Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02970/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02970-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Khalat Jamalthaeal Alama
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District

of Nebraska.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2970

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

Khalat Jamalthaeal Alama, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: January 9, 2007

Filed: May 23, 2007

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BYE and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

LOKEN, Chief Judge.

A jury convicted Khalat Jamalthaeal Alama of conspiring to distribute and

possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation

of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. Alama appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the

evidence and arguing that the admission of evidence seized during a warrantless

search of his residence violated the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Georgia v.

Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006), and that the district court1 erred in

admitting the plea agreements of cooperating government witnesses. We affirm.

Appellate Case: 06-2970 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/23/2007 Entry ID: 3312190
-2-

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Alama argues that the government failed to prove the elements of a conspiracy

offense, namely, “that: (1) a conspiracy existed for an illegal purpose; (2) the

defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant knowingly joined in it.”

United States v. Tensley, 334 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 2003). More particularly, he

argues that the government proved no more than a series of “mere sales agreements”

between Alama and the government’s cooperating witnesses, the deficiency in proof

that caused us to reverse the conspiracy conviction in United States v. West, 15 F.3d

119, 121 (8th Cir. 1994). We reject a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence if

the record, viewed most favorably to the government, contains evidence sufficient to

prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v.

Lopez, 443 F.3d 1026, 1030 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc). A conspiracy may be proved

by direct or circumstantial evidence. Tensley, 334 F.3d at 794.

The government’s main witness was Satar Alkafaji, a fellow Iraqi with whom

Alama lived at times during the alleged conspiracy. Alkafaji first admitted that he

pleaded guilty to a charge that he conspired to distribute methamphetamine. He then

testified that, beginning in early 2004, he allowed Alama to sell methamphetamine,

initially a few grams at a time and later in larger quantities. Alkafaji accompanied

Alama on his first large sale but thereafter did not supervise Alama, require prepayment for the drugs, or meet Alama’s customers because “we were building a

relationship and the confidence and trust was strong.” Alkafaji testified that he and

Alama shared a cell phone for their drug related activity, and that customers called and

dealt with either of them. Alkafaji also testified that he took Alama to meet Alkafaji’s

methamphetamine source in Grand Island, Nebraska. 

The government also introduced testimony by various methamphetamine

customers of Alkafaji and Alama. Chadwick Walters testified that he bought ounces

and half-ounces from Alama six to eight times. Teresa Jones testified she bought halfAppellate Case: 06-2970 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/23/2007 Entry ID: 3312190
-3-

ounce and ounce quantities of methamphetamine from Alama and Alkafaji for resale

and personal use. Joshua Love and Daniel Zeiger bought methamphetamine from

Alama and Alkafaji. Alama testified in his own defense that he occasionally used

methamphetamine, once with Alkafaji. But he denied buying methamphetamine from

Alkafaji, selling methamphetamine to anyone, or knowing Walters and Zeiger. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, as we must,

we conclude that the government’s evidence was more than sufficient to prove a

conspiracy between Alama and Alkafaji to distribute methamphetamine. Our later

cases make clear that West was a narrow ruling that has no application to the facts of

this case. See United States v. Bewig, 354 F.3d 731, 735-36 (8th Cir. 2003); United

States v. Cabrera, 116 F.3d 1243, 1247 (8th Cir. 1997). Moreover, Alama neither

proffered an instruction based on the mere-sales-agreement principle nor suggested

this defense theory to the jury at trial. See United States v. Montano-Gudino, 309

F.3d 501, 505 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hester, 140 F.3d 753, 757 (8th Cir.

1998). In addition to relying on West, Alama argues that the government’s

cooperating witnesses were not credible because they were convicted felons whose

plea agreements gave them a strong motive to lie to obtain sentencing relief.

However, credibility determinations are for the jury and are virtually unassailable on

appeal. See United States v. Enriquez, 201 F.3d 1072, 1074 (8th Cir. 2000). 

II. The Georgia v. Randolph Issue

Following his indictment and arraignment, Alama was released on bond. An

arrest warrant issued when he violated the terms of release, and he was seen at the

home of Jane Snelling, who lived with her two daughters and her niece, Alama’s

girlfriend, Nicole Delgado. U.S. Marshals went there to arrest him, accompanied by

local law enforcement officers. The officers knocked on the door, announced their

purpose, and ordered everyone out of the house. Snelling, her daughter, and Delgado

emerged and were taken across the street, where Snelling consented to a search of her

Appellate Case: 06-2970 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/23/2007 Entry ID: 3312190
-4-

home and signed a written consent form. Surveillance continued, and some time later

Alama came out of the house and was taken into custody. The officers then searched

the home, finding methamphetamine and marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a digital

scale, and numerous plastic baggies in the bedroom where Alama had been living with

Delgado and in a nearby toilet.

Alama filed no pretrial motion to suppress this evidence. At trial, Snelling and

the officer who obtained her consent to search briefly described the above sequence

of events. The government then called Officer Forrest Dalton, who conducted the

search and took custody of the seized contraband. After laying foundation, the

government offered three physical exhibits Dalton identified as comprising the

contraband. Defense counsel objected based upon a Supreme Court decision “just

before we started this trial,” a reference to Georgia v. Randolph. After a brief

colloquy outside the presence of the jury, the objection was clarified:

THE COURT: I understand you to be objecting to the degree that

your client has a Fourth Amendment right.

MR. GOOCH [defense counsel]: Yes.

THE COURT: And you assert that it’s a logical extension of the

Supreme Court’s recent decision to say that you’ve got to get consent of

guests in a home in a circumstance such as this.

MR. GOOCH: Yes.

THE COURT: And now having made that objection, it is denied

. . . I don’t think that’s what the [Supreme] Court intended.

On appeal, Alama argues that the district court erred in admitting this evidence

because Randolph required the police to obtain the consent of Alama as well as

Appellate Case: 06-2970 Page: 4 Date Filed: 05/23/2007 Entry ID: 3312190
-5-

Snelling, the primary occupant, before searching the portion of the house where

Alama was living and the contraband was found. We disagree.

Prior to Randolph, the Supreme Court held that the police may conduct a

warrantless search with the consent of an occupant who they reasonably believe has

common authority over the property even if a co-occupant later objects. See Illinois

v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).

In Randolph, the Court considered whether this principle applied when both cooccupants were present and the police conducted a warrantless search based on the

consent of one despite the other’s express refusal to consent. The Court held that this

search violated the Fourth Amendment. To reconcile its holding with Rodriguez and

Matlock, the Court expressly drew “a fine line,” 126 S. Ct. at 1527: 

if a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the

door and objects, the co-tenant’s permission does not suffice for a

reasonable search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited

to take part in the threshold colloquy, loses out. 

This case obviously falls on the Rodriguez and Matlock side of the line. The

police knocked on Snelling’s door for the purpose of executing the arrest warrant.

Alama did not come to the door and object to a search of the house. Instead, he

disobeyed the officers’ command that everyone come out of the house and remained

hidden inside until, he later testified, his lawyer urged him by telephone to give

himself up. Up to this point, Alama was like the sleeping co-occupant whose consent

to search was not constitutionally required in Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 180. By the time

Alama finally emerged from the house, Snelling had consented to the search and

Alama was arrested and removed from the scene. At this point, he was like the cooccupant under arrest in a nearby squad car whose consent to search was not required

in Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166-67.

Appellate Case: 06-2970 Page: 5 Date Filed: 05/23/2007 Entry ID: 3312190
2

Compare United States v. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 2006),

vacated & reh’g en banc granted, No. 05-3316 (8th Cir. Jan. 4, 2007).

-6-

Alama argues that Randolph was nonetheless violated because the Supreme

Court stated that its bright-line test would not apply if there is “evidence that the

police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake

of avoiding a potential objection.” 126 S. Ct. at 1527. Here, he argues, the police

knew he was physically present and would have objected to the search if asked.

Having “ample opportunity to obtain Alama’s consent,” the police instead obtained

Snelling’s consent and then waited until Alama left the residence before conducting

the search. This argument fails because it is without support in the trial record.

Snelling testified that she did not know if Alama was in the house when she consented

to the search. Neither Alama nor the officers who testified for the government were

asked whether there was any conversation when Alama was arrested. Thus, there is

no evidence that Alama objected to the search after his arrest and before the search

occurred.2

 Indeed, Alama was not asked whether he would have objected to the

search had he been asked. He testified only that he was not there when the search

occurred and denied that any of the seized contraband belonged to him. In these

circumstances, Rodriguez and Matlock are controlling. The district court properly

overruled Alama’s objection to admission of the fruits of the search.

III. Admission of Conspirator Plea Agreements

Alkafaji and four other cooperating witnesses testified during the government’s

case in chief. On direct examination, each testified that he or she had entered into a

plea agreement. Each agreement was then received into evidence without objection

by the defense, as expressly authorized by United States v. Brown, 941 F.2d 656, 659

(8th Cir. 1991). Accord United States v. Kroh, 915 F.2d 326, 331 (8th Cir. 1990) (en

banc); United States v. Drews, 877 F.2d 10, 12 (8th Cir. 1989). Consistent with

Brown, the district court instructed the jury:

Appellate Case: 06-2970 Page: 6 Date Filed: 05/23/2007 Entry ID: 3312190
-7-

You must not consider such a guilty plea as any evidence of this

defendant’s guilt. You may consider such a guilty plea only for the

purpose of determining how much, if at all, to rely upon a witness’s

testimony.

On appeal, Alama urges us to reconsider our decision in Brown, arguing that

“to permit the introduction of plea agreements of coconspirators listed as codefendants in the Indictment renders the defendant’s presumption of innocence

nugatory.” Only the en banc court may overrule a prior panel decision, see, e.g.,

Murphy v. United States, 268 F.3d 599, 601 (8th Cir. 2001), particularly a panel

decision that construed Kroh, a prior decision of the court en banc. 

At oral argument, counsel for Alama argued for the first time that plea

agreements should not be admissible during the direct examination of cooperating

witnesses in the District of Nebraska because the terms of the standard agreement used

by the United States Attorney’s office in that District contain impermissible vouching

of the witness’s credibility. District courts have discretion to exclude all or part of a

plea agreement whose specific terms would have an “‘undue tendency to suggest

decision on an improper basis.’” United States v. Morris, 327 F.3d 760, 762 (8th Cir.

2003) (quoting Fed. R. Ev. 403 & Advisory Committee notes). But this issue was not

raised at trial; indeed, it was not timely raised on appeal. Thus, there was no error,

plain or otherwise, in admitting the plea agreements, allowing extensive cross exam

by Alama’s trial counsel regarding those agreements, and then instructing the jury that

the agreements may not be considered evidence of Alama’s guilt. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-2970 Page: 7 Date Filed: 05/23/2007 Entry ID: 3312190