Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05330/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05330-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Securities and Exchange Commission
Appellee
Williams & Connolly LLP
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 19, 2011 Decided December 9, 2011

No. 10-5330

WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY,

APPELLANT

v.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-00651)

Simon A. Latcovich argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs were Robert M. Cary and Christopher R. Hart. 

Michelle Lo, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for

appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C. Machen Jr.,

U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney. 

Before: GINSBURG,

* Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judges.

*

 As of the date this opinion was published, Judge Ginsburg

had taken senior status.

USCA Case #10-5330 Document #1346786 Filed: 12/09/2011 Page 1 of 8
2

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: The United States

prosecuted Walter A. Forbes for securities fraud. Forbes’s first

two trials resulted in hung juries; the third resulted in a verdict

of guilty. Cosmo Corigliano and Kevin Kearney testified as

government witnesses in each trial. The Securities and

Exchange Commission had been investigating Corigliano and

Kearney for related securities violations. During and after the

criminal proceedings, Forbes’s defense counsel – Williams &

Connolly LLP – sent Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §

552, requests to the SEC. The requests sought, among other

things, the notes of SEC staff members taken during their

conversations with Corigliano, Kearney, and their attorneys. The

SEC refused to disclose the notes. After Forbes’s conviction,

Williams & Connolly sued the SEC to compel production. The

district court denied the law firm’s motion for in camera review

of the notes and granted the SEC’s motion for summary

judgment. 

The SEC identified 114 sets of notes fitting Williams &

Connolly’s FOIA request. The agency’s refusal to turn over

these documents rested on FOIA exemption 5. This entitles an

agency to withhold “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums

or letters which would not be available by law to a party other

than an agency in litigation with the agency.” 5 U.S.C. §

552(b)(5); see also NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S.

132, 148-49 (1975). The exemption encompasses evidentiary

privileges such as the work-product privilege and the

deliberative process privilege, both of which the SEC claims

apply in this case. Baker & Hostetler LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of

Commerce, 473 F.3d 312, 316, 321 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Burka v.

USCA Case #10-5330 Document #1346786 Filed: 12/09/2011 Page 2 of 8
3

U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 87 F.3d 508, 516 (D.C.

Cir. 1996). 

The work-product doctrine protects from disclosure

materials “prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or

for another party or its representative (including the other

party’s attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or

agent).” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A); see also Upjohn Co. v.

United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 & n.7 (1981); Hickman v.

Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947); McKinley v. Bd. of

Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 647 F.3d 331, 341 (D.C.

Cir. 2011). Although work product protection may be overcome

for cause in civil cases, FED.R.CIV.P. 26(b)(3)(A)(i) & (ii), any

materials disclosed for cause are not “routinely” or “normally”

discoverable and, for that reason, are exempt under FOIA. FTC

v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1983); Sears, Roebuck &

Co., 421 U.S. at 149; Martin v. Dep’t of Justice, 488 F.3d 446,

453 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Williams & Connolly does not dispute

that the 114 sets of SEC notes are work product and ordinarily

would be protected from disclosure under exemption 5. But the

firm claims work-product protection has been waived.

During Forbes’s criminal trial, the Department of Justice

disclosed to Williams & Connolly 11 of the 114 sets of notes,

along with thousands of other documents. The prosecution

apparently released the documents pursuant to Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 16, which obligates the government to

disclose documents that (1) are material to the defendant’s case

or (2) will be used at trial. FED.R.CRIM.P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i) & (ii).

The disclosure, Williams & Connolly argues, waived work

product protection – and thus exemption 5 – not only for the

documents that were released, but also for the remaining 103

sets of SEC notes.

USCA Case #10-5330 Document #1346786 Filed: 12/09/2011 Page 3 of 8
4

Two questions are thus presented. First, what to do about

the eleven sets of notes previously released? Second, what

impact does that disclosure have on the rest of the notes? As to

the first question, an agency has no obligation to release

documents to a requester when another agency has already given

the same requester the same documents. See Crooker v. U.S.

State Dep’t, 628 F.2d 9, 10 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam). Once

the documents are released to the requesting party, there no

longer is any case or controversy. See Carlisle Tire & Rubber

Co. v. U.S. Customs Serv., 663 F.2d 210, 214 & n.14 (D.C. Cir.

1980). Because the Department of Justice already turned over

to Williams & Connolly eleven sets of notes pursued in this

appeal, the controversy is moot with respect to those documents.

Boyd v. Criminal Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 475 F.3d 381,

385 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. EPA, 731 F.2d

16, 19-20 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 

As to the remaining 103 sets of notes, we do not believe the

SEC has waived work product protection or that the Justice

Department’s action in the criminal trial had that effect. It is

true that if a party voluntarily discloses part of an attorney-client

conversation, the party may have waived confidentiality – and

thus the attorney client privilege – for the rest of that

conversation and for any conversations related to the same

subject matter. See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980-81

(D.C. Cir. 1989); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C.

Cir. 1982). It may also be that if a party voluntarily introduces

part of a trial-preparation document memorializing a

conversation with a witness, the party cannot claim work

product protection to shield the rest of the conversation. But see

Mehl v. EPA, 797 F. Supp. 43, 47-48 (D.D.C. 1992). The rule

of completeness may itself demand introduction of the entire

conversation. Cf. 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2328, at 638

(McNaughton rev. 1961) (analogizing partial disclosure and

waiver to the rule of completeness); FED R. EVID. 106. But it

USCA Case #10-5330 Document #1346786 Filed: 12/09/2011 Page 4 of 8
5

does not follow that an agency’s decision to release some

documents protected by the work product privilege waives

FOIA exemption 5 for all of the agency’s similar documents.

“The purposes of the work product privilege . . . are not

inconsistent with selective disclosure – even in some

circumstances to an adversary.” In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at

818; see also Pittman v. Frazer, 129 F.3d 983, 988-89 (8th Cir.

1997). Thus, “disclosure of some documents does not

necessarily destroy work-product protection for other documents

of the same character.” 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.

MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 2024, at 530 (3d ed. 2010).

Williams & Connolly argues that the SEC “has made no

effort to distinguish the subject matter of the documents

produced [in the criminal trial] from the documents not

produced.” But there is no reason why the SEC had any

obligation to offer such a distinction. The decision of the Justice

Department to disclose the eleven sets of notes in the criminal

proceeding has no bearing on whether FOIA permits the SEC to

withhold the remaining 103 documents. In criminal trials,

evidentiary privileges may give way for any number of reasons.

See Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The

government’s obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963), to produce evidence favorable to the accused is one

example. See Boyd, 475 F.3d at 390. The prospect that the

prosecution might use the item in its case-in-chief is another.

See FED.R.CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(ii). Trade-offs in negotiations

between the prosecution and the defense may also result in the

release of government work product. Whatever the reason, the

notes not turned over in Forbes’s criminal trial still remain – as

Williams & Connolly admits – work product material not

ordinarily discoverable in civil proceedings. That is, the 103

sets of notes are still within FOIA exemption 5. 

USCA Case #10-5330 Document #1346786 Filed: 12/09/2011 Page 5 of 8
6

 Williams & Connolly never provides us with a persuasive

reason why the disclosure of documents by one government

agency waives work product protection for other documents

held by another government agency. The theory may be that

for purposes of disclosure, the Justice Department and the SEC

must treat similar documents similarly. But even if the theory

were generally sound, which we very much doubt for reasons

stated next, it would not apply here. As we just mentioned,

disclosure in criminal trials is based on different legal standards

than disclosure under FOIA, which turns on whether a document

would usually be discoverable in a civil case. Similar

documents, in other words, are not – indeed must not be –

treated similarly in the two different types of proceedings.

To uphold Williams & Connolly’s waiver theory would be

to impinge on executive discretion and to deter agencies from

voluntarily honoring FOIA requests. See Dep’t of the Air Force

v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361-62 (1976). There can be no doubt

that agencies frequently turn over documents even though FOIA

may not strictly require them to do so. In light of the enormous

volume of FOIA requests – nearly 600,000 in fiscal year 2010

– it is easy to see why agencies would operate in this manner.

An agency may decide to produce otherwise privileged

documents because the documents are innocuous. Or the agency

may determine that in light of the difficulty of establishing a

document’s exemption under FOIA, it would not be worth

fighting over. Or the agency may release documents because

the agency already has so many FOIA cases pending that it – or

the Justice Department – does not want to take on more cases

unless important documents or legal principles are at stake.

Courts have held, with respect to classified documents, that in

“exercising its discretion to make public some classified

documents, [the government] does not waive any right it has to

withhold other properly classified documents of a similar

nature.” Stein v. Dept’ of Justice, 662 F.2d 1245, 1259 (7th Cir.

USCA Case #10-5330 Document #1346786 Filed: 12/09/2011 Page 6 of 8
7

1981); see also Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724,

753-54 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The same is true with respect to work

product material under FOIA exemption 5. See, e.g., Mobil Oil

Corp. v. EPA, 879 F.2d 698, 701 (9th Cir. 1989).

We end with a few words about Williams & Connolly’s

argument that in camera review was necessary to determine

whether the withheld information (1) could be used for a

collateral attack on Forbes’s conviction or (2) was material to

Forbes’s defense. The argument rests on a mistaken view of the

law. FOIA does not draw distinctions based on who is

requesting the information, or for what purpose. Whether

exemption 5 applies is a judgment “to be made without regard

to the particular requester’s identity,” except in limited

situations not relevant here. Swan v. SEC, 96 F.3d 498, 499-500

(D.C. Cir. 1996). It does not matter why the requester seeks the

information, what the requester plans to do with it, or what harm

the requester might suffer from not getting the information. See

Swan, 96 F.3d at 500; Reed v. NLRB, 927 F.2d 1249, 1252 (D.C.

Cir. 1991). For reasons we explained in Swan, 96 F.3d at 500,

requiring agencies and courts to explore the requester’s

circumstances and review documents accordingly would create

an administrative nightmare. If Williams & Connolly believes

that its client should have received the notes during his criminal

trial, FOIA is neither a substitute for criminal discovery, Roth v.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 642 F.3d 1161, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 2011), nor

an appropriate means to vindicate discovery abuses, Boyd, 475

F.3d at 390. The district court therefore did not abuse its

discretion in refusing to conduct in camera review. See Larson

v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

* * *

Because the work product privilege has not been waived,

the 103 sets of disputed notes are protected by exemption 5. We

USCA Case #10-5330 Document #1346786 Filed: 12/09/2011 Page 7 of 8
8

therefore need not consider whether the documents are also

within the deliberative process privilege. The judgment of the

district court is

Affirmed.

USCA Case #10-5330 Document #1346786 Filed: 12/09/2011 Page 8 of 8