Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-00809/USCOURTS-ca2-14-00809-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marcus Hutchinson

Sharif Robinson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee USA

Document Text:

14-809-cr

United States v. Robinson

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

3 August Term, 2014

4 (Argued: March 25, 2015 Decided: August 26, 2015)

5 Docket No. 14-809-cr

6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

7 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

8

9 Appellee, 10

11 v.

12

13 SHARIF ROBINSON, 

14

15 Defendant-Appellant, 16

17 MARCUS HUTCHINSON, 

18

19 Defendant. 20

21 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 22

23 B e f o r e: WINTER, LIVINGSTON, and CHIN, Circuit Judges.

24 Appeal from a conviction after a guilty plea, in the United

25 States District Court for the Eastern District of New York

26 (Joanna Seybert, Judge), to aiding and abetting carjacking and

27 the brandishing of a firearm during a crime of violence. On

28 appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

29 underlying his plea in light of Rosemond v. United States, 134

30 S.Ct. 1240 (2014), and the failure of the district court to

31 depart downwardly from the Sentencing Guidelines. We affirm. 

1

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1 MITCHELL A. GOLUB, Golub & Golub,

2 LLP, New York, New York, for

3 Defendant-Appellant. 4

5 MICHAEL P. CANTY, Assistant United

6 States Attorney, for Kelly T.

7 Currie, Acting United States

8 Attorney, Eastern District of New

9 York, Brooklyn, New York, for

10 Appellee.

11

12 WINTER, Circuit Judge: 

13 Sharif Robinson appeals from his conviction and sentence

14 after pleading guilty before Judge Seybert to aiding and

15 abetting, 18 U.S.C. § 2: (i) carjacking, in violation of 18

16 U.S.C. § 2119; and (ii) the brandishing of a firearm during a

17 crime of violence, i.e., the carjacking, in violation of 18

18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the

19 evidence supporting his plea in light of Rosemond v. United

20 States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014), and asks us to vacate the plea

21 and conviction. 

22 We hold that his conviction for aiding and abetting a

23 violation of Section 924(c) was supported by his admission that

24 he knew that a firearm was being used during the carjacking and

25 thereafter aided and abetted the carjacking. Alternatively,

26 appellant attacks the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. 

27 We hold that the district court did not err in failing to depart

28 downwardly from the Sentencing Guidelines because of appellant’s

29 confinement in decrepit and unsafe conditions of confinement at

30 the Nassau County Correctional Center. Accordingly, we affirm.

2

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1 BACKGROUND

2 Based on the colloquy accompanying the guilty plea, the

3 following facts were the basis for appellant’s conviction. 

4 On August 26, 2012, appellant was "hanging out" with Marcus

5 Hutchinson and two other men on Albemarle Avenue in Hempstead,

6 New York, when they observed a Cadillac turning the corner to

7 Nostrand Place. Hutchinson, recognizing the male driver, left

8 the group, telling the others that he was going to rob the

9 driver. No mention was made of the use of a gun.

10 Hutchinson followed the car and disappeared around the

11 corner, but the driver retreated to a nearby house. Hutchinson

12 then decided to steal the Cadillac, in which a female passenger

13 remained. As this confrontation was happening, appellant

14 "decided to go around the corner to make sure everything was all

15 right." J. App. at 36. After rounding the corner, appellant saw

16 Hutchinson pointing a gun at the Cadillac's female passenger, who

17 “was getting out of the car.” J. App. at 41. Appellant told

18 Hutchinson to "put the gun away." J. App. at 41-42. Hutchinson

19 did so; the female passenger fled; and appellant and Hutchinson

20 then drove off in the vehicle. They were soon apprehended. 

21 Appellant was indicted for aiding and abetting, under 18

22 U.S.C. § 2: (i) carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119;

23 and (ii) brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, i.e.,

24 the carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 

3

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1 During his plea colloquy, appellant stated that he had been

2 initially unaware that Hutchinson was planning to use a gun

3 during the robbery. Appellant admitted that, at all pertinent

4 times, he knew that a robbery was intended and that the female

5 passenger was involuntarily surrendering the Cadillac. He also

6 acknowledged that he learned that the gun was being used to take

7 the vehicle, although he did tell Hutchinson to put the gun away

8 when he saw it. 

9 During the colloquy, the prosecutor noted that appellant did

10 not "turn[] and run[] the other way" after realizing that a gun

11 was being used. J. App. at 40. Instead, he continued to join in

12 as a reinforcement in the stealing of the vehicle. The district

13 judge asked appellant if he agreed with the version of events as

14 stated by the prosecutor, and appellant replied "yes." After

15 appropriate warnings to appellant of the consequences of pleading

16 guilty, the district judge accepted the plea. 

17 On February 28, 2014, the district court sentenced appellant

18 to 28 months of imprisonment on the aiding and abetting a

19 carjacking count and 84 months of imprisonment on the aiding and

20 abetting the brandishing of a firearm during a crime of violence

21 count. At sentencing, appellant's counsel requested that the

22 district court downwardly depart from the applicable Sentencing

23 Guidelines based on the conditions of confinement at Nassau

24 County Correctional Center ("NCCC"). Counsel alleged, inter

25 alia, that food preparation takes place under unsanitary

4

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1 conditions; access to the law library is restricted to only 45

2 minutes a day; heating systems are non-existent; inmate housing

3 is substandard with water leaks and roach infestations; and

4 unaffiliated inmates are not segregated from violent gang

5 members. The district court denied the request, noting that it

6 had past experience with cases out of NCCC. The court also

7 suggested that counsel had not provided enough evidence to

8 warrant a downward departure. The sentence described above was

9 then imposed.

10 On March 5, 2014, the Supreme Court decided Rosemond v.

11 United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014), clarifying the

12 relationship of the aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2,

13 and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)'s prohibition against using a firearm

14 during a crime of violence. On appeal, appellant argues that his

15 plea lacked a sufficient factual basis under Rosemond because he

16 was unaware that Hutchinson planned to use a gun in the

17 carjacking until he turned the corner and saw the weapon.

18 Alternatively, appellant attacks the procedural reasonableness of

19 his sentence given the district court’s failure to depart from

20 the Sentencing Guidelines. 

21 DISCUSSION

22 a) Sufficiency of the Evidence in Light of Rosemond

23 Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, the district court may accept a

24 guilty plea only if the plea has a "factual basis." Fed. R.

25 Crim. P. 11(b)(3). The court is not required “to weigh evidence

5

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1 to assess whether it is even more likely than not that the

2 defendant is guilty." United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513,

3 1524 (2d Cir. 1997). Instead, the district court must simply

4 satisfy itself that "the conduct to which the defendant admits is

5 in fact an offense under the statutory provision under which he

6 is pleading guilty." Id.; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(f).

7 In making this inquiry, the district court can accept a

8 defendant's own admissions as true. Maher, 108 F.3d at 1521. 

9 The court can rely on the defendant’s admissions and any other

10 evidence placed on the record at the time of the plea, including

11 evidence obtained by inquiry of either the defendant or the

12 prosecutor. Irizarry v. United States, 508 F.2d 960, 967 (2d

13 Cir. 1974); see also United States v. Adams, 448 F.3d 492, 499

14 (2d Cir. 2006). But, any plea colloquy must involve more than

15 simply "a reading of the indictment to the defendant coupled with

16 his admission of the acts described in it." United States v.

17 McFadden, 238 F.3d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation

18 marks omitted).

19 We review objections to the sufficiency of a guilty plea,

20 where -- as here -- the defendant raised no objection below, for

21 plain error. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 62-63 (2002); 

22 see also United States v. Vaval, 404 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir.

2005). We find no error here, much less plain error.1 23

1

 As noted in United States v. Needham, we have “applied a modified plain error

analysis in cases where, as here, the source of plain error is a supervening

decision,” whereby “the government, not the defendant, bears the burden to demonstrate

6

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1 Under Section 924(c), it is a crime to brandish a firearm

2 "during and in relation to any crime of violence." 18 U.S.C. §

3 924(c)(1)(A). For its part, the federal aiding and abetting

4 statute punishes, as a principal, an individual that "aids,

5 abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures" the commission of

6 an underlying federal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 2. In Rosemond, the

7 Supreme Court explained “what it takes to aid and abet a § 924(c)

8 offense." 134 S. Ct. at 1245. 

9 The Court noted that the aiding and abetting statute

10 requires both an affirmative act furthering the underlying

11 offense and an intent to facilitate that offense's commission. 

12 Id. The Supreme Court emphasized that the affirmative act

13 requirement is met when the defendant facilitates any element of

14 the underlying offense. Id. at 1247. Therefore, a defendant’s

15 conduct can satisfy the affirmative act requirement of aiding and

16 abetting the Section 924(c) offense, even if the act did not

17 specifically facilitate the use of the firearm. Id. at 1248. 

18 The intent requirement is stricter than the facilitation

19 requirement in that "the intent must go to the specific and

20 entire crime charged -- so here, to the full scope (predicate

21 crime plus gun use) of § 924(c)." Id. It is true that the

that the error . . . was harmless.” 604 F.3d 673, 678 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). This standard may be incorrect in light of

Johnson v. United States, where the Supreme Court applied plain error review when the

error stemmed from a change in Supreme Court law decided after the defendant’s

conviction. See 520 U.S. 461, 466 (1997). We “need not resolve this open question

[here] because, whether plain error or some modified approach is applied, our

conclusions would be the same.” Needham, 604 F.3d at 678.

7

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1 requisite intent to use a gun is shown only when a defendant has

2 prior knowledge that a firearm will be used. However, the

3 requisite prior knowledge "means knowledge at a time the

4 accomplice can do something with it -- most notably, opt to walk

5 away." Id. at 1249-50. In other words, "[a] defendant manifests

6 that greater intent, and incurs the greater liability of

7 § 924(c), when he chooses to participate in a [violent crime]

8 knowing it will involve a firearm; but he makes no such choice

9 when that knowledge comes too late for him to be reasonably able

10 to act upon it." Id. at 1251. And, a defendant can reasonably

11 walk away upon learning of a gun's use or planned use, so long as

12 withdrawing would not "increase the risk of gun violence." See

13 id.

14 At the time of appellant’s plea, there was a sufficient

15 factual basis on the record for the district court to accept

16 appellant's plea. The affirmative act requirement is easily met

17 because appellant joined Hutchinson in taking the car. The

18 intent requirement is also satisfied because, upon learning that

19 a gun was being brandished, appellant, as he conceded in his plea

20 colloquy, had a chance to "turn[] and run[] the other way" but

21 did not. J. App. at 40. See id. at 1250 n.9 (noting that

22 advance knowledge can be inferred "if a defendant continues to

23 participate in a crime after a gun was displayed or used by a

24 confederate"). Robinson saw the gun as he rounded the corner,

25 and joined the carjacking while Hutchinson was still

8

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1 “brandishing” the gun within the meaning of § 924(c)(4). Instead

2 of leaving then and there, he continued to participate. Thus,

3 there was a sufficient “temporal and relational conjunction,” id.

4 at 1248, between the predicate crime and the use of the firearm

5 to support a § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) conviction under an aiding and

6 abetting theory of liability. Finally, there is no reason on

7 this record to believe that appellant’s withdrawing would

8 increase the risk of gun violence, although Robinson could

9 certainly have argued so had he gone to trial. 

10 In sum, appellant could have reasonably retreated -- but did

11 not -- and the requirement described in Rosemond was met. We

12 accordingly conclude that the district court properly accepted

13 appellant's plea.

14 b) The Sentence’s Procedural Reasonableness

15 Appellant attacks the procedural reasonableness of his

16 sentence –- arguing that the district court erred by not

17 downwardly departing from the Sentencing Guidelines given the

18 conditions of confinement at NCCC. Appellant also contends that

19 the court erred by not adequately explaining its reasons for

20 refusing to depart. We review sentences for procedural

21 reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. 

22 United States v. Adams, 768 F.3d 219, 224 (2d Cir. 2014). A

23 district court commits procedural error when, inter alia, it

24 "treat[s] the Guidelines as mandatory" or fails "to adequately

25 explain the chosen sentence." Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.

9

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1 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. Preacely, 628 F.3d 72,

2 79 (2d Cir. 2010). The district court committed neither of these

3 errors.

4 While it is true that "pre-sentence confinement conditions

5 may in appropriate cases be a permissible basis for downward

6 departures," United States v. Carty, 264 F.3d 191, 196 (2d Cir.

7 2001), appellant provides insufficient reason to overturn the

8 district court's failure to depart from the Guidelines. 

9 First, a district court's decision not to depart from the

10 Guidelines is generally unreviewable, unless it misunderstood its

11 authority to do so. Adams, 768 F.3d at 224; see also United

12 States v. Valdez, 426 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[A] refusal

13 to downwardly depart is generally not appealable" unless "a

14 sentencing court misapprehended the scope of its authority to

15 depart or the sentence was otherwise illegal."). And, "[i]n the

16 absence of clear evidence of a substantial risk that the judge

17 misapprehended the scope of his departure authority, we presume

18 that a sentenc[ing] judge understood the scope of his authority." 

19 United States v. Stinson, 465 F.3d 113, 114 (2d Cir. 2006) (per

20 curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). There is nothing in

21 the record suggesting that the district court misunderstood its

22 ability to depart from the Guidelines. After implying that a

23 departure would be possible, albeit a "special consideration,"

24 the court listened to arguments on the merits of a downward

25 departure. 

10

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1 Second, while the court must explain how it arrived at a

2 given sentence, it need not engage in a prolonged discussion of

3 its reasoning, especially if the matter is conceptually simple. 

4 See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356-59 (2007). This is

5 because “we entertain a strong presumption that the sentencing

6 judge has considered all arguments properly presented to her,

7 unless the record clearly suggests otherwise.” United States v.

8 Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 29 (2d Cir. 2006).

9 In the present case, the district court adequately explained

10 its reasoning, noting its past experience with other NCCC

11 inmates. The court further suggested that the evidence provided

12 by appellant’s counsel was insufficient to justify a departure. 

13 In any event, a district court is under no obligation to engage

14 in an express discussion of every argument made by a defendant at

15 sentencing. See United States v. Bonilla, 618 F.3d 102, 111 (2d

16 Cir. 2010). Therefore, the district court committed no

17 procedural error in its sentencing. 

18 CONCLUSION

19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

20

11

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