Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-70724/USCOURTS-ca9-12-70724-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent
Jose L. Zumel
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE L. ZUMEL,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 12-70724

Agency No.

A079-192-469

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

May 12, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed September 29, 2015

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain and Sandra S. Ikuta,

Circuit Judges and James A. Teilborg,

*

 Senior District

Judge.

Opinion by Judge Ikuta

 

* The Honorable James A. Teilborg, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

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2 ZUMEL V. LYNCH

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel granted Jose L. Zumel’s petition for review of

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision finding him

inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I) for having

engaged in terrorist activity. 

The panel held that the BIA correctly found that an

attempted coup against the Philippine government in 1989

was unlawful under Philippine law, and that Zumel

“engaged” in the coup by planning it. For purposes of this

appeal, the panel assumed that the question of coup

participants’ “intent to endanger, directly or indirectly,

the safety of one or more individuals” under

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b) is a factual question, and held

that the BIA erred in failing to apply the clear error standard

of review to the Immigration Judge’s finding that the coup

participants lacked such intent. The panel remanded for the

BIA to review the IJ’s factual findings regarding intent for

clear error.

COUNSEL

Carrie Rosenbaum (argued), Law Offices of Carrie

Rosenbaum, Alameda, California; Nancy Ann Fellom, Law

Offices of Fellom and Solorio, San Francisco, California, for

Petitioner.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ZUMEL V. LYNCH 3

Mark Christopher Walters (argued), Senior Counsel for

National Security; Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy

Assistant Attorney General; Michael P. Lindemann, Chief,

National Security Unit, United States Department of Justice,

Office of Immigration Litigation, Appellate Court Section,

Civil Division, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

Jose Maria Carlos De Leon Zumel, a native and citizen of

the Philippines, petitions for review of a decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ruling that he is

inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I) for having

engaged in terrorist activity, and dismissing his appeal from

the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) order of removal. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and hold that the

BIA did not err when it determined that an attempted coup

against the Philippine government was unlawful under

Philippine law, and that Zumel “engaged” in the coup by

planning it. But assuming that the question whether the coup

participants lacked an “intent to endanger, directly or

indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals,” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b), is a question of fact, the BIA erred

in failing to apply clear error review to the IJ’s finding that

the coup participants lacked such intent. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i). We therefore grant the petition for review

and remand to the BIA.

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4 ZUMEL V. LYNCH

I

This appeal relates to Zumel’s activities during a period

of political instability in the Philippines from 1986 to 1989. 

In 1986, Zumel was serving as a general in the Philippine Air

Force. In February of that year, then-President Ferdinand

Marcos held snap elections. Despite allegations of election

fraud, the Philippine Congress adopted a resolution declaring

that Marcos received the highest numbers of votes and

proclaiming him president. However, a mass demonstration

of support for Marcos’s opponent, Corazon Aquino,

ultimately led Marcos to flee to the United States in exile and

Aquino to take power.

After Aquino took power, Zumel became a leader of an

opposition group known as Alyansang Tapat sa Sambayanan

(ALTAS). ALTAS was a faction of the military that believed

Marcos was the legitimate elected leader of the Philippines. 

To demonstrate their continued support for Marcos, ALTAS

members, including Zumel, attended a swearing-in ceremony

for Marcos’s vice-presidential running mate at the Manila

Hotel on July 6, 1986. As a result of Zumel’s attendance at

the swearing-in ceremony, the Air Force removed him from

active duty and placed him on an on-call assignment.

Despite his removal from active duty, Zumel remained

active in ALTAS. In January 1987, ALTAS staged a coup

against the Aquino government. Zumel participated in

planning the coup, including deciding which bases to target. 

In order to destabilize the Aquino government and pave the

way for Marcos to return to power, ALTAS decided to take

over two air force bases, Villamor Air Force Base (Villamor

AFB) and Sangley Air Force Base (Sangley AFB), and a

television station in Manila. The ALTAS forces took over

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ZUMEL V. LYNCH 5

Villamor AFB for about one hour, but succeeded in taking

over Sangley AFB for two days. During that period, ALTAS

detained the Sangley AFB commander on the premises and

prevented him from communicating with his troops. After

two days, the Philippine military forces supporting Aquino

suppressed the attempted takeover.

Zumel was not involved in tactical decisions about how

best to deploy the ALTAS forces on the ground. Rather, his

role during the operation was to coordinate the actions of the

opposition air force units and send reinforcements to assist

the troops if necessary. While the attempted coup was

underway, Zumel monitored the radio from a safe house. He

was unable to communicate with the ALTAS leaders at

Sangley AFB, however, because the battery on his radio died,

and he never sent any reinforcements to Villamor AFB

because the Philippine military regained control too quickly.

After the January 1987 coup attempt failed, Zumel went

underground, and the Aquino government issued warrants for

his arrest. According to the government, the warrants

charged Zumel with violating the Philippine Articles of War,

specificallyArticle 67 (“Mutiny or Sedition”) and Article 117

(“Officers, Separation from Service”). See An Act for

Making Further and More Effectual Provisions for the

National Defense byEstablishing a System of MilitaryJustice

for Persons Subject to Military Law, Comm. Act No. 408,

arts. 67, 117 (1938), 2 P.L. Comm. Ann., p. 781, 805, 817

(Phil.). While underground, Zumel continued to take a

leadership role in ALTAS, and served as the point of contact

for individuals wishing to join the movement. He also

communicated with Lieutenant Colonel Gregorio Honasan,

the leader of Reform the Armed Forces Movement, which

also opposed Aquino.

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Zumel, Honasan, and other opposition groups began

planning another attempt to unseat the Aquino government. 

This effort (the largest of the opposition initiatives) took

place in November 1989, and involved the coordinated efforts

of multiple organizations. According to the government, over

3,000 opposition troops participated. In this coup attempt, the

opposition attempted to take over Villamor AFB, Sangley

AFB, and the Aguinaldo Headquarters of the Armed Forces

of the Philippines. The attempt was initially successful: 

Honasan’s troops took control of Sangley AFB, and used it to

launch air attacks on the Aguinaldo Headquarters. Zumel’s

role during the operation was to coordinate reinforcement

troops for Sangley AFB. From his position in a safe house,

Zumel monitored the radio communications between ALTAS

members and the Philippine military, and sent reinforcement

troops to Sangley AFB. These reinforcements were forced to

turn back when the United States Air Force sent fighter

planes to help the Aquino regime gain control. Although the

opposition troops held on to Sangley AFB and the Army

Headquarters for several days, and controlled Villamor AFB

for a few hours, the coup was ultimately defeated with

American assistance. According to Zumel, the coup attempt

resulted in approximately 30 to 50 casualties on both sides. 

After this second coup attempt, the Aquino government

charged Zumel with an additional count of rebellion and

sedition for his participation in the 1989 coup.

The Aquino government and ALTAS, represented by

Zumel as its chairman, began negotiating a peace agreement

in 1992, and reached an agreement on May 29, 1995. 

ALTAS members agreed to surrender “all equipment,

firearms, ammunitions and explosives in their possession.” 

In turn, the Aquino government agreed that the ALTAS

members named on a list later provided by Zumel “shall be

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ZUMEL V. LYNCH 7

granted a general and unconditional amnesty for crimes

committed in pursuit of political belief during the period 26

February 1986 to 30 April 1994.” Zumel was one of the

ALTAS members who received amnesty. Zumel’s

“Certificate of Amnesty” stated:

This is to certify that Jose Ma. Carlos L.

Zumel was granted AMNESTY for acts

constituting Rebellion / Coup d’etat

committed during the period from February

26, 1986 to April 30, 1994 on June 23, 1995

pursuant to the provisions of Proclamation

No. 347, issued on March 25, 1994 by His

Excellency, President Fidel V. Ramos.

In September 2000, Zumel traveled to the United States

on a visitor’s visa. He applied for lawful permanent

residency through his daughter the next month. The

application did not mention Zumel’s involvement in ALTAS,

and it falsely stated that Zumel had never been charged with

violating any law in the United States or elsewhere, and had

never been a beneficiary of amnesty. On April 12, 2001, the

former Immigration and Naturalization Service (Service)1

granted Zumel permanent residency status.

On November 29, 2002, after a short visit to the

Philippines, Zumel arrived at Los Angeles International

Airport, where an immigration officer referred him to

1 On March 1, 2003, Congress transferred the functions of the former

INS to the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116

Stat. 2135 (2002). For the sake of simplicity, we refer to both the former

INS and the current DHS as “the Service.”

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8 ZUMEL V. LYNCH

secondary inspection. The Service subsequently served

Zumel with a Notice to Appear, charging Zumel with being

an arriving alien who was subject to removal under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I) for engaging in terrorist activities.2

Zumel’s case was referred to an IJ, and Zumel filed a motion

to terminate the proceedings on the ground that he had not

engaged in terrorist activity.

II

Before examining the IJ and the BIA’s rulings on Zumel’s

motion to terminate the proceedings, we first explain the

statutory provisions that render aliens who have “engaged in

a terrorist activity” ineligible to receive visas or to be

admitted to the United States. See generally 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(3)(B).

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I), “[a]ny alien who

. . . has engaged in a terrorist activity . . . is inadmissible.” 

The term “engage in terrorist activity” is defined to include

committing or inciting to commit a terrorist activity “under

circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or

serious bodily injury,” preparing or planning a terrorist

activity, and soliciting others to engage in terrorist activity,

either “in an individual capacity or as a member of an

organization.” Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv). It also includes

soliciting individuals “for membership in a terrorist

organization described in [§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III)] unless the

2 The Service also charged Zumel with being removable under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) for willfully misrepresenting a material fact on his

application for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident and

under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) for being an alien not in possession

of a valid immigrant visa. Neither charge is before us on appeal.

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ZUMEL V. LYNCH 9

solicitor can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence

that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known,

that the organization was a terrorist organization.” Id.

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(V)(cc).

A “terrorist organization” is defined in

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) to mean “a group of two or more

individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in, or

has a subgroup which engages in” terrorist activity. Id.

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III).

Finally, “terrorist activity” is defined to mean “any

activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where

it is committed (or which, if it had been committed in the

United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the

United States or any State).” Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii). 

“Terrorist activity” must also involve one of six enumerated

activities, including “[t]he use of any . . . explosive, firearm,

or other weapon or dangerous device . . . with intent to

endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more

individuals or to cause substantial damage to property,” or

“[a] threat, attempt, or conspiracy” to do the foregoing. Id.3

 

3

 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) provides in full:

As used in this chapter, the term “terrorist activity”

means any activity which is unlawful under the laws of

the place where it is committed (or which, if it had been

committed in the United States, would be unlawful

under the laws of the United States or any State) and

which involves any of the following:

(I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance

(including an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle).

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10 ZUMEL V. LYNCH

We have held that an armed attack “by dissidents on

the military of a country,” including attacking the

military’s convoy, constitute terrorist activity under

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii). Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 785 (9th

Cir. 2009).

While these interlocking definitions cover a wide range of

activities, we focus on the statutory language relevant to this

appeal: an alien is inadmissible if the alien (1) planned an

activity either individually or as a member of an organization,

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(II), (2) that was unlawful under

(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill,

injure, or continue to detain, another individual in order

to compel a third person (including a governmental

organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an

explicit or implicit condition for the release of the

individual seized or detained.

(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected

person (as defined in section 1116(b)(4) of Title 18) or

upon the liberty of such a person.

(IV) An assassination.

(V) The use of any–

(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear

weapon or device, or

(b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or

dangerous device (other than for mere personal

monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or

indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or

to cause substantial damage to property.

(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the

foregoing.

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ZUMEL V. LYNCH 11

the laws of the place where it was committed, id.

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii), and (3) involved the use of explosives,

firearms or other weapons or dangerous devices, id.

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b), (4) with the intent to endanger,

directly or indirectly, the safety of individuals or cause

substantial damage to property, id.

III

We now turn to the IJ and the BIA’s rulings. The IJ held

three evidentiary hearings and issued both an interim and

final decision in this case. The IJ first determined, as an issue

of first impression, that the government had the burden of

proving that Zumel was inadmissible at the time he adjusted

status, and therefore was never “lawfully admitted for

permanent residence,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C),

because he had engaged in terrorist activity.

4

Next, the IJ considered whether Zumel had “engaged” in

the 1989 coup attempt, and whether it was a “terrorist

activity” within the meaning of the statute.5 The IJ found that

4 Zumel does not argue that the Service erred in charging him with being

an inadmissible arriving alien, rather than a deportable admitted alien. 

Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (defining classes of aliens who are ineligible to

be admitted to the United States), with id. § 1227 (defining classes of

aliens who are deportable after admission) and id. § 1101(a)(13)(C)

(stating that “[a]n alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the

United States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the

United States” unless the alien falls within one of six enumerated

categories). Therefore, we do not address this issue.

5 The IJ concluded that neither Zumel’s attendance at the swearing-in

ceremony for Marcos’s running mate at the Manila Hotel nor his conduct

during the coup attempt in 1987 constituted “engag[ing] in a terrorist

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12 ZUMEL V. LYNCH

Zumel had “engaged” in the 1989 coup attempt by

participating in its general planning. See 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I), (iv)(II). She also found that the 1989

coup attempt was unlawful under the laws of the Philippines,

see id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii), and that weapons were used

during the coup attempt. She then addressed whether the

coup attempt was undertaken with the requisite “intent to

endanger.” See id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b). In her

preliminary ruling, she found that it was undisputed that there

were some deaths as a result of the coup attempt, which

raised the inference that the participants intended to endanger

individuals. In her final ruling, the IJ found Zumel to be

credible and therefore credited his testimony that there were

ALTAS officers stationed at Villamor AFB and Sangley

AFB. The IJ held that this raised the inference that ALTAS

intended to take over the bases using the leadership already

in place, thereby avoiding bloodshed. Based on Zumel’s

testimony, the IJ also found that the ALTAS troops detained

the commander at Sangley AFB, but did not injure or threaten

him. The IJ stated that this fact raised the inference that the

participants in the coup were promoting a peaceful surrender. 

Finally, the IJ found that the Aquino government, not the

opposition, destroyed fighter planes in the coup attempt. 

Based on these findings and inferences, the IJ concluded that

the government had not met its burden of proving that the

participants in the 1989 coup attempt intended to endanger

individuals or cause substantial property damage, and

therefore ruled that Zumel was not inadmissible as an

alien who engaged in terrorist activities. See id.

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I).

activity,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I). These determinations are not

before us on appeal.

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ZUMEL V. LYNCH 13

The BIA sustained the government’s appeal. In response

to the argument that Zumel’s efforts to return power to a duly

elected president made him a political combatant, not a

terrorist, the BIA first stated it lacked jurisdiction to consider

a group or individual’s motive for engaging in an activity that

otherwise meets the definition of “terrorist activity,” citing In

re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 941 (BIA 2006). The BIA then

concluded that Zumel “engaged” in the 1989 coup attempt

both by helping plan the attempt and by soliciting others to

join ALTAS and to participate in the coup attempt. In

considering whether the 1989 coup attempt was a “terrorist

activity,” the BIA adopted the IJ’s conclusions that the 1989

coup attempt was unlawful under Philippine law6

and the

attempt involved the use of firearms or other weapons. 

Turning to the intent of the coup participants, the BIA

reached a different conclusion than the IJ. Based on the

record, the BIA stated that the purpose of the members of

ALTAS and other participants in the attempted coup was to

force the government from power. Further, according to the

BIA, the means for obtaining that purpose included a range

of activities, including using weapons to secure an Air Force

base, and thus it was undisputed that the participants

anticipated that forcible action of some kind would be taken

against the government. Based on these facts, the BIA

concluded that the participants in the coup attempt intended

to, and did, use weapons to endanger individuals. In reaching

this conclusion, the BIA did not overturn the IJ’s holding that

Zumel was credible, instead noting that Zumel made

6 Neither the BIA nor the IJ addressed the question whether the 1989

coup attempt “would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or

any State,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii), nor did the parties address the

issue in their briefs. The issue is therefore not before us on appeal.

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14 ZUMEL V. LYNCH

“significant concessions” in his testimony that supported the

BIA’s conclusion.

In light of its conclusions that Zumel “engaged” in the

1989 coup attempt and that the coup attempt constituted a

“terrorist activity,” the BIA determined that Zumel was

inadmissible at the time he adjusted status to that of lawful

permanent resident, and was therefore an arriving alien who

was inadmissible as charged. The BIA ordered Zumel

removed to the Philippines.7 Zumel timely petitioned for

review.

IV

Where, as here, “the BIA conducts its own review of the

evidence and law, rather than adopting the IJ’s decision, our

review is limited to the BIA’s decision, except to the extent

the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” See Rodriguez v.

Holder, 683 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “We review agency factual

findings and determinations of mixed questions of law and

fact for substantial evidence,” and legal questions de novo. 

Khan, 584 F.3d at 776. Whether the BIA applied the correct

standard of review is a legal question. Ridore v. Holder,

696 F.3d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 2012). We defer to the BIA’s

7 After the BIA ordered Zumel removed, the parties agreed that the BIA

lacked authority to order Zumel’s removal in the first instance, see

Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874 (9thCir. 2003), and the case was

remanded to the IJ solely for the entry of an order of removal. The IJ

ordered Zumel removed for the reasons stated in the BIA’s September 7,

2007 decision, and Zumel appealed. The BIA dismissed the appeal

because the IJ’s decision “was purely ministerial in nature” and Zumel did

not raise any arguments not already addressed by the BIA in its September

7, 2007 decision.

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ZUMEL V. LYNCH 15

non-precedential interpretation of ambiguous immigration

statutes under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944),

meaning that our deference is proportional to the

interpretation’s “thoroughness, reasoning, consistency, and

ability to persuade.” Lezama-Garcia v. Holder, 666 F.3d

518, 524–25 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Mejia–Hernandez v.

Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 2011)).

On appeal, Zumel does not dispute that the ALTAS

members intended to overthrow the Aquino government. Nor

does he dispute that the coup attempt involved the use of

weapons. Instead he claims that the BIA erred in holding: 

(1) that he “engaged” in the coup attempt by planning it and

soliciting others to participate in it, (2) that the coup attempt

was unlawful under the laws of the place where it was

committed, and (3) that it was undertaken “with intent to

endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more

individuals or to cause substantial damage to property,” see

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b).8

A

We first consider Zumel’s argument that, even if the 1989

coup attempt was a “terrorist activity,” the record does not

support the BIA’s determination that he “engaged” in that

activity by planning it and soliciting others to participate in it.

8 The parties decline to raise any argument regarding the burden of

proof. The BIA assumed without deciding that the government had the

burden of proving that Zumel was not an “alien lawfully admitted for

permanent residence,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C), and on appeal, the

government argues we need not reach this question of first impression. 

We agree, because we would reach the same conclusions regardless which

party bears the burden of proof. Therefore, we will also assume without

deciding that the government has the burden here.

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We conclude that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s

determination that Zumel planned the 1989 coup attempt. See

id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(II). Zumel testified that prior to the

1989 coup attempt, he met with Honasan and they agreed to

join forces to carry out a coup against the Aquino

government; Zumel then held meetings with the relevant

commanding officers to coordinate the attempt. Zumel also

testified that he provided troops to support the takeover of

Sangley AFB. Such evidence supports the BIA’s

determination that Zumel “at a minimum . . . helped in

general planning of” the 1989 coup attempt. In light of this

evidence, we are not persuaded “that any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude that the

Government did not meet its burden” of proving that Zumel

planned the attempt.9 Abufayad v. Holder, 632 F.3d 623, 630

(9th Cir. 2011).

B

We next address Zumel’s argument that the BIA erred by

concluding that the 1989 coup attempt was unlawful under

Philippine law. Zumel argues that his activity cannot be

considered “unlawful under the laws of the [Philippines]”

within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) because

the Philippine government did not formally declare his

actions to be unlawful and no Philippine court formally

determined that Zumel engaged in an unlawful act, and the

9 Because we conclude that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s

determination that Zumel “engaged” in the 1989 coup attempt by planning

it, we need not address the BIA’s additional conclusion that Zumel also

“engaged” in the attempt by soliciting others to participate in it.

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ZUMEL V. LYNCH 17

Philippine government’s grant of amnesty eliminated the

existence of Zumel’s unlawful activityunder Philippine law.

10

Given the plain language of § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii), we reject

both arguments. The text of § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) defines

“terrorist activity” to mean “any activity which is unlawful

under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which,

if it had been committed in the United States, would be

unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State).” 

It does not require the IJ to determine whether the

government of the affected country formally declared the

activity unlawful; indeed, the IJ need not even consider the

laws of the affected country if the activity would be unlawful

in the United States.11 Nor does the IJ have to determine

whether the alien was convicted of the unlawful activity; the

language of § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) focuses on the unlawful

nature of an activity, not on whether the alien who engaged

in the activity was convicted of a criminal offense. When

Congress wants to make clear that immigration consequences

do not attach unless an alien is convicted of an offense, it uses

express language to that effect. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.

10 Zumel does not dispute the IJ’s conclusion that the 1989 coup attempt

was unlawful under Philippine law at the time it was committed. Nor

could he, because this conclusion is well supported in the record. Zumel

testified that the Philippine government charged him with the crime of

rebellion for the 1989 coup attempt, and a retired Associate Justice of the

Court of Appeals in the Philippines stated under oath that Zumel’s acts

“were considered illegal and punishable” under Philippine law. 

Additionally, the certificate of amnesty given to Zumel states that he was

granted amnesty “for acts constituting Rebellion / Coup d’etat committed

during the period from February 26, 1986 to April 30, 1994.”

11 In any event, we note that the government of the Philippines formally

declared in the Certificate of Amnesty that Zumel had engaged in “acts

constituting Rebellion / Coup d’etat.”

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§ 1182(a)(2)(B) (stating that an alien “convicted of 2 or more

offenses . . . for which the aggregate sentences to

confinement were 5 years or more is inadmissible.”).

Because Congress omitted any reference to convictions in

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii), we may presume this omission is

intentional. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200,

208 (1993).

For similar reasons, we reject Zumel’s argument that the

Philippine government’s grant of amnesty eliminated the

unlawfulness of Zumel’s offense for purposes of

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii). Again, nothing in § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)

suggests that a grant of amnesty eliminates the unlawfulness

of an activity. Id. The relevant inquiry under

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) is whether the activity is unlawful, not

whether the person who engaged in the unlawful activity now

stands before the law as though he had not committed a

crime, or has been immunized from any legal consequences

for the offense. Cf. Marino v. INS, 537 F.2d 686, 691 (2d Cir.

1976) (concluding that Italy’s grant of amnesty to the

petitioner did not “obliterate [the petitioner’s] conviction for

the purpose of determining eligibility to receive a visa and

meet the eligibility requirement for adjustment of status”

under U.S. immigration law). In other contexts, Congress has

expressly provided that an alien who has been pardoned for

unlawful conduct is relieved of immigration consequences. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) (stating that certain grounds

of deportability “shall not apply in the case of an alien with

respect to a criminal conviction if the alien subsequent to the

criminal conviction has been granted a full and unconditional

pardon by the President of the United States or by the

Governor of any of the several States”). Since Congress

knows how to eliminate the immigration consequences of

unlawful conduct when it wants to, we should not interpret

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ZUMEL V. LYNCH 19

congressional silence as accomplishing the same end. Cf.

Aguilera-Montero v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1248, 1251–52 (9th

Cir. 2008) (holding that an alien who receives a state pardon

cannot waive immigration consequences of his conviction

where the relevant statute lacks an express waiver provision). 

The BIA in this case likewise concluded that the amnesty

Zumel received merely relieves him of the legal

consequences of his actions, but it does not establish that the

underlying activity was not “unlawful” for purposes of

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(iii). This reasoning is entitled to

Skidmore deference. See Lezama-Garcia, 666 F.3d at

524–25. We therefore reject Zumel’s argument that because

of the grant of amnesty, the 1989 attempted coup did not

constitute an unlawful activity.

12

C

Finally, we address Zumel’s argument that the BIA erred

by concluding that the 1989 coup attempt involved the use of

firearms or other weapons “with intent to endanger, directly

or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals.” See

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V).

12 We also reject Zumel’s argument that the BIA erred by equating

amnesty with a pardon, as evidenced by its statement that Zumel received

a “full pardon or amnesty.” We need not determine whether there is a

material distinction between amnesty and a pardon because there is no

indication that the BIA misunderstood the nature of relief granted to

Zumel. Rather, the BIA adopted the IJ’s opinion, which included the

finding that under Philippine law, amnesty “abolishes and puts into

oblivion the offense itself” such that the person “stands before the law

precisely as though he had committed no offense.”

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20 ZUMEL V. LYNCH

1

We first briefly address Zumel’s argument that the BIA

erred by stating that it lacks jurisdiction under In re S-K- to

consider an organization or individual’s motive in engaging

in an activity. Zumel interprets this statement to mean that

the BIA thought it lacked authority to consider Zumel’s intent

in participating in the 1989 coup attempt and argues that such

a conclusion is contrary to § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b), which

defines terrorist activity as including the use of a weapon

“with intent to endanger” others, id. (emphasis added).

This argument is based on a misunderstanding of In re SK-, which considered whether an alien was statutorily

ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal under

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) due to providing material support to

a terrorist organization. 23 I. & N. Dec. at 937–38. In that

case, the BIA held that it lacked authority to consider the

argument that a rebel group is not a terrorist organization if

it is fighting against an illegitimate or oppressive government. 

Id. at 941–42. Rather, In re S-K- concluded that Congress

drafted § 1182(a)(3)(B) “very broadly, to include even those

people described as ‘freedom fighters,’” and did not give the

BIA “discretion to create exceptions for members of

organizations to which [the United States] Government might

be sympathetic.” Id. at 941. We upheld this interpretation in

Khan, where we determined that § 1182(a)(3)(b) contains no

exception “for armed resistance against military targets that

is permitted under the international law of armed conflict.” 

584 F.3d at 784. We acknowledged that this interpretation of

the statute would include such actions as “armed resistance

by Jews against the government of Nazi Germany,” but

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ZUMEL V. LYNCH 21

determined that such an interpretation is required by the

statute.13 Id. at 781.

Here, the BIA did not err in citing to In re S-K- for the

proposition that it lacks authority “to consider the motive of

a group or individual that otherwise meets the terrorism

definition.” This portion of the BIA’s opinion merely

responded to Zumel’s argument that ALTAS was not engaged

in terrorist activities because the Aquino government was

illegitimate. The BIA did not determine that it lacked

jurisdiction to consider whether Zumel and ALTAS intended

to endanger others in participating in the 1989 coup attempt;

indeed, it expressly considered that issue. Rather, the BIA

correctly noted that it lacked authority to consider the

legitimacy of the Aquino government and ALTAS’s motives

in attempting to overthrow it. See id. at 784.

2

We now consider Zumel’s argument that the BIA erred in

determining that the 1989 coup participants used weapons

“with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of

one or more individuals,” § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b). Zumel

argues that the coup participants’ intent is a question of fact,

and the BIA improperly conducted its own factfinding when

13 Khan also held that although the statute is broad, it is not

unconstitutionally vague because it “elaborates in great detail what

constitutes ‘terrorist activity.’” See 584 F.3d at 785–86. This holding

forecloses Zumel’s argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I) is

overbroad and vague.

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it determined that the coup participants had the requisite

intent.14 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3).15

14 Zumel did not raise this argument in his opening brief, but we may

consider it because the government had an opportunity to address it both

at oral argument and in a supplemental letter to the court after oral

argument. See Alcaraz v. INS, 384 F.3d 1150, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2004).

 

15 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3) provides:

(3) Scope of review.

(i) The Board will not engage in de novo review of

findings of fact determined by an immigration judge.

Facts determined by the immigration judge, including

findings as to the credibility of testimony, shall be

reviewed only to determine whether the findings of the

immigration judge are clearly erroneous.

(ii) The Board may review questions of law, discretion,

and judgment and all other issues in appeals from

decisions of immigration judges de novo.

(iii) The Board may review all questions arising in

appeals from decisions issued by Service officers de

novo.

(iv) Except for taking administrative notice of

commonly known facts such as current events or the

contents of official documents, the Board will not

engage in factfinding in the course of deciding appeals.

A party asserting that the Board cannot properly resolve

an appeal without further factfinding must file a motion

for remand. If further factfinding is needed in a

particular case, the Board may remand the proceeding

to the immigration judge or, as appropriate, to the

Service.

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ZUMEL V. LYNCH 23

No precedential BIA opinion has determined whether the

question of intent under § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b) is a factual

question, a legal question, or a mixed question of law and

fact. On appeal, the government did not address this issue,

but argued only that the BIA properly reviewed the IJ’s

factual findings regarding the coup participants’ intent for

clear error. See id. For purposes of this appeal, we assume

that intent under § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b) is a factual

question.

Although the BIA regulations permit the BIA to “review

questions of law, discretion, and judgment” de novo, 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.1(d)(3)(ii), they preclude it from reviewing an IJ’s

factual findings de novo, id. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). Instead, the

BIA may review an IJ’s factual findings only to determine

whether the findings are clearly erroneous. Id. Under the

regulations, the BIA may not make its own findings or rely

“on its own interpretation of the facts.” Vitug v. Holder,

723 F.3d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks

omitted). If the IJ has left certain factual disputes unresolved

and the BIA believes that it cannot decide the case unless

they are resolved, it cannot make its own factual findings but

instead “must remand to the IJ for further factual findings.” 

Rodriguez, 683 F.3d at 1173; see also 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.1(d)(3)(iv).

The BIA may determine that an IJ’s factual findings are

clearly erroneous if the findings are “‘illogical or

implausible,’ or without ‘support in inferences that may be

drawn from the facts in the record.’” Rodriguez, 683 F.3d at

1170–71 (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,

577 (1985)). When credibility determinations are at issue, the

BIA may also determine an IJ’s factual findings are clearly

erroneous if a witness’s testimony is contradicted by

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24 ZUMEL V. LYNCH

documents or objective evidence, or is “‘so internally

inconsistent or implausible on its face that a reasonable

factfinder would not credit it.’” Id. at 1171–72 (quoting

Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575). But “[u]nder clear error review,

if the BIA rejects a finding of the IJ, a ‘conclusory

pronouncement’ that the IJ has erred is insufficient; ‘the BIA

[is] obligated to explain why the IJ clearly erred in so

finding.’” Vitug, 723 F.3d at 1063 (alteration in original)

(quoting Ridore, 696 F.3d at 917).

If the BIA reviews the IJ’s factual findings de novo

instead of for clear error, or makes its own factual findings,

“it has committed an error of law.” Ridore, 696 F.3d at 911

(internal quotation marks omitted). If the BIA’s error

“materially affected its decision[] to reverse the IJ,” we must

vacate the BIA’s decision, Brezilien v. Holder, 569 F.3d 403,

414 (9th Cir. 2009), and remand for the BIA either to apply

the correct clear error standard of review or to remand to the

IJ to make any necessary additional factual findings. 

Rodriguez, 683 F.3d at 1177.

Assuming that intent under § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b) is

a factual question, the BIA here erred in failing to apply the

clear error standard of review to the IJ’s resolution of the

intent issue. We base this conclusion on a number of factors. 

First, although the BIA references the clear error standard of

review in its discussion of the IJ’s credibility finding, it does

not mention that standard in its discussion of the coup

participants’ intent. Although not dispositive, the BIA’s

failure to state it was reviewing the IJ’s intent finding for

clear error undermines the government’s argument that the

BIA actually applied that standard. Compare Ridore,

696 F.3d at 914, 919 (noting that “the BIA’s decision

nowhere mentions a standard of review” and ultimately

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ZUMEL V. LYNCH 25

concluding that the BIA improperly engaged in de novo

review of the IJ’s factual findings), with Perez-Palafox v.

Holder, 744 F.3d 1138, 1145–46 (9th Cir. 2014)

(distinguishing Ridore in part because the BIA “recognized

and acknowledged that the IJ’s factual findings were to be

reviewed for clear error”).

Second, the BIA did not address whether the IJ clearly

erred in making the key factual findings on which she based

her conclusion regarding the coup participants’ intent. For

instance, the BIA did not address the IJ’s finding that there

were ALTAS officers stationed at Villamor AFBand Sangley

AFB such that the bases could be taken over using the

leadership already in place there, nor did it address her

finding that ALTAS troops detained the commander at

Sangley AFB, but did not injure or threaten him. Indeed, the

BIA failed to even acknowledge that the IJ made a contrary

finding regarding the coup participants’ intent. The BIA’s

failure to evaluate the “factual findings of the IJthat were key

to the IJ’s holding,” indicates the BIA was not reviewing the

IJ’s determination for clear error. See Vitug, 723 F.3d at

1064.

Finally, rather than explaining why the IJ’s determination

that the coup participants lacked the requisite intent was

“illogical or implausible, or without support in inferences that

may be drawn from the facts in the record,” Rodriguez,

683 F.3d at 1170 (internal quotation marks omitted), the BIA

merely stated that “[i]t is clear from the record that

participants in [the 1989] coup intended to, and did, use

weapons to endanger others,” and that such weapons were

vital to securing the Air Force bases and to other stages of the

coup. Under our case law, such conclusory statements are

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26 ZUMEL V. LYNCH

inadequate when the BIA is applying the clear error standard. 

See Ridore, 696 F.3d at 917.

Because the BIA did not acknowledge the proper standard

of review, ignored facts found by the IJ, and did not explain

why the IJ erred in finding that the coup participants lacked

the requisite intent, we conclude that the BIA did not apply

the clear error standard of review to the IJ’s factual finding

regarding the coup participants’ intent. See Vitug, 723 F.3d

at 1063–64; see also Ridore, 696 F.3d at 919. The BIA

therefore engaged in a prohibited de novo review of material

facts. See Rodriguez, 683 F.3d at 1177.

Accordingly, we grant Zumel’s petition, vacate the BIA’s

decision, and remand for the BIA to consider the IJ’s factual

findings regarding intent under the correct clear error

standard of review. See Ridore, 696 F.3d at 922 (granting the

petition and remanding to the BIA to reconsider the IJ’s

decision applying the clear error standard of review);

Rodriguez, 683 F.3d at 1177 (same).

PETITION GRANTED.

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