Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03666/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03666-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dean Little Hawk
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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The Honorable Charles B. Kornmann, United States District Judge for the

District of South Dakota.

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Because the Government withdrew at oral argument its motion to dismiss the

appeal, that motion no longer is before us.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-3666

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Dean Little Hawk,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the District of

South Dakota.

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Submitted: April 18, 2006

 Filed: June 6, 2006 

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Before MURPHY, MELLOY and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Dean Little Hawk pled guilty to one count of assault resulting in serious bodily

injury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1153 and 113(a)(6). The district court1

 sentenced

Little Hawk to 60 months’ imprisonment. Little Hawk appeals the sentence. For the

reasons discussed below, we affirm.2

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I. BACKGROUND

Little Hawk was charged with assault following the November 25, 2003

bathwater burning of his two-year-old daughter at his mother’s residence on the

Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Indian Reservation in Iron Lightning, South Dakota.

Upset that the toddler soiled herself, Little Hawk drew a steaming bath and forcibly

held the unclothed girl on her back in the bathtub. He then left the child unattended,

trapped in the scalding water, for several minutes. As a result, the girl suffered firstand second-degree burns on her feet, calves, thighs, buttocks, back, shoulder and right

ear. The injuries were so severe that she was hospitalized for three weeks and

underwent multiple painful medical procedures, including blood transfusions, wound

debridement and skin grafting. She will have permanent scarring. 

Sentencing in the period between Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004),

and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the district court held that the

United States Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional and would be used merely

for guidance in sentencing. The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) calculated

a total offense level of 20, including a three-level reduction for acceptance of

responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and a criminal history level of I, resulting in

a recommended guidelines range of 33 to 41 months. The district court, however,

denied the three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and calculated a total

offense level of 23, resulting in a guidelines range of 46 to 57 months. After advising

counsel in a presentencing memorandum that it was considering a U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8

upward departure due to “unusually heinous, cruel, or brutal conduct, including, in

effect, torture of the victim, gratuitous infliction of injury, or prolonging of pain or

humiliation,” the district court sentenced Little Hawk to 60 months’ imprisonment.

On appeal, Little Hawk challenges his sentence on several grounds. 

II. DISCUSSION

Little Hawk argues that the district court erred by denying him credit for

acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. “A district court’s factual

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 In his reply brief, Little Hawk also suggests that the Government breached the

plea agreement by failing to recommend that Little Hawk receive credit for acceptance

of responsibility. However, the plea agreement provided that the Government was not

required to make such a recommendation if there was “significant evidence disclosed

in the presentence investigation” indicating a lack of acceptance of responsibility. For

the reasons we discussed in affirming the district court’s denial of a § 3E1.1 departure,

we find that there was sufficient evidence in the PSR to indicate a lack of acceptance

of responsibility and that the Government was not bound to recommend the reduction.

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determination on whether a defendant has demonstrated acceptance of responsibility

is entitled to great deference and should be reversed only if it is so clearly erroneous

as to be without foundation.” United States v. Annis, No. 05-3521, slip op. at 7 (8th

Cir. May 8, 2006) (citation omitted). 

To be eligible for a reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, “the defendant must

accept responsibility for all of the conduct that is part of his conviction. The

defendant may not minimize conduct or partially accept responsibility.” United States

v. Erhart, 415 F.3d 965, 971 (8th Cir. 2005). The district court found that a § 3E1.1

reduction was not warranted because, despite Little Hawk’s guilty plea and purported

acceptance of responsibility, Little Hawk minimized the crime and his responsibility

for it. Portions of the PSR to which Little Hawk did not object show that Little

Hawk’s acceptance of responsibility was equivocal and hedged with excuses for his

behavior. While admitting that he knew the water was hot, Little Hawk also claimed

that “he did not mean to hurt the child.” He made the incredible assertion that his

daughter did not cry during the scalding or during transport to the hospital. At

sentencing, Little Hawk attributed the assault to the fact that he “jumped into

fatherhood . . . too soon.” Given this, the district court did not clearly err by not

crediting Little Hawk for acceptance of responsibility.3

Additionally, Little Hawk argues that his sentence, including the three months

that exceeded the guidelines range, was unreasonable. We review the reasonableness

of a sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Sitting Bear, 436 F.3d 929, 935

(8th Cir. 2006).

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Little Hawk first claims that his sentence was unreasonable because it was a

product of the district court’s emotion, rather than a result of proper judicial

reasoning. In support of his argument, Little Hawk cites to the district court’s

characterization of the crime as “torture.” Although “torture” can be an extreme

characterization, it also is a ground for an upward departure from the guidelines range.

U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8. In a presentencing memorandum to counsel dated August 31,

2004, the district court advised that it was considering an upward departure under

U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8. At sentencing, the district court found that the crime was a heinous

act constituting torture. It is clear that the district court’s use of the word “torture”

was not emotional hyperbole but was a deliberate finding of fact in support of the

sentence. In addition, Little Hawk points to a comment in which the district court

mentioned the possible punishment for such an offense under Iranian law. However,

the district court also specifically rejected talionic retribution, noting that “we don’t

do things like that here.” Accordingly, the district court’s comment demonstrated that

the court was committed to following the applicable law and is not evidence that the

court was improperly influenced by emotion. 

Little Hawk also claims that his sentence was unreasonable because the district

court failed to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The district court abuses its

discretion by failing to consider a relevant § 3553(a) factor, giving significant weight

to an improper or irrelevant factor, or by making a clear error of judgment in the

weighing of the proper factors. Sitting Bear, 436 F.3d at 935. However, the district

court is not required to provide a mechanical recitation of the § 3553(a) factors when

determining a sentence. United States v. Cadenas, 445 F.3d 1091, 1094 (8th Cir.

2006). Rather, it simply must be clear from the record that the district court actually

considered the § 3553(a) factors in determining the sentence. Id.

The record shows that the district court considered and applied the § 3553(a)

factors. The district court discussed at sentencing several § 3553(a) factors, including

the nature and circumstances of the offense (characterizing the attack as

“inexcusable”) and the characteristics of the defendant (including Little Hawk’s

continued denial of knowledge regarding the temperature of the water and his

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In fact, the Statement of Reasons filed by the district court provides: “The

Statement of Reasons is no longer a part of the Judgments in criminal cases. This is

a ‘Not for Public Disclosure’ document, and it is only disseminated to defense

counsel, government attorneys, financial litigation units of the U.S. attorneys’ offices,

probation and pretrial services offices, the U.S. Sentencing Commission, and if a term

of imprisonment is imposed, the BOP.”

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We recognize that there are situations in which it might be inappropriate to

detail in the public record the district court’s reasons for the sentence. For example,

where the departure is based on the defendant’s cooperation with the Government and

public knowledge of that cooperation could put the defendant in danger. See, e.g.,

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indifference to the girl’s cries during the assault), § 3553(a)(1), as well as the need for

the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense (the attack left the child scarred

physically and emotionally), § 3553(a)(2)(A). The district court also identified in its

written Statement of Reasons specific § 3553(a) factors on which it relied. There is

no evidence that the district court failed to consider a relevant factor. The record does

not indicate that the district court considered any impermissible factors in imposing

sentence. Finally, the record establishes that the district court did not make a clear

error in weighing the proper factors. Given the brutality of the crime, the

defenselessness and prolonged suffering of the victim, the severity of the injuries, the

resulting permanent disfigurement, and the complete abdication by Little Hawk during

the attack of his most basic responsibilities as a parent, the district court’s decision to

sentence Little Hawk to 60 months’ imprisonment was a reasonable application of the

§ 3553(a) factors.

Finally, Little Hawk argues that his sentence was unreasonable because in

sentencing him above the guidelines range, the district court failed to specify its

reasons for the sentence in its written order of judgment and commitment, as required

by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). The district court provided a Statement of Reasons that

listed various § 3553(a) factors upon which it relied in determining the sentence.

However, this document was not part of the written order of judgment and

commitment.4

 As such, the district court did not provide its reasons in the form

required by the statute.5

 “However, when the district court fails to provide its reasons

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Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d)(3) (providing that the PSR must exclude information: which

is a diagnosis that, if disclosed, might seriously disrupt a rehabilitation program; that

was obtained upon a promise of confidentiality; or that, if disclosed, might result in

physical or other harm to the defendant or others). However, § 3553(c)(2) provides

that the district court is not required to set forth its reasons in the written order of

judgment and conviction to the extent the court relies upon statements received in

camera in accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. In that case, the

district court must state that such statements were received in camera and that the

court relied upon them in imposing sentence. § 3553(c)(2). The exception does not

appear to be applicable in this case, as the record does not suggest that the district

court relied on any such in camera statements.

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as required, we affirm the sentence if we determine that the sentence is reasonable.”

United States v. Ademi, 439 F.3d 964, 967 n.2 (8th Cir. 2006); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f).

Therefore, because we find Little Hawk’s 60-month sentence to be reasonable, the

failure of the district court to comply with § 3553(c)(2) does not require remand.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm the sentence of the district court.

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