Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-01514/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-01514-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Claude E. Finn
Respondent
Raymond Martinez
Petitioner

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYMOND MARTINEZ,

Petitioner,

vs.

CLAUDE E. FINN, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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No. C 02-1514 PJH (PR)

DENIAL OF PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be

granted. Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities

in support of it, and has lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner did not file a traverse. 

The matter is submitted.

BACKGROUND

A Santa Clara County jury convicted petitioner of possession of ammunition as

an ex-felon, see Cal. Penal Code § 245 (a)(2), and possession of less than 28.5 grams

of marijuana, see Health & Safety Code, § 11357 (b). Taking into account sentence

enhancements for a prior “strike” conviction and for having served a prior prison term,

the court sentenced petitioner to five years in prison and a $100 fine. The California

Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s convictions and sentence and the California

Supreme Court denied his application for review. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The petition in this case was filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), so the provisions of that act apply to it. 

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Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499-

1500 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) ("justice and judicial economy are

better served by applying the Act to cases filed after the enactment date."). Under the

AEDPA, a district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or

sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless

the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies

both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2001), while the second prong applies to decisions

based on factual determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under

the first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to

that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a

case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable

facts.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable

application of” Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1),

if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions

but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the

application must be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

DISCUSSION

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Petitioner’s only claim is that the trial court violated his Fourteenth Amendment

Due Process rights and his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury by instructing the jury

with CALJIC 17.41.1. As given to the jury, the instruction provides that:

The integrity of a trial requires that jurors at all times during

their deliberations, conduct themselves as required by

these instructions. Accordingly, should it occur that any juror

refuses to deliberate or expresses an intention to disregard

the law or to decide the case based on [penalty or

punishment], or any [other] improper basis, it is the

obligation of the other jurors to immediately advise the

Court of the situation.

Ex. CT at 84. 

 Petitioner argues that the instruction compromised what he contends is his due

process right to have the jury engage in a private thoroughgoing exchange of ideas

during its deliberation. 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected this claim, holding that giving

CALJIC 17.41.1 is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

United States Supreme Court authority. Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955-57 (9th Cir.

2004). Therefore, petitioner’s sole claim is without merit. 

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 27, 2005.

 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

 United States District Judge

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