Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03083/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03083-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Kevin C. Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 9, 1999 Decided October 26, 1999

No. 98-3083

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Kevin C. Williams,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cr00145-01)

Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.

J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Thomas S. Rees, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With him on the briefs were Wilma A. Lewis,

U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher and Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Before: Wald, Silberman and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: In Jones v. United States, 119 S. Ct.

1215 (1999), the Supreme Court held that a factor that

increases a defendant's sentence under the federal carjacking

statute is an element of the crime that the jury must find

beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than a sentencing factor to

be decided by the sentencing judge. In this case, a jury

convicted Appellant of possessing a detectable amount of

cocaine base with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.

s 841. Appellant argues that Jones requires us to reverse

the district court's ruling that the quantity of drugs he

possessed is a sentencing factor, not an element of the

offense. Concluding that Jones' effect on section 841 is not

sufficiently clear to permit a panel of this court to reconsider

our precedent holding that quantity is a sentencing factor, not

an element of the offense, and finding Appellant's other

claims without merit, we affirm.

I

Section 841(a) makes it unlawful for any person to possess

with intent to distribute a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C.

s 841(a)(1). Subsection (b)(1) of section 841 specifies different penalties depending on the amount and type of controlled

substance at issue: ten years to life for fifty grams or more of

crack; five to forty years for five grams or more of crack;

and up to twenty years for less than five grams of crack.

The difference in the amount of drugs attributed to Appellant, Kevin Williams, at different stages of his prosecution

forms the basis of his Jones argument. The grand jury

indicted him for possessing with intent to distribute fifty

grams or more of cocaine base. The jury was instructed that

it could convict if it found he possessed with intent to

distribute a detectable or measurable amount. The district

court found that he possessed sixty-six grams and imposed a

sentence of ten years under the Sentencing Guidelines. Relying on Jones, Williams argues that quantity is an element of a

section 841 offense and that because the jury was instructed

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that it could convict him if it found that he possessed a

"detectable" or "measurable" amount of cocaine base, the

district court erred by imposing a penalty for possessing

more than fifty grams.

Before considering Williams' Jones argument, we must first

address the Government's contention that we need not reach

the issue at all. Specifically, the Government claims that

Williams failed to preserve the issue for appeal because he

never presented it to the district court. We disagree. Following the close of evidence, Williams moved for judgment of

acquittal, expressly arguing that quantity is an element of the

offense and that the Government had failed to prove that the

quantity of drugs at issue exceeded fifty grams. Denying the

motion, the district court ruled that quantity "is not an

essential element ... of the offense charged under our case

law." After addressing several other issues, the district court

reiterated that quantity is not an element of a section 841

offense. To be sure, defense counsel lodged no objection to

the district court's "detectable amount" jury instructions.

But having had his argument that quantity is an element of

the offense twice rejected by the district court, Williams had

no obligation to go through the futile exercise of interposing

the same objection to the jury instructions.

The Government urges us not to reach Williams' argument

for a second reason. It claims that even if Williams were

correct that quantity is an element of a section 841 offense,

his sentence would not be affected because, as calculated by

the district court under the Sentencing Guidelines, it fell well

below section 841's twenty-year maximum for defendants who

(like Williams) are convicted of possessing a detectable or

measurable amount of crack. See 21 U.S.C. s 841(b)(1)(C).

Under these circumstances, the Government argues, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Edwards v. United States,

523 U.S. 511 (1998), bars us from addressing Williams' argument. Again, we disagree.

In Edwards, the defendants were convicted of conspiring to

possess with intent to distribute cocaine or crack. 523 U.S. at

513. Applying the Sentencing Guidelines, the district judge

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calculated defendants' sentences based on his finding that the

illegal conduct involved both cocaine and crack. Defendants

argued that because the jury had convicted them of participating in a cocaine or crack conspiracy, the district judge

erred by sentencing them for crack-related conduct rather

than for a cocaine-only conspiracy. The Court declined to

reach the merits of this argument since, even were it correct,

their sentences would not have been affected. This was so

because the Sentencing Guidelines permitted the district

judge to consider crack-related conduct in calculating defendants' sentences regardless of whether the jury found a

cocaine-only conspiracy or a crack and cocaine conspiracy,

and defendants' sentences were shorter than the statutory

maximum for cocaine-only conspiracies. Id. at 514-15.

In this case, the Government's entire Edwards argument is

set forth in two rather cryptic sentences: "[A]ppellant could

have received a maximum sentence of 20 years even if no

specific quantity of crack had been proven. His ten year

sentence was well below that maximum, and, here, as in

Edwards, the constitutional issue is not even presented."

The Government apparently is arguing that regardless of

whether Williams is correct that quantity is an element of a

section 841 offense, the district judge would retain authority

to determine quantity under the Sentencing Guidelines, and

since Williams' Guidelines sentence was less than the statutory maximum for possession with intent to distribute a detectable or measurable amount of crack, we have no reason to

reach the merits of his argument.

The Government's argument rests on the assumption that

under Edwards a defendant can show he was harmed only if

his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum that would have

been applicable absent the alleged error. But Edwards itself

recognized another way defendants could establish harm: by

showing that the crack-related conduct was not part of the

same course of conduct as the cocaine-only conspiracy found

by the jury. 523 U.S. at 515-16. Identifying still a third

type of harm, the defendants in Edwards argued that "the

judge might have made different factual findings" if he had

accepted their argument as correct. The Court never

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reached this latter argument, however, because defendants

"seem to have raised their entire [cocaine-only conspiracy]

argument for the first time in the Court of Appeals." Id.

Not so here. Williams expressly argued in the district court

that quantity is an element of the offense to be decided by the

jury. See supra at 3. If Williams turns out to be correct, the

jury's finding that he possessed a "detectable" amount might

very well have influenced the district court's quantity determination under the Guidelines, possibly resulting in a shorter

sentence. Because Edwards never addressed this situation,

we do not think it bars our consideration of Williams' argument. We thus save for another day (when the matter is

fully briefed) consideration of Edwards' precise scope and

turn to the merits of Williams' argument.

II

Announced in the final days of the Supreme Court's most

recent term, Jones considered whether a factor that substantially increases a defendant's sentence under the federal

carjacking statute is an element of the offense or a matter to

be decided by the district court at sentencing. As the Court

pointed out, this seemingly semantic distinction has enormous

practical significance. "[E]lements must be charged in the

indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt." 119 S. Ct. at 1219. Sentencing factors may be determined by the district court.

The statute at issue in Jones provided:

Whoever ... takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign

commerce from the person or presence of another by

force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do

so, shall--

(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more

than 15 years, or both,

(2) if serious bodily injury ... results, be fined under

this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or

both, and

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(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number of years up to life, or both.

18 U.S.C. s 2119 (1992). After a jury convicted Jones of

carjacking, the district court found that serious bodily injury

had occurred and imposed a longer sentence based on that

finding. On appeal, Jones argued that "serious bodily injury"

was an element of the crime that had to be submitted to the

jury. According to the Government, the statute created a

single offense--carjacking--and "serious bodily injury" was a

sentencing factor for the judge, not the jury.

The Supreme Court agreed with Jones. Analyzing the

structure of the statute and considering that serious bodily

injury has historically been considered an element of a crime,

the Court read the statute to create three separate offenses:

carjacking with no aggravating factors (maximum penalty of

fifteen years); carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury

(maximum penalty of twenty-five years); and carjacking resulting in death (maximum penalty of life imprisonment).

Serious bodily injury, the Court ruled, is an element of the

offense, meaning that the higher penalty for a carjacking

offense involving serious bodily injury may be imposed only if

the indictment alleges such injury and the jury finds it

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Characterizing its interpretation as the "fairest" reading of

the statute, the Court nonetheless "recognize[d] the possibility of the other view"--i.e., interpreting the statute to make

serious bodily injury a sentencing factor. 119 S. Ct. at 1222.

But adopting that "other view," the Court said, would have

required it to address a "serious constitutional question[ ] on

which precedent is not dispositive," a question the Court

described as follows: "when a jury determination has not

been waived, may judicial factfinding by a preponderance

support the application of a provision that increases the

potential severity of the penalty for a variant of a given

crime?" Id. at 1228, 1224. Faced with interpreting a statute

"susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and

doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of

which such questions are avoided," the Court found that it

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had a "duty" to adopt the latter construction. Id. at 1222

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Jones has thus far been applied by two of our sister

circuits. In United States v. Davis, the Fourth Circuit faced

a Jones challenge to a South Carolina law that increased the

maximum penalty for failing to stop when signaled by a police

officer if serious bodily injury occurred. 184 F.3d 366 (4th

Cir. 1999). The court held that serious bodily injury is an

element of the offense because any other interpretation of the

statute would present the constitutional question posed in

Jones. Id. at 368-72. In United States v. NuNez, the Fifth

Circuit held that Jones "foreclose[d]" the Government's argument that use of a deadly or dangerous weapon, which raised

the maximum penalty for the offense of forcibly resisting a

federal officer from three to ten years, was a mere penalty

provision. 180 F.3d 227, 233-34 (5th Cir. 1999).

Like the penalty provisions at issue in Jones, Davis, and

NuNez, section 841 penalties vary depending upon the circumstances of the offense. Subsection (a)(1) provides that "it

shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally

... [to] possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or

dispense, a controlled substance." Subsection (b) provides

that "any person who violates subsection (a) of this section

shall be sentenced ..." and goes on to set forth a wide range

of penalties depending on the quantity and type of drug

involved as well as other aggravating factors, such as serious

bodily injury and recidivism. Quantity significantly affects

the severity of the penalty. Defendants convicted of possessing with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of crack face

ten years to life, while those convicted of possessing fewer

than five grams face a maximum of twenty years.

Williams argues that because quantity so dramatically affects the severity of section 841 penalties, allowing the judge

to determine quantity implicates the unsettled constitutional

issue identified in Jones. Therefore, he argues, we must

consider whether the statute is susceptible to an alternative

construction that would make quantity an element of the

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offense. The Government responds that, unlike the carjacking statute, section 841 unambiguously makes quantity a

sentencing factor and that, so read, the statute presents no

serious constitutional concerns.

Were we writing on a clean slate, Jones would require us to

resolve this issue by asking whether treating quantity as a

sentencing factor raises "grave and doubtful constitutional

questions," and if so, whether section 841 can be interpreted

to make quantity an element of the crime. But our slate is

not clean. Unlike the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, which had

never interpreted the statutes challenged in those cases, this

circuit did construe section 841 prior to Jones and squarely

held that it makes quantity a sentencing factor, not an

element of the offense. In United States v. Patrick, we noted

"that the quantity of drug possessed is not a constituent

element of the offense of possession with intent to distribute

under 21 U.S.C. s 841(a). Quantity is relevant only to punishment; the district judge, and not the jury, makes this

determination." 959 F.2d 991, 995-96 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1992)

(citations omitted). In United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah,

we reiterated that we had "recently joined the majority of

other circuits holding that the quantity of drugs involved in a

conspiracy or distribution charge is not a basic element of the

offense, but is rather a sentencing factor to be determined by

the judge." 966 F.2d 682, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citations

omitted). The question, then, is whether Jones effectively

overrules, i.e., "eviscerate[s]," Patrick and Lam Kwong-Wah.

See Dellums v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,

863 F.2d 968, 978 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Silberman, J.). We

think it does not.

To begin with, Jones never squarely held that the carjacking statute would have been unconstitutional had the Court

been unable to interpret serious bodily injury as an element

of the crime. Jones held only that the opposite reading--

treating serious bodily injury as a sentencing factor--raised

sufficient constitutional doubt to require the Court, if possible, to interpret the statute as it did. That the Supreme

Court had doubts about the constitutionality of the carjacking

statute, doubts that it never had to resolve, is simply too thin

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a reed to permit a panel of this court to find similar doubts in

a different statute and, based on those doubts, to depart from

circuit precedent expressly interpreting the statute as making

quantity a sentencing factor.

We are also reluctant to reexamine our precedent because

it is not at all clear whether Jones applies broadly to all

criminal statutes or is limited to the unique facts of that case.

Jones represents only the latest in a series of seemingly

conflicting cases addressing the sentencing factor versus element issue, and its attempt to distinguish, explain, and reconcile earlier cases leaves unresolved several questions that lead

us to wonder about the precise scope of its holding.

The story begins with two cases that set forth the principles underpinning Jones. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970),

held that criminal defendants have a right to have the Government prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable

doubt. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), held that

there are limitations on the state's power to circumvent

Winship by redefining elements as sentencing factors. "[I]f

Winship were limited to those facts that constitute a crime as

defined by state law," the Court reasoned, "a State could

undermine many of the interests that decision sought to

protect.... It would only be necessary to redefine the

elements that constitute different crimes, characterizing them

as factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment....

Winship is concerned with substance rather than this kind of

formalism." Id. at 698-99.

Later cases retreated from the principle set forth in Mullaney. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), for

instance, the Court held that a state could constitutionally

define visible possession of a firearm, a fact that triggered a

mandatory minimum sentence for certain enumerated offenses, as a sentencing factor to be determined by the sentencing judge, rather than as an element of the offense. The

Court noted that defendants' argument "would have at least

more superficial appeal if [the judge's finding] exposed them

to greater or additional punishment." Id. at 88. But on the

basis of the facts presented, the Court concluded that because

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the statute "gives no impression of having been tailored to

permit the [sentencing factor] finding to be a tail which wags

the dog of the substantive offense," it raised no constitutional

issue. Id.

Building on McMillan, the Court held in AlmendarezTorres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), that an immigration statute that enhances the maximum penalty on the basis

of a judicial finding of recidivism raised no constitutional

issues. This was especially so, the Court reasoned, because

of the long tradition of treating recidivism as a sentencing

factor. Id. at 243-44. According to the Court, the only

difference between the case before it and McMillan was that

the finding of recidivism under the immigration statute altered the statutory maximum, while the finding of visible

possession of a firearm affected the mandatory minimum.

Id. at 243. Observing that mandatory minimums often affect

sentences more significantly than statutory maximums, the

Court found this not to be a "determinative difference"

between the two cases. Id. at 244-45.

While Jones draws on the principles set forth in Winship

and Mullaney, it does not question the Court's later conclusion in cases like McMillan and Almendarez-Torres that not

"every fact with a bearing on sentencing must be found by a

jury...." Jones, 119 S. Ct. at 1226. Jones even declares

that it "does not announce any new principle of constitutional

law, but merely interprets a particular federal statute in light

of a set of constitutional concerns that have emerged through

a series of our decisions over the past quarter century." Id.

at 1228 n.11. By framing the unresolved constitutional issue

as whether "any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in

an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a

reasonable doubt," Jones leaves undisturbed the Court's previous holdings as to mandatory minimums (McMillan) and

recidivism (Almendarez-Torres). Id. at 1224 n.6 (emphasis

added).

Yet we are not at all sure that federal courts should treat

as "unresolved" the potential constitutional issue lurking in

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every sentence-enhancing statute except those involving increased mandatory minimums and recidivism. For example,

if quantity (like recidivism) has historically been treated as a

sentencing factor, is the unresolved constitutional issue identified in Jones still implicated? Is it constitutionally significant

that in section 841, quantity affects both mandatory minimums and maximums? Do section 841's penalty provisions,

which extend for pages, cover topics ranging from death and

serious bodily injury to water pollution on federal lands to

date rape, and significantly affect sentence severity, suggest

that the sentencing tail may be wagging the section 841 dog?

See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88. And, if so, is examining the

relationship between a dog and its tail any longer relevant in

view of the fact that Jones mentions neither?

These unanswered questions, together with the fact that

Jones never ultimately resolved the constitutional doubts it

raised, convince us that Jones falls far short of "eviscerating"

Patrick and Lam Kwong-Wah. We therefore remain bound

by their holding that under section 841 quantity is a sentencing factor, not an element of the offense.

This leaves one remaining issue. Williams argues that if

Patrick and Lam Kwong-Wah are binding, then Jones renders section 841 unconstitutional because the question of

quantity is left to the sentencing judge. Since Williams failed

to challenge the constitutionality of section 841 before the

district court, we review for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim.

P. 52(b); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 (1997).

Williams must therefore establish (1) that there is "error," (2)

that the error is "plain," and (3) that the error "affect[s]

substantial rights." Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. at

467 (internal quotation marks omitted). Only if Williams can

establish all three may we exercise our discretion to "notice a

forfeited error, but only if ... the error seriously affect[s] the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Williams falls far short of satisfying this very heavy burden. Even with the benefit of Jones, it is hardly "plain" that

section 841 is unconstitutional. As we indicated above, not

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only does Jones expressly declare that it "does not announce

any new principle of constitutional law," but it is not at all

clear whether Jones even applies to section 841. See supra

at 10-11. Under these circumstances, we find no plain error.

III

Having concluded that in this circuit quantity remains a

sentencing factor in a section 841 offense, we turn to

Williams' alternative argument. He claims that the district

court never made a factual determination that the amount of

drugs at issue was sixty-six grams but instead erroneously

assumed that the jury had found that amount.

Williams was arrested after police officers discovered him

with his hand in a gym bag that turned out to contain crack

cocaine. The investigator who field-tested the drugs, Officer

Ramadhan, testified at trial that he tested a total of sixty-six

grams: twenty-two grams in nine small clear plastic bags and

forty-four grams in two larger bags. The two arresting

officers testified that when they arrested Williams they found

two large chunks of crack cocaine. Neither mentioned seeing

an additional nine plastic bags of drugs, although one of the

arresting officers identified the contents of an envelope that

contained the items tested by Officer Ramadhan, including

the nine small bags, as the same items that had been seized

when Williams was arrested.

Arguing that the arresting officers' testimony conflicted

with Officer Ramadhan's, that this inconsistency fatally undermined the Government's case, and that in any event there

was insufficient evidence of possession to convict, Williams

moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of the Government's case. Although the district court acknowledged that

the testimony was potentially conflicting, it found that "there

is certainly sufficient evidence as to the chain of custody and

the type and quantity of drugs that were seized," and, while

characterizing the Government's evidence of possession as

"thin," it found sufficient evidence to submit the issue to the

jury.

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At sentencing, defense counsel again pointed out the inconsistency in the testimony with respect to the twenty-two

grams, arguing that the gym bag contained only forty-four

grams. The district court rejected Williams' argument:

I am going to deny you any relief under the Sentencing

Guidelines as to the issues about the difference in testimony of the police officers.... And whether or not they

were in the possession of Mr. Williams, that was an issue

for the jury as to their differences in testimony and

whether they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt

that Mr. Williams was in actual possession or constructive possession of those drugs and the jury made that

determination.

Based upon all of the testimony after hearing, argument of counsel on each side, and experienced counsel

tried the case for Mr. Williams in a good fashion trying

to point out these inconsistencies and the failure of the

evidence. But that was a jury issue I believe and it

doesn't affect the Court now under the Guidelines because I will accept the jury's finding he was in possession knowingly of all of those drugs, which adds up to

the 66 grams, instead of a lesser amount.

Formally entering judgment against Williams, the district

court adopted the factual findings in the presentence report.

According to that report, a laboratory analysis of "the drugs

recovered from defendant Williams determined same to be

66.49 grams of cocaine base.... [T]he total amount of drugs

accountable to defendant Williams is 66.49 grams of cocaine

base."

From this sequence of events, we think that the district

judge did determine that Williams possessed sixty-six grams.

He said as much at the sentencing hearing. He adopted the

factual findings of the presentence report, which stated that

Williams was accountable for sixty-six grams. And he sentenced Williams based on sixty-six grams.

Williams interprets the district court's oral ruling, particularly the last sentence, to mean that the court mistakenly

believed that the jury had found that sixty-six grams of

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cocaine base were seized from the bag and that the court

based its finding on that mistaken assumption. We disagree.

To begin with, it defies logic that an experienced district

judge, having ruled that quantity is not a matter for the jury

but is instead a question for the court at sentencing, see

supra at 3, would then turn around and impose sentence on

the basis of an assumption that the jury had determined

quantity. Moreover, we read the district court's words quite

differently than does Williams. From the district court's

comments in ruling on the motion for judgment of acquittal

and at sentencing, it is clear that he thought the evidence that

Williams possessed any drugs at all was thin. But once the

jury found that Williams in fact possessed the drugs, the

district court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to

attribute to Williams the entire amount, "which adds up to

the 66 grams, instead of a lesser amount." Read in this

context, the phrase "that was a jury issue I believe and it

doesn't affect the Court now under the Guidelines" refers to

possession, not quantity.

IV

This brings us to Williams' final argument. He challenges

the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the drugs

seized when he was arrested.

Seven officers of the Metropolitan Police Department, executing a search warrant obtained on the basis of an informant's tip that guns and crack were present in an apartment

at 1209 Valley Avenue in Southeast Washington, entered the

apartment and found ammunition, handgun magazines, marijuana, and items often used in connection with drug distribution, including plastic bags, razor blades, and scales. Finding

neither guns nor crack, they left. Speculating that they may

have executed the warrant too early, five officers returned.

When the door of the apartment was opened, they saw

Williams moving away from them toward a back bedroom

with his right arm "tucked ... close to his side.... like he

was carrying something." Although the officers testified that

they could not see what Williams was carrying, they said they

suspected he might have had a gun. The two officers chased

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Williams into a back bedroom. Seeing Williams with his hand

in a gym bag, the officers secured him and dumped the

contents of the bag. Out fell two large chunks of crack.

Williams was arrested.

Denying Williams' motion to suppress, the district court

held that he lacked standing to challenge the seizure because

he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in either the

apartment or the bag and because he had voluntarily abandoned the drugs. Although Williams correctly points out that

whether a defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy

"is more properly placed within the purview of substantive

Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing," Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S. Ct. 469, 472 (1998) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted), he cannot escape the wellaccepted rule that in order to demonstrate that the search

violated his Fourth Amendment rights he must establish that

he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area

searched. See id. Moreover, an individual who abandons

property forfeits any reasonable expectation of privacy in the

property. See United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 845-46

(D.C. Cir. 1989).

Williams neither challenges the district court's determination that he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the

area searched nor argues that the district court erred in

finding that he abandoned the drugs. Instead, he claims that

the "police discovered the bag only as a result of the illegal

seizure of Mr. Williams' person." Because Williams failed to

argue either that the allegedly illegal seizure invalidated the

abandonment or that he had some sort of privacy interest in

the bag and therefore did not abandon the drugs by putting

them in the bag, however, his claim that the police illegally

"seized his person" is irrelevant. We therefore find no basis

for questioning the district court's denial of the motion to

suppress.

V

Williams' conviction and sentence are affirmed.

So ordered.

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