Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-04726/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-04726-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Guillermo Trujillo Cruz
Plaintiff
Gutierrez
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUILLERMO TRUJILLO CRUZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

GUTIERREZ,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-04726-HSG 

ORDER REVOKING LEAVE TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; 

ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO PAY 

FILING FEE IN FULL

Plaintiff, an inmate at Deuel Vocation Institution, filed this pro se civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 26, 2019. Dkt. No. 1. On January 6, 2020, the Court 

granted plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. No. 12. The Court then learned that the 

Eastern District of California had denied plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) based on dismissals of actions in 2014 through 2017. See, e.g., Cruz v. 

White, et al., 2:19-cv-1518 KJM KJN P, Dkt. Nos. 13 and 19 (E.D. Cal.); Cruz v. Chappius, 2:18-

cv-0193 KJM KJN P, Dkt. Nos 42 and 54 (E.D. Cal.). On January 16, 2020, the Court therefore 

ordered plaintiff to show cause why his in forma pauperis status should not be revoked pursuant to 

the three strikes provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Dkt. No. 15. Plaintiff filed his response 

with the Court on January 31, 2020. Dkt. No. 16. The Court has carefully considered the record 

and, for the reasons set forth below, REVOKES plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g).

DISCUSSION

This action is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”) which was 

enacted, and became effective, on April 26, 1996. The PLRA provides that a prisoner may not 

bring a civil action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, i.e., may not proceed in forma pauperis, “if the 

Case 4:19-cv-04726-HSG Document 19 Filed 03/06/20 Page 1 of 4
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prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought 

an action . . . in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, 

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under 

imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

For purposes of a dismissal that may be counted under Section 1915(g), the Ninth Circuit 

gives this guidance. The phrase “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” parallels 

the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and apparently means the same thing. Andrews v. King, 

398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). A case “is frivolous if it is ‘of little weight or importance: 

having no basis in law or fact.’” Id. (citation omitted). “A case is malicious if it was filed with 

the ‘intention or desire to harm another.’” Id. (citation omitted). “Not all unsuccessful cases 

qualify as a strike under § 1915(g). Rather, § 1915(g) should be used to deny a prisoner’s IFP 

status only when, after careful evaluation of the order dismissing an action, and other relevant 

information, the district court determines that the action was dismissed because it was frivolous, 

malicious or failed to state a claim.” Id. at 1121.

The plain language of the imminent danger clause in Section 1915(g) indicates that 

“imminent danger” is to be assessed at the time of filing of the complaint. See Andrews v. 

Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Andrews II”). The conditions that existed at 

some earlier or later time are not relevant. Id. at 1053 & n.5 (post-filing transfer of prisoner out of 

prison at which danger allegedly existed may have made moot his request for injunctive relief 

against alleged danger, but it does not affect Section 1915(g) analysis). The Court “should not 

make an overly detailed inquiry into whether the allegations qualify for the exception.” Id. at 

1055. It is sufficient if the complaint “makes a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced 

‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Id. 

I. Plaintiff’s Prior Strikes

The Court finds that, prior to this date, plaintiff has had at least three cases dismissed that 

count as “strikes.” The Court takes judicial notice of: (1) Trujillo v. Sherman, C No. 1:14-cv01401-BAM (PC), 2015 WL 13049186 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2015), aff’d 632 Fed. App’x. 426 (9th 

Cir. 2016); (2) Cruz v. Ruiz, C No. 1:15-cv-00975-SAB-PC, 2016 WL 8999460 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 

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2016), aff’d 688 Fed. App’x 435 (9th Cir. 2017); (3) Cruz v. Gomez, C No. 1:15-cv-00859 EPG 

(PC), 2017 WL 1355872 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2017), aff’d 698 Fed. App’x 368 (9th Cir. 2017); 

(4) Trujillo v. Gomez, C No. 14-cv-01797 DAD DLB, 2016 WL 1704178 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 

2016), report and recommendation adopted by Order Adopting Findings and Recommendations 

and Dismissing the Action for Failure to Exhaust, Trujillo v. Gomez, C No. 14-cv-01797 DAD

DLB, Dkt. No. 49, entered Aug. 5, 2016, aff’d 688 Fed. App’x 452 (9th Cir. 2017); and (5) 

Trujillo v. Gonzalez-Moran, C No. 17-15200 (9th Cir Aug. 21, 2017).1 As explained in the 

Court’s January 16, 2020 Order, the dismissals of these actions constitute “strikes” for the 

purposes of Section 1915(g). See Dkt. No. 15 at 3-6. Plaintiff does not dispute that the dismissals 

constitute “strikes” for the purposes of Section 1915(g). See generally Dkt. No. 16. Rather, he 

alleges that he meets the imminent danger exception set forth in Section 1915(g). Id.

II. Imminent Danger Exception

The complaint, filed on July 26, 2019, alleges that on January 19, 2019, while housed at 

Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”), defendant PBSP officer Gutierrez sexually harassed plaintiff 

by groping his genitals and running his hands between plaintiff’s buttocks during a clothed body 

search, in retaliation for plaintiff filing grievances regarding employee misconduct. See generally

Dkt. No. 1. 

In his response to the OSC, plaintiff alleges that he was in imminent danger of serious 

physical injury at the time he filed the complaint because defendant Gutierrez’s coworkers had 

verbally threatened plaintiff with battery for filing prison grievances, and that prison officials have

conspired with Gutierrez to have plaintiff be touched inappropriately with the overall intent to 

1 The district court “may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and 

without the federal judiciary system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at 

issue.” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted) (granting request to take judicial notice in Section 1983 action of five prior 

cases in which plaintiff was pro se litigant, to counter her argument that she deserved special 

treatment because of her pro se status). Plaintiff is also known as Guillermo Cruz Trujillo, and in 

titling plaintiff’s cases, courts have listed plaintiff’s last name as Trujillo, Trujillo Cruz, or Cruz. 

The Court has confirmed that the plaintiff in this action is the same plaintiff in the actions 

identified above as strikes by relying on the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation number assigned to plaintiff in each action, and confirming that the number is the 

same in all the actions: AA-2974.

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harm, offend, and humiliate plaintiff. Dkt. No. 16 at 3.

The Court finds that it would be speculative to conclude that plaintiff faced imminent

danger of serious physical injury at the time this action was filed based on plaintiff’s allegation 

that defendant Gutierrez’s co-workers have made verbal threats of physical injury at unspecified 

points in time, and based on plaintiff’s generalized speculation that there is an ongoing conspiracy 

among correctional officials to inappropriately touch plaintiff. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g), the Court REVOKES plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status. See Andrews, 493 F.3d at

1057 n.11 (“assertions of imminent danger of less obviously injurious practices may be rejected as 

overly speculative or fanciful”); cf. Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 315 n.1 (3d Cir. 

2001) (declining to reach question of whether “imminent danger” encompasses an ongoing danger 

of serious physical injury, but noting that generalized allegations of harassment were not 

sufficiently specific or related to support an inference of an ongoing danger”).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status is REVOKED pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Plaintiff may proceed with this action only if he pays the $400 filing and 

administrative fee in full. Plaintiff must pay the full filing fee within twenty-eight (28) days of 

the date of this order. If the full filing fee is not received by that date, the Court will dismiss this 

action without prejudice to plaintiff re-filing upon payment of the full filing fee.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 3/6/2020

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

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