Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-03099/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-03099-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Danny Garcia
Petitioner
Michael Martel
Respondent

Document Text:

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 Petitioner claims, inter alia, that the evidence submitted at trial against him was 1

tampered, including altered police reports; that his conviction was obtained pursuant to a

conspiracy between the public defender and the district attorney; and that counsel failed to collect

all relevant information or make a suppression motion. Petition (Dkt. No. 5), at 6, 17

(electronically-filed pagination). 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANNY GARCIA,

Plaintiff, No. 2:08-cv-3099 GEB KJN P

vs.

MICHAEL MARTEL, Warden,

Defendant. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner Danny Garcia is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel who seeks

a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, based on challenges to his conviction

made for the first time before this court. Respondent Michael Martel, Acting Warden of Mule 1

Creek State Prison, moves to dismiss this action on the ground that it was filed outside the

one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitioner has filed an opposition

in which he challenges calculation of the statute of limitations, asserts equitable tolling, requests

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 The exhaustion of available state remedies is a prerequisite to a federal court's 2

consideration of claims sought to be presented in habeas corpus proceedings. See Rose v. Lundy,

455 U.S. 509 (1982); Carothers v. Rhay, 594 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1979); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b). “A petitioner may satisfy the exhaustion requirement in two ways: (1) by providing

the highest state court with an opportunity to rule on the merits of the claim . . . or (2) by showing

that at the time the petitioner filed the habeas petition in federal court no state remedies are

available to the petitioner and the petitioner has not deliberately by-passed the state remedies.” 

Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). The exhaustion

doctrine is based on a policy of federal and state comity, designed to give state courts the initial

opportunity to correct alleged constitutional deprivations. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,

275 (1971).

 Although the exhaustion doctrine requires only the presentation of each federal claim to

the highest state court, the claims must be presented in a posture that is acceptable under state

procedural rules. Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1981). Thus, an appeal or petition for

post-conviction relief that is denied by the state courts on procedural grounds, where other state

remedies are still available, does not exhaust the petitioner's state remedies. Pitchess v. Davis,

421 U.S. 482, 488 (1979); Sweet, 640 F.2d at 237–38.

 Although the court docket indicates a filing date of September 8, 2008 (Dkt. No. 5),

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September 2, 2008 is the date on which petitioner, proceeding pro se, signed and delivered the

instant petition to prison officials for mailing (see Dkt. No. 5, at 17). Pursuant to the mailbox

rule, that date is considered the filing date of the petition. See Stillman v. Lamarque, 319 F.3d

1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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a stay and abeyance to exhaust new claims in state court, and asserts that he is in fact innocent. 2

Respondent has filed a reply, and petitioner thereafter filed a declaration. For the following

reasons, the court recommends that respondent’s motion to dismiss be granted and that this

action be dismissed with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (“AEDPA” or “Act”). The Act applies to all petitions for writs of habeas corpus

filed after its enactment, Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Ainsworth v. Calderon, 138

F.3d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1998), and therefore applies to the instant petition filed September 2,

2008. Pursuant to the Act’s revisions, Section 2244(d)(1) provides: 3

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

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 All documents identified as Lodged Documents were filed by respondent in this action 4

on February 5, 2010. (Dkt. No. 35.)

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review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d)(2) further provides that “the time during which a

properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 

The following facts and chronology are relevant to the instant statute of

limitations analysis:

1. In February 2004, petitioner was convicted in Butte County Superior Court of,

inter alia, multiple lewd acts upon four children. In March 2004, he was sentenced to a

determinate state prison term of 20 years, eight months, plus an indeterminate state prison term

of 30 years to life. (See Lodged Document (“LD”) No. 1, at pp. 541– 45.)4

2. On April 4, 2006, the California Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed the

judgment of the Superior Court. (LD No. 2.) 

3. Petitioner petitioned for review in the California Supreme Court on May 17,

2006, which was denied without prejudice on July 26, 2006, as follows (LD No. 4):

Petition for review denied without prejudice to any relief to which defendant

might be entitled after the United States Supreme Court determines in

Cunningham v. California, No. 05-6551, the effect of Blakely v. Washington

(2004) 542 U.S. 296 and United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220, on

California law.

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 The petition for writ of habeas corpus petitioner filed in the California Supreme Court 5

on July 9, 2008 (denied on December 23, 2008), had no independent tolling effect, nor did it

“restart” the limitations period because it was filed after expiration of AEDPA’s statute of

limitations. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003); Jimenez v. Rice, 276

F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Petitioner does not contend otherwise.

4

4. Petitioner filed one state post-conviction collateral challenge, a petition for writ

of habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court on July 9, 2008. (LD No. 5.)

The petition was denied on December 23, 2008. (LD No. 6.)

5. Meanwhile, on September 2, 2008, petitioner filed the instant federal petition

for writ of habeas corpus. (Dkt. No. 1.) 

Following the California Supreme Court’s denial of review on July 26, 2006,

pursuant to petitioner’s direct appeal, petitioner had ninety days within which to file a petition for

writ of certiorari before the United States Supreme Court. Rule 13, U.S. Supreme Court Rules. 

Petitioner did not pursue this option, and therefore his conviction became final upon expiration

of the time for seeking such final direct review on October 24, 2006. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

Thus, the one-year statute of limitations commenced running the following day,

on October 25, 2006. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Fed.

R. Civ. P. 6(a)). Absent tolling, the limitations period ended one year later, on October 24, 2007. 

Petitioner filed the instant action on September 2, 2008, more than ten months after expiration of

this AEDPA limitation period. 

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II. DISCUSSION

A. CONVICTION DATE

Petitioner first contends that his conviction did not become final on October 24,

2006, but on May 1, 2007. Petitioner argues that because the California Supreme Court denied

his petition for review without prejudice, citing the United States Supreme Court’s pending

decision in Cunningham, once that decision was filed, on January 22, 2007 (Cunningham v.

California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007)), petitioner then had ten days within which to file a second

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 See Rule 8.500(e) (formerly Rule 8), California Rules of Court (“petition for review 6

must be served and filed within 10 days after the Court of Appeal decision is final in that court”). 

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petition for review, followed by ninety days within which to file a petition for writ of certiorari 6

before the United States Supreme Court. Only at the conclusion of these deadlines, on May 1,

2007, argues petitioner, did the one-year statute of limitations commence running within which

petitioner was required to file the instant federal petition. 

These arguments lack merit. In an analogous case, the United States District

Court for the Central District of California rejected this argument based on an identical denial of

a petition for review by the California Supreme Court (“without prejudice to any relief to which

defendant might be entitled after the United States Supreme Court determines in Cunningham v.

California, No. 05-6551, the effect of Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 and United

States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220, on California law”). See Thompson v. Almager,

2009 WL 838156 (C.D. Cal. 2009). In Thompson, unlike the instant case, petitioner filed a

motion in the Court of Appeal to recall the remittitur in light of the Cunningham decision. The

motion was denied without prejudice to filing a writ of habeas corpus in the superior court, and

the California Supreme Court thereafter denied review. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in federal court, which the court in Thompson dismissed with prejudice as timebarred. The court found that, because the state never reopened petitioner’s direct appeal, the date

on which his conviction became final remained unchanged. 

The same reasoning applies in the instant case, as petitioner’s direct appeal was

never reopened. Therefore, the date on which petitioner’s conviction became final remains

October 24, 2006. 

B. IMPACT OF CUNNINGHAM ON STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 

Petitioner next contends that the date of the Cunningham decision (January 22,

2007) “restarted” commencement of the AEDPA statute of limitations as applied to petitioner. 

There is no basis for this contention.

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 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), held that, other than the fact of a prior 7

conviction, any fact increasing the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 

 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), held that the relevant statutory sentencing 8

maximum is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely based on the facts reflected in the

jury’s verdict or admitted by defendant. 

 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), addressing the constitutionality of the 9

federal sentencing guidelines, held that if a fact necessarily results in a mandated higher sentence,

the fact must be admitted by the defendant or found by the jury. 

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Some background is warranted. Petitioner’s contentions on direct appeal

(apparently not pursued in the instant petition) included the alleged misapplication of California

Penal Code Section 803(g), which permits prosecution of specified sexual offenses against

minors after expiration of the statute of limitations if, inter alia, the prosecution is commenced

within one year of the victim reporting the alleged abuse to law enforcement. Petitioner

contended, under his Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, that the State erred in failing to prove,

and requiring the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the factors permitting extension of the

statute of limitations under Section 803(g). This contention was based on the further argument

that the factors set forth in Section 803(g) should be treated as elements of plaintiff’s offenses,

based on the holdings in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Blakely v. Washington, 7

542 U.S. 296 (2004), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). See Petitioner’s 8 9

Petition for Review (LD 3, at 9-12). 

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s argument on the ground that

the California Supreme Court had decided in People v. Black, 35 Cal. 4th 1238 (2005) (“Black

I”), that the state’s sentencing scheme did not violate the Sixth Amendment. See Court of

Appeal Decision (LD 4, at 32). However, when the California Supreme Court denied review, it

did so without prejudice to any relief petitioner might be entitled after the United States Supreme

Court’s decision in Cunningham. (LD No. 4.) The Supreme Court thereafter held in

Cunningham that California’s determinate sentencing law violated a defendant’s Sixth

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Amendment right to a jury trial by assigning to the trial judge, rather than to the jury, the

authority to find facts that render a defendant eligible for an upper term sentence. The Supreme

Court disagreed with the decision in Black I. See generally, Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S.

270; see also, Black v. California, 549 U.S. 1190 (2007). In response, the California Legislature

amended California Penal Code Section 1170(b), to allow trial courts the discretion to select

among lower, middle, and upper terms without stating ultimate facts deemed to be aggravating or

mitigating. Stats. 2007, ch. 3, § 2, effective March 30, 2007; see People v. Sandoval , 41 Cal. 4th

825, 831, 836 (2007). Thereafter, in People v. Black, 41 Cal. 4th 799 (2007) (“Black II”), cert.

denied, 128 S. Ct. 1063 (2008), the California Supreme Court held that the Blakely line of cases

does not apply to the imposition of consecutive terms under state law. 

In short, these cases – Cunningham and its predecessors – do not address

plaintiff’s statute of limitations challenge to California Penal Code Section 803(g). This

conclusion is buttressed by the fact that this court has found only one post-Cunningham

challenge to Section 803(g). See Swanson v. Adams, 2007 WL 3119553 (N.D. Cal. 2007)

(rejecting ex post facto challenge to statute, and relying on Cunningham and Black II to conclude

that the Sixth Amendment is not implicated by the imposition of consecutive sentences) .

 Moreover, even were the Blakely line of cases relevant, petitioner’s challenge

remains time-barred. As found by the court in Thompson, AEDPA’s one-year statute of

limitations was not “restarted” by the date of the Cunningham decision because (1) the decision

is not recognized by the Ninth Circuit to be a new rule of law, see Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624,

639 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, ___U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 767 (2008), and (2) the Supreme Court

has not found Cunningham to be retroactive. See, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) (“[t]he limitation

period shall run from the latest of . . . the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review”). Thompson, 2009 WL

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 But see, Butler, 528 F.3d at 639 (although Cunningham did not announce new rule of 10

law, it may be applied retroactively on collateral review); cf., Chioino v. Kernan, 581 F.3d 1182,

1186, n. 1 (9th Cir. 2009) (proper remedy for Sixth Amendment error under Cunningham is

remand to the state trial court for re-sentencing, where conviction and sentencing became final

after Blakely, but before Cunningham).

 As set forth by another magistrate judge in this district: 11

Petitioner suggests that a later trigger date for the statute of limitations runs from

the date Cunningham was decided pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). In

Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 639 (9th Cir. 2008) the Ninth Circuit concluded

that Cunningham did not announce a new rule . . . In Butler, the Ninth Circuit

found that Cunningham was “clearly dictated by the Supreme Court’s Sixth

Amendment case law, in particular Blakely ...”. 528 F.3d at 628. Pursuant to

Butler, the statute of limitations for a Cunningham claim does not run from the

date on which Cunningham became final because the constitutional right was not

“newly recognized” by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C).

Further, if the source of the newly-recognized right for 2244(d)(1)(C) purposes is

treated as being Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 [] (2004), that case does not

meet the second 2244(d)(1)(C) prong because it is not retroactive, see Schardt v.

Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1038 (9th Cir.2005). The Ninth Circuit has also held that

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 [] (2005) is not retroactive. United States

v. Cruz, 423 U.S. 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). For these reasons, petitioner’s

application for a writ of habeas corpus [filed after expiration of the non-tolled

statute of limitations] is not timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C).

 Covert v. Yates, 2009 WL 4031120, at *2. 

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838156, at *2-*3. The court in Thompson further reasoned that, even if these threshold factors

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had been met, petitioner failed (as did petitioner in the instant case) to file his federal petition

within one year of the Cunningham decision. Thompson, 2009 WL 838156, at *3. Accord,

Covert v. Yates, 2009 WL 4031120 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (Cunningham decision did not create new

statute of limitations trigger date).11

This court therefore concludes that the Cunningham decision did not “restart” the

AEDPA statute of limitations and, even if it had, the line of cases addressed therein are not

relevant to petitioner’s challenge to the statute of limitations set forth in California Penal Code

Section 803(g).

C. TOLLING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Thus, petitioner has presented no basis upon which to find that the one–year

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AEDPA limitations period commenced later than October 24, 2006. However, petitioner next

contends that he is entitled to tolling of the limitations period from July 26, 2006 to May 1, 2007,

as “a direct result” of his appellate counsel’s failure to “finalize” petitioner’s direct appeal after

the Cunningham decision. For the foregoing reasons, Cunningham did not recognize new rights

to sustain further pursuit of petitioner’s appeal. There can be no claim for ineffective assistance

of counsel where no constitutional right exists, Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88

(1982), and thus there is no basis for equitable tolling. 

Petitioner next seeks tolling for the period February 8, 2008 to May 7, 2008, when

petitioner was housed in administrative segregation, and his “jailhouse lawyer,” Russell Davila, 

a “scam artist,” retained petitioner’s legal materials. Petitioner further asserts that the response

of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), by failing to assist

petitioner in obtaining the return of his legal materials or to provide basic legal assistance to

prisoners, and by generally failing to protect petitioner from other inmates, constituted

“governmental interference” that “had a direct detrimental impact on the Petitioner’s ability to

effectively communicate with appellate counsel and pursue a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus.” Opposition, at 1, 10. However, this period, in its entirety, is beyond the expiration of

the relevant statute of limitations and can have no tolling effect. 

D. STAY AND ABEYANCE

Petitioner concedes that the instant petition raises unexhausted claims. He states

that “[t]he current petition is deficient in several ways. First and foremost, it does not carry

forward the federal claims raised and exhausted by appellate counsel. . . . Second, there are

numerous issues that do not appear to have been raised either by direct appeal or habeas corpus.” 

Opposition, at 12. Petitioner requests a “stay and abeyance” to permit him the opportunity to

exhaust his claims, citing Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). 

The Supreme Court in Rhines authorized reliance on the “stay and abeyance”

procedure to stay a timely-filed federal habeas petition containing both exhausted and

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unexhausted claims, in order to permit the petitioner to first present his unexhausted claims in 

the state courts, “only in limited circumstances,” Id., 544 U.S. at 277 (emphasis added). The

Court cautioned that the procedure is “only appropriate” “if the petitioner had good cause for his

failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and there is no indication

that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Id. at 277, 278.

Because petitioner’s petition is untimely, the court is without jurisdiction to stay

it. Moreover, even if his petition was timely filed, petitioner has failed to demonstrate good cause

for his failure to exhaust newly raised claims or that any such claims are potentially meritorious. 

E. ACTUAL INNOCENCE CLAIM

Finally, at the conclusion of his petition, petitioner contends that he is innocent:

The inexperience of Mr. Davila and CDCR’s policy providing only law libraries

and not trained legal assistance ought not to be used as grounds to deny Petitioner

one full opportunity to present his absolute innocence claims. At the every stage

of the trial court proceedings Petitioner insisted to counsel that he was absolutely

innocent of the claims against him. Evidence existed which would tend to prove

this, but counsel failed to develop it and Petitioner requests leave to pursue those

claims in the state courts before proceeding with this matter.

Opposition, at 13. 

Petitioner is informed of the following principles. “A person when first charged

with a crime is entitled to a presumption of innocence, and may insist that his guilt be established

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398 (1993), citing In re Winship,

397 U.S. 358 (1970). However, “[o]nce a defendant has been afforded a fair trial and convicted

of the offense for which he was charged, the presumption of innocence disappears.” Herrera, 506

U.S. at 399 (citation omitted). “Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence

have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent

constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding.” Id. at 400.

A petitioner’s “otherwise-barred claims” may be considered on the merits “if his

claim of actual innocence is sufficient to bring him within the ‘narrow class of cases . . .

implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’ ” Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F. 3d 463, 477 (9th

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 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) provides (emphasis added):

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(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court

proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless

the applicant shows that--

(A) the claim relies on-- 

(I) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or 

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously

discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear

and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable

factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 

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Cir. 1997) (en banc) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315 (1995)). To make a successful

claim under Schlup, “a petitioner must show that in light of all the evidence, including new

evidence, ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Carriger, 132 F.3d at 478, quoting Schlup, at 327. While neither

the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has determined whether the Schlup “fundamental

miscarriage of justice standard” overrides AEDPA’s statute of limitations, Majoy v. Roe, 296

F.3d 770, 775-77 (9th Cir. 2002), this has been assumed in at least one Ninth Circuit case, see

Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2008) (assumed actual innocence blanket exception

to AEDPA limitations statute); but see, e.g., Hebert v. Marshall, 2009 WL 3055209, *8 (E.D.

Cal. 2009) (“the authority from other circuits dispels the preliminary blush that the AEDPA

limitations statute has an omnibus, unwritten, actual innocence exception”).

When presented with an actual innocence claim bearing on a potentially

meritorious constitutional challenge that requires further factual development, the court must

convene an evidentiary hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). “Where newly discovered

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evidence is alleged in a habeas application, evidence which could not reasonably have been

presented to the state trier of facts, the federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing. Of

course, such evidence must bear upon the constitutionality of the applicant’s detention; the

existence merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a

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ground for relief on federal habeas corpus.” Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963), quoted

with approval in Herrera v. Collins, supra, 506 U.S. at 400. 

In the present case, petitioner asserts that there exists evidence, other than that

presented at trial, that will prove he is innocent provided he is given sufficient time to develop it. 

He alleges that such evidence should have been, but was not, developed by his counsel. 

Petitioner does not identify this evidence or suggest what it may be. Review of petitioner’s

filings indicates that this evidence may relate to petitioner’s general assertions that the evidence

relied upon by the prosecution was tampered, including falsified police reports; that his

conviction was obtained pursuant to a conspiracy between the public defender and the district

attorney; that petitioner’s trial counsel failed to obtain records from the Department of Motor

Vehicles that would demonstrate petitioner did not own a particular car during the period he was

found guilty of perpetrating sexual crimes therein; that counsel failed to make a suppression

motion; and that an officer at Butte County Jail is having sexual relations with one of petitioner’s

victims, and convinced her to lie at petitioner’s trial.

The court finds that these allegations do not meet the requirements under AEDPA

for convening an evidentiary hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (n. 12, supra). Rather, petitioner

requests that he be permitted to investigate his case anew, based on his hope that exculpatory

evidence will be found. The court further finds that petitioner has not met the requirement of an

“extraordinarily high” showing of “a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence.’”

Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417; see also, Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 885 (9th Cir. 2007). The

court concludes, therefore, that plaintiff’s actual innocence claim is too inadequate to overcome

his statute of limitations bar.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 18), be granted; and

2. This action be dismissed with prejudice.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 21 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the

objections shall be filed and served within 14 days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: February 24, 2010

_____________________________________

KENDALL J. NEWMAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

garc3099.mtd

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