Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-07758/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-07758-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ariana Grande-Butera
Defendant
Monte Lipman
Defendant
Max Martin
Defendant
Kaleb McIntosh
Plaintiff

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KALEB MCINTOSH, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ARIANA GRANDE-BUTERA, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 18-cv-07758-DMR 

REQUEST FOR REASSIGNMENT TO 

DISTRICT JUDGE AND REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS 

AMENDED COMPLAINT 

Pro se Plaintiff Kaleb McIntosh filed a complaint and an application for leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis (“IFP”). [Docket Nos. 1, 8.] On February 7, 2019, the court issued an order 

granting the IFP application and screening the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 

[Docket No. 10 (“Screening Order”).] The court granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended 

complaint addressing the deficiencies identified in the screening order by February 21, 2019. Id. 

Plaintiff filed two “amendments” to the original complaint on February 13, 2019 and February 23, 

2019, which the court construes together as his first amended complaint (“FAC”). [Docket Nos. 

11, 13.] 

All parties have not consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c). Therefore, the court issues herein a Report and Recommendation and reassigns 

this case to a district judge for final disposition, with the recommendation that the amended 

complaint be dismissed with leave to amend. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

A court is under a continuing duty to dismiss a case filed without the payment of the filing 

fee whenever it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune 

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). If the court dismisses a case pursuant to 

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Section 1915(e)(2)(B), the plaintiff may still file the same complaint by paying the filing fee. This 

is because the court’s section 1915(e)(2)(B) dismissal is not on the merits, but rather an exercise of 

the court’s discretion under the IFP statute. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). 

To make the determination under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), courts assess whether there is 

an arguable factual and legal basis for the asserted wrong, “however inartfully pleaded.” Franklin 

v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). Courts have the authority to dismiss 

complaints founded on “wholly fanciful” factual allegations for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Id. at 1228. A court can also dismiss a complaint where it is based solely on conclusory 

statements, naked assertions without any factual basis, or allegations that are not plausible on their 

face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 

(2007) (per curiam). 

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than 

those drafted by lawyers, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), a complaint, or 

portion thereof, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails to set forth “enough facts 

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

554 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] district court should not dismiss a pro se 

complaint without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the 

complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quotations omitted). 

II. DISCUSSION 

In Plaintiff’s original complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Ariana Grande-Butera, 

Max Martin, and Monte Lipman released a song called “God is a Woman,” which featured lyrics 

that were “religiously offensive” to Plaintiff. Compl. 3. He also alleged that Grande-Butera 

“discriminates against men and belittles them which is a civil rights violation as an outspoken 

feminist, Free Mason KKK Taliban terrorist who has the record for the largest bombing in 

Manchester.” Id. Plaintiff alleged that the lyrics of and music video for the song, “God is a 

Woman” violate Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights and 47 U.S.C. § 151, due to the presence of 

allegedly “slander[ous]” and offensive words and imagery. Compl. 5, 6. 

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The court liberally construed Plaintiff’s claims based on the First Amendment as claims 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”), and concluded that the complaint failed to state a claim 

under either section 1983 or 47 U.S.C. § 151. As the court noted, a plaintiff must allege two 

elements to state a section 1983 claim: 1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States was violated and 2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting 

under the color of state law. Screening Order 3 (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); 

Ketchum v. Alameda Cty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987)). The court found that Plaintiff’s 

section 1983 claim failed to satisfy the second element, as he has not alleged that any of the 

defendants were acting under the color of state law. Id. (citing Rendell–Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 

830, 837 (1982)). The court also found that Plaintiff had not stated a claim under 47 U.S.C. § 151. 

That statute established the Federal Communications Commission; it did not create the right for an 

individual to bring a lawsuit regarding a broadcast that the individual finds offensive. Id. at 4 

(citing Scripps-Howard Radio v. F.C.C., 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942)). 

Plaintiff’s amendments do not remedy the deficiencies identified in the Screening Order. 

In his February 13, 2019 submission (Docket No. 11), Plaintiff alleges a section 1983 claim based 

on his claim that the song “God is a Woman” violates his First Amendment rights. As with his 

original complaint, Plaintiff has not stated a section 1983 claim because he has not alleged that 

Defendants Grande-Butera, Martin, or Lipman were acting under the color of state law. See Am. 

Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (“the under-color-of-state-law element of § 

1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful” 

(quotations omitted)). 

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 

201(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, which provides a claim for relief for discrimination or segregation in 

places of public accommodation. [Docket No. 11 at 4, 6.] It states: 

All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the 

goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and 

accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined

in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of 

race, color, religion, or national origin. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a). “[T]he overriding purpose of Title II [was] to [re]move the daily affront 

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and humiliation involved in discriminatory denials of access to facilities ostensibly open to the 

general public.” Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1969) (quotation omitted). Plaintiff 

alleges that “[e]ach of the following establishments which serves the public is a place where 

[“God is a Woman”] should not be performed. Any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, 

sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment.” [Docket No. 11 at 4.] 

Plaintiff has not identified a specific occasion on which he entered or attempted to enter a place of 

public accommodation and was denied “the full and equal enjoyment” of its “goods, services, 

facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations” on account of his religion or other 

protected characteristic. He has therefore failed to state a claim under Title II. 

Plaintiff’s February 23, 2019 submission fares no better. In that submission, Plaintiff 

challenges “God is a Woman” as well as another song called “Everyday,” which Plaintiff claims 

“discriminates against men and religion.” [Docket No. 13 at 3-4.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 

Grande-Butera’s lyrics “are obscene and are distributed to minors without the proper rating on 

youtube” and that she is “attempting terrorism.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff brings claims under California 

Penal Code sections 311(a) and 31. California Penal Code section 311 is a statute that defines 

various terms that appear in other provisions of state criminal statutes prohibiting certain acts 

related to child pornography and obscene matter. Similarly, California Penal Code section 31 

defines the term “principals” in terms of persons liable for punishment for crimes. Neither statute 

provides a private individual with the right to sue the creators of material that the individual 

asserts is obscene. 

In sum, Plaintiff’s FAC fails to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). As Plaintiff 

has already been given the opportunity to amend his complaint to state a claim under section 1983, 

the court recommends that his section 1983 claim be dismissed with prejudice, along with his 

claims under California Penal Code sections 311(a) and 31. As it is not “absolutely clear that the 

deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment,” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 

1212 (9th Cir. 2012), the court recommends that Plaintiff be given leave to amend his Title II 

claim. 

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III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons above, the court recommends that Plaintiff’s amended complaint be 

dismissed with leave to amend his Title II claim. The Clerk is directed to reassign this case to a 

district judge. Any party may file objections to this report and recommendation with the district 

judge within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(a); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 72-2. 

The court refers Plaintiff to the section “Representing Yourself” on the Court’s website, 

located at http://cand.uscourts.gov/proselitigants, as well as the Court’s Legal Help Centers for 

unrepresented parties. In San Francisco, the Legal Help Center is located on the 15th Floor, Room 

2796, of the United States Courthouse, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco. In Oakland, the 

Legal Help Center is located on the 4th Floor, Room 470S, of the United States Courthouse, 1301 

Clay Street, Oakland. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 7, 2019 

 ______________________________________ 

 Donna M. Ryu 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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Service_Certificate _CRD

rev. August 2018

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KALEB MCINTOSH,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ARIANA GRANDE-BUTERA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 4:18-cv-07758-DMR 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that: 

(1) I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court, Northern District of 

California; and

(2) On 3/7/2019, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said 

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an 

interoffice delivery receptacle located in the Clerk’s office.

Kaleb McIntosh

260 Lake Merced Blvd. #15

Daly City, CA 94015 

Dated: 3/7/2019

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

 

By:________________________

Ivy Lerma Garcia, Deputy Clerk to 

the Honorable Donna M. Ryu

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