Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05323/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05323-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd.
Appellee
Edward Ocampo
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 6, 1997 Decided September 23, 1997

No. 94-5321

NAN M. OLDHAM, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 

OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN R. OLDHAM, DECEASED,

APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT

v.

KOREAN AIR LINES CO., LTD.,

APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE

Consolidated with Nos. 94-5323, 94-5324, 94-5371 & 94-5382

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 83cv02941) 

(No. 83cv03792) 

(No. 83cv03889)

-

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Andrew J. Harakas argued the cause for appellant, with 

whom Deborah A. Elsasser was on the briefs. Timothy J. 

Lynes entered an appearance.

Juanita M. Madole argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for appellees.

Before WALD and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges, and BUCKLEY, 

Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Senior Judge BUCKLEY.

BUCKLEY, Senior Judge: These consolidated cross-appeals 

concern pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages awarded in 

three separate actions brought against Korean Air Lines Co., 

Ltd., by the survivors and estates of four passengers killed on 

a flight from New York City to Seoul, Korea in 1983. As 

explained more fully below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, 

and remand for certain proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Proceedings in and Disposition by the District Court

On September 1, 1983, Korean Air Lines ("KAL") flight 

KE007 deviated from its plotted course and strayed into the 

airspace of the former Soviet Union. The plane crashed into 

the Sea of Japan after being struck by missiles fired from a 

Soviet military fighter plane. The crash killed all 269 persons 

aboard. See generally In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of 

September 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475, 1477-79 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 

Multi-district litigation proceedings established KAL's liability for this disaster. The individual cases were then separately tried for damages. In this appeal, KAL challenges damage 

awards in three of those trials.

In 1993, KAL filed a number of motions in the cases then 

awaiting trial in the United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia, two of which now come before us on 

appeal. The first motion sought to limit recoverable damages 

to those authorized by the Death on the High Seas Act 

("DOHSA"), 46 U.S.C. App. §§ 761-768, which prohibits recovery of nonpecuniary damages. In the second, KAL opUSCA Case #94-5323 Document #298205 Filed: 09/23/1997 Page 2 of 26
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posed the plaintiffs' requests for the award of prejudgment 

interest and argued that in the event the court made such an 

award, interest should be based on the rates paid on 52-week 

Treasury Bills.

On April 8, 1993, the district court denied the motions. It 

held that DOHSA did not preclude the recovery of damages 

for non-pecuniary injuries because, in the court's view, damages for loss of society, survivor's grief, and pre-death pain 

and suffering were recoverable under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention governing international air transportation. 

See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating 

to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 

XVII, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934) (reprinted in note following 49 

U.S.C. § 40105 (1994)) ("Warsaw Convention"). The court 

also ruled that prejudgment interest is recoverable at a rate 

to be determined after trial.

The cases were then tried in order to determine KAL's 

liability for the four deaths. The juries made the following 

awards:

Oldham v. KAL:

Death of John Oldham:

a. to Nan M. Oldham (mother):

(1) loss of support: $ 26,000

(2) loss of society: $100,000

(3) grief: $225,000*

b. to Charlotte Oldham-Moore (sister):

(1) loss of financial support: $ 8,000

(2) loss of guidance, training, and advice: $ 25,000

(3) loss of society: $ 20,000

(4) grief: $ 65,000*

c. to Nancy Oldham Raab (sister):

(1) loss of society: $ 15,000

(2) grief: $ 40,000*

d. to William D. Oldham III (brother):

(1) loss of society: $ 20,000

(2) grief: $ 60,000*

e. Pre-death pain and suffering: $100,000

Maikovich v. KAL:

1. Death of Allen Kohn:

a. to Robert Kohn (son):

(1) loss of support, gifts, and contributions: $120,000

(2) loss of inheritance: $434,000

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(3) loss of guideance, training, aand advice: $ 50,000

(4) loss of society: $150,000

(5) grief: $180,000*

b. to Joseph Kohn (son):

(1) loss of gifts and contributions: $ 60,000

(2) loss of inheritance: $433,000

(3) loss of guidance, training, and advice: $ 30,000

(4) loss of society: $ 80,000

(5) grief: $ 80,000*

c. to Marsha Maikovich (daughter):

(1) loss of gifts and contributions: $ 70,000

(2) loss of inheritance: $433,000

(3) loss of guidance, training, and advice: $ 30,000

(4) loss of society: $100,000

(5) grief: $100,000*

d. Pre-death pain and suffering: $100,000

2. Death of Lillian Kohn:

a. to Robert Kohn (son):

(1) loss of gifts and contributions: $ 70,000

(2) loss of guidance, training, and advice: $ 50,000

(3) loss of society: $150,000

(4) grief: $130,000*

b. to Joseph Kohn (son):

(1) loss of gifts and contributions: $ 60,000

(2) loss of guidance, training, and advice: $ 30,000

(3) loss of society: $ 80,000

(4) grief: $ 80,000*

e. Pre-death pain and suffering: $100,000

c. to Marsha Maikovich (daughter):

(1) loss of gifts and contributions: $ 70,000

(2) loss of guidance, training, and advice: $ 30,000

(3) loss of society: $100,000

(4) grief: $100,000*

d. to Lillian Percy Beale (mother):

(1) loss of society: $ 50,000

(2) grief: $ 50,000*

e. Pre-death pain and suffering: $100,000

Ocampo v. KAL:

Death of Suellen Ocampo:

a. to Edward Ocampo (husband):

(1) loss of services: $ 26,000

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(2) loss of society: $ 35,000

(3) grief: $ 75,000*

b. to the Estate of Suellen Ocampo:

(1) loss of net accumulated assets: $ 63,016

(2) pre-death pain and suffering: $ 0

* All jury awards for grief were later stricken by the 

district court.

Following entry of final judgment in each case, KAL timely 

moved for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, 

for a new trial or remittitur of damages. The district court 

granted KAL's motions to set aside all damage awards for 

survivors' grief but denied the motions in all other respects.

B. Statement of Relevant Facts in the Individual Cases

1. Oldham v. KAL

This action was brought by Nan Oldham, the mother of 

decedent John R. Oldham, on her own behalf and as personal 

representative of his estate. She seeks pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages for herself, the estate, and the decedent's 

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three surviving siblings, Charlotte Oldham-Moore, Nancy 

Oldham Raab, and William D. Oldham III.

Mr. Oldham's parents, Dr. William Oldham and Nan Oldham, became separated in 1970 when she and her children 

returned to the United States from Taipei, Taiwan, where the 

family had lived since 1966. They were divorced in the 

following year. Since that time, Dr. Oldham has continued to 

live overseas and has had virtually no contact with his children. In fact, at the time of Mr. Oldham's death, his younger 

sister Charlotte, who was then 18, had not seen her father 

since she was one-and-one-half years old.

Mr. Oldham received his undergraduate degree from 

Princeton University. During his years there, he returned 

home during holidays and in the summers to be with his 

mother and siblings. In 1980, after a year abroad as a 

Fulbright scholar during his senior year of college, Mr. 

Oldham began a three-year program at Columbia University's 

law school, returning home to be with his family during 

vacations, in the summer, and about twice a month on weekends during the school year. There is ample testimony that 

during all these years, he took a special interest in the 

upbringing and education of his sister Charlotte and that she 

came to regard him as a surrogate father.

Following his graduation from law school in 1983, the law 

firm of Surrey & Morse offered him a job as an associate. 

Because he had an opportunity to teach the American legal 

system in China as a Ford Foundation Fellow, the firm 

rescheduled his starting date for June 1984 at the same 

salary. Mr. Oldham told a professor at the law school and a 

lawyer at Surrey & Morse about his family's background and 

about his belief that he bore the financial responsibility for 

supporting his mother and his sister Charlotte. (His sister 

Nancy had married in 1982.)

Mr. Oldham also mentioned to family members that he 

intended to provide financial assistance to his mother and 

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Charlotte once he was earning a salary. Charlotte admitted 

that she had never received financial assistance from her 

brother. Although she expected that he would have helped 

finance her education, she did not know how much he would 

have contributed.

2. Maikovich v. KAL

Marsha J.K. Maikovich, daughter of decedents Allen and 

Lillian Kohn, sued for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages 

on her own behalf and on behalf of her parents' estates. The 

Kohns were survived by three children, Marsha Maikovich, 

Joseph Kohn, and Robert Kohn, and Lillian Kohn's mother, 

Lillian Percy Beale. At the time of the crash, Allen Kohn 

was a 64-year-old stockbroker with Drexel Burnham Lambert ("Drexel Burnham"). He had spent his entire career at 

Drexel Burnham, having started to work for the firm in the 

mid-1950's. His compensation during the years from 1978 

through 1982 ranged between $58,425 and $78,355. In 1983, 

his earnings up to September 1, the day he died, totaled 

$106,365. In the approximately 30 years that he had worked, 

he had accumulated an estate of $1,500,000, all of which was 

distributed to his children after his death.

Decedent Lillian Kohn was 55 years old when she died. 

She was a homemaker who worked on occasion as a freelance 

writer. The only evidence of her earnings presented at the 

trial showed that she had been paid $11,654 in 1979.

The Kohns' two oldest children, Marsha Maikovich (age 29) 

and Joseph Kohn (age 26), were college educated, financially 

independent adults at the time of the crash. Both testified at 

the trial that, at the time of the crash, they were not receiving 

any money from the decedents for necessities and did not 

expect to need or receive financial support from them in the 

future. Nevertheless, the Kohns' children remained extremely close to their parents and telephoned them one or more 

times a week to share experiences and to discuss their 

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problems. The evidence also indicated that the Kohns made 

frequent financial contributions to or on behalf of the adult 

children.

Their third child, Robert Kohn, was 17 years old and 

preparing to attend college at the time of the crash. When 

he turned 18, Robert assumed control of a custodial account 

containing $102,449 that had been established by Allen Kohn 

for Robert's education. Although the Kohns had established 

similar accounts for their other two children, their father paid 

for their college and post-graduate expenses out of other 

funds and gave these children the money in the custodial 

accounts. Robert ultimately received undergraduate and 

graduate degrees and, at the time of the trial, was working 

for a consulting firm outside of Pittsburgh.

3. Ocampo v. KAL

Decedent Suellen Ocampo, who was 39 years old at the 

time of her death, lived with her husband Edward Ocampo 

(the plaintiff in this case), their two minor children (ages 3 

and 4), and her mother. Although Mrs. Ocampo's mother and 

two children were also killed in the KE007 crash, their claims 

were settled prior to trial. The trial therefore concerned only 

KAL's liability to Mr. Ocampo and to his wife's estate.

The decedent was a licensed pharmacist who earned approximately $32,000 a year. At the time of the crash, Mr. 

Ocampo was employed at a brokerage firm. He had previously worked as a housekeeper and as a restaurant manager. 

His mother-in-law looked after the two children and was fully 

dependent on the Ocampos for her financial support.

At the trial, Mr. Ocampo testified that he had contributed 

about 40 percent of the family's total support and that he and 

his wife had placed all of their money in a joint account from 

which he received $20 a week. He also testified that his wife 

paid the household bills from the account. The Ocampos 

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owned a home in Staten Island, New York, for which they 

had made a $20,000 down payment that virtually exhausted 

their savings. Mr. Ocampo failed to present any evidence 

that would indicate either the size of their family expenses or 

the extent to which the expenses had been paid by the 

decedent.

II. ANALYSIS

We will address the issues common to all three cases and 

then discuss the issues particular to Oldham, Maikovich, and 

Ocampo in that order.

A. Claims Common to the Three Cases

1. This Court's July 26, 1996 Order

Following the parties' submissions of briefs in these appeals, we ordered that the cases be held in abeyance pending 

the decision of the Supreme Court in Zicherman v. Korean 

Air Lines Co., Ltd., 116 S. Ct. 629 (1996). Order dated 

September 20, 1995. The Supreme Court issued its decision 

on January 16, 1996, which held, inter alia, that

Articles 17 and 24(2) of the Warsaw Convention permit 

compensation only for legally cognizable harm, but leave 

the specification of what harm is legally cognizable to the 

domestic law applicable under the forum's choice-of-law 

rules. Where, as [in the case of Flight KE007], an 

airplane crash occurs on the high seas, DOHSA supplies 

the substantive United States law.... DOHSA permits 

only pecuniary damages....

Id. at 637. The Court, however, explicitly declined to consider whether DOHSA permits the recovery of damages for a 

decedent's pain and suffering. Id. at 636 n.4. KAL moved 

for permission to submit a supplemental brief to address the 

recoverability of such damages under DOHSA. We directed 

the parties to file replacement briefs "limited in scope to 

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those issues which were raised in the parties' first [submissions]" and dismissed as moot KAL's motion for leave to file 

supplemental papers. Order dated July 26, 1996.

In its replacement briefs, KAL challenged the availability 

of damages for pre-death pain and suffering under DOHSA 

even though it had failed to raise that issue in its earlier 

submission. KAL claims that our July 26 Order implicitly 

permitted it to argue the question because, it asserts, we 

would not have dismissed its request as moot unless we 

intended to allow it to discuss the matter. KAL is mistaken. 

Our July 26 Order clearly stated that the parties' replacement 

briefs would be "limited in scope to those issues" raised in the 

first submissions. We dismissed KAL's motion as moot 

because our instructions indicated that KAL could not address the availability of pre-death pain and suffering damages 

if the question had not previously been raised.

KAL offers no reason why it could not have raised the 

issue in its initial briefs. This is hardly surprising because it 

was well aware of its existence long before the Supreme 

Court's decision in Zicherman. In fact, KAL's counsel had 

argued the unavailability of damages for pre-death pain and 

suffering before the district court and in several related cases 

elsewhere in the country. Accordingly, we will not consider 

KAL's claim that such damages are unavailable as a matter of 

law. See Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 96 F.3d 151, 

153-54 (6th Cir. 1996) (declining, in a related case, to address 

pre-death pain and suffering claims because issue was not 

raised in initial briefs), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997). 

2. Loss of Society

KAL contends that the district court erred in holding that 

damages for loss of society were available under Article 17 of 

the Warsaw Convention. Although such damages are recoverable under general maritime law, see Sea-Land Servs., Inc. 

v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585 (1974), the Supreme Court ruled, 

in Zicherman, that "where DOHSA applies, neither state law 

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... nor general maritime law ... can provide a basis for 

recovery of loss-of-society damages," 116 S. Ct. at 632 (citations omitted), and that "[b]ecause DOHSA permits only 

pecuniary damages, petitioners are not entitled to recover for 

loss of society." Id. at 637. Accordingly, the awards for loss 

of society are disallowed.

B. Oldham v. KAL

The jury awarded decedent John Oldham's younger sister, 

Charlotte Oldham-Moore, $8,000 for loss of support and 

$25,000 for loss of guidance, training, and advice. KAL 

argues that because Charlotte was not dependent on her 

brother prior to or at the time of his death, she cannot 

recover these damages under DOHSA.

The district court rejected this argument, reasoning that

[a]lthough KAL is correct that recovery for loss of 

guidance, training, and advice under ... DOHSA[ ] has 

generally been limited to a decedent's children, in light of 

the Warsaw Convention's intent to compensate claimants 

for "damage sustained," this Court finds that whether 

recovery for loss of guidance, training, and advice is 

permissible depends upon the factual circumstances giving rise to such a claim.

Oldham v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., C.A. No. 83-3889, 

mem. op. at 16 (D.D.C. Oct. 11, 1994). The court noted that it 

had instructed the jury that "in order for Charlotte to recover, you must find from the evidence that John Oldham acted 

in place of a parent or a father for her." Id. With respect to 

loss of support, the court found that, because the mother and 

sister had testified to conversations in which Mr. Oldham had 

pledged to provide them with financial assistance in the 

future, there was sufficient evidence in the record to sustain 

the jury award.

As we have explained, the district court erred in relying on 

the Warsaw Convention. See Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 634-

36. Moreover, under DOHSA, a suit for damages may be 

brought only "for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, 

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husband, parent, child or dependent relative." 46 U.S.C. app. 

§ 761; see Evich v. Connelly, 759 F.2d 1432, 1433 (9th Cir. 

1985) ("Siblings must prove their dependency in order to 

bring a DOHSA action."). For dependency to exist, "there 

must be a legal or voluntarily created status where the 

contributions are made for the purpose and have the result of 

maintaining or helping to maintain the dependent in his 

customary standard of living." Petition of United States, 418 

F.2d 264, 272 (1st Cir. 1969) (quoting United States Fidelity 

& Casualty Co. v. Britton, 188 F.2d 674, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1951)).

We agree with KAL that there is no evidence that Charlotte was financially dependent upon her brother. To the 

contrary, the record shows that she was supported by her 

mother and that Mr. Oldham had never provided her with 

any financial support prior to his death. Although there was 

evidence that Mr. Oldham had promised his mother and sister 

that he would support them in the future, a pledge of future 

performance is insufficient to establish a present state of 

dependency. Accordingly, we reverse the awards.

C. Maikovich v. KAL

KAL argues that, in Maikovich, the district court erred in 

allowing damage awards for the following: (1) the Kohn 

children's loss of inheritance; (2) their loss of gifts and 

contributions and of support; (3) their loss of guidance, 

training, and advice; and (4) the decedent's pain and suffering.

1. Loss of Inheritance

The jury awarded the Kohn children $1.3 million for loss of 

inheritance. The district court then employed the "Ibbotson 

Index" (a stock market index that tracks the rate of return on 

investments in traded securities) in calculating the prejudgment interest, which increased the total to approximately 

$5 million. KAL challenges this award on four grounds. 

KAL claims, first, that the court abused its discretion when it 

admitted testimony by the plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. 

Thomas C. Borzilleri. KAL relies on Joy v. Bell Helicopter 

Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 568 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that 

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admission of expert testimony was abuse of discretion when 

testimony was pure conjecture unsupported by the record), to 

argue that Dr. Borzilleri's testimony should have been excluded because his calculations and method of projecting the loss 

of inheritance were "rampant speculation." Second, it argues 

that the award is not supported by sufficient evidence in the 

record. Third, KAL contends that the amounts awarded for 

the losses of gifts and contributions should have been deducted from the awards for losses of inheritance. Fourth, it 

argues that the court erred in its calculation of prejudgment 

interest.

Each side presented expert testimony on the value of the 

Kohn children's lost inheritance. The testimony focused on 

two related questions: (1) How much would have been added 

to the children's inheritance out of Mr. Kohn's future earnings if he had not died prematurely; and (2) how much larger, 

if at all, would the inheritance have been if Mr. Kohn had 

been able to continue to manage the $1.5 million securities 

portfolio beyond 1983.

With respect to the first question, the parties' experts 

projected Mr. Kohn's future earnings over their respective 

estimates of his future work life, added a percentage for 

fringe benefits that Mr. Kohn would have received from his 

employer, and deducted taxes and personal/family expenses 

in order to arrive at annual savings that his children would 

have ultimately inherited. In his initial presentation, Dr. 

Borzilleri estimated the value of the accrued savings to be 

$1.6 million in 1993 dollars (1993 being the year the trial took 

place), while KAL's expert, Dr. John Glennie, valued the 

savings at $256,000 in 1983 dollars (the year of the crash).

The disparity between Dr. Borzilleri's and Dr. Glennie's 

initial estimates results largely from three critical differences 

in their assumptions and methodologies. First, the experts 

used different "base" incomes for their projections. While 

they both attributed to Mr. Kohn an annualized 1983 income 

of approximately $162,000 based on his earnings prior to his 

death on September 1, 1983, Dr. Borzilleri used that figure as 

his base in computing what Mr. Kohn would have earned in 

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succeeding years. But because Dr. Glennie considered those 

earnings aberrational (they were more than twice as large as 

those of any previous year), he used Mr. Kohn's 1982 earnings of $76,118 as the basis for his projections.

Second, because a stockbroker's compensation usually consists of commissions, both experts agreed that Mr. Kohn's 

income would reflect changes in the volume or value of the 

trading on the New York Stock Exchange ("Exchange"), but 

they arrived at different correlations between his earnings 

and those changes. Dr. Borzilleri assumed that Mr. Kohn's 

income would have gone up or down in direct proportion to 

any increase or decrease in the prices of stocks traded on the 

Exchange (e.g., if the value of the market increased by 10 

percent, so would Mr. Kohn's commissions). Dr. Glennie, 

however, examined Mr. Kohn's brokerage income for the 

years 1972 through 1982 (once again rejecting the 1983 

earnings as unrepresentative) and determined that, on average, Mr. Kohn's earnings rose or fell at about half the rate of 

change in the trading volume on the Exchange (e.g., if the 

trading volume increased by 10 percent, his earnings would 

increase by five percent). While Dr. Borzilleri based his 

projections on changes in prices on the Exchange and Dr. 

Glennie based his on changes in trading volume, they both 

agreed that whether one looks at price or volume makes little 

difference in the final outcome.

Third, the experts disagreed on the age at which Mr. Kohn 

would have retired. Dr. Borzilleri testified that, although the 

children had never heard their father speak of retiring and 

believed that he would have died on the job, he adopted the 

more conservative assumption that Mr. Kohn would have 

worked until he reached the age of 74. In contrast, Dr. 

Glennie relied solely on work life expectancy charts published 

by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of 

Labor to conclude that Mr. Kohn would have retired fourand-a-half years earlier, at age 69. He claimed that these 

charts were more objective than the children's testimony. On 

cross-examination, Dr. Borzilleri stated that he had done his 

doctoral thesis on the subject of retirement and emphasized 

that the Department of Labor chart reflected the average 

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retirement age of all persons. He noted that while laborers 

tended to retire before they reached the average age, high 

income professionals tended to fall into two groups: those 

who retire very early and "fish the rest of their lives" and the 

rest, who continue working past the average retirement age. 

He also indicated that the charts yield strange results for 

certain groups of people. For example, an 18-year-old is 

estimated to retire at age 55 even though, in reality, most 

people are not financially able to do so.

There were other differences in the two experts' assumptions. Dr. Borzilleri, for example, estimated that Mr. Kohn 

would have received fringe benefits amounting to 10 percent 

of his annual compensation whereas Dr. Glennie assumed a 

rate of 23 percent; and although Dr. Borzilleri's calculations 

of accrued savings ended with Mr. Kohn's actuarial death in 

1998, Dr. Glennie's projections extended to the year 2008, 

when his widow would have reached the end of her life 

expectancy, on the assumption that there would have been no 

distribution to the children until that time.

We need not analyze these differences because, on rebuttal, 

Dr. Borzilleri adopted Dr. Glennie's methodology and assumptions in all but two respects. First, he rejected the 

assumption that Mr. Kohn's 1983 earnings were aberrational. 

He therefore used them both as his base for projecting Mr. 

Kohn's subsequent earnings and in determining the correlation of those earnings with fluctuations of the market. Thus, 

employing Dr. Glennie's methodology but including the 1983 

earnings in his calculations, he concluded that, on average, 

Mr. Kohn's earnings changed at about 87 percent of the rate 

of change in trading volume on the Exchange. Second, Dr. 

Borzilleri continued to assume that Mr. Kohn would have 

worked until he reached the age of 74.

Having adopted Dr. Glennie's assumptions and methodology in every respect but these, Dr. Borzilleri calculated the 

children's loss, in 1983 dollars, to be $1.3 million. Dr. Borzilleri noted that this result was virtually the same as the one he 

had reached in his initial presentation because the net lost 

earnings of $1.6 million to which he had earlier testified was 

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stated in 1993 dollars, which is equivalent to $1.2 million in 

1983 dollars.

Because, in awarding damages for the loss of inheritance, 

the jury used the exact figure Dr. Borzilleri had arrived at in 

his rebuttal testimony, we conclude that the award was based 

on that testimony. See Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, 

Inc., 891 F.2d 1112, 1123 (4th Cir. 1989) ("The verdict that 

Sandberg's stock was worth $60 at the time of the merger 

clearly evinces acceptance by the jury of the testimony of her 

expert witness."); Cities Service Gas Co. v. FPC, 535 F.2d 

1278, 1287 & n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (finding that where jury 

award differed from expert's multimillion dollar evaluation by 

only 67 cents, the jury "must have accepted" that expert's 

assumptions). The question before us, then, is whether there 

was sufficient evidence to support the two key changes that 

Dr. Borzilleri made in his opposing expert's assumptions. We 

believe there was.

In his cross-examination, KAL's counsel sought to discredit 

Dr. Borzilleri's use of Mr. Kohn's 1983 compensation in his 

projections of Mr. Kohn's post-1983 income. He specifically 

challenged their inclusion in the calculation of "average earnings" that Dr. Borzilleri used to correlate his earnings with 

the volume of trading on the New York Stock Exchange. In 

answering counsel's questions, Dr. Borzilleri acknowledged 

that economists and statisticians typically used the median 

sum, i.e., the middle of a set of numbers, rather than the 

average because averages are influenced by extreme values 

whereas medians are not. He nevertheless defended his 

reliance on the 1983 earnings, stating that he knew of no 

basis for ignoring a number merely because it was too big 

and that anomalies must be scrutinized, not discarded out of 

hand.

Dr. Borzilleri agreed that the 1983 earnings were large 

when compared with those of previous years. But given the 

dramatic developments that had taken place in the securities 

markets in late 1982 and 1983, he thought they provided an 

appropriate basis for projecting future income. As he had 

earlier testified while presenting an Ibbotson Associates chart 

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illustrating the returns on various kinds of investments, August 1982 marked the beginning of one of the three strongest 

bull markets in our nation's history. Between then and the 

end of the bull market in August 1987, the value of investments in stocks with dividends reinvested nearly quadrupled, 

which represented a compound rate of return of 30.1 percent. 

Dr. Borzilleri maintained, therefore, that the likely explanation for the size of Mr. Kohn's 1983 earnings was that the 

stock market had "taken off." We believe that this evidence, 

combined with the correlation that both experts agreed existed between the market and a stockbroker's earnings, was 

sufficient to enable a reasonable jury to conclude that Dr. 

Borzilleri's use of the 1983 earnings was appropriate.

There was also ample support in the record for his assumption that Mr. Kohn would have continued to work until he was 

74. As we noted earlier, his children testified that their 

father had stated that he would never retire. The record also 

indicates that there was no retirement age at Drexel Burnham, that a former colleague at that firm was 73 years old 

and still working, and that Mr. Kohn had been a healthy, 

vigorous man. Accordingly, it would not have been irrational 

for the jury to accept this key assumption.

Because the award for the loss of inheritance was based on 

Dr. Borzilleri's computation, in rebuttal, of the savings Mr. 

Kohn would have accumulated but for his premature death, 

we do not reach the second question the experts were asked 

to address, namely, whether the heirs had suffered a loss 

resulting from the distribution to them of $1.5 million in 

securities that would otherwise have remained under their 

father's management.

Although we reject KAL's challenges to the jury's loss of 

inheritance award, we are persuaded by its contention that 

the Kohn children may well have received a double recovery 

in this case resulting from the awards to them of a total of 

$450,000 for the loss of gifts and contributions from their 

parents. Because the computation on which the $1.3 million 

loss of inheritance award was predicated did not include 

deductions for such gifts, these losses should have been 

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deducted from the amounts awarded for loss of inheritance 

unless there was evidence that the parents would have used 

funds other than those earned and saved by Mr. Kohn in 

making the gifts. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's 

decision not to deduct the awards for gifts and contributions 

from those for the loss of inheritance and remand for further 

proceedings to determine whether the awards resulted in 

double recoveries, and if so, to what degree.

Lastly, KAL objects both to the district court's award of 

prejudgment interest on the loss of inheritance awards and to 

the means by which the interest rate was calculated. 

"[W]hether pre-judgment interest is to be awarded is subject 

to the discretion of the court and equitable considerations." 

Motion Picture Ass'n of Amer., Inc. v. Oman, 969 F.2d 1154, 

1157 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The purpose of such awards is to 

compensate the plaintiff for any delay in payment resulting 

from the litigation. See id. ("interest compensates for the 

time value of money, and thus is often necessary for full 

compensation"). KAL argues that because Dr. Borzilleri 

stated his loss of inheritance calculations in 1993 dollars, 

there was no need to add prejudgment interest. Although 

that was true of his initial presentation, we have concluded 

that the jury's $1.3 million award was based on Dr. Borzilleri's rebuttal testimony, which was stated in 1983 dollars. 

Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest.

The question that remains is whether the court abused its 

discretion when it directed that the Ibbotson Index be used to 

determine how much interest was payable. We observed in a 

recent case that the prime rate, i.e., the rate that banks 

charge for short-term unsecured loans to credit-worthy customers, is an appropriate measure of prejudgment interest. 

Forman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 84 F.3d 446, 450 (D.C. 

Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 582 (1996). Although the court 

used the prime rate for all the other damage awards in these 

cases, it employed the Ibbotson Index in the case of the loss 

of inheritance award. The court reasoned that because that 

loss reflected

what Mr. Kohn would have made as a stockbroker and 

what he had saved through stock market transactions, 

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... the Ibbotson Index is the best tool for determining 

what interest the children could have made on the money 

if they had received it in 1983when the accident occurred.

Maikovich v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., C.A. No. 83-3792, 

mem. op. at 3 (D.D.C. July 16, 1993). We are not persuaded 

by this reasoning. What Mr. Kohn would have made and 

saved is irrelevant to the question of what constitutes appropriate compensation for a delay in a successful party's receipt 

of a cash payment. The time value of the money is the same 

whether paid in satisfaction of an award for a loss of inheritance or a loss of society. Accordingly, we strike the award 

and remand for recomputation.

2. Loss of Support, Gifts, and Contributions

Under DOHSA, recovery in a wrongful death action occurring on the high seas "shall be a fair and just compensation 

for the pecuniary loss" sustained by the decedent's wife, 

husband, parent, child, or dependent relative. 46 U.S.C. app. 

§§ 761, 762. The district court determined that the Kohns' 

17-year-old son, Robert, but not their two adult children, 

could recover for loss of support, which "includes all the 

financial contributions that the decedent would have made to 

his dependents had he lived," Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 584-85. 

The court decided, however, that all three could recover for 

the loss of gifts and financial contributions that, based on past 

experience, they could reasonably have expected to receive 

from their parents in the future. The jury awarded the three 

children an aggregate of $250,000 to compensate them for the 

loss of their father's support (in the case of Robert), gifts, and 

contributions and an aggregate of $200,000 for the loss of 

their mother's gifts and contributions.

KAL challenges these awards on three grounds. First, it 

claims that the loss of support award for Robert should have 

been limited to support until he reached the age of 18. 

Second, it argues that the awards to the adult children for 

loss of gifts and of contributions are not permitted under 

DOHSA. Third, it contends that the awards for the losses of 

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gifts from Lillian Kohn should be struck because she had 

virtually no income independent of her husband.

a. Loss of Support for Robert Kohn

KAL contends that the award for loss of support of Robert 

Kohn should be set aside. Although Robert was a 17-yearold minor at the time of the plane crash, he was preparing to 

go away to college. Mr. Kohn had established a custodial 

account containing more than $100,000 for his education, 

which was distributed to him when he turned 18. According 

to KAL, there was no evidence that Robert would have been 

financially dependent on his parents after reaching that age 

because the money in the account was sufficient to meet his 

education and living expenses.

KAL ignores uncontradicted testimony that the Kohns had 

provided their older children, Marsha and Joseph, with complete financial support through college and graduate school 

notwithstanding the existence of similar custodial accounts for 

their benefit. Under the circumstances, we are satisfied that 

the jury was entitled to conclude that, had they survived, the 

Kohns would have continued to support Robert financially 

until he had completed his college and graduate school education. Accordingly, we affirm the award.

b. Loss of Gifts and Contributions to Adult Children

Contrary to what KAL argues, there is nothing in DOHSA 

that prohibits an award for an adult's loss of financial gifts 

and contributions. In fact, the statute does not limit the 

kinds of losses for which damages may be awarded so long as 

they are pecuniary in nature. There is no question that the 

loss of prospective financial contributions is pecuniary in 

nature. Accordingly, we find no error.

c. Loss of Gifts and Contributions from Lillian Kohn

KAL maintains that the district court erred when it rejected KAL's motion to set aside the jury awards to the three 

children for the loss of gifts and contributions from their 

mother. It notes that the record contains no evidence that 

Mrs. Kohn received any income other than the $11,653 she 

earned in 1979 or that she provided gifts or contributions out 

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of her own resources. Therefore, KAL argues, these awards 

represent double recoveries by the children. We agree with 

the court, however, that there was sufficient evidence that 

Mrs. Kohn had used funds from the joint checking account 

she shared with her husband to make gifts and contributions 

to her children to support the conclusion that she would have 

continued to do so in the future. Accordingly, we affirm the 

awards.

3. Loss of Guidance, Training, and Advice

DOHSA permits recovery for the monetary value of services a decedent would have continued to provide but for his 

wrongful death. "Such services include ... the nurture, 

training, education, and guidance that a child would have 

received had not the parent been wrongfully killed." Gaudet,

414 U.S. at 585. The district court recognized that, under 

DOHSA, recovery for loss of guidance, training, and advice 

has generally been limited to that provided a decedent's 

minor children. It nevertheless concluded that awards to 

adult children for such losses were permissible under the 

Warsaw Convention.

As became clear when the Supreme Court issued its intervening decision in Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 634-36, the 

district court erred in relying on the Convention. Moreover, 

we agree with the Second and Fifth Circuits that, under 

DOHSA, damages for loss of parental guidance and training 

are available to adult children only if there is a very specific 

showing that "their parents' guidance had a pecuniary value 

beyond the irreplaceable values of companionship and affection." Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 789 (5th Cir. 1976) 

(quoting First Nat'l Bank in Greenwich v. National Airlines, 

Inc., 288 F.2d 621, 624 (2d Cir. 1961)); see also In re Air 

Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804, 

830 (2d Cir. 1994).

The evidence at the trial indicated that, after reaching her 

majority, Marsha Maikovich lived with her parents during her 

first year of law school, sought advice and guidance from 

them about career choices after she had received her law 

degree, discussed medical options when she was ill in the 

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hospital, discussed childbearing and parenting issues with her 

mother, and sought her father's advice on financial matters 

such as investments and home ownership. Similarly, Joseph 

Kohn testified that he lived with his parents after graduating 

from college, worked at Drexel Burnham with his father, and 

discussed with him his decision to pursue a master's degree in 

business. After leaving graduate school, he sought advice 

from his father about workplace dynamics and investment 

matters.

In short, the evidence showed that the Kohns were interested, loving, and helpful parents. Although we have no 

doubt that Marsha and Joseph placed great value on the 

counseling that they sought and continued to receive from 

their parents, there is nothing in the record to show that 

these children suffered a financial loss as a result of their 

inability to receive such guidance after 1983. Accordingly, we 

reverse the awards to Marsha and Joseph for loss of guidance, training, and advice and remand the award to Robert so 

that the district court may determine the value of the loss 

that he suffered between the time of the crash and his 

eighteenth birthday.

Because we reverse the jury awards on this issue, we need 

not consider KAL's argument that the claimants are not 

entitled to prejudgment interest on those awards. We express no opinion on whether prejudgment interest may be 

appropriate on any award that Robert may receive for the 

loss of guidance, training, and advice prior to his eighteenth 

birthday but leave that determination to the district court.

4. Pre-Death Pain and Suffering

Although we have declined to consider KAL's claim that 

damages for pre-death pain and suffering are not available 

under DOHSA because it was not raised in its initial briefs, 

see supra at 10, we will consider its timely argument that 

there was insufficient evidence to support the jury awards of 

$100,000 for the pre-death pain and suffering of each of the 

three decedents in Maikovich and Oldham.

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As we noted in Forman, the "key factual dispute turns on 

whether the passengers were immediately rendered unconscious." 84 F.3d at 449. Expert witnesses for the plaintiffs 

in Maikovich and Oldham addressed this issue. In Maikovich, one expert testified that although shrapnel from a Soviet 

missile had penetrated the rear of the plane, it had not caused 

the aircraft to explode or to disintegrate. He then stated 

that because Mr. and Mrs. Kohn were seated over the wing, 

they would have been able to don their oxygen masks after 

the missile attack and would have been fully conscious and 

aware of the events around them until the plane hit the 

water. Similarly, an expert for the plaintiff in Oldham

testified that the shrapnel would not have reached the seat 

assigned to John Oldham and that the drop in pressure within 

the plane automatically would have caused the oxygen masks 

to drop in front of the passengers.

A second expert in Maikovich testified that a rapid decrease in air pressure within the cabin could have resulted in 

ruptured eardrums, the tearing of sinus tissue and of the 

lungs, and a buildup of pressure in the stomach or intestines. 

He stated that the Kohns would have experienced physical 

pain from one or more of these causes and would have 

suffered mental pain as well. An expert in Oldham described 

the effects of decompression on the human body and testified 

that Mr. Oldham would have experienced physical pain, anxiety, and fear.

Although KAL asks us to dismiss this testimony as speculative because there was nothing in the record to confirm that 

the three decedents had in fact survived the Soviet strike and 

had remained conscious and experienced pain, we find that 

the evidence presented in these cases was substantially similar to that which we found sufficient in Forman. See 84 F.3d 

at 449-50; see also Bickel, 96 F.3d at 155-56 (finding sufficient evidence of pre-death pain and suffering in same accident); Hollie v. KAL, 60 F.3d 90, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995) (same), 

judgment vacated on other grounds and case remanded, 116 

S. Ct. 808 (1996); Zicherman v. KAL, 43 F.3d 18, 23 (2d Cir. 

1994) (same), rev'd in part on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 629 

(1996). Accordingly, we affirm the awards.

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D. Ocampo v. KAL

Plaintiff Edward Ocampo, who brought this action on his 

own behalf and as administrator of his wife's estate, contends 

that the district court made three trial errors: (1) it employed 

an overly narrow definition of loss of support and, as a result, 

incorrectly directed a verdict for KAL; (2) it improperly 

instructed the jury on his claim of "loss of the net accumulated assets"; and (3) it improperly admitted evidence of his 

salary.

1. Loss of Support

Mr. Ocampo argues that the district court misunderstood 

the nature of a loss of support claim by equating it with the 

costs associated with the basic necessities of life. According 

to him, the trial judge should have permitted damages for 

"loss of pecuniary benefits" or "loss of financial contributions" 

equivalent to his wife's gross earnings less taxes and her 

personal consumption.

We disagree. As an initial matter, the record does not 

support Mr. Ocampo's assertion that the district court limited 

his claims to the costs associated with the basic necessities of 

life. Rather, it characterized loss of support as

the loss of anything from which he economically benefitted directly. If [Mrs. Ocampo] made a contribution 

toward his ability to maintain himself, in any form that 

can be measured economically, that's what he lost when 

she died.

Transcript of Trial Proceedings, May 5, 1993, at 135. The 

court also noted that in order to determine what that contribution was, it would be necessary to take into account Mrs. 

Ocampo's expenditures for the benefit of her children and 

mother as well as such family expenses as the payments due 

on their mortgage.

Regardless of how the loss is defined, we find no error. 

Mr. Ocampo failed to present any evidence that would demonstrate the extent to which he personally benefitted from the 

decedent's earnings. He testified that he and his wife both 

worked full time, that he earned approximately 40 percent of 

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the family's income, and that they deposited their earnings in 

a joint bank account from which he received approximately 

$20 a week. He did not testify to having received any other 

money from either the account or his wife, and he presented 

no evidence concerning the breakdown of household expenses.

We find this case distinguishable from Forman because the 

evidence there indicated that the "Formans' was a share-andshare-alike household such that the jury could reasonably find 

that whatever portion of Evelyn's earnings remained after 

taxes and after her personal consumption would redound to 

Eric's benefit." 84 F.3d at 450. In this case, Mr. Ocampo 

failed to provide any evidence that would indicate how much 

of his wife's earnings would redound to his benefit as compared to that of his children and mother-in-law. Thus, the 

district court properly directed a verdict for KAL on this 

issue.

2. Loss of Net Accumulated Assets

The district court instructed the jury that Mr. Ocampo was 

entitled to recover damages for the "loss of the net accumulated assets" suffered by him in his capacity as administrator 

of his wife's estate. Mr. Ocampo argues that because the 

instruction limited the recovery to losses suffered by him in 

his capacity as administrator and because it equated the loss 

with a mere loss of inheritance, the court hopelessly confused 

the jury. As a consequence, he states, the jury ignored 

expert testimony to the effect that had she not died in the 

crash, his wife would have accrued more than $1.5 million in 

net earnings that would have been available to him.

We see no reason to question the district court's instruction. The court had already ruled that Mr. Ocampo had 

failed to introduce any evidence that would have enabled a 

jury to award damages for the loss of financial contributions. 

Therefore, it was entirely appropriate for it to advise the jury 

that the claim for loss of net accumulated assets was being 

made on behalf of the estate and that, in making the award, 

the jury would have to determine what property Mrs. Ocampo would probably have accumulated from her earnings and 

pension benefits had she not died. The jury was not confused 

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by this instruction. Mr. Ocampo's economist testified that, 

based on the decedent's earnings and after appropriate deductions, his wife would have been able to save approximately 

$18,562 between 1983 and the time of trial and an additional 

$34,454 thereafter. The jury awarded $18,562 for the past 

loss of net accumulated assets and $44,454 for future losses 

(i.e., $10,000 more than the expert's estimate).

3. Evidence of Mr. Ocampo's Salary

Mr. Ocampo also argues that the district court erred in 

admitting the amount of his salary into evidence, which he 

claims is inadmissible in a wrongful death action. He fails to 

explain how he has been harmed by this admission. The 

district court did not rely on this evidence when it found in 

favor of KAL on the loss of support claim. Accordingly, if 

there was any error, it was harmless.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the district court's rulings 

are affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

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