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Parties Involved:
Russell Earl Nichols
Appellant
George Sullivan
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

RUSSELL EARL NICHOLS, 

Petitioner-Appe!l.lant, 

FILED 

United St.ates Court of Appeals . Tenth Circuit · 

FEB 0 61989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk · 

v. 

. ) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 87-2391 

GEORGE SULLIVAN, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

) . 

) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. 86-0591-SC 

Tova Indritz, Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

for the Petitioner-Appellant. · 

Anthony Tupler, Assistant Attorney General (Hal Stratton, Attorney 

General, with him on the brief), Santa Fe, New Mexico, for the 

Respondent-Appellee. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 87-2391 Document: 01019739972 Date Filed: 02/06/1989 Page: 1 
Petitioner Russell Earl Nichols appeals from the district 

court order dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

We affirm. 

I • 

A New Mexico state grand jury indicted Nichols for murder, 

armed robbery, ~nd tampering with ~vidence on September 4, 1985. 1 

' . 

Prior to trial, Nichols filed motions in limine seeking to keep 

out of evidence any reference to his prior convictions for armed 

robbery, false imprisonment, and unlawful taking of a motor 

vehicle, or to his prior incarceration. Assured by the 

prosecution that it would not be necessary to decide these matters 

unless Nichols elected to testify, the trial judge took the 

motions under advisement and instructed the prosecution not to 

refer to Nichols' prior convictions or incarceration without first 

discussing the matter further with the court. The judge also 

directed the prosecutio~ to caution the state's witnesses to avoid 

any references to such matters in their testi~ony. 

Despite the trial judge's admonition to the prosecution, two 

of the state's witnesses, Lyndol Burks and_ Wesley Hammack, 

1 · The grand jury indictment also included a count charging 

Nichols with conspiracy to commit armed robbery, but the _ prosecution entered a nolle prospqui as to it prior to trial. 

Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at 2. 

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referred to Nichols' prior incarceration while testifying during 

the state's presentation of its case~in~chief • 2 Nichols objected 

in both instances, but moved for a mistrial only after Hammack's 

statement. · Al~hough the judge denied Nichol's mistrial ~ation, he 

did offer to give a cautio~ary instruction to the jury, an offer 

'Nichols declined. 

Nichols renewed his motions in limine at the close of the 

state's case-in-chief. The judge ruled, however, that evidence 

concerning Nichols' prior convictions could be admitted for 

purposes of impeachmerit pursuant to New Mexico Rule of Evidence 

11-609, N.M. Stat. Ann. 11-609 (1986). Thereafter, Nichols 

testified about his prior convictions on direct examination and 

acknowledged them again on cross-examination. The prosecution 

also mentioned Nichols' status as a convicted armed robber during 

its closing argument. 

The jury found Nichols guilty of felony murder, armed 

robbery, and tampering with evidence. At a separate "sentencing · 

hearing," the state district court judge who had presided over 

Nichols' juty trial sentenced him to consecutive terms of life 

imprisonment for felony murder, eighteen years for armed robbery, 

and eighteen months for tampering with evidence. The sentence for 

2 Burks testified that he· was reluctant to hire Nichols because 

Nich_ols "had just got out of jail." Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at 

6· .. Hammack testified that he was with Nichols when Nichols 

noticed "some iiuJtates he knew from • • • • " Id .• at 14. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2391 Document: 01019739972 Date Filed: 02/06/1989 Page: 3 
armed robbery reflected the state trial judge's f~nding that 

Nichols previously had been convicted of armed robbery, and 

6onsequently was subjec~ to a stiffer penalty under an enhanced 

sentencing statute. 

Nichols directly appealed his convictions and armed robbery 

senten6e to the New Mexico Supreme Court, State v. Nichols, 717 

P.2d 50 (N.M. 1986). In his brief to that court, Nichols alleged: 

(1) "[t]he trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial after 

the state's key witness . . • made reference to the defendant's 

prior criminal record;" and (2) "[t]he trial court denied th~ 

defendant due process of law when it failed to recuse itself from 

the sentencing hearing ••.• " Rec., vol. I, doc. 8, ex. Cat 

34, 39. The court rejected both his arguments. 

Failing to secure relief in the state courts, Nichols filed a 

petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for 

the district of New Mexico pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2254. The 

petition raised numerous claims, including: (1) "whether 

testimony concerning petitioner's prior convictions · ••• and his 

prior incarceration status violated petitioner's ~ight to due 

process and deprived him of a fair trial''; and (2) "whether 

petitioner's due process right to an impartial judge was violated 

" Rec., vol. I, doc. 11 at 1. The district court adopted 

the magistrate's proposed findings and recommended disposition and 

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Appellate Case: 87-2391 Document: 01019739972 Date Filed: 02/06/1989 Page: 4 
dismissed with prejudice Nichols' petition. Rec., vol. I, doc. 

18~ 

On appeal before this court, the paF~ies again contest the 

substantive issues of Nichols' challenge to his convictions and 

his challenge to the ~rmed robb,ry sentence. The State also 

argues, for the first Eime, that review of Nichols' dhallenge to 

his convictions is barred because of an alleged procedural default 

by him. 

II. 

The State argues as a threshold matter that review of 

Nichols' due process challenge to his convictions is barred by the 

procedural default doctrine. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 

(1971) (non-compliance with a state procedural rule bars federal 

habeas corpus review, absent showing of cause and prejudice). 

Notwithstanding the State's characterization of its new argument, 

however, a brief examination of it makes plain th~t the State is 

raising an argument concerning the failure to exhaust state 

remedies. The State does not contend that the New Mexico state 

courts refused to consider Nichols' challenge to his convictions 

because he failed to comply with a state procedural requirement, 

but rather that Nichols does not raise the challenge in his habeas 

petition in the same form as he presented it to the state courts. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2391 Document: 01019739972 Date Filed: 02/06/1989 Page: 5 
Hence, we treat the State's argum~nt as a nonexhausfion~of-stat~­

remedies defen~e.3 

The United States Supreme Court ~ddressed the meaning of the 

exhaustion requirement, ~s codified at 28 u.s.c. § 2254(b), in 

Picard v. Connor, 404 ·u. s·. 270 ( 1971). The Court, reasoning from 

the considerations of federal-state comity underlying the 

exhaustion doct~ine, held that the statutory exhaustion 

requirement was satisfied once the "substance of a federal habeas 

corpus.claim" has been presented to a state court. Id. at 278. 

Presentation of a claim's "substance'', the c6urt noted, does not 

require the defendant to cite "book and verse on the federal 

constitution." Id. at 278 (quoting Daugharty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 

750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)). Rather, it is only necessary that the 

federal claim be "fairly presented" to the state courts so that 

they have the first opportunity to hear the claim sought to be 

vindicated by the federal habeas petition. Id. at 275-276. See 

also Jones v. Hess, 681 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1983). Although the 

Supreme Court has interpreted the "fair presentation" staJ?.dard as 

requiring mor~ than that "all the facts necessary to support the 

federal claim were before the state courts, . . . or that a 

somewhat similar state-law claim· was made," Anderson v. Harless, 

459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982), the language of Picard makes clear that a 

failure to. invoke talismanic language (cite "book and verse" of 

3 The.cases cited by th~ State in support of its argument are 

inapposite as they address the issue 6f procedural ~efault. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2391 Document: 01019739972 Date Filed: 02/06/1989 Page: 6 
the constltution) shduld not be the-basis for a finding of 

nonexha~stion. See .Tamapua v. Shimoda, 796 F.2d 261, 263 (9th 

Cir.· 1986). 

The thrust of· Nichols' appeal to th~ New Mexico Supreme Court 

~as that the trial cou~t erred in refusing to grant h~s request 

for a mistrial because the unsolicited remark of witness Hammack 

rendered his trial unfair, especially when viewed in the context 

of the trial as a whole. Nichols argued that Hammack's remark 

prejudicially violated a "substantial right," rec., vol. I, doc. 

8, ex. C at 37, and that the "administration of justice was 

tainted," id. at 39. Although Nichols did not explicitly refer to 

the phrase "due process" in the relevant argument heading of his 

brief or in the body of his argument, nor refer to any federal 

cases, he did cite the Fifth Amendment due process clause as one 

basis for his claim in the docketing statement he filed with the 

New Mexico Supreme Court. Nichols' appellate papers thus put the 

New Mexico Supreme Court on notice that Nichols raised a 

constitutional violation and provided that court an opportunity to 

consider the claim. 

Nichols makes essentially the same argument in his habeas 

petition, but now explicitly characterizes it in terms of a due 

process violation. Considering that Nichols' state appellate 

papers referred to the due process clause as a basis for his 

claim, and the fact that fairness of trial is a fundamental 

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Appellate Case: 87-2391 Document: 01019739972 Date Filed: 02/06/1989 Page: 7 
concern of due pr9cess, see ~' Lisenba. v.. Caiifornia, 314 U.S. 

219, 236 (1941), we do not believe this label ~hange and his 

reference to additional releva~t facts 4 creates a fundamentally 

new argument which the state courts did not have an opportunity .to· 

consider; Compare Batten v. Scurr, 649 F.2d 564, 568 (8th Cir. 

1981) .'(ralsirig allegatio~ in state court that trial court err~d in 

not granting mistrial when witness made prejudicial remark about 

defendant is insufficient, without more, to exhaust claim that 

remark rendered trial so fundamentally unfair as to result in 

denial of due process). We conclude from a careful review of the 

record that Nichols did satisfy Picard's "fair presentation" 

requirement and so exhausted his state remedies. We therefore 

proceed to consider the merits of his claim. 

III. 

Our review of Nichols' convictions challenge is de novo 

because the question of whether the unsolicited remarks of a 

witness constitute prejudice of constitutional dimension is a 

mixed question of fact and law. Cf. United .States Ex Rel. Shaw v. 

De Robertis, 755 F.2d 1279, 1282 n.2 (7th Cir. (1985) (question 

4 The New Mexico Supreme Cour·t referred to three of the four 

facts relied on by Nichols in his habeas petition as demonstrating 

prejudice: remarks by two witnesses and the trial court's ruling 

on the admissiblity of prior convictions evidence. The fourth 

fact, the prosecutor's r~mark in closing at~um~rit, does not so 

change the· character of his claim as to render it unexhausted. 

See Jon~s·v. Hess, 681 F.2d 688, 694 (10th Cir. 1982) • 

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Appellate Case: 87-2391 Document: 01019739972 Date Filed: 02/06/1989 Page: 8 
whether prosecutor's conunent is conduct so prejudical as to 

. -

violate due process is a mixed question of fact and law reviewed 

de novo by appellate court); cf. ·also .Taylor v. ·Lombard, 606 F.2d 

371, 375 t2d Cir. 1979) (alleged prosecutorial use of perjured 

testimony). Nevertheless, the scope of our re~i~w is narrow: our 

.responsibility is to ensure that ~ichols was afforded the 

protections· of due process, not to exercise supervisory powers 

over the New Mexico state courts. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 

U.S. 639, 692 (1974). The New Mexico state courts' evidentiary 

and procedural ~ulings may not be questioned unless Nichols 

demonstrates that the remark by witness Hanunack was so prejudicial 

in the context of the proceedings as a whole that he was deprived 

of the fundamental fairness essential to the concept of due 

process. Id; Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F.2d 839, 850 (10th Cir. 1979) 

cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047 (1980); Batten, 649 F.2d at 569. 

Nichols' challenge focuses on witness Hanunack's remark that 

Nichols "noticed some inmates that he knew from • • " 

Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at 18. Nichols contends that two other 

remarks, one by witness Burks and one by the prosecutor in closing 

argument, and the judge's ruling per~itting the admission of 

evidence of his prior convictions exacerbated the prejudice of 

Hanunack's remark. Id. at 18-20. We note at the outset that the 

trial judge was apparently concerned about poten~ial prejudice 

resulting from reference to Nichols' prior convictions, as 

. evidenced by his order that no reference be made to them without 

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Appellate Case: 87-2391 Document: 01019739972 Date Filed: 02/06/1989 Page: 9 
f~rst holding a bench conference. At the time of the remark, 

however, the judge determined that the unsolicited remark was not 

sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial. Moreover, the 

·judge. offered to give a cautionary instruction_tc;:> the jury, but 

Nichols declined the offer. Such an instruction would have cured 

any possible prejudice complained of ~ere. We are unpersuaded 

that this remark alone so pre-judiced Nichols' right to a fair 

trial that he was denied due process. 

Nor do we believe thai the other remarks or the judge's 

refusal to preclude the admission of evidence of Nichols' prior 

convictions so exacerbated the alleged prejudice of Hammack's 

remark as to deprive Nichols of his constitutional right to a fair 

trial. In this connection, we note that evidence of Nichols' 

prior convictions could have been admitted for purposes of 

impeachment under New Mexico Rule of Evidence 11-609, N.M. Stat. 

Ann. § 11-609 (1986), when Nichols took the stand. We cannot say 

on the record before us that Nichols suffered prejudice of 

constitutional dimension. 

IV. 

Nichols also challenges his enhanced sentence for armed 

robbery on due process grounds. He argues that he was deprived of 

his·constitutional right to have an impartial tribunal determine 

his st~tus as a se~ond of fender becau$e the sentencing judge was 

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Appellate Case: 87-2391 Document: 01019739972 Date Filed: 02/06/1989 Page: 10 
biased. The source of the alleged bias is the judge's knowledge, 

e·rom pre~trial .motions and Nichols' own testimony at trial, of 

Nichols' previous con~fction fo~ armed robbery. We find this 

contention to be without ~erit. 

This court h~ld in Brinlee that, "[u]nless they amount to 

constitutional violations, prejudicial comments and conduct by a 

judge in-a criminal trial are not proper subjects for collateral 

attack • • " 608 F.2d at·853 (citation omitted). In general, 

·the standard for evaluating whether a habeas petition alleges 

judicial bias amounting to a denial of due process is whether the 

judge was "actually biased or prejudiced against the petitioner." 

Dyas v. Lockhart, 705 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 

U.S. 982 (1983) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has 

recognized, however, that the likelihood of bias or appearance of 

bias can, in certain circumstances, be so substantial as to create 

a conclusive presumption of actual bias. See, ~, Withrow v. 

Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (there are cases where "experience 

teaches that the probability of actual prejudice on the part of 

the judge or decision maker is too high to be constitutionally 

tolerable"); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501 (1974) ("the 

inquiry must be not only whether there was actual bias . , but 

also whether there was ••• 'a likelihood of bias or an 

appearance of bias •••• '") "'Such a stringent rule may 

sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and would do 

their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between 

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Appellate Case: 87-2391 Document: 01019739972 Date Filed: 02/06/1989 Page: 11 
contending parties,' but.due process of l•w requires no less." Id. 

(quoting In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).' But see,~' 

Margoles v. Johns, 660' F. 2d 291, 296 (7th Cir. 1981), c·ert .. ' 

denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982) ("[AJ litigant is not.denied due 

process by either the "appearance" of· partiality or by 

circumstances which m~ght lead one to speculate as to a judge's 

impartiality.- A litigant is denied due process if he is in fact 

treated unfairly.") The test for assessing whether the likelihocid 

of or appearance of bias is so great as to be constitutionally 

intolerable is w6ether "the judge [is] unable to hold the balance 

between vindicating the interests of the court and the interests 

of the accused." Taylor, 418 U.S. at 501. 

We are convinced that Nichols was not denied due process in 

his enhancement hearing under either the "actual bias" or 

"likelihbod or appearance of bias" standard. Judge Cole of the 

New Mexico state district court, who served as both the trial and 

sentencing judge, heard uncontradicted testimony at the 

enhancement hearing establishing that Nichols previously had been 

convicted for armed robbery. The judge explicitly stated that 

this evidence was sufficient to make a finding that Nichols was 

convicted of armed robbery for the second time in the case tried 

before him. Rec. vol. II, Tape 2, 3/18/85 at # 498.5 Judge Cole 

then noted, id. at # 489-91, apparently in an effort to preserve a 

5 The tape numbers are readings from the tape counter of a Sony.-

Dictator Secutive BM-40. 

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,' 

clear record for appeal, that.it was impossible for a trial judge· 

to "divorce the trial proceedings, or the pretrial proceedings 

from [che sentencing hearing].6 Contrary to Nichols, we do not 

read this .statement as indicating reliance on ~nformation from 

proceedings prior to the sentencing hearing, but as an 

acknowledgement that he was aware of Nichols prior admissions.7 

Even lf we read this statement as indicating some measure of 

reliance, however, it does not de~onstrate any "actual bias" on 

the part of Judge Cole towards Nichols. Neither does it show a 

"likelihood of bias or appearance of bias" so great that Judge 

Cole was unable to "hold the balance between vindicating the 

interests of the court and the interests of the accused." Taylor, 

6 The relevant portion of the sentencing hearing is as follows: 

"I'm going to find that for the purpose of 

sentencing that Mr. Nichols is being convicted of armed 

robbery for the second time. I think there's sufficient 

evidence at this hearing to make that finding, but it's 

impossible for a trial judge to divorce the trial 

proceedings, or the pretrial proceedings, from this. 

And on appeal, any appellate court should know that my 

uh decision is either supported or tainted by the fact 

that prior ~o trial certain motions were submitted to me 

by the defense ••• and at the time of the trial that 

the defendant.on the stand actually admitted a prior 

conviction. Does that make your record Mr. Lopez?" 

Rec., vol. II, Tape 2, 3/18/85 # 484-502. 

7 Because we resolve this issue ·on the basis of Nichols' 

failure to establish any violation, much less one of 

constitutional dimension, we do not discuss the issue of the 

source of the alleged bias. We n_ote, ·and petitioner concedes, 

however, that as a general rule the source of the alleged bias 

must be extra-judicial. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 

563 I 583 ( 1966) • 

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·41a u.s at 501. Because we conclude that Nichols has failed to 

demonstrate any bias, much less' that of a constitutional 

magnit~de, we affirm the order of the district court. 

Affirmed. 

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