Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-01113/USCOURTS-caDC-10-01113-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hearth, Patio & Barbecue Association
Petitioner
Natural Resources Defense Council
Intervenor for Respondent
United States Department of Energy
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 11, 2012 Decided February 8, 2013 

No. 10-1113 

HEARTH, PATIO & BARBECUE ASSOCIATION, ET AL., 

PETITIONERS

v. 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, 

RESPONDENT

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, 

INTERVENOR

Consolidated with 10-1181, 12-1010, 12-1014 

On Petitions for Review of Final Actions 

of the Department of Energy 

Barton D. Day argued the cause for petitioners. With 

him on the briefs were John A. Hodges, Eric Andreas, 

Thomas R. McCarthy, William D. Blakely, and Lauren 

Desantis-Then.

H. Thomas Byron III, Attorney, United States 

Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondent. With 

him on the brief were Gregory H. Woods, General Counsel, 

Department of Energy, Daniel Cohen, Assistant General 

USCA Case #10-1113 Document #1419488 Filed: 02/08/2013 Page 1 of 26
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Counsel, Eric Stas, Bettina Mumme, Attorneys, Stuart F. 

Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Michael S. Rabb, 

Attorney, United States Department of Justice. 

Timothy D. Ballo was on the brief for intervenor Natural 

Resources Defense Council in support of respondent. With 

him were Benjamin Longstreth and Katherine Kennedy. 

Before: HENDERSON and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge. 

 Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN. 

 Dissenting opinion by Senior Circuit Judge RANDOLPH. 

 

 BROWN, Circuit Judge: Petitioners Hearth, Patio & 

Barbecue Association (“HPBA”) and National Propane Gas 

Association (“NPGA”) seek review of two recently 

promulgated rules that petitioners believe expanded the 

Energy Policy and Conservation Act (“EPCA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 

6201 et seq., to include decorative fireplaces.1 Among other 

challenges, HPBA alleges the Department of Energy’s 

(“DOE”) interpretation of decorative fireplaces as “Direct 

heating equipment” (“DHE”), a specifically enumerated class 

of covered products under the Act, contravenes EPCA’s 

statutory scheme and, in turn, clear congressional intent. We 

agree. Finding no deference owed under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 

v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), we hold DOE’s feet to a 

 1

As used in this opinion, “decorative fireplace” includes “gas 

logs,” a similarly situated device which the Department of Energy 

also defined as “Direct heating equipment.” See Energy 

Conservation Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 71,836, 71,837 (Nov. 18, 

2011). 

USCA Case #10-1113 Document #1419488 Filed: 02/08/2013 Page 2 of 26
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not-so-decorative fire by vacating the rule in part and 

remanding. 

I. STATUTORY SCHEME

The EPCA authorizes DOE to promulgate “energy 

conservation standards,” 42 U.S.C. § 6291(6), for “covered 

products” provided that the standards are “technologically 

feasible,” “economically justified,” and result in “significant 

conservation of energy.” 42 U.S.C. § 6295(o). The EPCA 

initially recognized a total of fourteen classes of “covered 

products,” including “Home heating equipment, not including 

furnaces.” 42 U.S.C. § 6292(a)(7) (1987). In 1987, the 

National Appliance Energy Conservation Act (“NAECA”) 

amended the EPCA by, inter alia, expanding the number of 

“covered products” from fourteen to twenty and replacing the 

term “Home heating equipment, not including furnaces,” with 

“Direct heating equipment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6292(a)(9). 

Congress did not define either statutory phrase. 

 There are two types of covered products under this 

statutory scheme: nineteen specifically enumerated classes, 42 

U.S.C. § 6292(a)(1)-(19), including DHE, and a catch-all 

class that includes “[a]ny other type of consumer product 

which [DOE] classifies as a covered product under subsection 

(b).” 42 U.S.C. § 6292(a)(20). To classify a consumer product 

as a covered product under the catch-all provision, DOE must 

show that (1) the classification was “necessary or appropriate” 

to carry out the chapter’s purpose, and (2) the “average annual 

per-household energy use by products of such type is likely to 

exceed 100 kilowatt-hours (or its Btu equivalent) per year.” 

42 U.S.C. § 6292(b). But even if DOE satisfies this threshold 

jurisdictional test, it is not free to regulate newly classified 

covered products as it would one of the specifically 

enumerated covered products. To the contrary, DOE must 

USCA Case #10-1113 Document #1419488 Filed: 02/08/2013 Page 3 of 26
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make several showings before imposing energy standards for 

these products, including the aggregate household energy use 

by product type and the technological feasibility of substantial 

energy efficiency improvement. See 42 U.S.C. § 6295(l)(1). 

The EPCA also bars the application of “[a]ny new or 

amended standard . . . to products manufactured within five 

years after the publication of a final rule establishing such 

standard.” 42 U.S.C. § 6292(l)(2). 

II. RULEMAKING & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

For present purposes, it is enough to cut through the 

confused nomenclature and recognize the existence of two 

principal categories of heaters prior to the enactment of the 

NAECA in 1987: those which were purely functional, i.e., 

room heaters, and those which were purely decorative, i.e., 

faux fireplaces. Decorative fireplaces mimic the aesthetic of a 

conventional fireplace with a log fire, but are specifically 

designed to minimize the amount of heat generated.2

 

Sometime after 1987, however, manufacturers began to 

introduce fireplace heaters — heaters designed for both

utilitarian heating and general aesthetics. Fireplace heaters 

resemble traditional fireplaces but are “heater rated” insofar 

as they are tested and marketed on the basis of their “annual 

 2

 Petitioners submitted nine affidavits explaining, among other 

things, how decorative fireplaces differ from functional heaters. 

Some models, for example, are designed to “vent most of the heat 

they generate outdoors” and not, like functional heaters, into the 

home. See Belding Aff. at 3, Hearth, Patio & Barbeque Ass’n, No. 

12-1010 (D.D.C. Feb 8, 2012). Because they were “not intended to 

be heat efficient,” it is “unlikely that these products could be 

redesigned to meet the heating efficiency standards . . . and it 

makes no sense to try: the basic design of these products is 

inherently unsuitable for an efficient heating appliance.” Id.

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fuel utilization efficiency” (“AFUE”) ratings. Fireplace 

heaters, like decorative fireplaces, are classified as “vented 

gas hearth” appliances, which are also known as “vented 

hearth products” (“VHP”). 

The challenges in this case stem from two closely related 

rulemakings in which DOE defined both types of VHP — 

decorative fireplaces and fireplace heaters — as “Vented 

hearth heaters” (“VHH”). Because VHH are a subset of 

DHE, DOE’s rulemaking had the effect of subjecting both 

types of fireplaces to EPCA’s energy efficiency standards. 

DOE claims its interpretation of VHH to encompass 

decorative products is reasonable and thus entitled to 

deference. Petitioners respond that DOE’s dual rulemaking 

was a classic “bait-and-switch” designed to implement an 

interpretation that is unambiguously foreclosed by the 

statutory authority. To make sense of these arguments, we 

must turn to the rulemaking history. Here’s what happened. 

In late 2006, DOE announced that it was considering a 

rulemaking to determine whether VHP could be regulated as 

vented heaters, a type of DHE.3

 Petitioners and other 

interested parties assumed DOE’s references to VHP included 

only fireplace heaters, not decorative fireplaces. The 

assumption was well-founded since DOE had consistently 

limited its discussion to those VHP with a utilitarian heating 

purpose. The Department’s December 2009 proposed rule 

bore this supposition out. It proposed a fourth subcategory of 

vented heaters called “Vented hearth heater” that would be 

subject to the industry’s fireplace heater standard, ANSI 

 3 See Rulemaking Framework for Residential Water Heaters, 

Direct Heating Equipment, and Pool Heaters, U.S. Department of 

Energy at 10-11 (Sept. 27, 2006), available at 

http://www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance_standards/residen

tial/pdfs/heating_equipment_framework_092706.pdf. 

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Z21.88. See Energy Conservation Program, 74 Fed. Reg. 

65,852, 65,868 (Dec. 11, 2009). The proposed definition read: 

Vented hearth heater means a vented, freestanding, 

recessed, zero clearance fireplace heater, a gas 

fireplace insert or a gas-stove, which simulates a 

solid fuel fireplace and is designed to furnish warm 

air, without ducts to the space in which it is installed. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

Any consensus between manufacturers and DOE as to the 

scope of the rulemaking would, however, prove short lived. 

DOE abruptly reversed position in its Final Rule, sweeping 

both decorative fireplaces and decorative heaters into the 

definition of VHH. See Energy Conservation Program, 75 

Fed. Reg. 20,112, 20,128–30 (Apr. 16, 2010). To do this, 

DOE excised the term “fireplace heater” from the proposed 

definition of VHH and interpreted the phrase “designed to 

furnish warm air” to include decorative fireplaces. Id. at 

20,234. DOE reasoned that “all hearth products create heat 

and nearly all . . . provide some amount of [] heat, however 

small that may be, to the surrounding living space.” Id. at 

20,129. 

Because decorative products are designed to stay cool 

and look pretty — not efficiently convert energy to heat — 

their manufacturers would most certainly struggle to comply 

with the EPCA since the Act’s AFUE-based energy efficiency 

standards had been designed with traditional DHE products in 

mind. Likely recognizing as much, DOE included a safe 

harbor: any device with a “maximum input capacity” of less 

than 9,000 Btu/h would be deemed decorative and thus 

exempted from having to comply with DHE efficiency 

standards. See id. at 20,234. 

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After petitioner HPBA challenged the 2010 Final Rule in 

two cases later consolidated before this Court, see Case Nos. 

10-1113 and 10-1181, DOE issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking. Energy Conservation Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 

43,941 (July 22, 2011). The Final Rule issued approximately 

four months later. Energy Conservation Program, 76 Fed. 

Reg. 71,836 (Nov. 18, 2011) (“2011 Final Rule”). DOE’s 

2011 rulemaking did two things of relevance. First, it 

doubled down on its expansion of VHH’s definition by 

clarifying its belief “that all vented hearth products . . . are 

designed to furnish heat, regardless of whether they have a 

mechanical means for furnishing the air (such as a blower) or 

grills.” 2011 Final Rule at 71,839. Second, DOE modified the 

VHH safe harbor exemption by dropping the onerous 9,000 

Btu/h maximum input capacity requirement in favor of a set 

of four specific criterion. Id. at 71,837. 

Both petitioners challenged the 2011 Final Rule. See 

Case Nos. 12-1010 and 12-1014.4

III. ANALYSIS 

A. 

The question is a familiar one: is Chevron deference 

owed? We conclude it is not. 

For all the confusion in application, the Chevron two-step 

is old hat: “Pursuant to Chevron Step One, if the intent of 

Congress is clear, the reviewing court must give effect to that 

unambiguously expressed intent. If Congress has not directly 

 4

 HPBA’s challenges to the 2010 Final Rule have been held in 

abeyance since January, 2012. See Case No. 10-1113, Doc. No. 

1355446 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 2012) (per curiam). All four cases 

have been consolidated and are now before the Court. 

USCA Case #10-1113 Document #1419488 Filed: 02/08/2013 Page 7 of 26
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addressed the precise question at issue, the reviewing court 

proceeds to Chevron Step Two.” Petit v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 

675 F.3d 769, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

“Under Chevron Step One, we always first examine the 

statute de novo, employing traditional tools of statutory 

construction.” Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies v. EPA, 489 

F.3d 1221, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The Court is thus free to 

consider “the text, structure, purpose, and history of an 

agency’s authorizing statute to determine whether a statutory 

provision admits of congressional intent on the precise 

question at issue.” Petit, 675 F.3d at 781. Here, the question 

is simply this: can DOE interpret “Direct heating equipment” 

to encompass purely decorative fireplaces? Because we find 

clear congressional intent to the contrary, we answer in the 

negative and decline to reach Chevron Step Two. 

We begin as always with the relevant statutory text: 

“Direct heating equipment.” See Nat’l Petrochem. & Refiners 

Ass’n v. EPA, 630 F.3d 145, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Though 

ambiguity may yet lurk, plainly these are not vacuous words. 

When “direct,” a term ordinarily understood as that which is 

“[s]traight,” “undeviating in course,” and “not circuitous or 

crooked,” is read together with “heating,” that which “heats or 

makes hot, in various senses,” a functional purpose emerges.5

 

The first word distinguishes devices whose output must be 

routed in some way and the second supplies the output: heat, 

or warmth. To read both terms as modifying “equipment,” 

the “manner in which a person or thing is equipped,” 

strengthens the phrase’s instrumental and utilitarian gloss 

since the construction strongly suggests that the device in 

 5

 Definitions taken from The Oxford English Dictionary unless 

otherwise noted. 

USCA Case #10-1113 Document #1419488 Filed: 02/08/2013 Page 8 of 26
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question is one designed to deliver heat to its immediate 

surroundings. In the same vein, consider the following 

sentence: “Mary Ann called the contractor to fix the heating 

and air conditioning.” It is generally understood that as a 

noun, “heating” refers to a system designed to furnish heat 

into a living space.6

 It is for this reason that we understand 

the phrase “heating duct” to refer to a part of a building’s 

heating system, not a duct that produces its own ambient heat. 

In the end, however, we cannot say that this language 

establishes unambiguous intent at Chevron Step One. It is a 

close question, to be sure, but Congress’s refusal to define 

“Direct heating equipment” or qualify the term in a clear 

manner to apply only to functional products leaves a residuum 

of definitional uncertainty sufficient to establish ambiguity. 

Cf. Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 446 F.3d 140, 142–44 (D.C. 

Cir 2006) (finding Congress’s purposeful use of “daily” to 

modify “total maximum loads” unambiguously foreclosed a 

measure of time other than daily). 

But our inquiry does not end with the plain language. 

“[T]he sort of ambiguity giving rise to Chevron deference is a 

creature not of definitional possibilities, but of statutory 

context.” ABA v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 469 (D.C. Cir. 2005); 

see also Cnty. of L.A. v. Shalala, 192 F.3d 1005, 1014 (D.C. 

Cir. 1999) (“[T]o prevent statutory interpretation from 

degenerating into an exercise in solipsism, we must not be 

guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look 

to the provisions of the whole law. Under Chevron step one 

we consider not only the language of the particular statutory 

 6 See Heating, CAMBRIDGE ACADEMIC CONTENT 

DICTIONARY, available at

http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/american-english/heating 

(“the process of making something warm, esp. a building, or the 

equipment used for this”). 

USCA Case #10-1113 Document #1419488 Filed: 02/08/2013 Page 9 of 26
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provision under scrutiny, but also the structure and context of 

the statutory scheme of which it is a part.”); Petit, 675 F.3d at 

781–82 (same). As we explained in ABA, “the existence of 

ambiguity is not enough per se to warrant deference to the 

agency’s interpretation. The ambiguity must be such as to 

make it appear that Congress either explicitly or implicitly 

delegated authority to cure that ambiguity. Mere ambiguity in 

a statute is not evidence of congressional delegation of 

authority.” ABA, 430 F.3d at 469; see also Sea-Land Serv., 

Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 

(Chevron “deference comes into play . . . only as a 

consequence of statutory ambiguity, and then only if the 

reviewing court finds an implicit delegation of authority to the 

agency”). Accordingly, we turn our attention to the statute as 

a whole and ask whether it evinces a congressional desire to 

defer to DOE’s interpretation of DHE to encompass purely 

decorative fireplaces. We conclude it does not. 

Congress prescribed the specific means by which the 

Department must regulate new consumer products not 

specifically enumerated in the EPCA. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 6292 (b), DOE must make two initial factual determinations 

before classifying the new consumer product as a “covered 

product” under 42 U.S.C. § 6292(a)(20). Only then will DOE 

have jurisdiction to regulate it. Thereafter, DOE must 

prescribe energy standards in accordance with the 

supplemental requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 6295(l), including a 

five-year moratorium on any new or amended standards. 42 

U.S.C. § 6295(l)(2). 

When Congress speaks with such inimitable clarity, this 

Court must listen. The carefully drafted scheme we now 

confront reflects a considered balancing of competing 

concerns. On one hand, Congress recognized the importance 

of flexibility to a functioning administrative scheme. In 

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support of that cause, it authorized DOE to not only amend 

the substance of the regulations, see 42 U.S.C. 

§ 6295(e)(4)(A), but to expand its regulatory scope as well, 

see 42 U.S.C. § 6292(a)(20). On the other, Congress 

understood that if left unchecked, DOE would expand its 

power in a manner contrary to what the legislature intended in 

enacting the EPCA. To combat this, Congress inserted 

threshold jurisdictional requirements, see 42 U.S.C. § 

6292(b), and discrete substantive limits, see 42 U.S.C. § 

6295(l), that would curtail the way in which DOE could 

regulate consumer goods not previously classified as 

“covered.” In essence, Congress designed this statutory 

scheme to protect a defined class: manufacturers of products 

not specifically enumerated in the EPCA. 

Decorative fireplaces clearly fall within this protected 

class. Until DOE codified its labored interpretation of “Direct 

heating equipment,” decorative fireplaces had never been 

regulated under the EPCA. This was not an oversight. 

Congress was well aware of decorative fireplaces but thought 

it unnecessary to subject manufacturers to the costs and 

burdens of government regulations. Congress has done 

nothing in the roughly four decades since enacting the EPCA 

to suggest any deviation from that view. Indeed, Congress 

had multiple opportunities to amend the legislation and bring 

decorative fireplaces within the regulatory fold but 

consistently declined to do so. This was a conscious choice. 

As the NAECA amendment made clear, Congress revisits 

the EPCA with purpose, taking to the statutory scheme a 

scalpel, not a cudgel. Among other carefully crafted changes, 

Congress in 1987 enumerated entire new classes of covered 

products, including “Pool heaters,” 42 U.S.C. § 6292(a)(11), 

and clarified others. Had Congress wished to regulate 

decorative fireplaces, it would have. Much in the same way, 

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had Congress agreed with DOE that specifically enumerated 

covered product classes were flexible concepts that could be 

stretched broadly, presumably it would have regulated “Pool 

heaters” as a subset of “Water heaters,” 42 U.S.C. § 

6292(a)(4), rather than naming it a distinct covered product 

class. 42 U.S.C. § 6292(a)(11). 

Furthermore, to the extent Congress replaced “not 

including furnaces,” a clumsily worded statutory phrase, with 

“Direct,” it maintained its juxtaposition between furnaces 

(devices that provide indirect heat through ductwork) and 

DHE (devices that provide direct heat to their immediate 

surroundings). This clarification reinforces Congress’s 

understanding that “Direct” has a functional meaning. 

Relatedly, Congress made a conscious choice to define — and 

continue to define — the energy efficiency of DHE and 

furnaces in terms of “annual fuel utilization efficiency.” 42 

U.S.C. § 6291(22)(A). DOE explains on its website that 

AFUE is “a measure of how efficient the appliance is in 

converting the energy in its fuel to heat over the course of a 

typical year.” Furnaces and Boilers, Department of Energy, 

available at http://energy.gov/energysaver/articles/furnacesand-boilers (emphasis added). But as petitioners point out, 

the “ ‘efficiency’ of a product can be determined only by 

reference to the purpose it serves,” Pet. Br. at 34, and that 

purpose is obvious even by DOE’s own admission: heating 

living spaces.7

 Decorative fireplaces, of course, were not 

designed to heat rooms — never mind heat them efficiently. 

Surely Congress did not intend such incongruity. See API v. 

EPA, 198 F.3d 275, 278 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“if Congress makes 

 7 See 10 C.F.R. Part 430, Subpart B, Appendix O (test to 

calculate AFUE for DHE includes variables such as “average 

indoor temperature,” “average number of heating degree days,” 

“average length of the heating season,” etc.). 

USCA Case #10-1113 Document #1419488 Filed: 02/08/2013 Page 12 of 26
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an explicit provision for apples, oranges and bananas, it is 

most unlikely to have meant grapefruit”). 

DOE has no effective retort to the thrust of these 

arguments. The 2010 and 2011 Final Rules contain not a 

single reference to 42 U.S.C. §§ 6292(a)(20), 6292(b), or 

6295(l). Equally telling, petitioners’ charge that “DOE 

unlawfully circumvented the statutory mechanism for 

identifying new ‘covered products’ by using its VHH 

definition to add decorative products to a statutory category of 

‘covered products’ that does not include them,” Pet. Br. at 24,

goes unanswered in the government’s brief. DOE has simply 

failed to offer a single justification or explanation as to why 

these statutory mandates would not apply here.8

 8

 DOE’s implicit argument that the limiting provisions are not 

implicated because decorative fireplaces are properly classified as 

“Direct heating equipment” must fail as both circular and selfserving. It requires that the Court put the cart before the proverbial 

horse and assume DOE properly interpreted the statute. Such 

deference is wholly inappropriate where it provides a backdoor for 

a government regulator to circumvent the limits on its authority. 

We leave for another day — and other facts — the question of how 

to treat an agency’s proffered, non-circular justification for why its 

rulemaking did not implicate these statutory requirements. But we 

note without deciding that DOE may not be without interpretive 

authority under the EPCA. DOE might, for example, expand 

specifically enumerated covered product classes to include 

reasonably analogous products only recently introduced to the 

market. In this view, DOE could define DHE to encompass 

fireplace heaters without first classifying fireplace heaters as a new 

covered product. A relatively recent invention, fireplace heaters 

effectively post-date the NAECA, are functional in design, and 

their manufacturers have long subjected them to AFUE standards 

and testing. They simply do not pose the same questions and 

concerns as does the regulation of decorative products. Even 

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DOE’s contrived effort to regulate decorative fireplaces 

as “Direct heating equipment” thus circumvented the plain 

language of the EPCA. DOE was free to grow its regulatory 

authority through the statutorily provided for means, but 

chose instead to push the outermost limits of interpretive 

credulity. Whether a conscious decision or not, this plainly 

contravenes congressional intent as manifested in a 

methodically drafted — and amended — statutory scheme. 

Consequently, we hold that Congress has “spoke[n] to the 

precise question at issue,” Am. Petroleum Inst., 198 F.3d at 

278, and DOE’s interpretation to the contrary must fail at 

Chevron Step One. Government regulators simply cannot 

choose to ignore statutory limits on their authority and expect 

deference to come of their intransigence. See, e.g., Whitman 

v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 484 (2001) (gaps in 

Subpart 2 “cannot be thought to render Subpart 2’s carefully 

designed restrictions on EPA discretion utterly nugatory once 

a new standard has been promulgated”); NRDC v. EPA, 489 

F.3d 1364, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“That EPA may have 

broad subcategorization authority, however, does not 

authorize EPA to sidestep what Congress has plainly 

prohibited.”). 

Although decided outside the Chevron context, our 

decision in Colorado Indian Tribes v. National Indian 

Gaming Commissions, 466 F.3d 134 (D.C. Cir. 2006), is 

informative. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act established 

three distinct classes of gaming. The Act charged the 

National Indian Gaming Commission (“Commission”) with 

oversight of class II gaming, id. at 137, but “contemplate[d] 

joint tribal-state regulation” of class III gaming, id. at 138. 

 

petitioners concede as much in supporting the application of the 

rulemaking to fireplace heaters. 

USCA Case #10-1113 Document #1419488 Filed: 02/08/2013 Page 14 of 26
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The Commission eschewed the statute’s straightforward 

scheme and promulgated rules establishing mandatory 

operating procedures for class III gaming. In support of its 

regulatory bravado, the Commission argued oversight was 

necessary to assure the integrity of outside audits required of 

tribes engaged in class II and III gaming, id. at 139, and, more 

broadly, that their authority to implement the Act as a whole 

required as much, id. 

We rejected these arguments (and others) out of hand. 

Recognizing that “[a]ll questions of government are 

ultimately questions of ends and means,” id., we concluded 

that government agencies are “bound[] not only by the 

ultimate purposes Congress has selected, but by the means it 

has deemed appropriate, and prescribed, for the pursuit of 

those purposes.” Id. at 139–40 (citing MCI Telecomms. Corp. 

v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 231 n. 4 (1994)). Congress may well 

have desired to “ensure the integrity of Indian gaming, but it 

is equally clear that Congress wanted to do this in a particular 

way.” Id. at 140. And so it is here as well. With comparable 

clarity, Congress employed specific statutory mechanisms to 

circumscribe DOE’s authority to define and regulate new 

consumer products under the EPCA. DOE cannot now escape 

these limits through its “linguistic jujitsu.” Sherley v. 

Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Henderson, J., 

dissenting). 

In sum, the language, context, and history of the EPCA 

make clear that DOE’s “interpretation goes beyond the limits 

of what is ambiguous and contradicts what in our view is 

quite clear.” Whitman, 531 U.S. at 481. Congress has 

established — and DOE simply chose to ignore — the means 

by which DOE could extend its regulatory authority. For 

these very same reasons, we would also reject DOE’s 

interpretation at Chevron Step Two. 

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Because DOE’s interpretation is not entitled to deference, 

we need not consider petitioners’ related claims. 

B. 

The foregoing assumes that as a result of DOE’s 

rulemaking, decorative fireplaces are now regulated as DHE 

under the EPCA. The dissent, however, has adopted DOE’s 

untenable fiction that the agency “did not in fact regulate 

purely decorative fireplaces.” Dissent Op. at 1 (emphasis in 

original). Specifically, the dissent acknowledges that DOE 

included decorative fireplaces “in a broad definition” of DHE 

before “exempting them from the energy-conservation 

standards,” but finds no “principled objection to this 

technique” since “[t]he end result is the same as if the rule 

first defined [DHE] to exclude decorative fireplaces.” Id. at 

4.9

 We very strongly disagree. 

 9

 Assuming arguendo the dissent is correct that DOE could 

effectuate the same ends without formally regulating decorative 

fireplaces, this is not what DOE did. The Department’s 2011 Final 

Rule unequivocally stated: 

DOE believes that regardless of whether the product is 

intended to provide only aesthetic appeal, by design, the 

product will generate heat due to the presence of the flame, 

and some of that heat will be transferred to the space. Indeed 

(as discussed further in section III), many interested parties 

have conceded that vented hearth products intended primarily 

for decorative use and vented gas log sets are an effective 

supplemental or emergency heat source, providing further 

justification for their inclusion as a type of covered direct 

heating equipment. 

2011 Final Rule at. 71,839. 

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Even if we were to assume that there is no effective 

difference between defining DHE negatively to exclude

decorative fireplaces or defining the safe harbor positively to 

include them, this higher order observation does not change 

what is clear on present facts: DOE stands in a position of 

control. With the foreknowledge that decorative fireplace 

manufacturers would have to comply or face onerous, 

potentially unreachable energy standards, DOE could at any 

time manipulate the safe harbor criterion to compel different 

or broader compliance. This is the essence of regulation. The 

petitioners and their four lawsuits — four more than 

necessary for “unregulated” parties — certainly agree. 

More fundamentally, perhaps, we take issue with the 

dissent’s suggestion that the specter of “regulation” somehow 

disappears because DOE can, without formally bringing 

decorative products into the regulatory fold, indirectly define 

that class of products by gerrymandering its definition of 

DHE. The means may change, but the ultra vires end remains 

the same. Agencies don’t get a free pass simply because 

they’ve kept their definitional house in order. If faced with 

different facts, we suspect the dissent might agree. 

Imagine DOE interpreted DHE to include the universe of 

what we would traditionally call hot tubs, but created a safe 

harbor in which any device that (1) held water and (2) had 

less than four water jets would be excluded as a “hot tub” 

from DHE’s unattainable energy standards. Alternatively, 

imagine DOE defined DHE to include everything except

devices that (1) hold water and (2) have less than four water 

jets. Under either approach, all water-holding tubs with four 

or more water jets — of which there are countless on the 

market — would be deemed subject to DHE requirements. 

Would we say then that hot tubs have escaped regulation? No, 

USCA Case #10-1113 Document #1419488 Filed: 02/08/2013 Page 17 of 26
18 

certainly not. As a direct result of DOE’s interpretive 

machinations, a sizeable number of what had long been 

regarded as hot tubs would now be regulated as DHE.10 The 

only thing that escapes regulation is what the agency has 

declared to be a hot tub, regardless of whether or not it 

comports with the historical- or industry-based 

understandings of the term. And there’s the hitch. With hot 

tubs as with decorative fireplaces, an agency supposedly 

without authority over that product class has not only altered 

and narrowed the accepted contours of that class, but holds 

the manufacturers hostage with the threat of future 

modifications. 

True, this discrepancy might be more easily spotted in the 

hot tub hypothetical than here since decorative fireplaces are 

more closely related to traditional DHE, but the danger of 

such backdoor regulation is no less real. Consider the fourth 

safe harbor criterion, the requirement that products sold after 

January 1, 2015 must not include “a standing pilot light or 

other continuously-burning ignition source.” 2011 Final Rule 

at 71,859. By DOE’s admission, 38 percent of decorative 

fireplaces “would need to be redesigned to eliminate” these 

features. Id. at 71,849. Where more than a third of the 

products on the market would have to be reworked to comply 

with the safe harbor, it seems disingenuous to suggest DOE 

has not already altered the status quo. 

Worse yet, to the extent manufacturers will have to 

redesign their products to function without standing pilot 

lights, DOE will have effectuated yet another workaround of 

 10 Presumably, hot tub manufacturers would rush to redesign 

their products to comport with the four water jet maximum. Should 

DOE later reduce the figure to three — or add new requirements — 

the manufacturers would have no choice but to comply. 

USCA Case #10-1113 Document #1419488 Filed: 02/08/2013 Page 18 of 26
19 

statutory limits. “Energy conservation standards” under the 

EPCA take two forms: performance standards that 

“prescribe[] a minimum level of energy efficiency or a 

maximum quantity of energy use,” and design requirements. 

42 U.S.C. § 6291(6). Whereas Congress authorized DOE to 

impose performance requirements on all covered products, it 

specifically limited its authority to impose design 

requirements to just a handful of product classes. Id. 

§ 6291(6). Emphatically, DHE and the catch-all class, 

§ 6292(a)(20), are not among them. 

In response, DOE maintains in its briefing that the mere 

mention of an “energy-use characteristic[],” including 

standing pilot lights, will not “transform[] the definition into a 

design requirement.” Resp’t Br. at 44. But this is not what 

DOE argued in the 2011 Final Rule. Rather, DOE responded 

to the objection that the EPCA “does not provide DOE with 

the authority to impose design requirements,” 2011 Final Rule 

at 71,847, by stating that it was “not mandating a design 

requirement for primarily decorative hearth products, because 

meeting the exclusion criteria is completely optional and at 

the manufacturers’ discretion,” id. Having conceded that the 

ban was a design requirement — though not a mandatory one 

— the agency’s present argument is not an “amplified 

articulation” of its rulemaking position, Local 814, Int’l Bhd. 

of Teamsters v. NLRB, 546 F.2d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1976), 

but an entirely unavailing post hoc rationalization. See Motor 

Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 

Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983). 

IV. CONCLUSION

The dissent may well be correct that “the distance 

between two points on the vertical axis is the same whether 

one measures down or up,” Dissent Op. at 4 (quotation marks 

USCA Case #10-1113 Document #1419488 Filed: 02/08/2013 Page 19 of 26
20 

omitted), but it is likewise so that “a straight line is any 

distance between two places” and a circle but “a round 

straight line with a hole in the middle.” Mark Twain, English 

as She Is Taught 15 (Mut. Book Co. 1900). Clearly the phrase 

“Vented hearth heater” did not encompass decorative 

fireplaces as that term is traditionally understood. In light of 

DOE’s tightly limned regulatory circle, we vacate the entire 

statutory definition of “Vented hearth heater” and remand for 

DOE to interpret the challenged provisions consistent with 

this opinion. If the Department still wishes to regulate 

decorative fireplaces, it must do so through the EPCA’s catchall provision, § 6292(a)(20). 

So ordered. 

USCA Case #10-1113 Document #1419488 Filed: 02/08/2013 Page 20 of 26
RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting: The majority

opinion holds that the Department of Energy, acting under the

Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201 et seq.,

exceeded its authority when it regulated “purely decorative

fireplaces.” E.g., Maj. Op. 4, 8, 10.1

There is a fundamental problem with the majority’s

decision: the Energy Department did not in fact regulate purely

decorative fireplaces. I do not like using italics for emphasis, but

this deserves highlighting. This case is rather like an Escher

drawing—once the viewer comes to realize that decorative

fireplaces were indeed exempted from the government’s

regulating apparatus, it is difficult to see the case in any other

light.

One must first consider what “regulating” means in this

context. The rule we have before us is a definitional provision

adopted in 2011.2

 I have included it in an addendum. It is but a

tiny portion of 10 C.F.R. § 430.2. Part 430 is an imposing and

cumbersome set of detailed regulations establishing energyconservation standards for all manner of products under the Act.

See 10 C.F.R. § 430.1. In terms of part 430, “regulating” means

subjecting items—here decorative fireplaces—to energyconservation standards. But “purely decorative” fireplaces, as

the majority calls them, or “primarily decorative” fireplaces, as

the Energy Department calls them in its brief and in the

1

 A decorative fireplace, according to the majority’s

nomenclature, includes gas fireplaces, gas fireplace inserts, gas stoves,

and gas log sets that are “primarily decorative in nature.” Energy

Conservation Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 71,836, 71,837, 71,839 (Nov. 18,

2011). 

2

 An earlier petition for judicial review of a 2010 rule,

consolidated with this petition seeking review of the 2011 rule, is

moot. The relevant portion of the 2010 rule has been superseded by

the 2011 rule.

USCA Case #10-1113 Document #1419488 Filed: 02/08/2013 Page 21 of 26
2

preamble to its rule (e.g., Resp’t Br. 3, 27; 76 Fed. Reg. at

71,842, 71,846), are exempt from energy-conservation

standards. Reading the rule set forth in the addendum admits of

no other conclusion.3

The Energy Department rule—unlike the majority

opinion—describes a purely or primarily decorative fireplace

with precision. Such products have four defining characteristics,

each of which the Energy Department discussed in detail in the

2011 rulemaking. 76 Fed. Reg. at 71,846–49. 

The first is that the product is “[c]ertified to ANSI Z21.50

. . . but not to ANSI Z21.88.” 10 C.F.R. § 430.2 (vented hearth

heater). Translated, “ANSI” means the American National

Standards Institute, a standard-setting organization established

in 1918 whose members include representatives of industry and

government. Petitioners have no quarrel with this portion of the

3

 The Energy Department, in its brief and in oral argument,

stressed again and again that it was not regulating purely or primarily

decorative fireplaces. See, e.g., Resp’t Br. 37 (“The agency designed

the final rule to exclude primarily decorative hearth heaters from the

energy conservation standards applicable to hearth products that are

primarily designed for utilitarian heating functions.”); Oral Arg. Tr.

20:11–15 (“[T]he Government fundamentally agrees with Petitioners

that decorative hearth products should not be subject[] to energy

conservation standards. And indeed, the rule under review does not

subject them to energy conservation standards.”); id. at 42:12–13

(“They [decorative fireplaces] don’t have to meet the standards of . . .

efficiency that are set forth in the 2010 rule.”); id. at 50:14–15 (“[T]he

Agency hasn’t sought to regulate these [decorative] products.”); id. at

56:7–16 (“[N]obody wants to subject [decorative products] to energy

conservation standards. Petitioners don’t want that, the Agency

doesn’t want that, . . . we’re not trying to do that. . . . So, we do try to

carve out from the energy conservation standards those products that

are decorative, principally decorative . . ..”).

USCA Case #10-1113 Document #1419488 Filed: 02/08/2013 Page 22 of 26
3

definition of decorative fireplace. How could they? It contains

their industry’s distinction between purely or primarily

decorative fireplaces and those used for heating. See 76 Fed.

Reg. at 71,846. Apparently the majority opinion finds this factor

unobjectionable as well. It does not even mention it.

The second characteristic of a decorative fireplace is fairly

straightforward. The product is sold without a thermostat, a

device that “cycles the appliance on and off based on the

temperature of the room.” Id.4

 It is obvious why this is a

defining feature of a purely decorative fireplace. Here again

petitioners do not object to this part of the definition of a

decorative fireplace. The majority opinion also says nothing

about it.

The third defining characteristic also reflects common

sense—the product must be “[e]xpressly and conspicuously

identified on its rating plate and in all manufacturer’s

advertising and product literature” as a decorative product not to

be used for heating. 10 C.F.R. § 430.2 (vented hearth heater).

Again petitioners have nothing to say about this criterion and

neither does the majority opinion.

The fourth and final defining characteristic is that the

product does not have a standing pilot light (this applies only to

products manufactured after July 1, 2015). Petitioners object to

this criterion on the ground that it constitutes an impermissible

design standard. Their argument is a strong one, and the

majority seems to agree with them. To the extent that this fourth

criterion is problematic, it seems to me that the appropriate

4

 The rule further requires that the product’s warranty contain a

provision “expressly voiding all manufacturer warranties in the event

the product is used with a thermostat.” 10 C.F.R. § 430.2 (vented

hearth heater).

USCA Case #10-1113 Document #1419488 Filed: 02/08/2013 Page 23 of 26
4

solution is simply to vacate it. The majority does not explain

why that would not suffice.

To repeat, the Energy Department exempted primarily or

purely decorative fireplaces from energy-conservation standards.

It is true that it did this by including these products in a broad

definition (of direct heating equipment) and then exempting

them from the energy-conservation standards otherwise

applicable to direct heating equipment. I see no principled

objection to this regulatory technique, and the majority opinion

offers none. The end result is the same as if the rule first defined

direct heating equipment to exclude decorative fireplaces. “Even

a beginner in mathematics knows that the distance between two

points on the vertical axis is the same whether one measures

down or up.” Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123

U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1295 (1975). 

To this the majority responds that the Energy Department

“could at any time manipulate the safe harbor criterion to

compel different or broader compliance.” Maj. Op. 17. That,

according to the majority, is “the essence of regulation.” Id. But

the risk the majority identifies would exist even if the Energy

Department had excluded decorative fireplaces from the

definition of direct heating equipment. Whether decorative

fireplaces are included in the definition of direct heating

equipment and exempted from the otherwise-applicable energyconservation standards or altogether excluded from the

definition of direct heating equipment, there must still be a

method—a set of criteria—for distinguishing primarily or purely

decorative fireplaces from those used for heating. And in either

case, those objecting to any future modifications to the criteria

would be free to bring a new challenge.

The majority seems to assume that there is a “traditional

understanding” of the term “decorative fireplace.” See Maj.

USCA Case #10-1113 Document #1419488 Filed: 02/08/2013 Page 24 of 26
5

Op. 20. But, except for objecting to the portion of the definition

addressing standing pilot lights, the majority opinion never tells

us how its version of a purely decorative fireplace differs from

the Energy Department’s definition. The majority identifies no

problem with the first three criteria in that definition. Nor do

petitioners. While petitioners suggest that certification to ANSI

Z21.50 (the first criterion) should serve as the sole criterion for

identifying decorative fireplaces, they object only to the

“standing pilot light” (the fourth) criterion. But rather than

simply vacating that fourth criterion, the majority has thrown the

baby out with the bath water and set aside the entire definition

of “vented hearth heater” (a category of direct heating

equipment) in 10 C.F.R. § 430.2.

ADDENDUM

Section 430.2 is amended by revising the definition for

‘‘Vented hearth heater’’ to read as follows:

§ 430.2 Definitions.

* * * * *

Vented hearth heater means a vented appliance

which simulates a solid fuel fireplace and is designed

to furnish warm air, with or without duct connections,

to the space in which it is installed. The circulation of

heated room air may be by gravity or mechanical

means. A vented hearth heater may be freestanding,

recessed, zero clearance, or a gas fireplace insert or

stove. The following products are not subject to the

energy conservation standards for vented hearth

heaters:

USCA Case #10-1113 Document #1419488 Filed: 02/08/2013 Page 25 of 26
6

(1) Vented gas log sets and

(2) Vented gas hearth products that meet all of the

following four criteria:

(i) Certified to ANSI Z21.50 (incorporated by

reference; see § 430.3), but not to ANSI Z21.88

(incorporated by reference; see § 430.3);

(ii) Sold without a thermostat and with a warranty

provision expressly voiding all manufacturer

warranties in the event the product is used with a

thermostat;

(iii) Expressly and conspicuously identified on its

rating plate and in all manufacturer’s advertising and

product literature as a “Decorative Product: Not for use

as a Heating Appliance”; and

(iv) With respect to products sold after January 1,

2015, not equipped with a standing pilot light or other

continuously-burning ignition source.

Energy Conservation Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 71,836, 71,859

(Nov. 18, 2011).

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