Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02665/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02665-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hayes
Defendant
B. Swift
Defendant
Michael Woods
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL WOODS,

Plaintiff,

v.

B. SWIFT, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2: 14-cv-2665 JAM KJN P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On November 10, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint. 

(ECF No. 35.) While the motion to amend was pending, defendant Swift filed a summary 

judgment motion. (ECF No. 47.) On February 29, 2016, plaintiff filed an opposition. (ECF No. 

48.) 

On April 25, 2016, the undersigned granted plaintiff’s motion to file an amended 

complaint. (ECF No. 50.) The April 25, 2016 order vacated defendant’s summary judgment 

motion, and granted defendant twenty-one days to file a response to the amended complaint and 

to inform the court whether she sought reinstatement of the vacated summary judgment motion. 

(Id.)

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On May 13, 2016, defendant filed an answer to the amended complaint (ECF No. 51) and 

a motion to reinstate her summary judgment motion (ECF No. 52.)

For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment be granted.

II. Summary Judgment Motion

A. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that the standard set forth in 

Federal Rule of Civil procedure 56 is met. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those 

portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue 

of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting then-numbered Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 

“Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need 

only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Nursing 

Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp. (In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig.), 627 F.3d 376, 

387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory 

committee’s notes to 2010 amendments (recognizing that “a party who does not have the trial 

burden of production may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot 

produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the fact”). Indeed, summary judgment 

should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, 

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. 

“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s 

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. Consequently, if the moving 

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party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a 

genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of such a factual 

dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings, but is 

required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material in support of its contention that such a dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in 

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 

law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. 

Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is 

genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled in 

part on other grounds, Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1575 (9th Cir. 1990).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce 

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 

amendments).

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be 

drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences 

are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual 

predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. 

Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to 

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demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could 

not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for 

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citation omitted).

By contemporaneous notice provided on January 6, 2015, (ECF No. 11), plaintiff was 

advised of the requirements for opposing a motion brought pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); 

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

III. Plaintiff’s Claims

This action proceeds on plaintiff’s verified amended complaint filed November 10, 2015,

against defendant Swift. (ECF No. 35.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Swift, a nurse, provided 

inadequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Plaintiff alleges that on February 21, 2014, he injured his left ring finger while playing 

basketball. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff alleges that he hyperextended his finger. (Id.) Plaintiff was then 

taken to the nurse station, where he spoke with Nurse Hayes. (Id.) Nurse Hayes looked at 

plaintiff’s left ring finger and told him, “nothing is wrong. It’s probably jammed.” (Id.) Nurse 

Hayes advised plaintiff to submit a sick call slip. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that when he returned to his cell that day, he submitted a CDCR 7362 

Health Care Services Request form which stated that he had jammed his “ring finger...it hurt and 

swelled up around 4:00 p.m....my finger was still hurting and throbbing and turning purplish in 

color, and I could not move my ring finger. At 5 p.m. pill call, Nurse Hayes ignored my 

problem.” (Id.)

On February 24, 2014, defendant Swift saw plaintiff for triage. (Id.) Defendant Swift 

examined plaintiff’s left hand and told him, “there is nothing wrong with your hand. It’s just 

jammed or sprained.” (Id. at 13-14.) Plaintiff alleges that during this examination, plaintiff told 

defendant Swift that he was in severe pain, unable to close his left hand, and that he was 

experiencing numbness and tingling in his hand. (Id. at 14.) During this examination, plaintiff 

asked defendant Swift to allow him to see a doctor. (Id.)

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Plaintiff alleges that defendant Swift’s notes from the February 24, 2014 examination state 

that plaintiff complained of “sharp or throbbing” pain in his right ring finger. (Id.) She also 

wrote that plaintiff complained of numbness and tingling. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he did not 

complain of an injury to his right ring finger, but to his left ring finger. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Swift did not refer him to see a doctor following the 

February 24, 2014 examination. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that on April 9, 2014, he had another triage with defendant Swift 

regarding an injury to his lower leg area. (Id. at 15.) During this examination, defendant Swift

said, “Another basketball injury. I’m charging you $5.” (Id.) Plaintiff told defendant Swift that 

he had not yet seen a doctor for his injured finger. (Id.) Defendant Swift replied, “You are not 

going to see a doctor for your leg.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that on April 17, 2014, he saw Dr. Hamkar for a chronic care follow-up 

visit. (Id.) The purpose of this visit was not an evaluation of plaintiff’s injured finger. (Id.) 

However, Dr. Hamkar evaluated plaintiff’s left ring finger, noting that plaintiff was unable to 

fully flex the finger. (Id.) Dr. Hamkar noted “some mild swelling at the proximal interphalangeal 

joint.” (Id.) Dr. Hamker ordered an x-ray after concluding that plaintiff had a possible rupture of 

his flexor tendons at the proximal interphalangeal and the distal interphalangeal joints. (Id.) Dr. 

Hamkar also found that because plaintiff was left-handed, he would refer him to hand surgery for 

evaluation and treatment. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that on April 20, 2014, Dr. Hamkar’s request to refer plaintiff for 

evaluation by an orthopedic specialist was approved. (Id.) On June 30, 2014, plaintiff was 

evaluated by Dr. Ibrahim, an orthopedic surgeon at Doctors Hospital of Manteca. (Id. at 16.) Dr. 

Ibrahim told plaintiff that the only option was to fuse the finger joint using a screw to give him 

more function. (Id.) Dr. Ibrahim told plaintiff that he could not locate and reattach the torn 

tendon, given the amount of time between the injury and his surgical evaluation. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that on July 11, 2014, he had surgery on his left ring finger. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that he has permanent nerve damage in his left ring finger and requires the use of 

a finger sleeve. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he has permanently lost the full range of motion in his 

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left ring finger. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Swift violated his Eighth Amendment right to adequate 

medical care by failing to treat his left ring finger on February 24, 2014, and April 9, 2014. 

Plaintiff alleges that had defendant Swift referred him to a doctor in February or April 2014, he 

would have received surgery sooner and he would not have suffered permanent damage to his 

finger. 

IV. Legal Standard for Eighth Amendment Claims

To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim predicated on the denial of medical care, a 

plaintiff must establish that he had a serious medical need and that the defendant's response to 

that need was deliberately indifferent. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); see 

also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A serious medical need exists if the failure to 

treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may be shown by the denial, 

delay or intentional interference with medical treatment or by the way in which medical care is 

provided. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). To act with deliberate 

indifference, a prison official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be 

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Farmer 

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Thus, a defendant is liable if he knows that plaintiff faces 

“a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures 

to abate it.” Id. at 847. “[I]t is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his 

knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842. 

A physician need not fail to treat an inmate altogether in order to violate that inmate’s 

Eighth Amendment rights. Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). A 

failure to competently treat a serious medical condition, even if some treatment is prescribed, may 

constitute deliberate indifference in a particular case. Id. 

It is well established that mere differences of opinion concerning the appropriate treatment 

cannot be the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 

(9th Cir. 1996); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

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V. Discussion

A. Defendant’s Motion

In essence, defendant Swift moves for summary judgment on grounds that plaintiff did not

complain about an injury to his left ring finger—he complained about an injury to his right ring 

finger. The undersigned summarizes defendant’s evidence herein.

In her declaration, defendant Swift states, in relevant part,

2. I am employed by the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR) as a Registered Nurse (RN) at the California 

State Prison, Sacramento (SAC), in Represa, California. I have 

been employed as a RN at SAC for approximately fifteen years.

3. Between January 1, 2014 and May 30, 2014 (the relevant period) 

that is the subject of this action, I was an RN and I typically worked 

in the building where inmate Woods was housed.

4. During the relevant period my typical duties as an RN at SAC 

included, but were not limited to: evaluating inmates at triage 

pursuant to CDCR Form 7362 Health Care Services Request 

Forms, or sick call slips, submitted by inmates asking for 

appointments with their primary care physicians, responding to 

emergency medical alarms to administer immediate medical care 

including CPR, training new RN’s on institutional policies and 

procedures, collecting sick-call slips to determine how soon inmates 

need to be seen by a RN at triage and responding to doctors’ orders 

for ongoing medical care of inmates after their appointments. 

5. On or around February 4, 2014, pursuant to a CDCR Form 7362 

Health Care Services Request Form submitted by inmate Woods on 

February 2, 2014, I evaluate inmate Woods for reported foot, ankle 

and knee pain on his right leg after playing basketball. After 

evaluating his reported injuries, I did not refer inmate Woods for an 

appointment with his PCP. However, I did instruct him to file 

another Form 7362 if he had increased swelling and/or pain. A true 

and correct copy of the Health Care Services Request Form and the 

Encounter Form is attached as Exhibit 1.

6. On or around February 24, 2014, pursuant to a CDCR Form 

7362 Health Care Services Request Form submitted by Woods on 

February 21, 2014, I evaluated the ring finger on his right hand. At 

that time I observed that Woods’ had no swelling or discoloration 

on his right ring finger so I did not refer him for an appointment his 

[sic] PCP. However, I did instruct him to file another Form 7362 if 

he had increased swelling and/or pain. A true and correct copy of 

the Health Care Services Request Form and the Encounter Form is 

attached as Exhibit 2.

7. On or about April 8, 2014, pursuant to a CDCR Form 7362 

Health Care Services Request Form submitted by inmate Woods on 

April 7, 2014, I saw inmate Woods for injuries to his left leg and 

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Achilles tendon. After evaluating his reported injuries, I referred 

Woods for a routine appointment with his PCP. A true and correct 

copy of the Health Care Services Request Form and the Encounter 

Form is attached as Exhibit 3.

8. During the relevant time period, inmate Woods’ medical records 

reflect that I did not evaluate any injuries to the ring finger on 

inmate Woods’ left hand. 

9. During the relevant time period, I did not deny inmate Woods 

any medical treatment for any reported injuries. 

10. If inmate Woods had presented me with an injury and/or illness 

that required a doctor’s evaluation and treatment, I would have 

referred him to an appointment with his primary care physician. 

During the relevant period, only the injuries to inmate Woods’ left 

leg and left Achilles tendon required a referral. 

(ECF No. 47-4 at 1-3.)

The CDCR 7362 form submitted by plaintiff on February 21, 2014, and attached to 

defendant Swift’s declaration, contains the following statement by plaintiff:

On 2/21/14 at approx.. 155 p.m. I was shooting around a little 

basketball, when the ball came off the back board and hit and 

jammed my ring finger, it hurt and swelled up around 4:00 p.m. my 

finger was still hurting and throbbing and turned purplish in color 

and I could not move my ring finger. At 5 pm pill call Nurse Hayes 

ignored my problem.

(ECF No. 47-4 at 8.)

Plaintiff’s February 21, 2014 CDCR 7362 form does not state whether the injured ring 

finger is on plaintiff’s left or right hand.

The form completed by defendant Swift following her February 24, 2014 examination of 

plaintiff states that plaintiff complained of an injury to his right ring finger. (Id. at 9.) The form 

contains two notations by defendant Swift that the injury occurred to plaintiff’s right finger. (Id.) 

Defendant Swift wrote that plaintiff described the pain as short and throbbing. (Id.) Defendant’s 

notes also state, “no swelling or discoloration.” (Id.) Defendant checked the boxes indicating 

that plaintiff reported numbness and tingling. (Id.) Defendant wrote that she did not refer 

plaintiff to see a physician. (Id.) The form indicates that defendant Swift advised plaintiff that he 

had suffered a “strain or sprain.” (Id.) 

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The form completed by defendant Swift following her April 9, 2014 examination of 

plaintiff, attached to her declaration, states that plaintiff complained of pain in his left leg and that 

he could barely walk. (Id.) Defendant Swift also wrote that plaintiff was seen by the RN on 

either February 4, 2014, or February 24, 2014 (the undersigned cannot make out the date), for 

“finger swelling.” (Id. at 11-12.) The form indicates that defendant Swift referred plaintiff to a 

doctor following her examination of plaintiff on April 9, 2014. (Id.)

B. Plaintiff’s Opposition

In his opposition, plaintiff argues that defendant Swift mistakenly wrote in her February 

24, 2014 report that plaintiff injured his right ring finger. In support of his opposition, plaintiff 

has provided a copy of an administrative grievance he signed April 16, 2014, complaining that 

defendant Swift failed to treat an injury to his left ring finger. (ECF No. 48 at 10.) In this 

grievance, plaintiff wrote, 

On 3-18-14, I was seen in the 8 block dining area by Nurse Bonnie 

Swift of an injury that occurred on the basketball court. My left 

ring finger got pulled back jumping up for a rebound, the ball 

pulled my finger which swelled instantly and I could not bend my 

finger at all. Nurse Swift said that I would be scheduled to see a 

doctor. I never saw a doctor for that injury. She did prescribe 

Ibuprofen and now I can’t close my finger because I believe my 

tendon has snapped. Nurse Swift refuses to let me see a doctor to 

get further examinations such as an x-ray or MRI. On April 2, 2014 

I seen Nurse Swift again for another injury around the Achilles 

Heel area, sheen [sic], calf and around the ankle which I was in 

extreme pain. Nurse Swift scoffed and said another “basketball 

injury” and said I’m charging you $5. I said I still haven’t seen the 

doctor for my finger. She said your [sic] not going to see the doctor 

for your leg. I said what do you mean I’m not going to see the 

doctor. I’m in pain. My leg is swollen, I’m walking with a limp 

and I can’t put pressure on my left leg! Nurse Swift said because I 

can and told me to write a 602 nothing going to happen. 

(Id. at 10-11.)

According to the grievance form, this grievance was granted in part at the first level of 

review. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff appealed this response to the second level of review on July 3, 

2014. (Id. at 12.) In his second level grievance, plaintiff wrote,

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My finger will not properly work because on 6-3-14 I went to 

doctor’s hospital in Manteca. The doctor/surgeon said CSP-Sac 

New Folsom waited too long to have me seen for my torn tendon. 

It cannot be saved because of Nurse Swift delaying, denying me 

access to med. 

(Id.)

The form indicates that plaintiff’s second level grievance was granted in part on August 

12, 2014. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a grievance to the third level of review. (Id.) In his third level 

grievance, plaintiff wrote: “I was deliberately indifferent [sic] by Nurse Swift by not being seen. 

Something was wrong with my finger. Nothing was done until 5 months later which in at another 

prison. I can’t use my hand. It will be permanently disfigured.” 

Plaintiff has also provided a chronic care follow-up visit/progress note dated April 17, 

2014. (Id. at 14.) This report, signed by Dr. Hamkar, states that he examined plaintiff for his 

chronic care issues and injury to his left ring finger. (Id.) Dr. Hamkar wrote, 

About a month ago, he was playing basketball on the yard and he 

hyperextended his left ring finger. Since then, he complains of 

pain, swelling and inability to fully close his left hand. He is left 

handed. He was not seen apparently by any medical staff when the 

injury happened, and he is here discussing the issue with me for the 

first time. 

(Id.)

Dr. Hamkar ordered an x-ray of plaintiff’s left ring finger. (Id.) He wrote, “I am 

suspecting that he has a possible rupture of his flexor tendons at the proximal interphalangeal and 

the distal interphalangeal joints. Since he is left handed and it is his dominant hand we will refer 

him to hand surgery for evaluation and treatment.” (Id.)

C. Further Briefing

As discussed above, in his April 16, 2014 grievance, plaintiff alleged that on March 18, 

2014, he saw defendant Swift for his injured left ring finger. Dr. Hamkar’s note from his April 

17, 2014 examination stated that plaintiff injured his left ring finger “about a month ago.” These 

documents suggested that the injury to plaintiff’s left ring finger may have occurred later than 

February 21, 2014, such as in mid-March 2014. Erring on the side of caution, on June 3, 2016, 

the undersigned directed the parties to file further briefing addressing whether defendant Swift 

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examined an injury to plaintiff’s left ring finger at any time between February 24, 2014, and April 

16, 2014. (ECF No. 53.) The undersigned ordered that if any records existed demonstrating that 

defendant Swift treated plaintiff’s left ring finger during that time, the parties should file those 

records. (Id.) 

In her response to the June 3, 2016 order, defendant referred to her declaration filed in 

support of the summary judgment motion, where she stated that plaintiff’s medical records did

not reflect that she evaluated plaintiff for any injuries to his left ring finger during the relevant 

time period, i.e., January 1, 2014, and May 30, 2014. (ECF No. 47-4 at 1-2.) In addition, during 

the relevant time period, defendant did not deny plaintiff any medical treatment for any reported 

injuries. (Id. at 1-3.) 

In his response to the June 3, 2016 order, plaintiff again argued that defendant Swift 

mistakenly wrote in her February 24, 2014 report that plaintiff injured his right ring finger. (ECF 

No. 57.) In other words, plaintiff continued to allege that he injured his left ring finger on 

February 21, 2014. Attached as exhibits to plaintiff’s further briefing are plaintiff’s February 21, 

2104 request for health care form, a page from his amended complaint, and defendant Swift’s 

notes from her February 24, 2014 examination of plaintiff. (Id.) 

D. Analysis

Defendant Swift does not appear to dispute that, at some time, plaintiff injured his left ring 

finger and required surgery. It is also undisputed that defendant Swift examined plaintiff on 

February 24, 2014, and April 8, 2014. 

The issues requiring further discussion are: 1) when did plaintiff injure his left ring 

finger; 2) did he report an injury to his left ring finger to defendant Swift; and 3) is there any 

evidence that defendant Swift acted with deliberate indifference.

When Did Plaintiff Injure His Left Ring Finger?

In his verified amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that he injured his left ring finger on

February 21, 2014. However, as discussed above, plaintiff’s April 16, 2014 grievance and Dr. 

Hamkar’s April 17, 2014 report suggest that the injury occurred later, such as in mid-March 2014. 

A later injury would undermine plaintiff’s claim that defendant Swift failed to treat plaintiff’s left 

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ring finger on February 24, 2014. 

For the following reasons, the undersigned finds that plaintiff’s April 16, 2014 grievance 

and Dr. Hamkar’s report do not undermine plaintiff’s sworn statement in his amended complaint 

regarding when his injury occurred.

Under the sham affidavit rule, “a party cannot create an issue of fact by contradicting his 

prior deposition testimony.” Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Courts most commonly apply the sham affidavit rule to cases where a party submits an affidavit 

which contradicts the party's sworn deposition testimony. See Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 F.3d1076, 

1080 (9th Cir. 2012) (comparing an affidavit with deposition testimony), Kennedy, 952 F.2d at 

264–65 (same). But the rule’s application has extended beyond depositions: “This rule ... applies 

to conflicts between affidavits and interrogatory responses as well....” Kibbee v. City of Portland, 

1999 WL 1271868, at *4 (D.Or. Dec. 23, 1999) (citing Dist. No. 1J Multnomah County v. 

AcandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1264 (9th Cir. 1993)). However, “[u]nsworn testimony cannot be the 

basis for striking subsequent and contradictory sworn testimony.” Kibbee, 1999 WL 1271868, at 

*4, see also Leslie v. Grupo, ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir.1999) (reversing a district court's 

grant of summary judgment after striking plaintiff's affidavit because it was contradictory to presuit correspondence between plaintiff and defendant).

In addition, since Kennedy, the Ninth Circuit has imposed a second requirement for 

application of the sham affidavit rule: that the inconsistency between the party's prior deposition 

testimony and his subsequent affidavit be “clear and unambiguous.” Van Asdale v. Int’l Game 

Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2009).

For the following reasons, the undersigned finds that the sham affidavit rule does not bar 

plaintiff’s sworn statement in the amended complaint that the injury to his left ring finger 

occurred on February 21, 2014. Most importantly, plaintiff’s April 16, 2014 grievance and Dr. 

Hamkar’s report do not contain sworn statements by plaintiff. For this reason, the sham affidavit 

rule is not applicable to bar plaintiff’s sworn statement in his amended complaint that he injured 

his left ring finger on February 21, 2014. Moreover, neither plaintiff’s grievance nor Dr. 

Hamkar’s report clearly state when the injury to plaintiff’s left ring finger occurred. In other 

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words, the inconsistency between these two documents and plaintiff’s sworn amended complaint 

regarding when the injury occurred is not “clear and unambiguous.” 

Defendant has offered no evidence regarding when the injury to plaintiff’s left ring finger 

occurred. Accordingly, for purposes of this summary judgment motion, the undersigned accepts 

plaintiff’s sworn statement that the injury occurred on February 21, 2014. 

Did Plaintiff Report An Injury to His Left Ring Finger to Defendant on February 24, 

2014?

In his verified amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that on February 24, 2014, he told 

defendant Swift that he injured his left ring finger. As discussed above, in her declaration, 

defendant Swift states that on February 24, 2014, plaintiff complained of an injury to his right 

ring finger. Accordingly, based on this dispute, the undersigned finds that whether plaintiff 

informed defendant Swift of an injury to his left ring finger on February 24, 2014, is a disputed 

material fact. See Fed. R. Evid. 602 (lay witness may testify regarding matters of personal 

knowledge).

Did Defendant Swift Act with Deliberate Indifference on February 24, 2014?

Plaintiff alleges that had defendant Swift referred him to a doctor on February 24, 2014, 

he would have had surgery sooner and his finger would not have been permanently damaged. 

Other than disagreeing on what finger plaintiff reported was injured, the parties generally agree 

on what occurred on February 24, 2014. The parties are in agreement regarding the symptoms 

plaintiff reported suffering in his injured finger on that date: pain, numbness and tingling. 

Plaintiff also claims that he reported that he could not make a fist. The parties agree that 

defendant Swift told plaintiff that he had suffered a sprain or strain. The parties agree that 

defendant Swift did not refer plaintiff to a doctor on February 24, 2014. 

Taking the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, i.e. he reported an injury to his left 

finger that later required surgery, the undersigned finds that defendant Swift did not act with 

deliberate indifference on February 24, 2014. As discussed above, the test for whether a prison 

official acts with deliberate indifference is a subjective one: the official must “know[ ] of and 

disregard[ ] an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must both be aware of the 

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facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and 

he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

The party claiming an Eighth Amendment violation “need not show that a prison official 

acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the 

official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 842 (citation omitted). “[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he 

should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot ... be condemned as 

the infliction of punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837;

In order to prove that an official is subjectively aware of a risk to inmate health or safety, 

a plaintiff inmate need not produce direct evidence of the official’s knowledge; a plaintiff can rely 

on circumstantial evidence indicating that the official must have known about the risk. See Hope 

v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (“We may infer the existence of this subjective state of mind 

from the fact that the risk of harm is obvious”); Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 

1995).

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that defendant Swift knew that he faced a serious risk of 

harm if she did not refer him to a doctor on February 24, 2014. The undisputed facts 

demonstrate that defendant Swift thought that plaintiff’s finger was jammed or sprained, and he 

did not need further medical attention. These facts do not demonstrate that defendant Swift knew 

that plaintiff’s injury was more serious and required treatment by a physician. At best, plaintiff 

has demonstrated that defendant Swift negligently diagnosed his injury. However, a negligent 

diagnosis does not state an Eighth Amendment claim. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1123 

(9th Cir. 2012); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (a showing of medical 

malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation).

The undersigned also finds that the risk of harm to plaintiff was not obvious based on his 

symptoms. In other words, the symptoms plaintiff alleges he presented on February 24, 2014,

were not so severe that defendant Swift must have known that he faced a significant risk of harm 

if he did not see a doctor. Plaintiff has also provided no expert evidence to support a claim that 

the risk of harm was obvious.

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For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that defendant Swift did not act 

with deliberate indifference on February 24, 2014. 

Did Defendant Act with Deliberate Indifference on April 9, 2014?

The undersigned begins the analysis of plaintiff’s claim regarding April 9, 2014, by 

summarizing the relevant evidence.

Plaintiff alleges that on April 9, 2014, he saw defendant Swift regarding an injury to his 

leg. Plaintiff alleges that during this examination, he told defendant Swift that he had still not 

seen a doctor for his injured finger. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Swift replied, “You are not 

going to see a doctor for your leg.” 

In her declaration, defendant Swift states that she saw plaintiff on April 8, 2014, for 

injuries to his left leg and Achilles tendon. Defendant Swift states, as does her report from the 

examination, that she referred plaintiff for a routine appointment with his primary care physician 

for these injuries. (ECF No. 47-4 at 12.) 

On April 17, 2014, plaintiff saw Dr. Hamkar, who referred plaintiff for further treatment 

for his finger injury. Dr. Hamkar’s report states that he saw plaintiff for “chronic care issues” and 

an injury to his left ring finger. (ECF No. 48 at 14.) Dr. Hamkar’s report does not mention the 

leg and Achilles tendon injuries mentioned in defendant Swift’s April 8, 2014 referral. Therefore, 

it appears that Dr. Hamkar’s examination of plaintiff was unrelated to defendant Swift’s April 8, 

2014 examination of plaintiff. 

Plaintiff’s claim that on April 9, 2008, defendant Swift told him that she would not refer 

him to a doctor is contradicted by defendant’s notes stating that she referred him to his primary 

care physician for his leg injuries. However, neither party has submitted any records by the 

physician who saw plaintiff based on that referral. Dr. Hamkar’s April 17, 2014 notes, which do 

not mention the leg injuries and state that plaintiff had not been seen before by a doctor for his 

left finger injury, suggest that plaintiff did not see a doctor between the time defendant Swift 

prepared her April 9, 2014 report and April 17, 2014. 

However, assuming that defendant Swift did not refer plaintiff to a doctor on April 9, 

2014 (or April 8, 2014 as alleged by defendant Swift), plaintiff saw Dr. Hamkar eight (or nine) 

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days later on April 17, 2014. To succeed on his Eighth Amendment claim against defendant 

Swift based on her alleged failure to refer him to a doctor on April 8, 2014, plaintiff would have 

to demonstrate that he suffered substantial harm as a result of this nine day delay. Wood v. 

Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990) (when medical treatment is delayed rather than 

denied, the delay generally amounts to deliberate indifference only if it caused substantial harm). 

There is no evidence that this brief delay, occurring approximately six weeks after the initial 

injury, caused plaintiff to suffer more harm to his left ring finger. In addition, plaintiff allegedly 

did not receive the surgery on his finger until approximately two months after his April 17, 2014 

examination by Dr. Hamkar. Because there is no evidence that the alleged delay caused further 

damage to his finger, defendant Swift should be granted summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim 

that she failed to refer him to a doctor on April 8, 2014.

VI. Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time

In response to the June 3, 2016 further briefing order, plaintiff filed a motion for an 

extension of time to conduct discovery. (ECF No. 56.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) 

provides that, if a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it 

cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition to a summary judgment motion, the court 

may allow the party time to conduct discovery.

In his motion for an extension of time, plaintiff states that he intends to obtain 

“interrogatories or deposed statements” from several witnesses. (Id. at 4.) The only witness 

plaintiff specifically identifies is Dr. Ibrahim, who allegedly performed the surgery on his left 

ring finger. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Ibrahim will testify at a deposition that had 

plaintiff been treated sooner, he would not have had such extensive damage to his left ring finger. 

(Id.) 

Even if Dr. Ibrahim were to testify that a delay in plaintiff’s receipt of treatment for the 

injury to his left ring finger caused further damage, this testimony would not be evidence that 

defendant Swift acted with deliberate indifference on February 24, 2014. In addition, while it is 

plausible that a delay in plaintiff’s receipt of surgery on his left ring finger caused permanent 

damage, it is less plausible that the nine day delay alleged to have occurred in April 2014 

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significantly contributed to this damage. The undersigned is not willing to delay resolution of 

this action based on the very speculative nature of this claim. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to conduct discovery (ECF No. 56) be 

denied;

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 47) be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: August 30, 2016

Wo2665.sj

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