Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-07116/USCOURTS-caDC-08-07116-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
C. Westbrook Murphy
Appellant
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 13, 2009 Decided February 16, 2010 

No. 08-7115 

HAROLD SCHULER, 

APPELLANT

v. 

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LLP, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Consolidated with 08-7116, 08-7120 

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:02-cv-00982-RJL) 

Richard A. Salzman argued the cause for appellant C. 

Westbrook Murphy. Joshua N. Rose argued the cause for 

appellant Harold Schuler. With them on the briefs were 

Douglas B. Huron and David L. Rose. Tammany M. Kramer

entered an appearance. 

Howard M. Shapiro argued the cause for appellee. With 

him on the brief were Juanita A. Crowley, Edward C. 

DuMont, Eric M. Nelson, and Stephen L. Sheinfeld. 

USCA Case #08-7116 Document #1230109 Filed: 02/16/2010 Page 1 of 15
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Before: GINSBURG and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges, and 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG. 

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: The appellants, Harold Schuler 

and C. Westbrook Murphy, sued PricewaterhouseCoopers, 

LLP (PwC) alleging the firm refused to make them partners 

because of their ages, in violation of the Age Discrimination 

in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., the 

District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), D.C. 

Code § 2-1401.01 et seq., and the New York Human Rights 

Law (NYHRL), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq. The district 

court (1) dismissed as untimely Schuler’s claims under the 

ADEA for 1999 and 2000, (2) granted summary judgment for 

PwC on Schuler’s claims under the ADEA and DCHRA for 

2001 and on Murphy’s claims under those laws for 2000, 

2001, and 2004, and (3) dismissed all counts under the 

NYHRL for failure to state a claim. 

We reverse the judgment of the district court insofar as it 

dismissed the claims brought under the NYHRL. In all other 

respects we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

I. Background 

PwC is a partnership headquartered in New York that 

provides accounting, auditing, and other services to clients 

worldwide. It has more than 20,000 employees and more 

than 2,000 partners in the United States. The partnership 

agreement provides each partner shall retire upon reaching 

age 60 but in extraordinary circumstances a partner may delay 

retirement until he reaches age 62. The structure of the 

compensation and benefits package provided to a new partner 

USCA Case #08-7116 Document #1230109 Filed: 02/16/2010 Page 2 of 15
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makes it financially undesirable for most employees over the 

age of 55 to become partners. 

During the years relevant to this case, PwC was 

organized into several divisions, which were subdivided into 

practices, each comprising multiple practice groups. The firm 

hired Schuler in 1988, when he was 44 years old, and Murphy 

in 1989, when he was 49, to work in the Regulatory and 

Advisory Services (RAS) practice group in Washington, D.C. 

The RAS was part of the banking practice, which was in turn 

a part of the Audit and Business Advisory Services division. 

The RAS had four or five partners and about two-dozen other 

employees. 

The process for selecting a new partner at PwC began at 

the practice group level. Each year the managing partner or a 

group of partners in each practice group could propose one or 

more employees to be considered for partner. Current 

partners were then asked to submit their reviews of that 

employee — called “soundings” — to an evaluation 

committee. An employee who received sufficiently numerous 

and favorable soundings proceeded through further stages of 

review and could be made a partner as of July of the 

following year. 

In 1998 the RAS proposed Schuler, then 55, for partner. 

Only 12 partners submitted “soundings” about Schuler (six 

favorable, two unfavorable, and four reporting insufficient 

information), and he was not made a partner in 1999. 

In 1999 the head of the RAS proposed another employee, 

then 37 years old, for partner. He also wanted to propose 

Schuler again but the head of the banking practice was not 

amenable because, as he later explained, he believed there 

had been “no significant change in circumstances or views” 

about Schuler since the previous year. Twenty-two partners 

submitted soundings about the other candidate (17 favorable, 

none unfavorable, and five reporting insufficient information) 

and he became a partner in 2000. 

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In 2001, a year in which the RAS proposed no one for 

partner, Schuler and Murphy each filed an administrative 

charge with the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights 

and cross-filed the charge with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Each alleged PwC had 

refused to consider him for promotion to partner because of 

his age — Schuler in 1999, 2000, and 2001 and Murphy in 

2000 and 2001. 

In 2002 Schuler and Murphy sued PwC, alleging, among 

other things, the firm had “denied [them] promotion to partner 

in 1999, 2000, and 2001 ... in violation of the ADEA, the 

DCHRA, and the [NYHRL].” PwC moved to dismiss 

Schuler’s 1999 and 2000 and Murphy’s 1999 claim under the 

ADEA because “the plaintiffs failed to file a timely 

administrative charge.” Murphy v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, 

LLP, 357 F. Supp. 2d 230, 237 (D.D.C. 2004). The ADEA 

required each appellant, before suing, to have filed an 

administrative charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the 

alleged discriminatory action, see 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1), but 

Schuler filed his charge on June 29, 2001, more than 300 days 

after he did not become a partner in July 2000 (let alone July 

1999), and Murphy filed his charge on March 14, 2001, more 

than 300 days after he did not become a partner in 1999. 

PwC also moved to dismiss all counts under the NYHRL for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted 

because they did not allege a discriminatory act had occurred 

in New York. Finally, PwC moved to dismiss all claims 

under the DCHRA on the ground that the “exercise of ... 

supplemental jurisdiction [was] not appropriate” because 

those claims “predominate[d] over the remaining federal 

claims.” Murphy, 357 F. Supp. 2d. at 237, 245. The district 

court granted PwC’s motion, to the extent relevant here, by 

dismissing as untimely Schuler’s claims under the ADEA for 

1999 and 2000 and dismissing all counts under the NYHRL 

for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 

USCA Case #08-7116 Document #1230109 Filed: 02/16/2010 Page 4 of 15
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See id., 357 F. Supp. 2d at 239–40, 244. The district court 

also dismissed as untimely Murphy’s 1999 claim under the 

ADEA, which ruling Murphy has not appealed. 

In 2003, the RAS proposed another employee for partner. 

He received 18 soundings (16 favorable, none unfavorable, 

and two reporting insufficient information) and became a 

partner in 2004, when he was 39. 

In 2005 the appellants each filed a new lawsuit. Murphy 

alleged PwC did not make him a partner in 2004 because of 

his age, in violation of the ADEA and the DCHRA. The 

district court consolidated Murphy’s new suit with the one he 

and Schuler had filed in 2002; it is these consolidated cases 

that are now before us on appeal. Schuler’s 2005 lawsuit 

alleged “PwC has engaged in a pattern and practice of age 

discrimination in making decisions regarding assignments and 

promotions in violation” of the same two statutes, see Schuler 

v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 514 F.3d 1365, 1369 (D.C. 

Cir. 2008) (quoting complaint); that suit is pending in the 

district court (No. Civ. 05cv2355 (RJL)). 

That same year the district court denied PwC’s motion 

for summary judgment on the appellants’ remaining claims 

under the ADEA and DCHRA. In 2008, however, after the 

close of discovery PwC again moved for summary judgment, 

which the district court granted as to Murphy’s claims under 

the ADEA and DCHRA for 2000, 2001, and 2004 and as to 

Schuler’s claims under those statutes for 2001. The court 

concluded each had “failed to rebut PwC’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanations” for not making him a partner 

and had “not presented sufficient evidence to support a 

finding ... of intentional discrimination based on age.” 

Murphy v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 580 F. Supp. 2d 4, 

12 (2008) (Murphy); Murphy v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, 

LLP, 580 F. Supp. 2d 16, 28 (2008) (Schuler). The court also 

dismissed Schuler’s claims under the DCHRA for 1999 and 

2000 as untimely because they “rel[ied] on discriminatory 

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acts occurring more than one year before the filing of 

Schuler’s initial administrative complaint.” Murphy, 580 F. 

Supp. 2d. at 25–26. 

II. Analysis 

Schuler and Murphy challenge the district court’s 2004 

dismissal of their claims under the NYHRL and of Schuler’s 

claims under the ADEA for 1999 and 2000. They also 

challenge respectively the court’s grant of summary judgment 

in 2008 on Schuler’s claims under the ADEA and DCHRA 

for 2001 and on Murphy’s claims under those statutes for 

2000, 2001, and 2004. 

A. Schuler’s 1999 and 2000 claims under the ADEA 

Schuler does not dispute that in 2004 the district court 

correctly dismissed as untimely his ADEA claims for 1999 

and 2000. Schuler maintains, however, that the Lilly 

Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 (LLA), Pub. L. No. 111-2, 

123 Stat. 5, which applies by its terms to claims of 

“discrimination in compensation” pending on or after May 

28, 2007, § 6, 123 Stat. at 7, made his claims timely. Section 

4 of the LLA provides, in relevant part: 

[A]n unlawful practice occurs, with respect to 

discrimination in compensation in violation of 

[the ADEA], when a discriminatory 

compensation decision or other practice is 

adopted, when a person becomes subject to a 

discriminatory compensation decision or other 

practice, or when a person is affected by 

application of a discriminatory compensation 

decision or other practice .... 

USCA Case #08-7116 Document #1230109 Filed: 02/16/2010 Page 6 of 15
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Misquoting the statute, Schuler argues the decision not to 

promote him was an “‘other act’ ... intertwined with a 

discriminatory compensation decision” because as a result of 

that decision he received significantly less remuneration than 

he would have done as a partner. In support of this position 

he refers us to the decisions of two district courts interpreting 

the LLA, see Gentry v. Jackson State Univ., 610 F. Supp. 2d 

564, 566 (S.D. Miss. 2009); Rehman v. State Univ. of N.Y., 

596 F. Supp. 2d 643, 651 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), and to the failure 

of two proposed amendments, one to the 2009 bill that 

became the LLA and one to an identical bill proposed in 

2007, that would have deleted the phrase “other practice.” 

Schuler contends the failure of those amendments “makes 

clear that Congress did not intend to limit the [LLA] only to 

‘compensation decisions.’” 

For its part, PwC distinguishes between an employee’s 

claim he was paid less than another employee for doing 

similar work and Schuler’s claim that he should have been 

promoted to a higher paying position. The former is clearly 

discrimination in compensation and covered by the LLA; the 

latter, PwC argues, is not. 

There can be no dispute that in order to benefit from the 

LLA Schuler must bring a claim involving “discrimination in 

compensation” and point to a “discriminatory compensation 

decision or other practice.” The question is whether he did so 

by claiming PwC did not make him a partner because of his 

age. The answer is that he did neither. 

As PwC’s distinction implies, in employment law the 

phrase “discrimination in compensation” means paying 

different wages or providing different benefits to similarly 

situated employees, not promoting one employee but not 

another to a more remunerative position. See Anderson v. 

Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (plaintiff 

alleging “wage discrimination” under Title VII must show he 

was “performing work substantially equal to that of ... 

USCA Case #08-7116 Document #1230109 Filed: 02/16/2010 Page 7 of 15
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employees ... compensated at higher rates” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)); Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 

510, 522 (5th Cir. 2008) (prima facie case of “discrimination 

in compensation” under Title VII involves showing plaintiff 

“was paid less than a non-member [of the protected class] for 

work requiring substantially the same responsibility”); 

MacPherson v. Univ. of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 774 (11th 

Cir. 1991) (proof of “discrimination in compensation” under 

ADEA requires showing “similarly situated persons outside 

the protected age group received higher wages”). In contrast, 

a discriminatory failure to promote is actionable regardless 

whether it affects an employee’s compensation. See, e.g., 

MacKenzie v. City & County of Denver, 414 F.3d 1266, 

1277–78 (10th Cir. 2005) (prima facie case of “failure-topromote” under ADEA requires showing only that qualified 

plaintiff was rejected and “position was filled by someone 

outside the protected class”); Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 

514, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (prima facie case of “deni[al] [of] a 

promotion” under Title VII requires showing only that 

qualified plaintiff was rejected and “either someone not of his 

protected class filled the position or the position remained 

vacant and the employer continued to seek applicants”). In 

context, therefore, we do not understand “compensation 

decision or other practice” to refer to the decision to promote 

one employee but not another to a more remunerative 

position. 

Our interpretation of the LLA is fully consistent with the 

patent intent of the Congress to overrule the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 

U.S. 618 (2007), see § 2, 123 Stat. at 5. The plaintiff there 

claimed she was the victim of discrimination because, based 

upon allegedly discriminatory performance reviews, she “was 

being paid significantly less than any of her male colleagues,” 

550 U.S. at 622, and the Court repeatedly referred to her 

claim as one of “pay discrimination,” id. at 622–23, 638–42. 

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The Court held Ledbetter’s claim was untimely because she 

filed an administrative charge too long after the decisions 

about her compensation were made. Id. at 627. In the LLA 

the Congress characterized Ledbetter as having “significantly 

impair[ed] ... protections against discrimination in 

compensation” and “ignore[d] the reality of wage 

discrimination.” § 2, 123 Stat. at 5. That the Congress 

drafted and passed the LLA specifically in order to overturn 

Ledbetter strongly suggests the statute is directed at the 

specific type of discrimination involved in that case and not to 

other unspecified types of discrimination in employment. 

Nor does our interpretation of the phrase “discriminatory 

compensation decision or other practice” read “other 

practice” out of the statute. We need look no further than 

Ledbetter itself for an example of a discriminatory “other 

practice,” viz., giving an employee a poor performance 

evaluation based upon her sex (or any other unlawful 

criterion) and then using the evaluation to determine her rate 

of pay. See 550 U.S. at 622. 

For these reasons, we conclude the decision whether to 

promote an employee to a higher paying position is not a 

“compensation decision or other practice” within the meaning 

of that phrase in the LLA and Schuler’s failure-to-promote 

claim is not a claim of “discrimination in compensation.” 

The LLA therefore does not revive his claims under the 

ADEA.*

 

*

 In his Reply Brief (at 18–19) Schuler also argues his 2000 ADEA 

claim is timely because he can “piggyback” upon Murphy’s timely 

administrative charge filed in 2001. In his opening brief, however, 

Schuler refers to piggybacking only in a footnote, App. Br. 54 n.17, 

in which he makes no affirmative argument that he should be 

allowed to piggyback, contending only the reasons the district court 

gave for denying piggybacking were wrong. Because he first 

makes his affirmative argument in his reply brief, we do not 

consider it. See, e.g., Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of State, 

USCA Case #08-7116 Document #1230109 Filed: 02/16/2010 Page 9 of 15
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B. Other Claims under the ADEA and the DCHRA 

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment on Schuler’s 2001 and on Murphy’s 2000, 2001, 

and 2004 claims under the ADEA and DCHRA. See 

Venetian Casino Resort, LLC v. EEOC, 530 F.3d 925, 929 

(2008). In order to prevail at summary judgment, the plaintiff 

in an ADEA case must show that a reasonable jury could find 

his age was the “but-for” cause of the employment action he 

challenges. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 

2343, 2352 (2009); see also Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 

1191, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (plaintiff must “produce[] 

evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find” nondiscriminatory reason offered by employer was “not the 

actual reason” for challenged action and “employer 

intentionally discriminated against [plaintiff] based on his ... 

age” (internal quotation marks omitted)) (citing Brady v. 

Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 495 (D.C. Cir. 

2008)). 

The courts of the District of Columbia “look[] to federal 

court decisions interpreting the [ADEA] when evaluating age 

discrimination claims under the DCHRA.” Washington 

Convention Ctr. Auth. v. Johnson, 953 A.2d 1064, 1073 n.7 

(D.C. 2008). Under current D.C. precedent, which predates 

the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gross, a claimant 

under the DCHRA, if he is to survive summary judgment, 

must show a reasonable jury could find his age “had a 

determinative influence on the” challenged employment 

 

257 F.3d 828, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“we have repeatedly held that 

an argument first made in a reply brief ordinarily comes too late for 

our consideration”); see also United States v. Whren, 111 F.3d 956, 

958 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“absent extraordinary circumstances ... we do 

not entertain an argument raised for the first time in ... a footnote”).

USCA Case #08-7116 Document #1230109 Filed: 02/16/2010 Page 10 of 15
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action. Id. at 1073 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 

Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Hamilton v. Howard Univ., 960 A.2d 308, 

314 (D.C. 2008) (stating issue as whether age “actually 

motivated the employer’s decision”). We need not determine 

whether D.C. case law prescribes a meaningfully different 

standard from the one in Gross because, based upon the 

evidence in this case, no reasonable jury could believe either 

appellant’s age “had a determinative influence” upon PwC’s 

failure to promote him or was the “but-for” cause of that 

decision.

As for Schuler, PwC maintains it did not make him a 

partner in 2001 because there was no business case for doing 

so. The record shows business conditions had deteriorated: In 

2000 and in 2001 the RAS nominated no one for partner, and 

Schuler himself acknowledged there was “slow economic 

activity and not a lot ... of regulatory action” in “2000-2001.” 

Schuler presents no evidence rebutting that explanation. He 

points to a statement made by the head of the RAS in 

September 1999 when proposing him for partnership — the 

“RAS is booming and I need full time partners” — but it is 

anachronistic and therefore unavailing. 

Murphy likewise fails to provide any basis upon which a 

reasonable jury could disbelieve PwC’s primary explanation 

for not making him a partner, viz., that employees were rated 

on a scale of “1” to “4,” with “1” being the highest; the RAS 

proposed for partnership only employees with performance 

ratings of “1” in each of the three prior years; and Murphy 

was not promoted because he did not meet that requirement. 

The record documents the existence and exercise of such a 

policy: Every candidate the RAS proposed for partner in the 

years for which there are data in the record (1999 through 

2004) had a performance rating of “1” in each of the three 

years before he was proposed, see Murphy v. 

PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLC, 580 F. Supp. 2d 4, 13 n.15 

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(D.D.C. 2008) (noting this fact), and Murphy did not have 

three years of “1”s immediately before any year in which he 

claims he should have been made a partner — 2000, 2001, or 

2004. Murphy does not contest these facts. 

Murphy does, however, maintain a reasonable jury could 

find he received relatively low performance ratings only 

because those rating him believed that, in view of his age, 

PwC would never make him a partner. As evidence of a 

general policy not to make older employees partners, Murphy 

points to the provision for mandatory retirement in the 

partnership agreement, to the modest number of employees 

who were made partner after turning 50 (between 1998 and 

2005 only 61 (3.6%) of new partners were 50 or older; six 

(0.4%) were aged 55-59), and to comments three PwC 

executives made about the value of bringing in younger 

partners. No reasonable jury, however, could conclude from 

this general evidence that Murphy’s ratings in particular were 

the result of his age and not of his performance; the record 

shows in the RAS alone at least two other employees over the 

age of 50 each received ratings of “1” in multiple years. 

Indeed, his co-plaintiff Schuler had received ratings of “1” for 

each of the three years prior to his 1998 nomination for 

partner, when he was 54.*

 

Finally Murphy asks us to provide “guidance” as to 

whether the provision in the partnership agreement making 

retirement mandatory at age 60 or 62 violates the ADEA 

because, he says, the issue “is likely to rise [sic] again in this 

litigation.” He contends most partners at PwC are more like 

employees than owners of the firm and are therefore entitled 

to the protection of the statute, which prohibits any mandatory 

retirement age for employees over 40. See 29 U.S.C. § 

623(a)(2) (unlawful to “limit” an employee in “any way 

*

 The appellants make other arguments, but they do not warrant 

treatment in a published opinion. 

USCA Case #08-7116 Document #1230109 Filed: 02/16/2010 Page 12 of 15
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which would deprive [him] of employment opportunities” or 

“adversely affect his status as an employee because of [his] 

age”); see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., PC v. 

Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2003) (employees, but not 

owners, of firm protected by antidiscrimination laws). 

Be that as it may, the district court correctly observed, in 

declining to pass upon the issue, that nothing in the present 

case turns upon it. See Murphy, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 16 n.22. 

Murphy seems to suggest the legality of the retirement 

provision affects whether he should prevail here, but it does 

not: Even if the partnership agreement violated the ADEA, 

that violation would have no bearing upon whether a 

reasonable jury could disbelieve PwC’s explanation for not 

making Murphy a partner. Because a federal court does not 

have jurisdiction to issue an advisory opinion, see, e.g., Flast 

v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (“no justiciable controversy 

is presented ... when the parties are asking for an advisory 

opinion”), we must decline Murphy’s request to consider the 

issue. 

C. Claims under the NYHRL 

The district court dismissed all counts under the NYHRL 

for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 

Murphy v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 357 F. Supp. 2d 

230, 244 (2004). Reviewing the issue de novo, Covad 

Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 670–71 (D.C. 

Cir. 2005), we conclude the district court erred. 

The district court reasoned that in order to assert a claim 

under the NYHRL a non-New-York resident such as Schuler 

or Murphy “must allege that the actual impact of the 

discriminatory act was felt in New York,” Murphy, 357 F. 

Supp. 2d at 244, which the appellants have not done. In an 

intervening decision in a related case we held it is enough that 

a discriminatory act occurred in New York. Schuler v. 

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PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 514 F.3d 1365, 1378 (2008). 

Thereafter the district court declined to reinstate the 

appellants’ claims because it found “no evidence ... an act of 

discrimination occurred in New York.” Murphy v. 

PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 580 F. Supp. 2d 16, 22 n.17 

(2008). 

The relevant question is whether the appellants’ 

complaint alleges facts that, if true, would establish a 

violation of the NYHRL. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The 

appellants allege PwC did not promote them because it has a 

policy of promoting only younger employees. Both that 

policy and a decision pursuant thereto, if adopted in New 

York, would violate § 296 of the NYHRL. 

In Schuler we held that, in view of his “assertion that the 

company is headquartered in New York,” Schuler was 

entitled to the “reasonable inference” the alleged policy was 

adopted in New York. 514 F.3d at 1377. Based upon our 

reasoning in that case the appellants argue they are entitled to 

the reasonable inference the discrimination alleged in this 

case occurred in New York.* PwC says Schuler “does not 

control” because it addressed only PwC’s adoption and 

maintenance of a discriminatory policy, not the “discrete 

decision[] not to admit [Schuler] to partnership.” To which 

we say: Pettifoggery and piffle! 

Because the appellants in this case allege PwC is 

headquartered in New York, Compl. ¶ 4, both appellants are 

entitled to the reasonable inference the decisions not to 

promote them occurred in New York. The district court’s 

rationale for dismissing the claims under the NYHRL both as 

to Schuler and as to Murphy was therefore incorrect. 

*

 Although the appellants’ briefs focus in this respect upon Schuler, 

their opening brief makes clear both “[p]laintiffs ... appeal ... the 

district court’s order ... dismissing their claims under the 

[NYHRL],” and our analysis is equally applicable to both. 

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III. Conclusion 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court with respect to all claims brought under the 

ADEA or the DCHRA. We reverse the judgment of the 

district court with respect to the claims brought under the 

NYHRL, which claims we remand to the district court for 

further proceedings. 

We recognize our decision leaves only state-law claims 

pending in the district court. “Even if only state-law claims 

remain[] after resolution of the federal question,” however, a 

district court has “discretion ... to retain jurisdiction.” Osborn 

v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 245 (2007). And “once it has 

invested time and resources” in a case, “[c]onsiderations of 

judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants ... 

make it reasonable and proper for a federal court to proceed 

to final judgment” upon the state-law claims. Id. (internal 

citation and quotation marks omitted). 

So ordered. 

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