Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-02413/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-02413-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Advocates for Individuals with Disabilities Foundation Incorporated
Plaintiff
Golden Rule Properties LLC
Defendant

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Advocates for Individuals with Disabilities 

Foundation Incorporated, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Golden Rule Properties LLC, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-16-02413-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Dismiss Federal Claims pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), together with a Motion to Remand once his federal claim 

under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. (“ADA”) has 

been dismissed (Doc. 8). 

 The Ninth Circuit has held that Rule 41(a)(1) “does not allow for piecemeal 

dismissals.” Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 687 (9th 

Cir. 2005). “Instead, withdrawals of individual claims against a given defendant are 

governed by [Rule] 15, which addresses amendments to pleadings.” Id. (citing Ethridge 

v. Harbor House Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also Gen. Signal Corp. 

v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 66 F.3d 1500, 1513 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e have held that 

Rule 15, not Rule 41, governs the situation when a party dismisses some, but not all, of 

its claims.”) (citations omitted). Thus, “‘a plaintiff may not use [Rule 41(a)(1)] to 

dismiss, unilaterally, a single claim from a multi-claim complaint.’” Hells Canyon, 403 

F.3d at 687 (quoting Ethridge, 861 F.2d at 1392). Other circuits agree. See id. n.4 

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(collecting cases); see also S. Gensler, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and 

Commentary, at 1014 (Thomson Reuters 2016) (“[I]f a plaintiff has multiple claims 

against a defendant and wishes to dismiss one or more – but not all – of those claims, 

the appropriate procedural mechanism is to file an amended complaint under 

Rule 15(a).”).1

 The analysis in Hells Canyon applies equally to attempts to dismiss 

using either Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) or 41(a)(2). Therefore, if Plaintiff wishes to 

dismiss its federal claim, it is obliged to file a separate motion to amend that comports 

with LRCiv. 15.1. 

 As well, however, “[f]ederal courts are required sua sponte to examine 

jurisdictional issues such as standing.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 

939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citation omitted and alteration in the original). After 

reviewing the complaint, the Court is unconvinced that the Plaintiff, as a “charitable 

non-profit foundation” that allegedly “has a close relationship with former, current and 

future [unnamed] disabled individuals[,]” has standing to pursue injunctive relief under 

the ADA. (Doc. 1, Ex. 1 at 1–2.) 

 A plaintiff has standing to pursue injunctive relief only if he “is likely to suffer 

future injury.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983). The threatened 

injury must be “concrete and particularized”; that is, it must affect the plaintiff “in a 

personal and individual way.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 & n.1 

(1992). An “undifferentiated” interest in ensuring compliance with the law will not 

suffice. Id. at 575 (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974)); 

see also Simon v. E. Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976) (“an 

organization’s abstract concern with a subject that could be affected by an adjudication 

does not substitute for the concrete injury required by” Article III). 

 In cases under Title III of the ADA, a disabled plaintiff can establish standing to 

 

1

 The Ninth Circuit has held that Rule 41(a)(1) permits a plaintiff to dismiss all

claims against a particular defendant, even if other defendants remain in the case, 

Pedrina v. Chun, 987 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir. 1993), but that is not what Plaintiff attempts to do here. 

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pursue injunctive relief either by showing that “he intends to return to a noncompliant 

accommodation and is therefore likely to reencounter a discriminatory architectural 

barrier,” or by showing that “discriminatory architectural barriers deter him from 

returning to a noncompliant accommodation” that he otherwise would visit. Chapman, 

631 F.3d at 950. In either case, the plaintiff must show that he is personally affected by 

the barrier. Id. (claim for injunctive relief must seek to “vindicate the rights of the 

particular plaintiff rather than the rights of third parties”). Courts dismiss Title III 

claims on standing grounds where the plaintiff fails to assert a personalized injury 

stemming from the alleged violation. See Payne v. Chapel Hill N. Properties, LLC, 947 

F. Supp. 2d 567, 578 (M.D. N.C. 2013) (disability rights organization lacked standing to 

seek injunction under Title III, where it failed to identify any member personally 

affected by the barrier); Small v. Gen. Nutrition Companies, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 83, 

90-99 (E.D. N.Y. 2005) (same). 

 Instead of asserting that any actual disabled individual encountered the 

Defendant’s allegedly ADA-noncompliant public accommodation, Plaintiff’s complaint 

alleges the following: 

Plaintiff, who is known to have a relationship or association with 

individuals with disabilities, conducted an investigation into Defendant’s 

public accommodation for purposes of ascertaining whether it complies 

with the ADA. Plaintiff’s investigation confirmed that Defendant’s public 

accommodation was not accessible to individuals with disabilities in the 

following particulars: . . . 

(Doc. 1, Ex. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff appears to identify only a generalized interest in ensuring 

that Defendant complies with the ADA. Such an interest is insufficient to confer 

standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 575; Simon, 426 U.S. at 40. The fact that Plaintiff is an 

association that advocates on behalf of disabled individuals does not change this analysis. 

See Payne, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 578; Small, 388 F. Supp. 2d. at 90–99. 

 For those reasons, and in the interest of judicial economy, the Court orders that 

before Plaintiff files the requisite motion to amend in compliance with LRCiv. 15.1, 

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Plaintiff and its attorney individually are ordered to show cause as to why this case 

should not be dismissed for a lack of standing. 

 Finally, the Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff’s pre- and post-removal conduct 

suggests gamesmanship and a deliberate attempt to waste the Defendant’s time and to 

raise its costs. (See Doc. 11 at 4–6.) The Court may sanction a party who has “acted in 

bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 

501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, an 

attorney “who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously 

may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and 

attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 

Accordingly, the Court also orders Plaintiff and its attorney individually to show cause 

as to why it should not be sanctioned for its pre- and post-removal conduct as outlined 

by Defendant’s response brief and corroborated by its attached exhibits. (Doc. 11 at 4–

6, Exs. A, B.) 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of 

Federal Claims Without Prejudice and Motion to Remand (Doc. 10) is denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that before filing a motion to amend, Plaintiff and 

its attorney individually are directed to show cause why: (1) this case should not be 

dismissed for lack of standing; and (2) why it should not be sanctioned, by September 8, 

2016. Defendant, if it wishes to do so, may file a response by September 15, 2016. 

Plaintiff may file a reply by September 22, 2016. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an Order to Show Cause Hearing is set for 

September 29, 2016 at 3:30 p.m. in Courtroom 602, Sandra Day O’Connor U.S. Federal 

Courthouse, 401 W. Washington St., Phoenix, Arizona 85003-2151. 

 Dated this 25th day of August, 2016. 

Honorable G. Murray Snow

United States District Judge

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