Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06358/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06358-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Davis
Appellant
Donald B. Rice
Appellee

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

United Stiif@~ Q}yff of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

MAY 15 1;;1 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

JAMES DAVIS, Clerk 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

DONALD B. RICE, Secretary, Department 

of the Air Force, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 90-6358 

(D.C. No. CIV-90-776-P) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

This appeal is from an order of the district court granting 

swmnary judgment to the defendant on plaintiff's claims of racial 

discrimination and denial of his constitutional right to equal 

protection and due process of 1 law. We affirm the grant of 

1111rnmary judgment with respect to the racial discrimination claim. 

We also agree with the district court that it had no subject 

j 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

1 The parties requested that this matter be submitted on the 

briefs. After examining the briefs and appellate record, it was 

determined by the court that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case was therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 90-6358 Document: 010110106511 Date Filed: 05/15/1991 Page: 1 
matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's constitutional claims and 

that those claims should be dismissed. 2 

Plaintiff James Davis, a black American, was employed by 

defendant Secretary of the Air Force as a Supervisory Operating 

Accountant at Tinker Air Force Base. An investigation by the 

Inspector General determined that Mr. Davis had engaged in sexual 

harassment. This conclusion was based on statements by four 

female employees detailing specific acts of sexual harassment 

committed against them by Mr. Davis ranging over a period of 

approximately eight years. Two of the women complained that the 

objectionable conduct had occurred as recently as April 1989, the 

month in which the investigation by the Inspector 

commenced. 

General 

Mr. Davis was initially informed by defendant that he would 

be removed from his job. In response to this notice, he submitted 

affidavits from various employees, both male and female, stating 

that he had not, in their presence, engaged in acts of sexual 

harassment. After considering Mr. Davis' presentation, the Chief 

of Accounting and Finance informed Mr. Davis that he would be 

retained in federal service but demoted from his GS-12 

classification to the grade of GS-11 and assigned nonsupervisory 

duties. 

2 Because the district court had no jurisdiction over 

plaintiff's constitutional claims, as discussed herein, those 

claims should have been dismissed. To the extent that the 

district court's order purports to grant summary judgment to 

defendant on those claims, that portion of the order is vacated 

and Mr. Davis' claims based on due process and equal protection 

are dismissed. 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-6358 Document: 010110106511 Date Filed: 05/15/1991 Page: 2 
Contemporaneous with the adverse action taken against 

plaintiff, defendant also imposed disciplinary action against 

Mr. Donald Fairbetter, a Caucasian, for sexually harassing two 

female subordinates. Mr. Fairbetter, like Mr. Davis, was a GS-12 

Supervisory Operating Accountant, and he was similarly demoted to 

a GS-11 grade and deprived of supervisory duties. 

Alleging that he had been discriminated against because of 

his race, plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed his demotion to the 

Merit Systems Protection Board (hereafter MSPB or the Board). The 

Administrative Judge found that (1) plaintiff had failed to 

establish a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the agency had 

proven plaintiff's sexual harassment of three female employees; 

(3) there had been no harmful error to plaintiff in the processing 

of the proposed removal and resulting demotion action; and (4) the 

demotion action was "within the limits of reasonableness and 

promotes the efficiency of the service." Initial Decision, Merit 

Systems Protection Board, Dallas Regional Office, 

No. DA07529010070 (March 8, 1990). Mr. Davis did not pursue his 

administrative appeal further, and, thus, the Administrative 

Judge's decision became the MSPB final decision. 

In response to his unsuccessful MSPB action, Mr. Davis filed 

a complaint in the district court for the Western District of 

Oklahoma under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 

42 u.s.c. SS 2000(a)-2000(h) (1988), alleging racial 

discrimination and due process and equal protection violations. 

Mr. Davis contends that (1) he proved a prima facie case of racial 

discrimination; (2) the findings of sexual harassment were 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-6358 Document: 010110106511 Date Filed: 05/15/1991 Page: 3 
erroneous for a variety of reasons; and (3) the district court 

denied him his right to a trial de !1QYQ by relying on the record 

from the administrative proceedings in his racial discrimination 

case and by granting summary judgment for the defendant. 

Final decisions of the MSPB are subject to review by the 

federal district court and by this court. Wilder v. Prokop, 846 

F.2d 613, 620 (10th Cir. 1988). Where the MSPB is acting within 

the scope of its authority, a fact not disputed here, its findings 

will be sustained unless they are plainly erroneous or 

inconsistent with the Board's own regulations. Id. at 619. A 

reviewing court cannot · substitute its judgment for that of the 

Board and may only act to insure that federal law and required 

procedures have been followed and that the action of the Board is 

not arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion. Id. Under 

this standard, the Board's action needs only a rational basis in 

law to be sustained. Id. Because the reviewing district court 

granted summary judgment in this case, our role is to view the 

case in the same manner as did that court. Clark v. Atchison, 

Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 731 F.2d 698, 700 (10th Cir. 1984). We 

thus are required to determine "whether any genuine issue of 

material fact exists, and, if not, whether the substantive law was 

correctly applied." Id. 

Prima Facie Case of Discrimination 

In granting summary judgment against Mr. Davis and thus 

affirming the MSPB, the district court concluded that because he 

offered no evidence that he had been treated differently than a 

4 

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similarly situated white worker, Mr. Davis failed to prove even a 

prima facie case of race discrimination. Davis v. Rice, No. CIV90-776-P, Order Granting Summary Judgment, slip op. at 8-9 (W.D. 

Okla. Sept. 24, 1990) (District Court Order). We have reviewed 

the record and agree that Mr. Davis failed to present sufficient 

evidence of discrimination. 

Mr. Davis advanced a discrimination claim based on disparate 

treatment and so must show that he was treated in a manner which, 

"but for [his race] would be different." City of Los Angeles 

Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978). In 

order to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination based 

on individual disparate treatment , Mr. Davis must prove that (1) 

he is a member of a protected group; (2) he was similarly situated 

by circumstance to an individual not a member of such a group; and 

(3) he was treated more harshly or disparately than the similarly 

situated non-group member. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

411 U.S. 792, 802 & n.13 (1973); McAlester v. United Air Lines, 

Inc., 851 F.2d 1249, 1260 (10th Cir. 1988). The plaintiff must 

produce evidence of discriminatory intent or motive to establish a 

prima facie case; this intent can be inferred from the mere fact 

of differences in treatment. McAlester, 851 F.2d at 1260. Mr. 

Davis, however, can point to no one who was not a member of a 

protected group and whose circumstances were similar to his who 

received more favorable treatment than he did. He therefore has 

not established a prima facie case of race discrimination. 

Indeed, the evidence indicates that Mr. Fairbetter, a Caucasian 

similarly charged with sexual harassment was given the exact same 

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Appellate Case: 90-6358 Document: 010110106511 Date Filed: 05/15/1991 Page: 5 
penalty by the defendant as was Mr. Davis. 3 The district court 

was therefore correct in granting sununary judgment to the 

defendant on this issue. Because Mr. Davis failed to meet his 

initial burden of establishing a prima facie case, his argument 

that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the sexual 

harassment claim sufficient to raise the spectre of pretext is 

premature and irrelevant. 

Trial De Novo 

Mr. Davis correctly argues that 5 u.s.c. S 7703(c) (1988) 

requires a trial de IlQYQ in cases of discrimination. Mr. Davis, 

however, has received a trial de novo on his discrimination claim. 

He now attempts to argue that the district court, by considering 

the MSPB record from the proceedings surrounding the sexual 

harassment claim, has somehow denied him his de novo review. This 

argument is not persuasive. 

Mr. Davis cites Whatley v. Skaggs Cos .• Inc., 707 F.2d 1129, 

1137 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983), for the 

proposition that an agency record is inadmissible in a subsequent 

trial de novo involving a claim of racial discrimination. 

Whatley. however, is distinguishable from this case. In Whatley 

the court was reviewing an agency finding regarding the 

plaintiff's claim of race discrimination in a subsequent trial 

regarding the same claim. Here, the district court reviewed the 

defendant's record regarding the sexual harassment proceedings to 

3 Mr. Davis does not argue that he was sanctioned 

abusive behavior than was his Caucasian counterpart. 

6 

for less 

Appellate Case: 90-6358 Document: 010110106511 Date Filed: 05/15/1991 Page: 6 
determine whether the defendant had a legitimate nondiscriminatory 

reason for demoting Mr. Davis. The district court was not 

reviewing the record from the MSPB to determine whether the 

finding of sexual harassment could stand but rather was 

considering whether the defendant had raised a genuine issue of 

fact regarding its treatment of Mr. Davis sufficient to rebut the 

charges of race discrimination. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs 

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981). The district court, 

consistent with Burdine, reviewed the MSPB record to determine 

whether it could rationally conclude that the demotion of 

Mr. Davis had not been motivated by discriminatory animus. Id. at 

257. Because of Mr. Davis' failure to prove a prima facie case of 

discrimination, the court was not required to examine defendant's 

evidence regarding his nondiscriminatory reason for demoting 

Mr. Davis. However, the court did not err in conducting this 

review. 4 

Mr. Davis argues that because this case was disposed of on 

summary judgment he was denied his statutorily mandated trial de 

~- Mr. Davis cites no case, however, holding that the rules of 

civil procedure regarding summary judgment are suspended in Title 

VII cases. On the contrary, while the courts may be more cautious 

in granting summary judgment in cases where intent and motivation 

are at issue, summary judgment may still be appropriate in some 

4 The court in Whatley was also concerned about the problem of 

hearsay. That problem does not exist in this case, however, 

because the record considered by the district court was not 

offered to prove the truth of the matters contained therein, but 

rather was offered to show absence of discriminatory animus on the 

part of defendant. 

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circumstances. Foster v. Arcata Assocs., Inc., 772 F.2d 1453, 

1459 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986). "One 

purpose of the allocation of burden in Title VII and ADEA actions 

is to enable the district courts to identify meritless suits and 

dispense with them short of trial." Id.; accord Schwenke v. 

Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 858 F.2d 627, 628 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Under the facts of this case, summary judgment was appropriate and 

did not deny Mr. Davis his day in court. 5 

Constitutional Claims 

In his complaint, Mr. Davis alleged the deprivation of his 

constitutional right to equal protection and due process. 

Complaint at 4, 6. The district court was correct in noting that 

such constitutional claims are not within its subject matter 

jurisdiction. District Court Order at 13-14. In Bush v. Lucas, 

462 U.S. 367, 385-86 (1983), the Supreme Court held that 

constitutional claims raised by federal employees are fully 

cognizable in the elaborate, comprehensive civil service system 

created by Congress. It thus refused to recognize a Bivens6 

remedy for constitutional violations alleged by federal employees. 

Id. at 390; ~ also Petrini v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1482, 1483-84 

(10th Cir. 1990) (citing Lombardi v. Small Business Admin., 

5 Mr. Davis' remaining arguments regarding procedural 

irregularity are without merit. We are satisfied that both the 

MSPB and the district court followed federal procedural law in 

this matter and that the action of the MSPB was neither arbitrary 

nor capricious. Wilder, 846 F.2d at 619. 

6 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of 

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 

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889 F.2d 959 (10th Cir. 1989); Brothers v. Custis, 886 F.2d 1282 

(10th Cir. 1989)~ Hill v. Department of the Air Force, 884 F.2d 

1318 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub Il.Q!lk. Hill v. Britt, __ 

U.S. __ , 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990)). Thus the merit system of which 

Mr. Davis is a part presented his exclusive avenue for relief. 

See Wilder, 846 F.2d at 626-27. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

STEPHEN H. ANDERSON 

Circuit Judge 

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