Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cr-08206/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cr-08206-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher James
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Christopher James, 

Defendant.

No. CR-11-08206-PCT-NVW

ORDER 

Before the Court is the Oral Motion for Acquittal by Defendant Christopher James 

(Docs. 109, 125 at 63:15-17). The Court has considered Defendant’s Memorandum in 

Support of Oral Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a) 

(Doc. 121), the United States’ Response to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of 

Acquittal (Doc. 130), the evidence admitted at trial, the official transcripts of the jury trial 

in this matter (Docs. 122, 123, 124, 125), and oral argument on the motion, which was 

heard on September 23, 2013. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

“After the government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the 

court on the defendant’s motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for 

which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). The 

court may reserve decision on the motion, proceed with the trial, and decide the motion 

after the jury returns a guilty verdict. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(b). “If the court reserves 

decision, it must decide the motion on the basis of the evidence at the time the ruling was 

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reserved.” Id. “If the jury has returned a guilty verdict, the court may set aside the 

verdict and enter an acquittal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1). 

In deciding a motion for judgment of acquittal, the district court, “after viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorably to the government, must determine whether the 

jury could reasonably find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” U.S. v. 

Bernhardt, 840 F.2d 1441, 1448 (9th Cir. 1988). However, “it is the jury’s exclusive 

function to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw 

reasonable inferences from proven facts.” Id. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On November 1, 2011, Defendant Christopher James was indicted on two counts 

of sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B), which defines sexual abuse as knowingly 

“engages in a sexual act with another person if that other person is . . . physically 

incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that 

sexual act.” (Doc. 2.) The alleged sexual act in Count 1 involved “contact between the 

defendant’s penis and the victim’s vulva.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)(A). The alleged 

sexual act in Count 2 involved “the penetration of the victim’s genital opening with the 

defendant’s finger” “with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or 

gratify the sexual desire of any person.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)(C). Both acts were 

alleged to have been committed on August 3, 2011, against a 28-year-old woman with 

severe cerebral palsy and developmental disabilities. 

A jury trial was held on July 30 and 31 and August 1 and 2, 2013. On August 1, 

2013, defense counsel moved on behalf of Defendant for judgment of acquittal. (Doc. 

109.) The Court reserved ruling on the motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 

29(b). (Doc. 125 at 79:12-13.) At the close of evidence, defense counsel re-urged the 

Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, and the Court reserved ruling on it. (Doc. 125 

at 188:15-20.) On August 2, 2013, the jury returned a guilty verdict on each count. 

(Doc. 124 at 64:7-18.) The parties submitted post-trial briefing on the Rule 29 motion, 

and oral argument was heard on September 23, 2013. 

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III. ANALYSIS 

For each count, the government was required to prove: 

1. The Defendant knowingly engaged in a sexual act with the victim; 

2. The victim was physically incapable of declining participation in, or 

communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act; 

3. The offense was committed in the District of Arizona, within the confines 

of the Fort Apache Indian Reservation; and 

4. The Defendant was an Indian at the time. 

A. Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B) 

Section 2242(2) includes two subsections. The first subsection makes it a crime to 

engage in a sexual act with another person if that other person is “incapable of appraising 

the nature of the conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(A). Although the government presented 

some evidence that the victim had mental disabilities, it did not charge Defendant under 

§ 2242(2)(A). It charged Defendant only under the second subsection, § 2242(B), which 

makes it a crime to engage in a sexual act with another person if that other person is 

“physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to 

engage in, that sexual act.” 

Defendant contends that “physically incapable of declining participation in, or 

communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act” under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2242(2)(B) means unconscious or in a similar condition that renders the victim 

temporarily unable to communicate. The government contends that § 2242(2)(B) is not 

limited to a victim’s temporary condition, and that it presented sufficient evidence from 

which a jury could reasonably find that the victim was incapable of effectively 

communicating to Defendant in a manner through which Defendant would have been 

able to understand her. As explained below, § 2242(2)(B) is not limited to circumstances 

in which the victim is temporarily “physically incapable of declining participation in, or 

communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act,” and § 2242(2)(B) does not 

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require a jury to speculate regarding whether the Defendant would have been able to 

understand the victim’s communications. 

Section 2242 was enacted in 1986 as part of H.R. 4745, which was intended to 

modernize and reform the federal rape statutes. H.R. Rep. No. 99-594 (1986), reprinted 

in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6186, 6186, 1986 WL 31966 *1, *6. The House Judiciary 

Committee reported that H.R. 4745 did not incorporate traditional rape law doctrines, but 

instead explicitly defined all of the elements of each offense: 

The offenses set forth in H.R. 4745 define 

completely what the prosecution must prove to establish 

its case. Thus, for example, proposed section 2241 

(aggravated sexual abuse) does not, by its terms, require the 

prosecution to show that the victim did not consent to the 

sexual act, nor does it require the prosecution to show that the 

victim resisted. The Committee believes such a requirement 

to be inappropriate to the offense defined in proposed section 

2241 and intentionally omitted imposing such a requirement 

on the prosecution. Where the Committee believes it 

appropriate to the offense to require the prosecution to show 

that the conduct was engaged in without the victim’s 

permission, such a requirement has explicitly been set forth. 

1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6193, 1986 WL 31966 at *13 (emphasis added). The Report 

briefly describes proposed § 2242(2): 

Paragraph (2) of proposed section 2242 makes it an 

offense . . . to engage in a sexual act with another person who 

is incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct or 

physically incapable of declining participation in, or 

communicating unwillingness to engage in, the sexual act. 

There is no spousal immunity, and corroboration of the 

victim’s testimony is not required. Lack of consent by the 

victim is not an element of the offense, and the prosecution 

need not introduce evidence of lack of consent or of victim 

resistance.62 

Note 62: In a prosecution under proposed section 

2242(2)(B), the prosecution must show that the victim was 

physically incapable of declining participation in the sexual 

act or of communicating an unwillingness to engage in the 

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sexual act. The prosecution is not required to show that the 

victim did not consent to the sexual act. 

1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6196, 1986 WL 31966 at *16. The House Judiciary Committee 

Report, however, does not elaborate on the meaning of “physically incapable of declining 

participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act” under 18 

U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B). 

The parties have not cited, and the Court has not found, any federal cases that 

clarify the meaning of “physically incapable of declining participation in, or 

communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act” under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2242(2)(B). The Ninth Circuit has agreed with the Eighth Circuit that “[a] reasonable 

jury may conclude that a person who is asleep when a sexual act begins is physically 

unable to decline participation in that act.” United States v. Fasthorse, 639 F.3d 1182, 

1184 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Barrett, 937 F.2d 1346, 1347-48 (8th Cir. 

1991)); see also United States v. Papakee, 573 F.3d 569 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. 

Williams, 89 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 1996). In Fasthorse, Barrett, Papakee, and Williams, the 

victims had been drinking heavily and, in two cases, had smoked marijuana before falling 

asleep. But these federal cases do not address circumstances similar to those here and do 

not address whether § 2242(2)(B) applies only to situations where the victim is asleep, 

intoxicated, or otherwise temporarily physically unable to communicate. 

More helpful is an opinion of the Supreme Court of Connecticut that examined a 

state statute with language similar to that of § 2242(2)(B). State v. Fourtin, 307 Conn. 

186, 52 A.3d 674 (2012). In Fourtin, the statutes at issue criminalized sexual intercourse 

with a person who was “physically helpless” at the time of the sexual intercourse and 

defined a “physically helpless” person as one who is “unconscious or for any other reason 

is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act.” Id. at 188, 198, 52 A.3d at 

676, 682. In a prior case the court had determined that a victim restrained on a stretcher 

was not “physically helpless” under the statute because she was able to communicate 

even though she could not resist. Id. at 199, 52 A.3d at 682. In Fourtin, therefore, 

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although the victim could not walk and needed assistance performing daily living 

activities, the question was not whether she could physically resist, but whether she had 

the physical ability to communicate unwillingness to an act. The evidence at trial showed 

she was nonverbal, but communicated with others by gesturing, vocalizing, and using a 

communication board. Id. at 189, 52 A.3d at 677. The victim indicated her displeasure 

by kicking, biting, and scratching; she also vocalized her feelings by groaning or 

screeching. Id. at 189-90, 52 A.3d at 677. The court concluded that the state had 

presented ample evidence that the victim was capable of communicating and had not 

produced any credible evidence that the victim “was either unconscious or so 

uncommunicative that she was physically incapable of manifesting to the defendant her 

lack of consent to sexual intercourse at the time of the alleged sexual assault.” Id. at 212, 

52 A.3d at 690. 

The Fourtin court observed that case law from other jurisdictions, particularly 

New York, supported the view that “the physically helpless requirement was designed to 

protect victims who are unconscious or in a similar condition that has rendered them 

temporarily unable to communicate.” Id. at 201, 52 A.3d at 683. But it found only one 

case directly on point, and in that case the New York Court of Appeals did not limit its 

consideration of the statute’s applicability to a victim who was temporarily physically 

unable to communicate. See id. at 203-04, 52 A.3d at 685 (citing People v. Huurre, 84 

N.Y.2d 930, 645 N.E.2d 1210 (1994)). 

In Hurre, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court’s determination 

that a nonverbal, profoundly retarded woman with cerebral palsy and epilepsy was not 

physically helpless within the meaning of the New York statute equivalent to the 

Connecticut statute. 84 N.Y.2d at 930, 645 N.E.2d at 1210; see People v. Huurre, 193 

A.D.2d 305, 306-07, 603 N.Y.S.2d 179, 180 (1993). The victim’s caretakers testified 

that she was able to communicate whether she did or did not want something by making 

and understanding a few signs, crying, pointing, shaking her head, and making facial 

expressions. 193 A.D.2d at 307-08, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 181. The lower court concluded 

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that the evidence adduced at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, was legally insufficient to establish that the victim was physically unable to 

communicate unwillingness to an act: 

Although the victim, by virtue of her retardation, is not able 

to determine what she should or should not be unwilling to 

do, the testimony adduced at trial established that when she is 

unwilling to do something she communicates that 

unwillingness. 

Id. at 307, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 180. Relying on Huure, the Fourtin court concluded: 

In sum, even if the term “physically helpless” in § 53a-65(6) 

was not intended primarily to apply to a severely handicapped 

person who is able to communicate non-verbally, we agree 

with the conclusion in Huurre that a person’s physical or 

intellectual disabilities do not preclude a finding that such a 

person, by virtue of his or her disabilities or other reasons, is 

physically helpless in the sense of being “physically unable to 

communicate unwillingness to an act.” Thus, regardless of 

the reason for the alleged inability to communicate, the key 

question in cases that require proof of physical helplessness is 

whether, at the time of the alleged sexual assault, the victim 

was physically able to convey a lack of consent or 

unwillingness to an act. 

307 Conn. at 207, 52 A.3d at 687 (citation omitted). 

The Fourtin court also noted “this appears to be a case in which the state 

ultimately proceeded against the defendant under the wrong statute.” Id. at 210 n.20, 52 

A.3d at 690 n.20. Originally, the state had also charged the defendant with crimes that 

required that the victim be unable to consent to sexual intercourse because the victim was 

“mentally defective.” But the state chose to pursue only charges requiring proof that the 

victim was physically helpless. “By electing to prove that the victim was physically 

helpless rather than mentally defective, the state removed from the case all issues 

pertaining to the victim’s mental capacity to consent to sex.” Id. Similarly, Huure

concluded that the prosecution had adduced legally sufficient evidence to support a 

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conviction on the theory that the victim was unable to consent to sexual contact by reason 

of a mental defect, but that charge had been dismissed. 193 A.D.2d at 310. 

The dissent in Fourtin would have held “there is legally sufficient evidence in the 

record to support the jury’s finding that the victim’s physical and mental disabilities 

rendered her ‘physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act.’” 307 Conn. at 

220, 52 A.3d at 695. The Connecticut statute defined “physically helpless” as 

“unconscious or for any other reason is physically unable to communicate unwillingness 

to an act.” Perhaps “for any other reason” in the Connecticut statute could be interpreted 

to include “mentally defective” even though it would duplicate a separate offense. But 

§ 2242(2)(B) was intended to “define completely what the prosecution must prove to 

establish its case” and does not include the open-ended phrase “for any other reason.” 

Rather, § 2242(2)(B) requires the government to prove the victim is “physically 

incapable,” which is distinguished from “incapable of appraising the nature of the 

conduct” in § 2242(2)(A), though the elements could overlap in particular cases. 

Consistent with the reasoning of Fourtin and Huurre, § 2242(2)(B) applies not 

only when the victim is unconscious or in a similar condition that renders the victim 

temporarily unable to communicate, but also when the victim is “physically incapable of 

declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act” 

longer than temporarily. But a person who is able to communicate unwillingness or 

displeasure by vocalizations, gestures, or other actions is not “physically incapable of 

declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act” 

even if she cannot physically resist or she lacks the mental capacity to decide what she 

should or should not be unwilling to do. 

Finally, the government has provided no authority for its contention that even if 

the victim could sometimes communicate in some manner, § 2242(2)(B) applies because 

the Defendant would not have been able to understand her even if others could. Because 

the government did not present evidence that the Defendant would be unable to 

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understand the victim’s head shaking and vocalizations of displeasure, such as growling, 

it is not necessary to decide this issue. 

B. Evidence Presented at Trial Regarding Whether the Victim Was 

Physically Incapable of Declining Participation in, or Communicating 

Unwillingness to Engage in, the Sexual Act 

In her opening statement, the government’s counsel said, “[The victim] 

communicates primarily nonverbally with gestures and sounds. She can say yes or no.” 

(Doc. 122 at 13:10-11.) The government’s witnesses included Special Adrian Jim, 

Patricia Shands, Mark Quay, and Jodie Quay. 

Special Agent Adrian Jim testified that when he first met with the victim, she was 

crying and “[i]t didn’t seem like she wanted to talk to us.” (Doc. 123 at 15:15-16.) He 

testified that he interviewed the victim on a second visit, and the video recording of the 

second interview was played for the jury. The video showed the victim nodding her head 

in agreement and shaking her head for disagreement. Special Agent Jim testified that 

during the second interview the victim responded to his questions by nodding her head 

for yes and shaking her head for no. (Id. at 19:15-24.) 

Patricia Shands, the victim’s direct caregiver, testified that part of the victim’s 

school program involving practicing language skills, such as “sounding out our ABCs 

and her vowels,” working on the alphabet, and using flash cards with pictures to practice 

the sounds of letters. (Id. at 54:6, 55:6-9.) Ms. Shands testified that when the victim gets 

out of her wheelchair, she chooses where she wants to sit. (Id. at 57:6-11.) Ms. Shands 

also testified that the victim requires assistance to use the toilet, but “she’ll moan when 

she’s done” so that a caregiver can help her get back to her wheelchair. (Id. at 58:19-

59:3.) Ms. Shands testified that the victim can talk, but sometimes she has difficulty 

understanding the victim, and it is easier for the victim to show you something than to tell 

you. (Id. at 60:17-20, 61:19-22.) She also testified that the victim has many friends at 

school, and she can express anger and dislike for someone. (Id. at 61:23-24, 68:6-8, 68.) 

Ms. Shands testified that the victim communicates by nodding or shaking her head and 

making grunting sounds. (Id. at 73:16-18.) She further testified that the victim can 

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communicate her needs and desires, such as when she needs to go to the bathroom, when 

she is finished using the toilet, when she wants to go play on the computer, when she 

wants to play games, when she wants to do something, and when she does not want to do 

something. (Id. at 74:10-75:7.) 

Mark Quay, the victim’s uncle, testified that the victim understands both English 

and Apache and responds to questions by nodding her head for yes and shaking her head 

for no. (Id. at 124:4-15.) He testified that she does not talk much, but she can talk. (Id.

at 124:9-12.) Mr. Quay testified that sometimes she expresses that she loves him by 

hugging him. (Id. at 123:19-24.) He said that when he comes to her house, she always 

points at him and says “Mark” or “uncle.” (Id. at 123:22-24.) He also testified that if 

you change the television channel when the victim does not want you to, she gets mad, 

growls, and gives you a mean look. (Id. at 125:4-12.) Mr. Quay further explained that 

when the victim gives you a mean look it looks like the mean look that others give. (Id.

at 125:13-14.) 

Jodi Quay, the victim’s aunt, testified that on August 3, 2011, she saw the 

Defendant and the victim talking and laughing together, communicating. (Id. at 153:11-

17.) Ms. Quay also testified that she can communicate with the victim, and the victim 

nods her head for yes and shakes her head for no. (Id. at 155:13-16.) 

At the time the Court reserved ruling on Defendant’s Rule 29 motion, the evidence 

showed that the victim was physically able to communicate her unwillingness to engage 

in a sexual act and physically able to decline participation in a sexual act by head 

movements and vocalizations such as growling. As in Fourtin and Huurre, the 

government may have been able to present evidence that the victim was “incapable of 

appraising the nature of the conduct”—such as evidence of mental limitations, 

developmental delay, and lack of knowledge about sex—sufficient to support a 

conviction under § 2242(2)(A). But the government did not charge Defendant under 

§ 2242(2)(A). The victim’s mental limitations likely affected her ability to know what 

she should and should not be unwilling to do, but § 2242(2)(B) requires evidence that the 

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victim is physically incapable of expressing unwillingness or declining participation. 

The evidence presented by the government at trial was not sufficient for a jury to 

reasonably find that the victim was “physically incapable of declining participation in, or 

communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act.” 

C. Additional Elements of the Charges 

Defendant summarily challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

finding the remaining elements of the offenses with which he is charged. The Court 

granted the government’s motion to take judicial notice that the White Mountain Apache 

Tribe is a federally recognized tribe, and the jury was instructed accordingly. (Docs. 64, 

87, 106, 123 at 11:16-12:4.) Defendant did not object to the motion or instruction and 

did not dispute that the alleged offenses occurred at the victim’s home, in the District of 

Arizona, within the confines of the Fort Apache Indian Reservation. The government 

presented undisputed evidence that the Defendant was an Indian by testimony and 

documents showing that he is three-eighths White Mountain Apache and an enrolled 

tribal member. (Doc. 123 at 39:13-42:15.) 

The government was required to prove that the Defendant knowingly engaged in a 

sexual act with the victim. For Count 1, the government was required to prove the sexual 

act involved contact between the Defendant’s penis and the victim’s vulva. For Count 2, 

the government was required to prove the sexual act involved the penetration of the 

victim’s genital opening with the Defendant’s finger with the intent to abuse, humiliate, 

harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. Daniel Hawkins, a 

special agent for the Bureau of Indian Affairs at the time of the alleged offenses, testified 

that on August 5, 2011, and November 3, 2011, he read the Defendant his Miranda

rights, the Defendant initialed each statement regarding his rights on a form, and both 

Special Agent Hawkins and the Defendant signed and dated the form for each interview. 

(Doc. 123 at 228-236, 243-245.) The forms regarding the Defendant’s rights and a 

statement written by the Defendant on November 3, 2011, were admitted into evidence. 

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In response to Special Agent Hawkins’ questions on August 5, 2011, the 

Defendant admitted that he had put his finger into the victim’s genital opening. (Id. at 

238:2-12, 242:1-9.) In response to Special Agent Hawkins’ questions on November 3, 

2011, the Defendant admitted that he removed the victim’s pants and underwear, pulled 

down his own pants, got on top of the victim, and put his penis inside her. (Id. at 250:3-

251:4.) In addition, the Defendant wrote and signed a statement that he was ashamed and 

did not know what made him do what he did. (Id. at 251:14-253:25.) Viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence was sufficient for a 

jury to reasonably find the Defendant knowingly engaged in the sexual acts alleged in 

Counts 1 and 2 with the victim. 

D. Judgment of Acquittal 

Therefore, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government, the Court finds the evidence insufficient to sustain the convictions in this 

case. The jury could not reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was 

“physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to 

engage in, that sexual act” at the time of the alleged sexual acts. The Court further finds 

that the government presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably 

find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant knowingly engaged in the charged 

sexual acts with the victim, the offense was committed in Arizona, within the confines of 

the Fort Apache Indian Reservation, and the Defendant was an Indian at the time. 

Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal will therefore be granted. 

E. Conditional Ruling on a Motion for a New Trial 

“If the court enters a judgment of acquittal after a guilty verdict, the court must 

also conditionally determine whether any motion for a new trial should be granted if the 

judgment of acquittal is later vacated or reversed.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(d)(1). The 

judgment of acquittal entered here is based entirely on interpretation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2242(2)(B), an issue of law. If the judgment of acquittal is vacated or reversed on 

appeal, the Court finds no basis for a new trial. 

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Oral Motion for Acquittal by Defendant 

Christopher James (Doc. 109) is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk enter Judgment of Acquittal in favor 

of the Defendant Christopher James. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the Judgment of Acquittal entered in this case 

in favor of Defendant Christopher James is vacated or reversed, any motion for a new 

trial would be denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Christopher James is discharged 

from custody. 

Dated this 26th day of September, 2013. 

Case 3:11-cr-08206-NVW Document 134 Filed 09/26/13 Page 13 of 13