Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03787/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03787-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Faulkner County
Appellant
James M. Hayes
Appellee
Kyle Kelley
Appellant
Marty Montgomery
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable William R. Wilson, Jr., United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3787

___________

James M. Hayes, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Eastern

Faulkner County, Arkansas; * District of Arkansas.

Marty Montgomery, Sheriff *

of Faulkner County, Arkansas, *

in his individual and official capacities; *

Kyle Kelley, Jail Administrator, *

in his individual and official capacities, *

* 

Appellants. * 

___________

Submitted: September 17, 2004

Filed: October 29, 2004

___________

Before MURPHY, MCMILLIAN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges. 

___________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

James M. Hayes sued Faulkner County and its sheriff and jail administrator

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court1

 ruled that his 38-day pre-appearance

detention violated his right to due process, and entered judgment against Faulkner

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County and individually against jail administrator Kyle Kelley. Jurisdiction being

proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this Court now affirms.

In 1997, a police officer ticketed Hayes for not having automobile tags and

vehicle insurance. Hayes failed to appear at his municipal court hearing; bench

warrants issued. Stopped for a traffic violation on April 3, 1998, Hayes was arrested

on the warrants, given a court date of May 11, and jailed at the Faulkner County

Detention Center. He did not post the $593 cash-only bond. He remained in jail at

the Center until appearing before the court on May 11.

While in jail, Hayes sent four grievances to Kelley, who had primary

responsibility to oversee the Center. The first three were on April 16 (requesting a

money order), April 18 (requesting medication), and April 19 (requesting

medication). On April 26, Hayes hand-wrote a grievance stating,

I've been here for 23 days and have not been to court. According

Prompt First Appearance Rule 8.1 I should seen a judge within 72 hrs.

I have yet to be told when I will go to court. I also know that the

arresting told booking to hold me back. I want to know when you plan

to obay the law and allow me to go to court?

Kelley's written response: "I don't set people up for court. I hope you go to court &

are able to get out. Write the booking officer to find out about your court date."

Kelley testified he would have followed the same course of conduct if Hayes

had been jailed for 99 days. He said he wanted to obey the court and was not trying

to be disobedient as a jailer or law enforcement officer. During the detention, the

court met on April 13 and April 29. Though an April 29 appearance date was entered

on Hayes's booking card, he did not have the opportunity to appear before a judge

until May 11.

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The issue is a pretrial detainee's right to a prompt appearance in court, after

arrest by warrant. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment controls.

Spencer v. Knapheide Truck Equip. Co., 183 F.3d 902, 905 (8th Cir. 1999), cert.

denied, 528 U.S. 1157 (2000). This Court reviews de novo questions of law arising

under the Constitution. Estate of Davis v. Delo, 115 F.3d 1388, 1394 (8th Cir. 1997).

The Seventh Circuit decided similar cases in Coleman v. Frantz, 754 F.2d 719

(7th Cir. 1985) and Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 1998). In

Coleman, an 18-day detention after arrest by warrant, but before initial appearance,

violated Coleman's substantive due process rights. 754 F.2d at 723-24; cf. Davis v.

Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 713-14 (8th Cir. 2004). Citing the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth

amendments, the Seventh Circuit stated, "Almost every element of a 'first appearance'

under state statutes or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure serves to enforce or

give meaning to important individual rights that are either expressly granted in the

Constitution or are set forth in Supreme Court precedent." Coleman, 754 F.2d at 724.

An extended pretrial detention without an initial appearance "substantially impinges

upon and threatens" all of those specific rights. Id. Thus, the "ultimate effect" of

Coleman's 18-day detention was a denial of substantive due process. Id.

The Seventh Circuit followed Coleman in the Armstrong case, where a 57-day

detention on a (civil) body-attachment warrant without an initial appearance violated

substantive due process. The court looked to the totality of circumstances.

Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 570, citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,

850 (1998). It considered three questions: (1) whether the Due Process Clause

prohibits an extended detention, without an initial appearance, following arrest by a

valid warrant; (2) whether the defendants' conduct offended the standards of

substantive due process; and (3) whether the totality of circumstances shocks the

conscience. Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 570. By that analysis, the 38-day detention here

violates substantive due process.

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First, the Due Process Clause forbids an extended detention, without a first

appearance, following arrest by warrant. The Seventh Circuit so held in Coleman and

Armstrong, following two Fourth Amendment cases, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103

(1975) and Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979). In Gerstein, invalidating an

extended warrantless detention, the Supreme Court wrote, "The consequences of

prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest.

Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and

impair his family relationships." 420 U.S. at 114. In Baker, the Supreme Court

reiterated its concern with "extended restraint of liberty following arrest" in the

context of a mistaken arrest under a valid warrant after a judge found probable cause.

See Coleman, 754 F.2d at 723, quoting Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114. The Baker Court

wrote, "Obviously, one in respondent's position could not be detained indefinitely in

the face of repeated protests of innocence even though the warrant under which he

was arrested and detained met the standards of the Fourth Amendment." Baker, 443

U.S. at 144.

Second, this Court considers whether the defendants' conduct offends the

standards of substantive due process. Deliberate indifference to prisoner welfare may

sufficiently shock the conscience to amount to a substantive due process violation.

County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 853. "[L]iability for deliberate indifference to

inmate welfare rests upon the luxury enjoyed by prison officials of having time to

make unhurried judgments, upon the chance for repeated reflection, largely

uncomplicated by the pulls of competing obligations." Id. at 853. This Court

considers the County's official policy separately from Kelley's individual conduct.

As for the County, this Court examines the policy the district court found

deliberately indifferent. "A plaintiff may establish municipal liability under § 1983

by proving that his or her constitutional rights were violated by an 'action pursuant

to official municipal policy'. . . ." Ware v. Jackson County, 150 F.3d 873, 880 (8th

Cir. 1999), quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). A

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"policy" is a "deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from among

various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy

with respect to the subject matter in question." Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475

U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986). According to Kelley and the sheriff, the County adopted

a policy requiring that arrestees be taken before a court within 72 hours after arrest.

Also as policy, when a person is arrested, the sheriff's office notifies the court by

sending a jail roster to every court in the County. The sheriff's office then relies on

the court to schedule hearings, call the Center, and identify which detainees the court

will pick up for hearings. Hayes was subject to the same policy as other detainees at

the Center.

The County's policy was to submit the names of confinees to the court and then

wait for the court to schedule a hearing. That policy attempts to delegate the

responsibility of taking arrestees promptly before a court. In Oviatt v. Pearce, 954

F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1992), a policy was deliberately indifferent where the jail had no

internal procedures to track whether inmates had been arraigned. Id. at 1478. "A

policy that ignores whether the jail has the authority for long-term confinement seems

to be a policy of deliberate indifference." Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 578-79. Because

the County's policy here attempts to delegate the responsibility of bringing detainees

to court for a first appearance and ignores the jail's authority for long-term

confinement, the policy is deliberately indifferent to detainees' due process rights.

Next, the Court considers whether Kelley's individual acts violate the standards

of due process. Kelley helped promulgate and enforce the deliberately indifferent

policy. Receiving Hayes's specific appearance grievance, Kelley made a conscious

decision to do nothing. Kelley testified that he would have followed the same course

of conduct even if Hayes were held for 99 days. While Hayes sat in the Center for 38

days, Kelley consciously disregarded the violation of his constitutional rights. See

Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 577. That conscious disregard is deliberate indifference

violating the standards of due process.

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The third and final step in this substantive due process analysis is determining

whether, in the totality of circumstances, the defendants' conduct in depriving Hayes

of a constitutional right shocks the conscience. Id. at 581. See County of

Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 846-47. This is a question of law. Armstrong, 152 F.3d at

581.

In the totality of circumstances in this case, the key is Arkansas Rule of

Criminal Procedure 8.1, entitled "Prompt first appearance." The Rule requires: "An

arrested person who is not released by citation or by other lawful manner shall be

taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay." Ark. R. Crim. P. 8.1.

Rule 8.1 is mandatory. Bolden v. State, 561 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Ark. 1978).

Detentions of less than 38 days violate Rule 8.1. Duncan v. State, 726 S.W.2d 653,

656 (Ark. 1987) (31⁄2 days); Cook v. State, 623 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Ark. 1981) (31

days); cf. Richardson v. State, 671 S.W.2d 164 (Ark. 1984) (56 days). Rule 8.1 is

designed to protect "basic and fundamental rights which our state and federal

constitutions secure to every arrestee." Bolden, 561 S.W.2d at 284 (emphasis added).

The County's and Kelley's failure to take Hayes before a judge for 38 days shocks the

conscience. See Coleman, 754 F.2d at 724.

To hold Kelley liable as an individual under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Hayes must

prove: (1) the official's conduct deprived him of constitutional rights, and (2) the

official's actions were taken under color of law. See Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d

1271, 1275 (8th Cir. 1973). As discussed, Kelley's conduct deprived Hayes of

substantive due process. And as jail administrator, Kelley was acting under color of

law. Thus, unless shielded by qualified immunity, Kelley is individually liable under

§ 1983.

"Qualified immunity shields government officials from suit unless their

conduct violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a

reasonable person would have known." Yowell v. Combs, 89 F.3d 542, 544 (8th Cir.

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1996), citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To be clearly

established, "the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Johnson-El v.

Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1989), quoting Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). In other words, a constitutional right is clearly established

when "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation he confronted." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).

Rule 8.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a jailer to

ensure that a pretrial detainee appears before a judge "without unnecessary delay."

A reasonable officer knows that detentions of less than 38 days violate Rule 8.1. See,

e.g., Cook, 623 S.W.2d at 821. A reasonable officer knows that Rule 8.1 protects

"basic and fundamental rights which our state and federal constitutions secure to

every arrestee." See Bolden, 561 S.W.2d at 284 (emphasis added). A law

enforcement officer cannot reasonably believe that holding a person in jail for 38 days

without bringing him before a judicial officer for an initial appearance is

constitutional. Kelley is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Kelley argues this lawsuit is time-barred because Hayes did not amend the

complaint to include him until the statute of limitations expired. But, the amended

complaint relates back to the date of the original complaint under Schiavone v.

Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. The allegations

against Kelley arose from the same conduct described in the original complaint.

Kelley is not prejudiced in maintaining his defense because after the complaint was

filed, Kelley gave Hayes's file to the County lawyer. He had notice of Hayes's lawsuit

within the limitations period. He should have known that, but for a legal mistake, he

would have been named in the original complaint. See Schiavone, 477 U.S. 21, 29;

Donald v. Cook County Sheriff's Dep't, 95 F.3d 548, 557, 560 (7th Cir. 1996). The

suit is not time-barred.

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2

Hayes's motion to supplement the record is denied as moot.

-8-

Under § 1983, a prevailing party may receive compensatory damages.

Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986). Here, the district

court awarded $49,000 against Faulkner County and $1,000 against Kelley. This

award is not clearly erroneous. See Harmon v. City of Kansas City, 197 F.3d 321,

329 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1038 (2000).

The district court may allow attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a § 1983

action. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Attorney's fees are within the broad discretion of the

district court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Harmon, 197

F.3d at 328-29. The fee award here of $46,929.50 is not an abuse of discretion.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.2

_____________________________

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