Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-02133/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-02133-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Baptista Delivery Services, LLC
Defendant
Baptista Enterprises Transporting and Towing, LLC
Defendant
Amit Kansupda
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMIT KANSUPDA,

Plaintiff,

v.

BAPTISTA DELIVERY SERVICES, LLC, 

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 4:18-cv-02133-KAW 

ORDER RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 

FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 38

On February 19, 2020, Plaintiff Amit Kansupda filed a motion for default judgment against 

Defendants Baptista Delivery Services, LLC and Baptista Enterprises Transporting and Towing, 

LLC (collectively “Defendants”). (Pl.’s Mot. for Default J., Dkt. No. 38.) This is Plaintiff’s 

second motion for default judgment, as the first was denied due to Plaintiff’s failure to correctly 

allege Plaintiff’s dates of employment. (See Order Den. Pl.’s Mot. for Default J. at 1, Dkt. No. 

28.) Having considered the filings and the relevant legal authority, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s 

motion for default judgment is still defective.1

First, Plaintiff again alleges the wrong dates of employment. In the operative complaint, 

Plaintiff alleges that he worked “[f]rom approximately November 2016 to February 2017 and from 

March 2017 to approximately April 21, 2017.” (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 10, Dkt. No. 29.) 

These are the same dates the Court found problematic in the prior motion for default judgment 

because Plaintiff states in his declaration that he was employed “from April 15, 2016 to January 

23, 2017 and from March 14, 2017 until April 21, 2017.” (Kansupda Decl. ¶ 2, Dkt. No. 38-2; see 

also Order Den. Pl.’s Mot. for Default J. at 1.) Additionally, Plaintiff’s damages are calculations 

1 The April 2, 2020 hearing was vacated due to the ongoing COVID-19 public health emergency. 

(Dkt. No. 41.)

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United States District Court

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based on Plaintiff’s employment from August 15, 2016. (Burton Decl., Exh. C at 1.) Thus, either 

Plaintiff’s complaint, declaration, or damages calculations are incorrect. This is inadequate to 

satisfy the standards for a motion for default judgment.

Second, Plaintiff fails to allege adequate facts to support his claims. In reviewing a motion 

for default judgment, the Court takes “the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as 

true.” DirecTV, Inc. v. Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation omitted). 

The defendant, however, “is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit 

conclusions of law.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff asserts that he was misclassified by Defendants. In support, however, 

Plaintiff cites almost no factual allegations;2for example, with respect to control, Plaintiff alleges: 

“Defendants had the right to control, and did control, Plaintiff as to the work done and the manner 

and means in which it was performed . . . .” (FAC ¶ 11i.) There are no facts regarding that 

control, such as how Defendants actually controlled Plaintiff – such as, for example, by requiring 

Plaintiff to accept assignments or shifts, dictating Plaintiff’s delivery routes, or directing how 

Plaintiff dressed or behaved while delivering product. At most, Plaintiff cites to a December 16, 

2016 document which states “Four days on 2 days off,” “Changes must be approved a week 

ahead,” “Leave the truck at least 3⁄4 full-keep receipts,” and to call the police and take pictures if 

there were accidents. (FAC ¶ 12.) Plaintiff provides no explanation for how these instructions 

were applied to his work in the operative complaint, nor does he cite these instructions in the 

motion for default judgment, let alone explain how these instructions demonstrate the requisite 

control.

Likewise, it is unclear that Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that he “frequently worked 

more than eight hours in a workday and forty hours in a workweek,” but “was not paid overtime 

wages,” could support an overtime claim. In Landers v. Quality Communications, Inc., the Ninth 

Circuit found that “at a minimum, a plaintiff asserting a violation of the FLSA overtime provisions 

2 The Court finds it particularly noteworthy that Plaintiff cited no facts in his motion for default 

judgment, failing to include a facts section entirely.

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must allege that she worked more than forty hours in a given workweek without being 

compensated for the hours worked in excess of forty during that week.” 771 F.3d 638, 645 (9th 

Cir. 2014). Such allegations must provide “sufficient detail about the length and frequency of

[the] unpaid work to support a reasonable inference that he worked more than forty hours in a 

given week.” Id. at 646. Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s overtime 

claim where the plaintiff failed to allege “any detail regarding a given workweek when [the 

plaintiff] worked in excess of forty hours and was not paid overtime for that given 

workweek . . . ” Id. Here, Plaintiff provides no factual allegations that would allow the Court to 

find that he worked overtime. Additionally, it is not clear Plaintiff has provided sufficient facts to 

show that Defendants are joint operators, such that both Defendants are liable for damages.

Third, Plaintiff’s damages calculations do not appear to be tenable. For example, 

Plaintiff’s PAGA penalties for inaccurate wage statements and failure to reimburse expenses are

based on Defendants having paid its employees approximately once a week, and Defendants 

having employed five employees. (Pl.’ Mot. for Default J. at 12.) There is nothing, however, to 

support Plaintiff’s estimate that Defendant had five employees during the relevant period. At 

most, Plaintiff states that he worked with four other drivers; this does not mean, however, that 

Defendants continued to employ five employees after Plaintiff stopped working for Defendants in 

February 2017. (See Kansupda Decl. ¶ 11.) It is not clear how the Court can accept this 

assumption in calculating PAGA penalties without any evidence, especially when Plaintiff seeks 

PAGA penalties starting from February 2017.

Because Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is defective, the Court will give Plaintiff 

the option of voluntarily withdrawing the motion for default judgment and filing a second 

amended complaint within 21 days of this order. Plaintiff’s amended complaint and any renewed 

motion for default judgment must address the issues raised in this order. If Plaintiff does not wish 

to withdraw the motion for default judgment, the Court will reassign this case to a district judge

//

//

//

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with the recommendation that the motion for default judgment be denied for the reasons stated 

above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 22, 2020 __________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

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