Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03876/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03876-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
33 Media Companies and Organizations
Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)
Taya Kyle
Appellant
The First Amendment Scholars
Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)
Thomas More Law Center
Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)
Jesse Ventura
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3876

___________________________

Jesse Ventura, also known as James G. Janos

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Taya Kyle, as Executor of the Estate of Chris Kyle

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

------------------------------

33 Media Companies and Organizations; The First Amendment Scholars; Thomas

More Law Center

lllllllllllllllllllllAmici on Behalf of Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis

____________

 Submitted: October 20, 2015

 Filed: June 13, 2016

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, SMITH and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

____________

RILEY, Chief Judge.

Appellate Case: 14-3876 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Entry ID: 4410990 
Before his death, Chris Kyle was a sniper for a United States Navy Sea, Air and

Land (SEAL) team. He authored the book American Sniper: The Autobiography of 1

the Most Lethal Sniper in U.S. Military History (American Sniper). In the book, Kyle

described punching a “celebrity” referred to as “Scruff Face” who was making

offensive remarks about the SEALs at a gathering following the funeral of a SEAL

killed in combat. In interviews about the book, Kyle revealed “Scruff Face” was

James Janos, better known as Jesse Ventura. Ventura, who was at the bar but denied

a fight occurred, sued Kyle in this diversity action under Minnesota law for

2

defamation, misappropriation, and unjust enrichment, alleging Kyle fabricated the

incident. The jury found in favor of Ventura on the defamation claim, awarding

$500,000 in damages, and found in Kyle’s favor on the misappropriation claim. 

Serving in its advisory role as to the equitable unjust-enrichment claim, the jury

recommended an award of approximately $1.35 million, which the district court

adopted. Kyle appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for judgment as a

matter of law or a new trial. Having jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we

reverse and remand, in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The alleged altercation underlying this action occurred at McP’s, a bar in

Coronado, California, where Kyle and some friends were gathered in October 2006

after the funeral of a fellow SEAL. According to Kyle, 

Scruff started running his mouth about the war and everything and

anything he could connect to it. President Bush was an asshole. We were

only over there [Iraq] because Bush wanted to show up his father. We

Kyle was killed in 2013 and his wife Taya Kyle, as executor of his estate, was 1

substituted as the defendant. We continue to refer to the defendant in this case as

“Kyle.”

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

2

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Appellate Case: 14-3876 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Entry ID: 4410990 
were doing the wrong thing, killing men and women and children and

murdering. . . . 

Scruff said he hates America.

Kyle approached Scruff and asked him to “cool it.” “You deserve to lose a few,”

Scruff replied. Kyle was “calm,” but Scruff swung at him. Kyle “laid him out. 

Tables flew. Stuff happened. Scruff Face ended up on the floor. [Kyle] left.”

On January 4, 2012, the day after his book wasreleased, Kyle was interviewed

on a radio program and the television program “The O’Reilly Factor” to promote the

book. During the radio interview, one of the hosts said there was a caller on the line

who was saying Kyle was “in a bar fight with Jesse [Ventura],” a political

commentator who formerly served as the Governor of Minnesota and in the Navy

special forces. When asked if this was true, Kyle confirmed it was. During the

television interview later that day, host Bill O’Reilly asked Kyle, “[Y]ou say you

knocked Jesse Ventura to the floor with a punch. Now, you don’t mention his name,

but everybody knows who that is. . . . [T]hat happened?” Kyle again confirmed he

“knocked him down.” In the interviews, Kyle described the events similarly to the

way he did in the book, adding that after he punched Ventura, “I took off running,

because the cops were already outside. . . . [C]ops were watching, they saw the whole

thing happen.”

Kyle’s editor described the publicity resulting from Kyle’s radio interview as

“priceless” in an email, and Kyle’s publicist agreed the publicity response was “HOT,

hot, hot!” The book was by all accounts a success. In 2014, Kyle’s editor testified

1.5 million copies had been sold.

After the interviews, Ventura sued Kyle for defamation, misappropriation, and

unjust enrichment on the grounds that Kyle fabricated the entire interaction with

Ventura. Kyle moved for summary judgment on Ventura’s claims of

misappropriation and unjust enrichment, emphasizing he had “provided the Court

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Appellate Case: 14-3876 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Entry ID: 4410990 
with case after case, all rejecting these types of . . . claims in the context of expressive

works.” The district court denied the motion. 

At the close of discovery, Kyle moved for summary judgment on all claims. 

The district court concluded Kyle was not entitled to summary judgment on Ventura’s

defamation claim because “Ventura has proffered sufficient evidence upon which a

jury could conclude that Kyle’s statements [in the book] were materially false.” The

district court noted there were conflicting eyewitness accounts ofthe alleged incident,

and photos of Ventura fromthe following day showed no visible injuries. The district

court also rejected Kyle’s rehearsed motion as to the misappropriation and unjustenrichment claims. 

The case was tried in summer 2014, almost eight years after the alleged

altercation. Ventura testified he had a normal evening without any verbal or physical

altercation. Three people who were with him that evening also testified they

witnessed no altercation. However, these people were not in Ventura’s immediate

vicinity for the entire evening, and one testified he was hard of hearing. 

Ventura also introduced evidence Kyle told different versions ofthe story. For

example, in the book, Kyle alleged Ventura took the first swing, but he did not

mention that in his interviews. Kyle mentioned in the interviews, but not the book,

that the police saw the whole incident. Ventura produced a letter from the Coronado

police department stating there was no police record mentioning Ventura’s or Kyle’s

name. Ventura introduced photos of himself at a graduation event the day after the

alleged incident that show no obvious injuries, despite Kyle having written “rumor

has it he showed up at the BUD/S graduation with a black eye.” 

The jury watched part of Kyle’s video-recorded deposition recounting his

version of the evening’s events. Kyle also presented several witnesses who were at

the bar that evening, who testified they either heard Ventura make the alleged

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Appellate Case: 14-3876 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Entry ID: 4410990 
comments, witnessed some type of physical altercation, or both. All of Kyle’s

witnesses were current or former SEALs or friends or family of SEALs. 

At least seven witnesses testified they overheard some of Ventura’s remarks,

and offered generally similar accounts of what Ventura said. At least seven witnesses

testified they saw Kyle (or an unidentified man, for those who did not know Kyle)

punch Ventura; saw Ventura on the ground or getting up off the ground; or heard a

“commotion” or “yelling.” Witness estimates of the timing and location of the

incident were not consistent.

When questioned on cross-examination, Ventura agreed he had previously

made controversial comments such as, “More and more we’re seeing an Army run by

Christianist extremists and an accompanying cadre of what can only be described as

neo-Nazis.” 

Two witnessesfromHarperCollins,American Sniper’s publisher, also testified

at trial. Sharyn Rosenblum, HarperCollins’s publicist for Kyle’s book, testified about

the general process of preparing the book for publication and said she did not know

who “Scruff Face” was when she read the manuscript of the book, and did not ask. 

She testified she did not see the “Scruff Face” subchapter as relevant to her publicity

campaign for the book but she wanted to focus on “the themes of the war, military

service, love of country, [and] the patriotism to serve one’s country.” She was

“surprise[d]” when Ventura’s name came up in Kyle’s interview. When asked

whether “the Ventura story ha[d] any impact on the success of the book,” Rosenblum

replied it was “a very insignificant part” and did not impact the book’s success. 

Kyle’s editor, Peter Hubbard, testified the “Scruff Face” story was not relevant to his

decision to enter into a book contract with Kyle. Hubbard indicated he never

suggested incorporating thatsubchapter into HarperCollins’s marketing campaign for

the book. He characterized the “mention of Jesse Ventura” as having a “negligible”

effect on the success of the book. 

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Appellate Case: 14-3876 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Entry ID: 4410990 
Ventura’s counsel sought to impeach the HarperCollins witnesses by

questioning them about Kyle’s and HarperCollins’s insurance coverage to show

HarperCollins had “a direct financial interest in the outcome of th[e] litigation” and

the witnesses were biased in favor of Kyle. See Fed. R. Evid. 411 (permitting

questioning about insurance coverage to show a witness’s bias). Kyle’s counsel

objected to this testimony prior to its introduction, but the district court allowed it. 

See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (providing that otherwise admissible evidence may be excluded

“if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair

prejudice”). 

Ventura’s counsel asked Rosenblum, “[A]re you aware that the legal fees for

the estate’s attorneys . . . are being paid by the insurance company for

HarperCollins?” and “Are you aware that HarperCollins has a directfinancial interest

in the outcome of this litigation because they are providing the insurance?” 

Rosenblum denied knowledge of HarperCollins’s insurance policy. Ventura’s

counsel asked Hubbard if he knew about any insurance provisions in Kyle’s contract

with HarperCollins. He said he did not. Kyle’s counsel moved for a mistrial after

both inquiries. The district court denied both motions. 

Then, during closing arguments, Ventura’s counsel opined:

Sharyn Rosenblum testified thatshe did not know her company’s

insurer is on the hook if you find that Jesse Ventura was defamed. Both

her and Peter Hubbard also testified that they do not know that their

company’s insurer was paying for the defense of this lawsuit. But they

are not the disinterested, unbiased witnesses they were put in front of

you for you to believe. It’s hard to believe that they didn’t know about

the insurance policy because it’s right in Kyle’s publishing contract. 

Paragraph 6.B.3. of Exhibit 82, Chris Kyle is an additional insured for

defamation under the publisher’s insurance policy. 

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Appellate Case: 14-3876 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Entry ID: 4410990 
Kyle’s counsel did not object in front of the jury, but moved again for a mistrial due

to the insurance references once the jury was excused. The district court again denied

the motion. Kyle’s counsel did not ask for a curative instruction and the district court

did not give one. 

The jury struggled to reach a verdict. At noon on the fourth full day of

deliberations, the jury reported they could not reach a unanimous decision. The

district court instructed the jury to continue deliberating, yet they could not reach a

verdict that day. The next morning the parties consented to permitting a 9-1 decision,

but to no avail. The jury ultimately reached an 8-2 verdict on the fifth full day of

deliberations. The jury found for Ventura on the defamation claim, made an advisory

recommendation in Ventura’s favor on the unjust-enrichment claim, and found for

Kyle on the misappropriation claim. The jury awarded damages of $500,000 for

defamation and recommended damages of approximately $1.35 million for unjust

enrichment. The district court adopted the jury’s recommendations as to the unjustenrichment claim and accompanying damages award. 

Among other assigned errors we need not reach, Kyle moved for judgment as

a matter of law or a new trial, contending the jury wasincorrectly instructed about the

falsity element of defamation, the actual-malice requirement applicable in public

figure defamation cases, and the applicable burdens of proof. Kyle argued the 3

The jury instruction on the elements of defamation described the basis for the

3

defamation claimasfollows: “PlaintiffJesse Ventura claims thatChris Kyle defamed

him by asserting in American Sniper, as well as on television and radio, that Mr.

Ventura said ‘he hates America,’ the SEALs ‘were killing men and women and

children and murdering,’ and the SEALs ‘deserve to lose a few.’” The jury was then

instructed that Ventura was required to prove the “story” was “defamatory” and

“materially false” and Kyle “published the story knowing it was false, believing it

was false, or having serious doubts about its truth.” 

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Appellate Case: 14-3876 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Entry ID: 4410990 
unjust-enrichment judgment violated Minnesota law and the First Amendment and

Ventura did not prove the amount he was enriched. Finally, he sought a new trial on

the grounds that the jury’s “awards were tainted by the admission of prejudicial

testimony and argument regarding [Kyle’s] insurance.” The district court denied

Kyle’s motion. Kyle appeals.

We vacate the defamation judgment and damages award and remand that claim

for a new trial. We further reverse the unjust-enrichment judgment, and vacate the

accompanying damages award.

4

II. DISCUSSION

A. Defamation Claim

The district court may grant a new trial on all or some issues “after a jury trial,

for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law

in federal court; or . . . after a nonjury trial, for any reason for which a rehearing has

heretofore been granted in a suit in equity in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

59(a)(1)(A), (B). We review the district court’s denial of a new trial “for a ‘clear

abuse of discretion.’” Behlmann v. Century Sur. Co., 794 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir.

2015) (quoting Burris v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 875, 878 (8th Cir.

During deliberations, the jury asked, “when referring to Mr. Ventura’s story

(Punching Out Scruff Face) is the ‘story’ the sub-chapter or the 3 lines? (‘he hates

America,’ ‘we[’]re killing men & women and children and murdering,’ ‘deserve to

lose a few’).” Over Kyle’s objection, the district court responded, “‘The story,’ as

used in [the instructions] refers to the statements Mr. Kyle made about Mr. Ventura

in the Punching Out Scruff Face subchapter and on television and radio, which

include the three statements identified in your question. You are instructed to

consider each element . . . as to the story as a whole.” Kyle argues these instructions

were contradictory and leave unclear the basis for the defamation judgment, but we

do not reach this assigned error because we conclude a new trial is warranted on other

grounds. 

We need not decide Kyle’s other assignments of error. 4

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Appellate Case: 14-3876 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Entry ID: 4410990 
2015)). Kyle argues he is entitled to a new trial because the district court clearly

abused its discretion by permitting Ventura to ask questions that put prejudicial

information before the jury and to invoke Kyle’s insurance in closing argument.

Initially, we reject Ventura’s assertion Kyle waived any objection to the

insurance testimony and argument because he did not object to the admission of his

publishing agreement, which states, “Author will be named as an additional insured

under the terms of any insurance policy that Publisher may carry which covers the

cost of claims.” (Emphasis added). In the event the jury analyzed the lengthy

publishing contract’s fine print and learned Kyle may have had insurance, this

evidence alone would not permit Ventura’s counsel to argue to the jury that an

insurance policy including Kyle actually existed and the “insurer is on the hook.” 

See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co., 624 F.2d 749, 758 (6th Cir.

1980) (“[W]hile mention of the contractually-mandated insurance may have been

inevitable, it was prejudicial error for counsel for the City to inject into the trial the

idea that Kiewit had insurance which would cover any damages the defendant would

be obliged to pay.”). Counsel’s argument would have been improper and prejudicial,

even if the jury already was aware of an insurance policy. See id. The record

presented to this jury contained no evidence establishing an insurance policy covering

Kyle, which makes Ventura’s counsel’s argument more improper and prejudicial.

We next consider the insurance testimony elicited from the HarperCollins

employees. At trial, Ventura’s counsel asked Rosenblum whether she was aware

Kyle’s attorneys were “being paid by the insurance company for HarperCollins” and

“HarperCollins has a direct financial interest in the outcome of thislitigation because

they are providing the insurance.” Ventura’s counsel asked Hubbard whether he was

“aware of any insurance provision in [HarperCollins’s] contract [with Kyle]” and

inquired “you obtain insurance coverage in the case when an author may get sued for

libel or defamation, correct?” These questions assumed facts never in evidence—an

insurance policy purchased by HarperCollins that covered Kyle, and Kyle’s attorneys

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Appellate Case: 14-3876 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Entry ID: 4410990 
were paid by the insurer. Both witnesses denied awareness of any insurance policy. 

Kyle’s counsel objected to this questioning before Ventura’s counsel’s crossexamination, tried to object at the time, and moved for a mistrial after each witness

testified. The district court permitted this cross-examination, by which Ventura’s

counsel ostensibly sought to show the HarperCollins witnesses were biased in favor

of Kyle because HarperCollins and Kyle were covered by the same insurance policy. 

Rule 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits the introduction of

insurance evidence to prove whether a person acted wrongfully but permits it for

other purposes, such as proving a witness’s bias. For example, we have permitted the

use of evidence of insurance to show bias where a defense witness was employed by

the defendant’s insurance company. See, e.g., Charter v. Chleborad, 551 F.2d 246,

248 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); see also 23 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W.

Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5367 (1st ed. 1980) (“The paradigm

case for use of evidence of insurance to show bias is in the cross-examination of a

claims adjuster or insurance company doctor.”). 

Other “economic tie[s]” may “influence the witness to favor the insurance

company,” including “ownership of stock in the company, or a promise of

employment, or a promise to pay the witness directly for his testimony.” Wright &

Graham, supra § 5367 (footnotes omitted). 

A majority of jurisdictions addressing this issue have applied a

“substantial connection” analysis in order to balance the probative value

and potential prejudice . . . . The substantial connection analysis looks

to whether a witness has “a sufficient degree of connection with the

liability insurance carrier to justify allowing proof of thisrelationship as

a means of attacking the credibility of the witness.” These courts have

rejected a mere “commonality of insurance” approach, holding that the

likelihood of bias is so attenuated that the risk of prejudice substantially

outweighs the probative value.

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Appellate Case: 14-3876 Page: 10 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Entry ID: 4410990 
Bonser v. Shainholtz, 3 P.3d 422, 425 (Colo. 2000) (quoting Otwell v. Bryant, 497

So. 2d 111, 114 (Ala. 1986)) (finding a “substantial connection” between an expert

witness and the defendant’s insurance company where the defendant and the expert

witness were both members of a small insurance trust for dentists, “the expert witness

had cofounded the trust,” payments of claims “could result in a rise in premiums

charged to all members,” and “all members would be required to absorb a share” of

any judgment exceeding the amount in the trust); cf. Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“The court

may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by

a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.”).

Here, there is no evidence Rosenblum and Hubbard had any economic tie or

“substantial connection” to HarperCollins’s insurance carrier. They were not

currently or formerly employed by the insurance company, seeking employment with

the insurance company, paid for their testimony by the insurance company, or holders

of stock in the insurance company. See Wright & Graham, supra § 5367. There was

no risk Rosenblum and Hubbard might personally contribute to the payment of any

judgment in favor of Ventura. Ventura even failed to show a judgment in his favor

could adversely affect Rosenblum’s and Hubbard’s employment with HarperCollins. 

As a matter of basic evidentiary foundation, Ventura never established by

direct evidence or reasonable inference that Rosenblum and Hubbard even knew

about any insurance coverage or possible insurance payment. Rosenblum and

Hubbard had no personal knowledge on the topic and were not qualified to testify on

the subject. See Fed. R. Evid. 602 (“A witness may testify to a matter only if

evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal

knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the

witness’s own testimony.”).

Ventura’s counsel argued in closing, “It’s hard to believe that [Rosenblum and

Hubbard] didn’t know about the insurance policy because it’s right in Kyle’s

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Appellate Case: 14-3876 Page: 11 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Entry ID: 4410990 
publishing contract.” The one-line mention of insurance contained in the lengthy

small-print contract merely acknowledges HarperCollins “may carry” insurance. 

(Emphasis added). The publishing contract does not establish HarperCollins actually

purchased insurance, much less that Rosenblum and Hubbard knew about it. 

It is difficult to envision how Rosenblum and Hubbard could have been biased

or even influenced by an insurance policy of which they were unaware. Even if they

had been aware of a policy, any “connection” they had to the insurance carrier was

far too remote to create a risk of bias strong enough to outweigh the substantial

prejudice of Ventura’s counsel’s pointed and repeated references to unproven

insurance. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. 5

The district court also concluded Taya Kyle “opened the door to [questions

5

about insurance] by testifying about the financial impact of this litigation and her use

of the book’s proceeds,” so-called “poor mouthing,” Weiss v. La Suisse, Société D’

Assurances Sur La Vie, 293 F. Supp. 2d 397, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). We respectfully

disagree.

Taya Kyle only testified on redirect examination about her use of the book’s

proceeds after Ventura’s counsel had cross-examined her about how much of the

proceeds she had donated, insinuating she was insufficiently generous. Kyle’s

counsel attempted to rebut thisinsinuation by asking Taya Kyle whether “thislawsuit

had any impact upon what you have done with the proceeds from American Sniper?”

and “Would you be able to pay the Plaintiff?” We also note the district court

correctly rejected Ventura’s “poor-mouthing” argument only the day before,

explaining in an order, “Taya Kyle’s testimony did not open the door to evidence of

insurance because her testimony was accurate—the insurance policy covers only the

defamation claim, not unjust enrichment or misappropriation, and thus proceeds from

American Sniper are at risk, as she testified.” It also is confusing how Taya Kyle’s

purported “poor-mouthing” “opened the door” to the cross-examination of other

witnesses about HarperCollins’s insurance policy, particularly witnesses so

disconnected and with no personal knowledge on the subject. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 602.

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We now consider Ventura’s counsel’s statement during closing argument that

HarperCollins’s “insurer is on the hook if you find that Jesse Ventura was defamed”

and “Kyle is an additional insured for defamation under the publisher’s insurance

policy.” (Emphasis added). As noted already, what insurer? What insurance policy?

6

Ventura suggests Kyle’s counsel did not “timely object[] during closing.” We

are not convinced Kyle’s counsel’s motion for a mistrial as soon as the jury was

excused was necessarily untimely. See Lange v. Schultz, 627 F.2d 122, 127 (8th Cir.

1980) (“‘[C]ounsel must either make an objection or . . . move for a mistrial at the

time of the alleged misconduct, or where it involves a closing argument,

counsel . . . should[] make his objection, take his exception, or ask for remedial action

at the close thereof and before the case is submitted to the jury.’” (quoting Thomson

v. Boles, 123 F.2d 487, 495-96 (8th Cir. 1941) (“[N]o exception to [the closing]

remarks was taken by the defendant either during the argument or at its close.”

(emphasis added)))). However, Ventura did not object at trial to the timeliness of

Kyle’s motion for mistrial made after closing and instructions. The district court

likewise did not question the motion’s timeliness and instead ruled on the motion’s

merits, a general topic on insurance admissibility raised before, during, and at the end

of trial. Ventura’s timeliness argument now is itself untimely.

7

From our review, these unsupported, improper, and prejudicial statements 6

were not heat of the moment argument, but were strategic and calculated.

The dissent concludes the district court did not err in denying Kyle’s motion

7

for mistrial because the motion made “after the retirement of the jury was untimely.” 

Post at 23. The district court did not deny the motion because it was untimely. What

is untimely is Ventura’s timeliness argument on appeal—not preserved in the district

court—and it should not be addressed in the first instance on the appeal of this case. 

See, e.g., Wever v. Lincoln County, Neb., 388 F.3d 601, 608 (8th Cir. 2004) 

(“Ordinarily, this court will not consider arguments raised for the first time on

appeal.”).

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When deciding whether to grant a new trial due to improper remarks by

counsel, we consider whether: (1) “the remarks in question ‘were . . . minor

aberrations made in passing’”; (2) the district court took “‘specific curative action’”;

and (3) “‘the size of the damage award . . . suggest[s] that counsel’s comment had a

prejudicial effect.’” Gilster v. Primebank, 747 F.3d 1007, 1011-12 (8th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Whittenburg v. Werner Enters. Inc., 561 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (10th Cir.

2009)). “‘[T]he weight of the evidence’ is another relevant factor in determining

‘whether the improper argument deprived a party of a fair trial.’” Id. at 1013 (quoting

Stollings v. Ryobi Techs., Inc., 725 F.3d 753, 760 (7th Cir. 2013)). 

Although relatively brief, Ventura’s counsel’s closing remarks about insurance

“‘were not minor aberrations made in passing.’” Id. at 1011 (quoting Whittenburg,

561 F.3d at 1131). Given Ventura’s repeated efforts to introduce evidence of

HarperCollins’s and Kyle’s insurance at trial, it is difficult to see how Ventura’s

counsel’s comments were anything other than “a deliberate strategic choice” to try to

influence and enhance damages by referencing an impersonal deep-pocket insurer. 

Id. (“[W]e cannot say that thisimproper argument [counsel’s vouching and sympathyarousing personal experience] ‘did not accomplish the purpose which it was clearly

intended to accomplish, namely, the enhancement of damages.’” (quoting

Whittenburg, 561 F.3d at 1132-33)); cf. Indamer Corp. v. Crandon, 217 F.2d 391, 394

(5th Cir. 1954) (noting “defendant consistently sought to inject into the case the fact

that the plaintiff had been protected by insurance”); Altenbaumer v. Lion Oil Co., 186

F.2d 35, 36 (5th Cir. 1950) (per curiam) (observing references to insurance were

“continuously brought” to the jury’s attention, which was a “gravely prejudicial error”

necessitating a new trial). 

Second, the jury did not receive a specific curative instruction, only the general

reminder that “arguments of counsel are not evidence.” Gilster, 747 F.3d at 1012

(determining the “reminder that counsel’s arguments are not evidence” was an

insufficient curative instruction, particularly where the court overruled the

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Appellate Case: 14-3876 Page: 14 Date Filed: 06/13/2016 Entry ID: 4410990 
defendant’s contemporaneous objection). But see Jones v. Nat’l Am. Univ., 608 F.3d

1039, 1048-49 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing “the district court’s admonition to the jury prior

to closing arguments that statements made by the attorneys are not evidence” as one

factor supporting the decision to deny a new trial under the plain error standard). 

Third, the jury awarded Ventura $500,000 in damages, which is probably “‘not

beyond the bounds of rationality.’” Gilster, 747 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Whittenburg,

561 F.3d at 1132). Yet, as was the case in Gilster, “we cannot say that th[e] improper

argument ‘did not accomplish the purpose which it was clearly intended to

accomplish, namely, the enhancement of damages.’” Id. (quoting Whittenburg, 561

F.3d at 1132-33). 

Fourth, this was a close case that could have “go[ne] either way.” Id. at 1013. 

After five days of deliberations, the jury could only reach an 8-2 verdict. Although

there was extrinsic evidence suggesting the falsity of Kyle’s assertions that he

punched Ventura and police witnessed that altercation arising from the alleged

statements, the trial essentially was a credibility contest between Ventura, Kyle, and

their respective eyewitnesses. 

Finally, the risk of prejudice is high. In Halladay v. Verschoor, 381 F.2d 100,

112 (8th Cir. 1967), we explained it was “utterly repugnant to a fair trial or . . . a just

verdict” for the jury to hear that “the damages sued for . . . will be taken care of by an

insurance . . . company.” We observed that “it has been almost universally held that

the receipt of such evidence constitutes prejudicial error sufficient to require

reversal.” Id.; cf. Transit Cas. Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 387 F.2d 1011, 1013-14

(8th Cir. 1967) (“The fact that [the plaintiff] wasreinsured and stood to bear only five

percent of [its] loss is a fact that obviously would impress the jury, and might well

lead it to return a defendant’s verdict . . . [and] [t]he interjection of the issue of

reinsurance was prejudicial error.”). 

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In light of this precedent, we must conclude Ventura’s counsel’s closing

remarks, in combination with the improper cross-examination oftwo witnesses about

Kyle’s insurance coverage, prevented Kyle from receiving a fair trial. The district

court clearly abused its discretion in denying a new trial. See, e.g., Frymire-Brinati

v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183, 188 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Collectively, . . . [the

errors] presented the jury such a skewed picture that the verdict is unreliable and must

be set aside.”); Malek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 994 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1993) (reversing

judgment because “[a]lthough each of the erroneous evidentiary rulings . . . , standing

alone, may be insufficient to justify reversal, we cannot say that the cumulative effect

is harmless”). But see SEC v. Infinity Grp. Co., 212 F.3d 180, 196 (3d Cir. 2000)

(rejecting cumulative error doctrine for civil cases). We remand the defamation claim

for a new trial.8

B. Unjust-Enrichment Claim

Kyle argues the unjust-enrichment judgment is inconsistent with Minnesota law

and would be prohibited by the First Amendment even if it did comport with

Minnesota law. Kyle also asserts “Ventura presented no competent evidence Kyle

was enriched.” We agree Kyle was not unjustly enriched as a matter of Minnesota

law, so we do not consider Kyle’s constitutional arguments or review the district

court’s factual findings.

9

We note the complications that can arise when a general verdict form is used 8

in public-figure defamation cases. See, e.g., Greenbelt Co-op. Pub. Ass’n v. Bresler,

398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970); West v. Media Gen. Operations, Inc., 120 F. App’x 601, 602,

619 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (collecting cases). 

The district court concluded Kyle forfeited any challenge to the unjust- 9

enrichment judgment because Kyle filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law

with the district court under FederalRule ofCivil Procedure 50, which governs issues

tried to a jury, not Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52, which governs actions tried

without a jury or with an advisory jury. The district court stated that, even if it were

to treat Kyle’s motion as a Rule 52 motion, Rule 52 applies only to factual findings,

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Under Minnesota law, “to prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment, a claimant

must establish an implied-in-law or quasi-contract in which the defendant received

a benefit of value that unjustly enriched the defendant in a manner that is illegal or

unlawful.” Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc., 820 N.W.2d 826, 838 (Minn.

2012). We agree with Kyle that “Ventura cannot maintain a claim for unjust

enrichment because he had no pre-existing contractual or quasi-contractual

relationship with Kyle.” See id. (“We have limited the application of unjust

enrichment to claims premised on an implied or quasi-contract between the claimant

and the party alleged to be unjustly enriched.”). 

Although Ventura is correct that “[a] quasi-contract will be imposed” where “a

benefit was conferred unknowingly or unwillingly,” we reject Ventura’s assertion that

Ventura conferred a “benefit” on Kyle by Ventura’s mere existence as a colorful

figure who might inspire people to make up stories about him. Galante v. Oz, Inc.,

379 N.W.2d 723, 725-26 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). Ventura’s unjust-enrichment claim

is not allowed by Minnesota law.

whereas Kyle raised legal arguments. 

We cannot agree with the district court’s conclusion that Kyle improperly

attempted to “advance new theories” in his motion for judgment as a matter of law

because he waited until after the trial to argue that equitable remedies such as unjust

enrichment are not available when adequate legal remedies exist. Fontenot v. Mesa

Petroleum Co., 791 F.2d 1207, 1219 (5th Cir. 1986). Kyle raised this point in his trial

brief. He also raised several arguments for why Ventura’s unjust-enrichment claim

failed as a matter of law in both of his motions for summary judgment, his trial brief,

and his reply trial brief. See Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc., 532 F.3d 709, 715-16

(8th Cir. 2008) (finding a “lengthy footnote” in the plaintiff’s brief in opposition to

the defendant’s motion to amend its answer was “sufficient to avoid waiver on

appeal”). On the record in this case, we conclude Kyle has preserved the issue.

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Furthermore, even if Ventura had proven the other elements of unjust

enrichment, the equitable remedy would still not be available because “‘there is an

adequate remedy at law available’” for public figures—money damages for

defamation. Bame, 721 F.3d at 1030 (quoting ServiceMaster of St. Cloud v. GAB 10

Bus. Servs., Inc., 544 N.W.2d 302, 305 (Minn. 1996)). The district court concluded

Ventura’s legal remedy was inadequate because:

damages available to [Ventura] on his defamation claim were limited to

those necessary to remedy the injury to his reputation. . . . [T]he jury was

expressly advised—at [Kyle’s] behest—that it could not award

additional damages for unjust enrichment if it found that [Ventura’s]

“damages award for defamation . . . provide[d] him with an adequate

remedy”. . . . [Ventura’s] defamation claim provided him with no means

to obtain the disgorgement of [Kyle’s] ill-gotten gains . . . . [Ventura’s]

legal remedy was inadequate to fully ameliorate [Kyle’s] wrongful

conduct, and the defamation claim did not preclude the unjustenrichment claim as a matter of law.

(Fifth insertion in original).

This conclusion was erroneous. First, whether there is an adequate remedy at

law is a question of law, not a factual question for the jury. ServiceMaster of St.

Cloud, 544 N.W.2d at 305. The jury, not aware of the legal/equitable distinction,

likely would have interpreted “adequate” to mean “enough money.” Even if the

adequacy of the legal remedy were a proper question for the jury, we note the

inconsistency in the jury’s verdict. The jury determined $500,000 would “fairly and

adequately” compensate Ventura for Kyle’s defamation, but then suggested an award

The unjust-enrichment award cannot be based on Ventura’s misappropriation 10

claim because, although Ventura did not prevail, an adequate legal remedy was

available. Cf. United States v. Bame, 721 F.3d 1025, 1031-32 (8th Cir. 2013). 

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of approximately $1.35 million for unjust enrichment, which required the jury to find

the opposite—that the defamation award was an inadequate remedy. 

Second, as a matter oflaw, adequate legal remedies were available. Neither the

district court nor Ventura cited any case awarding profits in a defamation case under

an unjust-enrichment theory, or even suggesting money damages are an inadequate

remedy in a public-figure defamation case. We find none. Cf. Silvercorp Metals Inc.

v. Anthion Mgmt. LLC, No. 150374/2011, 2012 WL 3569952, at *12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.

Aug. 16, 2012)(unreported)(“[T]he factual allegations supporting Silvercorp’s unjust

enrichment claimare identical to those giving rise to the defamation claim[and merge

into the defamation claim].”). In one of the few cases addressing the issue, a New

York state trial court observed: 

Libel has been [a] field of much litigation in both England and this

country. . . . [I]t is significant that in none of these cases has an action

such as is brought by the plaintiff in this case been instituted. The

plaintiff recognizes this fact and states: “We are undertaking to prove

additional facts never before pleaded in a libel suit, namely, that the

defendant had and received money by virtue of his libellous

publication.” The absence of attempts to bring an action similar to the

instant one is evidence of the recognition by the legal profession and the

courts that such an action would not lie under the common law. 

Hart v. E.P. Dutton & Co., 93 N.Y.S.2d 871, 879 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949); see also

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 23 (1990) (“[I]mperfect though it is, an

action for damages is the only hope for vindication or redress the law gives to a man

whose reputation has been falsely dishonored.” (emphasis added)(quotingRosenblatt

v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 93 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring))); Cason v. Baskin,

20 So. 2d 243, 254 (Fla. 1944) (en banc). In Minnesota, the defamation action

generally applies to all “claims that arise as a consequence of . . . purported

defamatory statements.” Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard, 729 N.W.2d 302, 310

(Minn. 2007). 

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We cannot accept Ventura’s unjust-enrichment theory, because it enjoys no

legal support under Minnesota law. Ventura’s unjust-enrichment claim fails as a

matter of law.

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the unjust-enrichment judgment and vacate and remand the

defamation judgment for a new trial.

SMITH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concurin the majority's reversal ofthe unjust-enrichment judgment. See supra

Part II.B. However, I disagree with majority's decision to vacate and remand the

defamation judgment for a new trial because of references to insurance in trial

testimony and closing argument. See supra Part II.A. 

In an eleven-day trial, the subject of insurance arose on the second day

following the testimony of Taya Kyle ("Taya")—Kyle's widow. Ventura's counsel

asked the court "to address . . . the admissibility of the insurance policy that's

applicable here" in light of Taya's testimony "that she's had to pay the expenses

associated with this litigation"; "that if she gives the money away to charity, that she

wouldn't be able to pay a judgment; and that if she gave the money away,she may not

be able to feed her children as a result of this litigation." Ventura's counsel argued

that courts addressing this issue "have found that this is an instance where an

insurance policy should, in fact, be admitted to counteract testimony that is clearly

inaccurate." Ventura's counsel explained that when presented with the "opportunity

to do recross on Ms. Kyle, [he] plan[ned] to ask her about whether there is an

insurance policy that, in fact, covers the legal expenses and will pay a judgment,

because that is the case." Ventura's counsel sought "permission to raise the issue of

insurance" in light of Taya purportedly opening the door to the subject. The court

reserved ruling on the admissibility of insurance pending briefing from the parties. 

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On the seventh day of trial, the court heard argument outside of the jury's

presence concerning the admissibility of insurance. Ventura's counsel again argued

that Taya should not be permitted to "'plead poverty if an insurance company is going

to pick up the tab.'" But Ventura's counsel conceded that the insurance policy covered

only the defamation claim, not the misappropriation and unjust-enrichment claims.

In a written order, the district court denied Ventura's motion to question Taya

regarding the insurance policy. The court concluded that "Taya Kyle's testimony did

not open the door to evidence of insurance because her testimony was accurate—the

insurance policy covers only the defamation claim, not unjust enrichment or

misappropriation, and thus proceeds from American Sniper are at risk, as she

testified."

Undaunted,the next day,Ventura's counsel acknowledged the court'sruling but

made an offer of proof to preserve the issue for appellate review. Ventura's counsel

proceeded to attempt to introduce, as part of that offer of proof, the insurance policy.

"And related to that matter," Ventura's counsel asked the court's permission to

"inquire [pursuant to Rule 411] asto the existence of insurance" with Rosenblum and

Hubbard,HarperCollins representatives, because ofthosewitnesses' purported "direct

financial interests in this litigation" as representatives of the insured party. The court

again reserved ruling on the issue. When the court raised the issue later in the day,

Kyle's counsel reiterated that the witnesses were "not affected by any insurance

coverage at all" and that "if HarperCollins or th[ese] witness[es] were direct

defendants, the introduction of any evidence regarding insurance would be just as off

limits as it is against Mrs. Kyle. It would be completely inappropriate to delve into

the question of insurance here." The court overruled Kyle's counsel's objection and

permitted the inquiry, although it explained that the inquiry would not "be lengthy or

in detail." 

Thereafter, Ventura's counsel asked Rosenblum whether the witness was

"aware that the legal fees for the estate's attorneys . . . are being paid by the insurance

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company for HarperCollins." Rosenblum answered no. Ventura's counsel then asked

whether Rosenblum was "aware that HarperCollins has a direct financial interest in

the outcome of this litigation because they are providing the insurance." Rosenblum

again answered no. During a sidebar conference, Kyle's counsel moved for a mistrial

based on the "introduction of the insurance testimony." The district court denied the

motion. 

Ventura's counsel subsequently asked Hubbard, whether "you obtain insurance

coverage in the case when an author may get sued for libel or defamation." Hubbard

responded, "I don't know about that." Kyle's counsel objected based on relevance, and

the court overruled the objection. Ventura's counsel then inquired whether the witness

was "aware of any insurance provisions in [Kyle's publishing] contract." Kyle's

counsel again objected based on relevance, and the court again overruled the

objection. Hubbard answered, "I'm not aware."

On the final day of trial, during closing arguments, Ventura's counsel briefly

highlighted Rosenblum's and Hubbard's ignorance of an insurance provision in 11

Kyle's publishing contract. Thereafter, the court orally instructed the jury. One of its

general instructions was that "[q]uestions, objections, statements, and arguments of

lawyers are not evidence in the case." The "[j]ury retired at 11:59 a.m." After

dispensing with a couple routine matters, the court asked whether there was anything

else that it needed to cover. At that point, Kyle's counsel moved for a mistrial based

on Ventura's counsel's references to insurance in his closing argument. The district

court denied the motion for mistrial. Court adjourned at 12:02 p.m.

The district court permitted each side an hour for closing arguments.

11

Ventura's counsel's closing argument covers approximately 30 pages of transcript.

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Based on the record, I first conclude that the district court did not err in

denying Kyle's motion for mistrial. Kyle's motion for mistrial after the retirement of

the jury was untimely.

"When reviewing the denial of a motion for a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P.

59(a), we give great deference to the district court's ruling and will not reverse in the

absence of a clear abuse of discretion." Brown v. Davis, 813 F.3d 1130, 1138–39 (8th

Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). We will reverse the district court's denial of a motion

for new trial "only to prevent a miscarriage of justice." Behlmann, 794 F.3d at 963

(quotation and citation omitted). Likewise, we "will not disturb a trial court's denial

of a motion for mistrial absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion." Warger v.

Shauers, 721 F.3d 606, 609 (8thCir. 2013) (quotation and citation omitted). Here, the

district court's denial of the mistrial motion was not an abuse of discretion.

The majority concludes that "[w]e are not convinced Kyle's counsel's motion

for a mistrial as soon as the jury was excused was untimely." See supra Part II.A

(emphasis added) (citing Lange, 627 F.2d at 127 (citing Thomson, 123 F.2d at

495–96)). Lange provides that "'counsel must either make an objection or . . . move

for a mistrial at the time of the alleged misconduct, or where it involves a closing

argument, counsel . . . should[] make his objection, take his exception, or ask for

remedial action at the close thereof and before the case is submitted to the jury.'" 627

F.2d at 127 (emphasis added) (quoting Thomson, 123 F.2d at 495–96 ("[N]o

exception to [the closing] remarks was taken by the defendant either during the

argument or at its close.")). 

The record shows that Kyle's counsel failed to make his motion for mistrial

"before the case [was] submitted to the jury." See id. at 127. Here, the record clearly

shows that the court gave oral instructions to the jury and that, after that charge, the

"[j]ury retired at 11:59 a.m." Thus, the case was already "submitted to the jury" at

11:59 a.m. before Kyle's counsel moved for a mistrial based on improper closing

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argument. For that reason, I conclude that no timely objection was made. See Lange,

627 F.3d at 127.

12

Second, I do agree with the majority that the district court erred in permitting

Ventura's counsel's questions to HarperCollins's witnessesregarding insurance under

Rule 411. The record contains no evidence that "Rosenblum and Hubbard had any

economic tie or 'substantial connection' to HarperCollins's insurance carrier" and

"Ventura never established by direct evidence orreasonable inference that Rosenblum

and Hubbard even knew about insurance coverage or possible insurance payment."

See supra Part II.A. But the district court's error does not automatically render a new

trial necessary. "Rule 411 does not deal with the standard for reversal," which is an

abuse of discretion. 23 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal

Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5369 (1980) (citing, inter alia, Church Ins. Co.

v. Trippe Mfg. Co., 250 F. App'x 420, 422 (2d Cir. 2007) (abuse of discretion); King

v. Harrington, 447 F.3d 531, 533 (7th Cir. 2006) (abuse of discretion)). In fact, "some

courts have found minor violations of Rule 411 to be 'harmless error.'" Id. (citing

Nguyen v. Myers, 442 S.W.3d 434, 440 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013)). 

Although Ventura did not object to Kyle's motion for mistrial based on 12

untimeliness, "we may affirm[the district court's denial of the motion for mistrial] for

any reason supported by the record, even if different from the reasons given by the

district court." Robins v. Becker, 794 F.3d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 2015) (quotation and

citation omitted); see also Emery v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 15-10100, 2016 WL

1425939, at *3 (11th Cir. Apr. 12, 2016) ("Because the district court issued a

summary order, it is not apparent from the face of the order that the motion was

denied as untimely. We nevertheless may affirm the district court's decision for any

reason supported by the record, even if not relied upon by the district court." (citation

omitted)). 

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This interpretation is given some support by a former member of the

Advisory Committee who has argued that reversals for violations of

Rule 411 be limited "to those instances of gross mi[s]conduct in which

counsel has made a deliberate and apparently successful attempt to

prejudice the jury." In other words, reversal is required only when the

injection of insurance has resulted in an excessive verdict.

Id. (footnotes omitted).

After reviewing the record, I conclude that any error in allowing Ventura's

counsel to inquire about insurance was, at most, harmless and non-prejudicial. First,

Ventura's counsel asked a total of four questions about insurance to two witnesses

who disclaimed any knowledge about the subject during the course of an eleven-day

trial. Second, the inquiry about insurance came after Taya first testified that she

would be responsible for paying the judgment—at least as to the misappropriation

and unjust-enrichment claims—were Ventura to prevail. Thus, the jury was on notice

that Taya would be responsible for paying at least part of any judgment rendered

against Kyle. Third, the issue of insurance did not permeate the entire trial; instead,

in addition to the four questions asked of the HarperCollins witnesses, the only other

references to insurance were the two statements in Ventura's counsel's hour-long

closing argument. Fourth, the $500,000 in damages on the defamation claim is not an

excessive verdict; as even the majority concedes, the verdict "is probably not beyond

the bounds of rationality." See supra Part II.A. (quotations and citations omitted). 

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For these reasons, I conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion

in denying Kyle a new trial on the defamation claim.

13

______________________________

Because the majority vacates and remands the defamation judgment for new

13

trial based on the referencesto insurance in trial testimony and closing argument, the

majority does not address Kyle's additional arguments that Kyle is entitled to a new

trial on the defamation claim because the district court failed to instruct the jury that

Ventura had to prove material falsity by clear and convincing evidence and Ventura

failed to establish actual malice. On remand, these issues will likely be raised again.

Out of an abundance of caution, I decline to issue an advisory opinion on the merits

of these questions.

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