Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00559/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00559-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jesse Collins
Petitioner
J. Soto
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The instant petition was filed on March 26, 2015, in the Central District of California (Doc. 1), 

and transferred to this Court on April 10, 2015. (Doc. 3).1 A preliminary review of the petition, 

 

1

In Houston v. Lack, the United States Supreme Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner’s notice of appeal is deemed filed 

on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the actual date of its receipt by the court clerk. 

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 166, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The rule is premised on the pro se prisoner’s mailing of 

legal documents through the conduit of “prison authorities whom he cannot control and whose interests might be adverse to 

his.” Miller v. Sumner, 921 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1990); see Houston, 487 U.S. at 271. The Ninth Circuit has applied the 

“mailbox rule” to state and federal petitions in order to calculate the tolling provisions of the AEDPA. Saffold v. Neland, 

250 F.3d 1262, 1268-1269 (9th Cir. 2000); Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). The date the petition 

is signed may be considered the earliest possible date an inmate could submit his petition to prison authorities for filing 

under the mailbox rule. Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, for all of Petitioner’s 

state petitions and for the instant federal petition, the Court will consider the date of signing of the petition (or the date of 

signing of the proof of service if no signature appears on the petition) as the earliest possible filing date and the operative 

date of filing under the mailbox rule for calculating the running of the statute of limitation. Petitioner signed the instant 

petition on March 26, 2015. (Doc. 1, p. 8).

JESSE COLLINS,

 Petitioner,

v.

J. SOTO,

Respondent.

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Case No.: 1:15-cv-00559-JLT

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE PETITION 

SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR VIOLATION 

OF THE ONE-YEAR STATUTE OF 

LIMITATIONS AND LACK OF EXHAUSTION

ORDER DIRECTING THAT RESPONSE BE 

FILED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

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however, reveals that the petition may be untimely and should therefore be dismissed. Also, it appears 

that Petitioner has never raised his claim to the California Supreme Court, thus rendering his petition 

unexhausted.

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition.

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if 

it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not 

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The 

Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after 

an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.2001).

The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a 

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds if the court provides the petitioner adequate notice of 

its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-42. By issuing this Order to 

Show Cause, the Court is affording Petitioner the notice required by the Ninth Circuit in Herbst.

B. Limitation Period For Filing Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed 

after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); Jeffries 

v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant 

petition was filed on March 25, 2015, and thus, it is subject to the provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal 

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The 

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by 

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is 

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

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(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by 

the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented 

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or 

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending 

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct review 

became final. Here, the Petitioner was convicted in 1997 and his direct appeal concluded with the 

denial of his petition for review in the California Supreme Court on March 9, 1999. However, it 

appears that Petitioner is appealing the purported denial of his request for “recall” of his sentence, 

pursuant to California Penal Code sec. 1170.126, which went into effect on November 7, 2012 and 

provides for relief from an indeterminate life sentence under California’s Three Strikes Law in certain 

circumstances. Thus, here, under subsection (d), of section 2244, the limitation period would have 

begun to run on “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have 

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” It appears that date would have been the 

effective date of sec. 1170.126. 

By that calculation, the one-year period would have begun on November 8, 2012, and would 

have continued until it expired 365 days later on November 7, 2013. Since the instant petition was filed 

on March 25, 2015, approximately 18 months after the one-year period would have expired, the petition 

would appear to be untimely, unless Petitioner is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. 

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed 

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2). A properly filed application is one that complies with the applicable laws and rules 

governing filings, including the form of the application and time limitations. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 

U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361 (2000). An application is pending during the time that ‘a California petitioner 

completes a full round of [state] collateral review,” so long as there is no unreasonable delay in the 

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intervals between a lower court decision and the filing of a petition in a higher court. Delhomme v. 

Ramirez, 340 F. 3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Waldrip v. 

Hall, 548 F. 3d 729 (9th Cir. 2008)(per curium)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see

Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193-194, 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006); see Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 

220, 222-226, 122 S. Ct. 2134 (2002); see also, Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Nevertheless, there are circumstances and periods of time when no statutory tolling is allowed. 

For example, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period of time between finality of an appeal and the 

filing of an application for post-conviction or other collateral review in state court, because no state 

court application is “pending” during that time. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006-07; Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 

F.3d 1150, 1153 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2006). Similarly, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period between 

finality of an appeal and the filing of a federal petition. Id. at 1007. In addition, the limitation period 

is not tolled during the time that a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 563 U.S. 167, 

181-182, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (2001); see also, Fail v. Hubbard, 315 F. 3d 1059, 1060 (9th Cir. 2001)(as 

amended on December 16, 2002). Further, a petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling where the 

limitation period has already run prior to filing a state habeas petition. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 

820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that 

has ended before the state petition was filed”); Jiminez v. White, 276 F. 3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Finally, a petitioner is not entitled to continuous tolling when the petitioner’s later petition raises 

unrelated claims. See Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165, 1166 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, Petitioner attached documents to his petition that suggest he filed state habeas petitions in 

2001, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008, and 2009. Obviously, any petition filed prior to the effective date of 

sec. 1170.126 on November 7, 2012 could not have been raising that new statutory provisions as a 

grounds for habeas relief and, thus, would be irrelevant to the timeliness analysis since they were filed 

prior to the running of the one-year period. A tolling provision has no applicability where the period to 

be tolled has not commenced. See Hill v. Keane, 984 F.Supp. 157, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), abrogated on 

other grounds, Bennett v. Artuz, 199 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 1999) (state collateral action filed before 

commencement of limitations period does not toll limitation period), affirmed, 531 U.S. 4, 121 S.Ct. 

361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213. Petitioner does not allege any state habeas filings after November 7, 2012, and 

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thus would not be entitled to any statutory tolling during the running of the one-year limitation period. 

Therefore, unless Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling, the petition is untimely and must be 

dismissed.

D. Equitable Tolling.

The running of the one-year limitation period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) is subject to equitable 

tolling in appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 651-52, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2561 

(2010); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct., 128 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1997). The limitation period 

is subject to equitable tolling when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it 

impossible to file the petition on time.” Shannon v. Newland, 410 F. 3d 1083, 1089-1090 (9th Cir. 

2005)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “When external forces, rather than a petitioner’s 

lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of 

limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). “Generally, a 

litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: “(1) that he has been 

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” 

Holland, 560 U.S. at 651-652; Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807 (2005). “[T]he 

threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest the exceptions swallow 

the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F. 3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)(citation omitted). As a 

consequence, “equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases.” Miles, 187 F. 3d at 1107. 

Here, Petitioner has made no express claim of entitlement to equitable tolling and, based on the 

record now before the Court, the Court sees no basis for such a claim. Accordingly, Petitioner is not 

entitled to equitable tolling. Thus, the petition is untimely and should be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

The burden of demonstrating that the AEDPA’s one-year limitation period was sufficiently 

tolled, whether statutorily or equitable, rests with the petitioner. See, e.g., Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 

U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005); Smith v. Duncan, 297 

F.3d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 2002); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). For the reasons 

discussed above, the Court finds and concludes that Petitioner has not met his burden with respect to 

the tolling issue. Accordingly, the petition is late and should therefore be dismissed. 

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E. Exhaustion.

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The 

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state and gives the state court the initial opportunity to 

correct the alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose 

v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a 

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v. 

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 

F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and 

fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's 

factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 

112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a 

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th 

Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); 

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court 

reiterated the rule as follows:

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion of state remedies 

requires that petitioners “fairly presen[t]” federal claims to the state courts in order to give the 

State the “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of the prisoners' federal 

rights” (some internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity 

to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact 

that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas 

petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal 

court, but in state court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not “fairly presented” (and thus exhausted) his federal 

claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based 

on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the 

Supreme Court's decision in Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the 

federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, 

even if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the underlying claim would be 

decided under state law on the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim 

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on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. 

Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to the fact that the 

relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the state and federal standards for 

reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added), as amended by Lyons v. 

Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-5 (9th Cir. 2001).

Where none of a petitioner’s claims has been presented to the highest state court as required by 

the exhaustion doctrine, the Court must dismiss the petition. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 

(9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to hold a 

mixed petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims has not been extended to 

petitions that contain no exhausted claims. Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

Here, as the Central District noted in its transfer order, there is no evidence currently in the 

record that Petitioner has ever presented his “recall” claim to any state court, much less to the 

California Supreme Court. (Doc. 3, p. 2, fn. 2). Indeed, Petitioner has presented no evidence that he 

has ever asked for recall of his sentence pursuant to sec. 1170.126. As such, the petition appears to be 

completely unexhausted. The Court cannot consider a petition that is entirely unexhausted. Rose v. 

Lundy, 455 U.S. at 521-22; Calderon, 107 F.3d at 760. 

However, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s mandate, the Court will permit Petitioner thirty days 

within which to submit a response to this Order to Show Cause. In his response, Petitioner should 

provide evidence to show (1) that his petition is timely; and (2) that he has presented his “recall” claim 

to the California Supreme Court. If Petitioner fails to submit a response within the time permitted, or 

if the response so submitted fails to persuade the Court that the petition is both timely and exhausted, 

the Court will recommend that the petition be dismissed.

 ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. Petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE within 30 days of the date of service of 

this Order why the Petition should not be dismissed for violation of the one-year statute of limitations 

in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and for lack of exhaustion. 

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Petitioner is forewarned that his failure to comply with this order may result in a 

Recommendation that the Petition be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 29, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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