Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-08-05000/USCOURTS-ca4-08-05000-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Curtis Robert Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 08-5000

CURTIS ROBERT WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge.

(1:08-cr-00059-LMB-1)

Argued: September 22, 2009

Decided: January 21, 2010

Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and

James P. JONES, Chief United States District Judge for the

Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the

opinion, in which Judge Duncan and Judge Jones joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Todd M. Richman, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL

PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.

Andrew McCormack, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

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ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON

BRIEF: Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender,

Alexandria, Virginia; Ian Conner, HUNTON & WILLIAMS,

LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, Acting United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

OPINION

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

Based on evidence seized from his home during execution

of a search warrant, Curtis Williams was convicted of possession of an unregistered machine gun and an unregistered

silencer, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871, and

possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2256(8)(A). The district court sentenced him to 41 months’ imprisonment.

Before trial, Williams filed a motion to suppress the

machine gun, the silencer, and a DVD containing the pornography, arguing that the search for and seizure of them

exceeded the scope of the search warrant and that their seizure

was not justified by the "plain-view" exception to the warrant

requirement. The district court denied the motion, and Williams now appeals this ruling.

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the search for

and seizure of the child pornography fell within the scope of

the warrant or, alternatively, that its seizure was justified

under the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement.

We conclude that the seizure of the machine gun and silencer

was justified by the plain-view exception. Accordingly, we

affirm.

I

In September 2007, the Fairfax Baptist Temple in Fairfax

Station, Virginia, began receiving threatening e-mail mes2 UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS

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sages from an individual identifying himself as "Franklin

Pugh." Similar and related e-mails were later received from

several other e-mail accounts, registered in the names of children attending the Fairfax Baptist Temple School, who had

been referred to in the earlier e-mails.

In an e-mail dated October 16, 2007, Pugh named several

young boys who attended the Fairfax Baptist Temple School,

describing their physical characteristics. He stated that he was

a pedophile, that he could not face life without having sex

with the boys, and that he could not attend the Fairfax Baptist

Temple again unless he could give oral sex to a boy at the

church whom he identified by name. At the end of the e-mail,

he stated, "I know your boy’s names. I know where they go

for lunch after church. I know where they live. I know when

they come and leave school. There’s boys I’d love to sleep

with right now. There is an endless supply. Boy dick is everywhere."

In an e-mail dated October 22, 2007, the sender, now identifying himself as one of the boys named in an earlier e-mail,

wrote in the same vein as earlier e-mails. After sending several more e-mails, the sender announced that he would be getting a new account to send further messages. Nonetheless,

several more e-mails were sent under this name, continuing to

discuss molesting the boys at the Fairfax Baptist Temple

School, sacrificing them to God like Abraham and Isaac, and

having sex with one of the boys post-sacrifice, unless "God

makes me burn him."

Beginning on October 24, 2007, similar e-mails were

received from an account registered under the name of the

father of the pastor of Fairfax Baptist Temple. Again the messages discussed molesting the boys there. One of these emails included the following passage:

I think I might be close to getting saved. Jesus

allowed me to see [Boy 1’s] erection last night. I

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prayed all day and all night and Jesus showed it to

me. Just like Isaac’s and Ishmael’s penis[es] in the

bible book. [Boy 1] is the most beautiful boy I have

ever seen. Why did God make boys so beautiful if

we aren’t allowed to enjoy them? I know it will be

a sin to have sex with [Boy 1] or [Boy 2] or especially the younger boys, but I can’t see any way not

to do it. Now that Jesus showed me his erection I

know it is alright to love [Boy 1].

Upon investigation, the Fairfax County Police determined

that at least one of the e-mail accounts from which e-mails

had been received had been accessed repeatedly by an Internet account registered to Karol Williams, in Clifton, Virginia,

who is the wife of the defendant, Curtis Williams. Both Karol

and Curtis were active members of the Fairfax Baptist Temple. Upon learning this, the police applied for a warrant to

search Karol and Curtis Williams’ home.

In the affidavit supporting the warrant application, Fairfax

County Detective Craig Paul summarized the e-mails, detailed

the police investigation to date, and stated that the evidence

supported his belief that violations of state law had occurred,

particularly § 18.2-60 of the Virginia Code, prohibiting any

person from communicating threats to kill or do bodily harm

to persons at elementary, middle, or secondary schools, and

§ 18.2-152.7:1, prohibiting harassment by computer by communicating "obscene, vulgar, profane, lewd, lascivious, or

indecent language, or mak[ing] any suggestion or proposal of

an obscene nature." To support his concern for the safety of

the boys at the school, Detective Paul highlighted the e-mail

statements, "I know your boy’s names. I know where they go

for lunch after church. I know where they live. I know when

they come and leave school."

In addition to providing the factual basis for the violations,

Detective Paul explained, "It has been your Affiant’s training

and experience that adults who are engaged in the sexual

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exploitation of children keep images and related documents

with them. They also collect images and texts describing sexual interaction with minors and child erotica."1

 The detective

described the child pornography market, the use of computers

and other recording devices, and the need to seize and search

various types of electronic media to locate evidence of the

threat crimes, including evidence properly characterized as

child pornography.

Based on Detective Paul’s affidavit, a Fairfax County magistrate issued a search warrant on October 25, 2007, that

"commanded" officers to search for and seize from the home

of Karol and Curtis Williams:

Any and all computer systems and digital storage

media, videotapes, videotape recorders, documents,

photographs, and Instrumentalities indicat[ive] of the

offense of § 18.2-152.7:1 Harassment by Computer

and § 18.2-60 Threats of death or bodily injury to a

person or member of his family; threats to commit

serious bodily harm to persons on school property,

Code of Virginia (as amended).

Police, along with the FBI, executed the warrant the next

day and seized several computers, CDs, DVDs, and other

electronic media devices.

The police also seized a machine gun and a silencer, both

without serial numbers, which they discovered during their

search in a small lockbox in Williams’ garage. Detective Peter

Charles found the lockbox while searching the garage, and,

believing that it might contain evidence authorized by the

warrant, he opened it. Inside, Detective Charles observed a

machine gun and silencer, although it was not immediately

clear that these firearms were illegally owned. Detective

1

"Child erotica" is understood to refer to non-pornographic images of

children, apparently used for sexual gratification. 

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Charles picked up the gun to determine whether it was loaded

and, during the course of this inspection, noticed that neither

the gun nor the silencer had a serial number on it. As Detective Charles later explained, "Based on the examination,

which is primarily for my own safety, to make sure [the gun]

wasn’t loaded, I noticed that neither the silencer nor the

weapon itself had any serial numbers. In my experience and

training, there is no reason for any weapon to have—not have

any serial numbers and still be legally owned." Having identified the guns and silencer as contraband, Detective Charles

seized them and continued his search.

The FBI agents who had participated in the search of the

Williams’ house took the computers and electronic media and

later searched their contents. During the course of that search,

FBI Agent Michael French reported in an e-mail sent to the

U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of Virginia that

"we found many deleted images of young male erotica from

September-October 2007. We also found [that] the anonymizer software TOR had been installed." He concluded by

saying that he hoped to find Williams’ "collection" on the laptop and USB thumbdrives the following week.

Sometime later during his search, Agent French opened a

DVD that had been seized from the Williams’ home, labeled

with the words, "Virus Shield, Quaranteed Files, Destroy."

Upon opening the DVD, he observed over a thousand images

in "thumbnail view" of minor boys, some of which were sexually suggestive and some of which were sexually explicit. Of

the total number of images, approximately 39 constituted

child pornography.2

2After observing these images, Agent French obtained a second search

warrant from federal authorities specifically to authorize a search for child

pornography on Williams’ computers and electronic media. Williams’

challenge to the search and seizure, however, is directed to the authority

of the officers to search the computers and electronic media under the state

warrant. 

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Williams was indicted on two counts of possession of an

unregistered firearm (the machine gun and the silencer), in

violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871, and one count of

possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2256(8)(A). After he was indicted,

Williams filed a motion to suppress the child pornography,

the machine gun, and the silencer, contending that their seizure exceeded the scope of the warrant and was not justified

by the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement.

The district court denied Williams’ motion. The court

explained, with respect to the child pornography, "The fact

that a person who’s already under suspicion for threatening to

do bodily harm to minors would have imagery within his

computer or within his home showing significant mistreatment of minors in my view is sufficiently within the ambit of

those concerns to permit the agents to search for that [under

the warrant]." The court concluded that the child pornography

was "evidence and instrumentalities of criminal activity" and

therefore that its seizure was authorized by the warrant. With

respect to the machine gun and the silencer, the court concluded that their seizure was justified under the plain-view

exception to the warrant requirement:

The officer was legitimately in the location where he

saw the item, because the lockbox was large enough

to hold the specific items that were involved in the

warrant. . . .

The detective in my view was -– legitimately had the

right to handle the weapon to make sure it was not

armed. In doing so he notices no serial number on

either the silencer or the machine gun.

That in my view was more than sufficient probable

cause for the officer to believe that he had contraband per se in his possession. He was therefore obliUNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS 7

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gated in my view to seize it at that point. That’s not

a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Williams agreed to be tried by the court on stipulated facts,

and the court found him guilty of all three charges. Williams

now appeals the district court’s ruling on his motion to suppress the DVD containing images of child pornography, the

machine gun, and the silencer.

II

Williams contends first that the government’s seizure of a

DVD containing 39 images of child pornography, which

formed the basis for his conviction under 18 U.S.C.

§§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2256(8)(A), violated his Fourth

Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

He asserts that the search warrant did not authorize a search

of his computer and related digital media for child pornography. Rather, it only authorized a search for and seizure of evidence relating to two designated Virginia crimes involving

threats of bodily harm and harassment by computer.

Indeed, his argument is more nuanced. Reasoning that

"[s]ince computers can hold so much information, touching

on virtually every aspect of a person’s life, the potential for

invasion of privacy in a search of electronic evidence is significantly greater than in the context of a non-computer

search," Williams argues that traditional Fourth Amendment

rules cannot be successfully applied in this context. He specifically relies on an article by Professor Orin Kerr, in which

Professor Kerr maintained that a new approach is needed for

applying the Fourth Amendment to searches of computers and

digital media. See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a

Digital World, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 531 (2005). Professor Kerr

explained:

The new dynamics of computer searches and seizures teach important lessons about the Fourth

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Amendment. For most of its first two centuries, the

Fourth Amendment was used almost exclusively to

regulate government searches of homes and containers. The mechanisms of home and container searches

directed Fourth Amendment doctrine to focus primarily on the entrance to the home or container. In

a world of physical barriers, actions that broke down

those physical barriers became the focus of judicial

attention. The world of digital search and seizure

shows that this focus is contingent on the architecture of physical searches. As computer searches and

seizures become more common in the future, we will

begin to see twentieth-century Fourth Amendment

doctrine as a contingent set of rules that achieves the

foundational goals of the Fourth Amendment law

given the dynamics of searching physical property.

Those physical rules will be matched by a set of

rules for digital searches and seizures that attempts

to achieve the same purpose in a very different factual context.

Id. at 584-85; see also Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 Harv. J.L. & Tech.

75, 105 (1994) ("Since electronic storage is likely to contain

a greater quantity and variety of information than any previous storage method, computers make tempting targets in

searches for incriminating information."). But see David J.S.

Ziff, Note, Fourth Amendment Limitations on the Execution

of Computer Searches Conducted Pursuant to a Warrant, 105

Colum. L. Rev. 841, 861-72 (2005) (arguing that traditional

Fourth Amendment rules can successfully be applied to digital searches).

Emphasizing the basic principle that a search warrant must

not authorize general searches but must particularize the place

and items to be searched, Williams argues that the warrant in

this case must not be read to have authorized officers to view

each file on the computer, but rather to have authorized a

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search of only those files in his computer that related to the

designated state offenses. Applying this limitation to the

search in this case, Williams argues that the authorization for

the search of his computers and digital media was limited to

files relating to the two Virginia crimes of threatening bodily

harm and harassment by computer, and that the files relating

to child pornography fell outside the scope of the warrant and

therefore were seized without a warrant.

In addition, Williams argues that the search for and seizure

of child pornography in this case did not fall within any recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant

requirement. To apply the plain-view exception in the context

of computer searches would, Williams argues, "effectively

read[ ] the warrant requirement out of the Fourth Amendment." Relying heavily on United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d

1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999), which held that child pornography discovered on a computer during the course of a search

for evidence of drug transactions must be suppressed because

it was not "inadvertently discovered," Williams argues that

the plain-view exception cannot be applied in the context of

computer searches unless the files sought to be seized pursuant to the exception are discovered "inadvertently." In this

case, Williams observes that the officers suspected him of

possessing child pornography from the outset of their investigation and that they used the warrant’s authorization to search

for such materials, which, he maintains, fell outside the scope

of the warrant. Such a scenario, he concludes, can hardly be

thought of as "inadvertent," and thus the plain-view exception

cannot justify the seizure of the images.

The government contends that the child pornography

images fell within the scope of the search warrant as "instrumentalities" of the designated Virginia crime involving threats

to persons on school property. The government notes that

Williams had been involved in "extensive e-mail communications with church officials regarding the sexual exploitation of

children. These e-mails involved both overt and thinly dis10 UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS

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guised threats to molest and kill real children attending the

church. Further, at least one of these e-mails made express

reference to the fact that defendant had knowledge of when

the children ‘come and leave school.’" The government

argues that in response to this threat, police officers obtained

a search warrant authorizing the seizure of computer-based

evidence of the designated crimes and instrumentalities for

the commission of those crimes, which, because of the nature

of the offenses, included an authorization to search for and

seize child pornography.

The government also notes that, while it does not need to

rely on the affidavit supporting the search warrant, the affidavit explained that individuals involved in the criminal conduct

identified often collect images of the sexual exploitation of

children and tend to collect these images through the Internet.

Thus, it reasons, the district court was correct in finding that

child pornography constituted an "instrumentality" of the designated crimes. It concludes, "Simply stated, the child pornography constituted, among other things, computer-based

evidence and/or an instrumentality indicative of the offense of

Section 18.2-60 threats to commit serious bodily harm to persons on school property." (Internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Alternatively, the government contends that if the child

pornography was seized without the warrant’s authorization,

its seizure was nonetheless justified under the plain-view

exception to the warrant requirement. It observes that the warrant authorized officers to search Williams’ computer and

computer storage devices and that, during the search of those

items, the officers came upon the DVD containing thumbnail

images of child pornography, whose nature as contraband was

clear.

The parties’ contentions thus present two questions: (1)

whether the government’s search for and seizure of child pornography fell within the scope of the warrant’s authorization;

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and (2) whether the evidence of child pornography was in any

event properly seized under the plain-view exception to the

warrant requirement. We address these in order.

A

The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures" and provides that

"no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported

by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place

to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." At its

core, the Fourth Amendment protects against general warrants

that authorize "exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings . . . by requiring a particular description of the things to

be seized." Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976)

(internal quotation marks omitted). The particularity requirement is fulfilled when the warrant identifies the items to be

seized by their relation to designated crimes and when the

description of the items leaves nothing to the discretion of the

officer executing the warrant. See Andresen, 427 U.S. at 480-

82; Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965).

When a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant, it "is

limited in scope by the terms of the warrant’s authorization."

United States v. Phillips, No. 07-4230, ___ F.3d ___, 2009

WL 4061558, at *4 (4th Cir. Nov. 24, 2009); see also Walter

v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (plurality opinion);

United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 555 (4th Cir.

2000). But the terms of the warrant are not to be interpreted

in a "hypertechnical" manner. United States v. Robinson, 275

F.3d 371, 380 (4th Cir. 2001). Rather, they should be read

with a "commonsense and realistic" approach, to avoid turning a search warrant into a "constitutional straight jacket."

Phillips, ___ F.3d at ___, 2009 WL 4061558, at *4 (quoting

United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965), and

United States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195, 1198 (4th Cir.

1988)).

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When a search requires review of a large collection of

items, such as papers, "it is certain that some innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized

to be seized." Andresen, 427 U.S. at 482 n.11; see also United

States v. Crouch, 648 F.2d 932, 933-34 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that officers may conduct "some cursory reading" of documents discovered during the course of a search to determine

their relevance to the crime providing the basis for the

search). If, in those circumstances, documents not covered by

the warrant are improperly seized, the government should

promptly return the documents or the trial judge should suppress them. See Andresen, 427 U.S. at 482 n.11. While the

constitutional protection cannot demand perfection, any tolerance of imperfection does not give officers "free rein to ransack and take what they like[ ]." Phillips, ___ F.3d at ___,

2009 WL 4061558, at *9.

In this case, the warrant authorized a search for and seizure

of "[a]ny and all computer systems and digital storage media,

. . . documents, photographs, and Instrumentalities" indicative

of the Virginia state law offenses stated in Va. Code Ann.

§§ 18.2-152.7:1 (harassment by computer) and 18.2-60

(threats of death or bodily injury to a person or member of his

family; threats to commit serious bodily harm to persons on

school property). A violation of the referenced harassment by

computer offense includes using a computer or computer network "to communicate obscene, vulgar, profane, lewd, lascivious, or indecent language, or to make any suggestion or

proposal of an obscene nature, or threaten any illegal or

immoral act." Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-152.7:1. The district

court held that within the scope of that offense was the narrower conduct of making violent and sexual threats against

children from the Williams’ residence. The court concluded

that it was relevant to any prosecution of the designated

offense that the defendant possessed images in which children

were sexually exploited. It thus found that the images of child

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pornography on the DVD were "instrumentalities" of the

computer harassment charge.

We agree with the court’s reasoning. While the warrant did

not explicitly authorize a search for child pornography, it did

authorize a search for instrumentalities of computer harassment and "photographs . . . indicati[ve] of" this offense, which

involves communicating "obscene, vulgar, profane, lewd, lascivious, or indecent language," or making a "suggestion or

proposal of an obscene nature," or threatening an "illegal or

immoral act." Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-152.7:1. Particularly in

the context of the threats made in this case, which indicated

that the person sending the e-mails to the church was a

pedophile, pornographic images involving children were relevant to demonstrating the authorship and purpose of the emails. The e-mails stated that the sender could not face life

without having sex with the boys and that he could not attend

the church again unless he could give oral sex to a specific

boy at the church, whom he identified by the child’s actual

name. In addition, the sender of the e-mail stated, "I know

your boy’s names. I know where they go for lunch after

church. I know where they live. I know when they come and

leave school. There’s boys I’d love to sleep with right now.

There is an endless supply. Boy dick is everywhere."

The fact that the DVD containing child pornography might

also have indicated crimes other than those described in the

warrant does not preclude its seizure. "Courts have never held

that a search is overbroad merely because it results in additional criminal charges." Phillips, ___ F.3d at ___, 2009 WL

4061558, at *5. Thus, the fact that possession of child pornography is itself a crime does not render the seizure outside the

scope of an investigation into the computer harassment crime.

Whether seized evidence falls within the scope of a warrant’s

authorization must be assessed solely in light of the relation

between the evidence and the terms of the warrant’s authorization. See id.; United States v. Srivastava, 540 F.3d 277, 290

(4th Cir. 2008).

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In this case, we believe that the district court did not err in

concluding that the images of child pornography contained on

the DVD were sufficiently relevant to the crimes designated

in the warrant to justify their seizure under the warrant.

B

Even if we were to conclude that the warrant did not authorize a search for child pornography, we conclude alternatively

that the seizure of the images portraying child pornography

was, in any event, justified by the plain-view exception to the

warrant requirement.

As a general rule, warrantless searches or seizures are per

se unreasonable. But there are "a few specifically established

and well-delineated exceptions." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.

385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,

357 (1967)); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,

824-25 (1982). One such exception is that "under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,

465 (1971) (plurality opinion). Under this exception, police

may seize evidence in plain view during a lawful search if (1)

the seizing officer is "lawfully present at the place from which

the evidence can be plainly viewed"; (2) the seizing officer

has "‘a lawful right of access to the object itself’"; and (3)

"the object’s ‘incriminating character [is] . . . immediately

apparent,’" United States v. Legg, 18 F.3d 240, 242 (4th Cir.

1994) (quoting Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37

(1990)); see also United States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 707

(4th Cir. 2006). "The plain-view doctrine is grounded on the

proposition that once police are lawfully in a position to

observe an item first-hand, its owner’s privacy interest in that

item is lost; the owner may retain the incidents of title and

possession but not privacy." Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765,

771 (1983) (emphasis added).

The justification for the plain-view exception becomes evident when considering the difference between searches and

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seizures. "A search compromises the individual interest in privacy; a seizure deprives the individual of dominion over his

or her person or property." Horton, 496 U.S. at 133. "If an

article is already in plain view, neither its observation nor its

seizure would involve any invasion of privacy. A seizure of

the article, however, would obviously invade the owner’s possessory interest." Id. at 133-34 (emphasis added) (internal

citations omitted). Thus, the mere observation of an item in

plain view during the course of a lawful search does not

implicate any Fourth Amendment concerns and therefore does

not need to be justified by any exception to the warrant

requirement. And its seizure is justified by the fact that any

ownership or possessory interest in the item is defeated by its

illegality.

In this case, the warrant authorized a search of Williams’

computers and digital media for evidence relating to the designated Virginia crimes of making threats and computer

harassment. To conduct that search, the warrant impliedly

authorized officers to open each file on the computer and

view its contents, at least cursorily, to determine whether the

file fell within the scope of the warrant’s authorization—i.e.,

whether it related to the designated Virginia crimes of making

threats or computer harassment. See Andresen, 427 U.S. at

482 n.11; Crouch, 648 F.2d at 933-34. To be effective, such

a search could not be limited to reviewing only the files’ designation or labeling, because the designation or labeling of

files on a computer can easily be manipulated to hide their

substance. Surely, the owner of a computer, who is engaged

in criminal conduct on that computer, will not label his files

to indicate their criminality. See United States v. Hill, 459

F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2006) ("‘Criminals will do all they can

to conceal contraband, including the simple expedient of

changing the names and extensions of files to disguise their

content from the casual observer’" (quoting with approval the

district court’s opinion)); United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp.

2d 524, 527 n.5 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("[C]omputer files can be

misleadingly labeled, particularly if the owner of those files

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is trying to conceal illegal materials"); see also United States

v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[F]ew people

keep documents of their criminal transactions in a folder

marked ‘drug records’").

Once it is accepted that a computer search must, by implication, authorize at least a cursory review of each file on the

computer, then the criteria for applying the plain-view exception are readily satisfied. See Ziff, supra, at 861-66. First, an

officer who has legal possession of the computer and electronic media and a legal right to conduct a search of it is "lawfully present at the place from which evidence can be

viewed," thus satisfying the first element of the plain-view

exception. See Legg, 18 F.3d at 242 (quoting Horton, 496

U.S. at 136). Second, the officer, who is authorized to search

the computer and electronic media for evidence of a crime

and who is therefore legally authorized to open and view all

its files, at least cursorily, to determine whether any one falls

within the terms of the warrant, has "a lawful right of access"

to all files, albeit only momentarily. Horton, 496 at 136; see

also Andresen, 427 U.S. at 482 n.11; Crouch, 648 F.2d at

933-34. And third, when the officer then comes upon child

pornography, it becomes "immediately apparent" that its possession by the computer’s owner is illegal and incriminating.

See Horton, 496 U.S. at 136. And so, in this case, any child

pornography viewed on the computer or electronic media may

be seized under the plain-view exception.

Williams, relying on the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in United

States v. Carey, advances an argument that the plain-view

exception cannot apply to searches of computers and electronic media when the evidence indicates that it is the officer’s purpose from the outset to use the authority of the

warrant to search for unauthorized evidence because the unauthorized evidence would not then be uncovered "inadvertently." See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1273.

This argument, however, cannot stand against the principle,

well-established in Supreme Court jurisprudence, that the

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scope of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant is defined

objectively by the terms of the warrant and the evidence

sought, not by the subjective motivations of an officer. See

Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) ("Thus, the

scope of a lawful search is ‘defined by the object of the search

and the places in which there is probable cause to believe it

may be found’" (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 824)); see also

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)

("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probablecause Fourth Amendment analysis"). As the Court stated in

Horton, "[t]he fact that an officer is interested in an [unauthorized] item of evidence and fully expects to find it in the

course of a search should not invalidate its seizure if the

search is confined in area and duration by the terms of a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement." 496

U.S. at 138. In that case, the Court explicitly rejected the very

argument that Williams makes in this case, that unauthorized

evidence must be suppressed because its discovery was not

"inadvertent." As the Horton Court explained, "[E]ven though

inadvertence is a characteristic of most legitimate ‘plain view’

seizures, it is not a necessary condition." Id. at 130.

While Williams relies accurately on Carey, which effectively imposes an "inadvertence" requirement, such a conclusion is inconsistent with Horton. Inadvertence focuses

incorrectly on the subjective motivations of the officer in conducting the search and not on the objective determination of

whether the search is authorized by the warrant or a valid

exception to the warrant requirement.3

3We note that several of our cases decided prior to Horton required that

evidence discovered during the course of a search be discovered "inadvertently" in order to be seized pursuant to the plain-view exception. See, e.g.,

United States v. Talbot, 902 F.2d 1129, 1132 (4th Cir. 1990) ("Under the

plain-view doctrine, the warrantless seizure of property is permissible if

the following criteria are satisfied: (1) the police officer must first be

engaged in a lawful intrusion or must otherwise legitimately occupy the

position affording a plain view of the evidence seized; (2) the discovery

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In this case, because the scope of the search authorized by

the warrant included the authority to open and cursorily view

each file, the observation of child pornography within several

of these files did not involve an intrusion on Williams’ protected privacy interests beyond that already authorized by the

warrant, regardless of the officer’s subjective motivations. See

Horton, 496 U.S. at 133-34 & n.5. And neither did the seizure

of these photographs interfere with Williams’ possessory

interests, for once their nature as contraband became apparent,

Williams’ possessory interests were forfeited.

At bottom, we conclude that the sheer amount of information contained on a computer does not distinguish the authorized search of the computer from an analogous search of a

file cabinet containing a large number of documents. As the

Supreme Court recognized in Andresen, "[T]here are grave

dangers inherent in executing a warrant authorizing a search

and seizure of a person’s papers that are not necessarily present in executing a warrant to search for physical objects

whose relevance is more easily ascertainable." 427 U.S. at

482 n.11. While that danger certainly counsels care and

of the evidence must be inadvertent; and (3) it must be immediately apparent that the evidence may be either contraband or evidence of a crime");

United States v. Fawole, 785 F.2d 1141, 1145 (4th Cir. 1986) ("The warrantless seizure of private possessions is permissible under the ‘plain

view’ doctrine if the seizure meets three conditions. . . . Second, the

police officer must discover the incriminating evidence ‘inadvertently’").

These cases relied on a statement to this effect in the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 469-70, which the Supreme Court

specifically repudiated in Horton. See Horton, 496 U.S. at 130 ("In this

case we revisit an issue that was considered, but not conclusively resolved,

in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971): Whether the warrantless seizure of evidence of crime in plain view is prohibited by the

Fourth Amendment if the discovery of the evidence was not inadvertent.

We conclude that even though inadvertence is a characteristic of most

legitimate ‘plain-view’ seizures, it is not a necessary condition"). To the

extent that these cases suggested that inadvertence is a requirement of a

warrantless plain-view seizure, they are now overruled by Horton. 

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respect for privacy when executing a warrant, it does not prevent officers from lawfully searching the documents, nor

should it undermine their authority to search a computer’s

files. See United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 888 (9th

Cir. 2008) (holding that "neither the quantity of information,

nor the form in which it is stored, is legally relevant in the

Fourth Amendment context"). We have applied these rules

successfully in the context of warrants authorizing the search

and seizure of non-electronic files, see Crouch, 648 F.2d at

933-34, and we see no reason to depart from them in the context of electronic files.

Thus, the warrant in this case, grounded on probable cause

to believe that evidence relating to the Virginia crimes of

threatening bodily harm and computer harassment would be

found on Williams’ computers and digital media, authorized

the officers to search these computers and digital media for

files satisfying that description, regardless of the officers’

motivations in conducting the search. If, in the course of conducting such a search, the officers came upon child pornography, even if finding child pornography was their hope from

the outset, they were permitted to seize it as direct evidence

of criminal conduct and, indeed, bring additional charges

based on that evidence. See Phillips, ___ F.3d at ___, 2009

WL 4061558, at *5.

III

Williams also contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the machine gun and silencer found

by police during the search of his home. He argues that

because the gun and silencer were lying in a lockbox, they did

not pose a risk to the searching officers, and therefore the officers did not have any justification to pick them up to discover

that they lacked serial numbers.

To support his argument, Williams relies most heavily on

the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S.

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321 (1987), where the Court held that an officer violated the

defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights when the officer, even

though legally in the defendant’s apartment in response to a

shooting that had just taken place, picked up some stereo

components without a warrant to see their serial numbers and

determine whether they had been stolen. Id. at 323-26. Williams maintains that because the officers searching his home

did not have probable cause to believe that the machine gun

and silencer were illegal before one of the officers handled the

items to make a safety inspection, the inspection of the

machine gun and silencer was, like in Hicks, an unreasonable

warrantless search.

The government responds by arguing that this case is distinguishable from Hicks because of "the fundamentally different character of an officer moving an innocuous piece of

stereo equipment that is completely unrelated to the reason

the officer is lawfully present in an apartment and an officer

temporarily handling a firearm in order to ensure officer

safety in a home where the potential for violence existed."

The government relies on our opinion in United States v.

Legg, 18 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 1994), in which we held that officer safety gave police executing a warrant in a defendant’s

home the right to handle a gun that had accidentally fallen on

the floor when members of the defendant’s family refused to

cooperate and insisted on walking around the house. Based on

this, the government argues that concerns for officer safety

gave Detective Charles the right to inspect the gun to ensure

that it was not loaded and that its incriminating nature became

"immediately apparent" during the course of this lawful

inspection.

While we agree with Williams that the mere fact that the

item involved was a gun rather than a stereo does not serve

to distinguish this case from Hicks, we believe Detective

Charles’ decision to inspect the gun was justified here

because he had the authority under the warrant to conduct a

thorough search of the lockbox. The warrant authorized the

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police to search for things like disks and "thumbnail drives,"

which, the evidence showed, could be as small as a dime, and

which could very easily have been stored in the lockbox with

the gun and silencer. A thorough search of the lockbox would

therefore have required Detective Charles to move the gun

and silencer, even if only within the confines of the lockbox.

And before moving the gun, Detective Charles was entitled to

pick it up and determine whether it was loaded, for his own

safety. It was during that legitimate operation of determining

whether the gun was loaded that detective Charles discovered

the missing serial number, manifesting the gun’s illegality.

Thus, because it was during the course of a legitimate

safety inspection that the incriminating character of the

machine gun and silencer became "immediately apparent,"

Detective Charles’ warrantless seizure of them was justified

by the plain-view exception. See Horton, 496 U.S. 136-37.

For the reasons given, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED

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