Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04005/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04005-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Scott Barker
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

. FILED 

United States Co 

Tenth c~C:Uf: AppeaJs 

MAY , ... 1991 

.ROBERT L. HOECI(B 

Clerk R 

v. 

) 

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No. 90-4005 

(D. Utah) 

SCOTT BARKER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

(D.C. No. 88-NCR-62W) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Scott Barker appeals from his conviction on five counts of 

furnishing a false odometer statement in connection with the sale 

of five automobiles, in violation of 15 u.s.c. §§ 1988(b) and 

1990(c). He argues that a variance existed between the indictment, which alleged violations of both the statutes and certain 

sections of the Code of Federal Regulations, and some of the 

evidence offered at trial which, both parties agree, did not fully 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-4005 Document: 010110106490 Date Filed: 05/06/1991 Page: 1 
conform to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations. 

Barker concludes that since the government's case turned on 

documents that did not comply with the Code, the variance was 

fatal and we must reverse. He further argues that, absent the 

defective documents, the evidence was insufficient to support his 

conviction. We disagree and affirm. 

The linchpin of Barker's case is the concept of a variance in 

proof between the offense charged in the indictment and the proof 

offered at trial. Barker, however, fundamentally misconstrues 

this concept. A simple variance occurs when the evidence at trial 

establishes facts that are different from those charged in the 

indictment. Hunter v. New Mexico, 916 F.2d 595, 598 (10th Cir. 

1990); United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 670 (10th Cir. 

1989); United States v. Pinto, 838 F.2d 426, 433 (10th Cir. 1988). 

When a variance is alleged, our key inquiry focuses "not [on] 

whether there has been a variance in proof, but [on] whether there 

has been such a variance as to 'affect the substantial rights' of 

the accused." United States v. Morris, 623 F.2d 145, 149 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1065 (1980) (citations omitted). 

The relevant questions are whether Barker could have anticipated 

from the indictment what evidence would be presented against him 

at trial and whether a conviction based on the indictment would 

bar subsequent prosecution on the same matter. Id. If a variance 

exists but is harmless, we will affirm. See Hunter v. New Mexico, 

916 F.2d at 598. We will determine that a variance is fatal, thus 

requiring reversal, only if it rises to the level of a constructive amendment. In such a case, "[the] specific inquiry is 

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Appellate Case: 90-4005 Document: 010110106490 Date Filed: 05/06/1991 Page: 2 
whether the jury was permitted to convict the defendant upon a set 

of facts distinctly different from that set forth in the indictment." Id. at 599 (citations omitted). 

At the outset, we note that "[i]n interpreting an indictment, 

we are governed by practical rather than technical considerations." United States v. Phillips, 869 F.2d 1361, 1364 (10th Cir. 

1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1069 (1990). We read the indictment 

as a whole, construing it with common sense and in light of its 

basic purpose of informing the defendant of the pending charges. 

Id. (citations omitted). Additionally, where as here, Barker has 

objected to evidence for the first time on appeal, "the court, in 

order to preserve judicial efficiency, must construe any 

ambiguities in the indictment in favor of validity." United 

States v. Phillips, 869 F.2d at 1365 (citations omitted). Accord 

United States v. Freeman, 813 F.2d 303, 304 (10th Cir. 1987). 

Barker's failure to object to the documents at trial precludes us 

from reversing unless the admission of the evidence was plain 

error under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

Id. at 305. 

Barker contends that because the form of some of the evidence 

offered as proof at trial, odometer statements provided to him by 

the automobile auctions from which he procured the vehicles, did 

not fully comply with the requirements for odometer statements as 

specified by the sections of the Code of Federal Regulations cited 

in the indictment, a conviction based on these non-compliant 

documents cannot lie. 

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Appellate Case: 90-4005 Document: 010110106490 Date Filed: 05/06/1991 Page: 3 
/ 

., 

The indictment, though it does reference the Code of Federal 

Regulations, nowhere relies on its language or on the existence of 

a valid odometer statement within the meaning of the Code, for its 

basic allegation. Rather, the indictment explicitly spells out 

the nature of the offense with which Barker is charged, making 

clear that the crux of the matter is the false written statement 

of actual mileage on each vehicle, certified by Barker to his 

buyer. Plainly, the indictment put Barker on notice of the 

charges against him, regardless of whether the mileage statements 

provided by the auctions from which he purchased the vehicles 

complied with the odometer statement form specified by the Code of 

Federal Regulations. Equally clear is the fact that a conviction 

based on the indictment would preclude prosecution again on the 

same matter. We thus conclude that Barker was not prejudiced by 

any defect in form in the mileage statements he received at the 

time of purchase. Accordingly, we reject his argument for a fatal 

variance. 

Casting Barker's argument in another light, he also seems to 

be arguing that because the mileage statements offered as proof at 

trial did not conform to the mandates of the Code of Federal 

Regulations, they constituted unreliable evidence and, therefore, 

should never have been admitted. Without the documents, Barker 

would conclude, the evidence is insufficient to convict. We 

simply do not find persuasive Barker's contention that the 

documents provided to Barker by the auction were so deficient as 

to be inadmissible. 

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Appellate Case: 90-4005 Document: 010110106490 Date Filed: 05/06/1991 Page: 4 
✓ 

, 

"In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view 

the evidence -- both direct and circumstantial, together with all 

reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom -- in the light most 

favorable to the government." United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 

1526, 1529 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128 (1986) (citations omitted). Applying this standard, we agree with the 

district court that the documentary evidence in combination with 

the testimony of the Department of Motor Vehicles representative 

and of Barker himself provided sufficient evidence to support the 

government's case, and the conviction, beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The decision of the district court is, accordingly, AFFIRMED. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-4005 Document: 010110106490 Date Filed: 05/06/1991 Page: 5