Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01135/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01135-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Albaugh, LLC
Defendant
Munger Bros., LLC
Plaintiff
Garrett Neece
Defendant
Nutrien Ag Solutions, Inc.
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MUNGER BROS., LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

NUTRIEN AG SOLUTIONS, INC., et al.,

Defendant.

No. 1:24-cv-01135-KES-HBK

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND

AND DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS 

(Docs. 6, 11)

Plaintiff Munger Bros., LLC (“Munger”) moves to remand this action to the Tulare 

County Superior Court, arguing this action was improperly removed. Motion to Remand, 

Doc. 11. Defendants Nutrien AG Solutions, Inc. (“Nutrien”) and Garrett Neece (“Neece”) oppose 

the Motion to Remand and Neece moves to be dismissed from this action, arguing he was 

improperly joined. Opposition to Motion to Remand, Doc. 13; Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 6. This 

matter is suitable for resolution without a hearing pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). For the reasons 

set forth below, Munger’s motion to remand is granted and Neece’s motion to dismiss is denied 

as moot.

I. BACKGROUND 

Munger alleges that, at the written recommendation of Neece, a Nutrien employee and 

Pest Control Advisor, Oxystar 4L was sprayed on acres of pistachio trees owned by Munger. 

Notice of Removal, Ex. B (“Complaint”), Doc. 1 at 13. The Oxystar 4L, manufactured by 

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defendant Albaugh, LLC (“Albaugh”), allegedly caused significant and irreversible damage that 

has affected the long-term health and production of the pistachio trees. Id. Munger alleges that 

either the recommendation to use Oxystar 4L was incorrectly made by Neece and Nutrien or the 

Oxystar 4L was defective. Id. 

On July 25, 2024, Munger filed this action in Tulare County Superior Court against 

Nutrien, Neece, and Albaugh, alleging: (1) negligence, (2) negligence per se, (3) design defect 

strict product liability, (4) failure to warn strict liability, and (5) trespass. Id. at 15-20. Nutrien 

timely removed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and 28 U.S.C. § 1441, alleging diversity 

jurisdiction exists because the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and Neece was improperly 

joined as a defendant. Notice of Removal, Doc. 1. 

On October 1, 2024, Neece filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Munger failed to state a 

claim against him under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 6. 

Munger filed its response to the motion to dismiss and Neece filed his reply. Docs. 8, 13. On 

October 15, 2024, Munger filed a motion to remand, arguing that Neece was properly named in 

the lawsuit, Neece’s California citizenship destroys diversity jurisdiction, and therefore, the case 

should be remanded to state court. Motion to Remand, Doc. 11.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). A motion to remand is the proper 

procedure for challenging removal. Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 

(9th Cir. 2009). “The removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction, and the 

burden of establishing federal jurisdiction falls to the party invoking the statute.” Cal. ex rel. 

Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). If there is doubt as to the right of 

removal, a federal court must reject jurisdiction and remand the case to state court. Matheson v. 

Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Federal courts have original jurisdiction over cases where complete diversity exists 

between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and 

costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). “In determining whether there is complete diversity, district courts 

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may disregard the citizenship of a non-diverse defendant who has been fraudulently joined.” 

Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by & through Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2018). “A defendant 

invoking federal court diversity jurisdiction on the basis of fraudulent joinder bears a ‘heavy 

burden’ since there is a ‘general presumption against [finding] fraudulent joinder.’” Id. The 

Ninth Circuit has recognized two ways to establish fraudulent joinder: “(1) actual fraud in the 

pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action 

against the non-diverse party in state court.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“[T]he test for fraudulent joinder and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) are 

not equivalent. A claim against a defendant may fail under Rule 12(b)(6), but that defendant has 

not necessarily been fraudulently joined.” Id. at 549. Rather, the standard for fraudulent joinder 

is akin to the “wholly insubstantial and frivolous” standard for dismissing claims under Rule 

12(b)(1) for lack of federal question jurisdiction. Id. “[I]f there is a possibility that a state court 

would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any of the resident defendants, the 

federal court must find that the joinder was proper and remand the case to the state court.” Id.

(quoting Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in 

original)).

III. DISCUSSION

The sole issue in dispute in both the Motion to Remand and Motion to Dismiss is whether 

Neece is a proper defendant in this action. Nutrien is a citizen of Colorado and Delaware; and 

Albaugh is a citizen of Iowa and Delaware. It is undisputed that Munger and Neece are citizens 

of California and thus, if Neece is a properly joined defendant, there is no diversity jurisdiction. 

See Notice of Removal, Doc. 1 at 2-3; see Motion to Remand, Doc. 11 at 2. 

Munger alleges that Neece is responsible for the damage to the pistachio trees under 

multiple theories, including negligence. Munger argues that Neece was responsible for making 

the specific herbicide recommendation and that the Complaint’s allegations sufficiently state a 

plausible claim against Neece. Motion to Remand, Doc. 11-1 at 6-7. In opposition, Nutrien and 

Neece argue that the complaint fails to allege that Neece committed any acts outside his 

employment, that Neece and Nutrien are the same for liability purposes under the doctrine of 

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respondeat superior and California Labor Code § 2802,

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and that therefore there is no separate 

cause of action against Neece. Opposition to Motion to Remand, Doc. 14 at 2-3.

However, the duty to defend and indemnify is not a bar on litigation against an individual 

defendant. “Section 2802 requires an employer to indemnify an employee for liability incurred 

by the employee in the scope of the employee’s employment; it does not render the employee 

immune from liability altogether.” Thomas v. WalMart Stores, Inc., No. 18-cv-03422-RSWLSK, 2018 WL 3046967, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2018); see also Webber v. Home Depot, 

U.S.A., Inc., et al., No. 2:24-CV-01886-WBS-CSK, 2024 WL 4765315, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 

2024) (holding employer’s duty to defend and indemnify was not a bar on litigation against 

employee defendant and finding employee defendant had not been fraudulently joined); 

Alexander v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 2:24-cv-01754-DAD-CSK, 2024 WL 4212749, at *3 

(E.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2024) (holding employer’s duty to defend and indemnify was not a bar on 

litigation against employee defendant); Kyle v. Envoy Mortg., LLC, No. 18-CV-2396-BAS-WVG, 

2018 WL 6600105, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2018) (collecting cases where federal courts 

“routinely rejected” argument that agents cannot be held liable for actions made within scope of 

their employment).

The cases cited by Nutrien and Neece in support of the proposition that Neece was 

fraudulently joined are inapposite, as they concern situations involving Doe defendants, or in 

which the defendant employee was only minimally involved in the allegations, neither of which is 

the case here. See, e.g., Rojas by and through Rojas v. Sea World Parks & Entertainment, Inc., 

538 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1024-28 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (finding that although duty to indemnify and 

defend had no bearing on whether a Doe defendant could be sued for negligence, California

Labor Code § 2802’s indemnification provision was indicative that Doe employee served only to 

destroy diversity, but noting possibility that named defendant could be joined at a later time); 

1 California Labor Code § 2802(a) provides: “An employer shall indemnify his or her employee 

for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the 

discharge of his or her duties, or of his or her obedience to the directions of the employer, even 

though unlawful, unless the employee, at the time of obeying the directions, believed them to be 

unlawful.”

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Calderon v. Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC, No. 2:15-CV-01140-ODW, 2015 WL 3889289, at *4 

(C.D. Cal. June 24, 2015) (holding that defendant added following removal was not necessary or 

highly involved in allegations against employer and thus not necessary to afford plaintiff ability 

to obtain complete relief).

As the respondeat superior bar against employee liability is the only argument raised in 

support of fraudulent joinder and that argument is unpersuasive, Nutrien and Neece have failed to 

establish that Neece could not be found liable under a theory of liability. Nutrien and Neece have 

failed to overcome “both the strong presumption against removal jurisdiction and the general 

presumption against fraudulent joinder.” See Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). As Nutrien and Neece have failed to meet their burden, the Court cannot find that 

Neece was fraudulently joined. Therefore, the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED that:

1. Munger’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 11) is granted.

2. Neece’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6) is denied as moot.

3. This action is remanded to the Tulare County Superior Court for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction.

4. The Clerk of Court shall mail a copy of this order to the clerk of the Tulare County 

Superior Court.

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 6, 2024 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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