Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00559/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00559-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ajua Cocina Mexicana
Defendant
J & J Sports Productions, Inc.
Plaintiff
Jose Luis Ocampo
Defendant
Maricela Perez
Defendant

Document Text:

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

J & J Sports Productions, Inc. seeks the entry of default judgment against Jose Luis Ocampo 

and Maricela Perez, individually and doing business as Ajua Cocina Mexicana (collectively, 

“Defendants”). (Doc. 16) Defendants have not opposed this motion. The Court finds the matter 

suitable for decision without an oral hearing. Therefore, the Court takes the matter under submission 

pursuant to Local Rule 230(g) and VACATES the hearing date of October 28, 2016. For the following 

reasons, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment be GRANTED IN PART.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint on April 20, 2016 (Doc. 1), which Plaintiff 

amended on June 23, 2016 (Doc. 4). Plaintiff asserts the company possessed the exclusive rights to the 

nationwide commercial distribution of “The Fight of the Century" Floyd Mayweather, Jr. v. Manny 

Pacquiao Championship Fight Program” (“the Program”) televised on May 2, 2015. (Doc. 4 at 5, ¶ 

J & J SPORTS PRODUCTIONS INC.,

 Plaintiff,

v.

JOSE LUIS OCAMPO and MARICELA

PEREZ, individually and doing business as 

AJUA COCINA MEXICANA,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 1:16-cv-00559 - LJO - JLT

ORDER VACATING THE HEARING DATE OF 

OCTOBER 28, 2016

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

(Doc. 16)

Case 1:16-cv-00559-LJO-JLT Document 17 Filed 10/26/16 Page 1 of 10
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18) However, Plaintiff contends Defendants broadcast the Program at Ajua Cocina Mexicana without 

paying the requisite fee. Defendants were served with the complaint, but failed to respond within the 

time prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon application of Plaintiff, default was 

entered against Jose Luis Ocampo on August 1, 2016 (Docs. 11-12) and Maricela Perez on August 15, 

2016. (Docs. 14-15) 

II. Legal Standards Governing Entry of Default Judgment

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the entry of default judgment. After default is 

entered because “a party against whom a judgment for relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise 

defend,” the party seeking relief may apply to the court for a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)-

(b). Upon the entry of default, well-pleaded factual allegations regarding liability are taken as true, but 

allegations regarding the amount of damages must be proven. Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 22 

(1944); see also Geddes v. United Financial Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). In addition, 

“necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not 

established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(citing Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978)). 

Entry of default judgment is within the discretion of the Court. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 

1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). The entry of default “does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a courtordered judgment. Pepsico, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal 2002), accord 

Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit determined: 

Factors which may be considered by courts in exercising discretion as to the entry of a 

default judgment include: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of 

plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money 

at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts, (6) 

whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). As a general rule, the issuance of default 

judgment is disfavored. Id. at 1472.

III. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations

The factual assertions of Plaintiff are taken as true because default has been entered against 

Defendants. See Pope, 323 U.S. at 22. Plaintiff alleges that by contract, it was granted exclusive 

Case 1:16-cv-00559-LJO-JLT Document 17 Filed 10/26/16 Page 2 of 10
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

domestic commercial distribution rights to the Program and, pursuant to that contract, “entered into 

subsequent sublicensing agreements with various commercial entities throughout North America” to 

broadcast the Program within their establishments. (Doc. 4 at 5-6, ¶¶ 18-19)

Plaintiff alleges Defendants broadcast the Program at Ajua Cocina Mexicana without 

purchasing a proper sublicense from Plaintiff. (Doc. 4 at 6, ¶ 21) Plaintiff asserts Defendants were 

each “an owner, and/or operator, and/or licensee, and/or permittee, and/or person in charge, and/or an 

individual with dominion, control, oversight and management of the commercial establishment doing 

business as Ajua Cocina Mexicana.” (Id. at 3, ¶¶ 7-8) 

For this act, Plaintiff alleged violations of 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 605, conversion, and a 

violation of the California Business and Professions Code. (See generally Doc. 4 at 5-12) In the

application for default judgment, Plaintiff requests damages for the violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605 and 

conversion. (See Doc. 16-1) Therefore, the Court will address only these claims.

IV. Discussion and Analysis

Applying the factors articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Eitel, the Court finds the factors weigh 

in favor of granting Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. 

A. Prejudice to Plaintiff

The first factor considers whether the plaintiff would suffer prejudice if default judgment is not 

entered, and potential prejudice to the plaintiff weighs in favor of granting a default judgment. See 

Pepsico, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Generally, where default has been entered against a defendant, 

a plaintiff has no other means by which to recover damages. Id.; Moroccanoil, Inc. v. Allstate Beauty 

Prods., 847 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1200-01 (C.D. Cal. 2012). Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff would be 

prejudiced if default judgment is not granted.

B. Merits of Plaintiff’s claims and the sufficiency of the complaint

Given the kinship of these factors, the Court considers the merits of Plaintiff’s substantive 

claims and the sufficiency of the complaint together. See Premier Pool Mgmt. Corp. v. Lusk, 2012 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 63350, at *13 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 2012). The Ninth Circuit has suggested that, when 

combined, the factors require a plaintiff to “state a claim on which the plaintiff may recover.” Pepsico, 

Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175.

Case 1:16-cv-00559-LJO-JLT Document 17 Filed 10/26/16 Page 3 of 10
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1. Claim arising under 47 U.S.C. § 605

The Federal Communications Act of 1934 (“Communications Act”) “prohibits the unauthorized 

receipt and use of radio communications for one’s ‘own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled 

thereto.’” DirecTV, Inc. v. Webb, 545 F.3d 837, 844 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 605(a)). In 

pertinent part, the Communications Act provides, “No person not being authorized by the sender shall 

intercept any radio communication and divulge or publish the ... contents ... of such intercepted 

communication to any person.” 47 U.S.C. § 605(a). Thus, Plaintiff must establish it was the party 

aggrieved by Defendants’ actions. 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(A). Plaintiff must also show Defendants

intercepted a wire or radio program and published it without permission. 47 U.S.C. § 605(a). 

a. Party aggrieved

Under the Communications Act, a “person aggrieved” includes a party “with proprietary rights 

in the intercepted communication by wire or radio, including wholesale or retail distributors of satellite 

cable programming.” 47 U.S.C. § 605(d)(6). In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserted that J & J Sports 

Productions was granted the exclusive, nationwide commercial distribution rights to the Program. 

(Doc. 4 at 5) In support of this assertion, Joseph Gagliardi, President of J & J Sports Productions 

produced the Closed Circuit Television License Agreement between Mayweather Promotions and 

Plaintiff, granting Plaintiff “the exclusive license to exhibit . . . [the] live telecast” of the Program. 

(Doc. 16-4 at 10; see also id. at 10-16) Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff was the party aggrieved 

within the meaning of Section 605. 

b. Interception and publication of the Program

Plaintiff acknowledges it cannot be certain of the method of interception used to obtain the 

Program. (See Doc. 16-1 at 8) Similarly, in Joe Hand Prod. v. Behari, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37277

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013), the plaintiff was unable to identify the nature of the transmission. This 

Court observed: “Plaintiff’s inability to allege the precise nature of the intercepted transmission in this 

case ...raises a question regarding the scope of 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) and the sufficiency of plaintiff’s 

claim under that provision.” Id., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37277 at *7. Nevertheless, Plaintiff provided 

evidence that Defendants broadcast the Program in their establishment, because an investigator 

witnessed the Program broadcast at Ajua Cocina Mexicana. (Doc. 16-3) 

Case 1:16-cv-00559-LJO-JLT Document 17 Filed 10/26/16 Page 4 of 10
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Because Plaintiff was a party aggrieved, and Defendants intercepted the Program and published 

it without permission, Plaintiff has established the elements of a claim under the Communications Act.

2. Conversion

As recognized by the Ninth Circuit, conversion has three elements under California Law: 

“ownership or right to possession of property, wrongful disposition of the property right and damages.” 

G.S. Rasmussen & Assoc., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Services, Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 906 (9th Cir. 1992); see 

also Greka Integrated, Inc. v. Lowrey, 133 Cal.App.4th 1572, 1581 (2005) (“elements of a conversion 

are the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property at the time of the conversion; the 

defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and damages”). Previously, 

this Court determined the possession of “a right to distribute programming” constitutes ownership of 

properly for purposes of conversion. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Pahnke, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1189-90 (E.D. 

Cal. 2005) (citing Don King Prods./ Kingsvision v. Lovato, 911 F.Supp. 429, 423 (N.D. Cal. 1995)). 

Therefore, to state a claim for conversion, Plaintiff is required to possess the exclusive ownership of, or 

the exclusive right to license, the broadcasting of the Program. 

Given that Plaintiff established it held the distribution rights, the company held a “right to 

possession of property.” Further, Plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to support a finding that Defendants

engaged in signal piracy by broadcasting the Program without a sublicense. The investigator estimated 

the capacity of Ajua Cocina Mexicana was “approximately 45” patrons. (Doc. 16-3 at 2) The rate 

sheet indicates a sublicense cost $3,000.00 for an establishment with the capacity up to 100 persons. 

(Doc. 16-4 at 18) Consequently, Plaintiff has established damages in the amount of $3,000.00, and 

states a claim for conversion against Defendants.

C. Sum of money at stake

In considering this factor, the Court “must consider the amount of money at stake in relation to 

the seriousness of Defendant’s conduct.” Pepsico, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1176. Here, Plaintiff seeks 

compensatory damages for Defendant’s tortuous conversion of Plaintiff’s property. Also, Plaintiff 

requests statutory damages totaling $110,000 for the violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605. This amount 

represents the maximum amount Plaintiff would be permitted to recover under the statute, including 

enhanced damages. (Doc. 16-1 at 8-11) Plaintiff asserts Defendants should pay the statutory 

Case 1:16-cv-00559-LJO-JLT Document 17 Filed 10/26/16 Page 5 of 10
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

maximum because nominal damages have proven insufficient to combat piracy. (Id. at 19) Therefore, 

Plaintiff appears to concede that amount requested is not proportional to Defendants’ conduct. 

Given the substantial amount of money at stake, this factor could weigh against the entry of 

default judgment. See, e.g., Joe Hand Promotions v. Streshly, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (S.D. Cal. 2009) 

(proposed award amount of $100,975 was “manifestly excessive under existing law”); J & J Sports 

Productions. v. Montes, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9282, at * 5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2013) (“the large 

amount of money that Plaintiff is requesting—maximum statutory damages—weighs against granting 

an entry of default judgment, particularly because the amount requested appears disproportionate to the 

harm alleged”); Moore v. Cisneros, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177044, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2023) 

(“[d]efault judgment is disfavored when a large sum of money is involved”); but see G & G Closed 

Events, LLC v. Shahen, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58723, at *18 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2012) (“the statutes 

involved contemplate such an award under certain circumstances,” and the factor did not weigh against 

default judgment). However, the factor does not weigh against Plaintiff’s request for default judgment 

because the Court declines to enter judgment in the amount requested.

D. Possibility of dispute concerning material facts

There is little possibility of dispute concerning material facts because (1) based on the entry of 

default, the Court accepts allegations in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint as true and (2) though 

properly served, Defendants failed to appear. See Pepsico, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177; see also 

Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Because all 

allegations in a well-pleaded complaint are taken as true after the court clerk enters default judgment, 

there is no likelihood that any genuine issue of material fact exists”). Therefore, this factor does not 

weigh against default judgment.

E. Whether default was due to excusable neglect

Generally, the Court will consider whether Defendants’ failure to answer is due to excusable 

neglect. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. Here, Defendants were served with the Summons and First 

Amended Complaint, as well as the motion for default judgment. (See Doc. 16-1 at 23) Given these 

facts, it is unlikely that Defendants’ actions were the result of excusable neglect. Shanghai Automation 

Instrument Co., Ltd. v. Kuei, 194 F.Supp.2d 995, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (finding no excusable neglect 

Case 1:16-cv-00559-LJO-JLT Document 17 Filed 10/26/16 Page 6 of 10
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

because the defendants “were properly served with the Complaint, the notice of entry of default, as well 

as the papers in support of the instant motion”). Accordingly, this factor does not weigh against default 

judgment.

F. Policy disfavoring default judgment

As noted above, default judgments are disfavored because “[c]ases should be decided on their 

merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. Here, however, the policy underlying 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits does not weigh against default 

judgment because Defendants’ failure to appear before the Court and defend in this action makes a 

decision on the merits impractical.

V. Damages

Under the Communications Act, a party aggrieved may recover actual damages or statutory 

damages “not less than $1,000 or more than $10,000, as the court considers just.” 47 U.S.C. § 605(e) 

(3)(C)(i)(II). When the Court determines a violation was “committed willfully and for the purposes of 

direct or indirect commercial advantage or private financial gain,” a court may award enhanced 

damages by increasing the awarded damages up to $100,000.00 for each violation. 47 U.S.C. § 

605(e)(3)(C)(ii). The Court has “wide discretion” to determine the proper amount of damages to be 

awarded. DirecTV Inc. v. Le, 267 Fed. App’x 636 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

The Court may consider a number of factors in its determination of the amount of damages, 

including any promotional advertising by the defendant, the capacity of the establishment, the number 

of patrons present at the time of the broadcast, the imposition of a cover charge, the number and size of 

the televisions used for the broadcast, and whether a premium was charged on food or drink. J & J 

Sports Productions v. Sorondo, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99951, at * 10-11 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011) 

(citing Kingvision Pay-Per-View, Ltd. v. Backman, 102 F.Supp.2d 1196, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2000)).

Laura Burton, Plaintiff’s investigator, did not indicate there were any advertisements for the 

Program at Ajua Cocina Mexicana, and did not report a cover charge was required to enter. (See Doc. 

16-3 at 2) Ms. Burton noted the venue had two television sets, which she estimated were 46” and 48-

50”, and “both televisions were playing the fight.” (Id.) Ms. Burton estimated the capacity was 

“approximately 45” people, and she reports counted “22, 24, and 25 [people]” at separate times during 

Case 1:16-cv-00559-LJO-JLT Document 17 Filed 10/26/16 Page 7 of 10
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the broadcast. (Id.) Given these factors, the Court finds an award of $10,000— which is a little more 

than three times the cost of a proper sublicense—is appropriate.1

Although Plaintiff asserts a right to enhanced damages, allegations regarding the amount of 

damages must be well-plead and supported by factual allegations. See Pope, 323 U.S. at 22; Geddes, 

559 F.2d at 560. “The mere assertion that Defendant acted willfully is insufficient to justify enhanced 

damages.” Sorondo, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99951, at *10 (quoting Kingvision Pay-Per-View, Ltd. v. 

Backman, 102 F.Supp.2d 1196, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2000)). Here, Plaintiff alleged: “Said unauthorized 

interception, reception, publication, exhibition, divulgence, display, and/or exhibition by the each of the

Defendants was done willfully and for purposes of direct and/or indirect commercial advantage and/or 

private financial gain.” (Doc. 1 at 6-7, ¶ 22) Importantly, there are no factual allegations in the 

complaint to support the legal conclusion that Defendants’ actions were willful or for the purpose of 

financial gain. Previously, the Court explained:

To adequately state a claim against a defendant, a plaintiff must set forth the legal and 

factual basis for his or her claim. Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009), 

citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 

plaintiff must set forth “the grounds of his entitlement to relief,” which “requires more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

In its complaint, Plaintiff simply alleged a legal conclusion: “Said unauthorized 

interception, reception, publication, exhibition, divulgence, display, and/or exhibition by 

each of the Defendant [sic] was done willfully and for purposes of direct and/or indirect 

commercial advantage and/or private financial gain.”

Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Hathcock, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101208, at *2-3 (E.D Cal. July 20, 

2012). Consequently, the Court found Plaintiff “failed to allege facts establishing the grounds of 

entitlement to enhanced damages.” Id. at *3. 

 

1

Courts in this district have found that the statutory maximum is not an appropriate award for a first-time offender 

and in the absence of aggravating factors. See, e.g., J & J Sprots Prod. v. Corona, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96462 (E.D. Cal. 

July 10, 2013) (awarding $7,000 in damages where the defendant broadcast the program on two televisions, there was no 

premium for food or drink); Joe Hand Promotions v. Brown, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119435 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2010) 

(awarding $4,000 in damages where the program was broadcast on six 60-inch televisions, and there was no premium for 

food or drink); J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Morales, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30942 (E.D. Cal. March 8, 2012) 

(awarding $4,400 in statutory damages where the sublicense cost $2,200 for the broadcast that the defendants displayed on 

three televisions, ranging in size up to 54”); J & J Sports Productions v. Sorondo, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99951 (E.D. Cal. 

Sept. 6, 2011) (awarding $3,600 in statutory damages, an amount two times the cost of a sublicense).

Case 1:16-cv-00559-LJO-JLT Document 17 Filed 10/26/16 Page 8 of 10
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Here, as noted above, the evidence submitted indicates does not indicate that there were

advertisements for the fight, or that a cover charge was imposed to enter Ajua Cocina Mexicana. (Doc. 

16-3 at 2) There is no indication that food or drink prices were increased because of the fight, or that 

the number of people in the location was unusual or could be attributed to the fight. (See generally 

Doc. 16-3) Moreover, the complaint now before the Court contains the same language as the complaint 

in Hathock, and suffers the same infirmities. Because there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate the 

piracy was done for purposes of commercial or private gain, enhanced damages are not recommended. 

Finally, because Plaintiff chose to receive statutory damages rather than actual damages under 

the Communications Act, damages for conversion are subsumed into the total award of $10,000. See, 

e.g., Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Behari, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37277 at *8, n.2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 

2013) (explaining damages conversion would not be awarded “because the recommended statutory 

damages will sufficiently compensate plaintiff such that an award for conversion damages would be 

duplicative”); J &J Sports Productions v. Mannor, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32367, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 

28, 2011) (declining to award damages for conversion because “plaintiff has been sufficiently 

compensated through the federal statutory scheme” where the award total was $3,200 and the cost of

the proper license was $2,200); J & J Sports Productions v. Bachman, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44884, at 

*22 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2010) (declining conversion damages because statutory damages “sufficiently 

compensate[d]” the plaintiff).

VI. Findings and Recommendations

The Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment, and the entry of default judgment 

is within the discretion of the Court. See Aldabe, 616 F.2d at 1092. However, the damages requested 

are disproportionate to Defendants’ actions. Importantly, when determining the amount of damages to 

be awarded for signal piracy, “the principle of proportionality governs.” Backman, 102 F.Supp.2d at 

1198. Under this principle, “distributors should not be overcompensated and statutory awards should 

be proportional to the violation.” Id. 

Accordingly, the Court recommends the award of $10,000 for Defendants’ wrongful acts. This 

amount both compensates Plaintiff for the wrongful act and is a suitable deterrent against future acts of 

piracy. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1999) (observing 

Case 1:16-cv-00559-LJO-JLT Document 17 Filed 10/26/16 Page 9 of 10
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that a lower statutory award may deter while not destroying a business). 

Based upon the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS

1. Plaintiff’s application for default judgment (Doc. 16) be GRANTED IN PART AND 

DENIED IN PART AS FOLLOWS:

A. Plaintiff’s request for statutory damages for the violation of the Communications 

Act be GRANTED in the amount of $10,000;

B. Plaintiff’s request for enhanced damages be DENIED;

C. Plaintiff’s request for damages for the tort of conversion be DENIED; 

2. Judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff J & J Sports Productions, Inc. and against 

Defendants Jose Luis Ocampo and Maricela Perez, individually and doing business as 

Ajua Cocina Mexicana; and

3. Plaintiff be directed to file any application for attorney’s fees pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 

605 no later than fourteen days from the entry of judgment.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within fourteen

days of the date of service of these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 

(9th Cir. 1991); Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 834 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 26, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:16-cv-00559-LJO-JLT Document 17 Filed 10/26/16 Page 10 of 10