Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cr-00549/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cr-00549-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stanmore Cawthon Cooper
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v

STANMORE CAWTHON COOPER,

Defendant. /

No CR 05-0549 VRW

ORDER

Defendant Stanmore Cawthon Cooper is charged with three

counts of making false statements to a government agency in

violation of 18 USC § 1001. Cooper moves to suppress evidence. 

For reasons discussed below, Cooper’s motion is DENIED.

I

A

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) licenses

civilian pilots in the United States. Private pilots licensed by

the FAA must pass a medical examination every two years in order to

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obtain or renew their medical certificate from the FAA, which is a

precondition to continued licensure. FAA Form 8500-8 must be

completed as part of the application for a medical certificate. 

The examinee completes the first part of the form; the examining

physician completes the remainder of the form. Question 18 asks

examinees to indicate whether they have been diagnosed with various

medical conditions; Question 18(x), a catch-all, inquires about

“[o]ther illness, disability, or surgery.” Doc #16 (Jackson Decl),

Ex B.

Cooper’s counsel represents, and the government does not

dispute, the following facts: Cooper obtained a private pilot

license in 1964. In 1985, Cooper was diagnosed with the HIV virus. 

Because the FAA was not at that time issuing medical certificates

to persons with HIV, Cooper did not renew his medical certificate. 

By 1995, Cooper’s health had deteriorated and he applied for and

obtained disability benefits from the Social Security

Administration (SSA). New drug treatments allowed Cooper to

terminate his disability benefits and return to work in 1996. In

1998, Cooper learned that the FAA had begun issuing medical

certificates to eligible HIV-infected persons. Unable to find any

guidance regarding eligibility, and for fear of being disqualified,

Cooper applied for a medical certificate in 1998 without disclosing

his HIV condition. In 2000, Cooper discovered the criteria

governing special issuance of medical certificates to persons with

HIV. Cooper verified for himself that he met the criteria but

nevertheless did not disclose his condition in 2000, 2002 and 2004,

fearing possible punitive repercussions for his failure to disclose

his condition in 1998. 

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B

The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of

Transportation (DOT-OIG) and the Office of the Inspector General of

the Social Security Administration (SSA-OIG) each have the

responsibility of investigating crimes related to information

gathered by their respective agencies. Jackson Decl ¶1; Doc #18

(Stickley Decl) ¶1. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of

September 11, 2001, SSA-OIG and DOT-OIG undertook a project known

as “Operation Safe Pilot,” whereby SSA-OIG reviewed information

submitted by licensed pilots to the FAA. Doc #17 (Lasher Decl) ¶4. 

The purpose of Operation Safe Pilot “was to identify any active

FAA-licensed pilot who had obtained a license through

misrepresentation, generally of an SSN, on an FAA application.” Id

¶6. According to SSA Special Agent Robb Stickley, Operation Safe

Pilot proceeded as follows:

DOT-OIG provided SSA-OIG with each pilot’s name and

SSN, as provided to the FAA by the pilot. SSA-OIG

then compared that information to SSA databases. 

During the course of that comparison, SSA-OIG

discovered that certain pilots were receiving or had

received disability payments while simultaneously

claiming to the FAA that they were medically fit to

pilot an aircraft.

Stickley Decl ¶2.

Although “these discoveries were ancillary to” the original purpose

of Operation Safe Pilot, Lasher Decl ¶7, they nonetheless prompted

fraud investigations, whereby the SSA-OIG disclosed information to

the DOT-OIG. Cooper was the subject of one such investigation. 

Based on non-disclosure of his HIV condition on the

applications for a medical certificate in 2000, 2002 and 2004, the

indictment charges Cooper with three counts of making false

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statements to a government agency in violation of 18 USC § 1001. 

Doc #5. Cooper moves to suppress the records shared by the FAA and

the SSA and all other evidence obtained as a result of the exchange

of those records.

II

Cooper initially advanced three legal grounds for

suppression: the agencies’ sharing of his medical information

violated (1) the Fourth Amendment; (2) the Privacy Act of 1974, 5

USC § 552a; and (3) the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection

Act of 1988 (CMPPA). Cooper has since conceded that the CMPPA does

not apply to the facts of this case. Doc #20 at 14. Accordingly,

the court confines its discussion to the first two claims, but in

reverse order.

A

The Privacy Act provides: “No agency shall disclose any

record which is contained in a system of records by any means of

communication to any other person, or to another agency, except

pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent

of, the individual to whom the record pertains.” 5 USC § 552a(b). 

Significantly, however, this general prohibition is subject to

twelve exceptions, including disclosures made pursuant to a

“routine use.” Id § 552a(b)(3). The Act defines “routine use” as

“the use of such record for a purpose which is compatible with the

purpose for which it was collected.” Id § 552a(a)(7). Agencies

are required to publish routine uses in the Federal Register. Id §

552a(e)(4)(D).

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The government contends that Cooper’s records were

exchanged pursuant to routine uses established by the FAA and the

SSA. For example, the government cites the following routine use

notice published by the SSA:

Information from this system of records may be

disclosed to any other federal agency or any

foreign, state, or local government agency

responsible for enforcing, investigating, or

prosecuting violations of administrative, civil, or

criminal law or regulation where that information is

relevant to an enforcement proceeding,

investigation, or prosecution within the agency’s

jurisdiction.

55 Fed Reg 46,248 (November 2, 1990), adopted by SSA-OIG, 60 Fed

Reg 19,619 (April 19, 1995).

It is doubtful whether disclosure of Cooper’s SSA records

to the FAA for the purpose of determining whether Cooper was

entitled to a medical certificate from the FAA is “compatible with”

the purpose for which Cooper’s information was collected by the

SSA. See Swenson v United States Postal Service, 890 F2d 1075,

1078 (9th Cir 1989) (stating that compatibility under § 552a(a)(7)

requires “more than mere relevance: ‘There must be a more concrete

relationship or similarity, some meaningful degree of convergence,

between the disclosing agency’s purpose in gathering the

information and in its disclosure.’” (quoting Britt v Naval

Investigative Service, 886 F2d 544, 549-50 (3d Cir 1989))); see

also Covert v Harrington, 876 F2d 751, 755 (9th Cir 1989)

(suggesting in dictum that the collection of data for security

clearance purposes would not be compatible with disclosure to a

criminal investigation). Further, the court questions whether Form

SSA-3368-BK (reproduced below, see infra II(B)) adequately informs

individuals of the routine uses upon which the government now

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relies as required by § 552a(e)(3)(C). See Covert, 876 F2d at 755. 

These uncertainties aside, the court concludes that a violation of

the Privacy Act does not, by itself, justify exclusion of evidence

in a criminal proceeding.

The Privacy Act specifies civil remedies and criminal

penalties for violations of the Act. See 5 USC § 552a(g), (i). 

The Privacy Act does not explicitly provide that its remedies are

exclusive. Cf United States v Forest, 355 F3d 942, 949 (6th Cir

2004) (holding that suppression of electronic communications is not

a statutory remedy under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and

Safe Streets Act of 1968, which provides that its remedies are

exclusive), vacated on other grounds, 125 S Ct 1050 (2005); United

States v Frazin, 780 F2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir 1986) (holding that an

exclusionary remedy is unavailable for violations of the Right to

Financial Privacy Act of 1978 because the statute specifies that

its remedies were exclusive). Nonetheless, courts outside this

circuit have suggested that the Privacy Act’s remedies are

exclusive. See United States v Bressler, 772 F2d 287, 293 (7th Cir

1985); United States v Gillotti, 822 F Supp 984, 989 (WDNY 1993). 

Although these decisions are persuasive authorities, the court

declines the government’s invitation simply to follow those courts’

lead without more. Only Gilotti, in an opinion authored by a

magistrate judge, considered the issue in the context of a motion

to suppress. Further, the court does not find the government’s

citation to Congress’s expression of its intent to subject federal

agencies to civil suit for Privacy Act violations, see Privacy Act

of 1974, Pub L No 93-579, § 2(a)(6), to be particularly helpful;

that statement of legislative purpose is no more probative of an

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intent to create certain remedies to the exclusion of others than

the remedial provisions themselves. Still, the Ninth Circuit has

declined to imply an exclusionary remedy for statutory violations

when Congress has expressly created other remedies, regardless

whether Congress provided that those remedies are exclusive. See

United States v Michaelian, 803 F2d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir 1986)

(affirming district court’s refusal to fashion an exclusionary

remedy for violations of 26 USC § 6103(h), which restricts

disclosure of tax information by the Internal Revenue Service to

the Department of Justice).

Further, although the Supreme Court has in the past held

it proper for federal courts to exercise their supervisory power to

suppress evidence obtained through non-constitutional illegality,

see Miller v United States, 357 US 301 (1958); McNabb v United

States, 318 US 332 (1943), the Supreme Court has in more recent

times refused to extend the exclusionary remedy to situations in

which the defendant’s constitutional rights have not been violated,

see United States v Payner, 447 US 727 (1980) (holding it an

improper exercise of supervisory power to suppress evidence

illegally obtained from a third party); United States v Caceres,

440 US 741 (1979) (holding it an improper exercise of supervisory

power to suppress evidence obtained in violation of agency

regulations). Although the Ninth Circuit has declined to “limit

the exclusionary rule to use as a remedy for constitutional

violations alone,” it has nonetheless acknowledged that “an

exclusionary rule is typically available only for constitutional

violations, not for statutory or treaty violations.” United States

v Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F3d 882, 886 (9th Cir 2000) (en banc).

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In sum, judicially implied exclusionary remedies for

statutory violations are disfavored, particularly when Congress has

specified other remedies. Cooper overlooks these principles and

does nothing more than argue that suppression is an appropriate

remedy because the Privacy Act does not explicitly provide that its

remedies are exclusive. The court is unpersuaded and declines to

exercise its supervisory power to fashion an exclusionary remedy in

this case. Accordingly, Cooper must show that his constitutional

rights have been violated to obtain exclusion. 

B

“The Fourth Amendment protects legitimate expectations of

privacy rather than simply places.” Illinois v Andreas, 463 US

765, 771 (1983). Accordingly, “[t]o invoke the protections of the

Fourth Amendment, a person must show he had a legitimate

expectation of privacy.” United States v Nerber, 222 F3d 597, 599

(9th Cir 2000) (quotations omitted). In order to establish a

legitimate expectation of privacy, a person must demonstrate that

(1) he actually harbored an expectation of privacy and (2) the

expectation was “one that society is prepared to recognize as

reasonable.” Id (quotations omitted). 

A few background principles of Fourth Amendment law guide

the court. First, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not

places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his

own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment

protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an

area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”

Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 351-52 (1967) (citations

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omitted). Thus, it is not fatal to Cooper’s position that his

records were longer within his control, see, e g, Ex parte Jackson,

96 US 727, 733 (“The constitutional guaranty of the right of the

people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches

and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against

inspection, wherever they may be.”), or that his records were

lawfully possessed by the government, see, e g, Walter v United

States, 447 US 649, 654 (1980) (“The fact that FBI agents were

lawfully in possession of the boxes of film did not give them

authority to search their contents” because “it has been settled

that an officer’s authority to possess a package is distinct from

his authority to examine its contents.”) (citations omitted). 

But the protection of the Fourth Amendment is not without

limits. Relevant for present purposes, the Supreme Court has

refused to recognize a legitimate expectation of privacy in

information that an individual has shared with third parties, even

when such disclosure was made under a cloak of confidentiality. To

the contrary, “[t]he [Supreme] Court has held repeatedly that the

Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information

revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government

authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption

that it will be used for a limited purpose and the confidence

placed in the third party will not be betrayed.” United States v

Miller, 425 US 435, 443 (1976). Similarly, when a defendant

transmits information with the knowledge that it may be recorded

and used by a third party for certain purposes unrelated to law

enforcement, there can be no legitimate expectation of privacy

notwithstanding that the defendant did not actually anticipate that

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the information might be shared with law enforcement. Thus, for

example, the Supreme Court held that the use of a “pen register” to

document telephone numbers dialed by the defendant did not

constitute a search because it was “too much to believe” that

telephone subscribers “harbor any general expectation that the

numbers they dial will remain secret” given subscribers’ knowledge

“that they must convey numerical information to the phone company;

that the phone company has facilities for recording the

information; and that the phone company does in fact record this

information for legitimate business purposes.” Smith v Maryland,

442 US 735, 743 (1979). Although this case involves disclosure by

governmental agencies rather than private third parties, the

foregoing principles are still relevant inasmuch as Cooper claims

an expectation of privacy in information he knowingly divulged to

the outside world. 

Relying primarily upon the Privacy Act, Cooper contends

he had a legitimate expectation that the medical records he

submitted to the FAA and the SSA would be kept confidential. 

Although there is surprisingly little case law addressing whether

the Privacy Act may give rise to a legitimate expectation of

privacy in information provided to government agencies, courts have

not been unreceptive to claims of a legitimate expectation of

privacy predicated on the Privacy Act. See, e g, United States v

Jackson, 381 F3d 984, 990 (10th Cir 2004) (assuming, without

deciding, “that the Privacy Act can create a reasonable expectation

of privacy that could support suppression of evidence”); cf

Kimberlin v United States Dep’t of Justice, 788 F2d 434, 438-39

(7th Cir 1985) (opining, in the context of due process claims, that

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the plaintiff’s argument that he had an expectation of privacy

based on the Privacy Act “may be persuasive in a general context,”

but nevertheless finding no violation of plaintiff’s rights because

disclosure was proper pursuant to the routine use exception). The

court finds that the Privacy Act, although not necessarily

dispositive, could properly bear on a defendant’s subjective

expectation of privacy or on society’s preparedness to accept an

expectation of privacy as reasonable. Cf United States Dep’t of

Justice v Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 US 749,

766-67 (1989) (looking to “Congress’ basic policy concern”

expressed in the Privacy Act in evaluating an individual’s privacy

interest in his FBI “rap sheet” for purposes of the Freedom of

Information Act). But cf id at 762 n 13 (“The question of the

statutory meaning of privacy under the FOIA is, of course, not the

same as the question whether * * * an individual’s interest in

privacy is protected by the Constitution.”). 

With regard to Cooper’s subjective expectation of privacy

in the information submitted to the FAA and the SSA, the Privacy

Act statements printed on the forms completed by Cooper are the

proper starting point. Form SSA-3368-BK, which Cooper completed as

part of his application for disability benefits, states that

information furnished “on this form is almost never used for any

purpose other than making a determination on your disability

claim.” But the form goes on to provide that 

such information may be disclosed by the [SSA] as

follows: (1) To enable a third party or agency to

assist [the SSA] in establishing rights to Social

Security benefits and/or coverage; (2) to comply

with Federal laws requiring the release of

information from Social Security records (e.g., to

the General Accounting Office and the Veterans

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Administration); and (3) to facilitate statistical

research and audit activities necessary to assure

the integrity and improvement of the Social Security

programs). These and other reasons why information

about you may be used or given out are explained in

the Federal Register. If you would like more

information about this, any Social Security office

can assist you.

Stickley Decl, Ex A.

Similarly, although FAA Form 8500-8, which Cooper completed in

connection with his application for a medical certificate, states

that “the purpose of the information is to determine whether you

meet [FAA] medical requirements,” it further provides:

These records and information in these records may

be used (a) to provide basic airman certification

and qualification information to the public upon

request; (b) to disclose information to the National

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in connection

with its investigation responsibilities; (c) to

provide information about airmen to Federal, state,

and local law enforcement agencies when engaged in

the investigation and apprehension of drug law

violators; (d) to provide information about

enforcement actions arising out of violations of the

Federal Aviation Regulations to government agencies,

the aviation industry, and the public upon request;

(e) to disclose information to another Federal

agency, or to a court or an administrative tribunal,

when the Government or one of its agencies is a

party to a [judicial or administrative proceeding];

and (f) to comply with the Prefatory Statement of

General Routine Uses for the Department of

Transportation.

Jackson Decl, Ex B.

Cooper argues that the disclosures were not made pursuant

to any of the specific routine uses described on the forms. For

Fourth Amendment purposes, Cooper’s argument misses the mark. The

question to be decided is whether Cooper had a subjective

expectation of privacy, not whether the SSA and the FAA acted in

conformance with the Privacy Act. And based on these two Privacy

Act statements, Cooper could not have expected that his medical

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information would be held in a level of confidence that would

implicate the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Although these

statements did not advise Cooper that his medical information might

be disclosed for purposes of inter-agency investigations such as

Operation Safe Pilot, he was nonetheless apprised that his

information might be disclosed to other agencies, third parties or

the public for investigative and other purposes. 

According to Cooper, other considerations shaped his

subjective expectation. First, prior to applying for disability

benefits, he was provided with a pamphlet (SSA Publication No 05-

10020) that stated “[a]ll Social Security files are kept strictly

confidential.” Doc #20 (Cooper Decl) ¶2. Second, Cooper refers to

a public policy known as “HIV Exceptionalism” described on the

website of the Department of Health and Human Services, Health

Resources and Services Administration. Id ¶4. According to

Cooper, “one of the purposes of this policy was to provide extra

statutory privacy protections to persons infected with HIV.” Id. 

Finally, Cooper appears to suggest that his subjective expectation

in the privacy of his medical information was shaped by the Privacy

Act itself. See Doc #11 at 8-9 (“Based upon the Privacy Act of

1974, [Cooper] had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that the

highly sensitive medical records which he gave to the SSA should

have been kept inviolate by their very nature.”).

With regard to “HIV exceptionalism,” there is no evidence

that this rather vague “policy” was incorporated by statute or

regulations of the SSA or the FAA. More importantly, Cooper does

not -- and likely cannot -- state that this actually shaped his

expectation of privacy when he submitted his medical information to

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the SSA or the FAA. Further, it is “too much to believe,” Smith,

442 US at 743, that, based on the Privacy Act, Cooper expected his

medical information would be “kept inviolate,” Doc #11 at 9, by the

SSA or the FAA given that the Privacy Act’s protection is riddled

with exceptions -- a reality that must have been apparent to Cooper

based on the above-quoted Privacy Act statements. Similarly,

although the SSA’s statement that all files would be kept “strictly

confidential” could have, standing alone, given rise to a

subjective expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes,

any such expectation would have been undermined by the Privacy Act

statements on Form SSA-3368-BK.

Even if the court were to accept that Cooper harbored an

expectation of privacy, the court finds that Cooper’s expectation

is not one that society is prepared to accept as reasonable. 

“Legitimation of privacy by law must have a source outside the

Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or

personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and

permitted by society.” Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128, 143 n 12

(1978). Here, the court need look no further than the Privacy Act,

which is a meaningful barometer of society’s preparedness to accept

Cooper’s expectation as reasonable. Cf Reporters Committee, 489 US

at 766-67. In this regard, the Privacy Act demonstrates that

society is not prepared to accept as reasonable an individual’s

expectation that information he provides to one governmental agency

will not be shared with other agencies for purposes of 

investigating violations of law. Specifically, § 552a(b)(7) 

provides that agencies may disclose records 

to another agency * * * for a civil or criminal law

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enforcement activity if the activity is authorized

by law, and if the head of the agency has made a

written request to the agency which maintains the

record specifying the particular portion desired and

the law enforcement activity for which the record is

sought.

Again, although it does not appear that the FAA or the

SSA acted pursuant to this exception when they exchanged Cooper’s

records, see Lasher Decl ¶8, that is of no import. What matters is

that this exception reflects a societal determination that records

containing information knowingly and voluntarily submitted to one

agency are not protected from disclosure to another agency without

a warrant or consent when such disclosure is made for purposes of

law enforcement. The court has no trouble concurring, especially

when, as in this case, the agencies have reason to believe a

violation of law has been committed. Cooper does not cite, nor has

the court found, authority indicating the Constitution requires

more under these circumstances. Accordingly, whatever expectation

of privacy Cooper may have actually entertained, the court

concludes that society is not prepared to accept that expectation

as reasonable. Consequently, the conduct of the FAA and the SSA

does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.

Cooper’s motion to suppress is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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