Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03386/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03386-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rene Ramirez-Hernandez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Robert T. Dawson, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3386

___________

 *

United States of America, *

 *

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the 

v. * Western District of Arkansas.

*

Rene Ramirez-Hernandez, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 15, 2006

Filed: June 5, 2006

___________

Before ARNOLD, JOHN R. GIBSON, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Rene Ramirez-Hernandez pleaded guilty to possessing methamphetamine with

the intent to distribute it. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(viii). He then

moved to withdraw his plea on the ground that his attorney had coerced him into

making it. The district court1

 denied the motion, concluding that there was no fair and

just reason to permit a withdrawal. After sentencing, Mr. Ramirez-Hernandez

appealed, and we affirm.

Appellate Case: 05-3386 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/05/2006 Entry ID: 2052027
-2-

I.

With the help of a confidential informant, police arranged a meeting to purchase

methamphetamine from Audra Lemus. Ms. Lemus, in agreeing to meet, stated that

a person named Rene might accompany her. Police arrested both Mr. RamirezHernandez and Ms. Lemus upon arrival. A search of the truck that Mr. RamirezHernandez was driving yielded approximately ninety grams of methamphetamine. 

Through negotiations with the government, Mr. Ramirez-Hernandez's attorney

secured a plea agreement under which his client agreed to plead guilty to possession

of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it and the government agreed to

dismiss Mr. Ramirez-Hernandez on a related conspiracy count. Mr. RamirezHernandez, both in the plea agreement and in his plea colloquy, stated that his plea

was not the product of coercion.

Shortly before sentencing, Mr. Ramirez-Hernandez received a copy of the presentence investigation report, which indicated that the guidelines range for his offense

was 121 to 151 months' imprisonment. Mr. Ramirez-Hernandez then filed a pro se

motion asserting that his attorney had coerced him into pleading guilty. According

to Mr. Ramirez-Hernandez, his attorney made him believe that if he pleaded guilty he

would receive a lower sentence than he would if he proceeded to trial. The district

court denied the motion, concluding that Mr. Ramirez-Hernandez likely came to regret

his plea once he saw the pre-sentence report; such regret, the court concluded, did not

amount to a fair and just reason to permit a withdrawal of the plea. 

II.

A district court may permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea before

sentencing if there is a fair and just reason for the withdrawal. Fed. R. Crim.

P. 11(d)(2)(B). While the standard is liberal, the defendant has no automatic right to

withdraw a plea. United States v. Wicker, 80 F.3d 263, 266 (8th Cir. 1996). Even if

such a fair and just reason exists, before granting the motion a court must consider

Appellate Case: 05-3386 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/05/2006 Entry ID: 2052027
-3-

"whether the defendant asserts his innocence of the charge, the length of time between

the guilty plea and the motion to withdraw it, and whether the government will be

prejudiced if the court grants the motion." United States v. Nichols, 986 F.2d 1199,

1201 (8th Cir. 1993). Where the court sees no fair and just reason to permit

withdrawal, however, these additional matters need not be considered. United States

v. Austin, 413 F.3d 856, 857 (8th Cir. 2005). We review the district court's denial of

the motion to withdraw for an abuse of discretion. Id.

Although Mr. Ramirez-Hernandez's pro se motion speaks of compulsion, his

argument before the district court essentially was that his attorney's comments made

him think that by pleading guilty he would get a sentence significantly below the

guideline range in the presentence report. A defendant may not withdraw a plea,

however, merely because he misunderstands how the sentencing guidelines will apply

to his case. So long as the district court tells a defendant the statutory range of

punishment that he faces and informs him that the sentencing guidelines will be used

in determining the ultimate sentence, the plea is binding. United States v. Burney,

75 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir. 1996). This is true even where the misunderstanding is

caused by defense counsel's erroneous estimation of what the ultimate sentence will

be. Id. The plea agreement that Mr. Ramirez-Hernandez signed stated that the

possession count carried with it a minimum sentence of five and a maximum sentence

of forty years and that the district court would apply the sentencing guidelines in

determining the ultimate sentence. At the plea hearing, the district court confirmed

that Mr. Ramirez-Hernandez was aware of these facts. We therefore conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to withdraw the guilty

plea.

On appeal, however, Mr. Ramirez-Hernandez recasts the issue from one of

confusion to one of ineffective assistance of counsel. He contends that his attorney's

supposed misstatements amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel and that such

ineffective assistance is a fair and just reason to let him withdraw his guilty plea.

Appellate Case: 05-3386 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/05/2006 Entry ID: 2052027
-4-

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, are usually best litigated in

collateral proceedings, United States v. Payton, 168 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (8th Cir.

1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 843 (1999). We will consider ineffective-assistance

claims on direct appeal only where the record has been fully developed, where not to

act would amount to a plain miscarriage of justice, or where counsel's error is readily

apparent. United States v. Cook, 356 F.3d 913, 919-20 (8th Cir. 2004). Here, the

record is not sufficiently developed to let us pass on the merits of Mr. RamirezHernandez's claim. Most of the questions asked at the hearing on Mr. RamirezHernandez's motion to withdraw his plea were asked by the district court. A properly

developed record for purposes of determining a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel would include cross-examination by Mr. Ramirez-Hernandez of his counsel

on the question of what advice counsel gave him. We therefore decline to review

Mr. Ramirez-Hernandez's ineffective-assistance-of- counsel claim, concluding that it

is more properly raised in a separate motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United

States v. Cain, 134 F.3d 1345, 1352 (8th Cir. 1998). 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court, but we

deny without prejudice Mr. Ramirez-Hernandez's claim that his counsel was

ineffective.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 05-3386 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/05/2006 Entry ID: 2052027