Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-07-56568/USCOURTS-ca9-07-56568-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Leaf
Appellee
Mike Love
Appellant
Sanctuary Records Group, Ltd.
Appellee
Jean Sievers
Appellee
Soop LLC
Appellee
The Lippin Group, Inc.
Appellee
Brian Wilson
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MIKE LOVE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SANCTUARY RECORDS GROUP, LTD.; No. 07-56008 SANCTUARY RECORDS GROUP INC.;

SANCTUARY  D.C. No. ARTIST MANAGEMENT,

INC.; SANCTUARY MUSIC CV-05-07798-ABC

PRODUCTIONS, INC.; BIGTIME.TV;

MELINDA WILSON; SOOP LLC;

DAVID LEAF,

Defendants-Appellees. 

MIKE LOVE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 07-56568

SANCTUARY RECORDS GROUP, LTD.;

D.C. No. SANCTUARY RECORDS GROUP INC.;  CV-05-07798-ABC SANCTUARY ARTIST MANAGEMENT,

INC.; SANCTUARY MUSIC OPINION

PRODUCTIONS, INC.; SOOP LLC;

DAVID LEAF,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Audrey B. Collins, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 10, 2010—Pasadena, California

9771

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Filed July 8, 2010

Before: Sidney R. Thomas and Barry G. Silverman,

Circuit Judges, and Jeremy D. Fogel,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Thomas

*The Honorable Jeremy D. Fogel, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of California, sitting by designation. 

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COUNSEL

Philip H. Stillman, Stillman and Associates, Cardiff, California, for plaintiff-appellant Mike Love.

Barry E. Mallen, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, Los Angeles, California; Howard L. Weitzman, Kinsella Weitzman Iser

Kump & Aldisert LLP, Santa Monica, California, for

defendants-appellees Sanctuary Records Group, Ltd., Sanctuary Records Group, Inc., Sanctuary Artist Management, Inc.,

and Sanctuary Music Productions, Inc.

Neville L. Johnson, Johnson & Johnson LLP, Beverly Hills,

California, for defendant-appellee BigTime.tv.

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OPINION

THOMAS, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents the question, inter alia, of whether the

Lanham Act and California’s common law right of publicity

apply extra-territorially to events occurring in Great Britain.

Under the circumstances presented by this case, we conclude

that such claims are not viable, and we affirm the judgments

entered by the district court.

I

In 2004, founding Beach Boy member Brian Wilson, who

had written (or co-written) most of the iconic Beach Boy hits,

released a solo album called Smile. Wilson mounted a tour,

with backup band, to support the album. It had been years

since Brian Wilson had toured regularly with The Beach

Boys. As part of settlement of earlier litigation, Mike Love,

also a founding member of The Beach Boys, had acquired the

right to use The Beach Boys trademark in live performances.

He continued to tour as The Beach Boys with a varying

lineup, playing hundreds of shows a year. 

As part of a promotion campaign, the British newspaper the

Mail on Sunday distributed a compact disc, consisting of

Brian Wilson’s solo versions of Beach Boy songs, along with

of his solo work, with approximately 2.6 million copies of the

paper. The CDs were distributed in the United Kingdom and

Ireland. Approximately 425 copies of that edition of the Mail

were distributed in the United States without the CD, including 18 in California. 

The cover of the distributed compact disc, entitled Good

Vibrations, featured Brian Wilson, along with three smaller

photographs of The Beach Boys. The small photographs of

the group included a picture of Mike Love. The front page of

the Mail on Sunday advertised the CD prominently, and

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included an image of the CD’s cover. In addition to sound

recordings, the CD contained two videos of live performances

by Wilson’s band. 

Love was concerned that a second British invasion and

Wilson’s return to touring and recording would dampen ticket

sales for the live performances of his touring group. Thus, in

response to the English promotion, Love sued a variety of

parties for their involvement in the promotion campaign. He

sued Wilson; Associated Newspapers Limited (“ANL”), the

publisher of Mail on Sunday; BigTime.tv, a British company

that licensed and recorded the compact disc; Sanctuary

Records Group, Ltd., the entity that owned the rights to the

Brian Wilson recordings relevant to this case, as well as Sanctuary Records Group NY, Sanctuary Music Management,

Inc., and Sanctuary Music Productions, Inc. (“the Sanctuary

defendants”); Jean Sievers, the Lippin Group, Inc., and SOOP

LCC, Wilson’s managers and publicist; David Leaf, a writer

and producer for Wilson; and Melinda Wilson, Wilson’s wife.

The district court dismissed the complaint against BigTime.tv and ANL for lack of personal jurisdiction, and

awarded sanctions to BigTime.tv. It dismissed with prejudice

three of the Sanctuary defendants (Sanctuary Records Group

NY, Sanctuary Music Management, Inc., and Sanctuary

Music Productions, Inc.) on the basis of their unopposed

motion asserting that they had nothing whatsoever to do with

the case. The court dismissed Melinda Wilson from the suit

with prejudice, as Love had not been given permission to add

her as a defendant, and because the complaint alleged no facts

that would support keeping her in the lawsuit.

The district court dismissed the claims for violation of California’s statutory and common law rights of publicity after

holding that English law, which does not recognize a right of

publicity, governed. It dismissed three Lanham Act claims,

two for lack of standing, and one after finding that the extraterritorial reach of the statute did not encompass the claims.

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The district court also dismissed four claims raised only

against Wilson, four claims against various defendants for

interference with contractual relations and prospective economic advantage, and three copyright claims. Because Love’s

claim of violation of California fair business practices law

depended on the survival of the Lanham Act claims, and

because his civil conspiracy allegation depended on the survival of at least one other claim, and that Love had failed to

allege acts that would constitute conspiracy, the district court

dismissed those two claims as well.

Over the course of the proceedings, Love filed three complaints. In his first amended complaint, he alleged that he was

domiciled in Nevada. In his second amended complaint, he

removed that line, and claimed to be “an individual with a residence in California.” The district court “strongly admonishe[d]” Love for alleging to have a residence in California

and, based on this “legal nullity,” claiming in papers that

“Love is a California resident.” (emphasis in original).

Love responded to criticism by the district court that he had

failed to introduce any evidence that Good Vibrations had

ever entered the U.S. market by filing a declaration by Steven

Surrey that Surrey had bought a copy of Good Vibrations on

eBay because he thought it was an official Beach Boys product (“Surrey affidavit”). Because of uncontested evidence that

Surrey was a close associate of Love’s attorney and had fabricated his allegation that he was confused by the labeling of

Good Vibrations, the district court never considered the Surrey affidavit to have any evidentiary value, and entered sanctions against Love’s counsel.

In response to some confusion as to whether and when a

final and appealable judgment had been issued, the district

court entered a stipulated final judgment on June 1, 2007.

Love timely filed a notice of appeal on July 2, 2007. On September 7, 2007, the district court granted the motions for

attorney’s fees filed by eight defendants, including the Sanc9778 LOVE v. SANCTUARY RECORDS GROUP

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tuary defendants. Love appealed the attorney’s fees award on

October 17, 2007. The two appeals have been consolidated.

After reaching settlement with many of the defendants in

this case,1 Love continues to appeal the following issues: dismissal of BigTime.tv; dismissal of the right of publicity

claims; dismissal of the conspiracy claim; dismissal of the

three Lanham Act claims and the related California unfair

business practices claim; and the award of attorney’s fees to

the Sanctuary defendants.2

The central issue before us is whether American claims for

relief can be asserted on the basis of conduct that only

occurred in Great Britain. The defendants think not. Love

wishes they all could be California torts.

II

The district court dismissed BigTime.tv from the suit for

lack of personal jurisdiction, a decision we review de novo.

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Marin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800

(9th Cir. 2004). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is appropriate. Id. Where, as here, a

motion to dismiss is based on written materials rather than an

evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie

showing of jurisdictional facts. Id. Uncontroverted allegations

in the complaint must be taken as true, and conflicts over

statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in the

Love’s favor. Id.

1Love has now settled with Wilson, ANL, Jean Sievers, and the Lippin

Group, who have already been dismissed from this appeal, and SOOP

LLC and David Leaf, whom we now dismiss as well. 

2Because Love has not argued that dismissal of Melinda Wilson, Sanctuary Records Group NY, Sanctuary Music Management, Inc., or Sanctuary Music Productions, Inc. was in error, we affirm those dismissals

without further comment. 

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[1] Where there is no applicable federal statute governing

personal jurisdiction, the district court applies the law of the

state in which it sits. Yahoo! v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme,

433 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).3 California’s

long-arm jurisdictional statute is coextensive with federal due

process requirements. Id.; Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 410.10. Thus,

the district court was permitted to exercise personal jurisdiction over BigTime.tv only if BigTime.tv had “certain minimum contacts” with California “such that the maintenance of

the suit d[id] not offend the traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice.” Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1205 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The parties agree that we should use the “purposeful direction” or “effects” test in this case. The effects test is satisfied

if (1) the defendant committed an intentional act; (2) the act

was expressly aimed at the forum state; and (3) the act caused

harm that the defendant knew was likely to be suffered in the

forum state. Id. at 1206. Where a defendant’s “express aim

was local,” the fact that it caused harm to the plaintiff in the

forum state, even if the defendant knew that the plaintiff lived

in the forum state, is insufficient to satisfy the effects test.

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 807.

[2] Here, BigTime.tv did contact people in California

regarding the promotion that would eventually lead to this law

suit. However, those discussions did not enable or contribute

to the promotion activities that actually gave rise to the law

suit. The intentional acts that allegedly harmed Love—

including BigTime.tv’s licensing of the recordings and promotion of Good Vibrations on television and the internet—

were directed entirely at markets in the United Kingdom and

Ireland, and Love does not argue differently.4See Sinatra v.

3A majority of the en banc court concurred in Part II of Judge W.

Fletcher’s opinion, regarding personal jurisdiction. Citations are to that

part of the opinion. 

4Love also argues that harm directed at him was necessarily aimed at

California, since his musical career is based in California, and BigTime.tv

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Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 1988)

(finding jurisdiction because “the misappropriation of

Sinatra’s name” was “one component of a series of ongoing

efforts by the defendant to avail itself of the benefits of the

California market”).

[3] Because BigTime.tv did not purposefully direct any of

the relevant intentional acts at California, it was not subject

to the jurisdiction of a court in that state.

III

The district court correctly dismissed Love’s right of publicity claims using a choice of law analysis, an analysis we

review de novo. APL Co. Pte. Ltd. v. UK Aerosols Ltd., 582

F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2009). We also review the district

court’s interpretation of state law de novo. Evanston Ins. Co.

v. OEA, Inc., 566 F.3d 915, 920 (9th Cir. 2009). We apply the

clearly erroneous standard to factual findings that underlie the

was aware of that when it purposefully interfered with his commercial

interests. Since this case was argued, we have held that the “expressly

aimed” prong of the purposeful direction test can be met where a plaintiff

alleges that the defendant individually targeted him by misusing his intellectual property on the defendant’s website for the purpose of competing

with the plaintiff in the forum. See Brayton Purcell, LLP v. Recordon &

Recordon, ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 2135302, at * 4 (9th Cir. 2010). In

Brayton, in contrast to here, the plaintiff (a Southern California law firm)

actually alleged facts that, if proven, would show that the defendant (a

Northern California law firm) intentionally targeted the plaintiff’s business

where the plaintiff firm was located. Id. We merely held that the defendant’s “conclusory denial” that its actions were not aimed at prospective

clients in Northern California did “not rebut” the plaintiff’s fact-based

allegation to the contrary. Id. Here, Love’s argument that BigTime.tv targeted his business interests in California is not supported by facts. Even

if BigTime’s alleged misuse of Love’s persona and intellectual property

was expressly aimed at Love—and such a claim is significantly less supported than the plaintiff’s parallel claim in Brayton—Love is a citizen not

of California but of Nevada. 

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choice of law determination. Downing v. Abercrombie &

Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1005 (9th Cir. 2001). 

[4] Federal courts must apply state substantive law to state

law claims, including the forum state’s choice of law rules. Id.

at 1005. California applies the “governmental interest”

approach to conflicts issues, including those involving right of

publicity claims. Id. Under this approach,

(1) the court examines the substantive laws of each

jurisdiction to determine whether the laws differ as

applied to the relevant transaction, (2) if the laws do

differ, the court must determine whether a true conflict exists in that each of the relevant jurisdictions

has an interest in having its law applied, and (3) if

more than one jurisdiction has a legitimate interest

. . . the court [must] identify and apply the law of the

[jurisdiction] whose interest would be more impaired

if its law were not applied. Only if both [jurisdictions] have a legitimate but conflicting interest in

applying its own law will the court be confronted

with a “true conflict” case. 

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (omission

and first alteration in original).

A

[5] Although California recognizes both a statutory and

common law right of publicity, and England recognizes neither, this is not a case of true conflict. See Bi-Rite Enters., Inc.

v. Bruce Miner Co., Inc., 757 F.2d 440, 442 (1st Cir. 1985)

(citing Tolley v. Fry, 1 K.B. 467 (1930)); Gionfriddo v. Major

League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400, 408 (2001). California has no interest in applying its law to the conduct in question. None of the parties remaining in this suit is a citizen of

California. The misappropriation in this suit occurred almost

exclusively in the United Kingdom and Ireland, where mil9782 LOVE v. SANCTUARY RECORDS GROUP

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lions of copies of the Mail on Sunday and Good Vibrations

were distributed. See Downing, 265 F.3d at 1006 (explaining

that “any misappropriation of the names and likenesses” of

Hawaiian surfers occurred in California, where the catalogue

containing their photos was distributed). At most, de minimus

conduct occurred in California when a handful of copies of

the paper were delivered without the CD, and a handful of

copies of Good Vibrations were sent to Wilson’s attorney in

California.

Love asserts that he is not an out-of-state plaintiff because

he owns property in California and has other commercial

interests there. California’s right of publicity “permit[s] celebrities . . . to control the commercial exploitation of the celebrity’s likeness.” Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup,

Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001); see also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 445 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (“The right of publicity protects the intangible

proprietary interest in the commercial value in one’s identity.”). California’s interest in applying the right of publicity

extraterritorially is based on its interest “safeguarding its citizens from the diminution in value of their names and likenesses.” Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1202. Cf. Brand v. Menlove Dodge,

796 F.2d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[S]tates have a strong

interest in protecting their own citizens . . . .”). Love cites no

case where California has recognized that injury relevant to a

choice-of-law analysis is suffered anywhere other than the

domicile of the celebrity or the location where the image is

exploited.5

B

Even if Love’s commercial interests in California did create

5Love’s California “residence,” by which we assume Love means “a

building used as a home,” Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 996

(10th ed. 1996), has nothing to do with this case and therefore is irrelevant

to our choice-of-law analysis. 

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a true conflict, England’s interests would be much more

greatly impaired by a failure to apply English law. 

[6] “In making [its] comparative impairment analysis, the

trial court must determine the relative commitment of the

respective states to the laws involved and consider the history

and current status of the states’ laws and the function and purpose of those laws.” Wash. Mutual Bank, FA v. Super. Ct., 15

P.3d 1071, 1081 (Cal. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[O]ne of the goals of that analysis is the maximum

attainment of underlying purpose by all governmental entities.” Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914,

918 (Cal. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

[7] Although England does not recognize a right of publicity, it does provide celebrities with certain other limited protections against commercial misappropriation, including

copyright, trademark, and the tort of “passing off.” Alain J.

Lapter, How the Other Half Lives (Revisited): Twenty years

since Midler v. Ford — A global perspective on the right of

publicity, 15 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 239, 278-83 (2007). See

generally, Julie King, The Protection of Personality Rights for

Athletes and Entertainers under English Intellectual Property

Law: Practical difficulties in relying on an action of passing

off, 7 Sports Law. J. 351 (2000). Additionally, while England

does not recognize a right to privacy as such, it does provide

stronger protections against defamation than the United

States. See J. Thomas McCarthy, 1 Rights of Publicity and

Privacy § 6:155 (2d ed) (explaining that England has never

recognized a right to privacy); Raymond W. Beauchamp,

Note, England’s Chilling Forecast: The case for granting

declaratory relief to prevent English defamation actions from

chilling American speech, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 3073, 3077-91

(2006) (comparing American and English defamation law).

Thus, we agree with the First Circuit that England has manifested “a policy choice favoring unrestricted competition in

the area of commercial exploitation of names and likenesses.”

Bi-Rite, 757 F.2d at 445; see also id. (“In the area of publicity

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rights, as in the areas of trademark, patent, and copyright, the

law must balance the competing goals, on the one hand, of

facilitating public access to valuable images, inventions and

ideas and, on the other, rewarding individual effort.”).

[8] Even if California has an interest in protecting the right

of an entertainer with economic ties to the state to exploit his

image overseas, that interest is not nearly as significant as

England’s interest in (not) regulating the distribution of millions of copies of a newspaper and millions of compact discs

by a British paper primarily in the United Kingdom.

C

[9] Love argues that the Uniform Single Publication Act

(“USPA”) displaces the traditional choice-of-law analysis in

media cases. As the California Supreme Court has explained,

[t]he single-publication rule was created to address

the problem that arose with the advent of mass communication from the general rule in defamation cases

that “each time the defamatory statement is communicated to a third person . . . the statement is said to

have been ‘published,’ ” giving rise to a separate

cause of action.

Christoff v. Nestle USA, Inc., 213 P.3d 132, 137-38 (Cal.

2009) (quoting Shively v. Bozanich, 80 P.3d 676, 683 (Cal.

2003)) (omission in Christoff). The USPA “advances the universal interest in avoiding a multiplicity of suits and assisting

the orderly administration of justice” Motschenbacher v. R. J.

Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 823 n.4 (9th Cir. 1974).

But it does not displace the governmental interest test or have

any other application to the conflict of laws question at issue

in this case. See Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127,

134-35 (3d Cir. 1948); Givens v. Quinn, 877 F. Supp. 485,

488 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (“The single publication rule is not a

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choice-of-law rule.”). Therefore, it has no application in the

present context.

IV

The district court correctly dismissed Love’s Lanham Act

claims. Under the circumstances presented here, we conclude

that the Lanham Act cannot be applied extraterritorially to

encompass acts committed in Great Britian.

As we have noted, Love has the limited exclusive right to

use The Beach Boys trademark in live performances. Love

has alleged that the use of the mark “The Beach Boys” on and

to promote Good Vibrations, in conjunction with the inclusion

of video recordings of live performances on the disc,

infringed upon and diluted his interests in the trademark, and

competed with his live band unfairly. Sanctuary argues that

because the creation, promotion, and distribution of Good

Vibrations all occurred in Europe, the Lanham Act does not

apply in this case. We agree with Sanctuary.

[10] We analyze the Lanham Act’s coverage of foreign

activities under a three-part test originally developed in the

antitrust context.6See Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes &

6Recently, while refining the rules regarding the extraterritorial application of federal statutes, the Supreme Court explained that “[w]hen a statute

gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”

Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., __ S.Ct. __, 2010 WL 2518523, at

*5. The Court was unable to find a clear indication in the Securities

Exchange Act, and therefore limited the reach of § 10(b) to the purchase

or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, or the purchase

or sale of any other security in the United States. Id. at * 14. 

As we explained in Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co., 556

F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977), when we adopted the test for extraterritorial

application of the Lanham Act, “[t]he Lanham Act grants a civil right of

action against ‘[a]ny person who shall . . . use in commerce,’ in any

improper manner detailed therein, a registered trademark”; and, “[f]or purposes of the Act, ‘commerce’ is sweepingly defined as ‘all commerce

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Co., 769 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Timberlane

Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 549

F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), superceded by statute, 15 U.S.C.

§ 6a). For the Lanham Act to apply extraterritorially: (1) the

alleged violations must create some effect on American foreign commerce; (2) the effect must be sufficiently great to

present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs under the Lanham

Act; and (3) the interests of and links to American foreign

commerce must be sufficiently strong in relation to those of

other nations to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority. Id.

The first two criteria may be met even where all of the

challenged transactions occurred abroad, and where “injury

would seem to be limited to the deception of consumers”

abroad, as long as “there is monetary injury in the United

States” to an American plaintiff. See Ocean Garden, Inc. v.

Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 1991); see also

Reebok Intern’l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d

552, 554-55 (9th Cir. 1992) (the first two criterion were met

where a defendant was found to have “organized and directed

[the deception] from the United States” and to have known

that the deceptive product “went back to the United States

with regular frequency” and that sales of the “genuine” product decreased in the United States). 

[11] Here, it is undisputed that all relevant acts occurred

abroad. The idea for the CD originated with Ian Spero of BigTime.tv, who then approached ANL. BigTime.tv and ANL

are both British entities. The CDs were physically manufacwhich may lawfully be regulated by Congress.’ ” Id. at 426 (quoting 15

U.S.C. §§ 1114(a)(1), 1127). Because this sweeping language contrasts so

readily with the language in the Securities Exchange Act, not merely referring to foreign commerce but expressly covering all commerce Congress

can regulate, see Morrison, 2010 WL 2518523, at * 9-* 11, we see no

need to revisit our case law regarding the extraterritorial application of the

Lanham Act. 

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tured by Optical Disc Services Limited, a company in Germany with offices in London. Love no longer claims that the

CDs were distributed in the United States, and in fact Sanctuary never sold or distributed any copies of the CD to anyone

at all. The only CDs shown to have entered the United States

never reached the market, as Wilson’s attorney kept the CDs

in his office until this litigation commenced.7 Although BigTime.tv did discuss the album with Wilson’s attorney in California, it ignored the attorney’s advice not to use the images

of anyone other than Wilson, or at least to secure the permission of any other Beach Boy whose image would be used.

Therefore, for the Lanham Act to apply, Love must have

presented evidence that the complained of actions caused him

monetary injury in the United States. Love’ declaration—that

his ticket sales in the United States were lower after the distribution of Good Vibrations, the release of Smile, and the U.S.

tour embarked upon by Wilson—is insufficient. Even if, as

Love argues, European purchasers of the Mail of Sunday

would mistakenly associate the promotional CD with Love,

Smile, and the official Beach Boys touring band, it is too great

of a stretch to ask us, or a jury, to believe that such confusion

overseas resulted in the decreased ticket sales in the United

States.

[12] Because Love failed to present any evidence that the

alleged Lanham Act violations affected United States commerce in any way, we affirm dismissal of all three claims on

that ground.8 Love does not challenge the district court’s

7The district court acted well within its discretion determining that the

Surrey affidavit was “an attempt to manufacture a genuine issue of fact

where none exists” and thus according it no weight. Cf. Kennedy v. Allied

Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 267 (9th Cir. 1991) (permitting a district

court to discount a declaration in an affidavit that contradicts prior deposition testimony if it “make[s] a factual determination that the contradiction

was actually a ‘sham’ ”). 

8Love also argues that the district court abused its discretion granting

summary judgment in the face of requests for additional discovery. Love

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determination that his state law unfair competition claim and

his state law conspiracy claim could not survive if the Lanham Act and publicity claims failed, and so we affirm dismissal of those claims as well.

V

The district court awarded the Sanctuary defendants attorney’s fees with respect to all of the claims stated against them.

We review an award of attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion,

factual findings for clear error, and legal conclusions de novo.

Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC, 583 F.3d 1197, 1207

(9th Cir. 2009).

Attorney’s fees are awardable where there is an applicable

attorney’s fees provision in a contract, if “there is express

statutory authorization,” or for work done on claims that “involve a common core of facts or [are] based on related legal

theories” as the claims governed by statutory or contractual

attorney’s fees provisions, such that the “lawsuit cannot be

viewed as a series of discrete claims.” See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 435 (1983).

The district court determined that “for nearly every claim,

there is a statutory or contractual basis for awarding [the

Sanctuary defendants] fees.” Where no independent basis

existed to support an award, the district court found the claims

“inextricably intertwined with claims” that had such a support. We agree.9

describes in detail the discovery that he wished to pursue, none of which

relates to whether or not the alleged violations impacted U.S. foreign commerce or injured Love in any way. Because this “discovery would [have

been] ‘fruitless’ with respect to the proof of a viable claim,” the district

court did not abuse its discretion. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 930

(9th Cir. 2004). 

9Love does not argue that the Sanctuary defendants were not prevailing

parties, nor does he challenge the actual amounts awarded under the district court’s lodestar analysis. 

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A

[13] California’s right of publicity statute mandates an

award of attorney’s fees for “[t]he prevailing party in any

action under this section.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3344; Kirby v.

Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47, 62 (2006). Love

argues that the statute cannot support an attorney’s fees award

if, under our choice-of-law analysis, the statutory provision

did not apply to the claim.10

[14] Since Love brought an action under California’s right

of publicity statute, however, section 3344 clearly mandates

an award of attorney’s fees, notwithstanding the fact that the

action failed because the statute’s substantive law does not

govern Love’s claim. Cf. Cairns v. Franklin Mint. Co., 292

F.3d 1139, 1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) (awarding attorney’s

fees under comparable posthumous right of publicity statute

where plaintiff alleged claim under statute but law of Great

Britain actually governed the claim).

B

[15] Under the Copyright Act of 1976, a district court has

the discretion to award “a reasonable attorneys’ fee to the prevailing party.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. In considering whether to

exercise that discretion, the court might consider (1) the

degree of success obtained; (2) frivolousness; (3) motivation;

(4) the objective unreasonableness of the losing party’s factual and legal arguments; and (5) the need, in particular circumstances, to advance considerations of compensation and

deterrence. Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 1994)

10Because Love’s statutory and common law claims were premised on

the same facts and dismissed on the same basis, the district court determined that the claims were “inextricably intertwined.” Love does not challenge this conclusion. 

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(citing Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19

(1994)).11

The district court awarded attorney’s fees after finding that

the copyright claims “bordered on frivolous and were not

objectively reasonable” and that they “contributed to the

bloat” of a “vastly overpled . . . case.” The district court saw

Love’s theory of the case to be fatally flawed from the outset.

First, he did not hold the copyrights at issue, but was merely

a beneficial owner. Second, Love was attempting to hold the

Sanctuary defendants liable for somehow authorizing Rondor,

the legal copyright owner to the compositions and not a party

to the case, to license ANL to use of the compositions on the

CD at covermount prices when Good Vibrations was not technically a covermount CD.12

Love argues that the district court abused its discretion

because (1) the district court’s finding that Love, as a beneficial owner, had standing to bring his claims, means that they

could not be objectively unreasonable and (2) he presented

evidence before the attorney’s fees were granted that the

covermount license was invalid. 

[16] The mere fact that a plaintiff has statutory standing

11We note that, contrary to the statements of several circuits, including

our own, Jackson was not overruled by the previously-decided Fogerty.

See Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. Nutrition Now, Inc., 304 F.3d 829, 833 n.2

(9th Cir. 2002) (mistakenly stating that Jackson was abrogated by

Fogerty). See also Chirco v. Crosswinds Communities, Inc., 474 F.3d 227,

232 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co.,

Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1101 (9th Cir. 2004) (same); Jacobsen v. Deseret

Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 951 (10th Cir. 2002) (same). Rather, Jackson

specifically cites Fogerty as overruling a different Ninth Circuit case,

Cooling Sys. & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485 (9th

Cir. 1985). 

12Sanctuary licensed ANL to use the Wilson recordings, but ANL

obtained permission to use the compositions directly from the holder of

those copyrights. 

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does not make his legal and factual arguments objectively reasonable. Love did not plead any facts that would somehow

connect the Sanctuary defendants to Rondor and ANL’s allegedly invalid licensing agreement, and in fact three of the

Sanctuary defendants were dismissed from the case entirely,

based on their uncontested assertion that they had nothing

whatsoever to do with the promotion. The district court did

not abuse its discretion awarding these attorney’s fees.

C

[17] The Lanham Act allows for an award of attorney’s

fees in “exceptional cases.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).

“[I]nterpretation of what constitutes an ‘exceptional case’ is

a question of law [that] we review . . . de novo.” Earthquake

Sound Corp. v. Bumper Indus., 352 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.

2003). “Where a trademark case is exceptional, we review a

district court’s decision to award attorney’s fees for an abuse

of discretion.” Id.

[18] “A trademark case is exceptional where the district

court finds that the defendant acted maliciously, fraudulently,

deliberately, or willfully.” Id.; see also Stephen W. Boney,

Inc. v. Boney Servs., Inc., 127 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1997)

(citing an Eighth Circuit case that held that “[w]hen a plaintiff’s case is groundless, unreasonable, vexatious, or pursued

in bad faith, it is exceptional”).

Here, the district court awarded fees in part because Love

“presented not one item of evidence substantiating any U.S.

effect,” other than a “misleading and deceptive declaration,”

and that any case cited by Love to support his extraterritorial

application argument was “readily distinguishable and of no

persuasive value.” The district court found that the Surrey

affidavit “unreasonably and vexatiously . . . lengthened or

multiplied” the work of the defendants and the district court,

and it sanctioned Love’s attorney. 

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[19] The evidence supports the district court’s conclusion

that the Lanham Act claims were “groundless and unreasonable,” and we agree that the case is exceptional as a matter of

law.13

D

In appealing both the copyright claim awards and the Lanham Act claim awards, Love attempts to assert what he calls

an advice of counsel defense. He argues that he should not be

punished for his lawyers’ litigation strategy.

The only case that Love cites in his brief that could support

an advice of counsel defense is Takecare Corp. v. Takecare

of Okla., Inc., 889 F.2d 955 (10th Cir. 1989). In Takecare,

however, the exceptionality finding that supported an award

of attorney’s fees was based on the defendant’s wilfully illegal use of a mark after having received notice of infringement. Id. at 957. The court held that “a party’s reasonable

reliance on the advice of counsel may defuse otherwise wilful

conduct,” but that the defendant failed to prove reasonable

reliance. Id. at 957-58.

[20] Here, the district court’s finding of exceptional circumstances was based not on wilful out-of-court conduct by

Love, but rather on the unreasonableness of his Trademark

claims and his continued pursuit of the claims in bad faith.

Similarly, the Copyright attorney’s fees were awarded based

13Because we affirm dismissal of the Lanham Act claims based on

Sanctuary’s argument that the statute does not apply extraterritorially to

the violations alleged in Love’s complaint, we focus on the weaknesses of

Love’s argument on this ground. However, the fact that the district court

dismissed two of the claims on other grounds that we do not reach is relevant to our determination that this is an exceptional case. In particular, we

note that the district court found that Love “stated absolutely no allegations against [the Sanctuary defendants] by which they (as opposed to

ANL) could be held responsible for the creation or distribution of the

allegedly infringing material.” 

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on the frivolous and unreasonable nature of those claims. If

plaintiffs could evade attorney’s fees awards by showing that

the litigation was conducted based on the advice of counsel,

attorney’s fees would never be awarded to defendants under

the Lanham or Copyright Acts. Cf. Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball

Leagues, Inc. v. Very Minor Leagues, Inc., 223 F.3d 1143,

1148 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e disagree that there should be, or

even could be, perfect harmony between the standard for

awarding attorney fees to a prevailing plaintiff and a prevailing defendant. When attorney fees are awarded against a

defendant, the court looks to whether the defendant’s acts of

infringement were pursued in bad faith. When attorney fees

are awarded against a plaintiff, the court looks to the plaintiff’s conduct in bringing the lawsuit and the manner in which

it is prosecuted.”). 

E

[21] The district court found that the remaining claims

were inexorably intertwined with claims for which attorney’s

fees awards were warranted. Love does not argue to the contrary. Because the district properly exercised its discretion in

awarding attorney’s fees for each and every claim against the

Sanctuary defendants, it did not err not segregating the award

by claim.

VI

Under the circumstances presented by this case, we conclude that neither the Lanham Act nor California’s right of

publicity apply extraterritorially. The district court did not err

in awarding fees.

AFFIRMED.

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