Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-19-08061/USCOURTS-ca10-19-08061-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Justin David Brown
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

JUSTIN DAVID BROWN, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 19-8061 

(D.C. No. 2:19-CR-00019-ABJ-1) 

(D. Wyoming) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before PHILLIPS, MURPHY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Justin David Brown pleaded guilty to two counts of production of child 

pornography. After considering the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district 

court sentenced Mr. Brown to 360 months’ imprisonment on each count and ordered 

the sentences be served consecutively. Mr. Brown appeals his sentence as 

procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Exercising our jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we affirm. 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

May 21, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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I. BACKGROUND 

In connection with a child pornography investigation, the FBI identified a 

suspect who was found to be in possession of child pornography. The suspect told 

FBI agents that he had received a video depicting an adult male’s penis in between 

the buttocks of a toddler from an individual with the screen name “PDDDY.” The 

suspect believed the adult male was anally penetrating the toddler, Child Victim 1 

(“CV1”). The FBI executed a search warrant at the suspect’s residence and located 

child pornography on several devices. During a review of the images, the FBI 

identified four image files depicting the same toddler. The FBI classified two of the 

images as child pornography—both images are close-ups of CV1’s genitalia. 

The FBI’s investigation identified Mr. Brown as the possible source of the 

photos of CV1. During a custodial interview, Mr. Brown admitted to sexually 

abusing his son, CV1, and documenting this abuse with photos and videos. The abuse 

included anal penetration, Mr. Brown inserting his penis into the child’s mouth, and 

inserting the child’s penis into his mouth. Mr. Brown admitted to producing images 

depicting the abuse of CV1. Mr. Brown further confirmed that he used the screen 

name “PDDDY,” and that he had distributed files containing images of the abuse to 

one other individual. 

Mr. Brown permitted investigators to access his Yahoo! e-mail account. From 

a review of Mr. Brown’s e-mails, investigators learned that Mr. Brown had been 

communicating with a second individual about CV1. Mr. Brown sent a close-up 

photograph of a toddler’s anus in response to a request for such an image from that 

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individual. The e-mails also discussed arranging a meeting so the individual could 

sexually abuse CV1. At the sentencing hearing, Special Agent Nicole Bailey testified 

about her investigation into Mr. Brown’s conduct and her review of his e-mails and 

chat conversations. She explained that Mr. Brown had agreed to allow the individual 

to do whatever he wanted with CV1 short of injuring or killing the two-year-old. 

Mr. Brown planned to watch the abuse of CV1. 

On January 18, 2019, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Mr. Brown 

with two counts of production of child pornography, two counts of transportation of 

child pornography, and one count of possession of child pornography. On June 24, 

2019, Mr. Brown pleaded guilty to two counts of production of child pornography 

without a written plea agreement. 

In the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), the United States Probation 

Office recommended a total offense level of 43 and a criminal history category of II. 

The PSR calculated Mr. Brown’s sentencing range under the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) as life imprisonment. But because the statutory 

maximum for each count was 30 years’ imprisonment, the Guidelines range was 720 

months’ imprisonment. As to Mr. Brown’s criminal history, the PSR noted a juvenile 

adjudication related to Mr. Brown’s sexual abuse of his eight-year-old cousin. The 

PSR explained that Mr. Brown was sent to the Wyoming Boys School where he 

sexually abused other minor students. Neither party objected to the PSR. 

Prior to sentencing, Mr. Brown filed a sentencing memorandum discussing the 

sexual abuse he experienced as a child at the hands of his father and an older male 

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cousin. At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Brown’s counsel asked the district court to 

take Mr. Brown’s background into account when imposing a sentence. The district 

court discussed many of the § 3553(a) factors, including the Guidelines range, 

Mr. Brown’s background, the nature of the offense, the need to promote respect for 

the law, the need for deterrence, and the need to protect the public from further 

crimes. The court then concluded that a Guidelines sentence of 720-months’ 

imprisonment was appropriate because the nature of the offense conduct and 

Mr. Brown’s background demonstrated a risk of recidivism absent confinement. 

II. PROCEDURAL REASONABLENESS 

Mr. Brown challenges the procedural reasonableness of the district court’s 

sentence on multiple grounds. First, he questions the adequacy of the district court’s 

analysis of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and its explanation of the sentence 

imposed. Second, he asserts the district court improperly permitted Special Agent 

Nicole Bailey to testify about the findings of her investigation at the sentencing 

proceeding and erred by considering uncharged conduct when imposing a sentence. 

Third, Mr. Brown claims the district court predetermined his sentence. 

A. Standard of Review 

“Procedural reasonableness addresses whether the district court incorrectly 

calculated or failed to calculate the Guidelines sentence, treated the Guidelines as 

mandatory, failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors, relied on clearly erroneous facts, 

or failed to adequately explain the sentence.” United States v. Huckins, 529 F.3d 

1312, 1317 (10th Cir. 2008). “We normally review a defendant’s claim of procedural 

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unreasonableness for abuse of discretion . . . .” United States v. Ortiz-Lazaro, 884 F.3d 

1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 2018). “If, however, Defendant did not preserve the procedural 

challenge below, we review only for plain error.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “We 

will find plain error where there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) which affects 

substantial rights, and (4) which seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

Mr. Brown preserved at least one of his procedural challenges in the district 

court—he objected to the introduction of testimony from Special Agent Bailey at the 

sentencing hearing as irrelevant. We thus review this alleged error for abuse of 

discretion. See id. But Mr. Brown has not pointed this court to where he preserved his 

other procedural challenges. See Tenth Circuit Rule 28.1(A) (“For each issue raised 

on appeal, all briefs must cite the precise references in the record where the issue was 

raised and ruled on.”). As there is no indication in the record that Mr. Brown 

preserved these challenges before the district court, we review them for plain error.1

See Ortiz-Lazaro, 884 F.3d at 1262. 

B. Adequacy of the District Court’s Explanation 

Mr. Brown advances several challenges to the adequacy of the district court’s 

analysis of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and its explanation of the sentence 

imposed. With respect to the § 3553(a) factors, Mr. Brown contends the district 

1

 Mr. Brown’s unpreserved challenges fail under either standard of review. 

Resolving these challenges on the first prong of plain error, we conclude the district 

court did not commit any error. Because the district court did not err, it also did not 

abuse its discretion. 

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court’s analysis failed to explain how the 720-month sentence is sufficient but not 

greater than necessary. He specifically claims the district court “provided a 

philosophical discussion . . . on the rule of law and society, rehabilitation, and 

deterrence,” but failed to analyze how the 720-month sentence promotes respect for 

the law, affords adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, or furthers Mr. Brown’s 

rehabilitation. Aplt. Br. at 13–14. With respect to the district court’s explanation of 

the sentence, Mr. Brown argues the court erred by failing to specifically address 

factors that may have counseled in favor of leniency. According to Mr. Brown, these 

factors include his own background as a victim of child sexual abuse; his potential to 

return to society after corrective treatment; his cooperation with law enforcement; 

and the comparison of his sentence with the sentences of his co-defendants. 

“[A]fter giving both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they 

deem appropriate, the district judge should then consider all of the § 3553(a) factors 

to determine whether they support the sentence requested by a party.” Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007). But “a specific discussion of Section 3553(a) factors 

is not required for sentences falling within the ranges suggested by the Guidelines.”

United States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2007). Moreover, we do 

“not demand that the district court recite any magic words to show us that it fulfilled its 

responsibility to be mindful of the factors that Congress has instructed it to consider.” 

United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1115–16 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation 

marks omitted). But we will not “presume the district court weighed a party’s arguments 

in light of the § 3553(a) factors where the record provides no indication that it did so and 

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no clear explanation of the sentence imposed.” Id. at 1116. “After settling on the 

appropriate sentence, [the district court] must adequately explain the chosen sentence to 

allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” 

Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. A sentencing judge should articulate “enough to satisfy the appellate 

court that he has . . . a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking 

authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). 

Here, the sentencing court met this standard. The district court noted that it had 

reviewed the sentencing memorandum submitted by Mr. Brown’s counsel, and it gave 

both parties an opportunity to present argument at the sentencing hearing before imposing 

a within-Guidelines sentence. The district court explained the Guidelines calculations and 

specifically indicated it was imposing a sentence in light of the § 3553(a) factors: “The 

sentence as pointed out here today is one that seeks to be sufficient, but not greater than 

necessary considering Title 18 United States Code Section 3553(a).” ROA, Vol. III at 

74–75. Although the district court was not required to specifically discuss each § 3553(a) 

factor, Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d at 1202, its explanation at sentencing touched on several 

factors. 

Contrary to Mr. Brown’s contention that the district court failed to consider 

“mitigating personal factors,” the district court acknowledged that Mr. Brown was a 

victim of sexual abuse as a child. And the court noted that Mr. Brown began sexually 

abusing others as a teenager. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (requiring the district court to 

consider a defendant’s “history and characteristics”). The district court then addressed the 

need for the sentence “to promote respect for the law,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(A), and it opined 

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that “[w]hen a predator is allowed to continue to function[,] of course, that is antithetical 

to the law and a rule of law.” ROA, Vol. III at 75. The district court went on to discuss 

the severity of the conduct of conviction, which involved Mr. Brown sexually abusing 

and exploiting his two-year-old son. See § 3553(a)(1) (requiring the district court to 

consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense”). The district court next remarked 

on the need for general deterrence and deterrence specific to Mr. Brown. See id.

§ 3553(a)(2)(B) (requiring the district court to consider “the need for the sentence 

imposed . . . to afford adequate deterrence”). And while the district court specifically 

considered the availability of correctional treatment, it expressed concerns regarding 

Mr. Brown’s potential to reoffend: 

There are some programs within the prison system. As pointed out and 

suggested by [the United States], these offenses tend to repeat. There is a 

rate of recidivism. It is reflected in the history of this defendant. I am not 

optimistic that all of this will turn around. I wish that it would.[2]

ROA, Vol. III at 77; see also id. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (requiring the district court to 

consider “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to protect the public from further 

crimes of the defendant.”); id. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (requiring the district court to 

consider “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to provide the defendant with needed 

educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the 

most effective manner”). Ultimately, the district court concluded that a “very, very 

2

 These comments belie Mr. Brown’s contention that the district court failed to 

consider Mr. Brown’s potential to return to society with corrective treatment. The 

district court did consider the availability of treatment programs in prison, but it 

concluded that Mr. Brown’s prior conduct suggested he was likely to reoffend, even 

with such treatment. 

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harsh sentence” was appropriate based on both the offense conduct and Mr. Brown’s 

background because “there will be and is a risk that now and in the future should 

[Mr. Brown] not be confined, [he] would be a potential risk to others.” ROA, Vol. III at 

77–78. Contrary to Mr. Brown’s contentions, the district court’s analysis of these factors 

adequately explains why it imposed a 720-month sentence and why that sentence is 

sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to achieve the goals of § 3553(a)(2). 

Mr. Brown’s contentions, that the district court erred by failing to consider 

several items that may have counseled in favor of leniency, are also meritless. As 

discussed, the district court did consider mitigating facts from Mr. Brown’s 

background and his potential to return to society with corrective treatment. See supra 

note 2. And the district court did not err by failing to expressly address Mr. Brown’s 

cooperation with law enforcement or the sentences of his co-defendants because 

Mr. Brown did not make those arguments until appeal to this court. 3 Even if these 

arguments had been preserved, however, the district court is not required to explain why 

it disagrees with a defendant’s arguments for leniency. See United States v. 

3

 The district court was not required under the § 3553(a) factors to specifically 

consider Mr. Brown’s cooperation with law enforcement or the sentences of his 

co-defendants. Section 3553(a)(6) requires the district court to consider “the need to 

avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who 

have been found guilty of similar conduct.” Mr. Brown’s co-defendants received 

lower sentences than Mr. Brown, but there is no indication in the record that any of 

them had similar records and was found guilty of similar conduct--that is, two counts 

of production of child pornography. See ROA, Vol. II at 23–24 (noting one 

co-defendant pleaded guilty to attempted online enticement of a minor); ROA, Vol. II 

at 52 n.4 (noting another co-defendant pleaded guilty to aid and abet production of 

child pornography). 

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Jarrillo-Luna, 478 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by 

United States v. Lopez-Macias, 661 F.3d 485 (10th Cir. 2011). Rather, the district court 

must simply demonstrate that it has considered the party’s arguments, Rita, 551 U.S. at 

356. The district court did so here by noting it had reviewed Mr. Brown’s sentencing 

memorandum and by entertaining argument from his counsel at sentencing. The rejection 

of those arguments does not equate to the court’s failure to consider them. 

In sum, the district court adequately explained its imposition of a 720-month, 

within-Guidelines sentence and sufficiently considered the leniency arguments 

Mr. Brown brought to its attention. 

C. Consideration of Uncharged Conduct 

Mr. Brown argues the district court improperly permitted Special Agent Bailey 

to testify about her investigation of Mr. Brown and erred by considering uncharged 

conduct when imposing a sentence. At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Brown objected to 

the relevance of Special Agent Bailey’s testimony. On appeal, Mr. Brown contends, 

“This testimony was entirely unnecessary as the United States had already provided 

this uncharged conduct of Mr. Brown in their sentencing memorandum.” Aplt. Br. at 

11. 

We have “repeatedly stated that,” with few exceptions, “[n]o limitation shall be 

placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person 

convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for 

the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.” United States v. Pinson, 542 F.3d 822, 

836 (10th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

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18 U.S.C. § 3661. And the Federal Rules of Evidence, which might permit a court to 

exclude irrelevant or cumulative evidence, do not apply to sentencing proceedings. 

See United States v. Scott, 529 F.3d 1290, 1298 (10th Cir. 2008); Fed. R. Evid. 

1101(d)(3). As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted 

Special Agent Bailey to testify about her investigation of Mr. Brown. 

Further, under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), “[t]he court, in determining the 

particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider . . . the nature and circumstances of 

the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” That is, the district 

court was required to consider what Special Agent Bailey learned about Mr. Brown’s 

past conduct, even if uncharged, as part of the “nature and circumstances” of the 

charged conduct and Mr. Brown’s “history and characteristics.” 

The district court did not err when it considered Special Agent Bailey’s 

testimony in imposing a sentence on Mr. Brown. 

D. Predetermined Sentence 

Mr. Brown claims the district court inappropriately determined it would impose a 

lengthy sentence prior to considering the information provided at sentencing. Mr. Brown 

bases this argument on two statements the district court made at the change of plea 

hearing. First, the district court stated, “It is explained here very briefly by [Mr. Brown’s 

attorney,] Mr. Fleener[,] the sentencing range is huge, but, nevertheless, it is serious, very 

serious – from 15 years, that is 180 months, to 60 years if concurrent, at the same time, 

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sentences are imposed.[4] Do you understand that?” ROA, Vol. III at 19. Second, the 

district court stated, “Now, some words about supervised release. We are looking ahead a 

long way ahead for you and a period of supervised release will be imposed.” ROA, Vol. 

III at 22. 

These statements do not indicate that the district court prejudged Mr. Brown’s 

sentence and planned to impose a term of 30 years’ imprisonment on each count to run 

consecutively. Rather, these statements are consistent with the requirement under Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1) that the district court inform the defendant of the 

penalties he faces before accepting the defendant’s guilty plea. The district court 

correctly informed Mr. Brown that, if he pleaded guilty, he would be subject to a 

mandatory minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment on each count, and a statutory maximum 

of 30 years’ imprisonment on each count. The district court also correctly informed 

Mr. Brown that “there is a minimum mandatory period of supervision of five years.” 

ROA, Vol. III at 21 (emphasis added). Even if Mr. Brown received the mandatory 

minimum term of imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently, Mr. Brown faced at 

least 15 years’ imprisonment followed by at least 5 years’ supervised release. Thus, it 

was accurate for the district court to state that a period of supervised release was “a long 

way ahead” of Mr. Brown. But nothing in the district court’s statements at the change of 

4

 The district court appears to have misspoken. Mr. Brown could serve as few 

as 15 years if his sentences were run concurrently, or as much as 60 years if his 

sentences were run consecutively. As the district court later stated, Mr. Brown faced a 

mandatory minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment and a statutory maximum of 30 

years’ imprisonment on each count. 

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plea hearing indicate the court had already determined the length of Mr. Brown’s 

sentence. 

III. SUBSTANTIVE REASONABLENESS 

Mr. Brown also raises challenges to the substantive reasonableness of his 

sentence. Specifically, Mr. Brown contends the district court’s analysis was overly 

focused on providing punishment for the offense and protecting the public from his 

hypothetical future crimes. Mr. Brown again points to the factors previously 

discussed that he claims counseled in favor of leniency. 

A. Standard of Review 

“[T]he weight the district court places on certain factors is reviewed for 

substantive unreasonableness.” Pinson, 542 F.3d at 835–36. We review the 

substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 

We “will reverse only if the sentence imposed was arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, 

or manifestly unreasonable.” United States v. DeRusse, 859 F.3d 1232, 1236 (10th 

Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, “we will reverse a 

determination only if the court exceeded the bounds of permissible choice, given the 

facts and the applicable law in the case at hand.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

“[W]e presume a sentence is reasonable if it is within the properly calculated 

guideline range.” United States v. Chavez, 723 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 2013). 

“The defendant may rebut this presumption by showing that his sentence is 

unreasonable in light of the sentencing factors delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” 

United States v. Alapizco-Valenzuela, 546 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2008). “We do 

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not reweigh the sentencing factors but instead ask whether the sentence fell within 

the range of rationally available choices that facts and the law at issue can fairly 

support.” United States v. Blair, 933 F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Thus, our analysis “examine[s] whether the length of the 

sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors 

set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Chavez, 723 F.3d at 1233 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

B. Analysis 

We presume that Mr. Brown’s 720-month, within-Guidelines sentence, is 

reasonable. See id. Mr. Brown may rebut this presumption by demonstrating that the 

length of his sentence is unreasonable under the § 3553(a) factors. See AlapizcoValenzuela, 546 F.3d at 1215. 

As explained supra Part II.B, the district court’s thoughtful sentencing 

explanation discussed many of the § 3553(a) factors, including the Guidelines range, 

Mr. Brown’s background, the nature of the offense, the need to promote respect for 

the law, the need for deterrence, and the need to protect the public from further 

crimes. Ultimately, the district court concluded that a 720-month sentence was 

appropriate because the egregious nature of the offense conduct and Mr. Brown’s 

background both demonstrate a risk that Mr. Brown will reoffend absent 

confinement. 

None of the arguments Mr. Brown advances on appeal, taken individually or 

collectively, demonstrate that the district court’s conclusion was unreasonable. The 

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district court was permitted to reason that any factors that may have counseled in 

favor of leniency—such as, the sexual abuse Mr. Brown experienced as a child, the 

potential for him to return to society following corrective treatment, his cooperation 

with law enforcement, and the sentences of his co-defendants—were outweighed by 

other factors. Namely, the district court was permitted to conclude Mr. Brown’s 

history of perpetrating sexual abuse against others, the nature of the sexual abuse he 

perpetrated against his two-year-old son, and the risk of him reoffending outweighed 

mitigating factors and warranted a lengthy sentence. This weighing of the § 3553(a) 

factors was not “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable” and 

was within “the bounds of permissible choice, given the facts and the applicable law 

in the case at hand.” DeRusse, 859 F.3d at 1236 (quotation marks omitted). Thus, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed a 720-month sentence, 

emphasizing the need to protect the public from further crimes of Mr. Brown. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment. 

Entered for the Court 

Carolyn B. McHugh 

Circuit Judge 

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