Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02165/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02165-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jesus Antonio Alvarado-Lopez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES 

FIL ... ~ J 

Uniwd States Court of Appeahi ,.i'enth Circuit 

COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT APR 19 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JESUS ANTONIO ALVARADO-LOPEZ , 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 92 - 2165 

(D.C. No. CR 92 - 3-01-JC) 

(Dist. N . M . ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMKNT* 

Before LOOAN, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

Submitted on the Briefs: 

Jesus Antonio Alvarado-Lopez entered a conditional plea of 

guilty to a charge of re-entry into the United States after 

deportation, 8 u.s.c. § 1326(b) (1). He appeals the denial of 

motions to suppress and d i smiss as well as the district court's 

refusal of his request for a downward departure. We affirm. 

Senior Border Patrol Agent Stuart Woodside was advised by his 

superior that an informant claimed defendant Mr. Alvarado was 

illegally in the United States and living at a specific address in 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3 . 

Appellate Case: 92-2165 Document: 010110212757 Date Filed: 04/19/1993 Page: 1 
Organ, New Mexico. Assigned to verify that claim, Agent Woodside 

and his partner went to that address at 8:00 a.m on a December 

morning in 1991. When asked whether the purpose of his visit was 

to conduct a criminal or administrative investigation, he 

testified, "At that point it was administrative." He explained: 

[W]ith the Immigration Service, oftentimes for 

illegal aliens we, [sic] they are dealt with 

administratively, meaning that when they are apprehended 

by Immigration agents they are oftentimes given an 

opportunity to return to Mexico voluntarily or for 

deportation proceedings. And at first we have to 

question the individuals to find out their status to 

make that determination of if [sic] they are here 

lawfully or not in the United States. 

Upon arrival, Agent Woodside knocked on the door and was 

ultimately greeted by defendant's sister, Alma Carrasco. Agent 

Woodside told her he had information that illegal aliens were 

staying at her home, and he asked permission to speak to them. In 

particular, he told her he was looking for Jesus Antonio AlvaradoLopez and his son. When asked what Ms . Carrasco said, the agent 

responded: 

Well, she invited me in . . I spoke to her and 

asked her if Jesus Antonio Alvarado-Lopez was there 

again, and she said, yes, he was, that he was sleeping 

in a bedroom there. And I further asked at that time, 

"Is he here in the United States illegally?" And she 

told me yes. And thereafter she went to the bedroom 

where the defendant and his son were sleeping, and she 

knocked on the door and. advised him that the 

Immigration was here to speak to him. 

Defendant appeared after the agents waited for him to awaken and 

dress. Agent Woodside asked him whether he was Jesus Antonio 

Alvarado-Lopez, and defendant responded, "yes." The agent then 

asked him "if he had immigration documents, and he said he did 

not, he was here illegally." 

2 

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Upon hearing that statement, Agent Woodside said, "I told him 

that he needed to accompany us .... then we left to go to the 

Border Patrol office." 

During this entire time, 1 defendant was not physically 

restrained, but after Mr. Alvarado said he was in the country 

illegally, Agent Woodside did not believe Mr. Alvarado was free to 

leave .

2 Defendant was not arrested, however, until the agents 

returned with him to the Border Patrol station and determined by a 

computer check that Mr. Alvarado had a criminal history. Agent 

Woodside stated it was not until that time his focus changed from 

an administrative proceeding to a criminal case.

3 

Defendant moved to suppress his statement that he was 

illegally in this country on the ground that prior to 

interrogating him, Agent Woodside did not advise him of his 

Miranda rights. 4 The district court held that Miranda did not 

1 From entry to departure, the agents 

"about five minutes." 

were in the residence 

2 Under the circumstances, that fact is problematical inasmuch 

as Mr. Alvarado was in his own residence at the time. Indeed, the 

evidence does not suggest he was anxious to go anywhere else. 

Nonetheless, it is indisputable Agent Woodside thought defendant 

could not have walked out the door on his own volition. 

3 On cross examination, Agent Woodside admitted before he even 

encountered defendant he was aware that the informant claimed Mr. 

Alvarado had served time in prison. However he explained, in 

effect, he did not attach significance to that claim because 

informants are often mistaken or inclined to misstate facts for 

reasons of their own. Therefore, he would not act upon the claim 

until he had independently verified it. 

4 In light of his sister's statement, the evidentiary 

significance of the admission is not disclosed by defendant. 

Moreover, we assume the government could produce evidence of 

defendant's illegal status through independent sources without 

having to depend upon defendant's admission. It is therefore 

difficult to perceive this as anything but an academic issue. 

3 

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apply because the statement was made during "an administrative 

investigation." The court further found that the statement was 

made during "a consensual discussion;" therefore, the court did 

not believe it had to reach the question of whether defendant was 

detained when the admission was made . 

Defendant argues in his brief that the distinction drawn by 

the district court between an administrative and a criminal 

interrogation is insignificant. He contends when questions are 

asked that will likely elicit an incriminating response, the 

interrogator must comply with Miranda. 

We think several factors are dispositive. First, the 

district court found the interrogation occurred during a 

consensual confrontation. That is tantamount to a finding that 

questioning did not occur during a custodial setting. The 

conclusion is justified because the agents were freely admitted 

into the home of defendant's sister, defendant was allowed to 

dress before talking to the agents, he was not menaced in any way, 

nor was he under any form of duress when he volunteered his 

5 

response . Moreover, there is a significant fact which grows from 

the Administrative-Criminal distinction. 

One key to the application of Miranda is the expectation that 

questioning will, or might, produce incriminating responses. That 

expectation is not present here because the officers were not even 

5 We recognize these facts were disputed by defendant's sister, 

but the district court heard the testimony and chose not to 

believe her. We cannot overrule that choice, because the question 

of credibility is for the district court alone. Suffice, then, 

that the district court's findings are based on the testimony of 

the agents, and those findings are amply supported by the 

evidence. 

4 

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considering criminal charges against Mr. Alvarado at the time 

Agent Woodside asked him if he had "immigration documents." 

Remembering the agent placed little credence in information 

furnished by the unidentified informant, it is evident that the 

only concern the agents had was whether to place defendant in 

custody for the purpose of deporting him. Therefore, when 

defendant's response was made, the officers did not believe it was 

incriminating. It was not until after they officially determined 

he had a criminal history that the agents realized the potential 

of criminal charges against Mr. Alvarado. Although defendant 

relies upon United States v. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 

1983), for the proposition that the agent's civil investigation 

does not obviate the necessity for a pre-questioning advisement of 

rights, the case is inapposite and not compelling. 

In a major and critical way Mata is distinguishable because 

the defendant was in jail on state charges when he told INS agents 

he was a Mexican citizen. Although the INS investigator 

characterized his questioning as a "routine, civil investigation," 

the Ninth Circuit held Miranda applied solely because the 

defendant was in custody when the statement was made. This fact 

made the civil-criminal distinction irrelevant, See Mathis v. 

United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968). 

Here, defendant was in his residence, neither in custody on 

criminal charges nor under suspicion of criminal activity, when he 

volunteered his illegal alien status. While that admission 

subjected him to ensuing custody for the purpose of deportation, 

5 

Appellate Case: 92-2165 Document: 010110212757 Date Filed: 04/19/1993 Page: 5 
it did not place him in the custodial setting which prompted the 

Miranda rule. In fact, even conceding Agent Woodside would not 

have let defendant free after that admission, it is clear 

defendant was not even under the civil deportation constraint 

until after he volunteered his alien status. On this record, we 

can see no reason to hold a Miranda warning was necessary. 

Defendant next attacks the validity of the first deportation 

proceeding which made him subject to criminal prosecution in this 

case. He contends that proceeding was fundamentally unfair 

because the immigration judge who ordered deportation did not 

follow Immigration and Naturalization Service rules during the 

pre-deportation hearing. Specifically, defendant argues the 

immigration judge did not inform defendant of the availability of 

free legal services as required by 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(a) (1989). 

Although the judge did advise defendant of all the rights 

guaranteed to him under the Constitution, defendant contends the 

failure to comply with the rule resulted in the deprivation of due 

process. Consequently, defendant concludes, the indictment should 

have been dismissed or the evidence of his deportation suppressed 

because of this "flaw" in the deportation proceeding. 

Notwithstanding the evident lack of compliance with INS 

regulations, defendant must still show he was prejudiced by the 

failure before he can establish grounds for claiming a denial of 

fundamental fairness. United States v. Valdez, 917 F. 2d 466, 468 

(10th Cir. 1990 ) . As in Valdez, defendant urges the prejudice he 

suffered was the failure to follow regulations. He distinguishes 

Valdez, however, because in that case we held the immigration 

6 

Appellate Case: 92-2165 Document: 010110212757 Date Filed: 04/19/1993 Page: 6 
judge followed all the required regulations. He asserts the 

failure to do so in this case amounts to per se prejudice. 

We do not read the Valdez holding with the same generosity. 6 

We noted in that case there was no indication that the defendant 

was deprived of his right to appeal the deportation order as a 

consequence of the asserted default in due process. Consequently, 

we concluded the defendant sustained no resultant prejudice. 

Defendant offered no evidence to suggest that the failure to 

furnish him with a list of free legal services resulted in a 

prejudicial consequence. He did not, for example, demonstrate 

that he proceeded with the deportation hearing although he wanted 

the advice of counsel or that he wanted to appeal but was deprived 

of the opportunity because he did not have the service of counsel. 

Although he speculates in his brief how prejudice might have 

occurred, he presented no such evidence to the district court. 

Consequently, defendant failed to establish the necessary element 

of prejudice to carry the day. 

Finally, defendant argues the district court erred by 

refusing his request for downward departure. Recognizing we have 

held again and again we do not have jurisdiction to review denials 

6 Defendant claims that in Valdez we "surreptitiously" 

concluded a failure to follow administrative rules is different 

from a "violation of fundamental due process rights." We see 

nothing stealthy about the Valdez holding. Perhaps defendant's 

exuberance for his cause has influenced his unfortunate choice of 

words. Contrary to defendant's suggestion of our clandestine 

motives, the case forthrightly stands for the proposition that a 

defendant collaterally attacking the fundamental fairness of a 

deportation hearing as a ground for setting aside a subsequent 

conviction for re-entering after deportation must establish he was 

prejudiced by the claimed unfairness. 

7 

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of downward departure, See United States v. Soto, 918 F.2d 882, 

885 (10 th Cir. 1990), defendant tries to avoid the rule by 

contending it is unclear whether the district court knew it could 

depart downward in this case . We think the lack of clarity exists 

only in counsel's spirited advocacy. 

We have no doubt that the district judge denied downward 

departure with full knowledge of his authority. The fact that he 

did so with dispatch and without mention of defendant's request is 

not indicia of the court's ignorance or misunderstanding . 

AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

8 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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