Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01494/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01494-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
CSL Plasma
Appellee
Thomas Denn
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1494

___________________________

Thomas Denn

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

CSL Plasma, Inc.

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

____________

 Submitted: November 18, 2015

 Filed: March 16, 2016

____________

Before COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

____________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Thomas Denn sued his former employer, CSL Plasma, Inc. (“CSL”), claiming

that CSL had violated the anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions of the

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Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”). Both Denn and CSL filed motions for

summary judgment, and the district court granted CSL’s motion. We affirm. 

1

I.

CSL operates a number of blood plasma collection facilities around the

country, including in Kansas City, Missouri. Denn worked at the Kansas City facility

as an assistant center manager until November 8, 2012, when CSL terminated his

employment. According toCSL’s records, Denn received positive reviews during his

first few years, including a “strong” rating in or around September 2011 from his

then-supervisor Shane Kennedy, a male CSL employee who worked as the center

manager. Later in 2011, however, Kennedy issued Denn two separate verbal

warnings for revealing confidential information. 

In January 2012, Rebecca Heatherman replaced Kennedy as manager of the

Kansas City facility. In this capacity, Heatherman supervised both Denn and another

assistant center manager, Cristina Ceniceros. Denn and Ceniceros shared many ofthe

same duties and divided the workload evenly. During the time that Heatherman

supervised Denn and Ceniceros, Heatherman provided Denn with numerous verbal

and written warningsfor deficiencies in performing these duties. Ceniceros received

no such discipline. In February 2012, for example, Heatherman provided Denn with

a written warning noting that Denn was not meeting his responsibility to spend at

least half of his time building relationships, interacting with staff, and managing

workflow in the center’s production areas. The warning also cited several instances

when Denn had failed to deliver timely corrective actions to employees that he

oversaw. The warning required Denn to create a development plan to correct these

performance deficiencies, and it also stated that failure to improve his performance

The Honorable Greg Kays, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the

1

Western District of Missouri.

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could result in additional corrective action. Denn submitted the required

development plan on March 5, 2012.

Fromthat date through August 2012, Heatherman had numerous conversations

with Denn about his performance. These conversations related to Denn missing

deadlines, interacting poorly with others, failing to communicate with his peers and

supervisor, and failing to administer corrective actions to the employees he

supervised. During one of these discussions, Denn explained that he was having

difficulties managing his time and delegating tasks.

Several months after Denn’s initial written warning, Heatherman and Denn

reviewed his progress relative to his development plan goals. During this meeting,

Heatherman noted several assigned tasks that Denn had failed to complete, but the

two agreed that Denn had demonstrated significant improvement since submitting his

development plan. Heatherman and Denn included a statement recognizing this

progress in a second development plan, which also highlighted several areas in which

Denn needed to demonstrate further improvement.

Despite Denn’s initial progress toward his development goals, his subsequent

performance led to additional discipline. On July 19, 2012, Heatherman sent an email

to CSL’s human resources department (“human resources”) requesting permission to

proceed with a final written warning against Denn based on issues she had observed

during the preceding weeks. Heatherman’s request noted various inappropriate

statements Denn had made to other employees and described a three-day period

during which Denn’s failure to effectively manage and support his staff significantly

reduced the center’s productivity. Heatherman received approval to deliver the final

warning at some point between the end of July and the middle of August. 

On August 17, 2012, Denn complained to human resources about Heatherman,

explaining that Heatherman was discriminating against himbased on his sex. Several

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days later, a member of human resources discussed this complaint with Denn and then

conducted an investigation that involved interviewing several employees and

reviewing various documents. At the conclusion of this investigation, human

resources determined that Denn had not suffered any discrimination.

On August 21, 2012, Heatherman served Denn with his final written warning. 

The document noted the various instances in which Denn had performed below

expectations, and it specifically instructed Denn to be more diligent in

communicating important information to peers and supervisors.

Denn took a leave of absence from mid-September to mid-October 2012. 

Shortly after his return, Denn received an addendum to his final written warning that

revised his development timeline in light of his absence and reminded himof the need

to provide peers and supervisors with necessary updates according to the

communication channels described in CSL’s employee handbook. 

On October 31, 2012, an incident occurred between two of the employees

under Denn’s supervision, Kristina Todd and Christian Desouza. According to Todd,

Desouza aggressively grabbed her. Todd immediately told Denn about the incident,

which the two briefly discussed before Todd left work that day. According to his

deposition, Denn reviewed videotapes of the incident on either the day of the incident

or the following day, and he checked the center’s work schedules in an effort to

ensure that Todd and Desouza did not work together until he could investigate

further. Denn did not inform Heatherman, human resources, or Ceniceros about the

incident until November 7. 

At the time ofthe incident, CSL’s written policy regarding harassment required

all employees “to immediately report (orally and/or in writing) all incidents of

harassment to a manager and Human Resources. Managers who are aware of

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harassment orrelated inappropriate conduct and who fail to ensure suitable corrective

action is taken are subject to corrective action, or termination.”

CSL terminated Denn’s employment on November 8. The termination

paperwork stated that Denn’s failure to report the Todd-Desouza incident was the

primary basis for his firing. The paperwork also listed several previous corrective

actions that the company had taken against Denn. Heatherman and two members of

human resources, one of whom was a male, participated in the termination decision. 

At some point following the termination of Denn’s employment, Todd overheard

Brandi Robinson, a trainee manager at CSL, remark to Ceniceros, “Isn’t it nice that

all of the testosterone is gone so that we don’t have to deal with it anymore[?]” The

employee hired to replace Denn was male. 

Denn sued CSL in Missouri state court under two sections ofthe MHRA. First,

he claimed that CSL had discriminated against him based on his sex. See Mo. Rev.

Stat. § 213.055. Second, Denn claimed that his final warning and eventual firing

constituted unlawful retaliation for his complaint to CSL’s human resources

department regarding Heatherman’s conduct towards him. See Mo. Rev. Stat.

§ 213.070. CSL removed the case to federal district court based on diversity of

citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

In support of his claims, Denn submitted his own deposition as well as the

depositions of two other male CSL employees, Michael Carter and Kenneth Lain. 

Denn also submitted an affidavit from Todd, but the district court subsequently

excluded major portions of this document after a second affidavit from Todd

explained that various statements in the first affidavit exceeded her personal

knowledge. Based on the remaining evidence, the district court granted CSL’s

motion for summary judgment on both of Denn’s claims. Denn now appeals. 

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II.

Summary judgment is proper if the moving party “shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A court considering a motion for summary

judgment must view the evidence and inferences that reasonably may be drawn from

the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enter. Bank v.

Magna Bank of Mo., 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). A party opposing a properly

supported motion for summary judgment may not rest on mere allegations or denials,

but must set forth specific facts in the record showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).

A.

The MHRA prohibits an employer fromdiscriminating against an employee on

the basis of that employee’s sex. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.055.1(1)(a). In order to

prevail in a suit under this provision, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he suffered

an adverse employment action; (2) his sex was a contributing factor in that adverse

action; and (3) he incurred damages as a direct result. See Daugherty v. City of

Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 820 (Mo. 2007). With respect to the second

element, the Missouri Supreme Court has recognized that the “contributing factor”

standard, which stems fromthe MHRA’s prohibition of “any unfair treatment,” isless

rigorous than the “motivating factor” standard employed in federal discrimination

cases under Title VII. Id. at 819. This distinction has led Missouri to abandon the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis applied in federal cases. Templemire

v. W &M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 383 (Mo. 2014)(citing McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Instead, if “consideration of [a] protected

characteristic[] contributed to the unfair treatment, that issufficient.” Daugherty, 231

S.W.3d at 819. Although Denn points to various items in the record to support his

discrimination claim, none of this evidence demonstrates a genuine issue of material

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fact as to whether Denn’s sex was a contributing factor to CSL’s decision to take

action against him.

Denn acknowledges that CSL provided non-sex-related reasons for his

discipline and the eventual termination of his employment. Nonetheless,Denn argues

that the evidence created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether these

reasons lack credibility. Although the MHRA does not require an employee to show

that an employer’s stated reasons for taking adverse action were pretextual, evidence

undermining the credibility of those reasons can give rise to a factual issue as to

whether a discriminatory reason was a contributing factor to an employer’s conduct. 

Lomax v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 243 S.W.3d 474, 483 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 

According to Denn, CSL’s explanation for why he received repeated disciplinary

warnings lacks credibility because Denn completed more procedures, hiring, and

facility work than his female counterparts. None of the warnings Denn received,

however, stated that Denn was performing deficiently in any of these areas. Instead,

Denn’s verbal and written warnings cited various other shortcomings, including

(1) his inappropriate disclosure of confidential information; (2) his failure to manage

workflow, administer corrective actions, and build relationships among the employees

hemanaged; (3) his inability to effectively delegate, prioritize, and complete assigned

tasks; and (4) his failure to report promptly relevant information to his peers and

superiors. Denn protests that these warnings resulted from Heatherman’s animosity

towards him, but he does not deny that he also received discipline from Shane

Kennedy, a male supervisor. Denn also offers no evidence to rebut CSL’s

documentation of specific occasions in which he performed deficiently. To the

contrary, the record includes instances in which Denn acknowledged the need to

improve his performance. Based on this evidence, we conclude that Denn has failed

to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding the credibility of his written

warnings. 

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Similarly, Denn’s version of the events immediately preceding his firing fails

to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the credibility of CSL’s stated

basis for terminating his employment. Denn does not dispute that he did not report

the Todd-Desouza incident until eight days after it occurred. Nor does he dispute that

this delay contravened both CSL’s written policy requiring immediate reporting of

such incidents and a written warning he had received just days before the incident

regarding the timely elevation of such issues. Instead, Denn argues that his failure

to report this incident could not have been the basis for CSL’s decision to fire him

because Denn wasfollowing a verbal instruction fromhuman resourcesto investigate

these types of occurrences prior to reporting them. The record, however, does not

support Denn’s version of the facts. Denn’s deposition testimony states only that, on

prior occasions when he had reported such issues, human resources had instructed

himto investigate the incident further. At no point does he state that human resources

told him to conduct thisinvestigation prior to reporting the incident. To the contrary,

Denn admitted in his deposition that by failing to report the incident, he was

“skipping [a] step” in CSL’s policies based on his determination that conducting his

own investigation would expedite the process. These statementssupport, rather than 2

undermine, CSL’s contention that it lawfully fired Denn for violating company policy

after he had received a final written warning. Because Denn admitted that he failed

to comply with CSL’s policies, no genuine issue of material fact remained with

respect to the credibility of CSL’s assertion that Denn’s failure was the basis for the

termination of his employment. 

In addition,Denn argues thatsummary judgment wasinappropriate because the

evidence showed that CSL treated him unfavorably relative to similarly situated

female employees. Missouri courts do not require a plaintiff to present evidence of

In any event, the record undermines Denn’s assertion that his investigation 2

caused his eight-day reporting delay. The only investigatory effort that Denn

described in his deposition was his review of videotapes on either the day of the

incident or the following day.

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similarly situated employees in order to overcome summary judgment, but this type

of evidence can give rise to a factual issue regarding whether a discriminatory reason

was a contributing factor to an employer’s conduct. Holmes v. Kansas City Mo. Bd.

of Police Comm’rs ex rel. Its Members, 364 S.W.3d 615, 627 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 

“Employees are similarly situated if they are accused of ‘similar conduct and are

disciplined in different ways.’” Jain v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 779 F.3d 753, 759 (8th

Cir. 2015) (quoting Williams v. Trans States Airlines, Inc., 281 S.W.3d 854, 873 (Mo.

Ct. App. 2009)). Denn argues that Ceniceros, who also worked as an assistant center

manager, was a similarly situated female employee. The fact that Heatherman never

disciplined Ceniceros, Denn contends, requires an inference of sex discrimination. 

Denn provides no evidence, however, that Ceniceros’s performance as an assistant

center manager suffered fromthe same deficiencies as Denn’s performance. Nothing

in the record suggests that Ceniceros consistently failed to complete assigned tasks,

report issues to supervisors, or promptly administer corrective actions to

subordinates. Denn argues that Ceniceros performed fewer procedures and

contributed less to hiring and facility maintenance, but, as explained above, these

tasks were not areas in which Denn received negative feedback. Because the record

does not show that Denn and Ceniceros engaged in “similar conduct,” Denn’s

argument that Heatherman did not discipline Ceniceros cannot give rise to a genuine

issue of material fact as to whether CSL treated Denn less favorably than similarly

situated female employees. See Jain, 779 F.3d at 759. 

Similarly, Denn’s attempt to compare himself to Heatherman fails to create a

factual issue sufficient to overcome summary judgment. Denn alludes to a prior

harassment complaint that Heatherman failed to report, but no admissible evidence

indicates that Heatherman did not report this incident to human resources.

3

Denn presents two potential pieces of evidence supporting this assertion, but

3

neither is admissible. First, in her first affidavit, Kristina Todd stated that in

September 2012 she made a harassment complaint to Heatherman and that

Heatherman took no action to correct the behavior underlying this complaint. 

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Moreover, even if Heatherman did fail to report a similar incident, no evidence shows

that Heatherman’s superiors were aware of this failure but declined to punish her. 

Finally, Heatherman would not necessarily have deserved the same punishment as

Denn for any such failure because no evidence suggests that Heatherman was on

“final warning” when this previous instance of harassment occurred. As with

Ceniceros, because Heatherman was not disciplined less severely than Denn for

engaging in similar conduct, the district court correctly determined that no genuine

issue of material fact remained as to whether CSL treated Denn unfavorably relative

to similarly situated employees.

Denn also argues that Brandi Robinson’s statement to Ceniceros following

Denn’s firing represents evidence of sex discrimination. Admittedly, this statement

demonstrates that one or more of Denn’s peers may have harbored a bias against him

based on his sex. However, the statement is not direct evidence of discrimination

because neither Robinson nor Ceniceros was involved in the decision to fire Denn. 

See Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 818 n.4 (“Statements . . . are not considered direct

evidence if they are unrelated to the decisional process.”). Robinson’s comment also

However, the district court subsequently excluded much of this first affidavit due to

Todd’s admission in a second affidavit that the affidavit’s averments exceeded her

personal knowledge. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (“An affidavit or declaration used

to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge . . . .”). 

Although Denn argues that this exclusion was improper, we disagree. See Ward v.

Int’l PaperCo., 509 F.3d 457, 462 (8thCir. 2007) (holding that district court properly

excluded statements in affidavits for which affiants lacked personal knowledge). In

her second affidavit, Todd stated only that she was not aware of any action that

Heatherman took following this first complaint. Second, Denn stated in his

deposition that Heatherman “failed to do anything” when this prior incident was

brought to her attention. Elsewhere in his deposition and in his brief, however, Denn

makes clear that he learned of Heatherman’s alleged inaction through his

conversation with Todd. Like Todd’s statement in her first affidavit, therefore,

Denn’s statement is inadmissible because it is not based on either Todd’s or Denn’s

personal knowledge. See id. 

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does not represent indirect evidence of discrimination because no reasonable

inference links this statement to Denn’s discipline or firing. See id. at 818. Neither

Heatherman nor anyone in human resources could have considered Robinson’s

statement when deciding to take action against Denn, and no evidence indicates that

the comment was emblematic ofsimilar sentiments shared by those decision makers. 

Without facts connecting this comment, made by one of Denn’s peers, to CSL’s

decision to fire Denn, the statement does not give rise to a genuine issue of material

factregarding Denn’s discrimination claim. Cf. Fast v. Southern Union Co., Inc., 149

F.3d 885 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that comments by non-decision maker provided

circumstantial evidence of discrimination where other evidence indicated that the

comments influenced the decision to fire the plaintiff); Cox v. Kansas City Chiefs

Football Club, Inc., 473 S.W.3d 107, 126 (Mo. 2015) (finding that comments by

other high-level executives provided indirect evidence that employee’s firing was part

of a company-wide policy of age discrimination). 

Finally, Denn argues that evidence of other instances of discrimination against

CSL’s male employees rendered summary judgment improper. Missouri courts have

recognized that so-called “me too” evidence of other discrimination victims is

relevant where the plaintiff shows “that he and others were treated similarly by being

disciplined or fired and that the dominant common factor between himself and the

others who were disciplined or fired is their membership in the protected group.”

Cox, 473 S.W.3d at 120. The “me too” evidence Denn presents, however, fails to

give rise to a genuine issue of material fact. Although former CSL employee Michael

Carter stated that he felt that he was targeted by female superiors, this testimony did

not demonstrate that Carter was “treated similarly” to Denn because Carter did not

specify the nature of this treatment or whether it involved the type of discipline Denn

received. See id. at 118. Furthermore, neither Carter nor Denn’s other witness,

Kenneth Lain, was fired by CSL. Therefore, the only evidence that other males were

“treated similarly” to Denn was Lain’s statement that he, like Denn, received multiple

written warnings from Rebecca Heatherman. The fact that Heatherman disciplined

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both men may be relevant under Missouri law, but standing alone this “mere ‘scintilla

of evidence’ is insufficient to defeat summary judgment” on Denn’s discrimination

claim. See Brunsting v. Lutsen Mountains Corp., 601 F.3d 813, 820 (8th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). 

Because Denn supplied no evidence giving rise to a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether CSL considered his sex when disciplining and ultimately firing

him, the district court properly granted CSL summary judgment on Denn’s

discrimination claim. 

B.

Denn also argues on appeal that the district court erred by granting CSL

summary judgment on his retaliation claim. See Mo. Rev. Stat § 213.070. To

establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the MHRA, a plaintiff must prove

(1) he complained of discrimination; (2) the employer took adverse action against

him; and (3) a causal relationship existed between the complaint and the adverse

action. McCrainey v. Kansas City Mo. Sch. Dist., 337 S.W.3d 746, 753 (Mo. Ct.

App. 2011). With respect to the third element, Missouri courts have recognized that

a “causal relationship” exists when retaliation was a “contributing factor” to the

adverse action. Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 563 F.3d 357, 360 (8th Cir. 2009)

(citing Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W.3d 659 (Mo. 2009)). 

The parties do not dispute that the evidence is sufficient to establish the first

two elements of retaliation. Denn complained to human resources about sex

discrimination on August 17, 2012, and CSL took adverse actions against Denn when

it provided him with a final written warning on August 22, 2012 and when it

terminated his employment on November 8, 2012. With respect to the third element,

Denn claims that the temporal proximity between his complaint and CSL’s adverse

actions creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether his complaint

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contributed to CSL’s decision to take those actions. In order to survive summary

judgment on a retaliation claim, however, a plaintiff generally must present “more

than a temporal connection between protected activity and an adverse employment

action.” Williams, 281 S.W.3d at 869 (emphasis added) (quoting Buettner v. Arch

Coal Sales Co., Inc., 216 F.3d 707, 715-16 (8th Cir.2000)). Denn’s retaliation claim

cannot overcome summary judgment because he has failed to provide any evidence

that his discrimination complaint was a contributing factor to either his final warning

or the eventual termination of his employment.

First, although Denn received his final written warning shortly after he

complained to human resources, Heatherman had sought approval to deliver this

warning nearly a month before Denn’s complaint, and her request cited performance

issues dating back to February 2012. Furthermore, human resources already had

reviewed the warning and suggested revisions by the time Denn complained of

discrimination. In light of these facts, we agree with the district court that Denn’s

receipt of a final warning days after his complaint was a “mere coincidence oftiming”

that fails to give rise to a factual issue regarding whether the complaint was a factor

contributing to the delivery of this warning. See Kipp v. Mo. Highway & Transp.

Comm’n, 280 F.3d 893, 897 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Nelson v. J.C. Penney Co., 75

F.3d 343, 346-47 (8th Cir. 1996)). 

Denn also failed to show that his discrimination complaint contributed to

CSL’s decision to terminate his employment. Even if we accept Denn’s argument

that we should discount the leave of absence he took from September 15, 2012 until

October 14, 2012, more than seven weeks of work separated Denn’s complaint and

his eventual firing. This gap in time “weakens the inference of retaliation that arises

when a retaliatory act occurs shortly after a complaint.” See Shanklin v. Fitzgerald,

397 F.3d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Dhyne v. Meiners Thriftway, Inc., 184

F.3d 983, 989 (8th Cir. 1999)). Furthermore, without additional evidence linking

Denn’s complaint to CSL’s decision to fire him, any temporal connection between

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these eventsisinsufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. See Williams, 281

S.W.3d at 869. As explained above, Denn has failed to undermine CSL’s lawful

explanation for why the company terminated his employment. Because “filing a

complaint does not clothe [a plaintiff] with immunity for past and present

inadequacies,” Denn’s poor performance overwhelms any temporal relationship

between his discrimination complaint and subsequent firing. See Shanklin, 397 F.3d

at 604 (quoting Kneibert v. Thomson Newspapers, Mich., Inc., 129 F.3d 444, 455 (8th

Cir. 1997)).

Denn has failed to point to any evidence showing that his discrimination

complaint was a “contributing factor” to any adverse action taken by CSL. See

Wallace, 563 F.3d at 360. Accordingly, no genuine issue of material fact remained

as to whether any “causal relationship” exists between these two events. See id.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to CSL on both of Denn’s claims under the MHRA. 

______________________________

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