Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01802/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01802-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Estela Love
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Estela Love (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner 

of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) 

pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to 

conduct all further proceedings in this case before the Honorable Barbara A. McAuliffe, United States 

Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 6, 9.) The matter is before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were 

submitted without oral argument to Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. Having carefully

considered the parties’ briefs, as well as the entire record in this case, the Court finds that the 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in evaluating Plaintiff’s credibility. Accordingly, the ALJ’s 

decision is REVERSED and the case REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Order.

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ESTELA LOVE,

 Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:14-cv-1802-BAM

ORDER REVERSING AGENCY’S DENIAL OF 

BENEFITS AND ORDERING REMAND 

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FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

On July 9, 2011, Plaintiff filed her disability application. AR 10.1 Plaintiff’s application was 

denied initially and on reconsideration. AR 10. Subsequently, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). ALJ Whitfield Haigler, Jr. held a video hearing on April 16, 

2013, from St. Louis, Missouri and issued an order denying benefits on April 26, 2013. AR 10-18. 

On September 15, 2014, the Appeals Council denied review. AR 1. This appeal followed.

Relevant Medical Background

Plaintiff suffers from bilateral knee pain, obesity, hypertension and depression. AR 12. 

Plaintiff alleges that her pain and depressive symptoms cause functional limitations that prevent her 

from being able to perform substantial gainful activity. (Doc. 17 at 8). 

Plaintiff has sought treatment for various impairments including depression and bilateral knee 

pain from Ajit Singh Khaira, M.D. See generally AR 295-314, 343-354 and 874-902. An x-ray of the 

left knee revealed moderate degenerative changes of the medial joint compartment. AR 333. An MRI 

of her left knee revealed degenerative tearing of the medial meniscus and patellar chondromalacia 

(deterioration of cartilage). AR 335. An MRI of the right knee revealed extensively torn lateral 

meniscus, chondromalacia of the patella, joint effusion (swelling) and osteochondral defect of the 

femoral trochlea (portion of the femur that articulates with the patella). AR 336. 

Plaintiff also suffers from mental health impairments. On January 2, 2010, Plaintiff was 

placed on an involuntary, psychiatric hold for two days. AR 281-283. She was diagnosed as suffering 

from a major depressive disorder. AR 282-283. A consultative internist examined Plaintiff on 

September 1, 2011. AR 316-321. The examiner opined that Plaintiff could lift up to 20 pounds 

occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; stand/walk for four to six hours per workday; sit for up to six 

hours per workday; and frequently crouch, kneel, climb and balance. AR 320-321. A consultative 

psychiatrist examined Plaintiff on September 17, 2011. AR 323-325. The examiner diagnosed Plaintiff 

as suffering from a depressive disorder, not otherwise specified. AR 325. The examiner opined that 

 

1 References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate page number.

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Plaintiff could perform simple job instructions, but is unable to carry out an extensive variety of 

technical and/or complex instructions. AR 325.

Hearing Testimony

On April 16, 2013, Plaintiff appeared and testified before the ALJ. AR 24-48. At the hearing, 

Plaintiff, represented by Gina Fazio, testified that she has only completed the second grade and has 

limited reading skills. Plaintiff testified that, prior to becoming disabled, she worked as a janitor. AR 

33- 34. 

She testified that she has pain in her knees for which medications provide minimal and 

temporary relief. AR 34. The pain is exacerbated by standing and walking activities. AR 34-35. She 

estimated that she could stand approximately 20 to 30 minutes before needing to sit, and walk 

approximately about 10 to 15 steps before needing to sit or take a break. AR 35. She elevates her legs 

because of swelling. AR 37. She could sit between 20 and 30 minutes because of knee and back pain. 

AR 36. Plaintiff also testified that she has pain in her hands and right shoulder. AR 37. She has 

difficulty using her hands even when holding, for example, a can of soda. AR 38. She estimated that 

she could lift approximately 10 pounds. AR 39.

Plaintiff also testified that she experiences significant depression. AR 39. Her problems are 

compounded by her physical limitations. AR 39. She has problems with memory. AR 39. With respect 

to activities of daily living, Plaintiff’s daughters come several times per week to assist her with various 

chores and duties. AR 41. Although Plaintiff takes medications, she also experiences significant sideeffects. AR 43. 

The ALJ also heard testimony from vocational expert (“VE”) Tallson. AR 47. The ALJ posed 

a hypothetical question to VE Tallson that contemplates an individual with marked limitation in 

maintaining attention and concentration for extended periods, and responding appropriately to work 

pressures and adapting to changes in the work environment. AR 47. The net effect is that the 

individual would be off task approximately 12% of the time. AR 47. The vocational expert testified 

that such an individual would not be able to perform any work. AR 47. 

The ALJ posed an additional hypothetical question to the VE concerning a set of limitations 

including being limited to light work with only occasional climbing, crouching, and moving, and 

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crawling, frequently balancing or stooping, but having marked limitations in understanding, 

remembering, and carrying out detailed instructions. The VE testified that a person with those 

limitations would be able to perform Plaintiff’s past work as a maid as defined in the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles (“DOT”) code 323.687-014. AR 45-46. Adding additional limitations of no 

crawling and being markedly limited in understanding, remembering, and carrying out complex and 

detailed instructions, the VE testified that a person so limited would still be able to perform Plaintiff’s 

past work as a maid. AR 47. 

THE ALJ’S DECISION

Using the Social Security Administration’s five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff did not meet the disability standard. AR 10-18. More particularly, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since December 31, 2010. AR 

10. The ALJ identified obesity, hypertension, bilateral knee osteoarthritis, diabetes mellitus and 

depression as severe impairments. AR 12. Nonetheless, the ALJ determined that the severity of the 

Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or exceed any of the listed impairments. AR 13.

Based on his review of the entire record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a limited range of light work, including occasionally climbing 

ladders, ropes, scaffolds, ramps and stairs, performing frequent balancing and stooping, doing 

occasional crouching and kneeling but no crawling, and that she had marked limitations in 

understanding, remembering and carrying out detailed and complex instructions. AR 13-17. Based on 

the testimony of the VE, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was able to perform her past relevant work as a 

maid. AR 17. The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the meaning of the 

Social Security Act. AR 18.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision to 

deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations, this 

Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence. 

42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,” Richardson v. Perales, 

402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 

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1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). The record as a 

whole must be considered, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts 

from the Commission’s conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). In weighing 

the evidence and making findings, the Commission must apply the proper legal standards. E.g., 

Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). This Court must uphold the Commissioner’s 

determination that the claimant is not disabled if the Secretary applied the proper legal standards, and 

if the Commission’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of Health 

and Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987).

DISABILITY STANDARD

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that he or she is unable to engage in 

substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which has 

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 

1382c (a)(3)(A). A claimant must show that he or she has a physical or mental impairment of such 

severity that he or she is not only unable to do his or her previous work, but cannot, considering his or 

her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which 

exists in the national economy. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). The 

burden is on the claimant to establish disability. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 

1990).

DISCUSSION

In one argument, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting her subjective symptom 

testimony. 

A. The ALJ’s Credibility Determination is Flawed 

Plaintiff’s sole argument is that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for 

discrediting her subjective symptom testimony. (Doc. 17 at 9). According to Plaintiff, the ALJ 

rejected her subjective symptom testimony for the sole reason that it was not supported by the 

objective evidence, which is not, by itself, a legally sufficient basis for rejecting such testimony. 

Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that “[i]f an adjudicator could reject a 

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claim of disability simple because [plaintiff] fails to produce evidence supporting the severity of the 

pain, there would be no reason for an adjudicator to consider anything other than medical findings”). 

In response, the Commissioner asserts that the ALJ adequately articulated appropriate reasons for 

discrediting Plaintiff. (Doc. 20 at 4). A review of the record reveals the ALJ committed error because 

he failed to give clear and convincing reasons, as required, for finding Plaintiff lacked credibility. 

At the hearing and in her application for benefits, Plaintiff testified that she experiences pain in 

both knees, both approximately at the same severity. AR 34. While she takes medications, it only 

provides minimal and temporary relief. AR 34. The pain is exacerbated by standing and walking 

activities. AR 34-35. She estimated that she could stand approximately 20 to 30 minutes before 

needing to sit. AR 35. Plaintiff can walk about 10 to 15 steps before needing to sit or take a break and 

she frequently needs to elevates her legs because of swelling. AR 35, 37. Plaintiff could only sit 

between 20 and 30 minutes because of knee and back pain. AR 36. Plaintiff also testified that she has 

pain in her hands and right shoulder and she has difficulty holding objects. AR 37-38. She estimated 

that she could lift approximately 10 pounds. AR 39. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her credibility and assess her subjective 

complaints when he rejected her subjective symptom testimony solely because it lacked consistency 

with the objective findings. The Court agrees. 

Here, the ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s testimony by stating the following: 

The claimant alleges disability due to a combination of impairments. The claimant 

testified she is always depressed and crying; has no energy and cannot sleep. The 

claimant also testifies she has pain all of the time in both of her knees, which get 

swollen and go numb. The claimant further stated she can sit or stand for probably 

twenty to thirty minutes and has a hard time crawling and getting on her knees because 

they are swollen all of the time. The claimant additionally testified to having pain in 

her hand and shoulders; and stated her hands are weak and that she cannot hold much. 

However, the claimant’s allegation of disability is not fully credible. 

The objective medical evidence does not support limitations greater than in the residual 

functional capacity. Regarding the claimant’s physical complaints, the physical 

consultative examiner Rustom Damania, M.D., diagnosed the claimant with 

osteoarthritis of both knees, obesity, hypertension and diabetes mellitus. X-rays of the 

claimant’s left knee showed interval development of moderate degenerative changes of 

the medial joint compartment with a diagnosis of a lateral meniscus tear. An MRI of 

the right knee showed a torn lateral meniscus, chondromalacia patella, joint effusion 

and osteochondral defect involving the femoral trochlea. However, a recent treatment 

note indicated that she ambulated to an examination room without assistance; and was 

able to sit comfortably on the examination table without difficulty or evidence of pain. 

The claimants other impairments are all treated with medication. Regarding the 

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claimant’s depression, she received treatment from Sequoia Community Health Centers 

for major depression. However, the mental status examination indicated the claimant 

was oriented to person, place, time, and situation, had a euthymic mood, had intact 

memory, had a thought content that was within normal limits, and had good 

concentration, judgment and insight; and with a Global Assessment of Functioning 

(GAF) score of 65. The GAF score is a clinical rating of an individual’s overall 

psychological, social, occupational functioning, on a scale of 0 to 100. A rating of 65 

indicates mild symptoms in one area or difficulty in one of the following: social, 

occupational, or school functioning, but the person is generally functioning pretty well 

and has some meaningful interpersonal relationships (See, American Psychiatric 

Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, 

Text Revision pg. 32, 2000). Based on the longitudinal medical record, the evidence 

suggests that the residual functional capacity adequately accounts for the claimant’s 

limitations due to her impairments. 

AR 15-16. 

After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s 

medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged 

symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and 

limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely for the reasons explained in this 

decision. In terms of the claimant’s alleged physical impairments, the undersigned 

limits the claimant to light work with additional postural restrictions as stated in the 

residual functional capacity. In terms of the claimant’s depression, the undersigned 

finds the claimant has marked limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying 

out detailed and complex instructions as it is defined in the residual functional capacity. 

The claimant’s subjective reported history cannot substitute for the objective medical 

evidence contained in the record, which provides a more accurate longitudinal history 

of the claimant’s conditions. Turning to the medical evidence, the objective findings in 

this case fail to provide support for the claimant’s allegations of disabling symptoms 

and limitations. More specifically, the medical findings do not support the 

existence of limitations greater than the above listed residual functional capacity.

AR 16 (emphasis added).

The determination of whether or not to accept a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective 

symptoms requires a two-step analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281 

(citing Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986)). First, the ALJ must determine whether or not 

there is a medically determinable impairment that reasonably could be expected to cause the 

claimant’s symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281-82. Once a 

claimant produces medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the ALJ may not discredit the 

claimant’s testimony as to the severity of symptoms “based solely on a lack of objective medical 

evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.” Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 343, 

346-47 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citing Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407). Absent affirmative evidence that 

the claimant is malingering, the ALJ must provide specific “clear and convincing” reasons for 

rejecting the claimant’s testimony. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283-84.

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Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of obesity, hypertension, 

bilateral knee osteoarthritis, diabetes mellitus and depression. AR 12. He also found that Plaintiff’s 

“medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” 

AR 16. Therefore, the ALJ could not discredit properly Plaintiff’s testimony as to the severity of her 

symptoms “based solely on a lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged 

severity of pain.” See Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 343, 346-47 (citing Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407). However, 

that is exactly what the ALJ did here. See AR 14-15. 

There is one paragraph between the ALJ’s discussion of the lay evidence and the ALJ’s finding 

that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms 

are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity 

assessment.” AR 14-15. This paragraph begins with the statement that the “objective medical 

evidence does not support limitations greater than in the residual functional capacity.” AR 15. That 

paragraph continues with a selective discussion of the medical evidence. AR 15. The ALJ’s reliance 

on the lack of corroboration from the objective evidence alone is not a clear and convincing reason to 

support the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding. See Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 343, 346-47 (citing Cotton, 

799 F.2d at 1407).

The Commissioner responds that the ALJ’s opinion relied on more than the purported lack of

objective medical evidence to support the ALJ’s credibility determination. Directing the Court to the 

ALJ’s summary of Plaintiff’s testimony, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ relied on 

inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s testimony and the medical evidence. For example, the 

Commissioner notes that Plaintiff reported constant knee pain whether sitting or standing and pain in 

her hands and right shoulder, but that she ambulated to an examination room without assistance, and 

was able to sit comfortably on the examination table without difficulty or evidence of pain. AR 15; 

(Doc. 20 at 5). 

The Commissioner’s argument here fails for two reasons. First, identifying inconsistencies 

between Plaintiff’s testimony and the evidence in the treatment notes is simply another way of stating 

that the ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony because it was inconsistent with the 

objective medical evidence. Second, the ALJ did not cite this as a reason for disbelieving Plaintiff. 

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While the Commissioner now offers this as a reason to explain the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding, 

the Court cannot entertain these post hoc rationalizations. See, e.g., Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 

(9th Cir. 2007) (“We review only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and 

may not affirm on a ground upon which he did not rely”). 

The Commissioner also argues that the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s “other impairments were 

treated with medication.” AR 15. According to the Commissioner, the ALJ was entitled to reject 

Plaintiff’s credibility based on her successful response to medication. (Doc. 20 at 6). See Gerard v. 

Astrue, 406 Fed.Appx. 229, 232 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (ALJ properly discounted claimant’s 

asserted severity of her anxiety and depression, observing in part that claimant “was responding to 

psychotherapy and medication”); Morgan v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999) (ALJ properly 

discredited the claimant’s subjective complaints by citing physician’s report that mental symptoms 

improved with medication). Again, the Commissioner’s argument is misguided. It is not enough for 

the adjudicator to simply recite that Plaintiff takes medication. To reject Plaintiff’s credibility based on 

her treatment, the ALJ must explain whether the medication produced a satisfactory response and 

control of pain or symptoms. That Plaintiff’s “other impairments are all treated with medication” is 

not a sufficiently specific showing that Plaintiff’s impairments were effectively controlled with 

medication. 

Finally, the Commissioner argues that “the ALJ’s reference to daily activities is an additional 

sufficient reason to discount her disabling pain testimony.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 

(9th Cir. 2008) (The ALJ may consider many factors in weighing a claimant’s credibility, including 

the claimant’s daily activities). However, the ALJ’s “reference” to Plaintiff’s activities of daily living 

is simply not a sufficiently specific statement regarding which symptom testimony is not credible

based on the performance of Plaintiff’s daily activities. Certainly, there are facts included in the record 

which the ALJ could have utilized in supporting his credibility determination, but the ALJ did not 

make the necessary connections. See Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009)(where an 

ALJ failed to analyze the factors set forth in SSR 96-7p the ALJ did not build a logical bridge between 

the evidence and his conclusion that the claimant’s testimony was not credible). 

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Plaintiff carried her burden to demonstrate that the existence of her severe impairments had 

more than a minimal effect on her ability to function in a work setting, and that those impairments 

reasonably could have been expected to cause her alleged symptoms, as found by the ALJ. AR 15. 

Therefore, because there was no evidence of malingering, the ALJ was required to provide clear and 

convincing evidence for any failure to credit fully her testimony regarding her limitations, and was 

required to provide more than a conclusion that her limitations were not supported by the objective 

evidence of record. See id.; see also Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283-84; Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. This, the ALJ 

failed to do.

Having carefully reviewed the record, the ALJ here failed to provide clear and convincing 

reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s credibility. While the ALJ is not obligated to discuss every credibility 

factor, the ALJ must discuss some clear and convincing credibility findings beyond inconsistency with 

the objective medical evidence and weigh them against Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. If 

the ALJ then chooses to reject Plaintiff’s subjective testimony, the ALJ is required to give an 

explanation for her rejection. Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984) (ALJ 

required to explain why “significant probative evidence has been rejected”). Therefore, the ALJ’s 

determination that Plaintiff’s testimony was not credible without sufficient analysis constitutes error 

and remand is required. On remand, when reassessing Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ must provide 

clear and convincing reasons so that a reviewing court may know the basis for the ALJ’s decision and 

have the ability to assess the propriety of that decision.

B. Remand is Required

This Court has considered Plaintiff’s request that this Court award benefits rather than remand 

the case for additional proceedings but finds remand more appropriate here. The circumstances of the 

case suggest that further administrative review could remedy the ALJ’s errors claimed here, and 

therefore, remand is appropriate. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 2011); see Connett v. 

Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2003)(remand is an option where the ALJ fails to state sufficient 

reasons for rejecting a claimant’s excess symptom testimony); see also Garrison v. Colvin, 2014 U.S. 

App. LEXIS 13315, 2014 WL 3397218, at *21 (9th Cir. July 14, 2014) (court may “remand for further 

proceedings, even though all conditions of the credit-as-true rule are satisfied, [when] an evaluation of 

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the record as a whole creates serious doubt that a claimant is, in fact, disabled”); Vasquez v. Astrue, 

572 F.3d 586, 600-01 (9th Cir. 2009) (agreeing that a court need not “credit as true” improperly 

rejected claimant testimony where there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a proper 

disability determination can be made); see generally INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S. Ct. 353, 

154 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2002) (upon reversal of an administrative determination, the proper course is 

remand for additional agency investigation or explanation, except in rare circumstances).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding warrants

remand. Accordingly, the decision is REVERSED and the case REMANDED to the ALJ for further 

proceedings. On remand to the Social Security Administration, the ALJ should reconsider Plaintiff’s 

credibility and explain his reasons for determining the extent to which Plaintiff was credible and the 

effect of this determination on Plaintiff’s claim for benefits. The ALJ shall then proceed through steps 

four and five to determine what work, if any, Plaintiff is or was capable of performing and for what 

period of time. If deemed necessary, the Commissioner may hold a further hearing and receive 

additional evidence to address any additional issues. 

The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff Estela Love, and 

against Defendant, Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 12, 2016 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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