Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-57231/USCOURTS-ca9-11-57231-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jerry Brown
Appellee
John A. Clarke
Appellee
County of Los Angeles
Appellee
Kamala Harris
Appellee
Andrea Sheridan Ordin
Appellee
Nina Ringgold
Appellant
Justin Ringgold-Lockhart
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUSTIN RINGGOLD-LOCKHART; NINA

RINGGOLD,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; ANDREA

SHERIDAN ORDIN, erroneously sued

as Andrea Sheridan Orin, in her

Official Capacity as County

Counsel; JERRY BROWN, in his

Official Capacity as Governor of the

State of California; KAMALA

HARRIS, in her Official Capacity as

Attorney General of the State of

California; JOHN A. CLARKE, in his

Official and Administrative Capacity

as Executive Officer of the Superior

Court of the County of Los Angeles,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11-57231

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-01725-

R-PLA

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 2, 2013—Pasadena, California

 Case: 11-57231, 08/04/2014, ID: 9191583, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 1 of 19
2 RINGGOLD-LOCKHART V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Filed August 4, 2014

Before: Harry Pregerson, Marsha S. Berzon,

and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Berzon

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel vacated the district court’s order declaring

plaintiffs, attorney Nina Ringgold and her son Justin

Ringgold-Lockart, vexatious litigants and imposing a prefiling order, and remanded for further proceedings. 

The panel held that in light of the constitutional concerns

such pre-filing orders implicate, the district court erred by

relying in large part on Nina Ringgold’s motions practice

over the course of just two federal lawsuits, without

considering less restrictive sanctions. The district court also

erred by holding Nina Ringgold’s state litigation against

Justin Ringgold-Lockhart, without a record indicating that he

participated in that litigation. Finally, the panel held that

there was an insufficiently close fit between the terms of the

injunction and the problem it purported to address. 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 11-57231, 08/04/2014, ID: 9191583, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 2 of 19
RINGGOLD-LOCKHART V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 3

COUNSEL

Nina Ringgold (argued), Law Offices of Nina R. Ringgold,

Northridge, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Marc Jesse Wodin (argued), Law Offices of Marc J. Wodin,

Calabasas, California, for Defendants-Appellees County of

Los Angeles and Andrea Sheridan Ordin.

David Adida (argued), DeputyState AttorneyGeneral, Office

of the California Attorney General, Los Angeles, California,

for Defendants-Appellees Jerry Brown and Kamala Harris.

Kevin Michael McCormick (argued), Benton, Orr, Duval &

Buckingham, Ventura, California, for Defendant-Appellee

John A. Clarke.

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

This appeal requires us to consider the limits of a federal

court’s authority to impose pre-filing restrictions against socalled vexatious litigants. The case arises from one of many

episodes in a legal saga involving Nina Ringgold and the Los

Angeles Probate Court. Ringgold brought a federal lawsuit

challenging the Probate Court’s authority to remove her as a

trustee of the Aubry Family Trust. The district court

dismissed the suit in a series of rulings, culminating in an

order declaring Ringgold and co-plaintiff, Justin RinggoldLockhart, vexatious litigants. Ringgold and RinggoldLockhart appeal the vexatious litigant order. We reverse.

 Case: 11-57231, 08/04/2014, ID: 9191583, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 3 of 19
4 RINGGOLD-LOCKHART V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I.

Ringgold, an attorney, is a former trustee of the Aubry

Family Trust (“the Trust”). According to her complaint, the

Trust was established after the Aubry family was excluded

from purchasing a home in a white Los Angeles

neighborhood by race-based restrictive covenants. The

Trust’s purpose was to benefit and empower the AfricanAmerican community of South Central Los Angeles by

providing for future generations. After Robert Aubry died in

2002, Ringgold and another individual became trustees. For

reasons not entirely clear, the Los Angeles Probate Court in

2005 removed Ringgold and replaced her with a new trustee,

Myer Sankary. See Sankary v. Ringgold, No. B210169, 2009

WL 386969, *3 (Cal. App. Feb. 18, 2009). Ringgold alleges

that Sankary has since liquidated the trust and abused his

position.

Ringgold challenged her removal in state court, lost, and

was declared a vexatious litigant by the state courts. See id. 

She then filed suit in federal court. Ringgold-Lockhart —

Ringgold’s son and an alleged beneficiary of the Aubry

Family Trust — joined her suit as a named plaintiff.

After dismissing Ringgold and Ringgold-Lockhart’s

(together, “the Ringgolds”) claims, the district court issued an

order on December 6, 2011 declaring the Ringgolds vexatious

litigants and imposing a pre-filing condition. The court noted

that it warned the Ringgolds that they were at risk of being

declared vexatious litigants on September 19, 2011 and that

on November 7, 2011, it entered a tentative ruling deeming

them vexatious. The court described the scope of the order as

follows:

 Case: 11-57231, 08/04/2014, ID: 9191583, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 4 of 19
RINGGOLD-LOCKHART V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 5

Plaintiffs will need permission from this

Court prior to filing any action that relates to

the Aubry Revocable Family Trust or the

administration of state courts or probate

courts. The Court will approve all filings that

it deems to be meritorious, not duplicative,

and not frivolous.

The Court notes that Plaintiff Nina Ringgold

is subject to the order in her capacity as an

individual, not as an attorney. This distinction

is made in order to comply with the holding of

Weissman v. Quail Lodge Inc., 179 F.3d 1194

(9th Cir. 1999), which declared that attorneys

could not be sanctioned as vexatious litigants,

because they are merely appearing on behalf

of a client. Plaintiff Nina Ringgold will be

able to continue her law practice as she sees

fit, but she will be unable to raise her own

claims or the claims of her son, Justin

Lockhart-Ringgold [sic]to the extent that they

relate to the AubryRevocable Family Trust or

the administration of state courts or probate

courts.

The court appended a listing of the Ringgolds’ filings in the

instant case and in an earlier federal case, Ringgold-Lockhart

v. Sankary, No. 09-cv-9215 (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 15, 2009),

that, in its view, supported the order.

II.

Federal courts can “regulate the activities of abusive

litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions under . . .

 Case: 11-57231, 08/04/2014, ID: 9191583, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 5 of 19
6 RINGGOLD-LOCKHART V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

appropriate circumstances.” De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d

1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1990) (quotation marks omitted). 

Pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a),

“enjoining litigants with abusive and lengthy [litigation]

histories is one such . . . restriction” that courts may impose.1

De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147.

Restricting access to the courts is, however, a serious

matter. “[T]he right of access to the courts is a fundamental

right protected by the Constitution.” Delew v. Wagner,

143 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998). The First Amendment

“right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a

redress of grievances,” which secures the right to access the

courts, has been termed “one of the most precious of the

liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.” BE & K Const.

Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 524–25 (2002) (internal quotation

marks omitted, alteration in original); see also Christopher v.

Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12 (2002) (noting that the

Supreme Court has located the court access right in the

Privileges and Immunities clause, the First Amendment

petition clause, the Fifth Amendment due process clause, and

the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause).

Profligate use of pre-filing orders could infringe this

important right, Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d

1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam), as the pre-clearance

1 The district court cited and relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) as the source

ofits authority to issue the pre-filing order. While the district court’s local

rules permit courts, “at [their] discretion,” to “proceed by reference to the

Vexatious Litigants statute of the State of California, Cal. Code Civ. Proc.

§§ 391–391.7,” they do not “require that such a procedure be followed[.]” 

C.D. Cal. Local Rule 83–8.4. Because the district court did not “proceed

by reference to” the California Vexatious Litigant statute, we do not

consider it, or Local Rule 83–8.4, here.

 Case: 11-57231, 08/04/2014, ID: 9191583, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 6 of 19
RINGGOLD-LOCKHART V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 7

requirement imposes a substantial burden on the free-access

guarantee. “Among all other citizens, [the vexatious litigant]

is to be restricted in his right of access to the courts. . . . We

cannot predict what harm might come to him as a result, and

he should not be forced to predict it either. What he does

know is that a Sword of Damocles hangs over his hopes for

federal access for the foreseeable future.” Moy v. United

States, 906 F.2d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1990).

Out of regard for the constitutional underpinnings of the

right to court access, “pre-filing orders should rarely be

filed,” and only if courts comply with certain procedural and

substantive requirements. De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147. When

district courts seek to impose pre-filing restrictions, they

must: (1) give litigants notice and “an opportunity to oppose

the order before it [is] entered”; (2) compile an adequate

record for appellate review, including “a listing of all the

cases and motions that led the district court to conclude that

a vexatious litigant order was needed”; (3) make substantive

findings of frivolousness or harassment; and (4) tailor the

order narrowly so as “to closely fit the specific vice

encountered.” Id. at 1147–48.

The first and second of these requirements are procedural,

while the “latter two factors . . . are substantive

considerations . . . [that] help the district court define who is,

in fact, a ‘vexatious litigant’ and construct a remedy that will

stop the litigant’s abusive behavior while not unduly

infringing the litigant’s right to access the courts.” Molski,

500 F.3d at 1058. In “applying the two substantive factors,”

we have held that a separate set of considerations employed

by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals “provides a helpful

framework.” Id. The Second Circuit considers the following

five substantive factors to determine “whether a party is a

 Case: 11-57231, 08/04/2014, ID: 9191583, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 7 of 19
8 RINGGOLD-LOCKHART V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

vexatious litigant and whether a pre-filing order will stop the

vexatious litigation or if other sanctions are adequate”:

(1) the litigant’s history of litigation and in

particular whether it entailed vexatious,

harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the

litigant’s motive in pursuing the litigation,

e.g., does the litigant have an objective good

faith expectation of prevailing?; (3) whether

the litigant is represented by counsel;

(4) whether the litigant has caused needless

expense to other parties or has posed an

unnecessary burden on the courts and their

personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions

would be adequate to protect the courts and

other parties.

Id. (quoting Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir.

1986)). The final consideration — whether other remedies

“would be adequate to protect the courts and other parties” is

particularly important. See Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am.,

Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 818 (4th Cir. 2004). In light of the

seriousness of restricting litigants’ access to the courts, prefiling orders should be a remedy of last resort.

We review the district court’s compliance with these

procedural and substantive standards for an abuse of

discretion.2 Molski, 500 F.3d at 1056.

2 The Ringgolds’ contention that filing a notice of appeal divested the

district court of jurisdiction to issue the vexatious litigant order is without

merit. “A district court retains jurisdiction to enforce the judgments it

enters,” including through issuance of vexatious litigant orders. Wood v.

 Case: 11-57231, 08/04/2014, ID: 9191583, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 8 of 19
RINGGOLD-LOCKHART V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 9

A. Notice and Opportunity To Be Heard

The district court entered a tentative ruling declaring the

Ringgolds vexatious litigants on November 7, 2011. At that

time, the district court notified the Ringgolds that it was

considering “all of the complaints and motions filed in this

court, as well as the various appeals and writs of certiorari,”

and “a number of state court decisions that ultimately led to

Plaintiff Ringgold being declared a vexatious litigant.” Its

tentative order gave the Ringgolds two weeks to argue against

a final order and set the matter for a hearing.

TheRinggolds filed a brief opposing the vexatious litigant

designation and attached declarations from both Ringgold and

Ringgold-Lockhart. The court heard oral argument from the

SantaBarbaraChamber ofCommerce, Inc., 705 F.2d 1515, 1524 (9thCir.

1983).

We have jurisdiction over the Ringgolds’ appeal ofthe district court’s

order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Molski, 500 F.3d at 1054. We may

exercise this jurisdiction even absent an indication that the Ringgolds have

already been denied access to the court because of the district court’s

order. De Long, 912 F.2d at 1146 n.2; Moy, 906 F.2d at 470. Relying on

Molski, 500 F.3d at 1056, the Ringgolds maintain that we may not

consider the arguments given or briefs filed by appellees who were not

parties to the vexatious litigant order, which was entered sua sponte by the

district court. In Molski, however, we dismissed appellees on their own

motion, because those particular appellees had no interest in litigating the

vexatious litigant order, as evidenced by their motion seeking to be

dismissed from the appeal. Id. Here, although it was the district court that

initiated the vexatious litigant order at issue, there is a substantial

likelihood that the Ringgolds will name these appellees in future lawsuits. 

Appellees therefore have “a cognizable interest in the outcome of” this

appeal; there is no cause to dismiss them from this appeal, and we may

consider their arguments. Id. (quoting H.C. v. Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 612

(9th Cir. 2000)).

 Case: 11-57231, 08/04/2014, ID: 9191583, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 9 of 19
10 RINGGOLD-LOCKHART V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Ringgolds before it entered the vexatious litigant order. In

sum, the district court provided proper notice and an

opportunity to be heard, in accordance with our case law’s

first procedural requirement and due process. See Molski,

500 F.3d at 1058.

B. Adequate Record for Review

“An adequate record for review should include a listing

of all the cases and motions that led the district court to

conclude that a vexatious litigant order was needed.” De

Long, 912 F.2d at 1147. In Molski, we held that a district

court compiled a proper record for review where “[t]he record

before the district court contained a complete list of the cases

filed by Molski in the Central District of California, along

with the complaints from many of those cases,” and where

“[a]lthough the district court’s decision entering the pre-filing

order did not list every case filed by Molski, it did outline and

discuss many of them.” 500 F.3d at 1059.

We conclude that the district court compiled an adequate

record to permit us to review the basis of its order. The

district court discussed and explained the litigation history

leading to its order, and appended a list of twenty-one district

court filings, including motions, that it viewed as supporting

its order. In the body of the order, the court cited the

Ringgolds’ prior federal suit, which “featured a 110-page first

amend[ed] complaintwith sixteen causes of action and named

at least twelve defendants, including a number of officials

with the County of Los Angeles, the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County and various judges.” The court also cited the

present case, which “featured a 31-page complaint with

eleven causes of action and . . . named the County of Los

Angeles, as well as other county and state officials, including

 Case: 11-57231, 08/04/2014, ID: 9191583, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 10 of 19
RINGGOLD-LOCKHART V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 11

Governor Jerry Brown and Secretary of State Kamala

Harris.”

In addition, the district court (1) noted the Ringgolds’

state court litigation, which it described as “even more

extensive—and frivolous;” and (2) cited to the California

Court of Appeal’s decision in Sankary, 2009 WL 386969,

which held Ringgold was a vexatious litigant pursuant to

California Code of Civil Procedure section 391(b)(3) and

imposed a pre-filing restriction against her. Sankary outlined

Ringgold’s history of fighting her removal as trustee through

state court litigation.32009 WL 386969 at *3. The

California Court of Appeal explained that it held Ringgold

vexatious because she “repeatedly filed meritless papers [in

that court] and in the probate court which frivolously assert

she need not obey an order [to turn over documents belonging

to the Trust] which has caused unnecessary delay and

expense.” Id. at *2.

Together, the list of federal cases, allegedly baseless

motions, and the district court’s reference to the California

Court of Appeal’s reasoned decision in the Sankary case,

provide an adequate record for this Court to review the merits

of the district court’s order. We therefore conclude that the

order comports with the procedural requirements outlined in

De Long. As will be explained, it is the substance of the

court’s injunction and its breadth that concern us.

 

3 The California Court of Appeal cited fourteen state appellate matters

that were initiated by Ringgold and decided adversely to her. Sankary,

2009 WL 386969 at *1. However, not all of the state appellate cases cited

appear to relate to the instant litigation. For instance, one of the cases

cited is titled In re Marriage of Lockhart and relates to divorce

proceedings. Id.

 Case: 11-57231, 08/04/2014, ID: 9191583, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 11 of 19
12 RINGGOLD-LOCKHART V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

C. Substantive Findings of Frivolousness or Harassment

“[B]efore a district court issues a pre-filing injunction . . .

it is incumbent on the court to make ‘substantive findings as

to the frivolous or harassing nature of the litigant’s actions.’” 

De Long, 912 F.2d at 1148 (quoting In re Powell, 851 F.2d

427, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). To determine

whether the litigation is frivolous, district courts must “look

at ‘both the number and content of the filings as indicia’ of

the frivolousness of the litigant’s claims.” Id.(quoting same). 

While we have not established a numerical definition for

frivolousness, we have said that “even if [a litigant’s] petition

is frivolous, the court [must] make a finding that the number

of complaints was inordinate.” Id. Litigiousness alone is not

enough, either: “‘The plaintiff’s claims must not only be

numerous, but also be patently without merit.’” Molski,

500 F.3d at 1059 (quoting Moy, 906 F.2d at 470).

As an alternative to frivolousness, the district court may

make an alternative finding that the litigant’s filings “show a

pattern of harassment.” De Long, 912 F.3d at 1148. 

However, courts must “be careful not to conclude that

particular types of actions filed repetitiously are harassing,”

and must “[i]nstead . . . ‘discern whether the filing of several

similar types of actions constitutes an intent to harass the

defendant or the court.’” Id. at 1148 n.3 (quoting Powell,

851 F.2d at 431).

Finally, courts should consider whether other, less

restrictive options, are adequate to protect the court and

parties. See Molski, 500 F.3d at 1058; Cromer, 390 F.3d at

818; Safir, 792 F.2d at 24.

 Case: 11-57231, 08/04/2014, ID: 9191583, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 12 of 19
RINGGOLD-LOCKHART V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 13

Here, the district court found the Ringgolds vexatious

primarily on the basis of the current case and an earlier

federal case. As an initial matter, two cases is far fewer than

what other courts have found “inordinate.” See, e.g., Molski,

500 F.3d at 1060 (roughly 400 similar cases); Wood v. Santa

Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 705 F.2d 1515, 1523,

1526 (9th Cir. 1983) (thirty-five actions filed in 30

jurisdictions); In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 444 (3d Cir. 1982)

(more than fifty frivolous cases); In re Green, 669 F.2d 779,

781 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (between 600 and 700

complaints).

The district court also cites the Ringgolds’ motions

practice, taking issue with their “numerous motions to vacate

prior decisions or relief from judgment.” But examination of

the court’s list of “baseless motions” reveals that this

description is not entirely accurate. For example, the district

court granted one of the motions. A successful motion is

neither “baseless” nor “frivolous.” The list also includes

motions, accompanied by medical records, that Ringgold

filed requesting a medical accommodation in the briefing

schedule — also not frivolous. And the list includes a joint

motion to stipulate to a change in the briefing schedule. 

Again, not frivolous.

Most troubling, the district court’s list includes the

Ringgolds’ response to its tentative order finding them

vexatious. As explained, the Ringgolds had a due process

right to be heard on this matter. The district court faults the

Ringgolds for “reiterating old facts and arguments” in their

response to the court order. As the Ringgolds had to argue

that their filings were not frivolous, such repetition was

inevitable. What’s more, the district court invited their

 Case: 11-57231, 08/04/2014, ID: 9191583, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 13 of 19
14 RINGGOLD-LOCKHART V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

response, so it is particularly inappropriate to hold it against

them.

Whether a litigant’s motions practice in two cases could

ever be so vexatious as to justify imposing a pre-filing order

against a person, we do not now decide. Such a situation

would at least be extremely unusual, in light of the alternative

remedies available to district judges to control a litigant’s

behavior in individual cases.

The district court, however, failed to consider whether

other remedies were adequate to curb what it viewed as the

Ringgolds’ frivolous motions practice. The Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure provide courts with a means to address

frivolous or abusive filings: Rule 11 sanctions. Indeed, “Rule

11’s express goal is deterrence.” Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d

1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1994). “[W]hen there is . . . conduct in

the course of litigation that could be adequately sanctioned

under the Rules, the court ordinarily should rely on the Rules

rather than the inherent power.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,

501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory

committee’s note to 1993 Amendments, subdivision (d). 

Similar to the limitation courts have imposed on vexatious

litigant orders, Rule 11 requires that “[a] sanction imposed

under this rule must be limited to what suffices to deter

repetition of the conduct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). Rule 11

provides a list of sanctions of varying severity that courts

may, in their discretion, impose: “nonmonetary directives; an

order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion

and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing

payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable

attorney’s fees and other expenses directly resulting from the

violation.” Id. Before entering this broad pre-filing order,

applicable to other cases than this one, the district court

 Case: 11-57231, 08/04/2014, ID: 9191583, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 14 of 19
RINGGOLD-LOCKHART V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 15

assuredlyshould have considered whetherimposingsanctions

such as costs or fees on the Ringgolds would have been an

adequate deterrent. See Cromer, 390 F.3d at 818.

The district court also considered Ringgold’s pattern of

state court litigation. It was entitled to do so, as district

courts enjoin future litigation out of concern for the affected

parties, as well as out of concern for the courts themselves. 

And a pattern of frivolous or abusive litigation in different

jurisdictions undeterred by adverse judgments may inform a

court’s decision that an injunction is necessary.

There is, however, no indication that Ringgold-Lockhart

was a party to the state court litigation, so the state court

litigation does not support finding him vexatious and

imposing a pre-filing restriction against him. Aside from the

district court’s failure to consider alternative sanctions before

issuing this injunction, it was also error to issue an order

against Ringgold-Lockhart on the basis of state litigation in

which he played no part.

D. Narrow Tailoring

Finally, pre-filing orders “must be narrowlytailored to the

vexatious litigant’s wrongful behavior.” Molski, 500 F.3d at

1061. In Molski, we approved the scope of an order because

it prevented the plaintiff from filing “only the type of claims

Molski had been filing vexatiously,” and “because it will not

deny Molski access to courts on any . . . claim that is not

frivolous.” Id.

Here, the scope of the order is too broad in several

respects.

 Case: 11-57231, 08/04/2014, ID: 9191583, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 15 of 19
16 RINGGOLD-LOCKHART V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

First, it provides that the court “will approve all filings

that it deems to be meritorious, not duplicative, and not

frivolous.” The screening order should have stopped at “not

duplicative, and not frivolous.”

By providing that the court will not allow a new action to

be initiated unless the court deems the action “meritorious,”

the district court added a screening criteria that is not

narrowly tailored to the problem before it, and is in fact

unworkable. It is one thing for courts at an early stage of

litigation to filter out frivolous suits. Courts routinely

perform this task, as the Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit

frivolous filings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). But courts

cannot properly say whether a suit is “meritorious” from

pleadings alone. A lawsuit need not be meritorious to

proceed past the motion-to-dismiss stage; to the contrary, “a

well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy

judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that

recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (internal quotation marks

omitted). And even as to the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6)

dismissal, whether a case merits dismissal for failure to state

a claim is often determinable only after briefing and

argument; it is often not a decision accurately to be made at

a pre-filing stage. Because this pre-filing order requires that

only “meritorious” cases survive the court’s screening, the

order is not narrowly tailored to address the concern that the

Ringgolds will continue to pursue frivolous litigation.

Second, the pre-filing restriction extends to “any action

that relates to the Aubry Revocable Family Trust or the

administration of state courts or probate courts.” The part of

this order that bars the Ringgolds from litigating any action 

“relat[ing] to . . . the administration of state courts or probate

 Case: 11-57231, 08/04/2014, ID: 9191583, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 16 of 19
RINGGOLD-LOCKHART V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 17

courts” is expansive. The district court has not shown that

this breadth is justified.

In the underlying case, the Ringgolds challenged the

remuneration structure of California state courts. But the prefiling order goes well beyond remuneration issues; it covers

all administrative matters regarding all state courts. 

Moreover, “administration” is an indefinite term open to

broad interpretation, both by the district court and,

prophylactically, by the Ringgolds. This overbreadth

presents “the danger” that it “will leave [litigants] uncertain

as to what [they] may or may not do without” running afoul

of the court’s order, Wood, 705 F.2d at 1525, unduly chilling

their right to free access to the courts.

This portion of the order could also extend to factual

scenarios entirely unrelated to the dispute relating to the

Trust. Yet, the district court cites the Trust dispute as the root

of the problem with the Ringgolds’ litigation, characterizing

the litigation as “essentially no more than an attempt to

challenge the determination to remove Plaintiff Ringgold as

temporary trustee of the Aubry Family Trust.”

Sometimes a rancorous dispute leaves a person with a

bitter taste that does not fade, no matter how many resources

are expended and no matter how many years pass. From our

review of the case law discussing vexatious litigants, it is not

uncommon for district courts to enjoin litigants from

relitigating a particular case, such as when a litigant refuses

to accept the finality of an adverse judgment. See, e.g., Safir,

792 F.2d at 25; Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 775 F.2d

1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 1985); Wood, 705 F.2d at 1525. But in

such cases, courts generally tailor the scope of a litigation

restriction so as to restrain litigants from “reopen[ing]

 Case: 11-57231, 08/04/2014, ID: 9191583, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 17 of 19
18 RINGGOLD-LOCKHART V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

litigation based on the facts and issues decided in” previous

lawsuits. Wood, 705 F.2d at 1526; see Safir, 792 F.2d at 25;

Cook, 775 F.2d at 1033. The underlying litigation here

attempts to reopen a case that has reached final judgment. “A

narrowly tailored injunction . . . would address only filings in

that or related actions.” Cromer, 390 F.3d at 819.

In sum, we see no reason why the district court could not

have accomplished its goal of stemming the tide of the

Ringgolds’ litigation relating to the Aubry Family Trust

without also enjoining the Ringgolds from bringing suits

“relat[ing] to . . . the administration of state courts or probate

courts.” We therefore conclude that the injunction is

overbroad.

III.

We acknowledge that this case presents a host of

challenges to courts and defendants alike. The pleadings are

as far as can be from a model of clarity; there is duplication

of state litigation that was itself extensive, and there is a

multiplicity of claims. At some point, a federal pre-filing

injunction may well be needed to protect judicial resources

and the defendants from litigation related to this case. But

the district court relied in large part on the Ringgolds’

motions practice over the course of just two federal lawsuits,

without considering less restrictive sanctions. In light of the

constitutional concerns such pre-filing orders implicate, we

hold this was error. The district court also erred by holding

Ringgold’s state litigation against Ringgold-Lockhart,

without a record indicating that he participated in that

litigation. Finally, there is an insufficiently close fit between

the terms of the injunction and the problem it purports to

address. For these reasons, we vacate the pre-filing order and

 Case: 11-57231, 08/04/2014, ID: 9191583, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 18 of 19
RINGGOLD-LOCKHART V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 19

remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this

opinion.

VACATED and REMANDED.

 Case: 11-57231, 08/04/2014, ID: 9191583, DktEntry: 43-1, Page 19 of 19