Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07107/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07107-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of San Leandro
Defendant
Greg Lemmon
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED 

STATES 

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COURT

U

For the Northern District of California

NITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREG LEMMON

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF SAN LEANDRO

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

No. C 06-07107 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Cross-motions for Partial Summary

Judgment

Plaintiff Greg Lemmon and similarly situated San Leandro patrol police officers1 brought

suit against the City of San Leandro on November 16, 2006. Plaintiff seeks an order holding that

time spent donning and doffing his uniform and attendant equipment is compensable under the Fair

Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. section 201 et seq. Now before the court are parties’

cross-motions for partial summary judgment. The court has considered the parties’ arguments fully,

and for the reasons set forth below, the court rules as follows.

BACKGROUND2

There are 54 sworn patrol officers at the San Leandro Police Department (“SLPD”). Supp.

Willis Dec., ¶ 6. Patrol officers at the SLPD are required to report to duty properly uniformed and

equipped for a shift that could last from eight to twelve hours. Id., ¶¶ 15, 21. In addition, the

officers must maintain their uniform and equipment in good order. See George Dec., Exh. H at 31,

Exh. J.

Patrol officers are required to wear a “Class B” uniform and attendant equipment while on

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duty. Attarian Dec., ¶ 6. The required portions of this uniform are: undershirt or turtleneck, uniform

shirt, uniform shoulder patch, badge, name tag, police badge, uniform trousers, uniform socks,

uniform shoes, and trouser belt. Id., ¶ 6, Exh. A. In addition, patrol officers are required to carry

other equipment, including a gun holster, ammunition, ammunition holders, handcuffs, handcuff

case, tear gas canister, taser, taser case, baton ring, radio case, radio and gun, all of which attach to a

duty belt. Id., ¶ 7, Exh. A. This duty belt, which may be made of leather or nylon, attaches to the

officers’ trousers with fasteners. Id.; Willis Dec., ¶ 23; Supp. Willis Dec., ¶ 4. Bulletproof ballistic

vests are optional and are worn over the undershirt and under the uniform shirt. Attarian Dec., ¶ 9;

Willis Dec., ¶ 6; Supp. Willis Dec., ¶ 4. Wires linking the police radio to an earpiece are also

optional. Supp. Willis Dec., ¶ 5.

With regard to the maintenance of equipment, the SLPD may inspect the officers’ equipment

at the discretion of the supervising officer. Attarian Dec., ¶ 11. Weapons inspections are conducted

prior to each quarterly range qualification; more frequent inspections may be required at the

discretion of the supervising officer. Id., ¶ 12, Exh. B.

Plaintiff claims the entire donning and doffing process, along with the attendant

maintenance, takes anywhere between 25–35 minutes per day. Lemmon Dec., ¶ 21; Sobek Dec., ¶

24; Spirou Dec., ¶ 8.

The SLPD claims that departmental policies allow officers the option of donning and doffing

at home. Willis Dec., ¶ 18. There is no written policy allowing the officers to don and doff at home,

or conversely, requiring the officers to don and doff at the station. See Lemmon Dep. at 11:11–25. 

The SLPD, however, does seem to have an unwritten policy that, while not on duty, officers cover

up their uniforms. Willis Dec., ¶ 20; Pl. Opp. at 8, 18. At the summary judgment hearing, the city

stated that it “recommends” officers cover up while not on duty. Both the Captain of Police and the

Chief of Police of the SLPD testified that they have personally observed partially uniformed officers

arrive at the police station. Willis Dec., ¶ 7. In addition, patrol officers have testified that they have

at various times taken portions of their uniform or equipment home. Sobek Dep. at 31:8–18;

Henning Dep. at 48:3–13. In fact, plaintiff admits that three similarly situated individual plaintiffs

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partially don and doff at home. Pl.’s Opp. at 20 n.13. Nevertheless, the SLPD does provide lockers

to police officers in which officers may store uniforms, equipment and personal items. Willis Dec.,

¶ 19. It appears that most officers don and doff entirely at the police station.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there is

“no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the

case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is

genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving

party. Id. The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of identifying those portions

of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On an issue for which the opposing party

will have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out “that there is an absence

of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Mere allegations or denials do not defeat a moving

party’s allegations. Id.; Gasaway v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1994). The

court may not make credibility determinations, and inferences to be drawn from the facts must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Masson v. New Yorker

Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

The moving party may “move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment

in the party’s favor upon all [claims] or any part thereof.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Supporting and

opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be

admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the

matters stated therein.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

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DISCUSSION

“Whether an activity is excluded from hours worked under the FLSA . . . is a mixed question

of law and fact. The nature of the employees’ duties is a question of fact, and the application of the

FLSA to those duties is a question of law.” Ballaris v. Wacker Siltronic Corp., 370 F.3d 901, 910

(9th Cir. 2004).

Under the FLSA, it is axiomatic that employers pay employees for all hours worked. See

Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2003), aff’d, 546 U.S. 21 (2005); 29 U.S.C. §§ 206,

207. Work is the “physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required

by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer.” See Tenn.

Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944). This definition includes

“non-exertional acts.” Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 902; Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133

(1944). The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, however, relieves employers from compensating

employees for “activities which are preliminary or postliminary to [the] principal activity or

activities.” 29 U.S.C. § 254(a).

After passage of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, the Supreme Court held that “activities

performed either before or after the regular work shift” are compensable “if those activities are an

integral and indispensable part of the principal activities for which [the] workmen are employed.” 

Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956). In Steiner, production employees at a battery plant

were required to don protective work clothes before commencing work and to shower and change

back at the end of the work day. The Court held that employees should be compensated for the time

spent donning and doffing their protective work clothes because the process was “integral and

indispensable” to allay the dangers inherent in the principal activity of battery production. Id.

The Ninth Circuit has held that donning and doffing of both unique and non-unique

protective gear are integral and indispensable to the employee’s principal activities if they were:

1) necessary to the principal work performed; and 2) done for the benefit of the employer.3

 Alvarez,

339 F.3d at 902–03. In Alvarez, a meat products producer required its production employees to

wear protective gear, including liquid-repelling sleeves, aprons and leggings, after they got to the

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employer’s premises. It also required employees to wipe or hose the gear on-site at the end of their

shift. The court found the donning and doffing of this protective gear to be compensable. Id.

Concurrently, however, the court also held that time spent donning and doffing non-unique

protective gear was de minimis, and therefore not compensable as a matter of law. Id. at 904. 

Ballaris, another Ninth Circuit decision, re-affirmed the test laid out in Alvarez. 370 F.3d 901. In

Ballaris, the Ninth Circuit held that workers laboring in a “clean room” at a silicon chip

manufacturing facility must be compensated for the time spent changing into “bunny

suits”—specialized suits designed to maintain the sterile atmosphere in the “clean room.” Id. at 911. 

In addition, the Ninth Circuit compensated the workers for time spent donning and doffing their

plant uniforms while on the employer’s premises and worn under the “bunny suit,” because “the

plant uniforms were ‘required by’ the employer, and because the wearing of those uniforms was for

the employers’s benefit.” Id. at 911 (quoting Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 903).

I. Necessary to the Principal Work Performed

The components of the police uniform trigger instant recognition of police officers. Along

with this identification comes deference to the authority of police officers, which is essential to the

efficient performance of police work. Katsaris Dec, ¶¶ 6–9; Brodd Dec., ¶ 7; George Dec., Exh. C;

Attarian Dep. at 50:13–23. To this end, an SLPD “Operations Directive” states that the uniform is a

symbol that is essential to the Department’s police work. See George Dec., Exh. D. The patrol

officer’s uniform is also part of the continuum of force. The officer’s command presence—which

the uniform fosters—is the first of many points along the continuum that police officers regularly

use to enforce the law and obtain compliance from members of the public. Attarian Dep. at

50:1–51:23; Katsaris Dec., ¶¶ 7, 16. In fact, the SLPD admits that the authority conferred by the

uniform is essential to the performance of police work. Attarian Dep. at 25:1–26:16; Opp. Br. at 6–7

(uniform, along with the equipment, are “indispensable,” or necessary, to the performance of the

officer’s principal duties).

A patrol officer cannot effectively do her job without her uniform. Although an officer may

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perform some of her duties without the uniform, she cannot perform all of her required duties

without the uniform. For instance, officers must be in full uniform for the line-up or while on patrol. 

Furthermore, though it is theoretically possible for a police officer to do her job without her

uniform—as in the case of undercover police officers—it would be a practical absurdity to eliminate

uniforms due to the myriad benefits that officers and the SLPD obtain simply because officers are in

uniform. Specifically, police uniforms are special because the uniform itself forms part of the

equipment. In this respect, this court respectfully disagrees with Judge Breyer’s decision in

Martin—it is not convinced that “[a] police officer’s uniform, in and of itself, does not assist the

officer in performing his duties.” Martin v. City of Richmond, No. C 06-06146 CRB, 2007 WL

2317590, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2007) (order granting summary judgment in part and denying

summary judgment in part). Unlike practically any other profession, the police uniform is part of the

continuum of force. This distinguishing characteristic of the police uniform makes it necessary to

the principal work performed. Thus, this court again respectfully disagrees with Judge Bryer’s

characterization of the police uniform as “mere clothes.” Id., at *7. Specifically, when determining

if the uniform is necessary to the work of a police officer, it is of great consequence that these

“clothes” are of a particular color and design that afford the wearer special powers and deference in

our society.

In this context, there is no distinction between the uniform and equipment because the police

uniform with all its component parts functions as an integrated whole that serves as an officer’s

survival suit. Attarian Dep. at 32:3–9; Katsaris Dec., ¶ 14; see also Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 902 (the

court’s analysis must be context-specific). There can be no debate that police officers’ equipment is

necessary for them to perform their law enforcement duties. For example, the handcuffs, taser, radio

and gun all obviously aid the officer in her law enforcement duties depending upon the severity of

the situation at hand. That fact, however, does not compel that all time spent donning and doffing

the uniform and equipment be compensable. Specifically, in the same case that the Ninth Circuit

held that the compensation question is context-specific, it also held that certain “integral and

indispensable” non-unique safety gear is non-compensable because the time spent donning and

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doffing them was de minimis. Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 904. The donning and doffing of safety goggles

and hardhats held non-compensable in Alvarez were integral to employee safety and equally as

important as the unique gear the employees were required to don and doff. Without the non-unique

safety gear, the employees in Alvarez would have been vulnerable to workplace injuries, just as

police officers may be without their equipment when in a dangerous situation. Thus, in the context

of this case, even though the uniform and equipment function as a whole, their donning and doffing

are nevertheless subject to the de minimis rule. Specifically, “[m]ost courts have found daily periods

of approximately 10 minutes de minimis even though otherwise compensable.” Lindow v. United

States, 738 F.2d 1057, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Defendant claims that in each donning and doffing case binding upon this court in which the

activity was found to be compensable, plaintiffs were required to don and doff at the employer’s

premises. See Steiner, 350 U.S. 247; Alvarez, 339 F.3d 894; Ballaris, 370 F.3d 901. If the officers

here were explicitly required to don and doff at the station, then the donning and doffing would

clearly be compensable. This is because Ballaris rested squarely on the fact that the employer there

required changing into uniform be done on its premises. The court stated that “[b]ecause [the

employer] determined that all employees in the second plant must wear uniforms daily and must put

them on and take them off on the plant premises, and it adopted that rule [for business reasons], the

company, by its conduct, made such activities integral and indispensable to the job.” Ballaris, 370

F.3d at 912 (citation omitted). Although this does argue against compensation for the instant

plaintiff, there is no explicit requirement in the Ninth Circuit that the preliminary or postliminary

activity take place on the employer’s premises.4

 This court, therefore, refuses to inject a location

limitation into the analysis for finding compensability under the FLSA. In any event, most officers

don and doff at the station in practice—this is a strong indicia that the donning and doffing of the

uniform at the police station is a de facto requirement. This finding is further buttressed by the

lockers the SLPD provides to each officer.

Defendant also claims that basic activities, such as changing clothes, are not normally

compensable. 29 C.F.R. § 790.7(g) (changing clothes is normally ‘preliminary’ or ‘postliminary’);

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see also 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (the FLSA “exclude[s] any time spent in changing clothes or washing at

the beginning or end of each workday which was excluded . . . by the express terms of or by custom

or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement applicable to the particular

employee.”). It claims this is especially true if donning and doffing of clothes are not required to be

done on the employer’s premises. See 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c) n.65 (changing clothes may be

compensable if “the changing of clothes on the employer’s premises is required by law, by rules of

the employer, or by the nature of the work.”). The Ninth Circuit has defined “clothes” when

interpreting the scope of the “changing clothes or washing” exclusion to the FLSA under collective

bargaining agreements. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(o); Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 904–06. It held that “the

district court correctly interpreted the ‘changing clothes’ exception in [the changing clothes or

washing exclusion] as not including the time spent putting on personal protective equipment.” Id. at

905. The court then found that: “Personal Protective Equipment is specialized clothing or

equipment worn by an employee for protection against a hazard. General work clothes (e.g.

uniforms, pants, shirts or blouses) not intended to function as protection against a hazard are not

considered to be personal protective equipment.” Id. As discussed above, it is clear that most of the

police officer’s gear consists of specialized equipment for protection against criminals. This holds

true for the officer’s uniform as well because it consists of “specialized clothing” that forms part of

the continuum of force designed to protect against rogue elements and to inform the citizenry of the

legitimacy of the officer’s official position. Though the uniform itself is not “specialized” in its

protective properties, its color, appearance and component parts provides a gravitas that serve as an

effective deterrent against crime, thereby protecting the police officer. Thus, since the police

officers’ uniform and gear constitute personal protective equipment and not do not constitute

“clothes,” the standards stated above do not apply.5

The Department of Labor (“DOL”) has recently issued an advisory opinion, which states that

“if employees have the option and ability to change into the required gear at home, changing into the

gear is not a principal activity, even when it takes place at the [place of employment].” Request for

Judicial Notice, Exh. B, at 1–3 (hereinafter “DOL memo”).6 The DOL goes even further to state that

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“[e]mployees who dress to go to work in the morning are not working while dressing even though

the uniforms they put on at home are required to be used in the plant during working hours. 

Similarly, any changing which takes place at home at the end of the day would not be an integral

part of the employees’ employment and is not working time.” Id., Exh. A, at § 31b13. These DOL

pronouncements simply interpret “principal activity” and state that donning and doffing are not

compensable, and therefore not principal activities, if the employer or the nature of the job does not

mandate that they take place on the employer’s premises. As described above, this court does not

agree with this conclusion and holds that donning and doffing may be compensable even if

performed off the employer’s premises.

This court therefore also respectfully disagrees with Judge Sabraw of the Southern District of

California. In Abbe v. City of San Diego, he ruled that “the relevant inquiry is not whether the

uniform itself or the safety gear itself is indispensable to the job – they most certainly are – but

rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the nature of the work requires the donning and doffing

process to be done on the employer’s premises.” Nos. 05cv1629 DMS (JMA), 06cv0538 DMS

(JMA), 2007 WL 4146696, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2007) (order granting summary judgment in part

and denying summary judgment in part). This “process” standard is not in line with Ninth Circuit

precedent. Specifically, in Ballaris, the Ninth Circuit compensated workers for time spent donning

and doffing their plant uniforms while on the employer’s premises and worn under the “bunny suit,”

because “the plant uniforms were ‘required by’ the employer, and because the wearing of those

uniforms was for the employers’s benefit.” 370 F.3d at 911 (quoting Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 903). 

There is no indication that the nature of the work required the process of donning and doffing the

uniform be done on the employer’s premises. Furthermore, as discussed above, this court considers

the location of the donning and doffing activity to be only one of the considerations. Finally, the

SLPD’s policies, though somewhat lax, regarding the cover up of uniforms while off-duty and the

nature of police work strongly anticipate that the donning and doffing process will likely be done on

SLPD premises. The specific policy and prudential reasons, including avoidance of public

confusion and increased officer preparedness, are discussed below in further detail.

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II. Done for the Benefit of the Employer

In Alvarez, the court held that the donning and doffing of protective gear benefitted the

employer because it helped the employer: 1) comply with legal requirements; and 2) avoid work

slowdowns and problems that would arise as a result of injuries to employees. 339 F.3d at 903. The

same is true here. For instance, employers are required by state law to do everything reasonably

necessary to protect the safety of employees. Cal. Labor Code § 6401. In addition, it is clear, and

the SLPD admits, that donning the uniform and equipment minimizes the potential for injury to

officers, which in turn benefits the SLPD because it facilitates a ready and healthy police force. See

Attarian Dep. at 27:14–21, 66:11–23. It also helps police officers do their jobs more efficiently. 

The benefits of a healthy and efficient police force clearly flow to the SLPD since the SLPD must

hire more or less police officers depending upon its force’s efficiency and well being. Finally, if the

uniform is required by the SLPD, there is a presumption that it benefits the SLPD since it would not

have required the uniform otherwise. Thus, even if no efficiency or health benefits flow to the

SLPD, the donning and doffing of uniforms benefit the SLPD if done to comply with SLPD

requirements.

It must be noted, however, that only those aspects of the uniform and equipment required by

the SLPD meets this prong. Employees are not to be compensated for acts they perform of their own

volition, such as donning ballistic vests or radio wires, even if these acts benefit the SLPD. 

Compensation for such acts would leave the employer with little control over which acts are

compensable and which are not.

The benefits flowing to the employer are underscored by the lockers provided by the SLPD

to every patrol officer. This demonstrates that the donning and doffing of uniforms at the station,

though not required, are nevertheless very important to the SLPD. The vast majority of patrol

officers at least partially don and doff at the police station, thus avoiding an array of potential

problems associated with donning and doffing off-site. For instance, the general public will not be

confused by commuting off-duty uniformed officers. Though parties agree that the SLPD has an

unwritten policy requiring officers to cover-up while not on duty but in uniform, this policy seems

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more of a recommendation or a “best practice,” and not a mandate. The citizenry, as well as the

police officers, run the risk of being placed in an undesirable situation if an off-duty police officer is

perceived as being on-duty. Donning and doffing at the station further avoid a situation where

officers forget an essential piece of equipment at home. This benefits the SLPD because it makes

officers more likely to be in complete uniform and on-time when reporting for duty.

It must be noted that benefits to the SLPD from donning and doffing at the station do not

include: 1) an avoidance of crime on commuting off-duty uniformed officers; 2) the officers’ mental

preparation before reporting for duty; 3) the avoidance of back injuries; and 4) a reduction of biohazard exposure with respect to the officers’ families. First, criminals may always target commuting

off-duty officers independent of whether the officers don and doff at the police station. It would not

be difficult for a criminal to follow an off-duty plain-clothed police officer. Second, plaintiff has not

presented any evidence that demonstrates that the station is a better location than the officers’ homes

for the officers to “mentally prepare.” Third, the risk of back injury would not be greatly increased

if officers wear their duty belts while commuting because officers must continuously wear the belt

during an eight to twelve hour shift. Attarian Supp. Dec., ¶ 8. Fourth, there is no risk of bio-hazard

exposure to the officers’ families because if an officer comes into contact with bio-hazardous

materials while on duty, the officer is allowed to immediately remove his or her uniform, shower at

the station, and don a fresh uniform. Willis Dec., ¶ 26.

In sum, since both prongs of Alvarez are met, this court holds that the time spent donning

and doffing the required uniform and gear is compensable under the FLSA. The integral and

indispensable nature of the donning and doffing makes those activities principal to a police officer’s

duties. The Supreme Court has held that the time between conducting principal activities is

compensable. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005) (where donning and doffing protective gear

was integral and indispensable to employees’ principal activity, such donning and doffing was itself

a principal activity and thus time spent walking to and from changing and work areas was not

excluded from compensation). It must be noted that in this case, the time between the principal

activities of donning and doffing and the next principal activity of policing is not generally

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compensable. For instance, if officers choose to don the uniform at home, their commute is not

compensable for three reasons. First, the Portal-to-Portal Act specifically excludes from

compensation “walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the

principal activity or activities which such employee is employed to perform.” 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1). 

Second, compensation for the commute time would be a violation of the letter and spirit of the

FLSA—compensation here would be akin to compensating a police officer who is charged with the

care of a police dog for all the time in between feeding or training the police dog at home until the

next principal policing activity. See Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004). 

That would effectively make the “continuous workday” rule a “continuous pay” rule. Third, IBP is

factually distinguishable because the employer there required its employees to don and doff at the

employer’s premises immediately preceding and succeeding the compensable workday.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED

and defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED.

Dated: December 7, 2007 _______________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Court Judge

Northern District of California

Case 3:06-cv-07107-MHP Document 57 Filed 12/07/07 Page 12 of 13
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

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1. The police officers are similarly situated under 29 U.S.C. section 216(b) of the Fair Labor

Standards Act.

2. Plaintiff’s Proposed Supplemental Statement of Undisputed Facts submitted on October 16,

2007, see Docket No. 52, will not be considered because this statement is opposed by defendants,

see Docket No. 53, thereby making the statements therein disputed.

3. In light of clear Ninth Circuit precedent, this court declines defendant’s invitation to adopt

the Second Circuit’s interpretation of “integral and indispensable” as defined in Gorman v. Consol.

Edison Corp., 488 F.3d 586 (2d Cir. 2007).

4. Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004), is inapposite because there the

city had conceded that caring for and training the police dog at home was compensable work under

the FLSA.

5. The language in Steiner that “changing clothes and showering under normal conditions” are

not compensable is also inapplicable here because the government had conceded that issue in

Steiner. 350 U.S. at 249.

6. The court takes judicial notice of three documents pursuant to Rule 201 of the Federal Rules

of Evidence. These documents are: 1) DOL, Wage and Hour Division, Field Operations Handbook,

Section 31b13; 2) DOL, Wage and Hour division, May 21 2006 Advisory Memorandum No. 2006-

2; and 3) Portions of the San Leandro Administrative Code. The accuracy of these documents

cannot reasonably be questioned and have not in fact been questioned.

ENDNOTES

Case 3:06-cv-07107-MHP Document 57 Filed 12/07/07 Page 13 of 13