Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akb-3_16-ap-90001/USCOURTS-akb-3_16-ap-90001-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Acapita Education Finance Corporation
Defendant
Brazos Student Finance Corporation
Defendant
Brazos Higher Education Service Corporation
Defendant
Jessie L. Rizor
Plaintiff

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JUDGE HERB ROSS (Recalled)

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

605 West 4th Avenue, Room 138, Anchorage, AK 99501-2253 — (Website: www.akb.uscourts.gov) Clerk’s Office: 907-271-2655 (1-800-859-8059 In-State) — Judge’s Fax: 907-271-2692

Case No. A15-00383-HAR

In re JESSIE L. RIZOR and ASHLEY M.

RIZOR,

Debtor(s)

In Chapter 7

JESSIE L. RIZOR,

Plaintiff(s)

 v.

ACAPITA EDUCATION FINANCE

CORPORATION, a Texas Non-profit

Corporation, BRAZOS STUDENT

FINANCE CORPORATION and BRAZOS

HIGHER EDUCATION 

SERVICE CORPORATION, Texas

Non-profit Corporations,

Defendant(s)

Adv Proc No A16-90001-HAR MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY

PLAINTIFF [ECF No. 12] AND GRANTING

CROSS-MOTION BY DEFENDANTS

[ECF No. 13]

INDEX Page No.

1. SUMMARY OF RULING ........................................................2

2. FACTS .......................................................................2

3. LEGAL ANALYSIS .............................................................3

3.1. Summary Judgment Standards ............................................3

3.2. 11 USC §523(a)(8) .......................................................3

3.3. Arguments of the Parties .................................................4

3.4. The Loans are Qualified Under 11 USC §523(a)(8)(A)(i) [An Educational Loan Funded by a Nonprofit Institute] ........................................6

3.5. The Loans are Qualified Under 11 USC §523(a)(8)(A)(ii) [An Obligation to Repay Funds Received as an Educational Benefit, Scholarship, or Stipend] ............7

3.6. The Loans are Qualified Under 11 USC §523(a)(8)(B) [ Any Other Educational Loan That Is a Qualified Education Loan, as Defined in Section 221(d)(1) of the Internal

Revenue Code of 1986, Incurred by a Debtor Who Is an Individual] ...........8

4. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Page 1 of 13

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1. SUMMARY OF RULING- The debtor filed a motion for summary judgment to avoid

nondischargeability of student loans by the nonprofit defendants because they did not involve the

type of lenders or loans protected under 11 USC §523(a)(8). This is mainly because: (a) the loans

were made by a for-profit entity (not a governmental unit or nonprofit); and (b) the private loans

are not “qualified educational loans.” 

The defendant lenders filed a cross-motion for summary judgment claiming that of the

four categories of nondischargeable loans under §523(a)(8), they easily qualify for protection

under three of them. The defendants are right and will be granted summary judgment.

2. FACTS- The debtor went to St. George University School of Veterinary Medicine (St.

George) in St. George, Granada between 2004 and 2007. He finished his clinical work in his final

year at the University of Florida, although he was still enrolled at St. George and paid it for the

education. To fund this education, he borrowed $149,197.93. The loans were originated by

Richland State Bank in Texas, a for-profit institute.1 

Richland State Bank was part of a program to fund veterinary education. Its loans for this

purpose were quickly assigned to nonprofits like the defendants. The process was explained in an

affidavit of Ricky Turman, CFO of the defendant nonprofits:

 3. Brazos is engaged in funding and purchasing student loans as a national

secondary market. Secondary markets ensure the liquidity of federal loan programs

by buying student loans from education lenders. The usual pattern for funding

these loans, as was the pattern underlying the debt in this action, is as follows: The

bank of education institution takes the borrower's application and funds the loan,

thus originating the loan. Brazos purchases the loans and securitizes the loans by

selling bonds thereby providing education lenders with liquidity to originate new

student loans. The defendants in this action are nonprofit corporations, as

evidenced by letters, copies submitted with this affidavit, from the IRS granting

each of Acapita Education Finance Corporation, Brazos Student Finance

1

Affidavit of Jessie Rizor, ECF No. 12-2.

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY PLAINTIFF [ECF No. 12] AND 

GRANTING CROSS-MOTION BY DEFENDANTS [ECF No. 13] Page 2 of 13

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Corporation, and The Brazos Higher Education Service Corporation, Inc. nonprofit

501(c)(3) status. [citation to exhibits omitted]2

Mr. Turman also states that the loans to debtor were made “as an educational benefit,” as

evidenced by copies of the loan application and promissory notes attached to his affidavit.3

3. LEGAL ANALYSIS3.1. Summary Judgment Standards- Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7056 incorporates Fed.R.Civ.P. 56:

(a) Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment. A party may

move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense — or the part of

each claim or defense — on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall

grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The

court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.

The facts are basically uncontested,4 and the material facts (those that might effect the

outcome) are totally undisputed. The court has not weighed the evidence and given the

nonmoving parties all reasonable inferences in their favor. It has determined that as a matter of

law one of the parties is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.5

3.2. 11 USC §523(a)(8)- Most student loan cases involve claims of undue hardship. That

issue has not yet been raised by the debtor. Instead, his argument is that the defendants do not

qualify as the type of educational lenders protected by 11 USC §523(a)(8):

(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title

does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt—

(8) unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph would

impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents, for—

2

ECF No. 13-3, page 2, ¶3.

3

ECF No. 13-3, page 3, ¶5.

4

Debtor raised a fact issue about the “actual use” of the funds in his reply brief, but it is not material

since it is the “intended use” that controls. ECF No. 16, page 2 and Section 3.4 of this memorandum.

5

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 US 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY PLAINTIFF [ECF No. 12] AND 

GRANTING CROSS-MOTION BY DEFENDANTS [ECF No. 13] Page 3 of 13

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(A)

(i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan made,

insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made

under any program funded in whole or in part by a

governmental unit or nonprofit institution; or

(ii) an obligation to repay funds received as an educational

benefit, scholarship, or stipend; or

(B) any other educational loan that is a qualified education loan, as

defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,

incurred by a debtor who is an individual;

Simplifying the language, the 9th Circuit BAP said:

. . . post-BAPCPA, this Code provision: protects four categories of educational claims

from discharge: (1) loans made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit; (2)

loans made under any program partially or fully funded by a governmental unit or

nonprofit institution; (3) claims for funds received as an educational benefit,

scholarship, or stipend; and (4) any “qualified educational loan” as that term is defined

in the Internal Revenue Code.6

3.3. Arguments of the Parties- In his opening brief7 the debtor argues that: 

# (a) the loan was not made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit [11 USC

§523(a)(8)(A)(I)]; 

# (b) they were private loans made instead by presumably for-profit Richland State

Bank, which is not a nonprofit [11 USC §523(a)(8)(A)(i)]; and,

# (c) none of the loans were a “qualified educational loan” as defined by §221(d)(1) of

the Internal Revenue Code, citing 26 USC §25A(f)(2) to show that St. George was

not an “eligible education institute (even though debtor did his clinical work in the

forth year at the University of Florida, which apparently does qualify, he was still a

St. George student and paid his tuition there) [11 USC §523(a)(8)(B)]. 

The debtor embellished a bit in a reply brief that:

# (a) there is a disputed issue of why the purchase of the loans by defendants from

Richland State Bank (presumably a for-profit) should be treated with deference; or

if it is a nonprofit, evidence of that fact has not been offered; 

6

In re Christoff, 527 BR 624, 632 (9th Cir. BAP 2015), citing Benson v. Corbin (In re Corbin), 506 BR

287, 291 (Bankr. W.D. Wa. 2014).

7

ECF No. 12, pages 2-5.

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY PLAINTIFF [ECF No. 12] AND 

GRANTING CROSS-MOTION BY DEFENDANTS [ECF No. 13] Page 4 of 13

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# (b) there is no evidence that the loans to debtor were used only to cover his “cost of

attendance” at St. George; 

# (c) defendants’ reliance on 20 USC §1002 is misplaced since this is not referenced at

all in §523(a)(8)(B).8

Notably, in both briefs, the debtor only cites to two cases (in the reply brief) which do not

address the most relevant issues in this dispute.

The defendants’ opening brief for summary judgment argues that they are qualified in

three of the four categories9

:

 (1) . . . ; (2) loans made under any program partially or fully funded by a

governmental unit or nonprofit institution; (3) claims for funds received as an

educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend; and (4) any “qualified educational loan”

as that term is defined in the Internal Revenue Code.

10:

# under 11 USC §523(a)(8)(A)(i) [an educational loan funded by a nonprofit institute]

under the plain wording of that subsection;

# under 11 USC §523(a)(8)(A)(ii) [an obligation to repay funds for an educational

benefit or stipend] because debtor or St. George received funds from defendants for

his veterinary education; and,

# under 11 USC §523(a)(8)(B) [any “qualified educational loan” as that term is defined

in the Internal Revenue Code 221(d)(1)] carefully connecting the dots in the

statutory framework to show the offshore, non-accredited veterinary school, St.

George, was an entity covered by this subsection.

The defendants filed an opposition11 to debtor’s motion for summary judgment12:

# Although for-profit Richland State Bank originated the loans, it was the defendant

nonprofits that funded the loans; 

# 11 USC §523(a)(8)(B) excepts from discharge “any other educational loan that is a

qualified education loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue

8

This is discussed in more detail in Sec. 3.6 of this memorandum.

9

ECF No. 13, pages 3-8.

10In re Christoff, 527 BR at 632.

11ECF No. 15.

12ECF No. 12.

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY PLAINTIFF [ECF No. 12] AND 

GRANTING CROSS-MOTION BY DEFENDANTS [ECF No. 13] Page 5 of 13

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Code of 1986 [26 U.S.C. § 221(d)(1)], incurred by a debtor who is an individual”; it

makes no reference to 26 USC §26A(f)(2) [as it does to §26A(f)(3)] which relates to

tax issues; and,

# the fact that the debtor did his final year clinical work at the University of Florida

was to meet a requirement, spelled out in 20 USC §1002(2)(A) for loans involving

offshore veterinary schools like St. George to nonetheless be treated as an “eligible

institution.” 

Finally, in a reply to debtor’s opposition to defendants’ summary judgment motion,

defendants made these points:

# defendants cited case law that the structure of the program, using for-profit

Richland State Bank to originate the loans and the defendant nonprofits to fund

them, did not bar the loans as qualifying under 11 USC §523(a)(8)(i) [an educational

loan funded by a nonprofit institute];

# they cited cases supporting a finding that the funds were for an educational purpose

where this use was identified in the paperwork, without having to go through a 

tracing exercise to verify the use; and,

# the loans were within the scope of §523(a)(8)(B) notwithstanding that the school

might not have qualified as an “eligible intitution” under Title IV of Higher

Education Act of 1965.

3.4. The Loans are Qualified Under 11 USC §523(a)(8)(A)(i) [An Educational Loan

Funded by a Nonprofit Institute]- Richland State Bank originated the loans made to debtor for his

veterinary education in Granada. The fact that it may have been a for-profit institution is not

disqualifying under 11 USC §523(a)(8)(A)(i) for “an educational benefit . . . made under any

program funded in whole or in part by a . . . or nonprofit institution.”13

These loans were “funded” by the defendants under the program described by Ricky

Turman, CFO of the nonprofit defendants. Richland State Bank and some of the bank’s affiliates

had an agreement with defendants to provide long term funding to eligible borrowers for

education purposes. The bank paid St. George but defendants were to provide secondary market

13In re Maas, 497 BR 863, 869 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2013).

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY PLAINTIFF [ECF No. 12] AND 

GRANTING CROSS-MOTION BY DEFENDANTS [ECF No. 13] Page 6 of 13

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(securitization) takeout financing or were themselves part of the secondary market.14 “[T]he

inquiry is not restricted to whether an educational loan was made by a nonprofit institution, but

also whether the loan was made as part of a program.”15

Also, the fact that defendants have presented no evidence that all of the funds were used

for educational purposes does not create a material issue of fact that is in dispute. Most courts say

the question of whether a loan is for an educational benefit depends not how the funds were

actually “used,” but on the “stated purpose for the loan when it was obtained.”16

A “loan” as used in §523(a)(8)(i) makes no distinction between those used for tuition and

those used for other expenses. The actual use of the loan proceeds is immaterial. Where the loan

documents, as here,17 establish they were premised on the debtor’s status as a student and were for

educational purposes, they qualify under §523(a)(8)(A(i).18

Under the plain wording the loans in question were for “an educational benefit . . . made

under any program funded in whole or in part by a . . . or nonprofit institution.”

3.5. The Loans are Qualified Under 11 USC §523(a)(8)(A)(ii) [An Obligation to Repay

Funds Received as an Educational Benefit, Scholarship, or Stipend]- The loans in question easily

fit within the description of §523(a)(8)(A)(ii). The money was paid to St. George by Richland

14See, Affidavit in Support of Defendant’s Reply by Ricky Turman. ECF 20-1, pages 2-3, ¶¶ 4 and 5.

15In re Johnson, 2008 WL 5120913, *2 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008); In re Sears, 393 BR 678, 679 (Bankr.

W.D. Mo. 2008).

16In re Maas, 497 at page 869; In re Vasa, 2014 WL 6607512, *3 (Bankr. S.D 2014); In re Rumer, 469 BR

553, 562 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2012); and In re Busson-Sokolik, 635 F.3d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 2011).

17See, Ricky Turman affidavits. ECF No. 13-3, page 3, §5 and ECF No. 20-1, page 3, ¶ 5.

18In re Maas, 497 at page 871.

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY PLAINTIFF [ECF No. 12] AND 

GRANTING CROSS-MOTION BY DEFENDANTS [ECF No. 13] Page 7 of 13

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State Bank under the educational loan program sponsored by defendants. Debtor had a

contractual obligation to repay these loans.19

The 9th Circuit BAP discussed the legislative history of §523(a)(8) in In re Christoff.

20

Under the current BAPCPA version the lender had to actually pay something for the educational

purposes (not merely accrue an account receivable for providing the services themselves), to

trigger a duty to “repay.”21

In the present case, fulfills the predicate to the duty to repay: 

To except a debt from discharge under this subsection, the creditor must

demonstrate that the debtor is obliged to repay a debt for “funds received” for the

educational benefits.22

Although in the Christoff case the BAP focused on money that the debtor received,23 the

restriction to only money paid directly to the debtor does not appear in §523(a)(8)(A)(ii). Money

paid to the education institution for a debtor’s educational benefit which the debtor is required to

repay to the lender also qualifies.

3.6. The Loans are Qualified Under 11 USC §523(a)(8)(B) [ Any Other Educational Loan

That Is a Qualified Education Loan, as Defined in Section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,

Incurred by a Debtor Who Is an Individual]- Sec. 523(a)(8)(B) provides that a debtor does not get a

discharge (except where undue hardship can be shown) for “qualified education loans” as defined

by the Internal Revenue Code, 26 USC §221(d)(1).

19Affidavit of Ricky Turman. ECF No. 20-1, pages 2-3, ¶4.a.

20In re Christoff, 527 BR 624 (9th Cir. BAP 2015)

21In re Christoff, 527 BR, at page 633-34.

22In re Christoff, 527 BR, at page 633.

23In re Christoff, 527 BR, at page 633-34.

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY PLAINTIFF [ECF No. 12] AND 

GRANTING CROSS-MOTION BY DEFENDANTS [ECF No. 13] Page 8 of 13

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Debtor cites some statutes and materials (but no cases) to show that the defendants’ loans

do not qualify under IRC 221(d)(1).24 The defendants counter by laying out the statutory

framework and its numerous nested definitions to refute debtor’s analysis.25

Unless a debtor can show that repayment of the education loan would create an undue

hardship, 11 USC §523(a)(8)(B) makes nondischargeable “any other educational loan that is a

qualified education loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,

incurred by a debtor who is an individual.” What follows is a tedious tracing of nested statutory

definitions to end up showing why a loan involving an offshore veterinary school like St. George

qualifies for protection under 11 USC §523(a)(8)(B).

A “Qualified Education Loan” under IRC 221(d)(1) is defined as:

(d) Definitions For purposes of this section—

(1) Qualified education loan The term “qualified education loan” means

any indebtedness incurred by the taxpayer solely to pay qualified higher

education expenses—

(A) which are incurred on behalf of the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s

spouse, or any dependent of the taxpayer as of the time the

indebtedness was incurred,

(B) which are paid or incurred within a reasonable period of time

before or after the indebtedness is incurred, and

(C) which are attributable to education furnished during a period

during which the recipient was an eligible student.

Such term includes indebtedness used to refinance indebtedness

which qualifies as a qualified education loan. The term “qualified

education loan” shall not include any indebtedness owed to a

person who is related (within the meaning of section 267(b) or

707(b)(1)) to the taxpayer or to any person by reason of a loan

under any qualified employer plan (as defined in section 72(p)(4))

or under any contract referred to in section 72(p)(5).

24ECF No. 12, pages 4-5 and ECF No. 16, pages 2-3.

25ECF No. 13, pages 5-8 and ECF No. 20, pages 5-7.

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY PLAINTIFF [ECF No. 12] AND 

GRANTING CROSS-MOTION BY DEFENDANTS [ECF No. 13] Page 9 of 13

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26 USC §221(d)(2) defines a “Qualified Higher Education Expenses” [referred to in the first

paragraph of §221(d)(1)] as:

(2) Qualified higher education expenses The term “qualified higher education

expenses” means the cost of attendance (as defined in section 472 of the Higher

Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. 1087ll, as in effect on the day before the date of

the enactment of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997) at an eligible educational

institution, reduced by the sum of— [refering to various reductions]

26 USC §221(d)(3) defines an “Eligible Student” [referred to in §221(d)(1)(C)] as:

(3) Eligible student The term “eligible student” has the meaning given such term by

section 25A(b)(3).

Note that debtor argues that the loans in question do not comport with 26 USC §25A(b)(2), but

that is not part of the definition incorporated into 11 USC §523(a)(8)(B). Section 25A(b)(3),

which reads as follows, is:

(3) Eligible student For purposes of this subsection, the term “eligible student”

means, with respect to any academic period, a student who— 

(A) meets the requirements of section 484(a)(1) of the Higher Education

Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1091(a)(1)), as in effect on the date of the enactment

of this section, and

(B) is carrying at least 1⁄2 the normal full-time work load for the course of

study the student is pursuing.

The “Cost of Attendance” [referred to in the definition on “Qualified Higher Education

Expenses” in 26 USC 221(d)(2) is defined by 20 USC §1087ll. Section 1087ll lists a panoply of

expenses including tuition, books, supplies, room and board, etc.

The definition of “Eligible Student” under 26 USC 25A(b)(3) refers to “the requirements of

section 484(a)(1) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1091(a)(1)), . . .” 20 USC

§1091(a)(1) is in the section involving “Student eligiblity” and provides:

(a) In general In order to receive any grant, loan, or work assistance under this

subchapter and part C of subchapter I of chapter 34 of title 42, a student must—

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY PLAINTIFF [ECF No. 12] AND 

GRANTING CROSS-MOTION BY DEFENDANTS [ECF No. 13] Page 10 of 13

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(1) be enrolled or accepted for enrollment in a degree, certificate, or

other program (including a program of study abroad approved for

credit by the eligible institution at which such student is enrolled)

leading to a recognized educational credential at an institution of

higher education that is an eligible institution in accordance with

the provisions of section 1094 of this title, except as provided in

subsections (b)(3) and (b)(4) of this section, and not be enrolled in

an elementary or secondary school [§§ (b)(3) and (b)(4) involve

students taking less than a half-time work load];

The reference to “an eligible institution” leads us to 20 USC §1094(i)(4):

(4) Eligible institution

The term “eligible institution” means any such institution described in

section 1002 of this title.

Which finally leads us to the section blessing educational loans made for St. George, an

offshore veterinary school, for protection under 11 USC §523(a)(8)(B). 20 USC §1002(a)(2)(A)(ii):

(2) Institutions outside the United States

(A) In general For the purpose of qualifying as an institution under

paragraph (1)(C), the Secretary shall establish criteria by regulation for the

approval of institutions outside the United States and for the determination

that such institutions are comparable to an institution of higher education

as defined in section 1001 of this title (except that a graduate medical

school, nursing school, or a veterinary school, located outside the United

States shall not be required to meet the requirements of section 1001(a)(4)

of this title). Such criteria shall include a requirement that a student

attending such school outside the United States is ineligible for loans made

under part C of subchapter IV of this chapter unless—

. . .

(ii) in the case of a veterinary school located outside the United

States that does not meet the requirements of section 1001(a)(4) of

this title, the institution’s students complete their clinical training

at an approved veterinary school located in the United States;

Following this statutory trail, the defendants’ loans to debtor qualify these loans as being

nondischargeabile under 11 USC §523(a)(8)(B). These statutes refute debtor’s arguments that the

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY PLAINTIFF [ECF No. 12] AND 

GRANTING CROSS-MOTION BY DEFENDANTS [ECF No. 13] Page 11 of 13

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loans were not to an eligible educational institute or that it was not accredited by the American

Veterinary Medicine Association. With respect to the latter argument, defendants respond:26

20 U.S.C. § 1002. This section does not define the term “approved veterinary

school,” but 34 C.F.R. § 600.56, determining the eligibility of a foreign veterinary

school to participate in the Direct Loan Program, provides:

(2)(i) For a veterinary school that is neither public nor private nonprofit,

the school’s students must complete their clinical training at an approved

veterinary school located in the United States;

(ii) For a veterinary school that is public or private nonprofit, the school’s

students may complete their clinical training at an approved veterinary

school located—

(A) In the United States;

(B) In the home country; or

(C) Outside of the United States or the home country, if—

(1) The location is included in the accreditation of a veterinary

program accredited by the American Veterinary Medical

Association (AVMA); or

(2) No individual student takes more than two electives at the

location and the combined length of the elective does not exceed

eight weeks.” 

34 C.F.R. § 600.56

Therefore, the term “approved” includes schools that are at least accredited, but also

includes some schools that are not. Therefore, all schools that are AVMA accredited

are considered “approved” under this regulation, which likely supplies the meaning

intended in 20 U.S.C. § 1002.

These loans are nondischargeable under 11 USC §523(a)(8)(B), absent a showing of undue

hardship.

4. CONCLUSION- The defendants qualify three ways under 11 USC §523(a)(8) as lenders

protected by the statute. 

26ECF No. 13-1., page 7, fn 14.

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY PLAINTIFF [ECF No. 12] AND 

GRANTING CROSS-MOTION BY DEFENDANTS [ECF No. 13] Page 12 of 13

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An order denying summary judgment to plaintiff debtor and granting it to the nonprofit

defendant educational lenders will be entered. And, a final judgment dismissing debtor’s

complaint will also be entered based on that order.

 DATED: June 13, 2016

 /s/ Herb Ross 

 HERB ROSS

 U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

Serve :

Frank Cahill, Esq., for π

Richard Crabtree, Esq., for Δ

Cheryl Rapp, Adv. Proc. Mgr. D7741

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY PLAINTIFF [ECF No. 12] AND 

GRANTING CROSS-MOTION BY DEFENDANTS [ECF No. 13] Page 13 of 13

Case 16-90001 Filed 06/13/16 Entered 06/13/16 15:34:42 Doc# 21 Page 13 of 13