Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-08-04055/USCOURTS-ca10-08-04055-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gerardo Lopez-Medina
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

February 19, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

GERARDO LOPEZ-MEDINA,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 08-4055

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Utah

(D.C. No. 1:05-CR-00112-DAK-1)

Bel-Ami Jean de Montreux of Montreux Freres, P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah, for

Defendant - Appellant.

Stephen J. Sorenson, Assistant United States Attorney (Brett L. Tolman, United

States Attorney with him on the briefs) Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff -

Appellee.

Before HENRY, Chief Circuit Judge, HARTZ and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

O’BRIEN, Circuit Judge.

Gerardo Lopez-Medina was convicted by a jury of possession of

methamphetamine with intent to distribute and sentenced to 235 months

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1

 During a “trash run” police officers “retrieve trash that has been placed out by the

side of the road by a suspect or target residence” to “look for any evidence of drug use

[or] drug distribution.” (R. Supp. Vol. I, Doc. 184 at 191.)

2

 MSM refers to methylsufonylmethane and is used as a cutting agent for

methamphetamine. 

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imprisonment. He contends: (1) his rights under the Confrontation Clause were

violated by the admission of certain evidence, absent which there was insufficient

evidence to support his conviction; (2) the court erred in ruling he could not

question a government witness about the nature of the witness’ recent conviction;

and (3) the prosecution committed prosecutorial misconduct on multiple

occasions. Finding only one harmless error, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

In 2005, law enforcement agencies became suspicious of illegal drug

distribution at a residence in Layton, Utah, a split-level home containing an

upstairs and downstairs apartment. As part of their investigation, police officers

performed three “trash runs” at the Layton residence.1

 The officers discovered

several items associated with drug use or distribution: empty bottles of MSM,2

plastic baggies of various size (some containing white residue), green Saran wrap,

duct tape and a marijuana butt. A crystal shard from one of the baggies fieldtested positive for methamphetamine. Subsequent testing revealed some of the

baggies had contained methamphetamine and one had contained marijuana.

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3

 Although Lopez-Medina was not named as the lessor on the lease, the

landlord/owner of the Layton residence testified at trial that Lopez-Medina lived in the

upstairs apartment in July and August 2005. 

4

 The transcript reads “J-E-R-G-E-R-A.” (R. Supp. Vol. I, Doc. 184 at 35.) The

government explains the transcript reflects Johnson beginning to spell “Gera” with a “J”

then corrected himself. 

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On July 29, 2005, police officers executed a search warrant at the Layton

residence. Lopez-Medina was present in the upstairs apartment at the time of the

search.3

 Officers located various items in the upstairs apartment indicating drug

use or distribution. 

On August 4, 2005, Scott Cunningham, a handyman for an apartment

complex in Clearfield, Utah, met Lopez-Medina and another Hispanic male at the

complex to discuss their interest in renting an apartment. He spoke with LopezMedina, whom he recalled as having a “lazy eye.” During the conversation,

Lopez-Medina told Cunningham he was interested in renting Apartment E and

pointed to a green pickup truck saying “that’s my green truck over there” or

“that’s my truck.” (R. Supp. Vol. I, Doc. 184 at 76, 79.)

That same day, Officer Aaron Johnson of the Ogden City Police

Department met with a confidential informant. The informant told Johnson the

police had missed some evidence during the search of the Layton residence. The

informant said Lopez-Medina lived there and had “Gera” tattooed on his

shoulder.4

 According to the informant, Lopez-Medina was nervous because of the

search and was in the process of moving to an apartment complex in Clearfield,

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Utah. The informant took Johnson to the Clearfield apartment and pointed out a

green pickup truck. He said there would be fifteen pounds of methamphetamine

in the truck’s gas tank.

On August 5, 2005, Officer Johnson obtained a warrant to search the truck. 

There were approximately sixteen pieces of mail on the front seat, all addressed

to the Layton residence. Behind the seat, officers located a package wrapped in

brown and yellow tape containing a white crystalline substance which field-tested

positive for methamphetamine. Inside the gas tank, the officers discovered a false

wall creating two compartments—one held gasoline and the other contained

eleven packages similar to the one found in the cab. The officers field-tested one

of these packages; it tested positive for methamphetamine. All twelve packages

were subsequently tested in a laboratory; all contained methamphetamine. 

A crime scene investigator examined the truck and its contents for

fingerprints. He found four fingerprints: Lopez-Medina’s fingerprint on a cell

phone bill found on the front seat; two of Rogelio Lopez-Ahumado’s fingerprints

just above the driver’s side door handle; and a third-party’s fingerprint on a bill

of sale found in the glove compartment.

The next day officers obtained a search warrant for the Clearfield

apartment. As officers assembled to execute the warrant, Lopez-Ahumado left the

building. Lopez-Medina and Lopez-Ahumado are half-brothers and bear a strong

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 One distinguishing characteristic is that Lopez-Medina has a “lazy eye” whereas

Lopez-Ahumado does not. 

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resemblance to one another.5

 The officers assumed Lopez-Ahumado knew LopezMedina because of their resemblance and began talking to Lopez-Ahumado. They

learned he was Lopez-Medina’s half-brother, lived in Apartment E, and had a set

of keys to the green pickup truck. Officers confirmed the keys fit the truck. In

Apartment E, they found a quarter-pound of methamphetamine, wrapped similarly

to the drugs found in the truck. 

Officers spoke with Cunningham, asking if he could identify the owner of

the green pickup truck. Cunningham said it was the two Hispanics who had

rented Apartment E and “one of them told me that the green truck was his.” (R.

Supp. Vol. I, Doc. 184 at 82.) Cunningham was not comfortable identifying the

truck’s owner in person so an officer showed Cunningham a picture of LopezMedina on his cell phone. Cunningham identified Lopez-Medina as the person

with whom he had spoken.

B. Procedural History

Lopez-Medina and Lopez-Ahumado were charged with possession with

intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and aiding and abetting the same based on the drugs found in

the pickup truck (Count I). Lopez-Ahumado was also charged with possession

with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, also in violation

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6

 Notably, Lopez-Ahumado’s judgment stated only that he pled guilty to Count I; it

did not state his plea was based on his admission to aiding and abetting Lopez-Medina in

jointly possessing the drugs at issue.

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of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), based on the drugs discovered in the Clearfield

apartment (Count II).

Lopez-Ahumado pled guilty to Count I. In a statement submitted to the

court in advance of his guilty plea, Lopez-Ahumado stated:

I stipulate and agree that the following facts accurately describe my

conduct. They provide a basis for the Court to accept my guilty plea

and for calculating the sentence in my case:

On August 5, 2005, I, Rogelio Lopez-Ahumado, knowingly aided &

abetted Gerardo Lopez-Medina in jointly possessing, with intent to

distribute, 4.833 kilograms of mixture and substance containing

methamphetamine (4.63 kilograms actual methamphetamine) which

was located in Lopez-Medina’s vehicle parked near 607 South 1000

East, Clearfield, Utah.

On August 5, 2005, I also knowingly possessed, with intent to

distribute, 444.4 grams of mixture and substance containing

methamphetamine (426.6 grams actual methamphetamine) that was

located in my apartment at 607 South 1000 East, Apartment E,

Clearfield, Utah.

(R. Vol. I, Doc. 44 at 4.) Lopez-Ahumado admitted to these facts at his change of

plea hearing. In his plea agreement, the government agreed to request a

downward departure at sentencing if Lopez-Ahumado provided substantial

assistance to the government “in the prosecution of others involved in Controlled

Substance Offenses.” (Id. at 5.) Lopez-Ahumado did not assist the government

and was sentenced to 262 months imprisonment.6

 Lopez-Medina proceeded to

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trial.

1. Pre-Trial Proceedings

Prior to trial, the government filed a motion in limine informing the court

defense counsel had represented to the government that Lopez-Medina’s defense

would be that the government had already convicted the guilty individual, LopezAhumado, and Lopez-Medina was merely an innocent bystander. The government

stated it did not plan to call Lopez-Ahumado as a witness in its case-in-chief due

to his refusal to answer questions. The government asked the court to prohibit

Lopez-Medina from introducing the fact of Lopez-Ahumado’s conviction through

other witness’ testimony on the grounds it was irrelevant and inadmissible

hearsay. The government argued if “the Court allow[ed] [Lopez-Ahumado’s]

conviction to come in as an exception to the hearsay rule, the government should

be allowed under the rule of completeness to put in [Lopez-Ahumado’s] factual

statement in support of his guilty plea” to prevent the jury from assuming LopezAhumado admitted sole responsibility for the crime. (R. Vol. I, Doc. 109 at 2.) 

At the pretrial conference, both parties said they did not intend to call

Lopez-Ahumado as a witness. The government repeated its objection to the

admission of testimony relating to Lopez-Ahumado’s conviction but stated if

defense counsel “wants to put in the conviction . . . as long as the government is

allowed to give the rest of the story, that he has admitted to aiding and assisting

[Lopez-Medina] in distributing meth, we have no problem.” (R. Supp. Vol. I,

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Doc. 186 at 16.) The court responded: “I will let [defense counsel bring out

Lopez-Ahumado’s plea and conviction], but then I’m going to let the government

point out that this guy also said . . . that he knowingly aided and abetted [LopezMedina].” (Id. at 17.) After further discussion, the following exchange took

place:

THE COURT: Let’s see how it develops. My preliminary notion is

that if the conviction comes in, that the government is probably

entitled to introduce the rest of the—the important part of the plea

agreement, but let’s see how it develops. All right?

. . . . 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Are you saying they are entitled to bring

the plea agreement where they then will say my client aided and

abetted him?

THE COURT: If we spend much time on the co-defendant’s

conviction, yes. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: All right. I understand that.

(Id. at 20-21.)

The government filed pre-trial notices of intent to introduce the testimony

of Troy Fowers and Terry Kiesz pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of

Evidence. The government anticipated Fowers would testify about his drug deals

with Lopez-Medina in 2005, Lopez-Medina’s unique methods of concealing

methamphetamine (such as in drive shafts and car amplifiers), and Fowers’ visits

to Lopez-Medina’s residence. The government anticipated Kiesz would testify

about her drug deals with Lopez-Medina in Summer 2005, the frequency of the

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deals, and the truck Lopez-Medina drove. The government argued the

information was relevant, its probative value was not substantially outweighed by

unfair prejudice, and it was admissible to prove knowledge and intent. LopezMedina argued Fowers and Kiesz’s testimony should be excluded because it was

improper character evidence. The government subsequently filed a motion in

limine pursuant to Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to prevent crossexamination of Fowers concerning his criminal convictions over ten years old and

his more recent misdemeanor convictions not involving dishonesty or false

statements.

At the pretrial conference, the court ruled it would allow Fowers and Kiesz

to testify. With respect to Fowers’ prior convictions, the court ruled it was “not

going to let [defense counsel] get into anything that is more than ten years old.” 

(R. Supp. Vol. I, Doc. 186 at 4.) The court then reviewed Fowers’ criminal

record, designating the convictions about which he could be questioned.

2. Testimony Concerning Lopez-Ahumado

On initial cross-examination of Officer Johnson, defense counsel asked

about his encounter with Lopez-Ahumado at the Clearfield apartment:

Q. And then you placed [Lopez-Ahumado] under arrest . . .?

A. Yes.

. . . . 

Q. And you charged him?

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A. Yes.

Q. With possession of the 13 kilos of methamphetamine found in

the truck?

A. Yes. With the meth found there.

Q. And that person was convicted in this courtroom?

A. He pled guilty.

Q. And he was convicted?

A. Yes. Accepted guilt.

Q. Same thing. And he’s in prison for 22 years?

A. I don’t know exactly.

(R. Supp. Vol. I, Doc. 184 at 26.) 

Based on this exchange, the prosecutor advised the court he intended to ask

Johnson about the factual basis of Lopez-Ahumado’s plea on re-direct. Defense

counsel said “[o]kay” but argued if the factual allocution was admitted, LopezAhumado’s entire plea agreement should be admitted so he could point out

Lopez-Ahumado had been offered the possibility of a reduction in sentence if he

gave substantial assistance to the government. (R. Supp. Vol. I, Doc. 184 at 41.) 

The court denied this request. 

The government then asked Officer Johnson to read into evidence the

factual basis for Lopez-Ahumado’s plea as reflected in the transcript of LopezAhumado’s change of plea hearing. Defense counsel again argued if the factual

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basis was admitted, the whole agreement should be admitted. The following

exchange occurred:

THE COURT: Here’s what I’m going to do. And you’re not

going to like this so you make your record. I’m going to let in Pages

11 and 12 [the fact allocution] . . . . That doesn’t mean the stuff he

never did can come in and he’s not here, unfortunately.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Then, Your Honor, how do I – [be]cause I

need to cross-examine this witness on the basis of him pleading

guilty and why and what was the offer, what [were] his expectations.

THE COURT: The guy you need to cross-examine on this is the guy

who won’t testify for anybody, and that’s not your fault.

. . . . 

[PROSECUTOR]: And I just want to say this was brought up at

pretrial. It was brought up yesterday. If he opened the door, we

would be able to drive that truck in. He knew the consequences.

. . . . 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I have no problem opening any door in this

case. And I did that purposely, and I knew exactly what I did.

THE COURT: We did cover this generally in pretrial.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes.

THE COURT: That the factual basis could come in. And that doesn’t

leave the door open for everything else to come in.

(Id. at 50-52.) The court then allowed Officer Johnson to read into the record the

portion of the transcript of Lopez-Ahumado’s change of plea hearing containing

the factual allocution.

On final re-cross-examination, defense counsel asked Officer Johnson a

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number of questions about Lopez-Ahumado’s plea: 

Q. And somehow voluntarily [Lopez-Ahumado] implicated his

brother Gerardo in this case? 

A. Not somehow. He appeared very sad, was crying and

confessed.

. . . . 

Q. You read [Lopez-Ahumado’s factual allocution] in the record

to the jury. It says, and I’ll read it again. That he plead guilty

to jointly possessing 4.833 kilograms of a mixture and

substance containing methamphetamine. By jointly meaning

he meant he possessed that with Gerardo?

A. Yes.

. . . .

Q. He pled guilty and implicated my client for possessing the

drugs in the car; yes?

A. Yes.

Q. And he . . . also admitted that inside his apartment was 

located 444.4 grams of a mixture of methamphetamine?

A. Yes.

Q. He did not implicate my client in that part, did he?

A. No.

Q. So he took responsibility for that part as the finding in the

apartment?

A. Yes.

Q. But the big, the 12 kilos, he implicated my client?

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A. The 12 pounds, yes.

(Id. at 58-61.)

3. Testimony Concerning Confidential Informant

Officer Johnson testified on direct examination about the search of the

green pickup truck. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked: “How did you

come to know that that pickup truck was a suspected truck?” (R. Supp. Vol. I,

Doc. 185 at 84.) The government requested a sidebar conference and expressed

concern about this line of questioning. Defense counsel stated: “I think, Your

Honor, he’s worried that I am going to bring in the confidential informant

information. That’s my full intention. I don’t care what door we open. If I open

up a door, please feel free to drive into it. But I am going to explore the entire

case.” (Id. at 85-86.) The government objected on hearsay grounds but stated if

the court allowed Johnson to testify about what the informant told him, it should

be allowed to question him concerning other statements made by the informant.

Defense counsel assured the court he did not intend to ask what the informant told

Johnson. The court ruled: “He can ask [Officer Johnson] if he received

information from the informant. He can ask that without asking him what it is.” 

(Id. at 87.)

Defense counsel then asked Officer Johnson: “Would you please tell the

jury how you became aware that that pickup truck was there and it might have

contained contraband?” (Id. at 88.) Johnson responded he received this

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information from a confidential informant. Johnson also confirmed the

confidential informant told him Lopez-Medina’s address in Layton. Defense

counsel later asked: “Now, the informant that you mentioned, that’s that person

who is not here who will not testify in this case that we’re talking about; right?” 

(R. Supp. Vol. I, Doc. 184 at 6.) Counsel also asked: “Now, that informant

already had told you that the methamphetamine drugs would be found in the fuel

tank, correct?” (Id. at 7.)

On redirect, the government elicited testimony from Officer Johnson about

when and where he first met with the confidential informant and what the

confidential informant told him. The government asked: “And the information

that he provided to you appeared to be accurate?” (Id. at 35.) Johnson

responded: “Absolutely.” (Id.) 

On re-cross, defense counsel asked additional questions about Officer

Johnson’s knowledge of the informant’s past criminal history and whether the

officer had worked with the informant in the past. Counsel asked: “And he is the

one according to your testimony that told you that this drug belonged to my

client?” (Id. at 65.) Johnson responded: “Yes.” (Id.) 

4. Fowers’ Testimony

Troy Fowers offered the following testimony. He dealt methamphetamine

from October 2004 to April or May 2005. In April 2006 he pled guilty to

possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and agreed to cooperate

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with the government as part of a plea agreement. He acknowledged three prior

convictions for theft in 1996, 1997, and 2000. After a previous supplier was

arrested, Fowers was approached by an individual known as “My Friend” and his

nephew. Fowers identified Lopez-Medina as “My Friend” and stated he became

Fowers’ supplier in January 2005. Fowers obtained drugs from Lopez-Medina on

a daily or every-other-day basis, beginning at quantities of a quarter-ounce, a

half-ounce and an ounce and increasing over time to one pound and occasionally

two pounds. The smaller purchases were packaged in sandwich bags. The larger

purchases “were wrapped with a Ziploc bag like a burrito real tight . . . and then

either green or purple Saran wrap [was] wrapped around it.” (R. Supp. Vol. I,

Doc. 187 at 187.) Fowers identified the green Saran wrap found in the “trash

runs” in June 2005 as the type of plastic wrap he saw used by Lopez-Medina for

larger sales.

According to Fowers, Lopez-Medina would sometimes do drug deals at the

Layton residence. Fowers described three visits he made to the residence in

Summer 2005. On the second visit, Lopez-Medina sold him a pound of

methamphetamine concealed in a “fake bible” containing a metal box. (Id. at

200.) Lopez-Medina concealed drugs in other containers including car amplifiers,

hand-held vacuum cleaners, and drive lines (or drive shafts) for automobiles. 

Once Lopez-Medina came to Fowers’ mechanic shop carrying a drive line and

asked for a hacksaw. Although Fowers did not see Lopez-Medina use the

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hacksaw, Lopez-Medina soon gave him a pound of drugs. On another occasion

Lopez-Medina came to Fowers’ shop and asked him for a drive line for a truck. 

Fowers did not have one available but said he would look for one.

During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Fowers about the arrest

leading to his methamphetamine conviction. During a break in crossexamination, the government argued it appeared defense counsel was asking

Fowers about the facts and circumstances underlying his conviction and claimed

such questioning was inappropriate. The court agreed: “You’re entitled to put on

the record he was convicted of X, Y and Z . . . . You’re entitled to ask him . . .

whether he expects to get some break on the sentencing . . . . But I don’t think

you can get into the facts and circumstances of the underlying conviction . . . .”

(Id. at 217-18.) Defense counsel argued he should be able to question Fowers

about the length of imprisonment he would have faced absent his cooperation and

“to graph [the possible sentence] on the board.” (Id. at 219.) The court ruled:

“You can ask him if he expects to get a lot less than he might have gotten, but

you can’t graph the sentence report and the criminal history category. You can’t

do it.” (Id. at 220.) On further cross-examination, Fowers admitted he had not

yet been sentenced on the drug conviction and hoped to receive a recommendation

for leniency for his cooperation in this and other cases. 

On final re-direct, the government asked Fowers about his weight:

Q. Finally, just to give the jury a little insight about drug use,

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how much do you weigh currently?

A. About 210 pounds.

Q. How much did you weigh when you were abusing

methamphetamine?

A. About 165.

(R. Supp. Vol. I, Doc. 181 at 21.)

5. Kiesz’s Testimony

Kiesz testified as part of the government’s case-in-chief. She had two prior

convictions for possession of a controlled substance and had used and sold drugs

in the past. She met Lopez-Medina in Spring 2005 and visited his residence every

day or two for approximately six months to smoke methamphetamine. She was

not aware of anyone else living at the residence. She knew Lopez-Medina worked

on cars.

 During the time Kiesz smoked methamphetamine with Lopez-Medina, he

was her sole supplier. The following exchange took place:

Q. Obviously [methamphetamine is] expensive. How did you pay

for your methamphetamine?

A. Money; sometimes sex.

Q. Okay. How would you get your money?

A. I would sell it.

Q. Sell the methamphetamine?

A. Yes, sir.

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Q. Who did you sell for?

A. I sold for Gera.

(R. Supp. Vol. I, Doc. 187 at 155-56.) 

6. Lopez-Medina’s Testimony

Lopez-Medina testified. He was born in Mexico but had lived or resided in

the United States for “13, 14 years.” (R. Supp. Vol. I, Doc. 181 at 23.) His only

previous arrest was for a traffic ticket. He lived at the Layton residence with

Lopez-Ahumado and a nephew for approximately eight months beginning in

December 2004 or January 2005. The apartment had two bedrooms. LopezAhumado and the nephew slept in the bedrooms; Lopez-Medina slept on the

living room couch. Lopez-Ahumado and the nephew traveled frequently, buying

and selling cars. Lopez-Medina began to suspect “they were into something that

was not good” because people often visited the apartment looking for them. (Id.

at 26.) Lopez-Ahumado and the nephew were in the process of moving out at the

time Lopez-Medina was arrested.

Lopez-Medina denied the items found during the “trash runs” belonged to

him. He was in the habit of picking up all the mail from the postal box at the

curb of the Layton residence and placing it in a box inside the house for the other

tenants to pick up. Kiesz spent a lot of time with Lopez-Ahumado and the

nephew at the apartment. Lopez-Medina denied knowing Fowers: “I don’t know

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whether I’ve seen him, but he’s gone to see [Lopez-Ahumado] so much that I may

have seen him.” (Id. at 28.)

Lopez-Medina testified he had been mistaken for Lopez-Ahumado “[m]any,

many times.” (Id. at 29.) The first time he saw the green pickup truck was when

Lopez-Ahumado drove it while moving to the Clearfield apartment and he had

never been inside or under the truck. He denied placing drugs inside the fuel tank

and, asked if he was a drug dealer, answered, “No, sir. I am a mechanic.” (Id. at

30.)

On cross-examination, Lopez-Medina acknowledged he had his nickname

(Gera) tattooed on his shoulder. He also acknowledged weighing 180 pounds in

August 2005 and 203 pounds at the time of trial. This exchange then occurred:

Q. How many years have you been here in the United States?

A. Like 13 or 14 years.

Q. You are illegally here, aren’t you?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Have you been breaking the law for 13 or 14 years?

A. Well, I believe so.

(Id. at 31.) Lopez-Medina acknowledged Kiesz came to the Layton residence

almost every day when Lopez-Ahumado and the nephew were there. 

Q. She used methamphetamine with you every day she was there?

A. No, sir.

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Q. She exchanged sex for the methamphetamine that you gave

her?

A. No, sir, not with me. I don’t know if it was with my 

brother.

Q. You gave her methamphetamine?

A. No.

(Id. at 32.) 

On re-direct Lopez-Medina explained he had gained weight following his

arrest because he was incarcerated and was not allowed to exercise.

7. Closing Arguments

In closing the prosecutor referred to Lopez-Medina’s immigration status:

“He’s here illegally. Been so for 13 years. He’s living the lie.” (R. Supp. Vol. I,

Doc. 181 at 56.) The prosecution also referred to Kiesz’s “sex-for-meth”

testimony: “He got to the point where, yeah, I know Terri Kiesz, but I just know

her. If she slept with someone for methamphetamine, it was my brother.” (Id. at

57.) The prosecution also commented on Lopez-Medina’s post-arrest weight

gain, arguing it occurred “because he’s not using methamphetamine anymore.” 

(Id. at 58.) Counsel compared it to Fowers’ 35-plus pound weight gain since

stopping methamphetamine use and stated: “Methamphetamine causes you to lose

weight, but not necessarily in a good way.” (Id.) The prosecutor remarked on the

strength of the evidence against Lopez-Medina and argued “the final nail in the

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coffin for [Lopez-Medina]” was “his half-brother’s admission under oath in

court.” (Id. at 65.) The prosecutor read from the fact allocution at LopezAhumado’s change of plea hearing and stated: “His own half brother fingers

him.” (Id. at 66.) 

In his closing argument, defense counsel commented on the informant’s

absence at trial and spoke of Lopez-Ahumado’s fact allocution. “Why did he

implicate his brother? I didn’t get a chance to go there with you. You saw the

evidence, all of you. Use your common sense. Read what’s there. People make

deals in this business.” (Id. at 77.)

In rebuttal, the prosecutor stated Lopez-Ahumado’s participation “cements”

Lopez-Medina’s participation. (Id. at 85.) He explained: 

[A]s Agent Johnson brought to your attention, when he questioned

[Lopez-Ahumado], he cried. And, you know, he implicated his

brother. Again, draw from your own personal experience. Pointing a

finger at his brother implicating him in a crime, it’s not an easy thing

to do. It’s not surprising that he did cry. He pled guilty, he was

sentenced. He admitted that he aided and abetted his brother,

possessing the meth in his brother’s truck. That evidence is

undisputed in this case.

(Id. at 85-86.) He also stated Lopez-Medina “asked Mr. Fowers for [an]

aluminum driveline . . . for a truck . . . .” (Id. at 92.) 

8. Verdict and Post-Trial

The jury returned a verdict of guilty. Lopez-Medina moved for a new trial

under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court denied the

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-22-

motion and sentenced him to 235 months imprisonment.

II. DISCUSSION

Lopez-Medina contends his rights under the Confrontation Clause were

violated when the court admitted the confidential informant’s hearsay statements

and the factual basis for Lopez-Ahumado’s guilty plea. Absent this evidence, he

argues, there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. He also claims

his conviction should be reversed because: (1) the court ruled he could not

question Fowers about the nature of his recent drug conviction without

conducting the balancing test required by Rule 403, and (2) the prosecution

committed prosecutorial misconduct when it (a) failed to give notice Kiesz would

testify to a “sex-for-meth” exchange; and (b) referred in cross-examination and/or

closing argument to the “sex-for-meth” exchange, Lopez-Medina’s immigration

status, his post-arrest weight gain, and his possession of an aluminum drive line. 

He also claims cumulative error. 

A. Confrontation Clause

1. Hearsay Statements from Confidential Informant

Lopez-Medina contends his right to confrontation was violated when the

court admitted hearsay statements from a confidential informant on redirect. 

“Although a district court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of

discretion, whether admission of . . . evidence violates the Confrontation Clause

is reviewed de novo.” United States v. Townley, 472 F.3d 1267, 1271 (10th Cir.),

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-23-

cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3069 (2007). 

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides “[i]n all

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with

the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. In Crawford v. Washington,

the Supreme Court held “[w]here testimonial [hearsay] evidence is at issue . . .

the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and

a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). The Court

“le[ft] for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of

‘testimonial’” but explained “[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a

minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a

formal trial; and to police interrogations.” Id.

 A confidential informant’s statements to a law enforcement officer are

clearly testimonial. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, --U.S.--, 129 S. Ct. 2527,

2532 (2009); see also United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004)

(concluding “statements of a confidential informant are testimonial” because

“[t]ips provided by confidential informants are knowingly and purposely made to

authorities, accuse someone of a crime, and often are used against the accused at

trial”).

The government does not contend the confidential informant was

unavailable for trial and does not assert Lopez-Medina had a prior opportunity for

cross-examination. Instead, it argues the hearsay statements were properly

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7

 It does not appear the government offered the confidential informant’s statements

for the truth of the matter asserted. Instead, the statements appear to have been offered to

show why Officer Johnson targeted Lopez-Medina. The government does not argue the

statements were not hearsay, however, and thus we will treat them as hearsay.

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admitted because Lopez-Medina opened the door by questioning Officer Johnson

on cross-examination about the information he received from the informant.7

 The

government argues: “It is . . . clear that the defense made a tactical decision to

explore fully the information given by the confidential informant to Officer

Johnson, presumably to discredit the basis for police suspicion and investigation

of Lopez-Medina.” (Appellee’s Br. at 47.)

We agree with the government that Lopez-Medina opened the door to

further questioning of Officer Johnson regarding the information he received from

the confidential informant. Where, as here, defense counsel purposefully and

explicitly opens the door on a particular (and otherwise inadmissible) line of

questioning, such conduct operates as a limited waiver allowing the government

to introduce further evidence on that same topic. See Tanberg v. Sholtis, 401 F.3d

1151, 1166 (10th Cir. 2005) (“When a party opens the door to a topic, the

admission of rebuttal evidence on that topic becomes permissible.”). 

Prior to Crawford, we held there was “no doubt” a defendant could waive

his rights under the Confrontation Clause. See Hawkins v. Hannigan, 185 F.3d

1146, 1154 (10th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Aptt, 354 F.3d 1269, 1282

(10th Cir. 2004); Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1057 (10th Cir. 2002). The

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-25-

parties do not argue Crawford changed this rule. “[B]ecause there is a

presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights, for a waiver to be

effective it must be clearly established that there was an intentional

relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Hawkins, 185

F.3d at 1154 (quotations and citation omitted). That standard is satisfied here. 

The government requested a sidebar conference after defense counsel asked

Officer Johnson how he “[came] to know that that pickup truck was a suspected

truck[.]” (R. Supp. Vol. I, Doc. 185 at 84.) Defense counsel explained to the

court: “I think, Your Honor, [the government is] worried that I am going to bring

in the confidential informant information. That’s my full intention. I don’t care

what door we open. If I open up a door, please feel free to drive into it. But I am

going to explore the entire case.” (Id. at 85-86.) It is clear from this statement

that defense counsel intentionally relinquished his (or rather, his client’s)

confrontation right through his questioning of Johnson. This is not a case of

ignorance or inadvertence and we do not decide what rule would apply in that

context.

The determination that a particular right has been waived “does not end our

inquiry.” Aptt, 354 F.3d at 1281. The procedures and circumstances required for

effective waiver depend on the right at stake. Id. Similar to waiver by stipulating

to the admission of evidence, counsel in a criminal case may waive a client’s

Sixth Amendment right of confrontation by opening the door, “so long as the

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8

 If counsel’s decision to waive his client’s confrontation right was made over the

client’s dissent or was not a legitimate trial tactic, the client might have a viable claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. There is no such claim here and, in any case, such a

claim “should be brought in collateral proceedings, not on direct appeal.” United States

v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995).

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defendant does not dissent from his attorney’s decision and so long as it can be

said that the attorney’s decision was a legitimate trial tactic or part of a prudent

trial strategy.” Id. at 1282 (quotations omitted); see also United States v. Dazey,

403 F.3d 1147, 1169 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Defense counsel’s stipulation to

admission of evidence effectively waives the defendant’s confrontation rights

unless the defendant can show that the waiver constituted ineffective assistance of

counsel.”). Here there is no indication Lopez-Medina dissented from his

attorney’s decision to open the door. Similarly, there is no indication the decision

was not a legitimate trial tactic.8

We find a Fifth Circuit case to be instructive. In United States v. Acosta,

police officers discovered a large quantity of cocaine in a vehicle in which two

individuals, Acosta and Marrufo, were traveling. 475 F.3d 677, 679 (5th Cir.

2007). Marrufo pled guilty. He provided a statement articulating the factual

basis for his plea and a statement to qualify for a “safety valve” sentence

reduction, both implicating Acosta in the crime. The court ordered him to testify

at Acosta’s trial but he refused to answer several questions concerning Acosta’s

participation even when asked about his prior statements. On cross-examination,

Marrufo answered every question posed to him. Over the government’s objection,

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he testified he believed he would receive a more lenient sentence if he implicated

Acosta. The trial court found defense counsel’s questioning was designed to

impeach Marrufo by illustrating a motive to lie. The court allowed the

government to admit Marrufo’s safety valve statement to show his trial testimony

was not a recent fabrication and gave a limiting instruction to that effect. It also

allowed the government to recall the police officer who conducted Marrufo’s

safety valve debriefing to testify to the statements he made. 

The Fifth Circuit held the court did not err in admitting Marrufo’s written

safety valve statement “because it was not admitted to establish the truth of the

matter asserted and because Acosta opened the door to its admission.” Id. at 683. 

The court explained:

Acosta invited the error. If a defendant injects otherwise

inadmissible evidence, the defense cannot later object to such invited

error. In his cross-examination of Marrufo, Acosta made a tactical

decision to discredit Marrufo’s safety valve statement by presenting

it as a concession made to please the government and asserting that

Marrufo was being evasive at trial because he feared a perjury

conviction. This opened the door for the statement’s admission . . . .

Id. at 683-84 (quotations omitted). The court also rejected Acosta’s argument

“that the court violated the Confrontation Clause when it permitted [the officer] to

testify about Marrufo’s prior statements.” Id. at 684. The court held “even if this

testimony were otherwise inadmissible, Acosta opened the door to its

introduction.” Id. 

We agree with the Fifth Circuit’s analysis, at least where there is an

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-28-

explicit waiver. The Confrontation Clause is a shield, not a sword. Here, the

court advised defense counsel he could ask Officer Johnson whether he received

information from the informant but could not ask what information he received. 

Defense counsel proceeded to ask Johnson if the informant told him about the

drugs in the pickup truck and gave him Lopez-Medina’s address in Layton. This

opened the door to further questioning about the confidential informant’s

statements to Officer Johnson on redirect. It was defense counsel, not the

government, who first questioned Johnson regarding the specific information he

obtained from the informant. Lopez-Medina cannot now complain Johnson

should not have been allowed to answer the government’s related questions on

redirect.

Lopez-Medina relies on Cromer. On cross-examination, Cromer and his

counsel “introduced the existence of an informant and a description provided by

that informant in an attempt to discredit the government’s case.” 389 F.3d at 679.

Even after Cromer was warned that this line of questioning would

open the door to allow the government to question [the officer] about

the exact content of the informant’s statements, Cromer continued in

his attempt to establish that the informant’s statement did not

describe him. On redirect examination, the government . . . clarified

the precise nature of the description provided by the [informant].

Id. The court held the officer’s testimony on redirect violated Cromer’s right to

confrontation explaining: “As a matter of modern evidence law, the district court

may well have been correct in admitting [the officer’s] redirect testimony about

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9

 The government argues Cromer is inapposite based on a footnote in Cromer

where the court stated it “need not devote much attention to the question of whether the

Confrontation Clause was violated by any of the evidence admitted during [Cromer’s]

cross-examination since a party may not complain on appeal of errors that he himself

invited or provoked.” Cromer, 389 F.3d at 678 n.11 (quotations omitted). This footnote,

however, only suggests Lopez-Medina cannot complain of Officer Johnson’s testimony

on cross-examination because he himself elicited it. Like Cromer, Lopez-Medina

challenges the statements made by Officer Johnson on redirect by the government. Thus,

this footnote does not help the government. 

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the description provided by the informant since Cromer, on cross-examination,

had opened the door to the subject by asking about that description.” Id. at 678. 

The pertinent question, however, is not whether the [informant’s]

statements were properly admitted pursuant to “the law of Evidence

for the time being.” Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. Rather, the

relevant inquiry is whether Cromer’s right to confront the witnesses

against him was violated by [the officer’s] redirect testimony. If

there is one theme that emerges from Crawford, it is that the

Confrontation Clause confers a powerful and fundamental right that

is no longer subsumed by the evidentiary rules governing the

admission of hearsay statements. Thus, the mere fact that Cromer

may have opened the door to the testimonial, out-of-court statement

that violated his confrontation right is not sufficient to erase that

violation . . . . A foolish strategic decision . . . will not cause the

defendant to forfeit his rights under the Confrontation Clause.

Id. at 679.

 We disagree with Cromer and, as previously stated, believe a defendant

can open the door to the admission of evidence otherwise barred by the

Confrontation Clause.9

 Other jurisdictions have held, subsequent to Crawford,

there is no Confrontation Clause violation when the defendant opens the door to

the admission of hearsay testimony. See, e.g., Tinker v. State, 932 So.2d 168,

187-88 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005); State v. Birth, 158 P.3d 345, 355 (Kan. Ct. App.

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10 We further conclude Lopez-Medina’s argument is precluded under the invited

error doctrine, which “prevents a party from inducing action by a court and later seeking

reversal on the ground that the requested action was in error.” United States v. Edward J.,

224 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir.2000) (quotations omitted). By purposefully questioning

Johnson on what he learned from the informant, Lopez-Medina cannot now complain the

admission of that evidence was error. 

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2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1302 (2008); People v. Ko, 789 N.Y.S.2d 43, 45

(N.Y. App. Div. 2005); State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 492-93 (Tenn. 2004). 

As one federal district court has noted: “If the Cromer rule were correct, a

defendant would be free to mislead a jury by introducing only parts of an out-ofcourt statement, confident that the remainder of the statement could not be

introduced because the Confrontation Clause would provide a shield.” Ko v.

Burge, No. 06 Civ. 6826, 2008 WL 552629, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2008)

(Koeltl, J.).10 

2. Lopez-Ahumado’s Factual Allocution

Lopez-Medina also contends his right to confrontation was violated when

the court admitted Lopez-Ahumado’s factual allocution. As previously discussed,

“[w]here testimonial [hearsay] evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth Amendment

demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity

for cross-examination.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. Lopez-Ahumado’s statements

at his change of plea hearing fall within the “core class of testimonial

statements.” See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009)

(quotations omitted); see also United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 78 (2d Cir.

Appellate Case: 08-4055 Document: 01018370098 Date Filed: 02/19/2010 Page: 30 
11 The government does not argue the statements were not admitted for the truth of

the matter asserted.

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2004) (holding “there is no question” that a plea allocution is testimonial under

Crawford).

Because Lopez-Ahumado’s statements at his change of plea hearing were

testimonial, they could not be admitted in Lopez-Medina’s trial for the truth of

the matter asserted unless Lopez-Ahumado was unavailable and Lopez-Medina

had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.11 We need not consider whether

Lopez-Ahumado was unavailable because it is clear the second requirement was

not met—Lopez-Medina did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine LopezAhumado. 

The government contends Lopez-Medina waived his right to challenge the

admission of the plea allocution by questioning Officer Johnson about LopezAhumado’s conviction and sentence. The government also argues LopezAhumado’s statements were properly admitted pursuant to the rule of

completeness “in order to correct a likely misimpression that [Lopez-Ahumado]

had already claimed full responsibility for the crime.” (Appellee’s Br. at 39.) 

Lopez-Medina argues, for the first time on appeal, that he did not waive his rights

under the Confrontation Clause because his questioning of Johnson did not exceed

the scope of the district court’s ruling at the motion in limine. In the alternative,

he argues if the evidence was properly admitted pursuant to the rule of

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12 The rule of completeness does not depend upon an explicit waiver. Rather, its

purpose is to prevent a party from intentionally misleading the jury by introducing a

written or recorded statement in an inaccurate or unfair manner. See Christopher B.

Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 1:42 (3d ed. 2007).

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completeness, the court erred in refusing to allow him to introduce the portion of

Lopez-Ahumado’s plea agreement in which the government offered the possibility

of a reduced sentence in exchange for Lopez-Ahumado’s substantial assistance. 

Because we conclude the evidence was properly admitted under the rule of

completeness, we need not decide the waiver issue.12 

The rule of completeness is a common law doctrine partially codified in

Rule 106 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Echo Acceptance Corp. v.

Household Retail Servs., Inc., 267 F.3d 1068, 1089 (10th Cir. 2001). Rule 106

provides: “When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a

party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part

or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be

considered contemporaneously with it.” While Rule 106 applies only to writings

and recorded statements, we have held “the rule of completeness embodied in

Rule 106 is ‘“substantially applicable to oral testimony,” as well by virtue of Fed.

R. Evid. 611(a), which obligates the court to “make the interrogation and

presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth.”’” United States v.

Zamudio, 141 F.3d 1186, No. 96-2181, 1998 WL 166600, at *5 (10th Cir. Apr. 6,

1998) (unpublished) (quoting United States v. Mussaleen, 35 F.3d 692, 696 (2d

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13 Unpublished decisions are not binding precedent. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). We

mention Zamudio as we would any other non-precedential source.

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Cir. 1994)).13

The government contends the court correctly admitted the fact allocution

pursuant to the rule of completeness because it clarified that Lopez-Ahumado had

admitted to jointly possessing the drugs found in the truck and did not take sole

responsibility for the crime. Lopez-Medina does not contend the rule of

completeness is not applicable or cannot overcome the right to confrontation. 

Instead, he argues the court violated the rule of completeness by failing to allow

him to introduce the portion of Lopez-Ahumado’s plea agreement which reflected

the government’s offer of a reduced sentence in return for Lopez-Ahumado’s

substantial assistance. He claims this information was necessary to explain to the

jury Lopez-Ahumado’s motive for pleading guilty. 

“The purpose of Rule 106 is to prevent a party from misleading the jury by

allowing into the record relevant portions of a writing or recorded statement

which clarify or explain the part already received.” United States v. Moussaoui,

382 F.3d 453, 481 (4th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted); see also Echo Acceptance

Corp., 267 F.3d at 1089 (“The rule of completeness . . . functions as a defensive

shield against potentially misleading evidence proffered by an opposing party.”). 

“The rule of completeness, however, does not necessarily require admission of

[an entire statement, writing or recording.] Rather, only those portions which are

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-34-

‘relevant to an issue in the case’ and necessary ‘to clarify or explain the portion

already received’ need to be admitted.” Zamudio, 1998 WL 166600, at *6

(quoting United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1259 (7th Cir. 1993)). “In

determining whether a disputed portion of a statement must be admitted [under

the rule of completeness], the trial court should consider whether ‘(1) it explains

the admitted evidence, (2) places the admitted evidence in context, (3) avoids

misleading the jury, and (4) insures fair and impartial understanding of the

evidence.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Li, 55 F.3d 325, 330 (7th Cir. 1995)).

The fact allocution satisfies this four-part test. It is clear from the record

that, as the government predicted, Lopez-Medina tried to pin the crime entirely on

Lopez-Ahumado. The government objected to any reference to Lopez-Ahumado’s

conviction as irrelevant and inadmissible hearsay. Defense counsel stated he

wanted the jury to know Lopez-Ahumado was convicted because he wanted the

jury to hear the full story. The fact allocution explains the basis for LopezAhumado’s guilty plea and places that evidence in context. It avoids misleading

the jury into believing Lopez-Ahumado accepted sole responsibility for

possessing the drugs found in the truck and ensures that the jury understood

Lopez-Ahumado’s guilty plea did not relieve Lopez-Medina of potential liability.

Even if the fact allocution would be subject to a hearsay objection, that

does not block its use when it is needed to provide context for a statement already

admitted. See Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence §

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14 The Crawford Court held the Confrontation Clause is “most naturally read as a

reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions

established at the time of the founding.” 541 U.S. at 54. Thus, at least arguably, if the

rule of completeness is not a founding-era exception to the confrontation right, the fact

the court may have properly admitted Lopez-Ahumado’s fact allocution pursuant to this

rule does not overcome the potential Confrontation Clause violation. See Giles v.

California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2682 (2008). The Supreme Court has “acknowledged that

two forms of testimonial statements were admitted at common law even though they were

unconfronted.” Id. at 2682. These were “declarations made by a speaker who was both

on the brink of death and aware that he was dying” and “statements of a witness who was

detained or kept away by the means or procurement of the defendant.” Id. at 2682-83

(quotations omitted). The Court has not identified a common law exception to the

confrontation right for unconfronted testimonial statements admitted pursuant to the rule

of completeness. Lopez-Medina does not contend the factual allocution should have been

excluded for this reason and indeed relies on the rule of completeness to argue he should

have been permitted to introduce another portion of Lopez-Ahumado’s plea agreement. 

Thus, we deem this argument waived. See Krastev v. INS, 292 F.3d 1268, 1280 (10th Cir.

-35-

1:43 (3d ed. 2007); see also, e.g., United States v. Bucci, 525 F.3d 116, 133 (1st

Cir. 2008) (the rule of completeness “may be invoked to facilitate the introduction

of otherwise inadmissible evidence”); United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346,

1368 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting every major rule of exclusion, with the exception

of Rule 106, includes the proviso “except as otherwise provided by these rules”

and stating “Rule 106 can adequately fulfill its function only by permitting the

admission of some otherwise inadmissible evidence when the court finds in

fairness that the proffered evidence should be considered contemporaneously”);

but see United States v. Guevera, 277 F.3d 111, 127 (2d Cir. 2001) (Rule 106

does not make admissible what is otherwise inadmissible), rev’d on other grounds

on rehearing, 298 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2002). Thus, the court did not err in

admitting the fact allocution pursuant to the rule of completeness.14 

Appellate Case: 08-4055 Document: 01018370098 Date Filed: 02/19/2010 Page: 35 
2002) (“Issues not raised on appeal are deemed to be waived.”).

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Lopez-Medina argues if the fact allocution was properly admitted under the

rule of completeness, that same rule should have allowed him to introduce the

government’s promise it would seek a downward variance if Lopez-Ahumado

provided substantial assistance in the prosecution of others. The rule of

completeness connects with Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence. See Mueller &

Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 1:42. Rule 403 authorizes the court to exclude

relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger

of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . .” The

district court acted within its discretion in excluding the government’s promise

under Rule 403 because it does not satisfy the four-part test outlined above. 

The fact the government promised to seek a lower sentence in exchange for

Lopez-Ahumado’s substantial assistance does not explain either the fact of LopezAhumado’s plea or the factual basis for his plea. In the statement he submitted to

the court in advance of his guilty plea, Lopez-Ahumado admitted to possessing

with intent to distribute the methamphetamine found in the pickup truck and the

methamphetamine found in the Clearfield apartment. Presumably he pled guilty

to one count to avoid proceeding to trial and facing a possible (even likely)

conviction on two counts. The fact Lopez-Ahumado did not assist the

government suggests the government’s promise to seek a downward variance in

exchange for such assistance was not the reason he pled guilty. And there is no

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-37-

reason to believe the government’s promise altered the facts to which LopezAhumado admitted. Admitting the government’s promise would not have ensured

a fair and impartial understanding of the evidence which is the purpose of the rule

of completeness. Actually, it would have had quite the opposite

effect—misleading the jury by suggesting the government’s offer motivated

Lopez-Ahumado’s guilty plea, when, in fact, it did not. See United States v.

Wright, 826 F.2d 938, 946 (10th Cir. 1987) (rejecting defendant’s claim he should

have been allowed to introduce parts of diary that “were not demonstrably

relevant to the issues” since Rule 106 does not require admission of parts of

written statement that are “neither explanatory of the previously introduced

portions nor relevant [to those portions]”; “[i]t would be puerile to suggest that if

any part of a statement is to be admitted the entire statement must be admitted”).

B. Rule 403/Rule 609

Defense counsel asked Fowers during cross-examination about the arrest

leading to his methamphetamine conviction. During a break in crossexamination, the government argued it appeared defense counsel was improperly

questioning Fowers about the facts and circumstances underlying his conviction. 

Defense counsel claimed he should be allowed to question Fowers about the

sentence he would have faced if he had not agreed to cooperate with the

government. The court ruled counsel could not question Fowers concerning the

facts and circumstances of the conviction but could ask him whether he expected

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15 It is unclear whether Lopez-Medina properly objected to the court’s ruling as his

only objection was that the court prohibited him from questioning Fowers concerning any

benefits he received for his cooperation. If his objection was improper, our review would

be for plain error. See United States v. Teague, 443 F.3d 1310, 1314 (10th Cir. 2006);

Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). We need not resolve the issue because we find no error even

under the more lenient abuse of discretion standard.

-38-

to receive a reduced sentence based on his cooperation. Lopez-Medina contends

the court erred in precluding him from questioning Fowers concerning the nature

of his conviction without conducting the balancing test required by Rule 403 of

the Federal Rules of Evidence. “We review the district court’s decision to admit

or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion.”15 United States v. Howell, 285

F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 2002). “A court abuses its discretion when its

decision is based on an error of law.” Id.

Rule 609(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: 

For the purpose of attacking the character for truthfulness of a

witness, [ ] evidence that a witness other than an accused has been

convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the

crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year

under the law under which the witness was convicted . . . .

Rule 403 provides: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of

the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of

time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” 

“[O]rdinarily, evidence of a witness’s felony conviction shall include

information about the nature of that conviction unless, after Rule 403 balancing,

the probative value of such evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.” See

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16 The nature of a conviction is distinct from the specific facts and circumstances

underlying that conviction. See Howell, 285 F.3d at 1268-69 (collecting cases).

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Howell, 285 F.3d at 1268-69. A district court must conduct “a Rule 403

balancing before determining to exclude all evidence of [a witness’s] prior

convictions other than the fact and date of such convictions.” Id. at 1269. Here,

the jury was informed of the nature16 of Fowers’ conviction, i.e., that it was for

possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, which is all that Howell

requires. Id. at 1268-69. To the extent Lopez-Medina claims the court should

have allowed him to elicit the specific facts underlying Fowers’ conviction, we

disagree. “Ordinarily, it is improper for the prosecution to examine into the

details of the crime for which the accused was convicted. The cross-examination

should be confined to a showing of the essential facts of convictions, the nature of

the crimes, and the punishment.” United States v. Wolf, 561 F.2d 1376, 1381

(10th Cir. 1977). Though the questioning here involved a witness, not the

accused, we see no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to prohibit LopezMedina from eliciting the specific facts and circumstances underlying Fowers’

conviction. Cf. Howell, 285 F.3d at 1267 (seeing “no reason why we should

interpret Rule 609(a)(1) to permit introduction of evidence of the nature of an

accused’s prior felony conviction, but not evidence of the nature of a witness’s

prior felony conviction”). 

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C. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Lopez-Medina contends the prosecution committed prosecutorial

misconduct when it failed to state in its Rule 404(b) notice that Kiesz would

testify concerning a “sex-for-meth” exchange. Lopez-Medina also complains

about the prosecutors’ reference in cross-examination and/or closing argument to

Kiesz’s “sex-for-meth” testimony, his immigration status, the cause of his postarrest weight gain, and his possession of an aluminum drive line. Because LopezMedina did not contemporaneously object to any of these alleged errors, our

review is for plain error. See United States v. Sands, 968 F.2d 1058, 1063 (10th

Cir. 1992). “Plain error occurs when there is (i) error, (ii) that is plain, which

(iii) affects the defendant’s substantial rights, and which (iv) seriously affects the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v.

Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 850

(2007). “When evaluating allegedly inappropriate remarks of counsel for plain

error, we must view the remarks in the context of the entire trial.” United States

v. Oberle, 136 F.3d 1414, 1421 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted). 

1. Kiesz’s Testimony

Lopez-Medina contends the government committed prosecutorial

misconduct in failing to disclose in its Rule 404(b) notice that Kiesz would testify

to a “sex-for-meth” exchange and in referring to Kiesz’s “sex-for-meth”

testimony in its closing argument. The government asserts it was not aware Kiesz

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would testify concerning the “sex-for-meth” exchange and therefore did not err in

failing to disclose it in its Rule 404(b) notice. Because the testimony was

relevant to Lopez-Medina’s identity and his knowledge of the drugs, the

prosecution did not err in making “very limited use of the information after it was

conveyed.” (Appellee’s Br. at 62.)

Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove

the character of a person in order to show action in conformity

therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such

as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,

identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon

request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall

provide reasonable notice in advance of trial . . . of the general

nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.

Here, the government revealed prior to trial it intended to question Kiesz

regarding, inter alia, her drug dealings with Lopez-Medina in Summer 2005. At

trial, it asked Kiesz how she paid for the methamphetamine she received from

Lopez-Medina and she answered, “Money; sometimes sex.” (R. Supp. Vol. I,

Doc. 187 at 155.) The government points out there is nothing in the record to

indicate it was aware Kiesz would provide this answer. Lopez-Medina does not

contend otherwise. 

In United States v. Kravchuk, we held the trial court did not err in denying

the defendant’s motion for a mistrial on the ground the government failed to

provide notice one of its witnesses would testify the defendant had threatened to

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kill the witness because “the government did not know about the witness’s

testimony so as to warn the defendant, and therefore Rule 404(b)’s notice

provision cannot apply.” 335 F.3d 1147, 1155 (10th Cir. 2003). This holding is

equally applicable here. The government disclosed the general nature of Kiesz’s

bad act evidence and cannot be held responsible for failing to disclose certain

information about which it had no advance knowledge. Like in Kravchuk, Kiesz’s

testimony was “spontaneous” and did not trigger the notice requirement of Rule

404(b). See id. 

Nor do we find error in the government’s brief reference to Kiesz’s “sexfor-meth” testimony in its closing argument. The prosecution referred to the

testimony to support its argument that this was not simply a case of mistaken

identity. Kiesz’s testimony that Lopez-Medina was her sole supplier of

methamphetamine for a period of six months and that she exchanged sex for

methamphetamine is clearly relevant to show Lopez-Medina was not a victim of

mistaken identity. Kiesz would be expected to know the identity of someone

from whom she received drugs for a period of six months—more so if she was

having sex with him. “The prosecutor is entitled to argue to the jury that it

should draw reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the government’s

theory of the case.” Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1170. 

2. Reference to Lopez-Medina’s Immigration Status

On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Lopez-Medina about his

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immigration status: 

Q. How many years have you been here in the United States?

A. Like 13 or 14 years.

Q. You are illegally here, aren’t you?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Have you been breaking the law for 13 or 14 years?

A. Well, I believe so.

(R. Supp. Vol. I, Doc. 181 at 31.) In closing, the prosecutor argued: “Now

defense counsel tried to show him as a nice person, as a person that was law

abiding and never committed crime. He’s here illegally. Been so for 13 years. 

He’s living the lie.” (R. Supp. Vol. I, Doc. 181 at 56.) Lopez-Medina contends

this constitutes prosecutorial misconduct. The government argues “Lopez-Medina

opened the door for inquiry about his illegal status by testifying about his clean

record.” (Appellee’s Br. at 62.) We agree with the government. 

Lopez-Medina’s immigration status is not relevant to whether he committed

the crime of possession with intent to distribute but it does counter his suggestion

he was a law-abiding citizen wrongly accused of his half-brother’s criminal acts. 

Lopez-Medina does not contend the government’s statement misrepresented either

the facts or the law. And the jury was admonished: “You are here to decide

whether the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

is guilty of the crime charged. The defendant is not on trial for any act, conduct,

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or offense not alleged in the indictment.” (R. Supp. Vol. I, Doc. 138 at 36.) We

see no error. 

3. Reference to Lopez-Medina’s Weight Gain

Fowers testified to gaining a significant amount of weight since he stopped

using methamphetamine. During cross-examination, the government elicited

testimony from Lopez-Medina that he had gained 23 pounds since his arrest. In

closing argument, the prosecution referred to Lopez-Medina’s post-arrest weight

gain, arguing it was “because he’s not using methamphetamine anymore.” (R.

Supp. Vol. I, Doc. 181 at 58.) Counsel then compared it to Fowers’ weight gain

and argued: “Methamphetamine causes you to lose weight, but not necessarily in

a good way.” (Id.) Lopez-Medina contends this was error because it informed

the jury he was incarcerated and presented the prosecutors “as behavioral and

methamphetamine experts.” (Appellant’s Br. at 57.) The government contends

this was a permissible argument based on the evidence and “tend[ed] to make it

more likely than not that Lopez-Medina had used drugs as Kiesz testified.” 

(Appellee’s Br. at 63.) While we agree the prosecution’s statement corroborated

Kiesz’s testimony concerning Lopez-Medina’s drug use, we do not agree this was

a permissible argument based on the evidence.

 “[T]he cardinal rule of closing argument [is] that counsel must confine

comments to evidence in the record and to reasonable inferences from that

evidence.” Whittenburg v. Werner Enters. Inc., 561 F.3d 1122, 1128-29 (10th

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Cir. 2009). Here, there was no testimony regarding the connection between the

cessation of methamphetamine use and weight gain. Thus, the prosecutor’s

statements connecting the two were impermissible personal opinion. See United

States v. Jones, 468 F.3d 704, 708 (10th Cir. 2006) (“A prosecutor may not

express his personal opinion . . . .”). However, they do not constitute plain error

because they neither affected Lopez-Medina’s substantial rights nor seriously

affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. See RuizTerrazas, 477 F.3d at 1199. “We have often held that a stray improper remark in

closing is no basis for upsetting a trial and requiring the parties and district court

to redo their ordeal.” Whittenburg, 561 F.3d at 1131. This is especially true

where, as here, the jury is advised that arguments of counsel are not evidence. 

See id.

4. Reference to Lopez-Medina’s Request for an Aluminum Drive Line

In closing, the prosecutor stated: “Once again, don’t forget, the defendant

asked Mr. Fowers for [an] aluminum driveline—remember that—for a truck.” (R.

Supp. Vol. I, Doc. 181 at 92.) Lopez-Medina contends this statement constitutes

prosecutorial misconduct because Fowers referred to a drive line, not an

aluminum drive line. He does not indicate the significance of the word

“aluminum” and thus, we can perceive no possible prejudice. In any case, a

minor misstatement of fact in closing argument does not constitute prosecutorial

misconduct where the evidence of guilt is otherwise strong. See Wilson v.

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Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1117 (10th Cir. 2008). 

D. Cumulative Error

“A cumulative-error analysis merely aggregates all the errors that

individually have been found to be harmless, and therefore not reversible, and it

analyzes whether their cumulative effect on the outcome of the trial is such that

collectively they can no longer be determined to be harmless.” Hooper v. Mullin,

314 F.3d 1162, 1178 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted). Where, as here, a

defendant “has failed to establish the existence of multiple non-reversible errors

(i.e., harmless errors and plain errors failing to necessitate reversal)[,] . . . he

cannot benefit from the cumulative error doctrine.” United States v. Barrett, 496

F.3d 1079, 1121 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 1646 (2008).

AFFIRMED.

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