Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01250/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01250-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
George Anthony Stewart
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

U 'ted States Court of Appeals 

DI Tenth C' 1rcu1 't 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 0D1999 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

GEORGE ANTHONY STEWART, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

88-1250 

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On Appeal From The 

United States District Court 

For The District Of Colorado 

(D.C. Criminal No. 87-CR-332) 

Charles Szekely, Assistant Federal Public Defender {Michael G. 

Katz, Federal Public Defender, with him on the brief), Denver, 

Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Robert G. Chadwell, Assistant United States Attorney (Michael J. 

Norton, United States Attorney, and Kathryn Meyer, Assistant 

United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Denver, Colorado, 

for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before LOGAN, SETH and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

SETH, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-1250 Document: 01019739969 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 1 
Defendant was indicted for multiple violations of Title 21 of 

the United States Code after members of the Denver Police 

Department's Special Weapons Attack Team (S.W.A.T.), acting in 

tandem with federal agents and under the authority of a federal 

search warrant, stormed into his residence and seized numerous 

bags containing cocaine and marijuana. The trial court conducted 

an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress the 

seized evidence and denied the motion. The defendant then entered 

a conditional plea of guilty to distributing cocaine in violation 

of 21 u.s.c. § 84l(a)(l), reserving the right to appeal the trial 

court's denial of the motion to suppress. This appeal followed. 

Because we find that the Denver S.W.A.T. team's entry into the 

defendant's residence violated 18 U.S.C. § 3109, we reverse the 

trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress the seized 

evidence. 

I. 

An F.B.I. agent secured a federal warrant to search the 

defendant's house and to seize any drugs and firearms found 

within. The house was located in Denver and the search was to be 

a joint operation of the F.B.I. and the Denver Police S.W.A.T. 

team. The affidavit attached to the search warrant contained only 

conclusory statements, purportedly based on the affiant's 

experience (15 months as a special agent) and conversations with 

others regarding typical drug dealing operations. rt noted that 

drug dealers usually keep records, receipts, cash and contraband 

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Appellate Case: 88-1250 Document: 01019739969 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 2 
at their residences, and maintain the names of associates. As to 

firearms, the affidavit again spoke in generalities: 

"g. That cocaine and/or controlled 

substances traffickers do commonly possess and 

carry a firearm during the sale and 

distribution of cocaine and/or controlled 

substances." 

The affidavit was specific only as to the purchase, 

apparently on two occasions, by an undercover agent of an ounce of 

cocaine from a Wiley E. McClain. On both occasions, this person 

was followed to the defendant's house and apparently there 

obtained the drugs. The search warrant was issued on the basis of 

the undercover agent's statements and contained no special 

provisions as to how the entry or search was to be conducted. 

The Denver S.W.A.T. team (not the F.B.I.) had decided at 

least 24 hours before the federal warrant was obtained how the 

entry into the house was going to be made. The F.B.I. did not 

participate in this decision and the magistrate who issued the 

warrant was not advised of the plan. As mentioned, the warrant 

did not state anything as to how the entry was to be made. The 

Denver S.W.A.T. team and the F.B.I. agents arrived at the 

defendant's house at about 10:30 in the evening. The S.W.A.T. 

team used a two-man steel battering ram to break down the front 

door and immediately threw a full charge stun grenade into the 

living room, where it detonated (as the officers stood bac~) with 

an explosion and flash. The occupants were blinded and 

disoriented for at least five or ten seconds. There was no knock 

and no warning before the door was broken down and the grenade was 

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Appellate Case: 88-1250 Document: 01019739969 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 3 
detonated. There were three people in the living room at the 

time, the defendant, a co-defendant and a woman who had no 

connection with any illegal activity. The co-defendant was 

slightly injured. None were armed although a semi-automatic 

pistol was found in an upstairs room during the subsequent search. 

In its brief, the Government states that "[o]nce the 

residence was secured, a search was conducted by federal agents." 

The S.W.A.T. officers testified that they advised the F.B.I. 

agents by radio when the house was "secure." The search revealed 

the following items: three baggies of cocaine, eleven baggies of 

crack cocaine, two baggies of marijuana, six large bags of 

marijuana, a weighing scale, breathing masks, a bottle of Superior 

Inositol, and over $10,000 in cash. A loaded .45 caliber semiautomatic pistol was found in an upstairs bedroom, as mentioned. 

There was no testimony that anyone had seen a gun in the 

house before the search. There were no other facts known to the 

police that would have led to the inference that firearms were 

present in the house, although the officers testified that they 

had be~n informed some months before that the defendant had been 

seen with a semi-automatic pistol at another time and place. The 

information as to the pistol was received from a private 

investigator, who in turn had heard it from an informer who at the 

time was smoking marijuana. 

The officers had little other information about the defendant 

or his house. The officers testified that they knew that 

defendant had sold a small amount of cocaine to an intermediary, 

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Appellate Case: 88-1250 Document: 01019739969 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 4 
as mentioned, who then sold it to an undercover agent. They knew 

that defendant was a Jamaican and that some Jamaican drug dealers 

fortified their houses and most were armed. There had been no 

surveillance of the house and the officers did not know who or 

what was in the house at the time. The officers had no reason to 

think that the house was barricaded and indeed it was not 

barricaded. 

The trial court did not consider whether the search was 

illegal given that the warrant was issued to an F.B.I. agent but 

executed by the Denver Police S.W.A.T. team. See Fed. R. Crim. 

Proc. 4l(c); 18 u.s.c. § 3105. We thus do not address that issue 

on appeal. 

II. 

In order to decide if the evidence obtained in the search was 

properly entered into evidence, we must determine whether the 

entry into the defendant's residence was lawful. The Government, 

citing Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, argues that the 

method used in executing a warrant is left to the officers' 

discretion. Its argument is that officers may use what they know 

or have heard in deciding how the warrant will be executed, and 

this information may be in addition to that provided in the 

affidavit for the warrant. The dramatic method here used by the 

Denver S.W.A.T. team to accomplish the entry and to "secure" the 

premises was selected in the exercise of th~ team's discretion. 

It is apparent that this discretion is not without limitation as 

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Appellate Case: 88-1250 Document: 01019739969 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 5 
the action taken must be within statutory and constitutional 

limitations. 

The statutory standard governing the conduct of the officers 

in this case is contained in 18 u.s.c. § 3109, which requires the 

use of a knock and warning procedure: 

"The officer may break open any outer or inner 

door or window of a house, or any part of a 

house, or anything therein, to execute a 

search warrant, if, after notice of his 

authority and purpose, he is refused 

admittance or when necessary to liberate 

himself or a person aiding him in the 

execution of the warrant." 

The Court in Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313, stated as 

to this provision: 

"The requirement of prior notice of authority 

and purpose before forcing entry into a home 

is deeply rooted in our heritage and should 

not be given grudging application. Congress, 

codifying a tradition embedded in AngloAmerican law, has declared in § 3109 the 

reverence of the law for the individual's 

right of privacy in his house." 

Because we resolve this case under 18 U.S.C. § 3109, it is 

unnecessary to consider the defendant's arguments under the Fourth 

Amendment. 

This court has held that compliance with § 3109 may be 

excused only when "exigent circumstances" exist. Thus "(i]f the 

record clearly establishes • • • that the executing officers 

failed to announce their authority and purpose before forcibly 

entering the dwelling, and that no exigent circumstances were 

shown, the evidence seized must be suppressed as the fruit of an 

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Appellate Case: 88-1250 Document: 01019739969 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 6 
unlawful search." United States v. Ruminer, 786 F.2d 381, 383 

(10th Cir.) (citing Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585). 

There is no contention by the Government that the ''knock and 

announce" requirement was here followed in any respect. The steel 

battering ram operated by the two S.W.A.T. team officers knocked 

down the door without any warning whatsoever and the grenade was 

immediately thrown inside where it exploded. The S.W.A.T. team 

was in army fatigue type clothes. No uniforms or badges were 

apparent. The evidence seized during the search must be excluded 

unless it is determined that "exigent circumstances" existed at 

the time of the search that would justify the officers' decision 

not to knock and announce their purpose. 

The question of whether exigent circumstances exist in the 

execution of a search warr~nt is a mixed question of law and fact. 

While we must accept the trial court's findings on the underlying 

facts surrounding the execution of the warrant unless they are 

clearly erroneous, Ruminer, 786 F.2d at 383, the determination of 

whether those facts satisfy the legal test of exigency is subject 

to de nova review. Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 961 (10th 

Cir.) (citing United States v. Mcconney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199-1205 

(9th Cir.)). 

The term "exigent circumstances," in conjunction with the 

e~try of a residence during the execution of a search warrant, 

refers to those situations where "the officers believe there is an 

' 

emergency situation and ••. their belief is objectively 

reasonable." United States v. Spinelli, 848 F.2d 26, 29 (2d 

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Appellate Case: 88-1250 Document: 01019739969 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 7 
Cir.). See also United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1355 

(9th Cir.) (exigent circumstances are those which suggest an 

"urgent need for immediate action"). The reasonableness of the 

officers' conduct hinges on the facts within their knowledge 

indicating exigency. Mcconney, 728 F.2d at 1206. The conclusion 

of exigency under these facts muit be especially clear in this 

case where there was no knock or warning whatsoever, where there 

was no information as to who was in the house, where the 

destruction of physical property took place, and where the 

occupants of the residence could be injured as a result of the 

entry. We must determine whether the officers, after considering 

the particular facts regarding the premises to be searched and the 

circumstances surrounding the execution of the warrant, could 

reasonably have decided that an urgent need existed for such an 

entry into the premises. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 

272 ("a claim under 18 u.s.c. § 3109 depends upon the particular 

circumstances surrounding the execution of the warrant") (citing 

Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301). 

III. 

Two factors lead us to conclude that the circumstances 

surrounding the execution of this warrant were not sufficiently 

exigent to justify the type of forcible entry employed by the 

Denver S.W.A.T. team. First, all of the "exigent circumstances" 

sought to be relied on were matters that were known and that 

existed at least 24 hours before the warrant was issued. It is 

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Appellate Case: 88-1250 Document: 01019739969 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 8 
difficult to understand how the circumstances were ''exigent" when 

the officers had an entire day to formulate a response to those 

circumstances. The exigent circumstances exception to 18 u.s.c. 

S 3109 was developed so as to allow officers to formulate an 

immediate response to emergency situations that arise on the scene 

during the execution of a search warrant. In this case, the 

method of entry used was not formulated in response to an 

emergency but instead was carefully planned without specific 

information well in advance of the time the warrant was obtained. 

Second, the facts offered in support of the officers' 

decision on the mode of entry all consisted of generalities that 

bore no relation to the particular premises being searched or the 

particular circumstances surrounding the search. Each of the 

facts outlined in the affidavit supporting the warrant pertained 

to "drug dealers" or "cocaine and/or controlled substances 

traffickers" in general. None of these facts specifically 

pertained to the defendant or the defendant's house. No officer 

had any information to the effect that the house had been 

barricaded or fortified. No surveillance was conducted to 

determine if the house had been fortified or if the occupants were 

monitoring activity in the surrounding area. Most importantly, no 

effort was made to determine who was in the house at the time the 

entry was made. This information became crucial once it was 

decided to use the stun grenade. 

The officers were in possession of only two specific facts 

regarding the defendant that were relevant to the execution of the 

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Appellate Case: 88-1250 Document: 01019739969 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 9 
warrant other than the apparent sales of drugs on two occasions. 

First, they had been told that the defendant had been seen on one 

occasion with a pistol. This fact alone, however, does not 

justify the method used to enter the house. This information was 

obtained from a private investigator, who in turn obtained it from 

an informant. The informant was under the influence of marijuana 

at the time he told this to the investigator. The information was 

stale and involved only one incident. The officers had no 

information that would have led them to believe that the defendant 

armed himself on a regular basis. The officers thus had no 

information whether firearms were present within the house. The 

one incident involving the defendant and a pistol took place away 

from the defendant's house. Any conclusions regarding the 

presence of firearms on the premises were purely conjectural. 

The second piece of information the officers possessed about 

the defendant was that he is of Jamaican descent. This 

information seems to have inordinately influenced the conduct of 

the officers in this case. It seems sufficient to note that the 

race or nationality of a suspect cannot serve as a basis for 

failing to comply with the requirements of 18 u.s.c. § 3109. 

Thus, a failure to comply with the provisions of 18 u.s.c. 

§ 3109 cannot be excused unless the conduct of the officers 

involved a reaction to the type of specific facts that were absent 

here. The Government would have us justify this circumvention of 

§ 3109 on the basis of general conclusory statements regarding the 

conduct of drug dealers in general. Followed to its logical 

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Appellate Case: 88-1250 Document: 01019739969 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 10 
conclusion, the Government's argument would obviate the necessity 

for complying with the statute in any search of the residence of 

an alleged drug dealer. 

In those cases where the failure of the police to follow the 

requirements of § 3109 has been upheld, the police were in 

possession of specific facts regarding the premises to be searched 

or its occupants that demonstrated that compliance with the 

statute would be dangerous or imprudent. A good example of a 

situation where an unannounced entry into .a home was justified due 

to the presence of exigent circumstances is found in United States 

v. Spinelli, 848 F.2d 26 (2d. Cir.). In Spinelli, federal agents 

obtained a warrant to search the house of a man suspected of 

manufacturing methamphetamines. In holding that the agents' 

failure to knock was justified by exigent circumstances, the 

Second Circuit noted that the agents were aware that the suspect 

had a past history of firearm possession and a reputation for 

violence, that the agents had conducted a lengthy surveillance of 

the suspect's house, and that the agents believed the suspect had 

become aware of their surveillance. The agents had reason to 

believe that chemicals on the premises were flammable and 

explosive, and they were concerned that the suspect might try to 

destroy evidence by causing an explosion given that he had.become ~ 

aware of the surveillance. The circumstances were even more 

exigent in that children were present in the neighborhood. The 

court held that it was reasonable for the agents to break the 

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Appellate Case: 88-1250 Document: 01019739969 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 11 
house's door down without knocking given their knowledge of these 

specific facts. 848 F.2d at 30. 

United States v. Ramirez, 770 F.2d 1458, 1460-61 (9th Cir.), 

also involved the admissibility of evidence seized after police 

entered the suspects' apartment without knocking. In Ramirez, the 

officers had reason to believe that the suspects were armed within 

the apartment. The suspects were wanted on murder and kidnapping 

charges. The officers were aware that the suspects had recently 

been warned that the F.B.I. was looking for them. The officers 

conducted surveillance of the premises before entering to 

determine who was inside. The Ninth Circuit held that the 

circumstances surrounding the search were sufficiently exigent to 

justify breaking the door down without knocking. The officers' 

conduct was reasonable since it was based on specific facts known 

about the suspects and the apartment. 

The opinion of this court in United States v. Coffman, 638 

F.2d 192, 196-97 (10th Cir.), is of no help to the Government's 

position. In Coffman, there were specific facts that were known 

to the officers. The agents had been informed prior to entering 

the dwelling that there were weapons on the premises. Coffman did 

not involve an unannounced forcible entry of the type here at 

issue. There was testimony that the officers yelled "police" or 

"federal agents" as they approached the front door of the house. 

There was additional testimony that the door was partially open 

when the officers arrived and that the officers simply pushed it 

open the rest of the way before entering. The trial court found, 

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Appellate Case: 88-1250 Document: 01019739969 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 12 
and this court accepted, that the defendant had failed to prove 

the door had been broken down. 

For the reasons discussed above, the trial court's denial of 

defendant's motion to suppress the seized evidence is REVERSED and 

the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

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