Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-23-01015/USCOURTS-caDC-23-01015-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
GHG Management LLC
Respondent
National Labor Relations Board
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 19, 2023 Decided July 9, 2024 

No. 22-1312 

GHG MANAGEMENT LLC, D/B/A WINDY CITY CANNABIS,

D/B/A CURALEAF WEED STREET, 

PETITIONER

v. 

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with 23-1015 

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application 

for Enforcement of an Order 

of the National Labor Relations Board 

Maurice Baskin argued the cause for petitioner. With him 

on the briefs was Stefan Marculewicz. 

Gregoire F. Sauter, Senior Attorney, National Labor 

Relations Board, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief 

were Jennifer Abruzzo, General Counsel, Ruth E. Burdick, 

Deputy Associate General Counsel, David S. Habenstreit, 

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Assistant General Counsel, Usha Dheenan, Supervisory 

Attorney, and Jared D. Cantor, Senior Attorney. 

Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, HENDERSON, Circuit 

Judge, and ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SRINIVASAN. 

SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge: In 2021, employees at a 

Chicago cannabis dispensary voted on whether to be 

represented by a union. After voting commenced, the union 

and employer agreed to extend the election timeline to account 

for apparent delays in mail delivery. During the time 

extension, the National Labor Relations Board Agent 

overseeing the election told the parties that the office had 

received ballots from all voters who said they had mailed them. 

The Board Agent, however, did not relate that a ballot had yet 

to be received from another voter who had said she planned to 

mail hers. The vote count took place a few days later, with the 

union prevailing by one vote. The following day, the 

outstanding ballot arrived. 

The company objected to the validity of the election, 

including based on the failure to count the last-arriving ballot. 

The Board denied the objections and certified the union. The 

company now seeks review of the Board’s certification. The 

company claims, among other things, that the Board Agent’s 

communication about outstanding ballots misled the parties 

and affected the outcome of an election that had been decided 

by one vote. 

In rejecting that objection, the Board applied a line of 

decisions allowing for setting aside an election only when a 

party establishes reasonable doubt about the election’s validity 

and fairness. The Board rejected the company’s argument that 

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it should have applied an alternate line of decisions that would 

permit setting aside an election based on a lesser showing of 

prejudice—if there has been possible outcome-determinative 

disenfranchisement. 

In defending its approach in our court, the Board does not 

dispute that the company’s objection might have been 

sustained under the latter test; it instead argues only that 

applying the former test was correct. The Board, however, has 

failed to provide a coherent explanation for why the first test 

applies instead of the second. For that reason, we are unable to 

sustain the Board’s decision.

I. 

A. 

This case concerns an effort to unionize the “product 

specialists” at the Curaleaf store on West Weed Street in 

Chicago, Illinois. In January 2021, United Food and 

Commercial Workers Local 881 petitioned the National Labor 

Relations Board to administer a vote to determine whether the 

union would be the exclusive collective-bargaining 

representative for the dispensary’s product specialists. 

The union and Curaleaf entered into a stipulated 

agreement setting out the terms of the election. The parties 

agreed that the election would occur by mail under the 

following timeline: the Board’s Regional Office would mail 

ballots to eligible voters on February 25; the ballots would be 

due back to the Regional Office by March 19; and the Regional 

Office would count the ballots on the morning of March 22. 

The parties stipulated that “[i]f any eligible voter does not 

receive a mail ballot or otherwise requires a duplicate mail 

ballot kit, he or she should contact the [Regional Office] by no 

later than 5:00 p.m. CST on March 4, 2021 in order to arrange 

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for another mail ballot kit to be sent to that employee.” J.A. 

108.

One employee, Lisa Wratten, found herself in need of such 

a replacement ballot. Wratten did not receive an original ballot 

because she moved without updating her address with the 

employer. In early March, Wratten conveyed to the Board 

Agent that she needed a replacement ballot to be sent to her 

new address. The Agent texted Wratten on March 10, telling 

her that a duplicate ballot had been sent that day, and texted her 

again on March 15 to ask whether she had received that 

duplicate ballot. The following day, Wratten confirmed she 

had received the ballot and said she was mailing it that day. (In 

fact, Wratten did not mail the ballot until March 18.) 

Around this time, the parties agreed to extend the election 

timeline. On March 19—the day the ballots were originally 

due back to the Regional Office, and three days before the 

count was to take place—the parties entered into a second 

stipulated agreement. That agreement noted that, as of that 

date, the Regional Office had received only fifteen of the thirty 

ballots that had been mailed to voters, so “[t]here [was] a 

concern that not all . . . ballots mailed back to the Regional 

Office [had] been received.” Id. at 58–59. Curaleaf and the 

union agreed on a new deadline: to be counted, ballots had to 

be received by March 31. The Regional Office issued a 

corresponding order. 

The Board Agent and parties later exchanged a series of 

emails about outstanding ballots. On March 22, the Agent 

emailed the lawyers for Curaleaf and the union, writing: 

[T]he 3 ballots I had been expecting plus a 

couple more came in to our office late [on 

March 19]. So we’ve received ballots from all 

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at least that have told me that they sent their 

ballots in. 

Id. at 61. Wratten’s ballot was not one of those three ballots, 

even though Wratten had days earlier told the Board Agent she 

had mailed her replacement ballot. The Board Agent’s email 

concluded by saying that, because the Regional Office had 

received “about” twenty ballots, she “expect[ed]” to “go[] 

forward with the count on [March 31].” Id. 

Adhering to that plan, the Regional Office counted the 

ballots on March 31. The union prevailed by one vote: eleven 

to ten. The same day, Curaleaf emailed the Regional Office 

asking it to retain any late-arriving ballots. The company 

explained that, given the one-vote margin, it was concerned 

that mail delays might have affected the election outcome. The 

Board Agent responded to the company and union, agreeing to 

the company’s request and adding: “As you both know, as of 

[March 18,] before the original count scheduled on [March 22], 

there were 3 voters that had separately informed me they 

mailed their ballot but we had not received them at my office. 

That led us to reschedule the count. Those 3 voters’ ballots 

were then received the following day, on [March 19]. Thus, 

we received a ballot from each voter that had contacted me.” 

Id. at 62. 

The next day, Wratten’s ballot arrived at the Regional 

Office. The Board Agent emailed the parties to let them know 

the office had received Wratten’s ballot, and to explain why 

that ballot was not one of the three outstanding ballots 

described in the prior email exchanges:

While [Wratten] contacted me to request the 

duplicate, she did not request that I confirm we 

received her ballot, so she was not “on my 

radar” to contact upon receiving her ballot. In 

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any event, I’d like to clarify my statement [in 

the email exchange] below, “we received a 

ballot from each voter that had contacted me,” 

such that we received a ballot from those that 

contacted me to ask that I confirm when their 

ballot has been received by my office. 

Id. at 62. The Regional Office received no additional ballots.

B. 

Curaleaf raised various objections to the election and 

asked that a new, in-person election be held. Four objections, 

Objections 1, 2, 4, and 5, remain relevant. 

In Objections 1 and 2, the company alleged that actions by 

the Regional Office or Board Agent caused outcomedeterminative voter disenfranchisement. In Objection 1, the 

company claimed disenfranchisement resulted from the 

Regional Office’s delay in processing ballots and from 

“extraordinary and arbitrary delays with the United States 

Postal Service.” J.A. 115. In Objection 2, the company 

claimed that disenfranchisement resulted from the Board 

Agent’s “fail[ure] to notify the parties that the Region was 

aware that at least one voter [i.e., Wratten] had returned a ballot 

but it had not been received by the Region as of the ballot 

count.” Id. at 115–16. In Objection 4, the company asserted 

that the Regional Office wrongfully “force[d] postponement” 

of the ballot count. Id. at 116. And in Objection 5, the 

company alleged that the Board’s failure to issue a second 

Notice of Election with the updated election timeline was either 

a “per se” procedural violation that required setting aside the 

election or an objectionable election “irregularity.” Id. at 134, 

147; see id. at 116. 

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The Board’s Acting Regional Director rejected all of 

Curaleaf’s objections and certified the union as the employees’ 

representative. The Board granted Curaleaf’s request for 

review, but only as to Objection 2, thereby giving its 

“imprimatur” to, and making final, the Acting Regional 

Director’s determinations with respect to Objections 1, 4, and 

5. UC Health v. NLRB, 803 F.3d 669, 680 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

Objection 2, as just noted, alleged that the Board Agent 

“affected the outcome of the election by misrepresenting the 

status of” Wratten’s ballot. GHG Mgmt. LLC, 371 N.L.R.B. 

No. 93, at 1 (Apr. 21, 2022). The Board explained that the “test 

for setting aside an election based on regional office conduct is 

whether the alleged irregularity raises ‘a reasonable doubt as to 

the fairness and validity of the election,’” a standard that 

requires the objecting party to show “actual prejudice”—i.e., 

“prejudicial harm” that is “more than speculative.” Id. at 2 

(quoting Guardsmark, LLC, 363 N.L.R.B. 931, 934 (2016)).

That burden, the Board determined, had not been met by 

Curaleaf. The Board assumed “that the Board Agent’s March 

22 email misled the parties” into thinking “that the Region had 

received all [of] the outstanding ballots.” Id. Even so, the 

Board found, the company was unable to show anything more 

than conjectural harm. Id. While Curaleaf argued that it would 

have sought a second extension had it known about Wratten’s 

outstanding ballot, the Board found the possibility of prejudice 

to be speculative: “Even assuming” Curaleaf would have 

sought a second extension and the union would have agreed, 

the Board observed, “the Acting Regional Director was under 

no obligation to grant a second extension[,] and it would not 

have been an abuse of discretion to deny a request for a second 

extension based on one possibly outstanding ballot.” Id.

(parentheses omitted). 

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One Board member dissented. Id. at 2 n.7. Unlike the 

majority, the dissenting member did not find it dispositive that 

the Acting Regional Director could have refused to approve a 

second extension: in such an event, the dissenting member 

suggested, Curaleaf “could have sought extraordinary relief,” 

including by asking a Board panel to review the decision. Id. 

at 3 n.7 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(j)). 

Following the Board’s decision, the union sought to 

bargain with Curaleaf, Curaleaf refused, and the Board’s 

General Counsel brought an administrative complaint against 

the company claiming it committed unfair labor practices by 

refusing to recognize and bargain with the union. As a defense, 

the company reasserted its challenge to the union’s 

certification. The Board granted the General Counsel’s motion 

for summary judgment. GHG Mgmt. LLC, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 

13, at 1 (Dec. 5, 2022). 

Curaleaf filed a petition in our court seeking review of the 

unfair labor practice order, and the Board filed a crossapplication seeking enforcement of the order. 

II. 

Curaleaf argues that the Board was wrong to overrule the 

company’s objections under the legal tests the Board applied. 

But the company also contends as an antecedent matter that the 

Board applied the wrong tests, or, at the very least, failed 

adequately to explain its reasons for applying one test instead 

of another. We agree with the last of those contentions: we 

find that the Board failed to justify its application of different 

tests to different objections, so we are unsure whether the 

Board’s approach was reasonable in light of its precedent. We 

thus do not reach the question whether the Board properly 

overruled the objections under the tests it applied.

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We have jurisdiction pursuant to Section 10 of the 

National Labor Relations Act, which permits the Board to 

petition for enforcement of an unfair labor practice order, and 

permits “[a]ny person aggrieved by a final order of the Board” 

to “obtain review” of that order. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f). While 

the Board’s certification of the election is not a final order, it is 

indirectly reviewable because “the dispute concerning the 

correctness of the certification eventuate[d] in a finding by the 

Board that an unfair labor practice ha[d] been committed” by 

Curaleaf based on its “refus[al] to bargain with a certified 

representative on the ground that the election was” improper. 

Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 477 (1964). 

“As we have noted many times before, our role in 

reviewing [a Board] decision is limited,” Stephens Media, LLC 

v. NLRB, 677 F.3d 1241, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted), and we are particularly 

deferential to Board decisions regarding representation 

elections, see Am. Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 992 F.3d 1129, 1136 

(D.C. Cir. 2021). That said, “deference is not warranted where 

the Board fails to adequately explain its reasoning” or “leaves 

critical gaps in its reasoning.” DHL Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 813 

F.3d 365, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). That is the case here. 

The parties’ dispute over whether the Board evaluated the 

company’s objections under the correct test centers on two tests 

that derive from separate lines of Board decisions: the 

“possible-disenfranchisement test” and the “reasonable-doubt 

test.” While the Board also relied on other more specific Board 

precedent—for example, Board decisions that address how to 

evaluate mail irregularities—the two aforementioned tests 

provided the overarching framework for the Board’s evaluation 

of the company’s objections. And there is no dispute that the 

difference between the two tests can be a material one in that, 

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as we explain next, one requires a greater showing of prejudice 

than the other. As a result, the absence of any coherent 

explanation by the Board concerning when one test or the other 

applies is a threshold problem that calls for remanding the 

matter for further explanation before going on to address any 

specific contentions about the application of either test: we can 

only address the application of a test to a given objection after 

first determining which test governs the analysis. 

The Board often relies on the first test, the possibledisenfranchisement test, when a party objects that an election 

irregularity led to outcome-determinative voter 

disenfranchisement. That test, the Board has explained, 

“applies an objective standard to potential disenfranchisement 

cases in order to maintain the integrity of [the Board’s] own 

election proceedings.” Garda World Sec. Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. 

594, 594 (2011) (citing Wolverine Dispatch, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 

796, 797 (1996)). “Under that standard, an election will be set 

aside if the objecting party shows that the number of voters 

possibly disenfranchised by an election irregularity is sufficient 

to affect the election outcome.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, 

a party need not show that “any voters” were “actually 

disenfranchised” by the irregularity. Wolverine Dispatch, 321 

N.L.R.B. at 797. As an adjunct to the possibledisenfranchisement test, moreover, the Board will sometimes 

invoke still another test, the “notice-and-opportunity test,” 

under which an election will be upheld if “there [was] adequate 

notice and opportunity to vote and employees [were] not 

prevented from voting by the conduct of a party or by 

unfairness in the scheduling or mechanics of the election.” 

Lemco Constr., Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. 459, 460 (1987). 

The Board will sometimes apply the alternative test, the 

reasonable-doubt test, when a party complains that an action by 

a Board agent or regional office should invalidate an election. 

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As the Board has explained: “The test for setting aside an 

election based on regional office conduct is whether the alleged 

irregularity raised ‘a reasonable doubt as to the fairness and 

validity of the election.’” Guardsmark, 363 N.L.R.B. at 934 

(quoting Polymers, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 282, 282 (1969), 

enforced, 414 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1969)). That test calls for a 

more demanding showing of prejudice than the possibledisenfranchisement test. In particular, to meet the reasonabledoubt test’s burden, “[t]he objecting party’s showing of 

prejudicial harm must be more than speculative.” Id. 

Curaleaf principally objects to the Board’s application of 

different tests to Objection 1 and Objection 2. Objection 1, 

recall, alleged that ballot-processing delays attributable to the 

Regional Office and mail delays caused by the Postal Service 

led to outcome-determinative voter disenfranchisement. To 

overrule that objection, the Board (in the form of the Acting 

Regional Director, whose determination was left undisturbed) 

seemed to rely primarily on the possible-disenfranchisement 

test along with the notice-and-opportunity adjunct. In our 

court, the General Counsel accordingly defends the 

applicability of those tests to that objection.

The Board chiefly relied on the alternate test, the 

reasonable-doubt test, when overruling Objection 2. That 

objection alleged that the Board Agent misled the parties about 

the status of Wratten’s ballot and therefore caused her ballot to 

go uncounted. The Board said the reasonable-doubt test is the 

correct “test for setting aside an election based on regional 

office conduct.” GHG Mgmt. LLC, 371 N.L.R.B. No. 93, at 2. 

In our court, the General Counsel thus defends the application 

of the reasonable-doubt test to Objection 2. 

Curaleaf argues that the Board failed adequately to explain 

why one test rather than the other applied to the company’s 

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objections. Most pointedly, the company contends that the 

Board should have applied the possible-disenfranchisement 

test to Objection 2. In response, the General Counsel does not 

deny that Objection 2 might have been sustained had the Board 

applied the possible-disenfranchisement test rather than the 

reasonable-doubt test. Instead, the General Counsel’s position 

hangs entirely on its contention that it was correct to evaluate 

Objection 2 under the reasonable-doubt test. 

The General Counsel’s explanation in that regard falls 

short. The General Counsel accepts that some actions of a 

regional office or Board agent relating to an election can be 

evaluated under the possible-disenfranchisement test rather 

than the reasonable-doubt test. According to the General 

Counsel, the Board’s choice between the two tests turns on 

whether the objection concerns Board “misconduct”: the

possible-disenfranchisement standard “applies to objections, 

such as Objection 1, where the allegation entails employees 

being ‘prevented from voting by the conduct of a party or by 

unfairness in the scheduling or mechanics of the election,’” but 

“it is not the governing standard for agent-misconduct 

objections.” NLRB Br. 39 (quoting Lemco, 283 N.L.R.B. at 

460). And, the General Counsel adds, the “fact that a 

misconduct-based objection also claims resulting voter 

disenfranchisement does not render inapplicable the 

reasonable-doubt test or the necessity of proving nonspeculative prejudice.” Id. at 38 (emphasis added) (citing 

Guardsmark, 363 N.L.R.B. at 934 & n.14). 

In sum, the General Counsel asserts that the reasonabledoubt test displaces any other test when Board “misconduct” is 

at issue, even if that misconduct is alleged to have caused 

disenfranchisement. The General Counsel concludes that the 

Board was correct to evaluate Objections 2, 4, and 5 under the 

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reasonable-doubt test because those objections ostensibly 

concerned Board misconduct while Objection 1 did not. 

We cannot accept the General Counsel’s effort to justify 

the Board’s approach. To start, we are unable say that the 

choice between the tests turns on the presence or absence of 

Board “misconduct” because we do not know what that term 

means in this context. The General Counsel contends that 

“[t]he numerous cases cited by” Curaleaf “are unavailing” 

because, “unlike Objection 2, none of them analyze objections 

based on alleged misconduct by a Board regional office or 

agent.” Id. at 39 (emphasis added). Those cases, the General 

Counsel asserts, “involve regional offices’ failure to (timely) 

send ballots (or duplicate ballots) to voters” or involve Board 

agents’ “clos[ing] the polls or fail[ing] to open them when they 

were scheduled to be open.” Id. at 39–40. 

It is not at all apparent, though, why a regional office’s or 

Board agent’s failure to timely mail ballots or to keep the polls 

open at scheduled times would not qualify as Board 

“misconduct.” Indeed, the General Counsel sometimes 

describes misconduct as “improper conduct of the Board’s 

regional office or its agent.” Id. at 31 (emphasis added). We 

are left wondering: why is it not “improper conduct” to fail to 

send ballots in a timely fashion or to close the polls when they 

are supposed to be open? The General Counsel’s unelaborated 

assertion that those actions are not “misconduct” because they 

occurred in “factually and legally distinct situation[s]” is 

unhelpful. Id. at 40. 

In addition, the Board in the proceedings below did not 

offer—much less rely on—the explanation the General 

Counsel now presents to us. The Board did not indicate that 

the proper test hinges on the presence or absence of 

“misconduct,” however defined. Instead, when overruling 

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Objection 2, the Board simply asserted that the reasonabledoubt test applies when a party complains that “regional office 

conduct” merits “setting aside an election.” GHG Mgmt. LLC, 

371 N.L.R.B. No. 93, at 2. And the Board did not explain what 

factual or legal considerations dictated the application of 

different tests to Objections 1 and 2. The Board, that is, did not 

justify treating the Board Agent’s allegedly misrepresenting 

the status of an outstanding ballot (Objection 2) differently 

from her allegedly failing to promptly send a replacement 

ballot (Objection 1), even though Curaleaf argued that both 

actions led to outcome-determinative disenfranchisement and 

should thus be evaluated under the same (possibledisenfranchisement) standard. 

To be sure, the Board might not need to offer a fuller 

explanation if its approach were compelled by clear Board 

precedent: while we “may not accept [the General Counsel’s] 

post hoc rationalization for agency action,” Temple Univ. 

Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 929 F.3d 729, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2019) 

(citation omitted), and the Board “must explain why [its own 

relevant precedent] is not controlling,” the Board is not 

obligated “to distinguish a precedent expressly if the grounds 

for distinction are readily apparent,” Antelope Valley Bus Co. 

v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1089, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citations 

omitted); accord NCR Corp. v. NLRB, 840 F.3d 838, 843 (D.C. 

Cir. 2016). But this is not a case in which the Board simply 

failed to state the obvious. The General Counsel offers no case 

squarely supporting the notion that the presence of Board 

“misconduct” means the reasonable-doubt test applies instead 

of the possible-disenfranchisement test even when a party 

alleges outcome-determinative disenfranchisement. 

For example, the General Counsel cites our decision in 

American Bottling Co. as evidence of our “express approval” 

of its position. NLRB Br. 37–38 (citing Am. Bottling Co., 992 

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F.3d at 1140). But while we applied the reasonable-doubt test 

there, we had no occasion to engage the possibility that a 

different test might apply. And we found that, as a factual 

matter, the number of challenged ballots could not be outcomedeterminative. See Am. Bottling Co., 992 F.3d at 1141. So the 

decision cannot stand for the proposition that the reasonabledoubt test necessarily displaces the possibledisenfranchisement test when “misconduct” is at issue. 

Because we cannot uphold a Board order that “failed to 

apply the proper legal standard” or that “reflects a lack of 

reasoned decisionmaking” by “fail[ing] to offer a coherent 

explanation of agency precedent,” we remand this case to the 

Board for further explanation. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 

AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 994 F.3d 653, 658 (D.C. Cir. 2021) 

(citations omitted). On remand, the Board must justify—or 

reconsider—its application of the possible-disenfranchisement 

test to Objection 1 and the reasonable-doubt test to Objections 

2, 4, and 5. Specifically, the Board must explain when those 

(or other relevant) tests apply and why the specific conduct 

Curaleaf objects to in this case should be evaluated under one 

test instead of another. If the Board continues to believe its 

approach was correct, the Board must respond to the 

company’s arguments that Objections 2, 4, and 5 should be 

evaluated—and indeed sustained—under the possibledisenfranchisement test. 

We thus grant the company’s petition for review only 

insofar as we require further explanation from the Board. At 

this point, because we express no opinion on whether any of 

the company’s objections should be sustained, the Board does 

not need to set aside the election. 

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* * * * * 

For the foregoing reasons, we grant Curaleaf’s petition for 

review, deny without prejudice the Board’s cross-application 

for enforcement, and remand the case for clarification 

consistent with this opinion.

So ordered. 

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