Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-23-12736/USCOURTS-ca11-23-12736-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chronic Care Clinics
Appellee
D. Ray James Correctional Facility
Appellee
Ms. Green
Appellee
Jose Jimenez
Appellee
T. Johns
Appellee
Brian Maziar
Appellee
Mr. McCoy
Appellee
John Oliver
Appellee
Felipe Ignacio Rivadeneira
Appellant
The Geo Group, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12736

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

FELIPE IGNACIO RIVADENEIRA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

D. RAY JAMES CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, 

CHRONIC CARE CLINICS, 

Medical Facility, 

THE GEO GROUP, INC., 

A Florida Corporation, 

JOHN OLIVER, 

MR. T. JOHNS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees,

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12736

DR. RICK THOMAS, et al., 

Defendants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cv-00012-LGW-BWC

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, ABUDU, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Felipe Rivadeneira, a federal prisoner, appeals multiple 

orders dismissing and granting summary judgment on his pro se 

claims arising from his incarceration in a privately-owned prison. 

Rivadeneira’s complaint alleged several claims of negligence and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) and invoked 

both federal diversity jurisdiction and state law. The district court 

construed his state-law claims as brought pursuant to the Federal 

Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674. The 

district court then dismissed some of these claims and granted 

summary judgment in favor of the defendants on other claims 

primarily because the defendants, as independent contractors, 

were not subject to liability under the FTCA. 

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23-12736 Opinion of the Court 3

Rivadeneira did not object to the district court’s construing

his state law claims as FTCA claims. However, on appeal, 

Rivadeneira for the first time contends that the district court plainly 

erred in construing all of his state law claims as FTCA claims. For 

the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and 

remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Rivadeneira is a federal prisoner who, at the time of the 

underlying allegations, was incarcerated at D. Ray James 

Correctional Facility (“the prison”) in Folkston, Georgia. The GEO 

Group operated the prison pursuant to a contract with the federal 

government. The GEO Group also operated a program, called 

Chronic Care Clinics, in the prison. 

A. Rivadeneira’s Complaint—January 2021

On February 3, 2021, Rivadeneira filed a complaint alleging 

four causes of action: (1) negligence, (2) gross negligence, 

(3) professional negligence, and (4) IIED. In the jurisdiction section 

of his complaint, he stated that jurisdiction was “predicated on 28 

U.S.C. [§] 1332,” that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, 

and that complete diversity exists between the parties.1 His 

complaint did not reference the FTCA or allege that any defendant 

was a federal agency or employee. 

1 Section 1332 grants original jurisdiction to district courts in civil cases where 

the matter in controversy exceeds the sum value of $75,000 and is between 

citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-12736

Rivadeneira’s complaint named 10 defendants: (1) the 

prison; (2) the GEO Group; (3) Chronic Care Clinics; (4) two 

doctors who worked at the prison, Dr. Rick Thomas and Dr. Brian 

Maziarz; (5) John Oliver, the Director of Operations; (6) Tracy 

Johns, the Facility Administrator; (7) Jose Jimenez, the Health and 

Safety Administrator; (8) Ms. Green, the Assistant Facility 

Administrator; and (9) Mr. McCoy, a Case Manager.

As to Count 1 (Negligence), Rivadeneira alleged these facts. 

On July 11, 2018, Dr. Thomas at Chronic Care Clinics performed a 

diabetic foot screening and diagnosed Rivadeneira with tinea pedis, 

or athlete’s foot. Dr. Thomas imposed medical work restrictions, 

including no work duty, no prolonged standing, and no lifting over 

15 pounds. Despite those restrictions, “[s]ometime after July 11, 

2018,” defendant McCoy assigned Rivadeneira to work a laundry 

detail, causing “further injury” to him. Rivadeneira also alleged 

that on November 1, 2018, he was assigned to work as “Ice Orderly 

and Rotunda” and that McCoy laughed at him as he struggled to 

do that work. In 2019, McCoy instructed officers to search 

Rivadeneira’s property for any evidence he might have against 

prison staff. 

As to Count 2 (Gross Negligence), Rivadeneira alleged that 

on November 7, 2018, the prison assigned him to repetitively lift 

and carry a 50-pound ice chest despite his work restrictions, causing

him to slip and fall. He alleged that he sustained permanent injuries 

to his left shoulder, lower back, and right foot.

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As to Count 3 (Professional Negligence), Rivadeneira 

alleged that around November 27, 2018, Dr. Thomas failed to 

properly diagnose his lower back. Dr. Thomas advised him that 

x-rays showed minimal degenerative changes in his hips and 

minimal degenerative changes and calcaneal spurring in his right 

foot. An x-ray of his left shoulder, however, revealed a fracture 

that required surgery, so Dr. Thomas recommended a steroid 

injection for pain and a transfer to a facility where Rivadeneira 

could receive surgery. Dr. Thomas failed to identify a problem 

with Rivadeneira’s lower back though, resulting in Dr. Thomas’s 

decision to remove the medical work restrictions. Specifically, he 

alleged that in 2020, after he was transferred to another facility run 

by The GEO Group in Texas, an x-ray of his lower back showed 

degenerative disc disease at L4-L5 of his spine, which meant that 

the medical work restrictions should have remained in place.2 

2 Rivadeneira’s complaint further alleged that a report from the Texas facility 

stated that he “should have undergone surgery at the [D. Ray James facility].” 

But the report he cites only states in the “Subjective Data” section that the visit 

was a “Sick-call Referral” for “Pain in back & left shoulder. ‘I was supposed to 

get back surgery at previous prison.’” The report did not suggest that it was 

the doctor’s opinion that Rivadeneira should have received back surgery at the 

D. Ray James prison facility. 

Rivadeneira’s complaint also alleged that an x-ray at the Texas facility 

“identified a fracture to his lumbar discs” and cited another medical report. 

However, his cited medical report, regarding a “[f]ollow-up with x-ray” for 

“back pain,” states only “no change from previous exam—x-ray shows 

[degenerative disc disease at] L4-L5,” and mentioned no fracture. 

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6 Opinion of the Court 23-12736

Also as to Count 3, Rivadeneira alleged that Dr. Maziarz 

failed to administer properly the steroid injection in his left 

shoulder. When Dr. Maziarz inserted the needle, Rivadeneira 

allegedly experienced pain and could no longer lift his arm above 

shoulder level. 

As to Count 4 (IIED), Rivadeneira alleged that the prison

was responsible for its employees harassing him and searching his 

property without a reason. For example, in October 2019, prison 

staff transferred him to another unit in the middle of the night and 

made him walk through the pouring rain, only to move him back 

to his original unit two hours later. And in November 2019, 

defendant Johns told Rivadeneira that he was being transferred 

immediately to a medical facility for treatment. But a few days 

after Rivadeneira gave away his belongings in reliance on Johns’s 

statement, Johns laughed and admitted he had intentionally 

deceived Rivadeneira about the transfer. Lastly, around December 

2019, prison staff “ridiculed” Rivadeneira by placing him on suicide 

watch. He alleged he was thrown into a cold isolation room, his 

clothes were removed, he was tied into a straight jacket for eight 

days, and he was left unattended for six days. Prison staff told him 

that if he wanted to leave, he must sign papers releasing the prison, 

the staff, and owner The GEO Group from liability. 

Rivadeneira also included a statement of facts containing

allegations about the prison and staff, but these allegations were 

not connected to a cause of action. For example, Rivadeneira 

alleged that it was evident that defendant Oliver failed to 

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investigate properly or willfully chose to ignore the prison staff’s 

conduct after Rivadeneira filed an administrative grievance in 

August 2019. Another time, defendant Green summoned 

Rivadeneira to her office, where an officer was waiting with 

handcuffs, and she asked him to sign a statement releasing The 

GEO Group from liability for any wrongdoing, which he refused 

to do. And in November 2019, Rivadeneira filed an administrative 

grievance against defendant Jimenez “for manipulating his medical 

information” by omitting Rivadeneira’s work restrictions when 

Jimenez replied to Rivadeneira’s request for an informal resolution 

of complaints about Dr. Thomas. Rivadeneira attached copies of

several medical records, prison records, and grievance documents 

to his complaint. 

B. Magistrate Judge’s First R&R—November 2021

A series of four reports and recommendations (R&R)

followed. In the first R&R, the magistrate judge conducted a 

frivolity screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

magistrate judge stated that Rivadeneira’s complaint “assert[ed] 

claims under the [FTCA]” and thus recommended that the “FTCA 

claims for negligence against defendants Oliver, Green, and 

Jimenez” be dismissed because the allegations against them, 

appearing only in a Statement of Facts section, were vague and 

conclusory and would not support “an FTCA claim of negligence.” 

The magistrate judge directed service as to the “FTCA claims” 

against the remaining seven defendants. 

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-12736

Rivadeneira objected to the first R&R. He asserted that 

defendants Oliver, Green, and Jimenez were as responsible as the 

other defendants because (1) Oliver had been “denying” the 

lawsuit, (2) Green threatened to withhold relevant documents, and 

(3) Jimenez was aware of Rivadeneira’s health conditions but never 

helped him. 

After overruling Rivadeneira’s objections, the district court 

adopted the first R&R. The district court construed Rivadeneira’s

claims as “FTCA claims.” The district court ruled that, even 

combining the allegations in Rivadeneira’s complaint with the new 

allegations in his objections, he failed to state a plausible claim 

against defendants Oliver, Green, or Jimenez. 

C. Second R&R—August 2022

Dr. Thomas moved to dismiss Rivadeneira’s complaint on 

several grounds, including that the FTCA does not provide for 

private individual liability. The magistrate judge ordered 

Rivadeneira to respond to Dr. Thomas’s motion to dismiss and 

warned him that if he failed to do so “the Court will presume that 

[he] does not oppose the Motion and may dismiss individual claims 

or the entire action.” 

Dr. Maziarz then moved separately to dismiss Rivadeneira’s

complaint. Dr. Maziarz argued that Rivadeneira’s medical record 

regarding the steroid injection was signed by a nurse and 

physician’s assistant, establishing that Dr. Maziarz did not 

administer the injection. Dr. Maziarz further argued that as a 

federal contractor, he could not be sued under the FTCA. The 

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23-12736 Opinion of the Court 9

magistrate judge ordered Rivadeneira to respond to Dr. Maziarz’s 

motion too. 

Over a month later, having received no response from 

Rivadeneira to either Dr. Thomas’s or Dr. Maziarz’s motion to 

dismiss, the magistrate judge entered a second R&R

recommending that the unopposed motions be granted. The 

magistrate judge explained that the dismissals were warranted as a 

sanction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) or the district 

court’s inherent authority to manage its docket based on 

Rivadeneira’s failure to comply with court orders. 

After receiving the second R&R, Rivadeneira responded to 

Dr. Thomas’s, but not Dr. Maziarz’s, motion to dismiss. 

Rivadeneira explained that he was unable to respond earlier 

because his facility had been quarantined due to a COVID-19 

outbreak. He also argued that Dr. Thomas was responsible for all 

medical treatment at the prison and thus was responsible for the 

substandard healthcare he received there. 

Based on Rivadeneira’s late response to Dr. Thomas’s 

motion to dismiss, the magistrate judge vacated the portion of his 

second R&R concerning Dr. Thomas, leaving only the dismissal as 

to Dr. Maziarz intact. Rivadeneira filed no objections, and the 

district court adopted the revised second R&R, dismissing the 

claims against Dr. Maziarz. Dr. Thomas’s motion to dismiss 

remained pending. 

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10 Opinion of the Court 23-12736

D. Third R&R—February 2023

In a third R&R, the magistrate judge recommended granting 

Dr. Thomas’s motion to dismiss. The magistrate judge 

determined that Dr. Thomas was an employee of an independent 

contractor—a private correctional healthcare company that 

contracted with The GEO Group—and that contractors and their 

employees were excluded from FTCA liability. 

Rivadeneira filed no objections, and the district court 

adopted the third R&R, dismissing the claims against Dr. Thomas. 

E. Fourth R&R—June 2023

The prison, Chronic Care Clinics, The GEO Group, and 

Johns moved for summary judgment.3 These four defendants 

argued, in relevant part, that the prison and Chronic Care Clinics, 

as a privately-owned prison and a prison medical program, were 

not legal entities capable of being sued under Georgia law. They 

also argued that The GEO Group and Johns could not be sued 

under the FTCA because The GEO Group was an independent 

contractor and Johns was an employee of The GEO Group, both 

of which are excluded from liability under the FTCA. These four 

defendants also submitted various medical records and 

declarations. 

3 McCoy was the only defendant who did not respond to Rivadeneira’s 

complaint. The docket reveals that in July 2022, a Marshal personally served 

McCoy’s sister, who was a “person of suitable age and discretion then residing 

in defendant’s usual place of abode.” 

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23-12736 Opinion of the Court 11

In a fourth R&R, the magistrate judge recommended 

granting summary judgment because the prison and Chronic Care 

Clinics were not entities capable of being sued under Georgia law, 

and The GEO Group, as an independent contractor, and Johns and 

McCoy, as its employees, were explicitly excluded from FTCA 

coverage. The magistrate judge noted that it was “unclear if [] 

McCoy had been properly served” and explained that, in any event, 

it was unnecessary to address the remaining grounds. 

Rivadeneira objected to the fourth R&R and argued that 

granting summary judgment would violate his due process rights 

because he did not receive a copy of the four defendants’ joint 

summary judgment motion and thus could not respond to it. 

The district court adopted the fourth R&R and granted 

summary judgment in favor of the prison, Chronic Care Clinics, 

The GEO Group, and Johns. The district court overruled 

Rivadeneira’s objections as meritless because even assuming that 

he did not receive a copy of the joint summary judgment motion, 

he failed to address the substance of the fourth R&R, which fully 

explained the contents of the joint summary judgment motion, or 

move for additional time to respond. 

Rivadeneira timely appealed. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to 

state a claim under § 1915A de novo. Harden v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 1289, 

1292 (11th Cir. 2003). We review a dismissal for failure to comply 

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12 Opinion of the Court 23-12736

with a court order for abuse of discretion. Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. 

M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005). 

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Ireland v. 

Prummell, 53 F.4th 1274, 1286 (11th Cir. 2022). Summary judgment 

is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

When a party fails to object to a magistrate judge’s report, 

we review only for plain error and only if necessary in the interests 

of justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1. Under plain error review, we can 

correct an error only when (1) an error has occurred, (2) the error 

was plain, (3) the error affected substantial rights, and (4) the error 

seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings. Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 

1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 1999). 

III. DISCUSSION

Rivadeneira’s only argument on appeal is that the district 

court plainly erred by ignoring the jurisdictional statement in his 

complaint, which stated that he was bringing state-law claims 

under diversity jurisdiction, and by construing his various

negligence claims and IIED claims as FTCA claims. We consider 

this argument separately as to each group of defendants.

A. Defendants Oliver, Green, and Jimenez

To recap, the district court construed Rivadeneira’s

allegations against Oliver, Green, and Jimenez as “FTCA claims of 

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23-12736 Opinion of the Court 13

negligence” but determined that those allegations failed to state a 

claim because they were vague and conclusory. 

Rivadeneira does not challenge the district court’s finding 

that his allegations as to these three defendants fail to state a claim 

for negligence. Rivadeneira’s initial brief challenged only the 

district court’s construing his state-law negligence claims as FTCA 

claims of negligence as to Oliver, Green, and Jiminez—but not the 

ruling that his allegations were insufficient to state a claim for 

negligence at all.

Importantly, Georgia negligence law governs regardless of 

whether Rivadeneira brought a state-law claim of negligence or an 

FTCA claim of negligence, such that Rivadeneira’s failure to state 

a claim is unaffected by the district court construing the claim of 

negligence as being brought under the FTCA. See Shivers v. United 

States, 1 F.4th 924, 928 (11th Cir. 2021) (“The FTCA addresses 

violations of state law by federal employees, not federal 

constitutional claims” (emphasis added)); Zelaya v. United States, 

781 F.3d 1315, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015) (requiring an FTCA plaintiff to 

prove that “a private individual who had acted as did the federal 

employee, in like circumstances, would be liable for the particular 

tort under governing state law where the tort occurred” (emphasis 

added)).

Because Rivadeneira does not challenge the district court’s 

ruling that his allegations are too vague and conclusory to state a 

plausible claim of negligence, the dismissal as to Oliver, Green, and 

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14 Opinion of the Court 23-12736

Jimenez is due to be affirmed.4 See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 

860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (explaining that an appellant’s 

failure to raise an issue in the initial brief is treated as a forfeiture of 

that issue); Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 

(11th Cir. 2014) (holding that “when an appellant fails to challenge 

properly on appeal one of the grounds on which the district court 

based its judgment, he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge 

of that ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to be 

affirmed.”).

B. Defendant Dr. Maziarz

The district court dismissed Rivadeneira’s claim of 

professional negligence against Dr. Maziarz because Rivadeneira

failed to comply with the order to respond to Dr. Maziarz’s motion 

to dismiss. Rivadeneira never objected to the second R&R’s reason 

for dismissal, nor does he argue on appeal that the district court 

abused its discretion in dismissing the claim for failure to comply 

with a court order. Thus, the dismissal of his claim against 

Dr. Maziarz also is due to be affirmed. See Campbell, 26 F.4th at 873; 

Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680.

C. Defendant Dr. Thomas

Rivadeneira argues that the district court plainly erred by 

construing his state-law claims against Dr. Thomas as claims under 

4 We also note that Rivadeneira does not argue that the district court abused 

its discretion by not sua sponte allowing him an opportunity to amend his 

complaint. See Campbell, 26 F.4th at 873.

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the FTCA and then dismissing those claims on the sole basis that 

Dr. Thomas could not be subject to liability under the FTCA. We 

agree.

As an initial matter, Rivadeneira’s failure to object to his 

state-law claims being misconstrued as FTCA claims ordinarily 

would result in his having waived the right to raise that challenge 

on appeal. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (stating that we will only review a 

waived objection for plain error if necessary in the interests of 

justice). But this case reveals a rare instance of plain legal error. See 

Farley, 197 F.3d at 1329.

The district court plainly erred in construing Rivadeneira’s 

claims against Dr. Thomas as being brought only under the FTCA. 

The complaint makes clear that Rivadeneira intended to pursue his 

state-law negligence and IIED claims under diversity jurisdiction

(as opposed to federal question jurisdiction). He neither 

mentioned the FTCA, nor alleged that any of the defendants were 

federal employees or agencies. Instead, Rivadeneira’s complaint 

cited 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and explicitly invoked the district court’s

diversity jurisdiction over his negligence and IIED claims. In 

support of diversity jurisdiction, Rivadeneira alleged that the 

amount in controversy exceeded $75,000, cited Georgia law after 

listing his negligence and IIED claims, and alleged that the 

individual defendants were citizens of the United States.5 

5 Specifically, Rivadeneira alleged that at the time he filed his complaint he was 

incarcerated in Texas, that The GEO Group’s “headquarters” was in Florida, 

and that the remaining defendants were “citizens[]” of states other than Texas. 

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16 Opinion of the Court 23-12736

Rivadeneira also acknowledged that The GEO Group was a 

government contractor, not a federal agency. 

Rivadeneira’s complaint alleged that Dr. Thomas was an 

employee of the prison that was owned and operated by The GEO 

Group. Further, the defendants admit that they were independent 

contractors or employees of an independent contractor. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2671 (explicitly barring recovery under the FTCA from 

contractor-defendants); see also Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 

534 U.S. 61, 72-73 (2001) (discussing avenues to relief for federal 

prisoners housed in private prison facilities, including state tort law 

remedies). Here, the plain face of a pro se complaint was 

improperly construed to state only FTCA claims, something they 

are not.

Importantly, this erroneous construction of Rivadeneira’s 

state-law claim against Dr. Thomas reversibly affected the district 

court’s decision to grant Dr. Thomas’s motion to dismiss based 

solely on contractors and their employees, like Dr. Thomas, being 

“excluded from FTCA coverage.” Because the only ground for 

Although these diversity-of-citizenship allegations were insufficient because 

they did not specify the state in which each defendant is domiciled, “[d]efective 

allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon terms, in the trial or 

appellate courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1653. On remand, the district court can require 

Rivadeneira to set forth in which specific states he and the remaining 

defendants are domiciled before proceeding further on his state law claims. 

See id.; see also Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1314 

(11th Cir. 2002) (stating that for jurisdictional purposes, a prisoner’s domicile 

is his domicile before he was incarcerated).

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dismissing Rivadeneira’s claim against Dr. Thomas was the 

insufficient reach of the FTCA without any examination of his state 

law claims, we reverse the order granting Dr. Thomas’s motion to 

dismiss and remand for further consideration. 

D. Defendants Chronic Care Clinics and the Prison

The district court ruled that the defendant prison (owned 

and operated by The GEO Group) and Chronic Care Clinics (the 

defendant medical treatment program operated by The GEO 

Group) were not legal entities capable of being sued under Georgia 

law.6 Rivadeneira does not challenge the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment on this ground, and the erroneous FTCA 

construal does not impact this ruling. Thus, the judgment against 

the defendant prison itself and defendant Chronic Care Clinics is 

due to be affirmed. See Campbell, 26 F.4th at 873; Sapuppo, 739 F.3d 

at 680.

E. Defendants The GEO Group, Johns, and McCoy

Like Dr. Thomas, the district court granted summary 

judgment in favor of The GEO Group, Johns, and McCoy because 

they were independent contractors or employees of that 

independent contractor and therefore were explicitly excluded 

from liability under the FTCA. 

6 Georgia law provides for only three classes of legal entities capable of being 

sued: (1) a natural person, (2) a corporation, or (3) a quasi-artificial person. 

Cravey v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass’n, 105 S.E.2d 497, 500 (Ga. 1958). 

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For the reasons explained above, the district court plainly 

erred by construing these claims under an FTCA framework that 

would certainly defeat them. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 

F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (requiring liberal construction of 

pro se pleadings). 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM the dismissal of the 

claims against Oliver, Green, Jimenez, and Dr. Maziarz and the 

summary judgment in favor of the prison and Chronic Care 

Clinics. We REVERSE the dismissal of the claims against 

Dr. Thomas and the summary judgment in favor of The GEO 

Group, Johns, and McCoy and REMAND for proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

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