Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-17087/USCOURTS-ca9-14-17087-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chike Okafor
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHIKE OKAFOR,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-17087

D.C. No.

3:14-cv-01002-LB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Laurel D. Beeler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 18, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed January 13, 2017

Before: A. Wallace Tashima and Milan D. Smith, Jr.,

Circuit Judges, and Edward R. Korman,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Tashima

* The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for

the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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2 OKAFOR V. UNITED STATES

SUMMARY**

Forfeiture 

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of

claimant’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) motion for return of

$99,500 in cash that was seized by Drug Enforcement

Administration (“DEA”) agents from claimant’s carry-on bag

at San Francisco International Airport.

The DEA sent claimant a notice informing him that the

money was subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881

because it was used in, or acquired as a result of, a violation

of the Controlled Substance Act. The DEA subsequently

deemed claimant’s claim to contest the forfeiture as untimely.

The panel held that the district court had jurisdiction to

hear claimant’s motion for equitable relief. The panel treated

18 U.S.C. § 983(e) of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act

as a claim-processing rule, and held that it posed no clear

jurisdictional limitation.

The panel held that the district court did not err in holding

that claimant was not entitled to equitable tolling because

FedEx’s purported delivery delay of his claim did not

constitute an extraordinary circumstance that would justify

equitable tolling.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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OKAFOR V. UNITED STATES 3

COUNSEL

Edward M. Burch (argued) and David M. Michael, Law

Offices of David M. Michael, San Francisco, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Anne M. Voights (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Barbara J.Valliere, Chief, Appellate Division; Melinda Haag,

United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office, San

Francisco, California; for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:

Chike Okafor appeals the decision of the district court

denying his motion for return of property. See Fed. R. Crim.

P. 41(g). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and

we affirm the district court’s ruling.

In 2013, at San Francisco International Airport, Drug

Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agents seized $99,500

in cash from Okafor’s carry-on bag. The DEA sent Okafor a

notice on May 1, 2013, informing him that the money was

subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881 because it had

been used in, or acquired as a result of, a violation of the

Controlled Substances Act. The notice stated that the

deadline for Okafor to file a claim to contest the forfeiture

was June 5, 2013.

Okafor asserts that, on June 4, 2013, his attorney tendered

Okafor’s claim to FedEx Corporation (“FedEx”) for

overnight delivery to the DEA. The DEA, however, did not

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4 OKAFOR V. UNITED STATES

receive the claim until June 6. Thus, the DEA deemed

Okafor’s claim untimely. Okafor’s attorney sent several

letters to the DEA requesting that the agency consider

Okafor’s claim as timely filed. The DEA construed these

letters as a petition for remission, which it denied. The

agencythen administratively forfeited the propertyand issued

a declaration of forfeiture.

Okafor subsequently filed a motion for return of property

under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g), arguing that

the DEA had wrongfully deemed his claim untimely and that

the district court should exercise its equitable jurisdiction to

toll the filing deadline. The government opposed the motion

on the ground that, under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform

Act (“CAFRA”), the district court lacked jurisdiction to

consider Okafor’s motion. The district court held that it had

equitable jurisdiction to consider Okafor’s motion, but, on the

merits, held that Okafor had failed to establish extraordinary

circumstances warranting equitable tolling of the statutory

filing deadline, and denied the motion. Okafor timely

appealed.

I.

As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether the

district court had jurisdiction to reach the merits of Okafor’s

equitable tolling argument. “We review the district court’s

ruling on subject matter jurisdiction de novo.” Alto v. Black,

738 F.3d 1111, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013).

Under CAFRA, an interested party who wishes to contest

a forfeiture may elect to either commence a judicial forfeiture

action in district court or file a petition for remission or

mitigation with the agency. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(A);

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OKAFOR V. UNITED STATES 5

28 C.F.R. § 9.3. In order to elect a judicial proceeding, the

party must file a claim with the seizing agency by the

deadline set forth in the notice sent by the agency. 18 U.S.C.

§ 983(a)(2)(B). If a claim is not timely filed or the petition

for remission or mitigation is denied, the seizing agency

administratively forfeits the property and issues a declaration

of forfeiture. 19 U.S.C. § 1609.

Once a declaration of forfeiture has been issued, “the

exclusive remedy” for setting aside the declaration is a

motion under 18 U.S.C. § 983(e). 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(5). 

Section 983(e)(1) permits an interested party to move to set

aside a declaration of forfeiture if the party did not receive

written notice. A motion under § 983(e)(1) “shall be granted

if–(A) the Government knew, or reasonably should have

known, of the moving party’s interest and failed to take

reasonable steps to provide such party with notice; and (B)

the moving party did not know or have reason to know of the

seizure within sufficient time to file a timely claim.” Id.

The government argues that § 983(e) is jurisdictional and

therefore forecloses Okafor’s motion seeking equitable

tolling. This argument lacks merit. In Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.

Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161 (2010), the Supreme Court

warned against too quickly and too casually categorizing a

claim-processing rule as jurisdictional. It will treat such a

provision as jurisdictional only “[i]f the Legislature clearly

states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall

count as jurisdictional.” Id. (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H

Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006)). Section 983(e) does

not state that it is jurisdictional, nor is there any evidence in

CAFRA’s legislative history or otherwise on the record that

it should be treated as such. Accordingly, we treat § 983(e)

as a claim-processing rule. Because there is no clear 

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6 OKAFOR V. UNITED STATES

jurisdictional limitation in CAFRA, the district court

correctly determined that it had jurisdiction to hear Okafor’s

motion for equitable relief.

II.

We therefore consider Okafor’s argument that he is

entitled to equitable tolling. “Generally, a litigant seeking

equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).

Okafor has failed to meet this burden. Even if, as Okafor

contends, his counsel delivered his claim to FedEx for

overnight delivery before the close of business on June 4,

FedEx’s purported delivery delay does not constitute the kind

of extraordinary circumstance that we have found to justify

equitable tolling. We have noted that an attorney’s filing by

mail shortly before a deadline expires constitutes routine

negligence. Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 646 (9th Cir.

2015). We “do not recognize run-of-the mill mistakes as

grounds for equitable tolling because doing so ‘would

essentially equitably toll limitations periods for every person

whose attorney missed a deadline.’” Id. at 647 (quoting

Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007)).

The district court did not err in holding that Okafor was

not entitled to equitable tolling. Accordingly, we AFFIRM

the district court’s denial of Okafor’s Rule 41(g) motion.

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