Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01695/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01695-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brian Duffy
Respondent
James Earl King
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES EARL KING,

Petitioner,

v.

BRIAN DUFFY,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:15-cv-01695-LJO-SAB-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

RECOMMENDING DENIAL OF PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent declined magistrate judge jurisdiction and this matter 

was therefore referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(1)(B) and 

Local Rule 302.

I.

BACKGROUND

On April 16, 2013, Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial in the Fresno County 

Superior Court of assault with a deadly weapon (count 1) and inflicting corporal injury against a 

cohabitant (count 2). The jury found true the allegation that Petitioner personally used a 

dangerous weapon in the commission of count 2. (CT1186–87). On June 5, 2013, Petitioner was 

sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment term of twenty-five years to life. (CT 204). 

 

1

“CT” refers to the Clerk‟s Transcript on Appeal lodged by Respondent on February 11, 2016. (ECF No. 15).

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On December 29, 2014, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed 

the judgment. People v. King, No. F067424, 2014 WL 7402325, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 

2014). Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which 

denied the petition on March 11, 2015. (LDs

2

8, 9). Petitioner did not file any state habeas 

petitions. (ECF No. 1 at 4).3

On November 9, 2015, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. (ECF No. 1). On February 4, 2016, Respondent filed an answer. (ECF No. 14). On 

February 22, 2016, Petitioner filed a traverse. (ECF No. 16).

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws 

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as 

guaranteed by the United States Constitution. The challenged convictions arise out of Fresno

County Superior Court, which is located within the Eastern District of California. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its 

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th 

Cir. 1997) (en banc). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is 

therefore governed by its provisions.

Under the AEDPA, relitigation of any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court is 

barred unless a petitioner can show that the state court‟s adjudication of his claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

 

2

“LD” refers to the documents lodged by Respondent on February 11, 2016. (ECF No. 15).

3

Page numbers refer to ECF page numbers stamped at the top of the page.

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unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97–98 (2011); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 

U.S. 63, 70–71 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must “first decide what constitutes „clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.‟” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). In ascertaining what is “clearly established Federal law,” this 

Court must look to the “holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court‟s] decisions as 

of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. “In other words, 

„clearly established Federal law‟ under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles 

set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Id. In addition, 

the Supreme Court decision must “„squarely address [] the issue in th[e] case‟ or establish a legal 

principle that „clearly extend[s]‟ to a new context to the extent required by the Supreme Court in 

. . . recent decisions”; otherwise, there is no clearly established Federal law for purposes of 

review under AEDPA. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Wright v. 

Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008)); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); Carey v. 

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006). If no clearly established Federal law exists, the inquiry is at an 

end and the Court must defer to the state court‟s decision. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70; Wright, 552 

U.S. at 126; Moses, 555 F.3d at 760.

If the Court determines there is governing clearly established Federal law, the Court must 

then consider whether the state court‟s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, [the] clearly established Federal law.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(1)). “Under the „contrary to‟ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the 

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question 

of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412–13; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. “The 

word „contrary‟ is commonly understood to mean „diametrically different,‟ „opposite in character 

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or nature,‟ or „mutually opposed.‟” Williams, 529 U.S. at 405 (quoting Webster‟s Third New 

International Dictionary 495 (1976)). “A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to 

[Supreme Court] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the 

governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 405. If the state court 

decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent, the state decision is 

reviewed under the pre-AEDPA de novo standard. Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 

2008) (en banc). 

“Under the „reasonable application clause,‟ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if 

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court‟s decisions but 

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner‟s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent 

judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously 

or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411; see also Lockyer, 

538 U.S. at 75–76. The writ may issue only “where there is no possibility fair minded jurists 

could disagree that the state court‟s decision conflicts with [the Supreme Court‟s] precedents.”

Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. In other words, so long as fair minded jurists could disagree on the 

correctness of the state court‟s decision, the decision cannot be considered unreasonable. Id. If 

the Court determines that the state court decision is objectively unreasonable, and the error is not 

structural, habeas relief is nonetheless unavailable unless the error had a substantial and injurious 

effect on the verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011); Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 

1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). If the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially 

incorporates the reasoning from a previous state court decision, this court may consider both 

decisions to ascertain the reasoning of the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 

1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the 

state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the 

merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” 

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Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. This presumption may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to 

think some other explanation for the state court‟s decision is more likely.” Id. at 99–100 (citing 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)).

Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine 

whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. While 

the federal court cannot analyze just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, 

the federal court must review the state court record to determine whether there was any 

“reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. This court “must 

determine what arguments or theories ... could have supported, the state court‟s decision; and 

then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or 

theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. at 102.

B. Judicial Misconduct Claim

In his first claim for relief, Petitioner asserts that trial court engaged in judicial 

misconduct when it stated in the presence of the jury that it was surprised that Petitioner chose 

not to call any witnesses. (ECF No. 1 at 2). In the answer, Respondent argues that the state 

court‟s rejection of Petitioner‟s claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law. (ECF No. 14 at 19).

This claim was presented on direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth 

Appellate District, which denied the claim in a reasoned decision. The claim also was raised in 

the petition for review, which the California Supreme Court summarily denied. The Court 

presumes that the California Supreme Court adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Richter, 

562 U.S. at 99. As federal courts review the last reasoned state court opinion, the Court will 

“look through” the California Supreme Court‟s summary denial and examine the decision of the 

California Court of Appeal. See Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2276 (2015); Johnson v. 

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Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1094 n.1 (2013); Ylst, 501 U.S. at 806.

In finding that the trial court‟s comment did not deny Petitioner a fair trial, the California 

Court of Appeal stated:

The prosecution presented evidence that defendant hit his girlfriend and struck her 

with a cane during an argument, causing her injuries. At the close of the 

prosecutor‟s case, the defense rested without calling any witnesses, even though 

defense counsel had a defense witness (defendant‟s ex-girlfriend) waiting to 

testify (a fact known to the court but not the jury). The court commented: “Okay. 

I think, obviously, you can tell I‟m a little bit surprised about that. You are not to 

infer anything from the fact that I‟m surprised, ladies and gentlemen. It was just 

not necessarily what I expected.”

Defendant argues that the court‟s comment was “fraught with implications which 

negatively and prejudicially affected [his] chances of a favorable verdict” and 

violated his constitutional rights to remain silent, to have an impartial jury, and to 

receive due process of law. He explains that “while the court‟s comment was 

apparently innocently intended, it conveyed the unmistakable impression that in 

the court‟s opinion the testimony of the prosecution‟s witnesses was compelling 

enough so that in the absence of rebuttal by defense witnesses, in particular, 

[defendant], who was the only percipient witness to the events other than [his 

girlfriend], a guilty verdict was warranted.” Defendant says the court‟s comment 

amounted to a comment on defendant‟s failure to testify, shifted the burden of 

proof to defendant, biased the jury in favor of the prosecution, and directed a 

guilty verdict. We disagree.

“„[A] judge should be careful not to throw the weight of his judicial position into 

a case, either for or against the defendant.‟ [Citation.] [¶] Trial judges „should be 

exceedingly discreet in what they say and do in the presence of a jury lest they 

seem to lean toward or lend their influence to one side or the other.‟ [Citation.]” 

(People v. Sturm (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1218, 1237–1238.)

We evaluate judicial conduct on a “„case-by-case basis, noting whether the 

peculiar content and circumstances of the court‟s remarks deprived the accused of 

his right to trial by jury.‟” (People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 531–532.) A 

particular comment‟s propriety and prejudicial effect are judged by its content and 

by the circumstances in which it was made. (Id. at p. 532.) “The role of a 

reviewing court „is not to determine whether the trial judge‟s conduct left 

something to be desired, or even whether some comments would have been better 

left unsaid. Rather, we must determine whether the judge‟s behavior was so 

prejudicial that it denied [the defendant] a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial. 

[Citation.]‟ [Citation.]” (People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 347.)

Here, even if we assume the court‟s comment was improper, we conclude it was 

not so prejudicial that it denied defendant a fair trial. Immediately after the court 

stated it was surprised the defense was not calling any witnesses, the court 

admonished the jurors not to infer anything from the fact that it was surprised. 

Furthermore, the court instructed the jurors that the defense was not required to 

present evidence or prove the defendant was not guilty because he was presumed 

innocent, that the jurors must decide the facts of the case based only on the 

evidence presented at trial, that a criminal defendant is presumed innocent and 

must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the jurors were 

required to decide the facts of the case and use only the evidence presented in the 

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courtroom. The court instructed: “A defendant has an absolute constitutional right 

not to testify. He may rely on the state of the evidence and argue that the [P]eople 

have failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Do not consider for 

any reason at all the fact that the defendant did not testify. Do not discuss that fact 

during your deliberations or let it influence your decision in any way.” And later 

the court also instructed: “Do not take anything that I said or did during the trial 

as an indication of what I think about the facts or the witnesses or what your 

verdict should be.”

A reviewing court presumes the jurors followed the court‟s admonitions and 

instructions, unless the record affirmatively indicates otherwise, and speculation 

on appeal that the jury might not have followed those admonitions and 

instructions does not support reversal. (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 

Cal.4th 1, 83.) Accordingly, we conclude any impropriety in the court‟s comment 

was cured by the court‟s immediate admonition and thorough instructions. The 

comment did not deny defendant a fair trial.

King, 2014 WL 7402325, at *1–2.

Petitioner argues that the trial court‟s comment prejudicially affected his federal 

constitutional rights to remain silent, to an impartial jury, and to due process. (ECF No. 1 at 3). 

In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment

prohibits a prosecutor or judge from commenting on a defendant‟s failure to testify. A direct 

comment regarding a defendant‟s failure to testify always violates Griffin. Hovey v. Ayers, 458 

F.3d 892, 912 (9th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, an indirect comment violates Griffin only “if it 

is manifestly intended to call attention to the defendant‟s failure to testify, or is of such a 

character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure to 

testify.” Hovey, 458 F.3d at 912 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lincoln v. Sunn,

807 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1987)). Here, the trial court did not comment directly. Further, the

trial court‟s acknowledgement of its surprise was not manifestly intended to call attention to 

Petitioner‟s decision not to testify and was not of such a character that the jury would naturally 

and necessarily take it to be a comment on Petitioner‟s decision not to testify given that

Petitioner‟s ex-girlfriend was the other witness to the offense who could possibly offer evidence. 

Moreover, the trial court immediately instructed the jury, “You are not to infer anything from the 

fact that I‟m surprised, ladies and gentlemen.” (2 RT4222). A jury is presumed to follow the 

court‟s instructions. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 

 

4

“RT” refers to the Reporter‟s Transcript on Appeal lodged by Respondent on February 11, 2016. (ECF No. 15).

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481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987)). Additionally, the trial court gave instructions regarding the 

presumption of innocence, the prosecution‟s burden of proof, the defendant‟s right not to testify, 

that the jurors were to decide the facts based only on evidence that was presented in court, and 

that “[n]either side is required to call all witnesses who may have information about the case.” 

(CT 146, 147, 153, 159). The court also instructed, “It is not my role to tell you what your 

verdict should be. Do not take anything I said or did during the trial as an indication of what I 

think about the facts, the witnesses, or what your verdict should be.” (CT 172). In light of this

context, the trial court‟s acknowledgement of its surprise did not violate Griffin or “render[] the 

trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process under the United States 

Constitution.” Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The Court finds that the state court‟s denial of Petitioner‟s judicial misconduct claim was 

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law,5nor was it 

based on an unreasonable finding of fact. The decision was not “so lacking in justification that 

there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to 

habeas relief on his first claim.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

In his second claim for relief, Petitioner raises ineffective assistance of counsel in the 

event that the Court determines that Petitioner‟s first claim for relief is forfeited based on trial 

counsel‟s failure to make a contemporaneous objection. (ECF No. 1 at 10). However, 

Petitioner‟s judicial misconduct claim has not been forfeited and has been considered by this 

Court in section II(B), supra. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his 

second claim.

///

///

 

5 Although the California Court of Appeal did not cite to any federal authority, the pertinent inquiry is whether it 

“reasonably applied the principles contained in relevant Supreme Court precedent.” Parker v. Small, 665 F.3d 1143, 

1148 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011). The Supreme Court has noted that a state court is not required to cite or even be aware of 

its cases under § 2254(d). Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).

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III.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas 

corpus be DENIED.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 

THIRTY (30) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 

written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge‟s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The 

assigned United States District Court Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge‟s ruling 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within 

the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court‟s order. Wilkerson v. 

Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th 

Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 22, 2016 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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