Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01190/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01190-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Atlas IP, LLC
Appellant
St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc.
Appellee
St. Jude Medical, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ATLAS IP, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

ST. JUDE MEDICAL, INC., ST. JUDE MEDICAL

S.C., INC.,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2015-1190

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Florida in No. 1:14-cv-21006-CMA, 

Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga.

______________________ 

Decided: October 29, 2015 

______________________ 

GEORGE C. SUMMERFIELD, JR., Stadheim & Grear, 

Ltd., Chicago, IL, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also 

represented by ROLF STADHEIM, ROBERT M. SPALDING. 

MARK ANDREW PERRY, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 

Washington, DC, argued for defendants-appellees. Also 

represented by WAYNE M. BARSKY, JENNIFER RHO, Los 

Angeles, CA; HERVEY MARK LYON, Palo Alto, CA; NEEMA 

JALALI, San Francisco, CA. 

______________________ 

Case: 15-1190 Document: 59-2 Page: 1 Filed: 10/29/2015
2 ATLAS IP, LLC v. ST. JUDE MEDICAL, INC. 

Before MOORE, REYNA, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

TARANTO, Circuit Judge.

This case is closely related to Atlas IP, LLC v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 15-1071, decided today. The two cases 

involve the same patent and some of the same claim 

language. To avoid repetition, the present opinion relies 

heavily on the opinion in Atlas v. Medtronic, which partly 

construed the language at issue here. 

Atlas IP, LLC brought this action against St. Jude

Medical, Inc. and St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc. (collectively, 

“St. Jude”) in the Southern District of Florida, alleging 

that certain St. Jude medical products for monitoring a 

patient’s condition infringed claims 11 and 14 of the 

Atlas-owned patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,371,734, concerning wireless communications between a hub and remotes. 

Claims 11 and 14 provide:

11. A communicator for wirelessly transmitting 

frames to and receiving frames from a[t] least one 

additional communicator in accordance with a 

predetermined medium access control protocol, 

the communicators which transmit and receive 

the frames constituting a Group, each communicator including a transmitter and a receiver for 

transmitting and receiving the frames respectively, the medium access control protocol controlling 

each communicator of the Group to effect predetermined functions comprising:

[a] designating one of the communicators of the 

Group as a hub and the remaining the [sic]

communicators of the Group as remotes;

[b] the hub establishing repeating communication cycles, each of which has intervals during 

which the hub and the remotes transmit and 

receive frames; 

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ATLAS IP, LLC v. ST. JUDE MEDICAL, INC. 3

[c] the hub transmitting information to the remotes to establish the communication cycle 

and a plurality of predeterminable intervals 

during each communication cycle, the intervals being ones when the hub is allowed to 

transmit frames to the remotes, when the remotes are allowed to transmit frames to the 

hub, and when each remote is expected to receive a frame from the hub;

[d] the remotes powering off their transmitters 

during times other than those intervals when 

the remote is allowed to transmit frames to 

the hub, by using the information transmitted 

from the hub;

[e] the remotes powering off their receivers during times other than those intervals when the 

remote is expected to receive a frame from the 

hub, by using the information transmitted 

from the hub;

[f] the hub assigning transmission opportunities to the remotes, each transmission opportunity being an interval for a remote to 

transmit frames to the hub;

[g] the hub transmitting transmission opportunity allocation information in a frame 

transmitted by the hub;

[h] the hub monitoring the frames transmitted 

by each remote during its transmission opportunity; and

[i] the hub revoking a previous transmission 

opportunity allocation of a remote which has 

not transmitted more than a predetermined 

number of frames during a previous number 

of communication cycles.

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4 ATLAS IP, LLC v. ST. JUDE MEDICAL, INC. 

14. A communicator for wirelessly transmitting 

frames to and receiving frames from a[t] least one 

additional communicator in accordance with a 

predetermined medium access control protocol, 

the communicators which transmit and receive 

the frames constituting a Group, each communicator including a transmitter and a receiver for 

transmitting and receiving the frames respectively, the medium access control protocol controlling 

each communicator of the Group to effect predetermined functions comprising:

[a] designating one of the communicators of the 

Group as a hub and the remaining the [sic]

communicators of the Group as remotes;

[b] the hub establishing repeating communication cycles, each of which has intervals during 

which the hub and the remotes transmit and 

receive frames; 

[c] the hub transmitting information to the remotes to establish the communication cycle 

and a plurality of predeterminable intervals 

during each communication cycle, the intervals being ones when the hub is allowed to 

transmit frames to the remotes, when the remotes are allowed to transmit frames to the 

hub, and when each remote is expected to receive a frame from the hub;

[d] the remotes powering off their transmitters 

during times other than those intervals when 

the remote is allowed to transmit frames to 

the hub, by using the information transmitted 

from the hub;

[e] the remotes powering off their receivers during times other than those intervals when the 

remote is expected to receive a frame from the 

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ATLAS IP, LLC v. ST. JUDE MEDICAL, INC. 5

hub, by using the information transmitted 

from the hub;

[f] the hub establishing the length of each 

communication cycle; and

[g] the hub transmitting a frame containing information describing the length of the communication cycle prior to the end of the 

communication cycle whose length is established.

Id., col. 47, line 62, through col. 48, line 36; id., col. 49, 

lines 31–68 (bracketed letters added for convenience; 

emphases added to highlight language central to the 

issues on appeal).

The district court adopted constructions of the “establishing” and “transmitting” limitations, which are also 

found in claim 21, the subject of Atlas v. Medtronic. 

Initially, it construed the highlighted language in clause 

[c] to mean “the hub transmitting to the remotes information necessary to know in advance the starting time 

and duration of the communication cycle and of each of 

two or more predeterminable intervals during each communication cycle.” Atlas IP, LLC v. St. Jude Medical, 

Inc., No. 14-21006-CIV, 2014 WL 3764129, at *7–8 (S.D. 

Fla. July 30, 2014) (emphasis added). Then, on St. Jude’s 

motion for summary judgment, the court went beyond 

that construction. The court held that its “in advance” 

requirement meant that the information specifying “when 

the communication cycle starts and its duration . . . must 

be transmitted in advance of the very communication 

cycle at issue.” J.A. 7. That is, it construed the “transmitting” limitation to require not just that specified 

information be transmitted to remotes before the remotes 

begin transmitting in that cycle, as sufficed for noninfringement in the Atlas v. Medtronic case, but that “the 

hub transmits to the remotes information necessary to 

know the starting time and duration of the communicaCase: 15-1190 Document: 59-2 Page: 5 Filed: 10/29/2015
6 ATLAS IP, LLC v. ST. JUDE MEDICAL, INC. 

tion cycle in advance of that communication cycle.” J.A. 

10.

Atlas agreed that there was no infringement “under 

this interpretation of ‘in advance.’” J.A. 10. The district 

court therefore granted St. Jude summary judgment of 

non-infringement and entered a final judgment. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 

In Atlas v. Medtronic, we today hold that the starting 

time and duration of the cycle and of remote-transmission 

intervals within each cycle must be communicated by the 

hub to the remotes before the time at which remotes may 

begin transmitting. Here we hold, in agreement with 

Atlas, that the claim language at issue does not require

that the cycle’s starting time and duration be communicated to the remotes even earlier, i.e., before the communication cycle begins. The district court’s contrary 

conclusion, adopting St. Jude’s argument, rests at bottom 

on the notion that, unless that information is sent before 

the start of the cycle, the remotes would not be awake to 

receive the hub-sent information about the cycle. J.A. 8 

(“the remotes must know when to power up for the beginning of the next communication cycle, or they would be 

unable to receive the information frame” with the schedule for the cycle). But the patent does not support that 

premise or, therefore, the district court’s construction.

Nothing in the claim language requires that the hub 

transmit information to the remotes about the starting 

time of the communication cycle before the start of the 

communication cycle. The claims recite that the hub 

establishes repeating communication cycles and then 

transmits information to the remotes to establish the 

communication cycle and its intervals. ’734 patent, col. 

48, lines 7–17 (claim 11); id., col. 49, lines 44–54 (claim 

14). The claims also state that the remotes power off 

their transmitters and receivers for times outside the 

relevant interval. Id., col. 48, lines 22–25 (claim 11); id., 

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ATLAS IP, LLC v. ST. JUDE MEDICAL, INC. 7

col. 49, lines 59–62 (claim 14). Nowhere do the claims 

indicate that the starting time of the communication cycle 

is communicated in advance of that cycle. 

Similarly, the claims do not require that the duration

of the communication cycle be sent in advance of the 

communication cycle, and nothing in the intrinsic record 

dictates that result. Other claim language positively 

suggests, if it does not necessitate, that information about 

the duration may be sent during the communication cycle. 

Clause [g] of claim 14 itself recites that “the hub transmit[s] a frame containing information describing the 

length of the communication cycle prior to the end of the 

communication cycle whose length is established.” Id., 

col. 49, lines 65–68 (emphasis added).1 Claim 33, which 

also contains the transmitting clause [c], states that “the 

hub transmit[s] a frame containing information to establish a first interval in the communication cycle during 

which the information establishing the communication 

cycle . . . is transmitted.” Id., col. 53, lines 49–53. 

The specification also does not require pre-cycle 

transmission of the cycle’s starting time or duration. To 

the contrary, figure 3 depicts a communication cycle 70, 

which includes an information interval 76, and the specification explains that “[t]he time for the overall communication cycle 70” is transmitted by the hub to the remotes 

1 St. Jude does not distinguish clause [g] on the 

ground that it refers to “length” rather than “duration,” 

terms Atlas has elsewhere noted are different, though not 

unrelated. Rather, St. Jude repeatedly equates the terms 

for present purposes. St. Jude Br. 20, 28, 31 (treating 

specification language about length as referring to duration). Whatever the precise relation of the terms, clause 

[g] points toward the possibility, not excluded by anything 

in the patent, that duration information is sent after the 

cycle begins.

 

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8 ATLAS IP, LLC v. ST. JUDE MEDICAL, INC. 

during the information interval 76, i.e., after the cycle has

already begun. Id., col. 13, lines 23–28. That is strong 

evidence against the district court’s construction.

And that evidence is not undermined by passages in 

the specification that describe the hub as including in an 

information frame not only the duration of the present 

communication cycle but also information about the next 

two communication cycles. See id., col. 28, lines 54–56 

(“Th[e] duration [of the current communication cycle], as 

well as the durations of the next two communication 

cycles, are reported in each information frame.”); id., col. 

36, lines 3–5 (“[T]he hub transmits the lengths of each of 

the next two communication cycles as part of the information frame at the beginning of each communication 

cycle.”). St. Jude relies on those passages as providing for 

start-and-duration information about a cycle to be sent 

before the cycle: it is sent in the previous two cycles as 

well as during the present cycle. But the passages say 

nothing about the starting time being included; they 

speak only of “length” and “duration.”2 Moreover, they 

describe embodiments only, and while the three-cycle 

information frame is one way of helping remotes stay in 

contact and synchronized with the hub, id., col. 28, lines 

51–54; id., col. 36, lines 6–10, nothing says that it is 

necessary. There is no reason to read that particular 

embodiment into the claim language. 

St. Jude therefore rests its argument ultimately on 

the repeated assertion, which persuaded the district 

court, that the claimed invention, in order to function, 

2 The omission of starting-time information is highlighted by the specification passage that speaks of information about both “starting times” and “durations” for 

“intervals” within a cycle, while, for the cycles themselves,

speaking only of their “lengths,” not their starting times. 

Id., col. 27, lines 57–61.

 

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requires at least the starting-time information (perhaps 

also the duration information) to be sent to the remotes 

before the cycle begins. Unless the hub did so, St. Jude 

argues, the remotes could not know to power on their

receivers for the start of the cycle and so would not receive the scheduling information (allotting reception and 

transmission intervals) sent from the hub in the first part 

of the cycle. As a legal matter, of course, “‘a construction 

that renders the claimed invention inoperable should be 

viewed with extreme skepticism.’ ” See AIA Engineering 

Ltd. v. Magotteaux Int’l S/A, 657 F.3d 1264, 1278 (Fed. 

Cir. 2011). But that principle does not decide this case. 

St. Jude has not shown that the district court’s construction must be adopted in order to avoid inoperability.

The specification states that “[i]t is necessary for battery operated remotes to recognize when to expect the 

beginning of the next communication cycle, in order to 

power-up their RF modems to receive the information 

frames at the beginning of each cycle.” ’734 patent, col. 

35, line 66, through col. 36, line 2. See also id., col. 33, 

lines 28–31 (“Based on the information conveyed in the 

information frame 200, all remotes 66 enable their RF 

modems 96 at the time of the expected arrival of each 

information frame 200.”). But neither the specification 

nor operability requires sending the remotes the starting 

time or duration of an upcoming communication cycle 

before the cycle commences. In fact, the specification 

explicitly contemplates the remotes functioning by knowing “approximately when to expect frames transmitted 

from the hub.” Id., col. 13, lines 31–32 (emphasis added). 

St. Jude has not explained why it is insufficient for the 

remotes to know roughly “when to expect” an upcoming 

cycle to begin, not its exact starting time, and why that 

information cannot be supplied by providing a cycle’s 

starting time and duration during a given cycle. 

In particular, St. Jude has not explained why that information would not suffice to allow the remotes to have 

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10 ATLAS IP, LLC v. ST. JUDE MEDICAL, INC. 

their receivers on for whenever the next cycle actually 

starts. By default the remotes turn on their receivers 

when they first power on and await a signal from the hub. 

Id., col. 39, lines 34–38. They will therefore receive a 

“first” cycle’s scheduling-information frame, which can 

communicate the starting time (which has already

passed) and duration for that particular cycle. If the 

cycles “repeat[ ] on a continuous basis,” id., col. 11, line 41, 

the receipt of that information would seem to allow the 

remotes to have their receivers on when the next cycle 

begins, and thus receive the next-cycle scheduling information. St. Jude has not shown otherwise.

At oral argument, St. Jude suggested that communicating the duration of the current communication cycle

necessarily defines the starting time of the next cycle, so 

that transmitting one cycle’s duration is transmitting the 

next cycle’s starting time. Oral Arg. at 16:08–16:26. St. 

Jude did not recognizably make that contention before 

oral argument, and we are not persuaded. The only 

passage in the specification that refers to the continuous 

repetition of the cycles states that the cycles are “repeated 

on a continuous basis,” ’734 patent, col. 11, lines 39–42, 

not that each cycle begins immediately after the previous 

one ends. Moreover, St. Jude’s suggestion finds no support in the claims. The claims state that the cycles are 

repeating, see, e.g., id., col. 48, line 7; id., col. 49, line 44, 

but none states that the end of one is the start of the next. 

And claim 34, which has the same “transmitting” limitation as claims 11 and 14, recites that the hub transmits 

the “length” of the current cycle and the start of the next 

cycle. Id., col. 54, lines 28–32. Under St. Jude’s equating 

of “length” with “duration,” see note 1, supra, its new 

contention would render claim 34’s language redundant.

We conclude that the district court erred in construing 

the “transmitting” limitation to require that the starting 

time and duration of a communication cycle be sent in 

advance of the communication cycle. Because there is no 

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ATLAS IP, LLC v. ST. JUDE MEDICAL, INC. 11

ruling about infringement under any other claim construction, we vacate the summary judgment of noninfringement and remand for further proceedings. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the summary 

judgment of non-infringement and remand.

Costs awarded to Atlas.

VACATED AND REMANDED

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