Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03078/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03078-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Foote
Counter-claimant
Music Group Macao Commercial Offshore Limited
Counter-defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MUSIC GROUP MACAO COMMERCIAL 

OFFSHORE LIMITED,

Plaintiff,

v.

DAVID FOOTE,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-03078-JSC 

ORDER RE: DISCOVERY DISPUTES

Re: Dkt. Nos. 43, 44

This case arises out of a cyber attack on the global computer network and communication 

systems of Plaintiff Music Group Macao Commercial Offshore Limited (“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff 

asserts that the cyber attack occurred due to the failures of Defendant David Foote (“Defendant”), 

a technology consultant for the company. Now pending before the Court are two discovery 

disputes regarding Plaintiff’s responses to two distinct discovery requests. (Dkt. Nos. 43, 44.) 

Having considered the parties’ joint letter briefs, the Court concludes that oral argument is 

unnecessary, see Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). The Court DENIES Defendant’s request for an order 

compelling Plaintiff to respond to Request for Admission Number 1 and GRANTS IN PART and 

DENIES IN PART Defendant’s request for an order compelling Plaintiff to respond to discovery 

requests regarding disciplinary action.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant, the technology consultant that Plaintiff hired to investigate 

and analyze Plaintiff’s internet technology infrastructure, breached his consultancy agreement by 

failing to perform his duties and was grossly negligent in performing those duties because he 

failed to prevent a massive cyber attack on Plaintiff’s systems. Plaintiff brings suit against 

Defendant for (1) breach of contract, (2) negligence, and (3) express contractual indemnity. (Dkt. 

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No. 5.) Defendant contends that the cyber attack was caused by the tortious act of a third party 

and that, in any event, other high level information technology employees—rather than 

Defendant—were responsible for ensuring network security. (See generally Dkt. No. 32.) 

Defendant brings counterclaims against Plaintiff for (1) breach of contract, (2) open book account, 

i.e., to collect on money owed for services that Defendant performed; (3) quantum meruit to 

recover the reasonable value of those services rendered; and (4) declaratory relief in the form of an 

order setting forth whether Defendant has indemnification obligations to Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 14.)

LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that parties “may obtain discovery regarding 

any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(b)(1). In a motion to compel, the moving party bears the burden of showing why the other 

party’s responses are inadequate or their objections unjustified. See Williams v. Gate, No. 09-

0468, 2011 WL 6217378, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2011) (the moving party “bears the burden of 

informing the Court . . . for each disputed response, why [the responding party’s] objection is not 

justified[.] [The moving party] may not simply assert that he has served discovery responses, that 

he is dissatisfied, and that he wants an order compelling further responses.”). “Once the moving 

party establishes that the information requested is within the scope of permissible discovery, the 

burden shifts to the party opposing discovery. An opposing party can meet its burden by 

demonstrating that the information is being sought to delay bringing the case to trial, to embarrass 

or harass, is irrelevant or privileged, or that the person seeking discovery fails to show need for the 

information.” Khalilpour v. CELLCO P’ship, No. 09-02712, 2010 WL 1267749, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 

Apr. 1, 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

A. Response to the Request for Admission (Dkt. No. 43)

The parties’ first dispute pertains to Defendant’s Request for Admission (“RFA”) Number 

1, which asked Plaintiff to “[a]dmit that the attack on your computer network and communication 

infrastructure referred to in the Complaint constituted an illegal act.” (Dkt. No. 43 at 1 (emphasis 

added).) Plaintiff launched several objections to this request, contending, among other things, that 

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the request: (1) seeks information that is not relevant to the litigation; (2) seeks confidential, 

privileged information; (3) and calls for a legal conclusion. (Dkt. No. 43 at 1; Dkt. No. 45-2 at 10-

11.) Defendant argues that the illegality of the cyber attack is relevant to his affirmative defense: 

“because illegal acts are more apt to break the chain of causation, thereby absolving [Defendant] 

even if it is somehow found that he was in breach of his contract or was negligent.” (Dkt. No. 43 

at 2.) Moreover, from Defendant’s perspective, the question of illegality is not a pure matter of 

law, so Plaintiff should be bound to respond. (Id. at 3.)

In a request for admission, a party may seek an admission of “fact, the application of law 

to fact, or opinions about either.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1)(A). Although Rule 36 allows for 

requests applying law to fact, “[r]equests for admissions cannot be used to compel an admission of 

a conclusion of law.” Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1057 (S.D. Cal 1999) 

(citation omitted); see also Stark-Romero v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 275 F.R.D. 551, 554 

(D.N.M. 2011) (“It is still true, however, that one party cannot demand that the other party admit 

the truth of a legal conclusion.” (collecting cases)); Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. Am. Home 

Assurance Co., 177 F.R.D. 454, 458 (D. Minn. 1997) (“[A] request for admission which involves 

a pure matter of law, that is, requests for admission which are related to the facts of the case, are 

considered inappropriate.”). “For example, it would be inappropriate for a party to demand that 

the opposing party ratify legal conclusions that the requesting party has simply attached to 

operative facts.” Disability Rights Council v. Wash. Metro. Area, 234 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2006) 

(citation omitted); see, e.g., Reichenbach v. City of Columbus, No. 2:03-CV-1132, 2006 WL 

143552, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 19, 2006) (concluding that the defendants properly objected to an 

RFA asking them to admit that the curb ramp at issue was not compliant with federal accessibility 

design standards on the ground that it sought a purely legal conclusion); Playboy, 60 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1057 (noting that a defendant may object to an RFA asking her to admit that she is a “public 

figure” as defined in Supreme Court case law as improperly seeking a purely legal conclusion).

Such is the case here. Although Defendant has nominally tied his RFA to the facts of the 

case, the request remains an abstract legal conclusion: whether certain conduct is illegal. The 

RFA does not request underlying facts that may establish that the act was illegal, which may well 

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be appropriate RFAs. Rather, the RFA merely requests the legal conclusion of illegality. Under 

such circumstances, Plaintiff is not bound to answer the RFA and has properly objected on the 

ground that it calls for a legal conclusion.

Defendant’s attempt to distinguish Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050

(S.D. Cal 1999), is unavailing. Defendant contends that while “[t]he requests in Playboy involved 

intricate and specific questions that required legal expertise to answer . . . the request in this case 

calls for a more general application of law to fact[.]” (Dkt. No. 43 at 3.) But the RFA in this case 

is no different than the request in Playboy: both ask the responding party to admit a legal 

conclusion. Defendant’s argument that its request is more general, rather than making its RFA 

more appropriate, if anything makes it worse: unlike the requests in Reichenbach and Playboy

that identified a particular law, Defendant’s RFA here does not identify what law applies, let alone 

what illegal act is at issue. Defendant thus seeks a sweeping legal conclusion as to whether the 

cyber attack constitutes any illegal act in any jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s request for an order to compel Plaintiff to 

respond to RFA Number 1.

B. Response to the Special Interrogatory & Document Request (Dkt. No. 44)

The second dispute pertains to discovery requests regarding disciplinary action that 

Plaintiff took in response to the cyber attack, which implicates Defendant’s Special Interrogatory 

Number 15 and Document Request Number 9. (See Dkt. No. 44.) Special Interrogatory Number 

15 asks Plaintiff to “[d]escribe in detail any disciplinary action you took toward any of your 

personnel in response to the cyber attack referred to in the Complaint.” (Dkt. No. 44 at 1; Dkt. 

No. 45-1 at 3.) Plaintiff objected on the ground that the interrogatory “seeks confidential 

information that is protected by rights of privacy of persons who are not parties to this lawsuit” 

and stated that it would not disclose any confidential personnel information about third parties 

without their consent. (Dkt. No. 45-2 at 6-7.) However, Plaintiff did respond that the consultancy 

agreement with Defendant was terminated as a result of the cyber attack. (Id. at 7.)

Similarly, Defendant’s ninth document request seeks “[a]ny and all documents that reflect 

any official or unofficial personnel action relating to the cyber attack referred to in the Complaint, 

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whether or not that personnel action included termination of employment.” (Dkt. No. 45-1 at 4.) 

Once again, with the exception of documents related to the termination of Defendant’s 

consultancy agreement, Plaintiff objected to this document request on the grounds that it seeks 

confidential personnel information of third parties. (Dkt. No. 45-2 at 9.)

Under California law, the personnel records of other employees are confidential and thus 

protected from discovery “unless the litigant can show a compelling need for the particular 

documents and that the information cannot reasonably be obtained through depositions or from 

nonconfidential sources.” Foster v. ScentAir Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-05772-TEH (MEJ), 2014 WL 

4063160, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2014) (citing Harding Lawson Assocs. v. Sup. Ct., 10 Cal. 

App. 4th 7, 10 (1992)). Thus, it is insufficient for a plaintiff to state that discovery of an 

employee’s personnel record is necessary to facilitate the prosecution of the action. El Dorado 

Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sup. Ct. of Sacramento Cnty., 190 Cal. App. 3d 342, 345-46 (1987). A 

plaintiff must also show that there are no less intrusive means to “satisfy plaintiffs’ legitimate need 

for relevant information.” Id. at 346.

Here, the Court concludes that the requested information about disciplinary action towards 

individuals besides Defendant could be relevant to the issues in this litigation. Plaintiff’s

contention that disciplinary or other personnel action against other employees “has no bearing on 

[Defendant’s] own culpability” because he was ultimately responsible for those individuals (Dkt. 

No. 44 at 5), is shortsighted. To the contrary, if Plaintiff held other employees responsible for the 

cyber attack, information about their discipline may reveal information that could be relevant to 

show that Defendant was not negligent, that his acts did not cause the cyber attack, or both. 

Indeed, Plaintiff produced to Defendant a third-party report that “tentatively concluded that the 

Cyber Attack was mostly likely perpetrated by two former Music Group employees located in the 

United Kingdom.” (Dkt. No. 44 at 7.) Whether Plaintiff acted on suspicions and actually 

terminated any other individuals for the cyber attack makes Defendant’s affirmative defense much 

stronger. Thus, whether Plaintiff took any disciplinary or personnel action against other 

employees in the wake of the cyber attack is certainly relevant.

But Defendant has not shown a compelling need for the personnel files at this time. Courts 

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have found no compelling need for a party to produce confidential personnel files where the 

relevant information could just as easily be obtained through deposition or other less intrusive 

means. See, e.g., Foster, 2014 WL 4063160, at *2. The Special Interrogatories and follow-up 

depositions are such less intrusive means.

Having found that Plaintiff need not disclose the private personnel files under California 

law, the Court need not address Plaintiff’s concerns about disclosure under European Union 

privacy laws. (See Dkt. No. 44 at 7-8.) Accordingly, Plaintiff shall respond to Special 

Interrogatory 15, but need not produce the confidential personnel files.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s request for an order 

compelling Plaintiff to respond to Request for Admission Number 1. The Court GRANTS IN 

PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant’s request for an order compelling Plaintiff to respond to 

Special Interrogatory No. 15 and Document Request Number 9. Plaintiff must respond to Special 

Interrogatory 15 within seven days of the date of this Order, but need not produce the actual 

confidential personnel files. The denial of production of the personnel files is without prejudice to 

Defendant renewing his request should the other discovery means available to Defendant, 

including special interrogatories and depositions, not produce the relevant discovery.

This Order disposes of Docket Nos. 43 and 44.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 10, 2015

______________________________________

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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