Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03017/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03017-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
ANR Freight System, Inc.
Appellee
American Association of Retired Persons
Amicus Curiae
Harry Morgan
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

HARRY MORGAN, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

F 

U•Jiced ·, · ... ,razes Cou,c of A L 

.,.""'th c· . P#'eaus !ram 

APR 2 O 1990 

XOBER_y L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) 

) 

ANR FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC., also ) 

No. 89-3017 

(D.C. No. 87-2239-0) 

(Dist. of Kansas) 

known as Graves Truck Lines, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee, ) 

) 

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED ) 

PERSONS, ) 

) 

Amicus Curiae. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before BALDOCK, BARRETT and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

Plaintiff below, Harry Morgan (Morgan), appeals from the 

district court's grant of defendant-appellee ANR Freight Systems, 

Inc.'s (ANR) motion for Summary Judgment in this Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA ) , 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., 

and Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 u.s.c. § 

1140, et seq., action. The pertinent facts follow. 

Since 1978, Morgan had been promoted by ANR, a national 

general commodity freight carrier, to serve as its terminal 

manager at Iola, Kansas. In addition, in 1984 he assumed 

* This Order and Judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-3017 Document: 01019971635 Date Filed: 04/20/1990 Page: 1 
managerial duties at the Fort Scott, Kansas, terminal. Morgan's 

duties involved both operations and sales. He satisfactorily 

performed his duties. 

ANR experienced severe economic conditions due to recession, 

deregulation and increased operating costs, leading to a 1985 

year-end net operating loss of $7,655,523. As a result, ANR 

undertook drastic measures in 1986 to decrease its operating 

expenses and to cut its losses, including a reduction in salaried 

work force. Regional managers and district sales managers of ANR 

were directed, nationwide, to examine their operations in order to 

target reductions in operating expenses, and to identify salaried 

.positions . that. could be . eliminated without significantly affecting 

ANR's ability to serve its customers. From these determinations, 

some 78 salaried persons were terminated nationwide, with 13 of 

these terminations affecting salaried employees in the Kansas 

City, Missouri, Region, including Morgan. 

In the Kansas City Region, determinations relative to 

reductions in the salaried work force were made by Steve Emahiser, 

the Regional Operations Manager, and Cam Hill, the Regional Sales 

Manager. They were assisted by district sales managers, including 

Mr. Frank Hollingshead, whose district included the Iola/Fort 

Scott, Kansas, territory. 

Job terminations in the Kansas City Region included four 

terminal manager positions in smaller, outlying terminals, four 

territory sales managers, three dispatchers, one secretary and one 

cashier. The persons affected ranged from age 27 to age 57. Two 

of the three salaried personnel employed at the Iola, Kansas, 

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terminal were eliminated, i.e., the terminal manager's position 

held by Morgan, who was then age 57, and the territory sales 

manager position held by Scott Mann, then age 49. The terminal 

secretary was retained. The Iola, Kansas, terminal was selected 

for reduction because of a declining economic condition in the 

area, and the belief that the terminal operation duties performed 

by Morgan and the sales duties performed by Mann could be handled 

by Jerry Near, the terminal manager at nearby Cherryvale, Kansas. 

Near was age 52. 

Several weeks following the terminations of Morgan and Mann, 

ANR determined that the sales account load being handled by Jerry 

Near was excessive. Accordingly, ANR rehired Mann as its Iola, ~ 

Kansas, territorial sales representative. Mann testified by 

deposition that he performed only a few of the duties formerly 

performed by Morgan as terminal manager. 

District Court Decision 

On cross-motions for Summary Judgment on the ADEA claim, the 

district court concluded that there was no genuine issue of fact 

for trial and that Morgan had established (1) he was within the 

protected age group under the ADEA, (2) he had been adversely 

affected by ANR's employment decision, and (3) he was qualified 

for the position given to Scott Mann after Mann was recalled. The 

district court found, however, that Morgan had failed to establish 

the fourth prong of his prima facie reduction-in-force case in 

that Morgan had not produced any evidence that he was 

discriminated against on the basis of his age in either his 

termination or in not being rehired for other positions within 

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ANR. With regard to Morgan's claim that ANR failed to consider 

him for any job openings following his termination, the district 

court found that when Morgan was terminated, ANR did not make any 

representations to him relative to future employment and that 

Morgan failed to apply for any other positions at ANR. 

With regard to the ERISA claim, the district court concluded 

that Morgan failed to establish that ANR's "motivating factor" in 

Morgan's employment termination was to interfere with the 

attainment of Morgan's pension benefits. 

Contentions on Appeal 

On appeal, Morgan contends that the district court erred in 

.granting ANR' s motions for summary judgment on his ADEA and ERISA 

claims because the district court improperly reviewed the evidence 

and misapplied principles of law. 

Standard of Review 

In reviewing the district court's order granting a motion for 

summary judgment, we must apply the same standard as that employed 

by the district court. Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 

848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). The district court employed 

the standard that summary judgment should be granted "[i]f the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). 

To survive the motion, the nonmoving party must "present 

evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor." 

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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). "Where 

different ultimate inferences may properly be drawn, the case is 

not one for a summary judgment." Luckett v. Bethelehem Steel 

Corp., 618 F.2d 1373, 1377 (10th Cir. 1980} (citations omitted}. 

"By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence 

of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not 

. 

defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary 

judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of 

material fact." Anderson, v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, at pp. 

247-48 (emphasis in the original}. 

Discussion 

I. 

Morgan contends that the district court erred in granting 

ANR's motion for summary judgment on his Count I ADEA claim. 

29 U.S.C. § 623 (a}(l} of the ADEA renders it unlawful for an 

employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual 

or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to 

his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 

because of such individual's age. 

A. 

The Termination Claim 

Both Morgan and the American Association of Retired Persons 

(AARP), which filed an amicus curiae brief, argue that the 

district court's conclusion that there was no genuine issue of 

fact concerning ANR's motives in Morgan's "lay off" is clearly 

erroneous. They contend that the district court's conclusion that 

the company had proffered a legitimate reason for Morgan's "lay 

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off" based on economic conditions is clearly erroneous and 

reflects a fundamental misperception about the application of the 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) framework 

for proving discrimination in a reduction-in-force case. They 

argue that rather than viewing all of the evidence relevant to 

the ultimate issue as to whether age was a determining factor in 

"laying off'' Morgan, the district court applied a mechanistic 

approach rather than concentrating on whether Morgan was treated 

less favorably than younger employees. We observe that the 

district court's Memorandum and Order finds/concludes that Morgan 

was terminated rather than laid off (R., Vol. III, Doc. 96). We 

hold that the _record supports the district court's conclusion and 

that there is no genuine dispute of material fact on that issue. 

Morgan contends that the following evidence supports his 

contention that he was treated less favorably than younger 

employees, and further establishes his prima facie case: 

ANR's admission that at the time Mr. Morgan was laid 

off, persons younger and less qualified than Mr. Morgan 

were retained in managerial positions in the Kansas City 

region for which Mr. Morgan was equally or more 

qualified. (Doc. 80 at 5; Doc. 93 at 20-22). Evidence 

that Scott Mann, who was younger than Morgan had worked 

under him in Iola and had many fewer years with ANR, was 

recalled by ANR within a few weeks of the reduction-inforce and assumed Morgan's job duties. (Doc. 80 at 6). 

ANR's admission that it did not search for another 

position into which Mr. Morgan could be placed. (Doc. 80 

at 4- 5). 

ANR's statement that its sole criterion in cutting its 

work force was reducing the amount it paid in salaries. 

(Doc. 80 at 9-10). 

Evidence of other ADEA lawsuits against ANR. (Doc. 80 at 

11-12, 32-34; Doc. 93 at 14-15, 35-37). 

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Evidence that the reduction-in-force disproportionately 

affected ANR's older employees. For example, four of 

the five affected terminal managers in ANR's Kansas City 

Region were in the protected age group, (Doc. 76, 

Bullock Affidavit at 3), and eight of the 14 affected 

employees in ANR's Kansas City Region were in the 

protected age group. (Doc 76, Bullock Affidavit at 3). 

(Brief of Appellant, p. 15). 

There is no evidence in the record rebutting ANR's contention 

that the company's reduction-in-force was undertaken on a 

nationwide basis as a result of adverse economic conditions. 

Morgan has failed to submit credible evidence that ANR terminated 

him and failed to rehire him because ANR was motivated by age 

discrimination. 

The . record . demonstrates that of the thirteen salaried 

employees terminated in the Kansas City Region, seven of the 

thirteen were in the protected age group. In Branson v. Price 

River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1988), we held that in an 

ADEA suit the employer is not required to accord members of a 

protected class any preferential treatment, but only that 

employers must treat age neutrally. Thus, it is clear that the 

ADEA does not create a job priority based on age. 

An employer does not violate the ADEA unless it is 

established that age was the "determining factor" in the 

employment decision. See E.E.O.C. v. Sperry Corp., 852 F.2d 503 

(10th Cir. 1988); E.E.O.C. v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan 

Assoc., 763 F. 2d 1166 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 

(1985); Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F. 2d 654 (10th Cir. 

1984). In this case, just as in Title VII, 42 u.s.c. § 2000e 

cases, the employer has discretion to choose among equally 

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qualified employees in any employment decision, provided that the 

decision is not based upon unlawful criteria. Texas Dept. of 

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981). The 

question, then, is whether ANR terminated Morgan because his age 

was the "determining factor." 

Clearly, Morgan's termination resulted from ANR's decision to 

eliminate his position as part of the company's nationwide 

reduction in force. The district court found that ANR undertook 

this action based upon its nationwide unprofitable operations. 

Morgan's depositional testimony confirmed that. On the state of 

this record, there is no genuine issue as to that material fact. 

. -Mor.gan points to certain .evidence reflecting that in 1984 and 1985 

the Iola and Fort Scott terminals were operating at a profit and 

that ANR's Kansas City Region operated at a profit in 1984 and 

1985. This was disputed by ANR. However, there was no evidence 

disputing the fact that the reduction in force was undertaken by 

ANR because of unprofitable operations nationwide. 

We hold that Morgan did not present evidence from which a 

jury might return a verdict, finding that his termination was 

based upon discriminatory age animus. The district court did not 

err in granting ANR's motion for summary judgment. 

Courts "[a]re not free to second-guess an employer's business 

judgment." Branson v. Price River Coal Co., supra, at 772. See 

also Lucas v. Dover Corp., 857 F.2d 1397, 1403 (10th Cir. 1988) 

(In ADEA action held that "this court will not second guess 

business decisions made by employers, in the absence of some 

evidence of impermissible motives.") In our view, Morgan's 

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contentions both before the district court and on appeal are 

simply challenges to ANR's business judgment. They do not serve 

as substitutes for proof that ANR eliminated Morgan's position and 

terminated his employment because of any age discrimination 

animus. "ADEA does not protect against generally unfair business 

policies, however objectionable; the act proscribes only 

discriminatory practices." E.E.O.C. v. Sperry Corp., supra, at 

509. 

In this record, certainly no evidence was presented that 

Morgan's age was the "determining factor." The evidence before 

the district court established that Morgan's position as terminal 

manager was eliminated and Morgan was terminated in a nationwide 

bona fide reduction in force program. 

Morgan insists that he satisfied the fourth prong of the 

McDonnell-Douglas test and met his burden of establishing a prima 

facie case by (1) ANR's admission that when Morgan was "laid off" 

some younger and less qualified terminal managers in the Kansas 

City Region were retained, (2) showing that ANR did not search for 

another position for Morgan following his "lay off," (3) showing 

that ANR's sole criteria in the reduction in force was to reduce 

salaries, (4) presenting evidence that other ADEA lawsuits had 

been filed against ANR, and (5) evidence showing that the 

reduction in force disproportionately affected older employees of 

ANR (Brief of Appellants, p. 15). We disagree. 

First, the retention of some younger employees does not, ipso 

facto, establish a discriminatory animus. Such evidence would be 

relevant if Morgan had demonstrated that some of the terminal 

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managers retained in the Kansas City Region were not similarly 

situated, i.e., experience and job duties. No such evidence was 

presented. Second, Morgan admits that he did not apply to ANR for 

rehire. Third, although reduction of salaries was an intended 

savings, there is no evidence that Morgan's salary was the sole 

reason his position was eliminated. The determination was made 

that his duties could be assumed by Jerry Near, the terminal 

manager at nearby Cherryvale. Thus, this is not a case, as Morgan 

and AARP contend, like Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202 

(7th Cir. 1987) where a 54-year old employee with 27 years of 

service was replaced by a younger, lower-salaried employee. 

Fourth, the filing of .lawsuits is hardly evidence of one's ''bad 

acts" because no showing has been made therefrom that ANR had in 

fact violated the ADEA. Finally, although the impact on Morgan 

arising from his termination was difficult for him and did result 

in his inability to accrue pension benefits beyond those already 

vested and the loss of life insurance and medical benefits, there 

is nothing showing 

merely a pretext for 

that ANR's rationale for his termination was 

age discrimination. We hold that the 

evidence before the district court demonstrated that there was no 

genuine issue of material fact in contradiction to ANR's 

contention that it had a legitimate, business oriented, 

nondiscriminatory basis for the elimination of Morgan's terminal 

manager position. 

The Recall Claim 

Morgan argues that if the facts of this case had been 

properly analyzed by the district court, it would have concluded 

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that Morgan had been laid off rather than terminated. The 

significance of Morgan's ''layoff" contention centers on the action 

of ANR's recall of Scott Mann, younger than Morgan, within seven 

weeks of Morgan's termination to assume "[t)he job 

responsibilities Morgan held at the Iola terminal prior to his 

layoff." (Brief of Appellant, p. 21). Morgan points out that at 

the time of their "layoffs," Mann was being paid a lesser salary 

than he, Mann had no training in terminal management nor any 

supervisory training, and Mann did not file an application for reemployment with ANR. Id. 

Some seven weeks following the terminations of Morgan and 

Mann, ANR determined that the sales account was much more than 

Jerry Near could reasonably handle. Accordingly, Scott Mann was 

recalled because he had previously served as ANR's territorial 

sales manager for the southeast Kansas area covered by the Iola 

terminal. Morgan contends, without factual support, that Mann 

assumed the job responsibilities of Morgan following his recall. 

Id. Mann gave deposition testimony that although he performed 

some operational duties as the only salaried employee at the Iola 

terminal, he did not perform the duties formerly performed by 

Morgan while Morgan was the terminal manager. Further, Mann 

testified that his duties have not really been expanded from those 

he performed before his termination. 

Morgan argues that he established his prima facie case by 

showing that he was replaced by Scott Mann, a younger person. The 

record demonstrates, however, that as part of the reduction in 

force action, ANR eliminated Morgan's position as terminal manager 

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at both the Iola and Fort Scott terminals, for economic reasons. 

At the same time that Morgan was terminated and his positions 

eliminated, Scott Mann's position as sales manager was also 

eliminated and he, too, was terminated. ANR had determined that 

Jerry Near, its terminal manager at Cherryvale, Kansas, could 

assume the duties and responsibilities of both Morgan and Mann. 

The district court ruled that because Morgan did not make 

formal application for rehire, he could not complain that ANR aid 

not recall or rehire him. Morgan argues, however, that he should 

have been rehired for any of the positions nationwide that opened 

up with ANR since his termination. Morgan particularly contends 

that ,he should have been recalled to . serve in the territorial 

sales manager position filled by Scott Mann. 

Morgan acknowledges that he did not make application with ANR 

for any of the positions he claims that he should have been 

considered for. In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 

567 (1978), a case involving a Title VII claim of racial 

discrimination in employment, the Supreme Court held that in order 

to satisfy the second prong of the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 

Green, supra, test in making out a prima facie case, it is 

necessary that a plaintiff show that he applied and was qualified 

for the job. While the Supreme Court held that the McDonnell 

Douglas rule was not inflexible, still there is nothing in that 

case or in International Bro. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 

U.S. 324 (1977), upon which Morgan relies, supporting Morgan's 

contention that, based on the facts in this case, "Morgan's re-

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employment should not have depended on his submitting an 

application." (Brief of Appellant, p. 22). 

In International Bro. of Teamsters, supra, the Supreme Court 

held that the Government had sustained its burden of proving that 

there had existed a systemwide pattern or practice of employment 

discrimination against blacks and Spanish-surnamed persons in 

violation of Title VII. Measured against this background, the 

Court held that "[t]he company's assertion that a person who had 

not actually applied for a job can never be awarded seniority 

relief" must fail because "[a] consistently enforced 

discriminatory policy can surely deter job applications from those 

who are aware of it .and. are unwilling to submit themselves to the 

humiliation of explicit and certain rejection." 431 U.S. at 365. 

Quite obviously, that case has no application here. To the 

contrary, in the case at bar Morgan has offered no evidence that 

it would have been futile had he applied to ANR for a position 

following his termination. 

he expressed any interest 

inquiries relative thereto. 

Morgan did not offer any evidence that 

in being rehired or that he made 

Morgan's brief consistently refers to the proposition that he 

was "laid off" rather than "terminated." The district court 

found, however, that he was terminated, resulting "[f]rom a need 

to cut back on unprofitable operations in light of changed 

economic conditions." (R., Vol. III, Tab 96, p. 5). We agree. 

Morgan's insistence that he was "laid off'' rather than 

"terminated" is consistent with his contention that he had a 

reasonable expectation that he would be offered Scott Mann's 

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position when it was reestablished. We have already held that 

Morgan was terminated. The record does not support Morgan's 

contention that Scott Mann was rehired by ANR to perform those 

duties of terminal manager previously performed by Morgan. 

Throughout their briefs, both Morgan and the AARP have 

attempted to create the requisite inference of age discrimination 

by arguing that: Scott Mann, when rehired, was younger than 

Morgan; some ANR employees who were younger and without as much 

experience as older employees were retained; salary savings was 

the intended result in the reduction in force; and other like 

lawsuits have been filed against ANR. The bent of these arguments, 

if taken to their. logical . conclusion, would require an employer to 

grant preferential treatment to its employees within the protected 

age group. Such a result was not intended by the ADEA. Branson 

v. Price River Coal Co., supra, 853 F.2d at 772; Yartzoff v. 

Oregon Employment Div. of Dept. of Human Resources, 745 F.2d 557 

(9th Cir. 1984) (an age discrimination in employment plaintiff 

must establish that the condemned employment practices have a 

substantially disproportionate impact upon the protected class, 

and evidence that some younger employees are doing the same job in 

the same positions is not sufficient evidence to establish 

discriminatory practices). 

The ADEA simply requires that an employer reaches all 

employment decisions without regard to age. However, an employer 

is not required to show special, preferential treatment to members 

of a protected age class. "An ADEA plaintiff is not required to 

show that age was the sole motivating factor in the employment 

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decision, but only that age was also a reason, and that age was 

the factor that made a difference." Cockrell v. Boise Cascade 

Corp., 781 F.2d 173, 179 (10th Cir. 1986). 

Morgan did not present evidence to withstand ANR's motion for 

summary judgment on the issue that his age was the determining, 

motivating factor in his job termination or failure to recall. 

The district court did not err in granting ANR's motion for 

summary judgment on Morgan's ADEA claim. 

II. 

Morgan contends that the district court erred in granting 

ANR's motion for summary judgment on Count II, the ERISA claim . 

. 29 u.s.c. § 1140 of ERISA (§ 510) provides, inter alia: 

It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, 

fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate 

against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any 

right to which he is entitled under the provisions of 

the employee benefit plan, this Title, Section 3001 (29 

U.S.C. § 1201), or the Welfare and Pension Plans 

Disclosure Act, or for the purpose of interfering with 

the attainment of any right to which such participant 

may become entitled under the plan, this Title, or the 

Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act •... 

The district court, relying on Dillon v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998 

(3rd Cir. 1984), ruled that in order for a plaintiff to prevail 

under§ 510, supra, he or she must demonstrate that the defendant 

employer had a specific intent to interfere with the plaintiff's 

attainment of pension eligibility. The district court found that 

the record did not demonstrate that ANR terminated Morgan with a 

specific intent to interfere with his ERISA rights. We agree. 

Notwithstanding that the Pretrial Order in this case clearly 

defined the ERISA issue, both under issues of fact and of law, 

i.e., whether ANR terminated or laid off Morgan with the specific 

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intent of depriving him of his pension rights/benefits under ERISA 

(R., Vol. I, Doc. 36, pp. 9-10), on appeal Morgan argues that 

because of ANR's "[u]nlawful actions, Morgan lost an opportunity 

to accrue additional pension benefits, in addition to cancellation 

of his medical benefits, and reduced life insurance benefits •.• 

" (Appellant's Brief, p. 27). The district court did not err in 

confining Morgan's ERISA claim to his pension benefits/rights. 

The Pretrial order measures the dimensions of a lawsuit, both in 

the trial court and on appeal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, 28 

U.S.C.A. See Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 795 (10th 

Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 918 (1981). Morgan's 

deposition testimony that because of the termination, he lost not 

only the opportunity to accrue additional pension benefits, but 

that he also lost medical benefits and that his life insurance was 

reduced did not cure his failure to define his ERISA claim clearly 

for trial purposes when the district court's Pretrial Order was 

entered. 

The parties agree that Morgan's pension benefits under ERISA 

had vested prior to his termination. 

ANR urges that we hold, as did the court in West v. Butler, 

621 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1980) that "the legislative history 

[of§§ 510 and 511] reveals that the prohibitions were aimed 

primarily at preventing unscrupulous employers from discharging or 

harassing their employees in order to keep them from obtaining 

vested rights." 

Morgan, on the other hand, relies on Kross v. Western Elec. 

Co., Inc., 701 F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1983) where the court 

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pointed to the language in§ 510 which prohibits the discharge of 

an employee "for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of 

any right to which such participant may become entitled" (emphasis 

in original), as clearly demonstrating the Congressional intent to 

"remedy a broad range of problems in the field of employment 

benefit plans. 11 The Kross court found no support for the district 

court's conclusion that because Kross was already a participant in 

the insurance plans (vested), he was not prevented from attaining 

rights under the plan. The court concluded that Kross' 

allegations stated a claim under § 510 of ERISA because, if 

proven, he would establish that he was discharged for the purpose 

of interfering with the payment of certain medical and dental 

expenses he had incurred. 

The district court did not reach the statutory interpretation 

issue discussed in West v. Butler, supra, and Kross v. Western 

Elec. Co., supra, and we need not do so; we agree that Morgan has 

failed to present evidence demonstrating that ANR had the 

"specific intent" required to violate ERISA. Gavalik v. 

Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 851 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 

484 U.S. 979 (1987) (The loss of ERISA benefits under§ 510 must 

be the motivating factor, rather than a mere consequence, behind 

the termination of employment; a specific intent to interfere with 

the attainment of pension eligibility must be demonstrated). 

We have previously held that the district court did not err 

in ruling that Morgan did not present sufficient evidence of an 

unlawful employment motivation on ANR's part in terminating his 

employment so as to withstand ANR's motion for summary judgment. 

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• 

To the same effect, we hold that the district court did not err in 

ruling that Morgan failed to present sufficient evidence that ANR 

had the specific intent to interfere with Morgan's ERISA rights so 

as to withstand ANR's motion for summary judgment. 

We AFFIRM. 

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Entered for the Court: 

James E. Barrett, 

Senior United States 

Circuit Judge 

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