Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-18-02729/USCOURTS-ca7-18-02729-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James P. Ledonne
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued January 29, 2020

Decided February 26, 2020

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 18‐2729

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

   

v.

JAMES P. LEDONNE,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District

of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3:14‐cr‐00055‐JD‐MGG‐1

Jon E. DeGuilio,

Judge.

O R D E R

After James LeDonne pleaded guilty to two counts of mail and wire fraud, the

sentencing court included in his Guidelines calculation an enhancement for obstruction

of justice based on false statements he made to a probation officer about his criminal

history. On appeal, LeDonne argues that the court erred in finding that his statements

could support the enhancement. We see no such error and therefore affirm the sentence.   

LeDonne, a purported manufacturer of specialized trucks and trailers, defrauded

65 customers of over $1.5 million through five counterfeit companies he created from

2008 to 2013. Under the scheme, LeDonne solicited deposits for purchase orders that he

never fulfilled and provided false information to customers about production

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 18‐2729    Page 2

schedules, delivery dates, and refunds. When some customers obtained civil judgments

against LeDonne’s companies for the funds he owed, he filed a series of bankruptcies to

avoid paying the debts.   

LeDonne was indicted on fourteen counts of mail and wire fraud, among other

charges, and a probation officer conducted a pretrial‐detention interview. In the

interview, the officer asked LeDonne if he had a criminal history, and he initially denied

any. When confronted with three earlier federal and state convictions in 1993 related to

another fraud scheme (which the probation officer discovered in a pre‐interview

background check), LeDonne acknowledged the convictions and commented that the

state convictions were “tied into the federal case.” Regarding his assets and liabilities,

LeDonne told the officer that he earned $10,000 a month, that he had an outstanding

balance on a mortgage, that he had two vehicle loans, and that he had a couple of small

medical bills. Based on these answers, the officer recommended releasing LeDonne on

bond before trial.   

The probation officer, however, later learned additional information about

LeDonne’s criminal history and financial liabilities—discoveries that led her to

recommend instead that the court detain LeDonne before trial. First, the officer

discovered that LeDonne had an Arizona misdemeanor conviction for disorderly

conduct that he never disclosed. Second, she learned at the detention hearing that

LeDonne owed hundreds of thousands of dollars in civil judgments.   

LeDonne ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343,

and one count of mail fraud, id. § 1341.   

Before sentencing, both parties objected to the PSR. As relevant to this appeal,

the government objected to the probation officer’s decision to exclude from the

Guidelines calculation a two‐level enhancement for LeDonne’s obstruction of justice

under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for making three misleading statements at his pretrial detention

interview. As the government explained, LeDonne initially denied and later minimized

his criminal history, misrepresented his monthly income, and neglected to divulge the

outstanding civil judgments against him. LeDonne, meanwhile, maintained that any

misstatement resulted from confusion or a bad memory and, in any event, was

immaterial to the outcome of his case.   

After holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court determined that LeDonne

had misrepresented his criminal history, and on that basis the court imposed the

obstruction‐of‐justice enhancement. LeDonne’s initial denial of any criminal history was

the “critical fact” supporting the enhancement. The court concluded that the denial was

both “clearly intentional” and that there was “no chance that [LeDonne] simply forgot

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No. 18‐2729    Page 3

he had a criminal history” because LeDonne had “spent years in a federal prison” for

his previous conviction. The denial also was material, because LeDonne’s history

influenced the court’s decision about whether he would be released on bond.   

The enhancement increased LeDonne’s offense level from 31 to 33. This offense

level, combined with a criminal history category of III, bumped up the Guidelines range

to 168–210 months’ imprisonment—slightly higher than the 151–188‐month range

calculated in the PSR. The court sentenced LeDonne to 168 months’ imprisonment

followed by one year of supervised release. In doing so, it stated that its evaluation of

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors—including the scope and duration of the fraud scheme,

LeDonne’s history of fraudulent behavior, and the emotional impact on the victims—

would lead to the “same sentence even if [the Guidelines] range were different.”   

On appeal, LeDonne challenges the district court’s decision to impose the

enhancement for obstruction of justice. He contends, first, that the enhancement was

inappropriate because his initial denial of his criminal history was immaterial to the

outcome of his case. As he notes, the enhancement applies only when a defendant

provides “materially false information to a probation officer in respect to a presentence

or other investigation for the court.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(H) (emphasis added).   

But denying one’s criminal record to a probation officer preparing a

recommendation for pretrial detention is “most certainly material.” United States

v. Owolabi, 69 F.3d 156, 160, 163 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Rogers, 45 F.3d

1141, 1143 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding enhancement where defendant denied previous

bank‐fraud conviction)). Misrepresenting one’s criminal history to a probation officer

preparing a recommendation about pretrial detention falls “squarely” within this

guideline. United States v. Ojo, 916 F.2d 388, 390, 392–93 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding

enhancement where defendant lied about arrest record). Here, LeDonne denied having

any criminal history—despite having multiple previous fraud convictions for which he

spent years in federal prison. And though he admitted to the fraud convictions when

pressed, he never disclosed his Arizona misdemeanor conviction for disorderly

conduct.   

Next, LeDonne argues that his denial had no effect on the probation officer’s

investigation because the officer already knew of the fraud convictions from her

pre‐interview background check. But whether LeDonne’s denial obstructed the

investigation is beside the point; the guideline requires only that he

“willfully ... attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice” to impose

the enhancement. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (emphasis added). LeDonne may not have succeeded

in concealing his criminal history from the probation officer, but he did mislead her and

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cause her to expend time and resources to determine his true criminal history.

See Owolabi, 69 F.3d at 163–64. It is also irrelevant that LeDonne admitted to some of his

past fraud convictions when confronted with the information. See Ojo, 916 F.2d

at 392–93 (upholding enhancement where defendant “withheld information regarding

her prior conviction until it was ... brought to the attention of the court by the

government”).

LeDonne also downplays his statements about his criminal history as “likely the

result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory and not a willful attempt[] to obstruct

justice.” But an intent to obstruct justice can be “inferred from the defendant’s conduct.”

United States v. Schwanke, 694 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2012). Here, the district court

reasonably found that LeDonne’s complete denial of his criminal history was “clearly

intentional,” given the years he spent in prison for prior fraud convictions. The court

added that there was “no chance that [LeDonne] simply forgot he had a criminal

history.” In light of the evidence, that conclusion cannot be clearly erroneous.   

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment.   

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