Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50461/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50461-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Peter Hugh Pocklington
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

PETER HUGH POCKLINGTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-50461

D.C. No.

5:09-cr-00043-VAP-1

ORDER

Filed August 4, 2016

Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld, M. Margaret McKeown,

and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

Order

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel filed a published order denying Peter

Pocklington’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs under the

Hyde Amendment in a case in which this court reversed and

vacated Pocklington’s probation revocation and sentence on

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 13-50461, 08/04/2016, ID: 10075101, DktEntry: 79, Page 1 of 6
2 UNITED STATES V. POCKLINGTON

the ground that the district court had no jurisdiction under 18

U.S.C. §§ 3564(d), 3565(c), to revoke probation after it had

expired.

The panel held that assuming this outcome is construed as

a decision on the merits in favor of Pocklington—an issue the

government disputes—attorney’s fees are not warranted

because the government’s position was not “vexatious,

frivolous, or in bad faith.” The panel wrote that the issue

confronted in this appeal—whether the requirements for

extending probation under 18 U.S.C. § 3565(c) are

jurisdictional—was a matter of first impression before this

circuit, and this court had not addressed the impact of

§ 3565(c) on the circumstance of probation, invocation of

equitable tolling, or plain error review. The panel added that

Pocklington presented no evidence that the government

sought to “embarrass” or “annoy” Pocklington.

COUNSEL

Becky S. James and Jessica Rosen, James & Associates LLP,

Pacific Palisades, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Joseph B. Widman, Chief, Riverside Branch Office; JeanClaude André, Chief, Criminal Appeals Section; Lawrence S.

Middleton, Chief, Criminal Division; Eileen M. Decker,

United States Attorney; Office of the United States Attorney,

Riverside, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

 Case: 13-50461, 08/04/2016, ID: 10075101, DktEntry: 79, Page 2 of 6
UNITED STATES V. POCKLINGTON 3

ORDER

Peter Pocklington filed a motion for attorney’s fees and

costs under the Hyde Amendment, which permits such an

award to a prevailing party in a criminal case where the court

“finds that the position of the United States was vexatious,

frivolous, or in bad faith, unless the court finds that special

circumstances make such an award unjust.” Pub. L. No. 105-

119, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (reprinted in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3006A historical and statutory notes). In Pocklington’s

appeal, we reversed and vacated Pocklington’s probation

revocation and sentence on the ground that the district court

had no jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3564(d), 3565(c), to

revoke probation after the probation had expired. United

States v. Pocklington, 792 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Assuming this outcome is construed as a decision on the

merits in favor of Pocklington—an issue the government

disputes—attorney’s fees are not warranted because the

government’s position was not “vexatious, frivolous, or in

bad faith.”

In assessing the nature of the government’s position, the

three components of the statute are “disjunctive; thus, the

defendant need only prove one of the three elements to

recover.” United States v. Manchester Farming P’ship,

315 F.3d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003), opinion amended on

denial of reh’g, 326 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2003). Pocklington

does not assert that the government’s position was vexatious

or in bad faith. Rather, he relies entirely on the “frivolous”

ground. No matter which ground is at issue, “it is clear that,

‘[e]ven in its earliest form, the Hyde Amendment was

targeted at prosecutorial misconduct, not prosecutorial

mistake.’” United States v. Braunstein, 281 F.3d 982, 995

 Case: 13-50461, 08/04/2016, ID: 10075101, DktEntry: 79, Page 3 of 6
4 UNITED STATES V. POCKLINGTON

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Gilbert, 198 F.3d

1293, 1304 (11th Cir. 1999)).

A case is frivolous when the “government’s position was

‘foreclosed by binding precedent or so obviously wrong as to

be frivolous.’” Braunstein, 281 F.3d at 995 (quoting Gilbert,

198 F.3d at 1304). We have described a frivolous position as

“groundless . . . with little prospect of success; often brought

to embarrass or annoy the defendant.” Id. at 995 (quoting

Gilbert, 198 F.3d at 1299). Although the “Government’s case

was not strong,” it was not barred by precedent, obviously

wrong, “brought to embarrass or annoy [Pocklington],” or in

the nature of “outlandish . . . prosecutorial misconduct.” 

Manchester, 315 F.3d at 1184.

The issue we confronted in this appeal—“whether the

requirements for extending probation under 18 U.S.C. § 3565

are jurisdictional”—was a matter of first impression before

our circuit. Pocklington, 792 F.3d at 1039. Although we had

previously referenced § 3565(c) as jurisdictional, we did not

explain the context of this term, which has been used in

multiple ways, and it was in a wholly different factual

scenario. See United States v. Castro-Verdugo, 750 F.3d

1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014). Nor had we addressed the impact

of § 3565(c) on the circumstance of a retroactive extension of

probation, invocation of equitable tolling, or plain error

review. At the time of briefing and argument, several circuits

had deemed forfeitable the claim Pocklington made for the

first time on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Madden,

515 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Wimberly,

368 F. App’x 556, 558 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v.

Burcham, 91 F. App’x 820, 821 (4th Cir. 2004).

 Case: 13-50461, 08/04/2016, ID: 10075101, DktEntry: 79, Page 4 of 6
UNITED STATES V. POCKLINGTON 5

Retroactive application was a novel issue, but in our

opinion we drew an analogy to a supervised release statute

with identical language, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i), that had been

interpreted as jurisdictional in the real sense—meaning going

to the power of the court to hear the matter. See United States

v. Garrett, 253 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2001); United States

v. Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir. 2004). That

analogy was appreciably strengthened by the Third Circuit’s

decision in United States v. Merlino, 785 F.3d 79, 81 (3d Cir.

2015), which was argued and decided after briefing and

argument in Pocklington. The Third Circuit held not only

that § 3583(i) was jurisdictional, but also, critically, that this

jurisdictional rule was not subject to equitable tolling. Id. at

87–88. The concurring opinion in that case characterized the

question as a “close issue.” Merlino, 785 F.3d at 94 (Ambro,

J., concurring).

Finally, Pocklington presents no evidence that the

government sought to “embarrass” or “annoy” Pocklington.

Braunstein, 281 F.3d at 995. By all indications, the

government was sincerely interested in revoking

Pocklington’s probation for plausible violations of the

conditions of probation. Pocklington’s creditors reported to

the Probation Office that Pocklington was concealing

millions of dollars in assets in violation of a condition of his

probation that he make accurate financial disclosures. 

Pocklington, 792 F.3d at 1038.

After careful review of the record, including briefing and

argument on the merits and briefing on the Hyde

Amendment, we conclude, though the question is close, that

the government’s position was not frivolous. We decline to

assess fees against the government for testing an essentially

 Case: 13-50461, 08/04/2016, ID: 10075101, DktEntry: 79, Page 5 of 6
6 UNITED STATES V. POCKLINGTON

untested legal idea. Pocklington’s motion for attorney’s fees

and costs under the Hyde Amendment is DENIED.

 Case: 13-50461, 08/04/2016, ID: 10075101, DktEntry: 79, Page 6 of 6