Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07102/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07102-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Burns International Security Service
Appellee
Michael Lawrence Pack
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed December 9, 1997

No. 97-7102

MICHAEL LAWRENCE PACK,

APPELLANT

v.

BURNS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE,

APPELLEE 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia

-

On Motion to Dismiss

Michael Lawrence Pack, pro se, for appellant.

Paul R. Pearson was on the motion to dismiss, for appellee.

Before: WALD, SILBERMAN, and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

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PER CURIAM: This case poses the question whether the 

court has jurisdiction over an appeal which would have been 

untimely had the underlying judgment been entered in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Because the 

strictures of Rule 58 were not complied with, however, we do 

have jurisdiction over this appeal, and so deny the motion to 

dismiss. Michael Lawrence Pack filed a pro se complaint 

stemming from a September 1995 encounter at Union Station 

with Amtrak guards and employees of the Burns International Security Service ("Burns"). Burns filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief could be granted. When Pack failed to file a timely 

response to the motion, the district court issued an order 

directing him to respond by a date certain.

Two weeks prior to the deadline, Pack filed an opposition to 

the dismissal motion. Apparently unaware of Pack's filing, 

the district court subsequently entered an order stating that 

the motion to dismiss would be treated as conceded and 

granted. The district court's order provided several grounds 

for dismissal, and directed that the case be "dismissed with 

prejudice from the docket of this court." No separate judgment in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 was entered. 

Forty-eight days later, Pack filed a notice of appeal. The 

notice bears a hand-written notation from the district court 

judge stating: "Let this be filed." Burns has now filed a 

motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the notice of 

appeal was untimely and the district court judge's notation 

was ineffective to extend Pack's appeal time in the absence of 

a motion requesting an extension.

Rule 58 requires that every judgment be set forth on a 

separate document. The Supreme Court has held that this 

rule must be "mechanically applied." See United States v. 

Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 222 (1973). Because the district 

court's order failed to comply with Rule 58, Pack's notice of 

appeal cannot be considered late. See Baker v. Mercedes 

Benz of North America, 114 F.3d 57 (5th Cir. 1997) (right to 

appeal cannot be foreclosed by failure to file a notice of 

appeal when no Rule 58 separate document judgment has 

been entered). An appellant may, therefore, safely wait until 

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a conforming judgment has been entered and file an appeal at 

that time. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993).

The more difficult question is whether the court lacks 

jurisdiction over Pack's appeal on the grounds that it is 

premature, because no judgment in accordance with Rule 58 

has been entered. In certain circumstances, parties can 

waive Rule 58's requirements and an appellate court can 

exercise jurisdiction over an appeal even though no judgment 

conforming to Rule 58 has been entered. See Bankers Trust 

Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381 (1978); Diamond by Diamond v. 

McKenzie, 770 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (waiver rule announced in Mallis applies where district court intended to 

enter a final judgment, judgment was entered on docket, and 

no objection to absence of Rule 58 order was made).

This circuit has not heretofore found a waiver of Rule 58's 

requirements when an appellant failed to note a timely appeal 

from the district court's nonconforming judgment. Some of 

our sister circuits have held that where a timely notice of 

appeal was not filed, the court must decline to hear the merits 

of the appeal. See Baker, 114 F.3d at 61 (5th Cir. 1997) (court 

must decline to address merits of appeal where no timely 

notice of appeal is filed); Armstrong v. Ahitow, 36 F.3d 574 

(7th Cir. 1994) (appeal filed more than one year after entry of 

nonconforming judgment dismissed as premature). See also 

Hughes v. Halifax County School Board, 823 F.2d 832 (4th

Cir. 1987) (district court's denial of motion to enter judgment 

reversed; court notes that Rule 58 requirements not waived 

because no timely appeal filed and appellant sought district 

court entry of conforming Rule 58 judgment).

Other circuits, however, have reasoned that the Supreme 

Court's rationale in Mallis supports the exercise of jurisdiction over a challenge to an order which does not comply with 

Rule 58 but was clearly intended to be final, notwithstanding 

the appellant's failure to note a timely appeal. In Mallis, the 

Court noted that the separate document rule is aimed at 

achieving certainty as to time limits for appeal. If the district 

court's error in not entering its judgment on a separate 

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document was inadvertent, only delay would result from 

requiring the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal. "Upon 

dismissal, the district court would simply file and enter the 

separate judgment, from which a timely appeal would then be 

taken. Wheels would spin for no practical purpose." Id., 435 

U.S. at 385. See Clough v. Rush, 959 F.2d 182 (10th Cir. 1992) 

(court exercised jurisdiction over appeal, notwithstanding district court's failure to enter a separate judgment, because 

remand would waste judicial resources); McCalden v. California Library Ass'n, 955 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1990) (notice of 

appeal filed three months after nonconforming judgment 

would have become final not untimely; court exercised jurisdiction without requiring remand).

The First Circuit has adopted a compromise approach. 

Apparently out of concern that inadvertent failure to enter a 

Rule 58 judgment would provide an undeserved boon to tardy 

appellants, the First Circuit has promulgated procedures 

governing appeals taken from judgments which do not comply 

with the requirements of Rule 58. See Fiore v. Washington 

County Community Mental Health Ctr., 960 F.2d 229 (1st Cir. 

1992). These procedures permit the court to exercise jurisdiction over appeals which are filed less than three months 

after entry of the nonconforming judgment, but disallows, on 

timeliness grounds, appeals filed after the passage of more 

than three months. Id., 960 F.2d at 238-39.

Ultimately, we agree with those courts which have found 

the rationale behind the Supreme Court's discussion in Mallis

to require the exercise of jurisdiction over an appeal from a 

nonconforming judgment notwithstanding an appellant's failure to file a notice of appeal within the applicable period 

following entry of the judgment. In light of the district 

court's failure to enter a Rule 58 judgment, and because 

remand to the district court to require entry of a conforming 

judgment would serve no practical purpose, we assume jurisdiction over Pack's appeal and deny Burns' motion to dismiss.

So ordered.

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