Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05061/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05061-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carlos Arbelaez-Alfonso
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

.. 

UNI~ED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

-TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

United Stat.es Court of Appeals 

Tenth circuit 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

FRANCISCO BEJARANO-ALFONSO and 

CARLOS ARBELAEZ-ALFONSO, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

JUNO 8 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 89-5060 

& 89-5061 

(D.C. No. 88-CR-99-C) 

(N. D. Oklahoma) 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, LOGAN and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

This case comes to us on appeal from the defendants' 

Francisco Bejarano-Alfonso and Carlos Arbelaez-Alfonso conviction 

on one count each of conspiracy to distribute more than five 

kilograms of cocaine. 21 U.S.C. §§ 84l(a)(l), 84l(b)(l)(A)(ii), 

846. Each defendant pleaded guilty to the charge, reserving his 

right to appeal the district court's adverse ruling on their joint 

motion to suppress certain evidence. 

On July 21, 1988, defendants were traveling in a rental truck 

on the Will Rogers Turnpike when they approached the terminus at 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-5061 Document: 010110036159 Date Filed: 06/08/1990 Page: 1 
A 

Miami, Oklahoma. Defendant Beja~ano was driving; - defendant 

Arbelaez was a passenger in the cab. 

As they approached the toll booth, they were asked to pull 

over to the side of the road by two agents of the United States 

Border Patrol, which maintains a checkpoint at that toll plaza. 

The defendants do not dispute that the agents had a reasonable 

suspicion sufficient to detain them for a limited investigation. 

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). After talking with 

defendants and asking them questions such as whether they were 

legally in the United States and where they were headed, the 

agents requested permission to search the defendants' truck. 

After receiving defendant Bejarano's consent, the agents searched 

the truck and discovered approximately 750 kilograms of cocaine. 

The agents then arrested the defendants, requested backup from the 

Drug Enforcement Agency to secure the truck, and following some 

delay, transported the defendants to Tulsa to be brought before a 

federal magistrate. 

Defendants moved to suppress evidence of incriminating 

statements made by them and evidence discovered in the search of 

the truck. First, they contend that the length of their detention 

transformed it from a Terry stop to a de facto arrest, that they 

were not read their Miranda rights, and therefore, that their 

answers to the agents' questions should have been suppressed. 

Second, defendants contend that because they were in custody at 

the time the request to search was made, their permission was 

coerced, and the search was unreasonable. Finally, defendants 

allege that following their formal arrest, they were questioned, 

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and they made incriminating statements. They contend that those 

statements should be Buppressed because of the unreasonable delay 

between defendants' arrest and the initial appearance before a 

federal magistrate. We disagree and affirm the convictions. 

I 

There is no ''litmus paper" test to distinguish an 

investigative detention from an arrest. Florida v. Royer, 460 

U.S. 491, 506 (1983). While continuing to preserve the 

possibility that a Terry stop may exceed the bounds of an 

investigative detention and become an arrest, United States v. 

Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985), the Supreme Court has yet to lay 

down explicit guidelines as to when the transformation occurs. 

The Court has stated, however, that a Terry stop is proper if it 

is limited to the time required for an officer to ask a moderate 

number of questions in order to resolve his reasonable suspicion. 

See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (analogizing 

traffic stop to Terry stop). 

In this case, the detention of defendants did not exceed the 

limits of a valid Terry stop. They were detained for between 

twenty and thirty minutes in a public place. They were asked for 

identification including proof of legal residence, and then were 

asked fairly innocuous questions regarding their points of origin 

and destination. The length, place, and purpose of the detention 

comport with the requirements that investigative detentions be 

brief, public, and specific in purpose. See United States v. 

Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1986). The fact that 

defendants felt bound to remain and answer the questions of the 

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Appellate Case: 89-5061 Document: 010110036159 Date Filed: 06/08/1990 Page: 3 
officers does not transform the stop . into an arrest. See 

Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 436 & n.25, 442. 

Because defendants were not under arrest, and their detention 

was not the equivalent of a formal arrest, they were not entitled 

to Miranda warnings. Id. at 442. Therefore, their answers to 

questions asked by the border agents are admissible against them. 

II 

Defendants argue that their consent to the agents' search of 

the truck was coerced by the "shadow of authority'' surrounding the 

detention. 

search. 

They therefore ask us to suppress the fruit of the 

The voluntariness of consent to search is an issue of fact. 

The district court determination of the issue will not be 

disturbed unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Recalde, 761 

F.2d 1448, 1457 (10th Cir. 1985). Voluntary consent must be shown 

by clear and specific testimony; consent must have been given 

without coercion, express or implied; and the district court must 

take into account the traditional presumption against the waiver 

of constitutional rights. Id. at 1453. 

Based on the totality of the circumstances, Schneckloth v. 

Bustamente, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973), we cannot hold that the 

district court erred in concluding that defendant Bejarano 

voluntarily consented to the search of the truck. 1 There was no 

1 Defendant Arbelaez lacked standing to challenge the search of 

the truck because he was not an authorized renter of the truck and 

did not claim ownership of the contraband located therein. Rakas 

v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978); United States v. Erwin, 875 

F.2d 268, 270-71 (10th Cir. 1989). This holding accords with 

defendant Arbelaez's own testimony that he did not have the 

Continued to next page 

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evidence of threats, promises, or force in obtaining defendant's 

consent~- Espinosa, 782 F.2d at 892. · The agents had no obligation 

to inform Bejarano of his right to refuse to allow the search at 

the time they made their request. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. 

The environment, a roadside stop with questioning of two suspects 

by two agents, was not inherently coercive. See id. at 247 

(analogizing noncustodial questioning to request for consent to 

search); Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 438 (emphasizing public location 

and few officers as characteristic of roadside stop). 

We therefore hold that the consent to search given by 

Bejarano was valid and the district court properly denied 

defendants' joint motion to suppress the evidence of the cocaine 

found in the truck. 

III 

Defendants allege that there was an unnecessary twenty-fourhour delay in their initial appearance before the federal 

magistrate caused by the standard arraignment schedule in Tulsa, 

that this delay was unreasonable, and therefore, that all 

incriminating statements made by them during this period should be 

suppressed. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 5; 18 U.S.C. § 350l(c). 

We note that delay is not in itself sufficient to require 

suppression of the evidence. Only delay that undermines the 

voluntary character of the statements will serve to bar the 

statements. See United States v Shoemaker, 542 F.2d 561, 563 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976). Because the 

Continued from previous page 

authority to give permission for the search because he was "not 

the person that was in charge of the truck." IV R. 23-24. 

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Appellate Case: 89-5061 Document: 010110036159 Date Filed: 06/08/1990 Page: 5 
quantity~of drugs found required special handling to secure and 

transport, -· defendants'- lack of English required that a bilingual 

agent be found to assist in processing, 2 and defendants had to be 

transported a distance of ninety-five miles from Miami to Tulsa, 

the district court found the delay in the initial appearance 

before the magistrate to be reasonable. IV R. at 83-85, 87, 92. 

The district court expressly rejected defendants' contention that, 

despite the delays, they arrived in Tulsa early enough to allow an 

appearance before the magistrate on the day of their arrest, and 

we cannot disturb that factual finding on appeal. Id. at 87. 

Moreover, the evidence, as found by the district court, indicated 

that defendants were freely and voluntarily cooperating with the 

agents during the entire delay. Id. at 84, 86. We therefore hold 

that the delay the defendants experienced was not unreasonable and 

that statements made by them in the interim were admissible. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

James K. Logan 

Circuit Judge 

2 The delay attendant on the arrival of a bilingual DEA agent 

turned out to be entirely necessary because the agent ended up 

translating before the federal magistrate for defendants when an 

official translator could not be found. IV R. at 86. 

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