Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03615/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03615-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wesley George Thorn
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Ortrie D. Smith, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable

James C. England, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of

Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3615

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Wesley George Thorn, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: July 1, 2005

 Filed: July 11, 2005

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BOWMAN and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges.

___________

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Wesley Thorn was charged with one count of possession of child pornography

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2) (2000). The District Court1

denied Thorn's motion to suppress evidence obtained in a search of Thorn's office at

the Missouri Division of Child Support Enforcement, and Thorn entered a conditional

plea of guilty to the charge. Applying the mandatory sentencing guidelines scheme

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that was in place prior to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker,

125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), the District Court sentenced Thorn to twenty-seven months'

imprisonment. Thorn filed a timely appeal of the District Court's denial of his motion

to suppress, and we affirmed the District Court's decision on July 13, 2004. United

States v. Thorn, 375 F.3d 679 (8th Cir. 2004). Thorn then filed a petition for

rehearing and rehearing en banc in which he argued, for the first time, that pursuant

to Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), his sentence violated his Sixth

Amendment rights. The Court denied Thorn's petition for rehearing and rehearing en

banc on August 6, 2004. Thorn next filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the

United States Supreme Court. On January 24, 2005, the Supreme Court, at 125 S. Ct.

1065, granted Thorn's petition for writ of certiorari, vacated our judgment, and

remanded the case to us for further consideration in light of Booker. On

reconsideration, we affirm Thorn's sentence, and we reinstate our decision affirming

Thorn's conviction.

In Booker, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory nature of the United

States Sentencing Guidelines ran afoul of the Sixth Amendment insofar as a

sentencing judge, based on certain facts found by the judge, was required to impose

a more severe sentence than could have been imposed based on facts found by the

jury or admitted by the defendant. 125 S. Ct. at 749. Because the Court further held

that the constitutional parts of the guidelines could not be saved by severing them

from the parts it had found unconstitutional, the Court declared the entirety of the

guidelines "effectively advisory." Id. at 757. Nevertheless, sentencing judges must

"take account of the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals" enumerated in

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. at 764. 

Because Thorn did not raise a Sixth Amendment challenge to the

constitutionality of the guidelines in the District Court, we review his Booker claims

for plain error under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See

United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 549 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Plain error

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The PSR stated that Thorn's offense involved a minor under the age of twelve

years, resulting in a two-level enhancement to Thorn's base offense level pursuant to

§ 2G2.4(b)(1) of the guidelines; that Thorn's offense involved the possession of ten

or more items containing a visual depiction of the sexual exploitation of a minor,

resulting in an additional two-level enhancement pursuant to § 2G2.4(b)(2) of the

guidelines; and that Thorn's possession of materials depicting a minor engaged in

sexually explicit conduct resulted from his use of a computer, resulting in a further

two-level enhancement pursuant to § 2G2.4(b)(3) of the guidelines. PSR at ¶¶ 40–42.

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review is governed by the four-part test set forth in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.

725, 732–36 (1993): 

before an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there

must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.

If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its

discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.

Pirani, 406 F.3d at 550 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67

(1997)). Thorn bears the burden of proving plain error. Id. "Appellate review under

the plain-error doctrine, of course, is circumscribed and we exercise our power under

Rule 52(b) sparingly." Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 389 (1999).

Thorn first argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because the

District Court, in calculating a sentence under the guidelines, relied upon facts that

were not alleged in the indictment or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The District

Court enhanced Thorn's sentence based upon facts set forth in the presentence

investigation report (PSR).2

 Facts presented in a PSR are deemed admitted by a

defendant unless the defendant objects to the inclusion of those facts. United States

v. Yahnke, 395 F.3d 823, 825 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Bougie, 279 F. 3d

648, 650 (8th Cir. 2002). Sentencing courts do not violate the Sixth Amendment

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when they rely on facts admitted by a defendant in calculating the defendant's

sentence. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756. Although Thorn requested that information be

added to the PSR (a request which was granted), he did not object to the inclusion of

the facts in the PSR that led to his sentence enhancements. The District Court did not

commit a Sixth Amendment violation, let alone plain error, when it enhanced Thorn's

sentence based on facts admitted by Thorn. 

Thorn next argues that the District Court committed plain error by applying the

guidelines in a mandatory manner in violation of the principles announced in Booker.

It is undisputed that the first two plain-error factors are satisfied: "The district court

(understandably) committed Booker error by applying the Guidelines as mandatory,

and the error is plain, that is, clear or obvious, at this time." Pirani, 406 F.3d at 550.

To prove the third factor, however, Thorn must demonstrate that there is a

"reasonable probability that, but for Booker error, [he] would have received a more

favorable sentence under an advisory guidelines regime." Id. at 553. 

In an attempt to meet this heavy burden, Thorn argues that the District Court

did not consider evidence of Thorn's diminished mental capacity "in light of the

sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553" because the court believed that it was bound

by the definition of "diminished capacity" found in § 5K2.13 of the guidelines. Supp.

Br. for Appellant at 9. Thorn points to the District Court's statement that it would not

grant a downward sentencing departure because it was "not satisfied that Mr. Thorn

has a sufficiently reduced mental [capacity] as that phrase is used and applied

pursuant to [guideline § 5K2.13]." Sent. Tr. at 43. Nothing in the District Court's

statement, however, indicates that the District Court would have given Thorn a lesser

sentence had it known that it was not bound by the guidelines. Moreover, although

the District Court imposed a sentence at the bottom of the applicable guidelines

range, this is "insufficient, without more, to demonstrate a reasonable probability that

the court would have imposed a lesser sentence absent the Booker error." Pirani, 406

F.3d at 553. Because Thorn has not demonstrated that the District Court's error

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affected a substantial right, we need not proceed to the fourth plain-error factor.

Thorn is not entitled to plain-error relief from his pre-Booker sentence.

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed, and our judgment in United

States v. Thorn, 375 F. 3d 679 (8th Cir. 2004), is ordered reinstated.

______________________________

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