Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-14-11305/USCOURTS-ca5-14-11305-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nicolas A. Padron
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-11305

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

NICOLAS A. PADRON,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:12-CR-211

Before DAVIS, JONES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Nicolas A. Padron pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to one 

count of conspiracy to unlawfully distribute hydrocodone outside the scope of 

professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose. As part of the 

plea agreement, Padron waived his rights under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 

18 U.S.C. § 3742 to appeal his conviction and sentence. He also waived his 

right to challenge his conviction and sentence in any collateral proceeding. As 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 1, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 14-11305

2

pertinent to the instant appeal, Padron reserved the right to appeal directly a 

sentence exceeding the statutory maximum or an arithmetic error at 

sentencing. The district court sentenced Padron to 87 months of imprisonment 

and ordered the sentence to run consecutively to a previously imposed 57-

month federal sentence for a healthcare fraud conviction. It also imposed a 

two-year term of supervised release.

Padron argues that the district court misapplied U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) by 

imposing consecutive sentences because his sentence for the healthcare fraud 

conviction arose out of relevant conduct to the instant offense. He contends 

that the appeal waiver does not prohibit us from considering whether the 

district court erred in imposing consecutive sentences because the total term 

of 144 months of imprisonment exceeds the statutory maximum of 10 years of 

imprisonment for the instant offense and, thus, satisfies the exception in the 

appeal waiver.

We review the validity of an appeal waiver de novo. See United States v. 

Baymon, 312 F.3d 725, 727 (5th Cir. 2002). To determine whether an appeal 

of a sentence is barred by an appeal waiver provision in a plea agreement, we 

analyze whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary and whether the 

waiver applies to the circumstances at hand, based on the plain language of 

the agreement. United States v. Bond, 414 F.3d 542, 544 (5th Cir. 2005).

Even assuming Padron could appeal his sentence based on the 

reservation of the right to appeal a sentence in excess of the statutory 

maximum, the remaining language of the appellate waiver remains 

enforceable. We have consistently enforced broad appellate waivers and have

declined to examine the correctness of applying a particular Guideline where 

the defendant has agreed to a general waiver of the right to appeal the 

sentence. See Bond, 414 F.3d at 545-46; United States v. Smith, 404 F. App’x 

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No. 14-11305

3

884, 886-87 (5th Cir. 2010). In this matter, the plea agreement stated that 

Padron was waiving his right to challenge his sentence under § 3742. 

Section 3742 authorizes a defendant to file a notice of appeal “if the sentence . 

. . was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing 

guidelines.” § 3742(a)(2). Padron’s argument regarding the imposition of 

consecutive sentences rests solely on the district court’s alleged misapplication 

of § 5G1.3(b). Therefore, regardless of whether the imposition of consecutive 

sentences amounts to a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum, the appeal 

waiver is still enforceable because Padron seeks to challenge his sentence 

under § 3742(a)(2), and, thus, we need not address the merits of Padron’s 

appeal. See Bond, 414 F.3d at 545-46.

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 14-11305 Document: 00513363469 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/01/2016