Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-04205/USCOURTS-ca10-91-04205-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael L. Avila
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF A~PEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JUL 13 1992 

ROBEliT L. ~10 · C _ r: 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

MICHAEL L. AVILA, 

Defendant-Appel~ant. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Clc_·L~ 

No. 91-4205 

(D.C. No. 90-CR-169 S) 

(D. Utah) 

Before LOGAN and HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judges, and CONWAY**, District 

Judge. 

Defendant Michael L. Avila appeals his conviction on 

stipulated facts of knowingly and unlawfully possessing, with the 

intent to distribute, a quantity of cocaine, in violation of 21 

u.s.c. § 841(a) (1). On appeal, Mr. Avila contends that the trial 

court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm. 

At approximately 7:00 a.m. on August 28, 1990, Mr. Avila 

arrived in Salt Lake City aboard a Greyhound bus en route from 

southern California. Only Mr. Avila and one other passenger 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** The Honorable John E. Conway, United States District Judge 

for the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 91-4205 Document: 010110270392 Date Filed: 07/13/1992 Page: 1
departed the bus in Salt Lake City. Officers Michael w. Rufener 

and sterling B. Provost of the Utah Department of Public Safety 

were at the bus station for the purpose of detecting and 

arresting persons engaged in transporting narcotics. Both 

officers were dressed in plain clothes. Mr. Avila was carrying a 

black bag. According to the testimony of Officer Provost, the 

defendant looked directly at the officers as he exited from the 

bus, and his eyes widened, as if he realized that the officers 

were undercover agents. Mr. Avila then walked briskly through 

the bus depot. He did not stop to claim any luggage. While 

walking through the depot, the defendant repeatedly looked over 

his shoulder "in jerking motions" in the direction of the police 

officers. As soon as he exited the depot, Mr. Avila entered the 

passenger's side of the front seat of a taxi cab and locked the 

door. Officer Rufener, who had followed Mr. Avila through the 

depot, knocked on the passenger side window. Mr. Avila then 

reached in front of the driver, shifted the cab into drive, and 

motioned to the driver to leave. At this moment Officer Rufener 

produced his identification and indicated to the cab driver to 

halt. Officer Rufener then asked Mr. Avila to get out of the 

cab. 

The defendant exited the cab, but left the bag he had been 

carrying in the car. Officer Rufener asked him to retrieve the 

bag, and Mr. Avila did as instructed, placing the bag next to 

himself on the sidewalk. In response to questioning, the 

defendant told Officer Rufener that he had travelled to Salt Lake 

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City to visit his cousin; however, he could identify neither the 

name of his cousin or the location of his cousin's residence. 

Mr. Avila then told Officer Rufener that the bag belonged to his 

cousin. Officer Rufener asked the defendant if he was carrying 

any drugs or large amounts of money. According to Officer 

Rufener, Mr. Avila became visibly more nervous, and Officer 

Rufener asked him for permission to search the bag. Mr. Avila 

reiterated that it was not his bag, but nevertheless gave 

permission to search. Inside the bag the officers discovered a 

cylindrical shaped package wrapped in brown paper which, based on 

their experience, they recognized as a type of packaging 

sometimes used to ship narcotics. The officers opened the 

package and discovered that it contained what they believed to be 

cocaine. Mr. Avila was placed under arrest. A subsequent field 

test confirmed that the substance was cocaine. 

Mr. Avila filed a motion to suppress the cocaine. The 

district judge referred the matter to a magistrate judge to hear 

initial pretrial motions. The defendant's motion to suppress was 

extensively briefed. After conducting an evidentiary hearing the 

magistrate judge issued an exhaustive Recommendation and Report 

in which he recommended that the defendant's motion to suppress 

be denied. The district judge, after additional briefing, 

subsequently adopted the magistrate judge's Recommendation and 

Report in all material respects, and Mr. Avila's motion to 

suppress was denied. 

The defendant raises three issues on appeal. First, he 

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contends that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to seize 

him. Second, he argues that he did not voluntarily consent to 

the search of the black bag he was carrying when the officers 

stopped him. Finally, Mr. Avila claims that the officers 

violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they conducted a 

warrantless search of the container found within the black bag. 

"In reviewing the denial of a defendant's motion to suppress 

evidence, we accept the trial court's findings of fact, unless 

clearly erroneous, and consider all the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the Government. However, ultimate determinations of 

reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, and other questions of 

law, are reviewed de novo. 11 United States v. Evans, 937 F.2d 

1534, 1536 (10th Cir. 1991). 

Mr. Avila contends that the officers unlawfully detained him 

when they instructed the taxi cab driver to halt and ordered the 

defendant out of the automobile. We have previously identified 

three categories of citizen encounters with law enforcement 

officials. 

The first, a consensual encounter, involves a citizen's 

voluntary cooperation with an official's non-coercive 

questioning. A consensual encounter is not a seizure 

within the meaning of the fourth amendment. The 

second, an investigative detention or "Terry stop," is 

a seizure within the scope of the fourth amendment that 

is justified when specific and articulable facts and 

rational inferences drawn from those facts give rise to 

a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a 

crime. The third category, an arrest, is also a fourth 

amendment seizure that is characterized by a highly 

intrusive or lengthy detention and requires probable 

cause the arrestee has or is committing an crime. 

United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1990). 

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The encounter between Mr. Avila and the officers began as an 

investigative detention. As noted above, a person may be 

detained in this manner if specific and articulable facts and 

rational inferences drawn from those facts engender a reasonable 

suspicion that an offense has been or is being committed. 

Mr. Avila arrived in Salt Lake City on a bus that originated 

in southern California. 1 He exited the bus quickly and, 

according to Officer Provost, his eyes widened when he saw the 

two plain-clothed officers. Thereafter Mr. Avila walked through 

the bus station at a pace described by the officers as just below 

a run, repeatedly looking over his shoulder in jerking motions at 

the officers. Officer Rufener testified that the defendant 

entered the first available taxi cab and immediately locked the 

passenger door. Most significantly, when Officer Rufener knocked 

on the passenger window, Mr. Avila reached for the car's gear 

shift and attempted to move it into the drive position. We hold 

that under these facts Officer Rufener had a reasonable suspicion 

that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity. 

The defendant's behavior after he reached the taxi cab 

supported the resulting investigative detention. It is unusual 

for an individual to quickly exit a bus and practically run 

through the bus station to the first available taxi cab, while 

all the time looking over his shoulder toward two strangers. 

Neither officer clearly identified the specific city of 

origin. Nevertheless, the district judge took judicial notice of 

the fact that much of the narcotics entering Utah originates from 

southern California. 

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Neverthless, it is unlikely that this behavior alone would have 

justified an involuntary investigative detention. 2 However, 

when that individual then reacts to the presence of a stranger by 

locking his door and attempting to shift the gear shifter of the 

car in which he is a passenger into drive, the totality of the 

circumstances supports an experienced officer's suspicion that 

the individual is engaged in criminal activity. Cf. United 

States v. Haye, 825 F.2d 32, 35 (4th Cir. 1987); and United 

States v. Ceballos, 719 F.Supp. 119, 125 (E.D.N.Y. 1989 ) . 

Mr. Avila next contends that he did not voluntarily consent 

to the search of the black bag. "The voluntariness of consent is 

a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the 

circumstances." United states v. Evans, supra, 937 F.2d at 1538. 

We apply a three-tiered analysis to determine whether consent was 

voluntary: 

First, there must be clear and positive testimony that 

the consent was unequivocal and specific, and freely 

and intelligently given. Second, the Government must 

establish that consent was given without duress or 

coercion. Finally, we evaluate the first two standards 

with the traditional indulgence of the courts against a 

presumption of waiver of constitutional rights. 

United States v. Corral, 899 F.2d 991, 994 (10th cir. 

1990) (quoting United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1453 (10th 

Cir. 1985) (citations omitted)). 

2 Notably, there is nothing in this case to indicate that 

the officers initially intended to initiate anything other than a 

consensual encounter. In that event, Mr. Avila could have declined 

to answer questions and simply walked away. Cf. Florida v. Royer, 

4 6 0 U • S . 4 91 , 4 9 7 -9 8 , 10 3 S . Ct . 1319 , 13 2 3 - 2 4 , 7 0 L. Ed . 2 d 2 2 9 

(1983). 

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The district court concluded, and the record clearly 

demonstrates, that Mr. Avila gave a voluntary and unequivocal 

consent to the search of the black bag. Both officers asked the 

defendant if they could search the bag. Mr. Avila, although 

denying that the bag belonged to him, unambiguously responded in 

the affirmative. There is no evidence that the defendant was 

pressured or threatened. Mr. Avila argues, however, that his 

consent was tainted by the allegedly illegal detention directly 

preceding the search. Since we have concluded that the initial 

detention of the defendant was supported by reasonable suspicion, 

the defendant's taint argument is obviously without merit. 

Finally, Mr. Avila argues that his Fourth Amendment rights 

were violated when the officers opened the container they found 

inside the bag without first obtaining a search warrant. Because 

the officers acted within the scope of Mr. Avila's consent when 

they opened the cylindrical object found within the black bag, we 

reject the defendant's argument that the officer's conducted an 

unlawful warrantless search of that object. 

The scope of a consent search is limited by the breadth of 

the consent given. See United States v. Gay. 774 F.2d 368, 377 

(10th Cir. 1985). "The standard for measuring the scope of a 

suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of 

'objective' reasonableness-- what would the typical reasonable 

person have understood by the exchange between the officer and 

the suspect?" Florida v. Jimeno, U.S. __ , 111 s.ct. 1801, 

1803-04, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). "Whether a search remains 

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within the boundaries of the consent is a question of fact to be 

determined from the totality of the circumstances, and a trial 

court's findings will be upheld unless they are clearly 

erroneous." United States v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509, 1514 (10th 

Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 

L.Ed.2d 975 (1991). 

u.s. __ , 111 s.ct. 2802, 115 

In Florida v. Jimeno the Supreme Court ruled that a 

suspect's general consent to a search of his car included consent 

to open and examine a paper bag lying on the floor of that car. 

The scope of a search is generally defined by its 

expressed object. In this case, the terms of the 

search's authorization were simple. Respondent granted 

Officer Trujillo permission to search his car, and did 

not place any explicit limitation on the scope of the 

search. Trujillo had informed respondent that he 

believed respondent was carrying narcotics, and that he 

would be looking for narcotics in the car. We think it 

was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude 

that the general consent to search respondent's car 

included consent to search containers within that car 

which might bear drugs. A reasonable person may be 

expected to know that narcotics are generally carried 

in some form of a container ...• The authorization to 

search in this case, therefore, extended beyond the 

surfaces of the car's interior to the paper bag lying 

on the car's floor. 

Florida v. Jimeno, supra, 111 s.ct. at 1804. 

Officer Rufener asked Mr. Avila if he was carrying either 

narcotics or large amounts of money before he asked for consent 

to search the bag. Therefore, like the defendant in Jimeno, the 

defendant here was aware of the object of the search. The 

testimony before the trial court demonstrates that Mr. Avila did 

not attempt to limit the scope of his consent at any time during 

the search of the bag. We have previously held that "failure to 

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object to the continuation of the search under these 

circumstances may be considered an indication that the search was 

within the scope of the consent." United States v. Espinosa, 782 

F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986); see also, United States v. 

Dewitt, 946 F.2d 1497, 1501 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Rison 

v. United States, -- U.S.--' 112 s.ct. 1233, 117 L.Ed.2d 467 

(1992); and United States v. Pena, supra, 920 F.2d at 1514-15. 

Under Jimeno, the officers were justified in believing that 

Avila's consent included consent to search the brown cylindrical 

object. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court: 

John E. Conway 

District Judge 

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