2012, Remington Supervisor Percida Rosero

approached her and asked whether she had been asked to participate in a 

union meeting. Veronica Flores, a Remington housekeeper, testified that in 

June 2012, the Hotel’s then-director of housekeeping, Andrew Arpino, called 

her into his office and asked whether she “knew anything about a union.” No 

more than 28 days later – perhaps coincidentally and perhaps not –

Remington, for the first time in over six months, initiated contact with HSS 

and discussed outsourcing its employees. 13

Also relevant is a conversation that took place on August 22, 2012, the 

day after the 2012 HSS contract took effect. Remington employee Maritz 

Torres approached Rosero and asked “what was going on,” i.e., why did 

Remington choose to re-outsource the Hotel’s housekeeping department to 

HSS? “[B]ecause of the Union,” Rosero replied. 

Remington did not address this exchange in its petition or its reply. But

even assuming that Rosero was not “personally involved in [Remington’s]

decision” to re-outsource the Hotel’s housekeeping department, Rosero’s

statement provides “an explanation” that she, “as a supervisor,” was qualified 

 

13 Valmont Indus., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 244 F.3d 454, 465 (5th Cir. 2001) (Section 8 does 

not require “[o]vert direct evidence of an unlawful motive . . . . Circumstantial evidence of 

discriminatory animus may be sufficient” depending on, inter alia, “the timing of the 

employer's action in relationship to union activity . . . .”).

 Case: 16-60106 Document: 00513853422 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/27/2017
No. 16-60106

6

to give.14 Such a “definitive” statement, in these circumstances, constitutes 

substantial evidence of unlawful motive sufficient to withstand our deferential 

standard of review.15

We have considered Remington’s argument that it decided to remain a 

joint employer under the second HSS contract so as to evince a desire not “to 

avoid [its] duty to bargain with a union.” Ultimately, however, “[w]e must pay 

‘special deference’ to the [Board’s] conclusion that [an] employment decision 

was illegally motivated . . . where, as here, conflicting evidence requires that 

essential credibility determinations be made.”16

B.

Remington also challenges the Board’s finding that its decision to 

discharge Hotel employee Margaret Loiacono (“Loiacono”) violated Section 

8(a)(1) of the NLRA. The facts relevant to Loiacono’s discharge were well laid 

out by the Board majority.

In late December 2012, as part of its campaign against the Union, 

[Remington] distributed to each employee a pie chart setting forth 

the employee’s compensation and how it was allocated. The 

ostensible purpose of the chart was to demonstrate to employees 

that they received compensation and benefits beyond their base 

salary. On December 30, Loiacono, a lobby ambassador charged 

with greeting guests, left her post for 10 to 15 minutes to discuss 

her pie chart with Supervisor Yohenna Borrero. Loiacono informed 

Borrero that the chart was inaccurate because it allocated a 

portion of her compensation to a uniform allowance, and she did 

not wear a uniform. Loiacono stated that other employees’ charts 

might also contain mistakes. Later that day, Loiacono repeated her

concerns to [Remington’s] general manager, Jeff Rostek, and 

suggested that the chart be corrected. Still later that day, 

 

14 Tcb Sys., Inc. & Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 32bj, Successor to Serv. 

Employees Int'l Union, Local 11, 355 NLRB 883, 885 (2010), enf’d, TCB Sys., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 

448 F. App'x 993, 996 (11th Cir. 2011).

15 See id.

16 N.L.R.B. v. Brookwood Furniture, Div. of U.S. Indus., 701 F.2d 452, 464 (5th Cir. 

1983).

 Case: 16-60106 Document: 00513853422 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/27/2017
No. 16-60106

7

management spoke to Loiacono and two other employees about the 

difficulty employees would face in obtaining a collectivebargaining agreement and [Remington’s] purported freedom not to 

honor one.

The next day, [Remington’s] housekeeping manager, Andrew 

Arpino, sent [General Manager] Rostek an email containing a 

“statement” of Supervisor Borrero recounting her conversation 

with Loiacono the previous day. The statement purported to be 

Arpino’s typewritten transaction of Borrero’s oral account. 

According to the statement, Loiacono asserted that [Remington] 

should pay her the equivalent of a uniform allowance and should 

do the same for Borrero, accused [Remington] of “lying to the 

people,” said “that [what Remington was doing] was against the 

law,” and threatened to sue the hotel. The statement also noted 

that Loiacono had been communicating with another employee, 

Ken, about the pie chart discrepancies, and that Loiacono was 

waiting for Ken to discuss the issue with [General Manager] 

Rostek. [Remington] discharged Loiacono on January 2, 2013.

The Board recognized, and both sides concede, that Loiacono was not 

engaged in protected activity when she was terminated. Yet the Board still

held that Loiacono’s discharge violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. Remington 

argues that without finding the former, the Board cannot hold the latter. We

disagree.

The NLRA protects both actual and “alleged union activities.”17 “Thus, 

proof of an unfair labor practice does not require proof of actual union activity; 

it is sufficient if the employer was motivated by suspected union activity in 

discharging the employee.”18 “The same is true if an employer” acts to prevent 

 

17 N.L.R.B. v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 589—90 (1941).

18 Holyoke Visiting Nurses Ass'n v. N.L.R.B., 11 F.3d 302, 307 (1st Cir. 1993); see

Saffels v. Rice, 40 F.3d 1546, 1549 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing numerous cases in which courts 

have held that the NLRA protects employees who “did not actually engage in” protected 

activity). 

 Case: 16-60106 Document: 00513853422 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/27/2017
No. 16-60106

8

future protected activity.19 Employers cannot bypass the protections of the 

NLRA by launching a “pre-emptive strike.”20

Now, once again, on to the facts. The lawfulness of Loiacono’s 

termination necessarily turns on motive. We therefore analyze it under the 

same Wright Line burden-shifting framework outlined supra.21 Substantial 

evidence is the standard. We cannot simply re-weigh the evidence and displace 

those findings with which we disagree.22

As a “lobby ambassador,” Loiacono was required to be in the lobby at all 

times. She was the Hotel’s “lead cheerleader” – telling incoming guests hello, 

wishing outgoing guests goodbye, and addressing any complaints brought to 

her attention. Remington argues that Loiacono’s decision to leave her post at 

11:30 a.m. on a Sunday morning – “a heavy checkout time” – was indefensible, 

and that it previously terminated two “similarly situated” lobby ambassadors 

for doing the same thing. Remington’s attempted use of comparators is 

consistent with our precedent insofar as it recognizes that an employer who 

would have taken the same action regardless of any anti-union animus has not 

violated Section 8. We, however, find that the Remington comparators were 

not “similarly situated” to Loiacono.

 

19 Dover Energy, Inc. v. NLRB, 818 F.3d 725, 730 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 20 Parexel Int'l, 356 NLRB 516, 517 (2011); see Dover Energy, 818 F.3d at 730 (citing 

Parexel); N.L.R.B. v. RELCO Locomotives, Inc., 734 F.3d 764, 790 (8th Cir. 2013) (discussing 

Parexel). 

21 See Sutter E. Bay Hosps. v. N.L.R.B., 687 F.3d 424, 434 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting that 

Wright Line applies “when an employee is disciplined for a reason purportedly unrelated to 

any protected activity, such as a discharge for theft or poor performance”); Citizens Inv. Servs. 

Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 430 F.3d 1195, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (analyzing an alleged Section 8(a)(1) 

violation under Wright Line). 

22 See Inova Health Sys. v. N.L.R.B., 795 F.3d 68, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (referring to any 

NLRB evidentiary challenge as “a hard hill to climb”); Brookwood Furniture, 701 F.2d at 464

(“While it is true that illegal motive for an employment decision may not be lightly inferred,

it is also axiomatic that once the Board has made such an inference, a reviewing court may 

not lightly displace the Board's factual finding of discriminatory intent.”). 

 Case: 16-60106 Document: 00513853422 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/27/2017
No. 16-60106

9

The Remington comparators were fired for ignoring guests in order to 

engage in a sports discussion with each other. Loiacono was fired for leaving 

the lobby to discuss, with Remington, material that it distributed in order to 

advance its antiunion campaign. Loiacono did not ignore any guests, and 

Rostek never sought to the end the conversation. 

Remington argues that we are getting lost in the details. That Loiacono 

and the comparators were all fired for the same offense, and that Remington 

has therefore proven that it would have taken the same action regardless of 

any anti-union animus. But the details are important, and the Board was 

entitled to consider the substance of the conversation. An employer violates 

Section 8(a)(1) when it acts with the intent to “interfere with, restrain, or 

coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed” by the NLRA,23 and 

a conversation about unionization may implicate the rights guaranteed by the 

NLRA more than a conversation about sports.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Remington’s petition for partial 

review and ENFORCE the order.24

 

23 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). 

24 The Board made numerous findings that Remington did not address in its petition. 

Specifically, the Board found: (1) that Remington violated Section 8(a)(1) by unlawfully 

interrogating or threatening employees on six occasions from May through early August 

2012; (2) that Remington violated Section 8(a)(1) by unlawfully interrogating or threatening 

employees on six occasions in late August and September 2012; (3) that Remington violated 

Section 8(a)(1) by stating in its campaign literature that it would more strictly enforce 

workplace rules if the employees voted to unionize; and (4) that Remington violated Sections 

8(a)(1) and (3) by refusing to re-hire the incumbent housekeepers after it terminated the 2012 

HSS contract. Remington has, by virtue of its silence, waived any objection to these findings, 

Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994), and they are therefore summarily 

enforced.

 Case: 16-60106 Document: 00513853422 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/27/2017