Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01219/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01219-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Matson Terminals, Inc.
Respondent
National Labor Relations Board
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 14-1189 September Term, 2015

FILED ON: FEBRUARY 26, 2016 

MATSON TERMINALS, INC.,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with 14-1219 

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application

for Enforcement of an Order of 

the National Labor Relations Board

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and BROWN and PILLARD, Circuit Judges.

J U D G M E N T

This appeal was considered on the record from the National Labor Relations Board and on 

the briefs of the parties and oral argument of counsel. The Court has accorded the issues full 

consideration and has determined that they do not warrant a published opinion. See D.C. Cir. R. 

36(d). It is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the petition for review be DENIED and the National 

Labor Relation Board’s cross-application for enforcement be GRANTED.

Matson Terminals, Inc., (Matson) seeks review of a National Labor Relations Board (Board) 

decision that the company committed an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act 

(NLRA) by refusing to bargain with the certified union of certain longshoremen employed at 

Matson’s cargo facility in Honolulu, Hawai‘i. Matson claims that the Board erred in two respects.

As a threshold matter, Matson argues that the Board’s ActingRegional Director made impermissible 

credibility determinations during an earlier representation proceeding. On the merits, Matson 

challenges the Regional Director’s determination that the company failed to carry its burden to show

that the superintendents and senior superintendents at issue are not “supervisors” as defined by 29 

U.S.C. § 152(11). Both contentions are unavailing. 

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First, we reject Matson’s belated contention that the Regional Director impermissibly made

credibility determinations. Because Matson failed to raise that objection in its request that the Board 

review the underlying representation proceeding, the Board correctly concluded that Matson could 

not raise that issue for the first time in the subsequent unfair labor practice proceeding. See 29 

C.F.R. § 102.67(f) (2014) (foreclosing parties from raising, “in any related subsequent unfair labor 

practice proceeding, any issue which was, or could have been, raised in the representation 

proceeding”). The Board did not abuse its discretion in enforcing that well-settled procedural rule

here. See Pace Univ. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that, in the absence of an 

abuse of discretion by the Board, “a representation issue not previously litigated is not properly 

before the court upon a petition for review of an order in the unfair labor practice proceeding”).

Second, substantial evidence supports the Regional Director’s decision. See VIP Health 

Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 164 F.3d 644, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1999). After an objective and detailed review of 

the testimony and other evidence, the Regional Director concluded that Matson failed to establish 

that the superintendents and senior superintendents at issue are supervisors under the NLRA because 

they do not exercise any of the statutorily enumerated supervisory functions using the requisite 

independent judgment. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11); NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 

712-13 (2001). The Regional Director acknowledged that the Board had reached a contrary 

determination in a 2000 decision, but he ultimately concluded that technological innovations and 

changes in Matson’s operations that facilitate more centralized and remote planning and supervision 

justified a different result in this case. We find no basis in the record to disturb the Regional 

Director’s well-reasoned determination. See Allied Mech. Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 668 F.3d 758, 771 

(D.C. Cir. 2012). 

Accordingly, we deny Matson’s petition for review and grant the Board’s cross-application 

for enforcement of its order. 

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed 

to withhold issuance of the mandate until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for 

rehearing or rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. R. 41(b).

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

Ken Meadows

Deputy Clerk

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