Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03126/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03126-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alesteve Cleaton
Petitioner
Department of Justice
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ALESTEVE CLEATON,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3126

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DC-0752-14-0760-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: October 13, 2016

______________________ 

ROBERT J. GAJARSA, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, argued for petitioner. Also represented by 

LAUREN M. BENNETT. 

ERIC JOHN SINGLEY, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

SCOTT D. AUSTIN. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, WALLACH, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

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2 CLEATON v. DOJ

HUGHES, Circuit Judge.

Alesteve Cleaton was removed from his position as 

Correctional Officer pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7371, which 

mandates the removal of any law enforcement officer who 

is convicted of a felony. Mr. Cleaton appeals the Merit 

Systems Protection Board’s decision sustaining his removal. Because the Board did not err in finding that

Mr. Cleaton was convicted of a felony on May 6, 2014, we 

affirm. 

I 

Mr. Cleaton was a Correctional Officer with the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) at the Federal Correctional Complex in Petersburg, Virginia. On December 17, 2013, 

Mr. Cleaton was indicted in Virginia State court on a 

felony charge for possession of marijuana with intent to 

distribute. J.A. 1097. During a hearing on March 20, 

2014, Mr. Cleaton pled no contest to the felony charge

pursuant to a plea deal. Pet. Br. at 7 (“After his indictment, Mr. Cleaton pled no contest to the charge against 

him pursuant to a plea deal.”).1 

Following the hearing, on May 6, 2014, the trial court 

entered an order noting that “defendant was arraigned 

and plead [sic] guilty to the charge in the indictment.” 

J.A. 1059. The court further noted that “having heard the 

evidence, [the court] accepted defendant’s plea of guilty, 

and found him guilty of possess[ing] marijuana with 

intent.” Id. The court deferred the imposition of the 

sentence “upon the condition that defendant cooperate

fully with the requests for information made by the Probation Officer, who is directed to conduct a thorough 

investigation and to file a long-form presentence report 

with the Court.” Id. 

1 The initial plea agreement and transcript from 

the March 20, 2014 hearing are not in the record. 

 

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CLEATON v. DOJ 3

On May 9, 2014, BOP proposed to remove Mr. Cleaton 

from his position pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7371(b). J.A. 

1057–58. Mr. Cleaton was notified on May 20, 2014, that 

he would be removed from his position effective May 31, 

2014. J.A. 1055–56. 

On June 5, 2014, Mr. Cleaton appealed his removal to 

the Board asserting that he was not convicted on May 6, 

2014. The Administrative Judge issued an initial decision

on October 3, 2014, finding that Mr. Cleaton was properly 

removed under 5 U.S.C. § 7371(b) because he was “convicted of a felony” that was “recorded on May 6, 2014.” 

J.A. 1103. 

After Mr. Cleaton was removed, he obtained new 

counsel and on November 20, 2014, he entered into a 

revised plea agreement. J.A. 1143–49. The revised plea 

agreement added a misdemeanor charge for contempt, but 

did not change Mr. Cleaton’s previous no contest plea to 

the felony. J.A. 1141. The court accepted the plea agreement noting that “Defendant pled no contest to both 

charges and stipulated that evidence was sufficient to 

convict him on both charges.” Id. But, pursuant to the 

plea agreement the court “withheld a finding [of guilt] for 

a period of 2 years.” Id. The court placed Mr. Cleaton on 

supervised probation for two years and, upon successful 

completion of the probation period, the charges against 

Mr. Cleaton will be dismissed. 

Mr. Cleaton appealed the Administrative Judge’s initial decision to the Board, arguing that pursuant to the 

revised plea agreement the court withheld a finding of 

guilt and therefore he was not convicted of a felony on 

May 6, 2014. The Board disagreed and upheld 

Mr. Cleaton’s removal.

 Mr. Cleaton appeals. We have jurisdiction under 

5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). 

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4 CLEATON v. DOJ

 II

The Board’s decision upholding Mr. Cleaton’s removal 

must be set aside “if it was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 

of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; 

obtained without following applicable procedures; or 

‘unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.’” 

Lindahl v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 774 n.5 

(1985) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)(3)).

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7371(b), “[a]ny law enforcement officer who is convicted of a felony shall be removed 

from employment as a law enforcement officer on the last 

day of the first applicable pay period following the conviction notice date.” “Conviction notice date” is defined as 

the date on which the employing agency receives “notice 

that the officer has been convicted of a felony that is 

entered by a Federal or State court . . . .” Id. § 7371(a)(1). 

“[T]he removal is mandatory even if the conviction is not 

yet final because it has been appealed.” Canava v. Dep’t 

of Homeland Sec., 817 F.3d 1348, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 

On appeal, Mr. Cleaton argues that the Board erred in 

sustaining his removal because he has not been “convicted” of a felony under Virginia law. Therefore, we must 

first determine whether state or federal law governs the 

meaning of “conviction” under § 7371(b), and second, 

whether Mr. Cleaton’s plea constitutes a conviction for 

purposes of § 7371(b). 

The statute itself does not specify whether state or 

federal law controls. Absent “plain indication to the 

contrary, . . . it is to be assumed when Congress enacts a 

statute that it does not intend to make its application 

dependent on state law.” NLRB v. Nat. Gas Util. Dist., 

402 U.S. 600, 603 (1971). In Dickerson v. New Banner 

Institute, Inc., the Supreme Court held that whether a 

person has been “convicted” for purposes of a federal 

statute that imposed firearms disabilities was “a question 

of federal, not state, law, despite the fact that the prediCase: 15-3126 Document: 44-2 Page: 4 Filed: 10/13/2016
CLEATON v. DOJ 5

cate offense and its punishment are defined by the law of 

the State.” 460 U.S. 103, 112 (1983).2 The Court reasoned that “[t]his makes for desirable national uniformity 

unaffected by varying state laws, procedures, and definitions of ‘conviction.’” Id. The same logic applies here. 

Section 7371(b) requires immediate removal of a law 

enforcement officer convicted of a felony. Because federal 

agencies employ law enforcement officers in every state, it 

is desirable to have one uniform standard for “conviction” 

that is unaffected by varying state laws, procedures, and 

definitions. Therefore, whether one has been “convicted” 

within the language of 5 U.S.C. § 7371(b) is necessarily a 

question of federal law. 

Under federal law, “a guilty plea alone [can] constitute a conviction” in some circumstances. Id. at 113

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 

Mulder v. McDonald, 805 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 

(“[A]ccording to its ordinary meaning, a ‘conviction occurs 

when the accused is found—or pleads—guilty.”) (emphasis 

added). In Dickerson, for example, the Court determined 

that a formal judgment was not necessary to establish 

that an individual had been convicted of a felony for 

purposes of the firearms disability statute because the 

purpose of the statute “was to keep firearms out of the 

2 In Dickerson, the Supreme Court concluded that 

even if an individual’s felony conviction is expunged, the 

individual may not maintain a federal license to manufacture or sell firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) because the 

individual had been convicted within the meaning of the 

statute. See 460 U.S. at 119–20. Congress overruled this 

outcome in the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L.

No. 99-308, § 101, 100 Stat. 449 (1986), by clarifying that 

a conviction expunged under state law would not prevent 

an individual from maintaining such a license. See Logan 

v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 27–28 (2007).

 

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6 CLEATON v. DOJ

hands of presumptively risky people” and there was “no 

reason whatsoever to suppose that Congress meant 

[conviction] to apply only to one against whom a formal 

judgment has been entered.” Id. at 112 n.6. 

Similarly, Congress’s main concern in enacting 

§ 7371(b) was prohibiting individuals that were guilty of 

felonies from serving the public as law enforcement 

officers. Before Congress enacted § 7371(b), an agency 

had discretion regarding the removal of a law enforcement officer that had been convicted of a felony. See 146 

CONG. REC. S2617 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 2000) (statement of 

Sen. Grassley). Section 7371(b)’s broad language reflects 

Congress’s intent to remove that discretion in order to

maintain the public’s trust in the federal law enforcement

system. Id. (“Rank and file [law enforcement officers] . . . feel—as I do—that law enforcement officers, who 

are convicted of felonies—should be removed from their 

posts immediately. They don’t want their badges tarnished by having one of their own, who committed a 

felony, remain on the job.”). Nothing in the legislative 

history or statutory text indicates that Congress was 

concerned with whether the officer in question actually 

receives or serves a prison sentence, or whether a state 

court formally enters a written adjudication of guilt. 

Therefore, we find that an individual can be “convicted” for purposes of § 7371(b) “once guilt has been established whether by plea or by verdict and nothing remains 

to be done except pass sentence.” Dickerson. 460 U.S. at 

114. Further, when an individual is placed on probation, 

a court does not need to necessarily issue a formal adjudication of guilt because “one cannot be placed on probation 

if the court does not deem him to be guilty of a crime.” Id.

at 113–14. 

Here, Mr. Cleaton pled no contest to a single felony offense and on May 6, 2014, the court found him guilty of 

that felony. Because guilt was established on May 6, 

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CLEATON v. DOJ 7

2014, the Board correctly determined that Mr. Cleaton 

was convicted of a felony for purposes of § 7371(b) as of 

that date. 

Mr. Cleaton argues that even if he was convicted of a 

felony under the initial plea agreement, the initial plea

agreement was withdrawn and therefore the conviction 

was nullified. See Pet. Br. at 14. However, the statute is 

clear that a removal may only be set aside “retroactively 

to the date on which the removal occurred, with back 

pay,” if the conviction is overturned on appeal, which has 

not happened in this case. 5 U.S.C. § 7371(d); see id. 

§ 7371(e)(2) (stating that “[t]he employee may . . . contest 

or appeal a removal, but only with respect to whether—

(A) the employee is a law enforcement officer; (B) the 

employee is convicted of a felony; or (C) the conviction was 

overturned on appeal.”). And, although Virginia law 

permits a defendant to withdraw a plea agreement—

which could potentially affect whether there was a conviction if the plea were withdrawn as a result—Mr. Cleaton 

failed to present any evidence establishing that he filed a 

motion to withdraw the plea or that the court actually set 

aside the initial plea agreement. See Va. Code Ann. 

§ 19.2-296 (2016) (“A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 

or nolo contendere may be made only before sentence is 

imposed or imposition of a sentence is suspended.”); Hall 

v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E.2d 343, 346 (Va. App. 1999) 

(“Whether a defendant should be permitted to withdraw a 

guilty plea rests within the sound discretion of the trial 

court to be determined based on the facts and circumstances of each case.”). Instead, Mr. Cleaton’s initial plea 

agreement was simply revised to encompass an additional 

criminal offense. See Pet. Br. at 22; J.A. 1143. This 

conclusion is supported by the fact that Mr. Cleaton’s plea 

from the initial plea agreement did not change in the 

revised plea agreement—he merely pled no contest to the 

additional charge. Compare Pet. Br. at 7 with J.A. 1143. 

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8 CLEATON v. DOJ

This is also not a situation where there is a plea 

agreement, and, hypothetically, a withdrawal of that 

agreement could affect whether there was a conviction. 

See Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 113 n.7. Here, there was a 

judgment of guilt by the trial court based on the plea 

agreement. The theoretical possibility that Mr. Cleaton 

could have withdrawn his plea agreement cannot affect 

that the judgment was entered.

Congress enacted this statute to require the immediate removal of a law enforcement officer convicted of a 

felony. See supra at 6. It would be inconsistent with both 

the plain language of the statute and Congress’s intent if 

we were to hold that, although Mr. Cleaton was convicted 

of a felony in May 2014 that has not been overturned on 

appeal, he must be reinstated and awarded back pay 

because the initial plea agreement was revised to include 

additional criminal activity. 

Because Mr. Cleaton’s conviction has not been overturned on appeal, for purposes of § 7371(b), he stands 

convicted of a felony as of May 6, 2014. Therefore, the 

Board did not err in sustaining his removal as of that 

date. 

AFFIRMED

No costs.

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