Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01110/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01110-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Lakewood
Not Party
Jane Doe
Not Party
Elizabeth Hannula
Appellee
Don Lively
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ELIZABETH HANNULA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

CITY OF LAKEWOOD; and JANE DOE, 

Defendants, 

and 

DON LIVELY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth circuit 

JUN 2 9 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-1110 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 88-F-949) 

Christina M. Habas, of Denver, Colorado, for the DefendantAppellant. 

Sandra J. Pfaff, of the Law Firm of Sandra J. Pfaff, of Denver, 

Colorado, for the Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before*TACHA and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and VAN BEBBER, District 

Judge. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable G. Thomas Van Bebber, District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-1110 Document: 01019880593 Date Filed: 06/29/1990 Page: 1 
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Elizabeth Hannula seeks damages under the Civil Rights Act of 

1871, 42 U.S.C. section 1983, for injuries she allegedly sustained 

during an arrest by a police officer from the City of Lakewood. 

The officer moved for summary judgment based on a qualified 

immunity defense. The district court denied the motion. We 

reverse. 

I. 

On June 22, 1987 Hannula purchased a camping permit at Bear 

Creek Lake Park in the City of Lakewood, Colorado. She ate dinner 

at the park and went to sleep. Park Ranger Pam Nodolsky later 

awoke Hannula and informed her that she was sleeping in a nondesignated camping area and would have to move her campsite 

approximately 50 feet to a designated camping area. When Hannula 

began to place her belongings in her van in order to move, 

Nodolsky noticed some beer cans on a nearby picnic table and asked 

Hannula if she had been drinking. Hannula told Nodolsky that she 

had been drinking earlier in the evening during dinner. Because 

of Hannula's drinking, Nodolsky told her that she could not let 

her drive the van. According to her deposition, Hannula responded 

that because the designated camping area was so close, she would 

walk her belongings over there. 

At this point, Nodolsky told Hannula to wait while she got 

some help. Nodolsky contacted the Lakewood Police Department, 

which responded by sending two police cars. One of the police 

officers, defendant Don Lively, questioned Hannula concerning her 

prior alcohol consumption and then requested that she submit to a 

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Appellate Case: 89-1110 Document: 01019880593 Date Filed: 06/29/1990 Page: 2 
breath test. Hannula stated that she did not think she was under 

any obligation to submit to the test because she was neither in 

her vehicle nor driving her vehicle. In her deposition, Hannula 

stated that Lively became visibly upset by this remark. Lively 

administered a ''roadside test," asking Hannula to follow a pen 

with her eyes. Lively then handcuffed Hannula and told her that 

he was taking her to."detox. 111 It is undisputed that Hannula 

offered no physical resistance. 

Immediately after Lively placed the handcuffs on Hannula, she 

informed Lively that they were too tight. Lively made no attempt 

to loosen the handcuffs. During the trip to the detoxification 

center, Hannula complained twice more. Lively responded that they 

would "be there in a few minutes." According to Hannula, she 

"quietly argued" with Lively. 

Hannula alleges that the tight handcuffs damaged the nerves, 

and possibly the bones, in her wrist. The district court found 

that Hannula sufficiently set forth a claim for Lively's allegedly 

excessive use of force and denied Lively's motion for summary 

judgment. The court stated that there is evidence in Hannula's 

deposition testimony that the use of the handcuffs was excessively 

forceful; that the handcuffs caused serious injury; and that 

Lively acted in anger in applying the handcuffs. 

1 Lively argues that the arrest was permitted by Colo. Rev. Stat. 

§ 25-1-310 (1989), which permits protective custody of a person 

who is "intoxicated or incapacitated by alcohol and clearly 

dangerous to the health and safety of himself or others .•.. " 

Id. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1110 Document: 01019880593 Date Filed: 06/29/1990 Page: 3 
II. 

We review summary judgment decisions involving a qualifed 

immunity defense somewhat differently than other summary judgment 

rulings. In our prior decisions, we have emphasized that once a 

defendant raises a qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff bears 

a heavy burden. The qualified immunity defense "cannot be 

analogized to other affirmative defenses because of the interests 

implicated in suits against government officials. Unlike other 

affirmative defenses, qualified immunity not only shields a 

defendant from liability, but is also intended to protect the 

defendant £rom the burdens associated with trial.'' Pueblo 

Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 645 

(10th Cir. 1988) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 

(1985)). These burdens include distraction of. officials from 

their governmental responsibilities, the inhibition of 

discretionary decisionmaking, the deterrence of able people from 

public service, and the disruptive effects of discovery on 

governmental operations. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 

816-17 (1982). 

Because of these societal costs, once a defendant raises a 

qualified immunity defe·nse the plaintiff assumes the burden of 

showing that the defendant has violated clearly established law. 

To overcome the defense, the plaintiff must do more than identify 

a clearly established legal test and then allege that the 

defendant has violated it. See Pueblo Neighborhood, 847 F.2d at 

645. The plaintiff must demonstrate a substantial correspondence 

between the conduct in question and prior law allegedly 

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establishing that the defendant's actions were clearly prohibited. 

The "contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 

violates that right." Anderson~ Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 

(1987). While Anderson makes clear that there is no requirement 

that the specific action in question have previously been held 

unlawful, the plaintiff must show that the unlawfulness of the 

conduct in question is "apparent'' in light of preexisting law. 

Id. 

If the plaintiff fails to meet the burden of showing how a 

defendant violated a clearly established right, we must prevent 

the plaintiff from subjecting government officials to trial: 

[qualified immuriity is an] entitlement not to stand 

trial or face the burdens of litigation. The 

entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere 

defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it 

is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted 

to go to trial. 

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis in 

original). If the plaintiff fulfills the burden of showing how 

the defendant violated a clearly established right, the defendant 

then bears the normal burden of a movant for summary judgment of 

demonstrating that no material facts remain in dispute. See 

Powell v. Mikulecky, 891 F.2d 1454, 1457 (10th Cir. 1989). 

III. 

With these considerations in mind; we examine Hannula's claim 

that Lively violated her clearly established constitutional right 

to be free from the excessive use of police force in making an 

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arrest. 2 Both Lively and Hannula state that the contours of the 

right to be free from excessive force are outlined in Graham v. 

Connor, U.S. , 109 s.ct. 1865 (1989), which holds that a 

claim of excessive police force should be analyzed under the 

fourth amendment's objective reasonableness standard rather than 

under a substantive due process standard, see id. at 1871. While 

Graham sets forth the test for determining whether excessive force 

has occurred, it does not necessarily state the proper test for 

determining a defendant's qualified immunity from a claim of 

excessive force. 

To determine whether the law the defendant allegedly violated 

was clearly established, we focus only on the state of the law at 

the time of the defendant's actions. See Pueblo Neighborhood, 847 

F.2d at 645. We do not require government officials to predict 

future legal developments. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. When 

Lively arrested Hannula, the Tenth Circuit generally examined 

claims of excessive use of force under a substantive due process 

standard. See~' Trujillo .Y.!.. Goodman, 825 F.2d 1453, 1457 

(10th Cir. 1987); Hewitt .Y.!.. City of Truth or Consequences, 758 

F.2d 1375, 1378-79 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985); 

Wise .Y.!._ Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1333-34 (10th Cir. 1981). Hannula 

must therefore show that Lively's actions clearly constituted an 

excessive use of force under our former substantive due process 

standard. 

2 In her amended complaint, Hannula argued that she was also 

deprived of her right to due process, her right to freedom from 

.summary punishment, and her right to the equal protection of laws. 

On appeal Hannula does not renew any of these arguments. 

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Under the due process standard, the factors relevant to 

whether the use of force is excessive are: (1) the relationship 

between the amount of force used and the need presented; (2) the 

extent of the injury inflicted; and (3) the motives of the state 

officer. "Force inspired by unwise, excessive zeal amounting to 

an abuse of official power that shocks the conscience, or by 

malice rather than mere carelessness, may be redressed under 

section 1983." Hewitt, 758 F.2d at 1379 (citations omitted). 

We hold that Hannula has failed to show that Lively violated 

a clearly established right. First, we note that the extent of 

Hannula's injury is minimal. Hannula presents no evidence of 

contusions, lacerations or damage to the bones or nerves of her 

wrists. 3 The evidence establishes.nothing more than that the 

handcuffing caused her pain. Second, Hannula has not proven that 

the amount of force·was substantial. Indeed, if the injury is 

minimal, it is likely that the force creating the injury was also 

minimal. Third, on the issue of the officer's intent, 4 Hannula 

stated in her deposition that the officer appeared angry after she 

3 Hannula asserts that she has sustained nerve damage and 

possibly bone damage as a result of Lively's actions. However, 

Hannula does not offer any supporting evidence for these 

statements. Indeed, Hannula offers no medical evidence of any 

type of injury. 

4 Although qualified immunity normally involves only objective 

standards, inquiry into subjective standards is not precluded when 

they are essential elements in a plaintiff's claim. See Pueblo 

Neighborhood, 847 F.2d at 648; see also Trujillo, 8257':°2d at 

1459-60 (finding that intent of officer was essential element of 

plaintiff's excessive force claim); Musso~ Hourigan, 836 F.2d 

736, 743 (2d Cir. 1988)(Harlow eliminates inquiry into official's 

subjective knowledge of the law, but does not eliminate "all 

general examination of subjective intent unrelated to knowledge of 

law") • 

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refused to submit to the breath test. While this evidence may be 

probative of malice, it certainly_ does not establish it. Hannula 

points to no other evidence in the record showing malice. 

Considering all three factors together, we conclude that Hannula 

has not produced sufficient evidence to prove that Lively's 

actions constituted a clearly established constitutional violation 

under Hewitt. Compare this case with Trujillo, 825 F.2d at 1454 

(plaintiff stated cause of action for excessive force where police 

threw heavy metal flashlight at plaintiff, which caused a 

depressed skull fracture and required immediate surgery) and 

Martin v. Duffie, 463 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1972) (plaintiff stated 

cause of action for excessive force where he was struck on head 

with such force that he suffered a brain injury which required 

immediate surgery). 

Nor are we persuaded by the cases that Hannula cites in 

support of her proposition that applying the handcuffs tightly 

enough to cause pain constitutes a constitutional violation. The 

cited decisions establish that while loosening tight handcuffs may 

be the most compassionate action, the failure to do so does not 

rise to a clearly established constitutional violation. See ~.9 ... :._1 

Alm~ Moreth, 694 F.Supp. 1322, 1324 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (no 

constitutional violation where plaintiff repeatedly stated that 

handcuffs were injuring him but handcuffs not applied in an 

abnormal manner, such as to cause bleeding); Taylor~ Kveton, 684 

F.Supp. 179, 183 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (there is only an "arguable" 

duty to rectify handcuffs that are three notches too tight); Van 

--

Houten v. Baughman, 663 F.Supp. 887, 891 (c~·o-. Ill. 1987) 

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(numbness in wrists arising from handcuffing does not arise to the 

level of severity as to shock the conscience of the court). The 

cases do not ''clearly establish" that handcuffing a detainee too 

tightly constitutes excessive force, at least in the absence of 

apparent physical damage to the plaintiff's wrists. 

IV. 

We hold that Hannula failed to show that Lively's actions 

constituted a violation of clearly established law. For this 

reason, Lively need not demonstrate that no material facts remain 

in dispute to prevail on summary judgment. We REVERSE and REMAND 

with instructions that the district court enter summary judgment 

in favor of the defendant consistent with this opinion. 

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