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Parties Involved:
Juan Nunez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 87-1950 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

Vo ) 

) 

JUAN NUNEZ, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

FI LED 

Unite<l States Court of Appealu 

'rent.h Circuit 

JUN 201989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 86-CR-155-3) 

Dan B. Fahrney, Lakewood, Colorado, Attorney for DefendantAppellant. 

William D. Welch and Kathryn Meyer, Assistant United States Attorneys, Denver, Colorado (Michael J. Norton, Acting United States 

Attorney, District of Colorado, with them on the brief), Mountain 

States Drug Task Force, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellee. 

Before* McKAY and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District 

Judge. 

MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable Wesley.E. Brown, United States District Judge for the 

District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 87-1950 Document: 01019565537 Date Filed: 06/20/1989 Page: 1 
In a thirty-three count superseding indictment, twenty 

defendants were charged in the first count with conspiring among 

themselves, and with others, to distribute heroin and to possess 

heroin with an intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 

84l(a)(l). The objective of their conspiracy was to import heroin 

from outside the State of Colorado into Colorado and to then 

distribute and sell it within the state. The points of sale 

included, but were not limited to, the State Penitentiary at Canon 

City, Colorado. In the remaining thirty-two counts certain 

defendants were charged with the actual distribution of heroin, 

and other defendants were charged with the unlawful use of the 

telephone to facilitate such distribution and possession of 

heroin, in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 843(b) and 18 u.s.c. § 2. 

Thirteen of the original twenty defendants either pled·guilty 

or were dismissed from the case prior to trial, with the remaining 

seven going to trial. One of these seven pled guilty during the 

trial. Of the remaining six, the jury acquitted three defendants. 

The remaining three defendants were convicted on certain of the 

charges and they now appeal their respective convictions and the 

sentences imposed thereon. 1 

Each of the three defendant-appellants has prosecuted his or 

her appeal separately. Each has his or her own counsel who has 

filed a separate brief raising related, though not completely 

1 The seven defendants who stood trial were Juan "Blackie" Nunez, 

Corky Nunez, Anna Irene Martinez, Richard Nunez, Ellen Nunez, 

Christine Benavidez, and Charles Nunez. Charles Nunez pled guilty 

during the trial. Christine Benavidez, Ellen Nunez, and Richard 

Nunez were acquitted on all counts. Juan "Blackie'' Nunez, Corky 

Nunez, and Anna Irene Martinez were each convicted on several 

counts, and they now appeal their respective convictions. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1950 Document: 01019565537 Date Filed: 06/20/1989 Page: 2 
identical, issues, and each appeal was separately argued. There 

has been no order of consolidation of these three appeals. Accordingly, each will be addressed by separate opinion, although 

there will be some cross-reference between the cases. 

We are here concerned with the appeal of Juan "Blackie" 

Nunez, hereinafter referred to as Blackie. Blackie, an inmate in 

the Colorado State Penitentiary at Canon City, Colorado, for the 

relevant period of time was convicted on Count 1, the conspiracy 

charge, and sentenced to twelve years imprisonment on that count, 

with the sentence to commence after Blackie completed the state 

sentence which he was then serving. He was also convicted on 

Counts 16, 19, and 24, and sentenced to four years imprisonment on 

these counts to be served concurrently with the twelve-year 

sentence imposed on Count 1. Counts 16, 19, and 24, charged. 

Blackie with the use of the telephone to facilitate drug distribution and possession, with each count based on a separate use of 

the telephone. 

The principal matter raised on appeal by Blackie is that his 

constitutional rights were violated when he was banished from the 

courtroom on the fourth day of a twelve-day trial because of 

obstreperous and disruptive conduct, and, the somewhat related 

issue, that he was denied his right to defend, 12.!..9. se. 

From the outset Blackie was represented by court-appointed 

counsel. There is no indication that he was dissatisfied with the 

services of his appointed counsel prior to trial. On the first 

day of the trial, Blackie, in the presence of the jury, interrupted the prosecutor who was interrogating one of the 

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Appellate Case: 87-1950 Document: 01019565537 Date Filed: 06/20/1989 Page: 3 
government's witnesses by calling the witness a liar. The 

district judge told Blackie to "stop that,'' and added that "if 

there is one more outburst you will be removed from the 

courtroom." Later, on that same day, the district judge, outside 

the presence of the jury, advised Blackie that he would "have to 

control himself," to which Blackie replied, ''Excuse me for my 

unpardonable outburst, your Honor." 

On the second day of the trial, while the prosecutor was 

examining a witness, Blackie began talking in a loud voice and 

gesturing with his hands. The district judge advised Blackie that 

he was disturbing the proceedings and had him removed from· the 

courtroom. 

On the third day of the trial Blackie was brought into court 

outside the presence of the jury and was advise~ by the district 

judge that he would be permitted to return to the courtroom for 

his trial, but that if there was "any further outburst you will be 

excluded from the courtroom for the rest of the trial." Blackie 

stated that he "understood." On that occasion Blackie also stated 

that he didn't think he could "receive an impartial and unbiased 

trial" because the district judge was prejudiced against him, and, 

for the first time, he indicated displeasure with the performance 

of his counsel. The district judge denied any partiality on his 

part and at the same time refused Blackie's request to discharge 

his counsel. 2 By way of response, Blackie asked to be excused 

2 Appointed counsel also advised the district court that he had 

been instructed by Blackie to present "no defense," and the 

district court, in turn, instructed counsel to defend "to the best 

of his ability." 

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Appellate Case: 87-1950 Document: 01019565537 Date Filed: 06/20/1989 Page: 4 
from the courtroom, which he was. 

At noon on the third day of the trial, the district judge 

instructed a marshal to inquire of Blackie concerning his desire 

to return to the courtroom on a promise to not cause any further 

disruptions. The marshal reported back that Blackie refused to 

answer. 

On the fourth day of the trial Blackie was returned to court 

and in the absence of the jury he reiterated his desire for different counsel. The request was denied. However, Blackie, on his 

promise to behave, was permitted to remain in the courtroom and 

the jury was returned to the courtroom. Only moments later, 

Blackie started to interrupt and the district judge stated, 

"That's it. You are removed from the courtroom," to which Blackie 

replied that he didn't want to remain in a courtroom where 

"burlesque" and ''charades" were taking place. Blackie was then 

removed from the courtroom for the balance of his trial, though 

his court appointed counsel, with whom he was dissatisfied, 

remained and participated in the trial to the end. 

On appeal, Blackie, with counsel other than his trial 

counsel, argues that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were 

violated by his banishment from his trial. Specifically, it is 

argued that by his exclusion from the courtroom, Blackie was 

denied his Fifth Amendment right to due process of law, and that 

he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront the 

government's witnesses and to testify in his own behalf. Blackie 

also asserts that, all things considered, he was denied his Sixth 

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Appellate Case: 87-1950 Document: 01019565537 Date Filed: 06/20/1989 Page: 5 
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. We are 

not persuaded. 

In removing Blackie from the courtroom, the district court 

relied on Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b)(2), which reads as follows: 

(b) Continued presence not required. The 

further progress of the trial to and including the 

return of the verdict shall not be prevented and 

the defendant shall be considered to have waived 

the right to be present whenever a defendant 

initially present ..•• 

(2) after being warned by the court 

that disruptive conduct will cause the 

removal of the defendant from the 

courtroom, persists in conduct which is 

such as to justify exclusion from the 

courtroom. 

It is agreed that a defendant in a criminal proceeding can 

lose his right to be present ·at trial, if, following a judge's 

warning that he will be removed if his disruptive behavior 

continues, he thereafter persists in conducting himself in such a 

disruptive manner that his trial cannot proceed if he remains in 

the courtroom. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). 

In Allen, the Supreme Court held that there were three 

constitutionally permissible avenues for dealing with an 

obstreperous defendant: (1) have him bound and gagged but remain 

in open court; (2) civil or criminal contempt1 and (3) remove him 

from the courtroom and continue the trial "until the defendant 

promises to conduct himself properly." Id. at 344. Counsel would 

read the quoted language to mean that when Blackie was excluded on 

the fourth day of his trial, he should have thereafter been 

brought back at least once a day to ascertain whether he would 

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Appellate Case: 87-1950 Document: 01019565537 Date Filed: 06/20/1989 Page: 6 
promise to behave properly and if he did so promise, he should 

then have been allowed to stay in the courtroom unless, and until, 

his next outbreak, ad infinitum. Allen contains no such requirement. 

As the Fourth Circuit has observed, "A court should, of 

course, vigilantly protect a defendant's constitutional rights, 

but it was never intended that any of these rights be used as a 

ploy to frustrate the orderly procedures of a court in the 

administration of justice." United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 

1321, 1325 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1084 (1980). 

See also United States v. Gipson, 693 F.2d 109 (10th Cir. 1982) 

("The right to retain counsel of one's choice may not 'be insisted 

upon in a manner that will obstruct an orderly procedure in courts 

of justi.ce, and deprive such courts of th~ exercise of their 

inherent powers to control the same,'"); United States v. Hack, 

782 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, Owens v. United 

States, 106 S. Ct. 2921 (1986) (general prohibition against use of 

shackles inappropriate to insure orderly progress of trial). 

Furthermore, the right to testify is not absolute, United 

States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1979), and may be 

waived by "contumacious conduct." United States v. Ives; 504 F.2d 

935, 941 (9th Cir. 1974), vacated 421 U.S. 994 (1975), reinstated 

in relevant part and vacated in part, 547 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir. 

1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 1103 (1977). The right to confront 

witnesses and the Fifth Amendment right to due process may also be 

waived. United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983 (11th Cir. 1985). 

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Appellate Case: 87-1950 Document: 01019565537 Date Filed: 06/20/1989 Page: 7 
In the instant case, Blackie was given a warning on the first 

day of his trial. On the second day of the trial, when Blackie 

interrupted the trial with loud talk and gesturing, he was removed 

from the courtroom. On the third day of the trial, Blackie was 

returned to the courtroom, and the district judge advised him that 

he would be permitted to remain, but that if there was any further 

"outburst," he would be excluded from the courtroom for the rest 

of the trial. Blackie declined the offer and asked to be excused, 

and was. At noon on the third day of the trial, the district 

judge instructed the marshal to inquire whether Blackie wanted to 

return to the courtroom, and Blackie refused to talk. On the 

fourth day of the trial, Blackie was allowed to return to the 

courtroom, but when he interrupted the proceedings again by 

injecting hims~lf _into the proceedings, he-was banished for good. 

And at that time Blackie himself indicated that he did not want to 

be any part of a "burlesque" or "charade," and he did not 

thereafter indicate any desire to return or testify. The district 

judge, in our reading of the record, was slow to anger and we find 

no error in his handling of this matter. Blackie's constitutional 

rights were adequately protected. In the final analysis, it 

boiled down to whether Blackie, or the district judge, was going 

to conduct the trial. 

Intertwined with his banishment from the courtroom is 

Blackie's further argument that he was denied.his Sixth Amendment 

right to have his appointed counsel removed from the case and be 

allowed to conduct his own defense, E..EE se, or be given different 

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Appellate Case: 87-1950 Document: 01019565537 Date Filed: 06/20/1989 Page: 8 
counsel. The district judge denied his request and, under the 

circumstances, we find no error. 

We are not unmindful of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 

(1975). There the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment, as 

applied to States by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees that a 

defendant in a state criminal trial has an independent 

constitutional right of self representation. In Faretta, however, 

the defendant requested that he be allowed to represent himself 

"[w]ell before the date of the trial." In our case, the trial was 

in its third day before Blackie indicated any dissatisfaction with 

his court appointed counsel. At that juncture, it was too late to 

bring in new counsel, and if Blackie's request to proceed pro se 

had been granted, and he had later been removed from the 

courtroom, as he.was,. he would have been unrepresented. The 

district court, confronted with those circumstances, did not err 

in refusing Blackie's request to discharge his appointed counsel 

and proceed pro se. See Sapienza v. Vincent, 534 F.2d 1007 (2d 

Cir. 1976) where the Second Circuit, after Faretta, adhered to an 

earlier decision of that court which held that once a trial had 

begun and the defendant is represented by counsel, the defendant's 

right to discharge his lawyer and to represent himself is "sharply 

curtailed. 113 See also Lawrence, 605 F.2d at 1324-25. 

As stated above, Blackie was convicted on Counts 16, 19, and 

24, as well as on the conspiracy charge contained in Count 1. In 

3 We are not persuaded by Blackie's related contention that he was 

denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of 

counsel. Counsel did about as well as could be expected, given 

the circumstances. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 

(1984). 

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Appellate Case: 87-1950 Document: 01019565537 Date Filed: 06/20/1989 Page: 9 
Count 16 Blackie was charged with using the telephone on or about 

May 30, 1985, to facilitate a heroin distribution; in ~ount 19 he 

was charged with using the telephone on June 1, 1985, to 

facilitate a heroin distribution; and in Count 24 he was charged 

with using the telephone on June 9, 1985, to facilitate a drug 

transaction. Evidence at trial indicated that on each of these 

three dates Blackie initiated a telephone call from the state 

penitentiary in Canon City, Colorado, to his brother, Antonio 

"Pie" Nunez, who resided in Westminster, Colorado. 4 On May 30, 

1985, Blackie spoke with "Pie"; on June 1, 1985, he spoke with 

Sharon Nunez, "Pie's" wife; and on June 9, 1985, Blackie spoke 

with "Pie" and also with his {Blackie's) daughter, Louise 

Charlettie Nunez Lee. 

The government had obtained an order to intercept messages 

coming into the phone .at "Pie's" residence in Westminster, and 

when Blackie called ''Pie's" home in Westminster from the state 

penitentiary his calls were intercepted. 

In connection with his convictions on Counts 16, 19, and 24, 

counsel argues here that the order authorizing a wiretap of 

"Pie's" residence violated Blackie's constitutional rights, and 

that his conviction on those counts should be reversed. We do not 

agree. The validity of the wiretap is discussed more fully in the 

related appeal of Blackie's brother and co-defendant, United 

States v. Corky Nunez, No. 87-1976. 

4 "Pie" Nunez was the central figure or "hub" in this drug 

operation. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1950 Document: 01019565537 Date Filed: 06/20/1989 Page: 10 
Additionally, Blackie's contention that error was committed 

when the district court denied his motion for a severance of 

counts and defendants on the ground that any conspiracy relating 

to the state penitentiary was separate and distinct from any 

conspiracy to distribute heroin outside the penitentiary is 

without merit. The issue of single conspiracy vis-a-vis two 

conspiracies is also discussed in the appeal of United States v. 

Corky Nunez, No. 87-1976.5 

Judgment affirmed. 

5 Blackie, as well as Martinez, suggests that the indictment 

failed to provide adequate notice. However, under the standard of 

United States v. Saviano, 843 F.2d 1280, .1294 (10th Cir. 1988) and 

United States v. Smith, 692 F.2d 693, 696 (10th Cir. 1982), 

defendants had sufficient notice. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1950 Document: 01019565537 Date Filed: 06/20/1989 Page: 11 
No. 87-1950 - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JUAN "BLACKIE" NUNEZ 

McKAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:' 

I must dissent from that portion of the court's opinion that 

depends on its conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to 

prove a single conspiracy. In addition to the reasons set out in 

my dissents in United States v. Heath, 580 F.2d 1011 (1978); 

United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330 (1979); and United States 

v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571 (1984), I must add my observation that 

when it comes to the evidence showing the rim that connects the 

spokes (Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 

90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946); and United States v. Butler, 494 F.2d 1246 

(10th Cir. 1974)), in my view ,we are not faithfully applying the 

mandate of Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986), to 

view the evidence "through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden." 

Appellate Case: 87-1950 Document: 01019565537 Date Filed: 06/20/1989 Page: 12