Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02563/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02563-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Wichita
Appellant
Gene Denton
Appellant
Richard Lamunyon
Appellant
Sheldon L. Wulf
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

Uoitcd StllteG Court of Appeals 

Tenth Ci:r.uit 

AUG 9 1989 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF AP~EALS ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

SHELDON L. WULF, 

·' Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

THE CITY OF WICHITA, GENE 

DENTON, and RICHARD LAMUNYON, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants. ) 

Nos. 87-1725 

87-1735 

87-1750 

87-2563 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. NO. 81-1307) 

Robert L. Howard of Foulston, Siefkin, Powers & Eberhardt, 

(Timothy B. Mustaine of Foulston, Siefkin, Powers & Eberhardt, 

Gary Rebenstorf and Joe Allen Lang of the Office of the City 

Attorney, with him on the briefs), Wichita, Kansas, for 

Defendants-Appellants. 

Jack Focht of Focht, Hughey, Hund & Calvert, Wichita, Kansas 

(Karlin Church Lawing, San Francisco, California, with him on the 

brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

William C. Summers of International Association of Chiefs of 

Police, Inc., Gaithersburg, Maryland, on the brief Amicus Curiae 

of The International Associatipn of Chiefs of Police, Inc. 

John c. Ruckelshaus of Ruckelshaus, Roland, Hasbrook & O'Connor, 

r'ndianapolis, Indiana, on the brief Amicus Curiae of Fraternal 

Order of Police, Grand Lodge. 

Before ANDERSON, SETH and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 1 
Plaintiff Sheldon Wulf commenced this 42 u.s.c. § 1983 action 

against his former employer, the City of Wich-i ta ( the "City"), and 

against the City Manager and the Chief of Police, alleging that 

his dismissal from the police force because of a letter he wrote 

violated his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. After 

a trial to the court, Wulf was awarded damages of $702,642.95, 

allocated,.as follows: ·$250,000,for emotional distress, $242,465.95 

for back pay, and $210,177.00 for front pay, in lieu of reinstatement. The district court additionally assessed $50,000 in punitive damages against the Chief of Police alone~ Wulf's counsel 

was awarded $272,725.15 in attorneys' fees and $7,676.70 in costs. 

Defendants appeal, challenging the finding of liability, the 

amount of damages awarded, and the attorneys' fees. 1 We affirm in 

part, reverse in part and remand. 

BACKGROUND 

Wulf's employment as a police officer with the City began on 

March 1, 1966, and continued until his termination on April 21, 

1981. During that time his personnel record reveals that he was a 

competent and satisfactory employee. In May 1978, he was promoted 

to Lieutenant and as,such became a supervisory employee. At all 

times relevant to this appeal, defendant Richard LaMunyon was the 

Chief of Police and defendant Gene Denton was the City Manager of 

Wichita. 

1 Defendants initially filed an appeal which was dismissed for 

lack of a final order. They subsequently filed this timely 

appeal. 

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Wulf joined the Fraternal Order of Police ("FOP"} in 1974, 

and thereafter served as President of the local and state FOP 

lodges. He was a member of the Executive Board of the state FOP 

lodge for eight years. 

The record in this case amply supports the district court's 

conclusion that, commencing at least in 1978, "[t]here were 

problems between the F.O.Pr and .. Chief LaMunyon.'' Wulf v. City of 

Wichita, 644 F. Supp. 1211, 1214 (D. Kan. 1986). In September 

1978, there was a one week strike by 163 Wichita policemen which, 

while not officially sanctioned by the FOP, included some FOP 

members. Wulf did not participate in the strike. Following the 

strike, LaMunyon did not rehire 28 policemen who had participated 

in it. 

Relations between LaMunyon and the FOP w~re further strained 

by a stag party held in September 1979 at the FOP's private club. 

Activities at the stag party included the showing of a pornographic movie, nude dancing, and gambling. Various state liquor 

laws were violated. Wulf did not attend the party nor did he participate in its organization. Reports on the stag party appeared 

in the local news media. LaMunyon ordered an investigation into 

the party, fired the local FOP President and Secretary, demanded a 

public apology by the event's organizers, and asked the local FOP 

to turn in its private club license, which it ultimately did after 

an investigation by the Kansas Division of Alcoholic Beverages 

Control. 

Wulf, as well as six other supervisory officers, testified 

that, in the months following the stag party, they received 

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suggestions from superior officers that they resign from the FOP. 

Those superior officers in turn denied making such suggestions, 

although a few did state that they had conversations with Wulf and 

others concerning a perceived conflict of interest between being a 

supervisor and belonging to the FOP, but that no one was directed 

to resign from the FOP. 2 Wulf said that he had conversations with 

other officers-concerning similar suggestions from superiors and 

at one point spoke on television about them. Wulf recorded these 

conversations in a notebook. 3 LaMunyon conceded that if there was 

a rumor "from the brass, that it's not healthy for your career 

here in the Police Department if you belong to the FOP," it would 

have a ''chilling effect" on FOP membership. R. Vol.Vat 210-12. 

He denied having any interest in dissolving or weakening the FOP 

and testified that he had a good re~ationship with the FOP and 

that he viewed it as an important part of the police department. 

He also testified that membership in the FOP was never a 

2 Captain Floyd Powell's evaluation of Wulf for the year Marph 

4, 1979 through March 4, 1980 expressed a concern about the 

perceived conflict of interest: 

"Lt. Wulf should 

supervisor and 

views, opinions 

tries to keep 

[sic] places." 

be aware that dual job relations of WPD 

FOP office holder presents conflicting 

and working relations even though one 

such job descriptions in their seperate 

Pl.'s Ex. 1, Appellee's Addendum of Exhibits at 3. 

3 None of the officers testified as to any direct involvement 

with or communication from LaMunyon or City Manager Denton 

concerning FOP membership. Wulf testified that he never heard 

Denton or LaMunyon or any of LaMunyon's Deputy Chiefs direct 

anyone to get out of the FOP. Captain Vergil Ternes testified, 

however, that when Deputy Chief Coffey spoke to him about getting 

out of the FOP, he "assume[d] that he would be speaking with or 

advising with some authority." R. Vol. XXX at 726. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 4 
consideration in promotion decisions. He conceded, however, that 

he was correctly quoted in a newspaper article appearing on 

November 22, 1981 as saying ''To say the relationship between current FOP leadership and myself is strained is somewhat of an 

understatement. The fact of the matter is I don't speak to them." 

R. Vol. XXVI at 92. The district court specifically found that 

"LaMunyon's. testimony on the witness.-stand that he had a good 

relationship with the local F.O.P. is not credible and at best 

reflects his own subjective opinion." Wulf, 644 F. Supp. at 1214. 

On October 5, 1979,· Wulf's attorney wrote a letter to 

LaMunyon, alleging that "recent well-publicized problems have 

apparently led high-ranking officers in your Police Department to 

demand resignations from some members of the FOP," and charging 

that such conduct violated the First Amendment. Plaintiff's Ex. 

8, Appellants' Addendum of Exhibits at 1. LaMunyon testified 

that, after receiving the letter, he "called the staff together, 

the Deputy Chiefs and.the Majors, and asked if anyone was doing 

it. They said no. And I said if you are, knock it off. You 

can't do it." R. Vol.Vat 89. LaMunyon responded to the letter 

with his own letter dated October 9, in which he denied ever 

.personally suggesting that anyone resign or refrain from joining 

the FOP, and indicated that he had directed his staff to make no 

such suggestions. 

In August of 1980, Wulf was transferred laterally to the 

Records Department. LaMunyon testified that such transfers were 

sometimes used as a "form of discipline." R. Vol.Vat 81-82. 

The record indicates that, along with Wulf's transfer, eight other 

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Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 5 
promotions and transfers occurred. Plaintiff's Ex. l(a), 

Appellee '.s Addendum of Exhibits at 108-09. LaMunyon testified 

that Wulf was transferred to the Records Department "because of 

the fact that he was good with details, he did get along with 

people, and he was a solid supervisor." R. Vol.Vat 83. He 

testified that Wulf's membership in the FOP had nothing to do with 

his, transfer-. Wu-lf testified . .that .he .believed the transfer was 

punishment for his refusal to quit the FOP. 

Wulf's attorney wrote another letter to LaMunyon, challenging 

Wulf's transfer and charging that the transfer "is a direct result 

of Lt. Wulf's steadfast belief that he has First Amendment rights 

and his refusal to quit the FOP." Plaintiff's Ex. 10, Appellants' 

Addendum of Exhibits at 3. LaMunyon did not answer that letter, 

and took no further action regarding the allegations contained in 

it. Wulf did not pursue any available grievance procedures to 

challenge the transfer, nor did he request a transfer out of the 

Records Department. He did testify, however, that in August of 

1980, he unsuccessfully sought permission to speak to LaMunyon 

about his (Wulf's) concerns regarding treatment of the FOP. 

Wulf's wife, Mary, wrote a letter in October 1980 to the 

Kansas Attorney General inquiring how "to instigate either a grand 

jury investigation or an Attorney General's inquisition into what 

is thought to be a violation of law by a local city official." 

Plaintiff's Ex. 11, Appellants' Addendum of Exhibits at 4. Thomas 

Haney, Deputy Attorney General, in response suggested that she 

discuss the possibility of summoning a grand jury with an 

attorney, and indicated that the Attorney General's office was 

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unable to evaluate the possibility of conducting its own investigation into the allegedly improper activity without more specific 

details. 

On the advice of an attorney, Wulf began to prepare a letter 

to the Attorney General requesting an investigation of certain 

activities and incidents occurring in 

Department. 4 

the Wichita Police 

Meanwhile, people within the Wichita Police Department, 

including LaMunyon, learned of Wulf's letter. Although the testimony is ~onflicting as to details of time and place, LaMunyon 

apparently met with Captain Terry Crisp and Officer Peter Dubovich 

at least once or twice in February 1981 to discuss Wulf's letter, 

which Dubovich believed had already been sent to the Attorney 

General. Dubovich. testified that when ne told LaMunyon of the 

' 

contents of the letter, LaMunyon responded "If that's the case, 

I'll have his ass." At trial, LaMunyon could not recall making 

that statement. He testified that he was ''upset" when he learned 

of the letter. R. Vol.Vat 109-10. Crisp also testified that he 

did not believe that such a statement was made. R. Vol. XV at 34; 

R. Vol. XXXI at 878. Dubovich testified that either Crisp or 

LaMunyon said "if he [Wulf] continues to undermine me or this 

department, he's going to be the first 52-year-old policeman or 

4 Wulf testified that he decided not to pursue the possibility 

of empanelling a grand jury because "it would have exposed a lot 

of people, many of them police officers within the [Police] 

Department, to certain pressures and ridicule" and he wanted to 

keep the matter more private. R. Vol. VII at 68; R. Vol. XXXII at 

1090. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 7 
patrolman on the Wichita Police Department." R. Vol. XXX at 784. 

LaMunyon and Crisp both denied saying that. 

Newsreporter Nelson Schock testified that in early March i981 

he talked to Wulf and "just in so many words told Sheldon that he 

was going to be fired ••• because of stuff that was being 

attributed to him coming out of the department." Schock Deposition at B9,··-Appellants' Suppl-emental·,Addendum of Exhibits. Schock 

testified that information came "directly from the Chief because 

the conversation I had with him I assumed that Sheldon was going 

to get fired if he didn't do things differently." Id. Schock 

testified that he had conversations with other high ranking 

officers that led Schock to believe that "Sheldon's days were 

numbered," id. at BlO, primarily because of "his activity with the 

Fraternal Order of Police." Id. 

LaMunyon testified that he told Crisp to keep him informed of 

any more details he learned about the letter. Dubovich testified 

that, a day or so after his meeting with Crisp and LaMunyon, Crisp 

asked him if he could "lay [his]' hands on a copy of the letter." 

R. Vol. XXX at 789. Dubovich said Crisp told him "it would 

probably shed favorable light when it comes time for promotion." 

Id. at 790. Crisp denied making any promises concerning 

promotion. Crisp testified that LaMunyon indicated he wanted a 

copy of the letter, but denied that LaMunyon ever asked him to 

have Dubovich steal a copy or use subterfuge to obtain a copy. 

LaMunyon testified that he notified the City Manager's office 

and the Attorney General about the existence of the letter. He 

also said that he visited the Attorney General personally in March 

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Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 8 
1981, and was told that a copy of the letter would be mailed to 

him. R. Vol. XXVII at 216, 218. The Attorney General recalled no 

such visit. 

There was also testimony concerning Wulf's activities during 

this time. Wulf stated that he showed an earlier draft of the 

letter to several officers who were active in the state FOP. 

Lieutenant Pat Taylor. test{fied-~that, in .. later discussing with 

Wulf material to be used in the letter, Wulf stated he "would use 

anything I could to get that son of a bitch." R. Vol. XXXIV at 

1426. Wulf testified thati while he could not remember saying 

that, "[i]t's possible that I could have said something that he 

[Taylor] took to mean that.'' R. Vol. VII at 158; R. Vol. XXXIII 

at 1184. Dave Reavis, the State FOP President in 1981, testified 

that he "had convers~tions wit~ Sheldo~ Wulf where he's. indicated 

he did not like Chief LaMunyon." R. Vol. XXXV at 1578. Reporters 

Schock and Susan Edgerley testified as to the' animosity between 

Wulf and LaMunyon. 

In February 1981, Wulf showed a· copy of the letter to 

Assistant District Attorney Jim Puntch. Puntch testified that 

Wulf did not request an investigation. District Attorney Clark 

Owens testified that his office never received an official request 

to conduct an investigation, R. Vol. XXX at 828, nor did he recall 

ever seeing a copy of Wulf's letter until after Wulf was fired. 

Puntch testified that, after reviewing the letter, he told 

Wulf that his office would not be concerned with most of the 

allegations in the letter, as they were not criminal in nature, 

and that the one possible criminal matter would be difficult to 

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Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 9 
prosecute. Puntch testified that, after he discussed the letter 

with Wulf, he told District Attorney Clark Owens that there was 

.nothing in the letter to investigate, inasmuch as any investigations would be conducted by the Attorney General. 

Owens said that he told LaMunyon on the telephone that he did 

not intend to file any criminal charges on the basis of the letter. . -Owens conceded .at trial that, had two .of the allegations in 

Wulf's letter proved true, further action would have been "worth 

pursuing." Id. at 840-41. 

The letter was finally personally delivered by Wulf and the 

state FOP President to the Attorney General's office on March 6, 

1981. The letter stated in pertinent part: 

"We, the Fraternal Order of Police of the State of 

Kansas, do hereby respectfully request the Attorney 

General· of. Kansas to ••• acco~plish. fact-finding 

investigation and inquisition into the following matters 

which we feel strongly indicate violations of the laws 

of the State of Kansas, First Amendment Rights of the 

United States Constitution, and rulings of the Supreme 

Court of the United States. 

1. That Richard L. LaMunyon, Chief of Police of 

Wichita, Kansas, has in the past and is now attempting 

to dissolve the Fraternal Order of Police Organization, 

Lodge #5, and in so doing is in violation of the Laws of 

the State of Kansas including but npt limited to 21-

3902, 21-3910, 44-803, 44-806(6), 44-808, and 44-890(12) 

of the Kansas Statutes Annotated and Supplements 

thereto: 

A. During the period of time September 1979 and 

October 1979 a number of lieutenants and captains 9f the 

Wichita Police Department were told by superiors that 

for their own expediency it would behoove them to drop 

their Fraternal Order of Police membership. 

. . . 

2. That Richard L. LaMunyon, 

Wichita, Kansas, while strenuously 

Order of Police activity, and 

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Chief of Police of 

opposing Fraternal 

while taking drastic 

Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 10 
disciplinary measure in regard to the FOP stag party, 

has to the contrary withheld the filing for prosecution 

in numerous other cases involving violations of liquor 

and gambling laws as well as the purchase of an illegal 

drug by a narcotics officer. These other cases were 

investigated by police officers, evidence obtained, and 

in some cases laboratory reports completed and reports 

written by police officers of the Wichita Police Department. We feel the dismissal of these cases should be 

investigated by the Attorney General ••.. 

. . . 3. That Richard L. LaMunyon ••. apparently exempted 

himself from Jollowing the written departmental policy 

in that he did not request a polygraph test after being 

questioned by District Attorney Vern Miller in regard to 

a possible misappropriation of city funds, and the 

investigation was dropped prior to reaching a proper 

legal conclusion. 

4. That Richard L. LaMunyon ... permits the use of 

taxpayers' monies in the providing of printing and 

materials as well as postage, and the use of police 

qepartment letterhead on occasion, and_ permits on a 

regular basis the printing and materials and time for 

delivery of a document he personally signs in regard to 

notification of regular and special meetings of the 

Wichita Christian Police Officers' Association •••• 

s. Gross misconduct on the part of a staff member in 

the sexual harassment of a subordinate employee. 

Plaintiff's Ex. 21, Appellants' Addendum of Exhibits at 9. 

Specific instances of misconduct were alleged under each numbered 

paragraph. The letter was purportedly from the President of the 

State FOP, although it bears no signature. Wulf testified that he 

and his wife wrote it and that the State FOP Executive Board never 

endorsed the letter, although a draft of the letter was discussed 

with at least several members. Wulf further stated that when he 

delivered the letter, he asked the Attorney General's office to 

investigate it and to keep his involvement confidential. Deputy 

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Attorney General Thomas Haney testified that Wulf and Reavis were 

''insistent on confidentiality" and that he was therefore "surprised" w.hen a newspaper reporter called him a few days later to 

verify the existence of the letter. 

Wulf testified that he based the allegations in the letter on 

various conversations with other police officers and with the 

people-named in th& letter and on personal-knowledge. With regard 

to Paragraph lE, concerning officers allegedly canceling their FOP 

membership near the time that they were promoted, he conceded he 

was not able to determine himself that LaMunyon used FOP 

membership as a criterion for promotion, but that he.verified the 

decline in FOP membership from 1979 to 1980 by checking membership 

lists. 

L~Munyon testified that, at. the end of March 1981, he 

received copies of Wulf's letter at home and at his office. He 

testified that he received one from the Attorney General, but the 

Attorney General and his deputy both denied having any communication or contact with LaMunyon and could not recall sending him a 

copy of the letter until after Wulf's termination. LaMunyon 

further testified that, after receiving the letter, he notified 

city Manager Denton's office and John Dekker of the City 

Attorney's office. Denton testified that he had told LaMunyon on 

several occasions·to investigate the validity of the accusations 

contained in the letter. Denton Deposition at A22, A24, Appellants' Supplemental Addendum of Exhibits. LaMunyon testified that 

he could not recall whether he had been told to investigate the 

validity_of the accusations. Denton further testified that he 

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never received a written report from LaMunyon but that LaMunyon 

told him orally that the accusations were groundless and that the 

District Attorney and the Attorney General had determined that 

Wulf's charges were groundless. 5 

Both the Attorney General and his deputy testified that they 

discussed Wulf's letter and determined not to pursue any investigation othe~-than.a brief ,check--0f the alleged liquor law violations by private clubs. Haney testified that, based on a conversation with Assistant District Attorney Puntch, he (Haney) 

believed that the Wichita District Attorney's office would be 

making inquiries into the allegations. Haney testified that, 

pursuant to the policy of turning over investigations to local 

authorities, he and Owens or Puntch ''mu~ually agreed that they 

[the Dist~ict Attorney's office] would take over what needed to be 

done, if anything, on the complaint." R. Vol. xx~v at 1480-81. 

Neither Owe~s nor Puntch recalled any request by the Attorney 

General to investigate the letter's allegations, and Owens testified that he had no record in his file of such a request. 

LaMunyon said that he decided in mid-April to investigate the 

letter after he was "convinced" that neither the Attorney General 

nor the District Attorney was going to investigate the letter any 

further. He testified that he never authorized or directed his 

5 LaMunyon testified that he contacted the Attorney General's 

office a few times after he got the letter, and that on one 

occasion, the Attorney General told him they were looking into the 

allegations in the letter. He further stated that Deputy Attorney 

General Haney told LaMunyon the Attorney General's office had 

looked into the allegations and discussed them and was finished 

with its investigation. R. Vol.Vat 153, 292. Haney recalled no 

communications with LaMunyon. 

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Internal Affairs division to investigate the accuracy of the 

allegations in Wulf's letter. R. Vol. XXIII at 44; R. Vol. XXXVI 

at 1771. He also testified that he "had individuals, staff 

officers primarily, Hicks, Hampton, Crisp, corning to me indicating 

that this letter was creating problems for them in terms of moral 

[sic]." R. Vol. XXIII at 26. 6 Hampton testified that the letter 

· was the····Subject of a "tremendous--arnount of talk- amongst the patrol 

officers and supervisors." R. Vol. XXIV at 24. He could not, 

however, recall any specific names of those involved. He later 

characterized the talk as "just idle gossip and talk amongst the 

patrol officers and supervisors." Id. at 41; R. Vol. XXXVI at 

1711. LaMunyon also testified that at various times he talked to 

news reporters Susan Edgerling, Bill Hirschman and Nelson Schock 

about Wulf and the letter. R. Vol.Vat 132-41. 7 Schock testified that "[i]t was a situation where I th~nk everybody around was 

talking ·about it [the letter] •.. everyone was talking about 

6 LaMunyon further stated that he felt Wulf's actions 

the operation of the Police Department: 

hindered 

"[Wulf's] loyalty and his trust in terms of the burden 

placed on him was certainly questionable as to what he 

was doing within the Police Department. I was concerned 

of the--what it might do to the production and operation 

of the Police Department, of the individuals who were 

being subjected to the rumors, the people that really 

didn't have the facts. I think it had a serious impact 

in terms of our operation." 

R. Vol. XXIII at 30. 

7 LaMunyon testified that 

deceased, "every day." R. 

testified that he told Schock 

me know." Id. at 139. 

he talked to Nelson Schock, now 

Vol. V at 132. LaMunyon further 

"if he had anything on Sheldon let 

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it." Schock Deposition at B22-B23, Appellants' Supplemental 

Addendum of Exhibits. 

Susan Edgerley testified that on April 20, 1981, LaMunyon 

told her that he had the letter, that he was going to investigate 

it, and that he was going to call Wulf into his office the next 

day. She also testified that he was "angry." She testified that, 

later- that day, she- phonedi LaMunyon--and he characterized the 

allegations in the letter as ''not worth a damn." LaMunyon testified he did not remember making the latter comment, but said that 

"[i]t sounds like something I might have said." 

111. 8 

R. Vol. V at 

Edgerley, accompanied by Hirschman, met Wulf and his wife at 

the Wulfs' house that evening and were shown a copy of the letter. 

Both Wulf and his wife testified that the reporters told Mary Wulf 

that her husband was going to be fired and possibly sued because 

of the letter. 9 The reporters either denied or could not recall 

any such statement. The reporters wrote a story concerning the 

letter, which appeared in the next morning's newspaper. The story 

summarized the contents of the letter, reported that neither the 

8 LaMunyon also testified that he did 

Edgerley that he was going to investigate 

the Attorney General and District Attorney 

letter's allegations and cleared LaMunyon. 

not remember telling 

the allegations or that 

had investigated the 

9 Nelson Schock also testified that he told Wulf at some point 

that he was "going to get fired, that that was my conclusion from 

talking to various people." Schock Deposition at B24, Appellants' 

Supplemental Addendum of Exhibits. He later testified "I think I 

drew the conclusion really that Sheldon was going to be fired 

after my conversation with Chief LaMunyon because I realized at 

that point that Chief LaMunyon was serious." Id. at B34. Wulf 

testified, and recorded in his notebook, that Schock had told him 

that LaMunyon was "out to get [him]." R. Vol. VII at 81-82. 

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Attorney General nor the District Attorney planned to investigate 

the letter's accusations, that LaMunyon intended to investigate 

the letter, and that LaMunyon characterized the letter's contents 

as "not worth a damn." 

The morning the story appeared in the newspaper, April 21, 

1981, LaMunyon testified that he read the story and decided to 

commence .his,-i.nvestigation immediately •10 Without any prior warning to Wulf, LaMunyon summoned him and two internal affairs 

investigators to his office. Wulf appeared in LaMunyon's office 

at 7:10 a.m. 11 The transcript of the meeting reveals that 

LaMunyon began by stating in part: 

"[Y]ou are being questioned as part of an official 

investigation, police department. I want to further 

advise you that if you refuse to testify or to answer 

questions or if you don't tell us the truth relating to 

t_he performance of your official duties or the fitness 

of your duties you will be subject to departmental 

charges which could result in dismissal from the police 

10 Wulf testified that "in the morning hours" of April 21, 

reporter Nelson Schock told Wulf "that [he] should watch [his] 

step, be very careful, because the Chief was out to get [his] 

job." R. Vol. XXXII at 1102. 

11 LaMunyon testified that the normal hours for Internal Affairs 

investigations are between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. LaMunyon also 

testified that the usual Internal Affairs procedure permits an 

officer to have twelve hours in which to respond to and write a 

report concerning a complaint against the officer. Wulf was not 

given an opportunity to submit a report. LaMunyon's explanation 

for conducting the interview with Wulf at 7:10 a.m. was that 

Wulf's shift ended at 7:00 a.m. and, because of the newspaper 

article, there was "an emergency situation." R. Vol. V at 186. 

Furthermore, the procedure permitting the employee to submit a 

report need not be followed where the employee is suspected of 

criminal conduct, and LaMunyon testified that he suspected Wulf of 

criminal conduct in the form of "taking private security records 

and giving them to non-law enforcement people." R. Vol.Vat 42-

43. Finally, LaMunyon testified that he viewed the provision 

giving an officer twelve hours in which to respond to a complaint 

as applicable only to "external complaints," not to internal 

investigations of the type involving Wulf. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 16 
department. At the same time I want to inform you that 

any information obtained here cannot and will not be 

used against you in any criminal proceeding." 

Plaintiff's Ex. 22(a), Appellants' Addendum of Exhibits at 25. 

Wulf then asked if he had the right to have an attorney present, 

and was told he did not. Wulf refused to answer any questions 

concerning the letter unless he was permitted to talk to his 

·attorney. After repeatedly telling Wulf that he had no right to 

an attorney in an internal administrative meeting, LaMunyon 

"order[ed]" Wulf to answer his questions. Wulf repeatedly 

declined "until I talk to my attorney." Id. at 25-28. LaMunyon 

then fired Wulf for insubordination. LaMunyon testified that, had 

Wulf answered LaMunyon's questions, he probably would have suspended him pending an investigation and that, in light of what 

LaMunyon later learned about Wulf's activities, he ."2robably 

eventually" would ~ave terminated him. R. Vol.Vat 269; R. Vol. 

XXVII at 359-60. LaMunyon testified that Wulf's termination had 

''[n]o direct effect on maintaining discipline." R. Vol.Vat 269; 

R. Vol. XXIII at 63-64. 

The record reveals no prior acts of insubordination by Wulf. 

The record also reveals that, for the years 1978 through 1981, no 

other officer was fired for a first act of insubordination. 12 

12 In response to interrogatories from Wulf, the City stated 

that no officers were terminated for a first act of insubordination during those years. LaMunyon disputed that fact at trial, 

but conceded that the City's records did not reflect that any 

other officers had been terminated for a first act of insubordination. R. Vol. Vat 68-75. Denton testified that "we have dismissed officers for their refusal in an internal investigation 

••• if they do not cooperate •••• I can't give you a specific 

instance but I think there have been a number of them over my 

tenure here." Denton Deposition at A30-31, Appellants' Supplemental Addendum of Exhibits. 

-17-

Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 17 
Officer Pat Taylor testified that, at one point, he was interviewed by Internal Affairs and that he refused to answer 

questions, but he was not disciplined. R. Vol. XXXIV at 1427. 

LaMunyon testified that later that morning he contacted 

Denton to tell him that he had fired Wulf. Denton testified at 

trial that LaMunyon could only recommend termination, and that 

technicallyr Wulf was only suspended until the final -decision to 

terminate him was made by Denton. R. Vol. XXXVI at 1724. 1 3 

Denton told LaMunyon to check with the City's legal staff and to 

check th~ personnel rules and police department regulations to 

ensure that Wulf had been properly terminated. LaMunyon testified 

that, later in- the day of April 21, he told Denton that he had 

checked with the legal staff. Denton testified that he then 

decided to uphold LaMunyon's recommendation that Wulf be 

terminated. Denton stated that the "only consideration [in his 

13 In his deposition, which was read into the record in this 

case, Denton stated that LaMunyon recommended that Wulf be "suspended." At trial, Denton explained his use of that terminology 

in his deposition as follows: 

"The word suspended is my word. There was never 

any doubt in my mind about the recommendation of the 

Police Chief in the morning or that afternoon after he 

had made the consultations with the lawyer. Suspension 

was my word, I did use it. Technically, suspension is 

something that department heads do. Only the City 

Manager can terminate an employee. So he recommended 

terminationo And until the employee is terminated, he 

is suspended. And the termination of the employee is, 

and was in this case, completed and accomplished subsequent to all these discussions." 

R. Vol. XXXVI at 1724. 

-18-

Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 18 
decision to terminate Wulf] was his failure to cooperate .•• 

with an order of a superior officer." R. Vol. XXII at 10-11. 14 

Another newspaper article appeared on April 22, which 

described Wulf's termination. 15 LaMunyon testified that he could 

not remember making any of the statements attributed to him in the 

article. R. Vol.Vat 326-27. 

LaMunyon then .abandoned his investigation into the letter 

because it "was actually causing a bigger riff within the Police 

Department." R. Vol. XXIII at 32-33. He never received a written 

report from his Internal Affairs division concerning the investigation into the letter. R. Vol.Vat 197. He testified that he 

could not remember the substance of any oral reports from Internal 

Affairs concerning the investigation into the letter's 

allegations. 

After Wulf received his formal termination notice, he pursued 

the grievance procedures contained in the City's Administrative 

Policy and Procedure Manual. There was a mediation conference 

conducted by Sam Rothe, the City's Employee Relations Officer, and 

14 Although Denton made his initial decision that day, that 

decision was subject to reversal upon reevaluation after Wulf 

pursued the available grievance procedures discussed more fully 

infra. 

15 The newspaper article included the following statement: 

"Asked if he did in fact ever put the FOP private club 

under surveillance, or encourage officers to resign from 

the fraternal organization, the chief said: 

'I am not going to comment on any of that at 

all, period. But even if I did, what's 

illegal about it? But I don't care to discuss 

it here.'" 

Appellants' Supplemental Addendum of Exhibits at D68. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 19 
attended by Wulf, Wulf's lawyer, LaMunyon, and an Assistant City 

Attorney. The mediation failed when Wulf refused to accept anything less than reinstatement with full back pay and rejected an 

offer to work in any City department other than the Police Department. Rothe then conducted a fact-finding proceeding, in which he 

interviewed LaMunyon and Wulf, reviewed the transcript of Wulf's 

· termination interview and,his termination l~tter, reviewed Wulf's 

personnel file contained in the City's Personnel Office, and read 

the newspaper articles concerning the letter Wulf had written to 

the Attorney General. In his report to Denton, Rothe stated that 

"[b]oth the Attorney General and [the] County Attorney 

conducted investigations into the allegations [contained in Wulf's 

letter] • [and] these investigations were dropped for lack 

of evidence." Plaintiff's Ex. 32, Appellants' Addendum bf 

Exhibits at 35. He went on to conclude that "[t]here is no doubt 

Lt. Wulf was insubordinate in refusing to cooperate and 

disobeying a direct order of the Chief •••• " and he recommended 

that Wulf's termination be sustained. Id. at 36. 16 

Denton then denied Wulf's grievance in a letter dated May 28, 

1981, in which he stated: 

"It is obvious your conduct was insubordinate. You 

refused to cooperate with an internal investigation and 

then disobeyed a direct order from your superior. For 

these reasons your grievance is denied." 

16 LaMunyon testified that he could not remember whether he told 

Rothe that the District Attorney and Attorney General had investigated the allegations in Wulf's letter and that he, LaMunyon, had 

been completely cleared. Rothe testified that he had gotten that 

information from LaMunyon and from the newspaper article. R. Vol. 

XXVIII at 456. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 20 
Plaintiff's Ex. 33, Appellants' Addendum of Exhibits at 42. 

Denton testified that normally, ~e and Rothe would discuss Rothe's 

recommendation, although he could recall no specific meeting with 

Rothe concerning Wulf's termination. He further testified he did 

not review Wulf's personnel file, as he "didn't feel it was pertinent." He also did not review the penalty section for acts of 

··insubordination, contained··in the City of Wichita Police Department Rules and Regulations. 

Wulf appealed that decision to the City Personnel Advisory 

Board (the "Board"), composed of four private citizens and one 

City employee. The Board held a hearing on June 30, 1981, in 

which it heard testimony from Wulf and LaMunyon, reviewed the 

transcript of the termination interview, and heard opening and 

closing statements from Wulf!s and LaMunyon's lawyers. Wulf's 

attorney, as well as the Board members, questioned both Wulf and 

LaMunyon. Later that day, the Board sent a letter to Denton, 

stating in part: 

"[T]he Board has concurred with the termination of Mr. 

Wulf for insubordination. 

The Facts clearly indicated that refusing to 

cooperate and disobeying a direct order of the Chief of 

Police was an act of insubordination. The Chief of 

Police was within City policy and had full authority to 

terminate Wulf. We believe the actions of Mr. Wulf 

would be considered good cause for termination in a fair 

minded, well run business organization." 

Plaintiff's Ex. 41, Appellee's Addendum of Exhibits at 335. 

Denton concurred with the Board's report and findings, and sustained Wulf's termination. 17 He so notified Wulf by letter dated 

17 ·The Board's opinion is merely advisory, and the City Manager 

(cont'd on next page) 

-21-

Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 21 
the same day, June 30, 1981. 

Addendum of Exhibits at 334. 

Plaintiff's Ex. 41, Appellee's 

Wulf testified that the loss of his job was "very stressful." 

R. Vol. VII at 108. He testified that he had been "angry," 

"depressed," "scared," and "frustrated." Id. at 110. His wife 

testified that "he was under a tremendous emotional strain.'' R. 

·Vol. XXXIII at-·-1240. She ·-also t-estif ied that they had ·"tremendous 

financial difficulty." Id. at 1244. 

After he was fired, Wulf applied for several jobs, including 

the position of Police Chief of Park City, Kansas. LaMunyon 

testified that when the City Administrator for Park City called 

him to inquire about Wulf, LaMunyon told him that Wulf "had a 

reputation for being a good officer, a good investigator" but that 

"[LaMunyon] person~lly had some serious problems with [Wulf] in 

that he had accused [LaMunyon] of basically being a crook, which 

[LaMunyon] took personal exception with, and [that Wulf] had filed 

a lawsuit against [LaMunyon] ." R. Vol. Vat 240. He testified at 

trial that he did not remember telling the City Administrator that 

Wulf did not have his facts together when he went to the Attorney· 

General's office, but said that he "might have." Id. at 241. 

Wulf did not receive the job of Police Chief of Park City. Schock 

testified that he spoke with someone in Park City who said "when 

Chief LaMunyon said that they could not have a good working 

relationship with the Wichita Police Department or he couldn't 

(cont'd from previous page) 

need not accept it. Denton testified, however, that he has never 

changed a recommendation as given to him by the Personnel Advisory 

Board. Denton Deposition at A36, Appellants' Supplemental Addendum of Exhibits. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 22 
have a good working relationship that Sheldon was not hired." 

Schock Deposition at B18, Appellants' Supplemental Addendum of 

Exhibits. 

Unable to find other employment, Wulf began his own private 

investigation business in the summer of 1982. He testified that 

the Wichita Police Department interfered with that business by 

denying -him acoess---to the · Police . · Department's evidence locker 

because it was "disruptive" for him to go into the Police Department. Wulf testified that, while he would have been eligible to 

draw retirement at age 55, "ordinarily [he] would have worked 

through at least the 20 years and possibly on." R. Vol. XXXII at 

1130. 

Wulf then brought this action under 42 u.s.c. § 1983, alleging ·that his termination was a violation of his . F_irst Amendment 

right to freedom of speech and of association and to petition 

government for redress of grievances and his Fourteenth and Fifth 

Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. He sought 

declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as money damages. 

After a trial to the district court, the court held that Wulf 

failed to show that he had been deprived of a property interest 

without due process, but that Wulf was deprived of a liberty 

interest without due process. Wulf v. City of Wichita, 644 F. 

Supp. 1211, 1221-23 (D. Kan. 1986). The court found no equal 

protection violation. 

With respect to Wulf's First Amendment claim, the district 

court held that Wulf's letter to the Attorney General involved 

matters of public concern, and that Wulf's interest in writing the 

-23-

Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 23 
letter outweighed defendants' interest in firing him because of 

it. The court then found that Wulf had met his burden of proving 

that the letter he wrote was a substantial or motivating factor in 

the decision to fire him, and that defendants had failed to meet 

their burden of proving that they would have fired Wulf anyway. 

The district court held that Wulf had established both LaMunyon's 

.and- -Denton' s . personal . liability and that no good faith immunity 

shielded them. Finally, the court held that the City was liable 

because Denton and LaMunyon were "the City's official policymakers" whose decision, a deliberate choice to terminate Wulf, 

"formed the basis of the constitutional tort." Id. at 1226. 

The court then awarded.Wulf front pay in lieu of reinstatement, back pay and lost benefits. The total amount awarded for 

"back pay, loss of use of income ~nd taxes~ was $242,465.95. Id. 

The court awarded Wulf front pay "calculated at the 1985 rate for 

a police lieutenant F step until retirement at 65 years of age, 

with an additional factor for taxes, in the amount of 

$389,806.42." 

"clarify. 

Id. at 1226-27. It directed the parties to 

by way of stipulation" how the award of front pay 

should be discounted to its present value. Id. at 1227. Ultimately, the court awarded a discounted figure of $210,177.00. 18 

18 The parties never succeeded in satisfactorily devising an 

appropriate means for discounting the award to its present value. 

The district court accordingly determined that a net discount rate 

of 3% was appropriate, which reduced the front pay award to 

$210,177.00. The parties were unable to agree on a tax-adjusted 

figure, so the court concluded "that the only equitable solution 

is to enter judgment on the net discounted damage award of 

$210,177.00, which figure has not been adjusted for tax consequences in either direction [either upward to compensate Wulf for 

any taxes he might have to pay on the lump sum award or downward 

(cont'd on next page) 

-24-

Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 24 
The court further ordered: 

"[I]f at the time of Wulf's death he is married to Mary 

Wulf, she shall be entitled to the widow's benefits 

provided to all officers with twenty years or more of 

service. In addition, the City is ordered to contribute 

its share of the plaintiff's pension through February 

22, 1986, which will allow Wulf to receive the additional pension benefits for completing twenty years of 

service." 

Id. Defendants do not appear to challenge this on appeal. The 

court also awarded Wulf $250,000.000 for "mental anguish and 

emotional distress,11 finding that he had endured "significant 

emotional pain and suffering." Id. Finally, the court awarded 

$50,000 in punitive damages against LaMunyon alone because "[a]t 

worst, LaMunyon's conduct was malevolent, at best, it exhibited a 

callous disregard for Wulf's constitutional rights." Id.19 

Subsequently, the court entered attorneys' fees in favor of Wulf 

in the amount of $272,725.15 and expenses of $7,676.70. Defendants timely appealed the finding of liability, the award of 

damages and the award of attorneys' fees. 

DISCUSSION 

I. First Amendment 

"It is clearly established that a State may not discharge an 

employee on a basis that infringes that employee's constitution-

(cont'd from previous page) 

to reflect taxes which Wulf would have paid on the sum as he 

earned it]. The plaintiff will simply have to brook whatever the 

tax consequences may be." R. Vol. III at tab 120 (Memorandum and 

Order, April 17, 1987 at 3-4). 

19 The district court correctly noted that municipalities are 

not liable for punitive damages. See City of Newport v. Fact 

Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981V Vinyard v. King, 728 

F.2d 428, 433 (10th Cir. 1984). 

-25-

Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 25 
ally p~otected interest in freedom of speech." Rankin v. 

McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 2896 (1987); see also Connick v. 

Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983); Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 

Nos. 85-1738, 85-1739, 85-1740, 85-1741, 85-1742, 85-1811, slip 

op. (10th Cir. June 21, 1989), __ F.2d ; Koch v. City of 

Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1988)(en bane), cert. 

· denied, 109 S. Ct. 262 •. The· "threshold question" in determining 

whether an adverse employment decision violates the employee's 

First Amendment rights is whether the speech at issue is on a 

matter of "public concern." Rankin, 107 s. Ct. at 2896-97; 

Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; Koch, 847 F.2d at 1440. If it is, the 

court must ''balance ..• the interests of the [employee], as a 

citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the 

interest of the State, ,as an employer, in promoting 1:he efficiency 

of the public services it performs through its employees." 

Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2896 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 

U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). As we will explore more fully below, the 

truth or falsity of the speech in question is relevant to this 

inquiry. The inquiry into whether the speech is protected is a 

question of law, reviewable de nova on appeal. See Rankin, 107 s. 

Ct. at 2897 n.9; Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7; Melton, slip op. at 

7, F.2d at __ ; Koch, 847 F.2d at 1441. 20 

20 This court has also noted, however, that "the underlying 

historical facts upon which the constitutional claim is grounded 

are subject to the traditional standards of review governing the 

treatment of historical facts in any other case." Saye v. St. 

Vrain Valley School Dist. RE-lJ, 785 F.2d 862, 865 (10th Cir. 

1986). 

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Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 26 
Upon a finding that the speech in question is constitutionally protected, the plaintiff must prove that the speech was a 

substantial or motivating factor in the challenged employment 

decision. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 

429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); Conaway v. Smith 853 F.2d 789, 795 (10th 

Cir. 1988); Saye v. St. Vrain Valley School Dist. RE-lJ, 785 F.2d 

. -----862,, 866 (10th -Cir •. 19-86). --The --burden then - shifts to the 

defendant to show "by a preponderance of the evidence that it 

would have reached the same decision .•• in the absence of the 

protected activity." Saye, 785 F.2d at 866 (quoting Childers v. 

Independent School District, .676 F.2d 1338, 1341 (10th Cir. 

1982))~ see also Koch, 847 F.2d at 1440 n.11. These latter 

questions are ones of fact. Id. 

Consiitent with the above framework, we turn first to the 

question of whether Wulf's letter was on a matter of public concern. Speech on matters of public concern has been defined as 

speech "fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, 

social, or other concern to the community." Connick, 461' U.S. at 

146. Such speech is contrasted with speech "as an employee upon 

matters only of personal interest." Id. at 147. 

This public concern inquiry requires a court to consider the 

content, form and context of· the speech at issue, as revealed by 

the whole record. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2897; Connick, 461 U.S. 

at 147-48; Melton, slip op. at 8, __ F.2d at • Considering 

these elements, we hold that Wulf's letter to the Attorney General 

constituted speech on a matter of public concern. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 27 
As we noted in Koch, "many courts have particularly focused 

on the extent to which the content of the employee speech was 

calculated to disclose wrongdoing or inefficiency or other malfeasance on the part of governmental officials in the conduct of 

their official duties." Koch, 847 F.2d at 1445-46 & n.17 (and 

cases cited therein); see also Brawner v. City of Richardson, 

-.·.Texas, 855-F.2d-187, 191-92· (5th Cir. 1988); Conaway v. Smith, 853 

F.2d at 796; McMurphy v. City of Flushing, 802 F.2d 191, 198 (6th 

Cir. 1986); O'Brien v. Town of Caledonia, 748 F.2d 403, 407 (7th 

Cir. 1984); Brockell v. Norton, 732 F.2d 664, 668 (8th Cir. 1984). 

Wulf's letter alleged interference with the right of super-

_ visory police officers to join the FOP; unfair treatment of the 

FOP private club vis-a-vis other private clubs; misappropriation 

and misuse of_public funds; and sexual harassment of one officer 

by a supervisor. As we have indicated, defendants assert that 

such allegations are either false or trivial or relate to lawful 

activities. 

letter. 

We disagree with defendants' characterization of the 

Defendants argue that there was nothing unlawful about 

LaMunyon's discouragement of supervisory membership in the FOP, 

and that in fact such behavior was permitted by the Kansas Public 

Employer-Employee Relations Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. S 75-4325. 21 By 

21 Kan. Stat. Ann. S 75-4325 (1984) provides as follows:· 

"75-4325. Supervisory employee not prohibited from 

membership in employee organization. Nothing herein 

shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisory 

employee from becoming or remaining a member of an 

employee organization, but no public employer subject to 

this act shall be compelled to deem individuals defined· 

(cont'd on next page) 

-28-

Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 28 
its terms, section 75-4325 permits a supervisory employee to 

become or remain a member of an employe~ organization. The 

parties direct ~s to no legislative history or cases which might 

shed further light on the meaning of this section. 22 Accordingly, 

we are unpersuaded by defendants' assertion that LaMunyon could 

lawfully have ordered supervisory employees to leave the FOP. 

Thus~ an allegation of ,activity contravening a statutory right to 

belong to a union would clearly be on a matter of public concern. 

See McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983) 

(court found speech on matters of public concern where it dealt 

with "the working re1ationship between the police union and 

elected city officials.") As to the accuracy of the allegations, 

(cont'd from. previous page) 

herein as supervisory employees as public employees for 

the purposes of this act." 

22 This court considered in general terms the right of a city to 

prevent union membership by supervisory personnel in Key v. 

Rutherford, 645 F.2d 880 (10th Cir. 1981). In Key, the former 

police chief of the City of Stroud, Oklahoma sued the City and 

others, alleging that he had been discharged because he exercised 

his First Amendment rights, including "his participation in the 

formation of an FOP chapter and his public support for the group." 

Id. at 885. We noted that: 

"A city may prevent union membership of managers and 

supervisory personnel if it can show there is a substantial state -interest in the limitation on associational 

rights and that the limits employed are narrowly drawn 

to avoid unnecessary abridgement of such rights." 

Id.; see also Saye v. St. Vrain Valley School Dist. RE-lJ, 785 

F.2d at 867 n.2. Key argued that "the FOP is not a union but a 

fraternal organization for the professional advancement of law 

enforcement." Key, 645 F.2d at 885. We held that, on retrial, 

"the district court must determine whether the FOP is the type of 

association in which membership by the police chief could sufficiently conflict with the city's interest in an efficient police 

department." Id. No such argument has been made in this case, 

nor is there~vidence from which to evaluate the nature of the 

FOP. 

-29-

Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 29 
while there was conflicting evidence as to the substance or,. in 

some instances, even the occurrence of numerous conversations in 

which "orders" allegedly discouraging FOP membership were made or 

discussed, there was sufficient evidence of discouragement of FOP 

membership by supervisory employees to uphold the district court's 

finding that that allegation was substantially correct. 23 

Defendants. also argue that the allegations of anti-union 

activity had diminished significance because they were "dreadfully 

stale." While defendants correctly point out that virtually all 

of the specific allegations of discouragement of union membership 

occurred in late 1979, in the months immediately following the 

stag party, they overlook other evidence indicating that the 

problem was on-going. Officer Ray Floyd stated in April 1981 his 

perception that there was a "general feeling by a lot of people on 

[sic] the Department that if they are associated with the FOP, 

their likelihood of being promoted or such is very poor.'' R. Vol. 

XXXV at 1526-27. The decline in FOP membership continued 

throughout 1980. LaMunyon conceded that a November 22, 1981 

newspaper article, in which he was quoted as saying he was not on 

speaking terms with FOP leadership, was essentially accurate. 

Viewed as a whole, the evidence supports the district court's 

23 We do not view the lack of any testimony by the officers who 

reported such conversations as to LaMunyon's direct involvement as 

dispositive of LaMunyon's responsibility for the alleged antiunion activity. As Captain Vergil Ternes testified, it was 

assumed that superior officers spoke with the authority of their 

own superiors in the hierarchical structure of the police department. In addition, Lieutenant Harold Holtz testified as to a 

conversation in which Captain Troy Hampton reported an "order" by 

LaMunyon for captains to resign from the FOP. That conversation 

was included in the allegations of Wulf's letter. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 30 
conclusion that the allegations of interference by LaMunyon with 

the union were substantially correct and were of public concern 

for First Amendment purposes. 

We find the other allegations in Wulf's letter to be on 

matters of public concern as well, ·despite defendants' assertion 

that they are malicious, false or trivial. It is true, as 

.defendants~ argue, that some - false statements may lose First 

Amendment protection and it is therefore relevant to consider the 

truth or falsity of the speech in question. See Pickering, 391 

U.S. at 574; Solomon v. Royal Oak Township, 842 F.2d 862, 86~ (6th 

Cir. 1988); American Postal Workers Union .v. Postal Service, 830 

F.2d 294, 306 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Jett v. Dallas Independent School 

Dist., 798 F.2d 748, 758 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part and 

remanded in, part, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3130 (_1989); Brasslett v. Cota, 

761 F.2d 827, 839 (1st Cir. 1985); O'Brien v. Town of Caledonia, 

748 F.2d at 407 n.2. In particular, a knowingly or recklessly 

false statement is unlikely to be protected under the First Amendment, although the Supreme Court has left open the possibility 

that even such a statement might merit First Amendment protection 

where no harmful effects can be shown. See Pickering, 361 U.S. at 

574 n.6; Brasslett, 761 F.2d at 840. 24 

24 Presumably, the issue of the truth or falsity of the statements at issue is relevant to both the threshold public concern 

analysis and the balancing required under Pickering. It is 

difficult to see how a maliciously or recklessly false statement 

could be viewed as addressing a matter of public concern. Nonetheless, a merely erroneous statement may be of public concern. 

See Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d at 844. Similarly, under 

i?Ickering's balancing test, as the First Circuit noted in 

Brasslett, an employer will have a significant interest in "curtailing deliberate falsehoods," while the employee's interest in 

(cont'd on next page) 

-31-

Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 31 
Defendants characterize paragraph 2 ·of Wulf's letter as 

"blatantly and maliciously false." That paragraph alleges that 

LaMunyon vigorously prosecuted the FOP private club for various 

violations occurring during the stag, but failed to prosecute 

other private clubs for comparable violations, and failed to 

pursue an alleged drug sale to a narcotics officer • 

. We find that the- record does,not support th~-conclusion that 

these allegations were "knowingly or recklessly false." Wulf 

testified that he based the allegations of that paragraph on 

conversations he had with other police officers. While Wulf 

conceded that, when he wrote the paragraph, he did not have 

evidence that LaMunyon himself was involved in the failure to 

prosecute the other private clubs, the gist of the allegation was 

that t_he FOP private . club w~s more harshly treated than other 

private clubs for comparable violations. There was evidence that 

LaMunyon was involved in the severe discipline meted out to the 

FOP private club. While it may have been proper for LaMunyon to 

severely sanction a police private club for liquor and gambling 

law violations, because of his concern about the public image of 

the police department, we do not view Wulf's expressed concern 

about allegedly disparate treatment as maliciously or recklessly 

(cont'd from previous page) 

making such statements will,· of necessity, be slight, whereas 

merely "erroneous statements of public concern will be protected 

unless they are shown to have interfered with the employee's 

performance or the regular operation of his governmental agency." 

Id. at 839, 844. We address the falsity issue here, in the 

context of our public concern analysis, but note that the finding 

that a statement is or is not maliciously or recklessly false is a 

factor to be considered in .both the public concern and the 

Pickering balancing analyses. 

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or knowingly false. It was a suspicion on his part, which he 

wished investigated. Such a suspicion, alleging unfair treatment 

of a union private club, touches upon a matter of public concern 

for First Amendment purposes. See O'Brien v. Town of Caledonia, 

748 F.2d at 407 n.2 ("It does not matter whether or not O'Brien's 

suspicions were subsequently demonstrated to be correct."); see 

also Brasslett v.· Cota, 761 ·F.2d .at · 841; Trotman v. Bd. of 

Trustees, 635 F.2d 216, 226 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 

986 (1981). 

Defendants assert that the allegations of paragraph 3 of 

Wulf's letter, involving the allegedly improper use of undercover 

drug fund money by LaMunyon to repay money taken by a police 

officer from a citizen's wallet, are misleading because they fail 

. to reveal that. the money taken was replaced in the dr:ug fund from 

the police officer's next paycheck. They also argue that the 

letter incorrectly accuses LaMunyon of exempting himself from a 

departmental polygraph policy, whereas in fact no such policy 

exists. We agree with Wulf that what makes this incident a matter 

of public concern is the allegation of concededly improper use of 

public funds (the undercover drug funds), along with the allegation that LaMunyon attempted to cover up that improper use by 

stating, in response to an inquiry from the press, that he had 

repaid from his own pocket the money taken from the citizen's 

billfold. Clark Owens, the District Attorney for the City at the 

time of trial, testified that if he had know that the allegations 

in that paragraph were true, those allegations would be "worth 

pursuing.'' The fact that the amount of money involved is small 

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and that LaMunyon did not personally profit from the incident does 

not persu~de us that the incident is. not of public concern. The 

allegations still assist the public in "evaluating the performance 

of" LaMunyon. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148. 

LaMunyon does not dispute the impropriety of his conduct as 

alleged in Paragraph 4 of Wulf's letter. 25 Paragraph 5 of Wulf's 

letter alleged-sexual harassment of a subordin~te female police 

officer by Captain Troy Hampton. Allegations of sexual harassment 

have been found to involve matters of public concern. See Wren v. 

Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 

U.S. 1085 (1987). In this particular case, while there was 

conflicting testimony as to whether the alleged incident of 

harassment happened, there is no indication in the record that 

Wulf acted recklessly or made a knowingly false statement. At 

most, Wulf in good faith misinterpreted the nature of the contact 

he witnessed between the female officer and Hampton. In any 

event, since we have concluded that the remaining allegations in 

Wulf's letter involve matters of public concern, the fact that 

this latter incident may not, because the evidence that it ever 

even occurred is disputed, is immaterial. See Connick, 461 U.S. 

at 149; see also Brawner v. City of Richardson, Texas, 855 F.2d at 

25 Paragraph 4 alleged that LaMunyon used the police department's letterhead and postage meter to mail notices of meetings of 

the Wichita Christian Police Officer's Association, of which 

LaMunyon was the founder. LaMunyon conceded at trial that was 

"inappropriate." After he learned of the allegations in Wulf's 

letter, LaMunyon sought and received opinions from both the 

District Attorney and the City Attorney that his actions with 

regard to the mailing were improper. LaMunyon then directed the 

Christian Police Officers' Association to reimburse the City for 

the mailings, which it did. 

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192 ("[I]t is clear· that only a portion of a communication need 

address a matter of public concern."). 26 

We turn now to balancing Wulf's interest in writing the 

26 We have concluded that the content of Wulf's letter strongly 

supporcs a finding of public concern. The form and context of the 

letter also support such a finding. The form of the speech, a 

formal letter to the Attorney General seeking an investigation of 

alleged misconduct by a public official, emphasizes the public 

--concern. element. See Czurlanis v. Albanese,· 721 F.2d 98, 104 (3d 

Cir. 1983) (allegations of state agency inefficiency, waste and 

fraud made to "body with legislative power and investigative power 

germane thereto" are on matter of significant public concern). 

Wulf testified that he decided to proceed with that format on the 

advice of an attorney. Nothing in the form of Wulf's letter 

diminishei its public importance. 

With regard to the context of the letter, defendants argue 

that the letter arose out of Wulf's displeasure at being 

transferred to the Records Department and was the culmination of a 

personal vendetta by Wulf against LaMunyon. They thus suggest 

that this case is similar to Connick, where the Supreme Court 

found that most of the questionnaire circulated by the employee 

was a "~ere extension[] of [her] dispute oyer her transfer to 

another section of the criminal court" and therefore not on a 

matter of public concern. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148. There was 

testimony as to the animosity between Wulf and LaMunyon, and as to 

statements by each evidencing a desire to "get" the other. Nonetheless, we do not view Wulf's letter as a mere extension of a 

personal dispute with LaMunyon. While the letter was written 

after Wulf's transfer, which he believed was in retaliation for 

his refusal to quit the FOP, Wulf's concern about LaMunyon's 

treatment· of the FOP and LaMun.yon' s views about supervisory 

membership in the FOP preceded the transfer. Indeed, many of the 

allegations in the letter concerned events occurring prior to 

Wulf's transfer. 

Additionally, even the questionnaire in Connick, which the 

Court viewed as simply an extension of a personal dispute between 

employer and employee, contained one matter of public concern. 

Similarly, Wulf's letter, while arguably linked to some degree to 

his personal dispute with LaMunyon and to his dissatisfaction with 

his transfer to the Records Department, which he viewed as retaliatory, contains allegations of public concern. See Belk v. Town 

of Minocqua, 858 F.2d 1258, 1264 (7th Cir. 1988)("As was true of 

Myers' survey in Connick, Belk's allegations are bound up in a 

personal dispute with her employer. Similarly, just as Myers' 

questionnaire raised an issue of public concern, the substance of 

Belk's threatened grievance undeniably relates to matters of 

concern ·to the public."); Hall v. Ford, 856 F.2d 255, 260 (D.C. 

(cont'd on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 35 
letter against the interest of defendants in "promoting the 

efficiency of the public services it performs through its 

employees." Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2896 (quoting Pickering, 391 

U.S. at 568). In performing the requisite balancing under 

·Pickering, we must bear in mind the heightened interest of a 

police department in maintaining discipline and harmony among 

·-. empl.oyees.,_ See- Koch, .. -847 F.2d at 1452 n.22 (-and cases cited 

therein); Waters v. Chaffin, 684 F.2d 833, 836, 839 (11th Cir. 

1982). 

Pick~ring directs us to consider a number of factors in 

balancing. the competing interests at stake. " [ T] he manner, time, 

and place of the employee's expression are relevant, as is the 

context in which the dispute arose." Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2898 

(c~ting Connick, 461 U.S. at 152-53). Pertinent considerations 

include "whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors or 

harmony among coworkers, has a detrimental impact on close working 

relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or 

interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise." Rankin, 

107 S. Ct. at 2899. 

(cont'd from previous page) 

Cir. 1988)("But neither does a topic otherwise of public concern 

lose its importance merely because it arises in an employee 

dispute.")(emphasis original); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 

1195, 1202 (3d Cir. 1988)("Dismissing Rode's speech as unprotected 

merely because she had a personal stake in the controversy fetters 

public debate on an important issue because it muzzles an affected 

public employee from speaking out."). 

. Thus, the context of the letter does not negate our 

conclusion that it touched upon matters of public concern. 

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Taken together, 

interest "focuses on 

the 

the 

above factors reveal that the state's 

effective functioning of the public 

employer's enterprise." Id. Considering those factors, we find 

that Wulf's interest in writing the letter outweighed defendants' 

interest in discharging him. While there was some testimony that 

Wulf's letter caused controversy among officers and was the topic 

of. ~conversation, .those conversations were-also=described as "just 

idle gossip and talk," and there was no evidence that the letter 

adversely affected discipline. More importantly, there was 

evidence that at least some of the allegations in Wulf's letter, 

concerning different treatment of the FOP private club than other 

private clubs and efforts by superior officers to discourage 

lieutenants and other supervisory officers from belonging to the 

FOP, were already the topic of discussion and concern before Wulf 

wrote his letter. To_ the extent there was controversy and 

disruption occasioned by the allegations relating to the FOP, 

those were not entirely caused~ Wulf's letter; rather, they were 

a partial inspiration for Wulf's letter. See Solomon v. Royal Oak 

Township, 842 F.2d at 866. 

Similarly, the letter did not adversely affect "close working 

relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary." Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2899. There was testimony that 

LaMunyon, the person most directly criticized by the letter, was 

angry and upset when he learned of the letter, but LaMunyon was 

not someone with whom Wulf worked closely or regularly. Indeed, 

Wulf and LaMunyon were separated by the chain of command, and Wulf 

had to seek permission to speak to LaMunyon about Wulf's concerns 

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Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 37 
about the department. Additionally, Wulf did not address the 

letter to LaMunyon or to any other person with whom he would have 

regular contact, and when he did finally deliver the letter to the 

Attorney General, he insisted on confidentiality. Although Wulf 

showed drafts of the letter to a few other officers, as well as to 

Assistant District Attorney Jim Puntch, there is no evidence that 

his showing the drafts, or bhe final delivery of the letter, had 

any impact on his relationship with those other officers or with 

Puntch or on any other relationships, except that with LaMunyon. 

Ther~ is also no evidence that the letter either demonstrated 

Wulf's lack of fitness to perform his duties or "impede[d] the 

performance of [his] duties." Id. Indeed, Wulf 1 s personnel 

record reveals that he was consistently evaluated as a competent 

and satisfactory employee. While his evaluation for the year 

March 1979 through March 1980 (before he wrote the letter) 

expressed a concern 

job relations of .•• 

about Wulf distinguishing between the ''dual 

supervisor and FOP office holder," he 

nonetheless was evaluated as "competent" in every area and 

overall. 

Finally, there was insufficient evidence that Wulf's writing 

of the letter interfered with the police department's "regular 

operation." Rankin, 107 s. Ct. at 2898. LaMunyon's otherwise 

essentially unsubstantiated testimony that Wulf's "loyalty and his 

trust in terms of the burden placed on him was certainly questionable ••• I think it [the letter] had a serious impact in terms 

of our operation," does not persuade us to the contrary. There 

has been some confusion about how much disruption must be shown 

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Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 38 
before an employer may discipline or sanction an employee because 

of that employee's protected speech. See Melton, slip op. at 14, 

F.2d Some circuits suggest that a reasonable belief that 

disruption will occur is sufficient in certain circumstances. See 

id. at n~ll. However, "purely speculative allegations'' are 

insufficient. Id. 27 Although LaMunyon testified that he felt the 

~ette~-disrupted the -Operations of -the department, insufficient 

evidence supporting or demonstrating such disruption was 

presented. See Key v. Rutherford, 645 F.2d 880, 885 (10th Cir. 

1981) ("operational efficiency objections to speech must be real 

and important before they can serve as a basis for discipline or 

discharge of a public employee."). 

In sum, there is simply insufficient evidence that the letter 

itself interfere~ with effective functioning of the police department. Rather, the evidence supports the conclusion that Wulf's 

letter was seeking to rectify malfunctions already present in the 

department. Additionally, there is no evidence that LaMunyon. 

would ever have realized the impropriety in his use of departmental funds to mail Christian Police Officers' Association bulletins 

without Wulf's letter. See Brawner v. City of Richardson, Texas, 

855 F.2d at 192; Marohnic v. Walker, 800 F.2d 613, 616 (6th Cir. 

1986). 

Neither Wulf's position as a police officer, nor the heightened interest of a police department in maintaining discipline 

27 Of course, there may be cases "where the circumstances and 

content of the speech make unequivocal its harmful effects." 

American Postal Workers Union, 830 F.2d at 304 n.12. That is not 

the case here. 

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persuade us that the balance should tip in favor of the department. We therefore hold that Wulf's interest in writing the 

letter outweighed the department's interest in terminating him 

because of it. 

·Having concluded that Wulf's letter was protected speech, we 

now review the district court's factual conclusion that Wulf's 

.letter was a -substantial-or motivating factor in his termination. 

See Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 

429 U.S. 274 (1977). In resolving this issue, we must distinguish 

between LaMunyon and Denton. 

While LaMunyon testified that the decision to terminate Wulf 

was based solely on his insubordination in refusing to answer 

questions at the Internal Affairs hearing, there is ample evidence 

in the ;ecord that LaMunyon's motivation for firing Wulf· was the 

letter that Wulf wrote to the Attorney General. LaMunyon 

testified to his anger and displeasure when he learned of the letter. Although LaMunyon denied making the statement, there was 

testimony that, when he learned of Wulf's letter, LaMunyon said 

"If that's the case, I'll have his ass." There was also 

testimony, particularly from Nelson Schock, that Wulf was going to 

be fired even before he went into .the Internal Affairs interview. 

We agree with the district court's statement that "[a] fair 

reading of the interview ••• indicates that Wulf remained 

willing to answer questions if he could have his attorney 

present." Wulf, 644 F. Supp. at 1225. LaMunyon's refusal to 

permit Wulf to have an attorney present is suspect in view of the 

testimony of Lieutenant Ken Adamson that he had his attorney 

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present during an Internal Affairs interview. Additionally, no 

other officer was fired for a first act of insubordination in the 

four years prior to Wulf's termination, which suggests that 

LaMunyon's recommendation to fire Wulf was pretextual. The Police 

Department Rules and Regulations do not list termination among the 

permissible penalties for a first act of insubordination. Those 

facts were either known or should have been known to LaMunyon. We 

therefore affirm the district court's conclusion that Wulf's 

letter was a substantial or motivating factor in LaMunyon's 

recommendation. 

Denton. 

We reach a different conclusion with regard to 

Denton, like LaMunyon, testified that his decision to terminate Wulf was based upon his conclusion that Wulf had been 

insubordinate. That decision, in turn, was at least partially 

based upon the recommendation of two separate persons or bodies--

Rothe and the Personnel Advisory Board--each of which conducted a 

hearing and some kind of investigation, and concluded that Wulf 

had indeed been insubordinate. In addition, Denton testified that 

he had directed LaMunyon to investigate the validity of the 

accusations contained in Wulf's letter and that, at some point 

prior to his final decision to-terminate Wulf, he had been told by 

LaMunyon that LaMunyon and two separate law enforcement agencies 

had investigated the allegations and found them groundless. That 

statement was not, in fact, entirely accurate. 28 Similarly, 

28 For 

opinion 

April 21 

improper 

mailing. 

example, LaMunyon testified that he received a written 

from the City's Legal Department late in the evening of 

or early in the morning of April 22, stating that it was 

to use departmental funds for the Christian Officers' 

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Denton directed LaMunyon to consult with the City's legal 

department and to check the applicable City rules and regulations 

to determine if Wulf's termination was proper. 

by LaMunyon that the legal staff·had found no 

Again, he was told 

problems with the 

termination, and that the applicable rules and regulations had 

been complied with. 

On the-other hand, we note that Denton's investigation into 

the circumstances surroundin~ Wulf's termination was not a model 

of thoroughness. He knew the nature of the allegations in Wulf's 

letter and therefore knew that Wulf had alleged serious misconduct 

by LaMunyon. Yet he made no effort to independently confirm the 

status of any investigation into Wulf's letter, but instead relied 

in part upon LaMunyon--the object of Wulf's criticism--and newspapers. He was deferential to LaMunyon's recommendation that Wulf 

be terminated, yet he arguably should have been suspicious of, or 

at least thoroughly questioned, LaMunyon's recommendation in light 

of the fact that LaMunyon was the focus of Wulf's letter. He also 

made no effort to check on Wulf's employment history or to check 

whether termination, rather than some lesser penalty, was more 

appropriate. Additionally, we are aware that perfunctory consultation with counsel should not automatically insulate government 

officials from liability. Nonetheless, all of these omissions and 

oversights amount at most to simple negligence, which cannot form 

the basis for a First Amendment claim. 

Considering the evidence as a whole, we cannot say that 

Denton made the decision to terminate Wulf for the same impermissible reasons as LaMunyon. Thus, Wulf's protected speech was not 

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a substantial or motivating factor in Denton's decision and the 

district court clearly erred in so holding. Wulf has therefore 

failed to establish a First Amendment claim against Denton. 

Finally, we consider whether LaMunyon has met his burden of 

proving that Wulf would have been fired anyway. 29 The district 

court held he did not and we affirm. Wulf's personnel record 

·reveals· no problems ,with his per-formance as a police officer. We 

agree with the district court that defendants presented no credible evidence that Wulf would have been fired despite the letter. 

We therefore hold that Wulf's First Amendment rights were violated 

when he was terminated for writing the letter to the Attorney 

General. 

II. Personal Liability of LaMunyon and Denton 

Def_endants LaMunyon. and Denton were sued both in their 

official capacities ·and in their personal capacities. 30 The 

district court found their personal liability was established. 31 

In view of our holding that Wulf's protected speech was not a 

29 The district court held that Wulf established-a First Amendment cause of action against all the defendants, and accordingly 

considered whether all defendants"met their burden of proof. As 

previously indicated, we have held that Wulf failed to establish a 

First Amendment violation by Denton because he failed to prove 

that his letter was a substantial or motivating factor in Denton's 

decision. Therefore, Denton need not prove that he would have 

fired Wulf anyway. As more fully explained infra, Denton's nonliability relieves the City of liability as well. 

30 As the Supreme Court has made clear, official capacity suits 

are simply another way of suing the municipality itself. See 

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 163 (1985). 

31 The district court based Denton's personal liability on his 

ratification, on three occasions, of LaMunyon's decision to fire 

Wulf, while failing "to require meaningful fact-finding, even 

though he had been apprised of the allegations in Wulf's letter to 

the Attorney General." Wulf, 644 F. Supp. at 1226. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 43 
substantial or motivating factor in Denton's decision to fire him, 

Denton is relieved of any personal liability. With regard to 

LaMunyon, we have held that Wulf's protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in his recommendation to terminate 

Wulf. We accordingly must consider whether he can be personally 

liable for the damages flowing from Wulf's formal termination by 

Den ton. .We hold that he can. 

As we discuss more fully infra, only Denton had the actual 

authority to fire Wulf. LaMunyon's authority was technically 

limited to suspending Wulf or recommending his termination .. To 

hold LaMunyon personally liable for Wulf's termination, there must 

be a causal connection between his recommendation and Wulf's 

termination. See Neubauer v. City of McAllen, 766 F.2d 1567, 1577 

n .11 ( 5th Cir. 1985) ( and cases ci t.ed therein); see also Kentucky 

v. Graha~, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) ("to establish personal 

liability in a §1983 action, it is enough to show that the 

official, acting under colo~ of state law, caused the depr~vation 

of a federal right."). We think the evidence supports the 

. 

conclusion that LaMunyon "caused" Wulf's termination. No one 

disputes that Denton, as well as Rothe and the Personnel Advisory 

Boa~d, listened to LaMunyon's recommendation and, to some extent, 

relied on that recommendation. LaMunyon was sufficiently involved 

in the entire decision-making process that we can affirm the 

district court's finding of personal liability. See Conner v. 

Reinhard, 847 F.2d 384, 397 (7th Cir.) ("The requisite causal 

connection is satisfied if the defendant set in motion a series of 

events that the defendant knew or should reasonably have known 

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Appellate Case: 87-2563 Document: 01019831640 Date Filed: 08/09/1989 Page: 44 
would cause others to deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional 

rights."), cert. denied, 109 s. Ct. 147 (1988); Miller v. City of 

Mission, Kansas, 705 F.2d 368, 375 (10th Cir. 1983). 

Having concluded that LaMunyon is personally liable, we now 

consider whether qualified immunity shields him. 

III. Qualified Immunity 

Under. Harlow v. Fitzgerald., 457. u. S •. 800, 818 ( 1982) "government officials performing discretionary functions [are generally 

shielded] • from liability for civil damages insofar as their 

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known." As we noted in Melton, slip op. at 43, F.2d at 

"[t]he key to the inquiry is the 'objective reasonableness' of the 

official's conduct in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly 

. established' at the time the action was taken." 

Determining whether the law was "clearly established" can be 

particularly difficult in the context of First Amendment claims. 

This is so because, as the Supreme Court in Connick specifically 

acknowledged, the inquiry into whether public employee speech may 

properly serve as the basis for an adverse employment decision is 

necessarily factual and must be resolved case by case, without the 

benefit of "a general standard against which all such statements 

may be judged." Connick, 461 u.s. at 154. 

In Melton, we stated: 

"A simple black letter rule is not possible. What is 

clear is that Harlow places the presumption in favor of 

immunity for police officials acting in their individual 

capacities. Harlow is intended as a shield against 

liability but cannot become an insuperable barrier; 

therefore, public officials lose immunity in the face of 

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clearly established law. However, because a rule of law 

determined by a balancing of interests is inevitably 

difficult to clearly anticipate, it follows that where 

Pickering balancing is required, the law is less likely 

to be well established than in other cases. We believe 

that except for case-by-case analysis and application, 

the rule cannot be better stated than in Harlow itself 

with careful consideration of its underlying 

principles." 

Id. at __ (slip op. at 46) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 

We went on to note that in some, situations, .. particularly "where 

supervisors, in a reasonable and good-faith exercise of their 

duties, discipline employees without the direction that would come 

through analogous cases," a determination that the law is "clearly 

established'' will be precluded by the "fact-specific nature of the 

Pickering balancing." Id. at (slip op. at 47). We further 

cautioned if "courts in analogous but not necessarily factually 

identical cases have struck the necessary balance, government 

. officials will be deemed 'on notice' that their actions will be 

measured according to clearly established law and qualified 

immunity may not be available to them." Id. at n.36 (slip op 

at 47, n.36); but see Dartland v. Metropolitan Dade County, 866 

F.2d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir. 1989) ("Because no bright-line standard 

puts the reasonable public official on notice of a constitutional 

violation, the employer is entitled to immunity except in the 

extraordinary case where Pickering balancing would lead to the 

inevitable conclusion that the discharge of the employee was 

unlawful."). 32 

32 In Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3039 (1987), 

Supreme Court explained "clearly established" as follows: 

the 

"The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear 

(cont'd on next page) 

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Applying those principles to this case, we must determine 

whether, at the time the relevant events occurred, it was "sufficiently clear that [LaMunyon] should have been reasonably on 

notice" that the City's interest in terminating Wulf because of 

his letter would be outweighed by WUlf's interest in writing the 

letter. Melton, slip op. at 48, F.2d at 33 The parties 

direct us to no cases which_ ar~. analogous. _ Defendants assert 

there are none. 

The right generally to make statements critical of public 

officials has been long recognized as a protected First Amendment 

(cont'd from previous page) 

33 

that a reasonable official would understand that what he 

is doing violates that right. This is not to say that 

an official action is protected by qualified immunity 

unless the very action in. question has previously been 

held unlawful, but it is to say that in the. light of 

preexisting law the unlawfulness mu~t be apparent." 

(citations omitted). 

The district court phrased the inquiry too broadly: 

"The laws protecting the First Amendment rights of public. employees have been clearly established for years. 

A reasonable government official would have known that 

to punish an -employee under the circumstances in this 

lawsuit would violate the employee's First Amendment 

rights." 

Wulf, 644 F. Supp. at 1226. The district court failed to 

adequately relate the qualified immunity inquiry to the particular 

facts of the case. See Dartland v. Metropolitan Dade County, 866 

F.2d at 1322-23 ("[Plafiitiff] cannot persuade the court that the 

law is clearly established by making general, conclusory 

allegations of a constitutional violation or by stating broad 

legal truisms."); Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1190 (11th Cir. 

1989)("Plaintiff cannot discharge her burden [of proving the law 

was clearly established] by making general, conclusory allegations 

of some constitutional violation or by stating broad legal 

truisms. Rather, as the courts have plainly stated, plaintiffs 

must prove the existence of a clear, factually-defined, well 

recognized right of which a reasonable police officer should have 

known."). 

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right. See Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180, 1211 (7th Cir.)("[I]t 

is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not 

always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions.") 

(quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 272 (1941)), cert. 

denied, 109 S. Ct. 497 (1988); see also New York Times Co. v. 

Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). That right applies to 

policemen no less -than to .other public employees. See. e.g., 

Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) ("[P]olicemen, 

like teachers and lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down 

version· of constitutional rights."); Wilson v. Taylor, 658 F. 2d 

1021, 1027 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); Hanneman v. Breier, 528 F.2d 

750, 754 (7th Cir. 1976); Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901, 904 

(7th Cir. 1970). However, it has also been recognized for some 

time .that "the state's interest in regulating its pol_ice force can 

be exceptionally compelling." Waters v. Chaffin, 684 F.2d at 836; 

see also Barrett v. Thomas, 649 F.2d 1193, 1198 (5th Cir. Unit A 

1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 925 (1982) and cert. denied; 456 

U.S. 936 (1982); Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251, 1257 (5th Cir. 

Unit A 1980); Kannisto v. City and County of San Francisco, 541 

F.2d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977); 

Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 1970); see 

generally Finck, Nonpartisan Speech in the Police Department: The 

Aftermath of Pickering, 7 Hastings Const. L. Q. 1001 (1980). 

Wulf cites Fujiwara v. Clark, 703 F.2d 357 (9th Cir. 1983) 

for the proposition that the protected nature of Wulf's speech was 

clearly established. That case is not sufficiently analogous to 

this one, in part because it does not involve a police department 

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and therefore does not involve the heightened interest in maintaining discipline. 

We have found one case which has some similarities to our 

case. In Hanneman v. Breier, 528 F.2d 750, police officers, 

members of the Milwaukee Professional Policemen's Protective 

Association ("MPPPA'') alleged that the Chief of Police violated 

their First Amendment rights when. he. disciplined them under a 

police department rule prohibiting the disclosure of confidential 

police information. The discipline arose out of an 

into the· political activities of the MPPPA. 

thereafter wrote a letter, on behalf of the MPPPA, 

investigation 

The plaintiffs 

to the City 

Mayor, the City Council, the City labor negotiator, and the state 

labor board, protesting the investigation and alleging, 

untruthfully in fact, that the police chief ~as "acting for 

improper anti-union motives." Id. at 755. The plaintiffs were 

subsequently found guilty of violating a departmental rule 

prohibiting the disclosure of "official business of the 

Department." Id. at 752. They challenged as unconstitutional the 

application of the confidentiality rule. 

In finding that the imposition of punishment in response to 

the letter violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights, the 

court noted that "[a]ny unique aspect of police department employment is to be considered as but one element in the balancing of 

interests in an individual case." Id. 754; see also Tygrett v. 

Barry, 627 F.2d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1980). After balancing the 

interests at stake, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' 

interest in writing the letter, which revealed nothing which had 

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not already been made public in newspaper stories about the 

investigation, outweighed the department's interest in applying 

its confidentiality rule to plaintiffs. The court stated: 

"Once the matter was placed in the public eye, plaintiffs, as officers of the certified collective 

bargaining representative of nonsupervisory policemen, 

had a legitimate interest in bringing any improper antiunion conduct by the chief of police in connection with 

the now-publicized investigation to the attention of 

influential government officials outside the police 

department. The finding by the district court that the 

investigation was not motivated by anti-union animus 

does not negate plaintiff's interest in soliciting 

outside support which they believed to be necessary at 

the time." 

Hanneman, 528 F.2d at 755 (footnotes omitted). Thus, Hanneman 

would suggest that a reasonable police chief should have known 

that at least Wulf's allegations of anti-union animus, if not the 

other allegations, could not lawfully form the basis for 

. discipline in the circumstances of this cas~. See also Conner v • 

Reinhard, 847 F.2d 384, 390-93 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. 

Ct. 147 (1988); Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 629 F.2d 993, 1003 

(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 926 (1981); Gasparinetti 

v. Kerr, 568 F.2d 311, 317 n.18 (3d Cir. 1977)("The public 

interest in free and open debate about its police department's 

operations is vital. . . . Moreover, there is an especially 

strong public interest in having a police union leadership who 

will speak openly and candidly about their members' grievances and 

demands."), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903 (1978). 

While we regard this as a very close case, we conclude that a 

reasonable police chief should have been on notice that it would 

be a violation of the First Amendment to terminate a police 

officer who wrote a letter alleging, inter alia, anti-union animus 

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on the part of the police chief, particularly where the letter 

caused no significant disruption of police department operations. 

IV. Punitive Damages 

Because we have concluded that LaMunyon's personal liability 

was correctly established, and he is shielded by no qualified immunity, we must consider the propriety of the $50,000 punitive 

.damage award .assessed against-LaMunyo~, which defendants appeal. 

"Federal standards govern the imposition of punitive damages 

in federal civil rights cases." .Jackson v. Pool Mtge. Co., 868 

F.2d li78, 1181 (10th Cir. 1989); Garrick v. City and County of 

Denver, 652 F.2d 969, 971 (10th Cir. 1981). While the trier of 

fact has the discretion to determine the appropriate amount of 

punitive damages, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting such 

an· aw~rd is a legal question., Jackson, 868 F.2d at 1182; see also 

Miller v. Cudahy Co., 858 F.2d 1449, 1457 (10th Cir. 1988). 

As the district court· correctly noted, punitive damages are 

approp~iate in a section 1983 case "when the defendant's conduct 

is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it 

involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally 

protected rights of others.h Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 

(1983); Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313, 1322 (10th Cir. 1986); 

see also Melton, slip op. at 56, F.2d at The 

considerations for assessing punitive damagei include ''an evaluation of the nature of the conduct in question, the wisdom of some 

form of pecuniary punishment, and the advisability of a deterrent." Miller v. City of Mission, Kan., 705 F.2d 368, 377 (10th 

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Cir. 1983) (quoting Busche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509, 520 (7th Cir. 

1981)). we reverse the award of punitive damages. 

We have concluded that LaMunyon did indeed violate Wulf's 

constitutional rights because he recommended Wulf's termination on 

the basis of Wulf's protected speech. Yet not every intentional 

violation of a plaintiff's constitutional rights subjects a 

".defendant to - punitive damages. -- See Melton, slip op. at 56, 

F.2d at ("Just because public officials make mistakes in 

judgment in the performance of their duties sufficient to subject 

them to liability for actual damages does not automatically create 

a ·basis for a punitive award."). There was evidence that LaMunyon 

may have thought it was legitimate for him to terminate Wulf 

because of concerns that Wulf was undermining the efficiency of 

the police department'$ operations. It does not matter that we 

have concluded that his perception of disruption was objectively 

unreasonable, because an award of punitive damages requires an assessment of his subjective -state of mind. We accordingly find 

that insufficient evidence supports the district court's award of 

punitive damages against LaMunyon. LaMunyon's personal liability 

for Wulf's compensatory damages serves as an adequate pecuniary 

punishment as well as a deterrent to future misconduct. 

v. Liability of City of Wichita 

' The district court held that the City was liable because both 

Denton and LaMunyon were "the City's official policymakers" and 

their decisions "formed the basis of the constitutional tort." 

Accordingly, the court found the City's liability established 

under Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). We 

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hold that the district court erred in concluding that LaMunyon was 

an official policymaker whose actions can bind the City. Because 

we have held that Denton, who was the official policymaker, did 

not violate Wulf's constitutional rights when he decided to terminate him, we find no liability on the part of the City. 

As a plurality of the Supreme Court made clear in its most 

.re.cent- -case .defining .the:.contours of.-municipal 1iabili ty, City of 

St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. 915 ( 1988), "only those 

municipal officials who have 'final policymaking authority' may by 

their actions subject the government to§ 1983 liability." Id. at 

State law, as reflected in statutes, ordinances, regulations, city charters or other similar compilations, determines who 

has "final policymaking authority." See also Jett v. Dallas 

Independent School Dist., Nos. 87-2084, 88-214 (June 22, 1989), I 

1989 U.S. Lexis 3130. 

We noted in Melton that "the plurality in Praprotnik identified two situations where municipal liability nevertheless could 

be found even though the action is taken by an individual other 

than the 'final policymaker.'" Melton, slip op. at 34, F.2d 

at "[E]gregious attempts by local government to insulate 

themselves from liability for unconstitutional policies are 

precluded • • • [if a plaintiff proves] the existence of a 

widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law 

or express municipal policy, is 'so permanent and well settled as 

to constitute a "custom or usage" with the force of law.'" 

Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. at 925-26 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & 

Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)). Additionally, " [ i] f the 

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authorized policymakers approve a subordinate's decision and the 

basis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to the 

municipality because their decision is final." Id. at 926 

(emphasis added). In Melton, we found that the City Manager had 

ratified, under Praprotni~, the unlawful termination of a police 

officer, thus establishing the liability of Oklahoma City. In so 

-doing, _ we -took judicial notice of. the City. Charter,-, which "makes 

clear that the City Manager is the 'final policymaking authority' 

over employment decisions affecting City personnel." Melton, slip 

op. at 36, F.2d at 

In this case, we do not have in the record official copies of 

the City Charter or the relevant ordinances or procedure manuals 

for the City of Wichita. 34 Nonetheless, the evidence we do have 

in the form of Denton's testimony as to his duties· and quotations 

from the ordinances governing the City indicates that Denton is 

the only person with any claim of having "final policymaking 

authority" over employment decisions. Despite LaMunyon's testimony that he had been given "carte blanche" authority to hire and 

fire police department employees, and that in Wulf's case he, in 

practical effect, "fired" Wulf on the morning of April 21, the 

evidence in this case does not support a finding of municipal 

liability based on LaMunyon's actions. That evidence supports 

neither a "widespread practice ••• [constituting] a 'custom or 

34 The parties briefed this appeal prior to the issuance of the 

Praprotnik decision, and therefore have not argued this case with 

the benefit of Praprotnik's explicit directive, albeit in a plurality opinion, to look at state law to determine where policymaking authority resides. The district court also did not have 

the benefit of Praprotnik when it rendered its decision. 

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usage'" nor the kind of "ratification" which, under Praprotnik, 

may result in municipal liability. As was made clear in this 

case, it was Denton, not LaMunyon, who made the actual and ultimate decision to terminate Wulf, albeit with LaMunyon's initial 

recommendation that he do so. He did not completely delegate to 

LaMunyon the authority to make employment decisions. Yet we have 

.concluded that Denton's decision was not based on Wulf's protected 

speech and therefore did not amount to approval of the 

impe~missible basis (i.e. writing the letter) for LaMunyon's 

recommendation. Thus, because LaMunyon is not an official 

policymaker and because Denton did not ratify, under Praprotnik, 

LaMunyon's unlawful decision, the City is not liable for Wulf's 

termination. 

We recognize that it may seem anomalous to hold a subordinate 

City official such as LaMunyon ~iable for damages flowing from an 

unlawful termination which he lacked the actual authority to 

order, yet relieve the City and City Manager of liability because 

they, in contrast to the subordinate, did not act with the 

requisite impermissible motive. Such a result is, in our view, 

compelled by two lines of Supreme Court authority. First, the 

Court has steadfastly refused to premise municipal liability on 

the basis of respondeat superior. See Jett v. Dalles Independent 

School Dist., 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3130 (June 22, 1989); Praprotnik, 

108 s. Ct. at ; Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Second, Praprotnik 

directs us to look only at where statutory policymaking authority 

lies, rather than where de facto authority may reside. Thus, a 

subordinate who wields considerable actual power, yet who lacks 

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the legal power to terminate an employee, may, in the circumstances of this case, be liable, while the City is not. 

This result is not so anomalous when considered in light of 

the following hypothetical: A subordinate city official 

completely falsely states to his superior that an employee engaged 

in misconduct. The superior, through no negligence of his own~ is 

. unaware of the falsity of. ·th.e statements about the employee. The 

superior fires the employee, believing, falsely in fact, that good 

grounds exist therefore. In such a situation, it is inconceivable 

that the superior or the City would be liable. That hypothetical 

is not, however, far removed form the case before us. It 

illustrates the propriety of the result we reach. 

VI. Liberty Interest 

The district court held that "Wulf's termination, coupled 

with LaMunyon's disparaging, false and stigmatizing statements to 

Wulf's prospective employers, which damaged Wulf's ability to 

obtain other employment, establishes a claim of liberty deprivation." Wulf, 644 F. Supp. at 1222. We disagree. 

This court has stated: 

"[F]or an employee to make a successful liberty deprivation claim she must show that her dismissal resulted in 

the publication of information which was false and 

stigmatizing--information which had the general effect 

of curtailing her future freedom of choice or action." 

Asbill v. Housing Auth. of Choctaw Nation, 726 F.2d 1499, 1503 

(10th Cir. 1984)(emphasis original)(footnotes omitted); see also 

Koerpel v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 858, 865 (10th Cir. 1986). As we 

have also clearly stated, reputational injury is insufficient 

standing alone--"plaintiff's alleged ~eputational damage must be 

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entangled with some other 'tangible interests such as employment. I II McGhee v. Dra:eer, 639 F.2d 639, 643 (10th Cir. 1981). 

The Supreme Court has stated that the defamation must occur II in 

the course of the termination of employment. II Paul v. Davis, 424 

U.S. 693, 710 (1976). 35 

The statements which allegedly stigmatized Wulf were 

"- LaMunyon~ s .. stat.ement .made .. the day. befor.e Wulf was fired and quoted 

in a newspaper the day of Wulf's termination that Wulf's allegations were ''not worth a damn," and the statements allegedly made 

several months after Wulf's termination to the City Administrator 

of Park City, to the effect that Wulf "did not have his facts 

together" and that LaMunyon and Wulf could not have a good.working 

relationship with each other. The latter statements were not made 

"in the course of" Wulf's termination and thus cannot form the 

basis for a claimed deprivation of a liberty interest. See Paul 

v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 710; Ewers v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 802 

F.2d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 1986), reh'g granted on other grounds, 

813 F.2d 1583 (l987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 704 (1988). 

35 As we stated in McGhee: 

"Typically, when one's liberty interest is allegedly 

infringed upon by a discharge from employment, the 

termination or non-renewal will either explicitly state 

the stigmatizing factors ·or implicitly ratify some other 

stigmatizing allegations. Thus, the dismissal will 

either cause or contribute to the alleged defamation." 

Thus, 

McGhee v. Dra:eer, 639 F.2d at 643; see also Ewers v. Bd. of Cty. 

Commissioners, 802 F.2d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 1986), reh'g granted 

on other grounds, 813 F.2d 1583 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 

704 (1988); Harris v. Blake, 798 F.2d 419, 422 n.2 (10th Cir. 

1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987). 

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we need not reach the question of whether they were false and 

stigmatizing. 

With reg~rd to the former statement, that Wulf's allegations 

were "not worth a damn," Wulf asserts that the statement suggests 

that Wulf is a liar. We agree with Wulf that the statement is 

false--while not all of Wulf's allegations were sufficient to open 

LaMunyon to criminal. charges, we have· ,,.held that they were of 

public concern and protected under the First Amendment. Thus, 

they were worth something. We do not agree, however, with Wulf's 

contention that the statement was stigmatizing. 

This court has stated that "[t]he concept of liberty recognizes two particular interests of a public employee: 1) the protection of his good name, reputation, honor, and integrity, and 2) 

his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities." 

Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d at 794. 36 We find neither of these 

interests implicated by LaMunyon's statement. We find the 

statement to be ambiguous, susceptible to a number of different 

interpretations. It is not tantamount to calling Wulf a liar; it 

36 As Judge McKay noted in his dissenting op1n1on in Garcia v. 

Bd •. of Educ., 777 F.2d 1403, 1419 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 

479 U.S. 814 (1986), "[t]his court, and those in other circuits, 

has been struggling to define what types of charges are sufficiently stigmatizing to invoke due process" (footnote omitted). 

While charges of immorality or dishonesty are clearly stigmatizing, courts have not agreed on whether other allegations of, for 

example, incompetence.or poor work performance, are stigmatizing. 

See id. and n.8 (McKayu Judge, dissenting in part and concurring 

in part); see also Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d at 794 ("The reasons 

for [plaintiff~discharge, neglect of duties and insubordination, even when considered false, do not call into question his 

good name, reputation, honor, or integrity. In comparison, a 

liberty interest might be implicated by charges of 'dishonesty or 

immorality' because such charge might seriously damage his standing and association in the community.") (quoting Bd. of Regents v. 

Roth, 408 u.s·. 564, 573 (1972)). 

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is simply LaMunyon's personal views as to the weight to be given 

Wulf's allegations. It indicates a disagreement between Wulf and 

LaMunyon concerning the worth of Wulf's allegations, but that is 

not, in itself, stigmatizing. Additionally, there was no evidence 

that that statement contributed to Wulf's failure to get other 

employment. We cannot say that such an ambiguous statement 

impli.cated any liberty interest of Wulf' s. 

VII. Damages 

Defendants challenge the amount of damages awarded Wulf, 

arguing that factual and legal errors caused the figure to be too 

high. We agree in part and remand for a recalculation of damages. 

The district court awarded Wulf $242,465.95 for "back pay, 

loss of use of income and taxes." Wulf, 644 F. Supp. at 1226. 

Defendants argue that they only stipulated to a total of 

$140,559.97 for gross back pay, health and life insurance, and 

uniform allowance, covering the period from April 20, 1981 until 

February 22, 1986, Wulf's 20-year anniversary on the job and the 

day his pension vested. The remaining $101,905.98 ·reflects the 

district court's award of $21,084 for loss of the use of the 

income, which defendants do not challenge, and a 50% enhancement 

figure of $80,821.97 for taxes due on the lump sum award, which 

defendants do challenge. 

Defendants initially argue that the gross back pay award is 

too high because there are no deductions for Wulf's earnings during the relevant time period as reflected in Wulf's income tax 

returns for the years in question. 

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"Back pay awards seek to make whole discharged employees for 

their lost wages and not for extra expenses." Equal Employment 

Opportunity Comm'n v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 626 (10th Cir. 

1980); see also Blum v. Witco Chemical Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 373 

(3d Cir. 1987)("We caution ••• that such [lost pension] benefits 

may not be available where an award would make a plaintiff more 

than whole.") While-we agree that the trial court has discretion 

to utilize a variety of remedies, including an award of damages 

denominated as back pay, to make a plaintiff whole, we believe it 

is appropriate in this case to direct the district court to offset 

from Wulf's award amounts he earned from other employment during 

the relevant period. See Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600 (court 

affirmed district court order reducing back pay awards by amounts 

received from other employment); see also Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 8~0 

F. 2d 1317, 1333 ( 6th Cir. 1988) ( back pay award 'reduced by amounts 

plaintiff earned, "or with reasonable diligence could have earned" 

after denial of tenure); Blum, 829 F.2d at 374 ("A plaintiff, of 

course, has a duty to mitigate damages and his new salary will be 

deducted from the old to avoid a windfall award."); Haskins v. 

City of Boaz, 822 F.2d 1014, 1015 (11th Cir. 1987)(per curiam) 

(court affirmed award of front pay of "the difference between the 

salary he would have received had he been properly reinstated and 

the salary he was earning at a police job he had located ••• "); 

Barnett v. Housing Auth., 707 F.2d 1571, 1579 (11th Cir. 1983) 

(court affirmed computation of back pay "based on the evidence 

establishing the period [plaintiff] remained unemployed and the 

dif ferenc.e between his salary with [defendant] and the 

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compensation he received from later employment."). 37 There was no 

evidence that Wulf would have established his private 

investigating business had he not been terminated from employment 

as a police officer, so it is fair to reduce his back pay award by 

the amounts earned in that business. 

Defendants next challenge the tax enhancement figure, arguing 

that. the district court. failed- to explain its choice of a 50% 

enhancement figure and that a lump sum award for back pay in a 

section 1983 First Amendment case is not taxable. 

We first address the contention that the award is not taxable. Defendants rely on Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67 (3d 

Cir. 1987) for the proposition that a lump sum award for back pay 

in a First Amendment case is not taxable. Thus, defendants argue 

any tax adjustment_ requires a reduction of the lump sum figure "so 

as to equate the after-tax values of the tax-free lump sum and the 

taxable wages." Brief of Appellants at 42. 

In Bent, the plaintiff sued the school board after he was 

discharged, claiming that his discharge violated his constitutional rights, including his right to free speech. The court 

determined that his discharge had violated his First Amendment 

rights, but before a hearing on damages could be held, the parties 

settled and the defendants' insurance carrier paid the plaintiff 

.$24,000, "computed in part by the inclusion of lost wages as 

suggested by the taxpayer." Id. at 69. When the plaintiff failed 

to report the $24,000 as income, the Commissioner of the Internal 

37 "The relevant time period for calculating an award of back 

pay begins with wrongful termination and ends at the time of 

trial." Blum v. Witco Chemical Corp., 829 F.2d at 373. 

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Revenue assessed a deficiency, which the plaintiff challenged. 

The Tax Court was thus faced with the question of whether all or a 

part of· the $24,000 received by the plaintiff because of the violation of his First Amendment rights was taxable. The Tax Court 

concluded that the settlement was excludable from the plaintiff's 

taxable income, and the Third Circuit affirmed. 

As the -Bent court - noted, section,-· 61 (a) of the Internal 

Revenue Code provides that gross income included "all income from 

whatever source derived." 26 u.s.c. S 6l(a) (1988). One exception 

to that general rule is contained in section 104(a)(2), which 

provides in pertinent part: 

"gross income does not include 

(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit 

or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic 

payments) ·on account of personal injuries or sickness." 

Id. at§ 104(a)(2) 0 38 

The Third Circuit examined the nature of a First Amendment 

action and concluded that it is a "tort type right enforceable 

under 42 u.s.c. § 1983." Bent, 835 F.2d at 69. See also Carey v. 

Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 

187 (1961). The court then considered whether the plaintiff's 

damages were received "on account of personal injuries." The 

Commissioner argued that "since the settlement admittedly included 

a sum based on the taxpayer's lost wages, that sum represented 

compensation for lost wages which was not excludable from gross 

38 Treasury Regulation 1.104-l(c) defines the term "damages 

received (whether by suit or agreement)" as "an amount received 

(other than workmen's compensation) through prosecution of a legal 

suit or action based upon tort or tort-type rights." 26 C.F.R. 

S 1-104-l(c) (1988). 

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income under section 104(a)(2)." Bent, 835 F.2d at 70. The.court 

rejected th~t argument, stating: 

"[A]n award of damages for the violation of a const·itutional right may be measured in whole or in part by the 

amount of lost wages. This is possible .where, as here, 

the injury being compensated for is solely the violation 

of the taxpayer's First Amendment right of free speech, 

his direct contract claim for lost wages having been 

decided against him by the court. The amount of his 

lost wages may be used in computing the amount of - .. damages., awarded for the constitutional .violation even 

though an award based directly on the claim of lost 

wages has been rejected by the court." 

Id. (emphasis added). 39 

More recently, the Fourth Circuit tangled with a similar 

issue in a case involving the taxability of an award of back pay 

under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. Thompson v. Commissioner, 

866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989). The plaintiff in that case, who was 

paid less ~han her male counterparts, received an award of damages 

for back pay under the two statutory schemes, and an award of 

liquidated damages under the Equal Pay Act. The court held that 

39 The Ninth Circuit explored the rationale behind the exclusion 

of awards for personal injuries from gross income as follows: 

"An .individual who wins a personal injury suit is 

usually given a lump-sum award that includes an amount 

for items that ordinarily would be taxable, such as lost 

income. Although it might be logical to allocate a 

lump-sum award between its excludable and taxable 

components, the Commission has long excluded from income 

the entire monetary judgment. The rationale behind the 

exclusion of the entire award is apparently a feeling 

that the injured party, who has suffered enough, should 

not be further burdened with the practical difficulty of 

sorting out the taxable and nontaxable components of a 

lump-sum award." 

Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 696 (9th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). While arguably in this case the district court did 

allocate between the various components of the award, in our view, 

even the back pay award to Wulf represents damages received "on 

account of personal injuries." 

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the award of back pay was includable in the plaintiff's gross 

inc~me~ whereas the award of liquidated damages was not. In so 

holding, the court examined the nature of the two.different types 

of awards. With regard to back pay the court stated: 

"[T]he tax court correctly recognized that 'an amount 

paid as back pay under [the Equal Pay Act] is more in 

the nature of a payment for a contract violation than 

for a tort-type right.' Back pay under the Equal Pay 

Act is .'deemed·· to. be· unpaid minimum· wages or unpaid 

overtime compensation.' 29 u.s.c.A. S 206(d)(3). [The 

plaintiff] performed essentially the same work as her 

male co-workers for which she should have received equal 

pay. The back pay award was simply recovery for earned, 

but unpaid, wages which distinguishes her award of back 

pay from awards for lost wages or lost income in 

traditional personal injury/tort actions. She received 

compensation for services rendered whereas a .tort 

plaintiff receives compensation for the inability to 

earn an income due to the tortious action of a 

defendant." 

Thompson, 866 F.2d at 712 (citations omitted). By contrast, the 

court characterized the "liquidated damages award [as] • not 

earned income. Rather it served both as a deterrent to ensure 

compliance with the Act, and as 'compensation for the retention of 

a workman's pay which might result in damages too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages.'" 

Id. (quoting Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707, 

710 (1945)). The court accordingly found the back pay award was 

includable in gross income, whereas the liquidated damages award, 

as "compensation received through a tort or tort-type action for 

personal injuries," was not. Thompson, 866 F.2d at 712. 

Considering Bent and Thompson together, we hold that the damage award repre~enting back pay was not taxable. While arguably 

it is more clear in this case than in Bent that a portion of 

Wulf's damages award specifically represents back pay, nonetheless 

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the nature of his underlying claim was a tort-type claim--i.e. 

that the termination of his employment in contravention of the 

First Amendment violated section 1983. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 

U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (Court noted that section 1983 "should be 

read against the background of tort liability that makes a man 

responsible for the natural consequences of his actions."). The 

,,.award of .. back, .. pay compensated him .. for .. the economic injury 

resulting from the denial of his constitutional rights. It is 

still an award of damages "on account of personal injuries," and 

is therefore not taxable. See Bent, 835 F.2d at 71 ("any economic 

injury proximately resulting, such as loss of wages in this 

instance, may be compensated for in an award of damages for the 

personal injuries involved in the denial of the civil right."). 40 

We therefore reverse the award of an additional $80,821.97 for 

taxes due and we need not address how the court arrived at its 50% 

enhancement figure. 

We decline, however, to reduce the award of $161,643.97 at 

this point to reflect the tax free nature of the award. We direct 

the district court on remand to consider that fact, however, in 

determining an appropriate damage amount. See generally Gulf 

Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 485-88 (1981); 

Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980); In re Air 

Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., on May 25, 1979, 803 F.2d 304, 

310-12 (7th Cir. 1986). 

40 LaMunyon, of course, has no responsibility for or obligation 

to pay Wulf's wages. He can be liable for damages, as measured by 

Wulf's back pay, which flow from a tort he commits. 

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Next, defendants assert the front pay award of $210,177.00 

should be reversed in its entirety, since there is insufficient 

evidence in the record "to support the trial court's 'implicit' 

finding . . . that Wulf would have remained a policeman another 

eight years after his pension vested." 

42.41 

Brief of Appellants at 

An.award of front pay., .. in lieu ·.of reinstatement-is an equitable remedy. The district court accordingly has discretion to 

decide whether such an award is appropriate. See Starrett v. 

Wadley, Nos. 86-2002, 86-2067, 86-2423 (10th Cir. June 22, 1989) 

1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 6966; Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870, 

F.2d 1198, 1201 (7th Cir. 1989). We review the trial judge's 

award of front pay under an abuse of discretion standard. 

We are, of course, unable to tell with certainty whether Wulf 

would or would not have continued to work as a policeman after his 

pension vested. Wulf testified that he "possibly" would have. 

This uncertainty renders a damage award for front pay somewhat 

speculative. See Blum, 829 F.2d at 375 ("the speculative nature 

of future damages has been cited as a reason for denying such 

awards."); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Prudential Fed. 

Sav. and Loan Ass'n., 763 F.2d 1166, 1173 (10th Cir. 1985) ("We 

recognize that future damages have been criticized as uncertain 

and speculative."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985). 

Defendants, however, are the cause of this uncertainty, and they 

may not take advantage of an uncertainty that they have themselves 

41 No party argues on appeal that reinstatement 

in this case. 

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is appropriate 

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created. Furthermore, "'[t]he mere fact that damages may be 

difficult of computation should not exonerate a wrongdoer from 

liability.'" Id. at 1173 (quoting Koyen v. Consolidated Edison 

Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). 42 Since Wulf was 

52 years old at the time of his termination, it "does not require 

unreasonable speculation" to assume that he would have continued 

· ·to work· as a police g_f f icer for ·the, City of· Wichita· had he not 

been fired. Blum, 829 F.2d at 376; see also Davis v. Combustion 

Eng'g., Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984) ("the award of 

front pay to a discriminatorily discharged 41 year old employee 

until such time as he qualifies for a pension might be 

unwarranted. On the other hand, the failure to make such an award 

for an employee age 63, likewise discriminatorily discharged, 

might be an Bbuse of discretion."). Accordingly, we decline to 

reverse the award of front pay. 

The question of whether the front pay award should also be 

reduced or enhanced (or a combination of the two) to reflect the 

tax consequences of Wulf's receipt of a lump sum award for front 

pay was the cause of much-consternation and confusion before the 

42 In Prudential Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n: 

"Courts are able to alleviate the uncertainty of future 

damages by taking into account a discharged employee's 

duty to mitigate, 'the availability of employment opportunities, the period within which one by reasonable 

efforts may be re-employed, the employee's work and life 

expectancy, the discount tables to determine the present 

value of future damages and other factors that are 

pertinent on prospective damage awards.'" 

763 F.2d at 1173 (quoting Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. 

Supp. 1161, 1168-69); see also Shore v. Federal Express Co., 777 

F.2d 1155, 1160 (6th Cir. 1985). 

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district court. The district court ultimately determined that 

adjustments should be made on both sides of the fig~re--decreasing 

the stream of payments by the amount of taxes Wulf would have paid 

on those,payments, and then increasing the final lump sum award to 

reflect the amount of taxes Wulf would have to pay on the lump 

sum. It was, however, unable to determine the appropriate figure, 

and therefore awarded Wulf a non-tax-adjusted figure. Wulf withdrew his request for tax adjustments before the district court, 

and does not argue for such adjustments on appeal. Defendants 

simply assert, without supporting authority or specific argument, 

that "the front pay and back pay awards, rather, should have been 

reduced because they are tax free recoveries." Reply Brief of 

Appellants at 20. We therefore do not reach the question of 

whether any such tax adjustments would be necessa_ry, but direct 

the district court to consider that issue on remand, in light of 

our previous discussion. 

We do, however, address an issue which defendants do not 

specifically argue on appeal, but which the district court anticipated. After judgment was entered by the district court, 

defendants made a Rule 60(b) motion seeking to vacate the front 

pay award because Wulf applied for and began receiving retirement 

benefits after the judgment was entered. The district court found 

that Wulf was essentially forced to apply for retirement benefits 

because "defendants' appeal has placed him in an untenable 

financial position."· R. Vol. II at Tab. 111 (Opiniori and Order, 

Feb. 11, 1987 at 4). The district court concluded, however, that, 

if the front pay award is affirmed on appeal, an offset against 

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the front pay award of the amounts paid in retirement benefits 

might be appropriate. Wulf too conceded the propriety of such an 

offset. We agree that an offset might be appropriate and direct 

the district court on remand to consider it. See Patteson v. 

Johnson, 787 F.2d 1245, 1249 (8th Cir.)("[Plaintiff's] prospective 

relief should be reduced by any salary or benefits [plaintiff] has 

accrued~, in this period, .i.n mitigation.II), .cert. denied, 479 U.S. 

828 ( 1986). 43 

Finally, defendants argue that the district court's award of 

$250,000 for Wulf's mental anguish and distress is grossly excessive. Our review of a damage award is co~strained by familiar 

principles. The award itself must be supported by substantial 

evidence. See generally Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S. 

156, 159-60 (1968). Additionally, "absent an awards~ excessive 

or inadequate as to shock the judicial conscience and raise an 

irresistible inference that passion, prejudice or another improper 

cause invaded the trial, the [court's] determination of the amount 

of damages is inviolate." Foster v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 

773 F.2d 1116, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). 

Wulf's testimony was that his job loss was "very stressful," 

that he was angry, depressed, scared and frustrated. His wife 

testified that he was under "tremendous emotional strain" and that 

they experienced significant financial difficulties. He provided 

no other testimony or evidence of his emotional or mental suffer43 We also believe it is equitable to require an offset of the 

amounts Wulf earned in his private investigation business against 

his front pay award up until the time he began to draw retirement 

benefits. Thereafter, the offset of those retirement benefits 

will be sufficient to prevent Wulf from having a windfall. 

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ing. While we agree with defendants that Wulf's testimony and the 

evidence presented are not the most graphic and detailed display 

of emotional and mental anguish and distress, we cannot conclude 

that some award for such anguish and distress is unsupported by 

substantial evidence. We therefore affirm the district court's 

conclusion that an award for Wulf 0 s mental and emotional pain is 

·,appropriate, but ·we remand for a recalculation of the award, 

because we hold that $250,000 is excessive. 

Defendants assert that the "shock the conscience" standard 

for reduction of a damage award involves "comparability and 

proportionality, and ••• comparison with the awards in other 

cases." Brief of Appellants at .46. See Ramsey v. American Air 

Filter Co. Inc., 772 F.2d 1303, 1313-14 (7th Cir. 1985). First, 

they assert that the award is excessive compa~ed to other cases 

where a plaintiff received damages for emotional distress 

occasioned by his discharge in violation of his First Amendment 

rights. See, e.g., Sykes v. McDowell, 786 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 

1986) (deputy sheriff fired because he engaged in political 

activities received $60,000 for emotional distress); see also 

Ramsey, 772 F.2d at 1313-14 (plaintiff alleging racial discrimination in violation of section 1981 awarded $35,000 for mental 

distress). 

Second, they argue it is excessive compared to other cases 

where the plaintiff suffered emotional distress of a magnitude 

comparable to Wulf's. See, e.g., Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 

(10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987) (plaintiff 

received damages totaling $113,000, a portion of which represented 

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lost income, where her distress was so severe she was unable to 

work.); see also Spence v. Bd. of Educ., 806 F.2d 1198, 1200-01 

(3d Cir. 1986) (no recovery for emotional distress where plaintiff 

testified she was "depressed and humiliated" by retaliatory transfer); Ramsey, 772 F.2d at 1313-14 (and cases cited therein). 

While we are aware that it is rarely appropriate for an appellate 

~cour~ to reduce the trial•court's determination as to the proper 

. amount of damages, and while comparisons with other cases are not 

dispositive, the award of $250,000 in this case is clearly 

excessive in view of the evidence presented. Our review of the 

recqrd, informed by a review of awards granted in other comparable 

cases, indicates that the award should have been no greater than 

$50,000. We therefore remand the case for the district court to 

reconsider. damages on this issue and enter an award not to exceed 

$50,000. 

VIII. Attorney's Fees 

Defendants challenge the district court's award of attorney's 

fees to Wulf's counsel. The district court awarded attorney's 

fees of $272,725.15 and expenses of $7,676.70. The district court 

did not hold an evidentiary hearing, despite defendants' request 

for such a hearing. Defendants assert on appeal that the district 

court erred in failing to hold a hearing, and they challenge 

numerous specific aspects of the district court's award. We 

reverse and remand for a hearing on the fees and expenses properly 

awardable to Wulf. We note that, in view of our holding that 

neither the City nor Denton is liable for Wulf's injuries, 

attorney's fees may only be assessed against LaMunyon. 

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As the Supreme Court has recently made clear, a party is 

entitled to attorney's fees as a prevailing party under 42 u.s.c. 

§ 1988 when he "has succeeded on 'any significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit the parties sought in 

bringing suit.'" Texas State Teachers Association v. Garland Independent School Dist., 109 s. Ct. 1486, 1493 (1989) (quoting 

Nadeau v. Helgemoe,· 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 .(1st Cir. 1978). Wulf 

meets that test and is thus entitled to attorney's fees. See 

Starrett v. Wadley, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 6966. However, we remand 

for the di~trict court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the appropriate amount, given our partial reversal of Wulf's 

judgment on appeal. See Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 

1197, 1205 n.16 (10th Cir. 1986) ("Normally we would expect the 

district court to hold a hearing."). We offer some specific 

guidance to the district court on remand. 

First, a multiplier for "exceptional results" is inappropriate in this case, particularly in view of our disposition of this 

case on appeal. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' 

Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986)("Delaware I")("the 

'novelty [and] complexity of the issues,' 'the special skill and 

experience of counsel,' the 'quality of representation,' and the 

'results obtained' from the litigation are presumably fully 

reflected in the lodestar amount, and thus cannot serve as independent bases for increasing the basic fee award.")(quoting Blum 

v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-900 (1984)); Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 

920, 929 (1st Cir. 1987). 

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Furthermore, the district court failed to adequately support 

its conclusion that this is a case in which a real risk of loss 

justifies an enhancement of the lodestar amount. In Pennsylvania 

v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 107 s. Ct. 

3078 (1987) ("Delaware II"), the Supreme Court noted that: 

"if the trial court specifically finds that there was a 

real risk of not prevailing issue in the case, an upward 

·adjustment of the lodestar may -.be made, but, as a 

general rule, in an amount no more than 1/3 of the lodestar. Any additional adjustment would require the most 

exacting justification." 

Id. at 3089. While the district court stated that there was a 

real risk of loss in this case, such a conclusion is unsupported 

by specific findings. The other fa9tors justifying a risk 

multiplier, as identified by the Supreme Court's plurality opinion 

in Delaware II~ are not supported by adequate findings either. 

Thus, on remand, absent adequate findings, no iisk multiplier 

would be appropriate. 44 

Defendants also challenge the hourly rate selected by the 

district court, arguing it is too high and is based on rates in 

national markets and in other types of litigation. They also 

44 For example, in Delaware II, a plurality of the Court stated 

that "no enhancement for risk is appropriate unless the applicant 

can establish that without an adjustment for risk the prevailing 

party 'would have faced substantial difficulty in finding counsel 

in the local or other relevant market.'" Id. at 3091 (O'Connor, 

J., concurring)(quoting plurality at 3089)-.-The district court in 

this case concluded that "without risk-enhancement the plaintiff 

would have faced substantial difficulties in finding counsel." R. 

Vol. IV at tab 139 (Opinion and Order, August 27, 1987 at 9). Its 

explanation for that conclusion was that "[t]he case was brought 

against one of the most established institutions in this metropolitan county: its police force. Few counsel would have undertaken the job of tackling the bureaucracy as did Focht and 

Lawing." Id. That explanation, without more specific findings, 

is an insufficient basis on which to award an enhancement for 

risk. 

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challenge certain of the hours awarded to plaintiff's counsel, 

claiming that they reflect work not properly compensable. We 

direct the district court on remand to carefully calculate "the 

number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied 

by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 u. S. 424·, 

433 (1983). The court should review the appropriate standards for 

reaching~that figure set forth··in Hensley, ·and in·our opinions in 

Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197 and Ramos v. Lamm, 

713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1983). 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons we AFFIRM the district court's 

conclusion that Wulf's termination violated his First Amendment 

rights, a·nd that L~Munyon is personally liable and lacks qualified 

immunity. We REVERSE (1) the district court's conclusion that 

Denton is pe~sonally liable and that the City is liable; (2) the 

conclusion that Wulf's liberty interest was violated when he was 

terminated; and (3) the award of punitive damages' against 

LaMunyon. We REVERSE the award of $250,000 for emotional distress 

and direct the district court to recalculate the award and enter 

it in an amount not to exceed $50,000. We REMAND for a recalculation of the awards of front pay and back pay in light of our 

discussion of those awards. We REMAND for an evidentiary hearing 

on the attorney's fees due Wulf's counsel. 

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TO: 

RE: 

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 

C-404 United States Courthouse 

1929 Stout Street 

Denver Colorado 80294 

August 21, 1989 

ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

87-1725, Wulf v. City of Wichita 

Attached is corrected page 26 to the opinion authored by 

Judge Anderson filed on August 9, 1989. The citation to Melton v. 

City of Oklahoma City was modified to show that rehearing has been 

granted on other grounds. 

Enclosure 

Very truly yburs, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER, Clerk 

by: 

Patrick Fisher 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

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ally protected interest in freedom of speech." Rankin v. 

McPherson, 107 s. Ct. 2891, 2896 (1987); see also Connick v. 

Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983); Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 

Nos. 85-1738, 85-1739, 85-1740, 85-1741, 85-1742, 85-1811, slip 

op. (10th Cir. June 21, 1989), F. 2d rhr'g granted on 

other grounds; Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1440 

(10th Cir. 1988)(en bane), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 262. The 

"threshold question" in determining whether an adverse employment 

decision violates the employee's First Amendment rights is whether 

the speech at issue is on a matter of "public concern." Rankin, 

107 S. Ct. at 2896-97; Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; Koch, 847 F.2d at 

1440. If it is, the court must "balance ... the interests of 

the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 

concern and the interest of the State, as an. employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 

employees." Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2896 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. 

of Educ . , 3 91 U. S . 5 6 3 , 5 6 8 ( 19 6 8 ) ) • As we will explore more 

fully below, the truth or falsity of the speech in question is 

relevant to this inquiry, The inquiry into whether the speech 1s 

protected is a question of law, reviewable de novo on appeal. See 

Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2897 n.9; Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7; 

Melton, slip op. at 7, F.2d at Koch, 847 F.2d at 1441. 20 

20 This court has also noted, however, that "the underlying 

historical facts upon which the constitutional claim is grounded 

are subject to the traditional standards of review governing the 

treatment of historical facts in any other case." Saye v. St. 

Vrain Valley School Dist. RE-lJ, 785 F.2d 862, 865 (10th Cir. 

1986). 

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