Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-05036/USCOURTS-ca13-14-05036-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Colonial Press International, Inc.
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

COLONIAL PRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-5036

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:13-cv-00403-MBH, Judge Marian Blank 

Horn.

______________________ 

Decided: June 10, 2015

______________________ 

ANTHONY HAWKS, Hawks Law Office, Alexandria, VA, 

argued for plaintiff-appellant. 

WILLIAM JAMES GRIMALDI, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. 

Also represented by STUART F. DELERY, ROBERT E.

KIRSCHMAN, JR., DEBORAH A. BYNUM. 

______________________ 

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2 COLONIAL PRESS INTERNATIONAL v. US

Before LOURIE, PLAGER, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

PLAGER, Circuit Judge. 

INTRODUCTION

This is a post-award bid protest case. Of the two

questions raised, one is of first impression in this court—

whether the Government Printing Office (“GPO”),1 before 

declining to award a contract to a small business concern,

must, as part of its bid-evaluation process, refer the 

responsibility determination to the Small Business Administration (“SBA”). The other question is a familiar 

one—whether the deciding official’s determination was 

arbitrary or capricious as tested by the law relating to 

contract awards. 

Because we decide that the GPO is not required to refer such determinations to the SBA, and because we 

decide that the GPO’s actions in awarding the contract at 

issue in this case were not arbitrary or capricious, we 

affirm the judgment of the United States Court of Federal 

Claims. 

BACKGROUND

GPO Bid Solicitation and Award

In June 2012, the GPO issued an invitation for bids 

for a printing order for the Department of Health and 

Human Services–Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 

Services (“HHS”). The printing order involved the production of sixty-three versions of English and Spanish 

separate-covered, perfect bound publications entitled 

“Medicare and You” in English, and “Medicare y Usted” in 

1 The GPO is now the Government Publishing Office. See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 1301, 128 Stat. 

2130, 2537 (2014).

 

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COLONIAL PRESS INTERNATIONAL v. US 3

Spanish. The contract was for a term beginning on the 

date of award and ending on January 31, 2014, with four 

optional twelve-month extension periods.

The GPO received nine bids in response to its solicitation. Appellant Colonial Press International, Inc. (“Colonial Press”) was the lowest bidder with a discounted bid of 

$2,418,443.54, while Fry Communications, Inc. (“Fry 

Communications”) was the second lowest bidder with a 

discounted bid of $2,502,545.05. Colonial Press was a 

small business concern for purposes of the Small Business 

Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631 et seq. (“Act”).

As part of its solicitation and evaluation process, the 

GPO followed the protocols in its Printing Procurement 

Regulation (“PPR”), found in GPO Publication 305.3 (Rev. 

2-11). Under the PPR, the GPO can award contracts only 

to “responsible” bidders. A responsible bidder must meet 

certain minimum standards:

Prospective contractors must affirmatively 

demonstrate their responsibility. This may be 

achieved through satisfactory performance on prior similar awards or through the presentation of 

evidence of their ability to satisfy the contract requirements. A Contracting Officer, prior to making an affirmative responsibility determination, 

shall be satisfied that the available information 

sufficiently demonstrates that the prospective

contractor meets the minimum standards set 

forth in subsection 4. 

PPR, Ch. I, § 5.5(a). 

As part of the minimum standards, a bidder must:

(b) be able to comply with the proposed delivery 

schedules, taking into consideration other existing 

commitments, commercial as well as governmental;

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(c) have a satisfactory record of performance in 

regard to both quality and timeliness on previously awarded contracts.

Id. § 5.4.

If these standards are not met, or if there is doubt as 

to the bidder’s productive capacity or financial strength 

that cannot be resolved affirmatively, then the bidder 

must be deemed non-responsible. Id. § 6. 

Determinations of non-responsibility with respect to 

contracts worth more than $100,000 must be documented 

in a Determination and Findings (“D&F”) document. Id.

§ 6(a). The D&F: 

constitutes a special form of approval or exercise 

of judgment required as a prerequisite to taking 

certain actions by procurement officials. A D&F 

must stand alone on its own merits and should 

ideally be confined to a single page, containing all 

available findings, concisely stated, to support the 

determination. 

Id. § 3.5(a).

In Colonial Press’s case, and in accordance with the 

PPR, the GPO reviewed Colonial Press’s compliance 

history with respect to past GPO contracts. The GPO 

prepared a Preaward Survey relevant to Colonial Press’s 

responsibility, including information on its performance 

history, quality samples, program history, correspondence 

history, and investigation factors. 

The Preaward Survey included a performance history 

covering the prior thirteen months, on a month-by-month 

basis. Over the thirteen-month period, Colonial Press 

was late on just under 6% of the deliveries. During the 

three months prior to the date of solicitation, Colonial 

Press had three late deliveries in November (33% of 

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COLONIAL PRESS INTERNATIONAL v. US 5

deliveries were late in this month), zero in December, and 

zero in January.

 While preparing the Preaward Survey for Colonial 

Press, the GPO contacted Colonial Press and requested an 

explanation for the late deliveries and notification of any 

corrective measures that may have been taken to avoid 

such delays in the future. Colonial Press’s contract manager Chris Seruga (“Seruga”) responded on the same day

with explanations.

 On February 13, 2013, the GPO contracting officer 

signed the Preaward Survey for Colonial Press and included a recommendation of no award. The contracting 

officer set forth the rationale in support of her determination in a D&F document. On the same day, the contracting officer signed the Preaward Survey for Fry 

Communications with a recommendation of award.2

The next day, the contracting officer wrote a letter to 

Colonial Press stating that it was found non-responsible. 

On February 20, 2013, the contracting officer awarded the 

contract and issued a purchase order to Fry Communications. On the same day, Seruga informed the GPO that 

one of Colonial Press’s late deliveries was actually ontime; however, the GPO responded that: 

Because of the weighted critical delivery schedules mandated by Congress, the remaining incidents where Colonial Press was delinquent on 

contracted deliveries was sufficient evidence to 

support finding Colonial Press non-responsible for 

such a high-profile Term Contract for the Medicare Handbooks.

2 The GPO performed a Preaward Survey for Fry 

Communications, showing that over the prior thirteen 

months Fry Communications had zero late deliveries.

 

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J.A. 16.

GAO Protest and the Question of SBA Referral

Under 31 U.S.C. § 3552, a disappointed bidder for a 

government contract may appeal the decision of the 

agency by filing a protest with the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”). On February 22, 2013, Colonial 

Press filed its protest with the GAO. Colonial Press 

alleged that the GPO’s determination of Colonial Press’s 

non-responsibility constituted an abuse of discretion. 

Colonial Press also argued that the responsibility determination should have been referred to the SBA. The 

GAO, upon receipt of the protest, inquired of the SBA 

whether the GPO, a Legislative branch agency and not a 

part of the Executive branch, was nevertheless subject to 

the requirements of the SBA Certificate of Competency 

Program (“COC Program”) under provisions of the Small 

Business Administration Act, specifically 15 U.S.C. 

§ 637(b)(7). 

Under the SBA’s COC Program, a “Government procurement officer” may not preclude a small business 

concern from being awarded a “Government contract” due 

to non-responsibility without referring the matter to the 

SBA for a final disposition. See 15 U.S.C. § 637(b)(7); 13 

C.F.R. § 125.5. The SBA may thereafter issue a certificate of competency to a particular Government contracting officer certifying that a small business concern is 

responsible with respect to a particular Government 

procurement contract. 13 C.F.R. § 125.5. 

On March 15, 2013, the SBA responded to the GAO

inquiry stating that “based upon our review of the law in 

this area we believe the requirements of the COC program could, arguably, apply to GPO and other nonexecutive agencies.” The SBA also stated that:

It is SBA’s view that an open question exists as to 

whether the requirements of the COC program 

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apply to GPO. While requirements for compliance 

with most of SBA’s small business programs are 

generally not extended to non-executive branch 

agencies, the statutory provision creating the 

COC program does not refer to agencies but instead is directed more generally at government 

procurement officers. As a result, SBA believes it

is possible to construe that provision as applying 

to all procurement officers, regardless of the agency or branch of government for which they work.

J.A. 326.

Referencing Matter of Downtown Legal Copies, B289432, 2002 CPD ¶ 16 (2002) and Matter of Fry Communications, 62 Comp. Gen. 164 (1983), the SBA recognized 

that the GAO had previously found that the referral 

requirements of § 637(b)(7) did not apply to the GPO, but, 

nevertheless, the SBA distinguished those decisions:

Those decisions focused broadly on the definition 

of ‘agency’ in § 632(b) and used that as a basis for

reaching the sweeping conclusion that no portion 

of the Small Business Act applies to any legislative branch agency. Those decisions do not go any 

further than a consideration of § 632(b) and do not 

examine the actual wording employed by Congress in drafting § 637(b)(7)(A). As such, SBA 

questions whether they are dispositive in this instance.

J.A. 325–26.

Shortly thereafter, and after reviewing the SBA report to the GAO, the GPO submitted the agency’s views to 

the GAO. The GPO stated “‘the contracting officer had a 

reasonable basis to conclude that the Colonial past performance, especially the performance of Colonial in the 

last quarter of 2012, caused her to have doubt about the 

ability of Colonial to meet the stringent, constant, monthCase: 14-5036 Document: 34-2 Page: 7 Filed: 06/10/2015
8 COLONIAL PRESS INTERNATIONAL v. US

to-month demands of Program 199S [sic] for on time high 

volume production.’” J.A. 17 (citation omitted). The GPO 

“‘concluded that nothing in the comments from the SBA 

changes the well-reasoned determination by GAO more 

than thirty years ago that procurements of GPO are not 

subject to the Small Business Act.’” Id. (citation omitted). 

On May 6, 2013, the GAO denied Colonial Press’s bid 

protest, along with another protest not at issue in this 

appeal. The GAO found that the GPO was not subject to 

the referral requirements of the SBA’s COC Program, and 

determined that the contracting officer had a reasonable 

basis for her determination of non-responsibility.

Trial Court and Appeal

After losing at the GAO, Colonial Press filed a postaward bid protest in the United States Court of Federal 

Claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b). Colonial Press 

argued that the GPO’s award was improper because the 

GPO failed to refer the responsibility determination to the 

SBA, and because the GPO’s responsibility determination 

was arbitrary and capricious and lacked a rational basis. 

After determining it had jurisdiction, the trial court 

held that the GPO did not violate the referral requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 637(b)(7), and that the GPO’s responsibility determination was not arbitrary or capricious 

and did not lack a rational basis. The trial court denied 

Colonial Press’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, 

and granted the United States’s (“Government”) motion 

for judgment on the administrative record. 

Colonial Press appealed the trial court’s decision to 

this court. Appellant essentially raises the same two 

issues on appeal—whether the GPO was required to refer 

the responsibility determination to the SBA, and whether 

the GPO’s responsibility determination and award of the

contract to Fry Communications was arbitrary or capricious or lacked a rational basis.

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We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). 

DISCUSSION

We review the trial court’s judgment on the administrative record without deference. Bannum, Inc. v. United 

States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005). We reapply

the standard of 5 U.S.C. § 706 to determine whether the 

GPO’s action in awarding the contract was arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law. See id.

In Allied Technology Group, Inc. v. United States, 649 

F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2011), we said:

The plaintiff-appellant must show that the Contracting Officer’s award “lacked a rational basis,” 

Centech Grp., Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 

1037 (Fed. Cir. 2009), or “violates to prejudicial effect an applicable procurement regulation,” CACI 

Field Servs., Inc. v. United States, 854 F.2d 464, 

466 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The test under the first 

ground is “whether the contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its 

exercise of discretion, and the disappointed bidder 

bears a heavy burden of showing that the award 

decision had no rational basis.” Centech, 554 F.3d 

at 1037. The test under the second ground is 

whether the disappointed bidder has shown “a 

clear and prejudicial violation of applicable statutes or regulations.” Id. To show prejudice, the 

protestor must show that “but for the alleged error, there was a substantial chance that [it] would 

receive an award—that it was within the zone of 

active consideration.” Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted).

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I.

The GPO Was Not Required to Refer the Responsibility 

Determination to the SBA

We begin with the language of that part of the Small 

Business Act that relates to this question: 

It shall also be the duty of the [Small Business] 

Administration and it is empowered, whenever it 

determines such action is necessary— . . . (7)(A) 

To certify to Government procurement officers, and 

officers engaged in the sale and disposal of Federal property, with respect to all elements of responsibility, including, but not limited to, capability, 

competency, capacity, credit, integrity, perseverance, and tenacity, of any small business concern 

or group of such concerns to receive and perform a 

specific Government contract. A Government procurement officer or an officer engaged in the sale 

and disposal of Federal property may not, for any 

reason specified in the preceding sentence preclude any small business concern or group of such 

concerns from being awarded such contract without referring the matter for a final disposition to 

the [SBA]. 

15 U.S.C. § 637(b)(7) (italics added).

The question of whether the GPO was required to 

refer the responsibility determination to the SBA turns 

upon the definitions of “Government procurement officer” 

and “Government contract.” 

If these terms are defined broadly, then § 637(b) could 

require any government procurement officer, including 

officers in the Legislative and Judicial branches, to refer 

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responsibility determinations to the SBA.3 If these terms 

are defined narrowly, then § 637(b) could be limited to 

certain categories of government procurement officers, 

specifically those in the Executive Branch, and, as a 

result, only certain officers would be required to refer 

responsibility determinations to the SBA.

We do not construe statutes in a vacuum, and “the 

words of a statute must be read in their context and with 

a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” 

Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989); 

accord FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 

U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000).

Similarly, we do not read the Small Business Act as “a 

series of unrelated and isolated provisions,” Gustafson v. 

Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995). We “must consider 

not only the bare meaning of each word but also the 

placement and purpose of the language within the statutory scheme.” Barela v. Shinseki, 584 F.3d 1379, 1383 

(Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 

137, 145 (1995)). “Statutory interpretation is ‘not guided 

by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look[s] 

to the provisions of the whole law.’” Hawkins v. United 

States, 469 F.3d 993, 1000-01 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting 

Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 35, 

(1990)).

 We observe that neither of the specific terms “Government procurement officer” nor “Government contract” 

3 Colonial Press proposes to avoid this categorical 

distinction analysis by suggesting that a referral to the 

SBA by GPO procurement officers should be required 

when evaluating contracts awarded on behalf of executive 

agencies, which are themselves subject to § 637(b)(7). See 

Appellant’s Reply Br. at 17 n.4. We find this an unpersuasive dodge of the basic issue.

 

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is defined in § 637(b) or in any section of the Small Business Act. However, an examination of the statutory 

scheme reveals that Congress defined related terms that

cast light on how these particular terms should be understood. 

In 15 U.S.C. § 637c(3), a “Government procurement 

contract” is defined as “any contract for the procurement 

of any goods or services by any Federal agency.” A “Federal agency” has “the meaning given the term ‘agency’ by 

section 551(1) of Title 5, but does not include the United 

States Postal Service or the Government Accountability 

Office.” Id. § 637c(2). The terms “Federal agency” and 

“agency” are also separately defined in § 632(b): 

For purposes of this chapter [(Ch. 14A of U.S. 

Code, Title 15, which includes § 637(b)(7))], any

reference to an agency or department of the United States, and the term “Federal agency”, shall 

have the meaning given the term “agency” by section 551(1) of Title 5, but does not include the 

United States Postal Service or the Government 

Accountability Office.

In turn, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) provides that:

For the purpose of this subchapter [(Subch. II of

Ch. 5 of U.S. Code, Title 5)]— (1) “agency” means 

each authority of the Government of the United 

States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but does not include— (A) 

the Congress . . . .

The GPO is a legislative agency under the direction 

and control of Congressional administration. See United 

States v. IBM Corp., 892 F.2d 1006, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 

Although we have not previously examined the issue, we 

agree with our sister circuit that “Congress” in § 551(1) 

refers to legislative agencies and departments generally. 

See Mayo v. United States Gov. Printing Office, 9 F.3d 

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1450, 1451 (9th Cir. 1993) (determining the GPO is a unit 

of Congress and therefore contained within the term 

“Congress” in § 551(1)).

Therefore, we agree with both parties that the GPO, 

as a legislative agency, is excluded from the definition of 

‘agency’ in 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).

Colonial Press takes exception to the above analysis

and contends that the definitions of “Government procurement contract,” “Federal agency,” and “agency” are 

irrelevant because those terms do not appear in 

§ 637(b)(7). Colonial Press also argues that § 637c does 

not apply to the Small Business Act as a whole. Instead, 

Colonial Press believes that § 637c only applies to the act 

which contained it—An Act to Amend the Small Business 

Act and the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, Pub. 

L. 95-507, 92 Stat. 1757 (1978) (“1978 Amendments”). 

Colonial Press argues that § 637c’s language “[f]or purposes of this Act” limits its applicability to the 1978 

Amendments only—and not § 637(b)(7). 

However, if we were to adopt Colonial Press’s reasoning, we would interpret “Government procurement contracts” to exclude contracts solicited by legislative 

agencies in some portions of the Act, while interpreting 

“Government procurement officers” to include contracting 

officers of those same legislative agencies in another 

portion of the Act—namely, § 637(b)(7). We agree with 

the Government and the trial court that this is an unreasonable and untenable construction.

Colonial Press’s analysis clashes with our “fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a 

statute must be read in their context and with a view to 

their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Mich. Dep’t 

of Treasury, 489 U.S. at 809; accord Brown & Williamson 

Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 132-33.

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14 COLONIAL PRESS INTERNATIONAL v. US

 In this light, we construe “Government contract” and 

“Government procurement officer” to limit those terms to 

exclude contracts and contracting on behalf of legislative 

agencies such as the GPO, regardless of whether such 

agencies are contracting for executive agencies. (See note 

3, supra.)

Moreover, though not dispositive, we note that the 

GAO, GPO, and SBA have interpreted the Small Business 

Act consistently since 1983 with our interpretation, i.e., 

that the GPO is not subject to the SBA’s COC Program 

referral requirements. See J.A. 38–40, 388; Fry 

Commc’ns, Inc., 62 Comp. Gen. 164, 167 (1983) (finding 

the GPO was not subject to the Small Business Act).

Similarly, in Gray Graphics Corp. v. United States 

Government Printing Office, No. 82-2890, 1982 U.S. Dist. 

Lexis 18378, at *8 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 1982), the district 

court, relying in no small part on an affidavit from SBA 

Associate General Counsel, held that the GPO is not 

subject to the Small Business Act because the SBA “itself 

does not now and has never regarded the GPO to be 

subject to its jurisdiction.” See also Udall v. Tallman, 380 

U.S. 1, 18 (1965) (“‘[T]he practical constructions given to 

an act of Congress, fairly susceptible of different constructions, by those charged with the duty of executing it is 

entitled to great respect and, if acted upon for a number of

years will not be disturbed except for cogent reasons.’”)

(quoting McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 480–81 

(1921)). 

The SBA’s memorandum, cited above and written in 

the context of the GAO bid protest, that the COC referral 

process “could, arguably” apply to the GPO does not affect 

our analysis. J.A. 324. The statement as thus qualified 

by the SBA is true; it does not aid, however, in the ultimate determination of the question of whether it should 

be so interpreted.

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II.

The GPO’s Award Did Not Violate 5 U.S.C. § 706

Finally we turn to Colonial Press’s other argument on 

appeal, whether the GPO’s award lacked a rational basis. 

See Centech, 554 F.3d at 1037.

Colonial Press’s primary argument is that the D&F 

lacks a rational basis because it focused on three months

of performance history instead of a longer period with a 

lower rate of late deliveries and because, despite Seruga’s 

explanations, the D&F stated there was no evidence that 

would lead the GPO to believe performance would improve. Colonial Press asserts the contracting officer failed 

to carefully consider all information as required by PPR, 

Ch. I, § 5.6. 

Colonial Press also argues that the trial court erred—

and this court would err—by relying on material outside 

the D&F to provide a rational basis since the D&F must 

“stand alone” under PPR, Ch. I, § 3.5(a). But Colonial 

Press admits a court may consult the administrative 

record to ensure that the D&F findings are supported.

We do not agree with Colonial Press’s reasoning. The 

contracting officer’s reference to the three-month period 

instead of the thirteen-month period does not deprive the 

agency’s decision of a rational basis nor is it sufficient to 

overcome the wide discretion afforded to agencies in 

making responsibility decisions. See John C. Grimberg 

Co. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1297, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 

(“Because responsibility decisions are largely a matter of 

judgment, contracting officers are generally given wide 

discretion to make this decision.”).

In either the three-month or thirteen-month period, 

Colonial Press had late deliveries while Fry Communications had zero late deliveries. The contracting officer was 

required to consider PPR, Ch. I, § 5.4 and, based on 

Colonial Press’s past performance and Seruga’s evidence, 

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the GPO determined that it had “no evidence that the 

contractor has taken any actions that would lead us to 

believe that their [sic] performance will improve.” J.A. 

348. The ability to comply with proposed delivery schedules was an important and mandatory consideration for 

the contracting officer. Merely because some explanation 

was provided for Colonial Press’s late deliveries does not 

mean the contracting officer was required to accept these 

explanations, nor did it change Colonial Press’s historical 

past performance. Instead, the contracting officer had 

discretion to state that, after considering the evidence on 

both sides, she found the bidder non-responsible. 

Similarly, to the extent Colonial Press argues there 

were violations of applicable procurement regulations 

with prejudicial effect, Colonial Press fails to show there 

was an actual violation. See Centech, 554 F.3d at 1037. 

Colonial Press alleges no violation of PPR, Ch. I, § 3.5 by 

the contracting officer, and Colonial Press’s argument 

that § 5.6 was violated is unpersuasive.

We will not substitute our own judgment for that of 

the agency in this matter. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 

Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 

(1983). The contracting officer was within her discretion 

to reject the explanations provided by Colonial Press as 

insufficient to allay her concerns in the responsibility 

determination.

We decline to address whether the PPR somehow precluded the trial court from relying on evidence within the 

administrative record but outside the D&F—even if that 

were the case, which we do not hold, the issue is moot 

because there was sufficient rational basis provided by 

the D&F itself. There was no need to rely on evidence 

outside of it. The GPO provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion in the D&F 

itself.

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We have considered the other arguments raised on 

appeal, including potential waiver, and found them unpersuasive.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the United 

States Court of Federal Claims is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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