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Parties Involved:
City of Loveland
Appellee
David Fertig
Appellant
Charles Higney
Appellee
Joseph Quigley
Appellee
Lawrence Sieb
Appellee

Document Text:

FIL~ D 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Co~t ~! Appeals Tenth C•rcui, 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT MAY 12 1992 

DAVID FERTIG, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

CITY OF LOVELAND: JOSEPH QUIGLEY: 

CHARLES HIGNEY: LAWRENCE SIEB, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

) Clerk 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 91-1013 

) (D.C. No. 89-Z-80) 

) (D. Colo.) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a): 10th Cir. R. 34 . 1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Plaintiff David Fertig appeals the district court's grant of 

summary judgment to Defendants City of Loveland, Joseph E. Quigley 

and Charles Higney, Loveland police officers, and Lawrence Sieb, 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-1013 Document: 010110247685 Date Filed: 05/12/1992 Page: 1
Loveland Police Chief. Plaintiff brought this suit under 

§ 1983, alleging that his placement in protective 

Quigley and Higney constituted an arrest without 

42 u.s.c. 

custody by 

probable cause and violated his constitutional right to free 

speech under the First Amendment. He also asserts liability 

against the City of Loveland and Sieb for failure to adequately 

train its police officers. The district court granted summary 

judgment to the City of Loveland and Defendant Sieb, stating that 

Plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of establishing the 

existence of a municipal policy or custom which violated 

Plaintiff's constitutional rights. The 

judgment to Quigley and Higney based on 

Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm. 

court granted summary 

qualified immunity. 

Shortly after midnight on April 27, 1986, Higney and Quigley 

answered a 

Loveland. 

disturbance complaint 

In the parking lot 

at 

of 

an 

the 

apartment 

complex, 

complex in 

the officers 

encountered Plaintiff and his cousin, Randall Fertig. It appeared 

to the officers that Plaintiff and his cousin had been involved in 

an altercation. Plaintiff's shirt was torn off and both of the 

men had visible abrasions, cuts, and contusions. Randall Fertig 

refused to provide the officers with identification, and because 

he became verbally abusive and belligerent, the officers placed 

him under arrest. 

of his cousin. 

Plaintiff questioned the reason for the arrest 

Ultimately, Plaintiff also was taken into 

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Appellate Case: 91-1013 Document: 010110247685 Date Filed: 05/12/1992 Page: 2
protective custody as being intoxicated and a danger to himself 

and others. 1 He was detained for eight hours in detox and 

released. He was not criminally charged. 

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 

same legal standard applied by the district court under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c). Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc . v. First Affiliated 

Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990). "Summary 

judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute over a 

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law." Russillo v. Scarborough, 935 F.2d 1167, 1170 

(10th Cir. 1991). We must view the record in a light most 

favorable to the parties opposing the motion for summary judgment. 

"[W]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be 

held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action 

generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the 

1 Colo. Rev . Stat. S 25-1-310(1) states in pertinent part: 

(1) When any person is intoxicated or incapacitated by 

alcohol and clearly dangerous to the health and safety 

of himself or others, such person shall be taken into 

protective custody by law enforcement authorities or an 

emergency service patrol, acting with probable cause, 

and placed in an approved treatment facility. If no 

such facilities are available, he may be detained in an 

emergency medical facility or jail, but only for so long 

as may be necessary to prevent injury to himself or 

others or to prevent a breach of the peace ... . A 

taking into protective custody under this section is not 

an arrest, and no entry or other record shall be made to 

indicate that the person has been arrested or charged 

with a crime. Law enforcement or emergency service 

personnel who act in compliance with this section are 

acting in the course of their official duties and are 

not criminally or civilly liable therefore. 

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Appellate Case: 91-1013 Document: 010110247685 Date Filed: 05/12/1992 Page: 3
action assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly 

established' at the time [the action] was taken." Anderson v. 

Creighton, 483 U.S . 635, 639 (1987)(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 

457 U. S. 800, 818, 819 (1982)) . The plaintiff has the burden of 

establishing that the law was violated and that the law was 

clearly established at the time of the violation. Dixon v. 

Richer, 922 F.2d 1456, 1460 (10th Cir. 1991). If the plaintiff 

does not meet this burden, the official is not required to proceed 

further, and summary judgment is appropriate . Id. 

First, Plaintiff argues that his detention by the police 

officers was in violation of his constitutional right to free 

speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment. He bases his claim 

on his perception that he was taken into custody by the officers 

because he questioned them regarding the reasons for their arrest 

of his cousin, Randall Fertig. There is nothing in the record, 

however, to indicate that anything that Plaintiff said to the 

officers formed the basis for their decision to place him in 

custody. 

Plaintiff cites City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S . 451 (1987), 

in support of his claim of constitutional violation. In City of 

Houston, the Supreme Court held invalid, as overbroad, a municipal 

ordinance making it unlawful to interrupt police officers in the 

performance of their duties. Id. at 453, 467 . The plaintiff in 

City of Houston, was arrested pursuant to the ordinance for 

verbally challenging police officers during an arrest. Id. at 

454. The Supreme Court held that a certain amount of "expressive 

disorder" is permissible in a free society, id. at 472, and 

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Appellate Case: 91-1013 Document: 010110247685 Date Filed: 05/12/1992 Page: 4
therefore, the ordinance was held to be "substantially overbroad" 

and "facially invalid," id. at 467. 

Plaintiff in this case was not formally arrested. He does 

not challenge the constitutional validity of the state protective 

custody statute under which he was held. He was not criminally 

charged, and there is no evidence that any statements or verbal 

challenges he may have made to the officers had any bearing on 

their decision to place him in custody, except perhaps in support 

of the police officers' contention that the individuals appeared 

intoxicated and combative. Therefore, City of Houston is 

factually distinguishable and inapposite, and Plaintiff's reliance 

on the holding in the case is misplaced . 

Plaintiff states in his brief that, because of his reliance 

on a First Amendment violation, probable cause is not an issue in 

his appeal . However, it appears that the thrust of Plaintiff's 

argument centers around whether Plaintiff was intoxicated and 

whether, because of his intoxication, he presented a danger to 

himself or to others such that there was probable cause for the 

officers to detain him pursuant to the Colorado statute . In two 

Colorado cases the state court has had an opportunity to interpret 

this statute. 

In People v. Dandrea , 736 P.2d 1211, 1214-15 (Colo. 1987), 

the Colorado Supreme Court held that the language of section 

25-1-310 is unambiguous in stating that the act of placing a 

person in protective custody is not an arrest, but is permitted to 

"prevent harm to the detainee or others." 

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In Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986), the court 

considered whether an officer acting pursuant to 

section 25-1-310(1) is protected by qualified immunity. The court 

held that the decision of a police officer to place a 

protective custody is discretionary. Id. at 164. 

person in 

A police 

officer, making a decision as to whether an intoxicated person is 

dangerous to himself or others, enjoys qualified immunity unless 

his conduct is "willful, malicious or intended to cause harm." 

Id. at 163-64. 

Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of establishing that 

there was a First Amendment violation or that the officers' 

decision was an abuse of discretion. The facts in this case point 

to a reasonable conclusion on the part of the police officers that 

Plaintiff had been drinking, that he had been involved in a fight 

or an altercation, and that there was a probability that, left 

unprotected, additional violence could occur. Although Plaintiff 

denies he was intoxicated, he does admit that he had been drinking 

throughout the day. It is clear that the alcohol smell on his 

breath and his disheveled appearance would have led the officers 

to believe he was intoxicated and had been involved in a fight. 

The situation, as witnessed and perceived by the officers, 

supports their subsequent decisions. Plaintiff bears the burden 

of establishing a nexus between the conduct in question and prior 

law which would show that Defendants' actions were clearly in 

violation. See Hannula v. City of Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129, 131 

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Appellate Case: 91-1013 Document: 010110247685 Date Filed: 05/12/1992 Page: 6
(10th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff failed to meet this burden. The 

district court's determination that the officers are entitled to 

qualified immunity is therefore correct. 

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the grant of summary judgment 

as to Defendants City of Loveland and Sieb was inappropriate based 

upon his claim that these Defendants failed to adequately train 

the City's police officers in "deliberate indifference to the 

rights of persons with whom the police come into contact. " 

of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). 

"'[T]o survive summary judgment, the plaintiff must go beyond 

[his] pleadings and show that []he has evidence of specific facts 

that demonstrate that' the City . of [Loveland] exhibited 

deliberate indifference towards him in its alleged failure to 

institute a proper policy and in not properly training and 

supervising its officers." Medina v. City & County of Denver, No. 

90-1166, sli p op. at 16-17 (10th Cir. Mar. 31, 1992){quoting 

Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F .2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 

1988)). 

We have previously held that "there is no inherent 

inconsistency in allowing a suit alleging an unconstitutional 

policy or custom to proceed against the city when the individuals 

charged with executing the challenged policy . .. have been 

relieved from individual liability." Watson v. City of Kansas 

City, 857 F.2d at 697. However, it would not be proper to allow 

Plaintiff to maintain a suit against the City if it was determined 

that the officers' conduct did not comprise a constitutional 

violation. Id. 

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Appellate Case: 91-1013 Document: 010110247685 Date Filed: 05/12/1992 Page: 7
Plaintiff presented no evidence of a policy, custom or 

practice of the City of Loveland in support of his contentions. 

He also failed to present any evidence which would substantiate 

his allegation that the City failed to properly train its police 

officers. Therefore, because we determine that no constitutional 

violation occurred, and because we agree with the district court 

that Plaintiff failed to substantiate these allegations, we affirm 

the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City and 

Sieb. 

In conclusion, we determine that Plaintiff failed to meet his 

burden of establishing an issue of material fact in dispute, and, 

therefore, a grant of summary judgment is appropriate. The 

judgment of the United States District Court for the District of 

Colorado is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Wade Brorby 

Circuit Judge 

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