Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-05130/USCOURTS-ca10-93-05130-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Billy W. Hill
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

• 

PUBLISH 

SEP 2 7 199' UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 93-5130 

BILLY W. HILL, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. 93-CR-10-B) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, and Susan L. Forman, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Stephen C. Lewis, United States Attorney, and Allen J. Litchfield, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Northern District of Oklahoma, 

Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, McKAY and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 93-5130 Document: 01019306500 Date Filed: 09/27/1994 Page: 1 
The parties have agreed that this case may be submitted for 

decision on the briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); lOth Cir. R. 

34.1.2. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral 

argument. 

This is an appeal from two federal district court rulings 

denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence and sentencing him 

as an armed career criminal. On December 16, 1992, police 

officers executed a search warrant for narcotics at a residence in 

Tulsa, Oklahoma. While the officers were performing their 

investigation at the residence, the telephone rang five to ten 

times. The various callers on the phone asked to speak to Wanda 

or Tony, the persons who resided at that address. One phone call 

was answered by Officer Carlock, and the caller identified herself 

as Katrina. Katrina asked for Wanda, and Officer Carlock told her 

that Wanda was not in. Katrina stated that she had purchased 

drugs from Wanda earlier in the day but had failed to sell them so 

she wanted to return the drugs and get her money back. Officer 

Carlock, who told Katrina that his name was "Bill," indicated that 

Wanda would be not home for a while, but that if she would stop by 

the house he would take care of her problem. Katrina stated that 

she would arrive at the house in about thirty minutes. 

Approximately thirty-five minutes later, Defendant arrived at 

the scene. After two officers dressed in street clothes answered 

his knock on the door and greeted him, Defendant asked to see 

"Bill." Over the next several minutes, while the officers and 

-2-

Appellate Case: 93-5130 Document: 01019306500 Date Filed: 09/27/1994 Page: 2 
Defendant apparently chatted on the couch, Defendant continually 

asked to see Bill. After not getting a suitable answer, Defendant 

eventually got up to leave and announced that he would return 

later. One of the officers then walked in front of the door to 

block Defendant's exit, stuck his hand out, and identified himself 

as a police officer. According to the testimony of the officer, 

Defendant proceeded to walk directly into the officer's hand, at 

which time the officer's hand came to rest on a gun that was 

tucked under Defendant's waistband. Then, according to the 

officer, Defendant reached for his jacket pocket, so the officer 

grabbed Defendant's hand to intercept him from retrieving any 

weapons. The officer then searched Defendant and recovered a 

loaded weapon tucked into his pants and another gun in Defendant's 

jacket pocket. 

Defendant was subsequently indicted in federal district court 

for one count of felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1). Before trial, Defendant filed a motion to 

suppress, arguing that the guns that formed the basis for his 

prosecution were illegally seized under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 

(1967) . The district court held a pretrial evidentiary hearing on 

the motion and denied it. Defendant then pled guilty to the 

charge alleged in the indictment, reserving his right to appeal 

the denial of his suppression motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a) (2). The government subsequently filed a 

notice that it was seeking to have Defendant sentenced as an armed 

career criminal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1). The notice 

-3-

Appellate Case: 93-5130 Document: 01019306500 Date Filed: 09/27/1994 Page: 3 
cited three prior convictions as the basis for the enhancement: 

(1) a June, 1980 Kansas conviction for aggravated robbery, (2) a 

February 2, 1973 Kansas conviction for aggravated robbery, and (3) 

an October 19, 1966 Oklahoma conviction for second degree burglary. 

We first address the district court's denial of Defendant's 

suppression motion. The district court found that the officer had 

reasonable suspicion to subject Defendant to a Terry pat-down, 

because the officer felt the gun hidden in Defendant's pants when 

Defendant conveniently walked into his outstretched hand. After 

feeling the gun, the officer witnessed Defendant attempt to reach 

into his jacket pocket, and the officer feared that he might be 

reaching for a gun. At that point, the officer "seized" Defendant 

and subjected him to a Terry pat-down search which produced the 

two guns at issue in this case. While Defendant makes a persuasive argument that the circumstances prior to that incident did 

not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, there 

is no doubt that, if the officer's testimony is credited concerning the events that transpired in front of the door, the 

officer's actions were reasonable and justified. At the suppression hearing, the district court adopted the officer's version 

of the facts, and Defendant has not provided this court with a 

basis to rule that the district court's factual findings were 

clearly erroneous. The denial of Defendant's suppression motion 

is therefore affirmed. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 93-5130 Document: 01019306500 Date Filed: 09/27/1994 Page: 4 
Next, Defendant argues that the district court erred in 

enhancing his sentence as an armed career criminal. The Armed 

Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1), provides a fifteenyear mandatory minimum for anyone who is convicted under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g) and has three prior convictions for violent felonies or 

serious drug offenses. The district court enhanced Defendant's 

sentence under§ 924(e) (1) based on the evidence of Defendant's 

three prior convictions supplied by the prosecution. Defendant 

claims that the district court erred in this respect, because the 

government did not submit sufficient evidence that the 1966 second 

degree burglary conviction was a "violent felony" for purposes of 

enhancement. 

Because of the wide variances in state law burglary statutes, 

the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), 

created a narrow definition of burglary for purposes of implementing § 924(e). The Court stated: 

We conclude that a person has been convicted of burglary 

for purposes of a§ 924(e) enhancement if he is convicted of any crime, regardless of its exact definition 

or label, having the basic elements of unlawful or 

unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or 

structure, with intent to commit a crime. 

Id. at 598. In determining whether a conviction properly counts 

toward enhancement, Taylor provides that the sentencing court is 

to use a "categorical approach" rather than inquire into the 

underlying facts. Id. at 600. This approach requires a comparison of the elements of the relevant state statute with the basic 

elements of burglary adopted in Taylor. Id. 

-5-

Appellate Case: 93-5130 Document: 01019306500 Date Filed: 09/27/1994 Page: 5 
The Oklahoma law under which Defendant was convicted defines 

second degree burglary as follows: 

Every person who breaks and enters any building or 

any part of any building, room, booth, tent, railroad 

car, automobile, truck, trailer, vessel or other 

structure or erection, in which any property is kept, or 

breaks into or forcibly opens, any coin-operated or 

vending machine or device with intent to steal any 

property therein or to commit any felony, is guilty of 

burglary in the second degree. 

Okl. Stat. title 21 § 1435. 

Because this Oklahoma statute defines burglary to include the 

breaking and entering of automobiles, tents, coin-operated 

machines, railroad cars, trucks, trailers, vessels, and booths, it 

is clearly overbroad for purposes of the Taylor definition.l 

Therefore, convictions under it cannot, as a categorical matter, 

provide a basis for enhancement. See United States v. Barney, 955 

F.2d 635, 638 (lOth Cir. 1992) (burglary statute that includes 

automobiles and vending machines overbroad for purposes of Taylor 

and cannot provide basis for enhancement under Armed Career 

Criminal Act). Taylor further provides, however, that where the 

state statute is broader than the generic Taylor definition, the 

sentencing court may review the charging document and the jury 

instructions to see if the jury necessarily found the elements of 

a Taylor generic burglary. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. If, from 

1 The government asserts that in United States v. Amos, 984 

F.2d 1067, 1071 (lOth Cir. 1993), this court held that the 

Oklahoma second degree burglary statute at issue in this case is 

not overbroad for purposes of Taylor. However, Amos simply does 

not stand for the government's asserted proposition. Because it 

includes places and objects beyond mere buildings, the Oklahoma 

statute is a classic example of an overbroad burglary statute. 

-6-

Appellate Case: 93-5130 Document: 01019306500 Date Filed: 09/27/1994 Page: 6 
these documents, it is clear to the sentencing court that the 

earlier conviction actually satisfied the Taylor definition of 

burglary, then it may be used for enhancement purposes. Id. 

In the 1966 burglary case, however, Defendant did not face a 

jury because he pled guilty, so no jury instructions existed for 

the district court to review. In the context of a guilty plea, 

the Tenth Circuit has held: 

We join other circuits which have considered this 

question in holding that where enhancement is sought on 

the basis of a conviction obtained through a guilty 

plea, the sentencing court may look to the text of the 

underlying indictment or information and the text of the 

guilty plea to determine whether the defendant was 

charged with and admitted conduct which falls without 

question within the ambit of Taylor's generic definition. 

Barney, 955 F.2d at 639 (emphasis added). 

The policy behind the requirement that the government supply 

the text of the guilty plea is clear: The crime that a defendant 

is charged with and the crime that he ultimately pleads guilty to 

in a plea bargain can be, and often are, quite different. In the 

context of an overbroad burglary statute, for example, a person 

could break into a building, steal money from vending machines 

inside the building, and then break into a car in the parking lot 

as he is leaving the scene. Although he may originally be charged 

with three counts of second degree burglary under a statue similar 

to Oklahoma's, he may end up pleading guilty to burglarizing 

vending machines in exchange for having the other two charges 

dropped. In such a case, the conviction would not meet the 

-7-

Appellate Case: 93-5130 Document: 01019306500 Date Filed: 09/27/1994 Page: 7 
generic definition of Taylor, and, therefore, could not be used 

for enhancement. 

In this case, the government did introduce a copy of the 

Information that originally charged Defendant with second degree 

burglary of a building. However, the government did not introduce 

the text of the guilty plea, so the sentencing court had no way of 

knowing precisely what acts Defendant admitted to committing under 

Barney. Instead, the government offered police reports reflecting 

the Tulsa police department's investigation of the underlying 

facts of the crime. Clearly, these documents did not satisfy the 

Barney standard, and they represent the kind of 11 inquiry into the 

underlying facts 11 that Taylor specifically rejected. Taylor, 495 

U.S. at 600. 

The government also introduced the Judgment from the 1966 

conviction, which indicated that Defendant pled guilty to second 

degree burglary. In some circumstances, a Judgment could compensate for the lack of the text of the guilty plea if its 

specificity cured any doubt that the conviction met the Taylor 

definition. For example, if the Judgment stated that a defendant 

pled guilty to 11 Second degree burglary of a building, 11 it would be 

clear that the defendant's plea met the generic Taylor definition. 

In this case, however, the Judgment failed to provide specificity 

as to the underlying facts to which Defendant admitted, but simply 

stated that Defendant pled guilty to 11 Second degree burglary ... 

-8-

Appellate Case: 93-5130 Document: 01019306500 Date Filed: 09/27/1994 Page: 8 
Therefore, the Judgment offered by the prosecution fails to salvage the 1966 Oklahoma conviction as one that may be used for 

enhancement purposes under Taylor and Barney.2 

For all of the above reasons, we hold that the government 

failed to prove that the 1966 Oklahoma conviction for second 

degree burglary was for a 11 Violent felonyn under Taylor v. United 

States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), and United States v. Barney, 955 F.2d 

635, 638 (lOth Cir. 1992). Accordingly, the district court erred 

in sentencing Defendant as an armed career criminal, and we 

REVERSE and REMAND for resentencing. The district court's denial 

of Defendant's suppression motion is AFFIRMED. 

2 The government also asserts that this case is indistinguishable from United States v. Amos, 984 F.2d 1067, 1070-71 (lOth 

Cir. 1993). In Amos, this court held that the defendant's 

Oklahoma conviction for second degree burglary was properly considered for enhancement, despite the government's failure to 

submit the text of his guilty plea. In that case, however, the 

defendant admitted at his federal sentencing hearing that his 

earlier conviction fell within the Taylor definition of burglary, 

so the defendant's own admission cured any lack of specificity in 

the government's evidence. Id. at 1071 n.3. 

-9-

Appellate Case: 93-5130 Document: 01019306500 Date Filed: 09/27/1994 Page: 9 
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part. 

I am unable to join that portion of this court's opinion 

reversing Defendant's sentence pursuant to the Armed Career 

Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1). Relying on United States v. 

Barney, 955 F.2d 635, 639 (lOth Cir. 1992), this court holds that 

the government was required to produce the text of Defendant's 

guilty plea to his 1966 second degree burglary conviction in order 

to prove Defendant was convicted of conduct which fell within the 

generic definition of burglary as set forth in Taylor v. United 

States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). Because I conclude the government 

established that Defendant's 1966 burglary conviction represents 

conduct falling within Taylor's definition of burglary even in the 

absence of the text of Defendant's guilty plea, I must 

respectfully dissent. 

In Taylor, the Supreme Court defined burglary for§ 924(e) 

enhancement purposes as an "unlawful or unprivileged entry into, 

or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a 

crime." Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599. Where a defendant has been 

convicted under a state statute which defines burglary broader 

than Taylor, the conviction may nevertheless be used for 

enhancement purposes if "the charging paper and jury instructions 

actually required the jury to find all the elements of generic 

burglary in order to convict the defendant." Id. at 602. 

In instances where no jury instructions exist because the 

defendant pleaded guilty, we held in Barney that the sentencing 

court may review "the underlying indictment or information and the 

text of the guilty plea to determine whether the defendant was 

Appellate Case: 93-5130 Document: 01019306500 Date Filed: 09/27/1994 Page: 10 
charged with and admitted conduct which falls without question 

within the ambit of Taylor's generic definition." Barney, 955 

F.2d at 639. If the defendant pleaded guilty to charges supported 

by an indictment or information satisfying Taylor's burglary 

definition, the conviction may be used for enhancement purposes. 

Id. at 640. 

Applying Barney to the instant case, this court concludes 

that although the government submitted Defendant's burglary 

information and the "judgment and sentence on plea of guilty" to 

second degree burglary in support of the enhancement, Defendant's 

sentence must be reversed because the government did not introduce 

the text of Defendant's guilty plea. In the absence of the text 

of the plea, this court concludes the district court "had no way 

of knowing precisely what acts Defendant admitted to committing 

under Barney." The court further concludes the judgment of 

conviction fails to compensate for the lack of the text of the 

plea because the judgment merely states that Defendant pleaded 

guilty to "second degree burglary." As a result, this court holds 

the government failed to prove Defendant's 1966 burglary 

conviction represented conduct satisfying Taylor's generic 

burglary definition. I disagree. 

Although Barney permits a sentencing court to examine the 

text of the guilty plea, see id. at 639, I do not read Barney as 

requiring the government to introduce the text of the plea where 

the charging instrument and judgment necessarily show that the 

-2-

Appellate Case: 93-5130 Document: 01019306500 Date Filed: 09/27/1994 Page: 11 
defendant's conviction represents conduct falling within the ambit 

of Taylor's burglary definition.l Indeed, in United States v. 

Lujan, 9 F.3d 890, 892 (lOth Cir. 1993)--a case involving the 

government's obligation to introduce jury instructions to support 

an enhancement--we held that Taylor does not "require the 

government to provide jury instructions in a case where the 

charging document and verdict necessarily show that the jury found 

the requisite elements of burglary." 

Likewise, in the instant case, the charging document and the 

judgment--when read as a whole--"establish without question, that 

[Defendant's 1966 burglary conviction] fulfills the elements 

required by Taylor." Barney, 955 F.2d at 640. The information 

charged Defendant with second degree burglary and stated in 

explicit detail that Defendant: 

unlawfully, wrongfully, wilfully [sic], feloniously and 

burglariously, [broke] and entered into a certain 

building . . . owned by and in possession of STANDARD 

MOTOR SUPPLY in which building personal property of 

value was kept and contained, by breaking open the outer 

skylight of the said building, and entering the said 

building without the consent of said owner, with the 

wilfull (sic] and felonious intent to steal said 

property. 

Defendant's burglary information included all the elements of a 

generic burglary as defined in Taylor. Moreover, the 

corresponding judgment indicates that Defendant pleaded guilty to 

second degree burglary. By pleading guilty, Defendant necessarily 

1 As pointed out in this court's opinion, the government might 

be required to introduce the text of a defendant's guilty plea 

where the crime with which the defendant is charged differs from 

the crime he ultimately pleads guilty to in a plea bargain. 

However, we are not presented with such a scenario in this case. 

Rather, Defendant was charged in an information with a single 

count of second degree burglary and pleaded guilty to this count. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 93-5130 Document: 01019306500 Date Filed: 09/27/1994 Page: 12 
• 

admitted "all material facts alleged in the charge." United 

States v. Kelsey, 15 F.3d 152, 153 {lOth Cir. 1994). Because 

Defendant pleaded guilty to a charge supported by an information 

which satisfied the Taylor definition, his 1966 burglary 

conviction properly counts toward enhancement. 

I would affirm the sentence imposed by the district court. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 93-5130 Document: 01019306500 Date Filed: 09/27/1994 Page: 13