Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01945/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01945-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Motor Vehicles
Defendant
Gary Goethe
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 230(g). 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY GOETHE, No. 2:07-cv-01945-MCE-GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 

DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Presently before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment,

or alternatively, summary adjudication of issues, brought by

Defendant California Department of Motor Vehicles (“Defendant”). 

For the reasons set forth below, the Motion will be granted in

part and denied in part.1

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2

BACKGROUND 

On September 29, 2006, Plaintiff filed Charge of

Discrimination number 555-2006-01115 (“Charge”) with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Def.’s Undisputed

Fact (“DUF”) No. 1. Plaintiff checked boxes on the Charge

indicating that while he was employed by Defendant he was subject

to discrimination based on “race” and “retaliation.” He stated

the pertinent facts as follows in that Charge: 

I was hired on or about November 30, 1987. My

current job title is Staff Services Manager I in the

Business Consulting Group. 

In or about 1995, I filed a discrimination lawsuit

against Respondent. Since winning my lawsuit, I have

been denied numerous promotions and lateral transfers. 

These include: 

On or about March 6, 2006: Manager V, Customer

Service/Technology and Manager V, Program Support

Manager. On or about May 24, 2006: Manager V

International Registration Plan Policy Section Manager. 

On or about June 15, 2006: Manager V, Revenue and

Compliance Unit. All the selectees for the above

positions were Caucasian. 

On or about August 21, 2006: Manager V, Motor

Carrier Permit Policy Section Manager. The selectee

for this position is Black, but she has never

complained of discrimination, to my knowledge. 

In or about April 2006, I was denied a lateral

transfer to Staff Services Manager I FOD Sacramento

Headquarters Staff, Position number 438-4800-001,

Bulletin number 2-06-0400. The selectee was Caucasian. 

I believe I have been discriminated against

because my race, Black, and for engaging in protected

activity. 

See DUF Nos. 2-5; Pl.’s Dep., 4/18/09, Ex. 15. At Plaintiff’s

request, the EEOC issued a Right-to-Sue Notice on August 9, 2007. 

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3

In addition to those facts alleged in his EEOC Charge,

Plaintiff avers in his Second Amended Complaint that after

settling his 1995 lawsuit, he applied for 41 lateral transfers or

promotional opportunities between 1998 and 2000, yielding only

two interviews. (Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff

further contends that in November 2000, he approached his

Department Director about his alleged disparate treatment. 

Subsequently, he was promoted to his current position. Id. at

¶ 12. Plaintiff states that since his promotion, he has applied

for 40 additional transfers and/or promotions and has been

denied. Id. at ¶ 13. 

Based on these claims, Plaintiff alleges five causes of

action in his Second Amended Complaint: 1) Disparate Impact

Discrimination in violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); 2) Disparate Treatment

Discrimination in violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); 3) Retaliation for Engaging in a

Protected Activity in violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 4) Racial Discrimination and

Retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 5) Conspiracy to

Interfere with Civil Rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. 

(Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. P. 5-10.) 

On February 25, 2010, Defendant filed its current Motion for

Summary Judgment. In support of its Motion, Defendant submits

declarations of selected individuals who state that an applicant

more qualified than Plaintiff received each position.

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4

STANDARD 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

seeking to recover upon a claim ... may ... move ... for a

summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part

thereof.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp.

374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter

Twp. of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,” which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting Rule 56(c)).

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5

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that

the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of W. Pulp and Paper

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Stated another way,

“before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary

question for the judge, not whether there is literally no

evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could

properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it,

upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871)).

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6

As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the moving party has

carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more

than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts .... Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,

there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at

586-87.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the

opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences

that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987). 

ANALYSIS 

A. Summary Adjudication of Plaintiff’s Sex Discrimination

Claim is Granted. 

To establish subject matter jurisdiction over a Title VII

claim, a Plaintiff must have exhausted his administrative

remedies by filing a timely charge with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C.

section 2000e-5(b); B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091,

1099 (9th Cir. 2002). “The administrative charge requirement

serves the important purposes of giving the charged party notice

of the claim and ‘narrow[ing] the issues for prompt adjudication

and decision.’” 

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7

Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting

Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 472 n. 325

(D.C. Cir. 1976)). 

The permissible scope of a Title VII civil action is limited

to the scope of the administrative complaint and the EEOC

investigation. B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1100. The court “construe[s]

the language of EEOC charges ‘with the utmost liberality since

they are made by those unschooled in the technicalities of formal

pleading.’” Id. at 1100 (quoting Kaplan v. Int’l Alliance of

Theatrical & Stage Employees, 525 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir.

1975)). However, “[a]llegations of discrimination not included

in plaintiff’s administrative charge may not be considered by a

federal court unless the new claims are ‘like or reasonably

related’ to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge.” 

B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1100 (quoting Green v. Los Angeles County

Superintendent of Schs., 883 F.2d 1472, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

With these principles in mind, we consider the claims of the

Plaintiff. Here, Plaintiff failed to check the box for “sex”

discrimination in his EEOC charge. In the narrative portion of

the charge, Plaintiff explains that he was denied opportunities

because he was “Black” and in retaliation for filing suit. 

Nothing in the charge gives Defendant any notice that a claim for

sex discrimination is being made. Accordingly, Plaintiff has

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to any sex

discrimination claim. Therefore, this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction to adjudicate that portion of his lawsuit. 

Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication with respect to the

alleged sex discrimination is granted.

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8

B. Summary Adjudication for Plaintiff’s Claims in

Paragraphs 11 and 13 of his Second Amended Complaint is

Granted. 

The same analysis applied above extends to Plaintiff’s claim

that he applied for and did not receive 41 positions aside from

the five positions, as identified in his EEOC charge, that he

claims were wrongfully awarded to others between March and August

of 2006. Specifically, in paragraph 11 of the Second Amended

Complaint, Plaintiff states for the first time that he “submitted

no fewer than 41 job applications from 1998 to 2000 for lateral

transfers or promotional opportunities. These efforts yielded

just two interviews.” (Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff

further alleges that Plaintiff “repeatedly applied for lateral

transfer and promotions within the [DMV].” Id. at ¶ 13.

Moreover, despite submitting approximately an additional 40

applications for lateral transfers or promotional opportunities

after he was finally promoted in 2000, Plaintiff claims that

Defendant has “consistently and systematically refused to

transfer or promote” him. Id. 

These two additional claims, which together identify some 81

additional instances of alleged discrimination, were not

adequately raised in Plaintiff’s EEOC charge. The EEOC charge

discretely refers to lost promotional opportunities in 2006 only,

and nowhere alludes to dozens of other instances of claimed

discrimination occurring up to six to eight years beforehand. In

his EEOC charge, Plaintiff specifically identified only five

Manager V positions and one SSM I lateral transfer in 2006. 

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9

Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in

attempting to substantially broaden the time and scope of the

alleged discrimination against him. In the absence of that

exhaustion, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the

vastly amplified charges that Plaintiff now attempts to levy in

his Second Amended Complaint. Defendant’s motion for summary

adjudication with respect to the additional instances of

discrimination alleged in paragraphs 11 and 13 of the Second

Amended Complaint is therefore granted. 

C. Summary Adjudication of Plaintiff’s Claim that the DMV

Denied him Five Manager Promotions because he is Black

is Denied.

Under the McDonnell-Douglas test for assessing Title VII

discrimination claims, the plaintiff can establish a prima facie

case by showing: (1) he belonged to a protected class, (2) he was

performing according to his employer’s legitimate expectations

(3) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) some

indication of a discriminatory motive, such as similarly

qualified individuals being treated more favorably. McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973).

Once plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of

discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate

a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment

action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-803. 

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10

If defendant meets its burden in that regard, the burden shifts

back to plaintiff to establish that defendant’s proffered reason

was a pretext for discrimination. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v.

Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 

“The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that

the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff

remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Id. at 507 (quoting

Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253

(1981)). Moreover, the “amount that must be produced in order to

create a prima facie case is very little.” Sischo-Nownejad v.

Merced Comm. Coll. Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Defendant does not take issue with Plaintiff’s ability to

state a prima facie case. Therefore, the burden shifts to the

Defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for

the adverse employment action. 

Defendant asserts it is entitled to summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s claim that the DMV denied him five Manager V

positions based on his race because it offers legitimate

nondiscriminatory reasons for not selecting Plaintiff for the

positions. Defendant sets forth declarations of ten current and

former DMV employees involved in the selection process. Each

declaration details the process by those evaluators assigned a

numerical value to each candidate. The declarations uniformly

articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the fact that a

candidate other than Plaintiff was selected. Some positions were

filled with applicants who had more experience, while others were

selected because they were more familiar with the particular type

of work encompassed within the positions at issue. 

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11

Defendant DMV has also submitted the job opportunity bulletins to

which Plaintiff responded, along with and the completed scoring

sheets for the positions Plaintiff interviewed. This information

satisfies Defendant’s obligation to present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not selecting Plaintiff under the

McDonnell Douglas framework. The burden thus shifts back to the

Plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason articulated is

pretextual. 

“A plaintiff can prove pretext in two ways: (1) indirectly,

by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is ‘unworthy

of credence’ because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise

not believable, or (2) directly, by showing that unlawful

discrimination more likely motivated the employer.” Noyes v.

Kelly Services, 488 F.3d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting

Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. Of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115,

1127 (9th Cir. 2000)). “All of the evidence [as to pretext] -

whether direct or indirect- is to be considered cumulatively.” 

Id. (quoting Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323

F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003)). Moreover, “[a] plaintiff may

discredit an employer’s proffered reason by demonstrating such

weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or

contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reason for

its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find

that reason unworthy of credence.” Bowden v. Potter, 308 F.

Supp. 2d 1108, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2004). “In addition a plaintiff

may demonstrate pretext by showing that the employer treated

similarly situated employees outside the plaintiff’s protected

class more favorably.” Id. at 1119-20. 

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 The Court notes that Defendant has filed objections to 2

certain portions of Plaintiff’s declaration submitted in support

of his Opposition to this Motion, including objections to the

portions of that Declaration cited in both this paragraph and the

next paragraph. Despite those objections, however, Plaintiff may

unquestionably attest to his own perceptions and/or observations

while employed at the DMV. Defendant’s objections to those

portions of Plaintiff’s Declaration cited herein are accordingly

denied. The Court need not rule on the other portions of

Plaintiff’s Declaration not relied upon in reaching its decision

in this matter and declines to do so.

12

Plaintiff first rebuts the evidence offered by Defendant

with statistical data. Plaintiff states that from “1987 to 2007,

there were a total of four African-American males in middle

management positions out of approximately 500 middle managers” at

DMV headquarters in Sacramento. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J.

9:5-7 (citing Pl.’s Dec. ¶ 6.)). Additionally, he states that

“[o]f the five persons promoted to Manager V, four are white, and

one is an African-American female.” Id. at 9:14-15 (citing Pl.’s

Dec. ¶ 15.). This statistical information can and does support

an inference of pretext. See, e.g., Noyes, 488 F.3d at 1173. 

2

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges facts that warrant

determination by a jury. Plaintiff states that he is better

qualified than the five persons promoted. (Pl.’s Opp. to Mot.

for Summ. J. at 10:15 (citing Pl.’s Dec. ¶ 16-23.)). He contends

that contrary to the declarations submitted by Defendant, he had

knowledge either or superior to the individuals selected for

certain Manager V positions. Id. A determination as to who is

the more qualified candidate is ultimately a factually intensive

question best resolved by a jury. 

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13

See, e.g., Barefield v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ.,

Bakersfield, 500 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (“[I]t is not

the role of this Court to determine who was the most qualified,

but only to determine if there is a genuine issue of fact for

trial.”); Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1117 (9th Cir. 2002)

(“[W]hether appellants were as qualified as any of the promotion

recipients is a factually intensive question best resolved by the

jury.”).

Plaintiff has raised an issue of fact that he may have been

as qualified, or even more qualified, than the candidates

selected for promotion. Plaintiff has thus provided sufficient

evidence to raise a triable issue of fact that Defendant’s

proffered reason may be pretextual. Therefore, Defendant’s

motion for summary adjudication with respect to Plaintiff’s race

discrimination claim is denied. 

D. Summary Adjudication of Plaintiff’s Claim that the DMV

Denied him a Lateral Transfer Because he is Black is

Granted. 

Plaintiff’s EEOC charge alleges that Plaintiff was “denied a

lateral transfer to Staff Services Manager I FOD Sacramento

Headquarters Staff, Position number 438-4800-001, Bulletin number

2-06-0400.” DUF No. 57. Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot

state a prima facie case for discrimination given the fact that

the advertised SSM I position was cancelled and the position

abolished. 

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14

On March 15, 2006, the SSM I position, 438-4800-001, was

advertised through bulletin number 2-06-0400. The position

advertised, however, was canceled that same day. DUF Nos. 58-59. 

Defendant contends that the position was abolished to establish

position number 024-4800-003. Plaintiff does not allege that he

applied for this new position. 

Plaintiff argues that even though he applied for a position

that was literally cancelled the same day it was posted, he was

still “rejected” for that position for purposes of establishing a

discriminatory adverse employment action. While Plaintiff

admittedly received no letter indicating that he was unqualified

or that another candidate had been chosen, he persists in

maintaining that the cancellation constitutes a discriminatory

rejection. This is nonsensical. The Defendant cancelled the job

bulletin the same say that it was posted. Not only did the

Defendant not select a candidate over the Plaintiff, it also

appears certain that Defendant failed to even consider the

Defendant’s application since the position was abolished the same

day it was posted. 

Plaintiff nonetheless argues that “the position remained

open until it was filled by someone of Plaintiff’s

qualifications.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 13:18-

19.) Plaintiff alleges the position was filled by Jill D.

Ledden, a non African-American female. As evidence of this fact,

Plaintiff cites to a Deposition in which a DMV employee, Babette

Williams, states that Ms. Ledden was in fact hired. 

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15

However, in the same deposition, Ms. Williams admits, consistent

with Defendant’s version of events as enumerated above, that the

DMV position applied for by Plaintiff had in fact been “dropped”

for workload reasons. See Williams Dep., 6/09/09, 48:14-49:5. 

Thus, the evidence Plaintiff cites actually supports Defendant’s

claim that the cancellation of the position had nothing to do

with Plaintiff. 

Given that the Plaintiff has failed to rebut Defendant’s

evidence with any information demonstrating adverse employment

action or some other circumstance indicating a discriminatory

motive, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication of

Plaintiff’s claim that the DMV denied him a lateral transfer

because of his color must be granted. 

E. Summary Adjudication of Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim

Based on his EEOC Lawsuit is Granted.

In order to establish a viable retaliation claim, Plaintiff

must demonstrate: (1) that he engaged in protected activity,

(2) that his employer was aware of the activity, (3) that he

suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) that there was a

causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action. Raad, 323 F.3d at 1197, see also Yanowitz v.

L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1042 (2005). 

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim does not survive summary

adjudication because Plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case

of retaliation. Specifically, Plaintiff cannot establish that

the relevant decision makers knew of Plaintiff’s protected

activity. 

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Plaintiff alleges that he was denied the five Manager V

positions and a SMM I transfer in retaliation for his filing a

discrimination suit against the DMV during 1995. Following the

said charge, the EEOC and the DMV conducted an investigation. 

During the course of its investigation, the DMV found that it had

no information or records regarding Plaintiff’s protected

activity which occurred eleven years before the EEOC charge was

filed. See Ruiz Decl. ¶ 13; Ex. A, p. 3. This was probably

because the DMV only retains documents for five years. Id. 

Additionally, the hiring managers for each of the five positions

Plaintiff applied to have submitted declarations. Each hiring

partner declares that he or she was not aware of Plaintiff’s 1995

discrimination suit against the DMV. Plaintiff does not offer

any evidence to rebut these statements. 

Plaintiff also alleges that “as a result of [the 1995

lawsuit] and subsequent complaints, Defendant has retaliated

against Plaintiff.” (Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶ 10.) (emphasis

added). In support of this allegation, Plaintiff claims that in

February 2006 he complained to the DMV Deputy Director that he

was being treated unfairly and that on June 18, 2006, Plaintiff

submitted a grievance to the DMV for discrimination. (Pl.’s Decl.

¶¶ 7 & 10.) Additionally, on September 29, 2006, Plaintiff filed

a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Both filing a complaint

with the EEOC and making informal complaints to a supervisor are

protected activities. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240,

n. 3 (9th Cir. 2000). However, in his 2006 EEOC charge, the one

upon which this lawsuit is based, the only protected activity

Plaintiff identified was his 1995 discrimination lawsuit. 

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Plaintiff therefore failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

with respect to any additional retaliation claims. Thus,

Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication with respect to

Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation must also be granted. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Docket No. 69) as to Plaintiff’s claims in their

entirety is DENIED. Summary adjudication is GRANTED, however,

with respect to Plaintiff’s sex discrimination and retaliation

claims, his additional claimed instances of discrimination as

alleged in paragraphs 11 and 13 of the Second Amended Complaint,

and his claim that he was discriminated against by virtue of the

2006 cancelled lateral transfer. Summary adjudication is DENIED

as to Plaintiff’s claims that he was discriminated against due to

his race in being passed over for transfer and/or promotional

opportunities in 2006. Because the resolution of those claims

involves the weighing of disputed issues of material fact, this

lawsuit must proceed to trial on that basis.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 6, 2010

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:07-cv-01945-MCE-GGH Document 76 Filed 05/07/10 Page 17 of 17