Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05084/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05084-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kenneth Cody Jackson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff- Appellee, 

JUL 0 5 1998 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

v. No. 95-5084 

KENNETH CODY JACKSON, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-83-B) 

Jeffrey D. Fischer, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant- Appellant. 

Allen J. Litchfield, Assistant United States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma (Stephen C. 

Lewis, United States Attorney, and Ann P. Dooley, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Tulsa, Oklahoma, with him on the brief), for Plaintiff- Appellee. 

Before ANDERSON, McKAY and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant Kenneth Cody Jackson appeals from his conviction for carjacking and 

related firearm offenses. He argues that his trial counsel was ineffective and that the 

Appellate Case: 95-5084 Document: 01019280379 Date Filed: 07/05/1996 Page: 1 
district court impermissibly allowed the introduction of hearsay evidence used to identify 

him. We affirm Mr. Jackson's conviction for the reasons that follow. 

The government presented the following evidence at trial. The carjacking victim 

was talking on a pay phone at a Circle K convenience store when a man came up behind 

him with a chrome-colored snub-nose revolver and demanded the keys to his car. The 

carjacker was wearing an open-face ski mask and a blue jacket. While the carjacker was 

holding the revolver to the victim's head, a nearby eyewitness yelled out, "Kenny, don't 

do it!" After taking money from the victim, the carjacker sped away in his newly 

acquired automobile. 

The police were soon notified and quickly spotted the stolen car. Police officers 

gave chase. The carjacker jumped from the car and fled on foot. Although the officers 

pursued him, they were unable to apprehend him at that time. Nevertheless, three officers 

had gotten a good look at the carjacker's face and later were able to identify him as the 

defendant in this case. The police recovered from the car a snub-nose revolver and a ski 

mask. They also recovered a blue jacket which had been discarded by the carjacker 

during the foot chase. Inside the jacket the officers found a pager. One officer retained 

possession of the pager and had it with him while filling out a report on the carjacking. 

The pager went off and displayed a telephone number. The officer called the number and 

heard a female voice say, "Is this Kenny?" This statement as well as the statement, 

"Kenny, don't do it!" were admitted against Mr. Jackson over his objection. The jury 

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convicted Mr. Jackson of all charges against him. 

Mr. Jackson first argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. 

Normally, we do not allow ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be raised on direct 

appeal. We see no reason to deviate from this rule in the case at bar. United States v. 

Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (lOth Cir. 1995). Related to Mr. Jackson's ineffective 

assistance claim is his argument that the district court should have held an evidentiary 

hearing on his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. 1 The alleged 

new evidence was Mr. Jackson's belief that his trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance. The district court denied Mr. Jackson's motion. 

"Ineffective assistance of counsel may not serve as the basis for a motion for a new 

trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence under Rule 33 where the facts alleged in 

support of the motion were within the defendant's knowledge at the time of trial." United 

States v. Miller, 869 F.2d 1418, 1421 (lOth Cir. 1989). Mr. Jackson does not argue that 

Miller is not applicable. Rather, he asks us to reconsider our holding in that case. We 

decline this invitation. We hold that the district court did not err when it refused to hold 

an evidentiary hearing regarding Mr. Jackson's motion for a new trial. 

Mr. Jackson next argues that the statement, "Kenny, don't do it!" was inadmissible 

1

ln addition to his motion for a new trial, Mr. Jackson moved in the alternative for 

habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court correctly denied this 

motion as untimely because Mr. Jackson had not yet been sentenced. 

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hearsay and that its introduction violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse 

witnesses. At trial, the government introduced this statement through the testimony of the 

carjacking victim who overheard the exclamation rather than through the eyewitness who 

uttered the statement. The district court allowed the testimony to come in as an "excited 

utterance" under Fed. R. Evid. 803(2). Here, the statement, "Kenny, don't do it!" was 

made while the declarant witnessed the carjacker place a gun to the victim's head. This 

clearly falls within the purview of Rule 803(2) which provides that a statement related to 

a startling event is admissible if the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused 

by the startling event while making the statement. 

Furthermore, no Sixth Amendment violation occurred. In general, a hearsay 

exception that has sufficient indicia of reliability does not violate the Sixth Amendment's 

Confrontation Clause. "Firmly rooted" exceptions are normally considered sufficiently 

reliable. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 n.8 (1992). Rule 803(2) is itself a firmly 

rooted hearsay exception. Id. Thus, no constitutional violation occurred.2 

2

Mr. Jackson seeks to attack the reliability of this hearsay testimony by introducing 

grand jury testimony and information in an FBI report. This evidence, however, was 

never introduced at trial or presented to the district court. Thus, we may not consider it 

because it is not part of the record on appeal. ~Fed. R. App. P. lO(a). 

We also point out that Mr. Jackson has not asserted that the declarant was 

unavailable. Given the fact that Fed. R. Evid. 806 would have allowed Mr. Jackson to 

call the declarant as a witness and cross-examine him, it is hard to see how any 

unreliability in the hearsay statement would have violated Mr. Jackson's right to confront 

adverse witnesses. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 397-98 & n.8 (1986). 

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Finally, Mr. Jackson argues that the district court impermissibly allowed the 

introduction at trial of the declaration, "Is this Kenny?". The district court admitted the 

declaration as non-hearsay pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C) or as an exception to 

the hearsay rule under Fed. R. Evid. 803(24). On appeal, the government does not contest 

Mr. Jackson's argument that neither rule applies. Rather, the government argues that the 

declaration was non-hearsay because it was not a statement within the meaning of Rule 

801(a)(l) and (c). 

As an initial matter, we point out that evidence does not become inadmissible 

simply because the district court relied on an erroneous reason for admitting it. So long 

as the evidence is admissible under some legally correct theory, no error occurred. 

Navajo Frei~ht Lines. Inc. v. Mahaffy, 174 F.2d 305,307 (lOth Cir. 1949); see also 

Cayce v. Carter Oil Co., 618 F.2d 669, 677 (lOth Cir. 1980) (appellate court may affirm 

rulings of district court "on any ground that finds support in the record, even where the 

lower court reached its conclusions from a different or even erroneous course of 

reasoning"). 

In this case, the evidence was admissible because it was non-hearsay under Rule 

801(a)(l) and (c). Rule 80l(c) provides that '"Hearsay' is a statement ... offered in 

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." A "statement" is defined in Rule 

801(a)(1) as "an oral or written assertion." Although "assertion" is not defined in Rule 

80 1, the advisory committee notes state that "nothing is an assertion unless intended to be 

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Appellate Case: 95-5084 Document: 01019280379 Date Filed: 07/05/1996 Page: 5 
one." Fed. R. Evid. 801 advisory committee's note. The question, "Is this Kenny?" 

cannot reasonably be construed to be an intended assertion, either express or implied. 

Were we to construe this question completely in Mr. Jackson's favor, it might be possible 

to imply that the declarant believed Mr. Jackson was in possession of the pager and 

therefore he was the person responding by telephone to the declarant's message. The 

mere fact, however, that the declarant conveyed a message with her question does not 

make the question hearsay. See United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1580 (D.C. Cir.), 

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 948 (1990). As the D.C. Circuit pointed out in~' "[i]t is 

difficult to imagine any question ... that does not in some way convey an implicit 

message." Id. Rather, the important question is whether an assertion was intended. ld.. 

We find it hard to believe in this case that the declarant intended to assert that Mr. 

Jackson was in possession of the pager and that he was responding to her call. If any 

doubt remains, we believe it is resolved by the fact that Rule 801 places "the burden upon 

the party claiming that the intention [to make an assertion] existed; ambiguous and 

doubtful cases will be resolved against him and in favor of admissibility." Fed. R. Evid. 

801 advisory committee's note. Mr. Jackson has not met this burden. We hold that the 

district court did not err when it overruled Mr. Jackson's hearsay objection. 

AFFIRMED. 

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