Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50101/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50101-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David P. Gnirke
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DAVID P. GNIRKE,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-50101

D.C. No.

3:95-cr-01122-

LAB-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 10, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed January 2, 2015

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Milan D. 

Smith, Jr. and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Christen;

Concurrence by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

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2 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a special condition of supervised

release prohibiting the defendant from possessing depictions

of “sexually explicit conduct” involving children or adults

and from patronizing any place where such depictions are

available.

The panel held that the record supports the district court’s

conclusion that the condition is generally necessary to

achieve the goals of supervised release under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583, but it does not support the restriction of the

defendant’s access to non-pornographic depictions of adults

– speech that is protected by the First Amendment. The panel

therefore construed the condition to apply: (1) to any

materials with depictions of “sexually explicit conduct”

involving children, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2), and

(2) to any materials with depictions of “sexually explicit

conduct” involving adults, defined as explicit sexually

stimulating depictions of adult sexual conduct that are

deemed inappropriate by the defendant’s probation officer. 

The panel wrote that the defendant may not possess such

materials, nor may he patronize any place where such

materials or entertainment are available.

Concurring in the judgment, Judge M. Smith agreed with

the majority that the district court did not abuse its discretion

in imposing the condition; he disagreed that the panel must –

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE 3

or even can – reach that conclusion by construing the

condition to say something that it plainly does not say.

COUNSEL

John Charles Ellis, Jr. (argued), Amy Frances Kimpel, and

Harini P. Raghupathi, Federal Defenders of San Diego, San

Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Charlotte E. Kaiser (argued) and Bruce R. Castetter, Office of

the United States Attorney, San Diego, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge:

This case presents a potential conflict between the

statutory purposes of supervised release and a defendant’s

First Amendment rights. David Gnirke appeals a special

condition of supervised release prohibiting him from

possessing depictions of “sexually explicit conduct”

involving children or adults and from patronizing any place

where such depictions are available. The record in this case

supports the district court’s conclusion that the condition is

generally necessary to achieve the goals of supervised release

under 18 U.S.C. § 3583, but it does not support the restriction

of Gnirke’s access to non-pornographic depictions of

adults—speech that is protected by the First Amendment. 

Construing the condition not to apply to such materials, we

affirm.

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4 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE

BACKGROUND

In 1995 David Gnirke was living with his girlfriend and

her three children at the U.S. Marine Corps Base at Camp

Pendleton, California. One night, Gnirke’s girlfriend returned

home to find Gnirke icing the genital area of one of her twin

babies. Gnirke explained that the baby had gotten itself

caught on the top rail of the crib. Upon being taken to the

hospital, medical staff noted swelling of the genital area that

the staff did not find to be consistent with Gnirke’s

explanation. A doctor concluded that “[t]he best explanation

for the penile injury is that hard suction was applied to the

penis.”

Gnirke was tried and convicted of aggravated criminal

abuse of a child under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c), and corporal

punishment or injury of a child under California Penal Code

§ 273d.1 He was sentenced to 235 months of imprisonment

and five years of supervised release. The district court

initially imposed several conditions of supervised release,

which did not include restrictions on Gnirke’s access to

pornographic or sexually explicit materials.

Near the end of his term of imprisonment, two

psychologists for the correctional facility’s Sex Offender

Management Program prepared a discharge evaluation for

Gnirke. The evaluation first noted that Gnirke did not meet

the criteria for civil commitment of a sexually dangerous

person under 18 U.S.C. § 4248. It went on to evaluate

Gnirke’s relevant history and to assess his risk of reoffending.

1 This was a federal crime because it occurred on the marine base. 

18 U.S.C. § 13.

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UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE 5

The evaluation contained a diagnosis of pedophilia and

antisocial personality disorder. It noted a pattern of

deceitfulness and “irresponsible behavior as related to

treatment obligations.” In particular, Gnirke had refused to

participate in a sex offender treatment program while

incarcerated and was found in possession of pornographic

material. He also admitted to using hard drugs and alcohol

while in prison—a risk factor for sexual recidivism. Based

on an actuarial risk assessment tool, Gnirke’s risk for sexual

reoffending was assessed as “Moderate-High” (between the

81st and 90th percentile) relative to other adult male sexual

offenders.

The evaluation concluded with a number of

recommendations for Gnirke’s supervision and treatment. 

One of these recommendations was that Gnirke not “view or

possess anything sexually explicit or suggestive, including

books, videos, magazine cut-outs, etc., especially if the

content reveals child sexuality, nudity, partial nudity, or

adult-child sexual contact.”

Relying on the discharge evaluation, Gnirke’s probation

officer sought to modify the conditions of Gnirke’s

supervised release. Of relevance here, the probation officer

recommended a special condition that Gnirke “not possess

any sexually explicit material involving children and/or

adults, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2),” the federal statute

criminalizing possession and distribution of child

pornography. Gnirke objected to the modification of the

court’s conditions.

The district court held a hearing on the probation officer’s

proposed modifications in February 2013. At the hearing, the

court acknowledged that it had received and reviewed the

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6 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE

parties’ written arguments. The court described the proposed

condition regarding sexually explicit materials as “[to] not

possess child or adult pornography.” Gnirke did not

challenge the condition as applied to depictions involving

children but requested that it be limited to this particular

context.

The district court rejected Gnirke’s argument. The court

reasoned that, with sex offenders, “one leads to the other,”

presumably referring to adult pornography as the “one” and

child pornography as “the other.” It noted Gnirke’s

possession of adult pornographyin prison and emphasized the

need to prevent future offenses. Overruling Gnirke’s

objection, the district court concluded: “I think there is a

connection between adult and child pornography and the

other things it leads to.” The court stated that “the underlying

fear is that [access to pornography] is going to lead somebody

to molest a kid.” The court therefore imposed a condition

that required that Gnirke: “[n]ot possess any materials such

as videos, magazines, photographs, computer images or other

matter that depicts ‘sexually explicit conduct’ involving

children and/or adults, as defined by 18 [U.S.C. §] 2256(2);

and not patronize any place where such materials or

entertainment are available.”

Gnirke appeals, arguing this condition of supervised

release was both procedurally and substantively

unreasonable.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and

18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). “The government bears the burden of

establishing the necessity of any condition of supervised

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UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE 7

release.” United States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082, 1090

(9th Cir. 2012). Where the defendant properly objected to a

special condition of supervised release, we review the district

court’s imposition of the condition for an abuse of discretion. 

Id. at 1089. This standard incorporates “‘considerable

deference’” to the district court’s conclusions regarding

supervised release conditions. Id. (quoting United States v.

Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 557 (9th Cir. 2006)). Our review is

limited to whether the condition was procedurally and

substantively reasonable. Id. at 1090. Finally, “[c]onditions

affecting fundamental rights . . . are ‘reviewed carefully.’” 

Id. at 1089 (quoting United States v. Soltero, 510 F.3d 858,

866 (9th Cir. 2007)).

DISCUSSION

I. The district court did not commit procedural error.

To avoid procedural error, a district court must consider

the relevant statutory sentencing factors. United States v.

Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). When the

court imposes a special condition of supervised release, the

relevant factors include “the nature and circumstances of the

offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,”

the need for the sentence to “afford adequate deterrence to

criminal conduct,” the need to “protect the public from

further crimes of the defendant,” and the rehabilitation of the

defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2); 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(d)(1). Procedural error occurs if the district court

“choose[s] a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts” or

“fail[s] adequately to explain the sentence selected.” Carty,

520 F.3d at 993. A sufficient explanation “permit[s]

meaningful appellate review” and “communicates that the

parties’ arguments have been heard, and that a reasoned

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8 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE

decision has been made.” Id. at 992. We evaluate the

sufficiency of the district court’s explanation on a case-bycase basis. See United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 921

(9th Cir. 2008).

A detailed explanation from the court is not always

required; in some cases, “adequate explanation . . . may also

be inferred from the [Pre-Sentence Report] or the record as a

whole.” Id. at 922 (internal quotation marks omitted). In

cases implicating a “particularly significant liberty interest,”

however, a specific explanation from the court is necessary,

and there is an additional hurdle: “‘the district court must

support its decision to impose the condition on the record

with record evidence that the condition of supervised release

sought to be imposed is necessary to accomplish’” the goals

of supervised release and “‘involves no greater deprivation of

liberty than is reasonably necessary.’” Wolf Child, 699 F.3d

at 1090 (quoting United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988,

1005 (9th Cir. 2008)).

A. It is unnecessary to decide whether the condition

as written implicates a “particularly significant

liberty interest.”

Gnirke argues that the special condition as written

infringes on a particularly significant First Amendment

interest by preventing him from accessing “a broad swath of

modern visual media, much of it containing literary, artistic,

or cultural significance.” We do not take Gnirke to argue that

there is a particularly significant liberty interest in accessing

obscene or pornographic materials. We have already held

that a defendant’s free speech rights may be infringed to

“effectively address [his] sexual deviance problem.” United

States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 619 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal

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UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE 9

quotation marks omitted). And access to pornography is

clearly not a liberty interest on par with such significant

interests as associating with one’s life partner, see United

States v. Napulou, 593 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2010),

“having contact with one’s children,” Wolf Child, 699 F.3d at

1091, or “being free of unwanted antipsychotic medication,”

United States v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1045, 1055 (9th Cir.

2004). Rather, Gnirke argues that the relevant interest is in

accessing other materials with significant First Amendment

value—including popular non-pornographic films, television

shows, and theater—that may be swept up by the condition,

and in visiting places where such materials are available. We

analyze the broad scope of the condition at length in

consideringwhether it was substantivelyreasonable. Because

we conclude that the condition should be construed to apply

only to sexually explicit materials the district court described

as “pornography,” it is unnecessary to consider here whether

the condition as written implicates a particularly significant

liberty interest.

B. The district court adequately explained its reasons

for imposing the special condition.

Gnirke argues the district court failed to explain how the

special condition relates to the goals of supervised release. 

But it is apparent from the record that the district court

believed the condition was reasonably necessary, in light of

“the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history

and characteristics of the defendant,” to “protect the public

from further crimes of the defendant.” See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(1), (2); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1). The court

articulated that “the underlying fear is that [access to

pornography] is going to lead somebody to molest a kid.” 

The court also reviewed the parties’ written arguments. 

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10 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE

Drawing on Gnirke’s prison discharge evaluation, the

government emphasized the need to prevent future sexual

offenses. The district court’s discussion of the condition was

adequate to permit meaningful appellate review, ensure the

parties’ arguments were heard, and give confidence that a

reasoned decision was made. See Carty, 520 F.3d at 992.

Gnirke also argues that no record evidence supported the

restriction on materials depicting sexually explicit conduct

involving adults. Because this argument is properly

characterized as addressing whether the condition was

substantively reasonable, we discuss it in that context.

II. The special condition issubstantively reasonable if not

defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2).

A district court may order a special condition of

supervised release that: (1) “is reasonably related” to the

crime, “the history and characteristics of the defendant,” and

the purposes of supervised release, including deterrence,

protection of the public, and treatment of the offender, see

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D);

(2) “involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is

reasonably necessary”; and (3) “is consistent with any

pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing

Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3). 

Because the district court “has at its disposal all of the

evidence, its own impressions of a defendant, and wide

latitude,” we give “considerable deference to a district court’s

determination of the appropriate supervised release

conditions” under the abuse of discretion standard. Weber,

451 F.3d at 557 (internal quotation marks omitted). We take

into account “the totality of the circumstances presented to

the district court.” United States v. Collins, 684 F.3d 873,

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UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE 11

887 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). And

we carefully review conditions affecting fundamental rights. 

Wolf Child, 699 F.3d at 1089.

A. The scope of the challenged condition.

The district court clearly stated its intention to restrict

Gnirke’s access to what it referred to as “pornography.” This

was consistent with the Sex Offender Treatment Program

psychologists’ recommendation. But the condition as written

restricts Gnirke’s access to depictions of adult sexual conduct

using a statutory definition of “sexually explicit conduct” that

Congress has applied only to depictions of children. This

definition encompasses much more than what is commonly

understood as pornography in the context of adult sexual

activity.

Under the condition imposed by the district court, Gnirke

may not possess any materials depicting “sexually explicit

conduct,” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2), or patronize

places where such materials are available. This definition

comes from a statutory chapter specifically addressing the

sexual exploitation and abuse of children. Under the

provision:

“sexually explicit conduct” means actual or

simulated—

(i) sexual intercourse, including genitalgenital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal,

whether between persons of the same or

opposite sex;

(ii) bestiality;

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12 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE

(iii) masturbation;

(iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or

(v) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or

pubic area of any person[.]

18 U.S.C. § 2256(2). Because the special condition

incorporates this particular statutory definition of “sexually

explicit conduct,” it prevents Gnirke from possessing any

materials depicting real or simulated sexual acts or

“lascivious” full-frontal nudity,

2

and from going places where

he knows such materials are available. Such places might

include movie theaters, book stores, libraries, theaters, and

large retailers and grocery stores that sell magazines or Rrated movies. The condition appropriately prevents Gnirke

from entering strip clubs and X-rated video stores—but it also

prevents him from setting foot inside his local Walmart, a

library that loans R-rated movies, or a movie theater showing

an R-rated film with a simulated sex scene (even if Gnirke

enters the theater to see a different film).

We are aware that conditions of supervised release are

read to “require an element of mens rea,” and that this

mitigates to some extent the danger that Gnirke’s ability to

patronize certain businesses will be limited. See United

States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010). But

applying the standard literally, the average person will likely

have actual knowledge that most places selling or renting

DVDs—including local libraries—will stock materials

containing depictions of adult sexual acts or lascivious

2 Lascivious is defined as “tending to excite lust; lewd; indecent;

obscene.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).

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UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE 13

displays of nudity. The breadth of the condition poses a

problem both for probation officers, who must decide what

constitutes a violation, and for Gnirke, who should not be left

guessing where he permissibly may go.

B. The district court’s intention to restrict Gnirke’s

accessto “pornography” was reasonably related to

the goals of supervised release.

Gnirke argues that the special condition was not

reasonably related to the goals of supervised release. He

claims that “no evidence was presented that access to

sexually explicit material involving adults” would negatively

affect his rehabilitation or render him more likely to reoffend. 

Gnirke does not challenge the restriction on his access to

materials depicting children.

In United States v. Bee, 162 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 1998), we

affirmed a condition of supervised release that was

similar—though not identical—to the condition that Gnirke

challenges. Bee was convicted of sexually molesting a

six-year-old girl, and, upon his release from custody, the

district court imposed a condition that he “not possess any

sexually stimulating or sexually oriented material as deemed

inappropriate by[his] probation officer and/or treatment staff,

or patronize any place where such material or entertainment

is available.” Id. at 1234 (alteration in original). We held

that this condition was reasonably related to the goals of

supervised release because “[t]he probation officer believed

and the district court agreed that this condition was necessary

to address Bee’s problems with deviant sexual behavior . . .

[and it was] therefore sufficiently related to the goal of

‘protect[ing] the public from further crimes of the

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14 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE

defendant.’” Id. at 1235 (third alteration in original) (quoting

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C)).

The district court’s rationale for restricting Gnirke’s

access to “pornography” is similarly reasonable in this case. 

Gnirke was convicted of a sexual offense involving a young

child. While incarcerated for this crime, Gnirke refused to

participate in sex offender treatment and was found in

possession of pornography, among other infractions. He

admitted to using hard drugs and alcohol while in prison, a

factor that elevates his risk for sexual recidivism according to

the discharge evaluation. Accounting for this history, the

prison psychologists “place[d][Gnirke]in the Moderate-High

(between the 81st and 90th percentile) risk category [to

reoffend] relative to other male sexual offenders.” Given

Gnirke’s egregious offense, his failure to participate in sex

offender treatment, and the psychologists’ recommendation,

we conclude the district court’s intention to restrict Gnirke’s

access to sexually explicit materials was reasonablyrelated to

the protection of the public.

C. The condition as written deprives Gnirke of more

liberty than is reasonably necessary.

Gnirke also argues that the condition the court actually

imposed “infringes more on [his] liberty than is reasonably

necessary” to accomplish the goals of supervised release. See

18 U.S.C. § 3582(d)(2). He suggests that, in light of the

significant First Amendment interests at issue, the district

court should not have prohibited all depictions of adult sexual

conduct, or prohibited him from “patroniz[ing] any place

where such materials or entertainment are available.” For the

reasons explained below, we agree.

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UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE 15

First, we acknowledge that the condition imposed on

Gnirke unquestionably implicates his First Amendment right

to access protected speech. See United States v. Curtin,

489 F.3d 935, 956, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); see also

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (“If the First

Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no

business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what

books he may read or what films he may watch.”). We have

said there is also no doubt that “a defendant’s [First

Amendment rights] may be abridged to effectively address

[his] sexual deviance problem.” Rearden, 349 F.3d at 619

(internal quotation marks omitted). Because a condition may

not restrict more liberty than is reasonably necessary under

§ 3582(d)(2), the scope of the challenged condition is the

focus of our analysis.

We have previously considered restrictions on sexually

explicit materials as a condition of supervised release. In

Bee, our court approved a condition that prohibited

possession of “sexually oriented material as deemed

inappropriate by [Bee’s] probation officer.” 162 F.3d at

1234. In United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868 (9th Cir.

2002), our court held that a condition restricting access to

“pornography” was impermissibly vague. Id. at 872. In

Gnirke’s case, the district court tied the definition of adult

“sexually explicit conduct” to the statutory language in

18 U.S.C. § 2256(2), thereby encompassing virtually all

materials containing depictions of adult sexual conduct. 

Images of adult sexual activity are ubiquitous in

advertisements and a variety of mainstream media. By

employing the language from a statute intended to apply only

to child pornography, the plain language of Gnirke’s

condition includes any depiction of actual or simulated adult

sexual intercourse, however fleeting or veiled, and regardless

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16 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE

of how insignificant it may be to the overall content of an art

exhibit, play, or movie. Because the condition also prevents

Gnirke from patronizing establishments where anydepictions

of simulated adult sexual activity are available, he could

easily violate it by simply carrying on everyday activities like

shopping, seeing a mainstream movie, reading a mainstream

magazine, or watching television.

The government cites our decisions in United States v.

Rearden and United States v. Daniels. Neither is inconsistent

with the result we reach here. In Rearden, reviewing for

plain error, we upheld “a special condition that Rearden not

possess any materials depicting sexually explicit conduct as

defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)” where Rearden’s offense

consisted of transmitting pornographic images involving

sexual acts between “adult men and infant, prepubescent, and

pubescent boys, as well as the display of the genitalia of

boys.” 349 F.3d at 612. Rearden had collaborated with “a

dangerous pedophile,” and the offense resulted from

Rearden’s “interest in extremely vile and graphic depictions

of child rape and murder.” Id. at 620. The district court

determined that “limiting Rearden’s possession of materials

depicting sexually explicit conduct . . . furthered the goals of

rehabilitating him and protecting the public.” Id. Because we

have held that the phrase “sexually explicit conduct” as

defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) is neither unconstitutionally

“vague nor overbroad,” and given the facts of Rearden, we

found no plain error in the restriction preventing Rearden

from possessing legal adult pornography and pornographic

stories. Id. As we have explained, Gnirke may similarly be

prevented from possessing legal adult pornography.

Daniels concerned a prohibition on “possess[ing] any

materials, including pictures, photographs, books, writings,

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UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE 17

drawings, videos, or video games, depicting and/or describing

‘sexually explicit conduct’ as defined in 18 U.S.C.

§ 2256(2).” 541 F.3d at 927. Daniels was convicted of

possession of child pornography, and he argued on appeal

that the condition involved a greater deprivation of his liberty

than was reasonably necessary. Id. Citing Rearden, we held

that the condition was not plainly erroneous, even though

Daniels was not involved with a dangerous co-defendant and

his pornographic interests were less extreme than Rearden’s. 

Id. at 927–28.

There are at least two important distinctions between

Gnirke’s case, on the one hand, and Rearden and Daniels, on

the other. First, in both Rearden and Daniels, we reviewed

the district court’s rulings for plain error. “Under the plain

error standard of review, the appellant must show that:

(1) there was error; (2) the error committed was plain; (3) the

error affected substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously

affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” United States v. Gonzalez-Aparicio, 663 F.3d

419, 428 (9th Cir. 2011). An error “cannot be plain where

there is no controlling authority on point and where the most

closely analogous precedent leads to conflicting results.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because of

the lack of controlling authority on point, any error regarding

the scope of the condition in Daniels and Rearden would not

have been “plain” at the time those cases were decided.

Second, neither Rearden nor Daniels involved the

additional restriction found here: that Gnirke may “not

patronize any place where such [sexually explicit] materials

or entertainment are available.” This part of Gnirke’s

condition vastly expands its scope. Not only may he not

possess “any materials such as videos, magazines,

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18 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE

photographs, computer images or other matter that depicts

‘sexually explicit conduct’ involving children and/or adults,”

he is also severely restricted in where he may shop, acquire

information, and view art or entertainment.

Unlike Rearden and Daniels, Gnirke did object to the

portion of the condition imposed by the district court that

restricts his access to depictions of conduct involving only

adults. Our view is that it was within the scope of the district

court’s discretion to limit his access to child and adult

pornography—which the district court’s written order termed

“sexually explicit conduct”—but the condition actually

imposed sweeps too broadly by limiting Gnirke’s access to

non-pornographic depictions of “sexually explicit conduct”

involving only adults, and by prohibiting him from going

places where these materials or entertainment may be found.3

As written, the condition’s burden on Gnirke’s

constitutional rights is potentially great. The Supreme Court

recognizes that “[t]he portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature

and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny

material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech

and press.” Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957). 

“[I]t is one of the vital problems of human interest and public

concern.” Id. Applied literally, the language of the condition

would prevent Gnirke from viewing Oscar-winning films like

American Beauty and Brokeback Mountain, television shows

3 Contrary to the concurrence’s suggestion, we do not conclude that the

condition sweeps to broadly because we “equat[e] the district court’s use

of ‘sexually explicit conduct’ with ‘pornography.’” Rather, as we have

explained, we conclude the condition sweeps too broadly because it

defines “sexually explicit conduct” with reference to 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)

and prohibits Gnirke from patronizing places where materials depicting

such conduct may be found.

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UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE 19

like The Wire, or sexually explicit works of art that appear in

museums; yet such non-pornographic materials receive full

protection under the First Amendment. See Reno v. Am. Civil

Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997). Because the

condition also prevents Gnirke from patronizing places where

such materials are available, the burden it imposes extends

well beyond possession of what is commonly understood as

“pornography” and makes it much more likely that Gnirke

will unwittingly violate the condition. The government has

not made any specific showing why Gnirke’s access to nonpornographic depictions of adults must be restricted in order

to serve the purposes of supervised release, and it is not

apparent from the record; therefore, we conclude that the

condition as written deprives Gnirke of more liberty than is

reasonably necessary.

Our conclusion is consistent with the reasoning of our

earlier cases, and with decisions from other circuits. In

United States v. Simons, the Eighth Circuit recognized that

special conditions that prohibit possession of pornographic

materials “have often withstood First Amendment

challenges” but nonetheless held that a condition prohibiting

the defendant “from possessing any material that depicts

nudity” involved a “greater deprivation of liberty than [was]

reasonably necessary.” 614 F.3d 475, 483, 485 (8th Cir.

2010). And the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Siegel,

citing Simons, remanded for a district court to reconsider a

similar condition restricting the possession of materials

containing nudity. 753 F.3d 705, 712–13 (7th Cir. 2014).4

4 The special condition here is both broader and narrower than the

conditions in Simons and Siegel. It is broader because it prohibits

patronage as well as possession. But its definition of “sexually explicit

conduct” is narrower than the blanket definition of “nudity” in those cases.

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20 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE

The Seventh Circuit suggested that the prohibition be

rephrased to encompass only “material that depicts nudity in

a prurient or sexually arousing manner,” which accords with

the commonly understood definition of pornography. Id. at

713.5

D. Limitation on the special condition.

The district court intended to restrict Gnirke’s access to

“child and adult pornography,” but by applying the definition

in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) to depictions of adult sexual activity,

5 The concurrence incorrectly suggests that our conclusion conflicts with

United States v. Mefford, 711 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2013), United States v.

Deatherage, 682 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 2012), and United States v.

Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2009). As in Daniels and Rearden, the

conditions in Deatherage and Thielemann did not involve the restriction

that the probationer not patronize any place where sexually explicit

materials are available. See Deatherage, 682 F.3d at 762; Thielemann,

575 F.3d at 270. As we have explained, this part of Gnirke’s condition

vastly expands its scope.

In Mefford, the district court imposed the following two special

conditions: (1) “Defendant shall not access, view, possess, or have under

his control any pornography, including anymaterial that depicts or alludes

to sexual activity, or sexually explicit conduct as defined by 18 U.S.C.

§ 2256(2)”; and (2) “Defendant shall not enter any location where

pornography, erotica, or adult entertainment can be obtained or viewed.” 

Mefford, 711 F.3d at 926. In upholding these conditions, the Eighth

Circuit explained: “The district court intended that Mefford only be

prohibited from possessing or obtaining pornography . . . . The district

court explained that these ‘are limited restrictions that serve the purpose

of [§] 3553(a) while preserving the Defendant’s right to view and/or

possess non-obscene material that may contain nudity.’” Id. at 927. In

other words, the court upheld the condition because it understood it to be

limited to what is commonly understood as pornography. See id. at 928. 

Here, we similarly uphold Gnirke’s condition as substantively reasonable

when construed as the district court intended.

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UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE 21

the condition deprives Gnirke of more liberty than is

reasonably necessary. We therefore construe the condition to

apply: (1) to any materials with depictions of “sexually

explicit conduct” involving children, as defined by 18 U.S.C.

§ 2256(2), and (2) to any materials with depictions of

“sexually explicit conduct” involving adults, defined as

explicit sexually stimulating depictions of adult sexual

conduct that are deemed inappropriate by Gnirke’s probation

officer. Gnirke may not possess such materials, nor may he

patronize any place where such materials or entertainment are

available. See United States v. Goddard, 537 F.3d 1087,

1089 (9th Cir. 2008) (construing a facially broad condition

more narrowly to avoid a greater deprivation of defendant’s

liberty than was reasonably necessary). Contrary to the

concurrence’s suggestion, we believe Gnirke’s condition is

“readily susceptible” to this limiting construction because it

brings the condition in line with what the district court clearly

intended.

The concurrence argues that we should remand for the

district court to craft a new condition, rather than narrowing

the condition on appeal. But both this court and the district

court have struggled to describe a special condition of release

prohibiting access to sexually explicit materials that is

sufficiently clear and not overbroad. We believe it is

appropriate to provide the district court with a workable

alternative rather than yet another directive to “try again.”

With respect to the construed condition, we recognize

that, as in Bee and every other case involving special

conditions of release, Gnirke’s probation officer and the

district court will have some degree of discretion to decide

which materials the condition restricts. Cf. Bee, 162 F.3d at

1234–35 (upholding condition preventing Bee from

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22 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE

possessing “sexuallystimulating or sexuallyoriented material

deemed inappropriate by his probation officer and/or

treatment staff” and from patronizing places where such

material is available). The difficulty of defining

“pornography” with any degree of precision is inherent in the

nature of this condition of supervised release. Other courts

have had occasion to consider how to define the terms

“pornography” or “pornographic,” with varying degrees of

success.6 And we have suggested that “[t]he term

6 The Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. California concerned

obscenity but recognized that “[t]he material we are discussing in this case

is more accurately defined as ‘pornography’ or ‘pornographic material’”

because that case concerned sex-related obscenity. 413 U.S. 15, 18 n.2

(1973). The Court’s legal definition of sex-related obscenity was

narrower than the dictionary definition it quoted for pornography: “a

depiction (as in writing or painting) of licentiousness or lewdness: a

portrayal of erotic behavior designed to cause sexual excitement.” Id. 

Pornography is therefore a broader category than sex-related obscenity. 

See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002) (“As a

general rule, pornography can be banned only if obscene.”).

Others have tried to frame more focused legal definitions of adult

pornography. One influential strand of legal thought ties “pornography”

to “the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women,” but this

definition has not found favor with courts. See Am. Booksellers Ass’n,

Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324–25 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Catharine A.

MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 Harv. C.R.-C.L.

L. Rev. 1 (1985)), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). Another scholar has

required depictions of actual “physical abuse” with “the purpose and

effect of producing sexual arousal.” Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and

the First Amendment, 1986 Duke L.J. 589, 592 (1986). These are attempts

at a definition of legally “regulable pornography,” see id. at 592–93, that

is, pornography that lacks protection under the First Amendment. Here,

we are concerned not with defining the scope of the First Amendment, but

with the more prosaic and functional question of how to avert the

potentially negative effects of pornography on an individual who has

committed sexual abuse on a child.

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UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE 23

[‘pornography’] itself is entirely subjective; unlike

‘obscenity,’ for example, it lacks any recognized legal

definition.” Guagliardo, 278 F.3d at 872. But this does not

mean that pornography lacks a recognized definition in

society at large, however fuzzy its edges may be. Black’s

Law Dictionary defines “pornography” as: “Material (such as

writings, photographs, or movies) depicting sexual activity or

erotic behavior in a way that is designed to arouse sexual

excitement.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009); see also

Oxford English Reference Dictionary 1128 (Rev. 2d ed.

2006) (defining pornography as “the explicit description or

exhibition of sexual subjects or activity in literature, films,

etc., intended to stimulate erotic rather than aesthetic or

emotional feelings”). This seems to coincide with the

common understanding of the term. There may be various

additions and qualifications one may wish to make, but it is

evident that, at a minimum, pornography is explicit material

intended to stimulate, arouse, or the like.

We have little doubt that this ordinary definition is

generally what the district judge had in mind when he

paraphrased the special condition as: “[t]o not possess child

or adult pornography.” And we note that the exercise of

discretion by Gnirke’s probation officer and the district court

in applying the revised condition will be subject to judicial

review to the same extent as other conditions of supervised

release.

CONCLUSION

Construed in the manner discussed in the previous

section, the district court’s imposition of the special condition

restricting Gnirke’s access to sexually explicit materials is

AFFIRMED.

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24 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:

The question before the panel is whether the district court

abused its discretion in revising the conditions of Gnirke’s

supervised release. I agree with the majority that the district

court acted well within its discretion in imposing a condition

that prohibits Gnirke from “possess[ing] any materials . . .

that depict[] ‘sexually explicit conduct’ involving children

and/or adults, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2); and . . .

patroniz[ing] anyplace where such materials or entertainment

are available.” However, I cannot agree that we must—or

even can—reach this conclusion by construing the condition

to say something that it plainly does not say. Moreover, in

rewriting the challenged condition to substitute its own

definition of “sexually explicit material” for the district

court’s undoubtedly permissible definition of the materials

Gnirke is prohibited from accessing, the majority disregards

the abuse of discretion standard and exceeds the scope of our

authority.

For these reasons, I respectfully concur only with the

judgment.

I. The District Court Acted Within its Discretion

The district court acted well within its discretion in

prohibiting Gnirke from accessing “[material] that depicts

‘sexually explicit conduct’ involving children and/or adults,

as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)” and from “patroniz[ing]

any place where such materials or entertainment are

available.” The majority impugns the validity of the condition

by equating the district court’s use of “sexually explicit

conduct” with “pornography,” a term our court has found to

be unconstitutionally vague in the context of supervised

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UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE 25

release conditions because “it lacks any recognized legal

definition.” United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872

(9th Cir. 2002). From this false premise, the majority

erroneously concludes that “the condition actually imposed

sweeps too broadly.” But the district court did not prohibit

Gnirke from possessing “pornography”; instead, it specified

the materials that Gnirke cannot access, and tied the condition

to the definition of “sexually explicit conduct” set forth in

§ 2256(2).

We review the imposition of conditions of supervised

release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Wolf Child,

699 F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012). Any special condition

must be “reasonably related” to the goals of deterrence,

protection of the public, and rehabilitation of the offender.

18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d)(1), 3553(a). In addition, the conditions

cannot involve any “greater deprivation of liberty than is

reasonably necessary for the purposes” of supervised release.

18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). “The touchstone of reasonableness is

whether the record as a whole reflects rational and

meaningful consideration” of the relevant factors. United

States v. Rudd, 662 F.3d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

As the majority explains, Gnirke molested a twentymonth old baby who was left in his care, and was

subsequently convicted of aggravated sexual abuse, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c), and infliction of inhuman

punishment on a child, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 13 and

California Penal Code § 273(d). Gnirke’s sister further

reports that Gnirke engaged in sexual conduct with her on at

least two occasions when she was a child. And it is

undisputed that Gnirke himself was a victim of sexual abuse.

During his incarceration, Gnirke refused to participate in sex

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26 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE

offender treatment, was found in possession of pornography,

failed drug treatment, was charged three times for possession

of drugs or alcohol, used heroin and marijuana, and had ten

instances of institutional misconduct.

In preparing Gnirke’s Discharge Evaluation, the Sex

Offender Treatment Program psychologist considered these

factors and “placed [Gnirke] in a moderate to high (between

81st and 90th percentile) risk category to reoffend relative to

other male sexual offenders.” The psychologist further

recommended intensive treatment focusing on “offensespecific targets . . . [to] reduce the likelihood of further sexual

offending.” The psychologist specified that Gnirke “should

not view or possess anything sexually explicit or suggestive,

including books, videos, magazine [cutouts], etc.”

Following a hearing, the district court modified the

conditions of Gnirke’s supervised release to include a

condition that prohibits Gnirke from “possess[ing] any

materials . . . that depict[] ‘sexually explicit conduct’

involving children and/or adults, as defined by 18 U.S.C.

§ 2256(2); and . . . patroniz[ing] any place where such

materials or entertainment are available.” The record is thus

clear that the district court imposed this condition out of a

concern for public safety, to minimize Gnirke’s likelihood of

sexually violating another child, and to further Gnirke’s

rehabilitation.

As the majority observes, the challenged condition may

prohibit Gnirke from patronizing certain establishments, and

the condition reaches some forms of speech that are

constitutionally protected for most people. Nevertheless,

“[t]he district court has broad discretion in setting conditions

of supervised release, including restrictions that infringe on

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UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE 27

fundamental rights.” United States v. Bee, 162 F.3d 1232,

1234 (9th Cir. 1998). Moreover, we have recognized that “[a]

defendant’s right to free speech may be abridged to

effectively address [his] sexual deviance problem.” United

States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 619 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

For these reasons, we have previously upheld conditions

of supervised release that are nearly identical to the condition

before us. In United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 927 (9th

Cir. 2008), and United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d at 619, we

affirmed conditions of supervised release that prohibited the

probationer from possessing any materials depicting or

describing “sexually explicit conduct” involving children or

adults as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2). In United States v.

Bee, 162 F.3d at 1234, we upheld a condition that prohibited

the probationer from “possess[ing] any sexually stimulating

or sexually oriented material as deemed inappropriate by [his]

probation officer and/or treatment staff, or patroniz[ing] any

place where such material or entertainment is available.”

The majority concludes that these prior holdings are not

dispositive and that the challenged condition “sweeps too

broadly.” The majority reasons that we need not follow our

precedent because: (1) the conditions in Daniels, Rearden,

and Bee were reviewed for plain error, and (2) the conditions

in Daniels and Rearden did not include a provision that

prohibited the probationer from patronizing any place where

the prohibited materials were available. The majority’s

conclusion is inconsistent with our case law and also

contradicts that of other circuits.

Just because the conditions in Daniels, Rearden, and Bee

were reviewed for plain error does not mean that these cases

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28 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE

are devoid of precedential value. The condition at issue in

Bee restricted the probationer’s access to sexually explicit

materials and prohibited him from patronizing any place

where such materials are available. Id. In affirming this

condition, we did not merely hold that the district court did

not commit plain error. We specifically held that the

condition was substantively reasonable because “the

probation officer believed and the district court agreed that

this condition was necessary to address Bee’s problems with

deviant sexual behavior . . . [and it was] therefore sufficiently

related to the goal of ‘protect[ing] the public from further

crimes of the defendant.’” Id. at 1235 (quoting 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(2)(C)). We subsequently reaffirmed Bee’s holding

in United States v. Guagliardo, in which we explained that “a

probationer does not have an unqualified First Amendment

right to ‘sexually stimulating or sexually oriented materials.’”

278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bee, 162 F.3d at

1232).

Our sister circuits have also affirmed substantively

identical conditions. For example, in United States v.

Mefford, the Eighth Circuit rejected an overbreadth challenge

and upheld a condition of supervised release which stated that

the probationer “shall not access, view, possess, or have

under his control any pornography, including any material

that depicts or alludes to sexual activity, or sexually explicit

conduct as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) . . . [or] enter any

location where [such materials] can be obtained or viewed.”

711 F.3d 923, 926–28 (8th Cir. 2013); see also United States

v. Deatherage, 682 F.3d 755, 762 (8th Cir. 2012) (upholding

a condition of supervised release which stated that the

probationer “shall not purchase, possess . . . or use any media

forms containing pornographic images or sexually oriented

materials including . . . materials containing ‘sexually explicit

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UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE 29

conduct’ as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)”); United States

v. Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that

a condition that prohibited a probationer from “possess[ing]

and viewing . . . sexually explicit material, as defined in

18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A), does not violate the Constitution”).

In each of these cases, the court reviewed for abuse of

discretion, not for plain error, and each plainly held that the

challenged condition was not constitutionally overbroad.

Mefford, 711 F.3d at 926–28; Deatherage, 682 F.3d at 762;

Thielemann, 575 F.3d at 268.

In light of the egregious nature of Gnirke’s sexual

misconduct, the psychologist’s opinion that Gnirke is likely

to reoffend, and the psychologist’s recommendation that

Gnirke “not view or possess anything sexually explicit or

suggestive,” the district court acted well within its discretion

in imposing the challenged condition. The majority’s

unfounded conclusion that the condition “sweeps too

broadly,” is inconsistent with our case law and is also in

direct conflict with decisions of our sister circuits.

II. Rewriting the Challenged Condition is Improper

Even if the district court had erred in imposing the

challenged condition—which it did not—Iwould refrain from

rewriting the condition because it is not our role as an

appellate court to craft conditions of supervised release, and

doing so disregards the abuse of discretion standard and

exceeds the scope of our authority.

District courts have broad discretion in fashioning

conditions of supervised release. United States v. Gementera,

379 F.3d 596, 600 (9th Cir. 2004). On appeal, our only duty

is to determine whether the district court abused this

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30 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE

discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)

(“The sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts

and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case.

The judge sees and hears the evidence, makes credibility

determinations, has full knowledge of the facts and gains

insights not conveyed by the record.”).

If we determine that the district court acted within its

discretion in imposing a condition of supervised release, we

affirm the condition. Id. If we determine that the district court

abused its discretion, we must vacate the condition and

remand to the district court with instructions that the district

court impose a revised condition. See, e.g., Wolf Child,

699 F.3d at 1102 (holding that conditions of supervised

release were overbroad and remanding for the district court

to “carefully examine what more narrowly circumscribed

conditions would be reasonably related to the statutory

purposes of [supervised release]”); United States v. Sales,

476 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that condition of

supervised release was overbroad and remanding because

“the district court, in consultation with the probation officer,

is better suited to the job of crafting adequate but not overly

restrictive conditions of supervised release”).

Here, the challenged condition plainlystates that “[Gnirke

shall n]ot possess any materials such as videos, magazines,

photographs, computer images or other matter that depicts

‘sexually explicit conduct’ involving . . . adults, as defined by

18 U.S.C. § 2256(2); and [shall] not patronize any place

where such materials or entertainment are available.” The

majority concludes that it was within the scope of the district

court’s discretion to limit Gnirke’s access to adult

pornography, but that “the condition actuallyimposed sweeps

too broadly.” Nevertheless, rather than vacating the condition

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UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE 31

and remanding for the district court to narrow the condition’s

breadth, the majority rewrites the condition to substitute its

own definition of “sexually explicit conduct” for the district

court’s plainly stated definition. In so doing, the majority

exceeds the permissible scope of our review.

In order to justify rewriting the challenged condition of

supervised release, the majority cites to United States v.

Goddard, 537 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008). In that case, we

reviewed several conditions of supervised release. One

condition stated that the probationer “shall not add, remove,

upgrade, update, re-install, repair, or otherwise modify the

hardware or software on [his] computers, computer-related

devices, or their peripheral equipment . . . without the prior

approval of [his] Probation Officer.” Id. at 1090 n.3. We

concluded that this condition would be unworkable as a

“practical matter” if it were “broadly applied,” and we

narrowly construed the condition not to apply to “routine or

automatic” software modifications or upgrades. Id. at

1090–91. We further read a condition that the probationer

“shall use computers/devices only within the scope of his

employment” to apply only to the probationer’s use of

computers at work. Id. at 1090–91 (“[R]easonably construed

in context, [the condition] means that at work, [the

probationer] shall use computers and computer related

devices only within the scope of his employment.”).

As with any legal text, we may only impose a limiting

construction on a condition of supervised release if it is

“‘readily susceptible’ to such a construction.” Comite de

Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach,

657 F.3d 936, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Reno v.

Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997)). In

Goddard, the plain language of the challenged conditions was

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32 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE

fairly susceptible to a narrow reading, and our reading neither

conflicted with nor altered the conditions’ plain terms. By

contrast, the text of the condition before us specifically refers

to “sexually explicit conduct” and it adopts the definition of

“sexually explicit” found in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2). I see no

way to read the condition as having any alternate meaning,

including the one the majority has assigned to it.

I am not aware of any precedent that permits us to redraft

conditions of supervised release as we see fit. Accordingly,

if the majority believes that the challenged condition is

overbroad—a conclusion with which I disagree—the proper

course would be to vacate the condition and remand to the

district court.

III. Conclusion

The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing

a condition that prohibits Gnirke from “possess[ing] any

materials . . . that depict[] ‘sexually explicit conduct’

involving children and/or adults, as defined by 18 U.S.C.

§ 2256(2); and . . . patroniz[ing] any place where such

materials or entertainment are available.” I would affirm on

these grounds.

I am perplexed by the majority’s decision to exceed the

permissible scope of our review by rewriting a condition of

supervised release that is substantively identical to those that

we and our sister courts have affirmed on a number of

occasions.

For these reasons, I respectfully concur only with the

judgment.

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