Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00614/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00614-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mary Lattimore
Respondent
Deena Velasquez
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEENA VELASQUEZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

v. )

)

WARDEN MARY LATTIMORE, ) 

 )

Respondent. )

)

 )

1:10-cv—00614-SKO-HC

ORDER DISCHARGING THE ORDER TO

SHOW CAUSE (Doc. 7)

ORDER DISMISSING THE PETITION

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR

PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO EXHAUST

STATE REMEDIES (Doc. 1)

ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE A

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO

CLOSE THE ACTION

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), Petitioner has consented to

the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge to conduct

all further proceedings in the case, including the entry of final

judgment, by manifesting consent in a signed writing filed by

Petitioner on April 19, 2010. 

Pending before the Court are 1) the petition, which was

filed in this Court on April 8, 2010, and 2) Petitioner’s

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response, filed on July 16, 2010, to the Court’s order to

Petitioner to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed

for failure to exhaust state remedies. 

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The petition concerns the denial of Petitioner’s parole on

January 27, 2009. (Pet. 9.) 

I. Screening the Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United

States District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make

a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly

appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court....”

Habeas Rule 4; O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir.

1990); see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.

1990). Habeas Rule 2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all

grounds of relief available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts

supporting each ground; and 3) state the relief requested. 

Notice pleading is not sufficient; rather, the petition must

state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional

error. Rule 4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption;

O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d at 420 (quoting Blackledge v.

Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n. 7 (1977)). Allegations in a petition

that are vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible are subject to

summary dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th

Cir. 1990).

Further, the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas

In view of Petitioner’s response to the order to show cause, the order

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will be discharged.

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corpus either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to

the respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the

petition has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule

8, 1976 Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43

(9th Cir. 2001).

II. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to challenge

collaterally a conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus

must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and

gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the

state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,

518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir.

1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by

providing the highest state court with the necessary jurisdiction

a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before

presenting it to the federal court, and demonstrating that no

state remedy remains available. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,

275-76 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir.

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court

was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the

petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's

factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365

(1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9-10

(1992), superceded by statute as stated in Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362 (2000) (factual basis). 

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Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the

state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Hiivala

v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood,

133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United

States Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275...(1971),

we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that

petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the

state courts in order to give the State the

"'opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged

violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some

internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are

to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be

alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting

claims under the United States Constitution. If a

habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary

ruling at a state court trial denied him the due

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,

he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state

court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule

further in Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir.

2000), as amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th

Cir. 2001), stating: 

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly

presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims

in state court unless he specifically indicated to

that court that those claims were based on federal law.

See, Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir.

2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan,

this court has held that the petitioner must make the

federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing

federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding,

189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7... (1982)), or the underlying

claim would be decided under state law on the same

considerations that would control resolution of the claim

on federal grounds, see, e.g., Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon,

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88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Crotts, 73 F.3d 

at 865.

...

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert

the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a

federal one without regard to how similar the state and

federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how

obvious the violation of federal law is.

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as

amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir.

2001). 

Where none of a petitioner’s claims has been presented to

the highest state court as required by the exhaustion doctrine,

the Court must dismiss the petition. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478,

481 (9th Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to hold a mixed

petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims

has not been extended to petitions that contain no exhausted

claims. Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

In the petition, Petitioner alleges that she sought a writ

of habeas corpus in the state Superior Court, which was denied on

November 6, 2009. (Pet. 6.) Further, attached to the petition

is an order denying a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. (Pet.

156.) However, Petitioner does not describe any proceedings in

the California Supreme Court in which she exhausted her claims.

In response to the Court’s order to show cause, Petitioner

explains that she intended to file the petition in the Supreme

Court of California. Petitioner points to the caption of the

court on the petition as well as to indicia in other supporting

documents that tend to show that, as Petitioner claims, she

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mistakenly filed her petition in this Court instead of in the

California Supreme Court. (Resp. (doc. 8) 1.) Petitioner also

asks that she be allowed to proceed to exhaust her administrative

remedies. 

Petitioner thus admits that she did not exhaust her state

court remedies. 

The Court concludes that in view of Petitioner’s admission

that she has not exhausted her claims in the state courts, the

petition is unexhausted and must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(1).

With respect to Petitioner's request that she be allowed to

proceed to exhaust her administrative remedies, the Court

understands this as a statement of intention to proceed in the

state courts, and not as a request for a stay of the present

proceedings.2

III. Declining to Issue a Certificate of Appealabiity 

Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals

from the final order in a habeas proceeding in which the

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a state

court. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537

U.S. 322, 336 (2003). A certificate of appealability may issue

only if the applicant makes a substantial showing of the denial

of a constitutional right. § 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, a

Because the petition contains no exhausted claim and only unexhausted

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claims, a stay pursuant to either Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005) or

Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9 Cir. 2003) is not considered. Rasberry v.

th

Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133,

1134-35 (9 Cir. 2009).

th

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petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could debate whether

the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or

that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement

to proceed further. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 336

(quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). A

certificate should issue if the Petitioner shows that jurists of

reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a

valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that

jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district

court was correct in any procedural ruling. Slack v. McDaniel,

529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). In determining this issue, a court

conducts an overview of the claims in the habeas petition,

generally assesses their merits, and determines whether the

resolution was debatable among jurists of reason or wrong. Id. 

It is necessary for an applicant to show more than an absence of

frivolity or the existence of mere good faith; however, it is not

necessary for an applicant to show that the appeal will succeed. 

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338. 

A district court must issue or deny a certificate of

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the

applicant. Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

Here, it does not appear that reasonable jurists could

debate whether the petition should have been resolved in a

different manner. A petition containing only unexhausted claims

must be dismissed. Petitioner has not made a substantial showing

of the denial of a constitutional right. 

Accordingly, the Court will decline to issue a certificate

of appealability.

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IV. Disposition

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

1) The order to show cause that issued from this Court on

June 21, 2010, is DISCHARGED; and

2) The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED

without prejudice because Petitioner has failed to exhaust her

state court remedies with respect to all claims in the petition;

and

3) The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of

appealability; and

4) The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this action because this

order terminates it in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 26, 2010 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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