Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cr-00545/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cr-00545-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Keith Hopkins
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

KEITH HOPKINS, 

Defendant. 

Case No. CR-15-00545 YGR 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND STATEMENTS

Re: Dkt. No. 22 

Defendant Keith Hopkins was indicted for violations of: 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) (felon in 

possession of a firearm); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1) (B)(iii) (possession with intent to distribute 

crack cocaine); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a 

drug trafficking crime); and forfeiture. (Superseding Indictment, Dkt. No. 21.) Hopkins filed a 

motion to suppress evidence and statements obtained during and following a parole search of 

Hopkins at the residence of a third party, Sandra Randolph. (Dkt. No. 22.) The government has 

opposed the motion. (Dkt. No. 24.) The Court heard oral argument on August 18, 2016. 

Having carefully considered the papers submitted, the pleadings in this action, oral 

argument, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion to suppress 

evidence and statements. 

I. BACKGROUND1

 In 1999, defendant Keith Hopkins was convicted of second degree robbery with a weapon 

enhancement, and for being a felon in possession of a firearm. In 2014, he was released on parole 

with a warrantless search condition. (Declaration of SAUSA Erin A. Cornell (“Cornell Decl.”), 

Dkt. No. 28, Ex. 1.) The search condition states: 

 

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 The following facts are not materially in dispute, except as where noted. 

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“You, your residence, and any property under your control are 

subject to search or seizure by a probation officer, an agent or 

officer of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation, or any other peace officer, at any time or the day or 

night, with or without a search warrant, with or without cause.” 

Id. at 1. In around April 2015, Officer Tyler Walstrum of the Oakland Housing Authority 

(“OHA”) encountered a mobile home blocking traffic and in that context met Hopkins, who 

personally advised Walstrum that he lived therein (“Parole Address”). (Supplemental Decl., of 

Tyler Walstrum, Dkt No. 32-3 (“Walstrum Supp. Decl.”), ¶ 2.) Walstrum asked dispatch to run a 

records check, learned that Hopkins was on parole, and then conducted a parole compliance check 

on the mobile home finding nothing illegal. (Id.) 

 On September 19, 2015, Officer Walstrum and two other OHA officers went back to 

Hopkins’ Parole Address to conduct a parole compliance check. (Id. ¶ 3.) The officers had no 

warrant. Officers checked the registration of the mobile home parked in front of the Parole 

Address and confirmed that it was registered to Hopkins at the Parole Address. (Declaration of 

Tyler Walstrum, Dkt. No. 25 (“Walstrum Decl.”), Ex. 1, at 4; Declaration of Madeline Larsen, 

Dkt. 31-3 (“Larsen Decl.”) ¶ 4.) The officers encountered a juvenile male, 14-year-old J. Hopkins, 

who identified himself as Hopkins’ nephew. (Walstrum Supp. Decl. ¶ 6.) 

 The parties dispute exactly what J. Hopkins told officers. The government claims that 

Hopkins’ nephew told them that defendant Hopkins no longer lived at the Parole Address, but 

lived at another address down the street (“Searched Address”). (Walstrum Decl., Ex. 1, at 4.) 

However, J. Hopkins claims that he only informed officers that defendant Hopkins was at another 

address at that time and then pointed officers towards the Searched Address, as well as another 

building.2

 (Declaration of J. Hopkins, Dkt. No. 31-1, ¶¶ 4, 7-8.) Hopkins’ nephew also told the 

officers that the Lincoln Navigator parked in the complex at the Searched Address belonged to 

defendant Hopkins. (Walstrum Decl., Ex. 1 at 4.) According to Walstrum’s report, a “file check” 

on the Lincoln Navigator revealed that it was registered to defendant Hopkins at the Searched 

Address as of August 10, 2015. (Id.) The record does not indicate whether the officers conducted 

a “file check” on Walstrum’s driver’s license, which was issued on August 6, 2016 and listed the 

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 For the reasons set forth below, the Court need not resolve this factual dispute. 

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Parole Address as his residence. (Larsen Decl., ¶ 2.) 

 Next, the officers knocked on the door of the Searched Address. Legal tenant Sandra 

Randolph answered. When questioned about defendant Hopkins, Randolph said she did not know 

him or had not seen him recently. The officers noted that Ms. Randolph “became very 

argumentative” and also “appeared nervous and was sweating profusely.” (Walstrum Decl., Ex. 1, 

at 4.) Dispatch ran a file check for Randolph and advised the officers that she was on probation 

for petty theft with an “S7 four way search clause.” (Id.) She had consented to a four-way search 

clause as part of her probation conditions. That condition states: 

“4 Way Search. Submit to warrantless search and seizure by any 

law enforcement officer at any time of the day or night, including: 

person, place of residence, vehicle, and any property under your 

control.” 

(Cornell Decl. Ex. 2 at 2.) Randolph acknowledged her probation status and allowed the officers 

into her apartment. (Walstrum Decl., Ex. 1, at 4.) Officers entered the Searched Address, found 

Hopkins upstairs in a bedroom, seized myriad contraband, and obtained certain statements from 

him.3 The motion seeks globally to suppress the items and statements. 

II. DISCUSSION

 The government argues the legality of the search of Randolph’s home on two bases: (1) 

officers had probable cause to conduct a parole search for Hopkins at the Searched Address, and 

(2) the search was proper based on Randolph’s probation search condition. The Court addresses 

each as a threshold issue. 

/// 

/// 

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 Upon searching the room, officers found shotgun ammunition. Officer Walstrum asked 

Hopkins where the shotgun and any other firearms were located. (Walstrum Decl., Ex. 1, at 5.) It 

is disputed whether officers provided Hopkins with a Miranda warning prior to asking this 

question. Officers arrested Hopkins and, upon conducting a search incident to arrest, found 

additional contraband. (Id. at 6.) Officers drove Hopkins to the Oakland Housing Authority 

Police Department station. (Id.) Officer Brauli Rodriguez claims that he took a confession 

statement from Hopkins, which Hopkins signed. (Declaration of Brauli Rodriguez, Dkt. No. 26, 

Ex. 1, at 2 and Ex. 2.) Hopkins contends that his confession was involuntary because he made it 

after officers threatened to take Randolph into custody if he did not confess to owning the seized 

items. The government denies that the officers made any threats to Hopkins. 

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A. Probable Cause to Conduct a Parole Search 

“The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a person’s home, 

whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects.” Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 

181 (1990). “The warrantless entry into [a third party’s] home cannot be justified as a search for a 

parolee in what might have been the parolee’s residence.” Cuevas v. De Roco, 531 F.3d 726, 732 

(9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis supplied). Rather, “‘before conducting a warrantless search pursuant to 

a parolee’s parole condition, law enforcement officers must have probable cause to believe that the 

parolee is a resident of the house to be searched.’” United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1262 

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) 

(alteration supplied by Howard omitted), overruled on other grounds by United States v. King, 

687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)). The standard for establishing probable cause as to 

residence is “relatively stringent,” requiring “strong evidence” that the parolee resides at the 

address. United States v. Grandberry, 730 F.3d 968 (citing United States v. Franklin, 603 F.3d 

652, 657 (9th Cir. 2010); Cuevas v. De Roco, 531 F.3d at 736). 

In Howard, the Ninth Circuit provided guidance for analyzing this issue. There, four 

factors predominated, namely whether: (1) the police ascertained after an investigation that the 

defendant was residing at the place searched, rather than at the parole address on file; (2) the 

search was based on direct observations confirming that the defendant was residing in the place 

searched (e.g., parolee seen running errands, repeatedly entering or leaving over the span of 

multiple days, or receipt of mail at the residence searched); (3) the parolee had his/her own key to 

the residence and was seen using the same; and (4) co-residents confirmed that the parolee lived 

there. See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1265-66. 

Here, none of those factors exist. Regarding the first factor, police had questionable 

information suggesting that Hopkins was living at the Searched Address and not at his Parole 

Address. The officers’ only evidence consisted of: (1) the disputed statement of a 14-year-old 

boy, and (2) the registration of the Lincoln Navigator at the Searched Address in Hopkins’ name. 

First, the statement of a 14-year-old boy regarding Hopkins’ residence or location, without more, 

was not a reliable source of evidence. This is especially so in light of the countervailing evidence 

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that the mobile home was registered to Hopkins at the Parole Address, that his recently renewed 

driver’s license listed the Parole Address as his residence, and that Hopkins had been found there 

during a parole check five months prior. Second, the registration of the vehicle at the Searched 

Address also did not give rise to probable cause that Hopkins lived there. There are other valid 

reasons why the vehicle may have been registered to that address, and therefore the registration 

alone was not sufficient evidence of Hopkins’ residence status. 

Regarding the second factor, unlike the officers’ April encounter with Hopkins, they had 

no direct observations confirming that Hopkins was residing at the Searched Address (e.g., parolee 

seen running errands, repeatedly entering or leaving over the span of multiple days, or receipt of 

mail at the residence searched). The police must have probable cause to believe that the location 

is the parolee’s residence; presence as a guest does not suffice. Howard, 447 F.3d at 1265-66; see 

also id. at 1262 (information that parolee is occasional overnight guest is insufficient for probable 

cause to believe that parolee resides at residence); Franklin, 603 F.3d at 657 (holding it is not 

enough for probable cause that parolee “happens to be seen there”). 

Regarding the third and fourth factors, the government does not contend that officers 

observed Hopkins with a key to the Searched Address or that any co-residents confirmed that he 

lived there. 

In sum, none of the Howard factors set forth were present. The officers’ investigation into 

whether Hopkins resided at the Searched Address was entirely inadequate. Officers did not 

contact Hopkins’ parole officer before entering the Searched Address. They did not try to observe 

him entering the Searched Address or conducting activities indicating that he lived there. The 

boy’s statement and Hopkins’ car registration alone do not meet the “relatively stringent” or 

“strong evidence” requirement to allow a warrantless search of a third party’s home. Accordingly, 

the Court finds that the entry into the Searched Address was not justified as a parole search. 

B. Search Based on Randolph’s Probation Search Condition 

Next, the government argues that the entry into the Searched Address was legal pursuant to 

Sandra Randolph’s search condition. 

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“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a 

search is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an 

individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of 

legitimate governmental interests.” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Courts consider whether the search was 

reasonable under a “totality of the circumstances” approach, “with the search condition being a 

salient circumstance.” Id. at 112 (citation omitted). Importantly, the fact that a probationer has 

agreed to a search condition—even a suspicionless search condition—is not dispositive. See 

United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 609 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Lara’s acceptance of the terms of 

probation, including suspicionless searches of his person and property, is one factor that bears on 

the reasonableness of the search, but it is not in itself dispositive.”). At minimum, officers must 

have at least reasonable suspicion to conduct a search.4 

Regarding the first balancing consideration, the probationer’s privacy interest depends on 

several factors, the most important of which are her status as a probationer, the clarity of the 

conditions of probation, and the nature of the contents of the item searched. See Lara, 815 F.3d at 

610. Probationer status means expectation of privacy is “significantly diminished,” but “still 

substantial.” Id. at 610. Furthermore, a search condition “significantly diminishe[s]” an 

individual’s privacy interests when the probation order “clearly expressed the search condition” of 

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 The parties dispute whether the officers required probable cause or reasonable suspicion 

to search Randolph’s home based on her probation condition under United States v. King, 687 

F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012) (reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing not required to conduct a 

probation search of a violent felon who has agreed to a suspicionless search condition). Here, 

Randolph’s search condition did not have the same suspicionless-search language as in King. See 

King, 736 F.3d at 810. Randolph is also not a violent felon, unlike King. Id. (“We need not 

decide whether the Fourth Amendment permits suspicionless searches of probationers who have 

not accepted a suspicionless-search condition, or of lower level offenders who have accepted a 

suspicionless-search condition, because those cases are not before us.” (emphasis in original)). 

 Thus, the Court finds on this record that Randolph is not subject to suspicionless searches 

under the limited holding of King. Rather, under the diminished expectation of privacy for 

probationers recognized in Knights, Randolph’s warrantless probation search condition requires at 

least reasonable suspicion to perform a search. Knights, 534 U.S. at 121 (“Although the Fourth 

Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied in the term ‘probable cause,’ a 

lesser degree satisfies the Constitution when the balance of governmental and private interests 

makes such a standard reasonable.”). 

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which probationer “was unambiguously informed.” Id. However, a reasonable expectation of 

privacy is increased if the probationer was not convicted of a particularly “serious and intimate” 

offense. Id. 

Regarding the second balancing factor, “[p]robationary searches advance at least two 

related government interests—combating recidivism and helping probationers integrate back into 

the community.” Id. at 612 (citations omitted). “These are important interests whose strength in a 

particular case varies depending on the degree to which the government has a specific reason to 

suspect that a particular probationer is reoffending or otherwise jeopardizing his reintegration into 

the community.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Here, Randolph had agreed to a four-way search condition that allowed a warrantless 

search of her residence as part of her probation conditions. This diminished her privacy interests. 

However, the probation condition did not clearly state that she was subject to suspicionless 

searches, and she was on probation for a nonviolent misdemeanor crime. Thus, the facts weigh in 

favor of her privacy interests. 

As for the government’s interest in searching Randolph’s home, its interest was minimal 

given the circumstances. In support of reasonable suspicion, the government offers only that 

Randolph was nervous and sweaty and gave conflicting answers when she answered the door at 

the Searched Address. This is not a “specific reason” to suspect that she was reoffending or 

jeopardizing her reintegration into the community. Cf. Lara, 815 F.3d 605 (noting that 

defendant’s failure to meet with probation officer at appointed time, which prompted search of his 

home and then cell phone, was “worlds away” from the suspected crimes that prompted the 

searches in King (homicide) and Knights (vandalism and arson)). Here, the officers did not have 

any suspicion that Randolph had engaged in any crime or wrongdoing. Therefore, the search of 

Randolph’s home was not justified as a probation search. 

As the entry into Randolph’s home constituted a search in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment, the evidence and statements obtained as a result of the search were illegally obtained. 

The Court need not consider Hopkins’ remaining arguments for suppression. 

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III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the motion to suppress the evidence and statements is 

GRANTED. 

 This Order terminates Docket Number 22. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2016 _________________________________ 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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