Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-15-03409/USCOURTS-ca6-15-03409-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Internal Revenue Service
Appellee
Jon R. Rogers
Appellant

Document Text:

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 16a0106p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

_________________ 

JON R. ROGERS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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No. 15-3409 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus. 

No. 2:13-cv-00797—James L. Graham, District Judge. 

Argued: December 2, 2015 

Decided and Filed: May 4, 2016 

Before: NORRIS, CLAY, and COOK, Circuit Judges. 

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ARGUED: Frank J. Bruzzese, BRUZZESE & CALABRIA, Steubenville, Ohio, for Appellant. 

Gretchen M. Wolfinger, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., 

for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Frank J. Bruzzese, BRUZZESE & CALABRIA, Steubenville, Ohio, 

David W. T. Carroll, CARROLL, UCKER & HEMMER, LLC, Worthington, Ohio, for 

Appellant. Gretchen M. Wolfinger, Francesca Ugolini, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. 

 NORRIS, J., delivered the opinion of the court which COOK, J., joined, and CLAY, J., 

joined in part. CLAY, J. (pp. 6–17), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and 

dissenting in part. 

>

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_________________ 

OPINION 

_________________ 

ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Jon Rogers (“Rogers”) appeals the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”). For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm the district court’s decision. 

I.

Before Rogers brought the instant action, the IRS conducted a criminal investigation into 

several businesses owned by Rogers and two of his associates. Following the investigation, the 

IRS seized millions of dollars from Rogers and initiated four forfeiture actions in the Western 

District of Pennsylvania. 

The parties subsequently settled the forfeiture actions and executed a settlement 

agreement on August 1, 2012. The settlement agreement included a release clause, wherein 

Rogers released his right to bring future claims “related to and/or in connection with or arising 

out of” the forfeiture actions. 

 On November 29, 2012, Rogers requested records from the IRS pursuant to the Freedom 

of Information Act (“FOIA”). 5 U.S.C. § 552. The IRS denied the request. On August 9, 2013, 

Rogers filed this FOIA action in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. 

The parties filed a Rule 26(f) report pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

The report split discovery into two phases. Phase I included a “rolling production report plan” 

under which the IRS would review the documents it had determined responsive to Rogers’ FOIA 

request. According to the report, Phase I did not constitute formal discovery under Rule 26 of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the IRS could move for summary judgment before 

commencing Phase II. 

On November 13, 2014, the IRS moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the 

parties entered into a settlement agreement which contained a release that affirmatively waived 

Rogers’ right to bring his FOIA action. Rogers opposed the motion, arguing that (1) the IRS 

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forfeited its right to rely on the release clause by not pleading it as an affirmative defense; (2) the 

IRS should be estopped from asserting the affirmative defense; and (3) the release clause did not 

apply because the FOIA claim was not related to the forfeiture actions. 

The district court rejected Rogers’ arguments and granted the IRS’s motion for summary 

judgment. The district court held that the release’s language was broad enough to encompass 

Rogers’ FOIA action, noting that it “covers all claims, rights and demands ‘of every kind’ related 

to the forfeiture actions and discharges the [IRS] from all duties of every kind relating to the 

actions.” 

On April 10, 2015, Rogers filed this appeal. He raises the same arguments stated above. 

II.

A. Forfeiture of Affirmative Defense

This Court reviews a finding that a party did not forfeit an affirmative defense for abuse 

of discretion. See Smith v. Sushka, 117 F.3d 965, 969 (6th Cir. 1997). “Generally, an abuse of 

discretion is evident ‘when the reviewing court is firmly convinced that a mistake has been 

made. A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, 

or when it improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous legal standard.’” GrahamHumphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, 209 F.3d 552, 560 (6th Cir. 2000) (brackets 

omitted) (quoting Romstadt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 59 F.3d 608, 615 (6th Cir. 1995)). 

“A district court may, in its discretion, allow a defendant to raise an affirmative defense 

for the first time in a motion for summary judgment if doing so does not result in surprise or 

prejudice to the plaintiff.” Lauderdale v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 552 F. App’x 566, 573 (6th 

Cir. 2014) (citing Sushka, 117 F.3d at 969). 

In determining what constitutes prejudice, the court considers whether the 

assertion of the new claim or defense would: require the opponent to expend 

significant additional resources to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; 

significantly delay the resolution of the dispute; or prevent the plaintiff from 

bringing a timely action in another jurisdiction. 

Phelps v. McClellan, 30 F.3d 658, 662–63 (6th Cir. 1994). 

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Rogers notes that Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifies “waiver,” 

“release,” and “accord and satisfaction” as affirmative defenses that must be raised in responsive 

pleadings. He argues that the IRS forfeited its right to rely on the release clause because it failed 

to raise the release as a defense in its answer. 

Because we agree with the district court that under the circumstances of this case, Rogers 

cannot establish the existence of prejudice, we are unable to say the district court abused the 

discretion afforded it when it permitted the IRS to assert the defense. Rogers argues that he was 

prejudiced because the IRS allowed litigation to proceed for fifteen months before raising its 

defense. Although the IRS waited over a year to assert the defense, the delay does not appear to 

have prejudiced Rogers, since he received documents he was seeking during the rolling 

production process. And, manifestly, allowing the IRS to assert its affirmative waiver defense 

does not require Rogers to expend significant additional resources to conduct discovery and 

prepare for trial, as it puts an end to the litigation. 

Similarly, Rogers’ contention that he was surprised is without merit. A sophisticated 

party, he was represented by counsel when he signed the settlement agreement. The same 

lawyer who signed the settlement agreement represents Rogers in this action. Rogers should have 

anticipated that the IRS would raise the defense of waiver by release. And, Rogers had actual 

notice when the IRS raised the defense in its motion for summary judgment, and he was afforded 

ample opportunity to respond to it. Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 346 F.3d 579, 585 (6th Cir. 

2003) (“Because the plaintiffs had a fair opportunity to respond to the government’s statute of 

limitations argument, we find that the plaintiffs suffered no prejudice and, therefore, the 

government did not waive their defense.”); Sushka, 117 F.3d at 969 (“Failure to raise an 

affirmative defense by responsive pleading does not always result in waiver. The purpose of 

Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party notice of the 

affirmative defense and a chance to respond.”) (internal citation omitted). 

While the IRS could have been more diligent in raising its defense, we are unable to say 

the district court abused its discretion by permitting the IRS to raise the defense in its summary 

judgment motion. 

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B. Estoppel by Conduct and Scope of the Release

Rogers also contended that the IRS should be estopped from raising the release as a 

defense, and that his FOIA lawsuit does not fall within the scope of the release’s language. We 

now turn to the issues of estoppel and the scope of the release. Having had the opportunity to 

review the record below, the briefs submitted by the parties, and benefitted from oral argument 

on these issues, we conclude that the district court correctly rejected Rogers’ contentions for the 

reasons stated by the district court in its order of March 2, 2015, granting summary judgment to 

the IRS. 

Rogers does raise a mutual mistake argument for the first time on appeal. In general, 

‘“[i]ssues not presented to the district court but raised for the first time on appeal are not properly 

before the court.”’ McFarland v. Henderson, 307 F.3d 402, 407 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting J.C. 

Wyckoff & Assoc., Inc. v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 936 F.2d 1474, 1488 (6th Cir. 1991)). We 

therefore decline to consider the argument. 

III.

 The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

 

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_____________________________________________________ 

CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART 

_____________________________________________________ 

 CLAY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the 

majority’s holding that Rogers waived his ability to bring a FOIA claim against the IRS when he 

signed the release at issue. I write separately, in part, because I believe the issue—one of first 

impression in this circuit—merits additional analysis. I also write separately to dissent from the 

majority’s holding that the IRS did not waive the defense of release. 

I. 

 For nearly ten years, the IRS conducted an investigation into several offshore gambling 

businesses owned by Rogers and two of his partners. The IRS suspected that Rogers and his 

partners, through their business in Antigua and Belize, illegally accepted sports bets from U.S.-

based customers. As a result of the investigation, the IRS filed four civil forfeiture complaints in 

2003 and 2004 under 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(A) and (C) against $10 million in assets allegedly 

traceable to the gambling business. 

 On August 1, 2012, Rogers eventually settled the forfeiture cases with the IRS by 

agreeing to forfeit $500,000 of his individual assets. The settlement agreement contains, in 

pertinent part, the following release provision: 

This release is conditioned upon the United States paying to Jon R. Rogers and 

releasing from arrest/seizure/freeze that portion of the Jon R. Rogers Assets set 

forth in paragraph four (4) above. By reason of and in reliance upon this 

Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, Jon R. Rogers, his assigns, and heirs, 

hereby unconditionally release and forever discharge the United States, its agents, 

servants, employees, officers, attorneys, insurers, successors, representatives and 

assigns (including without limitation any victims, persons or entities which 

receive the forfeited property or any portion thereof), and each of them, from and 

against any and all manner of claims, actions, causes of action, rights, set-offs, 

promises, allegations, expenses, assessments, penalties, charges, injuries, losses, 

costs, obligations, duties, suits, proceedings, debts, dues, contracts, judgments, 

damages, claims, counterclaims, liabilities and/or demands of every kind, 

character and manner whatsoever in law or equity, administrative or judicial, 

contract, tort (including negligence of all kinds) or otherwise, whether known or 

unknown, claimed or unclaimed, asserted or unasserted, suspected or 

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unsuspected, discovered or undiscovered, choate or inchoate, accrued or 

unaccrued, anticipated or unanticipated, contingent or fixed, for, upon, or by 

reason of any and all matters whatsoever, related to and/or in connection with or 

arising out of these Forfeiture Actions. 

(R. 37-7, Rogers Settlement, PageID# 1318 (emphasis added).) 

 The agreement defines “Forfeiture Actions” as the four civil forfeiture actions brought by 

the IRS against Rogers. Rogers and his two attorneys signed the agreement, along with an 

attorney for the government. The agreement was then filed in federal district court in resolution 

of the civil forfeiture litigation. Criminal charges were never brought by the government as a 

result of this investigation. 

 On November 29, 2012, about four months after signing the agreement, Rogers submitted 

a FOIA request to the IRS. The 36-page request sought 71 categories of documents from the 

period 1993 through 2012 relating to the IRS’ criminal investigation and the civil forfeiture 

actions. On December 12, 2012, the IRS acknowledged receipt of Rogers’ FOIA request. After 

requesting and receiving additional information, the IRS ultimately denied the request in its 

entirety on February 28, 2013. The IRS cited a number of exemptions as its basis for refusing to 

provide the documents Rogers requested. This decision was affirmed in an administrative 

appeal. 

 On August 9, 2013, Rogers filed this suit against the IRS under the FOIA Act, 5 U.S.C 

§ 552, and the Privacy Act, see id. § 552a. Rogers’ complaint alleged that the IRS possessed 

non-exempt records which it failed to provide him pursuant to his FOIA request. Rogers moved 

the district court to order the IRS to produce the non-exempt records, complete its search for 

responsive records, and award him attorney’s fees and costs. The IRS never filed an answer to 

the complaint. Instead, it filed a partial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, directed 

toward that part of Rogers’ complaint seeking an order requiring the IRS to complete its search 

for records. 

 While the motion to dismiss was pending, the parties agreed on a “rolling production and 

report plan” under which the IRS would review the 500,000 pages it had determined were 

responsive to Rogers’ FOIA request. (R. 18, Rule 26(f) Report, PageID# 180-84.) Under the 

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plan, the IRS would issue monthly reports to Rogers identifying the records that it determined 

could be disclosed and those that it determined to be exempt. The IRS provided several monthly 

reports to Rogers. Based on the IRS’ representation about the rolling production and report plan, 

the district court denied the IRS’ partial motion to dismiss without prejudice. 

 On November 13, 2014, more than a year after Rogers filed his lawsuit, the IRS moved 

for summary judgment on the grounds that the August 2012 release waived future claims from 

Rogers, including his FOIA complaint. In his opposition to that motion, Rogers argued that the 

IRS waived its ability to rely on the release by not pleading it as an affirmative defense under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)(1). Rogers also argued that the IRS was estopped from 

relying on the release because it had considered the FOIA request on the merits. Finally, Rogers 

argued that the release agreement did not extend to his FOIA complaint. The district court 

disagreed with Rogers and granted the IRS’ summary judgment motion. 

II. 

 While it would appear that Rogers waived his ability to bring a FOIA claim against the 

IRS when he signed the release agreement, this issue requires a much more thorough analysis 

than that provided by the majority. 

 The release and settlement at issue was entered into pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2465, which 

governs the return of property in forfeiture proceedings. Because the agreement at issue involves 

the United States and was entered into pursuant to a federal statute, federal common law applies. 

United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 209-10 (1970); Gillham v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 488 

F. App’x 80, 83-84 (6th Cir. 2012). Federal common law likewise governs the validity of a 

release of a federal cause of action. Dotson v. Arkema, Inc., 397 F. App’x 191, 194 (6th Cir. 

2010) (citation omitted). 

 A release is a contract subject to principles of contract interpretation. See Hauf v. Life 

Extension Found., 454 F. App’x 425, 430 (6th Cir. 2011) (“The general rules governing the 

construction of contracts are applicable in the construction of written releases.”) (citation 

omitted). “The general rules of contract law require that courts interpret contracts according to 

their plain meaning, in an ordinary and popular sense.” Gillham, 488 F. App’x at 84 (citations 

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and quotations omitted). The basic goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the intent of 

the parties. In re AmTrust Fin. Corp., 694 F.3d 741, 749 (6th Cir. 2012). “Where a contract’s 

meaning is clear on its face, that meaning controls.” Id. at 750 (citation omitted). Additionally, 

courts are more likely to enforce express terms in a release when counsel represents sophisticated 

parties in drafting the release. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Pacific Northwest Software, Inc., 

640 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011); Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 871 F.2d 1279, 1283-84 

(5th Cir. 1989). 

 In a number of contexts, courts have upheld contractual releases of future claims. See, 

e.g., Nicklin v. Henderson, 352 F.3d 1077, 1081 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The settlement was a general 

release of all [the employee’s] claims” because “the plain language of the agreement 

unambiguously cover[ed] all his claims.”); Rogers v. Gen. Elec. Co., 781 F.2d 452, 454 (5th Cir. 

1986) (“A general release of Title VII claims does not ordinarily violate public policy.”) (citation 

omitted); Locafrance U.S. Corp. v. Intermodal Sys. Leasing, Inc., 558 F.2d 1113, 1115 (2d Cir. 

1977) (“When, as here, a release is signed in a commercial context by parties in a roughly 

equivalent bargaining position and with ready access to counsel, the general rule is that, if the 

language of the release is clear, . . . the intent of the parties [is] indicated by the language 

employed.”) (alteration in original) (citations and quotations omitted); Richard’s Lumber & 

Supply v. United States Gypsum Co., 545 F.2d 18, 20 (7th Cir. 1976) (“A general release, or a 

broad covenant not to sue, is not ordinarily contrary to public policy simply because it involves 

antitrust claims.”). 

 The issue here is narrower than any suggested by these basic principles. It is whether 

Rogers’ FOIA claim is covered and precluded by the broad language of the release he signed. 

The IRS says yes. Rogers, on the other hand, argues that he and the IRS never intended the 

release to include claims made under the FOIA. 

 Only one federal court appears to have confronted this issue. The District of Columbia 

District Court addressed the question in Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. U.S. EPA, 926 F. 

Supp. 2d 48, 54 (D.D.C. 2013). In that case, Dr. Richard Hammer, an employee of the 

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), filed a workplace complaint of harassment that was 

investigated by an outside contractor, Dr. Peter Maida. Id. at 51. During his employment with 

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the EPA, Dr. Hammer made two FOIA requests and one request under the Privacy Act for a 

copy of Dr. Maida’s contract, his report, and “[a]ll emails between Peter Maida and [the] EPA 

that pertain to [Dr. Hammer] in any way.” Id. at 52 (alteration in original) (citations and 

quotations omitted). The EPA released Dr. Maida’s contract and payment records but withheld 

the report he authored under a FOIA exemption. Id.

 Dr. Hammer appealed only the EPA’s refusal to release the report, but that decision was 

affirmed by the EPA’s Office of General Counsel. Id. Dr. Hammer then filed an Equal 

Employment Opportunity complaint with the EPA Office of Civil Rights alleging employment 

discrimination. Id. After his discharge from the EPA, Dr. Hammer filed a complaint with the 

Merit Systems and Protection Board alleging that his discharge lacked just cause. Id. Both 

complaints were settled by the EPA and Dr. Hammer. Id. By the terms of the settlement, Dr. 

Hammer “withdrew with prejudice all appeals, complaints, grievances, claims, or civil actions 

against [the] EPA concerning any incidents, personnel actions, Agency decisions or 

determinations, or terms or conditions of employment.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 

Dr. Hammer also agreed not to file “any new appeal, complaint, grievance, claim, or civil action” 

against the EPA “concerning any incidents, personnel actions, Agency decisions or 

determinations, or terms or conditions of employment.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 

For its part, the EPA cancelled Dr. Hammer’s discharge and recorded that he had resigned. Id. 

Dr. Hammer was represented by counsel in negotiating the settlement agreement. Id. at 53. 

 Several months later, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (“PEER”), a 

non-profit organization that works on behalf of EPA employees, submitted a FOIA request to the 

EPA for the same report, but that request was denied. Id. at 53-54. PEER and Dr. Hammer then 

sued the EPA under the FOIA to obtain the report. Id. at 53. 

 The court’s analysis was rather brief, going no further than recognizing that because “[a] 

settlement agreement is a contract, and Dr. Hammer is bound by the contract he signed,” he was 

precluded from filing a FOIA request. Id. at 54. The court reasoned that as part of the settlement 

agreement, Dr. Hammer expressly agreed not to institute any complaint or civil action in the 

future. Id. The court found that Dr. Hammer’s FOIA claim “was covered and precluded by the 

broad language of the settlement agreement.” Id. The court also reasoned that because Dr. 

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Hammer was a sophisticated party represented by counsel, it did not need to look beyond the 

language of the release. Id. Rather, the court found, the agreement spoke for itself. Id. 

According to the court, the “settlement agreement should be construed for enforcement purposes 

basically as a contract.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). Based on these principles, the 

court “ha[d] no hesitancy in holding Dr. Hammer to the bargain he struck.” Id.

 If Public Employees were to apply to the case at hand, the analysis would be rather 

straightforward. The release at issue reads, in pertinent part: 

[Rogers] . . . hereby unconditionally release[s] and forever discharge[s] the 

United States . . . from and against any and all manner of claims, actions, causes 

of action, rights, . . . suits, proceedings, . . . and/or demands of every kind, 

whether known or unknown, claimed or unclaimed, asserted or unasserted, 

suspected or unsuspected, . . . choate or inchoate, accrued or unaccrued, 

anticipated or unanticipated, . . . any and all matters whatsoever, related to and/or 

in connection with or arising out of these Forfeiture Actions. 

(R. 37-7 at 1318 (emphasis added).) 

 The language of the release is broad. It is also very general. When one looks at the 

“causes of action, rights, . . . suits, proceedings, . . . and/or demands of every kind” language, one 

cannot help but conclude that the release includes an action under the FOIA. Under Public 

Employees, there is no fair way to read the language of the release other than as fully 

encompassing any manner of claims. 

Public Employees would also suggest that whether Rogers really intended to release his 

FOIA rights under the release is one of those subjective questions that this Court cannot answer. 

Instead, this Court must read the words for what they say. Rogers is, by all accounts, a 

sophisticated party. And like Dr. Hammer, Rogers was represented by counsel when he signed 

the agreement—two attorneys to be exact. This is the agreement that he made. Just like the 

agreement in Public Employees, the agreement here is clearly expressed. This Court’s function, 

therefore, should be a limited one—it is to give meaning and substance to the words that the 

parties freely choose. 

 Without any case law to the contrary, there is no reason not to follow the reasoning of 

Public Employees and hold that Rogers—a sophisticated party represented by two attorneys—is 

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bound by the contract he signed. Therefore, his FOIA claim is covered and precluded by the 

broad language of the release. For these reasons, I concur in the majority’s holding affirming the 

district court’s decision in this respect. 

III. 

 Once again, however, the analysis cannot end there because Rogers raises a number of 

other arguments related to the nature of his FOIA claim. First, he argues that the release he 

signed does not bar his FOIA claim because the release was executed before his FOIA claim 

arose. In other words, he argues that his FOIA claim did not accrue until the IRS denied his 

request. But the terms of the release are unambiguous: Rogers agreed to give up “any and all 

manner of claims . . . whether accrued or unaccrued, . . .” (R. 37-7 at 1318 (emphasis added).) 

The release speaks for itself, and it clearly and unequivocally shows that Rogers specifically 

agreed to release unaccrued claims. 

 But even if Rogers had not agreed to release unaccrued claims, his FOIA claim arose well 

before the release was executed. Rogers’ FOIA request sought documents dating back to 1993. 

The civil forfeiture actions were filed in 2003 and 2004 and continued until the 2012 settlement. 

Rogers could have submitted his FOIA request at any time prior to the 2012 settlement. The fact 

that he chose to submit his request four months after signing the release does not mean that his 

claim was unaccrued on the date of the settlement. In other words, Rogers did not have to settle 

the forfeiture suits before his FOIA claim could be considered as having arisen. 

 Somewhat relatedly, Rogers also argues that he was not aware of the potential for a FOIA 

claim when he signed the release. However, he submitted an extraordinarily lengthy and detailed 

FOIA request just four months after he signed the release. The timing alone suggests that Rogers 

and his attorneys were at least aware of the potential for a FOIA claim at the time the release was 

executed. And regardless, as far as can be determined, all the circuits to have considered the 

issue agree that a party can release both unaccrued and unknown claims. See, e.g., Convey 

Compliance Sys., Inc. v. 1099 Pro, Inc., 443 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 2006); Brennan’s, Inc. v. 

Dickie Brennan & Co., 376 F.3d 356, 366-67 (5th Cir. 2004); Wagner v. NutraSweet Co., 

95 F.3d 527, 532-34 (7th Cir. 1996); Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 144 (3d Cir. 1978). 

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 Second, as the majority alludes to, Rogers asks this Court to declare void the release he 

signed. Generally, “[a] signed release is binding upon the parties unless executed and procured 

by fraud, duress, accident or mutual mistake.” Three Rivers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 

522 F.2d 885, 892 (3d Cir. 1975). Rogers argues that one of these exceptions, mutual mistake, is 

applicable in this case. He claims that there was a mistake in executing the release because it 

“defies common sense” that the IRS intended to bar him from bringing a FOIA claim. (Pl.’s Br. 

at 33-35.) The IRS says that is precisely what it intended; in other words, that the release was so 

broadly worded to ensure it would never have to engage in litigation of any sort with Rogers. 

 Rogers did not raise this argument in the district court. In general, “[i]ssues not presented 

to the district court but raised for the first time on appeal are not properly before the court.” 

McFarland v. Henderson, 307 F.3d 402, 407 (6th Cir. 2002) (alteration in original) (citations and 

quotations omitted). However, this Court “ha[s], on occasion, deviated from the general rule in 

exceptional cases . . . or when the rule would produce a plain miscarriage of justice.” Id.

(citations and quotations omitted). Even then, the new issue must be “presented with sufficient 

clarity and completeness” for this Court to resolve the issue. Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. 

Penn Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1461 (6th Cir. 1988). “The Pinney Dock exception is most 

commonly applied where the issue is one of law and further development of the record is 

unnecessary.” McFarland, 307 F.3d at 407 (citations and quotations omitted). 

 This is not such a case. In order to rule on Rogers’ allegations of mutual mistake, this 

Court would need to do much more than simply apply the law to the facts as they are alleged in 

Rogers’ complaint. There are no facts in Rogers’ complaint or in any of his district court 

pleadings that can be construed to support the existence of mutual mistake. By addressing the 

merits of this argument, this Court would be “designing [Rogers’] theory of liability for him, 

including the facts and the law.” Cheatom v. Quicken Loans, 587 F. App’x 276, 284 (6th Cir. 

2014). Therefore, the majority correctly declines to reach this argument on the merits. 

 Rogers’ final argument is that his FOIA claim does not arise from and is not related to the 

civil forfeiture actions. Rather, he says his claim arises from the IRS’ decision to withhold 

documents in response to his FOIA request. However, this argument defies common sense. 

Without the civil forfeiture actions, Rogers would not have submitted his FOIA request because 

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there would have been nothing to request. And even if the FOIA action is somewhat attenuated 

from the civil forfeiture actions themselves, it seems clear that Rogers’ complaint related to and 

arises out of the civil forfeiture actions. To be sure, the FOIA request specifically references 

each civil forfeiture action in its first three pages. 

 Along the same lines, Rogers argues that the district court erred by conflating the civil 

forfeiture proceedings with the criminal investigation. He says that the district court should have 

made a distinction between documents generated during the criminal investigation and those 

generated during the civil forfeiture proceedings. The problem with this argument is that in the 

context of forfeiture proceedings, there is generally not a clear separation between the criminal 

and civil cases. But even when there is a clear separation, courts generally find relatedness 

between the two cases if there are common facts, similar alleged violations, and common parties. 

See, e.g., United States v. $6,976,934.65, Plus Interest, 554 F.3d 123, 131 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 

(“[T]he question is whether the facts that underlie the [criminal] prosecution . . . also form the 

basis for the forfeiture action.”). 

 The criminal investigation of Rogers is unquestionably related to the forfeiture actions. 

Both were based on the exact same facts (the offshore gambling business), involved the same 

criminal allegations (illegally accepting sports bets from U.S.-based customers), and concerned 

the exact same parties (Rogers and his partners). Additionally, the government’s case-in-chief in 

the civil forfeiture cases was based on Rogers’ assets being derived from the proceeds of 

criminal activity; this in and of itself suggests that the two cases were related. Because the two 

cases were so intertwined, there would have been no conceivable way for the IRS to separately 

categorize documents as pertaining to either the criminal investigation or the civil forfeiture 

actions. 

 The bottom line is that the district court correctly held that Rogers’ FOIA claim is 

covered and precluded by the broad language of the release he signed. The language plainly 

states that Rogers released the IRS from any and all manner of claims. At best, there may be 

ambiguity as to which “claims” are included by the release, but there does not appear to be any 

ambiguity about which types of claims are released. On this issue, I agree with the majority that 

Rogers’ FOIA claim falls within the scope of the release he signed. 

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No. 15-3409 Rogers v. IRS Page 15 

IV. 

 While I agree with the majority that the IRS was not estopped from relying on the 

release, the IRS was precluded from relying on the release because of its failure to timely assert 

its rights pursuant to the release. Contrary to the IRS’ argument, the IRS should not have been 

permitted to raise the defense of release in its summary judgment motion—a motion which was 

filed more than a year after the lawsuit began. To be blunt, if this situation—tantamount to 

neglectful silence—does not amount to waiver, then nothing will. 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)(1) provides the basic rule for affirmative defenses: 

“In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative 

defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1). Rule 8(c)(1) specifically lists “waiver” as an affirmative 

defense. Id. The general rule in federal court is that a party’s failure to plead specifically any 

given affirmative defense will result in waiver of that defense. See, e.g., Wood v. Milyard, 

132 S.Ct. 1826, 1832 (2012) (“Ordinarily in civil litigation, a statutory time limitation is forfeited 

if not raised in a defendant’s answer or in an amendment thereto.”) (citations and quotations 

omitted); Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 410 (2000) (“[A]n affirmative defense [is] 

ordinarily lost if not timely raised.”). 

 Like the Supreme Court, this Court has held that “[a]s a general rule, failure to plead an 

affirmative defense results in a waiver of that defense.” Old Line Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Garcia, 

418 F.3d 546, 550 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “The Supreme Court has held that the 

purpose of Rule 8(c) is to give the opposing party notice of the affirmative defense and a chance 

to rebut it.” Moore, Owen, Thomas & Co. v. Coffey, 992 F.2d 1439, 1445 (6th Cir. 1993) 

(citation omitted). It is true that “[a] district court may, in its discretion, allow a defendant to 

raise an affirmative defense for the first time in a motion for summary judgment if doing so does 

not result in surprise or prejudice to the plaintiff.” Lauderdale v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 

552 F. App’x 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 

 Whether or not a court will find prejudice depends in large part on the amount of time a 

party had to bring the affirmative defense and its reason for not doing so earlier. See, e.g., 

Macurdy v. Sikov & Love, P.A., 894 F.2d 818, 824 (6th Cir. 1990) (delay of nineteen months was 

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No. 15-3409 Rogers v. IRS Page 16 

held to establish prejudice). A court will also consider the time and expense of discovery. See, 

e.g., Data Digests, Inc. v. Standard & Poors Corp., 57 F.R.D. 42, 45-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 

 What all this comes down to is this: where there is unfair prejudice, a party is taken by 

surprise, or unnecessary delay, the general waiver rule applies; on the other hand, where there is 

no unfair prejudice, surprise, or delay, the general waiver rule is left to the district court’s 

discretion. See Moore, Owen, Thomas & Co., 992 F.2d at 1445. 

 All of those factors, which establish prejudice, are present here. Rogers submitted his 

FOIA request just four months after he signed the release agreement with the IRS. That release 

agreement marked the end of a near ten-year long investigation by the IRS into Rogers’ offshore 

gambling business. It is difficult to believe that the IRS—having just signed a settlement 

agreement stemming from an investigation that spanned so many years—would have been 

unaware of the release it signed four months earlier. Yet when the IRS responded to Rogers’ 

request just two weeks later, it did not point to the release as it should have. The IRS did not, in 

the first instance, tell Rogers that the agreement he signed released it from any obligation under 

the FOIA to produce records relating to the civil forfeiture actions. 

 Instead, the IRS acknowledged receipt of Rogers’ request and asked him to send more 

information. When the IRS denied Rogers’ request in its entirety about two and a half months 

later, it cited a number of exemptions under the FOIA and left out the fact that the release 

applied to Rogers’ request. The IRS got its third opportunity to point to the release when it 

considered Rogers’ administrative appeal—but no such luck for Rogers there. Not once in the 

near five-month long period, that began with Rogers’ request and ended with the denial of his 

appeal, did the IRS even remotely refer to the release. 

 Even giving the IRS the benefit of the doubt that its FOIA examiners may not have 

known about the release, counsel for the IRS certainly should have known about the release 

when it was served with Rogers’ complaint. But the IRS did not mention the release when it 

filed a motion to dismiss. Nor did the IRS mention the release during the time it issued monthly 

reports to Rogers identifying the records that it determined could be disclosed and those it 

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No. 15-3409 Rogers v. IRS Page 17 

determined to be exempt. Not once in the 461 days between receiving Rogers’ complaint and 

filing its motion for summary judgment did the IRS even mention the release. 

 Only one of two scenarios is possible here: (1) either the IRS waited two years to raise 

the waiver defense, with no good reason for the delay, or (2) the IRS had a eureka moment in the 

middle of litigation. Either way, Rogers should not have to bear the brunt of something the IRS 

should have done two years earlier. 

 This dissent should not be construed as applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to 

the IRS’ administrative process. Nor am I suggesting that the IRS was required to assert an 

affirmative defense in its initial FOIA response. The analysis here is based solely upon the IRS’ 

failure to assert its affirmative defense in the litigation proceedings until 461 days after being 

served with the complaint. That being said, when considering whether or not Rogers had been 

prejudiced, one cannot help but take notice of the equities involved when considering the time in 

which Rogers’ request sat on someone’s desk without one mention of the release. 

 While the majority maintains that there was no prejudice to Rogers, the facts suggest 

otherwise. Through all this time, Rogers no doubt spent a significant amount on attorney’s fees, 

as well as time and effort in connection with responding to the IRS’ various communications and 

filings. There was considerable delay in this matter and the IRS has presented no reason why 

this defense was not raised in a timely manner. And while the majority also maintains that the 

IRS’ reliance on the release could not have surprised Rogers, there can be little doubt that Rogers 

was met with surprise when the IRS mentioned the release for the first time in 461 days (or two 

years counting from the time Rogers submitted his FOIA request). Moreover, the fact that 

Rogers contends that he does not believe his FOIA claim falls within the scope of the release he 

signed suggests that he never expected the IRS to raise this as a defense. These circumstances 

remove this case from the protections that Rule 8(c)(1) was intended to provide. The district 

court should have never allowed the IRS to plead this defense when it did. That decision was an 

abuse of discretion and should be reversed. 

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