Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04341/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04341-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
S.W. Ornoski
Respondent
Govani P. White
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 1

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GOVANI P. WHITE,

Petitioner,

 vs.

S.W. ORNOSKI, Warden,

Respondent. ______________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. C 05-4341 MJJ (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed the above-entitled petition for

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court ordered respondent to show

cause why the petition should not be granted based on petitioner’s cognizable claims for

relief. Respondent has filed an answer and memorandum in support thereof. Petitioner did

not file a traverse.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2002, petitioner was convicted by a jury in Santa Clara County Superior Court of

kidnapping to commit robbery, second degree robbery, carjacking, and making criminal

threats. Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. The

California Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction and denied his habeas petition. In a

consolidated opinion, the California Supreme Court denied his petitions for review of these

decisions by the California Court of Appeal. 

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 1 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 2

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal: 

Jesus Solorio was 21 years old at the time of his September 2002 trial

testimony, and lived in Hollister. His family owned a white 1995 Toyota

Corolla in June 2001. He paid for the installation of three televisions, a

PlayStation, a Pioneer stereo, and 12-inch speakers in the car. One television

was in the front on the dash, the other two were on the back of the front seats of

the car. The PlayStation was kept underneath the front passenger's seat, and

could be used with any of the three televisions. The speakers were in the trunk.

The night of June 17, 2001, Solorio drove the car to the Club Tropicana

in San Jose with four female friends. He parked in a lot about one block away.

They all got out and walked towards the club. Although the women went

inside, he went back to his car because he forgot his wallet. Other people were

scattered around the parking lot when he searched his car and found his wallet

under a seat. Two men that Solorio identified at trial as defendants White and

Gadsden walked towards the car and White said, " 'That's a nice car.' " Solorio

stayed by his car and talked to defendants. They asked him about the items he

had in the car as he was sitting in the driver's seat making sure that he had

secured everything. White opened the front passenger door and sat down

inside. Gadsden got in behind him and said that he wanted to play the

PlayStation. Solorio allowed Gadsden to play the PlayStation for four or five 

minutes.

Other people were around another car showing off its hydraulics in the

parking lot. A policeman drove into the lot and told everyone to leave, that they

could not stay there. White pointed a gun with a long barrel that was tucked in

his shirt at Solorio and said, "Drive." Solorio took off and drove defendants at

White's direction because he was afraid. During the drive defendants talked

about where they should take Solorio and about what they wanted out of the

car. White wanted the television and Gadsden wanted the PlayStation.

 After about ten minutes they arrived at some apartments on a dead-end

street. Solorio stopped the car and defendants started to strip it. White

attempted to take the television out of the dash and Gadsden took out the

PlayStation. They discussed who was going to keep the stereo parts; White

wanted the equalizer and Gadsden wanted the amp and speakers. White told

Solorio to take everything out of his pockets, so Solorio got out of the car and

gave White his wallet. White opened the wallet and said, " 'If anything

happens, I know where you live.' " Gadsden then told Solorio to get down on

his knees. Gadsden pointed a gun at Solorio while White struggled to get the

television out of the dash. After a minute or two, White told Solorio to get back

in the car.

White gave directions to Solorio to drive to an alley and to stop there. It

was dark but Solorio could see that they were at an apartment complex. Cars

were parked and there was a dumpster. Solorio asked to be let go, but White hit

him with his fist and said, " 'Be quiet.' " White told Solorio to get out of the car

and said that if he did anything, " 'I'm going to kill you.' " Solorio did not run

because White was still pointing a gun at him. He went around the front of the

car and stood by the back passenger side door. The car door was open and

Solorio could see Gadsden ripping the equalizer's wiring out while White took

the stereo out of the dashboard. White put the removed items, including the

speakers from the trunk, in a multicolored blanket in the back seat of Solorio's

car, and then put everything in a shopping cart. 

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 2 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 3

White told Gadsden that they should take Solorio somewhere, but

Gadsden told him to forget it, that Solorio would not say anything, and to let

him go. Gadsden told Solorio to stay there until White returned. White left with

the shopping cart, saying that they should put Solorio in the trunk, kill him, and

throw him in the river. Gadsden ordered Solorio, at gunpoint, to get into the

trunk of the car, so he did. Gadsden attempted to close the trunk lid two or

three times, but Solorio stuck a tire iron out to prevent it from closing. When

Gadsden opened the trunk lid to see what was going on, Solorio hit him in the

stomach with the tire iron. Gadsden went down. Solorio climbed out of the

trunk and ran the opposite direction from where White had gone. While he was

running, he heard a gunshot behind him. He kept running, jumped a fence at a

school, and then jumped another fence. A man he met took him to a police

officer. 

The officer drove Solorio back to where his car had been, but it was not

there. He reported his car, television, stereo, speakers, amp, equalizer, cell

phone, wallet, and PlayStation missing. He said that White was wearing an

athletic jacket, Gadsden was wearing a bandana, and they both were wearing

fishing hats. He suffered bruises from where White hit him

Detective Anthony Mata was assigned Solorio's case on June 19, 2001.

He spoke with Solorio that day at the police department, and did not observe

any physical injuries. He made a list of the property that was reported missing

and checked Solorio's cell phone records. He then asked other officers for

assistance with a parole search for an individual (not either of the defendants)

at a Fallingtree Drive residence in San Jose.

Sergeant Robert St. Amour, Officer Manuel Guerrero, Detective David

Gutierrez, and Detective Paul Joseph assisted Detective Mata with the parole

search at the Fallingtree Drive residence at 10:45 a.m. on June 22, 2001. While

waiting to do the search, Detective Mata heard a radio broadcast that officers

conducting surveillance had observed Solorio's car pull up to the residence.

Somebody left the residence and entered the car, and the car then drove away.

Guerrero saw Solorio's car leave the residence and attempted to initiate a

vehicle stop of the car by activating his patrol car's emergency lighting. The car

did not pull over, so Officer Guerrero activated his siren. The car still did not

pull over, but continued on to an onramp to northbound I-680. There it came to

a slow roll and both the driver's door and passenger's door swung open. The

two occupants exited the car and ran. Officer Guerrero started chasing them on

foot, but they disappeared into a wooded area. Officer Guerrero broadcast the

description of the two suspects. 

Sergeant St. Amour saw a young male who matched the description of

one of the suspects. The man was wearing a blue shirt and a white tee shirt.

Sergeant St. Amour directed Sergeant Alex Nguyen to the area where he saw

the man run. Sergeant Nguyen found the man inside a nearby house and took

him into custody. The man was identified at trial as Byron Finister. 

Officer Gutierrez and Detective Joseph saw another young male who

matched the description of one of the suspects. The man was not wearing a

shirt, was sweating, and appeared out of breath. Officer Gutierrez detained the

man, who was identified at trial as Gadsden. Detective Mata searched Gadsden

and found Solorio's cell phone in his pants pocket.

Detectives Mata and Joseph returned to the Fallingtree Drive residence

to conduct the parole search. Detective Mata found a denim fishing hat in the

garage of the residence. Detective Mata also found a police baton and Solorio's

wallet. Detective Joseph found a box containing stereo wire with frayed ends

and personal papers and letters. He found a blue backpack in the rafters of the

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 3 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 4

garage that contained stereo wire similar to the other [wire] found, as well as a

car CD player/radio, equalizer, and faceplate. Detective Joseph also found

Solorio's driver's license, some wallet inserts, and pictures in the garage rafters.

Officer Aaron Guglielmelli examined Solorio's car on June 22, 2001. He

did not notice any damage, marks, scratches, dents, or chips in the trunk area.

Detective Mata thereafter decided to conduct surveillance at a residence

on Vista Glen Avenue in San Jose. Sergeant St. Amour and Detective Joseph

searched the Vista Glen residence on June 22, 2001. They found White in the

garage of the residence which had been converted into living quarters. White

and Nathan Green were arrested there. Michelle Hermosillo, Green's mother,

later met with Detective Mata. Hermosillo was aware that White kept property

at her home, and told Mata that White's brother Jovarre had come to her home

and taken away some property. The property was in a bag, and she had no idea

what it was. Mata recovered a gray fishing hat and a black bandanna from the

garage.

Detective Mata returned to the Fallingtree Drive address, where he

spoke to Jasmine W. and her father. On Monday, June 18, 2001, at about 2:30

a.m., Jasmine was at home with Finister and her boyfriend, Felix Taplin, when

Gadsden came into the garage. Mata testified that Jasmine told him that

Gadsden placed a multicolored blanket on the ground and that, when he opened

it, it contained a PlayStation, CDs, and stereo equipment. She said that

Gadsden stated that he had just robbed somebody. She said that White spent the

night and left early in the morning. She said that afternoon she saw Gadsden

washing a white car in her driveway. Detective Mata recovered Solorio's 

multicolored blanket from the garage. Jasmine denied at trial that she owned

the multicolored blanket, and denied that she made any of the statements Mata

reported she did. She testified that she was aware that Taplin was charged with

possession of stolen property as a co-defendant in this case, but she was not

aware that he had pleaded guilty. 

Detective Mata determined that the incident took place in the general

vicinity of the El Rancho Verde apartment complex, and that both defendants

lived in the vicinity. He searched the carport area of the complex, but found no

weapons or casings, or any other evidence that a weapon had been discharged

in the area. 

Detective Mata requested that White's jail telephone calls be monitored.

On June 23, 2001, Mata received a copy of White's taped phone conversations

with his mother, Cheryl. During the first conversation, White told his mother to

"go clean my room up," and to tell Jovarre to "sell his speakers." He asked his

mother to "go in my room" and "anything you see that is not right then . . . pick

it up" "because . . . I think mike's . . . there." "Those things that are on the side

of the couch too." He said that "they [are] saying that we used a pellet gun,"

and responded "I don't know" when his mother asked him where the pellet gun

was. Cheryl told White that she knew "mike" and that she "got it," but that she

did not see "the other thing." White told her take something "gray" that she had

found. She also got "things that you put in" "mike." She told him that she took

"long" but not what "long holds." She could not find "an orange box that has

little gold things in it." Downstairs, she found "a blue and gray box, [that] has

tools in it," and White told her to "tell him to get those . . . things out of there 

. . . ASAP." During the second conversation, Cheryl told defendant that she

found "the orange case" and "that fake thing," and defendant told her to "get

those all out of the house."

After listening to the tape, Detective Mata went to the White household.

He knocked on the door, and saw Jovarre go in and out of a window. He was

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 4 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 5

let inside after about 20 minutes. Cheryl came inside the house through the rear

door, and Mata met her in the kitchen/living room area. He told her about her

taped phone conversations with White. She denied having had the

conversations. Mata saw Solorio's speaker box in the living room area, and

asked her who owned it. She said that she did not know. She finally admitted to

having the phone conversations with White. She said that "long" was also

known as "Mike," and was a rifle that was in her bedroom closet. She said that

she knew what "short" meant, and that she did not find it, but that she did find a

pellet gun. She said that she had "silver," which was the ammunition to "short."

She said that she had put "silver" in her car. Detective Mata recovered the

speaker box, a rifle from Cheryl's bedroom, an athletic jacket and two pairs of

athletic gloves from White's bedroom, ammunition and a suede gun case from

Jovarre's bedroom, and a pellet gun and an orange box of .22 ammunition from

Cheryl's vehicle that was parked in the back of the residence. He did not find a

handgun that could match the suede gun case.

White testified in his own defense as follows. Prior to his arrest, he had

been living in the garage area of Green's home. He had not lived with his

mother for about six months. Half of his things were at his mother's, half were

at Green's.

On the night of June 17, 2001, White borrowed his friend Fernando's

Mazda and went with Green to pick up his friend Samuel. They ran into

Gadsden when they were leaving Samuel's place. Gadsden asked if he could go

with him. The four of them then went downtown. They parked in a parking lot

by Club Tropicana because that is where Fernando was showing off a car he

had just bought from Green. A lot of other people were there. Fernando started

playing with the hydraulics on his new car while White and Green talked to

some girls. 

After about 45 minutes, Fernando's girlfriend called, wanting him home.

Fernando told White that he wanted to take the Mazda. Green offered to drive

the hydraulic car and got into the car. White went over and told Gadsden that

they were leaving. Gadsden was in the front passenger seat of a white car

playing with a PlayStation and Solorio was in the driver's seat. Solorio asked,

"Do you guys know where to get some ecstasy?" Gadsden said, "Yeah."

A police officer drove up and told everybody to leave. White went back

to the Mazda but Gadsden stayed in Solorio's car. After the officer left, White

went back to Gadsden. Gadsden said that he was going with Solorio. White

decided to go with them, and got in behind Solorio. Gadsden gave Solorio

directions to the El Rancho Verde apartments. When they arrived Gadsden was

still playing with the PlayStation, and asked White to see if "Jesse" was home.

White went to Jesse's apartment and saw that his upstairs bedroom light was

off. White threw rocks at Jesse's bedroom window but nobody responded.

When he returned to the car Solorio and Gadsden had switched seats, the car's

trunk was open, and speakers were in a shopping cart. Gadsden was "messing

with something in the front," and White asked him what he was doing. Solorio

looked frightened. Gadsden and Solorio got out of the car, and White started

arguing with Gadsden. Solorio stood there for a while, until White looked over

at him and said, "Man, you're stupid." Solorio then ran.

Gadsden got into the car and drove off, leaving the shopping cart

containing the speakers. White heard no gunshots. He started to walk away, but

then decided to take the speakers. He took them to his mother's house, which

was near by. It was then that he noticed that his cell phone was missing. He

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 5 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 6

started calling his cell phone number and finally, after "a long, long time,"

Gadsden answered it. White said, " 'Whatever you do is on you. Just give me

my phone.' " Gadsden hung up on him. White wanted his phone, so he called

Green and the two of them went looking for Gadsden. When they did not find

him, they went back to Green's house. White found Gadsden the next

afternoon, and got his cell phone back. He did not call the police because he

did not want to be involved; there was also a warrant out for his arrest.

White was arrested at Nathan Green's on June 22. He denied to

Detectives Mata and Joseph that he knew anything about what happened on

June 17 and 18. He called his mother from the jail and talked to her in code

because he knew that the call was monitored. He wanted everything out of the

house because he knew the police were going to search it. He did not use a gun

on Solorio, but he did not want any weapons found because he did not want the

police "to get the wrong impression."

People v. White, No. H025341, Slip Op. at 2-10 (Cal. Ct. App. April 5, 2004) (hereinafter

“Slip Op.”) (attached as Resp.’s Ex. F) (footnotes omitted).

DISCUSSION

A. Petitioner’s Claims

The instant federal habeas corpus petition presents six cognizable claims, all

predicated on the ineffective assistance of counsel in the state proceedings. Petitioner claims

his right to effective assistance of counsel was violated when: (1) his attorney failed to object

on due process grounds to the admission of evidence that he owned guns and ammunition;

(2) his attorney failed to object on due process grounds to the admission of evidence that

there was a warrant out for his arrest at the time of offense; (3) his attorney failed to object

on Confrontation Clause grounds to the admission of Cheryl White’s hearsay statements to

Detective Mata; (4) his attorney failed to request a limiting jury instruction regarding

Taplin’s no contest plea; (5) his attorney failed to argue that Solorio’s alleged request to

purchase ecstasy should be admitted as circumstantial evidence of Solorio’s intent to

willingly accompany petitioner; (6) his attorney failed to object to the exclusion of evidence

of Solorio’s prior misdemeanor conviction on the grounds that excluding such evidence

violated petitioner’s constitutional rights to due process, to confront witnesses against him,

and to present a defense.

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 6 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 7

B. Standard of Review

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a district

court may grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim

that was reviewed on the merits in state court only if the state court's adjudication: “(1) 

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under the ‘contrary to’ clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant a

writ if the state court’s conclusion is “opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). An

‘unreasonable application’ occurs when the state court identifies “the correct governing legal

principle” from the appropriate Supreme Court decision but “unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id. at 412-13. The federal court on habeas

review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be “objectively

unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

In any event, habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue is

structural error or had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury's verdict.’” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795-6 (2001) (quoting Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)). When there is no reasoned opinion from the

highest state court to consider the petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned

opinion, in this case that of the California Court of Appeal. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797, 801-6 (1991).

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 7 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 8

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

All of petitioner’s claims allege a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel,

which guarantees not only assistance, but “effective assistance” of counsel. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The “benchmark” for ineffectiveness is “whether

counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the

trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.” Id. To prevail on an

ineffectiveness claim, petitioner must satisfy two prongs of inquiry. 

The first prong is deficiency: petitioner must show that counsel's performance fell

below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. Id. at

687-88. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, and a court

must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689. 

The second prong is prejudice: petitioner must establish that “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. In determining whether a defendant was

prejudiced, “a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to

have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.” Id. at 696. 

As petitioner needs to satisfy both elements of the claim, the court need not address

both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. Id. at 

697. An ineffectiveness claim therefore can be disposed of for either lack of sufficient

prejudice to petitioner or by petitioner’s failure to demonstrate deficiency on the part of

counsel. Id.; see also Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Applying the appropriate standard of review to the ineffectiveness claim, petitioner

must ultimately establish that the state court applied a standard other than Strickland or

“applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Bell v.

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 8 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

As the California Court of Appeal applied Strickland in analyzing all of petitioner’s

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, its decision was not “contrary to” clearly

established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 9

Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699 (2002). This analysis makes the Brecht harmless error review

superfluous because the prejudice analysis under Strickland is complete in itself. See Avila

v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002).

1. Admission of Gun Evidence

Petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective for not objecting on due process grounds

to the admission of evidence that he owned guns and ammunition. Failure to raise an

objection only satisfies the prejudice prong of Strickland if petitioner can to show that “but

for” his counsel’s failure to raise such an objection, there is a reasonable probability that “the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

Consequently, trial counsel cannot be ineffective under Strickland for failing to raise a

meritless objection, as there will be no impact on the outcome of the trial. See Juan H. v.

Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005).

Before trial, petitioner’s counsel moved in limine to exclude “all evidence of guns and

ammunition not connected to the case” on grounds of “reliability and relevance” but the

judge overruled the objection, concluding that “the probative value of the evidence

outweighs any possibility of undue or unfair prejudice.” (Slip Op. at 19.) In addition to the

charges upon which White was convicted, he was also charged with gun use enhancements,

but the jury ultimately did not find true the allegations that he personally used a gun. (Id.)

The California Court of Appeal disposed of the claim of ineffectiveness by finding no

prejudice under Strickland1

:

Even if we were to assume that the trial court erred in admitting the gun

and ammunition evidence, we would find the error harmless. The jury found all

gun use enhancements to be not true as to both Gadsden and White. There was

overwhelming evidence that both defendants otherwise committed the charged

offenses.

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 9 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 10

(Slip Op. at 20.) 

It is unlikely that any objection by White’s attorney on due process grounds would

have been sustained. Petitioner correctly states that “admission of prejudicial character

evidence from which no permissible inference can be drawn also violates due process.” 

McKinney v. Reese, 993 F.2d 1378, 1382-6 (9th Cir. 1993). As the California Court of

Appeal pointed out, however, there was a permissible inference to be drawn form the gun

evidence: 

White relies on....cases [that] found prejudicial error in admitting

evidence that the defendant possessed a weapon which was obviously not the

one used in the charged offense. That is not the case here. There was evidence

that White pointed a gun with a long barrel at Solorio, and that Gadsden also

had a gun. White told his mother to look for and hide firearms she referred to

as "long" and "short."

(Slip. Op. at 20.) 

The permissible inference, therefore, is that White owned the very weapon that was

allegedly used in the commission of the crime. There would be a violation of due process

under McKinney only if there were no permissible inference to be drawn from the gun

evidence other than that White had a criminal disposition or bad character. See McKinney,

993 F.2d 1378. But as there was a permissible inference to be drawn from the gun evidence,

there was no violation of due process. See Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th

Cir. 1991). Because any objection to the admission of evidence on due process grounds was

unlikely to succeed, counsel’s failure to make such an objection was neither deficient nor

prejudicial. See Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1273; see also Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th

Cir. 1996) (holding that “the failure to take a futile action can never be deficient

performance” on the part of trial counsel). 

As an objection on due process grounds was likely futile, the state court was

reasonable in rejecting this claim under the prejudice prong of Strickland. Therefore, this

claim cannot serve as the basis for habeas relief.

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 10 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 11

2. Admission of Arrest Warrant

Petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object on due process

grounds to the admission of evidence that there was a warrant out for his arrest at the time of

offense. As noted above, there is no ineffectiveness when counsel fails to make a meritless

objection. See Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1273.

At trial, the prosecutor was able to introduce evidence of an existing arrest warrant to

impeach petitioner during cross-examination: 

During his direct examination, White testified that he did not call the

police to tell them what happened the night of the incident because, "I didn't

want to have any involvement with the police or anything that happened." Prior

to cross-examining White, the prosecutor requested permission to impeach

White with the fact that he had an outstanding arrest warrant. "When asked

why he didn't call the police, he said he didn't want to get involved with them.

And that's not the whole truth. I'm quite convinced the reason he didn't want to

call the police is that he had a warrant out for his arrest. It's not quite as

innocent as he's made it out to be." Defense counsel objected on the grounds of

relevancy, but the court overruled the objection.

(Slip Op. at 21.) 

As with Claim 1, a due process objection to the admission of the warrant evidence

would likely fail because the jury could draw a permissible inference therefrom. When the

prosecutor caught petitioner being less than forthcoming about his motive for not contacting

the police, the jury could properly infer from the outstanding warrant that petitioner was not

being truthful. This type of inference is permissible and the admission of the evidence of the

existing warrant did not violate due process. See McKinney, 993 F.2d 1378. 

Consequently, trial counsel’s failure to make such a due process objection was neither

deficient nor prejudicial and the state court was reasonable in its application of Strickland. 

Accordingly, habeas relief is not warranted on this claim. 

3. Admission of Cheryl White’s Statements

Petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to object on Confrontation

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 11 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 12

Clause grounds to the admission of Cheryl White’s hearsay statements to Detective Mata. 

As previously noted, if this objection would not have been successful, counsel was not

deficient. See Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1273. Whether an objection would have succeeded is

evaluated under the law controlling at the time the objection would have been made. See

Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the relevant inquiry is

not what defense counsel could have done, but rather whether the choices made by defense

counsel were reasonable when made). 

Cheryl White’s statements were admitted at trail in the following manner:

White's counsel brought a hearsay objection when the prosecutor first

questioned Detective Mata about his conversation with Cheryl regarding her

telephone conversations with White. The prosecutor argued that Cheryl's

responses were a statement against interest because she was attempting to hide

weapons which were potential evidence in the case. Cheryl was charged as an

accessory and was awaiting trial. White's counsel objected that Cheryl had

been subpoenaed as a witness and had not invoked her Fifth Amendment

rights, and that there was no mention of a rifle being involved in the case. "So

the fact that she may have been concealing weapons in her car is totally

irrelevant to the charges." The court sustained the objection.

 The next morning, Cheryl appeared with counsel, outside the presence

of the jury, and invoked her Fifth Amendment right not to testify. Later that

day, the prosecutor recalled Detective Mata. Defense counsel stated that she

had no objection to his testimony, as long as it was limited to Cheryl's

statements. Detective Mata then testified regarding Cheryl's statement

explaining her phone conversations with White and the meaning of "long,"

"Mike," and "short."

(Slip Op. at 23.)

The Court of Appeal rightly concluded that at the time of trial and under Supreme

Court precedent controlling at that time, White’s counsel made no error:

The prosecutor showed that Cheryl was unavailable, that her statements

were against her penal interest when made, and that the statements were

sufficiently reliable to warrant admission. Cheryl had invoked her Fifth

Amendment right not to testify. She knew at the time that she made the

statements, based on her telephone conversations with White as well as

Detective Mata's statements to her, that White was charged with robbery and

that firearms were involved. The statements she made were sufficiently

reliable, as the items she discussed were found by Detective Mata where she

said they would be. It is not reasonably probable that had counsel raised an

Evidence Code section 1230 objection, the objection would have been sustained.

 At the time of trial, it was settled that admission of a hearsay statement

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 12 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 13

possessing sufficient indicia of reliability to fall within the hearsay exception of

a declaration against penal interest did not deny a defendant the right of

confrontation guaranteed by the United States Constitution. (Ohio v. Roberts

(1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (Roberts); People v. Greenberger

(1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 330-331.) Thus, at the time of trial, a confrontation

clause objection by counsel would likewise have been unavailing. The United

States Supreme Court has recently overruled Roberts and held that, unless the

defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant when the

statement against penal interest was made, admission of the statement does

violate the confrontation clause. (Crawford, supra, at p. 2017.) As White did

not have an opportunity to cross-examine Cheryl at the time her statements to

Detective Mata were made, Crawford now precludes the admission of Cheryl's

statements. However, counsel cannot be faulted for failing, at the time of trial,

to anticipate that the United States Supreme Court would overrule Roberts and

24 years of precedent following it.

(Slip Op. at 21.)

Petitioner’s claim fails under the deficiency prong of Strickland. The performance of

petitioner’s counsel did not fall below an “objective standard of reasonableness,” as the

inquiry in an ineffectiveness claim is certainly not what a counsel could have done to

overturn existing law. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-8; see also Babbitt, 151 F.3d at 1173. 

Instead, a Confrontation Clause objection to Cheryl White’s out-of-court statements would

have been without merit under the law in effect at the time; therefore, counsel cannot be

ineffective for failing to make such an objection. See Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1273. 

Consequently, the state court’s application of Strickland was reasonable when it found no

deficiency on the part of counsel. This claim does not provide grounds for habeas relief. 

4. Absence of Limiting Jury Instruction Regarding Taplin’s Plea

Petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a limiting jury

instruction regarding Taplin’s no contest plea. The purpose of a limiting instruction would

have been to caution the jury that they could not use evidence of Taplin’s plea to infer

petitioner’s guilt. Under the prejudice prong of Strickland, the omission of a jury instruction

must make it reasonably probable that “the result of the proceeding would have been

different” had a different instruction been given. Strickland 466 U.S. at 694. The

significance of an omitted instruction should be evaluated in comparison to the instruction

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 13 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 14

that was in fact given. See Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 971 (9th Cir. 2001). 

At trial, the no contest plea was admitted for the express purpose of confronting

Taplin’s girlfriend Jasmine after she apparently disavowed the version of events she had

previously told police: 

Jasmine testified that Taplin was her boyfriend, and that they were both

present in her garage when Gadsden arrived there at 2:30 a.m. on June 18,

2001, but she denied making the statements to Detective Mata that he attributed

to her. In an attempt to show her bias, the prosecutor asked Jasmine whether

she was aware that Taplin was charged with possession of stolen property as a

codefendant in this case. When Jasmine responded in the affirmative, the

prosecutor then asked her whether she was aware that Taplin had pleaded

guilty to the charges. Jasmine responded that she was not aware of that, and

that she had spoken to Detective Mata before Taplin was charged.

(Slip Op. at 14.) 

The Court of Appeal concluded that regardless of whether White’s counsel should

have requested a limiting instruction, that no prejudice resulted:

We also find no incompetence of counsel warranting reversal. A

conviction will not be reversed on appeal based on a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel unless a defendant establishes both (1) that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, a

determination more favorable to the defendant would have resulted. If the

defendant makes an insufficient showing on either one of these components,

the ineffective assistance claim fails. (People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891,

935-936 (Padilla), overruled on another ground in People v. Hill (1999) 17

Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1.)

We will assume for the sake of discussion that defense counsel should

have requested a limiting instruction after Jasmine's testimony. However, we

conclude that defendants were not prejudiced by the absence of such an

instruction. The prosecutor presented the evidence of Taplin's guilty plea for

the limited purpose of showing Jasmine's bias. The prosecutor's argument about

the evidence limited the relevance of the evidence. The facts of the case,

including the fact that the stolen property was recovered from Gadsden and

White, overshadows the potential prejudice of the plea evidence. The court

gave CALJIC No. 2.09, although it did not instruct that it applied to evidence

of Taplin's plea. The possibility that such an instruction, had it been requested

and given, would have led to a result more favorable to defendants is not

reasonably probable " 'since the likelihood of the jury's using the evidence for

an improper purpose was so minimal under the facts of this case that any

conceivable error was harmless.'" (Padilla, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 951.)

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 14 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

CALJIC No. 2.09 provides: “Certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. 

At the time this evidence was admitted you were instructed that it could not be considered by

you for any purpose other than the limited purposed for which it was admitted. Do not

consider this evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for which it was admitted.”

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 15

(Slip Op. at 16.) This is a reasonable application of the Strickland standard because, as the

Court of Appeal reasons, the lack of a cautionary instruction did not likely result in prejudice

to petitioner. The plea evidence was admitted for the limited purpose of providing a potential

source of bias for Jasmine’s testimony. The prosecutor only presented the evidence for that

limited purpose, and did not attempt to expand the purpose for which the evidence could be

considered or make any guilt-by-association argument. (RT at 593.) In addition, the jury

was given a general limiting instruction, pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.092

, to only consider

evidence for the limited purpose for which it was admitted. And although this instruction

was not specifically directed at the evidence of Taplin’s no contest plea, it significantly

reduces the impact of the omitted instruction. See Murtishaw, 255 F.3d at 971.

Assessing the omitted instruction within the context of the trial record and the

instruction that was given, the lack of a specific limiting instruction regarding Taplin’s no

contest plea does not undermine confidence in the verdict. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

As a result, the state court reasonably concluded that counsel’s failure to request such an

instruction was not prejudicial, and the claim fails as a basis for habeas relief. 

5. Solorio’s Alleged Request to Buy Ecstasy

Petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that Solorio’s alleged

request to purchase ecstasy should be admitted as circumstantial evidence of Solorio’s intent

to willingly accompany petitioner. To satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland, petitioner

would need to show that while the statement was admitted at trial for the purpose of

establishing his own state of mind, had it been admitted for the purpose of establishing

Solorio’s state of mind, it is reasonably probable that “the result of the proceeding would

have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 15 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

CALJIC No. 9.54 provides:

“In order to prove this crime, each of the following elements must be proved: 

1. A person was [unlawfully] moved by the use of physical force; [or] A person

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 16

At trial, as per counsel’s motion, the statement was admitted, but only to show

petitioner’s state of mind:

 White testified that Solorio asked, "Do you guys know where to get

some ecstasy[?]" The prosecutor had objected to admission of this testimony,

but the trial court overruled the objection when White's counsel stated that the

testimony was not offered for its truth but only to show White's state of mind.

During his argument to the jury, the prosecutor reminded the jury that the court

had ruled that the testimony was not admitted for its truth but only to show

White's state of mind. The prosecutor argued that the evidence was admitted to

show why White did what he did, but that the jury was not allowed to consider

it proved that the statement was made or its effect on Gadsden. " 'You are not

to consider this evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for which

it was admitted.' "

(Slip Op. at 17.)

The Court of Appeal determined that this claim failed under the prejudice prong of

Strickland because the jury was able to consider the evidence to evaluate petitioner’s state of

mind and nonetheless convicted upon the kidnapping charge: 

Defendants argue on appeal that their counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to offer the evidence of Solorio's request to buy ecstasy as

circumstantial evidence of Solorio's intent and conduct in conformity with that

intent: "the request tended to prove that Solorio went willingly with

[defendants] and was not kidnapped. If admitted for this purpose, evidence of

Solorio's inquiry would have supported the defense theory that he lied about

the charged offense to avoid getting in trouble for trying to buy ecstasy to take

with underage girls." We find no incompetence of counsel.

The jury was allowed to consider White's testimony about Solorio's

request to buy ecstasy for the effect it had on White. That is, the jury could

have properly considered the statement as evidence that White believed that

Solorio was driving the car with defendants willingly. Accordingly, the jury

could have found that there was no kidnapping because Solorio was not moved

against his will, as Gadsden's counsel argued to the jury. The jury necessarily

rejected counsel's argument when it found both defendants guilty of

kidnapping. Neither defendant was prejudiced by their counsel's failure to

request that the testimony be admitted as circumstantial evidence that Solorio

went with defendants willingly and was not kidnapped.

(Slip Op. at 18.) 

Petitioner’s state of mind, however, is not the only probative factor. The jury was

instructed that to convict petitioner of kidnapping to commit robbery3

, they would need to

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 16 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

was [unlawfully] compelled to move because of a reasonable apprehension of

harm; 

2. The movement of that person was caused with the specific intent to commit

robbery, and the person causing the movement had the required specific intent

when the movement commenced; 

3. The movement of the person was without that person's consent; 

4. The movement of the person was for a substantial distance, that is, a distance

more than slight, brief or trivial; and 

5. The movement substantially increased the risk of harm to the person moved,

over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself.” 

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 17

find that the victim was both “compelled to move because of a reasonable apprehension of

harm” and that the movement “was without that person's consent.” (CT at 472-4.) The

defense theory that Solorio went along willingly on a drug deal would negate both of these

elements, because he would have been moving consensually and not as a result of an

apprehension of harm. Therefore, evidence of Solorio’s state of mind, if persuasive, could

also be important in determining petitioner’s guilt. 

As a result of the limited admission of the statement, however, the prosecutor was able

to effectively limit the jury to only considering its effect on petitioner’s state of mind: 

And the specific thing I’m talking about is Mr. White claims that Jesus

Solorio said, “Do you know where I can get some X?” I objected. The judge

said it comes in only – not for the truth, but only as how it informed you about

Mr. White’s state of mind. 

So it’s about what he thinks about it, not that it was actually said, not

that it’s true, not that – you can’t – I know it’s difficult. I see some of you

puzzling over it. It’s to inform you about why he did what he did. No effect on

Mr. Gadsden. You can’t say, “Oh, it’s been proven that Jesus Solorio wanted

ecstasy.” It hasn’t. You are, by law, not allowed to do that.

“You are not consider this evidence for any purpose except the limited

purpose for which it was admitted.”

(RT at 669-70.)

Petitioner satisfies the deficiency prong of Strickland because a reasonably competent

defense attorney would have known that the hearsay rule does not apply to a statement

“offered to prove conduct of the declarant in conformity with that state of mind.” People v.

Jones, 917 P.2d 1165 (Cal. 1996); see also Cal. Evid. Code § 1250. As petitioner’s testimony

was evidence that was central to the defense theory, this performance falls below an

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 17 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 18

“objective standard of reasonableness” under Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687-8. 

The prejudice prong, however, is where petitioner’s claim fails. If counsel had not

been deficient, the jury would still need to find petitioner’s story to be credible. But the jury

clearly did not believe petitioner’s statement when it was admitted for the purpose of

establishing his own state of mind. By convicting petitioner, the jury necessarily disbelieved

his testimony that Solorio had asked to purchase ecstasy from petitioner and Gadsden;

otherwise, as the California Court of Appeal explained, had they believed such testimony,

they could not have found petitioner had the requisite intent for kidnaping. It is unlikely that

the jury would have believed petitioner’s statement as it applied to Solorio’s state of mind

even though they did not believe it about his own state of mind. 

Therefore, the state court’s application of Strickland was reasonable in finding no

prejudice: it is not reasonably probable that if the alternate basis for admission had been

advanced that the jury would have returned a different verdict. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at

694. Hence, this claim is inadequate for relief.

6. Exclusion of Solorio’s Prior Misconduct

Petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the exclusion of

evidence of Solorio’s prior misdemeanor conviction on the grounds that excluding such

evidence violated his constitutional rights to due process, to confront witnesses against him,

and to present a defense. Because there is no ineffectiveness of counsel for not making futile

objections, the court must examine whether such objections had merit. See Juan H., 408 F.3d

at 1273.

At trial, the judge ruled that Solorio’s prior misdemeanor conviction for sex with a

minor was more prejudicial than probative and excluded use of the evidence for

impeachment purposes: 

The prosecutor moved in limine to exclude, on Evidence Code section

352 7 grounds, evidence that Solorio had an October 2001 misdemeanor

conviction for having sexual intercourse with a minor more than three years

younger than him ( § 261.5, subd. (c)). The prosecutor argued that the jury was

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 18 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 19

likely to overreact to the conviction resulting in substantial prejudice and that

proving the underlying conduct would result in an undue consumption of time.

At the hearing on the motion, the prosecutor conceded that the offense was a

crime of moral turpitude. The court disagreed that it would involve an undue

consumption of time, but felt that the probative value of the evidence was

outweighed by its undue prejudice "given the nature of the conviction to the

witness and potential for confusing the issues."

(Slip Op. at 10-11.)

The Confrontation Clause does not prevent a trial judge from imposing reasonable

limits on cross-examination based on concerns of harassment, prejudice, confusion of issues,

witness safety or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. See Van

Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. To determine whether a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment

right of confrontation has been violated by the exclusion of evidence on cross-examination, a

court must inquire whether: “(1) the evidence was relevant; (2) there were other legitimate

interests outweighing the defendant’s interests in presenting the evidence; and (3) the

exclusion of evidence left the jury with sufficient information to assess the credibility of the

witness.” See United States v. Beardslee, 197 F.3d 378, 383 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing United

States v. James, 139 F.3d 709, 713 (9th Cir.1998)).

Revealing possible bias or self interest on the part of a prosecution witness is part of

the right to confront, cross examine and test the credibility of that witness before the jury. 

See Chipman v. Mercer, 628 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 1980). But so long as the jury is given

sufficient information to evaluate the witness’s biases and motivations without the disputed

material, there is no Confrontation Clause violation. See United States v. Bridgeforth, 441

F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The due process right to a fair trial and the right to present a defense (similar to the

Confrontation Clause inquiry) require balancing multiple factors to determine whether the

exclusion of evidence is improper: (1) the probative value of the excluded evidence on the

central issue, (2) its reliability, (3) whether it is capable of evaluation by the trier of fact, (4)

whether it is the sole evidence on the issue or merely cumulative, and (5) whether it

constitutes a major part of the attempted defense. Su Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1004

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 19 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 20

(9th Cir. 2004). This balancing, however, is done while remaining mindful of the state

interests underlying the evidentiary rules on which the exclusion was based. Id. at 1006.

According to the Court of Appeal, the jury still had a sufficient basis to determine

Solorio’s credibility even absent the evidence of prior misconduct: 

The trial court in this case consciously exercised its discretion under

Evidence Code section 352. The court concluded that although the

misdemeanor evidence was admissible for impeachment, it was also highly

prejudicial, given the nature of the conviction, and had a potential for confusing

the issues. In general, a misdemeanor is a less forceful indicator of immoral

character or dishonesty than is a felony. (Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 296.)

In addition, misdemeanor conduct evidence entails problems of moral turpitude

evaluation that felony convictions do not present (ibid.) and crimes involving a

general readiness to do evil are less indicative of a witness's veracity in

testifying than crimes of dishonesty. (People v. Thornton (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th

419, 422.) The trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion under

Evidence Code section 352 when it found that the relevance of Solorio's

misdemeanor conduct was outweighed by its prejudice and potential for

confusion. We will not disturb the trial court's ruling.

Nor do we find that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

failing to object to the trial court's ruling on the grounds that it violated their

constitutional rights to confrontation and to present a defense. A trial court may

restrict cross-examination of an adverse witness pursuant to Evidence Code

section 352 despite the strictures of the confrontation clause. (People v.

Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 623-624 (Quartermain).) "The ordinary

rules of evidence do not infringe on a defendant's right to present a defense.

[Citation.] Trial courts possess the 'traditional and intrinsic power to exercise

discretion to control the admission of evidence in the interests of orderly

procedure and the avoidance of prejudice.' [Citation.]" (People v. Frye (1998)

18 Cal.4th 894, 945 (Frye).) A trial court's limitation on cross-examination

regarding the credibility of a witness does not violate the confrontation clause

unless a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different

impression of the witness's credibility had the excluded cross-examination been

permitted. (Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 946; Quartermain, supra, 16 Cal.4th at

¶. 623-624.)

In this case, Solorio was repeatedly confronted with contradictions

between his trial testimony and prior statements, and his credibility was

extensively impeached. Solorio admitted that he had told different stories when

he first reported the robbery the night it occurred, when he talked to Detective

Mata on June 19, 2001, when he testified at the preliminary hearing, and when

he testified at trial. For instance, at the preliminary hearing and at trial, Solorio

testified that he was inside his car when defendants came up and asked about

the stereo, but in his first statement to police he said that Gadsden pointed a

gun at him and ordered him into the car. In his statement to Detective Mata he

said that Gadsden asked him for a cigarette, White entered the rear passenger

seat of the car and pointed a gun at him, and Gadsden ordered him into the car

because "We're going for a ride." At trial Solorio testified that White was in the

front seat and did not pull a gun until after the officer entered and left the

parking lot. At the preliminary hearing Solorio testified that White had a pocket

knife that he used to poke Solorio in the stomach, but at trial he admitted that

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 20 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 21

he had never mentioned a knife to police. In his statement to police Solorio said

that he switched seats with White at a 7-11 store and that White drove to the

apartment complex, while at trial Solorio testified that he himself drove to the

apartment complex. Even if the trial court erred in failing to allow defendant to be cross-examined regarding his prior misdemeanor conduct, a reasonable

jury would not have received a significantly different impression of Solorio's

credibility. Thus, there was no confrontation clause violation and counsel

cannot be faulted for failing to argue that there was.

(Slip Op. at 12-14) (emphasis added).

Counsel for petitioner attempted to advance a theory connecting Solorio’s prior

misdemeanor conviction for sex with his underage girlfriend, his taking underage girls to the

club on the night in question, and his alleged request to buy ecstasy. At trial, counsel for

petitioner’s co-defendant, Gadsden, argued against the exclusion of the prior misconduct,

saying: "our defense is basically going to be a drug deal gone bad, . . . And I think that his

going to a club with people who are basically underage, something which is consistent with

what we hear from the moral turpitude prior, is something that the jury should know about

Mr. Solorio." (Slip Op at 11.) On appeal, the argument was framed thus: “[a]dmission of the

impeachment evidence would have strongly supported the defense theory that Solorio lied

about the charged offenses in order to avoid getting in trouble for additional unlawful

conduct with underage girls: trying to buy ecstasy to take with the seventeen and eighteenyear-old girls who accompanied him to the night club.” (Appellant’s Opening Brief at 23)

(attached as Resp.’s Ex. C). The relevance of the prior misconduct purportedly goes to a

specific bias or motivation: Solorio would be willing to lie about agreeing to go with

petitioner to buy drugs in order to avoid getting in trouble himself. 

In this case, however, the connection between the prior misconduct and the defense

theory is simply too remote to cause a constitutional violation. The quintessential instance of

biased self-interest is where a prosecution witness has received a deal in return for

incriminating testimony. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673. In such a situation, the benefit to

the witness is undisputed and the point of contention is whether the witness is biased as a

result. But here, the source of bias is entirely speculative: Solorio’s motive to lie exists only

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 21 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 22

if he did indeed try to buy ecstacy, a contention that finds little support in the record. Where

the proffered motivation to lie on the part of the victim of a crime is barely more than a

hypothetical, there is no constitutional guarantee to its admission, particularly when weighed

against the state interest of excluding prejudicial evidence. Here, the inflammatory nature of

Solorio’s prior offense presented a considerable risk of undue prejudice.

The analysis under the Sixth Amendment right to mount a defense and under due

process leads to the same conclusion. It is a constitutional violation to exclude critical,

corroborative defense evidence, but there is no violation where the evidence is only of

dubious probative value. See Su Chia, 360 F.3d at 1003; see also DePetris v. Kuykendall,

239 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001). When there is a countervailing state interest, exclusion

of such evidence is often proper: “[w]hile the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of

defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to

the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial

judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such

as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” Holmes v.

South Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1732 (2006).

Exclusion of evidence of Solorio’s prior misdemeanor, which had only marginal

relevance, did not violate the Confrontation Clause, the right to due process, or the right to

raise a defense in light its inherently prejudicial nature. Thus, counsel could not raise

meritorious objections to the exclusion of this evidence on these grounds. Consequently,

counsel’s failure to make such objections was neither deficient nor prejudicial, and the state

court’s denial of these claims was a reasonable application of federal law. Accordingly,

petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

//

//

//

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 22 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

N:\MJJ\Week of 7.16.07\white.dny.wpd 23

CONCLUSION 

In light of the foregoing, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The Clerk shall close the file and terminate any pending motions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 

____________________________

MARTIN J. JENKINS

United States District Judge 

Case 3:05-cv-04341-MJJ Document 13 Filed 07/17/07 Page 23 of 23