Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00034/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00034-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donahue Schriber Realty Group, LP
Defendant
Michael McCune
Plaintiff
Party City Corporation
Defendant

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MICHAEL McCUNE 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

PARTY CITY CORPORATION, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-00034-KJM-EFB 

ORDER 

The central issue in this action is whether the Roseville Center’s parking facilities 

constitute a single common parking lot serving all of the buildings in the shopping center or 

twelve distinct parking lots each serving only its own building for purposes of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (the “ADA”). Before the court is defendant Donahue 

Schriber Realty Group, LP’s (“Donahue Schriber”) motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 26. 

Plaintiff Michael McCune opposed the motion, ECF No. 27, and defendant replied, ECF No. 29. 

In response to plaintiff’s objection, the court allowed plaintiff to file a 

supplemental brief to challenge the new evidence submitted with defendant’s reply, ECF No. 40, 

and allowed defendant to file a sur-reply, ECF No. 43. McCune’s objections are otherwise 

overruled. The original Operation and Easement Agreement (“OEA”) and Amended OEA for the 

Case 2:14-cv-00034-KJM-EFB Document 46 Filed 03/17/16 Page 1 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

Roseville Center are readily available through public records searches, and plaintiff has not 

shown any prejudice from the court’s consideration of the evidence. 

The court submitted the motion as provided by Local Rule 230(g). The court now 

GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding the center’s parking facilities 

constitute a single common parking lot not dedicated to any particular building or parcel of land. 

I. UNDISPUTED FACTS 

The Roseville Center is a retail shopping center facility located at 1917 Douglas 

Blvd., Roseville, California. Harjer Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 26-3. It was originally constructed in 

1991 and consists of twelve parcels of land. See id. ¶ 3; Pl.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 27-3. The Party 

City parcel at issue is owned by defendant Donahue Schriber and operated by tenants Party City 

and Petco. See Harjer Decl. ¶¶ 2, 4; Finnerty Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 26-2 (“Finnerty Decl. I”). 

McCune, a C5-C6 quadriplegic,1

 is unable to walk or stand, and requires the use of 

an electronic wheelchair when traveling in public. Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 1. He filed the 

complaint on January 7, 2014, alleging he encountered ten architectural barriers when he visited 

Party City, and asserting claims for violations of the ADA, the California Disabled Persons Act, 

the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, and California Health & Safety Code § 19955(a). ECF 

No. 1. Eight of the ten alleged architectural barriers were located within the interior of the Party 

City store. Finnerty Decl. I ¶ 3. On March 17, 2014, defendant Party City settled with plaintiff 

and was dismissed from this action. See id.; see also ECF Nos. 7, 9. Only two of the 

architectural barriers identified in the complaint relate to the remaining defendant Donahue 

Schriber: namely, McCune alleges there were no accessible parking spaces at the Party City store, 

and one of the parking spaces designated as being accessible lacked an international symbol of 

accessibility. See Finnerty Decl. I ¶ 4. It is now undisputed the parking space McCune alleges 

lacked an international symbol of accessibility was previously decommissioned as an accessible 

parking space, and has not been designated as accessible at any time during at least the two years 

 1

 A quadriplegic is a person affected with paralysis of all four limbs. Merriam-Webster 

Dictionary (online ed. 2015), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/quadriplegic. “C5” 

and “C6” refer to the injured vertebrae in the cervical spine. 

Case 2:14-cv-00034-KJM-EFB Document 46 Filed 03/17/16 Page 2 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

prior to McCune’s filing of the complaint in this action. See Pl.’s Response to Statement of 

Undisputed Facts no. 6, ECF No. 27-1 (“Pl.’s SUF”); Harjer Decl. ¶ 5; Finnerty Decl. I ¶ 2. 

It is also undisputed the Party City parcel does not provide any accessible parking 

spaces. Every land parcel at the Roseville Center except the Party City parcel provides accessible 

parking spaces, including neighboring parcels. See Pl.’s SUF no. 11. Accessible spaces are 

provided at the entrances to Raley’s and Target, and the entrance to Styles for Less, which is 

approximately equidistant between Raley’s and Target, see id. Donahue Schriber has provided a 

diagram that illustrates the shopping center’s layout and the relationship of stores to each other: 

Donahue Schriber Diagram of Center, Harjer Decl., Ex. 1, ECF No. 26-3 (rotated horizontally) 

(from top left clockwise, labels identify: Raley’s, Petco, Party City, Leslie’s Swimming Pool 

Supplies, Weight Watchers, Styles for Less, Supercuts, Sprint, Payless, Target, Papa Murphy’s, 

Case 2:14-cv-00034-KJM-EFB Document 46 Filed 03/17/16 Page 3 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

FedEx Office, Jack in the Box, Chevy’s, Rubio’s, Big 5). An accessible pedestrian route runs 

directly adjacent to the northern storefronts at the Roseville Center, connecting the customer 

entrances to Raley’s, Party City, Styles for Less, and Target. See id.; Pl.’s SUF no. 11. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A court will grant summary judgment “if . . . there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

The “threshold inquiry” is whether “there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be 

resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either 

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the district court “that there 

is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, which “must establish 

that there is a genuine issue of material fact . . . .” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 (1986). In carrying their burdens, both parties must “cit[e] to particular 

parts of materials in the record . . .; or show [] that the materials cited do not establish the absence 

or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to 

support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (“[The 

nonmoving party] must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the 

material facts.”). Moreover, “the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material

fact . . . . Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 

law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48 

(emphasis in original). 

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court draws all inferences and 

views all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 

587–88; Whitman v. Mineta, 541 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 2008). “Where the record taken as a 

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine 

issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. 

Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). 

Case 2:14-cv-00034-KJM-EFB Document 46 Filed 03/17/16 Page 4 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

III. DISCUSSION 

As stated above, the two remaining alleged architectural barriers at issue are the 

lack of accessible parking spaces on the Party City parcel of land and the lack of an international 

symbol of accessibility on one of the designated parking spaces. The court addresses each 

alleged barrier in turn. 

A. Accessible Parking Spaces 

1. ADA Accessibility Guidelines 

The ADA was adopted to address discrimination against individuals with 

disabilities. Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports, 631 F.3d 939, 944–45 (9th Cir. 2011). Title III of the 

Act, which applies to places of public accommodation, requires owners, lessors or lessees of such 

facilities, if built or altered after 1993, to ensure that the facilities are “readily accessible to and 

usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12183(a)(2); Rush v. Kim, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2012). Here, defendant 

Donahue Schriber concedes plaintiff is disabled and the subject property is a place of public 

accommodation, but disputes whether the facilities are “readily accessible to and usable by 

individuals with disabilities.” “In general, a facility is ‘readily accessible to and usable by 

individuals with disabilities’ if it meets the requirements promulgated by the Attorney General in 

the ‘ADA Accessibility Guidelines’ or the ‘ADAAG,’ which is essentially an encyclopedia of 

design standards.” Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2011); Kohler v. 

Flava Enter., Inc., 826 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1226 (S.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d, 779 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 

2015). 

The Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) ADA Accessibility Guidelines must be 

consistent with the minimum guidelines and requirements issued by the Architectural and 

Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (the “Access Board”), a federal agency tasked with 

establishing the minimum guidelines for accessible public accommodations. Miller v. Cal. 

Speedway Corp., 536 F.3d 1020, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12186(c); 29 U.S.C. 

§ 792(b)). In 1991, the Access Board published its first ADA Accessibility Guidelines, and, after 

an opportunity for public comment and revision, the DOJ adopted and promulgated the guidelines 

Case 2:14-cv-00034-KJM-EFB Document 46 Filed 03/17/16 Page 5 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

verbatim (“1991 Standards”). 56 Fed. Reg. 35,408–01 (1991); Rush, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 1119. 

The Access Board revised the standards in 2004. Scherr v. Marriott Int’l, 703 F.3d 1069, 1076 

(7th Cir. 2013). In 2010, the DOJ adopted these updated standards as enforceable regulations 

(“2010 Standards”). Id. As of March 15, 2012, new construction or alterations must comply with 

the 2010 Standards. Id.; 28 C.F.R. § 36.406(a)(3). Before that date, a business owner in its 

discretion can choose to comply with either the 2010 Standards or the 1991 Standards. Kohler, 

826 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (citing Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public 

Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 56236, 56254–55 (Sept. 15, 2010) 

(to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36)). Defendant Donahue Schriber argues it has complied with 

both the 1991 Standards and the newer 2010 Standards. ECF No. 26-1 at 6. 

The 1991 Standards require parking lots to provide a certain minimum number of 

accessible parking spaces, calculated based on the total number of parking spaces in the lot. 28 

C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A § 4.1.2(5)(a). The 2010 Standards likewise require “parking facilities” to 

provide a certain minimum number of accessible parking spaces based on the total number of 

parking spaces in the “parking facility.” 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design (“2010 

Standards”) § 208.2. The advisory note to section 208.2 explains section 208.2 uses the term 

“parking facility” instead of “parking lot” “so that it is clear that both parking lots and parking 

structures are required to comply with this section.” 2010 Standards Advisory 208.2 Minimum 

Number. 

With respect to the location of the accessible parking spaces, the 1991 Standards 

provide: 

Accessible parking spaces serving a particular building shall be 

located on the shortest accessible route of travel from adjacent 

parking to an accessible entrance. In parking facilities that do not 

serve a particular building, accessible parking shall be located on 

the shortest accessible route of travel to an accessible pedestrian 

entrance of the parking facility . . . . 

28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A § 4.6.2 (emphases omitted). The 2010 Standards similarly provide: 

[Accessible parking spaces] that serve a particular building or 

facility shall be located on the shortest accessible route from 

parking to an [accessible entrance]. Where parking serves more 

Case 2:14-cv-00034-KJM-EFB Document 46 Filed 03/17/16 Page 6 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7

than one accessible entrance, [accessible parking spaces] shall be 

dispersed and located on the shortest accessible route to the 

accessible entrances. In parking facilities that do not serve a 

particular building or facility, [accessible parking spaces] shall be 

located on the shortest accessible route to an accessible pedestrian 

entrance of the parking facility. 

2010 Standards § 208.3.1 (emphases omitted). The 2010 Standards specify these requirements 

apply to “[p]arking facilities.” Id. § 208.3 (emphasis in original). 

2. Analysis 

The complaint alleges defendant violated the ADA by not offering accessible 

parking spaces “at the [Party City] Store.” Compl. ¶ 10. Defendant now moves for summary 

judgment, arguing plaintiff cannot prove defendant did not comply with the relevant ADA 

Standards governing accessible parking. 

In all statutory construction cases, the court “begin[s] with the language itself 

[and] the specific context in which that language is used.” McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 

816, 131 S. Ct. 2218, 2221 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the 2010 

Standards specify the parking requirements apply to “parking facilities” and calculate the 

minimum number of required accessible parking spaces based on the total number of parking 

spaces in the “parking facility.” 2010 Standards §§ 208.2, 208.3. Similarly, the 1991 Standards 

calculate the minimum number of required accessible parking spaces based on the total number of 

parking spaces in the “parking lot.” 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A § 4.1.2(5)(a). The 1991 and 2010 

Standards do not include an independent requirement that every building or parcel, let alone 

assessor’s parcel, provide accessible parking spaces. In addition, the Standards only require that 

the accessible spaces be located on the shortest accessible route to an accessible entrance to a 

particular building when the accessible parking spaces serve that particular building. Id. § 4.6.2; 

2010 Standards § 208.3.1. 

As a result, defendant must offer its own accessible parking spaces in front of 

Party City only if its parking spaces constitute a separate “parking facility” that serves only the 

Party City building. If, instead, defendant’s parking spaces are part of a larger, Roseville Center 

“parking facility” that serves all of the buildings at the center, defendant is not required to 

Case 2:14-cv-00034-KJM-EFB Document 46 Filed 03/17/16 Page 7 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8

independently offer accessible parking spaces for Party City. Consistent with this understanding, 

the parties jointly have presented the question before the court as whether the Roseville Center 

has a single common parking lot that serves multiple buildings, or whether each building at the 

center is served by its own smaller parking lot. If the center has a single shared parking lot, 

plaintiff has not argued the center as a whole does not comply with the standards for a shared 

parking facility, such as by not properly dispersing and locating the accessible parking spaces. 

See 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A §§ 4.1.2(5)(a), 4.6.2; 2010 Standards §§ 208.2, 208.3.1. 

To support its motion for summary judgment, Donahue Schriber has submitted a 

declaration from the property manager stating, “The Roseville Center is a private facility with one 

large parking lot that serves its many buildings. The parking facilities do not serve a particular 

building.” Harjer Decl. ¶ 6. Defendant also has submitted an aerial photograph of the center: 

Harjer Decl., Ex. 2, ECF No. 26-3 (rotated horizontally, with Raley’s, Party City, and Target 

oriented at the top of the image). 

Finally, Donahue Schriber submitted a copy of the Amended OEA for the 

Roseville Center. ECF No. 30-1. The original OEA was recorded on October 16, 1987. See id. 

at 2. That agreement was amended, restated and recorded on July 13, 1990. See id.; Finnerty 

Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 30 (“Finnerty Decl. II”). The Amended OEA defines the Common Areas as 

“all areas within the exterior boundaries of the Shopping Center” excluding interior and sales 

areas. Amended OEA, Section 1.2; see Amended OEA at 2 (defining “Shopping Center” as the 

Case 2:14-cv-00034-KJM-EFB Document 46 Filed 03/17/16 Page 8 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

9

parcels that make up the Roseville Center). Section 2.1 of the Amended OEA specifically created 

a “non-exclusive easement for the passage and parking of vehicles over and across the parking 

and driveway areas” of each parcel for ingress and egress for use by customers and others 

“insofar as their activities relate to the intended use of the Shopping Center.” Id. Section 2.1(a); 

id. Section 1.9 (defining “permittee”). The intended use of the Shopping Center is articulated in 

the eighth recital of the Amended OEA, as follows: 

WHEREAS, the signatories hereto intend to develop and 

operate their respective Tracts in conjunction with each other as 

integral parts of a retail shopping complex and in order to effectuate 

the common use and operation thereof, they desire to enter into 

certain covenants and agreements as a part of a general plan, and to 

grant to each other certain reciprocal easements, in, to, over and 

across their respective Tracts. 

Id. at 2. 

McCune has submitted a Placer County Assessor’s map to show that the Roseville 

Center consists of twelve parcels each with a distinct parking lot serving only its building: 

Pl.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 27-3 (showing Roseville Center on right side of map; plaintiff outlined the 

boundaries of the Party City parcel in red marker). The Placer County Assessor’s Office prepares 

Case 2:14-cv-00034-KJM-EFB Document 46 Filed 03/17/16 Page 9 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

10

parcel maps to assess the tax information of real property. See id. (note at bottom); What We Do, 

County of Placer, http://www.placer.ca.gov/departments/assessor/about-us/what-we-do (last 

visited Mar. 16, 2016). 

McCune has also submitted an image overlapping the property boundaries from 

the Assessor’s parcel map with an aerial photograph of the Center to show the boundaries of the 

twelve separate parking lots he argues exist: 

Pl.’s Ex. C (with plaintiff’s marking of the property boundaries showing as thin white lines on top 

of the image). 

Based on the evidence submitted, the court finds the parking spaces at the 

Roseville Center comprise one common parking facility serving multiple buildings for purposes 

of the ADA Standards. The Amended OEA specifically created an easement for parking on each 

parcel for use by all patrons, and established common areas “as integral parts of a retail shopping 

center . . . to effectuate the common use and operation thereof.” Amended OEA at 2. Plaintiff 

has not submitted evidence of any markers or physical barriers dividing the parking lot along the 

irregularly shaped parcel boundary lines, or any other evidence that the parcel owners in fact limit 

Case 2:14-cv-00034-KJM-EFB Document 46 Filed 03/17/16 Page 10 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

11

parking to their customers only. Each aerial photograph submitted by a party shows one large, 

continuous parking lot. Moreover, plaintiff has not identified any authority in the ADA 

regulations or case law defining the relevant parking facility as based on assessor parcels. 

Based on the record before the court, no reasonable juror could conclude each 

parcel at the Roseville Center has its own distinct parking lot serving only the building tied to that 

parcel. Summary judgment is GRANTED as to plaintiff’s ADA claim premised on a lack of 

accessible parking. 

B. International Symbol of Accessibility 

Section 4.6.4 of the 1991 Standards requires accessible parking spaces to be 

designated as reserved for persons with disabilities by a sign showing the symbol of accessibility. 

The 2010 Standards similarly mandate that accessible parking spaces be identified with the 

symbol of accessibility. 2010 Standards § 502.6. Plaintiff does not dispute that the parking space 

described in the complaint was decommissioned as an accessible space before he parked in it. 

Pl.’s SUF no. 6. Because the sign requirement only applies to accessible parking spaces, the 

decommissioned space was not required to be designated with the accessibility symbol. 

Summary judgment is GRANTED as to plaintiff’s ADA claim premised on a lack 

of an international symbol of accessibility. 

C. State Law Claims 

Defendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiff’s state law claims for 

violation of the California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54, 54.1, violation of the 

Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civil Code §§ 51, 51.5, and the Denial of Full and Equal Access to 

Public Facilities, Health & Safety Code §§ 19955, 19959, because they are predicated wholly on 

the same two alleged architectural barriers as plaintiff’s ADA claim. ECF No. 26-1 at 4, 6–7; 

Pl.’s SUF nos. 15 & 16; see Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 731 (9th Cir. 2007); Grove 

v. De La Cruz, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Plaintiff’s opposition does not 

respond to this argument or identify evidence apart from defendant’s alleged ADA violations. 

The court GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s state law claims. 

Case 2:14-cv-00034-KJM-EFB Document 46 Filed 03/17/16 Page 11 of 12
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

12

See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (requiring the nonmoving party to designate “specific facts showing 

that there is a genuine issue for trial” (citation omitted)). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment. 

Defendant requests the court order plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel to show cause 

why the court should not sanction them for failing to conduct a reasonable inquiry to verify 

whether their theory as to the parking lot configuration was well grounded in fact. See ECF 

No. 26-1 at 9; ECF No. 36 at 2; ECF No. 43 at 6 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11). Based on the record 

before the court, including defendant’s submission of the Amended OEA for the first time with 

the reply, the court declines to issue such an order at this time. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 17, 2016. 

Case 2:14-cv-00034-KJM-EFB Document 46 Filed 03/17/16 Page 12 of 12