Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02126/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02126-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Henning
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

JOHN A. HENNING, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant.) 

No. 89-2126 

FI LED 

United Scates Courr of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

J Ui·J 2 5 1990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO. 

(D.C. No. CR-88-348 JC) 

Ann Steinmetz, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. 

William L. Lutz, United States Attorney (Tara C. Neda, Assistant 

United states Attorney, with him on the brief), Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, 

and BRIMMER,* District Judge. 

BRIMMER, District Judge. 

*The Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, Chief Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-2126 Document: 01019880124 Date Filed: 06/25/1990 Page: 1 
John Henning was convicted after a jury trial in the United 

States District Court for the District of New Mexico of one count 

of possession with intent to distribute more than 20 grams of 

methamphetamine in violation of 21 u.s.c. §§ 841(a) (1) and 

841(b) (1) (C), two counts of carrying or using a firearm during and 

in relation to the drug trafficking offense charged in Count I in 

violation of 18 u.s.c. § 924(c) (1), and one count of possession of 

an unregistered firearm in violation of 26 u.s.c. §§ 5861(d) and 

5871. On appeal, Henning raises three issues: (1) whether the 

trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the 

methamphetamine and firearms as well as statements made in 

connection with the seizure of the physical evidence; (2) whether 

the trial court's failure to define "in relation to" regarding the 

counts for carrying or using a firearm during and in relation to 

a drug trafficking offense merits reversal; and (3) whether he can 

be convicted of two violations of 18 u.s.c. § 924(c) (1) for 

carrying or using two firearms during and in relation to only one 

underlying drug trafficking offense. Due to the Government's 

concession on the latter issue and because we agree, we affirm in 

part, vacate in part, and remand for resentencing on the firearms 

violation under§ 924(c) (1). 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-2126 Document: 01019880124 Date Filed: 06/25/1990 Page: 2 
I. 

On December 16, 1987, at approximately 2:42 a.m., Bernalillo 

County Sheriff's officers, who had been stationed across the street 

from a bar located on Isleta Boulevard in Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

investigating gang activity involving weapons and narcotics, heard 

a gunshot some 300 to 400 yards south of their position. Moments 

later, officer Bryan Murphy observed a yellow 1973 Chevrolet 

Suburban emerge from the general area of the gunshot, make "a real 

quick stop" at the stop sign at Isleta, and proceed north on 

Isleta. There was no other traffic in the area. He said, "That's 

it'' and activated his overhead lights ·and siren and proceeded to 

pull the vehicle over. Seated in the front of the Suburban were 

Henning and a female, Lucinda DeMaria. 

When Murphy asked Henning for his driver's license, Henning 

became abusive. Murphy had to again ask for the license before 

Henning held it out the window. When Murphy attempted to take the 

driver's license, Henning refused to release it. With two 

unsuccessful attempts, Murphy twice asked Henning to step out of 

the vehicle before he complied. As Henning opened the door, an 

automatic weapon fell to the ground. Murphy immediately drew his 

weapon, kicked the fallen weapon away and placed Henning's hands 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-2126 Document: 01019880124 Date Filed: 06/25/1990 Page: 3 
against the Suburban. A subsequent patdown revealed a semiautomatic pistol under his jacket. Henning was then placed under 

arrest for carrying a concealed weapon. 1 Both weapons, one of 

which Henning had converted to automatic capability, were fully 

loaded and readily accessible. 

Incident to the arrest, a search of his person and the 

Suburban resulted in the seizure of seven baggies of 

methamphetamine weighing 7. 58 grams from Henning' s shirt pocket and 

one baggie containing 12.54 grams of methamphetamine, along with 

59 empty baggies, inside a shaving kit within a blue denim athletic 

bag. Officers also found a loaded .22 calibre rifle on the front 

seat floorboard, a .22 calibre Reuger pistol inside a black bag, 

and 9mm ammunition, the same calibre ammunition as used in the 

previous two automatic weapons. During the booking process, a 

brown vial containing less than a gram of methamphetamine was found 

in Henning's breast pocket, along with two straws, thirteen Valium 

pills, and $360.00 in 20-dollar denominations. 

Henning filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence 

seized and all statements made in connection therewith, contending 

~In New Mexico a concealed weapon may be lawfully carried in 

a vehicle for protection. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-7-2 (Supp. 1989). 

However, once outside the vehicle, a person may not legally carry 

a concealed weapon on his person. Id. 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-2126 Document: 01019880124 Date Filed: 06/25/1990 Page: 4 
that the initial stop was not supported by probable cause, that 

no probable cause or reasonable suspicion existed for the arrest, 

and that no probable cause existed for the search of the Suburban. 

Rec. Vol. I, doc. a, at 3. He states he gave no consent for the 

search and that the seizure was neither part of a lawful inventory 

search nor amenable to the inevitable discovery doctrine. Id. 

While the evidence seized may not have been in plain view, says 

Henning, it was not "obviously contraband or instrumentalities of I 

a crime." Id. at 4. As for the evidence found in his pockets, 

Henning argues that the items were improperly removed because 

nothing recovered could have harmed the officers. A suppression 

hearing was held on February 1, 1989 and the trial court denied the 

motion to suppress, setting forth its reasons: 

I find there was certainly reasonable reason on the 

part of the police officers to have stopped the car. 

Once they stopped it, for their own protection, they had 

a right to ask him to exit the car based on his behavior. 

They also had a right to stop the car for speeding 

without the other incident of a shot being fired, and 

they had the right to ask him to step out of the car for 

their own protection. When he stepped out, and the 

rifle, or the automatic falls to the ground, certainly 

they had a right to pat him down, and when they patted 

him down, they found the other concealed weapon. 

They arrested him at the time, the search and 

narcotics, other controlled substance, which resulted in 

a lawful arrest. He was read his Miranda rights, 

indicated he understood those, and then spoke freely with 

the officers without ever asking for an attorney. 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-2126 Document: 01019880124 Date Filed: 06/25/1990 Page: 5 
Rec. Vol. II at 88-89. 

Following his conviction, Henning was sentenced to ten months 

imprisonment on the first count. As for the second and third 

counts, he was given consecutive sentences of ten years and five 

years, respectively. On the fourth count, the district court 

imposed a ten-month sentence to run concurrently with the sentence 

on the first count, for a total of fifteen years ten months 

imprisonment. This was to be followed by three years of supervised 

release. Rec. Vol. I, doc. 26. 

II. 

The trial court's findings of fact relative to a denial of a 

motion to suppress must be accepted unless they are clearly 

erroneous. United States v. Corral, 899 F.2d 991, 993 (10th Cir. 

1990). All the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and 

the trial must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party. United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1111 

{10th Cir. 1988). Our review of the record of the suppression 

hearing convinces us that the trial judge acted appropriately in 

denying suppression of the physical evidence seized and any 

incriminating statements made in relation thereto. 

In arguing that the initial stop was not supported by probable 

cause, Henning misstates the standard applicable to an 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-2126 Document: 01019880124 Date Filed: 06/25/1990 Page: 6 
investigative detention. All that is needed to support an 

investigative detention is reasonable suspicion. As we have said 

before: "[a]n investigative detention is justified where specific 

and articulable facts and rational inferences from those facts give 

rise to reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is 

committing a crime." United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 890 

(10th Cir. 1986). The evidence here showed that Henning's vehicle 

emerged from the general area of an early morning gunshot heard by 

officers only seconds earlier, that the vehicle made a "California 

stop", rec. vol. II at 58, and then proceeded away from the scene 

in excess of the posted speed limit. There was no other traffic 

in the area. Trained law enforcement officers could not reasonably 

be expected to simply stand by and ignore the potential 

significance such a fact pattern presents, believing, as they did, 

that they themselves might have been the targets of the gunfire. 

After all, only a few months earlier, this area was the scene of 

a drug-related homicide. Rec. Vol. II at 77. Under these 

circumstances, the district judge properly found the initial stop 

justifiable. 

With the vehicle stopped, Murphy's attempts at obtaining 

further information by asking to see Henning's driver's license 

were met with belligerence and abusive language. Unable to see 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-2126 Document: 01019880124 Date Filed: 06/25/1990 Page: 7 
Henning' s right hand, Murphy asked Henning to step out of his 

vehicle. Considering the "inordinate risk confronting an officer 

as he approaches a person seated in an automobile (, J" the intrusion 

upon Henning' s personal liberty at this point was de minimis. 

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110, 111 (1977). 

While it seems to us too plain to require comment, the instant 

the machine gun fell to the ground as Henning exited the vehicle, 

police officers were justified in performing a patdown search for 

their own protection and acted reasonably in doing so. See,~, 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Santillanes, 848 

F.2d 1103, 1108 (10th Cir. 1988). The presence of one firearm, 

especially a fully automatic weapon, certainly provides a law 

enforcement officer with a reasonable belief that the person being 

briefly detained may be carrying other deadly weapons. 

Santillanes, 848 F.2d at 1108. 

Once the patdown disclosed the presence of a loaded, concealed 

weapon, there was probable cause to arrest Henning for carrying a 

concealed weapon in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-7-2 (1978). 

The fact that' this charge was never listed on any police report, 

rec. vol. III at 107, is of no consequence since a higher charge 

took its place. Henning argues that he was in compliance with§ 

30-7-2 until the time Murphy asked him to exit the vehicle. In 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-2126 Document: 01019880124 Date Filed: 06/25/1990 Page: 8 
effect, says Henning, it was the officer who forced him to violate 

the state's deadly weapon statute. We believe Henning foreclosed 

his options by his belligerent behavior, leaving the officer no 

choice but to ask that he step out of his vehicle. 

The subsequent search of Henning's vehicle was incident to a 

lawful arrest. In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981), 

the Court held that such a search extends to the entire passenger 

compartment of a vehicle. Where, as here, the vehicle contains no 

trunk, the entire inside of the vehicle constitutes the passenger 

compartment and may be lawfully searched. Incident to the arrest, 

police may lawfully complete their search of a person as well. We 

agree with the district judge that the search which ensued 

comported with constitutional standards. 

Finally, Henning sought to have certain statements made at the 

scene suppressed, presumably based upon an alleged illegal arrest. 

Our ruling on the arrest precludes this argument. The statement 

of particular concern appears to be Henning's admission that he 

converted the fallen machine gun from a semi-automatic weapon into 

a fully automatic one. Suffice it to say that the testimony at 

trial showed that Henning was read his Miranda rights after the 

weapon was found concealed in a holster underneath his jacket and 

that he indicated to Murphy that he understood those rights. The 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-2126 Document: 01019880124 Date Filed: 06/25/1990 Page: 9 
statements he complains of were made after he indicated an 

understanding of his rights. Rec. Vol. III at 52-54. 

III. 

Henning' s next claim of error is directed at the district 

judge's failure to define "in relation to" in the jury instructions 

dealing with the second and third counts regarding firearms carried 

or used during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. 

Through this omission, Henning says the judge removed from the 

jurors' consideration an essential mens rea element of the crime 

charged. Since Henning did not object to the court's failure to 

give such an instruction during the trial2 , our review is under the 

plain error standard. Plain error is "'fundamental error, 

something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that 

justice cannot have been done.'" United states v. Coppola, 486 

F.2d 882, 884 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 948 

(1974) (quoting United states v. Summerour, 279 F.Supp. 407, 410 

2

Henning did submit a set of amended and additional 

instructions wherein is included instruction R which stated: 

"Defendant's use of a firearm must be an integral part of the drug 

trafficking in order to convict him of using a firearm during the 

commission of that crime." Rec. Vol. I, doc. 18. The court did 

not give this instruction and defense counsel did not raise an 

objection at the instruction conference. This instruction was 

adequately covered by the court's instruction 18, set out in the 

body of this opinion. There is no proposed instruction defining 

"in relation to" in the record. · 

10 

Appellate Case: 89-2126 Document: 01019880124 Date Filed: 06/25/1990 Page: 10 
(E.D.Mich. 1968) (emphasis in original)). 

The court's instructions 14 and 16 consisted of a reading of 

the second and third counts and, in each case, the penalty 

provision under 18 u.s.c. § 924(c) (1). Rec. Vol. I, doc. 20. 

Three other pertinent instructions were given: 

INSTRUCTION NO. 15 

As to Count II of the indictment, the government 

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the 

following essential elements: 

FIRST: The defendant John A. Henning did 

possess with the intent to distribute a 

controlled substance, to-wit: methamphetamine; 

SECOND: During and in relation to the 

possession with intent to distribute the 

methamphetamine John A. Henning knowingly used 

or carried a Heckler and Koch, Model 94, 9mm 

machinegun, Serial No. 1251; 

THIRD: This act occurred on or about December 

16, 1987, near Albuquerque, in the state and 

district of New Mexico. 

As stated before, the burden is always on the 

prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every 

essential element of the crimes charged. The law never 

imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden 

or duty of calling any witness or producing any evidence. 

Rec. Vol. I, doc. 20. Instruction 17 was identical to instruction 

15 in all respects except that it dealt with the weapons charge in 

the third count. Id. The following instruction was also given: 

INSTRUCTION NO. 18 

11 

Appellate Case: 89-2126 Document: 01019880124 Date Filed: 06/25/1990 Page: 11 
With reference to Counts II and III, the term 

'carries' means possession with the ability to exercise 

dominion and control of such proximity to make it 

available for use. 'Carries' does not mean mere 

transportation of a firearm in a vehicle. 

The term •use' includes use for security regardless 

of whether the weapons are ever referred to, displayed, 

pointed or fired. If a firearm plays any role in a drug 

trafficking crime or if it facilitates the crime in any 

way, it is being used within the meaning of 18 u.s.c. 

§ 924(c)(l). 

Rec. Vol. I, doc. 20. 

The failure to instruct separately on the meaning of "in 

relation to" did not exclude an essential element under § 924 (c) (1) 

from the jury's consideration. The legislative history of this 

section was analyzed in United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538 (9th 

Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 867 (1987). In 1984, the phrase 

"during and in relation to" was substituted for "during" in § 

924(c) (1). Circuit Judge (now Justice) Kennedy then reasoned that 

this substitution was not intended to create a new element of the 

crime but rather to clarify that a person could not be prosecuted 

under§ 924(c) for an unrelated crime committed while in possession 

of a firearm. Id. at 539 (citing S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st 

Sess. 312-14 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 

3182, 3490-92). As observed in Stewart, 779 F.2d at 540: 

If the firearm is within the possession or control 

of a person who commits an underlying crime as defined 

12 

Appellate Case: 89-2126 Document: 01019880124 Date Filed: 06/25/1990 Page: 12 
by the statute, and the circumstances of the case show 

that the firearm facilitated or had a role in the crime, 

such as emboldening an actor who had the opportunity or 

ability to display or discharge the weapon to protect 

himself or intimidate others, whether or not such display 

or discharge in fact occurred, then there is a violation 

of the statute. 

Henning took the stand at his trial and testified that his 

purpose in carrying the machine gun and other weapons was for 

target practice during an upcoming camping trip. Rec. Vol. III at 

267, 278. Detective Dennis Yurcisin, a 12-year veteran of the 

Albuquerque police department with a prior stint with the Drug 

Enforcement Administration in Albuquerque, testified concerning the 

techniques used in purchasing and selling· illicit controlled 

substances. Yurcisin gave four reasons that many drug traffickers 

carry firearms in conjunction with their illegal activities. These 

reasons were: (1) to protect their illegal merchandise because of 

its high street value; (2) to protect the cash generated from the 

drug sales; (3) as a contingent to avoid arrest or apprehension by 

law enforcement authorities; and (4) to intimidate the people they 

deal with through a show of force. Rec. Vol. III at 201. The jury 

considered this and other evidence, and any reasonable inferences 

to be drawn therefrom, and, not unreasonably, gave Yurcisin' s 

. testimony greater weight--not because of the trial judge's failure 

to define "in relation to'' in the instructions packet. 

13 

Appellate Case: 89-2126 Document: 01019880124 Date Filed: 06/25/1990 Page: 13 
The attorney for the United States, in his closing argument, 

emphasized several times that there had to be a relation between 

the possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and the 

knowing use or carrying of a firearm. Rec. Vol. IV at 387-389. 

Henning's counsel herself argued against any sort of relationship 

when she described the defendant as carrying weapons because of his 

interest in hunting. Rec. Vol. IV at 398. 

Henning relies upon Stewart as supporting reversal of his 

conviction. We do not agree. Stewart's conviction was reversed 

because "[t]he government ... did not attempt to link possession of 

the firearm with the underlying felony, and the district judge did 

not instruct the jury that a relation between the two is required." 

Stewart, 779 F.2d at 539. The Ninth Circuit has so recognized. 

See United States v. Power, 881 F.2d 733, 736 (9th Cir. 1989). In 

Henning' s case, the district judge properly instructed on the 

elements needed to secure a § 924(c) (1) conviction and the 

Government presented enough testimony from which a jury could 

reasonably find the requisite linkage and conclμde or infer that 

the machine gun and the pistol were present not only to facilitate 

Henning' s narcotics trafficking activities but also to prevent 

capture by authorities. We cannot conclude that the giving of an 

"in relation to" instruction would have had such an impact upon the 

14 

Appellate Case: 89-2126 Document: 01019880124 Date Filed: 06/25/1990 Page: 14 
jury that it would have reached a contrary result on the second and 

third counts. Considering the jury instructions as a whole, 

together with the evidence adduced at trial, the district judge's 

failure to give an "in relation to" instruction was not plain 

error. 

IV. 

This leaves Henning' s argument regarding the sentence he 

received for the second and third counts. At the time of his 

arrest in 1987, the penalty provision read, in pertinent part: 

Whoever, during and in relation to any ... drug 

trafficking crime,[] including a drug trafficking crime, 

which provides for an enhanced punishment if committed 

by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device, for 

which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United 

states, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to 

the punishment provided for such crime ... , be sentenced 

to imprisonment for five years, and if the firearm is a 

machinegun, ... to imprisonment for ten years. In the case 

of his second or subsequent conviction under this 

subsection, such person shall be sentenced to 

imprisonment for ten years, and if the firearm is a 

machinegun, ... to imprisonment for twenty years .... 

18 u.s.c. § 924(c) (1). These terms of imprisonment run consecutive 

to the sentence imposed for the underlying drug trafficking 

offense. 3 

3

of worthy note, the penalties under §924(c) (1) have increased 

significantly since 1987. Today, if the firearm is a machine gun, 

the mandatory consecutive sentence for a first-time conviction is 

twenty years. For subsequent convictions, a machine gun carries 

15 

Appellate Case: 89-2126 Document: 01019880124 Date Filed: 06/25/1990 Page: 15 
Henning contends, and the Government concedes, that he cannot 

be punished twice under § 924(c)(l) for one underlying felony. 

Section 924(c) is an enhancement statute enacted to punish those 

drug traffickers who choose to carry on their trade with the 

assistance of a firearm. Henning was convicted of one drug 

trafficking crime, to-wit: possession with intent to distribute 

methamphetamine on or about December 16, 1987. The Government 

charged two firearms counts under§ 924(c) (1) and,related both to 

the single drug trafficking offense. 

In United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987), 

we addressed the imposition of multiple sentences under§ 924(c). 

There, Chalan was convicted of one count of first degree murder in 

violation of 18 u.s.c. § 1111, one count of robbery in violation 

of 18 u.s.c. § 2111, and two counts of the use of a firearm during 

the commission of a crime of violence in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 

924(c). Chalan contended that the imposition of two consecutive 

sentences on the firearms counts violated double jeopardy. We 

concluded that under the test of Blockburger v. United States, 284 

U.S. 299 (1932), the underlying crimes constituted a single offense 

a mandatory consecutive life sentence without release. Most other 

firearms carry a mandatory consecutive twenty years imprisonment 

for subsequent convictions. 

16 

Appellate Case: 89-2126 Document: 01019880124 Date Filed: 06/25/1990 Page: 16 
I 

and a single crime of violence under§ 924(c). Chalan, 812 F.2d 

at 1317. Accordingly, we vacated one of the firearms convictions. 

A similar result obtained in United states v. Henry, 878 F.2d 

93 7 ( 6th Cir. 1989) , where in spite of two underlying drug 

trafficking offenses, the Sixth Circuit vacated one of the two 

firearms convictions under § 924 (c). This action came about 

because the indictment referenced both drug counts in each firearm 

count rather than linking one firearm to one drug count. Henry, 

878 F.2d at 943. Applying the reasoning in Chalan and Henry, we 

hold that where a defendant has been convicted of a single drug 

( trafficking offense and more than one firearm was involved, a 

single violation of§ 924(c)(l) occurs and multiple consecutive 

sentences may not be stacked to account for each firearm seized. 

v. 

In sum, for the reasons set forth above, we find that the 

district judge's denial of Henning's motion to suppress was not 

clearly erroneous and AFFIRM the same. We AFFIRM the conviction 

insofar as it relates to the judge's failure to give an "in 

relation to" instruction. Because Henning was convicted of only 

one underlying drug trafficking offense, we VACATE the sentences 

imposed on the second and third counts and REMAND for resentencing 

under§ 924(c) (1) in accordance with this opinion. 

17 

Appellate Case: 89-2126 Document: 01019880124 Date Filed: 06/25/1990 Page: 17