Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-canb-3_11-ap-03227/USCOURTS-canb-3_11-ap-03227-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Frank Brown
Plaintiff
Maureen Barbara Kenney
Defendant

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re

MAUREEN BARBARA KENNEY,

Debtor. 

FRANK BROWN,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

MAUREEN BARBARA KENNEY,

Defendant. 

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Case No. 11-33306 TEC

Chapter 7

Adv. Proc. No. 11-3227 TC

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 

AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

On December 14, 2012, this court held a hearing on Defendant

Maureen Kenney’s motion for extension of time to file notice of

appeal, motion for extension of time to file motion for

reconsideration, and motion for reconsideration. Michael S. Keck

appeared for Defendant Kenney. David J. Cook appeared for

Plaintiff Frank Brown. Upon due consideration, and for the reasons

set forth below, I determine that each of the motions should be

denied.

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE MOTIONS 

FOR EXTENSION OF TIME AND MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION -1-

Signed and Filed: January 2, 2013

________________________________________

THOMAS E. CARLSON

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

Entered on Docket 

January 03, 2013

GLORIA L. FRANKLIN, CLERK 

U.S BANKRUPTCY COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case: 11-03227 Doc# 69 Filed: 01/02/13 Entered: 01/03/13 14:38:59 Page 1 of 6 
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A. Extension of Time to File Notice of Appeal

Judgment in this action was entered on September 6, 2012. The

time to file a notice of appeal ran on September 20, 2012. Mr.

Keck’s declaration acknowledges that he received notice of entry of

judgment on September 7, 2012, but does not state that he made a

notation on his calendar of the deadline for filing a notice of

appeal. Instead, his declaration states that he became confused by

a notation on his calendar for September 17, 2012. That was the

date of a hearing on Kenney’s claim of exemption regarding her

affirmative claims against Brown. Mr. Keck attended that hearing. 

Kenney filed the present motion for extension of time on 

October 10, 2012, 20 days after the original deadline for filing a

notice of appeal expired.

Under Rule 8002(c)(2), the court can extend the time for

filing a notice of appeal for up to 21 days, but if the motion to

extend time is filed after the original 14-day deadline has

expired, the court may grant the motion for extension of time only

if the moving party establishes that the failure to file a timely

notice of appeal was the result of “excusable neglect.”

 In determining whether Kenney’s failure to file a timely

notice of appeal was excusable, this court is required to consider

the following four factors: the length of delay involved, whether

the opposing party was prejudiced by the delay, whether Kenney

acted in good faith, and whether the delay resulted from factors

beyond the reasonable control of Kenney and her counsel. Pioneer

Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship., 507 U.S. 380

(1993); SN Servicing Corp. v. Kloza (In re Kloza), 222 Fed. Appx.

547, 549 (9th Cir. 2007); 10 Collier on Bankruptcy 8002.10(2)

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE MOTIONS 

FOR EXTENSION OF TIME AND MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION -2-

Case: 11-03227 Doc# 69 Filed: 01/02/13 Entered: 01/03/13 14:38:59 Page 2 of 6 
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(16th ed. 2011).

Although the present motion involves limited delay, little

prejudice to the opposing party in terms of reliance or loss of

evidence, and no affirmative evidence of bad faith, that is equally

so in virtually every motion to extend time to file a notice of

appeal, because the time period for filing the notice of appeal can

never be extended by more than 21 days. Fed. R. Bankr. P.

8002(c)(2). For this reason, I am hesitant to rely solely upon the

three factors just described to find excusable neglect where the

failure to file a timely notice of appeal resulted solely from

counsel’s lack of attention and not from factors beyond his or his

client’s control. After consideration of all the relevant factors,

I find that Kenney has failed to establish excusable neglect. 

There is no evidence that Mr. Keck ever calendered the deadline. 

The effect of a hearing on a related matter three days before the

deadline should have been to remind Mr. Keck of the looming

deadline for filing a notice of appeal, not to confuse him or

distract him from doing so. I also note that Mr. Keck’s

declaration does not state that he ever spoke with his client about

an appeal and that the client had directed him to file a notice of

appeal.

B. Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration

Kenney’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for

reconsideration should be denied because the rules do not authorize

such relief. Rule 9023, which governs motions for reconsideration,

provides that any such motion must be filed within 14 days after

judgment is entered on the docket. That was not done here. Rule

9006, which governs extension of time, provides that the time for

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE MOTIONS 

FOR EXTENSION OF TIME AND MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION -3-

Case: 11-03227 Doc# 69 Filed: 01/02/13 Entered: 01/03/13 14:38:59 Page 3 of 6 
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filing a motion under Rule 9023 may not be extended. Fed. R.

Bankr. P. 9006(b)(2).

C. Motion for Reconsideration

I would deny Kenney’s motion for reconsideration if it were

properly before the court. I discuss this question to inform

Kenney that she has not been denied relief from judgment simply

because she failed to file her motion for reconsideration in a

timely manner.

The question raised in Kenney’s motion for reconsideration is

whether this court erred in affording issue-preclusion effect to

the confirmed arbitration award, either because the arbitrator

excluded evidence supporting Kenney’s affirmative claim, or because

Kenney stated in her declaration opposing summary judgment that the

arbitrator excluded evidence regarding Brown’s claim against her. 

This question relates to the principle of California law that a

judgment not be afforded issue-preclusion effect where to do so

would be against public policy. Khaligh v. Hadaegh (In re

Khaligh), 338 B.R. 817, 823-24 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006). 

The arbitrator’s exclusion of evidence regarding Kenney’s

affirmative claim on the basis that Kenney did not pay her share of

the costs of the arbitration did not violate California public

policy. California courts deal with claims of inability to pay

arbitration costs by examining ability to pay at the time the

parties agree to use arbitration. Parada v. Superior Court, 176

Cal. App. 4th 1554, 1582-84 (2009). There is no evidence of

Kenney’s inability to pay as of that time. Nor is there any

evidence that Kenney raised her alleged inability to pay when Brown

sought to confirm the arbitration award. Absent a showing that the

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE MOTIONS 

FOR EXTENSION OF TIME AND MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION -4-

Case: 11-03227 Doc# 69 Filed: 01/02/13 Entered: 01/03/13 14:38:59 Page 4 of 6 
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arbitration agreement should not be enforced, California courts

have shown no hesitation to enforce JAMS Rule 31, which is

the rule the arbitrator relied upon in barring Kenney from

introducing evidence in support of her affirmative claim. Brown &

Charbonneau v. Mahaffey, 2011 WL 5520208 at 4-6 (Cal. App. 2011).

I also determine that California law does not require this

court to resolve the conflict between the statement in the

arbitration decision that the only evidence excluded pertained to 

Kenney’s affirmative claim, and Kenney’s declaration that the

arbitrator barred her from offering evidence in defense of Brown’s

claims against her. I so conclude for the following reasons. 

First, Kenney could have raised the improper exclusion of evidence

when Brown sought to have the Superior Court confirm the

arbitration award. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1286.2(a)(5); Burlage v.

Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 4th 524, 529 (2009). California law

provides a remedy for improper exclusion of evidence that Kenney

did not avail herself of. Second, Kenney does not state what

evidence was excluded. California courts deny confirmation of an

arbitration award on the basis of exclusion of evidence only where

the evidence is crucial to the proper resolution of the dispute. 

Burlage, 178 Cal. App. 4th at 528-30. Finally, having failed to

challenge the exclusion of evidence when Brown sought to have the

arbitration award confirmed, Kenney now asks this court to conduct

a trial about a trial – to take evidence as to what evidence was

offered at the arbitration hearing. There is no transcript of the

arbitration proceedings. I conclude that any such inquiry should

have been conducted in the proceedings concerning confirmation of

the arbitration award, and that to conduct such an inquiry in the

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE MOTIONS 

FOR EXTENSION OF TIME AND MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION -5-

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present context is not required by public policy, but instead would

be inconsistent with the finality California courts attach to a

confirmed arbitration award. 

**END OF MEMORANDUM DECISION**

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE MOTIONS 

FOR EXTENSION OF TIME AND MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION -6-

Case: 11-03227 Doc# 69 Filed: 01/02/13 Entered: 01/03/13 14:38:59 Page 6 of 6