Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-01452/USCOURTS-caDC-98-01452-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Respondent
Georgia State Chapter Association of Civilian Technicians
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 5, 1999 Decided August 3, 1999

No. 98-1452

Georgia State Chapter Association of Civilian Technicians,

Petitioner

v.

Federal Labor Relations Authority,

Respondent

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Labor Relations Authority

Daniel M. Schember argued the cause and filed the briefs

for petitioner.

Judith A. Hagley, Attorney, Federal Labor Relations Authority, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the

brief were David M. Smith, Solicitor, and William R. Tobey,

Deputy Solicitor.

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Before: Ginsburg, Sentelle, and Randolph, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: Let us begin very simply. The

petitioner has raised several objections to a decision of the

Federal Labor Relations Authority. No one made these

objections, or any arguments in support of them, during the

administrative proceedings. The FLRA's opinion does not

address them. Congress, in 5 U.S.C. s 7123(c), decreed: "No

objection that has not been urged before the Authority ...

shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect

to urge the objection is excused because of extraordinary

circumstances." The particular "failure or neglect" encountered here cannot be excused. There are no extraordinary

circumstances. And so the petition for judicial review must

be denied. See EEOC v. FLRA, 476 U.S. 19, 22-23 (1986);

NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, 344 U.S. 344, 350

(1953).

Now for the details. Petitioner is the Georgia State Chapter of the Association of Civilian Technicians, a federal labor

union. It has a collective bargaining agreement with the

Office of the Adjutant General, Georgia Department of Defense. Section 5.2a(3) of the agreement gives the union, or

rather its members, a total of 2200 hours of paid administrative leave1--otherwise known as "official time"--for certain

specified purposes, one of which is to visit elected representatives regarding legislation that would affect union members.2

In August 1995, the union requested hours of official time for

__________

1 Administrative leave is "time granted an employee by an agency

to perform representational functions" and is considered hours of

work. See 5 C.F.R. s 551.424(b).

2 Section 5.2a states: "The Labor Organization is authorized two

thousand two hundred (2200) hours of administrative leave for the

following purposes: ... (3) Represent Technicians by visiting elected representatives in support or opposition to pending or desired

legislation which would impact the working conditions of Technicians represented by [the Association of Civilian Technicians]."

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eleven of its representatives to meet with Members of Congress to discuss "matters of interest to the Union and the

employees it represents." See Georgia State Chapter Ass'n

of Civilian Technicians, 54 F.L.R.A. 654, 656 (1998). The

Georgia Office of the Adjutant General refused on the basis

that the contractual leave provision, to the extent it concerned

lobbying of Congress, was unlawful and hence unenforceable.

See id.

After management reiterated its position, the union filed an

unfair labor practice charge. The FLRA's General Counsel

issued a complaint alleging that this arm of the Defense

Department, by repudiating a provision of the collective bargaining agreement, had violated s 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the

Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act.3 See

Georgia State Chapter, 54 F.L.R.A. at 654. During the ensuing administrative proceedings, the General Counsel contended that s 7102 grants employees the right to act in a representational capacity and, in that capacity, to present the views

of their union to Congress.4 See Georgia State Chapter, 54

F.L.R.A. at 660. The Act also requires that union representatives "be granted official time" in an amount set by contract. See 5 U.S.C. s 7131(d). In an anticipatory defense,

the General Counsel maintained that a criminal provision--18

U.S.C. s 1913--did not render the administrative leave provision illegal. The criminal provision forbids using appropriated funds "directly or indirectly to pay for any ... device,

intended or designed to influence in any manner a Member of

__________

3 5 U.S.C. s 7116(a) provides that "it shall be an unfair labor

practice for an agency--(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce any

employee in the exercise by the employee of any right under this

chapter; ... (5) to refuse to consult or negotiate in good faith with

a labor organization as required by this chapter."

4 5 U.S.C. s 7102(1) states that employees shall have the right to

form, join or assist any labor organization and that "such right

includes the right--to act for a labor organization in the capacity of

a representative and the right, in that capacity, to present the views

of the labor organization to heads of agencies and other officials of

the executive branch of the Government, the Congress, or other

appropriate authorities."

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Congress ... [regarding] any legislation or appropriation,"

"in the absence of express authorization by Congress." 18

U.S.C. s 1913. Section 7102(1), the General Counsel contended, is such an express congressional authorization. See

Georgia State Chapter, 54 F.L.R.A. at 660.

Although agreeing with the General Counsel about 18

U.S.C. s 1913, the FLRA held the disputed portion of the

contractual leave provision unenforceable on another ground.

Paying wages to union representatives for their lobbying of

Congress, the FLRA ruled, contradicted s 8015 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1996. See Georgia

State Chapter, 54 F.L.R.A. at 665-66; see also Department of

Defense Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-61,

s 8015, 109 Stat. 636, 654 (1995). Section 8015 provides that

"[n]one of the funds made available by this Act shall be used

in any way, directly or indirectly, to influence congressional

action on any legislation or appropriation matters pending

before the Congress." See Pub. L. No. 104-61, s 8015, 109

Stat. 654. In so ruling, the FLRA adopted the contention of

the Defense Department in the brief it filed with the agency.

The union tells us that the FLRA erred, because the

Appropriations Act could not repeal the provisions of the

Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act by implication; because the FLRA "overlooked its obligation to reconcile the statutes"; because the FLRA's interpretation raises a question under the First Amendment to the Constitution;

and because the labor statute is more specific than the

Appropriations Act. We can say with confidence that none of

these objections, none of these arguments, was ever urged

until the case arrived in this court. As we wrote in the

opening paragraph, that failure and neglect precludes us from

passing on the union's contentions. We do not have to deal

with any possible distinctions between, on the one hand,

preserving an "objection"--the term used in 5 U.S.C.

s 7123(c), and in its NLRB counterpart, 29 U.S.C. s 160(e)--

and, on the other hand, preserving an "issue," or a "claim," or

an "argument." Compare Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami,

344 U.S. at 350; Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S.

90, 99 (1991); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534-35

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(1992); Parsippany Hotel Management Co. v. NLRB, 99

F.3d 413, 417-18 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The fact of the matter is

that nothing was put before the FLRA to counter the Defense Department's contention that the Appropriations Act

rendered the contractual provision unenforceable. It is not

enough that the FLRA's General Counsel brought to the

agency's attention the maxim that a specific statute prevails

over a general one. This was said to explain why the criminal

provision (18 U.S.C. s 1913) did not override the provisions in

the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act. See

Georgia State Chapter, 54 F.L.R.A. at 660. Whether the

maxim should be applied to the Appropriations Act is another

question entirely, and one on which the General Counsel was

silent. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Commerce v. FLRA,

7 F.3d 243, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

Section 7123(c) permits us to pass on an objection even

though it has not been urged before the FLRA if "extraordinary circumstances" warrant excusing the failure. The union

points out that the FLRA requires simultaneous briefing.

See 5 C.F.R. s 2429.1(a) (1997), removed and reserved, Unfair

Labor Practice Proceedings: Miscellaneous and General Requirements, 62 Fed. Reg. 40,911, 40,922 (July 31, 1997). The

Defense Department's arguments regarding the 1996 Appropriations Act, the union tells us, were unanticipated. Be that

as it may, leave to file a reply brief setting forth the arguments in opposition was never sought. See 5 C.F.R.

s 2429.26(a); see Garment Workers v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420

U.S. 276, 281 n.3 (1975); NLRB v. FLRA, 2 F.3d 1190, 1195

(D.C. Cir. 1993). Nor did the union request reconsideration

of the FLRA's decision. See 5 C.F.R. s 2429.17.

It is true that we have considered and ruled on objections

first raised on judicial review when the FLRA rested its

decision on a ground neither party had argued, so long as a

request for reconsideration appeared clearly doomed. See

United States Dep't of Commerce, 7 F.3d at 245; United

States Dep't of Interior v. FLRA, 969 F.2d 1158, 1161 (D.C.

Cir. 1992). The situation here is not comparable. In the first

place, the FLRA did not sua sponte raise the Appropriations

Act; the Defense Department argued the point to the agency.

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Second, it is not so plain that a request for reconsideration

would have been futile. Shortly before issuing its opinion in

this case, the FLRA handed down two decisions--Office of

the Adjutant General, New Hampshire National Guard, 54

F.L.R.A. 301, 310-11 (1998), and Headquarters, National

Guard Bureau Washington, D.C. Nevada Air National

Guard, Reno, Nevada, 54 F.L.R.A. 316, 325 (1998). The union

describes these cases as identical to its case, and states that

in both, the FLRA rejected the arguments the union wishes

us to consider. But the factual setting of those cases was not

the same as this one and, in any event, the FLRA's opinions

do not even deal with several of the arguments contained in

the union's brief in this court. We have no doubt that these

precedents would have put the union in the position of waging

an uphill battle in getting the FLRA to reconsider, but "the

requirement that a litigant present such a petition is ordinarily not excused simply 'because the [FLRA] was unlikely to

have granted it.' " Compare NLRB v. FLRA, 2 F.3d at 1196.

The petition for review is denied.

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