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Parties Involved:
Sealed Case

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 1, 1998 Decided July 21, 1999

No. 99-3096

In re Sealed Case No. 99-3096

(Brady Obligations)

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

Evelina J. Norwinski, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Reita P. Pendry,

Chief Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Chrisellen R. Kolb, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S.

Attorney.

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Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Henderson and Garland,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: The defendant in this criminal

case contends that the government improperly denied his

repeated requests for information to which he was entitled

under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The government responds that because the information, if it exists, would

relate to the impeachment of a defense witness, it falls

outside the obligations imposed by Brady. Defendant replies

that impeachment information always comes within the ambit

of Brady, regardless whether the witness testifies for the

defense or the prosecution.

We need not accept either of these broad claims to resolve

this case. The information defendant seeks would not merely

be impeaching in the sense that it would weaken the credibility of his own witness. Rather, it would be exculpatory in the

sense that it would be affirmatively favorable to his assertion

of innocence. Accordingly, such information comes within the

scope of the government's Brady obligations. Because the

government concedes that it has not searched to determine

whether the requested information exists, we grant the defendant's request that the case be remanded to the district court.

The government must first search to determine whether the

information sought by defendant exists and, if it does, the

district court must then determine whether that information

is "material" within the meaning of Brady and its progeny.

I

In September 1996, an officer of the District of Columbia's

Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) applied for a warrant

to search the home of John Doe1 for a handgun and ammunition. The officer submitted an affidavit stating that an

unidentified informant had observed the gun and ammunition

there within the last 48 hours. The affidavit continued: "The

__________

1 Because this case remains under seal, the names of the defendant and the informant have been changed.

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source that provided this information has ... given information which has led to the arrests of several subjects for

narcotics violations, the recovery of one assault weapon, the

arrests of subjects wanted on warrants and the issuance of

two search warrants." Def. App. 11. A judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted the application.

The police executed the warrant the following morning.

The officers found one semi-automatic handgun under the

mattress in Doe's basement bedroom, and a second gun,

along with ammunition, in a shoebox under the basement

stairwell. Doe was arrested and questioned. He denied the

guns were his, and denied knowing that they were in the

house. He said he had seen one of the guns in the possession

of a friend, Thomas Jones, a couple of days earlier. Def.

App., Tab A at 51. Doe's girlfriend later testified that Doe

and Jones had picked her up at the hospital the day before

the search, and that after returning to Doe's house, Jones had

spent some time in the basement alone. Id., Tab D at 29-30.

Doe was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm and

ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

s 922(g). In a pretrial motion filed in October 1996, Doe

sought disclosure of the identity of the government's informant. Pursuant to Brady, he also sought production of

information concerning, inter alia: (1) "the amount of money

... paid to the source," and whether it was "paid in exchange

for information or otherwise"; (2) "other consideration provided to the source, including ... assistance in avoiding or

minimizing harm from pending or threatened charges"; (3)

"all benefits, promises of benefits, or statements that the

source would not benefit absent cooperation ... in connection

with this case"; (4) "the nature of assistance that the source

has provided in the past"; and (5) "the source's prior record,

pending cases, and parole and probation status." Def. App.

21. The court denied the request, ruling that defendant had

not met the burden for piercing the government's informant

privilege set forth in Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53

(1957), because "it is basically a position of speculation as to

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how the informer in this case might be helpful to the defendant ... as [the case] stands before the Court now...."

Def. App., Tab A at 83.

Shortly before Doe's trial was scheduled to begin, Thomas

Jones called Doe's attorney, told her that he had helpful

information, and asked to meet with her. In January 1997,

the attorney, her investigator, and Jones met in a restaurant

parking lot. According to the investigator's file memorandum, Jones told them that he was the government informant

in Doe's case and that "he wanted to clear his conscience."

Def. App. 29. He said that "he had a big gun and drug case

in [District of Columbia] Superior Court and he had to work

it off," and identified three detectives with whom he was

cooperating. Jones said the guns found in Doe's apartment

were his (Jones'). He said that the day before the execution

of the search warrant, he and Doe had gone to pick up Doe's

girlfriend at the hospital. When they returned to the house,

Jones continued, he "hid the guns, one under the mattress

and one in a box under the stairs." He did not tell Doe he

was hiding the guns, and Doe did not know what he had done.

Jones assured Doe's attorney that he would testify at Doe's

trial. At the same time, he asked for assistance with his own

legal problems: there was an outstanding bench warrant for

his arrest, and Jones feared that the police would incarcerate

him at the District of Columbia's correctional facility at

Lorton, Virginia. "I can't go back to Lorton," he said,

"because I snitched on so many people." Id.

Doe's trial began a week later. In her opening statement,

Doe's attorney told the jury the evidence would show that

Doe was innocent, and that Jones had planted the guns and

ammunition in the house without Doe's knowledge. Def.

App., Tab C at 12. Thereafter, Doe's attorney learned from

the attorney in Jones' Superior Court case that Jones intended to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination and would refuse to testify at Doe's trial. The

next morning, Doe's attorney advised the court that, in order

to get Jones' prior statements before the jury, she planned to

introduce them through the testimony of her investigator as

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statements against Jones' penal interest, see Fed. R. Evid.

804(b)(3). Def. App., Tab D at 3-4.

At this point, the prosecutor questioned whether Jones

really did have a Fifth Amendment privilege. After the court

appointed a lawyer to advise Jones, Jones formally asserted

his right not to testify. The prosecutor then asked "to speak

with [Jones' lawyer] over the luncheon recess to see if we can

reach some sort of accommodation ... which would permit

him [Jones] to testify." Id. at 68. Doe's counsel then made a

Brady request for Jones' "agreements with the government"

in what she understood to be his "sealed" cases in Superior

Court. Id. The prosecutor protested that "I don't have

access to that information readily. I would have to go back

to my office and try to pull out the old files and everything

else." Id. The district court denied Doe's request as "premature," indicating that it did not want to decide the issue

until it was determined that Jones would testify. Id. at 68-

69.

After the luncheon recess, Jones agreed to testify and the

government advised the court that it had agreed to make

arrangements for his safety. Suspecting that Jones had

become an adverse witness during the break, defense counsel

again requested production of Jones' "prior agreements with

the government" and "sealed" case records. The court again

put off decision, this time indicating it would not consider the

issue until after Jones testified. Def. App., Tab E at 11.

Jones was then called to the witness stand by Doe's counsel. Although he denied that he had told her the names of

police officers with whom he was cooperating or that he was

"working off" a conviction in Superior Court, id. at 22, 27,

Jones admitted that he had told her he was the confidential

informant in Doe's case, id. at 19. He also admitted to

confessing that, while he was alone in the basement, he had

planted the guns under the mattress and stairwell without

Doe's knowledge. Id. at 19-21.

On cross-examination by the prosecutor, Jones' story

changed dramatically. He testified that his pre-trial stateUSCA Case #99-3096 Document #454994 Filed: 07/21/1999 Page 5 of 20
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ments to Doe's counsel were lies. The guns, Jones said, were

Doe's. The day before the search, Doe had taken them out

from underneath the mattress and stairwell to show to him.

Id. at 33-38. Jones had lied about planting the weapons, he

said, because "some dudes" had "threatened, if I didn't call

his lawyer, and tell the guns was mine some bodily harm

would be done to me." Id. at 27-28. After hearing Jones'

testimony, defense counsel asked the court to declare him a

hostile witness and to permit her to cross-examine him. See

Fed. R. Evid. 611(c). The court agreed. Def. App., Tab E at

39.

At the same time, however, the court rejected defendant's

renewed request for "information regarding [Jones'] sealed

cases" and "agreements he's made with the government

regarding those cases." Id. The court denied the request

regarding the sealed cases saying, "I'm not going to at this

late juncture make any effort to get those sealed records

from the Superior Court." Besides, the court said, any

agreements reflected in the records of those cases "don't have

anything to do with this case anyway." Id. at 42.

Persistently, but tactfully, defense counsel asked that the

court at least direct the government to turn over its own

agreements with Jones, noting "[t]hat doesn't require anything from Superior Court." Id. The prosecutor replied that

there was no agreement in the instant case, but made no

representation about agreements in other cases.2 She did

__________

2 In its brief before this court, the government states that it has

"no reason to believe that any agreement existed between the

United States Attorney's Office and Mr. [Jones] with respect to his

case in Superior Court." Gov't Br. at 34 n.17 (citing, inter alia,

Gov't App., Tabs A-F). We are confused by the government's

statement since its citations, recently prepared transcripts of some

of Jones' Superior Court appearances, appear to refer to such an

agreement. See Gov't App., Tab C at 3 (statement by defense

counsel that "[Jones] has been cooperating with providing information"; reply by Assistant U.S. Attorney that "we will need to ensure

that the agreement is followed through"); id., Tab E at 3 (statement by court that at sentencing "[i]t was included in the representation by prosecution that the defendant was cooperating"). But

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state, however, that "I think there may be some records that

the police might have [although] I certainly don't have anything right now." More important, she continued, "I don't

think the government has an obligation to produce them to

the defense in connection with a defense witness." Id. The

court agreed, ruling that the government was not required to

produce records "in regard to a defense witness." Id. at 43.

The court advised defense counsel that she was free, however,

to question Jones about any agreements he might have. Id.

Doe's counsel proceeded to do so, but Jones denied being a

"snitch," id. at 50, said "I haven't told on anybody," id. at 53,

and denied having "an agreement with the government," id.

at 57-58. Doe's counsel did not impeach Jones or otherwise

offer affirmative evidence of prior agreements or government

cooperation. The jury convicted Doe of the offenses charged

in the indictment, and the court sentenced him to 92 months

in prison.

II

In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that the

Due Process Clause imposes upon the prosecution an obligation to disclose "evidence favorable to the accused ...

where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the

prosecution." 373 U.S. at 87; see Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,

480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987). In Giglio v. United States and United

States v. Bagley, the Court held that "impeachment evidence

... as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady

rule." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985)

(quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)).

__________

see id., Tab F at 7 (statement by prosecutor that "I have no

information whether or not the defendant is cooperating"). It may

be that the government regards the cooperation agreement referred

to in these transcripts as one involving the police rather than the

U.S. Attorney's Office. If that is the distinction the government is

drawing, it is of no moment to its obligations under Brady. See

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995); United States v. Brooks,

966 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

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And in Kyles v. Whitley, the Court held that the rule includes

evidence "known only to police investigators and not to the

prosecutor." 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995). Hence, to comply

with Brady, "the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of

any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police." Id. at 437.

As the Supreme Court recently noted in Strickler v.

Greene, courts have used the term "Brady violation" to cover

a multitude of prosecutorial sins involving breach of "the

broad obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence," often

called "Brady material." 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1948 (1999). These

include both the failure to search for Brady material and the

failure to produce it. "[S]trictly speaking," however, "there is

never a real 'Brady violation' unless the nondisclosure was so

serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict."

Id. As the Court explained, a "true Brady violation" has

three components: "The evidence at issue must be favorable

to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it

is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by

the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice

must have ensued." Id. To satisfy the prejudice component,

the withheld evidence must be "material"; that is, there must

be "a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would

have been different." Id. (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676);

see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34. If the undisclosed evidence is material, a new trial is required. Kyles, 514 U.S. at

421-22.

It appears from the parties' briefs that, contrary to Doe's

original understanding, the records of Jones' Superior Court

cases3 were not sealed. Gov't Br. at 36 n.21; Oral Arg. Tr.

14-15. Hence, Doe's request for access to those records is

effectively moot. His request for the disclosure of agreements between Jones and the government, however, remains

__________

3 Jones has convictions for carrying a pistol without a license,

attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and attempted distribution of cocaine. Gov't Br. at 6 n.7.

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very much alive. The government's appellate brief advises us

that Jones did "provid[e] information to the police as a paid

special employee," Gov't Br. at 34 n.17, and its appendix

discloses that Jones was required, as a condition of probation

in one of his Superior Court cases, to cooperate with the

police, see Gov't App., Tab C, at 3-4. At oral argument, the

government also advised that "in candor with the court, it

might involve the FBI, it might involve the DEA and other

law enforcement agencies" as well. Oral Arg. Tr. at 29.

We therefore proceed to examine the arguments asserted

by the government in support of its contention that, even if

cooperation agreements exist, it has no Brady obligation to

produce them. We conduct this examination de novo, since

whether the government has breached its obligations under

Brady is a question of law. United States v. Cuffie, 80 F.3d

514, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Lloyd, 71 F.3d 408,

411 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

A

At trial, the prosecutor argued and the court agreed that

Brady did not apply because Jones was a defense witness.

In response, the defendant points out that the Supreme

Court's description of the government's Brady obligations

encompasses evidence that can be used to impeach the credibility of a witness, and does not on its face distinguish

between impeachment of a prosecution witness and impeachment of a witness for the defense.4 The government replies

that the Court's references to impeachment in Bagley and

Giglio involved prosecution witnesses (the same was true in

Strickler), and that Brady and its progeny therefore do not

require disclosure of impeachment evidence concerning a

defense witness. "The Due Process Clause," the government

notes, "does not provide 'a general constitutional right to

discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one.' "

Gov't Br. at 17 (quoting Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545,

__________

4 See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433 (noting that in Bagley "the Court

disavowed any difference between exculpatory and impeachment

evidence for Brady purposes").

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559 (1977)). To require disclosure of potential impeachment

regarding defense witnesses, the government argues, would

effectively "displace the adversary system as the primary

means by which the truth is uncovered"--a result not intended by Brady. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675; see also United

States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109, 112 n.20 (1976).

In the usual case there is a conceptual difference between

the impeachment of a government witness and the impeachment of a defense witness. Evidence that impeaches the

former is almost invariably "favorable" to the accused, because by making the government's case less credible it enhances the defendant's chances of acquittal. Evidence that

impeaches a defense witness, by contrast, is not generally

favorable to the accused; by reducing the credibility of the

defendant's own witness, such impeachment reduces the probability that he will obtain a not guilty verdict. It is ordinarily

the prosecutor rather than defense counsel who wants to use

the latter kind of evidence--although she may prefer to delay

its use (and disclosure) until after the witness testifies, both

to prevent tailoring of the testimony in expectation of the

cross-examination and to employ the element of surprise to

expose the witness' mendacity.

But Doe's is not the usual case involving impeachment of a

defense witness. First, although it is true that defense

counsel's original plan was to put Jones on the stand as her

own witness (either directly or through the testimony of the

investigator), had things gone as planned she would have had

no reason to impeach Jones' credibility. It was only after

Jones "flipped" and started testifying against Doe that defense counsel wanted to impeach him, hoping that evidence of

a cooperation agreement would help her do so by showing

that Jones lied when he said he had never "snitched" on

anyone. Hence, even if we were to accept the proposition

that only the impeachment of a government witness falls

within Brady, by the time Jones flipped he had effectively

become a government witness--as the court recognized by

declaring him hostile. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 445-46 (ordering new trial where defense could have called informant as

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adverse witness and effectively used undisclosed evidence as

impeachment).

Second, and more important, the underlying reason Doe

sought information about Jones' relationship with the government was not to impeach Jones' statement, but to use it as

affirmative evidence of Doe's own innocence. Indeed, if all

had gone as planned, Doe would not have used evidence of a

cooperation agreement to impeach Jones' statement that he

planted the guns, but rather to corroborate it by exposing his

motive for doing so. With the testimony of Doe's girlfriend

that Jones had been alone in the basement, Doe had corroboration of Jones' opportunity to plant the weapons. What he

needed was evidence of motive, and any of several kinds of

cooperation agreements might have provided it. See Bagley,

473 U.S. at 683 (stating that where "the possibility of a

reward had been held out" to witnesses for providing useful

information, "[t]his possibility ... gave [the witnesses] a

direct, personal stake in respondent's conviction").5 For example, if there were an agreement that the prosecution would

seek the reduction of Jones' Superior Court sentences if he

provided "substantial assistance in investigating or prosecuting another person," see Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b), that agreement might have given him a motive to plant the guns.

Similarly, if cooperation with the police were a condition of

Jones' continued probation on his Superior Court convictions,

that might have provided an incentive. And Jones might also

have had a motive if the police had agreed to pay him in

return for information leading to successful arrests.6 As

noted above, there is evidence in the record that at least the

__________

5 Cf. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (vacating

judgment where court barred cross-examination about prosecutor's

agreement to drop charge in exchange for witness' promise to speak

with prosecutor, because "a jury might reasonably have found [it]

furnished the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution").

6 There is, of course, nothing inappropriate about such agreements. See United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 988-90 (D.C.

Cir. 1999) (noting legitimacy and law enforcement value of "prosecutorial promise(s) of leniency in exchange for truthful testimony").

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latter two kinds of agreements may exist. See Gov't App.,

Tab C at 3-4 (Superior Court hearing transcript indicating

cooperation with police was condition of Jones' probation);

Gov't Br. at 34 n.17 (noting that Jones "provided information

to the police as a paid special employee"); Oral Arg. Tr. at 29

(noting that Jones may also have had arrangements with the

FBI and DEA). By providing evidence of motive, such

agreements would have been relevant to Doe's defense independent of any impeachment value they might also have had

once Jones turned on him.

Finally, as the government conceded at oral argument, in

the circumstances of this case an agreement that gave Jones

a motive to plant the guns would be Brady material even if

Jones never appeared as a witness for either side. Oral Arg.

Tr. at 21, 27; see Kyles, 514 U.S. at 446; United States v.

Lloyd, 992 F.2d 348, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Indeed, in that

respect this case is similar to Kyles, where the Supreme

Court found that the prosecution violated Brady by failing to

disclose evidence that an informant who never testified might

have planted the murder weapon in defendant's apartment,

514 U.S. at 453, including evidence of the informant's motive.

See id. at 429 (noting defense theory that informant planted

gun for purposes of "removing an impediment to romance

with [Kyles' common-law wife] ... and obtaining reward

money" from police). That kind of evidence is exculpatory in

the purest sense, and its relevance does not depend on who

sponsors its admission. Indeed, once Doe's girlfriend testified that Jones had been alone in the basement, evidence of

an agreement giving Jones a motive to plant the guns would

have been admissible (assuming authentication) even if Jones

had never entered the courtroom. Accordingly, the fact that

__________

And we certainly do not suggest that any such agreement would, or

could, have authorized Jones to plant the guns. Rather, the point is

simply that such an agreement may give a person a motive that the

jury must be permitted to evaluate. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at

679; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683; Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55; United

States v. Smith, 77 F.3d 511, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

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Jones was originally proffered as a defense witness has no

consequence for the scope of the government's Brady obligations here.

B

The potpourri of other objections to disclosure argued by

the trial prosecutor and sustained by the trial court are also

unpersuasive. The court's original rejection of the defendant's pretrial Brady motion correctly rested on the ground

that, as matters then stood, the informant's identity was

confidential and "how the informer in this case might be

helpful to the defendant" was speculative. Def. App., Tab A

at 83. See United States v. Mangum, 100 F.3d 164, 172 (D.C.

Cir. 1996) (upholding nondisclosure of confidential informant's

identity where defendant's assertion that informant planted

gun in knapsack was "purely speculative" and there was no

evidence informant had access to knapsack); United States v.

Warren, 42 F.3d 647, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("Speculation as to

the information the informant may provide is insufficient.").

By the time the case went to trial, however, those factors no

longer applied. Jones had voluntarily revealed himself to

defense counsel, and had told her he planted the evidence in

Doe's basement. He had also told her that he was cooperating with the police in order to work off the gun and drug case

he had in Superior Court. This, together with the statement

in the affidavit for the search warrant that the informant had

previously "given information which has led to the arrests of

several subjects," Def. App. 11, moved the possibility that a

materially relevant cooperation agreement existed far beyond

the realm of speculation. See generally Roviaro, 353 U.S. at

60-65.

Nor is there any basis for the rulings that production of the

requested information was "premature," first until it was

clear Jones would testify, and then until after Jones actually

did testify. Contrary to the prosecution's contention, the

information did not become relevant only after Jones changed

his story, giving the defense reason to impeach him. As

noted above, evidence of Jones' motive was relevant independent of when or whether he testified. Similarly, we reject the

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government's suggestion that ordering a Brady search before

Jones testified would somehow have been inconsistent with

our admonitions in United States v. Marshall (made with

reference to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16), that "[t]o give rise to a

disclosure obligation, the evidence's materiality must, of

course, be evident to a reasonable prosecutor," and that the

"prosecutor need not guess that evidence may become material as a consequence of a defendant's not-yet-revealed strategic decisions." 132 F.3d. 63, 69 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1998). At least

from the moment defense counsel made the claim in her

opening statement that Jones planted the guns, it was clear

that any motive Jones might have had to do so was relevant

to the case. No clairvoyance on the part of the prosecutor

was required.

We also reject the government's Catch-22 rationale that

once Jones did testify, it was by then too late to compel

production of the information, since doing so would have

required a continuance to gather the materials. The government protests that "in the midst of the trial" it should not

have been required to "scamper" about searching for the

requested evidence. Gov't Br. at 32. But that problem could

have been avoided had the government gathered the material

earlier. In light of the defendant's opening statement, it was

no excuse the next morning that the prosecutor did not "have

access to that information readily" and "would have to go

back to my office and try to pull out old files and everything

else." Def. App., Tab D at 68. The same was true that

afternoon, when she said, "I think there may be some records

that the police might have [but] I certainly don't have anything right now." Id., Tab E at 42. And we do not understand the basis for the government's argument that "appellant cannot credibly complain because he failed to assert a

timely demand for this impeachment material." Gov't Br. at

40. To the contrary, defendant made his demands known

early, often, insistently, and with specificity--only to be met

with the government's claims that they were first premature,

and then too late. If by the time Jones testified the governUSCA Case #99-3096 Document #454994 Filed: 07/21/1999 Page 14 of 20
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ment still needed to "scamper" to collect the requested Brady

material, it had no one to blame but itself.7

We find equally unfounded the argument that any agreements Jones may have had in his Superior Court cases "don't

have anything to do with this case." Def. App., Tab E at 42.

Defendant's whole point was that Jones may have planted the

gun in this case in order to "work off" obligations that arose

in those Superior Court cases. Hence, agreements in the

other cases have everything to do with this case. Nor does it

matter that agreements in other cases may have involved

other prosecutors. The United States Attorney's Office for

the District of Columbia prosecutes cases in both the federal

District Court and the local Superior Court, and the prosecutor is responsible (at a minimum) for all Brady information in

the possession of that office. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154

(holding that ignorance by one prosecutor of promise made by

another is irrelevant since "[t]he prosecutor's office is an

entity and ... [a] promise made by one attorney must be

attributed, for these purposes, to the Government").

For a similar reason, we reject as irrelevant the contention

that the requested records may have been in the possession

of the Metropolitan Police Department, or the FBI or DEA,

rather than the U.S. Attorney's Office. As the Supreme

Court held in Kyles, "[t]he individual prosecutor has a duty to

learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on

the government's behalf in the case, including the police." 514

U.S. at 437. Anticipating Kyles, we specifically held in

United States v. Brooks that prosecutors in this District are

responsible for disclosing Brady information contained in

__________

7 Indeed, the government knew from the opening bell that it

would at least have to prepare to conduct its own cross-examination

of Jones. See Def. App., Tab B at 15 (listing defendant's potential

witnesses). Hence, it should not have needed the compulsion of

Brady to learn all it could about him. See Brooks, 966 F.2d at

1502-03 (noting that "prosecutor's own interest in avoiding surprise

at trial gives him a very considerable incentive to search accessible

files").

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MPD files, "[g]iven the close working relationship between

the Washington metropolitan police and the U.S. Attorney for

the District of Columbia (who prosecutes both federal and

District crimes, in both the federal and Superior courts)."

966 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The same is true for

files of the FBI and DEA which, like the U.S. Attorney's

Office, are components of the U.S. Department of Justice.

See id. (noting that Brady requires prosecutors to search FBI

records).

C

Next, we consider the government's appellate argument

that it did not breach a disclosure obligation with respect to

Jones' cooperation agreements because that information was

otherwise available through "reasonable pre-trial preparation

by the defense." Xydas v. United States, 445 F.2d 660, 668

(D.C. Cir. 1971). We note at the start that we find this

argument somewhat surprising. The government concedes

that it has not yet conducted a full Brady search of its own,

and hence does not know the details of any agreements Jones

may have had. See Oral Arg. Tr. at 22-24, 29-30, 38-39. In

particular, the government advises that it knows nothing of

his arrangements with the MPD other than that Jones was a

"paid special employee," Gov't Br. at 34 n.17; Oral Arg. Tr. at

29, and nothing at all of any arrangements he may have with

the FBI or DEA, Oral Arg. Tr. at 38-39. We do not

understand how the government can confidently assert that

defense counsel could have learned the contents of Jones'

agreements when the government concedes that it has no

idea what those contents are.

According to the U.S. Attorney, the first place the defendant should have turned for information about Jones' agreements was Jones himself. Jones, the government points out,

voluntarily contacted defense counsel and "was, for a time,

cooperative with the defense." Gov't Br. at 32. "Since

defense counsel had an opportunity to probe [Jones'] relationship with the government ... during their January ...

conversation [in the restaurant parking lot], appellant cannot

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now use Brady as a vehicle to get answers to questions left

unasked at that time." Id. at 33. Again, we find this

argument surprising. The government's position at trial was

that virtually everything Jones said to defense counsel at the

January meeting was a lie, a position the government maintains on appeal. Oral Arg. Tr. at 26-27. Surely information

obtained from a government-certified liar cannot substitute

for information obtained from the government itself--particularly not when the defense was seeking information from a

more trustworthy source in order to corroborate (or, as

became necessary, impeach) that individual.

Second, the government contends that if Doe wanted to

learn of Jones' agreements with the MPD, he should have

subpoenaed the involved officers themselves. Gov't Br. at 33.

This argument, too, is unpersuasive. As we have noted

above, "the prosecutor is responsible for 'any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf

in the case, including the police,' " Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at

1945 n.12 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437), and particularly

including the MPD, see Brooks, 966 F.2d at 1503. Accordingly, defense counsel was no more required to subpoena the

officers to learn of their agreements, than she was to subpoena the prosecutor to learn of hers. The appropriate way for

defense counsel to obtain such information was to make a

Brady request of the prosecutor, just as she did. See United

States v. Iverson, 648 F.2d 737, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding

that "the primary obligation for the disclosure of matters

which are essentially in the prosecutorial domain lies with the

government"). Indeed, at oral argument the government

agreed that had Jones been a government witness, it would

readily have produced his cooperation agreements without

insisting on a subpoena, Oral Arg. Tr. at 32-33, just as Giglio

and Bagley contemplate. Since Jones' status as a defense

witness is irrelevant here, there is no reason to require any

other procedure.

D

Finally, the government argues that Doe was not prejudiced by any nondisclosure that may have occurred because

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Doe's attorney failed to impeach Jones with the information

she did have in her possession. When Jones denied under

oath that he had ever informed on anyone else, Def. App.,

Tab E at 53 ("I haven't told on anybody"), counsel could have

contradicted him with the sworn affidavit attached to the

search warrant application, Def. App. 12 ("The source has

given information which has led to the arrests of several

subjects"). She might also have tried to use a representation

made by Jones' attorney at the bench almost immediately

after Jones made his denial. Id., Tab E at 61 (advising the

court that there "was a stipulation of [Jones'] probation to

assist the police on the street"). Defense counsel did not

attempt to use either one.

There is no doubt that this argument is relevant to the

ultimate question of the materiality of the undisclosed evidence, that is, whether there was "a reasonable probability

that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the

result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1948 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). But

an evaluation of the significance of the evidence that was

available to the defense cannot begin until the government

determines whether there was any evidence that was unavailable. If the information the government finds about Jones'

agreements is the equivalent of that which the defense already had, then it may well not be material for Brady

purposes. See Iverson, 648 F.2d at 738 ("[N]o violation of

due process results from prosecutorial nondisclosure if defense counsel both knows of the information and is able to

make use of it but still chooses, for tactical reasons, not to do

so.").

On the other hand, the evidence that was available to Doe

only indicated that Jones had cooperated with the government, and perhaps that he had an agreement to do so. It did

not disclose, at least not explicitly, the terms of any such

agreement and whether they gave Jones a motive to plant the

guns in Doe's house. The latter would not have been the

equivalent of what the defense already knew and, depending

on the other facts in the case, may or may not have been

material for Brady purposes. See United States v. Smith, 77

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F.3d 511, 512-13 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that although

aspects of witness' plea agreement were known to defense,

undisclosed elements were material to defendant's ability to

impeach); Cuffie, 80 F.3d at 517-18 ("[T]he fact that other

impeachment evidence was available to defense counsel does

not [necessarily] render additional impeachment evidence immaterial.") (internal quotations and citations omitted). Needless to say, until we know whether such information exists, we

are unable to determine whether it would have been material.

See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57 ("At this stage, of

course, it is impossible to say whether any information in the

... records may be relevant to [defendant's] claim of innocence, because neither the prosecution nor defense counsel

has seen the information....").

III

The government concedes that it never conducted a fullfledged Brady search with respect to any agreements its

various components may have had with Jones. See Oral Arg.

Tr. at 23-24, 29-30, 38-39. For the reasons stated above,

that failure constituted a breach of the government's "duty to

search" for Brady information. Brooks, 996 F.2d at 1502-03.

In their arguments before this court, both the government

and the defendant agreed that were we to find such a breach

of the obligation to search, the proper disposition would be to

remand this case to the district court, "to conduct a further

evidentiary hearing to resolve whether there exists any Brady information and whether such information was material."

Gov't Br. at 18 n.11; see Def. Br. at 20.

This is the course we have followed in other cases, see

Brooks, 966 F.2d at 1504-05; United States v. Lloyd, 992

F.2d at 352, and the course we follow here as well. "On

remand, the district court should require the U.S. Attorney's

[O]ffice to do what it should have done earlier," 966 F.2d at

1504, namely, to review information held by that office, as

well as the MPD and other relevant law enforcement agencies, to determine whether the government has or had any

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agreements with its informant of the kind discussed in this

opinion. If the government finds that such agreements exist,

the district court must then determine whether there is "a

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed

to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different." Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1948 (quoting Bagley, 473

U.S. at 682).

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