Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-03096/USCOURTS-caDC-11-03096-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Elohim Bey Cross
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 11, 2013 Decided September 10, 2013

No. 11-3096

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ELOHIM BEY CROSS,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cr-00281-11)

Adam H. Kurland, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for appellant.

Katherine M. Kelly, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C.

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, John P.

Mannarino, and John K. Han, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, ROGERS, Circuit Judge,

and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GARLAND.

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GARLAND, Chief Judge: Elohim Cross appeals his

conviction for conspiring to distribute heroin. He contends that

the trial court erred in not giving a multiple conspiracies jury

instruction, and that the prosecutor erred in making improper

statements regarding multiple conspiracies in his rebuttal

argument. We conclude that, even if there were error, any such

error was harmless. We therefore affirm Cross’ conviction.

I

In 2009, federal law enforcement authorities received a tip

that a man named Mouloukou Toure was distributing heroin on

a large scale in the Washington, D.C. area. In the course of

pursuing that lead, investigators tapped Toure’s telephones. 

Through those wiretaps, they learned that Toure’s supplier was

based in Toronto, Canada and operated under the alias “Big

Brother.” They also learned that couriers delivered the heroin

from Canada to Washington, D.C., where Toure served as a

regional supplier to several lower-level distributors. 

 On the wiretap, the agents overheard a series of

conversations between Toure and appellant Cross. On several

occasions, Cross used coded language to place narcotics orders. 

Cross and Toure also discussed purchasing prepaid cell phones

to escape detection by the police. In one conversation, Toure

told Cross about a police raid on a stash house where Toure had

kept some of his drugs; Toure expressed concern that an

individual arrested in the raid might become a police informant. 

And, in a moment of supreme irony, the two shared their

admiration for The Wire, an HBO television series about drug

dealers being monitored by a wiretap. Supp. App. 15 (“Yea

season three is my favorite.”).1

1

See The Wire (Season Three) (HBO television broadcast Sept. 19

- Dec. 19, 2004).

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Based on the intercepted conversations, the FBI staked out

a Comfort Inn in Capitol Heights, Maryland. On October 3,

2009, an FBI agent watched Toure walk into the hotel and enter

one of the elevators. “Seconds later,” the agent testified, “the

other elevator opened up, Mr. Cross came out, he looked around

the lobby, . . . . [and] [t]hen he went back into the elevator and

went up to the second floor.” Trial Tr. 82 (July 19, 2011 a.m.). 

The agent hid in a stairwell on the second floor and, when he

heard a door open, observed Toure walking out of Room 217. 

Id. at 83. 

On the morning of November 4, 2009, an FBI agent visited

the Comfort Inn. At his request, the hotel’s manager gave him

records confirming that Cross was staying in Room 217 and that

he had stayed in the same room on October 3, 2009. The

records also revealed that Cross had stayed at the hotel for

weeks at a time throughout 2009 and that he paid exclusively in

cash.

Later that morning, agents monitoring the wiretap

overheard Cross calling Toure in a panic. There followed a

conversation that could well have been written for The Wire. 

Cross told Toure that “I got a tip from the . . . front desk” that

the hotel’s manager gave an officer “a printout . . . of my whole

time” in the hotel. Supp. App. 19. Cross said he had to send

someone back to the hotel room “[b]ecause I still got things in

there, you feel me, it’s going to be hard to find but I got things

in there . . . [Y]ou know what I’m sayin?” Id. at 20. To which

Toure replied, “[y]eahhh, you got to be careful dawg.” Id. A

subsequent search of Room 217 unearthed a bag containing

heroin and morphine hidden behind the faceplate of an electrical

outlet; several small ziplock bags of heroin and cocaine base in

the drawer of a nightstand; and an assortment of drug-related

paraphernalia hidden elsewhere in the room, including numerous

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plastic sandwich bags, a digital scale, disposable gloves, and

surgical face masks.

In a call intercepted the day after the search, Cross told

Toure: “I sent a couple of my home boys . . . to the room to get

all my stuff,” and they found a copy of a “search and seizure

warrant.” Supp. App. 24. Cross told Toure not to worry,

because “I don’t call nobody from this phone but you.” Id.

Cross said that he wanted to meet Toure “face to face cause right

now this like . . . in the movie you know what I’m talking

about?” Id. at 25.

In a single-count indictment, a grand jury charged that

Cross, “Big Brother” (identified as Olayinka Johnson), and

several other named individuals “did knowingly and willfully

. . . conspire . . . together, and with other persons both known

and unknown,” to distribute and possess with intent to distribute

a kilogram or more of heroin. App. 34-35. Cross alone went to

trial. All of the others pled guilty, and Toure testified for the

government. Toure told the jury that he sold heroin to Cross in

amounts ranging from 50 to 200 grams, which, over time,

totaled 1.2 to 1.3 kilograms. Trial Tr. 18-19 (July 19, 2011

p.m.); Trial Tr. 36, 48, 50 (July 21, 2011 a.m.). The deals often

took place in Cross’ room at the Comfort Inn, Toure said, where

Cross had small ziplock bags and other paraphernalia for

“bagging” the heroin for subsequent distribution. Trial Tr. 26-

27 (July 19, 2011 p.m.). Toure testified that he told Cross that

Big Brother was the heroin supplier; where Big Brother “was at,

and where he was from”; and the quantities of heroin Big

Brother was providing. Id. at 20. Toure also said that he and

Cross discussed contributing $30,000 each so they could

purchase a kilogram of heroin directly from Big Brother. Id. at

25. 

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Cross was convicted and sentenced to 240 months in prison. 

He appeals on two grounds, which we consider in the following

two parts.

II

Before the close of trial, Cross asked the court to instruct

the jury that it should not convict him if the evidence showed he

had engaged in a buyer-seller conspiracy solely with Toure,

rather than in the larger conspiracy charged in the indictment. 

Under Cross’ theory, such an instruction was warranted because

“the Government elicited from Toure a totally separate

conspiracy” between Toure and Cross. Trial Tr. 27 (July 20,

2011 p.m.). 

The trial court rejected Cross’ request. The court ruled that

“the real question is whether there’s a factual . . . predicate

justifying the jury instruction for multiple conspiracies.” Id. at

24. The court found there was not. Reviewing the evidence

presented at trial, the court noted that Big Brother was “the

highest and only source of heroin in this charged conspiracy,

[who] used couriers to deliver to Toure, who in turn was the one

who distributed to, allegedly, Mr. Cross and others.” Id. Given

those facts, the court held that the evidence made out only one

conspiracy, as the jury was allowed “to infer . . .

interdependence . . . up and down the distribution chain.” Id. at

25 (citing United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384 (D.C. Cir.

1988)).

Although the court rejected Cross’ proposed multiple

conspiracies instruction, it granted his request for an instruction

cautioning the jury that “a simple buyer/seller relationship alone

does not make out a conspiracy, even where the buyer intends

to resell the heroin.” Id. at 51. The court instructed the jury to

consider several factors in determining “whether a conspiracy or

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a simple buyer/seller relationship existed,” including “whether

the transaction involved large quantities of heroin,” “whether the

parties had a standardized way of doing business over time,”

“whether the parties had a continuing relationship,” “whether

the seller had a financial stake in a resale by the buyer,” and

“whether the parties had an understanding that the heroin would

be resold.” Id.

On appeal, Cross argues that the court erred in denying his

request for a multiple conspiracies instruction. As with any

other theory-of-defense instruction, a multiple conspiracies

instruction “is in order if there is sufficient evidence from which

a reasonable jury could find for the defendant on his theory.” 

United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 78-79 (D.C. Cir. 2011)

(internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d on other grounds sub

nom. Smith v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 714 (2013). Cross

renews his argument that there was sufficient evidence because

“the evidentiary record, fairly construed, supported the argument

that [he] was part of a separate smaller conspiracy” with Toure,

“not the one charged in the indictment.” Appellant Br. 8. The

government responds that the “trial evidence supported only the

existence of the single conspiracy charged,” Gov’t Br. 16, “a

chain conspiracy” that ran from Big Brother through Toure to

Cross and other retail distributors, id. at 27.

We need not decide whether the district court erred in

failing to give a multiple conspiracies charge if any such error

was harmless. The harmless error rule provides that any error

that “does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” 

FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). This means that “the error must have

been prejudicial” for Cross to win reversal, United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). And in a case like this, an

error is not prejudicial unless it “had a ‘substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” United

States v. Baugham, 449 F.3d 167, 174 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting

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Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); see

United States v. Johnson, 519 F.3d 478, 483 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

Cross proffers only one possible kind of prejudice

stemming from the trial court’s failure to instruct on his multiple

conspiracies theory: the risk that he was convicted of the larger

conspiracy charged in the indictment, when the only one he was

guilty of beyond a reasonable doubt was a smaller one with

Toure alone. Appellant Br. 8-9, 16-17. As counsel

acknowledged at oral argument, this is essentially a claim of

variance. See Oral Arg. Recording at 49:10; see, e.g., United

States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

It is reasonable to raise a variance claim in this context,

because the purpose of a multiple conspiracies instruction is to

protect against the risk of a prejudicial variance between the

conspiracy charged in the indictment and the one proven at trial. 

See United States v. Celis, 608 F.3d 818, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2010);

United States v. Anguiano, 873 F.2d 1314, 1317-18 (9th Cir.

1989); United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 625

(2d Cir. 1979). Accordingly, because we are assuming for

purposes of argument that the district court erred in declining to

give a multiple conspiracies charge, we will likewise assume

that a variance involving multiple conspiracies occurred. See

Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d at 606.

But not every variance between the crime charged and the

crime proven is fatal to the validity of the resulting conviction. 

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 81 (1935); see United

States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 131 (1985) (holding that “the

Fifth Amendment’s grand jury guarantee” is not “violated when

a defendant is tried under an indictment that alleges a certain

fraudulent scheme but is convicted based on trial proof that

supports only a significantly narrower and more limited, though

included, fraudulent scheme”). “The true inquiry,” the Supreme

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Court has said, “is not whether there has been a variance in

proof, but whether there has been such a variance as to affect the

substantial rights of the accused.” Berger, 295 U.S. at 82. Once

again, then, “the proper standard of review for the type of

variance claimed here is the conventional one, articulated in

Kotteakos v. United States, i.e., whether the error had a

‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict.’” Baugham, 449 F.3d at 174 (quoting Kotteakos,

328 U.S. at 776 (internal citation omitted)).

In short, a variance between a single conspiracy charged in

an indictment and alleged multiple conspiracies proven at trial

requires reversal of a conviction only if the defendant suffered

prejudice as a consequence. Mathis, 216 F.3d at 25; United

States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1519 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United

States v. Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1996);

Tarantino, 846 F.2d at 1391. Hence, a showing of prejudice is

required regardless of whether the alleged trial error is that the

court failed to give a multiple conspiracies instruction, or simply

that a variance occurred. See United States v. Howard, 115 F.3d

1151, 1157 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[F]ailure to give a multiple

conspiracy instruction is not reversible error unless the

defendants demonstrate that they have been prejudiced by the

variance between the single conspiracy charged in the

indictment and the multiple conspiracies proven at trial.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

So, what was the prejudice in this case? Cross’ briefs do

not proffer any. Nor do we do discern any of the kinds of

prejudice that we typically associate with variances.

1. The alleged variance would, of course, be prejudicial if

there were insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find

Cross guilty of the conspiracy charged in the indictment beyond

a reasonable doubt. See Graham, 83 F.3d at 1472. But Cross

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does not dispute that there was sufficient evidence to support his

conviction for membership in that conspiracy. See Appellant

Br. 17; Appellant Reply Br. 4; Oral Arg. Recording at 5:20. Nor

could he.

The government presented evidence of a typical “chain-type

conspiracy common in narcotics cases,” Tarantino, 846 F.2d at

1392 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here the chain ran

from the principal supplier (Big Brother) through the middleman

(Toure) to lower-level distributors (including Cross). As the

evidence showed, Cross was a heroin dealer who received

continuous, wholesale amounts of heroin from his immediate

supplier, Toure, and then repackaged the heroin for retail sale. 

In Tarantino, we explained the legal implications of such a

distribution arrangement:

Under the chain analysis, the government need not

prove a direct connection between all the

conspirators. A single conspiracy may be established

when each conspirator knows of the existence of the

larger conspiracy and the necessity for other

participants, even if he is ignorant of their precise

identities. When the conspirators form a chain, each

is likely to know that other conspirators are

required. . . . The existence of a chain helps us

determine both the unlawful objective and the

conspirators’ intent. . . . [E]ach link in the chain may

rely upon the other links in furtherance of the

common interest. The street dealer relies upon his

supplier; the supplier relies upon his supplier; and so

on. The existence of such a vertically integrated,

loose-knit combination may raise the inference that

each conspirator has agreed with the others (some

whose specific identity may be unknown) to further

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a common unlawful objective, e.g., the distribution of

narcotics.

Id. at 1392; see e.g., United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498,

1516 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693,

709-10 (D.C. Cir. 1995).2

There is no dispute that Cross was “likely to know that

other conspirators” beyond Toure were necessary for the success

of the heroin venture, Tarantino, 846 F.2d at 1393.3

 As Cross’

counsel acknowledged at oral argument: “Everybody knows

that Toure -- he’s not the Rumpelstiltskin of heroin -- he didn’t

turn straw into heroin -- everybody knows that it’s coming from

somewhere else.” Oral Arg. Recording at 51:22. Indeed, Cross

did not even have to infer the existence of a higher-level

supplier; nor was he “ignorant of the[] precise identit[y]” of that

supplier, Tarantino, 846 F.2d at 1393. To the contrary, Toure

2

In Tarantino, we cautioned that: 

Chain analysis must be used with care. Even in a vertically

integrated combination, certain players may have performed

activities wholly unrelated to the aims of the conspiracy. . . . 

Thus, even if we determine that a chain conspiracy exists,

we may still conclude that certain actions were outside the

chain and formed a separate conspiracy.

846 F.2d at 1393 (emphasis added). In this case, however, there is no

evidence that the transactions between Cross and Toure were “wholly

unrelated” to the aims of the conspiracy charged in the indictment.

3

See Tarantino, 846 F.2d at 1398 (“The government was not

obliged to prove that [the defendant] knew every detail of the

conspiracy. All that is required is that the evidence establish that he

knew others were involved and that his own benefits depended upon

the success of the entire venture.”).

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told Cross that the heroin supplier was Big Brother; where Big

Brother “was at, and where he was from”; and the quantities of

heroin Big Brother was providing. Trial Tr. 20 (July 19, 2011

p.m.).

We conclude, as did the trial court, that there was sufficient

evidence for the jury to convict Cross of the conspiracy charged

in the indictment. See Sentencing Tr. 15 (Oct. 21, 2011). And

“[b]ecause the evidence [of a single conspiracy] was sufficient,

any variance from the indictment did not substantially prejudice

the appellant[],” Graham, 83 F.3d at 1472; see United States v.

Stewart, 104 F.3d 1377, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Or at least the

alleged variance alone did not prejudice the appellant. The

remaining question is whether the alleged variance led to any

other kind of prejudice that “had a ‘substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” 

Baugham, 449 F.3d at 174 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776).

2. Other than insufficiency of the evidence, the most

serious kind of prejudice that may stem from a variance between

the conspiracy charged in an indictment and the evidence proven

at trial is the problem of notice. This problem arises if the

variance interferes with either of the two purposes served by a

grand jury indictment:

(1) that the accused shall be definitely informed as to

the charges against him, so that he may be enabled to

present his defense and not be taken by surprise by

the evidence offered at the trial; and (2) that he may

be protected against another prosecution for the same

offense.

Berger, 295 U.S. at 82; see Miller, 471 U.S. at 134-35.

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But there was no notice problem here, as there rarely (if

ever) will be if the trial proof “supports only a significantly

narrower and more limited” charge than that stated in the

indictment. Miller, 471 U.S. at 131. Cross was clearly on

notice that he would need to defend against the charge that he

agreed with Toure to distribute heroin, because his transactions

with Toure were part of the proof of both of the two conspiracies

that Cross posits. Indeed, Cross’ opening statement to the jury

made clear he understood the risk that the evidence would show,

and the jury would find, that he had an agreement with Toure. 

See Trial Tr. 33 (July 19, 2011 a.m.). Nor is there any doubt

that the indictment was “sufficient to allow [Cross] to plead it in

the future as a bar to subsequent prosecutions.” Miller, 471 U.S.

at 135. Accordingly “none of these ‘notice’ related concerns --

which of course are among the important concerns underlying

the requirement that criminal charges be set out in an

indictment,” id. -- suggest that Cross suffered prejudice from the

variance he asserts.

3. Another kind of prejudice that is typically at issue in

variance cases is “the risk of ‘transference of guilt from one

[defendant] to another across the line separating conspiracies,

subconsciously or otherwise.’” Baugham, 449 F.3d at 175

(quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 774). But because Cross “was

tried alone, his is not a case in which the number of defendants

and conspiracies tried together created a danger that, due to

‘spillover’ effects, appellant might be found guilty based on

evidence properly admitted only against someone else.” 

Stewart, 104 F.3d at 1382; see Anguiano, 873 F.2d at 1318

(“[T]here is no problem of spillover when . . . the defendant

stands trial alone.”).

4. A related kind of “spillover” prejudice is the risk that

evidence of one conspiracy will spill over onto the jury’s

assessment of another conspiracy. See Tarantino, 846 F.2d at

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1391. Cross did not make this argument in his briefs. His effort

to assert it for the first time at oral argument, Oral Arg.

Recording at 22:53, 45:02, comes too late. See United States v.

Southerland, 486 F.3d 1355, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that

a contention first raised at oral argument is forfeited). 

In any event, it is unclear what the spillover argument

means in a case like this. Cross cryptically suggested at oral

argument that there was a “spillover” of evidence from the

“Canada conspiracy” -- i.e., the charged conspiracy that

included Big Brother, whose base was in Canada. Oral Arg.

Recording at 45:45. But onto what did that evidence “spill”? 

The answer would have to be the allegedly separate conspiracy

between Cross and Toure. But whether or not that conspiracy

was truly “separate,” the evidence that Cross was engaged in a

conspiracy with at least Toure was so strong -- indeed, Cross

essentially concedes the point, see Oral Arg. Recording at 48:16

-- that it is hard to see how any spillover could have materially

affected the jury’s view of Cross’ culpability for that

conspiracy.4

Finally, and most important, this particular spillover

argument is not really relevant to the gravamen of the claim

Cross raises on this appeal. Cross’ claim is not that he was

wrongly convicted of the alleged Toure conspiracy, but that he

4

Moreover, any danger of spillover prejudice was largely

eliminated by the government’s introduction of wiretap recordings in

which Cross directly implicated himself in the conspiracy. See Celis,

608 F.3d at 846 (holding that “the risk of prejudicial spillover is

minimal” when the government presents tape recordings of a

defendant discussing criminal acts, “because the jury has no need to

look beyond each defendant’s own words in order to convict” (internal

quotation marks omitted)); see also Gaviria, 116 F.3d at 1533; Mathis,

216 F.3d at 25.

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was wrongly convicted of the indicted conspiracy. And yet he

offers no argument at all that evidence of the former improperly

“spilled over” onto the latter.

* * *

In sum, even if we assume the district court erred in failing

to give a multiple conspiracies instruction, and even if we

assume that failure produced a variance, reversal of Cross’

conviction remains unwarranted. Variance is grounds for

reversal only if it prejudiced the defendant, and we discern no

prejudice here.

III

Cross’ second contention is that the prosecutor made

improper remarks during his rebuttal argument. The trial court

had instructed defense counsel not to argue a multiple

conspiracies theory during closing arguments. See Trial Tr.

62-63 (July 20, 2011 p.m.). According to Cross, the government

took unfair advantage of this limitation when it argued that, “for

the purpose of finding [Mr. Cross] guilty of the crime charged,

all you need is two, Mr. Cross plus one other person, Mr.

Toure,” Trial Tr. 47 (July 21, 2011 a.m.); that “in this case we

can prove simply Mr. Cross got in an agreement with one other

person -- that’s two -- in this case Mouloukou Toure,” id.; and

that the jury should “focus on the conspiracy, just two or more

people, between Mr. Toure and Mr. Cross,” id. at 52. See

Appellant Br. 21-22. 

Once again, we need not determine whether the

prosecutor’s argument was improper if the asserted error did not

cause the defendant to suffer prejudice. Moore, 651 F.3d at 50. 

Cross does not dispute that, at least theoretically, the

prosecutor’s “you only need two” argument “correctly state[s]

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the law” of conspiracy. See Appellant Br. 22; Oral Arg.

Recording at 11:49. Cross does maintain that, in context, the

prosecutor’s statements were prejudicial because they suggested

that the jury could convict him of the charged conspiracy

notwithstanding that he was only guilty of the separate

conspiracy with Toure. Appellant Br. 25. But that is the same

“fatal variance” argument that we considered and dismissed in

Part II. We dismiss it again here on the same basis.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is

Affirmed.

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