Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00859/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00859-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Guillermo Trujillo Cruz
Plaintiff
Gomez
Defendant
Sanchez
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUILLERMO TRUJILLO CRUZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

C/O GOMEZ,

1

Defendant.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00859-EPG-PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF No. 1)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE TO FILE 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Guillermo Trujillo Cruz (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil 

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Now before the Court for screening is Plaintiff’s 

Complaint, filed June 8, 2015. (ECF No. 1). Petitioner has consented to the jurisdiction of a 

United States magistrate judge to conduct all proceedings in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). (ECF No. 4).

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

 

1 The Court notes that although Plaintiff has included “et al.” in the caption of the Complaint, the Complaint only 

specifically lists Correctional Officer Gomez as a defendant.

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paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken 

as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, 

Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To state a 

viable claim, Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

570). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. The mere 

possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–

79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009)

II. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

(“CDCR”) at Kern Valley State Prison, where the events at issue occurred. Plaintiff names 

Correctional Officer Gomez as a defendant in this action. 

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that on October 7, 2014, Correctional Officer Gomez 

(“Defendant Gomez”) and Correctional Officer Sanchez (“C/O Sanchez”) searched Plaintiff’s 

cell for additional state clothing. After the cell search was conducted, Plaintiff noticed that his 

television was broken at the base and screws located next to the right speaker were unscrewed. 

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Gomez and C/O Sanchez damaged the television during the 

course of the search.

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Gomez retaliated against him on October 22, 2014, by 

stating that Plaintiff refused to attend school that morning and then sending Plaintiff to the 

administrative segregation unit for possession of an inmate manufactured weapon. After Plaintiff 

was transferred to administrative segregation, Defendant Gomez conducted a cell search. No 

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contraband was found, and Defendant Gomez personally filled out the personal property 

inventory.

On November 4, 2014, Committee Property Staff Officer Cervantez placed Plaintiff in a 

holding cell to give back to Plaintiff personal property that is allowed in the administrative 

segregation unit. As Plaintiff was sorting through his personal property, he noticed that a lot of 

his personal property was missing and that his AM/FM player was broken. Plaintiff contends that 

this was the result of Defendant Gomez’s negligence and intentional wrongdoing.

III. EVALUATION OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

“[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a 

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). See also Chapman v. 

Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 

1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); Anderson v. 

Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). 

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under 

color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or 

federal law. Long v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Marsh v. 

Cty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color of state law”). 

A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an 

affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is 

legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. 

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Clark Cty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite causal connection may be established when an 

official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should 

know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 

(quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of causation “closely resembles the standard 

‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.” Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 

1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th 

Cir. 2008).

A. Retaliation

The First Amendment protects a prisoner’s right to seek redress of grievances from 

prison authorities and a prisoner’s right of meaningful access to the courts. Jones v .Williams, 

791 F.3d 1023, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015). In the context of prisons, a First Amendment retaliation 

claim is comprised of five basic elements: “(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse 

action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action 

(4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 

(9th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a retaliation claim against Defendant 

Gomez. The Complaint does not clearly allege facts demonstrating that adverse action was taken 

against Plaintiff because he engaged in protected conduct, such as filing a grievance, and that 

such adverse action chilled Plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights. In other words, 

there are not sufficient facts to indicate that Defendant Gomez confiscated or damaged Plaintiff’s 

property or in retaliation for Plaintiff filing a grievance.

B. Deprivation of Personal Property

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of property without due

process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), and prisoners have a protected 

interest in their personal property, Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). “[T]he 

Due Process Clause is . . . not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss 

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of or injury to . . . property.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). Authorized 

intentional deprivation of property pursuant to an established state procedure is actionable under 

the Due Process Clause. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 & n.13 (1984) (citing Logan 

v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-36 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 

(9th Cir. 1985). On the other hand, “an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a 

state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is 

available.” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. California law provides a postdeprivation remedy for any 

property deprivations. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816–17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. Gov’t 

Code §§ 810–95).

Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a due process claim against Defendant 

Gomez or C/O Sanchez. The Complaint does not clearly allege facts demonstrating that Plaintiff

was intentionally deprived of his personal property pursuant to any authorized procedure or 

process. To the contrary, Plaintiff’s allegations indicate that Defendant Gomez and C/O Sanchez 

damaged Plaintiff’s television while searching Plaintiff’s cell for extra state clothing and that 

Defendant Gomez wrongfully and arbitrarily confiscated and damaged Plaintiff’s personal 

property after Plaintiff was transferred to the administrative segregation unit. The unauthorized 

deprivation of property, be it negligent or intentional, does not give rise to a claim for relief 

under the Due Process Clause. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533.

Rather, Plaintiff’s remedy, if any, would be found under California law. California’s 

Government Claims Act2requires that a tort claim against a public entity or its employees be 

presented to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board, formerly 

known as the State Board of Control, no more than six months after the cause of action accrues.

Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950–950.2 (West 2006). Presentation of a written 

claim, and action on or rejection of the claim are conditions precedent to suit. State v. Superior 

Court of Kings County (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1245 (Cal. 2004); Mangold v. California Pub. 

 

2 This Act was formerly known as the California Tort Claims Act. City of Stockton v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 

730, 741-42 (Cal. 2007) (adopting the practice of using Government Claims Act rather than California Tort Claims 

Act).

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Utils. Comm=n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). To state a tort claim against a public 

employee, a plaintiff must allege compliance with the Government Claims Act. Bodde, 32 

Cal.4th at 1245; Mangold, 67 F.3d at 1477; Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 

621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, the Complaint fails to allege facts demonstrating compliance with 

California’s Government Claims Act, and therefore fails to state a tort claim under state law.3

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court has screened Plaintiff’s Complaint and finds that it fails to state any cognizable 

claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, “leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Accordingly, 

the Court will provide Plaintiff with time to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies 

identified above. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–30 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff is granted 

leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days from the date of service of this order if he

chooses to do so.

Should Plaintiff choose to amend the complaint, the amended complaint must allege 

constitutional violations under the law as discussed above. The amended complaint should be 

brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each named defendant did that led to the 

deprivation of Plaintiff=s constitutional or other federal rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Jones, 297 

F.3d at 934. Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible 

on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff is reminded 

that Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of 

his rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Plaintiff is advised that a short, concise statement of the 

allegations in chronological order will assist the Court in identifying his claims. Plaintiff should 

name each defendant and explain what happened, describing personal acts by the individual 

 

3 Any tort claim against Defendant Gomez would be based on state law, which ordinarily would be heard in state 

court, and not a federal court like this one. Although the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law 

claims, Plaintiff must first have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In this instance, 

the Court has not found a cognizable § 1983 claim in the Complaint for retaliation against Defendant Gomez. 

Therefore, at this juncture, the Court does not have supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claim that forms 

part of the same case or controversy as Plaintiff’s alleged retaliation claim. See Brady v. Brown, 51 F.3d 810, 816 

(9th Cir. 1995) (“Pendent jurisdiction over state claims exists when the federal claim is sufficiently substantial to 

confer federal jurisdiction, and there is a ‘common nucleus of operative fact between the state and federal claims.’”) 

(quoting Gilder v. PGA Tour, Inc., 936 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir. 1991)).

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defendant that resulted in the violation of Plaintiff’s rights. Plaintiff should also describe any 

harm he suffered as a result of the violation. Plaintiff should note that although he has been given 

the opportunity to amend, it is not for the purpose of adding new defendants for unrelated issues.

If Plaintiff decides to file an amended complaint, he is advised that an amended 

complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 

(9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be complete in itself without reference to the prior or 

superseded pleading. Local Rule 220. Once an amended complaint is filed, the original 

complaint no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in 

an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 

alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First Amended Complaint,” 

refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within THIRTY (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff may 

file a First Amended Complaint attempting to cure the deficiencies identified in 

this order if he believes additional true factual allegations would state a claim; 

3. Should Plaintiff choose to amend the complaint, Plaintiff shall caption the 

amended complaint “First Amended Complaint” and refer to the case number 

1:15-cv-00859-EPG; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days, the Court 

will dismiss the case for failure to state a claim and failure to comply with a Court 

order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 4, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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