Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00987/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00987-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lamont Alexander Dean
Petitioner
Cheryl Pliler
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAMONT ALEXANDER DEAN,

NO. CIV. S-03-987 LKK/GGH P

Petitioner,

v. O R D E R

CHERYL PLILER, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding through counsel, has

filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1999 conviction for

attempted murder, assault with a firearm, second degree robbery and

attempted second degree robbery. Petitioner is currently serving

forty years and ten months to life. This matter was referred to

the magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). On August

20, 2004, the magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations

herein which were served on all parties and which contained notice

that any objections were to be filed within twenty days. 

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Petitioner timely filed his objections.

The district court reviews de novo those portions of the

proposed findings of fact to which objections have been made, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore

Business Machines, Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.

denied, 455 U.S. 920 (1982), and the magistrate judge’s conclusions

of law. Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 1989)

(citing Britt v. Simi Valley Unified School Dist., 708 F.2d 452,

454 (9th Cir. 1983)). The court may, however, assume the

correctness of that portion of the proposed findings of fact to

which no objection has been made and decide the motion on

applicable law. See United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617

(9th Cir. 1989)(citing Orand v. United States, 602 F.2d 207, 208

(9th Cir. 1979)).

The court is not bound to adopt the magistrate judge’s

findings and recommendation; on the contrary, the court must

exercise “sound judicial discretion” in making its own

determination on the record. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S.

at 675-76. The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or

in part, the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations. 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d at

617. Having carefully reviewed the file, the court declines to

adopt the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations and makes

the following determinations based on the record.

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A. BACKGROUND

In this court petitioner challenges the admission of certain

evidence admitted in his trial. In his direct appeal petitioner

argued that admission of these out-of-court statements violated

state law as well as the Confrontation Clause. Answer, Ex. 5. The

California Court of Appeal did not address the Confrontation Clause

claim, instead finding the admission of the testimony in question

to be a violation of the California Evidence Code § 1230. It held,

however, that the admission was harmless error. Answer, Ex. 8, p.

5. Petitioner raised the same claims in his petition for review

filed with the California Supreme Court. Answer, Ex. 9. The

California Supreme Court denied the petition for review without

opinion. Answer, Ex. 10. Petitioner did not file a habeas corpus

petition in state court.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

“worked substantial changes to the law of habeas corpus,”

establishing a deferential standard of review to be applied by a

federal habeas court in assessing a state court’s adjudication of

a criminal defendant’s claims of constitutional error. Moore v.

Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir. 1997). In particular, 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides,

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state court proceedings.

Ordinarily in a review under the AEDPA, the federal court

looks through unexplained decisions to the last reasoned decision

as the basis for the state court’s judgment. Gill v. Ayers, 342

F.2d 911, 917 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2003). In the matter at bar,

however, there is no reasoned state court decision addressing

petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim. Under such circumstances

an independent review of the record is the only means of deciding

whether the state court’s decision was objectively reasonable.

Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000)); Riggs v.

Fairman, 399 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, below

the court undertakes an independent review of the record on

petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim. 

B. TESTIMONY PRESENTED AT TRIAL

1. Ted White

Ted White testified that on the night of July 14, 1998, he and

Guy Woodrow, a.k.a. Scooty, sought to buy methamphetamine. RT at

61, 64, 131. Witnesses described White as a heavy-set white man

with tattoos. RT at 176. White described Woodrow as approximately

6 feet tall, African American, balding on top and weighing about

240 pounds. RT at 61. In pursuit of their objective White and

Woodrow drove to some apartments in north Vallejo near Jenai’s

Market where one Todd Dillard lived. RT at 61. They met Dillard

and gave him $400 or $500 with the understanding that he would

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return in a half hour with methamphetamine. RT at 62, 88. 

White testified that after two hours elapsed and Dillard had

not returned, they drove to 222 Wilson in White’s van with a man

named Jimmy. RT at 62-63. When they arrived, they saw Dillard who

told them that someone else had the money and would be returning

with the drugs. RT at 63-64. 

At some point, Dillard and Woodrow went inside 222 Wilson

while White waited outside in the van. RT at 64. White saw two

African American men drive up. RT at 64. One of these men had

dreadlocks. RT at 92. The two men began beating on the door,

which opened. RT at 64. White followed them inside, RT at 64,

while Jimmy stayed in the van. RT at 99. White followed them into

an office area. RT at 66. White testified that in the office at

that time were a total of six people: White, Woodrow, Dillard, a

Hawaiian looking man, and the two African American men he had

followed in. RT at 74, 93. On cross-examination, White testified

that the men he followed in had nothing to do with the shooting.

RT at 85.

White testified that at some point, another African American

man arrived and handed Woodrow a bag of methamphetamine. RT at 93,

94. The person with the methamphetamine was a fairly dark skinned

African American, 5'6" or 5'7", wearing a big puffy coat. RT at

67-68. On cross-examination White testified that this man was

actually 5'2" or 5'3". RT at 97-98. Woodrow told White that they

were going to give him a quarter ounce of methamphetamine for

$400.00. RT at 64. White protested that this was not enough. RT

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at 64. 

White told the man in the puffy coat that the deal was not

going to happen. RT at 68. At this point, the man in the puffy

coat began talking to the Hawaiian man. RT at 68. After their

discussion, the man in the puffy coat displayed a weapon and

stated, “You guys must be cops. Give me your wallets on chains,

you must be cops.” RT at 69. White then gave him his wallet. RT

at 70. The man then asked Woodrow for his wallet. RT at 71.

Woodrow started moving and White saw the gun come up toward

Woodrow’s head. RT at 72. White then heard a shot and started

running (though the testimony indicates he may have started moving

or getting up before the shot). RT at 72, 96-97. White did not

see the man actually pull the trigger. RT at 75. Woodrow was shot

in the right side of his face. RT at 111. 

On July 16, 1998, White was shown a photographic line-up. RT

at 78, 79. White pointed to photograph nos. 2 and 6 and said that

they were there. RT at 316. He said that no. 6 was not the

shooter. RT at 316. Charles McClough, a.k.a. Boo, was in picture

number 6. RT at 313-314. Petitioner was in photo no. 3. RT at

314. After Officer Coelho asked White if no. 3 could have been the

shooter, White said that either the person in no. 1 or no. 3 could

have been the shooter. RT at 316. He then said he thought the

shooter was in photo no. 1. RT at 316.

 About one year after the incident, White went to a live lineup and was unable to identify anyone in the line-up as the shooter.

RT at 78. At trial, White was unable to identify petitioner as the

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man who shot Woodrow. RT at 77. 

Officer Coelho interviewed White on July 15, 1998. RT at 303.

White initially told him that he ended up at 222 Wilson because he

and Wilson had met a man at the Short Stop grocery store who

offered to sell them parts for his van. RT at 304. White told him

that after going into the building, he and Woodrow were robbed by

some black males and Woodrow was shot. RT at 304. 

2. Guy Woodrow

Woodrow’s version of events differed from White’s version.

Woodrow testified that no one named Jimmy went with them to 222

Wilson. RT at 169, 159, 173-174. When they got to 222 Wilson,

they banged on the door and Dillard opened it and came outside.

RT at 160. Dillard went back inside the building then came out

again. RT at 161. Dillard told them he did not know how long it

was going to be and went back inside. RT at 161. White and

Woodrow went and sat in the van. RT at 161. 

Twenty minutes later, a white car pull up outside 222 Wilson.

RT at 134, 161. Two men got out of the car and went inside. RT

at 134. One man was white and the other was Mexican. RT at 137,

161-162. Woodrow testified that he, White and Dillard followed the

men inside. RT At 134. However, he also later testified that only

Dillard went inside with them, and then later came out and told

Woodrow and White to come inside. RT at 134, 162. Inside, Woodrow

saw the heavy-set Mexican man and the white man . RT at 135, 162.

Woodrow talked to the Mexican man about the drugs. RT at 136. 

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After Woodrow discussed the drugs with the Mexican man, White

started arguing with the Mexican man about paying for the drugs.

RT at 137. The Mexican man then said, “I’ll be right back.” RT

at 138. Ten or fifteen minutes later, two African American men

arrived. RT at 139. One of them had dreadlocks. RT at 139. The

other man was thin with short hair. RT at 139, 170. These two men

then went back to where the Mexican man was located. RT at 140.

At one point Woodrow testified that he and White were then alone

in the office, RT at 130, but his later testimony suggested that

Dillard stayed in the office. RT at 165. 

Woodrow testified that the man with the dreadlocks returned

to the office. RT at 140. However, he later testified that both

of the African American men returned and the man with dreadlocks

said, “Break yourself . . . I want your money, all of it” RT at

140, 141, 166. The man pointed a gun at Woodrow’s head. RT at

142. After the man took White’s wallet, Woodrow reached for his.

RT at 144. At this time, Woodrow heard the gun go off and felt

himself being shot. RT at 144, 146. 

A few months after the shooting, Woodrow attended a live lineup. RT at 149. He was unable to pick anyone out. RT at 154. 

At trial, Woodrow initially identified petitioner as the

person who shot him. RT at 148. When later questioned by the

prosecutor regarding whether he was sure that it was the man with

dreadlocks who had shot him, Woodrow testified that he could not

really remember whether it was the African American man with short

hair or the African American man with dreadlocks. RT at 153.

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Woodrow also later testified that he was not really sure if

petitioner was the man who shot him. RT at 153, although he

remembered that petitioner was there that night. RT at 171.

Finally he testified that he was not sure if petitioner was the man

with the dreadlocks. RT at 171. 

3. Todd Dillard

Todd Dillard testified that on July 14, 1998, White and

Woodrow came to his girlfriend’s house and asked him to buy them

some methamphetamine. RT at 176. Dillard then went to Glenn

Miller’s warehouse at 222 Wilson to talk to Miller about getting

the drugs. RT at 177. Glenn Miller went by the nickname “G.” RT

at 183. Miller agreed to help Dillard obtain the drugs. RT at

184. Miller told Dillard to stay at the building and he would go

take care of it. RT at 184. When Miller returned, White and

Woodrow arrived. RT at 185, 186. The four of them went to the

office. RT at 186. Dillard heard White saying that he was not

happy about the price he paid for the drugs. RT at 189. 

At some point, two more people arrived. RT at 190. Dillard

knew them as Ocean and Boo. RT at 190. Boo is African American,

6', 200 pounds. RT at 190. His hair may have been in dreadlocks

that night. RT at 190. Ocean is 5'8" or 5'9", the same weight as

Boo. RT at 190. Ocean was wearing a big dark Starter jacket. RT

at 190. Dillard identified petitioner as Ocean. RT at 191. 

Miller and Boo went up to the top bay of the warehouse. RT

at 193. Dillard started to follow them and that is when he heard

the first shot. RT at 193. Woodrow, White and Ocean were back in

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the office. RT at 194. Someone else was there who Dillard did not

recognize. RT at 194. Dillard’s attention was drawn back to the

office when he heard Woodrow saying, “You don’t need to do that.”

RT at 195. Dillard turned around and saw Ocean dumping papers out

of a wallet. RT at 195. At that time, Miller and Boo were still

in the top bay. RT at 196. As Dillard turned to go back to the

top bay, he heard a shot. RT at 196. Dillard turned around and

saw Ocean standing with a gun. RT at 197. Dillard then heard one

more shot in the office and possibly a couple more. RT at 197. 

Dillard attended a live line-up and identified petitioner,

a.k.a. Ocean, as the man with the gun. RT at 209. 

 When Dillard spoke to the police on the afternoon of July 15,

he told them that he thought Ocean had a gun in his hand but he was

not sure. RT at 217. Dillard knew that Ocean had something in his

hand but at that time he could not swear it was a gun. RT at 217.

A day or two later he stated that he remembered that it was a gun.

RT at 217. When Dillard first spoke to the police after the

incident, he did not tell them what had really happened because he

did not want to admit that there was a dope deal involved in the

incident. RT at 238. 

4. Vallejo Police Officer Coelho

Boo, whose real name is Charles McClough, was shot seven times

shortly before petitioner’s trial. RT at 25. As a result of the

injuries he suffered, McClough was unable to testify at trial. RT

at 34, 37. The trial court ruled that statements made by McClough

to Police Officer Coelho following the incident were against his

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penal interest and, therefore, admissible. RT at 39, 381-283. 

McClough told Officer Coelho that he went to 222 Wilson to

borrow money from Wilson. RT at 318. On his arrival, he saw

Ocean, Miller, Scooty, Todd Dillard and a heavy set white male.

RT at 319. At that point, the heavy set white male began to argue

with Ocean. RT at 319. McClough, Dillard and Miller went into an

adjacent office. RT at 319. At this point, he heard a gunshot.

RT at 319. Prior to that, he had heard Ocean accusing the heavy

set white man of being the police. RT at 319. 

The gun used in the incident was not found. RT at 327. 

C. ANALYSIS

Petitioner argues that admission of McClough’s statement

through Officer Coelho violated the Confrontation Clause. Below I

conclude that petitioner’s claim is well taken.

 In all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right “to be

confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST., amend. VI.

“The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the

reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by

subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary

proceeding before the trier of facts.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S.

836, 845, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990). When the government attempts to

introduce out-of-court statements of a declarant who is unavailable

to testify, the court must determine whether the Confrontation

Clause permits the government to deny the accused his usual right

to cross-examine the declarant. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116,

124, 119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999) (plurality opinion). 

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Respondent has conceded that McClough’s statement violated the

Confrontation Clause under law in place prior to the present

Supreme Court term. Resp’t Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Answer at

5-6. This term, the Supreme Court made that concession clearly

appropriate when it overruled Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980),

and substituted in its place a bright line rule which forbade outof-court testimonial statements unless the declarant was

unavailable to testify and the statement had been subject to crossexamination. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004)

(“Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth

Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and

a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”). The bright line rule

was violated in this case. Even if Crawford is not applied

retroactively to pending habeas cases, it highlights the propriety

of the concession under the prior, more permissive law.

As explained above, generally the standard utilized to

determine whether an error is harmless will depend on the state

courts’ treatment of the error. If the state court found a federal

constitutional error, and applied a federal harmless error test,

the habeas court reviews the effect of the error under the AEDPA

“unreasonableness” standard. Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877

(9th Cir. 2004). If, however, the state court did not, for

whatever reason, apply a federal harmless error standard, the

habeas court must undertake an independent review of the record to

determine whether the constitutional error was harmless. Pham v.

Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 2005); Visciotti v. Woodford,

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288 F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 2002); Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d

1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002). In the matter at bar, the state courts

did not apply the Chapman harmless error test, but rather a state

law “reasonably probable” test. Court of Appeal Order at 5. 

Accordingly, the court will not give AEDPA deference to the

harmless error finding of the state court.

Confrontation Clause violations are subject to harmless error

analysis. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986). 

Thus, this court must now consider whether admission of McClough’s

statement “‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.’” Brecht v. Abramson, 507 U.S.

619, 637-38 (1993)(quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.

750, 776 (1956)).

The magistrate judge opined that because “the jury had

sufficient evidence on which to find that petitioner shot Woodrow

even without McClough’s testimony” he could not conclude that

McClough’s testimony had a substantially injurious effect on the

verdict. The test applied by the magistrate judge is not the

proper one. Binding precedent holds that the court is not to

analyze whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s

decision, but rather should review whether the evidence which was

erroneously allowed had a substantially injurious effect on the

jury’s assessment of the case. Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939,

950 (9th Cir. 2002) (“the inquiry cannot be merely whether there

was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by

the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had

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1 In conducting an independent analysis, the court is to

avoid focusing on who carries the burden of proof. O'Neal v.

McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1995) (“we think it conceptually

clearer for the judge to ask directly, “Do I, the judge, think that

the error substantially influenced the jury's decision?” than for

the judge to try to put the same question in terms of proof

burdens . . .); Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 950 (9th Cir.

2002). But see Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094, 1139 (9th Cir.

2005)(holding that while the cases suggest that the analysis

should be done independently, “the State normally bears

responsibility for the error that infected the initial trial.”).

2 In finding the state law error harmless, the California

Court of Appeal found that while McClough’s statement placed

petitioner at the scene, it did not directly implicate him in the

shooting. Answer, Exhibit 8. I agree with the magistrate judge’s

finding that McClough’s statement did implicate petitioner in the

shooting because it placed him in the room with White and Woodrow.

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substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt,

the conviction cannot stand.”); Arnold v. Runnels, 2005 WL 2029557,

6 (9th Cir. 2005).1 Under this standard of review, the court must

not look to see if the jurors were correct, but whether the error

may have reasonably had an effect on the jury’s decision. Whelchel

v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir. 2000)(quoting

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946)). 

As the magistrate judge found, McClough’s statement placed

petitioner at the scene as well as in the room with White and

Woodrow at the time of the shooting.2 Moreover, it did much more

than that. It also served to remove McClough as one of the

possible suspects by placing him in another room at the time of the

shooting. RT at 319. There was other evidence which placed the

petitioner at the scene as well as in the room with White and

Woodrow at the time of the shooting. As discussed above, both

Dillard and Woodrow testified that petitioner was present, however,

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Woodrow could not identify petitioner as the shooter. RT at 148,

153, 171. Woodrow also remembered that both the petitioner and his

friend, presumably McClough, were both in the room when he was

shot. RT at 166, 171. White’s testimony also suggested that both

the petitioner and McClough may have been in the room at the time

of the shooting. RT at 68. Woodrow’s testimony was that he

thought a man with dreadlocks shot him, or at least that he was

unsure whether it was the man with the short hair or the man with

the dreadlocks, which, based on other testimony, would have been

McClough and not the petitioner. RT at 140, 141, 144, 166. Hence,

the testimony of White and Woodrow together suggests that it is

possible that either petitioner or McClough shot Woodrow. Thus,

the testimony of Officer Coelho served a dual purpose, both placing

petitioner in the room in a confrontation with White and Woodrow,

and placing McClough outside of the room, corroborating Dillard’s

testimony which is the only other testimony that has McClough

outside the room. RT at 319. 

Welchel identifies a number of factors to consider in making

the substantial and injurious determination, including: “the

importance of the testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative,

the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting

the testimony, the extent of cross-examination permitted, and the

overall strength of the prosecution's case.” 232 F.3d at 1206;

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986).

Here, the only evidence that clearly implicated the petitioner

was Dillard’s testimony. Neither White nor Woodrow was sure who

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3 The magistrate judge found that there was no evidence that

demonstrated that Dillard had any motive to lie. The absence of

clear evidence that Dillard was lying, however, does not

necessarily mean that the jury would have found Dillard’s testimony

fully credible, in light of his previous statements to the police,

his involvement in the drug deal, etc. 

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shot Woodrow, and their testimony is contradictory both to

Dillard’s and each other. Not only was the testimony of Officer

Coelho concerning McClough statement corroborative of Dillard’s

testimony, it was also important because McClough was another

person that may have been the shooter in light of the testimony by

White and Woodrow.3 Welchel further held that: 

While corroborative evidence may, as a general rule,

make the wrongful introduction of other evidence

harmless, this concept has no application where: (1)

there was a reason for the jury to doubt the only

eyewitness testimony; (2) the third party testimony was

not exceptionally strong; and (3) the physical evidence

connecting the accused to the crime was limited and

explained by the suspect's claimed role of accessory

after the fact.

232 F.3d at 1208. In the present case, the corroborating testimony

is what should not have been allowed, but the general principle

seems to apply equally here. 

All the testimony places the petitioner at the warehouse at

the time of the shooting, but there is only Dillard’s testimony

that firmly puts the petitioner in charge of the gun at any point.

The gun was not found in this case so there is no physical evidence

to tie petitioner to it. RT at 327. As noted above, other than

Officer Coelho’s improperly admitted testimony, Dillard is alone

in placing McClough outside of the room at the time of the

shooting. It is important to remember that Dillard originally told

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the police a false story why he was at the warehouse. It seems

unlikely that an explanation that he did not want to admit

involvement in illegal activity would make Dillard’s trustworthy

in the eyes of the jury, and thus sufficient to resolve the doubt

raised by Woodrow and White’s testimony. Woodrow was the one who

was shot and presumably would thus have the strongest motivation

to testify credibly, and, as noted above, he had considerable doubt

about whether it was the petitioner who shot him. 

The jury heard at least three different accounts of the events

that occurred on the night that Woodrow was shot. White, who was

in the room when it happened, was unable to correctly identify the

shooter in a photographic line up, in a live line-up, or at trial.

RT at 78-79, 316. Though he was able to narrow down the possible

shooters to the petitioner and another man, when pressed, he

selected the other man as the shooter. RT at 316. Woodrow was

initially able to identify the petitioner as the shooter, but later

said he could not remember if it was the man with the dreadlocks

or the short hair that shot him, but he thought it was the guy with

dreadlocks, which would have been McClough. RT at 153, 171.

Significantly, Woodrow testified that he did not believe petitioner

was the man with the dreadlocks at all. RT at 171. At a live

line-up a few months after the shooting, he was unable to pick

anyone out. RT at 154. Finally, while Dillard’s testimony places

petitioner in the room holding a gun, Dillard himself was not in

the room when the gun was fired and noted that there was someone

else in the office that he did not recognize at the time. RT at

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193-197.

While the testimony of White, Woodrow, and Dillard overlap in

certain areas, they diverge at the key point of determining what

actually happened at the moment that Woodrow was shot. In light

of this, this court must find that the admission of Officer

Coelho’s testimony about what McClough told him had a substantial

and injurious effect on the jury’s determination of the case.

Without it, the jury would have only had three different version

of the events, the addition of McClough’s testimony created one

story line that was substantially confirmed by two people, and it

is the one the jury apparently adopted. 

In sum, the jury has to have found beyond a reasonable doubt

that petitioner committed the crimes with which he was charged,

and, in this regard, the unconstitutional testimony might well have

influenced the jury’s determination. Whelchel v. Washington, 232

F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir. 2000)(quoting Kotteakos v. United States,

328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946)). Under the circumstances, this court

is left with a “grave doubt” that the error in admitting the

statements of McClough was harmless and thus cannot uphold

petitioner’s conviction. Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094, 1139

(9th Cir. 2005). 

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Accordingly, petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus

is GRANTED. The State shall commence proceedings to retry

petitioner within thirty (30) days or release him.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 31, 2005.

/s/Lawrence K. Karlton 

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON

SENIOR JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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