Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03967/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03967-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard O. Stevens
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD O. STEVENS, Trustee of The

Gloria S. Stevens Trust, and Named

Executor of the Gloria S. Keesey

Stevens Estate,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Defendant. 

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No. 05-03967 SC

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT'S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Richard O. Stevens, Trustee of the Gloria S.

Stevens Trust, and Named Executor of Gloria S. Keesey Stevens

Estate ("Plaintiff" or "Estate"), filed this action against

Defendant United States of America ("Defendant" or "Government"),

under 28 U.S.C. § 1346, 26 U.S.C. §§ 7422 and 6511, claiming a

refund of $65,481.89 in overpaid estate taxes. 

Defendant now moves for summary judgment on the sole ground

that under 26 U.S.C. § 6511(b)(2)(A), Plaintiff submitted its

refund claim to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") too late to

reach any overpayment remitted on November 16, 1998. Defendant's

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 3 ("Def.'s

Mem."). For the reasons stated herein, the Court DENIES

Defendant's motion WITHOUT PREJUDICE to either party's right to

file a similar motion after discovery has been conducted.

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II. BACKGROUND

The following basic facts are uncontested. On February 16,

1998, Plaintiff's mother, Gloria Stevens, passed away. Plaintiff

Richard O. Stevens’ Declaration in Support of Opposition to

Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 (“Pl.’s Decl.”).

Thus, unless granted an extension, the Estate was required to file

a Form 706 United States Estate Tax Return by November 16, 1998. 

Id., Ex. A. 

On that date, Plaintiff sent the IRS a completed Form 4768

Application for Extension to File a Return, along with a check for

$162,109.58, the amount Plaintiff listed on the form's line for

the "[a]mount of estate and GST taxes estimated to be due." Id.

The IRS granted Plaintiff a six month extension, setting May 16,

1999 as the new deadline for filing. Id. at 2. 

Plaintiff, however, did not file the return until July 30,

2002. Id., Ex. B at 1. The return claimed a "refund payable to:

Richard O. Stevens, Trustee Gloria S. Stevens Trust, of

$65,481.89." Id.

On October 3, 2003, the IRS sent a letter to Plaintiff,

denying his refund claim. Id., Ex. D. The letter stated the

following reason for the denial:

You filed your return late, more than 3 years after the

due date. Your return showed an overpayment. In order

to claim that overpayment as a refund or credit, the law

requires you to file your return on time, within 3 years

from its due date.

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1 This reason misstates the law in effect at the time and

currently, Omohundro v. United States, 300 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th

Cir. 2002)(abrogating Miller v. United States, 38 F.3d 473 (9th

Cir. 1994), and established that filing a return late does not

foreclose a taxpayer's opportunity under Section 6511(a) to file a

refund claim within 3 years of the date the return was filed). The

reason no longer forms a basis for the Government's arguments.

Def.'s Mem.

3

Id. at 1.1 On September 30, 2005, Plaintiff filed the instant

complaint in this Court.

In addition to the uncontested official contacts between the

IRS and Plaintiff detailed above, Plaintiff also asserts a series

of less formal contacts between himself or another in his family

and the IRS, Complaint of Richard O. Stevens, Trustees of The

Gloria S. Stevens Trust, and Named Executor of Gloria S. Keesey

Stevens Estate at 2 ("Compl."), which the Government denies. 

Answer of the United States of America at 2 ("Answer"). For the

purpose of evaluating Defendant's motion, the Court accepts as

true evidence Plaintiff presents in these assertions' support. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 

The first informal contact occurred on May 13, 1999, three

days before the Official Extension expired; Plaintiff's wife, Joan

Stevens, called “Mr. Richmond (IRS employee ID #4163)." Pl.’s

Decl. at 2. In the course of the conversation, Ms. Stevens told

Mr. Richmond that the Estate "had largely overpaid the tax on

11/16/98, and fully expected a refund.” Id. Mr. Richmond told

her in response "that the estate would not suffer any loss in any

way so long as the total tax due had already been paid.” Id. 

Notes taken by Ms. Stevens during the call appear to reflect

further statements by Mr. Richmond that while no additional

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2

 Plaintiff's Declaration lists two other written

communications from the IRS that the Estate received prior to the

Official Extension's expiration. Both informed the Estate that it

had a "credit balance of $162,109" and attached forms on which the

Estate was asked to indicate how it would like to deal with the

credit. Pl.'s Decl. at 2. The forms included an option for the

taxpayer to choose that stated: "I want a refund of the credit

balance." Id., Exs. F-1B, F-2B. Plaintiff did not complete and

return either form because he could not find an option on the forms

which reflected his intent to file a return later, have part of the

credit applied to satisfy his then determined liability, and the

remainder refunded. Id. at 3.

4

extensions of the filing deadline were supposed to be allowed, the

estate could try sending a letter "to Fresno office," explaining

the circumstances and requesting more time. Id., Ex. E. There is

no indication the Estate ever sent such a letter.

On January 28, 2002, Plaintiff received a letter "from IRS

Revenue Officer Nancy Wong Identification No. 68-11603 . . .

asking to meet with [Plaintiff] to discuss [Plaintiff's] failure

to yet file the 706 return." Id. at 3.2 

In response to the letter, Plaintiff made two calls to IRS

Officer Wong, on February 11, 2002 and April 25, 2002. Id. at 3-

4. In the course of these calls, Plaintiff explained to Officer

Wong that the family had experienced a string of tragic events,

including the sequential deaths of "our father, mother, sister,

and uncle (each of whom lived in our family home)," all of whom

"had very long term healthcare cancer problems preceding their

deaths" and were cared for at home. Id. at 4. Plaintiff also

explained how, in addition, his "brother had prostate cancer and

surgery therefor," part of the family's business had suffered a

"major fire" and thus had closed, while the business's other part

"was in severe decline." Id. Plaintiff further informed Officer

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Wong that "the estate had greatly overpaid any estate tax that

would ultimately be found due . . . and we were expecting a refund

for any unused credit which the estate had paid on account." Id. 

On these bases, Plaintiff "requested additional time to file the

706 with its formal refund claim." Id. In response, "Ms. Wong

acknowledged [Plaintiff's] statements and said she would wait

until 5/31/02 to receive the 706 return.” Id. 

On May 29, 2002, Plaintiff sent Officer Wong a letter in

which he thanked her for "extending the time to file the death tax

return . . . to May 31, 2002," but, as a result of the recent

death of Plaintiff's sister, requested a further extension to July

31, 2002. Id., Ex. C. The letter also stated: "Please remember

that we have already made substantial prepayment on account and

anticipate receiving a refund." Id. Officer Wong sent a postcard

in response, acknowledging that she would "wait for form 706 until

7/31/02." Id., Ex. G. 

In light of this series of communications with Mr. Richmond

and Officer Wong, Plaintiff states that he was "surprised," when

he subsequently received the IRS's denial of his refund claim. 

Id. at 5. In particular, he notes "previous assurances . . . [by]

IRS employees . . . that there would be no penalties whatsoever

for filing a late return so long as the estate had already fully

paid its tax liability," the agreement worked out with Officer

Wong "to obtain extensions until 7/31/2002 to file the 706

return," and the failure by both Officer Wong and Mr. Richmond to

"advise[] [the Estate] that the estate had a right to refund claim

only if filed within 3 years of the return due date." Id. at 5-6. 

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Together these actions, Plaintiff states, "lulled [him] into a

sense of complacency and lack of urgency." Id.

Regarding all of the oral communications between the Estate

and IRS employees just described, Plaintiff states each was

"contemporaneously documented in writing by the IRS agents, in

their files, both formal and informal, and by computer entries,

during our telephone conversations." Id. at 1.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." F.R.C.P. 56(c). A material fact is

one "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (1986). 

The moving party "always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the District Court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact." Celotex v. Catrett, 377 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). The non-moving party, in turn, "must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." 

F.R.C.P. 56(e). However, "[s]hould it appear from the affidavits

of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons

stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's

opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment."

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3 Though neither party has raised the issue, the court notes

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held Section 6511(b)(2)(A)

"is jurisdictional." Zeier v. IRS, 80 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir.

1996). Zeier does not discuss the basis for this holding except a

citation to Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Lundy,[516 U.S. 235, 238-

241], 116 S. Ct. 647, 650-51 (1996), and the court's only

subsequent holding in accord, an unpublished opinion, is similarly

opaque. Bhatacharya v. Internal Revenue Comm'r, No. CV-04-

015632006 WL 1381608 (9th. Cir., May 15, 2006). 

In Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Lundy, the Supreme Court

noted, with reference to 26 U.S. § 7422(a), that "provisions

governing refund suits in United States District Court or United

States Court of Claims . . . make timely filing of a refund claim a

jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing suit. 516 U.S. 235, 241

(1996)(emphasis added). Section 7422(a) states: "No suit or

proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any

internal revenue tax . . . until a claim for refund or credit has

been duly filed with the Secretary." 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a). 

Internal Revenue Code, Sections 6511(a) and 6532 govern

whether a claim for refund or credit taxes paid is timely filed. 

26 U.S.C. § 6511(a)("Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment

of any tax . . . shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from

the time the return was filed or two years from the time the tax

was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no

return was filed by the taxpayer, within two years from the time

the tax was paid."); 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(1) ("No suit or proceeding

under section 7422(a) for the recovery of any internal revenue tax,

penalty, or other sum, shall be begun before the expiration of 6

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F.R.C.P. 56(f). Further, whatever evidence the non-moving party

submits "is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to

be drawn in its favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Ultimately,

"summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material

fact is 'genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." 

Id. at 248. 

IV. DISCUSSION

Both parties agree that the sole issue in this case is the

application of the look-back provision of Section 6511(b)(2)(A). 

See Def.'s Mem. at 3; Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to

Government's Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 ("Pl.'s Mem.").3

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months from the date of the filing the claim under such section

unless the Secretary renders a decision thereon within that time,

nor after the expiration of 2 years from the date of mailing by

certified mail or registered mail by the Secretary to the taxpayer

of a notice of the disallowance of the part of the claim to which

the suit or proceeding relates.") 

In contrast, 6511(b)(2)(A) addresses the "[l]imit on the

amount of credit or refund" that such a claim can demand, rather

than when a refund claim must be filed in order to be timely. 26

U.S.C. 6511(b)(2).

The Government does not argue to the Court that

Plaintiff has failed to timely file its refund claim under

Section 6511(a) or Section 6532(a)(1), and the Court on its

own finds that Plaintiff has met the requirements of both. 

Regarding Section 6511(b)(2)(A), as the discussion below

makes clear, whether Plaintiff will be able reach any

overpayment paid on November 16, 1998 will depend on whether

the Estate made an adequate informal refund claim. It is

well established that an adequate informal refund claim can

satisfy jurisdictional requirements of timely filing. Lundy, 516 U.S. at 250. Thus, accepting that Section 6511(b)(2)(A)

creates a jurisdictional bar to Plaintiff's case, Plaintiff

may clear that bar with proof that the estate submitted an

adequate informal claim, the same thing it will need to

prevail on the merits.

8

Section 6511(b)(2)(A) limits the amount of money a refund

claim timely filed under Section 6511(a) may seek, according to

how long after an overpayment the refund claim is filed: 

If the claim was filed by the taxpayer during the 3-year

period prescribed by section (a), the amount of the

credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of tax

paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing

of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any

extension of time for filing the return.

26 U.S.C. § 6511(b)(2). 

The Government argues application of this provision to

Plaintiff's refund claim is quite simple: The Estate made its

payment on November 16, 1998 and filed its claim for refund on

July 30, 2002. The Estate was granted a six month extension to

file, so it could look back three and half years in its refund

claim. The Estate's refund claim, however, was filed more than

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three and a half years after its payment on November 16, 1998, so

the refund claim cannot reach any overpayment made at that time. 

Def.'s Mem. at 3. 

Plaintiff argues, however, that these are not the only two

relevant dates; rather, also relevant are "informal claims" for a

refund made by the Estate on May 13, 1999, February 11, 2002, and

April 25, 2002. The three and a half year look back period of

should be measured from these dates, which would entitle the

Estate to a refund of any overpayment made on November 16, 1998. 

Pl.'s Mem. at 2.

Because the Court finds that the "informal claim doctrine"

could apply to this case and that a reasonable jury could find, on

the basis of the evidence presented by Plaintiff and the evidence

which Plaintiff claims exists but to which it does not have

access, that Plaintiff made an adequate informal claim within

three and a half years of the Estate's November 16, 1998 payment,

the Court finds that there are unresolved questions of material

fact which preclude summary judgment at this time. 

Informal claim Doctrine: Basic Rule and Policy Bases

In United States v. Kales, the Supreme Court articulated the

basic rule which henceforth came to be known as the "informal

claim doctrine":

[A] notice fairly advising the Commissioner of the

nature of the taxpayer’s claim, which the Commissioner could reject because too general or because it does not

comply with formal regulations, nevertheless will be

treated as a claim where formal defects and lack of

specificity have been remedied by amendment filed after

the lapse of the statutory period. 

314 U.S. 186, 194 (1941); see also Lundy, 516 U.S. at 250

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(reaffirming as a general matter “that a claim that does not

comply with federal regulations might suffice to toll the

limitations periods under the Tax Code."). 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has cited with approval

Judge Posner's discussion in BCS Fin. Corp. v. United States, 118

F.3d 522, 524-526 (7th Cir. 1997) of the two basic policy

foundations for the doctrine which guide its application. Comm'r

of Internal Rev. v. Ewing, 439 F.3d 1009, 1015 (9th. Cir. 2006). 

The first is to provide a means for judges to "excus[e]

harmless non-compliance with the formalities prescribed for refund

claims by Treasury regulation," so as to prevent an "absurd

rigorism" that would "make the taxpayer's utterly harmless mistake

the basis for forfeiting a claim conceded to be substantively

valid." Id. at 524; see also Tucker v. Alexander, 275 U.S. 228,

231 (1927) (stating that the tax code and regulations "are

devised, not as traps for the unwary, but for the convenience of

government officials in passing upon claims for refund and in

preparing for trial.") 

The second basis(related to the quoted sentiment in Tucker

above) is based on the idea of waiver. As Judge Posner explains:

The question in an informal-claim case is when the

"claim" was filed. The tax code does not say. Congress

has left the question to be answered by the Treasury.

Id. at 525. The Treasury is left free to answer this question how

it pleases, including by delegation to the IRS to define

circumstantially in certain cases, or, in other words, to create a

baseline rule that can, in certain instances, be waived. Id. 

Such a waiver is purely regulatory and so runs no risk of

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4 While the Court is not aware of any Ninth Circuit case in

which the informal claim doctrine was applied in the context of

Section 6511(b)(2)(a), as opposed to Section 6511(a), its

applicability in the former has been recognized in other circuits.

See, e.g., Kaffenberger v. United States, 314 F.3d 944, 954-56 (8th

Cir. 2003)(cited by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals with

approval in Ewing. 439 F.3d 1009, 1015); Willis v. Dep't of

Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, 848 F. Supp. 1127, 1127

(S.D.N.Y. 1994); But see, Wertz v. United States, 51 Fed.Cl. 443

(2002). Moreover, the Court notes that, regardless whether the

issue arises in the context of Section 6511(a) or Section

6511(b)(2)(A), "[t]he question in an informal-claim case is when

the 'claim' was filed,” BCS Fin. Corp., 118 F.3d at 525, and

constitutes "a gloss on the text of a Treasury regulation,

specifying the form and contents of a claim for a refund,” and so,

in either case raises the same policy issues discussed above. Id. at 527. The Court, therefore, finds that the informal claim

doctrine applies equally in the context of cases turning on Section

6511(b)(2)(A) as it does in cases turning on Section 6511(a). 

11

thwarting any "legislative design," thus keeping it within the

bounds set by United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347 (1997) and

related decisions. Id. 

Judge Posner cautions, however, that in this context

"[w]aiver . . . differs only a hair's breadth from estoppel," with

courts "us[ing] it like estoppel to prevent IRS agents from

lulling taxpayers into missing the three-year deadline." Id. at

526. Such applications of the doctrine are in tension with the

rule disfavoring estoppel against the government, "especially when

it results . . . in an unauthorized expenditure of government

monies," id. (citing Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S.

414 (1990), which suggests caution in its application.

Standard for Determining Adequacy of an Informal Claim4

 

As might be expected, whether a taxpayer has filed an

adequate informal claim is by its nature an extremely contextual

question. Estate of Hale v. United States, 876 F.2d 1258, 1262

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(6th Cir. 1989)("A court required to determine whether an adequate

informal claim has been filed should look at all the facts and

circumstances."); United States v. Commercial Nat'l Bank of

Peoria, 874 F.2d 1165, 1171 (7th Cir. 1989). Indeed, at least one

court has gone so far as to state "no set rules can be elucidated

as to what constitutes an adequate informal claim; rather, each

case must be determined based on its own unique set of facts." New

England Elec. Sys. and Subsidiary Cos. v. United States, 75 AFTR2d

95-786, 95-171 (Ct. Cl. 1995). That said, a review of cases in

which courts found adequate informal claims to have been made

reveals some basic contours of a standard, best summarized by the

Fifth Circuit in Pala, Inc. Employees Profit Sharing Plan and

Trust Agreement v. United States, 234 F.3d 873 (5th. Cir. 2000).

The court in Pala, as an initial matter, noted that "no 'hard

and fast rules'" exist, and that whether an informal claim is

adequate ultimately depends on whether under the facts

constituting it, "the Commissioner knew, or should have known,

that a claim was being made." Id. at 877. It nonetheless

articulated on the basis of past decisions a basic four part test. 

An informal claim is adequate if it: 1) was "filed within the

statutory period;" 2) "put the IRS on notice that taxpayer

believes an erroneous tax has been assessed;" 3) "describes the

tax and year with sufficient particularity to allow the IRS to

undertake an investigation;" and 4) while an informal claim "may

include an oral communications, it must have a written component." 

Id. Finally, "any such informal claim 'must have been followed by

a formal claim which remedied any defects in the informal claim." 

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Ewing, 439 F.3d at 1015 (quoting Kaffenberger, 314 F.3d at 954). 

In the absence of any standard articulated by the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals, the Court adopts this standard as the most

appropriate under the law.

Adequacy of Written Component

Before getting to the application of this standard to the

evidence presented by Plaintiff, there is one part of the standard

that bears further discussion: the adequacy of the written

component of an alleged informal claim. Not surprisingly, the

analysis again is fundamentally contextual. “[T]he proper

analysis should focus on whether or not in the context of a

particular case, a writing can be construed as a claim of a

right." New England Elec. Sys., 75 AFTR2d at 95-794. Further, as

Pala makes clear, both the written and oral components of the

refund claim are evaluated together as a whole to determine the

adequacy of the claim. Id. at 1175 

Fortunately, however, several cases have addressed one of the

specific questions which faces the Court in evaluating the

evidence presented by Plaintiff: whether internal government

documents alone can suffice as the written component. The

consensus among them is that it can. See, e.g., BCS Fin. Corp.,

118 F.3d at 527 (rejecting the contention "that the doctrine is

never satisfied when the only written evidence of a potential

claim is an internal governmental document,” and noting

hypothetically that a "strong case for application for the

doctrine" would be presented if "a taxpayer makes a detailed and

unequivocal oral claim to an IRS agent who writes it down verbatim

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5

The Court notes that Plaintiff argues inter alia that its May

29, 2002 letter to Officer Wong might satisfy the written component

of the standard. Compl. at 2. While there may be law to support

this proposition, see, e.g., Tinari, 1998 WL at *6, it is not

necessary to resolve for this order and has not been sufficiently

briefed by either party. The Court therefore declines to rule on

the issue at this time. 

14

and without showing it to the taxpayer and files it as a claim for

a refund.”); New England Elec. Sys., 75 AFTR2d at 794 (“[W]hen

oral statements of a taxpayer are documented in written form by

IRS personnel, the cases suggest that the requirement of a written

component is satisfied.”) Tinari v. United States, 1998 WL 720156,

*4 (finding that an oral refund demand which is “documented and

supported by a writing that was contemporaneously generated by the

Revenue Officer” is adequate.).5

Plaintiff Has Presented Sufficient Evidence for Application of the

Informal Claim Doctrine

In light of the law defining the informal claim doctrine just

discussed, Plaintiff has stated facts in its sworn declaration

that, in combination with documentary evidence which Plaintiff

states exists but to which Plaintiff has no current access, are

"such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

[Plaintiff]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Defendant denies these

facts, Answer at 2, creating a genuine issue of material fact,

foreclosing summary judgment. 

Plaintiff states in its Declaration that on three separate

occasions, following its payment of estimated taxes on November

16, 1998, the Estate's representatives contacted IRS personnel. 

Pl.'s Decl. at 1. Plaintiff states, specifically, that these

contacts occurred by phone on May 13, 1999, February 11, 2002, and

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April 25, 2002, and that during each a refund claim was made on

behalf of the Estate. Id. Plaintiff further states that each of

these calls was "contemporaneously documented in writing by the

IRS agents, in their files, both formal and informal and by

computer entries." Id. 

Each of these contacts was made within three and a half years

of November 16, 1998, the date on which Plaintiff sent the IRS its

payment. And the Court finds that based on the evidence stated by

Plaintiff a reasonable jury could find that one or more of these

contacts, viewed separately or as a whole in the context of the

other facts which Plaintiff describes, constituted an adequate

informal claim. If the jury did make such a finding, the

corollary finding would be that Plaintiff made a refund claim

within three and a half years of its payment of taxes, and so,

under Section 6511(b)(2)(A), could demand that the Government

refund any overpayment made at that time. The Government's motion

for summary judgment is therefore denied without prejudice. 

Plaintiff's Arguments in the Alternative

Plaintiff makes two other arguments in the alternative. The

Court rejects both on the grounds that they are in direct

contradiction with precedent binding on this Court. 

Plaintiff's first argument in the alternative appears to be

that because the IRS is capable of designating something as either

a deposit or payment on its forms and in its other communications

with taxpayers, the IRS should be bound by the designations of

remittances as "unapplied credits" or "estimated" that it makes in

those contexts. Pl.'s Mem. at 9. Plaintiff cites in support of

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this contention the following statement by the Ninth Circuit Court

of Appeals in Zeier v. United States: 

The Code explicitly provides that absent specific

designation as a deposit, remittances paid at the time

the return was due constitute payments "whether

precisely calculated or not." 

80 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1996)(citations omitted). It is

unclear how or why Plaintiff believes that this language in Zeier

supports its position, as the Court reads it to be in direct

conflict of Plaintiff's position. Referring to something as an

"unapplied credit" or as an "[a]mount of estate and GST taxes

estimated to be due" is not a "specific designation as a deposit."

Id. at 1364. Thus, under Zeier, remittances so labeled

"constitute payments." Id. The Court therefore rejects this

argument of Plaintiff.

 Plaintiff next urges the Court to find that Plaintiff's

remittance to the IRS was a deposit rather than a payment, not in

spite of the fact that so holding would be in direct contradiction

with Ott v. United States, 141 F.3d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir. 1998),

but because it would be. Pl's Mem. at 9. Plaintiff admits the

court in Ott held that "a remittance with a request for extension

of time to file a tax return is a tax payment not a deposit," but

nonetheless urges the Court to hold otherwise in this case "solely

to preserve the within [sic] estate's right to appeal to the U.S.

Supreme Court." Id. This argument is nonsensical for several

reasons, not least because Plaintiff's right to appeal a decision

by the Court on this issue would depend, in the first instance, on

the Court's rejecting Plaintiff's refund claim on this basis,

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either at this stage or at trial, not the other way around. 

Regardless, the decisions of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

are binding on the Court, and the Court refuses the invitation to

disobey them. Plaintiff's argument for the Court to do so are

therefore rejected. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 26, 2006

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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