Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-15-20113/USCOURTS-ca5-15-20113-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald L. Bloom
Appellant
Memorial Hermann Hospital System
Appellee
Memorial Hermann Memorial City Hospital
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-20113

Summary Calendar

DONALD L. BLOOM,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

MEMORIAL HERMANN HOSPITAL SYSTEM; MEMORIAL HERMANN 

MEMORIAL CITY HOSPITAL,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:14-CV-3380

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Donald L. Bloom filed a civil action against Memorial Hermann Hospital 

System and Memorial Hermann Memorial City Hospital (collectively referred 

to herein as Memorial Hermann Health System).1 In this court, Bloom appeals 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

1 Memorial Hermann Health System is incorrectly identified in case filings and the 

caption as Memorial Hermann Hospital System, Memorial Hermann Memorial City 

Hospital, and Memorial Hermann Hospital System et al.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 3, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-20113 Document: 00513532639 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/03/2016
No. 15-20113

2

the district court’s denial of his motion for a default judgment and the 

dismissal of his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a default judgment for 

abuse of discretion. See Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001). Here, 

Bloom asserts that he was entitled to a default judgment because Memorial 

Hermann Health System filed its first responsive pleading one day late. 

However, even in the face of a technical default, such as when a party files its 

first responsive pleading late, a movant is not entitled to a default judgment 

as a matter of right. See Ganther v. Ingle, 75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996). 

Accordingly, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in 

determining that a default judgment was unwarranted. See Lewis, 236 F.3d 

at 767; Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead and Sav. Ass’n, 874 F.2d 274, 

276 (5th Cir. 1989).

Regarding Bloom’s second claim, we conduct a de novo review of a district 

court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Randall D. Wolcott, 

M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 2011). “A case is properly 

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the 

statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Hooks v. Landmark 

Indus., Inc. 797 F.3d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Bloom has not met his burden of identifying a statutory or 

constitutional provision giving the district court authority to adjudicate his 

case. See id.; Wolcott, 635 F.3d at 762. Thus, he has shown no error in the 

dismissal of his action for want of jurisdiction.

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 15-20113 Document: 00513532639 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/03/2016