Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00373/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00373-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paul Copenhaver
Respondent
Demetrius Donni Howard
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEMETRIUS DONNI HOWARD,

Petitioner,

v.

PAUL COPENHAVER, WARDEN,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00373-LJO-MJS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner presents several challenges to a disciplinary

proceeding leading to the loss of good conduct time.

I. JURISDICTION

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a writ of habeas corpus extends to a prisoner in custody under

the authority of the United States who shows that the custody violates the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Although a

federal prisoner who challenges the validity or constitutionality of his conviction must file

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a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner

challenging the manner, location, or conditions of the execution of a sentence must

bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Hernandez v.

Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864-65 (9th Cir. 2000).

Petitioner's claims arise out of a disciplinary hearing conducted on May 7, 2013,

in which the discipline hearing officer ("DHO"), Donald Tyson, found that Petitioner

committed the prohibited act of destruction of government property. 28 C.F.R. § 541.3, 

Code 218. (Tyson Decl., Ex. 1.) The DHO found that Petitioner destroyed a television 

set, having a value in excess of $100, and sanctioned him with a loss of twenty-seven

days of good conduct time, imposed thirty days of disciplinary segregation, and 

suspended commissary privileges until restitution was made. (Id.)

Petitioner asserts that his due process rights were violated when the Federal 

Bureau of Prisons (BOP) denied him access to video surveillance of the incident that he 

intended to present at his hearing and which the DHO failed to personally review. (See

generally Pet., ECF No. 1 at 6-8.) Petitioner further asserts that there was insufficient 

evidence presented of the value of the damaged television set. (Id.)

If a constitutional violation has resulted in the loss of time credits, it affects

the duration of a sentence and may be remedied by way of a petition for writ of

habeas corpus. Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 876-78 (9th Cir. 1990). The Court 

concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.

B. Jurisdiction Over the Person

28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) provides that writs of habeas corpus may be granted by

the district courts "within their respective jurisdictions." A writ of habeas corpus

operates not upon the prisoner, but upon the prisoner's custodian. Braden v. 30th

Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 494-495 (1973). A petitioner filing a

petition for writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 must file the petition in the judicial

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district of the Petitioner's custodian. Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir.

1990). The warden of the penitentiary where a prisoner is confined constitutes the

custodian who must be named in the petition, and the petition must be filed in the

district of confinement. Id.; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 446-47 (2004). It is

sufficient if the custodian is in the territorial jurisdiction of the court at the time the

petition is filed; transfer of the petitioner thereafter does not defeat personal jurisdiction

that has once been properly established. Ahrens v.Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 193 (1948);

Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1990).

At all relevant times, Petitioner was incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary 

in Atwater, California (USP Atwater), which is located within the Eastern District of 

California. Paul Copenhaver, Warden of USP Atwater, is Petitioner’s custodian and the 

proper respondent to this habeas action. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On March 31, 2013, Correctional Officer Carroll observed video surveillance of 

Petitioner striking and destroying a government owned television set. (Tyson Decl., Ex.1; 

Att. 4.) Carroll positively identified the Petitioner using the prison’s video surveillance and

BOPWARE system, an electronic program designed for inmate facial identification. (Id.)

Petitioner was charged with violating discipline code 218: “destroying, altering or 

damaging government property having a value in excess of $100.” (Tyson Decl., Ex. 1; 

Att. 4.) Petitioner was provided an incident report on April 1, 2013; he did not comment 

regarding the incident. (Id.)

Petitioner appeared at the disciplinary hearing on May 7, 2013. (Tyson Decl., Ex. 

1.) In his defense, Petitioner stated that he “didn’t do it,” and presented three witnesses 

who also stated that Petitioner did not hit the television set. (Id.) After considering all the 

relevant evidence, the DHO found that the greater weight of the evidence supported the 

finding that Petitioner committed the prohibited act of destroying the television. (Id.) 

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Sanctions of disallowance of good conduct time, disciplinary segregation, and suspension

of privileges were imposed. (Id.) 

III. PETITIONER'S CLAIMS

Petitioner raises two claims with regard to the disciplinary violation. First, he 

asserts that the BOP’s decision to deny him access to prison video surveillance deprived

him of his due process rights as he was denied the opportunity to present documentary 

evidence. (See Pet. at 6-8.) Second, he asserts that the BOP presented insufficient 

evidence of the value of the destroyed government property. (Id.)

A. Claim One: Denial of Access to Surveillance Video

1. Petitioner’s Procedural Due Process Requirements Met as He Had

Opportunity to Present Evidence and Call Witnesses

Petitioner alleges that his procedural due process rights were violated when the 

BOP denied him access to video surveillance he intended to present at his disciplinary 

hearing and when the DHO failed to view the video surveillance before rendering a 

decision. (See Pet. at 6-7.) 

When a prison disciplinary proceeding may result in the loss of good conduct time, 

due process requires that the prisoner receive: (1) advance written notice of at least 24 

hours of the disciplinary charges; (2) an impartial hearing body; (3) an opportunity, when 

consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present 

documentary evidence in his defense; (4) assistance for illiterate inmates or in complex 

cases; and (5) a written statement by the fact-finder of the evidence relied on and the 

reasons for the disciplinary action. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-455 (1984); 

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-567 (1974). In addition, due process requires that 

the decision be supported by "some evidence." Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. In this case, 

Petitioner does not challenge whether he was provided proper notice of the hearing. He 

only challenges his right to present evidence and the sufficiency of the evidence 

presented at the hearing. 

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Prisoners have a limited procedural due process right to present evidence at 

discipline proceedings. Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 499 (quoting) Wolff v. McDonnell, 

418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Wolff acknowledges that “the right to present evidence is basic 

to a fair hearing.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566. See Bartholomew v. Watson, 665 F. 2d 915, 918 

(9th Cir. 1982) (prison officials may not arbitrarily deny an inmate’s request to present 

documentary evidence.) 

The BOP determined that the surveillance video of Petitioner destroying the 

television set did not exist at the time of the DHO hearing. (Tyson Decl., Ex. 1; Att. 4.) As 

the DHO explained in his declaration, the particular surveillance system used to capture 

the incident in question is specifically programmed to override any unsaved footage 

within fourteen days of recording. (Tyson Decl. at ¶ 12.) The BOP contends that the 

video was not saved within the fourteen day period and was subsequently copied over 

by other recordings. (Id.) The fact that a surveillance video is no longer available for the 

DHO to review does not violate a petitioner’s due process rights. Alexander v. Schleder, 

790 F. Supp.2d 1179, 1187 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2011).

In Alexander, the District Court considered a case in which the DHO declined to 

view videos, relying instead on reports of other officers that did in fact view the videos.

Alexander, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1187. The Court held that “[t]he DHO did not need to 

personally review the videotape.” (Id.) The Court supported its reasoning by comparing a 

DHO’s right to rely on “statements of adverse witnesses without Petitioner’s crossexamination or confrontation” with a DHO’s right to “similarly rely on the statements of a 

staff member regarding his review of potentially exculpatory videotape evidence.” (Id.) 

Concluding that due process does not require a DHO to personally watch a video of an

incident, the Court held that a DHO can reasonably consider video evidence by relying 

on the written report of another officer that did view the video.

In a footnote in Alexander, the Court acknowledged a contrary but distinguishable 

ruling from the 10th Circuit, on which Petitioner relies. Howard v. United States Bureau 

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of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808, 814-15 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that an inmate's due process 

rights were violated by a DHO's refusal to review a videotape of the incident which might 

have conclusively established the inmate's innocence).

In Howard, the BOP failed to consider video that did exist at the time of the 

hearing, unlike the present case where video no longer existed at the time of the 

hearing. Howard, 487 F.3d at 814. In Howard, the BOP could not demonstrate that the

officers, who the DHO relied upon to support his finding of the petitioner’s guilt, had 

witnessed the entire incident captured on video. (Id.) As the Tenth Circuit held, if the 

video contained additional evidence, its review would not be cumulative, as the BOP had 

argued. (Id.)

In the present case, while Officer Carroll did not witness the event, he based his 

incident report on a review of the video, wherein he confirmed the Petitioner’s identity

through the BOPWARE Electronic Posted Picture Application, a database that maintains 

contemporaneous photographs of USP Atwater inmates for identification purposes. 

(Tyson Decl., Ex. 1; Att. 4.) As a result, the DHO reasonably relied on Officer Carroll’s 

report regarding his viewing of the videotape surveillance. (Id.)

Furthermore, prison officials' errors in denying an evidentiary request are subject 

to harmless error review. Howard, 487 F.3d at 813 (citing Grossman v. Bruce, 447 F.3d 

801 (10th Cir. 2006)); Powell v. Coughlin, 953 F.2d 744 (2nd Cir. 1991); Lee v. Kramer, 

WL 4507584, at *4 (E.D. Cal. October 7, 2008). Accordingly, even when prison officials 

error in denying evidentiary requests, the Court must deny Petitioner's request for a writ 

of habeas corpus if the error was “harmless.” A deprivation of due process will be 

harmless and a habeas petition will be denied unless the error had a “substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the [factfinder's] verdict.” Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). Petitioner 

must show that he was prejudiced so as to justify federal habeas relief. (Id.)

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Petitioner failed to establish that the outcome of his hearing would have been 

different if the video surveillance had been available. Petitioner and his three inmate 

witnesses all made statements at the hearing that Petitioner did not hit the television.

However, none of the four statements provided an alternative explanation of what the 

DHO would have seen had he personally viewed the video. See Stearns v. Williamson, 

No. 2:13-cv-00479-AA, 2013 WL 6328091, at *2 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2013). The record 

supports a reasonable inference that all four were present at the time of the incident, 

indicating that each one could have testified as to what actually happened if it was 

different from the events reported by Officer Carroll. Even if the failure to provide video 

surveillance resulted in error, such error was harmless as Petitioner has not shown that 

he was prejudiced so as to justify federal habeas relief. 

The BOP did not violate Petitioner’s due process rights when it considered 

videotape evidence by relying on the reporting officer’s report. 

2. Petitioner’s Substantive Due Process Requirements Met as

Decision was Supported by “Some Evidence”

The decision to revoke a prisoner’s good time credits need only be supported by 

“some evidence” even if that evidence might be characterized as meager. Hill, 472 U.S. 

at 445, 455. The Supreme Court in Hill stated:

“This standard is met if ‘there was some evidence from which 

the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be 

deduced....’ Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied 

does not require examination of the entire record, 

independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or 

weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is 

whether there is any evidence in the record that could 

support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”

Hill, at 455-456 (citations omitted.)

The DHO’s decision met the appropriate evidentiary standard in finding the 

Petitioner guilty of the charged offense, as the evidence relied on during Petitioner’s 

discipline hearing satisfies the “some evidence” standard. In support of its decision, the 

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DHO relied on the statement of the reporting officer and the documentary evidence 

contained in the discipline packet. (Tyson Decl., Ex. 1; Att. 4.) Such evidence supported 

the fact that Petitioner was positively identified as the inmate who struck the television 

set knocking it to the floor and breaking it. (Id.) Furthermore, the fact that the DHO found

the written statement of Officer Carroll more credible than the statements of the 

Petitioner and three inmate witnesses does not undermine a finding that “some 

evidence” exists. The some evidence standard is a low threshold, and will be met even 

when evidence to the contrary is presented.

For all of the reasons contained in the DHO's report, "some evidence" exists to

support a finding that Petitioner destroyed the television set. The evidence is sufficient to 

meet the deferential "some evidence" standard under Hill. Petitioner is not entitled to 

relief under this claim. 

B. Claim Two: Insufficient Evidence of Value of the TV

Petitioner argues that his due process rights were violated because there was 

insufficient evidence presented of the value of the destroyed television set. (See

Pet. at 9.)

As discussed above, due process requires that the decision be supported by

"some evidence." Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. The DHO determined that the value of the 

television exceeded $100. The DHO based the value upon the written statement of 

Officer Carroll, and later upon a price quote from Best Buy stating the television was 

priced at $227.99. (Tyson Decl., Ex.1; Att. 4; see also Pet. at 8.) Based on the 

statements of Officer Carroll and the price quote provided from Best Buy, there was 

some evidence that the value of the television exceeded $100. Furthermore, regardless 

of whether Petitioner was provided proof of the value of the television, any such error 

was harmless as Petitioner has not provided any argument that the television was not 

worth over $100. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.

For all of the reasons contained in the DHO's report, "some evidence" exists to

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support a finding that Petitioner destroyed government property with a value in excess 

of $100. The evidence is sufficient to meet the deferential "some evidence" standard 

required under Hill.

The Court finds no due process violation with regard to the findings of the

disciplinary proceeding at issue in this case. The Court recommends that the petition 

for writ of habeas corpus be denied. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for writ

of habeas corpus be DENIED.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the assigned

United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636

(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District

Court, Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a

copy, Petitioner may file written objections with the Court. Such a document should

be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations. The

Court will then review the Magistrate Judge's ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). Petitioner is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772

F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 28, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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