Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-01054/USCOURTS-ca8-14-01054-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jermaine Lamon Roy
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-1054

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jermaine Lamon Roy

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

____________

 Submitted: December 12, 2014

 Filed: March 23, 2015

____________

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

BENTON, Circuit Judge. 

A jury convicted Jermaine Lamon Roy of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or

coercion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1). He appeals, arguing the district

court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s sexual history, and by not granting 1

The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, United States District Judge for the Eastern 1

District of Arkansas. 

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a new trial because the government failed to inform the defense that the victim had

given a false statement in an Arkansas murder case. Having jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms. 

After arresting two prostitutes, officers arrested the victim, also a prostitute. 

Officers noticed a bruise or small cut on her face, and other markings on her body. 

She identified Roy as her pimp and boyfriend. Roy had initially treated her well, but

eventually told her that if she loved him, she would go make money for him. Roy

began posting ads for the victim on Backpage.com. She was required to give Roy all

the money she made from prostitution. Roy hit her every other day, one time taking

her into the woods, beating her, and telling her she was going to die. According to

several witnesses, the victim received disability benefits as a result of a learning

disability and had difficulty reading, writing, and understanding complex concepts. 

During the cross-examination of the victim, Roy sought to introduce a

videotape of her performing oralsex on him until she wasinterrupted by a customer’s

phone call for directionsto her apartment. He claimed the video wasrelevant to show

that the victim was not forced into engaging in prostitution. The district court

allowed Roy to cross-examine the victim about the video, but ruled that showing it

was too prejudicial. Roy also sought to introduce testimony that the victim had

engaged in prostitution before theymet. He claimed thisshowed his mental state—he

did not need coercion, threats, force, or fraud to convince her to engage in

prostitution. The district court excluded evidence, on both timeliness and substantive

grounds, of the victim’s sexual activity before and after the time period in the

indictment. 

Before trial, the government provided Roy a Giglio disclosure about the

prosecution’s witnesses, including the victim’s criminal history. See generally Giglio

v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (requiring prosecutors to disclose

impeachment evidence about government witnesses). The government did not know

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that, years earlier, the victim made a statement to the police in an Arkansas murder

identifying a man namedBeasley asthe shooter. She later testified atBeasley’s bondreduction hearing that she did not see him shoot the victim, and had told the police

what her friend said to say. See Beasley v. State, 258 S.W.3d 728, 729 (Ark. 2007).

Roy moved for a new trial, claiming that the district court erred in excluding

the video as well as evidence of the victim’s sexual history—this time claiming the

evidence was relevant to show that Roy did not need to force her because she was

experienced and willing to engage in prostitution. He also asserted a Brady violation

for failure to disclose information about the victim’s false statement to police in

Beasley v. State. The district court denied the motion. Roy appeals. 

I.

“We review the evidentiary rulings of a district court only for abuses of

discretion, and will reverse only when an improper evidentiary ruling affects the

substantial rights of the defendant or when we believe that the error has had more

than a slight influence on the verdict.” United States v. Harris-Thompson, 751 F.3d

590, 600 (8th Cir. 2014), quoting United States v. Yarrington, 634 F.3d 440, 447 (8th

Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A.

The district court excluded the video under Federal Rule of Evidence 403,

which allows a court to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” The video shows the

victim performing oral sex on Roy until she is interrupted to talk with a customer on

the telephone. Roy claims that this shows the victim was the primary arranger and

was not forced to engage in prostitution. Although the district court prohibited Roy

from playing the video to the jury, it allowed him to cross examine the victim about

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its contents. This court gives “substantial deference to a trial court’s exclusion of

evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 so long as the trial court’s exercise of

discretion [does] not unfairly prevent a party from proving [its] case.” United States

v. Condon, 720 F.3d 748, 754-55 (8th Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) (internal

quotations omitted), quoting Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Beelman River

Terminals, Inc., 254 F.3d 706, 716 (8th Cir. 2001). The district court correctly

concluded, “All ofthe relevant evidence that could have been shown by the videotape

wasshown through Smith’s testimony.” The district court did not abuse its discretion

by determining the explicit video was substantially more prejudicial than probative. 

B.

Evidence is not admissible to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual

behavior or to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition. Fed. R. Evid. 412(a). There

are three exceptions to this rule in criminal cases: 

(A) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior, if

offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the source

of semen, injury, or other physical evidence;

(B) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior with

respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct, if offered by the

defendant to prove consent or if offered by the prosecutor; and

(C) evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s

constitutional rights.

Id. 412(b)(1). A party wishing to introduce evidence under an exception must

specifically describe the evidence and why it is offered. Id. 412(c)(1)(A). A motion

must be filed at least 14 days before trial, unless the court sets a different time. Id.

412(c)(1)(B). The limitations of Rule 412 “serve[] an important interest—the

prevention of ‘potential embarrassment or harassment of alleged victims of sexual

abuse.’” United States v. Elbert, 561 F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 2009), quoting United

States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 558 (8th Cir. 2005).

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Roy claims that excluding evidence that the victim was a prostitute before

meeting him violates his Fifth Amendment due process right to present relevant

evidence. He relies on Elbert, which held that a history of prostitution was irrelevant

to determine whether there was force, fraud, or coercion where the victims were

minors and the crime had no element of force. Elbert, 561 F.3d at 777. Roy argues

that, by implication, it is relevant where force, fraud, or coercion is an element. 

However, Roy’s interpretation of Elbert is incorrect. Roy was charged under 18

U.S.C. § 1591:

(a)Whoever knowingly—

(1) . . . recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, or

maintains by any means a person . . . 

. . . .

knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats

of force, fraud, coercion . . ., or any combination of such means will be

used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act . . . shall be

punished as provided in subsection (b). 

At issue here is not recruiting an individual to engage in commercial sex for the first

time, but doing an act with the use of force, threats, fraud, or coercion to cause the

victim to engage in commercial sex. The victim’s participation in prostitution either

before or after the time period in the indictment has no relevance to whether Roy beat

her, threatened her, and took the money she made from prostitution in order to cause

her to engage in commercial sex. See United States v. Cephus, 684 F.3d 703, 708

(7th Cir. 2012) (“They wanted to suggest that having already been a prostitute she

would not have been deceived by Cephus and therefore her testimony that she was

coerced into working for him . . . should be disbelieved. But the testimony sought to

be elicited by the cross-examination would have been irrelevant. Even if no promises

were made to [the victim], this would not be evidence thatshe consented to be beaten

and to receive no share of the fees paid by the johns she serviced. And even if she

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knew going in, from her prior experience, that Cephus probably would beat her, it

was still a crime for him to do so. . . . [T]he fact that she’d been a prostitute before

does not suggest that he didn’t beat and threaten her . . . .”); United States v.

Valenzuela, 495 Fed. Appx. 817, 819-20 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“Appellants

cannot show the relevance of questions about prior prostitution to either Appellants’

knowledge of the use of force, fraud, or coercion, or the victims’ consent to work in

prostitution.”).

Roy argues that exclusion of the victim’s sexual history also violated his Sixth

Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to present a complete

defense. He says jurors “might reasonably doubt just how truthful her testimony was

if they were given evidence that she had been engaged in prostitution,” and that the

evidence could also demonstrate a reason for pleasing the government. First, “our

court has declared, ‘unchastity of a victim has no relevance whatsoever to [the

victim’s] credibility as a witness.’” Elbert, 561 F.3d at 777 (alteration in original),

quoting United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 271-72 n.3 (8th Cir. 1978). Second,

the district court excluded the evidence, but stated, “If there is some basis for

believing that she actually has a motive to testify against Mr. Roy based on the

possibility that she might be prosecuted and might get credit against any potential

sentence . . ., then that could come in without identifying what the crimes are.” 

Finally, evidence of past prostitution has little impeachment value because it does not

contradict her testimony about Roy. “If evidence has only minimal probative value

and would have a highly prejudicial effect, a court can exclude the evidence without

infringing upon the Confrontation Clause or other constitutional rights of a

defendant.” Elbert, 561 F.3d at 777. The district court did not abuse its discretion

in excluding the evidence.

Alternatively, as the district court ruled, Roy did not file notice of his intent to

present evidence of the victim’s sexual history at least 14 days before trial asrequired

by Rule 412(c)(1)(B). This “failure to comply with the time limits would be

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sufficient grounds to uphold the district court’s decision.” United States v. Eagle,

137 F.3d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 1998).

II.

Roy maintainsthat the prosecution improperly withheld information about the

victim’s lie to law enforcement discussed in the Beasley case, 258 S.W.3d at 729. See

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). “To establish a Brady violation, a

defendant must show that the government suppressed evidence that was favorable to

the defendant and material either to guilt or to punishment.” United States v.

Heppner, 519 F.3d 744, 750 (8th Cir. 2008). “The evidence is material only if there

is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473

U.S. 667, 682 (1985). 

There was no Brady violation here. “The government does not suppress

evidence in violation of Brady by failing to disclose evidence to which the defendant

had accessthrough other channels.” United States v. Santisteban, 501 F.3d 873, 877

(8th Cir. 2007) (alteration omitted), quoting United States v. Zuazo, 243 F.3d 428,

431 (8th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). See United States v.

Ladoucer, 573 F.3d 628, 636 (8th Cir. 2009) (“We conclude that the Government’s

failure to produce the transcript of Hartline’s state court testimony did not violate

Brady because the transcript was as available to Ladoucer as it was to the

Government.”). The information here was a matter of public record, in a published

opinion of the Supreme Court of Arkansas. Further, the government was unaware of

the victim’s false statement to state police. United States v. Kern, 12 F.3d 122, 126

(8th Cir. 1993) (holding that knowledge of state official is not imputed to federal

prosecutor). Roy has “not shown that the government possessed the . . . information

about [the victim] or was even aware of it prior to or during trial.” Heppner, 519

F.3d at 750. 

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* * * * * * *

The judgment is affirmed. 

______________________________

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