Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01660/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01660-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
J. Hasley
Defendant
Toby Wade
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOBY WADE,

Petitioner,

v.

J. HASLEY,

Respondent.

/

1:09-cv-01660 AWI DLB (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. 11]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on September 18, 2009.

(Court Doc. 1.) On November 19, 2009, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, and Petitioner

filed an opposition on December 21, 2009. (Court Docs. 11, 12.) Respondent filed a reply on

December 30, 2009. (Court Doc. 13.) 

Petitioner is incarcerated at Avenal State Prison serving a sentence of 15 years to life for a

1993 conviction for second degree murder. In the petition before the Court, Petitioner claims the

Board of Parole Hearings violated his state and federal due process rights by denying him an

opportunity to be present at an April 23, 2008 status hearing, when the parole hearing was

postponed for the purpose of conducting a psychological examination.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Summary Dismissal

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Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that

the court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4,

pursuant to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. 

See Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9 Cir.2001). Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254 th

Cases and case law, the Court will review Respondent’s motion for dismissal pursuant to its

authority under Rule 4.

B. Mootness

The case or controversy requirement of Article III of the Federal Constitution deprives

the Court of jurisdiction to hear moot cases. Iron Arrow Honor Society v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67,

70, 104 S.Ct. 373, 374-75 (1983); NAACP., Western Region v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d

1346, 1352 (9th Cir. 1984). A case becomes moot if the “the issues presented are no longer ‘live’

or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478,

481, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 1183 (1984). The Federal Court is “without power to decide questions that

cannot affect the rights of the litigants before them.” North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246,

92 S.Ct. 402, 406 (1971) per curiam, quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hayworth, 300 U.S. 227,

240-241, 57 S.Ct. 461, 463-464 (1937).

In this case, Respondent contends the petition should be dismissed as moot because

Petitioner has already been provided a parole consideration hearing. Respondent’s argument is

persuasive. On November 21, 2008, Petitioner appeared before the parole board for a subsequent

hearing. As the petition takes issue with the timeliness of the parole hearing, and Petitioner has

now been granted his hearing, he has already been granted the only relief available. The petition

should therefore be dismissed. 

C. Failure to State a Cognizable Claim

The basic scope of habeas corpus is prescribed by statute. Subsection (c) of Section 2241

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of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner

unless he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) states:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

(emphasis added). See also, Rule 1 to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United

States District Court. Furthermore, in order to succeed in a petition pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254, Petitioner must demonstrate that the adjudication of his claim in state court

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States; or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),(2).

The essence of Petitioner’s complaints involve the interpretation and application of state

law and regulations. Generally, issues of state law are not cognizable on federal habeas. Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, (1991) ("We have stated many times that 'federal habeas corpus relief

does not lie for errors of state law.' "), quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990);

Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-49 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“mere error of state

law, one that does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, may not be corrected on

federal habeas”); Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493

U.S. 942 (1989) (Federal courts are bound by state court rulings on questions of state law.).

Although Petitioner couches his claims as one based on a violation of the Constitution, his broad

assertion does not transform them into federal ones. Merely placing a “due process” label on an

alleged violation does not entitle Petitioner to federal relief. Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1386,

1388-89 (1996). The instant claims are predicated on the application of state law and regulations

regarding the manner in which the parole board conducts parole hearings, and Petitioner has not

demonstrated a violation of the Constitution or that the state court decision was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. In addition, Petitioner fails to cite any

United States Supreme Court authority standing for the proposition that prison officials may not

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postpone parole hearings for valid reasons or that inmates must be physically present at status

hearings where there is no discussion of the merits of the parole suitability. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1).

Moreover, contrary to Petitioner’s claim, “due process does not include receiving a parole

hearing in exact accordance with the specific time period required by [state regulations.]” Johnson

v. Paparozzi, 219 F.Supp.2d 635, 652 (D.N.J. 2002). The denial of a timely parole proceeding is

not a per se violation of due process. Jefferson v. Hart, 84 F.3d 1314, 1316-1317 (10 Cir. th

1996). To show a due process violation from a delayed hearing, a prisoner must show prejudice

from the delay. See Camacho v. White, 918 F.2d 74, 78-80 (9 Cir. 1990). In this case, th

Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice resulting from any delay because he was denied parole at

the delayed hearing. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show a violation of his due process rights.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss

the petition be GRANTED and the petition be DISMISSED with prejudice.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii,

United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and

Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District

of California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections

shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The Court will

then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 4, 2010 /s/ Dennis L. Beck

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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