Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-07130/USCOURTS-ca13-14-07130-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dennis W. Cogburn
Appellant
Robert A. McDonald
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DENNIS W. COGBURN,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-7130

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 12-3323, Judge Lawrence B. 

Hagel.

______________________ 

Decided: January 7, 2016

______________________ 

KENNETH M. CARPENTER, Law Offices of Carpenter 

Chartered, Topeka, KS, argued for claimant-appellant.

LOREN MISHA PREHEIM, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. 

Also represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E.

KIRSCHMAN, JR., MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR.; DAVID J.

BARRANS, AMANDA BLACKMON, Office of General Counsel, 

United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC. 

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2 COGBURN v. MCDONALD

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, DYK and HUGHES, Circuit 

Judges.

HUGHES, Circuit Judge. 

Dennis W. Cogburn appeals from a final judgment of 

the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims

affirming a Board of Veterans’ Appeals decision, which 

found that both formally and informally raised claims 

were implicitly denied in a 1985 Board decision. Because 

the implicit denial rule applies to both formal and informal claims, and its use does not violate the notice provision of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs

due process regulation, we affirm. 

I 

Mr. Cogburn served in the United States Army from 

August 1968 to August 1971, including a 12-month tour of 

duty in Vietnam. In November 1974, Mr. Cogburn sought 

both disability compensation and pension benefits from 

the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) 

based on a severe nervous condition. In December 1974, 

Mr. Cogburn was diagnosed with depressive neurosis. On 

March 11, 1975, Mr. Cogburn’s claim for pension benefits 

was denied, but the denial did not address the claim for 

disability compensation. He did not appeal and the 

decision became final. 

In June 1983, Mr. Cogburn submitted another application for disability compensation and pension benefits 

based on “nervous disorders.” J.A. 51. In August 1983, 

Mr. Cogburn was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress 

Disorder (PTSD) after a VA examination. The Regional 

Office (RO), however, returned the examination as inadequate for rating purposes because it failed to connect Mr. 

Cogburn’s PTSD to stressors from a period of military 

service. In January 1984, the RO granted non-service 

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COGBURN v. MCDONALD 3

connection pension, but denied service connection for 

PTSD. 

Mr. Cogburn appealed the 1984 RO decision to the 

Board of Veterans’ Appeals. In its 1985 decision, the 

Board framed the issue as “[e]ntitlement to service connection for a psychiatric condition claimed as posttraumatic stress disorder.” J.A. 59. After recounting

Mr. Cogburn’s symptoms, history of treatment, and his 

diagnoses of depressive neurosis, schizophrenia, and 

PTSD, the Board concluded that the record did not establish “a posttraumatic stress disorder caused by military 

service.” J.A. 63. The Board explained that the service 

records did not disclose “any evidence of psychiatric 

impairment,” J.A. 60, and that other evidence of record 

did not identify any in-service traumatic events that may 

have caused the PTSD. The decision notes that the record 

was lacking because Mr. Cogburn repeatedly failed to 

attend further VA examinations, which were intended to

determine if service-connected stressors caused his PTSD. 

The Board determined that “the preponderance of the 

medical evidence suggests that the veteran’s post service 

emotional and adjustment difficulties are manifestations 

of schizophrenia.” J.A. 63. At that time, there was no 

opportunity for further review because the Veterans 

Court was not established until 1988. 

In 2002, Mr. Cogburn inquired about the status of his 

1974 claim for disability compensation, arguing that this 

claim was never adjudicated. The RO determined that 

the 1974 claim was previously adjudicated as a claim for 

PTSD and, therefore, had been implicitly denied in the 

1985 Board decision. In 2012, after a remand from the 

Veterans Court for proper consideration of this issue, the 

Board affirmed the RO’s finding of implicit denial. The 

Board concluded that the 1985 Board decision “provided 

notice such that a reasonable person could infer that any 

claims of entitlement to service connection for any other 

psychiatric disability [including formal and informal 

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4 COGBURN v. MCDONALD

claims for nervous disorders, schizophrenia, and depressive neurosis] had been decided unfavorably.” J.A. 95. 

The Veterans Court affirmed after finding that the 

Board thoroughly weighed the evidence and applied the 

correct standard when concluding that the 1985 decision 

implicitly denied any pending claims for disability compensation due to psychiatric disorders. The Veterans 

Court also rejected Mr. Cogburn’s argument that the

implicit denial rule violated the VA’s due process regulation requiring notice when a claim is denied. Mr. Cogburn appeals.

II

We have jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans Court “with respect to the validity of a decision of the 

Court on a rule of law or of any statute or regulation . . . or any interpretation thereof (other than a determination as to a factual matter) that was relied on by the 

Court in making the decision.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). We 

review a claim of legal error in a decision of the Veterans 

Court without deference. See Szemraj v. Principi, 357 

F.3d 1370, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

Mr. Cogburn argues that the Veterans Court erred in 

affirming the Board’s application of the implicit denial

rule. First, he contends that the implicit denial rule 

cannot apply where, as here, the pending claim is filed 

separately from the explicitly denied claim and is based 

on a distinct medical diagnosis. Additionally, at oral 

argument, Mr. Cogburn asserted that the implicit denial 

rule cannot apply to formal claims. See Oral Argument at 

4:14–26, http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.

aspx?fl=2014-7130.mp3. We reject both arguments. 

Generally, both formal and informal claims for benefits remain pending until they are finally adjudicated. 

Adams v. Shinseki, 568 F.3d 956, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 

The implicit denial rule, however, “provides that, in 

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COGBURN v. MCDONALD 5

certain circumstances, a claim for benefits will be deemed 

to have been denied, and thus finally adjudicated, even if 

the [VA] did not expressly address that claim in its decision.” Id. at 961. The implicit denial rule applies when 

the VA’s decision provides a veteran with reasonable 

notice that his claim for benefits was denied. Id. at 964.

We conclude that the implicit denial rule can apply 

where a pending claim is filed separately from the explicitly denied claim and that pending claim is based on a 

distinct medical diagnosis. In Adams, this court held that 

“the fact that the claims were not filed at the same time 

does not mean that the implicit denial rule does not 

apply.” 568 F.3d at 962. The court clarified that “the key 

question in the implicit denial inquiry is whether it would 

be clear to a reasonable person that the [VA’s] action that 

expressly refers to one claim is intended to dispose of 

others as well.” Id. at 964. Therefore, the implicit denial 

rule may apply to pending claims, filed separately from 

the explicitly denied claim and based on a distinct medical 

diagnosis, when the Board’s decision makes it clear to a 

reasonable person that the pending claims have been 

denied. 

We also conclude, like the court in Munro v. Shinseki, 

that the implicit denial rule applies to both formal and 

informal claims. 616 F.3d 1293, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2010)

(after finding “no proper basis to distinguish between 

formal and informal claims,” the court determined that

“the implicit denial rule may be applied to terminate the 

pending status of both formal and informal claims”). 

Here, Mr. Cogburn argues that the implicit denial 

rule can only apply to informal claims. Mr. Cogburn 

asserts that this court, in Adams, incorrectly relied upon 

38 C.F.R. § 3.160(c) to demonstrate that formal and 

informal claims are indistinguishable. See Oral Argument at 3:55–4:14, 10:40–12:30 (citing 568 F.3d at 960) 

(“A claim for benefits, whether formal or informal, reCase: 14-7130 Document: 37-2 Page: 5 Filed: 01/07/2016
6 COGBURN v. MCDONALD

mains pending until it is finally adjudicated.”). 

Mr. Cogburn contends that formal and informal claims 

are distinguishable because only formal claims can be

pending claims, which are required to be fully adjudicated 

under 38 C.F.R. § 3.160(c), while informal claims are not 

considered pending claims and are therefore not required

to be fully adjudicated. Id. at 4:47–5:02, 10:10–12:30

(citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.160(c) (2015), which defines “pending 

claim” as “[a] claim which has not been finally adjudicated”). Mr. Cogburn asserts that this distinction requires 

limiting the application of the implicit denial rule to 

informal claims. 

Mr. Cogburn’s distinction incorrectly relies upon the

definition of “pending claim” found in the VA’s recently 

amended adjudication and appeals regulations, effective 

March 24, 2015. The VA’s new regulations replace the 

“informal claim” with the “intent to file a claim for benefits.” See Standard Claims and Appeals Forms, 79 Fed. 

Reg. 57660, 57664 (Sept. 25, 2014). To reflect this change, 

the term “informal claim” was removed from the regulations. Id. at 57674, 57678 (“Since VA is eliminating the 

term ‘informal claim,’ it has removed references to the 

phrase ‘informal claim’ . . . for consistency in these adjudication regulations to reflect this change.”). Prior to March 

24, 2015, however, “pending claim” was defined as “an 

application, formal or informal, which has not been finally 

adjudicated.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.160(c) (2013). 

Mr. Cogburn’s appeal is governed by the language of 

the former regulations because his claim and appeal were 

pending under those regulations.1 See Standard Claims 

1 Likewise, because Adams v. Shinseki was decided 

well before the regulations were amended, the court was 

correct in its reliance on the definition of “pending claim” 

to demonstrate that formal and informal claims are 

indistinguishable. 568 F.3d at 960. 

 

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COGBURN v. MCDONALD 7

and Appeals Forms, 79 Fed. Reg. at 57686 (“[T]his final 

rule will apply only with respect to claims and appeals 

filed 180 days after the date this rule is published in the 

Federal Register as a final rule. Claims and appeals 

pending under the current regulations as of that date 

would continue to be governed by the current regulations.”). Therefore, Mr. Cogburn’s distinction is irrelevant 

because the applicable definition of “pending claim” 

applies to both formal and informal claims. Since we find 

no proper basis to distinguish between formal and informal claims, we conclude that the implicit denial rule may 

be applied to both formal and informal claims. 

III

Lastly, the implicit denial rule does not violate the notice provision found in the VA’s due process regulation. 

At the applicable time, the due process regulation provided that “[t]he claimant will be notified of any decision 

affecting the payment of benefits or granting relief. 

Notice will include the reason for the decision and the 

date it will be effectuated as well as the right to a hearing 

. . . .” 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(e) (1975 & 1985). In Adams, this 

court held that the implicit denial rule does not violate 

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because

“the implicit denial rule is, at bottom, a notice provision.” 

568 F.3d at 965. Specifically, the court determined that

when the implicit denial rule applies, the claimant necessarily “received adequate notice of, and an opportunity to 

respond to, the [VA’s] decision . . . [and therefore] was not 

deprived of any due process rights.” Id. 

The VA’s due process regulation mirrors constitutional due process by requiring notice that a claim has been 

denied. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. v. Loudermill, 

470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (“An essential principle of due 

process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property be 

preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”) (internal citation and 

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8 COGBURN v. MCDONALD

quotation marks omitted). Because the implicit denial 

rule is a notice provision, the 1985 decision necessarily 

provided Mr. Cogburn with adequate notice that his

formal claim for a severe nervous condition, and all informal claims related to his diagnoses of depressive 

neurosis and schizophrenia, had been denied. Accordingly, the application of the implicit denial rule does not 

violate Mr. Cogburn’s right to receive notice pursuant to 

the VA’s due process regulation. 

IV

We lack jurisdiction to consider Mr. Cogburn’s remaining arguments concerning the Board’s application of 

the implicit denial rule to the facts of this case. 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(d)(2).

Because the implicit denial rule applies to both formal 

and informal claims, and its use does not violate the 

notice provision of the VA’s due process regulation, the 

judgment of the Veterans Court is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED

No costs.

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