Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-19-05023/USCOURTS-caDC-19-05023-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Maurice McGinnis
Appellant
Sonny Perdue
Appellee
Timothy C. Pigford
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 16, 2019 Decided February 21, 2020

No. 19-5023

TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, ET AL.,

APPELLEE

v.

SONNY PERDUE, SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 

OF AGRICULTURE,

APPELLEE

MAURICE MCGINNIS, BY HIS CONSERVATOR DERRICK K.

JONES,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with 19-5027

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:97-cv-01978)

(No. 1:98-cv-01693)

John M. Shoreman argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant.

USCA Case #19-5023 Document #1829480 Filed: 02/21/2020 Page 1 of 12
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Casen B. Ross, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellee Sonny Perdue. With him on the 

brief were Jessie K. Liu, U.S. Attorney, and Charles W. 

Scarborough, Attorney. Jennifer L. Utrecht, Attorney, entered 

an appearance.

Before: WILKINS, Circuit Judge, and WILLIAMS and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: Maurice G. McGinnis 

brought this action to claim damages under the Consent Decree 

created in the 1999 settlement between the Department of 

Agriculture and a class of African American farmers. The 

arbitrator responsible for adjudicating claims under the 

Consent Decree denied McGinnis’s claim because he did not 

timely submit evidence of racial discrimination. McGinnis 

then petitioned the district court for “monitor review” of the 

arbitrator’s decision. The district court denied that petition and 

McGinnis’s two motions for reconsideration. Because we 

agree with the district court that such review would have been 

futile, we affirm the district court’s holding. We also affirm

the district court’s decision declining to modify the Consent 

Decree under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5).

I.

In 1997, three African American farmers, representing a 

putative class of 641 African American farmers, filed a class 

action lawsuit against the Department of Agriculture alleging 

racial discrimination in denying their applications for farm 

loans, credit and other benefit programs. Pigford v. Glickman, 

185 F.R.D. 82, 86, 89 (D.D.C. 1999). The parties settled in 

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1999 and agreed to a Consent Decree that would “ensure that 

in the future all class members in their dealings with the USDA 

will ‘receive full and fair treatment’ that is ‘the same as the 

treatment accorded to similarly situated white persons.’” Id. at 

95 (quoting J.A. 292). 

The Consent Decree established two tracks for class 

members to claim monetary damages: Track A and B. Id. On 

Track A, a class member must “demonstrate[] by substantial 

evidence that he was the victim of race discrimination.” J.A. 

303. The class member submits the required documentation 

and an adjudicator issues a decision. Id. at 303–06. If the 

adjudicator determines that the USDA discriminated against 

the class member, the adjudicator can “discharge all of the class 

member’s outstanding debt to USDA” that was affected by 

discrimination and grant the class member a cash payment of 

$50,000. Id. at 304. Track A “provides those class members 

with little or no documentary evidence with a virtually 

automatic cash payment of $50,000, and forgiveness of debt 

owed to the USDA.” Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 95. 

On Track B, class members have a higher evidentiary 

hurdle: they must demonstrate that they were discriminated 

against by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.; J.A. 308. 

Class members submit a “claim package” to an arbitrator who 

then schedules an evidentiary hearing. J.A. 306–07. The

hearing can include witnesses and exhibits to prove 

discrimination. Id. at 307. Following the hearing, the arbitrator 

issues a decision and can award actual damages and discharge 

outstanding debt affected by discrimination. Id. at 308. 

Because the arbitrator can award actual damages, class 

members who pursue claims on Track B can receive much 

more than the $50,000 available on Track A, but the 

evidentiary standard required to show discrimination is higher.

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The Consent Decree makes the adjudicator’s decisions on 

Track A and the arbitrator’s decisions on Track B “final.” Id.

at 306, 309. There is a narrow review provision that empowers

a “monitor” to direct the arbitrator or adjudicator “to reexamine 

a claim where the Monitor determines that a clear and manifest 

error has occurred . . . and has resulted or is likely to result in a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 311. “Generally, 

the Monitor’s review will be based only on the Petition for 

Monitor Review, any response thereto, the record that was 

before the Facilitator, Adjudicator or Arbitrator, and the 

decision that is the subject of the Petition for Monitor Review.” 

Id. at 285. For Track B claims, “the Monitor will not be 

permitted to consider additional materials on review or to 

supplement the record for review upon reexamination.” Id. at

286.

Maurice G. McGinnis is an African American farmer from 

Mississippi who sought but was denied farm credit from the 

Department of Agriculture. Pigford v. Vilsack, 777 F.3d 509, 

510 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In 1999, he initiated a claim under the 

Consent Decree. Id. at 512. In an earlier phase of this 

litigation, “the persons responsible under the Consent Decree 

for processing his claim ignored or misinterpreted his clearly 

expressed wishes” to proceed under Track B. Id. at 510. There

was extensive confusion between the claims facilitator, who 

processed class member claims, and McGinnis as to whether 

he was pursuing a claim under Track A or Track B. Id. at 512–

13. The facts and circumstances of that phase of the litigation 

are more fully explained in Pigford, 777 F.3d at 512–13. 

McGinnis was represented by his privately retained attorney 

John M. Shoreman during part of that litigation. Pigford v. 

Perdue, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2018). As relevant for 

this phase of the litigation, McGinnis was ultimately able to 

submit his claim under Track B, as he intended. Pigford, 777 

F.3d at 510, 518.

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On May 29, 2015, the arbitrator issued a formal hearing 

notice for McGinnis’s Track B claim. Pigford, 330 F. Supp. 

3d at 4. McGinnis was again represented by Shoreman. Id. 

Before the scheduled hearing, the parties jointly requested 

severalstays of the proceeding while they discussed settlement. 

Id. at 5. The settlement negotiations stalled because McGinnis 

did not give Shoreman permission to disclose the expert report 

supporting his claim of racial discrimination. Id. Several times 

during December 2015, the parties and the arbitrator discussed

McGinnis’s reticence to disclose the expert report and 

Shoreman’s efforts to convince his client to allow its release. 

Id. The arbitrator even offered to speak with McGinnis ex 

parte about releasing the report, and the government did not 

object, but it is not clear if that conversation ever took place. 

Id. Finally, on December 23, 2015, the arbitrator informed 

Shoreman and the government that he would give McGinnis 

until December 28, 2015, to release the report or he would 

restart the schedule for a Track B arbitration. Id. at 5–6. When 

the report was not released, the government proposed a 

schedule for the proceeding including deadlines for filing 

expert reports, direct testimony and legal memoranda, and for 

completing discovery and depositions. Id. at 6. The 

government also requested that, if McGinnis failed to meet the 

deadlines, “he would be ‘precluded from offering any expert 

report, testimony, or other expert evidence in this case.’” Id.

On January 21, 2016, the arbitrator issued a formal hearing 

notice adopting the schedule proposed by the government and 

set the hearing for July 20, 2016. Id. “The arbitrator’s formal 

revised hearing notice made clear: ‘Should [McGinnis] fail to 

provide an expert report [on or before February 11, 2016,] he 

shall be precluded from offering any expert report, testimony, 

or other expert evidence related to economic damages.’” Id.

(second alteration in original). McGinnis did not disclose his 

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expert’s report or submit direct testimony, and neither he nor 

his counsel sought to depose the government expert or take 

discovery on the government’s expert report. Id. On June 30, 

2016, Shoreman filed an “unsigned economic damages report,” 

“a package of miscellaneous documents that included a threepage letter from Mr. McGinnis himself,” and other documents 

with handwritten annotations. Id. at 7. On July 5, 2016, the 

arbitrator excluded the damages report because it was not 

timely. Id. He determined, based on the rest of the documents 

filed at the same time, he would not hold a hearing. Id. On 

December 13, 2016, the arbitrator released his decision 

denying McGinnis damages because he “introduced no 

evidence in support of his claim” of discrimination. J.A. 277–

78.

Approximately four months after the arbitrator’s decision, 

in a state court proceeding, Derrick K. Jones was appointed as 

conservator on behalf of McGinnis. J.A. 262 n.1; Pigford, 330 

F. Supp. 3d at 7. Jones is McGinnis’s “nephew and long-time 

personal attorney.” Pigford, 330 F. Supp. 3d at 14. Shortly 

after Jones was appointed, Shoreman filed a petition for 

monitor review of the arbitrator’s decision, “purportedly on 

behalf of Derrick K. Jones.” Id. at 7–8. The petition asserts 

that the arbitrator made a “clear and manifest error resulting in 

a fundamental miscarriage of justice” when it denied 

McGinnis’s claim. Id. Specifically, the petition asserts that

McGinnis’s failure to meet deadlines for the arbitration process 

was attributable to his mental health conditions, which the 

petition asserted from the record were obvious to the 

participants in the process. Id. at 7–9.

The district court dismissed the petition for monitor 

review. Id. at 14. It first explained that monitor review would 

be futile because the monitor can direct a reexamination of the 

decision only when there is a clear error based on the evidence 

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in the record before the arbitrator. Id. at 11–12. Crucially, the

new evidence introduced as part of McGinnis’s competency 

proceeding was not before the arbitrator and, therefore, could 

not be considered during a reexamination. Id. Next, sua 

sponte, the district court considered, but ultimately rejected,

modifying the Consent Decree under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b)(5). Id. at 12–14. In reaching that conclusion, 

the district court relied on Supreme Court precedent that a party 

is bound by the conduct of voluntarily chosen counsel. Id. at 

13 (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 

U.S. 380, 396–97 (1993); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 

626, 633–34 (1962)). The district court explained, “Because 

Mr. McGinnis has been represented by Mr. Shoreman in this 

matter since at least 2012, he is not entitled to a Rule 60(b)(5) 

modification for any failures or mistakes made by his retained 

counsel. Rather, he is bound by his agent’s acts and 

omissions.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

McGinnis filed a motion for reconsideration on June 28, 

2018, but the district court denied the motion without prejudice

on August 6, 2018, because Shoreman had not properly added 

Jones, the conservator, as a party to the case. J.A. 234. After 

the court granted Shoreman’s motion to substitute Jones as a 

party, Shoreman filed a renewed motion for reconsideration on 

October 31, 2018. Id. at 234–35. The motion did not assert 

that there had been an intervening change in the law; instead, 

“using language almost identical to that found in the original 

petition,” the petition argued that the court should reconsider 

its decision because it represented a “fundamental and manifest 

injustice.” Id. at 236–37. The district court denied the renewed 

motion for reconsideration on January 2, 2019, because the 

motion merely retread the grounds in the original petition for 

monitor review. Id. at 237–40. McGinnis filed a timely notice 

of appeal on February 8, 2019, for both the dismissal of the 

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petition for monitor review and the denial of the renewed 

motion for reconsideration. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

The district court’s decision to dismiss the petition for 

monitor review represents an assessment that McGinnis’s 

arguments failed to demonstrate a colorable claim that the 

arbitrator committed a clear and manifest error. See Pigford, 

330 F. Supp. 3d at 11–12. The district court undertakes a 

similar analysis in the context of a motion to dismiss pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state 

a claim: determining whether “[a] claim has facial 

plausibility.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). As 

the district court was considering whether McGinnis had a 

claim under the Consent Decree and not interpreting said

decree, we will review the district court’s dismissal of 

McGinnis’s petition for monitor review de novo, as we do for 

12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Capitol Servs. Mgmt., Inc. v. 

Vesta Corp., 933 F.3d 784, 788 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

Next, we turn to McGinnis’s Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 59(e) motion for renewed reconsideration. “A Rule 

59(e) motion is discretionary and need not be granted unless 

the district court finds that there is an intervening change of 

controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to 

correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Ciralsky v. 

CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2004). We therefore review 

denials of motions for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, 

id., unless, in considering the motion, the district court also 

reached the merits of a new argument or legal theory, Dyson v. 

District of Columbia, 710 F.3d 415, 420 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 

Because the district court did not address any new arguments, 

J.A 236–40, we review the district court’s denial of the 

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renewed motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, 

Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 671.

We also review the district court’s denial of relief under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) for abuse of 

discretion. Am. Council of the Blind v. Mnuchin, 878 F.3d 360, 

366 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

A.

We agree with the district court that monitor review would 

be futile because there was no evidence of McGinnis’s 

incompetency in the record before the arbitrator. The record 

contained evidence of McGinnis’s potential frustration and 

confusion with the process, including: McGinnis’s refusal to 

allow his attorney to release the expert report, Pigford, 330 F. 

Supp. 3d at 5; the arbitrator’s offer to speak to McGinnis to 

resolve his reluctance to release the report, id.; McGinnis’s 

May 10, 2016 letter submitted to the arbitrator lamenting his 

treatment during the proceeding, J.A. 265–66; McGinnis’s 

failure to comply with the deadlines established by the 

arbitrator, Pigford, 330 F. Supp. 3d at 6–7; and, finally, a 

reference in the arbitrator’s decision that “McGinnis seriously 

misunderstood the nature of what he was required to do in the 

Track B process,” J.A. 275. But, as the district court explained, 

these examples could indicate McGinnis’s frustration or 

confusion with the process but do not raise an inference of 

mental incompetence. Pigford, 330 F. Supp. 3d at 12.

There is also no evidence that Shoreman raised the issue 

of McGinnis’s potential incompetence before the arbitrator

either by alerting the arbitrator or by moving to stay the case 

pending conservatorship proceedings in state court. Nor does 

Shoreman’s briefing explain why he failed to take action to 

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protect his client’s interests if he believed that competency was 

an issue. 

The lack of evidence is crucial because the Consent Decree 

permits only a limited review. The monitor may instruct the 

arbitrator to reexamine the claim when there is a clear error in 

the record, but the evaluation of error is limited to what was in 

the record before the arbitrator. J.A. 285–86. These limitations 

mean that the monitor cannot consider the new evidence from 

medical evaluations of McGinnis and the competency 

proceeding. Instead, the monitor could rely only on the 

evidence of McGinnis’s conduct during the proceeding, like 

the instances cited above. We agree with the arbitrator and the 

district court that McGinnis’s actions could be interpreted as a 

product of irrationality or confusion or frustration but do not 

support an inference of incompetence. Thus, a monitor review 

would be futile.

B.

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it 

refused to modify the Consent Decree. See Pigford, 330 F. 

Supp. 3d at 12–14. As the district court explained, Rule 

60(b)(5) permits relief from a “final judgment, order, or 

proceeding” if “applying it prospectively is no longer 

equitable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). “Modification [of a 

consent decree] is also appropriate when a decree proves to be 

unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles.” Rufo v. Inmates 

of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992). One such 

unforeseen obstacle could be an attorney’s failure to meet 

deadlines. This court has recognized the vital importance of 

competent representation for eligible farmers seeking damages

pursuant to the Consent Decree. Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 

918, 925–27 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In fact, we modified the

deadlines in the Consent Decree when the class counsel failed 

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to meet them. Id. at 925–26. But, importantly, in that decision, 

the presumption that clients are bound by the mistakes of their 

“voluntarily chose[n]” attorney, Link, 370 U.S. at 633, was 

rebutted because the class counsel was appointed by the district 

court, Veneman, 292 F.3d at 926. Because McGinnis 

voluntarily chose his attorney, the presumption is not rebutted

on that ground. He is therefore bound by his attorney’s failure 

to submit documents and memoranda by the arbitrator-imposed 

deadlines. As a result, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion when it declined to modify the Consent Decree 

because Shoreman did not meet the arbitration deadlines.

McGinnis’s failure or inability to cooperate with his 

attorney may be another unforeseen obstacle. But the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in declining to modify the 

Consent Decree because McGinnis’s alleged incompetence 

made it impossible for him to cooperate with or supervise his 

attorney. The district court reasonably explained that 

modification was not warranted for two reasons. First,

Shoreman never raised the issue of competency in the record.

Pigford, 330 F. Supp. 3d at 13–14. Second, modifying the 

Consent Decree would lead to “a mini-trial on a matter 

ancillary to the merits of this case”—namely Shoreman’s 

“options for advancing [McGinnis’s] interests independent of 

[his] relative competence.” Id. at 14. The district court further 

noted that “any grievance Mr. McGinnis may have with his 

counsel would be more properly resolved in a separate 

malpractice action.” Id. In sum, the district court provided a 

reasoned and reasonable explanation for its decision not to 

modify the consent decree.

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III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

denial of the petition for monitor review and the denial of the 

motion for reconsideration.

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