Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01351/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01351-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rusty Leisure
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, United States District Judge for the

District of Nebraska.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

Nos. 03-2503/04-1351

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeals from the United States 

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Nebraska.

Rusty Leisure, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: February 11, 2004

Filed: July 30, 2004

___________

Before MELLOY, SMITH, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Rusty Leisure appeals his conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to

distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and possession with

intent to deliver methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1).

Leisure also appeals a correction made by the district court1

 to its written judgment.

We affirm.

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In a brief submitted by counsel, Leisure advances three principal arguments.

First, Leisure contends that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that

he participated in the charged conspiracy. When evaluating the sufficiency of the

evidence from an appeal of a jury verdict, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict, and we will overturn the verdict only if no reasonable jury

could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v.

Gray, 369 F.3d 1024, 1028 (8th Cir. 2004). We accept "all reasonable inferences

drawn from the evidence that support the jury's verdict." United States v. Collins, 340

F.3d 672, 678 (8th Cir. 2003). Once a conspiracy is established, only slight evidence

is required to show the defendant's involvement and support a conviction. E.g.,

United States v. Mosby, 177 F.3d 1067, 1069 (8th Cir. 1999).

The government presented evidence from which a jury reasonably could infer

that a conspiracy existed, and that Leisure knowingly participated in it. Among other

evidence, there was testimony that Leisure was romantically involved with one April

Decenzo, and that Decenzo bought large amounts of drugs from Leisure over a period

of time, resold the drugs, kept drug records, and gave the drug sale proceeds to

Leisure. When Leisure was arrested shortly after meeting with Decenzo on July 17,

2002, Leisure possessed more than $11,000 in cash, as well as drugs and

instrumentalities of the drug trade. The combination of this direct and circumstantial

evidence alone was sufficient to support Leisure's conspiracy conviction. See, e.g.,

United States v. Kamerud, 326 F.3d 1008, 1012-13 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct.

969 (2003); Collins, 340 F.3d at 678.

Second, Leisure argues that the district court violated the rule set down in

United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1978), because there was insufficient

evidence of conspiracy to justify admitting out-of-court statements of co-conspirators.

The framework established in Bell requires the district court to undertake certain

cautionary measures when the prosecution seeks to introduce co-conspirator

statements pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). Leisure did not make

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the "timely and appropriate objection" required to trigger the Bell procedure, id. at

1044, thus forfeiting any claim of error. United States v. Coco, 926 F.2d 759, 761

(8th Cir. 1991). He then waived even plain error review when -- after the district

court rejected Leisure's belated Bell objection on the merits after the close of all

testimony -- Leisure's counsel withdrew his objection by saying, "I would agree with

your ruling." See United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 239 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir.

2001).

Even if Leisure's Bell argument were not waived, it would lack merit. Leisure

contends that statements by Decenzo to April Forbes relating to a pillowcase filled

with drugs should not have been admitted, because Decenzo was not a co-conspirator.

As discussed above, there was sufficient evidence to conclude that Decenzo and

Leisure were in a continuing conspiracy to distribute drugs. Although Leisure

apparently had not given Decenzo permission to take the pillowcase from a storage

unit rented by Leisure, there was evidence that Leisure gave Decenzo access to his

storage unit (including its number, the access code, and key), the pillowcase was

taken to a motel room where Decenzo and Leisure were staying, Leisure went through

the pillowcase and drugs with Decenzo, and Decenzo gave proceeds from the sale of

the pillowcase drugs to Leisure. In addition, a preponderance of the evidence

supported a finding that Decenzo's statements to Forbes regarding the pillowcase

drugs were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. The two women agreed that

Forbes would sell drugs from the pillowcase, and Decenzo's statement identifying the

source of those drugs was in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Arias,

252 F.3d 973, 977 (8th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the district court did not plainly err

in admitting the Forbes testimony.

Third, Leisure claims that the district court erred in admitting testimony

pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The government introduced testimony

from a cooperating witness, Larry Spicer, regarding Leisure's involvement with drug

dealing prior to the beginning date of the conspiracy as alleged in the superseding

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indictment – "[f]rom on or about July 1, 2002." Although the government asserted

that the disputed evidence of drug trafficking showed a continuous course of conduct

that was evidence of the charged conspiracy, it nonetheless notified Leisure before

trial of its intent to offer evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b). The district court initially

reserved ruling on Leisure's motion in limine to exclude the evidence. When the

testimony was offered, Leisure did not object to its admission, and cross-examined

the witnesses. Assuming that Leisure did not waive his objection to the evidence by

failing to object at the time the testimony was offered, see United States v. Mihm, 13

F.3d 1200, 1204 (8th Cir. 1994), we review for plain error.

Leisure was first arrested for the offense on July 17, 2002. Spicer testified that

he was purchasing large amounts of methamphetamine periodically from Leisure,

beginning in or after February 2002, that the last time he purchased from Leisure was

"[b]efore [Leisure] went to jail in July;" and that his drug supplier "after the July

arrest, [] was April [Decenzo]; before July, it was Rusty." From this evidence, the

jury reasonably could infer that Leisure's transactions with Spicer continued into the

period of time alleged in the indictment. Although some of the evidence concerned

Leisure's drug trafficking activity prior to the beginning date of the conspiracy as

charged in the indictment, we conclude that it was not plain error for the district court

to admit the evidence as probative of the charged conspiracy. The evidence involved

drug trafficking activity among the conspirators immediately prior to the charged time

period, and it was thus relevant to show the existence of the charged conspiracy and

Leisure's participation in that conspiracy. E.g., United States v. Summers, 137 F.3d

597, 602 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Stephenson, 924 F.2d 753, 763-64 (8th Cir.

1991). 

Leisure also argues the testimony of April Forbes should have been excluded.

Forbes's testimony, however, recounted the activities and statements of co-conspirator

Decenzo during July 2002 and events leading up to the arrests of Decenzo and

Leisure. It was therefore relevant to prove the charged conspiracy. United States v.

Wilson, 177 F.3d 712, 713-14 (8th Cir. 1999).

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Leisure advances numerous additional arguments in a lengthy pro se

supplemental brief. We briefly address several of those arguments. 

Leisure argues that he was entitled to jury instructions pertaining to multiple

conspiracies and buyer-seller relationships, but he never requested such instructions

at trial as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30. Leisure has failed to

meet the "heavy burden resting upon him to establish that the court's failure to give

sua sponte the instruction now suggested constitutes plain error under Rule 52(b)."

Edwards v. United States, 361 F.2d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 1966). A multiple conspiracy

instruction was not warranted, because Leisure was the only defendant on trial, and

if the evidence proved multiple conspiracies, then he was a member of each. "[T]he

chance of a prejudicial spillover effect from one conspiracy to another if the

defendant is a member of both conspiracies is minimal, if not nonexistent." United

States v. Ghant, 339 F.3d 660, 664 (8th Cir. 2003) (ellipses and internal quotation

omitted), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1184 (2004). Nor is it obvious that he was entitled

to a buyer-seller jury instruction given the scope, frequency, and amount of drug

trafficking involved. See United States v. Jefferson, 215 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir.

2000). 

Next, Leisure claims the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 43, which requires the presence of the defendant at "every trial stage,"

because he and his counsel were absent when responses to jury questions 1, 4, and 5

were discussed. The record indicates, however, that Leisure's counsel was indeed

present at a conference with the court and opposing counsel pertaining to jury

questions 1, 2, and 3, and that counsel did not object to the court's proposed response

to jury question 1 or to Leisure's absence. Moreover, Rule 43(b)(3) provides that a

defendant need not be present personally when a "proceeding involves only a

conference or hearing on a question of law." The jury question presented only a

question of law, United States v. Parker, 836 F.2d 1080, 1084 (8th Cir. 1987), and

the district court appropriately involved defendant's counsel. Cf. Rogers v. United

States, 422 U.S. 35, 39 (1975). The district court committed no error in responding

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to the jury's request to review Leisure's testimony by stating that "[a] transcript is not

available."

Although jury questions 4 and 5, and the responses thereto, were made part of

the record, there is no transcript of any discussion between the court and counsel

concerning those questions. Leisure asks us to assume that both he and his counsel

were absent, but he bears the burden of making this showing, United States v. Bokine,

523 F.2d 767, 769 (5th Cir. 1975), and Leisure's attorney has made no assertion that

trial counsel was excluded. We further conclude that even if Leisure and his counsel

were absent, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States

v. Bieganowski, 313 F.3d 264, 293 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1014

(2003). In the two remaining questions, the jury asked whether its verdict must be

unanimous with respect to the amount of methamphetamine. The court gave the same

response to both questions, saying "[y]our verdict must be unanimous in all respects."

Leisure does not contend that the response was an incorrect statement of the law, but

only suggests that perhaps he "could have caused them to be dealt with differently."

The district court's response "was substantially a repetition of the instructions which

had been given earlier by the court and involved a question of law." United States

v. Nelson, 570 F.2d 258, 261 (8th Cir. 1978). We find no error in the statement, and

we see no reasonable possibility that Leisure was prejudiced by the responses. 

Leisure argues for the first time on appeal that the district judge should have

recused herself, and we review for plain error. Fletcher v. Conoco Pipe Line Co., 323

F.3d 661, 663 (8th Cir. 2003); see generally United States v. Sypolt, 346 F.3d 838,

839 (8th Cir. 2003) (party alleging disqualification "must show that the district court's

failure to recuse was clearly improper under the law, affected his substantial rights,

and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings") (internal quotations and citations omitted), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1014

(2004). He asserts that the district judge, in a previous professional capacity, was a

member of a review panel that upheld a disciplinary action relating to Leisure while

he was incarcerated in 1990. Leisure also alleges that the district judge, as an

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attorney for the State of Nebraska, defended the state in a civil rights action initiated

by Leisure. Previous contact between judge and litigant in an unrelated context is not

grounds to disqualify a judge, and Leisure's belated suggestion to the contrary is

wholly without merit. See United States v. Hurst, 951 F.2d 1490, 1503 (6th Cir.

1991) (recusal not required where "[a]s a private attorney years earlier," the judge had

filed a fraud lawsuit against a defendant); United States v. Ratcliff, 806 F.2d 1253,

1255 (5th Cir. 1986) (rejecting claim that judge should have recused himself because

he presided over a previous "civil rights removal action" involving Ratcliff).

Leisure also contends that a new trial is required because during crossexamination, the prosecuting attorney forced him to comment on the credibility of

police witnesses by asking whether the police were lying. Other circuits have held

that such questions are inappropriate, because they intrude on the prerogative of the

jury to determine matters of credibility. E.g., United States v. Boyd, 54 F.3d 868, 871

(D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Akitoye, 923 F.2d 221, 224 (1st Cir. 1991); cf.

Lamar v. Graves, 326 F.3d 983, 987 (8th Cir.) ("we do not necessarily condone the

questions"), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 939 (2003). Leisure did not object to the

questions, and we conclude that there was no plain error. In response to three

separate questions as to whether an officer was lying, Leisure alternatively responded

that he (Leisure) "didn't say that," that he (Leisure) did not know, and that, in one

instance, he believed the police "probably were lying." In only one answer, therefore,

did Leisure actually comment on the credibility of the police, and in the context of the

entire trial, we are confident that this answer did not affect Leisure's substantial

rights. The jury had abundant reason to question Leisure's credibility, including

testimony of co-conspirators about his drug dealing, seizure of drug trafficking

evidence from Leisure's person and property, and Leisure's admission during crossexamination that he had fled the jurisdiction after his release on bond, only to be

caught in Las Vegas using a false identity, and in possession of a gun and drugs for

sale.

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Leisure also claims that he was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel ordinarily should be raised in a

collateral proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, where an appropriate record may

be developed. United States v. Martin, 59 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 1995). Consistent

with that general rule, we will not address the claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel on direct appeal.

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Leisure asserts that the district court erred at sentencing by adopting portions

of the revised presentence investigation report (PSR) to which Leisure objected

without convening an evidentiary hearing. Where, as here, the sentencing judge

presided over the defendant's trial, the court may resolve factual disputes in the PSR

based on the trial record, and the court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.

United States v. Wiggins, 104 F.3d 174, 178 (8th Cir. 1997).2

Finally, in his second appeal, Leisure argues that the district court erred in

amending its first amended judgment to include a 360-month term of imprisonment

for his conviction on Count II of the superseding indictment, to be served

concurrently with his 360-month sentence on Count I. The district court has authority

to correct a clerical error at any time pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

36. At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that "I impose a sentence of

360 months' imprisonment to be followed by ten years of supervised release on Count

I; and six years' supervised release on Count II with the term on Count II to be served

concurrent with the term on Count I." We conclude that the second amended

judgment properly corrects a clerical error in the written judgment to reflect the

district court's oral pronouncement of sentence. See United States v. Tramp, 30 F.3d

1035, 1037-38 (8th Cir. 1994). Consequently, Leisure was not entitled to notice of

the district court's action. Toyer v. United States, 291 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1961) (per

curiam).

Leisure's remaining arguments provide no basis for reversal. See 8th Cir. R.

47B. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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