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Parties Involved:
David L. Carey
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 17, 2010

Decided March 18, 2010

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐3130

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

DAVID L. CAREY,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 09 CR 10041

Joe Billy McDade, Judge.

O R D E R

David Carey pleaded guilty to receiving child pornography, 18 U.S.C.

§ 2252A(a)(2)(A), and the district court sentenced him to 151 months’ imprisonment, the

low end of the guidelines range.  Carey appeals, but his appointed lawyer moves to

withdraw, see Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), because he concludes that there are

not any meritorious issues to pursue.  Carey did not respond to our invitation to comment

on counsel’s motion.  See CIR. R. 51(b).  We review only the potential issue counsel has

identified in his facially adequate brief. See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973‐74 (7th

Cir. 2002).

Carey told counsel that he does not want his guilty plea vacated, so counsel properly

avoids any discussion of the adequacy of the plea colloquy or the voluntariness of the plea.

See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670‐72 (7th Cir. 2002).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 09-3130 Document: 13 Filed: 03/18/2010 Pages: 2
No. 09‐3130 Page 2

Counsel considers only one potential issue for appeal: whether Carey could

challenge the reasonableness of his prison sentence.  At sentencing Carey did not object to

the probation officer’s calculation of a guidelines range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment.

(This included a base offense level of 22, see U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(a)(2), a 3‐level reduction for

acceptance of responsibility, id. § 3E1.1, and 14 additional levels because Carey received

material involving a prepubescent minor and sadistic or masochistic conduct or other

depictions of violence, he used a computer to receive the images and distributed them to

others, and the offense involved at least 300, but less than 600, images.  See id. § 2G2.2(b)(2),

(b)(3)(F), (b)(4), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).)  Instead of challenging the calculation, Carey asserted that

the range was entitled to little deference because the guideline that produced it, § 2G2.2,

lacks empirical support and produces unjustly harsh sentences in child‐pornography cases

by piling on offense‐level increases for characteristics that are present in almost every case.

These arguments recently have gained momentum and have been cited by district courts

imposing below‐guidelines sentences in child‐pornography cases.  See United States v.

Huffstatler, 571 F.3d 620, 622‐23 (7th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases).  

The district judge evaluated Carey’s argument and even agreed that § 2G2.2 “is not

the product of the customary research and recommendation by the Sentencing

Commission.”  That fact, the court explained, would be considered in fashioning a sentence.

And Carey had been, the court observed, “a hard‐working man” without a continuous

history of criminal conduct who might be deterred from future crimes by a lifetime term of

supervised release.  On the other hand, the court was not satisfied with Carey’s explanation

that child pornography is “not sexual” to him and that he views it, along with adult

pornography, only because looking at the human body is “like looking at a beautiful picture

or like looking at the sunset.”  Ultimately, after weighing the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),

the court concluded that a sentence at the low end of the guidelines range was necessary to

achieve the goals of sentencing.  We would presume this within‐guidelines sentence to be

reasonable.  See United States v. Mendoza, 576 F.3d 711, 723 (7th Cir. 2009).  Counsel has not

identified any reason to disturb this presumption, and we therefore agree that any challenge

to the reasonableness of Carey’s sentence would be frivolous.  

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.

Case: 09-3130 Document: 13 Filed: 03/18/2010 Pages: 2