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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
David Leslie Wood
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

Ullited States Court of Appeal~~ 

Tenth Circuit 

JUN 0 D 1995 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

THOMAS NATHANIEL WOOD and 

DAVID LESLIE WOOD, 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

Defendants-Appellants. 

) 

) 

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) 

) 

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) 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

Nos. 94-7092 

94-7096 

94-7097 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CR-94-10-S) 

Submitted on the Briefs: 

Gene Stipe and Tim Maxcey of Stipe Law Firm, McAlester, Oklahoma, 

on the brief for Defendants-Appellants. 

John Raley, United States Attorney, and Dennis A. Fries, Assistant 

United States Attorney, on the brief for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, McKAY and HENRY, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge. 

Appellate Case: 94-7092 Document: 01019279282 Date Filed: 06/09/1995 Page: 1 
Thomas Nathaniel Wood and David Leslie Wood were charged with 

manufacturing marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a) (1), 

(b) (2), and 18 U.S.C. § 2, possessing marijuana with intent to 

distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a) (1) and 18 U.S.C. § 

2, maintaining a place for the purpose of manufacturing, 

distributing or using marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 

856(a) (1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and conspiring to commit the above 

offenses in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. A fifth count charging 

both defendants with managing a building for the purpose of 

unlawfully manufacturing, distributing, or using marijuana in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) (2) was dismissed prior to trial. 

A jury convicted both defendants on all the remaining counts. The 

trial judge sentenced Thomas Wood to 97 months and David Wood to 

78 months. Defendants appeal, challenging both their convictions 

and their sentences. We affirm.l 

I. 

The evidence at trial, viewed most favorably to the 

government, see United States v. Richard, 969 F.2d 849, 856 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 248 (1992) and 113 S. Ct. 1009 

(1993), establishes the following facts. Eugene Norwell, a law 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously to honor the parties' request for a 

decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(f); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 94-7092 Document: 01019279282 Date Filed: 06/09/1995 Page: 2 
enforcement officer with the National Forest Service, was 

performing aerial surveillance on June 10, 1993 for the Forest 

Service when he observed three patches of marijuana growing on 

National Forest land. The next day he did a ground check of the 

area he had spotted, traveling beyond the end of a Forest Service 

spur road about twenty yards to the first patch of seven marijuana 

plants. On a path further into the woods he discovered a second 

patch of fifty-three plants and ten yards beyond he found a third 

patch of twenty-eight plants. Officer Norwell testified that the 

plants were growing out of man-made mounds and that the vegetation 

around the plants had been cut away with a sharp instrument in 

order to expose the plants to sunlight. He further testified that 

the patches were located away from recreation areas in a remote 

place without hiking trails that received very little traffic. 

Officer Norwell arranged for the installation of a remote 

camera system at the second patch which would begin videotaping 

whenever anything moved into its range. Gary Rose, another Forest 

Service law enforcement officer, set up the camera ten to fifteen 

feet away from the plants in the second patch. He returned to 

check the camera about fifteen times before it was removed. On 

June 29, when he returned to service the camera, he noticed fresh 

tire tracks and footprints in the area. He reviewed the videotape, which showed that two individuals had been in the patch on 

June 26. Officer Norwell identified one of them as defendant 

Thomas Wood. The other person was subsequently determined to be 

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Thomas Wood's brother, defendant David Wood. Defendants appeared 

to be "working" the plants, topping them to promote a greater 

volume of growth. On August 3 when Officer Rose returned, he 

noticed footprints and found that, although the plants had 

previously been observed to be drying out and turning yellow due 

to the lack of rain, they now had better color, indicating that 

someone had been at the patch to water and fertilize the plants. 

He had also discovered a milk jug cap in the area. The videotape 

showed that defendants had been at the patch July 24, grooming the 

plants and carrying plastic jugs. On September 27 when Officer 

Rose went to the patch, he noticed some tire tracks on the service 

road and discovered that the plants at the first patch were 

missing, although the camera did not show any activity at the 

second patch. When he returned on October 12, he noticed a set of 

tracks leading into the area. Several of the plants at the other 

patches had been removed and the remaining plants had been heavily 

trimmed. The videotape revealed that defendants groomed the patch 

on October 9. On October 20, the officers removed the remaining 

twenty-four plants from the second and third patches and took 

samples of them. 

Federal agents executed a search warrant on October 30 at the 

home of Thomas Wood's parents, where Mr. Wood had lived during the 

summer. The agents discovered a paper sack containing marijuana 

in an upstairs bedroom, a zig-zag roll of papers, marijuana seeds, 

a pipe containing marijuana, ziplock baggies, and a statement of 

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Appellate Case: 94-7092 Document: 01019279282 Date Filed: 06/09/1995 Page: 4 
earnings. In addition, an agent saw a set of scales, a roach 

clip, and marijuana seeds in the front seat of an automobile 

parked in the front yard and belonging to Thomas Wood. The agent 

also observed the root of a marijuana plant protruding from the 

back of the closed car trunk. Upon opening the trunk, the agents 

discovered twelve freshly pulled marijuana plants. When agents 

executed a search warrant at David Wood's residence, they 

discovered a small portable set of scales next to a box of plastic 

baggies, marijuana seeds, pipes, hemostats, roach clips, six onequart baggies of processed marijuana, and seven marijuana stalks. 

Thomas Wood testified that he lived with his parents in their 

house two months a year and lived the remainder of the year in 

Arkansas. He admitted visiting the marijuana patches, asserting 

that he and his brother had come across them while looking for 

landscape plants pursuant to a Forest Service permit. He denied 

planting, grooming, or watering the marijuana, although he did 

admit he had picked some leaves for personal use. He also 

admitted throwing down some seeds by the Kiamichi River several 

miles from the three patches under surveillance and stated that 

the plants in the car had come from the river. He said that he 

and his brother had agreed to go to the three patches and took 

turns driving there. 

that of his brother. 

David Wood's testimony was consistent with 

Both defendants admitted using marijuana and 

growing it for personal use but denied selling it or growing the 

plants in the three patches. 

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Appellate Case: 94-7092 Document: 01019279282 Date Filed: 06/09/1995 Page: 5 
On appeal, both defendants contend that: 1) the evidence is 

insufficient to support their convictions on any count; 2) the 

court erred in its instruction on the definition of "manufacture" 

as used in 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) (1); 3) the court erred by including 

in its conspiracy instruction a reference to the count that was 

dismissed before trial; 4) the court incorrectly calculated their 

sentences by including in the drug quantity amounts allegedly 

possessed by defendants for their personal use; and 5) the court 

erroneously enhanced their sentences for obstruction of justice 

based on perjured testimony. In addition, David Wood argues that 

he was denied effective assistance of counsel when the court 

denied his request for a new attorney or alternatively for a 

continuance. Thomas Wood argues individually that the evidence 

was insufficient to support his conviction under section 856(a) (1) 

for maintaining a place for the purpose of distributing or using 

marijuana because the place in question was owned by his parents 

and he only stayed there two months a year. 

II. 

Immediately prior to trial, the court received a complaint 

from David Wood indicating that he was not satisfied with his 

attorney's preparation for trial. The court held a short hearing 

on the matter but took no sworn testimony. Mr. Wood asserted that 

he had been out-of-state on one of the dates the government 

alleged he appeared on tape at the marijuana patch. Mr. Wood 

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stated that although he had informed his lawyer, the lawyer had 

not followed up on it. The attorney responded that he had 

originally thought Mr. Wood's alibi was good and had filed an 

alibi defense. Subsequently, however, he and the government 

agents discovered that the report misstated the date by two days 

and that Mr. Wood did not have alibi evidence for the actual date 

shown on the videotape. Mr. Wood also asserted that the 

government report contained mistakes and that he did not have an 

opportunity to point them out to his attorney. The attorney 

responded that he had been over the report several times, and that 

although he spoke with Mr. Wood almost daily, Mr. Wood had not 

indicated until the morning of trial that he wanted to review the 

material with his counsel. The attorney stated that he felt 

prepared to go to trial. The court denied Mr. Wood's request for 

a new attorney, and the trial proceeded as scheduled. On appeal, 

Mr. Wood contends that he was denied effective assistance of 

counsel because he and his attorney were not ready for trial. He 

contends that if he had been able to go over the report with 

counsel to point out disputed testimony, the result would have 

been different. 

This court has held that "[t]he preferred avenue for 

challenging the effectiveness of defense counsel in a federal 

criminal trial is by collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255." 

Beaulieu v. United States, 930 F.2d 805, 806 (lOth Cir. 1991). We 

have pointed out that such allegations usually are not 

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appropriately considered on direct appeal because the defendant 

may not realize he has a meritorious claim until he begins 

collateral proceedings with new counsel, and because 

"ineffectiveness claims frequently require consideration of 

evidence not contained in the record on direct appeal." Id. at 

807. Nonetheless, we have recognized rare occasions in which we 

can make a fair evaluation of an ineffectiveness claim on direct 

appeal: "situations where the defendant is no longer represented 

by trial counsel and it is evident that resolution of the 

ineffectiveness claim would not be substantially aided by further 

development of the record." Id. We do not believe this is that 

rare case. Although Mr. Wood is represented by new counsel on 

direct appeal, we cannot be sure that the informal colloquy held 

by the trial court immediately before trial adequately developed 

the facts underlying Mr. Wood's claims. Accordingly, we decline 

to consider the claims without prejudice to Mr. Wood's ability to 

pursue them in a collateral proceeding should he choose to do so.2 

2 We have recently revisited the issue of the appropriate 

vehicle by which a claim of incompetent counsel may be pursued. 

See United States v. Galloway, 32 F.3d 499, 501-02 (lOth Cir. 

1994), reh'g en bane granted, No. 93-4169, Dec. 21, 1994. We do 

not believe the en bane opinion to be issued in Galloway will 

affect our determination here that the claims may not 

appropriately be resolved on direct appeal. 

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Appellate Case: 94-7092 Document: 01019279282 Date Filed: 06/09/1995 Page: 8 
III. 

Both defendants contend that the evidence was insufficient to 

support their convictions on all counts. On appeal, we must view 

all the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 

therefrom in the light most favorable to the government. Richard, 

969 F.2d at 856. The resolution of conflicting evidence and the 

assessment of credibility are within the province of the jury. 

Id. The evidence must raise more than a mere suspicion. Id. It 

must be substantial and allow us to determine that a reasonable 

jury could find defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 

A. 

To establish a conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the 

government must prove an agreement to violate the law, knowledge 

of the objectives of that agreement, knowing and voluntary 

participation in it, and interdependency between the conspirators. 

See United States v. Emmons, 24 F.3d 1210, 1217 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

Although we agree with defendants that mere presence at the scene 

is not enough to establish knowing participation in a conspiracy, 

see Richard, 969 F.2d at 856, the evidence set out above clearly 

permitted the jury to reasonably infer that defendants entered 

into a knowing and voluntary agreement to violate the substantive 

drug laws alleged in the indictment. 

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B. 

Both defendants contend that the evidence was insufficient to 

support their convictions for manufacturing marijuana in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). For purposes of section 841(a) (1), 

"[t]he term 'manufacture' means the production, preparation, 

propagation, compounding, or processing of a drug or other 

substance, . . . and includes any packaging or repackaging of such 

substance." 21 U.S.C. § 802(15). "The term 'production' includes 

the manufacture, planting, cultivation, growing, or harvesting of 

a controlled substance." Id. § 802(22). The evidence at trial is 

clearly sufficient to support defendants' convictions for 

manufacturing marijuana. Although they contend that they only 

picked some leaves, the evidence that they cultivated, grew and/or 

harvested marijuana is substantial. We thus affirm their 

convictions on this charge. 

c. 

Defendants also challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 

with respect to their convictions under section 841(a) (1) for 

possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. They point to 

their testimony that they possessed the marijuana only for 

personal use and to the lack of direct evidence of sales or 

distribution to third parties. Their argument, however, is based 

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on their version of the facts and ignores substantial evidence 

indicative of the requisite intent to distribute. 

Possession with intent requires the government to establish 

that defendants knowingly possessed the drug with the specific 

intent to distribute it. See United States v. Hager, 969 F.2d 

883, 888 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 437 (1992). 

Constructive possession is sufficient and may be proved by 

evidence that defendants had knowing dominion or control over the 

drugs and the premises where they were found. Id. A large 

quantity of the drug will support a reasonable inference that a 

defendant intended to distribute it. United States v. Parrish, 

925 F.2d 1293, 1297 (lOth Cir. 1991). Evidence admitted at trial 

tended to prove that the marijuana defendants admitted that they 

possessed for personal use was of a quantity large enough to 

permit the jury to infer that the drug was intended for 

distribution. In addition, the presence of scales and baggies at 

the residences of both defendants supports a reasonable inference 

of an intent to distribute. Accordingly, we affirm defendants' 

convictions under section 84l(a) (1) for possession with intent to 

distribute. 

D. 

To establish a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) (1), 

maintaining a place for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing 

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or raising a controlled substance, the government must prove that 

a defendant knowingly opened or maintained a place for the 

purposes listed in the statute. See United States v. Williams, 

923 F.2d 1397, 1403-04 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 

925 (1991) . Defendant Thomas Wood argues that the evidence is 

insufficient to s·upport his conviction for violating this statute 

because he did not 11maintain 11 the place in question. 

The undisputed evidence at trial established that although 

the place at issue was owned by Thomas Wood's parents, Mr. Wood 

lived there two months a year during the summer. We recently 

considered whether analogous facts provided sufficient evidence to 

sustain a conviction under section 856(a) (1). See United States 

v. Verners, Nos. 94-5029, 94-5030, 1995 WL 215254, at *2 (lOth 

Cir. April 11, 1995). In Verners, the defendant was charged under 

section 856(a) (1) with respect to his activity at a house owned by 

his mother. Although the defendant did not actually live at the 

house, we upheld his conviction on the basis of evidence of 

illegal drug activity found in the room under his control. Here, 

as in Verners, although Thomas Wood did not own the residence at 

issue, the agents discovered drug trafficking evidence in the 

rooms that he controlled while he lived there. These facts are 

sufficient under Verners to support his conviction under section 

856 (a) (1) . 

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IV. 

Defendants raise two challenges to the jury instructions. 

They contend that the court erred in its definition of the term 

"manufacture" and that the court erroneously included a reference 

to the dismissed count in its conspiracy instruction. These 

arguments are without merit. 

Defendants assert that the court erred in instructing the 

jury that the term manufacture includes cultivation and 

harvesting. As we have discussed in Part III.B supra, the term 

manufacture includes the term production, see 21 U.S.C. § 802(15), 

and the term production, in turn, includes cultivation and 

harvesting, see id. § 802(22). The instruction was therefore 

proper. 

Defendants further argue that the trial court erred in its 

drug conspiracy instruction by telling the jury that one of the 

substantive laws defendants allegedly conspired to violate was 21 

U.S.C. § 856(a) (2), which prohibits managing or controlling a 

building and making it available for use for the purpose of 

illegal drug activity. The count charging defendants with a 

substantive offense under section 856(a) (2) was dismissed by the 

government before trial as multiplicious to the count which 

charged defendants with a substantial violation of maintaining a 

place for the purpose of illegal drug activity in violation of 

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section 856(a) (1). Defendants argue that including both 

substantive offenses in the conspiracy count was also 

multiplicious. We disagree. 

Multiplicity occurs when more then one count of an indictment 

cover the same criminal behavior. See United States v. Morehead, 

959 F.2d 1489, 1505 (lOth Cir. 1992), reheard en bane on other 

grounds, 971 F.2d 1461 (lOth Cir. 1992). Multiplicious counts are 

improper because they allow multiple punishments for a single 

criminal offense. See id. We have held that counts charging 

substantive violations of section 856(a) (1) and section 856(a) (2) 

separately are multiplicious when they both concern the same place 

and the same time period. Id. at 1506-07. In this case, however, 

defendants were charged in a single count with a single conspiracy 

to commit several substantive crimes. Because defendants were 

subject to only one punishment for committing a single conspiracy 

offense, the fact that the conspiracy alleged an agreement to 

commit multiplicious offenses does not render the conspiracy count 

itself multiplicious.3 

3 Defendants do not argue that the conspiracy and the 

substantive offense were multiplicious. Such an argument would 

fail. 11 Congress intended to allow imposition of separate 

sentences for a conspiracy conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 

for the substantive drug offenses that form the object of the 

conspiracy ... United States v. Johnson, 977. F.2d 1360, 1371 (lOth 

Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1024 (1993). 

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v. 

Finally, we turn to defendants' challenges to their 

sentences. Defendants contend that the trial court erred in 

failing to exclude from its calculation of drug quantity the 

amount of marijuana defendants assert that they possessed for 

personal use. They also argue that the court erred in enhancing 

their sentences for obstruction of justice upon concluding that 

defendants had testified falsely at trial. These arguments are 

without merit. 

Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (2) and§ 3D1.2(d), as defendants 

concede, the sentencing court must group all the counts of 

conviction. The offense level applicable to this group is that 

corresponding to the aggregated quantity of marijuana for all the 

counts in the group. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3(b). Defendants argue. 

that only the marijuana they possessed with intent to distribute 

should have been included, and that the marijuana they possessed 

for personal use should have been excluded from the calculation of 

the aggregate amount. This argument, however, ignores the fact 

that defendants were convicted of manufacturing marijuana. Thus, 

the entire quantity of marijuana manufactured by defendants was 

properly included in the aggregate drug quantity amount.4 

4 Defendants' reliance upon United States v. Kipp, 10 F.3d 1463 

(9th Cir. 1993), is therefore misplaced. In Kipn, the manufacture 

of drugs was not involved in the common scheme or plan. Here 

defendants have never argued that the manufacturing count was 

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The district court enhanced defendants' offense level under 

U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.l for obstructing justice based on the court's 

determination that defendants had committed perjury by testifying 

falsely at trial. The court rejected defendants' testimony that 

they had just happened across the marijuana patches and were not 

growing the plants as false in light of the video footage clearly 

depicting defendants engaged in the cultivation of those plants. 

On appeal, defendants contend that their testimony was not false 

because the tape showed them only picking leaves. 

Enhancement under section 3Cl.l is proper when a defendant 

has given false testimony concerning a material matter with the 

willful intent to provide false testimony rather than as a result 

of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory. See United States v. 

Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. 1111, 1116 (1993); United States v. AriasSantos, 39 F.3d 1070, 1076-77 (lOth Cir. 1994). The sentencing 

improperly grouped with the other counts of conviction and the 

quantity involved in that count was thus properly included in the 

aggregate. Moreover, the sentencing judge here found as a matter 

of fact that all the marijuana possessed by defendants was 

possessed with intent to distribute. 

Further, it is inconceivable to the Court that one 

who is convicted of manufacturing as well as possessing 

marijuana with intent to distribute would possess drugs 

that were not for sale. There is sufficient evidence in 

the record of this hearing, as well as in the Presentence Report, to preponderate a finding that you and 

your co-defendant possessed for distribution purposes 

approximately one hundred seven kilograms of marijuana. 

Aplee. App., vol. II, at 277. 

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judge must make "a specific finding that independent of the jury 

verdict, defendant committed perjury." See Arias-Santos, 39 F.3d 

at 1077. Here the court properly reviewed the evidence and made 

the independent findings necessary to establish that defendants' 

trial testimony constituted perjury which obstructed justice. See 

id. at 1076. Although defendants contend that the court erred in 

rejecting their testimony, the record supports the court's 

determination even when viewing defendants' testimony most 

favorably to them. Accordingly, we· find no ground for concluding 

that the enhancement was improper. 

We AFFIRM the convictions and sentences. 

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