Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-03350/USCOURTS-ca8-15-03350-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Leonard Dwayne Hill
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-3350

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Leonard Dwayne Hill

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul

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 Submitted: June 16, 2016

 Filed: August 29, 2016

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Before MURPHY, BRIGHT, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted appellant-defendant Leonard Hill of being a felon in

possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(e). On appeal,

Hill challenges his conviction and the district court's denial of his renewed motion

1

The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the 1

District of Minnesota.

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for acquittal. Hill argues: (1) the government constructively amended the indictment;

(2) the government failed to establish the ammunition was in or affecting interstate

commerce; and (3) the de minimis connection to interstate commerce is insufficient

to satisfy the Commerce Clause. We affirm the district court.

I.

In the early morning hours of July 10, 2014, St. Paul police responded to

reports of gunfire outside of Willard's Bar in St. Paul, Minnesota. While police

investigated the area, they arrested and frisked Hill. As a result of the frisk, police

seized twenty-three rounds of Federal brand 9-millimeter Luger ammunition from

Hill.

A grand jury indicted Hill on August 18, 2014, charging him with one count

of being a felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and

924(e). Specifically the indictment stated that Hill “did knowingly possess, in and

affecting interstate and foreign commerce, ammunition, as defined by Title 18, United

States Code, Section 921(17)(A), that is, 23 live rounds of Federal brand 9-millimeter

Luger ammunition, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(1)

and 924(e)(1).”

Hill pled guilty on September 26, 2014. Two months later, however, he moved

to withdraw his plea. The district court granted Hill's motion and he proceeded to

trial. Before trial, Hill stipulated that he knowingly possessed ammunition and was

a convicted felon. Therefore, the only remaining issue at trial was whether Hill's

possession of the ammunition was in or affecting interstate commerce.

At trial, the government presented expert testimony from Steve Rodgers, the

product safety manager and fifteen-year employee for Vista Outdoor, the parent

company of Federal Cartridge Ammunition. In his examination of the ammunition,

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Rodgersrandomly disassembled two of the twenty-three roundsseized from Hill and

separated them into the four major components that form a round of ammunition: (1)

the primer, (2) the case, (3) the propellent powder, and (4) the bullet. Rodgers dated

the ammunition as being no older than 2011 and after discussing the manufacturing

origin of each component, Rodgers determined that three out ofthe four components–

including the primer, case, and bullet–were all manufactured by Federal Cartridge in

Minnesota.

Rodgers concluded that the propellent powder was manufactured outside of

Minnesota. To justify his conclusion, Rodgers testified that Federal Cartridge does

not manufacture its own propellent powder but instead purchases 95% of it from two

domestic sources–located in St. Marks, Florida, or Radford, Virginia–and the

remaining 5% frominternational sources. Further,Rodgers opined that the propellent

powder from the two rounds of ammunition he disassembled derived from St. Marks,

Florida, specifically because he recognized the propellent powder was “ball powder,”

which is a unique manufacturing process specific to Federal Cartridge's supplier in

St. Marks. Finally Rodgers testified that the remaining twenty-one rounds were

identical to the two rounds he had randomly disassembled and therefore his testimony

applied to those rounds as well.

At the close of the government's case, Hill moved for a judgment of acquittal

which the district judge denied. The jury returned a guilty verdict. On August 13,

2015, Hill filed a renewed motion for judgment of acquittal, which the district court

again denied. On October 15, 2015, the district court sentenced Hill to 192-months'

imprisonment. Hill timely filed this appeal.

II.

Hill makes three arguments on appeal. He first argues the government

constructively amended the indictment by presenting evidence at trial of how the

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individual components of ammunition were in or affecting interstate commerce rather

than the ammunition as a whole. Second, the district court should have granted Hill's

motion for acquittal because the government failed to establish the propellent powder

component was manufactured outside of Minnesota at the time Federal Cartridge

manufactured the ammunition seized fromHill–which is anywhere between 2011 and

the date law enforcement seized the ammunition from Hill. Lastly, even if the

propellent powder was in or affecting interstate commerce, this de minimis

connection to interstate commerce is insufficient to satisfy the Commerce Clause.

A.

We review de novo whether a constructive amendment to the indictment

occurred. United States v. Renner, 648 F.3d 680, 686 (8th Cir. 2011). Hill argues the

government created a fatal constructive amendment to the indictment because it listed

ammunition as a whole as being in or affecting interstate commerce instead of the

individual components, which is what the government presented evidence on at trial.

We disagree.

“A constructive amendment occurs when the essential elements of the offense

as charged in the indictment are altered in such a manner–often through the evidence

presented at trial or the jury instructions–that the jury is allowed to convict the

defendant of an offense different from or in addition to the offenses charged in the

indictment.” United States v. Johnson, 719 F.3d 660, 668 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting

United States v. Whirlwind Soldier, 499 F.3d 862, 870 (8thCir. 2007)). In evaluating

a constructive amendment claim, this court “consider[s] whether the admission of

evidence or the jury instructions created a ‘substantial likelihood’ that the defendant

was convicted of an uncharged offense.” Id.

The government did not create a fatal constructive amendment to the

indictment because the ammunition components were necessarily included in the

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indictment by statutory definition of the term ammunition. The indictment provides

that Hill knowingly possessed ammunition “as defined by Title 18, United States

Code, Section 921(17)(A)[.]” Under 18 U.S.C. § 921(17)(A), ammunition is defined

as “ammunition or cartridge cases, primers, bullets, or propellent powder designed

for use in any firearm.” Accordingly, the evidence presented at trial did not create a

“substantial likelihood” that Hill was convicted of an uncharged offense because the

individual components of ammunition were necessarily included in the indictment

language. The government therefore did not constructively amend the indictment.

B.

“This court reviews de novo the district court's denial of a motion for acquittal

based on insufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Gant, 721 F.3d 505, 510

(8th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Tyerman, 701 F.3d 552, 564 (8th Cir.

2012)). “On review, evidence is viewed most favorably to the verdict, giving it the

benefit of all reasonable inferences. Reversal is appropriate only where no reasonable

jury could find all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting United

States v. Aldridge, 664 F.3d 705, 715 (8th Cir. 2011)).

Hill argues there was insufficient evidence to establish the propellent powder

was manufactured outside of Minnesota between 2011 and the date of his arrest and

therefore the government failed to prove the ammunition wasin or affecting interstate

commerce. We disagree.

Based on Rodgers's expert testimony, a reasonable jury could find beyond a

reasonable doubt that Federal Cartridge used propellent powder manufactured outside

of Minnesota at the time it produced the ammunition seized from Hill. Rodgers–a

fifteen-year employee and trained expert in identifying Federal Cartridge

products–testified that Federal Cartridge does not manufacture any of its own

propellant powder but rather it is “[a]ll purchased” outside the state of Minnesota.

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(Trial Tr. p. 156). Not only did Rodgers conclude the propellent powder was

manufactured outside of Minnesota, but he was able to identify the specific supplier

for the ammunition seized fromHill because he recognized it as “ball powder” unique

to St. Marks, Florida. In viewing all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict, we

find a reasonable jury could find that Federal Cartridge used propellent powder

manufactured outside of Minnesota in its production of the ammunition seized from

Hill. Accordingly, the government established the ammunition seized from Hill was

in or affecting interstate commerce.

C.

“This court reviews federal constitutional questions de novo.” United States

v. Nash, 627 F.3d 693, 696 (8th Cir. 2013). Hill argues that even if the propellent

powder traveled interstate, the de minimis connection to interstate commerce is

insufficient to satisfy the Commerce Clause. Hill's argument isforeclosed by binding

precedent.

In United States v. Mosby, the defendant was a convicted felon charged with

being a felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) for

possessing assembled cartridges manufactured in Minnesota but which were

comprised of components manufactured out-of-state. 60 F.3d 454, 457 (8th Cir.

1995). We held that ammunition assembled from components which had traveled in

interstate commerce was in commerce for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) even

though the ammunition itself had been assembled intrastate. Id. The facts ofthis case

are analogous to Mosby and we are bound by our holding in that case. Therefore, the

propellent powder component manufactured in interstate commerce is sufficient to

satisfy the Commerce Clause.

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III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court.

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