Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-01282/USCOURTS-caDC-02-01282-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent
Mossville Environmental Action Now
Petitioner
Sierra Club
Petitioner
Vinyl Institute, Inc.
Intervenor
Christine Todd Whitman
Respondent

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 9, 2003 Decided June 18, 2004

No. 02-1282

MOSSVILLE ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION NOW

AND SIERRA CLUB,

PETITIONERS

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND

CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN, ADMINISTRATOR,

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENTS

VINYL INSTITUTE, INC.,

INTERVENOR

–————

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Environmental Protection Agency

–————

James S. Pew argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioners.

Brian H. Lynk, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief

were G. Scott Williams, Attorney, and Andrew G. Gordon,

Attorney, Environmental Protection Agency. Christopher S.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-1282 Document #830729 Filed: 06/18/2004 Page 1 of 17
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Vaden, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, entered an

appearance.

Before: SENTELLE, RANDOLPH and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Petitioners Mossville Environmental Action Now and Sierra Club seek review of an Environmental Protection Agency (‘‘EPA’’) rule styled ‘‘National

Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Polyvinyl Chloride and Copolymers Production.’’ 67 Fed. Reg.

45,886 (July 10, 2002) (‘‘the Part 63 NESHAP’’). This rule,

adopted pursuant to section 112 of the Clean Air Act

(‘‘CAA’’), set emission standards for PVC and Copolymer

production facilities that mirrored EPA’s previous rule, articulated at 41 Fed. Reg. 46,560 (Oct. 21, 1976); 40 C.F.R.

Subpart F (§§ 61.60 – 61.71) (‘‘the Part 61 NESHAP’’ or ‘‘the

Part 61 standard’’), because the EPA determined that the

Part 61 NESHAP were the most stringent controls in the

industry.

Petitioners contend that EPA has failed to meet the requirements of the CAA in setting various limits for vinyl

chloride emission. They further contend that EPA erred in

failing to set emission limits for all of the other hazardous air

pollutants (‘‘HAPs’’) emitted during PVC production. Two of

petitioners’ arguments regarding vinyl chloride emissions limits have been waived, and we do not find meritorious their

remaining challenges to those limits. We do, however, hold

that EPA has failed properly to set emissions limits on other

HAPs, as required by the CAA. The petition is therefore

granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

A. Statutory Background

This is the latest in a series of challenges to rulemakings

establishing emission standards for HAPs in various industries under the 1990 revisions to the CAA. See, e.g., Northeast Md. Waste Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 936 (D.C.

USCA Case #02-1282 Document #830729 Filed: 06/18/2004 Page 2 of 17
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Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (municipal waste combustors); Sierra

Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (copper smelters);

Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855 (D.C.

Cir. 2001) (hazardous waste combustors); Nat’l Lime Ass’n v.

EPA, 233 F.3d 624 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (portland cement manufacturing facilities); Sierra Club v. EPA, 167 F.3d 658 (D.C.

Cir. 1999) (medical waste incinerators); Appalachian Power

Co. v. EPA, 135 F.3d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam)

(electric utility boilers).

Section 112 of the CAA was amended in 1990 to include a

congressionally established list of HAPs. 42 U.S.C.

§ 7412(b)(1). Vinyl chloride is included on that list. Id. The

CAA directs the EPA to establish categories and subcategories of major sources that emit one or more of the enumerated HAPs. Id. § 7412(c). The statute further requires the

EPA to issue technology-based emission standards, known as

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants

(‘‘NESHAP’’), for those sources. There are essentially two

steps in this process.

The CAA establishes a minimum required reduction–known

as the maximum achievable control technology floor (‘‘MACT

floor’’). The MACT floor for new sources ‘‘shall not be less

stringent than the emission control that is achieved in practice by the best controlled similar source, as determined by

the Administrator.’’ Id. § 7412(d)(3). For existing sources:

Emission standards TTT may be less stringent than

standards for new sources in the same category or

subcategory but shall not be less stringent, and may

be more stringent than –

(B) the average emission limitation achieved by the

best performing 5 sources (for which the Administrator has or could reasonably obtain emissions information) in the category or subcategory for categories with fewer than 30 sources.

Id.

Once floor standards are established, the EPA determines

if standards more stringent than those actually achieved by

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the best performing sources are possible. These standards

must

require the maximum degree of reduction in emissions of the hazardous air pollutants subject to this

section (including a prohibition on such emissions,

where achievable) that the Administrator, taking

into consideration the cost of achieving such emission reduction, and any non-air quality health and

environmental impacts and energy requirements, determines is achievable for new or existing sources in

the category or subcategory to which such emission

standard applies[.]

Id. § 7412(d)(2). These are known as ‘‘beyond-the-floor’’

standards. In setting beyond-the-floor standards, the EPA is

to ‘‘require the maximum degree of reduction in emission of

the hazardous air pollutant’’ that is achievable

through application of measures, processes, methods, systems or techniques including, but not limited

to, measures which –

(A) reduce the volume of, or eliminate emissions

of, such pollutants through process changes, substitution of materials or other modifications,

(B) enclose systems or processes to eliminate

emissions,

(C) collect, capture or treat such pollutants when

released from a process, stack, storage or fugitive

emissions point,

(D) are design, equipment, work practice, or operational standards (including requirements for operator training or certification) as provided in subsection (h) of this section, or

(E) are a combination of the above.

Id. The EPA must balance these considerations with other

factors such as cost, non-air-quality health and environmental

concerns, and energy implications. Id. This technologybased regime replaced an earlier risk-based regime that

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required EPA to regulate at a level that provided an ample

margin of safety to protect the public.

Additionally, section 112(d)(1) requires the EPA to set

emission standards for every HAP emitted from each category or subcategory of major sources. Id. § 7412(d)(1); see

also Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 233 F.3d 625, 634 (D.C. Cir.

2000) (‘‘National Lime’’) (stating EPA has ‘‘the clear statutory obligation to set emission standards for each listed HAP’’).

B. Regulatory Background

Vinyl chloride, a gas that is highly toxic and a known

human carcinogen, is the starting point for PVC and copolymer production. It is first pressurized and agitated in a

reactor, resulting in polymerization. Once polymerized, vinyl

chloride can be transformed into many diverse products, from

latex paints to PVC piping. Vinyl chloride can enter the

atmosphere in several ways during PVC production. The gas

can escape to the atmosphere when equipment is opened for

routine maintenance, either through leaks in the production

system, or by being present in such low concentrations that it

escapes through recovery systems in exhaust streams. This

form of pollution is often referred to as ‘‘stack emissions’’ or

‘‘exhaust gasses.’’ There is also some residual vinyl chloride

in the PVC itself, know as residual vinyl chloride monomer

(‘‘RVCM’’). RVCM is removed from the PVC through a

process known as stripping. Stripping results in vinyl chloride emissions as well. Those emissions are often referred to

as ‘‘process equipment emissions’’ or ‘‘RVCM emissions.’’

In 1976, prior to the 1990 implementation of technologybased standards, the EPA promulgated emission standards

for vinyl chloride under the risk-based standard then in

effect. 41 Fed. Reg. 46,560 (Oct. 21, 1976); 40 C.F.R. Subpart F (§§ 61.60 – 61.71) (‘‘the Part 61 NESHAP’’). Pertinent to this case, under the Part 61 standard EPA regulated

exhaust gasses from the reactors of polyvinyl chloride plants

at ten parts per million (‘‘ppm’’) averaged over a three-hour

period. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 61.64(a)(1). RVCM emissions

were regulated at 2000 ppm per plant for PVC dispersion

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resins, excluding latex resins, 40 C.F.R. § 61.64(e)(1)(i), and

400 ppm per plant for all other PVC resins, averaged daily.

Id. at § 61.64(e)(1)(ii).

When Congress amended the CAA in 1990, it required the

EPA within ten years to review its emission standards to

ensure compliance with the amended CAA. 42 U.S.C.

§ 7412(q)(1). Pursuant to this command, EPA addressed the

Part 61 NESHAP in two separate rules. The first, known as

the Hazardous Organic NESHAP (‘‘HON Rule’’), addresses

and supersedes the Part 61 NESHAP as it relates to the

production of ethylene dichloride and vinyl chloride. 57 Fed.

Reg. 31,576 (July 16, 1992); see 40 C.F.R. part 63, subparts

F, G, and H (40 C.F.R. §§ 63.100 – 63.182). The HON Rule,

however, explicitly excludes batch operations, such as PVC

production, from its scope. 40 C.F.R. § 63.100(j)(4). Because batch operations were covered by the Part 61 NESHAP, another rulemaking was required to deal with the Part 61

NESHAP’s application to batch operations, including PVC

production. That rule is the Part 63 NESHAP at issue here.

To set the Part 63 standards, the EPA first determined

that twenty-eight sources in the United States produce PVC

and all are subject to the Part 61 NESHAP. 65 Fed. Reg. at

76,962/1. The EPA then considered state emission requirements and determined that the Part 61 NESHAP requirements, not state requirements, had the greatest influence on

emission controls. The EPA further determined that no

better technology was available than the Part 61 standard

already required. Looking specifically at RVCM emission

from PVC resins, the EPA recognized that while some states

had more stringent standards in place, those standards were

based on quarterly averages, while the Part 61 standard was

based on daily limits. Id. The EPA found that comparing

these standards was difficult because of the different measuring periods. In addition, the EPA found that the amount of

RVCM emission is primarily dependent on what type of PVC

resins each plant manufactures. There is thus a wide variation of RVCM emission during normal operation, and EPA

found that the daily limits ensure that operators keep average

RVCM emission low so that the spikes do not cause the

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average to violate the daily limits. The EPA also found that

the most stringent state standards had been imposed on

plants that produced PVC resins that were the most capable

of stripping to low RVCM levels. 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,962/1.

Because these state limitations were specific to the products

at each plant, EPA determined that the state permit limits

were not generally applicable.

In sum, the EPA concluded that the Part 61 NESHAP

satisfied all of the requirements set forth in the 1990 amendments, and adopted almost all of the old Part 61 NESHAP

standards as the new Part 63 NESHAP standards. Thus, the

Part 61 standards became the ‘‘floor’’ for existing sources

pursuant to section 112 of the CAA. The EPA then declined

to adopt beyond-the-floor measures, citing, inter alia, the

possibility that certain PVC production would be prohibited if

more stringent standards were adopted.

Additionally, the EPA determined that it was unnecessary

to set separate individual emission standards for all other

HAPs that result from PVC production, as required by

section 112(d)(1), because it could simply use vinyl chloride as

a surrogate for those other HAPs. This, according to the

EPA, was because the stripping, scrubbing, incineration, or

combination thereof, that is required under the Part 61

standard limits emission of all HAPs, not just vinyl chloride.

Unsatisfied with these standards, petitioners have sought

review of the Part 63 NESHAP here.

II. Analysis

This Court sets aside final EPA action under the CAA if

that action is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9);

see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983). Under this familiar standard,

‘‘[a]gency determinations based upon highly complex and

technical matters are ‘entitled to great deference.’ ’’ Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1051-52 (D.C. Cir.

2001) (per curiam) (quoting Public Citizen Health Research

Group v. Brock, 823 F.2d 626, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).

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A. Waiver

We first deal with whether certain of petitioners’ claims are

properly before us. The EPA contends that two of petitioners’ challenges–that EPA erred in setting the floor for exhaust gasses and erred in failing to establish beyond-the-floor

standards–were waived as they were not properly raised

before the agency below. We turn first to EPA’s establishment of a floor for exhaust gasses.

In its rulemaking, the EPA determined that no more

stringent limits applied to vinyl chloride exhaust gas streams

than the ten ppm limit in the Part 61 NESHAP, and established that limit as the floor. 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,962/2.

Petitioners claim that their concerns regarding this issue

were sufficiently raised in two letters submitted to the EPA

by parties not involved in this case. The question is whether

these letters were sufficiently specific to raise the issue

before the EPA.

The first is a February 8, 2001 letter from the State and

Territorial Air Pollution Programs Administrators (‘‘STAPPA’’) and the Association of Local Air Pollution Control

Officials (‘‘ALAPCO’’) to the EPA (‘‘STAPPA Letter’’). That

letter addresses different aspects of the rule, but with respect

to the setting of MACT floors it specifically addresses the 400

ppm standard for ‘‘residual vinyl chloride in the PVC slurry.’’

Indeed, it mentions the 400 ppm standard, which applies to

RVCM emissions, four times in the six paragraphs that

address the MACT floor. It does not, however, ever mention

the ten ppm standard that applies to exhaust emissions. Nor

do those paragraphs ever mention ‘‘gasses’’ or ‘‘exhaust.’’

The letter thus did not specifically challenge the ten ppm

exhaust gas limit.

In an effort to avoid the lack of a specific challenge,

petitioners argue that nothing in the letter directly limits the

fact that ‘‘their objection is a general one to EPA’s floor

approach.’’ This will not do. ‘‘Only an objection to a rule or

procedure which was raised with reasonable specificity during

the period for public comment (including any public hearing)

may be raised during judicial review.’’ 42 U.S.C.

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§ 7607(d)(7)(B). We ‘‘strictly’’ enforce this requirement.

Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Nichols, 142 F.3d 449, 462

(D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Reasonable specificity requires something more than a

‘‘general [challenge] to EPA’s approach.’’ The language in

the letter that petitioners rely upon is a sentence, in the last

paragraph addressing MACT floors, that states that ‘‘control

device performance and capabilities and process improvements have evolved’’ to a point below the Part 61 standards.

According to petitioners, because only the ten ppm standard

is based on the performance of control devices, it is clear that

the comments were not limited to the 400 ppm floor. This

fails. In a letter so obviously focused on the 400 ppm

standard, such general reference in the closing paragraph

does not rise to the ‘‘reasonable specificity’’ required by the

statute.1

The second letter that petitioners claim raised the issue is

dated February 12, 2001 and is from the State of Louisiana to

the EPA (‘‘the Louisiana Letter’’). This two-page letter also

does not mention the ten ppm standard, but again directly

addresses RVCM emissions. It does, however, have an attached table, which the letter claims proves that state limits

are more stringent than the Part 61 standards. One of the

eight columns in the table is labeled ‘‘Misc. Process Vents,’’

and includes data that could be exhaust limits. Again, and

for the reasons stated above, this does not meet the standard

of reasonable specificity. The letter does not directly address

the ten ppm standard, and attaching a table that cryptically

refers to miscellaneous process vents does not automatically

put the EPA on notice of a challenge to every piece of

information contained in the table. In sum, petitioners’ challenge to the floor on exhaust gasses is waived because it was

not raised with reasonable specificity to the agency below.

1 Petitioners also point to a sentence in the letter requesting the

EPA to use ‘‘all readily available data, including the data provided

under Subpart F.’’ Petitioners’ argument that, because Subpart F

contains data for both the ten and 400 ppm standards, the EPA was

on notice fails for the same reasons as articulated above.

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We now turn to petitioners’ claim that EPA erred in failing

to establish beyond-the-floor standards pursuant to CAA

section 112(d)(2). 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2). EPA again claims

that this argument is waived. For their part, petitioners

again point to the STAPPA and Louisiana letters as bringing

the beyond-the-floor concerns to the attention of the EPA.

In our view, both the STAPPA and Louisiana letters fail to

raise the beyond-the-floor issue with reasonable specificity.

The Louisiana letter consists of four numbered paragraphs.

The first paragraph, by its own language, addresses the

‘‘MACT Floor.’’ The fourth deals with EPA’s failure to

regulate other HAPs. The second and third paragraph present petitioners’ best argument that Louisiana raised the issue,

but they are simply not specific enough. The second paragraph states that Louisiana permits are ‘‘more stringent than

the currently proposed MACT requirements.’’ The third

paragraph describes the Part 61 standard as ‘‘old,’’ and

asserts that better technology is available. While these two

paragraphs could imply not only a challenge to the setting of

the MACT floor, but also a challenge to EPA’s failure to set

beyond-the-floor standards, that is all it does – potentially

imply a challenge. There is no mention of beyond-the-floor

standards.

It is just not clear that the State of Louisiana, in a letter

that contained specific and clear challenges to the setting of

the RVCM MACT floor, was also challenging the beyond-thefloor standards. While petitioners may argue that it is

obvious that if one challenges the floor, one is also implicitly

challenging the failure to set beyond-the-floor standards, that

is not the way the regulatory system is structured. Such a

standard would require agencies to review perpetually all of

the ‘‘implied’’ challenges in any challenge they receive. We

will not impose such a burden on the agency. All that

Louisiana had to do was draft one sentence that specifically

challenged EPA’s decision. It did not, and that specific

challenge is thus not preserved.

The same is true of the STAPPA letter. It specifically

addresses STAPPA’s concern that EPA’s proposed standard

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‘‘does not meet the MACT floor requirements of Section

112(d).’’ In closing the pertinent section, STAPPA requests

that the ‘‘EPA recalculate the MACT floor using information

about other sourcesTTTT’’ Like the Louisiana letter, this

letter fails to mention beyond-the-floor standards, nor does it

cite the specific provision of the CAA which deals with them.

In Motor & Equipment Manufacturers, we considered petitioners’ claims waived because they failed to cite the specific

provision to the agency below. 142 F.3d at 462 (holding that

a petitioner’s claim that EPA should comply with CAA section 202 does not put the agency on sufficient notice for a

specific claim regarding CAA section 202(b)(1)(C)). Like the

Louisiana letter, the only way the STAPPA letter could be

read as placing the EPA on notice is to place the burden on

EPA to cull through all the letters it receives and answer all

of the possible implied arguments. Such a rule would defeat

the statutory requirement for ‘‘reasonable specificity.’’

B. The RVCM Floor

Petitioners also contend that the EPA violated its statutory

duty by failing to identify the five best performing PVC

plants in setting the RVCM floor. Indeed, the EPA readily

admits that it did not identify the best five performing plants,

even though the CAA specifically requires the EPA to set

floors that

shall not be less stringent, and may be more stringent than –

(B) the average emission limitation achieved by the

best performing 5 sources (for which the Administrator has or could reasonably obtain emissions information) in the category or subcategory for categories with fewer than 30 sources.

42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3)(B). Petitioners further point to Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA, where we held that

‘‘EPA may not deviate from section 7412(d)(3)’s requirement

that floors reflect what the best performers actually

achieveTTTT’’ 255 F.3d 855, 861 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (‘‘CKRC’’).

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The EPA argues that in this case, determining the best five

sources was impossible. This is because of the great variability in RVCM emissions, and the fact that that variability is a

result of the type of resin being produced, not the technology

or processes applied to control emission. 67 Fed. Reg. at

45,889/2-3. According to the EPA, there can even be great

variability in RVCM emission at the same PVC plant, which

would obviously employ the same technology and processes

on a day-to-day basis, if that plant produces a variety of

resins, which most do. Id. at 45,887/2. With comparisons

between plants impossible, and emission variations not related to technological performance, the EPA claims it was

unable to select the best five sources. Therefore, after

considering other alternatives, it determined that since all

twenty-eight PVC plants were subject to the Part 61 NESHAP, those standards estimated the best five performing

sources.

In testing the EPA’s reliance on the Part 61 NESHAP, we

look to our earlier in-depth treatment of this and similar

provisions of the CAA. In Sierra Club v. EPA, the Sierra

Club challenged the EPA’s methodology when it ‘‘ranked TTT

incinerators by the stringency of the control provisions to

which they were subject’’ and then ‘‘selected the 12 percent of

the incinerator population subject to the strictest controls and

set the floor TTT by averaging the emissions limitations

governing those incinerators.’’ 167 F.3d at 661. Sierra Club

challenged the use of regulatory data for determining floors

because the statute in that case required, almost exactly as

the statute presently before us required, that ‘‘[e]missions

standards TTT shall not be less stringent than the average

emissions limitation achieved by the best performing 12 percent of units in the category.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 7429(a). Noting

that ‘‘this phrase on its own says nothing about how the

performance of the best units is to be calculated,’’ Sierra

Club, 167 F.3d at 661, we held that EPA need not base its

standards on actual data, but could lawfully rely on estimates

drawn from the regulatory data as to what the best performing 12 percent were achieving. Id. at 663. Ultimately,

however, we remanded that decision to the agency because

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EPA had ‘‘not pointed to evidence supporting the reasonableness of the approximation.’’ Id.

In National Lime, we heard another challenge to EPA’s

methodology, that time with respect to the statute presently

before us, CAA section 112. Relying heavily on Sierra Club,

we rejected a petitioner’s claim that textual differences in

CAA sections 129 and 112 mandated a different analysis.

National Lime, 233 F.3d at 632. There, EPA selected ‘‘the

median [performing] plant out of the best twelve percent of

the plants for which it had information and set the TTT floor

at the level of the worst performing plant in its databases

using th[e same] technology [as the median plant].’’ Id. at

630. Again, we held that CAA section 112 allowed the EPA

to ‘‘reasonably estimate’’ the performance of the top 12

percent rather than use the actual data, as long as the

estimate was reasonable. Id. at 633. We held that Sierra

Club had not offered a reason in the record to show EPA’s

estimate was not reasonable. Id.

In CKRC, we again reiterated our earlier position, enunciated in our Sierra Club and National Lime decisions, that

EPA could use estimates if reasonable, but in a different

context. There, EPA took the position that section 112

required it to set a standard that could be achieved by the

worst performing plant that utilized MACT control technology. CKRC, 255 F.3d at 861. The Sierra Club challenged this

on the basis that section 112 does not limit itself to any one

technology, so EPA was required to consider what the best

performers actually achieved, taking into consideration factors other than MACT technology. Id. We agreed, and held

that ‘‘the worst performing MACT source do[es] not, as the

CAA requires, represent a reasonable estimate of emissions

achieved by the best-performing sources.’’ Id. at 865. We

also reiterated that EPA could use estimates, as long as they

reflected a ‘‘reasonable[ ] estimate [of] the performance of the

TTT best-performing plants.’’ Id. at 862. In CKRC, EPA

failed to make the connection.

Most recently, in Northeast Maryland Waste Disposal

Authority v. EPA, we rejected EPA’s efforts to use state

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permit limits as the MACT floor for pollutants from small

municipal waste combustion units. 358 F.3d 936, 953-54 (D.C.

Cir. 2004) (‘‘NMWDA’’). There, ‘‘[a]s in Sierra Club, EPA

stated only that it ‘believes’ state permit limits reasonably

reflect the actual performance of the best performing units

without explaining why this is so.’’ Id. at 954. EPA only

asserted that the inherent variability of emission levels made

its data inaccurate, but gave ‘‘no evidence that the [state]

permit levels reflect the emission levels of the bestperforming’’ plants. Id. EPA’s belief did not rise to the

level of a reasonable estimate.

Turning to the present case, EPA again cites the variability

of emission, which EPA claims makes the lower state limits

inappropriate. This, EPA explained, is because the state

permit levels are tailored to the specific products at each

plant, and typically use a longer averaging time in order to

require a lower average limit. More importantly, however,

instead of simply claiming that it believes its Part 61 standards estimate what the best five plants actually achieve,

EPA points to some evidence. In its response to comments,

EPA cited its analysis of three years of data, and showed that

even ‘‘the facility that had the lowest overall long term

RVCM experienced significant variation in daily averages

including one daily (three hour) average of 397 ppm.’’ EPA

Response to Comments at 6, April 2002. Thus, the 400 ppm

daily standard contained in the Part 61 standard is just

barely satisfied by the plant with the lowest overall long term

RVCM. EPA has thus pointed to factual data that the Part

61 standard reasonably estimates the performance of the top

performers, because even the best performing sources occasionally have spikes, and under the standard, each facility

must meet the 400 ppm standard every day and under all

operating conditions. The EPA has met it burden of establishing that its standards reasonably estimate the performance of the best five performing sources. Having cited the

great variability of emission levels, even within the same

plants, and the inherent difficulty in other standards it considered, the EPA’s selection of the Part 61 standards as the

MACT floor is reasonable because it has supported its deciUSCA Case #02-1282 Document #830729 Filed: 06/18/2004 Page 14 of 17
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sion with record data that shows the connection between its

MACT floor and the top performing plants.

C. Use of Vinyl Chloride as a Surrogate

Petitioners also challenge the EPA’s failure to establish

emission standards for every HAP that PVC plants emit. We

have held that this requirement, spelled out in CAA section

112(d)(1), establishes a ‘‘clear statutory obligation to set emission standards for each listed HAP’’ that the source category

emits. Nat’l Lime, 233 F.3d at 634. Instead, according to

petitioners, EPA simply utilized the Part 61 NESHAP, which

addresses only vinyl chloride. Petitioners argue that this

fails under both the first and second step of the familiar

Chevron analysis, and in the alternative, that it is arbitrary

and capricious because EPA has failed to present any evidence that its vinyl chloride regulations regulate all other

HAPs.

For its part, EPA contends that it simply utilized vinyl

chloride as a surrogate for the other HAPs. EPA makes

several attempts to defend this effort, none of which can save

it. First, in EPA’s view, National Lime merely requires

‘‘that there [be] a correlation between [the surrogate and the

other HAPs]; it need not quantify that correlation or assess

its variability.’’ Id. at 639. In EPA’s own words, ‘‘if [it] can

demonstrate that the necessary correlation exists, the agency

may use a surrogate and avoid full-blown application of

Section 112 for each hazardous air pollutant emitted from an

industry.’’ EPA’s problem is that, assuming, without deciding, this is all that is required, it completely failed to do so.

We have clearly held that ‘‘EPA may use a surrogate to

regulate hazardous pollutants if it is reasonable to do so.’’

Nat’l Lime, 233 F.3d at 637. In assessing the reasonableness

of EPA’s use of a surrogate in that case, we held that because

EPA had demonstrated that there are always HAP metals in

particulate matter (the surrogate), and thus that the removal

of the particulate matter removed the HAP metals, EPA had

satisfied its burden. Id. at 639; see also Sierra Club v. EPA,

353 F.3d 976 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The EPA found no such

correlation here.

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The EPA asserts that it ‘‘is aware of no statutory or

regulatory provision or any case law imposing’’ the requirement that ‘‘EPA must identify each and every pollutant

controlled through a surrogate under Section 112(d).’’ The

EPA reads the requirement that it establish a correlation

between the surrogate and the HAP it is attempting to

regulate as not requiring identification of the HAP it is

attempting to regulate. To clarify EPA’s position, it contends

that ‘‘[p]rovided EPA reasonably determined TTT a link existed between vinyl chloride controls and other hazardous air

pollutants, it should make no difference whether EPA has

identified each of the other hazardous air pollutants emitted

by the industry.’’ While EPA may be able to know that a

correlation exists between one known pollutant and some

other unknown pollutants, it has not memorialized that knowledge in such a fashion that commenters, interested members

of the public, regulated entities, or most importantly, a reviewing court, can assess. We cannot review under any

standard the adequacy of the EPA’s correlation determination if we do not know what correlation the EPA found to

exist. The closest the EPA comes to supplying record support for its determination is a reference to tables included in

the administrative record showing what other hazardous air

pollutants were emitted by various plants at various locations.

These charts take up several pages of the joint appendix, and

we have no way of knowing what EPA’s claims are as to

which of the HAPs are represented by surrogacy or to what

degree. In short, we do not find EPA’s explanation persuasive, and hold that its determination that vinyl chloride is a

surrogate for all other HAPs emitted from PVC production

facilities is arbitrary and capricious and not supported in the

record. Therefore, EPA’s use of vinyl chloride as a surrogate

for other HAPs emitted from PVC plants is remanded to the

agency for more a adequate explanation.

III. Conclusion

The petition is denied in part and granted in part. The

Part 63 NESHAP is vacated and remanded to the agency for

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it to reconsider or properly explain its methodology for

regulating HAPs emitted in PVC production other than vinyl

chloride by use of a surrogate. All of petitioners’ remaining

claims are either not properly before us, or are not meritorious.

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