Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01203/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01203-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Abd Al-Rahim Hussein Muhammed Al-Nashiri
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 10, 2015 Decided June 23, 2015

No. 14-1203

IN RE: ABD AL-RAHIM HUSSEIN MUHAMMED AL-NASHIRI,

PETITIONER

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition to 

the United States Court of Military Commission Review

Michel D. Paradis, Counsel, Office of the Chief Defense 

Counsel, argued the cause for the petitioner. Richard 

Kammen was with him on the petition for writ of mandamus 

and the reply.

John F. De Pue, Attorney, United States Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for the respondent. Steven M. Dunn, 

Chief, Appellate Unit, and Joseph F. Palmer, Attorney, were 

with him on the opposition to the petition for writ of 

mandamus.

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and PILLARD, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge 

HENDERSON.

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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Abd alRahim Hussein Muhammed al-Nashiri (Nashiri) is a detainee 

at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who is currently being tried by

military commission. He asks this Court to resolve, via 

mandamus, two challenges to the constitutionality of the 

United States Court of Military Commission Review 

(CMCR). Our answer is simple: Not now. Because Nashiri 

can adequately raise his constitutional challenges on appeal 

from final judgment, we deny his petition.

I.

A.

The current structure of the military commissions

operating at Guantanamo Bay is the product of an extended 

dialogue among the President, the Congress and the Supreme 

Court. See generally Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 12–

15 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc); Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 

1023, 1028–30 (D.C. Cir. 2014). We briefly summarize that

back-and-forth here.

Immediately following the attacks of September 11, 

2001, the Congress enacted an Authorization for Use of 

Military Force (AUMF), empowering the President to use “all 

necessary and appropriate force” against the perpetrators. See 

Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001). 

President George W. Bush relied on the AUMF to capture, 

detain and ultimately try enemy combatants by military 

commission at Guantanamo Bay. See Detention, Treatment, 

and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 

Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). In Hamdan 

v. Rumsfeld, however, the Supreme Court held that the 

military commissions failed to comply with the procedural 

protections of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)

and Geneva Conventions. See 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006). But 

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because those protections were creatures of statute, several 

Justices noted that the Congress was free to amend them. See

id. at 653 (Kennedy, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, 

JJ., concurring).

The Congress responded with the Military Commissions 

Act of 2006 (2006 MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 

2600, 2739–44. The 2006 MCA sanctioned the use of 

military commissions, 10 U.S.C. § 948b(b), and largely 

exempted them from the strictures of the UCMJ and Geneva 

Conventions, see id. § 948b(c)–(d); 120 Stat. at 2602. The 

2006 MCA also directed the Secretary of Defense to establish

the CMCR, 120 Stat. at 2621—an intermediate appellate 

tribunal for military commissions akin to each military 

branch’s Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) for courts martial,

see 10 U.S.C. § 866. But whereas the decisions of the CCAs

are reviewed by another military court—the Court of Appeals 

for the Armed Forces (CAAF), id. § 867—the CMCR’s 

decisions are reviewed by this Court, id. § 950g.

1

 1

 Our review provision states, in relevant part:

(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction. – Except as 

provided in subsection (b), the United States Court of 

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit shall have 

exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of a final 

judgment rendered by a military commission (as 

approved by the convening authority and, where 

applicable, as affirmed or set aside as incorrect in law by 

the United States Court of Military Commission Review) 

under this chapter.

(b) Exhaustion of other appeals. – The United States 

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 

may not review a final judgment described in subsection 

(a) until all other appeals under this chapter have been 

waived or exhausted. . . .

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The lay of the land shifted again in 2009. On assuming 

office, President Barack Obama temporarily suspended the 

operations of the Guantanamo Bay military commissions. 

See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4899 (Jan. 

22, 2009). After further review, however, the President 

sought to reform the military commissions instead of 

dismantling them. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH 

SERV., R 41163, THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2009

(MCA 2009): OVERVIEW AND LEGAL ISSUES 3 (2014). The 

Congress obliged and enacted the Military Commissions Act 

of 2009 (2009 MCA), Pub L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, 

2574–614. The 2009 MCA added several procedural 

protections for enemy combatants. See generally ELSEA, 

supra, at 40–55 chart 2. It also expanded the availability of 

appellate review. Under the 2006 MCA, the CMCR and this 

Court could review military-commission judgments only on

“matters of law.” 120 Stat. at 2621, 2622. Pursuant to the 

2009 MCA, the CMCR can now review “any matter”—fact or 

law—and even “weigh the evidence” and “judge the 

credibility of witnesses.” 10 U.S.C. § 950f(c)–(d).2

 This 

Court then reviews the CMCR’s decisions on “matters of law, 

 

(d) Scope and nature of review. – The United States 

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 

may act under this section only with respect to the 

findings and sentence as approved by the convening 

authority and as affirmed or set aside as incorrect in law 

by the United States Court of Military Commission 

Review, and shall take action only with respect to matters 

of law, including the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the verdict.

10 U.S.C. § 950g(a)–(b), (d).

2 When the Government takes an interlocutory appeal, 

however, the CMCR can act “only with respect to matters of law.” 

10 U.S.C. § 950d(g).

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including the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 

verdict.” 10 U.S.C. § 950g(d).

Most importantly here, the 2009 MCA altered the 

structure of the CMCR. The CMCR is now a “court of 

record” composed of both civilian and military judges. Id. 

§ 950f(a)–(b). Civilian judges are appointed to the CMCR by 

the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. 

§ 950f(b)(3). Military judges are “assigned” by the Secretary 

of Defense but they must already be “commissioned” military 

officers. Id. § 950f(b)(2). Further, military judges cannot be 

removed from the CMCR absent “good cause” or “military 

necessity.” See id. § 949b(b)(4). As of today, two civilian 

judges and eight military judges are serving on the CMCR. 

See Judges U.S. Court of Military Commissions Review, 

OFFICE OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS, http://www.mc.mil/

ABOUTUS/USCMCRJudges.aspx (last visited May 19, 

2015). They generally sit in panels of three. See 10 U.S.C. 

§ 950f(a); Promulgation of Panel Assignments, USCMCR

(July 1, 2014), http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/Panel%20Assign

ments%20July%201%202014.pdf.

B.

Nashiri is a Saudi national and an alleged member of al 

Qaeda. According to the prosecution, Nashiri is the 

mastermind behind the bombings of the U.S.S. Cole and the 

M/V Limburg, and the attempted bombing of the U.S.S. The 

Sullivans. He was apprehended in Dubai in 2002 and 

transferred to Guantanamo Bay in 2006. Nashiri is charged 

with nine offenses, including terrorism, murder in violation of 

the law of war, attacking civilians, hijacking a vessel and 

attacking civilian objects. In 2011, the Defense Department 

convened a military commission to try Nashiri on these

charges. It is seeking the death penalty.

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In August 2014, Nashiri’s military trial judge dismissed

the charges and specifications stemming from the M/V 

Limburg bombing. The Government immediately appealed 

that ruling to the CMCR. See 10 U.S.C. § 950d(a)(1) 

(authorizing Government to take interlocutory appeal when 

military judge “terminates proceedings . . . with respect to a 

charge or specification”). Two military judges and one 

civilian judge were assigned to hear the Government’s 

interlocutory appeal. In September 2014, Nashiri moved to 

recuse the two military judges. He alleged that military

judges are assigned to the CMCR in violation of the 

Appointments Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and 

cannot be freely removed in violation of the Commander-inChief Clause, id. cl. 1. The CMCR denied Nashiri’s motion

in October 2014 and, one week later, Nashiri filed the petition 

now before us. He asks this Court to issue a writ of 

mandamus and prohibition3 disqualifying the military judges

on his CMCR panel.

II.

This case requires us to address the two “P’s” of 

mandamus: our power to issue the writ and whether issuance

would be proper. For the reasons set out below, we conclude 

that we have jurisdiction to issue the writ but it would be

inappropriate to do so here.

 3 For convenience, we refer to mandamus and prohibition 

collectively as “mandamus.” See In re Sealed Case No. 98-3077, 

151 F.3d 1059, 1063 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Because the grounds 

for issuing the writs are virtually identical, . . . and because 

‘mandamus’ is the more familiar term, we prefer to use it.” (citation 

and quotation marks omitted)).

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A.

We first address our jurisdiction. See In re Asemani, 455 

F.3d 296, 299 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Before considering whether 

mandamus relief is appropriate, . . . we must be certain of our 

jurisdiction.”). The All Writs Act allows us to issue “all writs 

necessary or appropriate in aid of [our] jurisdiction[].” 28 

U.S.C. § 1651(a). It is not, however, “an independent grant 

of appellate jurisdiction.” Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 

529, 535 (1999) (quoting 16 WRIGHT & MILLER § 3932 (2d 

ed. 1996)). In other words, there must be an “independent”

statute that grants us jurisdiction before mandamus can be 

said to “aid” it. Id. at 534–35. We have such a statute here: 

the 2009 MCA gives this Court “exclusive jurisdiction to 

determine the validity of a final judgment rendered by a 

military commission.” 10 U.S.C. § 950g(a). Accordingly, we 

can issue a writ of mandamus now to protect the exercise of 

our appellate jurisdiction later. See In re Tennant, 359 F.3d 

523, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (for purpose of mandamus, “[o]nce 

there has been a proceeding of some kind . . . that might lead 

to an appeal, it makes sense to speak of the matter as being 

‘within [our] appellate jurisdiction’—however prospective or 

potential that jurisdiction might be.” (first alteration and 

second emphasis added)); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 

319 U.S. 21, 25 (1943) (“[An appellate court’s mandamus 

jurisdiction] extends to those cases which are within its 

appellate jurisdiction although no appeal has been perfected. 

Otherwise the appellate jurisdiction could be defeated . . . by 

unauthorized action of the district court obstructing the 

appeal.”). The finality requirement of the 2009 MCA, 10 

U.S.C. § 950g(a), is not to the contrary because mandamus is 

understood to be an “exception[]” to the ordinary rules of 

finality. WMATC v. Reliable Limousine Serv., LLC, 776 F.3d 

1, 8 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. 

Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 111 (2009).

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Of course, when it comes to jurisdiction, the Congress 

giveth and the Congress taketh away. See Estep v. United 

States, 327 U.S. 114, 120 (1946) (“[E]xcept when the 

Constitution requires it, judicial review of administrative 

action may be granted or withheld as Congress chooses.”). 

The 2006 MCA contains a jurisdiction-stripping provision

that states:

(e)(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have 

jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a 

writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an 

alien detained by the United States who has been 

determined by the United States to have been 

properly detained as an enemy combatant or is 

awaiting such determination.

(2) . . . [N]o court, justice, or judge shall have 

jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action

against the United States or its agents relating to any 

aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or 

conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was 

detained by the United States and has been 

determined by the United States to have been 

properly detained as an enemy combatant or is 

awaiting such determination.

28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (emphases added).4

 The Government 

believes that section 2241(e)(2) revokes our power to issue 

writs of mandamus. We disagree.

 4 In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court held that 

subsection (1) of the 2006 MCA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision 

constituted an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas 

corpus. See 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008). Subsection (2), however, 

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A statute does not strip our authority under the All Writs 

Act absent a “clear[]” statement to that effect. Belbacha v. 

Bush, 520 F.3d 452, 458 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Califano v. 

Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 705 (1979); FTC v. Dean Foods 

Co., 384 U.S. 597, 608 (1966); Scripps–Howard Radio v. 

FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942)). The clear-statement rule is a 

species of the constitutional avoidance doctrine: if the 

Congress stripped our power to issue writs of mandamus, 

some constitutional violations would escape review 

altogether. See id. at 458–59. This would present a “serious 

constitutional question”—one we should avoid, if possible. 

Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988).

In Belbacha, we held that section 2241(e)(2) “does not 

displace [our] remedial authority, pursuant to the All Writs 

Act, to issue an auxiliary writ in aid of [our] jurisdiction.” 

520 F.3d at 458 (quotation marks omitted). It does not satisfy 

the clear-statement rule, we reasoned, because it fails to 

expressly include our “remedial powers.” Id. at 458 n.*. 

Although Belbacha deals with our authority to issue a 

preliminary injunction, its holding governs this case as well. 

The text of section 2241(e)(2) makes no mention of 

“mandamus”—an important omission under our case law. In 

Ganem v. Heckler, for example, we considered whether the 

following provision stripped the district court’s mandamus 

power:

No action against the United States, the Board, or 

any officer or employee thereof shall be brought 

under [the statutory grants of jurisdiction to the 

district courts] to recover on any claim arising under 

this title.

 

remains in force. See Janko v. Gates, 741 F.3d 136, 140 n.3 (D.C. 

Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1530 (2015).

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746 F.2d 844, 850–51 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting Social 

Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76–379, 

§ 205(h), 53 Stat. 1360, 1371 (1939)). We compared the

provision to the language of another statute that declared:

[N]o other official or any court of the United States 

shall have power or jurisdiction to review any . . . 

decision [of the Veterans’ Administration] by an 

action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.

Id. at 851–52 (quoting Pub. L. No. 91-376, § 8, 84 Stat. 787, 

790 (1970)) (emphasis in original). Comparing the two 

statutes, we concluded that “when Congress desire[s] to 

prohibit actions in the nature of mandamus . . . , it d[oes] so 

expressly.” Id. at 851; see also id. at 852 (“The fact that 

Congress knows how to withdraw a particular remedy and has 

not expressly done so is some indication of a congressional 

intent to preserve that remedy.”). The same reasoning applies 

here: the text of section 2241(e)(2) bears little resemblance to 

statutes that expressly strip mandamus jurisdiction.

5

 And the 

Government has not identified a reference to mandamus in 

the legislative history of the 2006 MCA, “even assuming 

 5 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b)(2) (“The action of the Secretary 

[of Labor] or his designee in allowing or denying a payment under 

this subchapter is . . . not subject to review . . . by a court by 

mandamus or otherwise.” (emphasis added)); 38 U.S.C. § 511(a) 

(“[T]he decision of the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] as to any 

such question shall be final and conclusive and may not be 

reviewed . . . by any court, whether by an action in the nature of 

mandamus or otherwise.” (emphasis added)); 42 U.S.C. § 1715 

(“The action of the Secretary [of Labor] in allowing or denying any 

payment under subchapter I of this chapter shall be final and 

conclusive on all questions of law and fact and not subject to 

review by any other official of the United States or by any court by 

mandamus or otherwise.” (emphasis added)).

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legislative history alone could provide a clear statement 

(which we doubt).” United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 

S. Ct. 1625, 1633 (2015).

In short, statutory silence does not equate to a clear 

statement. See Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1660 

(2011); see also Dean Foods, 384 U.S. at 608 (courts 

maintain All Writs Act authority “[i]n the absence of explicit

direction from Congress” (emphasis added)). We therefore 

conclude that, notwithstanding section 2241(e)(2), this Court 

has jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus in aid of our 

appellate jurisdiction of military commissions and the CMCR.

We are nonetheless mindful of the final-judgment rule 

that the Congress included in the 2009 MCA. See 10 U.S.C. 

§ 950g(a). Although it does not defeat our jurisdiction, the 

rule serves an important purpose that would be undermined if 

we did not faithfully enforce the traditional prerequisites for 

mandamus relief. See Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of 

Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976) (“A judicial readiness to issue 

the writ of mandamus in anything less than an extraordinary 

situation would run the real risk of defeating the very policies 

sought to be furthered by th[e] judgment of Congress” that 

“appellate review should be postponed until after final 

judgment.” (ellipsis omitted)); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 

247, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Lax rules on mandamus would 

undercut the general rule that courts of appeals have 

jurisdiction only over final decisions . . . and would lead to 

piecemeal appellate litigation.” (quotation marks and citation 

omitted)). We turn to those prerequisites now.

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B.

Mandamus is proper only if three conditions are satisfied:

First, the party seeking issuance of the writ must 

have no other adequate means to attain the relief he 

desires . . . . Second, the petitioner must satisfy the 

burden of showing that his right to issuance of the 

writ is clear and indisputable. Third, even if the first 

two prerequisites have been met, the issuing court, in 

the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that 

the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.

Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 

367, 380–81 (2004) (citations, brackets and quotation marks 

omitted). We conclude that Nashiri does not satisfy the first 

and second requirements.

1.

As we often caution, “[m]andamus is a ‘drastic’ remedy, 

‘to be invoked only in extraordinary circumstances.’ ” 

Fornaro v. James, 416 F.3d 63, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting 

Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980)). 

It is not available unless “no adequate alternative remedy 

exists.” Barnhart v. Devine, 771 F.2d 1515, 1524 (D.C. Cir. 

1985). Otherwise, the writ could “be used as a substitute for 

the regular appeals process.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380–81. 

Chief Justice Waite summed it up well: “The general 

principle which governs proceedings by mandamus is, that 

whatever can be done without the employment of that 

extraordinary remedy, may not be done with it.” Ex parte 

Rowland, 104 U.S. 604, 617 (1881).

Mandamus is inappropriate in the presence of an obvious 

means of review: direct appeal from final judgment. See

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Roche, 319 U.S. at 27–28 (“Ordinarily mandamus may not be 

resorted to as a mode of review where a statutory method of 

appeal has been prescribed or to review an appealable 

decision of record.”); Nat’l Right to Work Legal Def. v. 

Richey, 510 F.2d 1239, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (mandamus 

unavailable when “review of the . . . question will be fully 

available on appeal from a final judgment”); see also

Goldsmith, 526 U.S. at 537 & n.11 (suggesting that CAAF 

could not issue mandamus due to availability of ordinary 

direct appeal). Here, for instance, the 2009 MCA empowers 

this Court to review all “matters of law” once a military 

commission issues a final judgment and both the convening 

authority and the CMCR review it. See 10 U.S.C. § 950g(a), 

(d). The Government “acknowledge[s]” that this provision 

will allow us to consider Nashiri’s constitutional challenges 

on direct appeal. Oral Arg. Recording 29:37–30:24; see also

id. at 19:58–21:10; Resp’t’s Br. 13. Given the availability of 

ordinary appellate review, Nashiri must identify some

“irreparable” injury that will go unredressed if he does not 

secure mandamus relief. Banks v. Office of Senate SergeantAt-Arms & Doorkeeper of U.S. Senate, 471 F.3d 1341, 1350 

(D.C. Cir. 2006); Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Inc. 

v. DOJ (NACDL), 182 F.3d 981, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1999). He

makes two attempts to do so. Both fail.

First, Nashiri draws an analogy to judicial 

disqualification, pointing out that this Court has entertained 

mandamus petitions when a judicial officer declines to recuse 

himself. See, e.g., In re Kempthorne, 449 F.3d 1265, 1269 

(D.C. Cir. 2006); In re Brooks, 383 F.3d 1036, 1041 (D.C. 

Cir. 2004); Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 

2003). But Nashiri misses the “irreparable” injury that 

justified mandamus in those cases: the existence of actual or 

apparent bias. Cobell, 334 F.3d 1139. With actual bias, 

ordinary appellate review is insufficient because it is too 

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difficult to detect all of the ways that bias can influence a

proceeding. See id. (“[I]f prejudice exist[ed], it has worked 

its evil and a judgment of it in a reviewing tribunal is 

precarious. It goes there fortified by presumptions, and 

nothing can be more elusive of estimate or decision than a 

disposition of a mind in which there is a personal ingredient.”

(quoting Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 36 (1921)). 

With apparent bias, ordinary appellate review fails to restore

“public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process,” 

Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 

860 (1988)—confidence that is irreparably dampened once “a 

case is allowed to proceed before a judge who appears to be 

tainted.” In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 776 (3d 

Cir. 1992); accord In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st 

Cir. 1981) (“Public confidence in the courts requires that 

[bias] question[s] be disposed of at the earliest possible 

opportunity.” (alterations omitted)). Nashiri does not allege 

that the military judges on the CMCR are biased against 

him—in fact or apparently. And our recusal cases do not 

support his petition. See Cobell, 334 F.3d at 1139 (“A case 

involving a motion for disqualification is clearly 

distinguishable from those where a party alleges an error of 

law that may be fully addressed and remedied on appeal.” 

(quoting In re United States, 666 F.2d at 694 (ellipsis 

omitted))).

Nashiri reads our precedent differently. He contends 

that, in addition to bias, our recusal cases recognize another 

form of irreparable injury: a violation of the separation of 

powers. He cites Cobell, 334 F.3d at 1141, for this 

proposition. Yet, apart from bias, the irreparable injury we 

identified in Cobell was not an abstract concern with the 

separation of powers but rather the risk of “interference with 

the internal deliberations of a Department of the Government 

of the United States.” Id. at 1140–43. There, a court monitor

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was attending internal Department of Interior (DOI) meetings 

and interfering with the agency’s ability to comply with a 

court order. See id. at 1134–35, 1141–43. We put a stop to it, 

via mandamus, because “the Court Monitor’s duties were so 

wide-ranging as to have a potentially significant effect upon 

the DOI’s deliberative process.” Id. at 1145 n.*. Nashiri has 

identified no such immediate or ongoing harm from the 

CMCR’s alleged constitutional defects. See United States v. 

Cisneros, 169 F.3d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Most 

separation-of-powers claims are clearly not in th[e] category 

[of] . . . a right not to be tried.”). His purported injury—

conviction of one of the charged offenses—has yet to occur. 

Indeed, his separation-of-powers claims are, at bottom, a 

challenge to the constitutionality of a provision of the 2009 

MCA. See Pet’r’s Br. 23 (asking this Court “to strike down 

10 U.S.C. § 950f(b)(2)”). As we held in Cisneros, such 

claims are “fully reviewable on appeal should the defendant

be convicted.” 169 F.3d at 769; see also id. at 770–71 (“[I]f 

there is merit to [the defendant’s] claim about . . . 

infringement on the President’s (and the Senate’s) 

[constitutional authority], . . . there will be time enough in an 

appeal from the final judgment to vindicate the separation of 

powers.”).6

 Specifically, if Nashiri is convicted, the 

 6 Cisneros was technically a case about the collateral-order 

doctrine, not mandamus. See 169 F.3d at 767. Nevertheless, it is 

directly relevant here because the decision turned on the 

“effectively unreviewable on appeal” requirement of the collateralorder doctrine, id. at 767–68 (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 

437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)), which is functionally identical to the 

no-other-adequate-means requirement of mandamus. See

Papandreou, 139 F.3d at 250 (“[M]andamus’s ‘no other adequate 

means’ requirement tracks [the collateral order doctrine’s] bar on 

issues effectively reviewable on ordinary appeal.”); see also Belize 

Soc. Dev. Ltd. v. Gov’t of Belize, 668 F.3d 724, 730 (D.C. Cir. 

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convening authority and the CMCR affirm that conviction,

Nashiri appeals to this Court and convinces us his 

constitutional arguments are correct, we can then vacate the 

CMCR’s decision. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 

187–88 (1995) (explaining that, on final-judgment review, 

CAAF should vacate CCA decision if its judges were 

appointed in violation of Appointments Clause). Vacatur,

even at the appeal-from-final-judgment stage, would fully 

vindicate Nashiri’s “right[s]” and “the President’s [and] the 

Senate’s constitutional powers.” Cisneros, 169 F.3d at 769; 

see also Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 527 

(1988) (“the right not to be subject to a binding judgment may 

be effectively vindicated following final judgment”).

Second, Nashiri contends that, absent mandamus relief,

he will suffer irreparable injury in the form of “the sui generis

harms associated with defending against capital charges.” 

Pet’r’s Br. 13 (quotation marks omitted). He, in effect, wants 

us to create a “death penalty” exception to the traditional rules 

of mandamus. We decline the invitation. Such an exception 

would contradict the bedrock principle of mandamus 

jurisprudence that the burdens of litigation are normally not a 

sufficient basis for issuing the writ. See Parr v. United States, 

351 U.S. 513, 519–20 (1956) (finality requirements assume 

“the [defendant] will have to hazard a trial . . . before he can 

get a review” and “bear[] the discomfiture and cost of a 

prosecution”); Roche, 319 U.S. at 30 (“[A criminal t]rial may 

be of several months’ duration and may be correspondingly 

costly and inconvenient. But that inconvenience is one which 

we must take it Congress contemplated in providing that only 

final judgments should be reviewable.”); see also Bankers 

Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953) 

 

2012) (“This court has acknowledged the similarities between the 

requirements for mandamus and collateral order review.”).

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(“[E]xtraordinary writs cannot be used as substitutes for 

appeals, even though hardship may result from delay and 

perhaps unnecessary trial.” (citations omitted)).

Granted, in United States v. Harper, the Ninth Circuit 

relied on the “substantial hardship” of a capital trial to support 

its decision to issue a writ of mandamus. 729 F.2d 1216, 

1222–23 (9th Cir. 1984). But the constitutionality of the 

death penalty was the subject of the mandamus petition in that 

case. Specifically, the Harper court used mandamus to strike 

down the death-penalty provision of the Espionage Act. See 

id. at 1226. Here, however, Nashiri challenges the 

composition of an intermediate appellate tribunal. We fail to 

see how granting his petition would spare him the burdens of

capital prosecution. Even if the military judges were 

disqualified and an all-civilian panel of the CMCR affirmed 

the dismissal of the M/V Limburg charges, Nashiri has yet to 

even begin defending against the capital charges stemming 

from the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole and the attempted 

bombing of the U.S.S. The Sullivans. Thus, capital 

prosecution is inevitable for Nashiri, with or without 

mandamus. Harper is therefore inapposite.

Finally, Nashiri contends that, even absent irreparable 

harm, we should exercise our mandamus power to resolve the 

constitutional status of military judges on the CMCR—a pure 

question of law that could affect many cases. In other words, 

he wants us to use the writ in an “advisory” capacity. See 

generally 16 WRIGHT & MILLER § 3934.1. Whatever the 

continued legitimacy of advisory mandamus, see First Nat’l

Bank of Waukesha v. Warren, 796 F.2d 999, 1004 (7th Cir. 

1986) (“Although the [Supreme] Court has not yet erected the 

tombstone, it has ordered flowers.”), our past willingness to 

use the writ in that capacity “cannot be read expansively.” 

United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 309–10 n.62 (D.C. 

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Cir. 1980); see also Banks, 471 F.3d at 1350 (“So reluctant 

are we to consider [advisory] mandamus relief that even 

where we have been presented really extraordinary cases, we 

are careful to caution against indiscriminate mandamus 

review.” (quotation marks omitted)). Even if we were 

willing, we are unable to use advisory mandamus here 

because it would circumvent the no-other-adequate-means 

requirement. See Republic of Venezuela v. Philip Morris Inc., 

287 F.3d 192, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[N]o writ of 

mandamus—whether denominated ‘advisory,’ ‘supervisory,’ 

or otherwise—will issue unless the petitioner shows . . . that 

[he] has no other adequate means of redress.”); see also

NACDL, 182 F.3d at 987 (“In no event . . . could clear error 

alone support the issuance of a writ of mandamus” when the 

error “could be corrected on appeal without irreparable 

harm”).

Additionally, the use of advisory mandamus in this case

would conflict with the constitutional avoidance doctrine, a 

“time-honored practice of judicial restraint.” Cisneros, 169 

F.3d at 768. Nashiri’s petition presents two constitutional 

questions of first impression and “[c]ourts do not reach out to 

decide such questions.” Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. 

Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1507 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Because 

Nashiri may ultimately be acquitted of the charged offenses, 

we may never need to resolve his constitutional challenges to 

the 2009 MCA. We should plainly not enter the fray now. 

See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 

439, 445 (1988) (“A fundamental and longstanding principle 

of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching 

constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of 

deciding them.”).

To recap, we hold that Nashiri is not entitled to 

mandamus relief because this Court can consider his 

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Appointments Clause and Commander-in-Chief Clause 

challenges on direct appeal, after the military commission 

renders a final judgment and the convening authority and the 

CMCR review it.

2.

Nor can Nashiri demonstrate a “clear and indisputable” 

right to the writ. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381. Given its 

“exceptional” nature, we cannot use mandamus to remedy

anything less than a “clear abuse of discretion or usurpation 

of judicial power.” Bankers Life, 346 U.S. at 383 (quotation 

mark omitted). Otherwise, “every interlocutory order which 

is wrong might be reviewed under the All Writs Act” and

“[t]he office of a writ of mandamus would be enlarged to 

actually control the decision of the trial court rather than used 

in its traditional function of confining a court to its prescribed 

jurisdiction.” Id.

With these principles in mind, only Nashiri’s 

Appointments Clause challenge gives us pause. The Clause 

requires “all . . . Officers of the United States” to be 

appointed by the President “by and with the Advice and 

Consent of the Senate.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. This 

requirement is subject to an Excepting Clause that allows the 

Congress to vest the appointment of “inferior” officers in “the 

Heads of Departments.” Id. As noted supra, military judges 

are “assigned” to the CMCR by the Secretary of Defense, 10 

U.S.C. § 950f(b)(2)—the “Head[]” of the Department of 

Defense, see Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 515 

(1920) (“The term ‘head of a department’ means . . . the 

Secretary in charge of a great division of the executive branch 

of the government, like the State, Treasury, and War, who is a 

member of the Cabinet.”). Nashiri argues, however, that 

CMCR judges are “principal,” rather than “inferior,” officers

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and are therefore ineligible for the Excepting Clause. See 

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670–71 (1988). 

This Court has not addressed whether CMCR judges are 

principal or inferior officers. In Edmond v. United States, 520 

U.S. 651 (1997), the Supreme Court considered a close

analog: the judges who serve on the CCAs. The Edmond 

Court acknowledged that CCA judges enjoy extended tenure, 

have broad jurisdiction and “exercis[e] significant authority 

on behalf of the United States.” Id. at 661–62. It 

nevertheless concluded that CCA judges are inferior officers

because their work is extensively supervised. See id. at 666. 

According to the Court:

Generally speaking, the term “inferior officer” 

connotes a relationship with some higher ranking 

officer or officers below the President: Whether one 

is an “inferior” officer depends on whether he has a 

superior. . . . “[I]nferior officers” are officers whose 

work is directed and supervised at some level by 

others who were appointed by Presidential 

nomination with the advice and consent of the 

Senate.

Id. at 662–63. CCA judges are supervised by two entities: the

Judge Advocates General and the CAAF. Id. at 664. The 

Judge Advocates General “prescribe uniform rules of 

procedure” for the CCAs; “meet periodically . . . to formulate 

policies and procedure in regard to review of court-martial 

cases”; and “may . . . remove a [CCA] judge from his judicial 

assignment without cause” so long as the removal is not 

motivated by an “attempt to influence . . . the outcome of 

individual proceedings.” Id. The CAAF reviews the 

decisions of the CCAs and can reverse them for errors of law. 

Id. at 664–65 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 867).

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CMCR judges are similar to CCA judges in several 

respects—a similarity the Congress no doubt intended, see 10 

U.S.C. § 948b(c) (“The procedures for military commissions 

set forth in this chapter are based upon the procedures for trial 

by general courts-martial . . . .”). For example, like the Judge 

Advocates General, the Secretary of Defense supervises the 

CMCR by promulgating its procedures, id. § 950f(c), and he 

can also remove its military judges, id. § 949b(b)(4). Further, 

this Court reviews the CMCR’s decisions under a review 

provision virtually identical to the CAAF’s. See id. § 867(c). 

The judges of this Court are, of course, “appointed by 

Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the 

Senate.” Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663.

Despite these similarities, however, there are key 

differences between CMCR judges and their CCA 

counterparts. While the Judge Advocates General can 

remove CCA judges without cause, the Defense Secretary can 

remove military judges from the CMCR for “good cause” or 

“military necessity” only. 10 U.S.C. § 949b(b)(4). Because 

removal is “a powerful tool for control,” Edmond, 520 U.S. at 

664, the added insulation of CMCR judges is constitutionally 

significant. Additionally, the Supreme Court made a point in 

Edmond to emphasize that the CAAF is “another Executive 

Branch entity.” Id. at 664 & n.2 (emphasis added). The 

CMCR’s decisions, by contrast, “are appealable only to [a] 

court[] of the Third Branch,” id. at 666—namely, this Court. 

10 U.S.C. § 950g(a).

The key question, then, is whether the CMCR’s variation 

on the CCA model converts its military judges from inferior 

to principal officers. We faced a similar issue in 

Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 

F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2012). There, we considered an 

Appointments Clause challenge to the Copyright Royalty 

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Judges (CRJs). The Copyright Royalty Board (Board) sets

the terms and conditions of copyright licensing agreements by 

conducting ratemaking proceedings. See id. at 1334–35. 

CRJs are appointed by the Librarian of Congress, 17 U.S.C. 

§ 801(a), and can be removed for misconduct or neglect of 

duty, see id. § 802(i). The Board’s rate determinations are 

reviewed by this Court. Id. § 803(d)(1). We concluded in 

Intercollegiate that CRJs are principal officers. See 684 F.3d 

at 1340. The CRJs’ for-cause removal protection is not 

“generally consistent with the status of an inferior officer.” 

Id. And the fact that the Board’s rate determinations are 

reviewed by this Court rather than by an Executive Branch 

body means that “CRJs issue decisions that are final for the 

executive branch.” Id. Although the Librarian “approv[es]

the CRJs’ procedural regulations,” id. at 1338 (citing 17 

U.S.C. § 803(b)(6)), this limited supervision does not render 

the CRJs inferior officers because the Librarian does not 

“play an influential role in the[ir] substantive decisions.” Id.

Still, CMCR military judges are not entirely like the 

CRJs in Intercollegiate. Most significantly, the Defense 

Secretary has broader authority to remove military judges 

from the CMCR than the Librarian of Congress has vis-à-vis

the CRJs. The Secretary can remove a military judge either 

for good cause or “military necessity.” 10 U.S.C. 

§ 949b(b)(4). This additional removal authority is non-trivial; 

we would likely give the Executive Branch substantial

discretion to determine what constitutes military necessity. 

Cf. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 29–30 (1827) (“[T]he 

authority to decide whether [an] exigency [justifying the 

exercise of military power] has arisen, belongs exclusively to 

the President, and . . . his decision is conclusive upon all other 

persons.”); see also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93–94 

(1953) (“[J]udges are not given the task of running the Army 

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. . . . [W]e have found no case where this Court has assumed 

to revise duty orders as to one lawfully in the service.”).

In short, neither the CCAs (Edmond) nor the Copyright 

Royalty Board (Intercollegiate) is a perfect analog of the 

CMCR. This is unsurprising, as “[t]he line between ‘inferior’ 

and ‘principal’ officers” is “far from clear” and highly 

contextual. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671. More importantly, 

even if we agreed with Nashiri that military CMCR judges are 

principal officers, our analysis could not end there. As 

mentioned earlier, the Defense Secretary can assign only 

“commissioned” military officers to the CMCR. 10 U.S.C. 

§ 950f(b)(2). To become a commissioned military officer, an 

individual must be nominated by the President with the 

advice and consent of the Senate, id. § 531(a)7

—precisely the 

procedure contemplated by the Appointments Clause. The 

question, then, is whether the Constitution requires 

commissioned military officers to obtain an additional

appointment before they can serve on the CMCR.

The Supreme Court answered this question in the 

negative in Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994). That 

 7 To be specific, only high-ranking commissioned military 

officers are President-nominated and Senate-confirmed. See 10 

U.S.C. § 531(a)(2). The President alone can appoint officers to the 

grades of second lieutenant, first lieutenant and captain (or, in naval 

terminology, ensign, lieutenant (junior grade) and lieutenant). Id.

§ 531(a)(1). The military judges on Nashiri’s CMCR panel—

Colonel Eric Krauss, USA, and Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy S. 

Weber, USAF—are both high-ranking officers who were 

nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. See 157 

Cong. Rec. S7389–90 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2011) (Krauss); 160 

Cong. Rec. S5311 (daily ed. July 31, 2014) (Weber).

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case involved CCA8 judges—who, like CMCR judges, are 

assigned to their respective courts but must already be 

commissioned military officers. 10 U.S.C. § 866(a). 

According to Weiss, CCA judges need no additional 

appointment for two reasons. First, the Court found no 

evidence that the Congress was trying to circumvent the 

Appointments Clause by allowing CCA judges to be assigned 

without a second appointment. See 510 U.S. at 173–74. The 

Congress neither attempted to add responsibilities to an 

existing office, id. at 174 (distinguishing Shoemaker v. United 

States, 147 U.S. 282, 300–01 (1893)), nor tried to “diffus[e]” 

the appointment power, id. Second, the duties of 

commissioned military officers are “germane” to the duties of 

military judges. See id. at 174–76. As the Court explained, 

“all military officers . . . play a role in the operation of the 

military justice system” by disciplining subordinates, serving 

on courts martial and reviewing court-martial sentences. Id.

at 175. For these reasons, the Court unanimously held that 

commissioned military officers can serve as CCA judges 

without an additional appointment. Id. at 176.

Weiss is more complicated, however, than the Court’s

unanimity might ordinarily suggest. Notably, the Court

declined to hold that “germaneness” is required by the 

Appointments Clause; instead, it “assume[d], arguendo, that 

the principle of ‘germaneness’ applies.” Id. at 174. Justice 

Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote separately to explain 

why they believe germaneness is constitutionally required. 

 8 When Weiss was decided, the CCAs were the “Courts of 

Military Review” and the CAAF was the “Court of Military 

Appeals.” The Congress renamed these courts in 1995. See 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. 

No. 103-337, § 924, 108 Stat. 2663, 2831. For clarity, we use their 

current names.

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See id. at 196 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 

judgment) (“[T]aking on . . . nongermane duties . . . would 

amount to assuming a new ‘Offic[e]’ within the meaning of 

Article II, and the appointment to that office would have to 

comply with the strictures of Article II.”). But the majority 

opinion found it unnecessary to decide that question.

Additionally, Justice Souter wrote separately to explain 

why he thinks CCA judges are “inferior officers” under the 

Appointments Clause. Id. at 182 (Souter, J., concurring). 

Their inferior-officer status was important to Justice Souter 

because it meant that the assignment of commissioned 

military officers to the CCAs was inferior-to-inferior, not 

inferior-to-principal. Id. at 190. For Justice Souter, an 

inferior-to-principal assignment—without a second

Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation—“would 

raise a serious Appointments Clause problem,” id. at 191, 

because inferior-to-principal assignments would amount to an 

“abdication” of both the President’s and the Senate’s 

contemplated roles under the Appointments Clause. Id. at 

189. According to Justice Souter, “[i]t cannot seriously be 

contended that in confirming the literally tens of thousands of 

military officers each year the Senate would, or even could, 

adequately focus on the remote possibility that a small 

number of them would eventually serve as military judges.” 

Id. at 190–91. Justices Scalia and Thomas, for their part,

noted that the issues presented by inferior-to-principal 

assignments are “complex.” See id. at 196 n.* (Scalia, J., 

concurring).

Nevertheless, the majority opinion in Weiss did not 

discuss whether military judges are principal officers. Nor 

did the Court suggest that the inferior-versus-principal 

distinction played a role in its constitutional analysis. But 

neither did Weiss hold that an inferior-to-principal assignment 

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without a separate appointment is permissible. After 

Edmond, we know that CCA judges are inferior officers and, 

thus, Weiss dealt only with an inferior-to-inferior assignment. 

See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 666.

* * * *

As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, Nashiri’s 

Appointments Clause challenge raises several questions of 

first impression. Are CMCR military judges principal or 

inferior officers? If they are principal officers, does their 

initial appointment to be commissioned military officers 

satisfy the Appointments Clause? Likewise, what role, if any,

does “germaneness” play in the constitutional analysis? Does 

the Appointments Clause require germaneness for inferior-toinferior assignments? If not, would germaneness nonetheless 

cure any Appointments Clause question with an inferior-toprincipal assignment? Are the duties of a CMCR military

judge germane to the duties of a commissioned military 

officer? These are but a few of the questions we would 

confront if we followed Nashiri down the rabbit hole.

We do not resolve these open questions today. What 

matters for Nashiri’s petition is that they are just that—open. 

Legal aporias are the antithesis of the “clear and indisputable” 

right needed for mandamus relief. See NetCoalition v. SEC, 

715 F.3d 342, 354 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (right to mandamus not 

clear and indisputable in absence of “bind[ing]” precedent); 

Republic of Venezuela, 287 F.3d at 199 (petitioners did “not 

come close” to showing clear and indisputable right because 

they “identif[ied] no precedent of this court or of the Supreme 

Court” on point). Even if we ultimately agreed with Nashiri

on the merits, mandamus would not lie because the answer 

was hardly “clear” ex ante. See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, 

Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“An erroneous 

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district court ruling on an . . . issue by itself does not justify 

mandamus. The error has to be clear.”).

There may be another reason to pump our judicial brakes. 

Once this opinion issues, the President and the Senate could 

decide to put to rest any Appointments Clause questions 

regarding the CMCR’s military judges. They could do so by 

re-nominating and re-confirming the military judges to be

CMCR judges. Taking these steps—whether or not they are

constitutionally required—would answer any Appointments 

Clause challenge to the CMCR.

For the foregoing reasons, Nashiri’s petition for a writ of 

mandamus and prohibition is

Denied.

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