Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-01490/USCOURTS-ca7-09-01490-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Daniel Velasquez
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 17, 2010

Decided March 18, 2010

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 09-1490

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DANIEL VELASQUEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 08 CR 58-1

John W. Darrah, 

Judge

O R D E R

Daniel Velasquez, a convicted felon, twice sold guns to undercover agents from the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. As a result of these sales, Velasquez

was charged with two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1). Velasquez pleaded guilty to the charges without a plea agreement and was

sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment, the mandatory minimum given his prior felony

convictions. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Velasquez appeals, but his appointed attorney has

concluded that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw under Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967). Velasquez did not respond to our invitation to comment on counsel’s

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

Case: 09-1490 Document: 27 Filed: 03/18/2010 Pages: 2
No. 09-2267 Page 2

motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), so we review only the potential issues identified in counsel’s

facially adequate brief. See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973-74 (7th Cir. 2002).

Velasquez does not want his guilty plea vacated, so counsel appropriately refrains

from discussing possible arguments about the voluntariness of the plea or the adequacy of

the plea colloquy. See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2002).

Instead, counsel evaluates whether Velasquez could challenge his statutoryminimum sentence. Counsel first considers whether Velasquez could argue that the district

court erred in rejecting his contention that, despite his two prior convictions for violent

felonies (armed robbery and attempted armed robbery) and one prior conviction for a

serious drug offense (delivery of cocaine), he should not be sentenced as an armed career

criminal because these convictions dated back to 1974, 1975, and 1993. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(a). But this contention would be frivolous because § 924(e) does

not place a time limit on convictions that qualify for ACCA status. United States v. Wright,

48 F.3d 254, 255-56 (7th Cir. 1995). Counsel next asks whether Velasquez could challenge

the reasonableness of his sentence, but properly concludes that such a challenge would be

frivolous because Velasquez was given the lowest sentence the court was authorized to

impose. See United States v. Easter, 553 F.3d 519, 523 (7th Cir. 2009).

Counsel also examines whether Velasquez could argue that his trial counsel was

ineffective. But a claim of ineffective assistance is best pressed in a collateral proceeding

where the record can be fully developed. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-05

(2003); Harris v. United States, 394 F.3d 543, 557-58 (7th Cir. 2005).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED. 

Case: 09-1490 Document: 27 Filed: 03/18/2010 Pages: 2