Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00396/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00396-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Lee Darnell
Petitioner
Stu Sherman
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Petitioner filed this action on March 20, 2016.

1

 After a preliminary review of the petition 

revealed that the petition appeared to be untimely, the Court ordered Petitioner to show cause why the 

petition should not be dismissed. (Doc. 4). On April 8, 2016, Petitioner filed his response, indicating 

 

1

In Houston v. Lack, the United States Supreme Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner’s notice of appeal is deemed 

filed on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the actual date of its receipt by the court 

clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 166, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The rule is premised on the pro se prisoner’s 

mailing of legal documents through the conduit of “prison authorities whom he cannot control and whose interests might 

be adverse to his.” Miller v. Sumner, 921 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1990); see Houston, 487 U.S. at 271. The Ninth Circuit 

has applied the “mailbox rule” to state and federal petitions in order to calculate the tolling provisions of the AEDPA. 

Saffold v. Neland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268-1269 (9th Cir. 2000); Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The date the petition is signed may be considered the earliest possible date an inmate could submit his petition to prison 

authorities for filing under the mailbox rule. Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, 

for all of Petitioner’s state petitions and for the instant federal petition, the Court will consider the date of signing of the 

petition (or the date of signing of the proof of service if no signature appears on the petition) as the earliest possible filing 

date and the operative date of filing under the mailbox rule for calculating the running of the statute of limitation. 

Petitioner signed the proof of service for the instant petition on March 20, 2016. (Doc. 1, p. 55). 

ROBERT LEE DARNELL,

 Petitioner,

v.

STU SHERMAN,

Respondent.

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Case No.: 1:16-cv-00396-JLT

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DISMISS PETITION FOR VIOLATION OF THE 

ONE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

ORDER DIRECTING THAT OBJECTIONS BE 

FILED WITHIN TWENTY-ONE DAYS

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 

ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO CASE

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that he has mental and physical disabilities, that he has sought to exhaust claims in state court, and that 

he believes the weight of evidence does not support his conviction. (Doc. 6). In the Court’s view, 

these claims fall far short of establishing timeliness; thus, the Court will recommend that the petition 

be dismissed.

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition.

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition 

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is 

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The 

Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after 

an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.2001).

The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a 

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner adequate 

notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-42. By issuing this 

Order to Show Cause, the Court is affording Petitioner the notice required by the Ninth Circuit in 

Herbst.

B. Limitation Period For Filing Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas corpus 

filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); 

Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997). 

The instant petition was filed on March 20, 2016, and thus, it is subject to the provisions of the 

AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal 

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d) 

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The 

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limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by 

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is 

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by 

the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented 

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or 

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending 

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct 

review became final. The AEDPA, however, is silent on how the one year limitation period affects 

cases where direct review concluded before the enactment of the AEDPA. The Ninth Circuit has held 

that if a petitioner whose review ended before the enactment of the AEDPA filed a habeas corpus 

petition within one year of the AEDPA’s enactment, the Court should not dismiss the petition pursuant 

to § 2244(d)(1). Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,1286 (9th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 118 S.Ct. 899 (1998); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 127 F.3d 782, 784 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1395 (1998). In such circumstances, the limitations period would begin 

to run on April 25, 1996. Patterson v. Stewart, 2001 WL 575465 (9th Cir. Ariz.). 

Petitioner was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for his November 3, 1989 

conviction for first degree murder with special circumstances. (Doc. 1, p. 51). Petitioner appealed to 

the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed the conviction on July 3, 1991. Petitioner did not file 

a petition for review in the state supreme court and remittitur issued on October 7, 1991, thus 

concluding direct review of his conviction. (Id.). Since his direct review concluded prior to the 

enactment of the AEDPA, the one-year limitation period commenced on April 25, 1996 and expired 

one year later, on April 24, 1997. 

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As mentioned, the instant petition was filed on March 20, 2016, almost 19 years after the date 

the one-year period would have expired. Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to statutory or equitable 

tolling, the instant petition is untimely and should be dismissed.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed 

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2). A properly filed application is one that complies with the applicable laws and rules 

governing filings, including the form of the application and time limitations. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 

U.S. 4, 8 (2000). An application is pending during the time that ‘a California petitioner completes a 

full round of [state] collateral review,” so long as there is no unreasonable delay in the intervals 

between a lower court decision and the filing of a petition in a higher court. Delhomme v. Ramirez, 

340 F. 3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Waldrip v. Hall, 548 

F. 3d 729 (9th Cir. 2008)(per curium)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Evans v. 

Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193-194 (2006); see Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220, 222-226 (2002); see

also, Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Nevertheless, there are circumstances and periods of time when no statutory tolling is allowed. 

For example, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period of time between finality of an appeal and 

the filing of an application for post-conviction or other collateral review in state court, because no 

state court application is “pending” during that time. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006-1007; Raspberry v. 

Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2006). Similarly, no statutory tolling is allowed for the 

period between finality of an appeal and the filing of a federal petition. Id. at 1007. In addition, the 

limitation period is not tolled during the time that a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. 

Walker, 563 U.S. 167, 181-182 (2001); see also, Fail v. Hubbard, 315 F. 3d 1059, 1060 (9th Cir. 

2001)(as amended on December 16, 2002). Further, a petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling 

where the limitation period has already run prior to filing a state habeas petition. Ferguson v. 

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the 

limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed.”); Jiminez v. White, 276 F. 3d 

478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Finally, a petitioner is not entitled to continuous tolling when the 

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petitioner’s later petition raises unrelated claims. See Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165, 1166 (9th Cir. 

2006). 

Petitioner alleges that he filed a state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court 

challenging the imposition of various restitution fines at sentencing. (Doc. 1, p. 2). However, a

petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run prior to filing a state 

habeas petition. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478 

(9th Cir. 2001); see Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000)(same); Ferguson v. 

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2003)(“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the 

limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed.”); Jackson v. Dormire, 180 F.3d 

919, 920 (8th Cir. 1999) (petitioner fails to exhaust claims raised in state habeas corpus filed after 

expiration of the one-year limitations period). Thus, as mentioned, the limitations period expired in 

1997, almost twenty years before Petitioner filed his state habeas petition. Accordingly, he cannot 

avail himself of the statutory tolling provisions of the AEDPA. 

D. Equitable Tolling.

The running of the one-year limitation period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) is subject to equitable 

tolling in appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 651-652 (2010); Calderon v. United 

States Dist. Ct., 128 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1997). The limitation period is subject to equitable 

tolling when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file the 

petition on time.” Shannon v. Newland, 410 F. 3d 1083, 1089-1090 (9th Cir. 2005)(internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). “When external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, 

account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be 

appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). “Generally, a litigant seeking 

equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his 

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Holland, 560 U.S. 

at 651-652; Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807 (2005). “[T]he threshold 

necessary to trigger equitable tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F. 3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)(citation omitted). As a consequence, 

“equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases.” Miles, 187 F. 3d at 1107. 

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Petitioner’s response is threefold: (1) he has mental, physical, and learning disabilities; (2) he

is unschooled in the law and only obtained the services of a “jailhouse lawyer” in 2015; and (3) he is 

actually innocent because he had no intent to shoot the victim. 

1. Mental and Physical Illness.

Petitioner’s claim of mental and/or physical illness alone is insufficient to equitably toll the 

limitations period. Although some courts have recognized mental illness as a basis for equitable 

tolling of a federal statute of limitations, they have done so only where the mental "illness in fact 

prevent[ed] the sufferer from managing his affairs and thus from understanding his legal rights and 

acting upon them." Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 (7th Cir.1996); see also, Nunnally v. 

MacCausland, 996 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1993); United States v. Page, 1999 WL 1044829, at *1-2 (N.D.Ill. 

Nov. 16, 1999); Decrosta v. Runyon, 1993 WL 117583, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1993); Speiser v. 

United States Dept. of Health & Human Services, 670 F.Supp. 380, 384 (D.D.C.1986); cf. Accardi v. 

United States, 435 F.2d 1239, 1241 n. 2 (3rd Cir.1970) ("Insanity does not prevent a federal statute of 

limitations from running."); Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 184 (2nd Cir.2000) ("The question of 

whether a person is sufficiently mentally disabled to justify tolling of a limitation period is ... highly 

case-specific."). 

The Ninth Circuit has followed this rule in Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010), 

holding that a petitioner has the burden of showing that his “mental impairment made it impossible to 

meet the filing deadline under the totality of the circumstances, including reasonably available access 

to assistance.” In Bills, the Ninth Circuit established the following two-part test to determine whether 

equitable tolling should be permitted based on mental impairment:

(1) First, a petitioner must show his mental impairment was an “extraordinary circumstance” 

beyond his control by demonstrating that the impairment was so severe that either

(a) Petitioner was unable rationally or factually to personally understand the need to timely 

file, or

(b) Petitioner’s mental state rendered him unable personally to prepare a habeas petition and 

effectuation its filing.

(2) Second, the petitioner must show diligence in pursuing the claims to the extent he could 

understand them, but that the mental impairment made it impossible to meet the filing 

deadline under the totality of the circumstances, including reasonably available access to 

assistance.

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Bills, 628 F.3d at 1099-1100. Bills notes that, “to evaluate whether a petitioner is entitled to equitable 

tolling, the district court must determine whether the petitioner’s mental impairment made it 

impossible to timely file on his own.” Id. at 1100-1101. However, “[w]ith respect to the necessary 

diligence, the petitioner must diligently seek assistance and exploit whatever assistance is reasonably 

available.” Id. at 1101. Bills summarizes the relevant question as “Did the mental impairment cause 

an untimely filing?” Id. at 1100 n. 3.

Apart from vague and highly generalized allegations of mental and physical illness, Petitioner 

has provided no evidence whatsoever, in the form of medical reports, doctor’s evaluations, etc., that 

would permit the Court to conclude that equitable tolling should apply. Instead, Petitioner makes 

simply a vague assertion that he has mental and physical problems. Such assertions fall far short of 

the Ninth Circuit’s requirements for entitlement to equitable tolling, especially in light of the fact that 

Petitioner must account for essentially twenty years of equitable tolling. His allegations do not show 

that, for that entire span of two decades, he was prevented from filing a federal habeas petition 

because of mental and physical disabilities. 

2. Ignorance of the Law

Petitioner indicates that he is ignorant of the law and did not realize he could challenge the 

sentence until he obtained the services of a jailhouse lawyer. Nevertheless, a petitioner’s claims of 

ignorance of the law, lack of education, or illiteracy are not grounds for equitable tolling. Raspberry 

v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); see, e.g., Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 

F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir.1986) (pro se prisoner's illiteracy and lack of knowledge of law unfortunate but 

insufficient to establish cause); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710 (5th Cir. 1999); Rose v. Dole, 945 

F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir.1991). Accordingly, Petitioner’s lack of knowledge of the law, a 

circumstance shared with virtually all inmates and potential petitions, is not an extraordinary

circumstance meriting equitable tolling.

3. Actual Innocence

Petitioner implies that he should be excepted from the effects of the one-year limitation period 

because he is actually innocent. In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931-32 (2013), the 

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United States Supreme Court held that “actual innocence” could be an exception to the one-year

limitation bar in the AEDPA:

We hold that actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may 

pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar, as it was in Schlup and House,

2

or, as in this 

case, expiration of the statute of limitations. We caution, however, that tenable actualinnocence gateway pleas are rare: “[A] petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement 

unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting 

reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S., 

at 329; see House, 547 U.S., at 538 (emphasizing that the Schlup standard is “demanding” and 

seldom met). And in making an assessment of the kind Schlup envisioned, “the timing of the 

[petition]” is a factor bearing on the “reliability of th[e] evidence” purporting to show actual 

innocence. Schlup, 513 U.S., at 332.

McQuiggin, at 1928. The Supreme Court went on to explain that an “[u]nexplained delay in 

presenting new evidence bears on the determination whether the petitioner has made the requisite 

showing, and, thus, “a court may consider how the timing of the submission and the likely credibility 

of [a petitioner’s] affiants bear on the probable reliability of evidence [of actual innocence].” Id. at 

1927, quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 332. See also Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 932-933 (9th Cir. 

2011)(en banc)(“a credible claim of actual innocence constitutes an equitable exception to AEDPA’s 

limitations period, and a petitioner who makes such a showing may pass through the Schlup gateway 

and have his otherwise time-barred claims heard on the merits.” ) The “Schlup gateway,” however, 

may only be employed when a petitioner “falls within the narrow class of cases...implicating a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314-315; McQuiggin, at 1928. However, 

“[t]o ensure that the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception would remain ‘rare’ and would only 

be applied in the ‘extraordinary case,’ while at the same time ensuring that the exception would extend 

relief to those who were truly deserving,” the Supreme Court explicitly limited the equitable exception 

to cases where a petitioner has made a showing of innocence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321. “The Supreme 

Court did not hold that a petitioner may invoke Schlup whenever he wants a trial do-over.” Lee, 653 

F.3d at 946 (Kozinski, J., concurring.)

The rule announced in McQuiggin is not a type of equitable tolling, which provides for an 

extension of the time statutorily prescribed, but an equitable exception to § 2244(d)(1). McQuiggin at 

 

2

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851 (1995); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 126 S.Ct. 2064 (2006). 

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1928. Moreover, the Court noted that actual innocence, if proven, merely allows a federal court to 

address the merits of a petitioner’s constitutional claims; the Court has yet to address whether “a 

freestanding claim of actual innocence” provides a separate basis for granting habeas relief. 

McQuiggin at 1928.

Petitioner has failed to meet Schlup’s exacting standard. Petitioner alleges, quite simply, that 

he did not intend to kill the victim. He does not deny killing the victim. (Doc. 1, p. 13). In short, 

Petitioner is asking that this Court blindly accept his version of events over the evidence presented at 

trial and considered by the jury, regarding his guilt or innocence. Petitioner’s meager allegation falls 

far short of Schlup’s requirements, and fails to even come close to a prima facie showing of actual 

innocence for purposes of avoiding the effects of the AEDPA’s one-year limitation period.

 ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to assign a 

United States District Judge to this case. 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be 

DISMISSED as untimely.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the 

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 21 

days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a 

copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 

and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within 10 days (plus three 

days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate 

Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). 

///

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///

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The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 19, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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