Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01677/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01677-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Veterans Affairs
Respondent
Tracy Lehr
Petitioner
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

TRACY LEHR,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________

2019-1677

______________________

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. CH-1221-19-0002-W-1.

______________________

Decided: February 7, 2020

______________________

JAMES SOLOMON, Solomon, Maharaj & Kasimati, P.A., 

Tampa, FL, for petitioner. 

 STEPHEN FUNG, Office of General Counsel, United 

States Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC,

for respondent. Also represented by KATHERINE MICHELLE 

SMITH, TRISTAN LEAVITT. 

______________________

Before PROST, Chief Judge, SCHALL and WALLACH,

Circuit Judges.

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PROST, Chief Judge.

Tracy Lehr petitions for review of a Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) decision dismissing her Individual 

Right of Action (“IRA”) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See 

Lehr v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, No. CH-1221-19-0002-W1, 2018 WL 6682330 (M.S.P.B. Dec. 13, 2018) (“Decision”). 

We affirm.

I

Ms. Lehr, who was, and still is represented by counsel,

filed an IRA appeal with the Board raising allegations that 

she had been subjected to adverse personnel actions because of protected whistleblower disclosures. An administrative judge (“AJ”) entered an Order on Jurisdiction and 

Proof Requirements (“Order”). The Order stated that 

“[t]here is a question whether this appeal is within the 

Board’s jurisdiction.” J.A. 66 (emphasis removed). The Order therefore required Ms. Lehr to show that she had exhausted her administrative remedies at the Office of 

Special Counsel (“OSC”) and that she raised non-frivolous 

allegations regarding her whistleblower-related activity, 

both of which are required for the Board to have jurisdiction over the IRA appeal. J.A. 67, 72. The Order also 

stated that the AJ “will review only those alleged disclosures and personnel actions that were specifically raised to 

and exhausted at OSC.” J.A. 67. 

Ms. Lehr responded to the Order by filing a response

(the “response”) with two attachments. She described 

these attachments as: (1) “the letter from OSC notifying 

[Ms. Lehr] of her [IRA] to appeal to the Board,” (the “closure letter”); and (2) Ms. Lehr’s “complaint to OSC.” 

J.A. 81–82. Of relevance to this petition for review, in the 

complaint to OSC, in response to a box labelled “A. What 

Information Was Disclosed?,” only the following appeared:

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LEHR v. MSPB 3

J.A. 91.

The Department of Veterans Affairs (“Agency”) responded requesting the AJ “to enter an Order of Dismissal for want of jurisdiction pursuant to” the Order. 

J.A. 109 (emphasis in original). The Agency noted that the 

submitted OSC complaint “merely describes the whistleblower disclosure” as the hiring of Dr. Leskosky. J.A. 110.

The AJ issued an initial decision dismissing the IRA 

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The AJ first noted that the 

closure letter “refer[red] to [Ms. Lehr’s] alleged disclosures 

broadly, stating that they regard ‘fraud and patient safety 

concerns.’” Decision, slip op. at 3. The AJ then noted that 

the OSC complaint’s “sole disclosure” was related to the 

hiring of Dr. Leskosky. Id. The AJ also noted that the OSC 

complaint “generally claim[ed] that veterans’ reports were 

erroneous” and that the “record contain[ed] no other documents or any other evidence of any additional communications between [Ms. Lehr] and OSC.” Id.

The AJ then determined that the sole disclosure (i.e., 

the hiring of Dr. Leskosky) failed to meet the standards of 

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a protected whistleblower disclosure. Id. at 4 (citing 

5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)). Next the AJ found that the closure

letter’s summation concerning “‘fraud and patient safety 

concerns’ [was] too vague and too broad to evidence wrongdoing.” Id. Ultimately, the AJ dismissed the appeal because Ms. Lehr “failed to meet her burden of proving by 

preponderant evidence that the Board has jurisdiction to 

hear her IRA appeal.” Id. 4–5. 

The initial decision became the Board’s final decision

and Ms. Lehr petitioned for our review. We have jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(9). 

II

On petition for review, Ms. Lehr argues that her IRA 

appeal was improperly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

She contends that the AJ incorrectly interpreted her complaint to OSC and that the AJ’s conclusions were incorrect 

and unsupported. See, e.g., Pet’r’s Br. 5–6, 15–16, 21–23. 

We address these arguments below.

A

This court must affirm the Board’s decision unless the 

decision is: “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained 

without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation 

having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). The Board’s determination 

that it lacked jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Bennett v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 635 F.3d 

1215, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The petitioner bears the burden of proving the Board’s jurisdiction over her appeal by 

a preponderance of the evidence. Id. “[A]lthough we may 

review freely the Board’s conclusion that it did not have 

jurisdiction . . . we are bound by the AJ’s factual determinations unless those findings are not supported by 

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LEHR v. MSPB 5

substantial evidence.” Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 154 

F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal “if the 

appellant has exhausted [her] administrative remedies before the OSC and makes ‘non-frivolous allegations’ of whistleblowing activity with evidence that the disclosure was a 

contributing factor in the agency’s personnel action.” 

Kalil v. Dep’t of Agric., 479 F.3d 821, 824 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 

In order “[t]o demonstrate exhaustion of [her] remedies, 

[an appellant] must show not only that [she] made a complaint to OSC, but that the disclosures and personnel actions alleged in that complaint match the allegations made 

to the Board.” Cooper v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 468 F. App’x 

977, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2012). An allegation is non-frivolous if 

it: “(1) [i]s more than conclusory; (2) [i]s plausible on its 

face; and (3) [i]s material to the legal issues in the appeal.” 

5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s).

B

Ms. Lehr first argues that the AJ incorrectly interpreted the OSC complaint she submitted in response to the 

Order. She contends that the AJ “failed to consider the additional three pages of electronic text contained in text box 

‘A’” in her submission and that the AJ should have known 

that the “‘+’ sign in the corner of the text box . . . denote[d] 

additional text [was] attached.” Pet’r’s Br. 5, 14–15. She 

also contends that the AJ improperly denied her request to 

submit additional evidence prior to rendering a decision

and that the AJ should have first provided her notice that 

her response was deficient. Id. at 6, 22–23.

Ms. Lehr’s arguments, however, ignore that the additional three pages of the OSC complaint never became part 

of the record. Having not included the additional three 

pages, Ms. Lehr failed to show that the disclosures made in 

her OSC complaint match the disclosures she made in her 

IRA appeal. See Bennett, 635 F.3d at 1218 (“the petitioner . . . bears the burden of proving the MSPB’s

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jurisdiction over her appeal by a preponderance of the evidence”). Instead, based on what was submitted, the AJ 

found Ms. Lehr only proved she exhausted her administrative remedies for one disclosure—the hiring of 

Dr. Leskosky. Based on Ms. Lehr’s submissions in response to the Order, we conclude that substantial evidence 

supports the AJ’s finding that the only disclosure Ms. Lehr 

proved to have raised to OSC was the hiring of 

Dr. Leskosky.1 

Further, as the Government points out, and Ms. Lehr 

does not rebut, Ms. Lehr does not cite to any part of the 

record to show that she requested the opportunity to submit additional evidence prior to the AJ rendering a decision. See Resp’t’s Br. 23 n.6.2 Rather, Ms. Lehr only cites 

to a motion for reconsideration which was received on the 

same day that the AJ rendered her decision. See Pet’r’s Br. 

22–23 (citing J.A. 766). In addition, Ms. Lehr cites to

1 Ms. Lehr and her counsel were apparently aware 

that the response omitted the additional three pages of the 

OSC complaint. Specifically, Ms. Lehr admits to having 

“only retained” the incomplete “copy” of the OSC complaint 

that was attached to the response, and to requesting, 

through the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C.

§ 552 (2012), a complete copy of the OSC complaint the day 

before filing the response. Pet’r’s Br. 5 n.1. Yet, in the response, Ms. Lehr’s counsel failed to apprise the AJ of 

Ms. Lehr’s pending FOIA request or the additional three 

pages of the OSC complaint omitted from the response, or 

to otherwise supplement the response with an “affidavit, 

sworn statement, or declaration” as was expressly permitted. J.A. 72–73. See generally J.A. 81–82. Unfortunately, 

the failure of Ms. Lehr’s counsel prevents Ms. Lehr from 

moving forward. 

2 In fact, Ms. Lehr’s counsel did not submit a Reply 

brief in this appeal. 

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LEHR v. MSPB 7

Cahill v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 821 F.3d 1370 

(Fed. Cir. 2016), for the proposition that “the Board should 

have given notice of the suspected deficiencies.” Pet’r’s

Br. 6. We find the reference to Cahill unpersuasive. First, 

in Cahill “there [was] no dispute about exhaustion.” Cahill, 821 F.3d at 1373. Further, Cahill focused on how the 

agency (not the AJ) challenged some elements of the petitioner’s allegations, but did not challenge the particular element that the AJ later found deficient. See id. at 1375–

76. In Cahill, we emphasized that the agency’s silence suggested that the agency did not find the particular element

deficient. Id. Here, however, the Agency did challenge the 

sufficiency of Ms. Lehr’s submission. For example, the 

Agency requested “an Order of Dismissal for want of jurisdiction.” J.A. 109 (emphasis removed). The Agency also

pointed out that the disclosure in the submitted OSC complaint “merely describe[d]” the hiring of Dr. Leskosky and 

that the “Agency was unable to locate other disclosures in 

the OSC complaint form itself.” J.A. 110 & n.1. Accordingly, we do not find that Cahill supports Ms. Lehr’s arguments.

C

Ms. Lehr argues that the AJ incorrectly found that “no 

disinterested observer with knowledge of this alleged disclosure could reasonably conclude it evidences the type of 

wrongdoings protected under the WPEA [Whistleblower 

Protection Enhancement Act].” Pet’r’s Br. 15 (emphasis 

added). She also argues that the AJ incorrectly found that

the closure letter’s “summation of [Ms. Lehr’s] disclosures 

concerning ‘fraud and patient safety concerns’ was too 

vague and too broad to evidence wrongdoing.” Id. at 15–

16, 22. 

With respect to “this alleged disclosure,” Ms. Lehr does 

not explain how a disinterested observer could conclude 

that the hiring of Dr. Leskosky evidences the type of wrongdoing that the WPEA is intended to protect against. 

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8 LEHR v. MSPB

Ms. Lehr also does not describe why the AJ erred in finding

that the closure letter’s general reference of “fraud and patient safety concerns” was “too vague and too broad to evidence wrongdoing.” For example, she neither argues nor 

attempts to explain how the closure letter matches the allegations in her IRA appeal. Instead, Ms. Lehr states that 

she “would have clearly been able to further elaborate on 

her disclosures if given the opportunity.” See id. at 22. 

This argument, even if true, does not cure the deficiencies 

and does not demonstrate that the closure letter is not too 

vague and too broad to evidence wrongdoing. See also

Cooper, 468 F. App’x at 979 (finding a “letter from the OSC 

in which the OSC advised [the petitioner] that it was closing its investigation does not serve [the] purpose” of establishing what disclosures were made to the OSC). We 

therefore see no reason to disturb the AJ’s findings.

III

We have considered the other arguments raised by 

Ms. Lehr and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing 

reasons we affirm.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

The parties shall bear their own costs.

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