Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-02211/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-02211-12/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeronimo Aguilar
Plaintiff
City of Sacramento
Defendant
Daniel Hahn
Defendant
Nicollette Jones
Plaintiff
Loren Wayne Kidd
Plaintiff
Lyric Nash
Plaintiff
Sacramento Police Department
Defendant
Megan White
Plaintiff
Odette Zapata
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MEGAN WHITE; JERONIMO 

AGUILAR; LOREN WAYNE KIDD, 

LYRIC NASH; NICOLLETTE JONES;

and ODETTE ZAPATA,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SACRAMENTO POLICE DEPARTMENT; 

THE CITY OF SACRAMENTO; 

DANIEL HAHN; and DOES 1-200 

(the names and numbers of 

which are currently unknown),

Defendants.

No. 2:21-cv-02211-JAM-SCR

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

Before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment 

as to Plaintiff Loren Wayne Kidd’s claim for failure to 

accommodate. See Mot., ECF No. 78. The Court previously heard 

and ruled on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to other 

claims. See Minute Order, ECF No. 92. At the hearing, the Court 

requested supplemental briefs regarding Kidd’s claim which the

parties submitted. See Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief, ECF No. 

93; Defendants’ Supplemental Brief, ECF No. 94. For the 

following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion as to

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Kidd’s claim. 

Defendants argue that because Kidd’s only requested 

accommodation during his arrest was for marijuana, he cannot 

present a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”). See Defendants’ Supplemental Brief at 2. Kidd presents

four arguments as to why Defendants’ motion should be denied: (1) 

Kidd was denied access to his medication, marijuana; (2) Kidd’s 

restraints were not adjusted; (3) police did not expedite its 

review of body cam footage; and (4) police did not provide Kidd 

with his requested transportation upon his release from custody. 

See Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief at 1-5. None of these 

arguments present a genuine dispute of material fact.

First, the Ninth Circuit has foreclosed Kidd’s claim for 

being denied access to marijuana. The James court concluded, “We 

hold that doctor-recommended marijuana use permitted by state 

law, but prohibited by federal law, is an illegal use of drugs 

for purposes of the ADA, and that the plaintiffs’ federally 

proscribed medical marijuana use therefore brings them within the 

ADA’s illegal drug exclusion.” James v. City of Costa Mesa, 700 

F.3d 394, 405 (9th Cir. 2012). Kidd attempts to distinguish 

James by citing a footnote in the Court’s opinion that stated, 

“We do not hold, as the dissent states, that ‘medical marijuana 

users are not protected by the ADA in any circumstance.’ We hold 

instead that the ADA does not protect medical marijuana users who 

claim to face discrimination on the basis of their marijuana 

use.” Id. at 394 n.3. In this footnote, the court goes on to 

explain that an individual who has a disability is not denied 

protection under the ADA for that disability simply because they 

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use an illegal drug. See id. Thus, Kidd argues that James is 

inapposite because he faced discrimination on the basis of his 

epilepsy, not his marijuana use. The Court disagrees.

Kidd does not explain how the police’s refusal to provide him

access to marijuana was not based on his marijuana use. To do 

so, he seemingly would have to show that police provided access 

to marijuana to other individuals in custody. Put simply, there 

is no showing that police refused because Kidd is epileptic 

instead of the more plausible explanation that police refused 

because marijuana is an illegal substance under federal law. In 

addition to the James holding, courts across the nation that 

“have considered ADA claims for failure to accommodate medical 

marijuana use have relied on the [Controlled Substances Act’s]

classification of marijuana as a Schedule I illegal substance to 

conclude that ‘using marijuana is not a reasonable 

accommodation.’” Eccleston v. City of Waterbury, No. 3:19-CV1614 (SRU), 2021 WL 1090754, at *8 (D. Conn. Mar. 22, 2021) 

(collecting cases).

Second, police did not fail to provide a reasonable 

accommodation in adjusting Kidd’s restraints. Kidd relies on two 

cases, both of which dealt with a motion to dismiss. See

Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief at 3. This dispositional stage 

demands a higher burden. Kidd fails to explain how his

complaints of shoulder pain are related to his epilepsy other 

than he sustained similar injuries during a prior seizure. Kidd

also does not cite any caselaw explaining how adjusting his 

restraints was a reasonable accommodation for his epilepsy.

Third, police did not fail to provide a reasonable 

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accommodation in reviewing the body cam footage. As an initial 

matter, Kidd fails to show that police did not expedite the 

review process. Instead, he simply states it took “hours.” See

id. at 4. Kidd presents no evidence that allows the court to 

compare the review process in this case to other review 

procedures, which means Kidd has not raised a genuine dispute. 

Also, Kidd presents a wide range of cases regarding matters that 

are not relevant to this case, such as de-escalation procedures. 

See id. He does not present caselaw establishing that police 

have to expedite its review of footage for an epileptic 

individual. 

Finally, police did not fail to provide a reasonable 

accommodation when they released Kidd from custody. The only 

case Kidd presents is inapposite. In Gorman, the Eighth Circuit 

heard a case in which the plaintiff claimed that police failed to 

provide reasonable accommodations after he was arrested and while 

being transported in custody. See Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 

907, 910 (8th Cir. 1998) (Plaintiff “claimed that the manner of 

his post-arrest handling and transportation evidenced unlawful 

discrimination by all the defendants, including [officer] who 

drove the police van that took him to the station”). Here, Kidd

claims that police failed to provide him “with appropriate 

accommodations upon his release from custody.” See Plaintiffs’

Supplemental Brief at 5 (emphasis added). Kidd does not cite any 

other caselaw suggesting that he can state a claim for an 

accommodation after his release from custody. 

///

///

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As such, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment as to Plaintiff Kidd’s claim for failure to accommodate. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 7, 2025

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