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Parties Involved:
Anthony Lynn Averitte
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United State& Q,μrt ~ Appe& Tenth C1rcu1t 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT NOV 5 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

No. 91-2276 

v. (D.C. No. CR-90-545-01-JC) 

(D. New Mexico) 

ANTHONY LYNN AVERITTE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Submitted on the Briefs: 

Before SEYMOUR, LAY,**and MOORE, Circuit Judges. 

Anthony Lynn Averitte appeals his conviction on one count of 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 

U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) and 841(b) (1) (C). He advances three theories 

for reversal of his conviction: (a) the district court erred in 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

**Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Circuit Judge for 

States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 

designation. 

the United 

sitting by 

Appellate Case: 91-2276 Document: 010110145688 Date Filed: 11/05/1992 Page: 1 
denying his motion to suppress evidence allegedly seized in 

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; (b) the district court 

erred in refusing to allow him to present hearsay evidence; and 

(c) the evidence does not support a verdict of guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. We affirm. 

I. 

On December 11, 1990, at the Albuquerque train station, 

Police Detectives Erekson and Sheridan and DEA Agent Small were 

looking for drug couriers on the inbound Amtrak train from Los 

Angeles. Based on a tip from an Amtrak employee, Detectives 

Erekson and Sheridan approached defendant and his travel companion 

on the train platform, identified themselves as police officers, 

and asked to see their tickets. The agents discovered the tickets 

had been purchased with cash the day before travel. Defendant and 

his companion denied having identification. Detective Sheridan 

then informed the two men that Los Angeles was considered a 

"source city" for transportation of narcotics. The agents asked 

for and received consent to search their luggage but chose not to 

conduct a search at that time. 

After boarding the train and learning from a passenger that 

defendant had moved his bag, Agent Small asked defendant to "hang 

on a second" while he conferred with Detective Erekson. The 

agents then asked defendant if he had luggage elsewhere on the 

train. Defendant indicated he had a bag in the lounge car and 

gave the agents permission to search it. No narcotics were found, 

and the agents left the train. 

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' 

• The agents reboarded when they learned that a passenger who 

happened to be a private investigator found socks containing 

cocaine in the lounge car restroom. After using the restroom, the 

private investigator observed defendant carry his bag into the 

restroom, exit less than one minute later, leave his bag in the 

lounge car while he went upstairs, and then allow the agents to 

search the bag. Thinking defendant's behavior odd, the private 

investigator went into the restroom, looked in the trash bin, and 

saw a pair of socks lying on top of the paper towels he had 

discarded. He unrolled the socks, found what appeared to be 

cocaine, replaced the socks, and told the lounge car bartender to 

notify the agents. 

Agent Small recovered the socks and spoke with the lounge car 

bartender, who substantiated the private investigator's 

observations. Detective Erekson then talked to the private 

investigator and confirmed his willingness to testify at trial. 

About that time, defendant returned to the lounge car. Agent 

Small stood in the aisle engaging defendant in conversation, 

ostensibly blocking his view so he couldn't see Detective Erekson 

talking with the private investigator. 

Hoping to find socks matching those found in the restroom, 

Agent Small identified himself as a DEA agent and asked defendant 

if he would voluntarily consent to a second search of his bag. 

Defendant responded, "Sure, go ahead. I've got nothing to hide," 

and handed Agent Small the bag. Agent Small found socks "exactly 

matching" those taken from the trash bin, white with blue toes and 

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Appellate Case: 91-2276 Document: 010110145688 Date Filed: 11/05/1992 Page: 3 
heels. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, arrested, and 

removed from the train. 

After the train departed, Detective Erekson contacted Amtrak 

officials and requested train personnel thoroughly search the 

lounge car restroom. Three more pairs of socks containing cocaine 

were found. 

II. 

Defendant contends that the matching socks found in the 

second search of his bag should have been suppressed because he 

was unlawfully detained three times by the agents. First, he 

asserts Detectives Erekson and Sheridan had no constitutionally 

justifiable basis for initially questioning him on the train 

platform. Alternately, defendant argues that if the train 

platform encounter did not implicate the Fourth Amendment, Agent 

Small's instruction to "hang on" after learning defendant moved 

his bag amounted to an investigative detention. Moreover, 

defendant maintains he was illegally stopped a third time in the 

lounge car when Agent Small blocked the aisle while engaging him 

in conversation. Defendant claims his consent to search was 

tainted by these unlawful detentions and the fruit of the search, 

the matching socks, poisoned. 

It is well established that not all encounters between police 

and citizens involve seizures of persons. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 

1, 19 n.16 (1968). Indeed, "a seizure does not occur simply 

because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few 

questions." Florida v. Bostick, U.S. 111 S. Ct. 2382, 

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Appellate Case: 91-2276 Document: 010110145688 Date Filed: 11/05/1992 Page: 4 
2386 (1991). Thus, even when law enforcement officers have no 

basis for suspecting a particular individual of criminal activity, 

they may question the person, ask to see identification, and 

request consent to search luggage as long as they do not convey a 

message that compliance is required. Id. (citations omitted) .

1 

The inquiry is whether a show of authority is such that "a 

reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 

leave . " United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 

"Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of 

authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may 

we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." Ter:ry. 392 U.S. at 19 

n.16. A police-citizen encounter thus does not trigger Fourth 

Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature. 

Here, defendant does not suggest that the agents used 

physical force to compel his consent to search. Nor has defendant 

presented any evidence of coercion. The agents did not create a 

"threatening presence," display weapons, physically touch 

defendant, or use "language or tone of voice indicating that 

compliance ... might be compelled." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 

554. To the contrary, each encounter involved "voluntary 

cooperation" by defendant in response to "non-coercive 

questioning" by the agents. United States v. Morin, 949 F.2d 297, 

1

see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) ("[L]aw 

enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely 

approaching an individual on a street or in another public place, 

by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by 

putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by 

offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary 

answers to such questions.") . 

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Appellate Case: 91-2276 Document: 010110145688 Date Filed: 11/05/1992 Page: 5 
300 (10th Cir. 1991). Defendant readily responded to the agents' 

questions and gave unequivocal consent to search his bag. At no 

time did he hesitate or in any other way indicate that he was 

unwilling to talk with the agents or allow them to conduct a 

search. 

Defendant's contention that his consent nonetheless was 

invalid because he was not asked to consent in writing or informed 

of his right to refuse consent is unpersuasive. "Under the 

totality of the circumstances test, of course, this one factor by 

itself does not determine whether a seizure has occurred." United 

States v. Ward, 961 F.2d 1526, 1533 (10th Cir. 1992) (citation 

omitted). Indeed, an encounter "does not become a 'seizure' 

merely because the officer does not tell the person that he . 

may refuse to answer the questions and is free to leave." Id. 

(quoting United States v. Lloyd, 868 F.2d 447, 451 (D.C. Cir. 

1989)). 

The trial judge found each of defendant's encounters with the 

agents entirely consensual and his consent to search voluntary. 

Because those findings are not clearly erroneous and defendant has 

presented no evidence on appeal to support a determination of 

coercion or physical force, we conclude the trial judge properly 

denied the motion to suppress.

2 

2

our contrary holding in United States v. Ward, 961 F.2d 1526 

(1992), is distinguishable in two important respects. First, the 

search and seizure in Ward occurred in "the smallest private 

compartment on the train." Id. at 1530. Second, Ward's "slight 

physique and health problems" made him "more easily intimidated 

than some other persons." Id. at 1533. In contrast, here the 

encounters occurred in public places, and defendant does not claim 

his personal traits make him more susceptible to coercion than the 

average person. 

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• 

III. 

At trial, defendant attempted to shift the blame for cocaine 

possession to his travel companion by introducing hearsay 

statements which his companion allegedly made before the two men 

were approached by the agents. 3 The trial judge refused to admit 

the hearsay statements on the ground that they did not tend to 

subject defendant's companion to criminal liability. The judge 

did, however, permit defendant to present evidence about his 

companion's clothing, including expert testimony that such dress 

identified the man as a gang member. More importantly, the judge 

allowed defendant to testify that his companion was in all 

likelihood a gang member and former prison inmate, and that his 

companion's background enabled him to identify the plainclothes 

agents before their approach. Defendant also testified that he 

and his companion met for the first time at the boarding station 

in Los Angeles. 

On appeal, defendant argues his companion's hearsay 

statements should have been admitted under one of three hearsay 

exceptions: (a) Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) (3), as statements against 

penal or pecuniary interest; (b) Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) (4), as 

statements of personal or family history; or (c) Fed. R. Evid. 

3Defendant's companion allegedly said he had just been released 

from an Illinois prison, he was a member of the Crips gang in Los 

Angeles and a related gang in Chicago, he was going to Chicago to 

see his parole officer, and he was able to identify the undercover 

agents before their approach. The companion also allegedly told 

defendant his name was different from the name printed on his 

train ticket. 

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Appellate Case: 91-2276 Document: 010110145688 Date Filed: 11/05/1992 Page: 7 
804 (b) (5), as having "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 

trustworthiness." Defendant claims the trial court's refusal to 

admit this evidence served to deprive him of a fair trial because 

the statements supported his theory of defense that his companion 

was the likely drug courier. 

Defendant's evidentiary claims are without merit because the 

statements fail to satisfy the narrow definitional requirements of 

the Rule 804(b) hearsay exceptions. First, the statements are 

inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3), 4 because the 

connection between ex-felon or gang-member status and penal or 

pecuniary interests is tenuous at best. Similarly, the statements 

are not "declarations of pedigree 115 within the scope of Fed. R. 

Evid. 804 (b) (4) . 6 Finally, admitting the statements would not 

further "the general purposes" of the Federal Rules of Evidence 

and "the interests of justice" because defendant was allowed to 

introduce the contents of the statements at trial. Fed. R. Evid. 

804 (b) (5) (C). 7 

4Rule 804(b) (3) allows admission of "[a] statement which was at 

the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's 

pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the 

declarant to civil or criminal liability, ... that a reasonable 

person in the declarant's position would not have made the 

statement unless believing it to be true." 

5

see Fed. R. Evid. 804, Notes of Committee on the Judiciary. 

S. Rep. No. 93-1277. 

6Rule 804(b) (4) allows admission of "[a] statement concerning the 

declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, 

relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other 

similar fact of personal or family history .... " 

7Rule 804 (b) (5) allows admission of 

[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the 

(Continued to next page.) 

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Appellate Case: 91-2276 Document: 010110145688 Date Filed: 11/05/1992 Page: 8 
• 

• "Whether a statement is in fact against interest must be 

determined from the circumstances of each case." Fed. R. Evid. 

804 advisory committee's note. In reviewing a trial court's 

hearsay rulings, the need for deference "is particularly great 

because the determination of whether certain evidence is hearsay 

rests heavily upon the facts of a particular case." United 

States v. Rodriguez-Pando, 841 F.2d 1014, 1018 (10th Cir. 1988). 

The trial judge did not clearly abuse his discretion by refusing 

to admit the statements. 

IV. 

Defendant contends the evidence used to convict him was 

constitutionally insufficient to support his conviction beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Specifically, he claims the socks containing 

cocaine seized after his arrest were inadmissible for lack of 

(Continued from prior page.) 

foregoing exceptions but having equivalent 

circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the 

court determines that (A) the statement is offered as 

evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more 

probative on the point for which it is offered than any 

other evidence which the proponent can procure through 

reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of 

these rules and the interests of justice will best be 

served by admission of the statement into evidence 

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Appellate Case: 91-2276 Document: 010110145688 Date Filed: 11/05/1992 Page: 9 
foundation because of two gaps in the chain of custody. 8 First, 

defendant claims the government failed to present evidence about 

the bartender's possession of the socks, whomever else might have 

handled the socks, or whether the socks were tampered with before 

the train arrived in La Junta. More generally, defendant suggests 

the government offered no evidence about the custody of the socks 

from the time they were found until they were delivered to Agent 

Small in Albuquerque. 

This court has long recognized the broad discretion afforded 

trial court judges in ruling on the admissibility of evidence 

containing chain of custody deficiencies. A chain of custody 

"need not be perfect for the evidence to be admissible." United 

States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1531 (10th Cir.) (citations 

omitted), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 909 (1989). 

considering the nature of the article, the 

"If, upon 

circumstances 

surrounding its preservation and custody, and the likelihood of 

interrneddlers tampering with it, the trial judge deems the article 

to be in substantially the same condition as when the crime was 

committed, he may admit it into evidence." United States v. Wood, 

695 F.2d 459, 462 (10th Cir. 1982). 

8The record indicates that the private investigator who discovered 

the first pair of socks found three more pairs of socks containing 

cocaine in the lounge car restroom after the train left 

Albuquerque. He gave the socks to the bartender, who transferred 

them to the -train conductor. The conductor put the socks in a box 

for safekeeping and delivered the box to La Junta, Colorado, 

police officers when the train arrived there. The officers 

photographed, weighed, labelled and packaged the goods before 

sending them on another Amtrak train to Agent Small the next day. 

Agent Small received the socks on December 13, 1991, two days 

after they had been discovered. 

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' 

• 

' • At trial, Agent Small, La Junta police officers, and the DEA 

chemist who tested the cocaine identified the sock and cocaine 

exhibits by appearance and peculiarities, as well as their 

signatures on the evidence tags. In addition, testimony by the 

private investigator and La Junta police officers "indirectly 

establishe[d] the identity and integrity of the evidence by 

tracing its continuous whereabouts" during the train ride from 

Albuquerque to La Junta. United States v. Zink, 612 F.2d 511, 514 

(10th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). This uncontroverted 

testimony confirmed that the socks found on board the train and 

the socks introduced into evidence at trial indeed were one and 

the same. Moreover, the testimony established that the socks were 

"in substantially the same condition as when the crime was 

committed. 119 United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 

1985). 

Because the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion 

in allowing the socks into evidence, the government's failure to 

present testimony by the two Amtrak employees who handled the 

socks went "to the weight of the evidence and not to its 

admissibility." Wood, 695 F.2d at 462 (citations omitted). The 

jury concluded that the evidence was sufficiently reliable to 

support defendant's conviction despite testimonial gaps in the 

sock custody chain, a finding which we are not at liberty to set 

9Defendant's contention that the socks could have 

with is unpersuasive because he failed to present 

tampering or alteration. "Absent some showing by 

that the exhibits have been tampered with, it will 

that the investigators who had custody of them 

Wood, 695 F.2d at 462. 

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been tampered 

any evidence of 

the defendant 

not be presumed 

would do so." 

Appellate Case: 91-2276 Document: 010110145688 Date Filed: 11/05/1992 Page: 11 
aside. "All reasonable inferences and credibility choices must be 

made in support of the jury's verdict." United States v. Alonso, 

790 F.2d 1489, 1492 (10th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). 

"Evidence is considered sufficient to support a criminal 

conviction if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 

879, 881 (10th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). Moreover, "the 

circumstantial evidence required to support a verdict need not 

conclusively exclude every other reasonable hypothesis and it need 

not negate all possibilities save guilt." Gay, 774 F.2d at 373. 

The government was required to prove that defendant knowingly 

possessed cocaine with intent to distribute. 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841 (a) (1). The government established "constructive possession" 

through uncontroverted testimony that defendant was the only 

person who could have put the cocaine-filled .socks in the lounge 

car restroom. See Culpepper, 834 F.2d at 881-82. The government 

also created a chain of custody sufficient to justify admission of 

the socks seized after defendant's arrest. Finally, the quantity 

and purity of the cocaine found in the socks supported the 

inference that it was intended for distribution, not personal use. 

See Gay. 774 F.2d at 372-73. 

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the 

government, we believe there was sufficient evidence to sustain 

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' 

• 

the jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We 

therefore AFFIRM defendant's conviction. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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