Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-01023/USCOURTS-caDC-06-01023-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Aerospace Industries Association
Amicus Curiae
Air Transport Association of America
Amicus Curiae for Respondent
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent
National Association of Clean Air Agencies
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 15, 2007 Decided June 1, 2007

No. 06-1023

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CLEAN AIR AGENCIES,

PETITIONER

V.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of a Final Action of the

Environmental Protection Agency

Emma E. Garrison argued the cause for petitioner. With

her on the briefs was Hope M. Babcock.

Steven E. Rusak, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief

were John C. Cruden, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and

Michael W. Thrift, Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency.

David A. Berg, Mac S. Dunaway, and Thomas Richichi were

on the brief for amici curiae Air Transport Association of

America, Inc. and Aerospace Industries Association in support

of respondent.

USCA Case #06-1023 Document #1044015 Filed: 06/01/2007 Page 1 of 17
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Before: GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

Edwards.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: The Environmental

Protection Agency (“EPA”) issued a final rule increasing the

stringency of the oxides of nitrogen (“NOx”) emission standards

applicable to newly certified commercial aircraft gas turbine

engines under § 231 of the Clean Air Act (“CAA” or “Act”), 42

U.S.C. § 7571. See Control of Air Pollution From Aircraft and

Aircraft Engines; Emission Standards and Test Procedures, 70

Fed. Reg. 69,664 (Nov. 17, 2005) (“Final Rule”). Arguing that

the Final Rule did not go far enough, the National Association

of Clean Air Agencies (“NACAA”), a national trade association

that represents state and local governmental agencies

responsible for achieving and sustaining clean air, petitions for

review. Specifically, NACAA argues that EPA’s interpretation

of the Act – that § 231 does not require the agency to

subordinate all other concerns to emissions reduction and reach

a “technology-forcing” result – constitutes an impermissible

construction of the Act. Petitioner also argues that the Final

Rule is arbitrary and capricious because it relies upon an

insufficient time rationale, fails to establish a firm timeline for

tightening standards in the future, considers safety concerns with

little explanation, and departs from EPA’s practice of setting

production cut-off dates. EPA defends the Final Rule and

argues that NACAA lacks standing to challenge it. 

Although we conclude that NACAA has standing, we find

no merit in the petition for review. We hold that EPA’s

interpretation of § 231 is not manifestly contrary to the CAA

and that the agency did not otherwise act arbitrarily and

capriciously in promulgating the Final Rule. Most of the

arbitrary and capricious claims raised by NACAA are not

properly before the court, because they were never raised with

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EPA. NACAA’s preserved claim that the Final Rule departs

from EPA’s practice of setting production cut-off dates lacks

merit because the Final Rule provides a reasoned explanation for

the agency’s change in course. Because we find that none of

NACAA’s claims are meritorious, we deny the petition for

review in all respects. 

I. BACKGROUND

The Clean Air Act establishes “a joint state and federal

program for regulating the nation’s air quality.” Envtl. Def. v.

EPA, 467 F.3d 1329, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The CAA requires EPA to promulgate, review,

and revise National Ambient Air Quality Standards

(“NAAQS”), specifying maximum levels of certain air

pollutants in the ambient air. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409. “States, in

turn, are required to adopt State Implementation Plans (‘SIPs’)

that ‘provide[] for implementation, maintenance, and

enforcement of [NAAQS] . . . .’” Envtl. Def., 467 F.3d at 1331

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1)). “States that fail to comply

with th[is] requirement[] are subject to various sanctions . . . .”

Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir.

2001) (per curiam) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7509).

Section 231 of the CAA requires the Administrator of EPA

to study and investigate emissions of air pollutants from aircraft,

considering such emissions’ effect on air quality and the

“technological feasibility” of controlling them. 42 U.S.C.

§ 7571(a). The Administrator shall then, “from time to time,

issue proposed . . . standards applicable to the emission of any

air pollutant from . . . aircraft engines which in his judgment

causes, or contributes to, air pollution which may reasonably be

anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” Id.

§ 7571(a)(2)(A). After holding public hearings, the

Administrator must “issue such regulations with such

modifications as he deems appropriate.” Id. § 7571(a)(3).

Section 231 also authorizes the Administrator to revise such

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regulations “from time to time,” but mandates that he “not

change the . . . standards if such change would significantly

increase noise and adversely affect safety.” Id. § 7571(a)(2)(B),

(a)(3); see also id. § 7571(c) (establishing additional procedure

focused on aircraft safety). Furthermore, “[a]ny regulation

prescribed under [§ 231] . . . shall take effect after such period

as the Administrator finds necessary . . . to permit the

development and application of the requisite technology, giving

appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such

period.” Id. § 7571(b). This power to set standards resides in

EPA alone: “No State or political subdivision thereof may adopt

or attempt to enforce any standard respecting emissions of any

air pollutant from any aircraft or engine thereof unless such

standard is identical to [the federal] standard.” Id. § 7573.

EPA does not regulate on a blank slate. “[B]y virtue of

being a party to” the Chicago Convention on International Civil

Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, the

United States is a member of the United Nations International

Civil Aviation Organization (“ICAO”). Wardair Canada Inc. v.

Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1986). “As long as a

participating nation . . . adopts [domestic] aircraft emission

standards that are equal to or more stringent than ICAO’s

[environmental] standards,” aircraft belonging to that nation “are

permitted to travel through the airspace of other countries

without any restriction.” Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 69,667.

But any one of the approximately 190 contracting nations “can

ban use within its airspace of any aircraft that does not meet

ICAO standards.” Id. In 1981, ICAO first adopted standards

governing emissions of NOx, a precursor to the formation of

ozone and cause of acid rain, eutrophication, plant damage, and

visibility impairment. Id. at 69,667-68, 69,672-73. In 1993,

ICAO approved a proposal to tighten the 1981 ICAO standards

by 20%. See id. at 69,667. EPA altered its regulations to adopt

the 1993 ICAO standards in 1997. Id. ICAO approved an

additional 16% NOx reduction in 1999. Id.

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On September 30, 2003, approximately three months before

the 1999 ICAO standards were set to take effect, EPA published

a notice of proposed rulemaking declaring its intent to “adopt

standards equivalent to the [1999] NOx standards of [ICAO], and

thereby bring the United States emission standards into

alignment with the internationally adopted standards.” See

Control of Air Pollution From Aircraft and Aircraft Engines;

Emission Standards and Test Procedures, 68 Fed. Reg. 56,226,

56,226 (Sept. 30, 2003) (“NPRM”). After EPA held a public

hearing on the NPRM and after the close of the written comment

period, ICAO again lowered permissible NOx emissions, this

time by approximately 12%, and slated the new standards to

take effect after December 31, 2007. Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg.

at 69,677. The Final Rule, issued in November 2005, amends

EPA regulations to reflect the 1999 ICAO standards (a 16%

reduction from the previous EPA standards), not the more

stringent reduction approved by ICAO during the pendency of

the rulemaking. Id. at 69,667, 69,677. 

The Final Rule recognizes that the new standards “will not

impose any additional burden on manufacturers,” because “94

percent of all engine models currently in production already

meet the [1999 ICAO] standards.” Id. at 69,675. The Final

Rule also acknowledges ICAO’s 2005 standards and states that

“[m]ore stringent standards . . . will likely be necessary and

appropriate in the future.” Id. at 69,676-78. But it reasons that

“assess[ing] the costs (and emission benefits) of more stringent

standards” would have required additional time that EPA did not

then have “since [it had] already gone past the implementation

date of the [1999 ICAO] standards.” Id. at 69,675, 69,677-78.

The Final Rule ultimately justifies its adoption of the 1999

ICAO standards as “aimed at assuring that . . . progress is not

reversed in the future” and as part of an “ongoing phased

approach . . . to address[ing] emissions from aircraft engines.”

Id. at 69,675-77.

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In a similar vein, the Final Rule extends the 1999 ICAO

standards only to newly certified engine models, not to newly

manufactured engines of already certified models. Id. at 69,678.

Although the Final Rule recognizes that EPA has “historically

adopted production cut-offs for previous standards,” it

distinguishes the “unique case” of aircraft engine emissions. Id.

at 69,681. Because ICAO did not apply its 1999 standards to

newly manufactured engines of already certified models, id. at

69,678, the Final Rule reasons that “to apply [the 16%

reduction] to [those engines] (a production cut-off) could be

disruptive to the production planning of engine manufacturers,”

id. at 69,680-81. Moreover, “[to] develop a record that fully

analyzes the emissions benefits (if any) and the implementation

costs of [wider applicability]” would “unacceptably slow down

th[e] rulemaking.” Id. at 69,681. The Final Rule concludes:

“[I]n the interests of expediency and of bringing U.S. domestic

law into conformity with . . . obligations under the Chicago

Convention (albeit tardily), . . . the most appropriate course for

now . . . is to simply update [EPA] regulations to track [the 1999

ICAO standards] in terms of both stringency levels and scope of

applicability.” Id.

The Final Rule interprets § 231 of the CAA to authorize this

“ongoing phased approach”: 

EPA interprets its authority under section 231 to be

somewhat similar to those provisions that require us to

identify a reasonable balance of specified emissions

reduction, cost, safety, noise, and other factors. However,

we are not compelled under section 231 to obtain the

“greatest degree of emission reduction achievable” as per

[other provisions of the CAA], and so EPA does not

interpret the Act as requiring the agency to give subordinate

status to factors such as cost, safety, and noise in

determining what standards are reasonable for aircraft

engines. Rather, EPA has greater flexibility under section

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231 in determining what standard is most reasonable for

aircraft engines, and is not required to achieve a

“technology-forcing” result.

Id. at 69,676 (internal citation omitted). The Final Rule also

notes that “there is an added emphasis [in § 231] on the

consideration of safety. Therefore, it is reasonable for EPA to

give greater weight to considerations of safety in this context

than it might in balancing emissions reduction, cost, and energy

factors under other [CAA] provisions.” Id. (internal citations

omitted). EPA promulgated the Final Rule on November 17,

2005. 

On January 13, 2006, State and Territorial Air Pollution

Program Administrators and Association of Local Air Pollution

Control Officials filed a petition for review of the Final Rule.

The two organizations have since merged to form NACAA.

 II. ANALYSIS

A. Standing

At the outset, we must address EPA’s contention that

NACAA has failed to demonstrate standing to challenge the

Final Rule, and that this court thus lacks jurisdiction to entertain

the petition for review. See Byrd v. EPA, 174 F.3d 239, 243

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,

523 U.S. 83 (1998)). “Associations such as petitioner[] have

representational standing under Article III if (1) at least one of

their members has standing, (2) the interests the association

seeks to protect are germane to its purpose, and (3) neither the

claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation

of an individual member in the lawsuit.” Am. Library Ass’n v.

FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Since EPA does not

contest that NACAA satisfies “the germaneness [and]

individual-participation element[s] of [representational]

standing, and because ‘we [too] have [no] reason to believe’”

that NACAA fails to satisfy these “‘latter two requirements,’”

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Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1266 (D.C.

Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (quoting Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d

895, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2002)), we focus solely upon whether “at

least one of [NACAA’s] members has standing to sue in [its]

own right,” Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 5-6

(D.C. Cir. 2006).

“The ‘irreducible constitutional minimum of standing’ has

three elements: (1) injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3)

redressability.” GrassRoots Recycling Network, Inc. v. EPA,

429 F.3d 1109, 1111-12 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). Although

EPA makes a halfhearted attempt to contest the final two

elements, see Respondent’s Br. at 21 n.8, “[t]he only thing at

issue in this case is the injury-in-fact prong of Article III

standing, for causation and redressability are obvious if

petitioner[] can demonstrate injury,” Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC,

401 F.3d 489, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In order to demonstrate

injury, “petitioner[] must show that there is a substantial

probability that [EPA’s Final Rule] will harm the concrete and

particularized interests of at least one of [its] members.” Am.

Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 696 (internal quotation marks

omitted). 

Through references to the administrative record and an

affidavit submitted with its opening brief, NACAA adequately

demonstrates that, by failing to further tighten restrictions on

NOx, the Final Rule makes it more difficult for state air pollution

control agencies to establish SIPs. In other words, since the

federal NAAQS cap the total allowable NOx, when EPA allows

higher NOx emissions from aircraft engines, state agencies have

no choice but to impose greater restrictions on other sources of

NOx. And if NACAA’s member agencies fail to meet the

applicable standard, their states are exposed to federal sanctions.

EPA essentially concedes these facts, but disputes their

jurisdictional significance, arguing that since “the burden at

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most can be understood as affecting the mix of controls a State

may need to impose,” the Final Rule “does not require States

and local agencies to do anything as regulators that they were

not already directed to do.” Respondent’s Br. at 17-18. 

We have little difficulty concluding that NACAA has

satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing.

In West Virginia v. EPA, petitioners sought review of EPA rules

requiring various states to revise state implementation plans as

to NOx emissions and establishing emission limits for major

NOx sources. 362 F.3d 861, 865-67 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The

effect of the rules was to lower the states’ emission budgets.

(“Budgets” represent the amount of allowable NOx emissions.)

We found that “[t]he lower the emissions budget, the more

difficult and onerous is the states’ task of devising an adequate

SIP.” Id. at 868. We therefore held that the state petitioners in

that case had demonstrated injury where EPA lowered states’

total NOx emissions budgets, requiring states to revise their SIPs

to impose additional controls. Id. 

The standing issue in this case is controlled by our rationale

and judgment in West Virginia. Here, by allegedly raising (or

failing to lower) the emissions allocated to one source, the Final

Rule requires states to impose stricter controls on emissions

from other individual sources. In other words, the Final Rule

makes it “more difficult and onerous” for the states to “devis[e]

an adequate SIP.” Id. Because there is a substantial probability

that EPA’s action will harm the interests of NACAA’s state

agency members, NACAA has standing to challenge the Final

Rule and we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of the

petition. See also Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1454-

55 (2007) (stating that states are “entitled to special solicitude in

. . . standing analysis”).

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B. Standard of Review

Since EPA acted pursuant to delegated authority, we review

its interpretation of § 231 according to the principles enunciated

in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron instructs us to accord

agency interpretations of statutes they administer varying

degrees of deference. Under Chevron Step One, we always first

examine the statute de novo, “employing traditional tools of

statutory construction.” Id. at 843 n.9. “If the intent of

Congress is clear,” we accord the agency’s interpretation no

deference, “for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect

to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842-

43. But if Congress “has [not] directly spoken to the precise

question at issue,” id. at 842, we proceed to Chevron Step Two.

Under Step Two, “[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the

agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the

agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by

regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling

weight unless they are . . . manifestly contrary to the statute.”

Id. at 843-44. Where a “‘legislative delegation to an agency on

a particular question is implicit rather than explicit,’” INS v.

Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 445 n.29 (1987) (quoting

Chevron, 467 U.S. 844), we must uphold any “‘reasonable

interpretation made by the administrator’ of that agency,” Am.

Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 346, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844). 

Even where EPA’s construction satisfies Chevron, we still

must ensure that its action is not otherwise arbitrary and

capricious. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A); see also Bluewater

Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[R]eview

under the CAA’s ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is the same

as that required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A).”). The arbitrary and capricious standard is

“[h]ighly deferential,” and it “presumes the validity of agency

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action.” AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 349 F.3d 692, 698 (D.C. Cir.

2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). We must uphold an

agency’s action where it “has considered the relevant factors and

articulated a ‘rational connection between the facts found and

the choice made,’” Allied Local & Reg’l Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA,

215 F.3d 61, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs.

Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,

43 (1983)), and has not “relied on [improper] factors,” State

Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. “[T]he ultimate standard of review is a

narrow one. [We are] not empowered to substitute [our]

judgment for that of the agency.” Citizens to Pres. Overton

Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). And, “[w]e give

particular deference to . . . EPA when it acts under unwieldy and

science-driven statutory schemes like the Clean Air Act.”

Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 404, 410 (D.C. Cir. 2004)

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

C. Chevron Review

There can be no doubt that EPA acted pursuant to an

express delegation authority in adopting the disputed Final Rule.

An express delegation arises when “Congress has expressly

delegated to [an agency] the authority to prescribe regulations

containing such classifications, differentiations, or other

provisions as, in the judgment of the [agency], are necessary or

proper to effectuate the purposes of [the authorizing statute], to

prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate

compliance therewith.” Household Credit Servs., Inc. v.

Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 238-39, 242 (2004) (internal quotation

marks omitted). That is precisely what Congress has done in the

Clean Air Act in requiring the Administrator of EPA to study

and investigate emissions of air pollutants from aircraft and

adopt regulations to control them. The Act states that “[t]he

Administrator shall, from time to time, issue proposed . . .

standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from

. . . aircraft engines which in his judgment causes, or contributes

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to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to

endanger public health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C. § 7571(a)(2)(A).

After hearings, the Administrator is authorized to “issue such

regulations with such modifications as he deems appropriate.”

Id. § 7571(a)(3) (emphasis added). This delegation of authority

is both explicit and extraordinarily broad. See Atkins v. Rivera,

477 U.S. 154, 162 (1986) (finding an express delegation of

authority where “Congress conferred on the Secretary

exceptionally broad authority to prescribe standards for applying

certain sections of the Act”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, because Congress has “explicitly left a gap for the

agency to fill, the agency’s regulation is given controlling

weight unless [it is] . . . manifestly contrary to the statute.”

Household Credit Servs., 541 U.S. at 239 (internal quotation

marks omitted). 

NACAA argues that the Final Rule’s interpretation of § 231

to allow codification of current practices rather than requiring a

technology-forcing approach is inconsistent with CAA’s

“forward-looking language [and] . . . overall purpose and

legislative history” and “renders meaningless” § 231’s reference

to technology. Petitioner’s Br. at 17-23. Petitioner’s logic is

simple. Although the Final Rule tightens EPA regulations by

16%, almost all aircraft already satisfy this requirement by

virtue of their compliance with ICAO standards. Since § 231 is

intended to promote the “public health [and] welfare,” see 42

U.S.C. § 7571(a)(2)(A), not to “establish[] consistency with

international standards,” EPA must require use of new

technology to effect even greater emissions reduction.

Petitioner’s Br. at 21. Following this logic, NACAA argues that

“EPA’s determination that safety considerations were as

important as the overall goal of promoting public health and

welfare is inconsistent with the Act and an unreasonable

interpretation of section 231.” Id. at 26. And NACAA contends

that § 231 only permits EPA to consider compliance costs where

the standard ultimately issued would require development of

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new technology. Id. at 30-31. In other words, NACAA reads

§ 231 to focus primarily upon emissions reduction and to give

all other concerns – including international standards, safety

concerns, and compliance costs – a subsidiary role. The bottom

line, according to NACAA, is that the Final Rule impermissibly

interprets § 231 to permit EPA to promulgate a rule that will not

actually effect an emissions reduction.

The Final Rule announces a different view of the statutory

scheme. It first notes that other provisions of the CAA require

EPA to obtain the “greatest degree of emission reduction

achievable.” See Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 69,676 (quoting 42

U.S.C. § 7547(a)(3)). But § 231 does not contain such language.

Thus, the Final Rule reasons, EPA “is not required to achieve a

‘technology-forcing’ result” in the aircraft engine emissions

context. Id. Nor does the Final Rule “interpret the Act as

requiring the agency to give subordinate status to factors such as

cost, safety, and noise.” Id. Rather, it concludes that EPA “has

greater flexibility under section 231 in determining what

standard[s are] most reasonable for aircraft engines.” Id. The

Final Rule also notes that “there is an added emphasis [in § 231]

on the consideration of safety. Therefore, it is reasonable for

EPA to give greater weight to considerations of safety in this

context than it might in balancing emissions reduction, cost, and

energy factors under other [CAA] provisions.” Id. (internal

citations omitted). 

“[W]e need not find that [this interpretation] is the only

permissible construction that EPA might have adopted but only

that EPA’s understanding of this very complex statute is” not

manifestly contrary to the CAA. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985) (internal

quotation marks omitted). When Congress enacted § 231

providing that the Administrator could, “from time to time,” act

“in his judgment,” as “he deems appropriate,” it conferred broad

discretion to the Administrator to weigh various factors in

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arriving at appropriate standards. Moreover, to the extent that

§ 231 requires rules promulgated thereunder to tighten emission

standards, the Final Rule in fact does so by 16%. NACAA’s

argument that § 231 additionally requires a technology-forcing

result and prohibits consideration of such factors as safety and

compliance costs is a familiar one. In George E. Warren Corp.

v. EPA, the petitioners argued that “the maintenance or

improvement of air quality is the sole focus of the anti-dumping

provision [of the CAA].” 159 F.3d 616, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

Finding nothing in “the text or structure of the statute to indicate

that the Congress intended to preclude the EPA from

considering [factors other than air quality],” we refused “to infer

from congressional silence an intention to preclude the agency

from considering factors other than those listed in a statute.” Id.

at 623-24; see also Allied Local, 215 F.3d at 78; George E.

Warren Corp., 159 F.3d at 623-24 (“‘In the absence of clear

congressional direction to the contrary, we will not deprive the

agency of the power to fine-tune its regulations to accommodate

worthy nonsafety interests’ under a statute focused upon safety.”

(quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 735 F.2d 1525,

1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984))). 

Congress has delegated expansive authority to EPA to enact

appropriate regulations applicable to the emission of air

pollutants from aircraft engines. Because we find that the Final

Rule is not “manifestly contrary to the statute,” it must be given

controlling weight. We therefore defer to EPA’s construction of

§ 231. 

D. Arbitrary and Capricious Review

NACAA also contends that the Final Rule is arbitrary and

capricious under four different theories. However, “[i]t is a hard

and fast rule of administrative law, rooted in simple fairness,

that issues not raised before an agency are waived and will not

be considered by a court on review.” Nuclear Energy Inst., 373

F.3d at 1297-98 (citing United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines,

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Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952)). Indeed, the CAA specifically

provides that “only an objection to a rule or procedure which

was raised with reasonable specificity during the period for

public comment . . . may be raised during judicial review.” 42

U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B). Objections must be prominent and

clear enough to place the agency “on notice,” for EPA is not

required “to cull through all the letters it receives and answer all

of the possible implied arguments.” Mossville Envtl. Action

Now v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1232, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Petitioners

who fail to comply with this exhaustion requirement are barred

from seeking judicial review. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist.

v. EPA, 472 F.3d 882, 891 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Under this

standard, NACAA has forfeited three of its arguments by failing

to raise them “with reasonable specificity” in the proceedings

before EPA. 

Petitioner first claims that the Final Rule relies upon an

improper factor when it cites insufficient time as the primary

justification for not issuing more stringent standards. NACAA’s

argument is clear: since EPA “had complete discretion over the

timing of the rule” and thus caused the delay itself, it is barred

from relying upon shortage of time to support the Final Rule’s

limited stringency. Petitioner’s Br. at 23-24. Not only did

petitioner not raise this argument before EPA, it acknowledged

the opposite. Before EPA, the organizations that later joined to

form NACAA stated: 

[We] are disappointed that EPA waited as long as it did to

align U.S. aircraft standards with those of the international

community. . . . However, given the inexplicable delay,

EPA is now accurate to assert, as it does in this untimely

proposal, that “at this time, there is not sufficient lead time

to require more stringent emission standards . . . .”

Nonetheless, our associations firmly believe that EPA has

an obligation to immediately follow this rulemaking with

further, more aggressive regulatory action . . . . 

USCA Case #06-1023 Document #1044015 Filed: 06/01/2007 Page 15 of 17
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Comments of STAPPA/ALAPCO, 12/15/03, reprinted in Joint

Appendix (“J.A.”) 247, 249. NACAA understood that, in

aligning U.S. aircraft standards with those of the 1999 ICAO

standards, EPA did not have sufficient lead time to require more

stringent emission standards. NACAA voiced its

disappointment, but it did not claim that EPA was tardy in

considering further regulatory action. Rather, petitioner merely

asked that EPA “follow this rulemaking with further, more

aggressive regulatory action.” Because NACAA did not raise a

claim for unreasonable delay with the agency, see generally

Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 794-97 (D.C. Cir. 1987),

the challenge is not properly before the court. 

NACAA is also foreclosed from raising a claim that the

Final Rule is arbitrary and capricious because “EPA issued the

rule as ‘a near-term approach’ without firmly committing to

future action.” Petitioner’s Br. at 31. The Final Rule states,

“EPA intends to address more stringent emission standards

requiring more lead time in a future rulemaking.” 70 Fed. Reg.

69,674. Before EPA, NACAA did not object to this course of

action and did not argue that EPA must actually schedule a

future rulemaking in the Final Rule. NACAA only asked EPA

to “follow this rulemaking with further, more aggressive

regulatory action.” Comments of STAPPA/ALAPCO, reprinted

in J.A. 249. Accordingly, we will not consider this argument on

the merits. 

Finally, NACAA contends both that safety is an improper

factor under § 231 and that “EPA never explained why safety

considerations prevented it from issuing . . . standard[s] that

would require the development and application of technology.”

Petitioner’s Br. at 27. This argument was also forfeited.

NACAA concedes that it did not object before the agency, but

argues that this failure should be excused, because EPA’s notice

of proposed rulemaking did not mention safety concerns. But

even where “the ground for [an] objection arose after the period

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for public comment, . . . the petitioner must first seek a

proceeding for reconsideration. Only then may petitioner seek

judicial review.” Appalachian Power Co., 249 F.3d at 1055

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The fourth claim raised by NACAA – that EPA does not

adequately explain its refusal to extend the 16% reduction to

newly manufactured engines of already certified models – is

properly before the court on the merits. Although this claim was

properly preserved, it lacks merit. The Final Rule acknowledges

that EPA has “historically adopted production cut-offs,” but it

then distinguishes this “unique case.” 70 Fed. Reg. at 69,681.

The Final Rule explains that since ICAO did not apply its 1999

standards to newly manufactured engines, application of those

standards “could be disruptive to the production planning of

engine manufacturers,” id. at 69,678, 69,680-81, and would

require analysis of “the emissions benefits (if any) and the

implementation costs of [wider applicability],” id. at 69,681.

Because EPA did not have time to investigate these possible

compliance costs, the agency elected not to impose a production

cut-off date. It is settled law that an agency may change its past

practices, especially under changed circumstances, so long as it

provides a reasoned explanation for its action. See Williams Gas

Processing-Gulf Coast Co. v. FERC, 475 F.3d 319, 326 (D.C.

Cir. 2006). Since we have already rejected NACAA’s only

retort – that cost compliance is an improper factor – we

conclude that the Final Rule’s deviation from past practice is

supported by reasoned decisionmaking warranting our

deference.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition for review is

hereby denied.

So ordered.

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