Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02095/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02095-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Loffland Brothers Company
Appellee
Charles E. Pinner
Appellee
David Ray Smith
Appellant

Document Text:

~lniko :§taks Qfourt of t-PPl'als 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

C404 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER, COLORADO 80294 

ROBERT L. HOECKER January 10, 1990 

CLERK 

TO: 

RE: 

ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

No. 87-2095; Smith v. Pinner 

Opinion filed on December 12, 1989 by Judges Baldock, 

Brorby and Ebel. 

Attached is a corrected page 2 to be substituted 

for page 2 in the opinion sent to you on December 12, 1989. 

The footnote has been corrected to read ~l~Y 31, 1988. 

Very truly yours, 

TELEPHONE. 

( 303 l 844·3157 

(FTS) 564·31!57 

rRDBilRT \· ~Ko, Clerk 

\ tlJilL{I\ V ~tPF :kmh 

att9-chment 

By 

P a trick Fisher 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 87-2095 Document: 010110195615 Date Filed: 01/10/1990 Page: 1 
No. 87-2095; Smith v. Pinner 

Per curiam opinion filed on 12/12/89 by Judges Baldo·ck, Brorby and 

Ebel. 

Plaintiff appeals from a district court order granting 

defendant Loffland Brothers Company's motion for summary judgment 

on the two claims asserted against it1 in this diversity tort 

action brought by plaintiff to recover damages for personal 

injuries suffered when a vehicle owned and allegedly operated by 

Charles Pinner, plaintiff's immediate supervisor at Loffland, was 

involved in an accident in Moffat County, Colorado. The district 

court dismissed plaintiff's negligent entrustment claim by finding 

that Loffland had not exercised any control over Pinner's 

voluntary use of his own vehicle, and rejected plaintiff's 

vicarious liability claim by finding Pinner was not acting within 

the scope of his employment with Loffland at the time of the 

accident. Only the latter determination has been challenged, and 

therefore presented for our review, on this appeal. See generally 

Bledsoe v. Garcia, 742 F.2d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir. 1984)(issue not 

argued iri appellate brief deemed waived). 

The essentially undisputed facts reveal that the accident in 

question occurred while plaintiff and Pinner were driving together 

from a Loffland drill site in Teton County, Wyoming, toward their 

separate homes in Palisade, Colorado. Pursuant to a ''Driller's 

Travel R~imbursement Agreement" with Loffland; Pinner, a driller, 

1 By 6rder issued May 31, 1988, the parties were directed to 

submit briefs on the question whether this appeal was premature 

under 28 u.s.c. § 1291 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) because 

additional claims were pending against another defendant when 

plaintiff filed the notice of appeal. As a final disposition of 

all remaining claims has since been effected, we recognize our 

jurisdiction over the appeal. See FSLIC v. Huff, 851 F.2d 316 

(10th Cir. 1988); Lewis v. B.'f-:-Goodrich Co., 850 F.2d 641 (10th 

Cir. 1988). 

2 

Appellate Case: 87-2095 Document: 010110195615 Date Filed: 01/10/1990 Page: 2 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DAVID RAY SMITH, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

F 1 LED 

Uoittd Stare~ Cnurr of Appeais 

tf enr~1 Circui~ 

DEC 12 1989 

ROBERT L. 1-IOEr~KE,.. ·-·- ~ ,1"\. 

Clerk 

v. 

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No. 87-2095 

CHARLES E. PINNER; WALTER I. MELOTT, 

Defendants, 

LOFFLAND BROTHERS COMPANY, 

a Texas corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 86-A-1410) 

Susan Smith Fisher (John L. Breit and Patricia A. Pritchard on the 

brief) of Breit, Best, Richman & Bosch, P.C., Denver, Colorado, 

for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Michael T. McConnell (David B. Higgins on the brief) of Long & 

Jaudon, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before BALDOCK, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Appellate Case: 87-2095 Document: 010110195615 Date Filed: 01/10/1990 Page: 3 
Plaintiff appeals from a district court order granting 

defendant Loffland Brothers Company's motion for summary judgment 

on the two claims asserted against it1 in this diversity tort 

action brought by plaintiff to recover damages for personal 

injuries suffered when a vehicle owned and allegedly operated by 

Charles Pinner, plaintiff's immediate supervisor at Loffland, was 

involved in an accident in Moffat County, Colorado. The district 

court dismissed plaintiff's negligent entrustment claim by finding 

that Loffland had not exercised any control over Pinner's 

voluntary use of his own vehicle, and rejected plaintiff's 

vicarious liability claim by finding Pinner was not acting within 

the scope of his employment with Loffland at the time of the 

accident. Only the latter determination has been challenged, and 

therefore presented for our review, on this appeal. See generally 

Bledsoe v. Garcia, 742 F.2d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir. 1984)(issue not 

argued in appellate brief deemed waived). 

The essentially undisputed facts reveal that the accident in 

question occurred while plaintiff and Pinner were driving together 

from a Loffland drill site in Teton County, Wyoming, toward their 

separate homes in Palisade, Colorado. Pursuant to a "Driller's 

Travel Reimbursement Agreement" with Loffland, Pinner, a driller, 

1 By order issued April 31, 1988, the parties were directed to 

submit briefs on the question whether this appeal was premature 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) because 

additional claims were pending against another defendant when 

plaintiff filed the notice of appeal. As a final disposition of 

all remaining claims has since been effected, we recognize our 

jurisdiction over the appeal. See FSLIC v. Huff, 851 F.2d 316 

(10th Cir. 1988); Lewis v. B.~Goodrich Co., 850 F.2d 641 (10th 

Cir. 1988). 

2 

Appellate Case: 87-2095 Document: 010110195615 Date Filed: 01/10/1990 Page: 4 
( was compensated for a portion (27¢ per mile, up to 500 miles) of 

his weekly travel expense between home and site, while such 

transportation for plaintiff, a roughneck on Pinner's crew, was in 

no way compensated or otherwise provided for by Loffland. 

However, the agreement did expressly "permit," though not require, 

Pinner to transport subordinate crew members, who were not allowed 

to remain on the rig site during the seven-day break that 

alternated with their work week, in conjunction with his own 

reimbursed travel to and from the site. 

As the two men proceeded toward home, they made at least 

three stops to purchase beer and liquor, with which they became 

increasingly intoxicated. Neither Pinner nor plaintiff can 

remember the events immediately surrounding the accident resulting 

in plaintiff's injuries, but the investigating officer determined 

that Pinner was driving the vehicle, and doing well in excess of 

the speed limit, when it failed to negotiate a curve on Moffat 

County Road 10 and rolled over. Following an ultimately 

unsuccessful attempt to obtain workmen's compensation benefits, 

see Loffland Brothers Co. v. Industrial Commission, 714 P.2d 509 

(Colo. App. 1985), cert. denied, February 10, 1986, plaintiff 

filed this suit for recovery in tort. 

Colorado follows the general rule that "an employee traveling 

from his place at work to his home or other personal destination, 

after completing his day's work, cannot ordinarily be regarded as 

acting within the scope of his employment so as to charge the 

employer for the employee's negligence in the operation of the 

latter's own car." Beeson v. Kelran Constructors, Inc., 608 P.2d 

3 

Appellate Case: 87-2095 Document: 010110195615 Date Filed: 01/10/1990 Page: 5 
( 369, 371 (Colo. App. 1979), cert. denied, March 24, 1980, quoting 

Balise v. Underwood, 428 P.2d 573, 577 (1967); see also Varsity 

Contractors and Home Ins. Co. v. Baca, 709 P.2d 55, 56 (Colo. App. 

1985)(same principle followed in workmen's compensation context). 

Colorado courts have also recognized, however, that 11 the rule has 

many exceptions. 11 Beeson, 608 P.2d at 371; see also Varsity 

Contractors, 709 P.2d at 56. 

In a long line of workmen's compensation cases, Colorado has 

developed the following pertinent exception to the broad rule 

cited above: 11Where the employer agrees to provide its employee 

with the means of transportation or to pay the employee's cost of 

commuting to and from work, the scope of employment inferentially 

enlarges to include the employee's transportation. 11 Industrial 

Comm 1 n v. Lavach, 439 P.2d 359, 361 (Colo. 1968); see also Martin 

K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 377 P.2d 745, 747 (Colo. 

1963); Comstock v. Bivens, 239 P. 869, 870-71 (Colo. 1925). While 

we can appreciate the district court's expressed reluctance to 

adopt scope-of-employment principles developed within the 

workmen's compensation context to resolve the nominally identical 

issue in the substantively quite different vicarious liability 

setting, cf. Finnerman v. McCormick, 499 F.2d 212, 214-15 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974)(standards for resolving 

question of 

tort contexts 

employer 

differ 

relationship in workmen's compensation and 

sufficiently to preclude application of 

collateral estoppel), the Colorado courts have indicated that the 

travel reimbursement exception recognized in the cases cited above 

is to be applied in the vicarious liability setting as well. See 

4 

Appellate Case: 87-2095 Document: 010110195615 Date Filed: 01/10/1990 Page: 6 
( Beeson, 608 P.2d at 371 (vicarious liability case citing Martin K. 

Eby for rule that payment of travel expense "may raise an 

inference that, while so traveling, the employee is within the 

scope of employment," though holding that employer's payment of 

"remote site" wage premium, not contingent upon or otherwise tied 

to travel, did not warrant inference). Consequently, we cannot 

join in the district court's categorical conclusion that 

"[Loffland's] reimbursing Pinner for a portion of his travel 

expenses, without more, cannot bring him within the scope of 

Loffland's employment in the context of a negligence 

action." District court memorandum opinion and order at 5. 2 

Notwithstanding this point of analytical disagreement, however, we 

concur in the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's vicarious 

liability claim for the reasons set forth below. 

Loffland agreed to compensate Pinner for transportation only 

up to 500 miles round-trip. Accordingly, Pinner would submit a 

2 In this regard, we also note our rejection of Loffland's 

contention that the Colorado Court of Appeals' decision in 

Loffland Brothers, 714 P.2d 509, deeming plaintiff outside the 

scope of his employment during the same accident and denying 

workmen's compensation benefits accordingly, somehow precludes 

plaintiff's assertion of the vicarious liability claim pursued 

herein. Actually, Loffland Brothers is irrelevant to the present 

application of the travel reimbursement rule followed in such 

cases as Beeson and Lavach, since the crucial fact of Loffland's 

provision of compensation for employee travel, which is of 

critical significance to Pinner's employment status in the case at 

bar, was not a consideration in determining plaintiff's employment 

status while enjoying an unreimbursed ride as a passenger in 

Pinner's vehicle. See Loffland Brothers, 714 P.2d at 510 

(plaintiff not within scope of employment where Loffland made no 

provision for his transportation to and from work site). The 

Loffland Brothers court, deciding only plaintiff's entitlement to 

workmen's compensation benefits, had no occasion to determine 

whether Pinner was acting within the scope of his employment at 

the time of the accident. 

5 

Appellate Case: 87-2095 Document: 010110195615 Date Filed: 01/10/1990 Page: 7 
voucher for a point of destination within a 250-mile radius of his 

work site. The present accident, however, occurred more than 250 

miles from the rig where plaintiff and Pinner were working and, 

thus, on an unreimbursed portion of Pinner's trip. Since there is 

nothing in the record to suggest that Loffland intended to allow 

Pinner to expand the range of compensated travel, and thereby the 

scope of his employment, beyond the 250-mile radius, the travel 

reimbursement exception cannot serve to exempt Pinner from the 

general rule that an employee merely commuting to or from work is 

not acting within the scope of his employment. 

Furthermore, even if Pinner had been within the range of 

reimbursed travel, a second consideration would preclude the 

imposition of vicarious liability against Loffland. In 1979, the 

Colorado legislature amended Colo. Revo Stat. § 8-41-104 to 

include the following provision: "' [E]mployment • shall not 

include participation in a ridesharing arrangement, as defined in 

section 10-4-707.5, C.R.S." This amendment effectively modifies 

the travel reimbursement rule by eliminating its potential 

application to the reimbursed employee who commutes to work in a 

car pool. 3 

3 The amendment plainly furthers the socially-desirable goal of 

commuter-ridesharing by encouraging employer facilitation and 

support of employee car-pooling arrangements through its assurance 

that employer liability exposure will not thereby increase. 

However, it must also be admitted that, as to that portion of the 

work force which is currently paid an allowance for daily travel, 

the amendment may actually provide a disincentive to the employee 

for ridesharing, because it serves to withdraw the protections of 

the workmen's compensation scheme from that class of commuters who 

might otherwise be covered. While we thus discern a weak 

crosscurrent in the policy evident behind the statute, we do not 

consider the limited tension identified here sufficiently 

(continued to next page) 

6 

Appellate Case: 87-2095 Document: 010110195615 Date Filed: 01/10/1990 Page: 8 
( In plaintiff's workmen's compensation case, the parties 

stipulated that plaintiff was ridesharing with Pinner at the time 

of the accident. See Loffland Brothers, 714 P.2d at 510. Indeed, 

this was one of the reasons cited by the court of appeals for 

denying benefits in that case. Id. Since both plaintiff and 

Loffland were also parties to that prior litigation, plaintiff 

cannot herein deny the existence of his ridesharing arrangement 

with Pinner. 4 See Otte v. Pierce, 142 P.2d 280, 282 · (Colo. 

1943)(recognizing principle that, as between common parties, a 

position taken in an earlier judicial proceeding estops a litigant 

from adopting an inconsistent position in a later proceeding). 

Accord Reno v. Beckett, 555 F.2d 757, 770 (10th Cir. 

1977)(recognizing same "judicial estoppel'' principle under Kansas 

(continued from next page) 

pronounced to require divergence from our reading of the plain 

meaning of the words employed by the legislature. See generally 

American Metal Climax, Inc. v. Butler's Claimant, 532 P.2d 951, 

952 (Colo. 1975)(where language is plain and free from ambiguity 

and no absurdity results from direct reading, statutory provision 

is not subject to further judicial construction); Blanchard v. 

Griswold, 214 P.2d 362, 365 (Colo 1949}(in construing a statute, 

ordinary import of language controls unless clear showing of 

contrary intent appears). 

4 We do not consider the initial administrative context of 

plaintiff's stipulation an impediment to invocation of this rule 

of judicial estoppel, since it is well-established in Colorado 

that the closely related principles of collateral estoppel and res 

judicata also apply to administrative decisions, so long as the 

tribunal in question possesses subject matter jurisdiction. See 

Umberfield v. School Dist. No. 11, 522 P.2d 730, 732 (Colo. 1974); 

Wilson v. Town of Avon, 749 P.2d 990, 993 (Colo. App. 1987); 

Robertson v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 675 F. Supp. 1280, 

1283 (D. Colo. 1987). Here, the Industrial Commission was clearly 

invested with "original jurisdiction to hear and decide all 

matters arising under [the Workmen's Compensation Act]" with 

respect to plaintiff's claim for benefits. Colo. Rev. Stat. 

§ 8-53-101. 

7 

Appellate Case: 87-2095 Document: 010110195615 Date Filed: 01/10/1990 Page: 9 
( 

\ 

law). Moreover, unlike the matter of travel reimbursement 

discussed supra at n.2, the characterization of plaintiff's status 

in this regard obviously applies with equal force to Pinner, his 

ridesharing partner. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiff's 

vicarious liability claim against Loffland is precluded by 

§ 8-41-104, pursuant to which Pinner could not have been acting 

within the scope of his employment with Loffland at the time of 

plaintiff's injury. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado is AFFIRMED. 

8 

Appellate Case: 87-2095 Document: 010110195615 Date Filed: 01/10/1990 Page: 10