Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-02981/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-02981-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arthur LaMarque
Respondent
Kevin Hosea Thomas
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN HOSEA THOMAS,

Petitioner,

 v

ARTHUR LAMARQUE,

Respondent.

 /

No C-02-2981 VRW

 ORDER

On March 16, 2005, the court issued an order denying the

petition for writ of habeas corpus herein. Doc # 24. On March 18,

2005, the clerk of the court entered judgment in favor of respondent

Arthur Lamarque and against petitioner Kevin Hosea Thomas. Doc #

25. Petitioner did not file a timely request for a certificate of

appealability, nor did he file a timely notice of appeal. On

September 9, 2005, petitioner filed a motion seeking leave to file

an appeal, Doc # 26, to which the state filed a response. Doc # 27.

For the reasons stated herein, the court now DENIES the motion. 

\\
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The declaration of petitioner’s attorney Frank Prantil

states that he has never received notice of entry of judgment in

this electronic filing case. He further states that “the only

explanation that I have is that during the months of February and

March 2005, record rainfall was recorded in the Sierras where I live

and work from my home” and that his telephone line was not

functioning at times and the telephone company was “very slow” to

repair it. Doc # 24. Petitioner correctly cites Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) as the governing rule:

The district court may reopen the time to file an

appeal for a period of 14 days after the date when

its order to reopen is entered, but only if all the

following conditions are satisfied:

(A) the motion is filed within 180 days after the

judgment or order is entered or within 7 days after

the moving party receives notice of the entry,

whichever is earlier; 

(B) the court finds that the moving party was

entitled to notice of the entry of the judgment or

order sought to be appealed but did not receive the

notice from the district court or any party within

21 days after entry; and

(C) the court finds that no party would be

prejudiced. 

In responding to petitioner’s motion, the Attorney

General’s office has brought additional facts to the court’s

attention: (1) the assigned deputy attorney general received

electronic notice of the March 18, 2005 judgment on or about that

date and had no difficulty accessing and printing out the judgment,

Declaration of Juliet Haley (Doc # 32) at 1; (2) on or about July

18, 2005, she received service of a petition for writ of mandamus

petitioner had filed in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals seeking

an order directing this court to act on petitioner’s habeas
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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petition, id at 2; (3) on or about August 20, 2005, she received

service of petitioner’s motion for leave to amend filed in the Ninth

Circuit which contained the statement that this court “may have

entered a judgment denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus,”

id; and (4) on October 14, 2005, she received an order from the

Ninth Circuit granting petitioner’s motion for leave to amend and

denying both his petition and amended petition for writ of mandamus. 

Id. The Attorney General has filed with the court the documents

from the court of appeals docket (No 05-74326). Id, Ex 1, 2, 3. 

The state acknowledges that it would suffer no “special prejudice”

were the court to grant petitioner’s motion. Doc # 31 at 2. 

Petitioner’s amended petition to the Ninth Circuit

contains the following paragraph: 

It has come to the attention of Thomas that the

district court may have entered a judgment denying his

petition for habeas corpus. Thomas, nor his attorney

were not served the judgment. Therefore, Thomas moves

the court to amend the prayer to include an order to

the district court to reserve [sic] counsel the

judgment, by serving a hard copy of the judgment, and

further giving Thomas the right to file a notice of

appeal and motion for a certificate of appealability

with the district court within 30 days of service upon

counsel of the judgment.

Doc #32-3 at 2. 

The time limits prescribed in Rule 4(a) are

jurisdictional; district courts have no authority to extend them. 

Vahan v Shalala, 30 F3d 102 (9th Cir 1994). Even when a movant has

met the requirements of Rule 4(a)(6), moreover, the rule’s use of

the verb “may” authorizes district courts to grant or deny the

motion; district courts retain some discretion over the disposition

of the matter. See Nunley v City of Los Angeles, 52 F3d 792, 797-98

(9th Cir 1995). The merits of the underlying appeal, however, are
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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“not a permissible consideration” in ruling on a motion under Rule

4(a)(6). Arai v Leff, 316 F3d 1066 (9th Cir 2003). 

 For purposes of the instant motion, the court accepts as

true petitioner’s counsel’s representation that he did not receive

the e-mail notifications of the docketing of the order denying the

petition and of the judgment in favor of the respondent. The court

rejects, however, for reasons stated below, petitioner’s abovequoted assertion that he was “not served the judgment.” The court

also accepts as true that respondent will not be prejudiced if the

motion is granted. Parts B and C of the rule are therefore

satisfied. It appears, however, that petitioner failed to satisfy

part A of the rule. 

The moving party must seek relief under the rule by the

earlier of: (1) 180 days after entry of judgment or (2) seven days

after the moving party receives notice of the entry. Petitioner’s

motion was filed within 180 days after entry of judgment, but his

filings in the court of appeals make clear that he “received notice”

of the entry of judgment well before the expiration of the 180-day

period; the more stringent seven-day limitations period therefore

applied. 

The unmistakable import of petitioner’s August 19 filing

in the court of appeals is that he had somehow learned of this

court’s entry of judgment against him, though his papers do not

expressly admit this. Lacking any evidence of the precise date upon

which petitioner learned of the entry of judgment, the court gives

him the benefit of the rather implausible assumption that he learned

of the entry of judgment on the same day he filed his motion in the

court of appeals – August 19. 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Computing the seven-day period as provided in FRAP Rule 26

(governing the computation of time periods, which excludes weekends

and holidays for time periods of less than eleven days), the last

day petitioner could have filed his motion under Rule 4(a)(6) was

August 30, 2005. Although counsel’s papers are dated August 29,

2005, they were not filed with this court until Monday, September 5,

2005, nearly one week after the seven-day period had elapsed. Under

the law of this circuit, petitioner’s motion is untimely and this

court lacks jurisdiction to extend the time period or otherwise

consider the motion. Vahan v Shalala, 30 F3d 102, 103. 

Although petitioner does not contend in his moving papers

that electronic service of the March 2005 order and judgment by this

court was invalid, his amended petition before the Ninth Circuit

seems to do so, judging from the language already quoted and on the

following statement: “Thomas also suggests that the Court consider

and enter an appropriate order to the Northern District, to modify

its electronic filing system so that counsel may opt out, and

receive hard copies of any order entered by that court.” Doc #32-3,

at 2. The court infers from this statement that petitioner’s

counsel blames his failure to learn of the entry of judgment against

petitioner on this court’s electronic filing system. 

When petitioner’s attorney registered for electronic

filing with this court, he did so using a form that contained the

following wording: 

BY SIGNING AND SUBMITTING TO THE COURT A REQUEST FOR

AN ECF USER ID AND PASSWORD, YOU CONSENT TO ENTRY OF

YOUR E-MAIL ADDRESS INTO THE COURT’S ELECTRONIC

SERVICE REGISTRY FOR ELECTRONIC SERVICE ON YOU OF ALL

E-FILED PAPERS, PURSUANT TO RULES 77 and 5(b)(2)(D)

(eff. 12.1.01) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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General Order 45, which authorized the implementation of electronic

filing in this court, moreover contains important cautionary

language of which all attorneys practicing before the court are

presumed to be aware: “In addition to receiving e-mail

notifications of filing activity, the parties are strongly

encouraged to check the docket in their case on the electronic

filing system at regular intervals. A PACER account will be

necessary to check the electronic docket.” GO 45, IX.A. General

Order 45 also states that service of the court’s orders in

electronic filing cases will be only by e-mail and that “no paper

service will be made by the court.” GO 45, IX.D. Petitioner’s

counsel, furthermore, is the attorney of record in other electronic

filing cases before this court. 

Knowing that he had electronic filing cases pending in

this court, it was incumbent on petitioner’s counsel to monitor the

dockets regularly using a combination of the following means: (1)

checking his registered e-mail account on his own home or office

computer; (2) checking his registered e-mail account on any other

computer, such as a public library computer; (3) using the PACER

system on the internet; (4) calling the office of the clerk of the

court. Given that FRAP Rule 4(a)(1) gives a party thirty days from

entry of judgment to file a notice of appeal, it does not seem

unreasonable to expect an attorney awaiting an order or judgment

from the court to check the case docket at least once a month, even

if he were experiencing problems with a telephone line. It is

particularly surprising that petitioner’s counsel prepared and filed

papers seeking a writ of mandamus based on this court’s presumed

inaction without first taking the simple step of checking the
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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docket. The consequences of counsel’s failure to monitor the

court’s docket need no further elaboration, and the court has no

discretion to relieve his client of them. 

For the reasons stated herein, petitioner’s motion is

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge