Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-13-03170/USCOURTS-ca13-13-03170-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ramona Gill Herring
Petitioner
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

RAMONA GILL HERRING,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________ 

2013-3170

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DC844E120778-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: February 18, 2015

______________________ 

MATHEW B. TULLY, Tully Rinckey PLLC, Washington, 

DC, argued for petitioner. Also represented by STEVEN L.

HERRICK. 

SARA B. REARDEN, Office of the General Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, argued for 

respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G. POLISUK. 

______________________ 

Before REYNA, WALLACH, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

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2 HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge WALLACH. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge REYNA.

WALLACH, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner Ramona Gill Herring (“Petitioner”) appeals 

a Final Order of the Merit Systems Protection Board 

(“MSPB” or “Board”), dismissing her appeal as untimely 

filed without good cause. Because, under the circumstances of this case, the MSPB abused its discretion in 

determining Ms. Herring had not demonstrated good 

cause for the untimely filing of her appeal, this court 

reverses. 

BACKGROUND

In March 2010, Ms. Herring was removed from her 

position as a cytotechnologist with the Department of the 

Navy. After her removal, she filed an application for 

disability retirement benefits with the Office of Personnel 

Management (“OPM”), which was denied. Ms. Herring

received the relevant OPM denial letter on July 14, 2012. 

Under the applicable regulations, the due date to file an 

appeal of the OPM denial was August 13, 2012. However, 

because her attorney’s law office negligently failed to 

transmit to her attorney the documents submitted by Ms. 

Herring (while confirming to Ms. Herring that the necessary documents and payment had been received),1 Ms. 

1 According to Petitioner’s Brief: 

This proposed contract [between Ms. Herring and her attorney] was transmitted by 

administrative support staff located in the 

Firm’s Washington, DC office and incorrectly directed Petitioner to return the 

signed agreement to the Washington, DC 

office rather than the Arlington, VA office 

 

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HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 3

Herring did not file the appeal until August 23, 2012. 

Thereafter, an administrative judge dismissed the appeal 

as untimely filed, and the MSPB affirmed. Ms. Herring 

timely appealed. This court has jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) (2012). 

DISCUSSION

It is undisputed that Ms. Herring’s appeal was filed 

ten days late. “If a party does not submit an appeal 

within the time set by statute, regulation, or order of a 

judge, it will be dismissed as untimely filed unless a good 

reason for the delay is shown.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.22 (2012) 

(emphasis added). Consistent with this regulation, the 

MSPB acknowledges waivers may be granted “after 

considering all of the facts and circumstances of a particular case.” Herring v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. DC-844E12-0778-I-1, at 3 (M.S.P.B. July 1, 2013) (Resp’t’s App. 1–

6) (“Final Order”). 

The decision to waive the time limit to appeal to the 

Board is committed to the discretion of the Board, and is 

reversed only for abuse of that discretion. See Mendoza v. 

Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 966 F.2d 650, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 

where the consulting attorney was located. . . . Subsequently, on that same day[, 

August 7, 2012], Petitioner spoke with 

personnel in the Firm’s Albany, NY office 

and communicated that she had mailed 

documentation to the Washington DC office . . . . 

Pet’r’s Br. 7. She “confirm[ed] that payment had 

been received.” Id. at 13. “Subsequently, the Petitioner was notified of the firm’s receipt on August 8, 2012, of the FedEx package” containing 

the documentation. Id. at 14. 

 

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(en banc) (“Whether the regulatory time limit for an 

appeal should be waived based upon a showing of good 

cause is a matter committed to the Board’s discretion and 

this court will not substitute its own judgment for that of 

the Board.”); see also U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 

U.S. 1, 6–7 (2001); Hines v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 163 F. 

App’x 913, 914 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The issue is therefore 

whether the MSPB abused its discretion in finding Ms. 

Herring failed to show good cause for the delay.

MSPB regulations do not provide criteria for determining when good cause has been shown for waiving the 

time limitation with respect to the filing of an appeal. See 

5 C.F.R. § 1201.12; id. § 1201.22(c). Case law, however, 

provides nonexclusive criteria that may be considered. 

These include: 

the length of the delay; whether appellant was notified of the time limit or was otherwise aware of 

it; the existence of circumstances beyond the control of the appellant which affected his ability to 

comply with the time limits; the degree to which 

negligence by the appellant has been shown to be 

present or absent; circumstances which show that 

any neglect involved is excusable neglect; a showing of unavoidable casualty or misfortune; and the 

extent and nature of the prejudice to the agency 

which would result from waiver of the time limit. 

Alonzo v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 180, 184 (1980) 

(footnotes omitted); see also Walls v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 

29 F.3d 1578, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“We previously have 

recognized the efficacy of the Alonzo factors in good cause 

determinations by the Board.”); Smith v. Dep’t of the 

Army, 105 M.S.P.R. 433, 433 (2007) (listing similar factors). 

In its Final Order, the Board cited Alonzo and Smith 

and mentioned several of their factors, but did not systematically apply those factors to Ms. Herring’s case. See 

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HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 5

Final Order 3–5. Indeed, most of the factors were not 

discussed at all. See id. The Board did, however, address 

several of these factors in its brief before this court. 

I. Circumstances Beyond a Party’s Control 

In addressing one of these criteria, the MSPB in its 

brief asserts “Ms. Herring did not present any evidence to 

the Board that there were circumstances beyond her 

control.” Resp’t’s Br. 18. Ms. Herring had, however, 

executed a power of attorney authorizing agents of the 

federal government to “fully communicate with” her 

designated attorneys with respect to “any and all information . . . deemed necessary” to her appeal. Resp’t’s 

App. 67. In addition, although OPM determined Ms. 

Herring had not proven a disability, the agency acknowledged “the evidence [Ms. Herring] submitted shows that 

[she has] medical conditions.” Id. at 69. Among Ms. 

Herring’s claimed conditions were “[d]epression/[a]nxiety” 

and “[f]atigue.” Id. at 68. These circumstances are relevant when considering the reasonableness of Ms. Herring’s actions or inactions. See, e.g., Malloy v. U.S. Postal 

Serv., 578 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“It is established that mental impairment, when present, warrants 

consideration and weight in assessing the reasonableness 

of the action taken.”). 

The MSPB acknowledges Ms. Herring’s assertions 

that she contacted counsel substantially in advance of the 

deadline, submitted the required payment for legal services on August 7, 2012, and followed up by telephone on 

August 7 to ensure that payment and documentation had 

been received. Resp’t’s Br. 11; Pet’r’s Br. 7, 13–14. The 

unusual facts of this case show Ms. Herring had done 

everything that could reasonably be expected of her and 

the failure to timely file was due to circumstances beyond 

her control. “The appellant need not show an utter impossibility, but only that the delay was excusable in light 

of the particular facts and attending circumstances where 

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6 HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

diligence or ordinary prudence has been exercised.” 

Anderson v. Dep’t of Justice, 999 F.2d 532, 534 (Fed. Cir. 

1993) (quoting Alonzo, 4 M.S.P.R. at 184); see also Lamb 

v. U.S. Postal Serv., 68 M.S.P.R. 500, 502 (1995) (“To 

establish good cause for an untimely filing, a party must 

show that she exercised diligence or ordinary prudence 

under the particular circumstances of the case.”). 

In arguing there were no circumstances beyond Ms. 

Herring’s control, the MSPB states Ms. Herring could 

have “contacted her attorney between August 8, 2012, and 

August 13, 2012,” or “personally filed her appeal.” 

Resp’t’s Br. 19. It is true it is a party’s “duty to monitor 

the progress of the appeal at all times.” Soleto v. Dep’t of 

Agric., 58 M.S.P.R. 253, 256 n.2 (1993). However, under 

the circumstances of this case, where the petitioner had 

relevant physical and psychological conditions, executed a 

power of attorney in favor of her legal representatives, 

completed all of the steps requested by counsel, and 

followed up by telephone a few days prior to the filing 

deadline, the duty to monitor did not require the petitioner to make additional telephone calls to counsel, within 

the short period prior to the deadline, in the absence of 

any indication whatsoever that additional steps were 

necessary. The MSPB acknowledges Ms. Herring’s claim 

that she was reassured, just a few days before the filing 

deadline, that the appeal would be timely filed. See 

Resp’t’s Br. 11. These circumstances, taken together, 

indicate the actions and inactions of Ms. Herring’s law 

firm “were misleading and deceptive in effect” and “‘misled and lulled’” Ms. Herring “‘into believing th[e] case was 

proceeding smoothly.’” Crawford v. Dep’t of State, 60 

M.S.P.R. 441, 446 (1994) (quoting Dabbs v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 56 M.S.P.R. 57, 60 (1992)). 

For similar reasons, although a party could personally 

file an appeal, it is not reasonable to expect a party to do 

so under the circumstances of this case. In Crawford, the 

MSPB found the appellant had established good cause for 

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HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 7

a filing made twenty-three days late notwithstanding that 

repeated phone calls made by the appellant to her attorney had not been returned. 60 M.S.P.R. at 445. In Soleto, 

the MSPB found important “the fact that the petition was 

returned to [the appellant]” which “should have put him 

on notice that some additional action was necessary.” 58 

M.S.P.R. at 256. In Dabbs, the MSPB found good cause, 

56 M.S.P.R. at 60, even though “counsel’s apparent nonchalance regarding [the filing deadline]” could have 

indicated to the appellant the need to “file[] the petition 

himself,” id. at 61 (Levinson, dissenting). Unlike these 

cases where the returned petition, failure to return phone 

calls, or an attorney’s nonchalance might have alerted the 

claimant to the attorney’s negligence and suggested a 

need for personal filing, Ms. Herring’s interactions with 

her attorney provided no indication that additional action 

on her part was needed. See Pet’r’s App. 38. 

II. Negligence and Delay

The MSPB asserts the well-settled rule that “a petitioner is responsible for the errors of her chosen representative.” Resp’t’s Br. 19; see also Green v. Merit Sys. 

Prot. Bd., 232 F.3d 912, 2000 WL 369683, at *1 (Fed. Cir. 

2000) (unpublished) (“Citing precedent, the Board noted 

that . . . the errors and omissions of one’s attorney do not 

prove good cause for delay unless the attorney has 

thwarted a petitioner’s diligent efforts to pursue an 

appeal.”). However, the cases cited by the MSPB in 

support of this proposition involve either greater negligence or delay (or both) than the case at bar. Green, for 

example, involved a delay of more than two-and-a-half 

years between the filing deadline and the time at which 

the application was filed, due in part to the disbarment of 

counsel. Green, 232 F.3d. at *1. The MSPB specifically 

noted the petitioner “waited from June of 1996 until 

January of 1997 before asking his attorney whether she 

had filed his petition for review,” far longer than the six 

calendar days during which it is suggested Ms. Herring 

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8 HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

could have acted. Green v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 83 

M.S.P.R. 333, 334 (1999), aff’d, 232 F.3d 912 (Fed. Cir. 

2000). More significantly, the MSPB in Green also found 

that the petitioner, contrary to his assertion, had met 

with counsel two years before the petition was ultimately 

filed and was informed at that time of her disbarment. 

Id. In the present matter, Ms. Herring asserts she followed up by telephone with counsel six days before the 

filing was due, at which time it appeared matters were 

proceeding without issue. 

Other cases cited by the MSPB are similarly distinguishable in that they involve much longer delays or 

greater fault on the part of the petitioner. For example, 

Moore v. Department of Veterans Affairs involved a delay 

of more than four years, during which period Moore 

consulted with counsel but nevertheless failed to file an 

appeal. 80 M.S.P.R. 268, 270 (1998). In Link v. Wabash

Railroad Co., the Supreme Court noted it “could reasonably be inferred from [the facts of the case] . . . that petitioner had been deliberately proceeding in dilatory 

fashion.” 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962) (emphasis added). In 

Johnson v. Department of the Treasury, the MSPB presiding official had made “repeated requests” for information 

that were not satisfactorily answered and “[t]wo prior 

continuances had been granted despite delayed or insufficient support.” 721 F.2d 361, 364 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In 

Sofio v. Internal Revenue Service, both the appellant and 

her representative failed to appear at a scheduled hearing 

because the representative was ill, but the Regional Office 

was not notified in advance of the illness and no explanation was ever given for this failure. 7 M.S.P.R. 667, 668 

(1981). Even then, the presiding official found good cause 

present, and only after a third postponement request did 

the presiding official decide to adjudicate the matter on 

the record without a hearing. Id. at 669.

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HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 9

responsiveness. To the contrary, the record shows that 

immediately upon learning of the error, the consulting 

attorney filed Petitioner’s appeal with the Board via 

facsimile the same day at 5:56 P.M. Pet’r’s App. 36; see 

also Pet’r’s Br. 8–9. 

While previous cases have declined to find good cause 

even where the delay was short, these cases each contained some additional factor weighing against a finding 

of good cause. For example, only a four-day delay was at 

issue in Rowe v. Merit Systems Protection Board, where 

this court found good cause lacking. 802 F.2d 434 (Fed. 

Cir. 1986). Unlike the present case, however, where 

petitioner diligently communicated with her attorney and 

reasonably believed the appeal would be timely filed, in 

Rowe the petitioner made no efforts to ensure that his 

attorney would file within this period. Id. at 435 (noting 

the petitioner continued to insist the appeal “was not 

untimely” even though the deadline “had been specifically 

mentioned in his removal notice”). In Phillips v. United 

States Postal Service, the MSPB upheld a finding that the 

appellant had not shown good cause despite only a six-day 

delay, but the delay was due to the appellant’s failure to 

correctly address materials to his attorney. 5 M.S.P.R. 

339, 340 (1981). In Lands v. Department of the Air Force, 

the MSPB upheld a finding of no good cause despite only 

a single day of delay. 95 M.S.P.R. 593, 596 (2004). The 

sparse explanation for the lateness, however, was “oversight” on the part of the attorney. Moreover, the explanation was provided in an unsworn response even though 

“any explanation for the untimeliness of a petition for 

review that is not submitted in the form of an affidavit or 

a statement signed under penalty of perjury is insufficient 

to establish the assertions it contains.” Id. at 595; see also

McAdory v. Dep’t of Justice, 6 M.S.P.R. 112 (1981) (upholding a finding of no good cause despite only a single 

day of delay due to attorney negligence, but noting that in 

addition to the late filing, no response was received to the 

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10 HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

show cause letter). Goldberg v. Department of Defense

involved similar circumstances to the present matter in 

that only a seven-day delay was at issue and the cause for 

the delay, in part, was that the attorney’s office had 

misplaced the Board’s order denying a ninety-day extension of the time to file. 39 M.S.P.R. 515, 517 (1989). In 

upholding a finding of no good cause, however, the Board 

noted that a copy of the order had also been mailed to the 

appellant. Id. at 518. Unlike the present case, there was 

no indication that the appellant had attempted to contact 

counsel following receipt of the order. 

“To establish good cause for a filing delay, an appellant must show that the delay was excusable under the 

circumstances and that the appellant exercised due 

diligence in attempting to meet the filing deadline.” 

Zamot v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 332 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed.

Cir. 2003); see also Dunbar v. Dep’t of the Navy, 43 

M.S.P.R. 640, 643 (1990) (“To establish good cause, a 

party must show that due diligence or ordinary prudence 

was exercised under the particular circumstances of the 

case.”). It is unclear from the record what a reasonable 

person in Ms. Herring’s circumstances would have done 

that she did not do. This is not a case where the petitioner deliberately ignored a deadline due to the erroneous 

advice of counsel. See Massingale v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 

736 F.2d 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (upholding a finding of no 

good cause where petitioner, on the advice of counsel, 

initiated an arbitration proceeding rather than submitting an appeal to the agency, as the agency had indicated 

he must do). Nor is it a case where the petitioner repeatedly failed to communicate with the agency. See Barnes v. 

Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 566 F. App’x 909, 910 (Fed. Cir. 

2014). In hindsight, it may be easy to construct a sequence of events that would have led to timely filing. Ms. 

Herring, however, had no reason to know that any additional steps were necessary. 

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HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 11

To the extent any MSPB decision suggests attorney 

negligence can never constitute good cause,2 even where 

the petitioner has exercised ordinary prudence under the 

circumstances and other mitigating factors are present, it 

is erroneous. A recent MSPB order finding good cause 

despite attorney negligence illustrates this point and 

provides a useful comparison to the present matter. In 

Brink-Meissner v. Office of Personnel Management, the 

petitioner missed a filing deadline by six days because the 

OPM’s decision “was erroneously date stamped” by the 

attorney’s support staff as being received in the attorney’s 

office on September 4, 2013, when in fact it had been 

received on August 26, 2013. No. PH-844E-14-0077-I-1, 

2014 WL 5361501, at *1 (M.S.P.B. Aug. 5, 2014). As in 

the present case, see Pet’r’s Br. 6, 7, 13 and Pet’r’s App. 

37–38, Brink-Meissner communicated with her attorney 

several times in order to ensure the appeal would be 

timely filed, was assured by a staff member at the attorney’s office the attorney would handle the matter, and 

had no reason to believe otherwise, Brink-Meissner, 2014 

WL 5361501, at *2. The Board found under these circumstances, Brink-Meissner “[had] made the requisite showing under Dunbar,” i.e., that “her diligent efforts to 

prosecute her appeal were thwarted, without her 

knowledge, by her attorney’s deceptions and negligence.” 

Id. at *1; see also Crawford, 60 M.S.P.R. at 446 (finding 

the attorney’s negligence to have “misled and lulled” the 

appellant into believing the case was proceeding smoothly) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

2 See, e.g., Goldberg, 39 M.S.P.R. at 518 (“Negligence on the part of an appellant or his attorney does not 

constitute good cause for a late filing, even though the 

filing may be late by only [one] day.”); Stromfeld v. Dep’t 

of Justice, 25 M.S.P.R. 240, 241 (1984) (same). 

 

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12 HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

III. Prejudice

As this court has previously stated, “‘[i]f the employee 

gives a reasonable excuse for the delay, such excuse 

should be accepted by the presiding official, absent a 

showing of substantial prejudice to the agency caused by 

the delay in filing.’” Williamson v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 

334 F.3d 1058, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Alonzo, 4 

M.S.P.R. at 184); see also Primbs v. United States, 4 Cl.

Ct. 366, 370 (1984) (“‘[A] serious . . . dereliction by an 

attorney, when unaccompanied by a similar default by the 

client, may furnish a basis for relief [from a dismissal] 

under Rule 60(b)(6). That is the more so where, as apparently here, little if any prejudice has befallen the other 

party to the litigation.’”) (quoting Jackson v. Wash.

Monthly Co., 569 F.2d 119, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). The 

MSPB has not asserted the ten-day delay caused it any

prejudice. 

IV. Retirement Benefits Claims versus Other Claims

In her brief, Ms. Herring asserts “the Board summarily dismisses in a footnote Petitioner’s argument regarding 

the long-recognized, less-stringent application of the 

Alonzo principle in the context of retirement matters.” 

Pet’r’s Br. 20. Some precedent supports this assertion. In 

Edney v. Office of Personnel Management, 79 M.S.P.R. 60, 

62 (1998), the Board reinstated petitioner’s appeal despite 

“the errors of her chosen representative,” in part because 

“a retirement case . . . is substantively different from the 

nature of an adverse action appeal.” The Board explained:

In a discipline or removal case, it can be said that 

an expedient response to an appeal enables the 

agency to move forward with the management of 

its programs and its workforce. However, in an 

appeal related to a retirement decision made by 

OPM, there is no such agency need for finality to 

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HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 13

sion on the merits. . . . [A]ny doubt as to whether 

the Board should reopen the appeal for an adjudication of its merits should be resolved in favor of 

the appellant, even more so than in a disciplinary 

appeal.

Id. 

Nor is Edney alone in referencing a more lenient 

standard with respect to retirement claims. See, e.g., 

Kjeldsen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. CH-831M-07-0395-I4, 2012 WL 11881230, at *2 (M.S.P.B. Mar. 28, 2012) (“[I]t 

is true that the Board has made a distinction between 

retirement cases and adverse actions in determining 

whether to find good cause for an untimely filing.”); Lamb 

v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 110 M.S.P.R. 415, 419 (2009) 

(“Retirement cases are not adversarial proceedings in the 

sense that adverse actions are, and thus any doubt as to 

whether the Board should waive the filing deadline for an 

adjudication on the merits should be resolved in favor of 

the appellant.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted); Matson v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 105 M.S.P.R. 

547, 552 (2007) (“The Board has recognized that appeals 

involving an appellant’s entitlement to retirement benefits are fundamentally different from other types of appeals within its jurisdiction.”); see also Karker v. Office of 

Pers. Mgmt., 80 M.S.P.R. 235, 240 (1998) (finding “good 

cause to waive a filing deadline because the Board has 

placed a high priority on resolving retirement benefits 

cases on the merits”). 

The Board’s failure to consider a factor it has previously treated as significant contributes to this court’s 

conclusion that the MSPB abused its discretion in its 

disposition of Ms. Herring’s petition. See Webster v. Dep’t 

of the Army, 911 F.2d 679, 694 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Failure 

to consider a relevant factor constitutes an abuse of 

discretion.”); see also VanFossen v. Dep’t of Hous. & 

Urban Dev., 748 F.2d 1579, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1984)

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14 HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

(“[F]ailure to consider a significant mitigating circumstance constitutes an abuse of discretion.”). If the Board 

found this factor to be unimportant or unpersuasive in the 

present case, it should have articulated its reasoning. Cf. 

Copeland v. Wasserstein, Perella & Co., 278 F.3d 472, 484

(5th Cir. 2002) (“It is well settled that, to conduct our 

review [under the abuse of discretion standard], we must 

be able to understand the district court’s disposition of the 

sanctions motion.”). 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the judgment is

REVERSED

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

RAMONA GILL HERRING,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________ 

2013-3170

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DC844E120778-I-1.

______________________ 

REYNA, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

This is an unremarkable case that involves a law 

firm’s failure to make a timely filing on behalf of its client. 

As a result of the missed deadline, Ms. Herring’s appeal 

to the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board” or 

“MSPB”) for reconsideration of denial of her application 

for disability retirement benefits was dismissed. The 

Board considered whether good cause existed for the 

failure to meet the deadline and found none. The majority reverses the Board’s good cause determination, and 

further finds that the Board abused its discretion for 

failure to reach two other issues. For the following reasons, I dissent. 

MSPB regulations provide that an appeal will be dismissed as untimely filed “unless a good reason for the 

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2 HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

delay is shown.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.22(c) (2012). The Board 

may waive the time limit and accept an untimely filing 

where it determines, upon consideration of all of the facts 

and circumstances, that good reason exists for the delay. 

Id. § 1201.22. This court has held that the decision 

whether to waive an applicable time limit is committed to 

the Board’s discretion and that this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board. Mendoza v. Merit 

Sys. Prot. Bd., 966 F.2d 650, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en 

banc) (collecting cases). A Board decision not to grant a 

waiver will be reversed only upon a showing that the 

Board decision was an abuse of its discretion. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(c).

The majority finds that the “unusual” facts in this 

case render the Board’s decision not to waive the time 

limit an abuse of its discretion. Maj. Op. at 5. In addition, the majority holds that the Board abused its discretion by failing to assert the extent of prejudice it would 

suffer were a waiver to be granted and by failing to extend leniency to Ms. Herring on grounds that this case 

involves retirement benefits. I address each in turn. 

I. GOOD CAUSE

There is nothing unusual here. This is a case where a 

client hires a law firm to take its appeal and the law firm 

fails to file the appeal on time. There is no controversy 

surrounding whether an attorney-client relationship 

existed between Ms. Herring and the law firm. The 

record is clear that the circumstances leading to the 

untimely filing were solely related to the attorneys’ failure to file on time.1 The majority correctly states that 

1 Ms. Herring’s attorney conceded during oral argument that the filing deadline was missed due to negligence by the firm. Oral Argument Hearing Tr. at 4:51-

 

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HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 3

there are no extraordinary circumstances attributable to 

Ms. Herring that account for the delay. Maj. Op. at 8-9. 

The six day length of delay is unremarkable, and there 

are no extraordinary facts attributable to the MSPB or 

the law firm that account for the delay. In my view, the 

Board reviewed all relevant facts in this case in reaching 

its decision not to grant a waiver. I see no basis for 

faulting the Board for abuse of its discretion. 

The majority, however, makes an independent review 

of the facts, and substitutes its factual judgment for that 

of the Board. First, it faults the Board for not “systematically” applying the numerous Alonzo criteria. I find no 

authority that mandates a good cause determination to be 

made based on all Alonzo criteria. 

Second, the majority finds that the Board abused its 

discretion by failing to consider Ms. Herring’s “relevant 

physical and psychological conditions.” Maj. Op. at 6. 

While the record contains statements of Ms. Herring’s 

medical conditions, those statements relate only to the 

nature of Ms. Herring’s underlying disability claim. I find 

nothing in the record indicating any “relevance” of Ms. 

Herring’s medical condition to the issue of the delay. 

Indeed, neither party raised or argued the relevancy of 

Ms. Herring’s medical conditions and, as noted above, the 

majority was correct that there are no extraordinary

circumstances attributable to Ms. Herring that account 

for the delay. The Board therefore, did not abuse its 

discretion in failing to consider Ms. Herring’s medical 

conditions as a factor to the issue of delay.

Third, the majority sums up its review of circumstances in this case:

5:04, available at United States Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit website, http://cafc.uscourts.gov/. 

 

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4 HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

These circumstances, taken together, indicate 

the actions and inactions of Ms. Herring’s law 

firm “were misleading and deceptive in effect” 

and “‘misled and lulled’” Ms. Herring “‘into believing th[e] case was proceeding smoothly.’” 

Crawford v. Dep’t of State, 60 M.S.P.R. 441, 446 

(1994) (quoting Dabbs v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 56 M.S.P.R. 57, 60 (1992)). 

Maj. Op. at 6 (brackets original). This statement constitutes a significant, distinct factual finding by the majority. Yet, the evidence is that the missed deadline was 

caused by a failure of communication within the firm’s 

multiple offices. There is no evidence of any action on the 

part of the firm as deceiving or misleading, intended or 

otherwise. I find no legal support or factual basis for this 

holding. 

II. PREJUDICE AND LENIENCY

In addition, the majority finds that the Board abused 

its discretion because it failed to address the extent of 

prejudice it would suffer should waiver be granted, and 

because the Board did not apply or articulate a more 

lenient good cause standard in this case on the basis that 

leniency is “a factor it has previously treated as significant” in other instances. 

In the cases cited by the majority, prejudice and 

leniency are considered only after good excuse of the delay 

was established. In addition, the cases cited involve 

circumstances beyond the missed deadline facts of this 

case. See Williamson v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 334 F.3d 

1058, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“there are at least three 

documents that, taken together, are sufficient to constitute preponderant evidence that Williamson’s appeal was 

filed on [the deadline]”); Primbs v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 

366, 370 (1984) (where there was a dereliction of duty by 

an attorney and dismissal under Rule 60(b)(6)). Such

circumstances are not present in the instant appeal. As a 

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HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 5

result, the majority appears to elevate both prejudice and 

leniency as factors that alone may establish good cause, a 

proposition I do not accept.

This case is a simple matter of a law firm missing a 

filing deadline that has placed its client at risk of losing 

her retirement benefits. There are no excuses proffered, 

reasonable or otherwise, for missing the deadline. The 

Board fully reviewed the facts in its decision that good 

cause has not been shown. Because I find no reason to 

disturb that determination, I dissent. 

Case: 13-3170 Document: 59-2 Page: 19 Filed: 02/18/2015