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Parties Involved:
Uri Geller
Appellant
James Randi
Appellee
The Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 6, 1994 Decided December 9, 1994

No. 93-7140

URI GELLER,

APPELLANT

v.

JAMES RANDI, A/K/A ADAM JERSIN, A/K/A DONALD,

A/K/A TRUTH'S BODYGUARD, A/K/A THE AMAZING RANDI,

A/K/A RANDALL JAMES ZWINGE; COMMITTEE FOR THE

SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION OF CLAIMS OF THE PARANORMAL,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

91cv01014

Richard W. Winelander argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.

Lee Levine argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was James E. Grossberg. R.

Darryl Cooper entered an appearance for appellee Committee for the Scientific Investigation of

Claims of the Paranormal. Michael J. Kennedy entered an appearance for appellee James Randi.

Before WALD, SENTELLE, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Appellant Uri Geller challenges the district court's award of

monetary sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 11") in favor of

appellee Committee for the Scientific Investigation ofClaims ofthe Paranormal. Geller contends that

the district court erred when it treated a motion for Rule 11 sanctions as conceded by Geller under

local rules and thus awarded sanctions. Because we hold that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in sanctioning appellant under Rule 11, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant Uri Geller, a citizen of Israel and a permanent resident of England, is a

self-proclaimed psychic who uses his putative "powers" to accomplish such remarkable feats as

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reading minds or bending spoons and suspending cable-carsin mid-air with nothing but sheer mental

force. Geller has built a career and reputation on attempted demonstrations of these psychic "skills,"

appearing on numerous television programs such as "The Tonight Show with Johnny Carson" and

being featured in countless newspaper and magazine articles. Among Geller's critics is James Randi,

an accomplished magician, author and lecturer, better known as "The Amazing Randi." Randi was

a founding member of the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal

("CSICOP"), an organization dedicated to investigating, among other things, claims of psychic

phenomena such asthose made byGeller. Since Geller's rise to prominence in the early 1970's, Randi

has set about exposing various Geller feats as the fraudulent tricks of a confidence man.

In an April 9, 1991, article in the International Herald Tribune, Randi discussed Geller's

claimed psychic abilities, stating that Geller "tricked even reputable scientists" with tricks that "are

the kind that used to be on the back of cereal boxes when I was a kid. Apparently scientists don't eat

cornflakes anymore." Based solely upon these statements, Geller filed suit against both Randi and

CSICOP in United States District Court, alleging defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and

tortiousinterferencewith prospective advantage. The original complaint did not attribute any specific

conduct to CSICOP; however, Geller amended his complaint to allege that "Defendant Randi was

acting individually on his own behalf and/or as a duly authorized actual and/or apparent agent,

servant, employee and/or representative of the Defendant, CSICOP."

On January 15, 1992, eight months after Geller filed suit in district court, CSICOP filed

motions for summary judgment and Rule 11 sanctions against Geller. In support of its motion for

sanctions, CSICOP argued that Geller could not have reasonablybelieved that his complaint was well

grounded in fact or warranted by law and that the complaint was filed for purposes of harassing

CSICOP. Geller responded on January 29, 1992, by filing a motion for extension of time to oppose

CSICOP's motionspresumably in order to give Geller additional time for discovery. The district

court granted Geller's motion and ordered him to respond to CSICOP's motions by March 13, 1992.

When the deadline arrived on March 13, Geller filed another motion for an extension oftime until ten

days after he received a transcript of a deposition of CSICOP's corporate representative conducted

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that day. The district court never ruled on that motion. Instead, attorneys for both parties agreed

at a later deposition attended by Geller that Geller's request for a ten-day extension of time would

lapse on April 29, 1992. Geller did not file a response by that date. On May 28, 1992, CSICOP filed

a motion for leave to file a supplementalmemorandumin support ofits motions. CSICOP served this

motion and the accompanying memorandum upon Geller, who again failed to respond.

After Geller failed to respond to either the summary judgment or sanctions motion, CSICOP

moved on June 10, 1992, for expedited consideration of both motions. Again, CSICOP served its

motion upon Geller's counsel, who neither opposed it nor took any further steps with respect to the

underlying motionsfor summary judgment and Rule 11 sanctions. On July 2, 1992, the district court

granted all of CSICOP's motions, including the Rule 11 sanctions motion, as "unopposed." Shortly

thereafter, Geller filed successive motionsfor reconsideration, arguing that it was "inappropriate" to

respond to CSICOP's motions because the district court had not ruled on its second motion for

extension of time. The district court denied both motions for reconsideration, noting that its failure

to rule on the second motion for extension of time did not relieve Geller's counsel of the duty to file

opposition within the time required by local and federalrules. The district court explained that when

Gellerfailed to respond to the summary judgment and sanctionsmotions, bothmotions were properly

treated as conceded under D.C. Local Rule 108(b), which provides that a motion may be treated as

conceded if it is not answered within 11 days of the date of service. D.D.C. R. 108(b). Because

Geller had not adequately explained his failure to respond, he was not entitled to reconsideration.

After denying Geller'ssecond motion for reconsideration on July 27, 1993, the court entered

judgment against Geller in the amount of $149,000, representing fees and costsincurred byCSICOP

in defending this action. Geller appeals from this entry of judgment of Rule 11 sanctions.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Although both parties correctly agree that this court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal,

CSICOP argues that, in light of Geller's post-judgment conduct, we should decline to exercise that

jurisdiction. CSICOP asserts that, since entry of judgment by the district court, Geller has neither

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1While we do not decide the applicability of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in the civil

context, we note that our position here is not inconsistent with the Second Circuit's determination

not to decline jurisdiction where a litigant had neither complied with an order of the district court

nor sought a stay of the order because the litigant had not fled the jurisdiction. See In re Fait &

Drexler, Inc., 760 F.2d 406, 413-14 (2d Cir. 1985). 

satisfied the judgment nor posted an appropriate bond, and that he has secreted his assets abroad in

an attempt to abuse judicial processes. Consequently, because Geller has allegedly flouted judicial

authority, he should not be allowed to prosecute this appeal.

In support of its argument, CSICOP analogizes to the doctrine of "fugitive disentitlement,"

in which fugitive criminal defendants have been denied an appeal for failure to submit themselves to

lawful criminal authorities. See Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365 (discretionary refusal by

appellate court to entertain appeal of fugitive convict); In re Assets of Martin, 1 F.3d 1351, 1356

(3rd Cir. 1993) ("[I]f a defendant is not willing to suffer the penalties of the crime, then an appellate

court should not afford the defendant an opportunity to improve his or her position by challenging

the validity of the conviction."). Relying on this "simple principle of mutuality," CSICOP argues that

this court should exercise discretion not to hear Geller's appeal because he has not satisfied the lower

court's sanctions judgment and has placed himself and his assets beyond the reach of the district

court's authority.

Although CSICOP's argument appears to have at least facial appeal, we need not decide

whether we possess the discretion supposed by CSICOP. CSICOP's argument is not truly

jurisdictional; indeed, as both parties concede, this court has jurisdiction over this case under 28

U.S.C. § 1291 (1988) (appeals from final orders of the district court). Because we have crossed the

jurisdictional threshold, we may reach the merits of this dispute without considering appellee's

invitation to decline jurisdiction in our supposed discretion; and because the merits of this case so

clearly favor CSICOP, the party inviting this court to decline jurisdiction, we need not detain

ourselves with CSICOP's invitation, and turn instead to the merits of Geller's appeal.1

B. Rule 11 Sanctions

Although Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure wasrevised effective December 1,

1993, the district court imposed sanctions under the pre-revision rule; thus, our review is limited to

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that former rule, which provided, in relevant part:

Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall

be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose

address shall be stated.... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a

certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper;

that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after

reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a

good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and

that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause

unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.... If a pleading,

motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or

upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented

party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the

other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the

filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.

FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1993).

In reviewing the district court's imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, our review is limited

to a determination of whether the district court abused its discretion. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx

Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1989). In this case, the district court imposed Rule 11 sanctions by default

under Local Rule 108(b), which provides:

Within 11 days of the date ofservice or at such other time as the court may direct, an

opposing party shall serve and file a memorandum of points and authorities in

opposition to the motion. If such a memorandum is not filed within the prescribed

time, the court may treat the motion as conceded.

D.D.C. R. 108(b). The court treated the motion for sanctions as conceded when Geller failed to

respond to the motion within the time period prescribed by the rule.

Geller claims that the district court abused its discretion in treating CSICOP's sanctions

motion as conceded because a plain reading of Rule 11 indicatesthat sanctionsshould not be granted

by default or concession. Rule 11 requires a "pleading, motion or other paper" to be filed in violation

of the rule before sanctions can be granted. Geller maintains that this requirement is not met here

because no such paper or motion was filed, but that, in fact, he was sanctioned because he failed to

file a response to CSICOP's motion. Geller's argument mischaracterizes the district court's decision,

however. In support of its initial motion for sanctions, CSICOP complained that "Geller has not a

shred of factual or legalsupport for the allegationsin his Complaint that CSICOP can be held legally

responsible for statements made byRandi without its knowledge or authorization." Joint Appendix,

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Vol. 1, at 90-91. As this allegation makes clear, CSICOP's request for sanctions was directed at the

filing of Geller's initial complaint. When Geller failed to respond to the sanctions motion, the trial

court concluded that he had effectively conceded under LocalRule 108(b) that his original complaint

was not well grounded in fact or warranted by law. Consequently, the sanctions were not based upon

Geller's failure to answer; rather, they were based upon Geller's filing of a frivolous complaint.

Rather than finding Geller's failure to answer to be a sanctionable act, the court, at most, treated it

as a concession that he had, in fact, filed such a complaint.

Rule 11 expressly authorizes sanctions for groundless complaints when it states that if "a

pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court ... shall impose upon the

party who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction." FED.R.CIV.P. 11 (1993)

(emphasis added); see Cooter &Gell, 496 U.S. at 409 (affirming sanctions against law firm for filing

of frivolous antitrust complaint). We find nothing in the Rule that limits its applicability in cases in

which a party fails to respond to a motion for sanctions. On the contrary, we conclude that, under

District of Columbia local rules, a party can be sanctioned for a Rule 11 violation if that party fails

to respond to a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. See D.D.C. R. 108(b). Local Rule 108(b) is a rule of

neutral applicability; it is not qualified in any way by the language of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedureit applies equally when a party fails to respond to a Rule 11 motion. We think

it would be absurd to allow a party to concede an entire case by default while restricting the same

party's ability to concede a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. See Moy v. Howard Univ., 843 F.2d 1504,

1504 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (dicta) (party may concede a motion for summary judgment under LocalRule

108(b) by failing to respond); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 55 (governing default judgments).

Consequently, the district court properly treated CSICOP's sanctions motion as conceded by Geller

under Local Rule 108(b).

Turning to the underlying complaint, Geller argues that the complaint was indeed well

grounded in fact and warranted by existing law under a theory of "apparent agency." Based upon our

discussion ofLocalRule 108(b), however, we need not reach this argument. Regardless of the merit

of this claim, Geller cannot raise it now. The proper time for Geller to have raised this defense would

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have been in responding to CSICOP's motion for summary judgment. See Weil v. Seltzer, 873 F.2d

1453, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (concession of motion under Local Rule 108(b) acts as waiver; party

cannot raise conceded argument on appeal). When Geller failed to respond, he conceded a violation

of Rule 11 under Local Rule 108(b); he cannot now argue the merits of his Rule 11 defense.

Finally, Geller complainsthat the district court'simposition ofsanctionsshould be overturned

because it is not adequately supported by findings of fact. We agree that, in cases in which a motion

forsanctionsis opposed, our review is aided when a trial court supports a sanctions order by "explicit

findings of fact on either the exact basis underlying the sanctions or the reasonableness of the exact

sanction chosen." Confederate Memorial Ass'n v. Hines, 995 F.2d 295, 301 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Under

these circumstances, however, we are unwilling to mandate such findings of fact to support the

district court's order. In this case, the district court's basis for imposing sanctions is obvious. In its

sanctions order, the district court handwrote the word "unopposed" in its description of CSICOP's

sanctions motion. Later, in its denial of Geller's motion for reconsideration, the district court

explained that it had treated the motion as conceded under Local Rule 108(b). Thus, the court

treated the allegations in support of CSICOP's motion as true. The district court's reliance upon

Local Rule 108(b) provides us a basis to determine the sanctions order to be reasonable. The

reasonableness of the specific sanction levelled against Geller was conceded by him.

We find ample support for the district court'simposition ofsanctions against Geller. Rule 11

expresslyauthorizesthe imposition ofsanctions against a "represented party" for violation ofthe rule.

As the advisory committee notes to Rule 11 state, "Even though it is the attorney whose signature

violates the rule, it may be appropriate under the circumstances of the case to impose a sanction on

the client." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes to 1983 amendment (citing Browning

Debenture Holders' Committee v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977)). Given Geller's

litigious history, we find no abuse of discretion in this direct imposition of sanctions. The district

court properly treated the sanctions motion as conceded by Geller under Local Rule 108(b).

Although the size of the sanction is substantial, we find no abuse of discretion here, given the

aggravated facts before the district court. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

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Affirmed.

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