Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05058/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05058-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ceradyne, Inc.
Appellant
Peter D. Dayton
Appellee
Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.
Appellee
John S. Herrington
Appellee
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

I' 

PUBLISH 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

EAGLE-PICHER INDUSTRIES, INC., 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; JOHN S. 

HERRINGTON, Secretary of the 

Department of Energy; PETER D. 

DAYTON, Director, Procurement 

and Contracts Division, Department 

of Energy, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 

Defendants-Appellees, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---~> 

CERADYNE, INC., 

) 

) 

) 

Applicant-in-intervention, ) 

Appellant. ) 

. FILED 

U.n1ted S~tes Co~rt of Appeals 

emh Ctrcuit 

f.l.P11 8 0 1990 

APPEALS l\OBERT L. HOECKE 

Clerk R 

No. 89-5058 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. NO. 88-C-1518-E) 

William J. Spriggs, Spriggs & Hollingsworth, Washington, D.C. (Coy 

Morrow, Wallace, Owens, Landers, Gee, Morrow, Wilson, Watson, 

James & Coiner, Miami, Oklahoma and Philip Chung, Spriggs & 

Hollingsworth, Washington, D.C., with him on the briefs), 

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Jacob D. Vreeland, Attorney, Department of Energy, Washington, 

D.C. (Tony M. Graham, United States Attorney, Peter Bernhardt, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, on the brief), 

Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees. 

Appellate Case: 89-5058 Document: 01019627252 Date Filed: 04/30/1990 Page: 1 
Douglas L. Inhofe, Conner & Winters, Tulsa, Oklahoma (G. w. Turner 

III, Conner & Winters, Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Paul L. Gale, 

Stradling, Yocca, Carlson & Rauth, Newport Beach, California, with 

him on the briefs), Attorneys for Applicant-in-interventionAppellant. 

Before ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and GREENE,* District 

Judge. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

This appeal is taken from the denial of a motion to intervene 

filed by Ceradyne, Inc., in an action brought by Eagle-Picher 

Industries, Inc., against the United States. Because we find that 

the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over EaglePicher's claim, we do not reach the merits of Ceradyne's efforts 

to intervene. 

Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., manages, as an agent of 

the federal government, a facility for the United States Department of Energy (DOE) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. When it procures 

supplies for the facility, Martin Marietta must abide by the DOE's 

acquisition regulations. This dispute arose when Martin Marietta 

solicited bids on a certain project, and awarded the contract to 

Eagle-Picher. Ceradyne, which also had bid on the project, lodged 

a protest. The DOE decided that corrective action was warranted, 

and ordered Martin Marietta to suspend the contract with EaglePicher and resolicit bids on the project. In response, EaglePicher filed suit in the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma against the United States of America 

* The Honorable J. Thomas Greene, U.S. District Court for the 

District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 89-5058 Document: 01019627252 Date Filed: 04/30/1990 Page: 2 
and certain officials of the DOE, seeking to enjoin the suspension 

and resolicitation of the contract •. 

Jurisdiction was invoked under the Administrative Procedure 

Act (APA), especially 5 U.S.C. § 702, and the general federal 

question statute, 28 u.s.c. § 1331. However, the APA does not 

create an independent basis of jurisdiction. Califano v. Sanders, 

430 U.S. 99, 105-07 (1977). Also, jurisdiction over a suit 

against the United States cannot be based upon 28 u.s.c. § 1331, 

because that statute does not waive the government's sovereign 

immunity and the waiver of sovereign immunity in the APA does not 

extend to actions founded upon a contract with the United States, 

which are governed by the Tucker Act. New Mexico v. Regan, 745 

F.2d 1318, 1321-22 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 

(1985); Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. Bergland, 664 F.2d 818, 822-23 

(10th Cir. 1981). 

Under the Tucker Act, as amended by the Contract Disputes Act 

of 1978, the Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction over any suit 

against the United States which is "founded upon any express or 

implied contract with the United States." 28 u.s.c. § 1346(a)(l); 

S. Rep. No. 1118, 95th Cong., 2d Se.ss. 33 (1978), reprinted in 

1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5235, 5267. The contract in 

question is ''with the United States" because Martin Marietta acted 

as an agent of the DOE. See United States v. Johnson Controls, 

Inc., 713 F.2d 1541, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 

"A party may not circumvent the Claims Court's exclusive 

jurisdiction by framing a complaint in the district court as one 

seeking injunctive, declaratory or mandatory relief where the 

-3-

Appellate Case: 89-5058 Document: 01019627252 Date Filed: 04/30/1990 Page: 3 
thrust of the suit is to obtain money from the United States.'' 

Rogers v. Ink, 766 F.2d 430, 434 (10th Cir. 1985); accord Colorado 

Dep't of Highways v. United States Dep't of Transp., 840 F.2d 753, 

755 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. City of Kansas City, 

Kansas, 761 F.2d 605, 608-09 (10th Cir. 1985); New Mexico v. 

Regan, 745 F.2d at 1322; Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. Bergland, 664 

F.2d at 824; Alamo Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Andrus, 664 F.2d 

229, 233 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 963 (1982). The 

test for determining if a case belongs in the Claims Court is 

whether or not "the 'prime objective' or 'essential purpose' of 

the complaining party is to obtain money from the federal government." New Mexico v. Regan, 745 F.2d at 1322; accord Rogers v. 

Ink, 766 F.2d at 434. 1 

Situations in which the prime objective of the plaintiff was 

to obtain money from the government include an effort to enjoin 

the denial of a federal grant, United States v. City of Kansas 

City, Kansas, 761 F.2d at 608; a challenge to the accounting 

method used to calculate federal reimbursement of highway 

construction costs, Colorado Dep't of Highways v. United States 

Dep't of Transp., 840 F.2d at 756; a prayer for a declaration of 

eligibility for the continuation of certain agricultural loans, 

1 It could be argued that the "prime objective'' test is 

inconsistent with Bowen v. Massachusetts, 108 s. Ct. 2722, 2732 

(1988), which held that judicial review of an administrative 

decision disallowing a state's claim for Medicaid reimbursement is 

not a claim for "money damages'' (and therefore is permitted by 5 

u.s.c. § 702), even though it could result in a judgment which 

forces the federal government to pay money. Unlike the cases 

discussed above and the present action, however, the claim in 

Bowen did not relate to a government contract. Coggeshall Dev. 

Corp. v. Diamond, 884 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1989). Such cases must 

be filed in the Claims Court. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 89-5058 Document: 01019627252 Date Filed: 04/30/1990 Page: 4 
Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. Bergland, 66.4 F.2d at 823; and, a challenge to a decision not to fund local anti~poverty organizations, 

Rogers v. Ink, 766 F.2d at 434. 

Eagle-Picher seeks to distinguish the above decisions and 

relies upon Adamson v. Radosevic, 685 F. Supp. 814 (D. Kan. 1988). 

This reliance is misplaced. In Adamson, the Army Corps of 

Engineers leased 403 motel rooms from four different contractors, 

with 276 of those rooms being in the Magnolia Manor. The Corps 

later decided that it only need 264 rooms. Instead of soliciting 

bids for a new contract for 264 rooms, the Corps terminated its 

leases with each contractor except the Magnolia Manor. One of the 

other contractors brought suit to compel the solicitation of new 

bids. Because the plaintiff was not trying to force the Corps to 

perform a contract, but sought only a chance to bid on one,. his 

prayer for an injunction was not a disguised contract claim: 

"Unlike the Rogers line of cases, plaintiff is not 

directly or indirectly seeking funds from the government; he is only seeking an opportunity to submit a bid 

on the [new contract] •••• Should plaintiff prevail 

on tne merits of this claim, it would only entitle him 

to an opportunity to bid on a government contract; 

nothing in the case would entitle him, directly or 

indirectly, to monetary relief." 

Id. at 820. 

In contrast, were Eagle-Picher to prevail on the merits of 

its claim, it would be indirectly entitled to monetary relief, 

because the practical effect of such an injunction would be to 

force the government to abide by the contract. See S.J. Groves & 

Sons Co. v. United States, 495 F. Supp. 201, 206-08 (D. Colo. 

1980). Whereas the plaintiff in Adamson sought to bring about a 

resolicitation of. bids, Eagle-Picher seeks to prevent the 

-5-

Appellate Case: 89-5058 Document: 01019627252 Date Filed: 04/30/1990 Page: 5 
resolicitation of bids. The plaintiff in Adamson would experience 

no monetary gain from a favorable judgment, but a judgment in 

favor of Eagle-Picher would result in Eagle-Picher receiving money 

from the federal government pursuant to the contract. Because 

Eagle-Picher's prime objective in this litigation is to force the 

federal government to perform the contract, i.e., to pay money to 

Eagle-Picher, this action should have been brought in the Claims 

Court. 2 

The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the case 

is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

2 On a claim similar to the one at bar, the court in Vibra-Tech 

Engineers, Inc. v. United States, 567 F. Supp. 484 (D. Colo. 

1983), reached the opposite result. That opinion is flawed, 

however, in that it fails to apply the "prime objective" test. 

See id. at 487. Accordingly, it cannot be considered an 

authoritative application of the law. 

-6-

Appellate Case: 89-5058 Document: 01019627252 Date Filed: 04/30/1990 Page: 6