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Parties Involved:
District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority
Appellee
Anthony S. Harris
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 12, 2014 Decided June 23, 2015

No. 13-7043

ANTHONY S. HARRIS,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WATER AND SEWER AUTHORITY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:12-cv-01453)

John Wesley Davis argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Grace E. Speights argued the cause for appellee. With her

on the brief was Jocelyn R. Cuttino.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and TATEL and

SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GARLAND.

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GARLAND, Chief Judge: Plaintiff Anthony S. Harris worked

for the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority

(WASA) for sixteen years. After losing his job, Harris sued his

former employer on a number of grounds, including violating

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by retaliating against

him for opposing racially discriminatory employment practices. 

The district court dismissed the case, holding that Harris’

complaint failed to sufficiently allege a causal connection

between his opposition to WASA’s alleged discrimination and

his termination. Because the complaint did allege sufficient

facts to render Harris’ Title VII claim plausible, we reverse. 

I

Accepting, as we must, the factual allegations in Harris’

complaint as true, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007), the facts of this case are relatively straightforward. In

September 1995, Harris began work at WASA as a systems

operations manager. During his time there, Harris made a

number of significant contributions to WASA’s maintenance

operations, including innovations in administrative processing

of work orders, preventative maintenance scheduling, inventory

control, and financial planning. As a result, Harris was regularly

commended for his work and for his contributions to the

improvement of WASA’s operations. See Compl. ¶¶ 6, 9-10.

Around 2009, Harris and other WASA employees began to

notice that WASA was terminating a significant number of

black employees and replacing them with white employees. 

Around the same time, Harris became aware that WASA had

hired a number of consultants and contract employees, many of

whom were only marginally qualified and several of whom had

little or no work to do. In January 2011, Harris wrote a letter to

then-Mayor Vincent Gray complaining about problems at

WASA, including racial discrimination. In February 2011, he

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wrote a similar letter to the committee of the District of

Columbia City Council with oversight authority over WASA. 

In May 2011, WASA officials contacted Harris to arrange a

meeting to discuss his January letter. That meeting was

canceled and never rescheduled. See Compl. ¶¶ 11-14, 17-19.

On October 6, 2011, Harris took a leave of absence from

WASA to undergo surgery for chronic kidney failure, which had

forced him onto an adjusted work schedule to accommodate his

dialysis. On October 11, Harris informed WASA that, per his

physician’s instructions, he would be unable to return to work

until October 26. On October 13, WASA informed Harris that

his position had been abolished; it did not, however, provide him

with an opportunity to apply for other vacant positions for which

he might qualify. Notwithstanding the formal abolition of

Harris’ position, the functions of that position continued to be

performed at WASA. See Compl. ¶¶ 20-28. 

Harris filed suit against WASA, alleging that he was

terminated in retaliation for his January and February letters

opposing WASA’s racially discriminatory practices, in violation

of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Harris also stated a number

of claims under D.C. law, including a claim that WASA violated

the D.C. Family and Medical Leave Act, which prohibits

employers from retaliating against employees for taking medical

leave. D.C. CODE §§ 32-503, -507; D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 4,

§ 1621.1. In lieu of filing an answer, WASA filed a motion to

dismiss Harris’ action for “failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV P. 12(b)(6). 

The district court granted the motion. It dismissed Harris’

Title VII and § 1981 claims, finding that his complaint failed to

sufficiently allege a causal connection between his protected

activity (the January and February letters) and his termination,

as required to state a retaliation claim. Harris v. D.C. Water &

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Sewer Auth., 922 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34-36 (D.D.C. 2013). With no

federal claims remaining in the case, the court declined to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Harris’ D.C. law claims

and dismissed those claims as well. Id. at 36.

Harris filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, he argues

that the district court erred in dismissing his Title VII and

§ 1981 claims because his complaint did adequately allege

causation. He also argues that, because the district court should

not have dismissed his federal claims, his D.C. law claims

should be reinstated as well. 

II

We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for

failure to state a claim de novo. Kassem v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr.,

513 F.3d 251, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2008). “To survive a motion to

dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. But “the tenet that a court must accept

as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is

inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. Accordingly,

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

The misconduct alleged here is unlawful retaliation in

violation of Title VII, which both prohibits employers from

engaging in employment practices that discriminate on the basis

of race, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), and bars them from

retaliating against an employee “because he has opposed any

[such] practice,” id. § 2000e-3(a). See McGrath v. Clinton, 666

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F.3d 1377, 1379-80 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The complaint also

alleged that WASA’s unlawful retaliation violated § 1981,

which provides that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the same right

. . . to the full and equal benefit of all laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 

“To prove unlawful retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) that

he opposed a practice made unlawful by Title VII; (2) that the

employer took a materially adverse action against him; and (3)

that the employer took the action ‘because’ the employee

opposed the practice.” McGrath, 666 F.3d at 1380; see

McFadden v. Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, 611

F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (suggesting that the frameworks

applicable to claims of retaliation under Title VII and § 1981 are

“essentially the same”). 

The district court found, and the parties do not dispute, that

Harris’ complaint alleged sufficient facts on each of the first two

elements of a retaliation claim. The only remaining point of

contention is whether Harris’ complaint alleged sufficient facts

going to causation to render his claim plausible. We conclude

that it did.

Harris alleged that he complained to his employer about

racial discrimination, which is protected activity under Title VII,

in January and February of 2011; that his employer knew about

this protected activity by May 2011; and that he was fired in

October 2011. See Compl. ¶¶ 17-19, 26. WASA acknowledges

that, under some circumstances, temporal proximity between an

employer’s knowledge of protected activity and an adverse

personnel action may alone be sufficient to raise an inference of

causation. It maintains, however, that the five-month gap in this

case (from May 2011 to October 2011) was too long to support

such an inference.1

1

Cf. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)

(noting that “the temporal proximity must be very close” if the

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We need not decide whether a five-month time lag without

more would be sufficient to render Harris’ claim plausible

because his complaint alleged more. In addition to temporal

proximity, Harris alleged that he “was regularly commended for

his work, and [made] numerous contributions to the

improvement of WASA’s operations, especially with respect to

WASA’s facilities and equipment maintenance.” Compl. ¶ 10.

He also disputed the explanation WASA gave for terminating

him -- “that his position at WASA had been abolished,” id. ¶ 26

-- alleging that the “functions of the position continue[d] to be

performed,” id. ¶ 28, and that he “was given no opportunity by

WASA to apply for any vacant positions for which he might

qualify,” id. ¶ 27. 

If true, these facts would show that Harris’ termination was

not attributable to either of the “‘two most common legitimate

reasons’” for termination: “performance below the employer’s

legitimate expectations or the elimination of the plaintiff’s

position altogether.” George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 412 (D.C.

Cir. 2005) (quoting Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 145 (D.C.

Cir. 2002)). Such a showing is sufficient to satisfy a plaintiff’s

burden of establishing a prima facie case at the summary

judgment stage, id.; cf. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,

431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977) (explaining that eliminating the

analogous common reasons for refusing to hire an applicant “is

sufficient, absent other explanation, to create an inference that

plaintiff relies on temporal proximity alone); Hamilton v. Geithner,

666 F.3d 1344, 1357-58 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (recognizing that, in

Breeden, the Supreme Court “cited circuit decisions suggesting that in

some instances a three-month period between the protected activity

and the adverse employment action may, standing alone, be too

lengthy to raise an inference of causation,” but stating that “neither the

Supreme Court nor this court has established a bright-line three-month

rule”).

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the decision was a discriminatory one”), and therefore is

certainly enough to survive a motion to dismiss, cf. Swierkiewicz

v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).

But more than that, Harris’ complaint alleged facts that, if

shown, may be enough to make out not only a prima facie case

of retaliation, but also a case sufficient to survive summary

judgment outright. At oral argument, WASA’s counsel candidly

acknowledged that, if Harris’ factual allegations were given

credence, WASA’s proffered justification for terminating Harris

“sounds like pretext.” Oral Arg. Recording at 23:19-51. It

sounds like that to us as well. See Murray v. Gilmore, 406 F.3d

708, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that a jury could infer that

the elimination of the plaintiff’s position was pretextual when

the functions of the plaintiff’s job were reassigned to a new

position that was the “functional[] equivalent” of the plaintiff’s). 

And as this court has repeatedly held, “‘[u]sually, proffering

evidence from which a jury could find that [the employer’s]

stated reasons . . . were pretextual . . . will be enough to get a

plaintiff’s claim to a jury.’” Calhoun v. Johnson, 632 F.3d

1259, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting George, 407 F.3d at 413

(internal quotation marks omitted)); see Aka v. Wash. Hosp.

Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).

In short, because Harris’ complaint alleged facts that, if

shown, would be at least sufficient to state a prime facie case of

retaliation -- and perhaps enough to survive summary judgment

-- it necessarily alleged facts sufficient to render his claim

plausible at the motion to dismiss stage.

At oral argument, WASA advanced another argument,

suggesting that Harris had pled himself out of court by alleging

facts related to his medical leave. Oral Arg. Recording at 17:55-

18:12, 20:30-21:30; see Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216

F.3d 1111, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (explaining that a plaintiff can

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plead himself out of court if he “alleg[es] facts that render

success on the merits impossible”). According to WASA,

Harris’ need for medical leave was an intervening act that broke

any chain of causation between his protected activity and his

termination. Under this theory, it was Harris’ medical leave,

rather than his opposition to racial discrimination, that was the

true cause of his termination.

It is possible, of course, that during discovery WASA will

produce evidence showing that the real reason it terminated

Harris was that he took medical leave. Such evidence might be

enough to rebut Harris’ retaliation claim. (Needless to say, it

would simultaneously strengthen Harris’ D.C. Family and

Medical Leave Act claim.2

) Indeed, it is also possible that

discovery will show that the true reason for Harris’ termination

was what WASA said it was at the time: that his position had

been abolished. By the same token, however, discovery may

provide Harris with direct evidence of what he alleged in his

complaint: that he was terminated in retaliation for complaining

about racial discrimination.

But our role is not to speculate about which factual

allegations are likely to be proved after discovery. See

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The only question before us is

whether Harris alleged facts that, taken as true, render his claim

of retaliation plausible. See id. Having alleged a five-month

gap between WASA’s knowledge of his discrimination

complaint and his termination, supplemented by facts that rebut

“‘the two most common legitimate reasons’” for termination and

2

See D.C. CODE §§ 32-503, -507; see also D.C. MUN. REGS. tit.

4, § 1621.1 (prohibiting an employer from “us[ing] the fact that an

employee has requested . . . or taken a period of family or medical

leave under this chapter as a negative factor in employment actions,

such as . . . terminations”). 

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also give rise to a reasonable inference of pretext, George, 407

F.3d at 412 (quoting Stella, 284 F.3d at 145), Harris met that

burden.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s

dismissal of Harris’ Title VII and § 1981 claims. And because

the court’s dismissal of Harris’ District of Columbia law claims

was premised on the dismissal of those federal claims, see

Harris, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 36 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)),

we reverse that dismissal as well. 

So ordered.

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