Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10561/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10561-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Khusar Mobley
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KHUSAR MOBLEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-10561

D.C. No.

4:12-cr-00235-YGR-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 11, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed October 15, 2015

Before: Consuelo M. Callahan, Milan D. Smith, Jr.,

and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Watford

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2 UNITED STATES V. MOBLEY

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed convictions for assault on a federal

officer, 18 U.S.C. § 111(b); robbery of mail, money, or other

property belonging to the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a);

conspiring to commit those offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 371; and

brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence,

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), in a case in which the defendant

and two cousins attempted to rob an ATF special agent who

was posing as a buyer of illegal firearms.

The panel rejected the defendant’s contention that no

reasonable jury could have rejected his claim of self-defense

with respect to the assault charge.

The panel rejected the defendant’s contention that the

government did not introduce sufficient proof that the agent

actually had the money in his “charge, control, or custody” at

the time the defendant assaulted him.

The panel rejected the defendant’s contention that the

evidence does not support his conviction under § 371, which

makes it unlawful “to commit any offense against the United

States.” The defendant argued that the evidence established,

at most, only that he conspired to assault a person who was

not a federal officer and did not have custody of any money

or other property belonging to the United States. The panel

held that a rational jury could have inferred that the defendant

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. MOBLEY 3

and his cousins conspired to assault and rob not just the ATF

agent, but anyone who accompanied him to the transactions

as well. The panel also held that to be guilty of conspiring to

assault a federal officer, the defendant did not need to know

the ATF agent’s official status, and did not need to know that

the money the agent had in his custody belonged to the

United States.

COUNSEL

Mary E. Pougiales (argued), Pougiales Law Offices, Novato,

California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Owen P. Martikan (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Melinda Haag, United States Attorney; Barbara J. Valliere,

Chief, Appellate Division, United States Attorney’s Office,

San Francisco, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

WATFORD, Circuit Judge:

The government charged three cousins—appellant Khusar

Mobley, Otis Mobley, and D’Marce Hutcherson—with

various crimes arising out of their attempt to rob a federal

officer. The officer in question, Special Agent Tehran Palmer

of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives

(ATF), was posing as a buyer of illegal firearms. When

Agent Palmer showed up to purchase the grenade launcher

the defendants had agreed to sell, the defendants attempted to

rob him of the buy money at gunpoint. Otis (to avoid

confusion, we will refer to him by his first name) and

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4 UNITED STATES V. MOBLEY

Hutcherson pleaded guilty during trial, leaving Mobley to

face the jury alone. The jury convicted Mobley of assault on

a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. § 111(b); robbery of mail, money,

or other property belonging to the United States, § 2114(a);

conspiring to commit the above offenses, § 371; and

brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence,

§ 924(c)(1)(A).

Mobley challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

introduced to support the convictions, as well as the legality

of the 147-month sentence imposed by the district court. We

address Mobley’s sufficiency challenges here. We reject his

sentencing arguments in an unpublished memorandum

disposition filed together with this opinion.

I

Mobley’s older cousin, Otis, arranged to sell a grenade

launcher for $1,000 to an acquaintance named Aaron

McGrew. Otis and McGrew agreed to meet mid-afternoon in

the parking lot of a Chevy’s restaurant. Otis drove to the

meeting site accompanied by Mobley and Hutcherson. None

of them knew that McGrew was working as an informant, so

they did not suspect that one of the men accompanying

McGrew—Agent Palmer—was actuallyan undercover agent. 

Agent Palmer planned to buy the grenade launcher using

$1,000 in ATF funds, which he brought with him to the deal.

When Otis, Mobley, and Hutcherson pulled into the

parking lot, McGrew and Agent Palmer were already there,

parked in a four-door car being driven by Agent Palmer. 

Another informant who joined them, Dwight Bullard, was

standing outside the car. McGrew got out of the car and

greeted Otis. McGrew then got back into the front passenger

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UNITED STATES V. MOBLEY 5

seat of Agent Palmer’s car, while Mobley and Hutcherson got

into the back seat, with Mobley sitting behind McGrew and

Hutcherson sitting behind Agent Palmer. Otis and Bullard

stood outside the car nearby.

What happened next was sharply disputed at trial. We

first recount the facts viewed in the light most favorable to

the government, since that is the lens through which we must

review Mobley’s sufficiency challenges. United States v.

Ruiz-Lopez, 749 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 2014).

After the parties exchanged introductions, Mobley

removed an object concealed under a coat he was carrying,

which McGrew and Agent Palmer expected to be the

promised grenade launcher. Instead, it was a loaded TEC-9

handgun. Mobley suddenly lunged forward over the center

console, chambered a round, and pointed the gun at Agent

Palmer’s head and chest, which caused Agent Palmer to grab

the gun and attempt to direct the barrel away from him. 

Hutcherson then drew his own gun and aimed it at Palmer’s

head. McGrew, sensing that a bad situation was about to get

worse, jumped out of the car and took off running. Agent

Palmer and Mobley engaged in a brief struggle for control of

Mobley’s gun, which Agent Palmer lost. While holding

Agent Palmer at gunpoint, Mobley or Hutcherson shouted,

“Where’s the money at?” Mobley demanded, twice, that

Agent Palmer empty out his pockets. At that point, Bullard

reached through the open front passenger door and grabbed

Mobley’s gun, pulling the barrel away from Agent Palmer. 

As Bullard and Mobley fought for control of the weapon,

Mobley tried to fire it several times, but Bullard managed to

thwart those attempts byplacing his thumb behind the trigger. 

Bullard eventually succeeded in disarming Mobley, and

Agent Palmer’s cover team of plainclothes officers rushed in

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6 UNITED STATES V. MOBLEY

at about the same time. They arrested Mobley on the spot

and shot the still-armed Hutcherson as he attempted to flee. 

Officers arrested Otis a short time later in a nearby field.

According to Mobley’s version of events, this was all just

a big misunderstanding. Mobley testified at trial that he had

negotiated his own side deal—separate from the grenade

launcher sale negotiated by Otis—to sell McGrew the TEC-9

handgun for $700. Mobley claimed that he was merely trying

to show the gun to McGrew when Agent Palmer aggressively

tried to take it from him. Mobley asserted that he reasonably

(if mistakenly) believed he was under attack, and that all of

his subsequent actions were taken in self-defense.

II

Mobley challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on

three fronts.

First, he contends that no reasonable jury could have

rejected his claim of self-defense with respect to the assault

charge under 18 U.S.C. § 111(b). Although the government

bore the burden of proving that Mobley did not act in selfdefense, it easily met that burden here. Obviously, if the jury

had believed Mobley’s version of events, it would have

acquitted him. The jury chose instead to believe the

testimony of Agent Palmer and McGrew, whose testimony

completely negated Mobley’s claim of self-defense. In

deciding whom to believe, the jury did not have to take

anyone’s word for what happened, because Agent Palmer’s

car had been equipped with hidden audio and video recorders

that captured everything on tape. The jury could judge for

itself whose version of events was more credible. The tape

does not support Mobley’s version of events so decisively

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UNITED STATES V. MOBLEY 7

that a rational jury would have been compelled to believe

him. In fact, if anything, the tape strongly confirms Agent

Palmer’s and McGrew’s accounts of what happened.

Second, Mobley attacks the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the robbery conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a). 

That statute provides, in relevant part: “A person who

assaults any person having lawful charge, control, or custody

of any mail matter or of any money or other property of the

United States, with intent to rob, steal, or purloin such mail

matter, money, or other property of the United States, [shall

be guilty of a crime].” (Emphasis added.) Mobley contends

that the government did not introduce sufficient proof that

Agent Palmer actually had the buy money in his “charge,

control, or custody” at the time Mobley assaulted him.

Mobley is wrong. Agent Palmer testified that he brought

$2,000 in ATF funds with him to the deal, which he intended

to use to buy the grenade launcher and any other weapons the

defendants might have offered. Contrary to Mobley’s

argument, the fact that Agent Palmer never “showed” the buy

money during the transaction is of no consequence. It was

enough for the government to prove that Agent Palmer had

the ATF funds on his person, even if he never let Mobley see

the money. Agent Palmer’s uncontradicted testimony that he

had the ATF funds in his custody provided ample evidence

from which a rational jury could conclude that this element of

the statute was satisfied. See United States v. Nevils,

598 F.3d 1158, 1163–65 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

Finally, Mobley contends that the evidence does not

support his conspiracy conviction under the general

conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, which makes it unlawful

to conspire “to commit any offense against the United

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8 UNITED STATES V. MOBLEY

States.” The conspiracy count charged Mobley with

conspiring to commit the two substantive offenses charged in

the indictment: assault on a federal officer in violation of

§ 111(b); and robbery of mail, money, or other property

belonging to the United States in violation of § 2114(a). 

Mobley argues that the evidence established, at most, only

that he conspired to assault and rob McGrew. Because

McGrew was not a federal officer and did not have custody

of any money or other property belonging to the United

States, Mobley submits that his conspiracy conviction must

be reversed.

We disagree with Mobley’s argument, which turns on the

scope of the conspiracy proved at trial. A rational jury could

have inferred that Mobley and his cousins conspired to

assault and rob not just McGrew, but anyone who

accompanied him to the transaction as well. Mobley testified

that when he arranged to meet McGrew at the Chevy’s

restaurant, McGrew said he would have one other person with

him. So Agent Palmer’s presence in the car, at least, was no

surprise. Perhaps even more telling, after Mobley got in the

car and drew the TEC-9, he did not direct his assault at

McGrew. Right out of the box, Mobley pointed the gun at

Agent Palmer, and Hutcherson did the same with his weapon. 

Their demands for money were directed at Agent Palmer

alone, McGrew having fled immediately after the assault on

Agent Palmer began. From this evidence, the jury could

reasonably have concluded that the scope of the conspirators’

agreement was not limited to assaulting and robbing

McGrew.

Mobley of course did not know that one of the men

accompanying McGrew would turn out to be a federal officer,

or that the buy money involved would turn out to be money

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UNITED STATES V. MOBLEY 9

belonging to the United States. But the government did not

need to prove Mobley’s knowledge of those facts to secure a

conviction under § 371.

As a general rule, if knowledge of a fact necessary to

establish federal jurisdiction is not required for the

substantive offense, then it is not required under § 371 for a

conspiracy to commit that offense either. United States v.

Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 687, 695–96 (1975). In Feola, the

Court held that the victim’s status as a federal officer is a fact

necessaryto establish federal jurisdiction under § 111, but the

government need not prove the defendant’s knowledge of that

fact in order to secure a conviction. Id. at 684. The Court

concluded that a contrary reading of the statute would be

inconsistent with Congress’ purpose to accord “maximum

protection to federal officers by making prosecution for

assaults upon them cognizable in the federal courts,” rather

than leaving such prosecutions to the States alone. Id. The

Court saw no unfairness in construing the statute not to

require knowledge of the victim’s official status because in

most cases such knowledge is irrelevant to establishing the

wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct. Acting with the

intent to assault someone is still wrongful, even if the

defendant mistakenly thought he was assaulting a private

citizen. (The Court noted one exception—cases in which the

defendant’s “ignorance of the official status of the person

assaulted or resisted negates the very existence of mens rea.” 

Id. at 686. Because the jury rejected Mobley’s self-defense

claim, that exception does not apply here.) Thus, to be guilty

of conspiring to assault a federal officer, Mobley did not need

to know Agent Palmer’s official status.

We conclude that, by the same reasoning, Mobley did not

need to know that the buy money Agent Palmer had in his

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10 UNITED STATES V. MOBLEY

custody belonged to the United States. Under § 2114(a), the

federal character of the property at issue is a fact necessary to

establish federal jurisdiction, but the government does not

need to prove that the defendant knew the property belonged

to the United States. See United States v. Smithen, 213 F.3d

1342, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). That is true

because § 2114(a)’s purpose is similar to that of § 111: Its

aim is to extend maximum federal protection to a particular

class of individuals, but based on their status as persons

having lawful charge, control, or custody of federal property,

rather than on their status as federal officers. That purpose

would be undermined if the statute required proof of the

defendant’s knowledge of the federal character of the

property involved. And, as with § 111, knowledge of the

jurisdictional fact under § 2114(a) is irrelevant to establishing

the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct. An assault with

the intent to rob someone of property is wrongful whether the

property belongs to the federal government or someone else.

Under Feola, because knowledge of the federal character

of the property is not required for conviction of the

substantive offense under § 2114(a), such knowledge is not

required to obtain a conviction under § 371 for conspiring to

commit that offense. (To the extent the Seventh Circuit

adopted a contrary rule in United States v. Salgado, 519 F.3d

411, 415 (7th Cir. 2008), we do not think that rule can be

squared with Feola’s clear holding.) Thus, the government

did not need to prove that Mobley knew the buy money

Agent Palmer had in his custody belonged to the United

States in order to secure a conspiracy conviction under § 371.

AFFIRMED.

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