Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01044/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01044-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kohler Co.
Appellant
WBIP, LLC
Cross-Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

WBIP, LLC,

Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant

v.

KOHLER CO.,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2015-1038, 2015-1044

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

District of Massachusetts in No. 1:11-cv-10374-NMG, 

Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton.

______________________ 

Decided: July 19, 2016

______________________ 

 DAVID ANDREW SIMONS, K&L Gates LLP, Boston, MA, 

argued for plaintiff-cross-appellant. Also represented by 

ANDREA B. REED; MICHAEL E. ZELIGER, Palo Alto, CA.

E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, New York, NY, argued for defendantappellant. Also represented by RACHEL WAINER APTER;

BRIAN PHILIP GOLDMAN, San Francisco, CA; KATHERINE 

M. KOPP, T. VANN PEARCE, JR., ERIC SHUMSKY, Washington, DC; STEVEN M. BAUER, WILLIAM DAVID DALSEN,

SAFRAZ ISHMAEL, Proskauer Rose LLP, Boston, MA. 

______________________ 

Case: 15-1044 Document: 3-2 Page: 1 Filed: 07/19/2016
2 WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 

Before MOORE, O’MALLEY, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

MOORE, Circuit Judge.

Kohler Co. appeals from the United States District 

Court for the District of Massachusetts’ denial of judgment as a matter of law that claims 1–6, 8, and 10–12 of 

U.S. Patent No. 7,314,044 and claims 26 and 28 of U.S. 

Patent No. 7,832,196 (collectively “asserted claims”) 

would have been obvious and lack sufficient written 

description and the determination that Kohler willfully 

infringed the asserted claims. WBIP, LLC cross-appeals 

the court’s denial of its post-trial motion for a permanent 

injunction. We affirm the court’s denial of judgment as a 

matter of law on all issues raised by Kohler and its willful 

infringement determination, vacate the court’s denial of 

WBIP’s motion for a permanent injunction, and remand

for further consideration.

BACKGROUND

Westerbeke Corporation1 and Kohler are competitors 

who manufacture and sell marine generators (“gen-sets”) 

that are used on houseboats to create electrical power for 

appliances such as refrigerators and air conditioners. 

Gen-sets have two main parts, an engine and a generator. 

The exhaust from a typical engine in a gen-set, like any 

gasoline-powered engine, contains carbon monoxide, 

which can cause asphyxiation at certain concentrations. 

Carbon monoxide is particularly dangerous on boats, 

where the living quarters are confined in close proximity 

to the engine. Prior to the invention of the patents in

suit, the exhaust pipes of prior art marine gen-sets were 

 

1 John Westerbeke, the sole inventor of the patents 

in suit, majority-owns Westerbeke Corporation and wholly owns the assignee of the patents in suit, WBIP, which 

stands for “Westerbeke Intellectual Property.”

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WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 3

vented out of the boat into a safe location to reduce potential exposure to carbon monoxide. In the early 2000s, the 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

(“NIOSH”) investigated concerns about carbon-monoxiderelated poisonings and deaths on houseboats. NIOSH

found that, for houseboats with gen-sets that discharged 

exhaust around the swim platform, carbon monoxide 

levels in the swim area were at or above levels that are 

immediately dangerous to life and health. 

The ’044 and ’196 patents, which claim priority to 

2003 and have similar specifications, are directed to 

marine engine exhaust systems that reduce the amount of 

carbon monoxide released in the exhaust. See ’044 patent 

at Abstract, 1:13–14, 1:47–58, 2:12–30. The Background 

sections of the patents discuss the use of chemical catalysts as “[s]ome of the most effective and cost-efficient 

emissions controls” and discuss that it was generally 

known that these catalysts work better at higher temperatures. Id. at 1:21–27. They note that most of the development work for exhaust catalysts focused on catalytic 

converters in automotive applications. But they explain 

that marine gen-sets are subject to different regulations

than automotive engines, including regulations for emissions and safety. Id. at 1:27–32. One such regulation 

requires that exposed engine and exhaust system surface 

temperatures be kept low to reduce fire hazard potential. 

Id. at 1:32–35. The specifications explain that typical 

marine engines inject seawater into exhaust flows to cool 

exhaust gases and frequently circulate seawater through 

exhaust system components to keep surface temperatures 

low. Id. at 1:35–39. 

Claim 1 of the ’044 patent is representative of the asserted claims, and recites:

1. A marine engine comprising:

[A] an exhaust system including

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4 WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 

[B] a catalyst cooled by a flow of coolant, [C]

the catalyst arranged to intercept a flow of 

exhaust;

[D] a coolant injector that injects coolant into 

the flow of exhaust at a point downstream of 

the catalyst; and

[E] a sensor arranged to sense a characteristic 

of the flow of exhaust; and

[F] an engine controller configured to control an 

air/fuel ratio of the engine as a function of the 

sensed exhaust flow characteristic;

[G] wherein the engine controller is also configured to govern engine speed with respect to a 

constant speed while maintaining the air/fuel 

ratio. 

’044 patent, 7:4–17 (emphases and bracketed letters 

added).

Westerbeke makes a low–carbon monoxide gen-set

(“Safe-CO”) that incorporates the technology of the patents in suit. It introduced the Safe-CO gen-sets at a boat 

show in 2004. Two Kohler employees visited 

Westerbeke’s trailer at that show and asked how the low 

carbon monoxide levels were achieved. Westerbeke 

explained the technology to them and in particular how 

the Safe-CO gen-set used a catalyst and electronic fuel 

injection. About one year later, Kohler launched its own 

low–carbon monoxide gen-sets. 

The ’044 and ’196 patents issued in 2008 and 2010, 

respectively. In 2011, WBIP, the assignee of the patents

in suit, sued Kohler for patent infringement, asserting 

that Kohler’s low–carbon monoxide gen-sets infringed the 

asserted claims. Following a six-day trial in May 2013, a 

jury ruled in favor of WBIP, finding that Kohler infringed 

all the asserted claims and that Kohler had failed to prove 

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WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 5

that any of the asserted claims were invalid either for 

obviousness or for lack of written description. The jury 

also set a reasonable royalty rate, calculated a damages 

award of $9,641,206, and found that WBIP had proven by 

clear and convincing evidence that Kohler’s infringement 

was willful. After the jury verdict, WBIP moved for a 

permanent injunction. The district court denied the 

motion. It also denied Kohler’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law that the asserted claims were 

invalid for obviousness and for lack of written description. 

The district court granted Kohler remittitur, reducing the 

damages from $9,641,206 to $3,775,418. It granted 

WBIP’s motion for enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 284. It applied the factors from Read Corp. v. Portec, 

Inc., 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992), and concluded it was 

appropriate to enhance the damages by 50%. It found the 

case exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285 on account of 

Kohler’s willful infringement and awarded reasonable 

attorney fees to WBIP. It denied WBIP’s motion to reconsider the denial of a permanent injunction. Kohler appeals; WBIP cross-appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

We review a district court’s denial of judgment as a 

matter of law under the law of the regional circuit. Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350, 

1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The First Circuit reviews such 

denials de novo, explaining “a jury’s verdict must be 

upheld unless the facts and inferences, viewed in the light 

most favorable to the verdict, point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the movant that a reasonable jury 

could not have reached the verdict.” Id. at 1357–58 

(quoting Astro-Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden Am., Inc., 591 

F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2009)).

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6 WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 

I. Obviousness

Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying 

facts. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 

F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012). When reviewing a 

denial of judgment as a matter of law of obviousness, 

where there is a black box jury verdict, as is the case here, 

we presume the jury resolved underlying factual disputes 

in favor of the verdict winner and leave those presumed 

findings undisturbed if supported by substantial evidence. 

Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1342 

(Fed. Cir. 2011). We then examine the legal conclusion de 

novo in light of those facts. Id.

Kohler argues that the district court erred in refusing 

to grant it judgment as a matter of law that the asserted 

claims would have been obvious in light of U.S. Patent 

No. 5,832,896 (“Phipps”) and standard elements that 

would have been known to an ordinarily skilled artisan.2 

 

2 At trial, Kohler argued specific combinations of 

prior art would have rendered the claims obvious. See, 

e.g., J.A. 15,873–74 (Kohler’s expert testifying that “it 

would have been obvious to include” Phipps’ constant 

speed engine in the control system described in another 

reference (“Fujimoto”)). On appeal, Kohler argues that it 

would have been obvious to a skilled artisan to adapt 

Phipps with “standard coolant elements” that “also existed in the prior art,” identifying two references that purportedly describe these “standard elements.” Appellant’s 

Br. 27, 30–31. To facilitate appellate review, parties 

should make explicit their analysis as to the combination 

of references on which they rely, as well as the asserted 

reason(s) to combine them. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex 

Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). This is especially true 

here, where Kohler bears the burden on appeal to prove 

the evidence points so strongly and overwhelmingly in its 

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WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 7

It also argues that WBIP’s objective evidence of nonobviousness cannot overcome the prima facie case and 

that WBIP failed to establish a nexus between the objective evidence and the merits of the claimed invention. We 

disagree on both points. 

A. Obviousness and Motivation to Modify

 Kohler argues, and WBIP does not dispute, that 

Phipps teaches every element of claim 1 of the ’044 patent 

except elements [B] and [D] (identified above). And it is 

not disputed that these elements [B] and [D] existed in 

other prior art. Citing KSR, Kohler argues that because 

each of the elements was known in the prior art, the 

question is whether a skilled artisan starting with Phipps 

would have found it obvious to add the conventional 

coolant features to Phipps to produce the claimed invention. At trial, Kohler presented evidence that a skilled 

artisan could do so if asked. See, e.g., J.A. 15,858 (“Basically, one of ordinary skill, if they had [Phipps’] system 

and they were asked to apply that to -- in a marine environment, they would have known that the Coast Guard 

requires the exhaust system surface to be cooled.”); 

J.A. 14,873 (“[I]f someone said, Well, now you need to put 

[Phipps’ engine] in a marine environment, they would 

expect that by -- you know, No. 1, the Coast Guard tells 

them what they need to do.”). Kohler’s expert testified 

that if an ordinarily skilled artisan was told to put 

Phipps’ system in a marine engine, that artisan would 

have been “very confident that [he] would get predictable 

results.” J.A. 15,873. Kohler argues that combining 

Phipps’ land-based engine with the known coolant related 

elements necessary for marine engines would yield predictable results and that there were “design incentives 

 

favor that a reasonable jury could not have found facts in 

favor of WBIP.

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8 WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 

and other market forces” prompting one of skill in the art 

to adapt Phipps to boats. Appellant’s Br. 33. 

At trial, Kohler offered evidence that the government 

was encouraging marine gen-set manufacturers to look to 

automotive engines that successfully controlled exhaust 

emissions and adapt them into marine engines, 

J.A. 19,445, including by evaluating the efficacy of using 

catalytic converters, J.A. 18,897. And Kohler’s expert 

testified that “people would have been motivated to include technology of reducing emissions even with a ‘wet’ 

exhaust system” like that in marine engines. J.A. 15,881. 

Kohler provided evidence that skilled artisans looking to 

manufacture marine engines would look to land engines 

generally. And Kohler argued that Phipps emphasizes 

that its invention is “particularly useful” in “low emission” 

engines. J.A. 19,049 at 9:42–46. 

Whether an ordinarily skilled artisan would have 

been motivated to modify the teachings of a reference is a 

question of fact. Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1366–67; 

Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. 

Cir. 2015); see also Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 

1231, 1238–39 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that KSR “did not 

change th[e] rule” that “motivation to combine prior art 

references [i]s a question of fact”). We presume that the 

jury found that an ordinarily skilled artisan would not 

have been motivated to modify the teachings of Phipps. If 

such a fact finding is supported by substantial evidence, 

we may not reverse it. 

WBIP’s primary argument is that one of skill in the 

art would not have been motivated to convert Phipps into 

a marine engine. WBIP criticizes Kohler’s expert testimony on the ground that it focuses on whether one of skill 

in the art could convert Phipps to a marine engine, not 

whether one of skill in the art would have been motivated 

to do so. WBIP’s main argument is that one of skill would 

not have started with Phipps because of concerns over 

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WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 9

whether Phipps would even work for its intended purpose. 

WBIP’s expert testified that Phipps discloses an “exhaust, 

gas, recirculation” control system for land, not marine, 

generators that is not only atypical, but “totally reverse” 

from any control system he had ever seen or read about. 

J.A. 16,026–28. He explained how an ordinarily skilled 

artisan would have viewed Phipps’ reverse control system 

at the time of WBIP’s invention: 

[I]f I can equate this one to kind of a simple analogy, if you’re trying to build a piece of furniture. 

What’s a typical thing? You put on a piece of 

wood. You take a nail, and you hit the nail with a 

hammer. In control terms, what Mr. Phipps is 

suggesting is that you put the hammer on the 

workbench, pick up the piece of furniture and 

bash the piece of furniture onto the hammer. It’s 

totally backwards from what I believe one of skill 

in the art would even attempt to make an engine 

run, much less try to gain some secondary control 

like carbon monoxide. 

J.A. 16,027 (emphasis added). He further explained that 

modifying Phipps’ land engine to make a marine engine 

would require a number of conversions, including adding 

a water jacket around the exhaust, adding ignition protection for any electrical component that could accidentally 

cause a spark, and scaling down the engine parts in order 

to fit within the smaller-sized marine engine. And he 

explained that, given that modifying Phipps to make it a 

marine engine would be “a lot of work,” an ordinarily 

skilled artisan would not have seen the point in making 

such a modification because he would not have expected it

to result in a gen-set that produced low amounts of carbon 

monoxide. J.A. 16,030. The expert explained that there 

was a “catch up” problem with Phipps which would prove 

particularly problematic in marine conditions. 

J.A. 16,027; see J.A. 15,197. WBIP argued that based on 

this evidence, a skilled artisan would not have had a 

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10 WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 

reasonable expectation the significant changes to Phipps 

would be successful. 

WBIP argues that it presented evidence upon which a 

jury could have found that Phipps is “somehow so flawed 

that there was no reason to upgrade it, or [devices] like it, 

to be compatible with modern [devices]” and that this 

evidence may be sufficient to show that an ordinarily 

skilled artisan would not have modified that reference or 

combined it with others. Cf. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Thus, 

there is evidence of record from both sides regarding the 

presence or absence of a motivation to convert Phipps into 

a marine-based environment. As the ultimate question of 

obviousness is one of law which must consider all four 

Graham factors including objective indicia, we turn next 

to those factors, which can be powerful, real-world indicators of what would have been obvious. 

B. Objective Considerations 

The objective indicia of non-obviousness play an important role as a guard against the statutorily proscribed 

hindsight reasoning in the obviousness analysis. Indeed, 

we have held that “evidence of secondary considerations 

may often be the most probative and cogent evidence in 

the record.” Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 

1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Truswal Sys. Corp. v. 

Hydro-Air Eng’g, Inc., 813 F.2d 1207, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 

1987) (“That evidence is ‘secondary’ in time does not mean 

that it is secondary in importance.”); Graham v. John 

Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966) (“[Objective 

indicia] may also serve to guard against slipping into use 

of hindsight, and to resist the temptation to read into the 

prior art the teachings of the invention in issue.” (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

Kohler asserts on appeal that objective considerations 

of non-obviousness can never overcome a strong prima 

facie case of obviousness. Kohler misperceives the obviousness inquiry. A determination of whether a patent 

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WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 11

claim is invalid as obvious under § 103 requires consideration of all four Graham factors, and it is error to reach a 

conclusion of obviousness until all those factors are considered. In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride ExtendedRelease Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1075 (Fed. 

Cir. 2012) (citing Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 

122 F.3d 1476, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); see also Asyst 

Techs., Inc. v. Emtak, Inc., 544 F.3d 1310, 1313–16 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008) (considering, e.g., both the scope and content of 

the prior art and the objective considerations of nonobviousness before affirming the district court’s judgment 

as a matter of law). Indeed, we have repeatedly stressed 

that objective considerations of non-obviousness must be 

considered in every case. Transocean Offshore Deepwater 

Drilling Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 

1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[E]vidence rising out of the socalled ‘secondary considerations’ must always when 

present be considered en route to a determination of 

obviousness.” (quoting Stratoflex, 713 F.2d at 1538)). This 

requirement is in recognition of the fact that each of the 

Graham factors helps to inform the ultimate obviousness 

determination. Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1360; Nike, 

Inc. v. Adidas, 812 F.3d 1326, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 

(holding that evidence of secondary considerations must 

be examined to determine its impact on the first three 

Graham factors). Thus, the strength of each of the Graham factors must be weighed in every case and must be 

weighted en route to the final determination of obviousness or non-obviousness. 

Kohler also argues that the objective evidence of nonobviousness is so weak in this particular case that it does 

not support a finding of non-obviousness. As explained 

below, we disagree with Kohler’s argument that the 

objective evidence of non-obviousness is entitled to little 

or no weight in this case. In fact, we find substantial

evidence for the jury’s fact findings as to each of the 

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12 WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 

objective considerations of non-obviousness, which we 

conclude collectively support the jury verdict. 

1. Nexus

On appeal, Kohler argues that the objective evidence 

of non-obviousness WBIP presented to the jury should not

be considered because WBIP failed to prove there is a 

nexus between the presented evidence and the merits of 

the claimed invention. Kohler’s argument is that, in 

order to prove a nexus exists, WBIP must show that what 

is “novel in the claim,” which Kohler asserts are elements 

[B] and [D] of the claimed invention that are not disclosed 

by Phipps, is tied to the asserted objective evidence. 

As WBIP correctly argues, there is a presumption of 

nexus for objective considerations when the patentee 

shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a 

specific product and that product “is the invention disclosed and claimed in the patent.”3 J.T. Eaton & Co. v. 

Atl. Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 

1997); Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 

 

3 A limited exception to the presumption of nexus 

exists where the patented invention is only a component 

of the product to which the asserted objective considerations are tied. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Kohler 

does not argue that this exception applies in this case, nor 

could it. The asserted claims are drawn to a “marine 

engine” (’044 patent claims 1–6, 8, 10–11) or to a “method 

of controlling emissions from an internal combustion 

engine configured for marine application” (’044 patent 

claim 12 and ’196 patent claims 26 and 28). The 

Westerbeke and Kohler low–carbon monoxide gen-sets are 

the identical type of device, marine engines, as that of the 

asserted claims and practice the claimed methods in order 

to control their emissions. 

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1310–11 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Brown & Williamson Tobacco 

Corp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 

2000); Demaco, 851 F.2d at 1392–93. 

The presumption of nexus is rebuttable: a patent challenger may respond by presenting evidence that shows 

the proffered objective evidence was “due to extraneous 

factors other than the patented invention.” Demaco, 851 

F.2d at 1393. Such extraneous factors include additional 

unclaimed features and external factors, such as improvements in marketing. See, e.g., Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. 

Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000)

(applying presumption even though commercial embodiment had unclaimed mobility feature); Ormco Corp. v. 

Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006)

(holding that evidence that commercial success was due to 

unclaimed or non-novel features of device “clearly rebuts 

the presumption that [the commercial product’s] success 

was due to the claimed and novel features”). However, a

patent challenger cannot successfully rebut the presumption with argument alone—it must present evidence. 

Brown & Williamson, 229 F.3d at 1130 (citing Demaco, 

851 F.2d at 1393). 

At trial, WBIP presented evidence that specific products (i.e., Westerbeke’s Safe-CO gen-sets and Kohler’s 

accused products) are embodiments of the invention as 

claimed in the asserted claims. See Cross-Appellant’s Br. 

45–47 (citing J.A. 15,191–92, 15,195–200, 15,821–22, 

17,279, 17,283, 17,287, 17,291, 17,295, 17,299, 17,303, 

17,307, 17,253). And its proffered objective evidence 

relates to these specific products. As Kohler agrees, 

WBIP presented evidence on five types of objective evidence of non-obviousness, all of which are tied to the 

claimed gen-sets achieving safe carbon monoxide levels. 

This evidence was: 1) the long-felt need for reducing 

carbon monoxide poisonings from marine gen-sets, CrossAppellant’s Br. 34–35 (citing J.A. 17,915, 17,742, 17,204, 

15,371–72, 15,478, 15,500–01, 15,448–52, 15,996–97); 

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14 WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 

2) industry skepticism that gen-sets producing exhaust 

substantially free of carbon monoxide could be produced, 

id. at 39–40 (citing J.A. 17,213–15, 15,373–75, 15,489–

90); 3) industry praise of Westerbeke’s Safe-CO gen-sets, 

including winning the National Marine Manufacturers 

Association Innovation Award in 2004, id. at 40–41 (citing 

J.A. 15,562–68, 17,915, 17,252, 17,254–55); 4) Kohler’s 

copying of Westerbeke’s Safe-CO gen-sets following a 

2004 boat show, id. at 41–43 (citing J.A. 15,375–77, 

17,784–88, 17,813); and 5) the commercial success of low–

carbon monoxide gen-sets, including Kohler’s gen-sets, 

that incorporate the patented technology, id. at 43–45 

(citing J.A. 17,899, 16,003, 15,592–601, 17,785, 17,915, 

17,780, 17,782, 15,493–94, 15,569–70, 17,892). This

showing—that the specific products are embodiments of 

the claimed invention and that the proffered objective 

evidence relates to these products—is sufficient to establish the presumption of nexus for the objective considerations at issue in this case.4 

 

4 Kohler does not dispute the applicability of the 

presumption of nexus to commercial success. Kohler 

responds to WBIP’s argument that it is entitled to a 

presumption of nexus only in a footnote in its Response 

and Reply Brief, which asserts, without further explanation or citation, that “Crocs’ prima facie case of nexus 

applies only to evidence of commercial success, not to any 

other secondary-considerations evidence.” Resp. & Reply 

Br. 24–25 n.8. We do not read Crocs as so limited. Crocs

first discusses the presumption of nexus with respect to 

commercial success, but continues on to discuss the 

concept with respect to praise and copying. 598 F.3d at 

1311. In so doing, it recognizes that the prima facie case 

of nexus for any of the three objective considerations at 

issue was not rebutted, stating “[i]n the absence of any 

record evidence attributing these secondary considerations

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We review Kohler’s remaining arguments to ascertain 

whether they rebut the presumption of nexus. Kohler 

argues that all of WBIP’s proffered objective considerations are irrelevant because they are tied to a reduction in 

carbon monoxide emissions and Phipps discloses an 

engine that controls emissions inherently, Appellant’s 

Brief 46, or expressly, Response and Reply Brief 31–32. 

Thus, according to Kohler, WBIP had to show that the 

objective evidence was tied to the two coolant-related 

features ([B] and [D] in claim 1 of the ’044 patent) that 

Phipps does not disclose.

Kohler’s argument relies on an incorrect interpretation of our case law. We have held that “[w]hile objective 

evidence of nonobviousness lacks a nexus if it exclusively 

relates to a feature that was ‘known in the prior art,’ the 

obviousness inquiry centers on whether ‘the claimed 

invention as a whole’ would have been obvious.” Rambus 

Inc. v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citation 

omitted). Where the allegedly obvious patent claim is a

combination of prior art elements, we have explained that

the patent owner can show that it is the claimed combination as a whole that serves as a nexus for the objective 

evidence; proof of nexus is not limited to only when objective evidence is tied to the supposedly “new” feature(s). 

Id. at 1258 (remanding to the Board to determine whether 

objective evidence “relate[d] only to prior art functionality” or to “Rambus’s patented design as a whole”). In such 

a case, the fact that an isolated feature may be present in 

the prior art may not render irrelevant objective evidence 

 

to causes other than the claimed invention, Crocs may 

rely on this added support for non-obviousness.” Id.

(emphasis added). Thus, WBIP was entitled to rely upon 

the presumption of nexus for the objective considerations 

at issue and the burden of production shifted to Kohler to 

rebut that presumption if it sought to challenge nexus. 

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16 WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 

of non-obviousness of that feature in the claimed combination. 

WBIP was entitled to the presumption of nexus for its 

objective evidence of non-obviousness because it established that the specific products (Westerbeke’s Safe-CO 

gen-sets and Kohler’s accused products) are embodiments 

of the invention in the asserted claims. Attempting to 

rebut the presumption, Kohler argues that “[n]one of it 

bears any relationship to the asserted novelty of the 

claims.” Appellant’s Br. 37. It is certainly true that there 

must be “a nexus between the evidence and the merits of 

the claimed invention.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 

1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Kohler argues that no such nexus 

exists here because the objective indicia evidence is not 

tied to the elements in the claims that were missing from 

Phipps. Kohler starts with Phipps, which is the prior art 

land-based design, and argues that since only elements 

[B] and [D] of the claims are not present in Phipps, there 

is no nexus unless the objective indicia is linked to these 

elements. Kohler has failed to rebut the presumption of 

nexus. WBIP argues that it is the claimed combination 

which results in a low–carbon monoxide emission marine 

gen-set which is the “merits of the claimed invention.” 

According to WBIP, this combination overcame a specific 

problem in the marine environment. We conclude that 

this record contains substantial evidence upon which a 

jury could conclude that nexus exists between the objective evidence of non-obviousness and the claimed combination. 

For example, WBIP’s expert testified that each of the 

claimed catalyst, controller, and oxygen sensor were 

necessary to gain the requisite reduction in carbon monoxide emissions. J.A. 15,199 (“So you need all three of 

those components. You need the catalyst, a controller to 

control the air-to-fuel ratio, and the oxygen sensor to let 

the controller know how good of a job it’s been doing.”). 

He confirmed that those features disclosed in Phipps—

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WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 17

i.e., the controller and oxygen sensor—could not reduce 

carbon monoxide emissions without the addition of a 

catalyst: 

Q. If you took away the cooled catalyst, would 

there be low carbon monoxide output?

A. No, there wouldn’t.

Q. So you need all of this together in order to get 

the result of the invention?

A. Yes, you do.

J.A. 15,198–99.

Questions of nexus are highly fact-dependent and, as 

such are not resolvable by appellate-created categorical 

rules and hierarchies as to the relative weight or significance of proffered evidence. Rather, “[i]t is within the 

province of the fact-finder to resolve these factual disputes regarding whether a nexus exists between commercial success of the product and its patented features, and 

to determine the probative value of evidence of secondary 

considerations.” Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes 

Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The 

jury reviewed Kohler’s and WBIP’s competing objective 

evidence of non-obviousness, as well as evidence for the 

driving forces that established that objective evidence. Its 

resolution of the dispute in favor of WBIP is supported by 

substantial evidence. 

We further reject Kohler’s categorical claim that objective evidence must be tied exclusively to claim elements that are not disclosed in a particular prior art 

reference in order for that evidence to carry substantial 

weight. Requiring patentees to prove that objective 

evidence is tied to a specific claim element—and only that 

claim element—runs counter to the statutory instruction 

that the obviousness analysis involves determining 

whether “the claimed invention as a whole would have 

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18 WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 

been obvious.” 35 U.S.C. § 103 (emphasis added); see 

Rambus, 731 F.3d at 1257–58. This is especially true for 

situations like those at issue here, where the claimed 

invention is, admittedly, a combination of elements that 

were known individually in the prior art. Commercial 

success, for example, may be linked to an individual 

element or, in other circumstances, it could be linked to 

the inventive combination of known elements. And these 

are fact questions to which we must give deference on 

appeal. The jury’s presumed factual findings relating to 

nexus are supported by substantial evidence.

2. Long-Felt Need

Evidence of a long felt but unresolved need tends to 

show non-obviousness because it is reasonable to infer 

that the need would have not persisted had the solution 

been obvious. See, e.g., Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA 

Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Absent 

a showing of long-felt need or the failure of others, the 

mere passage of time without the claimed invention is not 

evidence of nonobviousness.”).

Kohler argues that substantial evidence does not support the jury’s presumed factual finding that the claimed 

invention solved the problem of carbon monoxide poisonings from marine gen-sets, a problem that was long 

known in the marine gen-set field. Specifically, Kohler 

argues that the evidence that WBIP relied upon to show a 

long-felt need in the industry—third-party product liability suits against Kohler involving carbon monoxide poisonings from older generation gen-sets—is not relevant to 

a long-felt need for low–carbon monoxide emitting gensets. Kohler argues that the evidence shows that it

resolved the carbon monoxide poisonings at issue in these 

lawsuits by changing the material it used for the exhaust 

pipes, from black iron (which corroded from the inside 

out) to stainless steel. Thus, Kohler argues that there is 

no nexus between the problems at issue in these product 

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WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 19

liability suits and the problem solved by the asserted 

claims. Kohler argues that, when this irrelevant evidence 

is not considered, the evidence of record shows that the 

industry was not aware of the dimensions of the carbon 

monoxide problem on boats until 2000. Because this date 

is only a few years before the priority date of the patents 

in suit, Kohler argues that substantial evidence does not 

support a finding of long-felt need. 

We have already rejected Kohler’s argument that the 

objective considerations lack nexus because they are not 

tied specifically to the coolant elements of the asserted 

claims. We similarly reject Kohler’s argument that the 

product liability suits are irrelevant to whether there was 

a long-felt need for a solution to carbon monoxide poisonings on boats and whether this need was met by the 

claimed invention. The evidence concerning the product 

liability suits undoubtedly establishes that there was a 

known problem in the industry regarding carbon monoxide poisonings. It also shows that Kohler was aware of 

this problem prior to 2000, as many of the lawsuits Kohler 

faced were the result of incidents that occurred in the 

1990s. See J.A. 15,448–52, 15,996–97. And, although 

Kohler argues that it solved the problem underlying the 

product liability suits by switching the exhaust pipe 

material that it used, other Kohler documents suggest 

that Kohler itself thought the carbon monoxide poisoning 

problem was solved by low–carbon monoxide emitting 

gen-sets. For example, a 2005 Kohler slide presentation

that accompanied Kohler’s launch of its low–carbon 

monoxide emitting gen-set, titled “Create the right atmosphere: Kohler Marine Generators helping make 

boating safer,” J.A. 17,741, states that “The need is clear!” 

above a bar chart of fatal and non-fatal boat-related 

carbon monoxide poisonings for the years 1984–2004, 

J.A. 17,742. The slides immediately following this bar 

chart describe the carbon monoxide problem and how the 

technology in Kohler’s low–carbon monoxide gen-sets

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20 WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 

solve this problem. J.A. 17,742–47. Kohler may be correct that switching from cast iron to stainless steel exhaust pipes helped to resolve the product liability suits, 

but Kohler’s own documents show that even Kohler 

recognized the carbon monoxide poisoning problem persisted despite switching pipe materials. And Kohler’s 

expert testified that low–carbon monoxide emitting gensets are not nearly as susceptible to the exhaust system 

integrity issues (i.e., corrosion and subsequent leak of 

carbon monoxide) that were the basis of the product 

liability suits. J.A. 16,012. He explained that, for the 

low–carbon monoxide emitting gen-sets, “if you had a leak 

right at the entrance to the catalyst, you know, it would 

be possible to have a [carbon monoxide] problem there. 

But that’s part of the engine, and it’s a very robust joint 

there.” Id. Presented with this conflicting evidence, the 

jury was entitled to find that the claimed invention, as 

opposed to switching the exhaust pipe material, solved 

the carbon monoxide poisoning problem. Given the verdict, we presume it did so in WBIP’s favor. Substantial 

evidence, in the form of the testimony and documents 

WBIP presented, supports this finding.

Kohler also challenges the evidence of product liability suits against it as “grossly prejudicial” and that the

inclusion of this evidence entitles it to a new trial. Appellant’s Br. 39. Prior to trial, the district court granted-inpart and denied-in-part Kohler’s motion in limine to 

exclude this evidence, explaining that it “notes that such 

evidence will be relevant to both non-obviousness and 

damages but cautions plaintiff that references to specific 

lawsuits will be limited so as to reduce any risk of undue 

prejudice to the defendant.” J.A. 15,005 (emphasis added). The parties agreed on “a limiting instruction as to 

the product liability suits in general,” J.A. 15,397–98, and 

this instruction was read to the jurors prior to the testimony that Kohler challenges on appeal, see, e.g., 

J.A. 15,447, 15,453. After the jury rendered its verdict, 

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WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 21

Kohler moved for a new trial based, in part, on its contention that introduction of this evidence was unfairly prejudicial, as evidenced by the jury’s damages verdict. The 

district court denied Kohler’s motion for a new trial on 

this ground, explaining that it rejected Kohler’s pre-trial 

arguments for exclusion and that “Kohler has presented 

no new arguments to dissuade it.” WBIP, LLC v. Kohler 

Co., No. 11-10374-NMG, 2014 WL 585854, at *3 (D. Mass. 

Feb. 12, 2014). But the district court determined that 

part of the jury’s damages verdict was not supported by 

substantial evidence and granted Kohler’s motion for 

remittitur, reducing the awarded damages from 

$9,641,206 to $3,775,418.5 Id. at *1–3, 9. 

We review a district court’s decision regarding whether to exclude evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 under the law of the regional circuit. SSL 

Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 769 F.3d 1073, 1092 (Fed. 

Cir. 2014). The First Circuit reviews such decisions for 

abuse of discretion, and cautions that “[o]nly rarely—and 

in extraordinarily compelling circumstances—will [it], 

from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a district 

court’s on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative 

weighing of probative value and unfair effect.” United 

States v. Whitney, 524 F.3d 134, 143 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 78, 84–85 (1st Cir. 

2000)). 

Kohler argues that the challenged evidence was grossly prejudicial “as evidenced by the runaway damages 

verdict.” Appellant’s Br. 43–44. But Kohler never explains how the mitigating and remedial steps taken by 

 

5 The district court offered WBIP a choice: either 

accept the remittitur or have a new trial on damages. 

WBIP, 2014 WL 585854, at *9. WBIP chose remittitur 

and neither party has appealed the amount of damages 

awarded. 

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22 WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 

the district court (i.e., its order that the parties’ agreedupon limiting instruction be read to jurors prior to any of 

the challenged testimony and its grant of remittitur) 

failed to redress any prejudice that may have affected 

Kohler. The First Circuit has held that “within wide 

margins, the potential for prejudice . . . can be satisfactorily dispelled by appropriate curative instructions” and 

that “[j]urors are presumed to follow such instructions, 

except in extreme cases.” United States v. Richardson, 

421 F.3d 17, 41 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. 

Freeman, 208 F.3d 332, 345–46 (1st Cir. 2000)). Kohler 

does not address the limiting instructions, nor does it

mention the district court’s grant of remittitur. Considered in context, we cannot say that these are extraordinarily compelling circumstances that warrant reversing 

the district court’s evidentiary decision and remanding for 

a new trial. 

We also reject Kohler’s argument that substantial evidence does not support a finding of long-felt need because

the record evidence establishes that “the Coast Guard and 

NIOSH first investigated [carbon-monoxide]-related 

poisonings on houseboats in 2000” and “there was no 

evidence of any efforts to limit [carbon monoxide] emissions from marine generators before 2000.” Resp. & 

Reply Br. 35. As Kohler correctly notes, whether there is 

a “long-felt need is analyzed as of the date of an articulated identified problem and evidence of efforts to solve that 

problem.” Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade 

Comm’n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1993). WBIP

presented evidence that the problem of carbon monoxide 

poisoning from houseboat gen-sets was known prior to 

2000 in the form of the product liability suits against 

Kohler. WBIP also presented testimony from Mr. 

Westerbeke that carbon monoxide had been a known 

problem in the houseboat industry since his company first 

started selling gasoline marine gen-sets in 1983. 

J.A. 15,478, 15,500–01. And Kohler itself presented 

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WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 23

evidence that it was making efforts to solve the carbon 

monoxide poisoning problem by replacing the exhaust 

pipes in its older generation gen-sets with stainless steel 

pipes. This constitutes substantial evidence to support 

the jury’s presumed factual finding that the claimed 

invention solved a long-felt need in the industry. 

3. Praise

Evidence that the industry praised a claimed invention or a product which embodies the patent claims 

weighs against an assertion that the same claim would 

have been obvious. Industry participants, especially 

competitors, are not likely to praise an obvious advance 

over the known art. Thus, if there is evidence of industry 

praise in the record, it weighs in favor of the nonobviousness of the claimed invention. See, e.g., Institut 

Pasteur & Universite Pierre Et Marie Curie v. Focarino, 

738 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[I]ndustry praise 

. . . provides probative and cogent evidence that one of 

ordinary skill in the art would not have reasonably expected [the claimed invention].”). 

Kohler argues that WBIP’s evidence of praise was only a “few snippets” that “fell far off target” because they

relate to WBIP’s Safe-CO, low–carbon monoxide gen-set 

products, not solely to the coolant elements [B] and [D] 

not disclosed in Phipps. Appellant’s Br. 45–46. This 

argument is primarily one of nexus. As discussed above, 

WBIP established its entitlement to a presumption of 

nexus for each type of objective evidence that it presented. 

Moreover, the jury’s presumed finding of industry praise 

of the claimed invention is supported by substantial 

evidence. 

WBIP’s evidence of praise includes the fact that 

Westerbeke received the National Marine Manufacturers 

Association Innovation Award in 2004 for its Safe-CO 

gen-sets. And the evidence includes an internal Kohler 

document regarding “Carbon Monoxide and Low [carbon 

Case: 15-1044 Document: 3-2 Page: 23 Filed: 07/19/2016
24 WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 

monoxide products]” which recognizes that Westerbeke

won the Innovation Award at a 2004 trade show. 

J.A. 17,915. Other record evidence of praise includes an 

award from Houseboating Adventures Magazine, an 

article positively mentioning Westerbeke’s Safe-CO gensets in Popular Mechanics magazine, and an email from 

an Industrial Hygienist at the U.S. Department of the 

Interior, thanking Westerbeke for developing its Safe-CO 

gen-sets and stating that “[h]opefully this will set new 

industry standards for generators and we will eventually 

be rid of this life threatening hazard” and that the SafeCO “generators will save lives.” J.A. 17,255. Contrary to 

Kohler’s argument, this constitutes substantial evidence 

to support the jury’s presumed factual finding. This 

strong evidence of industry recognition of the significance 

and value of the claimed invention weighs in favor of nonobviousness. 

4. Skepticism

Evidence of industry skepticism weighs in favor of 

non-obviousness. If industry participants or skilled 

artisans are skeptical about whether or how a problem 

could be solved or the workability of the claimed solution, 

it favors non-obviousness. Doubt or disbelief by skilled 

artisans regarding the likely success of a combination or 

solution weighs against the notion that one would combine elements in references to achieve the claimed invention. See, e.g., Gillette Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 

919 F.2d 720, 726 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[The infringer’s] 

skepticism is relevant and persuasive evidence of the 

nonobviousness of [the] invention.”); Envtl. Designs, Inc. 

v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 697–98 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 

(“Before learning of the [claimed] process, and with 

knowledge of earlier failed efforts, both [parties’ experts] 

stated unequivocally that they believed the [claimed 

process] would not adequately solve the problem. Expressions of disbelief by experts constitute strong evidence of 

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WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 25

nonobviousness.” (citing United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 

39, 52 (1966))). 

Kohler’s arguments regarding skepticism are similar 

to its arguments regarding praise, and fail for similar 

reasons. The jury’s presumed factual finding that there 

was skepticism that low–carbon monoxide gen-sets could 

be produced is supported by substantial evidence. WBIP 

presented evidence that an audience of over 200 people at 

an industry workshop on carbon monoxide poisonings, 

sponsored by the U.S. Coast Guard Office of Boating 

Safety and NIOSH and held at a 2003 boat show, expressed shock when Mr. Westerbeke announced that 

Westerbeke “would have low [carbon monoxide] -- actually 

zero percentage PPM [carbon monoxide] generators 

within one to two years.” J.A. 15,374, 15,369–70, 17,202. 

The same witness explained that, at the time, Westerbeke 

had a prototype gen-set that produced between zero and 

nine ppm of carbon monoxide and that, at the end of this 

session of the workshop, two individuals from Kohler told 

Mr. Westerbeke that “it was impossible to produce a 

generator with zero PPM of [carbon monoxide].” 

J.A. 15,374. Supporting this testimony, WBIP admitted 

the minutes from this workshop into evidence, which 

state that “[t]here was a prediction that generators with 

substantially [carbon monoxide] free exhaust will become 

available within a couple of years.” J.A. 17,213.

Kohler argues that this evidence shows that the only 

thing “shocking” or “impossible” was manufacturing a 

gen-set that produces zero ppm of carbon monoxide in the 

exhaust, not exhaust substantially free of carbon monoxide, and that, even now, no gen-set exists that produces 

zero ppm of carbon monoxide. WBIP produced more than 

a mere scintilla of evidence here—it produced witness 

testimony that was corroborated by the official minutes of 

the workshop. And, drawing reasonable inferences in 

favor of WBIP, the verdict winner, we cannot say that a 

jury would be unreasonable if it found, based on this 

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26 WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 

evidence, that the boating industry expressed skepticism 

that low–carbon monoxide producing gen-sets could be 

made.

5. Copying

“Copying may indeed be another form of flattering 

praise for inventive features,” Crocs, 598 F.3d at 1311, 

and thus evidence of copying tends to show nonobviousness. See also Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 

782 F.2d 995, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[C]opying the 

claimed invention, rather than one within the public 

domain, is indicative of non-obviousness.”). The fact that 

a competitor copied technology suggests it would not have 

been obvious.

The parties dispute whether substantial evidence 

supports a finding that Kohler copied Westerbeke’s SafeCO gen-sets, which are an embodiment of the claimed 

invention. WBIP argues it presented evidence that it 

demonstrated its Safe-CO gen-sets in a trailer at a 2004 

boat show and that, in response to a question from two

Kohler employees who visited this trailer, a Westerbeke 

engineer explained that the low–carbon monoxide emissions were achieved through use of a catalyst and electronic fuel injection. WBIP also presented evidence that, 

shortly after this show, an internal Kohler document 

requesting funding for development of Kohler’s own low–

carbon monoxide gen-sets explained that low–carbon 

monoxide exhaust would be achieved through the same 

two features that the Westerbeke engineer had described: 

“a precise electronically-controlled engine management

system and exhaust after-treatment with a catalyst.” 

J.A. 17,785. In fact, this document specifically mentions 

Westerbeke’s “‘Safe-CO’ line” of gen-sets and the fact that 

Westerbeke had “patented their concept” (albeit citing an 

earlier-issued Westerbeke patent, not the patents in suit, 

which had yet to issue). J.A. 17,785.

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WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 27

Kohler counters that it produced testimony and documentary evidence contradicting WBIP’s evidence of 

copying. Kohler argues that its engineer testified that he 

had already decided to use an electronic control unit in its 

low–carbon monoxide gen-sets a month prior to 

Westerbeke’s demonstration at the 2004 boat show, and 

that this testimony is supported by documentary evidence. 

Copying is a question of fact and, as with any question 

of fact, the fact-finder (here, the jury) was entitled to 

credit WBIP’s evidence over Kohler’s. See Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1362. And we will not substitute our 

view of the conflicting evidence for that of the jury. SIBIA 

Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349,

1355 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Based on the evidence presented, 

i.e., that Kohler engineers were aware of and had access 

to Westerbeke’s Safe-CO gen-set and shortly thereafter 

with express reference to the Westerbeke Safe-CO gensets adopted the same features in developing Kohler’s 

own low–carbon monoxide gen-set, we cannot say that a 

jury would be unreasonable in finding that Kohler copied 

the claimed invention.

6. Commercial Success

When “a product attains a high degree of commercial 

success, there is a basis for inferring that [attempts to a 

solution] have been made and have failed.” Merck & Co. 

v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 

2005). See also Magowan v. N.Y. Belting & Packing Co., 

141 U.S. 332, 343, 12 S. Ct. 71, 76, 35 L. Ed. 781 (1891) 

(“[S]uch an extensive public use [of the patented invention] as almost to supersede all packings made under 

other methods . . . was pregnant evidence of its novelty, 

value, and usefulness.”). Demonstrating that an invention has commercial value, that it is commercially successful, weighs in favor of its non-obviousness. 

Case: 15-1044 Document: 3-2 Page: 27 Filed: 07/19/2016
28 WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 

On appeal, Kohler’s primary argument regarding 

commercial success of the claimed invention is that WBIP 

failed to establish nexus. As discussed above, WBIP was 

entitled to a presumption of nexus, which Kohler 

acknowledged in its reply brief. Kohler did not rebut that 

presumption. WBIP presented the jury with evidence of 

the immediate and high level of success of the Kohler 

Low–carbon monoxide generator which was found to 

infringe. We see no basis to disturb the jury’s presumed 

factual findings of commercial success underlying its 

verdict on obviousness. 

Finally, Kohler reiterates its view that, even if we assume there was evidence of multiple objective considerations of non-obviousness, that evidence is not strong 

enough to overcome its own evidence of obviousness based 

on Phipps. We do not agree. The objective considerations 

in this case, commercial success, long-felt need, industry 

praise, skepticism, and copying, each weigh in favor of a 

conclusion that using conventional coolant components to 

convert the land-based Phipps engine into a low–carbon 

monoxide emission marine gen-set would not have been 

obvious to one of skill in the art at the relevant time. Too 

often the obviousness analysis is framed as an inquiry 

into whether a person of skill, with two (and only two) 

references sitting on the table in front of him, would have 

been motivated to combine (or, in Kohler’s view, could 

have combined) the references in a way that renders the 

claimed invention obvious. The real question is whether 

that skilled artisan would have plucked one reference out 

of the sea of prior art (Phipps) and combined it with 

conventional coolant elements to address some need 

present in the field (the need for low–carbon monoxide 

emission marine gen-sets). Whether a skilled artisan 

would be motivated to make a combination includes 

whether he would select particular references in order to 

combine their elements. This is part of the fact question 

and we must give deference to the jury’s findings on this 

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WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 29

point. Objective indicia minimize hindsight’s impact. 

And in this case, the objective indicia point to the nonobviousness of the claimed combination. They are substantial evidence that one of skill would not have found 

the claimed combination obvious. We see no legal error in 

the ultimate conclusion that Kohler failed to prove that 

the asserted claims would have been obvious by clear and 

convincing evidence.

II. Written Description

Written description is a question of fact, which we review for substantial evidence.6 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli 

Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 

banc). On appeal, Kohler argues it should have prevailed 

on written description as a matter of law and presents to 

this court a detailed argument regarding a lack of written 

description support for the claimed “compound control 

scheme.” See Appellant’s Br. 51–64. In support of its 

argument, it cites passages in both the ’044 and ’196 

patents and the prosecution history. Id. This detailed 

argument was not presented to the jury. Before the jury, 

Kohler asked its expert three questions on written description:

Q. All right. Last couple questions. Within the 

patent, the patent itself, does the patent describe 

-- provide any description of how the engine controller works?

A. It just described what I described on that first 

slide. That was the extent of it, that there’s oxy-

 

6 Kohler recognizes that written description is a 

question of fact, reviewed for substantial evidence. Appellant’s Br. 52. It nonetheless argues written description 

should be treated as a question of law. Id. (“Kohler reserves the right to seek further review on this issue if 

necessary.”).

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30 WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 

gen sensor feedback. Air/fuel ratio is kept at a 

target.

Q. Was there any other technical description suggesting there was any technical innovation or improvement or anything not trivial in how the 

Westerbeke people were doing that?

A. There was not.

[Two questions, to which the court sustained objections, omitted.]

Q. Was there any written description in the patent on how to do this?

A. There was not sufficient written description.

J.A. 15,890–91. Following this, Kohler admitted the 

prosecution history of the ’044 patent into evidence.7 

J.A. 15,891–92. In its closing argument to the jury, 

Kohler’s counsel stated:

Just a couple of other things that are going to pop 

up on the verdict form. You’re going to see a question about written description. What that issue is 

-- because there hasn’t been argument about it. 

 

7 Kohler disputes that this is the only evidence it 

presented to support its written description argument, 

arguing “Kohler elicited testimony from WBIP’s own 

expert showing the lack of written description.” Resp. & 

Reply Br. 52 (first emphasis added) (citing J.A. 15,196–97, 

15,364–65). The cited appendix pages are from WBIP’s 

direct (J.A. 15,196–97) and redirect (J.A. 15,364–65) 

examination of its expert, not Kohler’s cross-examination. 

While it does not matter which party elicited the reliedupon testimony, it is not clear from the cited testimony 

how it shows the lack of written description and Kohler 

offers no such explanation in its briefs.

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WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 31

The evidence is in. The question is does the patent adequately describe in the -- does it describe 

what the invention was as it relates to the control, 

because, since we’ve heard, this is where they say 

the invention is now. This is where it’s all different. And so there’s a question to you, do you believe this patent adequately describes the written 

-- the inventor adequately describes the written 

invention. You’ll hear the instruction from the 

Judge. But you’ll see that in there.

J.A. 16,093. The jury found that Kohler failed to prove by 

clear and convincing evidence that the asserted claims 

were invalid for lack of written description. J.A. 8099.

Nowhere in these quoted passages did Kohler present 

the jury with the detailed argument it provides to us in 

this appeal, despite the fact that Kohler, as the party 

challenging validity, had the burden to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the written description requirement was not met. Abbott Labs. v. Syntron Bioresearch, 

Inc., 334 F.3d 1343, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003). On appeal, we 

limit ourselves to the arguments raised by the parties and 

review jury findings on the record presented below. 

Based on what was presented to the jury in this case, the 

jury’s verdict is clearly supported by substantial evidence. 

Under our precedent, “[g]eneral and conclusory testimony . . . does not suffice as substantial evidence of 

invalidity.” Koito Mfg. Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, 381 

F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2004). This is precisely the 

type of evidence that Kohler submitted to the jury in this 

case. If such evidence fails to meet even the substantial 

evidence standard, it does not rise to the level of clear and 

convincing evidence, nor does it “point so strongly and 

overwhelmingly in favor of [Kohler] that a reasonable jury 

could not have reached the verdict” in favor of WBIP, 

which is what Kohler has to show to be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Marine Polymer Techs., 672 

Case: 15-1044 Document: 3-2 Page: 31 Filed: 07/19/2016
32 WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 

F.3d at 1357–58. We see no error in the district court’s 

denial of judgment as a matter of law that the asserted 

claims lack written description.8

III. Willful Infringement

This case was decided by the district court under the 

then-applicable willful infringement standard. At the 

time of this decision, proof of willful infringement required “clear and convincing evidence that the infringer 

acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent” and that 

“this objectively-defined risk . . . was either known or so 

obvious that it should have been known.” In re Seagate 

Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The 

jury found that WBIP had proven by clear and convincing 

evidence that Kohler’s infringement was willful. 

J.A. 8100. And the district court concluded that Kohler’s 

defenses at trial were objectively unreasonable. WBIP, 

2014 WL 585854, at *5–6. 

Kohler argues that the judgment of willful infringement must be reversed for two independent reasons. 

First, it argues that, contrary to the district court’s determination, its obviousness and written description 

defenses are objectively reasonable under Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., 769 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 

2014), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 356 (Oct. 19, 2015) (No. 14-

1513), and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & 

Associates, Inc., 682 F.3d 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Second, it 

 

8 It would not matter if we reviewed written description as a question of law or a question of fact in this 

case because Kohler introduced no detailed argument and 

nothing but a conclusory statement about written description. As such, under either standard, the evidence Kohler 

presented would be insufficient to establish a written 

description violation by clear and convincing evidence.

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WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 33

argues that WBIP did not present evidence to the jury 

that Kohler was aware of the patents in suit, which is an 

element of the subjective prong of the willfulness test, 

such that the jury’s verdict that Kohler willfully infringed 

cannot stand. After this case was argued on appeal, the 

Supreme Court decided Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse 

Electronics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) (“Halo”). 

Under Halo, we review the district court’s determination to award enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 

for abuse of discretion. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1934.9 As with 

awards of attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, a party 

seeking enhanced damages under § 284 bears the burden 

of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.10 Id. (citing 

Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness Inc., 134 

S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014)). Although “[t]he Seagate test 

reflects, in many respects, a sound recognition that enhanced damages are generally appropriate under § 284 

only in egregious cases,” the Supreme Court rejected that 

test as “unduly rigid” and as “impermissibly encumber[ing] the statutory grant of discretion to district 

courts.” Id. at 1932. 

 

9 Even Kohler admits WBIP “preserved a challenge 

to the standard of review” by asserting that the district 

“court’s willfulness determination should be reviewed only 

for abuse of discretion following Highmark Inc. v. Allcare 

Health Management System, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).” 

Resp. & Reply Br. 54 n.11 (citing Cross-Appellant’s Br. 

19).

10 This is a lower burden of proof than clear and 

convincing evidence, which the jury found that WBIP had 

met. This change in the law provides no basis for remand. If the jury found willfulness under the clear and 

convincing standard, the lower standard could not have 

helped Kohler.

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34 WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 

As to Kohler’s first argument—that its defenses were 

objectively reasonable—the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Halo expressly rejected the notion that objective recklessness must be found in every case involving enhanced 

damages for willful infringement. The Court cited the 

objective recklessness requirement as the “principal 

problem with Seagate’s two-part test,” explaining that 

“[s]uch a threshold requirement excludes from discretionary punishment many of the most culpable offenders,” 

including those “who intentionally infringe[] another’s 

patent.” Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932. Applying reasoning 

similar to Octane Fitness, the Court explained that an 

infringer’s subjective bad faith alone may support an 

award of enhanced damages. Id. at 1933 (“The subjective 

willfulness of a patent infringer, intentional or knowing, 

may warrant enhanced damages, without regard to 

whether his infringement was objectively reckless.”). And 

it explained that the appropriate time frame for considering culpability is by assessing the infringer’s knowledge at 

the time of the challenged conduct. Id. This is a departure from our Seagate line of cases, which permitted 

infringers to escape liability for enhanced damages provided that they were able “to muster a reasonable (even 

though unsuccessful) defense at the infringement trial.” 

Id. 

In this case, the district court determined that Kohler 

was objectively reckless under Seagate, as its litigationdeveloped obviousness and non-infringement defenses 

were unreasonable.11 WBIP, 2014 WL 585854, at *5. On 

 

11 It does not appear that Kohler argued that its 

written description defense was reasonable to the district 

court. On appeal, Kohler’s argument on this point is a 

single paragraph, asserting its defense was reasonable 

because there was countervailing evidence to support its 

theory such that it could have realistically expected its 

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WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 35

appeal, WBIP argues that the district court correctly 

determined that Kohler was objectively reckless, and that 

“Kohler’s obviousness defense was a litigation-contrived, 

hindsight reconstruction.” Cross-Appellant’s Br. 67. 

Kohler does not dispute that its obviousness defense was 

created during litigation, years after it began engaging in 

culpable conduct. Instead, Kohler argues that it “is no 

answer to characterize” its obviousness defense as litigation-contrived because Seagate’s objective recklessness 

prong “‘requires analysis of all of the infringer’s noninfringement and invalidity defenses, even if those defenses were developed for litigation.’” Resp. & Reply Br. 57 

(quoting Global Traffic Techs. LLC v. Morgan, 620 

F. App’x 895, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (unpublished)) (emphasis added by Kohler).12 But as the Supreme Court explained in Halo, timing does matter. Kohler cannot 

insulate itself from liability for enhanced damages by 

creating an (ultimately unsuccessful) invalidity defense

for trial after engaging in the culpable conduct of copying, 

or “plundering,” WBIP’s patented technology prior to 

litigation. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933. Proof of an 

objectively reasonable litigation-inspired defense to 

infringement is no longer a defense to willful infringement. Thus, Kohler’s arguments on appeal that the 

district court erred in concluding that its obviousness 

defense was objectively unreasonable is not a basis for 

concluding that the district court abused its discretion in 

enhancing damages. 

 

argument to succeed. Kohler does not argue that its noninfringement defense was reasonable on appeal. 

12 Notably, Global Traffic Technologies cites the 

Federal Circuit opinion in Halo, now vacated by the 

Supreme Court, for the proposition quoted in Kohler’s 

brief.

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36 WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 

Kohler also argues that the jury’s verdict that Kohler 

willfully infringed should be overturned because the

record did not contain substantial evidence that Kohler 

knew about the patents at the time it was infringing. 

Knowledge of the patent alleged to be willfully infringed 

continues to be a prerequisite to enhanced damages. See 

Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932–33 (discussing knowledge requirement for intent). We do not interpret Halo as changing the established law that the factual components of the 

willfulness question should be resolved by the jury.13 See 

 

13 Judge O’Malley’s concurrence raised the Seventh 

Amendment question and multiple briefs filed to the 

Supreme Court in Halo invited the Court to determine 

whether there was a Seventh Amendment right to a jury 

trial of the willfulness issue in Halo. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. 

Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 

(O’Malley, J., concurring); Brief of Mentor Graphics Corp. 

et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 20–

27, Halo, 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) (No. 14-1513), 2015 WL 

9292300; Brief of EMC Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support 

of Respondents at 28–30, Halo, 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) 

(No. 14-1513), 2016 WL 322586; Brief of Amicus Curiae 

Askeladden LLC in Support of Neither Party at 31 n.8, 

Halo, 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) (No. 14-1513), 2015 WL 

9245656. The Court chose not to decide the Seventh 

Amendment question. This leaves in place our prior 

precedent that there is a right to a jury trial on the willfulness question. Our case law is clear that in the absence of the Court overturning our established precedent 

that precedent remains in effect. See, e.g., Masias v. Sec’y 

of Health & Human Servs., 634 F.3d 1283, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 

2011) (citing Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 

1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Of course, this is not to say that a 

jury verdict of willful infringement ought to result in 

enhanced damages. Whether the conduct is sufficiently 

egregious as to warrant enhancement and the amount of 

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WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 37

Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1250

(Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Absent sufficient basis for directing the 

verdict, Richardson has the right of jury determination of 

this factual question. Willfulness of behavior is a classical 

jury question of intent. When trial is had to a jury, the 

issue should be decided by the jury.” (citations omitted)); 

Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1386 

(Fed. Cir. 2014) (O’Malley, J., concurring) (“[W]e have 

long held that a willfulness determination contains issues 

of fact that should be submitted to a jury.”). 

Kohler does not contest that it, in fact, had pre-suit 

knowledge of the patents in suit. And in fact, Kohler 

admitted in its Undisputed Statement of Facts in support 

of its Motion for Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement 

that it “first became aware of the ’044 Patent at the latest 

by August 20, 2010” when it received an inquiry “regarding its knowledge of any WBIP patents on low carbon 

emission marine generator products.” J.A. 2880. Despite 

this admission, Kohler argues that no evidence of its 

knowledge was presented to the jury and thus the jury’s 

finding of willfulness should be rejected because “there 

was no basis to find—or even infer—that Kohler knew or 

should have known of an objectively high risk of patent 

infringement.” Appellant’s Br. 70–71. 

We conclude that there was substantial evidence for 

the jury’s finding that Kohler had knowledge of the patents in suit at the time of infringement. At trial, WBIP 

presented testimony from John (“Jack”) Westerbeke, the 

inventor and majority-owner of Westerbeke Corporation, 

that Westerbeke’s low–carbon monoxide gen-sets have 

been marked with the patents in suit since their issuance. 

Supporting this testimony, WBIP submitted an email 

Mr. Westerbeke sent the day after the ’044 patent issued 

 

the enhancement that is appropriate are committed to the 

sound discretion of the district court. 

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38 WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 

in 2008, which states “I have to get a patent label on all 

gas EFI products immediately” and that the label would 

say “U.S. Pat. No. 7,314,044; Other patents pending.” 

J.A. 17,192. WBIP submitted representative photographs 

of Westerbeke’s low–carbon monoxide gen-sets that are 

clearly marked with both patents in suit. J.A. 17,261. It 

also presented testimony that Westerbeke and Kohler 

were the only two companies in the market that provide 

low–carbon monoxide gen-sets, and documentary evidence, such as Kohler’s November 2004 internal request 

for funding to develop low–carbon monoxide gen-sets, 

demonstrating that Kohler was aware of Westerbeke 

patents covering Westerbeke’s Safe-CO gen-sets. The 

district court also had before it Kohler’s admission in its 

Statement of Undisputed Facts in support of its Motion 

for Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement that Kohler 

“first became aware of the ’044 Patent at the latest by 

August 20, 2010” when it received an inquiry “regarding 

its knowledge of any WBIP patents on low carbon emission marine generator products.” J.A. 2880. The jury had 

record evidence upon which it could have inferred that 

Kohler had knowledge of the patents at issue, and thus its 

finding is supported by substantial evidence. 

Consistent with Halo, the district court, exercising its 

discretion, decided not to treble damages, but rather to 

enhance damages by 50%. The district court has the 

discretion to decide whether the case is sufficiently egregious to warrant enhancing damages and to decide the 

amount of enhancement that is warranted (up to the 

statutory limit of treble damages). And the Court explained, “none of this is to say that enhanced damages 

must follow a finding of egregious misconduct.” Halo, 136 

S. Ct. at 1933. We review the district court’s decision to 

enhance damages under an abuse of discretion standard. 

Id. at 1934. 

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WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 39

We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in enhancing damages for Kohler’s willful infringement. 

IV. WBIP’s Cross-Appeal 

WBIP cross-appeals the district court’s denial of a 

permanent injunction. The district court originally denied WBIP’s motion for a permanent injunction, reasoning the public interest factor weighed against an 

injunction because, as WBIP was a much smaller producer of low–carbon monoxide gen-sets than Kohler, it “would 

deprive the consuming public of access to a potentially life 

saving product.” J.A. 10,381–82. It determined that, 

based on its public interest finding, it need not address 

the remaining factors identified in eBay Inc. 

v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). WBIP 

moved for reconsideration, arguing that the district court 

misunderstood WBIP’s manufacturing capacity, which 

was sufficient to manufacture generators for Kohler’s 

customers. The district court declined to reconsider its 

denial of a permanent injunction, stating that “[e]ven if 

[WBIP] has a larger manufacturing capability than 

previously estimated, the Court is persuaded that it is in 

the public interest to have more than one company manufacture low–carbon monoxide generators” such that an 

ongoing royalty was a “more appropriate solution.” 

J.A. 10,671. 

On appeal, WBIP argues that the district court erred 

in its consideration of the eBay factors. We agree that the 

district court’s analysis is sufficiently flawed to constitute 

an abuse of discretion warranting vacating the judgment. 

Before the district court WBIP argued, inter alia, that 

there is a “public interest to uphold patent rights.” 

J.A. 8127. But the district court did not explain how this 

public interest was outweighed by the public interest of 

having more than one manufacturer of gen-sets that 

produce low–carbon monoxide in their exhaust, especially 

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40 WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 

if WBIP does have the manufacturing capacity to meet 

the industry’s needs. The district court’s decision is based 

on its reasoning that having more manufacturers of a lifesaving good in the market is better for the public interest. 

But this reasoning is true in nearly every situation involving such goods, such that, if it alone is sufficient, it would 

create a categorical rule denying permanent injunctions

for life-saving goods, such as many patented pharmaceutical products. As the Supreme Court has warned, categorical rules regarding permanent injunctions are 

disfavored. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 394 (“Just as the District Court erred in its categorical denial of injunctive 

relief, the Court of Appeals erred in its categorical grant 

of such relief.”). And Congress has expressly indicated 

that injunctions may be granted in cases involving lifesaving goods, such as pharmaceutical drugs. See 35 

U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(B) (“[I]njunctive relief may be granted 

against an infringer to prevent the commercial manufacture, use, offer to sell, or sale within the United States or 

importation into the United States of an approved drug, 

veterinary biological product, or biological product.”). In 

denying WBIP a permanent injunction on these grounds, 

the district court abused its discretion. We note that the 

district court limited its analysis to the public interest 

factor alone and that its decision to deny an injunction 

cannot be affirmed on this basis in light of this record. 

We vacate its judgment and remand for the district court 

to conduct a more thorough analysis of the eBay factors in 

the first instance. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district 

court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law that the 

asserted claims would have been obvious and lack sufficient written description and the willful infringement

determination. We vacate the district court’s denial of 

WBIP’s motion for a permanent injunction, and remand

for further consideration. 

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WBIP, LLC v. KOHLER CO. 41

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, AND 

REMANDED

COSTS

Costs to WBIP. 

Case: 15-1044 Document: 3-2 Page: 41 Filed: 07/19/2016