Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03345/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03345-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
DTG Operations
Appellee
Dollar Rent-A-Car
Appellee
Terri Wallace
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_________

No. 04-3345

____________

Terri Wallace, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* 

v. * 

* Appeal from the United States 

DTG OPERATIONS, INC., a Foreign * District Court for the Western 

Corporation, also known as Dollar * District of Missouri.

Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc.; DOLLAR *

RENT-A-CAR, INC., a Foreign *

Corporation, * 

*

Defendants - Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: April 14, 2005

 Filed: March 29, 2006 

___________

Before MELLOY, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Terri Wallace appeals the district court’s adverse grant of

summary judgment on her retaliatory discharge claim. Because we find outstanding

questions of material fact regarding the issue of retaliatory intent, we reverse.

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I. Factual Background

We present the facts in a light most favorable to Ms. Wallace, the non-moving

party, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Buettner v. Arch Coal Sales

Co., 216 F.3d 707, 713 (8th Cir. 2000).

On May 9, 2001, Ms. Wallace began working for DTG Operations, Inc. (the

“Company”), as a station manager in its Kansas City International Airport, Dollar

Rent-A-Car station. Ms. Wallace’s immediate supervisor was the Company’s city

manager for Kansas City, Brad Kjar. Mr. Kjar’s immediate supervisor was the

regional manager for the midwest region, Tom Mierendorf. Mr. Mierendorf’s

immediate supervisor was Stephen Duffy, the Company’s vice-president of

operations. Ms. Wallace was the least-senior station manager at the location. Mark

Lovelace, another station manager at the Kansas City International Airport location,

had one day of seniority over Ms. Wallace.

On April 9, 2002, Ms. Wallace complained via email to Mr. Mierendorf about

sexually inappropriate comments and contact from Mr. Kjar. Her complaints related

to four alleged incidents as follows. On February 27, 2002, Mr. Kjar called Ms.

Wallace and others into his office where he used the speaker phone to dial a number

that played a recorded message about masturbation. Later, Mr. Kjar called Ms.

Wallace and others into his office to view pornographic computer images of the

cartoon character Popeye. On November 21, 2001, and again on March 4, 2002, he

commented to Wallace on the size of her “butt,” once while lifting her arm to create

an unobstructed view of the object of his comment. Regarding the Popeye cartoon,

he warned the employees that some people might find the material offensive, and Ms.

Wallace walked out of his office. She did not complain directly to Mr. Kjar about any

of these incidents.

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The Company’s sexual harassment policy stated that an employee could

complain to the supervisor of an alleged harasser if the employee was not comfortable

complaining directly to his or her own supervisor or directly to the harasser. In fact,

before April 9, Ms. Wallace had become upset with Mr. Kjar’s behavior, checked with

a human resources employee named George Corneau, and received instructions to

bypass Mr. Kjar and complain directly to Mr. Mierendorf. Also, Mr. Duffy stated in

his deposition that Ms. Wallace reported the incidents to an appropriate supervisor.

Notwithstanding the propriety of Ms. Wallace’s reporting procedure, Mr.

Mierendorf testified in his deposition that he “was not happy that she did not feel

comfortable or take the time to actually just communicate with [Mr. Kjar].” Mr.

Mierendorf conceded that Ms. Wallace followed a correct procedure by going over

Mr. Kjar’s head, but stated that “what [he] was not pleased about [was] that she did

not feel comfortable just to go to him and talk to him.” Mr. Mierendorf also testified

that he liked to joke around with employees to “liven up the workplace,” he thought

joking “should happen openly and freely,” and he thought Ms. Wallace’s complaint

would put a “muzzle on interaction that should happen freely and openly and that was

no longer going to occur.” 

Twenty-eight days after Ms. Wallace reported these acts to Mr. Mierendorf, he

and Mr. Kjar met with Ms. Wallace in Mr. Kjar’s office and terminated her

employment with the Company. Mr. Mierendorf testified in his deposition that he

actually made the termination decision at an earlier date, only fifteen days after her

report. Before Mr. Mierendorf arrived in Kansas City for the meeting where he fired

Ms. Wallace, he told Ms. Wallace that he was coming to Kansas City to discipline Mr.

Kjar. Mr. Mierendorf testified that, in general, he made termination decisions jointly

with city managers. He claimed, however, that in this instance, Mr. Kjar was not

involved in making the decision to terminate Ms. Wallace.

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At the meeting, Mr. Mierendorf told Ms. Wallace that there were too many

station managers at the Kansas City International Airport location, a downturn in

business following September 11, 2001 had reduced revenue at the location, and she

was the least-senior manager at the location. Mr. Mierendorf told her that there was

a policy at the Company that stated seniority should determine who to lay off. Ms.

Wallace conceded in her deposition that the statements of fact surrounding a downturn

in business and overstaffing at the management level were true. Ms. Wallace’s

attorney also conceded at oral argument before our court that these statements were

true. Ms. Wallace, however, did not concede that these true statements accurately

described the true motivation behind Mr. Mierendorf’s decision to fire her.

Also at the meeting, Ms. Wallace asked to be transferred laterally to one of

several open station manager positions in other cities. Mr. Mierendorf and Mr. Kjar

refused to consider her for a transfer. They claimed that there was a November 2001

“written warning” in her personnel file in Kansas City that, under Company policy,

prohibited their consideration of her as a possible candidate for transfer for a period

of one year. Notwithstanding their claims regarding the Company’s policy, Mr.

Mierendorf had encouraged Ms. Wallace to apply for a transfer to Kentucky after the

purported “written warning” appeared in her Kansas City file.

The Company, in fact, had a policy consistent with the supervisors’ claim. The

Company, however, did not consistently follow this policy. Rather, the policy was

discretionary, as shown by the fact that employees with written warnings received

transfers or were encouraged to apply for transfers within their respective one-year

windows. Under Mr. Mierendorf’s authority, Mr. Kjar himself received a transfer less

than a year after he received a “written warning.” Also, Mr. Mierendorf and Mr. Kjar

had repeatedly told Mr. Lovelace to apply for positions at other locations. This

occurred less than a year after Mr. Kjar gave Mr. Lovelace a “written warning.”

Further demonstrating the discretionary nature of this policy, Mr. Corneau and Mr.

Duffy made clear in their depositions that there was not a regular practice at the

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Company of checking employees’ personnel files for “written warnings” before

granting transfers or promotions. 

The parties dispute not only the nature of the Company’s policy on transfers,

but also the propriety of applying that policy against Ms. Wallace. Ms. Wallace’s

personnel file at the local office in Kansas City contained a written record of a “verbal

warning.” This written record of a verbal warning was documentation of a verbal

notice that Ms. Wallace had received in November 2001 for failing to meet a sales

quota. Ms. Wallace’s signature appeared on the document. Her official personnel file

with the human resources office at headquarters in Tulsa, Oklahoma, however, did not

receive this written record of a verbal notice until October 2002, five months after her

termination. Mr. Kjar and Mr. Mierendorf stated that this document was a “written

warning” sufficient under Company policy to disqualify Ms. Wallace from eligibility

for transfer for one year. Ms. Wallace contests this characterization of the document.

She relies on the deposition testimony of Mr. Duffy to demonstrate that the Company

recognizes a distinction between written warnings and written records of verbal

warnings. Mr. Duffy testified that verbal warnings and/or written records of verbal

warnings are insufficient to trigger the company’s one-year, no-transfer policy. 

Suffice it to say, questions of fact abound regarding the Company’s policy and

the effect of the information in Ms. Wallace’s personnel file. As discussed below,

these questions of fact are material to the extent that they reveal what Ms. Wallace’s

supervisors actually believed about the nature of the Company’s policy and what they

actually believed about the applicability of that policy to Ms. Wallace.

During the depositions of Mr. Mierendorf, Mr. Corneau, and Mr. Duffy,

counsel for Ms. Wallace explored the issue of whether anyone at the Company had

considered terminating Ms. Wallace prior to her report of harassment. Mr. Mierendorf

stated that he had not been involved in any discussions specifically regarding the

termination of Ms. Wallace prior to her report of harassment. Neither Mr. Mierendorf

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nor Mr. Duffy could recall exactly when they first discussed the issue of terminating

Ms. Wallace. When asked about notes, records of communication, or other evidence

that might help pin down the timing of such discussions—or of related discussions on

the more general topic of manager lay-offs—Mr. Duffy stated that he had no such

records because his personal computer had crashed over the course of “the past couple

of years.” Also, Mr. Mierendorf explained that he too had experienced a crash of his

personal computer, that his crash was a total loss of all data, and that the data was not

backed-up because it was a laptop computer. Mr. Mierendorf claimed that the lost

data included “all of my files that we worked on for what our requirements were from

each city for reducing head counts and instructions and requirements that came to us.”

There is no evidence to suggest that these two computer crashes were related. 

Mr. Corneau did have documentation that related to Ms. Wallace from around

the time of her termination. This documentation was a single entry in a log of

telephone calls. It was dated April 29, 2002, and read, “Tom, about Terri Wallace

write-up from Brad. Have not received any write-up.” This entry was made after Ms.

Wallace’s report of harassment.

Although no one from the Company actually claimed to have specifically

discussed or considered the termination of Ms. Wallace prior to her report of

harassment, Mr. Mierendorf did claim that before Ms. Wallace made her report of

harassment, he knew he had too many station managers at the Kansas City

International Airport location. Mr. Kjar also stated that he knew before Ms. Wallace’s

report of harassment that he could not keep all of his station managers. Mr.

Mierendorf and Mr. Kjar both stated that there were too many managers at the

location because one of the station managers, Mr. Lovelace, had completed an inhouse management training program and was expected to apply for city manager

positions at other locations but had not applied for any such positions. 

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Mr. Lovelace left the Company in February or March of 2003. After he left, the

Company advertised the open position of station manager at the Kansas City

International Airport location on more than one occasion. This was the same position

Ms. Wallace had held. Ms. Wallace repeatedly applied for the open position but

received no response. She alleges that this is further evidence to refute the Company’s

claim that she was terminated out of economic necessity rather than as an act of

retaliation.

To further refute the Company’s explanation for her termination, Ms. Wallace

emphasizes the isolated nature of her termination relative to the broad downturn in

business. All employees of the Company who were deposed testified that the terrorist

attacks had a broad and severe impact on the travel industry. In his deposition,

however, Mr. Mierendorf stated that no other managers in the Midwest Region were

laid-off as a result of the downturn in business that followed September 11, 2001.

Following September 11, some manager positions across the country remained vacant

after managers left the Company or transferred to other locations. Also, some nonmanagement employees were laid off in the two months that followed September 11.

The Company later hired back some of these non-management employees. No

management employees other than Ms. Wallace were laid-off during all of 2002, and

no Midwest Region employees at all, other than Ms. Wallace, were laid-off during

2002.

Finally, Ms. Wallace makes reference to two other incidents in the history of

her employment with the Company that she believes to be material to her case. Prior

to her termination, Ms. Wallace asked Ms. Kjar about a possible transfer or promotion

to the position of revenue manager at another location. Mr. Kjar did not respond, and

as a deadline approached, Ms. Wallace contacted the human resources department

directly. When Mr. Kjar found out that she had done so, he became upset and stated,

“how dare she” to another employee. Also, following her termination, Ms. Wallace

contacted a city manager at another location, Clayton Hopkins, to seek help in

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obtaining a possible transfer. The practice of contacting personnel at locations with

openings was commonplace within the Company. Nevertheless, when Mr. Kjar or

others working under him discovered emails from Ms. Wallace to Mr. Hopkins, Mr.

Kjar reported this fact to his superiors, and Mr. Hopkins was disciplined for having

tried to assist Ms. Wallace.

Ms. Wallace instituted proceedings against the Company by timely filing a prose charge of discrimination with the EEOC. On the one-page form that comprised her

charge, she alleged discrimination and retaliation. She did not check the box labeled

“Continuing Action.” Also, she stated that the earliest and latest date of

discrimination took place on May 6, 2002, the date of her termination.

Ms. Wallace then brought suit alleging a claim of sexual harassment based on

Mr. Kjar’s actions. She also included a claim of retaliatory discharge. On summary

judgment, the district court found that her claim of sexual harassment failed as a

matter of law under the severe and pervasive prong of our framework for the analysis

of hostile work environment sexual harassment claims. The district court also found

that Ms. Wallace’s retaliatory discharge claim failed because the Company stated a

legitimate reason for her termination and she failed to present evidence sufficient to

raise a material question of fact as to whether the Company’s explanation was merely

pretextual. In this appeal, Ms. Wallace abandons her harassment claim and argues

only that she is entitled to a trial on her retaliation claim. She alleges that the

Company’s stated reason for her termination is merely a pretext to hide the true

motivation for her termination, namely, intentional retaliation for complaining about

Mr. Kjar’s actions.

We also note that, although not advanced by the Company as an argument

below, the record demonstrates that the Company terminated Ms. Wallace’s

employment one day before certain benefits would have vested. On appeal, the

Company argues that this fact lends further support to its claim that Ms. Wallace’s

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termination was not the result of intentional retaliation. Also, although not stated to

Ms. Wallace as a reason for her termination at the time of her termination, the

Company claims that she performed poorly while temporarily assigned to work in a

Chicago office. There was no disciplinary action taken, nor written record created,

concerning her alleged poor performance while temporarily stationed in Chicago.

Notwithstanding these arguments concerning Ms. Wallace’s work performance, Mr.

Mierendorf insisted in his deposition that the decision to terminate Ms. Wallace was

based strictly on seniority.

II. Standard of Review

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Buettner v. Arch Coal Sales,

Co., 216 F.3d 707, 713 (2000). We have stated that summary judgment should be

used sparingly in the context of employment discrimination and/or retaliation cases

where direct evidence of intent is often difficult or impossible to obtain. Haas v. Kelly

Services, Inc., 409 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (8th Cir. 2005); see also, United States Postal

Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (“There will seldom be

‘eyewitness’ testimony as to the employer’s mental processes.”). We have also stated,

however, that no separate summary judgment standard exists for discrimination or

retaliation cases and that such cases are not immune from summary judgment. See

Berg v. Norand Corp., 169 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir.1999) (“there is no

‘discrimination case exception’ to the application of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, and it remains

a useful pretrial tool to determine whether or not any case, including one alleging

discrimination, merits a trial”); see also, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327

(1986) (“Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored

procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole,

which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every

action.’”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1). 

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Taken together, the above cases demonstrate that, although Rule 56 contains

only one standard, we must exercise particular caution when examining the factual

question of intent to ensure that we dutifully extend all justifiable inferences in favor

of the non-moving party. See Gill v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-6, 32 F.3d 376, 378

(8th Cir. 1994) (stating that we review summary judgment “with caution in

employment discrimination cases . . . because intent is inevitably the central issue”).

Where reasonable fact finders could extend an inference in favor of the non-moving

party without resorting to speculation, we may not declare the inference unjustifiable

simply because we might draw a different inference. See Wabun-Inini v. Sessions,

900 F.2d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir. 1990) (“We recognize that summary judgment is a

drastic remedy and must be exercised with extreme care to prevent taking genuine

issues of fact away from juries.”). Viewing the evidence as a whole, and in this

deferential light, we must deny summary judgment where a reasonable jury could find

in favor of the non-moving party.

III. Discussion

 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from taking

adverse actions against employees in retaliation for employee reports of harassment

or discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). “A claim for retaliation is not based upon

[prohibited] discrimination, but instead upon an employer’s actions taken to punish

an employee who makes a claim of discrimination.” Haas, 409 F.3d at 1036. In

general, as long as a plaintiff had a reasonable, good faith belief that there were

grounds for a claim of discrimination or harassment, the success or failure of a

retaliation claim is analytically divorced from the merits of the underlying

discrimination or harassment claim. See Foster v. Time Warner Entm’t. Co., 250 F.3d

1189, 1195 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that a retaliation plaintiff “‘need not establish the

conduct which she opposed was in fact discriminatory but rather must demonstrate a

good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying conduct violated the law’”) (quoting

Buettner, 216 F.3d at 714); see also, Buettner, 216 F.3d at 714 (“A finding of unlawful

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1

As referenced by the dissent in Haas, if a plaintiff’s underlying claim is

frivolous, a reasonable fact finder could infer that the plaintiff knew the claim was

frivolous and that the plaintiff did not bring the claim in good faith, but merely raised

the underlying claim as a device to prevent or delay an anticipated adverse action. Cf.

Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 828 (1st Cir. 1991). In such a case, the

failure of the underlying claim would necessarily be intertwined with evidence of a

pre-existing basis for the adverse action, and therefore, not be analytically severable

from the claim of retaliation or the employer’s proffered reason for the termination.

Although dismissed on summary judgment, the allegations of harassment in the

present case clearly do not fall into this narrow category of frivolous claims. In this

case Mr. Kjar admitted that the phone and cartoon incidents occurred and did not deny

that the references to Ms. Wallace’s body occurred. As a result, the failure of Ms.

Wallace’s underlying claims has no bearing on our analysis of the retaliation claim in

this case.

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retaliation . . . is not conditioned on the merits of the underlying discrimination

complaint.”).1

We apply the burden shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp.

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973), to analyze retaliation claims. See, e.g., Grey

v. City of Oak Grove, 396 F.3d 1031, 1034 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying the burden

shifting framework to analyze a retaliatory discharge claim under the Fair Labor

Standards Act). The ultimate question in any retaliation case is whether the

employer’s adverse action against the employee was motivated by retaliatory intent.

Accordingly, the shifting of intermediate evidentiary burdens under McDonnell

Douglas is merely an analytical tool that “serves to bring the litigants and the court

expeditiously and fairly to this ultimate question.” Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). The ultimate burden of proof or persuasion to

show that the employer’s conduct was motivated by retaliatory intent remains at all

times on the plaintiff. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).

To succeed under this analytical framework, the plaintiff must first present

evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Hesse v. Avis Rent A Car Sys.,

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Inc., 394 F.3d 624, 632 (8th Cir. 2005). There are three elements to a prima facie

retaliation case. The plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she took part in protected

conduct, that he or she was subjected to an adverse employment action, and that there

exists a causal nexus between the protected conduct and the adverse action. Id. The

plaintiff’s burden at the prima facie case stage of the analysis is not onerous, and “[a]

minimal evidentiary showing will satisfy this burden of production.” Rodgers v. U.S.

Bank, N.A., 417 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Pope v. ESA Serv., Inc., 406

F.3d 1001, 1007 (8th Cir. 2005)).

It is undisputed that Ms. Wallace took part in protected conduct and that the

Company took adverse action against her. Mr. Mierendorf admits that he made the

decision to terminate Ms. Wallace’s employment only fifteen days after her report of

harassment. The actual termination occurred twenty-eight days after her report. For

the purpose of our analysis, the conceded date of the decision to terminate rather than

the date of actual termination is critical. This is because the inference of a cause and

effect relationship between the protected conduct and the adverse action relates to the

employer’s motivations for the action rather than its method or timing in the execution

of the action. See Kipp v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Comm’n, 280 F.3d 893,

897 (8th Cir. 2002) (“what is meant by causal link . . . is a showing that an employer’s

retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action”) (internal quotation

marks omitted). 

“An inference of a causal connection between a charge of discrimination and

termination can be drawn from the timing of the two events, but in general more than

a temporal connection is required to present a genuine factual issue on retaliation.”

Peterson v. Scott County, 406 F.3d 515, 524 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal citations

omitted). In Peterson, we held that a termination two weeks after a claim of

discrimination was “close enough to establish causation in a prima facie case.” Id. at

525. Based on Peterson, with an almost identical time frame, we believe that the

timing in this instance strongly supports an inference of causation for the purpose of

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the prima facie case. We need not rely solely on timing, however, because in this case

other evidence lends support to an inference of causation. That evidence includes Mr.

Mierendorf’s comments that reflected animus, inconsistent application of the policy

restricting transfers, and the isolated nature of Ms. Wallace’s termination when

compared to the widespread impact on the Company’s business caused by the

September 11, 2001 attacks. This evidence, taken together, is more than adequate to

support an inference of causation and complete Ms. Wallace’s prima facie case.

Because Ms. Wallace set forth a prima facie case, a presumption of retaliation

arose and the burden of production shifted to the Company to articulate a legitimate,

non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action. Buettner, 216 F.3d at 714. The

Company identified a post-September 11, 2001 downturn in revenue coupled with

overstaffing at the management level in Kansas City as a non-retaliatory reason for

the termination of Ms. Wallace’s employment. The Company, therefore, met its

burden at this second stage and rebutted the presumption of retaliation. Burdine, 450

U.S. at 255.

 Ms. Wallace was left with “the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered

reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.” Id. The Supreme Court

has recognized that, at this final stage of the burden shifting analysis, the plaintiff’s

burden “merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the

victim of intentional [retaliation].” Id. (discussing the burden shifting analysis in the

context of a discrimination claim). In making a showing at this final stage, evidence

used to support the prima facie case is considered along with other evidence before

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2

As the Court made clear in Reeves, a strong prima facie case coupled with

proof of pretext may suffice to create a triable question of fact. Id. (“Thus, a

plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find the employer’s

asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer

unlawfully discriminated.”).

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the court to determine whether there exists a triable fact on the ultimate issue of

retaliation. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000).2

There are at least two routes by which a plaintiff may demonstrate a material

question of fact at this final stage of the analysis. First, a plaintiff may succeed

“indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of

credence,” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, because it has “no basis in fact.” Smith v. Allen

Health Sys., Inc., 302 F.3d 827, 834 (8th Cir. 2002). Second, a plaintiff may succeed

“directly by persuading the court that a [prohibited] reason more likely motivated the

employer.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Both of these routes, in effect, amount to a

showing that the prohibited reason, rather than the proffered reason, actually

motivated the employer’s action. 

The first route, directly rebutting the proffered reason as false, usually involves

more than a rebuttal of the employer’s ultimate claims regarding its subjective

motivations. It typically involves a broader rebuttal of the employer’s underlying

factual claims. See, e.g., Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 (“In appropriate circumstances, the

trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer

is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose.”). Ms. Wallace’s concessions

regarding overstaffing at the management level and reduced revenue at the Kansas

City International Airport location demonstrate that she does not contest the

underlying facts as set forth by the Company to describe business conditions. Clearly

then, in this case, the employer’s explanation is at least “worthy of credence,”

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, and is not without “basis in fact.” Smith, 302 F.3d at 834.

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3

Nothing in today’s opinion should be construed to dilute the “determinative

factor” standard set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989)

and reaffirmed in Norbeck v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 215 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir.

2000). We hold only that a triable question of fact may still exist as to impermissible

retaliation when an employee concedes that the proffered justification would have

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Ms. Wallace’s concessions, however, do not address the ultimate question of whether

the proffered reason served as the actual basis for the adverse action.

The second route, in contrast, does not necessarily involve disproving the

underlying factual claims of the employer. It focuses instead on rebuttal of the

employer’s ultimate factual claim regarding the absence of retaliatory intent. See

Strate v. Midwest Bankcentre, Inc., 398 F.3d 1011, 1017-18 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e

have long recognized that a genuine issue of fact regarding unlawful employment

[retaliation] may exist notwithstanding the plaintiff’s inability to directly disprove the

defendant’s proffered reason for the adverse employment action.”). Success under

this route is dependant on showing that sufficient evidence of intentional retaliation

exists for a jury to believe the plaintiff’s allegations and find that the proffered

explanation was not the true motiving explanation. See Buettner, 216 F.3d at 717

(stating that a plaintiff “must adduce enough admissible evidence to raise genuine

doubt as to the legitimacy of a defendant’s motive, even if that evidence does not

directly contradict or disprove a defendant’s articulated reasons for its actions”);

Strate, 398 F.3d at 1017 (“‘pretext’ [is] shorthand for indicating that a defendant’s

proffered . . . explanation . . . is a pretext for unlawful discrimination, not that it is

merely false in some way”); Davenport v. Riverview Gardens Sch. Dist., 30 F.3d 940,

946 n.8 (8th Cir. 1994) (same). In effect, a plaintiff may concede that the proffered

reason, if truly the motivating cause for the termination, would have been a sufficient

basis for the adverse action while arguing that the employer’s proffered reason was

not the true reason for the action. See, e.g., Hitt v. Harsco Corp., 356 F.3d 920, 924

(8th Cir. 2004) (stating that whether an age discrimination plaintiff could show pretext

turned “on whether age was . . . the true reason for, the decision to terminate”).3

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been valid if it had been the employer’s true motivation. This is simply another way

of stating that general agreement as to background facts does not necessarily eliminate

questions of fact on the ultimate issue of subjective intent.

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The facts that Ms. Wallace relies upon to show intentional retaliation and to

show that the Company’s explanation was pretextual may be grouped as follows: (1)

timing issues, (2) issues related to the Company’s policy restricting transfers, (3)

supervisors’ comments that reflected animus, and (4) the Company’s change in its

explanation for the termination. We address these facts in turn.

A. Timing Issues

The Company argues that temporal proximity, standing alone, is insufficient to

prove retaliatory intent. While this is generally true, see Kiel v. Select Artificials,

Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999), any consideration of the impact of temporal

proximity “standing alone” tends to be unhelpful. We cannot presume that fact

finders view each piece of evidence in isolation, and most cases that involve claims

of retaliation stem from rich factual backgrounds that provide ample evidence to

support and/or disprove allegations of retaliation. In all such cases, the evidence of

pretext and retaliatory intent must be viewed in its totality. Viewed within the context

of the overall record, temporal proximity may directly support an inference of

retaliation, and it may also affect the reasonableness of inferences drawn from other

evidence.

Here, because only fifteen days elapsed between Ms. Wallace’s report of

harassment and Mr. Mierendorf’s decision to fire her, temporal proximity provides

strong support for an inference of retaliatory intent. Peterson, 406 F.3d at 525. This

is particularly true in light of the fact that the business conditions cited by the

Company had existed for a number of months before Ms. Wallace made her report of

harassment. Where an employer tolerates an undesirable condition for an extended

period of time, an employee takes part in protected conduct, and shortly thereafter, the

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employer takes an adverse action in purported reliance on the long-standing

undesirable condition, a reasonable jury can infer that the adverse action is based on

the protected conduct. See Eliserio v. United Steelworkers of America Local 310, 398

F.3d 1071, 1079-80 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that when an employer ignored or treated

as de minimis five complaints about an employee but took drastic action following a

sixth, identical complaint, a reasonable jury could infer that the employer’s claim of

reliance on the sixth complaint was pretextual and that the employer had acted in

retaliation for the employee’s intervening protected conduct). A fact finder could

reasonably infer that, if business conditions alone had been the true motivation for Ms.

Wallace’s termination, the Company would have fired her at an earlier date and her

termination would not have followed so closely on the heels of her report of

harassment. 

Also, when viewed against this time frame, a reasonable jury could find support

for an inference of retaliation based on the lack of evidence to show that supervisors

had considered Ms. Wallace’s termination before her report of harassment. In this

regard, we note that Mr. Mierendorf and Mr. Duffy claimed that they had previously

discussed the general issue of manager overstaffing and lay-offs. These claims,

however, were undocumented, and a finder of fact could infer that the purported loss

of data by supervisors at two levels calls into doubt the truth of their claims. Further,

the fact that there was an extra station manager at the location and the fact that the

supervisors had encouraged Mr. Lovelace to apply for a transfer do not demonstrate

that these supervisors had discussed or considered terminating Ms. Wallace prior to

her complaint of harassment.

Another timing issue relates to the isolated nature of Ms. Wallace’s termination,

eight months after the terrorist attacks, when compared to other terminations at the

Company purportedly linked to September 11. As described above, Ms. Wallace was

the only management employee in the Midwest Region actually terminated due to the

downturn in business. Also, she was the only Midwest employee actually terminated

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in 2002. A finder of fact need not reject the factual assertion that there was a general

downturn in business to infer that Ms. Wallace’s termination, as a relatively isolated

event, was motivated by retaliatory animus rather than by the broad economic

concerns cited by the Company.

B. Transfer Policy

Regarding the Company’s transfer policy, a reasonable jury could infer that Mr.

Mierendorf and Mr. Kjar knew that the policy was discretionary and/or not applicable

based on the facts of Ms. Wallace’s case. Mr. Kjar himself received a transfer under

Mr. Mierendorf’s authority at a time when Mr. Kjar should have been barred under

the policy, if the policy actually applied in the mandatory way claimed by Mr. Kjar

and Mr Mierendorf. Also, Mr. Mierendorf encouraged Mr. Lovelace to apply for a

transfer at a time when a transfer would have been barred under the Company’s

policy. Both of these examples, combined with the outstanding question of fact

regarding characterization of the contents of Ms. Wallace’s personnel file, suggest that

Mr. Mierendorf knew the policy did not actually bar Ms. Wallace from receiving a

transfer. Viewed in a light most favorable to Ms. Wallace, a reasonable jury could find

Mr. Mierendorf’s adverse and selective application of the policy to be evidence that

his reliance on the policy was merely pretext to hide a retaliatory motive. The

Company’s refusal to consider Ms. Wallace for rehire after Ms. Lovelace’s

termination further strengthens this inference

The Company argues that we may not consider the denial of a transfer or a

refusal to rehire because Ms. Wallace did not check the continuing action box on her

EEOC complaint and because she stated that the first and last day of discrimination

occurred on May 6, 2002, the date of her termination. The Company’s arguments are

misplaced for two reasons. 

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First, the Company misconstrues the nature of Ms. Wallace’s reliance on the

denial of a transfer and the failure to rehire. She does not argue that she has separate

retaliation claims based on separate adverse actions. Rather, she argues that the

subsequent facts provide evidence of the Company’s motivation for her earlier

termination. She clearly claimed only one retaliatory act. We have never held that

evidence of retaliatory motive for action on a fixed date is limited to evidence that

existed on that date or evidence that existed before a date listed on an EEOC form.

Here, with the issue of retaliatory intent in play, it is reasonable, in fact expected, that

the Company’s post-termination actions would be relevant to assessing the veracity

of claims of economic necessity. In effect, the Company argues that the EEOC form

serves to make evidence that followed May 6, 2002, infirm or irrelevant. We find no

support for this position. 

Second, the Company construes our precedent regarding the restrictive effect

of an EEOC filing too narrowly. We have held that claims based on an EEOC charge

must “grow out of” or be “like or reasonably related to” the claim stated in the EEOC

charge. Wentz v. Maryland Cas. Co., 869 F.2d 1153, 1154 (8th Cir. 1989). The

information contained in an EEOC charge must be sufficient to give the employer

notice of the subject matter of the charge and identify generally the basis for a claim,

but it need not specifically articulate the precise claim or set forth all the evidence an

employee may choose to later present in court. EEOC v. Delight Wholesale Co., 973

F.2d 664, 668 (8th Cir. 1992) (“The permissible scope of an EEOC lawsuit is not

confined to the specific allegations in the charge; rather, it may extend to any

discrimination like or related to the substance of the allegations in the charge and

which reasonably can be expected to grow out of the investigation triggered by the

charge.”). See also, Nichols v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 154 F.3d 875, 886-87 (8th Cir.

1998) (“In determining whether an alleged discriminatory act falls within the scope

of a Title VII claim, the administrative complaint must be construed liberally ‘in order

not to frustrate the remedial purposes of Title VII.’”) (quoting Cobb v. Stringer, 850

F.2d 356, 359 (8th Cir. 1988)).

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C. Supervisor’s Comments

The evidence just discussed must be viewed against the backdrop of Mr.

Mierendorf’s comments. Had the uncertainty surrounding the transfer policy occurred

in a vacuum, then it might not be reasonable for a jury to infer retaliatory intent. Here,

however, the temporal proximity and the supervisor’s comments make such an

inference justifiable. Mr. Mierendorf was displeased that Ms. Wallace had gone over

Mr. Kjar’s head. Also, Mr. Mierendorf stated that he thought her report of harassment

would put a muzzle on kidding that he considered beneficial in the workplace. These

comments are not general, offhand comments by a coworker. Rather, they are

comments from a supervisor, specific to Ms. Wallace, specific to the off-color humor

she complained about, and specific to the impact of Ms. Wallace’s report on the future

environment of the workplace. Taken as a whole, we believe that this evidence is

sufficient for a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the Company terminated Ms.

Wallace because of her report of harassment and that the proffered explanation was

merely an after-the-fact explanation for actions that truly grew from a retaliatory

intent. Hitt, 356 F.3d at 924 (stating that whether an age discrimination plaintiff could

show pretext turned “on whether age was. . . the true reason for, the decision to

terminate”). 

D. Shifting Explanations

Finally, we note that the Company’s position has not been consistent

throughout these proceedings or the time surrounding Ms. Wallace’s termination.

Prior to Ms. Wallace’s report of harassment, Mr. Mierendorf had encouraged her to

apply for a transfer to Kentucky. There was no evidence of dissatisfaction with Ms.

Wallace’s performance, other than the written record of a verbal warning, as discussed

above. Also, Mr. Mierendorf claimed reliance on a policy that mandated

consideration of seniority to the exclusion of other factors, including performance.

At her termination, no one from the Company suggested that performance factored

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into the termination decision. Nevertheless, in these proceedings, the Company raises

performance issues as a make-weight and non-retaliatory motive for Ms. Wallace’s

termination. As another make-weight and non-retaliatory motive, the Company notes

that it saved itself from paying Ms. Wallace certain benefits by terminating her

employment just short of an anniversary that would have caused those benefits to vest.

While these factors might provide evidence of a non-retaliatory motive, a jury could

reasonably infer that the Company’s after-the-fact reliance on these facts is evidence

that the Company is dissembling to cover up an impermissible motive. See Kobrin

v. Univ. of Minn., 34 F.3d 698, 703 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Substantial changes over time

in the employer’s proffered reason for its employment decision support a finding of

pretext.”).

While a jury certainly need not resolve the factual issue of retaliatory intent in

favor of Ms. Wallace, we believe that it reasonably could. As such, summary

judgment is inappropriate, and Ms. Wallace is entitled a jury trial on her retaliation

claim. 

We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

This case presents a plaintiff, Terri Wallace, who was laid off from her position

as a manager at an airport rental car station. It is undisputed that the employer, Dollar

Rental Car (“Dollar”), advised her at the time of the lay-off that the action was taken

because the company had experienced a downturn in revenue at her location, there

were too many managers at her location, and she was the least senior of the one-toomany managers. Wallace now concedes that, indeed: (1) the events of September 11,

2001, greatly affected the travel industry, including car rental agencies, (J.A. at 66-67;

see also id. at 45, ¶ 27); (2) there was a downturn in the revenue at her location at the

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4

There is no claim on appeal that Wallace was actually a victim of sexual

harassment. The district court dismissed Wallace’s allegation of sexual harassment,

concluding as a matter of law that she failed to establish that Brad Kjar’s conduct

created a hostile work environment actionable under Title VII.

-22-

time of her layoff, (id. at 68); (3) four managers at her location were too many,

particularly in light of the downturn of business since September 11, (id. at 68); and

(4) she was the least senior of the four managers at her location. (Id. at 76). There is

likewise no genuine dispute that the employer promulgated lay-off procedures on

September 21, 2001, providing that “[f]or field locations, layoffs must be based upon

the employee’s seniority.” (Id. at 96). Under those circumstances, the district court

ruled that there was no genuine issue of fact concerning whether the plaintiff was laid

off for a legitimate business reason, and dismissed the complaint.

The plaintiff claims, nonetheless, that she was terminated in retaliation for

making a complaint of sexual harassment.4

 The governing statute prohibits

discrimination against an employee “because [s]he has opposed any practice made an

unlawful employment practice by this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Wallace

does not claim to have opposed an employment practice that was actually unlawful,

but our court has held that the statute also encompasses opposition to practices that are

not unlawful, if an employee acted based on a good faith, objectively reasonable belief

that the practices were unlawful. Evans v. Kansas City, Mo. Sch. Dist., 65 F.3d 98,

100 (8th Cir. 1995); cf. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001)

(per curiam) (noting that Supreme Court had no occasion to rule on propriety of this

interpretation). Dollar does not argue that Wallace’s report of Brad Kjar’s behavior

was outside the scope of opposition protected by the statute. Cf. Breeden, 532 U.S.

at 271.

Wallace’s retaliation claim is thus considered under the traditional burdenshifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04

(1973). See Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 237 F.3d 920, 926 (8th Cir. 2001).

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5

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to provide that a plaintiff

establishes an unlawful employment practice when she “demonstrates that race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,

even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). This

amendment does not affect the analysis here, because it does not apply to retaliation

claims under Title VII. Norbeck v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 215 F.3d 848, 852 (8th

Cir. 2000).

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Assuming the plaintiff has made a prima facie case, she must then present evidence

sufficient to show that Dollar’s proffered reason for her lay-off was a pretext for

discrimination, and that the company’s alleged discriminatory motive was

determinative in the decision to effect the lay-off. Id.; see also Hazen Paper Co. v.

Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).5 Dollar is not liable, therefore, unless the evidence

shows that but for an alleged desire to retaliate against Wallace for reporting Kjar’s

behavior, Dollar would have continued to employ an extra manager that Wallace

concedes was not justified as a matter of sound business management. See Miller v.

CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 595-96 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc). Where the plaintiff

advances a claim that “simply makes no economic sense,” the plaintiff must “come

forward with more persuasive evidence to support [her] claim than would otherwise

be necessary.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

(1986); see also Fender v. Bull, 437 F.3d 770, 775 (8th Cir. 2006); Bator v. Hawaii,

39 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 1994). The court’s opinion offers no persuasive reason

to conclude that absent Wallace’s report about Kjar, Dollar would have followed an

unsound business practice and continued to fill an unnecessary position at the Kansas

City airport.

The court cites the correlation of timing between the plaintiff’s complaint and

the lay-off, a factor that we have said repeatedly is generally insufficient to make even

a prima facie case of retaliatory motive. Gagnon v. Sprint Corp., 284 F.3d 839, 851

(8th Cir. 2002); Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999);

Nelson v. J.C. Penny Co., Inc., 75 F.3d 343, 346-47 (8th Cir. 1996); but cf. Peterson

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v. Scott County, 406 F.3d 515, 524-25 (8th Cir. 2005). Nonetheless, the court finds

these precedents “unhelpful,” and says that temporal proximity alone actually provides

“strong support” for the claim that the conceded legitimate reason for Wallace’s layoff

was really a pretext for discrimination. Ante, at 16. The court relies on its view that

the “business conditions cited by the Company had existed for a number of months

before Wallace made her report” concerning Kjar. 

The precise condition that led to the layoff of Wallace, however, did not exist

for several months before the employment action. The supervisor, Tom Mierendorf,

had hoped to avoid a lay-off by arranging to promote one of the extra managers at the

Kansas City location, but in April 2002, this manager, Mark Lovelace, performed

inadequately during a trial management opportunity in Louisville. (J.A. at 322-23).

Dollar thus “realized that Mark Lovelace was not going to be leaving any time soon,”

(id. at 336), and the company was left with the “business condition” that necessitated

a layoff – one manager too many, with no prospect of an impending departure to

resolve the problem. (Id. at 209, 322, 336). This circumstance led Dollar’s vice

president for operations, Jim Duffy, in consultation with Mierendorf, to conclude that

a lay-off was necessary. (Id. at 190, 209, 336). Mierendorf testified that the

possibility of a lay-off had been under consideration for months before Wallace’s

report of Kjar’s behavior, but that the ultimate decision to reduce the workforce was

made “right after Louisville,” that is, right after Lovelace was deemed unready for a

promotion. (Id. at 332). “[T]he simple fact that the employer’s testimony is

necessarily self-interested” is not “enough under our previous cases to allow the jury

to find that the employer’s proffered reasons were pretextual.” Nelson, 75 F.3d at

346.

The court also finds it significant that the plaintiff was the only manager laid

off in the Midwest region in 2002, but the evidence presented was that other stations

were able to reduce staff through attrition or reduction of non-management

employees, and at least one departing manager was not replaced. (J.A. at 313-17,

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339). Most important, there was no evidence that other stations retained managers

that everyone – employee and employer alike – agreed were excessive. The absence

of layoffs in stations that were not shown to be overstaffed does not support an

inference of retaliatory motive. 

Although Wallace made no claim that she was denied an opportunity to transfer

based on retaliatory motive, the court concludes that the company’s failure to provide

an opportunity to transfer supports a finding of discriminatory motive for the lay-off.

There is a logical disconnect, however, between Wallace’s argument regarding a

transfer and the disputed lay-off. Wallace contends that the company treated her

differently than it might have treated another person who was laid off and sought to

transfer. But even if true, this in no way undermines Dollar’s explanation that the

underlying lay-off occurred because of overstaffing in Kansas City. Having failed to

bring an action alleging a retaliatory refusal to transfer, Wallace cannot now bootstrap

an abandoned claim into an entirely separate allegation concerning the company’s

decision to reduce its workforce at the Kansas City Airport.

Snippets of testimony from supervisor Mierendorf also do not make this a

submissible retaliation case. Mierendorf never objected to Wallace opposing Kjar’s

behavior. To the contrary, Mierendorf testified that “[s]he has the right to make

someone stop,” (J.A. at 335), that it was “appropriate” for Wallace to report the matter

to him rather than to Kjar, (id. at 331), and that he had “no problem” with her

approaching him directly. (Id. at 336). Mierendorf himself assured Wallace in

writing on the very date of her initial report that there “cannot be retribution” for the

report, and that he would “make Brad [Kjar] very clear on that.” (Id. at 87).

Mierendorf merely expressed disappointment that communication within his Kansas

City office had failed, because Wallace and Kjar could not resolve the situation

through informal discussions, even though five months had passed between the date

of the incidents and Wallace’s report. (Id. at 336). Mierendorf felt no sympathy for

Kjar, because he “caused an event to occur,” and Mierendorf’s regret that the

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atmosphere of the workplace might become more tense and less lively was a comment

on the entire “situation” – i.e., Kjar’s inappropriate behavior and the breakdown of

communication in the Kansas City office – not on Wallace’s decision to make a

report. (Id.).

But even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Mierendorf’s comments

reasonably could be read as indicating displeasure that Wallace had opposed Kjar’s

conduct, this inference would not demonstrate that Dollar’s legitimate explanation was

pretextual. At most, it would show that Mierendorf’s allegedly improper motive

coincided with the company’s legitimate motive to eliminate overstaffing, a

circumstance that is insufficient to state a retaliation claim under Title VII, unless the

improper motive had a determinative influence on the outcome. See Miller, 47 F.3d

at 597 & n.9. What is lacking on this record is evidence that Dollar would not have

acted to reduce its workforce for economic reasons that everyone agrees dictated a

reduction. Viewed in light of Dollar’s uncontested non-discriminatory rationale,

Mierendorf’s comments do not constitute the sort of “substantial evidence” of pretext

that would permit a reasonable inference that discriminatory intent by the company

was determinative in the employment decision. See Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710,

715 (8th Cir. 2003) (to defeat motion for summary judgment, facts and circumstances

relied upon by plaintiff “must attain the dignity of substantial evidence”).

It is further asserted that the employer has given “shifting explanations” for the

layoff, ante, at 20, but Dollar has maintained consistently since the date of the

employment action that Wallace was laid off because the station had too many

managers, and she was the least senior manager. The employer’s reference to the

vesting of the plaintiff’s benefits was simply a response to the plaintiff’s argument that

raised the topic: “Plaintiff failed to present evidence that defendant’s reason was

pretextual, admitted the reason was true and, in fact, articulated an additional nonretaliatory reason for her own layoff alleging in her Petition that she was ‘informed

that she was being laid off one day before her benefits vested.’” (Appellee’s Br. at

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19). Similarly, the plaintiff’s performance was not offered as a reason for the lay-off;

it was discussed in response to the plaintiff’s entirely different argument (not raised

in her complaint or EEOC charge) that the company impermissibly failed to transfer

her to another location.

The parties agree that the business reason stated for Dollar’s employment action

was entirely legitimate and dictated by business economics. The reason was

determined and articulated at the time of the lay-off; it was not an “after-the-fact

explanation.” Cf. ante, at 20. The evidence does not support the uneconomic

conclusion that but for the employee’s report of unprofessional workplace behavior

by a colleague, Dollar would have retained an unnecessary employee. I would

therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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