Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01508/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01508-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Armando Feliz
Petitioner
D. K. Sisto
Respondent

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARMANDO FELIZ,

Petitioner,

vs.

D. K. SISTO, Warden, California State

Prison, Solano,

Respondent.

No. 2:08-cv-01508-JKS

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Armando Feliz, a state prisoner appearing pro se, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus

Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Feliz is currently in the custody of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation, incarcerated at the California State Prison, Solano. Respondent

(“State”) has answered the Petition. Feliz has not replied.

I. BACKGROUND/PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

On May 24, 1984, Feliz was convicted upon a guilty plea in the Los Angeles County

Superior Court of one count of Murder in the Second Degree (Cal. Penal Code § 187). The trial

court sentenced Feliz to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life. Feliz does not challenge his

conviction or sentence in this proceeding.

In August 2006 Feliz made his ninth or tenth appearance before the California Board of

Parole Hearings, which denied him parole. Feliz timely filed a petition for habeas corpus relief

in the Los Angeles Superior Court, which denied his petition in an unreported, reasoned decision. 

The California Court of Appeal summarily denied Feliz’s subsequent petition for habeas corpus

Case 2:08-cv-01508-JKS Document 25 Filed 01/06/11 Page 1 of 17
 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 1

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562. 2

Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d 606 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), and Cooke v. Solis, 606 3

F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2010).

 Docket No. 15-3, p. 2. 4

2

relief in that court without opinion or citation to authority. The California Supreme Court

summarily denied Feliz’s petition for habeas relief in that court without opinion or citation to

authority on April 30, 2008. Feliz timely filed his Petition for relief in this Court on May 27,

2008.

After briefing was completed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,

sitting en banc, decided Hayward v. Marshall. At Docket No. 21 this Court entered an Order

1

directing the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the Hayward decision, in particular

that “[t]he prisoner’s aggravated offense does not establish current dangerousness ‘unless the

record also establishes that something in the prisoner’s pre- or post-incarceration history, or his

or her current demeanor and mental state’ supports the inference of dangerousness.” The Court 2

also directed the parties to consider two Ninth Circuit decisions applying Hayward. Both parties 3

have submitted supplemental briefing.

The facts underlying the crime, as recited by the Los Angeles Superior Court, are:

[. . . .] The record reflects that petitioner had been involved in an abusive

intimate relationship with the victim, who had physically assaulted petitioner in

the past. They had previously lived together. On the night of the murder,

petitioner met the victim at a bar. They returned to the victim’s residence.

Petitioner convinced the victim to disrobe. The victim then allowed petitioner to

tie him to a chair. Once the victim was naked and tied up, petitioner stabbed him

multiple times. He died as a result of the stabbing.4

Case 2:08-cv-01508-JKS Document 25 Filed 01/06/11 Page 2 of 17
See Rules—Section 2254 Cases, Rule 5(b). 5

3

III. GROUNDS RAISED/DEFENSES

In his Petition Feliz contends the Board erred in denying him parole, making four

contentions: (1) he has a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause; (2) the evidence is

insufficient to support a finding of unsuitability for parole; (3) a lack of nexus between the

evidence and the denial of parole; and (4) he has met all the factors demonstrating suitability for

parole. The State does not assert any affirmative defenses.5

III. DISCUSSION

In rejecting Feliz’s arguments, the Los Angeles Superior Court held:

The Board found petitioner unsuitable for parole after a parole

consideration hearing held on August 8, 2006. Petitioner was denied parole for

one year. The Board concluded that petitioner was unsuitable for parole and

would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society and a threat to public safety.

The Board based its decision on his commitment offense.

The record reflects that there is some evidence that, “the offense was

carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for

human suffering.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §2402, subd. (c)(I)(D).) This means

that “the offense in question must have been committed in a more aggravated or

violent manner than that ordinarily shown in the commission of that offense.” (In

re Scott (2004) 119 Cal.AppAth 871, 891.) An offense is more aggravated or

violent when it involves severe trauma, “as where death resulted from severe

trauma inflicted with deadly intensity; e.g., beating, clubbing, stabbing,

strangulation, suffocation, burning, multiple wounds inflicted with a weapon, not

resulting in immediate death or actions calculated to induce terror in the victim.” 

(Id at 892.) Here, petitioner inflicted multiple wounds with a knife, which did not

result in immediate death. He was naked and tied to a chair when the attack

started to induce terror in the victim. Because this crime involved severe trauma

to the victim, it shows an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.

The Board was also concerned that petitioner lacks understanding into the

nature and magnitude of his actions. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §2402, subd.

(d)(3).) Petitioner has changed his version of the commitment offense for

different parole suitability hearings. At previous hearings, petitioner claimed that

the victim was threatening him and he felt scared, despite the fact that the victim

was tied to a chair at the time. Petitioner pled guilty to murder. Where guilt is

Case 2:08-cv-01508-JKS Document 25 Filed 01/06/11 Page 3 of 17
 Docket 15-3, pp. 2-3. 6

Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1216. 7

 Docket No. 22, p. 2. 8

 If this were a single instance, this Court would be inclined to ignore the refusal to 9

address Hayward. Unfortunately, this is not such an isolated incident. This Court has received

several similar responses to its order in other parole cases that were held in abeyance pending the

en banc decision in Hayward, e.g., Walker v. Kramer, Case No. 2:07-cv-00803-JKS, Singer v.

Sisto, Case No. 2:08-cv-00048-JKS, and Dewey v. Sisto, Case No. 2:08-cv- 00580-JKS, of

which this Court takes judicial notice. Fed. R. Evid. 201. Consequently, this Court must

conclude that the position taken in this case represents the official position of the State of

California, acting through its Attorney General.

4

uncontested, a prisoner’s version of the events may be some evidence he lacks

remorse and understanding of the nature and magnitude of the offense. (In re

McClendon (2004) 113 Cal.App.4th 315,322.). This supports the Board’s denial.6

“When habeas courts review the ‘some evidence’ requirement in California parole cases,

both the subsidiary findings and the ultimate finding of some evidence constitute factual

findings.” In its Order requesting supplemental briefing, this Court directed the State to 7

“specifically identify those characteristics, other than the underlying commitment offense, that

support a finding that release of the Petitioner to parole status poses a current threat to public

safety, and point to the specific evidence in the record that supports that determination.” In its

8

response, the State argues that, because Hayward was wrongly decided and represents circuit

law, not the law as established by the Supreme Court, this Court need not follow Hayward or the

Ninth Circuit cases applying Hayward. The State, asserting that the order requiring that the

evidence supporting the finding that the release of Feliz to parole status poses a current threat to

public safety be identified is an improper question, declined to provide the required information.9

This Court disagrees. This Court, a district court, is bound by the published decisions of the

Ninth Circuit until those decisions are overruled or undermined by higher authority, e.g., an en

Case 2:08-cv-01508-JKS Document 25 Filed 01/06/11 Page 4 of 17
See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). A complication 10

exists because the Hayward court predicated a federally protected liberty interest on California

state statutes, regulations, and California Supreme Court decisions. Thus, a California Supreme

Court decision subsequent to Hayward, Pearson, and Cooke rejecting their reasoning might be

highly relevant. No such case has been identified.

 Supreme Court Rule 13. 11

Hayward v. Marshall, Ninth Circuit Case No. 06-55392, Docket No. 120, of which this 12

Court takes judicial notice. Fed. R. Evid. 201.

5

banc decision of the Ninth Circuit, a Supreme Court decision, or subsequent legislation. This 10

has not occurred. This Court notes that if, as the State contends, Hayward were incorrectly

decided, the appropriate remedy is to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court

within 90 days of the date the petition for rehearing in Hayward was denied. The 90-day period 11

began to run June 2, 2010, when the Ninth Circuit denied Hayward’s petition for a rehearing. 

12

As the time for filing a petition for certiorari had not yet expired, if the State contemplated

seeking certiorari, the State could have requested this Court to grant additional time to comply

with the Order. Alternatively, the State could have preserved its arguments that Hayward was

erroneously decided for further appellate review, and still complied with the express terms of the

Order. What the State could not do is what it did do in this case—ignore the clearly articulated

Case 2:08-cv-01508-JKS Document 25 Filed 01/06/11 Page 5 of 17
 Indeed, as a result of the failure of the State to comply with this Court’s Briefing Order, 13

the State appears to assume that this Court will mine the record to find sufficient evidence to

support the decision of the California Supreme Court. It is unquestionably the rule that the

burden of establishing a violation of a constitutional right sufficient to warrant habeas relief is

placed on the petitioner. Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 835 (9th Cir. 2002); see Wood v.

Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 8 (1995) (per curiam) (stating that a federal court cannot grant “habeas

relief on the basis of little more than speculation with slight support”). That does not, however,

mean that the petitioner has the burden of proving a “negative,” i.e., that something does not

exist. The State should not expect a federal district court to mine the record to find evidence that

Feliz is currently dangerous, which, if found, would support a determination that, as required by

Hayward, the California judicial decision approving the Board’s decision rejecting parole was

not an unreasonable application of the California some evidence requirement, or was not based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. 

See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 314 (1967) (“until its decision is 14

reversed for error by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court, [a court’s] orders based

on its decision are to be respected, and disobedience of them is contempt of its lawful authority,

to be punished.”) (quoting Howat v. State of Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922)); Celotex

Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 313 (1995) (same); United States v. United Mine Workers of

America, 330 U.S. 358, 293 (1947) (same).

 This Court recognizes that the court in Hayward ultimately affirmed the denial of 15

parole. The Attorney General and his subordinates know the record in the case. They also know

the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hayward and the California Supreme Court decisions in

Lawrence and Shaputis. If the record in this case could be reconciled with those cases and the

denial of parole, competent counsel would have so argued. Because the Attorney General is

competent counsel, the State’s failure to develop the argument lends support to only one

conclusion: that the record will not support a finding of present dangerousness.

6

requirements of Hayward and decline to obey this Court’s specific order. In so doing, even if 13

the Order was “improper,” the State did so at its own peril.14

This Court treats the State’s failure to point to the evidence in the record supporting the

factors, other than the commitment offense, cited by the Board’s finding that Feliz poses a

present threat of danger to society as conceding that no such evidence exists.

15

In its Order directing Respondent to answer, this Court, citing Rule 5 of the Rules

Governing § 2254 Cases, directed Respondent to provide the transcript of the August 8, 2006,

hearing, and any documents, reports or letters considered by the panel. In a footnote to that

Case 2:08-cv-01508-JKS Document 25 Filed 01/06/11 Page 6 of 17
 Docket No. 9. The Court notes that in every copy of the transcript of the Board hearing 16

pages 67 and 68, which constitute part of the decision, are missing.

 Omitted material reflects the missing pages, 67 and 68. 17

7

Order the Court also provided an alternative—that if the State agreed that the transcript attached

as an exhibit to the petition is complete and correct, a second copy need not be provided. In its

16

Answer, the State declined to provide the requested documents, contending that those documents

were not required under Rule 5. The State has disregarded two Orders entered by this Court. In

the case of the Order directing that a transcript of the Board hearing be provided, this Court treats

the State’s refusal to provide the transcript as an admission that the transcript attached to the

petition for relief in the Los Angeles Superior Court is complete and correct.

In denying Feliz parole, the Board in that part of the transcript provided to the Los

Angeles Superior Court, held:

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER SHELTON: [. . . .] The Panel has

reviewed all the information received and relied on the following circumstances in

concluding, Mr. Feliz, that you are not yet suitable for parole and would pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from

prison. We had a tough decision and a tough -- a lot of talking, and I want to pass

on some things to you. But what I want to do is let you know we’re giving you a

one-year denial. I know it’s not what you want to hear. You have been doing an

admirable job in a variety of areas. But the issue that probably confounds me the

most is how much insight you have for what you did and how much compassion

you truly have for your victim. I sat here and struggled, and a lot of what I do is

struggle between my head and my heart and my [. . . .] room were attempting to 17

stop you. With regards to your prior record, as a juvenile, it was not substantive. 

I will say substance abuse is. You ran the streets, as you indicated. Your social

history is incredible; incredibly awful for a young child to live the way you had to

live. You started prostituting your self at a very young age. Started using

substance at a very young age. And I think there’s still a question for us as to the

amount of violence that truly was in your background; especially as a child and

being victimized. As an adult, you were involved in opportunities; probation. 

Those did not work real well for you. You had several run-ins with the law and

some convictions; theft, prostitution. With regards to your institutional

Case 2:08-cv-01508-JKS Document 25 Filed 01/06/11 Page 7 of 17
8

background, you have 12 115s. The last in 1995 for marijuana. You have six

128s. The last in '89. That’s not a perfect discipline record, but you’ve done a

good job of distancing yourself from those disciplinaries. You haven’t gotten

anything for 11 years, and that’s good. With regards to self-help. And I'm going

to go into your positive aspects in a moment, because you’ve done a tremendous

job in the institution. I’m not concerned about your behavior in the institution,

I’m just shaky about what it would be outside at the present time. And I guess

what I would like, to see you do with regards to your self-help is that you take a

look at what motivated your actions that day. The intensity of your anger, your

frustration, your fear; whatever may have caused that. I don’t know. You need to

be able to come to terms with that, and probably, it would be especially helpful if

at some point in time, you could share your struggles in that world. Now

(indiscernible) offense necessary. You’re not required to. But your journey to

that. It’s been a painful one for you. I think you still have a little bit more work to

do there to get to the (indiscernible) side. Psychological report is fairly positive. 

Doctor Davis considered you a low risk for violence in January of ‘05. I don’t

know that that would change (indiscernible) think that would be positive

(indiscernible). With regards to your parole plans, you have letters from your

mom and family and employment. I would recommend before your next hearing

to get upgraded letters with current dates. If there’s any way that you could also,

with regards to your employment letter, add --

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER SULLIVAN: You’re about to lose tape.

You have to say something to her.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER ANDRES: Okay.

[Thereupon, the tape was turned over.]

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER ANDRES: On record.

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER SHELTON: We were discussing.

parole plans. And what I was suggesting is that with regards to the one you have

for employment is that if there’s a way for somebody to indicate what your

income would be and what your job responsibilities will be. We talked about PC

3042 responses. Mr. Morrison is here representing the Los Angeles District

Attorney’s Office and was in opposition for parole at this time. Like I said, Mr.

Feliz, you have done an excellent job in the institution. You work with PIA lens

lab. You have renewed your certificate every three years. And if I did my math

right, you’re good until '08.

INMATE FELIZ: Yes, Ma’am.

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER SHELTON: You received your GED

in '91. You received certification in customer service through the course you

took. You have a vocation in silk screening. You participated in NA and AA

since ‘90, with a blip in ‘94, and then continuously on. You participated in two

groups of Stress Management, two of Anger management. You participated in the

PLATO series and FEMA courses until they wouldn’t allow you to anymore due

to a lack of a social security number. Received a laudatory in February ‘06 for the

Case 2:08-cv-01508-JKS Document 25 Filed 01/06/11 Page 8 of 17
 Docket 15-1, pp. 116-122. 18

See Thorpe v. Housing Authority of City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 281-82 (1969); 19

Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 973 n.21 (9th Cir. 2004).

9

optical lab work you’re doing as well as AA. And participated in phases, which

you indicated is a life plan program. And though I applauded you for your

vocational work, you received your GED. You are, I think, prepared to take care

of yourself on the outside, and you already indicated to us that you will continue

with AA and NA or whichever. I think you indicated you prefer NA.

INMATE FELIZ: Yes ma’am.

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER SHELTON: And that’s a lifelong

participation for you. One of the other things that you might do this next year to

help a bit on your parole plans is to find out through maybe your mother or your 2

brothers, where you can attend AA or NA; where the meetings are held, the times

they're held and how you're going to get there. That just takes you -- You have

good parole plans, but that takes you a step further at this point. Mostly what I’m

concerned about, you know, in review, like I said, this is a one-year denial, is the

degree of insight you have into this. What is going to happen if a similar situation

arises and how are you going to respond to it. So if there’s nothing that you feel

comfortable with or available in the institution, get a couple of books to read and

do some book reports at home for us with regards to that. And I don’t know if I’m

being clear enough for you. I really do want to be specific. This is a very

horrendous crime and you had a horrendous life behind it. We want to make sure

it doesn’t repeat itself. Commissioner?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER ANDRES: Thank you. Commissioner

Shelton has expressed very well the things on my mind and that is this is very

impressive that the recommendations last hearing were to get self-help, stay

discipline free and earn positive chronos. You’ve done all that. There’s no reason

to believe that a Panel a year from now would not be equally impressed if you --

this year -- next coming year, you do more or less the same thing. That would --

That would be impressive to them as well. And that’s all I have to say, and to

wish you good luck sir.

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER SHELTON: And good luck to you,

sir.

INMATE FELIZ: Thank you.18

This Court must decide the case on the law as it exists at the time it renders is decision

and, if the law changes while the case is pending, this Court applies the new rule. Thus,

19

although it establishes a new rule, the holding in Hayward is controlling. In this case, this Court

Case 2:08-cv-01508-JKS Document 25 Filed 01/06/11 Page 9 of 17
Hayward, 603 F.3d at 563 (footnotes citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) omitted). 20

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-06 (2000); see also

21

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-75 (2003) (explaining this standard). 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. 22

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations 23

omitted).

10

“need only decide whether the California judicial decision approving the [Board’s] decision

rejecting parole was an ‘unreasonable application’ of the California ‘some evidence’

requirement, or ‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence.’” By its reference to § 2254(d), the Ninth Circuit implicitly, if not explicitly, directed 20

this Court to apply § 2254(d) to the decisions of the California Supreme Court using the same

standards as are applied to the determination of the law as established by the United States

Supreme Court. 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d), this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” at the time the state court renders its decision or “was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding.” The Supreme Court has explained that “clearly established Federal law” in 21

§ 2254(d)(1) “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court] as of the

time of the relevant state-court decision.” When a claim falls under the “unreasonable 22

application” prong, a state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent must be objectively

unreasonable, not just incorrect or erroneous. The Supreme Court has made clear that the 23

Case 2:08-cv-01508-JKS Document 25 Filed 01/06/11 Page 10 of 17
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). 24

See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (a federal habeas court cannot 25

reexamine a state court’s interpretation and application of state law); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.

639, 653 (1990) (it is presumed that the state court knew and correctly applied state law),

overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); see also Engle v. Isaac,

456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982) (challenging the correctness of the application of state law does not

allege a deprivation of federal rights sufficient for habeas relief); Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455

(2005) (a federal court may not lightly presume that a state court failed to apply its own law). 

Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); see West v. AT&T, 311 U.S. 223, 236 26

(1940) (“[T]he highest court of the state is the final arbiter of what is state law. When it has

spoken, its pronouncement is to be accepted by federal courts as defining state law . . . .”). 

See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) (“state courts are the ultimate 27

expositors of state law”).

See Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76-78 (“Because the Sixth Circuit disregarded the Ohio 28

Supreme Court's authoritative interpretation of Ohio law, its ruling on sufficiency of the evidence

11

objectively unreasonable standard is a substantially higher threshold than simply believing that

the state court determination was incorrect. Consequently, it appears that, under the mandate of 24

Hayward, this Court must canvas and apply California law as it existed at the time of the state

court decision to the facts in the record as presented to the state court. 

The mandate in Hayward is that this Court must review the decisions of state courts

applying state law—in effect serving as a super-appellate court over state court decisions. This is

in tension with the holdings of the Supreme Court. It is a fundamental precept of dual federalism

that the states possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law. A 25

fundamental principle of our federal system is “that a state court’s interpretation of state law,

including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court

sitting in habeas corpus.” This principle applied to federal habeas review of state convictions 26

long before AEDPA. A federal court errs if it interprets a state legal doctrine in a manner that 27

directly conflicts with the state supreme court’s interpretation of the law. It does not matter that 28

Case 2:08-cv-01508-JKS Document 25 Filed 01/06/11 Page 11 of 17
was erroneous.”). 

Id. at 76. 29

 190 P.3d 535 (Cal. 2008). 30

 190 P.3d 573 (Cal. 2008). 31

Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d at 218. Quoted with approval in Shaputis, 190 P.3d at 585. 32

12

the state supreme court’s statement of the law was dictum if it is perfectly clear and

unambiguous.

29

At the time of the state court decision in this case, the California “some evidence” rule

was embodied in Rosenkrantz and Dannenberg. Subsequently, the California Supreme Court,

applying Rosenkrantz and Dannenberg, decided In re Lawrence and In re Shaputis. 

30 31

In Rosenkrantz, the California Supreme Court held:

[. . . .] Due process of law requires that [the Board’s] decision be

supported by some evidence in the record. Only a modicum of evidence is

required. Resolution of any conflicts in the evidence and the weight to be given

the evidence are matters within the authority of the [Board]. [. . . .] [T]he precise

manner in which the specified factors relevant to parole suitability are considered

and balanced lies within the discretion of the [Board] . . . . It is irrelevant that a

court might determine that evidence in the record tending to establish suitability

for parole far outweighs evidence demonstrating unsuitability for parole. As long

as the [Board’s] decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as

applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards,

the court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the

record that supports the [Board’s] decision.32

The California Supreme Court then held:

The nature of the prisoner’s offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient basis

for denying parole. (Citations omitted.) Although the parole authority is

prohibited from adopting a blanket rule that automatically excludes parole for

individuals who have been convicted of a particular type of offense, the authority

properly may weigh heavily the degree of violence used and the amount of

viciousness shown by a defendant. [. . . .]

In some circumstances, a denial of parole based upon the nature of the

offense alone might rise to the level of a due process violation—for example

Case 2:08-cv-01508-JKS Document 25 Filed 01/06/11 Page 12 of 17
Id. at 222; see Shaputis, 190 P.3d at 584-85 (“The record supports the Governor’s 33

determination that the crime was especially aggravated and, importantly, that the aggravated

nature of the offense indicates that the petitioner poses a current risk to public safety.” (emphasis

in the original)).

Dannenberg, 104 P.3d at 795. 34

13

where no circumstances of the offense reasonably could be considered more

aggravated or violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for that

offense. Denial of parole under these circumstances would be inconsistent with

the statutory requirement that a parole date normally shall be set “in a manner that

will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in

respect to their threat to the public . . . .” (Pen.Code, § 3041, subd. (a).) “The

Board’s authority to make an exception [to the requirement of setting a parole

date] based on the gravity of a life term inmate’s current or past offenses should

not operate so as to swallow the rule that parole is ‘normally’ to be granted. 

Otherwise, the Board’s case-by-case rulings would destroy the proportionality

contemplated by Penal Code section 3041, subdivision (a), and also by the murder

statutes, which provide distinct terms of life without possibility of parole, 25 years

to life, and 15 years to life for various degrees and kinds of murder. (Pen. Code, §

190 et seq.) [¶] Therefore, a life term offense or any other offenses underlying an

indeterminate sentence must be particularly egregious to justify the denial of a

parole date.” (Citation omitted.)33

In Dannenberg the California Supreme Court explained:

[. . . .] So long as the Board’s finding of unsuitability flows from pertinent

criteria, and is supported by “some evidence” in the record before the Board

[citing Rosenkrantz], the overriding statutory concern for public safety in the

individual case trumps any expectancy the indeterminate life inmate may have in a

term of comparative equality with those served by other similar offenders. Section

3041 does not require the Board to schedule such an inmate’s release when it

reasonably believes the gravity of the commitment offense indicates a continuing

danger to the public, simply to ensure that the length of the inmate’s confinement

will not exceed that of others who committed similar crimes.34

The California Supreme Court then held:

Thus, there clearly was “some evidence” (citing Rosenkrantz) to support

the Board’s determination that Dannenberg’s crime was “especially callous and

cruel,” showed “an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering,” and was

disproportionate to the “trivial” provocation. Accordingly, under Rosenkrantz, the

Case 2:08-cv-01508-JKS Document 25 Filed 01/06/11 Page 13 of 17
Id. at 803. 35

Id. at 786-87, 802-803; see Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d at 222. 36

Dannenberg, 104 P.3d at 803 n.16 (citing Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d at 219). 37

190 P.3d at 554-55; see Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1214. 38

14

Board could use the murder committed by Dannenberg as a basis to find him

unsuitable, for reasons of public safety, to receive a firm parole release date.35

The Board must, however, “point to factors beyond the minimum elements of the crime

for which the inmate was committed” that demonstrate the inmate will, at the time of the

suitability hearing, present a danger to society if released. The Board “may credit evidence 36

suggesting the inmate committed a greater degree of the offense than his or her conviction

evidences.” In Lawrence, however, the California Supreme Court rejected the argument “that 37

the aggravated circumstances of a commitment offense inherently establish current

dangerousness,” holding:

 “[W]e conclude that although the Board and the Governor may rely upon the

aggravated circumstances of the commitment offense as a basis for a decision

denying parole, the aggravated nature of the crime does not in and of itself

provide some evidence of current dangerousness to the public unless the record

also establishes that something in the prisoner’s pre- or post-incarceration history,

or his or her current demeanor and mental state, indicates that the implications

regarding the prisoner's dangerousness that derive from his or her commission of

the commitment offense remain probative to the statutory determination of a

continuing threat to public safety.” 

38

This is the clarification upon which Hayward, Pearson, and Cooke rely, and it was this language

in Lawrence to which this Court alluded in its Order, which the State declined to address.

With respect to the underlying commitment offense, the applicable regulation provides:

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to be considered include:

Case 2:08-cv-01508-JKS Document 25 Filed 01/06/11 Page 14 of 17
 Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(c). 39

Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d at 210. 40

15

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or

separate incidents. 

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner,

such as an execution-style murder. 

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the

offense. 

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering. 

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to

the offense.39

The evidence clearly supports a finding that this case falls within the scope of (1)(C) and

(D), and probably falls within the scope of (1)(E). Under California law, a court neither reweighs the evidence nor substitutes it’s discretion for that of the Board. Judicial review of a

decision denying parole is “extremely deferential.” Thus, under Rosenkrantz and Dannenberg,

40

this Court could not say that the decision of the Los Angeles Superior Court was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of California law at the time it was decided, or was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. On the other hand,

because Hayward, Pearson, and Cooke require that Lawrence and Shaputis be applied, the

decision of the Los Angeles Superior Court in this case was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of California law.

While the record in this case might support an argument that the denial of Feliz’s parole

can be reconciled with Pearson and Cooke, the State has rejected the opportunity this Court gave

it to make that argument. Instead, the State decided to stand on its position that Hayward,

Pearson, and Cooke were wrongly decided and apparently void. 

Case 2:08-cv-01508-JKS Document 25 Filed 01/06/11 Page 15 of 17
 This Court recognizes that Lawrence and Shaputis were decided in 2008, after the 41

California Supreme Court denied a hearing; consequently, neither the Board nor the California

courts could have considered them.

Pirtle v. California Board of Prison Terms, 611 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2010). 42

 In reaching this conclusion, this Court is mindful of the following significant problems: 43

(1) the applicability of Lawrence and Shaputis to cases in which the state court decision became

final prior to August 21, 2008; and (2) the appropriate scope of review by federal courts in

federal habeas proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) of the application by the California courts

of the California “some evidence” rule. In other words, to what extent may subsequent

California cases modify the “liberty interest” established by California law and recognized in

Hayward, Pearson, and Cooke.

16

The Board and the Los Angeles Superior Court clearly found that Feliz’s crime was

atypical and arguably that his motive trivial. This, standing alone, would be sufficient under

Rosenkrantz and Dannenberg. It is not sufficient under Lawrence and Shaputis. Hayward,

Pearson, and Cooke, require this Court to apply Lawrence and Shaputis as the Ninth Circuit

interprets them. What the Board and the Los Angeles Superior Court did not do, and the State

expressly declined to address, is explain how events ending in 1983 show that Feliz presented a

significant risk to public safety in 2006, rendering determination of current dangerousness

insufficient under Lawrence and Shaputis. Thus, under Hayward, Pearson, Cooke, and Pirtle,

41 42

this Court is compelled to find that the Board’s denial of parole violated Feliz’s liberty interest

protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.43

IV. ORDER

Based upon the foregoing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 is GRANTED.

Case 2:08-cv-01508-JKS Document 25 Filed 01/06/11 Page 16 of 17
See In re Prather, 234 P.3d 541, 550-54 (Cal. 2010); Haggard v. Curry, --- F.3d ---,

44

2010 WL 4978842, *4-*5 (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 2010) (citing Prather).

17

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the denial of parole is vacated and this matter is

remanded to the California Board of Parole Hearings for further proceedings consistent with the

decisions of the California Supreme Court in In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535 (Cal. 2008), and In re

Shaputis, 190 P.3d 573 (Cal. 2008), as interpreted by Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th 44

Cir. 2010) (en banc), Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d 606 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), Cooke v.

Solis, 606 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2010), and Pirtle v. California Board of Prison Terms, 611 F.3d

1015 (9th Cir. 2010).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT, if the Board of Parole Hearings has not

held a hearing within 120 days of the date of entry of this Order, the Secretary, California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, must release Feliz to parole status.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT nothing in this Order is intended to, nor may it be

construed as, restricting or otherwise inhibiting, directly or indirectly, the authority of the

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, to set restrictions or

conditions on the grant of parole to the extent otherwise provided by the laws of the State of

California.

The Clerk of the Court is to enter final judgment accordingly.

Dated: January 6, 2011.

/s/ James K. Singleton, Jr.

JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:08-cv-01508-JKS Document 25 Filed 01/06/11 Page 17 of 17