Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08192/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08192-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vincent Anchando
Respondent
Kurt Braatz
Respondent
Ramiro Bustamante
Petitioner
Michael Valenzuela
Respondent

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Respondents Vincent Anchando and Kurt Braatz also filed Answers to Petitioner’s

Petition. (Docs. ##21, 23.) In their Answers, both Respondents essentially contend that they

are not proper respondents. (Docs. ##21, 23.) Neither Petitioner nor Respondent asserts

otherwise.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ramiro Bustamante, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Michael Valenzuela, et al., 

Respondents.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 09-8192-PCT-ROS (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Ramiro Bustamante (“Petitioner”), who is confined in the Coconino County

Detention Facility, in Flagstaff, Arizona, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1303 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. #1.) On November 3,

2009, the Court granted Petitioner’s request for appointment of counsel, and appointed the

Federal Public Defender for the District of Arizona to represent Petitioner in this case. (Doc.

#7.) On December 3, 2009, Respondent Michael Valenzuela (“Respondent”) filed an

Answer to Petitioner’s Petition. (Doc. #24.)1

\\\

\\\

\\\

Case 3:09-cv-08192-ROS Document 40 Filed 02/04/10 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 2 -

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is an enrolled member of the Pascua Yaqui Tribe (the “Tribe”). (Doc. #1

at 1.) On March 18, 2009, Petitioner was arrested in connection with an incident at his

parents’ home, located on the Pascua Yaqui Indian Reservation. (Doc. #1 at 4.) Namely,

Petitioner’s mother caught Petitioner taking items from a camper in the backyard of his

parents’ residence and Petitioner refused to leave after being told to do so. (Doc. #1 at 4.)

Prior to this incident, a Pascua Yaqui Tribal Court had ordered Petitioner to stay away from

his parents’ home and Petitioner did not have permission to be there on March 18. (Doc. #1

at 4.)

The same day, the Tribe filed a four-count complaint against Petitioner in Tribal Court

for: (1) domestic violence, burglary by entering his parents’ property with the intent to

commit a crime; (2) domestic violence, theft, by taking items from the camper located in his

parents’ backyard and refusing to leave when told to do so; (3) domestic violence, criminal

trespass, by remaining at his parents’ home after being told to leave; and (4) disobedience

to a lawful court order by going to his parents’ house. (Doc. #1 at 4.) Petitioner was

arraigned the same day. (Doc. #1 at 5.) At his arraignment, Petitioner pled guilty to three

of the four counts, and the fourth count was set for trial. (Doc. #1 at 5.)

On March 30, 2009, a public defender entered an appearance on behalf of Petitioner

and sentencing was reset to April 22, 2009. (Doc. #1 at 5.) On April 22, 2009, Petitioner

was sentenced to nine months in jail on Count 1 to be served immediately; nine months in

jail on Count 2 to be served consecutive to the sentence for Count 1; and nine months in jail

on Count 4 to be served concurrently with the sentence for Count 1. (Doc. #1 at 6.) The

Tribal Court set Petitioner’s release date as September 18, 2010. (Doc. #1 at 6.) It dismissed

Count 3 with prejudice. (Doc. #1 at 6.)

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal on April 23, 2009, alleging as his sole claim for

relief a violation of 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) of the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”). (Doc. #1

at 3.) The Tribe allegedly failed to file a timely response. (Doc. #1 at 3.) On August 14,

Case 3:09-cv-08192-ROS Document 40 Filed 02/04/10 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 3 -

2009, Petitioner filed a motion for decision on the record and filed a second motion on

September 4, 2009. (Doc. #1 at 3.) On October 14, 2009, the Pascua Yaqui Court of

Appeals denied Petitioner’s appeal as “frivolous” because the claim for relief was foreclosed

by a prior decision of the court. (Doc. #1 at 3.) According to Petitioner, no other judicial

remedies remain available to him in Tribal Courts. (Doc. #1 at 4.)

Accordingly, on October 23, 2009, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1303 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. #1.) Petitioner

alleges one ground for relief. (Doc. #1 at 7.) He challenges his sentence as violating 25

U.S.C. § 1302(7), which prohibits any Indian tribe exercising the powers of self-government

from imposing punishment for a term of more than one year in connection with a single

criminal transaction. (Doc. #1 at 7.) Petitioner contends that his conviction involves a single

criminal transaction and that his sentence is therefore excessive. (Doc. #1 at 7.) He further

contends that had the Tribal Court sentenced him to a total of one year, his term of

incarceration would expire on March 18, 2010. (Doc. #1 at 7.) On December 3, 2009,

Respondent filed an Answer to Petitioner’s Petition (Doc. #24).

Additionally, on December 3, 2009, Respondent filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment, Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion, and Statement of Facts in Support

of Motion. (Docs. ##26, 27, 28.) On December 9, 2009, Petitioner, through counsel, filed

a Response and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Controverting Statement of Facts in

Support of Petitioner’s Response, and Statement of Facts in Support of Petitioner’s CrossMotion. (Docs. ##29, 30.) Thereafter, Respondent filed his Response to Cross-Motion,

Reply in Support of Motion, and Controverting Statement of Facts. (Docs. ##34, 35.) Then,

on December 30, 2009, Petitioner filed a Reply in Support of Cross-Motion. (Doc. #36.)

DISCUSSION

In their pleadings, the parties do not dispute the fact that the Tribal Court imposed an

18-month sentence in Petitioner’s case, or that the Pascua Yaqui Court of Appeals ruled on

the merits of the same claim on which Petitioner is seeking relief in this Court. Thus, the

Case 3:09-cv-08192-ROS Document 40 Filed 02/04/10 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

parties agree that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute, and that this case is

properly resolved on a motion for summary judgment. The legal issues before the Court are:

(1) whether Petitioner exhausted his remedies in the Tribal Courts before filing a federal

habeas petition, and (2) whether the sentence imposed against Petitioner in the Tribal Court

is lawful under 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7).

A. Exhaustion

With respect to the exhaustion issue, Petitioner states that the Tribe’s highest court has

already definitively ruled on his claim, labeling his appeal “frivolous” because the same issue

was decided in Pascua Yaqui Tribe v. Miranda, CA-08-015 (2009) (Pascua Yaqui Court of

Appeals). Thus, Petitioner alleges that to the extent a habeas petition in the Pascua Yaqui

Court of Appeals may be available to him, it would be an ineffective and meaningless

procedure since the pertinent decision-making body has already rejected Petitioner’s attempt

to seek relief on the same claim.

Respondent contends that Petitioner’s Petition should be denied because Petitioner

failed to exhaust his remedies in the Tribal Courts. Specifically, Respondent asserts that

Petitioner was required to seek a writ of habeas corpus before the Pascua Yaqui Court of

Appeals to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. In support of his assertion, Respondent argues

pursuant to the Pascua Yaqui Tribal Codes that the Pascua Yaqui Court of Appeals shall

consist of three judges, one of whom shall be the Chief Justice. Respondent also cites to the

Pascua Yaqui Rules of Appellate Procedure, which contemplate a decision by a “majority”

and allow for a Petitioner to request a writ of habeas corpus. Lastly, in furtherance of the

proposition that Petitioner’s resort to further remedies in the Tribal Courts would not be

futile, Respondent seeks to analogize the Tribe’s habeas corpus procedure to the Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s procedure for en banc review stating that matters appealed

to the Ninth Circuit for hearing en banc are not always resolved in the same way that they

were initially decided by the three-judge panel.

Although the parties do not cite a statutory exhaustion requirement in this context, the

Supreme Court has determined that exhaustion of tribal court remedies is important to the

Case 3:09-cv-08192-ROS Document 40 Filed 02/04/10 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

“federal policy of promoting tribal self-government ... .” Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480

U.S. 9, 16-17 (1987). Further, the Court has recognized that development of a full record in

a Tribal Court will promote the orderly administration of justice in the federal court. See

National Farmers Union Ins. Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985).

The federal court should therefore “stay[] its hand until after the Tribal Court has had a full

opportunity ... to rectify any errors it may have made.” Id. at 857. “At a minimum,

exhaustion of tribal remedies means that tribal appellate courts must have the opportunity to

review the determinations of the lower tribal courts.” Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 17.

Exhaustion of Tribal Court claims, however, is not an inflexible requirement. See

Selam v. Warm Springs Tribal Correctional Facility, 134 F.3d 948, 953 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing

United States ex rel. Cobell v. Cobell, 503 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974)). As the Cobell court

explained:

A balancing process is evident; that is weighing the need to preserve the

cultural identity of the tribe by strengthening the authority of the tribal courts,

against the need to immediately adjudicate alleged deprivations of individual

rights. Thus, this Court must determine whether exhaustion is appropriate in

the case at bar. 

Cobell, 503 F.3d at 793 (quoting O’Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140,

1146 (8th Cir. 1973)).

Applying these balancing principles here, the Court finds that Petitioner has satisfied

the exhaustion requirement. Petitioner presented his 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) claim to the Pascua

Yaqui Court of Appeals, the tribe’s highest court, and Chief Justice James C. Hopkins

rejected it as “frivolous” stating, “the appeal raises no question of law not already decided

by this Court in Pascua Yaqui Tribe v. Miranda, CA-08-015 (2009).” (Doc. #30, Exh. A.)

Since the Pascua Yaqui Court of Appeals has already rejected this claim more than once,

presenting it again as a writ of habeas corpus before the Pascua Yaqui Court of Appeals

would be an exercise in futility.

Respondent’s citations to the Pascua Yaqui Tribal Codes and the Pascua Yaqui Rules

of Appellate Procedure to support his argument are unpersuasive. First, the Court notes that

the provision of the Code to which Respondent refers simply specifies the total membership

Case 3:09-cv-08192-ROS Document 40 Filed 02/04/10 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

of the court – it says nothing about how many judges may exercise the power of the court in

particular cases. (Doc. #34 at 11) (citing 3 Pascua Yaqui Tribal Code § 1-2-30.) From the

Court’s review of the record, neither the Tribal Codes nor the Rules of Appellate Procedure

prohibits a single judge sitting on the Pascua Yaqui Court of Appeals from exercising the

power of the Court of Appeals in issuing precedential opinions.

Respondent also points to Rule 22(A) of the Pascua Yaqui Rules of Appellate

Procedure. Rule 22(A), however, merely specifies that the Pascua Yaqui Court of Appeals

shall dispose of matters by opinion when “a majority of the justices acting” determine that

enumerated factors are present. (Doc. #30, Exh. B at 11-12.) Because it is clear from the

record that an individual judge may exercise the power of the Pascua Yaqui Court of

Appeals, the phrase “majority of the justices acting” must be construed to cover situations

in which a single justice is acting. Further, Rule 25 of the Pascua Yaqui Rules of Appellate

Procedure relating to habeas corpus petitions cited by Respondent simply identifies the

procedures for filing such petitions – it does not mandate that a petitioner file a habeas

petition or does it specify that a panel reviewing such a petition is empowered to overturn the

Pascua Yaqui Court of Appeals’ precedential opinions. (Doc. #30, Exh. B at 13.)

Finally, Respondent seeks to analogize the Tribe’s habeas corpus procedure to the

Ninth Circuit’s procedure for en banc review. The power of the Ninth Circuit when sitting

en banc to overturn its prior panel decisions is specifically enumerated in the Federal Rules

of Appellate Procedure and the Ninth Circuit’s Rules. See FRAP 35; 9th Cir. R. 35-1, 35-2,

35-3. The Pascua Yaqui Rules of Appellate Procedure contain no procedure for en banc

review, and they do not specify that any three-judge panel is automatically deemed an “en

banc” panel – empowered to overturn the Pascua Yaqui Court of Appeals’ precedential

opinions issued by single judges. (Doc. #30, Exh. B.)

Moreover, as the court stated at Doc. #46 in Beatrice Miranda v. Tracy Nielsen, et al.,

No. CV-09-8065-PCT-PGR (ECV) when addressing the same issue, “even the strict

exhaustion requirements for habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 do not require a

petitioner to present on collateral review to a state court the same claims already raised on

Case 3:09-cv-08192-ROS Document 40 Filed 02/04/10 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

direct review. The court will not impose such a requirement here.” For these reasons, the

Court finds that Petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion requirement. The Court will,

therefore, consider the merits of Petitioner’s claim.

B. Merits

Petitioner, applying the reasoning set forth in Spears v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa

Indians, 363 F.Supp.2d 1176 (D. Minn. 2005), argues that the charges against him arose from

“a single criminal transaction” as they involved a common nucleus of operative fact and were

factually and legally intertwined. As such, Petitioner contends that his sentence violates the

sentencing limitation of 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) as it exceeds one year for acts arising out of a

single criminal transaction.

Respondent first claims that the term “any one offense” set forth in 25 U.S.C. §

1302(7) is unambiguous and clearly encompasses separate offenses arising out of the same

set of facts. Then, in citing Ramos v. Pyramid Tribal Court, 621 F.Supp. 967 (D. Nev. 1985),

Respondent asserts that Petitioner’s sentence was lawful since 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7)

authorizes up to one year in prison for each separate offense and does not contain a

prohibition on consecutive sentences for separate offenses.

Under the ICRA, “[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall ...

impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment greater than

imprisonment for a term of one year ... .” 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7). The interpretation of a

federal statute is a matter of federal law. See McInnes v. California, 943 F.2d 1088, 1094

(9th Cir. 1991).

The previously cited case in this District, Beatrice Miranda v. Tracy Nielsen, et al.,

No. CV-09-8065-PCT-PGR (ECV), has addressed the precise issue before the Court. The

foundation for the court’s ruling in Miranda was derived from its analysis of Spears v. Red

Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 363 F.Supp.2d 1176 (D. Minn. 2005) and Ramos v.

Pyramid Tribal Court, 621 F.Supp. 967 (D. Nev. 1985).

In Spears, the petitioner pled guilty to six criminal charges in Red Lake Tribal Court,

including negligent homicide; driving under the influence of alcohol; failing to take a blood,

Case 3:09-cv-08192-ROS Document 40 Filed 02/04/10 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 The petitioner was also charged with involuntary manslaughter in federal court,

where he pled guilty and received a 14-month sentence in prison. See id. at 1176-77.

- 8 -

breath or urine test; failing to stop at the scene of a traffic accident; and two minor

violations.2

 See id. at 1176-77. Each charge arose from an incident in which the petitioner

– driving while intoxicated – struck and killed a person lying on the road. See id. The tribal

court sentenced the petitioner to consecutive sentences on the four more serious violations

that totaled 30 months. See id. at 1177. After exhausting his tribal appeals, the petitioner

filed a habeas petition in federal court claiming that his sentence violated 25 U.S.C. §

1302(7) of the ICRA, which limits tribal court prison sentences to 12 months for conviction

of “any one offense.” Id.

The court first looked at the language of the statute and found that the phrase “any one

offense” is ambiguous. See id. at 1178. To demonstrate that similar language has given rise

to controversy and confusion in other contexts, the court examined Supreme Court cases

dealing with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments illustrating how “any one offense” could mean

either “any discrete violation of the Tribal Code” or “any prosecution arising from a single

criminal transaction or episode.” Id. at 1178-79. After determining that “any one offense”

is subject to more than one interpretation, the court examined congressional intent in an effort

to construe 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) in a manner that “effectuate[s] the underlying purposes of

the law.” Id. at 1179 (quoting United States v. McAllister, 225 F.3d 982, 986 (8th Cir.

2000)).

The court considered the ICRA history and its underlying purposes. See id. at 1179.

First, examining the history, the court explained that because many tribes were not prepared

to extend the full range of federal constitutional rights to their members, the ICRA affords

only a limited set of rights. See id. Among the rights not afforded under the ICRA is

publicly funded counsel for criminal defendants in tribal court. See id. Thus, the original

version of the ICRA in 1968 limited the maximum sentence in tribal court to six months,

Case 3:09-cv-08192-ROS Document 40 Filed 02/04/10 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

with no guarantee of an appointed lawyer. See id. A subsequent amendment in 1986

increased the maximum sentence to one year. See id.

In discussing the purpose of the ICRA, the court stated that in 1968 Congress knew

that under the Major Crimes Act, Indians facing prosecution for serious charges in federal

court received the full range of constitutional rights. See id. at 1180. As the court explained:

Taken together, the ICRA and the Major Crimes Act created a balanced and

logical regime: Indians accused of minor crimes faced minor penalties in tribal

court where some constitutional rights were withheld; Indians accused of

serious crimes faced serious penalties in federal court where all constitutional

rights were available.

Id. The court found, however, that this balance could be maintained only if “any one

offense” is interpreted to mean “a single criminal transaction.” Id. To do otherwise would

expose tribal court defendants to serious sentences without the guarantee of all their

constitutional rights. See id. For these reasons, the court determined “that Congress intended

to adopt the concept that separate crimes arising from a single criminal episode should

normally be treated as a single offense for sentencing purposes.” Id. at 1181. The court

therefore interpreted the phrase “any one offense” to mean “a single criminal transaction.”

Id.

The court then applied this analysis to determine if the petitioner’s violations were

part of “a single criminal transaction.” Id. The court determined that the petitioner’s charges

arose from a “common nucleus of operative fact surrounding his ill-fated drive on April, 1,

2000” and were therefore factually intertwined. Id. The court further found that the charges

were legally intertwined. Id. As a result, the court concluded that “the violations underlying

petitioner’s tribal court sentence are facets of a single criminal event.” Id. at 1182.

Accordingly, the court held that the 30-month sentence imposed by the tribal court exceeded

the maximum sentence permitted for “one offense.” Id. The court granted the habeas

petition and remanded the matter to the tribal court. See id.

In Ramos, the petitioner was convicted in the Pyramid Lake Tribal Court of several

violations arising from the same incident and sentenced to consecutive sentences that totaled

more than two years. See 621 F.Supp. at 968. The petitioner filed a habeas petition in

Case 3:09-cv-08192-ROS Document 40 Filed 02/04/10 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

federal court arguing, inter alia, that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment

in violation of the ICRA. See id. at 970. In deciding the cruel and unusual punishment

question, the court considered whether the sentence exceeded the one year maximum allowed

by 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7). See id. With limited analysis, the court determined that the tribal

court’s imposition of consecutive sentences did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

See id. The court indicated that it “could find no cases holding that the imposition of

consecutive sentences constitute[d] cruel and unusual punishment” and noted that “the

imposition of consecutive sentences for numerous offenses is a common and frequently

exercised power of judges.” Id. The court, however, did not analyze the question of whether

the petitioner’s several violations constituted “one offense” for sentencing purposes under

§ 1302(7).

Having analyzed both Spears and Ramos, the Miranda court found the reasoning of

the Spears case persuasive and, as such, adopted its holding. Specifically, the court stated:

In light of the history and purpose behind the passage of the ICRA in 1968, the

court is convinced that Congress did not intend to allow tribal courts to impose

multiple consecutive sentences for criminal violations arising from a single

transaction. To hold otherwise would expose a tribal court defendant to a

lengthy prison term without the protection of representation by counsel and

other critical constitutional rights. The circumstances surrounding the passage

of the ICRA clearly demonstrate that in return for alleviating the tribes of the

burden of extending every federal constitutional right to its members, Congress

intended to significantly limit the sentence that a tribal court can impose.

Therefore, like the Spears court, the court here finds that the phrase “any one

offense” in § 1302(7) of the ICRA means “a single criminal transaction.”

Beatrice Miranda v. Tracy Nielsen, et al., No. CV-09-8065-PCT-PGR (ECV), Doc. #46 at

7. This Court agrees, finding that “any one offense” necessarily means “a single criminal

transaction,” and furthermore finds, similar to the charges in Spears and Miranda thereafter,

that Petitioner’s actions in this case constitute a single criminal transaction. Specifically, all

of the charges against Petitioner arose from a single incident, in which he took some

household items from a camper in his mother’s backyard, then refused to leave when asked

to do so. All of the charges relating to this single incident involved a common nucleus of

operative fact and were factually and legally intertwined.

Case 3:09-cv-08192-ROS Document 40 Filed 02/04/10 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

Although Respondent argues that this Court’s adoption of the reasoning set forth in

Spears would lead to a “strange and untenable situation in which the phrase ‘one offense’

committed by an Indian is defined one way in federal courts ... and an entirely different way

on Tribal reservations throughout the country,” the Court is not persuaded as Respondent has

failed to substantiate that tribal courts on “reservations throughout the country” uniformly

agree with his interpretation of 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7). In any event, this Court is not required

to defer to a tribal court in resolving an issue of federal law.

Respondent also seeks support for his construction of § 1302(7) in United States v.

Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977), and United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2007).

The Court finds that these decisions have no relevance here. Antelope involved the issue of

whether the Major Crimes Act violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment “by

subjecting individuals to federal prosecution by virtue of their status as Indians.” Antelope,

430 U.S. at 642. Mitchell involved a number of statutory and constitutional challenges to a

conviction and death sentence imposed in a case brought under the Major Crimes Act. See

Mitchell, 502 F.3d at 946-97. Neither of these cases involved any issue regarding a statute’s

use of the term “one offense.”

Finally, in further support of his position, Respondent states that “[s]tatutes are to be

construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their

benefit.” The Court, however, finds that the “benefit” to Indians that Congress had in mind

when it enacted the ICRA was the protection of individual Indians against the infringement

of their civil rights by tribal governments. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302. As the Spears court

observed, it would hardly advance this “benefit” to allow Indians to be subjected to multiyear sentences imposed by courts in which they are not guaranteed the right to appointed

counsel. See Spears, 363 F.Supp.2d at 1180.

Case 3:09-cv-08192-ROS Document 40 Filed 02/04/10 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 This Report and Recommendation should not be construed to mean that a tribal

court is prohibited from imposing consecutive sentences that exceed a total of one year in

prison when a defendant is involved in more than one criminal transaction. 

- 12 -

Thus, by finding that Petitioner’s charges arose from “a single criminal transaction,”

the Court concludes that Petitioner’s sentence of 18 months exceeded the 12-month

maximum permitted by the ICRA.3

Accordingly, the Court will recommend that Petitioner’s Petition be granted and that

this matter be remanded to the Pascua Yaqui Tribal Court for re-sentencing.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Respondent’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. #26) be DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. #29) be GRANTED;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Motion to Expedite Ruling

on Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #31) be GRANTED;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1303 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. #1) be GRANTED;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that this matter be remanded to the Pascua

Yaqui Tribal Court for re-sentencing.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

Case 3:09-cv-08192-ROS Document 40 Filed 02/04/10 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72.

DATED this 3rd day of February, 2010.

Case 3:09-cv-08192-ROS Document 40 Filed 02/04/10 Page 13 of 13