Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02466/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02466-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Frank Bilello
Appellant
Krause Gentle Corporation
Appellee
Kum & Go
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2466

___________

Frank Bilello, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

Kum & Go, LLC; *

Krause Gentle Corporation, * 

*

Appellees. *

 ___________

Submitted: March 8, 2004

Filed: July 8, 2004 

___________

Before RILEY, McMILLIAN, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Frank Bilello (Bilello), a Caucasian male, appeals the dismissal of his First

Amended Complaint alleging Kum & Go, LLC, and Krause Gentle Corporation

(collectively Kum & Go) violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a and 1981 (2000) by refusing

patrons access to restroom facilities at stores located east of 42nd Street in Omaha,

Nebraska, while permitting patrons access to restroom facilities at stores located west

of 42nd Street. Bilello contends the Omaha area located east of 42nd Street is racially

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The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, United States District Judge for the

District of Nebraska.

2

In his original complaint Bilello alleged Kum & Go was in willful violation

of Omaha Municipal Code § 49-492 (Code). Because Bilello did not allege the Code

provides any civil remedies or private right of action, the district court dismissed the

claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Bilello did not replead the alleged Code violation claim in his First Amended Complaint. 

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mixed and economically distressed. The district court1 dismissed the claims, without

prejudice, for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Bilello appeals.

We generally affirm.

I. BACKGROUND 

Bilello is an Iowa resident employed by Service One, which provides in-home

appliance repairs. Bilello works in residences located in the north and south sections

of Omaha, which, Bilello alleges, are “racially mixed and economically distressed.”

Kum & Go is a limited liability company doing business in Omaha, and is owned by

Krause Gentle Corporation. Kum & Go stores are located throughout Omaha and sell

gasoline, ready-to-eat foods, and sundries.

Bilello alleges Kum & Go engages in a discriminatory “practice and policy

. . . [of] provid[ing] restroom facilities to their customers outside the North and South

Omaha areas and [of] refus[ing] restroom services to their customers, including

[Bilello], east of 42nd Street, Omaha, Douglas County, Nebraska.” On multiple

occasions, Bilello purchased goods at Kum & Go stores located east of 42nd Street,

but store employees repeatedly refused Bilello access to restroom facilities, causing

him discomfort, inconvenience, and embarrassment. Bilello alleges the patron

restroom practice and policy at Kum & Go stores located east of 42nd Street

constitute willful violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(a) and 1981.2

 Bilello seeks

injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages, costs, and attorney

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fees. Kum & Go filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted for failure

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

On appeal, Bilello argues the district court erred in ruling he (1) did not have

standing to raise issues of racial discrimination directed against unidentified residents

of north and south Omaha; and (2) failed to state causes of action under 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000(a) and 1981.

II. DISCUSSION

A. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a

By its plain language, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(c) requires notice to the state or

local authority as a prerequisite to filing a civil action when a state or local law

prohibits discrimination in public accommodations and provides a remedy for such

practice. Subsection (c) proscribes a civil action may not be brought under section

2000a-3(a) “before the expiration of thirty days after written notice of such alleged

act or practice has been given to the appropriate State or local authority by registered

mail or in person.” Id.

Nebraska has enacted laws prohibiting discriminatory public accommodation

practices and has conferred authority on an administrative agency to investigate,

resolve, and, when necessary, redress discriminatory practices. Nebraska law

guarantees “[a]ll persons within this state shall be entitled to a full and equal

enjoyment of any place of public accommodation, as defined in sections 20-132 to

20-143, without discrimination or segregation on the grounds of race, color, sex,

religion, national origin, or ancestry.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-132 (Reissue 1991).

Section 20-139 directs that sections 20-132 to 20-143 “shall be administered by the

[Nebraska] Equal Opportunity Commission” (Commission) and further provides that

county attorneys are authorized to enforce these statutory sections and “possess the

same powers and duties” as the Commission. Id. § 20-139 (Supp. 2002).

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The record contains no indication the City of Omaha’s Human Relations

Director forwarded Bilello’s complaint to either the Commission or the Douglas

County Attorney.

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At least two federal circuit courts have ruled that when a state has enacted laws

to protect against discriminatory public accommodation practices, a Title II plaintiff

must establish he has satisfied the procedural prerequisites of section 2000a-3(c)

before filing a civil action in federal court. See Stearnes v. Baur’s Opera House, Inc.,

3 F.3d 1142, 1144-45 (7th Cir. 1993) (Illinois law); Harris v. Ericson, 457 F.2d 765,

766 (10th Cir. 1972) (New Mexico law). Although Bilello apparently attempted to

comply with the procedural requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(c) by filing written

notice of the alleged discriminatory practice with the City of Omaha’s Human

Relations Director, Nebraska law expressly declares the laws guaranteeing full and

equal enjoyment to public accommodation shall be administered by the Commission.3

See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-139 (Supp. 2002). 

 Since the requirements of section 2000a-3(c) are jurisdictional, we join the

Seventh and Tenth Circuits in holding these procedural prerequisites must be satisfied

before we have jurisdiction over a section 2000a claim. See Stearnes, 3 F.3d at 1144;

Harris, 457 F.2d at 767. We recognize the issue of jurisdiction was not raised below

by the parties or the district court. However, when the record indicates jurisdiction

may be lacking, we must consider the jurisdictional issue sua sponte. See GMAC

Commercial Credit LLC v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 357 F.3d 827, 828 (8th Cir.

2004) (explaining “[a]ny party or the court may, at any time, raise the issue of subject

matter jurisdiction”); Thomas v. Basham, 931 F.2d 521, 522-23 (8th Cir. 1991)

(clarifying that federal courts have limited jurisdiction, and “every federal appellate

court has a special obligation to consider its own jurisdiction” and raise sua sponte

jurisdictional issues “when there is an indication that jurisdiction is lacking, even if

the parties concede the issue”). Because the record establishes Bilello failed to notify

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the Commission of the alleged discriminatory public accommodation practice and

policy, we lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s dismissal of the 2000a claim.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 

Bilello also contends Kum & Go’s alleged discriminatory public

accommodation practice constitutes a willful violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which,

in relevant part, provides: 

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same

right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give

evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security

of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like

punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no

other.

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Bilello claims Kum & Go’s refusal to allow patrons

access to restroom facilities at stores located east of 42nd Street is founded in race

discrimination and denies him the full and equal benefit of the laws. Kum & Go

argues Bilello, a Caucasian, lacks standing to bring such a claim.

The vast majority of cases filed pursuant to section 1981 allege intentional

discriminatory conduct prompted by a hostile animus towards the plaintiff’s race. On

occasion, courts have permitted cases to proceed where a plaintiff alleges a

discriminatory practice was motivated by a hostile animus to another person’s or

group’s race. Typically, courts have limited these third-party standing cases to

situations in which the plaintiff is the direct target of discrimination. See Des Vergnes

v. Seekonk Water Dist., 601 F.2d 9, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1979) (concluding section 1981

confers an “implied Right of action against any other person who, with a racially

discriminatory intent, interferes with [the plaintiff’s] right to make contracts with nonwhites”; the statute also confers “an implied Right of action against any other person

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who, with a racially discriminatory intent, injures [the plaintiff] because he made

contracts with non-whites”); see also Winston v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 558 F.2d 1266,

1270 (6th Cir. 1977); cf. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969)

(reaching parallel result under § 1982). The D.C. Circuit has declared that implicit in

these cases, cited infra, “is a cause of action protecting people from private retaliation

for refusing to violate other people’s rights under § 1981, or for exercising their own

§ 1981 rights.” Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp.,

28 F.3d 1268, 1279-80 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

Third-party standing for section 1981 claims is also permitted in cases

involving discriminatory action taken directly against a non-minority person because

of the person’s relationship to, association with, or advocacy of minorities. See

Clayton v. White Hall Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 676, 678-80 (8th Cir. 1989) (concluding

white employee had standing under section 1981 to raise issue of racial discrimination

directed against minority co-worker); Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262,

1266-67 (10th Cir. 1989) (concluding white attorney had standing under section 1981

to sue newspaper publishing allegedly false articles because attorney represented

minority clients); Alizadeh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 802 F.2d 111, 114-15 (5th Cir.

1986) (permitting section 1981 suit by white plaintiff terminated because of marriage

to minority spouse); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 890

(11th Cir.1986) (same); Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian Sch., 631 F.2d 1144, 1150 (4th

Cir. 1980) (concluding white father and two white daughters had standing under

section 1981 to file suit against private sectarian school for terminating contractual

relationship with white daughters because of one daughter’s association with black

student at school); DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306, 312, modified on

reh’g, 520 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1975) (allowing suit under section 1981 where white

employee claimed his company forced him to retire because he sold his house to a

fellow black employee). 

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The Sixth Circuit granted rehearing en banc in Chapman and reversed the

panel decision, with a majority holding “section 1981 plainly protects against

impairment of its equal benefit clause by private discrimination.” Chapman, 319 F.3d

at 833, petition for cert. filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3725 (U.S. May 06, 2003) (No. 02-1646).

The Second Circuit, while “assuming that Section 1981 requires a nexus to state

proceedings or laws,” also held “the equal benefit clause of Section 1981(a) does not

require state action.” Phillip v. Univ. of Rochester, 316 F.3d 291, 298-99 (2d Cir.

2003). Under Eighth Circuit practice, we are bound to follow our precedents in

Youngblood and a subsequently decided case, Bediako v. Stein Mart, Inc., 354 F.3d

835 (8th Cir. 2004). Even if this circuit, sitting en banc, were to reverse its prior

holdings requiring state action for claims brought pursuant to section 1981’s equal

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Assuming, without deciding, these standing principles enunciated in section

1981 right-to-contract cases apply equally to section 1981 equal benefit cases, these

standing principles are simply not implicated in this case. Here, the challenged

practice and policy of refusing patrons access to restroom facilities was not

specifically targeted at Bilello, nor has Bilello alleged he was refused access to

restroom facilities because of his close relationship to, association with, or advocacy

of minorities. Nor has Bilello alleged “some hindrance to the third party’s ability to

protect his or her own interests.” Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991). If

minority individuals patronizing Kum & Go stores located east of 42nd Street are

being refused access to restroom facilities, then those individuals or persons related

to or associated with them may file a section 1981 action. Because Bilello has not met

the minimum requisites for third-party standing, we conclude the district court

properly dismissed his section 1981 claim.

Finally, with regard to section 1981’s right to “the full and equal benefit of all

laws,” we have recognized that “[b]ecause the state is the sole source of the law, it is

only the state that can deny the full and equal benefit of the law.” Youngblood v.

Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Chapman v.

Higbee Co., 256 F.3d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d en banc, 319 F.3d 825 (6th Cir.

2003)).4

 As such, we have held “[u]nder the Full-and-Equal Benefit clause [of 42

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benefit clause, we believe the facts alleged by Bilello do not support a viable section

1981 equal benefit claim under the standards articulated by the Sixth and Second

Circuits. See Chapman, 319 F.3d at 832 (declaring “[a] litigant must demonstrate the

denial of the benefit of a law or proceeding protecting his . . . personal security or a

cognizable property right”); Phillip, 316 F.3d at 298 (declaring “[p]rospective

plaintiffs . . . must identify a relevant law or proceeding for the ‘security of persons

and property’”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)). 

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U.S.C. § 1981 a plaintiff must] allege that some sort of state action contributed to [the

plaintiff’s] being discriminated against.” Bediako v. Stein Mart, Inc., 354 F.3d 835,

838 n.3 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Youngblood, 266 F.3d at 855). Bilello has not alleged

state action caused him to be denied the full and equal benefit of the laws; nor has

Bilello alleged the government was in a position of interdependence with Kum & Go

or was so connected with the actions of the Kum & Go store managers and employees,

that the alleged discriminatory practice may be attributed to the state. Therefore,

Bilello’s section 1981 equal benefit claim fails as a matter of law. See Youngblood,

266 F.3d at 855. 

III. CONCLUSION

 We affirm the dismissal, without prejudice, of Bilello’s section 2000a claim for

lack of jurisdiction, and we dismiss, with prejudice, Bilello’s section 1981 equal

benefit claim for want of standing and for failure to allege state action.

___________________________

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