Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10113/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10113-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stephen J. Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

STEPHEN J. JOHNSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-10113

D.C. No.

1:08-cr-00224-

LJO-DLB-12

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 13, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed February 5, 2016

Before: Alex Kozinski and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit

Judges, and Lee H. Rosenthal, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Rosenthal

* The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel vacated a sentence and remanded for

resentencing in a case in which the defendant, who was

convicted of committing perjury before a grand jury, received

an obstruction-of-justice enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 3C1.1 for committing perjury at trial on the underlying

perjury charge.

The panel agreed with the parties that the district court

erred by applying the § 3C1.1 enhancement without making

the requisite express findings that the trial testimony was

willfully and materially false.

The panel rejected the defendant’s request to instruct the

district court that, even if his trial testimony was perjurious,

the obstruction enhancement cannot be applied.

The panel wrote that the record does not support the

defendant’s argument that his trial testimony largely repeated

the false grand jury testimony that led to the underlying

perjury conviction, and concluded that inconsistencies

between the grand jury and trial testimony could make the

trial testimony (if found to be willfully and materially false)

a “significant further obstruction” under Application Note 7

to 3C1.1. The panel explained that perjury does not have to

actually impede a prosecution or trial to be a “significant

further obstruction” under Application Note 7. The panel

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON 3

rejected the defendant’s contention that applying the

enhancement would constitute impermissible

double-counting.

The panel remanded for the district court to make express

findings as to the willfulness and materiality of the

defendant’s trial testimony in order to determine whether the

obstruction enhancement applies, and to resentence

accordingly.

The panel rejected the defendant’s request to remand to

a different district judge.

COUNSEL

Jerald Brainin (argued), Los Angeles, California, for

Defendant-Appellant.

Benjamin B. Wagner, United States Attorney, Camil A.

Skipper, Assistant United States Attorney, Mark E. Cullers

(argued) and Laurel J. Montoya, Assistant United States

Attorneys, Fresno, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

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4 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

OPINION

ROSENTHAL, District Judge:

This case asks us to examine whether and when it is

proper to enhance a defendant’s sentence for obstructing

justice by committing perjury during a trial on a charge that

the same defendant had obstructed justice on an earlier

occasion. Other circuits have addressed the sentencing

consequences of committing perjury to try to avoid a perjury

conviction, but we have not.

Stephen Johnson was indicted for obstructing justice by

lying under oath to a grand jury about his role in impeding an

investigation by warning the targets about an impending

police raid. During the trial on that charge, Johnson testified

and allegedly lied under oath again. The district judge

applied the obstruction-of-justice enhancement under § 3C1.1

of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) based

on Johnson’s trial testimony, without expressly finding that

the testimony was willfully and materially false. Our

precedent requires these findings before the sentencing

enhancement can be applied. United States v. Castro-Ponce,

770 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 2014).

The parties agree that we must vacate the sentence and

remand for resentencing. The question is whether we should

remand for the district court to decide whether the trial

testimony was willfully and materially false, or whether we

should instruct the district court that it cannot apply the

enhancement as a matter of law. This in turn requires us to

address Johnson’s arguments that the sentencing

enhancement is precluded because his allegedly perjurious

trial testimony was not a “significant further obstruction”

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON 5

under Application Note 7 to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Johnson

claims that the trial testimony did not actually hinder or

impede the government’s investigation or prosecution of the

underlying obstruction offense and that enhancing the

sentence for the underlying grand-jury perjury conviction

based on the later trial perjury is impermissible double

counting.

We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing

without the limiting instructions Johnson seeks, and we reject

his request that we remand to a different district judge.

I. BACKGROUND

Johnson retired from his law-enforcement career to own

and run a business in Modesto, California raising and training

drug- and bomb-sniffing dogs for hire by law enforcement,

the military, and private clients. Johnson’s private clients

included suspected Hells Angels members who hired him “to

perform preventative canine searches of [their motorcycle

shop] so that they could locate and dispose of any drugs or

other contraband found on the premises.” United States v.

Ermoian, 752 F.3d 1165, 1167 (9th Cir. 2013). Johnson was

not a gang member or closely affiliated with the gang.

The Central Valley Gang Impact Task Force, a federally

funded group coordinating local efforts to eliminate gangrelated crimes in California’s Central Valley, began

investigating Hells Angels members who it learned were

trying to establish a Modesto chapter. The task force

suspected that sources associated with local law enforcement

were leaking confidential information to the Hells Angels

members under investigation. The task force issued an

“Officer Safety Bulletin” containing false information about

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6 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

a planned police raid to identifywho was passing information

to the suspected gang members. Johnson was among those

who heard about the Bulletin and warned suspected Hells

Angels members about an impending police raid.

Johnson was recorded in two telephone conversations on

September 20, 2007. In one conversation, Johnson called

Robert Holloway, a suspected Hells Angels member, and told

him to leave the gang’s motorcycle shop immediately. Later

that same day, Johnson was on the phone during a call to

Holloway from GaryErmoian, a private investigator working

for the Hells Angels. Johnson warned Holloway that lawenforcement surveillance vehicles were parked outside the

gang’s motorcycle shop.

When federal agents interviewed Johnson, he denied any

involvement in tipping off Holloway, contrary to what the

recorded telephone calls revealed. Johnson was subpoenaed

to testify before the grand jury. He denied, under oath, any

intent to leak information to the gang. Although Johnson

admitted that he had called Holloway and had taken part in a

second call with Ermoian and Holloway, he maintained that

he did not intend to warn Holloway about police action

against the gang. Johnson admitted giving Holloway

information about the police but testified that he did it as a

“joke” to “fuel [Holloway’s] paranoia.”

Johnson was indicted on one count of conspiring to

obstruct, influence, or impede an official proceeding, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c)(2) and (k); two counts of

making false statements to law enforcement, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1001; and five counts of committing perjury

before the grand jury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. 

Johnson testified at trial, repeating some of what he had said

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON 7

to law-enforcement agents and to the grand jury, but also

making statements inconsistent with what he had previously

said. Contrary to his grand jury testimony, Johnson asserted

that he had made everything up to induce Holloway into

signing a new canine-search contract, and he denied any role

at all in the second call.

The jury convicted Johnson on all counts, including the

charge of obstructing justice by lying to the grand jury. The

judge sentenced him to serve 21 months.

This is Johnson’s second appeal. In the first appeal, the

panel reversed Johnson’s conspiracy conviction but did not

disturb his convictions for making false statements and for

committing perjury before the grand jury. See Ermoian,

752 F.3d at 1173 & n.7. On remand, the district court

grouped the false-statement and grand-jury perjury

convictions under U.S.S.G. § 2J1.3; added a two-level

enhancement for obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1 based

on Johnson’s trial testimony; and refused to apply a two-level

reduction for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1. The

court nevertheless varied downward from the Guidelines

range of 21–27 months and imposed a 15-month sentence. 

This second appeal is from that sentence. Johnson challenges

it as procedurally erroneous and substantively unreasonable.

II. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and

18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). Our review of a sentence is “for

reasonableness; ‘only a procedurally erroneous or

substantively unreasonable sentence will be set aside.’” 

United States v. Christensen, 732 F.3d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir.

2013) (quoting United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th

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8 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

Cir. 2008) (en banc)). “Procedural errors include, but are not

limited to, incorrectly calculating the Guidelines range,

treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to properly

consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, using clearly

erroneous facts when calculating the Guidelines range or

determining the sentence, and failing to provide an adequate

explanation for the sentence imposed.” Id. (quoting United

States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 776 (9th Cir. 2008)). “We

review the district court’s interpretation of the [G]uidelines

de novo” and “the substantive reasonableness of the sentence

for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Hurtado,

760 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014).

III. DISCUSSION

Both sides ask us to vacate and remand for resentencing

because the district court erred by enhancing the sentence

without making the findings necessaryto show that Johnson’s

trial testimony was, in fact, perjury. We agree. But Johnson

goes further and asks us to remand with an instruction that

even if his trial testimony was perjurious, the obstruction

enhancement cannot be applied. We reject that request, as

well as his request to remand to a different judge for

resentencing.

A. The Obstruction Enhancement

Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides:

Obstructing or Impeding the

Administration of Justice

If (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or

impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede,

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON 9

the administration of justice with respect to

the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing

of the instant offense of conviction, and

(2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the

defendant’s offense of conviction and any

relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related

offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels.

U.S.S.G § 3C1.1. A district court applying the enhancement

based on perjury must expressly find that “(1) the defendant

gave false testimony, (2) on a material matter, (3) with willful

intent.” Castro-Ponce, 770 F.3d at 822 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Because the district court did not make the

required express findings, we must vacate the sentence and

remand.

Johnson contends that even if the district court finds on

remand that his trial testimony was willfully and materially

false, that testimony cannot be the basis for the obstruction

enhancement because it largely repeated the false grand jury

testimony that led to the underlying perjury conviction. 

Johnson cites Application Note 7 to § 3C1.1, which precludes

applying the enhancement to an underlying obstruction

offense (such as perjury) unless “a significant further

obstruction occurred during the investigation, prosecution, or

sentencing of the obstruction offense itself (e.g., if the

defendant threatened a witness during the course of the

prosecution for the obstruction offense).” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1

cmt. 7.1

1

Johnson argues that the government waived its arguments on this issue

by failing to raise them in its answering brief. Although the government’s

failure to assert an available argument in its answering brief generally

waives that argument, “we may consider an issue regardless of waiver if

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10 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

The record does not support Johnson’s argument. While

his trial testimony repeated some of the grand jury testimony

that was the basis for the five counts of conviction at trial, it

also introduced new falsehoods. Contrary to his grand jury

testimony that he warned a gang member of an impending

police raid as a joke, Johnson testified at trial that he used the

raid threat to persuade the gang member to sign a contract for

Johnson’s canine drug-sniffing services. Contrary to his

grand jury testimony and to his statements on the wiretap

recordings, Johnson testified at trial that he was never on the

phone call that Ermoian, one of the codefendants, made to

pass along Johnson’s warning about the police raid. These

and other inconsistencies between the grand jury and trial

testimony could make the trial testimony (if found to be

wilfully and materially false) a “significant further

obstruction.”2

Johnson also claims that the enhancement cannot apply

because his trial testimony, even if perjurious, “could not

have hindered the jury’s deliberations or otherwise impeded

the government’s prosecution of the underlying perjury

the issue is purely one of law and the opposing party will suffer no

prejudice . . . .” Huerta-Guevara v. Ashcroft, 321 F.3d 883, 886 (9th Cir.

2003); see also United States v. Mi Kyung Byun, 539 F.3d 982, 987 (9th

Cir. 2008); United States v. Berger, 473 F.3d 1080, 1100 n.5 (9th Cir.

2007). When, as here, the issue not raised in the government’s answering

brief is a question of law, the relevant record is fully developed, and the

parties have responded to requests for additional briefs, there is no

prejudice.

2 Because Johnson’s trial testimony differed from his grand jury

testimony, we need not reach the issue of whether identical false

testimony qualifies as a “significant further obstruction.” On this record,

the district court need only find that Johnson’s statements—both before

the grand jury and at trial—were wilfully false and material.

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON 11

charges in any significant or meaningful way.” Johnson

points out that the petit jury had a copy of his grand jury

testimony and of the recordings of the two phone

conversations and would not have been led astray by his trial

testimony. But perjury does not have to actually impede a

prosecution or trial to be a “significant further obstruction”

under Application Note 7 to § 3C1.1. Johnson’s argument to

the contrary misconstrues the exception, which has only two

requirements. First, the defendant’s obstructing conduct must

be “significant,” that is, meaningful or notable, as lying under

oath often will be. See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S.

87, 97 (1993) (defendant who commits perjury “def[ies] the

trial process”). Second, the conduct must be “further,” that

is, in addition to the underlying offense. Neither “significant”

nor “further” adds a requirement that the defendant’s

obstructive conduct succeed in impeding “the investigation,

prosecution, or sentencing of the obstruction offense itself.” 

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 7.

Application Note 4 to § 3C1.1 cites “examples of the

types of conduct to which [the obstruction] enhancement

applies.” Id. § 3C1.1 cmt. 4. Some of these examples

expressly require a finding that the defendant’s conduct

actually hindered the government’s efforts. Destroying or

concealing evidence “contemporaneously with arrest” does

not “warrant an adjustment for obstruction unless it results in

a material hindrance to the official investigation or

prosecution of the instant offense or the sentencing of the

offender.” Id. § 3C1.1 cmt. 4(D). Making “a materially false

statement to a law enforcement officer” may be enhanced

only if the statement “significantly obstructed or impeded the

official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense.” 

Id. § 3C1.1 cmt. 4(G); see also United States v. SolanoGodines, 120 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A]ctual,

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12 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

significant hindrance to investigation is necessarywhen false

aliases are given, not under oath, during the investigation.”

(emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Urbanek,

930 F.2d 1512, 1515 n.2 (10th Cir. 1991))).

Critically, the Application Notes to § 3C1.1 also give

examples of conduct warranting the enhancement without a

finding of actual hindrance. Providing “materially false

information to a judge or magistrate judge” or “to a probation

officer in respect to a presentence or other investigation for

the court” may warrant enhancement without showing actual

hindrance. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 4(F), (H). The

example of a “significant further obstruction” in Application

Note 7—“threaten[ing] a witness during the course of the

prosecution for the obstruction offense”—contains no

requirement that the witness’s testimony have changed

because of the threats. See id. § 3C1.1 cmt. 7. Similarly,

perjured testimony can be the basis for the enhancement

without a showing that the testimony actually impeded the

government’s prosecution or the trial. See id. § 3C1.1 cmt.

4(B) (allowing the enhancement for committing perjury). 

The Guidelines do not limit the exception to Application Note

7 to a later perjury that actually impedes an investigation,

prosecution, or sentencing.

The out-of-circuit cases Johnson cites are inapposite. In

each case, the uncharged conduct for the obstruction

enhancement involved using a false name or identification.3

3

See United States v. Elliott, 467 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2006); United

States v. Williams, 288 F.3d 1079, 1080 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v.

Manning, 955 F.2d 770, 774–75 (1st Cir. 1992), abrogated on other

grounds by United States v. Gonsalves, 435 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2006);

United States v. Robinson, 978 F.2d 1554, 1566 (10th Cir. 1992).

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON 13

The Guidelines instruct courts not to apply the § 3C1.1

enhancement when a defendant “provid[es] a false name or

identification document at arrest, except where such conduct

actually resulted in a significant hindrance.” Id. § 3C1.1 cmt.

5(A). This case, by contrast, involves lying under oath,

which is not so limited.

Johnson also argues that applying the enhancement to his

trial perjury in a sentencing for his grand jury perjury would

penalize him twice for the same conduct. “Impermissible

double counting occurs when one part of the Guidelines is

applied to increase a defendant’s punishment on account of

a kind of harm that has already been fully accounted for by

application of another part of the Guidelines.” United States

v. Pham, 545 F.3d 712, 717 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United

States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1001 (9th Cir. 2008)). But

Johnson testified before two separate tribunals, the grand jury

and the petit jury. As noted, his trial testimony not only

repeated much of his grand jury testimony but also introduced

new statements inconsistent with what he was recorded as

saying, what he told law enforcement, and what he testified

to before the grand jury. Applying the enhancement to his

trial testimony does not penalize him twice for the same

perjury. The trial testimony was separate and distinct from

the grand jury testimony, given in a different forum and at a

later time. See United States v. Holt, 510 F.3d 1007, 1012

(9th Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court’s application of

“two enhancements account[ing] for . . . distinct wrongs”).

The Seventh Circuit agrees that applying the § 3C1.1

enhancement in a case like this does not amount to double

counting. In United States v. Lueddeke, the court rejected the

defendant’s argument that an upward adjustment “for

obstructing the investigation of the initial perjury offense by

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14 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

continuing to lie to the grand jury and by producing false

documents before the grand jury . . . was neither appropriate

nor available in a case of multiple acts involving the same

kind of misconduct.” 908 F.2d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1990). The

court explained that “the Guidelines clearly call for two

adjustments in a case where . . . a defendant interferes with

one investigation and then also interferes with a resulting

investigation of the interference.” Id. at 234 n.2.

Allowing an obstruction enhancement for subsequent

perjury is also consistent with United States v. Dunnigan, in

which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of

applying § 3C1.1. 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993). The Court noted

that “[i]t is rational for a sentencing authority to conclude that

a defendant who commits a crime and then perjures herself in

an unlawful attempt to avoid responsibility is more

threatening to society and less deserving of leniency than a

defendant who does not so defy the trial process.” Id. at 97. 

That is no less true when, as here, the underlying crime is

perjury.

Under Johnson’s approach, a defendant who commits

perjury to try to avoid responsibility for a previous perjury

would escape any consequences unless there was a separate

prosecution for that second perjury. Applying the § 3C1.1

enhancement to the second perjury could “deter false

testimony in much the same way as a separate prosecution for

perjury.” Id. “[M]ore than a mere surrogate for a perjury

prosecution,” the enhancement “furthers legitimate

sentencing goals relating to the principal crime, including the

goals of retribution and incapacitation.” Id. Applying the

obstruction enhancement to Johnson’s false trial testimony

does not impermissibly penalize him twice for the same

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON 15

conduct if the district court finds that his trial testimony was

false, willful, and material.4

We remand for the district court to make express findings

as to the willfulness and materiality of Johnson’s trial

testimony in light of Castro-Ponce in order to determine

whether the obstruction enhancement applies, and to

resentence accordingly.

5

4 Our conclusion is consistent with that of other circuits. See United

States v. McCoy, 316 F.3d 287, 288–89 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (per curiam)

(“Lying under oath to protect oneself from punishment for lying under

oath seems to us—and to the Supreme Court—to be precisely the sort of

‘significant further obstruction’to which Note 7 refers.” (citingDunnigan,

507 U.S. at 97)); United States v. Pattan, 931 F.2d 1035, 1043 (5th Cir.

1991) (affirming under plain-error review enhancing the sentence under

a conviction for perjury before the grand jury based on “evidence in the

record of [the defendant’s] further false statements to the trial jury, to the

FBI investigator, and to his attorney after trial”); see also United States v.

Fernandez, 389 F. App’x 194, 203–04 (3d Cir. 2010) (the defendant’s

“perjury at trial constitutes a ‘significant further obstruction’ during the

prosecution of his perjury before the grand jury.” (citing McCoy, 316 F.3d

at 289)); United States v. Brewer, 332 F. App’x 296, 310 n.9 (6th Cir.

2009) (“[T]he district court properly concluded that the exception to

Application Note 7 applied in situations, such as this, where a defendant

took the stand in a perjury trial.” (citing McCoy, 316 F.3d at 289)).

5

Johnson also argues that the district court erred in failing to recognize

its discretion to apply both an obstruction enhancement and an

acceptance-of-responsibility reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, failing to

consider his relative culpability argument, and imposing a custodial

sentence that was longer than necessary. We leave these arguments for

the district court to consider on remand.

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16 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

B. Reassignment on Remand

Johnson argues that we should assign this case to a

different judge on remand. He points to the sentencing

judge’s denial of his motion for bail pending appeal before he

could file a reply and to statements made during sentencing.

6

“Absent personal bias, remand to a new judge is

warranted only in rare circumstances.” United States v.

 

6

 Johnson cites the following statements:

• “I don’t understand why [Johnson’s trial testimony]

is not further—why that furtherance of the perjury is

not obstruction.”

• “If [the jury] conclude[s] that it’s not truthful, they

rely on it in a different manner and they deal with it

in a different manner. But it is certainly further

obstruction.”

• “But when you get up and lie again in front of a jury

in a courtroom, that’s not the same thing [as lying

before a grand jury]. You may tell the same lie, but

it is not the same thing. It is further obstruction and

it is significant further obstruction.”

• After Johnson told the court that he “just came up

with this wild-ass story” about the impending law

enforcement raid to scare the Hells Angels into

signing a contract with him for more canine-sniff

work, the court responded that the story “turned out

to be true.”

• “I don’t think that there is acceptance of

responsibility when you lie before a jury. I’m talking

about not the Grand Jury. I’m talking about the jury

in criminal.”

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON 17

Huckins, 53 F.3d 276, 280 (9th Cir. 1995); see also

Krechman v. Cty. of Riverside, 723 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir.

2013). We consider “(1) whether the original judge would

reasonably be expected upon remand to have substantial

difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previouslyexpressed views or findings determined to be erroneous or

based on evidence that must be rejected, (2) whether

reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of

justice, and (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and

duplication out of proportion to any gain in preserving the

appearance of fairness.” Krechman, 723 F.3d at 1111–12

(internal quotation marks omitted). “The first two factors are

equally important and a finding of either is sufficient to

support reassignment on remand.” Id. at 1112.

The sentencing judge’s comments about Johnson’s trial

testimony and the denial of Johnson’s motion for bail pending

appeal did not demonstrate personal bias or suggest that the

judge would have substantial difficulty putting out of his

mind any previously expressed erroneous views. See id.

(rejecting the plaintiff’s reassignment request even though the

presiding judge “made several off-color comments that may

not have been well-received” because “the record [did] not

suggest that he was unfair”). Reassignment is not needed to

preserve justice or the appearance of justice and would entail

unnecessary waste and duplication. We deny Johnson’s

request to reassign this case to a different judge on remand.

IV. CONCLUSION

We vacate Johnson’s sentence and remand for the district

court to make explicit findings on the willfulness and

materiality of Johnson’s false trial testimony. We do not

reach Johnson’s additional arguments about applying the

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18 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment, his relative

culpability, or substantive reasonableness. The sentence is

reversed, and this action is remanded to the district court for

resentencing.

VACATED and REMANDED for resentencing.

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