Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03058/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03058-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert E. Quinn
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 23, 2007 Decided January 26, 2007

No. 06-3058

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ROBERT E. QUINN,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 05cr00018-01)

Aitan D. Goelman argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs was Barak Cohen.

John P. Mannarino, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeffrey A.

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, III, Elizabeth

Trosman, Jay I. Bratt, and Laura A. Ingersoll, Assistant U.S.

Attorneys.

Before: GRIFFITH and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.

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Per Curiam: This case involves the prosecution and

conviction of Robert E. Quinn for arranging the sale of forklift

replacement parts in violation of the trade embargo against Iran.

A superseding indictment charged Quinn with one count of

conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States, see

18 U.S.C. § 371, and five counts of violating the embargo (and

of aiding, abetting, and causing each violation), see 50 U.S.C.

§ 1705(b) (establishing penalties for “[w]hoever willfully

violates . . . any . . . regulation issued under this chapter”); 31

C.F.R. § 560.204 (prohibiting “the exportation . . . directly or

indirectly” of goods from the United States to Iran). Quinn’s

defense at trial was that he did not “willfully” violate the

embargo. 

Just over two months after Quinn was sentenced, Tatum,

Quinn’s boss, pled guilty to making a material false statement in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. In support of the plea, Tatum

admitted that he lied when he “stated to [federal] agents that,

after learning of Quinn’s . . . dealing with [the Iranian

company], he had instructed [Quinn] to cease sending . . .

replacement parts to [that company] either directly or through a

third party.” Joint Appendix 265. It appears that, prior to

Tatum’s admission of his material false statement during his

plea colloquy, Quinn had no way to prove that Tatum had lied

to government agents, and Quinn apparently did not know that

Tatum had admitted his material false statement to the

prosecutor. In other words, because Tatum’s plea was not

entered until after Quinn’s trial had concluded, Quinn was

unable to present this particular evidence of Tatum’s fabrication

and recantation to the jury. 

During oral argument before this court, counsel for Quinn

indicated that he planned to file a motion in the District Court

requesting a new trial based on the newly discovered evidence

of Tatum’s plea. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

33(b)(1), “[a]ny motion for a new trial grounded on newly

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discovered evidence must be filed within 3 years after the

verdict.” But, “[i]f an appeal is pending, the court may not grant

a motion for a new trial until the appellate court remands the

case.” FED.R.CRIM.P. 33(b)(1). The Supreme Court has stated

that, pursuant to Rule 33, where a defendant files a postconviction motion for a new trial during the pendency of his

direct appeal, “[t]he District Court ha[s] jurisdiction to entertain

the motion and either deny the motion on its merits or certify its

intention to grant the motion to the Court of Appeals, which

could then entertain a motion to remand the case.” United States

v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 667 n.42 (1984). 

Given counsel’s indication that a Rule 33 motion will be

filed with the District Court, we will hold the case in abeyance

until the District Court either denies the Rule 33 motion, or

certifies “its intention to grant the motion.” See id.; Smith v.

Pollin, 194 F.2d 349, 349-50 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (per curiam). If

the District Court “indicate[s] willingness to grant a new trial,”

Quinn may then file a motion in this court requesting remand of

the case. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 938 (D.C. Cir.

1967) (recounting application of the procedure); see United

States v. Hall, 324 F.3d 720, 721-22 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (same). If,

however, the District Court denies the Rule 33 motion, then

Quinn may appeal the denial, and that appeal will be

consolidated with the case now held in abeyance. See United

States v. Smith, 331 F.2d 145, 145 (6th Cir. 1964) (order)

(directing “that consideration and decision of this appeal be held

in abeyance until the trial judge certifies to this Court whether

he will grant the motion for a new trial or deny the same” where

counsel had orally informed court of Rule 33 motion); cf. United

States v. Lee, 509 F.2d 400, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (consolidating

appeal held in abeyance for another reason with appeal from

denial of post-conviction Rule 33 motion). In following this

procedure, we conserve judicial resources – neither needlessly

remanding the case, see Smith v. Pollin, 194 F.2d at 350, nor

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addressing issues on appeal that may ultimately be mooted by

the grant of a new trial.

The appeal presently before us will be held in abeyance

pending further proceedings in connection with the Rule 33

motion.

So ordered.

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