Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03501/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03501-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Barbara Burns
Not Party
Kevin E. Burns
Appellant
Wells Fargo Bank West
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3501

___________

Wells Fargo Bank West, National *

Association, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the District

Kevin E. Burns, * of Minnesota.

*

Appellant, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Barbara R. Burns, *

*

Respondent. *

___________

Submitted: June 4, 2004

Filed: June 9, 2004

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, FAGG, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

After Wells Fargo Bank West, N.A. (Wells Fargo) brought an action in

Minnesota state court against Kevin Burns, Barbara Burns, and E-Loan, Inc., arising

out of a mortgage dispute, Mr. Burns removed the case to federal court and invoked

the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667(e) (TILA) to support the removal.

Appellate Case: 03-3501 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/09/2004 Entry ID: 1775535 
1

The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, Chief Judge, United States District

Court for the District of Minnesota.

-2-

The district court1

 remanded the case to state court based on procedural defects and

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, awarded attorney’s fees to Wells Fargo, and

denied a recusal motion filed by Mr. Burns. Mr. Burns appeals. Although we do not

have jurisdiction to review the propriety of the remand order, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 1447(d); Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127-28 (1995), we

affirm the district court’s award of attorney’s fees and its denial of the recusal motion.

Specifically, we find that the district court did not abuse its considerable

discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to Wells Fargo under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), see

Hart v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc. Associates’ Health and Welfare Plan, 360 F.3d 674, 677

(7th Cir. 2004) (attorney’s-fees award under § 1447(c) is independently appealable

order); Children’s Broadcasting Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 357 F.3d 860, 870 (8th

Cir. 2004) (standard of review); Sirotzky v. New York Stock Exch., 347 F.3d 985,

987 (7th Cir. 2003). The removal notice was untimely, see 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), and the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, as a

federal question did not appear on the face of the complaint and the

complete-preemption doctrine does not apply to claims under the TILA, see

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1987); Magee v. Exxon Corp.,

135 F.3d 599, 601-02 (8th Cir. 1998). We also find that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in denying the recusal motion. See Bannister v. Delo, 100 F.3d

610, 614 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1126 (1997); United States v.

Johnson, 47 F.3d 272, 276 (8th Cir. 1995) (standard of review).

Accordingly, we affirm.

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Appellate Case: 03-3501 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/09/2004 Entry ID: 1775535