Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-canb-4_09-ap-04463/USCOURTS-canb-4_09-ap-04463-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffrey Koopen
Plaintiff
Rickey Lee Aberle
Defendant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

|

In re |

| No. 09-46563

Rickey Lee Aberle | Chapter 7

|

|

|

Debtor. |

______________________________|

|

Jeffrey Koopen, by and |

through his Guardian ad |

Litem, Jacobus Koopen, | 

|

| Adv. Pro. No. 09-04463

Plaintiff, | 

|

v. |

|

Rickey Lee Aberle, |

Defendant. |

______________________________|

MEMORANDUM REGARDING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The defendant in this adversary proceeding, Rickey Lee 

Aberle (“Defendant”), filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on 

The following constitutes

the order of the court. Signed January 20, 2015

________________________________________

William J. Lafferty, III

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

Entered on Docket 

January 21, 2015

EDWARD J. EMMONS, CLERK 

U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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July 2, 2014. The plaintiff, Jeffrey Koopen (“Plaintiff”), 

filed an Opposition on July 22, and a hearing was held on 

August 6, 2014. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court 

requested the parties submit supplemental briefs. The 

supplemental briefs were filed on September 8, and September

29, 2014, and the court took the matter under submission. For 

the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment is denied.

Factual Background & Procedural History

On September 23, 2005, Plaintiff was a passenger in a boat 

that was piloted by Defendant. An accident occurred, and 

Plaintiff suffered serious personal injury. On April 20, 2006, 

Plaintiff filed a complaint in Alameda County Superior Court 

against Defendant stating a negligence cause of action.1 On 

July 22, 2009, five days before the scheduled trial in the 

state court case, Defendant filed chapter 7 bankruptcy in the 

Northern District of California, Oakland Division. In re Rickey 

Lee Aberle, Bankr. No. 09-46563 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 22,

2009). The filing of the bankruptcy case triggered an 

automatic stay that prevented the state court action from 

proceeding. On October 19, 2009, Plaintiff filed this

1 Jeff Koopen an incompetent person, by and through his Guardian Ad 

Litem Jacobus Koopen v. Rick Aberle, et al., Alameda Super. Ct. No. 

HG06266136, a copy of which is attached as Ex. A to the Decl. of Alison 

M. Crane in Supp. Of Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., July 2, 2014, ECF No. 45 

(hereinafter “Crane Decl.”).

2

 

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adversary proceeding. The complaint alleged Defendant was 

liable to Plaintiff for injuries arising from the boating

accident, and that Defendant’s liability was excepted from 

discharge under sections 523(a)(6) and 523(a)(9) of the United 

States Bankruptcy Code. A debt is excepted from discharge

under section 523(a)(6) if it arises from willful or malicious 

injury by the debtor to another entity, and under section 

523(a)(9) if the debt arises from personal injury caused by the 

debtor’s unlawful operation of a motor vehicle due to 

intoxication. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012).

At the initial status conference in this adversary 

proceeding on December 9, 2009, the bankruptcy court (the 

undersigned judge’s predecessor) lifted the automatic stay sua 

sponte to allow the state court action to proceed, and stayed 

this adversary proceeding pending the outcome of the state 

court action. The bankruptcy court lifted the stay “only for 

the purpose of liquidating the claim in the amount of the 

judgment,” and the parties were to return to bankruptcy court 

once the claim was liquidated “for a determination as to 

nondischargeability.” Tr. of Status Conference at 3, Koopen v. 

Aberle (In re Aberle), Adv. No. 09-04463 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Dec. 

9, 2009). At the conclusion of the hearing, the bankruptcy 

court also suggested that, in the interests of judicial 

3

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economy, the Plaintiff seek a determination on Defendant’s 

intoxication in the state court proceeding. Id. at 5-6. 

Plaintiff returned to state court and filed a brief that

requested issues of intoxication be included in a special 

verdict form because intoxication was a basis for negligence 

per se, and an intoxication determination would assist the 

bankruptcy court to liquidate the claim.2 Plaintiff further 

argued that the automatic stay was lifted to allow the state 

court to determine the intoxication issue.3

 After voicing some 

concerns, the state court approved the request for a special 

verdict, and the verdict form instructed the jury first to 

consider whether Defendant was liable under a negligence per se

theory, and if not, then consider if Defendant was liable under 

a traditional negligence theory. When considering the 

negligence per se theory, the jury was to determine if 

Defendant was intoxicated, and if Defendant’s intoxication was 

a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s injuries. 

After conclusion of the trial, the jury determined 

Defendant was not intoxicated “when he operated the vessel at 

the time of the accident,” and this ended the jury’s negligence 

per se analysis.4

 The jury proceeded to determine if Defendant 

2 See Pl.’s Br. Re Intoxication Questions in Special Verdict Form, a 

copy of which is attached as Ex. E to the Crane Decl. 3 Id. 4 J. on Special Verdict a copy of which is attached as Ex. G to the 

Crane Decl.

4

 

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was negligent under a traditional theory, and whether 

Defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing 

Plaintiff’s injuries. The jury concluded Defendant was 

negligent because he chose to use a boat without a spot light, 

and piloted a boat at an excessive speed, and these were 

substantial factors in causing Plaintiff’s injuries.5 The jury 

calculated and apportioned damages, and assigned 35% of the 

responsibility for damages to Defendant.6

 However, it is 

unclear from the record if the jury considered Defendant’s nonintoxication when calculating and apportioning damages.7

 

The issue of whether Defendant consumed alcohol and 

marijuana on the day and night of the accident was litigated in 

the state court action. After the evidence was submitted, 

Defendant moved to strike all evidence of Defendant’s alcohol 

5 The judgment indicates that the jury deliberated and returned a 

special verdict of “No” in response to the question “Was Defendant Rick 

Aberle intoxicated when he operated the vessel at the time of the 

accident?”. The judgment also indicates the jury returned a verdict of 

“Yes” in response to the question “Was Rick Aberle negligent?” and “Was 

Rick Aberle’s negligence a substantial factor in causing harm to Jeff 

Koopen?”. See Special Verdict a copy of which is attached as Ex. F to 

the Crane Decl. The jury determined Defendant was negligent because he 

chose to use a boat without a spot light, and piloted a boat at an 

excessive speed. See Koopen v. Aberle, 2014 WL 795662 at *5 (Cal. App. 

1st Dist. Feb. 28, 2014). 6 The judgment calculates Plaintiff’s damages at $5,991,386.81 and 

assigns 35% of the responsibility for damages to Defendant. The 

remaining responsibility for Plaintiff’s harm was assigned 55% to Colin 

Troi, and 10% to Jeff Koopen. See Special Verdict at 4, a copy of 

which is attached as Ex. F to the Crane Decl. 7 See Special Verdict a copy of which is attached as Ex. F. to the Crane 

Decl.; J. on Special Verdict, a copy of which is attached as Ex. G to 

the Crane Decl.

5

 

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consumption and drug use.8 The court struck the evidence of 

marijuana use because the effects of marijuana on the human 

body were not common knowledge, and Plaintiff failed to provide 

evidence explaining these effects. Koopen v. Aberle, 2014 WL 

795662 at *2 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. Feb. 28, 2014). The evidence 

regarding Defendant’s blood alcohol content was excluded 

because it was not supported with expert testimony. Id. at *2

n. 3.

The Plaintiff appealed to the California Court of Appeal 

for the First District. A Statement of Issues on Appeal was 

not filed; however, the issues presented to the Court of Appeal 

were set forth in the Appellant’s Opening Brief.9 In the Brief 

Plaintiff argued that the jury’s comparative negligence finding 

was not supported by the law or evidence.10 Plaintiff also 

argued the trial court abused its discretion in striking all

testimony of Defendant’s marijuana use, and the ruling should 

be reversed.11 Plaintiff requested that even if a full retrial 

would not be required, the Court of Appeal should remand the 

case for a new trial on the issue of intoxication.12 

8 Appellant’s Opening Br. at 7, a copy of which is attached as Ex. A to 

the Decl. of Anthony Boskovich in Resp. to Ct.’s Req. for Statement of 

Issues, Aug. 5, 2014, ECF No. 56.

9 Id. 10 Id. at 33-34. 11 Id. at 21. 12 Id. at 32-33.

6

 

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On February 28, 2014, the Court of Appeal filed its

decision, Koopen v. Aberle, 2014 WL 795662 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 

Feb. 28, 2014). The Court of Appeal rejected Defendant’s 

argument that the jury erred in allocating comparative fault 

among the parties. Id. at *7. The Court of Appeal also found 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking the 

testimony of Defendant’s marijuana use, on the theory that 

expert testimony was necessary. Plaintiff further argued 

evidence of the marijuana consumption was relevant to the issue 

of intoxication, and requested the Court of Appeal remand the 

case for a new trial on that issue alone even if the judgment 

were not reversed. The Court of Appeal expressly declined to 

review the issue of intoxication or remand the case. The Court 

of Appeal stated:

Here, the inclusion of the question about

intoxication was extraordinary because, 

unlike the jury's findings of negligence 

and causation, the fact of Aberle's 

intoxication was not an element of Koopen's 

claim. As the trial court noted in 

permitting Koopen's requested jury 

interrogatory, a finding on the issue of 

intoxication was included in the verdict 

form only as, in effect, a favor to the 

bankruptcy court. Even if we were to 

review the finding on intoxication,

conclude it was erroneous, and vacate it, 

we would have no power to order a new trial 

with respect to the issue because its 

reversal would not affect the judgment. It 

goes without saying that recognized forms 

of state court proceedings do not include 

7

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the trial of an isolated fact, independent 

of a cause of action or other right to 

relief. From the perspective of this court, 

the issue is therefore moot. The legal

significance of the finding of no 

intoxication and the weight to be afforded 

it in bankruptcy court are matters to be 

determined by that court. We therefore 

decline to review the jury's finding

regarding intoxication. 

 

Id. at *7.

After the appellate court opinion was issued, the parties 

returned to bankruptcy court to dispose of this proceeding. 

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment in this adversary 

proceeding on July 2, 2014. Defendant argues issue preclusion 

should apply to the jury’s finding that Defendant was not 

intoxicated. Plaintiff opposes the motion, and argues issue 

preclusion cannot apply. At the hearing on August 6, 2014,

Plaintiff withdrew their claim that the debt was 

nondischargeable under section 523(a)(6).

Discussion

The issue before the court is whether the jury’s finding

during the state court action that Defendant was not 

intoxicated at the time of the accident should be given 

preclusive effect in this nondischargeability proceeding. If 

issue preclusion is appropriate, the jury’s finding of nonintoxication is determinative of whether the debt is excepted 

from discharge.

8

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The doctrine of “[i]ssue preclusion bars successive

litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and 

resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior 

judgment, even if the issue recurs in the context of a 

different claim.” Readylink Healthcare, Inc., v. State 

Compensation Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Bankruptcy courts can apply issue 

preclusion to findings made by state courts to determine if a 

debt is excepted from discharge under section 523(a). In re 

Baldwin, 249 F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Grogan v. 

Garner, 498 U.S. 278, 284 n. 11 (1991)). The “preclusive 

effect of a state court judgment [is determined] by applying 

that state’s preclusion principles.” Readylink Healthcare, 754

F.3d at 60. For purposes of Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment, California law applies because the judgment in Koopen 

v. Aberle was entered in the Alameda County Superior Court, and 

affirmed by the Court of Appeal. 

In a recent opinion by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,

Readylink Healthcare, Inc., v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 

754 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 2014), that court set forth the 

requirements for issue preclusion under California law. An 

9

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issue can be given preclusive effect by a court in a subsequent 

proceeding if five requirements are met. 

First, the issue sought to be precluded from 

relitigation must be identical to that decided 

in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must 

have been actually litigated in the former 

proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily 

decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the 

decision in the former proceeding must be final 

and on the merits. Finally, the party against 

whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, 

or in privity with, the party to the former 

proceeding.

Id. at 460-61 (quoting Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 

Cal.3d 335, 341, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 769, 795 P.2d 1223, 1227).

The party asserting that the issue should be precluded has 

the burden of demonstrating to the court in the subsequent 

proceeding that these requirements are present. In re Baldwin, 

249 F.3d at 917-18 (quoting Lucido, 51 Cal.3d at 341). If 

these five preliminary requirements are established, the court 

must consider whether application of issue preclusion would 

further public policies including the “preservation of the 

integrity of the judicial system, promotion of judicial 

economy, and protection of litigants from harassment by 

vexatious litigants.” Readylink Healthcare, 754 F.3d at 761

(quoting Lucido, 51 Cal.3d at 341).

10

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The only aspect of this test that is in dispute in this 

proceeding is whether the third requirement is met, i.e. was 

the matter necessarily decided.

Analysis

Under California law, preclusive effect cannot be given if 

a finding is “entirely unnecessary” to a judgment. Readylink 

Healthcare, 754 F.3d at 762. If the final judgment was issued 

by a trial court, the court in the subsequent proceeding should 

determine the preclusive effect of the trial court’s judgment 

by examining the relevance of the issue for which preclusive 

effect is sought to the trial courts’ ultimate determination of 

the matter. See id. at 760. If there has been appellate review

of a trial court’s judgment, however, the court in the 

subsequent matter should consider the disposition by the 

appellate court to determine whether the matter was necessarily 

decided. See Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th

860, 875, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 241, 251, 237 P.3d 565, 574; Zevnik 

v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 83, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 

817, 821. 

The Koopen v. Aberle state court matter has an unusual 

procedural context: in connection with granting a motion for 

relief from stay to permit an action to be tried in state 

court, a bankruptcy judge essentially directed the plaintiff in 

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that action to seek determination of an issue that would be 

critical in a subsequent proceeding in the bankruptcy court 

concerning dischargeability of a debt. As explained in greater 

detail below, this context, and the Court of Appeals 

disposition of the matter, dictates this court’s conclusion 

that it would be inappropriate to afford preclusive effect to 

the jury’s finding of non-intoxication. 

The finding is not necessary to the judgment

In Koopen v. Aberle, Plaintiff brought a claim for 

negligence under a negligence per se and a traditional 

negligence theory. The parties actually litigated the issue of 

intoxication for purposes of negligence per se, and the jury 

concluded Defendant was not intoxicated. Nevertheless, 

Plaintiff succeeded in proving Defendant was negligent under a 

traditional negligence theory and obtained a judgment against 

Defendant. 

Although successful in obtaining the judgment, Plaintiff 

appealed the trial court’s decision at least partially because 

Plaintiff needed the jury to determine Defendant was 

intoxicated for the judgment to be excepted from discharge by 

this court under section 523(a)(9). The Court of Appeal 

expressly declined to consider the issue of intoxication.

Koopen v. Aberle, 2014 WL 795662 at *4 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 

12

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Feb. 28, 2014). The Court of Appeal did not decline to review 

this issue merely because it could sufficiently dispose of the 

matter on other grounds, and ruling on a further matter was not 

consistent with principles of judicial economy. To the 

contrary, the Court of Appeal went much further and explained 

that the issue of intoxication was not an element of 

Plaintiff’s claim, and even if the issue of intoxication were

reviewed and reversed it would have no effect on the state 

court judgment. Id. at *4-5. There is no other conclusion 

possible than that the Court of Appeal determined that the 

issue of intoxication was not necessary to the lower court’s 

judgment. 

And although it is unquestionably this court’s 

responsibility to determine the preclusive effect, vel non, of 

the jury’s finding of non-intoxication in the state court, this 

court is convinced that it would be irresponsible to ignore the 

definitive statement of the Court of Appeal that the finding of 

non-intoxication was not necessary to the judgment. Therefore, 

this court concludes that preclusive effect should not be 

granted to the jury’s finding in this matter. 

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit has 

stated repeatedly that bankruptcy courts should exercise 

caution before granting preclusive effect to state court 

13

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findings in nondischargeability proceedings. See Genesis VJ, 

Inc. v. Nguyen (In re Nguyen), 2012 WL 603680 at *7-8 (B.A.P. 

9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2012) (finding unclear if state court decided 

agency issue, determining bankruptcy court did not abuse its 

discretion in declining to apply issue preclusion). The 

Defendant has not met his burden to prove the jury’s nonintoxication finding should be given preclusive effect. 

Appellate Review and Issue Preclusion

This court acknowledges, and the parties spent a lot of 

time discussing, one aspect of the question whether to afford 

preclusive effect to findings in a prior matter that has 

generated a very interesting debate among California courts, 

i.e. what is the preclusive effect of an issue actually 

determined by a trial court that is neither relied upon, nor 

disturbed, by a reviewing appellate court.

In a 2003 decision, DiRuzza v. County of Tehama, 323 F.3d 

1147 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit determined that an 1865 

California Supreme Court case, People v. Skidmore (1865) 27 

Cal. 287, remained controlling authority on this issue.

DiRuzza, 323 F.3d at 1156. According to DiRuzza, Skidmore held 

that preclusive effect can be given to all grounds upon which 

the lower court’s judgment was based, unless that holding is 

reversed on appeal. More recent California case law, however, 

14

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provides reason to doubt the continuing validity of this 

conclusion. 

This bankruptcy court is certainly bound by the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals’ interpretation of California state 

law, including the Ninth Circuit’s holding in DiRuzza that 

Skidmore continues to be controlling authority in this state on 

the issue of preclusive effect of findings not disturbed on 

appeal. However, unlike in DiRuzza and Skidmore, the finding 

at issue in this matter was not an alternative ground on which 

the judgment was based. Defendant succeeded in obtaining a 

judgment based on a traditional negligence theory, and that 

judgment was appealed. The non-intoxication finding was 

ultimately unnecessary and immaterial to the judgment, as 

explained by the Court of Appeal.13 This court accordingly 

believes that the clear ruling of the California Court of 

Appeal takes this matter outside the circumstances pertaining 

in Skidmore and DiRuzza, and that the appropriate result here 

is that the finding not be given preclusive effect.

Moreover, the Court of Appeal’s express declination to 

review the finding of non-intoxication further removes this 

matter from the rule announced in Skidmore.

13 In DiRuzza, the Ninth Circuit considered a 1952 California Court of 

Appeal decision, Natural Soda Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles

(1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 440, 240 P.2d 993, 996, which provided that the 

general rule under Skidmore may have an exception for a finding that is 

“unnecessary and immaterial.” See DiRuzza, 323 F.3d at 1155.

15

 

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Although the California Supreme Court has not expressly 

overruled Skidmore post-DiRuzza, in 2010 that Court issued its 

opinion in Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 

860, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 241, 237 P.3d 565, which discussed the 

importance of effective appellate review to a finding of issue 

preclusion, and cited the Restatement (Second) of Judgments as 

determinative on preclusive issues. See Murray, 50 Cal.4th at 

875. The putative rule from Skidmore, that an unrelied upon 

but undisturbed finding from a trial court does not lose its 

preclusive effect, appears to be directly contra the modern 

rule adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, under 

which only the grounds considered on appeal can be given 

preclusive effect. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 

28(1) (1982). According to section 28(1), issue preclusion 

should not be applied when “[t]he party against whom preclusion 

is sought could not, as a matter of law, have obtained review 

of the judgment in the initial action.” Id. 

In Murray, the California Supreme Court determined issue 

preclusion applied because the party against whom preclusion 

was sought had the opportunity to appeal the determination made 

by a federal official. The holding in Murray is arguably 

limited on the facts that if a vehicle for appeal is available, 

issue preclusion can be applied. However, the Murray decision 

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indicates the opportunity for appellate review is important 

under California law.14 In light of the holding in Murray,

Plaintiff’s inability to obtain appellate review of the finding 

of non-intoxication is itself instructive to this court’s 

analysis of the preclusive effect of the finding. See Murray,

50 Cal.4th at 875. 

Some Remaining Procedural Issues

As mentioned briefly above, at the conclusion of the 

hearing on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the court 

asked the parties for further briefing on two issues: (1) Were 

the court to conclude that issue preclusion should not be 

applied to the state court’s determinations, what should be the 

scope of the trial before this court, and is there any reason 

why this court would lack judicial power to enter a final order 

or judgment in this matter? and (2) in light of the 

determinations by the trial court regarding intoxication, is 

there any reason to limit the scope of the evidence that may be 

presented to this court in a trial in this proceeding? 

14 In at least two decisions published after DiRuzza, the California 

Court of Appeal has followed the modern rule under the Restatement 

(Second) of Judgments. See, e.g., Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 

Cal.App.4th 76, 79, 88, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 817, 819, 826 (finding Skidmore 

is not controlling authority for issue preclusion under California law, 

and “only the grounds relied on by the appellate court can establish 

collateral estoppel”). Courts outside of California have also adopted 

the modern rule. See Rutanen v. Baylis (In re Baylis), 217 F.3d 66, 71

(1st Cir. 2000) (declining to apply preclusive effect in a 

nondischargeability proceeding to a bad faith finding made by a state 

probate court because the finding was not subject to appellate review). 

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After review of the parties’ briefs, the court concludes 

that there is no dispute about the first question: the parties 

agree that the sole issue to be decided by this court is 

whether Defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident, 

as provided in Section 523(a)(9), and that this is the proper 

court to enter a final order on that issue.15 As to the second 

question, the parties do disagree about the scope of evidence 

that should be presented at a trial on this issue, Plaintiff 

arguing that no restriction is appropriate, and Defendant 

arguing that in light of the trial court’s disposition of the 

issue, including its exclusion of evidence for the reasons set 

forth above, Plaintiff should be limited in its presentation to 

the evidence actually considered by the jury. 16 

This court is convinced that if it is not to give 

preclusive effect to the jury’s finding on non-intoxication, it 

cannot fairly limit the scope of evidence that may be produced 

at trial, subject of course, to any appropriate motions in 

limine or to strike, based solely on facts and arguments 

presented contemporaneously to this court. 

15 See Br. Of Pl. Re Questions Posed by Court at Hearing Of 6 August 

2014, at 2, Sept. 8, 2014, ECF No. 58; Additional Br. In Support of 

Mot. For Summ. J. by Debtor Ricky Lee Aberle at 3, Sept. 29, 2014, ECF 

No. 59.

16 See Br. Of Pl. Re Questions Posed by Court at Hearing Of 6 August 

2014, at 3-5, Sept. 8, 2014, ECF No. 58; Additional Br. In Support of 

Mot. For Summ. J. by Debtor Ricky Lee Aberle at 3-5, Sept. 29, 2014, 

ECF No. 59.

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Accordingly, the court will conduct a status conference, 

in this adversary proceeding on January 28, 2015, at 10:30 AM, 

to consider matters pertinent to trial setting and other 

logistical issues. 

Conclusion

After considering the unique procedural history of this 

case, the court concludes that Plaintiff should not be 

precluded from litigating in this court the issue of 

intoxication. For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 

*END OF MEMORANDUM*

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COURT SERVICE LIST

Jeffrey Koopen, by and throgh his Guardian ad Litem, 

Jacobus Koopen

5141 Waller Avenue

Fremont, CA 94536

Anthony Boskovich

Boskovich & Appleton

28 N 1st St. 6th Fl.

San Jose, CA 95113-1210

Rickey Lee Aberle

37999 Stenhammer Drive

Fremont, CA 94536

C. Randall Bupp

Bardellini, Straw, Cavin and Bupp

2000 Crow Canyon Pl. #330

San Ramon, CA 94583

Chris D. Kuhner

Kornfield, Nyberg, Bendes and Kuhner

1970 Broadway #225

Oakland, CA 94612

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