Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cr-00967/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cr-00967-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alvaro Tapia-Rojas
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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 Although Movant's Motion has been assigned a civil number, CV 04-2834-

PHX-MHM (MS), all documents related to this motion are filed in the Court's criminal

file, CR 04-967-PHX-MHM. Therefore, whenever the undersigned refers to a

document contained in the file for this case, he refers to the docket number of the

document contained in the criminal file.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff/Respondent, 

vs.

Alvaro Tapia-Rojas, 

Defendant/Petitioner. 

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No. CR 04-967-PHX-MHM

No. CV 04-2834-PHX-MHM (MS)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Movant, currently confined at the California City Correctional Institution,

California City, California, filed a "Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence

By a Person in Federal Custody" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("Motion") on

December 9, 2004. [Doc. # 20].1

 In his Motion, Movant claims that his plea

agreement was not knowingly and voluntarily made, in that he though that he would

receive no more than 12 months imprisonment. [Id. at 4]. In his second claim,

Movant contends that counsel was ineffective for advising him that his sentence

would be "a minimum one." [Id.]. 

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2

 Movant failed to file a notice of change of address, and therefore the Court's

order regarding a Reply was returned as undeliverable. [Doc. # 31].

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I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 16, 2004, a criminal complaint was filed charging Movant with Reentry After Deportation, enhanced by a prior felony offense. [Doc. # 1]. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(a), (b)(2). Movant retained counsel. On September 7, 2004, Movant plead

guilty to Count II of an Information charging him with that offense. [Doc. # 8

(Information); 11]. The plea agreement outlines ranges of sentences that Movant

could receive, depending on the basis of the underlying felony conviction and his

criminal history. [Doc. # 19 at 2-4]. Movant was sentenced to 30 months

imprisonment and a two-year supervised release term. [Doc. # 17, 18]. The instant

motion followed.

In its Response to the Motion, the Government first contends that Movant

waived his right to appeal in the plea agreement. [Doc. # 29 at 2-3]. The

Government further avers that this waiver is valid because Movant received a

sentence consistent with the plea agreement. [Id. at 3]. As to Movant's claim that

his plea was not knowing or voluntary, the Government notes that during the plea

colloquy, Movant stated that he understood that his sentence could be up to 63

months imprisonment. [Id. at 4]. The Government concludes that counsel could not

have been ineffective, as Petitioner was sentenced at the bottom of the guideline

range. [Id.]. The Court provided time for Movant to file a Reply to the Government's

contentions (Doc. # 30), but Movant failed to do so even after the Court's Order was

mailed to the correct address.2

II. ANALYSIS

A federal prisoner may move the sentencing court to vacate, set aside or

correct his sentence "upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation

of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without

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jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the

maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 18 U.S.C.

§ 2255. Movant makes claims in his Motion of ineffective assistance of counsel in

violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and that his Fourteenth

Amendment due process rights were violated because his plea was not knowing and

voluntary in relation to the sentence he thought he would receive.

A. Movant's Waiver of His Appeal Rights

A movant may waive a right to appeal, including a right to relief pursuant to 28

U.S.C. section 2255, as part of a plea agreement. However, such a waiver may not

apply to a collateral attack alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, United States

v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d

1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993)). A defendant's waiver of appeal rights is only valid if it

is made knowingly and voluntarily. United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.3d 478, 480 (9th

Cir. 1991); United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.

denied, 503 U.S. 942 (1992). The longstanding test for determining the validity of

a guilty plea is whether 'the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice

among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.'" Hill v. Lockhart,

474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (internal citations omitted). Where a defendant is

represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice

of counsel, "the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice 'was

within the range of competency demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.'" Id. at 57

(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)).

Movant does not claim in his Motion that his waiver of appeal rights was not

knowingly or voluntarily made. Although the Government raised the issue of waiver,

Movant failed to respond to the contention. A review of the plea colloquy

demonstrates that the Court explained Movant's right to appeal his conviction and

sentence, and his right to collaterally attack his sentence, and that Movant

understood that he was waiving his these rights. [Doc. # 29, Attachment B at 14, ll.

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8-14 (Plea Colloquy Transcript)]. It would not have been unreasonable for counsel

to recommend that Movant accept the appeal waiver. Such a waiver is standard in

most plea agreements offered by the Government. If counsel would have insisted

that the waiver provision be removed, the Government easily could have rescinded

its plea offer. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Movant knowingly and voluntarily waived his

right to collaterally attack his sentence.

B. Movant's Claim That His Plea Was Not Knowing Or Voluntary As To The Sentence Received

To the extent that Movant did not waive his right to collaterally attack his

sentence, Movant's claim that he did not knowingly or voluntarily agree to the

possibility of a 30-month sentence fails. Movant stated during the plea colloquy that

he read the plea agreement, that his lawyer explained all of its provisions, and that

he was able to ask his attorney questions regarding its terms. [Doc. # 29,

Attachment B at 7]. The Magistrate Judge advised Movant that the maximum term

of imprisonment for the offense is up to 20 years in prison, and Movant stated that

he understood this. [Id. at 8-9]. The Magistrate Judge further asked if Movant

understood how the sentencing guidelines work, and Movant answered that he

understood. [Id. at 9-10]. The Magistrate Judge advised Movant that the maximum

guideline range under the plea agreement that he could receive was 63 months

incarceration. [Id. at 10]. Movant stated that he understood the maximum sentence

under the plea agreement. [Id.]. At no time during the plea colloquy did Movant

indicate to the Court that his counsel had advised him that he would receive a 12-

month sentence.

At his sentencing, the sentencing Judge explained how the sentencing

guidelines applied to Movant, and when asked if he understood, Movant stated in

the affirmative. [Id., Attachment C at 5-6 (Sentencing Transcript)]. When the

sentencing Judge indicated to Movant that his criminal history score, in combination

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with the downward departure in the plea agreement, resulted in a guideline

imprisonment range of 30 to 37 months, Movant stated that he understood this

calculation. [Id. at 8-9]. At no time during sentencing did Movant indicate to the

sentencing Judge that his attorney had told him that he would be receiving a 12-

month sentence.

The Court finds that Movant's plea agreement as to the possible sentencing

range for his crime was knowingly and voluntarily made. The Court, therefore, will

recommend dismissal of this claim.

C. Movant's Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim Related To The

Sentence Received

To prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Movant must

establish that: (1) considering all of the circumstances, his counsel's representation

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that Movant was

prejudiced by such representation. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88,

694 (1984); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-59 (1985); United States v. Solomon,

795 F.3d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1986). A movant establishes prejudice when "there is

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, Movant must identify the

specific acts or omissions of counsel that he alleges do not meet the reasonable

professional judgment standard. Id. at 688-90. The Court must then determine

whether the acts or omissions alleged fall outside a wide range of professionally

competent decisions given the surrounding circumstances. Id. Movant must

overcome the strong presumption that his counsel's conduct fell within this widerange of reasonable assistance, and that counsel made all significant decisions

exercising reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 689-90; United States v.

Hamilton, 792 F.3d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 1986), disapproved on other grounds, United

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States v. Kim, 105 F.3d 1579 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court determines the

reasonableness of counsel's actions from the facts of each particular case, and from

counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error based on all the attendant

circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

Movant's claim that counsel advised him that he would receive a 12-month

sentence is entirely unsupported by the record in this case. At both the plea

colloquy and his sentencing, neither counsel nor Movant indicated to the Court that

it was their understanding that Movant would receive a 12-month sentence. The

Court further notes that the sentencing Judge specifically explained to Movant that

someone with Movant's criminal history does not usually receive a sentence at the

low end of the guidelines. [Doc. # 29, Attachment C at 14]. Therefore, it cannot be

said that counsel's actions regarding the sentence Movant ultimately received were

unreasonable, or that Movant suffered prejudice from such actions. The Court will

recommend that this claim be denied.

III. RECOMMENDATION; ORDER

Based on the foregoing analysis,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Movant's "Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or

Correct Sentence By a Person in Federal Custody" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255

(Doc. # 20) be DENIED and DISMISSED in its entirety.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1),

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. The parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the

Court. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Rules 72, 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo

consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

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appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to

the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.

IT IS ORDERED that Movant file, within 20 days of the date of the filing of this

Report and Recommendation, a notice of change of address as required by the

Court's December 27, 2004 Order (Doc. # 22).

DATED this 23rd day of September, 2005.

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