Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_16-cv-00283/USCOURTS-alnd-4_16-cv-00283-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Arnold
Plaintiff
Social Security Administration, Commissioner
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

JAMES ARNOLD,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SOCIAL SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION, 

COMMISSIONER,

Defendant.

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Civil Action Number

 4:16-cv-00283-AKK

MEMORANDUM OPINION

James Arnold brings this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social 

Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of the final adverse 

decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). This 

court finds that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) applied the correct legal 

standards and that her decision — which has become the decision of the 

Commissioner — is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the court 

AFFIRMS the decision denying benefits.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Arnold filed his application for Title II Disability Insurance Benefits and 

Title XVI Supplemental Security Income on May 8, 2012, alleging a disability 

onset date of May 3, 2010 due to pain from a back surgery in July 2010, “feet and 

leg pain,” and depression. (R. 141–42, 165, 168). After the SSA denied his

FILED

 2017 Mar-24 PM 02:41

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:16-cv-00283-AKK Document 20 Filed 03/24/17 Page 1 of 12
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application, Arnold requested a hearing before an ALJ. (R. 85–86). The ALJ 

subsequently denied Arnold’s claim. (R. 10–21). The Appeals Council denied 

review, (R. 1–4), rendering the ALJ’s opinion the final decision of the 

Commissioner. Arnold then filed this action pursuant to § 405(g). (Doc. 1.).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The only issues before this court are whether the record contains substantial 

evidence to sustain the ALJ’s decision, see § 405(g); Walden v. Schweiker, 672 

F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982), and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal 

standards, see Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 791 (11th Cir. 1988); Chester v. 

Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c) 

mandate that the Commissioner’s “factual findings are conclusive if supported by 

‘substantial evidence.’” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). 

The district court may not reconsider the facts, reevaluate the evidence, or 

substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner; instead, it must review the 

final decision as a whole and determine if the decision is “reasonable and 

supported by substantial evidence.” See id. (citing Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 

F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).

Substantial evidence falls somewhere between a scintilla and a 

preponderance of evidence; “[i]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person 

would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529 

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(quoting Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239) (other citations omitted). If supported by 

substantial evidence, the court must affirm the Commissioner’s factual findings 

even if the preponderance of the evidence is against the Commissioner’s findings. 

See Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. While the court acknowledges that judicial review 

of the ALJ’s findings is limited in scope, it notes that the review “does not yield 

automatic affirmance.” Lamb, 847 F.2d at 701.

III. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show “the inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 

months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 416(i)(1)(A). A physical or mental 

impairment is “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or 

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrated by medically acceptable 

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

Determination of disability under the Act requires a five-step analysis. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)–(f). Specifically, the Commissioner must determine, in 

sequence:

(1)whether the claimant is currently unemployed; 

(2)whether the claimant has a severe impairment;

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(3)whether the impairment meets or equals one listed by the 

Secretary;

(4)whether the claimant is unable to perform his or her past work; and

(5)whether the claimant is unable to perform any work in the national 

economy. 

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). “An affirmative 

answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next question, or, on steps

three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative answer to any question, other 

than step three, leads to a determination of ‘not disabled.’” Id. at 1030 (citing 20 

C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)–(f)). “Once the finding is made that a claimant cannot return

to prior work the burden of proof shifts to the Secretary to show other work the 

claimant can do.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation 

omitted).

IV. The ALJ’s Decision

In performing the five-step analysis, the ALJ determined that Arnold met the 

criteria for Step One, because he had not engaged in any substantial gainful 

activity since his alleged onset date in May 2010. (R. 12). Next, the ALJ 

acknowledged that Arnold’s impairments of “status post, lumbar fusion at L4-S1 

(July 2010); mild lumbar disc protrusion; neuropathy; and obesity” met the 

requirements of Step Two. (Id.). The ALJ then proceeded to the next step and 

found that Arnold did not satisfy Step Three, because he did “not have an 

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impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the 

severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 

1.” (R. 14) (internal citations omitted). 

In this step, the ALJ considered the four “Paragraph B” categories. (R. 12). 

With regard to activities of daily living, the ALJ found only “mild limitation,” as 

Arnold helps care for the family pet, prepares meals, washes dishes, and performs

minor household repairs, and can independently bathe, dress, and groom. (R. 12, 

181, 193, 196–99). As to social functioning, Arnold drives, “go[es] out alone,” 

shops in stores, and “goes to church on a regular basis.” (R. 13, 198–99). The 

ALJ also found no problems with Arnold’s concentration, persistence, and pace, as 

Arnold “needs no special reminders to take medications or groom,” can “pay bills, 

count change, and handle a bank account,” and can “follow written and spoken 

instructions very well.” (R. 13, 198, 200, 203–07). Finally, the ALJ noted that the 

record shows no extended periods of decompensation. (R. 13).1

 

Although the ALJ answered Step Three in the negative, consistent with the 

law, see McDaniel, 800 F.2d at 1030, she proceeded to Step Four, where she 

determined that, at his date last insured, Arnold had the residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) to “perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) 

 1 The ALJ also stated that she “considered [Arnold’s] impairments under listings 1.00 et 

seq. Musculoskeletal System and 12.00 et seq. Mental Disorders, but concluded that [Arnold] 

does not have the requisite defects.” (R. 13).

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except [Arnold] must alternate the positions of sit and stand at will,” “cannot 

operate foot controls,” “cannot climb stairs, ladders, ropes, or scaffolds,” “cannot 

kneel, crouch, or crawl,” “must avoid exposure to excessive vibration,” and “must 

avoid exposure around hazardous machinery and unprotected heights.” (R. 14). In 

light of Arnold’s RFC and the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ 

determined that Arnold was capable of performing his past relevant work as a 

“radio dispatcher (sedentary and semiskilled),” as such work “does not require the 

performance of work-related activities precluded by [Arnold’s] residual functional 

capacity . . . .” (R. 20). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Arnold “has not been 

under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from May 3, 2010.” (Id.). 

V. ANALYSIS

Arnold raises four contentions of error. For the reasons below, the court 

rejects each contention and affirms the ALJ’s decision.

A. Alleged Bias by the ALJ

Arnold seeks remand purportedly because he did not “receive a fair hearing 

that comports with due process because [the ALJ, off the record] offered [him] one 

year of benefits if he would not file another claim” and, after Arnold refused the 

offer, the ALJ denied benefits. Doc. 19 at 3.2

 Arnold’s contention is unavailing

 2 Arnold submitted an affidavit stating that “prior to the first hearing ALJ Helmer offered 

my representative . . . one year of disability benefits but only if I agreed not to file another 

claim.” Doc. 9-2 at 1. 

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because, as an initial matter, “[t]here is a ‘presumption of honesty and integrity in 

those serving as adjudicators.’” Martinez v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 660 F. 

App’x 787, 794 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 

(1975)). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit, addressing similar facts, has stated that 

although “it would be improper for [an] ALJ to refuse to award [the claimant] 

social security benefits based on [the claimant’s] refusal to amend his onset date,” 

such conduct would not raise any “fundamental due process concerns that would 

warrant remanding th[e] case for another administrative hearing.” Lindsey v. 

Barnhart, 161 F. App’x 862, 870 (11th Cir. 2006). See also Moise v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 404 F. App’x 424, 426 (11th Cir. 2010) (rejecting claimant’s allegation 

of bias when, among other things, the “ALJ made a well-reasoned decision 

supported by substantial evidence”); Cline v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:15-cv480-FTM-MRM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124671, at *25 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 

2016) (insufficient evidence of bias due to plaintiff’s refusal to amend the alleged 

onset date because “the ALJ’s ‘on the record’ statements, at most, equate[d] to an 

error in judgment,” and “[r]egardless, . . . [the plaintiff] failed to show how he 

could have been penalized by the ALJ when substantial evidence support[ed] the 

ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was not entirely credible”) (emphasis omitted). 

Therefore, because, even accepting Arnold’s allegations as true, remand 

would not change the administrative result, and, as explained in Sections B and C 

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below, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision, the motion to remand, 

doc. 9, is due to be denied.

B. Alleged Failure to Consider Fully the Duties of Arnold’s Past Work 

Arnold contends next that the ALJ erred by not “consider[ing] all of the 

duties of [Arnold’s] past work and evaluat[ing] [his] ability to perform those duties 

in spite of the impairments.” Doc. 19 at 5. The record belies Arnold’s contention, 

and supports the ALJ’s finding that Arnold could perform his past relevant work as 

a radio dispatcher. (R. 20). As the record shows, Arnold reported that, as a 

dispatcher, he used machines, tools, and equipment, sat for 8 hours per day, wrote, 

typed, and handled small objects throughout the workday, and did no lifting or

carrying. (R. 181, 190–91). While the record shows a change in Arnold’s physical 

abilities since his alleged onset date as it relates to his ability to remain seated for 

long periods without taking breaks to stand, stretch, or elevate his feet, (see R. 200, 

209), this fact does not mean that Arnold cannot work as a dispatcher. To the 

contrary, the record shows that Arnold can “sit for reasonable periods of time,” (R. 

441) — specifically, 2 hours at a time and 5 total hours in a workday. (R. 443). 

Significantly, the ALJ accounted for this sitting limitation in her hypothetical 

question to the vocational expert.3 Moreover, Arnold’s abilities to perform the 

 3 The ALJ’s question incorporated, among other limitations, that the individual requires a 

“sit-stand option at will.” (R. 44). Despite this limitation, the VE found that “[t]he dispatcher 

job would still be viable.” (Id.). 

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other tasks involved with his past work as a radio dispatcher have not changed. 

(See, e.g., R. 38 (Arnold testified at the hearing that his back and legs are the “only 

conditions that interfere with [his] ability to work”); R. 441 (Arnold can “lift and 

carry light to medium weights”); R. 470 (Arnold reports cross-stitching, reading, 

and text messaging). For all of these reasons, the court finds no error in the ALJ’s 

conclusion that Arnold can perform his past relevant work as a radio dispatcher.

C. Alleged Improper Evaluation of the Opinion of Dr. Hisham Hikam

Arnold also contends that the ALJ erred by failing to afford proper weight to 

the opinion of consultative examiner Dr. Hisham Hikam, (doc. 19 at 9), who

determined that Arnold suffered from “chronic back pain,” “post-surgical 

changes,” and “nerve root irritation,” and that Arnold could “frequently” use his 

hands, “occasionally” work around pulmonary irritants and chemicals, and tolerate

only “moderate” noise at work. (R. 536, 538). The court finds no reversible error 

because, as an initial matter, the ALJ was not required to give any particular 

deference to the opinion of Dr. Hikam, a consulting physician. See Meade v. 

Astrue, No. 8:09-cv-02027-T-27AEP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139669, at *10 

(M.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2010), adopted by 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3473 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 

13, 2011) (quoting Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 709 (8th Cir. 2007)) (“[A] 

consulting physician’s opinion ‘deserves no special weight.’”). Moreover, the ALJ 

explained why she only afforded “some weight” to Dr. Hikam’s opinion, i.e., that 

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Arnold does not allege, and the record does not establish, any limitations related to 

Arnold’s hands, respiratory system, or hearing. (R. 18). Based on the court’s 

independent review of the medical record, the court agrees that Arnold does not 

allege any limitations related to his hands, respiratory system, or hearing. In fact, 

Arnold testified at his hearing that his back and leg problems are the “only 

conditions that interfere with [his] ability to work.” (R. 38). 

Therefore, contrary to Arnold’s contention, it is clear that the ALJ 

considered the full medical history and, in making her determination of Arnold’s 

RFC, properly and comprehensively analyzed the medical evidence as a whole. As 

such, the court concludes that the ALJ properly considered the medical evidence in 

determining Arnold’s ability to perform his past relevant work as a radio 

dispatcher in spite of his impairments, and made “clear the weight accorded to 

each item of evidence and the reasons for those decisions . . . .” Himes v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 585 F. App’x 758, 764 (11th Cir. 2014).

D. Alleged Improper Application of Social Security Ruling 16-3p 

Finally, Arnold requests remand for further proceedings because the ALJ 

purportedly failed to assess the “intensity and persistence of [his] symptoms,” 

pursuant to Social Security Ruling 16-3p, which became effective March 28, 2016

and which, Arnold claims, applies retroactively. (Doc. 15 at 1). As an initial 

matter, the court notes that SSR 16-3p announced that the SSA would depart from 

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“assess[ing] the ‘credibility’ of an applicant’s statements,” and instead “focus on 

the ‘intensity and persistence of [the applicant’s] symptoms.’” Cole v. Colvin, 831 

F.3d 411, 412 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing 81 Fed. Reg. 14166, 14167). Relevant here, 

however, Arnold fails to cite any binding authority to support his contention that 

SSR 16-3p applies retroactively. See doc. 15 (citing Cole, a Seventh Circuit case 

which does not endorse (or otherwise discuss) retroactive application, and 

Mendenhall v. Colvin, No. 3:14-cv-3389, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105404 (C.D. Ill. 

Aug. 9, 2016), which found that retroactive application was “appropriate,” id. at 

*10). Moreover, even assuming that the SSA intended SSR 16-3p to apply 

retroactively, a retroactive application would not help Arnold because the ALJ 

evaluated Arnold’s symptoms, and not Arnold’s overall credibility, by reviewing 

Arnold’s allegations, medical records, treatment notes, and activities of daily 

living. (See R. 14–20).4

 For these reasons, the court concludes that the motion to 

remand, doc. 15, is due to be denied.

 4 The court notes, however, that a physical therapist and physician raised questions about 

Arnold’s credibility. (See, e.g., R. 415 (“Client’s physical abilities indicate activities in the 

LIGHT to MEDIUM physical demand levels, but the client’s perceived abilities predict work in 

the less than SEDENTARY physical demand category. This indicates that the client can 

actually do a little more than he thinks he can.”) (emphasis in original); R. 375 (“[Arnold] has . . 

. vague subjective complaints of back pain. He says he doesn’t feel he will be able to go back to 

his previous job. . . . The upshot [sic] of the conversation is that he doesn’t feel able to work. 

The extended therapy has really not caused his complaints to go away. He says his muscles 

don’t hurt but then in the next breath he says his back hurts. I am not quite sure what he is trying 

to convey to me.”)).

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VI. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the ALJ’s determination 

that Arnold is not disabled and has the RFC to perform his past relevant work as a 

radio dispatcher is supported by substantial evidence, and that the ALJ applied 

proper legal standards in reaching this determination. Therefore, the 

Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED. The court will enter a separate 

order in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion.

DONE the 24th day of March, 2017.

 

_________________________________

ABDUL K. KALLON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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