Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02323/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02323-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mary Therese Pierce
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2323

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of North Dakota.

Mary Therese Pierce, also known as *

Mary Therese Lewis, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 13, 2006

Filed: May 9, 2006

___________

Before RILEY, MAGILL, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Mary Pierce appeals the sentence the district court imposed after she pleaded

guilty to two counts arising from one instance of unlawfully possessing a firearm, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and (g)(3). After considering the applicable

Guidelines imprisonment range of 27-33 months, the district court sentenced Pierce

to 21 months imprisonment and 3 years supervised release, and imposed a $100

special assessment for each count. On appeal, her counsel has moved to withdraw and

filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning the factual

basis for the plea and the extent of the sentence’s variance from the Guidelines range.

Appellate Case: 05-2323 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/09/2006 Entry ID: 2042473
-2-

We find no error as to those issues, but we remand for resentencing in light of United

States v. Richardson, 439 F.3d 421 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam).

First, there was a sufficient factual basis for the district court to accept Pierce’s

plea to unlawfully possessing a firearm. Pierce conceded that she knew the gun could

and probably would be left at her apartment, and the gun was found in a chest in her

bedroom. See United States v. Urick, 431 F.3d 300, 303 (8th Cir. 2005) (constructive

possession of firearm); United States v. Marks, 38 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 1994)

(factual basis for plea), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1067 (1995). Second, the sentence,

representing a six-month variance from the bottom of the Guidelines range, was

reasonable. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261-62 (2005)

(reasonableness review). In reaching its sentence, the district court considered, among

other things, the differences between Pierce and a “typical” felon in possession, her

criminal history, and the minimal danger she posed to society. All of these factors

were relevant under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and there is no indication that the district

court based the sentence on any improper or irrelevant factor. See United States v.

Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717-18 (8th Cir. 2005).

However, our review of the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80

(1988), persuades us that Pierce’s separate convictions on two separate counts (felon

in possession and drug user in possession), arising out of a single act of firearm

possession, requires that we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing based

on a single conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). See Richardson, 439 F.3d at 422

(separate convictions under § 922(g)(1) and § 922(g)(3) arising out of single act of

firearm possession are multiplicitous; vacating sentence with instructions to merge

counts of conviction and resentence defendant based on single conviction under

§ 922(g)).

Appellate Case: 05-2323 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/09/2006 Entry ID: 2042473
-3-

Accordingly, we remand for resentencing based on a single conviction, and we

deny counsel’s motion to withdraw.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 05-2323 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/09/2006 Entry ID: 2042473