Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02653/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02653-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Karen Alexandrou
Plaintiff
County of Sacramento
Defendant
Richard Maddox
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD MADDOX, a natural person; ) 

KAREN ALEXANDROU, a natural )

person; TIEN HONG VO, a natural )

person; THONG VO, a natural person;)

NGAU THI NGUYEN, a natural person; )

and SONIA LUONG, a natural person, )

) 2:06-cv-0072-GEB-EFB

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) ORDER

)

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, a local )

government agency; JAN SCULLY, a )

natural person and the District )

Attorney for Sacramento County; )

CYNTHIA BESEMER, a natural person )

and Chief Deputy District Attorney )

for Sacramento County; KAREN )

MAXWELL, a natural person and )

Deputy District Attorney for )

Sacramento County; NATALIA LUNA, )

a natural person and Deputy )

District Attorney for Sacramento )

County; WILLIAM MOTMANS, a natural )

person and an investigator )

employed by the District Attorney )

for Sacramento County; and JAMES )

COOPER, a natural person and a )

captain of the Sacramento County )

Sheriff’s Department, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Case 2:06-cv-02653-GEB-EFB Document 29 Filed 11/06/06 Page 1 of 8
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On October 23, 2006, the parties filed a “Stipulation and

Order” (“Stipulation”) in which they stipulate that all claims in the

Complaint asserted by plaintiffs Tien Hong Vo, Thong Vo, Ngau Thi

Nguyen, and Sonia Luong (“Homeowner Plaintiffs”) be stayed and that

the claims made by “Richard Maddox and Karen Alexandrou be allowed to

proceed immediately but only against defendant County of Sacramento

and that an order permitting discovery issue forthwith . . . .” 

(Stipulation at 2-3.) 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on January 11, 2006. An

Order issued on January 12, 2006, scheduling a status (pretrial

scheduling) conference (“status conference”) for April 17, 2006. That

status conference was continued to June 19, 2006, because no timely

joint status report was filed. The June 19 status conference was

subsequently continued to September 25, 2006, because the Joint Status

Report (“JSR”) submitted in advance of the June 19 status conference

“did not reflect the participation of all named Defendants.” (Order

at 1-2, June 12, 2006.) The September 25 status conference was

continued to December 18, 2006, because the JSR the parties filed on

September 8, 2006, (“September 8 JSR”) “reveal[ed] this action [was]

not ready for scheduling.” (Order at 2, Sept. 20, 2006.) The

September 8 JSR indicated that the parties needed more time to propose

how severance of two separate lawsuits identified in that status

report should be accomplished. The parties explained the separate

lawsuits as follows:

[T]here are two separate law suits with separate

claims alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint. The

Plaintiffs in this case include individuals who

owned or operated group homes for low income

and/or disabled persons . . . . These [Homeowner]

Plaintiffs claim that their federal civil rights

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have been violated by the conduct of Sacramento

County and its employees in the enforcement and

prosecution of building, housing, and nuisance

abatement codes. 

 At this time, [Homeowner] Plaintiffs are

Defendants in a criminal action in the Superior

Court for the County of Sacramento . . . for code

violations at the same property alleged in this

federal case.

 Plaintiffs, Richard Maddox and Karen

Alexandrou, on the other hand, are employees of

Sacramento County . . . with knowledge of code

enforcement activities of Sacramento County as it

pertains to the [Homeowner] Plaintiffs. Maddox and

Alexandrou have alleged employement [sic]

discrimination and retaliation claims under state

law, and federal constitutional claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that they have been

discriminated and retaliated against as a result

of opposing alleged wrongful conduct of employees

of Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office

and Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department.

 [The Homeowner Plaintiffs] and all Defendants

have agreed that . . . the employment

discrimination claims of Alexandrou and Maddox

[should] be severed from the claims of the

[Homeowner] Plaintiffs and tried separately. The

parties will file a written stipulation staying

the action and for severance.

(September 8 JSR at 4-5.)

DISCUSSION

I. Severance

Although the parties stated in the September 8 JSR that they

“[would] file a written stipulation staying the action and for

severance[,]” the Stipulation appears to address bifurcation of the

lawsuits under Rule 42, rather than severance under Rule 21. “Use of

the term ‘sever[ance]’ suggests . . . separate actions under Rule 21

was intended,” but here the parties appear to have used the term

“loosely . . . to refer to separation of issues for trial under Rule

42(b).” Hebel v. Ebersole, 543 F.2d 14, 17 (1976). Nevertheless, it

will be decided sua sponte whether Maddox and Alexandrou’s claims

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should be severed from the Homeowner Plaintiffs’ claims under Rule 21,

because the parties’ Stipulation indicates Maddox and Alexandrou

desire to proceed immediately with litigation of their claims to

appealable judgment, whereas the Homeowner Plaintiffs seek to await

the outcome of the criminal proceedings before they litigate their

claims. See United States v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2004 WL

1335723, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 2004) (“Rule 21 permits a court to

sever claims sua sponte.”); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v.

Shapiro, 190 F.R.D. 352, 355 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (“Rule [21] explicitly

provides authority to sever parties sua sponte . . . .). “As a general

matter, Rule 21 severance creates two discrete, independent actions,

which then proceed as separate suits for the purpose of finality and

appealability.” Gaffney v. Riverboat Services of Indiana, 451 F.3d

424, 441 (7th Cir. 2006). 

The Court has broad discretion in determining whether to

order severance under Rule 21. See Brunet v. United Gas Pipeline Co.,

15 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating “[t]he trial court has broad

discretion to sever issues”); Williams v. Felker, 2006 WL 495994, at

*1 (E.D. Cal. March 1, 2006) (stating that under Rule 21, “courts have

broad discretion regarding severance”); Grigsby v. Kane, 250 F. Supp.

2d 453, 456 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (“stating “the court has virtually

unfettered discretion in determining whether or not severance is

appropriate”); see also 7 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary

Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1689 (3d ed. 2001)

(“Questions of severance are addressed to the broad discretion of the

district court.”). Claims being severed must be “discrete and

separate . . . .” Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1016

(7th Cir. 2000). Further, “[f]airness is a critical consideration in

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This portion of the Stipulation indicates it is incumbent 1

upon the Court to issue “an order permitting discovery” before parties

may commence discovery. (Stipulation at 3.) However, Rule 26(a)(1)

permits parties to stipulate to a date for initial disclosures. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (“[Initial] disclosures must be made at or

(continued...)

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determining whether severance is appropriate[,]” and therefore it must

be determined whether any party would suffer prejudice. Pena v.

McArthur, 889 F. Supp. 403, 407 (E.D. Cal. 1994).

Here, the parties “agree that there are two separate law

suits with separate claims alleged in Plaintiff’s [sic] complaint.” 

(September 8 JSR at 4.) The parties explained that one lawsuit

belongs to the Homeowner Plaintiffs, who claim “their federal civil

rights have been violated by the conduct of Sacramento County and its

employees in the enforcement and prosecution of building, housing, and

nuisance abatement codes”; the other lawsuit belongs to Maddox and

Alexandrou, who “allege[] employement [sic] discrimination and

retaliation claims . . . .” (Id.)

The parties have acknowledged that allowing these two

lawsuits to proceed independently will not cause any prejudice:

“Because the actions pleaded by plaintiffs Maddox and Alexandrou . . .

may proceed on their own merits regardless of the outcome of the

criminal matter, the parties have agreed that proceeding with the

prosecution of the claims of plaintiffs Maddox and Alexandrou would

benefit everyone concerned and would avoid any prejudice that might be

caused by further delay.” (Stipulation ¶ 3.) Further, the parties in

the Maddox and Alexandrou lawsuit appear concerned that if they are

not allowed to proceed independently with their claims they could

suffer prejudice because “there has been no discovery order in this

case and [they] have not proceeded with discovery.” (Id. ¶ 2.) 1

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(...continued) 1

within 14 days after the Rule 26(f) conference unless a different time

is set by stipulation or court order . . . .” (emphasis added)). 

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Since the parties agree that Maddox and Alexandrou’s claims

are separate from the Homeowner Plaintiffs’ claims, and that allowing

Maddox and Alexandrou to proceed separately from the Homeowner

Plaintiffs will not prejudice any party, all of Maddox and

Alexandrou’s claims are severed from the Complaint. 

Evaluation of Maddox and Alexandrou’s severed claims reveals

they are all premised on state law, and thus do not present a federal

question. (Compl. ¶¶ 85-92, 117-121, 144-147.) Although the Complaint

states “[t]his is an action arising under the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States[,]” that statement concerns Homeowner

Plaintiffs’ federal claims. (Id. ¶ 15.) The Homeowner Plaintiffs’

federal claims are premised on the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and

section 1983, and purport to be class claims brought by “all

plaintiffs . . . .” (Compl. at 15, 19.) However, Maddox and

Alexandrou have not alleged sufficient facts showing they have

standing to bring these claims. 

Standing is raised sua sponte because “federal courts are

required sua sponte to examine jurisdictional issues such as

standing.” B.C. v. Plumas Unified School Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1264

(9th Cir. 1999). When a claim is purportedly a class claim, the

“named plaintiffs who represent a class ‘must allege and show that

they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered

by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and

which they purport to represent.’” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357

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(1996) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40

n.20 (1976)). 

The FHA and section 1983 claims both allege that Defendants 

unlawfully discriminated against Plaintiffs “because of a handicap of

a person residing in or intending to reside in a dwelling after it was

rented or otherwise made available to that person by the

plaintiffs . . . .” (Compl. ¶¶ 58, 94.) Neither Maddox nor

Alexandrou are included in the list of named Plaintiffs who operate “a

group home . . . for the benefit of disabled or low income

persons . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 17.) Since these Plaintiffs have not pled

that they are among the Plaintiffs who “rented or otherwise made

available” a dwelling to handicapped individuals, they have not

alleged that they suffered the injuries identified in these federal

claims. Therefore, these Plaintiffs have only pled state claims,

which include employment discrimination under Cal. Gov. Code

§ 12940(i), defamation and negligence. (Compl. ¶¶ 85-92, 117-121,

144-147.) 

II. Dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)

Before giving Maddox and Alexandrou’s severed action its own

action number, the discretionary decision will be made whether

supplemental jurisdiction should continue being exercised over their

lawsuit. This decision is made under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(2) and (3),

and “is informed by the [United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.

715,(1966)] values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” 

Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997)

(en banc) (quotation marks omitted). “In the usual case in which all

federal-law claims are eliminated . . . , the balance of factors to be

considered . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction

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28 Hereinafter, the caption of this action shall not name 2

dismissed Plaintiffs Richard Maddox and Karen Alexandrou as parties.

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over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.

Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); see also Wade v. Regional Credit

Assoc., 87 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 1996). The Gibbs values of

comity and fairness do not weigh in favor of the federal court

deciding Maddox and Alexandrou’s state employment discrimination and

tort claims, because as stated in Gibbs: “Needless decisions of state

law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote

justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed

reading of applicable law.” 383 U.S. at 726. 

Therefore, Maddox and Alexandrou’s claims are dismissed

under the rationale of §§ 1367(c)(2) and (3) as of the date on which

this Order is filed.2

III. Stay

Lastly, the Homeowner Plaintiffs’ request to stay this

action is granted and the status conference scheduled for December 18,

2006, is vacated. The parties shall file a joint status report no

later than January 3, 2007, in which they need only explain whether

the stay should be lifted. If the parties opine the stay should not

be lifted, they shall explain why not and the approximate date on

which it could be lifted; if the parties opine the stay should be

lifted, they shall propose a schedule. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 3, 2006

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