Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02809/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02809-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sparks Health System
Appellee
Sparks Regional Medical Center
Appellee
Gary D. Wallace
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Robert T. Dawson, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2809

___________

Gary D. Wallace, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Arkansas.

Sparks Health System; Sparks *

Regional Medical Center, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: March 18, 2005

Filed: July 20, 2005

___________

Before RILEY, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Gary D. Wallace appeals from an order of the District Court1

 granting summary

judgment in favor of Sparks Health System and Sparks Regional Medical Center

(collectively, "Sparks") on Wallace's claims of retaliation and wrongful discharge.

We affirm the District Court.

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I.

For nearly twenty years, Sparks employed Wallace as a transporter of patients

in the surgery department of the Sparks Regional Medical Center facility. By 2002,

Wallace was the only transporter in the surgery department on the evening shift.

Theresa Goss also worked as a transporter in the surgery department, but on the day

shift, resulting in a two-hour overlap of her shift and Wallace's shift from 2:30 p.m.

to 4:30 p.m. Dee Ann Wilcox was Wallace's evening-shift supervisor. Marquita

Johnson-Bailey, the director of surgical services, supervised Wilcox and was in

charge of the surgery department.

Wallace frequently complained to Wilcox that Goss "intimidated" him by being

"physically more aggressive" in transporting patients before Wallace had a chance to

do so. Wallace Dep. at 23, 39. Wallace believed that Wilcox allowed such

intimidation by Goss because Wilcox preferred female employees, and Wallace felt

that Sparks fostered a "sexually intimidating environment" against men. Id. at 40.

In addition, Wallace stated that Wilcox would yell at him and be "[v]erbally abusive"

about "[m]ost anything." Id. at 26, 27. Wilcox countered that Wallace "objected if

other people in the department did similar job duties" and that Wallace's complaints

"had gotten somewhat worse over the last several years." Wilcox Dep. at 20, 21.

Wilcox felt that Wallace's complaints resulted from his lack of "understanding of how

everybody's job role worked together." Id. at 19. Indeed, Wallace had a minor

confrontation with a male doctor on at least one occasion when Wallace felt the

doctor was transporting a patient too quickly. Goss, for her part, flatly denied

intimidating Wallace or being physically aggressive in order to transport patients

ahead of him, and Goss stated that she did not feel favored based on her gender.

Nevertheless, Wallace believed Sparks was discriminating against him based

on his gender, and he filed a complaint with the United States Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in June 2002. He alleged that Sparks had

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violated his civil rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended

("Title VII"). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-16 (2000). His EEOC complaint

resulted in a mediated settlement that was finalized in September 2002. Wilcox,

Johnson-Bailey, and Sharon Beauchamp, the director of human resources, were all

irritated by Wallace's EEOC complaint because they felt Wallace's charges of

discrimination were baseless, but they agreed to the settlement because its

requirements were innocuous.

In the settlement, Wallace agreed to request closure of his EEOC claim and not

to sue Sparks under Title VII. The parties also agreed that Sparks would not admit

having violated Wallace's rights. Sparks would, however, develop a new policy

regarding harassment and discrimination and make a "good faith effort" to distribute

a revised employee handbook stating the new policy. EEOC Mediation Settlement

Agreement at 1. Sparks also agreed to conduct meetings involving Wallace, JohnsonBailey, Wilcox, Beauchamp, and other appropriate persons regarding "conflict

management, team building, or other appropriate topics." Id. at 2. After the

mediation, according to Wallace, he told Johnson-Bailey about Wilcox's yelling at

him, and Johnson-Bailey told him, "[D]on't complain so you won't be yelled at. Don't

ask any questions." Wallace Dep. at 28. She also allegedly told him "she could not

function and run [the surgery] department with the trouble [Wallace] was causing."

Id. at 17.

Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Sparks conducted one conflict-resolution

meeting in January 2003, but Wallace became surprised that most of the attention and

questions during the meeting were directed at him, so he excused himself and walked

out. Sparks also enhanced its prior harassment and discrimination policy, but decided

against distributing a revised handbook on a company-wide basis. Instead, Sparks

distributed the revised handbook only to new employees and as replacements for lost

handbooks.

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By spring 2003, Sparks was experiencing financial difficulties resulting from

a decrease in patients, and its management decided to perform a reduction in force

("RIF"). Johnson-Bailey, who had the authority to make staff reductions in the

surgery department, stated that she made a decision to eliminate Wallace's position

as the only evening-shift transporter based on a decreased number of surgeries being

performed during that shift. Johnson-Bailey determined that scrub technicians and

registered nurses could perform transport work during the evening shift if necessary.

In addition, members of a central transport team, who transported patients in areas

other than the surgery department, could be called in for assistance when needed.

Johnson-Bailey reiterated in a deposition that she had decided to eliminate Wallace's

position, not to discharge Wallace for job-performance reasons. She also eliminated

the position of her own husband, who worked as a nurse in the surgery department,

as well as Goss's position as a transporter on the day shift.

Sparks notified Wallace in a memo dated May 7, 2003, that his position would

be eliminated on June 30, 2003. The memo stated that there was "no reasonable

expectation that [Wallace's] position will be reinstated and thus economic separation

is necessary." Memorandum from Human Resources to Wallace of May 7, 2003. The

memo also stated that Wallace "will . . . be placed on a priority rehire list and will be

contacted by the Human Resources Department if a position becomes available for

which a separated employee may be eligible through experience, training, education

and/or other qualifications." Id. Wallace then received an information sheet stating

that human resources would assist employees with their job search, continuation of

benefits provisions, and reference letters. After Wallace was notified of the

impending RIF, Johnson-Bailey informed him that he should contact human resources

prior to his discharge and watch for job postings to see if other positions became

available.

Sparks routinely posted open positions on a billboard in the human resources

department, in the cafeteria, and on the Internet. During the period between Wallace's

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notification of the RIF and his discharge, Sparks allegedly posted as available two

part-time positions on the central transport team. One position was filled by a

respiratory therapist whose position had been eliminated and who was seeking to

maintain employment and benefits with Sparks. Wallace, who stated he was not

aware of the open positions, never applied for either position even though he was

fully qualified. Wallace stated that he never visited or contacted human resources to

inquire because he was "afraid and intimidated [by human resources,] . . . [his] civil

rights had been violated," and "there was enough reason for [him] to stay away."

Wallace Dep. at 5. He stated that he looked at the postings in the cafeteria

"periodically" and that although he "may not have seen every posting," he did not

remember seeing the part-time transporter positions posted. Id. at 15.

But Beauchamp, as the director of human resources, stated that she became

curious why Wallace had not contacted her about the two part-time transporter

positions that were open. She stated that during a Displaced Workers Workshop she

asked Wallace if he was interested in applying for one of the positions, but Wallace

indicated he was not interested. Wallace stated that he did not remember being told

of the open transporter positions at the workshop, but Sparks employee Theresa

Phillips confirmed that she was at the workshop and witnessed this exchange between

Beauchamp and Wallace.

Sparks eventually discharged Wallace on June 30, 2003, along with 135 other

Sparks employees. Wallace immediately filed a second complaint with the EEOC on

July 8, 2003, charging that Sparks had retaliated against him for filing his initial

EEOC complaint. In response, the EEOC issued Wallace a "Dismissal and Notice of

Rights" form stating, "Based upon its investigation, the EEOC is unable to conclude

that the information obtained establishes violations of the statutes," but also that

"[t]his does not certify that [Sparks] is in compliance with the statutes." Dismissal

and Notice of Rights, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Jul. 15, 2003

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(responding to complaint filed by Gary D. Wallace). The Dismissal also notified

Wallace of his right to sue Sparks under Title VII and other statutes.

Wallace filed suit against Sparks on August 28, 2003, alleging retaliation under

both Title VII and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993 ("ACRA"), see Ark. Code

Ann. §§ 16-123-101 to -108 (Michie Supp. 2003), and alleging two state-law claims

for wrongful discharge—one in contract and one in tort. Sparks answered Wallace's

complaint on September 15, 2003, then removed the suit to federal court and moved

for summary judgment on all of Wallace's claims. The District Court granted

summary judgment in favor of Sparks after finding that Wallace had failed to

establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Specifically, Wallace had failed to show

a causal link between his EEOC complaint and his discharge. The District Court also

ruled that Wallace had failed to establish his state-law claims for wrongful discharge.

Meanwhile, on or about the day it filed an answer to Wallace's complaint,

Sparks rehired him to the central transport team, on the day shift, at the same rate of

pay he had received before his discharge but without the shift differential he had

received for working on the evening shift. Sparks also rehired Wallace as a new

employee with no seniority pursuant to a policy specifying that an employee must be

rehired within thirty days of economic separation to retain seniority status. Wallace

continues to work at Sparks to this day, but he believes that Sparks only rehired him

in order to mitigate his damages in the lawsuit. He appeals the District Court's grant

of summary judgment in favor of Sparks.

II.

We review de novo the District Court's grant of summary judgment. Pope v.

ESA Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 1001, 1006 (8th Cir. 2005). We will affirm if there is no

genuine issue of material fact and Sparks is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Id. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to Wallace, the non-moving

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We note that the performance score Wallace received on this evaluation

entitled him to receive the highest pay increase possible.

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party, and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Id.; Peterson v. Scott County,

406 F.3d 515, 520 (8th Cir. 2005).

A.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Wallace needed

to show that he engaged in statutorily protected activity, that Sparks took an adverse

employment action against him, and that there was a causal link between the two

actions. Pope, 406 F.3d at 1010. It is undisputed that Wallace's filing of an EEOC

complaint based on gender discrimination was protected activity under Title VII, see

id., and that Wallace's discharge was an adverse employment action by Sparks, see

Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark., 395 F.3d 872, 879 (8th Cir. 2005). The survival of

Wallace's claims therefore depended upon establishing a causal link between his

EEOC complaint and his discharge. The District Court found that Wallace had not

shown this causal link. We agree.

We are mindful that an employee must be shielded from retaliation for

protected activity, even if a court eventually decides that the employee's complaints

are without merit, as long as the employee reasonably believed the employer's

conduct violated Title VII. Peterson, 406 F.3d at 524 n.3. But filing an EEOC

complaint does "not insulate an employee from discipline for . . . disrupting the

workplace." Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir.), cert.

denied, 528 U.S. 818 (1999). Thus, Wilcox's mild comments on Wallace's

commendatory 2002 performance evaluation regarding his "difficulty recognizing the

team effort and supporting it" do not establish retaliation.2

 Sparks Health System

Performance Evaluation, July 18, 2002, at 4 (regarding Gary D. Wallace).

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Similarly, the comments made by Johnson-Bailey after the EEOC mediation

that Wallace should stop causing trouble and the general irritation regarding his

EEOC complaint are distinguishable from the comments made by the plaintiff's

supervisor in Watson v. O'Neill, 365 F.3d 609 (8th Cir. 2004). In Watson, the

plaintiff's supervisor told the plaintiff he "would never excel" at the company because

he had provided an affidavit in an EEOC discrimination case against the supervisor.

Id. at 612. We held that these comments established a causal link for the retaliation

claim in that case. Although our analysis of those comments was brief, the comments

on their face linked the plaintiff's prior EEOC activity to the decision not to promote

him. By contrast, Johnson-Bailey's comments on their face do not establish any link

between Wallace's EEOC complaint and the decision to eliminate his position during

the RIF. The fact that Sparks's management personnel were irritated by Wallace's

EEOC complaint, which they felt was baseless and which was never determined to

be valid, would not establish retaliation without some showing that this irritation was

linked to Wallace's discharge.

Nor is the timing of Wallace's discharge sufficient to establish retaliation

because more than temporal proximity is needed to show a causal link between the

discharge and the filing of the EEOC complaint. See Kiel, 169 F.3d at 1136. The

cases that have accepted temporal proximity alone as sufficient to create an inference

of a causal link have uniformly held that the temporal proximity must be "very close."

Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (citing cases in which

a three-month period and a four-month period, respectively, were insufficient to

establish a causal link); see Dhyne v. Meiners Thriftway, Inc., 184 F.3d 983, 989 (8th

Cir. 1999) (stating that a four-month gap, standing alone, weakened the showing of

a causal link in a retaliation claim). Here, nearly a year passed between Wallace's

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Although Wallace attempts to shorten this time period by asserting that he

engaged in protected activity as late as January 2003, he has not pointed to anything

in the record that would show he engaged in protected activity at that time. There is

no allegation that Wallace complained about Sparks's failure to comply with the

EEOC settlement agreement. Rather, Wallace by his own admission refused to honor

fully his commitment to engage in conflict-management meetings as required by the

agreement.

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filing of an EEOC complaint and his discharge.3

 This passage of time is insufficient

to show, and in fact weakens the showing of, the required causal link.

Wallace's attempt to create issues as to whether Sparks had the obligation to

inform him of the open transporter positions and whether he was actually informed

of those positions also falls short of showing a causal link between his EEOC

complaint and his discharge. Sparks discharged 136 employees during the RIF, many

of whom were apparently proactive in securing other positions within the company.

Wallace was given the notice and the wherewithal to help himself in his search for

re-employment with Sparks, and it appears he chose not to help himself. This

seriously undermines Wallace's implication that Sparks withheld information about

open positions from him in retaliation for his EEOC complaint.

Also unconvincing is Wallace's attempt to dispute whether Johnson-Bailey or

Beauchamp actually made the ultimate decision to eliminate his position. The

existence of such an issue would not establish the critical showing Wallace needed

to overcome summary judgment, i.e., that there was a causal link between his filing

an EEOC complaint and his discharge during the RIF. Because he failed to establish

this causal link, he failed to show a prima facie case of retaliation by Sparks, and

summary judgment in favor of Sparks was warranted.

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B.

Even if Wallace had shown a prima facie case of retaliation, we would still

affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment based on Wallace's failure to

overcome Sparks's legitimate reason for discharging him. Once a plaintiff has shown

a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer to show a

legitimate, nonretaliatory basis for the adverse employment action. Peterson, 406

F.3d at 524. The employer's burden is not onerous and the showing need not be made

by a preponderance of the evidence. Pope, 406 F.3d at 1007. The plaintiff then bears

the ultimate burden of showing that the employer's proffered reason was a mere

pretext for a retaliatory motive. Peterson, 406 F.3d at 524. To carry this burden, the

employee must show that the employer's proffered reason was "unworthy of

credence." Smith v. Allen Health Sys., 302 F.3d 827, 834 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (quoting Tex.

Dep't of Cmty Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1980))).

Sparks argues that the RIF, which resulted in $6 million in cost savings and

during which 136 positions were eliminated, accounts for Wallace's discharge.

Johnson-Bailey determined that Wallace's duties could be performed by other

employees and that his position should be eliminated. Johnson-Bailey also eliminated

her own husband's position when she eliminated Wallace's. Wallace has not shown

Sparks's legitimate, nonretaliatory reason to be "unworthy of credence." Id.

Nor has Wallace shown he was discharged pursuant to an inconsistent policy,

see Floyd v. Mo. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 188 F.3d 932, 937 (8th Cir. 1999), or that he

was treated differently from other employees who were "similarly situated in all

relevant respects," Pope, 406 F.3d at 1009. Sparks's management personnel were

consistent in their assertions that Wallace was discharged pursuant to a RIF policy

requiring the evaluation of an employee's job classification, employee classification,

shift, and seniority. Based on this policy, Wallace was discharged because he was the

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Wallace's assertion that Sparks rehired him only to mitigate his damages is

unsupported by anything in the record other than the fact that the rehire occurred after

Wallace filed the present lawsuit. Further, there is no evidence that any employees

rehired more than thirty days after economic separation had their seniority restored.

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only transporter on the evening shift and the evening-shift transporter position had

become unnecessary. To accept Wallace's proposition that all Sparks employees

potentially affected by the RIF were similarly situated, without regard to the criteria

specified by the RIF policy, would render the "all relevant respects" inquiry

meaningless. And Wallace's assertion that other employees were allowed to bump

less-senior employees from different positions or shifts in cascading fashion down the

corporate structure is not supported by the record. Indeed, we agree with Sparks that

such a policy likely would have created chaos in the organization.

In any event, we do not sit as a super-personnel department to review the

wisdom or fairness of Sparks's job-elimination policies during the RIF. See Hutson

v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 781 (8th Cir. 1995). Instead, our task in

this appeal is to decide whether the record reveals issues of material fact that would

prevent the entry of summary judgment in favor of Sparks. This is not a case in

which an employee complained of discrimination and later was discharged because

of alleged shortcomings in the employee's job performance, and based on the record

it cannot be inferred that Sparks chose to discharge Wallace—rather than another,

less-senior employee—for a retaliatory reason. In fact, Sparks rehired Wallace to the

central transport team on the day shift, and his former evening-shift position no

longer exists.4

 Even if Wallace could show a prima facie case of retaliation, Sparks's

legitimate motive for discharging Wallace would survive his attempts to demonstrate

pretext.

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III.

Wallace appears to have abandoned on appeal his state-law claims for

retaliation and wrongful discharge. See Br. of Appellant at 3 ("This is a Title VII

retaliation case."). Because Sparks addressed those claims, however, we too will

address them. Like Title VII, ACRA prohibits employment discrimination based on

gender as well as retaliation for complaining about such discrimination. Ark. Code

Ann. §§ 16-123-107(a)(1), 16-123-108(a) (Michie Supp. 2003). To overcome

summary judgment on a retaliation claim under ACRA, a plaintiff must make the

same showing as is required on an analogous claim under Title VII. See Island v.

Buena Vista Resort, 103 S.W.3d 671, 676 (Ark. 2003); Flentje v. First Nat'l Bank, 11

S.W.3d 531, 537 (Ark. 2000). Consequently, Wallace's ACRA claim fails for the

same reasons his Title VII claim fails, and summary judgment was proper on that

claim.

To overcome summary judgment on his contract claim for wrongful discharge,

Wallace, as an at-will employee, needed to show he was discharged in violation of

public policy. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385 (Ark. 1988).

Although a retaliatory discharge for filing an EEOC complaint likely would violate

public policy, Wallace failed to show retaliation. Thus, his contract claim must fail.

As to his tort claim for wrongful discharge, Arkansas has explicitly declined to

recognize such a claim. Id. Therefore, summary judgment was proper on both of

Wallace's state-law claims for wrongful discharge.

IV.

We have considered all of Wallace's arguments. We hold that all of his

arguments, whether or not specifically addressed in this opinion, are without merit.

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

______________________________

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