Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-03038/USCOURTS-caDC-11-03038-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sealed Case

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 8, 2012 Decided December 21, 2012 

No. 11-3038 

IN RE: SEALED CASE

______

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:09-cr-00213-01) 

______

Thomas J. Saunders argued the cause for the appellant. 

Nicholas P. Coleman, Assistant United States Attorney, 

argued the cause for the appellee. Ronald C. Machen Jr., 

United States Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III and Diane 

Lucas, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on brief. 

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, HENDERSON, Circuit 

Judge, and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON. 

 KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: After 

signing a plea agreement, the appellant pleaded guilty to four 

counts of sex trafficking of children, see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1591(a)(1). At sentencing the district court imposed a term 

of imprisonment and also ordered the appellant to pay a total 

of $3,892,055 in restitution to the four victims. The appellant 

challenges the restitution order; the government argues, 

USCA Case #11-3038 Document #1411353 Filed: 12/21/2012 Page 1 of 16
2 

however, that he waived his right to appeal the restitution 

order. While we conclude the appellant did not waive his right 

to appeal the restitution order, we reject his merits argument 

and affirm the district court. 

I. 

From 2006 through 2009, the appellant prostituted four 

underage females: S.H., T.S., M.S. and A.L. He prostituted 

S.H. from approximately March 1, 2008 through August 

2008; T.S. from approximately March 13, 2006 through May 

15, 2009; M.S. from approximately May 17, 2009 through 

May 30, 2009; and A.L from approximately May 27, 2009 

through May 30, 2009. He did so by transporting each victim 

from his residence in Temple Hills, Maryland into the District 

of Columbia, where the four exchanged sex for money. 

The government indicted the appellant on September 1, 

2009. On December 11, 2009, he signed a ten-page plea 

agreement. The agreement provides that the appellant “agrees 

to admit guilt and enter a plea of guilty to . . . four counts of 

violating 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (Sex Trafficking of Children).” 

Appendix (A) 24. Section Eleven of the plea agreement 

provides that “pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1593 and 3664, it is 

mandatory that the Court order [the appellant] to make 

restitution for the full amount of any victims’ compensable 

losses” and that any contested restitution issue may be 

litigated at sentencing or at a subsequent hearing. A 28. 

Section Twelve of the plea agreement includes the following 

appeal waiver: 

[The appellant] is aware that federal law, 

specifically 18 U.S.C. § 3742, affords [him] 

the right to appeal the sentence in this case. 

[He] is aware that in the event that sentence is 

imposed upon consideration of the Sentencing 

USCA Case #11-3038 Document #1411353 Filed: 12/21/2012 Page 2 of 16
3 

Guidelines rather than in accordance with 

Section Two [i.e. if the Court rejects the plea 

agreement], the Government’s factual 

stipulations and predictions about the 

calculation of the sentencing guidelines are not 

binding on the sentencing judge. Knowing that, 

[the appellant] waives the right to appeal his 

sentence or the manner in which it was 

determined pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742, 

except to the extent that (a) the Court sentences 

[him] to a period of imprisonment longer than 

the statutory maximum, or (b) the Court 

departs upward from the applicable Sentencing 

Guideline range pursuant to the provisions of 

U.S.S.G. § 5K.2 or based on a consideration of 

the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a). Further, [he] reserves the right to 

make a collateral attack upon [his] sentence 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, if new and 

currently unavailable information becomes 

known to him. In agreeing to this waiver, [the 

appellant] is aware that [his] sentence has yet 

to be determined by the Court. Realizing the 

uncertainty in estimating what sentence the 

Court ultimately will impose, [the appellant] 

knowingly and willingly waives [his] right to 

appeal the sentence, to the extent noted above, 

in exchange for the concessions made by the 

Government in this Agreement. 

A 29. 

 On December 31, 2009, the appellant pleaded guilty 

before a magistrate judge, who accepted the plea agreement. 

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On November 1, 2010, the district court sentenced the 

appellant to 240 months’ imprisonment. 

 The district court also held separate evidentiary hearings 

on January 21 and February 3, 2011 to calculate the amount 

of restitution the appellant owed the four minors. Before the 

hearings, the court received (1) mental health assessments 

(MHAs) prepared by psychologist C. David Missar (Missar) 

for each of the four; and (2) a report from the four minors’ 

guardian ad litem. 

Missar’s MHAs were based on his reviews of each 

victim’s mental health records and other relevant records, as 

well as his interviews of A.L and S.H. Missar did not 

interview M.S. or T.S. because M.S. had disappeared and 

T.S.’s family did not respond to Missar’s attempts to contact 

them. Based on this information, Missar diagnosed each 

victim with various mental health and substance abuse 

problems, including Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). 

Missar recognized that some of the victims’ mental health and 

substance abuse problems predated their association with the 

appellant but he concluded there was “little doubt” that the 

appellant had “exacerbated” any preexisting mental health 

problems. A 222, 226, 230, 242. Additionally, the fact that 

each victim was a minor prostitute working for the appellant 

created “tremendous additional emotional traumas” for each. 

A 222, 226, 230, 242. Missar concluded that each victim 

required “significant mental health services, in different 

stages and to differing degrees, for the rest of her life,” 

including therapy, psychiatric care and educational tutoring. 

A 222, 226, 230, 242. Missar created a “mid-range” estimate 

of the total cost of services each victim would need over her 

lifetime: $679,800 for A.L., $849,400 for T.S., $839,700 for 

M.S. and $849,400 for S.H. 

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The guardian ad litem submitted a restitution report on 

January 4, 2011. The report relied on Missar’s 

recommendations, calculations of the money the appellant 

received due to each victim’s prostitution (estimating each 

victim made $500 per day while prostituting) and sixty-eight 

hours of attorney’s fees for each victim at $125 per hour. The 

total recommended restitution was $1,122,925 for T.S, 

$871,825 for M.S., $1,398,525 for S.H. and $632,525 for A.L. 

Missar was the only witness at the district court’s two 

restitution hearings, during which he explained the reasoning 

he used in preparing the MHAs. First, Missar acknowledged 

that the estimated amount for needed mental health services 

was similar for each victim despite the fact that the length of 

time each had worked for the appellant varied. Missar 

explained that PTSD can develop in a matter of days but can 

cause lifetime damage. While Missar acknowledged that each 

victim had health/drug problems, he nonetheless believed that 

his treatment recommendations were necessary and 

appropriate because even if a victim had had no pre-existing 

mental health problem, the appellant’s abuse of her would 

have made necessary the treatment he recommended. Missar 

further explained that, while he had been unable to interview 

M.S. and T.S., he could render an expert opinion on their 

conditions/treatment based on his review of each victim’s 

grand jury testimony, his extrapolation from the two victims 

he did interview and his previous experience in evaluating 

individuals without interviewing them. 

On March 30, 2011, the district court granted, inter alia, 

the following restitution: (1) to S.H., $849,400 for treatment 

and $365,600 for ill-gotten gains; (2) to T.S., $573,800 for 

treatment and $577,500 for ill-gotten gains; (3) to M.S. 

$839,700 for treatment and $5,465 for ill-gotten gains; and (4) 

to A.L., $679,800 for treatment and $790 in ill-gotten gains. 

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In determining the necessary treatment, the district court 

adopted all of Missar’s recommendations but corrected the 

total amount in the guardian ad litem’s report for T.S.’s 

treatment because of a mathematical error. In calculating illgotten gains, the district court relied primarily on each 

victim’s grand jury testimony.1

 The appellant timely 

appealed. 

II. 

A. 

The appellant challenges the district court’s restitution 

order only. The government first maintains that the appellant 

waived his right to appeal the restitution order. We disagree. 

A waiver of the right to appeal a sentence is 

presumptively valid and is enforceable if the defendant’s 

decision to waive is “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” 

United States v. Guillen, 561 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009); 

 

1

 For S.H., the district court multiplied $400 (the average daily 

amount S.H. testified she earned for the appellant) by 914 days (the 

length of time the appellant admitted he had prostituted S.H.). For 

T.S., the court multiplied $500 (the daily amount T.S. testified she 

was required to earn for the appellant) by 1155 (the total number of 

days the appellant admitted that he prostituted T.S., minus four 

days T.S. testified she failed to meet the $500 daily minimum). For 

M.S., the court added $200 (the amount M.S. made on the first 

night she worked for the appellant) to $5,265, the product of the 

remaining number of days M.S. worked for the appellant and $405 

(the average amount M.S. earned each day). For A.L., the district 

court added the average of the amounts A.L. testified that she 

charged for each of the four sexual contacts she had on her first 

night working for the appellant ($280) to the amount she charged 

for each of the three contacts on the second night. 

USCA Case #11-3038 Document #1411353 Filed: 12/21/2012 Page 6 of 16
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see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) 

(“Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary 

but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient 

awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely 

consequences.”). Moreover, “[a]n anticipatory waiver—that 

is, one made before the defendant knows what the sentence 

will be—is nonetheless a knowing waiver if the defendant is 

aware of and understands the risks involved in his decision.” 

Guillen, 561 F.3d at 529; see also United States v. 

Cunningham, 145 F.3d 1385, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (in 

waiving right to counsel, record must show defendant “knows 

what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open”) 

(quotation marks omitted). “In the context of a plea bargain, 

. . . a determination [of whether a waiver is knowing and 

intelligent] is usually made at the plea hearing, at which the 

court can fully explain the consequences of the waiver by 

informing the defendant of exactly what rights he is giving up 

and what rights he retains.” United States v. Accardi, 669 F.3d 

340, 344 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Guillen, 561 F.3d at 528). A 

waiver, however, does not prevent an appeal if the district 

court commits an error of law during sentencing. See Guillen, 

561 F.3d at 530. For example, a waiver is not “enforced if the 

sentencing court’s failure in some material way to follow a 

prescribed sentencing procedure results in a miscarriage of 

justice”—for instance, an “utter[] fail[ure] to advert to the 

factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),” or if the sentence “is 

unlawful because it exceeds the statutory maximum.” Id. at 

531.2

 

2

 Interpretation of a plea agreement relies on contract law, In re 

Sealed Case, 686 F.3d 799, 802 (D.C. Cir. 2012), and ambiguity in 

a plea agreement is construed against the drafting party; in this 

case, the government. See Segar v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 16, 25 (D.C. 

Cir. 2007). 

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We conclude that the appellant did not waive his right to 

appeal the restitution order by signing the plea agreement. 

The ten-page plea agreement contains eighteen separate 

sections. Section Twelve of the plea agreement provides for 

waiver of appeal and recites, in pertinent part: “You [are] 

aware that federal law, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 3742, affords 

[you] the right to appeal the sentence in this case . . . . [and 

that you] waive[ ] the right to appeal [your] sentence or the 

manner in which it was determined pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3742 . . . .” A 29 (emphasis added). But the remainder of 

Section Twelve refers only to “a period of imprisonment” and 

“the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range” (providing for a 

range for imprisonment, supervised release and fines but not 

for restitution). See A 29. Section Twelve also references 

Section Two of the plea agreement (entitled 

“Recommendation as to Appropriate Sentence”), which 

defines “sentence” as simply the period of incarceration, 

stating “[you] and the Government agree that a sentence of 

180 to 240 months incarceration is the appropriate sentence.” 

A 25 (emphases added). Section Two also mentions “other 

sentencing incidents” such as “fines and terms of supervised 

release,” but does not include restitution. A 25. 

While Section Eleven of the plea agreement explains that 

the appellant must pay restitution,3

 the fact that the appellant 

acknowledges the obligation to pay restitution does not mean 

that he forfeits the right to appeal the amount thereof. 

Moreover, a comparison of the plea agreement’s restitution 

provision—Section Eleven—with its forfeiture provision—

 

3

 Section Eleven provides, in pertinent part: “[You] understand[ ] 

that in addition to the other penalties provided by law . . . it is 

mandatory that the Court order [you] to make restitution for the full 

amount of any victims’ compensable losses.” A 28. 

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Section Thirteen—indicates that the appeal waiver does not 

apply to restitution. Like Section Eleven, Section Thirteen 

provides that forfeiture is mandatory. Unlike Section Eleven, 

however, Section Thirteen contains its own appeal waiver: 

“[You] further agree[ ] to waive all constitutional and 

statutory challenges in any manner (including direct appeal . . 

. ) to any forfeiture carried out . . . as it relates to the noncontested items . . . .” A 30. The fact that the plea agreement 

expressly eliminates an appeal right for forfeiture but not for 

restitution suggests that appeal of restitution has not been 

waived. Cf. Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 

U.S. 513, 517-22 (1994) (language omitted from one statutory 

provision but included in parallel provision indicates former 

provision does not include language); Clinchfield Coal Co. v. 

Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 895 F.2d 773, 

779 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“explicit direction for something in one 

provision, and its absence in a parallel provision, implies an 

intent to negate it in the second context”).4

 The government nonetheless contends that waiver of the 

right to appeal the “sentence” waives the right to appeal 

restitution because “restitution” is necessarily part of a 

“sentence.” As noted above, Section Twelve of the plea 

agreement cites to the defendant’s right to appeal a sentence 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3742. Section 3742 does not address 

 

4

 Moreover, at the Rule 11 hearing during which the appellant 

entered his guilty plea, the magistrate judge did not discuss 

restitution or the right to appeal restitution but did discuss 

imprisonment, fines, forfeiture and supervised release. See Accardi, 

669 F.3d at 344 (finding appeal waiver not knowing and intelligent 

when no colloquy regarding appeal waiver occurred at Rule 11 

hearing). 

USCA Case #11-3038 Document #1411353 Filed: 12/21/2012 Page 9 of 16
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restitution.5

 Restitution is instead treated in sections 3663 and 

3664 of Title 18. Significantly, section 3664(o)(1)(B) 

provides that a defendant appeals a restitution order pursuant 

to section 3742: “[a] sentence that imposes an order of 

restitution is a final judgment notwithstanding the fact that 

such a sentence can be subsequently appealed and modified

under section 3742.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(o)(1)(B) (emphases 

added). But the appellant’s plea agreement defines sentence 

without reference to restitution—at the very least, it is 

ambiguous as to whether “sentence” includes restitution. Cf. 

United States v. Anderson, 545 F.3d 1072, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 

2008) (“‘In determining whether any particular plea 

agreement has been breached, we look to the reasonable 

understanding of the parties and resolve any ambiguities in 

the agreement against the government.’”) (quoting United 

 

5

 Section 3742(a) provides that a defendant may appeal a sentence 

if it 

(1) was imposed in violation of law; 

(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect 

application of the sentencing guidelines; or 

(3) is greater than the sentence specified in the 

applicable guideline range to the extent that the 

sentence includes a greater fine or term of 

imprisonment, probation, or supervised release 

than the maximum established in the guideline 

range, or includes a more limiting condition of 

probation or supervised release under section 

3563(b)(6) or (b)(11) than the maximum 

established in the guideline range; or 

(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is 

no sentencing guideline and is plainly 

unreasonable. 

USCA Case #11-3038 Document #1411353 Filed: 12/21/2012 Page 10 of 16
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States v. Rodgers, 101 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 1996)).6

Because the plea agreement cites only section 3742, which, as 

noted, does not mention restitution, we believe the appellant 

did not knowingly waive his right to appeal the restitution 

award. 

 The government also points to out-of-circuit authority 

that, it contends, establishes that waiver of the right to appeal 

a sentence waives the right to appeal restitution as well. See, 

e.g., United States v. Cohen, 459 F.3d 490, 497 (4th Cir. 

2006) (“[A]s a general rule, a defendant who has agreed ‘[t]o 

waive knowingly and expressly all rights, conferred by 18 

U.S.C. § 3742, to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,’ . . . 

has waived his right to appeal a restitution order.”). But other 

out-of-circuit cases have held that waiver of the right to 

appeal a “sentence” does not apply to “restitution” under the 

language of the plea agreement. United States v. Oladimeji, 

463 F.3d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 2006) (no waiver because plea 

agreement indicated “sentence” referred to imprisonment 

only); United States v. Sistrunk, 432 F.3d 917, 918 (8th Cir. 

2006) (no waiver under plea agreement stating: “the 

defendant hereby waives all rights conferred by [18 U.S.C. 

§ 3742] to appeal his sentence, unless the Court sentences the 

defendant above offense level 10”); United States v. Zink, 107 

 

6

 The government cites United States v. Monzel, in which we stated 

(in part relying on 18 U.S.C. § 3664(o)(1)(B)) that a restitution 

order is part of a sentence. 641 F.3d 528, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 

(“Amy is asking the court to revisit her restitution award, which is

part of Monzel’s sentence.”) (emphasis in original). We recognize 

that, due to section 3664(o)(1)(B)’s reference to section 3742, 

“sentence” as used in section 3742 includes restitution. To avoid 

this type of problem in the future, the government should consider 

including, in the appeal waiver section of the plea agreement, 

express waiver of the right to appeal restitution. 

USCA Case #11-3038 Document #1411353 Filed: 12/21/2012 Page 11 of 16
12 

F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 1997) (plea agreement indicated 

reference to “any sentence” was to sentence calculated under 

Sentencing Guidelines). In one of the cases cited by the 

government, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that, while it 

found the waiver in that case included restitution, its “analysis 

[was] guided foremost by the facts before [it].” United States 

v. Worden, 646 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2011). 

Similarly, we are guided by the facts before us. We 

conclude that based on the language of the appellant’s plea 

agreement, his Rule 11 colloquy and the rule of construction 

that ambiguity in a contract is construed against the drafter, 

the appellant did not knowingly waive his right to appeal the 

restitution order.

B. 

 Having established that the challenge to the restitution 

order has not been waived, we proceed to determine the 

merits of that challenge. We review a restitution order for 

abuse of discretion, United States v. Fair, No. 09–3120, 2012 

WL 5457679, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 9, 2012), and we examine 

the factual findings underpinning the order for clear error, 

United States v. Bryson, 485 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 

2007). 

Because the appellant pleaded guilty to 18 U.S.C. § 1591, 

the district court was required to impose restitution under 18 

U.S.C. § 1593. See 18 U.S.C. § 1593(a). Under section 1593, 

the order of restitution “shall be issued and enforced in 

accordance with [18 U.S.C. §] 3664 in the same manner as an 

order under section 3663A.” 18 U.S.C. § 1593(b)(2). Section 

3663A is part of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act 

(MVRA). Under the MVRA, “[a]ny dispute as to the proper 

amount or type of restitution shall be resolved by the court by 

the preponderance of the evidence” with the government 

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bearing the burden to establish the amount of loss suffered by 

the victim. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e). 

Section 1593 requires that the defendant pay the victim 

“the full amount of the victim’s losses,” id. § 1593(b)(1), 

defined as the sum of two components: (1) ill-gotten gains 

plus (2) the “full amount of the victim’s losses,” defined as 

“(A) medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or 

psychological care; (B) physical and occupational therapy or 

rehabilitation; (C) necessary transportation, temporary 

housing, and child care expenses; (D) lost income; (E) 

attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; and (F) any 

other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the 

offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3) (incorporated by reference 

in 18 U.S.C. § 1593(b)(3)).

The losses set forth in the second component of the 

definition—the “full amount of the victim’s losses”—must be 

proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct. United States 

v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 535, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 

(defendant who possessed single image of victim was not 

proximate cause of victim’s loss which was “due in large part 

to her knowledge that each day, untold numbers of people 

across the world are viewing and distributing images of her 

sexual abuse” and “she would have suffered tremendously 

from her sexual abuse regardless of what Monzel did”); see 

also 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2) (defining “victim” as “a person 

directly and proximately harmed”). In other words, the 

defendant should not be required to pay restitution for harm 

he did not cause. This does not mean, however, that the 

defendant must be the sole cause of the harm. See Monzel, 

641 F.3d at 538 (suggesting entire liability for harm may be 

imposed on defendant if two or more causes produce single 

result and either one cause would be sufficient alone to 

produce result or each cause is essential to harm). 

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14 

Nor must the amount of restitution be proven with 

exactitude. As we have explained, “determining the dollar 

amount of a victim’s losses attributable to the defendant will 

often be difficult” and “such a determination will inevitably 

involve some degree of approximation,” which is “not fatal.” 

Id. at 540. “Rather, the district court’s charge is ‘to estimate, 

based upon facts in the record, the amount of [the] victim’s 

loss with some reasonable certainty.’” Id. (quoting United 

States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2007) (section 

2259 does not require “mathematical precision”)). 

 Finally, the appellant makes several arguments that the 

district court abused its discretion. First, he argues that the 

district court did not properly take into account the fact that 

the four minors had been involved in prostitution or other 

traumatic events before their contact with him. We disagree. 

Missar testified that he attempted to determine “what would 

somebody who had just that experience with [appellant] 

need.” A 461-62. And he acknowledged that, while the 

victims had suffered trauma before being prostituted by the 

appellant, his abuse was the “proximate” or “most significant 

cause” and the treatment he recommended would be 

necessary even if the victims had had no previous trauma. A 

380-84. 

 Second, the appellant contends that the court erred by 

failing to find that the victims were in fact interested in 

seeking Missar’s recommended treatment. Not so. We 

compensate a victim with restitution, that is, money—whether 

she chooses to use the money in a particular way is up to her. 

See United States v. Frazier, 651 F.3d 899, 904 (8th Cir. 

2011) (purpose of restitution under MVRA is to “make 

victims of crime whole” by “fully compensat[ing]” them for 

their losses) (quotation marks omitted). 

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15 

 Third, the appellant complains that the district court 

improperly calculated similar damages amounts for each 

victim despite the fact that each victim prostituted for 

significantly different lengths of time; specifically, S.H. for 

approximately 914 days, T.S. for approximately 1159 days, 

M.S. for approximately fourteen days and A.L. for four days. 

Missar explicitly addressed this point, however, by explaining 

that the psychological harm from PTSD takes only a short 

time to occur. See, e.g., A 360 (“[T]he psychological impact 

and trauma that each of the girls sustained within the first few 

days . . . really set the stage for a traumatic reaction in their 

brain that is likely to carry on for, in my opinion, the rest of 

their lives.”); A 420 (“[C]ertainly the longer that the trauma 

went on, the more significant the trauma is, but in terms of 

meeting a particular threshold of being traumatic, if you will, 

they are equivalent, in my opinion.”). The district court did 

not abuse its discretion in accepting Missar’s explanation. 

 Fourth, the appellant contends that the district court’s 

calculation of his ill-gotten gains is improper because (1) the 

court relied primarily on grand jury testimony; (2) according 

to various studies, the testimony of child sexual abuse victims 

is inherently unreliable; and (3) the victims’ testimony 

regarding the amount of ill-gotten gains was “frankly 

unbelievable,” particularly because he has little money today. 

Appellant Br. 12-18. We disagree. There is no per se rule 

prohibiting a district court from relying on grand jury 

testimony at sentencing; in fact, the court may rely on such 

testimony so long as it has “sufficient indicia of reliability.” 

See In re Sealed Case, 246 F.3d 696, 699-700 (D.C. Cir. 

2001) (quotation marks omitted). Nor do we agree that the 

victims’ testimony was unbelievable. The victims gave 

detailed grand jury testimony and each victim’s testimony 

was consistent with the others’. Thus, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in relying on their grand jury testimony. 

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16 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court. 

So ordered. 

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