Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01797/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01797-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Keith Lynn Jenkins
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 

) 

KEITH LYNN JENKINS, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

. PILED. 

Ikured &far,, Court ol Appeals 

Tfflth Cirruit · 

MAY J 1 1990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

87-1797 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah 

(D.C. No. CR86-0116W) 

Vicki Mandell-King, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Michael G. 

Katz, Federal Public Defender, with her on the brief), Denver, 

Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Wayne T. Dance, Assistant United States Attorney (Brent D. ward, 

United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Salt Lake City, 

Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, and BROWN,* 

District Judge. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, United States District Judge 

for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 87-1797 Document: 010110550804 Date Filed: 05/31/1990 Page: 1
In a joint trial, Keith Lynn Jenkins was convicted of 

multiple counts of possession with intent to distribute and 

distribution of cocaine and marijuana, 21 u.s.c. § 84l(a)(l) 

(1988) and 18 u.s.c. § 2 (1988); one count of conspiracy to 

possess and distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. § 846 

(1988); multiple violations of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 

(1988); one count of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, 

21 u.s.c. § 848 (1988); several counts of distribution of a 

controlled substance to a person less than twenty-one years of 

age, 21 U.S.C. § 845 (1988); and four counts of income tax 

evasion, 26 u.s.c. § 7206(1) (1988). Criminal forfeiture orders 

were obtained against Jenkins' property in the same proceeding 

under 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988). We are not persuaded by the various 

issues Jenkins raises on appeal, and we therefore affirm his 

conviction on all counts. 

I . 

BACKGROUND 

This case involves a large Utah-based cocaine and marijuana 

distributio~ network. Jenkins was originally named in a 

ninety-two count indictment which charged six defendants with 

conspiracy, multiple substantive drug violations, and a variety of 

associated crimes. The government filed a ninety-six count 

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superseding indictment which added tax evasion charges against 

Jenkins. Among the numerous charges, count one alleged a single 

conspiracy by Jenkins and the other five defendants to possess and 

distribute controlled substances, and count two charged Jenkins 

with a managerial, supervisory or organizer's role in concert with 

at least five other persons, as part of a continuing criminal 

enterprise. See 21 U.S.C. § 848. 

Two of the six defendants pled guilty before trial, and the 

four remaining defendants began trial before one jury. Two weeks 

into trial, the attorney for defendant Michael Patrick Doran 

became sick and a mistrial was declared as to Doran. 1 The 

substantive criminal counts and the criminal forfeiture actions 

against Jenkins, Craig William McLachlan, and James Arthur Mann 

went to the jury. 

The evidence against Jenkins at trial consisted primarily of 

the testimony of lesser participants in the drug distribution 

system who testified in exchange for grants of immunity. Jenkins 

did not testify. The government's proof established generally 

that from approximately 1980 through 1983, Jenkins regularly 

imported or obtained delivery in Utah of shipments of up to 150 

l Doran was retried separately and convicted of seven counts 

upon a separate, superseding indictment. On appeal, Doran's 

conviction on seven counts was affirmed as to five counts, and 

reversed on Speedy Trial Act grounds as to the two remaining 

counts, which had originated in the initial indictment. See 

United States v. Doran, 882 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1989). 

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was 

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pounds of marijuana, usually purchased from co-defendant Michael 

Doran in Arizona. Jenkins would distribute this marijuana to or 

through various smaller-scale wholesalers and retailers in the 

Salt Lake City and Utah County area. In addition, Jenkins would 

import or obtain delivery of cocaine, in quantities of one-quarter 

pound up to three kilograms. Jenkins often purchased and 

distributed this cocaine for resale in partnership with co--

defendant Craig McLachlan, at least until an apparent "rift" 

developed between them in October 1981. Profits from these sales 

were invested into real estate, aircraft, businesses, money market 

funds, and bank accounts. These assets were the subject of the 

criminal forfeiture proceedings held jointly with the trial on the 

substantive criminal charges. Jenkins did not object to the 

unitary treatment of the substantive criminal counts and the 

forfeiture actions. 

The jury found Jenkins guilty of the great majority of the 

counts against him. Forfeiture orders were entered against him 

contemporaneously with the return of the verdict on the criminal 

counts. Jenkins was sentenced to twenty years on the continuing 

criminal enterprise conviction, and the sentence on the conspiracy 

charge was vacated as a lesser included offense. The sentences 

imposed on the various substantive drug charges were to run 

concurrently, while a three-year tax evasion sentence was to run 

consecutively. 

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On appeal, Jenkins asserts insufficient evidence to convict 

on the continuing criminal enterprise count, a variance between 

the conspiracy charge and the proof of conspiracy at trial, 

improper introduction of prejudicial and irrelevant evidence and 

of other wrongful acts under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), erroneous 

denial of a severance motion, improper use of a Fed. R. Crim. P. 

Rule 16(d)(2) sanction resulting in inability to use a prior 

inconsistent statement to impeach, failure to bifurcate the 

forfeiture proceedings from the guilt phase of Jenkins' criminal 

trial, and grand jury abuse. 

II. 

A. Continuing Criminal Enterprise 

Jenkins argues that the jury had insufficient evidence to 

convict him on the continuing criminal enterprise charge. 

Evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction if, 

viewing all the evidence most favorably to the prosecution, "any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Apodaca, 

843 F.2d 421, 425 (10th Cir.) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 319 (1979)), cert. denied, 109 s. Ct. 325 (1988). 

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Conviction on a continuing criminal enterprise charge 

requires (1) a felony violation of a drug law contained in the 

Controlled Substance Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (1988); (2) 

constituting part of a continuing series of such violations; (3) 

undertaken in concert with five or more other persons; (4) with 

respect to whom [the defendant] occupies a position of organizer, 

supervisor, or any other position of management; and (5) from 

which [the defendant] obtains substantial income or resources. 

See 21 u.s.c. § 848(c) (1988); see also United States v. Hall, 843 

F.2d 408, 410 (10th Cir. 1988). 2 Jenkins maintains that it was he 

who took orders from most of the persons with whom he was 

involved, and that the evidence does not enable one to specify 

five persons over whom he exercised the requisite managerial, 

supervisory, or organizing authority. We disagree. 

The statutory terms "organizer," "manager," and "supervisor" 

have nontechnical, "everyday meanings." See Apodaca, 843 F.2d at 

425-26; United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 587 (10th Cir. 

1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1985). Section 848 1 s use of 

the indefinite article when describing"~ position of organizer" 

or 11 ~ supervisory position or any other position of management" 

contemplates that a given network may have many persons in 

authority. Thus, the defendant need not be the dominant organizer 

2 The definition of a continuing criminal enterprise in the 

version of the statute in effect at the time these offenses 

occurred was found at 21 U.S.C. § 848(b). The identical 

definition occurs in the current version at 21 u.s.c. § 848(c). 

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or manager of the enterprise; he need only occupy some managerial 

position with respect to five or more persons. See Apodaca, 843 

F.2d at 426 (citing cases). Moreover, "[t]he defendant's 

relationships with the other persons need not have existed at the 

same time, the five persons involved need not have acted in 

concert at the same time or with each other, and the same type of 

relationship need not exist between the defendant and each of the 

five." Id. While proof of a buyer-seller relationship alone is 

insufficient to establish a managerial role, id., additional 

evidence of formal or informal authority or responsibility 

respecting a purchaser's conduct may suffice, see United States v. 

Jones, 801 F.2d 304, 309-10 (8th Cir. 1986) (requisite role 

evidenced by setting terms and method of transaction, directing 

wholesale purchaser as to manner of sale, furnishing financial and 

legal help, and supplying directions and/or training to 

subordinate wholesalers); see also United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 

1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1984) (not necessary to show defendant is 

able to control those whom he or she organizes). 

In the present case, the evidence reflects that Jenkins 

participated at different times as a partner, rival, or arguably 

even as a subordinate of persons with whom he did business. But 

simply because Jenkins was not the "king pin" does not mea.n that 

he did not have his share of minions. Cf. United States v. 

Becton, 751 F.2d 250, 255 (8th Cir. 1984) (irrelevant that 

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defendant is subject to supervision of superiors), cert. denied, 

472 U.S. 1018 (1985). 

Kim Barker and Dale Lowder, for example, sometimes helped 

Jenkins store large quantities of marijuana at their home in 

exchange for a discount on the drug, see rec., vol. 13, at 45-54, 

and helped Jenkins obtain a drug delivery, see id. at 205-07. 

Jenkins regularly fronted them drugs, see id. at 65-78, 81-84, 

threatened their children when payment was late, see id. at 216, 

made Lowder quit-claim his house as security, see id. at 135-37, 

and directed when and how to make payment, see id. at 152. 

Finally, Jenkins told Lowder to whom not to sell. See id. at 

210-11. 

Curtis Slack helped broker several of Jenkins' cocaine 

purchases in Florida. See rec., vol. 16, at 518-35, 553-67. Most 

importantly, Slack couriered the drug for Jenkins from Florida to 

Utah, see id. at 579-82, after following Jenkins' instructions on 

how to package it, see id. at 560. Finally, Jenkins bailed Slack 

out of jail after his arrest for couriering the drugs. See id. 

at 596. 

Brian Smith obtained marijuana from Jenkins on credit. He 

couriered Jenkins' purchases of marijuana from Arizona to Utah, 

see rec., vol. 23, at 1680-83, and would then store the marijuana 

for Jenkins at his home. Guy Robertson acted as Jenkins' agent in 

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marijuana transactions in Jenkins' absence. See rec., vol. 23, at 

1533, 1599. Finally, Wendell and Sherry Olsen arranged for the 

storage of marijuana for Jenkins when he needed it, see id. at 

1530, 1537, followed his advice concerning price-setting, see id. 

at 1603, and complied with Jenkins' request to gain introductions 

for new sales contacts, see id. at 1546-47. Based on this 

evidence, a rational trier of fact could easily conclude beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Jenkins occupied a managerial position as 

defined in the cases at least as to these seven persons. 3 See 

Apodaca, 843 F.2d at 427. We therefore affirm the conviction on 

the continuing criminal enterprise count. 4 

3 Jenkins complains for the first time in his Reply Brief that 

he was never specifically informed either in the indictment or the 

bill of particulars of the persons whose activities he allegedly 

organized, managed, or supervised. Although he requested that tpe 

government be required to supply the information, he did not 

appeal to the district court the denial of his motion by the 

magistrate. 

Jenkins also tangentiaily argues for the first time in his 

Reply Brief that the jury could have disagreed on which five 

people satisfied the element of the continuing criminal enterprise 

count, thereby violating the requirement of unanimity in the jury 

verdict. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 3l(a); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 

404 (1972) (five justices agree on implicit Sixth Amendment right 

to unanimous verdict in federal criminal trials). Jenkins did not 

identify the unanimity issue in the Statement of Issues in his 

Opening Brief. Moreover, raising the issue only in the Reply 

Brief affords the government no opportunity to address it. Given 

the complexity of the question, we decline to consider it without 

adequate briefing from both sides. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(2), 

(4) (requiring statement of issues in briefs and legal argument 

respecting the issues presented on appeal); United Transp. Union 

v. Dole, 797 F.2d 823, 827 (10th Cir. 1986) (issue may be 

abandoned or waived by inadequate development in the briefs). 

4 Jenkins vigorously argues in his Opening Brief that the 

indictment charging his involvement in a single drug conspiracy 

varied from what Jenkins characterizes as proof of multiple 

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B. Evidentiary Rulings 

1. Testimony concerning McLachlan's violence 

Over the relevancy objection of Jenkins and other 

co-defendants, the district court admitted testimony of certain 

violent acts of co-defendant McLachlan. For example, there was 

testimony that McLachlan tried to strike an employee of his 

nightclub with a sledgehammer, and that he used the hammer to 

damage the side of his adversary's car. The jury also heard 

evidence that McLachlan convinced the girlfriend of Curtis Slack 

to pose for sexually explicit photographs in return for legal help 

for her boyfriend, who had been arrested while transporting 

cocaine allegedly ordered by Jenkins. Finally, on two occasions 

testimony revealed that McLachlan had threatened individual 

employees of his club, once with a gun. 

conspiracies adduced at trial. In his Reply Brief, however, he 

acknowledges that the action of the court in vacating his 

conspiracy sentence as a lesser included offense of the continuing 

criminal enterprise charge makes the variance issue significant 

only if the continuing criminal enterprise conviction is reversed 

on appeal. Our affirmance of the CCE issue thus obviates the need 

to discuss the variance issue. 

To the extent the factual contentions underlying the variance 

argument have relevance to other issues in our discussion, we will 

discuss them separately. 

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Jenkins argues that the probative value of this evidence as 

to McLachlan is substantially outweighed by the possibility of 

unfair prejudice to Jenkins. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. In 

considering this question, we first take note of the broad 

discretion given the trial court in a Rule 403 balancing analysis. 

See United States v. Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173, 1175 (10th Cir. 1988). 

We also note that Jenkins raised no Rule 403 objections when the 

evidence was introduced below. Finally, the trial court twice 

gave cautionary instructions to the jury immediately after the 

testimony, admonishing jury members that the testimony had 

''nothing to do with Mr. Jenkins." Rec., vol. 18, at 1045-46; see 

also id., vol. 19, at 1184. 

We conclude that Jenkins was not unfairly p~ejudiced by the 

testimony. Little danger existed that the jury could have 

confused McLachlan with Jenkins or that the testimony concerning 

McLachlan would unfairly bias the jury against Jenkins. In fact, 

Jenkins was acquitted on nine of the fifty counts against him that 

went to the jury. Any danger of unfair prejudice was ameliorated 

by the limiting instructions. See United States v. Pinto, 838 

F.2d 426, 434 (10th Cir. 1988)(special limiting instruction 

enables jury to compartmentalize the evidence as to each of the 

defendants). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's evidentiary 

rulings concerning McLachlan's activities. 5 

5 Jenkins also argues that this evidence was character evidence 

under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). We do not agree. The evidence was 

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2. Bad acts concerning Doran 

The district court also admitted evidence of co-defendant 

Michael Patrick Doran's prior drug activities under Fed. R. Evid. 

404(b) as probative of Doran's motive, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, and identity regarding the drug conspiracy. Jenkins 

argues that admission of this Rule 404(b) evidence was not 

"necessary to bolster the government's case against Doran," 

Opening Brief at 26, and that the jury would unfairly attribute 

these acts to Jenkins, whom the government alleged was ·supervising 

Doran. 

The validity of the introduction of this evidence against 

Doran has already been ruled upon by this court. See United 

States v. Doran, 882 F.2d 1511, 1523-25 (10th Cir. 1989). We held 

that the evidence was properly admitted to show that Doran 

intended to enter into the conspiracy and knew the nature of it. 

admitted not to prove action in conformity with a criminal 

character, but rather to show McLachlan's involvement in Slack's 

cocaine delivery in one instance, and to show the duration of 

McLachlan's involvement in overt acts underlying the cocaine 

conspiracy through relations with employees in his club in the 

other instances. See United States v. Rodreguez, 859 F.2d 1321, 

1326-27 (8th Cir. 1988)(violent acts of conspirator in drug ring 

related to birth and nature of conspiracy and not Rule 404(b) 

evidence), cert. denied, 109 s. Ct. 1326 (1989). In any event, we 

question Jenkins' standing to object to evidence admitted against 

a co-defendant where he suffers no prejudice as a result. 

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Id. at 1524. We did not consider the issue of unfair prejudice 

against co-defendant Jenkins, however. 

Immediately following the admission of the evidence, the 

trial court instructed the jury that "[t]his testimony is not to 

be considered by you as it relates to any of the charges ... 

against Jenkins . [Y]ou must not consider this evidence as 

it relates to the charges against any of the other three 

defendants in this case." Rec., vol. 16, at 22. We believe that 

this cautionary instruction adequately safeguarded Jenkins from 

any prejudicial effect the Rule 404(b) testimony may have had. 

See Pinto, 838 F.2d at 434; see also United States v. Williams, 

897 F.2d.1034, 1037-38 (10th Cir. 1990)(presumption of 

effectiveness of cautionary instruction). 

3. Denial of opportunity to impeactt with a prior inconsistent 

statement 

A major prosecution witness against Jenkins was Curtis Slack, 

who testified that he couriered large quantities of cocaine from 

Florida for Jenkins. During cross examination, Jenkins sought to 

introduce a document purportedly containing a statement Slack made 

to a lawyer to the effect that the cocaine he transported did not 

belong to Jenkins. The trial court denied Jenkins the opportunity 

to use the document or its contents because it had not been 

provided to the government under the magistrate's reciprocal 

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discovery order. See rec., vol. 2, doc. 235 at l; see also Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 16 ( b) . 

Jenkins argues on appeal that the court abused its discretion 

by refusing to admit the document. The government responds that 

the court's choice of sanction was well within its discretion. 

The relevant rule provides: 

"Failure to Comply with a Request 

If at any time during the course of the proceedings it 

is brought to the attention of the court that a party 

has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order 

such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant 

a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing 

evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order 

as it deems just under the circumstances." 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2) (emphasis added). Jenkins maintains 

that, given the importance of Slack's testimony to several 

substantive charges and to the continuing criminal enterprise 

charge, the trial court should have continued the trial or 

permitted an inspection instead of refusing to admit the evidence. 

The record does not contain a copy of the document. 6 Accordingly, 

we are unable to rule on this issue. See generally Moore v. 

Subaru of America, 891 F.2d 1445, 

6 Jenkins' counsel represented in the Opening Brief at 31 that 

she would supplement the record upon receipt of the document from 

a co-defendant's counsel. To our knowledge, the record was never 

supplemented. Even if we were to rule, the trial court appears to 

have properly exercised its discretion. Counsel for Jenkins was 

aware of the document at least some days prior to its attempted 

introduction, but never apprised the government of its existence 

until the moment its admission was sought to impeach. Such 

tactics run directly contrary to the spirit of the mutual 

discovery order. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(c) (requiring prompt 

notification of adversary's counsel upon discovery of additional 

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1448 (10th Cir. 1989) (deferral to trial court appropriate where 

record on appeal is insufficient to substantiate general 

allegations of error). 

C. Severance 

The district court denied Jenkins' pretrial motion to sever, 

as well as his mid-trial motion for mistrial or severance arising 

out of the court's admission of McLachlan's violent acts. Jenkins 

maintains that these denials were an abuse of the trial court's 

discretion, resulting in actual prejudice.· See Williams, 897 F.2d 

at 1037 (defendant must show specific prejudice to warrant 

reversal of denial of severance motion); United States v. Wright, 

826 F.2d 938, 94~ (10th Cir. 1987)(reversal for denial of 

severance motion must be based on abuse of discretion resulting in 

actual prejudice); see also United States v. Hernandez, 829 F.2d 

988, 990 (10th Cir. 1987) (defendant's burden to show abu~e of 

discretion is "difficult;" "strong showing of prejudice" 

required}, cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1013 (1988). 

Jenkins argues that he was prejudiced by the admission of 

evidence reflecting McLachlan's violent nature due to its 

purported spillover effect. Our analysis above demonstrates that 

Jenkins was unable to show sufficient danger of prejudice arising 

from this testimony in a Fed. R. Evid. 403 context, particularly 

where the district court gave appropriate cautionary instructions. 

evidence or material previously requested or ordered). 

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Our prior analysis is dispositive of the severance issue, since 

Jenkins' burden in the severance context is the heavier one of a 

strong showing of actual prejudice. See Williams, 897 F.2d at 

1037 (severance not warranted based on allegation of spillover 

effect upon co-conspirator defendant). 

Moreover, the joint trial of Mann, Doran, Jenkins, and 

McLachlan substantially advanced the judicial-efficiency rationale 

behind the rules encouraging joinder of defendants. See Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 8(b). Jenkins and his co-defendants were jointly 

indicted and faced common conspiracy charges. 7 See Wright, 826 

F.2d at 945 (individual conspirators should be tried together); 

United States v. Rinke, 778 F.2d 581, 590 (10th Cir. 1985) 

(persons jointly indicted should be tried together). Jenkins and 

McLachlan were also alleged to have worked together as partners, 

leading to six joint charges on substantive counts. Given 

Jenkins' inability to show prejudice, as well as a substantial 

factual overlap in the charges against Jenkins and McLachlan, the 

trial court acted within its discretion in denying a severance. 

7 Jenkins maintains in his Reply Brief that the proof at trial 

revealed multiple, separate conspiracies as to which both 

McLachlan and Jenkins were not common members. Even if we were to 

accept that proposition, however, the evidence did show that 

Jenkins and McLachlan were partners in a single distribution 

system at least up to October, 1981, when the rift occurred 

between them. 

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D. Bifurcation 

In a separate indictment, the government initiated extensive 

criminal forfeiture proceedings under 21 u.s.c. § 853 against 

property belonging to Jenkins. Evidence pertaining to the 

forfeiture issues was admitted during the guilt phase of Jenkins' 

trial, and the jury returned its verdict the same day on both the 

criminal counts and the forfeiture of his property. Jenkins did 

not move below for separate jury consideration of the forfeiture 

issue after the guilt phase of the trial, but now asserts that it 

was plain error for the trial court not to require the jury to 

hear the case in two phases. 

We have not addressed the question of when, if ever, a jury 

should be required to determine a defendant's guilt before it is 

allowed to consider evidence and/or arguments pertaining to 

forfeiture. Other circuits have varying views. In United States 

v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1987), the district court held a 

partially bifurcated trial, in spite of the defendant's request 

for a fully bifurcated proceeding. The court required all 

evidence relating to forfeiture to be presented to the jury during 

the guilt phase, and limited the forfeiture phase of the trial to 

arguments of counsel and jury instructions relating to that issue. 

The Third Circuit recognized that the trial court's procedure 

presented the defendant with the Robson's choice of foregoing 

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testifying to protect his property from forfeiture or waiving of 

his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify at his criminal 

trial. 8 The court observed that a defendant's position is 

exacerbated by the rebuttable presumption in the forfeiture 

statute favoring the government, 9 and the court pointed out that 

"the right of rebuttal may be illusory when made contingent on 

waiving the privilege not to testify during trial." Id. at 874. 

Accordingly, the court exercised its supervisory power over the 

conduct of criminal trials to require complete bifurcation of in 

personam criminal forfeiture proceedings from the guilt phase of a 

criminal trial. Id. 

In United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir.) (per 

curiam), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 65 (1988), the defendant's 

pretrial request for separate proceedings on RICO forfeiture 

8 The court described the dilemma as follows: 

"A criminal defendant has the right to decline to 

testify at trial. He also may insist that his property 

not be taken without due process of law •.•. [T)he 

defendant's right to retain property arguably not 

subject to forfeiture should not be compromised or 

defeated by his decision to stay off the witness stand 

during the guilt phase of the trial."· 

816 F.2d at 873. 

9 21 u.s.c. § 853(d) provides a rebuttable presumption that 

property of a person is subject to forfeiture when the person is 

convicted of a felony under the Controlled Substance Act, and 

where the government shows by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the property was acquired during the period of the violation and 

that no other likely source for funds exists. 

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charges, see 18 u.s.c. § 1963(a) (1988), was denied. After 

concluding that a wholly unitary proceeding was consistent with 

due process, 10 the court declined to adopt a judicially-crafted 

procedural rule requiring any bifurcation whatsoever, much less 

respecting the taking of evidence. Id. at 367-68. 

10 The court in Perholtz concluded that the Supreme Court's 

decision in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), vacated 

in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 941-42 (1972), foreclosed a due 

process challenge to a unitary proceeding in the criminal 

forfeiture context. See 842 F.2d at 367-68. In McGautha, a 

defendant in a capitalcase argued that the Ohio state court's 

procedure determining guilt and punishment in a single trial with 

a single verdict offended the due process clause by compelling the 

defendant to exercise his rights of allocution during trial to 

avoid the death sentence. The Court found the unitary procedure 

consistent with due process, reasoning first that the prospect of 

losing the right of allocution before one's sentence does not 

amount to sufficient compulsion to testify, id. at 217, and second 

that Ohio had no obligation to allow the defendant to speak 

concerning punishment free of adverse consequences on guilt. Id. 

at 220. 

The court in Perholtz found this reasoning persuasive in the 

criminal forfeiture context, since "'forfeiture under RICO is an 

in personam penalty designed as part of the punishment for the 

criminal offense committed"'. 842 F.2d at 367 (quoting United 

States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 

470 U.S. 1052 (1985)). The court in United States v. Sandini, 816 

F.2d 868, 874 (3d Cir. 1987), found it unnecessary to decide the 

constitutionality of a unitary proceeding involving the in 

personam criminal forfeiture statute for drug trafficking':'" The 

court did note, however, that both the self-incrimination clause 

and the prohibition against governmental deprivation of property 

without due process were implicated. Id. at 873. The Ninth 

Circuit in United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 661 (9th Cir. 

1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1164 (1989), also declined to rule 

on the constitutionality, although it remarked cryptically that 

failure to bifurcate is "not necessarily unconstitutional." Id. 

Jenkins does not argue that bifurcation is constitutionally 

required. Thus, as in Sandini and Feldman, our discussion here 

has no bearing on the constitutional issues a unitary proceeding 

may raise. 

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The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648 

(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1164 (1989), adopted a 

more fact-bound approach to the problem. After the jury returned 

a guilty verdict, but before it retired to deliberate on the 

special verdict required in forfeiture proceedings, the defendant 

there requested a separate evidentiary hearing on RICO forfeiture 

issues. The district court denied the request. On appeal, the 

court held that "[u]nder some circumstances a single procedure may 

be unfair, where for example the evidence is very complex, there 

are evidentiary difficulties, or testimonial privileges are 

clearly implicated." Id. at 662. In other situations, however, 

evidence of guilt may satisfy forfeiture requirements and a single 

procedure would not be prejudicial. 11 The court noted that trial 

courts "should bifurcate forfeiture proceedings from ascertainment 

of guilt, requiring separate jury deliberations and allowing 

argument of counsel." Id. Bifurcation on the taking of evidence 

was left to trial court discretion, although "[i]f the defendant 

can show ... that a hearing is required on the extent of his or 

her assets subject to forfeiture, the court should allow evidence 

on the issue." Id. 

11 The court in Feldman gave as an example a forfeiture action 

against a RICO enterprise, where a finding of guilt on criminal 

RICO charges satisfies all the elements necessary to forfeit the 

enterprise itself. See Feldman, 853 F.2d at 662; 18 u.s.c. § 

1963(a) (1988). 

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We appreciate the unfair dilemma, described in Sandini, that 

a defendant faces when the jury hears evidence pertaining to 

forfeiture and criminal guilt in one sitting. The dilemma 

disappears, however, if the defendant does not intend to testify 

concerning the forfeiture. In such a case, it works no harm upon 

the defendant to emphasize the convenience and economy for the 

court, subpoenaed witnesses, and others involved by allowing 

evidence to be taken in a single proceeding. We hold, therefore, 

that the responsibility rests on the defendant and counsel to make 

the trial court aware of a desire to testify on the forfeiture 

issues. If no such request is made, the trial court and the 

government are entitled to assume that evidence concerning guilt 

and forfeiture may be heard together. 

In the present case, Jenkins argues that had the proceedings 

been bifurcated he "may well have desired to take the stand in his 

own behalf." Opening Brief at 40. In contrast to the defendants 

in Sandini, Perholtz, 12 and Feldman, Jenkins did not express at 

trial an intention to testify, nor did he request bifurcated 

12 The District of Columbia Circuit in Perholtz flatly rejected 

the defendant's request for bifurcation, even where he requested 

it below. See 842 F.2d at 367. Perholtz involved RICO forfeiture 

under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988), while the present case involves 

criminal forfeiture under 21 u.s.c. § 853 (1988). Since no 

similar request was made here, we need not decide whether the 

result in Perholtz is inconsistent with our suggested approach in 

the drug distribution forfeiture context. To the extent that the 

holding in Perholtz applies to forfeitures generally, however, we 

question its complete disregard of the potential dilemma created 

in a unitary proceeding. 

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proceedings, or advert to the dilemma described in Sandini. 

Consequently, the trial court was entitled to assume that Jenkins 

did not desire to testify concerning forfeiture, and the failure 

to require the jury to determine Jenkins' guilt before permitting 

it to hear evidence and/or arguments pertaining to forfeiture was 

not plain error. 

Jenkins also argues that the reading of jury instructions on 

.forfeiture together with the instructions as to guilt created a 

real danger that the jury may have confused the differing burdens 

of proof. Only a preponderance of the evidence is required to 

establish the rebuttable presumption in the forfeiture statute, 13 

while proof beyond a reasonable doubt is, of course, required to 

convict on the substantive criminal counts. While we agree with 

the Ninth Circuit in Feldman that the preferable procedure would 

have been to instruct the jury separately concerning forfeiture 

after return of the verdict on guilt, Jenkins failed to request 

any bifurcation of the guilt phase from the forfeiture phase of 

the trial. Because a cautionary instruction was given directly 

addressing the possibility of this type of confusion, the court 

did not commit plain error when it gave the instructions in a 

single reading. See United States v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 883 

13 Jenkins does not challenge the use of the preponderance 

standard in the ultimate determination of whether property is 

subject to forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988). We 

the existence of some disagreement on this issue, see,~, 

United States v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 156~1576-77 & 

n.10 (9th Cir. 1989), but we need not address it here. 

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note 

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(10th Cir. 1987) (plain errors are those that "seriously affect 

the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings"). 

E. Grand Jury Abuse 

Finally, Jenkins maintains that the trial court erred in not 

dismissing the indictment for grand jury abuse. After the 

government filed its superseding indictment, the grand jury heard 

additional testimony concerning Jenkins from several witnesses, 

including his mother. No subsequent superseding indictment was 

filed. Jenkins asserts that the government was attempting to 

obtain more evidence to strengthen its pending case against him, 

an improper use of the grand jury. See United States v. Gibbons, 

607 F.2d 1320, 1328 (10th Cir. 1979). He argues that the lower 

court erred in adopting the magistrate's conclusion that the 

primary purpose of the testimony was to investigate new charges, 

with only an incidental effect on the pending prosecution. 

We said in Gibbons that the grand jury process is abused when 

the prosecutor uses it "for the primary purpose of strengthening 

the Government's case on a pending indictment or as a substitute 

for discovery, although this may be an incidental benefit~" Id. 

In two in camera hearings, the magistrate found that Jenkins had 

failed to demonstrate this type of abuse. Jenkins' conclusory 

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statements in his brief and our review of the record provide us 

with no reason to disturb that finding. 

Moreover, Jenkins has not shown how the testimony before the 

grand jury amounted to prejudice. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. 

United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988) (dismissal of indictment for 

prosecutorial misconduct before grand jury subject to harmless 

error analysis). Jenkins does not argue that the grand jury 

testimony was employed against him in any fashion or that it had 

any effect whatsoever on the fairness of his trial based on the 

indictment issued before any of the purported abuse occurred. His 

claim of grand jury abuse must therefore fail. 

Jenkins' conviction is AFFIRMED. 

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