Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-06166/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-06166-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Richmond
Defendant
D.C.
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

D.C.,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF RICHMOND,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-06166-KAW 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 14

On October 8, 2018, Plaintiff D.C. filed the instant civil rights suit against Defendant City 

of Richmond ("the City") and Doe Defendants, asserting unconstitutional use of force. (Compl. ¶ 

1, Dkt. No. 1.) On January 28, 2019, the City filed a motion to dismiss the Monell claim. (Def.'s 

Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 14.) The Court deems the matter suitable for disposition without 

hearing pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b) and VACATES the hearing set for March 21, 2019. 

Having reviewed the parties' filings and legal authority, the Court GRANTS the City's motion to 

dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on February 2, 2018, Plaintiff was walking home from school with a 

friend. (Compl. ¶ 14.) As Plaintiff and his friend turned onto a footpath, he noticed a police SUV 

shining its high beam lights in his direction. (Compl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff continued walking when 

without warning, Richmond police officers stepped out of the SUV and immediately aimed their 

guns at the boys. (Compl. ¶ 16.) A Richmond police officer then pursued the two boys with his 

SUV, and intentionally struck Plaintiff with the vehicle. (Compl. ¶¶ 17-18.) Plaintiff hit the SUV 

window, breaking it in the process, and was knocked unconscious. (Compl. ¶ 18.) After Plaintiff 

regained consciousness, the officers instructed him to get into an ambulance. (Compl. ¶ 19.)

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Plaintiff then filed the instant action, asserting: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for unlawful 

seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) a § 1983 claim for excessive force in violation 

of the Fourth Amendment; (3) a § 1983 claim for denial of medical care in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment; (4) a § 1983 claim for municipal liability under Monell; (5) violation of California 

Civil Code § 52.1; (6) battery; (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (8) negligence. 

All but the Monell claim are alleged solely against Doe Defendants.

With respect to Monell, Plaintiff alleges that the City breached its duty of care by failing to 

discipline the Doe Defendants, and that the failure to discipline "demonstrates the existence of an 

entrenched culture, policy or practice of promoting, tolerating and/or ratifying with deliberate 

indifference the making of improper detentions and arrests, the use of excessive force and the 

fabrication of official reports to cover up . . . misconduct." (Compl. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff also alleges 

that the Doe Defendants "engaged in a repeated pattern and practice of using excessive, arbitrary 

and/or unreasonable force against individuals, including, but not limited to Plaintiff." (Compl. ¶ 

25.) Further, the City allegedly "knew or had reason to know by way of actual or constructive 

notice of the aforementioned policy, culture, pattern and/or practice and the complained of 

conduct and resultant injuries/violations." (Compl. ¶ 26.) Finally, Plaintiff challenges particular 

"official recognized" customs, policies, and practices, including: (1) the employment of police 

officers who were known to have "dangerous propensities for abusing their authority and for 

mistreating citizens by failing to follow written City Police Department policies;" (2) inadequate 

supervision, training, controlling, assigning, and disciplining of police officers; (3) "maintaining 

grossly inadequately procedures for reporting, supervising, investigating, reviewing, disciplining 

and controlling the intentional misconduct" of officers; (4) failing to discipline officer conduct; (5) 

ratifying intentional misconduct of officers; (6) "having and maintaining an unconstitutional 

policy, custom and practice of arresting individuals without probable cause or reasonable 

suspicion, and using excessive force;" and (7) "failing to properly investigate claims of unlawful 

seizures and excessive force." (Compl. ¶ 52.)

The City filed the instant motion to dismiss the Monell claim. (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, 

Dkt. No. 14.) On February 11, 2019, Plaintiff filed his opposition. (Plf.'s Opp'n, Dkt. No. 15.) 

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On February 19, 2019, the City filed its reply. (Def.'s Reply, Dkt. No. 16.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss based 

on the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss under Rule 

12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250

F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

In considering such a motion, a court must "accept as true all of the factual allegations 

contained in the complaint," Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citation 

omitted), and may dismiss the case or a claim "only where there is no cognizable legal theory" or 

there is an absence of "sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief." 

Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

A claim is plausible on its face when a plaintiff "pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate 

"more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

"Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action" and "conclusory statements" are 

inadequate. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th 

Cir. 1996) ("[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat 

a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim."). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully . . . When a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's 

liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal citations omitted).

Generally, if the court grants a motion to dismiss, it should grant leave to amend even if no 

request to amend is made "unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by 

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the allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations 

omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

"A government entity may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless a policy, 

practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force behind a violation of 

constitutional rights." Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Thus, "local governments are 

responsible only for their own illegal acts and are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for their 

employee's actions." Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (internal quotation and 

modifications omitted). To establish Monell liability, a plaintiff must prove: "(1) that the plaintiff 

possessed a constitutional right of which she was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; 

(3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) 

that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation." Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 

900 (internal quote and modification omitted).

In pleading a Monell claim, "allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply 

recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts 

to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." Starr v. Baca, 652 

F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Additionally, "the factual allegations that are taken as true must 

plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to 

be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation." Id.

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege specific facts in support of his Monell claim. First, Plaintiff 

alleges no specific facts regarding the policies at issue. Indeed, Plaintiff's opposition provides 

more specificity, explaining that the City has a policy requiring officers "to demonstrate 

proficiency in using appropriate force during encounters with citizens," which the individual 

Defendants violated. (Plf.'s Opp'n at 4.) Even this allegation, however, is insufficient because it

suggests that Defendants failed to follow a city policy requiring the use of appropriate force, not 

that the policy itself amounts to deliberate indifference or that it was the moving force behind the 

violation. Violation of a constitutionally sound policy is not sufficient to support a Monell claim. 

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See Box v. Miovas, Case No. 12-cv-4347-VC, 2015 WL 1927317, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2015) 

(finding that the plaintiff's allegations "impl[y] the City had a policy requiring officers to file use 

of force and offense reports, but Savage did not comply with that policy. This cannot form the 

basis of a Monell claim."); Klahn v. Alameda Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, Case No. 16-cv-833-JCS, 2017 

WL 2021370, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2017) (dismissing Monell claim where the allegations 

"establish that officers violated Alameda County's policies and, as a result, that the alleged 

violations were committed by individuals, not a municipality"); Garcia v. Moreno Valley Police 

Dep't, Case No. EDCV 17-1217 SVW (SS), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220772, at *48 (C.D. Cal. 

Nov. 19, 2018) (granting summary judgment in favor of county where the "evidence shows that 

the county has policies implementing Miranda's requirements").

Additionally, Plaintiff fails to allege specific facts that would show that a policy or custom 

exists, as Plaintiff cites to only one alleged incident of unconstitutional conduct by the Doe 

Defendants. "One occurrence, even if probable, does not a custom make." Cardenas v. Cty. of 

Alameda, Case No. 16-cv-5205-WHA, 2017 WL 1650563, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2017) ("even 

if County officers' conduct during the search of plaintiffs' home were unconstitutional, the 

complaint fails to demonstrate sufficient duration and consistency for the alleged conduct to 

establish a customary practice within the meaning of Monell"); see also Franklin v. City of San 

Leandro, Case No. 17-cv-789-HSG, 2017 WL 5665656, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2017) 

(dismissing Monell claim where "[t]he FAC speaks only to alleged unconstitutional conduct by 

individual defendants in handling one K9 officer"); Davis v. City of San Jose, Case No. 14-cv2035-BLF, 2014 WL 2859189, at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2014) ("there are equally no facts 

alleged concerning a pattern of repeated violations that would give the City fair notice to enable it 

to defend itself properly"). 

Further, to the extent Plaintiff alleges that the City "ratif[ied] the intentional misconduct of 

Defendants and other officers," Plaintiff again alleges no facts. Plaintiff does not explain how the 

ratification occurred, or "provide any factual support showing that anyone knew of the allegedly 

unconstitutional conduct." Cardenas, 2017 WL 1650563, at *4.

Finally, while Plaintiff alleges that "the aforementioned policies and practices" caused 

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Plaintiff to be severely injured, the complaint "is devoid of any specific facts suggesting that 

Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated by an official municipal policy or widespread 

practice . . . ." Franklin, 2017 WL 5665656, at *2.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege his Monell

claim, and GRANTS the City's motion to dismiss that claim. The Court finds, however, that 

amendment is not futile, and gives Plaintiff leave to amend.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the City's motion to dismiss the Monell

claim. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within thirty days of the date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 19, 2019

__________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

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