Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-03553/USCOURTS-ca8-07-03553-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Patrick D. Staggs
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

1

 The Honorable Bobby R. Baldock, United States Circuit Judge for the Tenth

Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-3553

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Southern

* District of Iowa.

Patrick D. Staggs, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 15, 2008

Filed: June 5, 2008

___________

Before GRUENDER, BALDOCK,1

 and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Patrick D. Staggs appeals his revocation sentence, contending it exceeds the

statutory maximum. Having jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. §

3742, this court affirms.

In 1999, Staggs pled guilty to one count of receiving child pornography, 18

U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and one count of possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. §

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 The Honorable John A. Jarvey, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa.

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2252(a)(4)(B). Because he had previously been convicted of child pornography

charges, the receiving offense was a Class B felony punishable by up to 30 years, and

the possession offense was a Class C felony punishable by up to 10 years. Staggs was

sentenced to concurrent 68-month terms of imprisonment on each offense, and a fiveyear term of supervised release. As special conditions of supervised release, he was

ordered not to use a computer, access the internet, or possess pornographic material.

Staggs was released from custody in 2003, beginning the supervised release.

In September 2007, he admitted to his probation officer accessing “singles” websites

on a friend’s computer, and accessing and saving nude pictures on the computer.

Staggs stipulated to the violations. The district court2

 sentenced him to 30 months

imprisonment, and an additional 30 months of supervised release. Staggs appeals,

arguing that the 60-month combination of incarceration and additional supervised

release exceeds the statutory maximum. 

The maximum revocation sentence allowed, including imprisonment and

additional supervised release, is equal to the maximum term of supervised release

authorized for the original conviction offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); United States

v. Palmer, 380 F.3d 395, 398-99 (8th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Unless otherwise

provided, the authorized term of supervised release for the original conviction offense

is based on the class of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b). The maximum term of

supervised release is five years for a Class A or B felony, and three years for a Class

C or D felony. Id. Offense classification is determined by the “maximum term of

imprisonment authorized” for the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a). If the offense is

punishable by: life imprisonment or death, it is a Class A felony; 25 years or more, it

is a Class B felony; or 10 to 25 years, it is a Class C felony. Id. 

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When Staggs was convicted in 1999, the maximum for receiving child

pornography was 15 years, unless the defendant had a prior conviction for child

pornography, in which case it was 30 years. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1) (1999). 

Staggs argues that his receiving offence should be viewed, for revocation

purposes, as a Class C felony — not a Class B felony — because the base offense

without the recidivist enhancement had a maximum of only 15 years. The

classification statute defines the “maximum term of imprisonment authorized” as “the

term authorized by the law describing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3559(b). He

contends that the “law describing the offense” means only the elements of the base

crime, and therefore, the maximum term is that for the base offense, without any

punishment enhancers. Classifying the receiving offense as a Class C felony, Staggs’s

total revocation sentence could not exceed three years. Staggs acknowledges that he

did not object to the sentence in the district court, and therefore, review is for plain

error. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 465 (1997); Fed. R. Crim. P.

52(b). 

Staggs’s argument is refuted by the Supreme Court decision United States v.

Rodriquez, 128 S. Ct. 1783 (2008), No. 06-1646, slip op. (May 19, 2008). The Court

held that the phrase “maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by law,” as written

in the ACCA, means the maximum term allowable, including recidivist enhancements.

Rodriquez, 128 S. Ct. at ___, No. 06-1646, slip op. at 4. Analyzing the key statutory

phrases “law,” “offense,” and “maximum term,” the Court determined that the

relevant “law” is the provisions prescribing the “maximum term” for both a first

“offense,” and a second or subsequent “offense.” Id. Therefore, the recidivist

defendant’s “maximum term” was that authorized for a subsequent offense. Id. 

There is no relevant difference between the phrase at issue in Rodriquez,

“maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by law,” and the phrase at issue here,

“term authorized by the law describing the offense.” As in Rodriquez, the “law”

describing the offense includes both the base and recidivist provisions. See also

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United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 762 (1997) (defining “maximum term

authorized” as the “term available once all relevant statutory sentencing enhancements

are taken into account”), cited in Rodriquez, 128 S. Ct. at ___, No. 06-1646, slip op.

at 7-8. Therefore, Staggs’s “maximum term of imprisonment authorized” is 30 years,

a Class B felony.

Staggs also argues that the categorical approach of Taylor v. United States, 495

U.S. 575, 600-602 (1990), applies here. This argument is without merit. See

Rodriquez, 128 S. Ct. at ___, No. 06-1646, slip op. at 9 (finding no connection

between Taylor and the meaning of “maximum term of imprisonment”).

Further, Staggs’s argument produces absurd results. Though he only challenges

the revocation sentence, his argument would also apply to conviction sentencing

because the classification statute (upon which his argument rests) also applies at

conviction sentencing. If “the law describing the offense” means only the base

offense provisions, recidivist provisions would never apply. Even if not extended to

conviction sentencing, Staggs’s argument would result in an authorized maximum

sentence of 30 years on the original conviction, while that same authorized maximum

sentence would be only 15 years for purposes of revocation. “It is hard to accept the

proposition that a defendant may lawfully be sentenced to a term of imprisonment that

exceeds the ‘maximum term of imprisonment.’” Id. at 4. There is no error here, plain

or otherwise.

The district court’s sentence is affirmed.

______________________________

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