Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-01197/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-01197-10/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Experian Information Solutions, Inc.
Defendant
Rick D. Fox
Plaintiff
Trans Union, LLC
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICK D. FOX,

Plaintiff,

v.

EXPERIAN INFORMATION 

SOLUTIONS, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

No. 1-22-cv-01197-DAD-DB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND 

STAYING THE PROCEEDINGS PENDING 

ARBITRATION 

(Doc. No. 46)

This matter is before the court on defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. (Doc. No. 

46.) On September 27, 2023, the pending motion was taken under submission on the papers 

pursuant to Local Rule 230(g) after it was reassigned to the undersigned. (Doc. Nos. 50, 53.) For 

the reasons explained below, the court will grant defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. 

BACKGROUND

On September 21, 2022, plaintiff Rick D. Fox initiated a consumer credit action against 

defendants Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“defendant”) and Trans Union, LLC.1 (Doc. 

No. 1.) In his operative complaint, plaintiff asserts the following four causes of action against 

defendant: (1) failing to establish and/or follow reasonable procedures in violation of 15 U.S.C. 

1

 On July 18, 2023, the court dismissed Trans Union, LLC as a named defendant in this action 

with prejudice pursuant to stipulation by plaintiff and Trans Union, LLC. (See Doc. Nos. 41, 42.) 

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§ 1681e(b); (2) failing to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation in violation of § 1681i; (3) failing 

to establish and/or follow reasonable procedures in violation of California Civil Code § 1785.14; 

and (4) failing to reasonably reinvestigate in violation of California Civil Code § 1785.16. (See 

id.) 

On August 22, 2023, defendant Experian filed the pending motion to compel arbitration, 

contending that by signing up for “CreditWorks,” a credit monitoring service with defendant 

Experian’s corporate affiliate, ConsumerInfo.com, Inc. (which does business as Experian 

Consumer Services (“ECS”)), plaintiff had agreed to arbitrate any claims against defendant 

Experian. (Doc. No. 46-1 at 8.)

2

 Defendant’s motion was accompanied by a declaration from 

David Williams, the Vice President of Business Governance for ConsumerInfo.com, stating that 

his review of enrollment data indicated that plaintiff enrolled in CreditWorks. (Doc. No. 46-2 at 

¶¶ 1, 3.) Mr. Williams also declared that every version of the Terms of Use that was in effect 

during plaintiff’s enrollment in CreditWorks contained an arbitration provision (the “Arbitration 

Agreement”). (Id. at ¶ 6.) At the time that plaintiff filed his lawsuit, the Arbitration Agreement 

in effect stated that “ECS and you agree to arbitrate all disputes and claims between us arising out 

of or relating to this Agreement to the maximum extent permitted by law” and:

The agreement to arbitrate includes, but is not limited to: claims 

arising out of or relating to any aspect of the relationship between us 

arising out of any Service or Website, whether based in contract, tort, 

statute (including, without limitation, the Credit Repair 

Organizations Act) fraud, misrepresentation or any other legal 

theory; claims that arose before this or any prior Agreement 

(including, but not limited to, claims relating to advertising); claims 

that are currently the subject of purported class action litigation in 

which you are not a member of a certified class; and claims that may 

arise after the termination of this Agreement.

(Id. at 46–47.) The Arbitration Agreement further provided that “[f]or purposes of this arbitration 

provision, references to ‘ECS,’ ‘you,’ and ‘us’ shall include our respective parent entities, 

subsidiaries, affiliates . . . .” (Id. at 47.) Based on these provisions, defendant argues that the

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2

 According to the Williams declaration, both ECS and defendant are wholly owned by Experian 

Holdings, Inc. and share the same parent company, Experian plc. (Doc. No. 46-2 at ¶ 2.) 

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court must grant its motion to compel plaintiff to arbitrate his claims against it. (Doc. No. 46-1 at 

12.) 

On September 5, 2023, plaintiff filed his opposition to defendant’s motion, arguing that 

defendant has waived its right to arbitrate. (Doc. No. 46.) On September 13, 2023, defendant 

filed its reply thereto, arguing that there was no waiver and that the issue of waiver has been 

delegated to an arbitrator under the agreement. (Doc. No. 51.) On October 10, 2023, plaintiff 

filed a notice of supplemental authority to alert the court of the decision in Slaten v. Experian 

Info. Sols., Inc., No. 21-cv-09045-MWF, 2023 WL 6890757 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2023). (Doc. No. 

58.) On October 11, 2023, defendant filed a response to plaintiff’s notice of supplemental 

authority. (Doc. No. 59.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

A written provision in any contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle 

a dispute by arbitration is subject to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). 9 U.S.C. § 2. The 

FAA confers on the parties involved the right to obtain an order directing that arbitration proceed 

in the manner provided for in a contract between them. 9 U.S.C. § 4. In considering a motion to 

compel arbitration, the “court’s role under the Act . . . is limited to determining (1) whether a 

valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the 

dispute at issue.” Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 

2000). The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving by a preponderance 

of the evidence the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. Ashbey v. Archstone Prop. Mgmt., 

Inc., 785 F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 2015); Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 771 F.3d 559, 565 

(9th Cir. 2014) (citing Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp., 14 Cal. 4th 394, 413 (1996)). 

“Arbitration is a matter of contract, and the FAA requires courts to honor parties’ expectations.” 

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011). However, parties may rely upon 

generally applicable contract defenses to invalidate an agreement to arbitrate. See id. at 339. 

There is an “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution.” Mitsubishi 

Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985). As such, “any doubts 

concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Id. at 626 

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(quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983)). 

However, the Supreme Court has clarified that “the FAA’s ‘policy favoring arbitration’ does not 

authorize federal courts to invent special, arbitration-preferring procedural rules.” Morgan v. 

Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411, 418 (2022). 

DISCUSSION

Here, plaintiff does not challenge the validity or scope of the parties’ Arbitration 

Agreement. Instead, he argues that he cannot be compelled to arbitrate his claims because 

defendant has waived any right it may have to compel arbitration. (Doc. No. 49 at 3.) Under the

legal standard set forth above, the court will first address whether the issue of waiver can be 

properly resolved by this court or whether it has been delegated to an arbitrator. Then, if 

necessary, the court will determine whether defendant has waived its right to arbitration. Finally, 

the court will decide whether it is appropriate to stay the action if it is found to be properly 

submitted to arbitration.

A. Delegation of the Waiver Issue

As stated above, plaintiff argues that defendant waived its right to compel arbitration. 

(Id.) In its reply, defendant argues that this court should not decide whether a waiver has 

occurred because the issue of waiver has been delegated to an arbitrator. (Doc. No. 51 at 3–6.) 

Whether a party has waived its right to arbitrate is “presumptively for a court and not an 

arbitrator to decide.” Martin v. Yasuda, 829 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2016). However, if parties 

“intend that an arbitrator decide” the issue of waiver, the parties can rebut that presumption with 

“clear and unmistakable language to that effect” in their arbitration agreement. Id. at 1124. 

Defendant argues that the parties’ intent to delegate the waiver issue to arbitration is 

evidenced by the clear and unmistakable language in the Arbitration Agreement stating that “[a]ll 

issues are for the arbitrator to decide, including the scope and enforceability of this arbitration 

provision.” (Doc. Nos. 51 at 4; 46-2 at 47.) However, the Ninth Circuit has previously found that 

similar language appearing in an arbitration agreement is insufficient to overcome the 

presumption and to demonstrate intent to have an arbitrator decide the issue of waiver. See

Martin, 829 F.3d at 1124 (holding that the district court did not err by deciding the waiver issue 

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where the arbitration agreement contained a scope provision stating that “[a]ll determinations as 

to the scope, enforceability and effect of this arbitration agreement shall be decided by the 

arbitrator, and not by a court”); Cox v. Ocean View Hotel Corp., 533 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 

2008) (finding that the district court properly decided the waiver issue despite language in the 

arbitration agreement stating that “[a]ny controversy . . . involving the construction or application 

of the terms, provisions, or conditions of this Agreement or otherwise arising out of or related to 

this Agreement shall likewise be settled by arbitration”). In light of binding Ninth Circuit 

precedent, defendant’s reliance on out-of-circuit authority suggesting that such broad provisions 

are sufficiently clear and unmistakable is unavailing. (See Doc. No. 51 at 3–5.) 

Further, defendant argues that the Arbitration Agreement’s incorporation of American 

Arbitration Association (“AAA”) rules evidences the clear and unmistakable intent to delegate 

the question of waiver to an arbitrator. (Id. at 4–5.) The court also finds this argument to be 

unpersuasive. While the Ninth Circuit has found that incorporating arbitration association rules 

signals such intent, this holding has been limited to cases involving sophisticated parties. See

Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. A.G., 724 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that “as long 

as an arbitration agreement is between sophisticated parties to commercial contracts, those parties 

shall be expected to understand that incorporation of the UNCITRAL rules delegates questions of 

arbitrability”); Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that “as in 

Oracle America, we limit our holding to the facts of the present case, which do involve an 

arbitration agreement ‘between sophisticated parties’”) (citation omitted). Here, plaintiff is an 

ordinary consumer and not a sophisticated party. See Brennan at 1131 (finding that the plaintiff 

was a sophisticated party where he was “an experienced attorney and businessman . . . who 

executed an executive-level employment contract”). Defendant does not address the issue of the 

level of plaintiff’s sophistication in its briefing or attempt to argue otherwise. (Doc. No. 51 at 3–

6.) Accordingly, the court finds that defendant has not rebutted the presumption, with clear and 

unmistakable language, that the issue of waiver should be decided by this court.

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B. Merits of the Waiver Issue

As noted, the parties dispute whether defendant has waived its right to compel arbitration. 

(Doc. Nos. 49 at 3–13; 51 at 3–6.) A party asserting a waiver in this context, here plaintiff, must 

demonstrate: (1) defendant’s knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration; and 

(2) defendant’s intentional acts inconsistent with that existing right. In re Google Assistant Priv. 

Litig., No. 19-cv-04286-BLF, 2024 WL 251407, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2024) (citing Hill v. 

Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC, 59 F.4th 457, 468 (9th Cir. 2023)). Until recently, a party seeking to 

prove waiver of a right to arbitrate was also required to demonstrate a third element, “prejudice to 

the party opposing arbitration resulting from such inconsistent acts.” Britton v. Co-op Banking 

Grp., 916 F.2d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Coinbase, Inc. v. 

Bielski, 599 U.S. 736 (2023). Although plaintiff here advances arguments addressing the issue of 

prejudice it has purportedly suffered, the Supreme Court has eliminated the third element of 

prejudice and thereby lightened plaintiff’s burden here. See Morgan, 596 U.S. at 417 (holding 

that, under the FAA, a court may not “condition a waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing of 

prejudice”). Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan, “the party opposing arbitration still 

bears the burden of showing waiver, [but] the burden is no longer ‘heavy.’” Armstrong v. 

Michaels Stores, Inc., 59 F.4th 1011, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2023) (explaining that “the burden for 

establishing waiver of an arbitration agreement is the same as the burden for establishing waiver 

in any other contractual context”).

In their arguments, the parties appear to agree that the first of the two elements is met 

here. Plaintiff states that defendant was “aware of the existence of an allegedly applicable 

arbitration agreement from the very start, evidenced by its reference to the same as an affirmative 

defense in its Answer.” (Doc. No. 49 at 5; see also Doc. No. 13 at 22.) In its reply, defendant 

agrees that it “pleaded arbitration as an affirmative defense in its Answer.” (Doc. No. 51 at 8.) 

Thus, the court finds that the knowledge requirement is satisfied in this case.

The court then turns to whether plaintiff has established that defendant’s intentional acts 

were inconsistent with it exercising its right to compel arbitration. In doing so, the court must 

consider “the totality of the parties’ actions.” Armstrong, 59 F.4th at 1015 (citation omitted). 

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“[A] party generally ‘acts inconsistently with exercising the right to arbitrate when it (1) makes an 

intentional decision not to move to compel arbitration and (2) actively litigates the merits of a 

case for a prolonged period of time in order to take advantage of being in court.’” Id. (citation 

omitted). Here, plaintiff argues that defendant has acted inconsistently with exercising the right 

to arbitrate due to its delay in moving for arbitration and its participation in this federal action, 

particularly the discovery phase of this litigation. (Doc. No. 49 at 4–13.) 

“[A] party’s extended silence and delay in moving for arbitration may indicate a conscious 

decision to continue to seek judicial judgment on the merits of [the] arbitrable claims, which 

would be inconsistent with a right to arbitrate.” Martin, 829 F.3d at 1125 (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). While the precise length of delay has not been specified as indicating such a 

conscious decision, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that litigating in federal court for well over a 

year in combination with the filing of substantive motions weighs in favor of a finding of waiver. 

See Hill, 59 F.4th at 476 (finding that the defendant acted inconsistently with its right to compel 

arbitration where it filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to a key issue in the case and 

litigated the action for nearly five years); Martin, 829 F.3d at 1126 (finding the right to arbitration 

waived where the defendant litigated in federal court for seventeen months, filed a motion to 

dismiss on a key merits issue, received an adverse ruling, and then moved to compel arbitration); 

Van Ness Townhouses v. Mar Indus. Corp., 862 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding waiver 

where defendant litigated in court for two years and filed a motion to dismiss on the merits). 

Particularly relevant here, moving to compel arbitration within a year of the filing of plaintiff’s 

complaint, in combination with never seeking or obtaining a ruling on the merits, has been found 

by the Ninth Circuit to indicate no waiver of the right to arbitrate. Armstrong, 59 F.4th at 1016 

(finding no waiver under these circumstances, despite the defendant’s propounding of limited

discovery requests). 

In this case, defendant moved to compel arbitration within a year of the filing of plaintiff’s 

complaint, and its motion to compel arbitration is the first substantive motion filed in this action. 

(Doc. No. 51-1 at ¶ 13.) Accordingly, the court finds that defendant’s delay is insufficient to 

establish waiver. See Capps v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2:22-cv-00806-DAD-JDP, 

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2023 WL 3030990, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2023) (finding that almost ten months of delay did 

not establish waiver where “defendant Experian [did] not [seek] nor obtain[] any ruling from the 

court on the merits of the action”).3 

Plaintiff points to defendant’s other filings in this case during the period between the 

filing of the complaint and defendant’s filing of the pending motion to compel arbitration. (Doc. 

No. 49 at 5.) However, the court’s review of these filings (which include a motion for extension 

of time to respond, a notice of interested parties, an answer, notices of appearance of counsel, a 

joint scheduling report, a joint motion for entry of a protective order, a motion to amend the 

parties’ stipulated protective order, and a joint stipulation to extend the discovery deadline), 

reveals that none are indicative of waiver because none sought judicial resolution of plaintiff’s 

claims on the merits and together they do not present “a clear narrative of . . . strategic choice to 

engage the judiciary for resolution of the [] claims rather than to obtain a resolution from an 

arbitrator.” Hill, 59 F.4th at 477; see also Newirth ex rel. Newirth v. Aegis Senior Cmtys., LLC, 

931 F.3d 935, 941–42 (9th Cir. 2019) (distinguishing between seeking resolution “on the merits 

of a key issue in a case” and other litigation activities, such as motions not addressing the merits, 

that do not evince a decision to take advantage of the judicial forum), abrogated on other grounds 

by Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411 (2022).

As noted, plaintiff’s notice of supplemental authority directs this court to a recent decision 

in which another California district court did find that the defendant had waived its right to 

compel arbitration based upon its conduct in actively litigating the case before the court. (Doc. 

No. 58) (citing Slaten v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 21-cv-09045-MWF, 2023 WL 6890757, at 

*5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2023)). However, in that case, the district court’s analysis discussed 

3

 Despite this conclusion, the court notes that under Ninth Circuit precedent, a party’s delay in 

moving to compel arbitration is more likely to be found reasonable when the moving party 

provides an explanation for its delay. See Letizia v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 802 F.2d 1185, 

1187 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding no waiver where the “defendants did not seek arbitration until after 

the close of discovery, nine months after their answer was filed . . . because such a move was 

futile under the then-prevailing law in this circuit”). Defendant here has provided no explanation 

for its delay in moving to compel arbitration, contributing to this court’s sense that this is a close 

case as to waiver. 

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various additional litigation activities that the defendant had engaged in, such as participating in 

mediation and discovery conferences and the making of certain relevant representations to the 

court. Id. (discussing the defendant’s “representations to the [c]ourt suggesting that it would not 

seek to compel arbitration” and “that it ‘anticipates it may file a motion for summary judgment’

on issues going to the merits of [the p]laintiff’s claims”). Here, the minimal substantive filings 

and the eleven months that elapsed between the filing of plaintiff’s complaint and defendant’s 

motion to compel arbitration, in the absence of other such indications of waiver, do not satisfy 

plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating that defendant has acted inconsistently with exercising its 

right to compel arbitration. 

In further support of its waiver argument, plaintiff has filed a declaration wherein his

attorney James Ristvedt states that on March 23, 2023, defendant served 20 requests for 

admission, 18 interrogatories, and 23 requests for production on plaintiff. (Doc. No. 49-1 at ¶ 2.) 

Attorney Ristvedt explains that in response, plaintiff produced more than 800 pages of 

documents. (Id.) He also states that about two months later, defendant sought supplemental 

written discovery responses from plaintiff, which were provided thereafter. (Id.) In response, 

defendant’s attorney, Jayce Gustafson, filed a declaration clarifying that plaintiff produced 776 

pages of documents, over half of which consisted of consumer credit disclosures and other 

communications from defendant’s affiliate, Experience Consumer Services. (Doc. No. 51-1 at ¶ 

11.) Attorney Gustafson added that plaintiff’s counsel took one deposition, while defendant has 

taken no depositions in this matter and has also note engaged in any third party discovery. (Id. at 

¶¶ 8, 12.) 

The discovery activity in this case is somewhat troubling to the court in resolving the 

pending motion. Defendant has provided no explanation for its decision to propound written 

discovery, and to even go so far as to seek supplemental written discovery, all while admittedly 

knowing that there was an arbitration agreement that bound the parties to conducting discovery 

subject to AAA rules. (Doc. No. 46-2 at 48.) Further, defendant makes no argument that the 

discovery conducted in this case was narrowly tailored, for example limited to determining the 

existence or applicability of the arbitration provision or other procedural matters. Rather than 

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explaining why the court should not view the discovery activity as evidence of an intent to 

litigate, defendant attempts to analogize the present facts to a past case in which this court found 

that the same defendant had not waived its right to arbitrate. See Doc. No. 51 at 3, 6 (defendant 

claiming three times that the facts of this case are “indistinguishable” from that of Capps, 2023 

WL 3030990). However, the defendant’s engagement in discovery in Capps was far less 

substantial than in the instant case. See Capps, 2023 WL 3030990 at *7 (noting that the parties 

exchanged document requests, requests for admission, interrogatories, and deposition notices, but 

defendant Experian filed its motion to compel arbitration before either party had responded to the 

interrogatories or produced documents). 

Despite defendant’s lack of explanation for its participation in discovery, the court finds 

that the weight of the relevant authority suggests that the discovery activity in this case is shy of 

being sufficient to establish a waiver. See Last v. M-I, L.L.C., No. 1:20-cv-01205-NODJ-EPG, 

2024 WL 551948, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2024) (concluding that the defendant had not engaged 

in intentional acts inconsistent with its right to compel arbitration despite discovery activity 

including the conducting of five depositions); Palmer v. Omni Hotel Mgmt. Corp., No. 15-cv01527 JM-MDD, 2016 WL 816017, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2016) (finding no waiver on the 

part of the plaintiff despite his engaging in written discovery, noticing multiple depositions, and 

taking a deposition). Plaintiff has not been able to “cite any instance in which a court has 

determined discovery requests alone—however extensive—are so inconsistent with a right to 

arbitrate that they effect waiver.” Sywula v. Teleport Mobility, Inc., No. 21-cv-01450-BAS-SBC, 

2023 WL 4630620, at *10 (S.D. Cal. July 18, 2023) (finding that the plaintiff did not meet his 

burden to demonstrate waiver, despite the fact that the defendants deposed him and served him 

with discovery requests that bled into the merits and required production of thousands of 

documents). 

Further, plaintiff has failed to direct the court to any case in which a court has found that a 

similar level of engaging with the discovery process alone, without the filing of any substantive 

motions, could amount to waiver. The court’s own review of cases in which a party was found to 

have waived its right to arbitrate, despite no filing or discussion of substantive motions, suggests 

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that more substantial pursuit of discovery, and even court involvement in discovery, may be 

required to find waiver of the right to arbitrate. See Augusta v. Keehn & Assocs., 193 Cal. App. 

4th 331, 339 (2011) (finding that the plaintiff waived the right to arbitrate where he propounded 

interrogatories, requests for admission, and document production, demanded supplemental 

responses, filed two motions to compel, and sought monetary sanctions for discovery rule 

violations, despite an arbitration clause prohibiting formal discovery); Guess?, Inc. v. Superior 

Ct., 79 Cal. App. 4th 553, 558 (2000) (finding that the defendant acted inconsistently with its 

right to arbitrate where it “fully participated in the discovery process” by sending “two sets of 

lawyers” to the depositions, objecting “in court and out” to discovery demands, and “taking full 

advantage of the opportunity to test the validity of [the plaintiff’s] claims, both legally and 

factually”); see also Madrid v. Lazer Spot, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-00669-JLT, 2020 WL 4274218, at 

*8 (E.D. Cal. July 24, 2020) (finding that the plaintiff acted inconsistently with his right to 

compel arbitration where he propounded and responded to interrogatories and requests for 

production, took four depositions, defended one deposition, and filed a discovery motion related 

to the defendant’s “refusal to designate a deponent”). The discovery activity in this action has not 

involved coming before the court on a motion to compel, a motion for sanctions, objections to 

discovery demands, a motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6), or the like. The 

court thus concludes that plaintiff has not shown that the discovery activity engaged in here, 

although not as limited as defendant suggests through analogy, is enough to lead to the conclusion 

that the right to compel arbitration has been waived.

Lastly, plaintiff argues in conclusory fashion that defendant not only vigorously 

participated in discovery before filing the pending motion to compel arbitration, but also 

manipulated the judicial process by pursuing avenues in discovery likely not available to it in

arbitration. (Doc. No. 49 at 8, 10.) Such manipulation could indeed indicate the making of a 

“strategic choice” for judicial rather than arbitral resolution. Hill, 59 F.4th at 477; see also Plows 

v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (finding waiver where the 

defendant pursued broader discovery than what would have been permissible in arbitration given 

the arbitration agreement’s specific discovery limitations). However, here, plaintiff has not 

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identified discovery avenues that defendant has pursued in this action that would not be available 

in arbitration, and he has not identified provisions in the Arbitration Agreement that conflict with 

the discovery that has already been conducted in this action. The court’s own review of the AAA 

rules for consumer actions suggests that a discovery process is available in arbitration and is not 

specifically tailored such that the discovery exchanged here would necessarily be prohibited. See

American Arbitration Association Consumer Arbitration Rules (2014), at 20 (stating that “[i]f any 

party asks or if the arbitrator decides on his or her own . . . the arbitrator may direct specific 

documents and other information to be shared between the consumer and business”). Thus, while 

the court questions defendant’s choice to engage in discovery before filing the pending motion, it

cannot find that plaintiff has demonstrated that the discovery conducted in this case is sufficient 

evidence of an active litigation strategy by defendant resulting in waiver of its right to arbitrate. 

Having considered plaintiff’s arguments regarding the totality of defendant’s actions in 

this case, including its filings in this action, its discovery activities, and its delay in moving for 

arbitration, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to establish that defendant’s intentional acts 

were sufficiently inconsistent with the exercising of its right to compel arbitration. However, the 

court again cautions defendant that it finds this to be a much closer case than what has previously 

come before the court, in light of defendant’s many months of knowledge of the arbitration 

provision, active participation in litigation activities before moving to compel arbitration, and the 

lack of explanation for these actions.

C. Staying Proceedings Pending Resolution of Arbitration

Based on its consideration of the totality of the circumstances described above, the court 

concludes that defendant has not waived its right to compel plaintiff into arbitration and will thus 

grant the pending motion. In addition, as is undisputed between the parties, any disagreement 

between them regarding the scope of the Arbitration Agreement and whether it covers the dispute 

between them is a matter that has been clearly and unmistakably delegated to the arbitrator under 

the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. (Doc. Nos. 46-1 at 21–22; 49 at 3–4.) 

Within its motion to compel arbitration, defendant requests that the court stay further 

litigation of this case pending resolution of arbitration. (Doc. No. 46-1 at 22.) In his opposition, 

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plaintiff does not address defendant’s stay request. (Doc. No. 49.) Under § 3 of the FAA, where 

an issue involved in a proceeding is properly referred to arbitration, the district court “shall on 

application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in 

accordance with the terms of the agreement . . . .” 9 U.S.C. § 3. Accordingly, because the court

has concluded that this action will be referred to arbitration, the court also finds that it must stay 

this action through the completion of arbitration pursuant to § 3 of the FAA.4

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above,

1. Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration (Doc. No. 46) is granted and both this 

action and plaintiff’s asserted claims are stayed pending the completion of 

arbitration; 

2. Plaintiff and defendant are required to notify the court that arbitration proceedings 

have concluded within fourteen (14) days of the issuance of the arbitrator’s 

decision; and

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4

 Under Ninth Circuit precedent, there is an exception to the requirement that a court must stay 

litigation pending arbitration where “the court determines that all of the claims raised in the action 

are subject to arbitration.” Forrest v. Spizzirri, 62 F.4th 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 2023), cert. granted, 

Smith v. Spizzirri, No. 22-1218, 2024 WL 133822 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2024) (citing Johnmohammadi v. 

Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 755 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 2014)). The Supreme Court recently granted 

the petition for certiorari in Forrest in order to decide whether the FAA allows for this exception. 

Spizzirri, 2024 WL 133822, at *1. In the meantime, some district courts have taken the approach 

of staying cases temporarily where arbitration is being compelled. See Rossi v. Purvis, No. 23-

cv-04148-PCP, 2024 WL 319679, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2024) (“Given the possibility of a 

change in this area of the law, the Court will stay this case until July 1, 2024. In the absence of 

new authority precluding dismissal, this case will be dismissed on that date.”); Last, 2024 WL 

551948, at *13 (adopting the same approach with a July 15, 2024 dismissal date). However, the 

court has made no determination that all of the claims presented in the action are properly subject 

to arbitration. As mentioned previously, the parties agree that the scope of the Arbitration 

Agreement and the arbitrability of their claims is a matter delegated to the arbitrator. (Doc. Nos. 

46-1 at 21–22; 49 at 3–4.) Thus, the court finds that the Ninth Circuit’s exception does not apply 

to the instant case. 

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3. Because the action is now stayed pending the completion of arbitration, all dates 

currently on the calendar in this case are vacated. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 22, 2024 

DALE A. DROZD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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