Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_15-cv-00049/USCOURTS-ared-5_15-cv-00049-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arkansas Department of Correction
Defendant
Roger Cameron
Defendant
James Campbell
Plaintiff
Ronald Chism
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

JAMES CAMPBELL PLAINTIFF

 5:15CV00049-BRW-JJV

ROGER CAMERON, Program 

Coordinator Specialist, ADC; et al. DEFENDANTS

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INSTRUCTIONS

The following recommended disposition has been sent to United States District Judge Billy

Roy Wilson. Any party may serve and file written objections to this recommendation. Objections

should be specific and should include the factual or legal basis for the objection. If the objection is

to a factual finding, specifically identify that finding and the evidence that supports your objection. 

An original and one copy of your objections must be received in the office of the United States

District Court Clerk no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of the findings and

recommendations. The copy will be furnished to the opposing party. Failure to file timely

objections may result in a waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact.

If you are objecting to the recommendation and also desire to submit new, different, or

additional evidence, and to have a new hearing for this purpose before either the District Judge or

Magistrate Judge, you must, at the time you file your written objections, include the following:

1. Why the record made before the Magistrate Judge is inadequate.

2. Why the evidence to be proffered at the new hearing (if such a hearing is granted) was

not offered at the hearing before the Magistrate Judge.

3. The details of any testimony desired to be introduced at the new hearing in the form

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of an offer of proof, and a copy, or the original, of any documentary or other non-testimonial

evidence desired to be introduced at the new hearing.

From this submission, the District Judge will determine the necessity for an additional

evidentiary hearing. Mail your objections and “Statement of Necessity” to:

Clerk, United States District Court

Eastern District of Arkansas

600 West Capitol Avenue, Suite A149

Little Rock, AR 72201-3325

DISPOSITION

I. INTRODUCTION

James Campbell (“Plaintiff”) filed this action alleging his rights were violated when the

named Defendants failed to accommodate his hearing disability while he was enrolled in the

Substance Abuse Training Program (“SATP”) mandated by the Arkansas Parole Board. (Doc. No.

24 at 2-3.) Defendants Roger Cameron and Ronald Chism were dismissed due to 

Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies against them. (Doc. No. 37.) Now, Defendant 

Arkansas Department of Correction (“ADC”) has motioned for summary judgment (Doc. No. 45)

and Plaintiff has responded (Doc. No. 53). 

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper “if

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to anymaterial fact and that the moving party

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

321 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in

a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th

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Cir. 2002). The nonmoving party may not rely on allegations or denials, but must demonstrate the

existence of specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. Mann v. Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 825

(8th Cir. 2007). The nonmoving party’s allegations must be supported by sufficient probative

evidence that would permit a finding in his favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or

fantasy. Id. (citations omitted). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a

reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the

outcome of the case. Othman v. City of Country Club Hills, 671 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 2012). 

Disputes that are not genuine or that are about facts that are not material will not preclude summary

judgment. Sitzes v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 606 F.3d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 2010).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant ADC argues that: (1) any claim arising under section 1983 is barred by the

Eleventh Amendment; (2) Plaintiff’s Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claims fail as a

matter of law; and (3) the ADC is entitled to sovereign immunity on Plaintiff’s ADA claims. After

careful review of these arguments and Plaintiff’s responses thereto, I conclude the Motion for

Summary Judgment should be granted.

A. Claims Arising Under Section 1983

Plaintiff stated in his Response that his section 1983 claims were intended only against

Defendants Cameron and Chism, both of whom have now been dismissed. (Doc. No. 53 at 2.)

Nevertheless, he argues that ADC staff, by exhibiting “gross incompetence,” violated his Eighth

Amendment rights. (Id. at 2-3.) He appears to raise this claim solely to abrogate Defendant’s

sovereign immunity under Title II of the ADA. As such, I will consider it only in that context.

B. ADA Claims

Defendant persuasively argues that Plaintiff’s ADA claims arise only under Title II of the

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ADA.1

(Doc. No. 47 at 8-9.) Plaintiff does not dispute this contention in his Response. To state a

claim under Title II of the ADA, a claimant must show that: (1) he is a person with a disability as

defined by statute; (2) he is otherwise qualified for the relevant benefit; and (3) he was excluded

from the benefit due to discrimination based on disability. See Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850,

858 (8th Cir. 1999). Defendant does not presently contest Plaintiff’s claim that he is a disabled

person and was otherwise qualified for the SATP. It argues, however, that Plaintiff cannot establish

he was actually excluded from the SATP and his ADA claims are barred by sovereign immunity. 

I agree on the first count and need not reach the second.

During Plaintiff’s SATP enrollment, the ADC transported him to an outside provider for

hearing aid evaluations. (Doc. No. 46-3 at 9-10; Doc. No. 46-4 at 8, 14; Doc. No. 46-8 at 9, 12-13.)

He was provided with a hearing aid on September 23, 2014, and was authorized to possess it through

August 1, 2015. (Doc. No. 46-4 at 15; Doc. No. 46-7 at 9.) SATP accommodations were also

offered in the form of headphones and offers to fit Plaintiff with appropriate hearing aids. (Doc. No.

46-3 at 1.) Plaintiff refused these accommodations and voluntarily signed out2

of the SATP, citing

the prejudices of other inmates and concerns that it would take too long to fit him with proper

hearing aids. (Id.) Nevertheless, Defendant states Plaintiff, during the period he was enrolled in the

SATP, received the benefits of the program. (Doc. No. 46-1 at 12-13.) I find the foregoing history

of medical treatment (and offers of medical treatment) establishes Defendant ADC provided

reasonable accommodations which conferred meaningful access to the SATP on Plaintiff. See

Mason v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 559 F.3d 880, 886 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that, under Title II,

1Plaintiff did not specify under which title of the ADA he was bringing his claims in his

Amended Complaint. 

2As a result of this voluntary sign-out, policy precluded Plaintiff from re-entering the SATP

for six months. (Doc. No. 46-3 at 1.)

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“qualified individual[s] with a disability are entitled to meaningful access to [the relevant benefit].”

(internal citations omitted)). For his part, Plaintiff argues that, irrespective of the treatment he was

afforded by the ADC medical department for his disability, Defendant cannot establish the SATP

is itself ADA complaint. (Doc. No. 53 at 2.) Plaintiff has not offered any convincing rationale for

drawing a distinction between the accommodations offered by ADC medical staff and

accommodations specific to the SATP. Nor has he offered any evidence, beyond his own

unsupported claims, which suggests the accommodations which the ADC offered him were

inadequate. Instead, the record indicates Defendant ADC offered him reasonable accommodations

which, if accepted by Plaintiff, would have provided him with meaningful access to the program.3

Given that the record provides no support for Plaintiff’s Title II claims, I need not decide

whether those claims are barred by sovereign immunity. See Johnson v. Neiman, 504 Fed. Appx.

543, 545 (8th Cir. 2013) (unpublished opinion). Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion should be

granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Defendant Arkansas Department of Correction’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Doc. No. 45) be GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Arkansas Department of Correction be 

DISMISSED with prejudice.

3. The Court certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma pauperis 

appeal from an Order adopting these recommendations would not be taken in good faith.

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I note it is undisputed that Plaintiff did eventually complete the SATP and make parole.

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IT IS SO RECOMMENDED this 11th day of January, 2016.

____________________________________

JOE J. VOLPE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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