Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-50273/USCOURTS-ca9-11-50273-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark Tyrell Fowlkes
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARK TYRELL FOWLKES, AKA

Mark Fowlkes, AKA Marq Tyrell

Fowlkes, AKA Shawn Walls,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-50273

D.C. No.

2:07-cr-00497-

CAS-1

ORDER AND

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 7, 2013—Pasadena, California

Filed September 28, 2015

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw and Mary H. Murguia,

Circuit Judges, and Jane A. Restani, Judge.

*

Opinion by Judge Wardlaw;

Partial Dissent by Judge Restani

* The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the U.S. Court of

International Trade, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel granted a petition for panel rehearing, withdrew

an opinion and partial dissent filed August 25, 2014, and filed

a new opinion and partial dissent in an appeal from a

conviction for drug distribution and possession with intent to

distribute.

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part – vacating

a conviction on a count predicated on drugs

unconstitutionally seized from the defendant’s body cavity,

and remanding for resentencing.

The panel held that the forcible removal of an

unidentified item of unknown size from the defendant’s

rectum during a body cavity search at the Long Beach City

Jail, without medical training or a warrant, violated the

defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, and that the evidence

obtained from this brutal and physically invasive seizure

should have been suppressed.

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of the

defendant’s motions to suppress evidence obtained through

wiretaps, to suppress evidence seized from his apartment, to

suppress cocaine base and marijuana seized from his car, to

dismiss the indictment on a claim of evidence tampering, and

to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds

following a mistrial.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES 3

Dissenting in part, Court of International Trade Judge

Restani disagreed with the majority’s decision to suppress the

evidence seized during the jailhouse search because she

believes the facts found by the district court render the

warrantless search and seizure reasonable under the totality

of the circumstances.

COUNSEL

Thomas P. Sleisenger (argued), Law Offices of Thomas P.

Sleisenger,LosAngeles, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Cheryl L. O’Connor (argued) and Kevin S. Rosenberg,

Assistant United States Attorneys; Robert E. Dugdale, Chief,

Criminal Division; and André Birotte Jr., United States

Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Los Angeles,

California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

ORDER

Appellee’s January 22, 2015 Petition for Panel Rehearing

is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Opinion and Partial Dissent

filed on August 25, 2014 are withdrawn, and a new opinion

and partial dissent are filed. See Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(4)(A).

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4 UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES

OPINION

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:

Mark Tyrell Fowlkes appeals his conviction for drug

distribution and possession with intent to distribute. Fowlkes

raises a number of claims on appeal, but only one has merit:

that the forcible removal of an unidentified item of unknown

size from Fowlkes’ rectum by officers without medical

training or a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 

Because we conclude that the evidence obtained from this

brutal and physically invasive seizure should have been

suppressed, we vacate Fowlkes’ conviction in part, vacate his

sentence, and remand to the district court.

I.

A.

Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agents and

Long Beach Police Department (“LBPD”) officers obtained

warrants for wiretaps on two phones (Target Telephones #1

and #2) in July and August of 2006. On September 3, 2006,

officers intercepted communications pursuant to the wiretap,

which led them to conclude that Fowlkes was arranging a

drug deal. Based on that information, LBPD officers placed

Fowlkes under surveillance and witnessed what appeared to

be a drug deal between Fowlkes and two other individuals,

Shaun Lee and Elaine Watson. Lee walked away from the

deal, but officers stopped him and found he possessed 0.61

grams of crack cocaine.

On September 4, 2006, the LBPD and DEA intercepted

several more phone calls, leading them to conclude that

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UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES 5

Fowlkes was planning to destroy or remove contraband from

his apartment. Within an hour of the last phone call, officers

arrived at the apartment. Upon entry, they saw Fowlkes and

another individual, Latoya Marshall, as well as a 9mm

handgun. The officers handcuffed Fowlkes and Marshall and

conducted a protective sweep of the apartment. After

securing a warrant, officers searched the apartment and found

approximately 2.6 grams of crack cocaine, a digital scale, and

the loaded 9mm handgun. Fowlkes was subsequently

released from police custody.

On September 13, 2006, after witnessing what appeared

to be a narcotics transaction between Fowlkes and an

unidentified man, LBPD officers requested that a marked car

execute a pretextual traffic stop. Pulled over for an expired

registration, Fowlkes and his passenger were asked to exit the

vehicle. Fowlkes denied consent to search the car. Asserting

that they saw marijuana in the open side panel of the car and

a substance they believed was cocaine base on the front seats

of the car, officers arrested Fowlkes for felony drug

possession and transported him to the Long Beach City Jail

for processing.

At intake, the officers strip searched Fowlkes in the jail’s

strip search room, a five by six enclosure with three concrete

walls and an opening in the fourth wall. Five officers

observed the strip search, including Officer JeffreyHarris and

Sergeant Michael Gibbs, who brought along his taser, gloves

and “assistance” in the form of additional officers because he

thought Fowlkes might have drugs. The officers instructed

Fowlkes to remove his clothing and face the far wall as they

watched him. Fowlkes was instructed to bend over, spread

his buttocks, and cough, but according to Sergeant Gibbs,

Fowlkes instead moved his hand toward his right buttock. 

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6 UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES

Instructed to repeat the procedure, Fowlkes made a quick

movement to his buttocks area with his hand and appeared to

Gibbs “to be forcing or forcibly pushing an item inward.” 

Officer Harris testified that he believed it was possible

Fowlkes was attempting to push something into his anus. 

However, he did not actually see any object Fowlkes could

have been pushing, and he acknowledged that there was no

other way for Fowlkes to comply with the directive other than

by reaching back and putting his fingers towards his anus. 

For his part, Sergeant Gibbs testified that he saw an object

protruding from Fowlkes’ anus and that he believed Fowlkes

appeared “to be forcing or moving an object or further

secreting an object” inside his rectum to destroy evidence.

To prevent that, Gibbs “delivered a drive stun tase to the

center portion of the defendant’s back.” Fowlkes’ arms went

straight into the air, and the officers handcuffed him. 

Fowlkes began to “squirm[]” and “struggl[e],” and the

officers “lean[ed] him against the wall, . . . brace[d] his body

up against the wall” so that “[h]e end[ed] up being bent over.” 

With Fowlkes in this position, the officers testified that they

could see what appeared to be a plastic bag partially

protruding from Fowlkes’ rectum.

Officers continued to “brac[e] [Fowlkes] up against the

wall” to prevent him from resisting. At this point, Fowlkes

was handcuffed and incapacitated by five male officers. 

Fowlkes had no ability to destroy or further secrete what was

in the plastic bag. Neither Sergeant Gibbs nor the other

officers could tell what, if anything, the plastic bag contained

while it remained in Fowlkes’ rectum. Nor could they

determine how large it was or how far it extended into

Fowlkes’ body. Despite this, and despite the fact that none of

the officers had any relevant medical training, the officers did

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UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES 7

not attempt to obtain a warrant, summon medical personnel,

move Fowlkes to a sanitary location, or allow Fowlkes to

pass the suspected contraband naturally. Instead, Sergeant

Gibbs forcibly “retrieved” the bag. He put on the protective

gloves he had brought along to the “search” and pulled the

object from Fowlkes’ rectum without the assistance of

anesthesia, lubricant, or medical dilation. Sergeant Gibbs

testified that he was able to remove the object using his

thumb and index finger without penetrating Fowlkes’ anal

cavity. Officer Harris testified that the removal itself was a

difficult, abrasive procedure:

I watched the entire process of him removing

it in his fingers. [The object] went from a

dime size to a penny size to a nickel size to a

quarter size to somewhat near a golf ball size

as it was taken out.

Officer Harris further testified that he could “see blood and

what looked to be feces” on the plastic bag after it had been

removed. Photographs of the object that are included in the

appellate record confirm that the object was covered in blood.

B.

On June 6, 2008, the government filed an indictment

charging Fowlkes with three counts of drug possession and

distribution and two related firearm counts. Before trial,

Fowlkes moved to suppress all of the evidence obtained in the

case pursuant to the wiretap, the evidence seized from the

searches of his apartment and car, and the drugs found within

his person during the body cavity search at the jail. The

district court denied each of these motions.

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8 UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES

On July 8, 2008, a jury trial commenced, but it ended two

days later when Fowlkes requested a mistrial after Federal

Marshals arrested a key defense witness outside of the

courtroom doors, but within earshot and possible view of the

jury. Fowlkes subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the

indictments on double jeopardy or due process grounds

because the government’s misconduct had goaded him into

requesting the mistrial. On September 17, 2008, the district

court denied the motion.

On November 4, 2008, Fowlkes’ retrial began, and on

November 20, the jury found Fowlkes guilty of the three

drug-related counts. The court sentenced Fowlkes to time

served (forty-six months) and supervised release for eight

years.

Fowlkes claims the district court erred by denying his

motions to: (1) suppress the evidence obtained through the

wiretaps because the application for the warrant was

technicallydeficient, and, at the least, the district court should

have held a Franks hearing; (2) suppress evidence seized

from his apartment because the officers’ warrantless entry

was unlawful and the warrant authorizing the search was

unsupported by probable cause; (3) suppress the cocaine base

and marijuana seized from his car because the initial stop and

subsequent search of his car was unlawful; (4) suppress the

evidence extracted from his rectum at the jail because this

evidence was retrieved in an unreasonable manner, in

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; (5) dismiss the

indictment on a claim of evidence tampering;

1

and (6) dismiss

1 Because the evidence found within Fowlkes’ body was seized in an

unreasonable manner and thus should have been suppressed, we need not

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UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES 9

the indictment on double jeopardy grounds following a

mistrial.

We affirm the district court’s rulings except the denial of

Fowlkes’ motion to suppress the cocaine seized from within

his body at the Long Beach City Jail. We therefore reverse

the conviction on the count predicated on that evidence.

II.

“Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison

inmates from the protections of the Constitution.” Turner v.

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). We review de novo a district

court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, and we

review the underlying factual issues for clear error. United

States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1234 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The district court concluded that a warrant was not required

for the drugs forcibly removed from Fowlkes’ rectum,

reasoning that the officers conducted a visual search rather

than a physical one. While it may be true that the search was

purely visual, the seizure of contraband discovered during

that search was clearly physical. Based on the particular

circumstances of the seizure at issue, we conclude that the

officers acted unreasonably and the evidence they seized

therefore should have been suppressed.

A.

The LBPD’s warrantless visual strip search of Fowlkes

during the jail intake process was not unreasonable. The

government has a strong interest in preventing contraband

resolve Fowlkes’ other allegations of discovery violations or chain of

custody issues pertaining to that evidence.

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10 UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES

from entering its prisons and jails, and in the jail intake

process, we have recognized that “adherence to the

warrant-and-probable cause requirement would be

impracticable.” Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 853,

858 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Specifically, in Bull v. City and County of San Francisco, we

addressed whether suspicionless visual body cavity searches

may be performed without a warrant during the jail intake

process. 595 F.3d 964, 968–69 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 

Answering this question in the affirmative, we relied

primarily on two factors to conclude that it would be

impracticable for the government to obtain a warrant prior to

each individual search. First, we looked to the sheer number

of individuals the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department intakes

annually: “50,000 individuals are booked and processed each

year.” Id. at 966. Given these large numbers, it would be

difficult, if not impossible, for the San Francisco Sheriff’s

Department to obtain a warrant prior to performing every

individual visual cavity search. Second, we observed that

visual cavity searches are often suspicionless; rather than

justified by probable cause, they are necessary by virtue of

the jail’s security concerns. See id. at 966–67.

Similarly, in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders,

132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012), the Supreme Court upheld a blanket

strip search and visual body cavity search for arrestees

entering detention facilities based on the same

impracticability rationale that we applied in Bull. The Court

considered, for example, that the Essex County Correctional

Facility intakes more than 25,000 inmates each year, id. at

1514, and that it would be very difficult practically to identify

or sort those detainees who should be searched because they

are more likely to be carrying contraband from those who

should not be searched, id. at 1520–22. The Court also

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UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES 11

explicitly noted: “There are no allegations that the detainees

here were touched in any way as part of the searches.” Id. at

1515.

By contrast, searches that require intrusion into a person’s

body implicate greater constitutional concerns. See Bouse v.

Bussey, 573 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)

(quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966)

(“Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of

dwellings, and, absent an emergency, no less could be

required where intrusions into the human body are

concerned.”)). An intrusion into the human body implicates

an individual’s “most personal and deep-rooted expectations

of privacy.” Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985). 

Therefore, while visual cavity searches that do not require

physical entry into a prisoner’s body are generally

permissible without a warrant during the jail intake process,

physical cavity searches generally are not. See Schmerber,

384 U.S. at 769–70 (“The interests in human dignity and

privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any

such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence

might be obtained.”).

Here, the LBPD officers went beyond the visual cavity

search found reasonable in Bull. They seized an unidentified

object of unknown size from Fowlkes’ rectum, subjecting

him to a physically invasive, painful experience and thereby

implicating his “most personal and deep-rooted expectations

of privacy.” Lee, 470 U.S. at 760. At the same time,

however, the officers, while acting without a warrant and

engaging in physical contact, were not acting “on the mere

chance that desired evidence might be obtained.” Schmerber,

384 U.S. at 770. They had reason to believe desired evidence

was located inside of Fowlkes’ body because Sergeant Gibbs

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12 UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES

could see a portion of an object which he thought Fowlkes

was attempting to further secrete. Thus, they conducted a

warrantless physical seizure of contraband they actually

observed during the course of a permissible warrantless visual

search.

B.

Having properly framed the officers’ conduct as a

warrantless, physically invasive seizure of actual (not merely

suspected) contraband, we must determine whether that

conduct was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. We

conclude that it was.

In reaching this conclusion, we need not and do not

determine whether a warrant is required to seize evidence

discovered during a visual strip search from an inmate’s body

because the officers’ conduct here was unreasonable for other

reasons. As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, “[e]ven if

a warrant is not required, a search is not beyond Fourth

Amendment scrutiny; for it must be reasonable in its scope

and manner of execution.” Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct.

1958, 1970 (2013); see also Bull, 595 F.3d at 967 n.2 (“There

is no doubt . . . that ‘on occasion a security guard may

conduct the search in an abusive fashion, and [s]uch an abuse

cannot be condoned.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,

560 (1979))). We have applied the same principle in

analyzing the constitutionality of a seizure in a nearly

identical context involving extraction of evidence from a

suspect’s rectum. See United States v. Cameron, 538 F.2d

254, 258 (9th Cir. 1976) (“[A] clear indication that the

suspect is concealing contraband does not authorize

government officials to resort to any and all means at their

disposal to retrieve it.”); see also United States v. Edwards,

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UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES 13

666 F.3d 877, 884 (4th Cir. 2011) (“The manner in which

contraband is removed from a suspect during a sexually

intrusive search, no less than the manner in which the

contraband initially is discovered, must be considered in

determining under the Bell analysis whether the search was

reasonable.”).2

In determining whether an individual search or seizure is

reasonable, we evaluate the “totality of [the] circumstances,”

Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 (2013), including

“[1] the scope of the particular intrusion, [2] the manner of its

conduct, and [3] the justification for initiating it.” Cameron,

538 F.2d at 258 (internal quotation marks omitted). We

address these three considerations in turn.

The scope of the seizure intruded beyond the surface of

Fowlkes’ body, interfering with his bodily integrity. As the

2 Whether the officers’ conduct here is labeled a “search” or a “seizure”

is immaterial to the legal analysis. We use the term “seizure” because

Sergeant Gibbs saw a plastic bag protruding from Fowlkes’ anus and had

probable cause to believe it was contraband. Thus, there was no need for

a “search” as that word is commonly understood; all that remained was to

seize evidence that had already been found. We have in some opinions,

including Cameron, referred to this conduct as a search. Semantics aside,

this case is like Cameron because the officers’ actions are challenged not

because the officers lacked sufficient certainty that evidence was located

inside Fowlkes’ body, but instead because, even assuming sufficient

certainty, the manner of removing the evidence was unreasonable. Where

the probability of finding evidence in the place to be searched is at issue,

different Fourth Amendment concerns and protections are implicated (for

example, a warrant serves to ensure that sufficient cause exists to search

a particular location). But even when those concerns are not present, our

decision in Cameron clearly stands for the proposition that the manner of

extraction—whether termed a search or a seizure—is subject to a

reasonableness requirement under the Fourth Amendment.

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14 UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES

Supreme Court explained in Schmerber, “[t]he overriding

function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal

privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the

State.” 384 U.S. at 767. The Court has subsequently

described the interest in bodily integrity as implicating the

“most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.” 

Lee, 470 U.S. at 760 (holding a compelled surgical intrusion

to remove a bullet, fired by a robbery victim, from the chest

of the suspect unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment);

see also Cameron, 538 F.2d at 258 (“[T]he fourth amendment

imposes a stricter standard on the ‘means and procedures’ of

a body search than does the due process clause.”). And here,

the seizure interfered with a particularlypersonal, private area

of Fowlkes’ anatomy.

Likewise, the manner in which this seizure was conducted

supports the conclusion that it was unreasonable. In making

this determination, we consider a variety of factors including

hygiene, medical training, emotional and physical trauma,

and the availability of alternative methods for conducting the

search. See Vaughan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736, 741 (9th Cir.

1988), abrogated on other grounds by Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386 (1989); see also Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d

694, 700–01 (9th Cir. 1997) (considering hygiene and

medical training of officers in evaluating the reasonableness

of the search).

As an initial matter, the officers violated the jail’s own

written policy for body cavity searches by failing to remove

the evidence “under sanitary conditions” and by not using a

“Physician, Nurse Practitioner, Registered Nurse, Licensed

Vocational Nurse, or Emergency Medical Technician.” 

There is no evidence that any of the officers had medical or

any other relevant training on how to safely remove

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UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES 15

suspicious objects from an arrestee’s rectum or how to

evaluate whether such removal could cause serious physical

harm or death.3 The manner of this seizure is the very sort

the Supreme Court explicitly distinguished from the blood

test it found “performed in a reasonable manner” in

Schmerber:

We are thus not presented with the serious

questions which would arise if a search

involving use of a medical technique, even of

the most rudimentary sort, were made by

other than medical personnel or in other than

a medical environment—for example, if it

were administered by police in the privacy of

the stationhouse. To tolerate searches under

these conditions might be to invite an

unjustified element of personal risk of

infection and pain.

384 U.S. at 771–72. As the Supreme Court accurately

predicted forty-years ago, tolerating such invasive conduct by

non-medical personnel invites an unjustified element of

personal risk—a risk that Fowlkes experienced first-hand and

one that is constitutionally intolerable.4

3 The dissent argues that, in the absence of medical testimony regarding

the dangers presented by the seizure here, we can only speculate about

medical necessity. Dissent at 38, n.8. While there is no testimony on the

issue, however, LBPD policy suggests that when physical intrusion into

a body cavity is necessary, medical personnel, rather than LBPD officers,

should perform the task.

4 As the dissent correctly notes, we have applied Schmerber to both

visual and physical body cavity searches. See Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry,

950 F.2d 1437, 1449 (9th Cir. 1991). This does not mean, however, that

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16 UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES

In Cameron, then-Judge Anthony M. Kennedy explained

that Cameron, like Fowlkes, was in a humiliating and

dangerous situation: “[T]he person accused of concealing

contraband within his body is faced with the real prospect that

the most intimate portions of his anatomywill be invaded and

that he will suffer resulting pain or even physical harm.” 

538 F.2d at 258. We also recognized that Cameron, like

Fowlkes, was particularlyvulnerable and totallyalone: “[T]he

suspect usually faces this ordeal without assistance,

surrounded by persons who administer the procedure on

behalf of the government and thus appear to him to have as

their overriding motive the obtaining of evidence to convict,

and not his personal well being.” Id.

After detailing the unique dangers, fears, and concerns

faced by detainees like Fowlkes, we held that the process for

removing suspected contraband from a detainee’s body, “if it

is to comport with the reasonableness standard of the fourth

amendment, must be conducted with regard for the subject’s

privacy and be designed to minimize emotional and physical

trauma.” Id. We further clarified that “[i]n a situation thus

laden with the potential for fear and anxiety, a reasonable

search will include, beyond the usual procedural

requirements, reasonable steps to mitigate the anxiety,

discomfort, and humiliation that the suspect may suffer.” Id.

Here, the LBPD officers did not take adequate steps to

minimize Fowlkes’ physical trauma. They did not, for

example, use lubrication or ensure that the removal was

conducted under sanitary conditions; they did not seek the

visual searches and physical searches and seizures are identical with

regard to whether they “might . . . invite an unjustified element of personal

risk of infection and pain.” Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772.

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UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES 17

guidance or assistance of medical personnel; and they did not

assure themselves that removing the object from Fowlkes’

rectum was safe—indeed they did not know the size, shape,

or substance of the object. Further, they did nothing to

mitigate his anxiety or emotional trauma. They did not, for

example, offer him options for removing the contraband or

secure his compliance; they did not (and could not) assure

him that the removal was safe or being conducted by a trained

professional; and they did not (and could not) assure him that

the procedure was legal and in keeping with LBPD policy

rather than an arbitrary show of force.

Far from taking steps to minimize physical harm and

mitigate anxiety, as required by Cameron, the officers’

actions potentially increased the physical and emotional

trauma Fowlkes suffered. Despite undisputed testimony by

the officers themselves that Fowlkes posed no threat, much

less an immediate threat to himself or the officers, and was

not a flight risk (he was naked, bent over, and in handcuffs at

the time), Sergeant Gibbs used a stun-gun taser to shock

Fowlkes in an apparent effort to subdue him. Cf. Bryan v.

MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 832 (9th Cir. 2010); Mattos v.

Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 446 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)

(holding a finder of fact could find the use of a drive stun

taser against a person posing no immediate threat

unreasonable and unconstitutionally excessive). Once

Fowlkes was subdued, the officers proceeded with the

degrading and dangerous removal of the as yet unidentified

cocaine from Fowlkes’ rectum.5

5 The dissent suggests that it is immaterial that the materials lodged

inside ofFowlkes’ bodywere unidentified, because theywere indisputably

contraband. See Dissent at 34–35. But knowing that an object is

contraband is not the same as knowing the object can be safely removed. 

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18 UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES

These actions stand in stark contrast to the conduct found

reasonable in Schmerber and are much more like the conduct

found unreasonable by the Fourth Circuit in Edwards. In

Schmerber, the Court explicitly considered that the blood

draw in question “involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain,”

and that it “was performed in a reasonable manner” because

“blood was taken by a physician in a hospital environment

according to accepted medical practices.” 384 U.S. at 771. 

In Edwards, by contrast, the court determined that the manner

in which an officer removed a plastic bag that an arrestee had

tied around his penis was unreasonable. 666 F.3d at 884. 

The officer put on gloves and then used a knife to cut the bag

off the suspect’s penis. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the

manner of the removal “posed a significant and an

unnecessary risk of injury to Edwards, transgressing wellsettled standards of reasonableness. The fortuity that

Edwards was not injured in the course of this action does not

substantiate its safety.” Id. at 885.6

As in Edwards and Cameron, the officers here should

have done more to “allay the anxieties and concerns of the

suspect,” and should have considered “less intrusive means

The officers’lack of information about the object—its precise size, shape,

and texture; whether the surrounding plastic was abraded; whether the

inside of Fowlkes’ rectal cavity was injured; and whether the substance

inside could potentially poison him—highlights the heightened “personal

risk” inherent in the physical search. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772. 

That Fowlkes may have been acting unlawfully by smuggling an item into

jail does not affect this calculus.

6

 To be clear, our holding does not preclude touching of the defendant

or seizure of contraband from a suspect’s rectum in all cases. As in

Edwards, we hold only that the particular manner of seizing evidence

employed by the LBPD in this case was unreasonable.

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UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES 19

of obtaining the evidence.” Cameron, 538 F.2d at 258. There

are any number of alternative methods the officers could have

considered employing to recover this evidence. This is not to

require a least-restrictive alternative test as determinative of

reasonableness, but it would have been more reasonable

simply to comply with the jail’s written policy and summon

medical personnel. And there was ample opportunity to do

so. Before strip searching Fowlkes, Sergeant Gibbs was

informed by another officer that Fowlkes had “put a baggie

down his pants.” Rather than readying medical personnel or

at least determining whether medical personnel were

available to facilitate compliance with LBPD policy, Gibbs

instead retrieved a taser from his vehicle and put on latex

gloves.7 Then, after observing a baggie protruding from

Fowlkes’ rectum, without securing judicial authorization,

Fowlkes’ compliance, or medical personnel, and without

assurances that doing so was safe or could be done without

causing severe pain, Gibbs simply extracted the unidentified

object.

Moreover, although we do not hold that a warrant was

required, we must “consider that the government failed to

obtain a warrant” in “evaluating the reasonableness of the

manner in which the search [or seizure] was conducted.” 

Cameron, 538 F.2d at 258. “In addition to certifying that a

search [or seizure] is reasonably justified a warrant can also

assure that it is conducted in a reasonable manner.” Id. at

259. A warrant can, for example, dispel a suspect’s concerns

that he is being subject to illegal, arbitrary procedures. Id. 

The warrant also clarifies the means of seizure the

7 These facts show that Gibbs had time to take additional precautions,

and thus they are relevant in assessing the objective reasonableness of

Gibbs’ conduct.

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20 UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES

government may employ, which may in turn secure the

cooperation of the suspect, reducing the risk of physical

trauma attendant with removing evidence from a suspect’s

body. Id. Thus, the officers’ failure to secure a warrant is yet

another way in which they did not mitigate the risk of

physical and emotional trauma associated with the seizure of

evidence from Fowlkes’ rectum.

Just as the scope of the intrusion into Fowlkes’ privacy

and the manner in which the seizure was conducted suggest

that the officers acted unreasonably, the justifications—or

lack thereof—for seizing the evidence in the chosen manner

reinforce our conclusion that the officers acted unreasonably. 

See Cameron, 538 F.2d at 258. As in Cameron, where

officers were all but certain the suspect had secreted drugs in

his rectum, here “there was no emergency requiring instant

seizure of the evidence.” Id. at 259. The government is

correct that a warrantless search may be conducted if an

officer reasonably believes that evidence will be destroyed if

he does not act quickly, so long as the search is conducted in

a reasonable manner. See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. at

770–71. But the record is devoid of any evidence from which

the officers reasonably might have inferred that evidence

would be destroyed if they took the time to secure a warrant

and summon medical personnel. When the baggie was

removed, Fowlkes was handcuffed, tased, and surrounded by

five police officers. He was under arrest and in the custody

of the LBPD. Fowlkes, like the evidence lodged inside his

rectum, was not going anywhere.8

8 The dissent contends that Gibbs’ testimony constitutes evidence from

which officers might reasonably have inferred that the evidence protruding

from Fowlkes’ anus would be destroyed if they did not seize it. Dissent

at 35. Gibbs’ testimony, however, only proves that he subjectively

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UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES 21

Similarly, the record contains no evidence that a medical

emergency existed. See Cameron, 538 F.2d at 259 & n.8

(“There were no facts on the record indicating that failure to

remove the heroin would constitute a danger to the

suspect. . . . [O]nly a showing of the greatest imminent harm

would justify intrusive action for the purpose of removal of

the drug.”); see also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,

15 (1948) (“No suspect was fleeing or likely to take flight.”). 

Thus, there was time to take steps—potentially including,

inter alia, securing medical personnel, a warrant, or both—to

mitigate the risk that the seizure would cause physical and

emotional trauma.

Further, the practicability concerns underlying Bull and

Florence are absent here. While we have approved

suspicionless visual strip searches in the prison intake context

given the government’s need to keep contraband out of

prisons and the sheer volume of incoming inmates, the

government does not contend that it is necessary to seize

evidence from the body cavities of every person booked into

the Long Beach City jail. In Bull, for example, over a sixty

month period, from April 2000 to April 2005, visual body

cavity searches revealed only seventy-three cases of illegal

drugs or drug paraphernalia hidden in arrestees’ body

cavities—a rate of approximately fifteen cases a year. 

595 F.3d at 969. And, in Bell, the Supreme Court noted “only

one instance” where an inmate was discovered attempting to

smuggle contraband into the institution in this manner. 

441 U.S. at 558.

believed evidence might be destroyed if he did not seize the baggie

quickly; the record remains devoid of evidence suggesting that Gibbs’

subjective belief was objectively reasonable.

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The relatively small numbers of inmates concealing

contraband in their body cavities undercuts any argument that

it would be impractical to take additional “steps to mitigate

the anxiety, discomfort, and humiliation that . . . suspect[s]

[like Fowlkes] may suffer.” Cameron, 538 F.2d at 258. One

step in particular, obtaining a warrant, would place very little

burden on the government given these small numbers and

technological advancements that facilitate nearly immediate

access to warrants.9

 See id. at 259 (“It should not have been

difficult to obtain a warrant . . . .”). That LBPD policy

requires medical personnel to perform cavity searches under

sanitary conditions also suggests that there were no practical

obstacles to taking these additional steps to mitigate the

potential danger to prisoners like Fowlkes.

In the end, the LBPD conducted a warrantless forcible

seizure of an unidentified item of unknown size from

Fowlkes’ rectum by non-medical personnel who (1) did

nothing to assure that the removal was safe and performed

under sanitary conditions; (2) were aided by the use of a taser

but not by lubricant; (3) seized the object in the absence of

exigent circumstances; and (4) acted in violation of LBPD

policy. No single factor is dispositive, but under the totality

of the circumstances presented here, we conclude that the

manner of this seizure was unreasonable. See Cameron,

9

“[A]dvances in the 47 years since Schmerber was decided . . . allow for

the more expeditious processing of warrant applications, particularly in

contexts . . . where the evidence offered to establish probable cause is

simple. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended in 1977

to permit federal magistrate judges to issue a warrant based on sworn

testimony communicated by telephone. . . . And in addition to technologybased developments, jurisdictions have found other ways to streamline the

warrant process, such as by using standard-form warrant applications

. . . .” McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561–62.

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UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES 23

538 F.2d at 258–60. The district court therefore erred in

admitting the unreasonably seized evidence at Fowlkes’ trial.

C.

Finally, numerous jurisdictions have concluded in similar

circumstances that such warrantless conduct violates the

Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Meeks v. City of Minneapolis,

822 F. Supp. 2d 919 (D. Minn. 2011) (granting summary

judgment for plaintiff in a § 1983 suit on the claim that

officers’ conduct in pulling an item protruding from

defendant’s anus while he was pushed up against a squad car

violated his Fourth Amendment rights); United States v.

Broadway, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1185 (D. Colo. 2008)

(suggesting that “actual touching, penetration, attempted

touching, or attempted penetration of Defendant’s anus or

anal cavity” might constitute unreasonable scope or manner

of search); State v. Barnes, 215 Ariz. 279, 281 (Ariz. Ct. App.

2007) (“[A]n officer must secure a warrant to remove items

partially protruding from an arrestee’s rectum.”); State v.

Robinson, 937 A.2d 717, 728–29 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008)

(noting that, under Connecticut law, police must procure a

warrant before obtaining contraband from a defendant’s anus,

but finding that the search at issue was not a body cavity

search because “the bag was wholly outside of the

defendant’s rectum”); People v. Hall, 10 N.Y.3d 303, 311

(2008) (“[T]he removal of an object protruding from a body

cavity, regardless of whether any insertion into the body

cavity is necessary, is subject to the Schmerber rule and

cannot be accomplished without a warrant unless exigent

circumstances reasonably prevent the police from seeking

prior judicial authorization.”); Hughes v. Commonwealth,

524 S.E. 2d 155, 162 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a

search in which officer asked suspect to bend over, inspected

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24 UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES

his anus, instructed him to cough, then manually removed

plastic bag protruding from suspect’s anus violated suspect’s

Fourth Amendment rights).

This persuasive authority reinforces our conclusion that

the seizure of evidence from Fowlkes’ rectum, under the

totality of the circumstances, violated his Fourth Amendment

rights, and that the district court therefore should have

suppressed the evidence.10

III.

Although the district court erred in failing to suppress the

evidence seized from within Fowlkes’ body, it properly

denied Fowlkes’ remaining motions.

A.

Fowlkes asserts that an apparent discrepancy between the

person who prepared the government’s application for the

wiretap and the person who signed it renders the interception

of the wire communications “unlawful” and mandates

suppression of any evidence obtained as a result of that

wiretap. At a minimum, he claims the district court erred in

denying him a Franks11hearing because the affidavit in

10 The Government has not argued that the instant Fourth Amendment

violation warrants a remedy other than suppression, so we do not consider

alternative sanctions for the officers’ conduct.

11

“[W]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that

a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard

for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the

allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the

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UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES 25

support of the wiretap contained material misrepresentations

and omissions. Because any technical deficiencies in the

wiretap application do not warrant suppression and because

Fowlkes’ Franks claim is without merit, the district court did

not err in denying the motion to suppress.

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets

Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520, governs wiretapping

by law enforcement. United States v. Garcia-Villalba,

585 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009). Evidence obtained from

a wiretap must be suppressed if “the communication was

unlawfully intercepted.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(i). In

United States v. Chavez, the Supreme Court held that

establishing a rule in which “every failure to comply fully

with any requirement provided in Title III would render the

interception of wire or oral communications unlawful”

“would be at odds with the statute itself.” 416 U.S. 562,

574–75 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather,

“suppression is required only for a failure to satisfy any of

those statutory requirements that directly and substantially

implement the congressional intention to limit the use of

intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the

employment of this extraordinary investigative device.” 

United States v. Donovon, 429 U.S. 413, 433–34 (1977)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, any technical deficiency caused by one AUSA

signing for another does not constitute a failure to satisfy

such a statutory requirement. The affidavit prepared by

Agent Jonathan Koeppen in support of the wiretap application

satisfies the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C.

Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s

request.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978).

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§ 2518(1)—it was prepared in writing by an investigative or

law enforcement officer, it stated Koeppen’s authority to

make an application, it provided a full and complete

statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon, and it

was signed under oath. We have previously implied that an

affidavit attached to a wiretap application can fulfill the

requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) in lieu of the application

itself. See Garcia-Villalba, 585 F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (9th Cir.

2009) (evaluating whether the affidavit contained the full and

complete statement as to whether other investigative

procedures had been tried and failed as required by 18 U.S.C.

§ 2518(1)(c), which governs the requirements of a wiretap

application); United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199,

1234–37 (9th Cir. 2004).

The only statutory requirement that Koeppen’s affidavit

failed to meet was to identify the officer authorizing the

application, as required under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(a). The

Supreme Court, however, has held that misidentification of

the authorizing officer in the wiretap application is not a

technical deficiency that requires suppression. Chavez,

416 U.S. at 575. So too here. Exhibit A attached to the

wiretap application did provide authorization for the wiretap,

and the singular failure of Agent Koeppen’s affidavit to

identify the authorizing official does not warrant suppression.

The district court did not err in denying a Franks hearing

because Fowlkes has not shown that “the allegedly false

statement[s] [were] necessary to the finding of probable

cause.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56. Even if we accept as

true all of Fowlkes’ allegations regarding misstatements and

omissions in Koeppen’s affidavit, Fowlkes still must “show

that the affidavit purged of those falsities and supplemented

by the omissions would not be sufficient to support a finding

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UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES 27

of probable cause.” United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775,

782 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171–72). This

he cannot do. The affidavit contains many unchallenged

factual allegations linking the phones and implicating Target

Telephone #2 in the service of drug trafficking. These

include numerous calls between the phones, shared subscriber

information, high call volume, and toll information

connecting one phone to suspected narcotics traffickers.

B.

Fowlkes also asserts that the district court erred in

denying his motion to suppress the 2.6 grams of cocaine

seized from his apartment because the officers’ warrantless

entry was unlawful and the warrant authorizing the search

was unsupported by probable cause. As the district court

correctly found, however, probable cause coupled with

exigent circumstances justified the officers’warrantless entry,

and the warrant itself was supported by probable cause. See

United States v. Alaimalo, 313 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir.

2002) (“Even when exigent circumstances exist, police

officers must have probable cause to support a warrantless

entry into a home.”).

Probable cause justifying a warrantless entry requires the

government to show a “fair probability that contraband or

evidence of a crime” was in the residence. Illinois v. Gates,

462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); see Bailey v. Newland, 263 F.3d

1022, 1032 (9th Cir. 2001). Examining the totality of the

circumstances known to the officers at the time, Alaimalo,

313 F.3d at 1193, the officers here had probable cause

sufficient to believe there was contraband at Fowlkes’ Cedar

Avenue apartment. Officers intercepted a voicemail

suggesting that Fowlkes paid rent for the apartment. They

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also intercepted calls in which Fowlkes mentioned

undercover officers and referenced “get[ting] everything out

of” the premises and “trash[ing]” his phone because he’s “not

gonna give them shit to put together on me.” On this basis,

the officers reasonably concluded that drugs were present at

Fowlkes’ Cedar Avenue apartment. See United States v.

Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986) (“In the

case of drug dealers, evidence is likely to be found where the

dealers live.”).

Exigent circumstances include “those circumstances that

would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry . . . was

necessaryto prevent . . . the destruction of relevant evidence.” 

United States v. Howard, 828 F.2d 552, 555 (9th Cir. 1987)

(quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199

(9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984)). The

September 4 calls further support a finding of exigent

circumstances. During those calls, Fowlkes stated, “It’s a 911

. . . . The homie said the police is outside in the back . . . . I

was gonna tell you to take that shit over to Keisha’s house,”

and he instructed the person on the other end of the line to

“move that computer and the rest of all that you know, just

get everything out of here . . . .” As the district court

correctlyfound, those intercepted communications, viewed as

they would reasonably appear to a prudent law enforcement

officer, could have led to the conclusion that it was necessary

to enter and secure the Cedar Avenue apartment to prevent

Fowlkes from destroying contraband. The one-hour lapse

between the last intercepted call and officers’ entry into the

apartment did not undermine the exigency of the situation. In

United States v. Lindsey, 877 F.2d 777, 782–83 (9th Cir.

1989), we held that a delay of the same duration did not

negate the exigency because the delay was caused by officers

awaiting reinforcements. Similarly, here the delay occurred

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UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES 29

because of the time it took officers to respond and then

“coordinate[] their efforts” for entry.

Finally, the magistrate judge did not clearly err in finding

probable cause sufficient to support the search warrant for the

apartment. See United States v. Krupa, 658 F.3d 1174, 1177

(9th Cir. 2011). The affidavit in support of the warrant

alleged the following: 1) Fowlkes was a cocaine distributor;

2) he was using a phone that was the subject of an ongoing

wiretap; 3) he resided at 2310 Cedar Avenue, Apartment 3,

Long Beach, CA; and 4) during a phone call on one of the

tapped phones, Fowlkes instructed a woman to clear out the

place, including the computer, which the affiant interpreted

as telling the woman to remove all evidence of narcotics

distribution from the Cedar Avenue apartment. These facts

are sufficient to support the magistrate’s finding of probable

cause. Fowlkes’ assertion that the affidavit contained

material misrepresentations and omissions is unavailing. As

the district court correctly found, some of Fowlkes’

allegations lack evidentiary support. The other errors he

points to appear to be simply typographical errors, which do

not alter the substance of the affidavit.

C.

Finally, the district court correctly denied Fowlkes’

motion to suppress the cocaine base seized from his car. An

officer may conduct a traffic stop if the officer has “probable

cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren

v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). “The fact that the

alleged traffic violation is a pretext for the stop is irrelevant,

so long as the objective circumstances justify the stop.” 

United States v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir.

2000). Here, the officer observed an expired temporary

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30 UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES

operating permit on the car Fowlkes was driving, which

provided the basis for the Terry stop. See Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).

The search of the car was likewise appropriate under the

automobile exception to the warrant requirement, which

allows police officers to “conduct a warrantless search of a

vehicle if they have probable cause to believe that it contains

contraband.” United States v. Pinela-Herandez, 262 F.3d

974, 977–78 (9th Cir. 2001). A determination of probable

cause is based on the “totality of the circumstances” known

to the officers, United States v. Smith, 790 F.2d 789, 792 (9th

Cir. 1986), and because the officers were acting in concert in

this case, we “look[] to the collective knowledge of all the

officers involved in the criminal investigation.” United States

v. Ramirez, 473 F.3d 1026, 1032–37 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the officers who

ordered the traffic stop had just observed what they believed,

based on previous surveillance of Fowlkes and their own

experiences, to be a narcotics transaction between Fowlkes

and another individual. Once the car was pulled over and

Fowlkes was ordered to get out of the car, officers observed

small, off-white rock-like chips on the driver and passenger

seats in plain view and a green, leaf-like substance inside a

clear bag in plain sight. Based upon the totality of these

circumstances, the district court properly denied Fowlkes’

motion to suppress the evidence found in the car.

IV.

The district court did not clearly err when it found,

following its grant of Fowlkes’ request for a mistrial, that the

government had not “goad[ed]” him into making the request. 

See United States v. Lun, 944 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1991). 

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UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES 31

“[O]nly where the governmental conduct in question is

intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into moving for a mistrial

may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second

trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own

motion.” United States v. Lopez-Avila, 678 F.3d 955, 962

(9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Fowlkes asserts that the government’s conduct in

arresting Marshall, a witness who had just testified for the

defense, immediately outside the courtroom doors and within

sight and hearing of the jury, goaded him into requesting the

mistrial. The trial court, after two days of evidentiary

hearings, found it could not “conclude that the arrest of Ms.

Marshall was done in bad faith or with the intention to secure

a mistrial.” The evidence supports the district court’s finding

“that the government did not intentionally effectuate Ms.

Marshall’s arrest so as to bring it to the attention of the jury.” 

Indeed, the jury was able to observe the arrest only because

the glass panes on the courtroom doors afforded them a view

of the hallwaywhere the arrest was taking place. Given these

facts, the district court’s finding is not clearly erroneous. See

United States v. Hagege, 437 F.3d 943, 951–52 (9th Cir.

2006). Moreover, while not conclusive, the government’s

opposition to Fowlkes’ motion for a mistrial supports the

district court’s finding of a lack of intent. See United States

v. McKoy, 78 F.3d 446, 449 (9th Cir. 1996) (considering the

government’s opposition to a motion for mistrial as a factor

in affirming the district court’s finding that the government

did not intentionally goad the defendants into seeking a

mistrial).

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V.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and reverse

in part. We vacate Fowlkes’ conviction and sentence on

Count V, which was predicated on the drugs

unconstitutionally seized from his body cavity, and remand

for re-sentencing consistent with this decision.12

AFFIRMED, REVERSED, VACATED, and

REMANDED.

12 Fowlkes was sentenced to time served with an eight-year term of

supervised release, of which he has served approximately four years. The

district court made this term subject to a review of the Fair Sentencing Act

of 2010. We therefore decline to reach Fowlkes’ challenge to the

propriety of his original sentence under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,

and leave that issue in the hands of the district court.

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UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES 33

RESTANI, Judge, dissenting in part.

Because I believe the facts found by the district court,

which the majority does not contend were clearly erroneous,

render the warrantless search and seizure reasonable under

the totality of the circumstances, I dissent from the majority’s

decision to suppress the evidence seized during the jailhouse

search.1

I.

The majority begins its discussion of the present case by

choosing to describe the facts surrounding the jailhouse

search in the most unfavorable light, at times engaging in

wholesale speculation, to portray this case as one involving

brutal, unnecessary police action. I believe it is helpful to

clarify some of the more important factual considerations in

order to fairly lay out the context the court must consider in

evaluating the reasonableness of the police actions at issue.2

The majority opinion makes much of the fact that Gibbs

“brought along his taser, gloves and ‘assistance’ in the form

of additional officers because he thought Fowlkes might have

drugs” and “retrieved a taser from his vehicle and put on latex

1

I concur in the reasoning of the majority opinion with respect to all

other issues raised on appeal.

 

2

 Of course, as an appellate court, we are not to engage in independent

fact finding, deferring instead to the findings of the district court unless

they are clearly erroneous. In seemingly making new factual findings, the

majority appears dissatisfied with the lack of clear factual findings in the

district court’s order. If this is so, the remedy would be to remand to the

district court, not to engage in our own weighing of the disputed facts,

without the benefit of live testimony.

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gloves.” See Maj. Op. at 5, 19. Not only is this insinuation

of an improper pre-search intent irrelevant under the

objective test used to evaluate the reasonableness of the

search, but Gibbs provided testimony, which the trial court

appeared to credit, plausibly explaining all of his actions. 

Gibbs testified that he wore gloves during all strip searches in

the event he recovered evidence that was hidden on or in the

arrestee’s body, because these items might be used as

evidence (in which case fingerprints and/or DNA evidence

might need to be protected) and because the items could have

bodily fluids on them (posing a health hazard). He also

explained that he brought his taser from his patrol vehicle,

after obtaining permission to bring it into the jail, because

Fowlkes had been verbally aggressive, and Fowlkes was a

large individual (over six feet tall and 250 pounds).3

The majority also downplays an important fact in

describing the search in this case. See id. at 11–12. The

officers here were not completely in the dark as to what they

were seeking to seize, probing inside Fowlkes as part of a

wild goose chase. Instead, testimony from Officer Harris

made clear that the officers knew that the object protruding

from Fowlkes’ body cavity was unmistakably contraband for

two reasons: a) it was an undisclosed plastic baggie, and b) it

was almost certainly drugs.4 Officer Harris described the bag

3 The majority’s statement that Fowlkes posed no threat at all to the

officers simply is not supported by the record, although it was

acknowledged that Fowlkes was not physically aggressive, only verbally

aggressive, prior to the search. Maj. Op. at 17.

4 Contraband refers to any unauthorized item, not just illegal items,

including lighters, matches, currency, and pens. See Florence v. Bd. of

Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1519 (2012) (“Contraband is any

item that is possessed in violation of prison rules. Contraband obviously

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UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES 35

as “a white object slightly protruding . . . maybe a little bit

less than a golf ball size, off-white substance in a plastic

baggy. Or inside plastic.”

Finally, the majority asserts that “the record is devoid of

any evidence from which the officers might reasonably have

inferred that evidence would be destroyed if they took the

time to secure a warrant and summon medical personnel.” Id.

at 20. Contrary to this assertion, Gibbs testified during the

evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress that he was

concerned the evidence could be destroyed or adulterated by

Fowlkes. In fact, Gibbs explained that during past searches,

he had witnessed defendants, who had secreted drugs into

their body cavities, attempt to crush and swallow them during

the strip search. Moreover, Gibbs explained that it was not

uncommon for arrestees to become physicallyviolent in order

to prevent recovery of the contraband once it fell out. Thus,

contrary to the majority’s conclusion, Gibbs’ testimony

indicates that it was objectively reasonable to believe that

Fowlkes might destroy the evidence. See Maj. Op. at 20–21

n.8.

includes drugs or weapons, but it can also be money, cigarettes, or even

some types of clothing.” (quoting Prisons: Today and Tomorrow 237 (J.

Pollock ed. 1997)). Here, when the object was protruding, the officers

could see that it was a plastic bag with an off-white substance inside, and

thus it was readily apparent that Fowlkes possessed an unauthorized

object. Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, I do not believe that the

officer’s knowledge of the type of contraband secreted inside the

arrestee’s body is immaterial, and in this case, we need not consider the

situation where the unauthorized nature or general character of the object

is not apparent. See Maj. Op. at 17–18 n.5.

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36 UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES

II.

Having set out the facts, tethered to the record before us,

I turn now to the majority’s holding that the search5 was

unreasonable.

“The expectations of privacy of an individual taken into

police custody necessarily are of a diminished scope. Both

the person and the property in his immediate possession may

be searched at the station house. A search of the detainee’s

person when he is booked into custody may involve a

relatively extensive exploration . . . .” Maryland v. King,

133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978 (2013) (internal quotation marks,

brackets, and citations omitted). “Once an individual has

been arrested on probable cause for a dangerous offense that

may require detention before trial, . . . his or her expectations

of privacy and freedom from police scrutiny are reduced.” Id.

Under the Fourth Amendment, “[e]ven if a warrant is not

required, a search . . . must be reasonable in its scope and

manner of execution.” Id. at 1970. The reasonableness

analysis is fact-intensive and requires considerations of issues

such as privacy, hygiene, and the training of those conducting

the search. See Vaughan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736, 741 (9th

Cir. 1988), abrogated on other grounds by Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); see also United States v.

Carpenter, 496 F.2d 855, 855 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). 

To determine the reasonableness of a search, we balance the

“scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is

conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in

 

5

 As the majority notes at footnote 2, whether a police action is termed

a “search” or a “seizure” is immaterial to the legal analysis. Accordingly,

the dissent uses the terms interchangeably.

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UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES 37

which it is conducted.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559

(1979).

Although the majority is correct that under Schmerber v.

California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), any bodily intrusion is a

search within the meaning of that term, “[t]he fact that an

intrusion is negligible is of central relevance to determining

reasonableness.” King, 133 S. Ct. at 1969.6 The removal of

the protruding object here admittedly required an invasion of

Fowlkes’ privacy interests beyond that of a visual search. 

The removal, however, did not require any further touching,

intrusion, or probing into Fowlkes’ body.

7 This simply is not

6

In Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, we stated that Schmerber’s reference to

“intrusions into the body” applies to “all searches that invade the interior

of the body . . . [including] a visual intrusion into a body cavity.” 

950 F.2d 1437, 1449 & n.11 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting the Ninth Circuit,

unlike other courts, has not limited Schmerber to cases in which skin is

pierced or entry is forced). Thus, even the visual inspection of the body

cavity here was an intrusion into the human body under Schmerber, but as

noted by the majority, that particular intrusion into the body is justified by

the need to maintain institutional security. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 560. 

Thus, Schmerber does not require a warrant or exigent circumstances for

all searches involving intrusion beyond the body’s surface.

7 The majority relies on the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in United States v.

Edwards, 666 F.3d 877 (4th Cir. 2011). Although the majority there held

the search unreasonable because a knife was used to remove a bag of

drugs tied to the defendant’s genitals, the majority did not preclude any

touching of the defendant. See id. at 886. Instead, the majority suggested

other permissible alternatives including “untying the baggie, removing it

by hand, tearing the baggie, requesting that blunt scissors be brought to

the scene to remove the baggie, or removing the baggie by other nondangerous means in any private, well-lit area.” Id. (footnote omitted). 

The majoritymisunderstands this footnote as indicating that the majority’s

holding precludes any further touching of a suspect or seizure of

contraband from a suspect’s rectum in all future cases. Maj. Op. at 18 n.6. 

I make no such suggestion.

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a case where the search required the government to probe

inside the subject’s body cavity based on the belief that

contraband might be concealed inside. Rather, it was a search

that involved negligible additional intrusion and was based on

the presence of contraband in plain sight.

Additionally, unlike in Carpenter,

8 Fowlkes presented no

medical testimony related to the danger of removing the

protruding plastic bag, nor did Fowlkes argue that he was at

risk for injury or was injured by the removal. Fowlkes’

assertion before the district court was that Gibbs forcefully

inserted his fingers into Fowlkes’ anal cavity and probed,

8

In Carpenter, two judges concurred in the two sentence per curiam

opinion to limit the holding to the particular facts of that case. See

496 F.2d at 856 (Chambers, J., concurring) (“I regard the case as one . . .

of no precedential value except on a similar record.”); id. (Taylor, J.,

concurring) (“I am constrained to concur in reversing the conviction of

appellant only because of the record made on remand . . . .”). In

Carpenter, the district court credited testimony from the government’s

expert witness that a doctor should have been summoned to dilate the anal

cavity and did not credit other testimony from the same expert that the

object could be removed by a customs official without danger. Id. at 856. 

Both concurring judges stated that if not for this particular medical

evidence credited by the district court, they would have concluded that a

customofficial could remove the protruding object. Id. at 856 (Chambers,

J., concurring) (“The customs officer was entitled to assume the probable

– that the package was one that went in without much trouble and would

come out the same way.”); id. at 856–57 (Taylor, J., concurring) (noting

that despite the idealistic testimony of medical experts, common sense

dictates that the inspector was entitled to perform the simple process of

taking hold of and pulling the protruding end of the condom). As

indicated, there is no medical testimony here, and we can only speculate

as to what is considered necessary by medical professionals. That LBPD

policy requires medical personnel to perform body cavity searches is not

the same as medical testimony concerning the safety, propriety, and

reasonableness of the search and does not rise to the level of testimony

relied on in Carpenter. See Maj. Op. at 15 n.3.

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UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES 39

unsuccessfully, for drugs, facts that were rejected by the

district court. As a result, Fowlkes made no allegations as to

the harm caused by the actual removal of the protruding

plastic bag, and there is nothing on the record from Fowlkes’

perspective indicating that the manner of removal was

dangerous or harmful. Instead, the record states that the

search was performed in a private area by LBPD officers

wearing gloves and of the same sex as Fowlkes. The plastic

bag was protruding far enough so that Gibbs could grab the

bag with two fingers and pull it out, and there is no indication

that this process was difficult or prolonged.

The only evidence on the record suggesting that the

removal caused Fowlkes any pain or discomfort is a picture

of the plastic bag after it was removed, which shows

substances that appear to be blood and feces on the bag. 

Fowlkes argues the officers planted the plastic bag in the strip

search room and denied that it was recovered from his body

cavity. Thus, there is no testimony from Fowlkes as to the

existence of the plastic bag inside of him or the manner of its

removal, and there is nothing on the record demonstrating

that the possible presence of blood on the bag was caused by

the officers’ conduct, as opposed to Fowlkes’ own conduct of

forcing the plastic bag into his anal cavity, or his attempt to

push the bag further into his anal cavity during the search. 

See Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 700 (9th Cir. 1997)

(“[T]he prisoner ‘bears the burden of showing that [prison]

officials intentionally used exaggerated or excessive means

to enforce security.’” (second alteration in original)) (quoting

Michenfelder v. Summer, 860 F.2d 328, 333 (9th Cir. 1988)).

At the same time, the context of the search diminished

Fowlkes’ reasonable expectation of privacy and provided a

strong justification for the search. Here, Fowlkes was strip

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40 UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES

searched pursuant to a blanket LBPD policy that all

individuals booked on felony charges are subject to a strip

search before being housed in “General Population Felony

cells.”9 The undisputed testimony is that the purpose of this

policy is to “prevent the introduction of contraband or

weapons into the jail.” Thus, because the search here was

performed in order to maintain institutional security and

order, we should evaluate the reasonableness of the search

given this particular context. See Bull v. City & Cnty. of San

Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 971–72 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bell,

441 U.S. at 547) (noting that prison policies must be

evaluated in the light of the prison’s primary objective of

institutional security). The removal occurred during the jail

intake process, after a felony arrest supported by probable

cause, after Fowlkes attempted to smuggle contraband into

the jail, and after a lawful visual inspection revealed the

contraband in plain sight. Given the government’s interest in

preventing the introduction of contraband into the facility, I

believe that although removing the protruding object from

Fowlkes’ bodywas an invasion of privacy beyond that caused

by a visual cavity inspection, we must conclude from this

record that the search was nevertheless reasonable.10

9 My views are not directed to any due process claim in a separate action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, stemming from the officers’ failure to follow the

jail’s own regulations. See Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148,

1155 (9th Cir. 2012).

10 For this reason, I find the majority’s reliance on the series of cases

cited on pages 12–13 of its opinion to be inapposite, as they are outside of

the jail context and do not deal with facts analogous to the present case. 

Under Bull, these cases are distinguishable because “[c]ases that address

searches of arrestees at the place of arrest, searches at the stationhouse

prior to booking or placement in a holding cell, or searches pursuant to an

evidentiary criminal investigation do not control our review.” 595 F.3d

at 971.

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UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES 41

On the suppression record before us, which demonstrates

the object was removed without any intrusion into the anal

cavity,

11 without any significant injury, harm, or pain to

Fowlkes, and in a sanitary and private environment, I cannot

conclude that the manner of removal was in violation of the

Fourth Amendment.12

11 The removal of a protruding object raises different, and less grave,

considerations for health than when contraband is fully inserted inside a

cavity and can only be located and removed through digital penetration

and probing. The actual probing for the inserted object may itself cause

medical harm distinct from the removal of the item, and the officers may

have no idea as to its shape, size, or location. Thus, without evidence we

cannot assume a need for medical training when a protruding object is

removed.

12 Additionally, the facts in this case do not include those that we found,

when combined with others, render the manner of removing an item

unreasonable. For example, in Vaughan, we found a digital rectum search

was performed unreasonably when conducted on an unsanitary table by

medical assistants who were not trained in involuntary rectal searches, the

assistants did not wash their hands between searches, and the search was

visible to other inmates and prison personnel, including female prison

officials. Vaughan, 859 F.2d at 741; see also United States v. Cameron,

538 F.2d 254, 258 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding two forced digital probes of

rectum by a doctor, two enemas, and a liquid laxative administered

without the presence of a doctor unreasonable, especiallywhen performed

without consideration of the subject’s claim that he was under medical

supervision for stomach and rectal problems). The search here did not

involve penetration ofthe anal cavity, let alone multiple forced probes and

enemas as in Cameron or the unsanitary conditions and lack of privacy as

in Vaughan. Officers also took steps to minimize potential harm to

Fowlkes and to protect his privacy by conducting the search in an

apparently clean, private room dedicated for this purpose and by using

medical gloves.

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42 UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES

III.

For the reasons above, I believe the seizure of the small

baggie of obvious contraband during a constitutionally

permissible strip search of a criminal detainee was reasonable

under the totality of the circumstances. In concluding,

however, it is worth passing upon the “alternative methods”13

of recovering the contraband alluded to by the majority. See

Maj. Op. at 6–7, 16–17, 19. The majority mentions these

alternatives only with respect to its conception of a

reasonable method of seizure. This may be because pleasant

alternatives are less obvious under these circumstances.

I suppose the officers could have placed Fowlkes in an

isolation cell, handcuffed, partially clothed, and under

constant surveillance, allowing them to respond immediately

when the baggie worked its way the other inch or so out of

Fowlkes’ body. This hardly seems to be, per se, a less

intrusive or offensive condition in which to place a detainee. 

See, e.g., Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 548 (Brennan,

J., dissenting) (noting individual was able to avoid passing

naturally any of the 88 drug-filled balloons secreted in her

alimentary canal for almost 27 hours after initial detention

despite her obvious need to use the restroom).

With respect to removal, certainly a medical professional

is always preferable, but it remains a mystery whether one

13 As the majority concedes, the existence of a less-intrusive alternative

“does not, in itself, render the search unreasonable.” United States v.

Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542 (1985) (noting a creative mind

“can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the

objectives of the police might have been accomplished”); see Bell,

441 U.S. at 559 n.40 (rejecting the “less-restrictive-alternative” test as

determinative of reasonableness).

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UNITED STATES V. FOWLKES 43

was readily available to assist the officers in removing the

baggie and what he or she would have done differently. 

Without such information and based on the totality of the

circumstances, the lack of medical personnel did not render

the seizure unreasonable. See Florence, 132 S. Ct. at

1513–14 (“In addressing this type of constitutional claim

courts must defer to the judgment of correctional officials

unless the record contains substantial evidence showing their

policies are an unnecessary or unjustified response to

problems of jail security.”); Bull, 595 F.3d at 976 (“When the

allocation of resources and the ability of administrators to

protect staff and detainees at the facility are at issue, ‘courts

should be particularly deferential to the informed discretion

of corrections officials.’”) (quoting Turrner v. Safley,

482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987)). In sum, the factual record needed to

find a Fourth Amendment violation warranting suppression

is lacking.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

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