Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-00016/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-00016-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lawrence S. Brown
Petitioner
Cynthia Tampkins
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

LAWRENCE S. BROWN,

Petitioner,

 vs.

CYNTHIA TAMPKINS,

Respondent. /

No. C 13-0016 PJH (PR)

ORDER GRANTING

RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO

DISMISS AND DENYING

CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY 

This is a habeas case brought pro se by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the petition is barred by the

statute of limitations. Petitioner has filed an opposition and respondent has filed a reply. 

For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted.

DISCUSSION

Statute of Limitations

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which

became law on April 24, 1996, imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on petitions

for a writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions filed by prisoners challenging

non-capital state convictions or sentences must be filed within one year of the latest of the

date on which: (A) the judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or the

time passed for seeking direct review; (B) an impediment to filing an application created by

unconstitutional state action was removed, if such action prevented petitioner from filing;

(C) the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral

review; or (D) the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the

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 Petitioner filed other state habeas petitions that were denied prior to the start of the

statute of limitations. Respondent did not include these petitions as they do not affect the

statute of limitations analysis. See Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) (A state

habeas petition that is filed and denied before the federal limitations period begins does not

have any tolling effect.) Petitioner has included the petitions which indicate they were denied

prior to the commencement of the statute of limitations. Opposition, Ex. 8.

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exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Time during which a properly filed

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending is excluded from

the one-year time limit. Id. § 2244(d)(2). The one-year period generally will run from "the

date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

Petitioner was sentenced on several counts in Monterey County to a six year, eight

month term on May 24, 2005. Motion to Dismiss (MTD), Ex. 1 at 1, 11. On November 1,

2006, the California Court of Appeal remanded the matter for retrial on just two counts, and

directed the trial court to enter a new judgment reflecting that the sentence for a third count

be stayed. Ex. 1 at 39-40. The California Supreme Court denied review on January 17,

2007. Ex. 2. 

On March 8, 2007, the two counts remanded for retrial were dismissed by the

prosecution. Ex. 3. The abstract of judgment was amended on November 28, 2007, and

February 28, 2008. Ex. 4. The abstract was amended a final time on June 22, 2009. Ex.

5. The sentence remained six years and eight months. Id. Petitioner filed a habeas

petition in the Monterey County Superior Court on February 6, 2012, that was denied as

untimely on March 28, 2012. Ex. 6. On April 17, 2012, petitioner filed a habeas petition in

the California Court of Appeal, that was summarily denied on May 1, 2012. Ex. 7.1

 The

instant federal habeas petition was filed on January 2, 2013.

The final abstract of judgment was amended on June 22, 2009, and giving petitioner

the benefit of the doubt was the latest date for the statute of limitations analysis. The

conviction therefore became final 60 days later on August 21, 2009, as petitioner did not

appeal. See Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006) (because California

prisoner did not appeal his conviction, process of direct review became final 60 days after

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conviction); Cal. Rule of Court 8.104(a). The statute of limitations expired one year later on

August 21, 2010. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The instant federal petition filed on January

2, 2013, in untimely absent tolling.

Petitioner’s first state habeas petition after the conviction became final, was filed in

Monterey County Superior Court on February 6, 2012, more than a year after the expiration

of the statute of limitations. Petitioner will not receive statutory tolling for this state habeas

petition or the next petition filed in the court of appeal, as they were filed after the expiration

of the statute of limitations. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)

("[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended

before the state petition was filed," even if the state petition was timely filed). Thus, this

petition is untimely.

Actual Innocence

Petitioner argues that he is actually innocent, therefore the court should review the

merits of his claims. 

In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924 (2013), the Supreme Court recently ruled

that a “convincing showing” of actual innocence under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)

can overcome the AEDPA statute of limitations. In Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, the Supreme

Court held that, a claim of actual innocence “requires petitioner to support his allegations of

constitutional error with new reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence,

trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that was not presented at

trial.” Further, “the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable

juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id. at 327. Under Schlup,

petitioner must establish his factual innocence of the crime, and not mere legal

insufficiency. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); Jaramillo v.

Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 882–83 (9th Cir. 2003).

The Supreme Court has stressed that the exception is limited to “certain exceptional

cases involving a compelling claim of actual innocence.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 522

(2006). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has noted that, because of “the rarity of such evidence,

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in virtually every case, the allegation of actual innocence has been summarily rejected.” 

Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Calderon v. Thomas, 523

U.S. 538, 559 (1998)).

In support of his actual innocence claim, petitioner contends that the trial court gave

improper jury instructions. Petitioner includes a declaration from his appellate counsel. 

Opposition, Ex. 7. Counsel states he no longer has the trial record, but according to

petitioner, the trial court failed to give certain instructions and other instructions were not

complete. Id. Counsel states that if petitioner’s information is correct, it is a claim he

should have raised on appeal. Id.

Petitioner’s allegations regarding jury instructions do not rise to the high level

required to state a claim of actual innocence. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 328 (noting the

need to present “evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have

become available only after the trial”); see also Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 (9th Cir.

2011) (en banc) (“to pass through the Schlup gateway, a petition must show reliable

evidence of his innocence that was not, and could not have been, presented at trial”)

(Kozinski, C.J., concurring). Petitioner has not presented new evidence or shown that no

reasonable juror would have convicted him based on the alleged instructional error.

Equitable Tolling

Petitioner also argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling.

AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate

circumstances. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). "[A] petitioner is entitled

to equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and

(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing." Id.

at 2562 (internal quotation and citation omitted); accord Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104,

1107 (9th Cir. 1999) ("When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence,

account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may

be appropriate."). The diligence required to establish entitlement to equitable tolling is

"reasonable diligence." Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2565.

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Petitioner bears the burden of showing "extraordinary circumstances were the cause

of his untimeliness." Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation

and citation omitted). Where a petitioner fails to show "any causal connection" between the

grounds upon which he asserts a right to equitable tolling and his inability to timely file a

federal habeas application, the equitable tolling claim will be denied. Gaston v. Palmer,

417 F.3d 1030, 1034–35 (9th Cir. 2005). Further, such petitioner must show "his

untimeliness was caused by an external impediment and not by his own lack of diligence." 

Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Roy v.

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2006)).

To the extent that petitioner argues for equitable tolling due to appellate counsel’s

failure to have raised the jury instruction claim on direct appeal, petitioner has failed to

argue why he was unable to raise the issue in a timely manner. Petitioner even states that

he began to consider that the jury instructions could be improper after the court of appeal

remanded several counts back to the trial court on November 1, 2006. Opposition at 7. It

is not clear why several years passed before these claims were pursued. That petitioner

did not fully recognize the significance of the legal issues due to his minimal knowledge of

the law, will not support equitable tolling. See Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154

(9th Cir. 2006) (A pro se petitioner's lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.) Petitioner’s arguments are

insufficient to warrant equitable tolling.

CONCLUSION

Respondent’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 15) is GRANTED as discussed above. 

The petition is DISMISSED. The clerk shall close the file.

APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a

district court that enters a final order adverse to the petitioner to grant or deny a certificate

of appealability in the order. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C.

foll. § 2254.

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A petitioner may not appeal a final order in a federal habeas corpus proceeding

without first obtaining a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App.

P. 22(b). Section 2253(c)(1) applies to an appeal of a final order entered on a procedural

question antecedent to the merits, for instance a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds,

as here. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000).

“Determining whether a COA should issue where the petition was dismissed on

procedural grounds has two components, one directed at the underlying constitutional

claims and one directed at the district court’s procedural holding.” Id. at 484-85. “When the

district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the

prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at

least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim

of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. at 484. As each of these

components is a “threshold inquiry,” the federal court “may find that it can dispose of the

application in a fair and prompt manner if it proceeds first to resolve the issue whose

answer is more apparent from the record and arguments.” Id. at 485. Supreme Court

jurisprudence “allows and encourages” federal courts to first resolve the procedural issue,

as was done here. See id. 

Here, the court declines to issue a COA regarding the procedural holding or the

underlying claims as reasonable jurists would not find the court’s findings debatable. The

court therefore DENIES a COA. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 7, 2014. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\HC.13\Brown0016.mtd.wpd

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