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Parties Involved:
Omar Malik Miller
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11911

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

OMAR MALIK MILLER, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-00011-LAG-TQL-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11911

Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

A grand jury indicted Defendant Omar Miller, a convicted 

felon, for knowingly possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). Miller pled guilty to that sole count in the 

indictment against him. And the district court sentenced Miller to 

84 months of imprisonment followed by a 3-year term of supervised release. 

The district court did so, in part, because the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines assign a base offense level of 24 for an offense involving the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon if 

the defendant committed any part of the instant offense after sustaining at least two prior felony convictions for a “crime of violence.” U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(2) cmt. n.1 

(U.S. SENT. COMM’N 2023) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. Before Miller’s 

instant offense, Georgia juries twice convicted him of aggravated 

assault with a deadly weapon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-

21(a)(2). The district court, over Miller’s objection, held that Georgia’s crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon qualifies as 

a “crime of violence,” as Section 4B1.2(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines defines the term. Miller timely appealed his sentence. 

On appeal, Miller argues the district court erred in concluding that his prior convictions qualify as a crime of violence under 

the Sentencing Guidelines. We review de novo interpretations and 

applications of the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Dupree, 

57 F.4th 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc). And that means we 

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review de novo whether an offense is a crime of violence within the 

meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Harrison, 56 

F.4th 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2023). 

But we agree with the district court that Georgia’s crime of 

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon is a crime of violence as 

the Sentencing Guidelines define that term. Controlling precedent 

compels us to do so. See United States v. Morales-Alonso, 878 F.3d 

1311, 1320 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding Georgia aggravated assault 

conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under Section 2L1.2 of 

the Sentencing Guidelines); United States v. Hicks, 100 F.4th 1295, 

1299–1301 (11th Cir. 2024) (concluding Georgia’s crime of “aggravated assault with a deadly weapon qualifies as a crime of violence”

under Section 4b1.2(a)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines). We thus 

affirm Miller’s sentence.

I.

We first recount the relevant Sentencing Guidelines and 

then explain how Hicks compels us to affirm Miller’s sentence.

A.

As we previewed, Section 2K2.1(a)(2) provides for a base offense level of 24 if a convicted felon-in-possession sustained at least 

two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence. Section

2K2.1(a)(2)’s commentary defines “crime of violence” by cross-reference to other parts of the SentencingGuidelines: Section 4B1.2(a) 

and Application Note 1 of the Commentary to Section 4B1.2. See 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) cmt. n.1. And we generally follow the Sentencing Commission’s commentary to the Guidelines unless the 

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commentary is inconsistent with the Guidelines themselves. 

Dupree, 57 F.4th at 1274. So we turn to Section 4B1.2(a) for its definition of a “crime of violence.”

Section 4B1.2(a) defines a “crime of violence” as “any offense 

under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term 

exceeding one year, that” either (1) “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person 

of another; or” (2) “is murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, a forcible sex offense, robbery, arson, extortion, or the use or unlawful possession of a firearm described in 

26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or explosive material as defined in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 841(c).” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).

The second clause, called the enumerated-offenses clause,

includes “aggravated assault” in the list of offenses that are crimes 

of violence. Id. § 4B1.2(a)(2). So the Sentencing Guidelines consider Miller’s prior offenses for aggravated assault to be crimes of 

violence if the elements of Georgia’s aggravated-assault crime 

“roughly correspond[]” to those of the Sentencing Guidelines’ aggravated-assault crime. Morales-Alonso, 878 F.3d at 1314–15.

Miller argues the two aggravated-assault crimes do not 

roughly correspond to each other. Specifically, he contends a person can commit an aggravated assault under Georgia law “with a 

general intent mens rea, while generic federal aggravated assault requires a more exacting mens rea.” In other words, Miller suggests 

Georgia’s aggravated-assault statute criminalizes more conduct 

than does the aggravated-assault crime for which the Sentencing 

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Guidelines increase an offender’s sentence. So he claims it is possible that one could commit an aggravated assault under Georgia 

law without committing an aggravated assault as the Sentencing 

Guidelines contemplate that offense. And that, according to Miller, 

means his sentence cannot stand. See Morales-Alonso, 878 F.3d at 

1315 (explaining “a conviction only constitutes a crime of violence 

under the enumerated offenses clause . . . if the elements of the 

statute of conviction are the same as, or narrower than, the generic 

version of the enumerated offense”).

B.

But we squarely rejected Miller’s argument in Hicks. 100 

F.4th at 1299. We did so for three reasons, each of which directly 

refutes the points Miller now raises on appeal.

First, we explained that “Georgia aggravated assault with a 

deadly weapon qualifies as a crime of violence under the enumerated offenses clause because it has ‘substantially the same’ elements 

as” does the Sentencing Guidelines’ “generic aggravated assault.” 

Id. at 1299 (quoting Morales-Alonso, 878 F.3d at 1320). We had already concluded as much in Morales-Alonso. To be sure, MoralesAlonso interpreted the enumerated-offense clause in Section 2L1.2 

of the Guidelines, not Section 4B1.2(a)(2), which was at issue in 

Hicks (and is at issue here). But “[a]bsent indications to the contrary 

in the commentary, we interpret the same language used in two 

provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines consistently.” Id. (citing 

United States v. Martinez, 964 F.3d 1329, 1333–36, 1334 n.2 (11th Cir. 

2020)). And nothing in the Guidelines suggested “that the two 

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enumerated offenses clauses—both listing aggravated assault—

should be read differently.” Id. In fact, both used “nearly identical 

language.” Id. So Morales-Alonso compelled us to conclude that 

Georgia’s aggravated assault with a deadly weapon qualifies as a 

“crime of violence” under Section 4B1.2(a)(2). Id.

Second, we addressed Hicks’s argument that Morales-Alonso 

should not apply because “Georgia aggravated assault with a 

deadly weapon is categorically broader than generic aggravated assault,” id.—the same argument Miller makes here. We rejected it, 

explaining that our prior precedent rule foreclosed Hicks’s argument. We highlighted that Morales-Alonso could not have held that 

Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon qualifies as a 

crime of violence without concluding “Georgia aggravated assault 

with a deadly weapon is not categorically broader” than the Sentencing Guidelines’ “generic aggravated assault.” Id. Because that 

conclusion was necessary to our prior decision, we explained, it 

“constitute[d] a holding that binds future panels” and thus foreclosed Hicks’s argument. Id. (citing United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 

1181, 1198 (11th Cir. 2019)); United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 

1253 n.10 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining a holding is what is “necessary to the result reached” and cannot be “discarded without impairing the foundations of the holding”). 

We also recognized that Morales-Alonso did not consider the 

specific mens-rea argument Hicks made—again, the same one that 

Miller makes here. Hicks, 100 F.4th at 1299. But as we pointed out, 

our prior-precedent rule does not include an exception for 

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arguments our prior panels purportedly “failed to consider.” Id. at 

1300 (quoting Gills, 938 F.3d at 1198). We have “categorically rejected an overlooked reason or argument exception to the priorpanel-precedent rule,” In re Lambrix, 776 F.3d 789, 794 (11th Cir. 

2015), and refused to consider attempts to impugn a prior panel’s 

decision based on “a perceived defect in” its “reasoning or analysis 

as it relates to the law in existence at that time,” Gillis, 938 F.3d at 

1198 (quoting Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1301–03 (11th Cir. 

2001)). So we concluded that Hicks’s contention that Georgia’s aggravated-assault-with-a-deadly-weapon offense is broader than the 

Guidelines’ generic aggravated-assault offense could not escape 

our prior precedent’s conclusion to the contrary. Hicks, 100 F.4th 

at 1299–1300.

Third, we rejected Hicks’s argument that United States v. 

Jackson, 55 F.4th 846 (11th Cir. 2022), aff’d sub nom. Brown v. United 

States, 602 U.S. 101 (2024), and United States v. Penn, 63 F.4th 1305, 

1310-11 (11th Cir. 2023), allow us to depart from our prior-precedent rule. Miller repeats that argument here, too. We illustrated 

that Jackson and Penn were “materially different” and did “not apply” to our interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. Hicks, 100 

F.4th at 1300.

Jackson addressed whether a defendant’s Florida cocaine-related convictions were “serious drug offenses” under the Armed 

Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). 55 F.4th at 850–51. We concluded 

that ACCA’s definition of a “serious drug offense” covered Jackson’s prior convictions but, in the process, id. at 861–62, rejected 

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the government’s argument that our prior precedent foreclosed 

the defendant’s challenge, id. at 854. As we explained, ACCA’s definition of a “serious drug offense” includes multiple parts, and our 

prior precedent “did not address” the parts of the statutory definition that were at issue in Jackson. Id. at 854; Hicks, 100 F.4th at 

1300–01. Simply, no prior holding bound the Jackson panel.

That posture recurred in Penn: A defendant challenged the 

conclusion that his Florida drug-related convictions qualified as a 

“serious drug offense” under ACCA, and the government contended that our prior precedent foreclosed the defendant’s argument. 63 F.4th at 1310–11. We again rejected the government’s 

invocation of our prior-precedent rule because our prior precedent 

simply did not “answer[] the question Penn . . . asked us to resolve.” Id. at 1311. Just as in Jackson, no prior holdings bound us. 

That was not the case in Hicks. In contrast to the defendants’ 

arguments in Jackson and Penn—which also concerned the definition of a “serious drug offense,” not the definition of a “crime of 

violence”—Hicks’s position ran headlong into established precedent. Morales-Alonso “explicitly concluded that O.C.G.A. § 16-5-

21(a)(2) ‘contains substantially the same elements as generic aggravated assault’ and qualified as a ‘crime of violence.’” Hicks, 110 

F.4th at 1301 (quoting Morales-Alonso, 878 F.3d at 1317, 1320). So 

accepting Hicks’s mens rea argument would “necessarily [have]

mean[t] that the panel in Morales-Alonso was wrong.” Id. Our priorprecedent rule thus forbade us from accepting Hicks’s overbreadth 

argument. Id. (citing Gillis, 938 F.3d at 1198). 

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The same goes for Miller, but doubly so. If we were to accept Miller’s argument, we would undermine not only MoralesAlonso but also Hicks. Whatever the merits of Hicks’s reasoning, 

our prior precedent now requires that we follow it. Gills, 938 F.3d 

at 1198; In re Lambrix, 776 F.3d 789, 794; GTE Corp., 236 F.3d at

1301–03. At bottom, Hicks holds that convictions under Georgia 

law for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon serve as predicates 

for Section “2K2.1(a)(2)’s increased base offense level of 24” when

calculating the advisory sentencing range under the Guidelines. 

100 F.4th at 1301. 

When we apply that principle to Miller’s conviction, it is 

clear the district court did not err in calculating the guidelines range 

for his sentence by starting from a base offense level of 24. Miller

pled guilty to knowingly possessing a firearm as a felon. Before

committing that offense, he sustained two convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under Georgia law.1 And 

1 Miller argues that these convictions should not be used as crime-of-violence 

offenses because the government failed to submit documentation required by 

Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), to show with certainty the elements 

on which his convictions rested. We have since held that undisputed statements in a PSI qualify under Shepard as a suitable basis for evaluating whether 

a defendant’s prior offenses merit imposing a sentencing enhancement. United 

States v. McCloud, 818 F.3d 591, 596, 599 (11th Cir. 2016). Here, the undisputed 

statements in the PSI support the conclusion that Miller committed the first 

offense with a knife and the second with a gun. Though the PSI could have 

been clearer in specifying which portion of the statute Miller was convicted 

under, it is still sufficient to show Miller was convicted of aggravated assault 

with a deadly weapon (a knife and a gun, respectively). 

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according to Hicks, Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly 

weapon is a “crime of violence.” Id. Those three facts fulfill Section’s 2K2.1(a)(2) conditions to apply an increased base level of 24 

in calculating Miller’s advisory guidelines range. See U.S.S.G. 

§§ 2K2.1(a)(2), 4B1.2(a)(2). 

II.

For these reasons, we affirm Miller’s sentence of 84 months 

of imprisonment followed by a 3-year term of supervised release.

AFFIRMED. 

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