Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01867/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01867-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Doe
Intervenor
First Unum Life Insurance Company of America
Defendant
Radfer Trust
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RADFER TRUST,

Plaintiff, No. C 05-1867 PJH

v. ORDER RE DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

FIRST UNUM LIFE INSURANCE

COMPANY,

Defendant.

_______________________________/

Before the court is the defendant’s motion for an order awarding attorney’s fees and

costs, pursuant to ERISA § 502(g)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). Having read the parties’

papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good

cause appearing, the court GRANTS the motion, and orders that plaintiff pay defendant the

amount of $15,000 in fees and costs.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Radfer Trust (“Radfer”) filed this action on May 5, 2005, alleging that defendant

First UNUM Life Insurance Company of America (“First UNUM”) wrongfully denied benefits

owed to “John Doe” (“Doe”) under a group long-term disability policy (“the Policy”) that First

Unum managed for Doe’s former employer, the New York City law firm of Hawkins, Delafield,

& Wood (“Hawkins”). Doe (the real party in interest) assigned his rights under the Policy to

Radfer. 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In 1993 and 1994, Doe was under treatment for schizophrenia, and was hospitalized

twice for that condition. In 1995, when his schizophrenia became less acute, he took the Law

School Aptitude Test, with accommodations based on his mental illness. After graduating

from law school and passing the New York Bar Exam, and began working as a full-time

associate for Hawkins in October 1998. First UNUM’s coverage of Doe under the Policy

became effective on October 1, 1998. The Policy provided payments for disability, with a

180-day elimination period beginning on the first day of disability, and with a 24-month

limitation on claims for mental illness

Doe’s symptoms began to return the following year, and he was subsequently

terminated because he could not longer perform his job duties. On October 1, 1999, Doe filed

a claim for long-term disability benefits. After UNUM denied the claim, Doe apparently

assigned his claim to an entity known as the Radford Trust (“Radford”), a trust whose sole

trustee is Doe’s father, Bernard Doe. Radford filed suit in the District of Massachusetts,

alleging a claim for recovery of unpaid benefits under ERISA and a claim of unfair competition

or unfair business practices under Massachusetts law. First UNUM argued that the denial of

benefits had been proper, because at the time that Doe’s alleged disability commenced, he

was ineligible for coverage because his active employment had terminated. The parties

disputed the date of onset of disability, as well as the date of termination of employment, but

the district court ultimately ruled in Radford’s favor, finding that Doe was covered by the Policy

and had become disabled before he was terminated. 

On March 31, 2004, the court issued a 4-page order and judgment, and on June 15,

2004, the court issued a Memorandum and Order setting forth its reasoning. See Radford

Trust v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America, 321 F.Supp. 2d 226 (D. Mass. 2004). The court

found that Doe was entitled to receive benefits under the Policy as of October 17, 1999, and

for the twenty-four months thereafter, and that Radford was entitled to collect on Doe’s behalf. 

The court noted that “[t]wenty-four months was the maximum period [under the Policy]

for receipt of benefits for disability due to a ‘mental illness,’ with certain exceptions relating to

confinement in a hospital or institution after that period.” Id. at 251. The court added, “To the
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For the Northern District of California

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extent that Doe might have considered his schizophrenia a physical disability rather than a

mental illness, or to the extent he might have had claims for confinement after the twenty-four

months,” Radford had presented neither issue to First UNUM and thus no record was before

the court. Id. The court noted that any decision with regard to whether Doe’s disability was a

“mental” one or a “physical” one was for First UNUM to make in the first instance, and held that

“should First UNUM or any court or other entity with the power to pass on such matters

determine that Doe’s disability is a ‘physical’ one, entitling him to receive benefits for the

length of his disability, he would have to be treated as if that determination had been made

before his eligibility for benefits for “mental” disability expired.” Id. 

Meanwhile, on May 25, 2004, an entity called the “Radfer Trust” (“Radfer”) filed a

lawsuit in the Northern District of California, Radfer Trust v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co., C-04-

2054 FMS. The suit was assigned to the Hon. Fern M. Smith. Radfer alleged that First

UNUM was liable under ERISA for benefits to Doe beyond those awarded by the

Massachusetts court. The complaint alleged, in two causes of action, that two provisions in

the Policy were unenforceable as a matter of New York law – the mental illness limitation and

the Social Security offset provision. 

In September 2004, First UNUM filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction and improper venue, and also asserting that Radfer’s claims were barred by res

judicata, collateral estoppel, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In the alternative,

First UNUM argued that the action should be transferred to the District of Massachusetts for

the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interests of justice. On October 25, 2004,

Judge Smith denied the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper

venue, but found that Radfer’s claims were barred by res judicata. See Radfer Trust v. First

UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America, 2004 WL 2385000 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 25, 2004).

 Judge Smith described Radfer as “a second incarnation of Radford,” noting that 

[i]n the instrument that created Radford, John Doe’s aging father, Bernard Doe,

was named as the trustee exclusively responsible for determining distribution of

assets and no successor was named. Radfer, which provides for a successor

trustee when Bernard Doe dies, was created after Judge Young’s judgment in
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For the Northern District of California

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 The declaration of counsel that provided this information was sealed by the court.

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favor of Radford in March 2004.1 

Id. at *1.

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars a party from bringing a claim if a court of

competent jurisdiction has rendered final judgment on the merits of the claim in a previous

action involving the same parties or their privies. In re International Nutronics, Inc., 28 F.3d

965, 969 (9th Cir.1994). "Res judicata bars all grounds for recovery that could have been

asserted, whether they were or not, in a prior suit between the same parties on the same

cause of action." Id. at 969 (citation omitted). In order to bar a later suit under the doctrine of

res judicata, an adjudication must (1) involve the same "claim" as the later suit, (2) have

reached a final judgment on the merits, and (3) involve the same parties or their privies. 

Blonder-Tongue Labs, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1971); Nordhorn v.

Ladish Co., 9 F.3d 1402, 1404 (9th Cir., 1993). 

Judge Smith found that the second and third requirements, above, were met because

there was a final judgment on the merits in the Massachusetts action, and the plaintiff Radfer

was a second incarnation of the plaintiff Radford, both of which were established to sue First

UNUM on behalf of Doe, the real party in interest. Radfer, 2004 WL 2385000 at *3. With

regard to the first requirement – whether the claims were identical – Judge Smith noted that

the two suits arose out of the same transactional nucleus of facts, because in both actions the

plaintiffs were seeking disability benefits allegedly owed to Doe under the Policy because of

the onset of schizophrenia while he was employed by Hawkins. Id. Judge Smith found further

that the grounds for recovery asserted by Radfer in the California action could have been

asserted by Radford in its case before the Massachusetts court, and found that the similarity

of arguments made by Radford before the Massachusetts court and the arguments made by

Radfer in the California action were evidence that the two claims were the same. Id. at *4. 

Judge Smith found that Radfer, in its previous incarnation as Radford, had a full and fair

opportunity to litigate its claims against First UNUM in the Massachusetts court, which entered
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judgment in its favor. “The Massachusetts court’s dicta implying the possibility of further

litigation does not change the fact that final judgment has already been rendered on the merits

of Radfer’s claim against First UNUM. The doctrine of res judicata prevents Radfer from

taking a second bite at the apple.” Id. Judge Smith dismissed the complaint without leave to

amend. Radfer filed a motion to amend the judgment, but the request was denied. Radfer

filed no notice of appeal from this decision.

On March 10, 2005, Judge Young issued an order in the Massachusetts case directing

UNUM to make a determination, within 30 days of the date of the order, whether Doe’s

disability was a “mental” or a “physical” one, and to provide that determination to Radford. On

April 8, 2005, Doe/Radford received the letter denying Doe’s initial appeal of First UNUM’s

decision that the 24-month limitation applied to Doe’s diagnosis of schizophrenia. 

On May 5, 2005, Radfer filed the complaint in the present action, alleging two causes

of action identical to the two causes of action asserted in the case before Judge Smith, and

adding a third cause of action for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation. First UNUM

moved to dismiss, and plaintiff filed a first amended complaint with some minor changes from

the original complaint, plus one additional cause of action. 

In the new first cause of action, Radfer alleged that “[p]laintiff’s [sic] disability is not one

within the policy’s 24-month limitation for ‘mental illness,’” and that First UNUM’s failure to pay

long-term disability benefits due to Doe and Radfer was a “violation of the terms” of the Policy

In the second cause of action, Radfer asserted that the 24-month cap on benefits

based on mental illness was unenforceable under New York law because First UNUM did not

disclose the mental illness limitation in its Synopsis of benefits that was provided to Doe, and

did not set forth the mental illness limitation in bold type. 

In the third cause of action, Radfer alleged that the Social Security offset was

unenforceable under New York law because the Policy did not disclose the offset in bold type

or prominent language. 

In the fourth cause of action for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, Radfer asserted

that immediately after the March 2004 judgment entered by Judge Young in the District of
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For the Northern District of California

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Massachusetts, Radfer made various attempts to cause the New York Department of

Insurance to order First UNUM to make further benefit payments. Radfer claimed that UNUM

then made false representations to the Department of Insurance, including that a court had

ordered the Department to stay its review until the court proceeded further. Radfer asserted

that the Department in fact ceased review based on First UNUM’s false representations.

First UNUM moved to dismiss. On August 17, 2005, the court granted the motion,

finding that the first cause of action was barred by failure to exhaust administrative remedies,

because Radfer filed the action before either it or Doe had exhausted the Plan’s internal

review procedure and before First UNUM had issued its decision on the final appeal of the

applicability of the 24-month limitation. The court found further that the second and third

causes of action were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and that the fourth cause of

action failed to state a claim. Because the court concluded that amendment would be futile,

the dismissal was without leave to amend.

First UNUM now seeks an order awarding attorney’s fees in the amount of $29,153.50

and costs in the amount of $241.30.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

In an ERISA action to recover unpaid disability benefits, the court in its discretion may

award reasonable attorney’s fees to either party in a benefits claim action. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1132(g)(1); see also Tingley v. Pixley-Richards West, Inc., 958 F.2d 908, 909 (9th Cir.

1992). The court’s discretion is guided by five criteria, known as the Hummell factors. These

are 1) the degree of the opposing party’s culpability or bad faith, 2) the ability of the opposing

party to satisfy an award of fees, 3) whether an award of fees against the opposing party

would deter others from acting in similar circumstances, 4) whether the party requesting fees

sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant

legal question regarding ERISA, and 5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions. Honolulu

Joint Apprenticeship & Training Comm. v. Foster, 332 F.3d 1234, 1238-39 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citing Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 1980)). None of the
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Hummell factors is decisive; “various permutations and combinations can support an award of

attorney fees." Paddack v. Morris, 783 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir.1986). 

Generally, the Hummell factors are applied to plaintiffs and defendants alike. See

Tingley, 958 F.2d at 909. However, while recognizing that either a plaintiff or a defendant may

be awarded fees under § 1132(g)(1) as a prevailing party, the Ninth Circuit has also indicated

that the Hummell factors “very frequently suggest that attorney’s fees should not be charged

against ERISA plaintiffs.” Id. at 909 (citation and quotation omitted). In particular, the Ninth

Circuit recognizes “little benefit to be had by charging individual plan-beneficiary plaintiffs . . .

with costs for policy reasons that speak more appropriately to institutional litigants in the

ERISA arena. Id. at 910; see also Corder v. Howard Johnson & Co., 53 F.3d 225, 231 (9th

Cir. 1995) (noting that Ninth Circuit disfavors awards of attorney’s fees against individual

ERISA plaintiffs who seek pension benefits to which they believe they are entitled). 

In decisions more recent than Tingley and Corder, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that it

does not disfavor fee awards against ERISA plaintiffs. 

The statute is clear on its face – the playing field is level. In Corder, we did hold

that “the district court abused its discretion in awarding full fees against them.” 

We pointed out that our analysis was consistent with and was a part of the

Hummell factors. Thus, our analysis in this case must focus only on the Hummell

factors, without favoring one side or the other.

Estate of Shockley v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 130 F.3d 403, 408 (9th Cir. 1997); see

also Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1223, 1236 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing Alyeska Pipeline, and noting that the court should not favor one side over the other

because “the playing field is level”). 

In a 2003 case, the Ninth Circuit harmonized these two apparently conflicting positions,

declaring that “[o]ur cases are not inconsistent.” Honolulu Joint Apprenticeship, 332 F.3d at

1240. The court emphasized not only that “our application of the Hummell factors must

recognize the remedial purpose of ERISA in favor of participants and beneficiaries,” and that

a prevailing participant or beneficiary “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless

special circumstances would render such an award unjust,” but also that the “clear statutory

language” makes fees available to “either party.” Id. at 1239-40 (citations and quotations
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 Radfer asserts, inexplicably, that it was acting on the advice of its Massachusetts

attorneyWarrenPyle (actuallyRadford’sMassachusettsattorney) whenit filed the present action.

Radfer also claims thatits counselMr.Polindid notknowofthe existence of case No.C-04-2054

FMS, the suitpending before Judge Smith, and thatplaintiff (notclear whether Radfer is referring

to itself or to Doe) did not inform Mr. Polinof the existence of Judge Smith’s decisiondismissing

the case. Radfer asserts that Mr. Polin had “no reason whatsoever to imagine that the matter

could be res judicata.” (Mr. Polinprovides no declaration to that effect, but rather appends a 4-

line declaration to the opposition brief, stating that “all the factual statements in this opposition

are,to myknowledge,true and correct, unless it is otherwise stated in the opposition.”) John Doe

states in his declaration that he did not bring the decision to Mr. Polin’s attention because his

Massachusetts attorney told him that the dismissal of case No. C-04-2054 FMS “did not bar a

newsuit.” (However, WarrenPyle,the Massachusetts attorneywho represented Radford,states

in a declaration that he advised Doe that Judge Smith’s order did not bar a new suit to recover

benefits in excess of those awarded in the Massachusetts action because a claim for those

benefits could not have been brought before Judge Smith.) Doe’s claims notwithstanding, the

court finds Mr. Polin’s assertion that he was unaware of the existence of case No. C-04-2054

FMS to be not credible in view of the undeniable similarities between the complaint filed in that

case and the complaint filed in the present case, and plaintiff’s assertions that Mr. Polin did not

actasa “mere rubber stamp for a complaint writtenbya client.” The court also finds the claim that

Mr. Polin “had no reason whatever to imagine that the matter could be res judicata” to be not

credible. 

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omitted). 

B. Defendant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees

First UNUM argues that all five of the Hummell factors favor its motion. First UNUM

contends that plaintiff’s culpability or bad faith is shown by the fact that this case is the third

lawsuit filed by Radfer or its “alter ego” (Radford) regarding the exact same issues. First

UNUM contends that the present lawsuit was completely without hope of succeeding at the

time it was filed, and that the court may consequently infer that plaintiff filed it for the purpose

of harassing defendant rather than to obtain a favorable judgment. In particular, First UNUM

asserts, based on the fact that this action was filed while plaintiff’s “alter ego” was making

multiple motions and pursuing additional remedies related to the first action before the

Massachusetts court, the court should conclude that plaintiff intended to force First UNUM to

defend this matter on two fronts on opposite coasts. 

In opposition, Radfer asserts that neither it, nor the insured (John Doe), nor plaintiff’s

counsel (David Polin) acted in bad faith, claiming that none of them realized that the matter

was res judicata when case No. C-04-2054 FMS was filed.2 Radfer contends that it filed case

No. C-04-2054 FMS because it was “discouraged” by First UNUM’s delay in issuing the
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 Radfer claims that Mr. Polin was unaware of any continuing proceedings or motions

being filed in Massachusetts. Yet he was plainly aware of the existence of the Massachusetts

action, as the complaint references the Massachusetts court’s order directing First UNUM to pay

plaintiff two years’ worth of benefits for the benefit of John Doe.

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administrative decision on the mental cap. Radfer asserts that although Judge Smith called

the lawsuit a “second bite of the apple,” it did not appear so to Radfer at the time, but rather

appeared to be a “perfectly logical and legal way to settle a matter that was threatening to

drag on indefinitely.” Radfer maintains that it believed that “the matter” had not yet been

decided by the Massachusetts court. 

Radfer acknowledges that rather than filing the present action, the best course would

have been to file an appeal from Judge Smith’s decision, but contends that it did not do so

because First UNUM continued to process the claim.3 Radfer then asserts that it waited until

First UNUM had issued its decision on the mental cap limitation (April 2005) before filing the

present action (May 2005). What Radfer refuses to acknowledge, however, is that the April

2005 decision was First UNUM’s initial decision, not the final decision that would allow the

plaintiff to file suit in district court.

Radfer claims that this action was not filed in order to harass First UNUM, but simply to

“appeal the defendant’s administrative decision rendered in April 2005.” Radfer tries to

characterize it as an “honest legal mistake,” and also asserts that Doe, the insured, is

schizophrenic and suffers from “disorganized thinking” which “could very well cause him to

analyze his case in a manner that others have found questionable.” 

The court finds that this factor strongly favors First UNUM. In order to avoid a finding of

bad faith under the Hummell factors, a plaintiff “must have a reasonable belief that [he] could

prove an actionable ERISA claim.” Cline, 200 F.3d at 1236. Despite Radfer’s attempts to

justify its actions (claiming that it filed suit on the advice of Radford Trust’s Massachusetts

attorney, claiming that Doe’s disorganized thinking caused him to wrongly analyze the case,

claiming that Mr. Polin was unaware of the pendency of case No. C-04-2054 FMS) the fact

remains that Radfer filed this action alleging the same claims it had alleged in case No. C-04-

2054 FMS, and then amended the complaint to add a claim that was plainly barred by failure
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to exhaust. The complaint was frivolous, and can therefore be characterized as having been

filed in bad faith. 

With regard to the second Hummell factor – the ability of the opposing party to satisfy

an award of fees – First UNUM asserts that it “suspects” that Doe, Radfer’s beneficiary,

formerly an attorney in New York, has been preparing the pleadings in this case, and is using

plaintiff’s counsel David Polin as “local counsel” only. First UNUM contends that Doe has the

ability to satisfy the fee award, as Doe received a check in the amount of $181,899.51 from

First UNUM for payment of benefits. First UNUM submits that as Doe is acting as an attorney

and is “likely making all decisions related to this action,” and as Doe can satisfy a fee award,

the second factor is satisfied.

In opposition, Radfer asserts that neither it nor Doe has the ability to satisfy an award of

attorney’s fees. Radfer claims in its opposition brief that it is “holding money for multiple

beneficiaries, the insured among them” – that while it did accept the $181,000 check from

First UNUM, it has not accepted that amount in satisfaction of its claims, and has placed the

money in an interest-bearing account. Radfer claims that Doe is living on public assistance. 

Radfer submits a declaration from Doe, who maintains that he did not receive a check

from First UNUM for $181,899.51. According to Doe, First UNUM gave a check for that

amount payable jointly to Radford and its attorney Warren Pyle in June 2005, to cover the “first

two years’ benefits,” as ordered by the Massachusetts court. Doe asserts that Radford has

“multiple beneficiaries,” and that trustee Bernard Doe has exclusive power to decide which of

the beneficiaries will receive funds. He claims that he has received no money from Bernard

Doe, and that Bernard Doe has stated that the “other beneficiaries” will receive all of the

$181,899.51. Doe asserts that beyond the assignment of any additional benefits he might

receive from First UNUM under the policy, Radfer, the plaintiff in the present action, has no

assets. Doe claims that he himself is not working, has no income, and lives on public

assistance. 

The court finds that this factor does not favor either side, as neither side has

established that Radfer has, or does not have, the ability to pay an award of attorney’s fees. 
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 On the other hand,Radfer apparently assumes anidentityof interest betweenitself and

Radford, as it states in the opposition that it (Radfer) “won a decision from the United States

DistrictCourtfor Massachusetts, awarding two years of benefits, to whichthe insured (John Doe)

was unquestionably entitled,” and that it then “filed a second action, which was heard by Judge

Smith of this Court.” Radfer states further that it “is a trust that is holding money for multiple

beneficiaries, the insured among them” and that it “has received a check for over $181,000, but

it has not accepted that amount as satisfaction of any claim, and has placed the money in an

interest-bearing account.” Radfer also refers to Warren Pyle, attorney for Radford, as its own

Massachusetts attorney.

5

 If this is true, it is cause for concern.

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First UNUM submits no evidence supporting its claim that Radfer itself has the assets to pay

First UNUM’s attorney’s fees. First UNUM refers throughout its papers to Radfer and Radford

as “alter egos,” but has not established that the two Trusts are in fact alter egos.4 

For its part, Radfer submits no declaration from its trustee, and no other evidence

supporting the claim that it has no assets. Indeed, Radfer states in its opposition that it

received a check for over $181,000 in the Massachusetts action (though this claim is

contradicted by Doe’s assertion that the money from the Massachusetts action went to

Radford). Radfer’s evidence consists of a declaration from Radford’s Massachusetts

attorney, stating that he advised Doe that Judge Smith’s dismissal order did not bar the filing

of another lawsuit on the same claims, as well as a declaration from Doe, who is described by

Radfer in its opposition to the motion as suffering from “paranoid schizophrenia, one of the

symptoms of which is ‘disorganized thinking,’” and as suffering from “a disability that affects

his judgment in complex matters.” It is Doe who asserts that Radfer has no assets other than

the assigned future hypothetical benefits that he (Doe) hopes to receive under the policy, and

that he has been informed by the trustee of the Radford Trust that he will receive none of the

money awarded him by the Massachusetts court, because the money will go instead to some

other unidentified “beneficiaries” of the Radford Trust.5

With regard to the third factor – whether an award of fees would deter other persons

acting under similar circumstances – First UNUM argues that an award of fees would deter 

claimants from pursuing baseless claims in the future, while Radfer argues that there is no

reason to think that an award of fees would have a significant impact on other claimants. 
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Radfer also claims that awarding fees to First UNUM would “have the effect of rewarding

defendant for the foot-dragging behavior that made it necessary for the plaintiff to sue in the

first place” (ignoring the fact that Radfer sued First UNUM before Doe was entitled to

challenge First UNUM’s denial of the challenge to the mental illness cap). 

The court finds that the third factor does not favor either side. The third factor is,

generally speaking, more appropriate to a determination of whether to award fees to a

prevailing plaintiff than to award fees to a defendant. See Tingley, 958 F.2d at 910. This

factor is more relevant when it is the participant/beneficiary who is seeking fees from the

defendant insurer, as the “deterrence” referred to is more likely the deterrence of unjustified

denial of claims by insurers or ERISA plans. Here, awarding fees to First UNUM is not likely

to deter other plaintiffs from filing baseless claims, as it is not probable that other plaintiffs

would even know about the award of fees in this case. 

With regard to the fourth factor – the benefit conferred on the members of the Plan as a

whole – First UNUM contends that an award of attorney’s fees against plaintiff would ultimately

benefit all participants in the Plan by allowing First UNUM to recover its costs and attorney’s

fees incurred in defending against plaintiff’s meritless legal action, while Radfer argues that

the imposition of fees would benefit First UNUM, not members of pension plans.

The court finds that the fourth factor does not favor either side, as it is a factor that is

more appropriate to at determination whether to award fees to a plaintiff than to a defendant. 

See Bogue v. Ampex Corp., 976 F.2d 1319, 1327 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Tingley, 958 F.2d

at 910. The benefit asserted by First UNUM – that obtaining fees will mean that First UNUM

has more money available to satisfy claims – does not appear to be what the Ninth Circuit has

had in mind when it has applied the Hummell factors. In a case such as this one, the interest

of the insurance company is in avoiding liability, not in making funds available for the Plan. 

Finally, with regard to the fifth factor – the relative merits of the parties’ positions – First

UNUM claims that as it meets at least four of the five Hummell factors, the court should find

that First UNUM’s request for fees should be granted. Radfer reiterates that it acted in good

faith, pursuant to an attorney’s advice (Radford’s Massachusetts attorney), and denies First
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For the Northern District of California

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 These factors are 1) the time and labor required, 2) the novelty and difficulty of the

questions involved,3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, 4) the preclusionof

other employment by the attorneydue to acceptanceof the case,5) the customaryfee,6) whether

the fee is fixed or contingent, 7) timelimitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, 8) the

amount involved and the results obtained, 9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the

attorneys, 10) the undesirability of the case, 11) the nature and length of the professional

relationship with the client, and 12) awards in similar cases. Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70. 

13

UNUM’s assertion that it has filed the same claims repeatedly. The court finds that the fifth

factor also favors First UNUM. Plaintiff’s protestations aside, this case is completely without

merit.

With regard to the reasonableness of the fees requested, plaintiff argues only that it is

improper for First UNUM to seek fees for prevailing with regard to the non-ERISA claims. 

First UNUM does not respond to this argument. It is true that ERISA does not authorize an

award of fees for non-ERISA claims. Nevertheless, This is an action brought by an ERISA

participant or beneficiary, against an ERISA Plan and an ERISA insurer, in which the statute

authorizes payment of fees for the prevailing party. The fact that plaintiff may have alleged in

this action that various provisions of the Plan were unlawful under New York law does not

mean that First UNUM, as the prevailing party, should not recover its fees for defending

against the suit, where plaintiff’s claims were barred by res judicata, because the same claims

were previously found to be res judicata, based on the plaintiff’s having previously filed an

ERISA action in Massachusetts. 

Plaintiff does not otherwise challenge the amount requested by First UNUM in

attorneys’ fees. The general rule is that when awarding fees under ERISA, the court must

determine a “lodestar” amount by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the

litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. Credit Managers Ass’n of So. Cal. v. Kennesaw Life

and Accident Ins. Co., 25 F.3d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 1994). The court may increase or decrease

the lodestar fee based on the factors identified by the Ninth Circuit in Kerr v. Screen Actors

Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975)6 that are not subsumed within the initial calculation of

the lodestar. Credit Managers, 25 F.3d at 750.

Having reviewed the documentation submitted by counsel for First UNUM, as well as
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the other papers filed by the parties in this case, the court finds that the number of hours spent

by First UNUM’s counsel and the hourly rate charged are reasonable in view of the

competence of counsel in the filed of ERISA litigation, the relative lack of complexity of the

issues, and Radfer’s persistence in filing an action asserting claims that had already been

declared res judicata by another judge of this court. 

CONCLUSION

First UNUM’s motion is GRANTED. In summary, the first Hummell factor – plaintiff’s

culpability or bad faith – strongly supports an award of fees to First UNUM, as this action was

plainly frivolous at the time it was filed. Apart from the first cause of action, which was subject

to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the claims asserted in the

complaint were identical to the claims that Judge Smith had found to be barred by res

judicata. The third and fourth Hummell factors are neutral, and in any event, are not particularly

relevant in a case where fees are sought by the defendant rather than the plaintiff. The fifth

factor – the relative merits of the parties’ positions – also favors First UNUM. 

The second factor does not favor either side, as neither side has provided any

evidence to support its claim. Radford, the plaintiff in the Massachusetts action, was awarded

almost $182,000 for the benefit of Doe. As detailed in the above discussion, both Radfer and

Doe appear to view the Radford Trust and the Radfer Trust as fictions, and to consider Doe to

be the real party in interest. Doe claims to be unable to work, and to have no assets other

than the money that was awarded him by the Massachusetts court. Thus, while the court finds

that First UNUM is entitled to some award of fees, and that the hours claimed and the hourly

billing rate appear reasonable, the court also finds that the amount of fees requested by First

UNUM should be reduced in light of the plaintiff’s ability to pay. The court finds a 50%

reduction in the amount of fees sought is appropriate under the facts presented here. 

In accordance with the foregoing, the court GRANTS defendant’s motion for

attorney’s fees, and awards First Unum $15,000 in fees and costs.

/ / /

/ / /
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The date for the hearing on this motion, previously set for Wednesday, November 2,

2005, is VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 1, 2005 

______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge