Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06120/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06120-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles Curtis Harris
Appellant
Gary Maynard
Appellee
Gary A. Parsons
Appellee

Document Text:

,, PILED 

Uoited Sc,res Court of Appeals 

T,.Nh Cirrui! 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 2 5 1990 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

CHARLES CURTIS HARRIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

GARY MAYNARD; GARY A. PARSONS, 

Deputy Director, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 90-6120 

) (W.D. Oklahoma) 

) (D.C. No. CIV-89-1878-R) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Pursuant to 28 u.s.c. S 1915(d), the district court dismissed 

as frivolous plaintiff-appellant Charles Harris's claim under 42 

u.s.c. § 1983 alleging that the defendant prison officials violated his constitutional rights when they changed the criteria for 

community treatment security status. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-6120 Document: 010110064860 Date Filed: 10/25/1990 Page: 1 
• 

On May 8, 1989, Oklahoma enacted a statute relating to 

prisoners "whose controlling, concurrent, or consecutive sentence 

is for a sex or incest related offense or a drug distribution of 

drug trafficking offense or who have a prior conviction for a sex 

or incest offense or a drug distribution or drug trafficking offense." Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 510.l(C). Such offenders in 

prisons were made ineligible for weekend passes, while such offenders in community treatment centers and community security 

facilities were made ineligible for such passes until they were 

within eleven months of their release date. Id. On July 17, 

prison authorities revised the criteria for placement in community 

treatment centers and community security facilities so that 

prisoners affected by the above enactment would not be eligible to 

transfer to such facilities until they were within twenty-two 

months of their release date, "in order to eliminate the temptations and problems that can result from the fact that these offenders are no longer eligible for week-end passes." 

Harris is a prisoner at a minimum-security prison. He is 

serving concurrent sentences for operating a motor vehicle under 

the influence of intoxicating liquor after former conviction of a 

felony and possession of a controlled and dangerous substance with 

intent to distribute after former conviction of a felony. He is 

not within twenty-two months of his release date. He claims that 

the July 17 policy change is an ex post facto law, that it is 

contrary to Oklahoma law dealing with inmate transfers, and that 

it is being applied in a discriminatory manner. The district 

court found his claims to be frivolous, i.e., "lack[ing] an argu-

-2-

Appellate Case: 90-6120 Document: 010110064860 Date Filed: 10/25/1990 Page: 2 
able basis either in law or in fact," Neitzke v. Williams, 109 s. 

Ct. 1827, 1831 (1989). 

The policy change is not an ex post facto law. Regulations 

governing the classification of prisoners are not "laws" for 

purposes of ex post facto analysis. Resnick v. United States 

Parole Comm'n, 835 F.2d 1297, 1301 (10th Cir. 1987) (parole 

guidelines); Dyke v. Meachum, 785 F.2d 267, 268 (10th Cir. 1986) 

(classification within prison). Moreover, a procedural change 

which does not lengthen one's punishment is not an ex post facto 

law. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 33-35 (1981); Dobbert v. 

Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 (1977). This claim lacked an arguable 

basis in law. 

The policy change is consistent with Oklahoma law. In 

Oklahoma, the classification of prisoners is completely within the 

discretion of prison officials. Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 

357 (10th Cir. 1978); Julien v. Meachum, 618 F. Supp. 49, 52 (W.D. 

Okla. 1985). "By Oklahoma statute the Director of Corrections is 

vested with broad discretionary powers to .•. transfer prisoners 

from one institution to another .... " Twyman v. Crisp, 584 

F.2d at 356 (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 57, S 510(9))· In no way did 

the May 8 enactment change this. The claim had no arguable legal 

basis. 

Harris's claim that the policy change has been applied 

discriminatorily also lacked an arguable basis in law. He alleged 

discriminatory application, but he did not allege that the 

discrimination was intentional or purposeful. "The unlawful 

administration by state officers of a state statute fair on its 

-3-

Appellate Case: 90-6120 Document: 010110064860 Date Filed: 10/25/1990 Page: 3 
• > face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are 

entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection 

unless there is shown to be present in it an element of 

intentional or purposeful discrimination." Snowden v. Hughes, 321 

U.S. 1, 8 (1944); see also Mccleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 

(1987). 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Harris's motion for leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees is GRANTED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

-4-

Appellate Case: 90-6120 Document: 010110064860 Date Filed: 10/25/1990 Page: 4