Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01945/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01945-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Motor Vehicles
Defendant
Gary Goethe
Plaintiff

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY GOETHE, No. 2:07-cv-01945-MCE-GGH

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 

DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

On May 7, 2010, this Court issued its Memorandum and Order

(Docket No. 76) which granted in part, and denied in part, the

Motion for Summary Judgment, or alternatively for Summary

Adjudication of Issues, brought by Defendant Department of Motor

Vehicles (“Defendant” or “DMV”) in this matter (Docket No. 69). 

That Memorandum and Order summarily adjudicated all of

Plaintiff’s claims in favor of Defendant, except for Plaintiff’s

claims that he was discriminated against because of his race in

being passed over for transfer and/or promotional opportunities

in 2006. 

Case 2:07-cv-01945-MCE-GGH Document 84 Filed 07/23/10 Page 1 of 6
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2

Now before the Court is Defendant’s request that the Court

reconsider its denial of summary adjudication as to that

discrimination claim. 

A court should not revisit its own decisions unless

extraordinary circumstances show that its prior decision was

wrong. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S.

800, 816, 108 S. Ct. 2166 (1988). Reconsideration may be

appropriate if the district court 1) is presented with newly

discovered evidence; 2) has committed clear error or issued an

initial decision that was manifestly unjust; or 3) is presented

with an intervening change in controlling law. School Dist. N.

1J, Multnomah County, Oregon v. AcandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1244, 1263

(9th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 512 U.S. 1236, 114 S. Ct. 2742

(1994).

Through the present motion, Defendant contends that

reconsideration is proper because its ruling on the discrimination

issue constitutes clear error. The DMV’s argument is two-pronged. 

First, Defendant argues that it was wrong for the Court to

consider Plaintiff’s observation, based on his twenty-year tenure

in working for the DMV, that only four African American men had

occupied middle management jobs at DMV headquarters in Sacramento

(which he claimed amounted to some 500 positions) during that

period. Second, Defendant contends that Plaintiff did not show

that his qualifications were “clearly superior” to the individuals

ultimately selected for the promotional opportunities in question,

and that consequently the Court erred in denying summary

adjudication on that ground because Plaintiff did not satisfy his

burden in establishing pretext.

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3

Although Defendant repeatedly accuses the Court of

fundamentally misapprehending the requisite burden-shifting

standard in assessing the propriety of a discrimination claim, in

the Court’s view it is Defendant who both misstates Plaintiff’s

burden in showing pretext under the circumstances of this matter

and fails to grasp the standards upon which summary judgment must

be based.

Under the so-called McDonnell-Douglas analysis, in

determining whether the reasons proffered by Defendant in failing

to select Plaintiff were in fact pretextual, the court should

cumulatively consider all evidence pointing towards potential

pretext. Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir.

2007) (quoting Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323

F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003). Even when considered together,

the burden on Plaintiff in raising a triable issue of fact as to

pretext is “hardly an onerous one”. Payne v. Norwest Corp., 113

F.3d 1079, 1080 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff must only present

some “specific” and “substantial” facts pointing to a genuine

issue for trial with respect to circumstantial pretext. Godwin

v. Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998).

Moreover, in considering such evidence in the context of a

motion for summary judgment, all permissible inferences must be

drawn in favor of the non-moving party, here Plaintiff. Raad v.

Fairbanks, 323 F.3d at 1194.

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4

Applying these standards to the present matter, the Court

pointed to both evidence comparing Plaintiff’s own qualifications

to those of the successful candidates, and statistical data drawn

from Plaintiff’s own observations with respect to the composition

of DMV’s middle management personnel in Sacramento during the

twenty-year period he worked there. The inference that may be

drawn from Plaintiff’s claim that only four African American men

worked in such positions during that period must be coupled with

Plaintiff’s own detailed claims, as set forth in paragraphs 17 to

23 of his Declaration, that his qualifications exceeded those of

the individuals ultimately selected for the promotional

opportunities in question. The Court found that those factors,

particularly when viewed together and when construed favorably to

Plaintiff in the context of summary judgment, were enough to

satisfy Plaintiff’s burden in establishing pretext sufficient to

defeat Defendant’s request for summary adjudication. That

conclusion is neither clearly erroneous or manifestly unjust,

despite Defendant’s strident protestations to the contrary.

While Defendant claims that Plaintiff must establish that

his qualifications were “clearly superior” to those of the

selected candidate to show discrimination, in the Court’s view

that conclusion is misplaced. While Defendant cites the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in Raad as support for that proposition, in

fact that case does not so hold. Rather, the court’s finding in

Raad is limited to an acknowledgment that clearly superior

qualifications provide “a proper basis for a finding of

discrimination”. Raad v. Fairbanks, 323 F.3d at 1194. 

///

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5

The inference that such qualifications are not the only means by

which pretext can be established is buttressed by the Raad

court’s citation to another Ninth Circuit decision, Odima v.

Westin Tucson Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484, 1492 (9th Cir. 1995) as

standing for the proposition that a plaintiff’s “superior

qualifications standing alone were enough to prove pretext.” 

Id., emphasis in original. Significantly, too, Raad goes on to

state that the Ninth Circuit has never followed other courts in

requiring that a disparity of qualification be “so apparent as to

jump off the page and slap us in the face” in finding pretext. 

Id. Raad found this analysis to be “especially true at the

summary judgment stage.” Id. Consequently, there is nothing in

Raad to compel the conclusion advanced by Defendant that

Plaintiff must necessarily establish his own “clearly superior”

credentials, even at summary judgment.

In Blue v. Widnall, 162 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 1998), another

case cited by Defendant in support of its reconsideration

request, the court did find no triable issue of fact with regard

to the alleged superiority of the plaintiff’s qualifications.

That ruling, however, was factually predicated on a finding that

Blue had presented no evidence that his qualifications were

superior. Id. at 546. Here, on the other hand, Plaintiff Goethe

offers fact-specific comparisons which allegedly demonstrate that

his own skills were in fact better than those of the chosen

candidate. Those comparisons, which must be afforded deference

at the summary judgment stage, are enough to show the requisite

pretext.

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 Because oral argument was not of material assistance, the 1

Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefs in accordance

with E.D. Local Rule 230(g).

6

The only decision that arguably supports Defendant’s

position is the Idaho District Court’s decision in Banks v.

Pocatello Sch. Dist., 429 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Id. 2006). 

Although the Banks decision does opine that a plaintiff must show

clearly superior qualifications to satisfy his or her burden in

showing pretext, it premises that conclusion on Raad and Widnall,

which as stated above are in fact inapposite. This Court

accordingly disagrees with the Banks decision and declines to

follow it.

In addition, the Court maintains that Plaintiff Goethe

himself can properly present his own observations as to the

composition of the workforce at the office where he was employed

during a time period he worked there. The inferences drawn from

Plaintiff’s claim that only four of five hundred middle managers

were African American men also cannot be discounted after

construing that evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, as the Court must

do on summary judgment.

Given the foregoing, the Court reiterates its prior ruling

and DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration (Docket No. 79).1

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 23, 2010

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:07-cv-01945-MCE-GGH Document 84 Filed 07/23/10 Page 6 of 6