Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02004/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02004-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Herbert Ellingwood
Appellee
Merit Systems Protection Board
Appellee
United States of America
Appellee
Richard J. Wall
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

86-2004 

RICHARD J. WALL, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH ) 

AND HUMAN SERVICES, ) 

OTIS BOWEN; ) 

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION ) 

BOARD; and ) 

HERBERT ELLINGWOOD, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

Fil,ED United States Court of Appeal.J T~nth Circuit 

MAR 3119B9 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 85-2307) 

J. Larry Louk (Michael L. Snider and Timothy J. Arehart of Thomas, 

McDonald, Maier, Dykes & Johnston, Chartered, with him on the 

brief), Overland Park, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

E. Yvonne M. Ernzen (Benjamin L. Burgess, Jr., United States Attorney, District of Kansas; Julie Robinson Trice, Assistant u.s. 

Attorney, Kansas City, Kansas; Of Counsel: Paul P. Cacioppo, 

Chief Counsel, Region VII, Department of Health and Human 

Services; and Frances Reddis, Assistant Regional Counsel), Kansas 

City, Missouri, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Appellate Case: 86-2004 Document: 01019300950 Date Filed: 03/31/1989 Page: 1 
Before SEYMOUR and *McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BOHANON, 

Senior District Judge. 

McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable Luther L. Bohanon of the United States District Court 

for the Northern, Eastern and Western Districts of Oklahoma, 

sitting by designation. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2004 Document: 01019300950 Date Filed: 03/31/1989 Page: 2 
Richard J. Wall; a resident of Kansas, was employed by the 

Department of Health and Human Services (Department) from October, 

1973, to September 28, 1984, when his employment was terminated. 

Shortly prior to September 28, 1984, Wall executed an application 

for retirement with an effective date of September 28, 1984. 

Notwithstanding his application to retire, Wall thereafter 

filed a timely appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board 

(Board) protesting his termination. Wall's position was that on 

September 18, 1984, the Department informed him that he would be 

"removed" from his civil service position on September 28, 1984, 

because a physical disability prevented him from performing his 

employment duties and, further, that there was no existing possibility of lateral transfer. According to Wall, at the suggestion of the Department, he then sought advice concerning his 

retirement rights and that he was misinformed and misled by 

employees of the Department concerning those rights, all of which 

led to his application for retirement. Wall claimed that his 

employment was terminated by the Department because of his age, 65 

years of age, and his physical handicap, his left leg having been 

amputated below the knee in 1981, apparently the result of a 

diabetic condition. 

A hearing was held before a Presiding Official of the Board, 

which hearing was limited, in the first instance, to the single 

issue of whether Wall "voluntarily" retired on September 28, 1984. 

Evidence was taken by the Presiding Official on the issue of the 

voluntariness of Wall's application for retirement, and the 

Presiding Official held that Wall's retirement was voluntary. 

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Because a voluntary- retirement is not an adverse action which is 

appealable, 1 the Presiding Officer dismissed Wall's appeal on the 

ground that the Board had no jurisdiction to hear Wall's claim of 

wrongful employment termination because of his age or physical 

handicap. 2 Wall filed a timely petition for review by the Board 

of the Presiding Official's ruling. On May 2, 1985, the Board 

denied Wall's petition for review. 

On May 29, 1985, Wall filed an action in the United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, naming as defendants 

the United States of America; the Department and Margaret Heckler, 

then Secretary of the Department; and the Board and its head, 

Herbert Ellingwood. In his complaint, Wall stated that, after 

being advised that the Department was going to remove him from his 

civil service position, he sought advice from the Department 

concerning possible retirement; in the course of that inquiry he 

was misled and misinformed by the Department; and as a result he 

applied for retirement. Wall then set forth two claims for 

relief, the first based on age discrimination, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et 

seq., and a second based on handicap discrimination, 29 u.s.c. § 

701, et seg. 

On May 30, 1985, Wall filed a parallel petition for review of 

the May 2 decision of the Board with the United States Court of 

1 Christie v. United States, 518 F.2d 584, 207 Ct. Cl. 333 (1975); 

Schultz v. United States Navy, 810 F.2d 1133 (Fed. Cir. 1987); 5 

C.P.R. § 752.40l(c)(3) (1984). 

2 Presumably, if the Presiding Officer had ruled that Wall's 

application for termination was involuntary, he would have then 

proceeded to hear and rule on the merits of Wall's claim that he 

was terminated because of his age and physical handicap. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2004 Document: 01019300950 Date Filed: 03/31/1989 Page: 4 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. By agreement of the parties, 

Wall's proceeding in the Federal Circuit has been stayed pending 

final resolution of the action filed by Wall in the United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas. 

In the Kansas proceeding the defendants filed a motion to 

dismiss on the ground that the district court in Kansas lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction and that because of Wall's voluntary 

retirement, the Federal Circuit had exclusive jurisdiction to 

review the ruling of the Board. The district court granted the 

defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissed Wall's action for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction. Wall appeals the district court's 

order of dismissal. We affirm. 

The Memorandum and Order of the district court was published 

and appears as Wall v. United States, Dep't of Health and Human 

Services, 637 F. Supp. 90 (D. Kan. 1986). Although the matter is 

not necessarily free of all doubt, we believe the district court 

properly construed the statutes in question, and we are in accord 

with the result reached by the district court and the supporting 

rationale. We could well let the entire matter rest here, but 

brief additional comment is in order. 

The statutory provisions with which we are primarily 

concerned are 5 U.S.C. §§ 7703(b)(l), 7703(b)(2), and 7702. Under 

S 7703(b)(l), "[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2) of this 

subsection, a petition to review a final order or final decision 

of the Board shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit." The exception in§ 7703(b)(2) provides, 

in effect, that cases of alleged discrimination "subject to the 

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Appellate Case: 86-2004 Document: 01019300950 Date Filed: 03/31/1989 Page: 5 
provisions of section 7702" shall be filed under the applicable 

statute in a United States District Court. Discrimination cases 

"subject to the provisions of section 7702" include cases where an 

employee or an applicant for employment (1) has been affected by 

an action of an agency which may be appealed to the Board and (2) 

alleges that the basis for the agency's action was discrimination 

prohibited by, inter alia, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the 

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. See 28 u.s.c. § 

7702. 

The district court in the instant case construed those 

statutory provisions to mean that where, in a given case, the 

Board determines that the agency action complained of may be appealed to the Board and where the Board further finds that there 

was no discrimination, the case falls within the exception 

mentioned in§ 7703(b)(l), and detailed in§§ 7703(b)(2) and 7702. 

Coming within the exception, the employee, in such circumstance, 

may then file a discrimination action in a United States District 

Court, and the Federal Circuit would have no jurisdiction to 

review such an order of the Board. However, the district court 

also construed those statutory provisions to mean that where the 

Board determines, as it did in the instant case, that an 

employee's appeal to the Board is "not appealable" under the 

statute, and the Board does not consider the employee's claim of 

.discrimination on its meritsi review of the Board's determination 

that it lacks jurisdiction to hear the employee's claim lies 

exclusively in the Federal Circuit. As the district court noted, 

if, in the instant case, the Federal Circuit reverses the Board's 

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determination that Wall's retirement was voluntary, the matter 

will then be remanded to the Board to hear Wall's discrimination 

claim on its merits. Should Wall then suffer an adverse ruling on 

the discrimination issue, he could then file an action in the 

district court. It would seem to follow that should the Federal 

Circuit on appeal uphold the Board's finding that Wall voluntarily 

retired, such would rule out any claim of discrimination. If 

Wall, in fact and in law, voluntarily retired, he cannot argue 

that his termination was the result of agency discrimination. 

In support of the district court's construction of these 

statutory provisions, see Synan v. Merit Systems 

765 F.2d 1099 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Ballentine 

Protection Bd., 738 F.2d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1984); 

Dep't of Army, 715 F.2d 1485 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 

Protection Bd., 

v. Merit Systems 

and Williams v. 

In Synan a postal employee appealed a seven-day suspension 

order to the Board contending that his suspension was the result 

of agency discrimination because of physical handicap. The Board 

dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 

did not reach the discrimination issue. On review, the Federal 

Circuit affirmed the Board, holding that the jurisdiction of the 

Board is not plenary, but is limited to those actions which are 

made appealable to it by law, rule or regulation, and that the applicable statute provides only for review of a suspension order of 

more than 14 days. Synan, 765 F.2d at 1100. The Federal Circuit 

rejected the employee's alternative argument that the appeal 

should be transferred to a United States District Court because of 

lack of jurisdiction by the Federal Circuit, since an appellant is 

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Appellate Case: 86-2004 Document: 01019300950 Date Filed: 03/31/1989 Page: 7 
granted no rights to a trial de novo in a civil action under § 

7702 or § 7703 until the discrimination issue and the appealable 

action have been decided on the merits by the Board. Id. at 1101. 

Ballentine was the basis for Synan, and neither, in our view, 

is at odds with Williams. 

Such cases as Covington v. Dep't of Health and Human 

Services, 750 F.2d 937 (Fed. Cir. 1984) and Christo v. Merit 

Systems Protection Bd., 667 F.2d 882 (lOth Cir. 1981), relied on 

by Wall, are inapposite. 

alleged discrimination, 

and, on appeal, the 

In Covington, which does not involve 

the Board found "voluntary retirement," 

Federal Circuit held that because of 

misinformation the retirement was involuntary as a matter of law, 

and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings. 

Covington, 750 F.2d at 944. As indicated, should the Federal 

Circuit reverse the Board's findings that Wall voluntarily 

retired, the matter presumably will be remanded to the Board with 

directions to hear the discrimination charge. 

In Christo, the Board rejected a terminated employee's claim 

of discriminatory discharge, and the employee filed a civil rights 

case in the United States District Court for the District of 

Colorado and a petition for review of the Board's decision in this 

court (the statute at that time provided for review of the Board's 

action by a United States Court of Appeals or the Court of 

Claims}. On a motion to dismiss, this court.transferred the petition to the district court. In Christo, unlike the instant case, 

the Board admittedly had jurisdiction of the appeal and accordingly ruled on the discrimination claim on its merits. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2004 Document: 01019300950 Date Filed: 03/31/1989 Page: 8 
We therefore hold that the Federal Circuit has exclusive 

jurisdiction to hear Wall's appeal from the Board's May 2 order 

that he voluntarily retired from the Department, and that his de 

novo action in the United States District Court for the District 

of Kansas was properly dismissed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2004 Document: 01019300950 Date Filed: 03/31/1989 Page: 9 
NO. 86-2004 --RICHARD J. WALL v. UNITED STATES, et al. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

I agree with the majority's conclusion that, under section 

205 of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. S 7703(b)(l) 

(1982), the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review 

the Board's ruling that it did not have an appealable order before 

it. The Board's decision that Wall's termination was "voluntary," 

and his action therefore not appealable, precluded the district 

court from exercising jurisdiction over Wall's discrimination 

claim pursuant to section 7703(b)(2) of that statute. However, I 

do not agree with the majority's conclusion that the district 

court had no jurisdiction over Wall's discrimination claims. 

Federal employees with discrimination claims are entitled to bring 

de novo actions in federal district court under the relevant civil 

rights statutes. Wall filed this action directly under the Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. S 633a(c) (1982), and 

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 u.s.c. S 749a (1982). For the 

reasons set out below, I am convinced that the district court had 

jurisdiction over Wall's action under those statutes. Because I 

conclude that the result reached by the majority is contrary to 

both the spirit and the language of the statutes at issue, I must 

respectfully dissent. 

On August 17, 1984, the director of Wall's division of the 

Department of Health and Human Services gave him a notice of 

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proposed termination. Wall protested the decision to his regional 

director, Al Kemp, but on September 18, 1984, Kemp informed Wall 

in a written memorandum that the termination decision would become 

effective on September 28. This memorandum advised Wall that he 

could appeal the decision to the Board, and further stated: 

"An appeal to the MSPB containing an allegation of 

discrimination (as defined in MSPB Regulations 

1201.15l(a)(2)) will not be erocessed concurrently with 

a discrimination complaint f1led within the Department. 

Accordingly, if you believe that this action is based on 

such discrimination, you may: 

1. Either appeal to the MSPB within 20 calendar days after the effective date of 

the action taken against you, raising the 

matter of discrimination in your appeal 

to the MSPB (and otherwise complying with 

MSPB Regulation 1201.153), ~ 

2. File a discrimination complaint within 

the Department ••• ; but you must, if 

you wish to file a discrimination 

complaint, first consult an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Counselor within 

30 calendar days after you receive the 

decision. 

Rec., vol. I, doc. 6, ex. B (emphasis added). Wall chose the 

first option and appealed the allegedly discriminatory decision to 

the Board. 

I. 

As set out below, the statutes governing appeals t0 the Board 

make clear that appeals decided by the Board involving discrimination are entitled to de novo judicial review. Cases in which an 

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employee both challenges an action that is appealable to the Board 

and alleges discrimination are termed mixed cases. See Christo v. 

Merit Systems Protection Board, 667 F.2d 882, 883-84 (lOth Cir. 

1981). Such cases are appealed to the Board under 5 u.s.c. S 

7702(a)(l) (1982), which states: 

"(a)(l) Notwithstanding any other prov1s1on of law, 

and except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, in the case of any employee or applicant for 

employment who --

(A) has been affected by an action which the 

employee or applicant may appeal to the Merit 

Systems Protection Board, and 

(B) alleges that a basis for the action was 

discrimination prohibited by --

(i) section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964 (42 u.s.c. 2000e-16), 

(ii) section 6(d) of the Fair Labor 

Standards Act of 1938 (29 u.s.c. 206(d)), 

(iii) section 501 of the Rehabilitation 

Act of 1973 (29 u.s.c. 791), 

(iv) sections 12 and 15 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 

u.s.c. 631, 633a), or 

(v) any rule, regulation, or policy directive prescribed under any provision of law 

described in clauses (i) through (iv) of this 

subparagraph, 

the Board shall, within 120 days of the filing of the 

appeal, decide both the issue of discrimination and the 

appealable action in accordance with the Board's appellate procedures under section 7701 of this title and 

this section." 

Adverse actions that may be appealed to the Board under the 

above-italicized language are narrowly defined, and include only 

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Appellate Case: 86-2004 Document: 01019300950 Date Filed: 03/31/1989 Page: 12 
removal, suspension for more than fourteen days, reduction in 

grade or pay, and furlough of thirty days or less. See Williams 

v. Dept. of the Army, 651 F.2d 243, 244 (4th Cir. 1981) (per 

curiam). As the majority notes, they do not cover a "voluntary" 

retirement, even when made under threat of remova1. 1 See Christie 

v. United States, 518 F.2d 584, 588 (Ct. Cl. 1975). 

Judicial review of Board decisions involving discrimination 

claims is governed by the following provisions. Section 

7702(a)(3)(A) states that "[a]ny decision of the Board under 

paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be a judicially reviewable 

action as of •.. the date of issuance of the decision •••. " 

Section 7703(b)(2) provides: 

"Cases of discrimination subject to the provisions 

of section 7702 of this title shall be filed under 

section 717(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 

u.s.c. 2000e-16(c)), section 15(c) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 u.s.c. 633a(c), and 

section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 

as amended (29 U.S.C. S 216(b)), as applicable. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any such case 

filed under any such section must be filed within 30 

days after the date the individual filing the case 

received notice of the judicially reviewable action 

under section 7702." 

5 u.s.c. § 7703(b)(2). Under these provisions, mixed cases in 

which discrimination is an issue, are reviewed de novo in federal 

1 Wall, of course, did not ·know his action was not appealable 

and thus not covered by section 7702(a)(l) until after he had 

chosen to appeal via that section and the Board found his 

termination voluntary. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2004 Document: 01019300950 Date Filed: 03/31/1989 Page: 13 
district court. See Christo v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 667 

F.2d 882, 885 (lOth Cir. 1981). Judicial review of Board 

decisions in which discrimination is not an issue is obtained in 

the Federal Circuit. 

"Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this 

subsection, a petition to review a final order or final 

decision of the Board shall be filed in the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any petition 

for review must be filed within 30 days after the date 

the petitioner received notice of the final order or 

decision of the Board." 

5 u.s.c. § 7703(b)(l). 

II. 

If Wall had chosen the second option set out in the Kemp 

memorandum and filed a discrimination claim with his department, 

he would have followed the procedures for filing age and handicap 

discrimination claims. See generally, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.211-.283; 

1613.501-.514; 1613.701-.709 (1987). An examination of the 

relevant civil rights statutes and associated regulations reveals 

that if Wall had pursued this option, he would have been entitled 

to de novo judicial review. 

It is apparent that Congress intended the Civil Service 

Reform Act provisions and the civil rights statutes to be read 

together to provide "a unified, coherent Federal structure to 

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Appellate Case: 86-2004 Document: 01019300950 Date Filed: 03/31/1989 Page: 14 
combat job discrimination in all its forms." Message of the 

President accompanying Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 32, 

(1978), reprinted in 5 u.s.c. App. at 1155 (1982), and in 92 Stat. 

3781 (1978). Confusing overlap and duplication were meant to be 

eliminated. The thrust behind these statutes and associated 

administrative enforcement procedures is 

Id. 

"to ensure that: (1) Federal employees have the same 

rights and remedies as those in the private sector and 

in State and local government; (2) Federal agencies meet 

the same standards as are required of other employers; 

and (3) potential conflicts between an agency's equal 

employment opportunity and personnel management functions are minimized. The Federal government must not 

fall below the standard of performance it expects of 

private employers." 

In this case, Wall asserted that his resignation was 

involuntary due to discrimination both on the basis of physical 

handicap and on the basis of age. Under the Rehabilitation Act of 

1973, which governs claims of handicap discrimination against the 

Federal government, a federal employee asserting such a claim may 

file a civil action as provided by Title VII within thirty days of 

final agency action on his claim. 2 See 29 u.s.c. § 794a(a)(l) 

(1982); 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-16(c) (1982). The claimant is entitled 

to de novo judicial consideration in such an action. See Prewitt 

v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 303 (5th Cir. 

2 Wall filed his claim in the district court within thirty days 

of the Board's decision dismissing his case. 

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1981). A federal worker alleging age discrimination has two 

options. He may either forego agency action and file a civil suit 

after giving the EEOC thirty days notice of his intent to file, or 

he may seek administrative relief. See 29 u.s.c. § 633a(c), (d) 

(1982); see also Langford v. United States Army Corps of 

Engineers, 839 F.2d 1192, 1193-94 (6th Cir. 1988); Purtill v. 

Harris, 658 F.2d 134, 138 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. 

Purtill v. Heckler, 462 u.s. 1131 (1983).3 If an employee chooses 

to first seek admininstrative relief, the subsequent judicial 

proceeding is an action de novo. See Rosenfeld v. Dep't of the 

Army, 769 F.2d 237 (4th Cir. 1985); Nabors v. United States, 568 

F.2d 657, 658 (9th Cir. 1978); see also Duggan v. Bd. of Educ., 

818 F.2d 1291, 1297 (7th Cir. 1987) (unreviewed state or local 

agency fact findings not given preclusive effect); but see 

Stillians v. State of Iowa, 843 F.2d 276, 282 (8th Cir. 1988) (2-1 

decision) (unreviewed state agency findings entitled to preclusive 

effect). 

These civil rights statutes, when read together with the 

provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act set forth above, 

manifest a clear Congressional directive that a federal employee 

seeking administrative relief on a discrimination claim be 

provided de novo judicial review. An employee may obtain such 

3 There is a split of authority on whether a plaintiff who 

chooses to first seek an administrative remedy must obtain final 

agency action in his claim before filing suit. Compare Langford, 

839 F.2d at 1193-94 with Purtill, 658 F.2d at 138. 

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review by filing suit in federal district court within thirty days 

of final agency action on the claim, whether the final agency 

action consists of resolution of a mixed case by the Board, or 

rejection of the claim by the claimant's agency. See S. Rep. No. 

969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 63, reprinted in 1978 u.s. Code Cong. & 

Admin. News 2723, 2785. 

III. 

The Board found that Wall's termination was voluntary. 4 It 

then ruled that because a voluntary termination is not an action 

which may be appealed to the Board, it had no jurisdiction under 

section 7702(a)(l) to decide the discrimination claim. The 

majority concludes that Wall may only appeal the finding of lack 

4 The Board here set out its standard for voluntariness as 

follows: 

"Although employee-requested actions are presumed to be 

voluntary, Christie v. United States, 518 F.2d 584 (Ct. 

Cl. 1975), this presumption will not prevail if the 

employee comes forward with sufficient evidence to show 

that the disputed action was involuntarily extracted or 

coerced. The standards for determining duress are set 

forth in Fruhauf Southwest Garment Co. v. United States, 

111 F. Supp. 945, 951 (Ct. Cl. 1953), as follows: 

(1) that one side involuntarily accepted the terms 

of another; 

(2) that circumstances presented no other alternative; and 

(3) that said circumstances were the result of 

coercive acts of the opposite party." 

Rec., vol. I, doc. 6, ex. H, at 2. 

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of jurisdiction, and that this appeal must be taken in the Federal 

.Circuit. In so concluding, however, the majority appears to 

equate the issue of voluntariness, which underlies the jurisdictional question, with the claim of discrimination. See slip op. 

at 7. If the two issues are in fact one and the same, that issue 

is whether the alleged discrimination resulted in a constructive 

discharge, i.e., an involuntary termination. Requiring Wall to 

appeal the Board's resolution of this issue in the Federal Circuit 

deprives him of de novo review of his discrimination claim in 

district court, a result contrary to the statutes and our holding 

in Christo. 

The Government, on the other hand, appears to argue that the 

issue of jurisdiction is a "threshold" issue unrelated to the 

discrimination claim. Accordingly, the Government asserts that 

Wall is only entitled to judicial review of this decision, and 

that review is therefore exclusively in the Federal Circuit. 

Apart from the conceptual difficulty of separating the issues of 

voluntariness and discriminatory constructive discharge, 5 under 

5 It is unclear what relationship, if any, exists between the 

Board's finding of voluntary retirement and Wall's discrimination 

claims. Board "voluntariness" is arguably relevant to either a 

claim of constructive discharge, a defense of waiver, or both. 

Although their standards vary, the circuits are in general 

agreement that the doctrine of constructive discharge is available 

to a civil rights plaintiff. See Derr v. Gulf Oil Co., 796 F.2d 

340, 343 (lOth Cir. 1986). In the Tenth Circuit, "the question on 

which constructive discharge cases turn is simply whether the 

employer by its illegal discriminatory acts has made working 

conditions so difficult that a reasonable person in the employee's 

position would feel compelled to resign." Id. at 344. If, as the 

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the Government's analysis, as it candidly admits, a person in 

Wall's position may be unable to raise his discrimination claim in 

any judicial forum. I cannot accept the Government's conclusion 

that Congress intended federal employees to be without a remedy in 

this situation. The Government has presented no compelling 

statutory construction or policy argument to support such a 

result, and it is clearly contrary to the Congress' express intent 

that federal workers' rights and remedies under the civil rights 

majority seems to suggest, the Board's finding of voluntariness is 

a determination of whether the agency here created an intolerable 

work environment by telling Wall he was to be terminated, the 

Board has without question resolved the merits of the alleged 

constructive discharge. 

The courts also recognize that a victim of discrimination may 

waive his right to seek relief under the civil rights acts by 

entering into a settlement with his employer. See, ~' 

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 & n.l5 (1974); 

Cox v. Allied Chem1cal Corp., 538 F.2d 1094, 1097-98 (5th Cir. 

1976), cert. denied sub nom. Allied Chemical v. White, 434 u.s. 

1051 (1978); Bernste1n v. Consolidated Foods Cor ., 622 F.Supp. 

1096, 1105-06 (N.D. Ill. 1984). However, [i n determining the 

effectiveness of any such waiver, a court would have to determine 

that the employee's consent to the settlement was voluntary and 

knowing." Alexander, 4+5 u.s. at 52 n.l5 (emphasis added).---

The Board decision in this case found that "the agency's 

personnel specialists clearly did not inform appellant that he 

would be precluded from exercising his appeal rights to the 

adverse action if he selected a retirement date effective the same 

date as that action." Rec., vol. I, doc. 6, ex. H, at 5. In 

ruling that Wall's decision was voluntary despite his lack of 

knowledge of the rights he was giving up, the Board clearly 

employed a standard inconsistent with that required to ascertain 

whether he waived a cause of action for discrimination. Moreover, 

an employer who alleges that a civil rights plaintiff has waived 

his right to proceed with his discrimination claim is asserting an 

affirmative defense to that claim. To the extent that the Board's 

decision was a ruling on this issue, the decision is, contrary to 

the Government's argument, a disposition of the merits of Wall's 

claim on an issue Wall is entitled to have reviewed de novo in 

district court. 

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statutes are to be fully protected. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1717, 

95th Cong., 2d Sess. 141, reprinted in 1978 u.s. Code Cong. & 

Admin. News 2723, 2874-75. 

IV. 

The Government argues that Wall has failed to exhaust 

admininstrative remedies with respect to the discrimination claims 

because the agency has not had an opportunity to address them. An 

argument can be made, however, that these claims have in fact 

received administrative consideration. See note 5 supra. 

Moreoever, as set out above, Wall was told by his agency that he 

could either raise his discrimination claims in his appeal to the 

Board, or file a complaint with the agency, but not both •. These 

instructions mirror the regulations issued by the EEOC controlling 

the administrative processing of mixed cases. See 29 C.F.R. 

1613.403. The regulations thus provide alternative means by which 

an employee such as Wall, who contends that his resignation was 

the involuntary result of illegal discrimination, can exhaust his 

administrative remedies. Wall pursued his claims with the Board, 

and its decision that it had no jurisdiction to consider those 

claims became final on May 7, 1985, long after the thirty-day 

period had expired within which Wall was required to initiate a 

-discrimination complaint with the agency. See 29 C.F.R. § 

1613.214(a). Even assuming that the agency would have extended 

the filing time, see id. at S 1613.214(a)(4), by establishing 

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alternative procedures for pursuing administrative relief, the 

regulations make clear that pursuing either alternative is 

sufficient to exhaust admininstrative remedies. See id. at S 

1613.421. 

Under the Government's argument, an employee such as Wall 

would have to undertake administrative relief twice, inevitably 

beginning his second attempt after the time to do so had run, a 

result that defies logic and congressional intent to eliminate 

confusing overlap and duplication. Because Wall was clearly 

entitled to present his claims to the Board instead of filing a 

discrimination complaint with his agency, the Board's ruling that 

Wall's resignation was voluntary is final agency action on those 

claims for purposes of triggering Wall's right to de novo judicial 

review under the applicable civil rights statutes. 

v. 

Accordingly, I would hold that Wall is entitled to judicial 

review of his discrimination claims in district court. In so 

doing, I recognize that Wall would then have two parallel judicial 

actions arising from one administrative proceeding, a result we 

disapproved in Christo, 667 F.2d at 885. However, given the 

instant circumstances, .such a consequence is the unavoidable 

outcome of insuring Wall's statutory right to de novo review of 

his discrimination claims. The Federal Circuit has taken steps to 

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• 

ameliorate the duplication by holding Wall's appeal in that court 

in abeyance pending our resolution here. The Federal Circuit 

could choose to continue this course of action until Wall's 

discrimination claims have been disposed of, and then take 

whatever action it deems proper in light of their disposition. 

For these reasons, I dissent. 

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