Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03231/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03231-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gail W. Douglas
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

 The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District Court of Missouri, adopting the report and recommendation of The

Honorable Sarah W. Hays, United States Magistrate for the Western District of

Missouri. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3231

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the Western 

* District of Missouri.

Gail W. Douglas, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 16, 2005

Filed: June 1, 2005

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, BOWMAN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

This case presents the question of whether a police officer's warrantless search

of Gail Douglas's apartment was unreasonable under the fourth amendment. The

district court1

 denied Mr. Douglas's motion to suppress a shotgun seized as a result

of the search. It adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation that

concluded that the search was not unreasonable, because a reasonable police officer

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could have believed that Stephanie Burton, who consented to the search, was a cohabitant of the apartment and, in the alternative, that sufficient exigent circumstances

existed to warrant the search. Mr. Douglas entered a conditional guilty plea to the

charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm, see 18 U.S.C.

§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to

suppress. We affirm the district court’s order denying the suppression motion, but

on different grounds: We conclude that Ms. Burton had actual authority over the

apartment and therefore could consent to a search of it.

The magistrate judge found the following facts based on evidence adduced at

the suppression hearing. Two police officers went to Mr. Douglas's apartment to

investigate a domestic-disturbance call. Ms. Burton, Mr. Douglas's girlfriend at the

time, answered the door and invited the officers in. Once inside, the officers

interviewed Mr. Douglas and Ms. Burton. Mr. Douglas told the officers that

Ms. Burton did not live in the apartment. Ms. Burton told the officers that she had

another residence but that she stayed primarily at Mr. Douglas's apartment;

Ms. Burton had a microwave oven, a television, clothes, vitamins, and some of her

children's toys at the apartment. She also informed them that Mr. Douglas was a

convicted felon (which one of the officers confirmed by calling the police dispatcher)

and that he possessed a shotgun which he stored under the mattress in the bedroom

of the apartment. One of the officers followed Ms. Burton to the bedroom and seized

the shotgun from underneath the mattress. Following the search, Ms. Burton

reiterated to the police that she lived at the apartment, explaining that she stayed there

about four nights per week. On the basis of these facts, the magistrate judge found

that Ms. Burton lived at the apartment with Mr. Douglas.

The fourth amendment provides that "the right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,

shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. As a rule, searches and seizures are

unreasonable unless accompanied by a warrant. See, e.g., Illinois v. McArthur,

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531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001). There are exceptions to this rule, however. Id. A

warrantless search or seizure is not unreasonable if it has been consented to. See

generally Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). An individual’s

consent is valid if he or she has common authority over the property to be searched.

United States v. James, 353 F.3d 606, 613 (8th Cir. 2003). The existence vel non of

common authority does not depend upon the technical rules of property law, United

States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974), but "is a function of mutual use, joint

access, and control." James, 353 F.3d at 613. Thus "an adult co-occupant of a

residence can consent to a search." United States v. Jones, 193 F.3d 948, 950 (8th

Cir. 1999). 

Whether an individual has common authority over property is a question of

fact. James, 353 F.3d at 613. Here, the magistrate judge found on an ample record

that Ms. Burton lived at the apartment at the time of the search. (Part of the basis for

this finding was that Ms. Burton had clothes, a television set, and a microwave oven

there, facts that Mr. Douglas does not contest.) A finding that Ms. Burton had

common authority over the premises follows as a matter of law. Her consent to

search it was therefore valid.

Affirmed.

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