Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-02007/USCOURTS-ca7-09-02007-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James L. Govan
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued December 3, 2009*

Decided February 25, 2010

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

DANIEL A. MANION,  Circuit Judge

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐2007

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

               Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

JAMES L. GOVAN,

              Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

No. 08 CR 12

Theresa L. Springmann, Judge.

O R D E R

JamesGovanpleadedguilty topossessing with the intenttodistribute crack cocaine and

carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, but in doing so reserved

the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the crack and gun.

Govan appeals, and we affirm.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 09-2007 Document: 14 Filed: 02/25/2010 Pages: 5
** In Indiana, it is a misdemeanor for a person to furnish an alcoholic beverage to a

minor.  Ind. Code § 7.1‐5‐7‐8(a).  On the other side of the coin, it is also a misdemeanor for a

minor to knowingly possess an alcoholic beverage.  Id. § 7.1‐5‐7‐7(a)(1).

Just before midnight on January 19, 2008, Officers Chris Drake and Doug Schwertfager

of the Indiana State Excise Police were on patrol across the street from a liquor store in Fort

Wayne, Indiana.  From their unmarked vehicle and with the aid of binoculars, the officers

observed two males who appeared to be under the age of 21 walking along the well‐lit

sidewalk in front of the store.  The men stopped, faced each other, and appeared to exchange

something.  One of them, Marquel Marsh, then entered the liquor store, while the other man,

later identified as James Govan, stood behind a pay phone on the storefront beyond the store

clerk’s view. After a few minutes, Marsh exited the store and met Govan.  The two faced each

other, madehand motions consistent with the exchange of an item, andresumed walkingdown

the sidewalk.  

Although they did not see the items the young men exchanged, the officers suspected

that they had witnessed the furnishing of alcohol to a minor.**  As the men began to cross the

street, the officers drove toward them and activated their vehicle’s emergency lights.  The

officers exited the vehicle, identified themselves as law enforcement, and asked the men for

some form of identification.  Neither had any.  Officer Schwertfager dealt with Marsh and

verified his identity and age (20) through the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles database.

Marsh informed Officer Schwertfager that he had purchased condoms at the liquor store and

showed him the condoms and a receipt.  Meanwhile,OfficerDrake dealt withGovan who, after

about five minutes ofrefusing to disclose his name, identified himself as Marcus Williams and

gave a birth date of March 17, 1985.  Officer Drake was unable to locate a person by that name

and birth date in the Bureau of Motor Vehicles database.  He then contacted Officer Chris

Hoffman ofthe FortWaynePoliceDepartment who ran the name and birth date through a local

database.  Officer Hoffman was unable to locate a black male named Marcus Williams born on

March 17, 1985, in the local system; he did discover, however, that there was an active arrest

warrant for a black male who had that birth date—James Govan.  Officer Hoffman relayed that

information to Officer Drake, accessed Govan’s photo by computer, and then informed Officer

Drake that Govan had a scar above his eye.  Officer Drake asked Govan to remove his hat and

glasses.  When the man complied, Officer Drake observed a scar above his left eye.  Officer

Hoffman then arrived on the scene and confirmed that the man matched the computer photo

of James Govan.  In order to be certain, Officer Hoffman asked the man for his social security

number.Officer Hoffmancheckedthenumberhe was given againstthenumberfrom the James

Govan entry in the local database and discovered that they matched except for two digits that

had been transposed.  The officers then placed Govan under arrest based on the outstanding

warrant and for giving false information to police during the investigation of a crime. (Twenty

minutes had elapsed between the initiation of the stop and Govan’s arrest.)  Officer Hoffman

searched Govan and discovered baggies of crack cocaine and marijuana.  After Govan was

Case: 09-2007 Document: 14 Filed: 02/25/2010 Pages: 5
*** A minor is a person less than 21 years of age.  Ind. Code § 7.1‐1‐3‐25.

transported to jail, Officer Hoffman searched him a second time and discovered a handgun in

his coat pocket.

A grand jury indicted Govan for possessing with the intent to distribute crack cocaine

(Count 1), being a felon in possession of a firearm (Count 2), and carrying a firearm during and

in relation to a drug trafficking crime (Count 3).  Govan filed a motion to suppress the crack

and the gun, alleging they were the fruits of an unlawful investigatory stop.  Following a

hearing, the district court denied the motion.  Govan then pleaded guilty to Counts 1 and 3 of

the indictment pursuant to a conditional guilty plea wherein he reserved his right to appeal the

district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.  The district court sentenced Govan to a term

of 33 months’ imprisonment on Count 1 and a consecutive term of 60 months’ imprisonment

on Count 3.  Govan appeals the denial of his motion to suppress the crack and handgun.  

On appeal, Govan argues that the crack cocaine and gun should have been suppressed

because their discovery resulted from the officers’ violation of his Fourth Amendmentright to

be free from unreasonable seizures.  Specifically, he contends that Officers Schwertfager and

Drake stopped him without reasonable suspicion that he was committing (or had committed)

a crime.  And even if the stop was justified at its inception, says Govan, the duration of the stop

was unreasonable.

Inreviewing adistrict court’sdenial of a motion to suppress, we examine its conclusions

of law de novo and its factual findings for clear error, giving special deference to its credibility

determinations.  United States v. Burnside, 588 F.3d 511, 516–17 (7th Cir. 2009).  Govan does not

challenge the district court’s findings of fact and concomitant credibility determinations.

Hence, ourreview is limitedto thedistrict court’s legal conclusion thatthe stopcomported with

the Fourth Amendment.

Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a law enforcement officer can conduct an

investigatory stop of a suspect if he has a reasonable suspicion based on particular, articulable

facts that criminal activity is afoot.  United States v. Hampton, 585 F.3d 1033, 1038 (7th Cir. 2009).

Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is an objective inquiry based on the totality

of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the stop.  United States v. Hicks, 531 F.3d

555, 558 (7th Cir. 2008).  The officer’s action must be justified at its inception and reasonably

related in scope to the circumstances that warranted the stop initially.  Jewett v. Anders, 521 F.3d

818, 824 (7th Cir. 2008).  The duration of the stop must be reasonable.  United States v. Jackson,

300 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 2002).

Under Indiana law, it is a crime for a minor*** to knowingly possess an alcoholic

beverage.  Ind. Code § 7.1‐5‐7‐7(a)(1).  The observations of the experienced excise officers gave

Case: 09-2007 Document: 14 Filed: 02/25/2010 Pages: 5
  At the time, Officer Drake was an 11‐year veteran of the Indiana State Excise

Police.  Officer Schwertfager had been on the job for two and a half years.

rise to a reasonable suspicion that Govan was a minor in possession of alcohol.** **  Standing in

the well‐lit area nearthe liquor store, Govan appeared to be underthe age of 21—he was in fact

only 22.  It was almost midnight when the officers saw Govan exchange an item with Marsh.

While Marsh went inside the store, Govan stood behind a pay phone out of the store clerk’s

view, something a minor not wishing to arouse the suspicion of store personnel might do.

After Marsh had tarried a few minutes in the store, he came out and had a face‐to‐face

encounter with Govan; the two again appeared to exchange an item.  The officers did not

actually see any items exchanged and the men’s hand movements were susceptible of an

innocent explanation, but given the circumstances it was reasonable for them to think that

Govan had supplied Marsh with money to buy alcohol and that Marsh had done so and

delivered it to him.    See Illinois v. Wardlaw, 528 U.S. 119, 125–26 (2000) (Terry stops are

appropriate even where suspect’s conduct is ambiguous and subject to an innocent

explanation); United States v. Grogg, 534 F.3d 807, 810 (7th Cir. 2008) (“While certain behavior

in isolation may have an innocent explanation, that same behavior, when viewed in the context

of other factors at play, may amount to reasonable suspicion.”).  Hence, the officers had a

reasonable suspicion that Govan was a minor in possession of an alcoholic beverage.

Accordingly, at its inception the investigatory stop of Govan did not offend the Fourth

Amendment.

Govan argues that even if the stop were initially justified, the duration of the stop was

unreasonable because the officers continuedtodetainhimaftertheydiscoveredthatMarsh was

20 years old and had purchased condoms in the liquor store.  “There is no bright‐line rule as

to how long an investigative detention may last; instead we look to whether the police

diligently pursued a means of investigating that was likely to confirm or dispel quickly their

suspicions.”    United States v. Adamson, 441 F.3d 513, 521 (7th Cir. 2006).    While Officer

Schwertfager was dealing with Marsh, Officer Drake attempted to learn Govan’s identity,

which is generally permissible during an otherwise valid stop.  Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist.

Court, 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004) (observing that “it is well established that an officer may ask a

suspect to identify himself in the course of a Terry stop”).  The fact that the officers learned that

Marsh was a minor did not dispel their reasonable suspicion that Govan was a minor in

possession of alcohol:  Marsh still could have purchased alcohol in the store, perhaps with a

fake identification or none at all, and given it to Govan.  And the condoms and receipt that

Marsh produced did not necessarily dispel theirreasonable suspicion that Govan was a minor

in possession of alcohol: the apparent exchanges between Govan and Marsh before and after

Marsh’s visit in the store were still unexplained.  Moreover, within five minutes of the stop,

Govan refused to reveal his name and then gave a false name that did not show up in the

Bureau of Motor Vehicles database.  At that point, there was ample reason for Officer Drake

to be suspicious that Govan was wanted for another crime, see id., or had given him false

Case: 09-2007 Document: 14 Filed: 02/25/2010 Pages: 5
***** Because the stop was at all times consistent with the Fourth Amendment, we need

not decide whether the outstanding arrest warrant might have been an intervening

circumstance sufficient to dissipate the taint of an illegal stop and thus avert suppression of

the crack cocaine and gun.  See United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 1997).

information during the investigation, which is itself a misdemeanor offense in Indiana, Ind.

Code § 35‐44‐2‐2(d)(1).    The officers therefore had reasonable suspicion that Govan had

committed a separate offense, which provided additional grounds for extending the stop and

investigating further.  They investigated the new suspicion by searching the local database.

Afterlearning Govan might be wanted on an arrest warrant, they looked to see if he had a scar

above his eye and checked his social security number.  All of these measures were aimed at

confirming or dispelling the officers’ suspicions raised by Govan’s conduct, and Govan’s

continued detention (for less than 15 minutes) while these steps were taken was reasonable.

See Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1063 (7th Cir. 2006) (officers do not exceed the permissible

duration of a stop where the extension of the stop is attributable to the suspect’s evasive

conduct).

In sum, the stop was lawful both at its inception and in its duration and thus provides

no basis for excluding the crack and gun.*****  Accordingly, the district court properly denied

Govan’s motion to suppress.  We AFFIRM.

Case: 09-2007 Document: 14 Filed: 02/25/2010 Pages: 5