Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-15-30787/USCOURTS-ca5-15-30787-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
New Hampshire Insurance Company
Appellee
Virgie Ray
Appellant
Specialty Retailers, Incorporated
Appellee
Stage Stores, Incorporated
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-30787

Summary Calendar

VIRGIE RAY, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

STAGE STORES, INCORPORATED; SPECIALTY RETAILERS, 

INCORPORATED; NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:14-CV-631

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, ELROD, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellant Virgie Ray filed suit in Louisiana state court to recover 

damages for injuries she sustained as a result of a trip and fall. Appellees 

removed to federal court and filed a motion for summary judgment, which the 

district court granted. Ray now appeals the district court’s judgment, and we 

REVERSE.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 19, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 15-30787

2

I.

Appellant Virgie Ray used to shop at the Stage department store in 

Plaquemine, Louisiana about once a month. On November 1, 2013, Ray went 

to the Stage store and proceeded to the “Misses” department. Ray found a pair 

of pants that she wanted to buy, but was unable to find a matching blouse. Ray 

asked an employee for help, and the employee walked away with the pants to 

locate a match. Shortly after, Ray followed the employee, taking the same path 

through the store. As she attempted to walk between a clothing rack and a 

nearby register, Ray tripped on the base of the clothing rack and fell to the 

ground. Ray sustained serious injuries to her knees, face, shoulder, neck, and 

right eye. The entire incident was captured by a store surveillance camera.

Ray filed a petition for damages in Louisiana state court alleging that 

the clothing rack was a dangerous condition that created an unreasonable risk 

of harm. Appellees removed to federal court and filed a motion for summary 

judgment. They argued that the clothing rack was an “open and obvious” 

hazard, and thus did not create an unreasonable risk of harm. The district 

court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees. The court 

reasoned that the “video evidence clearly show[ed] that the bottom of the rack 

was plainly visible and not covered or obscured by the clothes on the racks, any 

other clothing rack or the employees working the area.” The district court also 

noted that Ray had made a “binding admission in which she denied that 

immediately before she tripped, she did not see the base or bottom of the 

clothing rack.” Ray timely appealed to this Court. 

II.

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo.1 Summary 

judgment is appropriate if the record demonstrates “that there is no genuine 

 

1 Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574, 581 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).

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3

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.”2 “We construe all facts and inferences in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party when reviewing grants of motions for 

summary judgment. If the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational 

trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, then there is no genuine issue for 

trial.”3

III.

“This dispute is governed by Louisiana’s premises liability statute, 

which provides that a claimant must prove (1) the condition that caused the 

injury created an unreasonable risk of harm, (2) the merchant created or had 

constructive notice of the condition, and (3) the merchant failed to exercise 

reasonable care.”4 The district court concluded that Ray could not establish 

the first or the third element of her claim because the clothing rack was an 

“open and obvious” hazard. Under Louisiana law, an “open and obvious” 

hazard generally does not present an “unreasonable risk of harm.”5 In the 

same vein, a merchant’s duty of reasonable care requires only that it protect 

customers from “unreasonably dangerous” hazards.6 The parties’ dispute thus 

reduces to whether the clothing rack was an “open and obvious” hazard.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that “the mere presence 

of obstacles in a store, such as shopping carts, does not create an unreasonable 

risk of harm when the condition is open and obvious.”7 Lower Louisiana courts 

 

2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 3 Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 650 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation 

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

4 Cates v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 624 F.3d 695, 696 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing La. Stat. 

Ann. § 9:2800.6).

5 See Bufkin v. Felipe’s La., LLC, 171 So. 3d 851, 856 (La. 2014); Eisenhardt v. Snook, 

8 So. 3d 541, 844-45 (La. 2009) (per curiam).

6 See Primrose v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 So. 3d 13, 17 (La. Ct. App. 2013).

7 Rodriguez v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 152 So. 3d 871, 872 (La. 2014) (per curiam).

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have similarly held that stationary obstacles, such as restocking carts or 

displays, represent “open and obvious” hazards.8 Appellees urge that these 

cases are fully applicable here, as the clothing rack was a stationary obstacle 

that Ray easily could have avoided.9 Appellees, however, fail to recognize a 

key distinction between these cases and the facts under review. Ray does not 

contend that the clothing rack, as a whole, was not plainly visible. She argues 

that the base of the rack jutted out in such a way as to create a tripping hazard. 

Courts applying Louisiana law have almost uniformly concluded that an 

otherwise-visible obstacle that protrudes outward near ground level is not—at 

least as a matter of law—an “open and obvious” hazard.10 The logic of these 

decisions is that “a shopper’s attention is usually directed to merchandise, not 

the floor.” As a result, “[s]omething on the floor which may cause a shopper to 

trip and fall when her attention is directed toward her purchases is a hazard.”11

 

8 See, e.g., Primrose, 127 So. 3d at 17-18 (concluding that a watermelon display was 

an “open and obvious” hazard); Russell v. Morgan’s Bestway of La., LLC, 113 So. 3d 448, 452-

53 (La. Ct. App. 2013) (concluding that two stocking “carts side-by-side” were an “open and 

obvious” hazard).

9 See Pryor v. Iberia Par. Sch. Bd., 60 So. 3d 594, 598 (La. 2011) (per curiam) 

(explaining that the plaintiff “could have easily avoided any risk” posed by the “open and 

obvious” hazard); see also Caserta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 90 So. 3d 1042, 1043 (La. 2012) 

(per curiam).

10 See, e.g., Jones v. Arch Ins. Co., No. 12-2029, 2013 WL 5441354, at *4 (W.D. La. 

Sept. 27, 2013) (concluding that a jury could find that a low shelf on an end cap display was 

not an “open and obvious” hazard because “the end cap display may have been open and 

obvious, but the low shelf, which was six inches off the ground, may not have been open and 

obvious”); Nunez v. Dolgencorp, LLC, No. 2:12-CV-630-PM-KK, 2013 WL 2458736, at *9-10 

(W.D. La. June 6, 2013) (concluding that a jury could find that a wooden clothing rack was 

not an “open and obvious” hazard “because the base support for the rack jutted out several 

inches into the aisle way”); Johnson v. Cato Corp., No. 12-25, 2012 WL 4959623, at *4 (M.D. 

La. Oct. 17, 2012) (concluding that a jury could find that a clothing rack was not an “open 

and obvious” hazard because “placing a [clothing] rack in the entrance way to a dressing room 

where the foot of that rack allegedly protrudes could be said to be a dangerous condition”); 

Latter v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. Civ.A. 03-1167, 2004 WL 242479, at *3-4 (E.D. La. Feb. 5, 

2004) (finding, in a bench trial, that a folding table “protruding into the passageway” with 

“flared legs” created “an unreasonable risk of harm”).

11 Broussard v. Family Dollar Store, 918 So. 2d 1148, 1151 (La. Ct. App. 2005); see also 

Guerrero v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 165 So. 3d 1092, 1098 (La. Ct. App. 2015).

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We find these cases persuasive. Though the clothing rack as a whole 

was quite visible, a reasonable jury could conclude that the low-lying base, 

which jutted outward around ankle level, was not an “open and obvious” 

hazard.12 Indeed, the normal risk of a protruding obstacle was exacerbated in 

this case by the narrowness of the pathway between the rack and the register.13 

And a reasonable jury could further conclude that the clothing rack was 

“unreasonably dangerous” under Louisiana’s risk-utility balancing test.14 

While the clothing rack had some utility, “[t]he likelihood and magnitude of 

harm to a customer” was “great” because the obstacle posed by the base of the 

rack was not “obvious and apparent.”15 The cost of preventing the harm was 

also inconsequential—Appellees could have easily moved the rack to a different 

location or cordoned off the area behind the register—and Ray was not engaged 

in an inherently dangerous activity. Accordingly, we conclude that the district 

court erred in granting summary judgment. A jury should decide whether the 

clothing rack was “unreasonably dangerous.”

In reaching this conclusion, we deem it irrelevant whether Ray 

admitted to seeing the base of the clothing rack. The Louisiana Supreme Court 

recently reiterated that the relevant inquiry is whether an allegedly “open and 

obvious” hazard is “open and obvious” to all, not just the plaintiff.16 The 

 

12 We caution that a reasonable jury could also find the opposite. See Calderone v. 

Dorignac’s Food Ctr., Inc., 734 So. 2d 152, 154 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that the “jury 

must have found either that the [obstacle] was not protruding into the aisle or, even if it was, 

that it was in plain view and should have been seen by anyone walking through the checkout aisle in time to avoid stumbling over it”).

13 See Latter, 2004 WL 242479, at *3 (remarking that “[t]he risk of serious injury to a 

customer, especially an elderly or infirm customer, was great” in part because the folding 

table was “too close to the clothing racks”).

14 See Butler v. Int’l Paper Co., No. 15-30674, 2016 WL 181254, at *2-3 (5th Cir. Jan. 

14, 2016) (discussing test).

15 Guerrero, 165 So. 3d at 1098.

16 See Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Bldgs., 113 So. 3d 175, 188 (La. 2013)

(“[I]n order to be open and obvious, the risk of harm should be apparent to all who encounter 

the dangerous condition.”).

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plaintiff’s knowledge may lead to the inference that others were aware of the 

hazard,17 but the question is one of “global knowledge.”18 Under this standard, 

evidence of Ray’s knowledge is insufficient to establish that the rack was an 

“open and obvious” hazard.19 We also reject the relevance of the non-Louisiana 

authority cited by Appellees. Most of these cases did not involve an obstacle 

that protruded or flared into a pathway near ground level. The only one that 

did, Cudney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., expressly noted that the clothing rack in 

question did not have “an unusual design that caused a tripping hazard.”20 

The evidence here suggests that the clothing rack—which was a restocking 

rack that differed from the permanent clothing racks21—may have had such 

“an unusual design.” To the extent it did not, Cudney has limited 

persuasiveness as a decision of Michigan law.

IV.

For the reasons stated above, we REVERSE the district court’s grant 

of summary judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

 

17 See Butler, 2016 WL 181254, at *2.

18 Broussard, 113 So. 3d at 188.

19 Ray’s knowledge may be sufficient to establish comparative fault though. See id. at 

188-89.

20 21 F. App’x 424, 430 (6th Cir. 2001). 

21 See R.601 (describing the clothing rack as a “rolling freight clothing rack” that 

differed from a “standard clothing rack”).

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