Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-14-50375/USCOURTS-ca5-14-50375-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Samuel Ucles
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-50375

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

SAMUEL UCLES, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 2:13-CR-414-1

Before JOLLY and DENNIS, Circuit Judges, and REEVES*, District Judge.

PER CURIAM:**

Samuel Ucles pled guilty to illegal reentry after deportation in violation 

of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The district court enhanced Ucles’s sentence by sixteen 

levels after determining that his prior, Minnesota conviction for second-degree 

assault with a dangerous weapon constituted a “crime of violence” under 

§ 2L1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.

 

* District Judge of the Southern District of Mississippi, sitting by designation.

** Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. 

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 23, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 14-50375 Document: 00513127364 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/23/2015
No. 14-50375

2

I.

Ucles pled guilty to illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 8 

U.S.C. § 1326. Ucles previously had been convicted in Minnesota of seconddegree assault with a dangerous weapon, see Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1. 

Based on this conviction, the presentence investigation report recommended 

that Ucles’s sentence be enhanced by sixteen levels under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), which applies, as relevant here, when the defendant 

previously has been convicted of a “crime of violence.” Ucles objected to this 

enhancement. He argued that, because the “dangerous weapon” required to 

violate § 609.222, subd. 1 may include the defendant’s hands or feet, § 609.222, 

subd. 1 is broader than the most analogous crime that the Guidelines 

enumerate as a “crime of violence”—“aggravated assault.” See U.S.S.G. § 

2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii). The district court rejected this argument, concluding 

that the generic crime of “aggravated assault” incorporates a definition of 

“dangerous weapon” capacious enough to include the defendant’s hands or feet.

Applying the enhancement, the district court calculated a Guidelines 

range of 57–71 months of imprisonment. The district court sentenced Ucles to 

57 months, and Ucles appealed.

II.

On appeal, Ucles’s sole argument is the one he made to the district court:

that Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 is not categorically a “crime of violence” 

because under § 609.222, subd. 1—unlike under the generic crime of 

“aggravated assault”—the defendant’s hands or feet may constitute a 

“dangerous weapon.” “We review de novo whether a prior conviction 

constitutes a conviction for a crime of violence within the meaning of the 

Guidelines.” United States v. Carrasco-Tercero, 745 F.3d 192, 195 (5th Cir. 

2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Case: 14-50375 Document: 00513127364 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/23/2015
No. 14-50375

3

III.

A.

“The Guidelines define a crime of violence as (1) any offense in a list of 

enumerated offenses which includes ‘aggravated assault,’ or (2) ‘any other 

offense . . . that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 

physical force against the person of another.” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 

cmt. n.1(B)(iii)). “This court employs a ‘categorical approach’ in determining 

whether an offense qualifies as a [crime of violence] under § 2L1.2.” United 

States v. Garcia-Figueroa, 753 F.3d 179, 184 (5th Cir. 2014) (some internal 

quotation marks omitted). The categorical approach requires us to compare 

the statute of conviction with the enumerated offense to determine whether 

the former “categorically fits within the generic federal definition of” the latter. 

Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2012) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599–600 (1990)). “A 

state offense is a categorical match with a generic federal offense only if a 

conviction of the state offense necessarily involved facts equating to the generic 

federal offense.’” Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Ucles argues that, because the defendant’s hands or feet may supply the 

“dangerous weapon” needed to violate Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1, that 

statute is broader than the most analogous enumerated offense under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii)—“aggravated assault.” We disagree.

B.

We begin our categorical-approach analysis by examining the statute of 

conviction. Ucles was convicted under Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1, which 

prohibits “assault[ing] another with a dangerous weapon.” The term 

“dangerous weapon” is defined as “any . . . device or instrumentality that, in 

the manner it is used or intended to be used, is calculated to produce death or 

great bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6. Construing this definition, 

 Case: 14-50375 Document: 00513127364 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/23/2015
No. 14-50375

4

Minnesota courts have held that a defendant’s hands or feet may constitute a 

“dangerous weapon,” but only if the essential requirements of the definition 

are satisfied; that is, only if the hands or feet are used in a manner calculated 

to produce death or great bodily harm. See, e.g., State v. Born, 159 N.W.2d 283, 

284–85 (Minn. 1968); State v. Davis, 540 N.W.2d 88, 90–91 (Minn. Ct. App. 

1995). 

C.

We turn next to the generic crime of “aggravated assault.” “Our primary 

source for the generic contemporary meaning of aggravated assault is the 

Model Penal Code.” United States v. Torres-Diaz, 438 F.3d 529, 536 (5th Cir. 

2006); see also United States v. Ramirez, 557 F.3d 200, 205 (5th Cir. 2009). The 

Model Penal Code provides that “[a] person is guilty of aggravated assault if 

he,” among other things, “attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes 

bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon.” Model Penal Code § 

211.1(2)(b). “Deadly weapon,” in turn, is defined as “any . . . device, 

instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in 

the manner it is used or is intended to be used is known to be capable of 

producing death or serious bodily injury.” Id. § 210.0(4).

D.

As noted above, Ucles’s only argument is that the Minnesota statute of 

conviction is broader than the generic offense of “aggravated assault” because 

the former incorporates a broader definition of “dangerous weapon” than does 

the latter.1 Viewing the relevant definitions side by side, it is plain that this 

argument lacks merit. 

 

1 It has been suggested that Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.222, subd. 1, is broader than the 

generic offense of “aggravated assault” for a different reason than the one Ucles identifies—

that is, that it incorporates a broader definition of “assault” than does the generic offense. 

Compare Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.02, subd. 10 (defining “[a]ssault” as “(1) an act done with

intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death; or (2) the intentional 

 Case: 14-50375 Document: 00513127364 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/23/2015
No. 14-50375

5

As an initial matter, the definitions are nearly identical. Compare Minn. 

Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6 (“‘Dangerous weapon’ means any . . . device or 

instrumentality that, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is 

calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm . . . .”) with Model 

Penal Code § 210.0(4) (“‘[D]eadly weapon’ means any . . . material or substance, 

whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended 

to be used is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.”). 

Furthermore, the text of the Model Penal Code’s definition of “deadly weapon”

gives every indication that it, like Minnesota’s definition, is broad enough to 

encompass the defendant’s hands or feet, provided they are used in a manner 

“known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.” Model Penal 

Code § 210.0(4). Again, the Model Penal Code defines a “deadly weapon” as 

“any . . . material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which” is used 

in the above-described manner. Id. (emphasis added). There is no question 

that a hand or a foot is a “material or substance.” See Oxford English 

Dictionary (online ed. 2014) (defining “material” as “[m]atter” or “a material 

thing”); Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (defining “substance” as “[a]ny 

matter”). And any residual reluctance we might have to describe something 

living—like a hand—using a word typically reserved for nonliving things—

“weapon”—is dispelled by the Model Penal Code’s express statement that a 

“deadly weapon” may be “animate or inanimate.” Model Penal Code § 210.0(4).

* * *

 

infliction of or attempt to inflict bodily harm upon another” (emphasis added)) with, e.g., 

United States v. Esparza-Perez, 681 F.3d 228, 231 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[Generic a]ssault . . . 

requires proof that the defendant either caused, attempted to cause, or threatened to cause 

bodily injury or offensive contact to another person.”). This argument is not properly before 

the court, however, because Ucles has never raised it. See, e.g., Turner v. Quarterman, 481 

F.3d 292, 295 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[A party] waives the arguments he has not briefed.”); 

Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 669 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Arguments not raised 

in the district court cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal.”).

 Case: 14-50375 Document: 00513127364 Page: 5 Date Filed: 07/23/2015
No. 14-50375

6

We therefore conclude that, for the purposes of the generic crime of 

“aggravated assault,” the defendant’s hands and feet may constitute a 

“dangerous” or “deadly weapon,” provided they are used in a manner known to 

be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. Because these are the 

same circumstances under which a defendant’s hands or feet may constitute a 

“dangerous weapon” under Minn. Stat. § 602.222, subd. 1, we reject Ucles’s 

argument that Minnesota’s definition of “dangerous weapon” makes his statute 

of conviction broader than the generic offense of “aggravated assault.”

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 14-50375 Document: 00513127364 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/23/2015