Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02732/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02732-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Panoptx, Inc.
Counter-claimant
Protective Optics, Inc.
Counter-defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PROTECTIVE OPTICS, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

PANOPTX, INC.,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 05-2732 CRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Protective Optics, Inc. (“Protective”) filed suit against Panoptx, Inc. (“Panoptx”) for

infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,062,688 (“the ’688 patent”). The parties filed a Joint

Claim Construction Statement asking that the Court construe four claim terms.

BACKGROUND

The ’688 patent, entitled “Detachable Eyeglass Foam Shield,” discloses an eye

shielding system to prevent liquids and solids from entering the face area behind eyeglasses.

The patent was issued May 16, 2000, to Mr. Joseph Vinas. By assignment, Protective

Optics, Inc. is the owner of the entire right, title, and interest of the ’688 patent. 

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Protective alleges that certain Panoptx products infringe claims 1, 2, 8, 10, 15-18, 20, and

42; the terms to be construed are present in claims 1, 15, 16 and 42.

2

The relevant patent claims are directed to an “eye shield system,” and the “shield”

itself.1

 Generally, the system includes an air-permeable shield that is releasably secured to

the frame of eyeglasses. When the system is worn, the shield sits between the entire

perimeter of the frame and the wearer’s face. The purpose of the shield is to “block,”

“resist,” or “prevent” the passage of liquids and solids from reaching the eyes. The shield is

formed from air-permeable material to allow the passage of gases so as to prevent fogging of

the lenses.

The patentee described shields known in the prior art, and asserted that these systems

did not meet all of the needs of persons who must wear prescription glasses and are subject to

the risk of harmful substances coming in contact with their eyes. For example, prior art

shields suffered from one or more of the following characteristics: not being detachable, not

providing continuous coverage around the periphery, leaving a gap between the shield and

the face, or not being air-permeable. According to the patentee, the invention is designed to

surmount all of these prior shortcomings.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard for Claim Construction

Claim construction is a matter of law for the court to decide. Markman v. Westview

Instruments, Inc., 57 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). When

construing claims, a court first looks to intrinsic evidence of record, and thereafter, if

appropriate, to extrinsic evidence. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582

(Fed. Cir. 1996). Intrinsic evidence comprises the patent claims, the specification, and, if

entered into evidence, the prosecution history. Id. Intrinsic evidence also comprises the

prior art cited in a patent or during the prosecution. Kumar v. Ovonic Battery Co., 351 F.3d

1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In most cases, the intrinsic evidence alone will determine the

proper meaning of the claim terms. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583. 

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When construing claims, the analysis begins with, and must focus on, the language of

the claims themselves. Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331

(Fed. Cir. 2001). If the claim language is clear on its face, then the rest of the intrinsic

evidence is considered only for whether any deviation from the plain meaning is specified. 

Id. Deviation may be warranted if, for example, the patentee has “chosen to be his own

lexicographer,” or if the patentee has disclaimed a certain portion of the claim scope that

would otherwise be afforded by the plain meaning. Id. (citations omitted). Where the claim

language is not clear, other intrinsic evidence is used to resolve the lack of clarity. Id.

Generally, a court gives the words of a claim their ordinary and customary meaning. 

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The “ordinary and customary

meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill

in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the

patent application.” Id. at 1313. The context in which a word appears in a claim informs the

construction of that word. Id. at 1314. Where there are several common meanings, the

patent disclosure “serves to point away from the improper meanings and toward the proper

meanings.” Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1300 (Fed. Cir.

2003) (citation omitted). If more than one definition is consistent with the usage of a term in

the claims, the term may be construed to encompass all consistent meanings. Texas Digital

Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

Claims must be read in light of the specification. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. The

specification “is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d

at 1582. Where a claim term has multiple, yet potentially consistent, definitions, the rest of

the intrinsic record, beginning with the specification, provides further guidance. BrookhillWilk, F.3d at 1300. If the patentee explicitly defined a claim in the specification, that

definition trumps the ordinary meaning of the term. CCS Fitness v. Brunswick Corp., 288

F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The specification may define a term by implication. 

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321. The specification may also reveal a disclaimer of the claim scope

by indicating that the invention and all of its embodiments only occupy part of the broad

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The claim language reads “solid and liquids.” ’688 patent at 14:5.

4

meaning of a claim term. SciMed Life Sys. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 242 F.3d

1337, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 

It is error, however, to import a limitation from the specification into the claim. 

Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Standing alone,

an embodiment disclosed in the specification does not limit the claims. Id. at 906. Even

when the specification describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent are not to

be construed as restricted to that embodiment unless the patentee demonstrates a clear

intention to limit the claim scope using “words or expressions of manifest exclusion or

restriction.” Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

Absent clear statements of scope, courts are constrained to follow the language of the claims

and not that of the written description provided by the specification. Id. at 1328; see also

Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating a limitation

should not be read into the claims unless a specification so requires).

Conversely, a construction that excludes a preferred embodiment is “rarely, if ever,

correct.” Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharm., USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1374 (Fed.Cir. 2005)

(quoting Sandisk Corp. v. Memorex Products, Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 

Courts require highly persuasive evidence that the claims do not encompass a preferred

embodiment. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583.

II. Construction of the Disputed Terms

A. The Terms

The parties have requested the Court to construe the following terms: 

(1) “blocks passage of liquids and solids” claims 1 and 42

(2) “to seal” or “a seal” claims 1 and 16

(3) “resists passage of liquids and solids” claim 15

(4) “prevent the passage of liquids and solids”2 claim 42

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Panoptx alluded to the prosecution history in the Joint Claim Construction Statement,

but made no further argument based on the file history in its response brief or at oral argument.

Because the prosecution history is not in evidence, the Court will give it no further

consideration. 

5

The first and third terms are both used to modify the description of the air-permeable

material that forms the shield, and will be analyzed together. The fourth term is used in the

context of how the shield “engage[s] with a wearer’s face.” The second group of terms uses

the word “seal” as a verb and a noun, also in the context of how the shield contacts the

wearer’s face.

The primary dispute between the parties is the degree to which the shield material, and

the point of contact between the shield and the face of the wearer, each affect the ability of

liquids or solids to breach the eye shield system. Panoptx argues that the claim terms all

require that the material and the seal formed between shield and face must be essentially

“impenetrable.” In contrast, Protective contends that the seal and the material need not

function in such an absolute manner. Protective contends that the construction proposed by

Panoptx impermissibly imports a single embodiment described in the specification into the

claims. The following analysis considers as intrinsic evidence the claims and the

specification.3

 

B. “Blocks” and “Resists”

1. The claim terms and proposed constructions

Claims 1, 15, and 42 contain the terms “blocks” and “resists” and recite, in relevant

part:

1. . . . a shield, comprising an air-permeable material, having left and right ends, and

forward and rearward sides, wherein the air-permeable material allows passage of

gasses, but blocks passage of liquids and solids, and the shield has two lens openings

formed therein . . . . 

’688 patent at 10:1-5 (emphasis added).

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15. . . . a shield structure, comprising an air-permeable material, having forward and

rearward sides, wherein said air-permeable material allows passages of gasses, but

resists passage of liquids and solids, said forward side has at least one lens opening

formed therein, and said forward side is operable to be releasably secured to the

rearward side of the frame . . . . 

Id. at 10:64 - 11:4 (emphasis added).

42. . . . a unitary body configured to fit interstitially between a pair of eyeglasses and a

wearer’s face, said unitary body comprising an air-permeable material that blocks the

passage of solids and liquids therethrough . . . . 

Id. at 13:33-36 (emphasis added).

Preventive proposes a construction of “impedes” for the term “blocks,” and “hinders”

for the term “resists.” Panoptx contends that both terms should be construed to mean “stops

or does not allow the passage of liquids or solids.” In other words, Panoptx would require

that the shield material be impermeable to liquids and solids, while Protective would construe

the terms to mean less than an absolute barrier.

2. Plain meaning of the claim 

The claim limitations recite, respectively, a “shield,” a “unitary body,” and a “shield

structure” as the main element, and then further recite limitations on the structure and

function of that element. In each case, the main element comprises a material possessing

certain properties. Each claim limitation requires that the material both (i) permit gas to pass

through, but (ii) not permit liquids or solids to pass through. The notion that liquids or solids

are not permitted to pass through is expressed by the verbs “blocks” and “resists.” 

The plain meaning of both of these terms ranges from the absolute, such as,

“completely blocks” or “absolutely resists,” to the passive, in which an obstacle is present,

but simply slows the passage around or through the material. The fact that gases may pass

through the material indicates that the material is not impervious to all matter, but instead

acts more like a filter that stops different matter to different degrees. The fact that the

invention requires at least some breach of the shield undermines an interpretation of the

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claim as requiring complete blockage or absolute resistance, at least with respect to liquids,

because liquids, like the gases that are required to pass through, are fluids. One of skill in the

art would not read the claim as ruling out the possibility that a liquid would be able to wick

through the material. The plain meaning with respect to solids is different, however. If

liquids are “blocked” or “resisted,” one would readily infer that solids are blocked or resisted

to a greater degree, tending more towards absolute blockage. The skilled artisan would also

understand this tendency to hold for liquids as they become more viscous.

The plain meaning of “blocks” or “resists,” when not used in an absolute sense, also

implies an element of time. That is, the material blocks liquids or solids from immediately

traversing the material, but over time, they may in fact be able to do so. To “resist,” or to

“block” the passage also carries the connotation that the substances will eventually, or

gradually, pass around or through the material.

In certain senses, the two terms are distinguishable. “Blocks” also carries the meaning

of a physical barrier that prevents a direct hit. To get beyond a blocking barrier requires

circumventing the barrier. In contrast, “resist” suggests that the body of the object that

prevents passage ultimately allows passage through the object itself.

In short, the plain meaning of the claim encompasses the constructions proposed by

both parties. Although the proposed terms differ significantly in scope, the claim language

does not suggest that only one or the other is the correct construction. Note, too, that the

degree of resistance offered by the material, and thus the characterization of the degree of

prevention implied by “blocks” or “resists,” depends on the nature of the substance coming

into contact with the shield. Thus, the plain meaning of the claim limitations for both

“blocks” and “resists” is that the material provides a range of protection against the passage

of liquids and solids, from protection for a period of time, to protection against direct ingress,

to an absolute bar to passage. See Texas Digital Systems, 308 F.3d at 1203 (“If more than

one dictionary definition is consistent with the use of the words in the intrinsic record, the

claim terms may be construed to encompass all such consistent meanings.”).

3. Specification

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4

This passage in the “Background” section is directed to both the ability of the material

itself to withstand passage of substances, as well as the conformal fit of the shield to the face in

serving as a protective seal.

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The specification does not explicitly define the terms. Nor does it disclose a rate by

which any substance was contemplated to pass through the shield material. The specification

also does not distinguish between the degree of protection afforded against liquids and solids. 

Instead, the ability of the material to withstand the passage of substances is to be inferred

from the stated functions and exemplary intended uses of the invention. 

First, the patent specifies that the shield is to be made of material permeable to air to

the extent that fogging of the lenses of the eye protection system is “inhibit[ed].” ’688 patent

at 2:25. The patentee further emphasizes that one function of the invention is to “permit

enough air to pass through it, so that it inhibits the fogging up” of the glasses. Id. at 2:53-56. 

This degree of permeability notwithstanding, the system is “particularly useful for providing

protection for surgeons or other medical personal from splashed liquids or solids.”4

 Id. at

2:25-27. The specification continues, “[i]t is also useful for any workers who must wear

some protective shield for their eyes.” Id. at 2:27-29. One specific example noted by the

patentee is that the invention can be used for protection from splashed bodily fluids that may

carry the AIDS virus. Id. at 2:29-32. 

Panoptx contends that the claims must be read to “keep out all contaminants . . . like

the HIV virus.” The more natural reading of the specification is that the shield protects

against a splash directly hitting the eye region, but does not absolutely block or resist the

passage of fluids. Absolute protection against all contaminants is not required by the claims

and the specification makes no such restriction. The shield “blocks”or “resists” fluid from

directly entering, but nothing in the specification requires that the material be impermeable. 

Some materials may be capable of absolutely blocking out fluid, but the invention is not

limited to such materials. The fact that the material is required to allow gas to pass through

means that openings exist. The specification does not preclude the reasonable inference that

fluids may wick through the material over some period of time. 

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Claims 1 and 15 recite a “retainer for releasably securing the shield,” ’688 patent at 10:10, 11:5,

and claim 42 requires the shield to be “adapted for releasable engagement,” id. at 14:2. 

9

To read the claims as requiring the material to “keep out all contaminants” would

impermissibly import into the claims an inference based on a single embodiment. The

specification introduces two broad areas of use for the eye shield system: (i) surgeons or

medical personal, and (ii) any workers who must wear some protective shield. For neither

application does the patentee indicate in the specification that absolute blockage is necessary,

nor does the plain meaning of the claim suggest it. Such a reading is inferred by Panoptx

based on a preferred embodiment that the shield is to protect from viruses carried in splashed

liquids. Even if the inference as to what would satisfy the goals of the preferred embodiment

were correct, without “words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction,” the claims

are not to be restricted to any single embodiment. Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1327. Accordingly,

the scope of the terms “blocks” and “resists” is not to be set by the embodiment of eyewear

for a surgeon needing to prevent contamination.

Furthermore, to infer that protection from viruses requires absolute blockage is to

neglect alternative means of achieving protection that are consistent with the claims. 

Specifically, another limitation in these claims requires that the shield be releasable or

detachable.5

 The specification teaches that “one desire” of the invention is that the shield be

“low cost” so that it can be regarded as disposable. This is said to be particularly important

“in a medical situation.” Wearers can still be protected from contaminants that enter the

material, and that might eventually pass through, by removing the shield and disposing of it. 

Thus, a claim interpretation that permits the shield material to be less than an absolute barrier

is fully consistent with the disclosed embodiments. Pfizer, 429 F.3d at 1373 (“[I]t is

necessary to consider the specification as a whole and to read all portions of the written

description, if possible, in a manner that renders the patent internally consistent.”). Panoptx’

proposed construction reaches for a particular interpretation of how the invention should

function that is neither suggested by the claims or the specification, nor required to practice

the invention. 

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Note that “resists passage of liquids and solids” is the only construed term of claim 15.

The limitation of “a seal” found in dependent claim 16 is not present and is not to be read in.

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (“[T]he presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation

gives rise to the presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent

claim.” ). 

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4. Conclusion

The terms “blocks [the] passage of liquids and solids” and “resists passage of liquids

and solids”6 mean that the shield material “substantially blocks” or “substantially resists” the

passage of liquids and solids. See Playtex Products, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 400 F.3d

901, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The term ‘substantial’ is a meaningful modifier implying

‘approximate’ rather than ‘perfect.’” (quoting Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., Inc.,

355 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). An equivalent expression of the construction is that

the material “stops the direct passage of, but is not impermeable to, liquids and solids.” The

material is not required to “block” or “resist” absolutely the passage of liquids and solids. 

C. “Prevent”

1. The claim term and proposed constructions

The relevant portion of claim 42 recites:

42. . . . said shield having forward and rearward edges, said forward edge being

adapted for releasable engagement upon a rearward side of a pair of eyeglasses and

said rearward edge adapted to engage with a wearer’s face and prevent the passage of

solid and liquids therebetween . . . . 

’688 patent at 14:1-6 (emphasis added). 

Preventive proposes a construction of “hinder” for the term “prevent,” based in part on

dictionary definitions that denote several degrees of meaning. Panoptx contends that the

phrase should be construed, as for “blocks” and “resists,” to mean “stops or does not allow

the passage of liquids or solids.” Panoptx argues this construction would be consistent with

the alleged overall purpose of the invention, and because “blocks” and “prevent” both appear

in claim 42 they should have the same meaning.

2. Plain meaning of the claim 

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The ordinary meaning of “prevent” is to “keep from occurring.” Globetrotter

Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 362 F.3d 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing

Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 1535 (2d ed. 1998)). The claim recites

that the rearward edge of the shield is adapted to engage the face so as to keep liquids and

solids from passing between the face and the shield edge. Thus, the claim language is

focused on the properties of the rearward edge, and the importance of achieving conformal

contact between the shield system and face. By this contact, the shield is intended to

“prevent” seepage along the interface by preventing gaps from appearing at the interface

between face and shield. The claim language does not require any other mechanism, such as

applying pressure to keep the shield against the face, to ensure that such a gap does not open

or that the interface is resistant to seepage. Thus, the plain meaning of “prevent” as used in

the claim is to stop the passage of solids and liquids between the shield and the face. 

The claim language, however, is not clear about the degree to which the shield edge

stops fluids and solids. This uncertainty arises because of the range of meanings associated

with troponyms of “prevent.” Manners of “preventing” include: deflect, avert, obstruct,

hinder, thwart, frustrate, baffle, stop and block. WordNet: An Electronic Lexical Database

(Christiane Fellbaum, ed., MIT Press 1998), available at http://wordnet.princeton.edu; see

also Sightsound.com Inc. v. N2K, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 2d 321, 334-35 (W.D. Pa. 2003)

(concluding based on the breadth of definitions in multiple dictionaries that “prevent”

incorporates both the “concept of absolutely stopping . . . as well as merely hindering the

event” by making it difficult for the event to occur). Given this range of possibilities, it

becomes necessary to consult the specification to determine the scope of the invention. 

Interactive Gift Exp., 256 F.3d at 1331.

3. Specification 

The critical question is whether the invention, as described by the specification,

requires the shield edge to absolutely prevent the passage of materials between the face and

shield, such that it would be appropriate to limit the claim accordingly. An objective of the

eye shield system is to provide a sufficient fit “between the shield and the face to adequately

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protect the eyes from materials splashed onto the face.” ’688 patent at 2:42-43. The shield

is to be “resilient and to mold itself to the contours of the face, thus creating a seal preventing

entry into the protected area of either liquids or solids splashed on the face.” Id. at 3:15-18. 

Consideration of the specification as a whole indicates that the eye shield system is

not intended to be perfect. First, the words used by the patentee in the summary of the

invention, “adequately protect,” indicate a tolerance for less than absolute protection. The

plain meaning of adequate itself admits of a variable degree of protection that is

commensurate with the circumstances. The specification contains no explicit notice that the

eye shield system must only provide the highest level of protection, that is, it must be an

impermeable shield. Protection adequate to the needs of “any workers who must wear some

protective shield” is within the scope of the claim. Therefore, less-than-impermeable

shielding is part of the invention. 

Second, the lack of any mechanism to ensure a tight, secure fit of the eye shield

system to the head and face of wearer also indicates a tolerance for less than absolute

protection. The means for keeping the system in place is generally described with reference

to Figure 1, as follows: “[w]hile standard temple connectors are shown it is understood that

the temple connectors may be of various shapes and may extend around the head of a user

and may be adjustable. Any of these types of temple connectors that hold and retain the

eyeglasses or eye goggles on a user’s head are acceptable.” ’688 patent at 4:5-10. Based on

this description, one of skill in the art would not understand the invention to require

positively securing the shield against the face by anything more than the downward angle of

a standard temple connector pressing against the rim of the ear. Gas masks and safety

goggles known in the art that do absolutely prevent the entry of liquids require more secure

retention means in order to create such a seal, but this invention lacks any such teaching or

limitation.

Where a claim is expressed in general descriptive words, the court will not put a

narrowing modifier before an otherwise general term that stands unmodified in a claim. 

Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249-50 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 

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Claim 42 incorporates the two construed terms “blocks passage of liquids and solids” and

“prevent passage of liquids and solids.” The two should not, simply because they appear

together in the claim, have the same meaning. In fact, the presumption is the opposite. See

Innova/Pure Water, 381 F.3d at 1119; Pickholtz v. Rainbow Technologies, Inc., 284 F.3d 1365,

1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Here, the two refer to different protective modalities. “Blocks” modifies

the shield material itself, whereas “prevents” is a limitation on the interface between shield and

face. That both are construed in a similar sense – stopping, but not absolutely – is not to say

they have the same meaning. The different modes, made operational by different principles, are

however understood to achieve a similar degree of performance from the intrinsic evidence, read

as a whole.

13

“Prevents” connotes a range of degrees of “keeping from occurring.” Panoptx’ preferred

reading would essentially require the claim to be rewritten as “absolutely prevents.” Absent

clear indication in the specification to justify this narrowing interpretation, and in view of the

invention as understood as a whole, the broader interpretation is preferred. 

4. Conclusion 

The term “prevent the passage of solids and liquids” as used in claim 42 means to

“substantially stop the passage of solids and liquids.”7

 See Playtex Products, 400 F.3d at

907. The rearward edge engages with the face to stop, although not to the degree of

absolutely stopping, the passage of liquids and solids at the interface. The specification does

not require the term to carry only the most restrictive meaning that the rearward edge of the

shield “not allow” the passage of liquids or solids.

D. “To Seal” and “A Seal”

1. The claim terms and proposed constructions 

Claims 1 and 16 recite in relevant parts:

1. . . . wherein said shield’s forward side abuts the frame’s rearward side and said

shield’s rearward side contacts the face of the wearer of the frame to seal with the

wearer’s face . . . . 

’688 patent at 10:6-9 (emphasis added).

16. . . . wherein the shield structure is resilient and extends rearwardly to form a seal

with the wearer’s face. 

Id. at 11:7-9 (emphasis added).

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Preventive proposes the verb “to seal” should be construed as “to fit snugly or mold

with another surface so as to hinder the passage of liquids and solids,” and the noun “seal”

should be “a means of hindering the passage of liquids and solids.” Panoptx contends that

the terms should instead mean “to create a tight and impenetrable barrier or closure

preventing entry,” and “a tight and impenetrable barrier or closure preventing entry,”

respectively. Again, Preventive seeks a construction with “hinder” as the operative term

connoting less than a perfect seal, whereas Panoptx offers the absolute terminology of

“impenetrable barrier.”

2. Plain meaning of the claim 

The ordinary meaning of the verb “to seal” is to: make tight, secure against leakage,

close, or close hermetically. Even though this word admits of less of a range in the degree of

closure, a range is nonetheless discernable. It is undisputable that “to close,” and “to close

hermetically” carry different connotations. Thus, it is reasonable to question whether the

claim term should be restricted to the more stringent interpretation offered by Panoptx, or

whether it carries a broader, less absolute meaning. 

The ordinary meaning of the noun “a seal” is: a device that prevents leakage, or an

airtight or watertight closure. Again, a range of meaning is present. The shield material

itself is air permeable, although there is no indication that it need be watertight. Whether

either or both of these conditions apply to the interface between the shield and the face,

where “the seal” in question is formed, is not apparent from the language of the claims.

The rest of each claim limitation provides the context for what is making the seal. 

Again, it is the shield’s rearward side, where it contacts the face of the wearer, that is forming

the seal. Note that it is this same contact between the rearward side of the shield and the face

that is said to “prevent the passage of liquids and solids.” See supra Part C. The terms “seal”

and “prevent” do not appear within the same claim, however, and thus are entitled to the

presumption of a difference in meaning and scope. Power Mosfet Technologies, L.L.C. v.

Siemens AG, 378 F.3d 1396, 1409-10 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Nonetheless, because the claim

language itself does not resolve the ambiguity regarding the degree to which the shield seals

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to, or forms a seal with, the face, the specification is again consulted for the context of the

invention.

3. Specification 

The key question is whether by the term “seal” the patentee was claiming an eye

shield system that is “leakproof” at the point of contact between shield and face as the

invention. In the specification the phrase “seal or fit snugly” appears numerous times. ’688

patent at 1:22, 2:12, 20, 41. A duo of terms given in the alternative normally implies that

each word or phrase carries a distinct meaning. See Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water

Filtration Systems, Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Within this pair, “seal”

would carry a more stringent meaning than “fit snugly.” However, any distinction between

these two is blurred by the passage in the specification teaching that the shield “must fit

snugly to both the face and the frame of the eyeglasses or goggles, thus creating a seal.” ’688

patent at 2:50-52 (emphasis added). A “snug fit” does not necessarily connote a leakproof

seal, but an object that “fits snugly” does at least amount to a “close contact with another

surface” that can be described as a seal. Other uses in the specification of the term “seal,” as

either a noun or a verb, also fail to specify the degree to which a leakproof fit is required.

The discussion above for the term “prevents” is also relevant to this construction. The

specification interrelates the two terms, for example, “a seal preventing entry,” ’688 patent at

3:16, and nowhere does it indicate they carry distinguishable connotations. “Where neither

the plain meaning nor the patent itself commands a difference in scope between two terms,

they may be construed identically.” Power Mosfet, 378 F.3d at 1410 (citation omitted). 

Again, viewing the invention as a whole, the eye shield system is not intended to be

restricted to perfect systems. “Seal” generally implies a tight, secure contact that does not

permit leakage. In the context of this invention, however, nothing in specification explains

that the terms “to seal” has any different meaning than “to prevent”as these terms relate to

the interface between the shield and face. As with the teaching relating to the term

“prevents,” the allowance of a mechanism for wearing the glasses that does not ensure a

positive, secure fit against the face also would lead one of skill in the art to understand that

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the “seal” at the interface need not be absolute. Nowhere is it explained that “a seal” does

anything more than “prevent” the passage of liquids to the degree construed above. 

Furthermore, although the condition of a “leakproof seal” may be established periodically, or

even nearly continuously, the language of the claims and the specification does not establish

that an “absolute seal” must be created and maintained by the shield system. 

4. Conclusion 

The term “to seal,” as used in claim 1 means “to make contact with another surface so

as to substantially stop the passage of solids and liquids.” See Playtex Products, 400 F.3d at

907. The related term “a seal,” as used in claim 16 is “a means for substantially stopping the

passage of liquids.” See id. The rearward edge contacts the face to seal, or form a seal, that

largely stops, although not to the degree of absolutely stopping, the passage of liquids and

solids at the point of contact. The specification does not require the term to carry only the

most restrictive meaning that the contact between the shield and face “not allow” the passage

of liquids or solids.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 23, 2006 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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