Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01099/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01099-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Keith Anderson
Defendant
City of Dunsmuir
Defendant
David Fabbrini
Plaintiff
John Fisher
Defendant
Bill Sanford
Defendant

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This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h). 

All subsequent references to “Rules” are to the Federal Rules 1

of Civil Procedure.

SLAPP stands for Strategic Lawsuit Against Public 2

Participation.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID FABBRINI, )

) 2:07-CV-1099-GEB-CMK

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

CITY OF DUNSMUIR, JOHN FISHER, )

BILL SANFORD, KEITH ANDERSON, and )

DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s federal malicious

prosecution claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and 1

to strike Plaintiff’s defamation claim under California’s Anti-SLAPP2

statute. The gravamen of Plaintiff’s action is that Defendants caused

a meritless lawsuit to be filed against him and defamed him by

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Defendants Keith Anderson (“Anderson”), Fisher and Sanford 3

are California public officials. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 6.) It appears from

the briefs that Fisher and Sanford are members of the city council for

the City and Anderson is a City officer. (See Opp’n at 13:4; Mot. at

15:4.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “caus[ed]” the City to

institute the prior action. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 1.)

The Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal standards are well known and need 4

not be repeated here.

2

publishing statements about that lawsuit (“the prior action”). 

Defendant City of Dunsmuir (“the City”) initiated the prior action

following a dispute between the City and Plaintiff over a loan to

Plaintiff of City funds and a lease to Plaintiff of City land. The 3

City subsequently voluntarily dismissed the prior action.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss Federal Malicious Prosecution Claim4

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a federal

malicious prosecution claim because (a) the prior action that

Defendants filed against Plaintiff did not terminate in Plaintiff’s

favor, (b) Defendants had probable cause to institute the prior action

against Plaintiff, (c) Defendants are protected by Noerr-Pennington

immunity, and (d) Defendants John Fisher and Bill Sanford are

protected by absolute legislative immunity. (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss

and Mot. to Strike (“Mot.”) at 9:14-16.)

To state a federal malicious prosecution claim, Plaintiff

must allege facts showing that the prior action terminated in

Plaintiff’s favor, was brought without probable cause, was initiated

by or at the direction of Defendants, was initiated with malice, and

was initiated “for the purpose of denying [Plaintiff] equal protection

or another specific constitutional right.” Awabdy v. City of

Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Freeman v. City

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of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995)); Zamos v. Stroud, 32

Cal. 4th 958, 966 (2004) (discussing malicious prosecution elements).

A. Termination in Plaintiff’s Favor

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s federal malicious

prosecution claim, arguing that since the City voluntarily dismissed

the prior action against Plaintiff without prejudice and for economic

reasons, the prior action did not terminate in Plaintiff’s favor. 

(Mot. at 9:19-11:2.) However, a party’s voluntary dismissal is

considered a favorable termination for the opposing party unless there

is a reason for the dismissal not having to do with the merits of the

action. MacDonald v. Joslyn, 275 Cal. App. 2d 282, 289 (1969). “The

determination of the reasons underlying the dismissal is a question of

fact.” Haight v. Handweiler, 199 Cal. App. 3d 85, 89 (1988). 

Defendants request judicial notice be taken of the City

Media Release that states that the prior action was dismissed for

economic reasons. However, “documents are judicially noticeable only

for the purpose of determining what statements are contained therein,

not to prove the truth of the contents or any party’s assertion of

what the contents mean.” United States v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 300 F.

Supp. 2d 964, 975 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (internal citations omitted). 

Since Defendants have not demonstrated that their voluntary dismissal

of the prior action was unrelated to the merits of the action,

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s federal malicious

prosecution claim on this ground is denied.

B. Probable Cause

Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff’s malicious

prosecution claim, arguing that Plaintiff has not pleaded facts

showing Defendants lacked probable cause to initiate the prior action

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Although the City also alleged claims for fraud and breach of 5

contract in the prior action, the issue is whether the City had probable

cause for its declaratory relief claim since the fraud and breach of

contract claims that appeared in the City’s first complaint in the prior

action were dropped from the City’s amended complaint. See Jenkins v.

Pope, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1292, 1300-01 (1990) (“To allow a malicious

prosecution suit to be based on a cause of action dropped from an

amended complaint would discourage amendment of pleadings to delete

theories which come to appear untenable.”). 

4

against Plaintiff, since there was an actual controversy stated

therein which created an objectively legally tenable claim for

declaratory relief. (Defs.’ Reply at 5-11; Mot. at 12:15-14:9.) 5

However, the mere existence of a dispute does not

necessarily make a suit for declaratory judgment “legally tenable” for

malicious prosecution purposes. See Camarena v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 190

Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1097 (1987) (holding that declaratory relief

actions may form the basis for a malicious prosecution claim). Since

Defendants have not shown that Plaintiff failed to plead facts

establishing that Defendants lacked probable cause to initiate the

prior action, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s federal

malicious prosecution claim on this ground is denied.

C. Noerr-Pennington Immunity

Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff’s federal

malicious prosecution claim, arguing that they are immune from

liability for that claim under the Noerr-Penington doctrine. (Mot. at

11:4-8.) 

Plaintiff counters that Noerr-Pennington immunity does not

immunize Defendants because the prior action was a “sham litigation.” 

(Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. (“Opp’n”) at 11:21-13:1.) NoerrPennington immunity does not immunize a defendant when the defendant

filed a “sham litigation.” Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 938

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(9th Cir. 2006). A lawsuit is considered a “sham litigation,” inter

alia, “where the lawsuit is objectively baseless and the defendant’s

motive in bringing it was unlawful.” Id. Plaintiff sufficiently

alleges that the City’s prior action was objectively baseless and

brought for an unlawful motive. (See Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 19, 21 (alleging

that Defendants caused the prior action to be initiated “with malice,”

in “retaliation against [P]laintiff for his criticism of the [C]ity’s

governance”)). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

federal malicious prosecution claim on this ground is denied.

D. Legislative Immunity

Defendants Fisher and Sanford also move to dismiss

Plaintiff’s federal malicious prosecution claim, arguing that they are

entitled to legislative immunity for their acts of voting, as members

of the City of Dunsmuir city council, to cause the City to institute

the prior action. (Mot. at 14:10-13.) However, Plaintiff alleges

Defendants initiated the prior action “with malice” and in

“retaliation against [P]laintiff for his criticism of the [C]ity’s

governance.” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 19, 21.) Since legislative immunity

“does not extend to even traditionally legislative actions of

officials taken either in bad faith, because of corruption, or

primarily in furtherance of personal instead of public interests,”

Haskell v. Wash. Twp., 864 F.2d 1266, 1278 (6th Cir. 1988), Fisher and

Sanford’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s federal malicious prosecution

claim based on legislative immunity is denied.

II. Anti-SLAPP Motion

Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s defamation claim under

California’s Anti-SLAPP statute. (See Mot. at 15:11-23:4.)

///

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Plaintiff also indicates that he may wish to dismiss all 6

claims against Anderson. Plaintiff states in his opposition brief that

he “will dismiss the defamation claim against Keith Anderson, because it

was not [Anderson] who made the statement as set forth in the complaint

. . . .” (Opp’n at 4 n.1.) Plaintiff further states, in opposing

Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP motion, that “[b]ecause Keith Anderson was not

the one, at least apparently, who made such statement, he will be

dismissed as a defendant.” (Id. at 15:3-4.) Plaintiff also omits

Anderson’s name from the caption in Plaintiff’s opposition brief. These

representations do not unambiguously demonstrate whether Plaintiff

intended to dismiss all claims against Anderson or solely the defamation

claim against Anderson. (Id. at 4 n.1.) Therefore, Anderson remains a

Defendant in this action.

6

A. Plaintiff’s Attempt to Voluntarily Dismiss Defamation Claim

Plaintiff states in his opposition to Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP

motion to strike that he “will forthwith dismiss the defamation claim

as alleged . . . .” (Opp’n at 14:20-22.) However, to dismiss the

defamation claim from his multi-claim Complaint, Plaintiff must amend

the Complaint under Rule 15. Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S.

Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]ithdrawals of

individual claims against a given defendant are governed by [Rule] 15,

which addresses amendments to pleadings.”); see Ethridge v. Harbor

House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1392 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a

plaintiff “may not use Rule 41(a)(1)(i) to dismiss, unilaterally, a

single claim from a multi-claim complaint”). Plaintiff’s statements

in his opposition brief cannot amend the Complaint under Rule 15. See

Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir.

1984) (“[I]t is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the

briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”). Accordingly,

Plaintiff has not dismissed the defamation claim.6

B. Anti-SLAPP Standard

To succeed on their Anti-SLAPP motion to strike, Defendants

must first demonstrate that Plaintiff’s defamation claim arises from a

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protected activity; in other words, Defendants must show that the act

of which Plaintiff complains was taken “in furtherance of the

[Defendants’] right of petition or free speech under the United States

or California Constitution in connection with a public issue” as

defined in the Anti-SLAPP statute. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §

425.16(b)(1); Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 53,

67 (2002). Second, “[i]f the court finds such a showing has been

made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a

probability of prevailing on the claim.” Id. at 67.

 C. Protected Activity

Plaintiff’s defamation claim is based on a statement in a

City press release and other “defamatory statements to members of the

public through publication of news articles regarding plaintiff’s

actions that allegedly led to [Defendants’] filing of the [prior

action] and by asserting that he had engaged in wrongdoing regarding

the [] lease.” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 28.) 

Defendants argue that making the statements in the press

release and the “news articles” was protected activity under the AntiSLAPP statute. (Mot. at 16:26-19:8.) “[A] writing made in . . . a

public forum in connection with an issue of public interest” is a

protected activity for Anti-SLAPP purposes. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §

425.16(e). The City’s press release and the “news articles”

constituted statements in public fora. See Damon v. Ocean Hills

Journalism Club, 85 Cal. App. 4th 468, 476 (2000) (holding that a

newsletter containing a “single viewpoint” was a public forum “in the

sense that it was a vehicle for communicating a message about public

matters to a large and interested community”); Annette F. v. Sharon

S., 119 Cal. App. 4th 1146, 1161 (2004) (holding that a news

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publication is a public forum). Further, the statements were in

connection with the litigation between the City and Plaintiff and the

loan to Plaintiff of public funds. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 14.) These were

issues of public interest. See Copley Press, Inc. v. Sup. Ct., 63

Cal. App. 4th 367, 376 (1998) (“[T]he public has a legitimate interest

in knowing how public funds are spent and how claims (formal or

informal) against public entities are settled.”). Accordingly,

Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating that making the

allegedly defamatory statements in the press release and in the news

publications were protected activities under the Anti-SLAPP statute.

D. Plaintiff’s Probability of Prevailing on the Merits

In opposing the Anti-SLAPP motion, Plaintiff “cannot simply

rely on [his] pleadings, even if verified, but must adduce competent,

admissible evidence” to establish a probability of prevailing on the

merits. Roberts v. Los Angeles County Bar Ass’n, 105 Cal. App. 4th

604, 613-614 (2003).

Plaintiff has not demonstrated a probability of prevailing

on the merits of his defamation claim based on the press release. 

Since Plaintiff failed to provide evidence demonstrating that he filed

a tort claim with the City alleging that the press release was

defamatory, Plaintiff has not shown that the defamation claim is not

barred by the California Tort Claims Act. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 900

et seq.; see Rabkin v. Dean, 856 F. Supp. 543, 553 (N.D. Cal. 1994)

(dismissing claim for defamation against city council member because

plaintiff “fail[ed] to comply with the claims procedure of the

California Tort Claims Act”).

Further, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a probability of

prevailing on the merits of his defamation claim based on the other

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“defamatory statements to members of the public through publications

of news articles” because Plaintiff has presented no admissible

evidence of these other statements or who made them. (Pl.’s Compl. 

¶ 28.) “Even under liberal federal pleading standards, general

allegations of the defamatory statements which do not identify the

substance of what was said are insufficient.” Jacobson v.

Schwarzenegger, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1216 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (holding

that a “defamation claim is insufficient” because the plaintiff failed

to “identify and state the substance of the allegedly defamatory

statement”). Accordingly, Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP motion to strike

Plaintiff’s defamation claim is granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s federal malicious prosecution claim is denied and

Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP motion to strike is granted. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 11, 2008

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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