Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-05167/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-05167-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Southern California Edison Company
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON

COMPANY, 

Defendant.

CIV-F-01-5167 OWW DLB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S CROSS MOTIONS FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(DOCS. 257) AND DENYING

DEFENDANT’S CROSS MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOCS. 253).

I. INTRODUCTION

This is an action for damages stemming from a fire allegedly

ignited by electrical equipment operated by Defendant Southern

California Edison Company (“Defendant” or “SCE”) in Big Creek,

California. The fire caused damage to property belonging to the

United States of America (“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff alleges that

the fire ignited when a squirrel came into contact with a 12kV

transformer located within an enclosure known as the 12kV

substation. 

The parties cross-move for partial summary judgment on the

issue of whether the 12kV substation is covered by the Federal

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The procedural history of this case is set forth in 1

greater detail in the August 10, 2004 Order Re: Request for

Reconsideration of Magistrate Judge’s Ruling. (Doc. 99.) 

2

Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) licenses held by SCE. Even

if the 12kV substation is not covered by the terms of the FERC

licenses, the government moves in the alternative for partial

summary judgment on the issue of whether SCE is nonetheless

liable under the terms of the licenses. Finally, if SCE is found

not to be liable under the terms of the license, the government

moves for partial summary judgment that SCE is liable in trespass

regardless of fault. 

The parties have each filed lengthy statements of undisputed

fact and evidentiary objections thereto. (See Docs. 275, 284

Attch. 1; 289; 291; 294; 297.)

II. GENERAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

SCE operates a hydroelectric power generation facility in

Big Creek, California, which is located on federal lands, inside

the boundary of the Sierra National Forest. On August 24, 1994,

a fire ignited in the vicinity of Big Creek Powerhouses Nos. 2

and 2A. (SCE Undisputed Fact (“SCE UF”) #1, Doc. 298;

Plaintiff’s Undisputed Fact (“USA UF”) #1, Doc. 297.) The fire

(“Big Creek fire”) allegedly burned more than 5,000 acres of

National Forest lands before it was extinguished. (Second

Amended Complaint (“Complaint”), ¶6.) The fire apparently began

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when a squirrel came into contact with one of the 7.2/12kV

transformers located in a switchyard (the “12kV substation”) near

Powerhouses Nos. 2 and 2A. (SCE UF #3; USA UF #3.)

Both Powerhouse Nos. 2 and 2A are owned and operated by

Defendant under licenses from the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission (“FERC”). (USA UF #8 & #14.) The 12kV substation is

a fenced-in yard located approximately 400 feet from Powerhouses

Nos. 2 and 2A and contains various pieces of equipment, including

several 12kV transformers. (See SCE UF #8.) The 12kV

transformers located within the 12KV substation step up a 7,000

volt (“7kV”) power source from Big Creek Powerhouse No. 2 to

12,000 volts (“12kV”). (SCE UF #10.) 

The Complaint contains fifteen causes of action: (1) breach

of the Project No. 2175 license, (2) indemnity under the Project

2175 license, (3) breach of Project No. 67 license, (4) indemnity

under the Project 67 license, (5) breach of Memorandum of

Understanding, (6) breach of Special Use Permit, (7) trespass to

federal lands, (8) trespass in violation of California Civil Code

§ 3346, (9) trespass by fire, (10) Trespass under California

Civil Code § 3334, (11) negligence per se for violation of Cal.

Pub. Res. Code § 4291, (12) liability under Cal. Health and

Safety Code §§ 13007 and 13008, (13) negligence based on Pub.

Util. Code § 451, (14) negligence, (15) recovery of interest,

penalties, and investigative, administrative and collection

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Plaintiff initially alleged that Defendant’s 2

hydroelectric plant is an ultrahazardous activity that should

subject it to strict liability, and that Defendant should be

liable for attorneys’ fees under 13 U.S.C. §§ 13009, 13009.1 or

31 U.S.C. § 3717. By order dated January 9, 2004, these claims

were dismissed. (See Doc. 42.) 

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costs. (Doc. 172, filed Nov. 30, 2004. )

2

During the early stages of discovery, SCE responded to

requests for admissions, admitting that the Project 2175 and 67

Licenses applied to the Transformer and 12kV substation. (See

Doc. 126, filed Sept. 21, 2004.) After reviewing documents

produced by the government in discovery, SCE moved to withdraw

these admissions. On October 22, 2004, the magistrate judge

granted SCE’s motion to withdraw admissions. (Doc. 150, filed

Oct. 22, 2004.) The United States was given leave to amend its

complaint and submit a plan for additional discovery. (Doc. 150

at 8-9.) During the hearing on the motion to withdraw, the

magistrate judge suggested that the scheduling order in this case

be amended to allow additional time for discovery. The parties

then moved to modify the scheduling order. (Docs. 157, filed

Oct. 27, 2004, and 158, filed Oct. 28, 2004.) 

With the original summary judgment motion approaching (and

the scheduling order not yet modified by the court), the parties

filed motions for partial summary judgment. (Doc. 139, filed

Oct. 15, 2004; Doc. 159, filed Oct. 29, 2004; Doc. 176, filed

Nov. 30, 2004.) At the hearing on those motions, the parties

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agreed to postpone summary judgment proceedings to provide both

sides additional time for discovery for all but one discrete

legal issue: Whether the United States is entitled to assert a

claim for prejudgment interest on any recovery under the FERC

licenses. The district court granted summary judgment for the

government on this issue, finding that such a claim may be

pursued. (See Doc. 205, filed Jan. 25, 2005.) 

Following the hearing on the first round of summary judgment

motions, a new scheduling order was entered. (Doc. 211, filed

Feb. 6, 2005.) Among other deadlines, the revised scheduling

order set April 5, 2005 as the deadline for “further disclosure

of experts” and May 5, 2005 as the deadline for “supplemental

expert disclosure.” (Id. at 2.) The district court also stated

that “either side may disclose any further experts by April 5th,

and any rebuttal or supplemental experts to the new experts by

May 5th.” On April 5, 2005, Edison designated Joel Prehiem and

Geoffrey Rabone, both Edison employees, as expert witnesses. The

United States disclosed no expert on this date. On May 5, 2005,

the United States designated Kevin J. Mara and Cynthia A. Whelan

as experts. The United States later withdrew Ms. Whelan as an

expert. Mr. Mara’s expert report was provided to SCE along with

the May 5, 2005 disclosure. On May 23, 2005, Edison moved to

strike Mr. Mara’s opinion. (Doc. 230.)

In a decision filed July 13, 2005, the magistrate judge

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The district court’s order was issued after both 3

parties had filed initial briefs on the pending motions for

partial summary judgment, but before oppositions were filed.

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found that the district court “did not intend to limit the May

5th designation to supplementation to an initial disclosure or

rebuttal to other experts designated.” (Doc. 250 at 5.) In the

alternative, even if the modified scheduling order only permitted

the designation of rebuttal witnesses on May 5, 2005, the

magistrate judge’s July 12, 2005 order found that Mr. Mara’s

opinion was proper rebuttal testimony. (Id.)

SCE requested reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s

order. (Doc. 260, filed July 27, 2005.) The district court,

interpreting the language of its own order, found that Mr. Mara’s

opinion was not proper rebuttal testimony and struck his expert

opinions. (Doc. 272, filed Sept. 23, 2005.) 

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);

California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Therefore, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show (1) that a genuine factual issue exists

and (2) that this factual issue is material. Id. A genuine

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issue of fact exists when the non-moving party produces evidence

on which a reasonable trier of fact could find in its favor

viewing the record as a whole in light of the evidentiary burden

the law places on that party. See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square

D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986). The evidence

must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. West Oregon Wood Products,

Inc., 268 F.3d 639, 644 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by 2001 WL

1490998 (9th Cir. 2001). Facts are “material” if they “might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” 

Campbell, 138 F.3d at 782 (quoting Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

at 248). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating

the absence of a genuine issue of fact. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263

F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001). If the moving party fails to

meet this burden, “the nonmoving party has no obligation to

produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine

Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th

Cir. 2000). However, if the nonmoving party has the burden of

proof at trial, the moving party must only show “that there is an

absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the

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moving party has met its burden of proof, the non-moving party

must produce evidence on which a reasonable trier of fact could

find in its favor viewing the record as a whole in light of the

evidentiary burden the law places on that party. Triton Energy

Corp., 68 F.3d at 1221. The nonmoving party cannot simply rest

on its allegations without any significant probative evidence

tending to support the complaint. Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076.

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the

entry of summary judgment, after adequate time

for discovery and upon motion, against a party

who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential

to the party's case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such

a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as

to any material fact,” since a complete failure

of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all

other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.

“In order to show that a genuine issue of material fact

exists, the nonmoving party must introduce some ‘significant

probative evidence tending to support the complaint.’” Rivera v.

AMTRAK, 331 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249). If the moving party can meet his

burden of production, the non-moving party “must produce evidence

in response....[H]e cannot defeat summary judgment with

allegations in the complaint, or with unsupported conjecture or

conclusory statements.” Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med., Inc., 343

F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003). “Conclusory allegations

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unsupported by factual data cannot defeat summary judgment.” 

Rivera, 331 F.3d at 1078.

The more implausible the claim or defense asserted by the

nonmoving party, the more persuasive its evidence must be to

avoid summary judgment. See United States ex rel. Anderson v. N.

Telecom, Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless,

“[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor.” Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255. A court’s role on summary judgment

is not to weigh evidence or resolve issues; rather, it is to find

genuine factual issues. See Abdul-Jabbar v. G.M. Corp., 85 F.3d

407, 410 (9th Cir. 1996).

IV. SUMMARY OF THE PARTIES’ MOTIONS

Several of the United States’ claims for relief allege that

SCE breached certain terms and conditions of the FERC licenses

covering Project 67 and Project 2175. The United States asserts

that SCE operates Big Creek Powerhouses No. 2 and 2A and

associated works, including the 12kV substation and the

transformers that allegedly sparked the fire, under these

licenses. The licenses contain indemnification language that,

according to the United States, would require SCE to pay for

damage to the property of the United States caused by facilities

covered by the licenses. SCE denies that the licenses apply to

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the 12kV substation and/or the 12kV transformers and that,

therefore, the indemnity provisions contained within the licenses

do not govern any liability determination in this case. 

The United States moves for summary judgment on the

applicability of the license indemnification clauses to the

damage caused by the Big Creek fire. The United States first

argues that the Project 67 and Project 2175 licenses explicitly

apply to the 12kV transformer, pointing to various general

provisions in the licenses and to one specific provision which,

according to the United States, operates to explicitly

incorporate the 12kV substation into the licenses. SCE cross

moves on this issue, asserting that the licenses do not

explicitly cover the 12kV substation and/or the transformer. SCE

points to, among other things, lists of structures and equipment

contained in the licenses, none of which mention the 12kV

transformers or substation. SCE also points to a map attached to

the Project 2175 license which appears to indicate that a

“substation” in the approximate location of the 12kV substation

is “not part of the project.” 

As additional support for its argument that the 12kV

transformers are not covered by the terms of the licenses, SCE

argues that FERC cannot lawfully assert jurisdiction over the

12kV transformers. Specifically, SCE maintinas that the

transformers feed lines that serve retail customers and are

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The United States does not offer a theory of liability 4

under these statutes and regulations. It appears, instead, that

the United States simply desires summary adjudication as to

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therefore part of the “interconnected distribution system” over

which FERC has no jurisdiction. The United States objects to

SCE’s characterization of the lines leaving the 12kV substation

and maintains that the 12kV transformers are in fact part of the

power generation system, not the distribution system, and

therefore properly fall within FERC’s jurisdiction. In the

alternative, even if the 12kV transformers do not technically

fall within FERC’s jurisdiction, the United States maintains that

FERC has “mandatory jurisdiction” over the transformers by virtue

of the fact that the entire complex sits on federally reserved

lands. The United States further argues that, even if there is

no basis for FERC to assert jurisdiction over the 12kV

transformers, the license provisions nevertheless render SCE

liable for the damage in this case. 

Finally, in the event it is determined that the license

provisions do not apply in this case, the United States requests

summary judgment on several alternative legal theories. First,

the United States submits that, if the licenses do not cover the

12kV substation or transformers, SCE was operating that equipment

unlawfully on government lands in violation of the Federal Power

Act and laws and regulations governing use the of National Forest

lands. Assuming SCE was operating the 12kV substation 4

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unlawfully on government land, the United States requests summary

judgment on the ground that SCE would therefore be liable in

trespass for the damage to the National Forest, regardless of the

extent to which SCE was at fault for the fire. Second, the

United States requests summary judgment on the ground that SCE is

also liable, regardless of fault, under California Health and

Safety Code § 13007. 

V. DISCUSSION

A. Cross Motions for Summary Judgment Concerning SCE’s

Liability under the Licenses. 

1. Basic Regulatory Background.

The Federal Power Act authorizes FERC to:

issue licenses to...any corporation...for the purpose

of constructing, operating, and maintaining dams, water

conduits, reservoirs, power houses, transmission lines,

or other project works necessary or convenient for the

development and improvement of navigation and for the

development, transmission, and utilization of power

across, along, from, or in any of the streams or other

bodies of water over which Congress has

jurisdiction...or for the purpose of utilizing the

surplus water or water power from any Government dam.

16 U.S.C. § 797(e)(emphasis added). The Act defines a

hydroelectric “project” as a:

complete unit of improvement or development, consisting

of a power house, all water conduits, all dams and

appurtenant works and structures (including navigation

structures) which are a part of said unit, and all

storage, diverting, or forebay reservoirs directly

connected therewith, the primary line or lines

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transmitting power therefrom to the point of junction

with the distribution system or with the interconnected

primary transmission system, all miscellaneous

structures used and useful in connection with said unit

or any part thereof, and all water-rights, rights-ofway, ditches, dams, reservoirs, lands, or interest in

lands the use and occupancy of which are necessary or

appropriate in the maintenance and operation of such

unit.

16 U.S.C. § 796(11). “Project works” are defined as “the

physical structures of a project.” A facility must meet the

statutory definition of a “project work” to be licensed by FERC. 

New York Power Authority, 98 FERC 61,033, 61,095 (2002)(“The

Commission has jurisdiction over qualifying non-federal

hydroelectric project works, which are defined in Part I of the

Federal Power Act (FPA). If a project work does not meet the

definition, it is not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction

and therefore does not belong in the project license.”). 

The United States argues that the terms of the FERC licenses

may nevertheless apply to structures and equipment that are

appurtenant to project works, even if those appurtenant structures

and/or equipment are not themselves “project works.” There is some

support for this assertion. In Lake Ontario Land Dev. & Beach

Protection Ass’n v. F.P.C., 212 F.2d 227, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1945), the

D.C. Circuit noted:

According to the statutory definitions, “project works”

include all the physical structures of a project, and

“project” includes not only named types of structures,

such as dams, but also “all miscellaneous structures

used and useful in connection with said unit.”

But, this does not change the underlying rule that FERC’s licensing

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The United States advances a rule that is contrary to 5

this warning from Lake Ontario, by suggesting that it may not be

appropriate to sharply distinguish between “project works” and an

entire “project.” In support of this assertion, the United

States points to language from SCE v. FERC, 116 F.3d 507, 512

(D.C. Cir. 1997). In that case, the D.C. Circuit examined a 1986

amendment to section 4(e) of the Federal Power Act, Pub. L. 99-

495, which requires FERC to include certain additional

environmental conditions in its licenses. SCE argued in that

case that section 4(e) should only apply to “original licenses”

(those issued for projects that have yet to be built), not “new

licenses” (those issued to existing projects whose licenses have

expired). SCE pointed out that section 4(e) made reference to

the licensing of “project works” while section 15 (which provides

general procedures for relicensing) referred only to “projects.” 

SCE argued that this “reflects the different types of licenses to

which the two sections apply.” The D.C. Circuit rejected this

argument on several grounds, while also noting that the “1986

amendment to the Power Act... seems to ignore the distinction

between projects and project works, making us even more hesitant

to place too much stress on this distinction.” 

Here, the United States points to this passage to support

its assertion that FERC jurisdiction may extend beyond project

works. But, SCE v. FERC did not discuss the breadth of FERC’s

jurisdiction, nor suggest that FERC’s jurisdiction should reach

beyond “project works.” 

Exactly how the law defines the “point of junction” and 6

the applicability of this jurisdictional rule to the facts of

this case are in dispute and are discussed at length at Part

V.A.3.

14

authority is limited to “project works,” not entire “projects”: 

The Commission licenses facilities-- dams, powerhouses,

transmission lines, and other “project works” of

various sorts--not projects as such. Care must be taken

in any consideration of this statute lest an

inadvertent shifting of the terms “project” (which is a

whole development) and “project works” (which are

structures) cause confusion.

 

Lake Ontario, 212 F.2d at 232. It appears to be well settled that 5

under the definition of “project works,” FERC’s licensing

authority ends at the “point of junction with the distribution

system.” See infra at Part V.A.3. In other words, even if a 6

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particular structure or piece of equipment might under certain

circumstances be considered appurtenant to a project work, if

that structure or equipment is beyond the reach of FERC’s

jurisdiction, FERC cannot license it.

In certain circumstances, FERC may assert a form of

jurisdiction over facilities that do not meet the statutory

definition. For example, FERC may review and then may grant an

application to delete a facility that was at one time approved

for licensing but no longer meets the statutory definition. See

Great N. Paper, Inc., 97 F.E.R.C. 61,204, 61,893 (2001)(“The only

way the Commission has jurisdiction over the reservoirs at issue

is if they are project works of the downstream unit of

hydroelectric development. They no longer are. Nor were they ever

under license, which means that the Commission cannot exercise

the kind of authority it may exercise with respect to the

transition of a work or facility from licensed status to nonlicensed status.”). It may be inferred from this rule that FERC

may assert jurisdiction over the previously licensed equipment or

structure until the agency has acted upon an application to

remove the equipment from the license. 

Two fundamental questions are presented here: (1) Are the

transformers explicitly included in one of the licenses, and

therefore are covered equipment until FERC approves an

application to remove them from the license? (2) Assuming the

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answer to this first question is no, does FERC have jurisdiction

to regulate the 12kV transformer that was the origin of the Big

Creek fire?

2. Is the 12kV Substation Explicitly Covered by the

Licenses?

If a piece of equipment was at one time approved for

licensing, FERC may entertain an application to have the

equipment removed from the license’s coverage. See Great N.

Paper, Inc., 97 F.E.R.C. at 61,893. If the licenses explicitly

covered the 12kV transformers, it may be inferred from Great

Northern Paper, that the terms of the licenses apply to the 12kV

transformers unless and until FERC removes them from the

license’s coverage. It is not disputed that prior to the Big

Creek fire, SCE had not applied to have the 12kV transformers

removed. It is hotly disputed, however, whether the licenses

make any explicit references to the 12kV transformer, or other

items the licensing of which would render the transformers

licensable. 

The language of the licenses was briefed extensively in the

last round of summary judgment motions. (Docs. 139, 159 & 176.) 

The parties reassert many of these arguments in the pending

motions by exhaustively listing all the portions of the licenses

that could arguably refer to the 12kV substation. For example,

on the one hand, the government points to passages containing

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Both licenses state that, “[t]he entire project, as 7

described in the order of the Commission, shall be subject to all

the provisions, terms, and conditions of the license.” (Project

67 License, Form L-1, Art. 1; Project 2175 License, Form L-5,

Art. 1.) In addition, a list of project works contained in the

Project 67 license, includes “[a]ll structures, fixtures,

equipment, facilities, or property which may be employed in

connection with the project whether located on or off the project

area, as approved by the Commission, and all riparian or other

rights necessary or appropriate for the maintenance or operation

of the project.” (Project 67 License at 19 (emphasis added).)

The government argues that the use of the term “project” rather

than “project works” was intentional and, therefore, that the

License should be applied to the entire “project,” not just those

features listed as “project works.” 

For example, License 67 explains that the “principal 8

features” of the project are “two powerhouses with a total

installed capacity of 154,000 kW; a switchyard; and two 220-kV

transmission lines linking the two project powerhouses to a

central system switchyard.” (Kimball Decl. ¶5, Ex. A at 2.) The

12kV substation is not mentioned.

17

general language, such as a section of the Project 67 License

which states that the license applies to “all lands...

constituting the project area and enclosed by the project

boundary.” (Project 67 License at 13; USA UF #5, 6, 10, 11.)7

In contrast, SCE points to lists of equipment contained in the

licenses, none of which make any mention of the 12kV substation

or any transformer that steps up 7.2kV power to 12kV. (SCE UF

#42-58.) 

8

The parties advance three central arguments based on the

text of the licenses. First, the United States emphasizes a

reference in the Project 67 license to “small ancillary lines”

and insists that this references lines that currently extend from

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the 12kV substation. Second, SCE points to a map that

purportedly excludes the 12kV substation from Project 67. 

Finally, the United States notes that the 12kV substation is

referenced in the application materials SCE submitted to FERC

when it sought initial approval for Project 2175. 

a. “Small ancillary lines.”

The Project 67 license provides:

 Transmission Facilities

Two 220-kV, 3-phase, single circuit transmission lines

emanate from the switchyard at Powerhouse No. 8. One is

the intertie between Powerhouse No. 2A and No. 8; the

other carries project power to the central switchyard

at Powerhouse No. 3 (FERC Project No. 120), where it

enters Applicant's interconnected primary transmission

system. In addition, small ancillary power lines extend

from Powerhouse No. 2A to Shaver Lake and to the top of

the Powerhouse No. 8 penstocks. We find that these

transmission facilities constitute part of the project

as defined in Section 3(11) of the Act.

(Project 67 License at 4; Kimball Dec. at Ex. A (emphasis

added).) The parties dispute whether the phrase “small ancillary

power lines” is intended to be a reference to any of the lines

currently emanating from the 12kV substation (the Snocat,

Manzanita, and Stevenson). 

The United States asserts that a portion of the Stevenson

line, which currently emanates from the 12kV substation,

currently supplies power to the penstocks of Powerhouse 8. (USA

UF #15.) In addition, a portion the Sno-Cat line “was at one

point the primary power supply to Shaver Lake Dam and still

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supplies power to Shaver Lake Dam.” (USA UF #17.) There are

certainly similarities between the “small ancillary lines”

described in the Project 67 license and these characteristics of

the Stevenson and Sno-Cat lines. 

SCE insists, however, that Plaintiff’s evidence is suspect

and disputed. For the most part, the United States relied on the

expert opinions of Mr. Mara to support the undisputed nature of

these facts. SCE correctly points out that Mr. Mara’s opinions

have been stricken by the court. The United States argues that

these facts are present in other portions of the record. For

example, the government points to deposition testimony given by

SCE’s expert, Mr. Preheim, who stated that the Stevenson line

supplies “backup power” to the penstocks of powerhouse 8, as well

as to powerhouse 8. (Ex. 16, at 89:8-90:8.) Preheim also

admitted that, if the power were to go out at Powerhouse 8, SCE

would provide power to run the penstocks through the Stevenson

line. (Ex. 16, at 92:1-9.) 

SCE, however, presents a declaration from Mr. Preheim

submitted with SCE’s opposition to the government’s motion for

summary judgment. In that declaration, Mr. Preheim clarifies

that he actually believes that the reference to “small ancillary

power lines” in the Project No. 67 license is “confusing because

it does not accurately describe any power lines associated with

[] Powerhouse No. 2A as currently configured.” (Preheim Opp’n

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Decl., at ¶9.) Mr. Preheim further declares that he has

determined that “the lines referred to were the Musick line which

emanates from [] Powerhouse No. 2 and goes toward Shaver Lake and

the Jumbo line which runs from Big Creek Powerhouse No. 8 to the

top of the Powerhouse No. 8 penstocks.” (Id. at ¶8-9.)

Rather than responding to SCE’s objections with facts, the

United States protests that SCE should not be permitted to create

a dispute of fact by submitting a declaration from Mr. Preheim

contradicting his deposition testimony. In support of this

proposition, the United States cites School District No. 1J,

Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1264 (9 Cir. th

1993), which makes reference to cases, including Foster v. Arcata

Assoc., Inc., 772 F.2d 1453, 1462 (9th Cir. 1985) and Radobenko

v. Automated Equipment Corp., 520 F.2d 540,544 (9th Cir. 1975),

where the Ninth Circuit held that a party should not be able to

substitute an affidavit alleging helpful facts, which contradict

earlier deposition testimony harmful to its case in order to

avoid summary judgment. However, the Ninth Circuit warns that

the Foster-Radobenko rule “should be applied with caution.” 

Multnomah, 5 F.3d at 1264. 

[T]he Foster-Radobenko rule does not automatically

dispose of every case in which a contradictory

affidavit is introduced to explain portions of earlier

deposition testimony. The district court must make a

finding of fact that the affidavit was a “sham.”

Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Here, there is

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nothing in the record which indicates that Mr. Preheim’s second

affidavit is a “sham,” which means baseless or frivolous. The

declaration appears to be a good faith effort on the part of SCE

to clarify Mr. Preheim’s otherwise confusing and ambiguous

deposition testimony. 

In the final analysis, the evidence concerning the meaning

and identification of the “small ancillary lines” mentioned in

Project 67 is disputed. Neither party is entitled to summary

adjudication on this issue. 

b. Project 67 map indicating that the 12kV

substation is “not a part of this project.” 

SCE cross-moves on the issue of whether the licenses

explicitly cover the 12kV Substation/transformers. In support of

this contention, SCE relies heavily on Exhibit K-5 attached to

License 67, which is a map described as showing the “Project Area

in the Vicinity of Big Creek Powerhouse No. 2A.” It is not

disputed that this map identifies the 12KV Substation as “Not

Part Of This Project.” (SCE UF #46.)

The United States insists that the Project 67 map only

excludes the 12kV substation because the 12kV substation is a

project work under the Project 2175 license. (USA’s response to

SCE UF #46.) The government also points out that 

Powerhouse 2, which is a project work of project 2175

(but not project 67), is also shown on Exhibit K-5 with

a dashed outline. In contrast, FERC Exhibit K-6 to the

project 2175 license depicts the 12kV substation in the

same location but with a solid line, as it does for

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powerhouse 2 and the other project works licensed under

project 2175. Powerhouse 2A, which is a project work of

project 67 (but not project 2175), is shown with a

dashed outline.

 

(Id. (emphasis added and citations omitted).) Taken together,

these two maps, Exhibit K-5 to the Project 67 license and Exhibit

K-6 to the Project 2175 license, create a dispute as to a

material fact: whether the 12kV substation is a part of Project

67, Project 2175, or neither. Summary adjudication as to the

explicit exclusion or inclusion of the substation in the license

is therefore not warranted on this ground. 

c. The United States’ arguments regarding

references to the 12kV substation in license

applications filed by SCE.

The United States continues to point to numerous references

to the 12kV substation in SCE’s application for the licenses.

(See, e.g., USA UF 9, 12A-12C.) Any arguments based on the

mention of the 12kV transformer in the license applications are

not well founded. Even assuming, arguendo, that the 12kV

transformer is included in the license, only FERC may determine

whether a particular piece of equipment is a project work and is

licensable. See also Dept. of Water Resources, 51 F.P.C. at 533

(“The mere fact that various facilities are proposed for

licensing by an applicant is not sufficient reason to assume that

all of such facilities are properly the subject of a license.”).

Neither party is entitled to summary judgment based on the

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Whether the licenses nevertheless provide indemnity to 9

the United States against damages caused by this fire, a related

but distinct question, is discussed infra at Part V.B.2.

23

face of the licenses. The government has failed to establish

that the licenses explicitly include the 12kV transformers and

SCE has failed to establish that the licenses affirmatively

exclude the transformers. This issue remains for trial.

As a matter of contract law, the license terms are

ambiguous. Beyond the above-discussed arguments concerning the

plain language of the licenses, however, both parties place great

emphasis upon the breadth and scope of FERC’s jurisdiction. 

Although neither party supports their jurisdictional arguments

with an over-arching legal theory, the extent of FERC’s

jurisdictional reach is relevant to the interpretation of the

ambiguous licenses. SCE impliedly asserts that ambiguity in the

licenses should be construed in SCE’s favor because FERC cannot

lawfully assert jurisdiction over the 12kV transformers. In

contrast, by insisting that FERC’s jurisdictional reach includes

the 12kV transformers, the United States impliedly argues that

the ambiguous license should be construed in its favor. 

3. Does FERC have jurisdiction to regulate the 12kV

transformer(s)?

One of the primary disputes raised by these motions is

whether FERC has jurisdiction to regulate the 12kV transformers.9

This question breaks down into two separate inquiries. The first

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inquiry is a legal one: Under what circumstances, if any, does

FERC have jurisdiction over transformers that step up hydrogenerated power for ultimate distribution to retail customers? 

The second inquiry is factual: Do the 12kV transformers qualify

as the type of equipment over which FERC has jurisdiction?

A review of the record and relevant caselaw suggests that

neither party is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of

whether the 12kV transformers fall within FERC’s jurisdiction. 

a. Applicable Law: What is the reach of FERC’s

jurisdiction?

The starting point for this jurisdictional inquiry is the

agency’s enabling statute. The Federal Power Act authorizes FERC

to:

issue licenses to...any corporation...for the purpose

of constructing, operating, and maintaining dams, water

conduits, reservoirs, power houses, transmission lines,

or other project works necessary or convenient for the

development and improvement of navigation and for the

development, transmission, and utilization of power

across, along, from, or in any of the streams or other

bodies of water over which Congress has

jurisdiction...or for the purpose of utilizing the

surplus water or water power from any Government dam.

16 U.S.C. § 797(e)(emphasis added). 

As discussed, FERC’s licensing jurisdiction is limited by

the statutory definition of “project”: 

“[P]roject" means complete unit of improvement or

development, consisting of a power house, all water

conduits, all dams and appurtenant works and structures

(including navigation structures) which are a part of

said unit, and all storage, diverting, or forebay

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reservoirs directly connected therewith, the primary

line or lines transmitting power therefrom to the point

of junction with the distribution system or with the

interconnected primary transmission system, all

miscellaneous structures used and useful in connection

with said unit or any part thereof, and all waterrights, rights-of-way, ditches, dams, reservoirs,

lands, or interest in lands the use and occupancy of

which are necessary or appropriate in the maintenance

and operation of such unit;

16 U.S.C.A. § 796 (emphasis added); see also Montana Power Co. v.

FPC, 112 F.2d 371, 373 (9th Cir. 1940). The point of demarcation

between licensable and unlicensable equipment is the “point of

junction with the distribution system or with the interconnected

primary transmission system.” Critically, a “primary line,”

falls under FERC’s jurisdiction, while a line that is part of the

“primary transmission system,” is beyond FERC’s jurisdiction.

Here, the issue is whether the 12kV transformer that

allegedly ignited the Big Creek fire lies on the licensable or

the unlicensable side of this jurisdictional demarcation. It is

not disputed that several lines (specifically, the Snocat,

Manzanita, and Stevenson lines) emanate from the 12kV substation. 

It is disputed, however, whether any of the these three lines are

part of the “distribution system or..the interconnected primary

transmission system.” Even if this initial question is answered

in the affirmative, it is also disputed whether the 12kV

transformer is the “point of junction.” 

// 

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(1) “Primary line” v. “primary transmission

system.”

To determine whether a line is a “primary line” or is part

of the “primary transmission system”:

the test to be applied is that of the basic purpose of

the line in relation to other facilities. In

determining which of the many purposes of any given

line is the basic purpose we must, therefore, look to

the specific facts before us.

Re: Western Mass. Elec. Co., 39 F.P.C. 723, 731 (1968) FERC

defines a “primary line” as follows:

If a line is used solely to transmit power from a

Commission-licensed project to a load center, and if

without it there would be no way to market the full

capacity of the project, then that line is primary to

the project. However, if a line serves both the

project and a distribution system or interconnected

transmission system, it is not a primary line. 

Puget Sound Hydro, 109 F.E.R.C. 61,039 at *8 (2004); see also

Georgia Power Co., 39 F.P.C. 930, 931-32 (1968)(a facility cannot

serve as both a primary line, over which FERC has jurisdiction,

and a distribution system, over which FERC has no jurisdiction).

(2) “Point of junction.” 

FERC has repeatedly held that its jurisdiction ends at the

“point of junction” with the primary distribution system. To

properly apply this rule, two legal questions must be answered:

(1) Under a particular equipment configuration, which piece of

equipment is the “point of junction” with the distribution

system? (2) Once this “point of junction” is identified, does

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FERC jurisdiction include or exclude the particular piece of

equipment that is so identified? 

A number of cases shed light on how a court should determine

the “point of junction” with the primary transmission system. 

In Montana Power Company v. FPC, 56 F.P.C. 3290 (1976), the FPC

considered whether its jurisdiction extended to several power

lines emanating from a switchyard. A number of lines connected

to a 100kV bus (which is essentially a switching station

containing lines and switches that all operate at 100kV) within a

switchyard. Two 100kV lines (the Kerr-Thompson Falls A and B

lines) connected directly to the 100 kV bus. For various reasons

that were specific to the facts of the Montana case, the FPC

found that these 100kV lines were distribution lines (i.e., they

were not primary lines subject to FPC jurisdiction). Two other

lines connected to the 100kV bus, each through a 100/161 kV

transformer. These lines carried power at 161kV away from the

switchyard. Again, for reasons specific to the Montana case, the

FPC found that these 161kV lines were also distribution lines

(i.e., not primary lines). In contrast, however, a fifth line

connected a 13.2 kV hydropower plant to the 100kV bus through a

13.2/100 kV transformer. The FPC found that this line, including

the 13.2/100kV transformer, and the 100 kV line leading from the

transformer to the 100kV bus were primary lines, and therefore

should be included in the license. The FPC found, however, that

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the 100kV bus was “common to both distribution lines and the

interconnected transmission system” and that the FPC’s

jurisdiction was “limited to that point of interconnection.” 

Montana did not explicitly define what it meant by finding

that its jurisdiction is “limited to” that point of

interconnection. In other words, FPC did not explicitly address

whether its jurisdiction included or excluded this point of

interconnection (the 100kV bus). It can be inferred from the

case, however, that its jurisdiction excluded this point of

interconnection because in the Montana opinion the FPC listed all

those pieces of equipment that should be included in the license

and the 100kV bus was not included in this list. 

Each side relies on Montana to support its position. SCE

emphasizes that the FPC excluded the 100kV bus as well as the

100/161 kV transformers feeding two of the distribution lines

from the license. The United States emphasizes that the FPC

included the 13.2/100 kV transformer that stepped up power from

the Kerr plant and fed it into the 100kV bus. 

Lockhart Power Co., 11 FERC 61,287, 61585 (1980) provides

additional guidance. In Lockhart, FERC found that a transformer

within a substation was the point of junction with the

distribution system and excluded from the license, while three

other transformers were found to be part of the “facilities

associated with the primary lines.” Lockhart concerned two

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independent sets of equipment. First, a single transformer

converted power from a 2.3kV generation source to 33kV, which was

then sent on to a distribution substation. Second, a separate

bank of three transformers also converted power from a 2.3kV

generation source to 33kV. All three transformers then fed power

at 33kV into a 33kV “bus.” The bus, in turn then fed power to

several distribution substations and a switching station 

The applicable factual description in Lockhart provides some 

additional information:

The project substation contains four 2.3/33 -kV

transformers, Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4. On its 2.3-kV

side--the generator lead side--transformer No. 1

constitutes the point of junction with Lockhart's

distribution system serving the Lockhart Village

distribution substation. Since transformer No. 1 serves

as a “point of junction with the distribution system”

within the meaning of Section 3(11) of the Act, it is

not part of the project and will be excluded from the

license. Transformers Nos. 2, 3 and 4, on the other

hand, are part of the project within the meaning of

Section 3(11). Power flows from the hydroelectric

generators at the project through these transformers to

the 33-kV bus on their high voltage side. The 33-kV bus

is the point of junction with the 33-kV lines to the

Adamsburg and Lockhart Mill distribution substations

and the Monarch switching station. Thus, these three

transformers are part of the facilities associated with

the primary lines (the generator leads) through which

project power flows before reaching the point of

junction with the interconnected primary transmission

system. Ordering paragraph (B)(2)(g) of the order

issuing the license for Project No. 2620 is also being

amended consistent with these findings.

11 FERC at 61585. 

The United States focuses on the second part of FERC’s

reasoning, concerning transformers 2, 3, and 4: 

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Transformers Nos. 2, 3 and 4...are part of the project

within the meaning of Section 3(11). Power flows from

the hydroelectric generators at the project through

these transformers to the 33-kV bus on their high

voltage side. The 33-kV bus is the point of junction

with the 33-kV lines to the Adamsburg and Lockhart Mill

distribution substations and the Monarch switching

station. Thus, these three transformers are part of the

facilities associated with the primary lines (the

generator leads) through which project power flows

before reaching the point of junction with the

interconnected primary transmission system. Ordering

paragraph (B)(2)(g) of the order issuing the license

for Project No. 2620 is also being amended consistent

with these findings.

Id. (emphasis added). From this description it can be inferred

that where a transformer (or a bank of transformers) steps up

power from a lower-voltage generation source to a distribution

voltage and then feeds this stepped-up power into a bus operating

at the distribution voltage, the bus is considered the point of

junction with the distribution system, not part of the primary

line, but the transformers which feed the bus are considered part

of the primary line and are licensable. 

SCE, for obvious reasons, focuses on the holding concerning

transformer No. 1:

On its 2.3 kV side--the generator lead side--

transformer No. 1 constitutes the point of junction

with Lockhart's distribution system serving the

Lockhart Village distribution substation. Since

transformer No. 1 serves as a “point of junction with

the distribution system” within the meaning of Section

3(11) of the Act, it is not part of the project and

will be excluded from the license. 

Id. SCE emphasizes that it is the low voltage side (i.e., before

the power is stepped up to the distribution voltage) that is

considered the point of junction with the distribution system. 

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SCE also points to Puget Sound Hydro, 109 F.E.R.C. 10

61,039. In that case, FERC determined that it lacked

jurisdiction over an entire hydro-power project because the

project generated energy from a non-navigable waterway. However,

one line emanating from the project passed over federal land. 

Even if a project is not located on a navigable water way (a

basis for Congressional action under the Commerce Claus) location

of a project on federal land (a basis for Congressional action

under the Property Clause) is an alternative basis for FERC

jurisdiction. 16 U.S.C. § 797. FERC reasoned that if the line

extending over federal land was a “primary line,” the agency

would possess licensing jurisdiction over the entire project. 

FERC then examined the electrical relationship between this line

and the rest of the project. From a physical perspective, the

line in question left the project’s generation plant, passed

through a substation, and then continued via a 55kV line, which

crossed over federal property. At the substation, power was

stepped down via transformers which fed two secondary lines. 

The transformer stepped power down from 55kV to 2300 volts to

“supply station service to Puget Hydro.” The second transformer

stepped power down to 220 volts for distribution to a retail

service meter located 500 feet from the substation on project

land (i.e., not on federal land). FERC held that the substation

was the “point of junction with the interconnected primary

transmission system.” FERC also found that the “primary

transmission line end[ed] at the PSE substation” which was not on

project land. In other words, once the 55kV line passed through

the substation, it was no longer a primary line. Therefore, even

though the 55kV line crossed federal land, it was not a

licensable line at that point. Accordingly, because no part of

the project was located on federal land, the project was not

licensable. What is not clear from the Puget Sound case is

which, if any, pieces of equipment in the substation were

considered licensable by FERC. Puget Sound is not particularly

helpful to this case. 

31

It is not clear whether Lockart’s transformer No. 1 was connected

to the distribution system through a bus or similar piece of

intermediary equipment, but it is safe to infer that there was

some structural distinction between transformer No. 1 and the

other three transformers. This description is of limited

precedential value, however, because it is so lacking in

detail.10

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The United States also points to Consumers Power Co., 5

FERC, 61,141, 61,336 (1978), in which FERC confronted the

following factual situation. 

[A] 7.5kV line runs from the power plant bus to

7.2-kV/14.4-kV step-up transformers in the new 14.4-kV

[ ]substation. From there, a 14.4-kV tap line runs to

two 14.4-kV distribution lines. 

Id. The licensee argued that the 7.2kV/14.4kv step-up

transformers were part of the distribution system and should be

excluded from the license. Id. FERC rejected this argument,

finding instead that

The “point of junction” with the Licensee’s

distribution system is clearly the point where its

14.4kV distribution lines begin -- after project power

has been stepped-up to the distribution voltage. 

Accordingly, the 7.2 kV line from the power plant bus

to the 14.4 kV substation and the bank of 7.2 kV/14.4

kV step up transformers constitute project lines and

appurtenances. 

Id. This holding appears to conflict with the portions of

Lockhart cited by SCE, where FERC found that the low-voltage (or

the “generator lead”) side of a step-up transformer was the

“point of junction” and therefore that the entire transformer was

unlicensable. For example, in Consumers Power, a “tap line” is

situated between the transformers and the distribution lines. If

this “tap line” is electrically similar to a “bus,” then

Consumers Power more closely parallels the factual situation in

Montana and the holdings from Lockhart cited by the United

States. Interpretation of such a similarity from the available

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The United States points to Georgia Power Co., 39 11

F.P.C. 930, 934 (1968). In that case, FERC was called upon to

determine whether several lines were licensable primary lines. 

After analyzing the uses to which those lines were put, FERC made

determinations as to each line. Several lines were found to be

part of the interconnected transmission system and therefore were

not included in the license. However, “each line or cable

transmitting power from the hydro generating equipment...to the

first point of junction with the Applicant’s distribution system

or interconnected primary transmission system....” were

licensable primary lines. Id. at 933. In its final order

concerning the license, FERC stated that the licenses should

include these lower voltage lines leading away from the

generation facilities, the transformers that stepped up power to

the transmission voltage, and associated switching facilities.

Once again, perhaps because FERC was focused on the

classification of the lines, rather than the transformers, this

case lacks the kind of detailed description of the electrical

relationship between the transformers and the interconnected

distribution system.

33

information requires analysis by an expert witness. No such

evidence has been provided. 

11

A few general rules can be elicited from the caselaw, even

without expert testimony; despite inconsistencies between

Montana, Lockhart and Consumers Power. 

(1) First, whether a line is a primary line or is part of

the primary transmission is determined by examining the

basic purpose served by that line. 

(2) Second, once it has been identified that at least one

line leaving a substation is part of the primary

transmission system, a court must closely examine the

relationship between the elements of that substation

(from an electrical engineering perspective) to

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determine which pieces of equipment are licensable and

which are not. 

(3) Third, based on those cases which specifically describe

the interconnections between the primary lines and the

primary transmission system, a set of rules can be

inferred. 

(a) If one or more lines that are part of the primary

transmission system feed off of a bus, that bus is

the point of interconnection and is not

licensable. 

(b) If a primary line feeds into the bus through a

transformer, that transformer is considered part

of the primary line and is licensable. 

(c) However, under certain situations, if a primary

line feeds directly into a transformer which, in

turn, feeds directly into the primary distribution

system (i.e., without an intervening bus), the

transformer should be considered the point of

junction with the distribution system and is not 

licensable. 

These “rules” are derived by interpretation of

administrative caselaw many decades old. Federal district court

judges do not, in general, possess expertise in electrical

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engineering, nor in the field of hydro-power licensing. What is

clear from the case law is only this: there are no definitive

criteria by which to determine if a step-up transformer is

licensable as a project work. At the least, where a transformer

steps up low voltage power from a generation source and feeds

that power into a bus, which in turn feeds distribution lines,

the transformer is part of a primary line and therefore falls

within FERC’s jurisdiction. The question is whether this rule

governs the 12kV transformer that allegedly sparked the Big Creek

fire. 

In the context of the pending cross-motions, the inquiry is

whether there is undisputed evidence to permit application of

this rule as a matter of law. For example, can the United States

establish that the lines emanating from the 12kV substation are

in fact primary lines, contrary to SCE’s submission that they are

for distribution to retail customers? Alternatively, can the

United States establish that the 12kV transformers feed into a

bus, and therefore that the bus, not the transformers, is the

point of interconnection? In either case, the United States

might be entitled to summary adjudication on the issue of whether

FERC would have had jurisdiction over the transformers. 

//

//

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4. Is the 12kV transformer that allegedly sparked the

Big Creek fire subject to FERC jurisdiciton?

SCE asserts that one or more of the lines emanating from the

12kV substation distribute power to retail customers and are part

of the interconnected distribution system. SCE also asserts that

the bank of 12kV transformers in the substation (including the

disputed 12kV transformer) is the point of junction with the

distribution system. The United States rejoins that none of the

three lines currently emanating from the 12kV substation are

distribution lines. Therefore, according to the United States,

all of the equipment in the substation is licensable. In the

alternative, even if any or all of the three lines are part of

the distribution system, the United States asserts that the point

of interconnection is actually a 12kV bus situated between the

12kV transformers and the three emanating lines. If this is the

case, the 12kV transformers sit on the licensable side of the

jurisdictional line.

a. Are any of the three lines emanating

from the 12kV substation distribution

lines? 

It is not disputed that three power lines currently emanate

from the 12kV substation: Snocat, Stevenson, and Manzanita. 

SCE, primarily through the declaration of Joel Preheim, focuses

on establishing that at least one of three lines emanating from

the 12kV substation is a distribution line. The United States

objects to SCE’s evidence and points to several facts that

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As discussed above in Part V.A.2.a, the government also 12

maintains that these three lines are referenced in the Project 67

license, which refers to several “small ancillary power lines

[that] extend from Powerhouse No. 2A to Shaver Lake and to the

top of the Powerhouse No. 8 penstocks.” SCE has demonstrated

that there is a dispute over material facts relevant to this

assertion. As a result, for the purposes of this motion, it is

disputed if the “small ancillary lines” language refers to either

the Snocat, Stevenson, or Manzanita lines. 

37

suggest these lines should instead be considered primary lines.12

SCE maintains that “the Manzanita line formerly served as a

local distribution line to company-owned housing which was built

from the 1910s through the 1930s in the area surrounding Big

Creek Powerhouse Nos. 2 and 2A.” (SCE UF #18; Preheim Dec. ¶6) 

Mr. Preheim, who lived in one of the cottages in the SCE housing

area during the 1980s, maintains that the cottages “were equipped

with meters to measure electrical power consumption for billing

purposes” no later than the 1930s. (SCE UF ## 19-23; Preheim

Dec. ¶6.) 

According to SCE, the Snocat line formerly distributed

electricity to more than 75 percent of the light commercial and

residential customers in and around the town of Shaver Lake. 

(SCE UF #24; Preheim Dec. ¶7.) Preheim estimates that Shaver

Lake first got electrical service from SCE on the Snocat line no

later than 1940 and possibly in the 1930s. (SCE UF #25; Preheim

Dec. ¶7; Kimball Dec., Ex. H.) The Snocat line also supplied

power to SCE facilities at Shaver Lake, such as Shaver Dam and

certain SCE operated recreational facilities. (SCE UF #26;

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Preheim Dec. ¶7.) In the 1980s and 1990s, the use of the Snocat

line changed, during which time it provided about 40 percent of

the customer service to Shaver Lake and served as a backup

distribution source. (SCE UF #27; Preheim Dec. ¶ 7.) Currently,

the Snocat line “continues to serve as primary power to Forest

Service facilities and the Ponderosa Telephone Company at Musick

Mountain near Shaver Lake and as a backup source for Shaver

Lake’s customer load.” (SCE UF #28; Preheim Dec. ¶7.)

With respect to the Stevenson line, SCE maintains that it

“provides a distribution system along Big Creek, serving

residential and light commercial customers and providing backup

power to certain SCE facilities.” (SCE UF #30; Preheim Dec. ¶8.)

Retail customers on the Stevenson line include Hogue Ranch, the

United States Forest Service’s Clear Water Forest Station, and

Wagner’s Mammoth Pool Resort, a retail store, restaurant and

campground at Mammoth Pool Reservoir. (SCE UF #32; Preheim Dec.

¶ 8; Wagner ¶¶ 2-5.) SCE maintains that the Stevenson line has

served the Mammoth Pool Resort since 1958 and its operators have

paid monthly bills to SCE since June 1, 1958. (SCE UF #33;

Declaration of Nelda Wagner ¶¶ 2-5; Preheim Dec. ¶ 8.) It is

undisputed that the Stevenson line also supplies backup power to

several Big Creek powerhouses operated by the Hydro Division of

SCE. (SCE UF #37; Preheim Dec. ¶ 9.) However, backup power is

not continuously supplied to SCE powerhouses via the Stevenson

Line. Rather, power from Stevenson may be called upon if any of

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these facilities become disconnected from their primary power

source. (SCE UF #38; Preheim Dec. ¶9.) 

The United States challenges almost every “undisputed fact”

proffered by SCE. The evidentiary dispute surrounds the evidence

presented by SCE’s expert Joel Preheim, who speaks most directly

to the purpose of the power lines emanating from the 12kV

substation. In support of his expert opinions Mr. Preheim relies

upon some evidence he has observed first-hand and some evidence

he apparently gathered from the historical record and, perhaps,

from other SCE employees. 

The government objects generally to the admission of Mr.

Preheim’s opinions on the ground that he bases his opinions on

evidence about which he has no personal knowledge. But, it is

perfectly permissible for an expert witness to base his or her

opinions on the synthesis of second-hand information which may or

may not be part of the record or even admissible: 

Rules 702 and 704 allow properly qualified experts to

testify in the form of an opinion about issues as to

which their expertise may assist the trier of fact,

even if the opinion embraces an ultimate issue of fact.

Rule 703 permits the expert to base opinions or

inferences on facts or data not admissible in evidence

if they are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts

in the field. Rule 705 permits an expert to give

opinion testimony without prior disclosure of the

underlying facts or data.

Bieghler v. Kleppe, 633 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1980).

The United States also objects on the ground that Mr.

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Preheim’s deposition testimony conflicts with the facts set forth

in his declarations, upon which SCE relies upon to support its

statement of undisputed facts. In general, the government’s

objections are grounded in government counsel’s effective crossexamination of Mr. Preheim at his deposition on the accuracy of

the dates provided in his declarations. Mr. Preheim repeatedly

backed away from specific dates. (See USA’s Objections to SCE’s

Evidence, Doc. 284, Attch. 1, at 13-19.) Mr. Preheim’s

deposition testimony does raise disputes as to the accuracy of

specific dates included in his declarations. 

The dates are material because of a rule set forth in Great

Northern Paper. 97 F.E.R.C. at 61,893 (“The only way the

Commission has jurisdiction over the reservoirs at issue is if

they are project works of the downstream unit of hydroelectric

development. They no longer are. Nor were they ever under

license, which means that the Commission cannot exercise the kind

of authority it may exercise with respect to the transition of a

work or facility from licensed status to non-licensed status.”). 

This case suggests that, if a piece of equipment was once covered

by a license, FERC must approve an application to delete that

equipment from the license before it loses jurisdiction over the

piece of equipment. 

It is undisputed that the 12KV Substation was initially

built in 1926 to supply power for construction of other

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powerhouses, such as Big Creek Nos. 3 and 8. (SCE UF #15;

Preheim Dec. ¶ 10.) It also cannot be disputed that the 12kV

substation (and the transformers within it) would have been

licensable at this initial stage. However, it is SCE’s

contention that the use/purpose of at least some of the lines

emanating from the substation changed over time. As explained

above, SCE maintains that now at least some of the lines serve

retail customers. But, even accepting SCE’s classification of

the current use of the lines, it is important to know exactly

when these changes were made vis-a-vis the issuance of the most

recent FERC licenses in 1959 (for the Project 2175 license) and

1978 (for the Project 67 license). 

If the licenses were issued BEFORE the change in the use of

the lines, then the Great Northern Paper rule suggests that SCE

should have applied for those lines to be REMOVED from the

license. It is not disputed that SCE never applied for removal

and, accordingly, that FERC never granted such an application or

removed the transformers sua sponte or by operation of law.

The United States has pointed to record evidence raising a

dispute as to the dates provided by Mr. Preheim. The quesiton

then becomes: Has either party presented any additional

undisputed evidence that definitively establishes the history of

these lines? Neither party presents alternative evidence

concerning the Manzanita line. For the purposes of this motion,

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neither party has established the date on which the Manzanita

line first began to bill SCE employees living at Big Creek as

retail customers. 

SCE presents one piece of alternative evidence concerning

when the Snocat line began to serve retail customers in and

around Shaver lake: an excerpt from a book, Reflections of

Shaver Lake. (Kimball Dec., Ex. H.) On page 121 of that book,

the author provides a three-page “Shaver Lake Chronology”

covering the period of time from 5000 B.C. to 1983. The entry

for 1935 reads: “The dark ages end as electricity arrives at

Shaver Lake Heights.” Id. at 123. Setting aside Plaintiff’s

many evidentiary objections to SCE’s reliance on this excerpt, it

is simply not dispositive of the critical question: When did the

Snocat line began to serve retail customers? The Chronology

entry does not provide any details concerning the provision of

power to Shaver Lake Heights, let alone whether that power was

even provided by SCE. For the purposes of this motion, neither

party has established the date on which the Snocat line first

began to serve retail customers. 

The factual backdrop for the Stevenson line is more complex.

Independent of Mr. Prehiem’s statements concerning the Stevenson

Line, SCE presents a declaration from the operators of the

Mammoth Pool Resort. It appears to be undisputed that the Resort

is served by the Stevenson line. Its operators, Nelda and

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Weymond Wagner state that they have paid monthly bills to SCE

since 1958. (SCE UF #33; Wagner Dec. ¶¶2-5.) In addition to

raising several objections to the evidence presented by the

Wagners, the United States points to an important independent

fact that appears to be undisputed: The location of all the

retail customers SCE alleges are served by the Stevenson line, is

beyond where the Stevenson line passes from the 12kV substation

to powerhouse 8 and draws power from that source. (See USA’s

Objections to SCE’s UF #30.) Although no party provides expert

testimony that permits legal analysis of this electrical fact, it

is enough to raise questions as to the “primary purpose” of that

portion of the Stevenson line extending from the 12kV substation

to powerhouse 8. Accordingly, the “primary purpose” of the

Stevenson line cannot be determined as a matter of law on this

record. 

The disputed nature of these facts makes it improper to

grant summary judgment to either party on this issue.

5. What is the relationship between the 12kV

transformers and these lines?

The character of the three lines emanating from the 12kV

substation is a threshold issue to the factual inquiry: Assuming

at least one of the lines serves residential customers and could

be considered part of the distribution system, what relationship

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do the 12kV transformers have to this line? Do the transformers

feed directly into the line (like the line excluded from FERC

jurisdiction in Lockhard) or do the transformers feed into a 12kV

bus which is the point of junction? 

A critical electrical diagram, the “One Line for Operation,”

SCE 004857, appears to indicate that the 12kV transformers

connect to the Snocat, Stevenson, and Manzanita lines though at

least one and possibly two separate busses. During oral argument

on these motions, counsel for both parties expounded upon the

nature and effect of these pieces of electrical equipment. This

discussion is not evidence. Although the report prepared by

Plaintiff’s expert Kevin Mara, does discuss the existence of a

bus, his report has been stricken. Even if Mr. Mara’s report was

considered by the court, it does not clarify the situation, for

it does not delineate between the transformers and the bus in any

way that permits application of the Lockhart and Montana rule. 

No other record evidence bears on this subject or provides

sufficient detail concerning the electrical relationship between

the 12kV transformers and the three lines which currently emanate

from the substation. 

//

//

//

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B. Does the 12kV Transformer Fall Within FERC’s

Jurisdiction by Virtue of SCE’s Occupancy and Use of

Reserved Federal Lands?

The United States suggests that, regardless of the scope of

FERC’s jurisdiction under the cases discussed above at Part

V.A.3, the 12kV transformer falls under FERC’s jurisdiction

because the enclosure lies on federal lands reserved to the

Sierra National Forest. The United States points to 16 U.S.C. §

817(1) in support of the proposition that FERC has mandatory

licensing jurisdiction over the transformer. Section 817(1)

provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person, State, or

municipality, for the purpose of developing electric

power, to construct, operate, or maintain any dam,

water conduit, reservoir, power house, or other works

incidental thereto across, along, or in any of the

navigable waters of the United States, or upon any part

of the public lands or reservations of the United

States (including the Territories), or utilize the

surplus water or water power from any Government dam,

except under and in accordance with the terms of a

permit or valid existing right-of-way granted prior to

June 10, 1920, or a license granted pursuant to this

chapter....

16 U.S.C. § 817(1). But, this provision simply reinforces the

undisputed proposition that FERC has jurisdiction to authorize

hydroelectric projects on federal lands. It does not speak to

the critical question, whether the 12kV transformer is a “project

work.” In other words, § 817(1) does not apply unless

Transformer No. 2 is a “dam, water conduit, reservoir, power

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house, or other works incidental thereto.”

 The United States also relies heavily on language from

FERC’s decision in Southern California Edison Co., 106 F.E.R.C.

61,212, 61,711 (2004). In that case, the Commission examined

whether it had licensing authority over a hydroelectric project

on federal lands that was temporarily out of operation. SCE

argued in that case that FERC no longer had jurisdiction over the

project because it was no longer being operated. In rejecting

that argument, FERC stated that “hydroelectric projects that are

located on any part of U.S. lands or reservations fall under the

Commission's mandatory licensing jurisdiction.” FERC clarified

in a footnote that “[i]f any part of a hydroelectric project is

located on U.S. lands or reservations, the entire project must be

licensed.” Id. at n.21. 

The United States’ reliance on this rule is misplaced. 

FERC’s jurisdiction over a project on federal lands is still

limited by the statutory definition of the term “project.” 

Although FERC may have licensing authority over an entire project

even if only part of the project is located on federal land, FERC

still lacks authority over equipment that cannot be considered

part of the “project works” under the FPA, such as those pieces

of equipment which form the point of interconnection with the

primary transmission system. Plaintiff presents no legal

authority to the contrary.

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FERC licenses are to be interpreted and enforced under 13

the general principles of federal contract law. Cal. Power

Agency v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 104 FERC 63,029, 2003 WL

21796229; see also Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243

U.S. 389, 403-04 (1917).

 Although the court previously ruled that the license 14

conditions are valid and enforceable against SCE. See United

States v. Southern California Edison, Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d

964,982 (E.D. Cal. 2004); this ruling preceded SCE’s successful

effort to withdraw its admission that the licenses applied to the

12kV substation.

47

C. Even If the 12kV Transformer Does Not Fall Within

FERC’s Jurisdiction, May the United States Nevertheless

Recover Under the Terms of the License? 

Both of the licenses at issue in this case contain identical

language:

The Licensee shall be liable for injury to, or

destruction of, any buildings bridges, roads, trails,

lands or other property of the United States,

occasioned by the construction, maintenance, or

operation of the project works or of the works

appurtenant or accessory thereto under the license...

Project 2175 License, Form L-5, Art. 19; Project 67 License, Form

L-1, Art. 24 (emphasis added). The United States argues that 13

the indemnity provisions in the licenses operate against SCE even

if the 12kV transformer is not expressly covered by either of the

licenses. To support its argument, the United States relies 14

heavily on the fact that Articles 19 and 24 use language that is

almost identical to that found in 16 U.S.C. § 803(c). Section

803(c) operates to impose liability on a FERC licensee for all

damage to the property of third parties occasioned by the

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licensed operations, and requires every FERC license to include

language imposing liability on the licensee for third party

property damage. 

But, critically, the plain language of the Articles 19 and

24 does not extend liability beyond the reach of the FERC

license. In fact, it specifically conditions the liability upon

coverage under the license: 

The Licensee shall be liable for injury to...lands or other

property of the United States, occasioned by the

construction, maintenance, or operation of the project works

or of the works appurtenant or accessory thereto under the

license.” (Emphasis added.)

Here, there is no dispute that the fire began in the 12kV

transformer, but there is considerable dispute over whether that

piece of equipment was covered by the license. Replacing the

phrase “occasioned by” with the phrase “caused by” does not erase

this conditional language.

Moreover, section 803(c) limits itself to equipment

“constructed under the license”:

Each licensee hereunder shall be liable for all damages

occasioned to the property of others by the

construction, maintenance, or operation of the project

works or of the works appurtenant or accessory thereto,

constructed under the license, and in no event shall

the United States be liable therefor.

The language of this provision begs the same question: Is the

particular facility that caused the damage covered by the

license?

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D. Assuming the Terms of the Licenses Do Not Apply, Is SCE

Civilly Liable For Operating the 12kV Transformer in

Violation of Federal Law? 

The United States argues that “[if] the 12kV substation is

not licensed under the Project 2175 or 67 licenses, SCE has

operated and maintained the 12kV substation in trespass on

federal lands, in violation of at least the Federal Power Act []

and applicable Forest Service regulations.” (Doc. 257 at 19.) 

a. Violation of the Federal Power Act.

Assuming that the terms of the licenses do not apply to the

12kV substation or transformers, the United States maintains that

SCE’s operation of this equipment without a FERC license violates

the terms of the Federal Power Act, which provides: 

It shall be unlawful for any person...for the purpose

of developing electric power, to construct, operate, or

maintain any dam, water conduit, reservoir, power

house, or other works incidental thereto...upon any

part of the public lands or reservations of the United

States (including the Territories)...except under and

in accordance with the terms of...license granted

pursuant to this chapter. 

16 U.S.C. § 817. Again, reliance on this provision begs the

question of whether the substation and/or any transformer therein

is “a dam, water conduit, reservoir, power house, or other works

incidental thereto.” If, as SCE maintains, the substation and/or

transformers are not covered by the terms of § 817, the operation

of that equipment does not require a license. As discussed

above, there are disputed material facts that make it impossible

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16 U.S.C. § 551 provides in full: 15

The Secretary of Agriculture shall make provisions for

the protection against destruction by fire and

depredations upon the public forests and national

forests which may have been set aside or which may be

hereafter set aside under the provisions of section 471

of this title, and which may be continued; and he may

make such rules and regulations and establish such

service as will insure the objects of such

reservations, namely, to regulate their occupancy and

use and to preserve the forests thereon from

destruction; and any violation of the provisions of

this section, sections 473 to 478 and 479 to 482 of

this title or such rules and regulations shall be

punished by a fine of not more than $500 or

imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. Any

person charged with the violation of such rules and

regulations may be tried and sentenced by any United

States magistrate judge specially designated for that

purpose by the court by which he was appointed, in the

same manner and subject to the same conditions as

provided for in section 3401(b) to (e) of Title 18.

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to determine at this time whether the substation and/or the

transformers are covered by this definition. Accordingly, it

would be similarly inappropriate to find as a matter of law that

SCE violated the FPA by operating this equipment without a

license, despite the government’s contention that no equipment of

any kind can be lawfully sited on U.S. government land.

b. Violation of applicable Forest Service laws

and regulations.

The United States next points to 16 U.S.C. § 551, which

enables the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate the “use and

occupancy” of National Forests and to preserve the National

Forests from destruction by fire. More specifically, the 15

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The United States also references separate provisions 16

that prohibit “[c]ausing timber, trees, slash, brush or grass to

burn except as authorized by permit,” 36 C.F.R. § 261.5(c), and

other related regulations. See 36 C.F.R. § 261.6(a) (prohibiting

damaging any timber, tree, or other forest product except as

authorized by a special use permit, contract or other federal law

or regulation), and § 261.9(a) (prohibiting damaging any natural

feature or property of the United States). 

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government points to implementing regulations set forth at 

36 C.F.R. Part 261. The provision on which the government

principally relies is 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(a), which prohibits 

Constructing, placing, or maintaining any kind of road,

trail, structure, fence, enclosure, communications

equipment, or other improvement on National Forest

System lands or facilities without a special use

authorization, contract, or approved operating plan,

unless such authorization, contract, or operating plan

is waived pursuant to § 251.50(e) of this chapter.

(emphasis added). It is a misdemeanor to violate this 16

provision. 16 U.S.C. § 551.

Assuming the licenses do not apply, the United States argues

that it cannot be disputed that SCE was operating the 12kV

substation on federal lands in violation of this provision. In

support of this assertion, the United States maintains that the

following facts are undisputed:

(i) the 12kV substation is located on national forest

land; (ii) SCE would have been required to obtain an

approved special use authorization to use, operate or

maintain the 12kV substation if the FERC licenses did

not apply (or to dismantle the 12kV substation if no

such permit were granted), (iii)(no authorization

(other than the Project 2175 and 67 licenses) permitted

SCE’s use, operation, or maintenance of the 12kV

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The United States focuses unwarranted attention on a 17

quote from Langley where the district court stated that “[f]orest

service regulations may be enforced in federal district court by

injunction or otherwise.” 587 F. Supp at 1265. But, a footnote

following this quote suggests that the “otherwise” is a reference

to the criminal sanctions which may be imposed under 16 U.S.C. 

§ 551. See id. at 1265 n.11. 

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substation on National Forest land, and (iv) the Big

Creek Fire ignited as a result of the operation of an

SCE transformer located within the 12kV substation.

(Doc. 257, at 21-22 (citations omitted)). 

SCE objects generally that civil liability for damages

cannot be imposed under this (or any similar) regulation, citing

Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980), which

holds that a criminal provision does not provide a basis for

civil liability. The United States, in its reply brief, responds

by citing to United States v. Langley, 587 F. Supp. 1258, 1265

(E.D. Cal. 1984), and United States v. Hells Canyon Guide Serv.,

Inc., 660 F.2d 735, 736-38 (9th Cir. 1981), each of which

supports the unsurprising proposition that the government may

seek to enforce Forest Service regulation by injunction. The 17

United States points to no authority to support its contention

that violation of a land management regulation renders the

violator liable for damages arguably caused by that violation. 

Perhaps these regulatory violations support civil liability under

a trespass theory, but the United States does not provide any

legal authority suggesting as much. SCE’s motion for summary

adjudication that it cannot be liable in damages for violation of

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The United States mistakenly relies upon Hammond v. 18

County of Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 804 (9th Cir. 1988) for this same

legal rule. The plaintiff in Hammond owned an Indian land

allotment. Trespass onto Indian lands is one of the rare

instances in which a trespass cause of action is governed by

federal common law, not state law. See United States v. Pend

Oreille Public Utility Dist. No. 1, 28 F.3d 1544, 1550 n.8 (9th

Cir. 1994)(“The Supreme Court has recognized a variety of federal

common law causes of action to protect Indian lands from

trespass, including actions for ejectment, accounting of profits,

and damages.”); see also County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian

Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985) (right of Indians to occupy

lands held in trust by the United States for their use is "the

exclusive province of federal law"). 

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these Forest Service regulations, whether injunctive relief is

appropriate, must await trial.

E. Is SCE Liable in Trespass for Damage Caused by the Big

Creek Fire?

“Trespass is the intentional use of the property of another

without authorization and without privilege.” United States v.

Imperial Irrigation Dist., 799 F. Supp. 1052, 1059 (S.D. Cal.

1992). “Trespass entitles the plaintiff to nominal damages as

well as compensatory damages in an amount that will compensate

for all detriment proximately caused.” In re Burbank Envtl.

Litig., 42 F. Supp. 2d 976, 984 (1998)(citing Costerisan v. Tejon

Ranch, 255 Cal. App. 2d 57 (1967)).18

In California, “proximate cause” or “legal cause” exists if

the actor's conduct is a “substantial factor in bringing about

the harm and there is no rule of law relieving the actor from 

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liability.” Lombardo v. Huysentruyt, 91 Cal. App. 4th 656,

665-66 (2001)(applying proximate cause standard in medical

malpractice case). 

The doctrine of proximate cause limits liability; i.e.,

in certain situations where the defendant's conduct is

an actual cause of the harm, he will nevertheless be

absolved because of the manner in which the injury

occurred. Thus, where there is an independent

intervening act which is not reasonably foreseeable,

the defendant's conduct is not deemed the “legal” or

proximate cause. In general, if the risk of injury is

reasonably foreseeable, the defendant is liable. An

independent intervening act is a superseding cause

relieving the actor of liability for his negligence

only if the intervening act is highly unusual or

extraordinary and hence not reasonably foreseeable. 

Id. “Causation is generally a question of fact for the jury,

unless reasonable minds could not dispute the absence of

causation.” Id.; see also Commodities Reserve Co. v. St. Paul

Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 879 F.2d 640, 644-45 (9th Cir. 1989)(“We

recognize that proximate cause generally is an issue for the

jury.”). 

The United States maintains that the normal rules concerning

proximate cause do not apply to an intentional trespasser. 

Rather, a trespasser is liable for all damages its operation

inflicted to the property during the trespass. The United States

relies upon the following language from Miller v. National

Broadcasting Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1481 (1986): 

Quite frequently [] the [trespasser] has been held

liable for indirect consequences, some of which have

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The United States points out that Miller is consistent 19

with the Restatement (2d) of Torts § 162, which provides that a

trespasser is liable for all damages “to the land or to [the

owner’s] things... caused by any act done, activity carried on,

or condition created by the trespasser, irrespective of whether

his conduct is such as would subject him to liability were he not

a trespasser.” The United States further points to the

following illustration from the § 162 fo the Restatement: 

A is driving his car along the highway in a

neighborhood with which he is unfamiliar. He asks B to

direct him to a certain town. B tells him that he can

take a short cut through a private road over which the

public is not accustomed to travel, which B asserts to

be upon his own land but which, in fact, is on the land

of C. While driving carefully along the road, A runs

over D, C's three-year-old child, who suddenly dashes

out from the bushes which border the road. A is subject

to liability to D and to C. 

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not been reasonably foreseeable, of conduct engaged in

while trespassing.... It is important to realize that

those who use another’s land without permission may

justifiably have “risks of loss” allocated to them far

beyond those normally imposed when liability is imposed

on a negligence theory.

This passage appears to severely restrict any defenses based upon

foreseeability.19

SCE responds by pointing to McKenzie v. Pacific Gas 7 Elec.

Co., 200 Cal. App. 2d 731 (1962). In that case, the court

rejected a claim for strict liability for trespass. Plaintiff

was injured when a television tower he was lowering came into

contact with power lines operated by defendant. The lines

encroached upon Plaintiff’s property, so that defendant was

considered to be trespassing. The court reasoned that strict

liability was only appropriate where the “act of trespass alone

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caused the injury.” Because the injury in McKenzie was caused by

“when the tower was lowered into contact with defendant’s wires”

the court found that the encroachment did not “in and of itself”

cause the damage.” Id. at 737. The court held that:

It is true the trespass created a condition which was a

factor in the accident, but this did not thrust

absolute liability upon defendant. The trial judge

correctly analyzed the situation in regard to the

trespass when he commented, “It is like saying that if

I had driven 40 miles an hour instead of 30 miles an

hour, I wouldn't have been in the intersection when I

got hit.”

Id.

In contrast, the facts in Miller, the case relied upon by

the government, are quite different. In Miller a television

camera crew entered a home, without the residents’ consent,

accompanying paramedics who tended to a man within the residence,

who later died. The station broadcast film of the incident

without obtaining consent of the residents. The Miller court

found that the camera crew had made an unauthorized entry into

the residence which constituted a trespass. 187 Cal. App. 3d at

1481. The court then held that the trespassers would be liable

for a wide range of damage caused by that unlawful entry,

including the emotional distress which resulted. Id. Unlike in

McKenzie, the trespass in Miller did “in and of itself” cause the

injury. 

The question here is: Assuming that SCE unlawfully operated

the substation in trespass, did that trespass “in and of itself”

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For a description of the life and times of a more 20

fortunate member of the genus sciurus, see Pennsylvania v.

Gosselin, 2004 Pa. Super. 426 (Nov. 5, 2004). 

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cause the fire. It is not disputed that the fire was sparked

because an unfortunate rodent came into contact with one of the 20

12kV transformers. The presence of the transformer was not “in

and of itself” the cause of the fire. It is necessary to explore

whether the presence of the transformer was the proximate cause

of the fire, following the rules set forth in cases like

Lombardo, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 665-66, discussed above. The

record is not sufficient to even begin an inquiry into the

reasonable foreseeability of the squirrel’s contact with the

transformer and the condition of the transformer which made it

susceptible to vaporizing the squirrel. 

F. Is SCE liable for damages under California Health and

Safety Code § 13007? 

Finally, the United States seeks summary judgment on the

ground that “[i]f the Project 2175 and 67 licenses did not

authorize the 12kV substation, SCE is liable as a matter of law

under California Health and Safety Code sections 13007, 13009,

and 13009.1.” (Doc. 257 at 22.)

Section 13007 assigns liability for damage caused fire:

Any person who personally or through another wilfully,

negligently, or in violation of law, sets fire to,

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allows fire to be set to, or allows a fire kindled or

attended by him to escape to, the property of another,

whether privately or publicly owned, is liable to the

owner of such property for any damages to the property

caused by the fire.

Section 13009(a) provides a cause of action for the recovery

of fire suppression costs. 

Any person [] who negligently, or in violation of the

law, sets a fire, allows a fire to be set, or allows a

fire kindled or attended by him or her to escape onto

any public or private property...is liable for the fire

suppression costs incurred in fighting the fire and for

the cost of providing rescue or emergency medical

services, and those costs shall be a charge against

that person. The charge shall constitute a debt of that

person, and is collectible by the person, or by the

federal, state, county, public, or private agency,

incurring those costs in the same manner as in the case

of an obligation under a contract, expressed or

implied.

Section 13009.1 similarly assigns liability for the costs of

investigating the fire and any costs related to accounting for

damages caused by the fire. 

It is appropriate for the United States to rely upon

provisions of the Health and Safety Code as a basis for a claim

to recover damages to National Forest land caused by fire and/or

to recover associated fire suppression and investigation costs.

See United States v. State of Cal., 655 F.2d 919-20 (9th Cir.

1980). The question remains, however, whether the United States

is entitled to summary judgment on these claims. 

The parties do not agree on the essential elements that must

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be proved to recover under the Health and Safety Code provisions. 

The United States asserts that liability is established where a

party (1) acts in violation of law, and (ii) sets a fire, or

allows a fire to be set, on the property of another. The United

States further asserts that these elements have been conclusively

established in this case, because (a) if the licenses do not

apply to the 12kV substation and SCE did not possess a special

use permit, SCE was acting in violation of the law; and (b) SCE

“allowed the Big Creek Fire to be set by its operation of the

transformer.” The government places great emphasis on the “or in

violation of the law” language in the cited Health & Safety Code

provisions, and suggests that a party operating equipment in

violation of any applicable law is subject to strict liability

for any damage caused by a fire sparked by that equipment. The

United States does not, however, point to any caselaw imposing

strict liability under these provisions. The only case cited by

the United States is Ventura County v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 85

Cal. App. 2d 529, 533 (1948), which concerned a claim that a

party acted negligently and, accordingly, did not impose strict

liability.

SCE suggests that a party can only be liable under sections

13007, 13009, and 13009.1 if its wrongful conduct was the

proximate cause of defendants harm, citing People v. Southern

California Edison Co., 56 Cal. App. 3d 593, 605 (1976). None of

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the statutory provisions cited by Plaintiff suggest that strict

liability is the standard. The issue of causation remains for

trial, summary judgment on the United States’ claims under the

California Health and Safety Code is not appropriate at this

stage.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above,

(1) The United States’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED in

its entirety; and

(2) SCE’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED in its entirety.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 6, 2006 

_/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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