Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02676/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02676-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael J. Astrue
Appellee
Patricia D. Pratt
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable James R. Marschewski, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Western District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by

consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-2676

___________

Patricia D. Pratt, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Arkansas.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner *

of Social Security Administration, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: March 31, 2010

Filed: April 21, 2010

___________

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Patricia D. Pratt appeals from the district court’s1

 order affirming the final

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, which denied her application for

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. In her February 2004

application, Pratt alleged she has been disabled since May 28, 2000. After a hearing,

an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Pratt’s impairments of fibromyalgia,

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pain, and depression were severe but did not meet a listed impairment either singly or

in combination; her allegations regarding her limitations were not fully credible; she

had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform the exertional demands of light

work with additional limitations; she could not perform her past relevant work; and

she could perform work as a surveillance system monitor, call out operator, and order

clerk. After the Appeals Council denied review, the district court affirmed.

We reject Pratt’s contention that the ALJ improperly disregarded the opinion

of neuropsychologist Vann Smith, who examined Pratt once and completed a mental

RFC questionnaire wherein he rated her as unable to meet competitive standards or

as seriously limited in several categories required for performing unskilled work. We

conclude that the ALJ properly discounted the RFC assessment in Dr. Smith’s report

after finding that it was not supported by the objective evidence in the record and that

it contrasted sharply with the evidence in the record as a whole. See Goff v. Barnhart,

421 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2005) (global-assessment-of-functioning score of 58 was

inconsistent with doctor’s opinion that claimant suffered extreme limitations);

Dunahoo v. Apfel, 241 F.3d 1033, 1039 (8th Cir. 2001) (failure to allege depression

in disability application was significant); cf. Smith v. Shalala, 987 F.2d 1371, 1375

(8th Cir. 1993) (report of single-visit psychiatrist who found disabling mental

impairments was properly discredited where mental impairment was not alleged in

application, claimant had not previously sought or been referred for mental health

treatment, and treating doctor noted only occasional periods of anxiety).

Although Pratt argues that the ALJ failed to develop the record regarding her

mental limitations, the ALJ referred her for a consultative psychological examination

with Robert Hudson, Ph.D., and found that Pratt had mental limitations closely

following those set out by Dr. Hudson. See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 749

(8th Cir. 2001) (record must contain sufficient information for ALJ to make informed

decision). The ALJ also properly considered Pratt’s impairments in combination. See

Hajek v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 89, 92 (8th Cir. 1994) (where ALJ found claimant did not

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have impairment or combination equaling listing-level impairment and referred to

evidence as a whole, ALJ properly considered combined effect of impairments).

We conclude that the ALJ gave sufficient weight to the opinion of Pratt’s

treating physician, Dr. Safwan Sakr, that she had fibromyalgia. The ALJ referred

Pratt to Dr. Ted Honghiran for a consultative orthopedic evaluation, and combined

elements from the RFC assessments of both doctors in determining Pratt’s RFC.

Although the ALJ did not include a few of the restrictions assessed by Dr. Sakr, the

ALJ noted the lack of objective medical evidence and Pratt’s failure to follow Dr.

Sakr’s treatment recommendations, as well as the fact that Dr. Honghiran’s

assessment did not include the omitted restrictions. See Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d

842, 849 (8th Cir. 2007) (ALJ may credit another medical evaluation over that of

treating physician when other assessment is supported by better medical evidence, or

where treating physician renders inconsistent opinions); Goff, 421 F.3d at 790

(treating physician’s opinion is given controlling weight if supported by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and not inconsistent with

other substantial evidence). 

We hold that the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by consideration of

medical records, daily activities, failure to comply with treatment recommendations,

and lack of mental health treatment. See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 972 (8th Cir.

2000) (if adequately explained and supported, credibility findings are for ALJ to

make).

Accordingly, we affirm.

______________________________

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