Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02384/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02384-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Grant E. Bentrud
Appellant
Bowman, Heintz, Boscia & Vician, P.C.
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-2384

GRANT E. BENTRUD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BOWMAN, HEINTZ, BOSCIA & VICIAN, P.C.,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:12-cv-1340 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 9, 2014 — DECIDED JULY 27, 2015

____________________

Before POSNER, RIPPLE, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. Grant E. Bentrud owes Capital One 

Bank, N.A. (“Capital One”), money—$10,955.20 to be exact. 

He amassed that debt on his credit card, and he does not 

dispute it here. Bentrud’s dispute instead concerns the manner in which Capital One’s lawyers attempted to collect the 

debt. The way he sees it, Bowman, Heintz, Boscia & Vician, 

P.C. (“Bowman Heintz”), an Indiana law firm specializing in 

debt collection, committed multiple violations of the Fair 

Case: 14-2384 Document: 20 Filed: 07/27/2015 Pages: 13
2 No. 14-2384

Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) during their collection efforts. 

To remedy those alleged violations, Bentrud commenced 

this action in the Southern District of Indiana. After a volley 

of motions between the parties, the district court granted 

summary judgment in favor of Bowman Heintz on each of 

Bentrud’s FDCPA claims. For the reasons expressed below, 

we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

The alleged FDCPA violations that form the basis for this 

federal case occurred in state court. On January 6, 2012, 

Bowman Heintz filed a complaint in Hendricks County Superior Court in Indiana. There, Bowman Heintz sought recovery of the full amount of Bentrud’s credit card debt owed 

to Capital One. The case proceeded unremarkably, and nearly ten months later, on October 1, 2012, Bowman Heintz filed 

a motion for summary judgment. See Ind. R. Trial P. 56(c).

Bentrud responded to that motion by invoking the arbitration provision in his credit card agreement with Capital 

One. The arbitration provision provides: “If you or we elect 

arbitration of a claim, neither you nor we will have the right 

to pursue that claim in court or before a judge or jury.” The 

state court granted Bentrud’s election of arbitration and denied Bowman Heintz’s motion for summary judgment. It also stayed the case, allowing Bentrud thirty days to initiate 

arbitration. If, however, Bentrud failed to initiate arbitration 

within that window, the court ordered the stay “automatically dissolved.”

That was a prescient order, because a curveball quickly 

emerged: no one agreed to do the arbitration. The American 

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No. 14-2384 3

Arbitration Association (“AAA”) declined because Capital 

One had previously failed to comply with its policy regarding consumer claims. Although it is unclear whether Bentrud, Bowman Heintz, or Capital One attempted to contact 

other possible arbitrators, what is clear is that after AAA declined, efforts to arbitrate stalled. Bentrud subsequently 

failed to meet the thirty-day deadline (April 11, 2013) set by 

the state court, which meant that the stay was automatically 

dissolved.

So on May 20, 2013, more than a month after the deadline 

to arbitrate had lapsed, Bowman Heintz filed a second motion for summary judgment.1

Importantly, that filing forms the first basis of Bentrud’s 

FDCPA case. For he characterizes that motion, made after he 

had elected to pursue arbitration of the debt claim, as an unfair or unconscionable means of attempting to collect a debt. 

See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. This FDCPA claim, of course, did not 

arise until Bentrud filed his federal action in the Southern 

District of Indiana. At the time, Bentrud simply responded to 

the second motion for summary judgment with a combined 

“Verified Motion to Dismiss or Continue Stay.” The state 

court granted the continuance but denied the motion to dismiss. It extended his deadline to initiate arbitration to July 

31, 2013—three months after the original deadline. That ex-

 

1 There is some question as to whether this motion was actually a second

motion for summary judgment or a mere renewal of the first motion for 

summary judgment. At oral argument, counsel for Bowman Heintz presented it as the latter. Given the posture of this case and the fact that the 

state court denied Bowman Heintz’s initial motion for summary judgment, we treat the motion as a second, discrete motion for summary 

judgment. 

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tension worked, as Bentrud and Capital One are now proceeding with arbitration of the state-law debt collection 

claim.

Bentrud has another FDCPA claim against Bowman 

Heintz. His second claim concerns interest rates. Two rates 

are at issue here: 10.65% and 13.9%. Bentrud claims that 

from May 17, 2009 to May 16, 2011, the Annual Percentage 

Rate (“APR”) on his credit card debt with Capital One was 

13.9%. That APR is reflected on his May 16, 2011, statement 

from Capital One. Yet when Bowman Heintz filed its complaint in the state court action, it averred the applicable interest rate to be 10.65%. Bentrud, apparently unsatisfied with 

that reduced interest rate, sees impropriety in the averment. 

So he advances an either-or argument against Bowman 

Heintz. Either the correct interest rate is 13.9%, in which case 

Bowman Heintz misrepresented the interest rate when it 

averred the interest rate to be 10.65% in its complaint. See 15 

U.S.C. § 1692e (prohibiting misrepresentation of the amount 

of the debt). Or the correct interest rate is 10.65%, in which 

case Bowman Heintz attempted to collect a debt that was not 

authorized by the terms of the agreement. See 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692f(1) (prohibiting collection of a debt not authorized by 

the agreement). Regardless, he argues, Bowman Heintz violated the FDCPA.

Before turning to the merits, we make a couple of observations on this second FDCPA claim. First, Bentrud’s credit 

card agreement with Capital One expressly states that Capital One “may add, delete or change any term” of the agreement at “any time[.]” That same agreement further states 

that Bentrud’s APR may go up or down, depending on the 

market index. 

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No. 14-2384 5

Second, record evidence demonstrates that Capital One 

formally changed Bentrud’s rate to 10.65% on May 17, 

2011—nearly seven months before Bowman Heintz filed its 

complaint. With that change came the deletion of the “D” 

designation accompanying the interest rate. According to the 

terms of the agreement, the presence of a “D” next to the interest rate signifies that the interest rate was calculated using 

the monthly prime rate (3.25%) plus a previously disclosed 

margin. The earliest statement that Bentrud gave the district 

court—May 16, 2011—listed a “D” next to the 13.9% interest 

rate. By contrast, the next statement—dated August 15, 

2011—lists the interest rate at 10.65% without the “D” designation. Some math: 13.9% minus the monthly prime rate of 

3.25% equals 10.65%—the rate Bowman Heintz averred in its 

complaint.

II. ANALYSIS

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment 

de novo. Hanover Ins. Co. v. N. Bldg. Co., 751 F.3d 788, 791 (7th 

Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate where the admissible evidence reveals no genuine issue of any material 

fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 

916, 922 (7th Cir. 2001). A fact is “material” if it is one identified by the law as affecting the outcome of the case. Anderson 

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. We “construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party.” Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 

965 (7th Cir. 2013). On cross-motions for summary judgment, 

we draw inferences “in favor of the party against whom the 

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motion under consideration was made.” McKinney v. Cadleway Props., Inc., 548 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 2008).

Regarding the FDCPA, Congress passed the Act to eliminate the many evils associated with debt collection. Under 

the FDCPA, no longer may debt collectors: (1) make false or 

misleading representations; (2) attempt to collect an amount 

(including interest) not authorized by the agreement; or 

(3) engage in unfair practices when attempting to collect a 

debt. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e–f. Although the FDCPA forbids 

other conduct, these three proscriptions form the focus of 

Bentrud’s appeal. We note that his opponent, Bowman 

Heintz, qualifies as a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. 

Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292 (1995).

Our analysis starts with the summary judgment motion 

and then proceeds to the interest rate issue.

A. The Second Motion for Summary Judgment

Bentrud claims that Bowman Heintz’s second motion for 

summary judgment violated 15 U.S.C § 1692f.2 That section 

states in relevant part: “A debt collector may not use unfair or 

unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any 

debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f (emphasis added). Unfortunately, 

the statute does not define the phrase “unfair or unconscionable,” and we have called the phrase “as vague as they 

come.” Beler v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 480 

 2 Below, Bentrud also argued that the motion constituted “harassment or 

abuse” under 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. He abandons that theory on appeal, now 

asserting his “claim is only about whether it was unfair to file the second 

summary judgment motion in light of the terms of the parties’ arbitration 

agreement.” (emphasis added). Whether a debt-collection practice is unfair is a question of law under § 1692f.

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No. 14-2384 7

F.3d 470, 474 (7th Cir. 2007). Fortunately, however, the statute 

provides a list of eight illustrative violations. We need not 

list each of them; subsection (6) is the most relevant one here. 

That subsection prohibits “[t]aking or threatening to take 

any nonjudicial action to effect dispossession or disablement 

of property” under certain circumstances. 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692f(6)(A)–(C) (emphasis added). The operative phrase 

here, is “nonjudicial action.” It implies “that state judicial 

proceedings are outside the scope of § 1692f.” Beler, 480 F.3d 

at 475. And if state judicial proceedings are outside the scope 

of § 1692f, then Bentrud does not have a leg to stand on. For 

it is undisputed that the basis for his § 1692f action against 

Bowman Heintz flows from the state proceedings in Hendricks County Superior Court. Accordingly, we very much 

doubt that a state court motion for summary judgment—

filed to collect an overdue credit card debt—could qualify as 

an unfair or unconscionable act under the FDCPA. Nevertheless, we note that subsection (6) is merely one of eight illustrations in a non-exhaustive list. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f (stating the 

list does not limit the general application of the section). So 

we look to the facts of this particular case before we pass 

judgment on Bentrud’s claim.

Significantly, there is only one fact that matters for Bentrud’s FDCPA claim under § 1692f: the invocation of his arbitration provision with Capital One. Once again, that arbitration provision states: “If you or we elect arbitration of a 

claim, neither you nor we will have the right to pursue that 

claim in court or before a judge or jury.” Given the plain 

terms of that provision, Bentrud argues that it was unfair for 

Bowman Heintz to file its second motion for summary 

judgment after he had elected arbitration. So unfair, in fact, 

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that by doing so it offended § 1692f of the FDCPA. We disagree.

The FDCPA is not an enforcement mechanism for matters 

governed elsewhere by state and federal law. Beler, 480 F.3d 

at 474. But that is what Bentrud is attempting to do here; he 

seeks to transform the FDCPA into an enforcement mechanism for the arbitration provision in his credit card agreement. In Beler, we rejected such a use of § 1692f. There, the 

appellant theorized that it was “‘unfair’ or ‘unconscionable’ 

for a debt collector to violate ... rule[s] of positive law.” Id. at 

473. Specifically, the appellant faulted a debt collector law 

firm (like the one here) for allegedly violating federal and 

state laws exempting Social Security benefits from execution 

or attachment. Id. at 473-74. We denied the claim, noting that 

both the federal and state laws implicated provided remedies for violations. 

So it is here. If Bentrud is concerned about Bowman 

Heintz resuming litigation after he elected arbitration—a 

procedural oddity, at worst—his remedy sounds in breach of 

contract, not the FDCPA. A contrary ruling would require us 

to declare that adherence to an arbitration provision in a 

contract, even in the face of a state court order to the contrary, is essential to fair debt collection. Cf. Beler, 480 F.3d at 474. 

This we will not do.

Prudential considerations compel this result. Forget 

about the state court’s order giving Bentrud thirty days to 

initiate arbitration, Bentrud impliedly argues, because once 

invoked, the arbitration provision forever barred Bowman 

Heintz from resuming litigation in court. Of course that cannot be the case. Once the thirty-day deadline of April 11, 

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2013, lapsed, the state court’s stay was, as the court put it, 

“AUTOMATICALLY DISSOLVED.”3

Bowman Heintz, at that point, had every reason to resume litigation on behalf of its client Capital One. Indeed, if 

it did not resume litigation, then Bowman Heintz may have 

run afoul of one of the primary pillars of effective representation—diligence. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.3. 

(2004). What is more, the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure 

empower trial courts to dismiss civil actions for “failure to 

prosecute” when no action has been taken on a case for a period of sixty days. Ind. R. Trial P. 41(E). Had Bowman Heintz 

waited another month—it had already waited five weeks after the original deadline lapsed—to file something with the 

court, it could have faced the ordeal of a show-cause hearing 

to prevent dismissal of its case. Id.

Bentrud, then, would have Bowman Heintz choose between dismissal for failure to prosecute and a possible malpractice claim from Capital One, on the one hand, and a potential, albeit uncertain, FDCPA violation, on the other. That 

is an easy choice for Bowman Heintz. In filing its second motion for summary judgment, Bowman Heintz made the only 

choice that a reasonable advocate in its position would have 

made. And that choice does not equate to an unfair or unconscionable means of attempting to collect a debt.

 3 When a judicial order includes key phrases in capital letters, as the state 

court’s order did here, it is the literary equivalent to shouting. Cf. Pat R. 

Graves & Joyce Kupsh, Presentation Design & Delivery: Be Professional and 

Effective 27 (2009) (“Using all capital letters (uppercase) is like 

SHOUTING!”). Litigants disobey the order at their peril.

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If anything, Bentrud’s real gripe lay with the state court 

for setting a deadline to arbitrate. That initial thirty-day 

deadline set these wheels in motion. Without it, there would 

be no incentive to press forward with the case after efforts to 

arbitrate stalled and the deadline lapsed. Tellingly, however, 

Bentrud did not complain of the deadline when it was first 

imposed. Nor did he file a motion seeking clarification of the 

state court order setting the deadline. Bentrud proceeded 

with the litigation, as any party would. The state court acted 

within its discretion when it set a deadline for Bentrud to 

initiate arbitration, just as it acted within its discretion when 

it extended that deadline for another three months.

In sum, when Bowman Heintz filed a second motion for 

summary judgment, it acted consistently with the state court 

order setting a time limit to initiate arbitration. We do not 

find that such a motion is an unfair or unconscionable means 

of attempting to collect a debt under § 1692f. Nor will we 

transform the FDCPA into an enforcement mechanism for 

matters governed by state law. We turn now to Bentrud’s final issue on appeal.

B. The Interest Rates

Bentrud’s next claim against Bowman Heintz is similarly 

unavailing. The gist of this claim is that Bowman Heintz 

averred an interest rate—10.65%—in its complaint that was 

different than the interest rates Capital One previously reported in its credit card statements—13.9%. In light of this 

discrepancy, Bentrud argues that one of two possibilities results: either (1) Bowman Heintz misrepresented the interest 

rate when it alleged 10.65% in its complaint, in violation of 

15 U.S.C. § 1692e; or (2) Bowman Heintz attempted to collect 

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No. 14-2384 11

a debt not authorized by the agreement, in violation of 15 

U.S.C. § 1692f(1). We reject this either-or argument.

On summary judgment, the central question is whether 

there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Here, Bentrud offered no evidence that Bowman Heintz misrepresented the interest rate applicable to Bentrud’s debt with Capital 

One,4 or attempted to collect a debt not authorized by the 

agreement. Because there is no evidence to support a theory 

under § 1692e or § 1692f(1), the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Bowman Heintz. 

In its January 6, 2012 state court complaint filed on behalf 

of Capital One, Bowman Heintz averred that the interest rate 

applicable to Bentrud’s debt was currently “10.65% per annum.” That averment is corroborated by Capital One’s August 2011 statement and by the affidavit of Stephen Hardy, a 

representative of Capital One. Hardy’s affidavit, which was 

attached to the state court complaint, swears that Bentrud 

owed $10,955.20 with interest accruing from May 17, 2011 

“at an annual percentage rate in accordance with the Customer Agreement, currently 10.65%.” 

These facts do not evince a discrepancy. The earliest 

statement that Bentrud provided to the district court was the 

May 16, 2011 statement. To be sure, that statement listed the 

interest rate as 13.9%. But no other statements provided to 

the court did. In fact, the date noted by Hardy—May 17, 

2011—is one day after the earliest statement provided to the 

district court by Bentrud. The August 2011 statement is 

 4 Because we do not find evidence supporting the misrepresentation theory under § 1692e, we need not decide whether the bona fide error defense applies to Bowman Heintz.

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12 No. 14-2384

months later, and that, too, lists the interest rate to be 

10.65%. The same is true for the complaint itself, which 

averred that as of October 8, 2011, the interest rate was 

10.65%. These rates are not inconsistent; they simply apply 

at different points in time.

What is more, the record evidence demonstrates that interest rates could go up or down, and that Capital One could 

change the rates. These facts are consistent with the terms of 

the credit card agreement. The actual change that occurred 

here is also consistent with the terms of the agreement. Capital One dropped the “D” designation from the APR listed on 

Bentrud’s August statement. When it did, the amount that 

the “D” represented, the 3.25% prime rate, also dropped.5

The result is that 13.9% became 10.65%, a reduced amount 

that, we note, is advantageous to Bentrud. This is math. It is 

not a misrepresentation, and it is not an attempt to collect an 

amount not authorized by the terms of the agreement. In 

short, it is not an FDCPA violation.

Bentrud has one arrow left in his quiver. He claims that 

the district court inferred that Capital One’s change to the 

interest rate constituted a legal—rather than illegal—change. 

In assuming that Capital One’s change was of the legal variety, he argues that the district court made an impermissible, 

adverse inference against him, the non-movant. See Apex 

Digital, Inc., 735 F.3d at 965 (construing all facts and inferences on summary judgment in the light most favorable to 

the non-moving party). We reject this argument.

 5 Per Hardy’s affidavit, the lower rate applied on May 17, 2011. The August 2011 statement merely reflects that fact.

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No. 14-2384 13

First and foremost, Capital One is not a party to this action. If Bentrud has a complaint with the manner in which 

Capital One changed (i.e. reduced) the interest rate, he can 

raise that issue in arbitration. The district court’s inquiry, and 

ours on appeal, concerns the representations and collection 

efforts of Bowman Heintz, the party alleged by Bentrud to 

have committed the FDCPA violations. Based on the record 

before us, Bentrud has not raised a triable issue that Bowman Heintz either misrepresented the interest rate or attempted to collect an amount not authorized by the agreement with Capital One.

Because Bentrud failed to carry his burden, see Hess v. 

Kanoski Bresney, 784 F.3d 1154, 1159 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding 

plaintiff to his burden of persuasion on appeal of summary 

judgment), his second FDCPA claim, theorized under 

§ 1692e and § 1692f(1), fails.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is AFFIRMED.

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