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Parties Involved:
Mark Fisher
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MARK FISHER 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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/FILED ·- ., "ted States court o_f ApfC&.., 

uDI Tenth Circult 

MAY 0 4 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-4108 

Appeal from the United State District Court 

for the District of Utah 

(D.C. No. 93-CR-0071 B) 

Jerold D. McPhee, Salt Lake City, Utah for Defendant-Appellant. 

Bruce c. Lubeck, Assistant United States Attorney (Scott M. 

Matheson, Jr., United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Salt 

Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before HENRY, Circuit J~dge, MCKAY, Senior Circuit Judge, and KANE, 

Senior District Judge. 

KANE, Senior District Judge. 

Mark Fisher appeals from the district court's judgment 

sentencing him to sixteen (16) months imprisonment following his 

plea of guilty to Count I charging him with the offense of 

* The Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior United States 

District Judge for the District of Colorado, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-4108 Document: 01019290510 Date Filed: 05/04/1995 Page: 1 
distribution of a controlled substance, Lysergic Acid Diethylamide 

(LSD) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). Fisher also appeals 

the district court's ruling on his Motion for Stay of Execution of 

Sentence and Release of the Defendant Pending Appeal. 

On appeal, Fisher argues, in light of his physical 

infirmities, the district court abused its discretion by (1) 

failing to depart downward from the sentencing guidelines pursuant 

to u.s.s.G. § 5H1.4. and (2) failing to rule on his motion for 

stay of execution and release pending appeal in a timely fashion. 

I. Facts. 

The facts recited here have been gleaned from the briefs on 

appeal, the presentence report, the transcript of the sentencing 

proceeding and other documents contained within the criminal docket 

of the district court. 

Mark Fisher was born on October 23, 1970. At age eleven, he 

fell from a tree, causing loss of movement from his mid-chest down 

and confining him to a wheelchair. In addition, Fisher suffers 

from decubitus ulcers and has undergone a colostomy, which 

periodically results in bouts of infection. 

On February 17, 1994, Fisher entered a plea of guilty to one 

count of a two count indictment charging him with the offense of 

distribution of a controlled substance in violation of 21 u.s.c. 

§ 841(a) (1). 

At the sentencing hearing on April 19, 1994, Fisher's counsel 

requested a six level downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. 

§ 5H1.4 on the basis that Fisher is infirm, a paraplegic, and has 

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developed serious complications. Without making reference to the 

request for downward departure, the district court judge sentenced 

Fisher to the maximum sixteen months imprisonment, commencing 

forthwith, to be followed by three years of supervised release. 

Fisher filed a notice of appeal on April 25, 1994. 

Simultaneously Fisher filed a motion for an order staying the 

execution of his sentence of confinement and releasing him pending 

appeal. On May 6, 1994, the district court, without findings, 

' denied the motion. The order was entered on May 10, 1994. 

Meanwhile, Fisher had, on April 29, 1994, been transported to his 

designated place of confinement. 

II. Discussion - Disposition. 

a. Downward Departure under u.s.s.G. § 5Hl.4. 

Fisher argues the district court abused its discretion, or, 

alternatively erred in failing to depart downward as provided for 

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5Hl.4. 

"[W]e review the application of the sentencing guidelines for 

errors of law, while factual determinations made by the trial court 

are reviewed for clear error. " United States v. Diggs, 8 F. 3d 

1520, 1526 (lOth Cir. 1993). As a general rule, "this court does 

not have jurisdiction to hear a defendant 1 s appeal from the 

district court's discretionary refusal to depart downward from the 

Sentencing Guidelines." Id.; see United States v. Holsey, 995 

F.2d 960, 963 (lOth Cir. 1993). However, "a sentence imposed 

within the guideline range only because the court erroneously 

believed that the guidelines did not permit a downward departure is 

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a sentence •imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the 

sentencing guidelines,' 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(a) (2)." United States 

v. Lowden, 905 F.2d 1448, 1449 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 

876 (1990). 

The determinative question here is whether the district judge 

correctly believed he had the power to depart under u.s.s.G. §5Hl.4 

but declined to do so, in which case his decision is not 

reviewable, or whether he erroneously believed he lacked authority 

to depart from the guidelines, in which case it is. 

At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the judge addressed 

Fisher's counsel as follows: 

You have indicated in a document filed with the Court, 

and it has been very helpful, that there are factors that 

warrant departure. And you're indicating the 

extraordinary physical impairment and that that may be 

reason to impose a sentence before [sic.) the applicable 

guideline range. And I have made note of that as I am 

sure [the Assistant United States Attorney) has. 

R. Vol. II at 4 (referring toR. on Appeal, Vol I, Doc. 23.) 

The judge then invited Fisher's counsel "to address the 

departure along with anything else you want to say about the 

sentencing generally." R. Vol. II at 4. Fisher's counsel argued, 

without interruption, that a downward departure was warranted 

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4 because of Fisher's physical 

condition. Section 5H1.4 provides: 

Physical condition or appearance, including physique, is 

not ordinarily relevar.t in determining whether a sentence 

should be outside the applicable guideline range. 

However, an extraordinary physical impairment may be a 

reason to impose a sentence below the applicable 

guideline range; ~' in the case of a seriously infirm 

defendant, home detention may be as efficient as, and 

less costly than, imprisonment. 

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u.s.s.G. s SH1.4. 

Fisher's counsel submitted a letter from Steven J. Mintz, M.D. , 

Fisher's treating physician, dated March 10, 1994, stating that 

Fisher "has basically total lower body paralysis with decubitus 

ulcers needing bladder treatments as well as colostomy treatments." 

See R. Vol. II at 6; letter included in R. Vol. 1 at final page. 

Fisher's counsel asserted Fisher had "an extraordinary physical 

impairment" and was "a seriously infirm defendant" as envisaged by 

§ SH1.4. He drew the court's attention to the section's reference 

to the possibility of "home confinement" (in fact termed "home 

detention") as a being less costly than and as efficient as 

imprisonment. R. Vol. II at 8. 

Fisher's counsel requested departure pursuant to § SH1. 4 

"downward five levels, six levels to a level four, criminal history 

category three, zero to six months, as placing probation well 

within the range." Id. He noted "should probation be imposed that 

there certainly needs to be something more than straight probation, 

some sort of treatment." Id. at 9. Fisher's counsel commented he 

did not know of a facility in Salt Lake City capable of dealing 

with Fisher on a long-term basis and that Fisher would be "at some 

risk in his transportation" to a federal facility that could deal 

with him. Id. Fisher himself declined to make a statement before 

the imposition of sentence. 

The Assistant United States Attorney made the following 

remarks regarding sentence: 

Judge, I don't know the· exact sentence that is 

appropriate either. I suspect none of us will know what 

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life is like for Mr. Fisher in that wheelchair. However, 

as I see his history, Judge, his attitude, it seems to me 

that the sentence has to say to Mr. Fisher as difficult 

as that life is, you can't continue to use that 

wheelchair as an excuse to commit crimes. I suspect 

incarceration would be very unpleasant for those who have 

to move Mr. Fisher and care for him and very unpleasant 

for Mr. Fisher, but I think perhaps that is the sentence 

that is required. 

Id. at 10. 

The judge then imposed the terms and conditions of Fisher's 

sentence. He determined Fisher was entitled to a two-level 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility bringing the offense 

level to ten and the applicable range of imprisonment to between 

ten and sixteen months. The judge sentenced Fisher to the maximum 

sixteen month term to be followed by three years of supervised 

release. 

The judge did not enter any specific finding concerning the 

application of § 5H1. 4. He did, however, make the following 

observations: 

I recognize that I have sentenced you, Mr. Fisher, I have 

sentenced you to the top end of the guideline range. 

Under the sentencing guidelines I can't sentence you to 

any higher term of imprisonment. Frankly I would if I 

could. I would have to depart upward and I don't see 

that there are reasons for that. 

I am not in the business of rehabilitation in this 

case, I am in the business of punishing the sale of 

L.S.D. And it is a dangerous business you have engaged 

in and you need to be punished. I am as sympathetic as 

I can be with your physical condition. But it is not an 

excuse for criminal conduct and I am sure you don't need 

that lecture from me. Hopefully 16 months in a federal 

prison will do you some good. I hope it does. I hope it 

stops your taking marijuana and stops your taking 

cocaine, and stops your abusing prescription drugs, and 

stops your whining and complaining about your condition 

in life. I don't know if it will. I hope it does. 

R. Vol. II at 12. The judge then stated that Fisher was "bound 

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over forthwith" and that his "sentence starts right now." Id. 

Fisher does not dispute the general rule within this Circuit 

that "'[w]e do not have authority to hear an appeal over the trial 

court's discretionary refusal to depart downward from the 

guidelines."' United States v. Youngpeter, 986 F.2d 349, 355 (lOth 

Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Davis, 900 F.2d 1524, 1529-30 

(lOth cir.), cert. denied, 498 u.s. 856 (1990)). 

While not a model of clarity on the point, the court's 

statement appears to us to reject the mandate of the Guidelines in 

the case of physical disability. The court's statement that it is 

"not in the business of rehabilitation in this case, I'm in the 

business of punishing the sale of L.S.D." is not an exercise of 

discretion but a rejection of the philosophy and mandate of 

§ 5Hl. 4. Furthermore, the court failed to comply with our 

unambiguous mandate in§ 5Hl.4 cases as set out in United States v. 

Slater. We there directed: 

[T]he district court should first make a factual finding 

to decide whether [defendant's] physical and mental 

disabilities constitute "an extraordinary physical 

impairment." United States v. Carey, 895 F.2d 318, 324 

(7th Cir. 1990). If the court so finds, it should then 

consider whether that condition warrants a shorter term 

of imprisonment or an alternative to confinement. Id. 

The court should set forth its reasoning in support of 

its decision. Thus, we remand for resentencing on this 

issue. 

971 F.2d 626, 635 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

We are persuaded that the trial court refused to follow the 

mandate of the Guidelines to exercise informed discretion guided by 

the standards of § 5Hl.4 and our mandate set out in Slater. We are 

mindful of the dicta in United States v. Rodriguez, 30 F.3d 1318, 

7 

Appellate Case: 94-4108 Document: 01019290510 Date Filed: 05/04/1995 Page: 7 
1319 {lOth Cir. 1994). However, Slater has established the 

procedures for these disability cases, and the court's statement is 

sufficiently clear that it does not accept the principles set forth 

in § 5H1.4. Even though the judges may be generally familiar with 

the Guidelines, it is clear in this case the court was not familiar 

with our mandate set out in Slater. Nor is it clear that the trial 

court was familiar with special concerns of the Sentencing 

Commission when it promulgated § 5H1.4, at least one of which is 

concern about costs of imprisonment, not just concern for fairness 

to the defendant. 

We therefore remand for resentencing concerning the issue of 

downward departure under u.s.s.G. § 5H1.4. We direct the district 

court to first make a factual finding to decide whether Fisher's 

disabilities constitute "an extraordinary physical impairment" 

under§ 5H1.4 and, if so, whether that condition warrants a shorter 

term of imprisonment or an alternative to confinement such as home 

detention. The court should set forth reasoning in support of its 

decision. 

b. Ruling on Motion to Stay Execution of Sentence. 

On April 25, 1994, Fisher filed his motion for stay of the 

execution of his sentence and release pending appeal pursuant to 

Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 1 and 18 u.s.c. 

Rule 38(b) provides: 

A sentence of imprisonment shall be stayed if an appeal 

is taken from the conviction or sentence and if the 

defendant is released pending disposition of appeal 

pursuant to Rule 9{b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. If not stayed, the court may recommend to the 

Attorney General that the defendant be retained at, or 

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Appellate Case: 94-4108 Document: 01019290510 Date Filed: 05/04/1995 Page: 8 
s 3143. 2 He simultaneously filed his notice of appeal. 

In his motion, Fisher stated he was a paraplegic, being held 

at the Salt Lake County Jail awaiting designation and 

transportation to a federal correctional facility. He asserted 

that the conditions of his pre-designation confinement at the jail 

lacked the proper facilities "for the care of individuals suffering 

from the multitude of physical ailments that the Defendant suffers 

from." R. Supplemental Vol. I, Doc. 27 at 2. He maintained that, 

since being held at the jail his condition had "deteriorated, in 

that Defendant believes that he is developing blood clots and, 

owing to lack of handicap facilities at the Salt Lake County Jail, 

is unable to maintain a [sic.] proper health conditions or 

supervision." Id. 

The judge denied the motion on May 6, 1994. His order, 

docketed on May 10, 1994, states: 

On April 19, 1994, defendant Mark Fisher was 

transferred to, a place of confinement near the place of 

trial or the place where an appeal is to be heard, for a 

period reasonably necessary to permit the defendant to 

assist in the preparation of an appeal to the court of 

appeals. 

2 18 u.s.c. § 3143(b) provides: 

Release or detention pending appeal by the defendant. -

The judicial officer shall order that a person who has 

been found guilty of an offense and sentenced to a term 

of imprisonment, and who has filed an appeal . . . be 

detained, unless the judicial officer finds -

(1) by clear and convincing evidence that a person is not 

likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any 

other person or the community if released pursuant to 

section 3142(b) or (c); and 

( 2) that the appeal is not for purpose of delay and 

raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to 

result in reversal or an order for a new trial. 

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sentenced by this Court to a term of imprisonment for 

violation of Title 21 U.S. C. § 841 (a) ( 1) , distribution of 

a controlled substance. The Court entered judgment in a 

Criminal Case on April 21, 1994. 

Counsel for defendant has moved for 

execution of the sentence pending appeal. 

having reviewed the defendant's motion and 

hereby DENIES the defendant's motion. 

R. Supplemental Vol. I, Doc. 33. 

a stay of 

The Court, 

case file, 

On April 29, 1994, before the judge's determination and denial 

of Fisher's post-sentencing relief motion, Fisher was transported 

at substantial government expen~e .to the federal correctional 

facility at Fort Worth. (See Criminal Docket Item 33.) 3 

Fisher states the "sole purpose in requesting post-sentencing 

relief from the lower court was to allow [him) to remain in Salt 

Lake city, with his physician and his family during the pendency of 

his appeal." (Br. Appellant at 9.) He argues that because the 

Bureau of Prisons transferred him to a correctional institution 

before the ruling on the motion, the judge's failure to rule "in a 

timely fashion rendered the Defendant's post-sentencing requests 

moot in the sense that no meaningful relief could, or would, be 

granted by the lower court after the Defendant had been 

transported." He further maintains the delay in ruling 

"effectively deprived [him] of his appellate review rights • . • 

pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Particularly, after [he] had been transported to the designated 

place of confinement." Id. 

The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide: 

3 

court. 

We obtained a copy of this document from the district 

It was not included as part of the record filed on appeal. 

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Application for release after a judgment of 

conviction shall be made in the first instance in the 

district court. If the district court refuses release 

pending appeal, or imposes conditions of release, the 

court shall state in writing the reasons for the action 

taken. Thereafter, if an appeal is pending, a motion for 

release, or for modification of the conditions of 

release, pending review may be made to the court of 

appeals or to a judge thereof. The motion shall be 

determined promptly upon such papers, affidavits, and 

portions of the record as the parties shall present and 

after reasonable notice to the appellee. The court of 

appeals or a judge thereof may order the release of the 

appellant pending disposition of the motion. 

Fed. R. App. P. 9(b) (emphasis added). 

Fisher argues that, by failing to determine the motion 

promptly, the judge thwarted the policy behind Rule 38 of the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 18 u.s.c. § 3143 which is 

to permit individuals to seek the type of post-sentence relief 

Fisher sought. Fisher states once he had been transported, it was 

unlikely that the relief would be granted and, even if it was, it 

would have been meaningless since it would have required the 

government, again at great expense, to return Fisher to Salt Lake 

City. 

The government argues that there was no requirement that the 

motion be ruled upon within a certain time. Fisher concedes that 

there is no authority for determining timeliness as it relates to 

the lower court ruling on a post-sentencing relief motion. 

However, Rule 9(b) requires the court of appeals or judge thereof 

to determine such motion "promptly." Because the defendant is in 

the custody of the sentencing court's district, Fisher argues the 

requirement of prompt determination should apply a fortiori to the 

lower court. 

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Initially we have to determine whether we have jurisdiction 

over this issue on appeal. "Our jurisdiction under Art. III, § 2 

of the Constitution extends only to actual cases and 

controversies." Nebraska Press Ass•n v. Stuart, 427 u.s. 539, 546 

(1976). The issue may appear moot since the appeal has been heard 

and Fisher has served a significant portion of his term of 

imprisonment. 

We recognize an exception to the mootness doctrine, however, 

in cases which are "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 

Fischbach v. New Mexico Activities Ass'n, 38 F.3d 1159, 1161 (lOth 

Cir. 1994). To meet this exception the following conditions must 

be met: "' (1) the challenged action . [must be] in its 

duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or 

expiration, and (2) there . . . [must be] a reasonable expectation 

that the same complaining party . • • [will] be subjected to the 

same action again. ' " Id. (quoting Gannett Co. , Inc. v. DePasquale, 

443 u.s. 368, 377 (1979). 

Here, the first condition is met. The judge's ruling on 

Fisher's motion for stay of execution of sentence and release 

pending appeal only after Fisher's transportation did not occur in 

a timely fashion so as to permit of full review. More than being 

"by nature short-lived," Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 u.s. 

539, 547 (1976), it occurred after the fact preventing full 

litigation. 

Any ruling on the motion post-transportation rendered his 

right to apply for release pending appeal meaningless and 

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frustrated the intended purpose of Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of 

criminal Procedure and 18 u.s.c. § 3143. The heavier burden which 

a defendant, already transported, bears to persuade a court to retransport him back to where he was pending the outcome of an 

appeal, effectively eliminates meaningful review. 

The second condition too is satisfied. We have remanded for 

resentencing concerning the issue of downward departure under 

U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4. There is a "demonstrated probability," 

Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 u.s. 147, 149 (1975), that after the 

sentencing judge has resentenced him in accordance with our order, 

Fisher may again be subject to a ruling on a post-sentencing relief 

motion. Thus, the issue is properly before us. 

We agree with Fisher that, in the circumstances of this case, 

and taking into account the allegations in his post-sentence 

motion, the judge had a duty to rule on the motion promptly, i.e. 

before Fisher's transportation. Any ruling on the motion posttransportation rendered his right to apply for release pending 

appeal meaningless and frustrated the intended purpose of Rule 38 

of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 18 u.s.c. § 3143. 

Finally, contrary to Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, the judge's order refusing release pending appeal, did 

not "state in writing the reasons for the action taken." Fed. R. 

App. P. 9(b). See United States v. Bishop, 537 F.2d 1184, 1185 

(4th Cir. 1976). Here too, in light of our remand for 

resentencing, Fisher may apply afresh for release pending appeal of 

a further sentencing order, making the issue "capable of 

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repetition, yet evading review." See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. 

v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). 

In failing to state his reasons, the judge has, once again, 

left us in an unwelcome zone of speculation. Judicial action is 

not an exercise in ipse dixit - the bare assertion of an individual 

resting not on expressed reason, but merely on the authority vested 

in an off ice. Accordingly, when a judge takes action, it is 

fundamental that a basis grounded in law is articulated. 

We ' therefore vacate the order denying Fisher's motion for a 

stay of execution of sentence and release pending appeal and remand 

the case to the district court to remedy its order in accordance 

with the foregoing. 

REVERSED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent herewith. 

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