Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02502/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02502-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bank of America Corporation
Defendant
Bank of America, N.A.
Defendant
Antonio Esquivel
Plaintiff
Beatriz Esquivel
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ANTONIO ESQUIVEL and BEATRIZ 

ESQUIVEL, individually, on 

behalf of all others 

similarly situated, and on 

behalf of the general public,

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; BANK 

OF AMERICA CORPORATION; and 

Does 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants. 

No. 2:12-cv-02502-GEB-KJN 

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ DISMISSAL 

MOTION 

Defendants Bank of America, N.A., and Bank of America 

Corporation (“Bank of America and/or Defendants”) move for 

dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) 

of Plaintiffs’ following state claims: breach of contract, 

promissory estoppel, California Consumer Credit Reporting 

Agencies Act, Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and 

unfair business practices.1

 In essence, this putative class 

action concerns Defendants’ alleged conduct regarding a permanent 

loan modification under the Home Affordable Modification Program 

(“HAMP”). 

 

1

 Plaintiffs’ Federal Debt Collections Act claim was previously dismissed 

in an order filed February 21, 2013. (Order, ECF No. 32.) 

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 

Plaintiffs allege the following in their Class Action 

Complaint (“Complaint”). Plaintiffs “Beatriz and Antonio Esquivel 

are senior citizens who own and live at their home at 430 La 

Esperanza Drive in Dixon, California.” (Compl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 1.) 

They “bought their home in 2001,” and they refinanced their home 

in 2009 “with a loan of approximately $322,975 insured by the 

Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”).” (Id. at ¶ 13.) 

Subsequently, Plaintiffs “fell behind on their mortgage 

payments,” and “applied to their mortgage servicer, . . . Bank of 

America, for a mortgage modification in or about August, 2011.” 

(Id. at ¶ 15.) 

Initially, Bank of America offered, and Plaintiffs 

accepted, a “trial mortgage modification” that “required monthly 

trial period plan payments of $1,509.52.” (Id. at ¶ 16.) 

Plaintiffs timely made the monthly payments, and subsequently, 

Bank of America offered Plaintiffs a permanent modification under 

the FHA’s Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”) in late 

February, 2012. (Id. at ¶¶ 16–17.) Under the FHA-HAMP partial 

claim procedure: 

the lender reduces the loan principal as part 

of a modification, requiring the borrower to 

execute a promissory note and subordinate 

mortgage payable to the Secretary of Housing 

and Urban Development. The partial claim 

promissory note caries no interest, and is 

not due until the borrower pays off the 

mortgage or no longer owns the property. The 

lender then files the partial claim against 

the FHA mortgage insurance, and is 

compensated by HUD both for the amount of the 

reduction in principal, and with incentive 

payments for the partial claim and for 

modification under the HAMP program. 

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(Id. at ¶ 14.) 

Specifically, Bank of America offered Plaintiffs an 

FHA-HAMP permanent modification which would reduce the unpaid 

balance on the note to $226,755.02 and the interest rate to 

4.625%, and extend the term to thirty years. (Id. at ¶ 17.) The 

new principal and interest payments would be $1,165.84 per month; 

and with escrow included, the full monthly payment would start at 

$1,515.96. (Id.) As part of the modification, Plaintiffs would be 

required to sign a subordinate mortgage (“Partial Claim 

Mortgage”) “under which Plaintiffs promise to pay the Secretary 

of Housing and Urban Development $93,591.63 under certain 

conditions.” (Id. at ¶ 19.) 

“The Esquivels accepted Bank of America’s offer of an 

FHA-HAMP permanent loan modification by signing and notarizing 

the Modification Agreement, the Subordinate Note, and the Deed of 

Trust on February 25, 2012, returning the signed documents to 

Bank of America, and making payments under the modified 

mortgage.” (Id. at ¶ 20.) The permanent HAMP agreement alters the 

terms of the mortgage for the remaining life of the loan.” (Id.) 

“The Esquivels made timely payments on their modified 

loan of $1,515.96 in March, April, May, June, and July, 2012. The 

Esquivels made their first payment of $1,515.96 on March 2, 2012 

because they had already made a payment in February of $1,509.52-

approximately six dollars less than the modified amount.” (Id. at 

¶ 21.) 

“Despite the Esquivels’ months of timely payments on 

their modified loan, and Bank of America’s recordation of the 

partial claim deed of trust, Bank of America has continued to 

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treat the loan as if it were in default.” (Id. at ¶ 23.) “The 

Esquivel’s June, 2012 mortgage statement states that they were 

over $10,000 in arrears on their loan.” (Id. at ¶ 24.) “In July, 

2012, Bank of America sent them a letter stating the amount they 

had paid was insufficient to cover the full payment due of 

$2,088.43, and returning partial payment to them. Bank of America 

has since refused to accept further payments on the loan.” (Id.) 

Bank of America reported to . . . credit 

reporting agencies that they were 

increasingly late on their mortgage payments. 

From February, 2012, when the Esquivels 

became current on their mortgage, to the 

present, Bank of America reported them as 

between 120 days and 180 days late on their 

mortgage. 

(Id. at ¶ 27.) Further, “Bank of America recorded a Notice of 

Default against the property on or about August 2, 2012. . . . 

The Notice of Default asserted that the Esquivels were over 

$13,000 in arrears on their loan.” (Id. at ¶ 28.) 

“Because of Bank of America’s . . . conduct in 

treating the loan as in default and attempting to foreclose on 

the home while Plaintiffs are current on their mortgage, 

Plaintiffs have suffered substantial damages, including but not 

limited to monetary damages from damage to their credit, 

unwarranted fees, and emotional harm.” (Id. at ¶ 30.) Further, 

“[u]nless the Notice of Default is rescinded, Bank of America 

can, under California’s nonjudicial foreclosure statute, proceed 

with foreclosure.” (Id. at ¶ 29.) 

Plaintiffs seek “judicial intervention to halt the sale 

of their home,” damages, specific performance, injunctive relief, 

and restitution, together with attorney fees, costs, and 

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expenses. (Id. at ¶ 29, prayer for relief.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Decision on a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion requires 

determination of “whether the complaint’s factual allegations, 

together with all reasonable inferences, state a plausible claim 

for relief.” United States ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 

Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678—79 (2009)). “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678 (citing Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). 

When determining the sufficiency of a claim under Rule 

12(b)(6), “[w]e accept factual allegations in the complaint as 

true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to 

the non-moving party.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, this 

tenet does not apply to “legal conclusions . . . cast in the form 

of factual allegations.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Therefore, conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 

inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Id. 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (“A pleading that offers 

‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.’”). 

/// 

/// 

/// 

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III. DISCUSSION 

A. Rosenthal Fair Debt Collections Act 

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim alleged 

under the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collections Act, California Civil 

Code sections 1788, et seq., (“Rosenthal Act”), arguing Bank of 

America is not a “debt collector” under the act because loan 

servicers who acquire servicing rights before the loan is in 

default do not qualify as debt collectors, and Plaintiffs “make[] 

no allegation that Plaintiffs defaulted on the loan before Bank 

of America obtained servicing rights.” (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 

(“Defs.’ Mot.”) 4:5-7, 4:20-5:1, ECF No. 20.) Defendants further 

argue “that a mortgage loan is not a ‘debt[,]’ and collection 

efforts related to mortgage loans do not constitute ‘debt 

collection’ under the Act[].” (Id. at 5:7-9.) 

Plaintiffs counter that “the plain language of the 

Rosenthal . . . Act . . . defining debt collectors and consumer 

debt . . . allows no other conclusion than that the R[osenthal 

Act] applies to mortgage servicers collecting mortgage debt.” 

(Pls.’ Mem. P.&A. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss (“Pls.’ Opp’n”) 16:20–17:1, 

ECF No. 21.) Specifically, Plaintiffs argue “the Rosenthal Act is 

. . . more expansive in scope, and excludes no one from its 

coverage,” unlike the Federal Debt Collection Practice Act 

(“FDCPA”), which “excludes creditors collecting on their own 

debts” and “loan servicers who acquire servicing rights before a 

mortgage loan is in default.”2 (Id. at 17:2–10.) Plaintiffs 

further argue that “most published cases clearly recognize that 

 

2

 The February 21, 2013 Order, which dismissed Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim 

with prejudice, held that “neither Defendant is a ‘debt collector’ within the 

meaning of the FDCPA.” (Order 5:1–10.) 

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the Rosenthal Act applies to mortgage servicers attempting to 

collect on home mortgage loans through non-foreclosure 

activities” as opposed to the act of foreclosure. (Id. at 11:18-

28.) 

California’s Rosenthal Act was enacted “to prohibit 

debt collectors from engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or 

practices in the collection of consumer debts and to require 

debtors to act fairly in entering into and honoring such 

debts . . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.1. The Rosenthal Act defines 

the term “debt collector” as “any person who, in the ordinary 

course of business, regularly, on behalf of himself or herself or 

others, engages in debt collection.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(c). 

“Debt” is defined as “money, property or their equivalent which 

is due or owing or alleged to be due from a natural person to 

another person.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(d). 

“As a number of courts have recognized, the definition 

of ‘debt collector’ is broader under the Rosenthal Act than it is 

under the FDCPA . . . .” Reyes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C10-01667 JCS, 2011 WL 30759, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2012). For 

example, the FDCPA explicitly excludes as “debt collector[s]” 

persons collecting or attempting to collect debt “which was not 

in default at the time it was obtained by such person[,]” 

whereas, the Rosenthal Act does not have such an exclusion. 

Compare 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii), with 1788.2(c); see also 

Gaudin v. Saxon Mortg. Sers., Inc., --- F.R.D. ----, 2013 WL 

4029043, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (recognizing this distinction). 

Therefore, Defendants are not excluded as “debt collectors” under 

the Rosenthal Act because the Complaint lacks an allegation that 

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they obtained servicing rights after Plaintiffs defaulted on the 

loan. 

Further, although district courts have been divided on 

the issue of whether non-foreclosure collection efforts related 

to a mortgage are outside the scope of the Rosenthal Act, the 

Ninth Circuit has recently applied the Rosenthal Act in the 

context of a bank’s collection activities concerning a HAMP 

mortgage modification. See Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A., --- F.3d ----, 2013 WL 4019279, at *6 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(stating “[t]he district court . . . correctly recognized that 

Wells Fargo was engaged in debt collection”) (citing with 

approval Reyes, 2011 WL 30759, at *20). 

For the stated reasons, the portion of Defendants’ 

motion seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Rosenthal Act claim is 

DENIED. 

B. Unfair Business Practices Claim 

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ unfair 

business practices claim, alleged under California Business & 

Professions Code sections 17200, et seq., (“§ 17200”), arguing 

Plaintiffs have not “plead sufficient facts to plausibly allege 

that they suffered an injury in fact and lost money or property 

as a result of [Defendants’] alleged actions.” (Defs.’ Mot. 6:10–

13.) 

Plaintiffs counter: 

The Complaint alleges that the Esquivels 

entered into and performed on a contract for 

permanent loan modification, but Bank of 

America nonetheless demanded payments higher 

than those called for in the contract and 

imposed unwarranted fees, increasing their 

alleged unpaid balance. (Compl. ¶ 4). The 

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Complaint alleges that Bank of America 

imposed a $93,000 lien on the Esquivels’ 

home, supposedly as a condition of the 

permanent loan modification, but then 

continued to demand the old unpaid balance - 

with a net result that the Esquivels 

supposedly owed both their old loan balance 

and $93,000 to HUD. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 22, 24, 28). 

The Complaint alleges that Bank of America’s 

incorrect credit reporting caused them 

economic damage. ([Id.] ¶[¶] 27, 30). There 

is simply no doubt that these allegations are 

sufficient to confer standing under the UCL. 

(Pls.’ Opp’n 9:11-20.) 

Section 17200 “prohibits, and provides civil remedies 

for, unfair competition, which it defines as ‘any unlawful, 

unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.’” Kwikset Corp. v. 

Sup. Ct., 51 Cal. 4th 310, 320 (2011) (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. 

Code § 17200). Although “the substantive reach of [section 17200 

is] expansive,” 2004 amendments to section 17200’s “standing 

requirement” limited “private standing . . . to any ‘person who 

has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property’ as a 

result of unfair competition.” Id. (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. 

Code § 17204.) “To satisfy the[se] narrower standing 

requirements . . . , a party must now (1) establish a loss or 

deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury 

in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that that economic 

injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business 

practice . . . that is the gravamen of the claim.” Id. at 322. 

“There are innumerable ways in which economic injury from unfair 

competition may be shown[, including] . . . [the diminishment of] 

a present or future property interest . . . .” Id. at 323. 

Here, Plaintiffs allege that “[a]s a direct and 

proximate result of [D]efendants’ unlawful and unfair business 

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practices, Plaintiffs have been injured in fact and have lost 

money or property due to the imposition of a $93,591.53 note and 

subordinate lien in favor of the Secretary of Housing and Urban 

Development on their residence.” (Compl. ¶ 81 (emphasis added).) 

Plaintiffs also allege that the $93,591.53 note and lien were 

imposed in connection with Defendants’ offer of a permanent HAMP 

mortgage modification. (Id. at ¶ 17-22.) These allegations state 

sufficient facts to plausibly allege they suffered an injury in 

fact and lost money or property as a result of Defendants’ 

alleged conduct. Therefore, the portion of Defendants’ motion 

seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs’ § 17200 claim is DENIED. 

C. California Credit Reporting Agencies Act Claim 

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim alleged 

under the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act 

(“CCRAA”) on two grounds. “First, [Defendants argue,] to the 

extent Plaintiffs purport to assert a claim against Bank of 

America under any section of the CCRAA other than section 

1785.25(a), the[] claim is preempted by the Federal Credit 

Reporting Act [(“FCRA”)].” (Defs.’ Mot. 8:10–12.) Plaintiffs do 

not oppose this argument. 

Section 1681t(b)(1)(F) of the FCRA prescribes: 

No requirement or prohibition may be imposed 

under the laws of any State . . . with 

respect to any subject matter regulated under 

. . . section 1681s–2 of this title, relating 

to the responsibilities of persons who 

furnish information to consumer reporting 

agencies, except that this paragraph shall 

not apply— . . . (ii) with respect to 

section 1785.25(a) of the California Civil 

Code (as in effect on September 30, 1996). 

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15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F). 

Since the referenced section of the FCRA expressly 

preempts state laws applicable to those who furnish information 

to consumer reporting agencies except California Civil Code § 

1785.25(a), to the extent Plaintiffs’ CCRAA claim is based on any 

section of the CCRAA other than § 1785.25(a), the claim is 

preempted. Accordingly, this portion of Defendants’ motion is 

GRANTED with prejudice. 

Second, Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ CCRAA claim 

alleged under § 1785.25(a) “also fail[s] because Plaintiffs sue 

Bank of America in its capacity as a furnisher of credit 

information,” which Defendants contend “the CCRAA does not permit 

. . . .” (Defs.’ Mot. 8:16–19.) 

Plaintiffs rejoin: 

Defendant[s’] argument regarding furnishers 

is simply wrong. To support its argument that 

the CCRAA does not permit claims against 

furnishers, Bank of America cites two 

district court cases which, in turn, rely on 

a California appellate case, Pulver v. Avco 

Fin. Serv., 182 Cal. App. 3d 622, 633 (1986). 

Bank of America’s reliance on Pulver is 

misplaced. In Pulver, the court held that the 

CCRAA’s Section 1785.31 did not apply to 

furnishers because the federal Fair Credit 

Reporting Act did not apply to furnishers, 

and the CCRAA’s purpose had been to regulate 

consumer credit reporting agencies rather 

than those who furnish information to such 

agencies. Pulver, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 633-35. 

The Pulver court’s decision, however, came in 

1986, reviewing a prior version of the CCRAA 

that did not include Section 1785.25(a). The 

California legislature amended the CCRAA 

effective July 1, 1993[,] to include, inter 

alia, Section 1785.25 entitled “Obligations 

of Furnishers of Credit Information.” See 

Cal. Civ. Code 1785.25. The FCRA, in turn, 

was amended in 1996 to exempt Section 

1785.25(a) from preemption. See Gorman v. 

Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1172 

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(9th Cir. Cal. 2009). By the plain language 

of the current statute, the CCRAA applies to 

furnishers like Bank of America. 

(Pls.’ Opp’n 5:19–6:4.) 

Section 1785.31 provides a private right of action for 

enforcement of 1785.25(a) against furnishers of credit 

information. See Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 

1147, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that 1785.25(a) may be 

enforced by “private rights of action” against “furnisher[s] of 

credit information”). Further, this “private right of action to 

enforce California Civil Code section 1785.25(a) is not preempted 

by the FCRA.” Id. at 1173. Therefore, the portion of Defendants’ 

motion seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs’ CCRAA claim alleged under 

section 1785.25(a) is DENIED. 

D. Breach of Contract Claim 

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ breach of 

contract claim on two grounds: “First,” Defendants argue 

“Plaintiffs neglect to allege what provisions of the [HAMP 

permanent] modification documents [Defendants] allegedly 

breached.” (Defs.’ Mot. 9:16–17.) “Second,” Defendants argue 

“Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim fails for the additional 

reason that Plaintiffs have not alleged any actual damages 

resulting from [Defendants’] alleged breach.” (Id. at 10:5–6.) 

Plaintiffs counter: “[t]he Modification Agreement which 

Bank of America breached is attached as [an e]xhibit . . . to the 

Complaint . . . ; [i]ts language is explicit, and both the 

Complaint and Modification Agreement are specific about what 

terms were breached.” (Pls.’ Opp’n 6:13-15.) “Moreover, 

[Plaintiffs argue Defendants] can cite no authority for [their] 

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contention that Plaintiffs must identify specific contractual 

language in their Complaint to state a [breach of contract] 

claim.” (Id. at 6:26-28.) Plaintiffs further rejoin that they 

“sufficiently plead contract damages” since “it is not necessary 

to point out in detail the nature and extent of general damages. 

The question of how they arose . . . is the subject of evidence 

rather than pleading.” (Id. at 7:14–21.) Plaintiffs also argue: 

specific allegations [in their Complaint] 

that they were damaged by Bank of America’s 

breach in that Bank of America tried to 

collect well over $10,000 of arrears they did 

not owe (Compl. ¶ 28) that it sought to 

collect on the amount of their original 

unpaid balance even though it had induced 

them to enter into a $93,000 debt to HUD in 

exchange for a reduction of that debt (id. ¶ 

25) that it brought them to the brink of 

foreclosure (id. ¶ 28) imposed fees in breach 

of the contract, and harmed their credit (id. 

30). These allegations more than meet the 

Iqbal standard for pleading contract damages. 

(Id. at 7:23–8:1.) 

To state a claim “for breach of contract, a plaintiff 

must plead . . . (1) a contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or 

excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) damage 

to plaintiff.” Walsh v. W. Valley Mission Cmty. Coll. Dist., 66 

Cal. App. 4th 1532, 1545 (1998). 

Here, “the [permanent loan modification agreement] is 

[attached to the Complaint] and . . . [Plaintiffs’] [C]omplaint 

clearly sets out the facts and legal theory under which [they] 

seek relief.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 

F.3d 1035, 1042 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010). Under such circumstances, 

Defendants have not shown that the Plaintiffs must allege the 

specific contractual provision breached to state a breach of 

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contract claim. Id. at 1042 (reversing district court’s dismissal 

of breach of contract claim where the specific portions of the 

contract that the plaintiff alleges were violated where not set 

forth in the complaint); see also McKell v. Wash. Mut., Inc., 142 

Cal. App. 4th 1457, 1490 (2006) (stating that “Plaintiffs have 

still failed to identify the . . . contractual provision under 

which Washington Mutual required them to pay underwriting and 

wire transfer costs,” but holding that plaintiffs “stated a cause 

of action for breach of contract”). 

Further, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged damages 

resulting from Defendants’ alleged breach of the permanent 

mortgage modification agreement. See, e.g., Sutcliffe v. Wells 

Fargo Bank, N.A., 283 F.R.D. 533, 553 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 

(indicating “adverse credit consequences . . . would sufficiently 

allege damages to support [the p]laintiffs’ breach of contract 

claim”); Newsome v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, Nos. C 11-00423 

SBA, C 09-5288 SBA, 2011 WL 2462315, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 

2011) (denying motion to dismiss breach of contract claim for 

inadequate allegations concerning damages where the plaintiffs 

alleged they “incurred . . . late fees and other charges as a . . 

. result of [the d]efendant’s alleged breach of their 

agreement”). 

For the stated reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim is DENIED. 

E. Promissory Estoppel Claim 

 Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ promissory 

estoppel claim, arguing, inter alia: 

Plaintiffs admit that Bank of America’s 

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alleged promise to bring Plaintiffs’ loan 

current was conditioned upon Plaintiffs 

‘entering into a new subordinate Note and 

Deed of Trust, among other requirements.’ See 

Complt. [sic] ¶ 47. Where an alleged promise 

is . . . subject to further considerations, 

the “clear and unambiguous” requirement for 

promissory estoppel is not met. 

(Defs.’ Mot. 11:8-26.) 

Plaintiffs do not address this argument in their 

opposition. Instead, Plaintiffs confirm that Defendants’ alleged 

promise for a “permanent loan modification” was conditioned upon 

“agree[ing] to a subordinate loan and lien on their property.” 

(Pls.’ Opp’n 8:12-14 (citing Compl. ¶ 47).) 

“Promissory estoppel is ‘a doctrine which employs 

equitable principles to satisfy the requirement that 

consideration must be given in exchange for the promise sought to 

be enforced.’” Kajima/Ray Wilson v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. 

Auth., 23 Cal. 4th 305, 310 (2000) (quoting Raedeke v. Gibraltar 

Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 10 Cal.3d 665, 672 (1974)). “‘The purpose of 

this doctrine is to make a promise binding, under certain 

circumstances, without consideration in the usual sense of 

something bargained for and given in exchange. If the promisee’s 

performance was requested at the time the promisor made his 

promise and that performance was bargained for, the doctrine is 

inapplicable.’” Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 198 Cal. App. 

4th 256, 275 (2011) (quoting Youngman v. Nev. Irrigation Dist., 

70 Cal. 2d 240, 249 (1969)). “Accordingly, a plaintiff cannot 

state a claim for promissory estoppel when the promise was given 

in return for proper consideration. The claim instead must be 

pleaded as one for breach of the bargained-for contract.” Id. 

Case 2:12-cv-02502-KJM-KJN Document 48 Filed 10/25/13 Page 15 of 16
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