Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03142/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03142-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ricardo Henry
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 8, 2009 Decided March 6, 2009

No. 07-3142

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

RICARDO HENRY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 06cr00079-01)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee and Mary M.

Petras, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, entered

appearances.

Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for

appellee. With him on the brief were Roy W. McLeese III,

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Elizabeth Trosman, Thomas E. Zeno, and Suzanne G. Curt,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: ROGERS and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: This appeal involves the question

whether harassing telephone calls made by Ricardo Henry to the

family of a government auditor constitute obstructing justice

within the meaning of § 3C1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) and so justified a two-point

enhancement of his sentence. Section 3C1.1 requires “willful”

conduct. Although a finding regarding a defendant’s intent to

obstruct justice may not be required where conduct is obviously

obstructive and the defendant knew it would be, the obstructive

nature of Henry’s conduct is clouded because he apparently

attempted to disguise his identity in placing the calls and did not

otherwise link the calls to the auditor’s investigation of him.

Accordingly, we must remand the case for the district court to

clarify the factual basis for the enhancement and, if necessary,

resentencing.

I. 

Henry was president of Insight Therapeutic Services, Inc.,

a mental health clinic in the District of Columbia that submitted

claims to Medicaid for mental health services rendered by Henry

and others. On May 11, 2006, Henry was indicted for health

care fraud, submitting false claims to Medicaid, bankruptcy

fraud, and a variety of related offenses. On December 12, 2006,

he pled to one count of submitting a false Medicaid claim, and

the government moved to dismiss the remaining charges. The

calculated Sentencing Guidelines range, including a two-point

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§ 3C1.1 enhancement for obstruction of justice, was 27 to 33

months; the government recommended a sentence of no more

than 27 months as set out in the plea agreement. The district

court sentenced Henry to 20 months incarceration and 24

months supervised release.

In enhancing Henry’s sentence, the district court based its

understanding of the relevant facts on the grand jury testimony

of Henry’s sister and an FBI agent, as well as a report written by

Special Agent Gerald Goldstein of the Office of the D.C.

Inspector General. That record indicates Agent Goldstein was

investigating Henry for Medicaid fraud. Henry apparently knew

this because Agent Goldstein had in person requested documents

from Henry in November 2001 and was the affiant on a search

warrant for Henry’s place of business in June 2002. Henry left

several telephone messages on Agent Goldstein’s answering

machine in regard to the investigation after each of these two

encounters. On August 31, 2002, Agent Goldstein’s two adult

daughters received telephone calls from a blocked number in

which the caller identified himself as an agent of the Justice

Department. The caller claimed to be investigating Agent

Goldstein for “abusing his power” and stated he would send an

agent to meet with the daughters. The caller had an accent, but

the record is unclear as to what kind: Agent Goldstein in 2007

reported that one of his daughters identified the caller’s accent

as Carribean, but the sealed record presents contradictory

evidence. Both calls ended inconclusively soon afterward, and

the daughters informed their father of the calls. On September

5, 2002, Agent Goldstein’s mother received a similar call, which

she immediately reported to her son.

The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence

that Henry made the calls to the Agent’s family, and, although

Henry denied it at the sentencing hearing, he now concedes as

much, see Appellant’s Br. at 12. The district court adopted the

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recommendation of the presentencing report and, over Henry’s

objection, added a two- point enhancement for obstruction of

justice based on the calls. Henry had argued that his conduct did

not constitute obstruction of justice because he attempted to

disguise his identity and avoided otherwise linking the calls to

the ongoing investigation and thus intended only to harass and

not to intimidate or influence a witness or hamper the

investigation. The district court rejected his argument,

observing: “Special Agent [Goldstein] linked these calls to the

Defendant, [with] the heavy Carribean accent, and the

Defendant in these voice mails had accused the Special Agent

of, quote, abusing his authority, unquote, which [during] one of

the calls the caller had told the agent’s family about Special

Agent Goldstein and used those words.” Sentencing Hr’g. at 7.

The district court therefore concluded that Henry’s “purpose was

to influence the witness [Agent Goldstein].” Id. Unpersuaded

by Henry’s objection that his behavior did not show an intent to

obstruct justice because there was not a significant enough link

between the calls and the investigation, the district court stated:

“I don’t know of any other message other than I can get to you

through family or whatever . . . . So, I think in terms of the

intent, I think it goes beyond just harassing . . . .” Id. at 18.

II.

On appeal Henry contends that a sentencing enhancement

under § 3C1.1 can apply only when a court finds the defendant

either intended to obstruct justice or engaged in “inherently

obstructive” conduct. Because he made efforts to hide the link

between the harassing calls and the investigation, and because

the record does not support the district court’s apparent

conclusion that he made the calls using his own accent, Henry

maintains that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence

and his case must be remanded for resentencing. 

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A.

The Supreme Court has instructed that “a district court

should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating

the applicable Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 128 S.

Ct. 586, 596 (2007); see United States v. Gardellini, 545 F.3d

1089, 1092 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The parties disagree about the

proper standard for our review. The government would apply a

clear error standard to the obstruction of justice ruling, citing

United States v. Dozier, 162 F.3d 120, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1998),

while Henry distinguishes that case as involving the purely

factual question of what conduct was committed whereas his

appeal involves the question whether conduct that was clearly

committed constitutes obstruction under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. In

Henry’s view the relevant precedent is United States v. Day, 524

F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 2008), where the court upheld a § 3C1.1

enhancement because it was “not error under the due deference

standard,” id. at 1373-74. 

Before United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), this

court reviewed sentencing challenges under the “trichotomy”

established in 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e): “[P]urely legal questions are

reviewed de novo; factual findings are to be affirmed unless

‘clearly erroneous’; and we are to give ‘due deference’ to the

district court’s application of the guidelines to facts.” United

States v. Kim, 23 F.3d 513, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Due deference

lies “presumably . . . somewhere between de novo and ‘clearly

erroneous.’” Id. In Booker, the Supreme Court held § 3742(e)

unconstitutional to the extent it required an appellate court to

reverse a sentence that fell outside the Guidelines range, 543

U.S. at 245. In United States v. Tann, 532 F.3d 868 (D.C. Cir.

2008), this court held that, after Booker, the trichotomy

described in Kim remains in place and the due deference

standard still applies to the application of Guidelines to facts:

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The “due deference” standard survives Booker because

that case did “not change[] how the Guidelines range

is to be calculated.” United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d

366, 375 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Accordingly, when we

apply the first step of the two-step process outlined in

Gall and [United States v.] Olivares [473 F.3d 1224

(D.C. Cir. 2006)], we do precisely what we did prior to

Booker — determine whether the district court

correctly calculated the Guidelines range and remand

for resentencing if it did not. We therefore see no

reason to think Booker displaced the congressionally

mandated standard of review of a district court’s

application of the Guidelines to facts. As we noted in

Olivares, every circuit to have considered the matter

has arrived at the same conclusion. 473 F.3d at

1227-28.

Tann, 532 F.3d at 874. 

Tann involved a two-point sentencing enhancement for the

abuse of a position of trust, id.; U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. Due

deference is also appropriate here. Although at times our §

3C1.1 precedent has used phrases more in keeping with review

for clear error, see, e.g., United States v. Monroe, 990 F.2d 1370

1376 (D.C. Cir. 1993), or de novo review, see, e.g., United

States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551, 1560 (D.C. Cir. 1993), when the

court has focused on whether particular conduct was sufficient

to warrant the enhancement, it has largely accorded due

deference, see, e.g., Day, 524 F.3d at 1373-74; United States v.

Maccado, 225 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Kim, 23

F.3d at 517.

B.

Section 3C1.1 of the 2000 version of the Guidelines, which

applies to Henry’s sentencing, provides:

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If (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or

attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of

justice during the course of the investigation,

prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of

conviction, and (B) the obstructive conduct related to

(i) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any

relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely related offense,

increase the offense level by 2 levels.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (2000). The

Commentary includes non-exhaustive lists of conduct that does

and does not constitute obstruction of justice, and states that

“[a]lthough the conduct to which this adjustment applies is not

subject to precise definition, comparison of the examples . . .

should assist the court.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.3. Among the

examples of obstructive conduct is “threatening, intimidating, or

otherwise unlawfully influencing a co-defendant, witness, or

juror, directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so.” Id. at cmt.

n.4(a). In Henry’s case, the district court applied the sentencing

enhancement based on such conduct, finding it foreseeable that

Agent Goldstein, as the lead investigator, would be a likely

witness at Henry’s trial. 

Because § 3C1.1 applies to the “willful” obstruction or

“attempted” obstruction of justice, it clearly contemplates some

form of intent. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1630 (8th ed.

2004) (defining willful as “[v]oluntary and intentional, but not

necessarily malicious.”); id. at 137 (defining attempt as “[a]n

overt act that is done with the intent to commit a crime but that

falls short of completing the crime”). The parties disagree,

however, about what a defendant need intend under the law of

this circuit. Henry argues the district court must find that the

defendant specifically intended to obstruct justice, at least where

the defendant’s conduct is not “inherently obstructive,” while

the government argues the court need only find the defendant

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intended to engage in an act listed as an example in the

Commentary. Henry is correct to the extent our precedent holds

that a § 3C1.1 enhancement is only appropriate where the

defendant acts with the intent to obstruct justice, a requirement

that “flow[s] logically from the definition of the word ‘willful,’

which, this court has suggested, ‘requires that the defendant

consciously act with the purpose of obstructing justice.’”

Monroe, 990 F.2d at 1376 (quoting United States v. Thompson,

962 F.2d 1069, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). Other circuits have

come to the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Gage,

183 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 1999); see id. at 717-18 (Posner, J.,

concurring) (collecting cases in the 2d, 5th, 7th, 9th, and 10th

Circuits). 

However, where a defendant willfully engages in behavior

that is inherently obstructive – that is, behavior that a rational

person would expect to obstruct justice – this court has not

required a separate finding of the specific intent to obstruct

justice. For example, in Maccado, the court upheld a § 3C1.1

enhancement for failure to provide a handwriting example

because such failure “clearly has the potential to weaken the

government’s case, prolong the pendency of the charges, and

encumber the court’s docket” and the record did not show a lack

of such an intent. 225 F.3d at 772. Still, our precedent is clear

that where a defendant offers evidence that he acted without any

subjective motivation to obstruct justice, a court must evaluate

that evidence and can apply a § 3C1.1 enhancement only upon

finding the defendant acted “with the purpose of obstructing

justice,” Monroe, 990 F.2d at 1376. Again, in Maccado, the

court held that although a § 3C1.1 enhancement normally

applies for the objectively obstructive conduct of failing to

provide a handwriting exemplar, “[i]t remains for the district

court to determine whether a defendant has offered a sufficient

reason for failing to comply with the court order as would make

application of the guideline inappropriate.” 255 F.3d at 772. In

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other words, although a court ordinarily may rely on the willing

commission of conduct that, objectively viewed, tends to

obstruct justice, such an objective standard serves only as a

proxy of the actual subjective intent required by the Guideline.

Where conduct is directly and inherently obstructive, the court

may infer an intent to obstruct justice. But where the evidence

shows such a proxy is not reliable and the defendant did not

have the required intent, an enhancement is not warranted.

United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551 (D.C. Cir. 1993),

relied on by the government, is not to the contrary. The

defendant in Taylor argued he fled the courthouse during jury

deliberations out of fear, without an intent to obstruct justice,

and so enhancement under § 3C1.1 was unwarranted. This court

upheld the enhancement in large part because the Guidelines had

recently been amended to include flight to escape sentencing as

an example of obstructive conduct. Id. at 1559-60. Although

this holding has sometimes been interpreted as a signal that the

specific intent to obstruct justice is not necessary under § 3C1.1,

see Maccado, 225 F.3d at 772; Gage, 183 F.3d at 718 (Posner,

J., concurring), such an interpretation is in tension with the

Guidelines and with Taylor itself, which quoted Monroe for the

proposition that “the willfulness requirement of section 3C1.1

arguably ‘requires that the defendant consciously act with the

purpose of obstructing justice.’” 997 F.2d at 1560 (quoting

Monroe, 990 F.2d at 1376). The court in Taylor proceeded to

describe how the defendant’s behavior did, in fact, show an

intent to obstruct justice: 

It is not a foregone conclusion the defendant’s

motivation of fear would have taken his conduct out of

the mens rea requirement our sister circuits discerned

under the unamended Guideline. That is, he fled

because he was afraid, but presumably what his fear

motivated him to accomplish was the obstruction of

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justice. It seems unlikely that he fled thinking the

criminal justice process would go on in his absence,

and if he thought so originally, he must have known

better by the time he was free for five days before he

ultimately surrendered to the bench warrant.

Id. 

Thus, the court’s reliance in Taylor on the Commentary

listing of the conduct at issue is best understood not as an

exception to the requirement of a showing of intent to obstruct

justice, but rather as an acceptance of the Sentencing

Commission’s judgment that the defendant’s behavior in that

case necessarily showed such intent. As Taylor embraced our

holding in Monroe that the text of § 3C1.1 requires the intent to

obstruct justice, 997 F.2d at 1560, had Taylor further held that

an enhancement is warranted because the defendant engaged in

behavior listed in the Commentary, regardless of intent, it would

have elevated the Commentary over the text of the Guidelines

themselves in an impermissible manner. Stinson v. United

States, 508 U.S. 36, 43, 45 (1993). Furthermore, nothing in

Taylor contradicts the holding of Maccado that, even given

inherently obstructive conduct, a court must review proffered

evidence of a non-obstructive intent. In Taylor, this court, like

the district court, considered and rejected the defendant’s

explanation that he fled only out of fear because the record

showed he was aware of the requirement to be present, knew his

failure to appear would obstruct justice, and willfully absented

himself nevertheless, 997 F.2d at 1560, and so was “motivated

. . . to accomplish . . . the obstruction of justice.” Id. Of course,

where conduct is inherently obstructive and no evidence is

proffered to show non-obstructive intent, the district court can

presume the existence of the requisite intent.

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For these same reasons, the government’s contention that a

court need find only that a defendant engaged willingly in

behavior listed in the Commentary examples, even in the face of

evidence of a lack of intent to obstruct justice, is not well taken.

Some of the examples listed in the Commentary, like failure to

appear at a sentencing, require only factual findings by a court;

the court need only find the defendant committed that act, and

did so knowingly, to rely on the judgment of the Sentencing

Commission that commission of the act shows the requisite

intent, absent a showing of a contrary intent. See Taylor, 997

F.2d at 1560. Other Commentary examples, such as “indirectly

attempting” to “unlawfully influenc[e] a . . . witness,” require

legal conclusions as to intent, and in order to find the

defendant’s conduct falls within the ambit of the Commentary

example, a court must find the defendant willfully engaged in

behavior that is objectively obstructive. For example, while the

Commentary lists “committing, suborning, or attempting to

suborn perjury” as an example of obstructive conduct, without

any mention of the required intent, the Supreme Court has held

that “a district court must review the evidence and make

independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment

to or obstruction of justice, or an attempt to do the same.”

United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95 (1993); see United

States v. Smith, 374 F.3d 1240, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Where

threatening a witness is found to be inherently obstructive, and

the defendant fails to proffer sufficient evidence of a different

intent, a court need look no further because the conduct itself

creates the presumed inference of obstructive intent. Where the

conduct is indirect or ambiguous, a court must make a supported

finding that the defendant acted with the intent to obstruct

justice. See Maccado, 225 F.3d at 772.

C.

On the current record, Henry’s conduct in making the

telephone calls to the investigator’s family does not appear

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inherently obstructive. It is possible to harass an investigator or

witness without obstructing the investigation. Anonymously

dumping garbage in an investigator’s yard, for example, would

be harassing but not obstructive. As we read the sentencing

transcript, the district court did not conclude the act of making

the calls was inherently obstructive, but rather relied on two

factors to link Henry’s conduct to the investigation and thereby

find he intended to obstruct justice: his accent and his use of the

phrase “abuse his power.” It would not be clear error to find

Henry made the call using his own accent since Agent Goldstein

so stated in his declaration and his relatives were able to identify

Henry’s voice from a recording as the same voice they heard

during the calls. It is not clear that the district court was making

such a finding, however, because the court did not mention the

evidence that indicated Henry may have attempted to disguise

his identity by affecting a different accent. But even if the

district court had made such a finding it would not suffice to

show the requisite intent. Facts focused on by the district court

— such as Henry’s accent and his use of the phrase “abuse of

power” — do not say anything about Henry’s intent to obstruct.

Neither the district court nor the parties suggest that his attempt

to preserve his anonymity (or his failure to do so) is dispositive

of the question of intent. This is especially so in light of the

evidence that Henry also used a false name and blocked his

telephone number. According due deference to the district’s

court’s application of law to facts, these two factors are

insufficient to support the finding that Henry’s purpose was to

influence Agent Goldstein as a witness. 

Henry objected at sentencing that there was not a

“significant enough link” between his telephone calls to the

investigator’s family and the on-going investigation of him. By

this he presumably meant that he could not have intended to

obstruct justice because, if his apparent plan to harass

anonymously had succeeded, and if Agent Goldstein had been

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motivated to execute his duties less vigorously, Agent Goldstein

would not have known what investigation to sabotage. Neither

the district court nor the government have addressed this

inconsistency. The district court replied to Henry’s objection

that “the whole point” of the Guidelines in punishing attempted

“indirect” influence or intimidation of witnesses “is that you

don’t have to say I’m doing this so that he stops . . . [the]

investigation into . . . my activities . . . . But clearly it’s targeted

to people who would be . . . associated with the Special [A]gent

who clearly would be family who would let him know. And I

don’t know of any other message other than I can get to you

through family or whatever.” Sentencing Hr’g 17-18. The

district court thus concentrated on the severity of the threat or

the link between Agent Goldstein and his family, rather than on

the link between the calls and the investigation. The district

court was correct that Henry cannot be relieved of the § 3C1.1

enhancement simply because he called Agent Goldstein’s family

members, rather than the Agent himself. However, unlike the

defendant in United States v. Jackson, 974 F.2d 104, 105 (9th

Cir. 1992), who attempted to influence a witness indirectly,

Henry took steps to prevent Agent Goldstein from knowing who

made the threats or linking those threats to the Agent’s

investigation of Henry. The district court stated the implied

message in Henry’s calls was “I can get to you through family,”

Sentencing Hr’g at 18, but on this record Henry seems to have

attempted to obscure the identity of the “I” doing the

threatening. 

The government suggests the calls were linked when Agent

Goldstein discovered the identity of the caller. But the question

is whether Henry intended that they be linked. The

government’s reliance on United States v. Searcy, 316 F.3d 550

(5th Cir. 2002), for the proposition that a threat need not be

direct in order to obstruct justice is misplaced. In Searcy, the

defendant, who was on pre-trial release, had unsuccessfully

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attempted to plant drugs at the home of a cooperating witness

who had informed on the defendant, id. at 551. Unlike Henry’s

intent, Searcy’s intent to obstruct was clear because “had

Searcy’s plan succeeded, the credibility of a potential

Government witness would have been undermined, adversely

affecting the Government’s ability to present its case.” Id. at

553. To the extent the government relies primarily on United

States v. Chavarria, 377 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2004), in urging that

Henry had the requisite intent, that case is clearly

distinguishable. In Chavarria, the defendant had made a

graphic threat to an arresting officer, threatening to disembowel

him and burn down his house, and claiming membership in a

well-known gang. Id. at 477. The district court rejected the

defendant’s explanation he had reacted in pain without any

intent to obstruct justice, and the enhancement for obstruction of

justice was upheld on appeal on review for clear error.

Whatever the persuasive force of Chavarria, see id. at 482

(Dennis, J., dissenting), the officer/potential-witness could have

no doubt that the threat was directly tied to the defendant’s case,

and, to the extent the officer found the threat credible and

adjusted his behavior, the threat would obstruct the prosecution

of the defendant’s case. If Henry’s calls had remained

anonymous, the record suggests no reason to think they were of

such number or severity that could have affected Agent

Goldstein’s investigation of Henry.

Henry’s conduct in calling Agent Goldstein’s family is

difficult to explain. Perhaps he intended, as he contends, only

to inflict petty revenge with no effect on the investigation.

Perhaps, as the government suggests, he wanted to impede the

investigation but not leave enough evidence to get caught doing

so. Perhaps he had some other intent altogether, or a murky

intent, or multiple, inconsistent intents. A number of these

scenarios are consistent with the record evidence and would still

qualify him for the sentencing enhancement. However, absent

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findings by the district court that offer a sufficient explanation

of what intent Henry had, other than the summary assertion that

his “purpose was to influence the witness” — a conclusion that

is difficult to square with the evidence of his efforts at

concealment without further findings or explanation — a

remand is necessary. Accordingly, we remand the case for the

district court to clarify the factual basis for the enhancement

and, if necessary, resentencing.

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