Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-15-05796/USCOURTS-ca6-15-05796-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
Appellee
Andrea Lee Gilbert
Appellant
Donald Gilbert

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 16a0385n.06

Case No. 15-5796

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE 

CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DONALD GILBERT, et al.,

Defendants,

ANDREA LEE GILBERT,

Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE 

CORPORATION,

Counter Defendant-Appellee,

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

Third Party Defendant-Appellee.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF 

TENNESSEE 

BEFORE: DAUGHTREY, MOORE, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.

SUTTON, Circuit Judge. When Wells Fargo foreclosed on Andrea Gilbert’s home in 

2010, she refused to leave, claiming that the bank had agreed to modify the terms of her loan. 

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All the bank had done at that point, however, was agree to provide her with an application that 

would allow her to request a loan modification. Because she later failed to qualify for the loan 

modification, the district court held that the bank had the right to seize her home. We affirm.

Andrea fell behind on her mortgage around the same time her marriage to Donald Gilbert 

fell apart. Any hope of staying in her home apparently hinged on Donald, whom the divorce 

court ordered to pay the mortgage in lieu of child support. Donald, sad to say, paid nothing, 

leaving Andrea (and their children) in the lurch. By early 2010, Andrea was ten monthly 

payments behind on the mortgage and lacked the resources to pay what she (in truth her former 

husband) owed.

She asked Wells Fargo if there was any way she could modify the terms of the loan. The 

bank told her about the federal Home Affordable Modification Program, which “encourage[s] 

mortgage holders to renegotiate qualifying loans to reduce the homeowner’s mortgage payments 

to a sustainable level” and delays foreclosure while the bank reviews the homeowner for 

eligibility. Thompson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 773 F.3d 741, 747 (6th Cir. 2014). That sounded 

like manna from heaven. Andrea gave Wells Fargo her financial information, including her 

estimated monthly income, and the bank told her that she “prequalified” for a modification. R. 

44-12 at 12. “To be reviewed [further] for the [program],” the bank explained, she needed to 

complete a three-month trial period plan, apply for a permanent loan modification, and “provide 

[some] requested documentation,” including her current income. Id. at 11–12. She made the 

three monthly trial payments and submitted her application, which listed her monthly income at 

$1545—$845 of which purportedly came from “Child Support/Alimony.” R. 44-14 at 19. But 

she was never able to provide proof that she received the child-support payments because Donald 

never made them. The bank requested documentation of the payments at least five times, 

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including proof of “a Divor[ce] Decree” to show how long the payments would last and “proof 

of Child Support” to show she received the money each month. Id. at 26–27. Andrea responded 

that she “had neither [of the] documents” that the bank “told” her to send. Id.

Without the documents, the bank could not confirm that Andrea’s income sufficed to 

modify the loan. The bank denied her application on May 18, 2010. Later efforts to modify the 

loan failed as well, and the bank foreclosed on her property on August 30, 2010. The bank 

assigned its interest to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, better known as Freddie 

Mac.

Andrea refused to leave the home, prompting Freddie Mac to file an unlawful detainer 

action in Tennessee state court to evict her. Andrea counterclaimed against Freddie Mac 

(on several state law grounds) and filed a third-party claim against Wells Fargo, alleging it had 

agreed to modify her loan. Freddie Mac removed the case to federal court and, together with 

Wells Fargo, moved for judgment as a matter of law. See 12 U.S.C. § 1452(f). The district court 

dismissed many of Andrea’s claims on the pleadings and granted the defendants summary 

judgment on the rest. With respect to Freddie Mac’s eviction claim, the court denied Andrea’s 

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, struck her answer as untimely, and set 

the case for trial. Before trial, the district court entered judgment for Freddie Mac on the 

remaining claim as a matter of law. 

On appeal, Andrea challenges (1) the district court’s summary judgment decision 

rejecting her state law claims against Wells Fargo, (2) its denial of her motion to dismiss Freddie 

Mac’s eviction action, and (3) its decision to strike her answer to the eviction action. 

State law claims against Wells Fargo. Andrea first claims that Wells Fargo breached a 

contract to modify her loan. But no such contract existed. Wells Fargo invited Andrea to apply

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to modify her loan and offered to review her application if she complied with certain 

requirements. She applied. But she failed to meet the application’s requirements, namely that 

she submit documentation of her current income. Her application thus remained just that. Now, 

as ever, an “application when made is not a contract.” Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wolfe, 78 F.2d 78, 

81 (6th Cir. 1935); see Fed. Ins. Co. v. Winters, 354 S.W.3d 287, 291 (Tenn. 2011); Canton 

Cotton Mills v. Bowman Overall Co., 257 S.W. 398, 402 (Tenn. 1924). 

Look no further than the application itself to confirm the point. “The Trial Period Plan,” 

it says, “is the first step” to permanent modification. R. 44-13 at 4. It “is not a modification of 

the Loan Documents” itself. R. 1-1 at 292. Permanent modification, it adds, does not occur

“unless and until” Andrea satisfied “all of the conditions required for modification.” Id. One 

such condition required Andrea to provide “documentation for all income” that she regularly 

received, including “any child support or alimony.” Id. at 291. She thus needed to provide a 

copy of her divorce decree “that states the amount of the alimony or child support” and “[p]roof 

of full, regular and timely payments.” R. 44-13 at 3. Yet, as Andrea admitted to the bank at the 

time, she sent “neither [of those] documents.” R. 44-14 at 26–27. That meant she did not “meet 

all of the conditions required for modification,” and that meant her application never became a 

loan-modification contract. R. 1-1 at 292. 

Unfortunate though this conclusion may be, it is supported by communications between

Wells Fargo and Andrea at the time. The bank told Andrea that “[i]f [her] income 

documentation does not support the income amount that [she] previously provided . . . [she] may 

not qualify for this loan modification program.” R. 44-13 at 2. And Andrea recalled being 

“told” to provide the documentation and repeatedly called and wrote Wells Fargo to discuss the 

relevant documents. E.g., R. 44-14 at 26–27. She said that she was still “waiting on [the] 

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Divor[ce] Decree + Child Sup.,” id. at 25, and still “working on getting” the money and 

corresponding documents, id. at 26–27. But because her ex-husband, a one-time defendant in 

this saga and a less-than-admirable figure in it, never paid the child support, the money never 

came. Neither did any documentation of a payment. Neither did any binding contract to modify 

the mortgage.

Andrea tries to counter this conclusion on several grounds. She contends that she did

supply sufficient documentation of her regular monthly income. But the document that she 

provided—the divorce court’s February 2010 order for her to receive past-due and future child 

support—showed only that she expected to receive future payments, not that she had actually 

received “regular and timely” payments as Wells Fargo required. R. 44-13 at 3. Nor does 

Andrea’s prequalification for a loan modification mean that she was in fact qualified for one. Cf. 

Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Kan. Dep’t of Transp., 810 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2016). Her 

“income documentation,” without the payments from Donald, could show a monthly income of 

only $700, which did “not support the income amount” of $1545 that she used to become 

prequalified. R. 44-13 at 2. Nor was anything amiss with Wells Fargo’s denial letter. It gave 

Andrea sufficient notice of the denial. And it was issued “as quickly as possible,” R. 44-13 at 5, 

with any delay attributable to the bank’s “extension of time” for Andrea to “gather [her] 

documents,” id. at 3. It’s hard to fault the bank for working with Andrea to try to qualify her for

the loan modification rather than denying the application the first chance it had.

Andrea persists that she made the three trial payments when she used the lump-sum 

award she received from Donald’s past-due child support. But just because Andrea could make 

past payments based on a past lump-sum award does not prove that she could make present (to 

say nothing of future) payments on a “regular and timely” basis, as required. Id. In point of fact, 

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the past-due child support dried up quickly—after the three payments—and when it did, Andrea 

(no fault of her own) had no way to make any ongoing payments. The bank in the final analysis 

did not breach any contract with Andrea. 

Andrea separately claims that the district court should not have rejected her promissory 

estoppel claim. But just as Andrea did not produce evidence of a contract to modify her loan, 

she did not produce evidence of a promise to do so either. Such a promise, we have insisted, 

“must be actual, clear, and definite—a conditional promise will not do.” Olson v. Merrill Lynch 

Credit Corp., 576 F. App’x 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). The Tennessee courts 

say the same thing. A promise “must be unambiguous and not . . . vague.” Amacher v. BrownForman Corp., 826 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

Andrea’s problem is that Wells Fargo did not make an “actual, clear, and definite” or 

“unambiguous” promise to modify her loan. To the contrary, it told her that it didn’t 

“guarant[ee] anything at all,” R. 48-6 at 33, and used words like “may,” “maybe,” “if,” “could,” 

and “possibly” to back that up, e.g., R. 44-8; R. 44-10; R. 44-12. “At most, [Wells Fargo] 

informed [Andrea] that she might qualify”—if she complied with all of its prerequisites. 

Thompson, 773 F.3d at 753 (emphasis added). But she did not comply. In the absence of a 

promise, Andrea’s estoppel claim must fail. Amacher, 826 S.W.2d at 482; see Alden v. Presley, 

637 S.W.2d 862, 864 (Tenn. 1982).

Andrea’s wrongful foreclosure claim also comes up short. She acknowledged in the 

district court and in her opening appellate brief that, if her breach of contract and promissory 

estoppel claims failed, then her wrongful foreclosure claim must fail as well. That’s because a 

Tennessee wrongful foreclosure claim does not amount to an independent cause of action in the 

Home Affordable Modification Program context. Clay v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 

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392 S.W.3d 72, 79 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012); see Mik v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 743 F.3d 

149, 166–67 (6th Cir. 2014).

Her contrary contention raised for the first time in her reply brief on appeal comes too 

late. Jones v. Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685, 695 (6th Cir. 2006). It would fail anyway. See Clay, 392 

S.W.3d at 79.

No doubt, we have considerable sympathy for Andrea’s “frustrating inability to procure a 

payment modification.” Thompson, 773 F.3d at 753. The bank by all appearances was frustrated 

by that inability as well. But all of this does not give us a warrant to ignore the requirements of 

the application and Tennessee state law.

Freddie Mac’s eviction action. The district court also correctly denied Andrea’s motion 

to dismiss Freddie Mac’s eviction action. Andrea contends that the district court lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction over the case. That is not the case, however. The “Freddie Mac” Act, see 

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-351, Tit. III, §§ 301–310, 84 

Stat. 450, 451–58 (1970), grants district courts “original jurisdiction” over “all civil actions to 

which [Freddie Mac] is a party.” 12 U.S.C. § 1452(f). And it allows Freddie Mac to remove 

state-court cases to federal court that name it as a party. Id. That’s all Freddie Mac did here.

Andrea responds that the state court from which Freddie Mac removed the case lacked 

jurisdiction, which deprived the federal court of jurisdiction as well. Known as “derivative 

jurisdiction,” this theory holds that a “federal district court does not acquire subject matter 

jurisdiction by removal if the state court lacked jurisdiction over the original action.” W. & S. 

Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 859 F.2d 407, 409 n.4 (6th Cir. 1988). The doctrine, for what it is worth, 

appears to be on its last legs. See 14B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and 

Procedure § 3721 (4th ed. 2016) (collecting materials). Congress notably has abolished it for 

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cases removed under the general removal statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(f). Yet the parties agree that 

it applies here because Freddie Mac relied on the Freddie Mac Act, not the general removal 

statute, to remove the case. See, e.g., Lopez v. Sentrillon Corp., 749 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 

2014); Palmer v. City Nat’l Bank, of W. Va., 498 F.3d 236, 246 (4th Cir. 2007). 

Assume then that the doctrine, even if just for argument’s sake, applies. And assume, 

again for argument’s sake, that the doctrine is “jurisdictional” in the sense that it goes to our 

power to hear the case. But see Morda v. Klein, 865 F.2d 782, 784 (6th Cir. 1989); Rodas v. 

Seidlin, 656 F.3d 610, 619–25 (7th Cir. 2011). Even so, the district court had jurisdiction 

because the state court had jurisdiction. An overview of the Tennessee court system shows why. 

Tennessee general sessions courts, where Freddie Mac initiated this lawsuit, are akin to small 

claims courts. They have limited jurisdiction (over cases such as eviction actions), and their 

judgments do not bind losing parties that appeal to general trial courts, known as circuit courts. 

See Ware v. Meharry Med. Coll., 898 S.W.2d 181, 183–84 (Tenn. 1995); see Tenn. Code Ann. 

§§ 27-5-108(a)(1), 29-18-128. The general trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the case so long 

as the losing party files its appeal within ten days of the adverse judgment and “give[s] bond 

with good security . . . for the costs of the appeal.” Id. §§ 27-5-101, -103(a). 

Freddie Mac met these state law requirements, giving the state court—and thus the 

federal court—jurisdiction over the case. After it lost at the general sessions court, it filed an 

appeal within ten days, and it used a surety bond for the appeal costs. The Tennessee circuit 

court made note of the bond on its docket and properly asserted jurisdiction over the case. 

Contrary to Andrea’s argument, Tennessee law requires nothing more. It contains no specific 

signature requirement, no type-of-surety requirement, no form-of-payment requirement. See 

Griffin v. Campbell Clinic, P.A., 439 S.W.3d 899, 905 (Tenn. 2014); Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-

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729. It says only that “[a]n appeal bond . . . shall be considered sufficient if it secures the cost of 

the cause on appeal.” Id. § 27-5-103(b). That’s all. And that’s what Freddie Mac’s appeal bond 

did. The district court properly denied Andrea’s motion to dismiss. 

Leave to file an answer. The court also acted within its discretion in denying Andrea 

leave to file her answer over a year and a half too late—on the night before the joint pretrial 

order was due and less than a month before trial. Andrea submitted this late filing without the 

required motion to extend her time to file, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B), which in some quarters 

dooms the request by itself. Unicorn Tales, Inc. v. Banerjee, 138 F.3d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 1998); 

see B & D Partners v. Pastis, No. 05-5954, 2006 WL 1307480, at *2 (6th Cir. May 9, 2006). 

Yet the district court (graciously) considered whether to allow the filing, using the late-filing 

“excusable neglect” standard that Andrea urged. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). The court 

nonetheless determined that the alleged “oversight” by Andrea’s lawyer—forgetting to file—did 

not excuse the late filing. R. 77 at 16; see McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

On appeal, Andrea argues that the district court applied the wrong standard—that it 

should have applied the more lenient Civil Rule 55(c) “good cause” standard applicable to 

excuse default judgments. At least one court, it is true, has applied this standard to excuse a latefiled answer when doing so avoided a default judgment. See Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 

F.3d 1329, 1339 (11th Cir. 2014). But in this case there was no default judgment to avoid. The 

district court denied Freddie Mac’s request for a default judgment at the same time it denied 

Andrea’s motion to file a very late answer. What’s more, the district court applied the standard 

Andrea urged it to apply. We generally do not allow litigants to move the goalposts on appeal, 

particularly when they set the goalposts in the first place and offer no good reason for making a 

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change on appeal. See Greco v. Livingston County, 774 F.3d 1061, 1064 (6th Cir. 2014); United 

States v. LaBarge, 52 F. App’x 216, 219 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002). 

For these reasons, we affirm.

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SUTTON, Circuit Judge, concurring. There is one interesting feature to this dispute, not 

necessary to resolution of the case and therefore not explored in the majority opinion, but worth 

a few separate thoughts. The question is: When a case is removed from state court to federal 

court, does the state court’s lack of jurisdiction deprive the federal court of jurisdiction as well?

Andrea Gilbert says it does. Because the state court from which Freddie Mac removed 

the eviction action allegedly did not have jurisdiction over it, Andrea maintains, the federal court 

necessarily lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In making this argument, Andrea invokes 

“derivative jurisdiction,” a doctrine that purports to limit the removal jurisdiction of the federal 

courts “if the state court lacked jurisdiction over the original action.” W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. 

Smith, 859 F.2d 407, 409 n.4 (6th Cir. 1988).

The court’s opinion holds that we have jurisdiction regardless, because the state court had 

jurisdiction over the original eviction action. But it’s worth asking whether, even if that weren’t 

true, even if the state court lacked jurisdiction, our subject matter jurisdiction would be altered. 

My answer is no: Federal removal subject matter jurisdiction is not dependent on, or for that 

matter “derivative” of, the jurisdictional rules of the state courts. 

Once “well settled,” Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 243 n.17 (1981); see Lambert 

Run Coal Co. v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922), the concept of derivative 

jurisdiction appears to be on its last legs. See 14B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice 

and Procedure § 3721 (4th ed. 2016); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 5.5, at 288 

(1989). The key problem with its use here is that the United States Constitution and federal 

statutes, taken together, give federal courts subject matter jurisdiction to entertain cases removed 

from state courts that arise under federal law or that involve diverse parties. Nothing in any of 

the federal removal statutes makes the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts turn on the 

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underlying jurisdiction of the state courts over the dispute under state law. See Breuer v. Jim’s 

Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 694 (2003).

Any other approach would create intractable oddities. Suppose a case could be brought 

only in federal court. A patent case offers one example. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). An ERISA 

case offers another example. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1). And there are many more: admiralty, 

maritime, and prize actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1333; copyright lawsuits, id. § 1338(a); Title 11 

bankruptcy actions, id. § 1334(a); claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, id. § 1346(b)(1); 

challenges to some federal agency actions, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (Clean Water Act); claims 

under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a); federal antitrust actions, see, 

e.g., Gen. Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261, 286–88 (1922); and other 

more obscure cases, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 290k-11(b) (cases challenging an award of an arbitral 

tribunal under the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency); 

16 U.S.C. § 2440 (cases arising under the Antarctic Marine Living Resources Convention).

Suppose as well that the claimant nonetheless brings this kind of case in state court. The 

conventional option for the defendant, the one Congress established, would be to remove the 

case to federal court, where the plaintiff could (and should) have brought the original lawsuit. 

Now suppose the plaintiff does not protest, does not invoke derivative jurisdiction, and thus does 

not claim that the federal court lacks jurisdiction because the state courts lacked jurisdiction. 

Discovery commences. Pretrial proceedings move forward. Summary judgment motions 

appear. If the plaintiff loses at summary judgment (or for that matter after a jury trial), may it 

move to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction? The answer is yes if, as 

Andrea claims today, the concept of derivative jurisdiction goes to the subject matter jurisdiction 

of the federal courts. And this in a setting where the federal court has original jurisdiction—in 

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reality, exclusive jurisdiction—over the case, and the state courts no jurisdiction over the matter. 

“The result is that a federal court refuses to entertain a case over which only it has jurisdiction.” 

North Dakota v. Fredericks, 940 F.2d 333, 336 (8th Cir. 1991). This problem by the way would 

apply in all such cases misfiled in state court—a not-unusual situation, particularly for ERISA 

cases—because, if the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction, the state courts would lack 

jurisdiction and derivative jurisdiction would apply. 

The only recourse at this point would be for the plaintiff to refile in federal court 

(assuming no limitations bar applied). And the upshot would be the “kind of rigmarole [] 

unworthy of a civilized judicial system,” id., and “indefensibl[e] from the standpoint of practical 

judicial administration,” Washington v. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 654, 

658–59 (9th Cir. 1972); see also Hollis v. Fla. State Univ., 259 F.3d 1295, 1298 (11th Cir. 2001); 

Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. Gen. Cinemas Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 218 (1st Cir. 1987).

Appreciating these problems, Congress in 1986 abolished the concept of derivative 

jurisdiction for some cases—those removed under the general removal statute, see Judicial 

Improvements Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-336, 100 Stat. 633—and did so again in 2002 with 

slightly different language, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(f). But “for no apparent policy reason,” 

Congress appears to have “limit[ed] the abrogation . . . to cases removed under” that statute. 

Wright et al., supra, § 3721. The doctrine lives on, some courts have held, for actions removed 

under other removal statutes, such as the federal officer removal statute. See, e.g., Conklin v. 

Kane, No. 14-4106, 2015 WL 8125304, at *2 (3d Cir. Dec. 8, 2015); Palmer v. City Nat’l Bank

of W. Va., 498 F.3d 236, 246 (4th Cir. 2007); Lopez v. Sentrillon Corp., 749 F.3d 347, 351 (5th 

Cir. 2014); Rodas v. Seidlin, 656 F.3d 610, 618–19 (7th Cir. 2011).

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In this instance the government relied on the “Freddie Mac” Act, see Federal Home Loan 

Mortgage Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-351, Tit. III, §§ 301–310, 84 Stat. 450, 451–58 

(1970), not the general removal statute, in removing the case to federal court. See 12 U.S.C. 

§ 1452(f). For that reason, the parties agree that some form of the doctrine applies here.

What form, is the key question. That the doctrine may apply does not tell us how it 

applies. The answer to that question depends on the interpretation of a word with “many, too 

many meanings”: “jurisdiction.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) 

(quotation omitted).

Once used as shorthand for anything “mandatory,” see, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 

361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960), “jurisdiction” now refers to “the courts’ statutory or constitutional 

power to adjudicate the case,” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89. A careful use of the term covers far 

fewer disputes than was once the case. See id.; see also, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 

500, 514–15 (2006); United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784, 790–91 (6th Cir. 2015).

The derivative jurisdiction doctrine, properly understood, does not go to the federal 

courts’ subject matter jurisdiction—their power—to review a case. Despite its “improvident 

name,” the doctrine “is best understood as a procedural bar to the exercise of federal judicial 

power” rather than “an essential ingredient to federal subject matter jurisdiction.” Rodas, 

656 F.3d at 619. We have said as much. Morda v. Klein, 865 F.2d 782, 784 (6th Cir. 1989). 

So has every other circuit but one. Compare Patriot Cinemas, 834 F.2d at 217–18, Calhoun v. 

Murray, 507 F. App’x 251, 256 (3d Cir. 2012), Foval v. First Nat’l Bank of Commerce in New 

Orleans, 841 F.2d 126, 129 (5th Cir. 1988), Rodas, 656 F.3d at 619, and Sorosky v. Burroughs 

Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 800–01 (9th Cir. 1987), with Bullock v. Napolitano, 666 F.3d 281, 286 (4th 

Cir. 2012). And even Bullock did so without confronting the argument that the doctrine is 

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merely a procedural bar. See Appellant’s Br., Bullock v. Napolitano, 666 F.3d 281 (No. 10-

1222) 2010 WL 2592618.

Not only does the doctrine lead to strange outcomes, it has no constitutional or statutory 

basis and appears to have been “subject to qualification” from the beginning. Fid. Trust Co. v. 

Gill Car Co., 25 F. 737, 739 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1885) (cited in Lambert Run Coal, 258 U.S. at 383 

n.3); see Rodas, 656 F.3d at 624–25 (collecting cases). This conclusion also furthers the 

“mission to rein in profligate uses of ‘jurisdiction,’” Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv., 803 F.3d 809, 813 

(6th Cir. 2015), a mission that we do not undertake alone, see, e.g., Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l 

Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013); Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 

434–35 (2011); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67, 81 (2009); Arbaugh, 

546 U.S. at 514–15; Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89–90; Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d at 790–91; EEOC v. 

Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 553 F.3d 593, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2009).

That derivative jurisdiction counts as a procedural defect, not a subject-matterjurisdiction defect, “makes an enormous practical difference.” Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d at 790–91. 

“Challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or forfeited,” but procedural 

challenges to other types of so-called “jurisdiction” (like derivative jurisdiction) “can be forfeited 

by litigants” and “can be outright waived.” Id.; see Smith, 859 F.2d at 409 n.4. That’s what 

happened here. Because Andrea’s challenge alleged a “defect other than lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction,” it “must [have] be[en] made within 30 days” of Freddie Mac’s removal. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1447(c); see Rodas, 656 F.3d at 621. It was not. Andrea waited eleven months to make her 

motion—until after she lost at summary judgment—and thus would have forfeited her challenge. 

See Music v. Arrowood Indem. Co., 632 F.3d 284, 287 (6th Cir. 2011); Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. 

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Case No. 15-5796, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Gilbert

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v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 327–29 (6th Cir. 2007). She cannot resurrect it now by 

using a jurisdictional label.

The only pertinent jurisdictional question here is “not whether the case was properly 

removed, but whether the federal district court would have had original jurisdiction of the case 

had it been filed in that court.” Grubbs v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 702 (1972). 

The answer is yes. The Freddie Mac Act grants district courts “original jurisdiction” over “all 

civil actions to which [Freddie Mac] is a party.” 12 U.S.C. § 1452(f). And it allows Freddie 

Mac to remove state court cases that name it as a party to federal court. Id. That’s just what 

Freddie Mac did. I suspect, therefore, that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over 

this case, even applying the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction.

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