Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-23-02071/USCOURTS-ca6-23-02071-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Russell Wayne Salisbury
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 24a0517n.06

Case No. 23-2071

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RUSSELL WAYNE SALISBURY, 

Defendant - Appellant.

)

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)

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)

ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

O P I N I O N

Before: GIBBONS, McKEAGUE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Russell Salisbury pleaded guilty to possession with intent 

to distribute methamphetamine. The applicable sentencing guidelines range was 77 to 96 months 

in prison. After reviewing Salisbury’s extensive criminal history, including multiple convictions 

for sexually assaulting minors, the district court sentenced him to 77 months in prison, consecutive 

to an undischarged and unrelated state prison sentence. The court also prohibited Salisbury from 

contacting minors without permission while on supervised release.

Salisbury appeals his sentence, claiming that (1) his bottom-of-the-guidelines sentence was 

procedurally and substantively unreasonable, and (2) the district court improperly imposed a 

condition of supervised release that is unrelated to the crime of conviction. Because the court 

provided sufficient justification for both the sentence and the conditions of supervised release, 

Salisbury’s arguments fail. We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

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I.

In July 2020, law enforcement officers received a tip that three men were selling 

methamphetamine in a hotel parking lot in Gladwin, Michigan. As the officers prepared to execute 

a search warrant at the hotel, one of the three suspects met Salisbury in the parking lot. The officers 

approached the scene, and Salisbury sped away in his car. During the ensuing pursuit, Salisbury 

threw a bag out of the car window before he was eventually caught and arrested. The bag contained 

over 100 grams of methamphetamine. Salisbury admitted that he frequently purchased 

methamphetamine and typically sold about half of what he bought.

Salisbury was charged with one count of possession with intent to distribute more than 50 

grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). Salisbury pleaded guilty to the 

charge without a plea agreement. The mandatory minimum sentence was five years in prison 

followed by four years of supervised release. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii). The presentence 

investigation report (PSR) stated that the sentencing guidelines range was 77 to 96 months of 

imprisonment. Salisbury did not object to the PSR or the recommended guidelines range.

The district court held a sentencing hearing in December 2023. At that time, Salisbury was 

serving an undischarged sentence of 14 to 240 months in state prison for possession of 

methamphetamine. The sentence, which was enhanced under Michigan’s habitual offender statute, 

resulted from a 2022 traffic stop that was unrelated to the events that led to his federal indictment.

At the sentencing hearing, Salisbury acknowledged his extensive criminal history and 

conceded that he had “blazed quite the trail.” Sent’g Tr., R.77 at PageID 432. Salisbury then 

requested a sentence of 60 months—the mandatory minimum and 17 months below the guidelines 

range. He added that the federal sentence should run concurrently with his ongoing state prison 

sentence because “[t]he underlying issues . . . are the same.” Id. at PageID 437.

The government requested a sentence within the guidelines range that would run “at least 

partially consecutive[ly]” to Salisbury’s state prison sentence. Id. The government noted that 

Salisbury had multiple convictions for domestic violence and sexual assault of minors. In one 

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instance, Salisbury sexually assaulted his daughter’s 13-year-old friend while she was staying at 

his home. The government further noted that Salisbury repeatedly violated the terms of his 

probation. After Salisbury was released pending trial in this case, he (1) assaulted his pregnant 

girlfriend, (2) resisted corrections officers at the Gladwin County Jail, and (3) possessed 

methamphetamine again.

The district court sentenced Salisbury to 77 in months in prison—the bottom of the 

guidelines range—consecutive to his undischarged state prison sentence. The court first 

acknowledged that Salisbury had a difficult childhood, but then noted that there was “uncorrected 

chaos in his life.” Id. at PageID 438. The court specifically referenced Salisbury’s sex offenses, 

noting that he committed at least one of them while wearing a court-ordered monitoring device. 

Salisbury’s consistent problems with substance abuse and domestic violence were also 

“concerning.” In the court’s view, Salisbury had every reason to know of the “potential 

consequences of the behavior” that led to his federal charge. The court then determined that a 

consecutive sentence was justified because the state offense and the federal offense “were separate 

events,” and “it’s appropriate that the sentences indeed be served for the different behavior.” Id. at 

PageID 439.

The district court also placed Salisbury on supervised release—with special conditions—

for four years following his incarceration. One of the conditions prohibited Salisbury from having 

direct contact with a child under the age of 18, including his own children, without permission 

from his probation officer.

Salisbury did not object to the district court’s sentence, but he timely appealed.

II.

A. Term of Incarceration

Salisbury first claims that his 77-month sentence was unreasonable. There are two 

components to our review of a district court’s sentence: procedural reasonableness and substantive 

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reasonableness. See United States v. Solano-Rosales, 781 F.3d 345, 351 (6th Cir. 2015). First, we 

must determine whether the court committed any significant procedural errors, such as failing to 

“consider the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)” or “explain why it chose the sentence.” 

United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 51 (2007)). Then, we must consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence by asking 

whether the sentence “conforms with the sentencing goals” set out in § 3553(a). United States v. 

Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748, 753 (6th Cir. 2020).

On appeal, Salisbury argues that his sentence was (1) procedurally unreasonable because 

the district court failed to adequately explain its reasoning, and (2) substantively unreasonable 

because the court placed too much weight on his criminal history and not enough weight on the 

fact that he was already serving a state prison sentence. We disagree.

1. Procedural Reasonableness

First, we consider whether the district court’s sentence was procedurally reasonable. 

Normally, we review this question under the abuse-of-discretion standard. See United States v. 

Small, 988 F.3d 241, 257 (6th Cir. 2021). But because Salisbury failed to object to any procedural 

defects in the district court, we review his procedural reasonableness claim for plain error. SolanoRosales, 781 F.3d at 351. Under plain error review, Salisbury must show that there was “(1) error 

(2) that ‘was obvious or clear,’ (3) that ‘affected [Salisbury’s] substantial rights’ and (4) that 

‘affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.’” United States v. 

Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 

445, 459 (6th Cir. 2006)).

Salisbury does not challenge the guidelines calculation or claim that the court relied on 

erroneous facts. Instead, he argues that his sentence is procedurally defective because the court 

failed to sufficiently explain its reasoning.

The district court is required by statute to state “the reasons for its imposition of the 

particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). But the court is not required to recite a “ritual 

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incantation” of the sentencing factors provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Conatser, 

514 F.3d 508, 524 (6th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Trejo-Martinez, 481 F.3d 409, 413 

(6th Cir. 2007). Rather, the required depth of the court’s reasoning depends on the circumstances 

of each case. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007) (“The appropriateness of brevity 

or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say, depends upon circumstances.”). For 

example, a judge’s decision to apply the sentencing guidelines range “will not necessarily require 

lengthy explanation.” Id. So long as the court “addressed the relevant factors in reaching its 

conclusion” and the record “allow[s] for meaningful appellate review,” the resulting sentence is 

procedurally reasonable. United States v. Dexta, 470 F.3d 612, 614–15 (6th Cir. 2006). And 

because we review this claim for plain error, we will only reverse if the court’s explanation “was 

so deficient as to qualify as obvious error.” United States v. O’Lear, 90 F.4th 519, 541 (6th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2542 (2024).

The district court adequately explained why it sentenced Salisbury to 77 months in prison. 

First, the court said there was “no doubt” that Salisbury had a difficult childhood. Then the court 

addressed Salisbury’s extensive criminal history. The court specifically noted that he committed 

one of his crimes—sexually assaulting his daughter’s thirteen-year-old friend—while wearing a 

court-ordered monitoring device. The court then cited Salisbury’s substance abuse, his history of 

domestic violence, the fact that Salisbury knew the potential consequences of his behavior, and 

“the circumstances of the offense that [brought] Mr. Salisbury into court.” In short, the court 

referenced the sentencing factors under § 3553(a) that it found to be “particularly important”: the 

sentencing guidelines range, the nature of the offense, Salisbury’s criminal history, the need for 

deterrence, and mitigating circumstances. This analysis was sufficient to explain the relevant 

factors and permit appellate review of the court’s reasoning. Dexta, 470 F.3d at 614–15. Under 

plain error review, it was not “so deficient as to qualify as obvious error.” O’Lear, 90 F.4th at 541.

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2. Substantive Reasonableness

We next consider whether Salisbury’s bottom-of-the-guidelines sentence was substantively 

reasonable. A sentence is substantively unreasonable if it is “too long.” Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 442. 

More specifically, the sentence must be “‘proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances of 

the offense and offender, and sufficient but not greater than necessary, to comply with the 

purposes’ of the sentencing factors.” United States v. Johnson, 24 F.4th 590, 607 (6th Cir. 2022)

(quoting United States v. Vowell, 516 F.3d 503, 512 (6th Cir. 2008)). 

Even though Salisbury did not object to his sentence in the district court, we review the 

substantive reasonableness of the sentence for an abuse of discretion rather than for plain error. 

Solano-Rosales, 781 F.3d at 356. We afford a “great deal of deference” to the district court, as the 

court “is in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a).” United States 

v. Xu, 114 F.4th 829, 846 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Mayberry, 540 F.3d 506, 519 

(6th Cir. 2008)). Because the court’s sentence was within the sentencing guidelines range, we 

presume that it is substantively reasonable. United States v. Gardner, 32 F.4th 504, 530 (6th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 251 (2022). Salisbury can rebut this presumption by showing that the court 

“chose a sentence arbitrarily, ignored pertinent § 3353(a) factors, or gave unreasonable weight to 

any single factor.” Id. (citing Conatser, 514 F.3d at 520).

Salisbury claims that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court 

placed “inordinate weight” on Salisbury’s criminal history. In other words, he argues that the court 

“placed too much weight on [one] of the § 3553(a) factors and too little on others.” Rayyan, 885 

F.3d at 442.

There is no reason to deviate from the presumption of reasonableness here. As explained 

above, the district court considered several § 3553(a) factors before sentencing Salisbury to 77 

months in prison. While the court highlighted Salisbury’s prior criminal activity—including sex 

offenses and domestic violence—it also addressed his difficult childhood and the need for 

deterrence. Moreover, the court specifically noted that its determination was driven not by 

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Salisbury’s criminal history, but by the nature of the offense. Because the court exercised 

“reasoned discretion,” we are in no position to second-guess its ultimate conclusion. Id. Salisbury’s 

77-month sentence is substantively reasonable.

B. Consecutive Sentence

Salisbury next argues that the district court’s decision to have the 77-month sentence run 

consecutively to his undischarged state prison sentence was unreasonable. In his view, the court 

failed to sufficiently explain why a consecutive sentence was warranted (i.e., the sentence is

procedurally unreasonable), and his consecutive sentence creates “sentencing disparities among 

defendants with similar records” (i.e., the sentence is substantively unreasonable). This challenge 

fails too.

Salisbury did not object to the imposition of a consecutive sentence before the district court, 

so we review his procedural claim—that the court’s reasoning was inadequate—under the plain 

error standard described above. See United States v. Mitchell, 107 F.4th 534, 546 (6th Cir. 2024); 

United States v. Hall, 632 F.3d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 2011). We review his substantive claim—that 

the consecutive sentence is disparately long—for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. 

Majors, 852 F. App’x 956, 963–64 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. James, 428 F. App’x 533, 536 

(6th Cir. 2011).

1. Procedural Reasonableness

If a defendant “is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment” at the time of 

federal sentencing, then the federal sentence “may run concurrently or consecutively” to the 

undischarged sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). When deciding whether the federal sentence should 

run concurrently or consecutively, the district court “shall consider . . . the factors set forth in [18 

U.S.C. §] 3553(a).” Id. § 3584(b). 

In addition to these statutory factors, the court must also consider any applicable guidelines 

or policy statements issued by the United States Sentencing Commission. United States v. Johnson, 

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640 F.3d 195, 208 (6th Cir. 2011). In this case, the relevant Sentencing Commission policy 

statement provides that the federal sentence “may be imposed to run concurrently, partially 

concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to achieve a 

reasonable punishment for the instant offense.” U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 5G1.3(d) (U.S. 

Sent’g Comm’n 2021). The related application note states that courts should also consider the 18 

U.S.C. § 3584 factors(i.e., the § 3553(a) factors), the type and length of the undischarged sentence, 

the time already served on the undischarged sentence, the time likely to be served on the 

undischarged sentence, the fact that the undischarged sentence was imposed in state court, and 

“any other circumstance” that is relevant to choosing an appropriate sentence. U.S. Sent’g 

Guidelines Manual § 5G1.3, comment. (n.4) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2021).

The court does not need to explicitly reference § 5G1.3 “if there is some other evidence in 

the record that it considered the section.” Hall, 632 F.3d at 336. So long as the court’s reasoning

is “generally clear,” then the court does not commit plain error if it fails “to expressly consider the 

factors contained in § 5G1.3 Application Note 4(A).” United States v. Potts, 947 F.3d 357, 369 

(6th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Harmon, 607 F.3d 

233, 239 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Covert, 117 F.3d 940, 945 (6th Cir. 1997).

When imposing a consecutive sentence, “a district court must indicate on the record its 

rationale, either expressly or by reference to a discussion of relevant considerations contained 

elsewhere.” United States v. Cochrane, 702 F.3d 334, 346 (6th Cir. 2012), abrogated on other 

grounds by Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015). The court’s explanation for the length 

of the sentence and the rationale for imposing a consecutive sentence may be “intertwined.” 

Johnson, 640 F.3d at 208; see also United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 332, 343 (6th Cir. 2009)

(“Requiring district courts to conduct a separate Section 3553(a) analysis for the concurrent or 

consecutive nature of the sentence would be repetitious and unwarranted, and we hold that district 

courts have no such distinct obligation.”).

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The district court made it “generally clear” why it ordered Salisbury’s federal sentence to 

run consecutively to his undischarged state prison sentence. At the sentencing hearing, Salisbury 

explained to the court that he had served two years of his undischarged state prison sentence. The 

court then discussed the nature of the offense, mitigating factors, Salisbury’s substance abuse, his 

history of violence, and his criminal record. Immediately after addressing the “particularly 

important” § 3553(a) factors, the court concluded that the 77-month sentence would run 

consecutively to the undischarged state prison sentence. The court explained that the state offense 

and the federal offense “were separate events,” and that “it’s appropriate that the sentences indeed 

be served for the different behavior.”

The record shows that the district court considered (1) the § 3553(a) factors, (2) the time 

Salisbury already served on the undischarged sentence, and (3) the fact that the federal offense and 

the state offense arose from wholly unrelated events. To be sure, the court’s rationale was 

“somewhat cursory.” United States v. Watford, 468 F.3d 891, 917 (6th Cir. 2006). But it reflected 

the relevant considerations under § 3553 and § 5G1.3 enough to make clear why it imposed a 

consecutive sentence. Id. at 916. It was, therefore, sufficient. Id. Indeed, we have affirmed 

consecutive sentences when the district court articulated a nearly identical rationale. See, e.g., 

United States v. McGhee, No. 22-3471, 2023 WL 3815181, at *4 (6th Cir. June 5, 2023) 

(concluding that the district court neither abused its discretion nor plainly erred when it explained 

that a consecutive sentence was appropriate because the federal offense “is separate and distinct” 

from the conduct underlying the undischarged state prison sentence); United States v. Kitchen, 428 

F. App’x 593, 597–98 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

by imposing a consecutive sentence when it explained that the federal offense and the state offense 

were “separate and distinct matters”); Watford, 468 F.3d at 916–17 (finding that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion when it imposed a consecutive sentence because “the conduct in [the 

federal] case stands apart and is separable factually, temporally and in any other fashion” from the 

undischarged state prison sentence). We do the same here.

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2. Substantive Reasonableness

We are also not persuaded by Salisbury’s claim that the consecutive sentence is 

substantively unreasonable because it creates “disparities.” Salisbury asserts that a consecutive 

sentence “adds more than 24 months” and “as much as 240 months” to his undischarged state 

prison sentence. But this is legally—and mathematically—incorrect.

When imposing a sentence, § 3553(a) requires a district court to consider “the need to avoid 

unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found 

guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). This factor concerns national sentencing 

disparities, not disparities between co-defendants. United States v. Simmons, 501 F.3d 620, 623–

24 (6th Cir. 2007). When a sentence is within the guidelines range, a claim that the sentence creates 

disparities is “an unconventional ground” for appeal. United States v. Swafford, 639 F.3d 265, 270 

(6th Cir. 2011). This is because the sentencing guidelines are intended to “reduce disparities, not 

create them.” United States v. Bailey, 27 F.4th 1210, 1215 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 267 

(2022).

Salisbury does not dispute the PSR’s assertion that for similarly-situated defendants, the 

average sentence is 71 months and the median sentence is 77 months. Instead, Salisbury argues—

without support—that his consecutive sentence creates “an increase far beyond what others with 

similar records and crimes face in the federal system.”

First, we reject his claim that a 77-month consecutive sentence adds “as much as 240 

months” to his overall term of incarceration; it adds 77 months. Second, we disagree with 

Salisbury’s premise that the 77-month sentence “increases” his undischarged state prison sentence. 

The record clearly indicates that Salisbury’s federal offense and his state offense are distinct and 

unrelated. His federal offense arose from a 2020 arrest after he attempted to purchase 

methamphetamine for resale. His state offense arose from a 2022 traffic stop during which law 

enforcement officers discovered methamphetamine in his car. For the latter offense, Salisbury 

received a sentence of 14 to 240 months under Michigan’s habitual offender statute. The district 

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court did not “increase” Salisbury’s state prison sentence; it merely imposed a separate—and 

statistically average—sentence for a separate offense. Thus, the court’s decision to impose a 

consecutive sentence was substantively reasonable.

C. Special Conditions of Supervised Release

In addition to a 77-month term of incarceration, the district court also imposed a four-year 

term of supervised release. The court may, at its discretion, attach conditions to a defendant’s term 

of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c). These conditions must be “reasonably related” to 

the § 3553(a) factors, and any deprivations of liberty must not be greater than what is “reasonably 

necessary” to achieve the goals of sentencing. Id. § 3583(d).

Salisbury objects to the condition that he cannot have “direct contact” with any child that 

he knows or should know is under the age of 18 without permission from his probation officer.1

In his view, the court “owed him an explanation” for why it imposed this condition, which will 

leave him “isolated” from his grandchild. In short, Salisbury challenges both the procedural and 

substantive reasonableness of this special condition of supervised release. See United States v. 

Carter, 463 F.3d 526, 528–29 (6th Cir. 2006).

1. Procedural Reasonableness

Because Salisbury did not object to the special conditions before the district court, we 

review his procedural reasonableness claim for plain error. United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 

572 (6th Cir. 2012). To be procedurally reasonable, the court must state in open court the reasons 

for imposing special conditions of supervised release. United States v. Widmer, 785 F.3d 200, 203 

(6th Cir. 2015). If the court’s discussion of the § 3553(a) factors “satisfies the procedural 

reasonableness requirement for imposing a term of incarceration,” it can also demonstrate that 

“attachment of special conditions was also procedurally reasonable.” United States v. Henry, 819 

1 The PSR—to which Salisbury did not object—recommended that the court attach this special 

condition to Salisbury’s supervised release.

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F.3d 856, 874 (6th Cir. 2016). “Even if the district court failed to adequately explain its decision, 

the error is harmless if the reasons for imposing the special conditions are ‘clear from the record.’”

Id. (quoting United States v. Collins, 799 F.3d 554, 599 (6th Cir. 2015)).

The district court’s justification for imposing this special condition was clear from the 

record. To be sure, the court did not explain its reasoning immediately before or after it announced 

the special condition. But before imposing its sentence, the court referenced information in the 

PSR and specifically noted its concern with Salisbury’s prior sex offenses. The PSR stated that 

Salisbury had (1) inappropriately touched, kissed, and licked an incapacitated a 17-year-old victim, 

(2) sexually assaulted his daughter’s 13-year-old friend while she stayed overnight in his home, 

and (3) failed to comply with his reporting duties as a sex offender. The government argued that 

this criminal history shows that Salisbury was “incredibly violent towards women and children on 

a consistent basis.” The reason for the special condition “is clear from the record,” as it “addressed 

the need . . . to protect the public” by minimizing Salisbury’s contact with minors. United States 

v. Lenhart, No. 22-3111, 2023 WL 5524851, at *4 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2023). Thus, any procedural 

error by the court is harmless. Henry, 819 F.3d at 874.

2. Substantive Reasonableness

Before addressing the substantive reasonableness of the special conditions of supervised 

release, we must address the proper standard of review. In cases where the defendant did not object 

to the special conditions in the district court, we have reviewed the substantive reasonableness of 

the conditions for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, No. 22-5215, 2023 WL 2487338, 

at *4 (6th Cir. Mar. 14, 2023); Henry, 819 F.3d at 873–76; Zobel, 696 F.3d at 573. But we have 

also said that “we review all substantive arguments for abuse of discretion and reasonableness.” 

United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 464 (6th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added); see also United 

States v. Jackson, No. 22-3288, 2023 WL 3059078, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 24, 2023) (“We always 

review substantive reasonableness for abuse of discretion.”). Here, the outcome is the same under 

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either standard: the condition of supervised release is substantively reasonable. Therefore, we need 

not reach a conclusion as to the appropriate standard.

The district court has “broad discretion to impose appropriate conditions of supervised 

release.” United States v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 502, 506 (6th Cir. 1997). When reviewing the substantive 

reasonableness of a special condition, we look to whether it (1) “is reasonably related to specified 

sentencing factors,” (2) “involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to 

achieve these goals,” and (3) “is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the 

Sentencing Commission.” Id. at 504; see also U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 5D1.3(b) (U.S. 

Sent’g Comm’n 2021). If the conditions of supervised release are “reasonably related to the dual 

goals of probation, the rehabilitation of the defendant and the protection of the public, [they] must 

be upheld.” Ritter, 118 F.3d at 504 (quoting United States v. Bortels, 962 F.2d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 

1992)). Even if a condition implicates a defendant’s fundamental right to freedom of association, 

it is “generally upheld” if it is “primarily designed to meet the ends of rehabilitation and protection 

of the public.” Id.

On appeal, Salisbury correctly notes that the special condition at issue (prohibiting contact 

with minors) does not relate to his federal offense (possession with intent to distribute 

methamphetamine). But a direct relation is not required. Instead, the special condition may be 

“based on any of several sentencing factors,” including “‘the history and characteristics of the 

defendant.’” United States v. Childress, 874 F.3d 523, 527 n.2 (6th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added) 

(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)). And here, the special condition related to Salisbury’s history of 

sexually assaulting minor children and “the need . . . to protect the public from further crimes” by 

him. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(C). Moreover, the special condition is neither permanent 

nor absolute. The district court imposed only a four-year term of supervised release, and Salisbury 

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can be in contact with a minor if he has permission from his probation officer.2 The court neither 

abused its discretion nor plainly erred in imposing the condition in light of Salisbury’s history of 

sexually assaulting minors.

III.

We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment. 

2 We have found a nearly identical special condition to be substantively reasonable. See United 

States v. Wagner, No. 22-1880, 2024 WL 328841, at *7 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 2024) (affirming the imposition 

of special conditions which included a requirement that the defendant “must not have direct contact with 

any child he knows or reasonably should know to be under the age of 18, without the permission of the 

probation officer” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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