Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02188/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02188-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Randal Kent Hansen
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2188

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Randal Kent Hansen

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of South Dakota - Sioux Falls

____________

 Submitted: February 12, 2015

 Filed: June 30, 2015

____________

Before GRUENDER, SHEPHERD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Randal Kent Hansen of mail fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy

to commit mail fraud and wire fraud, as a result of actions Hansen took while

operating a hedge fund that cost its investors millions of dollars when it collapsed in

2011. The district court sentenced Hansen to 108 months imprisonment and ordered 1

The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States DistrictJudge for the District 1

of South Dakota.

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him to pay over $17 million in restitution. Hansen appeals his conviction,

challenging the district court’s (1) denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal,

(2) giving of a willful blindness instruction, and (3) instruction on conspiracy. We

affirm. 

I. Background

In reviewing the denial of Hansen’s motion for judgment of acquittal and the

giving of a willful blindness instruction, we view the evidence and all reasonable

inferences supported by that evidence in the light most favorable to the government. 

See United States v. Foster, 740 F.3d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir.) (motion for judgment of

acquittal), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2714 (2014); United States v. Florez, 368 F.3d

1042, 1044 (8th Cir. 2004) (willful blindness instruction). Randal Kent Hansen is a

farmer from South Dakota who gained investment experience by investing his own

money and by serving for several years as a trust officer at a bank. At some point

during the 1990s, Hansen met a stock broker named Anthony Johnson and the two

developed a rapport. In 2003, Johnson offered Hansen the opportunity to invest in

Hudson Capital Partners (the “Hudson Fund”), a hedge fund Johnson ran with Ward

Onsa and Vincent Puma. Hansen invested in the Hudson Fund and then continued

investing in other funds with Johnson, Onsa, and Puma. Johnson, Onsa, and Puma

eventually proposed creating a new fund with Hansen as their co-partner. Hansen

agreed. 

After several years of this arrangement, Hansen and Johnson decided to create

yet another hedge fund. In 2007, they formed a limited partnership named RAHFCO

Funds, LP, short for Randy and Anthony’s Hedge Fund Company. Hansen served as

RAHFCO’s general partner. As the general partner, he retained ultimate control over

all of RAHFCO’s investment activities. Once RAHFCO became operational,

however, Hansen delegated responsibility for executing RAHFCO’s trades to the

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Hudson Fund, RAHFCO’s sub-advisor. Thus while Hansen retained control over 2

RAHFCO’s investing, in practice, Onsa and Puma, through the Hudson Fund,

executed RAHFCO’s trades.

In his role as general partner, Hansen made numerous misrepresentations about

RAHFCO to investors. Hansen worked with Sadis & Goldberg, a financial services

law firm, to create a private placement memorandum (“PPM”) to help solicit

investments. The PPM described RAHFCO as having a conservative investing

strategy. It stated RAHFCO generally would be able to satisfy withdrawal requests. 

And it assured investors RAHFCO would receive regular audits. All of these

representations proved untrue.

Hansen made other false statements directly to investors. For example, Hansen

elaborated on the fund’s investing strategy, explaining it would place 95% of

investors’ money in low-risk treasuries and only 5% in higher-risk options. He

reiterated that the fund would honor withdrawal requests. And at one point he

assured an investor that RAHFCO was covered by the Securities Investor Protection

Corporation (“SIPC”), which he explained was like the Federal Deposit Insurance

Company but for securities. None of these statements was true.

Throughout RAHFCO’s existence, moreover, Hansen sent investors quarterly

earnings statements, which he had prepared, that falsely inflated the fund’s

performance. The statements showed the fund performing well even as it lost all its

money. Hansen testified he was unaware the quarterly earningsstatements were false

because he relied on Onsa and Johnson to provide him the numbers and never

confirmed the numbers himself. The quarterly earningsstatements also falsely stated

they were “Presented by SFG Accounting.” While Hansen hired SFG Accounting to

Testimony at trial suggested it is common for general partners to solicit

2

investors and then to rely on their sub-advisors to execute their funds’ trades.

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do some work for RAHFCO, it did not prepare the quarterly earnings statements and

had no knowledge Hansen used its name. 

Hansen additionally assured investors, as the PPM had done, that RAHFCO

would be audited regularly. However, no audits took place. Hansen hired the

accounting firm Spicer Jeffriesto conduct an audit in 2007, but Spicer Jeffries ceased

its audit after Hansen refused to authorize Spicer Jeffries to obtain a brokerage

statement confirming that RAHFCO had actually made the investments it reported it

had. When Sadis & Goldberg learned that Spicer Jeffries had discontinued its audit,

the law firm withdrew from its representation of RAHFCO. Hansen never informed

investors that Spicer Jeffries ceased its audit or that Sadis & Goldberg withdrew its

representation. Nor did he attempt to find another auditor. 

Hansen testified that he became concerned about RAHFCO’s lack of

transparency after Sadis & Goldberg withdrew as counsel. He visited Onsa, who had

been executing RAHFCO’s trades, to ease his concerns. Although Onsa showed

Hansen a trading account that contained $25 million, Onsa never confirmed any of

the fund’s particular investments for Hansen. Hansen did not press Onsa for more

information.

Another area of concern for RAHFCO was that Johnson was charged in 2007

with securities fraud in relation to another investment company. Johnson spoke with

Hansen the day after the arrest and informed Hansen he had been arrested for

securities fraud. Hansen did not inform investors of Johnson’s charges. Similarly,

Onsa was sued civilly for fraudulent securities trading in 2009. Although Hansen

knew of this suit, he did not inquire further and did not notify investors of the issue.

RAHFCO investors began to withdraw their money from the fund in 2008 as

the economy declined. Although the fund honored the requests at first, it started

experiencing liquidity problems in early 2009. These problems escalated later in

2009 when a group of investors learned about Onsa’s legal troubles. Hansen testified

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that RAHFCO’s liquidity problems signaled to him that the fund had deviated from

its purported investing strategy. 

By 2010, RAHFCO was having great difficulty satisfying its withdrawal

requests. Around that time, Hansen began depositing money into RAHFCO’s

checking account. The amounts of Hansen’s deposits corresponded with the amounts

RAHFCO was paying investors to satisfy withdrawal requests. In one instance, for

example, RAHFCO wrote an investor a check for $129,000 when the fund did not

have enough money in its checking account to cover that amount. A few days later,

however, Hansen deposited $140,000 from his personal account into RAHFCO’s

checking account. Hansen claimed his deposits were legitimate investments in

RAHFCO and denied he deposited money to pay off investors. Yet, on one occasion,

Hansen paid $300,000 from his personal account directly to an investor who wished

to withdraw from the fund. Further, in 2010, Johnson convinced a professional

basketball player to invest $1.7 million inRAHFCO. Instead ofinvesting the player’s

money, however, RAHFCO used the money to satisfy other investors’ withdrawal

requests. Hansen claimed he had no knowledge of this diversion. 

By May 2011, RAHFCO had collapsed and Hansen was forced to inform

investors that the fund had lost all their money and “that for some time, the earnings

figures in our statements have been inaccurate.” That statement was true.

A grand jury indicted Hansen on charges of mail fraud, wire fraud, and

conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341,

1343, and 1349. The case proceeded to a trial, where Hansen argued he wasinnocent

of fraud because he did not know his misstatements were false when he made them. 

He claimed he was unaware of RAHFCO’s fraud and that he had been duped by

Johnson, Onsa, and Puma, just like every other investor. The jury found Hansen

guilty on all counts and the district court sentenced him to 108 months imprisonment

with 3 years supervised release and ordered him to pay over $17 million restitution

to 75 victims. Hansen appeals his conviction. 

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II. Discussion

A. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

We first address Hansen’s argument that the district court erred in denying his

motion for judgment of acquittal. We review this denial de novo, “‘view[ing] the

evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, [and] granting all reasonable

inferences that are supported by that evidence.’” United States v. Foster, 740 F.3d

1202, 1205 (8th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Clark, 668 F.3d 568, 573 (8th Cir.

2012)), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2714 (2014). “We must affirm the verdict if a

reasonable juror could have found the defendant guilty of the crime charged beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Id.

Hansen argues he is entitled to a judgment of acquittal because the government

failed to show he had an intent to defraud or even any knowledge of RAHFCO’s

fraud. Each of the charges Hansen faced at trial—mail fraud, wire fraud, and

conspiracy to commit mail fraud or wire fraud—required the government to prove

that Hansen intended to commit fraud. See United States v. Parker, 364 F.3d 934,

941 (8th Cir. 2004) (mail fraud); United States v. McKanry, 628 F.3d 1010, 1017 (8th

Cir. 2011) (wire fraud); Foster, 740 F.3d at 1205 (conspiracy). “Absent an outright

admission of intent to defraud, the requisite intent can be shown by circumstantial

evidence.” United States v. Ervasti, 201 F.3d 1029, 1037 (8th Cir. 2000); see also

United States v. Kelley, 152 F.3d 881, 886 (8th Cir. 1998) (“‘[A] motion for a

judgment of acquittal should be denied when there is substantial evidence justifying

an inference of guilt irrespective of any countervailing testimony that may be

introduced.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Cunningham, 83 F.3d

218, 222 (8th Cir. 1996))). “Provided the victims suffered some tangible loss—as

they did here—‘[t]he scheme itself often serves as evidence of a defendant’s intent

to defraud.’” Ervasti, 201 F.3d at 1037 (alteration in original) (quoting United States

v. Whitehead, 176 F.3d 1030, 1038 (8th Cir. 1999)).

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Here, the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find that

Hansen possessed an intent to defraud. Over the course of several years, RAHFCO

defrauded many investors out of tens of millions of dollars. As RAHFCO’s general

partner, Hansen played a prominent role in these actions and possessed significant

control over the fund’s operations. Hansen made many misrepresentations about

RAHFCO to investors. He worked with Sadis & Goldberg to prepare the PPM, which

misrepresented that RAHFCO would pursue a conservative investing strategy, that

the fund would honor withdrawal requests, and that it would be audited regularly. 

Hansen reiterated many of these false statements directly to investors, and

additionally told an investor RAHFCO was SIPC insured when it was not. Hansen

also prepared and sent out quarterly earningsstatementsthat contained false numbers

and falsely represented that the statements were provided by an accounting firm. 

Hansen failed to informinvestors that Spicer Jeffries discontinued its audit, that Sadis

& Goldberg withdrew from its representation, and that both Johnson and Onsa faced

allegations of securities fraud. Moreover, a reasonable juror could have found an

intent to defraud based on the payments Hansen made into the fund starting in 2010

that corresponded with the fund’s payments to investors—and in one case involved

his payment directly to an investor—which indicated that RAHFCO had become a

Ponzi scheme.

Although Hansen disputes this evidence, claiming that he did not know about

RAHFCO’s fraud and that he relied on Johnson’s, Onsa’s, and Puma’s assurancesthat

everything was aboveboard, in light of the evidence presented against him, a

reasonable juror could have disbelieved him and found an intent to defraud. See id.

(“The jury was not obligated either to believe the [defendants’] claims that they never

intended to defraud anyone or to accept the [defendants’] interpretation of the

evidence.”).

Further, even if Hansen lacked actual knowledge of the fraud, a reasonable

juror could have found he was willfully blind to the truth. See United States v.

Chavez-Alvarez, 594 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th Cir. 2010) (“A defendant’s willful

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blindness may serve as the basis for knowledge if, ‘in light of certain obvious facts,

reasonable inferences support a finding that a defendant’s failure to investigate is

equivalent to burying one’s head in the sand.’” (quoting United States v. Florez, 368

F.3d 1042, 1044 (8th Cir. 2004))).

The Supreme Court has stated the two requirements of willful blindness are

“(1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact

exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that

fact.” Global-Tech Applicances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011); see

United States v. Sigillito, 759 F.3d 913, 939 (8th Cir. 2014) (applying Global-Tech

in a wire fraud and mail fraud case). “[T]hese requirements give willful blindness an

appropriately limited scope that surpasses recklessness and negligence.” GlobalTech, 131 S. Ct. at 2070. 

The Supreme Court’s definition of willful blindness accords with our holding

that “[t]he concept of willful blindness is a limited exception to the requirement of

actual knowledge, and the jury may find willful blindness only if the defendant was

aware of facts that put him on notice that criminal activity was probably afoot and

deliberately failed to make further inquiries, intending to remain ignorant.” ChavezAlvarez, 594 F.3d at 1067.

Here, the evidence was sufficient for the government to prove that if Hansen

had no actual knowledge of his misrepresentations, then this was only because he

chose to bury his head in the sand. First, there was sufficient evidence to allow a

reasonable juror to find that Hansen was aware of facts that put him on notice that

criminal activity was probably afoot. This evidence included that Spicer Jeffries

discontinued its audit because it could not confirm RAHFCO’s investment holdings;

that Sadis & Goldberg withdrew its representation when Spicer Jeffries ceased its

audit; that Hansen admitted he became concerned about RAHFCO’s lack of

transparency after Sadis & Goldberg withdrew as counsel; that Hansen learned

Johnson and Onsa faced allegations of securities fraud; that Hansen knew a large

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group ofinvestors withdrew fromthe fund after learning of Onsa’s legal troubles; that

RAHFCO was unable to meet withdrawal requests; and that Hansen made Ponzi

scheme payments.

Second, there was sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to find that

Hansen deliberately failed to make inquiries, intending to remain ignorant. This

evidence included that Hansen refused to authorize Spicer Jeffries to receive a

brokerage statement confirming RAHFCO’s investments and never found another

auditor; that when Hansen visited Onsa to inquire about RAHFCO’s holdings he

confirmed that Onsa had a trading account but did not request information on

RAHFCO’s particular holdings, which Spicer Jeffries had told himwas necessary for

confirmation; that he did not learn more about Onsa’s or Johnson’s securities fraud

allegations; that he never confirmed RAHFCO’s investing strategy even when the

fund failed to satisfy withdrawal requests; and that, in spite of all this, Hansen,

RAHFCO’s general partner and the man responsible for reporting the fund’s

performance to investors, never once confirmed RAHFCO’s investments and

continued to rely on Johnson and Onsa to provide the fund’s performance numbers.

3

See Sigillito, 759 F.3d at 939-40 (finding evidence sufficient to support instruction

that defendant was willfully blind to fraudulent misrepresentations where defendant

relied on others to provide information about asset values but claimed to have

conducted due diligence on those values and where defendant claimed he did not

know of liability amount because he chose not to review document listing that

Hansen argues a recent case fromthe SeventhCircuit, United States v. Macias, 3

– F.3d –, 2015 WL 3377773 (7th Cir. May 26, 2015), supportsreversal here. Macias,

of course, is not binding on this court. And even as persuasive authority it fails to

help Hansen because it declined to address whether “taking some active measure to

avoid confirming one’s suspicions,” which is exactly what a reasonable jury could

have found Hansen did here, can amount to willful blindness. Macias, 2015 WL

3377773, at *2 (stating it might be willful blindness where “[a] person who suspected

that he had rented his house to a drug gang [took] a wide detour to avoid driving by

the house lest he notice someone carrying what appeared to be illegal drugs out of or

into the house.”).

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amount); United States v. Hiland, 909 F.2d 1114, 1131 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding

evidence sufficient to support willful blindness instruction where defendant received

multiple warnings about danger of product and never followed up even though, asthe

manufacturer, he was responsible for the product).

On the whole, we find the evidence wassufficient for a reasonable juror to find

Hansen intended to commit fraud and thus to convict Hansen of mail fraud, wire

fraud, and conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud.

B. Willful Blindness Instruction

We next address Hansen’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to

instruct the jury on willful blindness. “We review the district court’s jury instructions

for abuse of discretion and will affirm ‘[i]f the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly

and adequately submitted the issuesto the jury.’” Florez, 368 F.3d at 1044 (alteration

in original) (quoting United States v. Lalley, 257 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001)). 

When determining “whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the instruction,

[we] review[] ‘the evidence and any reasonable inference from that evidence in the

light most favorable to the government.’” Id. (quoting Hiland, 909 F.2d at 1130-31). 

‘“A willful blindness instruction is appropriate when the defendant asserts a lack of

guilty knowledge, but the evidence supports an inference of deliberate ignorance.’” 

Id. (quoting United States v. Gruenberg, 989 F.2d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 1993)). 

“Ignorance is deliberate if the defendant was presented with facts that put her on

notice that criminal activity was particularly likely and yet she intentionally failed to

investigate those facts.” Id. 

For the reasons mentioned in our discussion of Hansen’s motion for judgment

of acquittal, we find there was sufficient evidence both that Hansen was presented

with facts that put him on notice that criminal activity was particularly likely and that

he intentionally failed to investigate those facts. Morever, the district court properly

instructed the jury it could “not conclude that Hansen had knowledge . . . from proof

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of a mistake, negligence, carelessness, recklessness, or a belief in an inaccurate

position.” Final Instructions to the Jury, R. Doc. 50, at 18; see Chavez-Alvarez, 594

F.3d at 1068 (upholding willful blindness instruction in part because instruction

prohibited jury fromfinding knowledge on impermissible grounds). Thus the district

court did not err in submitting the willful blindness instruction to the jury.

C. Conspiracy Instruction

Finally, we address Hansen’s argument that the district court erroneously

instructed the jury on conspiracy. See 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (“Any person who attempts

or conspires to commit any offense under [the mail fraud and other fraud] chapter

shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the

commission of which wasthe object of the attempt or conspiracy.”). Because Hansen

did not object to the district court’s instruction, we are limited to reviewing for plain

error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d) (“Failure to object in accordance with this rule

precludes appellate review, except as permitted under Rule 52(b).”); Fed. R. Crim.

P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though

it was not brought to the court’s attention.”). “Plain error review requires [Hansen]

to show (1) an error, (2) that was ‘plain,’ (3) ‘affects substantial rights,’ and (4) ‘the

error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.’” United States v. Rush-Richardson, 574 F.3d 906, 910 (8th Cir. 2009)

(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735-36 (1993)). “‘Jury instructions

are adequate if, taken as a whole, [they] adequately advise the jury of the essential

elements of the offenses charged and the burden of proof required of the

government.’” United States v. Fast Horse, 747 F.3d 1040, 1042 (8th Cir. 2014)

(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Rice, 449 F.3d 887, 895 (8th

Cir.2006)). 

The district court instructed the jury that the government wasrequired to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt three essential elements of conspiracy:

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One, that from on or about and between March of 2006 and May of

2011, two or more persons reached an agreement or came to an

understanding to devise, make up, or participate in a scheme to defraud

investors out of money or property, by means of material false

representations or promises; . . .

Two, that Hansen voluntarily and intentionally joined in the

agreement or understanding, either at the time it was first reached or at

some later time while it was still in effect; . . .

And three, that at the time Hansen joined in the agreement or

understanding, he knew the purpose of the agreement or understanding.

Final Instructions to the Jury, R. Doc. 50, at 3-6. These instructions mirrored the

model jury instructions in all relevant respects. See Eighth Circuit Manual of Model

Jury Instructions(Criminal) 5.06A-I (2014); see also United States v. Cornelison, 717

F.3d 623, 628 (8th Cir. 2013) (“The model instructions‘are not binding on the district

courts of this circuit, but are merely helpful suggestions to assist the district courts.’”

(quoting Bady v. Murphy-Kjos, 628 F.3d 1000, 1004 (8th Cir. 2011))). The district

court elaborated on the third element as follows:

Without knowledge of the purpose of the conspiracy, Hansen cannot be

guilty of the conspiracy offense, even if his acts furthered the

conspiracy. The prosecution does not have to prove that Hansen knew

that what he did was unlawful. In other words, Hansen must have

known that the purpose of the conspiracy was to commit wire fraud or

mail fraud, but did not have to know that conspiring to commit that

offense was illegal.

Final Instructions to the Jury, R. Doc. 50, at 6 (emphasis added). This explanation

mirrored the model jury instructions’ definition of “knowingly.” See Eighth Circuit

Manual of Model Jury Instructions (Criminal) 7.03 (2014). 

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During its deliberations, the jury sent the district court a note asking for

clarification on the third element. After conferring with the parties, the district court

responded:

A person may join in an agreement or understanding, asrequired by this

element, without knowing all the details of the agreement or

understanding, and without knowing who all the other members are. 

Further it is not necessary that a person agree to play any particular part

in carrying out the agreement or understanding. A person may become

a member of a conspiracy even if that person agreesto play only a minor

part in the conspiracy, aslong asthat person has an understanding of the

unlawful nature of the plan and voluntarily and intentionally joins in it. 

In order to join in the agreement or understanding the defendant must

possess the knowledge and intent that are required of the underlying

crimes alleged in the [indictment].

Response To Jury Note #1, R. Doc. 49, at 1.

Hansen objects to the district court’s instruction, which we have emphasized

above, that “[t]he prosecution does not have to prove that Hansen knew that what he

did was unlawful.” Final Instructions to the Jury, R. Doc. 50, at 6. He contends this

instruction was in error because he “could [not] have committed the crime of

conspiracy without knowing ‘what he did’ was unlawful.” Appellant Br. 33. In other

words, Hansen argues he could not have conspired to commit a criminal act unless

he knew that act was criminal. Thus he maintains the district court’s instruction

erroneously permitted the jury to return a guilty verdict (1) even if he lacked

knowledge that Johnson, Onsa, and Puma were committing fraud and (2) even if he

himself lacked an intent to defraud. We disagree.

The district court addressed Hansen’s first concern when it instructed the jury

that “Hansen must have known that the purpose of the conspiracy wasto commit wire

fraud or mail fraud.” Final Instructions to the Jury, R. Doc. 50, at 6. It addressed his

second concern when it responded to the jury’s note by explaining that “[i]n order to

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join in the agreement or understanding the defendant must possess the knowledge and

intent that are required of the underlying crimes alleged in the [indictment].” 

Response To Jury Note #1, R. Doc. 49, at 1. Further, because the jury found Hansen

guilty of the underlying mail fraud and wire fraud charges, it is clear the jury found

he possessed the requisite underlying intent. 

Moreover, we see no error in the district court’s instructing the jury that “[t]he

prosecution does not have to prove that Hansen knew that what he did was unlawful.” 

Final Instructions to the Jury, R. Doc. 50, at 6. As noted, the district court based that

instruction on the model jury instructions. See Eighth Circuit Manual of Model Jury

Instructions (Criminal) 7.03 (2014). We have observed that a prior and nearly

identical version of the model instructions represents “an accurate statement of the

law.” United States v. Dockter, 58 F.3d 1284, 1288 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Manual

of Model CriminalJury Instructions for the District Courts of the Eighth Circuit 7.03

(1994) (“The government is not required to prove that the defendant knew that [his]

[her] acts or omissions were unlawful.”)). Such instructions reflect the “fundamental”

principle that to sustain a conspiracy charge “[t]here need not . . . be proof that the

conspirators were aware of the criminality of their objective.” Ingram v. United

States, 360 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1959); see also Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. 404,

411 (1833) (“It is a common maxim, familiar to all minds, that ignorance of the law

will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally . . . .”). Hansen cites no cases

suggesting 18 U.S.C. § 1349 deviates from this principle, and we decline to issue the

first. 

Taken as a whole, the district court’s instructions adequately advised the jury

of the essential elements of the conspiracy charge. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Hansen’s conviction. 

______________________________

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