Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00911/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00911-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Baroya
Defendant
Calderon
Defendant
Fam
Defendant
Griffin
Defendant
Hamilton
Defendant
Carlos D. Hendon
Plaintiff
Reidman
Defendant

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Plaintiff does not specify where defendants are employed. The Court presumes that CCI 1

refers to California Correctional Institution at Tehachapi. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS D. HENDON, 

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

BAROYA, et al.,

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

NO. 1:09-cv—911-MJS-PC

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY

PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

SHOULD NOT BE DENIED

RESPONSE DUE IN THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 1)

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). 

Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR) at California State Prison Sacramento. Plaintiff identifies the following

defendants: “Baroya, Fam, Griffin, Hamilton, Calderon, and Reidman are employed by or under

contract with CCI as prison physicians.” (Compl. ¶ IIB.) Plaintiff’s statement of claim, in its 1

entirety, reads:

From June 5, 2002 to March 27, 2003, plaintiff was almost always

removed from suicide watch and placed in regular cell by

defendant Baroya, despite plaintiff being suicidal. Plaintiff was

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often placed in cells not equipped for suicidal inmates that had

surfaces with which he could harm himself and contained items

such as clothing, sheets, towels, and other things that could be used

to tie and suspend items. Defendants Fam, Griffin, Hamilton,

Reidman, including Warden Calderon knew that plaintiff had a

history of suicidality; they knew of the repeated decisions to

remove plaintiff from suicide watch; and they took no steps either

to object to the decision to remove plaintiff from suicide watch, or

to move plaintiff back to suicide watch. 

(Compl. ¶ III.) 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner bring a

civil action . . . under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more occasions, while incarcerated

or detained in a facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was

dismissed on the ground that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious injury.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915(g). Plaintiff has, on three occasions, suffered dismissals for failure to state a claim on

which relief could be granted: Hendon v. Witcher, 1:05-cv-01246-AWI-DLB-PC (E. D. Cal.,

dismissed on August 6, 2007); Hendon v. Rogel, 2:05-cv-01063-DFL-PAN-PC(E. D. Cal.,

dismissed on August 28, 2006); Hendon v. White, 2:07-cv-01825-GEB-CMK-PC (E. D. Cal.,

dismissed on February 5, 2008). Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to proceed in forma pauperis

unless he alleges facts indicating that he is in imminent danger of serious injury.

Plaintiff’s allegation is that during an approximate nine month period of time in 2002 and

2003, defendants failed to object to the removal of plaintiff from suicide watch. 

In Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047 (9 Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit adopted the th

view that “requiring a prisoner to ‘allege [ ] an ongoing danger’ - the standard adopted by the

Eighth Circuit - is the most sensible way to interpret the imminency requirement.” Id. at 1056,

citing Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8 Cir. 2003). Andrews held that the imminent th

danger faced by the prisoner need not be limited to the time frame of the filing of the complaint,

but may be satisfied by alleging a danger that is on-going. Therefore, plaintiff may satisfy the

imminent danger exception to the three strikes rule by alleging facts indicating an ongoing

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danger. 

In his most recent previous case, Hendon v White, case number 2:07-cv-01825, plaintiff

made quite similar allegations as he does in this case, although with reference to a later date. He

alleged:

On March 20, 2006, I was abruptly removed from the suicide

watch 

by defendant Davidson, the prison psychologist, despite his

knowledge that I was still suicidal, and that same day I was denied

readmittance to the suicide watch by defendant White, the prison

psychiatrist, despite my protestations that I was suicidal and

confined in a regular cell that was not equipped for a known

suicidal inmate. 

As a result, I later cut my wrist in which I had to be readmitted to

the suicide watch that same day.

The unequip cell had surfaces with which I could harm myself, and

contained items such as clothing, sheets, towels, and other things

that could be used to tie and suspend items.

Both defendants know of my history of suicidality, including my

prior suicide attempts and know that there was a substantial risk

that I would attempt suicide. Despite this knowledge, defendants

failed to intervene and provide appropriate mental health

intervention to protect me from harming myself, and, for all

practical purposes, simply abandoned me as a patient.

Prison rules required that I remained on suicide watch until I

uttered the “magic words” that I was not suicidal, and be admitted

after such otherwise utterance.

Simply subjecting me to remain in a cell not designed for suicidal

inmates while suicidal inherently posed a likelihood of selfinjurious behavior as illustrated before the inevitably suicide itself.

( Id., Compl. ¶¶ 9-14.) 

Prison grievance decisions attached to plaintiff’s complaint in the White case revealed

additional facts: Plaintiff was taken off suicide watch as a result of a series of daily assessments. 

He was evaluated on a number of factors determined to constitute suicidality. The defendant in

that case, Dr. Kelly, acted according to plaintiff’s signs and symptoms and using his best

judgment. (Id . F&R of January 4, 2008). After analyzing plaintiff’s allegation under relevant

case law, the court ruled:

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In this case, the court notes the consistent description of plaintiff’s

claim, as revealed by documents attached to the complaint and

which are considered part of the complaint. See Branch v. Tunnell,

14 F.3d 449, 454 (9 Cir. 1994). Specifically, it is clear that th

plaintiff was examined by mental health professionals and that

plaintiff’s claim is based on his assertion that defendants made

mistakes and were otherwise professionally negligent when it was

decided that plaintiff no longer required suicide precautions. 

Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not,

however, give rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a difference of opinion

between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the

appropriate course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth

Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th

Cir. 1996). 

(Id.)

Since plaintiff failed to state a claim under similar allegations in 2006, it follows that he

fails to allege facts indicating he was in imminent danger of serious injury when the complaint

was filed in this case in May of 2009. Though Andrews holds that a prisoner can satisfy the

exception by alleging facts indicating an ongoing danger, it limited the ongoing danger to the

time of the filing of the complaint: “In other words, the availability of the exception turns on the

conditions a prisoner faced at the time the complaint was filed, not at some earlier or later time.”

Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1053. Plaintiff may not, therefore, satisfy the exception by filing a

complaint in 2009 regarding a failure to keep plaintiff on suicide watch in 2002 and 2003

particularly when plaintiff could not state a claim on similar allegations in 2007. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff shall show cause, within thirty

days of the date of service of this order, why his application to proceed in forma pauperis should

not be denied pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and why plaintiff should not be directed to submit

the $350 filing fee, in full, or suffer dismissal pursuant to Local Rule 110. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 8, 2010 /s/Michael J. Seng 

ci4d6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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