Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-07496/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-07496-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
State of California
Defendant
Raymond C Watkins
Petitioner

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYMOND C WATKINS,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-07496-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 17

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Raymond C. Watkins, a pretrial detainee at Napa State Hospital, has filed a pro se

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the violation of his constitutional rights 

because he is being medicated against his will. Now pending before the Court is defendant’s 

motion to dismiss this action. Dkt. No. 17. Plaintiff has filed an opposition, Dkt. No. 22, and 

defendant has filed a reply, Dkt. No. 23. For the reasons set forth below, defendant’s motion to 

dismiss is GRANTED.

DISCUSSION

I. Complaint

According to the complaint,1on October 17, 2018,2plaintiff was found to be incompetent 

to stand trial. Dkt. No. 1 at 6. Plaintiff was transferred to Napa State Hospital where custodial 

medical staff are forcing him to take unwanted psychiatric medication. Id. Plaintiff alleges that 

the medication adversely affects his ability to communicate with counsel, to understand the nature 

 

1 The Court liberally construes the pleading docketed at Dkt. No. 1 as a complaint.

2

In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, plaintiff states that he was sent to Napa State Hospital 

on October 18, 2018. Dkt. No. 22 at 2. 

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of the legal proceedings, and to participate in his defense. Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2. Plaintiff seeks to 

have the involuntary medication stopped. See generally Dkt. No. 1. 

II. Additional Background

Plaintiff is a defendant in criminal proceedings in Tuolumne County Superior Court. Dkt. 

No. 19 at 4-5.3 Plaintiff was found mentally incompetent within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code 

§ 1368.4 Subsequently, on August 6, 2018,5pursuant to the finding of mental incompetence, the 

Tuolumne County Superior Court ordered the suspension of the criminal proceedings, ordered that 

plaintiff be committed to Napa State Hospital pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 1370,6and authorized 

the administration of involuntary medications pursuant to Sell v. United States.

7

 Id. The 

Tuolumne County Superior Court further ordered that plaintiff be returned to Tuolumne County 

Superior Court upon the filing of a certificate of restoration to competence. Id. Counsel for 

defendant has searched the California Appellate Courts Case Information System and there is no 

indication that plaintiff has appealed this order. Dkt. No. 17 at 6.

 

3 The Court GRANTS defendant’s unopposed request for judicial notice of the Order Suspending 

Trial and Committing Mental Incompetent, filed on August 6, 2018, in Tuolumne County Superior 

Court in Case Nos. CRF54869, CRF51450 because this is a pleading filed in a court that has a 

direct relation to the matters at issue, and because this pleading can be accurately and readily 

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. See U.S. ex rel. 

Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (federal 

courts may “take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial 

system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to the matters at issue.”) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted); Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Dkt. No. 19.

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In relevant part, Cal. Penal Code § 1368 provides that if during the pendency of an action and 

prior to judgment a judge has doubts as to the mental competence of the defendant, the court may 

inquire as to whether the attorney finds the defendant to be mentally competent, or order a hearing 

into the present mental competence of the defendant. Cal. Penal Code § 1368.

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In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, plaintiff states that his case was suspended earlier, on 

January 29, 2018. Dkt. No. 22 at 2. The discrepancy in the dates that the criminal proceedings 

were suspended does not affect the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the 

relevant issue is whether plaintiff’s claim requires the Court to review a state court decision. 

6 Cal. Penal Code § 1370(a) provides that the criminal process shall resume upon a defendant 

being found mentally competent. Cal. Penal Code § 1370(a). Cal. Penal Code § 1370(b) provides 

that if a defendant is found mentally incompetent, the hearing on the alleged violation shall be 

suspended until the defendant becomes mentally competent. Cal. Penal Code § 1370(b).

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In Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), the Supreme Court held that the Fifth 

Amendment’s due process clause permits involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs to a 

mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant competent 

to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have 

side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive 

alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests. 

Sell, 539 U.S. at 178-84.

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II. Motion to Dismiss

Defendants seek dismissal of this action under both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). 

Defendant argues that the complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend because this 

Court is without subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, because the 

complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because it does not name a 

proper party as the defendant, and because the complaint fails to provide sufficiently particular 

evidentiary facts. Dkt. No. 17. Plaintiff argues that he intended to file a state habeas action and 

not a Section 1983 action; that the underlying state court competency proceedings violated his 

rights under the Due Process Clause because he was not allowed to question the prosecution’s 

witness or call his own witnesses; that he should have been appointed a third attorney rather than 

being sent to Napa State Hospital; that his attempt to appeal the state court’s August 6, 2018 order 

was blocked by the court; that Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, provides that he should have been 

provided with certain due process protections prior to being transferred to a mental hospital for 

treatment; and that the commitment to Napa State Hospital violated his liberty interest in making 

decisions regarding his health and rejecting unwanted medical care and violated his First 

Amendment right to free speech, free thought, and freedom of religion.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to 

consider this action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, the Court does not address 

defendant’s 12(b)(6) challenge.

A. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and it 

is “presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 

of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The party invoking the jurisdiction of the federal court bears 

the burden of establishing that the court has the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to grant the 

relief requested. Id. A challenge pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) may be facial or factual. See White v. 

Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). In a facial attack, the jurisdictional challenge is 

confined to the allegations pleaded in the complaint. See Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 

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(9th Cir. 2004). The challenger asserts that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient “on 

their face” to invoke federal jurisdiction. See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 

1039 (9th Cir. 2004). To resolve this challenge, the court assumes that the allegations in the 

complaint are true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing dismissal. 

See Wolfe, 392 F.3d at 362. In a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations 

that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d 

at 1039. Once a party has moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 

12(b)(1), the opposing party bears the burden of establishing the court's jurisdiction. See Chandler 

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010).

B. Analysis

The Court agrees that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this action. The 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that lower federal courts are without subject matter jurisdiction 

to review state court decisions. State court litigants may therefore only obtain federal review by 

filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. See District of 

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-87 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust 

Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies even when the state court 

judgment is not made by the highest state court, see Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 

F.2d 888, 893 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986), and when federal constitutional issues are at stake, see Branson 

v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1995). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine essentially bars federal 

district courts “from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from 

a state court judgment.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004). This 

complaint is a de facto appeal from the Tuolumne County Superior Court’s August 6, 2018 order. 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this Court from reviewing or vacating the order of the 

Tuolumne County Superior Court. If plaintiff wishes to challenge the superior court’s order, his 

recourse is to appeal to the California Court of Appeal at the appropriate time.

The arguments raised by plaintiff in his opposition do not establish federal court subject 

matter jurisdiction. This Court remains without subject matter jurisdiction to consider a Section 

1983 challenge to a state court order even if the plaintiff’s intent was to file a petition for a writ of 

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habeas corpus. Nor may the Court construe this action as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995) (district court should not 

convert a defective section 1983 claim into a habeas petition because it may bar petitioner from 

bringing other habeas claims). If plaintiff wishes to bring this claim in a federal habeas petition, 

he should file a separate federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus.8 Nor does plaintiff’s 

argument that his state court competency proceedings violated his federal constitutional rights and 

violated federal caselaw confer subject matter jurisdiction. As discussed supra, the RookerFeldman doctrine applies even when federal constitutional issues are at stake. See Branson, 62 

F.3d at 291. Similarly, plaintiff’s allegation that the judge blocked him from filing an appeal does

not confer subject matter jurisdiction. Regardless of why a plaintiff seeks review of a state court 

decision, a federal district court does not have appellate jurisdiction over a decision from a state 

superior court. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415-16 (district courts may not exercise appellate jurisdiction 

over state courts).

The Court therefore GRANTS the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

The Court declines to address defendant’s remaining arguments in support of its motion to 

dismiss.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to 

consider this action and GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Clerk of the Court shall 

enter judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff.

This order terminates Dkt. No. 17.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 11/27/2019

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

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It is unclear whether plaintiff has met the requirements for seeking federal habeas relief, such as 

being in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), or having 

exhausted state court remedies, 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)(A).

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