Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-4_05-cv-04063/USCOURTS-arwd-4_05-cv-04063-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Burch
Plaintiff
SSA
Defendant
Elizabeth Bell Woody
Plaintiff

Document Text:

AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNTIED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

JOHN BURCH on behalf of

ELIZABETH BELL WOODY PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 05-4063

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

O R D E R 

Plaintiff John Burch, on behalf of, Elizabeth Bell Woody appealed the Commissioner's

denial of benefits to this court. On August 30, 2006, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's

case to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 12). Plaintiff

now moves for an award of $2,187.50 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the

Equal Access to Justice Act (hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 17.50 hours of

work before the court at an hourly rate of $125.00. (Doc. # 13). The defendant has filed a

response, expressing no objection to this award. (Doc. # 14).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986). After

reviewing the file, we find plaintiff is a prevailing party in this matter. Under Shalala v.

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

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Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a sentence-four

judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case for further

proceedings is a prevailing party. 

The Commissioner does not oppose the award of a reasonable attorney's fee under the

EAJA, does not object to the hourly rate requested by plaintiff’s counsel for attorney’s fees and

does not dispute the number of hours expended by counsel. (Doc. # 14). The court construes this

lack of opposition to the award of a reasonable fee as an admission that the government's

decision to deny benefits was not "substantially justified." 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

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In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularlywhen the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for the EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the

EAJA at an hourly rate of $125.00. We find plaintiff's attorney entitled to compensation at this

rate. 

We next address the number of hours plaintiff's counsel claims he spent working on this

case. Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.10 hour on September 19, 2005 (letter to the Clerk), from which

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we deduct 0.10 hour. This time cannot be compensated under the EAJA. Granville House, Inc.

v. Department of HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir.1987) (work which could have been

completed by support staff is not compensable under the EAJA). Accordingly, 0.10 hour must

be deducted from the total compensable time sought by counsel.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks a total of 1.20 hours on September 19, 2005, October 13, 2005,

November 17, 2005, November 21, 2005, January 20, 2006, and August 30, 2006, to review the

file. The EAJA requires that a party seeking an award of fees and other expenses ... “submit

to the court an application... including an itemized statement from any attorney or expert

witness...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The undersigned concludes that the mere addition

of the phrase “reviewed the file” to the above time entries, falls short of what the statute

contemplates. Plaintiff’s counsel frequently represents social security plaintiff’s before this

court, should be well versed in social security law and the proceedings before this court, and

has been given ample time for the review and preparation of the necessary documents on

behalf of plaintiff. We further point out, there were no complex or unique issues in this case.

Therefore, we deduct 1.20 hours from the amount of compensable time sought.

Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to compensation under the EAJA for: 16.20

(17.50-1.30) hours for attorney’s fees, at the rate of $125.00 per hour for a total attorney's fee

award of $2025.00. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out of, any past due

benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future.

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(Rev. 8/82)

5

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 25 day of September 2006. th

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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