Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04839/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04839-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
A. P. Kane
Respondent
Samuel Webb
Petitioner

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAMUEL WEBB,

Petitioner,

v.

A. P. KANE, warden, 

Respondent. /

No. C 06-4839 MHP (pr)

ORDER DENYING HABEAS

PETITION

INTRODUCTION

Samuel Webb, a prisoner at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, filed this

pro se action for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge the parole

board's 2003 decision that he was not suitable for parole. The petition will be denied. 

BACKGROUND

Samuel Webb was convicted on a guilty plea in 1984 in Los Angeles County Superior

Court of second degree murder and robbery, and admitted to use of a firearm in the

commission of the robbery. He is currently serving a sentence of 15 years to life in prison on

the murder. His sentence also included 5 years on the robbery plus a 1-year enhancement for

the firearm, both of which were stayed until completion of the murder sentence. His habeas

petition does not concern that conviction directly, but instead focuses on the November 17,

2003 decision by the Board of Prison Terms (now known as and referred to herein as Board

of Parole Hearings (“BPH”)) to find him not suitable for parole. As of the time of the BPH

hearing, Webb had been in custody about 19 years on his 15-to-life sentence.

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The specifics regarding the crime and the circumstances regarding parole suitability

are described in the Discussion section later in this order. Briefly, petitioner and three

fellow street gang members committed an armed robbery of three people during which one of

his confederates shot and killed one of the people they were robbing. The BPH found Webb

unsuitable for parole for several reasons, including the commitment offense, Webb's

escalating pattern of criminality, his unstable social history, and his disciplinary record in

prison. Webb sought relief in the California courts. The Los Angeles County Superior Court

denied his petition in a reasoned order. Resp. Exh. 5. The California Court of Appeal and

California Supreme Court summarily denied his petitions. Resp. Exhs. 6 and 7. 

Webb then filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting that his right

to due process had been violated because (1) there was not sufficient evidence to support the

decision, (2) his plea agreement had been breached, and (3) the BPH failed to set a term

using the matrix. Respondent filed an answer. Webb filed a traverse. The matter was

transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California to this district

after having been fully briefed. The matter is now ready for a decision on the merits. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged

action occurred at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad. Soledad is in Monterey

County and within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).

EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state

judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every

claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). The parties do not

dispute that state court remedies were exhausted for the claims asserted in the petition.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits

in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 409-13 (2000). Section 2254(d) applies to a habeas petition from a state prisoner

challenging the denial of parole. See Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d

1123, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2006). 

DISCUSSION

A. Due Process Requires That Some Evidence Support A Parole Denial

A California prisoner with a sentence of a term of years to life with the possibility of

parole has a protected liberty interest in release on parole and therefore a right to due process

in the parole suitability proceedings. See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1127-28; Board of Pardons v.

Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442

U.S. 1 (1979); Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). 

A parole board's decision satisfies the requirements of due process if “some evidence”

supports the decision. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29 (adopting some evidence standard for

disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)). "To

determine whether the some evidence standard is met 'does not require examination of the

entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the

evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that

could support the conclusion reached'" by the parole board or the governor. Id. at 1128

(quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56). The "some evidence standard is

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minimal, and assures that 'the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the . . .

board were without support or otherwise arbitrary.'" Id. at 1129 (quoting Superintendent v.

Hill, 472 U.S. at 457). The some evidence standard of Superintendent v. Hill is clearly

established law in the parole context for purposes of § 2254(d). Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. 

Having determined that there is a due process right, and that some evidence is the

evidentiary standard for judicial review, the next step is to look to state law because that sets

the criteria to which the some evidence standard applies. One must look to state law to

answer the question, "'some evidence' of what?"

B. State Law Standards For Parole For Murderers In California

California uses indeterminate sentences for most non-capital murderers, with the term

being life imprisonment and parole eligibility after a certain minimum number of years. For

example, the minimum period for second degree murder is 15 years and for first degree

murder is 25 years. See In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1078 (Cal.), cert. denied, 126

S. Ct. 92 (2005); Cal. Penal Code §§ 190. California's parole scheme described below

provides that a release date normally must be set unless various factors exist, but the "unless"

qualifier is substantial. 

A BPH panel meets with an inmate one year before the prisoner's minimum eligible

release date "and shall normally set a parole release date. . . . The release date shall be set in a

manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in

respect to their threat to the public, and that will comply with the sentencing rules that the

Judicial Council may issue and any sentencing information relevant to the setting of parole

release dates." Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a). Significantly, that statute also provides that the

panel "shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted

offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses,

is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration

for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting." Cal.

Penal Code § 3041(b). 

One of the implementing regulations, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2401, provides: "A parole

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date shall be denied if the prisoner is found unsuitable for parole under Section 2402(c). A

parole date shall be set if the prisoner is found suitable for parole under Section 2402(d). A

parole date set under this article shall be set in a manner that provides uniform terms for

offenses of similar gravity and magnitude with respect to the threat to the public."1

 The

regulation also provides that "[t]he panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is

suitable for release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be

found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose

an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison." 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

2402(a). The panel may consider all relevant and reliable information available to it. 15 Cal.

Code Regs. § 2402(b).

The regulations contain a matrix of suggested base terms for several categories of

crimes. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403. For example, for second degree murders, the matrix

of base terms ranges from the low of 15, 16, or 17 years to a high of 19, 20, or 21 years,

depending on some of the facts of the crime. Some prisoners estimate their time to serve

based only on the matrix. However, going straight to the matrix to calculate the sentence

puts the cart before the horse because it ignores critical language in the relevant statute and

regulations that requires the prisoner first to be found suitable for parole.

The statutory scheme places individual suitability for parole above a prisoner's

expectancy in early setting of a fixed date designed to ensure term uniformity. Dannenberg,

34 Cal. 4th at 1070-71. Under state law, the matrix is not reached unless and until the

prisoner is found suitable for parole. Id. at 1070-71; 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403(a) ("[t]he

panel shall set a base term for each life prisoner who is found suitable for parole"). The

California Supreme Court's determination of state law in Dannenberg is binding in this

federal habeas action. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629-30 (1988). 

The California Supreme Court also has determined that the facts of the crime can

alone support a sentence longer than the statutory minimum even if everything else about the 

prisoner is laudable. "While the Board must point to factors beyond the minimum elements

of the crime for which the inmate was committed, it need engage in no further comparative

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analysis before concluding that the particular facts of the offense make it unsafe, at that time,

to fix a date for the prisoner's release." Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071; see also In re

Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 682-83 (Cal. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 980 (2003) ("[t]he

nature of the prisoner's offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole"

but might violate due process "where no circumstances of the offense reasonably could be

considered more aggravated or violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction

for that offense"). 

The federal habeas court's task is not to determine whether some evidence supports

the reasons cited for the denial of parole, "but whether some evidence indicates a parolee's

release unreasonably endangers public safety. Some evidence of the existence of a particular

factor does not necessarily equate to some evidence the parolee's release unreasonably

endangers the public safety." Hayward, 512 F.3d 536, 543 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 

A critical issue in parole denial cases concerns the BPH's use of evidence about the

crime that led to the conviction. Four Ninth Circuit cases guide the application of the

Superintendent v. Hill some evidence standard on this point: Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910

(9th Cir. 2003), Sass, 461 F.3d 1123, Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2007), and

Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536. Biggs explained that the value of the criminal offense

fades over time as a predictor of parole suitability: “The Parole Board’s decision is one of

‘equity’ and requires a careful balancing and assessment of the factors considered. . . . A

continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and

conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the

prison system and could result in a due process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17. Biggs

upheld the initial denial of a parole release date based solely on the nature of the crime and

the prisoner’s conduct before incarceration, but cautioned that “[o]ver time . . . , should

Biggs continue to demonstrate exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying

him a parole date simply because of the nature of Biggs’ offense and prior conduct would

raise serious questions involving his liberty interest in parole.” Id. at 916. Next came Sass,

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which criticized the Biggs statements as improper and beyond the scope of the dispute

before the court. Sass determined that the parole board is not precluded from relying on

unchanging factors such as the circumstances of the commitment offense or the parole

applicant's pre-offense behavior in determining parole suitability. See id. at 1129

(commitment offenses in combination with prior offenses provided some evidence to support

denial of parole at subsequent parole consideration hearing). Irons then determined that due

process was not violated by the use of the commitment offense and pre-offense criminality to

deny parole for a prisoner 16 years into his 17-to-life sentence. Irons emphasized that in all

three cases (Irons, Sass and Biggs) in which the court had "held that a parole board's decision

to deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole solely on the basis of his commitment offense

comports with due process, the decision was made before the inmate had served the

minimum number of years required by his sentence." Irons, 479 F.3d at 665. Most recently,

in Hayward, the Ninth Circuit confronted a case where the prisoner was long past his

minimum parole date, and had been in custody for 27 actual years on his 15-to-life sentence. 

Hayward granted habeas relief to the petitioner, relying on Biggs and Irons, and citing with

approval In re. Scott, 133 Cal.App.4th 573, 595 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) for the proposition that

the "'commitment offense can negate suitability only if circumstances of the crime reliably

established by evidence in the record rationally indicate that the offender will present an

unreasonable public safety risk if released from prison.'" Hayward, 512 F.3d at 545. 

C. The BPH's Decision Was Supported By Some Evidence

The BPH determined that Webb was "not suitable for parole and would pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society or threat to public safety if released from prison." RT

47. In finding Webb not suitable for parole, the BPH relied on the commitment offense, his

escalating pattern of criminal conduct, his unstable social history, and his disciplinary record

in prison. 

1. The Commitment Offense

The crime was described in a 2001 life prisoner evaluation report and was read into

the record at the 2003 hearing: 

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On January 19, 1984, the deceased, Curtis Martin, and witnesses John Johnson, Janice

Marlon, and Wauneta Woodruff . . . arrived in Los Angeles from Monterey,

California. They parked at 115th Street. At approximately 1915 hours, Webb and

three companions approached the victim's car and Codefendant Turner asked the

victim if he wanted to purchase PCP. The victim indicated, no, and it appeared that

Webb passed a gun to Codefendant Turner. At that point, Victim Martin and two

companions were ordered out of the car and subsequently robbed. Statements were

made to the effect, if he moves, shoot him in the head. Witnesses hear two or three

gunshots from the driver's side of the vehicle, and it appeared that Codefendant Turner

shot the victim Martin.

Resp. Exh. 4, reporter's transcript of November 17, 2003 parole hearing ("RT") at 12-13. 

The version of the crime reported in the probation officer's report suggests that this was a

common ruse in the area where the crime took place, i.e., approach a car, offer to sell drugs

and then rob the people in the car. The report indicates that the victims were in the area to

visit a local resident and not for the purposes of buying drugs. 

Webb's version was that the victim pulled the gun while Webb's cohorts were talking

to him, a struggle ensued for the gun, one of Webb's codefendants said "he's got a gun" and

then Turner pulled out a gun and fired one shot. RT 14. Webb's version also was that he saw

the victim was not breathing so he ran away. RT 15. Webb's version was taken from an

earlier report, and he declined to discuss the crime at this hearing. The BPH was not

required to accept Webb's version, especially since it was inconsistent with his conviction. 

 2. Pre-Incarceration History

At the time of the commitment offense, Webb had already amassed a noteworthy

criminal record, even though he was only about 19 years old. He had numerous offenses as a

juvenile. In 1977 he was arrested for robbery, and placed in a home on probation in 1977. 

Later in 1977, he was arrested for petty theft and referred to a public agency. And yet again

in 1977, he was arrested for receiving stolen property and burglary and was counseled and

released. In 1979, he was arrested for petty theft, and counseled and released. In 1980, he

was arrested for burglary, although the burglary charge was dismissed and a receiving stolen

property charge was sustained. In 1980, he was put on home probation. Later in 1980, he

was arrested for receiving stolen property and was placed on probation. On October 15,

1980, he was arrested for kidnapping for robbery, rape, crimes against children, and grand

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theft auto; five counts were later dismissed, and charges of criminal conspiracy and robbery

were sustained (for robbery of a bus by a group of masked bandits), and he was sentenced to

the California Youth Authority for five years. In February 1983, he was paroled from the

CYA, but was arrested just months later: he was arrested in September 1983 for robbery and

again in November 1983 for robbery, although the record did not include information about

the disposition of either offense (possibly because he was arrested for the current offense on

February 1, 1984). He was on parole and probation from the CYA at the time of the arrest

for the murder. RT 15-17; see Resp. Exh. 2. . 

His social life was "somewhat stable," according to Webb. RT 18. He was,

nonetheless "constantly on the streets," RT 19, and in a street gang. He was one of seven

children. One of his brothers had been in prison but was out and had completed parole. 

Webb was in the Projects Crips street gang, but has been out of the gang for over ten years. 

RT 19. He had dropped out of high school in 10th grade. RT 20. Before he was

incarcerated, he worked with his stepfather doing janitorial work. While he was in the CYA,

he did landscaping and upholstery work. RT 20. Webb stated that he did not use any illegal

drugs. He drank beer a couple of times. RT 21. 

Webb has a 14-year old daughter with whom he maintains contact. RT 22-23, 35-36. 

3. In-Prison Behavior

The BPH panel reviewed Webb's prison conduct and activities since his last parole

hearing in 2001, at which it was recommended that he remain disciplinary-free, upgrade

vocationally and educationally, and participate in self-help and therapy. 

Webb had worked as a porter and was starting the vocational print shop program. RT

24. He had received positive work evaluations. RT 24-25. Webb had completed the graphic

arts vocation training in 2003. He also had done the dry cleaning vocation in 1992 and the

plumbing vocation training in 1989 and 1992. RT 25. 

Webb obtained his GED in November 1990. RT 25. 

He had a negative disciplinary history. He had received six CDC-115 rule violation

reports. The most recent CDC-115 was dated October 25, 2002 for disrespect to staff. He

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called a correctional officer a bitch. RT 39-40. He also had received six CDC-128(a)

counselling memoranda, the most recent of which was in February 1993 for disrespect

toward staff. RT 25-26. 

Webb had received favorable evaluations on some of his endeavors. He had received

memoranda for his completion of a two-hour session of a parenting program, and an twoweek anger management lecture course. RT 26. He apparently had done other programming

in prison, but the BPH was focused more on the recent history at this hearing. RT 24. 

His correctional counselor had written an unfavorable evaluation in July 15, 2003.

The counselor wrote that Webb "'would probably pose a moderate degree of threat to the

public at this time if released from prison.'" RT 27. 

 Webb's psychological report dated March 13, 2001, stated that he had a "'recent

psychiatric diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, improved.'" RT 27. The

psychologist stated that Webb's violence potential within a controlled setting was considered

lower than that of the average level II inmate based in part of the fact that he had not received

a disciplinary action in almost 5 years. RT 29. His violence potential also was considered no

more than that of the average citizen if released into the community. RT 29. The

psychologist concluded that Webb did not have a mental health disorder in need of treatment

and did not appear to have a significant drug or alcohol problem, so there were no

recommendations in that area. RT 29-30. 

 4. Parole Plans

If paroled, Webb planned to reside in Colton 0(in San Bernardino County), with a

friend. RT 31. His former plan (from 2002) to live with his wife had been abandoned due to

their marital separation. RT 31-32. Webb stated that his sister was looking for possible

employment opportunities for him. RT 33. 

5. District Attorney Opposition

The district attorney opposed parole. RT 41. He doubted that Webb had "come to

grips with his crime" because he refused to discuss it at the hearing and his version offered

earlier is substantially different from the witnesses' statements and police report. RT 41. The

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district attorney also pointed out that the counselor's report was unfavorable. RT 42. The

district attorney's mere opposition to parole generally does not provide a sufficient ground for

denying parole, see Hayward, 512 F.3d at 545 n.9, but may be of use in providing a

counterpoint to the parole candidate's presentation and focusing on problem areas for the

candidate. 

6. Consideration of Webb's Case

When the full picture is considered, there was some evidence to support the BPH's

denial of parole because he was "not suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk

of danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from prison." RT 47. As noted

earlier, the BPH relied on the commitment offense, and Webb's escalating criminality,

unstable social history, and disciplinary history to find him not suitable for parole. With

regard to the commitment offense, the BPH stated that the crime was "carried out in an

especially cruel and callous manner," that there were multiple victims and one was shot to

death. The crime appeared to have been calculated and was carried out in a manner that

demonstrated an exceptionally callous disregard for another human being, and there was an

inexplicable motive (apparently referring to the shooting, which was unnecessary to

accomplish the robbery). RT 47. The murder victim was shot and killed by one of the three

other gang members present with Webb, and Webb was not the actual shooter. The

description of the crime does, however, suggest that Webb was the leader, as he originally

had the gun and gave it to Turner with directions to shoot in the head anyone who moved,

and then Webb was separating the victims from their valuables when Turner fired the fatal

shot. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1). 

There was strong evidence of an escalating pattern of criminality, although there was

no evidence as to whether any of the earlier incidents involved actual violence, as mentioned

in the regulation, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(2). Webb repeatedly had been in trouble as a

juvenile and had failed to profit from the various attempts to correct his criminality, such as

juvenile probation, time in the CYA, and parole. RT 48. Webb did not grow out of his

juvenile delinquency but continued to engage in criminal activity until put in prison for the

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current offense. He was on parole and probation from the CYA at the time of the current

offense. 

There was evidence to support for the BPH's finding of an unstable social history, as

the BPH pointed to the criminality described above, the lack of adult supervision and the

existence of street gang activity as indicative of an unstable social history. RT 48. 

There also was support for the BPH's reliance on Webb's failure to demonstrate

evidence of positive change: he had receive a CDC-115 after his most recent parole hearing

for calling a correctional officer a bitch in the dining hall, which the BPH panel thought

could have incited a riot because it occurred in a dining hall in which the inmate to guard

ratio was very high. See RT 48, 52. The BPH wanted a new psychological report with a

new evaluation of Webb's dangerousness because of the CDC-115 and also to explore

whether he needed further work to explore the underlying causes of the commitment offense. 

RT 53-54. 

The existence of some evidence to support the cited reasons does not end the matter,

as the focus here remains on whether there was some evidence to support the decision that

Webb's release unreasonably endangers public safety. See Hayward, 512 F.3d at 543. 

Webb's pre-incarceration criminal activity can be relied upon to assess his current

dangerousness. The cluster of Ninth Circuit cases discussed earlier instruct that the BPH can

look at immutable events, such as the nature of the conviction offense and pre-conviction

criminality to predict current unsuitability, but the weight to be attributed to those immutable

events should decrease over time as a predictor of future dangerousness as the years pass and

the prisoner demonstrates favorable behavior. Here, Webb has continued to engage in

misconduct in prison, so that his behavior undermines rather than supports a view that he has

been rehabilitated. he had received six CDC-115s, the most recent of which was just one

year before the parole hearing at issue. Regardless of whether he considers them serious, the

disciplinary actions do reflect an unwillingness to follow rules and conform to societal

norms. Although Webb had positive accomplishments in prison, his continuing misconduct

takes his case out of the category of cases where the BPH is relying on only pre-incarceration

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facts that the prisoner can never change. Webb does have control over his behavior in

prison, and the BPH may consider that misconduct in determining whether he is

rehabilitated. Under the circumstances, the BPH's reliance on the circumstances of the

murder and unfavorable pre-incarceration behavior and history did not offend due process. 

The Los Angeles County Superior Court correctly identified the “some evidence”

standard as the applicable standard for judicial review, as evidenced by its citation to In re

Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616 (Cal. 2002), which had cited and adopted the Superintendent v.

Hill some evidence standard as the proper standard for judicial review of evidentiary

sufficiency for parole denial cases. See Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 665-67. And the court's

decision was a reasonable application of the some evidence standard. The superior court

determined that the nature of the commitment offenses committed at age 19, plus Webb's

lengthy juvenile criminal record, plus his unstable social history (that included him

constantly being on the streets and street gang membership – an affiliation that lasted until

about a decade before the parole hearing and therefore continued for almost a decade after

his current imprisonment started), plus his disciplinary record, even when viewed together

with his accomplishments in prison, provided some evidence to support the BPH's decision

that Webb was not suitable for parole. See Resp. Exh. 5. Webb is not entitled to relief under

the standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

D. Breach Of Plea Agreement Claim

“Plea agreements are contractual in nature and are measured by contract law

standards.” Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v.

De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1337 (9th Cir. 1993)). Although a criminal defendant has a due

process right to enforce the terms of a plea agreement, see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.

257, 261-62 (1971), there is no evidence that Webb's subjective expectations about how

parole would be decided were part of the plea agreement. Webb also provides no evidence

that there was a "guarantee of parole." Traverse, p. 9. His sentencing documents clearly

reflect an indeterminate sentence of 15 years to life on the murder conviction and not a

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straight 15 year sentence. Resp. Exh. 1. As Webb concedes, he received a sentence of 15 to

life on the murder charge, with the possibility of parole. Traverse, p. 8. The possibility of

parole does not mean a guarantee of parole; under state law (as it existed when he was

sentenced and as it exists now), the inmate must be found suitable before his term and release

date are set. Webb has received the parole considerations to which he was entitled under that

agreement and sentence. Unlike the case of Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d at 1157-58, on which

he relies, Webb does not identify any actual promise made to him or any particular term of

the agreement that has been breached. The Brown petitioner was able to point to explicit

statements in the plea colloquy that led her to believe she would get out in half the minimum

years if she behaved herself in prison. See id. at 1160 ("Brown heard and acknowledged the

prosecutor's promises, and in the process of waiving her right to trial she accepted them as

part of her bargain. 'The intent of the parties becomes clear upon an examination of the

language of the plea agreement and the conduct of the parties during the plea colloquy.") 

This court agrees with the state superior court's statement that Webb received an

indeterminate term, but disagrees with the statement that there could not be a breach because

the BPH was not a party to the agreement. See Resp. Exh. 1, order, p. 2 & n.1. Brown v.

Poole stated that, if there was a breach of an agreed upon term of imprisonment, specific

performance of the plea agreement could be ordered in a habeas action, see 337 F.3d at 1159,

1162, and did so without regard to the fact that parole authority that made the decision was a

different entity from the prosecutor. Brown suggests that the government as a whole is on

one side and the prisoner is on the other for purposes of viewing the contractual relationship. 

Webb has been given parole consideration and has not been kept in custody beyond the end

of the life term he received. His claim that his plea agreement was breached in violation of

his right to due process fails. 

/ / /

/ / /

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E. Claim For Failure To Set a Term Under The Matrix

Webb argues that the BPH violated due process by failing to consult the matrix and

fix a term for him. As discussed in Section B, above, the matrix is not consulted under state

law unless and until the inmate has been found suitable. Webb has never been found suitable

for parole, so the day to consult the matrix has not yet arrived. There was no due process

violation in not consulting the matrix and not setting a term for him. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 19, 2008 

Marilyn Hall Patel

United States District Judge

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1. The listed circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole are the nature of the

commitment offense, i.e., whether the prisoner committed the offense in "an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner;" the prisoner has a previous record of violence; the

prisoner has an unstable social history, the prisoner previously engaged in a sadistic sexual

offense, the prisoner has a lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense;

and negative institutional behavior. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c). The listed circumstances

tending to show suitability for parole are the absence of a juvenile record, stable social

history, signs of remorse, a stressful motivation for the crime, whether the prisoner suffered

from battered woman's syndrome, lack of criminal history, the present age reduces the

probability of recidivism, the prisoner has made realistic plans for release or developed

marketable skills, and positive institutional behavior. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(d). 

NOTE

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