Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00327/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00327-13/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sanjay Bhatnagar
Plaintiff
The Presidio Trust
Defendant
United States of America
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SANJAY BHATNAGAR,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-00327-MEJ 

ORDER RE: SECOND MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 55

INTRODUCTION

On May 19, 2015, the Court dismissed this case because Plaintiff Sanjay Bhatnagar failed 

to present an administrative claim to the Presidio Trust within two years of the November 14, 

2009 bicycle accident that gave rise to his claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 

U.S.C. §§ 2671-80. Order Re: Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 46 (“Order”). However, in response to new 

evidence proffered by Bhatnagar that he had in fact submitted administrative claims before the 

deadline, the Court reopened the case. Dkt. No. 53. Defendant United States of America (the 

“Government”) now moves to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 

(6) on the ground that Bhatnagar has still failed to establish he presented a timely claim to the 

proper federal agency as required under the FTCA. Dkt. No. 55. Bhatnagar filed an Opposition 

(Dkt. No. 58), and the Government filed a Reply (Dkt. No. 59). The Court finds this matter

suitable for disposition without oral argument and VACATES the August 27, 2015 hearing. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civil L.R. 7-1(b). Having considered the parties’ positions, relevant legal 

authority, and the record in this case, the Court DENIES the Government’s Motion for the 

following reasons.

BACKGROUND

A. Bhatnagar’s Accident

On the morning of November 14, 2009, Bhatnagar was riding his bicycle westbound on 

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West Pacific Avenue in the Presidio park area in San Francisco. Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) ¶

8, Dkt. No. 54. Bhatnagar had taken that same route on West Pacific Avenue many times before. 

Id. Around 11:30 a.m., Bhatnagar approached an area near the Julius Kahn Playground, where he 

encountered a newly installed speed bump. Id. ¶ 9. Unlike many other speed bumps in the 

Presidio, this was a rubberized speed bump attached to the road with bolts, rather than a concrete 

speed bump built into the road. Id. Bhatnagar alleges the speed bump was defectively and 

negligently designed, installed, or maintained in several respects: (1) the design was too abrupt 

for bicyclists riding within the speed limit to safely traverse; (2) the speed bump was defectively 

and negligently installed because it was bolted into the road in such a way that there was too 

abrupt a transition between the road and the speed bump to allow a bicyclist to safely traverse the 

speed bump; and (3) there was inadequate signage surrounding the speed bump to warn bicyclists 

of its presence or to give them sufficient time to decrease their speed to safely traverse the speed 

bump. Id. ¶ 10.

When Bhatnagar rode over the speed bump, he lost control of his bike, fell, and landed on 

his face, head, and side, suffering severe injuries. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. He fractured his cervical and 

thoracic spine, requiring surgery to fuse four vertebrae, and suffered cuts and bruises to his face 

and head and had to receive stitches on his face and lip. Id. As a result of his injuries, Bhatnagar 

has been declared permanently disabled and has not been able to return to work. Id. ¶ 14. 

B. Administrative Proceedings

On December 10, 2010, Bhatnagar retained the Dolan Law Firm to represent him in filing

an administrative tort claim against the Government for his injuries. Id. ¶ 16. On or around July 

14, 2011, Bryan D. Lamb, the attorney at the Dolan Law Firm primarily responsible for 

Bhatnagar’s case, executed a Standard Form 95 administrative tort claim on Bhatnagar’s behalf. 

Id. ¶ 17. Bhatnagar alleges the Dolan Law Firm filed the administrative claim with a number of 

federal agencies over a period of four months. 

On July 21, 2011, the Dolan Law Firm submitted Bhatnagar’s administrative claim to the 

Federal Highway Administration (“FHA”) by certified mail. Id. ¶ 19 & Ex. A. Bhatnagar alleges

the FHA did not respond to this submission, so on September 20, 2011, the Dolan Law Firm tried 

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again, submitting the claim to the United States Department of Transportation (“DOT”) by 

certified mail. Id. ¶¶ 20-21 & Ex. B. Bhatnagar alleges the DOT also did not respond. Id. ¶ 22.

Having received no response, the Dolan Law Firm sent four more copies of Bhatnagar’s 

administrative tort claim to the Government in November 2011. On November 2, 2011, the firm 

sent the claim to the United States Department of the Interior (“DOI”) by certified mail. Id. ¶ 24 

& Ex. C. On November 4, it sent the claim to the San Francisco regional office of the National 

Park Service (“NPS”) by Federal Express, and a Federal Express receipt shows the regional office 

received the mailing on November 7, 2011. Id. ¶ 26 & Ex. D. Also on November 4, the Dolan 

Law Firm sent the claim to the Washington, D.C. offices of the NPS and DOT by Federal Express. 

Id. ¶ 28. Both agencies received those copies of the claim on or around November 7, 2011. Id. 

Bhatnagar alleges the San Francisco NPS office did not respond to the claim. Id. ¶ 25. In 

its Motion, the Government admits this copy of Bhatnagar’s claim “was not transferred” by the 

San Francisco Office to any other federal agency. Mot. at 4. As to the claims sent to the 

Washington, D.C. DOT and NPS offices, both agencies determined the Presidio Trust was the 

appropriate federal agency to respond to Bhatnagar’s claims, and they transferred copies of the 

claim to the Presidio Trust. SAC ¶¶ 29-31. The Presidio Trust received the claim from the NPS 

on December 14, 2011, and from the DOT on or around January 11, 2012. Id. ¶¶ 30-31. On May 

31, 2012, the Dolan Law Firm sent an amended administrative claim to the Presidio Trust that 

made a correction to the date on which Bhatnagar’s accident occurred and provided information 

about Bhatnagar’s physician. Id. ¶ 32 & Ex. E. 

The Dolan Law Firm stopped representing Bhatnagar in or around July 2012, after which 

Bhatnagar proceeded with his claim pro se. Id. ¶ 33. Bhatnagar was not informed by the Dolan 

Law Firm of any of its attempts to submit his administrative claim before November 2011. Id. ¶

35. He did not learn of these earlier submissions until he received his file from the Dolan Law 

Firm on or around July 12, 2012. Id. Bhatnagar did not realize the earlier attempts to submit his 

claim had any legal significance. Id. 

The Presidio Trust denied Bhatnagar’s claim on November 21, 2013. Id. ¶ 36 & Ex. F. 

The denial letter explained Bhatnagar was entitled to resubmit his claim or institute an action in 

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the United States District Court for the Northern District of California within six months. Id., Ex. 

F.

C. Procedural Background

Bhatnagar filed his initial Complaint in this Court on January 22, 2014. Dkt. No. 1. On 

November 21, 2014, Bhatnagar filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Dkt. No. 20. 

Although Bhatnagar had been aware of the July and September 2011 claim submissions since July 

2012 (SAC ¶ 35), he did not include allegations regarding these earlier submissions in his FAC. 

Instead, the FAC alleged that “plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with defendants on 

11/01/11 within the 2 year statute of limitations.” FAC § 6. 

On December 8, 2014, Bhatnagar filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel. Dkt. No. 24. The 

Court subsequently referred this case to the Federal Pro Bono Project of the Volunteer Legal 

Services Program, and on January 14, 2015, the Court appointed Stephanie Skaff, Anthony 

Grumbach, and James Reese of Farella Braun + Martel LLP as pro bono counsel for Bhatnagar.

Dkt. Nos. 25, 31. 

On April 24, 2015, the Government moved to dismiss Bhatnagar’s FAC, arguing he failed 

to present his administrative tort claim to the Presidio Trust within two years of the date of the 

bicycle accident as required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b) and 2675(a). Dkt. No. 38. On May 19, 

2015, the Court granted the Government’s Motion, finding Bhatnagar’s administrative claim 

untimely. In its Order, the Court first determined “the Presidio Trust has exclusive administration 

jurisdiction over the site of Bhatnagar’s accident and responsibility for the roadway and signage at 

that site,” and “is the only appropriate agency for his claim.” Order at 5-8. Next, as the Presidio 

Trust did not receive Bhatnagar’s claim until after November 14, 2011, the Court determined the 

claim fell outside the two-year statute of limitations period and was therefore untimely. Id. at 8-

11. Finally, the Court determined equitable tolling of the deadline was inappropriate because

Bhatnagar retained counsel almost a year before the two-year deadline to file his claim, yet he 

waited eleven more months to send the one-page administrative claim a week before the 

limitations deadline, and to the wrong agency. Id. at 11-12. 

On May 29, 2015, Bhatnagar filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and to Seek 

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Reconsideration. Dkt. No. 48. Without addressing the merits of Bhatnagar’s arguments, the Court 

made a preliminary finding that he may be able to proceed on his claims, as his proposed Second 

Amended Complaint contained additional facts and evidence that addressed the deficiencies noted 

in its May 19 Order, including allegations regarding the July and September 2011 claim 

submissions. Dkt. No. 53. The Court permitted Bhatnagar to file his proposed amended and 

directed the Government to file a responsive pleading. Id. 

Bhatnagar filed his SAC on June 2, 2015. The Government responded with the present 

Motion, arguing that Bhatnagar’s new allegations do not render his administrative claim timely. 

Mot. at 6.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; “[t]hey possess only that power 

authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen 

v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citation omitted). Accordingly, “[i]t 

is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing 

the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1) authorizes a party to move to dismiss a 

lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A jurisdictional challenge may be facial or factual. 

Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the attack is facial, 

the court determines whether the allegations contained in the complaint are sufficient on their face 

to invoke federal jurisdiction, accepting all material allegations in the complaint as true and 

construing them in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 

(1975). Where the attack is factual, however, “the court need not presume the truthfulness of the 

plaintiff’s allegations.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. In resolving a factual dispute as 

to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, a court may review extrinsic evidence beyond the 

complaint without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Id.; McCarthy 

v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a court “may review any 

evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of 

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jurisdiction”). 

Once a party has moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 

12(b)(1), the opposing party bears the burden of establishing the Court’s jurisdiction. Kokkonen, 

511 U.S. at 377; Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint contain a “short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint must therefore 

provide a defendant with “fair notice” of the claims against it and the grounds for relief. Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) when it does not contain enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. at 570. “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for 

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 557). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need 

detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and parentheticals omitted).

In considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all of the plaintiff’s allegations as 

true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 550; Erickson v. Pardus, 

551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007). In 

addition, courts may consider documents attached to the complaint. Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. 

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 

If a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, the “court should grant leave to amend even if no 

request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly 

be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 

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banc) (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, the Court may deny leave to amend 

for a number of reasons, including “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the 

movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice 

to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” 

Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Foman v. 

Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

DISCUSSION

A. Scope of the Government’s Motion

As a preliminary matter, the parties dispute whether the Court may consider the 

Government’s Motion under Rule 12(b)(1). Bhatnagar argues that whether a claimant meets the 

deadline to file an administrative claim under the FTCA is not a jurisdictional issue, and the 

statute “‘does not define a federal court’s jurisdiction over tort claims generally, address its 

authority to hear untimely suits, or in any way cabin its usual equitable powers.’” Opp’n at 6 

(quoting United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1633 (2015)). Thus, Bhatnagar argues 

the Court cannot consider four declarations the Government submitted regarding the record 

keeping practices of the Presidio Trust (Rosen Decl., Dkt. No. 55-1), the DOT (Lee Decl., Dkt. 

No. 55-2), the FHA (Holian Decl., Dkt. No. 55-3), and the DOI (Wallace Decl., Dkt. No. 55-4), as 

the matters in these declarations are not public record, and his SAC does not refer to any of the 

matters in the declarations. Opp’n at 5.

In response, the Government argues that whether Bhatnagar satisfied the presentment 

requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) is a jurisdictional issue and appropriate for resolution on a 

Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. Reply at 4.

The FTCA empowers the federal district courts with the “exclusive jurisdiction of civil 

actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, . . . for injury or loss of property, 

or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee 

of the Government.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). For there to be liability, the employee’s act must 

have taken place “while acting within the scope of his [or her] office or employment, under 

circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in 

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accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” Id.

The FTCA has both an administrative exhaustion requirement, set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 

2675(a), and a statute of limitations, set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). These mark both a date 

before which a claim may not be filed and a date after which any filing is untimely. Under §

2675(a), a civil action cannot be instituted “unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim 

to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2675(a); 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(1). This exhaustion requirement “is tied by explicit 

statutory language to jurisdiction,” and is therefore “‘jurisdictional.’” Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 

732 F.3d 1030, 1047 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 134 

S. Ct. 2873 (2014) and aff’d and remanded sub nom. United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 

1625 (2015) (internal quotation and citation omitted). When a time bar is jurisdictional, the court 

must enforce it. Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1631.

Under § 2401(b), a claim will “be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the 

appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun 

within six months after the date of mailing . . . of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency 

to which it was presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Unlike the jurisdictional requirement of 

§ 2675(a), the Supreme Court recently held § 2401(b) is a procedural—not jurisdictional—time 

bar. Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1627. In Wong, the Supreme Court held that, in enacting the FTCA, 

Congress did not establish a clear statement showing that § 2401(b) is jurisdictional. Id. at 1628. 

The text of this provision provides only a statute of limitations, not a restriction on a court’s 

jurisdiction. Id. (citing Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 647 (2010)). 

With this distinction in mind, it would be improper for the Court to consider the 

Government’s declarations on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in connection with § 2401(b). However,

whether Bhatnagar satisfied the presentment requirement of § 2675(a) is a jurisdictional issue and 

appropriate for resolution on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Jimenez v. United 

States Postal Serv., 2013 WL 5529722, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2013) (“The FTCA’s exhaustion 

requirement—both the presentment and final denial elements—goes to the subject matter 

jurisdiction of this Court.’” (citing Yacek v. U.S. Postal Serv., 447 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006) 

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(“We have repeatedly held that the exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional in nature and must be 

interpreted strictly.”)); Wiseman v. United States, 976 F.2d 604, 605 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Presenting 

an FTCA claim to the appropriate governmental agency and having it denied is a jurisdictional 

prerequisite to filing a claim in the district court.”)). Thus, in resolving a factual dispute as to the 

existence of jurisdiction under § 2675(a), the Court may review the Government’s extrinsic 

evidence. Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039; McCarthy, 850 F.2d at 560 (holding that a 

court “may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes 

concerning the existence of jurisdiction”). 

B. Administrative Exhaustion

The Government argues Bhatnagar’s new allegations do not render his administrative 

claim timely. Mot. at 6. Of the six submissions Bhatnagar alleges the Dolan Law Firm made, the 

Government claims it never received three, received one but did not transfer it, and received and 

transferred two. Id. at 3-4. First, the Government asserts it has no record of receiving the claim 

Bhatnagar submitted to the FHA by certified mail on July 21, 2011 (id. at 3; Holian Decl. ¶¶ 7-

12); the claim submitted to the DOT by certified mail on September 20, 2011 (Mot. at 3; Lee Decl. 

¶¶ 5-10); or the claim submitted to the DOI by certified mail on November 2, 2011 (Mot. at 3; 

Wallace Decl. ¶¶ 6-10). As to the November 4, 2011 claim submitted to the San Francisco NPS 

office by Federal Express, the Government admits the San Francisco office did not forward any 

such claim to another agency. Mot. at 4. As to the remaining two claims submitted to the NPS 

and the DOT in Washington, D.C., the Government admits receiving both claims on November 7, 

2011 and transferring them, but the Presidio Trust did not receive them until after the statutory 

deadline. Id. 

Although Bhatnagar alleges the July and September 2011 claims were submitted via 

certified mail, the Government notes he does not plead or offer any direct evidence of receipt by 

FHA or DOT. Id. at 6. Without direct evidence of receipt by the agencies, the Government argues 

Bhatnagar cannot satisfy his burden to show he presented his claim to the appropriate agency 

pursuant to the FTCA, nor can these unfiled submissions support “constructive filing” to satisfy 

the two-year limitations period. Id. As to the November 2011 claim submissions, the 

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Government argues they were mailed to the wrong agencies at the “eleventh hour,” and therefore 

cannot provide a basis for jurisdiction. Id. 

In response, Bhatnagar argues the facts alleged in the SAC show he presented his 

administrative claim to numerous federal agencies between July and November 2011, and these 

efforts show diligence and support a finding that he constructively filed his claim on time. Opp’n 

at 7. Even if the Court were to accept the Government’s version of the facts as correct, Bhatnagar 

argues the Court should still deny the Government’s Motion because, by its own admission, it 

failed to respond to his claim presented to the San Francisco NPS office on November 7, 2011. Id. 

“[U]nder certain limited circumstances, a claim filed with the wrong agency may 

nevertheless be considered constructively filed with the appropriate agency.” Ortiz v. United

States, 2007 WL 404899, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2007). Although the Ninth Circuit has not 

addressed the issue, as another judge in this District has recognized, “other circuits have found that 

a timely, but incorrectly, filed claim does constitute proper presentment where the federal agency 

failed to comply with 28 C.F.R. [§] 14.2(b)(1).” Richman v. United States, 2008 WL 3264137, at 

*2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2008). In Bukala v. United States, 854 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1988), the 

plaintiff incorrectly filed her tort claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(“EEOC”) when it should have been filed with the VA. Id. at 202. The EEOC did not transfer the 

claim to the VA or return the claim back to the plaintiff, and the limitations period expired by the 

time the plaintiff realized that the VA had never received her claim. Id. After the suit was filed at 

the district court, the VA moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to present 

her claim to the VA within the two-year limitations period. Id. The district court granted the 

motion, but the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that “when a federal agency fails to comply with 

the transfer regulation that a timely but misdelivered claim may nevertheless be deemed timely 

presented to the proper agency.” Id. at 204. 

The Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Greene v. United States, 872 F.2d 236 

(8th Cir. 1989). There, the plaintiff fell down stairs in a building owned and operated by the 

United States. Id. at 236. Before the limitations period on her claim had expired, the plaintiff 

presented her claim to the General Services Administration (“GSA”), which acknowledged her 

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claim and subsequently denied it. Id. The plaintiff then filed suit and the government moved to 

dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff had presented her claim to the wrong agency. Id. In 

response to the motion, the plaintiff maintained her claim had been constructively filed because 

the Government failed to comply with the requirements of 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(1). Id. at 236-37. 

The Eighth Circuit held: “When a federal agency fails to comply with section 14.2(b)(1), a claim 

that is timely filed with an incorrect agency shall be deemed timely presented to the appropriate 

agency. Because Greene’s claim was timely filed, albeit with the wrong agency, and because 

GSA failed to transfer or return the claim, her claim satisfies the FTCA administrative claim 

procedure.” Id. at 237.

In its previous Order, the Court found Bukala and Greene were unlike Bhatnagar’s case, 

because the evidence showed the NPS forwarded Bhatnagar’s claim to the Presidio Trust. Order 

at 10. The Court also recognized that submissions at the “last minute or the eleventh hour” to the 

wrong federal agency are not eligible for constructive filing, and Bhatnagar’s claim, filed one 

week before the deadline, was therefore filed outside of the time for which constructive notice is 

typically available. Id. However, given Bhatnagar’s new allegations, the Court reconsiders its 

constructive filing ruling.

“[I]n a dutiful and timely fashion[,]” agencies are to either transfer the claim to the 

appropriate agency if the agency can be identified from the claim or return the claim to the 

claimant if transfer is not feasible. See 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(1); Hart v. Dep’t of Labor ex rel. 

United States, 116 F.3d 1338, 1340-41 (10th Cir. 1997); Bukala, 854 F.2d at 204. “Where one 

agency of government attempts in a dutiful and timely fashion to transfer a misdelivered claim to 

the appropriate federal agency and despite due diligence the claim arrives at the proper agency 

after the two year limitations period has run, the claim will be time-barred.” Bukala, 854 F.2d at 

204; Oquendo-Ayala v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 193, 195-96 (D.P.R. 1998); Hart, 116 F.3d 

at 1340. In contrast, when an “inappropriate agency” fails in its duty to promptly comply with § 

14.2(b)(1), and, as a result, a timely filed, but misdirected claim does not reach the proper agency 

within the limitations period, the claim may be considered timely filed. Hart, 116 F.3d at 1341; 

Greene, 872 F.2d at 237; Bukala, 854 F.2d at 204. However, claimants who wait to the last 

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minute or the eleventh hour and file with the wrong agency cannot take advantage of constructive 

filing. See Hart, 116 F.3d at 1341; Bukala, 854 F.2d at 204 n.4; Cronauer v. United States, 394 F.

Supp. 2d 93, 100 (D.D.C. 2005); Oquendo-Ayala, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 195-96; Johnson v. United 

States, 906 F. Supp. 1100, 1108 (S.D. W.Va. 1995); Lotrionte v. United States, 560 F. Supp. 41, 

43 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 

There is no bright line rule for what constitutes “the last minute” or “the eleventh hour.” 

Courts have held that claims filed with an inappropriate agency approximately eight months

(Bukala v. United States, 727 F. Supp. 382, 384-85 (N.D. Ill. 1989)); nine weeks (Greene, 872 

F.2d at 236-37); seven weeks (Blair v. United States, 1990 WL 113900, at *1, 6 (D. Kan. July 23, 

1990)); and thirty-three days (Ortiz, 2007 WL 404899, at *17) prior to the expiration of the 

limitations period were constructively filed, and therefore timely. In contrast, courts have held 

that claims filed with an inappropriate agency on the final day (Cronauer, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 100-

01); one day (Johnson, 906 F. Supp. at 1100); three days (Lotrionte, 560 F. Supp. at 42-43); eight 

days (Oquendo-Ayala, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 195-96); fifteen days (Martinez v. Minnis, 257 Fed. 

App’x 261, 264 (11th Cir. 2007) (unpublished)); and eighteen days (Massengale v. United States, 

2006 WL 3220333, at *1-2 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2006)) prior to the expiration of the limitations period 

were filed at the “last minute” or “eleventh hour” and were therefore time barred. 

As explained in its previous Order, the Court finds Bhatnagar’s November 2011 claims 

ineligible for constructive notice because they were filed at the eleventh hour. Order at 11. 

Bhatnagar argues constructive notice applies to the San Francisco NPS claim because the agency 

failed to comply with 28 C.F.R § 14.2(b)(1) by either transferring or returning the claim. Opp’n at 

15. In support of his argument, Bhatnagar cites Fraley v. United States, 2009 WL 2579199 (W.D. 

Pa. Aug. 20, 2009). In that case, the court found a claim submitted to the wrong agency five days 

before the filing deadline constituted constructive filing. Id. at *16. However, Fraley is 

distinguishable because it involved circumstances where the plaintiff was both “both misled and 

improperly served by government actors.” Id. In Fraley, the plaintiff had been injured by 

members of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard (“National Guard”). Id. at *1. Five months 

after the incident, the plaintiff sent a letter to the correct federal agency, the National Guard,

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providing notice of his intent to sue, but failing to state a sum certain for his claim, thus failing to

satisfy the presentment and notice requirements of § 2675(a). Id. at *11. Pursuant to applicable 

regulations, the National Guard should have advised the plaintiff of the jurisdictional defects in the 

claim, but it failed to “follow[] its own regulations.” Id. at *11-12. Further, the National Guard 

actually “fail[ed] to recognize itself as the proper entity for handling the FTCA claim.” Id. at *9 

n.8. Instead, “the claim was apparently forwarded to some entity within the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania,” which denied the claim based on the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity. Id. at *2, 

12. Nineteen months later, the plaintiff filed an administrative tort claim with the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”)—an inappropriate agency—which did not transfer 

the claim to the National Guard. Id. at *16. Instead, FEMA sent a “final denial,” stating the claim 

was filed with the wrong agency and the FTCA was inapplicable because no government 

employees were involved. Id. at *2. 

While the Fraley court concluded on these facts it could reject the case law regarding 

eleventh-hour filings, no similar circumstances exist here. Unlike the National Guard, the San 

Francisco NPS did not mislead Bhatnagar regarding whether it was the appropriate agency to 

consider his claim or whether any government employees were involved. Further, although the 

Fraley court found the “timing of the [plaintiff’s] various filings” was “excusable,” id. at *16, it 

did so because the plaintiff’s “dead-end experience” with the appropriate agency—the National 

Guard—excused the failure of his counsel to “locat[e] the proper avenue for filing an 

administrative claim.” Id. at *13, 16. As the Fraley court concluded, “much of that problem is 

properly attributed to the failings of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard to properly know or 

follow its own administrative procedures.” Id. at *16. There are no similar facts here as

Bhatnagar did not file a claim with the appropriate agency prior to the filing deadline. Thus, even

though the Government admits the San Francisco NPS office did not forward its copy of the claim, 

Bhatnagar cannot take advantage of constructive filing because he waited until the eleventh hour 

and filed with the wrong agency. See Hart, 116 F.3d at 1341; Bukala, 854 F.2d at 204 n.4; 

Cronauer, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 100; Oquendo-Ayala, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 195-96; Johnson, 906 F.

Supp. at 1108; Lotrionte, 560 F. Supp. at 43.

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Accordingly, the issue is whether Bhatnagar’s allegations regarding the July and 

September claim submissions satisfy the presentment requirement of § 2675(a) or provide a basis 

for constructive filing. Bhatnagar has alleged facts and submitted evidence showing he mailed his 

administrative claim in July and September 2011, well before the statutory deadline. SAC ¶¶ 19-

22 & Exs. A & B. However, the Government has submitted evidence that the FHA and DOT have 

no record of these submissions. Lee Decl. ¶ 12; Holian Decl. ¶ 14. 

In order to present a claim, the appropriate agency must actually receive it: a claim is 

“deemed to have been presented when a Federal agency receives from a claimant . . . an executed 

Standard Form 95 or other written notification of an incident.” 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a); see also 

Bailey v. United States, 642 F.2d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1981); Jimenez, 2013 WL 5529722, at *3 

(“The presentment requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) is satisfied when a federal agency ‘receives 

an executed Standard Form 95 or other written notification of an incident accompanied by a claim 

for money damages in a sum certain.’” (citation omitted)). Plaintiff bears the burden to establish 

jurisdiction pursuant to § 2675(a). See Vacek v. U.S. Postal Serv., 447 F.3d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir. 

2006); Wages v. United States, 2015 WL 3809414, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2015) (“[Plaintiff] 

bears the burden of proof to establish that her claim was presented to the appropriate federal 

agency by the two-year deadline.” (citing Bailey, 642 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1981)). 

In Vacek, the Ninth Circuit, analyzing the presentment requirement, held that the mailbox 

rule does not apply to FTCA claims. 447 F.3d at 1251. The Ninth Circuit also noted that 

“virtually every circuit to have ruled on the issue has held that the mailbox rule does not apply to 

[FTCA] claims, regardless of whether it might apply to other federal common law claims.” Id.

Further, the court rejected the appellant’s claim that there was presumption of receipt by the 

Government, noting that “[a]ssuming, without deciding, that such a presumption may arise under 

federal law, it was amply rebutted by the affidavits presented to the district court by the 

government.” Id. (citing Bailey, 642 F.2d at 347). Thus, in the absence of direct evidence of 

receipt, Bhatnagar’s allegation that the submissions were mailed does not satisfy the presentment 

requirement of § 2675(a). See Estes v. United States, 302 Fed. App’x 563, 565 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(evidence claim was mailed is insufficient to establish agency received claim as required by 28 

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U.S.C. § 2675(a)); Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1251-53 (holding that presumption of receipt on the basis of 

mailing along may be rebutted); Bailey, 642 F.2d at 346-47 (refusing to “rewrite the Act and in 

effect repeal the regulation by holding that mailing alone is sufficient to meet the requirement that 

a claim be ‘presented’”). Further, while Bhatnagar alleges both claims were sent by certified mail, 

he does not provide a signed return receipt for either letter. See SAC, Exs. A & B. Thus, 

Bhatnagar’s evidence of mailing is “insufficient to establish that the claim had been received 

where the agency asserted that it had no record of the claim.” Estes, 302 Fed. App’x at 565 (citing 

Bailey, 642 F.2d at 346-47). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Estes:

Neither the attorney’s declaration in Vacek nor the attorney’s 

declaration and proof of service form here provides any direct 

evidence that the claim was received by the agency, only that it was 

mailed. Indeed, in Bailey, the government conceded for purposes of 

the appeal that the claim had been mailed, but this was considered 

insufficient to establish that the claim had been received where the 

agency asserted that it had no record of the claim.

302 Fed. App’x at 565 (citing Bailey, 642 F.2d at 346-47). Even if Bhatnagar conclusively 

established the Dolan Law Firm mailed the claims, he would still fail to carry his burden to show 

the claims had been received.

For these reasons, the alleged July and September 2011 submissions do not satisfy the 

requirements of § 2675(a) and do not provide a basis for constructive filing. Accordingly, as in its 

previous Order, the Court finds Bhatnagar’s claim untimely.

C. Equitable Tolling

If constructive filing does not apply to his claim, Bhatnagar argues the Court should 

equitably toll the deadline because he diligently submitted his claim at least six times. Opp’n at 

16. In response, the Government argues Bhatnagar has failed to show he pursued his rights 

diligently because the new claim submissions he identifies in his SAC were addressed to the 

wrong agencies and he has still “‘fail[ed] to provide an explanation as to why his former counsel 

would be unable to determine where to file.’” Reply at 10 (quoting Order at 13). The 

Government further argues that, if Bhatnagar’s counsel actually did mail the July 21 and 

September 20 submissions via certified mail, he offers no explanation as to why he does not have

the return receipts or why the agencies have no record of the claims. Id. Finally, the Government 

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argues Bhatnagar has failed to identify any extraordinary circumstances that would excuse his late

filing. Id. 

To invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling, a plaintiff must show that (1) he has been 

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. Beebe, 

732 F.3d at 1052 (quotations and citations omitted). This standard is very high. See Irwin v. 

Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (“a garden variety claim of excusable neglect” is 

not enough to show equitable tolling); Nelmida v. Shelly Eurocars, Inc., 112 F.3d 380, 384-86 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (affirming rejection of equitable tolling argument where plaintiff did not diligently 

pursue her claim by filing suit on time); Baldwin Cty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 

(1984) (“Procedural requirements established by Congress for gaining access to the federal courts 

are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants.”). “The 

burden is on the plaintiff to show that equitable tolling is appropriate.” United States v. Marolf, 

173 F.3d 1213, 1218 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). However, as noted above, the 

requirements of § 2401(b) are procedural, not jurisdictional. Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1627. Thus, in 

considering the Government’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion, the Court must accept all of Bhatnagar’s 

allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to him. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

550.

Taking his allegations as true, Bhatnagar’s efforts to submit his claim at least six times 

over a four month period establish diligence. As an initial matter, Bhatnagar retained the Dolan 

Law Firm to represent him in filing an administrative tort claim nearly one year before the 

statutory filing deadline. SAC ¶ 16. Despite this, the allegations show the Dolan Law Firm 

waited seven months, until July 21, 2011, before attempting to submit a claim, and it is not clear 

from Bhatnagar’s allegations the firm even submitted that claim. Id. ¶ 19 & Ex. A. The same is 

true for the September 2011 claim. Id. ¶¶ 20-21 & Ex. B. Typically, equitable tolling is not 

appropriate where a party is represented by counsel. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 

(1993) (“It is no doubt true that there are cases in which a litigant proceeding without counsel may 

make a fatal procedural error, but the risk that a lawyer will be unable to understand the 

exhaustion requirement is virtually nonexistent.”). However, based on the record before it, the 

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Court is troubled by the performance of the Dolan Law Firm, whose potential lack of diligence

could foreclose Bhatnagar from having a federal court adjudicate his claim. 

The Dolan Law Firm stopped representing Bhatnagar in or around July 2012, after which 

Bhatnagar proceeded with his claim pro se. SAC ¶ 33. Thus, it does not appear to be Bhatnagar’s 

lack of diligence (nor that of his current counsel, who were not appointed until earlier this year) 

that is responsible for the delayed filing. “[T]he purpose of the equitable tolling doctrine ‘is to 

soften the harsh impact of technical rules which might otherwise prevent a good faith litigant from 

having a day in court.’” Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Jones v. 

Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2004)). “Equitable tolling also serves to ‘prevent the unjust 

technical forfeiture of causes of action.’” Id. (quoting Jones, 393 F.3d at 928). “Equitable tolling 

is typically granted when litigants are unable to file timely petitions as a result of external 

circumstances beyond their direct control.” Id. (citing Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1202 

(9th Cir. 2003)). Here, because of the Dolan Law Firm’s lack of diligence, Bhatnagar’s claim was 

received by the appropriate agency and denied after the statutory deadline. There is no indication 

that any mistake by Bhatnagar himself contributed to his predicament. To the contrary, he 

diligently pursued his rights by retaining counsel well before the statutory deadline and continuing 

to pursue his claim after the Dolan Law Firm stopped representing him. Under these 

circumstances, the Court finds equitable tolling is justified.

CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis above, the Court DENIES the Government’s Motion to Dismiss.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 12, 2015

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

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