Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02609/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02609-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Rhonda Timmons
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RHONDA TIMMONS, No. CIV S-06-2609-CMK

Plaintiff, 

vs. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

 /

Plaintiff, who is proceeding with retained counsel, brings this action for judicial

review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Pursuant to the consent of the parties, this case is before the undersigned for final decision on

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 19) and defendant’s cross-motion for summary

judgment (Doc. 20). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff challenges the cessation of benefits pursuant to a continuing disability

review. Plaintiff applied for social security benefits on August 26, 1993, and on September 15,

1993. In her applications, plaintiff claims that disability began on April 1, 1992. In a disability

report submitted on September 3, 1993, plaintiff claims her disability consists of: “mutilation,

domestic violence stab victim, anorexia, beleamic [sic], emotional problems, depression.” 

Plaintiff is a United States citizen born November 24, 1961, with an eleventh-grade education. 

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff was initially determined to be disabled and was granted benefits. This

determination was confirmed in a March 10, 1994, decision. Following a first continuing

disability review in March 1997, it was determined that plaintiff’s condition had improved and

that she was no longer disabled. Plaintiff sought reconsideration of that determination and a

disability hearing was held on August 12, 1997. On August 27, 1997, the agency issued a

decision granting reconsideration and determining that plaintiff was still disabled. In that

decision, the hearing officer recited the following background:

In 1993, beneficiary was using both alcohol and methamphetamines. 

Beneficiary has a long history of treatment for destructive behavior. At the

time of the [March 10, 1994, decision], she was experiencing panic

attacks, depression, and problems with bulimia. She also has a history of

anorexia nervosa and was being treated at a battered women’s facility on a

weekly basis. A past employer reported that she often had conflicts with

other people, was distracted. She was terminated as she was unable to

persist or keep the pace required. . . .

Currently, beneficiary has been clean and sober for several years. She was

hospitalized three times in 1996 because of paranoia, irrational fears,

confusion, and eating disorder. She continues to have an eating disorder,

paranoia, depression, and panic attacks. She is not suicidal and she has no

cognitive problems. In addition, she experiences severe headaches and

generalized body pain which affects her concentration. The etiology of

these headaches and pain is not yet known. Beneficiary has difficulty

coping and completing normal activities of daily living. . . .

After a second continuing disability review, it was determined in February 2000 that plaintiff

remained disabled because her condition had not improved since the 1997 decision. 

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A third continuing disability review was conducted in December 2003. This

review concluded that plaintiff was no longer disabled because of improvement. Plaintiff

appealed that determination and a hearing was held on June 8, 2004. On June 9, 2004, the

agency issued a decision affirming the December 2003 determination, concluding that plaintiff

was no longer disabled because her condition has improved as of November 2003. In the June 9, 

2004, decision, the hearing officer provided the following procedural summary:

Ms. Timmons is a 42-year-old woman who was initially found disabled in

a State Agency decision of 3/10/94 due to mental problems. Disability

was established as of 3/1/93 based on medical and vocational factors. In a

continuing disability review decision dated 2/3/00, it was determined that

the beneficiary’s condition has not significantly improved. This decision

represents the comparison point decision (CPD) for purposes of the current

review. 

The hearing officer described plaintiff’s condition at the time of the February 2000 CPD as

follows:

Ms Timmons has a history of mental problems including depression,

paranoia, eating disorders, and substance [abuse] dating back many years. 

She was hospitalized three times in 1996. She also has displayed

symptoms of a destructive disorder and has been fired due to conflicts with

other people and her inability to keep up with the work lead. In 1/00, she

spoke in a pressured, rambling, and loose manner. Her mood was

expansive and she admitted to hearing voices. She was depressed and

anxious, but was not suffering from suicidal or homicidal ideation. These

findings were supported by evidence submitted by Sutter-Yuba Mental

Health, on 1/19/00. 

* * *

. . . At the time of the CPD, she admitted to hearing voices and was

depressed and anxious. She also was suffering from an eating disorder. 

Contrasting plaintiff’s condition as of the February 2000 CPD, the hearing officer described

plaintiff’s condition as of the December 2003 determination as follows:

Currently, the beneficiary continues to be treated for mental problems and

has complaints of depression and anxiety. She is dressed casually and

groomed neatly. Her mood is dysphoric, her affect is irritable, and her

speech is of normal volume and rate. She is not suffering from suicidal

ideation or auditory hallucinations. She reports to still have trouble

dealing with people and can become defensive easily. These findings are

supported by evidence submitted by Sutter-Yuba Mental Health, on

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12/9/03.

At the hearing, the beneficiary was cheerful, cooperative, and forthright in

all answers she provided except when discussing her substance abuse. She

did not walk with a limp and did not appear depressed or anxious. She

was able to answer . . . all questions without hesitation. 

An evaluation of the total evidence establishes that the beneficiary has

experienced significant improvement in her mental status. She also was

suffering from an eating disorder. Currently, she states she no longer

suffers from delusions or auditory hallucinations. Her eating disorder has

also been cured. . . . In comparing the beneficiary’s current mental status

with that present at the CPD, a finding for medical improvement can

reasonably be established. 

Plaintiff sought reconsideration. A hearing was held on May 18, 2005, at which

time plaintiff waived her right to representation and appeared pro se. Also appearing at the

hearing was plaintiff’s mother, Sally Timmons. In his May 23, 2005, decision, Administrative

Law Judge (“ALJ”) Antonio Acevedo-Torres offered the following background statement

concerning the 2004 cessation of benefits determination:

In a Continuing Disability Review (CDR) decision, dated June 9, 2004, it

was held that disability benefits were properly ceased on November 1,

2003, as the claimant’s medical condition had significantly improved since

the time of the Comparison Point Decision (CPD) of March 10, 1994. 

This finding was supported by mental health evidence showing that she

was no longer experiencing delusions or auditory hallucinations, her eating

disorder had been cured, neither anxiety nor depression were evident upon

examination, her mood was cooperative and cheerful, speech was

unremarkable, grooming and appearance were adequate, suicidal and

homicidal ideations were not present, and her answers to questions were

forthright. She walked without a limp and was thereby found to be

capable of performing medium work. Hence, it was concluded that given

the claimant’s residual functional capacity and vocational factors, she was

no longer disabled under vocational rule 203.25 of table No. 3 as

contained in Appendix 2 of the Social Security regulations. 

The ALJ made the following findings:

1. The claimant was found to be disabled and eligible for supplemental

security income under Title XVI and disability insurance benefits under

Title II as of March 1, 1993;

2. The claimant has not performed substantial gainful activity since March 1,

1993;

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3. Pursuant to a Continuing Disability review (CDR) decision dated June 9,

2004, it was determined that the claimant’s disability ceased effective

November 1, 2003;

4. The record as a whole supports a finding that there has been medical

improvement in the claimant’s condition since March 10, 1994, the

Comparison Point Decision (CPD);

5. The claimant’s medical improvement is related to her ability to work;

6. The claimant’s testimony is not substantially credible . . .;

7. The claimant is severely impaired as a result of an old right knee injury,

chronic anxiety, and depression; the claimant does not have a severe

substance abuse disorder;

8. The claimant no longer has an impairment or a combination of

impairments which either meets or equals any listed impairment in 20

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1;

9. Since November 1, 2003, the date that the claimant’s disability benefits

were ceased, she has had the exertional residual functional capacity to

perform light work; her exertional limitations preclude her from frequently

lifting more than 10 pounds and occasionally lifting more than 20 pounds;

her ability to work since this date has also been eroded by a limitation to

frequently socially interact with the public;

10. The claimant does not have any past relevant work that she could perform;

11. The claimant is a 43-year-old younger age individual who has a high

school education and no work experience;

12. The claimant does not have any acquired work skills which are

transferable to the unskilled or semiskilled work functions of other work;

13. Because the claimant has the ability to perform light work with a nonexertional mental impairment related limitation, rule 202.17 of table No. 2,

Appendix 2, Subpart P, Regulations No. 16, indicates that a finding of not

disabled would be appropriate within the framework of this rule; and

15. The claimant’s disability was properly ceased on November 1, 2003.

Based on these findings, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was no longer disabled and, therefore,

not entitled to continuation of benefits. Plaintiff sought review by the Appeals Council. In its

November 6, 2006, decision denying review, the Appeals Council noted:

In looking at your case, we considered the reasons you disagree with the

decision. Your representative contended that the Administrative Law

Judge used the wrong comparison point date. However, insofar as there

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was no medical improvement at your later continuing disability reviews,

medical improvement since March 1994 presumes that there has also been

medical improvement since those later reviews. . . .

B. Summary of Relevant Evidence

Because this is a cessation of benefits case where the primary issue is whether

plaintiff’s medical condition improved with respect to her ability to work, the court need only

focus on the evidence relevant to this issue. Specifically, as discussed above, plaintiff’s

condition in February 2000 – the date of the most recent favorable disability determination – is

the starting point. It is undisputed that plaintiff was disabled at that time due to her mental

impairments. The question is whether her condition improved after that date and, if so, whether

that improvement related to her ability to work. 

For dates after February 2000, plaintiff offers the following background:

. . . In late 2003 (by which time Ms. Timmons was past her second

cessation review), [treating physician ] Dr. Yang carried [sic] Ms.

Timmons as suffering bipolar disorder, with a GAF of 57/58. (Transc., p.

573). As of then, she took Paxil and Risperdal. (Transc., p. 572). The

earliest reference to bipolar disorder may be 2002, the first time Dr.

Yang’s handwriting appears (Transc., p. 584), but these treating records

rarely give diagnoses, she acted manic while admitting both anxiety and

depression in early 2000 (Transc., p. 585), and as will be seen her

medication list evolved more than it changed since . . . 1998's

prescriptions. In 2004, Dr. Yang’s diagnosis was bipolar disorder, rule-out

schizoaffective disorder. (Transc., p. 762). Per a recommendation of Ms.

Timmons’ OB/GYN, he switched her from Risperdal to Geodon. (Transc.,

pp. 762-763). As of March 2005, Ms. Timmons was taking Paxil,

Geodon, Neurotonin, Abilify, plus Ambien for sleep (so that, if medication

lists determined disability, she would appear worse than she had been at

any point). (Transc., p. 768). 

 

From this, it appears that plaintiff asserts the following timeline would summarize her medical

condition after February 2000:

Early 2000 Plaintiff acted manic and complained of anxiety and

depression.

2002 First appearance of diagnosis of bipolar disorder by Dr.

Yang.

/ / /

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Late 2003 Dr. Yang diagnosed bipolar disorder and assigns a GAF of

57/58; plaintiff was taking Paxil and Risperdal.

2004 Dr. Yang diagnosed bipolar disorder, rule-out

schizoaffective disorder; medications changed.

2005 Plaintiff was taking Paxil, Geodon, Neurotonin, Abilify,

plus Ambien for sleep.

A large portion of the certified administrative record (“CAR”) consists of medical

records from before 2000 and is not relevant to this case. The relevant medical documents are: 

(1) records from Sutter Health Clinic covering the period from January 6, 1995, through January

20, 2004 (CAR 455-557); (2) records from Sutter Yuba Mental Health covering the period from

September 2, 1983, through January 20, 2004 (CAR 566-689); (3) psychiatric evaluation by

agency examining psychiatrist Timothy Canty, M.D., dated October 30, 2003 (CAR 432-35); 

(4) mental residual functional capacity assessment and psychiatric review technique form dated

November 6, 2003 (CAR 438-54); (5) physical residual functional capacity assessment dated

December 15, 2003 (CAR 558-65); (6) medical records from Sutter Health Clinic covering the

period from August 19, 2003, through May 20, 2004 (CAR 732-57); (7) medical records from

Sutter Yuba Mental Health covering the period from March 10, 2004, through July 27, 2004

(CAR 758-67); (8) mental residual functional capacity assessment and psychiatric review

technique form dated April 15, 2004 (CAR 692-709); (9) physical residual functional capacity

assessment dated April 19, 2004 (CAR 712-19); (10) medical records from Dr. Yang dated

March 21, 2005 (CAR 768); and (11) letter from Dr. Yang dated April 5, 2005 (CAR 769). 

1. Sutter Health Clinic 

Treatment notes by Dr. Yang from April 2002 reflect that plaintiff reported: “I

have accomplished a lot since I saw you last.” Plaintiff also reported that she was “going for a

diploma” and that she was happy and felt more positive. She reported that she was eating well

and not restricting intake. Dr. Yang noted bipolar disorder under “Plan/Comment.” (CAR 584). 

In May 2002, plaintiff reported to Dr. Yang that “everything is going well.” She also told Dr.

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Yang that she wanted to have a child. While Dr. Yang continued to note bipolar disorder, he also

observed that plaintiff was dressed well, pleasant, and had good speech. (CAR 583). In October

2002, plaintiff reported that she was not feeling well, but that she was doing well in school and

that concentration was good. (CAR 581). Between July 2002 and October 2003, Dr. Yang

altered the doses of plaintiff’s psychiatric medications. (CAR 582). 

By January 2003, plaintiff reported that her mood was worse and she was not

doing as well in school. (CAR 588). In February and April 2003, plaintiff reported that she was

“still working 5 days/wk.,” and was still attending school. Plaintiff reported that her mood and

energy were good. She was also discussing the possibility of getting pregnant. (CAR 578-79). 

By May 2003, plaintiff had moved into her own apartment and was living on her own. She

reported her mood was very stable. Dr. Yang noted “very good improvement” and ruled out

schizoaffective disorder. (CAR 577). Notes from June 25, 2003, indicate that plaintiff was a

little depressed because she lost her job, but that she was still living on her own. Plaintiff’s sleep

was fine and she was eating well. Dr. Yang suggested that plaintiff attend vocational

rehabilitation. (CAR 576). In July 2003, plaintiff reported that, because some days she doesn’t

feel well, she takes extra Paxil tablets. So, she requested an increase in dosage, which Dr. Yang

approved. (CAR 575). In November 2003, plaintiff reported to Dr. Yang that her disability

benefits were going to be discontinued and asked if there was anything he could do to help. 

(CAR 570). In December 2003, plaintiff reported to Dr. Yang that she felt “everything is coming

down” on her. Dr. Yang encouraged plaintiff to appeal the social security denial and continue to

look for a job. However, he also stated that he helped plaintiff summarize the reasons she can’t

keep a job, such as trouble dealing with people and becoming defensive. (CAR 569). 

In January 2004, plaintiff reported that she had found a job, but that she needed

surgery for her right knee due to a bicycle accident. She also reported to Dr. Yang that she was

crying a lot, felt resentful towards her boyfriend, but that her sleep was good. Dr. Yang observed

no paranoia. (CAR 567). 

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2. Sutter Yuba Mental Health

These documents appear to be duplicates of Dr. Yang’s treatment notes. 

3. October 30, 2003, Psychiatric Evaluation

Agency consulting physician Timothy Canty reported on his psychiatric

examination of plaintiff on October 30, 2003. Plaintiff reported to Dr. Canty that her chief

complaint was: “I have anorexia and schizophrenia.” She also reported that she was living by

herself, attending school, but had recently lost her full-time janitorial job at PRIDE Industries. 

Plaintiff suggested that she might be re-hired after a six-month hiatus. She recently turned down

a job offer due to lack of transportation and told Dr. Canty that she supports herself on social

security benefits. Plaintiff also reported that she does her own chores, handles her own finances,

enjoys outdoor activities, watches television, and socializes well with family and friends. 

Dr. Canty reported the following objective findings upon conducting a mental

status examination: (1) plaintiff was well-groomed and arrived on time; (2) her speech was clear

and she was cooperative; (3) her logic was clear and goal-oriented; and (4) she was in a good

mood. As to intellectual functioning, Dr. Canty observed good results across the board. Dr.

Canty expressed the following opinion:

. . . Her symptoms are well controlled by her medications. She is

followed closely by mental health and as long as she is in compliance with

her medications, she will likely remain stable. She is currently actively

seeking employment and could be able to work as soon as a job is offered

to her. . . . [¶] She is fully functional from a psychiatric standpoint. . . .

4. November 6, 2003, Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment 

This assessment was performed by agency physician E. Harrison. Dr. Harrison

noted no significant limitations in any category of mental functioning. He concluded that “she

has significantly medically improved. . . .” As to restrictions of activities of daily living,

difficulties in maintaining social functioning, and difficulties maintaining concentration,

persistence, or pace, Dr. Harrison noted only mild limitations. He noted one or two episodes of

decompensation. 

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5. December 15, 2003, Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment

An agency physician noted no limitations in any category. 

6. April 15, 2004, Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment

The agency physician noted no significant limitations in any category except

moderate limitations in plaintiff’s ability to understand and remember detailed instructions, carry

out detailed instructions, and accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism. The

physician also noted moderate limitation in plaintiff’s ability to maintain social functioning. 

7. April 19, 2004, Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment

By this time, plaintiff had injured her knee. The agency physician noted some

limitations associated with this injury. Specifically, plaintiff could occasionally lift and carry up

to 20 pounds, frequently lift and carry up to ten pounds, stand and/or walk at least two hours in

an eight-hour workday, sit about six hours in an eight-hour workday, and was limited in pushing

and pulling with her lower extremities. He also noted that plaintiff could only occasionally

climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. 

8. March and April 2005 Medical Records from Dr. Yang

A prescription signed by Dr. Yang on March 2, 2005, indicates that plaintiff was

taking Paxil, Geodon, Neurotonin, Abilify, and Ambien for sleep. In an April 5, 2005, letter, Dr.

Yang offered the following opinion:

As Rhonda’s treating physician, I am writing this letter at her request to

assist her Social Security Disability review. [¶] It is my opinion that

Rhonda is not ready to enter a full-time work force at this time, even

though she may appear to be symptom-free. Because she is deficient in

work skills and social skills, when she is placed in a work-related

environment, her emergent psychopathology becomes evidence. At her

last job, she had trouble getting along with her supervisor and co-workers

and had very low tolerance for stress. She was overwhelmed by anxiety

and paranoia. Her attempt at sustaining her work triggered a relapse of her

paranoia and depression. Without further job training and social skill

training, the expectation of her succeeding at work would be unrealistic. 

/ / /

/ / /

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision to determine whether it is: 

(1) based on proper legal standards; and (2) supported by substantial evidence in the record as a

whole. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). “Substantial evidence” is

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521

(9th Cir. 1996). It is “. . . such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). The record as a whole,

including both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, must

be considered and weighed. See Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones

v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not affirm the Commissioner’s

decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. See Hammock v.

Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the administrative

findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a particular finding, the finding of the

Commissioner is conclusive. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Therefore, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of

which supports the Commissioner’s decision, the decision must be affirmed, see Thomas v.

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002), and may be set aside only if an improper legal

standard was applied, see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). 

III. DISCUSSION

In her motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argues: (1) the ALJ used the

wrong comparison point decision date and made other procedural errors; (2) the ALJ failed to

give proper weight to the April 5, 2005, opinion of plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Yang; 

(3) the ALJ erred in determining that plaintiff’s testimony was not credible; (4) the ALJ failed to

consider the lay witness testimony from plaintiff’s mother; (5) the ALJ’s residual functional

capacity determination lacks explanation; and (6) the ALJ erred in not obtaining vocational

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expert evidence. 

A. Procedural Errors

Plaintiff assigns the following procedural errors: (1) the ALJ erred by using the

March 10, 1994, decision as the comparison point decision for purposes of his continuing

disability analysis; (2) the ALJ failed to provide any rationale regarding the applicability of the

Listing of Impairments at the second step of the sequential analysis; (3) the decision conflates

steps three and four of the sequential analysis; (4) the decision contains no rationale to support

the severity finding. Defendant only responds to the first of these arguments in his cross-motion. 

1. Comparison Point Decision Date

The comparison point decision – CPD – for purposes of a continuing disability

review is the most recent favorable medical determination. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(1); SSR

05-03p. Plaintiff argues that, by referencing the March 10, 1994, determination, the ALJ erred

because the most recent favorable determination was in February 2000. As the Appeals Council

noted, plaintiff is correct that the ALJ’s decision erroneously states that the March 1994 decision

is the relevant CPD. In fact, the March 1994 decision is the CPD with respect to March 1997

cessation of benefits decision, which was ultimately reversed in August 1997. The relevant CPD

for purposes of the cessation determinations at issue in this case is the February 2000

determination. 

The court, however, agrees with defendant that this error was clerical and

harmless. The Ninth Circuit has applied harmless error analysis in social security cases in a

number of contexts. For example, in Stout v. Commissioner of Social Security, 454 F.3d 1050

(9th Cir. 2006), the court stated that the ALJ’s failure to consider uncontradicted lay witness

testimony could only be considered harmless “. . . if no reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting the

testimony, could have reached a different disability determination.” Id. at 1056. Similarly, in

Batson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 359 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2004), the court applied

harmless error analysis to the ALJ’s failure to properly credit the claimant’s testimony. 

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Specifically, the court held:

However, in light of all the other reasons given by the ALJ for

Batson’s lack of credibility and his residual functional capacity, and in

light of the objective medical evidence on which the ALJ relied there was

substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision. Any error the ALJ

may have committed in assuming that Batson was sitting while watching

television, to the extent that this bore on an assessment of ability to work,

was in our view harmless and does not negate the validity of the ALJ’s

ultimate conclusion that Batson’s testimony was not credible.

Id. at 1197 (citing Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

In Curry, the Ninth Circuit applied the harmless error rule to the ALJ’s error with respect to the

claimant’s age and education. 

In this case, it is clear that the ALJ described plaintiff’s condition as of the

appropriate CPD of February 2000 in conducting his analysis. Specifically, the ALJ described

plaintiff’s condition in the same way the hearing officer did in the June 2004 decision and it is

not disputed that the June decision is based on the correct CPD. It appears that the clerical error

in the ALJ’s decision resulted because the March 1994 decision was the CPD relevant to the

earlier cessation determination in 1997. Notwithstanding the confusion in dates, the ALJ’s

decision properly considered plaintiff’s condition as of the most recent favorable decision date –

February 2000 – in determining that her condition had improved. The clerical error does not

affect the substance of the ALJ’s analysis. 

Furthermore, as the Appeals Council observed, even if the ALJ had based his

decision on the starting point of March 1994, the evidence shows that there was nonetheless

medical improvement by the date of the ALJ’s decision in 2005. In other words, if there was

improvement by the time of the ALJ’s 2005 decision as measured from March 1994, there must

also have been improvement as measured from February 2000. 

/ / /

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2. Listings Analysis

Plaintiff argues:

It can reasonably be said that [the ALJ’s] decision not only looks to

the wrong comparison point decision at the third step [of the sequential

analysis], but had already gone awry by failing to perform a listing analysis

at step two. Although the Findings section purported to make one, . . . the

body of the decision contains none. Decisions must be made, and

explained, in the rationale section. Raw conclusions in the Findings

section alone do not meet legal requirements. 

Plaintiff cites 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4), SSR 85-28, Flake v. Gardner, 399

F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1968), and Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2001), in support of this

argument. In this case, the ALJ stated at Finding No. 8 that “[t]he claimant no longer has an

impairment or a combination of impairments which either meets or equals any listed impairment

in the [Listing of Impairments].” 

The Social Security Regulations “Listing of Impairments,” which is typically

considered at step three of the sequential analysis, is comprised of impairments to fifteen

categories of body systems that are severe enough to preclude a person from performing gainful

activity. Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183-84 (9th Cir. 1990); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). 

Conditions described in the listings are considered so severe that they are irrebuttably presumed

disabling. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). In meeting or equaling a listing, all the requirements of that

listing must be met. Key v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545, 1550 (9th Cir. 1985). This step-three

determination is made only if the claimant actually has an impairment which is determined at

step two to be severe. Here, the ALJ found at Finding No. 7 that plaintiff “. . . is severely

impaired as a result of an old knee injury, chronic anxiety, and depression” but that plaintiff does

not have a severe substance abuse disorder. The decision, however, provides no rationale to

support Finding No. 8 regarding the Listings. 

/ / /

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The court, however, concludes that any omission of a rationale to support Finding

No. 8 is harmless in light of the record as a whole. The medical evidence is clear that plaintiff’s

medical condition improved significantly by the time of the ALJ’s decision. Before February

2000, plaintiff was described as having depression, eating disorders, and substance abuse

problems. She also displayed symptoms of a destructive disorder and had been fired from a job

she held prior to 1994 due to conflicts with other people and her inability to keep up with the

work load. In 1996, plaintiff had been hospitalized three separate times due to her mental

problems. In January 2000, she spoke in a pressured, rambling, and loose manner. Her mood

was expansive and she admitted to hearing voices. However, as demonstrated by the Sutter

Health Clinic records from 2000 on, plaintiff’s eating disorder was gone, her mood was good, her

speech was good, and she had been able to hold down a full-time janitorial job at PRIDE

Industries. She was also confident enough with her social skills to look for other jobs and

potentially be re-hired by PRIDE Industries. Thus, even had the ALJ provided a rationale

supporting his Listings conclusion at Finding No. 8, no reasonable ALJ would have reached a

different disability conclusion in this case. There is no possibility that, given plaintiff’s

improvement, her remaining mental impairment met or equaled any listed impairment. 

The court also concludes that neither of the cases cited by plaintiff direct a

different result. In Flake, the court held that, even if the result reached by the ALJ is supported

by substantial evidence, it should nonetheless be set aside if the ALJ applied the wrong legal

standard. See 399 F.2d at 540. In that case, the legal standard at issue had been amended since

the date of the ALJ’s decision under review. See id. By contrast, there is no claim in this case

that the ALJ applied the wrong standard. Rather, the claim is simply that the ALJ did not

provide a rationale to support his Listings conclusion. In Pinto, the court stated that the ALJ is

required to make the “requisite factual findings to support his conclusion.” 249 F.3d at 844. In

this case, the ALJ did make factual determinations to support Finding No. 8 that the Listings did

not apply. 

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3. Analysis at Steps Three and Four

Next, plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s analysis conflates steps three and four of the

sequential evaluation process. Specifically, plaintiff argues:

. . . The decision offers up a hodge-podge of historical facts,

claimant statements, upbeat out-takes from chart notes, and ultimate

medical findings. Either it does not identify the narrow medical findings

that would properly support a step three medical findings, or it in effect

asks this court to prise out of a rambling paragraph on page 26 of the

transcript those items that would support a proper step three finding. Flake

v. Gardner . . . and Pinto v. Massanari preclude the court from doing so. 

Similarly, “medical improvement not related to ability to do work” and

“medical improvement that is related to ability to do work” are also

defined, technical terms . . .; this rambling paragraph does not fit its

hodge-podge of facts into these categories; and this court cannot substitute

a more proper ordering or reading of these facts. 

At step three of the sequential evaluation process applicable in cessation cases, the

question is whether there has been medical improvement since the CPD. Medical improvement

is defined as “any decrease in the medical severity of impairment(s) present at the time of the

most recent favorable medical decision . . . and is determined by a comparison of prior and

current medical evidence which must show that there have been changes (improvement) in the

symptoms, signs, or laboratory findings. . . .” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(c)(1) and (f). If there

has been medical improvement, the question at step four is whether such improvement is related

to the ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(c)(2) and (f). 

The court finds that the ALJ’s decision properly conducts analyses of both steps. 

In particular, the paragraph at page 26 of the transcript that plaintiff complains about contains the

ALJ’s analysis supporting his conclusion that plaintiff’s medical condition has improved. In this

paragraph, which is admittedly very long, the ALJ details the evidence of record supporting a

finding of medical improvement. He also states as to various pieces of evidence how the change

in condition relates to plaintiff’s ability to work, thereby performing the required step four

analysis. 

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For example, the ALJ relates various facts demonstrating that plaintiff does not

have any current psychiatric symptoms and notes a psychiatric assessment from Dr. Canty:

. . . This coincides with a consultative psychiatric assessment from Dr.

Timothy Canty, M.D., dated October 30, 2003, which held that given the

claimant’s normal mental status examination, well controlled psychotic

disorder while on medications, and GAF of 85, she does not have any

nonexertional functional limitations. 

This discussion demonstrates how the ALJ first set forth the evidence to make a step-three

determination of improvement and then the evidence – Dr. Canty’s opinion – that her

improvement relates to her ability to work. It is not necessary for the court to “prise” anything

out of the ALJ’s decision. There is nothing in the cases cited by plaintiff which precludes an

ALJ from combining steps three and four in the way the ALJ did in this case particularly where,

as here, the ALJ made specific findings and provided rationale as to each step such that this court

can conduct meaningful review. See e.g. Pinto, 249 F.3d at 847. 

Further, any possible error with respect to application of the sequential analysis

was harmless because the medical evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’s medical

condition improved and that the improvement related to her ability to work. As to Dr. Canty’s

GAF rating of 85 in late 2003, the court finds that Dr. Yang’s assessment at about the same time

that plaintiff’s GAF was as lows as 57 is not supported by plaintiff’s activities of going to school,

holding down a full-time job at PRIDE Industries, living on her own, and maintaining her own

finances. No reasonable ALJ would have found that plaintiff’s disability had not ended, even

had the analyses at steps three and four been performed exactly as plaintiff suggests. 

4. Severity Finding

Finally, plaintiff assigns procedural error based on the contention that the ALJ’s

decision contains no rationale to support a severity finding. Here, at Finding No. 7, the ALJ

concluded that plaintiff currently has severe impairments, both physical and mental. As with

Finding No. 8 regarding the Listing of Impairments, there is no rationale to support this

determination. It appears that this was also a clerical error with the word “not” being omitted

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from the finding. A finding that plaintiff had no severe impairments is consistent with the body

of the ALJ’s decision and the medical evidence as a whole. Furthermore, this error is completely

harmless because it is clear from the medical evidence that plaintiff’s mental impairment had

improved and was not severe by any stretch of the imagination. Similarly, any physical

impairment associated with her knee injury was not severe, as demonstrated by both physical

residual functional capacity assessments. 

B. Evaluation of Medical Opinions

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are

proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating

professional, who has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual,

than the opinion of a non-treating professional. See id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285

(9th Cir. 1996); Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). The least weight is given

to the opinion of a non-examining professional. See Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 & n.4

(9th Cir. 1990).

In addition to considering its source, to evaluate whether the Commissioner

properly rejected a medical opinion the court considers whether: (1) contradictory opinions are

in the record; and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. The Commissioner may reject an 

uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and

convincing” reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. 

While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted

by an examining professional’s opinion which is supported by different independent clinical

findings, the Commissioner may resolve the conflict. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,

1041 (9th Cir. 1995). A contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be

rejected only for “specific and legitimate” reasons supported by substantial evidence. See Lester,

81 F.3d at 830. This test is met if the Commissioner sets out a detailed and thorough summary of

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the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, states his interpretation of the evidence, and makes a

finding. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751-55 (9th Cir. 1989). Absent specific and

legitimate reasons, the Commissioner must defer to the opinion of a treating or examining

professional. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. The opinion of a non-examining professional,

without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a treating or examining

professional. See id. at 831. In any event, the Commissioner need not give weight to any

conclusory opinion supported by minimal clinical findings. See Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111,

1113 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting treating physician’s conclusory, minimally supported opinion);

see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. 

In this case, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinions of her

treating physician, Dr. Chunlin Yang, M.D., as expressed in his April 5, 2005, letter. As to Dr.

Yang, the ALJ stated:

The record also contains an April 5, 2005, letter from Dr. Chunlin Yang,

M.D., which opined that the claimant could not work full-time due to her

depression and anxiety. However, the undersigned finds that this brief,

conclusory, one-paragraph letter is not credible as: (1) The doctor’s

attached chart notes consistently documenting mental health improvement

with very scant objective clinical findings of a mental impairment; (2) The

doctor acknowledges in his letter that the claimant appears symptom free;

(3) The doctor’s assessment appears to be based upon the claimant’s selfserving subjective statements; (4) The doctor’s assessment is at odds with

the fact that she is working and attending school; (5) The doctor’s

assessment is refuted by the more thorough consultative psychiatric

assessment from Dr. Canty. As such, the undersigned does not accord this

assessment any weight. 

The court finds that the ALJ provided numerous specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr.

Yang’s opinion that plaintiff could not perform full-time work. As to plaintiff’s argument that

the reasons provided by the ALJ are “inaccurate, debatable, or unacceptable,” where there are

conflicts in the record, the ALJ may resolve those conflicts. See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. 

/ / /

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Dr. Canty’s opinion does indeed provide a source of contradictory clinical

findings. Specifically, Dr. Canty observed: (1) plaintiff was well-groomed; (2) speech was clear;

(3) plaintiff’s thought processes were logical and goal-oriented; (4) her mood was good; and 

(5) her intellectual functioning was good. These objective findings certainly contradict Dr.

Yang’s opinion that plaintiff could not perform full-time work. It is not required, as plaintiff

suggests, that Dr. Canty’s findings be contrary to Dr. Yang’s findings. What is required is that

there be findings which contradict the treating physician’s opinion. See id. 

Further, as the ALJ noted in his decision, Dr. Yang’s own notes clearly show that

plaintiff’s condition had improved. Her mood is consistently described as good, with very few

exceptions which were related to specific events and not chronic. Plaintiff has been able to hold

down a full-time job and attend school. She was even considering having a child. 

Finally, the court agrees with the ALJ that it appears the April 5, 2005, letter was

based on the doctor’s desire to help plaintiff avoid cessation of social security benefits and not on

clinical findings. Specifically, in December 2003, Dr. Yang encouraged plaintiff to continue to

look for a job but, at the same time, helped plaintiff summarize the reasons she can’t keep a job. 

Apparently, Dr. Yang’s opinion as to whether plaintiff could work depended on whether her

benefits would continue. The law requires the opposite – benefits only continue if the claimant

cannot work. 

C. Credibility Determination

The Commissioner determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the

court defers to the Commissioner’s discretion if the Commissioner used the proper process and

provided proper reasons. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1995). An explicit

credibility finding must be supported by specific, cogent reasons. See Rashad v. Sullivan, 903

F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). General findings are insufficient. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). Rather, the Commissioner must identify what testimony is not credible

and what evidence undermines the testimony. See id. Moreover, unless there is affirmative

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evidence in the record of malingering, the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting testimony as not

credible must be “clear and convincing.” See id.

If there is objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the

Commissioner may not discredit a claimant’s testimony as to the severity of symptoms merely

because they are unsupported by objective medical evidence. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d

341, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). The Commissioner may, however, consider the nature of

the symptoms alleged, including aggravating factors, medication, treatment, and functional

restrictions. See id. at 345-47. In weighing credibility, the Commissioner may also consider: 

(1) the claimant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements, or other inconsistent

testimony; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a

prescribed course of treatment; (3) the claimant’s daily activities; (4) work records; and (5)

physician and third-party testimony about the nature, severity, and effect of symptoms. See

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 

The ALJ summarized plaintiff’s testimony as follows:

The claimant testified that she cannot work . . . due to depression and

anxiety with a resulting fear of being around people. She stated that she

visits her treating physician monthly and has been prescribed three

different types of psychiatric medications. She further stated, however,

that she does not have any physical problems. 

As to plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ stated:

. . . [T]he claimant’s wide-ranging activities of daily living are inconsistent

with a disabling impairment as she has been working for Burger King for

the last two months, four hours a day, five days per week, washes dishes,

sleeps well, does the laundry and housework, and is able to maintain her

own appearance. 

A review of the hearing transcript reflects that plaintiff testified that she cannot work at all due to

anxiety and being fearful of people. However, as the ALJ noted, this is inconsistent with her

testimony that she has a part-time job at Burger King and plans to return to college, both of

which involve interacting with people. Therefore, the court concludes that the ALJ properly

rejected plaintiff’s claim that she cannot work as not credible. 

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D. Lay Witness Testimony

In determining whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ generally must consider lay

witness testimony concerning a claimant's ability to work. See Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915,

919 (9th Cir. 1993); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d)(4) & (e), 416.913(d)(4) & (e). Indeed, “lay

testimony as to a claimant's symptoms or how an impairment affects ability to work is competent

evidence . . . and therefore cannot be disregarded without comment.” See Nguyen v. Chater, 100

F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996). Consequently, “[i]f the ALJ wishes to discount the testimony

of lay witnesses, he must give reasons that are germane to each witness.” Dodrill, 12 F.3d at

919. 

The ALJ, however, need not discuss all evidence presented. See Vincent on

Behalf of Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984). Rather, he must explain

why “significant probative evidence has been rejected.” Id. (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700,

706 (3d Cir.1981). Applying this standard, the court held that the ALJ properly ignored evidence

which was neither significant nor probative. See id. at 1395. As to a letter from a treating

psychiatrist, the court reasoned that, because the ALJ must explain why he rejected

uncontroverted medical evidence, the ALJ did not err in ignoring the doctor’s letter which was

controverted by other medical evidence considered in the decision. See id. As to lay witness

testimony concerning the plaintiff’s mental functioning as a result of a second stroke, the court

concluded that the evidence was properly ignored because it “conflicted with the available

medical evidence” assessing the plaintiff’s mental capacity. Id.

In Stout, the Ninth Circuit recently considered an ALJ’s silent disregard of lay

witness testimony. See 454 F.3d at 1053-54. The lay witness had testified about the plaintiff’s

“inability to deal with the demands of work” due to alleged back pain and mental impairments. 

Id. The witnesses, who were former co-workers testified about the plaintiff’s frustration with

simple tasks and uncommon need for supervision. See id. Noting that the lay witness testimony

in question was “consistent with medical evidence,” the court in Stout concluded that the “ALJ

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was required to consider and comment upon the uncontradicted lay testimony, as it concerned

how Stout’s impairments impact his ability to work.” Id. at 1053. The Commissioner conceded

that the ALJ's silent disregard of the lay testimony contravened Ninth Circuit case law and the

controlling regulations, and the Ninth Circuit rejected the Commissioner’s request that the error

be disregarded as harmless. See id. at 1054-55. The court concluded:

Because the ALJ failed to provide any reasons for rejecting competent lay

testimony, and because we conclude that error was not harmless,

substantial evidence does not support the Commissioner’s decision . . . 

Id. at 1056-67. 

From this case law, the court concludes that the rule for lay witness testimony

depends on whether the testimony in question is controverted or consistent with the medical

evidence. If it is controverted, then the ALJ does not err by ignoring it. See Vincent, 739 F.2d at

1395. If, however, lay witness testimony is consistent with the medical evidence, then the ALJ

must consider and comment upon it. See Stout, 454 F.3d at 1053. However, the

Commissioner’s regulations require the ALJ consider lay witness testimony in certain types of

cases. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996); SSR 88-13. That ruling

requires the ALJ to consider third-party lay witness evidence where the plaintiff alleges pain or

other symptoms that are not shown by the medical evidence. See id. Thus, in cases where the

plaintiff alleges impairments, such as chronic fatigue or pain (which by their very nature do not

always produce clinical medical evidence), it is impossible for the court to conclude that lay

witness evidence concerning the plaintiff’s abilities is necessarily controverted such that it may

be properly ignored. Therefore, in these types of cases, the ALJ is required by the regulations

and case law to consider lay witness evidence. 

In this case, the ALJ summarized plaintiff’s mother’s testimony as follows:

The claimant’s mother also testified that her daughter cannot work due to

anxiety with panic attacks and has had to leave work due to aggravation of

her condition. 

The ALJ did not, however, discuss this testimony beyond providing this brief summary. Citing

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Vincent, defendant argues there is no error because the testimony conflicts with the medical

evidence. The court agrees. Specifically, Dr. Canty’s observations as well as Dr. Yang’s

treatment notes, all outlined above, conflict with plaintiff’s mother’s testimony. 

E. Residual Functional Capacity Determination

Residual functional capacity is what a person “can still do despite [the

individual’s] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a) (2003); see also Valencia v.

Heckler, 751 F.2d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (residual functional capacity reflects current

“physical and mental capabilities”). In determining residual functional capacity, the ALJ must

assess what the plaintiff can still do in light of both physical and mental limitations. See 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a) (2003); see also Valencia v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 1082, 1085

(9th Cir. 1985) (residual functional capacity reflects current “physical and mental capabilities”). 

Where there is a colorable claim of mental impairment, the regulations require the ALJ to follow

a special procedure. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(a), 416.920a(a). The ALJ is required to record

pertinent findings and rate the degree of functional loss. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(b),

416.920a(b). 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s analysis of plaintiff’s current residual functional

capacity is inadequate. Here, the ALJ stated that plaintiff’s “non-exertional residual functional

capacity since November 1, 2003, has been compromised only to the extent that she is incapable

of frequently socially interacting with the public.” He also stated that she has the exertional

residual functional capacity to perform light work. As to plaintiff’s non-exertional residual

functional capacity in light of her colorable claim of mental problems, the court agrees with

plaintiff that the ALJ’s analysis is too cursory. Specifically, the ALJ did not make the specific

findings outlined in the regulations. See e.g. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c). However, any error is

harmless. It is clear based on the two mental residual functional capacity assessments that the

findings required by the regulations were in fact made. That the ALJ did not recite these findings

in his decision does not render the ultimate disability determination incorrect. The fact remains

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that the record contains the required findings and supports the conclusion that plaintiff’s

disability ceased. 

F. Vocational Expert Testimony

The Medical-Vocational Guidelines (“Grids”) provide a uniform conclusion about

disability for various combinations of age, education, previous work experience, and residual

functional capacity. The Grids allow the Commissioner to streamline the administrative process

and encourage uniform treatment of claims based on the number of jobs in the national economy

for any given category of residual functioning capacity. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458,

460-62 (1983) (discussing creation and purpose of the Grids). 

The Commissioner may apply the Grids in lieu of taking the testimony of a

vocational expert only when the grids accurately and completely describe the claimant’s abilities

and limitations. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Heckler v.

Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 462 n.5 (1983). Thus, the Commissioner generally may not rely on the

Grids if a claimant suffers from non-exertional limitations because the Grids are based on

strength factors only. See 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 200.00(b). “If a

claimant has an impairment that limits his or her ability to work without directly affecting his or

her strength, the claimant is said to have non-exertional . . . limitations that are not covered by

the Grids.” Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing 20 C.F.R., Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 200.00(d), (e)). The Commissioner may, however, rely on the Grids

even when a claimant has combined exertional and non-exertional limitations, if non-exertional

limitations do not impact the claimant’s exertional capabilities. See Bates v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d

1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1990); Polny v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 661, 663-64 (9th Cir. 1988).

In cases where the Grids are not fully applicable, the ALJ may meet his burden

under step five of the sequential analysis by propounding to a vocational expert hypothetical

questions based on medical assumptions, supported by substantial evidence, that reflect all the

plaintiff’s limitations. See Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 184 (9th Cir. 1995). Specifically,

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where the Grids are inapplicable because plaintiff has sufficient non-exertional limitations, the

ALJ is required to obtain vocational expert testimony. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 587 F.2d 1335,

1341 (9th Cir. 1988). 

In this case, the ALJ identified non-exertional limitations, specifically plaintiff’s

inability to interact with the public frequently. However, as defendant argues, this limitation

does not affect plaintiff’s ability to perform exertional activities of sitting, standing, walking,

lifting, carrying, pushing, or pulling. Therefore, vocational testimony was not necessary. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the Commissioner’s final

decision is based on substantial evidence and proper legal analysis. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied;

2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted; and

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment and close this file.

DATED: February 4, 2008

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:06-cv-02609-CMK Document 22 Filed 02/05/08 Page 26 of 26