Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-03206/USCOURTS-ca8-15-03206-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Esther C. Durham
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-3206

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Esther C. Durham

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Nebraska - Omaha

____________

 Submitted: April 12, 2016

Filed: September 6, 2016

____________

Before GRUENDER and KELLY, Circuit Judges, and ERICKSEN, District 1

Judge.

____________

ERICKSEN, District Judge.

Appellant Esther Durham, who pleaded guilty to a drug distribution conspiracy

charge, appeals her sentence. Before sentencing, Durham’s attorney filed objections

The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District 1

of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

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to the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) and, in the same document, moved

for a downward departure or variance. On appeal, Durham focuses on just one of her

objections: her objection to the Probation Office’s finding that she was not entitled

to a downward adjustment as a minor or minimal participant in calculating her

offense level. The Probation Office distributed a revised PSI with an addendum

responding to Durham’s filing, and the district court announced that it would 2

consider Durham’s objections and motion at the sentencing hearing. At sentencing,

after hearing argument fromDurham’s attorney, the district court found the applicable

United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) range for imprisonment to be 87

to 108 months and then, after further proceedings, imposed a sentence of 72 months’

imprisonment.

Durham appeals the sentence primarily on the ground that the district court did

not explicitly rule on her objection relating to a mitigating role adjustment. That

characterization of the sentencing proceedings, however, is incorrect. We recognize

that it is a serious error to improperly calculate the applicable Guidelines range. 

Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016). But the district court

did rule on Durham’s role-adjustment objection, and we find no clear error in its

calculation of Durham’s Guidelines range based on the denial of a mitigating role

adjustment. We affirm.

I.

On appeal, Durham raises two issues: First, whether the district court erred by

failing to resolve the factual dispute about the applicability of a downward adjustment

to her offense level for a mitigating (minor or minimal) role under Guidelines §

The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, United States District Judge for the

2

District of Nebraska.

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3B1.2, and second, whether the district court erred in calculating Durham’s offense

level. “We review de novo the district court’s application of the Guidelines, and we

review for clear error the district court’s factual findings.” United States v. Betts, 509

F.3d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Ingram, 501 F.3d 963, 968 (8th

Cir. 2007)).

II.

Durham and her codefendant in this action, Ryan Franks, were charged in

Count I of a superseding indictment with conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more

of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. On May 21, 2015, Durham pleaded

guilty, without a plea agreement, to this single count. Franks pleaded guilty on June

1 pursuant to a plea agreement filed that same day, in which the parties agreed that

Franks should be held responsible “for at least 500 grams, but less than 1.5kg of

methamphetamine (mixture).”

The Probation Office was required to distribute its initial PSI regarding

Durham to counsel by July 2. The PSI found, among other things, that in an

interview, Durham admitted that for four to five months, drugs were sold out of the

apartment she shared with Franks; that she picked up pound quantities of

methamphetamine from a supplier; that she had occasionally delivered narcotics to

customers even though they usually met with Franks; and that she assisted Franks in

maintaining a ledger of drug sales. PSI ¶ 31. It concluded that a “‘minimal

participant’ or ‘minor participant’ reduction is not applicable in this case” because

Durham “wasinvolved with different aspects of the criminal enterprise,” “was aware

of the transactions completed by . . . Franks,” and “admitted to picking up quantities

of methamphetamine from their supply source and conducting drug sale transactions

with customers, as well as assisting in tracking their customers’ drug debts.” PSI ¶

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34. The initial PSI also found that Durham was accountable for a total of 19 pounds

of methamphetamine mixture, resulting in a base offense level of 34. PSI ¶ 32. It

recommended a two-level increase for firearm possession, PSI ¶ 33, and a three-level

decrease for acceptance of responsibility, PSI ¶ 38, but no downward adjustment for

role, PSI ¶ 43. These determinations resulted in an offense level of 33. Combining

the offense level with a criminal history category of III, the initial PSI calculated the

applicable Guidelines range to be 168 to 210 months’ imprisonment.

In a document titled “Objectionsto PSI [and] Motion for Downward Departure

or Variance,” DCD 90, Durham filed objections to the initial PSI, consistent with the

district court’s amended order on sentencing schedule, DCD 85, which required any

such objections to be filed by July 23. See also NECrimR 32.1(b). Durham raised

numerous objections to the PSI. Most pertinent to this appeal, she objected to PSI ¶

31 as follows:

Ms. Durham acknowledged that “she assisted Franks in keeping track

of the drug debt in a ‘black book.’” The probation officer has

interpreted this in the most damning possible way. In fact, Ms. Durham

did occasionally write information in Ryan Franks’ black book but only

occasionally and only under his direction. . . . Rather than supporting

the inference, see ¶ 34, that Ms. Durham is not a minimal or minor

participant, her obedience and subordination to Ryan Franks strongly

supports a role adjustment for Ms. Durham.

DCD 90 ¶ 9 (emphasis added). Without specifically referencing PSI ¶ 34 again,

Durham asked the district court to find “thatshe [was] in fact eligible for a downward

role adjustment.” DCD 90 ¶ 21. Durham also objected to the amount of drugs for

which she wasresponsible and to the application of the two-level increase for firearm

possession. Referring to Franks’ plea agreement, Durham further asserted that her

base offense level should be lower than Franks’ and that “an appropriate offense level

would be 25.” She also argued that a downward variance or departure from the

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recommended Guidelines range was warranted because of policy considerations

relating to how her relatively minor role in the drug distribution prohibited her from

being eligible for a substantial-assistance departure.3

Consistent with the scheduling order, the Probation Office distributed a revised

PSI by August 6, with an addendum explaining its position regarding Durham’s

objections (“PSI Addendum”). Responding to the objection to PSI ¶ 34, the PSI

Addendum stated:

Regarding the issue of a role adjustment, the defendant admitted in her

post-Miranda statement to being involved in various phases of drug

distribution, including bookkeeping, picking up shipments from the

supplier, as well as meeting with customers. The defendant’s

participation was not simply limited to a single task within the

conspiracy. Additionally, she acknowledged that drugs were being sold

out of the apartment she shared with her codefendant. While her

codefendant appears to have conducted most of the sales, the defendant

had knowledge and/or understanding of the scope and structure of the

conspiracy, specifically the activities of her codefendant. Thus, the

threshold requirement for a “minor” or “minimal participant” reduction

is not satisfied.

The PSI Addendum also responded to other of Durham’s objections, including to the

quantity of drugs involved and the firearm possession.

At this point, the district court’s scheduling order provided that Durhamshould

file and serve “a written statement of position respecting each of the unresolved

objections to the presentence report, including the specific nature of each objection,”

We are sensitive to the confidentiality of the sealed objections but discuss

3

them to the extent that arguments were repeated in the unsealed sentencing transcript

and briefing on appeal.

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and should attach any written evidence in support of the position to that document or

request an opportunity to provide oral testimony. DCD 85. Durham did not file any

written statement of position, did not file supporting documents, and did not make

any request to provide testimony.

The district court held Durham’s sentencing hearing on September 28, four

days after sentencing Franks. At the hearing, the parties first addressed Durham’s

objections relating to the amount of drugs for which she should be held responsible. 

With a government concession, the court found that the attributable amount was 500

grams to 1.5 kilograms ofmethamphetamine mixture—the same asthe amount agreed

to in Franks’ plea agreement. Durham then raised her objection with regard to her

allegedly minor role, “request[ing] that the Court recognize Ms. Durham’s lesser

involvement than of the codefendant . . . either in the argument that she should get a

two-level reduction for being a minor participant or that the Court consider at the

level of a variance.” Sent. Tr. 4. Durham noted that this request could affect the

Guidelines calculation but reiterated thatshe had no preference in “how you deal with

it, so long as I can address to the Court basically what happened and why the Court

should at least consider that in some fashion in deciding what sentence is

appropriate.” Id. at 4-5. The district court responded that it would “be happy to

consider that” and “should consider that in connection with the statutory sentencing

factors that [it is] required to weigh,” including “the need to avoid unwarranted

sentencing disparities.” Id. at 5. It explained that “where someone’s conduct is less

culpable than a codefendant, it makes sense that the less culpable person receives a

lower sentence, unless obviously there’s some criminal history factor that causes that

person to receive a greater sentence.” Id.

The court then noted that the PSI Addendumhad addressed many of Durham’s

DCD 90 objections. Id. The court overruled certain objections relating to each

party’s presentation ofthe offense, noted that the PSI Addendum“addressed the other

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objections that did not affect the guideline calculation,” and concluded, “So I am

going to deny the remainder of the objections in . . . filing number 90, recognizing

that I can sentence outside the guideline range, recognizing that I have an obligation

to consider all the statutory sentencing factors and an obligation to impose a sentence

that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to serve all of those statutory

objectives.” Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).

After denying the DCD 90 objections, the district court began to walk through

its calculation of the applicable Guidelines range. At the court’s determination to add

two points to the base offense level for firearm possession, Durham’s counsel

interrupted to press her objection that the upward adjustment was inapplicable. The

district court resolved that objection in Durham’s favor.

The district court then set out its Guidelines calculations, starting with a base

offense level of 30 (lower than the Probation Office’s selection of 34 because of the

court’s findings on drug quantities) and decreasing by 3 points for acceptance of

responsibility. With a criminal history category of III, which was not contested, the

resulting range ofimprisonment under the Guidelines was 87 to 108 months. Durham

did not press her role-adjustment objection, and the proceedings moved on to

allocution. At allocution, Durham argued that in its consideration of the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) factors, the district court should consider, among other things, how she

attempted to cooperate but was deemed too insignificant a player to be helpful. Sent.

Tr. 13-14. Echoing Durham’s policy argumentsin DCD 90, counsel argued that these

facts should be considered to “adjust the sentence appropriately.” Id. at 14; see also

id. at 15 (alluding to her alleged inability to qualify for a sentence reduction under

Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). Counsel urged the court to

impose the mandatory minimum sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment. Id. at 15.

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Before announcing its sentence, the district court discussed the § 3553(a)

factors that it was required to consider, including the need to avoid unwarranted

sentencing disparities. The court explained that it ruled out the possibility of a

mandatory minimum sentence because of Durham’s category III criminal history. 

The court concluded by sentencing Durhamto 72 months’ imprisonment. Durham’s 4

counsel then made several requests, e.g., regarding credit for time served. In closing,

the district court asked Durham’s counsel if he had “anything further,” and he

represented, “No, your Honor, that’s all.” Sent. Tr. 24-25.

III.

A.

Durham’s primary argument on appeal is that the district court erred by failing

to resolve the factual dispute about the applicability of a minor-participant downward

adjustment to her offense level. Durham asserts that the district court did not deny

her role-adjustment objection and that the failure to rule on this objection at

sentencing was a significant procedural error in violation of the directives outlined

in Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

The premise of Durham’s argument, however, is mistaken. The district court

did rule on Durham’s role-adjustment objection. Durham’s counsel raised the issue

at the sentencing hearing, asking the district court to “recognize Ms. Durham’s lesser

involvement than of the codefendant” either “in the argument that she should get a

two-level reduction for being a minor participant” or in considering a variance. 

Immediately after this request, the district court indicated that it would consider the

The district court sentenced Franks to 87 months’ imprisonment on Count I, 4

and 60 months on a separate count, to be served consecutively. DCD 99.

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lesser-involvement argument as part of the § 3553(a) factors, specifically with regard

to “the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.” Then, the district court

found that the PSI Addendum had addressed many of Durham’s DCD 90 objections,

indicating its familiarity with both the objections and the Probation Office’s

responses to those objections, which included the officer’s renewed determination

that a minor-role downward adjustment to Durham’s offense level was not warranted. 

After addressing certain DCD 90 objections that did not affect the Guidelines

calculation, the district court then explicitly stated that it was “going to deny the

remainder of the objections in . . . filing number 90.” By referring to “the remainder

of the objections,” the district court reinforced the impression that it understood that

Durham’s role-adjustment objection could affect the Guidelines calculation, and was

rejecting that argument. This was the denial that Durham now asserts never

happened.

5

The record suggests that Durham’s counsel understood that the district court

was denying the argument that a minor-role two-point downward adjustment should

be applied, and made a strategic decision to, instead of challenging that denial, ply

the contention that Durham played a less substantial role as part of the argument for

a variance. Indeed, this was the very choice that Durham’s counsel himself proposed

The government argues that because Durhamdid not raise the issue of whether 5

the district court failed to decide the objection, the court was not alerted to the

argument and this claimof error wasthus not preserved for appeal. See United States

v. McDowell, 676 F.3d 730, 732 (8th Cir. 2012). Because we think it clear that

Durham is mistaken on this point and the court did make a decision on the record, we

need not decide whether to review for harmless or plain error. The question of

whether the district court would have imposed the same sentence anyway—a question

examined in Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1342-48, and United States v. Martinez,

821 F.3d 984, 988-90 (8th Cir. 2016)—therefore need not be answered in this case. 

If there is no error, we need not analyze whether the asserted error would have been

plain or harmless.

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to the district court. Two points reinforce this conclusion. First, when the district

court was outlining its calculation of the offense level, counsel interrupted to press

(successfully) the objection relating to the firearm-possession adjustment but did not

speak up again to assert the role-adjustment objection. The court’s calculation of the

offense level clearly made no downward adjustment for a mitigating role, yet he did

not contest its absence. Second, at allocution, in arguing for a variance, counsel

6

picked up his argument that Durham’s role was minor, urging the district court to

consider how her relative insignificance prevented her eligibility for a

cooperation-related departure or potential Rule 35 sentence reduction. This position

tracks Durham’s factual contentions in arguing on appeal that the § 3B1.2 adjustment

should have been applied. See Appellant Br. 8-9; see also infra § III.B.

After listening to counsel’s arguments at allocution, and having already

explicitly denied the DCD 90 objections—which included the role-adjustment

objection—the district court indicated that it considered Durham’s relative

significance or culpability in considering “the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing

disparities.” Sent. Tr. 19; see Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 n.6 (quoting the

§ 3553(a) factors, including this factor, § 3553(a)(6)). The court’s statement of

reasons for its sentence also identified this factor as one of its justifications for

varying below the Guidelines range, calling out specifically in its written explanation

for the sentence “the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.” DCD 112. 

The district court’s consideration of Durham’s role-related argument as part of its

decision to vary, rather than as a downward adjustment to the offense level, is

consistent with how the district court told Durham’s counsel that it would address that

argument directly after counsel raised it and just before denying the DCD 90

objections. It is also consistent with how counsel raised the issue, asking the court

Indeed, counsel represented at the end of the hearing that he had no further 6

arguments, passing up another opportunity to remind the district court to decide the

role-adjustment objection if he thought the court had failed to decide it.

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to consider Durham’s relatively minor role either in calculating the offense level or

in varying or departing downward.

Had the district court failed to rule on Durham’s role-adjustment objection, that

might have constituted a “significant procedural error.” United States v. Parker, 762

F.3d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). But the district court

did not fail to rule on this objection.

To the extent Durham’s argument can be characterized as an assertion that the

district court did not adequately explain its denial of the objection, we reject that

argument too. A district court must “adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow

for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.”

United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 572 F.3d

at 596). In leading up to its denial of the DCD 90 objections, the district court

explicitly referenced both DCD 90 and the Probation Office’s responses in the PSI

Addendum. The PSI Addendum, as noted, set out several reasons in support of its

conclusion that “the threshold requirement for a ‘minor’ or ‘minimal participant’

reduction is not satisfied.” In addition, as indicated in the statement of reasons, the

district court adopted the second revised PSI, which included the PSI Addendum and

updated information to reflect the court’s findings at the sentencing hearing. The

court’s adoption of and clear referencesto the Probation Office’s reasoning in the PSI

Addendum provided adequate explanation for its denial of Durham’s objection. Cf.

United States v. Phillips, 431 F.3d 86, 93-94 (2d. Cir. 2005) (determining that factual

findings were sufficient where the district court adopted a PSI and referenced its

addendum, which had specifically addressed the defendant’s arguments). Further, the

district court, after hearing counsel’s argument that the court should consider how

Durham’s relatively minor role prevented her from benefitting from a

substantial-assistance departure orRule 35 reduction,specifically stated in explaining

its sentence that it had considered the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing

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disparities. This statement was further illuminated by the district court’s earlier

explanation, after counsel first raised Durham’s role-related argument, that absent

reasons related to criminal history, a less culpable person should receive a lower

sentence than her more culpable codefendant in order to avoid unwarranted

sentencing disparities. Sent. Tr. 5. These explanations were sufficient under the

circumstances, given the context and in light of Durham’s multi-faceted arguments. 

See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356, 359 (2007) (“The appropriateness of

brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say, depends upon

circumstances.”) (finding that an explanation was adequate given “context and the

record”). Furthermore, the district court twice noted its consideration of this

sentencing factor, § 3553(a)(6), in its statement of reasons.

The district court’s consideration of Durham’s argument about her relatively

minor role in view of the sentencing disparities factor makes sense when seen in the

context of the whole record. Durham’s arguments in DCD 90 and at sentencing

consistently hammered home an overarching theme: she should receive less time, or

certainly no more time, than her co-conspirator and codefendant, Franks, for the same

count. This was, after all, a conspiracy oftwo. Durhamcould only be considered less

culpable than (or less significant than, or minor in relation to) the one other person

indicted in the conspiracy: Franks. So, she vigorously and successfully contested

being held accountable for 19 pounds of methamphetamine mixture when Franks had

reached a plea agreement that would hold him accountable for 500 grams to 1.5

kilograms. She protested, again successfully, being held responsible for Franks’

firearm possession. She sought a § 3B1.2 downward adjustment. And she sought a

variance or departure because supposedly despite her willingness to cooperate, she

was too relatively minor a player to be helpful. Given the totality of the arguments

and the record in this case, the district court understandably homed in on the heart of

the argument: whether, in the spirit of avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities,

Durham’s sentence should be lower than her co-conspirator’s on the same count. Cf.

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Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52 (“The sentencing judge has access to, and greater familiarity

with, the individual case and the individual defendant before him [or her] than the

Commission or the appeals court.”) (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 357-58). We note that

Durham did not challenge the substantive reasonableness of her sentence on appeal

or argue that she was entitled to a larger variance or that she was dissatisfied with the

explanation for the variance.

B.

Durhamalso identified as an issue in this appeal whether the district court erred

in calculating her base offense level. As the government noted in its brief, Durham

did not flesh out this issue clearly.

A defendant’s base offense level is calculated pursuant to Chapter 2 of the

Guidelines Manual. USSG Manual § 1B1.1(a)(2) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2014). 

Next, the district court considers whether the adjustments discussed in Chapter 3

apply. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(3).

Although Durham’s statement of the issues refers to an error in calculating the

base offense level, she identifies no alleged error relating to the Chapter 2 findings.7

To the extentshe intended to argue such a Chapter 2-related error, she has abandoned

the issue by not supporting it with any argument. United States v. Aldridge, 561 F.3d

759, 765 (8th Cir. 2009).

The district court ultimately determined Durham’s base offense level to be 30. 

7

Under § 2D1.1, if her offense level had been 32 or above, the court’s determination

on the § 3B1.2 adjustment could have affected her base offense level under § 2D1.1,

but the Guidelines do not provide for any effect on the base offense level of 30. 

USSG Manual § 2D1.1(a)(5).

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We understand Durham’s issue instead to be that the district court erred in

calculating the offense level (but not the base) by failing to apply the requested

2-point reduction under § 3B1.2. The determination whether to apply a § 3B1.2

adjustment “is based on the totality ofthe circumstances and involves a determination

that is heavily dependent upon the facts of the particular case.” USSG Manual §

3B1.2 cmt. 3(C). A “minor participant” adjustment applies to a defendant “who plays

a part in committing the offense that makes [her] substantially less culpable than the

average participant” (here, Franks) “but whose role could not be described as

minimal.” Id. § 3B1.2 cmts. 3(A) & 5. Durham bore the burden of establishing her

entitlement to a minor-role reduction. See United States v. Salazar-Aleman, 741 F.3d

878, 880 (8th Cir. 2013). We review for clear error the district court’s determination

that the minor-role adjustment was inapplicable. Id.

As noted above, before denying Durham’s DCD 90 objections, the district

court referred several times to the PSI Addendum. The PSI Addendum stated that

Durham was not a minor participant because she sometimes picked up pound

quantities of methamphetamine from the supplier, participated in drug hand-offs to

customers, and helped maintain accounts of customer debts; drugs were sold out of

the home she shared with Franks; and she knew about the extent of Franks’

endeavors. Although Durham took issue with the interpretation of some of these

facts, she did not argue that these statements of fact were inaccurate. Significantly,

moreover, she offered no evidence in support of her objection. The district court’s

scheduling order notified Durham of the opportunity to make such submissions or

requests and provided a deadline for doing so. Even overlooking the deadline,

Durham never—timely or untimely—submitted any written evidence or asked to put

on testimony in support of her objection. The district court did not fail to consider

evidence in support of a factual finding on the objection; rather, Durham did not

submit any. On appeal, Durham argues that the record shows a factual basis for a role

reduction: that Durham was denied the opportunity to cooperate because she played

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too minor a role. Those “facts” mirror the arguments, again without evidentiary

support, that Durham’s counsel made in asking for a variance. Considering the entire

record, we cannot find clear error in the denial of Durham’s objection that a § 3B1.2

reduction should apply.

8

IV.

Accordingly, we affirm.

KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully disagree that the district court explicitly ruled on Durham’s

request for a 2-level reduction in her offense level pursuant to USSG § 3B1.2. While

the district court did “deny the remainder of the objections in . . . filing number

Comment 3(B) to § 3B1.2 appears to further support a finding that the minor 8

role was inapplicable. “If a defendant has received a lower offense level by virtue of

being convicted of an offense significantly less serious than warranted by his actual

criminal conduct, a reduction for a mitigating role under this section ordinarily is not

warranted . . . .” Id. § 3B1.2 cmt. 3(B). The district court found that Durham should

only be accountable for 500 grams to 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine

mixture—not the 19 pounds that the PSI said was actually attributable to the

conspirators’ crime. Durham did not contest the accuracy of the amounts of the drugs

involved during the period in which she participated, but argued that it would be

unfair to hold her accountable for more than what Franks had agreed to. The court

ultimately decreased Durham’s base offense level four points below what it would

have been if she had been held accountable for the actual amount of drugs involved

in the conspiracy during the relevant time. Despite the potential effect of this change

to the applicability of a § 3B1.2 adjustment under comment 3(B), at no point after the

district court accepted the lower quantities of drugs attributable to Durham did her

counsel alert the court to whether this change affected her objection as previously

articulated in DCD 90.

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90”—the document in which Durham presented her objections to the presentence

report and her request for a departure or variance—the court later revisited one of the

very objections listed in filing number 90 and ruled in Durham’s favor. I also do not

read the district court’s rulings on the § 3553(a) factors as a denial of the request for

a role reduction. The court discussed factors such as deterrence and Durham’s

progress on pretrial release, but did not address the participants’ relative culpability. 

See United States v. Deans, 590 F.3d 907, 909 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting that a

determination of whether a defendant is entitled to a minor role reduction requiresthe

district court to first determine the defendant’s relevant conduct and then compare the

defendant’s actions against those of the other participants in relation to the elements

of the offense). In my view, the district court—not the appellate court—should have

the opportunity in the first instance to decide whether Durham is entitled to a 2-level

reduction in her offense level for her role in the offense. See Molina-Martinez, 577

U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. at 1345. I offer no view on whether the reduction should be

applied—indeed, this court lists several reasons why the reduction may not be

appropriate. But I would leave that decision to the sound discretion of the district

court. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

______________________________

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