Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07014/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07014-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
District of Columbia
Appellee
Robert Kinberg

Frances Rogala
Appellant
Ephriam Williams
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed November 12, 1998

No. 98-7014

Frances Rogala,

Appellant

v.

District of Columbia and Ephriam Williams,

Officer, Badge #4357,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94-02516)

---------

BEFORE: Silberman, Henderson, and Tatel, Circuit

Judges.

O R D E R

Upon consideration of the motion for summary affirmance,

the opposition thereto, and the reply, it is

ORDERED that the motion be granted. The merits of the

parties' positions are so clear as to warrant summary action.

See Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Walker v. Washington, 627

F.2d 541, 545 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S.

994 (1980). We affirm the judgment for appellees on appellant Rogala's claims substantially for the reasons well-stated

in the district court's "Opinion, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" filed January 5, 1998, and reprinted as an

appendix to this order. We note that although the district

court discussed a "split" on whether police may detain a

passenger during a traffic stop, this case is readily distinguishable from Dennis v. State, 693 A.2d 1150 (Md. 1997)

(holding detention invalid). Unlike in Dennis, appellant did

not seek to leave the scene, and Officer Williams merely

required her to remain in the car, rather than in the street or

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on the sidewalk, in light of his concerns about his safety, her

creation of a traffic hazard, and her interference with the field

sobriety test. We do not reach appellant's arguments concerning the field sobriety test administered to her companion

Kinberg, as he did not appeal and appellant lacks standing to

challenge the test. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,

133-34 (1978) (" 'Fourth Amendment rights are personal

rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be

vicariously asserted.' ") (quoting Alderman v. United States,

394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)).

The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate

herein until seven days after disposition of any timely petition

for rehearing. See D.C. Cir. Rule 41.

Per Curiam

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APPENDIX

Robert KINBERG and Frances ROGALA,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 94-2516 (PLF)

United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

Jan. 5, 1998.

OPINION, FINDINGS OF FACT AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

FRIEDMAN, J.

Robert Kinberg and Frances Rogala bring this action for

damages against the District of Columbia and Officer

Ephriam Williams, an officer of the Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD"). All of the claims arise from a traffic stop

and ensuing arrest of both plaintiffs.

Robert Kinberg was pulled over by Officer Williams as he

drove through Georgetown late on a November evening with

Frances Rogala as his passenger. After stopping the car,

Officer Williams ordered Mr. Kinberg out of the car and

directed him to undergo a field sobriety test. Ms. Rogala got

out of the car to join Mr. Kinberg on the sidewalk. Plaintiffs

claim that Officer Williams became aggressive and threatening and ordered Ms. Rogala back into the car. A dispute

broke out between Ms. Rogala and Officer Williams, and

Officer Williams ultimately arrested Ms. Rogala and Mr.

Kinberg and charged them with assault. Both plaintiffs

spent the night in custody and were released early the next

morning. The United States Attorney's Office declined to file

charges against either Mr. Kinberg or Ms. Rogala.

Ms. Rogala and Mr. Kinberg sued Officer Williams and the

District of Columbia for: (1) violating their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures; (2) violating Mr. Kinberg's Sixth Amendment right to counsel; (3)

violating Mr. Kinberg's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to

compulsory process and to due process of law; (4) committing

assault and battery against both of them; (5) falsely arresting

and imprisoning them; (6) maliciously prosecuting them; and

(7) intentionally inflicting emotional distress on Ms. Rogala.

Plaintiffs also claim that the District of Columbia negligently

retained Officer Williams with the knowledge that he was

unfit to serve as a police officer.

The case was tried before the Court without a jury over a

period of five days. At trial, Mr. Kinberg and Ms. Rogala

testified on their own behalf. Plaintiffs also called as witUSCA Case #98-7014 Document #400607 Filed: 12/04/1998 Page 3 of 27
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nesses Ms. Eva Kempner, Mr. Afzal Kahn, Dr. Eric Cantor,

Dr. Lynn Hornyak, Mr. Brian Mooar, Mr. Gerald Fisher, an

attorney representing Mr. Kinberg and Ms. Rogala in their

efforts to seal their arrest records, Ms. Diane Walton, former

Executive Director of the Civilian Complaint Review Board,

Mr. Louis Wolff and Mr. Robert Klotz, a former Captain and

former Commanding Officer of Internal Affairs for the MPD,

who testified as an expert in police practices and procedures.

Officer Williams testified in his own defense. Defendants

also called as a witness Mr. Jerry Wilson, a twenty-five year

veteran and former Chief of the MPD, who testified as an

expert in police practices and procedures.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

At approximately 11:00 p.m. on Monday, November 22,

1993, plaintiff Robert Kinberg was driving westbound on M

Street, Northwest, in Georgetown with plaintiff Frances Rogala as his passenger. The two, both attorneys, were driving

home after seeing a special showing of the movie Schindler's

List. Officer Ephriam Williams, an officer with the Metropolitan Police Department since 1986, was stationed alone in

the 3200 block of M Street, Northwest, and observed Mr.

Kinberg pull up next to a blue car and stop at a red light at

the intersection of 33rd and M Streets. Officer Williams

testified that he heard one of the cars stopped at the light

race its engine. The blue car rocked forward slightly and

then stopped. Officer Williams testified that he then saw Mr.

Kinberg drive through the intersection against the red light.

Mr. Kinberg and Ms. Rogala both testified that Mr. Kinberg

did not run the red light.

The Court finds Officer Williams' testimony credible.

While Mr. Kinberg may not have intended to run the red

light and may genuinely believe he did not, he may well have

been drawn through the light by the movement of the car

next to him.1 The Court credits the testimony of Officer

Williams that he saw Mr. Kinberg run the red light and

therefore concludes that the decision to stop Mr. Kinberg's

car was reasonable.

Officer Williams activated his emergency lights and

stopped Mr. Kinberg's car in the 3400 block of M Street.

Officer Williams testified that he pulled the car over in order

to determine why the car had run the red light and to

ascertain whether the driver was intoxicated. Officer

Williams got out of his cruiser and walked up to the driver's

side of the car. He testified that Mr. Kinberg's eyes appeared "glossy" and that his face was "bloated." He requested Mr. Kinberg's driver's license and vehicle registration and

asked Mr. Kinberg whether he had been drinking. Both

Officer Williams and Mr. Kinberg testified that Mr. Kinberg

handed Officer Williams his license and registration and

replied that he had not had anything to drink. At that point,

Officer Williams ordered Mr. Kinberg to step out of the car

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for a field sobriety test.

Officer Williams testified that he decided to conduct the

field sobriety test based on the following facts: he had seen

Mr. Kinberg run a red light; Mr. Kinberg's eyes were glossy

and his face was bloated; and, in Officer Williams' experience,

there were often intoxicated drivers traveling through

Georgetown at that time of night. Former Chief Jerry

__________

1 Officer Williams also testified at trial that the light for eastbound traffic turned green before the westbound light did, further

supporting the idea that Mr. Kinberg mistakenly may have thought

the light was green when he went through the intersection.

Wilson, defendants' expert in police practices, testified that

these factors would be sufficient to indicate to a police officer

that a driver may be intoxicated and to justify a field sobriety

test.2 Mr. Kinberg disputes Officer Williams' characterization of his facial appearance, and Ms. Eva Kempner, who saw

Mr. Kinberg and Ms. Rogala at the movie earlier in the

evening, testified that Mr. Kinberg looked normal after the

movie. At trial, however, Mr. Kinberg testified that he may

have cried at the movie, which he said had an emotional

impact on both him and Ms. Rogala, and that his eyes may

have been red.

The Court finds credible Officer Williams' testimony both

about his observation of Mr. Kinberg's appearance and his

reasons for conducting the field sobriety test. While Mr.

Kinberg's glossy eyes and bloated face may have been caused

by his reaction to the movie that he had just seen, in Officer

Williams' experience Mr. Kinberg's appearance was consistent with that of an intoxicated person. Combined with the

other factors identified by the officer, Mr. Kinberg's appearance was a legitimate basis for Officer Williams' decision to

conduct a field sobriety test.

Officer Williams testified that he called for back-up at this

time and then moved Mr. Kinberg to the sidewalk near the

rear of the vehicle for the field sobriety test. He said that he

wanted to be in a position to keep both Mr. Kinberg and Ms.

Rogala in his view for his own safety. The first test, a

"finger count" test, required Mr. Kinberg to count to five on

the fingers of one hand and then count back down. Mr.

Kinberg began counting with his first finger and then realized

that he should have started with his thumb because he was

going to run out of fingers. When he realized his mistake,

Mr. Kinberg stopped and asked Officer Williams to clarify the

__________

2 Plaintiff's expert, Robert Klotz, testified that a police officer

must look at a combination of factors to determine whether to

conduct a field sobriety test. In his view, however, if a police

officer does not detect slurred speech, lack of coordination or

alcohol on the driver's breath, the officer should not detain the

driver to conduct a field sobriety test.

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instructions. After Officer Williams repeated the instructions, Mr. Kinberg successfully performed the test. Officer

Williams then had Mr. Kinberg perform an "alphabet test,"

which consisted of Mr. Kinberg reciting the alphabet from H

to Z with his head tilted backwards.

While Mr. Kinberg was performing these tests, Ms. Rogala

opened the passenger door and began to get out of the

vehicle. Officer Williams ordered her to get back into the

car. Officer Williams testified that it is his usual practice to

instruct passengers to remain in the car during traffic stops

for their safety, as well as for his own. He testified that he

instructed Ms. Rogala to get back into the vehicle because

she was interfering with the field sobriety test and because he

perceived her attitude as belligerent. Both defendants' and

plaintiffs' police experts testified that it is consistent with

appropriate police procedure to control the movements of

individuals during a traffic stop if the officer has a reasonable

belief that a threat is posed, and former Chief Wilson testified

that except in the case of a high risk stop it was good police

practice to direct passengers to stay in the vehicle during a

traffic stop. The Court finds that Officer Williams believed

that Ms. Rogala was interfering with the field sobriety test

and was posing a threat when he ordered her back into the

car.

After several requests, Ms. Rogala initially complied with

Officer Williams' instructions, got back into the vehicle and

closed the passenger door. She then slid across to the

driver's seat and exited the vehicle into the roadway on the

driver's side. Officer Williams ordered Ms. Rogala to move

out of the roadway and to get back into the car, and he told

her that if she did not move out of the roadway he would

arrest her for failing to obey his order. Officer Williams

testified that he told her three times to get out of the street

and that Ms. Rogala finally raised her hands over her head

and said, "OK, lock me up; I want you to lock me up," and

that he then advised her that she was under arrest. Officer

Williams testified that he did not take her into custody at that

time because he was the only officer on the scene, and he

wanted to wait for backup before taking her into custody.

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Former Chief Wilson testified that it is a permissible practice

to wait for back-up before effecting an arrest. Ms. Rogala

testified that Officer Williams threatened to arrest her at this

time, but she denies telling Officer Williams to lock her up.

After this verbal exchange between Officer Williams and

Ms. Rogala, Ms. Rogala moved to the other side of the car,

but she refused the officer's direction to get back into the car.

She informed Officer Williams that she was an attorney and

that she had a right to be with Mr. Kinberg and observe him

perform the field sobriety tests. Mr. Kinberg testified that

he told Officer Williams that Ms. Rogala was his attorney and

he wanted her to observe the sobriety test. Officer Williams

testified that he repeatedly instructed Ms. Rogala to get back

into the car but that she refused.

Ms. Rogala eventually got back into the car on the passenger side. She testified that she did not remember how much

time passed before she got into the car, but in her statement

to the police, she indicated that Officer Williams had his

attention focused on her for approximately ten minutes. Defendant's Exhibit 28, p. 7. Ms. Rogala sat on the passenger

seat with the door open and her feet on the curb. Ms. Rogala

testified that Officer Williams ordered her to get all the way

into the car and threatened to arrest her if she did not. She

testified that she then got a pen and paper from her purse to

write down Officer Williams' name and badge number. According to Ms. Rogala, after she asked him for his name and

badge number, Officer Williams threatened to call for backup. Ms. Rogala also testified that two pedestrians who had

stopped to watch the events were ordered to leave the area

by Officer Williams.

The Court finds that while Officer Williams may have told

Ms. Rogala that he was going to call for a back-up unit after

she asked him for his identifying information, his call for

back-up was reasonable. According to plaintiff's own police

expert, Robert Klotz, one-officer stops can be dangerous, and

it therefore often is appropriate to call for backup. The

Court finds that Officer Williams' decision to do so was

reasonable and was not made in retaliation for Ms. Rogala's

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request for identifying information. The Court also finds

credible Officer Williams' testimony that he in fact called for

back-up when he first stopped Mr. Kinberg's car.

Officer Williams testified that after a back-up officer arrived he again told Ms. Rogala that she was under arrest and

attempted to take her into custody. He ordered her out of the

car; when she twice refused to come out of the car, he

reached in to pull her out. Officer Williams testified that Ms.

Rogala resisted his efforts to take custody of her, that she

lunged forward and made a clawing motion with her hands

and scratched his hand and that she screamed for Mr.

Kinberg to come to her aid. Former Chief Wilson testified

that if a passenger refuses to get out of a vehicle when placed

under arrest, an officer may use force to get her out of the

vehicle. Ms. Rogala testified that Officer Williams did not

inform her that she was under arrest, but that he did grab

her and pulled her out of the car; in doing so, she testified

that he bruised her arm and she struck and bruised her head

on the interior of the car and suffered a black eye. She did

not deny calling out to Mr. Kinberg. The Court credits

Officer Williams' testimony that he told Ms. Rogala that she

was under arrest and that she resisted his efforts to take her

into custody. The Court finds that Ms. Rogala resisted

Officer Williams' attempts to arrest her and that Officer

Williams acted reasonably in the circumstances.

Meanwhile, Mr. Kinberg, responding to Ms. Rogala's

scream, approached Officer Williams from behind. Officer

Williams testified that Mr. Kinberg grabbed him around the

neck and shoulder; Mr. Kinberg testified that he merely

touched Officer Williams on the shoulder. Officer Williams

turned to face Mr. Kinberg, and the two tussled while Officer

Williams attempted to handcuff Mr. Kinberg. Mr. Kinberg

testified that Officer Williams threw him to the ground, while

Officer Williams testified that they both fell to the ground

while tussling; both agree that Mr. Kinberg ended up facedown on the ground. Mr. Kinberg testified that he suffered

neck and shoulder pain for three months as a result of being

"tackled" by Officer Williams, but he acknowledged that

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Officer Williams did not hit, kick or punch him.3 Officer

Williams testified that he arrested Mr. Kinberg for interfering while Officer Williams was trying to take Ms. Rogala into

custody. Former Chief Wilson testified that a police officer

is justified in arresting someone who physically interferes

with an arrest by grabbing the police officer from behind.

The Court finds that Officer Williams arrested Mr. Kinberg

for interfering with the arrest of Ms. Rogala and that, while

Mr. Kinberg may not have intended to threaten Officer

Williams, it was not unreasonable for Officer Williams to

believe that in responding to Ms. Rogala's screams Mr.

Kinberg was in fact acting in a threatening manner toward

Officer Williams and interfering with the arrest of Ms. Rogala. Given the fast-moving chain of events, Mr. Kinberg's

concern for his friend, and the conflicting perceptions of the

players in this drama as to exactly what was happening and

why, the Court cannot find by a preponderance of the evidence that Officer Williams' conduct with respect to Mr.

Kinberg was assaultive or abusive rather than a reasonable

police response to the situation.4

Ms. Rogala and Mr. Kinberg were placed in Officer Rusnak's cruiser to await transport to the Second District police

station. Ms. Rogala requested her purse from Mr. Kinberg's

car, but Officer Williams refused to give it to her. Officer

Williams testified that MPD procedures do not permit arrestees to have personal belongings, such as purses, in the

transport vehicle. Ms. Rogala testified that she also asked

Officer Williams if she could retrieve a silver bracelet that

had fallen off her wrist. Officer Williams testified that he

was not aware of any complaint by Ms. Rogala that she had

__________

3 Dr. Eric Cantor, a doctor of internal medicine, testified that Mr.

Kinberg suffered mild rotator cuff syndrome and intermittent stiffness of neck.

4 Officer George Rusnak, who had arrived on the scene during the

struggle, assisted in handcuffing Mr. Kinberg. Neither the plaintiffs nor defendants called Officer Rusnak, Officer Max Arevalo (the

first back-up officer to arrive) or any other police officer as witnesses to corroborate their version of the events.

lost her bracelet. When the transport vehicle arrived, Mr.

Kinberg and Ms. Rogala were placed in it. Ms. Rogala

testified that she overheard another officer ask Officer

Williams if it was really necessary to arrest the two of them.

Ms. Rogala testified that Officer Williams responded, "Why,

cause they're fucking attorneys? Let them see what it is

like." Mr. Kinberg testified that he never heard Officer

Williams use profanity.

Mr. Kinberg and Ms. Rogala then were taken to the

Second District police station, where Officer Williams read

them their Miranda rights and processed the paperwork in

connection with their arrests. Both Mr. Kinberg and Ms.

Rogala were charged with simple assault and were kept in

separate holding cells pursuant to Second District procedures.

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Mr. Kinberg and Ms. Rogala testified that the cells were

filthy. Ms. Rogala testified that she was frightened and was

crying and that a number of officers (but not Officer

Williams) were quite solicitous and tried to calm her down.

Mr. Kinberg testified that he twice complained that his

handcuffs were too tight. Officer Williams loosened the cuffs

on both occasions. Officer Williams testified that Ms. Rogala

kept interrupting him during his reading of Miranda rights,

telling him that she knew her constitutional rights better than

he did, and said that she would call the judge and get the

charges dropped.

Ms. Rogala testified that she was extremely upset and that

she cried much of the time that she was at the station. Ms.

Rogala also testified that Officer Williams was rude and

taunted her. She testified that her hearing in one ear is

impaired and that while she was speaking on the telephone

with a pretrial services representative, she asked Officer

Williams to change her handcuff so that she could hold the

telephone to her good ear, but he refused. Both Dr. Cantor

and Dr. Lynn Hornyak, a clinical psychologist, testified that

Ms. Rogala suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder as

a result of the events surrounding the traffic stop and her

arrest. As was apparent both from the substance of her

testimony and her demeanor while testifying, Ms. Rogala was

visibly upset by her experience, and the Court credits her

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testimony and her doctors' testimony that she was traumatized by the events.

Officer Williams testified that processing at the Second

District took longer than an hour but less than the three hour

time limit imposed by MPD regulations. Mr. Kinberg testified that they were at the Second District from approximately

midnight until 3:30 a.m. Mr. Kinberg and Ms. Rogala were

then transported to the Central Cell Block for fingerprinting

and photographing. Mr. Kinberg testified that they were

finally released at 5:30 a.m. and that they took a taxicab back

to Mr. Kinberg's car.

The United States Attorney decided not to file charges

against Ms. Rogala and Mr. Kinberg, and they were so

informed at their first court appearance on December 2, 1993.

Gerald Fisher testified that Ms. Rogala and Mr. Kinberg

went to considerable expense to seal their arrest records and

that Ms. Rogala and Mr. Kinberg were still in the process of

trying to get the records sealed. He stated that even if they

succeeded in sealing the arrest records, the arrests will

continue to affect their job prospects and lives.

At trial, the Court heard testimony from three other people, pursuant to Rule 404(b), Fed.R.Evid., about their experiences with Officer Williams on other occasions. Mr. Afzal

Kahn testified that in October 1991, he heard fire engines on

his street and, when he went outside, he saw that his friend's

house was on fire. As Mr. Kahn stood on the street with his

neighbors watching the firefighters, Officer Williams approached him and told him to go away. Mr. Kahn testified

that he refused to leave, and Officer Williams became abusive

and asked Mr. Kahn if he understood English. When Mr.

Kahn started to walk away, Officer Williams forcibly arrested

him for failure to obey an officer. Mr. Kahn filed a complaint

with the Civilian Complaint Review Board alleging harassment and excessive force. Mr. Kahn's complaint for harassment was sustained, but his excessive force complaint was

not. The Board recommended that Officer Williams receive

diversity training and that a letter of prejudice be placed in

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his file.5

Officer Williams testified that he asked Mr. Kahn to move

because the fire was dangerous and he was trying to keep the

area clear. Officer Williams also testified that he was not

sure that Mr. Kahn understood the order to move because

Mr. Kahn had spoken with an accent. Mr. Louis Wolff, a

journalist, testified that he witnessed the incident with Mr.

Kahn and that Mr. Kahn was not impeding the firemen.

Mr. Brian Mooar, a reporter with the Washington Post,

testified that he witnessed Officer Williams and another

officer arresting a woman for drunk driving and handcuffing

her to a mailbox at approximately 2:30 a.m. on December 18,

1993. The woman was crying and very distraught; the

officer appeared to be laughing. Mr. Mooar testified that

when he tried to photograph the incident, Officer Williams

became abusive, grabbed Mr. Mooar's camera, and threatened to arrest him. Mr. Mooar testified that he did not get

his camera back until a sergeant arrived on the scene.6

Having heard the testimony of the witnesses in this case

and having observed their demeanor, the Court believes that

Mr. Kinberg and particularly Ms. Rogala were upset, frightened and shaken by their unaccustomed encounter with a

police officer late at night in Georgetown. Because they

probably believed they had not run a red light and knew they

had not been drinking, they were undoubtedly also offended

by the indignity of being stopped, ordered about, (in Mr.

Kinberg's case) made to take a sobriety test, and ultimately

__________

5 A letter of prejudice is a written notice to a police officer

"outlining specific unsatisfactory job performance or conduct." The

letter of prejudice is considered in performance evaluations, may be

used in deciding greater degrees of disciplinary action and places

the police officer on notice that he or she "shall receive either an

official reprimand or adverse action for any similar violation within

a two year period." Plaintiffs' Exhibit 21, General Order No. 1202,

et seq., Disciplinary Procedures and Processes at 8.

6 The incident described by Mr. Mooar was the subject of litigation against the District of Columbia and Officer Williams. See

DeGraff v. District of Columbia, 120 F.3d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

arrested. No doubt that Officer Williams is an imposing,

aggressive and controlling individual, as evidenced by his

conduct here and in the case of Mr. Kahn. Furthermore,

while the Court believes that other officers might have handled the situation differently, the testimony of former Chief

Wilson (and to a large extent of Mr. Klotz as well) persuades

the Court that the procedures followed were not unreasonable. The Court also finds that Ms. Rogala overreacted to

Officer Williams' legitimate display of authority; she was

aggressive and defiant of his authority and position. The

situation escalated largely because of her conduct, not his,

and the Court concludes that Officer Williams acted reasonably in the circumstances.

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II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Ms. Rogala and Mr. Kinberg have asserted claims under 42

U.S.C. s 1983 against both Officer Williams and the District

of Columbia for violations of their Fourth, Fifth and Sixth

Amendment rights.7 They have asserted claims for false

arrest, assault and battery, and malicious prosecution against

both Officer Williams and the District of Columbia. Ms.

Rogala has asserted a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against both Officer Williams and the District

of Columbia. Finally, Mr. Kinberg and Ms. Rogala have

asserted a claim against the District of Columbia for negligent retention of Officer Williams as a police officer. Each of

these claims is considered separately below.

__________

7 Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable

to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. s 1983.

A. Section 1983 Claims Against Officer Williams

1. Fourth Amendment

A citizen who alleges that he or she has been subjected to

an unreasonable search or seizure, or excessive force in the

course of an arrest or seizure, in violation of the Fourth

Amendment may seek redress under Section 1983. Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443

(1989). In determining whether a seizure is reasonable,

"[t]he touchstone of [the court's] analysis ... [is] the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." Pennsylvania v.

Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331

(1977). This analysis requires "a careful balancing of the

nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth

Amendment interest against the countervailing governmental

interests at stake." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 396

(internal quotation omitted). The test is an objective one,

made "from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the

scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id.

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20

L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

Plaintiffs allege that Officer Williams' conduct, from the

initial traffic stop through their arrests, violated their Fourth

Amendment rights to be free of unreasonable seizures.

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Plaintiffs first allege that Officer Williams violated their

Fourth Amendment rights by stopping Mr. Kinberg's vehicle

without probable cause to believe that Mr. Kinberg had

violated the law. Because the Court credits Officer Williams'

testimony that he observed Mr. Kinberg run a red light, the

initial stop of Mr. Kinberg's car was reasonable, supported by

probable cause, and there therefore was no Fourth Amendment violation. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,

116 S.Ct. 1769, 1777, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (when officer has

probable cause to believe a motorist has violated traffic laws,

a traffic stop is presumptively reasonable).

Plaintiffs next claim that Officer Williams lacked the requisite level of suspicion to conduct a field sobriety test. The

Supreme Court has not directly addressed the level of suspicion required for the detention of a lawfully stopped driver

for a field sobriety test. See Michigan Dep't of State Police

v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412

(1990) (although police may set up roadblocks without any

individual suspicion, detention of particular motorist for more

extensive sobriety testing "may require satisfaction of an

individualized suspicion standard") (in dictum). Because of

the significant public interest in preventing a motorist whom

an officer reasonably believes may be intoxicated from continuing to drive, and because further detention for a field

sobriety test is a minimal intrusion on an already legally

stopped individual's privacy, however, many state courts have

held that an officer may detain a motorist for such testing so

long as there is reasonable suspicion that the driver may be

intoxicated. See, e.g., State v. Lamme, 19 Conn. App. 594,

563 A.2d 1372 (Conn. App. 1989), affirmed, 216 Conn. 172, 579

A.2d 484 (Conn. 1990) (administration of field sobriety tests

requires only Terry reasonable suspicion); State v. Little, 468

A.2d 615, 617-18 (Me. 1983) (same); State v. Superior Court,

149 Ariz. 269, 718 P.2d 171, 175-76 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc)

(same); State v. Wyatt, 67 Haw. 293, 687 P.2d 544, 552-53

(Haw. 1984) (same); see generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave,

Search and Seizure s 10.8(d) at 707-708 & n.176 (3d ed.

1996); but see People v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1984)

(field sobriety test may be conducted only where officer has

preexisting probable cause to arrest for driving under influence).

No court in the District of Columbia has yet considered the

degree of suspicion required to conduct a field sobriety test,

but this Court is persuaded by the reasoning of the courts in

those states that have concluded that a field sobriety test is

such a minimal intrusion on the driver of the car that only

reasonable suspicion is required to conduct such a test. At

the time of the stop of Mr. Kinberg's car for running a red

light, Officer Williams observed that Mr. Kinberg's eyes were

glossy and that his face was bloated. These observations,

when coupled with the fact that Officer Williams had just

seen Mr. Kinberg drive through a red light, are sufficient to

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justify a field sobriety test under the reasonable suspicion

standard.

Plaintiffs also allege that Officer Williams unconstitutionally seized Ms. Rogala when he ordered her to get back into

the vehicle. A person has been "seized" under the Fourth

Amendment if her freedom of movement is restrained by use

of force or show of authority such that a reasonable person in

the circumstances would believe that she is not free to walk

away. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54,

100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). The Court concludes

that Officer Williams asserted such control over Ms. Rogala

when he ordered her to get back into the car. The question

is whether the exercise of that control violated Ms. Rogala's

Fourth Amendment rights.

The Supreme Court recently clarified that passengers in

cars that are legitimately stopped may be subject to some

control by the police officer conducting the stop. See Wilson

v. Maryland, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41

(1997). In Wilson, the Court held that a police officer

conducting a valid traffic stop may constitutionally order a

passenger out of the car, even where the police officer has no

suspicion that the passenger has committed a crime. Id. at

886. The court in Wilson expressly reserved the question of

whether an officer may forcibly detain a passenger for the

duration of the stop. See id. at 886, n.3. The courts are split

on this issue. Compare United States v. Moorefield, 111 F.3d

10 (3d Cir. 1997) (police officer lawfully ordered passenger to

remain in car with hands in air) with Dennis v. State, 345 Md.

649, 693 A.2d 1150 (Md. 1997) (where state articulated no

reason why it was necessary for officer's safety to detain

passenger rather than letting him walk away, detention unconstitutional), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 329, 139

L.Ed.2d 255.

In this case, Officer Williams ordered Ms. Rogala back into

the car because she was blocking traffic and interfering with

the field sobriety test that he was conducting of Mr. Kinberg.

Both former Chief Wilson and Mr. Klotz testified that it is

reasonable and appropriate police procedure to take steps to

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control the movements of individuals during a traffic stop if

the officer reasonably believes that a threat is posed, and

former Chief Wilson specifically testified that it is good police

practice to direct passengers to stay in the vehicle during a

traffic stop. This Court concludes that in the circumstances

presented, it follows from Wilson v. Maryland that a police

officer has the power to reasonably control the situation by

requiring a passenger to remain in a vehicle during a traffic

stop, particularly where, as here, the officer is alone and feels

threatened. See United States v. Moorefield, 111 F.3d at 12-

13; United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29, 37 (D.C. Cir.) (in the

context of traffic stops, "[c]ourts have routinely allowed officers to insist on reasonable changes of location when carrying

out Terry stops. The exigencies of the circumstances determine what moves are reasonable in a given situation ...")

(internal citations omitted), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 924, 102

S.Ct. 424, 70 L.Ed.2d 233 (1981); see also United States v.

Mangum, 100 F.3d 164, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The Court

concludes that it was reasonable for Officer Williams to order

Ms. Rogala to stay in the car in order to maintain control of

the situation and that he therefore did not violate her Fourth

Amendment rights.

Plaintiffs next assert that Officer Williams violated their

Fourth Amendment rights because he lacked probable cause

to arrest them. A police officer in the field can make a

warrantless arrest if he has knowledge of "facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a prudent [officer] in believing

that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an

offense." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111, 95 S.Ct. 854,

43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); see also D.C. Code s 23-581(a)(1)(B) (a

law enforcement officer may arrest without a warrant "a

person who he has probable cause to believe has committed

or is committing an offense in his presence").

Officer Williams arrested Ms. Rogala for disobeying his

order to return to the car after she had interfered with the

field sobriety test that he was conducting. Ms. Rogala's

interference and refusal to obey Officer Williams' orders

provided grounds for her warrantless arrest. See D.C. Code

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s 22-505(a).8 While D.C. Code s 22-505(a) has been narrowly construed to apply to physical conduct rather than speech,

In the Matter of E.D.P., Jr., 573 A.2d 1307, 1309 (D.C. 1990),

Officer Williams was responding to Ms. Rogala's physical

conduct in refusing to return to the car, which prevented him

from focusing his attention on conducting Mr. Kinberg's field

sobriety test. Plaintiffs' police expert, Mr. Klotz, testified

that citizens are required to obey lawful orders of the police,

and on cross examination, he testified that if a passenger

constitutes a threat or interferes with an officer's routine

performance of his duties, the officer may arrest the passenger. Defendant's expert, former Chief Wilson, testified that

if a passenger seeks to interfere with a field sobriety test, the

officer may order her to stop interfering; he also testified

that passengers are ordinarily told to remain in the vehicle

during traffic stops. As discussed above, the Court finds that

Officer Williams had reasonable grounds to order Ms. Rogala

to remain in the car to prevent her from interfering with the

field sobriety test. Ms. Rogala disobeyed that order and

remained outside the car for ten minutes. Her refusal to

obey Officer Williams' order interfered with Officer Williams'

performance of his official duties and constituted an arrestable offense committed in his presence.

Officer Williams arrested Mr. Kinberg for interfering with

his arrest of Ms. Rogala. Impeding an officer performing an

arrest is a criminal offense. See D.C. Code s 22-505(a). Mr.

Kinberg's intent may have been only to calm the situation.

From Officer Williams' perspective, however, Mr. Kinberg's

__________

8 D.C. Code s 22-505(a) provides, in pertinent part,

(a) Whoever without justifiable and excusable cause, assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates or interferes with

any officer or member of any police force operating in the

District of Columbia ... while engaged in or on account of the

performance of his or her official duties, shall be fined not more

than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. It is

neither justifiable nor excusable cause for a person to use force

to resist an arrest when such arrest is made by an individual he

or she has reason to believe is a law enforcement officer,

whether or not such arrest is lawful.

actions constituted a threat to Officer Williams as Officer

Williams tried to arrest Ms. Rogala. A reasonably prudent

officer in Officer Williams' situation could well believe that

Mr. Kinberg was intending to interfere with the arrest of Ms.

Rogala. Officer Williams therefore had probable cause to

arrest Mr. Kinberg.

Finally, plaintiffs claim that Officer Williams' actions in

pulling Ms. Rogala from the car, his alleged verbal harassment and his tackling of Mr. Kinberg constitute violations of

their Fourth Amendment rights. Under the "objective reasonableness" standard of the Fourth Amendment, an officer

has the authority to use "some degree of physical coercion or

threat thereof" during the course of an arrest, and "not every

push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the

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peace of a judge's chambers," violates the Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 395-97. The use of

such coercion is to be judged "from the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene ... [with] allowance for the

fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments ... about the amount of force that is necessary in

a particular situation." Id. at 396-97. An officer will only be

held liable if the force used was so excessive that no reasonable officer could have believed in the lawfulness of his

actions. See Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297, 1303 (D.C. Cir.

1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1204, 114 S.Ct. 2672, 129 L.Ed.2d

808 (1994). The underlying intent or motivation of the officer

is not considered; the only issue is whether the officer's

actions are " 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and

circumstances" confronting him. See DeGraff v. District of

Columbia, 120 F.3d 298, 301 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In view of the

factual and credibility findings made by the Court, the Court

necessarily concludes that the force used by Officer Williams

was not excessive and that his conduct was objectively reasonable.

In taking custody of Ms. Rogala, Officer Williams reached

into the car and pulled her out by the arm. Defendants'

police expert testified that it is permissible police procedure

to reach into a vehicle to remove a person who has been

placed under arrest and who refuses to get out of the vehicle.

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The Court finds that Ms. Rogala did not exit the vehicle when

Officer Williams tried to take her into custody and ordered

her out of the car. The Court also finds that Ms. Rogala

resisted Officer Williams' attempts to remove her from the

car. There is no indication that Officer Williams used excessive force in removing Ms. Rogala from the car. See Martin

v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (no excessive force

even where arresting officer allegedly brutally grabbed driver

by waist, threw him back into the driver's seat and slammed

door on his legs). The Court finds that the level of force used

by Officer Williams to remove Ms. Rogala from the car was

reasonable, and that there was no constitutional violation.

Officer Williams' arrest of Mr. Kinberg resulted in Mr.

Kinberg being thrown to the ground, according to Mr. Kinberg, or placed on the ground or having fallen there as the

result of a tussle, according to Officer Williams. Defendants'

police expert testified that if an officer is grabbed from

behind, the officer may have to tackle the person if it is

necessary to bring the person under control. Officer

Williams reasonably perceived Mr. Kinberg's actions as

threatening and interfering with his arrest of Ms. Rogala.

The Court finds that Officer Williams did not use unreasonable force in responding to that threat. See Wardlaw v.

Pickett, 1 F.3d at 1304 (no unreasonable force where U.S.

Marshal punched man in jaw and chest who interfered with

arrest).

The Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to establish a

deprivation of their Fourth Amendment rights, and Officer

Williams is entitled to judgment on this claim.

2. Sixth Amendment

Mr. Kinberg next asserts that Officer Williams' attempted

control over Ms. Rogala during the field sobriety test deprived him of his right to counsel in violation of the Sixth

Amendment. There is no merit to this claim.

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only upon

the initiation of adversarial judicial criminal proceedings,

which include the "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment," Kirby v. Illinois, 406

U.S. 682, 688-89, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972), and

"certain 'critical' pretrial proceedings ... [at which] the accused [is] confronted, just as at trial, by the procedural

system, or by his expert adversary, or by both." United

States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81

L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) (citation omitted). Mere confrontation

with a police officer, or even an arrest, does not signal the

initiation of such proceedings. Id.; see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765-66, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908

(1966) (no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in connection

with blood alcohol test). Until adversary judicial proceedings

have been initiated, the mere "fortuity" that a person happens

to have retained counsel does not give that person a Sixth

Amendment right to consult with that counsel. See Moran v.

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Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 430, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410

(1986) ("the suggestion that the existence of an attorneyclient relationship itself triggers the protections of the Sixth

Amendment misconceives the underlying purposes of the

right to counsel ... [the right to counsel] becomes applicable

only when the government's role shifts from investigation to

accusation").

When Officer Williams ordered Ms. Rogala to return to the

car, he was conducting a field sobriety test of Mr. Kinberg.

No formal charges had been filed against Mr. Kinberg at that

time, and adversary judicial proceedings had not been initiated. Without the initiation of criminal judicial proceedings,

Mr. Kinberg's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet

attached. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. at 688-89. The "fortuity" that he was stopped while riding with an attorney does

not give him any additional Sixth Amendment protection.

See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 428-31. Officer Williams

therefore is entitled to judgment on this claim.

3. Fifth and Sixth Amendments

Plaintiffs' final constitutional claim against Officer Williams

is that he violated Mr. Kinberg's Sixth Amendment right to

compulsory process and his Fifth Amendment right to due

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process of law by excluding Ms. Rogala from witnessing the

sobriety test and by ordering two bystanders to leave the

area. Plaintiffs have not established a deprivation of a constitutional right, and judgment on this claim therefore is entered for Officer Williams.

Plaintiffs cite no case establishing an affirmative duty on

the part of the police to allow bystanders to remain at an

arrest scene so that they may become witnesses favorable to

the arrestee. The duty of the police to preserve material and

potentially exculpatory evidence does not extend to require an

officer to allow witnesses to remain at potentially dangerous

scenes of crime. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58,

109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988); United States v.

McKie, 951 F.2d 399, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Such a duty

would be inconsistent with the officer's prerogative to control

the scene of an encounter for his own safety and for the

safety of the public. See United States v. White, 648 F.2d at

37.

Even if plaintiffs could establish that Officer Williams had a

duty to preserve witnesses, there is no basis for a constitutional claim unless a defense is prejudiced by the breach of

that duty. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488,

104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1983); United States v.

Alston, 832 F. Supp. 1, 5-6 (D.D.C. 1993). The fact that

neither Mr. Kinberg nor Ms. Rogala was ever prosecuted on

any charges stemming from their altercation with Officer

Williams ends the analysis. In the absence of a criminal trial,

there was no defense to be prejudiced by the unavailability of

bystanders to testify or by the absence of Ms. Rogala's

testimony. Cf. United States v. Alston, 832 F. Supp. at 5-6.

Plaintiffs therefore have failed to establish a deprivation of

their Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights.

B. Section 1983 Claims Against The District of Columbia

Plaintiffs allege that the District of Columbia has been

deliberately indifferent to the rights of its citizens by failing

to maintain effective systems for evaluation of the performance of its police officers, for in-service training of its

officers, and for resolution of citizen complaints. Pls.' Pretrial Brief at 17-18. They further allege that this failure to

act caused the violation of their constitutional rights through

the conduct of Officer Williams. Id.

A municipality may be sued under Section 1983 for implementing or executing a policy or custom that causes the

deprivation of an individual's constitutional rights. Monell v.

Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018,

56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Plaintiffs therefore have the burden

of proving (1) that they were deprived of constitutional

right(s); and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a policy

or custom of the municipality. See Atchison v. District of

Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (municipality can

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tional deprivation of rights"). For suits alleging failure to

train or supervise, plaintiffs must also establish that the need

for more or different training or supervision was so obvious

and the inadequacy so likely to result in a violation of

constitutional rights that policymakers can be said to have

been deliberately indifferent to the need. See City of Canton

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412

(1989); Dorman v. District of Columbia, 888 F.2d 159, 165

(D.C. Cir. 1989).

Plaintiffs have not established the deprivation of any constitutional right, see supra at Section A, and the Section 1983

claim against the District of Columbia therefore cannot be

sustained.

C. Common Law Claims Against Officer Williams

And The District of Columbia

Plaintiffs assert a number of common law claims against

Officer Williams and the District of Columbia. The District

of Columbia stipulates that Officer Williams acted within the

scope of his employment throughout the encounter with plaintiffs. Therefore, any judgment in favor of or against Officer

Williams on the common law claims will also constitute a

judgment in favor of or against the District of Columbia

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under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Wade v.

District of Columbia, 310 A.2d 857, 863 (D.C. 1973).9

1. False Arrest

The central question in an action against a police officer for

false arrest is whether the officer was justified in arresting

the plaintiff. District of Columbia v. Murphy, 631 A.2d 34,

36 (D.C. 1993); accord Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 175

(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916, 98 S.Ct. 3146, 57

L.Ed.2d 1161 (1978). An officer can demonstrate justification

by showing that he had probable cause to believe a crime had

been committed. District of Columbia v. Murphy, 631 A.2d

at 36; accord Wade v. District of Columbia, 310 A.2d at 862.

The Court already has concluded that Officer Williams had

probable cause to arrest both Ms. Rogala and Mr. Kinberg.

Defendants therefore are entitled to judgment on this claim.

2. Assault and Battery

Plaintiffs next allege that Officer Williams assaulted and

battered them by forcefully arresting them and by treating

__________

9 Plaintiffs also assert a common law negligent retention claim

against the District of Columbia. In order to prevail on a negligent

retention claim, plaintiffs must first prove that Officer Williams was

negligent and must then prove the additional element of negligent

retention. See e.g. Ang v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No.

95-0667, Memorandum Opinion and Order at 5 (D.D.C. November

25, 1995) (Friedman, J.); Middough v. District of Columbia, Civil

Action No. 93-0622, Order at 4 (D.C. Super. July 27, 1993) (Kramer,

J.). Because the District of Columbia has already stipulated that

Officer Williams was acting within the scope of his employment,

however, it is liable under a theory of respondeat superior for any

tortious actions taken by Officer Williams and it is unnecessary for

plaintiffs to prove the additional negligent retention element. See

Curry v. Giant Food Co., 522 A.2d 1283, 1289-90 (D.C. 1987)

(negligent retention claim intended to be used in situations where

employer disclaims the actions of its employees). The Court therefore does not need to decide whether or not the District negligently

retained Officer Williams. Cf. Burkhart v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 112 F.3d 1207, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

them roughly and subjecting them to verbal abuse during

their detention. In the course of making a lawful arrest, a

police officer is privileged to use force so long as the "means

employed are not in excess of those which [he] reasonably

believes [are] necessary." Etheredge v. District of Columbia,

635 A.2d 908, 916 (D.C. 1993) (internal quotation omitted).

The officer's judgment is to be reviewed "from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene," with allowance for

the officer's need to make quick decisions under potentially

dangerous circumstances. Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. at 396-97). This standard is similar to the excessive

force standard applied in the Section 1983 context. Id. at 915

n.10. Furthermore, an officer may commit what at common

law would be an assault unless "the threatened use of force is

clearly excessive." Jackson v. District of Columbia, 412 A.2d

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948, 956 (D.C. 1980). The Court finds that Officer Williams

did not threaten Ms. Rogala or Mr. Kinberg with "clearly

excessive" force. For substantially the reasons discussed

supra at 18-19, the Court finds that Officer Williams did not

use excessive force in arresting Ms. Rogala and Mr. Kinberg.

Plaintiffs therefore have failed to prove their assault or

battery claim.

3. Malicious Prosecution

An action for malicious criminal prosecution requires proof

of the institution of a criminal action, with malice and without

probable cause, that ultimately terminates in the plaintiffs'

favor. Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d at 191 n.65. A criminal

action is "instituted" upon the filing of an information or

indictment; a mere arrest, not followed by the filing of an

information or the return of an indictment, cannot give rise to

liability for malicious prosecution. Id. at 192 (in dictum)

(citing Auerbach v. Freeman, 43 App.D.C. 176 (D.C. Cir.

1915) (when larceny charge was nolle prossed, no prosecution

had been instituted)); see also Jackson v. District of Columbia, 710 F. Supp. 13, 14-15 (D.D.C. 1989) (tort of malicious

prosecution intended to remedy the "evil" of "defending

against unjustified litigation," and the remedy therefore is

unavailable for "mere arrest"). While Mr. Kinberg and Ms.

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Rogala were arrested for simple assault, no charges were

ever filed against them. Because plaintiffs have failed to

establish that there was any prosecution, much less a malicious one, the Court enters judgment for defendants on this

claim.

4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Ms. Rogala asserts a claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress based upon Officer Williams' treatment of

her prior to, during and after her arrest. Specifically, Ms.

Rogala claims that Officer Williams threatened to arrest her

repeatedly, yelled and cursed at her, ignored her request to

recover her purse and bracelet after she was arrested, told

her that he wanted her to see what it was like to be arrested,

laughed at her hearing impairment, laughed when she cried,

and detained her for an unnecessarily long time at the

station. She claims that Officer Williams' conduct caused her

severe emotional distress.

To recover on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress, a plaintiff must demonstrate "extreme and outrageous conduct which intentionally or recklessly cause[d] severe emotional distress." Jackson v. District of Columbia,

412 A.2d at 956-57 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts

s 46 (1965) ("Restatement")). The conduct must be "so

outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go

beyond all possible bounds of decency." Id. at 957 (quoting

Restatement s 46 cmt. d). An action for intentional infliction

of emotional distress may be maintained against an arresting

officer if he made a lawful arrest but applied "a serious

[quantum] of excessive force," id. at 955, or if he made an

egregiously unlawful arrest. See Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The ultimate question is whether the officer's actions constituted "mere insults,

indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other

trivialities," or whether they were truly outrageous. See

Restatement s 46 cmt. d.

While the Court credits Ms. Rogala's testimony and that of

her doctors that she was extremely distressed by Officer

Williams' actions in arresting her, the Court finds that Officer

Williams' conduct did not approach the level of egregiousness

necessary to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court finds that Officer Williams told

Ms. Rogala that he was going to arrest her, and he may have

spoken to her with a raised voice and harsh words, but he did

not yell and curse at her. The Court also finds that Officer

Williams' refusal to allow Ms. Rogala to keep her purse with

her is consistent with police procedure and was reasonable.

The Court credits Officer Williams' testimony that he was not

aware that Ms. Rogala had lost her bracelet. The Court also

credits Officer Williams' testimony that Mr. Kinberg and Ms.

Rogala were detained for less than three hours. Even according to Mr. Kinberg's account, Mr. Kinberg and Ms.

Rogala were held at the police station for at most something

less than four hours, from a little before midnight until 3:30

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a.m. The Court finds that the duration of this detention does

not constitute outrageous conduct. Finally, to the extent that

Ms. Rogala perceived that Officer Williams took pleasure in

arresting her, the alleged conduct simply does not rise to the

level of truly outrageous conduct "as to go beyond all possible

bounds of decency." Jackson v. District of Columbia, 412

A.2d at 957. Plaintiff therefore has failed to establish this

claim.

III. CONCLUSION

The events that occurred on the evening of November 22,

1993 were most unfortunate. They had a considerable impact

on the lives of Mr. Kinberg and especially Ms. Rogala. On an

objective reasonableness standard, however, and in view of

the credibility findings made by the Court, the Court cannot

find that plaintiffs have carried their burden of proof by a

preponderance of the evidence on any of their claims. The

Court finds that Officer Williams' conduct violated none of the

constitutional or common law rights asserted by plaintiffs and

that his conduct was objectively reasonable. Judgment

therefore must be entered for defendants on all claims.

An Order and Judgment consistent with this Opinion shall

be issued this same day.

SO ORDERED.

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