Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-91-03267/USCOURTS-caDC-91-03267-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Frederick F. Fadayini
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 13, 1994 Decided July 15, 1994

No. 91-3267

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

FREDERICK F. FADAYINI,

APPELLANT

No. 91-3268

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

FATAI A. GAFARI,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(Cr. No. 91-208)

-

William J. Garber(appointed by the court) argued the cause and filed the briefsfor appellant Gafari.

On the briefs for appellant Fadayini was Gregory Burr MacAulay (appointed by the court).

Linda I. Marks, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the

brief were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Roy W. McLeese, III, and

Thomas E. Zeno, Assistant United States Attorneys.

Before: MIKVA, Chief Judge, BUCKLEY and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Decision of the Court filed by Chief Judge MIKVA.

MIKVA, Chief Judge: Appellants appeal their respective convictions and sentences for bank

fraud and access device fraud. We affirm. We write principally to express a concern about the nature

of the admitted expert testimony and to clarify a point about departure under § 5K2.0 of the

Sentencing Guidelines.

USCA Case #91-3267 Document #92986 Filed: 07/15/1994 Page 1 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

I. BACKGROUND

Appellants eachwere indicted on four counts of bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344) and one count

of access device fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1029) for the unauthorized withdrawal over one weekend in

February, 1989 ofapproximately$78,000 fromD.C.-area automatic tellermachines("ATMs"). After

a jury trial before Judge Gesell, appellants were convicted on July 16, 1991 on three of the four bank

fraud counts and the access device fraud count. Judge Gesell sentenced Gafari and Fadayini to 37

and 30 months' incarceration, respectively, under the United States Sentencing Guidelines and to

three years of supervised release. Appellants now challenge their convictions and sentences.

Central Trust, a Cincinnati-based bank, issues "Affinity" Mastercards which can be used to

obtain cash in ATMs connected to the "CIRRUS" network. In 1988, Central Trust received and

approved an Affinity card application in the name of Martha Hunt. It issued a card in that name and

sent it to the Washington, D.C. address indicated on the application. It later received a change of

address form indicating a forwarding address, also in the District of Columbia.

In June, 1989, the United States Secret Service informed Central Trust that it was

investigating the possible fraudulent use of the Martha Hunt Affinity card. The FBI located Cherline

Wilkinson, a prior occupant of the apartment listed on the card application. Wilkinson revealed that

she had allowed appellant Fadayini to use the address to receive mail at the time the Martha Hunt

application wassubmitted. She supplied a photograph of Fadayini. The investigators also contacted

the banks at which Central Trust's records indicated the Martha Hunt card had been used, and

obtained ATM photographs from two of those banksRiggs and First Americanfor the relevant

days and times. The investigators believed appellants to be the two individuals shown in the ATM

photographs. FBI fingerprint experts analyzed the change of address cards sent to both Central Trust

and the local post office, finding latent prints belonging to Fadayini on each. FBI agents arrested

appellants based on this and other information.

The government presented a number of witnesses at trial. FBI and Secret Service agents and

Cherline Wilkinson testified to the facts described above. The real Martha Hunt testified that

although her name, date of birth, and socialsecurity number were correctly listed on the application,

USCA Case #91-3267 Document #92986 Filed: 07/15/1994 Page 2 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

she did not fill out or sign the application; she had not authorized anyone to do so on her behalf; she

had never lived at the addresseslisted on either the application or on the change of addressform; and

she did not know either appellant. Ms. Hunt also testified regarding her credit difficulties that

resulted from the fraudulent use of the card bearing her name.

Mr. Nienaber, an assistant vice-president at Central Trust, testified concerning the bank's

ATM logs which reflected the transactions involving the Martha Hunt card. Keepers of records

and/or security officers at each of the four banks at which the Martha Hunt card was used testified

regarding the times the card was used and the manner in which the banks' ATMs and surveillance

cameras operate. The government introduced a number of ATM photos from First American Bank

and Riggs Bank. No photos were introduced from Signet or Crestar, the other two banks at which

the Martha Hunt card was used.

Secret Service Agent Byers (who had booked appellants) identified appellant Fadayini in

thirteen of the ATM photos. After counsel for Mr. Gafari objected to the identifications, the court

qualified Agent Byers as an expert witnessin the identification of individualsfrom photographs. The

basisfor Agent Byers' qualification as an expert wasthat his Secret Service dutiesincluded reviewing

photographs of potential troublemakers prior to protective assignments and then identifying those

individuals if they appeared in crowds. Byers proceeded also to identify Gafari in a number of the

ATM photographs.

Finally, Secret Service Agent John Kirkwood testified as a summary witness. He

cross-referenced the withdrawalsreflected in Central Trust'slogs with those on the individual banks'

ATM logs, noting slight discrepancies between the two. He also matched the ATM photographs to

the transaction logs, again noting minor discrepancies. Agent Kirkwood testified that the Martha

Hunt card was used to withdraw a total of $78,000 between February 10 and February 12, 1989.

After the government's case-in-chief, appellants moved for acquittal, which was denied. The

defense presented no evidence. The jury convicted both appellants of the three bank fraud counts

involving First American, Riggs, and Crestar, and the access device fraud count. Each was acquitted

of the Signet count.

USCA Case #91-3267 Document #92986 Filed: 07/15/1994 Page 3 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

At the September 13, 1991 sentencing hearing, the government presented additional evidence

of credit card abuse by both appellants. Agent Kirkwood testified that on April 18, 1989, appellants

were arrested at Bloomingdale's for the use of three stolen credit cards. Gafari was apprehended

outside the store attempting to bury the cards. Agent Kenny testified that appellants co-owned a

clothing boutique called Gaf-Fad, and that the store's merchant bank, Peachtree Bank, reported that

eight fraudulent credit cards had been used to chargemerchandise at the store totalling some $23,000.

Peachtree eventually revoked Gaf-Fad's merchant account due to the credit activity at the store.

Citibank also reported that still other fraudulent cards were used to the tune of $17,500 at the store,

and $43,000 elsewhere. Agent Kenny also testified that when appellants were arrested for the instant

offense, he found a crumpled Visa receipt bearing the name Adam Corzine and an identification card

with Corzine's name but Gafari's picture. Also found throughout the boutique and in Fadayini's car

were some 75 blank credit card applications. Further testimony indicated that appellants used a stolen

card to buy tires while awaiting trial in this case, an offense that led to bond revocation. No charges

were filed in any of these cases.

After accepting sentencing memoranda fromboth parties, Judge Gesellset Fadayini's offense

level at 20 and Gafari's at 22, each of which included enhancementsfor "more than minimal planning"

of the crime, and obstruction of justice. Pursuant to § 5K2.0 of the Guidelines (which allows the

sentencing judge to impose a sentence outside the Guidelines' range based on factors not adequately

taken into account by the Sentencing Commission in drafting the Guidelines) the court then added

to each offense level 3 levels for appellants' continuing engagement in fraudulent conduct while on

release (analogizing to U.S.S.G. § 2J1.7); 2 levels for the "extraordinary extent of the criminal

conduct" (analogizing to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(e)); and 1 level to account for the non-monetary harm

done to the victim of appellants' scheme. The adjustments resulted in sentences of 41 months for

Gafari and 33 months for Fadayini. Upon the government's motion for clarification, those sentences

were reduced because the court erroneouslyconsidered the uncharged conduct incalculating the total

dollar amount of the offense. The recalculated sentences were 37 and 30 months, respectively, in

addition to the mandatoryminimumthree years'supervised release. Both appellants have served their

USCA Case #91-3267 Document #92986 Filed: 07/15/1994 Page 4 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

sentences and currently are on supervised release.

Appellants make four broad arguments on appeal: (1) each claims the evidence submitted at

trial was insufficient to support one or more of his respective convictions; (2) each argues that the

court erred in qualifying Agent Byers as an expert witness; (3) each contends that the ATM

photographs admitted into evidence were not properly authenticated; and (4) each challenges the

court's base offense level enhancement and its upward departure from the guideline range.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

1. Fadayini. Fadayini does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him

on the counts where photographic evidence linked him to the offense (Riggs and First American).

What he does challenge is the Crestar conviction, which (along with the Signet count on which he

was acquitted) was not supported with photographic evidence. But surely the jury could infer from

Fadayini's use of the card at Riggs and First American that he used the card at Crestar as well: The

card was used at Crestar nineteen times over a three day period at locations and times in close

proximity to withdrawalsto which appellant was photographically linked. As we draw no distinction

between direct and circumstantial evidence in evaluating the government's proof, United States v.

Harris, 435 F.2d 74, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the evidence presented was sufficient to convict Fadayini

on the Crestar count.

2. Gafari. In denying Gafari's motion for a new trial, the court concluded that the

government's proof demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that Gafari aided and abetted Fadayini

in the commission of credit card fraud. The court based its conclusion on the ATM photographs,

"some [of which] with clarity show [Gafari] using the card, some show him in company with the

co-defendant on a particular occasion when the card was used numeroustimes at the same location."

Order Denying Defendants' Motion for a New Trial and/or Judgment of Acquittal N.O.V. (July 24,

1991). Gafari challenges the court's finding, arguing that the photographic evidence is not sufficient

to establish that he had the specific intent required to commit either the bank fraud or access device

fraud offenses.

USCA Case #91-3267 Document #92986 Filed: 07/15/1994 Page 5 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Ifthe trial court'sfinding that "some ofthe ATM photographs with clarityshow [Gafari] using

the card" wasintended to mean that Gafari was shown exercising direct physical control of the card,

then we think the court misspoke. Nowhere did Agent Byers, who identified Gafari in the photos,

testify that Gafari was shown handling the card. Rather, the evidence against Gafari was all

indirectphotographs depicting himeitherstanding near anATM at the time the card was being used

or seated in the driver's seat of a car parked at or near an ATM.

Nevertheless, the court's apparent mischaracterization of the evidence does not alter its

ultimate conclusion that Gafari had the requisite intent to commit bank fraud. Under either a "direct

use" theory or an aiding and abetting theory, the circumstantial photographic evidence wassufficient

to link Gafari to the commission of the crime. With respect to direct use, at least one of the ATM

photographs shows Gafari in the driver'sseat of a vehicle parked at a drive-through ATM in Temple

Hills, Maryland. Because such ATMs are usually located on the driver's side, one can draw a

permissible inference that Gafari used the Martha Hunt card to withdraw money from that particular

ATM.

An aiding and abetting theory is applicable as well. "In order to convict a defendant of aiding

and abetting a crime, a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant willingly

associated himself with a criminal venture and participated therein as something he wished to bring

about. The abettor's criminal intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, and the

government must prove only that the abettor intended to assist the perpetrator of the crime." United

States v. Castro, 887 F.2d 988, 995-96 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Here, although no evidence linked Gafari with the application for the Martha Hunt card and none of

the picturesshow him with card in hand, it is not unreasonable to infer that he was aware ofthe crime

and acquiesced in it. He was pictured with Fadayini as the card was being used multiple times,

suggesting that he knew of and did nothing to prevent the crime. In addition, he was seen waiting

for Fadayini in the car, creating a not so unreasonable inference that he aided in the crime by

transporting Fadayini from one ATM to the next. And, for the reasons discussed in reference to

Fadayini's sufficiency challenge, the proximity in time and place of the photographed offenses to the

USCA Case #91-3267 Document #92986 Filed: 07/15/1994 Page 6 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

non-photographed ones is sufficient to create an inference that Gafari aided and abetted in those

crimes as well.

Accordingly, both sets of convictions withstand appellants' sufficiency challenges.

B. The ATM Photos

1. Qualification of Agent Byers. Appellants contend that the court abused its discretion by

qualifying Agent Byers as an expert witness in the identification of individuals from photographs.

Although we are troubled by the court's ruling, we do not think it rose to a level of abuse of

discretion. Agent Byers testified that as part of his duties for six years as a Secret Service Agent, he

was assigned to protective details guarding the President, Vice President, and visiting dignitaries on

over 200 occasions. Prior to each assignment, he would review photographs of persons known to

pose security risks and then watch for those individuals at any location visited by the protectee,

focusing particularly on facial features and distinguishing marks. Purporting to rely on this

experience, Agent Byers positively identified appellants asthe individuals depicted in a number ofthe

ATM photographs.

The troubling aspect of the court's qualification of Agent Byers is not so much the training

and experience upon which the agent based his supposed expertise. Courts are well within their

discretion to qualify expert witnesses whose expertise was obtained "in something more than a casual

manner." United States v. Carswell, 922 F.2d 876, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Certainly that is the case

here. What does concern us, however, is that the opinions Agent Byers expressed do not really

require any particular expertise. Where the jury is just as capable of drawing correct conclusions as

the witness possessed with special training, expert testimony is unnecessary. In United States v.

Brewer, 783 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1986), for instance, the Ninth Circuit held that it was not an abuse

of discretion for the trial court to disallow the expert testimony of a forensic anthropologist as to

whether the defendant was pictured in bank surveillance photographs. In the court's view, the

untrained juror could fully assess the photographs without the assistance of the expert. The same is

true here. But whether the court's ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion is another question. We

conclude that it does not. Although Agent Byers' testimony may have been unnecessary, we cannot

USCA Case #91-3267 Document #92986 Filed: 07/15/1994 Page 7 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

say that it was totally unhelpful to the jury. It may have served to focus the jury on particular

characteristics ofthe defendants(e.g., facialfeatures, distinguishing marks), therebyaiding the jurors'

independent assessments of the photographs. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court's qualification

of Agent Byers as an expert witness.

2. Authentication. We conclude also that the ATM photos were properly authenticated.

Clearly, testimony by bank personnel familiar with the operation of the ATM cameras, and the time

and date imprints on the photographsthemselves, were sufficient "to permit a reasonable juror to find

that the evidence is what its proponent claims." United States v. Rembert, 863 F.2d 1023, 1027

(D.C. Cir. 1988).

C. The Sentences

In reviewing appellants' sentences, we must address initially the government's claim that

because appellants have served their sentences, consideration of the trial court'ssentence calculation

is moot. A criminal appeal is moot only if there is "no possibility that any collateral legal

consequences will be imposed" upon the defendant. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968)

(emphasis added). There are two such potential consequences in this case: (1) if appellants'

sentences were reduced to less than 13 months, each would receive two instead of three criminal

history pointsa reduction that could affect the duration of any future sentence they might receive

in federal court, see, e.g., United States v. Dickey, 924 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112

S. Ct. 383 (1991); and (2) if appellants' sentences were reduced, each might be eligible for a credit

against their period of supervised release for the excess time they spent in prison. Although the

government may be correct that both of these contingencies are remote, Sibron requires only that

they be possible. Consequently, the sentencing issue is not moot.

Moving to the merits ofthe sentences, appellants argue on several groundsthat the trial court

erred in imposing upward departures from the sentencing range suggested by the Guidelines for the

instant offense. In reviewing departures from the Guidelines, this Court (1) ascertains "whether the

district court's reasons for the departure are, as a matter of law, of a kind or degree that may

appropriately be relied upon to justify a departure," (2) determines "whether the factssupporting the

USCA Case #91-3267 Document #92986 Filed: 07/15/1994 Page 8 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

district court's reasoning are clearly erroneous," and (3) reviews "the extent of the departure under

a standard of reasonableness." United States v. Jones, 948 F.2d 732, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (internal

citations and quotations omitted). Applying this standard, we conclude that the departures imposed

by the trial court were based on a proper application ofthe Guidelinesto the facts and were otherwise

reasonable.

First, the trial court properly imposed under § 5K2.0 ofthe Guidelines a three-level departure

for appellants' continuing criminal activity occurring "during the time [appellants] were on release

from the instant offense as well as the earlier Bloomingdale's arrest." Sentencing Memorandum at

4. Evidence of such conduct included the phony card charges that occurred through appellant's

clothing store, the bogus cards found in appellants' possession upon their arrest, and the numerous

credit card applications found in the clothing store and in Fadayini's car. The Guidelines make clear

that post-arrest criminal conduct can warrant additional penalty. See U.S.S.G. § 2J1.7 (authorizing

a three-level departure when the instant offense occurs while on release). Because this case involves

criminal conduct occurring after the instant offense, it does not fit squarely within the rubric of §

2J1.7. However, we agree with the trial court that appellants' post-arrest criminal conduct was of

a nature not adequately taken into account by the Sentencing Commission. It is therefore an

appropriate basis for departure under § 5K2.0. Finally, a three-level departure is reasonable, given

that it is the same level of departure recommended by § 2J1.7.

The court also properly departed two levels under § 5K2.0 based on the extent of appellants'

immersion in fraudulent activity. The evidence showed that appellants' involvement in credit card

fraud was longstanding and extensive. But because appellants were not convicted of any prior

offenses, such conduct was not taken into account in determining their criminal history categories

under § 4A1.3. We conclude that by analogy to § 4A1.3, non-conviction misconduct may be a

proper basisfor departure under § 5K2.0 ifit reveals extensive immersion in criminalitysimilarin type

to the charged offense. Cf. United States v. Dawson, 1 F.3d 457, 464-65 (7thCir. 1993) (suggesting

that upward departure may be appropriate under § 5K2.0 where uncharged conduct is not a basisfor

a criminal history category enhancement and is similar to the conviction offense). On this record, it

USCA Case #91-3267 Document #92986 Filed: 07/15/1994 Page 9 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

was not error for the trial court to conclude that appellants' conduct merited a two-level departure.

Appellants also argue that the court erred by imposing a one-level upward departure based

on the intangible effect that appellants' fraud had on their victim. The court concluded that "the

intrusion into [a victim's] privacy and peace of mind" and the aggravation that a victim may suffer "in

attempting to set the record straight" were factors not considered by the Sentencing Commission in

determining the applicable range for the instant offense. Because some degree of injury to credit and

emotionaldiscomfort isinevitable in any creditfraud scheme, we cannotsaythat an upward departure

on those grounds is appropriate in the ordinary case. However, the Sentencing Guidelines explicitly

permit an upward departure in fraud cases "where the [monetary] loss ... does not fully capture the

harmfulness and seriousness of the conduct." U.S.S.G § 2F1.1(b)(1), application note 10. Frauds

contemplated bytheCommission as warranting such a departure include those that "risk[] reasonably

foreseeable, substantial non-monetary harm," "cause[ ] reasonably foreseeable, physical or

psychological harm," and "knowing[ly] endanger[ ] the solvency of one or more victims." Id.,

application notes 10(a), (c), (f). Although the trial court based its departure on § 5K2.0, all the above

examples from § 2F1.1 reasonably could describe the fraud involved here. We therefore uphold the

trial court's enhancement insofar as it was based on appellants' extraordinary conduct in this case.

Considering the volume of fraud perpetrated on Ms. Hunt, and testimony by Ms. Hunt ofthe distress

she experienced over having to rectify her credit difficulties, it was not error for the trial court to

impose a one-level upward departure.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, appellants' convictions and sentences are

Affirmed.

USCA Case #91-3267 Document #92986 Filed: 07/15/1994 Page 10 of 10