Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02358/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02358-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nancy A. Berryhill
Defendant
Ana Valle
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANA VALLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,

Defendant.

Case No.16-cv-02358-JSC 

ORDER RE CROSS MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Re: Dkt. Nos. 15, 21

Plaintiff Ana Valle seeks social security benefits for a combination of physical and mental 

impairments, including: status post breast cancer, status post bilateral breast mastectomy and 

breast reconstruction, chronic pain, fibromyalgia, and depression. Plaintiff brings this action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision by Defendant 

Nancy A. Berryhill, the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, denying 

Plaintiff’s application for disability benefits.1 Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion 

for summary judgment and Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.2(Dkt. Nos. 15, 21.) 

For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and 

DENIES Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

LEGAL STANDARD

A claimant is considered “disabled” under the Social Security Act if he meets two 

requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 

1 Nancy Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, and is 

therefore substituted for Carolyn W. Colvin as the Defendant in this action. See 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g); Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

2 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 6 & 8.)

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First, the claimant must demonstrate “an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by 

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less 

than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Second, the impairment or impairments must be 

severe enough that he is unable to do his previous work and cannot, based on his age, education, 

and work experience “engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the 

national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). To determine whether a claimant is disabled, an 

ALJ is required to employ a five-step sequential analysis, examining:

(1) whether the claimant is “doing substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the 

claimant has a “severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment” or 

combination of impairments that has lasted for more than 12 months; (3) whether 

the impairment “meets or equals” one of the listings in the regulations; (4) whether, 

given the claimant’s “residual functional capacity,” the claimant can still do his or 

her “past relevant work”; and (5) whether the claimant “can make an adjustment to 

other work.”

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a).

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In June 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of 

the Social Security Act. (Administrative Record (AR) 193.) Plaintiff’s claim was initially denied 

in December 2012, and then again upon reconsideration in June 2013. (AR 7, 26, 65, 72, 113.) 

Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a hearing which was held on May 23, 2014. Plaintiff testified and 

was represented by her attorney Steven Bruce. The ALJ subsequently denied Plaintiff’s 

application in a written decision. (AR 10-22.) Plaintiff filed a request for review, arguing that the 

ALJ committed errors of law and that her decision was not supported by substantial evidence. 

(AR 293-297.) The Appeals Council denied review of Plaintiff’s application, resulting in the 

ALJ’s decision becoming the Commissioner’s final decision. (AR 1-6.) Plaintiff subsequently 

commenced this action for judicial review and moved for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 15.) 

Defendant then crossed moved for summary judgment and for affirmance of the Commissioner’s 

final decision. (Dkt. No. 21.) 

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ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD

Plaintiff was born on July 23, 1970. (AR 36.) She has experienced back pain since 1996. 

(AR 1059.) In 1997 she injured her back at work and had back surgery. (AR 1056.) In 1998 

Plaintiff attended a pain management program at St. Francis Hospital. (AR 1056, 1061.) In the 

following years her chronic back pain spread to other parts of her body. (AR 1059.) 

Plaintiff alleges she has been unable to return to work since she was diagnosed with stage 

II breast cancer in July 2011. (AR 36, 41, 1147.) Plaintiff underwent a mastectomy and 

chemotherapy treatment. (AR 41.) Plaintiff also experiences fibromyalgia, back pain, joint pain, 

knee pain, anxiety, and depression. (AR 41.) 

I. Medical History

Plaintiff has been a regular patient of Kaiser Permanente since 2010. (AR 310-1149.) Her 

primary doctor is Dr. Yunie Kim. (AR 712.) Plaintiff has a medical history of hypothyroidism, 

lumbar fusion, fibromyalgia, chronic pain, breast cancer, vitamin D deficiency, constipation, 

phlebitis or thrombophlebitis of the superficial vein of the upper limb, hyperlipidemia, anxiety, 

and depression. (AR 310, 589,595.) Plaintiff has received 19 medical prescriptions to address

these health conditions. (AR 345-346.) 

Plaintiff began seeing Dr. Michelle Yang Sun at Kaiser in August 2010. (AR 313.) In 

addition to the medical conditions described above, Plaintiff complained of joint, hip, knee, and 

increasing neck and back pain. (AR 314, 320-21, 369, 441) Plaintiff reported it was painful to 

walk up stairs. (AR 441.) Plaintiff informed Dr. Sun that she had low energy and had lost her job 

in 2010. (AR 322.) Plaintiff reported feeling anxious about her breast cancer surgery and 

continued to experience whole back and elbow pain. (AR 330.) In August 2011 Plaintiff was to 

see Dr. Sun in person. (AR 330.) Dr. Sun diagnosed Plaintiff with anxiety associated with 

depression and proscribed citalopram. (AR 330, 332.) Dr. Sun also proscribed Etodolac and 

Naproxen for Plaintiff’s pain. (AR 365.) 

Plaintiff’s husband, Jose Villanueva, became Plaintiff’s primary caretaker when Plaintiff 

was diagnosed with breast cancer. (AR 340-342.) In 2012, Plaintiff began recovering from breast 

surgery and underwent rounds of chemotherapy treatment. (AR 503.) As a result of 

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chemotherapy, Plaintiff experienced significant fatigue, nausea, constipation, mouth sores, mucosa 

symptoms, teeth and sinus sensitivity, hair and appetite loss, shortness of breath, bloating, 

deepening back pain, musculoskeletal pain, and tingling in her feet. (AR 449, 466, 474, 503, 514.) 

In 2013, Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression continued. (AR 585.) Plaintiff experienced 

excessive worrying, crying spells, insomnia, and decreased energy and concentration. (AR 585.) 

Plaintiff felt overwhelmed due to past work harassment and verbal abuse and was fearful of 

finding new work. (AR 585.) Plaintiff worried about her cancer returning, particularly because of 

her pain and fatigue. (AR 1121.) She was also fearful about a blot clot surgery she needed after a 

bad experience trying to establish an IV. (AR 590.) She felt anxious about her upcoming breast

reconstruction surgery and port removal. (AR 612.) Plaintiff was diagnosed with major recurring 

depression and anxiety disorder. (AR 612.) 

In addition to her psychological conditions, Plaintiff’s physical challenges continued into 

2013. Plaintiff felt “overwhelming feelings of fatigue and pain,” “constant body pain,” and “a 

heaviness from this that stops her from functioning in her daily life.” (AR 590.) She complained 

of “no energy to do daily tasks.” (AR 590.) Her chronic constipation and pain issues also 

continued. (AR 595, 589.) Plaintiff started a chronic pain program in 2013, but was initially 

unable to complete the paperwork due to anxiety and discomfort. (AR 595.) The chronic pain 

program included physical therapy. (AR 728.) 

On June 18, 2013, Plaintiff underwent bilateral breast reconstruction surgery. (AR 649.) 

Around this time Plaintiff also experienced: a skin problem with light areas on her hands, armpits, 

and groin, pain in her jaw with some clenching and difficulty chewing, leg, knee, and hip pain, 

weakness in her hands, heartburn, and difficulty sleeping due to her chronic pain. (AR 656, 785, 

1056.) Plaintiff sleeps about four to five hours per night, but needs eight. (AR 1061.) 

In 2014, Plaintiff experienced hot flashes, weight gain, lower abdominal pain, and 

continued chronic constipation, back pain, fibromyalgia, vitamin D deficiency, anxiety disorder, 

and major depression. (AR 918-919, 937, 943-944.) Plaintiff also participated in the “most 

vulnerable patient” program at Kaiser Permanente. (AR 1147.) She felt overwhelmed by her 

illness and the many surgeries she had to undergo. (AR 1147.) 

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II. Medical Evaluations 

A. Treating Physician Dr. Yunie Kim

Dr. Kim is Plaintiff’s treating physician. (AR 291.) On May 5, 2014, Dr. Kim conducted 

a medical assessment of Plaintiff’s ability to do work related activities. (AR 712.) Dr. Kim 

concluded that Plaintiff’s chronic anxiety would impact her ability to deal with work stress, and 

that her depression can affect her memory, mood, and interactions with others. (AR 713-714.)

Dr. Kim found that Plaintiff has weak grip strength and can only lift less than 10 pounds and less 

than 5 pounds with frequency during an eight hour workday. (AR 715.) Dr. Kim also concluded 

that Plaintiff can stand and/or walk for only 1-2 hours per day and sit for six hours in an eight hour

workday. (AR 715.) Dr. Kim recommended the following environmental restrictions due to 

Plaintiff’s impairments: heights, moving machinery, extreme temperatures, chemicals, dust, and

noise. (AR 716.) 

B. Examining Psychiatrist Dr. Bruce Pither

Dr. Bruce Pither examined Plaintiff on October 20, 2012. Plaintiff is originally from 

Mexico and moved to the Bay Area when she was 10 years old. (AR 554.) She dropped out of 

school after tenth grade to support her family. (Id.) She received her GED in 2000. She 

experienced chronic neck and back pain which was accommodated accordingly. (Id.) Plaintiff 

then attended City College of San Francisco and earned a certificate in Community Health. (AR 

555.) Plaintiff’s employment history includes working at a clothing store, taking orders at a pizza

shop, and answering phones and doing case work at two domestic violence hotlines. (AR 555.) 

Plaintiff has not worked full time since December 2010. (Id.)

Plaintiff reported chronic back and neck pain. (Id.) This back and neck pain affects 

Plaintiff’s whole system. (Id.) Plaintiff reported feeling weak most of the time, as well as pain, 

numbness, and swelling in her arms, hands, and fingers. (Id.) Plaintiff stated she was taking 

citalopram for depression and lorazepam for relaxation and sleep. (Id.) Plaintiff’s weakness 

makes it difficult to manage her chronic pain. (Id.) Dr. Pither concluded that it appears to be a 

“vicious cycle that affects her mood and sleep.” (Id.) Plaintiff also reported that her former 

employer, the pizza restaurant, did not deduct enough SSI from her paycheck and she was 

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informed she owes the federal government $20,000. (Id.) This development makes her even more 

anxious, which exacerbates her chronic neck and back pain. (Id.) 

Dr. Pither reported that Plaintiff appeared pleasant and cooperative, but extremely timid. 

(AR 556.) Plaintiff was oriented to time and place, but stated she was feeling forgetful and her 

general state was scared, unsafe, and weak. (Id.) Her judgment, affect, thought content, dress, eye 

contact, and mood were neutral and adequate. (Id.) 

Dr. Pither concluded that Plaintiff is “unable to engage in any work activities at this time.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff’s activities are limited by her “pain disorder and myriad medical problems” which 

“may not appeal to potential employers” and “prohibit her from engaging in any form of work 

activities.” (Id.) Dr. Pither also reported that Plaintiff is marginally capable of caring for herself 

in terms of bathing, washing her clothes, and nourishing herself, but that she is assisted by her 

husband. (Id.) He also stated that if Plaintiff could work, she would be able to understand, 

remember, and carry out simple instructions, but that she demonstrates some difficulty 

“concentrating, persisting, and pacing.” (Id.) Dr. Pither concluded “if [Plaintiff] could work, she 

would.” (Id.) 

C. Non-Examining Doctors

1. Dr. Dan Funkenstein

Dr. Funkenstein submitted a report regarding Plaintiff on December 3, 2012. (AR 41.) He 

noted Plaintiff underwent four rounds of chemotherapy, has anxiety due to her pain, and takes 

citalopram for depression. (AR 40, 41.) He concluded Plaintiff had three severe impairments, 

breast cancer, disorders of the back, and somatoform disorder, and that these impairments can 

reasonably be expected to cause Plaintiff pain. (AR 42-43.) In regards to mental capacity, Dr. 

Funkenstein found Plaintiff had sustained concentration and persistence limitations, and 

moderately limited ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions, maintain 

attention and concentration for extended periods, perform activities within a schedule, maintain 

regular attendance, and be punctual. (AR 45-46.) He also concluded that Plaintiff’s ability to 

complete a normal workday or week without interruption from her psychological symptoms or to 

perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number of rest periods was moderately 

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limited. (AR 46.) 

2. Dr. K. Rudito

Dr. Rudito submitted a report regarding Plaintiff in September 2012. (AR 45.) He 

concluded that Plaintiff could occasionally lift 20 pounds, frequently lift 10 pounds, stand or walk 

for two hours, and sit for six hours in an eight hour work day. (AR 44.) He also found that 

Plaintiff had postural limitations such that she could frequently climb stairs, kneel, and crouch by 

bending at the knees, but could only occasionally climb ladders or scaffolds or stoop by bending at

the waist. (AR 44.) Dr. Rudito concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled. (AR 48.) 

3. Doctors Elizabeth Covey and J.R. Saphir

Doctors Elizabeth Covey and Dr. J.R. Saphir submitted the medical opinions for Plaintiff’s

disability reconsideration. Dr. Covey, similar to Dr. Funkenstein, concluded Plaintiff’s 

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause her pain. (AR 57.). Dr. Covey also agreed 

with Dr. Rudito’s opinion that Plaintiff could occasionally lift 20 pounds, frequently lift 10 

pounds, stand or walk for two hours, and sit for six hours in an eight hour work day. (AR 58-59.) 

Dr. Covey concluded that Plaintiff’s ability to carry out short and simple instructions, work in 

coordination with others, and make simple work decisions was not significantly limited; however 

he concluded that Plaintiff’s ability to maintain attention, carry out detailed instructions, sustain an 

ordinary routine, or complete a normal weekday without interruptions from her mental symptoms 

was moderately limited. (AR 60-61.) In his June 3, 2013 determination, Dr. Saphir, similar to 

Dr. Rudito, concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 63.) 

III. Administrative Hearing

Plaintiff’s disability hearing was held on May 23, 2014 in San Francisco. (AR 113.) 

Jennifer Horne was the presiding administrative law judge. (Id.) Plaintiff, her husband Jose 

Villanueva, witness Cinzia Bartolomeo, and vocational expert Lynda Berkeley were present and 

testified. (Id.)

A. Plaintiff’s Testimony

When Plaintiff’s last job ended in 2010 she did not look for new work because she was 

very depressed. (AR 123, 126.) When she lost her job, Plaintiff also lost her home and health 

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insurance. (AR 123.) Plaintiff obtained health benefits through her husband’s insurance six

months later, in July 2011. (AR 124, 126.) At this time Plaintiff was diagnosed with breast 

cancer. (AR 126.) Plaintiff didn’t apply to obtain disability benefits right away because her body 

“couldn’t function” and everything was more stressful. (AR 129.) 

Plaintiff wasn’t feeling well even before she was diagnosed with breast cancer, and 

learning that she had it made “everything worse.” (AR 130.) The pain made it difficult for the 

Plaintiff to sleep or function. (AR 131.) Plaintiff took Vicodin after her breast surgery but later 

switched to Tylenol because her health providers did not want Plaintiff taking anything stronger. 

(AR 132.)

Plaintiff can only sit or stand for one hour at time due to her back pain and fatigue. (AR 

134.) Plaintiff can only walk for 30-40 minutes before she feels extremely tired. (Id.) Lifting 

weights is very difficult for her. (AR 135.) Sometimes plates or cups fall out of her hands due to 

weakness in both arms. (Id.) Plaintiff’s lymph nodes were removed when she was diagnosed with 

cancer and as a result sometimes her arms swell, become inflamed, and are painful all over. (Id.) 

When the pain is severe Plaintiff lies down and rests which relieves some of her discomfort. (AR 

136.) Plaintiff feels pain in her jaw, neck, arms, legs, and back. (Id.) Plaintiff is taking 

medication for her anxiety and depression. (AR 139-140.)

Plaintiff accompanies her father to his chemotherapy treatments by driving him to his 

appointment, sitting for 30 minutes with him at the appointment, and driving him home. (AR 

141.) Plaintiff also performs some cooking, cleaning, and shopping. (AR 142.) Plaintiff mops 

and cleans approximately once a week. (Id.) Plaintiff is unable to vacuum due to the difficulties

with her hands and back. (AR 143.) She occasionally goes for a walk or grocery shopping with 

her sister. (AR 146.) Plaintiff also buys groceries alone. (Id.) Due to her medical and mental 

condition, Plaintiff’s physical relationship with her husband has deteriorated. (AR 148-149.) It 

has become difficult for Plaintiff to enjoy spending time with her family when they visit. (Id.) 

B. Spouse’s Testimony

José Villanueva, Plaintiff’s husband, testified that Plaintiff’s illness has limited their ability 

to do activities together such as camping and spending time outdoors. (AR 150-151.) Plaintiff 

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can’t be out in the sun too long because even the natural light bothers her. (AR 151.) Plaintiff has 

difficulty cooking on a consistent basis, sometimes she can manage for an hour or so. (AR 152.) 

Plaintiff is able to perform light cleaning, but has difficultly lifting and opening items – holding a 

gallon of milk or opening a bottle of water is challenging. (Id.) 

Plaintiff is depressed and constantly worries that her cancer will return or that she will be 

diagnosed with a different type of cancer due to the other illnesses in her family. (Id.) Plaintiff 

can occasionally work for an hour or two, but not on a consistent basis. (AR 153 - 154.) The 

main cause of Plaintiff’s inability to work is her pain. (Id.) 

C. Social Worker’s Testimony

Cinzia Bartolomeo is a social worker and case manager at Kaiser who had been working 

with Plaintiff for approximately one month at the time of the hearing. (AR 156-157.) Ms. 

Bartolomeo helped Plaintiff obtain food stamps and general assistance. (AR 167.) Ms. 

Bartolomeo was in the process of helping Plaintiff obtain a shower bar to help Plaintiff bathe.

(AR 158.) Ms. Bartolomeo was also in the process of connecting Plaintiff to organizations that 

provide social and mental health support to breast cancer survivors. (AR 157-158.) 

Plaintiff can get dressed and go shopping herself, therefore Ms. Bartolomeo did not help 

Plaintiff apply for grooming assistance. (AR 168-169.) In regards to Plaintiff’s mental health, 

Plaintiff appears very overwhelmed by her physical condition which is having a negative effect on 

her mental condition causing Plaintiff to be very anxious, depressed, and forgetful. (AR 170.) 

Plaintiff appears to be “trying the best she can do....but it’s definitely difficult, really, really 

difficult for her to manage her life.” (AR 170.) 

D. Vocational Expert’s Testimony

The ALJ presented Vocational Expert (“VE”) with six hypotheticals. In the first 

hypothetical, the individual is similar to Plaintiff in age, education, and past work history. The 

individual can lift 10 pounds and carry 20 pounds occasionally, sit for six hours and stand for two 

hours in an eight hour day, occasionally climb ropes, and is limited to simple routine work. The 

VE testified that the individual can perform the full range of sedentary work, including: Plaintiff’s 

former job of an order clerk, telephone quotation clerk (DOT 237.367-046, of which there are 

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approximately 1,000 jobs in California and 58,000 in the United States), addresser (DOT 209.587-

010, of which there are 2,400 jobs in California and 8,800 nationally), final assembler of optical 

goods (DOT 713.687-018, of which there are 3,000 jobs in California and 35,000 in the United 

States), and document preparer (DOT 249.587-018, of which there are 5,000 jobs in California and 

44,700 in the United States). (AR 174.)

In hypothetical two, the individual was the same as hypothetical one; however the 

individual could sit or stand for no more than an hour. (AR 176-177.) The VE testified that the 

individual could still perform the order clerk, final assembler, and optical goods jobs from 

hypothetical one because they offer sit/stand options. (AR 177.) The VE stated that the individual 

could also perform the work of a small products assembler (DOT 7063684-022, of which there are 

6,000 jobs in California, and 100,0000 in the United States) and ticket seller (DOT 211.467-030, 

with 4,500 jobs in California and 45,000 in the United States); however the small products 

assembler requires the individual to lift up to 20 pounds while working on a high bench. (AR 178-

180.)

In hypothetical three, the individual was the same as hypothetical two; however he could 

only lift 10 pounds. (AR 180.) The VE testified the individual could not perform any light jobs, 

but could perform sedentary work such as the order clerk, optical assembler, and ticket seller. 

(AR 180-182). In hypothetical four, the individual is the same as hypothetical one; however the 

individual cannot do any climbing. (AR 183.) The VE testified individual four can perform the 

same jobs as individual one. (AR 183.) In hypothetical five, the individual is the same as 

hypothetical two but also cannot do any climbing. (AR 184.) The VE testified that this individual 

could do the same jobs as individual two. (AR 184.) In hypothetical six, the individual is the 

same as hypothetical five, but would also be off task for more than 10 percent of the workday. 

(AR 184.) The VE testified that individual six would be precluded from all full-time employment. 

(AR 184.) 

Plaintiff’s attorney inquired whether an individual in hypothetical two who needs to take a 

30 minute break after every hour of work could perform sedentary work. (AR 185.) The VE 

testified that no, such an individual “would barely be working a half a day.” (AR 185-186.)

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III. ALJ’s Findings

In a September 25, 2014, written decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff is not disabled under 

Section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act, taking into consideration the testimony and 

evidence, and using the SSA’s five-step sequential evaluation process for determining disability. 

(AR 7-22.) 

At the first step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since the alleged onset date, July 1, 2011. (AR 12.) At the second step, Plaintiff had the 

following severe impairments: status post breast cancer, status post bilateral breast mastectomy 

and breast reconstruction, chronic pain, fibromyalgia, and depression. (Id.) These impairments 

“significantly limit the claimant’s ability to do basic work-related activities.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s 

hypothyroidism, hyperlipidemia, and history of lumbar fusion are “non severe” impairments 

because the hypothyroidism and hyperlipidemia did not last longer than 12 months, cause 

significant limitations in Plaintiff’s ability to do work functions, there were no recent abnormal 

findings to support any limitations Plaintiff may allege, and the medical records show that 

Plaintiff’s back pain is “helped with over-the-counter Advil.” (AR 12-13.) 

At the third step, Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that 

met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 404.1525, 404.1526). The ALJ considered the 

listings of 12.04. (AR 13.) The ALJ also considered the “paragraph B” criteria, as to whether 

Plaintiff’s mental impairment resulted in at least two of the following: marked restriction of daily 

living activities, marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning, concentration, persistence, 

pace, or repeated episodes of decompensation of an extended duration (three episodes in one year 

or an average of once every four months lasting two weeks each). (Id.) 

Plaintiff does not have any restrictions of daily living because Plaintiff testified that she 

can shop, cook, do chores, and has no problems with personal care. (Id.) In regards to social 

functions, Plaintiff has mild difficulties getting along and spending time with others, shopping, 

and using public transportation. (Id.) Plaintiff has moderate difficulties with concentration, 

persistence or pace such as completing tasks, following instructions, and mental fatigue. (Id.) As 

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a result of finding that Plaintiff’s mental impairment does not cause at least two “marked” 

limitations or one “marked” limitation and repeated episodes of decompensation, the ALJ 

concluded the “paragraph B” criteria were not satisfied. (Id.) The “paragraph C” 12.04 criteria 

was not satisfied because “the evidence fails to establish the presence of a medically documented

history of a chronic affective disorder of at least two years’ duration that has caused more than 

minimal limitation of ability to do basic work activities.” (AR 13-14.)

At the fourth step, Plaintiff can perform sedentary work, lift up to 10 pounds, sit for six 

hours and stand for two hours in an eight hour work day, sit and stand at will with no sitting or 

standing for more than one hour at a time, occasionally grip, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, 

push, and pull. (AR 14.) Plaintiff can never climb. (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff’s work should be 

limited to simple, routine, repetitive, and unskilled work tasks. (Id.) The findings of the objective 

medical evidence do not provide strong support of the Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling 

limitations. (AR 16.) Plaintiff’s chronic pain was not persuasive because Plaintiff traveled during 

her chemotherapy treatment. (Id.) Plaintiff’s breast cancer has not returned and Plaintiff tolerated 

her medication well. (Id.) 

In regards to her chronic pain and fatigue, Plaintiff complained she was often tired but also 

got up, went for walks, and exercised. (AR 17.) The treatment records from March and April of

2013 indicated that the reconditioning program, group therapy, cognitive behavioral therapy and 

relaxation practice seemed to help Plaintiff because in May 2013 she reported that she could sit 

longer, sleep better, and take better care of herself. (Id.) Despite the fact Plaintiff’s chronic pain 

continued into 2013 Plaintiff took her father to his cancer treatments and doctors instructed 

Plaintiff to exercise, despite her pain, in order to control her weight. (Id.) Plaintiff’s pain must not

be as severe as she alleges or work-preclusive because she takes Advil and Tylenol. (AR 18.) 

Plaintiff’s allegations about her mental health are not credible because her medical 

treatment has been “conservative and not indicative of total disability” and the treatment 

medications helped her anxiety and depression. (AR 18.) Plaintiff’s daily living activities

including walking, personal care, cooking simple meals, laundry, light cleaning, reading, going 

out a few times a week, using transportation, and taking her father to his cancer treatment 

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appointments are “not what I would expected from one as impaired as the claimant.” (Id.)

The ALJ accorded some weight to Dr. Kim’s physical assessments, but concluded Dr. 

Kim’s finding that Plaintiff can only stand or walk less than two hours in an eight hour day is not 

supported by the medical evidence or Plaintiff’s testimony that she can walk one hour at one time 

and stand for half an hour at one time. (AR 19.) The ALJ only accorded some weight to Dr. 

Kim’s assessment of Plaintiff’s mental condition because mental health is not Dr. Kim’s area of 

expertise. (Id.) The ALJ accorded some weight to Dr. Pither’s finding that Plaintiff could not 

work because of her chronic pain and depression, but disagreed that Plaintiff would work if she 

could. (Id.) The ALJ accorded some weight to Ms. Bartolomeo’s testimony regarding Plaintiff’s 

mental limits because although Ms. Bartolomeo is a registered nurse, she is not a mental health 

expert. (Id.) The ALJ did give great weight, however, to Ms. Bartolomeo’s testimony about the 

services she provides and Plaintiff’s needs because it “shows that, despite her impairments, the 

claimant is still able to perform a wide range of activities with the ability to focus, concentrate, 

and complete tasks, which belies her testimony that she is disabled.” (AR 20.)

In step five, the ALJ accepted the VE’s expert opinion. (AR 21.) Plaintiff could perform 

her past work because the VE testified that someone with Plaintiff’s background and residual 

functional capacity could do so. (AR 20.) The VE testified that an individual with limitations 

similar to Plaintiff’s can perform unskilled occupations such as an optical final assembler (with 

3,000 jobs in California and 35,000 nationally) and a ticket seller (with 4,500 jobs in California 

and 45,000 nationally). (AR 21) The ALJ concluded that a finding of “not disabled” is 

appropriate because Plaintiff “is capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that 

exists in significant numbers in the national economy”. (Id.) 

IV. Appeals Council 

Plaintiff filed a request for review on September 25, 2014, arguing that the ALJ committed 

errors of law and that her decision was not supported by substantial evidence. (AR 293-297.) The 

Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s appeal on February 25, 2016, concluding there was no reason 

to grant review. (AR 2.) The Appeals Council’s decision rendered the ALJ’s opinion final.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court has authority to review an ALJ’s decision to 

deny benefits. When exercising this authority, however, the “Social Security Administration’s 

disability determination should be upheld unless it contains legal error or is not supported by 

substantial evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Andrews v. 

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”; it is “more than a mere 

scintilla, but may be less than a preponderance.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110-11 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). To determine whether the ALJ’s 

decision is supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court “must consider the entire record 

as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting 

evidence.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotation 

marks omitted).

Determinations of credibility, resolution of conflicts in medical testimony, and all other 

ambiguities are roles reserved for the ALJ. See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. “The ALJ’s findings 

will be upheld if supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Tommasetti v. 

Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see 

also Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (“When the evidence 

before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational interpretation, we must defer to the ALJ’s 

conclusion.”) “The court may not engage in second- guessing.” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039. “It 

is immaterial that the evidence would support a finding contrary to that reached by the

Commissioner; the Commissioner’s determination as to a factual matter will stand if supported by 

substantial evidence because it is the Commissioner’s job, not the Court’s, to resolve conflicts in 

the evidence.” Bertrand v. Astrue, No. 08-CV-00147-BAK, 2009 WL 3112321, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 

Sept. 23, 2009). Similarly, “[a] decision of the ALJ will not be reversed for errors that are 

harmless.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). However, the Court can only 

affirm the ALJ’s findings based on reasoning that the ALJ herself asserted. See Connett v. 

Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). In other words, the Court’s consideration is limited 

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to “the grounds articulated by the agency[.]” Cequerra v. Sec’y, 933 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 

1991).

DISCISSION

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred as a matter of law by: (1) finding Plaintiff was capable of 

performing a full range of sedentary work and relying on the VE’s testimony despite Plaintiff’s 

physical and psychological limitations; (2) making an improper finding that Plaintiff’s back pain is 

non-severe; and (3) finding Plaintiff was not disabled during cancer treatment. Plaintiff requests 

the Court reverse and remand to the Commissioner for payment of benefits. 

I. The ALJ’s Consideration of Medical Opinion Evidence

A. Legal Standard

In the Ninth Circuit, courts must “distinguish among the opinions of three types of 

physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do 

not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the 

claimant (nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995) (as 

amended (Apr. 9, 1996)). The medical opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is given 

“controlling weight” so long as it “is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and 

laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the 

claimant’s] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). “To reject [the] uncontradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining doctor, an ALJ must state clear and convincing reasons that are supported by 

substantial evidence.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(alteration in original) (quoting Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005)). “If a 

treating or examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may 

only reject it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial 

evidence.” Id. (quoting Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216); see also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725

(9th Cir. 1998) (“[The] reasons for rejecting a treating doctor’s credible opinion on disability are 

comparable to those required for rejecting a treating doctor’s medical opinion.”). 

“The ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts 

and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.”

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Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 

1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986)). “The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute 

substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a 

treating physician.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 831 (internal citation omitted). Ultimately, “the ALJ must 

do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own interpretations and explain why 

they, rather than the doctors’, are correct.” Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421–22 (9th Cir. 

1988).

“When an ALJ does not explicitly reject a medical opinion or set forth specific, legitimate 

reasons for crediting one medical opinion over another, he errs. In other words, an ALJ errs when 

he rejects a medical opinion or assigns it little weight while doing nothing more than ignoring it, 

asserting without explanation that another medical opinion is more persuasive, or criticizing it 

with boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive basis for his conclusion.” Garrison v. 

Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012-1013 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted). In conducting this

review, the ALJ “must consider the entire record as a whole.” Hill, 698 F.3d at 1159 (internal 

citations omitted). “An ALJ may not cherry-pick and rely on portions of the medical record which 

bolster his findings.” See, e.g., Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 

2001) (holding that an ALJ may not selectively rely on some entries and ignore others “that 

indicate continued, severe impairment”). “Particularly in a case where the medical opinions of the 

physicians differ so markedly from the ALJ’s [,]” “it is incumbent on the ALJ to provide detailed, 

reasoned, and legitimate rationales for disregarding the physicians’ findings.” Embrey, 849 F.2d 

at 422.

B. Analysis 

To reject the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Kim, and the examining 

psychiatrist, Dr. Pither, in favor of the non-examining consultants, Drs. Rudito, Covey, and 

Saphir, the ALJ was required to provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial 

evidence for doing so. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. The ALJ did not do so.

1. Treating Physician Dr. Kim

Dr. Kim is Plaintiff’s treating physician. The ALJ accorded some weight to Dr. Kim’s 

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physical assessments, but concluded Dr. Kim’s finding that Plaintiff can only stand or walk less 

than two hours in an eight hour day is not supported by the medical evidence.

The ALJ erred by failing to apply the factors relevant to determining the extent to which 

the opinion of a treating physician should be credited. Although the ALJ suggested that Dr. Kim’s 

opinion is “generally inconsistent with the medical evidence of record and with my findings as 

well” such that it should not be given dispositive weight, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), “the ALJ did 

not consider factors such as the length of the treating relationship, the frequency of examination, 

the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, or the supportability of the opinion.” Trevizo v. 

Berryhill, 862 F.3d 987, 998 (2017) (citing id. § 404.1527(c)(2)–(6)). “This failure alone 

constitutes reversible legal error.” Id.

The ALJ also concluded Dr. Kim’s findings regarding Plaintiff’s ability to sit and stand are 

not supported by Plaintiff’s testimony that she can walk one hour at one time and stand for half an 

hour at one time. This reasoning is clearly erroneous. First, Ms. Valle’s testimony does not 

contradict Dr. Kim’s findings. Just because Plaintiff can stand for one hour at a time does not 

mean she can stand for two or more hours in an eight hour day. Second, an ALJ may not reject an 

examining physician’s opinions by questioning the credibility of the patient’s complaints where 

the doctor does not discredit those complaints. See Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1159 

(9th Cir. 2001) (where the ALJ appears to have relied on her doubts about the plaintiff’s overall 

credibility to reject the entirety of the physician’s report). The ALJ’s speculation that Plaintiff can 

stand more than two hours in an eight hour day because she testified she can stand for one hour at 

a time does not amount to “substantial evidence.” See id. 

The ALJ only accorded some weight to Dr. Kim’s assessment of Plaintiff’s mental 

condition because mental health is not Dr. Kim’s area of expertise. It is true that in general more 

deference is given to the “opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of 

specialty” than to those who are not specialists. See Benecke v. Barnhart,379 F.3d 587, 594 n. 4 

(9th Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5)). However, it is also true that “[u]nder general 

principles of evidence law,” a duly licensed treating physician “is qualified to give a 

medical opinion as to [the claimant's] mental state as it relates to her physical disability even 

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though [that physician] is not a psychiatrist.” Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 

1987). A duly licensed physician can practice and render psychiatric services, i.e., prescribe 

psychotropic medication and conduct psychotherapy. Id. Therefore, Dr. Kim’s opinion is 

competent psychiatric evidence, based on her clinical observations of Plaintiff’s depression. See 

id. Furthermore, Dr. Kim’s opinion that Plaintiff’s depression would negatively her ability to 

work with others is in line with Dr. Pither’s psychiatric opinion that Plaintiff is “unable to engage 

in any work activities” due to her chronic pain and depression. 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by never asking the VE a hypothetical with a sedentary 

residual functional capacity that contained bimanual dexterity and depression limitations. In 

hypothetical 6, the individual can lift 10 pounds frequently, carry 20 pounds occasionally, and is 

off task more than 10% of the workday. Dr. Kim recommended that Plaintiff not lift more than 5 

pounds frequently or 10 pounds occasionally, and stated that Plaintiff has weak grip strength. The 

physical restrictions described in Dr. Kim’s opinion are greater than hypothetical 6, but the VE 

ultimately concluded that the individual in hypothetical 6 would be precluded from all fullemployment. Therefore a more restrictive hypothetical adding weak grip strength is unnecessary 

to make the same conclusion that Plaintiff is unable to work full-time. 

2. Examining Psychiatrist Dr. Pither

Dr. Pither, Plaintiff’s examining psychiatrist, determined Plaintiff is limited by her “pain 

disorder and myriad medical problems” and had “difficulty concentrating” which “prohibit her 

from engaging in any form of work activities.” The ALJ accorded some weight to Dr. Pither’s 

finding that Plaintiff could not work because of her chronic pain and depression, but disagreed that 

Plaintiff would work if she could. 

The ALJ did not follow the appropriate methodology for weighing an examining 

physician’s medical opinion. The ALJ can reject Dr. Pither’s opinion only by providing “specific 

and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216. 

The ALJ provides no legitimate stated reason for rejecting Dr. Pither’s opinion. Furthermore, Dr. 

Pither’s opinion that Plaintiff cannot work is entitled to greater weight than non-examining Drs. 

Saphir and Rudito’s opinion that Plaintiff can work. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. As such, the ALJ 

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erred by giving Dr. Pither’s opinions “some weight” and disregarding his conclusion that Plaintiff 

would work if she could. 3

3. Ms. Bartolomeo

The ALJ gave greater weight to Ms. Bartolomeo’s testimony than Dr. Kim or Dr. Pither’s 

opinions because Ms. Bartolomeo’s testimony “shows that, despite her impairments, the claimant 

is still able to perform a wide range of activities with the ability to focus, concentrate, and 

complete tasks, which belies her testimony that she is disabled.” However, Plaintiff’s ability to do 

simple household chores does not constitute specific or legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Kim’s 

or Dr. Pither’s medical opinions. See Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198; see also Gallant v. Heckler, 753 

F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (ordering award of benefits for constant back and leg pain despite 

claimant’s ability to cook meals and wash dishes). Moreover, claimants are not required to be 

utterly incapacitated to be eligible for benefits. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 

1989). Nor are many home activities easily transferrable to what may be “the more grueling 

environment of the workplace, where it might be impossible to periodically rest or take 

medication.” Id. 

The VE testified that a claimant would be unable to work if she has the physical limitations 

outlined in Dr. Kim’s opinion and is off task 10% of the time due to difficulty with concentration, 

persistence, and pace, as identified in Dr. Pither’s opinion. Therefore, the opinions of Dr. Kim 

and Pither “establishes that [Plaintiff] is entitled to benefits.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 

1028, at 1041 n.12 (9th Cir. 2007). The ALJ’s decision not to fully credit the opinions of Drs. 

Kim and Pither was erroneous.

II. The ALJ’s Credibility Determination 

A. Legal Standard

 

3

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ also erred by not finding Plaintiff disabled during the 13 

months she was treated for cancer. However, Drs. Kim and Pither provided work restriction 

recommendations based upon their medical opinions concerning Plaintiff’s chronic pain, 

weakness, depression, and anxiety. There is not enough evidence in the medical record nor Dr. 

Kim or Dr. Pither’s opinions to conclude that Plaintiff’s cancer treatment, alone, was a medical 

impairment that precluded employment. 

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The Social Security Administration’s policy on determining Residual Functional Capacity 

(“RFC”) directs ALJs to give “[c]areful consideration ... to any available information about 

symptoms because subjective descriptions may indicate more severe limitations or restrictions 

than can be shown by medical evidence alone.” SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *5 (S.S.A. July 

2, 1996). If the record establishes the existence of an impairment that could reasonably give rise 

to such symptoms, the “ALJ must make a finding as to the credibility of the claimant’s statements 

about the symptoms and their functional effect.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 

(9th Cir. 2006); see also Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 670 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because the 

RFC determination must take into account the claimant’s testimony regarding [her] capability, the 

ALJ must assess that testimony in conjunction with the medical evidence.”).

To “determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is 

credible,” an ALJ must use a “two-step analysis.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014. “First, the ALJ 

must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying 

impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms 

alleged.” Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036. “Second, if the claimant meets the first test, and there is 

no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her 

symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). The clear and convincing standard is “the most 

demanding required in Social Security cases.” Moore v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 

F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002). “General findings are an insufficient basis to support an adverse 

credibility determination.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). Rather, 

the ALJ “must state which pain testimony is not credible and what evidence suggests the claimant[ 

][ is] not credible.” Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Ghanim v. 

Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (“General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ 

must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s 

complaints.”)

B. The Severity of Plaintiff’s Pain

The medical record demonstrates that Plaintiff has experienced back pain since 1996, had 

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back surgery in 1997, and attended her first chronic pain management program in 1998. Plaintiff 

consistently complained of chronic back and neck pain since she became a patient with Kaiser in 

2010. Plaintiff participated in a second chronic pain program through Kaiser in 2013, but was 

initially unable to complete the paperwork during the consult due to her discomfort. Both of 

Plaintiff’s treating and examining physicians, Dr. Kim and Dr. Pither, noted that Plaintiff 

complained of chronic back and neck pain, and that this pain affected Plaintiff’s entire system and 

general health. 

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff met the first part of the two part test to determine 

whether her pain is credible. The ALJ concluded there is objective medical evidence that 

Plaintiff’s breast cancer, chronic pain, fibromyalgia, and depression could reasonably be expected 

to produce the pain and symptoms alleged. See Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036. Since Plaintiff 

met the first part of the test, the ALJ could only reject Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the severity 

of her symptoms due to evidence of malingering or by offering specific, clear and convincing 

reasons for doing so. See id. The ALJ erred in rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the 

severity of her pain because there is no evidence of malingering and the ALJ failed to meet the 

demanding clear and convincing reasons standard. See Moore, 278 F.3d at 924.

The ALJ did not find Plaintiff’s complaints regarding her back pain persuasive because 

Plaintiff went for walks, took her father to his cancer treatments, and was instructed to exercise. 

“Yet it is not inconsistent with disability that [Plaintiff] was not entirely incapacitated by fatigue at 

all times.” Trevizo, 862 F.3d at 1002. Plaintiff was instructed by her medical providers to 

exercise in order to control her weight and manage her health. Plaintiff took 30 minute walks.

Her occasional participation in this low intensity exercise is not inconsistent with her disability. 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s periodic trips with her father to his cancer treatment appointments do not 

preclude a finding of disability. See Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986) (a 

claim of pain-induced disability is not gainsaid by capacity to engage in periodic restricted travel). 

The ALJ decided Plaintiff’s pain could not be severe because the treatment records from 

March and April of 2013 indicated that the chronic pain program, group therapy, cognitive 

behavioral therapy, and relaxation practice seemed to help Plaintiff. However, “treatment records 

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must be viewed in light of the overall diagnostic record.” Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1164. The medical 

records reflect that Plaintiff has consistently complained of chronic back and neck pain. 

Furthermore, “[o]ccasional symptom-free periods ... are not inconsistent with disability.” Lester v. 

Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 833 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff’s improvement during the few weeks in 2013 

when she participated in the pain program is not inconsistent with 20 years of chronic pain. 

The ALJ also concluded that Plaintiff’s pain must not be work-preclusive because she 

takes Advil and Tylenol and not stronger medications. However, the ALJ did not address the 

believability of Plaintiff’s proffered reason that she took Vicodin but later switched to Tylenol 

because her health providers did not want Plaintiff taking stronger medication. An ALJ may not 

rely on “the claimant’s failure to take pain medication where evidence suggests that the claimant 

had a good reason for not taking medication.” Fair, 885 F.2d at 602. Plaintiff had good reason to 

not continue taking Vicodin – she was instructed by her health providers to do so, not because she 

was not in pain, but because of the adverse effect of stronger medication. In light of the recent 

opioid epidemic it is wrong to penalize a claimant for following her physician’s instruction to 

avoid opioids. As such, the specific reasons the ALJ gave for disbelieving Ms. Valle’s testimony 

about the severity of her pain symptoms are not “clear and convincing.”

III. Award of Benefits

“The decision whether to remand a case for additional evidence, or simply to award 

benefits[,] is within the discretion of the court.” Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 

1987) (remanding for determination of benefits where the panel was “convinced that substantial 

evidence does not support the Secretary’s decision, and because no legitimate reasons were 

advanced to justify disregard of the treating physician’s opinion”). “[I]f additional proceedings 

can remedy defects in the original administrative proceeding, a social security case should be 

remanded” for further proceedings. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 

F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981)). Generally, however, where “(1) the record has been fully 

developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has 

failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or 

medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ 

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would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand,” id. at 1020, we remand for an award 

of benefits.

Each of the “credit-as-true factors” is satisfied. First, the record is fully developed. It 

totals hundreds of pages and includes treatment notes documenting dozens of doctor visits from 

2010 to 2014 addressing Ms. Valle’s various medical conditions. The record also reflects 

Plaintiff’s testimony before the ALJ, her responses to questionnaires about her physical and 

mental limitations, and the responses of her spouse, all of which corroborate her impairments. Dr. 

Kim’s opinion is developed and substantiated by her treatment relationship with Plaintiff since 

2010. Moreover, the VE opined regarding the inability of an individual with Plaintiff’s physical 

and mental limitations, as described by Drs. Kim and Pither, to sustain work.

The other two prongs of the Garrison test are also satisfied. The ALJ failed to provide 

legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the informed medical opinions of Plaintiff’s primary 

treating physician, Dr. Kim, and her examining physician, Dr. Pither, and instead improperly 

substituted her judgment for that of the doctors. If credited as true, the opinions of Drs. Kim and 

Pither establish that Plaintiff is disabled, because the VE testified that someone with limitations

similar to Plaintiff would be unable to find full-time work. Finally, there is no “serious doubt” 

based on “an evaluation of the record as a whole” that Plaintiff is, in fact, disabled, given her 

severe impairments of chronic back and neck pain, fibromyalgia, weakness, depression, and 

anxiety. Thus, the requirements of the Garrison test are met and the Court remands for the 

calculation and award of benefits.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment and DENIES Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

This Order disposes of Docket Nos. 15 and 21.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 29, 2018

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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