Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01447/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01447-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric Arnold
Respondent
Daniel Aaron Eckes
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DANIEL AARON ECKES, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

ERIC ARNOLD, Warden, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:14-cv-1447 MCE AC P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

I. Introduction 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Presently pending are two matters: (1) petitioner’s motion to stay 

and abey this action, filed contemporaneously with his petition, ECF No. 2; and (2) respondent’s 

motion to dismiss the petition, ECF No. 11. For the reasons set forth herein, this court 

recommends that respondent’s motion to dismiss be granted, and petitioner’s motion to stay be 

denied as moot. 

II. Factual and Procedural Background 

 Based on an incident that occurred March 26, 2010, petitioner was charged in Yolo 

County Superior Court with attempted murder (in violation of California Penal Code1 §§ 664(a) 

 

1

 All further Penal Code and Section references are to the California Penal Code. 

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and 187(a)) (Count 1); attempted second degree robbery (in violation of Penal Code §§ 664 and 

211) (Count 2); and conspiracy to commit robbery (in violation of Penal Code §§ 182(a)(1) and 

211) (Count 3). Each count included enhancement allegations of firearm use and infliction of 

great bodily injury. See Respondent’s Lodged Doc. No. 2, Appendix before the Court of Appeal, 

at 001-004. 

 On February 6, 2012, in exchange for the dismissal of Counts 1 and 2 and a maximum 

prison term of 22 years, petitioner entered a guilty plea on Count 3 and admitted the enhancement 

allegations of firearm use (Penal Code § 12022.53(c)), and great bodily injury (id., § 12022.7(a)). 

See Lodged Doc. No. 2, Appendix at 005-012. The plea included an agreement that the great 

bodily injury enhancement would be dismissed at sentencing pursuant to a “Harvey waiver.”2 Id. 

 On March 12, 2012, after imposing restitution and fines, and dismissing the great bodily 

injury enhancement, the trial court sentenced petitioner to a 22-year term of incarceration, based 

on the following calculation: Two years based on petitioner’s conviction for “conspiracy to 

commit a felony” in violation of Section 182(a)(1),3 and twenty years based on the firearm 

enhancement set forth in Section 12022.53(c).4 Lodged Doc. No. 2 at 013-022, 033. The trial 

court explained that its sentence under Section 182 was based on the “middle base term” of two 

years for second degree robbery. Id. at 20. Petitioner was represented by defense attorney 

Russell Miller throughout the trial court proceedings. 

 On April 26, 2012, court-appointed appellate counsel, William Malloy, filed a “Wende 

//// 

 

2

 The California Supreme Court’s holding in People v. Harvey, 25 Cal. 3d 754 (1979), authorizes 

a trial court to impose restitution on a defendant based on a count that is subsequently dismissed 

pursuant to a plea bargain. 

3

 Felony conspiracy includes the following: “If two or more persons conspire . . . [t]o commit 

any crime.” Cal. Penal Code § 182(a)(1). 

4

 Penal Code section 12022.53(c) provides: 

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person who, in the 

commission of a felony specified in subdivision (a) [enumerated 

felonies], personally and intentionally discharges a firearm, shall be 

punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in 

the state prison for 20 years. 

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brief” in the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District.5 On May 10, 2013, the Court 

of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s judgment of conviction, but directed the trial court to correct the 

abstract of judgment to properly reflect imposition of the low (rather than middle) term of two 

years as the base term for petitioner’s conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery,6 and to 

correctly identify the source of petitioner’s conduct credits.7 Lodged Doc. No. 1 at 3 (Case No. 

C070957); see also People v. Eckes, 2013 WL 1984392 (Cal. App. 3d 2013). Petitioner did not 

seek further direct review in the California Supreme Court. 

 Meanwhile, on May 8, 2013 (two days prior to the Court of Appeal’s decision on direct 

review), and through a third attorney, Donald Masuda, petitioner filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District. Lodged Doc. No. 2. 

Petitioner contended that his sentence violated the California Penal Code because Section 

182(a)(1) (felony conspiracy to commit a crime) is not among the enumerated felonies that 

qualify for enhancements under Section 12022.53(c). Petitioner argued that his twenty-year 

enhancement under Section 12022.53(c) should be stricken. Id. On May 16, 2013, the Court of 

Appeal summarily denied the petition. Lodged Doc. No. 3 (Case No. C073700). 

 On May 29, 2013, again through attorney Masuda, petitioner filed a petition for review in 

the California Supreme Court, on the same grounds asserted in his petition for writ of habeas 

corpus denied by the Court of Appeal. Lodged Doc. No. 4. Petitioner again contended that his 

 

5

 A “Wende” brief sets forth the facts of a case, requests that the appellate court review the entire 

record on appeal without raising a specific issue, and offers to provide further briefing if 

requested by the court. See People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d 436 (1979). 

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 The Court of Appeal explained: 

Conspiracy is punishable in the same manner as the target offense 

(§ 182, subd. (a) foll. par. (6)), which in this case is robbery. 

Second degree robbery is punishable by two, three, or five years. 

The court stated it was imposing the “middle base term of two 

years” and the abstract of judgment repeats the error. Since the plea 

bargain was clearly for a two-year base term, the court’s records 

should be corrected to reflect imposition of the low term of two 

years as the base term. 

People v. Eckes, 2013 WL 1984392 at *1. 

7

 The Court of Appeal directed the trial court to correctly identify the source of petitioner’s 

conduct credits as Penal Code section 2933.1, not section 4019. See Lodged Doc. No. 1 at 3. 

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sentence was unauthorized by California statutory law and that his enhancement should be 

stricken. Id. On July 24, 2013, the California Supreme Court summarily denied review. Lodged 

Doc. No. 5 (Case No. S211039). 

 Several months later, on May 9, 2014, through attorneys Tara Hoveland and Kent Russell, 

petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Yolo County Superior Court. Lodged 

Doc. No. 6. Petitioner claimed that his constitutional rights to due process and effective 

assistance of counsel were violated by the failure of his trial counsel to argue that the felony to 

which petitioner pled guilty (Section 182) could not be enhanced by Section 12022.53(c). 

Petitioner asserted that, in response to his May 2013 petition for review before the California 

Supreme Court, the Attorney General conceded that petitioner’s sentence was contrary to state 

statutory law but argued pursuant to People v. Hester, 22 Cal. 4th 290, 295 (2000), that petitioner 

had forfeited his right to challenge his sentence because he had agreed to, and substantially 

benefitted from, his plea bargain. Lodged Doc. No. 6, Addendum to Superior Court Petition, at 2 

n.6. 

 On June 17, 2014, while his May 2014 petition was pending in the Yolo County Superior 

Court, petitioner filed the instant, purportedly “mixed” federal habeas petition, which asserts the 

following two grounds for relief: (1) petitioner was deprived of due process and the effective 

assistance of trial counsel during plea negotiations and sentencing proceedings (Ground One), and 

(2) petitioner’s sentence under Section 12022.53 constitutes a denial of due process and cruel and 

unusual punishment (Ground Two). ECF No. 1. The federal petition states that Ground One had 

not been exhausted in the state courts but was then pending in the Yolo County Superior Court. 

Id. at 12. 

 Also on June 17, 2014, petitioner filed a motion to stay and abey his federal petition, 

pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), until such time that Ground One is exhausted 

in the state courts. ECF No. 2. Petitioner explained that his federal petition was filed 

“protectively” to preserve Ground One without running past the statute of limitations. Petitioner 

requested that his federal habeas petition be stayed until Ground One is ruled on by the California 

Supreme Court. 

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 By order filed June 20, 2014, this court directed respondent to respond to petitioner’s 

federal habeas petition and to petitioner’s motion to stay. ECF No. 4. On September 9, 2014, 

respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss and to deny petitioner’s stay request. ECF No. 11. 

Plaintiff filed an opposition, ECF No. 13, and respondent filed a reply, ECF No. 14. 

 Thereafter, petitioner filed two Notices of Decision concerning the exhaustion status of 

Ground One. On October 6, 2014, the Yolo County Superior Court summarily denied petitioner’s 

habeas petition for failure “to make a prima facie showing that he is entitled to relief.” ECF No. 

15 (Case No. HC CR 14-20). On January 2, 2015, the California Court of Appeal, Third 

Appellate District, summarily denied his petition. ECF No. 16 (Case No. C077723). Review of 

the dockets in the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court indicates that, as 

of this writing, petitioner has not pursued this action in the California Supreme Court.8

III. The Parties’ Positions 

 There is no dispute between the parties that petitioner has not exhausted his Ground One 

ineffective assistance and due process claims, which remain pending in the state courts. 

Additionally, petitioner concedes that his Ground Two cruel and unusual punishment claim has 

not been exhausted. ECF No. 13 at 5:19-20. The parties dispute whether petitioner’s Ground 

Two due process claim was exhausted in the state courts. Petitioner contends that it was 

exhausted, thus supporting his assertion that the instant federal petition is a “mixed” petition that 

may be stayed under Rhines, supra, 544 U.S. 269. Respondent contends that petitioner failed to 

exhaust his Ground Two due process claim before commencing this action and, therefore, that the 

instant federal petition was fully unexhausted when filed and must be dismissed on that basis. 

Petitioner responds that, if this court finds his Ground Two due process claim unexhausted, then it 

should find that petitioner’s failure to exhaust his Ground One claim is excused under Martinez v. 

Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), premised on the failure of petitioner’s initial post-conviction 

 

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 This court may take judicial notice of its own records and the records of other courts. See 

United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 876 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Wilson, 631 

F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201 (court may take judicial notice of facts 

that are capable of accurate determination by sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned). 

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counsel to assert a claim for the ineffective assistance of petitioner’s trial counsel. 

IV. Legal Standards 

A. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies 

 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a 

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not 

entitled to relief in the district court.” The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 5 of the Rules 

Governing § 2254 Cases state that “an alleged failure to exhaust state remedies may be raised by 

the attorney general, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as to that ground.” The Ninth 

Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner failed to 

exhaust state remedies as a request for the Court to dismiss the action under Rule 4 of the Rules 

Governing § 2254 Cases. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990); 

White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989). Therefore, based on the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases and case law, the court will review respondent's motion for dismissal 

pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

The exhaustion of available state remedies is a prerequisite to a federal court’s 

consideration of claims sought to be presented in habeas corpus proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion 

requirement by providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider all the 

claims before presenting them to the federal court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971), 

Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). The 

exhaustion “requirement serves to minimize friction between federal and state courts by allowing 

the state an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of a petitioner’s federal 

rights, and to foster increased state court familiarity with federal law.” Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 

1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988). In this manner, the exhaustion requirement is a matter of federalstate comity rather than jurisdiction. See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987). 

 When presented with a wholly unexhausted federal habeas corpus petition, a federal 

district court must dismiss the petition pending the exhaustion of state court remedies. See 

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (completely unexhausted petition must 

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be dismissed without prejudice); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478 (9th Cir. 2001) (district court 

properly dismissed unexhausted federal habeas petition even though at the time of dismissal the 

claims were exhausted). While the advent of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations has led to 

the development of judicially-crafted procedures to deal with exhaustion issues, this court has no 

authority to stay a wholly unexhausted federal habeas petition. See Rhines, 544 U.S. 269 

(authorizing stay and abeyance of a mixed federal habeas corpus petition); King v. Ryan, 564 

F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) (after Rhines district court may still stay a petition that has been 

amended to state only exhausted claims, pursuant to Kelly v. Small, 35 F.3d 1063 (2003)); 

Rasberry, 448 F.3d 1150 (declining to extend the Rhines stay and abeyance procedure to wholly 

unexhausted petitions). 

B. Stay and Abeyance 

 Petitioner requests a stay of this action under Rhines, supra, 544 U.S. 269.9 A federal 

habeas corpus petition that includes both exhausted and unexhausted claims is a “mixed” petition 

subject to dismissal. Id. at 273 (federal court “may not adjudicate mixed petitions for habeas 

corpus, that is, petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims”). Under Rhines, a 

district court should stay a mixed petition only in “limited circumstances,” specifically, when (1) 

petitioner demonstrates good cause for failure to first exhaust the claim(s) in the state courts, (2) 

the claim(s) at issue are potentially meritorious, and (3) petitioner has not been dilatory in 

pursuing the litigation. Id. at 277-78. 

 Good cause under Rhines does not require a showing of “extraordinary circumstances.” 

Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 2005). However, “[a]n assertion of good cause without 

evidentiary support will not typically amount to a reasonable excuse justifying a petitioner’s 

failure to exhaust.” Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2014). One district court has 

held that the Rhines good cause standard “requires the petitioner to show that he was prevented 

 

9

 Petitioner does not request a stay of the instant action under Kelly, supra, 35 F.3d 1063, which 

does not require a showing of good cause. Under Kelly, a petitioner may amend a mixed petition 

to delete unexhausted claims; seek a stay of the resulting, fully-exhausted petition while 

proceeding to state court to exhaust the deleted claims; and later amend his federal petition to 

reincorporate the newly-exhausted claims. Id. at 1070-71. While this procedure does not require 

a showing of good cause, it does not preserve the protective filing date of the federal petition. 

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from raising the claim, either by his own ignorance or confusion about the law or the status of his 

case, by circumstances over which he had no control, such as actions by counsel, either in 

contravention of the petitioner’s clearly expressed desire to raise the claim, or when petitioner had 

no knowledge of the claim’s existence.” Riner v. Crawford, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1211 (D. Nev. 

2006). 

V. Analysis 

 A. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Petition is Fully Unexhausted 

 A Rhines stay is available only if the instant federal petition is a “mixed” petition, 

containing at least one exhausted claim. Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1154. In light of petitioner’s 

concessions that he has not exhausted Ground One (which remains pending in the state courts), 

and has not exhausted his Ground Two cruel and unusual punishment claim, whether the petition 

is mixed depends on the status of petitioner’s Ground Two due process claim.10 Petitioner 

contends that this claim was exhausted because it was fairly presented to the California Supreme 

Court in his June 27, 2013 “Reply to Answer to Petition for Review” filed in the state’s highest 

court. See ECF No. 13 at 5, citing id. at 19-35 (Exh. 5). 

 There are two problems with petitioner’s exhaustion theory. First, a federal claim 

presented for the first time to the State’s highest court on discretionary review, in a procedural 

posture in which the state court need not consider its merits, is not “fairly presented” and 

therefore is not exhausted. Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 915-18 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that 

presentation of federal constitutional claims to state Supreme Court in petition for discretionary 

review, when only state law grounds for relief had been presented to the lower state courts, failed 

to exhaust the claims), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1146 (2005). Here, petitioner’s due process theory 

was presented in state court for the first and only time in his Reply to the Answer to his Petition 

for Review. Neither petitioner’s underlying May 8, 2013 petition for writ of habeas corpus filed 

in the California Court of Appeal (Case No. C073700), see Lodged Doc. No. 2, nor his May 29, 

2013 petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court (Case No. S211039), see Lodged 

 

10 Petitioner’s motion to stay assumed without argument that both of his Ground Two claims 

were exhausted in the state courts. See ECF No. 2. 

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Doc. No. 4, asserted or referenced a due process claim. Instead, those versions of the sentencing 

challenge asserted violations of state statutory provisions only. Under these circumstances, the 

applicable rules did not require the Supreme Court to consider the due process issue at all. See 

Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8.500(b) (Supreme Court review is discretionary) & (c)(1) (Supreme 

Court will normally not consider issues not raised below); Rule 8.516(b)(1) (if review is granted, 

Court may decide any issues raised in the petition or answer [without reference to reply]) & (b)(3) 

(Court need not decide every issue raised). Because petitioner presented his federal due process 

claim for the first time in a posture that made review unlikely at best, the due process claim was 

not “fairly presented” and therefore is unexhausted. See Casey, 386 F.3d at 918. 

 Even if petitioner had presented the due process theory articulated in his California 

Supreme Court reply brief to the lower state courts and in his petition to the California Supreme 

Court, Ground Two would not be exhausted. A federal claim is fairly presented to the state court 

if the petitioner described the operative facts and the federal legal theory upon which his claim is 

based. See Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Fair presentation requires 

that a state’s highest court has ‘a fair opportunity to consider . . . . and to correct [the] asserted 

constitutional defect.’”); Lounsbury v. Thompson, 374 F.3d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2004) (same) 

(quoting Picard, 404 U.S. at 276); Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Exhaustion requires that petitioner specify the federal constitutional basis of his claim in state 

court. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995); Fields v. Washington, 401 F.3d 1018 (9th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1037 (2005). To the extent that petitioner presented a due process 

theory to the state court, it is not the same claim presented here. 

 In the 2013 reply brief, petitioner was responding to the Attorney General’s argument 

under People v. Hester, supra, 22 Cal. 4th 290, that petitioner had forfeited his right to challenge 

his sentence by writ when he accepted his plea bargain. In Hester, the California Supreme Court 

held as follows: 

The rule that defendants may challenge an unauthorized sentence 

on appeal even if they failed to object below is itself subject to an 

exception: Where the defendants have pleaded guilty in return for a 

specified sentence, appellate courts will not find error even though 

the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction in reaching that figure, 

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so long as the trial court did not lack fundamental jurisdiction. The 

rationale behind this policy is that defendants who have received 

the benefit of their bargain should not be allowed to trifle with the 

courts by attempting to better the bargain through the appellate 

process. 

Hester, 22 Cal. 4th at 295. Petitioner responded that an exception to Hester should apply when 

the underlying sentence is patently unlawful, as the Attorney General reportedly conceded was 

true of petitioner’s sentence. See Lodged Doc. No. 6, Addendum to Superior Court Petition, at 2 

n.6. Petitioner sought to distinguish cases relied on in Hester, and cases that thereafter relied on 

Hester, from the facts of his own plea bargain. See ECF No. 13 at 26-34. Plaintiff’s only 

reference to due process was as follows: 

Second, Petitioner had the right to rely upon the advice and counsel 

of his attorney, rely on the representations of the district attorney, 

and rely upon the trial court to ensure that he was legally sentenced. 

There can be no waiver of this fundamental right to due process 

under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

ECF No. 13 at 26 (Exh. 5: Petitioner’s June 27, 2013 Reply to Answer to Petition for Review 

filed in the California Supreme Court); see also id. at 5. 

 The due process claim presented to this court is a direct challenge to the constitutionality 

of petitioner’s sentence. Petitioner alleges that imposition of the sentencing enhancement under 

Section 12022.53(c) violated his due process rights. Petitioner’s principal argument is that the 

trial court “could not legally attach the twenty (20) year ‘discharge of a firearm in a violent 

offense’ enhancement to the conspiracy charge.” ECF No. 1 at 21. Instead, asserts petitioner, 

“[t]he correct firearm enhancement for the non-violent crime of conspiracy to commit a felony 

would have been pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.5(a) which provides for a punishment of 

three (3), four (4) or ten (10) years. (Pen. Code § 12202.5(a).) This was the enhancement 

originally attached to the conspiracy count in the Information. (CT 11.)” Id. at 21-2 n.9. 

 This federal due process claim presents an entirely different legal theory than that 

presented by petitioner to the California Supreme Court. Petitioner’s due process argument in 

rebuttal to the Attorney General’s Hester argument was premised on petitioner’s asserted right to 

rely on the advice of his trial counsel, the representations of the district attorney, and the expertise 

and authority of the trial court. This was, in essence, an “unfair reliance” argument. The 

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argument was directed at overcoming an implied waiver, it was not proffered as a substantive 

basis to set aside the sentence. Accordingly, the argument did not provide the California Supreme 

Court a fair opportunity to consider petitioner’s claim that his sentence, itself, violates due 

process. See Picard, 404 U.S. at 276; Wooten, 540 F.3d at 1025. 

For both the reasons explained above, this court finds that petitioner’s Ground Two due 

process claim was not exhausted in the state courts. Because none of petitioner’s other claims 

were exhausted in the state courts, petitioner’s federal habeas petition is fully unexhausted. See 

Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1154. This court lacks the authority stay a fully unexhausted federal habeas 

petition. Id. Accordingly, under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the petition 

must be dismissed without prejudice, and petitioner’s motion to stay denied as moot. 

 B. Petitioner’s Alternate “Cause and Prejudice” Argument 

 Petitioner argues, in the alternative, that this court should apply Martinez v. Ryan, supra, 

132 S. Ct. 1309, and find “cause and prejudice” for petitioner’s failure to previously exhaust 

Ground One, the claim currently pending in the state courts. In Martinez, a case that did not 

involve exhaustion, the Supreme Court held that “inadequate assistance of counsel at initialreview collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of 

ineffective assistance at trial.”11 Id. at 1315.12 In essence, petitioner asks this court to refrain 

from dismissing his federal habeas petition on exhaustion grounds by (1) construing his 

concededly unexhausted Ground One as procedurally barred because it can no longer be 

exhausted in the state courts, and then (2) finding cause and prejudice for the imputed default 

 

11 The factors supporting a finding of “cause” under Martinez are distinct from those supporting 

a finding of “good cause” under Rhines. But see Blake, supra, 745 F.3d at 984 (“we hold that the 

Rhines standard for IAC-based cause is not any more demanding than the cause standard 

articulated in Martinez”). 

12 As a general rule, a federal habeas court “will not review a question of federal law decided by 

a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the 

federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Calderon v. United States District Court 

(Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir.1996) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 

(1991)); cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1204 (1997). A petitioner can overcome a procedural default by 

demonstrating cause and prejudice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. Martinez creates a “narrow 

exception” to Coleman’s holding that an attorney’s errors in a post-conviction proceeding do not 

constitute cause for a procedural default. See Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1917 (2013). 

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under Martinez. 

 Petitioner contends that his initial collateral review counsel (Masuda) rejected petitioner’s 

request13 to assert a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel (Miller) for failing to 

recognize and cure petitioner’s illegal sentencing. As earlier noted, the pleadings filed by 

Masuda – petitioner’s May 8, 2013 petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Court 

of Appeal (Case No. C073700), see Lodged Doc. No. 2, and petitioner’s May 29, 2013 petition 

for review filed in the California Supreme Court (Case No. S211039), see Lodged Doc. No. 4 – 

allege only a violation of state statutory law. 

 Respondent replies that petitioner’s argument is premature because, at the time petitioner 

raised this argument in his opposition brief before this court, no state court had found petitioner’s 

Ground One claim to be procedurally barred. This remains an accurate statement. Both courts 

that have so far considered petitioner’s Ground One ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim 

have denied it on the merits. See October 6, 2014 Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus filed in the Yolo County Superior Court (Case No. CR 14-20), which “summarily denied” 

the petition because “[p]etitioner has failed to make a prima facie showing that he is entitled to 

relief.”14 ECF No. 15. See also January 2, 2015 Order of the California Court of Appeal, Third 

 

13 In his March 17, 2013 declaration filed in support of his petition for writ of habeas corpus to 

the Yolo County Superior Court, petitioner asserted that, “Despite my request, Mr. Masuda 

refused to raise the issue of Mr. Miller’s ineffectiveness. . . .” ECF No. 13 at 14; see also ECF 

No. 13 at 3 n.3. 

14 In its order denying the petition, the Yolo County Superior Court stated in full, ECF No. 15-1: 

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is SUMMARILY DENIED. 

Petitioner has failed to make a prima facie showing that he is 

entitled to relief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.551(g) [“Any order 

denying a petition for writ of habeas corpus must contain a brief 

statement of the reasons for the denial.”]) 

Petitioner has not provided all of the information required by MC275 in his form petition or in the other moving papers 

accompanying his petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.551; MC275, p. 5.) 

(MC-275 is a blank form, approved by the Judicial Council of California, that may be used to file 

a state Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Page 5 of MC-275 requests, inter alia, an explanation 

why a collateral claim was not made on appeal.) 

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Appellate District (Case No. C077723), summarily denying the petition. ECF No. 16. See also 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991) (“Where there has been one reasoned state 

judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting 

the same claim rest upon the same ground.”). Moreover, petitioner states that he still intends to 

exhaust this claim in the California Supreme Court.15

 Petitioner leaps too quickly from the fact that Ground One is not yet exhausted to the 

proposition that it is procedurally barred. Without a procedural bar, Martinez has no application. 

While it is true that the procedural default doctrine, and its cause and prejudice exception, may 

come into play under certain circumstances even where no state court has actually invoked a 

state-law procedural bar, such circumstances are not present here. 

 The Ninth Circuit has held that the Martinez exception may apply where an unexhausted 

ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim is barred from presentation to the state courts, and 

therefore is both incapable of exhaustion and procedurally defaulted. Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 

1302 (9th Cir. 2014). In this context, a finding of procedural default follows from the fact that 

further exhaustion is barred by state law, id. at 1317, not from the mere fact that exhaustion has 

not yet been achieved. See also Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002) (an 

unexhausted claim will be deemed procedurally defaulted if state procedural rules would now bar 

petitioner from bringing the claim in state court). The U.S. Supreme Court has extended the 

availability of the Martinez exception to situations in which there is no absolute bar to the IAC 

claim, but the state’s procedural framework “as a matter of its structure, design and operation,” 

fails to provide defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a claim of ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013). 

 

15 In his October 6, 2014 declaration filed in support of his opposition to the pending motion to 

dismiss, petitioner states, ECF No. 13 at 18: 

Upon an adverse decision from the Yolo County Superior Court, I 

intend to immediately file an original petition in the California 

Supreme Court in order to properly exhaust state remedies as to 

Claim One. 

See also Petition, ECF No. 1 at 5, 6. 

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 The findings of default in Dickens and Beaty were based on Arizona state procedural rules 

that affirmatively prevented exhaustion under the circumstances of those cases. See Dickens, 740 

F.3d at 1317; Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987 (citing Ariz. Rule Crim. P. 32.2). Martinez was also an 

Arizona case in which the claim was barred, and Thaler involved a Texas statutory regime that 

made it “virtually impossible” for petitioner to present his claim. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. at 1915. 

California imposes no statute of limitations on state habeas relief, and although successive 

petitions are disfavored, they are not barred. See In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750 (1993). Petitioner’s 

own case illustrates the point. He has not been prevented from exhausting, but has been actively 

pursuing a second round of state habeas relief – so far without success, but also without 

imposition of any procedural bar. Indeed, petitioner’s progress in state court, and representations 

in this court that he is pursuing exhaustion, contradict his claim of entitlement to relief from the 

exhaustion requirement on Martinez grounds. 

 Martinez is inapposite here because it is intended to remedy a Catch-22 that petitioner 

does not face: the inability of some habeas petitioners to obtain state court review of claims that 

trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, due to the failure of post-conviction counsel to raise 

the issue at the first possible opportunity. Petitioner’s first state habeas lawyer did indeed fail to 

raise the claim of ineffective assistance at trial, but petitioner is in the process of pursuing that 

claim now. Accordingly, petitioner does not need the relief from default that Martinez offers. 

This court will not impute a procedural default under the circumstances presented here. Because 

Martinez is relevant only in the default context, and does not provide an exception to the 

exhaustion requirement absent a default, it cannot affect the status of petitioner’s federal habeas 

petition as wholly unexhausted. 

VI. Conclusion 

 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

 1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 11, be granted; 

 2. Petitioner’s motion to stay, ECF No. 2, be denied as moot; and 

 3. This action be dismissed without prejudice. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

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assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” In his objections, petitioner 

may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue in the event he files an appeal of 

the judgment in this case. See 28 U.S.C. 2253(c) (absent a certificate of appealability, an appeal 

may not be taken from the final decision of a district judge in a habeas corpus proceeding or a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255). Any response to the objections shall be filed and served 

within twenty-one days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: February 15, 2015 

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