Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02068/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02068-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ricky Lee Hendershot
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of

Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2068

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Ricky Lee Hendershot, *

also known as Richard Hendershot, * 

*

Defendant-Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: November 14, 2006

Filed: December 1, 2006

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, LAY and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

LAY, Circuit Judge.

Ricky Lee Hendershot appeals the sentence imposed in district court1

 following

violations of his supervised release. We affirm.

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BACKGROUND

On May 28, 2004, Hendershot pled guilty to one count of being a felon in

possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). A presentence report

(PSR) was prepared, which calculated Hendershot’s criminal history category at VI

due to his seventeen criminal history points. 

At his February 14, 2005 sentencing hearing, Hendershot moved for a departure

due to the overstatement of his criminal history category pursuant to United States

Sentencing Guidelines § 4A1.3. He argued that although he technically qualified as

a category VI offender, most of his prior convictions were relatively minor offenses.

The district court accepted his argument and reduced Hendershot’s guidelines range

from 30 to 37 months to 15 to 21 months, the range for a category III offender.

Hendershot was sentenced to 15 months of imprisonment, to be followed by three

years of supervised release.

After Hendershot’s release from prison, he admitted violating the conditions of

his supervised release by using methamphetamine and missing drug test appointments,

Grade C violations. USSG § 7B1.1(a), p.s. (classifying supervised release violations).

At the sentencing hearing on his revocation of supervised release, Hendershot argued

he was entitled to be treated as a criminal history category III offender, since that

category was used in his initial sentencing. The district court disagreed, found

Hendershot’s criminal history category to be VI, and imposed an eight-month

sentence. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Hendershot argues the district court erred by failing to use the same

criminal history category for his revocation sentencing that it did for sentencing

Hendershot on the underlying offense. We review the district court’s interpretation

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The government exhibits some confusion as to our standard of review on

revocation sentences. It suggests that because the revocation sentencing guidelines

are advisory, we need only review the ultimate sentence for unreasonableness, without

regard to any errors made in arriving at that sentence. Our cases, however, recognize

that in the wake of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the advisory

guidelines scheme for the defendant’s offense of conviction now mirrors the scheme

that had already been in place for violations of supervised release. United States v.

Coleman, 404 F.3d 1103, 1104-05 (8th Cir. 2005). As such, we review challenges to

both types of sentences in the same manner: first, determining whether the district

court correctly applied the guidelines under our traditional standard of review, and,

if so, then considering whether the ultimate sentence is reasonable. See United States

v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1016-17 (8th Cir. 2005). 

In some instances, of course, an error in calculating the guidelines range may

be harmless. There are some indications that is the case here, for the district court

indicated it had “made up [its] mind” to sentence Hendershot to eight months of

imprisonment, no matter what his criminal history category. (Revocation Tr. at 11.)

An eight-month sentence is within the advisory range proposed by the defendant, see

USSG § 7B.14(a), p.s. (sentencing range of 5 to 11 months for Grade C violator with

a criminal history category III), lending credence to the view that the alleged error had

no effect on the outcome. This, however, is not altogether clear. (See Revocation Tr.

at 11-12 (agreeing to treat Henderson’s case as a “test case” so that court of appeals

can clarify criminal history category ambiguities, and explicitly using criminal history

category VI).) Because we find no error in determination of the sentence, we need not

address whether the error would have been harmless.

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and application of the sentencing guidelines de novo. United States v. Mathis, 451

F.3d 939, 941 (8th Cir. 2006). The ultimate sentence imposed, however, is reviewed

for unreasonableness.2

 United States v. Nelson, 453 F.3d 1004, 1006 (8th Cir. 2006);

United States v. Tyson, 413 F.3d 824, 825 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

We find no error in the district court’s use of criminal history category VI for

Hendershot’s revocation sentence. At his original sentencing, Hendershot benefitted

from a § 4A1.3 departure to criminal history category III; his true criminal history,

however, remained category VI. See USSG § 4A1.1, comment. (“The total criminal

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history points from § 4A1.1 determine the criminal history category (I-VI) . . . .”) An

application note relevant to revocation sentences suggests it is permissible, but not

mandatory, for a court to grant a similar departure for revocation sentencing:

“Departure from the applicable range of imprisonment in the Revocation Table may

be warranted when the court departed from the applicable range for reasons set forth

in § 4A1.3 (Adequacy of Criminal History Category) in originally imposing the

sentence that resulted in supervision.” USSG § 7B1.4, comment. (n.2). We read this

note to instruct sentencing courts to calculate a defendant’s criminal history category

as it was in the original proceeding prior to any § 4A1.3 departure that was granted;

if the court then sees fit to grant a departure, that is within its discretion. Accepting

the defendant’s contrary interpretation would render this application note’s

anticipation of a criminal history category departure redundant, for the defendant’s

criminal history category for the revocation sentence would already be the departed-to

category used during the original sentencing proceeding. We reject this approach. Cf.

Cody v. Hillard, 304 F.3d 767, 776 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting courts ought not interpret

statutes in a manner which renders sections inconsistent, meaningless, or superfluous);

accord United States v. Marasas, 62 Fed. App. 727, 730 (7th Cir. 2003) (unpublished)

(district court not bound to impose a § 4A1.3 departure on revocation sentence).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the sentence imposed by the district

court.

______________________________

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