Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-09579/USCOURTS-ca10-15-09579-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Zu-Chen Horng
Petitioner
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

ZU-CHEN HORNG, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

LORETTA E. LYNCH, United States 

Attorney General, 

 Respondent. 

No. 15-9579 

(Petition for Review) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, BACHARACH and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Zu-Chen Horng, a citizen of Taiwan, seeks review of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals’ order affirming the Immigration Judge’s order finding him ineligible for 

adjustment of status or a waiver of inadmissibility. We have jurisdiction under 

8 U.S.C. § 1252 and remand to the BIA for further proceedings. 

Horng was admitted to the United States in 1981 on a temporary tourist visa 

but stayed beyond the authorized period. He was convicted in Utah state court of 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

September 27, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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shoplifting in 1990, theft in 1992, battery in 1993, and felony possession of a 

controlled substance under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) in 1994. He was charged in 

2012 with being removable as an alien convicted of two crimes involving moral 

turpitude under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), based on his shoplifting and theft 

convictions, and he conceded removability. 

Horng then applied for adjustment of status to become a permanent resident 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). But his controlled-substance conviction rendered him 

potentially ineligible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), which states that an alien 

is inadmissible, and thus ineligible for adjustment under §1255(i), if he’s been 

convicted of a “controlled substance” offense, as that term is defined in 21 U.S.C. 

§ 802. Horng sought a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), which 

permits a waiver if the controlled-substance conviction was for “a single offense of 

simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana.” § 1182(h). But the record of 

Horng’s controlled-substance conviction doesn’t identify the controlled substance he 

was convicted of possessing. 

Courts generally employ a “categorical” approach to determine if a state 

controlled-substance conviction qualifies as an offense under § 802 for immigration 

purposes. See Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1987 (2015). Under that approach, 

we determine if the state controlled substance statute categorically fits § 802. See id. 

at 1990-91. The IJ determined, and the government concedes, that a violation of 

Utah § 58-37-8(2) is not categorically a controlled-substance offense under 

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§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) because Utah’s list of controlled substances includes 

substances not listed in § 802. 

Courts may use a “variant” of the categorical approach, called a “modified 

categorical approach,” if the statute of conviction is “divisible”; that is, if it “sets out 

one or more elements of the offense in the alternative.” Descamps v. United States, 

133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013). Under this approach, we may look to certain 

documents to determine which alternative formed the basis of the prior conviction. 

Id. But if a statute isn’t a categorical match, and it isn’t divisible, it can’t be used as 

the underlying predicate or disqualifying offense. Id. at 2285-86 (holding that an 

indivisible, overbroad statute can’t serve as the basis for a predicate offense). 

Utah § 58-37-8(2)(a)(1) makes it unlawful to “knowingly and intentionally . . . 

possess or use a controlled substance,” referencing a list of controlled substances 

written in the disjunctive in § 58-37-8(2)(b). Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (1994). 

The IJ determined that § 58-37-8(2) was divisible and thus applied the modified 

categorical approach, ultimately concluding from his review of the underlying 

documents that Horng failed to show his eligibility for adjustment of status or a 

waiver of inadmissibility. 

Horng appealed to the BIA, arguing the Utah statute was overbroad and 

indivisible. During the pendency of his BIA appeal, we decided United States v. 

Trent, 767 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir. 2014), holding that a statute is divisible if it sets out 

alternative ways of committing the crime, even if those means weren’t alternative 

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“elements in the traditional sense.” Id. at 1060-61. Based on Trent, the BIA agreed 

that § 58-37-8(2) was a divisible statute and affirmed. 

Horng seeks review, arguing § 58-37-8(2) is not a “divisible” statute because it 

criminalizes only the use of a controlled substance; he contends the identity of the 

controlled substance isn’t an element of the crime. And since it’s undisputed the 

Utah statute is overbroad—that is, it criminalizes possession of substances that aren’t 

controlled substances in § 802—Horng contends the Utah conviction can’t be used to 

determine he is ineligible for adjustment of status based on a controlled substance 

conviction. 

We generally lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of relief 

under § 1255(i) and § 1182(h), see § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), but here we have jurisdiction 

because Horng raises purely legal issues. See § 1252(a)(2)(D) (permitting court to 

review constitutional claims and questions of law). 

While Horng’s petition for review was pending in this court, the Supreme 

Court decided Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), overruling Trent and 

holding that the modified categorical approach can be used only when a statute lists 

alternative elements of the crime; with “elements” strictly defined as the “constituent 

parts of a crime’s legal definition” that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt or 

that a defendant must necessarily admit to plead guilty. Id. at 2248, 2253 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Mathis rejected Trent’s conclusion that a statute could be 

considered divisible if it lists alternative means of satisfying its elements, id. at 2248, 

2253, and made clear that the modified categorical approach can’t be used “as a 

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technique for discovering whether a defendant’s prior conviction, even though for a 

too-broad crime, rested on facts. . . that also could have satisfied the [relevant] 

elements” of the predicate or disqualifying offense, id. at 2254. 

The BIA’s determination that § 58-37-8(2) is divisible relied upon Trent’s 

now-overruled holding that a statute is divisible if it uses alternative statutory 

phrases. Neither the IJ nor the BIA determined whether Utah treats the identity of 

the specific controlled substance as an element of the § 58-37-8(2) crime that must be 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of Mathis, the BIA’s divisibility analysis 

is no longer valid. Accordingly, we vacate the BIA’s decision and remand this 

matter to the BIA for further consideration in light of Mathis.

1

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge 

 1

 Horng also argues in his petition for review that Descamps’ categorical 

analysis is a legal determination not subject to his burden of proving he is eligible for 

discretionary relief. On remand, resolution of whether § 58-37-8(2) is a divisible 

statute may obviate the need to address this burden-of-proof argument. 

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