Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56211/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56211-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
I.R.
Appellant
Los Angeles Unified School District
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

I.R., a minor by her Mother E.N.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-56211

D.C. No.

2:12-cv-09924-

R-VBK

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 10, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed November 17, 2015

Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit

Judges, and Miranda M. Du,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Du

* The Honorable Miranda M. Du, District Judge for the U.S. District

Court for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.

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SUMMARY**

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

Reversing the district court’s judgment in an action under

the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, the panel

concluded that a school district did not initiate a due process

hearing within a reasonable time after a child’s parents failed

to consent to the provision of services necessary to provide a

Free Appropriate Public Education.

California Education Code § 56346(f) required the school

district to initiate a due process hearing if it determined that

a portion of an Individualized Education Program to which

the parents did not consent was necessary to provide the child

with a FAPE. The panel concluded that a period of a year

and a half was too long for the school district to wait to

initiate the hearing. The panel remanded for the district court

to determine the appropriate remedy for the injury of the

child remaining in an inappropriate program for a much

longer period of time than should have been the case.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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I.R. V. LOS ANGELES USD 3

COUNSEL

Jennifer Guze Campbell, Vanessa Jarvis (argued), Special

Education Law Firm, APC, Lakewood, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

David Holmquist, Diane H. Pappas, Patrick J. Balucan

(argued), Office of General Counsel, Los Angeles Unified

School District, Los Angeles, California, for DefendantAppellee.

OPINION

DU, District Judge:

California Education Code § 56346(f) requires school

districts to initiate a due process hearing if the school district

determines that a portion of an Individualized Education

Program (“IEP”) to which a parent does not consent is

necessary to provide a child with a Free Appropriate Public

Education (“FAPE”) under the Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act (“IDEA”). 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1450. This

appeal raises the issue of a school district’s responsibility to

initiate a due process hearing within a reasonable time after

a child’s parents fail to consent to the provision of services

necessary to provide a FAPE. Because we conclude that a

period of a year and a half is too long for a school district to

wait to initiate a due process hearing pursuant to California

Education Code § 56346(f), we reverse and remand.

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I. BACKGROUND

Appellant I.R. is a child. I.R., through her mother

(“Mother”), contends that Appellee Los Angeles Unified

School District (“LAUSD”) failed to provide I.R. with a

FAPE for the 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 school years in

which I.R. was in second and third grade.

In 2006, in response to Mother’s request for an

assessment, LAUSD found I.R. to be eligible for special

education under the category of “autistic-like” behaviors. An

initial IEP meeting was held in August 2006. However,

Mother decided to enroll I.R. in a private preschool and then

a private school through first grade.

In the fall of 2010, Mother sought to enroll I.R. at

Heliotrope Elementary School, a public school in LAUSD,

for second grade. In September 2010, Mother consented to

portions of the August 2006 IEP but did not consent to other

portions. I.R. was placed in a second grade general education

class with a one-on-one special education aide.

A later IEP, prepared on November 9, 2010,

recommended placement in a special education environment

at Heliotrope. On November 10, 2010, Mother’s counsel

wrote a letter to Heliotrope’s principal in which she

consented to some of the services offered in the IEP but

disagreed with the special education placement. Among other

things, Mother wanted I.R. to be placed in a general

education classroom with a one-on-one aide. In a response

letter dated November 19, 2010, Heliotrope’s principal

affirmed that I.R. would remain in her general education

placement, pursuant to an earlier IEP issued on October 13,

2010. However, the response letter noted that the IEP

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I.R. V. LOS ANGELES USD 5

members believed that I.R. required a smaller classroom

setting with individualized instruction, which was not

available in the general education classroom.

Several more IEP meetings were held throughout I.R.’s

second and third grade years, from March 2011 to February

2012. From November 2010 until February 2012, all the

IEPs recommended placing I.R. in a special education

environment.1

 Mother consented to portions of the IEPs but

never consented to the IEPs’ proposal to place I.R. outside of

the general education classroom. LAUSD implemented

components of the services offered in the IEPs to which

Mother gave her consent, but not the portions to which

Mother did not consent and, as a result, I.R. remained in a

general education class with a special education aide.

On May 29, 2012, I.R. filed a request for a due process

hearing in which she raised a number of issues. Relevant to

this appeal is the issue of whether LAUSD denied I.R. a

FAPE by failing to provide I.R. with an appropriate

placement during each of the 2010/2011 and 2011/2012

school years. For the most part, LAUSD prevailed at the

hearing. The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who

conducted the hearing concluded that the program proposed

by LAUSD was appropriate for I.R. and that LAUSD had

thus offered her a FAPE. The ALJ acknowledged that

California Education Code § 56346(f) required LAUSD to

initiate a due process hearing if it determined that the

1

IEPs and amended IEPs prepared in November 2010, March 2011, and

April 2011 all offered placement in a special education environment. An

IEP prepared in June 2011 allowed for placement in a general education

class for some classes. An IEP prepared in February 2012 offered

placement in a general education class.

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component to which a parent did not consent was necessary

to provide a FAPE. The ALJ’s decision stated that the

“District acknowledged that the general education classroom

placement was inappropriate and, therefore, [the] District

failed to provide [a] FAPE.” Nonetheless, the ALJ did not

hold LAUSD liable for failing to request a due process

hearing. Instead, the ALJ concluded that “the evidence

convincingly establishes that [LAUSD] offered an

appropriate placement, but Mother’s refusal to consent

prevented [the] District from implementing and providing a

FAPE.”

I.R. appealed to the district court, but that court affirmed

the ALJ’s decision. The court noted that the ALJ had found

that LAUSD had not provided I.R. with a FAPE for two

years, a finding that LAUSD did not contest before the

district court. The court further observed that the ALJ also

found that LAUSD had offered an appropriate program, a

finding that I.R. did not contest before the district court. 

Instead, before the district court, I.R. focused on the failure of

LAUSD to request a due process hearing. On that subject,

the district court noted that the ALJ had excused LAUSD for

its failure to provide a FAPE because I.R.’s parents refused

to consent to LAUSD’s proposed program. The district court

agreed and affirmed. With regard to the failure to initiate a

due process hearing, the district court held that LAUSD could

not initiate such a hearing or take action to override the

parents’ failure to consent under 20 U.S.C. § 1414. Nor,

under that section, the district court held, could LAUSD be

held liable for its failure to provide a FAPE. The district

court thus affirmed the ALJ’s decision in favor of LAUSD.

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I.R. timely appealed. This court has jurisdiction over this

appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. K.D. ex rel. C.L. v.

Dep’t of Educ., 665 F.3d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 2011).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

I.R. raises questions of law and is thus entitled to de novo

review. See Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark Cty. Sch.

Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 887 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Questions of law

and mixed questions of fact and law are reviewed de novo,

unless the mixed question is primarily factual.”). Further, the

Ninth Circuit reviews de novo “the district court’s decision

that the school district complied with the IDEA.” E.M. ex rel.

E.M. v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Office of Admin.

Hearings, 758 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotingK.D.,

665 F.3d at 1117).

III. DISCUSSION

A.

The district court held that, in effect, 20 U.S.C. § 1414

foreclosed LAUSD from initiating a due process hearing. We

disagree.2

When interpreting a statute, the court begins with the

statutory text and interprets “statutory terms in accordance

with their ordinary meaning, unless the statute clearly

expresses an intention to the contrary.” United States v. Neal,

776 F.3d 645, 652 (9th Cir. 2015). “[W]e must read the

words [of a statute] ‘in their context and with a view to their

2 LAUSD conceded as much during oral argument by taking the position

that it could have chosen to initiate a due process hearing in this case.

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place in the overall statutory scheme.’” King v. Burwell,

135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (quoting Food & Drug Admin.

v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133

(2000)). “Particular phrases must be construed in light of the

overall purpose and structure of the whole statutory scheme.” 

United States v. Lewis, 67 F.3d 225, 228–29 (9th Cir. 1995).

The district court’s error is apparent upon examination of

the plain language of the applicable statutes. The district

court appears to have been relying on 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414(a)(1)(D)(ii)(II),3 which states that if the parent

“refuses to consent to services under clause (i)(II), the local

educational agency shall not provide special education and

related services to the child by utilizing the procedures

described in [20 U.S.C. § 1415].” Section 1415, in turn,

grants school districts the power to initiate a due process

hearing. However, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(ii)(II) and its

implementing regulations, by their plain text, foreclose a

school district from initiating a due process hearing only

where a parent has refused consent before the initial

provision of special education and related services. Clause

(i)(II), the parental consent provision to which

§ 1414(a)(1)(D)(ii)(II) refers, states that a school district must

obtain parental consent “before providing special education

and related services to the child.” 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(II) (emphasis added). The implementing

regulation similarly forecloses a school district’s ability to

file a due process complaint and relieves it of its duty to

provide a FAPE only “[i]f the parent of a child fails to

respond to a request for, or refuses to consent to, the initial

3 The district court did not cite to a specific subsection of 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414.

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provision of special education and related services . . . .” 34

C.F.R. § 300.300(b)(3) (emphasis added).

The statute relied upon by the district court thus does not

apply where, as in this case, a parent consented to special

education and related services, but did not consent to a

specific component of the IEP.4 The district court therefore

erred in concluding that LAUSD could not initiate a due

process hearing to address Mother’s refusal of the IEPs’

recommended placement.

B.

LAUSD conceded at oral argument that a school district

is required to initiate a due process hearing pursuant to

California Education Code § 56346(f). LAUSD argues,

however, that its obligation to initiate a due process hearing

was not yet triggered.5

 

4

 Further, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A) provides an “opportunity for any

party” to present a due process complaint with respect to a child’s

placement. If § 1414(a)(1)(D)(ii)(II) served to foreclose a school district

from initiating a due process hearing where a parent has consented to

special education and related services but the parties have disagreements

over placement, § 1415(b)(6)(A) would be rendered meaningless.

5 LAUSD also relies on Anchorage School District v. M.P., 689 F.3d

1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2012) to argue that it opted to resolve the placement

dispute by continuing to work with I.R.’s parents through the IEP process. 

In Anchorage, the court held that where a school district developed an IEP

and then received extensive revisions to the IEP from parents, the school

district could either continue working with the parents on the IEP or

initiate a due process hearing. Id. However, in Anchorage, the parties

were not in California and California Education Code § 56346(f)’s

mandate did not apply.

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The California Education Code supplements the IDEA. 

See J.W. ex rel. J.E.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d

431, 433 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Both state statutes and federal

regulations supplement IDEA’s procedural and substantive

requirements.”). The California Education Code requires that

“as soon as possible following development” of the IEP,

“special education and related services shall be made

available to the individual with exceptional needs in

accordance” with the IEP. Cal. Educ. Code § 56344(b)

(emphasis added).

To that end, California Education Code § 56346(e)

requires that the school district implement those portions of

the IEP to which the parent has consented if “the parent of the

child consents in writing to the receipt of special education

and related services for the child but does not consent to all

of the components of the [IEP].” In accordance with

subsection (e), California Education Code § 56346(f)

provides, in pertinent part, that if a school district “determines

that the proposed special education program component to

which the parent does not consent is necessary to provide” a

FAPE, “a due process hearing shall be initiated.”

Section 56346(f) thus delineates certain steps that must be

taken after an IEP is prepared and presented to the parent if

the parent consents in writing to the receipt of special

education and related services but does not consent to all

components of the IEP. First, the school district must

determine whether the proposed special education program

component to which the parent does not consent is necessary

to provide a FAPE. If the disputed component is determined

to be necessary, the school district must initiate a due process

hearing. Once the school district determines that the

component is necessary, and that the parents will not agree to

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it, the district cannot opt to hold additional IEP meetings or

continue the IEP process in lieu of initiating a due process

hearing. Rather, the school district must initiate a due

process hearing expeditiously.

In effect, § 56346(f) compels a school district to initiate

a due process hearing when the school district and the parents

reach an impasse. As the goal of the statute is to ensure that

the conflict between the school district and the parents is

resolved promptly so that necessary components of the IEP

are implemented as soon as possible, a school district may not

artificially prolong the process by failing to make the

necessary determination to trigger § 56346(f)’s mandate.

In evaluating how long is too long for a school district to

take in determining a component’s necessity and initiating a

due process hearing, we recognize that the school district

must have some flexibility to allow for due consideration of

the parents’ reasons for withholding consent to an IEP

component. Parents are an integral part of the IEP process. 

See Amanda J., 267 F.3d at 891 (“By mandating parental

involvement and requiring that parents have full access to

their child’s records, Congress sought to ensure that the

interests of the individual children were protected.” (citing

Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v.

Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208 (1982))). Indeed, parents are part

of the cooperative team that determines the contents of the

IEP in the first place. See M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 767

F.3d 842, 851 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 20 U.S.C.

§§ 1400(c)(5)(B), 1414(a)(1)(D), 1414(b)(4)(A); 34 C.F.R.

§ 300.306(a)(1)). Given the parents’ involvement in the

process from the first IEP team meeting, a school district

should be able to consider the parents’ position and make a

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determination as to a disputed component’s necessity within

a reasonable period of time.

The relevant period in this case runs from November

2010, when Mother failed to consent to I.R.’s placement in a

special education environment, to May 2012, when I.R.

requested a due process hearing. LAUSD does not contend

that it took that entire period for it to assess whether

placement in a special education environment was necessary

to provide I.R. with a FAPE. LAUSD had already reached

that conclusion when it prepared the November 2010 IEP.

Instead, LAUSD simply argues that during that year and

a half time frame, it was continuing to try to work with I.R.’s

parents through the IEP process. It argues that “[w]hile

[LAUSD] may eventually have had to initiate the due process

hearing proceedings pursuant to California Education Code,

section 56346(f), it was still attempting to use the IEP team

meeting process prior to doing so.” Indeed, it was finally

I.R.’s parents who requested a due process hearing. LAUSD

never did.

LAUSD’s approach cannot be squared with the

requirement to initiate a due process hearing imposed on

school districts under California Education Code § 56346(f). 

The statute does not say that a school district is obligated to

request a due process hearing “eventually” or “when the

school district finally gets around to it.” If, in the school

district’s judgment, the child is not receiving a FAPE, the

district must act with reasonable promptness to correct that

problem by adjudicating the differences with the parents. The

reason for this urgency is that it is the child who suffers in the

meantime. LAUSD had concluded that I.R. was not receiving

a FAPE in her current placement. The obvious point of

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§ 56346(f) is to minimize the duration of the denial of a

FAPE by requiring the school district, if it cannot reach

agreement with the child’s parents, to initiate the process to

adjudicate the dispute.

In other circumstances, determining within what time

period the school district must act might require factual

findings by the trier of fact, an ALJ, or a district court. In this

case, though, it is plain that the delay of LAUSD of more than

a year in requesting a due process hearing was unreasonable. 

A vague hope that maybe an agreement with the child’s

parents will be reached someday is not enough to justify

putting off the obligation imposed by section 56346(f). 

Accepting the explanation offered by LAUSD here would

effectively gut the statute.

A school district’s failure to comply with a procedural

requirement, such as the requirement of California Education

Code § 56346(f), denies a child a FAPE when the procedural

inadequacy “result[s] in the loss of educational opportunity”

or “cause[s] a deprivation of educational benefits.” M.M.,

767 F.3d at 852 (quoting N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch.

Dist., 541 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008)). LAUSD’s

failure to comply with its obligation to initiate the

adjudication process left I.R. to remain in a placement that

LAUSD itself acknowledged was inappropriate. To the

extent that I.R. lost an educational opportunity and was

deprived of educational benefits for an unreasonably

prolonged period, LAUSD can be held responsible for

denying her a FAPE for that unreasonably prolonged period.

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C.

LAUSD has argued that its sole obligation under the

IDEA was to offer I.R. a FAPE, an obligation it claims was

satisfied by its November 9, 2010 offer of special education

placement, along with its later, similar offers during 2011. 

I.R., in response, has argued that school districts also have a

duty to provide a FAPE to students by implementing any

proposed plan. We do not agree that a school district’s duty

extends quite this far. As I.R. herself argues, parents

retain the right to refuse consent to an offer of a FAPE. See

34 C.F.R. § 300.300(d)(3). Accordingly, it would prove

impossibly onerous to require school districts to somehow

implement a rejected IEP and provide a FAPE in the face of

such refusal.

But this does not mean that the mere offer of a FAPE is

enough to immunize a district from liability. As we have

explained, school districts in California must complywith the

additional requirement imposed by the California Education

Code of initiating a due process hearing if agreement between

the district and the parent on an appropriate placement cannot

be reached. LAUSD’s failure to initiate a due process

hearing, as was required under California law, directly

resulted in a clear injury, namely I.R. remaining in an

inappropriate program for a much longer period of time than

should have been the case.

On remand, the district court shall determine the

appropriate remedy for this injury.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the

district court and remand for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

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