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Parties Involved:
Willie Holland
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Courtof Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 21, 2010

Decided January 21, 2010

Before

    JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

    JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

    MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

   

No. 09‐3199

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

WILLIE HOLLAND, JR.,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 01‐CR‐16

Rudolph T. Randa,

Judge.

O R D E R

Willie Holland was sentenced to a total of 77 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’

supervised release after he pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1).  Two months into his supervised release, Holland was arrested for possessing

cocaine with intent to distribute and, after pleading guilty in state court, was sentenced to a

year in prison.  The district court then revoked his supervised release and ordered him to

serve another 24 months’ imprisonment.  Holland appeals, but his appointed counsel has

concluded that the case is frivolous and moves to withdraw.  See Anders v. California , 386

U.S. 738, 744 (1967).  Holland opposes counsel’s motion.  See CIR. R. 51(b).  We confine our

review to the potential issues outlined in counsel’s facially adequate brief and Holland’s

response.  See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973‐74 (7th Cir. 2002).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09‐3199 Page 2

At his revocation hearing Holland stipulated that he violated the conditions of his

supervised release by committing the state drug crime, and the only conceivable ground for

appeal identified by counsel is whether 24 months is too much time.  We will uphold a term

of reimprisonment imposed on revocation of supervised release unless it is “plainly

unreasonable,” a very narrow standard.  United States v. Kizeart, 505 F.3d 672, 674‐75 (7th

Cir. 2007).  In selecting an appropriate prison term to follow revocation, district courts must

consider the policy statements in the guidelines, see U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. B, and the sentencing

factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  United States v. Neal, 512 F.3d 427, 438 (7th Cir. 2008).

In this case the court, by statute, could not imprison Holland for more than two years, see 18

U.S.C. §§ 3583(e)(3), 3559(a)(3), 922(g)(1), even though his Grade A violation and criminal

history category of VI yielded a guidelines range of 33 to 41 monthsʹ reimprisonment, see

U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1(a)(1), 7B1.4(a).  In selecting 24 months the court weighed the § 3553(a)

factors, including the nature of the underlying drug violation and the need to protect the

public and promote respect for the law—especially in light of how quickly Holland had

reoffended once released from prison.  As counsel notes, it would be frivolous to contend

that the courtʹs evaluation of the statutes and guidelines factors was inadequate.

Counsel questions whether Holland could argue that his term of reimprisonment is

unreasonable in light of his time already served in state custody.  Before pleading guilty in

state court, Holland already had spent almost 18 months in state custody, most of which

was credited against his state sentence.  He argued at the revocation hearing that the district

court should imprison him for just 6 months to account for the time in state custody, but the

court declined to award any reduction below the 24‐month statutory maximum.  

District courts are not required to shorten a term of reimprisonment to annul time

served in state custody for misconduct underlying the revocation, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f);

United States v. Huusko, 275 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Harvey, 232 F.3d

585, 588‐89 (7th Cir. 2000). In this case the court emphasized that it would have imposed a

longer term of reimprisonment if the statutory maximum was higher.  The court explained

that Holland already had received a break from having a statutory maximum well below

the bottom of the guidelines range.  And the court correctly noted that postrevocation

reimprisonment is part of the penalty for the original offense and separate from any

punishment for an offense underlying revocation.  See United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 694,

700‐01 (2000).  Any challenge to the length of Hollandʹs term on this ground would be

frivolous.

In his Rule 51(b) response, Holland questions whether he is entitled to credit under

18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) for the almost 6 months in state custody that was not applied to his state

sentence.  But it is the Bureau of Prisons, not the sentencing court, that computes the credit

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No. 09‐3199 Page 3

due under § 3585(b). United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334‐35 (1992); United States v. Ross,

219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000).  A claim based on § 3585(b) would thus be frivolous in this

appeal.

Accordingly, we GRANT counselʹs motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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