Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01520/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01520-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Pamela Pyne
Plaintiff

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 Michael J. Astrue is substituted for his predecessor, Jo Anne B. Barnhart, as Commissioner of the Social 1

Security Administration. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1). 

 Claimant’s opening brief indicates that she also sought supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI 2

of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., which application the Commissioner denied. (Doc. 23, pp. 1-2). Claimant,

however, did not apply for Title XVI benefits. (See Administrative Record (“AR”) 78-80). In addition to Title II

benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., Claimant applied for benefits under Part A of Title XVIII of the Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1395(c) et seq. (Id.). Title XVIII, Part A, provides for hospital coverage for those entitled to disability or old-age

benefits under the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(c) et seq. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAMELA PYNE, ) No. 05-cv-1520 FVS TAG

)

Plaintiff, ) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

) ON PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL FROM 

vs. ) ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, )

1

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

____________________________________/

Plaintiff Pamela Pyne (“Claimant” or “Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of an administrative

decision denying her claim for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social

Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Pending before the Court is Claimant’s appeal 2

from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). 

Claimant filed her complaint on November 26, 2005, and her opening brief on October 16, 2006. 

(Docs. 1, 23). The Commissioner filed an opposition to the appeal on November 17, 2006. (Doc.

24). Claimant did not file a reply brief.

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 Claimant previously filed a claim for disability benefits under Title II of the Act in September 2002. (AR 75- 3

77). The Social Security Administration denied the 2002 application after determining that Claimant was gainfully

employed at the time. (AR 38-40). Because the Administrative Law Judge amended Claimant’s onset date to July 2,

2002 at Claimant’s request, Claimant’s work history and alleged impairments relating back to that date are addressed as

necessary to resolve Claimant’s instant appeal. (AR 22, 321).

2

JURISDICTION

On March 21, 2003, Claimant filed an application for DIB, alleging an onset date of February 

5, 2003. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 78-80). The application was denied initially and on 3

reconsideration. (AR 34-37, 41-45, 48-52). 

After timely requesting a hearing, Claimant and her attorney appeared telephonically before

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Philip E. Moulaison on March 22, 2005. (AR 22, 53, 301-323). 

On April 27, 2005, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Claimant was not disabled. (AR

19-31). The Appeals Council denied Claimant’s request for review on August 30, 2005. (AR 8-11). 

The Appeals Council’s decision, therefore, became the final decision of the Commissioner, which is

appealable to the district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The initiation of an appeal in the

district court must be commenced within sixty (60) days of the Appeal Council’s decision. 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On November 26, 2005, Claimant timely filed this action. (Doc. 1).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The relevant facts have been presented in the administrative hearing transcript, the ALJ’s

decision, and the briefs filed by the Claimant and the Commissioner, and will only be summarized

here. To the extent necessary, additional facts will be addressed in this Court’s analysis.

Claimant was born on October 27, 1945, making her 59 years old at the time of the March 22,

2005, administrative hearing. (AR 305). Claimant testified that she attended school through the

twelfth grade. (AR 306). She added that she has a valid driver’s license and drives to and from

work. (AR 305-06). Claimant further stated that she is 5feet two inches tall and weighs 330 pounds. 

(AR 305).

Regarding her work, Claimant testified that, for the last five months, she has been working

part-time at Wal-Mart as a clerk in the children’s department. (AR 306-307, 313). Claimant

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testified that she works four days per week for six hours daily, and is paid $7.70 per hour. (AR 306-

307). In addition, she testified that she uses a grocery cart as a supportive device for walking and

performing her duties at Wal-Mart, which her employer has seen but had not discussed with her. 

(AR 312-313). Claimant testified that she needs no other assistance to perform her job duties, but,

when the question was rephrased, reported that the manager of her department (the “manager”) 

performs Claimant’s tasks that require stooping and bending because the manager “is aware of the

pain and [Claimant’s] inabilities to do certain things and she goes ahead and just does it.” (AR 313-

314). Claimant testified that, without the grocery cart and the assistance of the manager, she would

not be able to perform the job. (AR 314-315). According to Claimant, she has missed a few days of

work because of her ailments. (AR 316). 

Claimant also testified that she worked at Wal Mart on a prior occasion for 10 months, and

also worked as a motel manager for approximately two months in either 2002 or 2003. (AR 307,

311-312, 319). She added that she could not perform the motel manager job because it required her

to be on her feet constantly, which caused her leg and foot pain that made it difficult to concentrate

on handling money, which was another responsibility of the position. (AR 312). Claimant also

testified that she has worked in retail at Michael’s Crafts and at a bank. (AR 306). 

As to her medical problems, Claimant testified that her most disabling impairment is the

constant pain she suffers from fibromyalgia and spondylosis, adding that she believes the

fibromyalgia causes her knees and ankles to swell and become tender. (AR 307). Claimant reported

that, when she engages in prolonged activity, she experiences pain in her lower and upper back,

shoulders, hands, elbows, knees, ankles, and feet. (AR 310). She stated that she also has chronic

depression, which causes her to cry, become frustrated, and suffer bad moods. (AR 307, 310). 

Claimant testified that she takes extra-strength Tylenol for pain, Prozac for depression, a potassium

supplement, xaxatine, and hydrochlorothiazide. (AR 308, 311). When Claimant is at home, she

sometimes lies down and elevates her legs to alleviate the pain, and remains prone until the pain

dissipates. (AR 315). Claimant noted that she saw a psychologist for one year before she filed her

2002 disability application, but acknowledged that has not seen a mental health professional since

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then. (AR 311). In addition, Claimant has a history of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, for which

she underwent surgery in both April and August 2004. (AR 316). Claimant testified that the

surgeries relieved the numbness in her hands, but that she has to rest her hands for “about 20 minutes

to an hour” after she uses them for “a couple of hours.” (AR 316, 317). 

With respect to the activities of daily life, Claimant testified that lives by herself in an

apartment. (AR 305, 308). Claimant stated that she does her own housework, cooks, washes dishes,

and can climb stairs. (AR 308-309). She testified that she can walk 50 yards before she has to stop

and rest, and can stand or sit for approximately 20 minutes before having to reverse positions. (AR

309). Claimant added that she can lift and carry 10 pounds, and reach, but not easily. (Id.). She

testified that she cannot stoop, bend, kneel, or squat. (Id.). Claimant testified that she has no loss of

feeling or sensation anywhere. (AR 309, 310). Claimant also reported that she has difficulty with her

vision, but it is somewhat corrected by glasses. (AR 310). 

Marilyn Kinnier, a vocational expert (“VE”), testified that, based on the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles (“DOT”), Claimant’s current position as a retail clerk would be classified as a

semi-skilled, light exertion job. (AR 319). The VE stated that Claimant’s earlier job as a motel

manager is a skilled, sedentary job, but noted that Claimant had not held that job long enough for it

to qualify as past relevant work. (Id.). The ALJ questioned whether Claimant’s current job, as she

described it, constituted competitive employment in the economy and the VE responded that

Claimant would have difficulty performing the job if her manager did not perform part of her duties. 

(AR 320). The VE further testified that, taking Claimant’s testimony as true, she would not be able

to perform the job full-time because she could not lift and stand for six hours in an eight hour day. 

(AR 320, 321). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of a Commissioner’s decision. See

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A court must uphold the Commissioner’s decision, made through an ALJ, when

it is supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error. See Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d

1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2005)(quotations and citations omitted); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995

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(9th Cir. 1985); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, Sorenson v.

Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975), but less than a preponderance. McAllister v.

Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 601-602 (9th Cir. 1989); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv.,

846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence “means such evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)

(citations omitted). “[S]uch inferences and conclusions as the [Commissioner] may reasonably draw

from the evidence” will also be upheld. Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). On

review, the court considers the record as a whole, not just the evidence supporting the decision of the

Commissioner. Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). See Orn

v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (summarizing standard of review in social security

cases).

It is the role of the trier of fact, not the court, to resolve conflicts in evidence. Richardson,

402 U.S. at 400. If the evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the court must

uphold the decision of the ALJ. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). Moreover, if

there is substantial evidence to support the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence

that would support a finding of either disability or non-disability, the Commissioner’s decision is

conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-1230 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, a decision

supported by substantial evidence will be set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in

weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv., 839

F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1987).

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of

not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Act also provides that a claimant shall

be determined to be under a disability only if his impairments are of such severity that claimant is not

only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education and work experience,

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engage in any other substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(2)(A).

Sequential Evaluation Process

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining

whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Step one determines if the claimant is engaged

in substantial gainful activities. If she is, benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If she is not,

the decision maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether claimant has a medically severe

impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).

If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the

disability claim is denied. If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step,

which compares claimant’s impairment with a number of listed impairments acknowledged by the

Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d);

20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P App. 1. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments,

the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is not one conclusively

presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which determines whether the

impairment prevents the claimant from doing work she performed in the past. If the claimant is able

to perform her previous work, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If the claimant cannot

perform this work, the fifth and final step in the process determines whether she is able to perform

other work in the national economy in view of his age, education and work experience. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(f). See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987). 

The initial burden of proof rests upon a claimant to establish a prima facie case of entitlement

to disability benefits. Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 1971). In terms of the fivestep sequential evaluation process, the Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]he burden of proof is on the

claimant as to steps one to four,” while at the same time noting that an ALJ’s “affirmative duty to

assist a claimant to develop the record . . . complicates the allocation of burdens” such that “the ALJ

shares the burden at each step.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (italics in

original). The initial burden is met once a claimant establishes that a physical or mental impairment

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prevents her from engaging in her previous occupation. The burden then shifts to the Commissioner

to show (1) that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful activity and (2) that a “significant

number of jobs exist in the national economy” which claimant can perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722

F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984).

ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS

The ALJ found at step one that Claimant “has engaged in substantial gainful activity since

July 2, 2002,” because in 2003 she met the work activity and income requirements, and currently met

the work activity requirements although she earned slightly below the presumptive income required

to meet the requirements for substantial gainful activity (“SGA”).” (AR 23-24, 30). In rendering his

step one finding, ALJ Moulaison considered 20 C.F.R. § 404.1573 and found that Claimant was able

to perform her current job satisfactorily. (AR 24). The ALJ found there was no evidence that

Claimant was given more supervision or assistance than is usually given other people doing similar

work, and he was not persuaded that Claimant performed her work with any special or extraordinary

considerations or accommodations. (AR 24). The ALJ noted that Claimant had worked at a bank in

2003, and there was no evidence that she received special or extraordinary treatment at Wal-Mart. 

(Id.). At step two, the ALJ determined that Claimant suffered from arthritis and obesity, which were

severe medically determinable impairments. (AR 25, 30). At step three, the ALJ assessed whether

Claimant’s impairments were among those acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so severe as to

preclude substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (Listing of

Impairments). The ALJ concluded that Claimant’s medically determinable impairments did not

meet or equal a listed impairment. (AR 26, 30). 

The ALJ then found that Claimant’s only limitations were that she could not lift or carry

more than 40 pounds at a time and 20 pounds frequently. (AR 27). The ALJ found that Claimant

had no limitations on her ability to walk, stand, and sit (AR 27). The ALJ found that Claimant’s

testimony regarding her pain and limitations was not fully credible given the lack of medical

evidence and in light of her daily activities and the requirements of her current job. (AR 26-30). 

The ALJ determined that Claimant retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light

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exertional work. (AR 26-30). Accordingly, at step four, the ALJ concluded that Claimant was able

to perform her current job, which the VE testified was classified as light, semi-skilled work. (AR

30). At step five, the ALJ found that, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 1520(f), Claimant could work as a

retail clerk. (AR 30). Based on his findings, the ALJ determined that Claimant was not disabled

and, therefore, not entitled to disability benefits under the Act. (AR 30-31). 

ISSUES

Claimant’s Opening Brief raised the following issues for consideration:

A. The ALJ erroneously found that Claimant was able to perform her current job without

special circumstances

B. The ALJ’s determination of Claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) is not

supported by the record.

C. The ALJ discounted Claimant’s testimony without providing adequate reasons.

D. The ALJ failed to further develop the record as to Claimant’s depression.

As discussed above, this Court must uphold the Commissioner’s determination that claimant

is not disabled if the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards and there is substantial

evidence in the record as a whole to support the decision.

DISCUSSION

New Evidence

As an initial matter, Plaintiff includes new evidence in her opening brief that she contends

warrants a remand for further administrative proceedings. (Doc. 23, pp. 6-7 & attach.). The new

evidence consists of a May 20, 2005 report prepared by rheumatologist Mohammad A. Shakir, M.D.,

and results from a September 9, 2005 MRI of Claimant’s lumbar spine. (Doc. 23, attachs.).

Dr. Shakir reported that Claimant suffers from severe fibromyalgia syndrome for which he

recommends a daily exercise program and a slightly stronger pain killer (Vicodin) than the Darvocet

that had been previously prescribed for her pain. (Doc. 23, attach. 2). The September 2005 MRI

revealed degenerative changes to the L3-L5 discs and a bulging L4 disc/osteophyte changes. (Doc.

23, attach. 1). 

///

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Title 42, section 405(g) of the United States Code provides for remand when there is new

evidence that is material and good cause exists for the plaintiff’s failure to incorporate the evidence

in a prior proceeding. Burton v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 1415, 1417 (9th Cir. 1984). To meet the

materiality requirement, the new evidence must bear directly and substantially on the matter in

dispute. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 462 (9th Cir. 2001)(quotations and citations omitted). 

In addition, the plaintiff must show that there is a “reasonable possibility that the new evidence

would have changed the outcome of the administrative hearing.” Id. The good cause requirement is

satisfied if new information does not surface until after the Commissioner’s final decision, and the

plaintiff could not have obtained that evidence at the time of the administrative proceedings. Booz v.

Sec’y of Health and Human Serv., 734 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1984). 

In the instant case, Claimant did not obtain or introduce Dr. Shakir’s report or the MRI

impression at any phase of the administrative proceedings, although both were dated before the

Appeals Council (“AC”) denied her request for review of the ALJ’s decision on September 22, 2005. 

(AR 8-11). Claimant offers no reason why she did not submit this evidence to the AC, which is

noteworthy given that she provided other supplemental information to the AC before it denied her

request for review. (See Doc. 23, pp. 6-7; AR 292-300). Nor does Claimant explain why she waited

until September 2005 to obtain an MRI of her lumbar spine. (Doc. 23, pp. 6-7). The logical

explanation is that Claimant neglected to provide the Appeals Council with Dr. Shakir’s report and

decided that, after losing at the administrative level, the report and the MRI would provide additional

evidence to support her appeal in this Court. The “good cause” requirement would “be meaningless

if such circumstances were sufficient to allow introduction of new evidence.” Allen v. Sec’y of

Health and Human Serv., 726 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir. 1984). Claimant fails to establish good

cause for her failure to submit Dr. Shakir’s report and the MRI impression in a timely fashion. 

Since Claimant fails to meet the “good cause” requirement, the question as to whether the

new evidence is material is moot. Burton, 724 F.2d at 1417. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that either 

Dr. Shakir’s report or the MRI included with Claimant’s opening brief would have affected the

outcome of the administrative proceedings and, thus, they are not material. Mayes, 276 F.3d at 463.

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Although Dr. Shakir determined that Claimant suffered from fibromyalgia, he said nothing about her

ability to work or engage in activities, and instead recommended that she participate in a daily

exercise program and take a stronger pain pill twice daily as needed. (Doc. 23, attach. 2). The

September 2005 MRI reported that Claimant had osteoarthritis in her lower back. (Doc. 23, attach.

1). The MRI impression is not material because the ALJ found that Claimant suffered from arthritis. 

(AR 30). To the extent that the Dr. Shakir’s diagnosis of fibromyalgia indicates a new condition and

the MRI demonstrates a deterioration of Claimant’s arthritis, the evidence may support a new

application for benefits, but it does not meet the standard for a new evidence remand. Ward v.

Schweiker, 686 F.2d 762, 764-765 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Based on the lack of good cause and the finding that the new evidence is not material, the

undersigned declines to recommend a remand. 

A. Claimant’s Current Job 

Claimant asserts that the ALJ erred in finding that, because there was no record evidence that

Claimant’s manager assisted her with her job-related duties, there were no special circumstances

present such that 20 C.F.R. § 404.1573(c) was applicable. (Doc. 23, p. 5). Claimant further

contends that the ALJ misrepresented the testimony of VE Kinnier in stating that her testimony 

supported his conclusion that Claimant could perform her current job. (Id.). According to Claimant,

the VE testified that Claimant would not be able to work in the national economy without the 

assistance she received from her department manager. (Id.). In addition, Claimant avers that, in light

of the fact that she received special support at work, her current position did not constitute past

relevant work (“PRW”), necessitating a remand to enable the Commissioner to ascertain whether

there were jobs that Claimant could perform. (Id.). 

In general, PRW is defined as a job that the claimant held long enough to learn how to do it,

that consisted of substantial gainful activity (“SGA”), and at which the applicant worked within the

15 years before applying for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1)

Substantial gainful activity (“SGA”) is considered work for which an individual is

remunerated that requires significant physical and/or mental activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571-

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404.1572; Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 515 (9th Cir. 2001). To be deemed SGA, the ALJ first

considers a claimant’s monthly earnings, which are re-calculated annually pursuant to 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1574(b), and from which the cost of any special services or devices required to enable the

claimant to work are subtracted. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1576. If the claimant earns less than the monthly

amount such that he is presumed not to be engaged in SGA, the ALJ must provide other substantial

evidence that indicates that the claimant has engaged in SGA. Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 515

(9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ may consider factors that demonstrate (1) whether the nature of the work

indicates that the claimant is able to perform at the SGA level; (2) how well the claimant performs

the job; (3) whether the work is performed under special conditions; (4) the length of time the

claimant has worked; and (5) the amount of time he spends at work. Id. at 515-16; 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1573. The claimant’s daily activities generally are not considered to be SGA. Lewis, 236 F.3d

at 516 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(c)). 

Moreover, the mere fact that a claimant does his job under one of many factors that are

deemed “special conditions,” is not a definitive basis for finding that the claimant does or does not

have the ability to perform work at the SGA level. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1573(c). Some of the special

conditions that may be considered are (1) whether the claimant requires and receives assistance

performing his work from co-workers; (2) whether the claimant is permitted to take frequent breaks,

work irregular hours, or perform less efficiently or productively than his co-workers; and (3) whether

the claimant has the job only because of pity, concern for his well-being, or nepotism. (Id.).

In the instant case, there are no third-party questionnaires or employment records

demonstrating that Claimant received special assistance or worked under special circumstances. 

(See generally AR). Nor did Claimant’s manager or any of her co-workers testify at the hearing or

provide statements attesting to an informal arrangement between the manager and Claimant, to

which the latter testified. (Id.; see AR 312-15). As noted by the ALJ and discussed above, the

record does not establish that Claimant was given more supervision or assistance than other people

doing similar work, nor contain any indication that Claimant received any special assistance, worked

irregular hours, took frequent rest periods, or was permitted to work at a lower standard of

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productivity. (AR 24). In addition, it is Claimant, not the ALJ, who misstates the VE’s testimony. 

(Doc. 23, p. 5; see AR 320). As stated above, VE Kinnier provided testimony based on the

assumption that Claimant’s testimony as to her limitations and assistance at work were true. (AR

320). The VE testified that, if Claimant’s testimony was deemed credible, Claimant would not be

able to perform her current job without assistance or work on a full-time basis. (Id.). Implicitly, the

converse of the VE’s testimony is that, if Claimant’s testimony was not credible, as the ALJ found in

this case, Claimant would be able to work competitively on a full-time basis as a retail clerk. 

Because the ALJ found no persuasive evidence that would support Claimant’s contention that

she worked with any special or extraordinary considerations or accommodations, the ALJ did not err

when he found that Claimant could work without assistance and on a full-time basis. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1573; (See generally AR; see AR 24, 30). In addition, Claimant’s remaining assertions were

based on erroneous facts – specifically that the VE testified that Claimant required special assistance

and had limitations that precluded her form working full time. (Doc. 23, p. 5). As discussed above,

however, the VE’s testimony was based on the assumption that Claimant’s testimony was credible. 

(AR 32). Based on the lack of evidence supporting Claimant’s argument, the inference that Claimant

could satisfactorily perform her job since she had been doing so for five months, and the ALJ’s

proper application of the law, it is recommended that the Court uphold the ALJ’s findings as to

Claimant’s first argument. Allen, 749 F.2d at 579; (Doc. 23, p. 5).

B. Assessment of Claimant’s RFC

In her brief, Claimant argues that the ALJ improperly found that she retained the RFC to

perform light work. (Doc. 23, p. 5). Claimant contends that the ALJ’s faulty RFC determination

resulted from his reliance on medical records unfavorable to her and a 2003 RFC assessment by an

examining consultant, instead of focusing on the record as a whole and according weight to the RFC

assessment prepared by her treating source, physician’s assistant (“PA”) Marilyn Heron, in 2005. 

(Doc. 23, pp. 6-8). Claimant further contends that the ALJ ignored many of Claimant’s ailments,

including the combination of her arthritic impairments in conjunction with her obesity, citing SSR

02-1p. (Id.). 

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An RFC is defined as “what an individual can still do despite his or her limitations.” SSR

96-8p. A claimant’s RFC is not a medical issue but an administrative finding, dispositive of the

case, which is reserved to the Commissioner, and, by delegation of authority, to the ALJ. SSR

96-5p. Accordingly, it is the ALJ who determines the claimant’s RFC. In making this finding,

however, the ALJ must consider the whole record and explain how he weighs the medical evidence

and testimony. SSR 96-8p. 

Under SSR 02-1p, the Social Security Administration “will find that obesity is a ‘severe’

impairment when, alone or in combination with another medically determinable physical or mental

impairment(s), it significantly limits an individual’s physical or mental ability to do basic work

activities [and] will also consider the effects of any symptoms (such as pain or fatigue) that could

limit functions.” Thus, while the SSR states that the Social Security Administration will evaluate the

effects of obesity, it remains Claimant’s burden to show that obesity has some effect on her

functional capacity. 

In this case, the ALJ found that Claimant had the medically determinable severe impairments

of obesity and arthritis. (AR 25). After finding that Claimant did not meet or equal a listing, the

ALJ discussed in detail the administrative record and Claimant’s testimony, noting the paucity of

evidence including medical records, the daily activities, and Claimant’s ability to maintain her job as

a retail clerk. (AR 24-30). ALJ Moulaison specifically addressed Claimant’s depression and her

obesity, noting that the latter “likely contributed to the claimant’s allegations of pain and functional

limitations [but] there is no evidence to show it precluded work activities altogether.” (AR 24-25,

29). 

The ALJ also specifically addressed Claimant’s depression, noting that the medical records

show that Claimant was diagnosed with depression, for which she takes Prozac prescribed by her

PA, and also noting that she received no mental health treatment for depression. (AR 25). The ALJ

determined that Claimant has an affective disorder, and found that her mental impairments “have

resulted in only slight restriction of her activities of daily living and slight difficulties in maintaining

social functioning.” (AR 25). The ALJ further noted that there was no evidence that Claimant had

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 Additional medical records provided by treating sources include a 2002 MRI of Claimant’s left knee and 4

2003 x-rays of both knees by Sutter Gould Medical Foundation. (AR 226-229). These diagnostic tests indicate

degenerative changes and mild narrowing of the medial joint compartments. (Id.). On August 24, 2002, Dr. David

Hilburn’s PA examined Claimant and noted concern about her obesity as well as reporting a 2001 diagnosis of

degenerative joint disease. (AR 231-232). Also on August 24, Dr. Hilburn wrote, on the DDS’s request for records

form, that Claimant had the following limitations: standing 15 minutes per hour; walking for 15 minutes; and lifting 5

pounds. (AR 230). Dr. Hilburn, however, provided no diagnosis or explanation for his summary limitations. (AR 230). 

14

problems getting along with her coworkers, supervisors, or the general public, and there was no

evidence of any complaints or symptoms of depression or any limitations in the medical records.

(AR 28). 

In his discussion of the medical records, the ALJ also observed that Claimant suffered from 

degenerative changes in her knees, but x-rays of her hip and pelvis were negative. (AR 27). He

further stated that Claimant took medication for her hypothyroidism, depression, and pain, but noted

that, given her complaints of disabling pain, her treatment was minimal. (AR 27). The ALJ’s

findings are supported by the medical records, which reflect that PA Heron injected Claimant twice 4

in October 2004 – once with Toradol and Decadron and once with an unspecified drug – after she

complained of severe pain radiating down her leg and inflammation of her left sacroiliac, but there is

no indication that PA Heron prescribed strong painkillers. (AR 252-257; see generally 240-284). 

PA Heron’s records diagnosed Claimant with degenerative joint disease, hypothyroidism, obesity,

and left hip pain due to, inter alia, falls and sciatica. (See, e.g., AR 268, 270, 280). She did not

request, receive, or review any of Claimant’s medical records. (AR 240-287). 

In March 2005, PA Heron completed a medical report form and RFC assessment apparently

based on Claimant’s subjective complaints, laboratory and radiology work she had ordered, and

Claimant’s self-reported medical history. (AR 258, 284, 287-91). PA Heron acknowledged that she

did not have Claimant’s previous medical records, but reported that Claimant suffered from (1) left

SI with radiculopathy; (2) easy fatigue; (3) knee pain; (4) degenerative joint disease; (5) DDD (spinal

spondylosis w/accompanying spasms); and (5) pain and decreased strength and agility in her hands.

(AR 287). She added that Claimant’s prognosis could not be determined as she had not been fully

evaluated by a rheumatologist or a physical therapist. (Id.). 

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With respect to Claimant’s RFC, PA Heron concluded that Claimant’s diagnosed

impairments, coupled with asthma and weak and painful ankles, precluded her from sitting more

than 3 hours in an 8-hour work day, with a maximum of 0-1 hours at a time; standing more than 2

hours, 0 hours at a time; and walking 2 hours, 1 hour at a time with support. (AR 288). In addition,

she concluded that Claimant could occasionally lift and carry a maximum of 10 pounds, and had

multiple postural, physical, and environmental restrictions. (AR 288-291). 

On July 31, 2003, Dr. Steve McIntire, a Board-certified neurologist, performed a

comprehensive examination of Claimant. (AR 234-237). Dr. McIntire reported that Claimant

primarily complained about her progressively worsening arthritic joint pain, non-radicular lumbar

pain, and occasional swelling of her right ankle and left knee. (AR 234). Dr. McIntire

acknowledged that he did not have Claimant’s prior radiology films or reports. (Id.). Upon

examining Claimant, Dr. McIntire noted, inter alia, that she needed no assistive devices for walking;

had no trouble getting on and off the exam table; but exhibited slightly decreased ranges of motion in

her lumbar spine, ankles, and knees. (AR 235). He explained that her lumbar spine had abnormal

vertebra, but this resulted only in a slight loss of motion as there was no indication of sciatica,

tenderness on palpitation, or muscle spasms. (AR 236). As to Claimant’s knees, Dr. McIntire again

found some significant deformity and slight crepitus with slight loss of range of motion, but no other

problems. (Id.). Dr. McIntire found no problems with respect to Claimant’s wrists, muscle bulk and

tone, motor strength, senses, or deep tendon reflexes. (AR 236-267). He diagnosed slight

degenerative osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine, knees, and ankles. (AR 237). Dr. McIntire

concluded that Claimant’s subjective complaints were not supported by the results of his

examination. (Id.). With respect to Claimant’s functional limitations, Dr. McIntire stated that the

only restriction was that Claimant should not lift or carry more than 20 pounds frequently or 40

pounds occasionally. (Id.). 

The DDS non-examining physicians assessed Claimant’s RFC based on Dr. McIntire’s

examination in August, September, October, and December 2003. (AR 189-197). All of the

assessments stated that Claimant could return to her previous work, although the December 2003

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 The opinion of a claimant’s treating physician generally would be accorded the most weight, and an 5

examining consultant’s opinion would receive more deference than a non-examining doctor. Because, however, there is

no treating physician in the instant case, the examining consultant’s opinion is accorded the most weight. See Orn v.

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007); 20 C.F.R. § 303.1527(d); SSR 96-2.

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assessment limited her to her past sedentary work as a customer service representative or a tow truck

dispatcher. (Id.).

The ALJ discounted PA Heron’s RFC assessment because a physician’s assistant is not an

acceptable medical source, and because PA Heron’s evaluation was not supported by the medical

evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a) (listing acceptable medical sources); (AR 29). The ALJ noted

that PA Heron did not work under the close supervision of an acceptable medical source or as part of

an interdisciplinary team such that her assessment should be accorded more weight than that of

examining consultant Dr. Steve McIntire. (AR 29, citing Gomez v. Chater, 74 F.3d 967, 971 (9th

Cir. 1996)). ALJ Moulaison further found that PA Heron imposed restrictions and limitations on

Claimant due to ailments, such as asthma and ankle instability, for which there was no medical

evidence, and otherwise limited Claimant for no apparent reason other than sympathy for her

subjective complaints, as the limitations were not required based on the medical records. (AR 29). 

Instead, the ALJ relied on the assessment of examining consultant Dr. McIntire, whose assessment of

Claimant’s restrictions are consistent with the ability to perform light work. (AR 29-30); 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1567(b) (defining light work). The ALJ also concluded that an RFC of light work coincided

with Claimant’s duties at her current job and her daily activities. (AR 28-29). In addition, because

the opinion of an examining physician is entitled to more weight than that of a non-examining

physician, the ALJ properly accepted Dr. McIntire’s assessment over those of the DDS physicians.

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(AR 30); Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); SSR 96-2.

 Because the ALJ properly considered the medical evidence as a whole, or lack thereof,

accorded the most weight to the Dr. McIntire’s assessment because he was the only acceptable

medical source to examine Claimant, and considered Claimant’s work and daily activities in

determining her RFC, his conclusion that she retained the RFC to perform light work is based on the

application of the appropriate law and the substantial record evidence.

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C. Claimant’s Testimony

Closely related to the above discussion, Claimant asserts that the ALJ did not provide

specific and convincing reasons for finding her pain testimony not credible, especially in light of the

record evidence. (Doc. 23, pp. 8-9). In support of the veracity of her testimony, Claimant notes that

she underwent more aggressive treatment than the ALJ reported, including surgery and injections of

toradol. (Id. at 9). Claimant further contends that her motivation to work, despite her pain, is 

additional evidence of her credibility. (Id.). 

A two step analysis applies at the administrative level when considering a claimant’s

subjective credibility. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). First, the claimant

must produce objective medical evidence of an impairment and show that the impairment could

reasonably be expected to produce some degree of symptom. Id. at 1281-1282. If claimant satisfies

this test – and if there is no evidence of malingering – the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony

about the severity of his or her symptoms “only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for

doing so.” Id. at 1281. Such specificity is crucial so as to enable effective judicial review. See

Mersman v. Halter, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2001)(“The lack of specific, clear, and

convincing reasons why Plaintiff’s testimony is not credible renders it impossible for [the] Court to

determine whether the ALJ’s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence”); SSR 96-7p (the

ALJ’s decision “must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent

reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and reasons for that

weight”). Thus, an ALJ’s decision “must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 835 (9th Cir. 1995). Grounds

for an adverse credibility finding include, but are not limited to, inconsistencies either in the

claimant’s testimony or between the claimant’s testimony and conduct, the claimant’s daily activities

and work record, the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the claimant’s pain or other

symptoms, testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of

the symptoms of which the claimant complains, and the lack of adequate explanation for a claimant’s

failure to follow a prescribed course of treatment. See Light v. Social Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789,

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792 (9th Cir. 1997); SSR 96-7p. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that, when a claimant testifies about disabling pain, but does not

seek treatment for it or comply with prescribed treatment, the ALJ may find that the claimant’s pain

testimony is “unjustified or exaggerated.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 638. This Court further notes that there

are any number of clear and specific findings that the ALJ can make, many of which are identified in

SSR 96-7p. Such findings include: (1) whether “the level or frequency of treatment is inconsistent

with the level of complaints,” SSR 96-7p (Medical Treatment History), (2) whether “the medical

reports or records show that the individual is not following the treatment as prescribed and there are

no good reasons for this failure,” id., and (3) the consistency of statements made by the claimant to

physicians, to those deciding benefits under other programs (e.g., workers’ compensation), and to the

Social Security Administration itself, while recognizing that “[s]ymptoms may vary in their intensity,

persistence, and functional effects, or may worsen or improve with time, and [that] this may explain

why the individual does not always allege the same intensity, persistence, or functional effects of his

or her symptoms.” Id. Each of these and other potential findings are fact-specific, precisely the

province of the ALJ. Some other ALJ findings, as identified in reported cases, are illustrative and

demonstrate the many ways in which ALJs can draw credibility inferences from the facts at hand: (1)

an ALJ found that claimant’s testimony that her neck pain was so severe that she had to cut her long

hair for relief was contradicted by the fact that her hair reached well below her shoulders at the

administrative hearing, Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003), (2) the same ALJ

found that claimant’s testimony that she had never undergone physical therapy was contradicted by

medical records indicating that she had, in fact, attempted such treatments, id., (3) an ALJ found that

claimant’s “‘extremely poor work history’” and low “‘propensity to work’” negatively affected her

credibility regarding her assertion that her disability precluded work, Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d

947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002), (4) the same ALJ found that claimant had not been a reliable historian,

“‘presenting conflicting information about her drug and alcohol usage,’” id., (5) the same ALJ also

found that claimant’s efforts to impede accurate testing of her limitations argued strongly against her

credibility, (6) an ALJ found that claimant had been uncooperative during consultative examinations,

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 Although Claimant may argue that the rheumatologist’s report diagnosing her with fibromyalgia would have 6

changed the ALJ’s assessment of her credibility and, therefore, his overall decision, given his additional findings that her

activities and work rendered her testimony of disabling pain not credible, it is not reasonable to assume that the diagnosis

would have altered the administrative decision. Booz v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 734 F.2d 1378,

1380-1381 (9th Cir.1984) (there must be a reasonable possibility that the new evidence would have changed the outcome

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and illustrated that finding with a specific statement by a physician regarding claimant’s “‘poor

effort,’” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001), (7) the same ALJ found that

claimant tended to exaggerate, and illustrated that finding with a specific comment by a physician

that claimant was deficient during cognitive testing but “‘much better’” when giving reasons for her

inability to work, id., (8) an ALJ found that claimant’s pain assertions were inconsistent with the

opinion of his own treating physician, who was “‘quite emphatic in his report about the lack of

objective evidence to support claimant’s complaints of pain and weakness,’” Orteza v. Shalala, 50

F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995), (9) an ALJ found that claimant’s limited and recent use of nonnarcotic pain medications were inconsistent with her claim of extreme pain, Ruiz v. Apfel, 24 F.

Supp. 2d 1045, 1048-1049 (C.D. Cal. 1998), and (10) the same ALJ found that claimant’s

conservative treatment regimen was inconsistent with her complaints of extreme pain, id. at 1049. 

Light v. Social Security Administration provides a brief synopsis of factors that can form a basis for

ALJ credibility findings, including consideration of a claimant’s reputation for truthfulness,

inconsistencies either in his testimony or between his testimony and his conduct, his daily activities,

his work record, and testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and

effect of the symptoms of which he complains. See Light, 119 F.3d at 792 

In finding Claimant’s testimony not wholly credible, the ALJ explained that the medical

records do not support her allegations of disabling pain and limitations. (AR 28). He specifically

noted that the records indicate that Claimant reported no continued pain after her carpal tunnel

surgery, did not complain of constant pain in general, and there was no evidence that her alleged

depression limited her in any way. (Id.). The ALJ added that Claimant did not complain of, nor did

the examining consultant find, that Claimant suffered pain or tenderness. (Id.). He also noted the

lack of evidence indicating that she had fibromyalgia. (Id.). Essentially, the ALJ did not find 6

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if it had been before the Secretary).

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evidence of an impairment that could or did cause the pain to which Claimant testified. (Id.) The

ALJ further observed that Claimant was able to work 24 hours per week without any obvious

assistance. (Id.). He also explained that she was able to engage in various activities, including

cooking, shopping, cleaning her house, and driving, which were inconsistent with her complaints of

constant, disabling pain. (Id.). 

Based on the foregoing, the ALJ satisfied the two-steps set forth in Smolen by finding that 

both the medical evidence and Claimant’s ability to work and perform various activities belied her

testimony. 80 F.3d at 1281; Light, 119 F.3d at 792; SSR 96-7p. 

D. Failure to Develop the Record

Claimant asserts that ALJ Moulaison failed in his duty to further develop the record as to her 

depression. (Doc. 23, p. 7). Claimant contends that psychiatric consultations would provide

evidence that she suffered a mental health impairment that, in combination with her physical

ailments, would have led to a different RFC assessment. (Id. at 7). 

In a Social Security case, an ALJ is obligated to fully and fairly develop the record even if the

claimant is represented by counsel. Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2003). There is

a heightened duty where the claimant is suffering from a mental condition because mental claimants

may not be able to protect themselves from loss of benefits by producing evidence. DeLorme v.

Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 1991). An ALJ’s duty to develop the record is further triggered

when there is ambiguous evidence or when “the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation

of the evidence.” Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-460 (9th Cir. 2001); Tonapetyan v. Halter,

242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). This duty may require that the ALJ obtain additional

information by, inter alia, contacting treating physicians, scheduling consultative examinations, or

calling a medical expert. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(d)-(f). 

In the instant case, the ALJ was not obligated to further develop the record with respect to

Claimant’s depression given that she responded well to Prozac, which she stated that her treating

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sources prescribed, and she had not seen a therapist since 1991 – well before the July 2002 onset

date. (AR 124, 129, 131, 134, 187). Moreover, Claimant reported that she stopped taking Prozac in

approximately November 2004. (AR 270). In addition, there were no indications that her depression 

interfered with her ability to work or engage in daily activities, although Claimant testified that she

cried, became frustrated, and had bad moods due to her depression. (AR 187, 306-312).

Nonetheless, the ALJ considered it, pursuant to Listing 12.04, and concluded that Claimant had only

slight limitations due to her depression given her ability to work in a job that involved public contact,

the lack of evidence indicating that she did not get along with people, and her daily activities. (AR

25). The ALJ further noted that Claimant had not complained of a lack of concentration or other

symptoms to her treating sources. (AR 26). Accordingly, as discussed above, the ALJ found that

Claimant had an affective disorder that caused her slight limitations in her daily activities, ability to

concentrate, and social functioning. (Id.). 

Based on the forgoing, including the scant mention of Claimant’s depression, the failure of

her treating sources to recommend that she see a therapist, and the lack of any indication that her

depression contributed to her alleged disability, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not err in

failing to develop the record further as to Claimant’s depression. Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459-460. 

 [ CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s analysis and his

determination that Claimant is not disabled. The Court further finds that the ALJ’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and based on proper legal standards. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS:

1. That Claimant’s Social Security complaint be DENIED; and 

2. That Judgment be ENTERED for Defendant Michael J. Astrue and against Claimant

Pamela S. Pyne. 

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the District Judge assigned to this

action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 72-304. No later than ten

(10) court days after service of these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written

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objections to the Findings and Recommendations with the Court and serve a copy on all parties and

the Magistrate Judge and otherwise in compliance with this Court’s Local Rule 72-304(b). Such a

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” 

Responses to objections shall be filed and served no later than ten (10) court days after service of the

objections and otherwise in compliance with this Court’s Local Rule 72-304(d). A copy of the

responses shall be served on the Magistrate Judge. The District Judge will review the Findings and

Recommendations, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Judge’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 4, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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