Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01618/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01618-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Herineo Serrano
Petitioner
P.L. Vasquez
Respondent

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28 All further statutory references are to the California Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HERINEO SERRANO,

Petitioner,

v.

P.L. VASQUEZ, WARDEN,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 06-1618 OWW DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

 BACKGROUND

Petitioner is in currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR), following his conviction in the Fresno County Superior Court for two

counts of second degree murder in violation of California Penal Code section 187. Both counts 1

included an enhancement for the use of a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 12022.5;

thus, Petitioner is serving an aggregate term of 32 years to life. (Exhibit 1, Abstract of Judgment,

attached to Answer.) 

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28 This statement of facts is taken from the petition for writ of habeas corpus, which cites the parole hearing 2

transcript. (Petition, at 9.)

2

In the instant petition, Petitioner does not challenge the validity of his conviction or

sentence; rather, he challenges the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) 2004 decision finding him

unsuitable for parole. (Exhibit 2, attached to Answer.)

Petitioner filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Fresno County Superior

Court on February 10, 2005. (Exhibit 3, attached to Answer.) The Court denied the petition

finding that the BPH’s decision to deny Petitioner parole was supported by “sufficient evidence.” 

(Id.)

On June 6, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District, which was summarily denied on June 16, 2005. (Exhibit 4.)

Petitioner then filed a petition in the California Supreme Court, which was summarily

denied on June 14, 2006. (Exhibit 5.)

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on November 13, 2006. 

Respondent filed an answer on March 5, 2007, and Petitioner filed a traverse on April 1, 2007. 

(Court Docs. 11, 12, 13.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS2

On March 3, 1984, at approximately 3:15 a.m., Serrano [a]nd two (2) codefendants, Estevan Arreola and Jorge Negrete went to the residence of Alejandro

Hernandez located at 13887 South Peach in Selma, California. Co-defendant

Negrete was armed with a .45 caliber handgun. Serrano and co-defendant Arreola

were armed with rifles. An argument subsequently ensured between co-defendant

Negrete and Hernandez. Co-defendant Negrete shot Hernandez twice when he

attempted to flee. He was pursued and Hernandez was able to obtain his weapon

and wounded Negrete. Serrano and co-defendant Arreola then repeatedly fired

their rifles into a living room containing nine other individuals who were waking

up. Co-defendant Arreola also fired his rifle repeatedly into the house from a

position outside as the three (3) men fled. A sixteen year old male victim and a

nineteen year old male victim died as a result of gunshot wounds. Five other

victims received gunshot wounds as a result of this incident. Serrano was arrested

for the instant matter on March 4, 1984.

(Petition, at 9.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

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On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries

v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5 th th

Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). 

The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its

provisions.

Petitioner is in custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to a state

court judgment. Even though Petitioner is not challenging the underlying state court conviction,

28 U.S.C. § 2254 remains the exclusive vehicle for his habeas petition because he meets the

threshold requirement of being in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. Sass v. California

Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-1127 (9 Cir.2006), citing White v. Lambert, 370 th

F.3d 1002, 1006 (9 Cir.2004) (“Section 2254 ‘is the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a th

state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petition is not

challenging his underlying state court conviction.’”).

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 70 (2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless

the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this

Court must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as

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of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other

words, 'clearly established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or

principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

72, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S.

at 72. “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at

413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at

409. 

 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to

or involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the

states, Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a

state court decision is objectively unreasonable. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9

th

Cir.2003); Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir.1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied,

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537 U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003).

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as to the basis for the state court

judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9 Cir. 2002) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 th

U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991)). Here, the last reasoned state court opinion of the Fresno County

Superior Court found that “some evidence” supported the Board’s finding of unsuitability of

parole. (Exhibit 3.) 

II. Review of Claims

A parole release determination is not subject to all of the due process protections of an

adversary proceeding. Pedro v. Oregon Parole Board, 825 F.2d 1396, 1398-99 (9 Cir. 1987); see th

also Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979)

(explaining that due process is flexible and calls for procedural protections that particular

situations demand). "[S]ince the setting of a minimum term is not part of a criminal prosecution,

the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding is not constitutionally mandated,

even when a protected liberty interest exists." Pedro, 825 F.2d at 1399; Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of

Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir.1987). At a state parole board proceeding, the only process

to which an inmate is entitled is: 1) the inmate must receive advance written notice of a hearing,

Pedro, 825 F.2d at 1399; 2) the inmate must be afforded an "opportunity to be heard,"

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16; and 3) if the inmate is denied parole, the inmate must be told why

"he falls short of qualifying for parole.” Id.

“In Superintendent, Mass. Correc. Inst. v. Hill, the Supreme Court further held that

‘revocation of good time does not comport with ‘the minimum requirements of procedural due

process,’ unless the findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in

the record.’ 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985), quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).”

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128. In determining whether the “some evidence” standard is met, the Court

need not examine the entire record, independently assess the credibility of witnesses, or re-weigh

the evidence. Id. Rather, the Court must determine whether there is any evidence in the record

that could support the conclusion of the disciplinary board. Id., citing Superintendent v. Hill, at

455-56. Although Hill involved the accumulation of good time credits, the same standard applies

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to parole, as both situations “directly affect the duration of the prison term.” Id., citing Jancsek

v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d at 1390. 

In making a determination whether an inmate is suitable for parole, the BPH is guided by

the following regulations:

(a) General. The panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for

release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found

unsuitable for a denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.

(b) Information Considered. All relevant, reliable information available to the

panel shall be considered in determining suitability for parole. Such information shall

include the circumstances of the prisoner's social history; past and present mental state;

past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal misconduct which is

reliably documented; the base and other commitment offenses, including behavior before,

during and after the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any conditions of

treatment or control, including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may

safely be released to the community; and any other information which bears on the

prisoner's suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone may not firmly

establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding of

unsuitability.

15 Cal. Code Regs. §§ 2402(a) and (b).

Further, when an inmate is considered for the first time at the initial parole consideration

hearing, “[a] parole date shall be denied if the prisoner is found unsuitable for parole under

Section 2402(c). A parole date shall be set if the prisoner is found suitable for parole under

Section 2402(d). Cal. Code Reg. tit. 15, § 2401.

Petitioner was provided all the procedural protections outlined in Greenholtz. Petitioner

was provided with advance notice of the hearing, an opportunity to submit materials for the

BPH’s consideration, an opportunity to be heard during the hearing, and a written decision

explaining the reasons that parole was denied. 

Petitioner, however, contends the BPH’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and had no

evidentiary support. After reviewing all relevant evidence, the Court finds that the state court

decisions rejecting Petitioner’s claims were not unreasonable, because the BPH’s decision is

supported by “some evidence.” 

At Petitioner’s initial 2004 parole hearing, the BPH relied on several factors in denying

parole including: (1) Petitioner’s commitment offense was carried out in an especially callous

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 Pursuant to Title 15, of the California Code of Regulations, Section 2402(c)(1) sets forth circumstances 3

tending to demonstrate unsuitability for parole regarding the committed offense. The factors to be considered

include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or separate incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an execution-style

murder.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for

human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.

15 Cal.Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1)(A)-(E).

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manner; (2) Petitioner had an unstable social history; (3) Petitioner had an escalating pattern of

criminal conduct; (4) Petitioner had not sufficiently participated in beneficial self-help; (5)

Petitioner’s disciplinary history during incarceration; (6) Petitioner’s psychiatric evaluations; and

(7) Petitioner’s parole plans.

There is “some evidence” to support the BPH’s finding that Petitioner’s release will

unreasonably endanger the public safety. First, the BPH found that the offense was carried out in

an especially callous manner. Petitioner and another individual entered a residence armed with a 3

rifle and began shooting. The two individuals that were killed were sleeping in the house and we

unaware of what was going on, and therefore had no chance to either flee or in any way defend

themselves. Multiple victims were attacked, two of them died, and one was paralyzed. (Exhibit

2, at 56-57.) The motive for obtaining drug money was very trivial in relation to killing two

young individuals and injuring several others. (Id.) In light of these factual circumstances,

“some evidence” supports the BPH’s finding that the circumstances of the commitment offense

was carried out in an especially callous manner. 

Petitioner’s claim that the BPH may not base its suitability determination on his

commitment offense, is simply unfounded. Under California law, the commitment offense and

past convicted offenses alone provide a sufficient basis to deny parole. In re Dannenberg, 34

Cal.4th at 1061, 1095 (2005); Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). In Sass v. California Bd. of Prison

Terms, 461 F.3d 1123 (9 Cir. 2006), the Ninth Circuit found that evidence of Sass’s prior th

offenses and the gravity of his commitment offense provided some evidence to support the

Governor’s denial of parole, and held that “the state court decisions upholding the denials were

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 Although the Ninth Circuit has recognized that “continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, 4

the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrdary to the rehabilitative goals

espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process violation.” Biggs v. Terhune. 334 F.3d 910, 916-

917 (9th Cir. 2003). Recently, in Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, as amended, (July 13, 2007), petition for rehearing

en banc pending, the Ninth Circuit again upheld the denial of parole based on the prisoner’s commitment offense and

prior criminal history, stating that “in all the cases in which we have held that a parole board’s decision to deem a

prisoner unsuitable for parole solely on the basis of his commitment offense comports with due process, the decision

was made before the inmate had served the minimum number of years required by his sentence.” Irons, at 853. 

Here, at the time of Petitioner’s 2004 hearing, he had only served 19 years of his 32 years to life sentence. 

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neither contrary to, nor did they involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Sass, at 1129.4

However, as discussed infra, this was not the sole basis for the denial of parole by the BPH. 

In addition, Petitioner’s claim that the BPH maintains an overly restrictive application of

California Penal Code section 3041 and follows a policy of under-inclusion with regards to

granting parole, it too is not persuasive. Initially, Petitioner has failed to establish how the

BPH’s alleged policy of under-inclusion adversely affected the fairness of his 2004 parole

consideration hearing. Moreover, the BPH is not required to take proportionality into account

until after an inmate is found suitable for parole and no longer posses an unreasonable danger to

public safety. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1084. In addition, this claim as stated is

completely conclusory and unsupported by any evidence. See Allard v. Nelson, 423 F.2d 1216,

1217 (9 Cir.1970) (Conclusory allegations in a habeas petition fail to state a claim and do not th

suffice to shift the burden to the state to answer an order to show cause.); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d

20, 29 (9th Cir.1994) ("Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific

facts do not warrant habeas relief."); Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9 Cir.1995) th

(holding that conclusory allegations made with no reference to the record or any document do not

merit habeas relief). 

Petitioner has had an unstable social history including, crossing the Mexican border into

the United States on three separate occasions. Cal. Code Reg. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(3). He admitted

to trafficking in narcotics and crossed the border for that purpose. (Id. at 57.) See Cal. Code

Reg. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(3). 

The BPH noted that Petitioner has not sufficiently participated in beneficial self-help

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programming. Although Petitioner has participated in AA, it began in 2000, and it was observed

that he needs a longer period of participation to achieve the full benefit of such programming. It

was also noted that he had not participated in any anger management programming, and given

that Petitioner’s commitment offense was extremely violent, such programming was warranted. 

(Exhibit B, at 57-58.) Section 2402(b) states that “[a]ll relevant, reliable information available to

the panel shall be considered in determining suitability for parole.” 

Petitioner has received five serious 115 disciplinary reports. The first occurred on July

19, 1986, for fighting. The second occurred on October 4, 1988, for possession of inmate

manufactured alcohol. The third occurred on August 31, 1990, for undue familiarity. The fourth

occurred on September 14, 1994, for battery on an inmate. The fifth and most recent occurred on

April 23, 1998, for disobeying a direct order. (Exhibit B, at 58.) See Cal. Code Reg. tit. 15, §

2402(c)(6) (the Board may consider institutional behavior while in prison in determining whether

prisoner poses an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released.).

In addition, Petitioner has suffered seven 128(a) counseling chronos. The first occurred

on January 27, 1998, for an unexcused absence from class. The second occurred on August 28,

1990, for destruction of state property. The third occurred on September 18, 1991, for disrupting

and talking in class. The fourth occurred on May 12, 1992, for not completing a task. The fifth

occurred on June 22, 1995, for disobeying orders. The sixth occurred on November 28, 1996, for

disobeying orders. The seventh occurred on June 1, 1999, for possession of contraband. (Exhibit

B, at 58.) 

The psychiatric evaluation dated February 17, 2004, authored by Dr. Massac, was

unfavorable to Petitioner’s release. Specifically, Dr. Massac noted that although Petitioner has

matured in some ways, there were still questions relating to his upbringing in a dysfunctional

family including a crime-ridden environment in Mexico. (Exhibit B, at 59.) Dr. Massac opined

that this may have had a long-lasting affect on Petitioner’s risk of re-offending, and it was

difficult to predict how successful Petitioner would be to adjusting to society. (Id.)

Petitioner did not have realistic parole plans as there was nothing in writing for his plans

in returning to Mexico. (Id. at 59.) It was noted that Dr. Massac opined that it would be

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important for Petitioner’s success to be gainfully employed and actively involved in substance

abuse counseling. (Id.) Petitioner had no evidence of any employment plans. (Id. at 59-60.) 

The BPH noted that the District Attorney opposed Petitioner’s release. This was properly

considered pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 3042(a) and (f)(3), and Cal. Code Reg. tit. 15, §

2402(b). 

The BPH also considered factors favoring Petitioner’s suitability for release, and

commended Petitioner for completing the office services program, receiving his GED, and

participating in AA. Cal. Code Reg. tit. 15, § 2402(d).

It is apparent the Board considered all relevant evidence in this case and carefully

balanced and assessed the various factors. Those findings were supported by at least “some

evidence” and it cannot be said that the state court’s resolution of Petitioner’s claim “resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence before the

state court.” 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served 

///

///

///

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and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 9, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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