Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-01180/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-01180-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Leslie Atkins
Plaintiff
Department of the Army
Defendant
John M. McHugh
Defendant

Document Text:

Page 1 of 11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

LESLIE ATKINS,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN M. MCHUGH,

Secretary of the Army,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil Action Number

5:13-cv-1180-AKK

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Leslie Atkins, a 54 year old1 African-American who has worked for the 

United States Department of the Army for over twenty years, claims that her 

supervisors denied her promotions and training, and reassigned her to a less 

desirable job because of her race and age. Doc. 15. Accordingly, Atkins pursues 

claims against the Secretary of the Army, John McHugh, for alleged violations of 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 

and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et 

seq. Doc. 15. The Secretary moved for summary judgment, doc. 28, which is due 

to be granted for the reasons below. 

 

1 This is Atkins’s age as of the date she filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (“EEOC”). See doc. 29-15 at 1. 

FILED

 2015 Apr-21 PM 12:02

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:13-cv-01180-AKK Document 45 Filed 04/21/15 Page 1 of 11
Page 2 of 11

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary

judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” To support 

a summary judgment motion, the parties must cite to “particular parts of materials 

in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, 

affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other 

materials.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Moreover, “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of 

summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a 

party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden 

of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving 

party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who is required to 

“go beyond the pleadings” to establish that there is a “genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 

324 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A dispute about a material fact 

is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 

the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

The court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 

Case 5:13-cv-01180-AKK Document 45 Filed 04/21/15 Page 2 of 11
Page 3 of 11

398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (all justifiable 

inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor). However, “mere 

conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a 

summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 

2005) (per curiam) (citing Bald Mountain Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 863 F.2d 1560, 

1563 (11th Cir. 1989)). Furthermore, “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting 

the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing 

that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 

1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

Atkins’s allegations center around her experiences while working as an 

administrative assistant in the Department of Public Works (“DPW”) of the U.S. 

Army Garrison at Redstone Arsenal (“Redstone”). Atkins joined Redstone in 1995 

as a secretary for the Fox Army Health Center, and in 2003 transferred to DPW to 

 

2 Atkins sought three extensions of the deadline to respond to the Secretary’s motion for summary 

judgment. See docs. 31, 33, 35. The court granted the first two, see docs. 32, 34, and denied the third one, which 

Atkins filed after the deadline for her responsive brief, see doc. 41. Without obtaining leave from the court (which 

the court would have denied) Atkins nonetheless submitted a response on March 2, 2015—a week after the extended 

deadline the court afforded her. See docs. 36-40. To make matters worse, Atkins completely ignored the court’s 

guidelines and limitations and separated her brief into two separate documents, which totaled fifty pages 

collectively—twenty pages more than the court’s page limit. See docs. 36, 37. For filing her brief after the twice 

extended deadline, for exceeding the page limits, and for violating the court’s submission guidelines, Atkins’s 

responses in opposition to the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment are STRICKEN.

Consequently, because Atkins failed to file a timely response, the only evidence before the court is that 

which Defendant has submitted in support of its motion. Despite the fact that the motion is unopposed, the court has 

carefully reviewed all record evidence, resolved all inferences in favor of Atkins, and considered the merits of the 

motion in reaching its decision. See United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, 

Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he district court cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the 

mere fact that the motion was unopposed, but, rather, must consider the merits of the motion.”). Moreover, the court 

also read the stricken briefs Atkins filed to satisfy itself that nothing in them would justify a different result in this 

case. 

Case 5:13-cv-01180-AKK Document 45 Filed 04/21/15 Page 3 of 11
Page 4 of 11

work as an Office Automation Assistant. Doc. 29-3 at 14-15. Redstone categorized

the Office Automation Assistant Position as a “GS-5” grade level position. Id. In 

October 2006, Atkins earned a promotion to a GS-6 Administrative Support 

Assistant for the Engineering Division of DPW. Id. at 16. Atkins remained in that 

position for five years, consistently earning pay raises until she reached the 

maximum salary allowed for a GS-6 position. Id.

In 2011, Redstone received instructions from its Installation Management 

Command to “reduce its overall size” by eliminating personnel in excess of the 

“table distribution of allowances” (“TDA”).3 Docs. 29-6 at 24, 67; 29-8 at 12. In 

compliance with this mandate, Redstone’s Garrison Commander, Colonel John 

Hamilton, eliminated many clerical positions which were “less critical” to the 

organization—including Atkins’s position at DPW. Doc. 29-8 at 17. As a result, 

Colonel Hamilton transferred Atkins laterally with no loss in pay to a vacant GS-6 

Administrative Support Assistant position with the Installation Safety Directorate 

(the “Safety Office”). See docs. 29-3 at 18; 29-6 at 67; 29-8 at 18. Atkins contends, 

however, that the Safety Office is “one of the lowest branches within” Redstone

and believes Colonel Hamilton transferred her because of her race and age. Doc.

29-3 at 40, 56.

Atkins also believes that Redstone denied her training because of her race 

 

3 The TDA is a budgeting document the Army publishes each fiscal year for each Army organization that 

dictates “what resources [the organizations are] authorized in terms of people and equipment.” Doc. 29-8 at 11. 

Case 5:13-cv-01180-AKK Document 45 Filed 04/21/15 Page 4 of 11
Page 5 of 11

and age throughout her tenure as a GS-6 employee, which presumably prevented 

her from qualifying for a promotion to a higher grade level. Id. at 26. Specifically, 

Atkins purportedly requested training from two supervisors—Joey Skinner and 

Keith Cook—but never received that training because her supervisors told her 

“they didn’t have the funding.” Id. at 26, 77. Meanwhile, Atkins’s “general belief” 

is that Redstone offered training to four other Caucasian and/or younger 

employees,4 who were then able to successfully compete for promotions. Id. at 30. 

According to Atkins, Redstone “preselected” these employees for those higher 

level positions by “fixing” the job announcements. Id. 

The four employees Redstone trained and promoted purportedly because of 

their race and/or age are: 

1. Margaret Ingram

Margaret Ingram purportedly received training to help her advance from a 

GS-7 Environmental Protection Specialist Assistant position to a GS-9 Specialist 

Assistant position. Id. at 28-30. To support this contention, Atkins claims that she 

“just [feels] like” Ingram received training. Id. at 29. 

 

4 While Atkins identified two additional comparator employees (Allison Holt and Christina Fults) in her 

complaint, doc. 15 at 3-4, she clarified in her deposition that she is no longer alleging those employees are 

comparators, doc. 29-3 at 50. Likewise, in the stricken opposition she filed, she clarified that she is no longer 

alleging that Teresa Dial and Mary Kight are comparators. The court will nonetheless include Dial and Kight in its 

analysis. 

Case 5:13-cv-01180-AKK Document 45 Filed 04/21/15 Page 5 of 11
Page 6 of 11

2. Teresa Dail

Teresa Dail began working at Redstone in 2006 as a GS-7 Management 

Assistant. Doc. 29-10 at 4. Two years later, Dail successfully applied for a GS-9 

Program Analyst Position. Id. Atkins generally believes that Redstone trained and 

preselected Dail for the GS-9 position because she “would have to get some onthe-job training or some training somewhere . . . [since] she doesn’t have any 

education in order to qualify her for the [GS-9] job.” Doc. 29-3 at 46. But, Atkins 

testified that she is “not sure” what on-the-job training Dail received. Id. at 45. 

3. Mary Kight

Along the same lines, Atkins seemingly believes that Redstone chose Mary 

Kight—who is older than Atkins—for a GS-7 position based on discriminatory 

animus. See id. at 51-53; doc. 29-14 at 24.

4. Misty Taylor

Finally, Atkins takes issue with Redstone’s decision to hire and promote

Misty Taylor. Taylor joined DPW in June 2009 as a temporary summer hire while 

in college. Doc. 29-9 at 13. As her summer job came to its end, Taylor asked her 

supervisors if she could stay on as a “Co-Op” as part of the Student Career 

Experience Program (“SCEP”), id. at 28, a government program which allows 

“[s]tudents, who are U.S. citizens, [to] be noncompetitively converted from the 

[SCEP] to a term, career or career-conditional appointment” upon the satisfactory 

Case 5:13-cv-01180-AKK Document 45 Filed 04/21/15 Page 6 of 11
Page 7 of 11

completion of certain requirements, 5 C.F.R. § 213.3202(a) & (b)(10)-(11) (2001).5

In light of Taylor’s “exceptional performance and . . . good [grade point average],” 

her supervisors kept Taylor at DPW under the SCEP as a Student Trainee Program 

Analyst in the Master Planning Division. Doc. 29-9 at 25, 28, 30. After Taylor 

received an associate’s degree in July 2010, her supervisors “non-competitively 

converted” her through the SCEP to a career Management and Program Analyst in 

a “developmental position.” Id. at 48, 64. Taylor’s developmental position was a 

“5-7-9 grade,” which means that she became a career employee with the goal of 

advancing to a GS-9 position—but, first, she “would start out as a [GS-]5,” and 

upon completing certain duties to her supervisors’ satisfaction, she would 

ultimately “develop” into her target GS-9 grade. Id. at 48. In July 2011, after 

Taylor had “worked in the GS-5 level for one year, proved exceptional service, 

[and] performed all [her] duties as assigned,” Taylor advanced to the GS-7 grade, 

and then to the GS-9 grade in July 2012. Id. at 65-66. Atkins takes issue with 

Taylor’s promotion because, as she describes in her EEOC complaint, Atkins “had 

not been selected for any of the secretary/administrative assistant position jobs that 

were open in DPW, but [the positions] were filled by young students/co-ops” like 

Taylor. Doc. 29-15 at 2. 

 

5

Subsections (a) and (b) were revised effective July 20, 2012, and the SCEP is now the “Pathways 

Program.” See Excepted Service, Career and Career-Conditional Employment; and Pathways Programs, 77 FR 

28194-01.

Case 5:13-cv-01180-AKK Document 45 Filed 04/21/15 Page 7 of 11
Page 8 of 11

IV. ANALYSIS

The Secretary maintains that summary judgment is appropriate because: (a) 

Atkins’s failure to promote claims are time barred; and (b) Atkins’s reassignment 

to the Safety Office was not “an adverse employment action,” or alternatively, that 

Atkins cannot rebut Redstone’s legitimate reason for the reassignment. The court 

addresses these contentions in turn.

A. Claims surrounding promotions of comparators are time barred

It is well-established that a plaintiff alleging discrimination based on 

“discrete acts such as . . . failure to promote,” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002), may not bring a Title VII or ADEA action 

unless the alleged discriminatory act “has been made the subject of a timely-filed 

[EEOC] charge,” Alexander v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 207 F.3d 1303, 1332 (11th Cir. 

2000) overruled on other grounds by Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 

2003) (Title VII); see also Hipp v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1214 

(11th Cir. 2001) (ADEA). Relevant here, because Alabama is a non-deferral state, 6

an EEOC charge is timely where the plaintiff files the charge “within 180 days 

 

6

“Deferral states” are “those states having a state law banning . . . discrimination in employment and a state 

entity authorized to grant or to seek relief for victims of such discrimination.” Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 

1086, 1100 n. 21 (11th Cir. 1996). While Alabama has a law prohibiting age discrimination, see ALA. CODE § 25-1-

20, it does not have a state agency that is “an EEOC equivalent,” Jones v. Dillard’s, Inc., 331 F.3d 1259, 1263 (11th 

Cir. 2003) certified question answered sub nom. Byrd v. Dillard’s, Inc., 892 So. 2d 342 (Ala. 2004). Therefore, the 

court “examines the timeliness of [an] ADEA claim in the context of the 180-day rule.” Id. 

Case 5:13-cv-01180-AKK Document 45 Filed 04/21/15 Page 8 of 11
Page 9 of 11

after the allegedly discriminatory acts.” Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1208 n. 2. Giving Atkins 

the benefit of the doubt and using the December 19, 2011 date when she first 

contacted an EEOC official—rather than the January 31, 2012 date she filed her 

complaint, see doc. 29-15 at 2—any claims surrounding promotion decisions 

occurring prior to June 22, 2011 are time barred. Unfortunately for Atkins, the 

record is undisputed that the promotions of Ingram, Dail, Kight, and Taylor 

occurred prior to June 22, 2011. Specifically, Redstone promoted Ingram in 

February 2009, doc. 29-11 at 18, Dail in May 2008, April 2009, January 2010, and 

October 2010, doc. 28-12 at 19, Kight in June 2009, doc. 29-14 at 24, and placed 

Taylor in the developmental series position—through which she advanced to a GS7 and GS-9—in July 2010, doc. 29-9 at 48, 64. Consequently, to the extent Atkins 

bases her action on these promotion decisions—or any training that Redstone 

offered these employees to purportedly “preselect” them or “fix” them up for the

promotions7—the “acts are untimely filed and no longer actionable.” Morgan, 536 

U.S. at 115. Therefore, summary judgment is due with respect to the failure to 

promote claims. See Moses v. State Farm Ins., No. 2:14-CV-00146-MHH, 2015 

WL 404264, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 29, 2015) (granting summary judgment on 

 

7 To the extent Atkins is basing her action on disparate treatment in the training she received as compared 

to other employees, the court notes that there is no evidence that any of these employees received any training that 

was denied to Atkins, nor any training to “preselect” them for promotions. In fact, Atkins admittedly bases her 

allegations on her “general belief” and testified that she is “not sure” what training the other employees received but 

that she “just feel[s] like” they received some training. See doc. 29-3 at 29-30, 45-46. Therefore, even if the actions

were not time barred, Atkins’s claims would fail at the prima facie level in light of the lack of any affirmative 

evidence that her “employer treated similarly situated employees . . . more favorably.” See Holifield v. Reno, 115 

F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)).

Case 5:13-cv-01180-AKK Document 45 Filed 04/21/15 Page 9 of 11
Page 10 of 11

untimely Title VII and ADEA claims); Goodridge v. Siemens Energy, Inc., No. 

4:11-CV-240-VEH, 2013 WL 597782, at *7 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 30, 2013) (same). 

B. The allegedly discriminatory reassignment to the Safety Office 

Even assuming that Atkins’s allegedly discriminatory reassignment is an 

adverse employment action, summary judgment is also due with respect to this 

claim because Atkins cannot establish that the Secretary’s reason for the 

reassignment was pretext for discrimination. In fact, there is no evidence that

Colonel Hamilton’s decision to transfer Atkins “to promote a more effective and 

efficient operation of the Garrison [at Redstone],” doc. 29-4 at 38, was based on 

discriminatory animus, see Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 

529 (11th Cir. 1983) (to prove discrimination, a plaintiff “must convince the court 

that [defendant] operated . . . with a racially discriminatory motive, purpose, or 

animus”). As Colonel Hamilton explained, in downsizing to meet TDA 

requirements, he “had to decide based on . . . necessity . . . [and] priority where 

[Redstone] could afford to cut people,” and which positions were “less critical” to 

the organization. Doc. 29-8 at 17. He concluded that Atkins’s DPW position—

along with many other administrative positions supporting lower-level managers—

was less critical as compared to administrative positions supporting higher-level 

managers (such as Atkins’s position in the Safety Office). See id. at 16-17. Based 

on this, Colonel Hamilton eliminated the DPW position and then worked to “get 

Case 5:13-cv-01180-AKK Document 45 Filed 04/21/15 Page 10 of 11
Page 11 of 11

[Atkins and other employees] to other positions that were authorized” by the TDA. 

Id. Because there is no evidence that Colonel Hamilton’s decision was “pretext for 

accomplishing a racially discriminatory purpose,”8 Clark, 717 F.2d at 529; see also

Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1265 (11th Cir. 2010) (to 

show pretext, a plaintiff must demonstrate “such weaknesses, implausibilities, 

inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered 

legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them 

unworthy of credence”), the court concludes that summary judgment is 

appropriate. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the court will grant the Secretary’s motion for 

summary judgment and dismiss this action with prejudice. The court will enter a 

separate order consistent with this opinion. 

DONE the 21st day of April, 2015. 

 

_________________________________

ABDUL K. KALLON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

8

In the stricken brief, the crux of Atkins’s argument on this issue is that there were vacant positions in 

other departments to which Colonel Hamilton could have transferred Atkins, and that Colonel Hamilton could have 

“curtailed temps, terms, [and] students” instead of eliminating Atkins’s DPW position. Even if Atkins is correct, her

arguments are unavailing because it is not the court’s role to “act as a super personnel department that secondguesses employers’ business judgments.” Alexander, 207 F.3d at 1340 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). This is especially relevant here where Colonel Hamilton transferred Atkins to a comparable position with 

no loss in pay. See docs. 29-6 at 67; 29-8 at 18. 

Case 5:13-cv-01180-AKK Document 45 Filed 04/21/15 Page 11 of 11