Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08103/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08103-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anthony M. Frank
Appellee
Ricky R. Richardson
Appellant

Document Text:

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

Unit.ed States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

OCT 2 31991 

RICKY R. RICHARDSON, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

ANTHONY M. FRANK, in his official ) 

capacity as Postmaster General, United ) 

States Postal Service, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-8103 

(D.C. No. C90-0143-B) 

(D. Wyo.) 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, EBEL, Circuit Judge, and SAFFELS,** 

District Judge. 

**Honorable Dale E. Saffels, Senior District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

* 

The case is therefore ordered 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-8103 Document: 010110092128 Date Filed: 10/23/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiff Ricky Richardson appeals the district court's grant 

of summary judgment to the Defendant United States Postal Service 

on Plaintiff's sex discrimination suit pursuant to Title VII, 42 

u.s.c. § 2000e-16. Defendant argued in his summary judgment 

motion that Plaintiff's failure to bring his complaint to the 

attention of the United States Postal Service Equal Employment 

Opportunity office (EEO office), in compliance with 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1613.214(a)(l)(i), serves to bar his sex discrimination suit. 1 

Plaintiff and his wife were both hired by the Rock Springs, 

Wyoming, post office on July 21, 1986, on a three-month 

probationary basis. Plaintiff alleges that prior to beginning his 

employment in Rock Springs, he was told he could be terminated 

without cause during the probationary period and, in the event of 

termination, he would have no right of appeal. A publication 

given to Plaintiff also stated that termination during the 

probationary period could be at will with no recourse. Appendix 

to Brief of Appellant at 63. Plaintiff further alleges that there 

1 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(l)(i) states in pertinent part: 

(a) Time limits. (1) An agency shall require that a 

complaint be submitted in writing by the complainant or 

representative and be signed by the complainant .... The agency may accept the complaint for processing in 

accordance with this subpart only if: 

(i) The complainant brought to the attention of the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor the matter 

causing him/her to believe he/she had been discriminated 

against within 30 calendar days of the date of the 

alleged discriminatory event, the effective date of an 

alleged discriminatory personnel action, or the date 

that the aggrieved person knew or reasonably should have 

known of the discriminatory event or personnel 

action; ... 

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Appellate Case: 90-8103 Document: 010110092128 Date Filed: 10/23/1991 Page: 2 
were no notices of EEOC rights or procedures posted in the Rock 

Springs post office. 

Following an unfavorable performance evaluation, Plaintiff's 

employment was terminated on October 15, 1986. He claims he was 

terminated because his female supervisor did not like husband and 

wife teams working together, did not like male employees, and 

because Plaintiff rebuffed her sexual advances. 

Plaintiff contends that he continued in the belief that he 

had no right of appeal until sometime in November 1986, when he 

"heard" that he "may" have some appeal rights. He alleges that he 

contacted several attorneys regarding his termination, but was not 

informed that there were any time limits on the appeal procedure. 

Plaintiff maintains that the first time he was informed of the 

thirty-day time limit was on January 23, 1987, when he .drove to 

Denver and contacted the EEO office by telephone. During the 

course of this telephone conversation, he alleges he was informed 

that he was late in reporting his complaint, but that under 

certain circumstances late notices were accepted. He was further 

informed that he should seek the advice of an attorney. Plaintiff 

also asserts that the party he spoke with led him to believe that, 

because he was already late, there was no time limit on his late 

filing. 

Plaintiff alleges that he continued to seek counsel. Once he 

had retained an attorney, his attorney made several contacts with 

the EEO office, finally reaching the counselor ultimately assigned 

to the case. After being instructed to do so by his attorney, 

Plaintiff contacted the EEO counselor on April 7, 1987. 

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Appellate Case: 90-8103 Document: 010110092128 Date Filed: 10/23/1991 Page: 3 
In approximately 

a 

January 1988, the EEO counselor contacted 

Plaintiff regarding settlement offer which he declined to 

accept. Plaintiff asserts that the counselor stated that the 

offer was being made because there were "irregularities" in his 

case. Plaintiff then claims he had no contact from the EEO office 

until February 1989, over one year later, when he received notice 

of his right to file a formal complaint. Plaintiff filed his 

complaint on March 2, 1989. The EEO office finally denied his 

complaint on December 26, 1989, based on the untimeliness of 

Plaintiff's initial agency contact. Plaintiff's appeal of this 

decision to the EEOC was ultimately denied on May 10, 1990. 

We review the district court's decision to grant summary 

judgment de novo. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 

862 F.2d 796, 798 (10th Cir. 1988). All facts and reasonable 

inferences must be construed in a light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Anderson v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 

907 F.2d 936, 946-47 (10th Cir. 1990)(citing Gray v. Phillips 

Petroleum Co., 858 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1988)). Summary 

judgment is appropriate when the record indicates "that there is 

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed R. Civ. P. 

56(c). We conclude that the district court erred in finding that, 

as a matter of law, Plaintiff failed to allege facts that, if 

proved, could support an equitable tolling of the applicable time 

limitations. Consequently, we reverse the district court's grant 

of summary judgment and remand for trial. 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-8103 Document: 010110092128 Date Filed: 10/23/1991 Page: 4 
In Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 

(1982), the Supreme Court held "that filing a timely charge of 

discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite 

to suit in federal court." See also Carlile v. South Routt Sch. 

Dist., 652 F.2d 981, 985 (10th Cir. 198l)("[F]iling of a notice of 

intent to sue within defined time limitations is not 

jurisdictional in the traditional sense."). It is more likened to 

a statute of limitations subject to waiver, estoppel, and 

equitable tolling. Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393. It is undisputed that 

Plaintiff failed to comply with the thirty-day time limit set 

forth in the EEOC regulations. Consequently, the question before 

this court is whether disputed issues of fact exist which would 

affect a determination of whether Plaintiff's circumstances 

warrant application of the doctrines of equitable estoppel and 

tolling. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was misinformed by his employer 

regarding his appeal rights in the event he was terminated during 

his probationary period, and that he had no way of knowing the 

procedures required for initiating an investigation of his 

complaint. The district court found Plaintiff's delay from the 

time of his termination in October 1986, until his initial EEO 

office contact in January 1987, to be justified and we agree. 

District Court's Order of September 7, 1990, at 5. See Brezovski 

v. United States Postal Serv., 905 F.2d 334, 337 (10th Cir. 

1990)(misleading language in a right to sue letter sufficient to 

trigger equitable tolling); Donovan v. Hahner, Foreman & Harness, 

Inc., 736 F.2d 1421, 1427 (10th Cir. 1984)("[W]hen an employer 

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Appellate Case: 90-8103 Document: 010110092128 Date Filed: 10/23/1991 Page: 5 
misleads an employee regarding a cause of action, equitable 

estoppel may be invoked."); Wilkerson v. Siegfried Ins. Agency, 

Inc., 683 F.2d 344, 348 (10th Cir. 1982)(equitable tolling may be 

appropriate if an employer actively misleads a plaintiff). 

The question thus narrows to whether Plaintiff was misled by 

his January 1987 conversation with the EEO counselor into 

believing that time was not critical, and to whether Plaintiff's 

actions following the January 1987 telephone conversation up until 

he finally contacted the EEO counselor on April 7, 1987, 

constitute due diligence. 

1112 (10th Cir. 1984). 

See Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 

The court bases its grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff's 

failure to "file" immediately after learning of the thirty-day 

limit. We agree with Plaintiff that, read literally, the 

applicable regulation does not require a complainant to "file" a 

written complaint with the EEO office within the thirty days, but 

only to bring the matter "to the attention" of an EEO counselor 

within the time limitation. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214 (a)(l)(i). 

Whether or not Plaintiff's telephone conversation of January 23, 

1987, was notification of the kind intended to satisfy this 

requirement must be determined by the district court. 

A review of the record indicates that "[t]his case does not 

involve an unreasonable or unnecessary delay. Nor does it 

constitute an attempt to revive a long stale claim or otherwise 

circumvent the statutory period at issue." Martinez, 738 F.2d at 

1112. The pertinent EEOC regulation states: 

[t]he agency shall extend the time limits in this 

section when the complainant shows that he/she was not 

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Appellate Case: 90-8103 Document: 010110092128 Date Filed: 10/23/1991 Page: 6 
notified of the time limits and was not otherwise aware 

of them, was prevented by circumstances beyond the 

complainant's control from submitting the matter within 

the time limits; or for other reasons considered 

sufficient by the agency. 

29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(4). "Title VII is remedial legislation to 

be construed liberally rather than technically." Peterson v. City 

of Wichita, 888 F.2d 1307, 1309 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 

110 S. Ct. 2173 (1990). 

EEO complaints are often, as in this case, presented 

initially by persons without the benefit of counsel or the 

information to be technically knowledgable. The correct inquiry 

then becomes whether the purpose of the time limit has been met 

and whether the agency was put on adequate notice. The procedural 

requirements of Title VII should not be allowed to become so 

formidable and inflexible as to preclude the aggrieved employee 

from receiving relief from employment discrimination. See Dartt 

v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 1976)(ADEA time 

limitations should not be strictly construed against aggrieved 

employees attempting to enforce their statutory rights), aff'd, 

434 U.S. 99 (1977). 

The EEO office held Plaintiff's complaint in various stages 

of processing for almost three years before Plaintiff received 

final agency resolution. The exhaustion doctrine's purpose of 

giving the agency notice and allowing them ample opportunity to 

handle the matter outside the courts has been served in this case. 

Although it has been held that an agency investigation alone does 

not constitute an agency waiver of the timeliness issue, Oaxaca v. 

Roscoe, 641 F.2d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 1981), it appears that the EEO 

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Appellate Case: 90-8103 Document: 010110092128 Date Filed: 10/23/1991 Page: 7 
office was not diligent in investigating and processing 

Plaintiff's complaint in compliance with its own regulations. See 

29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.213(a) and 1613.220(a). However, because of our 

decision in this case, we do not reach Plaintiff's claim that this 

agency delay constitutes a constructive waiver of the timeliness 

requirement. 

Plaintiff's knowledge of the time limits, whether or not his 

telephone call of January 1987 satisfied the requirement that the 

matter be brought "to the attention" of an EEO counselor, or 

whether he was misled by the agency as to the time limits are fact 

issues which are not proper for summary judgment disposition. See 

Bragg v. Reed, 592 F.2d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 1979)(allegations 

that complainant did not know of requisite time limits for 

notifying agency of discrimination raises issues of fact requiring 

evidentiary hearing); Thornhill v. Marsh, 866 F.2d 1182, 1184-85 

(9th Cir. 1989)(whether complainant had notice of time limits is 

factual question which precludes summary judgment). 

We make no determination on the merits of Plaintiff's 

discrimination claim or on whether Plaintiff will be able to prove 

at trial that he was misled and lulled into inaction despite his 

due diligence. It is our determination that the question of 

whether or not Plaintiff's circumstances warrant equitable 

estoppel and tolling is a factual determination which prevents a 

grant of summary judgment. 

8 

Appellate Case: 90-8103 Document: 010110092128 Date Filed: 10/23/1991 Page: 8 
The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Wyoming is REVERSED and REMANDED for proceedings in 

accordance with this order and judgment. 

Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Chief Judge 

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