Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03008/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03008-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Derrick Cook
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 8, 2009 Decided February 12, 2010

No. 09-3008

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DERRICK COOK,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:93-cr-00365-RCL-1)

Mary M. Petras, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Michael T. Ambrosino, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Roy W. McLeese

III, John P. Mannarino, and Mary Ann Snow, Assistant U.S.

Attorneys.

USCA Case #09-3008 Document #1229882 Filed: 02/12/2010 Page 1 of 14
2

Before: ROGERS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from the denial of

a motion for the reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2) in view of amendments to the U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) reducing the base level offense for

offenses involving crack cocaine. We join the other circuits in

holding that section 3582(c)(2), which refers to sentences “based

on a guideline range subsequently lowered by the Sentencing

Commission,” applies only to a sentence that is determined by

a guideline range. Because Cook was sentenced to the

mandatory minimum in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), his

sentence was not based on a guideline range, and he is ineligible

for relief under section 3582(c)(2). Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

On October 7, 1993, Derrick Cook and Dwayne Short were

indicted on one count of possession with intent to distribute fifty

grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a

detectable amount of cocaine base (also known as crack), in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 18

U.S.C. § 2. The government filed an information regarding

Cook’s prior drug conviction, which made him eligible for

enhanced mandatory penalties under 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). A jury convicted Cook of possession with

intent to distribute a detectable amount of cocaine base but did

not make any findings as to the quantity of drugs for which he

was to be held accountable. The district court found as a matter

of fact, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Cook had

possessed 111 grams of cocaine base, making his guideline

range under the 1994 Sentencing Guidelines 135 to 168 months.

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The district court noted, however, that Congress had

“superimposed mandatory minimums on top of the Guidelines.”

Sentencing Tr. 20, lines 24–25 (Jul. 5, 1994). Pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b), which required imposition of the

mandatory minimum sentence if it was greater than the

guideline range, the district court sentenced Cook to the

mandatory minimum sentence for repeat offenders of 240

months’ imprisonment in section 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and to a

mandatory term of ten years’ supervised release, see id. 

Cook appealed his conviction, and this court affirmed.

United States v. Cook, 70 F.3d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (unpub. per

curiam). In 1997, Cook moved to vacate, set aside, or correct

the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, on the ground of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which motion the district

court denied, United States v. Cook, 130 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C.

2000); this court affirmed, United States v. Cook, 22 Fed. Appx.

3 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In 2003, Cook moved to reduce his sentence

under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on Amendment 645 to the

Sentencing Guidelines, seeking credit for time served

concurrently with the sentence imposed upon revocation of his

probation for this conviction. The district court denied the

motion, and Cook did not appeal.

In August 2008, Cook moved to reduce his sentence under

section 3582(c)(2) based on the Sentencing Commission’s

adoption of Amendments 706, 711 and 713, which together

retroactively lowered the base level offense under U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1 by two points for offenses involving crack cocaine, see

U.S.S.G. app. C, amendments 706 and 711 (Nov. 1, 2007); see

id. amendment 713 (Mar. 3, 2008). He argued that in 1994 the

district court had sentenced him to 240 months’ imprisonment

on the mistaken belief that he was subject to a statutory

mandatory minimum sentence even though the jury had not

found him guilty of possessing with intent to distribute more

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than 50 grams of crack cocaine. Applying the amendments, his

guideline range would be 108–135 months. His projected release

date was April 27, 2013. As of March 3, 2008, when the

amendments took effect, he would have served more than fifteen

years (180 months), well above the amended sentencing range.

Cook therefore requested that his sentence be reduced to time

served. 

The district court denied the motion, ruling that it lacked

authority to grant the relief Cook sought. Cook appeals. This

court has jurisdiction to review the denial of a section 3582

motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see United States v. Paulk, 569

F.3d 1094, 1095 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Mateo, 560

F.3d 152, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009); and under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3742(a)(1), see United States v. Legree, 205 F.3d 724, 727

(4th Cir. 2000).

II.

Section 3582(c)(2) provides:

[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to

a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range

that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing

Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), upon

motion of the defendant or the Director of the Bureau

of Prisons, or on its own motion, the court may reduce

the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors

set forth in section 3553(a) [18 USCS § 3553(a)] to the

extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is

consistent with applicable policy statements issued by

the Sentencing Commission.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (emphasis added). Because the proper

interpretation of a statute is a question of law, our review is de

USCA Case #09-3008 Document #1229882 Filed: 02/12/2010 Page 4 of 14
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novo. United States v. Goodwin, 317 F.3d 293, 297 (D.C. Cir.

2003). We begin with the text of the statute, Hughes Aircraft

Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999), giving words their

ordinary and natural meaning, Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9

(2004), while recognizing that plain or not, the meaning of a

word depends on its context, see Halloway v. United States, 526

U.S. 1, 7 (1999) (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118

(1994)).

To be eligible for relief pursuant to section 3582(c)(2), a

defendant’s sentence must be “based on a sentencing range that

has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”

The circuit courts have held that where a defendant is sentenced

to a statutory mandatory minimum sentence, relief under section

3582(c)(2) is unavailable because the sentence is no longer

“based on” a sentencing range. As the Seventh Circuit

explained in United States v. Poole, 550 F.3d 676, 678 (7th Cir.

2008), “Congress has authorized district courts to modify

sentences in very limited circumstances,” and such relief is

unavailable where a defendant was sentenced to a mandatory

minimum sentence because the “sentence was ‘based on’ a

statutory minimum, not a sentencing range that Amendment 706

lowered.” To the argument that the defendant’s sentencing

range had been subsequently lowered because the district court

had initially calculated a guideline range that the Amendment to

the Sentencing Guidelines altered, the court responded, “this

view ignores the fact that the district court’s initial guidelines

calculation became academic once [the defendant’s] prior drug

felony was factored in, triggering the statutory minimum

sentence.” Id. at 679.

The other circuits to address the question are in agreement

with this interpretation of the phrase “based on.” In United

States v. Williams, 551 F.3d 182, 185 (2d Cir. 2009), the Second

Circuit stated that “[o]nce the mandatory minimum applied, [the

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defendant’s] sentence was no longer ‘based on a sentencing

range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing

Commission.’” (quoting § 3582(c)(2)). In United States v. Hood,

556 F.3d 226, 233 (4th Cir. 2009), the Fourth Circuit agreed that

the defendant’s 240 months’ sentence was based on the

Sentencing Guidelines pursuant to the mandatory minimum

sentence, rather than the sentencing range derived from U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1 for individual crack cocaine offenses. The Sixth Circuit

in United States v. Johnson, 564 F.3d 419, 423 (6th Cir. 2009),

likewise stated the defendant “was not in fact sentenced based on

a Guidelines range that was subsequently reduced” because “his

sentence was based on the mandatory minimum imposed by 21

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), which remained unchanged by Guidelines

Amendment 706.” So too in Paulk, 569 F.3d at 1095, the Ninth

Circuit concluded the defendant was “not entitled to a reduction

because his sentence was not ‘based on a sentencing range that

has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission,’

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), but rather was based on the statutory

mandatory minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 841.” To the same

effect are decisions in the First, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and

Eleventh Circuits, which have denied relief under section

3582(c)(2) to defendants sentenced to statutory mandatory

minimum sentences without referencing the “based on” phrase.

See United States v. Ganun, 547 F.3d 46, 47 (1st Cir. 2008);

United States v. Jones, 523 F.3d 881, 882 (8th Cir. 2008); United

States v. Smartt, 129 F.3d 539, 542 (10th Cir. 1997); United

States v. Eggersdorf, 126 F.3d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 1997);

United States v. Pardue, 36 F.3d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 1994).

Cook attempts to avoid this precedent and meet section

3582(c)(2)’s threshold “based on” requirement in two ways: first,

by pointing to the two-step sentencing procedure under the

Sentencing Guidelines, and second, by challenging the

lawfulness of the imposition of the mandatory minimum

sentence. Neither attempt succeeds.

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1

 U.S.S.G.§ 1B1.1 Application Instructions lists the order in

which the provisions of the Manual are to be applied, referring, as

relevant, to “the guideline range” in subsection (g): “Determine the

guideline range in Part A of Chapter Five that corresponds to the

offense level and criminal history category determined above.” 

2

 U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1, Sentencing on a Single Count of

Conviction, provides, as relevant:

(b) Where a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater

than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the

statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline

sentence.

 First, Cook contends that his sentence was in part “based

on” a sentencing range because of the two-step sentencing

process required by the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court

must first determine “the guideline range” and only then

determine, second, whether the “applicable guideline range” is

“trumped” by a statutory mandatory minimum. Appellant’s Br.

11; see U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.11

 & 5G1.1(b)2. “Because this process

requires that the applicable sentencing range be part of the basis

for the sentence, when the range is reduced the district court

necessarily has the authority to reduce the sentence.”

Appellant’s Br. 7. Because Cook claims he therefore is eligible

for relief under section 3582(c)(2), it follows Cook argues that

the district court can reassess the original decision to sentence

him to a mandatory minimum sentence under an improper

sentencing theory, which allowed the district court rather than a

jury to determine the amount of drugs for which he was

responsible, see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244–45

(2005); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), and

upon recalculating his guideline range not reimpose the improper

mandatory minimum upon resentencing. 

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3

 The Fourth Circuit plea-agreement case cited by Cook was

vacated and dismissed as moot. United States v. Dews, 551 F.3d 204

As preliminary matters we note that on appeal Cook agrees

his Apprendi claim is foreclosed because his 240-months

sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum for the offense

of conviction, see United States v. Graham, 317 F.3d 262,

273–74 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C),

which would have applied in the absence of the judicial

factfinding, Cook would have been eligible for up to twenty

years’ imprisonment. Cook also states he is not raising the issue

of whether upon obtaining relief under section 3582(c)(2) the

district court must treat the Guidelines as mandatory when

imposing a new sentence, an issue pending before the Supreme

Court in United States v. Dillon, 572 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 2009),

cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3334 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2009) (No. 09-

6338). Instead, he relies on precedent construing the phrase

“based on” as not imposing a condition of exclusivity and on the

distinction in the Sentencing Guidelines between a “guideline

range,” see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B), and a “guideline

sentence,” see U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b). 

The phrase “based on” must be construed in the context of

the relevant statute, and precedent on section 3582(c)(2) does not

favor Cook’s interpretation. Cook’s reliance on precedent

involving other statutory schemes, Sierra Club v. EPA, 356 F.3d

296, 305–06 (D.C. Cir. 2004); McDaniel v. Chevron Corp., 203

F.3d 1099, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000); United States ex rel. Kreindler

& Kreindler v. United Tech. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1158 (2d Cir.

1993), is unavailing because the meaning of statutory words is

informed by the particular statutory context, see Halloway, 526

U.S. at 7. Even the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of section

3582(c)(2) as broad enough to include a sentence imposed

pursuant to a plea agreement, United States v. Cobb, 584 F.3d

979 (10th Cir. 2009),3

 is of no assistance because the court

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(4th Cir. 2008), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, No. 08-6458 (4th

Cir. Feb. 20, 2009), appeal dismissed as moot, No. 08-6458 (4th Cir.

May 4, 2009). 

reasoned that “[i]t is simply unrealistic to think that the

applicable guideline range is not a major factor (if not the major

factor) in reaching a stipulated sentence.” Id. at 985 (emphasis

original). No such practical relationship is manifest in Cook’s

case. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has held that defendants

“sentenced to a statutory mandatory minimum” are “ineligible

for a reduction of sentence under section 3582(c)(2).” Smartt,

129 F.3d at 542. In any event, this court noted in United States

v. Robinson, 587 F.3d 1122, 1129 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2009), that

“[o]ther circuits have reached the opposite result, concluding that

a sentence imposed pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea

agreement is not ‘based on’ the Guidelines and thus does not

come within the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).” See, e.g.,

United States v. Main, 579 F.3d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 2009); United

States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 280 (3d Cir. 2009); United

States v. Scurlark, 560 F.3d 839, 841 (8th Cir. 2009); United

States v. Peveler 359 F.3d 369, 378–79 (6th Cir. 2004); see also

United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 364 (7th Cir. 2005).

Construed in its ordinary sense, the phrase “based on” refers,

for purposes of section 3582(c)(2), to a guideline range that

determined the defendant’s sentence. If as Cook contends the

guideline range calculated by the district court under a two-step

sentencing process comprehends a mandatory minimum, then

Amendments 703, 711 and 713 on which Cook relies are of no

relevance. Although, as the government acknowledges, the

phrase “based on” can mean “based in part on” rather than

“based solely on,” Cook’s 1994 sentence, i.e., his sentencing

range, was not “based on” a guideline range within which the

district court had sentencing discretion, but on the statutory

mandatory minimum sentence under which the district court lost

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4

 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 Reduction in Term of Imprisonment as

a Result of Amended Guideline Range (Policy Statement), reads in

part subpart (a)(2): “ Exclusions.—A reduction in the defendant’s term

of imprisonment is not consistent with this policy statement and

therefore is not authorized under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) if — . . . (B)

[a]n amendment . . . does not have the effect of lowering the

defendant’s applicable guideline range.” 

sentencing discretion. As the Seventh Circuit observed in Poole,

550 F.3d at 679, the district court’s initial calculation of a

guideline range became “academic” once the mandatory

minimum sentence kicked in. To go behind the statutory

mandatory minimum, as Cook’s interpretation requires, would

mean his statutory mandatory minimum sentence could be

reduced under section 3582(c)(2) even though that sentence was

determined independent of and rendered irrelevant an otherwise

applicable guideline range. Congress’ use of the phrase “based

on” would be a curious way to accomplish that result, much less

to indicate the Sentencing Guidelines Commission’s amendment

to a base offense level would amend a statute calling for the

imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence. See United

States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997). 

Indeed, the Third Circuit, rejecting a similar argument to

Cook’s in United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir.

2009), equated the statutory mandatory minimum sentence,

imposed pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b), with the “applicable

guideline range” under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B)4

 inasmuch as

the defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence “subsumed and

displaced” the initial guideline range, and hence the applicable

guideline range was not affected by the crack cocaine

amendments. See id. Similarly, the Eighth Circuit explained in

Jones, 523 F.3d at 882, that the defendant’s “final originally

calculated guidelines range was the statutorily required minimum

sentence of 120 months” such that his “guidelines range was

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11

unaffected by the recent amendments to the crack quantity

guidelines.” Or as the Ninth Circuit stated, the “mandatory

minimum ‘was not affected by the changes in the [drug]

equivalency tables.’” Paulk, 569 F.3d at 1095 (quoting United

States v. Mullanix, 99 F.3d 323, 324 (9th Cir. 1996) (alteration

in original)). The Sixth Circuit in Johnson, 564 F.3d at 423,

agreed. This court in United States v. Lafayette, 585 F.3d 435,

440 (D.C. Cir. 2009), reached the same conclusion in rejecting

the defendant’s request to reduce the five-year term of

supervised release, assuming such a request to come within the

scope of section 3582(c)(2), because the five-year term was

mandated by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). 

Cook’s analytical error is clear from the plain text of section

3582(c)(2), which uses neither of the formulations in U.S.S.G.

§ 5G1.1(g) or U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B), referring instead to

“a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has

subsequently been lowered,” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (emphasis

added). That the statute refers to “sentencing range” further

supports the circuits’ interpretation that the statutory mandatory

minimum is the applicable guideline range for purposes of

section 3582(c)(2). “[T]he term ‘sentencing range’ clearly

contemplates the end result of the overall guideline calculus, not

the series of tentative results reached at various interim steps in

the performance of that calculus.” Mateo, 560 F.3d at 155

(internal quotations omitted).

The cases on which Cook relies for his two-step analysis of

sentencing under the Sentencing Guidelines do not address the

question now before the court. In United States v. RodriguezMartinez, 25 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 1994), the court did hold

that the district court could not abdicate its responsibility to

determine the guideline range by skipping to the mandatory

minimum in the first instance, but the court said nothing about

whether the mandatory minimum became the basis of the

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12

sentence for purposes of a section 3582(c)(2) motion. In United

States v. Richardson, 521 F.3d 149, 158–59 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008),

the court was addressing the initial sentencing, not whether being

sentenced to a mandatory minimum would foreclose relief under

a later filed section 3582(c)(2) motion. Cook’s response that the

mandatory minimum cases of Paulk, 569 F.3d at 1095, and

United States v. McChriston, 329 Fed. Appx. 255, 256 (11th Cir.

2009), “brushed over the issue of whether or not the original

sentence was ‘based on’ the subsequently reduced guideline

range,” Appellant’s Reply Br. 14–15, overlooks that the circuits

have held that the original sentence was “based on” the statutory

mandatory minimum, not the initial guideline range, Paulk; 569

F.3d at 1095; McChriston, 329 Fed. Appx. at 256; see also

Poole, 550 F.3d at 678–79. Cook’s interpretation, that the

“based on” requirement in section 3582(c)(2) refers to an

“academic”guideline range, Poole, 550 F.3d at 679, is unfaithful

to the text. 

Second, Cook attempts to demonstrate his eligibility for

section 3582(c) relief on the ground that his 1994 mandatory

minimum sentence is unlawful. Cook would distinguish the

mandatory minimum cases in the other circuits by noting that in

those cases there was no dispute that the defendant was

convicted of an offense that carried a mandatory minimum

sentence, unlike here where there is no statutory mandatory

minimum sentence upon conviction of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C),

the provision under which Cook would have been sentenced on

the jury findings. See United States v. Webb, 255 F.3d 890,

896–97, 899–900 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing United States v.

Fields, 251 F.3d 1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). But when Cook

was sentenced in 1994, it was standard practice for the

sentencing court to make findings of fact on drug quantity. See

id. at 894. That aside, the plain text of section 3582(c)(2) does

not support the broad resentencing remedy Cook seeks. The

statutory mandatory minimum provision under which he was

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13

sentenced was not reduced by the Guidelines amendments,

much less was it a guideline range that has been reduced.

In Lafayette, this court joined the other circuits in rejecting

a broad interpretation of section 3582(c)(2) as generally

reopening a defendant’s sentence. The court explained that

section 3582(c)(2)

provides a circumscribed opportunity for district courts

to give sentencing relief when the Sentencing

Guidelines are changed. A defendant’s right to file

under this exception to the usual finality of sentencing

decisions is triggered only by a Guidelines amendment.

Given this, . . . it would be quite incongruous . . . if

section 3582(c)(2) provided an avenue for sentencing

adjustments wholly unrelated to such an amendment.

585 F.3d at 438. The court consequently rejected the

defendant’s claims regarding the constitutional infirmities of his

sentence under Booker and Apprendi as “features of earlier

sentencing decisions, not the district court’s . . . narrow section

3582(c)(2) determination.” Id. Cook’s contention that the

imposition of a mandatory minimum was unlawful because it

was unauthorized is, as in Lafayette, a feature of his 1994

sentence. Lafayette’s interpretation of the limited scope of the

opportunity for relief presented by section 3582(c)(2) thus bars

Cook’s alternative attempt to obtain relief. See LaShawn v.

Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc). 

Cook’s reliance on the rule of lenity and the canon against

producing absurd results is misplaced. The former is a canon of

last resort where there is statutory ambiguity. See United States

v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 305–06 (1992). Section 3582(c)(2) is

not ambiguous. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120,

132–33 (2000) (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118

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14

(1994)). The latter canon imposes a high threshold: A “statutory

outcome is absurd if it defies rationality” by “render[ing] a

statute nonsensical or superfluous” or if it creates “an outcome

so contrary to perceived social values that Congress could not

have intended it.” Landstar Express Am., Inc. v. FMC, 569 F.3d

493, 498-499 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). No

such concerns exist here as the distinction drawn by the circuits

is between sentences imposed under mandatory minimums and

those imposed under the otherwise applicable guideline range.

Moreover, the government argues that granting Cook relief

would provide a windfall to a small class of defendants

convicted of crack-related drug offenses, with no comparable

relief offered to similarly situated drug offenders, resulting in

unwarranted sentencing disparities that Congress sought to

eliminate in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, P.L. No.

98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, as amended and codified at 18 U.S.C. §§

3551–3626 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998. This concern echoes

that expressed by this court in Lafayette, 585 F.3d at 438. 

Accordingly, because Cook was sentenced to a statutory

mandatory minimum sentence, he is ineligible for relief under

section 3582(c)(2) based on Sentencing Guidelines’

Amendments 703, 711, and 713, and we affirm the denial of his

motion.

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