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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Michael A. Whren
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 13, 1995 Decided May 12, 1995

No. 94-3012

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

MICHAEL A. WHREN,

APPELLANT

and consolidated case No. 94-3017

-

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

93-cr00274

93-cr00274-02

Lisa D. Burget, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant MichaelA. Whren.

With her on the briefs was A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

G. Allen Dale argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant James L. Brown.

Margaret M. Lawton, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on

the brief were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, John R. Fisher, Frederick W. Yette and

Thomas C. Black, Assistant United States Attorneys.

Before BUCKLEY, WILLIAMS, and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE,Circuit Judge: Appellants Michael Whren and James Lester Brown challenge their

convictions for federal drug offenses, asserting, among other things, that the District Court erred in

denying their motionsto suppress physical evidence. Appellants contend that police officers obtained

evidence as a result of an illegal search and seizure in violation of appellants' Fourth Amendment

rights. Appellants also challenge their convictions and sentences for possession with intent to

distribute cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1988), arguing that section 841 is a lesser-included

offense of theirseparate convictionsfor possession with intent to distribute cocaine base within 1000

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feet of a school under 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) (1988). While we reject appellants' Fourth Amendment

challenges and otherwise affirm appellants' convictions, we remand for resentencing pursuant to the

parties' agreement that section 841 is a lesser-included offense of a section 860(a) offense.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 8, 1993, a federal grand jury returned a four-count indictment against appellants

Michael Whren and James Lester Brown, charging appellants with (1) possession with intent to

distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, or crack, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and

841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (Count One); (2) possession with intent to distribute cocaine base within 1000 feet

of a school in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) (Count Two); (3) possession of a controlled substance

(marijuana) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (Count Three); and (4) possession of a controlled

substance (phencyclidine ("PCP")) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (Count Four). Following a

pre-trial suppression hearing to consider appellants' claim that evidence was seized as a result of a

police stop and seizurewhichviolated appellants'FourthAmendment rights, the District Court denied

appellants' motions to suppress physical evidence. After a subsequent jury trial, the jury found

appellants guilty on all four counts.

A. The Suppression Hearing

The District Court heard extensive evidence in considering appellants' Fourth Amendment

claim. The government presented as witnesses the arresting officers, who testified about the events

surrounding appellants' arrest. On the evening of June 10, 1993, District of Columbia police officers

Efrain Soto,Jr., Homer Littlejohn and severalother plainclothes vice officers were patrolling for drug

activity in the area of Minnesota Avenue and Ely Place, in Southeast Washington, in two unmarked

cars. Officers Soto and Littlejohn were in a car driven by another officer, Investigator Tony Howard.

Soto testified that as the officers turned left off of 37th Place onto Ely Place heading north,

he noticed a dark colored Nissan Pathfinder with temporary tags at the stop sign on 37th Place. Soto

observed the driver, later identified as Brown, looking down into the lap of the passenger, Whren.

Soto testified that at least one car was stopped behind the Pathfinder. As the officers proceeded

slowly onto 37th Place, Soto continued to watch the Pathfinder, which Soto testified remained

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stopped at the intersection for more than twenty seconds obstructing traffic behind it. Investigator

Howard had already begun to make a U-turn to tailthe Pathfinder when Soto instructed himto follow

it. As the officers turned to tail the vehicle, appellants turned west onto Ely Place without signalling

and, as Soto testified, "sped off quickly." Soto further testified that the Pathfinder proceeded at an

"unreasonable speed."

The officersfollowed the Pathfinder onto Ely Place, until it stopped at the intersection of Ely

Place and Minnesota Avenue, surrounded by several cars in front of it, two behind it, and several to

itsright. The officers pulled into the eastbound lane of traffic parallel to the Pathfinder on the driver's

side. Officer Soto then immediately exited his vehicle and approached the driver's side of the

Pathfinder, identifying himself as a police officer. Officer Littlejohn followed a few steps behind and

to the right of Soto.

After noticing that appellants could not pull over because of parked cars to their right, Soto

told appellant Brown to put the Pathfinder in park. As he was speaking, Soto noticed that appellant

Whren was holding a large clear plastic bag of what the officer suspected to be cocaine base in each

hand. Soto yelled "C.S.A." to notify the other officers that he had observed a Controlled Substances

Act violation. He testified that, as he reached for the driver's side door, he heard Whren yell "pull off,

pull off," and observed Whren pull the cover off of a power window control panel in the passenger

door and put one of the large bagsinto the hidden compartment therein. Soto opened the door, dove

across Brown and grabbed the other bag from Whren's left hand. Officer Littlejohn pinned Brown

to the back of the driver's seat so that he could not move.

Multiple officersthen placed appellants under arrest and searched the Pathfinder at the scene.

The officersrecovered two tinfoils containing marijuana laced with PCP, a bag of chunkywhite rocks

and a large white rock of crack cocaine from the hidden compartment on the passenger side door,

numerous unused ziplock bags, a portable phone and personal papers.

Defense attorneys pressed the arresting officers on their reasons for making the stop. Soto

stated that the driver of the vehicle was "not paying full time and attention to his driving." Soto

testified that he did not intend to issue a ticket to the driver for stopping too long at the stop sign, but

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he wished to stop the Pathfinder to inquire why it was obstructing traffic and why it sped off without

signalling in a school area. He testified that the decision to stop the Pathfinder was not based upon

the "racial profile" of the appellants, but rather on the actions of the driver. Officer Littlejohn's

testimony differed only slightly from Soto's with respect to the hand from which Soto seized the

drugs, but otherwise confirmed Soto's account.

B. The District Court's Suppression Ruling

After hearing the evidence and appellants' argument that the traffic stop was pretextual and

thus violated the Fourth Amendment, the District Court denied appellants' motions to suppress the

physical evidence. Although the court noted some minor discrepancies between testimony by

Littlejohn and Soto, it noted that

the one thing that was not controverted ... is the facts surrounding the stop. There

may be different ways in which one can interpret it but, truly, the facts of the stop

were not controverted. There was nothing to really demonstrate that the actions of

the officers were contrary to a normal traffic stop. It may not be what some of us

believe should be done, or when it should be done, or how it should be done, but the

facts stand uncontroverted, and the court is going to accept the testimony of Officer

Soto.

The court thus concluded that "the government has demonstrated throughthe evidence presented that

the police conduct was appropriate and, therefore, there is no basis to suppress the evidence."

C. The Convictions and the Appeal

Following the court's pre-trial suppression ruling, trial proceeded, and appellants were

convicted on all four counts. On January 26, 1994, appellant Whren was sentenced to 168 months

incarceration and five yearssupervised release on count one, 168 monthsincarceration and ten years

supervised release on count two, one year imprisonment and one year supervised release on each of

counts three and four. All terms were to be served concurrently. Whren was also assessed a fine of

$8,800 on each count, all fines to be concurrent with count two, and a special assessment of $150.

On February 9, 1994, appellant Brown was sentenced to 168 months incarceration and ten years

supervised release on count one, 168 monthsincarceration and five yearssupervised release on count

two, one year imprisonment and one year supervised release on each of counts three and four, all

terms to be served concurrently, and a $150 special assessment.

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Whren and Brown appeal their convictions and sentences, raising several challenges.

Although we have accorded each alleged error full consideration, we believe several do not merit

separate discussion. For those challenges to appellants' convictions not discussed specifically herein,

we reject appellants' arguments. We thus turn our attention to the two arguments we believe merit

separate discussion: (1) that the District Court erred in denying their motions for suppression of

physical evidence under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) that count one of appellants' indictment is

a lesser-included offense of count two.

II. DISCUSSION

Appellants contend that the District Court erred in denying their motionsto suppress physical

evidence seized as a result of the traffic stop on June 10, 1993. They argue that the police officers

used the alleged traffic violations as a pretext for what in actuality was a search for drugs without

probable cause; thus, the search was objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Although appellants recognize that this circuit has faced similar circumstances in United States v.

Mitchell, 951 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1976 (1992), they contend that

Mitchell did not adopt a standard with sufficientspecificityto govern this case. Appellants assert that

Mitchell merely requires a court to "look to objective circumstances ... rather than an officer's state

of mind," in determining the legitimacy of police conduct. Mitchell, 951 F.2d at 1295. Here, they

contend that the objective circumstances did not justify the stop.

Appellants argue that this court should borrow from the law of other circuits in determining

whether "objective circumstances" warrant a search. While several circuits hold that an alleged

pretextualstop is valid as long as an officer legally "could have" stopped the car in question because

of a suspected traffic violation, see, e.g., United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 782-84 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 115 S. Ct. 207 (1994); United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 1993), cert.

denied, 114 S. Ct. 1374 (1994), appellants urge the court to adopt the test laid out by the Tenth and

Eleventh Circuits, which have held that a stop is valid only if "under the same circumstances a

reasonable officer would have made the stop in the absence of the invalid purpose." United States

v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added); see United States v. Guzman, 864

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F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988). Appellants contend that the "would have" test is superior to the

"could have" test because the latter fails to place any reasonable limitations on discretionary police

conduct, thus "cut[ting] at the heart of the Fourth Amendment." Brief of Appellant Whren at 22.

Finally, appellants assert that the District Court erred in convicting them for violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841 as well as 21 U.S.C. § 860(a), because the former is a lesser-included offense of the

latter.

A. The Traffic Stop and Search.

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the people to

be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,

shall not be violated...." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Amendment imposes "a standard of

"reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government officials." Delaware v. Prouse, 440

U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979). Because an ordinary traffic stop constitutes a limited seizure within the

meaning of the Fourth Amendment, Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653, such action must be justified by

probable cause or, at least, reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct, based upon specific and

articulable facts. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). In the context of automobile stops and

searches, a court "must look to objective circumstances in determining the legitimacy of police

conduct under the Fourth Amendment." Mitchell, 951 F.2d at 1295.

In claiming that this court should adopt the "would have" test for determining whether

objective circumstances exist to warrant an automobile stop and subsequent search, appellants argue

that pretextualstops are objectively unreasonable because, under the same circumstances, an officer

without ulterior purposes would not have stopped the offenders. However, "[e]ven if we agreed that

the stop was a mere pretext for a search, that does not mean that a violation of the Fourth

Amendment has occurred." Mitchell, 951 F.2d at 1295.

Mitchell providesstrikinglysimilarfactsto this case. In Mitchell, aD.C. police officer, Stone,

observed the two defendants, Mitchell and Zollicoffer, drive at a "high rate ofspeed," stop suddenly,

and turn sharply without signalling. Id. at 1293. Stone gave chase and pulled their car over after

brief pursuit. When Stone went to the window of the car, he had not yet decided whether to issue

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a citation. As he returned to his car to run a check on the driver, an assisting officer noticed

Zollicoffer leaning forward in the passenger seat with his hands inside his coat, as if holding a

weapon. The officer ordered the defendants out of the car, searched them, and found weapons on

each. Id. at 1293-94. Mitchell and Zollicoffer moved to suppress tangible evidence recovered during

the stop, but the trial court denied their motions to suppress. Id. at 1294.

Against appellants' arguments that the stop was an unlawful pretext to search, this court

affirmed. Id. at 1299. We reasoned that "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not bar the police from

stopping and questioning motorists when they witness or suspect a violation of traffic laws, even if

the offense is a minor one." Id. at 1295. Officer Stone had observed two of the violations observed

by Officer Soto in this case: speeding and turning without a signal. Id. Like Officer Soto, Officer

Stone had not yet decided whether to issue a citation, but we held that hisindecision "does not vitiate

the justification for the initialstop." Id. In applying the "objective circumstances" test, we noted that

"[e]ven a relatively minor offense that would not of itself lead to an arrest can provide a basis for a

stop for questioning and inspection ofthe driver's permit and registration." Id. (quoting United States

v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). Presented with the fact that the officer had

observed the traffic violations, the court concluded that "objective circumstances clearly justified

stopping the car." Id.

In holding that a traffic stop isreasonable aslong asthe officer has observed traffic violations

by the defendant, Mitchell implicitly adopts the standard embraced by the majority of courts which

have considered the "pretext" issue. That is, regardless of whether a police officer subjectively

believesthat the occupants of an automobile may be engaging in some other illegal behavior, a traffic

stop is permissible as long as a reasonable officer in the same circumstances could have stopped the

car for the suspected traffic violation. See United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d at 784 ("[W]here the

arresting officer had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred or was occurring in

the officer's presence, and was authorized by state or municipal law to effect a custodial arrest for the

particular offense, the resulting arrest will not violate the fourth amendment."); United States v.

Hassan El, 5 F.3d at 730 ("[W]hen an officer observes a traffic offense or other unlawful conduct,

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he or she is justified in stopping the vehicle under the Fourth Amendment."); United States v.

Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 392 (6th Cir. 1993) (in banc) ("[T]raffic stops based on probable cause, even

if other motivations existed, are not illegal."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 97 (1994).

We thus reject appellants' suggestion that we adopt the more open-ended "would have"

standard of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits. See United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 709 (11th Cir.

1986); see also United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517 (10th Cir. 1988). The objective "could

have" standard provides a more principled method of determining reasonableness for two primary

reasons. First, it eliminates the necessity for the court's inquiring into an officer's subjective state of

mind, in keeping with the Supreme Court's admonitionsthat FourthAmendment inquiries depend "on

an objective assessment of the officers' actionsin light ofthe facts and circumstances confronting him

at the time ... and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was

taken." Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985). At the same time, in response to

appellants' legitimate concerns regarding police conduct, the "could have" test provides a principled

limitation on abuse of power. Officers cannot make a traffic stop unless they have probable cause

to believe a traffic violation has occurred or a reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct based upon

articulable factsrequirements which restrain police behavior. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.

at 661.

Applied to the facts of this case, the objective test adopted in Mitchell suggests that Officers

Soto and Littlejohn had sufficient grounds to stop appellants. The District Court credited the

testimony of Soto, who observed three traffic violations when appellant failed to give "full time and

attention" to his driving, see Title 18 D.C.M.R. Vehicle and Traffic Regulations § 2213.4, turned

withoutsignalling,see id. at § 2204.3, and drove away at an unreasonable speed. That factual finding

is not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551, 1553 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (district

court's findings of fact reviewed for clear error). Having seen those violations, Soto had the

articulable and specific facts necessary to establish probable cause to stop appellants. See Mitchell,

951 F.2d at 1295; Hassan El, 5 F.3d at 729-30; Scopo, 19 F.3d at 781. Our inquiry goes no further.

We wish to make one point clear in applying the Mitchellstandard. The Mitchell test ensures

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that the validity of the traffic stop "is not subject to the vagaries of police departments' policies and

procedures." Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 392. That is, whether a stop can be made depends on whether the

officers had an objective legal basis for it, not on whether the police department assigned the officer

in question the duty of making the stop. See Hassan El, 5 F.3d at 730 (rejecting defendant's

argument that stop was unreasonable because particular arresting officers were plainclothes officers

assigned to narcotics duty, not traffic duty). In this instance, it is of no moment that Soto and

Littlejohn were vice officers patrolling for drug violations rather than traffic police. When they

observed a traffic violation, they, as officers of the law, were constitutionally justified in stopping

appellants.

Accordingly, we reject appellants' Fourth Amendment arguments. Because appellants

challenge only the stop and not the subsequent search of the Pathfinder, we need inquire no further.

We conclude that the District Court properly denied appellants' motions to suppress.

B. The Lesser-Included Offense.

Appellants contend that their convictions for violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which

proscribes possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, including cocaine base, should

be vacated because that section describes a lesser-included offense of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a), which

proscribes possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance within one thousand feet of a

school. Appellants rely on United States v. Williams, 782 F. Supp. 7, 8-9 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'd

without opinion, 6 F.3d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1993), in which the District Court concluded that section 841

offenses were, in fact, lesser included offenses of section 860(a) offenses. The government agrees

with appellants' argument. Consequently, pursuant to the agreement of the parties, we will remand

to the District Court for entry of an amended judgment and resentencing on Counts One and Two.

III. CONCLUSION

United States v. Mitchell dictates that police conduct in this case was reasonable. When a

police officer observes a traffic violation, his subsequent stop of the vehicle is reasonable because it

is supported by probable cause. We thus reject appellants' Fourth Amendment arguments, as well

as all claims not discussed specifically herein. We remand, however, for entry of an amendment

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judgment and resentencing only with respect to Part II.B. above.

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