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Parties Involved:
J.C. Penney Corporation, Inc.
Appellee
Josephine Joyce
Appellant

Document Text:

*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 22, 2010*

  Decided July 23, 2010

Before

        FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

        RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

        DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐4031

JOSEPHINE JOYCE,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

J.C. PENNEY CORPORATION, INC.

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 05 C 6596

Harry D. Leinenweber,

Judge.

O R D E R

Josephine Joyce sued J.C. Penney in Illinois state court for negligently injuring her in

a retail store.  J.C. Penney removed the suit to federal court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1446, where the

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 09-4031 Document: 14 Filed: 07/23/2010 Pages: 3
No. 09‐4031 Page 2

company won a partial summary judgment that excluded from the case most of Joyce’s

asserted injuries.  To obtain review of that ruling, Joyce then voluntarily moved to dismiss

with prejudice the remainder of her case.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2).  We affirm the

judgment.

We first determine whether we have appellate jurisdiction.  When a plaintiff

voluntarily forgoes with prejudice the remainder of a case to secure immediate appellate

review of a contested and otherwise interlocutory ruling, the proceedings in the district

court are finished.  And here, because those proceedings are over, appellate jurisdiction is

secure. See McMillian v. Sheraton Chi. Hotel & Towers, 567 F.3d 839, 843 (7th Cir. 2009); Ash v.

Wallenmeyer, 879 F.2d 272, 273‐74 (7th Cir. 1989).  We turn, then, to the merits.

Joyce claims that in November 2003 an employee at one of J.C. Penney’s stores

negligently rammed a rolling display rack into her ankle, causing her to twist and fall.

Joyce continued shopping, but sought treatment the next day for pain in her left leg and

back.  Doctors observed tenderness in her lower back and a possible sprain to her foot or

ankle, but concluded that the pain in her leg was “not anatomically related” to her foot or

ankle injury.  By the time she sued, Joyce attributed several other medical conditions to the

collision.  These included a cyst behind her left knee, a viral infection in her left eye, and the

aggravation of many preexisting conditions, such as: an injured sciatic nerve and other

lower‐back and leg injuries (from a car accident and another fall years earlier), bulging discs

in her spine, a degenerative spinal disease, arthritis, anxiety, and possible depression (all

diagnosed before the store accident).  For her alleged injuries, she sought three million

dollars in damages.  No expert was willing to testify to a reasonable degree of medical

certainty that the collision at the store had caused or exacerbated any of Joyce’s injuries or

conditions, except for some pain in her back and left ankle.

Both parties moved for summary judgment.  In granting J.C. Penney’s motion in

part, the district court noted that Joyce could point to no medical evidence linking her cyst,

viral infection, depression, or arthritis to the collision at the store.  As for Joyce’s other back,

neck, and leg conditions (such as her bulging discs, spinal disease, and injured sciatic

nerve), the district court observed that no medical expert was willing to attest to more than

a mere possibility that these were caused or aggravated by the clothes‐rack crash.  Thus, the

district court ruled, no reasonable jury could find that she had established causation under

Illinois law, which requires “reasonable certainty,”and not just a chance, that J.C. Penney

caused these injuries.  Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 640 n.1 (7th Cir. 2008); First

Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 720 N.E.2d 1068, 1072 (Ill. 1999).  Only the evidence of

the back and ankle pain that followed the store accident, the district court concluded,

required a trial.

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On appeal Joyce argues that under Illinois law her lay opinion and her medical

experts’ opinions about the mere possibility of causation were enough to defeat summary

judgment.  Under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal courts in diversity cases

like this one apply state substantive law on the requirement of causation, but follow the

federal law of evidence, Schindler v. Seiler, 474 F.3d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 2007).  Here, Joyce’s

evidence would not permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the collision in the store

caused or aggravated any of the maladies that the district court said were unrelated to the

collision.  First, Joyce did not produce any competent evidence that the collision caused her

cyst, viral infection, depression, or arthritis.  Her lay views about the origins of these

medically complex problems do not suffice.  See United States v. York, 572 F.3d 415, 420 (7th

Cir. 2009) (“Opinions or inferences based on ‘scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge within the scope of Rule 702ʹ are not admissible as lay testimony under Fed. R.

Evid. 701.”).  Second, although some of Joyce’s doctors were unwilling to rule out the

possibility that the collision worsened her earlier back, neck, and leg injuries, speculation

about causation will not defeat summary judgment.  See Wintz v. Northrop Corp., 110 F.3d

508, 515 (7th Cir. 1997) (Illinois law); Zimmer v. Celotex Corp., 549 N.E.2d 881, 883 (Ill. App.

Ct. 1989); Lindenmier v. City of Rockford, 508 N.E.2d 1201, 1207 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).  The only

competent evidence that Joyce presented was that the collision created additional back and

ankle pain, but Joyce chose to abandon a trial to recover damages for only that pain.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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