Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06556/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06556-12/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City Of Fresno
Defendant
Holly Louen
Plaintiff
Brian Twedt
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOLLY LOUEN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

BRIAN TWEDT, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:04-CV-6556-REC-SMS

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT CITY OF

FRESNO’S MOTION TO COMPEL

RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR

PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS REGARDING

EXPERTS (Doc. 97)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT CITY OF

FRESNO’S MOTION TO COMPEL

WITNESSES LAURA G. MAGILL AND

CHARLES MAGILL TO RESPOND TO

DEFENDANT’S DEPOSITION QUESTIONS

(DOC. 96)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO ENFORCE COURT ORDER AND

REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS AND

ATTORNEY’S FEES (D0C. 100)

ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO

SUBMIT TO MENTAL EXAMINATION BY

DR. SEYMOUR ON JUNE 9, 2006 AT

8:00 A.M. 

Plaintiffs are proceeding with a civil action in this Court.

The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72-302(c)(1) and 72-303.

I. Background

The motions of Defendant City of Fresno to compel production

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 The motion to enforce court order and request for sanctions and attorney’s fees was unopposed and was

not the subject of a joint statement.

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of documents regarding expert witnesses and to compel further

deposition testimony of third-party witnesses Laura Guzman-Magill

and Timothy Magill, and the motion of Defendants City of Fresno

and Officer Brian Twedt for enforcement of Judge Robert E.

Coyle’s order regarding Plaintiff’s submitting to a mental

examination came on regularly for hearing on June 2, 2006, at

9:30 a.m. in Courtroom 7 before the Honorable Sandra M. Snyder,

United States Magistrate Judge. Erica Camarena and Lara Moriarty 

appeared on behalf of Defendant City of Fresno; Greg Myers

appeared for Defendant Twedt; and Kevin Little appeared on behalf

of Plaintiff. The Court had reviewed all the papers submitted in

support of the motions, including the moving papers,

declarations, and exhibits thereto, as well as the stipulations

pursuant to Local Rule 37-251.1 After argument the matter was

submitted to the Court.

II. Motion to Compel

A party, upon reasonable notice and after certifying that

the parties have met in a good faith effort to resolve the

dispute and secure the material without court action, may apply

for an order compelling disclosure or discovery, or further

disclosure or discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a), (d); Local Rule

37-251. An evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer or response

is treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37(a)(3). A stipulation regarding the discovery

disagreement must be filed except in cases involving a complete

and total failure to respond to a discovery request or order, and

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when the only relief sought by the motion is the imposition of

sanctions. Local Rule 37-251(e).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d) provides:

(d) Failure of Party to Attend at Own Deposition

or Serve Answers to Interrogatories or Respond to

Request for Inspection. If a party or an officer,

director, or managing agent of a party or a person

designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify

on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the

officer who is to take the deposition, after being

served with a proper notice, or (2) to serve answers

or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33,

after proper service of the interrogatories, or 

(3) to serve a written response to a request for

inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper

service of the request, the court in which the action

is pending on motion may make such orders in regard

to the failure as are just, and among others it may

take any action authorized under subparagraphs (A), (B),

and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. Any motion

specifying a failure under clause (2) or (3) of this

subdivision shall include a certification that the

movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to

confer with the party failing to answer or respond 

in an effort to obtain such answer or response without

court action. In lieu of any order or in addition

thereto, the court shall require the party failing

to act or the attorney advising that party or both

to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's

fees, caused by the failure unless the court finds

that the failure was substantially justified or that

other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

The failure to act described in this subdivision

may not be excused on the ground that the discovery

sought is objectionable unless the party failing to act

has a pending motion for a protective order as provided

by Rule 26(c).

Further, a failure to comply with a request for production of

documents is subject to the procedures set forth in Rule 37 with

respect to motions to compel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b).

II. Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Production

 of Documents regarding Experts

On March 21, 2006, Defendant City of Fresno served on

Plaintiff a request for production of documents (Request for

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Production, Set Two (Re: Experts)) seeking documents relating to

Plaintiff’s designated experts, such as e-mails and

communications with experts, documents created by experts, notes

taken by experts, materials relied on by experts, including

articles and research, test results, documents in the experts’

files, etc. Plaintiff failed expressly to respond to each subpart

of the request; instead, Plaintiff provided some documents that

responded to one of the subparts, and those documents themselves

referred to other documents that Plaintiff believed had already

been produced to Defendant. This resulted in Defendant’s being

unsure that the documents referred to were the precise documents

that Defendant already had. Further, because of the form and

extent of the response, Plaintiff did not expressly indicate when

there were no documents responsive to a particular request, or

whether a response was partial or complete. Thus, Defendant was

uncertain whether or not Plaintiff had submitted all the

documents that existed. Indeed, Defendant had to piece the

requests and responses together to try to ascertain if the

documents adverted to had been produced.

The Court notes that there is no showing that Plaintiff is

unable to produce any of the documents requested.

Even if there are no documents responsive to a request for

production, the requesting party is entitled to a response

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b). Fishel v. BASF Group, 175

F.R.D. 525, 531 (S.D.Iowa 1997). Defendant is entitled to

individualized, complete responses to each of the requests, as

numbered and identified in the requests, accompanied by

production of each of the documents responsive to the request,

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regardless of whether the documents have already been produced.

Thus, Defendant’s motion will be granted.

Defendant seeks reasonable expenses in making the motion,

including attorney’s fees. However, no declaration regarding fees

or expenses was submitted. Expenses and fees will not be awarded. 

II. Motion to Compel Further Deposition of Third-Party

 Attorney Witnesses

Defendants seek an order compelling attorneys Laura GuzmanMagill and Charles Magill to 1) submit to further deposition and

answer questions pertaining to exhibits 2, 9, 17, and 19 of

Guzman-Magill’s deposition transcript; 2) permit Defendants to

explore further information contained in the documents produced

by Plaintiff and identified by the Magistrate Judge as Bates

stamped numbers 1038, 1064-66, 1121, 1123-26, 1131-32, 1139-40

because Plaintiff and her attorneys have waived any claims of

privilege regarding this document; 3) or, in the alternative, an

order precluding Plaintiff from producing Mr. Magill and Laura

Guzman-Magill in her case-in-chief at trial.

Guzman-Magill is apparently a neighbor and friend of

Plaintiff as well as an attorney for Plaintiff in a state

proceeding against Defendant Twedt involving an injunction. It is

undisputed that Magill and Guzman-Magill are percipient witnesses

with respect to liability and damages because it was stated by

Plaintiff in the initial disclosures that they had information

regarding Plaintiff’s encounters with Defendant Twedt and

subsequent damages that Plaintiff incurred. 

The basis of Defendants’ motion is that Plaintiff and her

attorneys have waived any claims of attorney-client privilege or

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work product protection with respect to the documents pursuant to

the Magistrate Judge’s ruling of December 22, 2005, in which the

Court ruled that 1) as to the twelve pages of documents claimed

to have been protected by attorney-client privilege or work

product protection, namely, Bates stamp numbers 1038, 1064-66,

1121, 1123-26, 1131-32, and 1139-40, Plaintiff and her attorney

have waived any claim of privilege by Plaintiff’s voluntary

and/or inadvertent disclosure; and 2) the remaining 1,847

documents are not privileged.

Preliminarily, the Court notes that although there has been

some delay since the taking of depositions in question, which

occurred on November 16, 2005, the delay has been justified

because of the extensive resources having to be devoted to this

case; Plaintiff does not object to the delay, and no prejudice is

claimed. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the motion was

brought within a reasonable time and was not unreasonably

delayed.

With respect to the documents that were the subject of the

Court’s earlier ruling of December 22, 2005, the attorney-client

privilege and work product protection have been waived. Plaintiff

has not formally moved for reconsideration, and the Court does

not reconsider its former determination. 

“The law of the case doctrine is a judicial invention

designed to aid in the efficient operation of court affairs."

Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 902 F.2d 703, 715

(9th Cir.1990). Under the doctrine, a court is generally

precluded from reconsidering an issue previously decided by the

same court, or a higher court in the identical case. See id. A

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 The Court notes that this is not “new” evidence because it was in existence at the time of the Court’s

earlier ruling.

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trial judge's decision to apply the doctrine is thus reviewed for

an abuse of discretion. See Milgard Tempering, 902 F.2d at 715.

United States v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 443, 452 (9th Cir.

2000). A court abuses its discretion in applying the law of the

case doctrine only if (1) the first decision was clearly

erroneous; (2) an intervening change in the law occurred; (3) the

evidence on remand was substantially different; (4) other changed

circumstances exist; or (5) a manifest injustice would otherwise

result. United States v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d at 452-53

(citing United States v. Cuddy, 147 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir.

1998)).

Here, the additional evidence2 before the Court is the

declaration of Guzman-Magill, which was apparently submitted to

the state court but which has not previously been submitted to

this Court. Review of the totality of the circumstances, as shown

by all the evidence, including this declaration, demonstrates

voluntary disclosure; further, the evidence does not indicate

that counsel employed reasonable precautions to prevent

inadvertent disclosure or to protect any privilege upon the

discovery of disclosure, and there are no circumstances

indicating any unfairness or manifest injustice in finding a

waiver. Thus, the Court will not disturb its earlier ruling.

At argument Defendant City’s counsel noted that two of the

documents about which Defendant seeks to question Magill and

Guzman-Magill were not the subject of the Court’s earlier order,

namely, Exhibits 2 and 17 to the deposition of Guzman-Magill.

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Exhibit 2 is the declaration of Guzman-Magill that was submitted

to the state court; Exhibit 17 is a letter from Guzman-Magill

dated March 16, 2005, addressed to a captain and lieutenant in

the Fresno Police Department Internal Affairs Unit relating to an

incident of March 13, 2005, which appears to have ultimately

resulted in Defendant Twedt’s bringing a defamation action

against Guzman-Magill. 

The precise circumstances of Defendants’ having received

possession of these documents are unclear. Exhibit 2, the

declaration, has been revealed to opposing counsel in the state

court action and does not appear to have otherwise been treated

as confidential. Exhibit 17, the letter likewise was sent to a

public agency. The Court notes that the only basis for privilege

or other protection noted by Plaintiff in the joint statement is

the argument that inadvertent production should not have been

considered a waiver. The burden is on the party asserting the

privilege to establish all the elements of the privilege. United

States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2002). A person

asserting attorney-client privilege has the burden of persuasion

as to all elements of the privilege, including an affirmative

showing of non-waiver if the issue of waiver has been raised.

United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987), aff’d

in part and vacated in part, 491 US. 554 (1989), overruled on

other grounds, United States v. Jose, 131 F.d1325, 1329 (9th Cir.

1997 (en banc); Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research &

Management, 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Here, Plaintiff has not sustained her burden of establishing

that these documents are privileged or otherwise protected.

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The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that any finding of

waiver should not be binding on the attorney witnesses. The

principle of limited or selective waiver, whereby disclosure of a

privileged communication to one entity does not preclude

assertion of the privilege against another entity, is not

uniformly recognized, and where recognized appears to be limited

to voluntary disclosure of privileged materials to a governmental

agency in a separate and nonpublic investigation. See, In re

Syncor Erisa Litigation, 229 F.R.D. 636, 645 (C.D.Cal.2005). The

work product protection is waived, with respect to all

adversaries, by disclosure of work product to a single adversary

that enables the adversary to gain access to information. Id. at

646 n. 8. However, see Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 720

n.5 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting the trend to find to find limited

waivers, and suggesting that disclosure to the government did not

necessarily constitute a waiver as to a private third party);

United States v. Bergonzi, 403 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2005)

(noting that it was an open question whether a selective or

partial waiver could be recognized that would allow corporate

disclosure of information to an investigating governmental agency

without waiving attorney-client or work product protection as to

the outside world). 

Here, the initial waiver determination was made with respect

to the same parties in the same proceeding, and it rested on

conduct by the affected attorney witnesses as well as others; the

only distinction apparent with respect to the present motion is

that different witnesses are being questioned about the material

in question. There was no compulsion or other circumstances

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attending the waiver that might render appropriate an application

of the selective waiver rule. This case should be governed by the

generally recognized principle that once waived, the attorneyclient privilege cannot be subsequently asserted. Genentech, Inc.

v. United States International Trade Commission, 122 F.3d 1409,

1416-17 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

Likewise, the Court rejects Plaintiff contention that the

Magills should not be bound by the Court’s previous ruling

because they had no opportunity to challenge it. It does not

appear that the Magills made any effort to proceed pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(iii) to quash or modify the

deposition subpoena.

Thus, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion. Further

deposition of the Magills is appropriate with respect to matters

relating to liability and damages to which they were percipient

witnesses, and questions relating to the documents or

communications previously claimed to be privileged but found not

to be privileged. However, it is possible that some information

other than and in addition to the documents that have been

considered by the Court may remain privileged. Therefore, the

Court suggests that it would be efficient to take the deposition

within the courthouse with the Magistrate Judge available to

consider and rule upon claims of privilege as the deposition

proceeds. Further, the Court will order the deposition transcript

and its contents to be sealed and dissemination thereof

restricted. 

The Court notes that under the federal rules, the only time

it is permissible to counsel a witness to refuse to answer a

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deposition question is when it is necessary to preserve a

privilege, enforce a limitation directed by the Court, or to move

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(4) with respect to an

examination being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as

unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or the

party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1).

III. Motion to Enforce Court Order and Request for Sanctions

 and Attorney’s Fees

Defendants move to enforce the Court’s order of April 19,

2006, in which Judge Coyle denied Plaintiff’s request for a stay

of this action based on abstention, further denied Plaintiff’s

motion for reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s order

regarding sanctions with respect to Plaintiff’s failure to attend

an ordered medical examination, and ordered the following:

1. Plaintiff is sanctioned $2,500.00 for failure

to comply with a court order.

2. The sanctions are stayed until the conclusion

of this case.

3. As soon as is practicable, Plaintiff shall appear

for an Independent Mental Examination with Dr. Harold

L. Seymour.

4. The parties shall either stipulate to a date

and time for the examination or arrange a scheduling

conference with Magistrate Judge Snyder to do so.

5. The examination will be audio-recorded.

6. No third party, including counsel, may attend the

examination. (Emphasis added.)

(Id. at 16.) The Court finds that Plaintiff and her counsel have

failed to comply with the Court’s order because they neither

stipulated to a date and time for the exam or cooperated in the

arrangement of a scheduling conference to schedule the exam. No

excuse appears for this failure, which was not substantially

justified. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) provides that if a party fails to obey

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an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a), the Court may make such orders

as are just, including ordering designated facts established,

precluding specific claims or defenses, striking out pleadings or

parts thereof, dismissing the action or any part thereof,

entering a default judgment, deeming any failure except a failure

to submit to a physical or mental examination to be a contempt,

and/or requiring the party failing to obey, or the attorney

advising that party, or both, to pay the reasonable expenses,

including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the

Court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that

other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

Plaintiff’s motion to enforce the Court’s order and request

for sanctions and attorney’s fees IS GRANTED in part. 

Plaintiff will be ordered to attend a mental examination at

the next convenient date for Dr. Seymour, which the Court and

Plaintiff’s counsel were informed by counsel for Defendant at the

hearing on this motion is June 9, 2006, at 8:00 a.m.

Further, Court finds that counsel for Defendant City of

Fresno expended $768.00 in reasonable expenses and attorney’s

fees, and that no circumstances appear that would make an award

of expenses unjust. Thus, Plaintiff will be ordered to pay this

amount to Defendant’s counsel. 

DISPOSITION

Accordingly, it IS ORDERED that

1) Defendant City of Fresno’s motion to compel responses to

requests for production of documents regarding experts IS

GRANTED; Plaintiff SHALL RESPOND by serving responses no later

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than June 30, 2006, with individualized, complete responses to

each of the requests, as numbered and identified in the requests,

accompanied by production of each of the documents responsive to

the request, regardless of whether any of the documents has

already been produced; if no document exists that is responsive

to a request, then Plaintiff IS DIRECTED to state that no

document exists that is responsive to the request; and 

2) Defendant City’s motion to compel witnesses Laura G.

Magill and Charles Magill to respond to Defendant’s deposition

questions IS GRANTED; the deposition SHALL PROCEED upon

appropriate notice, and sanctions SHALL BE imposed upon any

witness who refuses to appear for continued deposition without a

legally sufficient excuse or justification; Defendants MAY

QUESTION the witnesses regarding the documents previously claimed

to be privileged, and the communications which they embody as to

which any privilege has been waived, as well as Exhibits 2 and 17

to the deposition of Laura G. Magill; further, Defendants MAY

QUESTION the witnesses regarding all matters not privileged; the

transcript of any such deposition IS ORDERED to be sealed, the

contents thereof shall be revealed only to the attorneys, clients

shall be allowed to assist in review of the contents for purposes

of this case only, and any testimony derived from any continued

deposition is for use in this action only and not in any other

case; and

3) Defendants’ motion to enforce court order and request for

sanctions and attorney’s fees IS GRANTED in part; Plaintiff IS

DIRECTED to attend a mental examination by Dr. Seymour on June 9,

2006, at 8:00 a.m.; further, Plaintiff IS DIRECTED to pay

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forthwith to Weakley, Ratliff, Arendt & McGuire, counsel for

Defendant City of Fresno, $768.00 in reasonable expenses and

attorney’s fees caused by Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the

Court’s order; except insofar as Defendants’ motion is granted,

Defendants’ motion is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 6, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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