Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00030/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00030-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Clifford George
Petitioner
J. Soto
Respondent

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CLIFFORD GEORGE, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

J. SOTO, 

Movant. 

No. 2:13-cv-0030 GEB EFB P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction 

entered against him on July 10, 2009, in the Sacramento County Superior Court for possession of 

a weapon by an inmate. He seeks federal habeas relief on the following grounds: (1) the trial 

court violated his right to due process when it excluded from evidence an exculpatory declaration 

from his cellmate; (2) the trial court violated his right to due process when it denied his motion to 

dismiss one of the counts against him; and (3) the combined effect of errors at his trial violated 

his right to due process. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, it is 

recommended that the petition be denied. 

///// 

///// 

///// 

Case 2:13-cv-00030-GEB-EFB Document 19 Filed 04/30/15 Page 1 of 21
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

I. Background 

 In its unpublished memorandum and opinion affirming petitioner’s judgment of 

conviction on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the 

following factual summary: 

A jury convicted defendant Clifford George of one count of 

possessing a dirk or dagger while confined in prison. (Pen.Code, § 

4502, subd. (a); further undesignated statutory references are to the 

Penal Code.) The trial court found that defendant had three prior 

serious felony convictions within the meaning of the “three strikes” 

law. (§§ 667, subds.(b)-(i), 1170.12.) Consequently, the court 

sentenced defendant to a prison term of 25 years to life, consecutive 

to the sentence he was already serving. 

On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court abused its 

discretion by precluding the defense from introducing a declaration 

in which his cellmate admitted responsibility for one of the 

weapons, (2) the court erred by allowing a second count, which 

pertained to another weapon found in the cell, to be considered by 

the jury, and (3) the cumulative prejudice of the alleged errors 

compels reversal of the judgment. 

We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding the cellmate's 

declaration insufficiently untrustworthy to be admissible as a 

declaration against penal interest. We also reject defendant's 

second contention because he was acquitted of the charge that he 

complains was improperly submitted to the jury. Finding no error, 

we shall affirm the judgment. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Prosecution Evidence 

On the morning of March 2, 2007, Correctional Sergeant (now 

Lieutenant) Sam Banke and Officer Anthony McNeal conducted a 

search of a cell in Folsom Prison that housed defendant and another 

inmate, Christopher Edwards. When the officers entered the cell, 

defendant appeared to be asleep on the bottom bunk. Defendant 

was lying on his stomach with his hands underneath his pillow. 

Edwards was lying on the top bunk, also apparently asleep. 

Sergeant Banke positioned himself at the cell's entrance and 

instructed defendant to get out of bed. As a matter of standard 

protocol, officers move only one inmate at a time. Only after 

repeated orders by Sergeant Banke and Officer McNeal did 

defendant slowly sit up in bed. Unbidden, Edwards also began to 

sit up on the upper bunk. Edwards was instructed to remain seated 

on his bunk. 

Officer McNeal ordered defendant to stand up. The officer 

carefully watched defendant as he rose from the bottom bunk and 

came toward him. Nothing obstructed the officer's view of 

Case 2:13-cv-00030-GEB-EFB Document 19 Filed 04/30/15 Page 2 of 21
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

defendant's movements. Defendant was handcuffed and placed in 

another holding cell with the assistance of Officer Pulley. 

Once defendant was removed from the cell, Sergeant Banke 

instructed Edwards to come down from the top bunk with his hands 

where the sergeant could see them. Sergeant Banke and Officer 

McNeal carefully watched as Edwards complied. Sergeant Banke 

did not see anything in Edwards's hands. Likewise, Officer McNeal 

did not see Edwards with anything in his hands or get rid of 

anything that he had been holding. Edwards made no motion 

toward the lower bunk on which defendant had been sleeping. 

Edwards was removed from the cell by Officer de Rosa. 

Sergeant Banke and Officer McNeal searched the cell. Taped to the 

bottom of the cell door, Officer McNeal found an inmatemanufactured weapon. The weapon consisted of small, round metal 

stock that was about three or four inches long and ground to a point 

at one end. Blue cloth was wrapped around it to form a handle. 

Officer McNeal found another inmate-manufactured weapon 

underneath the pillow on which defendant had been lying. The 

weapon was a seven-inch knife with a blade of approximately four 

inches. The knife was out of its sheath when found. 

Sergeant Banke and Officer McNeal testified that inmatemanufactured weapons are hidden by inmates throughout the 

prison. The cell that housed defendant and Edwards is located in a 

building with approximately 29 to 32 cells on each of five tiers. 

Two inmates are housed in each cell. 

During the day, inmates move throughout the cellblock and have 

access to other cells on their tier. Even so, Officer Banke testified 

that it would be easier to hide the weapon found under the door 

from inside the cell when no one was around, rather than to attempt 

to conceal the weapon when the door was open and staff patrolled 

the tier. 

No fingerprint impressions were found on either weapon. 

Defense Evidence 

Defendant testified on his own behalf and admitted three prior 

robbery convictions as well as a conviction for possession of 

cocaine for sale. Defendant had known Edwards since October 

2004. They had been cellmates for almost a year prior to the 

search. 

Defendant acknowledged that nothing blocked Sergeant Banke and 

Officer McNeal from observing defendant lying on his bed once the 

officers entered the cell. However, defendant also stated, “You 

can't really see anything in there” because the cells are dark and he 

had boxes and a sheet at the foot of the bed to block outside light. 

Defendant denied having any prior knowledge about either of the 

weapons found in his cell. He first learned of the weapons when 

Case 2:13-cv-00030-GEB-EFB Document 19 Filed 04/30/15 Page 3 of 21
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

Sergeant Banke and Officer McNeal came to his temporary holding 

cell to tell him that he had been issued a “115,” which is “like a 

ticket.”1

Defendant explained that each day the cell door was open for many 

hours when he and Edwards were not present. The cellblock, is 

large, and defendant estimated that it housed about 1,200 inmates at 

the time of the search. Only one correctional officer is on duty at 

any time to control multiple tiers. During the day, there is a great 

deal of activity in the cellblock with inmates going to their work 

assignments, classes, showers, meals, to make phone calls, and to 

pick up necessities. Thus, one of the hundreds of other inmates in 

the cellblock could have hidden the weapon under the cell door. 

Defendant asserted that the weapon found under the door had to 

have been taped to the bottom of the cell door from the outside 

when the door stood open. He explained that there was not 

adequate clearance from the cell floor to reach under the door when 

it was closed. However, when the door stood open, it came to rest 

about a foot above the outside floor. 

Defendant admitted that the position in which he was sleeping 

when the officers came into his cell meant that he probably would 

have felt a weapon if it had been under his pillow. However, he 

denied prior knowledge of the knife found under his pillow. 

People v. George, No. C062882, 2011 WL 2347580 at **1-3 (Cal.App.3d Dist. June 14, 2011).2

 After his judgment of conviction was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal, 

petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. ECF No. 1-3 at 41. That 

petition was summarily denied. Id. 

 Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Sacramento County 

Superior Court, raising the same three claims he had raised on direct appeal. Id. at 48-49. Citing 

In re Waltreus, 62 Cal.2d 218 (1965) and In re Harris, 5 Cal.4th 813, 829 (1993), the Superior 

Court denied that petition on the grounds that the claims raised therein had been raised and 

rejected on appeal. Id. at 49. In its order denying the habeas petition, the Superior Court 

described the background to petitioner’s claims as follows: 

 1

 The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation uses a “115” as a way by which to 

“document[ ] misconduct that is ‘believed to be a violation of law or is not minor in nature.’ (Cal. 

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3312, subd. (a)(3).)” In re Reed (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1077 & fn. 2. 

2

 In addition, by way of background, petitioner informs the court that, while both he and 

Edwards were convicted in prison disciplinary proceedings of possessing both knives, only 

petitioner was criminally prosecuted on those charges. ECF No. 1-2 at 11. 

Case 2:13-cv-00030-GEB-EFB Document 19 Filed 04/30/15 Page 4 of 21
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

In Case No. 07F07012, Steven C. Sanders represented petitioner at 

jury trial, at which time petitioner was convicted of one count of 

Penal Code § 4502(a) possession by a prisoner of a dirk or dagger 

found under petitioner’s pillow; the jury acquitted petitioner, 

however, of a second charge, that of possessing an inmatemanufactured weapon found under the cell door. The trial court 

found true three “strike priors,” and sentenced petitioner to 25 years 

to life, to be served consecutively to the sentence petitioner was 

already serving. 

At trial, Sanders asked the court to admit a “confession” by 

petitioner’s cellmate, that the cellmate had actually been the one 

possessing the knife found under petitioner’s pillow, after the 

cellmate invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify when 

called to the stand. However, the “confession” was drafted and 

signed long after the cellmate had had his own in-prison 

disciplinary hearing on the matter, at which time the cellmate made 

no such confession; further, the cellmate was serving a 40-years-tolife sentence, did not expect to become eligible for parole under age 

71, and had nothing to lose and everything to gain in prison inmate 

respect by signing the confession. As such, the trial court found the 

confession to not be trustworthy and not be a statement against 

penal interest. 

Id. at 48. Petitioner subsequently filed a request for reconsideration of the Superior Court’s order, 

which was denied on August 7, 2012. Id. at 52. 

 Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, 

which was summarily denied. Answer, Ex. 10. He subsequently filed a habeas petition in the 

California Supreme Court, which was also summarily denied. Answer, Ex. 11. 

II. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims 

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 

state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S.___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2010); 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 

2000). 

///// 

///// 

///// 

///// 

Case 2:13-cv-00030-GEB-EFB Document 19 Filed 04/30/15 Page 5 of 21
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas 

corpus relief: 

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not 

be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 

claim - 

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists of 

holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. 

Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Greene v. Fisher, ___ U.S. 

___, 132 S.Ct. 38 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Circuit court precedent “may be persuasive in determining 

what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 

633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)). However, circuit 

precedent may not be “used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court 

jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] Court has not announced.” Marshall 

v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (citing Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 

(2012) (per curiam)). Nor may it be used to “determine whether a particular rule of law is so 

widely accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, 

be accepted as correct. Id. Further, where courts of appeals have diverged in their treatment of 

an issue, it cannot be said that there is “clearly established Federal law” governing that issue. 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006). 

 A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule 

contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court 

precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). 

Case 2:13-cv-00030-GEB-EFB Document 19 Filed 04/30/15 Page 6 of 21
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s 

decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.3

 Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 

(9th Cir. 2004). In this regard, a federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 

(2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent 

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”). 

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S.___,___,131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 

652, 664 (2004)). Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal 

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in 

federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 131 

S. Ct. at 786-87. 

 If the state court’s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing 

court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 

527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of § 

2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by considering 

de novo the constitutional issues raised.”). 

///// 

 3

 Under § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision based on a factual determination is not to be 

overturned on factual grounds unless it is “objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Davis v. Woodford, 

384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

Case 2:13-cv-00030-GEB-EFB Document 19 Filed 04/30/15 Page 7 of 21
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8

 The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). If 

the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a 

previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of 

the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “When 

a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication 

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. This 

presumption may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other explanation for 

the state court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 785 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

803 (1991)). Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects some claims 

but does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to 

rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 

___, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013). 

 Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo 

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether 

a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no 

reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. 

 A summary denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner’s claims. 

Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 957 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 2012). While the federal court cannot analyze 

just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must review the 

state court record to determine whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. This court “must determine what arguments or theories ... 

could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible 

Case 2:13-cv-00030-GEB-EFB Document 19 Filed 04/30/15 Page 8 of 21
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

9

fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the 

holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. at 786. The petitioner bears “the burden 

to demonstrate that ‘there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.’” Walker v. 

Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784). 

 When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s 

claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal 

habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 

F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). 

III. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Exclusion of Evidence

 In his first ground for relief, petitioner claims that the trial court violated his federal rights 

to due process and to present a defense when it excluded from evidence a declaration by his 

cellmate admitting ownership of the knife found under petitioner’s pillow. ECF No. 1-2 at 7-9, 

21-60.4

 

 The California Court of Appeal denied this claim, reasoning as follows: 

I. Claimed Error in Exclusion of Edwards's Written 

Declaration 

Defendant contends the trial court erred in excluding a written 

declaration, signed under penalty of perjury, in which Edwards 

asserted that he was responsible for the knife found under 

defendant's pillow. We reject the contention. 

A 

When called by the defense to testify, Edwards invoked his Fifth 

Amendment right against self-incrimination. The defense then 

sought to introduce a written declaration signed by Edwards in 

which he admitted that the knife was his. The prosecution opposed 

the admission of the declaration on grounds that it was 

untrustworthy. 

Outside the presence of the jury, the defense called inmate Glenn 

Robison to testify about the circumstances giving rise to the 

declaration by Edwards. Robison testified that he was an inmate in 

Folsom Prison and had been convicted of petty theft with a prior (§ 

 4

 Page number citations such as this one are to the page numbers reflected on the court’s 

CM/ECF system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties. 

Case 2:13-cv-00030-GEB-EFB Document 19 Filed 04/30/15 Page 9 of 21
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

10

666) and failure to appear. About a week after Edwards was 

released from administrative segregation, he told Robison that he 

“felt responsible for the weapon under George's pillow.” Two or 

three weeks later, defendant told Robison that Edwards wanted to 

sign a declaration to accept responsibility for the weapon found in 

defendant's bed. 

Around December 20, 2007, Robison contacted Edwards about the 

declaration. Defendant was not present, and Edwards did not 

appear to be coerced or under duress. Edwards wanted the 

declaration to explain “how the weapons really came about to be 

placed inside the cell” and dictated the declaration to Robison. 

Edwards appeared to be sincere in explaining that defendant should 

not take the blame for something that was Edwards's responsibility. 

The first declaration had a typographical error in it, so Robison 

retyped it and met with Edwards two or three days later to have him 

sign. Edwards signed the declaration and Robison signed as a 

witness. In pertinent part, the declaration states, verbatim: 

“[D]uring the time that I was ordered down from the top bunk, I 

was in possession of a prison made weapon, and as I climbed down, 

I was again order[ed] to move out of the cell, I panic[ed], then bent 

down at the end of the bunk to put on shoes, which is at the end of 

the cell, where my shoe lies under the bottom bunk, bent down and 

slide [sic] the weapon found under the pillow that inmate George 

was lying on.” 

At the time Edwards signed the declaration, Robison thought the 

115 against Edwards was still pending. Edwards later told Robison 

that he had been found guilty of the 115. 

About two or three weeks after signing the declaration, Edwards 

told Robison that he thought the statute of limitations had run on 

the charge of being an inmate in possession of a weapon. 

Nonetheless, Edwards asked Robison to research the applicable 

statute of limitations. Robison, who had access to the prison law 

library, concluded that a three-year period applied. When Robison 

informed Edwards that the statute of limitations had not yet run, 

Edwards did not appear surprised. 

In submitting the issue of the declaration's admissibility for the trial 

court's decision, the parties stipulated: “Edwards has been 

convicted of four burglaries: Three of which are first degree 

residential burglaries. [¶] Because of these convictions, he falls 

under the three strikes statute, was sentenced to 40 years to life state 

prison in 1997. [¶] Edwards [sic] earliest projected release date is 

October 13th of 2033. On that date, he will be 71 years old. [¶] 

Edwards' 115 hearing date was held on October 8th 2007 before 

Lieutenant Anthony Gentilly (phonetic). [¶] Prior to that hearing, 

Edwards was provided with reports detailing the correctional 

officer's discovery of two weapons in he and George's cell, March 

2nd, 2007. [¶] One weapon taped under the cell door, and one 

weapon under a pillow Inmate George was sleeping on. [¶] 

Edwards was given an opportunity to call witnesses, make a 

statement himself at the hearing. [¶] At that hearing, the only 

Case 2:13-cv-00030-GEB-EFB Document 19 Filed 04/30/15 Page 10 of 21
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

11

statement he made was, quote, there is no way that piece, end 

parenthesis, added, inmate manufactured weapon would fit under 

the door, end of quote. [¶] At that hearing, Inmate Edwards never 

admitted the weapon found underneath George's pillow was his.” 

The trial court found that Edwards was an unavailable witness after 

he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to refuse to testify. 

However, the trial court excluded the declaration signed by 

Edwards. In so ruling, the court explained: “An initial threshold 

issue in this case is whether the statement is reliable or trustworthy 

sufficiently such that the matter can go before the jury. 

“To determine trustworthiness, the Court may take into 

consideration the circumstances and possible motivation of the 

defendant, and the declarant's relationship to the defendant. 

“Based upon the Court's evaluation of the utterance, court finds that 

the statement lacks sufficient reliability or trustworthiness to permit 

its admission, and finds it is not properly admissible under 

Evidence Code Section 1230. 

“The statement from Mr. Edwards was prepared and submitted for 

us in Mr. George's criminal prosecution, the statement was not a 

spontaneous statement made under circumstances that would 

indicate its reliability. It was in fact prepared possibly eight 

months, possibly more after the occurrence itself. 

“The declarations itself is addressed to Mr. George, and I think its 

[sic] interesting to note that Mr. Robison went to Mr. Edwards in 

response to a request by Mr. George. 

“Both Mr. George and Mr. Edwards had been cellmates at the time, 

and there doesn't appear to be any evidence of animosity between 

the two that would indicate that the statement is trustworthy. More 

importantly, the declaration, apparently, was executed after the 

declarant had been prosecuted for a 115. 

“There was no further arresting at that time, that the defendant 

would receive administrative sanctions. 

“And I think it's reasonable to assume that given the timing of the 

declaration, and the date of the occurrence, that Mr. Edwards could 

have easily – and I think the circumstances suggest that he assumed 

that he would not be subject to criminal prosecution at least at the 

time of the utterance. 

“It is interesting to note that Mr. Robison initially indicated, 

although I agree Mr. Robison is confused with a number of things, 

he did indicate that at the time that Mr. Edwards provided the 

statement to Mr. Robison, the initial statement that Mr. Robison 

indicated was Edwards thought the statute of limitations had run 

out. And then subsequent to testifying to that, he indicated that a 

couple of weeks later there was a discussion between the two 

involving what the true statute of limitations was. 

Case 2:13-cv-00030-GEB-EFB Document 19 Filed 04/30/15 Page 11 of 21
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

12

“Obviously, that would reconcile with the fact that now Mr. 

Edwards is assuming – or taking the Fifth Amendment at this time. 

So it would seem consistent, at least, that Mr. Edwards gave a 

statement at the time he believed the statute of limitations had run 

out, or that he was no longer subject to criminal prosecution, or the 

alternative as Mr. Harry has indicated, he simply didn't care 

because of the fact that he's doing a life sentence at this point. 

“So the Court finds there is insufficient indicia of reliability to 

permit admission of the statement, the evidence would suggest the 

statement is unreliable and to [present] its admission would be 

misleading to the jury. 

“Independent from this Court's determination the statement is 

unreliable, the Court would also find that the statement is not a 

statement against penal interest. Although, the Defense Exhibit 

contains a statement where declarant admits to possessing one of 

the weapons found in the cell, give[n the] circumstances under 

which the statements were made, the Court does not find that 

statement is such that a reasonable person would have [sic] made 

that statement unless it were true. 

“This is one of those unusual cases where in fact the contrary is 

true: Circumstances under which the declaration was prepared, 

suggests that the statement was specifically designed to exonerate 

the defendant made by a declarant who had already been punished 

for it – his involvement through administrative proceedings, and no 

longer either believed he was facing prosecution or frankly did not 

care if he was prosecuted. 

“Unlike typical circumstances where a declaration against penal 

interests are made, the declarant in this particular case had nothing 

to lose and perhaps much to gain within the prison culture by 

providing an exonerating statement to his former cellmate.” 

B 

Under Evidence Code section 1200, “evidence of a statement that 

was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing 

and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated” is 

generally inadmissible as hearsay. However, an exception to the 

rule against hearsay exists for declarations against penal interest. 

To this end, Evidence Code section 1230 provides that “[e]vidence 

of a statement by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the 

subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant 

is unavailable as a witness and the statement, when made, . . . so 

far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, . . . that a 

reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement 

unless he believed it to be true.” 

The party seeking to admit evidence under this exception “must 

show that the declarant is unavailable, that the declaration was 

against the declarant's penal interest when made and that the 

declaration was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its 

hearsay character. (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 462.)” 

Case 2:13-cv-00030-GEB-EFB Document 19 Filed 04/30/15 Page 12 of 21
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

13

(People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 610–611 (Duarte).) A 

witness who refuses to testify by invoking the Fifth Amendment 

privilege against self-incrimination is deemed to be an unavailable 

witness. (Evid.Code, § 240, subd. (a)(1).) 

To be admissible, a declaration against penal interest “must be 

‘distinctly’ against the declarant's penal interest and must be 

‘clothed with indicia of reliability.’ (People v. Shipe (1975) 49 

Cal.App.3d 343, 354.)” (People v. Jackson (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 

1670, 1677–1678.) As the California Supreme Court has noted, 

“‘the precedents in the hearsay area provide a persuasive reminder 

that declarations against penal interest may contain self-serving and 

unreliable information’ and, consequently, ‘an approach which 

would find a declarant's statement wholly credible solely because it 

incorporates an admission of criminal culpability is inadequate.’ 

(People v. Campa (1984) 36 Cal.3d 870, 883, italics in original.) 

As scholars have observed, ‘“a self-serving statement lacks 

trustworthiness whether it accompanies a disserving statement or 

not.”’ (People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 439, fn. 15 (Leach), 

quoting Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to 

the Hearsay Rule (1944) 58 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 60.) Moreover, that a 

hearsay statement may be facially inculpatory or neutral cannot 

always be relied upon to indicate whether it is ‘truly selfinculpatory, rather than merely [an] attempt[ ] to shift blame or 

curry favor.’ (Williamson v. United States [ (1994) ] 512 U.S. 

[594,] at p. 603 [129 L.Ed.2d 476] (Williamson).) Even a hearsay 

statement that is facially inculpatory of the declarant may, when 

considered in context, also be exculpatory or have a net exculpatory 

effect. (See, e.g., People v. Coble (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 187, 191.) 

Ultimately, as the high court has noted, ‘whether a statement is selfinculpatory or not can only be determined by viewing it in context.’ 

(Williamson v. United States, supra, at p. 603.)” (Duarte, supra, 24 

Cal.4th at pp. 611–612.) 

“To determine whether the declaration passes the required threshold 

of trustworthiness, a trial court ‘may take into account not just the 

words but the circumstances under which they were uttered, the 

possible motivation of the declarant, and the declarant's relationship 

to the defendant.’ [Citation.] On appeal, the trial court's 

determination on this issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 

[Citation.]” (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 607.) A trial 

court abuses its discretion “only when its ruling ‘“‘fall[s] “outside 

the bounds of reason.”’” [Citation.]’ (People v. Benavides (2005) 

35 Cal.4th 69, 88); accord, Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 

Cal.3d 557, 566 [abuse of discretion requires a showing that the 

trial court ‘“exceed[ed] the bounds of reason, all of the 

circumstances before it being considered”’].” (People v. Jacobs

(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 728, 736.) 

C 

Hence, there was no abuse of discretion. The trial court properly 

found that Edwards was unavailable as a witness once he invoked 

his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. (Evid .Code, 

§ 240, subd. (a)(1).) And the trial court properly determined that 

Case 2:13-cv-00030-GEB-EFB Document 19 Filed 04/30/15 Page 13 of 21
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

14

the circumstances of his confinement and the timing of his 

declaration rendered the declaration untrustworthy. 

Given that Edwards's release date would be no earlier than 2033, 

when he will be 71 years old, the distant possibility of release from 

custody undermined the incentive to avoid an increased prison 

sentence. It was reasonable to conclude that he did not care about 

the possible additional years in prison that might flow from a 

conviction for the weapons possession charge. Moreover, as the 

trial court noted, Edwards more immediately stood to gain by 

taking the blame for the offense for defendant. By helping 

defendant avoid criminal responsibility, Edwards's declaration was 

likely to “curry favor” from his cellmate. (Williamson, supra, 512 

U.S. at p. 603 [129 L.Ed.2d at p. 485].) 

The declaration was more likely to confer immediate advantages to 

Edwards so that the disadvantage of distant punishment was 

outweighed. On this point, it is significant that Edwards did not 

admit possession of the knife found under defendant's pillow when 

it would have made an immediate difference to him: during the 

hearing on his own 115 charge. Had Edwards been willing to suffer 

the immediate consequences of a prison disciplinary action, his 

admission of responsibility would have had a greater aura of 

reliability. Instead, Edwards did not admit culpability until later 

and only for purposes of charges that had little, if any, material 

consequence. 

Defendant points out that Edwards dictated and signed the 

declaration at a time when even a one-year statute of limitations 

would have subjected him to criminal prosecution. However, as we 

have pointed out, the prospect of additional prison time was not 

such a significant penalty that it cloaked Edwards's statement with 

trustworthiness. 

Defendant next argues the possibility that Edwards would not care 

about additional prison time constituted an issue for the jury, rather 

than the court, to consider. Not so. The trial court was required to 

make a threshold determination about whether the declaration was 

sufficiently trustworthy to be presented for jury consideration. 

(Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 610–611.) Here, the trial court 

fulfilled its duty to determine the admissibility of the evidence 

before it was submitted to the jury. (People v. Garcia (2001) 89 

Cal.App.4th 1321, 1336.) And, as we have explained, the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the declaration as 

untrustworthy. 

As defendant correctly points out, the trial court gave additional 

reasons for excluding Edwards's declaration. These additional 

rationales were that the declaration was (1) offered in a criminal 

trial, (2) addressed to defendant, (3) made when Edwards went to 

Robison at defendant's direction, and (4) was not the product of any 

animosity between defendant and Edwards. Even if these rationales 

failed to support the trial court's ruling, the evidentiary ruling 

nonetheless reached the correct result. “If a judgment rests on 

admissible evidence it will not be reversed because the trial court 

Case 2:13-cv-00030-GEB-EFB Document 19 Filed 04/30/15 Page 14 of 21
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

15

admitted that evidence upon a different theory, a mistaken theory, 

or one not raised below.” (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 

901.) 

The proper exclusion of the declaration undermines defendant's 

contention that the ruling denied him his federal and state jury trial 

rights. A defendant's constitutional rights are not violated by the 

exclusion of evidence under the well-established rule against 

hearsay. (See People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 995.) 

In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate 

defendant's constitutional rights in excluding Edwards's declaration 

as insufficiently untrustworthy to be admissible as a statement 

against penal interest. 

George, 2011 WL 2347580, at 3-8. 

 Petitioner argues that the trial judge improperly relied on extra-record facts to support his 

conclusion that Edwards’ declaration was unreliable and therefore inadmissible. He also argues 

that the judge improperly usurped the role of the jury to determine the pertinent facts. ECF No. 

1-2 at 8-9. Petitioner argues, “other than a general predilection to disbelieve a prison inmate, 

there is no basis in this record to question the veracity of the Edwards declaration or anything 

testified to by inmate Robison.” Id. at 24. Petitioner contends the trial court’s decision to 

exclude his cellmate’s declaration was arbitrary, disproportionate, and not justified by the facts 

before the judge. Id. at 27. 

 Petitioner also argues that the trial court’s exclusion of the Edwards declaration 

eviscerated the only defense available to him: that Edwards was responsible for the knife found 

under petitioner’s pillow. Id. at 29. He argues the judge’s decision constituted “the wholesale 

removal of the defense presentation from the jury, over frankly speculative concerns.” Id. at 34. 

Petitioner notes that the trial judge originally was inclined to exclude the declaration based on the 

Confrontation Clause, but then changed his mind and excluded it on the grounds that it was not 

reliable. Id. at 31. He contends this provides support for his argument that the reliability of the 

declaration was apparent on its face. 

 Petitioner also argues that the trial court’s reasons for excluding the declaration were 

based upon “evidence that could be reasonably interpreted in another manner.” Id. at 36. He 

analyzes each of the judge’s stated reasons for excluding the declaration and refutes those reasons 

Case 2:13-cv-00030-GEB-EFB Document 19 Filed 04/30/15 Page 15 of 21
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

16

with his own analysis. Id. at 36- 60. Petitioner argues, “in the end, the Trial Court judged 

evidence more harshly than a criminal jury would be able to, and the fact the evidence 

surrounding the declaration was subject to multiple interpretations, rather than a single unerring 

one, itself should have established sufficient credibility to allow it to reach a jury.” Id. at 38. He 

also argues, 

The Court must keep in focus this was a criminal trial where the 

defendant faced life in prison, for a crime Mr. Edwards admitted 

committing in writing under penalty of perjury, and for which 

Edwards invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. To deprive the 

jury of this crucial information seems to miss the point of a jury 

trial. The error is all the worse when Edwards was the only 

possible perpetrator beyond petitioner himself. 

Id. at 49. In the traverse, petitioner summarizes his arguments as follows: “The trial court 

violated petitioner’s state and federal constitutional right to compulsory process/jury trial in 

determining that otherwise relevant and material evidence, bearing directly on the sole defense 

being tendered, should not reach the jury due to speculative trial court concerns about the 

reliability of that evidence.” ECF No. 18 at 2.5

 Criminal defendants have a constitutional right, implicit in the Sixth Amendment, to 

present a defense; this right is “a fundamental element of due process of law.” Washington v. 

Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). See also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 687, 690 (1986); 

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972). 

Necessary to the realization of this right is the ability to present evidence, including the testimony 

of witnesses. Washington, 388 U.S. at 19. However, the constitutional right to present a defense 

is not absolute. Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 877 (9th Cir. 2003). “Even relevant and 

reliable evidence can be excluded when the state interest is strong.” Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 

1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1983). 

 5

 Petitioner purports to challenge the decision of the Superior Court on this claim, and 

especially the Superior Court’s statement that Edwards “had nothing to lose and everything to 

gain in prison inmate respect by signing the confession.” ECF No. 1-2 at 21-23. However, the 

Superior Court did not address the merits of petitioner’s claims but denied all of them on the 

procedural ground that the claims had been raised and rejected on appeal. The last reasoned 

decision on this claim is the decision of the California Court of Appeal, set forth above. 

Accordingly, that is the decision this court will analyze for purposes of AEDPA review. 

Case 2:13-cv-00030-GEB-EFB Document 19 Filed 04/30/15 Page 16 of 21
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

17

 State law rules excluding evidence from criminal trials do not abridge a criminal 

defendant’s right to present a defense unless they are “arbitrary” or “disproportionate to the 

purposes they were designed to serve” and “infringe[s] upon a weighty interest of the accused.” 

United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). See also Crane, 476 U.S. at 689-91 

(discussion of the tension between the discretion of state courts to exclude evidence at trial and 

the federal constitutional right to “present a complete defense”); Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 

1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 2002). Further, a criminal defendant “does not have an unfettered right to 

offer [evidence] that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of 

evidence.” Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 

410 (1988)). In general, it has taken “unusually compelling circumstances . . . to outweigh the 

strong state interest in administration of its trials.” Perry, 713 F.2d at 1452. “A habeas petitioner 

bears a heavy burden in showing a due process violation based on an evidentiary decision.” 

Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 Here, the trial judge excluded the Edwards declaration on the basis that it was not 

trustworthy and was therefore not admissible as a hearsay exception under Cal. Evid. Code 

§ 1230. As explained by the California Court of Appeal, the trial judge was required to exercise 

his discretion under this hearsay exception to determine whether the Edwards declaration was 

trustworthy and therefore admissible. The Court of Appeal specifically found that the trial court 

“did not abuse its discretion in excluding the declaration as untrustworthy.” George, 2011 WL 

2347580, at *7. The United States Supreme Court has not “squarely addressed” whether a state 

court’s exercise of discretion to exclude testimony violates a criminal defendant’s right to present 

relevant evidence. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 758-59 (9th Cir. 2009). Nor has it clearly 

established a “controlling legal standard” for evaluating discretionary decisions to exclude the 

type of evidence at issue here. Id. at 758. Accordingly, the decision of the California Court of 

Appeal that the trial court’s discretionary evidentiary ruling did not violate the federal 

constitution is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established United States 

Supreme Court precedent and may not be set aside. Id. See also Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 

U.S. 111, 112 (2009) (“it is not ‘an unreasonable application of’ ‘clearly established Federal law’ 

Case 2:13-cv-00030-GEB-EFB Document 19 Filed 04/30/15 Page 17 of 21
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

18

for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by 

[the United States Supreme Court]”); Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008) (per 

curiam) (relief is “unauthorized” under Section 2254(d)(1) when the Supreme Court's decisions 

have “given no clear answer to the question presented, let alone one in [the petitioner's] favor,” 

because the state court cannot be said to have unreasonably applied clearly established Federal 

law); Brown v. Horell, 644 F.3d 969, 983 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Between the issuance of Moses and 

the present, the Supreme Court has not decided any case either ‘squarely address[ing]’ the 

discretionary exclusion of evidence and the right to present a complete defense or ‘establish[ing] 

a controlling legal standard’ for evaluating such exclusions.”), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 2011 

WL 4901379 (Nov. 14, 2011). 

 In any event, Cal. Evid. Code § 1230, the California Rule of Evidence under which the 

trial judge excluded the Edwards declaration, is certainly not “arbitrary” or disproportionate to the 

purposes it was designed to serve. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308. Further, the state appellate court’s 

decision that the Edwards declaration was properly excluded as untrustworthy is not unreasonable 

under the facts of this case, notwithstanding petitioner’s arguments regarding alternative 

interpretations of the evidence before the trial judge. Certainly the decision of the California 

Court of Appeal is not “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 131 

S.Ct. at 786-87. As explained by the Court of Appeal, the statements contained in the Edwards 

declaration were unreliable given the context in which they were made and were not sufficiently 

against Edwards’ penal interests to comply with the statutory hearsay exception. The court also 

notes that the arresting prison guards testified they did not see anything in Edwards’ hands when 

he got down from his bunk and exited the cell. In short, under the circumstances of this case, 

petitioner has not met his “heavy” burden to show a due process violation resulting from the trial 

court’s decision to exclude the Edwards declaration. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to 

federal habeas relief on this claim of evidentiary error by the trial court. 

///// 

///// 

Case 2:13-cv-00030-GEB-EFB Document 19 Filed 04/30/15 Page 18 of 21
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

19

B. Failure to Dismiss Count Two

 In his second ground for relief, petitioner claims that the trial court violated his right to a 

fair trial by refusing to dismiss Count Two, which charged him with possession of the knife found 

under his cell door. ECF No. 1-2 at 60. He argues that there was “no way to determine” whether 

the knife belonged to him, to Edwards, or to another inmate. Id. at 61. Petitioner also argues that 

the addition of Count Two added to the unfairness of his trial because “psychologically the jury 

has a different mental calculus on the case without the Count Two charge clouding its judgment.” 

Id. at 64. He contends that he was charged with Count Two simply to create the improper 

inference that he “had knives everywhere.” Id. at 65. 

 The California Court of Appeal denied this claim on the grounds that petitioner failed to 

demonstrate prejudice. The court explained: 

Defendant contends the trial court erred in submitting the charge 

relating to the weapon found under the cell door for consideration 

by the jury. Even if defendant established some sort of error on this 

ground, he was acquitted on this charge. Thus, defendant does not 

establish prejudice as to count one. The record shows that the jury 

properly performed its duties, analyzing each count separately. 

George, 2011 WL 2347580, at *8. 

 This court agrees with the conclusion reached by the state appellate court. Because 

petitioner was acquitted of count two, he cannot show that any error by the trial court in failing to 

dismiss this count “had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 

verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). There is no evidence in the record 

that the inclusion of Count Two caused the jury to convict petitioner of Count One. As stated by 

the Court of Appeal, “the record shows that the jury properly performed its duties, analyzing each 

count separately.” George, 2011 WL 2347580, at *8. Because petitioner has failed to 

demonstrate prejudice with respect to this claim, he is not entitled to habeas relief. 

C. Cumulative Error

 In his final claim, petitioner argues that the combination of errors alleged in his first two 

grounds for relief violated his right to due process. ECF No. 1-2 at 66-69. 

///// 

Case 2:13-cv-00030-GEB-EFB Document 19 Filed 04/30/15 Page 19 of 21
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

20

 The California Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, reasoning as follows: 

Finally, defendant contends the cumulative prejudice of the errors 

he alleges in the exclusion of the declaration and improper 

submission of count two to the jury requires us to reverse the 

judgment. Having been acquitted of count two, the only potential 

relief available pertains to defendant's conviction for the knife 

found under his pillow. And, as we explained in part I, ante, we 

perceive no error in the trial court's exclusion of Edwards's 

declaration. Without any showing of error, there can be no 

prejudice. (See People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 832.) 

George, 2011 WL 2347580, at *8. 

 The cumulative error doctrine in habeas recognizes that, “even if no single error were 

prejudicial, where there are several substantial errors, ‘their cumulative effect may nevertheless 

be so prejudicial as to require reversal.’” Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(quoting United States v. de Cruz, 82 F.3d 856, 868 (9th Cir. 1996)). However, where there is no 

single constitutional error existing, nothing can accumulate to the level of a constitutional 

violation. See Fairbank v. Ayers, 650 F.3d 1243, 1257 (9th Cir. 2011), cert denied. ___ U.S. ___, 

132 S.Ct. 1757 (2012) (“[B]ecause we hold that none of Fairbank’s claims rise to the level of 

constitutional error, ‘there is nothing to accumulate to a level of a constitutional violation.’”) 

(citation omitted); Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 524 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because we conclude that 

no error of constitutional magnitude occurred, no cumulative prejudice is possible.”). “The 

fundamental question in determining whether the combined effect of trial errors violated a 

defendant's due process rights is whether the errors rendered the criminal defense ‘far less 

persuasive,’ Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973), and thereby had a ‘substantial 

and injurious effect or influence’ on the jury's verdict.” Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637). 

 This court has addressed petitioner’s claims of error and has concluded that no error of 

constitutional magnitude occurred. There is also no evidence that an accumulation of errors 

rendered petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on 

his claim that cumulative error violated his right to due process. 

///// 

///// 

Case 2:13-cv-00030-GEB-EFB Document 19 Filed 04/30/15 Page 20 of 21
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

21

IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s 

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue 

in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a 

final order adverse to the applicant). 

DATED: April 29, 2015. 

Case 2:13-cv-00030-GEB-EFB Document 19 Filed 04/30/15 Page 21 of 21