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Parties Involved:
Brian David Roth
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

BRIAN DAVID ROTH, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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FILED 

United States Co'Jrt of Appeals 

Tenth circuit 

f.Ud 2 4 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-4028 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah 

(D.C. No. 89-NCR-32 S) 

Jerold D. McPhee, Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendant-appellant. 

Dee v. Benson, United States Attorney (Bruce c. Lubeck, Assistant 

United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Salt Lake City, 

Utah, for plaintiff-appellee. 

Before HOLLOWAY' Chief Judge, LOGAN, Circuit Judge, and BRETT, 

District Judge. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Thomas R. Brett, United States District Judge for 

the Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-4028 Document: 01019292978 Date Filed: 05/24/1991 Page: 1 
Defendant Brian David Roth appeals his sentence imposed following his plea of guilty to theft of government property, in 

violation of 18 u.s.c. § 641. On appeal, defendant argues that 

the district court erred in departing upward from his calculated 

guideline sentencing range and that he should have received credit 

for the time he served awaiting disposition of his case. 

At the time of his arrest, defendant was a member of the 

United States Air Force assigned to a security police squadron at 

Hill Air Force Base, Utah. Defendant's primary duty was to guard 

the assets stored at the base. In October 1987, defendant began 

selling military equipment that he had stolen to Military Surplus 

Brokers, an undercover business set up by the FBI. Over the 

course of approximately two years, defendant sold a variety of 

items ranging from helmets and goggles to communication and 

aviation equipment. 

In early 1989, defendant and undercover FBI agents began 

discussing the sale of four F-16 jet engines stored at Hill Air 

Force Base. The parties agreed to a sale price of $100,000 per 

engine. Defendant engaged another military policeman, Danny 

Stroud, to assist in the theft and sale of the engines. Defendant 

and Stroud removed three engines from their storage hangar and 

delivered them to the undercover agents. Defendant and Stroud 

were arrested several days later. 

Defendant pleaded guilty to five counts of theft of government property. His presentence report specified a guideline 

sentencing range of thirty to thirty-seven months imprisonment--

based on a criminal history score of zero, a total loss of 

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Appellate Case: 90-4028 Document: 01019292978 Date Filed: 05/24/1991 Page: 2 
$10,043,605 ($9.9 million attributed to the jet engines), a twolevel increase for more than minimal planning, a two-level 

increase for utilizing a position of trust, and a two-level 

decrease for acceptance of responsibility. See u.s.s.G. 

§§ 2Bl.l(b)(l), 2Bl.l(b)(4), 3B1.3 & 3El.l(a). The sentencing 

court departed upward from the recommended range, imposing a 120 

month sentence. The court also refused to credit defendant's 

sentence for his predisposition detention. 

I 

Defendant first argues that the district court erred in 

departing upward from his calculated guideline range because it 

stated insufficient reasons for departure. Alternatively, 

defendant argues that the degree of departure is unreasonable. 

In reviewing a sentencing court's upward departure from the 

guidelines, we undertake a three-step review process. United 

States v. White, 893 F.2d 276, 277-78 (lOth Cir. 1990). First, we 

consider whether the circumstances cited by the sentencing court 

justify a departure from the calculated guideline sentencing 

range. Id. at 277. The court may depart only if it "finds that 

there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, 

or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the 

Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should 

result in a sentence different from that described." 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(b). Second, we must determine "whether the circumstances 

cited by the sentencing court to justify departure actually exist 

in the instant case." White, 893 F.2d at 278. Finally, we must 

decide whether the degree of departure is reasonable. Id.; see 

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Appellate Case: 90-4028 Document: 01019292978 Date Filed: 05/24/1991 Page: 3 
also 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3). 

Focusing on the first step of the White analysis, the court 

identified the following circumstances to justify an upward 

departure from the calculated guideline range: 

"Number 1. The Court finds that the guideline 

range does not adequately consider the value involved in 

this theft. 

Number 2. That there was a significant disruption 

of governmental function in that morale and the pride of 

the military are affected. 

Number 3. What appears to the Court to be a lack 

of concern for the ultimate destination for these 

engines which could have serious effect upon our 

national security." 

II R. at 34. Defendant contends that these reasons do not justify 

an upward departure because "all of these items were adequately 

considered by the Sentencing Commission at the time of the 

Defendant's offense." Amended Brief of Appellant at 7. Defendant 

argues that the Commission properly accounted for the 

circumstances of this case by requiring a two-level increase for 

an "abuse of trust," u.s.s.G. § 3B1.3, and a thirteen-level 

increase for theft of items exceeding $5,000,000 in value, id. at 

§ 2Bl.l(b)(l)(N). 

A sentencing court may "depart for reasons already considered 

in the guidelines (i.e., adjustment for specific offense 

characteristics), 'if the court determines that, in light of 

unusual circumstances, the guideline level attached to that factor 

is inadequate.'" United States v. Dean, 908 F.2d 1491, 1496 (lOth 

Cir. 1990) (quoting U.S.S.G. § SK2.0) (emphasis added by Dean 

court). In the instant case, the district court determined that 

the guideline level attached to the value of the theft was 

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Appellate Case: 90-4028 Document: 01019292978 Date Filed: 05/24/1991 Page: 4 
inadequate. We agree. The amount involved, $10 million, when 

compared to the $5 million maximum considered by the guidelines, 

is sufficiently "unusual" to warrant departure. 

The two other reasons cited by the district court also are 

sufficient justifications for an upward departure. u.s.s.G. 

§§ 5K2.7 and 5K2.14 authorize a sentencing court to depart if the 

defendant's conduct "resulted in a significant disruption of a 

governmental function" and "[i]f national security .•. was 

significantly endangered." In the instant case, the court found 

that the theft's effect on the morale and pride of the military 

was a significant disruption of governmental function and that the 

sale could have endangered national security. 1 After reviewing 

the record, we conclude that these findings are not clearly erroneous and that departure was therefore warranted. 

The second step of the White analysis--whether the 

circumstances cited by the sentencing court to justify its 

departure actually exist--is not at issue in this case. Defendant 

does not challenge the facts cited by the sentencing court to 

justify the upward departure. We therefore move to the final step 

of the White analysis and assess whether the degree of departure 

is reasonable. 

"Reasonableness requires that the sentence regard the 

guideline factors set forth in § 3553, which include factors of 

uniformity and proportionality." United States v. Gardner, 905 

1 The factual basis for the district court's findings appears to 

be a letter written by Colonel John R. Brancato of the United 

States Air Force. In his letter, Colonel Brancato described the 

seriousness of the theft and the effect it had on the morale of 

the Security Police Squadron and the entire base. I R. tab 103. 

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Appellate Case: 90-4028 Document: 01019292978 Date Filed: 05/24/1991 Page: 5 
F.2d 1432, 1436 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 202 (1990). 

Specifically, in reviewing the sentencing court's degree of 

departure, we must consider: 

"[T]he district court's proffered justifications as well 

as such factors as: the seriousness of the offense, the 

need for just punishment, deterrence, protection of the 

public, correctional treatment, the sentencing pattern 

of the Guidelines, the policy statements contained in 

the Guidelines, and the need to avoid unwarranted 

sentencing disparities." 

White, 893 F.2d at 278 (citing 18 u.s.c. §§ 3742(e)(3) & 3553(a)). 

Although all of the above factors recited in White serve as 

indicia of reasonableness, the sentencing court's "proffered 

justifications" for the departure is a threshold requirement. 

United States v. Jackson, 921 F.2d 985, 990 (lOth Cir. 1990) (en 

bane). "Without specific reasons for the sentence imposed, we 

cannot exercise our statutory mandate to review the reasonableness 

of a departure sentence." Id. at 989-90. Further, such reasons 

must be couched in terms of inadequacies in an offense level or 

criminal history category. "Just as the district court must 

premise its departure on the Guidelines' deficiency in assigning a 

defendant a particular offense level, criminal history category, 

or both, the court also must explain a departure sentence in these 

terms." Id. at 990. Specifically, the sentencing court should 

draw analogies to offense characteristic levels, criminal history 

categories, and other principles in the guidelines to determine 

the appropriate degree of departure. Id. at 991. 

In the instant case, the sentencing court's statements to 

support its degree of departure did not comport with the standards 

laid out in Jackson. The court's reasons for imposing a 120 month 

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Appellate Case: 90-4028 Document: 01019292978 Date Filed: 05/24/1991 Page: 6 
sentence amounted to only a general statement in which it reiterated one of its reasons for departure: 

"As one who has been privileged to wear the uniform of 

the Armed Forces namely the United States Air Force, I 

am convinced that any sentence less than that which the 

Court proposes to impose and which I will impose, would 

have a serious adverse effect, impact upon the pride and 

morale of our military personnel and the citizenry of 

this great nation." 

II R. at 34-35. Nowhere did the sentencing court draw analogies 

to the guidelines or explain its sentence in guideline terms. 

Indeed, the government admits that the court did not present a 

proper justification for imposing a sentence eighty-three months 

above the maximum guideline range. Brief of Plaintiff/Appellee at 

17. 

As we noted in Gardner, 905 F.2d at 1436, 

"We cannot evaluate the reasonableness of a 

particular departure from the guidelines without an 

adequate factual record, nor can we speculate as to 

reasoning that might have been employed by the sentencing court to arrive at a particular sentence. The 

initial task of deciding when and by how much to deviate 

from the guidelines falls upon the trial court, and the 

trial court must articulate its analysis supporting the 

degree of departure selected. Without such an articulation of the trial court's reasoning, we simply are not 

able effectively to supervise the sentencing process, 

nor to enforce the principles of uniformity and 

proportionality implicit in the concept of reasonableness." 

Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Because the 

sentencing court failed to present proper reasons for its degree 

of departure in accordance with Jackson, we must remand for an 

explanation of the departure sentence. 

Defendant also implicitly argues that the sentencing court 

abused its discretion and violated due process when, by its statements, it "relinquished its role as arbiter and cloaked itself in 

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Appellate Case: 90-4028 Document: 01019292978 Date Filed: 05/24/1991 Page: 7 
the mantle of advocate." Amended Brief of Appellant at 12. 

Defendant cites United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 

1991), as support of this contention. We do not agree that the 

sentencing court's statements can be equated with those condemned 

in Bakker. In reviewing the sentencing of television evangelist 

Jim Bakker, the Fourth Circuit was left with the impression "that 

the imposition of a lengthy prison term . . . may have reflected 

the fact that the [sentencing] court's own sense of religious 

propriety had somehow been betrayed." Id. at 741. 2 Although the 

instant sentencing judge referred to his own military service, we 

think that, fairly construed, his statement simply highlighted the 

seriousness of defendant's offense, ~ United States v. Torres, 

901 F.2d 205, 246-47 (2d Cir. 1990) (sentencing judge's statement 

about harm to communtiy resulting from drug dealers' activities 

properly emphasized seriousness of offense), cert. denied, 111 

S. Ct. 273 (1990), and reiterated one of its reasons for 

departure--the theft's adverse effect on the military and the 

public at large. Thus, we will not hold that the statement 

violated defendant's due process rights, abused the sentencing 

court's discretion, or that resentencing should be by a different 

judge. 

II 

Finally, defendant contends that the sentencing court erred 

in denying him credit for time served while awaiting disposition 

2 The sentencing judge condemned Bakker because "[h]e had no 

thought whatever about his victims and those of us who do have a 

religion are ridiculed as being saps from money-grubbing preachers 

or priests." Bakker, 925 F.2d at 740. 

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Appellate Case: 90-4028 Document: 01019292978 Date Filed: 05/24/1991 Page: 8 
of his case. Citing United States v. Woods, 888 F.2d 653 (lOth 

Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 1301 (1990), he argues that 

he should have been given credit for his three month stay at Correction Services Corporation, a federally accredited, level I 

facility, and that the court's denial contravened its earlier 

order authorizing the credit. 

The credit statute, 18 u.s.c. § 3585(b), 3 provides: 

"A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of 

a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence 

commences--

(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence 

was imposed • • " 

"Official detention" means "imprisonment in a place of confinement, not stipulations or conditions imposed upon a person not 

subject to full physical incarceration." Woods, 888 F.2d at 655. 

The confinement must "equal the deprivation of liberty experienced 

by a person incarcerated in a jail facility" to warrant a credit 

for time served. Id. at 656. Applying these principles, the 

Woods court held that a defendant was not entitled to credit for 

time served at a halfway house where he was allowed to participate 

in a work release program and spend weekends at home. Id. at 654, 

656. See also United States v. Insley, 927 F.2d 185, 186 (4th 

Cir. 1991) (no credit for time on release pending appeal when the 

3 Section 3585 became effective on November 1, 1987, replacing 

§ 3568, which provided that a defendant shall receive "credit 

toward service of his sentence for any days spent in custody in 

connection with the offense or acts for which sentence was 

imposed." Woods, 888 F.2d at 654-55. Although§ 3568 used the 

phrase "in custody" instead of "official detention," Congress did 

not intend a different result or a departure from the precedents 

decided under § 3568. Id. at 655. 

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Appellate Case: 90-4028 Document: 01019292978 Date Filed: 05/24/1991 Page: 9 
defendant was required to seek employment, reside with her parents 

and leave only for work or church, report regularly to the probation office, be in her residence by 9:00p.m., execute a bond, be 

electronically monitored, submit to random drug testing, and stay 

in touch with her attorney); United States v. Carlson, 886 F.2d 

166, 166-67 (8th Cir. 1989) (no credit for post-trial release for 

defendant required to report to authorities and travel 

restricted); United States v. Figueroa, 828 F.2d 70, 70-71 (1st 

Cir. 1987) (no credit for time spent on pre-trial conditional 

release). 

In the instant case, we are unable to determine whether the 

district court properly denied defendant credit for the time 

served awaiting sentencing. A review of the record does not 

clearly reveal defendant's conditions of confinement. 4 Further, 

the district court initially ruled that defendant would receive 

credit for his presentence incarceration. I R. Supp. tab 82. 5 

Accordingly, on remand the sentencing court should determine 

whether defendant must receive credit under Woods and our analysis 

herein. 

4 The only information we have found are references in 

defendant's brief. Specifically, he contends that his confinement 

conditions included "24 hour superv~s~on, restriction to the 

premises, involuntary searches of both his person and his living 

quarters, random urinalysis and subject to Federal charges should 

he fail to comply with the terms and conditions of his confinement. " Amended Brief of Appellant at 15. 

5 At the sentencing hearing, however, the court denied credit for 

the time served, concluding that "any halfway house time that was 

served is not considered detention." II R. 36. 

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Appellate Case: 90-4028 Document: 01019292978 Date Filed: 05/24/1991 Page: 10 
III 

In conclusion, we VACATE the sentencing court's departure 

sentence and REMAND for resentencing in accordance with our 

analysis herein. We also direct the sentencing court to reexamine defendant's presentence detention, taking evidence on the 

conditions of confinement if necessary, to determine if defendant 

should receive credit for this time served. 

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