Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-14013/USCOURTS-ca11-14-14013-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Board of Trustees of The University of Alabama, The
Appellee
Robert Bourge
Appellee
Susan Conrad
Appellee
Alesia M. Jones
Appellee
Gary E. Jones
Appellee
Janet L. Skotnicki
Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-14013

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-03497-RDP

JANET L. SKOTNICKI, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, THE, 

DR. ROBERT BOURGE, 

SUSAN CONRAD, 

ALESIA M. JONES, 

GARY E. JONES, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(December 10, 2015)

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Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT and SENTELLE,* Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Janet Skotnicki, a former nurse at the University of Alabama at Birmingham

(UAB) Hospital, filed a lawsuit alleging violations of federal and state law related 

to the denial of her request for medical leave and the termination of her 

employment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on 

all of Skotnicki’s claims. This is her appeal.

I. Background

Viewed in the light most favorable to Skotnicki, the facts are these. In 

November 1998, she began working in UAB’s Coronary Care Unit (CCU) as a 

staff nurse.1 “Staff nurse” is the term UAB typically uses for a registered nurse 

(RN) who gives direct bedside care to patients. Skotnicki’s job in the CCU was 

not sedentary and required her to have certain physical abilities. 

In 1998, Skotnicki was diagnosed with Autoimmune Cerebellar Ataxia, a 

neurological condition that can affect gait and balance. Three years later, in June 

2002, she changed her employment status from full-time (36 hours/week) to part-

 * Honorable David Bryan Sentelle, United States Circuit Judge for the District of 

Columbia Circuit, sitting by designation.

1 The CCU was one of several “units” in the Cardiovascular Services Department, 

for which defendant Susan Conrad was the Director of Nursing. Conrad testified that she 

had approximately fifteen Nurse Managers reporting to her from the various units of that 

department and that they supervised approximately 300 additional nurses, the majority of 

which were staff nurses like Skotnicki. 

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time (24 hours/week).2 Five years after that, in September 2007, she requested and 

was granted a one-month period of leave under the Family Medical Leave Act 

(FMLA) to seek necessary medical treatment. 

While on leave, Skotnicki had a conversation with her supervisor in the 

CCU, Pat Long, concerning her return to work. Long told her that she could return 

to one of two positions, both of which were sedentary and did not have the 

physical demands of bedside care. The first position was as an “admit nurse” in 

the CCU, a position that UAB in late 2007 was willing to create for Skotnicki.

She declined the position and it was never created for, or filled by, anyone. 

The second position — the one Skotnicki elected to take — was as a nurse in 

the Interventional Cardiology (IC) office, a temporary position. The position was 

available because, at the time Skotnicki returned from leave, IC was short three 

nurse practitioners and had decided to cover some of the work with staff nurses 

(typically RNs) until the vacant positions could be filled with nurse practitioners. 

Skotnicki admits that she chose the IC position over the CCU position with the 

knowledge that it was temporary, although she thought at the time that it “could 

become permanent.”3

 2 The record does not tell us whether the status change was related to her medical 

condition. 

 

3 In her deposition, Skotnicki stated that she “was told initially that [the IC 

position] was temporary — it could be temporary, but it could become permanent. And 

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In March 2008, Skotnicki received an employee performance evaluation. It

included an “individual development plan” that Skotnicki herself had written. The 

evaluation and the plan were signed by Long and Long’s boss, Susan Conrad. As 

part of the plan, Skotnicki wrote that she would “[c]ontinue to work in [IC] or 

CCU as [an] admit nurse.” That was the only individual development plan and the 

only evaluation that Skotnicki received during her time in the IC office. 

In February 2009, Skotnicki suffered a fall at her home, which left her 

unable to walk without assistance. To assist her, she began using a rollator — a 

rolling walker — for balance support. The rollator was the first visible sign of 

Skotnicki’s neurological condition. Later that same month, she learned that 

defendant Robert Bourge, M.D., who was in charge of IC personnel matters, was 

still looking to fill her position with a nurse practitioner. On February 26, she sent 

an email to Dr. Vijay Misra that stated in relevant part: 

I learned this week that . . . my job will end when a fourth [nurse 

practitioner] is hired. Hopefully, that will change and I will be made a 

permanent employee, but as much as I would like for that to happen, I 

don’t think I can’t [sic] count on it. Although I am still technically a 

CCU employee[

4

] . . . I am unable to return to work in CCU because 

 

then in February 2009 I was told that it was permanent.” She identified Nurse 

Practitioner David Lawson as the individual who told her that the job would be 

permanent in February 2009. According to the defendants, either Lawson didn’t say that 

or, if he did, it was bad information because the plan to fill Skotnicki’s temporary 

position with a nurse practitioner never changed. In any event, Skotnicki acknowledges 

that Lawson did not have the authority to make personnel decisions. 

4 There is some record support for Skotnicki’s assertion — which has come up 

again in this lawsuit — that she was “still technically a CCU employee.” Throughout her 

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of my neurological illness. Unless I have another office-type nursing 

job lined up in advance, I would have to file for disability status when 

my job here ends. I do not want to do that if at all possible.

In the summer and fall of 2009, Skotnicki applied to two other sedentary 

jobs at UAB that are relevant to her claims in this lawsuit. The first was a “Patient 

Flow Coordinator” position in the then-newly-created “Patient Flow Center.” 

Skotnicki first discussed that position with Susan Kuklinski, the person who would 

be responsible for the Center’s hiring, in June 2009. Skotnicki forwarded 

Kuklinski her resume. In December 2009, however, HR Consultant Sharon Lane

informed Skotnicki that the position required a bachelor’s degree, which is more 

education than the associate’s degree Skotnicki had at the time.5

 The second job 

she applied for — a “Patient Services Coordinator I” position — required only a 

 

two plus years in the IC office, Skotnicki continued to be listed on the CCU employee 

roster and was supervised by CCU’s nurse manager, which at some point changed from 

Long to defendant Gary Jones. When asked why Skotnicki was still listed and treated as 

a CCU employee after her move to the IC office, Conrad testified: “I had to leave [her] 

in [the CCU] cost center so that she could remain an employee and get benefits, because I 

didn’t have another position to put her into. There was not a position in the [IC] office . . 

. that I could have transferred her to.” Skotnicki’s salary was covered by IC, using funds 

that were available as a result of the vacant nurse practitioner position(s). 

5 Skotnicki asserts that Lane’s email also told her that UAB would waive the 

degree requirement if a job applicant was, at the time she applied, enrolled in the 

necessary program or agreed to obtain the degree by a certain future date. Skotnicki 

offers two record citations in support of the proposition that UAB had that waiver policy, 

neither of which are the email from Lane. The first citation is to her own testimony about 

what Lane told her. The second is Sharon Conrad’s testimony that UAB generally allows 

staff nurses to complete their bachelor’s degrees or other education while they are 

employed. Conrad said nothing, however, about whether a staff nurse could be hired into 

a position that required a bachelor’s degree without first obtaining the degree.

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high school diploma or G.E.D. The defendants put into evidence an affidavit from 

Lane stating that Skotnicki was not interviewed or selected for the position 

“because her salary expectations exceeded the salary that [the] department was 

willing to pay.”6

 

On December 11, 2009, Skotnicki was told that a fourth nurse practitioner

had been hired for the IC position. Because the new hire would need orientation, 

however, Skotnicki was asked to continue in the job until Friday, April 2, 2010.

On February 10, 2010, Skotnicki sent an email to defendant Gary Jones, who was 

the nurse manager in the CCU and her supervisor at the time. She wrote:

I have decided to apply for a medical leave of absence to begin 

immediately when my job in the [IC] office ends on April 2. I plan on 

receiving medical treatment for my medical condition during that time 

and hope to be able to find another position at UAB before the leave 

ends so that I can return to work.

The next day, Skotnicki sent another email to Jones requesting his fax 

number so that she could send the FMLA paperwork for his signature. A few 

hours later, Jones replied: “I am unsure about the process for FMLA at this time 

since your job is ending. I will consult HR and get back with you.” Skotnicki 

wrote back:

 6 Skotnicki asserts, for the first time in her reply brief, that “[t]he posted job listing 

stated a salary range of between $13 and $20/hour and on her application, [she] listed 

$16/hour, which was clearly within the range listed.” But her single record citation in 

support of that assertion directs us to a letter from UAB about long-term disability 

benefits. As far as we can tell, there is no evidence whatsoever that Skotnicki stated that 

$16/hour was her salary requirement. 

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After this medical leave and the treatment that my physician and I 

plan on me receiving over those 16 weeks, it is possible I may be able 

to return to CCU . . . . Or certainly that there may be another position 

made available to me that I will be able to do upon the completion of 

my medical leave. My current position is ending, but not necessarily 

my employment with UAB so I believe my leave request is due to be 

granted.

It is undisputed that Skotnicki’s FMLA application was submitted to UAB’s 

Leave Office on February 11, 2010, and that she requested leave to begin on April 

4, 2010, which was after her last day in the IC position. On February 18, 2010 —

one week after her leave request was submitted — Skotnicki received a 

memorandum from Conrad that stated: 

RE: Final Day of Employment

As you are aware, you were given non-bedside nursing duties in 

October 2007 to accommodate your medical restrictions that limited 

you from resuming your bedside nursing duties. The accommodation 

was made at that time, because [IC] needed additional assistance. . . . 

You have been repeatedly advised that you could not continue to 

serve in that capacity once the department was adequately staffed with 

[n]urse [p]ractitioners . . . .

Since you have informed us that your medical condition will not allow 

you to return to your staff RN role in CCU and the [nurse 

practitioners] are nearing the completion of their orientation, I am 

writing to inform you that your last day of work with UAB will be 

Friday, March 26, 2010 (pay date of April 2, 2010.)

Additionally, you recently informed your CCU Nurse Manager, Gary 

Jones, of your intention to apply for FMLA to begin April 2, 2010. 

Because your employment will have ended by that date, we are unable 

to grant you FMLA unless you secure other employment with UAB 

prior to that time. 

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Skotnicki contacted several higher-ranking individuals at UAB to request a 

reconsideration of the decision to deny her leave. By letter dated March 22, 2010, 

defendant Alesia Jones, who was UAB’s Chief Human Resources Officer,

reiterated UAB’s position that Skotnicki was “ineligible for a leave of absence” 

because she would “not be able to return to either of [her] previous positions,”

which were the bedside position in CCU or the temporary IC position that had 

been filled with a nurse practitioner. 

Skotnicki worked her last day at UAB on March 26, 2010.

7 She then filed 

this lawsuit in federal district court in September 2011, alleging violations of the 

FMLA, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and state law. 

On August 8, 2014, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants 

on all fifteen federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

Skotnicki’s state law claim, dismissing it without prejudice. 

II. Discussion

Skotnicki appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the 

defendants on four of her federal claims: (1) a FMLA interference claim; (2) a 

FMLA retaliation claim; (3) a Rehabilitation Act disparate treatment claim; and

(4) a Rehabilitation Act failure-to-accommodate claim. She contends that the 

 7 Thereafter, Skotnicki: (1) applied for and received long-term disability benefits; 

(2) continued to apply for open positions at UAB and elsewhere; and (3) obtained her 

bachelor’s degree (in February 2012). 

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district court erred by making credibility determinations, ignoring her sworn 

testimony, and construing the facts against her at the summary judgment stage. 

We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, applying the same legal 

standards that governed the district court’s decision. McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 

1558, 1560 (11th Cir. 1994). We may affirm on any ground supported by the 

record, “regardless of whether the district court relied on that ground.” Id. 

A. FMLA Claims

Among the substantive rights granted by the FMLA to eligible employees8 is 

the right to “12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period . . . [b]ecause of a 

serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions 

of the position of such employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). The FMLA creates 

two types of claims: “interference claims, in which an employee asserts that [her] 

employer denied or otherwise interfered with [her] substantive rights under the 

Act, see id. § 2615(a)(1), and retaliation claims, in which an employee asserts that 

[her] employer discriminated against [her] because [s]he engaged in activity 

protected by the Act, see id. § 2615(a)(1) & (2).” Strickland v. Water Works & 

Sewer Bd. of City of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2001). 

 8 An “eligible employee” is an “an employee who has been employed (i) for at 

least 12 months by the employer with respect to whom leave is requested . . . ; and (ii) for 

at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer during the previous 12-month period.” 

29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A).

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The district court never got around to addressing Skotnicki’s allegations of 

retaliation and interference because it granted summary judgment on the ground 

that the requested leave “fell outside her term of employment” and the decision to 

terminate her “had been announced before [she] engaged in any protected 

activity.” In essence, the court concluded that Skotnicki could not state a claim 

under the FMLA because she had no right to commence leave after her last day of 

employment, at which point she was no longer covered by the FMLA. On appeal, 

Skotnicki doesn’t challenge the court’s (correct) conclusion that the FMLA does 

not create a “right” to commence leave after an employee’s last day of 

employment. Instead, she argues that the court erroneously conflated the 

“termination” of the temporary IC position with the termination of her employment

at UAB (and, more specifically, her allegedly “permanent” position in the CCU), 

when in fact those were two separate events. Which is to say that she thinks her 

status as a CCU employee, instead of as a temporary IC employee, is the status 

upon which her FMLA leave request should have been evaluated, and thus the 

decision to deny it was “interference” with her right to take the leave and the 

decision to terminate her was “retaliation” for having requested it.9

 9 It is not clear to us that Skotnicki made this argument in the court below. If she 

did, it was not articulated well enough for the court to pick up on it; in an otherwise 

thorough order, it goes unmentioned. We could reject it on that basis alone. See Access 

Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1326–27 (11th Cir. 2004) (declining to 

address the merits of a claim where the appellants “raised an entirely new theory on 

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The problem with that argument is two-fold: there is no evidence to support 

it, and there is plenty of evidence to contradict it. Skotnicki relies most heavily —

indeed, almost exclusively — on the March 2008 individual development plan 

stating, in her handwriting, that she would “[c]ontinue to work in [IC] or CCU as 

[an] admit nurse.” But regardless of what Skotnicki’s or even UAB’s “plan” was 

in March 2008, there is nothing in the facts or the law to suggest that such a plan

imposed any constraints on the employment decisions made by UAB in late 2009 

and early 2010.10 

While UAB does not direct us to any clear-cut evidence that the end of 

Skotnicki’s temporary IC position and the end of her UAB employment were one 

and the same, it is undisputed that Skotnicki: (1) voluntarily took the IC position 

with the knowledge it was temporary; (2) repeatedly communicated that she was 

not capable of returning to her bedside care position in CCU; and (3) repeatedly 

expressed her understanding that, when the IC position ended, she would need to 

find another job within the UAB system or file for disability benefits. In a 

 

appeal — one never presented to or considered by the trial court”). Giving Skotnicki 

every benefit of the doubt, however, we will go ahead and address the argument. 10 Skotnicki also points to the fact that she was at all times “listed” on the CCU 

employee roster, but she does not explain — and we cannot discern — how that fact is 

significant. There is no organizational chart that shows how the parts of UAB Hospital 

fit together, or any explanation of the HR-related implications of being “listed” on any 

given roster. Indeed, the record is devoid of anything that would indicate that Skotnicki’s 

status as a CCU employee, instead of as an IC employee, is the status upon which her 

FMLA leave request should have been evaluated. 

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February 2009 email to Dr. Misra, for example, Skotnicki stated in no uncertain 

terms that she was “unable to return to work in [the] CCU” and “[u]nless [she had] 

another office-type nursing job lined up in advance, [she] would have to file for 

disability status when [her] job [in IC] end[ed].” 

Skotnicki’s own deposition testimony contradicts her position on appeal.

When asked whether she was given “notice” of her “final day of employment” 

after a fourth nurse practitioner was hired for IC, she responded, “Yes. April the 

2nd.” While she would no doubt urge us to read “final day of employment” as 

meaning “final day in the IC office,” such a reading strains credibility, especially 

in light of the other record evidence. Nothing in Skotnicki’s sworn testimony or 

anything else in the record amounts to more than “a mere scintilla of evidence”

that she had not already been terminated when she requested FMLA leave to begin 

after her last day of employment. See Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 

(11th Cir. 1990) (“A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the [nonmoving] party’s 

position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could 

reasonably find for that party.”) (quotation marks omitted). 

There is another reason Skotnicki’s FMLA claims fail. The right to 

commence FMLA leave is not absolute, and “an employee can be dismissed, 

preventing her from exercising her right to commence FMLA leave, without 

thereby violating the FMLA, if the employee would have been dismissed 

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regardless of any request for FMLA leave.” Krutzig v. Pulte Home Corp., 602 

F.3d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir. 2010). So even if UAB made the decision to terminate 

Skotnicki’s employment, or informed her of that decision, after she requested 

FMLA leave, the decision would not amount to a violation of the FMLA provided 

that UAB’s reason was unrelated to the leave request. UAB has consistently 

stated, and the record consistently reflects, that it terminated Skotnicki because the 

temporary IC position was no longer available and Skotnicki had informed the 

hospital that she could not return to bedside care duties in the CCU. 

In sum, the FMLA does not give a terminated employee the right to 

commence medical leave after her last day of employment, when she is no longer 

covered by the Act. Even construing the facts and all reasonable inferences in 

Skotnicki’s favor, as we must, the record is clear that she requested leave to 

commence after her last day of employment. As a result, there was no right with 

which the defendants could have interfered and there was no “protected activity” 

that could serve as the basis for a retaliation claim. We will affirm the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on both of Skotnicki’s 

FMLA claims. 

B. Rehabilitation Act Claims

The Rehabilitation Act prohibits any program or activity receiving federal 

funds from discriminating against otherwise qualified individuals with a disability. 

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See Mullins v. Crowell, 228 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000); see also 29 U.S.C. 

§ 794(d). To establish a prima facie claim of failure to accommodate under the 

Rehabilitation Act, Skotnicki must show that: (1) she was disabled; (2) she was a 

qualified individual; and (3) she was discriminated against by way of the 

defendant’s failure to provide a reasonable accommodation. Lucas v. W.W. 

Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001). 

UAB does not dispute that Skotnicki was disabled and that she was a 

qualified individual. The question is whether UAB discriminated against her by 

failing to provide a reasonable accommodation. Skotnicki bears the burden of 

identifying an accommodation and establishing that it was reasonable. Id. She 

points to four accommodations that she requested and that UAB failed to provide. 

But none of them are reasonable. 

The first accommodation Skotnicki requested was medical leave. Although 

granting medical leave is one way an employer may accommodate an employee 

with a disability, see Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277, 279 (11th Cir. 

1994), the accommodation is not required unless it is a reasonable one. A medical 

leave period that commences after an employee’s last day of employment is not a 

reasonable accommodation.

The remaining three of Skotnicki’s accommodation requests were essentially 

requests for reassignment. We have said that reassignment to a vacant position is a 

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reasonable accommodation. Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1256. Any duty to reassign does 

not, however, require the employer to bump another employee from a position, to 

create a new position, to promote the disabled employee, or to assign the disabled 

employee to a position for which he is not qualified. Id. at 1256–57; Terrell v. 

USAir, 132 F.3d 621, 625–26 (11th Cir. 1998). 

Skotnicki’s first reassignment request — that she be put into the CCU as an 

“admit nurse” — was not reasonable because it would have required UAB to create 

a new position. See Terrell, 132 F.3d at 626. The fact that UAB had offered, two 

years earlier, to create an admit nurse position in CCU for Skotnicki — an offer 

she declined — does not change anything. Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1257 n.3 (“Good 

deeds ought not be punished, and an employer who goes beyond the demands of 

the law to help a disabled employee incurs no legal obligation to continue doing 

so.”); see also Terrell, 132 F.3d at 626 n.6 (“An employer that bends over 

backwards to accommodate a disabled worker . . . must not be punished for its 

generosity by being deemed to have conceded the reasonableness of so farreaching an accommodation.”) (quotation marks omitted).

The second reassignment request — to the “Patient Flow Coordinator”

position — was not reasonable because that position required a bachelor’s degree 

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and Skotnicki did not have one when she applied for the position. 11 See Lucas, 

257 F.3d at 1259 (“The law in this area is crystal clear: an otherwise qualified 

person is one who is able to meet all of the [job’s] requirements in spite of his 

handicap.”) (quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). 

The third and final accommodation request — reassignment to the open 

“Patient Services Coordinator I” position — presents a question that the district 

court did not address in its order granting summary judgment to the defendants. 

Sharon Lane’s affidavit states that Skotnicki was not selected for the job “because 

her salary expectations exceeded the salary that this department was willing to 

pay.” Skotnicki offered no response or rebuttal to that reason in the district court 

or in her main brief to this Court. Instead, she waited until her reply brief to assert 

that “[t]he posted job listing stated a salary range of between $13 and $20/hour and 

on her application, [she] listed $16/hour.” And the only record citation she offered 

in support of that assertion — which directed us to a letter from UAB discussing 

long-term disability benefits — offered no such support. Even if we were willing

to entertain a critical factual assertion raised for the first time in a reply brief, 

which we are not, our law is clear that “[u]nsupported assertions in a brief cannot 

 11There is no evidence to support Skotnicki’s assertion that UAB had a policy of 

hiring candidates without the required degree if they agreed to complete it while in the 

job. Although Sharon Conrad acknowledged that UAB generally allows staff nurses to 

complete bachelor’s degrees or other education while employed, she was not asked and 

did not say whether a staff nurse could be hired into a position that required a bachelor’s 

degree without first obtaining the degree.

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substitute for evidence in the record.” ACLU v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 436 (11th 

Cir. 1999). 

Finally, Skotnicki contends that UAB’s failure to hire her to the “Patient 

Services Coordinator I” position was not only a failure to accommodate, but also 

an instance of “disparate treatment.” According to Skotnicki, “the resume and

application of the [non-disabled] person hired were not consistent as to the 

person’s educational background, such that . . . the inference drawn is that UAB 

hired a person who falsified a claim to a [b]achelor’s degree . . . and discriminated 

against [Skotnicki] because of her disability.” But aside from a stray reference in 

its response brief to “another candidate . . . believed to be the best candidate,” 

UAB has relied exclusively on Skotnicki’s alleged “salary expectation” as its nondiscriminatory reason for excluding her from consideration. And Skotnicki has not 

offered any evidence to rebut that reason. See Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 

1012, 1037 (11th Cir. 2000) (“In order to avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff 

must produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that each

of the employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons is pretextual.”) (emphasis 

added).

AFFIRMED.

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