Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00660/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00660-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jonathan Hughes
Plaintiff
Brandon Kelly
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JONATHAN HUGHES,

Plaintiff,

v.

BRANDON KELLY,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:24-cv-00660-HBK (PC)

ORDER TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN CASE TO 

A DISTRICT JUDGE

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DISMISS CASE1

(Doc. No. 8)

FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD

Pending before the Court for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A is Plaintiff’s First 

Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 8, “FAC”). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned 

recommends the district court dismiss the FAC because it fails to state any cognizable federal

claim and any further amendments would be futile.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT 

A plaintiff who commences an action while in prison is subject to the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act (“PLRA”), which requires, inter alia, the court to screen a complaint that seeks relief 

against a governmental entity, its officers, or its employees before directing service upon any 

defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This requires the court to identify any cognizable claims and 

dismiss the complaint, or any portion, if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon 

1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 

(E.D. Cal. 2023). 

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which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

At the screening stage, the court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true, 

construes the complaint liberally, and resolves all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. 

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Bernhardt v. L.A. County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 

2003). The Court’s review is limited to the complaint, exhibits attached, materials incorporated 

into the complaint by reference, and matters of which the court may take judicial notice. Petrie v.

Elec. Game Card, Inc., 761 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). A court 

does not have to accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted 

deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Critical 

to evaluating a constitutional claim is whether it has an arguable legal and factual basis. See 

Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that a complaint include “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

Nonetheless, a claim must be facially plausible to survive screening. This requires sufficient 

factual detail to allow the court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 

572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not 

sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Although detailed factual allegations are not 

required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted), and courts “are not required 

to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 

2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

If an otherwise deficient pleading can be remedied by alleging other facts, a pro se litigant 

is entitled to an opportunity to amend their complaint before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Lucas v. Department of Corr., 66 F.3d 

245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). However, it is not the role of the court to advise a pro se litigant on how 

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to cure the defects. Such advice “would undermine district judges’ role as impartial 

decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 

n.13. Furthermore, the court in its discretion may deny leave to amend due to “undue delay, bad 

faith or dilatory motive of the part of the movant, [or] repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 

amendments previously allowed . . . .” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Srvs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892 

(9th Cir. 2010). 

BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF OPERATIVE PLEADING

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this action by 

filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1, “Complaint”). On August 

30, 2024, the undersigned screened Plaintiff’s Complaint and found that it failed to state any 

cognizable constitutional claim. (See Doc. No. 7). The Court advised Plaintiff of the pleading 

deficiencies and applicable law and afforded Plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended 

complaint. (Id.). Plaintiff timely filed the instant FAC. (Doc. No. 8).

The events in the FAC took place at California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility in 

Corcoran, California (“SATF”). (See generally id.). Petitioner identifies correctional officer 

Brandon Kelly as the sole Defendant. (Id. at 1). The FAC alleges excessive use of force by the 

Defendant in violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 

punishment. (See id. at 3). As relief, Plaintiff seeks $4 million in damages. (Id. at 5). The 

following facts are presumed to be true at this stage of the screening process.

On April 5, 2024 Plaintiff believed that Defendant Kelly intended to move him into a cell 

which was a danger to his safety. (Doc. No. 8 at 3). Plaintiff exited his cell and approached 

Kelly to explain his concerns about the cell assignment, to which Kelly responded that Plaintiff 

should “go try and find a cell or go back to [his] cell.” (Id.). Plaintiff remained outside the cell as 

Defendant Kelly began to yell at him to get down and unholstered his pepper spray. (Id. at 4). 

Plaintiff turned away from Kelly and put his hands in the air, and Kelly continued to direct 

Plaintiff to get down. (Id.). Defendant’s “partner” arrived and was told by Kelly to “back up.” 

(Id.). Defendant Kelly then deployed an unspecified amount of pepper spray into Plaintiff’s face, 

for an unspecified amount of time. (Id.). Once the responding officer arrived, Plaintiff was 

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promptly handcuffed and taken to wash off. (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that as a result of this incident 

he suffered permanent hearing loss and now has to wear a hearing aid. (Id. at 5). 

APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Eighth Amendment Excessive Use of Force

Prison officials who use excessive force against inmates violate the inmate’s Eighth 

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 832 (1994); Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir., 2002). “[W]henever prison 

officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the [Eighth Amendment], 

the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or 

restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 

1, 6-7 (1992). When determining whether the force was excessive, the court looks to the “extent 

of injury suffered by an inmate . . . the need for application of force, the relationship between that 

need and the amount of force used, the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,’ 

and ‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.’” Id. at 7 (quoting Whitley v. 

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)). 

While de minimis uses of physical force generally do not implicate the Eighth 

Amendment, significant injury need not be evident in the context of an excessive force claim, 

because “[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, 

contemporary standards of decency always are violated.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. Officers may

reasonably use force in a “good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline” but may not apply

force “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992).

Turning to the instant case, the facts alleged support the inference that Defendant Kelly

used pepper spray not maliciously or sadistically to cause harm, but in a good faith effort to 

maintain or restore discipline. Plaintiff exited his cell and ignored Defendant Kelly’s repeated 

commands to return to his cell. (Doc. No. 8 at 4). In response to Kelly’s orders to “get down”

Plaintiff did not get down, but rather turned away from Kelly and put his hands up. (Id.). 

Plaintiff, therefore disregarded multiple direct orders from the Defendant correctional officer. 

While pepper spray is not justified when an inmate only questions an order or seeks 

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redress for an officer’s action, it can be justified when an inmate fails to comply with an order. 

See Williams v. Benajmin, 77 F.3d 756, 763 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding no Eighth Amendment

violation where officer administered small quantity of pepper spray after prisoner asked

“Why?” in response to command); see also Jackson v. Morgan, 19 F. App’x 97, 102 (4th Cir.

2001) (upholding use of twelve bursts of pepper spray at three different times when inmate

refused to comply with repeated commands to move from his cell). Prison inmates are not

allowed to pick and choose those orders they will obey. See Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270

(7th Cir. 1984) (correctional officers are not required to concede to the demands of inmates or

wait them out in order to avoid the use of force). In fact, the Ninth Circuit has held that “the

policy of spraying prisoners with pepper spray for refusing to follow directions falls within the

wide ranging zone of deference accorded to prison officials in shaping preventive measures

intended to reduce incidents of breaches of prison discipline.” Stewart v. Stewart, 60 F. App’x

20, 22 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Here, Plaintiff admits that Kelly ordered him to “get down” multiple times and instead he 

chose to turn away. (Doc. No. 8 at 4). Kelly’s choice to use pepper spray when Plaintiff failed to 

comply with his orders, without more, does not support a claim that Defendant’s use of force falls 

outside of this “zone of deference” and was done maliciously and sadistically to harm Plaintiff. 

See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7. 

Even when an objective need for force exists, a constitutional violation may still occur

when the amount of force used is not commensurate with the situation. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-

10). The Ninth Circuit has ruled that the “use of [tear gas] in small amounts may be a necessary 

prison technique if a prisoner refuses after adequate warning to move from a cell or upon other 

provocation presenting a reasonable possibility that slight force will be required.” Spain v.

Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 195 (9th Cir.1979). However, the Ninth Circuit has also noted that the

“quantity of pepper spray discharged by the officers is unquestionably material, because the

amount of force is central to a claim sounding in the alleged use of excessive force.” Furnace v.

Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[I]t is generally recognized that ‘it is a violation

of the Eighth Amendment for prison officials to use mace, tear gas or other chemical agents in

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quantities greater than necessary or for the sole purpose of infliction of pain.’”). 

Here, there are no facts from which the court can infer that Defendant used more pepper 

spray than was reasonable for the purpose at hand simply to inflict pain. See Procunier, 600 F.2d 

at 196 (“[U]se of nondangerous quantities of the substance in order to prevent a perceived future 

danger does not violate ‘evolving standards of decency’ or constitute an ‘unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain”); see also Furnace, 705 F.3d at 1028. Other than pepper spray, no force was 

used on Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 8 at 4). Plaintiff was handcuffed when the responding officer arrived 

and then taken to decontaminate promptly. Thus, the facts do not support the inference that the 

amount of force Kelly used was disproportionate to the threat he presented.

Indeed, Defendant exercised reasonable efforts to temper the severity of a forceful 

response. According to the FAC, Defendant Kelly issued repeated verbal orders for Plaintiff to 

“get down” before deploying the pepper spray. (Doc. No. 8 at 4); see Johnson v. Schneider, 

2016 WL 3033691, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2016) (defendants “tempered the forcefulness of 

their response by starting with verbal commands and only escalating to pepper spraying, grabbing 

and striking [p]laintiff as [p]laintiff continued to resist”), report and recommendation adopted, 

2016 WL 3033690 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2016). Indeed, when Plaintiff failed to comply, 

Defendant’s choice to use pepper spray instead of other, more severe force demonstrates a 

tempered response. See Soto, 744 F.2d at 1262 (a limited application of mace may be “much

more humane and effective than a flesh to flesh confrontation with an inmate”); see also Williams 

v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 763 (4th Cir. 1996) (“a limited use of mace constitutes a relatively 

‘mild’ response compared to other forms of force, the initial application of mace indicates a 

‘tempered’ response by the prison officials.”). Further reflecting a tempered response, Plaintiff 

was promptly handcuffed and taken to wash the pepper spray off following the incident. (Doc. 

No. 8 at 4); See Soto, 744 F.2d at 1262 (prompt washing of the maced area of the body will 

usually provide immediate relief from any discomfort). Thus, this factor also weighs in favor of 

finding that Defendant did not violate Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights.

Finally, Plaintiff’s injuries from the incident appear to be minimal. The FAC alleges that 

“[Defendant] permanently damaged [Plaintiff’s] hearing” and that he now has to use a hearing 

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aid. (Doc. No. 8 at 5). However, the FAC does not allege facts to support a causal connection 

between Kelly’s use of pepper spray and Plaintiff’s hearing loss, nor can the Court infer such a 

connection based on Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion, which is contrary to common sense.

2

 See 

Western Mining Council, 643 F.2d at 624 (a court need not accept as true conclusory assertions, 

unwarranted inferences or unwarranted deductions of fact). Other than the alleged loss of 

hearing, Plaintiff did not point to any lasting physical injuries he suffered from the incident. 

While the absence of a significant injury is not dipositive of an excessive force claim, the extent 

of an inmate’s injury is one factor indicative of whether the force used was necessary in a 

particular situation. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (“The absence of serious injury is therefore relevant to

the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end it.”).

B. Violation of CDCR Policy 

To the extent Plaintiff asserts he suffered a constitutional violation because Defendant 

Kelly violated CDCR’s use of force policy, this is insufficient to state a claim. Plaintiff cites a

memo he received from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) 

informing him that Kelly’s actions on April 5 violated CDCR’s use of force policy. (Id. at 6). 

Even assuming that Defendant was found to have violated the CDCR’s use of force policy, a 

violation of “state departmental regulations do not establish a federal constitutional violation.” 

Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009); see Case v. Kitsap County Sheriff’s 

Dep’t, 249 F.3d 921, 930 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 (8th 

Cir. 1997) (“[T]here is no § 1983 liability for violating prison policy. [Plaintiff] must prove that 

[the official] violated his constitutional right . . . .”)); see also Gagne v. City of Galveston, 805 

F.2d 558, 560 (5th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot state a federal constitutional claim 

based solely on Defendant’s alleged violation of California state prison regulations.

2 The Court takes judicial notice under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence of the following

information from the U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons: OC aerosol spray is an

inflammatory agent which causes a burning sensation on the skin, tearing and closing of the eyes, and

swelling of the mucus membranes. https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5576_004.pdf (last visited: 

October 21, 2024). Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits a court to take judicial notice of facts that are 

“not subject to reasonable dispute” because they are either “generally known within the trial court's 

territorial jurisdiction,” or they “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 

cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 

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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Based on the above, the undersigned finds Plaintiff’s FAC fails to state any cognizable 

claim. The FAC suffers from many of the same pleading deficiencies that the undersigned 

identified and explained to Plaintiff in screening his original Complaint. Plaintiff reasserted 

many of the same claims that were asserted in his Complaint, including that Defendant Kelly’s 

violation of CDCR policy constitutes an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, and that he 

was pepper sprayed with an unknown quantity for no reason. Despite being provided with 

guidance and the appropriate legal standards, Plaintiff was unable to cure the deficiencies 

identified above. A plaintiff’s repeated failure to cure a complaint’s deficiencies constitutes “a 

strong indication that the [plaintiff has] no additional facts to plead.” Zucco Partners, LLC v.

Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Thus, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss the FAC without 

further leave to amend. McKinney v. Baca, 250 F. App’x 781 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir.1992)) (noting discretion to deny leave to amend is 

particularly broad where court has afforded plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend his 

complaint).

ACCORDINGLY, it is ORDERED:

The Clerk of Court randomly assign this case to a district judge for consideration of these 

Findings and Recommendation.

It is further RECOMMENDED:

The First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 8) be dismissed under § 1915A for failure to 

state a claim and this case be dismissed.

NOTICE TO PARTIES

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days 

after being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written 

objections with the Court. Id.; Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed fifteen 

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(15) pages. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party 

wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference the exhibit in the record by its 

CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, or otherwise reference the exhibit with 

specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the fifteen (15) page limitation may be disregarded by 

the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and Recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(l)(C). A party’s failure to file any objections within the specified time may result in the 

waiver of certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

Dated: October 23, 2024 

HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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