Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-02053/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-02053-14/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dean Barthelmes
Defendant
City of Bakersfield
Defendant
Miguel A. Gonzalez-Chavez
Plaintiff
Christopher Messick
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Miguel Gonzalez-Chavez seeks an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

1988. (Doc. 105) Defendants oppose the motion, asserting fees should not be awarded in light of 

Plaintiff’s limited success at trial and, if awarded, the amount should be reduced. (Doc. 106) As 

discussed below, the Court finds Plaintiff is a prevailing party within the meaning of Section 1988, 

but fails to demonstrate the amount of fees sought is reasonable. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for 

attorney fees is GRANTED IN PART. 

I. Background

Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint on December 18, 2012. (Doc. 1) Plaintiff 

alleged Bakersfield Police Officers Christopher Messick and Dean Barthelmes, as well as the City 

of Bakersfield, were liable “for the use of excessive force and/or unlawful search and seizure” in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Id. at 6) Plaintiff later dismissed his claim against the City of 

Bakersfield, and pursued only the claims against Officers Messick and Barthelmes. (Docs. 33-34)

MIGUEL A. GONZALEZ-CHAVEZ,

 Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF BAKERSFIELD, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:12-cv-02053 JLT

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES

(Doc. 105)

Case 1:12-cv-02053-JLT Document 109 Filed 05/17/16 Page 1 of 16
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The parties tried the matter before a jury beginning on February 9, 2015. (Doc. 73) The 

jury deliberated for a day-and-a-half, and returned a verdict in favor of Defendant Barthelmes and 

against Defendant Messick. The jury found Messick used excessive force and awarded 

compensatory damages for past pain and suffering in the amount of $100.00. (Doc. 81 at 1, 2) 

Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied on March 18, 2016. (Doc. 104) 

On April 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed the motion for attorney fees now pending before the Court. 

(Doc. 106) Defendants filed their opposition to the motion on May 3, 2016 (Doc. 107), to which 

Plaintiff filed a reply on May 10, 2016 (Doc. 107). The Court heard the oral arguments of the 

parties on May 17, 2016. 

II. Evidentiary Objections

Defendants contend Plaintiff failed to present any admissible evidence in support of the 

motion for attorneys’ fees. (Doc. 106 at 12-13) Defendants contend Mr. Kawai’s “statements 

regarding the background, training, experience, billing practices, and billing by other attorneys is 

nothing more than hearsay.” (Id. at 13, emphasis omitted) 

1. Background and experience of each attorney

Defendants object to Mr. Kawai’s statements regarding the experience of each attorney as 

hearsay. (Doc. 106 at 13) For purposes of calculating reasonable fees with the Laffey Matrix, Mr. 

Kawai reported Martha Rossiter “had 4 to 7 years of experience;” J. Miguel Flores “had 8-10 years 

of experience;” Matthew Jackson “had 11 years of experience;” and Daniel Rodriguez had “more 

than 20 years of experience.” (Doc. 105 at 10-11, Kawai Decl. ¶ 9) However, according to 

Defendants, Mr. Kawai “is not competent, nor does he have personal knowledge[,] to attest to the 

background, training, experience, or reputation of any attorney other than himself.” (Doc. 160 at 13) 

Notably, however, the California State Bar website provides the credentials of each attorney, 

including education, the number of years active as an attorney, and whether the attorneys have been 

subject to disciplinary proceedings. The Court may take judicial notice of a fact that “is not subject 

to reasonable dispute because it (1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; 

or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit determined the information 

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contained on the California State Bar website is subject to judicial notice. White v. Martel, 601 F.3d 

882, 885 (9th Cir. 2010).

Therefore the Court takes judicial notice of the admission dates for each of the attorneys who 

worked on this action—including Martha Rossiter, Jose Miguel Flores, Matthew Jackson, John 

Kawai, and Daniel Rodriguez—as well as their disciplinary records.

2. Billing practices and hours worked

Defendants argue Mr. Kawai “is not competent to attest to the billing practices of any 

attorney other than himself and is not competent to authenticate the time sheets for any attorney 

other than himself.” (Doc. 106 at 13). For example, Defendants contend Mr. Kawai “does not have 

personal knowledge about what Ms. Rossiter’s billing practices are, when she entered time, how she 

entered time, etc.” (Id.) Therefore, Defendants contend the statements regarding the billing 

practices and hours work should be deemed as inadmissible hearsay. (Id.)

Defendants observe, “In Kranson v. Fed. Express Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 173499, *17 

(N.D. CA Dec. 11, 2013), the Plaintiff’s attorney submitted a declaration seeking to recover not 

only her time, but the time spent by a paralegal in the office.” (Id.) However, the Court rejected 

the declaration explaining that “the best evidence to explain the nature of her work, hours, and 

experience, would have been a declaration” from the paralegal herself. Kranson, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

17499 at *18. Similarly, Defendants note the Ninth Circuit declined “to allow an attorney to attest 

to time spent by someone else in his office[,] finding that such an attestation was hearsay.” (Id., 

citing Muniz v. UPS, 738 F.3d 214 (9th Cir. 2013)). In Munoz, the attorney filed a declaration in 

support of a motion for attorney fees in which he attested to the hours his paralegal worked on the 

action. Muniz, 738 F.3d at 222-23. The attorney “stated that he had watched [the paralegal] 

reconstruct her hours using the same information he used, and that the attached spreadsheet showed 

her hours.” Id. at 223. The defendant objected to the attorney’s “statement and the accompanying 

spreadsheet” as “inadmissible hearsay.” Id. The Ninth Circuit determined “that the only reasonable 

interpretation” of the attorney’s declaration was that the paralegal calculated her hours, and 

provided this information to the attorney. Id. Accordingly, the Court determined the declaration 

and the spreadsheet were hearsay, and remanded to the district court to determine “whether any 

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hearsay exception applies.” Id. at 223, 227. 

Defendants also rely upon Yeager v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 2012 WL 6629434, at *2 (E.D. 

Cal. Dec. 19, 2012) for the proposition that attorney time sheets are not self-authenticating and that 

each attorney must file his/her own declaration attesting to the time spent on the case for the time to 

be recoverable. The Court agrees as to the former proposition but disagrees as to the latter. 

Notably, Yeager held only that an attorney who lacks personal knowledge of the time spent by 

another attorney cannot attest to the fees sought by that other attorney. Id. at 3. Here, the business 

records are authenticated by Mr. Kawai, who is acting as the firm’s custodian of records. 

In contrast to Kranson and Munoz, in this case, Mr. Kawai provided not only a declaration 

and not just a spreadsheet, but also reviewed and provided the business records of Rodriguez & 

Associates. A document is a “business record” pursuant to Rule 803 of the Federal Rules of 

Evidence when:

(A) the record was made at or near the time by--or from information transmitted by--

someone with knowledge;

(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business, 

organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit;

(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;

Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). A “custodian or other qualified witness” must provide testimony to these 

conditions. (Id.) Here, Mr. Kawai attests he has “personal knowledge... of the firm’s civil rights 

case intake and timekeeping practices since the time [he] joined the firm in 2010.” (Doc. 105 at 8, 

Kawai Decl. ¶ 1) According to Mr. Kawai,

All of the attorneys at Rodriguez & Associates use timekeeping software to create 

time logs of time spent on civil rights cases such as the present case and other cases 

eligible for attorneys’ fees awards. Our custom and practice is to enter our time and a 

description of the work we did in that time contemporaneously, or if we are away 

from our office, to manually keep notes of our time and enter that time into our 

computer when we return to the office. Each attorney is assigned a unique code that 

indicates who performed what work, for how long, and when, on a particular case. 

For example, Daniel Rodriguez is “DR”, Matthew Jackson (who is no longer with the 

firm) is “MJ”, Martha J. Rossiter (no longer with the firm) is “MJR”, J. Miguel Flores 

goes by “MF”, and I go by “JK”.

(Id. at 9, Kawai Decl. ¶ 6) Because Mr. Kawai reports the timesheets were kept in the regular 

course of business and entering time at or near the time of the activities is a regular practice for 

lawyers at Rodriguez & Associates, the entries made in the timekeeping software are admissible as 

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business records. 

Mr. Kawai reports that he “personally printed the timesheets associated with Mr. GonzalezChavez’s case that were maintained in the course of the firm’s business, and... reviewed them.” 

(Id., Kawai Decl. ¶ 7) Based upon that review, Mr. Kawai calculated the number of hours each 

attorney spent on the action, and attached a copy of the timesheets as an exhibit to his declaration. 

(Id. at 10, Kawai Decl. ¶ 8) Significantly, “personal knowledge can come from the review of the 

contents of business records and an affiant may testify to acts that she did not personally observe but 

which have been described in business records.” Banga v. First USA, NA, 29 F. Supp. 3d 1270, 1275 

n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 

Accordingly, Mr. Kawai has sufficient personal knowledge to authenticate the business 

records and provides sufficient foundation to admit the records as an exception to hearsay. Thus,

Defendants’ objections to the admissibility of the evidence are OVERRULED.

III. Attorney Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988

A district court may, in its discretion, award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing 

party in a civil rights action. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Under Section 1988, “a prevailing plaintiff 

should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an 

award unjust.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

IV. Discussion and Analysis

A. Plaintiff is a prevailing party

As an initial matter, Defendants contend Plaintiff should not be rewarded fees “because the 

Plaintiff was not a prevailing party who would be entitled to an award of fees within the meaning of 

42 U.S.C. §1988. (Doc. 106 at 9) Significantly, “[t]here is no rule of proportionality in a civil 

rights action under § 1988.” Archer v. Gipson, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172270 at *14 (E.D. Cal.

Dec. 28, 2015), citing Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96 (1989); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 

477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986). The Supreme Court specifically “reject[ed] the proposition that fee 

awards under § 1988 should necessarily be proportionate to the amount of damages a civil rights 

plaintiff actually recovers.” Rivera, 477 U.S. at 574. As the Court explained in Blanchard, “Unlike 

most private tort litigants, a civil rights plaintiff seeks to vindicate important civil and constitutional 

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rights that cannot be valued in monetary terms.” Id., 489 U.S. at 96. Thus, a claimant’s financial 

success is not determinative of whether a fee should be awarded. See Rivera, 477 U.S. at 574; 

Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 96. 

To be entitled to fees under Section 1988, a civil rights litigant must be the prevailing party 

and the relief “materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the 

defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.” Fisher v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 

F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000). For example, “[t]he plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment 

against the defendant from whom fees are sought, Hewitt, supra, 482 U.S., at 760, 107 S.Ct., at 

2675, or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement, Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 

129, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2574, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980).” Farrar, at 111. Thus, though plaintiff’s 

damage award was small, the Court finds he is a prevailing party in this litigation. 

B. Plaintiff is entitled to a fee award

Defendants argue the verdict “against one officer in the amount of $100... does not equate 

to any sort of meaningful victory for the Plaintiff.” (Id.) According to Defendants, the degree of 

Plaintiff’s success shows “low fees or no fees” should be awarded. (Id., citing Farrar v. Hobby, 

506 U.S. 103 (1992) [holding that “when a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his 

failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is 

usually no fee at all.”)] Notably, defendants rely on Aponte v. City of Chicago, 728 Fed.3d 724, 

728 (7th Cir. 2013) in which the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its understanding of Farrar that denial 

of a fee award may be proper where there is a significant difference between the amount the 

plaintiff requested from the jury and the amount the jury awarded. Notably, Aponte impliedly 

found that absent such a request, this Farrar factor does not support a trial court’s decision to award 

no fees at all.

In Thomas v. City of Tacoma, 410 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit reversed 

an order denying attorney’s fees where the plaintiff received compensatory damages, though the 

amount was quite small. The Court held,

Plaintiff contends that reliance on Farrar was error. We agree. The district 

court used Farrar as a vehicle to arrive at the ultimate denial of Plaintiff's request for 

fees. After categorizing Farrar as a “primary case” for analyzing a request for a 

prevailing plaintiff's attorney's fees, the district court stated that Farrar “cautions that 

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any fee award must be evaluated by comparing the extent of the plaintiffs' success 

with the amount of the award ... [and] recognizes that even where a plaintiff formally 

or technically prevails, sometimes the only reasonable fee is no fee at all.” Thomas, 

No. 01–5138 RBL, at *6 (internal citation and internal quotation omitted). In so 

characterizing Farrar, the district court missed its central holding and improperly 

applied it to this case. The district court characterized Farrar as a case authorizing an 

award of no attorney's fees, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff prevailed, because 

the plaintiff did not prevail enough. Farrar's holding is much more limited. In 

Farrar, the United States Supreme Court decided the propriety of a fee award when 

the plaintiff was awarded only nominal damages. It held that, although a plaintiff is 

technically “prevailing” when awarded nominal damages, a formal or technical 

victory may, in some circumstances, only support an award of no fees. 506 U.S. at 

115, 113 S.Ct. 566. By contrast to the plaintiff in Farrar who was awarded only 

nominal damages, Plaintiff here recovered a total of $35,000: $15,000 in 

compensatory damages and $20,000 in punitive damages. The jury's award of 

punitive damages alone is sufficient to take it out of the nominal category. Therefore, 

the district court's reliance on Farrar was improper.

The proper analysis requires that a prevailing plaintiff only be denied an 

award of attorney's fees when special circumstances exist sufficient to render an 

award unjust. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933. In applying the “special 

circumstances” exception, we focus on two factors: “(1) whether allowing attorney 

fees would further the purposes of § 1988 and (2) whether the balance of the equities 

favors or disfavors the denial of fees.” Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 

878 (9th Cir.1999)

Id. In remanding the matter, the Court ordered,

On remand, the district court must determine the reasonable fee for Plaintiff in this 

case. Because Plaintiff “achieved only partial or limited success, the product of hours 

reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may 

be an excessive amount.” Id. at 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (emphasis added). Therefore, the 

district court's inquiry is more searching, though it “should not result in a second 

major litigation.” Id. at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933. In such cases, we have employed a twopart test: (1) whether Plaintiff prevailed on unrelated claims (“[h]ours expended on 

unrelated, unsuccessful claims should not be included in an award of fees”), and (2) 

whether “the plaintiff achieve[d] a level of success that makes the hours reasonably 

expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award.” Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 

1168 (9th Cir.2003) (internal quotation omitted).

Id. To do this, the Court instructed, 

To determine whether the claims are related, the district court should focus on 

whether the claims on which Plaintiff did not prevail “involve a common core of facts 

or are based on related legal theories.” Id. (emphasis in original). [Footnote] To the 

extent the claims are related, Plaintiff should recover reasonable fees for prosecuting 

those claims. However, a determination that certain claims are not related does not 

automatically bar an award of attorney's fees associated with those unrelated claims; 

work performed in pursuit of the unrelated claims may be inseparable from that 

performed in furtherance of the related or successful claims. We recognize the 

difficulty in parsing through Plaintiff's claims to determine relatedness and in no way 

imply which of the myriad claims brought by Plaintiff are related to his successful 

claim. That is for the district court to decide.

Id., footnote omitted.

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Here, Plaintiff had only one cause of action, which asserted a claim of excessive force under 

the Fourth Amendment. Though he brought the same claim against Officer Barthelmes and was 

unsuccessful on this claim, the Court cannot find that this claim is distinct from that brought against 

Messick. Indeed, though the jury apparently felt the actions of the officers were separable—and the 

Court agrees that there was a reasoned basis for doing so (See Doc. 104)—the claims contained a 

common core of facts. Accordingly, the Court must consider the reasonable fee to be awarded 

without deducting amounts attributable to the claim against Officer Barthelmes. On the other hand, 

the stipulation dismissing the City of Bakersfield failed to indicate whether the parties agreed to 

bear their own costs. (Doc. 33) However, once again, the Court does not find that the claim against 

the City is unrelated to the successful claim Plaintiff successfully prosecuted. Thus, thought he 

Court considers Plaintiff’s failure to prevail against Barthelmes and the City of Bakersfield when 

evaluating the reasonableness of the ultimate fee it will award.

B. Fees awardable

The Court determines a reasonable fee award “by multiplying the number of hours 

reasonably expended by counsel on the particular matter times a reasonable hourly rate.” Florida , 

v. Dunne, 915 F.2d 542, 545 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433)). The product of 

this computation, the “lodestar” amount, yields a presumptively reasonable fee. Gonzalez v. City of 

Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013); Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 

978 (9th Cir. 2008). 

1. Hourly rates

The rates sought by counsel range from $300 to $520 per hour. (See Doc. 105 at 10-12, 

Kawai Decl. ¶ 10) The Supreme Court determined that attorneys’ fees should be calculated 

according to the “prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 

886, 895, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 79 L. Ed. 2d 891 (1984). In general, the “relevant community” for 

purposes of determining the prevailing market rate, is the “forum in which the district court sits.”

Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008). Consequently, when a case is 

filed in the Fresno Division of the Eastern District of California, “[t]he Eastern District of California, 

Fresno Division, is the appropriate forum to establish the lodestar hourly rate.” See Jadwin v. 

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County of Kern, 767 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1129 (E.D. Cal. 2011).

Here, to determine reasonable hourly rates for purposes of calculating the lodestar, Mr. 

Kawai “consulted the Laffey Matrix,” and determined:

In the relevant 2014-2015 timeframe, attorneys such as Martha Rossiter, who had 4 

to 7 years of experience, billed at the rate of $300 per hour. Prior to joining 

Rodriguez & Associates, Ms. Rossiter had significant trial experience as a result of 

her work with the Kern County Public Defender’s Office. Attorneys such as J. 

Miguel Flores, who had 8-10 years of experience, billed at $370 per hour. Mr. Flores 

had significant experience litigating against government entities and major law firms 

in a land-use context prior to joining Rodriguez & Associates in 2010, since which 

time he has handled complex personal injury and civil rights cases. Attorneys such 

as Matthew Jackson, who had 11 years of experience, billed at $460 per hour. Mr. 

Jackson had been an accomplished prosecutor and trial attorney in Cleveland, Ohio 

before joining Rodriguez & Associates. In the same timeframe, attorneys with more 

than 20 years of experience, such as Daniel Rodriguez, billed at the rate of $520 per 

hour. 

(Doc. 105 at 10-11, Kawai Decl. ¶ 9) However, this Court rejected rates based upon the Laffey

Matrix as irrelevant to determining reasonable hourly rates for’ counsel in the Eastern District of 

California. See Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 454 (9th Cir. 2010) (“just 

because the Laffey matrix has been accepted in the District of Columbia does not mean that it is a 

sound basis for determining rates elsewhere, let alone in a legal market 3,000 miles away”). Rather, 

having reviewed the hourly rates in the Fresno Division of the Eastern District, this Court found the 

acceptable rates “for an attorney with less than ten years of experience” ranged “between $175 to 

$300,” noting that attorneys with four and five years of experience were recently awarded $200 per 

hour. Silvester, 2014 WL 7239371 at *4 n.2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014) (citing Willis v. City of

Fresno, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97564 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2014); Gordillo v. Ford Motor Co., 2014 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84359 (E.D. Cal. June 19, 2014)). In addition, “the hourly rate[] generally 

accepted in the Fresno Division for competent experienced attorneys is between $250 and $380, with 

the highest rates generally reserved for those attorneys who are regarded as competent and reputable 

and who possess in excess of 20 years of experience.” Silvester, 2014 WL 7239371 at *4. 

Consequently, the hourly rates sought by Plaintiff’s counsel exceed the ranges awarded in Fresno 

Division of the Eastern District of California. 

Accordingly, for purposes of the lodestar calculation the hourly rates for each attorney must 

be adjusted. Hours for Martha Rossister will be calculated at an hourly rate of $200; John Kawai’s 

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hours will be calculated an hourly rate of $225; J. Miguel Flores’ hours will be calculated at an 

hourly rate of $300; Matthew Jackson’s hours will be calculated at a rate of $325; and Daniel 

Rodriguez’ hours will be calculated at the rate of $380 per hour.

2. Time to be awarded

Defendants contend the hours billed “are unreasonable, lack sufficient description[s], and are 

duplicative.” (Doc. 106 at 17, emphasis omitted) Further, Defendants assert the time sheets indicate 

Plaintiff seeks to recover time related to his criminal trial and clerical work, and such time should 

not be awarded. (Id. at 20-21)

a. Plaintiff’s criminal trial

Defendants contend Plaintiff should not be awarded fees related to his criminal case because 

it “ha[d] absolutely nothing to do with this case.” (Doc. 106 at 20) On the other hand, Plaintiff 

contends it was appropriate to “ bill[]for time spent at criminal hearings for Plaintiff, and not work 

generally spent on the case, because closely following the criminal proceedings was necessary to 

anticipate and, to the extent possible, avoid, Heck v. Humphrey issues that could result from a 

conviction in the criminal case.” (Doc. 107 at 8) At the hearing, platniiff’s counsel conceded that 

these amounts should not be included.

Significantly, the Supreme Court determined a prevailing party is entitled to attorneys’ fees 

for time “reasonably expended on the litigation.” Webb v. Board of Educ. of Dyer Co., 471 U.S. 234, 

242 (1985) (emphasis in original). Though the events in the criminal matter may have been related 

to the civil action, the hours expended in the representation of Plaintiff in the criminal matter were 

not part of this civil matter, which was initiated in December 2014. Consequently, the Court finds 

the following hours must be deducted from the lodestar calculation:

Date Attorney Task Time

1/14/2012 MJ Correspondence with JR re: scene investigation 0.1

1/18/2012 MJ Correspondence with JR re: Walmart lot, investigation report, etc. 0.4

2/8/2012 MJ Correspondence with Client re status of case, research 

investigation

0.3

3/2/2012 MJ Court with Client re Criminal Case from Incident 1.0

3/16/2012 MJ Court Hearing with Client re Criminal Case from Incident 1.5

4/27/2012 MJ Court Hearing with Client re Criminal Case from Incident 1.5

5/18/2012 MJ Pretrial Conference for Client Criminal Case 2.0

6/15/2012 MJ Pretrial Court Appearance with Client re Criminal Case 2.0

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6/29/2012 MJ Pretrial Court Appearance with Client re Criminal Case 1.5

12/13/2012 MJ Draft letter to Virginia Rameriz to get status of Miguel’s 

probation transfer

0.3

12/16/2014 MJR Probation Modification w Client Day 1 1.5

12/17/2014 MJR Probation Modification w Client Day 2 1.5

(Doc. 105-1 at 2, 14-24, 96-97) This results in a total deduction of 13.6 hours from the lodestar, 

10.6 hours for Matthew Jackson, and 3.0 hours for Martha Rossiter. 

b. Clerical tasks

Defendants observe that the time sheets indicate several clerical tasks, which should not be 

included in the lodestar, including entering dates on the calendar and preparing deposition notices. 

(Doc. 106 at 20-21) Courts have discounted paralegal billing entries for “clerical tasks” such as 

“filing, transcript, and document organization time.” Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 921 (9th 

Cir. 2009); see also Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 985 (4th Cir. 1997) (approving the 

court’s elimination of hours spent on secretarial tasks from the lodestar calculation); Jones v. 

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (discounting time for 

“filing or retrieving electronic court documents or copying”). 

Plaintiff agrees “certain of the description of tasks in this case appear clerical in nature, so 

retracts his request for any such time.” (Doc. 107 at 8) Accordingly, the Court reviewed the time 

sheets and determined the following tasks are clerical in nature, and should be deducted from the 

lodestar calculation:

Date Attorney Task Time

12/18/2012 MJ E-file Complaint and Civil Cover Sheet with Eastern District of 

California

0.5

6/3/2013 MJR Entered all court dates from scheduling order 1.5

6/14/2013 MJR Processed discovery propounded by Defendants, entered on 

calendar

0.8

1/15/2014 MJR Prepared depo notices: Christopher Messick, Dean Barthelmes, 

Christopher Peck, and Helmuch Acthmann

0.7

3/3/2014 MJR Prepared and file[d] 2nd notice of depositions 0.3

3/31/2014 MJR Prepared depo notices, for PMQ, etc. 0.5

4/1/2014 MJR Prep amended depo notice for Burdick 0.1

4/15/2014 MJR Amended notices of depos, PMQ and Burdick 0.4

4/20/2014 MJR Amended notice of depo- Burdick 0.2

4/22/2014 MJR Prep Depo Ntc of Williamson 0.2

7/17/2014 MJR Renotice of Depo for Expert Huene, M.D. 0.1

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7/29/2014 MJR 3rd Depo Notice w RTP for Huene, M.D. 0.1

8/7/2014 MJR Depo Notice for Thomas Degenhardt, MD 0.2

(See Doc. 105-1 at 36-83) This results in a total deduction of 5.6 hours from the lodestar, including 

0.5 hours for Matthew Jackson, and 5.1 hours for Martha Rossiter. 

c. Time related to unsuccessful claims

Defendants contend the time awarded should be reduced where it was related to Plaintiff’s 

abandoned claim against the City and unsuccessful claim against Officer Barthelmes. However, it 

can be “proper for a court to award fees against one defendant for time spent litigating against 

another.” Blackwell v. Foley, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 

As noted above, the Court concludes the claims against Officer Barthelmes and the City of 

Bakersfield were related to the claim against Officer Messick. Thus, the time spent on these claims 

will be considered in determining the appropriate fee award. (Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 813 (9th

Cir. 2005), quoting Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2003).

d. Block billing and overbilling time

Defendants contend the hours awarded should be reduced because the time sheets include 

“block billing” (Doc. 106 at 18), where the timekeeping format “bundles tasks in a block of time, 

[and] makes it extremely difficult for a court to evaluate the reasonableness of the number of hours 

expended.” Aranda v. Astrue, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63667, at *13 (D. Ore. June 8, 2011). The 

Ninth Circuit observed that “block billing makes it more difficult to determine how much time was

spent on particular activities.” Welch v. Metro. Life Ins., 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Notably, as Defendants observe, there are several entries that include more than one task for 

the identified date. For example, on March 16, 2014, Ms. Rossiter indicated she expended 2.5 hours 

for “Depo prep, cont’d. reviewing documents, etc.” (Doc. 105-1 at 47) However, there is no 

indication as to what documents were being reviewed, and if they were related to the preparation of 

the deposition. 

In addition, review of the timesheets reveals excessive overbilling on Court appearances by 

Ms. Rossiter. For example, on May 14, 2014, Ms. Rossiter billed 1.0 hour for a conference with 

Heather Cohen and the Court (Doc. 105-1 at 68), while the Court’s records indicate the conference 

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lasted for only 30 minutes. Ms. Rossiter entered 1.7 hours for the pre-trial conference with the Court 

on December 10, 2014 (Doc. 105-1 at 91), which lasted only 17 minutes. Curiously, she also logged 

2.0 hours for a pre-trial conference on February 2, 2015 (Doc. 105-1 at 114), which did not occur. 

Finally, Ms. Rossiter indicated 2.5 hours for the “Hearing re [Motions in Limine]” (Doc. 105-1 at 

113), which took one hour and five minutes. Accordingly, the times reported by Ms. Rossiter for 

these Court appearances will be reduced from 7.2 hours to 1.9 hours, or a total deduction of 5.3 

hours. 

Moreover, the overbilling—particularly when coupled with the block format— causes grave 

concerns regarding the accuracy of the remainder of the hours reported by Ms. Rossiter. Notably, 

the Ninth Circuit explained that, where the attorney presents time expended in “blocks,” the Court 

may “simply reduce[] the fee to a reasonable amount.” Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Welch, 480 F.3d at 948 (“We do not quarrel with the district court's 

authority to reduce hours that are billed in block format”). A district court may “impose a small 

reduction, no greater than 10 percent—a ‘haircut’—based on its exercise of discretion” for block 

billing. Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the Court 

finds it appropriate to reduce the remainder of the number of hours reported by Ms. Rossiter by 

10%, for a total reduction of 23.11 hours. 

e. Duplicative tasks

Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not be awarded time for tasks performed by 

Daniel Rodriguez, because “[h]e never made an appearance in this matter and did not participate in 

the trial...” (Doc. 106 at 20) Rather, Defendants contend the majority of his reported time was 

expended meeting with Ms. Rossiter for updates on the case, and attending the same focus group. 

(Id. at 19-20)

Notably, it is apparent from the record that Mr. Rodriguez was not actively involved in the 

matter, but received status updates from Ms. Rossiter after she attended depositions. (See, Doc. 

105-1 at 3-10, 12-13), In addition, Mr. Rodriguez attended the same focus group as Ms. Rossiter on 

January 3, 2015. (See Doc. 105-1 at 10, 98) However, in general, two attorneys cannot bill for 

attending the same meeting or communicating with each other. In re Mullins, 84 F.3d 459, 467, 

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318 U.S. App. D.C. 19 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Robinson v. Plourde, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1099 (D. 

Haw. 2010). Similarly, time billed by an attorney is not reasonably expended where it serves as 

training. Gauchat-Hargis v. Forest River, Inc., 2013 WL 4828594 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2013). 

Because Plaintiff does not to present any evidence that the time Mr. Rodriguez spent in the status 

meetings or attending the focus group was necessary, the failure of evidence results in a reduction 

of 20.75 hours.

3. Lodestar Calculation

With the hourly rates and time adjustments set forth above, the lodestar in this action is

$48,166.50:

Attorney Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar

Matthew Jackson 4.4 $325 $1,430.00

J. Miguel Flores 7.2 $300 $2,160.00

Daniel Rodriguez 4.0 $380 $1,520.00

Martha Rossiter 207.97 $200 $41,594.00

John Kawai 6.5 $225 $1,462.50

$48,166.50

On the other hand, the Court may adjust the lodestar upward or downward considering the 

following factors adopted by the Ninth Circuit in a determination of the reasonable fees:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions 

involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the 

preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the 

customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed 

by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, 

(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of 

the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, 

and (12) awards in similar cases.

Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975). However, the Court has since 

determined that the fixed or contingent nature of a fee and the “desirability” of a case are no longer 

relevant factors. Resurrection Bay Conservation Alliance v. City of Seward, 640 F.3d 1087, 1095, 

n.5 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Davis v. City of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1546 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

However, in favor of no departure from the lodestar, the Court notes, the hours remaining above are 

reasonable for prosecution of this case, the plaintiff was Spanish speaking, which complicated the 

representation, the experience and reputations of the attorneys involved is significant and the 

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representation existed for more than three years. In favor of departure from the lodestar, the case 

presented no difficult or novel issues. Rather the case involved a straightforward claim of excessive 

force. Though there was a use of a taser, there were no other complicating factors such as the use of 

a K-9 or the use of deadly force. Moreover, the evidence related to the use of the taser was fairly 

minimal. Thus, the skill needed to handle the matter was low-to-moderate. 

In addition, Plaintiff has not provided the Court any information about of any lost 

opportunities for the attorneys due to the decision to take on this matter. He has not provided 

information about the customary fee for such a representation or the awards in similar cases. Most 

important, the evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff’s economic losses for treatment for his injuries 

was more than $40,000 which does not include lost wages (Doc. 106-1 at 9)—which Plaintiff 

testified he suffered as a result of his injuries—and the fact that Plaintiff demanded $250,000 to 

settle the matter a few months before trial. When compared to the insignificant results obtained, the 

Court finds that the lodestar should be adjusted downward by 25 percent. Hensley, 461 U.S., at 436 

[“the most critical factor” in determining the reasonableness of a fee award “is the degree of success 

obtained.”] Thus, the Court will award $36,124.88.

V. Conclusion and Order 

There is a strong presumption that the lodestar is a reasonable fee. Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 

1202; Camacho, 523 F.3d at 978. However, the Court may adjust the lodestar “upward or downward 

only in rare and exceptional cases, supported by both specific evidence on the record and detailed 

findings . . . that the lodestar amount is unreasonably low or unreasonably high.” Van Gerwen v. 

Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000 (internal punctuation and citations 

omitted). Based upon the Court’s review of the record including the timesheets of counsel and the

results obtained as well as the other factors set forth in Kerr ̧ the Court finds this is a case that 

justifies a downward adjustment of the lodestar. 

///

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees is 

GRANTED in the amount of $36,124.88.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 17, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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