Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01287/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01287-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jerry A. Burton
Plaintiff
A. Scribner
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY A. BURTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. SCRIBNER,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 05 1287 OWW SMS P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

DISMISS ACTION (Doc. 1, 15.) 

 Jerry A. Burton (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the instant action on

September 21, 2005, in the Sacramento Division of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern

District of California. The action was transferred to this Court and received on October 11,

2005. On January 31, 2006, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. 

A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

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dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

B. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

The basis of plaintiff’s claims in this action is his placement in administrative segregation

on December 9, 2004, for possession of a weapon, a rules violation. On June 16, 2005, the

Classification Committee was granted a ninety day extension to hear Plaintiff’s rules violation. 

On September 8, 2005, when the extension expired, the Institutional Classification Committee

refused to bring Plaintiff to his scheduled rules violation hearing. On that day Plaintiff attempted

suicide by hanging and overdose and was admitted to the mental health hospital. Plaintiff filed a

602 on September 8, 2005, concerning his continued detention in ad-seg. On October 6, 2005,

Plaintiff was released back into the general population even though a hearing on the rules

violation had not occurred. Plaintiff states that the rules violation was heard in his absence. 

On December 19, 2005, Plaintiff’s 602 was granted at the first level. On December 22,

2006, Plaintiff resubmitted his 602 based on false imprisonment. On January 12, 2006, the 602

was screened out at the second level indicating that the action was granted and no further action

was required. Plaintiff alleges that the illegal confinement in administrative segregation violated

his constitutional right to due process. 

C. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

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The Court notes that Plaintiff names only the Warden as Defendant but fails to link him to an act or 1

omission giving rise to the allegation and does not allege sufficient facts to hold the Warden liable under a theory of

supervisory liability. Generally, such defects are curable, however, because Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief

the Court will not grant leave to amend to cure these deficiencies. 

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1. Due Process1

Plaintiff alleges that his placement in administrative segregation violated his right to due

process. The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of

action for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a

liberty interest for which the protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due

Process Clause itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). The

state does not create protectable liberty interests by way of mandatory language in prison

regulations. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Rather, the existence of a liberty

interest is determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. Id. Liberty interests created

by prison regulations are limited to freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. 

Plaintiff is pursuing a claim under section for 1983 for violation of his rights under the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The

provision for certain procedural protections under state law does not work to enlarge the

protections plaintiff is due under federal law, which as discussed below are fairly minimal. See

Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, allegations

concerning the failure of staff to follow certain state regulations concerning procedure do not

give rise to a claim for relief unless plaintiff has a protected liberty interest at stake and plaintiff

is deprived of the procedural protections he is also due under federal law.

The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in being

confined in the general prison population instead of segregation, see Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466-68,

and plaintiff has not alleged any facts which support a finding that plaintiff had a liberty interest

in remaining free from administrative segregation created by state law. Plaintiff’s conclusory

allegation that he had a liberty interest is insufficient, and the allegation that the granting of his

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appeals demonstrates the existence of a liberty interest is without merit. An appeals process

decision that was favorable to plaintiff does not create a liberty interest. The amended complaint

is devoid of any facts supporting a finding that plaintiff was subjected to a situation which

constituted atypical and significant hardship. See May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir.

1997) (convicted inmate’s due process claim fails because he has no liberty interest in freedom

from state action taken within sentence imposed and administrative segregation falls within the

terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence) (quotations omitted); Resnick v.

Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff’s placement and retention in the SHU was

within range of confinement normally expected by inmates in relation to ordinary incidents of

prison life and, therefore, plaintiff had no protected liberty interest in being free from

confinement in the SHU) (quotations omitted). Accordingly, the Court will RECOMMEND that

Plaintiff’s Due Process claims be dismissed, with prejudice. 

The Court notes that even if Plaintiff had alleged facts sufficient to support a finding that

he had a liberty interest at stake, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts which support a claim that he

was deprived of the minimal procedural protections he is due under federal law. Plaintiff is

entitled only to “an informal nonadversary hearing within a reasonable time” after segregation,

notice of the charges or reasons for segregation, and an opportunity to present his views. 

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff’s allegation that he was

not provided a hearing within the expected time frame does not give rise to a constitutional

violation. Further, the Court notes that the documentation submitted by Plaintiff indicates that

the Rules Violation Hearing took place on October 16, 2005, and indicates that Plaintiff was

present and entered a plea of not guilty. (Unmarked attachment p. 5, Am. Compl.) Plaintiff was

also found “not guilty” and the case was dismissed. Id. Thus, Plaintiff’s allegation that the

hearing was held in absentia is incorrect. 

2. False Imprisonment Claims

Under California law, false imprisonment is the “‘unlawful violation of the personal

liberty of another.’” Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 1998)

(quoting Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal.4th 744, 757 (1997)). “There are two bases for

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claiming false imprisonment: imprisonment pursuant to a false arrest and unreasonable delay in

bringing the arrested person before a judicial officer.” Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197

F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff is a convicted prisoner in the custody of the California

Department of Corrections and this action involves no claims to the contrary. Plaintiff’s

placement in administrative segregation does not give rise to a false imprisonment claim under

California law. The court recommends that this claim be dismissed, with prejudice. 

3. Exhaustion

Finally, even had the Court found the allegations to state a claim, dismissal is warranted

because Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this action. 

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) of 1995, “[n]o action shall be brought

with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Section 1997e(a)

exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life. Porter v. Nussle, 435

U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Prisoners must complete the prison’s administrative process, regardless of

the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the process, as long as the

administrative process can provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated. Booth v. Churner,

532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). "All 'available' remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies need

not meet federal standards, nor must they be 'plain, speedy, and effective." ' Porter, 534 U.S. at

524 (citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 739 n. 5). Exhaustion must occur prior to filing suit. McKinney

v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir.2002). Thus, plaintiff may not exhaust while the

suit is pending. McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199-1201.

Plaintiff’s allegation concerning his placement in administrative segregation took place

on December 9, 2004, and he filed his first administrative grievance on September 5, 2005. 

(Unmarked Attach. P.2, Am. Compl.) However, Plaintiff instituted this action on September 21,

2005, at the informal level. Although his grievance was granted, it was not done so until

December 9, 2005, after Plaintiff filed this action. 

D. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

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Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief

under Section 1983 and did not exhaust his administrative remedies prior to instituting this action

as is required by law. The Court further finds that the deficiencies outlined above are not capable

of being cured by amendment, and therefore leave to amend should not be granted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F. 2d 1446, 1448-49 (9 Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the th

Court RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed in its entirety.

It is HEREBY ORDERED that these Findings and Recommendations be submitted to the

United States District Court Judge assigned to the case pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C.

§ 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District

Court, Eastern District of California. Within THIRTY (30) days after being served with a copy

of this Report and Recommendation, any party may file written objections with the Court and

serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed

within TEN (10) court days (plus three (3) days if served by mail) after service of the Objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. th

1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 21, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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