Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-05828/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-05828-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Dovey
Defendant
Robert A. Horel
Defendant
Jose Luis Morales
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE LUIS MORALES,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ROBERT A. HOREL and JOHN

DOVEY,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-5828 PJH (PR)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS

This is a civil rights case filed pro se by a state prisoner. Before the court for ruling

are plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel and defendants’ opposed motion to

dismiss.

DISCUSSION

I. Appointment of Counsel

There is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case, Lassiter v. Dep't of Social

Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981), and although district courts may "request" that counsel

represent a litigant who is proceeding in forma pauperis, as plaintiff is here, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(1), that does not give the courts the power to make "coercive appointments of

counsel." Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that a district court may ask counsel to represent an

indigent litigant only in "exceptional circumstances," the determination of which requires an

evaluation of both (1) the likelihood of success on the merits and (2) the ability of the

plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. 

Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991).

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Plaintiff has done an exceptional job of presenting his claims and resisting the

motion to dismiss; that it is granted below is a reflection of the intransigent facts, rather than

any lack of ability on plaintiff’s part. The interests of justice do not require appointment of

counsel prior to consideration of the motion to dismiss. 

II. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Among other things, defendants contend that plaintiff did not exhaust his state

administrative remedies before filing his complaint. 

A. Standard

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide

that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983],

or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a). Although once within the discretion of the district court, exhaustion in prisoner

cases covered by § 1997e(a) is now mandatory. Porter v Nussle, 122 S. Ct. 983, 988

(2002). All available remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies "need not meet

federal standards, nor must they be 'plain, speedy, and effective.'" Id. (citation omitted). 

Even when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money

damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. Id.; Booth v Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741

(2001). Similarly, exhaustion is a prerequisite to all inmate suits about prison life, whether

they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege

excessive force or some other wrong. Porter, 122 S. Ct. at 992. 

The State of California provides its inmates and parolees the right to appeal

administratively "any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those

individuals as adversely affecting their welfare." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). It

also provides its inmates the right to file administrative appeals alleging misconduct by

correctional officers. See id. § 3084.1(e). In order to exhaust available administrative

remedies within this system, a prisoner must proceed through several levels of appeal: (1)

informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second

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level appeal to the institution head or designee, and (4) third level appeal to the Director of

the California Department of Corrections. See id. § 3084.5; Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp.

1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997). A final decision at the director’s level satisfied the exhaustion

requirement under § 1997e(a). Id. at 1237-38. 

Nonexhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense. Wyatt v Terhune, 315

F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir 2003). It should be treated as a matter of abatement and brought

in an “unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion rather than [in] a motion for summary judgment.” 

Id. (citations omitted). In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies under § 1997e(a), the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed

issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20. If the court concludes that the prisoner has not exhausted

California’s prison administrative process, the proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice. 

Id. at 1120.

B. Background

The complaint sets out the following facts: Defendant Dovey, Director of the

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, changed the department’s policy regarding

quarterly hygiene packages that inmates are permitted to buy. Formerly, the packages

could contain up to twenty bars of soap; under the new policy, this was reduced to four. 

This is supplemental or replacement soap, presumably of a higher quality than the stateissue soap; it is undisputed that the prison provides twelve state-issued bars of soap per

quarter and that one bar lasts roughly one week, that is, the state-issued soap is sufficient

to last the quarter. Plaintiff and many other inmates filed a group petition addressed to

Dovey, who returned it to the institution for response. The response by Associate Warden

Jacquez did not change the policy. Plaintiff then filed an administrative appeal on his own

behalf. It was rejected at all levels, including by defendant Horel, the acting warden, and at

the director’s level. Plaintiff contends that he is allergic to the state-issue soap and as a

result has contracted Bell’s Palsy. 

In the initial review order the court concluded that plaintiff’s claim that defendants

were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need was sufficient to proceed. 

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C. Analysis

The group petition sent to Dovey was cast in general terms and was not an

administrative appeal pursuant to the regulations quoted above in the “standard” section. It

therefore did not suffice to exhaust available remedies. Plaintiff seems, rather, to base his

contention that he did exhaust his remedies upon his individual administrative appeal. 

Defendants contend that the administrative appeal was not specific enough to exhaust,

however.

 Compliance with prison grievance procedures is all that is required by the PLRA to

properly exhaust, so the level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the

grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the

prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion. 

Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 923 (2007). In California, the regulations permit an

administrative appeal to be filed as to "any departmental decision, action, condition, or

policy which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare." Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a)." As to content, the regulations only instruct the prisoner to 

"describe the problem and action requested... ." Id. at § 3084.2(a). 

Although what would constitute "the problem" might vary depending on the facts of

the claim, the court concludes that in this case “the problem” which gave rise to this

medical claim is that plaintiff allegedly is allergic to the state-issue soap, and thus the

change in policy about buying one’s own soap endangered his health – and indeed caused

him injury. A review of the administrative appeal, however, shows that plaintiff did not say

that he is allergic to the state-issue soap, nor that he suffered or would suffer injury from

having to use it. See Decl. N. Huynh, exh. 2. This is the only mention of allergies in the

grievance: “On another note, there are some inmates that are allergic to the state soap

provided and of [sic] the detergent the prison laundry uses. These inmates would have to

purchase twice the amount of soap an average person would use since detergent is not

available to inmates. Inmates in Pelican Bay State Prison are confined to closed quarters

for long periods of time, hygiene is a high standard demand to maintain personal health.” 

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Id. at 2.2. In short, plaintiff did not say in the grievance that he is allergic to the soap and

needs to purchase soap for medical reasons, but rather appeared to be advancing that

argument on behalf of other inmates. Had he specified that he personally could not use the

state-issue soap, it might have been possible for the institution to work out some sort of

accommodation, such as making an exception for plaintiff, or arranging for medical tests to

confirm the allergy and then prescribing soap that would not trigger it. But not having been

told that plaintiff himself was allergic to the soap, defendants had no reason to take such

steps. 

One of the purposes of the exhaustion requirement is to give the institution a chance

to remedy justified inmate grievances without the necessity of court action. See Jones v.

Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 923 (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2004)

("the primary purpose of a grievance is to alert prison officials to a problem ... .")). The

grievance here was not sufficient to alert defendants to “the problem,” and thus the

possibility of remedial action was prevented. Under these circumstances, dismissal of the

action because of plaintiff’s failure to exhaust state remedies enforces the goals of the

requirement. The motion to dismiss will be granted.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion to dismiss (document number 11 on the docket) is GRANTED.

This case is DISMISSED without prejudice. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 31, 2007. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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