Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00888/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00888-16/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stanley Bradford Clarke
Plaintiff
County of Madera
Defendant
Department of Social Services
Defendant
Sandra Upton
Defendant
Amparo Williams
Defendant

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STANLEY BRADFORD CLARKE, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

SANDRA UPTON, et al., )

)

)

Defendants. )

)

)

No. CV-F-07-888 OWW/SMS

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST

FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE (Doc.

101); GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS SIXTH

AMENDED COMPLAINT (Doc.

102); DENYING DEFENDANTS’

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

(Doc. 104); GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

PLAINTIFF'S COUNTER-MOTION

FOR LEAVE TO FILE SEVENTH

AMENDED COMPLAINT (Doc.

108); AND GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR

JUDICIAL NOTICE (Doc. 110)

Plaintiff Stanley Bradford Clarke, again proceeding in pro

per, filed a Sixth Amended Complaint pursuant to the Memorandum

Decision filed on May 26, 2009 (May 26 Memorandum Decision; Doc.

92). 

Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss and

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Plaintiff’s counter-motion for leave to file a Seventh Amended

Complaint. Defendants move to dismiss the state law causes of

action for failure to allege compliance with the California Tort

Claims Act and to dismiss the federal civil rights causes of

action on the ground that Plaintiff cannot complain of alleged

failures to present exculpatory evidence at the September 16,

2005 hearing or of the alleged misrepresentation of facts at that

hearing. Plaintiff’s counter-motion to amend seeks to amend to

allege compliance with the California Government Tort Claims Act.

A. BACKGROUND.

Plaintiff, proceeding in pro per, commenced this action in

the Madera County Superior Court on September 20, 2006. On June

21, 2007, Defendants removed Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint

from the Madera County Superior Court on the basis of federal

question on the ground that the Third Amended Complaint alleges

at least one cause of action arises under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and

1983.

By Memorandum Decision and Order filed on October 3, 2007,

(Doc. 18), Defendants’ motion to dismiss was denied in part and

granted in part with leave to amend.

On November 19, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Fourth Amended

Complaint. By Memorandum Decision and Order filed on May 29,

2008, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint

was granted in part with leave to amend, granted in part without

leave to amend, denied in part, and deferred in part for limited

discovery on the issues of absolute and qualified immunity from

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liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff, then represented by counsel, filed a Fifth

Amended Complaint on June 6, 2008. Defendants moved to dismiss

and Plaintiff moved for leave to amend to allege timely

compliance with the requirements of the California Tort Claims

Act. By Memorandum Decision and Order filed on May 26, 2009,

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Fifth Amended Complaint was

granted in part with prejudice and denied in part and Plaintiff’s

motion for leave to file a Sixth Amended Complaint was granted.

B. GOVERNING STANDARDS.

1. Motion to Dismiss.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of the complaint. Novarro v. Black, 250 F.3d 729,

732 (9 Cir.2001). Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) th

where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or where the

complaint presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead

essential facts under that theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9 Cir.1984). In reviewing a th

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the

truth of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences

from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9 Cir.2002). However, th

legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they

are cast in the form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock,

Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9 Cir.2003). “A district court th

should grant a motion to dismiss if plaintiffs have not pled

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‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Williams ex rel. Tabiu v. Gerber Products Co., 523 F.3d

934, 938 (9 Cir.2008), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley,

th

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “‘Factual allegations must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Id. 

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do.” Bell Atlantic, id. at 555. A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The

plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,’

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

has acted unlawfully, Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that

are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. at 557. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___

U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), the Supreme Court explained:

Two working principles underlie our decision

in Twombley. First, the tenet that a court

must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to

legal conclusions. Threadbare recitations fo

the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice

... Rule 8 marks a notable and generous

departure from the hyper-technical, code4

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pleading regime of a prior era, but it does

not unlock the doors of discovery for a

plaintiff armed with nothing more than

conclusions. Second, only a complaint that

states a plausible claim for relief survives

a motion to dismiss ... Determining whether a

complaint states a plausible claim for relief

will ... be a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense ... But

where the well-pleaded facts do not permit

the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has

alleged - but it has not ‘show[n]’ - ‘that

the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ....

In keeping with these principles, a court

considering a motion to dismiss can choose to

begin by identifying pleadings that, because

they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth. While

legal conclusions can provide the framework

of a complaint, they must be supported by

factual allegations. When there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should

assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement to relief.

Immunities and other affirmative defenses may be upheld on a

motion to dismiss only when they are established on the face of

the complaint. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th

Cir.1999); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th

Cir. 1980) When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may

consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached

to the complaint, documents relied upon but not attached to the

complaint when authenticity is not contested, and matters of

which the court takes judicial notice. Parrino v. FHP, Inc, 146

F.3d 699, 705-706 (9 Cir.1988). th

2. Motion to Amend.

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Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that

“leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so

requires.” “The purpose of pleading is ‘to facilitate a proper

decision on the merits’ ... and not erect formal and burdensome

impediments to the litigation process. Unless undue prejudice to

the opposing party will result, a trial judge should ordinarily

permit a party to amend its complaint.” Howey v. United States,

481 F.2d 1187, 1990 (1973). However, “[t]his strong policy

toward permitting the amendment of pleadings ... must be tempered

with considerations of ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive

on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies

by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing

party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of

amendment, etc.’ Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 ... (1962).” 

Schlacter-Jones v. General Telephone of California, 936 F.2d 435,

443 (9 Cir. 1991). “These factors, however, are not of equal th

weight in that delay, by itself, is insufficient to justify

denial of leave to amend.” DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 186; see

also Jones, 127 F.3d at 847 n.8. “[I]t is the consideration of

prejudice to the opposing party that carries the greatest weight

... Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining

Foman factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in

favor of granting leave to amend.” Eminence Capital, LLC v.

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9 Cir.2003). “The party th

opposing leave to amend bears the burden of showing prejudice.” 

Serpra v. SBC Telecommunications, Inc., 318 F.Supp.2d 865, 870

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(N.D.Cal.2004).

C. CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT CLAIMS ACT.

Defendants move to dismiss the Third Cause of Action for

intentional infliction of emotional distress and the Fourth Cause

of Action for negligent infliction of emotional distress on the

ground that Plaintiff did not timely comply with the claim

requirements of the California Tort Claims Act.

The day after the Sixth Amended Complaint was filed, on July

28, 2009 (Doc. 101), Plaintiff filed a Request for Judicial

Notice in which he requests the Court take judicial notice of his

claim for damages filed with the County of Madera on March 13,

2006 (“First Tort Claim”). The claim states that Plaintiff’s

injury or damage occurred on September 15, 2005 at 3:00 p.m. at

the Department of Social Services in Madera. The claim states

that the injury or damaged occurred:

MINOR CHILD REMOVED FROM PARENT, AND RETURNED

TO OFFENDING PARENT WITHOUT PROPER

INVESTIGATION CHILD ENDANGERMENT, OBSTRUCTION

OF JUSTICE, FAILURE TO REPORT CHILD ABUSE,

BREACH OF DUTY, NEGLIGENCE, INTENTIONAL

INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, MALICE TO

COMMIT RECKLESS, WILLFUL AND CONSCIOUS

DISREGARD OF THE RIGHTS AND SAFETY OF OTHERS,

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND PROCESS, VIOLATION OF

STATUTE, FAILURE TO DISCLOSE KNOWN

EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE, FALSIFYING

DOCUMENTATION. 

The claim names the County employees involved as “SANDRA UPTON,

AMPARO WILLIAMS, FERN MILLS, SUSAN ARTEAGA, BILL SMITH, RON

NISSILA.” Plaintiff requests the Court take judicial notice of

Madera County’s rejection of his claim dated March 15, 2006. The

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rejection states: “DATE OF MAILING: 03/15/06.” 

On October 9, 2009, (Doc. 110), Plaintiff filed a second

Request for Judicial Notice. Plaintiff requests the Court take

judicial notice of his claim for damages filed with the County of

Madera on September 10, 2006 (“Second Tort Claim”). The claim

states that the injury was “malicious prosecution” and that it

occurred in April 2006. The claim names the County employees

involved as “Sandra Upton, Ron Nissila, Miranda Neal, Erik

Beauchamp.” The action or inaction of the County employees who

caused the injury is stated: “Failure to disclose exculpatory

evidence, Fraud, Perjury.” Plaintiff requests the Court take

judicial notice of the County’s rejection of this claim dated

September 20, 2006. The rejection states: “DATE OF MAILING:

09/20/06.” 

Pursuant to Rule 201, Federal Rules of Evidence, The Court

takes judicial notice of the filing date and content of the 

First Tort Claim and its rejection by the County, and of the

filing date and content of the Second Tort Claim, and its

rejection. These documents are matters of public record and set

forth facts “capable of accurate and ready determination by

resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably

questioned.”

Plaintiff also requests the court take judicial notice of

the 2005 Madera County Grand Jury Final Report on Child Welfare

Services Part 1, attached as Exhibit C to Doc. 101. Plaintiff’s

request for judicial notice of this Final Report is denied,

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except for the fact that the Final Report was issued. 

Also on October 9, 2008, Plaintiff filed a counter-motion

for leave to file a Seventh Amended Complaint, his declaration in

support of this motion, and a Request for Judicial Notice. 

Plaintiff seeks leave to amend to add “paragraph 53 on page 16

under the common allegations of the complaint:”

53. Plaintiff was required to comply with

the California Government Tort Claims Act and

plaintiff did comply by filing Government

Tort Claims on forms supplied by the County

of Madera on or about March 13, 2006, and

again on September 19, 2006; Plaintiff’s

Government Tort Claims were rejected by the

County of Madera on or about March 15, 2006,

and September 20, 2006, respectively. 

Thereafter, plaintiff timely filed this

complaint in the Superior court of Madera.

Defendants argue that dismissal of the state law causes of

action and denial of leave to amend should be ordered as to

Plaintiff’s First Tort Claim, which was denied on March 15, 2006. 

Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on September 20, 2006.

Essentially, Defendants contend that amendment to allege

compliance with the California Tort Claims Act with regard to the

First Claim will be futile. Leave to amend may be denied if the

proposed amendment is futile or would be subject to dismissal. 

Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9 Cir.1991). Leave th

to amend may be denied based upon futility alone. Bonin v.

Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9 Cir.1995). A claim is considered th

futile and leave to amend shall not be given if there is no set

of facts that can be proved under the amendment that would

constitute a valid claim. Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845

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F.2d 209, 214 (9 Cir.1988). However, denial on this ground is th

rare and courts generally defer consideration of challenges to

the merits of a proposed amended pleading until after leave to

amend is granted and the amended pleading is filed. Netbula, LLC

v. Distinct Corp., 212 F.R.D. 534, 539 (N.D.Cal.2003), citing

Schwarzer, California Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure

Before Trial at 8:422 (The Rutter Group, 2002).

California Government Code § 945.6(a)(1) provides that, if

the public entity gives written notice of the rejection of a tort

claim in accordance with Government Code § 913, suit against the

public entity must be brought no later than six months after the

date the notice of rejection is personally delivered or deposited

in the mail. Here, Madera County’s rejection of Plaintiff’s

March 15, 2006 claim complied with the requirements of Section

913 and was mailed to Plaintiff on March 15, 2006. The County’s

rejection of the March 15, 2006 claim specifically advised

Plaintiff that “you have only six months from the date this

notice was personally delivered or deposited in the mail to file

a court action on this claim.” Plaintiff’s Complaint was not

filed until September 20, 2006, five days after the expiration of

the six month period. 

Plaintiff acknowledges that he did not file the Complaint

within six months of the rejection of his March 15, 2006 tort

claim. Plaintiff submits his declaration in which he avers:

During the time period between September 15,

2005, and specifically through 2007, I

suffered severe emotional distress,

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physically manifested ailments, and financial

hardships that rendered me incapable of

possessing the power, strength, and ability

to adequately pursue claims against the

County of Madera. I feared continued

retaliation from the Department of Social

Services. I suffered anxiety and unbearable

sorrow due to the loss of my child. I was

relegated to supervised visits with my child

and occupied with counseling and therapy as

well as having false charges pending against

me including kidnaping and the complete loss

of my parental rights. 

Plaintiff argues that Defendants “do not consider or acknowledge

the fact that Plaintiff was under tremendous duress, severe

emotional distress, suffering physical ailment, anxiety, and fear

of retaliation from defendants ... that intimidated Plaintiff

from pursuing any claims while defendants were requesting the

termination of Plaintiff’s parental rights, and supporting a

petition to remove all custody and visitation from Plaintiff and

his minor child.” Plaintiff asserts that the emotional and

physical distress alleged in his declaration “caused an

incapacity and inability during the time period of the claims

requirements such that plaintiff Clarke would be excused from

California Government Tort Claims requirements pursuant to the

California Government Code section 946.6(c)(3).” 

Plaintiff cites no authority that his alleged aggrieved 

mental state excuses his failure to timely file the Complaint and

the Court can find none. The six month period set forth in

Section 945.6(a)(1) is mandatory and strict compliance is

required. Julian v. City of San Diego, 183 Cal.App.3d 169, 176

(1986); 1 California Government Tort Liability Practice, § 8.14

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(4 Ed.). California Government Code § 946.6 does not apply to th

Plaintiff. Section 946.6 provides:

(a) If an application for leave to present a

claim is denied or deemed to be denied

pursuant to Section 911.6, a petition may be

made to the court for an order relieving the

petitioner from Section 945.4. The proper

court for filing the petition is a superior

court that would be a proper court for the

trial of the action on the cause of action to

which the claim relates ....

(b) The petition shall show each of the

following:

(1) That application was made to 

the board under Section 911.4 and was denied

or deemed denied.

(2) The reason for failure to 

present the claim within the time limit

specified in Section 911.2.

(3) The information required by 

Section 910.

(c) The court shall relieve the petitioner

from the requirements of Section 945.4 if the

court finds that the application to the board

under Section 911.4 was made within a

reasonable time not to exceed that specified

in subdivision (b) of Section 911.4 and was

denied or deemed denied pursuant to Section

911.6 and that one or more of the following

is applicable:

...

(3) The person who sustained the 

alleged injury, damage or loss was physically

or mentally incapacitated during all of the

time specified in Section 911.2 for the

presentation of the claim and by reason of

that disability failed to present a claim

during that time.

California Government Code § 911.4 provides in relevant part:

(a) When a claim that is required by Section

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911.2 to be presented not later than six

months after the accrual of a cause of action

is not presented within that time, a written

application may be made to the public entity

for leave to present that claim.

(b) The application shall be presented to the

public entity as provided in Article 2

(commencing with Section 915) within a

reasonable time not to exceed one year after

the accrual of the cause of action and shall

state the reason for the delay in presenting

the claim. The proposed claim shall be

attached to the application.

Here, Plaintiff makes no showing that he has complied with

either Sections 911.4 or 946.6. He makes no showing that he

petitioned the County of Madera for permission to file a late

claim.1

 To the extent that Plaintiff seeks leave to amend to allege

timely compliance with the requirements of the California Tort

Claims Act relative to Plaintiff’s alleged injuries occurring on

September 15, 2005, the date of the claimed injury in Plaintiff’s

First Tort Claim, Defendants argue that leave to amend should be

denied and that the Third and Fourth Causes of Action be

dismissed with prejudice to the extent these causes of action are

based on the events of September 15, 2005 or before. Defendants

argue that Plaintiff cannot rely on the Second Tort Claim to

support these claims because the Second Tort Claim refers to

Because of this, it is unnecessary to address whether the 1

federal district courts have jurisdiction under Section 946.6. See

See Harvey v. City of Fresno, 2009 WL 3157524 at 

*9 (E.D.Cal.Sept. 28, 2009), noting a spit of authority among the

district courts in California whether federal district courts have

jurisdiction under Section 946.6.

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“malicious prosecution” in “April of 2006" and does not name

Amparo Williams as a tortfeasor. 

Plaintiff refers to accrual of a cause of action. Plaintiff

cites California Government Code § 901:

For the purposes of computing the time limits

prescribed by Sections 911.2, 911.4, 912, and

945.6, the date of the accrual of a cause of

action to which a claim relates is the date

upon which the cause of action would be

deeded to have accrued within the meaning of

the statute of limitations which would be

applicable thereto if there were no

requirement that a claim be presented to and

be acted upon by the public entity before an

action could be commenced thereon ....

Plaintiff cites Mosesian v. County of Fresno, 28 Cal.App.3d 493,

500 (1972): “A cause of action normally accrues when under the

substantive law the wrongful act is done and the liability or

obligation arises, that is, when the action may be brought.” 

Plaintiff then refers to the delayed discovery doctrine, citing

Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 21 Cal.4th 383, 397-398 (1999):

The general rule for defining the accrual of

a cause of action sets the date as the time

‘when, under the substantive law, the

wrongful act is done,’ or the wrongful result

occurs, and the consequent ‘liability arises

....’ ... In other words, it sets the date as

the time when the cause of action is complete

with all of its elements ....

An exception to the general rule for defining

the accrual of a cause of action - indeed,

the ‘most important’ one - is the discovery

rule ... It may be expressed by the

Legislature or implied by the courts ... It

postpones accrual of a cause of action until

the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to

discover, the cause of action ....

Under Jolly [v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal.3d

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1103 (1988)], ... the plaintiff discovers the

cause of action when he at least suspects a

factual basis, as opposed to a legal theory,

for its elements, even if he lacks knowledge

thereof - when, simply put, he at least

‘suspects ... that someone has done something

wrong’ to him ..., ‘wrong’ being use, not in

any technical sense, but rather in accordance

with its ‘lay understanding’ ... He has

reason to discover the cause of action when

he has reason at least to suspect a factual

basis for its element ... He has reason to

suspect when he has ‘”’”notice or information

of circumstances to put a reasonable person

on inquiry’”’” ...; he need not know the

‘specific “facts” necessary to establish’ the

cause of action; rather, he may seek to learn

such facts through the ‘process contemplated

by pretrial discovery’; but within the

applicable limitations period, he must indeed

seek to learn the facts necessary to bring

the cause of action in the first place - he

‘cannot wait for’ them ‘to find’ him and ‘sit

on’ his ‘rights’; he ‘must go find’ them

himself if he can and ‘file suit’ if he does

....

See also Gutierrez v. Mofid, 39 Cal.3d 892, 897-898 (1985):

[T]he uniform California rule is that a

limitations period dependent on discovery of

the cause of action begins to run no later

than the time the plaintiff learns, or should

have learned, the facts essential to his

claim ... It is irrelevant that the plaintiff

is ignorant of ... the legal theories

underlying his cause of action. 

See also Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 35 Cal.4th 797, 802

(2005):

[U]nder the delayed discovery rule, a cause

of action accrues and the statute of

limitations begins to run when the plaintiff

has reason to suspect an injury and some

wrongful cause, unless the plaintiff pleads

and proves that a reasonable investigation at

that time would not have revealed a factual

basis for that particular cause of action. 

In that case, the statute of limitations for

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that cause of action will be tolled until

such time as a reasonable investigation would

have revealed its factual basis.

See also McCready v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 2006 WL

1708303 at * 4 (E.D.Cal.June 19, 2006):

Plaintiffs’ claims here began to accrue when

Plaintiffs had notice or information of

circumstances that would have put a

reasonable person on inquiry, or had the

opportunity to obtain knowledge for sources

open to their investigation ... As such, to

invoke the delayed discovery rule, Plaintiffs

had to plead facts showing: (1) lack of

knowledge; (2) lack of means of obtaining

knowledge; and (3) how and when the fraud or

mistake was actually discovered. 

Plaintiff asserts:

Plaintiff’s second tort claim relates to new

misconduct by UPTON and the DSS causing

severe emotional distress to Plaintiff that

was discovered during juvenile court

testimony between April and September 2006. 

Plaintiff’s second tort claim relates back to

previous misconduct by UPTON and the

Department of Social Services by way of the

‘doctrine of delayed discovery’ for

misconduct that Plaintiff previously had no

factual basis in believing. The County of

Madera rejected Plaintiff’s second tort claim

but failed to contest the timeliness or

insufficiency, thereby waiving any objections

now.

As Defendants reply, Plaintiff’s reliance on the delayed

discovery rule is misplaced:

Plaintiff’s claim filed on March 13, 2009

[sic] identifies injuries due to the

Defendants’ wrongful conduct caused on

September 15, 2005. Plaintiff was aware of

the cause of action and timely filed a claim

with the County ... Plaintiff cannot claim

that he was not on notice of the cause of

action until April and that there was a

delayed discovery of the cause of action. 

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The filing of the first claim admits that he

was on notice.

Plaintiff argues that he was not aware of all

the facts or wrongful acts committed by the

Defendants on September 15, 2005, but this

does not alter the accrual of the cause of

action. So long as he was aware that he had

an injury that was caused by the Defendants’

wrongful conduct, the late discovery rule

does not apply. It is accepted and assumed

that a plaintiff may not know all the facts

and the totality of the wrongdoing, so long

as there is a reason to make an inquiry. As

to the events of September 16, 2005,

Plaintiff had the same reason to suspect

wrongdoing, especially when he was able to

file a claim regarding the related events the

day before.

Defendants also note that the Sixth Amended Complaint does not

allege facts supporting invocation of the delayed discovery rule.

To the extent the Sixth Amended Complaint alleges state law

claims based on alleged misconduct occurring on September 15-16,

2005 and before, leave to amend is DENIED and the Third and

Fourth Causes of Action are DISMISSED because of Plaintiff’s

failure to timely comply with the California Government Tort

Claims Act. The allegations of the Sixth Amended Complaint make

clear that Plaintiff knew of the alleged wrongs and identities of

the wrongdoers on September 15 and 16, 2005. He filed a timely

tort claim with regard to these alleged wrongs, but then failed

to timely file this lawsuit. 

As to Plaintiff’s assertion that “[t]he County of Madera

rejected Plaintiff’s second tort claim but failed to contest the

timeliness or insufficiency, thereby waiving any objections now,” 

Plaintiff cites no supporting authority. California Government

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Code § 910.8 provides:

If, in the opinion of the board or the person

designated by it, a claim as presented fails

to comply substantially with the requirements

of Sections 910 and 910.2, or with the

requirements of a form provided under Section

910.4 if a claim is presented thereto, the

board or the person may, at any time within

20 days after the claim is presented, given

written notice of its insufficiency, stating

with particularity the defects or omissions

therein. The notice shall be given in the

manner prescribed by Section 915.4. The

board may not take action on the claim for a

period of 15 days after the notice is given.

California Government Code § 911 provides:

Any defense as to the sufficiency of the

claim based on a defect or omission in the

claim as presented is waived by the failure

to give notice of the insufficiency with

respect to the defect or commission as

provided in Section 910.8, except that no

notice need be given and no waiver shall

result when the claim as presented fails to

state either an address to which the person

presenting the claim desires notices to be

sent or an address of the claimant.

Here, Defendants do not assert that Plaintiff’s Second Tort

Claim did not comply with the requirements of Sections 910 or

910.2; rather, they assert that the Second Tort Claim refers only

to an alleged malicious prosecution of Plaintiff in April 2006

and does not name Defendant Williams. Therefore, Defendants

argue, the Second Tort Claim is limited to an alleged malicious

prosecution in April 2006 and to the named tortfeasors in the

Second Tort Claim. Plaintiff can only proceed on the Third and

Fourth Causes of Action with regard to the alleged misconduct in

connection with the hearing in April 2006. 

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D. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM RE SEPTEMBER 16, 2005 HEARING.

Defendants move to dismiss the Sixth Amended Complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted:

Plaintiff brings this action for alleged

misrepresentations or an alleged failure to

produce exculpatory evidence at the hearing

of an ex parte application that occurred on

September 16, 2005. The pleadings have

always identified this as the date of injury,

and the date when the Defendants’ wrongful

acts or omissions occurred. While Plaintiff

has included several different claims for

relief based on various theories of

liability, such as the wrongful acts were

motivated by racial animus, or prejudice

against Plaintiff’s gender, or that the acts

or omissions were done pursuant to a custom

and practice, the events at the hearing are

the cause of action.

In so moving, Defendants request the Court take judicial

notice of the following documents:2

1. Declaration of Ronald A. Nissila in

Support of Motion Juvenile Dependency

Petition Pursuant to Welfare & Institutions

Code § 388, filed on September 15, 2005,

Madera County Superior Court, Case No.

BJP015618. (Exh. B, Decl. of Ryan Libke,

filed under seal on April 16, 2009 (Doc. 86);

2. Reporter’s Transcript of the matter

before the Madera County Superior Court,

Department 4, on September 16, 2005,

commencing at 8:30 a.m., Judge Thomas L.

Bender presiding. (Exh. C, Decl. of Ryan

Libke, filed under seal on April 16, 2009

(Doc. 86);

3. Reporter’s Transcript of the matter

before the Madera County Superior Court,

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice filed on August 10, 2

2009 (Doc. 104), incorrectly refers to the Reporter’s Transcript of

the hearing on September 16, 2005 as Exhibit A to the Declaration

of Ryan Libke.

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Department 4, on October 11, 2005, commencing

at 1:30 p.m., Judge Thomas L. Bender

presiding. (Exh. D, Decl. of Ryan Libke,

filed under seal on April 16, 2009 (Doc. 86).

Based on these exhibits, Defendants request the Court take

judicial notice of the following facts:

1. At the ex parte hearing occurring on

September 16, 2005, in front of Judge Bender

in the Madera County Superior Court, as is

referenced in the Sixth Amended Complaint,

Defendant Upton was present as the case

manager for the minor. (Reporter’s

Transcript, Dept. 4 of the Madera County

Superior Court, Sept. 16, 2005, 8:30 am,

Judge Bender, p. 3:10-12).

2. The minor’s private counsel had made a

“request for modification.” (Id. at 3:16-

20).

3. The minor’s private counsel and county

counsel submitted the matters on the request

and attachment, as did the mother’s attorney. 

(Id. at pp. 3:13-4:5). Plaintiff’s attorney

requested to be heard, and requested an

evidentiary hearing. (Id. at p. 4:6-12).

4. The court stated that it would grant the

request, but that it had to make an immediate

decision. (Id. at p. 4:13-16).

5. Plaintiff’s attorney requested that the

child be returned to his father, that a SART

interview be conducted, and that results be

considered relative to a temporary custodial

arrangement for the child. (Id. at p. 4:17-

25).

6. Plaintiff’s attorney requested that the

child be taken to a doctor for further

evaluation concerning the allegations of

sexual abuse. (Id. at p. 5:1-6).

7. Plaintiff’s counsel reiterated his

request for an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at

p. 5:8-12).

8. The court denied the request for a return

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of the child to the father, and for a second

SART interview. (Id. at p. 5:13-15).

9. The court also denied the request to have

the mother take the child to a doctor for

further evaluation. (Id. at p. 20-21).

10. The court granted the application for

modification made pursuant to California

Welfare and Institutions Code section 388,

and removed the child from the care of his

father. (Id. at p. 20-24).

11. Plaintiff would have supervised

visitation upon further psychological

evaluation. (Id. at pp. 5:25-6:5).

12. The court specified that the order was

temporary and that an evidentiary hearing on

the petition would be set. (Id. at 6:4-7).

13. Plaintiff’s attorney requested “a

minimum of a couple of weeks” to prepare for

the hearing, which was then set for October

11, 2005. (Id. at pp. 6:8-7:10).

14. The child’s private attorney made the

application and submitted the attachments,

not any of the Defendants. 

Plaintiff does not object to Defendants’ Request for

Judicial Notice. However, case authority establishes that

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice must be denied. In

Taylor v. Charter Medical Corp., 162 F.3d 827 (5 Cir.1988), the th

Fifth Circuit held that the District Court did not err in

refusing to take judicial notice of the Milonas courts’

determination that Old Provo Canyon was a state actor:

Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence

provides that a court may take judicial

notice of an ‘adjudicative fact’ if the fact

is ‘not subject to reasonable dispute in

that it is either (1) generally known within

the territorial jurisdiction of the trial

court or (2) capable of accurate and ready

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determination by resort to sources whose

accuracy cannot be questioned.’ Taylor

asserts that the factual findings of the

district court in Milonas - upheld on appeal

- fall within this second category. We

disagree.

We have not previously addressed this precise

issue, but the Second, Eighth, and Eleventh

Circuits have, holding that, even though a

court may take judicial notice of a ‘document

filed in another court ... to establish the

fact of such litigation and related filings,’

a court cannot take judicial notice of the

factual findings of another court. This is

so because (1) such findings do not

constitute facts ‘not subject to reasonable

dispute’ within the meaning of Rule 201; and

(2) ‘were [it] permissible for a court to

take judicial notice of a fact merely because

it had been found to be true in some other

action, the doctrine of collateral estoppel

would be superfluous.’ 

The Ninth Circuit appears to follow this line of cases. In Wyatt

v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 801 th

(2003), the Ninth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment,

stating in dicta:

Although Wyatt never formally objected to

judicial notice of the Toyebo findings, he

did state in his objections to the magistrate

judge’s report:

The Magistrate furthermore relies

upon the ruling in [Toyebo]. 

Plaintiff’s objections are based

upon the fact the court has failed

to take into consideration

plaintiff’s action on a case by

case basis for which differs from

that of Friedman and Toyebo,

surrounding essential issues and

arguments that differ in this

action before the court.

Represented by counsel in this appeal, Wyatt

contends that the magistrate judge’s use of

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the Toyebo findings constituted an improper

procedural shortcut and that judicial notice

was improper under Rule 201 ... Although we

appreciate that the magistrate judge was

attempting to utilize an expeditious

procedure, we have held that taking judicial

notice of findings of fact from another case

exceeds the limits of Rule 201. See M/V Am.

Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr. Corp., 708

F.2d 1483, 1491 (9 Cir.1983)(stating th

general rule that ‘a court may not take

judicial notice of proceedings or records in

another case so as to supply, without formal

introduction of evidence, facts essential to

support a contention in a cause before it.’). 

315 F.3d at 1113-1114. 

Here, Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice seeks to have

the Court accept the findings and rulings of the Madera County

Superior Court at hearings before it on September 16, 2005 and

October 11, 2005. This cannot be done under governing law. 

While the documents submitted in Defendants’ Request for Judicial

Notice strongly undermine Plaintiff’s allegations concerning the

events at the September 16, 2005 hearing, the viability of

Plaintiff’s claims relative to that hearing cannot be resolved by

the requested judicial notice in the context of a motion to

dismiss.

Further, while the Sixth Amended Complaint focuses primarily

upon the events of September 15-16, 2005, those events are not

the only basis for the allegations against Defendants in this

action. The motion to dismiss on this ground is DENIED.

E. EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION.

Although Defendants do not move to dismiss the Eighth Cause

of Action, to the extent it alleges a violation of Title VI of

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the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d to 2000d-7, the

Eighth Cause of Action does not state a claim for relief. Title

VI provides:

No person in the United States shall, on the

ground of race, color, or national origin, be

excluded from participation in, be denied the

benefits of, or be subjected to

discrimination under any program or activity

receiving Federal financial assistance.

As explained in Epileptic Foundation v. City and County of Maui,

300 F.Supp.2d 1003, 1011 (D.Hawaii 2003):

To state a Title VI claim for damages, ‘a

plaintiff need only allege that (1) the

entity involved is engaging in racial

discrimination; and (2) the entity involved

is receiving federal financial assistance.’ 

... To prevail on a Title VI claim, however,

a plaintiff must prove (1) that he is an

‘intended beneficiary of the federally-funded

program the defendants ... participated in,’

... and (2) that the defendant intentionally

discriminated against him in violation of the

statute.

There is no allegation in the Sixth Amended Complaint that either

the Department of Social Services or the County of Madera is

receiving federal financial assistance or that Plaintiff is an

intended beneficiary of the federally-funded program. At the

hearing, Plaintiff referred to Paragraphs 51-52 of the Sixth

Amended Complaint:

51. From January 10, 2005, until September

18, 2007, during the entire course of the

dependency action by Madera County Department

of Social Services, plaintiff was denied

equal access to social workers and family

reunification services that were provided for

the mother of plaintiff’s minor child. 

Social workers Upton, Williams, and Maria

Cruz, refused to complete home visits,

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refused to return phone calls, and refused to

document plaintiff’s concerns.

52. On or about July 2005, August 2005, and

again in October 2005, plaintiff made

complaints to the Department of Social

Services and to the Madera County Grand Jury

about the discriminatory treatment of

plaintiff by Madera DSS social workers. The

Madera County Department of Social Services

was indifferent failed to take any action to

correct the problems that plaintiff

complained of. [SIC]

These allegations do not allege the elements of a violation of

Title VI. 

 The Eighth Cause of Action is defective to the extent it is

based on the First Amendment. Plaintiff cannot bring a claim

directly under the First Amendment because Congress has created

an alternative remedy. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980) 

Moreover, the May 26 Memorandum Decision granted Plaintiff

leave to file a Sixth Amended Complaint to name his son Ambroise

as a plaintiff and to include him in the allegations against

Defendants and to include an allegation of compliance with the

California Tort Claims Act. By Order filed under seal, the Court

denied Plaintiff’s application for appointment of himself as

guardian ad litem for his minor son, thereby negating the naming

of his son as a plaintiff in this action. (Doc. 91). The Eighth

Cause of Action is entirely new and leave to amend to allege it

was neither requested nor granted. The Eighth Cause of Action is

DISMISSED.

///

///

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated:

1. Defendants’ request for judicial notice is DENIED;

2. Plaintiff’s requests for judicial notice are GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART;

3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART. The Third and Fourth Causes of Action are

dismissed to the extent they are based on alleged actions or

omissions occurring before April 2006 and are dismissed as to

Defendant Umparo Williams. The Eighth Cause of Action is

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.

4. Plaintiff’s motion to amend is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART;

5. Within thirty (30) days of service of this Memorandum

Decision and Order, Plaintiff shall file a Seventh Amended

Complaint alleging compliance with the California Government Tort

Claims Act as to the tort claim filed on September 10, 2006 and

denied on September 20, 2006. No other amendments are

authorized.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 18, 2010 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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