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Parties Involved:
Wesley Allen Dorrough
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

F"ES 2 8 t§gy 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

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Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 89-7086 

WESLEY ALLEN DORROUGH, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 89-21-CR) 

Larry Finstrom, Dallas, Texas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Sheldon J. Sperling, Assistant United States Attorney (John Raley, 

United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Eastern District 

of Oklahoma, Muskogee, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, SETH, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant Wesley Allen Dorrough appeals his convictions under 

18 u.s.c. S 2 (1988) and 21 U.S.C. SS 841, 846 (1988) for attempting to manufacture phenyl-2-propanone and amphetamine and for 

possession of phenyl-2-propanone with intent to manufacture 

amphetamine. The defendant also appeals his convictions under 21 

Appellate Case: 89-7086 Document: 01019726340 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 1 
u.s.c. § 846 for conspiring to manufacture, possess, and distribute amphetamine, and under 18 u.s.c. SS 2, 1952 (1988) for traveling in interstate commerce in the aid and promotion of drug 

offenses. Finally, Mr. Dorrough appeals his sentence under the 

Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 

I. 

The defendant was charged a long with Larry Callihan, Darrel 

Russell, and Dennis Moore in an e ight-count indictment relating to 

the manufacture of phenyl-2-propanone ("P-2-P") 1 and amphetamine. 

The police observed these individuals purchase chemicals in Texas 

and transport the chemicals, glassware, and other laboratory 

equipment for manufacturing P-2-P and amphetamine to a drug 

laboratory in Oklahoma. 

On February 22, 1989, the defendant's brother and mother, 

purchased ether2 from a chemical supply house in Dallas, Texas. 

They delivered the ether to the residence of co-defendant Robert 

Moore in Dallas. Mr. Moore and a companion took a barrel apparently containi ng phenylacetic a cid, a building block for the manufacture of amphetamine, from Dallas to Navarro County and returned 

to Dallas the next day. On the morning of February 23, 1989, 

1 Phenyl-2-propanone is a controlled substance produced by 

heating chemicals under the proper conditions. It is then heated 

in combination w±th other chemicals to produce amphetamine. 

2 Ether is used to powder, or dry, the chemical produced from 

the cooking process. 

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co-defendants Callihan and Russell arrived at Mr. Moore's 

residence with their pickup trucks. The chemicals were loaded 

into Mr. Russell's truck and Messrs. Callihan and Russell drove 

their trucks to Hugo, Oklahoma. 

In Hugo, Messrs. Callihan and Russell met the defendant. 

They followed him to a site where they left the truck loaded with 

chemicals and traveled to his home in a secluded rural area outside of town. The three co-defendants returned to retrieve the 

truck and drive it to the house . That afternoon the defendant 

made several trips from his house to a mini-storage unit in Hugo 

to pick up laboratory glassware and more chemicals. He brought 

these items back to his house. 

The police subsequently executed a search warrant on the 

defendant's house and arrested the defendant, Mr. Russell, and Mr. 

Callihan. Investigating agents discovered a large drug laboratory 

and seized a variety of chemicals, glass flasks, tubes, pumps, and 

other lab equipment. A government chemist analyzed the chemicals 

seized and found that P-2-P had been manufactured and that the 

other necessary chemicals to produce amphetamine were present. 

II. 

The defendant's first contention on appeal is that evidence 

was erroneously introduced because it was seized as a result of a 

search warrant that did not sufficiently describe the place to be 

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searched. 

The fourth amendment states that search warrants may be 

issued only on probable cause "particularly describing the place 

to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." u.s. 

Canst. Amend. IV. The warrant must describe the place to be 

searched with sufficient particularity so that the executing 

officer can locate and identify it with reasonable effort. United 

States v. Mab~, 809 F.2d 671, 681 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 484 

U.S. 874 (1987). The requisite specificity of the description 

differs for rural and urban areas and depends heavily on the facts 

of each case. United States v. Williams, 687 F.2d 290, 293 (9th 

Cir. 1982). 

The defendant highlights several aspects of the warrant that 

differ from the actual description of the home. The warrant 

described the defendant's residence as a single-story wood frame 

dwelling. In fact, the home was only partially wood framed. The 

warrant also described the residence as having two wood frame 

single-story storage buildings within its curtilage, but there was 

actually only one outbuilding. Finally, the warrant described the 

turnoff to the defendant's residence as being located one-half 

mile from an intersection. The defendant testified that the turnoff was three-tenths to four-tenths mile from the intersection. 

Although the actual physical characteristics of the defendant's residence may have varied to some degree from the 

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Appellate Case: 89-7086 Document: 01019726340 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 4 
description contained in the warrant, we conclude that the warrant 

sufficiently described the area to be searched. The Supreme Court 

has stated that practical accuracy rather than technical precision 

controls the determination of whether a search warrant adequately 

describes the premises to be searched. United States v. 

Ventresca, 380 u.s. 102, 108 (1965). In this case, the warrant 

stated that the turnoff to the defendant's home was marked by a 

red, white, and black mailbox in the shape of a house. This 

unique landmark enabled the officers to locate the residence with 

reasonable effort. See United States v. Mabry, 809 F.2d at 681. 

In addition, the warrant described the home's location as onequarter mile up the side of a mountain. At the sentencing 

hearing, the defendant admitted that his house was the only one in 

that area on a hill. Based on the evidence presented, we conclude 

that the trial court did not err when it denied the defendant's 

motion to suppress. 

II. 

The defendant's second argument is that the evidence is 

insufficient to support the conviction for conspiracy to manufacture, possess, and distribute amphetamine. He also contends that 

there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for 

traveling in interstate commerce to manufacture, possess with 

intent to distribute, and/or distribute amphetamine. The test for 

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases is 

that the evidence, both direct and circumstantial and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, is sufficient if, when 

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viewed in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable 

jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1531 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 475 u.s. 1128 (1986). 

The defendant argues that the government failed to present 

evidence regarding what would be done with the P-2-P in order to 

manufacture amphetamine. He urges us to conclude that a reasonable jury could not find him guilty of the conspiracy and interstate travel counts without evidence describing the recipe and 

procedure for manufacturing amphetamine. 

Several government witnesses and co-defendant Larry Lee 

Callihan testified about the operations of the drug laboratory 

which would have allowed a jury to conclude that the defendant 

conspired to manufacture, possess, and distribute amphetamine. 

Government chemist Steven Brookman testified that he discovered 

six flasks at the laboratory and found substances used to make P2-P. He further testified that the chemicals for manufacturing 

amphetamine were present at the lab. Mr. Brookman stated that 

chemicals were being cooked which would have produced about 100 

pounds of amphetamine. Record, vol. 7, at 671-74. 

The police recovered hydrogen chloride gas and ether at the 

laboratory. Detective Shaw of the Dallas Police Department testified that these chemicals were used to dry the amphetamine produced from the cooking process. He also described the lab as a 

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"working methamphetamine lab or amphetamine lab ... Record, vol. 4, 

at 124-29. Similarly, Detective Bjurstrorn described the lab as "a 

very large amphetamine lab." Record, vol. 5, at 249. 

Co-defendant Larry Lee Callihan testified that the defendant 

told him what to do in order to set up a drug laboratory. Record, 

val. 6, at 520. The defendant gave Mr. Callihan money to purchase 

materials for the lab. Id. at 529. At the defendant's direction, 

Mr. Callihan and Darrel Russell took chemicals for the drug laboratory to Hugo, Oklahoma. In Hugo, they met the defendant and 

took the supplies to the clandestine lab site. 

We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the 

defendant's conviction for conspiracy. Direct evidence that the 

defendant and his co-defendants used the P-2-P to manufacture 

amphetamine is not required. Criminal convictions may be sustained on circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Cook, 793 

F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Downen, 496 F.2d 314, 

318 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 419 u.s. 897 (1974). The reasonable inferences to be drawn from the testimony of Mr. Callihan, 

Mr. Brookman, and Detectives Shaw and Bjurstrorn would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant directed his codefendants to bring chemicals and supplies to Hugo and that they 

agreed to use these materials to manufacture amphetamine. Accordingly, the defendant's conspiracy conviction is affirmed. 

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We also believe that the evidence is sufficient to support 

the defendant's conviction for traveling in interstate commerce in 

the aid and promotion of drug offenses in violation of the Travel 

Act, 18 u.s.c. § 1952, and in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 2. A 

Travel Act violation must be supported by proof that a defendant: 

(1) traveled or used facilities in interstate commerce (2) with 

the intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on or facilitate 

the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of a prohibited activity; and (3) thereafter attempted to or did in fact 

engage in one of the proscribed activities. United States v. 

Peveto, 881 F.2d 844, 860 (lOth Cir.), cart. denied, Hines v. 

United States, ___ U.S. ___ , 110 s. Ct. 348, 107 L.Ed.2d 336 

(1989). 

The testimony presented at trial demonstrated that the 

defendant arranged for the interstate transportation from Texas to 

Oklahoma of chemicals and laboratory supplies to be used in the 

manufacture of amphetamine. The defendant met Messrs. Callihan 

and Russell when they arrived in Hugo, Oklahoma, and went with 

them to the secluded lab site. Viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the government, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could find the defendant guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt of violating the Travel Act. 

III. 

The defendant also argues that the district court applied the 

incorrect base offense under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 

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The court arrived at a base offense level of 34 by multiplying the 

94 liters of liquid containing P-2-P that was found at the laboratory by the .375 cocaine equivalency formula contained in the 

Guidelines' drug equivalency table and arriving at a cocaine 

equivalency of 35.25 kilograms. 

The defendant contends that the correct base offense level 

should be 28. This calculation is based on the testimony of Mr. 

Castle, a chemist for the defense, who stated that the most P-2-P 

that could have been produced from the laboratory was 8.85 kilograms. The defendant argues that the correct weight for calculating the base offense level in a manufacturing case should be the 

maximum amount of drugs that could be produced from the manufacturing process. The waste products of the process, according to 

the defendant, should not be included·. 

The base offense level for drug offenses is calculated from 

the drug quantity table found in section 201.1 (c) of the 

Sentencing Guidelines. The footnote accompanying the table states 

that ''the weight of a controlled substance set forth in the table 

refers to the entire weight of any mixture or substance containing 

a detectable amount of the controlled substance." u.s.s.G. § 

201.1 (c) note* (Nov. 1990). Indeed, this court has held that 

for purposes of the drug quantity table, the weight of a mixture 

containing a controlled substance is the entire amount of the mixture. United States v. Callihan, 915 F.2d 1462 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

Other courts have reached the same conclusion. See United States 

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v. Mueller, 902 F.2d 336, 345 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. 

Daley, 883 F . 2d 313, 318 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, ___ u.s. 

___ , 110 S. Ct. 2622, 110 L.Ed.2d 643 (1990). 

In this case, agents found 94 liters containing a controlled 

substance, phenyl-2-propanone, at the drug laboratory outside 

Hugo, Oklahoma. The trial court converted this quantity to 35.25 

kilograms of cocaine using the drug equivalency table in the 

Guidelines and arrived at the correct base offense level of 34. 

We affirm the trial court's calculations under the Sentencing 

Guidelines. 

The order of the district court if AFFIRMED. 

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