Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02283/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02283-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stephanie Abeyta
Appellee
Peter Casados
Appellant
Chama Valley Independent School District
Not Party

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

STEPHANIE ABEYTA, a minor, by and 

through her next friends Susie Martinez 

and Raymond Martinez, 

v. 

Plaintiff-Counter-DefendantAppellee, 

CHAMA VALLEY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL 

DISTRICT, NO. 19, 

Defendant-Counter-Claimant, 

and 

PETER CASADOS, in his individual 

capacity, 

Defendant-Counter-ClaimantAppellant. 

No. 94-2283 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CIV-94-133-LH) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Gregory L. Biehler and Lisa A. Joynes, of Beall, Biehler & Bannerman, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant-Counter-ClaimantAppellant. 

John B. Roesler and Stephen E. Tinkler, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for 

Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee. 

Appellate Case: 94-2283 Document: 01019277341 Date Filed: 02/22/1996 Page: 1 
Before BRISCOE, LOGAN, Circuit Judges, and THOMPSON,* District 

Judge. 

*Honorable Ralph G. Thompson, District Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

I 

The plaintiff in this case is a twelve-year-old female student whose teacher allegedly called her a prostitute in front of 

the class and continued to call her that over a month-and-a-half 

period. The only issue we need to decide is whether the student's 

complaint against her teacher states a violation of her substantive due process rights cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 

Plaintiff Stephanie Abeyta, through her next friends, brought 

this suit under § 1983, alleging that her teacher, defendant Peter 

Casados, violated plaintiff's substantive due process rights to be 

free from invasion of her personal security by sexual abuse and 

harassment and by psychological abuse.2 The complaint alleged 

that in September 1990, defendant read aloud to plaintiff's sixth 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously to grant the parties' request for a 

decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(f) and lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 Plaintiff also alleged claims against the defendant school 

district for violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 

1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688, and against defendant for violation 

of her equal protection rights. The district court dismissed 

those claims, and they are not raised in this appeal. 

2 

Appellate Case: 94-2283 Document: 01019277341 Date Filed: 02/22/1996 Page: 2 
grade class a note written by plaintiff to a fifth grade student, 

Dominic. The note said "You're cute ... I like you," and was 

signed "Always, Stephanie." Appellant's App. 3. After reading 

the note, defendant asked the class if they thought plaintiff was 

a prostitute. The class laughed. At recess and during lunchtime, 

various classmates taunted plaintiff by calling her a prostitute 

and asking her when she was going to work on Central. Defendant 

continued to call plaintiff a prostitute that day in a low voice 

and for the following month and a half. Her classmates' taunts 

continued until December 20, 1990, when she left school. 

Defendant sought summary judgment, asserting a defense of 

qualified immunity. The district court ultimately concluded that 

calling plaintiff a prostitute was psychological abuse directed at 

her well-being and therefore violated her protected liberty interest to be free from unjustified intrusion of her personal security. It ruled that defendant was not entitled to qualified 

immunity because the law was clearly established that persons have 

a right to be free from unjustified intrusions upon their emotional well-being. The court then defined verbal sexual abuse and 

harassment as a subset of psychological abuse and applied the same 

reasoning to deny qualified immunity to that claim. Defendant 

appealed these denials. 

We review the denial of summary judgment de novo applying the 

same legal standard used by the district court pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c). James v. Sears. Roebuck & Co., 21 F.3d 989, 997-98 

(lOth Cir. 1994). "Summary judgment is appropriate if 'there is 

no genuine issue as to any material fact and . 

3 

the moving 

Appellate Case: 94-2283 Document: 01019277341 Date Filed: 02/22/1996 Page: 3 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' 11 Hagelin for 

President Comm. v. Graves, 25 F.3d 956, 959 (lOth Cir. 

1994) (quoting Rule 56(c)) (alteration in original), cert. denied, 

115 S. Ct. 934 (1995). 11 In applying this standard, we construe 

the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the 

light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. 11 

Blue Circle Cement. Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 27 F.3d 1499, 

1503 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

II 

11 As a threshold inquiry to qualified immunity, we first must 

determine whether plaintiff's allegations, even if accepted as 

true, state a claim for violation of any rights secured under the 

United States Constitution ... Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 

729 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1266 (1993). 

Plaintiff has the 11 burden to show with particularity facts and law 

establishing the inference that defendant violated a constitutional right. 11 Walter v. Morton, 33 F.3d 1240, 1242 (lOth Cir. 

1994) . We do not reach the issue of qualified immunity if plaintiff's claim is not actionable. See Gehl Group v. Koby, 63 F.3d 

1528, 1533 (lOth Cir. 1995). 

A 

We consider first whether the plaintiff's allegation of sexual harassment and abuse stated an actionable claim. Defendant 

argues that plaintiff failed to establish discrimination based on 

hostile environment sexual harassment. Defendant contends that 

any alleged isolated comments were insufficient to show a pervasive hostile atmosphere and that his conduct was not gender-based. 

4 

Appellate Case: 94-2283 Document: 01019277341 Date Filed: 02/22/1996 Page: 4 
Thus, he asserts that any conduct alleged in the complaint does 

not rise to the level of a constitutional tort. 

Sexual assault or molestation by a school teacher violates a 

student's substantive due process rights. See Maldonado, 975 F.2d 

at 730-31. A teacher's sexual molestation of a student is an intrusion of the student's bodily integrity. Stoneking v. Bradford 

Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 727 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 

493 U.S. 1044 (1990). Here, defendant's conduct as alleged certainly was harassing, and we must accept that it directly inflicted emotional harm on plaintiff. Cf. Maldonado, 975 F.2d at 

730-31. There were no allegations, however, of sexual assault, 

molestation, or touching of any sort. We have found no case in a 

school context that held conduct falling shy of sexual molestation 

or assault constitutes constitutionally actionable sexual harassment. 

Plaintiff suggests that Title VII case law prohibiting hostile environment sexual harassment in an employment setting provides analogous support to her cause of action. For hostile environment sexual harassment in an employment setting, there must 

be severe and pervasive sexual conduct creating an intimidating, 

hostile, or offensive environment. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. 

Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 

F.2d 1406, 1413 (lOth Cir. 1987). 

Defendant allegedly called plaintiff a prostitute and apparently permitted her classmates to taunt her over a period of 

weeks. Plaintiff did not set forth any other evidence of 

insulting, sexually specific name-calling, or similar conduct 

5 

Appellate Case: 94-2283 Document: 01019277341 Date Filed: 02/22/1996 Page: 5 
directed toward plaintiff or other female students. What 

allegedly occurred here might be enough to state a claim under 

Title VII if done in an employment context. See Gross v. Burggraf 

Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1539 (lOth Cir. 1995). But plaintiff 

is claiming a constitutional substantive due process violation. 

More is required to state a claim for a constitutional violation--

the standard we must apply here--than for a statutory claim under 

Title VII. We believe the fact that verbal harassment is 

gender-specific gives it no greater claim as a constitutional 

violation than verbal harassment generally. Thus, we must look at 

this claim as one for psychological abuse. 

B 

We next consider whether plaintiff's allegation of psychological abuse states an actionable claim. Defendant argues that 

psychological abuse absent physical contact or a threat to bodily 

integrity is not a deprivation of constitutional rights. No published authority addresses this particular issue in a school context. In other contexts, however, even extreme verbal abuse 

typically is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation. Cf. Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (lOth Cir. 

1979) (holding that verbal abuse where sheriff laughed at prisoner 

and threatened to hang him did not state constitutional deprivation actionable under § 1983). 

We have decided one substantive due process violation case in 

a regular school punishment context, Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650 (lOth Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 

(1988). There, a nine-year-old third grader received two beatings 

6 

Appellate Case: 94-2283 Document: 01019277341 Date Filed: 02/22/1996 Page: 6 
at school. During the first, she was held upside down by a 

teacher and beaten on the legs with a split wooden paddle by the 

principal. The beating drew blood, and resulted in a welt and 

two-inch cut on her leg that left a permanent scar. For the second beating, the principal struck the child on the buttocks several times with the same wooden paddle. The child struggled during the beating and hit her back on a desk. Thereafter, she was 

struck three additional times. She suffered from serious bruises 

on her buttocks which hurt for two to three weeks and back pains 

for several weeks. An examining physician and nurse considered 

the second beating severe enough to report as child abuse. 

In review, we held that "at some point, excessive corporal 

punishment violates the pupil's substantive due process rights." 

Id. at 653. Focusing on the physical harm and citing Rochin v. 

California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding forced stomach pumping 

shocks the conscience and violates substantive due process) , we 

held that when a school official's conduct is shocking to the 

conscience, brutal, or offensive to human dignity, it offends the 

Due Process Clause. See also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 

503 U.S. 115, 126, 128 (1992) (to prevail on a substantive due 

process claim, plaintiff must prove action shocking to the conscience). In determining whether the corporal punishment was 

extreme enough to constitute a substantive due process violation, 

we focused on 

whether the force applied caused injury so severe, was 

so disproportionate to the need presented, and was so 

inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a 

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Appellate Case: 94-2283 Document: 01019277341 Date Filed: 02/22/1996 Page: 7 
brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally 

shocking to the conscience. 

Garcia, 817 F.2d at 655 (quoting Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 

(4th Cir. 1980)). Garcia is distinguishable, however, because 

plaintiff in the instant case suffered no physical abuse. Garcia 

does not discuss psychological abuse. 

Plaintiff and the district court relied on the Seventh Circuit case of White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979), and 

the unpublished New Mexico district court case of McGinnis v. Cochran, No. 85-261-M (D.N.M. June 3, 1985), in determining that 

psychological abuse alone can violate substantive due process 

rights. In White, police officers left three minor children in an 

abandoned car on a cold evening after arresting the driver, the 

children's uncle. The children eventually left the car, crossed 

eight lanes of traffic, and searched for a telephone. As a result, the children suffered mental anguish and one, who was asthmatic, was hospitalized for a week. 

The three-judge panel produced three opinions--one a dissent. 

The majority refused to require physical injury for a § 1983 action. White, 592 F.2d at 384-85. Instead, it held that the 

officers' refusal through their official actions to provide aid to 

the helpless children, who were left subject to the weather and 

physical danger and who suffered emotional injury, violated due 

process guarantees. The judge authoring the principal opinion 

recognized that an allegation of psychological injury alone presented a closer due process question than an allegation of physi8 

Appellate Case: 94-2283 Document: 01019277341 Date Filed: 02/22/1996 Page: 8 
cal injury, id. at 385; and it was clear that the plaintiff children were in physical danger. Id. at 387 (Tone, J., concurring). 

McGinnis involved an eleven-year-old special education student who misbehaved in chorus class. The teacher then required 

each class member to write 11 I will kill you, Billy11 one hundred 

times. McGinnis at 2. The following school day, the teacher 

directed the students to wad up the papers and throw them at the 

plaintiff. Several of the papers struck the plaintiff, including 

one in which a stone or other hard object had been placed. The 

teacher required the child to pick up the papers and encouraged 

the other students to laugh and jeer. After the incident, the 

other students attacked the plaintiff and harassed him with 

threats to kill him. Eventually the plaintiff's parents transferred him to another school. The plaintiff underwent psychotherapy and contended that he suffered from nightmares in which he 

was being chased by people who were trying to kill him. The district court found that the plaintiff's allegations of psychological abuse stated a substantive due process claim. 

Of course, we are not bound by unpublished district court 

authority or by the decision of another circuit. See Garcia, 817 

F.2d at 659. Both White and McGinnis are distinguishable, although the latter is the closer, of course. McGinnis involved a 

special education student who actually suffered some physical 

abuse; his teacher allegedly incited students against him; and the 

psychological abuse--a handicapped student threatened with death--

was much more egregious than in the case before us. Milonas v. 

Williams, 691 F.2d 931 (lOth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 

9 

Appellate Case: 94-2283 Document: 01019277341 Date Filed: 02/22/1996 Page: 9 
1069 (1983), also relied upon by the district court, is distinguishable in the number and types of abuses of the students and 

especially in the prison-type setting of that school for boys with 

serious behavioral problems. 

The concept of substantive due process is not fixed or final, 

Rochin, 342 U.S. at 170, but generally is accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily 

integrity, see Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 812 (1994) 

(citation omitted); see also Collins, 503 U.S. at 125 ( 11 AS a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the 

concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and 

open-ended. 11 ). A substantive due process violation must be something more than an ordinary tort to be actionable under § 1983. 

We are unwilling to hold that actions which inflict only 

psychological damage may never achieve the high level of 11 a brutal 

and inhuman abuse of official power literally shocking to the 

conscience, .. Hall, 621 F.2d at 613, necessary to constitute a 

substantive due process violation. We can imagine a case where 

psychological harassment might be so severe that it would amount 

to torture equal to or greater than the stomach pumping abuse 

condemned in Rochin. But we are sure that the actions alleged in 

the instant case do not reach that level--whether they were done 

with indifference or with deliberate intent to cause psychological 

harm. Having said this, if defendant acted as alleged, we 

strongly condemn his behavior. A teacher who calls a student a 

prostitute engages in a complete abuse of his authority. To do so 

10 

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repeatedly, and turn a deaf ear as other students follow the 

teacher's example, is flagrant misconduct. But we must leave 

plaintiff to whatever relief statutory or state tort law may 

afford her. 

Because we hold that taking plaintiff's claims as true they 

do not state an actionable § 1983 claim against defendant based on 

the substantive due process violation alleged, we need not discuss 

qualified immunity as a separate issue. 

REVERSED and REMANDED. 

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