Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01357/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01357-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Randolf Grounds
Respondent
Juilaki Strawther
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JUILAKI STRAWTHER, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

RANDOLF GROUNDS, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:13-cv-1357-MCE-EFB P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel with a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges a judgment of conviction entered 

against him on December 15, 2009, in the Sacramento County Superior Court on charges of 

second degree robbery with use of a firearm. He seeks federal habeas relief on the following 

grounds: (1) the trial court violated his right to due process in admitting testimony from a 

fingerprint expert; (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance through numerous errors; 

(3) jury instruction error violated his right to due process; (4) prosecutorial misconduct violated 

his right to a fair trial; and (5) cumulative error at his trial violated his right to due process. Upon 

careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned recommends that 

petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied. 

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I. Background

 In its unpublished memorandum and opinion affirming petitioner’s judgment of 

conviction on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the 

following factual summary: 

Defendant Juilaki Strawther appeals from his conviction of second 

degree robbery. He contends the trial court made numerous 

prejudicial errors regarding the admission of the prosecution's 

fingerprint evidence against him. Alternatively, he claims his trial 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance when she did not raise 

numerous objections to the fingerprint evidence. He also alleges 

instructional error and prosecutorial misconduct. We disagree with 

defendant's contentions and affirm the judgment. 

FACTS 

Jagdeep Singh and Kuldeep Lally were working at a 7–Eleven store 

on 43rd Avenue in Sacramento the evening of July 19, 2009. Singh 

was the assistant manager and worked at the cash register. Lally 

was the night clerk. He was responsible for stocking the shelves 

and cleaning the store regularly. 

One of Lally's duties included cleaning the store's counter areas. 

He would wipe the counters with a damp cloth. That day, he 

cleaned the counter in front of the cashier with a damp towel at 

7:19:05 p.m. He was recorded doing so by the store's surveillance 

camera. 

At about 7:30 p.m. that evening, Singh was helping a customer 

when he noticed two men outside the store. After the customer left 

and while Singh was putting change in the register drawer, a man 

suddenly came up to him, displayed a gun, and told Singh to give 

him the money or he would shoot him. Singh feared he would be 

shot. He noticed the robber put his left hand onto the glass counter 

in front of the cash register while he held the gun in his right hand. 

The robber was not wearing gloves. Singh opened the drawer and 

gave the robber the money. The robber took the money, put the gun 

in his pants, and ran out. Singh then hit the robbery bell at his 

counter and called 911. 

Singh described the robber as Black, approximately 20 or 21 years 

of age, and wearing a beanie, a black jacket, and a t-shirt with a 

golden sign on the front. The robber also had a little beard and 

some facial hair. Singh did not notice any tattoos on the robber. 

The robber's gun was a black revolver with a long barrel. 

Singh was unable to identify the robber at trial. He was not sure if 

defendant was the robber, but he noted defendant's color and facial 

hair looked similar to the robber's. Singh had participated in a 

photo lineup about a week after the robbery, however, and at that 

time he identified defendant as the robber. His memory then was 

much better than it was at trial, and he was confident then that he 

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had identified the correct person. He had seen the man he identified 

in the photo lineup in his store sometime during the month before 

the robbery, but not earlier on the day of the robbery. 

Sacramento Police Department Detective Mike Mullaly was 

assigned to investigate the robbery. On July 28, 2009, he met with 

the store's owner and viewed the surveillance tape of the robbery. 

The tape showed the robber, and showed him pointing a revolvertype weapon at Singh. It also showed the robber was accompanied 

by another person who wore a white t-shirt. This accomplice 

remained outside of the store during the robbery. Both the robber 

and his accomplice fled after the robbery. 

Detective Mullaly became aware that defendant was a suspect in 

the robbery. He administered the photo lineup to Singh. Singh 

looked at the photos “for just a few seconds,” pointed to defendant's 

photo, and said he was the robber. Singh said he was certain he had 

selected the robber. 

Fingerprint evidence was collected as part of the investigation. On 

the evening of the robbery, Sacramento Police Department forensic 

investigator Bridget Wilson collected two latent fingerprints from 

the 7–Eleven's counter near the cash register and four latent prints 

from the interior of the store's door. 

On October 13, 2009, Sacramento Police Department forensic 

investigator Darin Noonan met with defendant in order to take a set 

of “major case prints” from him. Investigator Noonan described 

major case prints as “known exemplars from every portion of the 

hand, the joints of the fingers and of the palms and the lower 

portion and side portions of the palms that you would normally not 

obtain during the booking process.” Investigator Noonan obtained 

defendant's case prints and booked them into the file. He also 

photographed defendant to document his identity as the person 

whose fingerprints he had collected. 

Sacramento Police Department forensic investigator Timothy 

Sardelich analyzed the latent prints investigator Wilson had 

collected at the scene. Along with the latent prints, investigator 

Sardelich received a known print from a database of known prints 

used for when someone applies for a background check, for 

employment with law enforcement, or by the Department of Motor 

Vehicles (DMV).1

 The known print belonged to defendant. 

Sardelich was asked to compare the latent prints with the known 

print. Sardelich compared the latent prints taken from the scene 

with the known print, and he determined the latent prints taken 

from the 7–Eleven's glass counter matched defendant's known print. 

Investigator Sardelich next compared defendant's known print from 

the database with the case prints taken from defendant by 

 

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 Sardelich testified the database contained millions of prints, more than five million of 

which were from California. 

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investigator Noonan. He concluded the known print and the case 

prints came from the same person. 

From these comparisons, investigator Sardelich concluded one of 

the latent prints lifted from the 7–Eleven's counter was of 

defendant's left little finger. Another latent print lifted from the 

counter was of defendant's left hand and fingers. Other latent prints 

that had been lifted from the 7–Eleven's door by investigator 

Wilson during the robbery investigation did not match defendant's 

known print or his case prints. 

We provide additional facts in context as necessary. 

Following the presentation of evidence, a jury convicted defendant 

of one count of second degree robbery (Pen.Code, § 211).2

 The 

jury also found true an allegation that defendant had personally 

used a firearm when he committed the crime. (§ 12022.53, subd. 

(b).) 

In a bifurcated bench trial, the court found true allegations that 

defendant had previously been convicted of a serious felony within 

the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a), and the “Three Strikes” 

law (§§ 667, subds.(b)-(i), 1170.12). 

The court sentenced defendant to a state prison term totaling 25 

years, calculated as follows: the upper term of five years on the 

robbery count, doubled under the Three Strikes law, plus a 

consecutive 10 years for the firearm use enhancement and a 

consecutive five years for the prior felony conviction. 

People v. Strawther, No. C064127, 2012 WL 486877, at **1-3 (Cal.App. 3 Dist. Feb. 15, 2012). 

 After the California Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s judgment of conviction, he filed 

a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 5. On April 25, 2012, 

that petition was summarily denied. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 6. 

II. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims 

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 

state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S.___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2010); 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 

2000). 

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 Further undesignated references to sections are to the Penal Code. 

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 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas 

corpus relief: 

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not 

be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 

claim - 

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

 For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists of 

holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. 

Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Greene v. Fisher, ___ U.S. 

___, 132 S.Ct. 38 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Circuit court precedent “may be persuasive in determining 

what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 

633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)). However, circuit 

precedent may not be “used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court 

jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] Court has not announced.” Marshall 

v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (citing Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 

(2012) (per curiam)). Nor may it be used to “determine whether a particular rule of law is so 

widely accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, 

be accepted as correct. Id. Further, where courts of appeals have diverged in their treatment of 

an issue, it cannot be said that there is “clearly established Federal law” governing that issue. 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006). 

 A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule 

contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court 

precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the 

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writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s 

decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. 3 Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 

(9th Cir. 2004). In this regard, a federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 

(2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent 

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”). 

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S.___,___,131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 

652, 664 (2004)). Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal 

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in 

federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter,131 

S. Ct. at 786-87. 

 If the state court’s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing 

court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 

527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of § 

2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by considering 

de novo the constitutional issues raised.”). 

 The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). If 

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 Under § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision based on a factual determination is not to be 

overturned on factual grounds unless it is “objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Davis v. Woodford, 

384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

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the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a 

previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of 

the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “When 

a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication 

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. This 

presumption may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other explanation for 

the state court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 785 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

803 (1991)). Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects some claims 

but does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to 

rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 

___, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013). 

 Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo 

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether 

a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no 

reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. 

 A summary denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner’s claims. 

Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 957 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 2012). While the federal court cannot analyze 

just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must review the 

state court record to determine whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. This court “must determine what arguments or theories ... 

could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible 

fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the 

holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. at 786. The petitioner bears “the burden 

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to demonstrate that ‘there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.’” Walker v. 

Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784). 

 When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s 

claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal 

habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 

F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). 

III. Petitioner’s Claims 

 A. Fingerprint Evidence

 Petitioner’s first three claims challenge the trial court’s admission into evidence of the 

testimony of Timothy Sardelich, the prosecution’s fingerprint expert. Claim one asserts that 

Sardelich’s testimony was without sufficient foundation and was therefore irrelevant. ECF No. 1 

at 13-20.4

 Claim two argues that admission of Sardelich’s testimony violated petitioner’s due 

process rights because the testimony was “confusing, misleading and irrelevant.” Id. at 26. 

Claim three argues that the expert’s testimony was inadmissible because it relied upon 

“fingerprint transitivity, a new scientific technique that does not meet the requirements of the 

Kelly test.” Id. at 28. 

 1. State Court Decision

 The California Court of Appeal denied all of these claims, both on procedural grounds and 

on the merits. First, the court found that “[d]efendant has forfeited these arguments by not 

objecting on these grounds at the trial court.” Strawther, 2012 WL 486877 at **3. Second, it 

found that “[e]ven if the arguments had been properly raised, they lack merit.” Id. The court 

described the background and explained its analysis as follows: 

A. Additional background information 

During trial and outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel 

suggested she intended to challenge the fingerprint testimony 

investigator Sardelich would give. Counsel knew that Sardelich 

compared the crime scene latent prints and the “major case prints” 

taken by investigator Noonan with the known print taken from a 

 4

 Page number citations such as this one are to the page numbers reflected on the court’s 

CM/ECF system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties. 

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database (in this case, a Department of Justice (DOJ) database), but 

he had not compared the latent prints and the case prints with each 

other. To further complicate the matter, the known print had not 

been introduced into evidence. According to counsel, Sardelich had 

used the known print “as the crux of what he would look at and 

compared that to everything else.” 

Counsel argued the evidence of the known print lacked foundation 

and a chain of custody. She also claimed the evidence was 

prejudicial. If the known print was admitted, the jury would 

wonder why DOJ had obtained defendant's prints back in 2004. 

Yet if the known print was not admitted, the expert's basis for 

claiming that the latent prints were defendant's would be missing. 

Counsel asked for a hearing under Evidence Code section 402 to 

determine whether the known print was admissible. Counsel also 

asked that if the court determined the known print was not 

admissible, it exclude from evidence Sardelich's expert opinion as 

to the latent prints' identity, since he based that opinion on the 

known print. 

Responding to counsel's motions, the prosecutor argued investigator 

Sardelich could use and reference the known print without having 

to admit it into evidence and still testify as to his opinion on the 

latent prints' identity. He explained the latent prints were entered 

into the DOJ's automated database, which notified the examiners of 

a potential match. This is how defendant was identified as a 

suspect. At that point, Tanya Atkinson of the crime scene 

investigations unit printed out the copy of the DOJ known print and 

compared it to the latent print taken from the crime scene. She 

verified the two matched. 

The prosecutor, however, did not intend to have a witness testify to 

that. In his opinion, the DOJ known print only identified a possible 

suspect. He was not relying on the known print to tie defendant to 

the crime. 

The prosecutor had obtained by court order defendant's major case 

prints. He had intended for an investigator to obtain the case prints 

and compare them with the latent prints. However, the investigator 

did not do that. Instead, investigator Sardelich compared the case 

prints investigator Noonan had obtained to the DOJ known print. 

This established the DOJ known print was in fact defendant's print. 

Investigator Sardelich then took the DOJ known print and 

compared it to the latent prints lifted from the crime scene by 

investigator Wilson, and he determined they were a match. “So 

what we have is, as he put it, A equals B, B equals C, so, therefore, 

in his expert opinion he will say A equals C. [¶] Even if he doesn't 

say A equals C, [that] A equals B[and] B equals C establishes 

[defendant] left that latent print.” Inexplicably, it never occurred to 

Sardelich to make, or to the prosecutor to direct Sardelich to make, 

a comparison of the latent prints with the major case prints. 

 

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Missing the obvious remedy of a direct comparison between A and 

C, the prosecutor offered “to sanitize” where the known print came 

from by asking investigator Sardelich if he had access to multiple 

databases used for background checks, employment screens, and 

DMV fingerprints. He would then ask Sardelich if he compared the 

major case prints to a photo of a known print taken from one of 

those databases. Once he compared them, Sardelich could say the 

known print was defendant's. Then Sardelich could compare the 

known print to the latent prints and conclude in his expert opinion 

that it is the same person. The prosecutor argued this sanitation 

would take care of any foundation and prejudice concerns raised by 

defense counsel. 

Turning to defense counsel, the court asked whether an expert could 

rely on the case prints, the latent prints, and the known print and 

conclude in his opinion they were all defendant's prints. Defense 

counsel did not answer the question directly. Instead, she claimed 

that situation would force her to show the jury what she claimed 

was inadmissible evidence (the known print) in order to question 

the expert about his comparisons. 

The court said that was not per se improper. In fact, it was a 

common occurrence where expert opinions are challenged, as they 

can be based on inadmissible hearsay. 

The court implied the evidence was admissible by stating it 

understood the prosecution's argument that the cross-comparisons 

of the three sets of prints supported the reliability of investigator 

Sardelich's opinion. It denied defense counsel's motion to exclude 

any evidence to the extent the motion sought that relief. 

The court also denied counsel's motion for an Evidence Code 

section 402 hearing without prejudice “because I have no idea 

exactly what's going to be said. These are merely offers of proof at 

this time.” 

During trial, investigator Sardelich testified as an expert witness to 

the points discussed above. Neither the prosecution nor the defense 

sought to admit the known print into evidence. Defense counsel 

offered no objections to Sardelich's status as an expert witness or to 

his testimony. On cross-examination, investigator Sardelich 

repeated he had reached his conclusions by comparing the crime 

scene latent prints with the known print, and the major case prints 

with the known print. 

B. Analysis 

Defendant has forfeited his argument that the court erred in 

admitting investigator Sardelich's testimony. Defendant never 

objected to Sardelich's testimony as inadmissible because it was 

irrelevant, confusing, misleading, or lacking a proper scientific 

foundation, the grounds he raises on appeal. At trial, defendant 

argued the evidence was inadmissible because it lacked foundation 

and a chain of custody and was prejudicial. Defendant cannot raise 

an objection to evidence on appeal that was not made in the trial 

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court. (Evid.Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Partida (2005) 37 

Cal.4th 428, 435.) 

Defendant's claims also fail on their merits. The trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by admitting investigator Sardelich's testimony. 

The testimony was relevant, was not confusing or misleading, and it 

did not require any particular scientific foundation. No doubt 

Sardelich could have reached his opinion in a less circuitous route, 

but he nonetheless concluded the latent prints found at the crime 

scene belonged to defendant. That opinion was obviously relevant, 

and the jurors could consider the manner in which Sardelich 

reached that opinion as part of determining the weight and 

credibility they would attach to his opinion. 

Defendant argues investigator Sardelich's testimony was 

inadmissible because it relied on what he calls a “transitivity 

relation” that he claims in this case is false. In logic, the term 

“transitive” “describes a given relation between terms such that if it 

exists between ‘a’ and ‘b’ and between ‘b’ and ‘c,’ then it also 

exists between ‘a’ and ‘c.’ Typical transitive relationships include 

‘is greater than,’ ‘is equal to,’ and ‘is similar to.’” (Encarta World 

English Dict. (North Amer. ed.) [Microsoft Word 7 utility].) 

Defendant claims fingerprint analysis is not mathematics but is 

contextual and subjective, and thus the type of transitive 

relationship used by the prosecutor and investigator Sardelich does 

not hold true here. In his opinion, the relationship between the 

database known print, the latent prints, and the major case prints is 

a transitivity fallacy, similar to that expressed in such phrases as if 

A is perpendicular to B, and B is perpendicular to C, then A is 

perpendicular to C, or if A is a friend of B, and B is a friend of C, 

then A is a friend of C. As a result, he argues the evidence was 

irrelevant, misleading, and based on a new scientific technique. We 

disagree. 

Expert testimony may “be premised on material that is not admitted 

into evidence so long as it is material of a type that is reasonably 

relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming their 

opinions. [Citations.] Of course, any material that forms the basis 

of an expert's opinion testimony must be reliable. [Citation.] [¶] ... 

“So long as this threshold requirement of reliability is satisfied, 

even matter that is ordinarily inadmissible can form the proper basis 

for an expert's opinion testimony. [Citations.] And because 

Evidence Code section 802 allows an expert witness to ‘state on 

direct examination the reasons for his opinion and the matter ... 

upon which it is based,’ an expert witness whose opinion is based 

on such inadmissible matter can, when testifying, describe the 

material that forms the basis of the opinion. [Citations.]” (People 

v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 618, original italics.) 

Defendant does not contest the reliability of the database known 

print. And there is no doubt the DOJ database is reasonably relied 

upon by experts to assist with the fingerprint identification process. 

(See, e.g., People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 160.) Thus, 

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whether the database known print was admissible is beside the 

point, as investigator Sardelich was free to rely upon it and discuss 

it in his testimony as material he relied upon to form his opinion. 

Admitting the testimony also did not violate defendant's due 

process rights, as the evidence was not misleading, confusing, or 

lacking a required scientific foundation. Contrary to defendant's 

assertions, investigator Sardelich's testimony was that, based on his 

scientific analysis, the latent prints matched, or were equal to, the 

known print, which in turn matched, or was equal to, the major case 

prints. Each comparison was made in Sardelich's opinion to a 

scientific certainty. That was sufficient for purposes of expert 

opinion testimony, and whether it was a true or false transitive 

relationship was a matter of weight to be decided by the jury. 

Due process was also accorded defendant. Counsel was able to, 

and did challenge investigator Sardelich's methodology and 

analysis on cross-examination. She chose not to introduce the 

known print because she did not want the jury to speculate why 

defendant had been fingerprinted years earlier. The jury had the 

latent prints and the major case prints to compare and determine 

their similarity for themselves. Moreover, Sardelich did not rely on 

the database's identification of the known print belonging to 

defendant as the means for identifying the prints. Rather, he first 

determined the latent print and the known print were made by the 

same person, and then he determined the known print and the case 

print were from defendant. 

Kelly also did not bar investigator Sardelich's testimony. There is 

nothing in the record on which to claim Sardelich's methodology 

was not scientifically accepted. Transitive relationships are not 

novel to logic, and defendant certainly does not challenge the way 

in which Sardelich actually compared the various sets of prints. 

We thus conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

admitting investigator Sardelich's fingerprint identification 

testimony. 

Strawther, 2012 WL 486877 at **3-6. 

 2. Analysis 

 As set forth above, the California Court of Appeal ruled, in part, that petitioner forfeited 

his challenges to investigator Sardelich’s testimony because his trial counsel failed to make a 

contemporaneous objection to that testimony on the same grounds that he raised on appeal. 

Respondent argues the state court’s finding of waiver based on the lack of a contemporaneous 

objection constitutes a state procedural bar precluding this court from addressing the merits of 

petitioner’s first three claims. ECF No. 11 at 43-45. 

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 State courts may decline to review a claim based on a procedural default. Wainwright v. 

Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). As a general rule, a federal habeas court “‘will not review a question 

of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that 

is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.’” Calderon v. 

United States District Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)). The state rule is only “adequate” if it is “firmly 

established and regularly followed.” Id. (quoting Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991)); 

Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F 3d 573, 583 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[t]o be deemed adequate, the state law 

ground for decision must be well-established and consistently applied.”). The state rule must also 

be “independent” in that it is not “interwoven with the federal law.” Park v. California, 202 F.3d 

1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983)). Even if 

the state rule is independent and adequate, the claims may be heard if the petitioner can show: (1) 

cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law; or (2) 

that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 

501 U.S. at 749-50. 

 Respondent has met his burden of adequately pleading an independent and adequate state 

procedural ground as an affirmative defense. See Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. Petitioner does not 

deny that his trial counsel failed to make a contemporaneous objection to investigator Sardelich’s 

testimony on the same grounds that he raised on appeal and also in his first three claims before 

this court. Although the state appellate court addressed petitioner’s claims on the merits, it also 

expressly held that the claims were waived on appeal because of defense counsel’s failure to 

object. Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of asserting specific factual allegations that 

demonstrate the inadequacy of California’s contemporaneous-objection rule as unclear, 

inconsistently applied or not well-established, either as a general rule or as applied to him. 

Bennet, 322 F.3d at 586; Melendez v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120, 1124-26 (9th Cir. 2002). Petitioner’s 

first three claims before this court therefore appear to be procedurally barred. See Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 747; Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989); Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 

1092-93 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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 Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that there was cause for his procedural default or 

that a miscarriage of justice would result absent review of the claims by this court. See Coleman, 

501 U.S. at 748; Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 957-58 (9th Cir. 1999). Ineffective assistance 

of counsel will establish cause to excuse a procedural default if it was “so ineffective as to violate 

the Federal Constitution.” Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000) (citing Murray v. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 486–88 (1986)). However, for the reasons explained below, the failure of 

petitioner’s trial counsel to object to the testimony of the fingerprint expert on the grounds raised 

in the instant petition does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 

 Even if petitioner’s challenges to the admission of investigator Sardelich’s testimony are 

not procedurally barred, they should be denied. A writ of habeas corpus will be granted for an 

erroneous admission of evidence “only where the ‘testimony is almost entirely unreliable and . . . 

the factfinder and the adversary system will not be competent to uncover, recognize, and take due 

account of its shortcomings.’” Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983)). Evidence violates due process only if “there are 

no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence.” Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 

F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991). Evidence must “be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair 

trial” for its admission to violate due process Id. (quoting Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 

1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

 Notwithstanding the above, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has observed 

that: 

The Supreme Court has made very few rulings regarding the 

admission of evidence as a violation of due process. Although the 

Court has been clear that a writ should be issued when 

constitutional errors have rendered the trial fundamentally unfair 

(citation omitted), it has not yet made a clear ruling that admission 

of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due 

process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ. 

Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). Therefore, “under AEDPA, even 

clearly erroneous admissions of evidence that render a trial fundamentally unfair may not permit 

the grant of federal habeas corpus relief if not forbidden by ‘clearly established Federal law,’ as 

laid out by the Supreme Court.” Id. See also Greel v. Martel, No. 10-16847, 472 F. App’x 503, 

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504, 2012 WL 907215, *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 2012) (“There is likewise no clearly established 

federal law that admitting prejudicial evidence violates due process.”).5

 

 In light of these authorities, the state court’s rejection of petitioner’s arguments that the 

trial court violated his right to due process in admitting Sardelich’s testimony does not support the 

granting of federal habeas relief under AEDPA. There is no “clearly established federal law” 

prohibiting the admission into evidence of the type of fingerprint testimony provided by 

investigator Sardelich. As noted by the California Court of Appeal, Sardelich’s testimony was 

undoubtedly relevant, it was not misleading or confusing, and it did not require a scientific 

foundation to be admissible. ECF No. 12 at 13. 

 Assuming arguendo that the state court erred under federal circuit law in admitting the 

testimony, petitioner must still show that the error “had a substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict” and that he suffered actual prejudice, defined as a 

“reasonable probability” that the jury would have reached a different result but for the error. See 

Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 916 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 

637 (1993)). See also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (in § 2254 habeas proceeding, 

federal court must assess prejudicial impact of constitutional error under Brecht “substantial and 

injurious effect” standard). Petitioner has failed to make this showing. Investigator Sardelich 

explained in detail how he compared fingerprints and reached the conclusion that petitioner’s 

print was found at the 7-Eleven. Petitioner’s trial counsel cross-examined Sardelich on the 

methods he used to reach his conclusions. The jury was instructed that it must “decide whether 

information on which the expert relied was true and accurate,” and that it should “disregard any 

opinion that you find unbelievable, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence.” Clerk’s 

Transcript on Appeal (CT) at 88. By these means, the jury was given the tools to carefully 

evaluate Sardelich’s testimony. 

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 5

 Citation to this unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion issued after January 1, 2007 is 

appropriate pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3(b). 

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In addition, as noted by the California Court of Appeal in another part of its opinion, the 

other evidence against petitioner was substantial. Specifically, 

The victim identified defendant in a photo lineup as the person who 

robbed him, and, having seen the person in his store within the 

month before the robbery, he testified he was certain at the time of 

his identification that the person he selected was in fact the robber. 

That person was defendant. 

Strawther, 2012 WL 486877 at *6-7. Under these circumstances, there was no reasonable 

possibility the jury would have reached a different verdict absent any error in admitting the 

testimony of the fingerprint expert. 

 For the foregoing reasons, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his first 

three claims. 

B. Jury Instruction Error

 Petitioner’s next ground for relief claims that the trial court violated his right to due 

process when it failed to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that in order to conclude from investigator 

Sardelich’s testimony that the major case prints matched the latent prints, “the jury had to 

determine whether a valid transitivity relation existed.” ECF No. 1 at 31. Petitioner provides an 

example of such an instruction, as follows: 

The fingerprint expert testified that the rolled Noonan prints 

matched the computerized known prints and the computerized 

known prints matched the latent prints lifted from the 7-Eleven 

glass countertop. You must decide not only if the expert’s matches 

are accurate but also whether they demonstrate a third match, that 

of the rolled Noonan prints and the latent prints. You may only 

consider the fingerprint evidence as proof of guilt if you find the 

third match to be true. Otherwise, the fingerprint testimony cannot 

be considered for any purpose. 

Id. at 32 n.3. Petitioner argues that “the crucial error in fingerprint analysis was the failure to 

match the Noonan prints with the latent prints.” Id. at 33. He contends that without a jury 

instruction such as the one he suggests, he was unable to articulate his theory of defense and “the 

jury simply acquiesced to [the expert’s] testimony that the prints identified Petitioner as the 

robber.” Id. at 31. 

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 1. State Court Decision

 The California Court of Appeal denied this claim, reasoning as follows: 

Defendant asserts the trial court had a duty to instruct the jury sua 

sponte that it had to determine whether a valid transitive 

relationship existed between the three sets of prints. The trial court 

was under no such duty. 

The court instructed the jury it was not required to accept 

investigator Sardelich's opinion as true, and that it could determine 

what meaning or importance to give to his opinion in reaching a 

verdict. (CALCRIM No. 332.) In that instruction, the court 

specifically informed the jury that “[y]ou must decide whether 

information on which the expert relied was true and accurate. You 

may disregard any opinion that you find unbelievable, 

unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence.” 

These instructions adequately informed the jurors they could give 

whatever weight they believed appropriate to investigator 

Sardelich's opinion and the methods he used to reach that opinion. 

Had the court given any other instruction more specific than these 

on this issue, that instruction would have been argumentative. 

Thus, a pinpoint instruction was not required in this instance. 

Strawther, 2012 WL 486877 at *6. 

 2. Applicable Law

 In general, a challenge to jury instructions does not state a federal constitutional claim. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72; Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 

F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). “Failure to give [a jury] instruction which might be proper as a 

matter of state law,” by itself, does not merit federal habeas relief.” Menendez v. Terhune, 422 

F.3d 1012, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 993 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

In order to warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury instruction “cannot be merely 

‘undesirable, erroneous, or even “universally condemned,”’ but must violate some due process 

right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973). 

To prevail on such a claim, petitioner must demonstrate “that an erroneous instruction ‘so 

infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.’” Prantil v. State of 

Cal., 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Darnell v. Swinney, 823 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 

1987)). In making its determination, this court must evaluate the challenged jury instructions “‘in 

the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process.’” Id.

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(quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir. 1984)). Where the challenge is to a 

refusal or failure to give an instruction, the petitioner’s burden is “especially heavy,” because 

“[a]n omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of 

the law.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). See also Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 

F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997) (same). 

 A defendant is entitled to jury instructions that present the crux of his defense. See 

Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2002). However, there is no entitlement to 

tailor-made instructions that pinpoint certain aspects of the defense. “‘So long as the instructions 

fairly and adequately cover the issues presented, the judge’s formulation of those instructions or 

choice of language is a matter of discretion.’” United States v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 

1560, 1570 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Echeverry, 759 F.2d 1451, 1455 (9th Cir. 

1985)); see also United States v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1996); Duckett v. 

Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 743 (9th Cir. 1995) (“it is not reversible error to reject a defendant’s 

proposed instruction on his theory of the case if other instructions, in their entirety, adequately 

cover the defense theory”). 

 3. Analysis

 Petitioner has not shown that the trial court violated his right to due process in failing to 

give a sua sponte jury instruction on the necessity of a valid transitive relationship between the 

three sets of fingerprints. Petitioner’s jury received the following instruction: 

A witness was allowed to testify as an expert and to give an 

opinion. You must consider the opinion, but you are not required to 

accept it as true or correct. The meaning and importance of any 

opinion are for you to decide. In evaluating the believability of an 

expert witness, follow the instructions about the believability of 

witnesses generally. In addition, consider the expert’s knowledge, 

skill, experience, training, and education, the reasons the expert 

gave for any opinion, and the facts or information on which the 

expert relied in reaching that opinion. You must decide whether 

information on which the expert relied was true and accurate. You 

may disregard any opinion that you find unbelievable, 

unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence. 

CT at 88. As noted by the California Court of Appeal, this instruction adequately covered 

petitioner’s argument that Sardelich’s testimony was not supported by sufficient evidence and/or 

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was illogical. The jury was instructed to consider the reasons Sardelich gave for his opinion and 

to reject that opinion if those reasons were “unbelievable, unreasonable, or unsupported by the 

evidence.” That is essentially what petitioner’s suggested instruction was designed to 

accomplish. The trial court’s decision not to give additional instructions that were either legally 

incorrect, argumentative, or cumulative did not render petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. 

 The decision of the California Court of Appeal denying this jury instruction claim is not 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. It is certainly not 

“so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing 

law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter,131 S. Ct. at 786-87. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

C. Prosecutorial Misconduct

 Petitioner’s next claim is that the prosecutor committed misconduct by “introducing 

misleading fingerprint evidence, and suggesting during closing argument that Sardelich matched 

petitioner’s fingerprints directly with the latent prints.” ECF No. 1 at 34. Petitioner states that 

Sardelich’s testimony was so confusing that the jury could have believed petitioner’s case prints 

had been compared with the latent prints, and he argues that “the prosecutor facilitated this 

misperception during direct examination of the expert and failed to question [the expert] about a 

transitivity analysis.” Id. 

 Petitioner specifically objects to the following portion of the prosecutor’s closing 

argument: 

We have got the CSI officers. Bridget Wilson, again, she’s the one 

that powder [sic] lifted off the counter. She watched the video 

herself. She told us that, saw where the suspect touched, gets lifts 

off the counter. 

She didn’t know whose they are. She didn’t know it was going to 

come back to this man, but she did her job. She did it right. She 

did it within her training. No issues with what she did. 

Officer Noonan fingerprints the Defendant. 

This man left those cards that Noonan told us about. And Tim 

Sardelich ultimately does the comparisons. 

 

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Do you remember what he told us? 

The defendant’s prints. No one else. 

Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal at 255. Petitioner contends that this argument essentially 

informed the jury that investigator Sardelich compared petitioner’s fingerprints directly with the 

latent prints and concluded they were both petitioner’s fingerprints. ECF No. 1 at 34. Petitioner 

notes that, on the contrary, “Sardelich never compared the [case] prints directly to the latent 

prints.” Id. He contends that the prosecutor’s argument compounded both the confusion created 

by Sardelich’s testimony, and the prosecutor’s failure to adequately cross-examine Sardelich or to 

question him about “a transitivity analysis.” Finally, petitioner argues that, assuming the 

prosecutor was attempting with his closing argument to explain “the transitivity relation,” he was 

“introduc[ing] facts not in evidence.” Id. at 34-35. 

 Citing People v. Friend, 47 Cal.4th 1, 29 (2009) (defendant forfeited claims of 

prosecutorial misconduct because his trial counsel failed to object), the California Court of 

Appeal denied this claim on the grounds that it was waived by petitioner’s failure to object to the 

prosecutor's closing argument and to request an admonition from the trial court. Strawther, 2012 

WL 486877 at *6. 

 Respondent argues that the state court’s finding of waiver constitutes a state procedural 

bar precluding this court from addressing the merits of this claim. ECF No. 11 at 17-18. As in 

his first three claims, petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct appears to be procedurally 

barred because petitioner’s trial counsel did not raise a contemporaneous objection to the 

prosecutor’s closing argument. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 747; Harris, 489 U.S. at 264 n.10; 

Paulino, 371 F.3d at 1092-93. However, even assuming that the claim is not procedurally barred, 

it should be denied. 

 A criminal defendant’s due process rights are violated when a prosecutor’s misconduct 

renders a trial fundamentally unfair. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). Claims of 

prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed “‘on the merits, examining the entire proceedings to 

determine whether the prosecutor's [actions] so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the 

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resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 

1995) (citation omitted). See also Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987); Donnelly v. 

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974); Towery v. Schriro, 641 F.3d 300, 306 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Relief on such claims is limited to cases in which the petitioner can establish that prosecutorial 

misconduct resulted in actual prejudice. Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-83. See also Towery, 641 F.3d 

at 307 (“When a state court has found a constitutional error to be harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt, a federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the state court's determination is 

objectively unreasonable”). Prosecutorial misconduct violates due process when it has a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. See Ortiz-Sandoval 

v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct 

by virtue of his closing argument or any failure to examine the fingerprint expert. Contrary to 

petitioner’s claim, the prosecutor’s closing remarks did not inform the jury that Sardelich had 

directly compared petitioner’s fingerprints with the latent prints taken from the 7-Eleven. 

Although the prosecutor mentioned the major case prints and the latent prints, he simply 

reminded the jury that Sardelich had “done the comparisons.” Sardelich had previously testified 

that he concluded petitioner’s prints were on the 7-Eleven countertop after comparing the known 

prints with the latent prints and then comparing the known prints with the major case prints taken 

by investigator Noonan. Strawther, 2012 WL 486877 at *4. The prosecutor’s vague reference to 

Sardelich doing “the comparisons” could not contradict, nullify, or change this testimony. In any 

event, the jury was advised that: 

Nothing that the attorneys say is evidence. In their opening 

statements and closing arguments, the attorneys discuss the case, 

but their remarks are not evidence. Their questions are not 

evidence. Only the witnesses’ answers are evidence. 

CT at 75. Any possibility that the jurors might rely on the prosecutor’s closing remarks to find, 

contrary to Sardelich’s testimony, that he compared the case prints with the latent prints would 

have been eliminated by this instruction. 

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 Upon examination of the entire proceedings, this court concludes that the prosecutor’s 

performance did not “so infect[ ] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a 

denial of due process.’” Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

 D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 In his next ground for relief, petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance. He argues: 

A. Petitioner’s trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective for failing 

to object to Sardelich’s testimony as irrelevant. 

B. Petitioner’s trial counsel failed to cross-examine Sardelich 

concerning the fallacy of applying a transitivity relation to 

fingerprint analysis or to introduce such evidence through a defense 

expert. 

C. Petitioner’s trial counsel failed to cross-examine Sardelich 

concerning the effect of biasing contextual information on 

fingerprint examiners or to introduce such evidence through a 

defense expert. 

D. Petitioner’s trial counsel failed to cross-examine Sardelich 

concerning his testimony that only two points of similarity were 

found or needed for identification or to introduce contrary evidence 

through a defense expert. 

ECF No. 1 at 36. Petitioner also claims his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in: (1) 

failing to request a “limiting instruction for the known prints discussed by Sardelich;” (2) failing 

to object to Sardelich’s testimony on the grounds that it violated his right to due process; (3) 

failing to make a “Kelly” objection; (4) failing to request a pinpoint jury instruction on the 

“required transitivity finding;” and (5) failing to object to the prosecutor’s closing remarks. Id. at 

26, 28, 30, 35, 36. 

 Petitioner argues that the case against him was “close.” Id. at 36. He notes that the video 

from the 7-Eleven did not identify him as the robber. Id. at 25. He argues that Jagdeep’s failure 

to identify him in court as the robber “tainted” his earlier lineup identification. Id. He also notes 

that Jagdeep failed to notice any tattoos on the robber’s hands, when petitioner has prominent 

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tattoos on his hands. Id. Finally, petitioner asserts that the six-photo lineup was unduly 

suggestive because he and one other person had darker skin than the other participants in the 

lineup. Id. 

 1. State Court Decision

 The California Court of Appeal denied petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel, reasoning as follows: 

Defendant asserts his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 

on numerous occasions by failing to: (1) object to investigator 

Sardelich's testimony as irrelevant and in violation of due process; 

(2) cross-examine Sardelich on the transitive relationship he used, 

his standard for determining any of the prints were matches, and the 

effect of “biasing contextual information;” (3) seek a Kelly hearing; 

(4) request a pinpoint or limiting instruction on proof of a transitive 

relationship; and (5) object to the prosecutor's closing argument. 

We have already determined the trial court committed no error by 

admitting investigator Sardelich's testimony. Thus, there was no 

ineffective assistance when counsel chose not to make 

nonmeritorious, or even frivolous objections, to that testimony. 

Even if there had been error, there was no prejudice. It is not 

reasonably probable defendant would have obtained a more 

favorable outcome. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 

668, 687.) The victim identified defendant in a photo lineup as the 

person who robbed him, and, having seen the person in his store 

within the month before the robbery, he testified he was certain at 

the time of his identification that the person he selected was in fact 

the robber. That person was defendant. 

In light of such a strong identification, there is no reasonable 

probability defendant would have fared better at trial had counsel 

raised the objections and arguments appellate counsel raises here. 

Strawther, 2012 WL 486877 at *6-7 (parallel citation omitted). 

 2. Applicable Legal Principles

 The clearly established federal law for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To succeed on a Strickland claim, a defendant 

must show that (1) his counsel's performance was deficient and that (2) the “deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. Counsel is constitutionally deficient if his or 

her representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” such that it was outside 

“the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. at 687–88 (internal 

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quotation marks omitted). “Counsel’s errors must be ‘so serious as to deprive the defendant of a 

fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.’” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 787-88 (quoting Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687). 

 Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” 

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 792. Under AEDPA, “[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court’s 

application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable.” Id. at 785. “[B]ecause the Strickland

standard is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a 

defendant has not satisfied that standard.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). 

 3. Analysis

 The state court’s conclusion that petitioner failed to demonstrate deficient performance or 

prejudice with respect to his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is not unreasonable 

and should not be set aside. As discussed above, the California Court of Appeal determined that 

the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of investigator Sardelich, either on state law 

or federal due process grounds. This court has rejected petitioner’s federal due process claims. 

Accordingly, with respect to petitioner’s claims directed to Sardelich and his testimony about the 

fingerprints, petitioner cannot show prejudice resulting from his counsel’s failure to object on due 

process grounds. The failure to make a meritless objection does not constitute ineffective 

assistance. See Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1239 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Boag v. Raines, 

769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1985)) (an attorney’s failure to make a meritless objection or 

motion does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel)). See also Matylinsky v. Budge, 577 

F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 2009) (counsel’s failure to object to testimony on hearsay grounds not 

ineffective where objection would have been properly overruled); Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 

1445 (9th Cir. 1996) (“the failure to take a futile action can never be deficient performance”). 

 The same is true with respect to petitioner’s jury instruction and prosecutorial misconduct 

claims. Petitioner’s arguments, which are all directed to the fingerprint evidence, fail to establish 

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error by the trial court or the prosecutor. Accordingly, trial counsel’s failure to object to the jury 

instructions or the prosecutor’s closing argument does not constitute ineffective assistance and 

did not result in prejudice. 

 For these reasons, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. 

E. Cumulative Error 

 In his final ground for relief, petitioner claims that the cumulative effect of errors at his 

trial violated his right to due process. ECF No. 1 at 36-37. 

 The cumulative error doctrine in habeas recognizes that, “even if no single error were 

prejudicial, where there are several substantial errors, ‘their cumulative effect may nevertheless 

be so prejudicial as to require reversal.’” Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(quoting United States v. de Cruz, 82 F.3d 856, 868 (9th Cir. 1996)). However, where there is no 

single constitutional error existing, nothing can accumulate to the level of a constitutional 

violation. See Fairbank v. Ayers, 650 F.3d 1243, 1257 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 

132 S.Ct. 1757 (2012) (“[B]ecause we hold that none of Fairbank's claims rise to the level of 

constitutional error, ‘there is nothing to accumulate to a level of a constitutional violation.’”) 

(citation omitted); Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 524 (9th Cir.2011) (“Because we conclude that 

no error of constitutional magnitude occurred, no cumulative prejudice is possible.”). “The 

fundamental question in determining whether the combined effect of trial errors violated a 

defendant's due process rights is whether the errors rendered the criminal defense ‘far less 

persuasive,’ Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973), and thereby had a ‘substantial 

and injurious effect or influence’ on the jury's verdict.” Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637). 

 This court has addressed petitioner’s claims of error and has concluded that no error of 

constitutional magnitude occurred. There is also no evidence that an accumulation of errors 

rendered petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on 

his claim that cumulative error violated his right to due process. 

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IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s 

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue 

in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a 

final order adverse to the applicant). 

DATED: June 23, 2015. 

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