Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00851/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00851-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sharon Kay Clark
Plaintiff
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SHARON KAY CLARK, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

 No. 2:14-cv-0851 AC (TEMP) 

ORDER 

 This social security action was submitted to the court without oral argument for ruling on 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.1 

For the reasons explained below, plaintiff’s motion is granted, the decision of the Commissioner 

of Social Security (“Commissioner”) is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this order. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 In July of 2010, plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) 

under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), alleging disability beginning on June 30, 

 

1

 Both parties have previously consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction over this action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See ECF Nos. 8 & 10. 

Case 2:14-cv-00851-DB Document 19 Filed 03/09/16 Page 1 of 15
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

2010. (Transcript (“Tr.”) at 16, 173-79.) Plaintiff’s application was denied initially, (id. at 123-

27), and upon reconsideration. (Id. at 137-41.) Plaintiff requested a hearing and a hearing was 

held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on August 2, 2012 and August 3, 2012. (Id. at 

49-105.) Plaintiff was represented by an attorney and testified at the administrative hearing. (Id. 

at 49-50.) 

 In a decision issued on September 7, 2012, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. 

(Id. at 29.) The ALJ entered the following findings: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through March 31, 2014. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since June 30, 2010, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et 

seq). 

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: depressive 

disorder, frozen right shoulder, degenerative disc disease of the 

lumber and cervical spine (20 CFR 404.1520(c)). 

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 

(20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526). 

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to 

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except she 

can sit for 8 hours requiring a change of position every 30 minutes 

to one hour without leaving the work stations, stand or walk 30-45 

minutes at a time for a total of 6 hours in an 8-hour day. She could 

not climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, and has no limitations in the 

left upper extremity. In the right upper extremity she can 

occasionally lift above the head or shoulder, and lift in all 

directions. She is able to interact appropriately with the general 

public, coworkers and supervisors. She has no limitation in her 

ability to receive, remember and carryout simple job instructions; 

occasionally receive, remember and carryout detailed job 

instructions, job related judgments and able to make judgments and 

adjustments to changes in the workplace. 

6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a 

cashier. This work does not require the performance of workrelated activities precluded by the claimant’s residual functional 

capacity (20 CFR 404.1565). 

//// 

//// 

Case 2:14-cv-00851-DB Document 19 Filed 03/09/16 Page 2 of 15
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from June 30, 2010, through the date of this 

decision (20 CFR 404.1520(f)). 

(Id. at 18-29.) 

 On March 5, 2014, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s 

September 7, 2012 decision. (Id. at 1-3.) Plaintiff sought judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) by filing the complaint in this action on April 4, 2014. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

 “The district court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision for substantial evidence, 

and the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial 

evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001); Sandgathe v. 

Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). 

 “[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 

simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 

466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 

1989)). If, however, “the record considered as a whole can reasonably support either affirming or 

reversing the Commissioner’s decision, we must affirm.” McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 

1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 A five-step evaluation process is used to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). The five-step 

process has been summarized as follows: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? 

If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, 

proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

Case 2:14-cv-00851-DB Document 19 Filed 03/09/16 Page 3 of 15
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If 

so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity 

to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If 

not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987). The Commissioner bears the burden 

if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.; Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 

1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

APPLICATION 

 In her pending motion plaintiff asserts the following three principal claims: (1) the ALJ 

erred in his treatment of the medical opinion evidence; (2) the ALJ improperly rejected plaintiff’s 

own subjective testimony; and (3) the ALJ’s question to the Vocational Expert was incomplete. 

I. Medical Opinion Evidence

 Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s treatment of the medical opinions offered by Lynn 

Holmquist, David E. McGee-Williams and Lynne Fiore. Although the ALJ’s decision provides a 

detailed and thorough recitation of the opinions offered by these individuals, the ALJ concludes 

his analysis of all the medical opinion evidence in a single lengthy paragraph that is vague and 

conclusory, and ends by simply asserting that: 

Dr. McGee-Williams, Dr. Fiore and physician assistant Holmquist’s 

conclusions are inconsistent with the other treatment records, they 

lack probative value. The undersigned gives those opinions little 

evidentiary weight. 

(Tr. at 28.) 

 In this regard, the ALJ’s decision properly and appropriately recounted the opinion of 

Lynn Holmquist, a physician’s assistant, (“PAC), who had seen plaintiff “monthly since March 

2009 for cervical disc disease, shoulder pain and frozen shoulder.” (Id. at 25.) The ALJ then 

went on to recount PAC’s Holmquist’s summary of plaintiff’s symptoms and limitations. 

Case 2:14-cv-00851-DB Document 19 Filed 03/09/16 Page 4 of 15
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

Specifically, the ALJ acknowledged that it was PAC’s Holmquist’s opinion, in relevant part, that 

plaintiff’s limitations restricted her to sitting and standing/walking for 30 minutes at a time for a 

total of four hours in an eight-hour day, but plaintiff would need to “get up and walk around for 

ten minutes every 30 minutes,” and would need to shift positions and take unscheduled breaks 

three to four times a shift. (Id.) Moreover, according to PAC Holmquist, plaintiff could 

occasionally lift up to 10 pounds, rarely lift 20 pounds, and “would miss work four days each 

month.” (Id. at 25-26.) 

 Despite fully recounting PAC’s Holmquist’s opinion, the ALJ stated that he afforded 

“[l]ittle weight” to PAC Holmquist’s opinion stating simply that the opinion was rendered by “a 

physician (sic) assistant and not an acceptable medical source.” (Id. at 28) As noted above, the 

ALJ also stated that “Holmquist’s conclusions are inconsistent with other treatment records, they 

lack probative value,” and, therefore, were given “little evidentiary weight.” (Id.) 

 Although the opinion of a physician’s assistant is not an opinion from an acceptable 

medical source, it is an “other source” opinion.2 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d)(1). Opinions and 

evidence from other sources, such as physician’s assistants, are important and must be evaluated 

by the ALJ. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2014) (the ALJ erred by 

failing to recognize “other source that can provide evidence about the severity of a claimant’s 

impairments and how it affects the claimant’s ability to work”); SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, 

at *3 (“Opinions from these medical sources, who are not technically deemed ‘acceptable medical 

sources’ under our rules, are important and should be evaluated on key issues such as impairment 

severity and functional effects, along with the other relevant evidence in the file.”). The ALJ may 

only discount evidence from an “other source,” such as a physician’s assistant, if the ALJ gives a 

germane reason to each witness for doing so. See Britton v. Colvin, 787 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th 

Cir. 2015); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012); Petty v. Colvin, 954 

 

2

 “However, a physician’s assistant may be considered to be an acceptable medical source where 

the assistant consults frequently and works closely with a physician and thus acts as an agent of 

the doctor in the relationship with the patient.” Xiong v. Astrue, No. 1:09-cv-0928 SKO, 2010 

WL 3715135, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2010) (citing In Gomez v. Chater, 74 F.3d 967, 970-71 

(9th Cir. 1996)). 

Case 2:14-cv-00851-DB Document 19 Filed 03/09/16 Page 5 of 15
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

F.Supp.2d 914, 926 (D. Ariz. 2013) (“An ALJ is free to discount testimony from other sources, 

but as the Commissioner concedes, he must give reasons germane to each witness for doing so.”). 

Here, the ALJ failed to offer any reason for rejecting PAC’s Holmquist’s opinion aside from the 

bare assertion that the opinion, along with the opinions of Dr. McGee-Williams and Dr. Fiore, 

was inconsistent with other, unspecified, treatment records. 

 The ALJ’s decision also discussed the opinion of Dr. David E. McGee-Williams, a 

“Clinical Psychologist Neuropsychology.” (Tr. at 245.) Dr. McGee-Williams examined plaintiff 

on January 27, 2010, February 22, 2010, March 4, 2010, March 5, 2010, and April 7, 2010, 

during which time he administered the Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Test Battery for 

Adults, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III, the Wechsler Memory Scale-III, the Woodcock 

Johnson-III Test of Cognitive Abilities (Visual-Auditory Learning subtest), the MMPI-2, a 

Neuropsychological History Questionnaire, the Neuropsychological Deficit Scale for Adults and 

a clinical interview. (Id.) Although Dr. McGee-Williams examined plaintiff most recently in 

April of 2010, Dr. McGee-Williams submitted his report to the ALJ on May 6, 2011, and noted 

that because more than a year had passed since he examined the plaintiff he could not “comment 

on the patient’s current status.” (Id. at 244.) 

 The ALJ noted that IQ tests administered by Dr. McGee-Williams placed plaintiff “in the 

borderline range,” that her Wechsler Memory Scale-III score placed plaintiff in the “extremely 

low” range, and that plaintiff “obtained a general neuropsychological deficit scale score of 52 

which places her in the moderately impaired range.” (Id. at 24-25.) Plaintiff’s “most significant 

levels of impairment occurred in the areas of higher-order cognitive processing, incidental 

memory function, non-visually mediated spatial motor skills, higher-level attention concentration, 

and cognitive flexibility.” (Id. at 25.) “When one calculates the Halsted Impairment Index 

(composed of the seven most brain-sensitive subsets) it is found that 100% of these tests are in the 

impaired range.” (Id.) The ALJ also noted that it was the opinion of Dr. McGee-Williams that 

this “was a generalized brain impairment pattern, as there are no significant left/right hemispheric 

//// 

//// 

Case 2:14-cv-00851-DB Document 19 Filed 03/09/16 Page 6 of 15
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7

differences,” and that this was “a long-standing brain impairment pattern present, in all 

probability, since birth.”3 (Id.) 

 The ALJ’s opinion, however, expressly “sets aside” the report of Dr. McGee-Williams, 

because Dr. McGee-Williams “had seen the claimant once previously,” and “stated on May 6, 

2011 that he was unable to assess the claimant’s current mental functioning.” (Id. at 28.) As was 

true of PAC Holmquist and as noted above, after discussing other medical opinion evidence, the 

ALJ asserts in a vague and conclusory manner that the opinion of Dr. McGee-Williams was 

“inconsistent with other treatment records . . . lack[s] probative value,” and, therefore, [was] 

given “little evidentiary weight.” (Id.) 

 However, it is clear that Dr. McGee-Williams had seen the plaintiff on more than one 

occasion, as his opinion states that he examined plaintiff on five occasions. (Id. at 245.) 

Moreover, it is entirely unclear why the opinion of an examining physician, and a specialist, 

should be set aside or given little weight simply because the physician saw the plaintiff on only 

one occasion.4 Examining physicians often see the claimant on only one occasion. 

 Additionally, the fact that Dr. McGee-Williams was unable to comment on plaintiff’s 

condition as of May 6, 2011, provides no basis for the ALJ’s decision to set aside his opinion. 

The question before the ALJ was whether plaintiff had been under a disability from June 30, 

2010, through the date of the decision. (Id. at 29.) Although it is not clear exactly when Dr. 

 

3

 Although not discussed in the ALJ’s decision, the testing administered by Dr. McGee-Williams 

also found that if plaintiff “engaged in a particular task and is interrupted, she is likely to have 

serious difficulty returning to the original task without undue levels of inefficiency,” that plaintiff 

“demonstrated difficulty sustaining attention/concentration and perform (sic) mental work under 

increasing time pressure and demand,” and that plaintiff “demonstrated severe impairment” in 

higher-order cognitive processing. (Tr. at 247.) Moreover, Dr. McGee-Williams also opined, 

with regard to plaintiff’s long-standing brain impairment, that “[t]he psychological effects are 

undoubtedly going to include frustration, anger and probable depression,” and that “[s]imply 

attempting to negotiate the demands of everyday life effectively, with the kinds of deficits and 

lack of general intellectual power seen here, is going to be very difficult.” (Tr. at 249.) 

4

 Generally greater weight should be given to the “‘opinion of a specialist about medical issues 

related to his or her area of specialty.’” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 594 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5)). 

Case 2:14-cv-00851-DB Document 19 Filed 03/09/16 Page 7 of 15
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8

McGee-Williams drafted his opinion, it had to have been sometime on or after April 7, 2010, the 

date he last examined plaintiff. 

 “Where evidence predating the alleged date of disability is made part of the record, the 

regulations require the Commissioner to consider that evidence.” Cotton v. Colvin, No. 5:14-CV425-FL, 2015 WL 5714912, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 29, 2015) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(3) 

(“We will consider all evidence in your case record when we make a determination.”)); see also 

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The ALJ must consider all medical 

opinion evidence.”); Vandenboom v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 2005) (“there is no 

valid reason to exclude consideration of medical records dated prior to Vandenboom’s alleged 

date of onset”); Sayers v. Colvin, No. 3:14-CV-00253-RCJ-WGC, 2015 WL 5092669, at *7 (D. 

Nev. Aug. 25, 2015) (rejecting Commissioner’s assertion “that the ALJ was not required to 

discuss [medical opinions] because they were not significant or probative as they were rendered 

prior to the alleged amended onset date”). 

 Moreover, the ALJ’s vague and conclusory assertion that the opinion of Dr. McGee 

Williams was “inconsistent with the other treatment records,” is not sufficient. (Tr. at 28.) In this 

regard, “an ALJ errs when he rejects a medical opinion or assigns it little weight while doing 

nothing more than ignoring it, asserting without explanation that another medical opinion is more 

persuasive, or criticizing it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive basis for his 

conclusion.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012-13. 

 With respect to Dr. Fiore, a psychologist, on June 21, 2012, Lynne Fiore, Ph.D.,5

completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire. (Tr. at 608-12.) Although the 

ALJ’s opinion states that Dr. Fiore had “seen the claimant once on April 17, 2012 for chronic 

major depressive disorder and developmental problems,” (id. at 27), Dr. Fiore’s opinion states 

that plaintiff was seen on two occasions, April 17, 2012, and June 5, 2012. (Id. at 608.) The ALJ 

recounted Dr. Fiore’s opinion, noting that Dr. Fiore “sees the claimant for individual therapy to 

reduce depression and pain management skills,” that the plaintiff had “moderate-severe 

 

5

 At one point, the ALJ’s decision mistakenly refers to Dr. Fiore as an “M.D.” (Tr. at 27.) 

Case 2:14-cv-00851-DB Document 19 Filed 03/09/16 Page 8 of 15
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

9

depression,” “has confusion and difficulty talking at times,” and “[b]ased on Dr. McGee-Williams 

neurocognitive evaluation” and testing plaintiff had “serious limitations in mental functioning,” 

and “a brain impairment since birth impacting her job performance, mental health and daily living 

expectations.” (Id. at 27.) The ALJ also noted that Dr. Fiore opined that plaintiff could likely 

“not hold a job due to disabilities.”6 (Id.) 

 The ALJ stated with respect to Dr. Fiore’s opinion that: 

Dr. Fiore gave very restrictive mental limitations noting that the 

claimant has moderate-severe depression. She opined that the 

claimant’s condition has not changed since the report of Dr. 

McGee-Williams on April 7, 2010. Dr. Fiore’s assessed limitations 

are too restrictive for the objective findings in the record. Dr. 

Fiore’s statement that the claimant has a brain impairment since 

birth impacting her job performance, mental health and daily living 

expectations and that she could “probably not hold a job due to 

disabilities” is given no probative value here. The claimant has 

held jobs for 2-3 years at a time. Clearly, the claimant does not 

have a brain impairment since birth making her unable to hold a 

job. 

(Tr. at 28.) 

 The ALJ, however, may not reject Dr. Fiore’s opinion by simply asserting that the 

“assessed limitations are too restrictive for the objective findings in the record” or as 

“inconsistent with the other treatment records.” In this regard, the weight to be given to medical 

opinions in Social Security disability cases depends in part on whether the opinions are proffered 

by treating, examining, or nonexamining health professionals. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; Fair v. 

Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989). “As a general rule, more weight should be given to 

the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant . . . .” 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. This is so because a treating doctor is employed to cure and has a greater 

opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1285; Bates v. 

 

6

 Although not discussed in the ALJ’s decision, Dr. Fiore also evaluated plaintiff’s mental 

abilities and aptitudes needed to do unskilled work, semiskilled and skilled work, and particular 

types of jobs. With the exception of her abilities to interact appropriately with the general public, 

maintain socially appropriate behavior and adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness, 

Fiore found that plaintiff was either seriously limited, but not precluded or unable to meet 

competitive standards. (Tr. at 610-11.) 

Case 2:14-cv-00851-DB Document 19 Filed 03/09/16 Page 9 of 15
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

10

Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1990). The uncontradicted opinion of a treating or 

examining physician may be rejected only for clear and convincing reasons, while the opinion of 

a treating or examining physician that is controverted by another doctor may be rejected only for 

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 

830-31. As noted above, “an ALJ errs when he rejects a medical opinion or assigns it little 

weight while doing nothing more than ignoring it, asserting without explanation that another 

medical opinion is more persuasive, or criticizing it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a 

substantive basis for his conclusion.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012-13. 

 Moreover, with respect to Dr. Fiore’s statements concerning whether plaintiff has had a 

brain impairment since birth and her inability to “hold a job,” although it is not clear from the 

ALJ’s opinion, Dr. Fiore actually made two separate statements in response to two separate 

portions of the Mental Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire. In this regard, when asked to 

explain plaintiff’s limitations in her abilities and aptitude to do particular job types, Dr. Fiore 

responded that plaintiff “has a brain impairment since birth impacting job performance, mental 

health and daily living expectations.” (Tr. at 611.) A later question asks Dr. Fiore to estimate 

how often plaintiff’s impairments would cause her to be absent from work, and Dr. Fiore 

responded that plaintiff “probably couldn’t hold a job due to disabilities afore mentioned.” (Tr. at 

612.) Although evidence that plaintiff has held a job would certainly be inconsistent with Dr. 

Fiore’s assertion that plaintiff could not hold a job due to her disabilities, it is not inconsistent 

with Dr. Fiore’s opinion that plaintiff has had a brain impairment since birth nor is it a specific 

and legitimate reason supported by substantial evidence in the record for discrediting Dr. Fiore’s 

entire opinion. 

 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the court finds that the ALJ’s treatment of the 

medical opinion evidence constituted error. Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to relief with respect to 

this claim. 

II. Subjective Testimony

 The Ninth Circuit has summarized the ALJ’s task with respect to assessing a claimant’s 

credibility as follows: 

Case 2:14-cv-00851-DB Document 19 Filed 03/09/16 Page 10 of 15
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

11

To determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective 

pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step 

analysis. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 

presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 

symptoms alleged. The claimant, however, need not show that her 

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of 

the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could 

reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom. Thus, the 

ALJ may not reject subjective symptom testimony . . . simply 

because there is no showing that the impairment can reasonably 

produce the degree of symptom alleged. 

Second, if the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence 

of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about 

the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so . . . . 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). “The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required in Social Security 

cases.” Moore v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002). “At 

the same time, the ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else 

disability benefits would be available for the asking . . . .” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 

(9th Cir. 2012). 

 “The ALJ must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 

693 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 

1999)). In weighing a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ may consider, among other things, the 

“[claimant’s] reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in [claimant’s] testimony or 

between [her] testimony and [her] conduct, [claimant’s] daily activities, [her] work record, and 

testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the 

symptoms of which [claimant] complains.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 

2002) (modification in original) (quoting Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 

1997)). If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the 

court “may not engage in second-guessing.” Id. 

 Here, the ALJ’s decision fails to identify what portions of plaintiff’s testimony were 

credible and what portions of testimony undermined her complaints. The ALJ’s decision does 

Case 2:14-cv-00851-DB Document 19 Filed 03/09/16 Page 11 of 15
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

12

recount plaintiff’s testimony, including her testimony that she “cannot walk one hour; sit for 4 

hours . . . is unable to stand for 30 minutes at a time,” and “lies down 3-4 hours at a time.” (Tr. at 

22-23.) However, the ALJ’s decision then rejects plaintiff’s testimony by stating simply that 

although plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause 

the alleged symptoms” plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting 

effects of those symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with” the ALJ’s 

residual functional capacity assessment. (Id. at 24.) In this regard, the ALJ’s decision does not 

provide a clear and convincing reason for rejecting plaintiff’s subjective testimony regarding her 

symptoms. 

 Accordingly, plaintiff is also entitled to summary judgment in her favor with respect to 

this claim as well. 

III. Complete Hypothetical 

 Plaintiff also argues that in determining that she was able to perform past relevant work 

the ALJ relied on the testimony of the Vocational Expert (“VE”) that was provided in response to 

an inadequate hypothetical question which failed to account for all of plaintiff’s limitations. ECF 

No. 13 at 12. 

 While an ALJ may pose a range of hypothetical questions to a VE based on alternate 

interpretations of the evidence, the hypothetical question that ultimately serves as the basis for the 

ALJ’s determination, i.e., the hypothetical question that is predicated on the ALJ’s final RFC 

assessment, must account for all of the limitations and restrictions of the particular claimant. 

Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009). “If an ALJ’s 

hypothetical does not reflect all of the claimant’s limitations, then the expert’s testimony has no 

evidentiary value to support a finding that the claimant can perform jobs in the national 

economy.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). See also Taylor v. Commissioner of 

Social Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because neither the hypothetical nor 

the answer properly set forth all of Taylor’s impairments, the vocational expert’s testimony 

cannot constitute substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings.”); Palomares v. Astrue, 887 

F.Supp.2d 906, 919 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Since the analysis of RFC was flawed and not based on 

Case 2:14-cv-00851-DB Document 19 Filed 03/09/16 Page 12 of 15
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

13

the whole record, the VE’s testimony based thereon has no evidentiary value, and the ALJ’s 

finding that Mr. Palomares can perform his previous work is not based on substantial evidence in 

the whole record.”); cf. SSR 83-14 (“Any limitation on these functional abilities must be 

considered very carefully to determine its impact on the size of the remaining occupational base 

of a person who is otherwise found functionally capable of light work.”). 

 Here, because the ALJ erroneously rejected the opinions of PAC Holmquist, Dr. Fiore, 

Dr. McGree-William and plaintiff’s own subjective testimony the hypothetical question posed by 

the ALJ to the VE did not include all the limitations indicated by that evidence. (Tr. at 100-04.) 

Because the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the VE did not reflect all of plaintiff’s limitations, the 

ALJ could not properly rely on the VE’s testimony to make the determination that plaintiff was 

able to perform past relevant work. See Bray, 554 F.3d at 1228 (“If an ALJ’s hypothetical does 

not reflect all of the claimant’s limitations, then the expert’s testimony has no evidentiary value to 

support a finding that the claimant can perform jobs in the national economy.”); Werthy v. 

Astrue, 882 F.Supp.2d 1202, 1235 (D. Or. 2011) (“The ALJ’s hypothetical question to the VE, 

although consistent with the ALJ’s RFC assessment, failed to include all of Werthy’s limitations 

and restrictions. The ALJ therefore could not rely on the VE’s testimony to make a determination 

that Werthy is able to work.”); see also Robbins v. Social Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 886 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (in posing a hypothetical to VE “an ALJ is not free to disregard properly supported 

limitations”). 

 Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff is also entitled to summary judgment in her 

favor with respect to her claim that the ALJ failed to pose a legally adequate hypothetical 

question to the VE. 

SCOPE OF REMAND 

 With error established, the court has the discretion to remand or reverse and award 

benefits. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). A case may be remanded 

under the “credit-as-true” rule for an award of benefits where: 

(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has 

failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting 

Case 2:14-cv-00851-DB Document 19 Filed 03/09/16 Page 13 of 15
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

14

evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and 

(3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, 

the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on 

remand. 

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. Even where all the conditions for the “credit-as-true” rule are met, 

the court retains “flexibility to remand for further proceedings when the record as a whole creates 

serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social 

Security Act.” Id. at 1021. See also Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 

1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Where . . . an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is uncertain 

and ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.”). 

 Here, although the ALJ committed several significant errors, it is also true that the nature 

of the ALJ’s errors renders a considerable amount of evidence unevaluated and that the record 

contains conflicting evidence as to whether or not plaintiff is in fact disabled. Accordingly, this 

matter will be remanded for further proceedings. 

 On remand, the ALJ shall consider and evaluate the opinions of Dr. McGee-Williams and 

Dr. Fiore and provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the 

record, if any portion of those opinions are discredited. The ALJ shall also consider plaintiff’s 

subjective testimony and, if any portion of plaintiff’s testimony is found to be not credible, the 

ALJ shall provide clear and convincing reasons. Finally, the ALJ shall also consider the opinion 

of PAC Holmquist and, if that opinion is rejected, the ALJ shall provide a germane reason for 

doing so. If the ALJ receives testimony from a VE the ALJ shall ensure that the VE’s 

hypothetical question accounts for all of plaintiff’s limitations. 

CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF. No. 13) is granted; 

 2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF. No. 14) is denied; 

 3. The Commissioner’s decision is reversed for the reasons indicated above; and 

//// 

//// 

Case 2:14-cv-00851-DB Document 19 Filed 03/09/16 Page 14 of 15
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

15

 4. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order. 

DATED: March 8, 2016 

Case 2:14-cv-00851-DB Document 19 Filed 03/09/16 Page 15 of 15