Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-24-10242/USCOURTS-ca11-24-10242-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jarvis Hoskins
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-10242

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JARVIS HOSKINS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-00113-MLB-JSA-3

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-10242

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jarvis Hoskins appeals his 48-month sentence for conspiracy 

to commit bank larceny and to possess stolen bank funds. On appeal, Hoskins argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. After careful review, we affirm. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2022, Hoskins, Rodney Brooks, and Michael Hollins were 

charged with conspiracy to commit bank larceny and possess stolen bank funds, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (“Count One”), bank larceny, 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(b) & 2 (“Count Two”), and possession of stolen 

bank funds, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(c) & 2 (“Count Three”). In a plea 

agreement, Hoskins later agreed to plead guilty to Count One, and 

the government agreed to dismiss Counts Two and Three and recommend that Hoskins receive a sentence at the low end of the applicable guidelines range. 

Before sentencing, a probation officer prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSI”) detailing the following offense 

conduct. In March 2021, Hoskins, Hollins, and Brooks burglarized 

a Brink’s van in Sandy Springs, Georgia while the van’s driver was 

out of sight refilling an ATM at a bank. Surveillance video showed 

a GMC Terrain with a temporary paper license plate pull into the 

bank’s parking lot shortly after the Brink’s van arrived. The GMC 

backed up next to the Brink’s van. A passenger exited the GMC 

and used a device to shatter the front passenger window of the 

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Brink’s van. The man grabbed two bags containing $134,000 in 

cash, returned to the GMC, and drove away. 

Footage from traffic cameras and license plate readers

showed that a second vehicle, a Nissan Pathfinder, acted as a lookout during the burglary. Rental car records showed that Brooks 

rented the Pathfinder and that Hollins rented the GMC Terrain. 

Cell phone records for Hollins, Brooks, and Hoskins showed that 

their phones had been in the vicinity of the bank during the time of 

the burglary and that the men had been in contact with one another. Google provided account content for Brooks’ email account

which contained photographs from around the time of the incident, including street signs in the area, the rental vehicles, large 

amounts of cash and Brink’s packaging consistent with the sums

stolen, and images and receipts of luxury goods purchased after the 

theft.

The PSI also calculated an advisory guideline range for 

Hoskins. First, for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 371, it calculated 

a base offense level of six, U.S.S.G. §§ 2X1.1(a) & 2B1.1(a)(2). It 

then added eight levels because the offense caused a loss of 

$134,000, U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(E), and applied a two-level reduction because Hoskins had accepted responsibility, U.S.S.G. 

§ 3E1.1(a), yielding a total offense level of twelve. 

The PSI listed Hoskins’ lengthy criminal history which led 

to a total criminal history score of twenty-three and a criminal history category of VI. It reported six juvenile adjudications in 2000 

and 2001—two for theft, two for robbery, one for aggravated 

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assault with a deadly weapon, and one for marijuana possession—

as well as twenty adult criminal convictions, including nine related 

to theft, burglary, or identity fraud. Relevantly, in March 2007, 

Hoskins pleaded guilty to giving false identifying information to 

law enforcement while detained, and marijuana possession. In 

May 2007, he pleaded guilty to unlawful carrying of a handgun. In 

both August 2007 and February 2008, he pleaded guilty to driving 

with a suspended license. In August 2008, he pleaded guilty to theft 

and burglary, and he was sentenced to one- and three-years’ custody for those crimes, respectively. In May 2010, he pleaded guilty 

to theft and evading arrest with a vehicle for which he was sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment. In January 2011, he

pleaded guilty to marijuana possession. In September 2011, he 

pleaded guilty to two counts of theft and one count of possession 

of a firearm by a felon and was sentenced to three years’ custody.

Less than a month after his release, Hoskins was arrested for theft 

of a motor vehicle, pleaded guilty to that charge, and was sentenced to 180 days’ custody. In March 2015, he pleaded guilty to 

driving with a suspended license and possession of a window punch 

for burglarizing motor vehicles. In May 2018, he pleaded guilty to 

delivering cocaine and was sentenced to two years’ custody. In October 2018, he pleaded guilty to fraud, use/possession of identification information, and was sentenced to two years’ custody. The 

same month, he pleaded nolo contendere to burglary of a vehicle and 

was sentenced to five months and twenty-four days of confinement. In 2022, he pleaded guilty to fraudulent possession of identification items and was sentenced to fifteen years’ custody. 

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Based on a total offense level of twelve and a criminal history category of VI, the PSI calculated Hoskins’ guidelines imprisonment range to be thirty to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment. 

It also noted that the maximum term of imprisonment was five 

years. Further, it reported that, in the prior five years, the average 

and median sentence for defendants sentenced under § 2B1.1 with 

an offense level of twelve and criminal history category of VI was 

thirty months’ imprisonment. Neither party objected to the PSI’s 

guidelines calculations. 

The PSI also detailed Hoskins’ personal and family information. Hoskins’ father was murdered in 2019. Hoskins described 

his childhood as being negative, explaining that his father was imprisoned while he was a child, and he regularly visited his father in 

prison. Hoskins himself was in and out of juvenile custody from 

age twelve to nineteen. Still, Hoskins had a daughter and two stepsons, all of whom he lived with before his arrest. 

Prior to sentencing, Hoskins submitted a sentencing memorandum in which he discussed his background and explained that 

his criminal history began at twelve years old and that his “formative years” between six and thirteen consisted of visiting his father 

at prison. He explained that, by the time his father was released, 

he was already “involved in his own criminal activity” that had continued into adulthood. He also highlighted mitigating facts, including that he was “a positive presence in the life of his children and 

his family” and that he had made efforts “towards a productive lifestyle” while incarcerated, evidenced by the educational certificates

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he earned and the self-help books he had read. He expressed a desire to obtain a commercial driver’s license and begin a trucking 

business. He sought a thirty-month sentence and reiterated that he 

would work while incarcerated to prepare for a “productive lifestyle” upon his release. He also contended that a sentence of more

than thirty months would create a sentencing disparity between 

him and similarly-situated defendants. Hoskins attached several 

letters from friends and family to his sentencing memorandum. 

One writer shared that Hoskins “ha[d] been a positive presence [in 

his children’s] lives.” His wife noted that he was hardworking and 

was committed to improving himself while in prison. Hoskins’

daughter and two stepsons commended him as a father, and one 

stepson wrote that Hoskins had taught him more than his own biological father. His daughter wrote that Hoskins “ha[d] always 

been there for [her], [her] brothers and [her] mom . . . providing 

guidance and support whenever needed.” 

Hoskins also mailed a letter with a personal statement to the 

court. Hoskins agreed that the PSI showed his “trouble[d] past” 

but he argued that it did not “show how far [he had] come to transform [his] life.” He described various financial challenges when he 

was younger that had led him into a life of crime. After having 

previously served time in prison, he explained, he had started a

“24/7 lockout and towing service.” However, “[t]imes had got 

hard” again and he chose “to do the wrong thing instead,” leading 

to another arrest, conviction, and imprisonment. After his release, 

Hoskins lost multiple jobs after failing background checks, which 

“led [him] back to committing crime to provide for [his] family.” 

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Hoskins reported taking classes to further his education as he 

worked towards earning a G.E.D. during his incarceration. He expressed that he did not have “any excuse for the crime [he had]

committed,” but explained that he had been “thinking about how 

I could provide for my family.” He also accepted responsibility, 

stating his determination “to work in every way possible to reconcile with society,” and asked for mercy as a “humiliated man.” He

enclosed transcripts and certificates from the coursework he had 

completed in prison. 

The government submitted a sentencing memorandum 

which noted that Hoskins, Hollins, and Brooks had traveled from 

Texas to Georgia to commit this crime and had used the stolen 

money to purchase luxury goods and to party. It identified three 

aggravating factors: (i) Hoskins’ consistent contact with law enforcement starting in 1999; (ii) his serious felony convictions including robbery, burglary, and firearms offenses; and (iii) his current incarceration for another theft crime—fraudulent possession 

of items of identifying information. It contended that this was not 

a “crime of necessity”—rather, Hoskins and his codefendants “frivolously used the stolen money to buy luxury goods and feed their 

vices”—so “the circumstances d[id] not beget leniency.” That said,

it conceded that Hoskins had “accepted responsibility . . . without 

delay,” pleaded guilty promptly, and had not acted violently—so it

recommended a sentence at the lower end of the guidelines range. 

At sentencing, the district court stated it had reviewed the 

PSI, the parties’ memoranda, the letters from Hoskins’ family and 

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friends, and the documents Hoskins had personally mailed to the 

court. Both parties agreed there were no other documents to consider and that there were no objections to the PSI. The court 

adopted the PSI in whole and reiterated that Hoskins had an offense level of twelve, a criminal history category of VI, and a guidelines range of thirty to thirty-seven months. 

The district court stated that it had considered the factors in 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and would provide its preliminary view of 

them. It expressed that Hoskins’ crime had been done “for no apparent reason” other than to “spend the money on shopping sprees 

and at clubs.” The court also noted Hoskins’ “significant” criminal 

history, which had not occurred in a “big spree” but had been “accumulated over a lifetime through earnest efforts to continue violating the law.” While it recognized that Hoskins had family who 

spoke on his behalf, it stated that it “suspect[ed] that” Hoskins’ 

criminal conduct had “wreak[ed] havoc on [his] family.” The court 

also noted the need to deter and appropriately punish those who 

commit crimes not because of “drug addiction or . . . dire need” 

but, instead, do so on a “casual and needless basis.” It stated that 

there was no need “to drive from Texas to Atlanta to commit a 

robbery,” and expressed uncertainty that a thirty-month sentence 

would afford adequate deterrence or protect the public. It added 

that it had considered “[t]he kinds of sentences available and the 

sentencing range” and the need to avoid “unwarranted disparities,” 

including the PSI’s explanation that defendants “within this range 

with this category of criminal history, some good number of them 

are sentenced at 30 months . . . .” However, it reiterated that the 

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“casual and needless basis for this crime” was troubling. It also 

noted that Hoskins was not just in criminal history category VI, he 

was “well, well, well above” that level because he had reached the 

maximum criminal history category when he exceeded thirteen

criminal history points. It added that it could not “find [any] explanation for [Hoskins’] criminal history” that did not “reflect [a] dire 

need to protect the public from more crimes.” It explained that 

Hoskins had repeatedly committed theft and burglary offenses and 

his sentences did not deter him from committing more similar offenses. In the court’s view, Hoskins had “a fervent dedication to 

criminal activity” and a thirty-month sentence did not seem to be 

a “magic bullet that [would] adequately protect[] the public from

his further crimes . . . .” After providing these initial thoughts, the

court asked the parties for their arguments on an appropriate sentence. 

The government noted that the crime appeared to be “premeditated” because the defendants rented cars, took two cars even

though they could have fit in one, and “switched out the plate on 

at least one car.” It also agreed with the district court that the crime 

was not “to feed [Hoskins’] family or because of need.” Moreover,

this was a case with “strong circumstantial evidence” which revealed the money was spent “frivolously . . . on luxury goods as 

well as at the clubs.” It noted that Hoskins had accepted responsibility quickly and, because his offense level was so low, received 

only two points for accepting responsibility instead of three. Finally, it contended that Hoskins was “probably equally as culpable” 

as Hollins, whom the court had sentenced to twenty-seven

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months. The court noted that Hollins and Hoskins had significantly different criminal histories. The government agreed but argued that Hollins also had a very serious criminal history, even if

not as extensive as Hoskins’. Recognizing some differences, it ultimately reiterated that Hoskins and Hollins were “equally culpable 

in the offense” and “their guidelines came out substantially similar.” 

The court responded that it was “struggling to get below 

five years” because “the minute” Hoskins was released, it believed 

“he [wa]s going to do something else.” The government then suggested that Hoskins’ sentence could be imposed to run consecutively to his state sentence in Texas as Hoskins had not gotten any 

credit for his time in federal custody. It also volunteered, in mitigation, that Hoskins had told his codefendants that he wanted 

some, if not all, of his money to go to his family, and the court

agreed that this fact was mitigating. The court then addressed the 

letters that Hoskins’ family submitted, noting that what they had

said about him was “clearly love.” However, it expressed that 

Hoskins was “such a selfish person” that his family’s emotions 

about him defied logic, given his acts. The government concluded 

by highlighting Hoskins’ acceptance of responsibility. 

Hoskins, in turn, argued that his offense was a mere financial 

crime without violence. The court explained that Hoskins, who 

acted from “pure greed,” was different from people who have a 

drug addiction, grew up selling drugs, or are brought to the United 

States to sell drugs. Hoskins admitted he stole solely to obtain 

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money but argued that the absence of a dire need should not be an 

aggravating factor. Even so, the court expressed that “the cavalierness of the crime was indicative of” Hoskins’ character, and expressed concern that society needed protection from his future behavior given his lengthy criminal history. Hoskins argued that his 

criminal history points accounted for these concerns, but the court 

disagreed and emphasized that criminal history points stop affecting a guidelines range after a defendant accumulates thirteen 

points. 

Hoskins next argued that the court should consider the letters that were submitted on his behalf and the fact that he filed no 

frivolous motions, accepted responsibility, and took a plea in what 

he characterized as a “triable case” because no witnesses saw him. 

He also reiterated that he would not get credit for his year in federal 

custody because he was serving a state sentence and argued that 

the court should give more weight to the educational work he had

done while in federal custody “to turn himself around” and to the 

letters submitted on his behalf. The court stated that it was trying 

to properly weigh those facts but found it difficult to believe 

Hoskins’ assurances. It also noted that Hoskins and Hollins were 

distinguishable—Hollins had only one lengthy sentence from 

around 2000 and minor sentences since that time, while Hoskins

had received multiple sentences—shorter than Hollins’ sentence—

over a significant timeframe. Thus, it explained that it thought a 

longer sentence was needed to deter Hoskins. Hoskins reiterated 

that the guidelines range had been “appropriately calculated” and 

represented adequate punishment accounting for his past 

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convictions. He also emphasized his difficult start to life, especially 

visiting his father in prison from the age of six, and the normalization of a lifestyle of crime and incarceration. 

The court explained that hopes and plans for self-improvement must be “proven through action, not words.” It added that 

it could not ignore the danger Hoskins posed to the public because 

of his repeated crimes. Hoskins objected, arguing that the court’s 

comments gave no weight to the work he had done since his federal incarceration. The court admitted as much “in case [he]

want[ed] to appeal,” because “very little weight” was due to his rehabilitation efforts given they were “in the avenue of aspirational.”

Instead, it gave “much more weight” to Hoskins’ actions as an 

adult. It noted that it had considered Hoskins’ letter and the letters 

submitted on his behalf, but reiterated that they deserved “very little weight” compared to what he had done when he was out of 

prison. 

Hoskins then argued again that the court was overly punishing him for his criminal history, which was already reflected in his

guidelinesrange, and he highlighted mitigating factors and the lowend sentencing recommendation that both he and the government

had proposed. Hoskins’ wife and his mother also spoke on his behalf, highlighting his positive qualities and seeking leniency. 

Hoskins likewise spoke on his behalf, apologizing to the court and 

the victims of his offense. He admitted losing his way and discussing his difficult upbringing. He also explained his struggle to keep 

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a decent job due to his status as a felon and shared his recent efforts 

towards enhancing his education. 

The court returned to its comparison between Hoskins and 

Hollins. It remarked that Hollins had “one big conviction” around 

2000 and a few shorter sentences since then and less criminal history overall than Hoskins. In contrast, Hoskins was in “a different 

situation” with “well in excess of” criminal history category VI with 

“23 points on a scale that stops at 13” and “two prior incarcerations 

for 30 months” that did not deter him from committing this crime. 

It emphasized that Hoskins’ repeated crimes suggested that the 

court was “doing the same thing and expecting a different outcome.” However, it accepted the Hoskins’ “good intentions” and

explained that it had expected to impose a 60-month sentence, the 

statutory maximum, but had reconsidered. It also credited 

Hoskins’ arguments about the nature of the offense and reiterated 

that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors, the guidelines, and sentencing disparities based on both the PSI’s statistics and Hollins. 

In light of these factors, the district court sentenced Hoskins 

to forty-eight months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years 

of supervised release. The court explained that it did not believe 

that the guidelines range captured Hoskins’ criminal history or the 

danger he posed. It also reasoned that a sentence greater than what 

Hoskins had received for his past crimes was necessary to change 

his behavior. Hoskins objected to the sentence based on the court’s 

upward variance. Hoskins’ appeal followed. 

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for 

an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 

1354-55 (11th Cir. 2022). “In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we will not substitute our own judgment for that of the sentencing court and we will affirm a sentence so long as the court's 

decision was ‘in the ballpark of permissible outcomes.’” Id. at 1355 

(quoting United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th 

Cir. 2015)). A party challenging a sentence as unreasonable bears 

“the burden of establishing the sentence is unreasonable in light of 

the record and the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Gonzalez, 

550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Hoskins contends his sentence is substantively 

unreasonable for several reasons. He first contends that he and 

Hollins were “similarly situated in terms of criminal history and in 

terms of the roles they played.” He notes the government had 

agreed that the two men were equally culpable. He states that he

received a “substantially higher sentence than similarly situated defendants nationwide” receive. He contends the district court unnecessarily relied on his criminal history, which was a factor already taken into account by the Sentencing Guidelines. He also 

notes that the court did not have similar concerns about Hollins’ 

criminal history which shows that the disparity in the two sentences was “unwarranted.” 

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He also contends that the district court failed to meaningfully consider the mitigating factors he identified. He reiterates 

that there was no violence involved, his conduct led to a low offense level, and his criminal history was already factored into his 

guidelines range. He also points to the letters from his family and 

friends which highlighted positive aspects of his character. In sum, 

he contends the court gave too little weight to that evidence and 

failed to provide a sufficient basis for doing so.

The government contends the district court did not err. It 

asserts that the district court addressed each of Hoskins’ arguments 

and that the record supports the court’s conclusion that Hoskins 

and Hollins were not similarly situated. Finally, it asserts that 

Hoskins’ reliance on data about offenders with similar guidelines 

calculations does not show error because the data does not establish that Hoskins was similarly situated with those other defendants. It concludes by arguing that the court provided a “fulsome 

sentencing proceeding with justification” for its upward variance. 

Under § 3553(a), a district court must impose a sentence 

“sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to provide just 

punishment for the offense, to afford adequate deterrence, and to 

protect the public from future crimes of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a). In addition, the court must consider, among other factors, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and 

characteristics of the defendant, and the need to avoid unwarranted 

sentence disparities among similarly-situated defendants. Id. 

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“[W]e have identified three ways in which a district court 

can abuse its discretion [and] impos[e] a substantively unreasonable sentence: (1) failing to properly consider a relevant sentencing 

factor that was due significant weight, (2) giving significant weight 

to a factor that was not relevant, or (3) committing a clear error of 

judgment by weighing the sentencing factors unreasonably.” Butler, 39 F.4th at 1356; see also United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 

(11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (same). 

A sentencing court must consider all relevant § 3553(a) factors, but “the weight given to each factor is committed to the 

sound discretion of the district court,” and it may attach great 

weight to one factor over the others. Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355. In 

general, “a district court’s acknowledgment that it has considered 

the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ arguments is sufficient.” Id.

(citing United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1219 (11th Cir. 2009)). 

“Upward variances are imposed based on the § 3553(a) factors,” so 

a court may permissibly “impose an upward variance if it concludes 

that the Guidelines range was insufficient in light of a defendant’s 

criminal history.” Id. at 1355. Similarly, “in imposing a variance,” 

a court “may consider conduct that [was already] considered in calculating the defendant’s advisory guidelines range.” United States 

v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 983 (11th Cir. 2015).

Although a sentencing court is required “to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records 

who have been found guilty of similar conduct,” a sentencing disparity among co-defendants is usually not grounds for appellate 

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relief. United States v. Cavallo, 790 F.3d 1202, 1237 (11th Cir. 2015); 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). In addition, “[a] well-founded claim of [unwarranted] disparity . . . assumes that apples are being compared to 

apples.” United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 

2009) (quoting United States v. Mateo-Espejo, 426 F.3d 508, 514 (1st 

Cir. 2005)). Evaluating alleged sentencing disparities among similarly-situated defendants requires “more than the crime of conviction and the total length of the sentences.” United States v. Azmat, 

805 F.3d 1018, 1048 (11th Cir. 2015). “The underlying facts of the 

crime and all of the individual characteristics are relevant.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Here, Hoskins has not shown that the district court imposed 

a substantively unreasonable sentence. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. 

The court stated that it heard the parties’ arguments and had considered all the § 3553(a) factors, and it also provided factual support 

in its discussion of the factors. Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355; Sarras, 

575 F.3d at 1219. The court also addressed Hoskins’ claim that it

was improperly focusing on his criminal history which had already

been factored into his guidelines range by explaining that ten of 

Hoskins’ twenty-three criminal history points had no effect on his 

guidelines range calculation because everything above thirteen

points falls into criminal history category VI. See U.S.S.G. § 5, pt. A. 

In addition, the court did not err in varying upward based on conduct that was already used to calculate Hoskins’ guidelines range—

our precedent permits exactly that. See Moran, 778 F.3d at 983–84; 

Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355. 

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The district court also considered Hoskins’ mitigating evidence and permissibly gave that evidence lesser weight than his

criminal history and the need to protect the public. Butler, 39 F.4th 

at 1355; Sarras, 575 F.3d at 1219. The court provided a detailed 

explanation for its conclusion that this mitigating evidence was “aspirational” and was not as representative as Hoskins’ conduct while 

out of prison—i.e., his repeated arrests and convictions for largely 

similar conduct. The district court had considerable discretion in 

weighing these relevant factors, Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355, and it did 

not “(1) fail[] to properly consider a relevant sentencing factor that 

was due significant weight, (2) giv[e] significant weight to a factor 

that was not relevant, or (3) commit[] a clear error of judgment by 

weighing the sentencing factors unreasonably,” id. at 1356. 

Finally, the district court did not create an unwarranted sentencing disparity between similarly-situated defendants. As our 

precedent requires, the district court considered the underlying 

facts of the crime and each of the defendants’ individual characteristics. Azmat, 805 F.3d at 1048; Cavallo, 790 F.3d at 1237. The court 

discussed Hoskins’ more extensive, recent, and repeated criminal 

history related to theft and fraud and noted that Hollins had only 

received one substantial sentence roughly 20 years earlier. It also 

correctly noted that the two codefendants had different criminal 

history levels under the guidelines which meant they were not similarly situated. Given the district court’s careful consideration of all 

relevant factors relating to Hoskins and Hollins—which included

much “more than the crime of conviction and the total length of 

the sentences”—it did not abuse its discretion. Azmat, 805 F.3d at 

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1048. Where, as here, the district court correctly concludes that 

“apples are [not] being compared to apples” the disparity is not unwarranted. Docampo, 573 F.3d at 1101. 

IV. CONCLUSION

When we review a sentence for substantive reasonableness, 

we ask only whether the sentence the defendant received was “in 

the ballpark of permissible outcomes.” Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355. On 

these facts, Hoskins has not borne his burden to show that the district court abused its discretion and imposed an unreasonable sentence. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. We, therefore, affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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