Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-06-04418/USCOURTS-ca6-06-04418-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Margaret Bradshaw
Appellee
Ronald Phillips
Appellant

Document Text:

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 10a0155p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

RONALD PHILLIPS,

 Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

MARGARET BRADSHAW, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

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No. 06-4418

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron.

No. 03-00875—Kathleen McDonald O’Malley, District Judge.

Argued: July 29, 2009

Decided and Filed: June 1, 2010 

Before: SILER, COLE, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Timothy F. Sweeney, LAW OFFICE OF TIMOTHY FARRELL SWEENEY,

Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Adam Michael Van Ho, OFFICE OF THE OHIO

ATTORNEY GENERAL, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Timothy F.

Sweeney, LAW OFFICE OF TIMOTHY FARRELL SWEENEY, Cleveland, Ohio, Ruth L.

Tkacz, OHIO PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Sarah A.

Hadacek, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for

Appellee.

SILER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which McKEAGUE, J., joined.

COLE, J. (pp. 34-47), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

SILER, Circuit Judge. Ronald Phillips was convicted of rape and aggravated murder

of Sheila Marie Evans and sentenced to death. The Ohio courts upheld his conviction and

sentence on direct review and in post-conviction proceedings. The federal district court

1

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denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the following

reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Phillips’s petition.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court recited these facts:

On January 18, 1993, Sheila Marie Evans, age three, died as a result

of cardiovascular collapse due to, inter alia, severe, blunt force trauma to her

abdomen. At the time, Sheila’s mother, Fae Evans, was dating and

occasionally cohabiting with [Phillips]. In addition to Sheila, Evans had two

other children, Sara, twenty-nine months old, and Ronald, Jr., [Phillips’s]

infant son.

Shortly after 10:00 a.m. on the morning of January 18, 1993, Fae

Evans took Ronald, Jr. to see the family physician for a routine physical

examination. [Phillips] remained at Evans’s apartment to care for Sheila and

Sara. Evans returned to the apartment at approximately 11:25 a.m. and

found [Phillips] sitting in the kitchen. Soon thereafter, Evans called out to

her daughters, but they failed either to respond or to appear. [Phillips]

walked into the girls’ bedroom and found Sheila lying on her bed

motionless, pale and cold. He then lifted Sheila and carried her downstairs

to his grandmother’s apartment. Hazel Phillips, [Phillips]’s grandmother,

telephoned the 911 emergency operator, reported that Sheila was not

breathing, and relayed instructions on performing cardiopulmonary

resuscitation to [Phillips]. [Phillips] in turn attempted to revive Sheila until

medical assistance arrived.

Paramedics from the city of Akron responded to the 911 call within

four minutes of being dispatched and immediately transported Sheila to

Children’s Hospital in Akron. Upon her arrival at the emergency room,

Sheila was not breathing and had no pulse. The first physician to examine

Sheila, Dr. Eugene Izsak, noted that she had multiple bruises on her torso,

a distended stomach, apparent internal abdominal injuries, and a stretched

anus with some acute, recent changes. Dr. Izsak’s medical team continued

cardiopulmonary resuscitation and was eventually able to obtain a pulse.

Sheila was transported to the operating room after spending approximately

one hour in the emergency room. Dr. Robert Klein performed emergency

abdominal surgery, which revealed that Sheila’s abdominal cavity was filled

with a significant amount of free air and blood, and that a portion of her

intestine, the duodenum, was perforated and gangrenous. Dr. Klein removed

the dead portion of the intestine, and attempted to control the internal

bleeding. Based upon his observations, Dr. Klein determined that the injury

to the duodenum had been inflicted at least two days prior to Sheila’s

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admission into the hospital. Despite the significant medical efforts

performed at Children’s Hospital, Sheila died later that day.

On January 19, 1993, Dr. William Cox, the Summit County Coroner,

conducted an autopsy on Sheila. During his external examination of Sheila,

Dr. Cox documented more than one hundred twenty-five bruises, many of

which he identified as acute injuries that had been inflicted within a few

hours of death. The bruising indicated that Sheila had been severely beaten

about her head, face, upper and lower torso, arms, legs, and genitalia. He

also detailed that the blows to Sheila’s abdomen had resulted in severe

internal trauma, including hemorrhaging in her stomach, intestine and other

internal organs. Dr. Cox examined the section of Sheila’s bowel that had

been surgically removed, and determined that the injury to the duodenum

had occurred approximately forty-eight hours prior to her death. During that

forty-eight-hour period, Dr. Cox opined, Sheila would have suffered from

intense abdominal pain, an inability to eat, vomiting, a high temperature, and

listlessness. The beating Sheila suffered on the morning of January 18, 1993

caused the already necrotic and gangrenous duodenum to rupture. Dr. Cox

concluded that Sheila died as a result of cardiovascular collapse stemming

from the severe, blunt force trauma to her abdomen, and the numerous

related complications.

Dr. Cox also discovered during the autopsy evidence of acute anal

penetration. Based upon the presence of contusions and lacerations, Dr. Cox

determined that Sheila had sustained repetitive anal penetrations over a

period of time, and that the most recent anal trauma had occurred sometime

during the morning of January 18, 1993. Given the absence of abrasions

within the rectum, Dr. Cox further concluded that Sheila had been anally

penetrated by a penis rather than by a finger or some other foreign object.

At approximately 3:00 p.m. on the day Sheila died, Detective Jan

Falcone, an officer with the Juvenile Bureau of the Akron Police

Department, interviewed [Phillips] at the police station. Although [Phillips]

was not placed under arrest, Falcone read [Phillips] his Miranda rights,

which he waived. During the interview, [Phillips] admitted that on Friday,

January 15, 1993, or Saturday, January 16, 1993, he had spanked Sheila

three times with an open hand. After the spanking, [Phillips] noticed bruises

on the girl’s bottom, which surprised him. He said, “I really didn’t think I

spanked her that hard but I told Fae I would not do it any more.” [Phillips]

indicated that Sheila had not felt well during the weekend, and that she had

vomited several times.

[Phillips] also told Falcone that Sheila had been injured on several

previous occasions. He recalled one incident in which Sheila fell on a

railroad spike which penetrated either her vagina or anus. On another

occasion, [Phillips] claimed that Sheila hurt her “vagina and stomach area”

when she jumped from a dresser to a bed and struck the corner of the bed.

Sheila bruised her eye and cut her lip when she fell down a flight of stairs.

[Phillips] denied having ever touched Sheila or Sara in their “private areas.”

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At some point during the interview, [Phillips] was informed that

Sheila had died. Falcone then asked [Phillips] again what had happened to

Sheila. [Phillips] responded that the night before Sheila’s death, he had

observed Evans in the girls’ bedroom standing over Sheila with both fists

clenched after hearing Sheila scream, “Don’t beat me.” The interview

ceased after that exchange, and [Phillips] left the police station. In total, the

interview lasted approximately seven hours, during which time [Phillips]

was provided with food, beverages, and several breaks.

On Wednesday, January 19, 1993, [Phillips] telephoned the Akron

police station in order to speak with the detectives who were investigating

Sheila’s death. Detective Ronald Perella, a detective assigned to the case,

was attending Sheila’s autopsy at the time [Phillips’s] call was received and

thus was unable to immediately speak with appellant. The next morning,

Perella and his supervisor, Sergeant Dye, drove to South Alternative School,

where [Phillips] was enrolled as a student. The officers met with [Phillips]

and asked him to return to the police department for further questioning.

[Phillips] complied, was driven to the Juvenile Bureau of the police

department, and taken to an interviewing room. Perella read [Phillips] his

Miranda rights, which he again waived, and asked [Phillips] to share

whatever additional information he wished to convey. [Phillips] then

repeated the same information he had given to Detective Falcone on the

previous day. The detectives questioned [Phillips] as to why he had

telephoned them if he simply wanted to reiterate his earlier statement. They

also informed [Phillips] that the coroner had performed an autopsy on

Sheila, and therefore knew everything that had happened to her.

At that point, [Phillips] asked Sergeant Dye to leave the room so that

he could speak with Detective Perella alone. Dye agreed. Once they were

alone, [Phillips] told Perella, “I don’t want to go to jail, I don’t want to get

pumped in the butt.” Perella responded that “not everybody who gets

arrested goes to jail, that there could be counseling but without knowing

what [Phillips] wanted to talk about, that [Perella] couldn’t promise him

anything except to tell the prosecutor and the judge that he cooperated.”

[Phillips] then confessed that on the morning of January 18, 1993, he “lost

it” and repeatedly hit Sheila. [Phillips] explained that he had called Sheila

three times for breakfast and she had failed to respond. As a result,

[Phillips] went to the girls’ bedroom, pulled the covers off Sheila, and began

hitting her, throwing her against the walls, and dragging her by her hair.

During the beating, [Phillips] noticed that Sheila was not wearing

underwear, which caused him to become sexually aroused. After beating

Sheila, [Phillips] stated he put Vaseline on her anus and inserted his fingers.

While [Phillips] admitted that he thought about anally penetrating the

three-year-old girl with his penis on that morning, he denied doing so.

[Phillips] did confess to anally penetrating Sheila with his penis on two prior

occasions, but claimed that Evans had paid him to perform those acts.

Toward the end of the approximately three-hour interview, [Phillips]

prepared a handwritten statement detailing the events to which he had

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verbally confessed. Shortly after he completed the written statement,

[Phillips] was arrested.

State v. Phillips, 656 N.E.2d 643, 650-52 (Ohio 1995).

B. Procedural history

On August 18, 1993, an Ohio jury convicted Phillips on one count of aggravated

murder, one count of felonious sexual penetration, and three counts of rape. On

September 14, 1993, the trial court adopted the jury’s recommendation and sentenced

Phillips to death on the aggravated murder conviction and to life imprisonment on each of

his remaining convictions. The Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court

affirmed his convictions and sentence. State v. Phillips, No. 16487, 1994 WL 479164 (Ohio

Ct. App. Aug. 31, 1994); Phillips, 656 N.E.2d at 673. 

In 1996, Phillips filed a state petition for post-conviction relief, which the trial court

denied. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for

further proceedings. State v. Phillips, No. 18949, 1999 WL 58961 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 3,

1999). On remand, the trial court again rejected Phillips’s petition, and the Ohio Court of

Appeals affirmed. State v. Phillips, No. 20692, 2002 WL 274637 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 27,

2002). The Ohio Supreme Court denied Phillips’s request for further review. State v.

Phillips, 769 N.E.2d 403 (Ohio 2002). In 2003, Phillips petitioned for a writ of habeas

corpus, alleging twenty-five separate grounds for relief. The district court denied his petition

but granted him a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on six claims. Phillips v. Bradshaw,

No. 5:03 CV 875, 2006 WL 2855077 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2006).

II. ANALYSIS

The six claims certified for appeal are: (1) whether Phillips’s conviction for

aggravated murder was supported by sufficient evidence; (2) whether the jury’s finding that

Phillips raped Sheila on the morning of her death was supported by sufficient evidence; (3)

whether the jury’s finding that Phillips intended to kill Sheila was supported by sufficient

evidence; (4) whether members of the jury were inflamed by the statements of a grand juror;

(5) whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury outside the presence of Phillips and

his counsel; and (6) whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the

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mitigation phase. Phillips also asserts claims of prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury

instructions, but he has not obtained a COA as to these issues. Accordingly, these issues are

not before us. See Owens v. Guida, 549 F.3d 399, 408, 414 (6th Cir. 2008).

A. Standard of review

We review the district court’s decision to grant or deny a habeas petition de novo.

Murphy v. Ohio, 551 F.3d 485, 493 (6th Cir. 2009). Because Phillips filed his habeas

petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,

Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (“AEDPA”), we may grant the writ “with respect to a

‘claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings’ if the state court’s

decision ‘was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Murphy, 551 F.3d

at 493 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). “A state-court decision is contrary to clearly

established federal law ‘if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set

forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases’ or ‘if the state court confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives

at a result different from [that] precedent.’” Id. at 493-94 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 405 (2000)). “A state-court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law if it correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it

unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case, or if it either unreasonably extends

or unreasonably refuses to extend a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new

context.” Id. at 494 (quotation marks and citations omitted). The AEDPA standard of

review only applies to claims that were “adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings.” Hartman v. Bagley, 492 F.3d 347, 356 (6th Cir. 2007).

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B. Ineffective assistance of counsel

We turn first to whether counsel for the defendant provided adequate assistance at

the penalty phase of Phillips’s trial because we see this as the central issue in this appeal.

1. State court decisions

The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this claim: 

Appellant contends that his counsel introduced “paltry evidence” in

mitigation, and presented appellant in a manner that provided the jury with

no reasonable means to recommend a sentence other than death. We

disagree. The defense introduced six witnesses during the mitigation

hearing in addition to appellant’s unsworn statement. Appellant’s

grandmother, mother, father, brother and neighbor described appellant as a

kind, helpful, friendly, and good person who never abused drugs or alcohol

and who cared a great deal for all of Fae Evans’s children. The defense also

introduced the fact that appellant did not have a juvenile or criminal record,

which appellant repeated in his unsworn statement. A defense psychologist

presented expert testimony that appellant functions with a “low average”

level of intelligence, that he is “a rather simple, emotionally immature,

psychologically inadequate person” who is ill-equipped to deal with the

pressures of a family situation. Added to the evidence of appellant’s age

(nineteen) and his expressed remorse, the evidence presented in mitigation

fails to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Phillips, 656 N.E.2d at 659.

After Phillips raised this issue again in his post-conviction petition, the Ohio Court

of Appeals concluded that it was meritless: 

Mr. Phillips claimed that his convictions are void or voidable

because he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel in the

mitigation phase of his trial when his counsel: 1) failed to request Children’s

Services records in order to get information both on Mr. Phillips and the

environment in which he was raised and 2) neglected to request funds for a

mitigation specialist, who would have gathered complete background

information on Mr. Phillips. He avers that, had a mitigation specialist been

retained, the psychologist could have conducted a more reliable

psychological evaluation of Mr. Phillips and his attorneys could have

presented complete mitigating evidence to the jury. He argued that, as a

result of his counsel’s allegedly deficient performance, his constitutional

rights guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 1, 2,

5, 9, 10, 16 and 20 of the Ohio Constitution were violated.

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As previously discussed, before a hearing is granted in proceedings

for postconviction relief upon a claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel, the petitioner bears the initial burden to submit evidentiary material

containing sufficient operative facts that demonstrate a substantial violation

of any of defense counsel’s essential duties to his client and prejudice arising

from counsel’s ineffectiveness. [State v.] Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d [279,] 289,

714 N.E.2d 905 [(1999)]; see, also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 [].

Furthermore, when a defendant challenges a death sentence, the appropriate

standard for determining whether prejudice resulted “is whether there is a

reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer-including an

appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence-would

have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances

did not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 [].

Generally, the decision of what mitigating evidence to present during

the penalty phase of a capital trial is a matter of trial strategy. State v. Keith

(1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 530, 684 N.E.2d 47. Moreover, debatable trial

tactics generally do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. [State v.]

Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d at 49, 402 N.E.2d 1189 [(1980)]. This court must

indulge in a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct falls within the

wide range of reasonable professional assistance. [State v.] Hartman, 93

Ohio St.3d at 300, 754 N.E.2d 1150 [(2001)]. Significantly, the existence

of alternative or additional mitigation theories generally does not establish

ineffective assistance of counsel. [State v.] Combs, 100 Ohio App.3d [90,]

105, 652 N.E.2d 205 [(1994)].

During the penalty phase of trial, Mr. Phillips’ counsel presented the

testimony of Mr. Phillips’ grandmother, mother, father, brother, and

neighbor. Through their testimonies, counsel attempted to show that Mr.

Phillips was a kind and caring person, who was always trying to help his

relatives and friends and who cared deeply for Ms. Evans’ children.

Evidence was presented that, during Mr. Phillips’ youth, his family got

along well together and routinely went on family camping trips and played

games. Counsel also introduced evidence that, despite being raised in a high

crime area and having immediate family members with criminal

backgrounds, Mr. Phillips made a conscious choice to abstain from drug and

alcohol abuse, avoid gang activity, and improve his grades so that he could

graduate from high school and join the military. Mr. Phillips had no prior

criminal record and was nineteen years old at the time of the murder.

Additionally, Dr. James Brown, a defense psychologist who met with Mr.

Phillips on four occasions, interviewed his parents, and administered

psychological tests, testified that Mr. Phillips was an emotionally immature

individual with below average intelligence, who was unable to cope with the

stresses of a family situation. Although defense counsel was aware that Mr.

Phillips’ family history was less than ideal, counsel chose to downplay those

facts, and instead, focus on Mr. Phillips’ character, family support, and his

potential for rehabilitation.

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In his petition, Mr. Phillips attacked his trial counsel’s mitigation

strategy, asserting that such strategy was a result of poor preparation and

inadequate investigation into his background. To that end, Mr. Phillips cites

his counsel’s failure to request Summit County Children’s Services records

and to obtain a mitigation specialist. He argues that, had more background

information been obtained by his counsel, a reliable psychological

evaluation could be performed and the jury could have been presented with

complete mitigating evidence.

In furtherance of this assertion, Mr. Phillips proffered new evidence

which tended to show that his father was verbally, emotionally, and

physically abusive to the children in his household. He also submitted a

psychological evaluation of a psychologist who was provided with more

background information than Dr. Brown. This psychologist opined that Mr.

Phillips may suffer from a variety of psychological disorders, including

bipolar disorder, but stated that, before he could “complete a valid and

comprehensive evaluation,” he would need to obtain additional information.

Mr. Phillips also presented affidavits of a mitigation specialist and a capital

litigation specialist. The mitigation specialist concluded that the mitigation

phase was not handled properly by defense counsel. The capital litigation

specialist did not address Mr. Phillips’ case but rather described effective

methods of presenting mitigating evidence.

Initially, we note that hiring a mitigation specialist in a capital case

is not a requirement of effective assistance of counsel. State v. McGuire

(1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 399, 686 N.E.2d 1112. A review of the record

in this case reveals that trial counsel performed an adequate investigation of

Mr. Phillips’ personal background and presented the expert testimony of a

psychologist, thereby providing insight into Mr. Phillips’ mental condition.

Trial counsel chose to present Mr. Phillips as a caring, helpful, and decent

person, who was a “salvageable” human being and would do well in prison.

On the other hand, Mr. Phillips’ petition subscribes to an alternative

mitigation strategy, namely focusing on the dysfunction and abusive family

environment and the absence of a moral and social compass for Mr. Phillips.

The evidence adduced with the petition supports this alternative mitigation

strategy-a strategy that may actually have been less persuasive.

As previously discussed, the existence of alternative or additional

mitigation theories generally does not establish ineffective assistance of

counsel. Combs, 100 Ohio App.3d at 105, 652 N.E.2d 205. Based on the

foregoing, we cannot find that the trial court erred in determining that Mr.

Phillips failed to set forth sufficient operative facts that demonstrate a

substantive violation of his trial counsel’s essential duties. See Calhoun, 86

Ohio St.3d at 289, 714 N.E.2d 905. Significantly, on direct appeal, the Ohio

Supreme Court held that the evidence presented in mitigation was not paltry,

as Mr. Phillips contended, and failed to support a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d at 86, 656 N.E.2d 643.

Furthermore, this court holds that Mr. Phillips failed to adduce sufficient

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operative facts establishing that there was a reasonable probability that,

absent trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance, the sentencer would

have concluded that the aggravating circumstance did not outweigh the

mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.

Phillips, 2002 WL 274637, at *9-11.

2. Legal standard 

Phillips claims that his counsel were ineffective because they failed to investigate,

discover, and present evidence found in the Summit County Child Services Bureau (“CSB”)

records and to interview his half-siblings about the Phillips’ home. He claims that such

investigation would have revealed extensive mitigating information about his background

that was important for the jury to hear and that would have allowed his psychologist to opine

accurately about his psychological condition and the reasons for his crime. We engage in

a two-part inquiry when reviewing ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims: 

First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.

This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was

not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment. Second the defendant must show that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense. This requires a showing that counsel’s

errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose

result is reliable. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A counsel’s performance is deficient

if it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. Strickland held that:

[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts

relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic

choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely

to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations

on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular

investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision

not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the

circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s

judgments.

Id. at 690-91. Counsel has an obligation to perform a thorough investigation of the

defendant’s background or make a reasonable decision that such investigation is

unnecessary. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522-23 (2003). We must decide “whether

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the investigation supporting counsel’s decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of

[Phillips’s] background was itself reasonable.” Id. at 523. “A counsel's performance is

deficient if he committed errors so serious that he was not performing at a reasonable

professional level. The burden is on the defendant to make such a showing by ‘identify[ing]

the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable

professional judgment.’” Williams v. Coyle, 260 F.3d 684, 703 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 

“We review the decision of the last state court to reach this point, the state court of

appeals [in post-conviction proceedings] for compliance with AEDPA.” See Johnson v.

Bagley, 544 F.3d 592, 599 (6th Cir. 2008). “[I]n judging the reasonableness of the

adjudication, we look to Wiggins [] and Rompilla . . . because they . . . ‘applied the same

clearly established precedent as Strickland.’” Id. (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522).

Even if there is deficient performance, there is no constitutionally ineffective

assistance of counsel unless Phillips was prejudiced by the performance. To satisfy this

prong, Phillips “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694. Because the state court decided this constitutional issue in cursory fashion

“‘without extended discussion,’” we apply a modified form of AEDPA review. See

Maldonado v. Wilson, 416 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d

940, 943 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000)). The modified-AEDPA standard of review requires us to

“conduct a careful review of the record and applicable law, but nonetheless bars [us] from

reversing unless the state court’s decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of

federal law.” Id. (citing Howard v. Bouchard, 405 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir.2005)). 

3. Counsel’s mitigation efforts and the evidence presented to the jury

Phillips’s counsel did perform some investigation into potential mitigating factors.

Kerry O’Brien and Michael Edminister represented Phillips at trial, with Edminister handling

most of the responsibilities related to the mitigation phase. The trial court appointed a

psychologist, Dr. James Brown, to evaluate Phillips, and the court allowed Phillips’s counsel

to hire a mitigation specialist. Counsel retained the services of a former Akron police officer

who, according to counsel, was the only available option with the resources available. 

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In his efforts to acquire mitigating evidence, Edminister talked with Phillips’s mother

and father, at least one of his siblings and one of his half-siblings, his grandparents,

neighbors, and former teachers. Edminister obtained Phillips’s school records and reviewed

some CSB records relating to the Phillips family. At the CSB office, Edminister met with

the prosecutor and a CSB attorney and was given access to only five files, none of which he

was permitted to copy. Edminister took handwritten notes about the contents of those files,

stating that one of them was a “very important file for mitigation purposes.” Edminister’s

notes from what appears to be an interview with the Phillips family also indicate that “CSB

came out inquiring about possible sexual abuse of William, Sr. on daughter Tanya,” but

Edminister failed to confirm this in CSB’s records. He never viewed CSB’s other files on

the Phillips family and never made any other effort to obtain access to those files or copy any

of the materials. In Edminister’s and O’Brien’s conversations with Phillips and his family

members, none revealed a history of abuse in the Phillips household.

Dr. Brown, whom counsel provided with a summary of the case and Phillips’s

written confession, interviewed Phillips on four occasions and performed at least two

psychological tests on him. He also interviewed Phillips’s parents. He prepared a five-page

report summarizing his findings. It noted that four of Phillips’s siblings “exhibit rather

marginal adjustments to society” and that, like Phillips’s parents, three of Phillips’s siblings

had felony convictions. The report stated that Phillips showed signs of “character

deficiencies,” such as emotional immaturity, “underlying hostility and [an] inflexible

approach to conflict,” “remarkably poor tolerance for stress and pressure,” “self-doubt,

inferiority and feelings of incompetence,” “psychological inadequacy,” and an “extremely

simplistic and immature view of the world.” However, Dr. Brown concluded that Phillips

was not mentally ill and did not suffer from a personality disorder. 

At Phillips’s mitigation hearing before the jury, counsel called several witnesses to

testify. A neighbor, Lonnie Bell, testified that Phillips was always respectful and would help

him with household chores. Hazel Phillips, Phillips’s grandmother, testified that Phillips was

a normal boy who was generally obedient and helped her with chores around the house.

William Phillips, Jr., Phillips’s brother, testified that he and Phillips played together as

children and engaged in normal activities, such as fishing, swimming, and camping. He also

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explained that Phillips was generally a good student without disciplinary problems and was

good with younger children.

Phillips’s father, William, Sr., testified that Phillips was a good child with many

friends. He testified that Phillips was always respectful to his elders and that prior to his

arrest for the present offenses, Phillips planned to join the Army to become a diesel

mechanic. William, Sr. acknowledged physically punishing his children when they were

disobedient. On cross-examination, he admitted that he had been convicted for obstruction

of justice and receipt of stolen property. Donna Phillips, Phillips’s mother, testified that

Phillips was a normal child who was helpful around the house and assisted elderly neighbors

with chores. She stated that Phillips never drank, smoked, or used drugs. While he had no

behavior or disciplinary problems at school, Phillips was intellectually slower than the other

students. On cross-examination, Donna admitted that Phillips had been suspended from

school several times for disciplinary reasons, including gross insubordination to a teacher

and physically harming another student. She also admitted that she knew of at least one

occasion when the defendant had struck Fae Evans. Donna acknowledged that she had a

felony conviction for aggravated drug trafficking.

 Dr. Brown testified that Phillips came across as “a rather simple, emotionally

immature, psychologically inadequate person” who harbored “a lot of anger[,]” felt

“frustrated very easily[,]” lived with feelings of insecurity, inadequacy, and inferiority, and

did not “feel particularly connected with any people[.]” Brown told the jury that “Phillips

experienced repeated frustrations in his life,” which caused his “anger [to] build[] up so that

it comes out and it seems way out of proportion to what may trigger it.” According to

Brown, Phillips’s IQ score was 87, which placed him in the low-average range, but he did

not suffer from a mental disease, mental illness, retardation, or antisocial disorder. Brown

stated that Phillips “came off much more like a 12-year old.” Brown testified that it was “a

little surprising” that Phillips had committed this crime, since he had managed to avoid any

previous criminal record even though he had grown up in an “antisocial” environment.

Brown found no evidence that Phillips had been beaten or sexually abused as a child, but he

found that Phillips manifested a poor tolerance for stressful situations. He explained that

Phillips needed a structured environment with rigid controls, where authority and the

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consequences of not obeying authority were clearly delineated. Brown opined that Phillips

could adjust well to prison.

Phillips made an unsworn oral statement on his own behalf. Despite growing up in

a crime-infested neighborhood, he avoided drinking and using drugs. He tried to be helpful

to his family and neighbors. He denied that he suffered abuse during his childhood. He also

indicated that he had never been arrested prior to the current offense and had only one

previous minor brush with the police. Once he started dating Evans, he helped care for her

two young daughters, and he gave them a dog as a pet. After his son was born, Phillips

cared for him as well.

4. Undisclosed mitigating evidence

The following evidence was not presented to the jury during the mitigation phase and

Phillips alleges its omission was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

a. Child Services Bureau records

The nature of Phillips’s home life is described in the course of nearly two decades

worth of CSB records that his counsel apparently never saw. Phillips’s mother had three

children in a prior relationship: Tracy (born in 1965), Mary (born in 1966), and Edward, or

“Eddie” (born in 1968). She then married Phillips’s father, William, Sr., with whom she had

four children: William, Jr. (born in 1972), Petitioner (born in 1973), Eric (born in 1975), and

Tanya (born in 1976). The family moved from Pennsylvania to Akron, Ohio, when Phillips

was two years old. CSB records state that the CSB’s counterpart in Pittsburgh contacted

CSB to warn that “[w]hile living in Pittsburgh, the three older children were frequently

physically abused,” and, on the seldom occasions when they came to school, “were marked

and bruised.” The Pittsburgh caseworker described the family’s situation as “deplorable.”

CSB visited the Phillips home in Akron and described Donna Phillips as an

inadequate mother and the family as functioning “marginally” with multiple problems. In

1977, when Phillips was three years old, CSB received a complaint that Phillips’s father was

beating his step-children, grabbing them by the throat, and threatening them with additional

physical abuse if they revealed to anyone that they were being beaten. However, the

complainant noted that William, Sr. did not abuse his own children in the same manner. The

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complainant also stated that there were dog feces “all over the place” at the Phillips home

and that the children were “always dirty and unkempt.” Following a visit to the Phillips

home that year, a CSB caseworker stated that “[t]he house smelled terrible, was filthy dirty,

was messy, and cluttered. The odor was overwhelming; it was a combination of their dog

. . . old food and dirt.” The children “looked hungry and not very well nourished.” (Id.)

During this time, Donna Phillips informed CSB that Phillips’s father “comes and goes,” and

she falsely told CSB that they were divorced.

 The next year, in 1978, CSB received another complaint that the three step-children

were being beaten by both parents and that the family had threatened their neighbors with

injury if they reported the abuse to CSB. The complainant told CSB that the “children are

grabbed by the back of the neck, slapped across the face, beaten on [the] back and legs.”

The caller also believed that there were knives and guns in the house. When a CSB

caseworker made a visit to investigate, she could not verify any abuse, but she described

Phillips’s father as screaming and swearing at the top of his lungs when confronted with the

allegations, and she described the children as dirty and of marginal appearance. 

Two years later, in 1980, when Phillips was six years old, CSB received a call

reporting that the three step-children were “always being beaten” and that the previous day

they had been beaten badly. However, the caller stated that the children were afraid to tell

anyone. The following year, in 1981, the principal of Eddie’s school contacted CSB to

report a bruise on his arm allegedly caused by his mother. Donna Phillips admitted that she

had hit both Eddie and William, Jr. with a belt in a fit of rage. In 1983, when Phillips was

nine years old, Eddie reported to CSB that Phillips’s father had grabbed him by the shoulder

and thrown him onto a bench, causing a red mark and difficulty moving the arm. At that

time, Phillips’s father was living at the home sporadically, and a total of fifteen people were

living in the home. Later that same year, one of the adults living in the home contacted CSB

to report that Phillips’s father “punches” his three step-children and had recently “punched

Tracy in the face.” Also in 1983, Eddie reported to CSB that his stepfather had twice pushed

him, had pulled his hair, and had beaten him. On a visit to the Phillips home in 1983, a CSB

caseworker described cockroaches crawling on the table and walls while she was

interviewing Donna Phillips.

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In 1984, a caller reported to CSB that in addition to physically abusing the older

step-children, William, Sr. was molesting Mary. When interviewed by a social worker, the

step-daughter admitted that William, Sr. had physically abused her in the past, but she denied

any sexual abuse. Following additional complaints in 1985, all three of the older stepchildren confirmed that they had been physically abused by both parents. Tracy, who is

mentally retarded, arrived at work with a bruised arm and a cut lip, stating that her mother

had struck her in the face. In 1988, a caller informed the CSB that a drug raid was occurring

at the Phillips house, and children were involved. It turned out that Donna Phillips had been

illegally selling the prescription drug Ritalin. Both parents and Mary were arrested on drugrelated charges, and various drugs and weapons were seized from the house. CSB reported

that, at this time, the Phillips home was in “an extremely filthy condition” with “a rancid

odor” and dog feces throughout the living area of the house. Phillips, who was in seventh

grade at the time, was temporarily sent to live with his grandmother. Later in 1988, an

anonymous caller informed CSB that the Phillips children were running wild, that Donna

Phillips was in jail, and that the children were living with Phillips’s father. In 1992, CSB

received a report that the house was “disgusting [and] uninhabitable for human beings.” 

b. Affidavits of Phillips’s half-siblings

In addition to the CSB reports, Phillips’s three half-siblings submitted affidavits

attesting to the violence and sexual abuse committed against them. Mary Phillips stated that

Phillips’s father physically disciplined Phillips, along with the three step-children. She also

stated that Phillips’s father “would break dishes over my head when I did not do them to his

satisfaction.” According to Mary, Phillips’s father “used to beat my sister, Tracy, and me

buck naked even when we were of high school age,” that he “left black and blue marks on

my butt for a month,” and “used to beat us kids with a belt and smack our faces.” She stated

that her step-father “used to sexually fondle Tracy and me. Once, he took Tracy with him

while looking for a business associate of his. After getting in the truck, [he] pulled off on

a side street and started feeling her breast.” She recounted an incident when she was eight

years old and her step-father exposed his erect penis to her. She stated that he “used to grab

my breast and feel on my butt.” Mary also stated that William, Sr. would engage in fist

fights with Phillips and was emotionally abusive toward him. Mary stated that she was never

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contacted by Phillips’s trial counsel. Tracy confirmed in her affidavit that Phillips’s father

had frequently beaten her. 

Edward stated in an affidavit that “[t]he home that Ron and I grew up in was screwed

up. Ron saw things he should never have seen.” He stated that Phillips’s father would grab

the penises of the male children in the home while wrestling with them. He stated his belief

that Phillips’s father was having sexual relations with his youngest daughter, Tanya. Edward

confirmed the regular beatings that William, Sr. inflicted on his children, stating that he

“used to throw Tracy, Mary, and me up against the wall.” He recounted an incident when

he was twelve years old in which his father beat him on the back with a two-by-four. He

also stated that William, Sr. had regularly beaten his wife and had thrown knives and dishes

at her. Finally, he confirmed that Phillips’s father “used to molest my sisters, Mary and

Tracy, in that he would grab them by the butt or the breast and fondle them.”

c. Psychological report and testimony of Dr. Smith

In the habeas proceeding, Phillips submitted an evaluation from clinical psychologist

Dr. Robert Smith. Smith was provided with the CSB records and wrote an initial opinion

following two interviews of Phillips in 1995 and 1996. He also wrote a supplemental report

based on a follow-up interview in 2004 and testified before the district court.

Smith diagnosed Phillips as suffering from a mixed personality disorder with

borderline and paranoid traits, and opined that Phillips might also suffer from bipolar or

post-traumatic-stress disorder, although Phillips’s refusal or inability to discuss certain

subjects made him difficult to assess. In his initial written report, Smith noted that Phillips

displayed a “level of defensiveness [that] is indicative of severe family dysfunction and an

abusive background.” Smith’s administration of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality

Inventory-2 test resulted in his conclusion that “[i]t is likely that [Phillips] suffers from either

a severe personality disorder, bipolar disorder, or schizophrenia.” He reiterated in the

conclusion of the report: “It is believed that Mr. Phillips suffers from a severe psychological

disorder beyond his personality disorder, such as bipolar disorder or post traumatic stress

disorder.” Dr. Smith testified that Dr. Brown’s prior determination that Phillips did not

suffer from a mental illness or disorder was due to Brown’s lack of awareness of the true

history of Phillips’s life. 

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Phillips admitted to Smith that he had been physically abused by his father. Phillips

stated to Smith that, among other things, his father punched the children in the face and

frequently hit them with little or no provocation. Phillips himself “ran away from home on

several occasions to avoid his father’s wrath.” Phillips also stated that his parents paid for

their houses with the proceeds of drug sales and purchased shoplifted food, clothing, and

household items from their drug customers. He informed Smith that prostitution was

common on the street in front of his childhood home and that he was exposed to drug use

and sexual activity from a young age as a result of parties his parents regularly held at their

house. Smith concluded that “Phillips’ home was surrounded by crime and violence [and

his] family was enmeshed in this criminal element and served as role models for violent

attacks and criminal activities.” 

Dr. Smith was of the opinion that Phillips was sexually abused as a child, although

Phillips never admitted it. He stated that childhood abuse is the “hallmark” of those who

develop borderline personality disorder, and that “[Phillips] had the same code of silence that

the other [Phillips] children had[, ][and Phillips’s] feelings of guilt and shame were very

evident.” 

Smith opined in his report that

Phillips’ misplaced loyalty to his family prevented him from sharing openly

the extent of the abuse he endured. This protection of “family secrets” is

common among children of abuse. They tend to blame themselves for the

abuse the[y] suffer and fail to recognize that the behavior of their parents is

abusive and inappropriate. . . . The difficulties Mr. Phillips has experienced

with his interpersonal relationships, especially his sexual relations, strongly

suggest that he was the victim of sexual abuse. The research has identified

several characteristics of victims of sexual abuse (e.g., feelings of guilt and

shame, difficulty with impotence, confusion about the role of sex- enmeshed

with sadistic and masochistic behavior). Mr. Phillips reported many of these

behaviors.

Smith also testified that it is common for men, even well into adulthood, to deny

sexual abuse, noting especially that such men “fear being victims of future sexual abuse by

other perpetrators” and “fear that other men within the prison environment may view [them]

as open to various sexual activities and that they may take advantage of that.” 

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Smith connected Phillips’s childhood experiences to his personality disorder, and,

in turn, to his crime. He testified:

If we take Ronald’s background and look at his family, what we have is

ongoing history of violence, criminal activity, both by father, mother, and

siblings. We know that the household is involving [sic] alcohol and drug

abuse. We know there’s drugs being sold out of the home. We know there’s

physical and sexual abuse going on. As a child, you’re watching all of that,

you’re trying to formulate what does all this mean. For borderlines [i.e.,

those with borderline personality disorder], the problem is that they are not

sure what it means. . . . What they end up doing is reacting in a sort of

survival way to their environment and they often misinterpret and overreact

because of the dysfunction they experience so they become reactionary,

overly aggressive . . . .

[I]f you think about Ronald’s background and what he knows about

parenting, the only role models he has had are his mother and father, both

physically abusive [] as long as he can remember and it didn’t m[at]ter the

age or sex of the child or what the child was doing, the response was always

the same. Always physical violence.

Smith stated his belief in his initial report that “Mr. Phillips’s disorders were directly related

to the instant offense.” In his testimony, he elaborated, explaining that “[a]n individual with

borderline personality disorder has misperceptions all the time, misperceptions about

themselves, [their] abilities and their role and misperceptions about other people and their

relationships.” Smith opined that Phillips misperceived Sheila’s conduct and reacted as

follows:

[a child who is] not listening, not obeying, not responding, ignoring,

becomes a sense of this is a threat to me as a person because I’m telling you,

and I’m the authority, I’m the adult, you should respond and when you

don’t, what happened in my household is you get popped, you get punched,

slapped, hit, you get beat because you do what you’re told to do.

Smith also offered testimony about why Phillips was capable of raping Sheila. He

testified that Phillips’s borderline personality disorder inclined him toward both anger and

a willingness to engage in deviant sexual activities encouraged by Evans:

[Evans] is seven years older than [Phillips] is and is clearly the more mature

person. Ronald is still living at home, still attending high school, has had

really no ongoing sexual relationship and becomes involved with [Evans]

who, as he described it, is very very, intriguing but he’s sort of

uncomfortable and confused and frightened by some of the things she

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suggests, like sex with her sister and sex with her cousin. He doesn’t denies

[sic] he’s aroused or finds it sexually interesting, but he’s still confused and

ashamed and doesn’t know what is right and wrong.

She reassures him and takes on a maternal role. They develop a

sexual relationship. She becomes pregnant and they now are forming this

sort of very dysfunctional relationship.

He explained that Evans then encouraged Phillips to begin molesting and eventually rape

Sheila:

[Phillips] indicated [that Evans] encouraged him to have physical contact

[with Sheila]. I don’t know if he saw it as sexual originally. . . . [A]s he

described it, she would fondle him as he would touch Sheila so that would

be arousing. 

. . .

It’s very unfortunate, but in working with [homeless, chemically dependent,

and mentally ill women], we know that a number of the women, because of

their own backgrounds, their own history of being physically and sexually

abused, find various inappropriate behavior very arousing and many of the

women will admit that they have sexually abused the[ir] children

themselves, or observed their partner or encouraged their partner to be

sexually abusive.

Dr. Smith testified that a clear connection existed between Phillips’ abusive life in his

parents’ home, his resulting personality disorder, his violent and sexually deviant

relationship with Evans, and, eventually, his crime.

5. Prejudice

We choose to focus on the prejudice prong of the Strickland test because it is easier

to resolve, and there can be no finding of ineffective assistance of counsel without prejudice.

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92. Because the state court did not unreasonably apply

federal law when it found prejudice to be lacking, we do not need to discuss whether

counsel’s performance was deficient. See Smith v. Spisek, — U.S.— , 130 S.Ct. 676, 685-88

(2010) (assuming counsel’s performance was deficient, but holding that it did not result in

cognizable prejudice because there was no reasonable probability that the sentencing

outcome would have been different but for counsel’s error).

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The state court found that, even assuming that counsel was deficient, Phillips was

not prejudiced by the jury’s ignorance of the subsequently discovered mitigating evidence.

 “In assessing prejudice, we reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of the

mitigating evidence” adduced at trial and in post-conviction proceedings. Wiggins, 539 U.S.

at 534-36; see Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 393 (2005). “Prejudice is established

where, taken as a whole, the available mitigating evidence ‘might well have influenced the

[sentencer’s] appraisal of [the petitioner’s] moral culpability.’” Jells v. Mitchell, 538 F.3d

478, 498 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398 (2000)) (alterations

in original). There is no prejudice if the newly available evidence is merely cumulative or

is not substantially different from the evidence presented during the penalty phase. See

Beuke v. Houk, 537 F.3d 618, 645 (6th Cir. 2008). 

“When a defendant challenges a death sentence such as the one at issue in this case,

the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer

. . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did

not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. “A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. “Ohio is a weighing state,

which means that the aggravating circumstances must outweigh the mitigating factors in

order to impose the death penalty.” Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 493 (6th Cir. 2003).

As previously stated, we are applying a modified form of AEDPA review on this

issue, which requires us to assess “whether the Ohio court’s application of the Strickland

standard . . . was unreasonable or its decision contrary to the standard.” Williams v. Coyle,

260 F.3d at 704. Thus, after reweighing the evidence, we may only reverse if Phillips can

demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for the alleged error of omitting certain

mitigating evidence, he would not have been sentenced to death, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694,

and if we find that the state court’s conclusion was contrary to or an unreasonable

application of federal law, Williams v. Coyle, 260 F.3d at 704. For the following reasons,

we conclude that Phillips has not met this burden.

Phillips’s counsel presented the following evidence during the mitigation phase of

sentencing: (1) a psychological report of Phillips by Dr. Brown, which included a diagnosis

of Phillips’s character deficiencies such as emotional immaturity, inflexible approach to

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conflict, poor tolerance for stress and pressure, self-doubt and inferiority, psychological

inadequacy, a simplistic and immature view of the world, but which concluded that Phillips

was not mentally ill and did not suffer from a personality disorder; (2) expert testimony from

Brown that Phillips functioned with a “low average” level of intelligence, is “a rather simple,

emotionally immature, psychologically inadequate person,” is “ill-equipped to deal with the

pressures of a family situation,” and would adapt well to prison life; (3) testimony from five

other witnesses, including Phillips’s mother, father, brother, grandmother, and neighbor, who

testified that Phillips was a “kind, helpful, friendly, and good person who never abused drugs

or alcohol and who cared a great deal for all of Fae Evans's children”; (4) evidence of

Phillips’s youthfulness when the crime was committed (nineteen); (5) Phillips’s lack of a

criminal record; and (6) a statement from Phillips in which he expressed remorse for his

actions. 

Phillips claims that he was prejudiced by the following information that should have

been introduced as mitigating evidence: (1) CSB records that indicated physical abuse of

Phillips’s siblings, unsanitary conditions of the Phillips’ home, drug abuse by Phillips’s

parents, and an overall hostile living environment; (2) affidavits from Phillips’s half-siblings

that indicated mistreatment by Phillips’s father, such as physical abuse of themselves, sexual

abuse to Mary and Tracy, and possible sexual abuse of Phillips’s sister Tanya; and (3) a

report and testimony from Dr. Smith based on an interview in 2004, in which Smith

diagnosed Phillips with a borderline personality disorder.

Although Phillips claims he was prejudiced by the omission of the additional

evidence, the majority of the additional evidence contradicts the theory that his counsel

presented during the mitigation phase. Counsel presented the theory that Phillips was a

person of low intelligence who was generally considered a good person, but whose pent-up

frustrations and aggressions led him to snap. By introducing positive evidence of Phillips’s

background, his counsel attempted to show he deserved a second chance at life. In contrast,

the undisclosed evidence showed that Phillips grew up in a less than ideal environment,

surrounded by abuse, crime, and drugs. The purpose of introducing this evidence would

have been an attempt to explain the reasons behind Phillips’s actions. Therefore, although

most of the additional evidence was not cumulative, see Beuke, 537 F.3d at 645, it would not

have fit neatly into counsel’s chosen mitigation theory, and a different approach would have

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been required if the totality of the mitigating evidence were to be presented. Nonetheless,

we proceed with the reweighing of the evidence. 

To establish prejudice, Phillips must show that a reasonable probability exists that,

but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceedings would have been

different. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In determining prejudice,

the court must reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of the available

mitigating evidence adduced at trial and in post-conviction proceedings. Wiggins, 539 U.S.

534-36. Phillips demonstrates prejudice if a reasonable probability exists that at least one

juror would have reached a different result. See id. at 537. In analyzing the aggravating

evidence against the totality of the mitigating evidence, we find that the addition of the

undisclosed mitigating evidence is insufficient to conclude that the state court’s decision was

contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. See Beuke, 537 F.3d at 646. The

aggravating evidence presented in this case includes the particularly heinous way in which

the murder was committed, that is, the brutal beating and anal rape of a three-year-old girl.

Section 2929.04(B) of the Ohio Revised Code listed the following items as mitigating factors

in death penalty cases:

(1) Whether the victim of the offense induced or facilitated it;

(2) Whether it is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but

for the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong

provocation;

(3) Whether, at the time of committing the offense, the offender, because of

a mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the

criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of

the law;

(4) The youth of the offender;

(5) The offender’s lack of a significant history of prior criminal convictions

and delinquency adjudications;

(6) If the offender was a participant in the offense but not the principal

offender, the degree of the offender’s participation in the offense and the

degree of the offender's participation in the acts that led to the death of the

victim;

(7) Any other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether the offender

should be sentenced to death.

Phillips’s counsel presented evidence on the mitigating factors listed in subsection

four, five, and seven. The additional undisclosed mitigating evidence only provided further

support for subsection seven. This would arguably have been inconsistent with some of the

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1

The only evidence in the record of sexual abuse of Phillips was the testimony of Dr. Smith, who

stated, “My opinion is he was sexually abused.” There is no admission by Phillips, or testimony from his

family, that he was sexually abused. Moreover, Phillips never admitted he knew of any sexual abuse by

his father of his sisters. Hence, as the dissent implicitly acknowledges, Dr. Smith’s “opinion” is based on

speculation—speculation that is not only without factual support in the record, but is actually contrary to

the record evidence. Notwithstanding the lack of evidence that Phillips was the victim of sexual abuse,

Dr. Smith noted the existence of circumstances which, when viewed in light of other sexual abuse victims’

profiles, “strongly suggest” that Phillips was sexually abused. It follows that even assuming Dr. Smith’s

speculative opinion would have been admissible at all, its reliability and weight would certainly have been

suspect in the eyes of the jury. 

mitigating evidence Phillips’s counsel already presented under this factor. While this

additional evidence may have been helpful, it does not render the state court’s finding of a

lack of prejudice an unreasonable application of Strickland. See Williams v. Coyle, 260 F.3d

at 705. 

In looking at the undisclosed mitigating evidence, one component towers above the

rest. The overwhelming majority of the additional evidence is evidence of physical and

sexual abuse of Phillips’s siblings, namely, his half-siblings. There was evidence that

Phillips’s father sexually abused Mary and Tracy on numerous occasions, but the evidence

of sexual abuse of Phillips personally was virtually non-existent.1

 Likewise, the evidence

of physical abuse of Phillips’s half-siblings was apparent, but evidence of abuse of

Phillips by his parents was minimal at best. 

The CSB records indicate that Phillips’s half-siblings were physically abused by

Phillips’s mother and father. However, the records are less conclusive as to the presence

of physical abuse of Phillips’s full siblings. Most importantly, in over fifteen years of

CSB records, there are no reports that indicate that Phillips, himself, was physically

abused. Likewise, the affidavits of Phillips’s half-siblings indicate that they were the

main recipients of abuse by Phillips’s father. Only minor accounts by Phillips’s halfsiblings record any abuse of Phillips.

While we have no doubt that the conditions in the home and the treatment of

Phillips’s siblings made for an unpleasant living environment, they do not tip the

aggravation-mitigation scale in favor of mitigation. Further, an examination by a mental

health professional with this information would not have supplied the court with

evidence that “differ[ed] in a substantial way-in strength and subject matter-from the

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2

The dissent posits that if Dr. Smith had been allowed to state his “opinion” that Phillips may

have been sexually abused by his father and that this caused him to suffer from a borderline personality

disorder, the jury would have been offered an explanation for this “shocking atrocity”—for this otherwise

inexplicable brutal rape and murder of a three-year old girl. In our opinion, this reasoning suffers from

two flaws. First, it ignores the fact that even Dr. Smith was unable to identify a specific causal nexus

between the sexual abuse that Phillips presumptively suffered and the unthinkable brutality that he

unleashed on a helpless toddler. Second, in view of the heinousness of the offense conduct, the notion that

a psychologist’s speculative explanation would have been so mitigating of Phillips’s culpability as to create

a reasonable probability of a different sentencing outcome is simply untenable. 

evidence actually presented at sentencing.”2 See Hill v. Mitchell, 400 F.3d 308, 319 (6th

Cir. 2005). 

Phillips fails to show that the state court’s decision was contrary to or an

unreasonable application of Strickland under the modified-AEDPA standard. “A

decision of the state court is ‘contrary to’ clearly established federal law ‘if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme]

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the

Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.’” Howard, 405 F.3d

at 467 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)) (alterations in original).

“An ‘unreasonable application’ occurs when ‘the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.’” Id. (quoting Taylor, 529 U.S. at 413)

(alteration in original). “A state adjudication is not ‘unreasonable’ ‘simply because [a

federal habeas court] concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.’” Id.

(quoting Taylor, 529 U.S. at 411) (alteration in original). “Instead, the state court’s

application of established Supreme Court precedent must be objectively unreasonable.”

Id. (citing Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002)). Since the state court’s

conclusion of no prejudice was not contrary to clearly established federal law, and it was

not an unreasonable application of federal law to the case, we are precluded from

reversing the state court’s decision. 

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C. Sufficiency of the evidence

Phillips also argues that no rational jury could have found, based on the evidence

presented at trial, that he purposely caused Sheila’s death while “committing or

attempting to commit . . . rape,” as is required for a conviction of aggravated murder

under Ohio Revised Code § 2903.01(B). He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

in three ways: first, he claims that the evidence does not support a finding that his

beating of Sheila on January 18 caused her death; second, he claims that the evidence

does not support a finding that he raped Sheila during the course of that beating; and

third, he claims that the evidence does not support a finding that he intended to kill

Sheila. 

In determining whether sufficient evidence existed to support a jury’s conviction,

we ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Tucker v. Palmer,

541 F.3d 652, 656 (6th Cir. 2008). We give deference both to the jury’s verdict and,

under AEDPA, to the state court’s determination of whether that verdict was supported

by sufficient evidence. See Parker v. Renico, 506 F.3d 444, 448 (6th Cir. 2007). The

substantive elements of the crime are defined by state law. Id. To convict Phillips of

aggravated murder, the State had to prove that he purposely caused Sheila’s death while

committing or attempting to commit rape. O.R.C. § 2903.01(B).

1. Sufficient evidence showed that Phillips’s beating of Sheila on January

18 caused her death

Phillips argues that Sheila died not from his beating on January 18, but from

intestinal injuries sustained on January 16, relying on testimony by Dr. Klein that these

prior injuries would have led to Sheila’s death by themselves if they had not been

treated. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this argument, pointing to testimony from Dr.

Cox that Phillips’s January 18 beating caused Sheila’s death, in part by rupturing her

already-injured intestine. Phillips, 656 N.E.2d at 656. The district court reached the

same conclusion. Phillips, 2006 WL 2855077, at *17-19.

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Phillips admitted to the police that he severely beat Sheila on the day of her

death. Detective Ronald Perella of the Akron police department testified that Phillips

admitted that he “got pissed off and began hitting Sheila all over her body, throwing her

against the walls and dragging her by the hair.” In Phillips’s written statement to the

police, he admitted that he:

fliped [sic] out and I beat up Sheila by fist, stomach, (hit in stomach). A

lot, hit hard, when hitting her I hit all over her body, and also threw her

around, by trying to cool down. Not knowing how many times I hit her.

(But I hit Shelia [sic] a lot) I was very mad at Shelia [sic] because she

didn’t respond to me. I pulled Shelia [sic] by her hair.

He also referred in his written statement to dragging Sheila from the bedroom to the

living room, where he penetrated her anus with his fingers. 

Medical evidence presented at trial supported the jury’s finding that this beating

caused Sheila’s death. Dr. Cox, who performed the autopsy on Sheila’s body, testified

that on the day of her death she suffered numerous internal and external injuries from

multiple blows, and that, based on a reasonable medical certainty, these blows caused

Sheila’s death. He elaborated:

The cause of death is cardiovascular collapse; due to hypovolemic shock;

due to intraperitoneal hemorrhage, hemorrhage into the soft tissue of the

pelvis and into the lumen of the small and large bowel due to multiple

acute contusions of the small and large bowel, with perforations of the

duodenum, complicated by perforation of the superior mesenteric artery

and vein, associated with compromise of the superior

pancreaticoduodenal artery and vein; due to blunt force trauma,

complicated by brain swelling with herniation. 

Contrary to this evidence, Phillips argues that Sheila’s death was caused by an

earlier injury. Dr. Cox testified that Sheila had sustained severe blows to the abdomen

about two days before her death that compressed her duodenum, a part of the intestine,

against her second lumbar vertebra, disrupting the blood supply to the duodenum and

“eventuat[ing] a necrosis.” Dr. Eugene Izsak, the emergency room physician who

treated Sheila on the day of her death, testified that her ruptured duodenum would have

been a “fatal injury if left untreated.” However, Dr. Cox opined that the beating Sheila

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sustained two days later, on January 18, “ended up rupturing this already necrotic

bowel.” This testimony does not conflict with Dr. Izsak’s testimony, and the jury was

free to rely on Dr. Cox’s opinion that the January 18 beating was the immediate cause

of Sheila’s death. The state court’s determination that the evidence supported such a

finding was not an unreasonable application of or contrary to the sufficiency-of-theevidence standard set forth in Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

2. Sufficient evidence supported a finding that Phillips raped Sheila while

beating her on the day of her death

Phillips contends that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence to allow

a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he raped Sheila on the day of her

death. As a result, he claims that his aggravated murder conviction was unconstitutional.

The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this claim, concluding that Dr. Cox’s testimony was

sufficient evidence to allow a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Phillips

raped Sheila in the course of the killing. See Phillips, 656 N.E.2d at 656. The district

court agreed. See Phillips, 2006 WL 2855077, at *20-21.

Phillips admitted to police officers that in the course of beating Sheila on the day

of her death he became sexually aroused when he realized she was not wearing

underwear, and he penetrated her anus with his finger. He also admitted anally raping

Sheila with his penis on at least two prior occasions. He stated to police officers that

while he thought about raping Sheila on the day of her death, he did not do so. Dr. Cox

testified that Sheila’s anus was penetrated with an object significantly larger than a

finger on the day of her death. He was able to determine this by examining the signs of

hemorrhaging on microscopic sections of Sheila’s anal region, uterus, and urinary

bladder. Phillips argues that this testimony was implausible. He also relies on testimony

by Dr. Izsak, who concluded that Sheila had been anally raped in the past but could not

specify when the most recent rape had occurred. This testimony was not contradictory

of Dr. Cox’s. Furthermore, as the Ohio Supreme Court pointed out, Dr. Cox, as coroner,

undertook a much more thorough examination than Dr. Izsak, who merely examined

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Sheila when she was brought to the emergency room, so a reasonable jury could easily

have placed greater reliance on Dr. Cox’s opinion. 

The Ohio Supreme Court’s conclusion that sufficient evidence supported the

jury’s finding that Phillips raped Sheila while beating her on the day of her death was

not an unreasonable application of or contrary to federal law. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at

319; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

3. The jury’s finding that Phillips intended to kill Evans was supported by

sufficient evidence

Phillips argues that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support the

jury’s finding that he purposely killed Sheila, claiming that he merely lost his temper.

He argues that the fact that his blows were directed at non-vital areas and that he

attempted to resuscitate Sheila show that he lacked the intent to kill. The Ohio Supreme

Court rejected Phillips’s arguments, ruling that sudden rage does not negate an intent to

kill, that Phillips’s attempt to save Sheila came more than an hour after the beating and

was not determinative of his state of mind during the beating, that Phillips struck vital

areas including Sheila’s head, and that the “severe, protracted nature of the beating also

indicates a purpose to kill.” Phillips, 656 N.E.2d at 656. The state court also reasoned

that “[t]he use of such substantial force by an adult on a three-year-old victim is certainly

sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find a purpose to kill.” Id. The

district court agreed. Phillips, 2006 WL 2855077, at *19-20. Under the standard set

forth in Jackson, the Ohio Supreme Court’s denial of this claim was not unreasonable.

D. Comments by a grand juror

Phillips claims that comments made during a court recess by a grand juror to

members of the petit jury in his case deprived him of due process and a fair trial. In

denying this claim on direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court summarized the relevant

facts as follows:

[D]uring a trial recess, four jurors and one alternate left the courthouse

to smoke. Eleanore Crowe, a member of a grand jury panel that was also

in recess, was already outside when the jurors in the instant action

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approached. Crowe chatted with some of the jurors, mentioned that she

was a grand juror, and then said something about the Phillips case. All

five jurors immediately returned to the courthouse and reported the

comments to the bailiff.

Phillips, 656 N.E.2d at 660. As the Supreme Court noted, the trial court proceeded to

hold a hearing to determine whether the jurors had been biased by the grand juror’s

remarks:

The trial court examined each of the jurors and Crowe. Two jurors heard

Crowe say that she hoped appellant “gets it” or “gets whatever he

deserves.” One thought she said: “The worst case that I was on was the

Sheila Marie Evans case.” One juror heard only the words “Sheila Marie

Evans,” while another heard “Sheila Marie” and “Goddamn.” Jurors

described Crowe’s tone as “heated” or “agitated.” Three jurors

expressed the belief that Crowe had served on the grand jury that had

indicted appellant, although she had not. All five of the jurors indicated

that the experience would not influence their decision in the case. At the

conclusion of his examination of the jurors, the trial judge stated that he

was “satisfied that they put it out of their minds, they’re not going to

consider it.” Despite this finding, appellant contends that Crowe’s

remarks fatally compromised the jury’s impartiality.

Phillips, 656 N.E.2d at 660. The Ohio Supreme Court went on to conclude that, under

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 216-17 (1982), and Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S.

227, 230 (1954), the trial court had conducted the required inquiry, had reasonably

concluded that the jurors were unbiased by the contact, and had not abused its discretion

in deciding to retain the jurors and proceed with the trial. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court

further explained: 

[a] juror’s belief in his or her own impartiality is not inherently suspect

and may be relied upon by the trial court. Furthermore, the jurors’

actions in this case reveal that they understood both the impropriety of

Crowe’s remarks and their own obligation to be fair. First, when Crowe

began speaking about [Phillips] and his case, the jurors immediately left

the area and reported the contact to the bailiff. Thereafter, each juror

made a conscious decision not to discuss Crowe’s comments with one

another.

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Phillips, 656 N.E.2d at 661 (internal citations omitted). On habeas review, the district

court found that the Ohio Supreme Court had reasonably applied federal law in denying

Phillips’s claim.

In reviewing claims of juror bias in the habeas context, we bear in mind that: (1)

the trial court must hold a hearing when the defendant alleges unauthorized contact with

a juror; (2) no presumption of prejudice arises from the unauthorized contact; (3) the

defendant has the burden of proving actual juror bias; and (4) juror testimony at the

Remmer hearing is not inherently suspect. Zuern v. Tate, 336 F.3d 478, 486 (6th Cir.

2003). Due process requires a new trial only where the defendant demonstrates actual

bias, not every time a juror is placed in a potentially compromising situation. See Smith

v. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 217. Interpreting Smith v. Phillips and Remmer, we have held

that the burden rests upon the defendant to demonstrate prejudice. See United States v.

Zelinka, 862 F.2d 92, 95 (6th Cir. 1988).

 Following the jurors’ reports of Crowe’s contact with them, the trial court held

a Remmer hearing at which the court and both counsel questioned all of the jurors and

Crowe. The court concluded, based on the jurors’ actions and assurances, that they

could be fair and impartial arbiters. Phillips has not provided any reason to believe that

the jurors’ assurances should be viewed with suspicion or are unreliable, and he has not

demonstrated any juror bias. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision affirming the trial

court’s conduct was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Smith v. Phillips

or Remmer. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

E. Phillips’s claim that the trial court instructed the jury in his absence

Phillips contends that the trial court erroneously gave the jury supplemental

instructions when he and his counsel were not present. The Supreme Court has held that

A criminal defendant has the right to be present at any proceeding

whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the

fulness [sic] of his opportunity to defend against the charge. . . . [The]

presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a

fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent

only.

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United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (quoting Snyder v. Mass., 291 U.S.

97, 105-06 (1934)). Phillips defaulted this claim by failing to raise it on direct review.

Generally, to obtain review of a defaulted claim, a petitioner must demonstrate cause for

the default and prejudice resulting from it. See Murphy, 551 F.3d at 502. However,

these requirements do not apply if counsel was totally absent from a critical stage of the

defendant’s criminal proceedings; such an absence is constitutional error even without

a showing of prejudice. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 & n.25 (1984);

Hudson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 212, 216 (6th Cir. 2003). 

Phillips is not excused from showing prejudice because the incident at issue was

not a critical stage of his trial. During its guilt-phase deliberations, the jury sent the trial

judge a note stating: “We wish to have the following defined again[:] ‘Aggravated

murder’ with all included definitions[;] also ‘Aggravated Murder’ with ‘Specification’

with all included definitions.” The record does not reflect that the court responded to the

jury’s request or issued any supplemental instructions. In response to an interrogatory

issued with the federal habeas court’s permission, the trial judge stated that he did not

recall receiving this note but that his usual response to such a request is to provide the

jury with a written copy of the jury instructions. The trial judge stated that he presumed

he had followed this course on this occasion. The record therefore shows, and Phillips

provides no reason to disbelieve, that the trial judge merely provided the jury with a

written copy of the instructions he had already given them orally. Although certain

instances of jury re-instruction and the reading of supplemental instructions qualify as

critical stages of a trial, see, e.g., Valentine v. United States, 488 F.3d 325, 335 (6th Cir.

2007); Caver v. Straub, 349 F.3d 340, 350 (6th Cir. 2003), the re-reading of identical

jury instructions does not. See Hudson, 351 F.3d at 217. Providing the jury with a

written copy of instructions that have already been delivered orally is not a critical phase

of a trial. Therefore, Phillips is not excused from showing cause and prejudice, and,

even assuming that he could show cause, he identifies no prejudice stemming from his

counsel’s absence during this event. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision denying this

claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Gagnon, 470 U.S. at

526.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Phillips’s

petition.

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_________________

DISSENT

_________________

COLE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Phillips’s crime is heinous. Reading the facts

of this case, as so vividly described in the majority’s opinion, one cannot but feel a deep

sense of moral revulsion and horror that one human being could inflict such acts on

another. It is for precisely this reason, however, that knowledge of Phillips’s appalling

childhood environment—the environment in which he spent his entire life prior to his

crime, a world in which violence, criminal activity, and physical and sexual abuse of

children were the status quo—is critical in assessing his culpability and determining the

punishment he deserves. 

The jury that recommended Phillips be sentenced to death, however, heard little

evidence about his childhood because his counsel failed to investigate the red flags

leading to a large body of mitigating evidence that would have considerably altered the

picture of his culpability. By failing to investigate these leads and to discover and

present this mitigating evidence to the jury, Phillips’s counsel failed to meet the

minimum standard of competency required by the United States Constitution. Because

there is also a reasonable probability that, had counsel not failed to meet their

constitutional responsibilities, at least one member of the jury would have found that the

aggravating circumstances of Phillips’s crime did not outweigh the mitigating

circumstances, I would reverse the district court’s denial of Phillips’s petition for a writ

of habeas corpus on this score.

i. Counsel’s performance was deficient

Under the constitutional standard we employ when reviewing ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims, we must first determine whether counsel’s performance

“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and so was constitutionally

deficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). Counsel has an

obligation to perform a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background or make

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a reasonable decision that such investigation is unnecessary. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539

U.S. 510, 522-23 (2003). This obligation exists even if the defendant is reluctant to

cooperate or disclose mitigating evidence. See Harries v. Bell, 417 F.3d 631, 638 (6th

Cir. 2005).

Phillips’s counsel, Kerry O’Brien and Michael Edminister, were alerted to the

history of abuse in the Phillips home by two red flags: first, the existence of Summit

County Child Services Bureau (“CSB”) records beyond the five files that Edminister

reviewed and described in his notes as “very important” for mitigation purposes, and

second, the knowledge that CSB had come to the Phillips home to investigate an

allegation that Phillips’s father, William Sr., was sexually abusing Tanya, Phillips’s

sister. Nonetheless, counsel failed to learn what the CSB files, other than the five to

which they were given access, contained or to provide any of the information in those

files to Dr. Brown, the psychologist charged with examining Phillips. In fact, Edminister

testified that he was “completely unaware of any familial violence” or that the CSB

records indicated a long history of complaints and allegations of neglect, abuse, and

assault in the Phillips household. (JA Vol. 10 at 5610.) Edminister explained that he did

not move the trial court to order CSB to provide him with full access to the records

because he thought there was no chance of such a motion being granted: In his words,

he “had never heard of that before and so I didn’t even bother.” (JA Vol. 10 at 5604.)

His lack of knowledge may have been due to his never previously having worked on the

mitigation phase of a trial; certainly, Phillips’s post-conviction counsel do not appear to

have had difficulty in obtaining an order requiring CSB to disclose the records. This

failure to undertake a full investigation of the CSB records, provide their contents to the

psychologist who examined Phillips, and follow the new leads that the files would have

generated amounts to constitutionally deficient performance. See Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 395 (2000) (holding that counsel were ineffective because they “failed to

conduct an investigation that would have uncovered extensive records graphically

describing Williams’ nightmarish childhood, not because of any strategic calculation but

because they incorrectly thought that state law barred access to such records”);

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-91 (stating that “counsel has a duty to make reasonable

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investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations

unnecessary” and that “strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are

reasonable” only “to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the

limitations on investigation”); Johnson v. Bagley, 544 F.3d 592, 600 (6th Cir. 2008)

(finding deficient performance where counsel failed to read files obtained from a state

agency that would have revealed a different mitigation strategy); Jells v. Mitchell, 538

F.3d 478, 478 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding deficient performance where counsel failed to

investigate and locate files revealing the petitioner’s unstable and abusive home

environment or to present such files to the examining psychologist). As Edminister

himself acknowledged, “I suspect that I may have failed [Phillips] in not being more

forceful in an attempt to obtain copies of all of these documents.” (JA Vol. 10 at 5617.)

It was not reasonable for counsel to rest their conclusion that no abuse had

occurred on the assurances of Phillips’s parents, as the abusers themselves cannot be

assumed to be forthcoming about their own past crimes; nor did Phillips’s own reticence

excuse counsel from performing an independent investigation. See Rompilla v. Beard,

545 U.S. 374, 389 (2005) (“No reasonable lawyer would forgo examination of the file

thinking he could do as well by asking the defendant or family relations whether they

recalled anything helpful or damaging” contained in the file.); Harries, 417 F.3d at 638

(finding that counsel’s failure to follow leads indicating a troubled childhood was

deficient and that counsel has a duty to pursue such investigation even if the defendant

refuses to cooperate); Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 449-50 (6th Cir. 2001)

(“[D]efendant’s resistance to disclosure of information does not excuse counsel’s duty

to independently investigate.”). O’Brien and Edminister’s admission that they distrusted

Phillips further demonstrates the unreasonableness of accepting his assurances—despite

their awareness of prior CSB involvement with the Phillips family—that no abuse had

occurred.

According to the ABA Guidelines on death-penalty representation, which the

Supreme Court has used in determining whether penalty-phase counsel’s investigation

of a defendant’s background was deficient, see Williams, 529 U.S. at 396, defense

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counsel should consider introducing evidence “‘that would be explanatory of the

offense(s) for which the client is being sentenced,’” as well as that which would provide

insights “‘into the client’s mental and/or emotional state and life history that may explain

or lessen the client’s culpability for the underlying offenses.’” Johnson, 544 F.3d at 599

(quoting ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in

Death Penalty Cases 10.11(F) (rev. ed. 2003)). The commentary to the ABA Guidelines

charges counsel with reviewing records from government agencies that “‘can contain a

wealth of mitigating evidence, documenting or providing clues to childhood abuse,’”

such that “‘[r]ecords should be requested concerning not only the client, but also his

parents, grandparents, siblings, and children.’” See Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482,

487 n.2 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting ABA Guideline 10.7 Commentary at 80-83). If

Phillips’s counsel had met these professional standards, they would have learned of the

wealth of mitigating evidence in the CSB records, which in turn would have enabled

them to provide Dr. Brown—and the jury—with a true picture of the violent, abusive,

and neglectful environment in which Phillips spent his life.

Not only did counsel fail to obtain these files or provide them to Dr. Brown,

Edminister did not “remember even talking to Dr. Brown until he walked into the

courtroom.” (JA Vol. 10 at 5617.) When Edminister was asked whether, as the person

“leading the charge on mitigation,” it was possible for him to put together “an effective

case without working hand in hand with Dr. Brown,” Edminister replied: “Probably not.”

(JA Vol. 10 at 5617.) Nor, given that he delegated most of the responsibility for

gathering records to a private investigator—one who, because of counsel’s limited

financial resources, had no experience in mitigation-related investigation—could

Edminister have prepared an effective mitigation case without whatever evidence the

investigator uncovered. Yet the private investigator did not begin attempting to develop

information in support of mitigation until six days prior to jury selection in the guilt

phase of Phillips’s trial. Without such information, Phillips’s counsel could not have

begun preparing significant portions of their mitigation case until during or after the guilt

phase. This untimeliness further supports the conclusion that counsel’s performance was

deficient. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 395 (finding it significant in holding counsel’s

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performance deficient that “counsel did not begin to prepare for [the sentencing] phase

of the proceeding until a week before the trial”); Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1207 (6th

Cir. 1995) (concluding that counsel’s failure “to make any significant preparations for

the sentencing phase until after the conclusion of the guilt phase . . . was objectively

unreasonable”). 

When he did set about preparing a mitigation case, Edminister explained that he

was at a loss as to what strategy he could pursue: “In this kid’s case, we had absolutely

nothing to work with, nothing. I mean, you know, everybody we talked to said . . . what

a nice boy he was. [The crime] was so completely totally out of character. So then how

do you develop mitigation . . . ?” (JA Vol. 10 at 5614.) As Edminister stated regarding

his decision to call Phillips’s father to testify at the penalty phase, “we were grasping,

I was grasping at straws in an attempt to try and pull together any live bodies that could

testify and say something nice about – say something at all about him . . . .” (JA Vol.

10 at 5618.) Significantly, Edminister himself did not find his mitigation strategy

plausible: “You tell me how you explain to your client that . . . I don’t believe you’re

telling the truth. I don’t think you snapped. I think you are some underlying psychotic

and we need to develop that in some way.” (JA Vol. 10 at 5616.) Of course, as revealed

by habeas counsel and described above, there was a wealth of material available for

mitigation that Edminister would have discovered had he pursued the leads of which he

already was aware. In light of Edminister’s belief that the true explanation for Phillips’s

crime lay in Phillips’s psychological condition, no reasonable counsel in Edminister’s

position would have abandoned the investigation at the point he did or failed to have a

single conversation with Dr. Brown. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524, 527 (explaining that,

in assessing the reasonableness of counsel’s investigation, the court considers whether

the quantum of evidence known to counsel should have led to further investigation).

The state court, in concluding that counsel’s performance was not deficient,

relied on the fact that trial counsel presented several witnesses attesting to Phillips’s

good character and called Dr. Brown to testify about Phillips’s “character deficiencies.”

For three reasons, this conclusion was an objectively unreasonable application of the

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Strickland standard. First, Phillips’s counsel could not have made a reasonable strategic

decision not to introduce evidence of Phillips’s abusive childhood environment because

they failed to learn of it. See Wiggins, 529 U.S. at 521, 528, 533; Williams, 529 U.S. at

395; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-91. Second, even had counsel learned of the evidence,

there would have been no strategic benefit to choosing not to present it. Informing the

jury of the disadvantages Phillips faced in his everyday life only could have increased

the effect of the positive pieces of mitigation evidence, such as the fact that Phillips had

not used drugs and the testimony that Phillips was a helpful child. See Williams, 529

U.S. at 396 (reasoning that counsel’s “failure to introduce the comparatively voluminous

amount of evidence that did speak in [the defendant’s] favor was not justified by a

tactical decision to focus on [his] voluntary confession”).

Third, the state court was objectively unreasonable in finding that the mitigation

evidence that counsel failed to discover would have provided only an additional or

alternative mitigation strategy. In making this conclusion, the state appeals court

ignored the patent absurdity of counsel’s attempt to persuade the jury that Phillips was

a “kind” person “who cared deeply for Ms. Evans’ children,” State v. Phillips, No.

20692, 2002 WL 274637, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2002), despite the fact that the

jury had just convicted him of raping and murdering one of those children. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of

law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”) (emphasis

added); see also Johnson, 544 F.3d at 603 (finding prejudice where competent counsel

would have discovered evidence that would have altered considerably the mitigation

theory presented to the jury). The mitigation evidence that counsel failed to discover

would have given rise to a viable mitigation theory where none otherwise existed. Yet

the state court inexplicably and unreasonably opined that such evidence “may actually

have been less persuasive.” Id. This conclusion cannot stand in light of the

considerations above.

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In sum, the state court’s determination that Phillips’s representation was

constitutionally adequate unreasonably applies federal law as set forth by the Supreme

Court.

ii. Counsel’s performance resulted in prejudice

The state court found that, even assuming that counsel were deficient, Phillips

was not prejudiced by the jury’s ignorance of the subsequently discovered mitigating

evidence. Because the state court decided this constitutional issue in cursory fashion

“‘without extended discussion,’” this court applies a modified form of AEDPA review.

See Maldonado v. Wilson, 416 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Harris v. Stovall,

212 F.3d 940, 943 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000)). The modified-AEDPA standard of review

requires that the court “conduct a careful review of the record and applicable law, but

nonetheless bars [it] from reversing unless the state court’s decision is contrary to or an

unreasonable application of federal law.” Id. 

As the majority notes, to obtain relief under the prejudice prong of Strickland,

Phillips is required to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the newly available

mitigation evidence would have led to a different result. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537. “A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Thus, if there is a reasonable probability that a

single member of the jury would have found, based on both the newly-discovered and

any previously introduced mitigation evidence, that the aggravating circumstances of the

crime did not outweigh the mitigating circumstances, and if the state court’s conclusion

to the contrary was an objectively unreasonable application of federal law, Phillips is

entitled to a new penalty-phase trial. See Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 804 (6th

Cir. 2006); Hamblin, 354 F.3d at 493; see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537. Phillips has

met this burden.

In the mitigation phase of the trial, the jury was presented with a picture of

Phillips as a “nice,” “normal” young man, who generally was non-violent and “good

with children.” As noted, these claims were absurd in light of the jury’s conviction.

Edminister himself acknowledged that the portrayal of Phillips as a good kid who

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snapped did not make sense. The falsity of this story became even more apparent when

Phillips’s mitigation witnesses, including his convicted-felon parents, admitted on crossexamination that Phillips had struck Evans in the past and been suspended from school

for violent outbursts. Nor is it any surprise that Dr. Brown’s testimony failed to reduce

Phillips’s culpability in the eyes of the jury. Dr. Brown benignly described Phillips as

“rather simple [and] emotionally immature” and unpersuasively explained the brutal rape

and murder as the result of Phillips’s “repeated frustrations in his life,” which caused his

“anger [to] build[] up so that it comes out and it seems way out of proportion to what

may trigger it . . . .” Such evidence was useless to a jury seeking to understand why a

person could have done what Phillips did.

If Phillips’s attorneys had pursued the leads of which they were aware, they

would have discovered the mitigating evidence that would have allowed the jury to

better understand what led Phillips to commit his horrific crime. See Penry v. Lynaugh,

492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (“Evidence about the defendant’s background and character

is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit

criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background . . . may be less

culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”); Johnson, 544 F.3d at 604-05

(finding prejudice where no witness testified about the abuse and privation the defendant

and his brother suffered as a way of life, and where evidence of the defendant’s abusive

childhood environment would have presented the jury with a plausible reason to spare

the defendant’s life). Had counsel fulfilled their constitutional duty, the jury would have

known that Phillips grew up undernourished and without adequate clothing in a house

littered with dog feces and crawling with cockroaches. They would have heard that his

parents regularly bought shoplifted items from their drug-clientele, that as a seventhgrader he watched as his parents and half-sister were arrested in a drug raid at his home.

They would have heard that prostitution was common on the street in front of Phillips’s

home and that he was exposed to drugs and sexual activity at a young age because of

parties thrown by his parents. Most importantly, the jury would have heard of the

repeated reports that the Phillips children were being severely abused. 

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The jury heard that Phillips was a normal, all-American boy who liked to play

with model airplanes. The jury did not hear, however, what the CSB records and the

affidavits of Phillips’s half-siblings reveal: that he was surrounded by violence, without

interruption, from the time of his birth to the age of nineteen. Instead of the rosy and

wholly unbelievable picture Phillips’s counsel presented, the jury should have heard that

Phillips’s father beat him, beat his mother, broke dishes over his half-sister’s head when

she failed to clean them properly, beat his twelve-year-old brother over the back with a

two-by-four, and punched the children—male and female alike—in the face. They

should have heard that Phillips’s father regularly threw Phillips’s half-brother and two

half-sisters against the wall to punish them and grabbed Phillips’s half-brother by the

hair, just as Phillips would later do to Sheila. They should have heard that Phillips’s

father molested his half-sisters, one of whom was mentally retarded, and abused them

while they were naked, even after they had reached high-school age, leaving bruises that

lasted for a month. They should have heard that Phillips’s half-brother Eddie believed

his step-father was having sexual relations with Phillips’s younger sister and that the

CSB had investigated a similar allegation. But the jury heard none of this because, as

Phillips’s counsel admitted regarding the evidence they presented at the penalty stage,

“we had absolutely nothing to work with, nothing.” See Johnson, 544 F.3d at 604

(finding prejudice where, due to counsel’s failure to investigate, the jury was misled into

believing that the defendant’s grandmother raised him properly and provided him with

a stable life, when in fact both she and the defendant’s mother provided the defendant

with a violent, abusive childhood). 

In describing the Phillips home as “an unpleasant living environment,” the

majority turns a blind eye to the abhorrent conditions that Phillips endured and their

effect on his moral and emotional development. It is difficult to understand how the

majority, in weighing the aggravating evidence against Phillips, can describe his crimes

as “particularly heinous,” while dismissing the violence he and his siblings

suffered—acts of the same order of odiousness as those he committed—as merely

“unpleasant.” It is also difficult to understand the majority’s argument that the fact that

much of the undisclosed mitigating evidence focuses on the abuse of Phillips’s siblings,

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not Phillips himself, offers “towering” support for the conclusion that this evidence

could not outweigh the aggravating evidence in the minds of the jury. Even were it to

be shown that Phillips miraculously was spared the violence to which the other children

in the household were repeatedly and brutally subjected, growing up in this environment

and witnessing this abuse undoubtedly would have left its mark. But, in a household of

rampant and indiscriminate violence, it beggars belief to suggest that Phillips was so

spared. The testimony of Dr. Smith, armed with the evidence that Phillips’s counsel

failed to provide Dr. Brown at the penalty phase, offers a compelling argument as to why

Phillips may not have shared this information. In his words,

children who come from an abusive home, their first response is to deny

that there’s any abuse in the home. They are filled with guilt, shame,

embarrassment. There’s concerns about what other people will think.

There is concern about reprisal within the family. Oftentimes, the child

who breaks the code of silence will be rejected and shunned by other

members of the family.

(JA Vol. 10 at 5761-62.). Yet despite Phillips’s lack of disclosure, it was Dr. Smith’s

unequivocal opinion that Phillips had been abused: 

The difficulties Mr. Phillips has experienced with his interpersonal

relationships, especially his sexual relations, strongly suggest that he was

the victim of sexual abuse. The research has identified several

characteristics of victims of sexual abuse (e.g., feelings of guilt and

shame, difficulty with impotence, confusion about the role of sexenmeshed with sadistic and masochistic behavior). Mr. Phillips reported

many of these behaviors.

(JA Vol. 11 at 6590.) Incidentally, this conclusion is consistent with Phillips’s otherwise

jarring focus, when confessing his crimes to the police, not on being accused of murder

or on the sentence he might receive, but rather on the fear of “get[ting] pumped in the

butt” if sent to jail. State v. Phillips, 656 N.E.2d 643, 652 (Ohio 1995).

It appears incontestible that the jurors would have viewed Phillips differently had

they heard a psychologist opine, based on traits that Phillips shared with many adult men

who had been sexually abused as children, that Phillips had been sexually abused

himself, and that his refusal to admit such abuse was unsurprising. Equipped with an

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accurate picture of Phillips’s background, Dr. Smith also could have testified, as he did

at the habeas phase, that Phillips suffered from at least borderline personality disorder,

if not a more serious disorder, as the direct result of the trauma he experienced in his

formative years. He could have offered the jury an explanation for the otherwise

inexplicable fact that Phillips, with encouragement from Evans, had raped a three-yearold girl. Finally, he could have testified, based on clinical experience, to the likelihood

of what might otherwise have seemed impossible to the jury: that Evans, like other

women with a history of abuse and mental illness, had encouraged and participated in

the abuse of her own child, and that her sway over Phillips was due to his own childhood

abuse and resulting personality disorder. Instead of hearing this evidence, the jury heard

from Dr. Brown that, while immature and prone to frustration, Phillips had no mental

problems and was essentially normal. See Johnson, 544 F.3d at 605 (finding prejudice

because mitigation expert gave damaging testimony that he would not have given had

he been provided “a more complete picture of [the defendant’s] background—namely,

the [defendant’s] remarkably traumatic childhood”).

The new evidence that Phillips could have introduced is the opposite of

cumulative. Rather, it would have provided counsel, who was “grasping at straws,” with

a viable mitigation strategy. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 393 (finding prejudice where the

evidence counsel failed to discover “adds up to a mitigation case that bears no relation

to the few naked pleas for mercy actually put before the jury”); Morales v. Mitchell, 507

F.3d 916, 951 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that we have “found prejudice when the jury was

deprived of non-cumulative mitigating evidence such as severe physical, psychological,

or sexual abuse, a violent upbringing, or abject poverty”). The evidence withheld from

the jury is similar to evidence that has led us to find prejudice in previous cases. In Jells,

for example, counsel presented mitigation evidence focusing on the petitioner’s quiet,

non-violent nature and love of his family and called a psychologist who testified, like

Dr. Brown did here, that the petitioner had borderline intelligence and difficulty

controlling his hostility but no personality disorder or mental illness. 538 F.3d at 499.

We found prejudice based upon evidence that Jells’s counsel had failed to present that

bears a striking similarity to that at issue here: Jells’s mother was an alcoholic; Jells saw

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his mother’s boyfriends beat her and was occasionally beaten by them himself; Jells had

a history of violence in school and learning and socialization impairments; and, as

psychologists provided with an accurate description of Jells’s history concluded, Jells’s

“abusive home environment had a profound impact on [his] psychological

development.” Id. at 499-500. Similarly, in Hamblin, we found that the petitioner was

prejudiced when his counsel failed to present evidence of an unstable and deprived

childhood characterized by extreme poverty, neglect, and family violence, as well as

signs of a mental disability or disorder. 354 F.3d at 489-91. All of these elements are

present here. 

Numerous other decisions support the conclusion that counsel’s deficient

performance in this case prejudiced Phillips. In Williams, we found prejudice where,

due to counsel’s inadequate investigation, the jury never learned that petitioner “grew

up in an environment[] in which there was an expectation that violence can and

sometimes needs to be used, that people are constantly attempting to exploit others, and

that illegal activities are often to be admired.” 460 F.3d at 804-05. The other evidence

that counsel failed to discover and present in that case would have shown that the

petitioner’s alcoholic mother frequently hit him, that his father left his mother when the

petitioner was young, that his primary role model was an uncle who was a career

criminal, that the petitioner was dependent on cocaine that induced paranoid fears at the

time of the crime, and that he suffered from dyssocial reaction and mixed personality

disorder. Id. This body of evidence is not materially different from the evidence in

Phillips’s case. Similarly, in Johnson, although some aspects of the abuse suffered by

the petitioner were more severe than in this case, we found prejudice because the jury

was not informed that abuse was “a way of life” during the petitioner’s childhood. 544

F.3d at 604. We noted that a fully-informed psychologist would have opined to the jury

that the abuse Johnson suffered caused his mental illness and that such a psychologist

would have described to the jury “the cycles of generational abusive and neglectful

parenting that repeat the same behaviors and lead to the same outcomes.” Id. at 605-06

(internal quotation marks omitted). In Harries, we found prejudice where counsel’s

deficient investigation failed to uncover evidence of “Harries’s traumatic childhood,

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including the significant physical abuse Harries suffered at the hands of” his family, as

well as the fact he spent much of his childhood in violent and unsanitary institutions; the

fact that he suffered from a mental illness that may have been bipolar disorder, anxiety

disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, or antisocial personality disorder; and the fact

that he had suffered frontal-lobe damage. 417 F.3d at 639. 

In Dickerson v. Bagley, we found prejudice where counsel’s inadequate

investigation failed to reveal that the petitioner functioned only slightly above the

retarded level and was raised in a home where his biological father denied his

relationship and where he was called the “the moron” and surrounded by “pimps,

prostitutes and drug dealers.” 453 F.3d 690, 698-99 (6th Cir. 2006). In Carter v. Bell,

we found prejudice because counsel failed to present evidence “of a childhood in which

abuse, neglect and hunger were normal,” in addition to evidence that petitioner suffered

from schizophrenia and psychosis. 218 F.3d 581, 600 (6th Cir. 2000). In Coleman, we

found prejudice where the jury never heard that petitioner was exposed to group sex and

pedophilia, nor was told of petitioner’s “probable mixed personality disorder with

antisocial, narcissistic, and obsessive features,” nor of the likelihood he had organic

brain problems and manic-depressive disorder. 268 F.3d at 449, 451; see also Glenn,

71 F.3d at 1207 (“[T]he jury was given virtually no information on [defendant’s] history,

character, background and organic brain damage—at least no information of a sort

calculated to raise reasonable doubt as to whether this young man ought to be put to

death.”).

In sum, this case is well within the range of this court’s precedent finding

prejudice resulting from ineffective assistance of counsel. Even under our modifiedAEDPA review, I find that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland when it failed

to find that Phillips was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to present to the jury the violent

and abusive childhood revealed by the CSB records and his half-siblings’ affidavits, or

the testimony of a fully-informed psychologist who could attest that Phillips was

sexually abused and suffered from, at the very least, borderline personality disorder. The

undiscovered evidence would have allowed the jury to better understand how a nineteen-

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year-old who had never lived outside the control of his abusive parents could have

committed a crime of such shocking atrocity. Phillips’s culpability undoubtedly would

have been reduced in the jury’s eyes if they had known that his only male role model had

taught him by life-long example that it was appropriate to physically and sexually abuse

the children in one’s care. Viewed in relation to this evidence, Phillips’s crime,

atrocious as it was, becomes more comprehensible. Had this evidence been presented

by competent counsel, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have

voted not to put Phillips to death.

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