Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00060/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00060-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lafayette Cade
Plaintiff
Jeanne Woodford
Defendant
James Yates
Defendant

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 Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at Pleasant Valley State Prison. Therefore, his claims for injunctive 1

relief are moot. Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir.

1991). 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAFAYETTE CADE,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEANNE WOODFORD, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-CV-00060 OWW SMS P

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH

LEAVE AMEND

(Doc. 1)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL SET FORTH

IN COMPLAINT

(Doc. 1)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement 

Plaintiff Lafayette Cade (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action for

injunctive relief on January 17, 2006. Plaintiff names formerCalifornia Department of Corrections 1

and Rehabilitation (CDCR) Director Jeanne S. Woodford, Pleasant Valley State Prison (PVSP)

Warden James Yates, and Does 1-10 as defendants. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

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court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may

appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the

test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004)(“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a

plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

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. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes

the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

The only two named defendants in this action are the former CDCR Director and PVSP’s

warden. Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions

of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation

must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for

relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the

defendant either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of

the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient

that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the

constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards

are broad, some facts must be alleged to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v.

Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of facts

sufficiently linking the named defendants to any actions or omissions that violated plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. 

Further, plaintiff’s complaint does not comply with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which calls for a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Rule 8(a) expresses the principle of notice-pleading, whereby the pleader need

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only give the opposing party fair notice of a claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

Rule 8(a) does not require an elaborate recitation of every fact a plaintiff may ultimately rely upon

at trial, but only a statement sufficient to “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim

is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. at 47. 

Plaintiff’s complaint does not in compliance with Rule 8(a), because it does not consist of

a short and plain statement of plaintiff’s claims, and it does not provide defendants Woodford and

Yates with fair notice of what they did or did not do that allegedly violated plaintiff’s rights. In

addition, plaintiff’s lengthy allegations consist largely of facts which do not support any claims for

relief and/or are factually fanciful. For example, plaintiff alleges in part that he is being “battered

. . . by adverse substances administered to him through his air food and water,” and that defendants

“employed undetectable machine units that plaintiff believes transmitted modulated magnetic and

or electronic force beams or similar type force that was used to repeatedly pound his head, heart, and

lungs - as if said body parts were being struck with a hard material object - at times when he was in

his cell, in the dayroom of his housing building, and on the prison exercise yard . . . .” (Comp., ¶¶3,

8.) These allegations are fanciful.

C. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

In his complaint, plaintiff sets forth a request for the appointment of counsel. Plaintiff does

not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action, Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520,

1525 (9th Cir. 1997), and the court cannot require an attorney to represent plaintiff pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490

U.S. 296, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 1816 (1989). However, in certain exceptional circumstances the

court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to section 1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d

at 1525. 

In the present case, the court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. See Rand,

113 F.3d at 1525. Even if it is assumed that plaintiff is not well versed in the law and that he has

made serious allegations which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, his case is not exceptional.

This court is faced with similar cases almost daily. Therefore, plaintiff’s request for the appointment

of counsel shall be denied.

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D. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint does not state any claims upon which relief may be

granted under section 1983 and failsto comply with Rule 8(a). The court will provide plaintiff with

the opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in this

order.

Plaintiff is informed he must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained

of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d

227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once

plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case.

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement

of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted under section 1983 and failure to comply with Rule

8(a);

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file an

amended complaint;

4. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the court

will recommend that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted; and

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5. Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 23, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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