Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_06-cv-00409/USCOURTS-alnd-5_06-cv-00409-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Larry M. Beasley
Plaintiff
The Boeing Company
Defendant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

LARRY M. BEASLEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Civil Action No. CV-06-S-409-NE

)

THE BOEING COMPANY, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Larry Beasley (“plaintiff” or “Beasley”), is a former employee of

defendant, The Boeing Company (“defendant” or “Boeing”). He claims that Boeing

terminated his employment because of his age, in violation ofthe Age Discrimination

in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. He also claims that his

termination was in retaliation for making complaints of age-related discrimination.

The case currently is before the court on defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Upon consideration of defendant’s motion, the parties’ briefs, and the evidentiary

submissions, the court concludes the motion should be granted.

PART ONE

Standard of Review 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides, in part, that summary judgment

“shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

FILED

 2007 Jul-10 PM 02:10

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 1 of 25
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and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Thus, “the plain language of Rule 56(c)

mandates the entry ofsummary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

The party seeking summary judgment always bearsthe initial responsibility of

informing the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues

of material fact to be decided at trial. Id. at 323; Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929

F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). The moving party discharges this burden by

“showing” or “pointing out” to the court that there is an absence of evidence to

support the non-moving party’s case. Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d

590, 593 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Rule 56 permits the moving party to

discharge this burden with or without supporting affidavits. See Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 324.

When the moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party cannot

rest upon the pleadings; rather, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) requires the party opposing

summary judgment to go beyond the pleadings, and to demonstrate by affidavit or

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 2 of 25
Doc. no. 17 (defendant’s evidentiary submission), Exhibit 1 (Deposition of Larry Beasley), 1

at 59-63.

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other appropriate means that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See

also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593-94.

In making this determination, the court must review all evidence and

make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary

judgment.

The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat

summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue

affecting the outcome of the case. The relevant rules of substantive law

dictate the materiality of a disputed fact. A genuine issue of material

fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the

nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.

Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting

Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)); see also United States v.

Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 

PART TWO

Statement of Facts 

A. Plaintiff’s Employment with Boeing

Plaintiff Larry Beasley first worked for defendant Boeing for a period of

approximately three years between 1966 and 1969. In February of 1969, plaintiff was

laid off, along with thousands of other employees, when the project he and the other

employees had been working on ended. Plaintiff reapplied for employment with 1

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 3 of 25
Id. at 64-65, 67; doc. no. 17 (defendant’s evidentiary submission), Exhibit 3 (Declaration 2

of Kathleen Ganey), at ¶ 1. Plaintiff identifies several facts related to an allegedly discriminatory

age-based comment made while he was working at the Huntsville facility in 1997, and his

subsequent complaint to the Human Resources department. These facts are relevant only to his

retaliation claim, and need not be discussed in this opinion, because plaintiff has abandoned his

retaliation claim. See Part Three (A), infra.

 Ganey Declaration, at ¶ 1. 3

Id. at ¶ 9. 4

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Boeing in May of 1990, and he was re-hired as a machinist at Boeing’s Huntsville,

Alabama, facility, at the age of forty-seven. Plaintiff transferred to Boeing’s 2

Decatur, Alabama, facility in 2002, and remained employed there until his discharge

in November of 2004. 

3

B. Boeing’s Policies and Procedures

Boeing follows a Business Process Instruction policy when disciplining

employees. That policy is designed to assist members of management and Human

Resources employees to determine both the severity of any violations of the Boeing

Code of Conduct, and the propriety of any proposed corrective action. Boeing

reserves the right to modify the corrective action based on the severity and magnitude

of the specific violation.4

Each individual Boeing plant also maintains its own localized policies.

Plaintiff received training on the Decatur plant’s policies and procedures, including

Decatur Operating Procedure – Personal Warranty, Decatur Operating Procedure –

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 4 of 25
 Doc. no. 17 (defendant’s evidentiary submission), Exhibit 2 (Declaration of Jacqueline 5

Chadwick), at ¶ 1. See also Beasley Deposition, at 95.

 Chadwick Declaration, at ¶ 3. 6

 Id. at ¶ 2. 7

Id. at ¶ 4. See also Beasley Deposition, at 95-96. 8

 Chadwick Declaration, at ¶ 5; Ganey Declaration, at ¶ 2; Beasley Deposition, at 93-94. 9

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Nonconforming Material, and Detailed Process Instructions. A “Personal Warranty” 5

is an employee’s certification or affirmation that work performed is acceptable and

in compliance with all relevant requirements, specifications, agreements, instructions,

and procedures. Detailed Process Instructions (or “DPI’s”) convey in detail the work 6

processes, instructions, and requirements for all work performed in the Decatur

facility. The Decatur Operating Procedure – Nonconforming Material instructs

employees on how to identify and dispose of non-conforming material, or work

products that do not conform the company’s set standards. 

7

The Decatur facility utilizes a system called “Factory Net,” which documents

all of the work steps performed on an item produced in the facility. Employees are

required to report all non-conformances, or “NCS,” on the Factory Net system. 

8

C. Non-Conformances Caused by Plaintiff’s Work

On October 24, 2003, plaintiff transferred to the position of Production

Technician, and began working on the aft skirt and engine sections of a rocket.9

Other Production Technicians assisted on the engine work, but plaintiff was the only

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 5 of 25
 Chadwick Declaration, at ¶ 5; Beasley Deposition, at 100. 10

 Chadwick Declaration, at ¶¶ 6-7. 11

Id. 12

 Chadwick Declaration, at ¶ 8. 13

 Beasley Deposition, at 94-95, 104-05, 122-23. 14

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Production Technician who worked on the aft skirt. On May 25 and 26, 2004, 10

plaintiff entered NCS 14491-1 and NCS 14491-2 on the Factory Net system,

reflecting non-conformances in the engine section. Jacqueline Chadwick, plaintiff’s 11

immediate supervisor, discussed these mistakes with him, and plaintiff stated that he

had been confused about the drawings for the part, but insisted that he did not intend

to make a mistake. Ms. Chadwick stated that she asked plaintiff why he kept 12

creating non-conformances, and whether he needed additional training. Plaintiff

responded that he did not know why he continued to create non-conformances, but

he did not need any help because he had not experienced performance problems in

the past. Even so, because plaintiff had created non-conformances on two

consecutive days, Chadwick stated she issued him a verbal counseling. Chadwick

also assigned a “buddy” to work with and assist plaintiff. Plaintiff did not 13

specifically recall these conversations with Chadwick about training, or the verbal

counseling, but he stated they could have occurred. He acknowledged having

14

another individual assigned to work with him, but he did not believe the assignment

was a result of his own poor performance. Instead, plaintiff believed the additional

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 6 of 25
Id. at 119-22. 15

 Chadwick Declaration, at ¶ 9. 16

Id. 17

 Beasley Deposition, at 98-99. 18

 Chadwick Declaration, at ¶ 10. See also Beasley Deposition, at 100-01, 113-15. 19

 Chadwick Declaration, at ¶ 10. 20

 Beasley Deposition, at 103, 130-31. 21

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worker was assigned so that the project could be completed more quickly. 

15

Plaintiff entered another NCS, No. 14800, on the Factory Net System on June

30, 2004, reflecting a non-conformance in the engine section. Chadwick stated that, 16

as a result of this non-conformance, she issued another verbal counseling to plaintiff

for poor workmanship or inattention to detail. Plaintiff did not recall receiving a 17

verbal counseling on this occasion.18

Plaintiff continued to work on the aft skirt section, and on September 13, 2004,

the aft skirt was delivered to the team in charge of its final assembly. The final

assembly team refused to accept the aft skirt because it had too many nonconformances, and the aft skirt was returned to plaintiff’s department for additional

work and repair. Chadwick stated that she issued plaintiff another verbal counseling 19

on September 21, 2004, as a result of the non-conformances found in the aft skirt.

20

Plaintiff did not recall receiving a verbal counseling on this occasion, but he did

recall Chadwick telling him there had better be “a good explanation” for the defects,

and that plaintiff was “too popular.”21

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 7 of 25
 Chadwick Declaration, at ¶ 12. 22

Id. 23

Id. at ¶ 13. 24

Id. 25

 Beasley Deposition, at 125-26. 26

Id. at 105-06; Chadwick Declaration, at ¶ 13. Chadwick states that plaintiff asked to be 27

moved to the inspection position, because he was not good at his job, and could not perform the

work assigned to him. Id. Claimant, however, does not recall requesting to be moved to the

inspector position. Beasley Deposition, at 105-06.

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On September 28, 2004, NCS Nos. 16223-1 to 16223-5 were entered on

Factory Net, reflecting multiple non-conformances in the aftskirt. After these non22

conformances were discovered, Chadwick removed plaintiff from working on all

hardware products and directed him to review and ensure his full understanding of

the plant’s Detailed Process Instructions. On October 7, 2004, NCS 16359 was 23

entered on Factory Net, reflecting multiple non-conformances in the engine section.

24

Plaintiff had not noted these non-conformances on the Factory Net system, nor

otherwise identified them. On October 15, 2004, plaintiff told Chadwick that he had 25

become “a liability rather than an asset” to his work team. Chadwick then 26

reassigned plaintiff to a position in which he would only be inspecting other people’s

work.27

On October 22, 2004, more non-conformances were entered on Factory Net,

reflecting problems with the aft skirt that appeared to have been concealed by a plate.

Chadwick questioned plaintiff about whether he had covered up the nonCase 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 8 of 25
 Chadwick Declaration, at ¶ 14. 28

Id. at ¶ 15. 29

Id. at ¶ 16. 30

Id. at ¶ 17. 31

Id. at ¶ 18. 32

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conformances, and plaintiff denied doing so. Chadwick then re-emphasized that

plaintiff needed to be cautious in his work and to fully understand the Detailed

Process Instructions. On October 25, 2004, Chadwick checked Factory Net and 28

confirmed both that plaintiff had alone performed the work on the aft skirt, and that

he had not entered any of the aft skirt’s non-conformances on Factory Net.

29

Chadwick then met with plaintiff again to ask why he had not entered the nonconformances noted in NCS 16223-1. Plaintiff responded that he did not report any

non-conformances on the aft skirt because, at the time he performed the work, he did

not believe he had made any errors. 

30

Still more non-conformances were discovered on October 25 and 26, reflecting

additional problems with the aft skirt. Plaintiff had not entered these nonconformances on Factory Net. Subsequently, Chadwick prepared a proposed 31

corrective action for plaintiff, and presented it to Jackie Nesselroad — the Manager

for the Assembly and Test Department — for review. Nesslerod, however, instructed

Chadwick to report the issue to the Employee Corrective Action Review Board (the

“ECARB” or “Board”). While plaintiff’s situation was being reviewed by the 32

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 9 of 25
Id. 33

 Ganey Declaration, at ¶ 4. 34

Id. at ¶ 5. 35

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ECARB, NCS Nos. 16223-7 through 16223-10 were entered on Factory Net,

reflecting numerous non-conformances in the aft skirt.

33

D. The ECARB Investigation and Plaintiff’s Termination

The purpose of the ECARB is to recommend appropriate and consistent

corrective actions for employees whose conduct is investigated by any department at

Boeing for alleged violations of the Ethical Business Conduct, Procurement Integrity,

or Security policies. The ECARB reviews any potentially precedent-setting cases and

all cases involving time off from work, job reclassification, or discharge. The

Board’s review is intended to ensure consistency with prior actions and compliance

with company policies, state and federal laws, agency regulations, and contractual

obligations. The ECARB is comprised of senior-level, non-union employees 34

representing a cross-section of the plant’s various functions. In reviewing a case, the

ECARB receives only an employee’s job history, including hire date, transfer date,

current classification, and disciplinary history. The review team does not learn the

employee’s name, race, gender, or age. 

35

Edquna Thompson, an employee in Boeing’s Human Resources department,

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 10 of 25
Id. at ¶ 6. See also doc. no. 17 (defendant’s evidentiary submission), Exhibit 4 36

(Declaration of Edquna Thompson), at ¶ 1.

 Thompson Declaration, at ¶ 2. 37

Id. at ¶ 3. 38

Id. at ¶ 4. 39

Id. at ¶ 5. 40

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served as coordinator ofthe ECARB’s investigation into plaintiff’s actions. During 36

the course of this investigation, on November 3, 2004, Thompson met with Tony

Garcia and Herb Bryan, who were Quality Engineers, and Mike Savage, who was a

Manufacturing Engineer. Garcia, who had inspected some of plaintiff’s work, 37

informed Thompson that, during his final walk around on the aft skirt, he did not

notice any major defects. Although he noticedminor nicks, blemishes, and scratches,

he stamped the unit as ready for transfer to the Final Assembly department.38

Thompson showedBryan some pictures ofthe non-conformances on the aft skirt, and

Bryan stated that several of them could be considered major defects that should have

been entered on the Factory Net system. Savage stated that plaintiff could not have 39

overlooked the non-conformances on the aft skirt because the defects were so

obvious. Savage also stated that it appeared as if plaintiff had attempted to conceal

several of the non-conformances, and that plaintiff had earlier admitted to feeling “out

of his comfort zone” in his current work assignment.40

On November 4, 2004, plaintiff met with Chadwick, Thompson, and Robert

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 11 of 25
 Chadwick Declaration, at ¶ 19; Beasley Deposition, at 137-40. 41

 Chadwick Declaration, at ¶ 20; Beasley Deposition, at 153-56. 42

 Ganey Declaration, at ¶ 7; Beasely Deposition, at 143-44. 43

 Ganey Declaration, at ¶ 7. 44

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Kozuch, who served as union steward. During this meeting, Chadwick again showed

plaintiff pictures of all the discovered non-conformances, and again asked him

whether he had any knowledge of them. Plaintiff denied having any knowledge of 41

most of the non-conformances. With regard to the non-conformances plaintiff did

admit knowing about, he acknowledged the workmanship was poor, but stated he

would not have intentionally created defective work. 

42

On November 11, 2004, plaintiff saw Kathleen Ganey, the Decatur plant’s

Senior Manager of Human Resources, who told him not to worry about his job. At 43

that time, however, the ECARB had not met to discuss plaintiff’s situation, and

Ganey did not know the extent of the problems with the aft skirt. Later that day, the 44

ECARB met and unanimously voted to terminate plaintiff’s employment. The voting

members of the ECARB were ages sixty-three, fifty-six, forty-seven, and forty-six.

The following day, the decision of the ECARB was implemented, and plaintiff’s

employment was terminated for the following stated reasons: (1) violating Decatur

Operating Procedure – Personal Warranty and Decatur Operating Procedure –

Nonconforming Material for failing to report multiple non-conformances; (2)

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 12 of 25
Id. at ¶ 8; Chadwick Declaration, at ¶ 21. 45

 Chadwick Declaration, at ¶ 24; Ganey Declaration, at ¶ 13. 46

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engaging in the unauthorized performance of work; and (3) violating Business

Process Instruction – 2616, concerning the concealment of work, an offense that

plaintiff acknowledges usually results in an employee’s discharge. Plaintiff was 45

sixty-three years old at the time of his termination. 

After plaintiff’s termination, additional non-conformances continued to surface

on plaintiff’s work products. Boeing ultimately determined that plaintiff had created

and failed to report hundreds of non-conformances, and that he had attempted to

conceal many of the non-conformances that had been discovered. The repair of

plaintiff’s work on the aft skirt cost Boeing approximately sixteen thousand dollars

and three hundred hours of labor, and resulted in an inspection by the customer, the

United States Air Force.46

E. Disciplinary Experiences of Other Boeing Employees

The ECARB also investigated Tony Garcia, the Quality Engineer who had

inspected some of plaintiff’s work on the aft skirt. The ECARB determined that

Garcia did not intend to conceal any non-conformances or make any

misrepresentations to the company. Garcia had, however, failed to properly manage

his time, which had resulted in hisfailure to notice some of the non-conformances on

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 13 of 25
 Ganey Declaration, at ¶ 10. 47

Id. 48

Id. 49

 Ganey Declaration, at ¶ 11. See also doc. no. 20 (plaintiff’s brief), at § I(A) (plaintiff’s 50

Response to Defendant’s Statement of Facts), failing to dispute the facts set forth in paragraph 11

of Ganey’s Declaration.

 Ganey Declaration, at ¶ 12. See also doc. no. 20 (plaintiff’s brief), at § I(A) (plaintiff’s 51

Response to Defendant’s Statement of Facts), failing to dispute the facts set forth in paragraph 12

of Ganey’s Declaration.

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the aft skirt. As a result of this failure, Garcia received a verbal counseling. Ron 47

Fluke, a Production Technician, and Robert Kozuch, the union steward, also had

inspected some of plaintiff’s work. The ECARB reviewed their work as well, but

found no evidence that Fluke or Kozuch knew or should have known of the nonconformances. At the time of plaintiff’s discharge, Garcia, Fluke, and Kozuch were 48

forty-seven, fifty-six, and forty-seven years old, respectively.49

Plaintiff admits that other employees at the Decatur facility — aged twentyeight, thirty-three, and thirty-eight — have been terminated for poor performance.50

He also admits that, in the history of the Decatur facility, there has never been an

employee who was found to have created and failed to report hundreds of nonconformances, and who attempted to conceal many of the non-conformances.51

Plaintiff has, however, identified other Boeing employees who have experienced

performance problems but were not discharged as a result. 

On October 19, 2004, Anthony Locke, a Production Technician, performed

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 14 of 25
 Ganey Declaration, at ¶ 17. 52

 In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that Locke was in his late twenties. See doc. no. 1 53

(complaint), at ¶ 11. However, plaintiff has presented no actual evidence of Locke’s age. The

allegations of his complaint are insufficient, standing alone, to prevent the entry of summary

judgment. See also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593-94 (requiring the party

opposing summary judgment to “go beyond the pleadings” to demonstrate a genuine issue of

material fact).

 Ganey Declaration, at ¶ 18. 54

 Ganey Declaration, at ¶ 19. 55

See note 53, supra. 56

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unauthorized work, created one non-conformance, and admitted to concealing it. As

a result, he was suspended without pay. Plaintiff has offered no evidence of 52

Locke’s age. Plaintiff had inspected some of Locke’s work without reporting the

53

defects to Boeing, but Boeing determined that plaintiff did not intend to conceal any

of Locke’s non-conformances or to make any misrepresentations to the company.

Therefore, plaintiff was not disciplined as a result of this incident. 

54

In July of 2002, James Slone, a Manager, instructed Greg Jacobs, a Production

Technician and one of Slone’s subordinates, to perform work without written

authorization. As a result, Slone was suspended without pay, demoted, and

transferred to another work area. Jacobs received a written corrective action.

55

Plaintiff offers no evidence of Slone’s and Jacobs’ respective ages. 

56

In March of 2002, three Production Technicians — Dale Elledge, Reba

Hughes-Orr and Steve Ridaught — damaged a tank during transport. After an

investigation, Boeing determined that the transportation process was flawed, but that

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 15 of 25
 Ganey Declaration, at ¶ 20. 57

See note 53, supra. 58

 Beasley Deposition, at 202-03. 59

Id. at 202-04; Ganey Declaration, at ¶ 23. 60

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the Production Technicians also should have paid more attention to detail. As a result

of this incident, Hughes-Orr and Ridaught received verbal warnings. Elledge, who

had a prior disciplinary history, received a written warning. Jesse Caddell, their

supervisor, received a written warning for failing to give his employees necessary

information. Plaintiff has offered no evidence of the respective ages of Hughes-Orr, 57

Ridaught, Elledge, and Caddell.58

F. Unemployment Proceedings Before the Alabama Department of Industrial

Relations

Plaintiff sought unemployment compensation benefits after his discharge from

Boeing. He initially was awarded benefits, and Boeing appealed the award to the

Alabama Department of Industrial Relations. During a hearing conducted by the 59

Department’s Hearings and Appeals Division, plaintiff testified in support of his

application, but he never mentioned that he thought Boeing terminated his

employment because of his age, or in retaliation for making complaints of age

discrimination. The Hearings and Appeals Division upheld the denial of 60

unemployment benefits, because it found plaintiff to have violated a provision of

Alabama law requiring “denial of benefits to an individual discharged or removed

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 16 of 25
 Beasley Deposition, at Exhibit 10 (Hearing Decision by the Hearings and Appeals Division 61

of the State of Alabama Department of Industrial Relations). See Ala. Code § 25-4-78(3)(a) (1975

& Supp. 2006) (stating that an individual will be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits

if “he was discharged or removed from his work for a dishonest or criminal act committed in

connection with his work or for sabotage or an act endangering the safety of others”).

 Beasley Deposition, Exhibit 10, at 1. 62

Id. at 2. 63

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from work for committing a dishonest or criminal act in connection with the work or

for sabotage or an act endangering the safety of others.” The hearing officer made

61

the following factual findings:

The claimant worked for the listed employer from July 30, 1990,

until November 12, 2004. He was employed as a production technician.

The claimant was discharged as a result of gross misconduct. The

claimant was responsible for making over 200 defects in the production

of materials but he failed to inform the employer and this resulted in the

final product being rejected or returned to correct these errors. The

claimant was responsible for the work that he did. He was further

required to certify that the work was complete and was correct. The

claimant made numerous errors in his work which were not revealed to

the employer. The total errors made by the claimant numbered in the

hundreds. Many of these errors were obvious to the non-lay person.

Some defects were also concealed so that they could not be easily

detected. The claimant had been warned or counselled [sic] concerning

his performance but not for concealing defects.62

The hearing officer concluded that 

[t]he numerous errors revealed concerning the claimant’s employment

clearly establish gross negligence. The number of mistakes is such that

even the lay person would reasonably have known that such were

occurring. The claimant’s failure to report such and his apparent

concealing of such constitutes a dishonest act. Accordingly, he is

subject to a denial of benefits . . . .

63

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 17 of 25
 Beasley Deposition, at 202-03. 64

Id. at 77-78, and Exhibit 6 (plaintiff’s EEOC Charge). 65

 Beasley Deposition, at Exhibit 8 (EEOC Dismissal and Notice of Right to Sue). 66

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Plaintiff did not appeal the decision of the Hearings and Appeals Division.64

G. Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge and Lawsuit

Plaintiff submitted a Charge of Discrimination to the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on May 11, 2005, alleging that his termination

from Boeing was the result of unlawful age discrimination. On December 13, 2005, 65

the EEOC dismissed plaintiff’s charge and issued him a notice of his right to sue,

stating it was unable to conclude whether the information presented established any

legal violation. This suit followed.

66

PART THREE

Discussion

A. Abandonment of Retaliation Claim

At the summary judgment stage, plaintiff effectively abandoned his retaliation

claim. Plaintiff has offered no response to defendant’s well-supported arguments that

summary judgment should be granted on that claim. Issues and contentions not raised

in a party’s brief are deemed abandoned. See, e.g., Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1027

(“Parties opposing summary judgment are appropriately charged with the

responsibility of marshaling and presenting their evidence before summary judgment

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 18 of 25
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is granted, not afterwards.”); Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v.

Independent Sprinkler Corp., 10 F.3d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that a

district court can “properly treat as abandoned a claim alleged in the complaint but

not even raised as a ground for summary judgment”) (citing Lazzara v. Howard A.

Esser, Inc., 802 F.2d 260, 269 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that a ground not pressed in

opposition to a motion for summary judgment is to be treated by the district court as

abandoned)).

In opposing a motion for summary judgment, a party may not rely on his

pleadings to avoid judgment against him. There is no burden on the

district court to distill every potential argument that could be made

based upon the materials before it on summary judgment. Rather, the

onus is upon the parties to formulate arguments; grounds alleged in the

complaint but not relied upon in summary judgment are deemed

abandoned. . . .

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted).

B. ADEA Claim

The ADEA makes it “unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or

to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because

of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The protections of the ADEA

extend to those individuals who “are at least 40 years of age but less than 70 years of

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 19 of 25
 In order to make out a prima facie case for an ADEA violation based upon termination of 67

employment, the plaintiff must show (1) that he was a member of the class of persons protected by

the ADEA, that is, individuals between the ages of 40 and 70, (2) that he was discharged, (3) that

he was qualified to perform the duties of the job from which he was dismissed, and (4) that a

substantially younger person replaced him. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000); Bogle v. Orange County Board of County Commissioners, 162 F.3d 653,

656-57 (11th Cir. 1998). Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case because

he cannot show that he was qualified to perform his job, or that he was replaced by a substantially

younger individual. See doc. no. 16 (defendant’s brief), at 23-26. The court need not address these

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age.” 29 U.S.C. § 621(a). 

Plaintiff claims that Boeing violated the ADEA when it terminated his

employment, but he does not claim to have direct evidence of age discrimination.

Thus, he must prove his claims with circumstantial evidence, navigating the burdenshifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973), and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).

Under this analysis, plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of age-based

disparate treatment, which creates a presumption of discrimination. To rebut the

presumption, Boeing then must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

the disputed employment action. If Boeing does so, the presumption of

discrimination drops from the case, and the burden shifts back to plaintiff to show

that Boeing’s proffered reason is merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination. See

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-56.

Even assuming that plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of age-based

discrimination, his ADEA claim cannot survive summary judgment because he 67

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 20 of 25
arguments because, even assuming plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, his ADEA claim still

would fail. He has no evidence to rebut defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for

terminating his employment.

 Doc. no. 16, at 26. 68

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cannot show that Boeing’s proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for

terminating his employment were a mere pretext for age discrimination. Boeing

states that plaintiff was terminated for creating, failing to report, and possibly

attempting to conceal hundreds of non-conformances. To rebut these proffered 68

reasons, plaintiff would have to demonstrate that they are merely a pretext for age

discrimination. Plaintiff cannot succeed by simply disagreeing with, or questioning,

defendant’s stated reasons. “Stated somewhat differently, a plaintiff may not

establish that an employer’s proffered reason is pretextual merely by questioning the

wisdom of the employer’s reason, at least not where, as here, the reason is one that

might motivate a reasonable employer.” Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d

1519, 1543 (11th Cir. 1997). Rather, the plaintiff’s burden is that of “cast[ing]

sufficient doubt on the defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons to permit a

reasonable factfinder to conclude that the employer’s proffered ‘legitimate reasons

were not what actually motivated its conduct’ . . . .” Id. at 1538 (quoting CooperHouston v. Southern Railway Co., 37 F.3d 603, 605 (11th Cir. 1994)). The plaintiff

shoulders that burden by demonstrating “such weaknesses, implausibilities,

inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proferred

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 21 of 25
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legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy

of credence.” Combs, 106 F.3d at 1538 (quoting Sheridan v. E.I. duPont de Nemours

& Company, 100 F.3d 1061, 1072 (3d Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff argues that Boeing’s more lenient disciplinary treatment of younger

employees demonstrates that its proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons are

false, and that it actually was motivated by age-based discrimination. Specifically,

plaintiff identifies Anthony Locke, James Sloane, Dale Elledge, Reba Hughes-Orr,

and Steve Ridaught as his alleged comparators. Locke performed unauthorized work,

created a single non-conformance, and admitted to concealing it. He was suspended

without pay. Slone instructed a subordinate employee to perform unauthorized work,

and he was suspended without pay, demoted, and transferred to another work area.

Elledge, Hughes-Orr, and Ridaught damaged a piece of equipment. After Boeing

determined the damage was partially due to circumstances beyond these employees’

control, it issued them verbal and written warnings. 

Importantly, plaintiff has produced no evidence of the respective ages of any

of these alleged comparators. Therefore, the allegedly more lenient treatment they

received cannot be considered evidence of age-based discrimination. See Howard v.

BP Oil Co., Inc., 32 F.3d 520, 526 (11th Cir. 1994) (summary judgment is proper

where the plaintiff fails to produce evidence to discredit the defendant’s explanation

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 22 of 25
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of its action).

Further, even if plaintiff had produced evidence that his alleged comparators

were substantially younger than he, the alleged comparators were not sufficiently

similar to plaintiff for the more lenient treatment they received to demonstrate an agebased discriminatory motive. The Eleventh Circuit requires that “the quantity and

quality of the comparator’s misconduct be nearly identical to prevent courts from

second-guessing employers’ reasonable decisions and confusing apples with

oranges.” Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing

Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1989)) (emphasis

supplied). Thus, plaintiff mustshow that younger employees were found guilty of the

same or “nearly identical” misconduct, yet were disciplined in different ways.

Maniccia, 171 F.3d at1369. Where there are clear differences in either the quantity

or quality of the acts of misconduct committed by the plaintiff and his alleged

comparators, it cannot be said that they are “nearly identical.” Cf. Silvera v. Orange

County School Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[A]lthough Silvera and

Ritter have in common the fact that they were arrested in the 1970’s . . . Silvera has

three additional arrests . . . . The fact that Silvera had multiple arrests is by itself

sufficient to establish that he is not similarly situated to Ritter.”); see also Maniccia,

171 F.3d at 1368-69 (holding that a female plaintiff in a Title VII sex discrimination

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 23 of 25
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case was not similarly situated to male employees who each committed a single

policy violation, whereas the female plaintiff had committed at least four policy

violations). It is true that plaintiff’s alleged comparators suffered performance

problems related to workmanship, and that none of them were terminated as a result.

Even so, all of the alleged comparators were disciplined for a single incident, not for

creating, failing to report, and possibly attempting to conceal hundreds of nonconformances, as was plaintiff. See, e.g., Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Medical Ctr.,

137 F.3d 1206, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that employees who allegedly

committed one act of misconduct were not similarly situated to the plaintiff, who

engaged in multiple instances of misconduct in the same day). 

Plaintiff has no other evidence of age-based discrimination. As defendant

points out, plaintiff was forty-seven years old — well above the threshold age for

ADEA coverage — when he was re-hired by Boeing in 1990. Further, the members

of the ECARB who voted to terminate plaintiff’s employment were sixty-three, fiftysix, forty-seven, and forty-six years of age, respectively. These facts suggest that

Boeing did not discriminate against plaintiff because of his age. See Elrod v. Sears,

Roebuck and Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1471 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that the plaintiff

faced “a difficult burden” of proof because “all of the primary players behind his

termination . . . were well over age forty and within the class of persons protected by

Case 5:06-cv-00409-CLS Document 31 Filed 07/10/07 Page 24 of 25
 Defendant also argues that plaintiff is estopped from asserting that he was terminated as

69

a result of age discrimination because he did not raise such an argument before the State of Alabama

Department of Industrial Relations Hearings and Appeals Division during the hearing on his claim

for unemployment benefits. See doc. no. 16, at 28-29. The court need not consider this argument,

because summary judgment is due to be granted on other grounds.

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the ADEA”). Accordingly, he has no evidence to support a claim under the ADEA,

and summary judgment is due to be granted in defendant’s favor on that claim.69

PART FOUR

Conclusion and Order

In accordance with the foregoing, the court finds there are no genuine issues

of material fact, and defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and all of

plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. The clerk is directed to close this

file.

DONE this 10th day of July, 2007.

______________________________

United States District Judge

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