Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-04013/USCOURTS-ca10-89-04013-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stephen G. Koonce
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

Uoited States Court of Appeals 

'Tenth Circuit 

SEP 2 5 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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No. 89-4013 

STEPHEN G. KOONCE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah 

(D.C. No .. 88-CR-074W) 

Samuel Alba and Robert G. Wing, of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, 

Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Karen Skrivseth, Department of Justice, Brent D. Ward, United 

States Attorney, and Wayne T. Dance, Assistant United States 

Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, TACHA, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuft Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-4013 Document: 01019937001 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 1 
This appeal raises the issue of whether the government, 

consistent with the Double Jeopardy Clause and the federal 

sentencing guidelines, can prosecute a defendant for a crime even 

though evidence concerning defendant's commission of that crime 

already has been used to enhance defendant's sentence for an 

·earlier offense. We hold that the government can do so. 1 

Defendant Stephen G. Koonce challenges the district court's 

denial of his motion to dismiss a federal indictment against him 

in Utah. The Utah indictment stems from defendant's alleged 

possession of 963 grams of methamphetamine and various firearms, 

which federal agents found in defendant's Utah home while 

conducting a search pursuant to a warrant. Defendant previously 

was convicted in the United States District Court for the District 

of South Dakota of distributing 443 grams of methamphetamine by 

mailing a package containing the methamphetamine to a prospective 

buyer in South Dakota. During the sentencing hearing for the 

South Dakota offense, the government presented evidence about the 

alleged Utah offense and other crimes that defendant allegedly had 

perpetrated elsewhere. Relying upon the evidence of the other 

offenses, the South Dakota district court sentenced defendant to 

20 years in prison for the South Dakota offense, which was the 

statutory maximum. 

Defendant contends that the Utah prosecution violates the 

Double Jeopardy Clause (U.S. Const., amend. 5) and the federal 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the cause is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 89-4013 Document: 01019937001 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 2 
sentencing guidelines (18 u.s.c.A. App.) because some of the 

alleged criminal misconduct underlying the Utah prosecution 

already has been used to enhance defendant's sentence for the 

prior conviction in South Dakota. 

In response, the government argues that the Double Jeopardy 

Clause's ban on multiple prosecutions for the same offense is not 

implicated here because the Utah and South Dakota offenses are 

plainly different. The government further contends that 

"[n]othing in the language of the [sentencing] guidelines or the 

commentary precludes a subsequent prosecution for conduct 

considered in determining the base offense level" of a different 

offense. (U.S. Br. at 17.) As for the Double Jeopardy Clause's 

ban on multiple punishments for the same offense and the 

guidelines' requirement that certain offenses be grouped together 

for sentencing purposes, the government contends that this case is 

not ripe for review. The government argues that defendant has not 

yet been sentenced (or even tried) for the Utah offense, and there 

is no way of knowing whether defendant will receive additional, 

cumulative punishment for the Utah offense. 2 

2 Although the government's brief on appeal generally avoids 

addressing the merits of the multiple-punishment issue, the 

government does analogize to our holding about enhanced sentences 

in United States v. Vigil, 818 F.2d 738 (10th Cir. 1987). In 

Vigil, we held that recidivist statutes, which impose enhanced 

sentences on repeat offenders, do not violate the Double Jeopardy 

Clause: 

The defendant is not punished a second time for the same 

offense; rather, the repetition of criminal conduct 

aggravates his guilt and justifies a heavier sentence 

upon again being convicted ••.• 

"Recidivist statutes have passed double jeopardy 

[Footnote continued ••. ] 

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Appellate Case: 89-4013 Document: 01019937001 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 3 
We agree with the government that defendant's prosecution for 

the Utah offense does not offend either the Double Jeopardy Clause 

or the sentencing guidelines. The Double Jeopardy Clause's ban on 

multiple prosecutions for the same offense is not implicated here 

because defendant is not now facing a trial in Utah for the same 

offense for which he previously has been convicted in South 

Dakota. The Utah offense and the South Dakota offense are 

different. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 

(1932) ("[T]he test to be applied to determine whether there are 

two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof 

of a fact which the other does not"). Moreover, defendant has not 

pointed us to anything in the language of the guidelines that 

precludes a defendant's subsequent prosecution for a different 

offense. Defendant's reference to the principle of lenity is not 

relevant in this context because defendant has not shown us any 

ambiguity in the guidelines concerning the government's right to 

prosecute fully a defendant accused of committing different 

offenses. 

[ ••• footnote continued] 

scrutiny because they work on the theory that 'the 

increased punishment does not represent punishment 

for the earlier crimes, but rather the fact of the 

earlier crimes aggravates the commission of the 

latest crime warranting imposition of the longer 

sentence.' [United States v.] Bowdach, 561 F.2d 

[1160, 1176 (5th Cir. 1977)). In other words, the 

underlying offense becomes a greater crime, worthy 

of greater punishment, when a recidivist commits 

it." 

Vigil, 818 F.2d at 742 (quoting United States v. Pleasant, 730 

F.2d 657, 662 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 869 (1984)). 

For the reasons stated below, we do not reach the multiplepunishment issue. 

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Appellate Case: 89-4013 Document: 01019937001 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 4 
Nor do we agree with Judge McKay's dissent that defendant's 

South Dakota sentencing hearing constituted a prosecution for the 

Utah offense. Although the South Dakota district court inquired 

into the Utah offense during the sentencing hearing and made 

findings concerning it, at no time was defendant in jeopardy for 

the Utah offense~ Rather, defendant was only "in jeopardy" of 

receiving a harsher sentence for the South Dakota offense than he 

otherwise would have received. Put another way, the Fifth 

Amendment prohibits a person from being "twice put in jeopardy of 

life or limb" for the "same offence," and defendant never was "put 

in jeopardy" for the Utah offense during the South Dakota 

sentencing hearing. 

With regard to defendant's argument that he is subject to 

multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the 

Double Jeopardy Clause and the sentencing guidelines, we agree 

with the government that the issue is not ripe for review. 

Defendant has not yet been convicted of the Utah offense and may 

never be. Unless and until defendant receives some punishment 

from the district court that is arguably multiple, the issue is 

not ripe for review. 3 

3 The government contends that defendant does not even have an 

argument that he has received multiple punishments for the Utah 

offense unless he is given a Utah sentence that runs consecutively 

to the South Dakota sentence or else is longer than it. In other 

words, the government asserts that if defendant ultimately 

receives a sentence for the Utah offense that runs concurrently to 

his South Dakota sentence and is less than or equal to it in 

length, then defendant cannot possibly have suffered any multiple 

punishment. Because defendant has not yet received any sentence 

for the Utah offense, we need not reach that issue. 

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Appellate Case: 89-4013 Document: 01019937001 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 5 
r • I The district court's ruling that defendant's prosecution for 

the Utah offense does not offend either the Double Jeopardy Clause 

or the sentencing guidelines is AFFIRMED, .and the case is REMANDED 

to the district court for trial. In all other respects, the 

appeal is DISMISSED. 

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Appellate Case: 89-4013 Document: 01019937001 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 6 
No. 89-4013 - United States of America v. Koonce 

MCKAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

I believe the proposed trial in this case violates the first 

leg of Double Jeopardy protection, that is, multiple trials for 

the same offense. When the District Court for South Dakota 

conducted its "hearing" for the purpose of determining by a 

preponderance of evidence that the defendant committed this 

offense, that was a trial of the merits of whether he committed 

the offense. Even though the burdens of proof and sentencing 

purposes were different, what is now proposed is a second trial 

for precisely the same offense. 

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Appellate Case: 89-4013 Document: 01019937001 Date Filed: 09/25/1989 Page: 7