Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-05076/USCOURTS-ca13-14-05076-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jacqueline R. Sims, LLC
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

JACQUELINE R. SIMS, LLC, DBA 

JRS Management,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES, 

Defendant-Appellee.

______________________ 

2014-5076

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:13-cv-00196-EJD, Judge Edward J. 

Damich. 

______________________ 

Decided: January 27, 2015

______________________ 

MICHELE YVETTE SIMS, Sims Law Firm, of Duluth, 

Georgia, for plaintiff-appellant. 

MICHAEL D. AUSTIN, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department

of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. 

With him on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, Assistant 

Attorney General, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., Director, 

and STEVEN J. GILLINGHAM, Assistant Director.

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2 JACQUELINE R. SIMS v. UNITED STATES

______________________ 

Before MOORE, WALLACH, and CHEN, Circuit Judges. 

WALLACH, Circuit Judge. 

Appellant Jacqueline R. Sims, LLC (“JRS”) seeks review of the decision of the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in Jacqueline R. Sims, LLC v. United States, No. 

13-174 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 25, 2014) (“Sims”) (J.A. 1–15), 

granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee the 

United States. For the reasons set forth below, this court 

affirms.

BACKGROUND

A. The Ceramics Contract

JRS signed Contract No. DJBP010100000006 (“Ceramics Contract”) with the United States, acting through 

the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), on September 24, 

2009, with an effective date of October 1, 2009. The value 

of the contract award was $63,180 for a base year and 

included four option years. Under the terms of the contract, JRS was to provide ceramics instruction to the 

inmates at Federal Prison Camp (“FPC”), Alderson, West 

Virginia. JRS hired a subcontractor who provided the 

ceramics instruction. Typically, JRS would receive a task 

order and would then provide a payment invoice to the 

Government.

JRS was required to provide three sessions a week, 

each session lasting three hours, totaling 468 hour sessions per year. Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. 

ch. 1 (“FAR”) § 52.216-21, titled “Requirements (Oct. 

1995) Alternate I (Apr. 1984),” was incorporated into the 

contract and defines the requirements terms of the contract. J.A. 29. 

JRS’s subcontractor provided services in October and 

November 2009 and January 2010, and was paid in full 

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JACQUELINE R. SIMS V. UNITED STATES 3

for those services. JRS did not provide any services to the 

Government “during December 2009, or for the period 

from February 1, 2010 to September 30, 2010.” Sims, at 

4. The Government exercised the first option period, 

extending the contract to September 2011.

On September 9, 2010, BOP prepared a Past Performance Evaluation (“PPE”) pursuant to FAR § 42.15. JRS 

was rated on four criteria: quality of service (“unsatisfactory”); timeliness of performance (“poor”); business relations (“fair”); and customer satisfaction (“fair”).” Id. BOP 

noted JRS had failed to provide a ceramics instructor for 

the inmates during part of the performance period. JRS 

responded and argued that when actual services were 

provided, they were of “good quality.” J.A. 87. The company also provided an explanation why the subcontractor 

failed to provide services. Based on this response, the 

evaluation was changed from overall “unsatisfactory” to 

“fair.” JRS asked for review of the evaluation. Citing

FAR § 42.1503(b), BOP’s chief of acquisition issued a 

memorandum in which JRS was evaluated on the four 

criteria listed above. Under “Timeliness of Performance,” 

JRS received a rating of “Poor” because it failed to provide 

services under the contract. The officer wrote:

A review of the rating period reveals that four 

task orders were issued beginning in October 2009 

through September 30, 2010; however, service was 

not rendered from February 1, 2010 to September 

30, 2010. JRS initially notified BOP that lack of 

service was due to personal illness of the contract 

instructor. Although, JRS did inform the BOP of 

their instructor’s illness, such circumstances do 

not relieve the contractor of [its] obligation to provide service under the terms of the contract. Additionally, we note that service was not rendered 

as of June 2010 because JRS did not have an employee cleared to enter the institution to perform 

service. Failure to provide service during the last 

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4 JACQUELINE R. SIMS v. UNITED STATES

eight months of the rating period effectively compromised achievement of the contract requirements resulting in a revised rating of Poor for 

Timeliness of Performance for the full rating period. 

J.A. 83. Relating to business relations, JRS received a 

rating of “Fair.” J.A. 84. According to the contracting 

officer: 

JRS was notified more than once during the rating period that the contract instructor was not 

performing service. . . . Responses to contractual 

issues were generally effective at the beginning of 

the rating period; however, the effectiveness and 

responsiveness to issues of non-performance 

steadily declined in the last eight months of the 

rating period rendering an overall rating for 

Business Relations for the full rating period of 

Fair.

J.A. 84. JRS received a rating of “Good” for “Quality of 

Service” and a rating of “Fair” for “Customer Satisfaction.” J.A. 83–84. The last sentence of the memorandum 

read “[t]hese evaluations may be used to support future 

award decisions, and shall be therefore marked ‘Source 

Selection Information.”’1 J.A. 84.

On November 12, 2010, BOP notified JRS that the 

company had “failed to provide . . . ceramics instruction 

services since June 29, 2010” and JRS had thirty days to 

1 “Source Selection Information” means certain information “prepared for use by an agency for the purpose 

of evaluating a bid or proposal to enter into an agency 

procurement contract, if that information has not been 

previously made available to the public or disclosed 

publicly.” FAR § 2.101. 

 

 

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provide a replacement instructor. Appellee’s Supp. App.

(“Supp. App.”) 57. JRS failed to find a replacement. On 

December 27, 2010, BOP accordingly notified JRS it was 

“considering terminating th[e] contract for cause.” Id. at

58. The contract was terminated on January 24, 2011, 

and after JRS appealed the termination, it was converted 

into a termination for convenience. 

In February 2012, JRS bid on a contract to provide 

radiology technologist services at the Federal Correctional 

Institution in Miami, Florida. Based in part on JRS’s 

PPE, a contracting officer for BOP, determined that JRS 

was non-responsible and JRS was not awarded the contract. JRS was notified of the decision and that the 

“matter [had been referred] to the [Small Business Association] for a [Certificate of Competency (“COC”)] determination.” Supp. App. 66. 

JRS then requested that the agency “reverse your determination of nonresponsibility, withdraw the COC 

referral, and proceed to award my firm the contract.” Id. 

JRS did not mention the Ceramics Contract evaluation or 

any argument about the unenforceability of the Ceramics 

Contract. JRS did not take any other action relating to 

the non-responsibility finding. 

On March 27, 2012, JRS submitted a “Contracts Disputes Act Claim,” requesting relief from the December 16, 

2010, PPE. JRS requested an equitable adjustment in the 

amount of $1500 for what it alleged was a breach by the 

Government of the contract terms. Specifically, JRS 

argued PPEs were not authorized for the contract and 

that by issuing a PPE, BOP “unilaterally chang[ed]” the 

terms of the contract without first obtaining JRS’s written 

consent. Id. at 68. JRS also raised the issue of unenforceability for the first time, arguing “[t]he fact that the 

contract at issue was not legally enforceable is key with 

regards to the Contractor Performance Report, because it 

means that my company was under no legal obligation to 

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6 JACQUELINE R. SIMS v. UNITED STATES

furnish Ceramics Instructor services ordered by the 

Government.” Supp. App. 71. 

On May 24, 2012, JRS’s claim was denied and the 

contracting officer explained: “[a]lthough per FAR 

[§] 42.1502(b), Federal agencies are only required to 

prepare evaluations of contractor performance for a 

contract that exceeds the simplified acquisition threshold, 

Contracting Officers are not prohibited from utilizing this 

resource for contracts not exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold.” Supp. App. 72. The contracting officer 

also stated she would “not reopen a performance evaluation review more than a year later to address concerns 

that JRS was capable of raising in the designated time 

frames for review,” and thus there was insufficient reason 

to change the evaluation. Id at 73.

On August 15, 2012, JRS presented additional documentation and a revised claim, which expanded the scope 

of JRS’s legal arguments to include: violation of FAR 

§ 42.1502; unilateral modification of the contract; breach 

of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; unenforceability; and bad faith. On October 12, 2012, the contracting officer rejected JRS’s revised claim, finding “the 

allegations made stem from the same set of operative 

facts as, and are substantially the same as, the original 

claim [JRS] filed on March 27, 2012.” Id. at 97. 

B. The Parenting Contract

On or about August 20, 2009, JRS entered into a 

contract with the BOP to provide parenting classes (“Parenting Contract”). Pursuant to the contract, JRS was to 

provide classes in order to “support positive relationships 

between inmates and their children during and after their 

incarceration.” J.A. 92. As the Court of Federal Claims

explained, “[t]he substantive provisions of the Parenting 

Contract largely mirror those in the Ceramics contract. 

The similarities between the two contracts include the 

inclusion of FAR 52.216-21, Requirements (Oct. 1995) 

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JACQUELINE R. SIMS V. UNITED STATES 7

Alternate I (Apr. 1984) and FAR 52.212-4(c).” Sims, at 6. 

The effective date of this contract was October 1, 2009, it 

included a base year plus four one-year option periods, 

and was valued at $81,432. Like the Ceramics Contract, 

the process entailed JRS receiving a task order; JRS 

hiring subcontractors to provide the actual instruction; 

and JRS invoicing the Government after the services had 

been rendered. 

Through its subcontractors, JRS performed the “services for the first year of the contract and the first four 

months of the first option period,” and has been paid for 

these services. Sims, at 6. No services were rendered 

during the last eight months of the first option period, 

and the Government opted not to exercise the second 

option period.

The BOP produced a PPE for the base year and the 

first option period, and both were submitted to JRS for 

review. JRS submitted a rebuttal and on February 24, 

2011, JRS received an amended PPE, receiving an overall 

rating of “good” for the base year evaluation. JRS did not 

raise the unenforceability of the contract as an excuse for 

its non-performance in its rebuttal. JRS submitted a 

“Contracts Disputes Act Claim” relating to the base year 

and option year PPE on the Parenting Contract on March 

27, 2012. Similar to the Ceramics Contract, JRS argued 

the generation of PPEs amounted to a unilateral change 

in the terms of the contract, and for the first time argued 

the Parenting Contract was legally unenforceable for the 

same reasons expressed in the Ceramics Contract claim.

The Court of Federal Claims noted “the Parenting 

Contract and the Ceramics Contract claims followed 

virtually identical paths.” Sims, at 7. On the same date 

the contracting officer denied JRS’s Ceramics Contract 

claim, May 24, 2012, the Parenting Contract claim was 

also denied for the same reasons. As with the Ceramics 

Contract, JRS submitted an amended claim with addiCase: 14-5076 Document: 44-2 Page: 7 Filed: 01/27/2015
8 JACQUELINE R. SIMS v. UNITED STATES

tional legal theories on August 15, 2012, and “[t]he Parenting Complaint mirrors the Ceramics Complaint save 

that it does not include the affirmative bad faith claim 

raised with respect to the Ceramics Complaint.” Id. Both 

complaints allege four counts: (1) the BOP exceeded its 

authority to prepare performance evaluations as delineated in FAR Subpart 42.15; (2) the BOP’s preparation of the 

PPEs amounts to a unilateral change in the terms of the 

contracts, in violation of the Contracts’ express incorporation of FAR § 52.212-4(c); (3) the BOP’s evaluations were 

arbitrary and capricious because JRS received negative 

evaluations for failing to perform under contracts which 

were unenforceable; and (4) the BOP, by preparing the 

PPEs as if JRS was obligated to perform when JRS claims 

it was not, breached the implied duty of good faith and 

fair dealing. The Ceramics Complaint states a fifth count

alleging affirmative bad faith on the BOP’s part when the 

BOP delivered the Ceramics PPE directly to the Federal 

Correctional Institution in Miami. 

As with the Ceramics Contract claim, the revised Parenting Contract claim was denied on October 12, 2012. 

The contracting officer determined the arguments raised 

in the revised claim were substantially the same as those 

raised in the original Parenting Contract claim.

JRS appeals and this court has jurisdiction pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (2012). 

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate “when there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” R. Ct. Fed. Cl. 

56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 247–48 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” when “the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

248. A fact is material if it could “affect the outcome of 

the suit under the governing law.” Id.

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JACQUELINE R. SIMS V. UNITED STATES 9

A grant of summary judgment by the Court of Federal 

Claims is reviewed de novo. Local Okla. Bank, N.A. v. 

United States, 452 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In 

particular, “[t]his court reviews judgments of the Court of 

Federal Claims to determine whether they are premised 

on clearly erroneous factual determinations or otherwise 

incorrect as a matter of law.” Foley Co. v. United States, 

11 F.3d 1032, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing Transamerica 

Ins. Corp. v. United States, 973 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 

1992)). 

I. The Court of Federal Claims Correctly Determined the 

Contract Was Enforceable as Performed

The Court of Federal Claims concluded “the contracts 

were both enforceable to the extent that they were actually performed.” Sims, at 9. Both parties agree the contract was enforceable as performed, however, JRS 

contends “[s]ince the contracts were unenforceable and 

only binding to the extent actually performed, during 

periods when JRS did not perform, no valid contract 

existed.” Appellant’s Br. 12. Additionally, JRS argues,

“[t]he contracts were unenforceable at inception—a fact 

which the BOP admits. This means that JRS had no 

obligation to perform. Case law clearly settles that an 

unenforceable requirements contract is only definite and 

binding to the extent actually performed by the parties.” 

Id. Essentially, JRS argues it could be evaluated only 

when it physically performed (i.e., taught a ceramics or 

parenting class) as agreed, and not when it chose not to

perform. 

JRS also argues the Court of Federal Claims erred in 

finding no genuine dispute of material fact because “JRS 

disputed the factual allegation that the parties acted at 

all times as if there was mutuality of intent to be bound, 

and provided sufficient evidence to prove that the factual 

dispute was genuine.” Id. at 18. Furthermore, to JRS, it 

“never acted as if bound to perform, and at no time did 

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10 JACQUELINE R. SIMS v. UNITED STATES

JRS perform exactly as prescribed by the contracts.” Id.

at 18–19. JRS also contends the “record demonstrates 

that the BOP never intended to be bound to the contracts 

as if they were enforceable requirements contracts.” Id. 

at 19. To JRS, because “an essential element of a requirements contract is the promise by the buyer to purchase the subject matter of the contract exclusively from 

the seller,” that BOP used other entities to fulfill its needs 

demonstrates BOP did not act as though it was bound. 

Id. 

As the Court of Federal Claims explained, “[t]he parties performed as if their conduct was governed by an 

enforceable contract,” Sims, at 13, and the Government 

paid JRS for all performed services. The court also emphasized:

[T]he only evidence before the Court shows that 

the parties entered into a pair of contracts that, 

while unenforceable, were not treated as such. . . . 

The parties performed as if their conduct was governed by an enforceable contract: JRS performed 

and the Government paid. Indeed, after the Government prepared the performance evaluations 

for both contracts, JRS had the opportunity to 

comment on the evaluations. JRS did not raise 

even the specter of unenforceability. From the 

Court’s view, both parties acted as if they were 

bound by a contract which required that JRS perform certain services whenever the Government 

requested them.

Id. Though JRS makes contrary arguments, it does not 

provide support for these assertions. Without evidence 

from Appellant, these findings will not be disturbed. 

Indeed, when given the chance to review the PPEs of the

Ceramics and Parenting Contracts, JRS rebutted the 

ratings, and provided explanations for why the subcontractors failed to provide services. JRS did not raise any 

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JACQUELINE R. SIMS V. UNITED STATES 

11

enforceability argument. See Supp. App. 65, 168. Thus, 

the Court of Federal Claims correctly determined “despite 

the flaws in the written language of the contracts, the 

parties intended to be bound.” Sims, at 13. 

JRS alternatively argues “the question as to whether 

the parties intended to form binding requirements contracts or performed as if their conduct was governed by 

enforceable requirements contracts is of no consequence.” 

Appellant’s Br. 24. That is, to JRS, “[t]he infirmities in 

the contracts rendered the contracts unenforceable, and 

the contracts were only enforceable and binding to the 

extent actually performed.” Id.

Basing its arguments on contract law, JRS argues 

that because the contracts were unenforceable, the four 

elements of contract law had to be “satisfied for the orders 

to be binding upon JRS: (1) mutuality of intent to contract

i.e., a meeting of the minds regarding the provisions of the 

agreement; (2) offer and acceptance; (3) consideration; and 

(4) a Government representative having actual authority 

to bind the United States.” Id. at 26–27 (citing Hometown 

Fin., Inc. v. United States, 409 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 

2005)). JRS contends there was no mutual assent or 

acceptance, and that “the orders were akin to unilateral 

purchase orders, or offers to create option contracts.” Id. 

at 27.

In Willard, Sutherland & Co. v. United States, a case 

that also involved a contract with the Government, the 

contract was found to be unenforceable as written, but 

enforceable as it was actually performed. 262 U.S. 489, 

494 (1923) (“While the contract at its inception was not 

enforceable, it became valid and binding to the extent 

that it was performed.”); cf Horn v. United States, 98 Fed. 

Cl. 500, 504–05 (2011). As explained above, the “Government would provide delivery orders or task orders to 

JRS requesting services, JRS would render service, and 

then JRS would invoice the Government for payment.” 

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12 JACQUELINE R. SIMS v. UNITED STATES

Sims, at 3. This process demonstrates mutual assent and 

acceptance. 

Finally, as the Court of Federal Claims explained, 

“[u]nless the contracts are enforceable to some degree, . . . 

wrongful negative evaluations under the contracts, and 

the effect of the negative evaluations lack a legal basis.” 

Sims, at 8. Accordingly, this court discerns no error in

the court’s determination the parties acted as though they 

were bound by the contracts.

II. The Court Correctly Determined the Government Was 

Entitled to Evaluate JRS’s Performance

The Court of Federal Claims held that language in the 

two contracts provided the contracting officer with discretion to prepare PPEs in accordance with FAR Subpart 

42.15, which also permitted the BOP to release the evaluations as Source Selection Information. JRS’s original 

Complaints alleged BOP exceeded the authority of FAR 

subpart 42.152 by creating PPEs, and there was therefore 

2 FAR § 42.1502 states:

(a) General. Past performance evaluations shall 

be prepared at least annually and at the time the 

work under a contract or order is completed. Past 

performance evaluations are required for contracts and orders for supplies, services, research 

and development, and contingency operations, including contracts and orders performed inside and 

outside the United States . . . . These evaluations 

are generally for the entity, division, or unit that 

performed the contract or order. . . . 

(b) Contracts. Except as provided in paragraphs 

(e), (f), and (h) of this section, agencies shall prepare evaluations of contractor performance for 

each contract (as defined in FAR part 2) that ex-

 

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JACQUELINE R. SIMS V. UNITED STATES 

13

an unlawful unilateral change to the contract. JRS argued 

to the Court of Federal Claims that “FAR [§] 42.1502 

describe[d] the only situations in which a government 

agency can prepare PPEs (presumably absent contractual 

ceeds the simplified acquisition threshold and for 

each order that exceeds the simplified acquisition 

threshold. . . . 

(c) Orders under multiple-agency contracts. 

Agencies shall prepare an evaluation of contractor 

performance for each order that exceeds the simplified acquisition threshold that is placed under a 

Federal Supply Schedule contract or placed under 

a task-order contract or a delivery-order contract 

awarded by another agency . . . . 

(d) Orders under single-agency contracts. For single-agency task-order and delivery-order contracts, the contracting officer may require 

performance evaluations for each order in excess 

of the simplified acquisition threshold when such 

evaluations would produce more useful past performance information for source selection officials 

than that contained in the overall contract evaluation . . . . 

(g) Past performance evaluations shall include an 

assessment of contractor performance against, 

and efforts to achieve, the goals identified in the 

small business subcontracting plan when the contract includes the clause at 52.219-9, Small Business Subcontracting Plan.

(h) Agencies shall not evaluate performance for 

contracts awarded under Subpart 8.7.

(i) Agencies shall promptly report other contractor 

information in accordance with 42.1503(h).

 

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authority to do so),” however, the court disagreed, finding

contracting officers have broad discretion to create PPEs 

except in the limited circumstances expressly identified in 

the FAR. Sims, at 9, 11. On appeal, JRS argues “[t]he 

contracts at issue made no mention of FAR Subpart 42.15, 

and did not contain a performance evaluation clause that 

identified performance evaluation factors or evaluation 

rating definitions that would be used to evaluate JRS’s 

performance.” Appellant’s Br. 40. 

 The Court of Federal Claims also determined 

“[s]everal parts of [FAR subpart 42.15] inform the Court’s 

conclusion that a contracting officer is given discretion to 

prepare performance evaluations in those circumstances 

not expressly described in the FAR,” id. at 11, and this 

court agrees. FAR § 42.15(a) provides that past performance evaluations shall be prepared at least annually 

and the evaluations are for the entity that performed the 

contract or order. Pursuant to FAR § 42.1503(a) and (b), 

contracting officers consider all relevant sources of information relating to a contractor’s performance, and the 

contractor must be given an opportunity to respond to the 

evaluations, as happened here. See FAR § 42.1503. 

Contrary to JRS’s argument, FAR § 42.1502 does not 

describe the only situations in which PPEs must or must 

not be generated. The BOP did not violate FAR subpart 

42.15 by preparing performance evaluations that are not 

mandated by that provision. The Court of Federal Claims

correctly concluded that “contracting officers have broad 

discretion in producing evaluations, except in the limited 

circumstances discussed in FAR § 42.1502.” Sims, at 12. 

With regard to its argument that the preparation of 

the PPEs was a unilateral change to the contracts, JRS 

argues the contracts do not expressly provide for the 

preparation of evaluations. It also says, since the contracts expressly incorporate FAR § 52.212-4, requiring 

that any modification to the scope of the contract “may be 

made only by written agreement of the parties,” the 

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15

Government breached the contract. Both the Ceramic 

and Parenting Contracts have a clause stating: “[t]he 

[contracting officer’s technical representative] is responsible, as applicable, for . . . evaluating performance.” Sims, 

at 12 (emphasis added). “This is the only language in 

either contract that refers to performance evaluations, 

and it certainly does not place a duty upon the BOP not to 

prepare evaluations.” Id.

JRS nevertheless argues this clause allows the contracting officer’s technical representative, not the contracting officer, to create performance evaluations. JRS 

offers no support for this semantic distinction and we 

afford this argument no weight. Furthermore, JRS offers 

no other persuasive evidence for why BOP was prohibited 

from evaluating JRS under FAR subpart 42.15. Thus, 

because the BOP did not exceed its authority under FAR 

subpart 42.15, there was no unilateral change to the 

contract. 

III. The Court Correctly Determined the Government Did 

Not Breach the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

JRS argued to the Court of Federal Claims that “[b]y 

failing to provide [JRS] with a fair and accurate assessment of its performance, Defendant breached [] the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by depriving Plaintiff 

of the reasonable expectation of having its performance 

fairly[] and accurately evaluated.” J.A. 34. “In essence, 

this duty requires a party to not interfere with another 

party’s rights under the contract. The United States, no 

less than any other party, is subject to this covenant.” 

Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. United States, 596 F.3d 

817, 828 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). 

The Court of Federal Claims held that “JRS has failed 

to demonstrate anything in the Government’s actions that 

breach the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing or 

otherwise demonstrate that the BOP’s evaluations were 

arbitrary or capricious.” Sims, at 13. 

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JRS contends the court should have applied a “preponderance of the evidence” standard, rather than a “clear 

and convincing evidence” standard, and improperly required JRS to show bad faith. This is incorrect. The 

court found JRS was unable to show “the BOP’s evaluations were arbitrary or capricious,” id., and explained “the 

only evidence before the Court shows the parties entered 

into a pair of contracts that, while unenforceable, were 

not treated as such.” Id. The court then evaluated the 

evidence and found a complete lack of a breach on the 

Government’s part. This was not error. Here, JRS provides no substantive evidence that the Government 

breached the contract.

JRS also argues that “[i]n preparing erroneous [PPEs] 

that included low ratings and negative comments about 

JRS’s performance, the BOP failed to provide JRS with 

fair and accurate evaluations. The evaluations were 

based upon the false premise that the contracts were 

enforceable, and that JRS was required to furnish all 

requested services.” Appellant’s Br. 36. As described 

above, the parties acted as though they intended to be 

bound by the contract. 

Finally, though the PPEs did address JRS’s failure to 

provide services, JRS did not provide the services when it 

received a valid task order. JRS did not raise the unenforceability argument when it had the chance to respond 

to the PPEs, but contended its subcontractors were unable to perform. “We have previously explained that a 

contractor is responsible for the unexcused performance 

failures of its subcontractors.” Todd Constr., L.P. v. 

United States, 656 F.3d 1306, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court of Federal Claims correctly determined the 

Government did not breach the covenant of good faith and 

fair dealing. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court 

of Federal Claims is 

AFFIRMED

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