Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01549/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01549-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bob Watson
Plaintiff
Yolo County Flood Control and Water Conservation District
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

BOB WATSON,

NO. 2:06-cv-1549 FCD DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YOLO COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL AND

WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendant’s motion for

certification of this court’s October 17, 2007 Order (the

“Order”) for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and

for a stay of this action pending the appeal. Plaintiff Bob

Watson (“plaintiff”) opposes the motion. For the reasons set

forth below, the court finds that defendant has met his burden of

demonstrating that the court’s Order involves a controlling

question of law as to which there is substantial ground for

difference of opinion, and that an immediate appeal may

Case 2:06-cv-01549-FCD-DAD Document 78 Filed 11/16/07 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-320(h).

2

materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation. 

Thus, pursuant to Section 1292(b), defendant’s motion is

GRANTED.1

BACKGROUND

Defendant moved for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims

for damages for allegedly unpaid minimum wages and overtime wages

accrued during his employment as a damtender at the Indian Valley

Dam at Indian Valley Reservoir in Yolo County, California. 

Defendant asserted, inter alia, that the irrigation exemption to

the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(12),

applied to plaintiff’s position as a damtender, and thus, it was

not required to pay plaintiff overtime wages. The irrigation

exemption provides that the maximum hour requirements of the FLSA

shall not apply to

any employee employed in agriculture or in connection

with the operation or maintenance of ditches, canals,

reservoirs, or waterways, not owned or operated for

profit, . . . and which are used exclusively for

supply and storing of water, at least 90 percent of

which was ultimately delivered for agricultural

purposes during the preceding calendar year.

29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(12) (West 2007). 

In its Order, the court found that the irrigation exemption

was inapplicable to plaintiff’s case because the Indian Valley

Reservoir is not used exclusively for the supply and storing of

water. (Mem. & Order [Docket #72], filed Oct. 17, 2007, at 14-

15). Specifically, the court held:

In amending section 213(b)(12), Congress did not remove

the term “exclusively” from the language of the

Case 2:06-cv-01549-FCD-DAD Document 78 Filed 11/16/07 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Because the defendant did not demonstrate that the

Indian Valley Reservoir was used exclusively for the supply and

storing of water, the court did not reach the issue of whether 90

percent of the water delivered was used for agricultural

purposes. (Id. at 14-15). Plaintiff requested further discovery

with respect to this issue. (Id. at 15).

3

statute. As such, the court must give this term force. 

See Dole, 909 F.2d at 351. By its definition, the term

“exclusively” cannot and does not mean 90 percent. 

Therefore, these two statutory terms cannot be

conflated. . . . A plain reading of the statute,

giving force to each of the terms set forth by

Congress, demonstrates that the term “exclusively”

applies to the supply and storage component while the

“90 percent” applies to the delivery component. 

Furthermore, the court’s interpretation of the function

of the term “exclusively” in § 213(b)(12) narrowly

construes the section against defendant District. See

Arnold, 361 U.S. 388 at 392 (1960)); Cleveland, 420

F.3d at 988; Dole, 909 F.2d at 352 (9th Cir. 1990).

(Mem. & Order [Docket #72] at 14). Based upon its interpretation

of the statute, the court held that the irrigation exemption did

not apply to plaintiff’s position as a damtender.2 

After review of defendant’s other bases for its motion, the

court granted in part and denied in part defendant’s motion for

summary judgment. Defendant now moves for interlocutory appeal

of the court’s October 17 Order as it relates to the

interpretation of the irrigation exemption to the FLSA.

STANDARD

The general rule is that an appellate court should not

review a district court ruling until after entry of a final

judgment. Coopers & Lyband v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474 (1978);

In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir.

1982), aff’d sub nom. Arizona v. Ash Grove Cement Co., 459 U.S.

1190 (1983); see 28 U.S.C. § 1291. There is, however, an

exception to this general rule:

Case 2:06-cv-01549-FCD-DAD Document 78 Filed 11/16/07 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

When a district judge, in making in a civil action an

order not otherwise appealable under this section,

shall be of the opinion that such order involves a

controlling question of law as to which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion and that

an immediate appeal for the order may materially

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he

shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of

Appeals . . . may thereupon . . . permit an appeal . .

. if application is made to it within ten days . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The party seeking certification of an

interlocutory appeal has the burden to show the presence of those

exceptional circumstances. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 474-

75.

Section 1292 identifies three factors that must be present

in order for the court to certify an appeal. First, the issue to

be certified must involve a controlling issue of law. “Courts

have refused to interpret the phrase so narrowly as to require

that reversal of the district court’s order terminate the

litigation.” In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026

(citing United States v. Woodbury, 263 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir.

1959). Rather, an issue is “controlling” if “resolution of the

issue on appeal could materially affect the outcome of litigation

in the district court.” Id. (citing U.S. Rubber Co. v. Wright,

359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 1966)). Second, there must be

substantial ground for difference of opinion on that issue. A

party’s strong disagreement with the court’s ruling is not

sufficient for there to be a “substantial ground for difference;”

the proponent of an appeal must make some greater showing. KernTulare Water Dist. v. Bakersfield, 634 F. Supp. 656, 667 (E.D.

Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828

F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987). Third, an interlocutory appeal must be

Case 2:06-cv-01549-FCD-DAD Document 78 Filed 11/16/07 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

likely to materially speed the termination of the litigation. 

This factor is linked to whether an issue of law is “controlling”

in that the court should consider the effect of a reversal by the

court of appeals on the management of the case. See In re Cement

Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026.

As to a stay of the pending action, Section 1292(b) states: 

“[A]pplication for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings

in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of

Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.” Thus, by statute,

this court has authority to stay the proceedings pending an

interlocutory appeal. This court also possesses the inherent

power to control its own docket and calendar. “A district court

has inherent discretion to control the disposition of the causes

on its docket in a manner which will promote economy of time and

effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Filtrol

Corp. v. Kelleher, 467 F.2d 242, 244 (9th Cir. 1972) (quotations

and citations omitted). In Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v.

Ssangyong Corp., the Ninth Circuit recognized: 

A trial court may, with propriety, find it is efficient

for its own docket and the fairest course for the

parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending

resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon

the case. This rule . . . does not require that the

issues in such proceedings are necessarily controlling

of the action before the court.

708 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

As to the first requirement for interlocutory appeal,

defendant seeks certification for immediate interlocutory appeal

on the singular issue of whether the irrigation exemption applies

to plaintiff’s position as a damtender at the Indian Valley

Case 2:06-cv-01549-FCD-DAD Document 78 Filed 11/16/07 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 The court did not make any findings with respect to

this component of the exemption because it was unnecessary in

light of the court’s interpretation of § 213.

6

Reservoir. The applicability of the exemption hinges on the

interpretation of the language of § 213 of the FLSA and

specifically, upon the meaning of the term “exclusive.” The

proper interpretation of the language of § 213 is a question of

law. See Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 219 F.3d

674, 676 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that “question of law” refers

to a “question of the meaning of a statutory or constitutional

provision”).

That question of law is “controlling” within the meaning of

Section 1292(b) because an interlocutory appeal would “materially

affect the outcome of [the] litigation in [this court].” In re

Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026. Plaintiff contends

that reversal of this court’s decision would not necessarily be

dispositive of the case due to unresolved factual issues relating

to the 90 percent component of the exemption; however,

termination of the litigation is not required to satisfy this

element. Id. In this case, the applicability of the irrigation

exemption is a threshold issue with respect to plaintiff’s claim

for unpaid overtime wages. Even if there is an issue of fact

regarding whether 90 percent of the water was delivered for

agricultural purposes,3 the court would need to submit that

question to the jury. Under the court’s interpretation of § 213

as set forth in the October 17 Order, this is not currently an

issue that would be presented to the jury. Further, if

defendant’s evidence relating to the 90 percent component is

Case 2:06-cv-01549-FCD-DAD Document 78 Filed 11/16/07 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

undisputed, the interpretation of the irrigation exemption is

dispositive of the case; reversal of this court’s order would

terminate the litigation. 

For these same reasons, defendant has also demonstrated that

the appeal will advance the ultimate termination of the

litigation. The potential for bringing the litigation to a more

expeditious close is related to the “controlling issue of law”

factor for certification. See id. The court must consider the

effect of a reversal by the court of appeals on the management of

the case. Id. Here, a reversal of this court’s Order could

resolve this case in its entirety if defendant can present

undisputed evidence that 90 percent of the water delivered was

used for agricultural purposes. Further, even if a triable issue

of fact is raise with respect to this element, the submission of

this threshold issue to the jury will also advance the ultimate

termination of the litigation. 

As to the final requirement for certification of

interlocutory appeal, the court acknowledged in its Order that

there was a paucity of relevant case law on the applicability of

the irrigation exemption. (Mem. & Order [Docket #72] at 12-13). 

The court specifically noted that the only federal case to

address the interpretation of § 213 after it was amended in 1997

is an unpublished decision from the Eastern District of

California. See Avila v. Turlock Irrigation District, 2006 WL

3437549 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2006). However, the court’s Order

did not adopt the interpretation of § 213 set forth in Avila. As

such, there is now an intra-district conflict with respect to the

Case 2:06-cv-01549-FCD-DAD Document 78 Filed 11/16/07 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 The court does not repeat its analysis of the

irrigation exemption or its rationale for rejecting the court’s

rational in Avila v. Turlock Irrigation District, 2006 WL 3437549

(E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2006). Such analysis is fully set forth in

the Order.

8

interpretation of the irrigation exemption to the FLSA.4 Thus,

the court finds that there is substantial ground for difference

of opinion on the issue.

Because a reversal of this court’s Order by the Ninth

Circuit could materially affect this case and advance the

ultimate termination of litigation, the court stays this action

in its entirety pending resolution of defendant’s appeal of the

Order. Said stay promotes economy of time and effort both for

the court and the parties. Filtrol Corp., 467 F.2d at 244.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that its 

October 17, 2007 Order, holding that the irrigation exemption to

the FLSA is inapplicable to plaintiff’s position as a dam-tender

at the Indian Valley Reservoir, involves a controlling question

of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of

opinion, and that an immediate appeal from the Order may

materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. 

As such, defendant’s motion for certification of the court’s

October 17, 2007 Order for interlocutory appeal is GRANTED. The

court stays this action in its entirety pending resolution of

said appeal. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 16, 2007

Case 2:06-cv-01549-FCD-DAD Document 78 Filed 11/16/07 Page 8 of 8