Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-01362/USCOURTS-caDC-12-01362-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cape Wind Associates, LLC
Intervenor for Respondent
Federal Aviation Administration
Respondent
Town of Barnstable, Massachusetts
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 8, 2013 Decided January 22, 2014

No. 12-1362

TOWN OF BARNSTABLE, MASSACHUSETTS,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

RESPONDENT

CAPE WIND ASSOCIATES, LLC,

INTERVENOR

Consolidated with 12-1363

On Petitions for Review of Final Agency Action 

of the United States Federal Aviation Administration

W. Eric Pilsk argued the cause for petitioners. With him on

the briefs were Charles C. Lemley and Catherine M. van

Heuven. 

Daniel J. Lenerz, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were

Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General,

Michael J. Singer, Attorney, Richard H. Saltsman, Assistant

Chief Counsel for Litigation, Federal Aviation Administration,

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and Vicki Leemon, Manager, Adjudication Branch.

Christopher H. Marraro argued the cause for intervenor

Cape Wind Associates, LLC. With him on the brief was

Geraldine E. Edens.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and ROGERS and BROWN,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: This case arises in the context of

the approval of a lease by the U.S. Department of Interior to

Cape Wind Associates for construction of an offshore wind farm

in Nantucket Sound. Under the lease, Cape Wind must obtain

the Federal Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”) determination

whether the turbines pose a hazard to air navigation and comply

with any mitigation measures before beginning construction. In

Town of Barnstable, Mass. v. FAA, 659 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2011)

(“Barnstable I”), the court held that the “no hazard”

determinations in 2010 for each of the wind turbines in a

25–square mile area of Nantucket Sound were “inadequately

justified.” Id. at 31. Petitioners now challenge the no hazard

determinations in 2012 as similarly deficient for failing to

analyze the safety risks posed by the project and to perform an

environmental review required by the National Environmental

Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4332. For the following

reasons, we deny the petitions for review.

I.

Regarding structures interfering with air commerce,

Congress has instructed that: 

Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary [of

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Transportation], if the Secretary decides that

constructing . . . a structure may result in an

obstruction of the navigable airspace or an interference

with air navigation facilities and equipment or the

navigable airspace, the Secretary shall conduct an

aeronautical study to decide the extent of any adverse

impact on the safe and efficient use of the airspace,

facilities, and equipment. 

49 U.S.C. § 44718(b)(1). In conducting the study, the Secretary

is to “consider factors relevant to the efficient and effective use

of the navigable airspace,” including “the impact on arrival,

departure, and en route procedures for aircraft operating under

visual flight rules [VFR],” “the impact on [such procedures] for

aircraft operation under instrument flight rules [IFR],” and “the

cumulative impact resulting from the proposed construction . .

. when combined with the impact of other existing or proposed

structures.” Id. § 44718(b)(1)(A), (B) & (E).

The Secretary’s regulations provide the standards to be used

to determine whether a structure would constitute an

“obstruction[] to air navigation,” 14 C.F.R. § 77.13, and define

an “obstruction” in terms of height and location. Id. § 77.17. 

As relevant, a structure within three nautical miles of an airport

constitutes an obstruction if it is more than 200 feet above

ground level, id. § 77.17(a)(2), but regardless of its location a

structure higher than 499 feet above ground level will constitute

an obstruction. Id. § 77.17(a)(1). The FAA is directed to issue

a Determination of No Hazard to Air Navigation “when the

aeronautical study concludes that the proposed construction . .

. will exceed an obstruction standard but would not have a

substantial aeronautical impact to air navigation,” id. § 77.31(d),

or when “a proposed structure does not exceed any of the

obstruction standards and would not be a hazard to air

navigation.” Id. § 77.31(e). The FAA’s aeronautical studies are

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conducted according to the FAA Handbook, Procedures for

Handling Airspace Matters, FAA Order JO 7400.2J (February

9, 2012), of which Section 3, on identifying and evaluating

aeronautical effect, is relevant here.

In 2009, the FAA determined that the proposed turbines,

which are to be located in the middle of Nantucket Sound,

would have an electromagnetic effect on local radar facilities —

namely the ASR-8 radar at Otis Airfield in Falmouth,

Massachusetts — and conducted a year-long aeronautical study

of the effects of the project on the operation of navigation

facilities and the safe and efficient use of the navigable airspace. 

Based on the study, the FAA issued no hazard determinations,

finding that each of the turbines would not be a hazard to air

navigation provided (1) a digital processor—the TDX2000—was installed at the ASR-8 radar at Otis Airfield, (2)

Cape Wind provided financial assurance for the installation of

an additional radar upgrade if the TDX-2000 insufficiently

mitigated any radar interference, and (3) the turbines were

properly lighted and marked. Applying Handbook § 6-3-8(c)(1),

the FAA concluded that the turbines would not have an adverse

effect on aircraft operating under VFR, when pilots navigate by

reference to physical landmarks, because the turbines would be

less than 500 feet high and located in the area of “en route”

operations (i.e., not affecting takeoffs or landings). Petitioners

sought review.

In Barnstable I, 659 F.3d at 34–35, this court held that the

FAA had misread its regulations by relying solely on § 6-3-

8(c)(1) of the Handbook to find no adverse effect on VFR

operations because the turbines would not exceed 500 feet in

height. The FAA had not addressed whether the turbines would

have an “adverse effect” under § 6-3-3. Id. at 35. Section 6-3-3

states that “[a] structure is considered to have an adverse effect

if it first . . . is found to have physical or electromagnetic

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radiation effect on the operation of air navigation facilities.” If

so, then an “adverse effect,” as relevant, exists where a structure

would require a change to an IFR minimum flight altitude or to

a VFR operation’s regular flight course or altitude, or affect

future VFR or IFR operations. Handbook § 6-3-3 (a), (b), (e). 

The court found no “apparent analysis of the record evidence

concerning the wind farm’s potentially adverse effects on VFR

operations,” Barnstable I, 659 F.3d at 35, although at the time

it was “undisputed” that the turbines would have “physical or

electromagnetic radiation effect on the operation of air

navigation facilities,” id. The court therefore vacated the 2010

no hazard determinations and remanded the matter. Id. at 36.

By the time the FAA issued no hazard determinations on

August 15, 2012, the circumstances with regard to radar had

changed. In January 2012, the FAA upgraded the ASR-8 radar

and beacon at Otis Airfield by digitizing the output with a TDX2000 processor. The FAA had concluded in the aeronautical

study that the installation of the TDX-2000 would not only

address existing radar issues with “coasting, dropped targets,

and ring around,” but also reduce unwanted returns from the

wind turbines. 2012 Determination at 5. In a study conducted

before the TDX-2000 was permanently installed, the FAA ran

tests simulating wind turbines on the ASR-8 radar at Otis

Airfield with and without a TDX-2000 and confirmed that the

modification was effective. The FAA further evaluated the

actual operation of the TDX-2000 at Otis Airfield after its

permanent installation in 2012. See Resp’t Br. at 13. 

On remand, the FAA explained that its aeronautical study

had relied on multiple reports to evaluate potential impacts to

the three FAA radar sites on or near Nantucket Sound. The

FAA found that the Cape Wind project would have no

noticeable impact on beacon, or “secondary,” radars. All three

radar sites (at North Truro Cape, Nantucket, and Falmouth) are

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more than 2.4 nautical miles from the proposed turbines, a

distance at which a 2008 study near a wind farm in Great Falls,

Montana, found that turbines generated no false target reports. 

2012 Determination at 4 & n.2 (citing Guidelines for Evaluating

Wind Turbine Impacts to Radars (Dec. 2010) (“2010

Guidelines”)). 

As to search, or “primary,” radar, the FAA found the

turbines would not affect the service at the North Truro Cape

site, which is used for long-range coverage, because it was

located 31.66 nautical miles from the project. Because of the

distance from the radar to the project and the “minimal”

elevation angle of the proposed turbines, the FAA found that the

low-altitude coverage of the North Truro radar would be

unaffected. Id. at 4. The Departments of Homeland Security

and Defense, which rely on this radar for national defense and

drug interdiction, also evaluated the project and identified no

impacts. Although acknowledging that the wind turbines could

decrease the probability of detection at the Nantucket search

radar as a result of wind turbine “clutter,” the FAA Operations

Engineering Support Group had determined that this level of

impact would not rise to the level of a “physical or

electromagnetic effect” on the air navigation facility because the

probability of detection is not expected to drop “below

acceptable values,” in part because the ASR-9 sites have been

upgraded with the installation of a 9PAC-II dynamic sensor that

significantly reduces “clutter.” Id. at 5. The FAA also

concluded that while search radar at Otis Airfield might be

affected by the “shadowing” of aircraft flying behind turbines at

lower than 800 feet and within three nautical miles of the wind

farm, any such effect would be “brief and intermittent” due to

the spacing between the turbines and their individual width. Id.

In evaluating the likely effect of the turbines on VFR

operations, the FAA applied the criteria in Handbook § 6-3-

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8(c)(1). That subsection states as to “en route operations” that

“[a] structure would have an adverse effect upon VFR air

navigation if its height is greater than 500 feet above the surface

at the site, and within 2 statute miles of any regularly used VFR

route.” Although the wind farm would be within the two-mile

distance, the height for the proposed turbines is not greater than

500 feet above the surface at their sites. The FAA noted that its

adverse effects determinations were based on “long-standing

FAA policy governing aeronautical studies of proposed

structures and their potential impact on VFR operations.” 2012

Determination at 6. “Therefore, even if the proposed wind

turbines exceeded an obstruction standard in 14 CFR § 77.17,

they would not adversely affect VFR operations.” Id. The FAA

also found no adverse effect on “any existing or proposed arrival

or departure VFR operations or procedures.” Id. 

Although the FAA therefore concluded that under its policy

“no VFR analysis is required in this case,” the FAA collected

data on VFR traffic in the area “to address concerns raised by the

court in [Barnstable I].” Id. The FAA hired the MITRE

Corporation to assess the project’s effects on VFR flights. The

MITRE study found that between January 1 and September 30,

2011, 427 VFR flights equipped with transponders flew over the

location of the proposed turbines at 949 feet or below, flights that

presumably would have had to change altitude or route had the

wind farm been in existence, see 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(a),(c). Of

those flights, more than half (220) passed over the proposed

location of the four turbines in the southeast corner of the wind

farm. On any given day during the nine-month period, the

greatest number of transponder-equipped VFR flights that passed

over the turbines’ proposed location at an altitude of 949 feet or

below was nine, which occurred three times. As the FAA notes,

more often, on 165 of 273 days, no flights or one flight passed

over that location at or below 950 feet. See Resp’t Br. at 11–12.

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 Because the FAA cannot track VFR aircraft that lack an

operating transponder, see 2012 Determination at 6 n.10, the

FAA also issued a public notice of the wind farm proposal on

February 10, 2012 “to all known aviation interests and to nonaeronautical interests that may be affected by the proposed

turbines,” id. at 4 (citing Handbook § 6-3-17(a)(1)), and sought

information regarding the turbines’ potential impact on this type

of VFR operations. Of the public comments received,

“supporting commenters stated that the turbines would not have

a significant adverse effect on VFR flight in the area,” and “that

any adjustments to flight paths or altitudes would be minor and

brief,” with which the FAA agreed. Id. at 7. In response to the

nine commenters objecting to the project because of its impact

on the navigable airspace and radar, the FAA explained why it

found none persuasive. For example, the FAA explained that the

project would not compromise safety during marginal weather

periods because the turbines would be marked and lighted to

make them conspicuous and pilots could safely fly around them. 

Further, the FAA stated: “This is not unusual and does not of

itself create a safety risk,” observing that some commenters

indicated “aircraft currently make course and altitude

adjustments in this area to avoid passenger ferries and other

marine traffic.” Id. at 9. The FAA additionally explained that

VFR operations would not be “compressed” into IFR corridors,

which begin at 2,000 feet and higher, because VFR flights may

operate as low as 940 feet over the turbines, permitting

“adequate airspace for VFR and IFR aircraft operating in this

area.” Id. at 8. The FAA noted as well that “[a] mixture of IFR

and VFR operations is not unique to Nantucket Sound and is

common in areas with major commercial airports and numerous

general aviation airports,” and that “[a]dherence to [14 C.F.R.]

§ 91.119 provides basic separation between . . . operations,

regardless of whether the pilot is familiar with local customs,

because all pilots are operating under the same requirements.” 

Id.

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Having found that the turbines, individually and as a group,

would neither exceed the obstruction standards in 14 C.F.R. §

77.17 nor have a physical or electromagnetic radiation effect on

the operation of air navigation facilities, see Handbook § 6-3-3,

the FAA concluded, in the absence of either condition, that no

further “adverse effect” evaluation was required. The FAA also

found the turbines would not create a safety risk for local pilots

because they would be properly lighted and marked. In issuing

the 2012 no hazard determinations because the proposed wind

farm would not have a substantial adverse effect and would not

be a hazard to air navigation, the FAA included several

conditions, one of which required Cape Wind to place $15

million in escrow for two years to acquire and install an ASR-11

radar system if the TDX-2000 upgrade at Otis Airfield proved

insufficiently effective. Petitioners again sought review. 

II.

Petitioners contend that on remand the FAA again relied on

its erroneous view that a structure can only be a hazard if it is an

“obstruction,” notwithstanding its adverse effect on the operation

of air navigation facilities by interfering with the operation of

FAA radar facilities or its effect on VFR flights, and failed to

conduct the safety analysis mandated by the court in Barnstable

I. To successfully challenge the 2012 no hazard determinations,

petitioners must demonstrate that the FAA’s action was

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see, e.g., Clark

Cnty., Nev. v. FAA, 522 F.3d 437, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2008). An

agency’s interpretation of its regulations is “controlling unless

plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Auer v.

Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). And the FAA’s factual findings, if

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, are

“conclusive.” 49 U.S.C. § 46110(c). The substantial evidence

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standard “requires more than a scintilla, but can be satisfied by

something less than a preponderance of the evidence.” Fla. Gas

Transmission Co. v. FERC, 604 F.3d 636, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2010)

(citation omitted). The court, however, must consider the

evidence in light of “whatever in the record fairly detracts from

its weight.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,

488 (1951). 

A.

Petitioners contend that the 2012 no hazard determinations

are inconsistent with the Handbook procedures and 49 U.S.C. §

44718. We conclude that the FAA could reasonably view its

Handbook procedures implementing the Secretary’s regulations

to establish a threshold finding necessary to trigger a further

“adverse effects” analysis. Cf. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. The

Handbook provision for “Determining Adverse Effect” reads: “A

structure is considered to have an adverse effect if it first exceeds

the obstruction standards of part 77, and/or is found to have

physical or electromagnetic radiation effect on the operation of

air navigation facilities.” Handbook § 6-3-3 (emphasis added). 

By using the word “first” the FAA signaled, as a matter of the

ordinary usage of the word, cf. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast

Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004), that a finding

of either an obstruction or an air navigation effect is antecedent

to the remaining analysis of adverse effects under the Handbook.

 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 439 (10th

ed. 1993). Indeed, the FAA has revised the sentence to state

explicitly that “[i]f a structure first exceeds the obstruction

standards of Part 77, and/or is found to have a [radar effect], then

the proposed or existing structure . . . has an adverse effect if it

would [have other effects listed in ¶ 6-3-3 (a)-(f)].” Guidance on

Determining Adverse Effect, FAA Notice N JO 7400.29 (June

19, 2012). This further clarifies the FAA’s intended meaning. 

In any event, when read as a whole, the plain text of § 6-3-3

indicates that VFR impact is one category of effects to be

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considered once either of the two threshold conditions is found. 

See § 6-3-3(b). 

Reading § 6-3-3 in the context of the Handbook provisions

on the identification and evaluation of aeronautical effect

confirms that the FAA’s interpretation is reasonable. Section 7-

1-3(e) states that the FAA will issue a hazard determination if a

structure would have a “substantial adverse effect” that cannot

be eliminated. Section 6-3-5 states that a “substantial adverse

effect” exists when a structure “causes electromagnetic

interference . . . or if there is a combination of: a. Adverse effect

as described in paragraph 6-3-3; and b. A significant volume of

aeronautical operations . . . would be affected.” Therefore, if a

structure does not cause electromagnetic interference under § 6-

3-5, then § 6-3-3 prescribes the process for determining adverse

effect. When neither of the threshold conditions in § 6-3-3

exists, the FAA has determined that it need not analyze whether

a “significant volume” of VFR flights would be required to

change their course or altitude, see § 6-3-3(b) and § 6-3-4. In

Barnstable I, 659 F.3d at 35 n.1, the court assumed this

interpretation was permissible, and petitioners present no cause

for a different conclusion. The FAA likewise does not need to

evaluate VFR effects under § 6-3-8 when neither of the two § 6-

3-3 threshold criteria is satisfied. 

Neither the governing statute on which petitioners rely nor

the Secretary’s regulations render a threshold requirement

impermissible. Congress specified the factors that must be

considered in an aeronautical study, see 49 U.S.C.

§ 44718(b)(1)(A)-(E), but left to the Secretary’s broad discretion

the determination of when a structure may result in an

obstruction of navigable airspace and what constitutes an adverse

impact. Section 44718 does not use the term “hazard,” much

less set the requirements for determining when a structure is a

“hazard.” To the extent petitioners maintain that the FAA’s

“threshold” interpretation of § 6-3-3 of the Handbook violates 49

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U.S.C. § 44718, by failing to “decide the extent of any adverse

impact on the safe and efficient use of the airspace, facilities, or

equipment,” Petrs’ Br. 37, they ignore the statutory scheme

Congress created and the deference this court owes to the

reasonable interpretation of the FAA, acting for the Secretary, in

implementing the statute. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural

Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984); see, e.g.,

Public Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 

When the FAA found in 2009 that the proposed turbines “may

result in an obstruction of the navigable airspace or an

interference with air navigation facilities and equipment or the

navigable airspace,” 49 U.S.C. § 44718(b)(1), it conducted an

aeronautical study and proceeded to “decide” and “disclose” the

extent of any adverse impact. That is what Congress required,

leaving further elaboration on standards for regulations to be

issued in light of the Secretary’s expertise and judgment. Cf.

Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass’n v. FAA, 600 F.2d 965, 973–74

(D.C. Cir. 1979). The statute’s reference to “any adverse

impact,” while “all inclusive,” Petrs’ Br. 37, does not limit the

Secretary’s discretion to reasonably determine what can

constitute an adverse impact or how those impacts should be

evaluated. 

Petitioners’ assertion that the statute proscribes the FAA’s

decision to impose a backup plan for the TDX-2000 also finds no

statutory support. Air Line Pilots’ Ass’n Int’l v. FAA, 446 F.2d

236, 241–42 (5th Cir. 1971), on which they rely, confirms that

the regulatory purpose of the safety provisions administered by

the FAA contemplates pre-construction evaluation of

modification of operating procedures, but that opinion is

addressing the ripeness of the FAA’s determination for judicial

review, not the required substance of a determination.

Neither do petitioners demonstrate that the FAA’s threshold

interpretation of § 6-3-3 is arbitrary and capricious because it

accounts for potential VFR effects only when either an

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obstruction or radar interference is present. VFR flights do not

rely on instruments or instructions from air traffic control to

navigate; rather, the FAA explained, “[i]t is the pilot’s

responsibility to see and avoid other aircraft and structures when

conducting VFR flight.” 2012 Determination at 8. The FAA

could reasonably conclude, at least in the circumstances here,

that when proposed construction will not compromise radar

operations, then changes to VFR flight paths will not be

hazardous because air traffic control will be able to track VFR

and IFR flights on radar and direct IFR flights away from other

flights or the wind turbines. 

Petitioners’ suggestion that in Barnstable I the court

mandated a “safety analysis” ignores the changed circumstances

after 2010 and the FAA’s further evaluation in light of the

court’s concerns. When there is neither an obstruction nor radar

interference, as the FAA found in 2012, the FAA interprets its

Handbook not to require the remaining “adverse effect” analysis

under § 6-3-3, which in turn renders the analysis under § 6-3-8

inapplicable. In Barnstable I, the court stated the FAA needed

to perform additional analysis because the adverse effect on

radar was at that time “undisputed,” 659 F.3d at 35. 

Notwithstanding the changed radar circumstances in 2012 and its

longstanding policy reflected in its Handbook, the FAA on

remand addressed the court’s concern in Barnstable I by hiring

the MITRE Corporation to do a further study, which found that

most VFR flights would be over just four turbines in one corner

of the wind farm, and by seeking public comments and

responding to aeronautical objections to the wind farm.

B.

Petitioners’ challenge to the FAA’s factual findings

regarding radar and mitigation for interference with the Otis

ASR-8 as lacking substantial evidentiary support fare no better. 

They suggest that the TDX-2000 may not mitigate the known

adverse effects of the turbines and that an ASR-11 also may not

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resolve the acknowledged interference issues. They also

maintain that the FAA failed to fully analyze other adverse

effects, specifically the “shadowing” effects on beacon and

search radar, the decreased probability of detection for search

radars, impacts to the Truro ARSR-4, and unique weather

conditions in Nantucket Sound. And they maintain the FAA

failed to impose mitigation measures it had identified as

necessary.

Multiple studies of record analyzing the anticipated impact

of wind turbines on the radar systems in Nantucket Sound and on

radar in general support the FAA’s findings that the wind

turbines will neither “have physical or electromagnetic radiation

effect on,” Handbook § 6-3-3, nor “cause[] electromagnetic

interference to,” Handbook § 6-3-5, air navigation. These

studies — which include the Technical Operations Division

Response, the 2009 Impact Study of 130 Offshore Wind

Turbines in Nantucket Sound (“Impact Study”), and the 2010

Surveillance Engineering Study — address the potential safety

concerns such as unwanted search radar returns (“clutter”) and

drops of targets. The Technical Operations Division Response

found that impacts of the wind turbines to radars other than Otis

Airfield were unlikely and that the TDX-2000 would

“significantly improve[]” the Otis Airfield radar performance. 

The Impact Study acknowledged the vulnerability of the older

Otis Airfield radar and recommended a TDX-2000 to ameliorate

the problem, stating that TDX-2000s “are known to perform well

with the ASR-8” and have “many post processing tools and

features that are designed for operating in a high clutter

environment.” Impact Study at 24–25. Although at the time the

TDX-2000 had not been tested near a wind farm, the study

concluded that it would “greatly enhance the radar product.” Id.

at 25. For the Surveillance Engineering Study, the FAA

temporarily installed a TDX-2000 at Otis Airfield and tested its

performance with simulated wind turbines. The TDX-2000 was

found to have “exceeded expectations” for search radar

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probability of detection. Surveillance Engineering Study at 16. 

Other FAA documents of record also indicate that the ASR11’s performance would be satisfactory. The FAA’s 2010

Guidelines on the technical operations process for evaluating

effects of wind turbines on radar state that turbine effects require

detailed study only if they are less than 6.5 nautical miles from

the radar, see 2010 Guidelines at 5, and here the nearest radar is

9.5 miles away. Additionally, the FAA pointed out in

responding to concerns of an FAA air traffic control specialist

about a proposed mitigation plan for radar interference,

particularly with respect to the ASR-8 at Otis Airfield, that the

TDX-2000 is “performing as expected, with a reduction in false

and dropped targets,” that “the enhancement of a TDX-2000 has

been performed at approximately 25% of the ASR-8 sites, with

documented improvements to clutter and false targets,” and that

Technical Operations and Air Traffic personnel have

“acknowledged improvements in overall radar performance.” 

Response of Douglas A. Klauck, FAA, (July 9, 2012) to

Affidavit of Mark J. Cool, Air Traffic Control Specialist (July 2,

2012). 

There also was evidence regarding the faulty performance

of a TDX-2000/ASR-8 combination and an ASR-11 over a wind

farm in Travis Air Force Base in California. In opposing the

project, two concerned citizens “with extensive radar

experience” submitted a 2008 presentation indicating that neither

a TDX-2000 nor an ASR-11 had worked near the Travis Air

Force Base wind turbines and that the base eventually warned

search radar–only aircraft that they were invisible to radar over

the turbines. They also stated that restricting flights without

transponders over Nantucket Sound would necessitate substantial

rerouting because the Sound has many small and recreational

aircraft. But neither the commenters nor petitioners offered

details about the Travis wind farm to indicate it is comparable in

size or geography to the proposed wind farm in Nantucket

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Sound. By contrast, the FAA’s February 2010 engineering study

tested the Otis ASR-8 and the TDX-2000 to predict the effects of

the proposed wind farm at its future location in Nantucket

Sound. The FAA’s Guidelines noted that the TDX-2000 at

Travis had “good results.” 2010 Guidelines at 10. 

To the extent petitioners cite concerns about impacts to other

radars, radar “shadowing,” and the unique weather conditions of

Nantucket Sound, the FAA addressed many of these matters in

the Impact Study and found these impacts, if any, would be at

acceptable levels. The FAA’s findings with regard to the ARSR4 at Truro are buttressed by the lack of objections from the

Departments of Defense and Homeland Security that rely on the

radar. The FAA was “not required to address every argument

advanced by petitioners,” only, as it has done, to “state the main

reasons for its decision and indicate that it has considered the

most important objections.” Simpson v. Young, 854 F.2d 1429,

1434–35 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Given the record evidence and the

level of FAA expertise involved in drawing factual conclusions

from the reports, conducting the aeronautical study, and

responding to comments, petitioners fail to show that the FAA

findings are unsupported by substantial evidence. See Aircraft

Owners & Pilots’ Ass’n, 600 F.2d at 973–74.

C.

Finally, petitioners’ contention that the FAA was required

under NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332, to perform or participate in an

analysis of the environmental impacts of its no hazard

determinations is based on a flawed premise. 

Preliminarily, we note that intervenor Cape Wind

Associates’ challenges to petitioners’ standing to raise the NEPA

objection are unpersuasive. Given the location of the Town of

Barnstable, its standing might well appear self-evident in view

of its concerns the wind farm would adversely affect noise or

traffic, or degrade views or coastal areas. Sierra Club v. EPA,

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292 F.3d 895, 900 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Ass’n of Data Processing

Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); see also Ry.

Labor Execs. Ass’n v. U.S., 987 F.2d 806, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 

To the extent the FAA challenged the causation and

redressability prongs of the standing analysis in Barnstable I, this

court held that petitioners had standing. 659 F.3d at 31. Were

there any doubt now, petitioners’ supplemental declarations

establish that they have standing to raise this NEPA claim. See,

e.g., Cmtys. Against Runway Expansion, Inc. v. FAA, 355 F.3d

678, 685 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC,

401 F.3d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Neither is the court’s

jurisdiction defeated because, as Cape Wind suggests, petitioners

have impermissibly split their NEPA claim, which is pending in

the district court, since any challenge to the no hazard

determinations must be brought in the court of appeals. 49

U.S.C. § 46110(a); see U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Blake Constr. Co.,

Inc., 765 F.2d 195, 205 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 

No hazard determinations generally do not require

preparation of an environmental impact statement because they

are not legally binding. See BFI Waste Sys. of N. Am., Inc. v.

FAA, 293 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The fact that the

Interior Department has required Cape Wind to obtain the FAA’s

hazard determination and comply with any mitigation measures

it imposes before beginning construction does not create an

exception. The FAA has no authority to countermand Interior’s

approval of the project or to require changes to the project in

response to environmental concerns. Cf. Dep’t of Transp. v.

Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004). Although in Barnstable

I this court supposed, when addressing petitioners’ standing,

“that the Interior Department would rethink the project if faced

with an FAA determination that the project posed an unmitigable

hazard,” 659 F.3d at 34, the court did not suggest that the FAA

could unilaterally alter the project or that Interior would alter its

decision in response to environmental, as distinct from aviation,

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concerns expressed by the FAA. “[W]here an agency has no

ability to prevent a certain effect due to its limited statutory

authority over the relevant actions, the agency cannot be

considered a legally relevant ‘cause’ of the effect.” Pub. Citizen,

541 U.S. at 770. Because the FAA “simply lacks the power to

act on whatever information might be contained in the

[environmental impact statement (“EIS”)],” id. at 768, NEPA

does not apply to its no hazard determinations. 

NEPA’s “rule of reason” does not require the FAA to

prepare an EIS when it would “serve no purpose.” Id. at 767

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Interior

Department prepared an EIS on the wind farm project and stated

that it would assess whether additional mitigation measures

included in the FAA determination merited a supplemental EIS. 

There is no need for FAA to duplicate Interior’s NEPA analysis,

which has been challenged in another proceeding. New York v.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 681 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012),

on which petitioners rely, is not on point. The court held there

that the agency rulemaking on the safety of nuclear waste storage

was subject to NEPA even though the Commission did not

license any storage because the rule and its findings would

“enable licensing decisions” and “render[] uncontestable general

conclusions about the environmental effects of plant licensure”

that would apply in later decisions. Id. at 477. By contrast, the

FAA’s no hazard determinations were not a preliminary stage of

decisionmaking that enabled Interior’s lease to Cape Wind

Associates; rather, the lease was the product of a distinct

decisionmaking process by a different agency prior to FAA’s

final determinations. Nor do the FAA’s determinations

“render[]” any conclusions about the environmental impacts of

the wind turbine project “uncontestable.” Petitioners can and

have challenged the sufficiency of Interior’s EIS for the wind

farm project, including Interior’s decision not to supplement the

EIS in response to FAA’s determinations and mitigation

requirements. See Town of Barnstable First Am. Compl. ¶¶

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179–94 in Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility v.

Bromwich, No. 1:10-cv-01067 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2011). 

Accordingly, for these reasons, we deny the petitions for

review.

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