Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_05-cv-00204/USCOURTS-alsd-2_05-cv-00204-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael J. Astrue
Defendant
Willie Lee Moore
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

On February 12, 2007, Michael J. Astrue became the Commissioner

of Social Security. Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, he has been substituted as the Defendant in this

suit. No further action need be taken to continue this suit by reason

of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42

U.S.C. § 405(g).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

WILLIE LEE MOORE, *

 * 

Plaintiff, *

 *

vs. * CIVIL ACTION 05-00204-BH-B

 *

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,1 *

Commissioner of Social *

Security, *

 *

Defendant. *

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Application

for Attorney's Fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (Doc.

16). This action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge

for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)

and Local Rule 72.2(c)(3). Upon consideration of the pertinent

pleadings, it is the recommendation of the undersigned that

Petitioner’s motion is due to be GRANTED in part and DENIED in

part.

I. Findings of Fact

1. Plaintiff commenced this action on April 5, 2005 by

filing a complaint, a motion for leave to file in forma pauperis,

and a motion to remand. (Docs. 1, 2, 3). On August 10, 2005, the

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Commissioner filed a motion to remand this case pursuant to

sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 12). On September 14,

2005, this Court entered Judgment, and pursuant to sentence six,

reversed and remanded this cause to the Commissioner of Social

Security for further proceedings. (Docs. 14, 15).

2. On August 1, 2006, Petitioner filed a motion for

attorney's fees and motion for judgment. (Doc. 16). In the

motion, Petitioner requests an attorney's fee award of $578.05.

(Id.) The attorney's fee request represents a total 3.70 hours, at

an hourly rate of $156.23 per hour, for attorney time spent

representing Plaintiff in this Court. (Id.) However, the

undersigned notes that the Time Sheet attached to Petitioner’s

motion shows a different total amount of $462.50, for the same

number of hours worked, which actually results in an hourly rate of

$125.00. (Id.) Nevertheless, the undersigned interprets this as

a scrivener’s error, because a review of Petitioner’s motion

indicates that he seeks the hourly rate of $156.23 as he requests

an attorney’s fee award of $578.05 for 3.70 hours of attorney work.

(Id.)

3. On August 15, 2006, the Commissioner of Social Security

filed a Response, stating that it did not dispute the issue of

prevailing party status because a fully favorable decision was

entered on June 1, 2006, but that it objected to the requested

hourly rate as exceeding the EAJA cap and this district’s

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prevailing hourly rate of $125.00. (Doc. 18). The Commissioner

added, however, that it had no objection to Petitioner being

awarded an attorney’s fee of $462.50, for 3.70 hours attorney work

at the prevailing EAJA rate of $125.00 per hour. (Id.)

4. On November 1, 2006, pursuant to this Court’s request,

Petitioner filed a motion to supplement/motion for judgment (Doc.

16 at Ex. 3), and attached thereto a copy of the fully favorable

decision entered by the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on June 1,

2006. (Doc. 21 at Exhibit A).

5. On December 5, 2006, the undersigned Magistrate Judge

issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that Petitioner’s

motion for judgment – which was construed as a motion to reopen the

case – be granted, so that Plaintiff’s case could be reopened

prevailing party status could be determined. (Doc. 23). See,

e.g., Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086 (11th Cir. 1996); Hawkins v.

Apfel, 2001 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 1449 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 3, 2001).

6. On January 4, 2007, Senior District Judge W.B. Hand

entered an Order and Judgment, reopening this case and entering

judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against the Commissioner.

(Docs. 24, 25). Accordingly, Petitioner’s application for an award

of attorney’s fees is ripe for review.

II. Conclusions of Law

1. The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) requires a

district court to “award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other

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Pursuant to Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1090 (11th Cir.

1996), the ALJ’s fully favorable June 1, 2006 decision, upon the

sentence six remand, rendered Plaintiff a prevailing party.

3

On March 29, 1996, the EAJA was amended so as to increase the

statutory cap on EAJA fees from $75.00 per hour to $125.00 per hour. 

See, e.g, Ikner v. Apfel, 2000 WL 1844704, *2 n.1 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 9,

2000). These amendments apply to civil actions commenced on or after

the date of enactment; therefore, the statutory cap of $125.00 per

hour applies in this present action.

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expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . .

including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought

by or against the United States . . . unless the court finds that

the position of the United States was substantially justified or

that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(1)(A). The Commissioner does not dispute the issues of

prevailing party status,2

 timeliness, or substantial justification.

2. The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that "the most

useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable

fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation

multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Watford v. Heckler, 765

F.2d 1562, 1568 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). See also Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 772

(11th Cir. 1988) (discussing the reasonableness of the hours

expended in the context of contentions by the government that the

fee requests were not supported by sufficient documentation and

often involved a duplication of effort), aff'd sub nom,

Commissioner, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990). 

3. The EAJA (as amended)3

 provides, in relevant part, as

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follows:

The amount of fees awarded under this subsection shall be

based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and

quality of the services furnished, except that . . .

attorneys fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125.00

per hour unless the court determines that an increase in

the cost of living or a special factor, such as the

limited availability of qualified attorneys for the

proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added.) 

4. In Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir. 1992), the

Eleventh Circuit determined that the EAJA establishes a two-step

analysis for determining the appropriate hourly rate to be applied

in calculating attorneys fees under the Act: 

The first step in the analysis, . . . is to determine the

market rate for “similar services [provided] by lawyers

of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and

reputation.” . . . The second step, which is needed only

if the market rate is greater than [$125.00] per hour, is

to determine whether the court should adjust the hourly

fee upward from [$125.00] to take into account an

increase in the cost of living, or a special factor. 

Id. at 1033-1034 (citations and footnote omitted). 

5. With regard to the reasonableness of the hours claimed by

Plaintiff’s attorney, “[t]he fee applicant bears the burden of

establishing entitlement and documenting the appropriate hours and

hourly rates.” Norman v. Housing Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836

F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988). “[T]he measure of reasonable

hours is determined by the profession’s judgment of the time that

may be conscionably billed and not the least time in which it might

theoretically have been done.” Id. at 1306. 

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See also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 571-572 (1987)

(holding that Congress determined that $125.00 per hour is "quite

enough" public reimbursement for Social Security counsel under EAJA). 

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6. In the case sub judice, Petitioner argues that an

increase in the cost of living has occurred, thus justifying an

hourly rate of $156.23; however, he has cited no cases from this

district in which a fee in excess of the $125.00 cap was awarded.

Moreover, the Court's own research has revealed that $125.00 per

hour is the going rate in this District for social security awards.

See, e.g., Stanley v. Barnhart, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1230 (S.D.

Ala. 2005); Boone v. Apfel, CV 99-0965-CB-L (August 20, 2001)

(adopting the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that the prevailing

market rate be raised from $117.00 to the EAJA cap of $125.00);

Willits v. Massanari, CV 00-0530-RV-C (same); Boggs v. Massanari,

CV 00-0408-P-C (same). Further, while the district court has

authority to increase the fee, it is not required to do so.4 Id.;

Hall v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 367, 369 (5th Cir. 1995), reh'g den., 62

F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 1995). As aptly noted by the Fifth Circuit, the

statutory cap serves to "ensure an adequate source of

representation" and to minimize the cost of representation to tax

payers - the dual purposes of the EAJA. Id. at 369-370. Thus,

based on the record before the Court, the undersigned finds that

the requested hourly rate of $156.23 is not justified, and that the

current $125.00 rate adequately ensures that the purposes of the

EAJA are met. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the hourly

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rate of $125.00.

7. Attached to Petitioner’s motion is an itemization of time

detailing the description of work performed, the time expended, and

the date on which the work was performed. (Doc. 16 at Exhibit 2).

The undersigned has reviewed this document and the Commissioner’s

response, and finds that, under the circumstances, and given the

usual number of hours billed by attorneys in similar actions, the

Petitioner is entitled to an attorney’s fee in the amount of

$462.50, representing 3.70 hours of attorney time expended

representing Plaintiff in federal court at the hourly rate of

$125.00. See, e.g., Coleman v. Apfel, 2000 WL 1367992 (S.D. Ala.

Aug. 30, 2000).

III. CONCLUSION

Therefore, upon consideration of the pertinent pleadings, the

undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that Petitioner’s

Application for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to

Justice Act be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:

Petitioner’s EAJA award is limited to the EAJA rate of $125.00 per

hour, thereby resulting in an award of $462.50 for 3.70 attorney

hours spent representing Plaintiff in connection with this action.

DONE this 2nd day of March, 2007.

 /s/Sonja F. Bivins 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything

in it must, within ten days of the date of service of this document, file

specific written objections with the clerk of court. Failure to do so

will bar a de novo determination by the district judge of anything in the

recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual findings

of the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)©); Lewis v. Smith,

855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988). The procedure for challenging the

findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more

detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides, in part, that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate

judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a “Statement of Objection

to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation” within ten days after

being served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a

different time is established by order. The statement of

objection shall specify those portions of the recommendation

to which objection is made and the basis for the objection.

The objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at the

time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation

should be reviewed de novo and a different disposition made.

It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the original brief

submitted to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the

original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection.

Failure to submit a brief in support of the objection may be

deemed an abandonment of the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court

of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Opposing party’s response to the objection. Any opposing party may

submit a brief opposing the objection within ten (10) days of being

served with a copy of the statement of objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72;

SD ALA LR 72.4(b). 

3. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). Pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the magistrate judge finds

that the tapes and original records in this action are adequate for

purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this recommendation,

but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the

United States will pay the cost of the transcript.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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