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Parties Involved:
Louisville Recovery Service, LLC
Appellee
Joy Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 24a0478n.06

No. 24-5303

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

JOY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LOUISVILLE RECOVERY SERVICE, LLC,

Defendant-Appellee.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE WESTERN 

DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

OPINION

Before: BATCHELDER, MOORE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Joy Williams made several visits to the 

emergency room for medical treatment. Because she never paid the medical bills from any of

these visits, her healthcare provider turned the bills over to a collection agency. When that agency 

then attempted to collect on those debts several years later, Williams sued under the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act, alleging that the agency had unlawfully threatened to collect on timebarred debts. The district court disagreed and held that the statute of limitations for collecting on 

these debts had not yet expired. We affirm.

I.

Between 2011 and 2015, Joy Williams had made seven relevant visits to the emergency 

room at Hardin Memorial Hospital. Each time she did so, Williams first signed a “Conditions and 

Authorization for Treatment” form and then received treatment from Elizabethtown Emergency 

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Physicians, a third-party healthcare provider. While the authorization form contained many 

provisions, only three are relevant here. First, the form authorized the Hospital and its third-party 

providers to perform various “diagnostic tests” and “procedures” to determine the patient’s health 

problem. Second, the form clarified that most of the Hospital’s healthcare providers are 

“independent contractors and practitioners” and that these third-party providers bill separately. 

And third, the form explained that, by accepting treatment, the patient also agreed to “accept full 

responsibility for all charges associated with the care provided.” 

Because Williams never paid the medical bills from any of the relevant visits, 

Elizabethtown Emergency Physicians turned her bills over to Louisville Recovery Service, a 

collection agency. Louisville Recovery then reported the debts to the major credit bureaus, which 

hurt Williams’s credit score. All in all, Williams owed $1,986.61 across her eight unpaid bills.

Several years passed before Williams eventually discovered the negative history on her 

credit report. Believing that she did not have any outstanding medical debt, Williams sent a letter 

to Louisville Recovery disputing the bills. Louisville Recovery then responded to Williams one 

year later and provided her with an “account itemization” that identified the eight outstanding bills 

from her emergency room visits. Soon after that, on April 1, 2021, Louisville Recovery followed 

up with another letter that threatened to pursue legal action if Williams failed to pay. 

Williams sued Louisville Recovery under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, alleging 

that Louisville Recovery had unlawfully threatened to collect on time-barred debts. Both parties 

then moved for summary judgment. The district court held that the statute of limitations for 

collecting on these debts had not yet expired and awarded summary judgment to Louisville 

Recovery. Williams now appeals. 

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II.

We review a district court’s award of summary judgment de novo. Ward v. NPAS, Inc., 63 

F.4th 576, 582 (6th Cir. 2023). Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In making that determination, we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party. Raimey v. City of Niles, 77 F.4th 441, 447 (6th Cir. 2023). 

III.

To bring a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, a plaintiff must show that 

(1) she is a “consumer”; (2) she incurred the debts “primarily for personal, family or household 

purposes”; (3) the defendant is a “debt collector”; and (4) the defendant’s conduct violated the Act. 

Wallace v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 683 F.3d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 2012). Here, the parties dispute only 

this fourth element—that is, whether Louisville Recovery’s threat-to-sue letter violated the Act.

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act makes it unlawful for a debt collector to “use any 

false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any 

debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. That prohibition means, among other things, that a debt collector cannot 

threaten “to take any action that cannot legally be taken.” § 1692e(5). A debt collector makes 

such an unlawful threat if it threatens to take legal action against a time-barred debt. See Buchanan 

v. Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 398-99 (6th Cir. 2015). The only issue in this appeal, then,

is whether the statute of limitations for collecting on Williams’s debts had already expired when 

Louisville Recovery sent its threat-to-sue letter. 

The statute of limitations for collecting a debt in Kentucky depends on whether the contract 

creating the debt is written or oral. If the parties’ contract is a written agreement, then Kentucky 

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uses a 15-year statute of limitations.1 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.090. But if the parties’ contract is 

an oral agreement, then Kentucky instead uses a 5-year statute of limitations. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 

§ 413.120(1). Here, we must first determine whether the contracts creating Williams’s debts were 

written or oral before we can ultimately decide whether Louisville Recovery unlawfully threatened 

to collect on time-barred debts. Louisville Recovery’s threat to sue violates the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act only if the 5-year statute of limitations for oral contracts applies. 

Under Kentucky law, a written contract is one that contains all the essential terms for a 

contract in writing. Cornett v. Student Loan Sols., LLC, 672 S.W.3d 852, 858 (Ky. Ct. App. 2023). 

A written agreement contains all the essential terms when the document includes the parties to the 

contract, the price to be paid, and the performance to be rendered. Id. If the contract is missing

any of these terms, then Kentucky treats that partially written agreement as an oral contract. Mills 

v. McGaffee, 254 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Ky. 1953).

Williams argues that the authorization forms she signed failed to create written contracts—

and are therefore subject to the 5-year statute of limitations—because the forms did not identify 

the parties, the price, or the performance. We disagree and address each issue in turn.

A.

First, Williams argues that the authorization forms failed to create written contracts because 

they did not identify Elizabethtown Emergency Physicians as a party to the contracts. But this 

argument fails because Kentucky does not require that a contract name its third-party beneficiaries. 

1 Kentucky now uses a 10-year statute of limitations for written contracts created after July 15, 

2014. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.160. But because this new statute of limitations applies only to

Williams’s final medical bill from July 23, 2015—and because Louisville Recovery timely 

attempted to collect on that debt within the 10-year window—we refer only to the 15-year statute 

of limitations.

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Olshan Found. Repair & Waterproofing v. Otto, 276 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009); see 

also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 308 (Am. L. Inst. 1981) (“It is not essential to the 

creation of a right in an intended beneficiary that he be identified when a contract containing the 

promise is made.”). Nor does Kentucky treat an otherwise valid written contract as an oral 

agreement merely because it did not identify its third-party beneficiaries by name. See Home 

Indem. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 585 S.W.2d 419, 424 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). So, taken 

together, these two principles mean that the 15-year statute of limitations will apply here if

Elizabethtown Emergency Physicians qualifies as a third-party beneficiary of Williams’s contract 

with the Hospital. Id.

A non-party qualifies as a third-party beneficiary when the contract was created for that

party’s “actual and direct benefit.” Sexton v. Taylor County, 692 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Ky. Ct. App. 

1985). In determining whether a contract is created for a third party’s benefit, we consider both 

the agreement’s terms and its surrounding circumstances. Prime Finish, LLC v. Cameo, LLC, 487 

F. App’x 956, 959 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Olshan, 276 S.W.2d at 831).

Here, Williams concedes, as she must, that Elizabethtown Emergency Physicians is a thirdparty beneficiary of the authorization forms, and we need not look further than the forms 

themselves to see why. Indeed, the forms make clear that the Hospital uses mostly “independent 

contractors and practitioners” to provide care, that these independent contractors and practitioners 

“bill[] separately,” and that the patient agrees to “accept full responsibility for all charges 

associated with the care provided.” Under this arrangement, the patient’s promise to pay benefits 

the third-party providers—not the Hospital—because the Hospital rarely provides patient care 

directly and therefore does not bill most patients who sign the form. So because Elizabethtown 

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Emergency Physicians directly benefits from the Hospital’s contract with Williams, it qualifies as 

a third-party beneficiary under those agreements. 

B.

Next, Williams argues that the authorization forms failed to create written contracts 

because they did not include a price. True, the forms did not assign a specific price for the services 

to be provided, but that does not transform these written agreements into oral contracts because 

Kentucky does not require a written contract to assign such a price when the agreement otherwise 

includes a “definite promise to pay.” Lyons v. Moise’s Ex’r, 183 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Ky. 1944)

(applying Kentucky’s 15-year statute of limitations). And here, the authorization forms included 

such a definite promise because Williams agreed to “accept full responsibility for all charges 

associated with the care provided.”

Williams responds that Lyons does not apply unless the parties’ agreement includes a 

definite promise to pay and an “objective standard” for calculating the total price. But Williams 

misreads Lyons because not even the contract at issue there included an objective standard for 

determining price separate from the definite promise to pay. See Lyons, 183 S.W.2d at 496 

(explaining that the contract contained only a definite promise to pay). Lyons held instead that a

definite promise to pay “all charges” incurred—like the one Williams made here—is itself what 

supplies the objective standard for later calculating the price. Id. That is, the party has agreed in 

writing to pay all the charges that she incurs, and that is a definite amount that we can later calculate 

through parol evidence. Id.

C.

Finally, Williams argues that the authorization forms failed to create a written contract 

because they did not describe the performance to be rendered. But this argument, too, misses the 

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mark. Kentucky does not require written contracts to provide every detail of performance—only

to describe the required performance with reasonable certainty. Fisher v. Long, 172 S.W.2d 545, 

547 (Ky. 1943). And reasonable certainty simply means that each party can understand the other’s 

intended performance. Id.

Here, the authorization forms reasonably described the performance required under the 

contract. Each form explained that the Hospital (through its third-party providers) would perform 

various “diagnostic tests” and “procedures” to determine Williams’s health problem, and given the 

context in which these forms are signed—that is, at the emergency room while a patient’s condition 

and required treatment are still unknown—the forms could not reasonably have been any more 

specific about the performance that would be provided. For that reason, we conclude that any 

reasonable patient could have understood the performance required of the Hospital under the 

contract. Indeed, to hold otherwise would require hospital emergency rooms to hand “patient[s] 

an inches-high stack of papers detailing . . . each and every conceivable service” that the hospital 

provides, cf. DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 264 (3d Cir. 2008), and Kentucky law does 

not require such an absurd result, Fisher, 172 S.W.2d at 547 (instructing courts to give Kentucky 

contracts a “practical interpretation”).

* * *

In sum, we hold that the authorization forms included all the essential terms for a contract,

and that they are therefore written contracts subject to Kentucky’s 15-year statute of limitations. 

That means that the statute of limitations for collecting on Williams’s debts had not yet expired

when Louisville Recovery threatened to sue, which in turn means that Louisville Recovery did not 

violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

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IV.

Because the statute of limitations for collecting on Williams’s debts had not expired when 

Louisville Recovery threatened to sue, Louisville Recovery’s threat did not violate the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act. We AFFIRM the district court’s award of summary judgment.

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