Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-30210/USCOURTS-ca9-14-30210-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jesus Pimentel-Lopez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JESUS PIMENTEL-LOPEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-30210

D.C. No.

2:13-cr-00024-SEH-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Sam E. Haddon, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 15, 2015

Seattle, Washington

Filed July 15, 2016

Before: Alex Kozinski, William A. Fletcher

and Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Kozinski

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2 UNITED STATES V. PIMENTEL-LOPEZ

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel vacated a sentence and remanded for

resentencing in a case in which the jury made a special

finding that the quantity of drugs involved was less than 50

grams, but the district judge calculated the sentence based on

his own finding that the quantity involved was far in excess

of 50 grams. 

The panel wrote that the Apprendi v. New Jersey line of

cases is beside the point because the defendant is not

complaining that the district court raised the maximum

statutory sentence, and that this is not a case where the jury

failed to find a fact under the exacting standard applicable to

criminal cases. The panel explained that this is a case where

the jurymade an affirmative finding after deliberations, under

the highest standard of proof, that the amount of

methamphetamine attributable to the defendant is less than 50

grams. The panel held that district judges do not have the

power to contradict the jury’s finding under these

circumstances. The panel remanded with instructions that the

defendant be resentenced on the premise that the quantity of

drugs involved in his crimes was less than 50 grams.

The panel held that because two witness’s hearsay

statements did not meet the “minimal indicia of reliability”

standard, the district court was not justified in relying on

them in determining the sentence. Because absent these

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. PIMENTEL-LOPEZ 3

statements, there is no evidence that the defendant exercised

some control over others involved in the commission of the

evidence, the panel held that the district court clearly erred in

assessing an organizer enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 3B1.1(c).

COUNSEL

Timothy M. Bechtold (argued), Bechtold Law Firm, PLLC,

Missoula, Montana, for Defendant-Appellant.

Zeno B. Baucus (argued) and Michael S. Lahr, Assistant

United States Attorneys; Michael W. Cotter, United States

Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office, Helena, Montana;

for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge:

The jury in defendant’s criminal case made a special

finding that the quantity of drugs involved was “less than 50

grams.” We consider whether the district judge may

nevertheless calculate defendant’s sentence based on the

judge’s finding that the quantity involved was far in excess of

50 grams.

FACTS

Defendant was convicted of possession of

methamphetamine with intent to distribute and conspiracy to

possess with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

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4 UNITED STATES V. PIMENTEL-LOPEZ

§§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The punishment for both of these

crimes is determined by section 841(b), which sets

differential punishments, depending on drug type and

quantity. If the quantity involved is less than 50 grams or an

indeterminate amount, then the maximum sentence is 20

years. § 841(b)(1)(C). The statute sets higher minimum

and maximum sentences for larger drug quantities. 

§ 841(b)(1)(A)–(B).

With the consent of both parties, the court gave the jury

a verdict form, which it filled out as follows:

Having found Jesus Pimentel-Lopez guilty of

the charge . . . we unanimously find beyond a

reasonable doubt the amount of a substance

containing a detectable amount of

methamphetamine attributable to Jesus

Pimentel-Lopez to be:

 x Less than 50 grams of a substance

containing a detectable amount of

methamphetamine.

 50 grams or more, but less than 500

grams, of a substance containing

a d e t e c t a b l e a m o u n t o f

methamphetamine.

 500 grams or more of a substance

containing a detectable amount of

methamphetamine.

At sentencing, the district judge found that the actual

quantity attributable to defendant’s crimes was 4.536 kg,

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UNITED STATES V. PIMENTEL-LOPEZ 5

which yielded a Sentencing Guidelines range of 235 to 293

months.1 The judge then sentenced defendant to 240

months—the statutory maximum sentence for a quantity of

less than 50 grams. § 841(b)(1)(C). Had the court been

bound by the jury’s determination that the quantity

attributable to Pimentel-Lopez was less than 50 grams, the

sentencing range would have been 63–78 months.2 The

court’s 240-month sentence would then have represented a

substantial upward departure.

ANALYSIS

I

The principal question presented is whether the district

judge was entitled to make a drug quantity finding in excess

of that found by the jury in its special verdict. The district

court believed it was entitled to do so because “[t]here is no

increase in the statutory maximum sentence beyond the 20

years or 240 months that is charged in the [i]ndictment.”

In reaching its conclusion, the district court relied on

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its

1 Under the then-applicable Sentencing Guidelines section 2D1.1(c) the

offense level for possessing at least 1.5 kg but less than 5 kg of

methamphetamine was 34. The court also assessed a two-level

enhancement under Guidelines section 3B1.1(b) upon finding that

Pimentel-Lopez was an organizer of the conspiracy. The corresponding

sentencing range for a net offense level of 36 and a criminal history

category of III was 235 to 293 months. See U.S.S.G., ch. 5, pt. A (Nov.

2013).

2 Assuming a level 24 offense under section 2D1.1(c), a criminal history

category of III and no organizer enhancement. See U.S.S.G., ch. 5, pt. A.

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6 UNITED STATES V. PIMENTEL-LOPEZ

progeny, which leave it up to the district judge to find any

facts bearing on sentencing, other than those that would

increase the statutory sentencing range. See, e.g., Alleyne v.

United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2163 (2013); Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 481. But the Apprendi line of cases is beside the

point, because defendant is not complaining that the district

court raised the maximum statutory sentence. Rather, he

argues that the court’s finding that the drug quantity found

was more than 50 grams contradicts the jury’s special finding

that the drug quantity was less than 50 grams. The jury found

“beyond a reasonable doubt [that] the amount of

[methamphetamine] attributable to Jesus Pimentel-Lopez [is]

. . . [l]ess than 50 grams.” This is not a case where the jury

failed to find a fact under the exacting standard applicable to

criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S.

148, 157 (1997) (per curiam). Where this happens, the

district judge is free to find the same fact under a less

stringent standard of proof. Id. Rather, what we have here is

a case where the jury made an affirmative finding, under the

highest standard of proof known to our law, that the amount

of methamphetamine attributable to defendant is less than 50

grams. The district court cannot attribute more than that

amount to defendant without contradicting the jury on a fact

it found as a result of its deliberations. District judges have

many powers, but contradicting juries as to findings of facts

they have been asked to make is not among them.

In reaching the contrary conclusion, the district judge

overlooked our caselaw on point. In Mitchell v. Prunty,

107 F.3d 1337, 1339 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other

grounds by Santamaria v. Horsley, 133 F.3d 1242, 1248 (9th

Cir. 1998) (en banc), we noted as follows: “Special findings

. . . are dispositive of the questions put to the jury. Having

agreed to the questions, the government cannot now ask us to

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UNITED STATES V. PIMENTEL-LOPEZ 7

ignore the answers; to do so would be a clear violation of

petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights.”

The precise issue presented in Mitchell differed slightly

from that presented here, but the difference actually makes

ours an easier case. In Mitchell we considered whether there

was sufficient evidence to convict petitioner of murder when

the only evidence of his involvement was one witness’s

testimony that he drove the car that ran over the victim’s

body. Id. at 1342. We concluded that there was insufficient

evidence to support the verdict because the jury had

elsewhere made a special finding that petitioner “was not the

driver of the car which drove over” the victim. Id.

In its petition for rehearing, the state asked us to ignore

the special finding as a case of inconsistent verdicts. Id. at

1339 n.2. We treated the special finding as binding even on

the jury itself. Id. The special finding must also be binding

on the parties and the court.

In our case, the jury was asked to find the upper limit of

the quantity of illegal drugs involved in Pimentel-Lopez’s

crimes, and it did just that: “[T]he amount of

[methamphetamine] attributable to Jesus Pimentel-Lopez [is]

. . . [l]ess than 50 grams.” This was not a gratuitous finding

added by the jury of its own accord as in Floyd v. Laws,

929 F.2d 1390, 1397 (9th Cir. 1991). The parties presented

evidence on point and the jury was instructed that this was a

permissible finding. In such circumstances, the finding is

binding, no matter how inconvenient it may be in subsequent

proceedings.

Some of our sister circuits seem to have held that a jury’s

special-verdict finding that the quantity of drugs involved in

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8 UNITED STATES V. PIMENTEL-LOPEZ

the crime is less than a particular amount did not preclude the

judge from finding a greater quantity for purposes of

sentencing. See United States v. Webb, 545 F.3d 673, 677

(8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672,

685 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Goodine, 326 F.3d 26,

33–34 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Smith, 308 F.3d 726,

745–46 (7th Cir. 2002). But those cases did not directly

address the argument raised by Pimentel-Lopez—that the

affirmative finding by the jury that the quantity of drugs

involved was less than a specific amount precluded a

contradictory finding by the district judge during sentencing.

All four cases held that the district court’s sentencing did

not violate the Apprendi line of cases. But, as explained

above, Apprendi has no bearing on our analysis. In addition,

the other circuits addressed the drug quantity finding only in

passing, while emphasizing the less demanding

preponderance-of-the-evidence standard governing judicial

factfinding at sentencing. See Webb, 545 F.3d at 676–77;

Smith, 308 F.3d at 745–46. They therefore implicitly relied

on the holding of Watts to the effect that “a jury’s verdict of

acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from

considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long

as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the

evidence.” 519 U.S. at 157. The rationale of Watts is that

“[a]n acquittal can only be an acknowledgment that the

government failed to prove an essential element of the

offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 155 (quoting

United States v. Putra, 78 F.3d 1386, 1394 (9th Cir. 1996)

(Wallace, C.J., dissenting)). This rationale is inapplicable

where, as here, we have an affirmative finding that the

amount in question is less than a particular amount. Or, to

put it differently, there is no inconsistency between a jury’s

acquittal as to a particular fact that had to be proved beyond

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UNITED STATES V. PIMENTEL-LOPEZ 9

a reasonable doubt and a later finding that the same fact is

proved by a preponderance of the evidence. But there is an

inconsistency between a jury’s finding that the amount is less

than 50 grams and a later finding by the judge that the amount

is more than 50 grams.

Some of our sister circuits seem to have assumed that the

juries’ findings merely acquitted defendants of possessing

higher quantities of drugs, and that may have been warranted

on the record before them. See, e.g., Magallanez, 408 F.3d at

682 (“When we review a verdict where the jury did not find

a specific amount of drugs attributable to the defendant, but

a range, we only know that the jury found unanimously the

amount at the bottom of the range.”). Here, by contrast, the

record is clear that the jury didn’t merely acquit defendant of

possessing 50 grams or more of methamphetamine; it made

an affirmative finding “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the

amount attributable to defendant was “[l]ess than 50 grams.” 

Our own caselaw, and simple logic, precludes us from

vouchsafing sentencing judges the power to make

contradictory findings under these circumstances.

Our conclusion does raise a fair question: How is it

possible to punish a defendant convicted of crimes involving

less than 50 grams to the full statutory term of 240 months,

when the Sentencing Guidelines cap the term available when

the drug quantity involved is less than 50 grams at 125

months? In other words, does a jury’s finding that the

quantity of drugs falls in the 0 to 50 range always preclude a

district judge from punishing the defendant for quantities in

excess of 50 grams? The judge may, of course, depart

upward from the sentencing range generated by the jury’s

findings. Also, where the jury makes no finding as to

quantity or finds an unspecified amount, there would be no

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10 UNITED STATES V. PIMENTEL-LOPEZ

inconsistency between the verdict and any quantity that the

judge finds during sentencing. And any jury finding that does

not set an upper boundary would leave the district court free

to find a greater quantity in determining the sentencing range.

In our case, the government agreed to special verdict

questions that set both a lower and an upper boundary for the

amount of drugs involved. That may have been a blunder,

but the jury answered the questions it was asked and so the

die is cast: The government cannot disavow the finding that

the jury makes as a result. 107 F.3d at 1339 n.2. Because the

district court enhanced defendant’s sentence based on its

finding that more than 50 grams of a controlled substance

were involved in defendant’s crimes, we must vacate the

sentence and remand with instructions that defendant be

resentenced on the premise that the quantity of drugs

involved in his crimes was less than 50 grams, as the jury

found.

II

The district court also applied a two-level enhancement

under Guidelines section 3B1.1(c) upon finding that

Pimentel-Lopez directed the behavior of his co-conspirators. 

Under section 3B1.1(c), “[i]f the defendant was an organizer,

leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity,”

courts are instructed to increase a defendant’s offense by two

levels. The application notes to section 3B1.1 clarify that

“[t]o qualify for an adjustment . . . the defendant must have”

either “been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of

one or more other participants” or must have “exercised

management responsibility over the property, assets, or

activities of a criminal organization.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 n.2.

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UNITED STATES V. PIMENTEL-LOPEZ 11

“A court may impose this enhancement if there is

evidence that the defendant exercised some control over

others involved in the commission of the offense or was

responsible for organizing others for the purpose of carrying

out the crime.” United States v. Whitney, 673 F.3d 965, 975

(9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). But “even

a defendant with an important role in an offense cannot

receive an enhancement unless there is also a showing that

the defendant had control over others.” Id.(internal quotation

marks omitted).

The government introduced scant evidence that PimentelLopez directed his co-conspirators. DuringPimentel-Lopez’s

sentencing hearing, an agent testified that Jesus Elizondo—a

co-conspirator who didn’t testify—said that Pimentel-Lopez

directed Elizondo’s fiancée, Heather Mallo, and Mallo’s

sister, Elizabeth Gardiner, to rent a house “to be used . . . to

distribute drugs.” Mallo corroborated this allegation during

a pre-trial police interview.3 But when Mallo and Gardiner

testified at Pimentel-Lopez’s trial, neither mentioned that he

directed them to rent a residence. Moreover, Gardiner

testified that she couldn’t even communicate with PimentelLopez because she didn’t speak Spanish. During an interview

with the investigating agents and before entering his guilty

plea, Elizondo declared that Pimentel-Lopez directed two

individuals to deposit the proceeds of the drug sales into a

bank account. But this statement was only corroborated by

Mallo’s pre-trial statements to the police, not by her trial

testimony.

3 To the extent that we refer here to facts contained exclusively in the

presentence report, we pro tanto lift the order sealing that document.

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12 UNITED STATES V. PIMENTEL-LOPEZ

“Generally, hearsay evidence . . . may be used in

sentencing,” but “we require that ‘some minimal indicia of

reliability accompany a hearsay statement.’” United States v.

Huckins, 53 F.3d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United

States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1993)). 

Elizondo’s “statements were not made under oath, nor at trial

where he could be cross-examined.” Id. Furthermore, “a

codefendant’s confession inculpating the accused is

inherently unreliable.” Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 546

(1986). This “time-honored teaching” is equally applicable

in the sentencing as in the conviction context. See Huckins,

53 F.3d at 279 (quoting Lee, 476 U.S. at 546).

“[E]xternal consistency” may demonstrate “the reliability

of hearsay statements by co-defendants.” United States v.

Berry, 258 F.3d 971, 976 (9th Cir. 2001). “Specifically,

hearsay statements by co-defendants that are consistent with

each other may be deemed sufficiently reliable even if such

statements are self-serving and contrary to the testimony of

the defendant.” Id. at 976–77. Here, Elizondo’s statements

were only corroborated by his fiancée, and even then only out

of court. Gardiner’s testimony that she couldn’t

communicate with Pimentel-Lopez casts further doubt on

Elizondo’s and Mallo’s hearsay statements. In light of these

facts, Elizondo’s hearsay statements have not been

“sufficiently corroborated . . . to provide the minimal indicia

of reliability necessary to qualify the statements for

consideration by the district court during sentencing.” Id. at

977.

Because Elizondo’s and Mallo’s hearsay statements do

not meet our “minimal indicia of reliability” standard, the

district court was not justified in relying on them in

determining Pimentel-Lopez’s sentence. Absent these

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UNITED STATES V. PIMENTEL-LOPEZ 13

statements, there is no evidence indicating that PimentelLopez “exercised some control over others involved in the

commission of the offense.” United States v. Yi, 704 F.3d

800, 807 (9th Cir. 2013). It was therefore clearly erroneous

to assess the organizer enhancement. See id.

* * *

WeVACATEPimentel-Lopez’ssentence andREMAND

for resentencing.

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