Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03198/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03198-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Iona Calhoun
Petitioner
General Services Administration
Respondent

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

IONA CALHOUN,

Petitioner

v.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3198

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DC-1221-14-0758-W-1.

______________________ 

Decided: January 12, 2016 

______________________ 

 IONA CALHOUN, Silver Spring, MD, pro se.

 ADAM E. LYONS, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by ELIZABETH 

M. HOSFORD, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., BENJAMIN C.

MIZER. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, MOORE, and TARANTO, Circuit 

Judges.

Case: 15-3198 Document: 24-2 Page: 1 Filed: 01/12/2016
2 CALHOUN v. GSA

PER CURIAM. 

Iona Calhoun worked for the General Services Administration for over twenty years before retiring in 2005. In 

the present action, she alleges that the GSA had refused 

to promote her—and thus had underpaid her—because of 

protected disclosures she made while working at the 

agency. The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed 

Ms. Calhoun’s claims for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Ms. Calhoun worked for the GSA between 1977 and 

2005. When she first transferred to the GSA from the 

Office of Management and Budget, Ms. Calhoun’s employment level was GS-11. Eleven months after her 

transfer to the GSA, Ms. Calhoun received a promotion to 

level GS-12.

In 2007, after retiring, Ms. Calhoun sued the Administrator of the GSA in the United States District Court for 

the District of Columbia, alleging violations of Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq.; 

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 621 et seq.; and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). 

Calhoun v. Prouty, 643 F. Supp. 2d 87, 90 (D.D.C. 2009). 

She alleged that the GSA discriminated (including retaliated) against her on the basis of age, sex, and race by not 

selecting her for a GS-14 position she sought in December 

2000. Id. at 93. The district court granted summary 

judgment to the GSA on all of Ms. Calhoun’s claims. Id.

at 97. When Ms. Calhoun appealed, the United States 

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 

affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding one of 

Ms. Calhoun’s claims for trial. Calhoun v. Johnson, 632 

F.3d 1259, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 

In June 2012, Ms. Calhoun and the GSA settled their 

dispute. In the settlement agreement, Ms. Calhoun 

agreed “not to hereafter assert any claim or institute or 

Case: 15-3198 Document: 24-2 Page: 2 Filed: 01/12/2016
CALHOUN v. GSA 3

prosecute any civil action or other proceeding against . . . 

the Agency . . . with respect to any event complained of” in 

the 2007 district court action. J.A. 77. The agreement 

states that Ms. Calhoun had 21 days to sign and seven 

days to revoke after signing, and it advises her to consult 

an attorney before signing. J.A. 76.

In September 2013, Ms. Calhoun filed a complaint 

with the Office of Special Counsel under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 1214(a), alleging that she was due back pay for what she 

alleged to be unwarranted personnel actions. The Office 

of Special Counsel declined to investigate her claims, and

in May 2014 she filed this Individual Right of Action 

appeal with the Board under 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3), 

1221(a). She alleged that she was due back pay because 

the GSA had failed to promote her from GS-11 to GS-12 

until eleven months after she had started working there 

in December 1977 and had later refused to promote her to 

a GS-14 position despite the fact that she was performing 

GS-14-level roles and carrying GS-14-level responsibilities. 

In June 2014, the Board ordered Ms. Calhoun to prove 

that it had jurisdiction to hear her appeal. She responded

that she sought back pay for the GSA’s failure to promote 

her to a GS-14 position and identified two disclosures that 

she had made as president of her local union as motivating the GSA’s conduct. One was a class-action employment-discrimination complaint filed in 2001, the other an 

overtime-pay grievance filed in 2002. She alleged that 

her union activities and those disclosures contributed to 

the GSA’s continuing decision not to promote her.

In October 2014, the Board again ordered Ms. Calhoun to demonstrate its jurisdiction over her appeal, 

highlighting its concern that the 2012 settlement agreement barred her claim. Ms. Calhoun responded that the 

GSA’s prohibited personnel practices at issue were not 

actually litigated in the 2007 district court action, and she 

Case: 15-3198 Document: 24-2 Page: 3 Filed: 01/12/2016
4 CALHOUN v. GSA

maintained that the Board had jurisdiction over her 

appeal because she non-frivolously alleged that she had 

made protected disclosures that contributed to prohibited

personnel practices against her. She demanded “back pay 

that [she] earned from December 1977 through December 

2000.” J.A. 98. 

An administrative judge dismissed Ms. Calhoun’s 

appeal based on issue preclusion, and Ms. Calhoun then 

petitioned for review by the full Board. The Board, while

vacating the issue-preclusion ruling, denied her petition 

for review. First, the Board determined that the settlement agreement covered Ms. Calhoun’s claim that the 

GSA violated 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) in denying her a 

promotion to GS-14 in 2000; accordingly, Ms. Calhoun 

had waived that claim. Second, the Board concluded that

Ms. Calhoun had failed to make non-frivolous allegations 

of the elements needed for Board jurisdiction under 

§§ 1214(a)(3) and 1221(e)(1) to hear the Individual Right 

of Action appeal. In particular, the Board found no nonfrivolous allegations that her disclosures in 2001 and 

2002 contributed to the GSA’s failure to timely promote 

her to GS-12 in 1977. For those reasons, the Board dismissed Ms. Calhoun’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) and 5 

U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

DISCUSSION

We review de novo the Board’s legal determination 

that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Ms. Calhoun’s appeal. 

Clark v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 361 F.3d 647, 649 (Fed. Cir. 

2004). We review the Board’s factual findings underlying 

its jurisdiction determination for substantial evidence. 

Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 154 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. 

Cir. 1998). Ms. Calhoun has the burden of establishing 

the Board’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Campion v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 326 F.3d 1210, 

1212–13 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We review the Board’s interCase: 15-3198 Document: 24-2 Page: 4 Filed: 01/12/2016
CALHOUN v. GSA 5

pretation of a settlement agreement de novo. King v. 

Dep’t of Navy, 130 F.3d 1031, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

Ms. Calhoun’s passing references to the GSA’s commission of prohibited personnel practices under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 2302(b)(1) do not satisfy her burden to show the Board’s 

jurisdiction. Section 2302(b)(1) prohibits employees who 

are authorized to take, recommend, or approve personnel 

actions from discriminating against employees in violation of various federal statutes. Ms. Calhoun has not 

alleged any facts showing discrimination on any basis 

covered by § 2302(b)(1).

Ms. Calhoun has also presented no non-frivolous 

allegations that the GSA’s failure to promote her in 1977 

justifies the Board’s jurisdiction. To obtain a remedy 

under § 1221(e)(1), Ms. Calhoun must show that she made 

a protected disclosure, § 2302(b)(8), or engaged in a protected activity, § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B)–(D), and that her 

disclosure or activity contributed to the GSA’s decision to 

commit a prohibited personnel practice as defined by 

§ 2302(a). The Board found that Ms. Calhoun had alleged 

that she made protected disclosures only in 2001 and 

2002. Indeed, Ms. Calhoun has pointed to only two allegedly protected disclosures: a class-action complaint filed 

in 2001 and a grievance filed in 2002. Because these 

disclosures post-date the GSA’s failure to promote Ms. 

Calhoun in 1977, they cannot have contributed to the 

GSA’s failure to promote her then. Davis v. Merit Sys. 

Prot. Bd., 278 F. App’x 1009, 1012–13 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 

Horton v. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 279, 284 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 

Thus, the Board’s finding is supported by substantial 

evidence and suffices to uphold the conclusion that the 

Board lacks jurisdiction to consider Ms. Calhoun’s claim 

that the GSA failed timely to promote her in violation of 5 

U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1).

Ms. Calhoun also contends that she did not waive her 

remaining claim in the 2012 settlement agreement beCase: 15-3198 Document: 24-2 Page: 5 Filed: 01/12/2016
6 CALHOUN v. GSA

cause she entered into that agreement under duress. The 

Board correctly concluded that the settlement agreement’s waiver provision is enforceable. Under the agreement, Ms. Calhoun had 21 days to consider its terms, and 

she had express notice that by signing she 

“acknowledge[d] that her decision . . . [was] knowing and 

voluntary, and . . . not . . . induced by any threat, promise, 

or other representation attributable to” the GSA. J.A. 76. 

The agreement also states that Ms. Calhoun would have 

seven days to revoke her agreement after signing and that 

she should consult an attorney. Ms. Calhoun and her 

attorney signed the agreement. Ms. Calhoun’s allegation 

that “[m]entally, physically, and financially, after more 

than twenty years, [she] could not afford to fight GSA any 

longer,” J.A. 124, does not amount to sufficient duress to 

invalidate the agreement. Long v. U.S. Postal Serv., 229 

F. App’x 919, 921 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 

Under the 2012 settlement agreement, Ms. Calhoun 

waived her claim that the GSA’s failure to select her for a 

GS-14 position in 2000 violates 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b). According to the settlement agreement, Ms. Calhoun agreed 

“not to hereafter assert any claim or institute or prosecute 

any civil action or other proceeding against . . . the Agency 

. . . with respect to any event complained of therein.” J.A. 

77. Ms. Calhoun applied but was not selected for a GS-14 

Computer Specialist position in 2000. Prouty, 643 F. 

Supp. 2d at 93. In the 2007 district court action, she

alleged that her non-selection for that position in 2000

violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 

93–94. Ms. Calhoun therefore is now asserting a claim 

against the GSA concerning an event that she complained 

of in the 2007 action. The settlement agreement covers 

Ms. Calhoun’s claim regarding the GSA’s failure to promote her to a GS-14 position in 2000, and Ms. Calhoun 

has waived that claim. 

Moreover, Ms. Calhoun at most frivolously alleges 

that the GSA violated 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) by its continuing 

Case: 15-3198 Document: 24-2 Page: 6 Filed: 01/12/2016
CALHOUN v. GSA 7

decision not to promote her to a GS-14 level position. Ms. 

Calhoun has demanded only “back pay that [she] earned 

from December 1977 through December 2000,” J.A. 98,

and, as discussed above, she has not pointed to any agency actions post-dating her 2001 and 2002 disclosures. 

The Board did not address Ms. Calhoun’s arguments 

that the GSA breached the settlement agreement, and 

rightly so. The Board’s jurisdiction is strictly limited to 

that provided by statute, rule, or regulation. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7701(a); Hartman v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 77 F.3d 1378, 

1380 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Ms. Calhoun has pointed to no

statute providing the Board jurisdiction to enforce a 

settlement agreement entered in a forum other than the 

Board. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.3; Berry v. Merit Sys. Prot.

Bd., No. 08-3235, 2009 WL 89668, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 15, 

2009). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of 

the Merit Systems Protection Board.

No costs.

AFFIRMED

Case: 15-3198 Document: 24-2 Page: 7 Filed: 01/12/2016