Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-06-04123/USCOURTS-ca7-06-04123-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
George E. Taylor
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 06-4123

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

GEORGE E. TAYLOR,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 06 CR 105—Barbara B. Crabb, Chief Judge.

____________

ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2008—DECIDED MARCH 26, 2008

____________

Before POSNER, RIPPLE, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

POSNER, Circuit Judge. George Taylor pleaded guilty to

distribution of crack cocaine and was sentenced to 124

months in prison. His appeal presents the recurring issue

of the proper treatment of crack sentencing appeals that

were pending when the Supreme Court decided Kimbrough

v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007). Taylor objects to his

sentence on the ground that the district judge in sentencing

him did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s

decision. The government points out that our review is for

Case: 06-4123 Document: 34 Filed: 03/26/2008 Pages: 6
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plain error because no objection to the sentence based on

the 100:1 ratio of the weight of crack cocaine to the weight

of powder cocaine, used in the sentencing guidelines, was

made in the district court. The government further argues,

but this time incorrectly, that because the district judge

evinced no unhappiness with the guideline range that the

ratio generated, there is no ground for ordering Taylor

resentenced.

Before the Supreme Court’s decision, the rule in this

court was that the 100:1 ratio was a statutory Diktat that a

sentencing judge was not permitted, even under the

liberalized regime of the Booker decision, to question. Even

“after Booker district judges are obliged to implement the

100-to-1 ratio as long as it remains part of the statute and

the Guidelines . . . .[D]efendants are not entitled to a

deviation from the statutory ratio . . . . [D]istrict judges

must continue to carry out the legislative choice, even

though there may be powerful reasons for change.” United

States v. Miller, 450 F.3d 270, 275 (7th Cir. 2006). “[A]

district judge is required to abide by the 100-to-1 crack

cocaine to cocaine powder ratio when applying the Sentencing Guidelines to a defendant’s conduct; . . . . [A]

sentencing judge may not recalculate a Guidelines sentence

or impose a lesser, non-Guidelines sentence based on his

opinion that the statutory and/or Guidelines disparity

between punishments for crack cocaine and powder

cocaine is unjust or unwarranted.” United States v. Hankton,

463 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 2006). Because the guidelines

were advisory, the sentencing judge could dip below them

in a crack case as in any other case (provided the judge did

not try to go below a mandatory minimum sentence),

United States v. Miller, supra, 450 F.3d at 275, but not on the

basis of a disagreement with the weighting of crack versus

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No. 06-4123 3

powder; that we thought a decision that Congress, either

directly or by delegation to the Sentencing Commission,

had removed from the area of judicial discretion, just as

Congress does when it fixes minimum and maximum

sentences.

In Kimbrough, the Supreme Court (as the government

acknowledges in a post-argument submission in the

present case) held that this was incorrect; that the 100:1

ratio is not a statutory dictate, but merely a judgment,

entitled to respect but not to uncritical acceptance, made by

the Sentencing Commission as an input into fixing guideline ranges for crack offenders. 128 S. Ct. at 574; see also

United States v. Medina Casteneda, 511 F.3d 1246, 1248-49

(9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 472-

73 (4th Cir. 2007).

Even before Kimbrough, a sentencing judge could if he

wanted rail against the 100:1 ratio, but that would have

been spitting against the wind, since we had held that the

ratio was not to be questioned by sentencing judges. Thus

the fact that a judge—the judge in this case for example—does not say anything about the ratio cannot be taken

to mean that he (in this case she) thinks it is fine. The

situation is the same as we faced after the Supreme Court

in Booker demoted the sentencing guidelines from being

mandatory to being merely advisory. Since until then they

had been mandatory, the fact that a sentencing judge gave

a sentence within the applicable guideline range without

questioning the appropriateness of such a sentence did not

mean that, had he known that the guidelines were merely

advisory, he would have given the same sentence. So in

such cases, where the defendant had been sentenced before

Booker and his appeal from the sentence was pending after

Booker, unless the judge had made clear that he would have

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given the same sentence under an advisory regime we

directed a limited remand to enable the judge to advise us

whether he was minded to resentence the defendant, and

if he said he was then we remanded for resentencing. We

pointed out that a sentence founded on a clear error of law

was appropriate for correction on review for plain error.

That was United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 481-84

(7th Cir. 2005), and its approach (including, as held in

United States v. White, 2008 WL 585036, at *6 (7th Cir.

Mar. 8, 2008), the “unless” qualification) is equally applicable in the present setting. As the Eighth Circuit,

adopting an approach similar to ours, has explained,

“Normally, a district court that is aware of an argument

does not abuse its discretion by not considering it. When a

district court does not consider an argument because it is

unaware of its power to do so, however, a remand is

appropriate. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 249 F.3d 793,

795 (8th Cir. 2001). In Lewis, we could not determine from

the record whether the district court was aware of its

authority to grant a downward departure, and thus we

remanded the case to allow the district court to exercise its

discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny the downward departure. Id. In this case, the district court said

nothing in either [defendant’s] sentencing hearing about

the disparity. It is unclear whether the district court

declined to use its discretion in the requested manner

because of then-current Eighth Circuit precedent or

because it did not find that the disparity warranted any

variance from the guidelines. We therefore vacate the

sentences and remand to the district court so that it may

reconsider the sentences in light of Kimbrough.” United

States v. Roberson, 2008 WL 323223, at *4 (8th Cir. Feb. 7,

2008) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Stratton,

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No. 06-4123 5

2008 WL 656514, at *1 (11th Cir. Mar. 13, 2008) (per

curiam); United States v. Regalado, 2008 WL 577158, at *3-5

(2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2008) (per curiam).

A complication is that beginning on March 3, persons

sentenced for crack offenses have been able to move for a

reduction in their sentence to conform to the Sentencing

Commission’s decision to reduce retroactively the 100:1

ratio that generates such harsh sentences for crack offenses

relative to powder offenses. United States Sentencing

Commission, “Supplement to the 2007 Guidelines Manual”

1-4 (Mar. 3, 2008); News Release, “U.S. Sentencing Commission Votes Unanimously to Apply Amendment Retroactively for Crack Cocaine Offenses” (Dec. 11, 2007),

www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel121107.htm (visited Jan. 28,

2008). It might seem, in light of the Commission’s decision,

that our remanding a case for possible resentencing in light

of Kimbrough would be pointless, since the judge minded to

reduce a crack defendant’s sentence could simply

resentence under the new guideline. (Moreover, the judge

can do this on his own initiative, or on motion by the

director of the federal bureau of prisons, without a motion

by the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).)

But that may be incorrect. The new guideline provides

that a sentence under it may not be lower than the new

guidelines range, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) (Mar. 3, 2008),

unless the original sentence was a nonguideline sentence,

in which event, however, “a further reduction generally

would not be appropriate.” Id., § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B). Like the

rest of the guidelines, this provision may be merely

advisory, in which event a sentence lower than the one

prescribed by section 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) may be “consistent

with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing

Commission,” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), the

statute granting district courts authority to reopen a

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sentence that has become final. But the status of section

1B1.10(b)(2)(A) has not been argued to us and we take no

position on it. In any event, Kimbrough, following Booker,

allows a judge to sentence below the guidelines range.

The district judge should hold off on telling us whether

she is minded to resentence the defendant under Kimbrough

until she decides whether to act favorably on the defendant’s motion (if he makes one, or on the judge’s own

initiative, if he does not) for relief under the Commission’s

new crack regime. If she decides to impose the same

sentence under the new guideline, or if though she lowers

the sentence the defendant believes that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

would warrant a still-lower sentence, or if he does not

make a proper motion for relief under the new guideline

and she is not minded to grant such relief on her own

initiative, she will then have to advise us whether she

would be inclined to reduce his sentence under the dispensation granted sentencing judges by Kimbrough. To avoid

delay, the judge should impose a deadline on the filing of

a motion to resentence; we suggest 21 days after the date of

this decision.

Because this opinion lays down a rule for handling

appeals pending in this court when Kimbrough was decided

by the Supreme Court, we have circulated the opinion to

the full court in advance of issuance. 7th Cir. R. 40(e). No

judge in active service requested that the case be heard en

banc.

USCA-02-C-0072—3-26-08

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