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Parties Involved:
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Amicus on Behalf of Appellant
KidsPeace Corporation
Appellee
Mesabi Academy of KidsPeace
Appellee
Michael Muehlberg
Appellee
Lisa Vajdl
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2482

___________

Lisa Vajdl, * 

* 

Appellant, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Minnesota.

Mesabi Academy of Kidspeace, Inc.; * 

Kidspeace Corporation; Michael * 

Muehlberg, * 

* 

Appellees, *

____________________ * 

* 

Equal Employment Opportunity * 

Commission, * 

* 

Amicus on Behalf of * 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: January 10, 2007

Filed: April 25, 2007

___________

Before MURPHY, HANSEN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Lisa Vajdl filed a Title VII suit against her employer, Mesabi Academy of

KidsPeace, ("the Academy") alleging sexual harassment, retaliation, and constructive

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The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of

Minnesota.

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discharge. The district court1

 granted the Academy's motion for summary judgment

on all three claims. Vajdl appeals. We affirm. 

I. Background

The Academy, a non-profit organization licensed by the Minnesota Department

of Corrections, provides residential care along with educational and vocational

training to male youths convicted of violent crimes, including rape and murder. The

Academy hired Vajdl to work as a youthcare worker at the Academy on August 18,

2003. Vajdl left the Academy in February 2004.

During her training and orientation, Vajdl learned that she would be working

with serious sex offenders in the sex-offender unit. Over the course of her sevenmonth employment in the sex-offender unit, several youths made physical threats and

sexual comments to Vajdl. In addition, three colleagues repeatedly engaged in

inappropriate conduct towards her. Vajdl reported the three co-workers to her

supervisor after months of such conduct and comments. The Academy immediately

sanctioned the co-workers and the harassment ended. 

The day after filing her complaint, Vajdl received a written warning from the

head of the sex-offender unit requiring her to receive permission from her shift

supervisor before issuing sanctions to the inmates. Sanctions represent one method

used by Academy personnel to punish inmates for inappropriate conduct and can

range from the loss of minor privileges to confinement and isolation. Vajdl alleged

that the Academy issued the warning in retaliation for her complaints against coworkers. The Academy, on the other hand, contends that it issued the warning based

on Vajdl's work performance and her possible misuse or overuse of inmate sanctions.

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Vajdl alleges that the harassment by her co-workers and the inmates, combined

with the Academy's retaliation, forced her to leave the Academy. Specifically, Vajdl

claims that she was so traumatized by her experience at the Academy that her doctor

instructed her to resign. After her departure, Vajdl filed a timely claim with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and subsequently received a Notice

of Right to Sue from the EEOC. She then filed this Title VII suit alleging sexual

harassment, constructive discharge, and retaliatory discharge.

II. Discussion

We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, considering the facts in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Arnold v. Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. at

Good Shepard, LLC, 471 F.3d 843, 845 (8th Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is proper

when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Id.

A. Hostile Work Environment

"Sexual discrimination that creates a hostile or abusive work environment is a

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., Inc.,

842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 1988). A hostile work environment "arises when sexual

conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's

work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working

environment." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Hostile work environment claims are limited in nature, requiring a high

evidentiary showing that the plaintiff's workplace is "permeated with discriminatory

intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment."

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Nitsche v. CEO of Osage Valley

Elec. Co-op., 446 F.3d 841, 846 (8th Cir. 2006) (requiring hostile work environment

plaintiff to "clear a high threshold to demonstrate actionable harm"); Al-Zubaidy v.

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TEK Indust., Inc., 406 F.3d 1030, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that lower courts must

apply "demanding harassment standards" when considering hostile work environment

claims); Powell v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 445 F.3d 1074, 1078 (8th Cir. 2006)

(holding "Title VII's purpose is not to smooth the rough edges of our daily discourse,

nor to provide a federal cause of action for every slight").

To establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must

prove: (1) that she was a member of a protected group; (2) the occurrence of

unwelcome harassment; (3) a causal nexus between the harassment and her

membership in the protected group; (4) that the harassment affected a term, condition,

or privilege of employment; and (5) that the employer knew or should have known of

the harassment and failed to take prompt and effective remedial action. Carter v.

Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 700 (8th Cir. 1999).

The parties agree that Vajdl has satisfied the first three elements of the prima

facie claim. We focus first on whether Vajdl suffered an adverse employment action

affecting the term, condition, or privilege of employment. Vajdl points to the offensive

conduct of co-workers and the inmates to prove that a hostile work environment

forced her to leave her employment. As an initial matter, we consider it proper to

distinguish the conduct of co-workers from that of the facility's inmates. 

1. The Inmates

The Academy and similar institutions house some of the nation's youngest and

most violent criminal offenders. The operation and atmosphere of these institutions

differ substantially from typical work environments and warrant specialized legal

analysis. "Prisoners, by definition, have breached prevailing societal norms in

fundamentally corrosive ways. By choosing to work in a prison, corrections personnel

have acknowledged and accepted the probability that they will face inappropriate and

socially deviant behavior." Slayton v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Serv., 206 F.3d 669, 677

(6th Cir. 2000). 

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We note, however, that there may be limited circumstances where liability for

prisoner conduct may be properly attributed to the prison facility. Slayton, 206 F.3d

at 677 (stating that liability to facility attaches where guards "encouraged, endorsed,

and even instigated the inmates' harassing."); Randolph v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Serv.,

453 F.3d 724, 734 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that liability to facility attaches where coworkers sat idly by as plaintiff was subjected to multiple physical attacks).

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As part of its rehabilitation program, the Academy encourages inmates to

verbalize their anger, frustrations, and, in the sex-offender division where Vajdl

worked, sexual fantasies. To impose liability upon the Academy for the inappropriate

sexual expressions of severely troubled youth would not be reasonable without

evidence of special circumstances.2

 We, therefore, conclude that, in the absence of

special circumstances not present here, the conduct of inmates cannot be attributed to

an employer in order to show that the harassment affected a term, condition, or

privilege of employment.

2. The Co-Workers

Vajdl's claim stands or falls on the proof that her co-workers' harassing conduct

subjectively and objectively affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment.

Bowen v. Mo. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 311 F.3d 878, 883 (8th Cir. 2002). 

Vajdl alleges that three co-workers harassed her in various ways. The

overwhelming majority of Vajdl's complaints focus upon the conduct of Michael

Muehlberg. According to Vajdl, Muehlberg would frequently comment to Vajdl about

her body. He also once touched the bangs of her hair. Additionally, he wiped water

off her pant leg after one of the inmates splashed her at the pool. In an effort to court

her, he repeatedly suggested that they go on dates and that she leave her current

boyfriend. Muehlberg once telephoned her at home. He also offered to buy her a drink

and to give her a ride home. 

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Similarly, the conduct of another co-worker, Joel Lawson, amounts largely to

repeated requests for dates. A third co-worker, John Gustafson, also made a series of

inappropriate comments about Vajdl's body during the two-week period that the two

worked together. Viewed in the light most favorable to Vajdl, this conduct, neither

objectively nor subjectively supports a claim of harassment so severe or pervasive as

to alter a term, condition, or privilege of Vajdl's employment.

The objective standard for evaluating harassment is set forth in this circuit in

Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2002). In Duncan, the

plaintiff alleged that a co-worker repeatedly petted her hand; told her he wanted to

have a relationship with her; requested that she make a sketch of a planter, shaped like

a slouched man with a hole in the front of his pants that allowed for a cactus to

protrude; put up a poster portraying the plaintiff as president of "Man Hater's Club of

America," and requested that she type a draft of beliefs of "He-Men Women Hater's

Club." Id. at 931–33. Further, Duncan was also required to use a computer with a

screen saver displaying a picture of a naked woman. Id. at 931. Duncan's harasser also

kept a penis-shaped pacifier in his desk which he showed Duncan. Id. Duncan's

harasser once forced her to go with him to a bar. Id. at 932. Despite this offensive

behavior, we decided that Duncan failed to "clear the high threshold" of showing that

the conduct was so severe or pervasive as to alter a term, condition, or privilege of the

plaintiff's employment. Id. at 934. 

Objectively, the behavior Vajdl alleges does not reach the Duncan threshold.

Whether an environment was objectively hostile or abusive must be judged by looking

at the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency and severity of the

discriminatory conduct, whether such conduct was physically threatening or

humiliating, as opposed to a mere offensive utterance, and whether the conduct

unreasonably interfered with the employee's work performance. Id. at 884. In Duncan,

for example, the conduct occurred over three years. Here, Vajdl was employed by the

Academy for less than eight months. Muehlberg's conduct occurred mostly within a

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three-month window. Further, Vajdl does not allege that she felt physically threatened

by the offensive conduct. In light of these factors and our holding in Duncan, the

conduct endured by Vajdl cannot objectively support a claim of harassment so severe

or pervasive as to alter a term, condition, or privilege of her employment.

Subjectively, the record evidence shows that Vajdl was justifiably annoyed by

the conduct of her co-workers; however, she has not shown severe or pervasive

harassment as required by our precedents. For example, in describing her reaction to

Muehlberg's conduct, Vajdl stated, "I took it as a way of flirting. An absurdity." When

Muehlberg called her at home, she stated that the conversation "was ridiculous, I don't

know, it was ridiculous. . . . It was just things over nothing." Likewise, she also

characterized conversations with Lawson as flirting. In her deposition she stated,

"When I'd come up the stairs, [Lawson would] kick me in the ankles, not like, you

know, viciously, but just a tap on the ankle."

There can be no question that this conduct is offensive, juvenile, and

inappropriate for any workplace. However, we cannot say that this conduct creates a

genuine issue of material fact whether the harassment affected a term, condition, or

privilege of employment. Given this holding, we need not consider whether the

Academy knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and

effective remedial action. 

B. Retaliation Claim

In order to prove retaliation, a plaintiff must show, "that a reasonable employee

would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context

means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting

a charge of discrimination." Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, ___

U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2416 (2006) (internal quotation omitted).

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"We believe that the provision's standard for judging harm must be objective.

An objective standard is judicially administrable. It avoids the uncertainties and unfair

discrepancies that can plague a judicial effort to determine a plaintiff's unusual

subjective feelings." Id. 

"The new standard attempts to find employer actions that are likely to deter

victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC, the courts, and their

employers. And normally petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good

manners will not create such deterrence." Id.

Vajdl contends that after she filed her complaint with her superior, the Academy

retaliated against her by restricting her ability to sanction inmates. The record shows

that Vajdl's allegation is largely a subjective harm. In her deposition, Vajdl admits that

her shift managers "never really enforced [the restriction] on me." She also said that

"there wasn't a real problem. . . . [The restriction] was a problem with me because it

made me feel worthless." Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Vajdl, no

reasonable worker would likely be dissuaded from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination based upon the Academy's requirement that she seek supervisor

approval before imposing discipline on a juvenile inmate. Accordingly, we affirm the

judgment of the district court granting summary judgment on the retaliation claim.

C. Constructive Discharge

Vajdl also argues that the district court erred in dismissing her constructive

discharge claims. An employee is constructively discharged when an employer

deliberately renders the employee's working conditions intolerable and thus forces her

to quit her job. West v. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., 54 F.3d 493, 497 (8th Cir. 1995).

A constructive discharge arises only when a reasonable person would find her

working conditions intolerable. Id. "An employee who quits without giving her

employer a reasonable chance to work out a problem is not constructively

discharged." Id. at 498.

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Neither party disputes that the harassing conduct from Vajdl's co-workers

ceased before she resigned. She argues, however, that she was so traumatized by the

entire experience that she had to leave. Viewed in the light most favorable to Vajdl,

the record does not support the presence of objectively intolerable working conditions.

A constructive discharge claim requires the plaintiff to show "the employer created

the intolerable conditions intending to force the plaintiff to quit." Smith v. World Ins.

Co., 38 F.3d 1456, 1462 (8th Cir. 1994). Vajdl fails to produce evidence suggesting

her employer intentionally created an intolerable work condition in an effort to cause

her to resign.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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