Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01365/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01365-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Mee Xiong
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MEE XIONG, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner )

of Social Security, )

)

)

Defendant. )

 )

1:09-cv-1365 GSA

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S

SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Mee Xiong (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying his application for

supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The matter is currently

before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to the

Honorable Gary S. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge.1

The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. (Doc. 8 & 9.)

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FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS2

Plaintiff protectively filed an application for supplemental security income on January 12,

2006, alleging disability beginning September 1, 1999, as the result of mental and physical

impairments stemming from a seizure disorder and hearing loss. (AR 15, 17). Plaintiff’s

application was denied initially and on reconsideration, and subsequently he requested a hearing

before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (AR 79-90, 105). ALJ Bert C. Hoffman, Jr. held

a hearing on September 11, 2008, and issued an order denying benefits on February 27, 2009. 

(AR 15-21). On June 26 2009, the Appeals Council denied review. (AR 8-11).

Hearing Testimony

Mee Xiong

On September 11, 2008, in Fresno, California, ALJ Hoffman held a disability hearing

during which Plaintiff, represented by attorney Robert Shakon, appeared and testified with the

assistance of an interpreter, Chi Yang. (AR 23-41). Plaintiff’s father, Yong Xiong, also testified. 

(AR 41-51, 56-62).

At the time of the ALJ’s hearing, Plaintiff was a twenty-one year-old male living in

Fresno, California with his parents. (AR 27-28). He attended Washington Union High School

and was generally enrolled in special education classes. (AR 40). While at Washington Union,

he typically earned average marks in his classes, but he was unable to complete the course work

required to graduate before he turned twenty. (AR 57). 

Currently, Plaintiff is attending adult school. His class schedule fluctuates from twice a

week to daily, depending on his course load. (AR 39). His classes are taught in English, and he

took English while attending Washington Union High School, but his mastery of the language

remains elusive. Plaintiff attributed this to his inability to remember his English lessons. (AR

48-49). 

Plaintiff sometimes gets lost when riding his bike to and/or from the local convenience

store. (AR 42, 50). He has some concept of money, as he knows if the convenience store clerk is

References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate page number.

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giving him correct change, yet he does not think he could work as a cashier at McDonalds

because the position is “difficult.” (AR 49-50). Plaintiff, however, believes he could do other

duties of a McDonalds’ employee, such as wiping tables and washing dishes, because he is

already doing those tasks at home. (AR 50). He does not particularly enjoy doing dishes at

home, and complains of being tired, but he tries the best he can and often he just does it because

his mother told him to. (AR 50-51). Occasionally, he helps his father and brother-in-law with

bundling vegetables for retail sale and sometimes picking vegetables. (AR 46-47). Plaintiff

enjoys walking to his relatives’ residence, who live in a nearby apartment complex. He also

enjoyed going on bike rides with his friends to a local Chinese buffet restaurant. (AR 45-46).

When Plaintiff is about to suffer a seizure, he is alerted by a little pain in his head and

feelings of disorientation. (AR 43). After his seizure, he is dizzy and it takes from thirty minutes

to an hour for him to regain his composure. (AR 44). He last had a seizure a month or two ago. 

(AR 44). He takes medication daily to control his seizures, and he admits that the medication

helps him experience fewer seizures, but the medication also causes memory difficulty, and as a

result, sometimes he forgets to take his medication. (AR 42, 45).

Yong Xiong

Yong Xiong, Plaintiff’s father, provided lay testimony at the hearing. He testified that

when Plaintiff is struck with a seizure, he stands up, raises his arms, he will not blink, and he

begins making a chewing motion. (AR 56, 59). He states that Plaintiff’s seizures can last from

two to three minutes and that Plaintiff needs to lie down for about thirty minutes after the

seizures pass. (AR 56-57). Mr. Xiong and his wife remind Plaintiff to take his medicine daily. 

Mr. Xiong believes that if Plaintiff takes his medication daily that he can reduce the seizure 

occurrence to two or three seizures per month . (AR 58-60). However, without the medication, 3

Plaintiff suffers seizures approximately once or twice a day. (AR 59).

The transcript reflects that Yong Xiong initially testified that no seizures occurred when Plaintiff took his medicine

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regularly, but later amended his testimony to say that Plaintiff suffered two or three seizures per month. (AR 58-60).

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Medical Record

The entire medical record was reviewed by the Court. Those records relevant to the

issues on appeal are summarized below. Otherwise, the medical evidence will be referenced as

necessary in the Court’s decision.

Ronaldo A. Ballecer, M.D.

Dr. Ballecer’s medical records consist solely of an audiogram which resulted in a 4

diagnosis of“[s]evere right conductive hearing loss [and] normal hearing in the left ear,” on

January 17, 2005. (AR 213). He recommended that Plaintiff “avoid unnecessary noise exposure

and use ear protectors as needed.” (AR 213). The doctor’s examination also includes a simple “-

” notation next to the word “[s]eizures,” apparently indicating no objective sign of seizures was

present at the time. (AR 213).

Kings Winery Medical Clinic (KWMC)

Plaintiff received medical care at KWMC from November 13, 2004, through July 21,

2008. (AR 215-223, 259-261, 287-289, 293-300, 304-315, 319). While more than one physician

provided Plaintiff with treatment during the aforementioned period, his primary KWMC care

giver was Tou C. Vang, M.D. (AR 319), however, Plaintiff also received care on at least two

occasions from M. Parayno, M.D. (AR 304-315) and on at least one occasion by a “Dr. Krueger”

(AR 299-300). The records from this facility entail the single largest contribution of medical

evidence to this case. Yet other than the September 2008 letter from Dr. Vang, these medical

records consist almost exclusively of handwritten progress notes, often illegible, that only briefly

document objective information pertaining to Plaintiff’s hearing loss and seizure disorder.

On January 31, 2005, Plaintiff complained about his poor hearing, and his sister reported

to the attending physician that his hearing was adversely impacting his ability to learn at school. 

(AR 217). The attending physician recommended Plaintiff “[a]void unnecessary noise exposure

[, and] use ear protection.” (AR 217).

The audiogram was apparently conducted at the behest of John Lubenko, M.D., as opposed to “by” Dr. Lubenko as

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Defendant suggests. (See Doc. 12 at 2 & AR 213.)

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The following year, on June 19, 2006, the progress notes begin to document seizures as

part of Plaintiff’s medical assessment. (AR 299). The attending physician’s notations indicate

that Dr. Krueger had previously treated Plaintiff’s seizure disorder, including prescribing

medication. (AR 299). The KWMC physician recommended continuing the medication regimen

proposed by Dr. Krueger. (AR 299). 

On June 20, 2006, Plaintiff was referred to Dr. Parayno for psychiatric care stemming

from his subjective complaints of depression . (AR 298). Plaintiff attributed the onset of his 5

depression to his ongoing seizure disorder. (AR 298).

Plaintiff’s father, Yong Xiong, accompanied him to his January 20, 2007, KWMC

appointment and complained that the current level of Plaintiff’s seizure medication was

inadequate. The elder Xiong explained that Plaintiff was suffering seizures once or twice per

month, apparently despite his current prescription regimen. (AR 293). Later, on September 10,

2007, Yong Xiong reported that Plaintiff had suffered seizures twice while at school. (AR 308). 

The progress note of September 10, 2007, also states, “new [medication] not working as well.” 

(AR 308). In inconsistent fashion, the progress note of September 14, 2007, states “[history of]

uncontrolled [seizures].” (AR 308). The history of uncontrolled seizures is also noted on the

progress note of January 30, 2008. However, on July 21, 2008, the attending physician again

identified a history of seizures, but also stated they were controlled with medication. (AR 304).

Finally, on September 1, 2008, Dr Vang provided a narrative report which explained the

onset of Plaintiff’s seizures as resulting from a traumatic brain injury suffered when he was

thirteen. (AR 319). Dr. Vang reported that Plaintiff’s seizures cause his eyes to roll up, his

extremities to stiffen, and a loss of consciousness for two to three minutes, but no loss of bladder

control or bowel function, and no tongue biting. (AR 319). Dr. Vang noted that Plaintiff had

been prescribed Phyenytoin ER and Keppra by a neurologist, yet “[h]e continues to have

Psychiatric sessions with Dr. Parayno were conducted twice in 2006 and three times in 2007. (AR 296-297, 309,

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314-315). The records documenting these visits consist of brief, handwritten progress notes that are mostly illegible.

The little information that is discernable conveys only that Plaintiff was assessed with a “depressed mood (309.0),”

and apparently he was initially prescribed Wellbutrin (AR 296-297, 314-315), but this was later revised during his

last visit in June 2007 to ‘no psychotropic [medication].” (AR 296-297, 309, 314-315).

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seizure[s] once or twice per month. He also has poor attention and poor memory. He was also

seen by a psychiatrist who diagnosed him as having a ‘cognitive deficit.’” (AR 319). Dr. Vang

concluded by opining “[Plaintiff’s] ability to work and learn is limited because of his

uncontrolled epilepsy, cognitive deficit, and [by] the side effect[s] of his medications which can

cause drowsiness.” (AR 319).

University Medical Center (UMC)

On December 24, 2005, Plaintiff underwent a CT scan of his head. (AR 258). The

doctor’s impression noted a low density abnormality in the right temporal region; he suspected

this finding was related to “encephalomalacia related to prior [craniotomy].” (AR 258).

Plaintiff returned to UMC on February 14, 2006, wherein he was given a neurological

consult. (AR 250-252). It was reported that Plaintiff’s seizures typically occurred about once a

month, but that the occurrence would increase to “twice a day if he doesn’t take [medications].” 

(AR 250). The report also states that Plaintiff had suffered a seizure one week prior, but that he

“didn’t take [medicine] . . . [G]ot refill and no [seizures] since then.” (AR 250). The treating

physician indicated that Plaintiff had a “[history] of missing [his] medication.” Plaintiff was

advised to avoid driving, riding a bicycle, climbing, or swimming. His prescription of Dilantin

was increased. (AR 252).

Community Medical Center (CMC)

On November 21, 2005, a CT scan of Plaintiff’s brain was conducted. (AR 303). The

findings included evidence of encephalomalacia of the right temporal lobe, and a previous right

temporal craniotomy. (AR 303).

A few years later, between August and September of 2007, Plaintiff’s seizures increased

while his medications were adjusted. (AR 317-318). However, the doctor’s notes indicate that

when Plaintiff is off his medication, he experiences one to two seizures per day, but if he is on

his medication he experiences none. (AR 317).

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William A. Spindell, Ph.D.

On May 20, 2005, Dr. Spindell, a consultative psychologist, examined Plaintiff as part of

a State agency disability evaluation. (AR 230-234). The examination administration included

use of the TONI III, a non-verbal I.Q. test, and the Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised tests. (AR

231). Dr. Spindell stated that Plaintiff’s TONI III raw score was fifteen, which yielded a quotient

of 78 that placed Plaintiff in the seventh percentile. He tempered this assessment, however,

because he believed the TONI III score was a “significant underestimate” of Plaintiff’s actual

intellectual ability based on the presence of “significant language difficulties,” despite the

presence of a professional Hmong interpreter who suggested that Plaintiff’s language and verbal

abilities were fluent. (AR 231). Plaintiff’s Weschler Memory Scale evaluation assessed a

Verbal Memory of sixty-five, Visual Memory of seventy-one, General Memory of sixty-six,

Attention Concentration Index of fifty-eight, and a Delayed Recall of fifty-four. (AR 231). Dr.

Spindell’s final impression was that Plaintiff suffered from hearing loss in his right ear, however,

the doctor did not have a psychological diagnosis. (AR 231). Dr. Spindell did not address

Plaintiff’s mental functional capacity, but did indicate that “while his language skills are limited

[,] he is able to communicate in a school situation. . . . [H]e probably will be able to address the

labor market with more education in English.” (AR 232).

A.R. Garcia, M.D.

On March 14, 2006, Dr. Garcia, a State agency consulting physician, opined that

Plaintiff’s mental impairment was not severe based on his level of mental retardation. (AR 262). 

No specific basis for his disposition is readily apparent to this Court as no other markings or

comments, other than those above, are included in the report. (AR 262-275).

B.X. Vaghaiwalla, M.D.

On April 5, 2006, Dr. Vaghaiwalla, a State agency analyst and consulting physician,

opined that Plaintiff suffered from a seizure disorder as well as hearing loss, but neither of these

impairments met the listing level. (AR 276-283). Dr. Vaghaiwalla formed this opinion after

reviewing Plaintiff’s medical record evidence. (AR 283). While he did assess Plaintiff with

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hearing loss and a seizure disorder, he found those impairments to “not [be] at listing level.” 

(AR 283). “[Plaintiff was] not fully credible (alleged severity of learning disorder not fully

consistent with objective evidence). Limitations as reflected in RFC most consistent with present

objective findings.” (AR 283). Dr. Vaghaiwalla found no basis for any exertional, postural, or

visual limitations, but did find communicative and environmental limitation based on Plaintiff’s

hearing loss and seizure disorder respectively. (AR 277-280).

ALJ’s Findings

Using the Social Security Administration’s five-step sequential evaluation process, the

ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not meet the disability standard. (AR 15-21, see also 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520.) At steps one through three, the ALJ found that: (1) the Plaintiff had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since January 12, 2006; (2) he was severely impaired by his seizure

disorder and hearing loss and (3) he did not have an impairment or combination of impairments

sufficient to meet or equal a listed impairment in Title 20 of the Code of federal Regulations Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AR 17). At step-four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to “perform work without exertional limitations. He must

observe seizure precautions and . . . is restricted to work not requiring acute hearing.” (AR 17). 

The Plaintiff was found to have no past relevant work or transferable job skills, and was unable

to communicate in English. (AR 20). He was also classified as a “younger” individual based on

his age at the time his application was filed. (AR 20). Based on his age, education, work

experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform jobs that exist in significant

numbers in the national economy. (AR 20). Finally, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not

been under a disability “as defined by the Social Security Act, since January 12, 2006, the date

the application was filed.” (AR 21) (citations omitted).

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision

to deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations,

the Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial

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evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,”

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v.

Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at

401. The record as a whole must be considered, weighing both the evidence that supports and

the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993,

995 (9th Cir. 1985). In weighing the evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must

apply the proper legal standards. E.g., Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). 

This Court must uphold the Commissioner’s determination that the claimant is not disabled if the

Secretary applied the proper legal standards, and if the Commissioner’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th

Cir. 1987). Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the

ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995).

REVIEW

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that he is unable to engage in

substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42

U.S.C. § 1382c (a)(3)(A). A claimant must show that he has a physical or mental impairment of

such severity that he is not only unable to do her previous work, but cannot, considering his age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which

exists in the national economy. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The burden is on the claimant to establish disability. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th

Cir. 1990).

In an effort to achieve uniformity of decisions, the Commissioner has promulgated

regulations which contain, inter alia, a five-step sequential disability evaluation process. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)-(f), 416.920 (a)-(f) (1994). Applying this process in this case, the ALJ

found that Plaintiff: (1) had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 12, 2006,

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the date on his disability application; (2) has a seizure disorder and hearing loss which qualify as

“severe” impairments based on the requirements in the Regulations (20 CFR §§ 416.921 et seq.);

(3) does not have an impairment or combination of impairments which meets or equals one of the

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) is able to perform work

without exertional limitations, but must observe seizure precautions and is restricted to work not

requiring acute hearing; and (5) retains the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform jobs

that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. (AR 15-21).

Here, Plaintiff argues that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence and are

not free of legal error because (1) the ALJ improperly rejected the medical opinion of Plaintiff’s

treating physicians a KWMC, namely Dr. Tou Vang, (2) the ALJ improperly rejected the

testimony of both Plaintiff and his father, Yong Xiong, a third-party witness, and (3) the ALJ

reliance on the opinion of Dr. Spindell lacks support by substantial evidence because (a) the

Wechsler Memory Scale –Revised test is outdated, and the doctor failed to “provide meaning and

guidance” to the Depressed Attention, Concentration Index, and Delayed Recall scores; and (b)

the doctor’s dismissal of the seventy-eight I.Q. score on the TONI III due to significant language

difficulties is converse to the alleged function of the TONI III to provide a norm-referenced

measure of intelligence completely free from the use of language. (Doc. 11 at 7-11). In turn,

Defendant responds by arguing that the ALJ’s rejection of opinions from Plaintiff’s treating

physician was proper as they were inconsistent with the other medical evidence, as well as

inconclusive. Defendant further argues that the ALJ properly assessed the testimony of Plaintiff

and his father as not credible as there statements are either in conflict with the medical evidence

or display only inconsistency. Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s assault of Dr. Spindell’s

opinion lacks merit because the test was the standard test at the time of the evaluation in 2005,

and because Plaintiff’s argument merely attempts to supplant his own lay opinion for that of Dr.

Spindell. (Doc. 12 at 4-7.)

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DISCUSSION

A. Treating Physician Opinion

As stated above, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly weigh the opinions of

his treating physicians at KWMC, namely Dr. Vang. (Doc. 11 at 7-10). He supports his

contention by citing to both subjective and objective findings pertaining to Plaintiff’s seizure

disorder, and argues that these findings are sufficient to constitute a mental impairment in

accordance with Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1,

sections 11.00F and 11.02. (Doc. 11 at 7-10).

It is well-established in the Ninth Circuit that a treating physician's opinions are entitled

to special weight, because a treating physician is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity

to know and observe the patient as an individual. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 602 (9th

Cir. 1989). “The treating physician’s opinion is not, however, necessarily conclusive as to either

a physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751

(9th Cir. 1989). The weight given a treating physician's opinion depends on whether it is

supported by sufficient medical data and is consistent with other evidence in the record. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). If the treating physician's opinion is controverted, it may be rejected

only if the ALJ makes findings setting forth specific and legitimate reasons that are based on the

substantial evidence of record. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002);

Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751; Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). The ALJ

may accomplish this task by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and

conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings. Magallanes,

881 F.2d at 751. He must offer more than merely his conclusions. He must set forth his

interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctor’s, are correct. Embry v. Bowen, 849

F.2d 418, 421-422 (9th Cir. 1988). On the other hand, if the treating physician's opinion is

uncontroverted by another doctor, it may be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995); Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th

Cir. 1991). 

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The Ninth Circuit, however, has also held that “[t]he ALJ need not accept the opinion of

any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and

inadequately supported by clinical findings.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957; see also Matney ex rel.

Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992). Additionally, a treating or examining

physician's opinion based on the plaintiff's own complaints may be disregarded if the plaintiff's

complaints have been properly discounted. Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d

595, 602 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997);

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995). Moreover, “[w]here the opinion of the

claimant's treating physician is contradicted, and the opinion of a nontreating source is based on

independent clinical findings that differ from those of the treating physician, the opinion of the

nontreating source may itself be substantial evidence; it is then solely the province of the ALJ to

resolve the conflict.” Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041; Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751; Miller v. Heckler,

770 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1985).

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the KWMC progress notes completed by

Plaintiff’s treating physicians, including Dr. Vang, primarily reflect Plaintiff’s self-reported

symptoms, and contain little, if any, objective medical evidence. For example, Plaintiff cites his

report of poor results from the pharmacological changes, that his seizures are uncontrolled, that

he is running out of medication, and so on. (AR 304-306, 308). Plaintiff cites these passages as

evidence of Dr. Vang’s improperly rejected medical opinions. (Doc. 11 at 9). This Court,

however, is not convinced that Dr. Vang’s opinion was in fact entirely rejected. While the ALJ

did explicitly reject Dr. Vang’s opinion that Plaintiff’s seizure disorder was uncontrolled because

it was inconsistent with the remainder of the medical evidence (AR 19), the KWMC progress

notes completed by Plaintiff’s treating physicians, and cited by Plaintiff, do not reflect Dr. Vang's

opinion, but are simply a recitation of what Plaintiff reported to him. Thus, it is not entirely clear

that the ALJ actually discounted Dr. Vang's conclusions; rather, he merely found, based on the

substantial evidence of record, that the Plaintiff retained the RFC to work without exertional

limitation.

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Second, the Court notes that the ALJ was presented with contradictory medical evidence. 

Plaintiff’s treating physicians have opined that his seizure disorder is uncontrolled in September

2007 and 2008, as well as in January 2008. (AR 306, 308, 319). They also altered his seizure

medication to achieve better results in February 2006, wherein it was also pointed out that

Plaintiff had a poor history of following his treatment regimen. It was also noted in August

2007. (AR 252, 317). Yet, after changing the medication in August 2007, Plaintiff’s treating

physicians quickly reversed course in September 2007 and returned to the medication he was

using in August 2007. (AR 318). And, in August of 2007 his treating physicians described his

seizure disorder as if it was readily treatable, if not controllable, stating that Plaintiff experienced

zero seizures when he was taking his medication regularly, even characterizing the disorder as

“controlled” with medication in July 2008. (AR 304, 317). Interestingly, when the KWMC

records are viewed longitudinally, the pharmacological approach is more consistent than varied,

often simply indicating a continuation of the current regimen by way of a refill. (AR 215-223,

259-261, 287-289, 304-315, 319). Finally, the inconsistency of the medical record is obviously

apparent when the records of the examining physicians are contrasted to that of the treating

physicians, particularly Dr. Vang. In short, the examining physicians have opined that Plaintiff’s

seizure disorder, hearing loss and learning disability are present, but not at the level of

impairment which Plaintiff and Dr. Vang are alleging. (AR 230-234, 262-283, 319). Given the

conflicting medical record, the ALJ was obligated to resolve the inconsistency. Magallanes, 881

F.2d at 750.

Plaintiff argues that the CMC chart notes for August 20, 2007, which describe Plaintiff’s

seizure disorder as controlled with medication, is contradicted by the pharmacologic change the

treating doctor implemented as a result of this same encounter . Thus, he reasons that the 6

notation suggesting Plaintiff’s seizures are controlled by medication cannot infer anything other

than the “treatment array on August 19, 2007 was not sufficient.” (Doc. 11 at 8-9). His

argument, however, is unavailing.

Part of Plaintiff’s argument also contends that the ALJ’s credibility analysis failed to weigh the testimony of his

6

father properly. This contention will be addressed in the separate “Lay Witness Testimony” section below.

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When attempting to resolve conflicts presented in the medical record, the ALJ is entitled

to draw inferences logically flowing from the evidence. Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642

(9th Cir. 1982). In this instance, the ALJ had to resolve a conflict between the amended thirdparty testimony provided by Plaintiff’s father, and the statements made to treating physicians, as

well as the conflict between the treating physician opinion and examining physician opinions,7

both of which pertain to the extent of control Plaintiff’s medication provides over his seizure

disorder.

While at the disability hearing, Plaintiff’s father testified that if Plaintiff takes his

medication daily that he can reduce the seizure occurrences to two or three events per month. 

(AR 58-60). In contrast, the CMC record of August 20, 2007, documents that Plaintiff, or his

father, told the physician that he experiences zero seizures while on medication. (AR 318). That

Plaintiff or his father are the source of this statement is reasonably inferred from the fact that the

statement is housed in the section of the chart note typically used by physicians to document a

patient’s subjective complaints, e.g., just above the doctor’s objective findings, assessment, and

plan. (AR 318). While the Court is cognizant that impairments such as Plaintiff’s are subject to

wax and wane over time, statements that suggest Plaintiff’s seizures are at least subject to a

degree of control by way of medication are useful in that they reasonably infer that

pharmacological treatment is not only beneficial, but has historically been successful at

controlling, or at least significantly curtailing, the frequency of Plaintiff’s seizures. This

inference is supported by substantial evidence in the form of: (1) the neurologic consultation of

February 14, 2006, wherein it was reported that the frequency of seizures increased to twice daily

when Plaintiff failed to take his medication and decreased to once a month when he did take it;

(2) the CMC progress notes of August 20, 2007, describing a similar inverse relationship

between the onset of seizures and the regular use of his medication; (3) the KWMC progress

notes of March 4, 2008, and July 21, 2008, that also correlates Plaintiff’s seizure frequency to his

medication use; (4) the testimony of both Plaintiff and his father, wherein each conveyed that the

The conflict between the medical records provided by Plaintiff’s treating physicians and the examining physicians

7

is described thoroughly in the above section. That discussion will not be repeated here, except as necessary.

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regular use of seizure medication curtails the frequency of seizures, and Plaintiff testified that he

had experienced only one seizure in the past month or two; and (5) to Dr. Vang’s September 1,

2008, letter which stated that Plaintiff’s current medications have limited his seizures to “once or

twice per month.” (AR 42, 45, 58-60, 250, 304-305, 317, 319). Thus, while Plaintiff may

attempt to characterize the ALJ’s reading of the treatment notes as “absolute . . . meaning 100%

efficacious treatment eliminating all remnants of the seizure disorder” no such inference was

necessary, or likely taken, as all that was required to resolve the conflicts was the reasonable

inference that Plaintiff’s seizures are subject to a significant degree of control by way of regular

use of medication.

To the extent, if any, the ALJ may have rejected Dr. Vang’s conclusions, the Court agrees

with the Commissioner that the ALJ provided numerous specific and legitimate reasons for doing

so, and for concluding that despite Plaintiff's hearing loss and seizure disorder, Plaintiff retains

the RFC to perform work without exertional limitations, while observing seizure precautions and

avoiding work requiring acute hearing. (AR 17). In fact, he carefully reviewed the entire

medical record and opinion evidence regarding Plaintiff's seizure disorder, hearing loss, and

alleged learning disorder. (AR 15-21.)

In the instant case, the ALJ identified “seizure disorder and a hearing loss” as severe

impairments affecting Plaintiff at step two of his disability analysis. (AR 17). Then, at step four

of his analysis, the ALJ stated:

The evidence shows that the claimant treated at [KWMC] from November

13, 2004 through January 20, 2007. On December 8, 2004, the treating records

show the claimant was seen, and the doctor noted hearing difficulties and referred

for testing. The claimant was seen on January 17, 2005, by Dr. John Lubenko, for

an ear examination. The exam revealed an infection of the right radical mastoid

cavity and a debridement of the right radical cavity was performed. The doctor

also conducted an audiogram which showed a severe conductive hearing loss in

the claimant’s right ear, and normal hearing in the left.

On May 20, 2005, the claimant was seen by consultative psychologist

William A. Spindell. Dr. Spindell’s examination included administration of the

TONI III, a non-verbal I.Q. test, and the Wechsler Memory Scale tests. The

doctor was unable to give the claimant the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for

Children because of a language barrier, in spite of the presence of a professional

interpreter. Dr. Spindell stated that the claimant’s TONI III score of 15 yielded a

quotient of 78. Dr. Spindell was of the opinion that this score significantly

underestimated the claimant’s actual intellectual ability. The Weschler Memory

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Scale showed mild deficits in memory, which may be due to the claimant’s

language barrier. The doctor concluded that the claimant did not have a

psychological diagnosis. He did not offer an opinion on the claimant’s mental

functional capacity, but cited a lack of English as the primary barrier to

employment.

The claimant underwent a CT scan of his brain on November 21, 2005 at

[CMC]. The findings indicated that encephalamalcia of the right temporal lobe,

and showed evidence of a previous right temporal craniotomy. One month later,

in December 2005 the claimant was seen at [UMC] after suffering a seizure. The

claimant reported experiencing seizures since 2003, following brain surgery. A

CT scan given at that time noted encephalamalcia of the right temporoparietal

region. The claimant returned to UMC on January 6, 2006, following another

seizure. He was prescribed Phenytoin. On February 14, 2006, the claimant had a

neurological consultation. It was reported that he was hit in the head in 2001

while living in Thailand. He developed a brain abscess and a craniotomy was

performed. Since that surgery the claimant had experienced seizures. The

frequency of the seizures increased to twice a day when the claimant failed to take

his medication; when he took his medication he reported seizures occurring once a

month. The claimant was advised to avoid driving, riding a bicycle, climbing or

swimming. His dosage for Dilantin was increased. In August 2007 the claimant

experienced an increase in seizures while his medications were adjusted.

The claimant continued to treat at [KWMC]. On January 20, 2006, the

records show that he was provided with refills for the prescriptions provided by a

“Dr. Krueger” for his seizures. He was seen again in January 2007 for refills on

this medication. In September 2008 Dr. Vang, from [KWMC], provided the

claimant with a letter regarding his seizures. Dr. Vang stated that the seizures

occur once or twice per month, last 2 to 3 minutes, with loss of consciousness. 

Dr. Vang said the claimant does not lose control of his bladder or bowels during

seizures, and does not bite his tongue. He was taking Kappra and Phenytoin ER

for control of the seizures, and was being seen by a neurologist. Dr. Vang opined

that the claimant had a limited ability to work and learn because of uncontrolled

epilepsy, a cognitive deficit, and because of drowsiness caused by his

medications.

The claimant also had two therapeutic sessions with Dr. M. Parayno, who

diagnosed the claimant with an adjustment disorder. Subsequently Dr. Parayno’s

notes show that he was not prescribing medication for the claimant’s mental

problems because of his seizure disorder.

On April 5, 2006, a State agency analyst and consulting physician stated

that the claimant had hearing loss and seizure disorder impairments which did not

meet the listings. The analyst concluded that the claimant had no exertional,

postural or visual limitations; however, he had hearing limitations and was

restricted for seizure precautions.

(AR 17-19) (internal citations omitted).

Having thoroughly summarized the medical evidence, the ALJ began his step-four

analysis by first explicitly identifying the governing regulations and rules, specifically Title 20 of

the Code of Federal Regulations sections 404.1527 and 416.927, as well as Social Security

Rulings 92-2p, 96-6p, and 0603p. (AR 19). As to Plaintiff’s physical impairments, the ALJ

bestowed “substantial weight” on State agency medical consultant Dr. Vaghaiwalla’s physical

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assessment of Plaintiff. (AR 19). He explained that his rationale for doing so was because “[t]he

seizures are controlled by medication, the hearing loss does not meet the listings, and the residual

functional capacity” attributed to Plaintiff by Dr. Vaghaiwalla’s report was “consistent with other

medical records.” (AR 19). The ALJ gave “[l]imited weight” to Dr. Vang’s opinion that

Plaintiff’s seizures were uncontrolled because it was “not supported by the medical evidence.” 

(AR 19).

The above demonstrates that the ALJ astutely perceived an inconsistency between Dr.

Vang’s opinion that Plaintiff’s ability to work and learn was limited because his seizure disorder

was uncontrolled, and the contrary opinion of Dr. Vaghaiwalla which implied Plaintiff’s seizure

disorder was manageable with medication, and imparted only an environmental hazard

limitation. As Dr. Vang was Plaintiff’s treating physician, the ALJ would usually be obliged to

first provide specific and legitimate reasons warranting an abandonment of the treating

physician’s opinion. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957; Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751; Winan, 853 F.2d at

647. However, the ALJ need not accept Dr. Vang’s opinion if it is brief, conclusory, and

inadequately supported by clinical findings. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957; Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019.

 Moreover, if the opinion was based largely on Plaintiff's own complaints, it may be disregarded

if Plaintiff's complaints have been properly discounted. Morgan, 169 F.3d at 602; Sandgathe,

108 F.3d at 980; Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043.

Dr. Vang’s opinion letter was accurately summarized by the ALJ in his disability

decision. (AR 18). The letter is only two paragraphs. It first recites the current duration of

treatment, and then it provides a historical development and common description of Plaintiff’s

seizure disorder. Dr. Vang then recites the findings of a 2005 CT scan before explaining that a

neurologist has been treating Plaintiff, currently with prescription for Phenytoin ER and Keppra. 

He reports that Plaintiff still suffers seizures once or twice per month, and that Plaintiff has poor

memory and attention. He states that a psychologist has diagnosed Plaintiff with a cognitive

deficit, and that an ear, nose and throat specialist diagnosed severe conductive hearing loss in

Plaintiff’s right ear. Finally, Dr. Vang opines in the second paragraph that Plaintiff’s “ability to

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work and learn is limited because of his uncontrolled epilepsy, cognitive deficit, and the side

effects of his medications which can cause drowsiness.” (AR 319). Apparently attempting to

support his opinion, Dr. Vang states that he has attached the results of the CT scan, the

consultation notes from Plaintiff’s various medical specialists, and he suggests contacting

Plaintiff’s medical specialists directly for up-to-date reports. (AR 319).

Dr. Vang’s opinion letter was accorded only limited weight by the ALJ because he found

its conclusions to be unsupported by the medical evidence. (AR 19). Likewise, after review of

the entire medical record, this Court finds that the ALJ did not error in devaluing the opinion of

Dr. Vang because the conclusion that Plaintiff’s seizures were uncontrolled is only supported by

two brief and conclusory KWMC progress notes from September 2007 and January 2008 that

merely document “[history of] uncontrolled [seizures],” but contain little to no clinical findings

to support that assessment. (AR 306, 308). Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957; Matney, 981 F.2d at

8

1019. Moreover, Dr. Vang’s two paragraph opinion letter is also brief and conclusory; it fails to

provide any guidance as to how Plaintiff’s ability to work is limited or otherwise equate

Plaintiff’s alleged impairment to functional limitations applicable to a work setting. Thomas,

278 F.3d at 957; Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019; Morgan v. Comm’r, 169 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 1999).

The absence of objective medical evidence supporting Dr. Vang’s opinion, the brevity

and conclusory nature of the little medical evidence supporting the opinion, as well as the brief

and conclusory opinion letter itself, are all proper factors that weigh against the opinion that

Plaintiff’s seizures are uncontrolled. In contrast, the conclusion that Plaintiff’s seizures are

controlled by medication is well supported by the medical evidence. For instance, Dr.

Vaghaiwalla opined that Plaintiff’s seizures are present, but do not rise to the listing level. (AR

283). Additionally, the neurologic consultation of February 14, 2006, reported that the frequency

of seizures increased to twice daily when Plaintiff failed to take his medication and decreased to

once a month when he did take it. (AR 250-252). The CMC progress note of August 20, 2007,

describes an inverse relationship between the onset of seizures and the regular use of his

Plaintiff also argued that the testimony of his father supported Dr. Vang’s opinion. This is addressed below in the

8

separate “Lay Witness Testimony” section.

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medication. (AR 317). Moreover, the KWMC progress notes of March 4, 2008, and July 21,

2008, correlate Plaintiff’s seizure frequency to his medication use, with the July progress note

actually reporting that Plaintiff’s seizures are “controlled [with] meds.” (AR 204-305). Finally,

Plaintiff testified that the regular use of seizure medication curtails the frequency of seizures, and

that he had experienced only one seizure in the past month or two. (AR 42, 45). The above

demonstrates that the ALJ’s decision to forgo Dr. Vang’s opinion, and instead rely on the opinion

of Dr. Vaghaiwalla, is well supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, given the inconsistent

medical record, this Court finds the ALJ’s interpretation of the medical evidence to be wellreasoned and free from legal error. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2005).

B. Lay Witness Testimony

Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s credibility determination fails to consider his father’s

testimony, to the extent that it corresponds with Dr. Vang’s opinion that Plaintiff’s seizures were

uncontrolled, and still occurring once or twice per month. (Doc. 11 at 9). Plaintiff does not take

issue with any particular part of the ALJ’s credibility discussion, but rather seems to merely

suggest that the ALJ should have placed more reliance on the testimony, and in so doing he

would have arrived at the conclusion that Plaintiff’s seizures are uncontrolled to the extent they

still occur at least once or twice per month. (Doc. 11 at 9). In response, Defendant argues that

the ALJ properly discounted the testimony of Plaintiff’s father as it was inconsistent with

previous statements. (Doc. 12 at 5).

In determining whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ must consider lay witness

testimony concerning a claimant's ability to work. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir.

1993). “Lay testimony is not equivalent of medically acceptable diagnostic techniques that are

ordinarily relied upon to establish disability.” Vincent on Behalf of Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d

1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984). However, lay witness testimony as to a claimant's symptoms is

competent evidence which the Commissioner must take into account. Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919. 

Such testimony is competent evidence and cannot be disregarded without comment. 

;4820;4820Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ must consider

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competent lay testimony but in rejecting such evidence, he need only provide reasons for doing

so that are “germane to [the] witness.” Carmickle v. Commissioner, Social Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d

1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008); Valentine v. Commissioner Social Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694

(9th Cir. 2009). Disregard of this evidence violates the Secretary's regulation that he will consider

observations by non-medical sources as to how an impairment affects a claimant's ability to

work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(e)(2); Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987). 

However, inconsistency with medical evidence is a valid reason for rejecting a lay witness's

testimony. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir.2005); Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d

503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001).

In this case, the ALJ accurately summarized the elder Xiong’s testimony as follows:

The claimant’s father, Yong Yang Xiong, testified at the hearing. Mr.

Xiong said his son lives with him. He testified that if his son takes his medication

he suffers seizures 2-3 times a month, but without medication they are more

frequent. Mr. Xiong testified the claimant attended Washington Union High

School, and would miss school 3-4 days a month because of exhaustion from his

seizures. Based on the totality of the evidence, this third party testimony is given

some weight; however, the frequency of his son’s seizures while on medication is

contradicted by other objective evidence and is therefore disregarded.

(AR 20).

The above demonstrates that the ALJ’s partial rejection of Mr. Xiong’s testimony

regarding the frequency of his son’s seizures is based on its inconsistency with the medical

record, which conveyed Plaintiff’s seizure frequency ranged from less than once a month to at

most twice a month. (AR 250, 304-305, 317, 319). The ALJ accepted the testimony of

Plaintiff’s father to the extent that it was consistent with the record of Plaintiff's activities and the

objective evidence in the record; however, he rejected portions of his testimony that did not meet

this standard. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d at 1218. The ALJ's rejection of certain testimony is

supported by substantial evidence and was not error.

C. Dr. Spindell’s Opinion and the Substantial Evidence Standard

Plaintiff concludes his brief by arguing that the ALJ erred when he relied on Dr.

Spindell’s opinion that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were non-severe. He supports this

contention by alleging the Wechsler Memory Scale – Revised (“WSM-R”) tests was outdated,

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and that Dr. Spindell failed to comment on the portions of his report indicating Plaintiff suffered

from memory and intelligence deficits. (Doc. 11 at 10-12). Defendant counters by arguing that

the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Spindell’s opinion was supported by substantial evidence in the

medical record, and that Plaintiff is merely attempting to supplant his own medical opinion for

that of Dr. Spindell. (Doc. 12 at 5-7).

At step two of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ must conclude whether Plaintiff

suffers from a “severe” impairment. The regulations define a non-severe impairment as one that

does not significantly limit a claimant’s physical and mental ability to do basic work activities. 

An impairment is not severe “if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has ‘no more

than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work.’” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F. 3d 1273,

1290 (9th Cir. 1996). To satisfy step-two's requirement of a severe impairment, the claimant

must prove the existence of a physical or mental impairment by providing medical evidence

consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings; the claimant's own statement of

symptoms alone will not suffice. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508; 416.908. The effects of all symptoms

must be evaluated on the basis of a medically determinable impairment which can be shown to

be the cause of the symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929. An overly stringent application

of the severity requirement violates the statute by denying benefits to claimants who do meet the

statutory definition of disabled. Corrao v. Shalala, 20 F.3d 943, 949 (9th Cir. 1994). 

The step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless or

frivolous claims. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153-154 (1987). Further, the ALJ must

consider the combined effect of all of the claimant's impairments on his ability to function,

without regard to whether each alone was sufficiently severe. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B). The

combined effect “shall be considered throughout the disability determination process. Id. The

adjudicator's role at step two is further explained as follows:

A determination that an impairment(s) is not severe requires a careful evaluation

of the medical findings which describe the impairment(s) and an informed

judgment about its (their) limiting effects on the individual's physical and mental

ability(ies) to perform basic work activities; thus, an assessment of function is

inherent in the medical evaluation process itself. At the second step of sequential

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evaluation, then, medical evidence alone is evaluated in order to assess the effects

of the impairment(s) on ability to do basic work activities.

SSR 85-28. Furthermore, Plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate that his alleged impairment is

sufficiently severe so as to preclude work activity. Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir.

1998).

Here, the ALJ identified Plaintiff’s seizure disorder and hearing loss as severe

impairments. (AR 17). However, the ALJ also determined that Plaintiff’s mental impairment

was non-severe. AR 12. He reasoned as follows:

In evaluating the claimant’s possible psychological impairment, I give substantial

weight to the findings of William A. Spindell. His opinion was based upon a

thorough, well-documented examination. I give some weight to the State agency

medical consultant’s psychiatric assessment that the claimant’s mental impairment

was non-severe. Limited weight is given to Dr. Parayno’s treating notes which are

too brief to support a finding that the claimant has a “severe” mental impairment.

(AR 19).

Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erroneously relied on the opinion of Dr. Spindell is

unpersuasive. First, his contention that Dr. Spindell’s opinion is compromised by the use of the

WMS-R simply because a newer version of the test, the WMS III, was available lacks citation to

case law supporting reversal of an ALJ’s decision on that basis. Moreover, while Plaintiff asserts

that the psychological community abandoned the concept that the WSM-R was valid, reliable, or

appropriately normed, he cites no medical authority to support his statement .

9

Second, Dr. Spindell’s report clearly indicates that he at least considered using the

Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – III, however, he did not use this version in his

assessment, likely because of the significant language difficulties that could not be overcome

despite the presence of a professional interpreter. (AR 230-231). The ALJ expressed this very

sentiment in his disability determination. (AR 18). On balance, while use of the WMS-III may

have provided a more detailed analysis of Plaintiff’s memory function when compared to the

The Court’s research efforts into these two versions of the WSM revealed that the third edition updates the WMS-R

9

and provides subtest and composite scores that assess memory and attention functions using both auditory and visual

stimuli. The third edition retains the index score configuration of the WMS-R, but scale content, administration and

scoring procedures have been changed. Reliability coefficients for the WMS-III primary subtests and primary

Indexes were on average found to be higher than for the WMS-R. http://www.cps.nova.edu/~cpphelp/WMS-3.html

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WMS-R, the Court does not find that use of the WMS-R was so egregious as to fall below the

standards for reliable test results articulated in Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Section 12.00 D.5(c).

As to Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ erred in assuming that he only suffered mild

deficits despite being assessed with a depressed attention score of fifty-eight, a delayed recall

score of fifty-three, and a TONI III I.Q. score of seventy-eight, the Court again disagrees. Dr.

Spindell’s failure to comment on the depressed attention and delayed recall scores alone does

adversely affect the entirety of his opinion. While the low scores may seem significant when

viewed in isolation, the results were only a small portion of the overall psychological assessment. 

Thus, Dr. Spindell’s failure to explicitly address the depressed attention and delayed recall scores

merely implies that he found the scores insufficient to warrant a psychological diagnosis. Cf.

Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[t]he Secretary . . . need not

discuss all evidence presented to her. Rather, she must explain why ‘significant probative

evidence has been rejected.’”). 

With regard to Plaintiff’s allegation that the TONI III I.Q. score was dismissed, the Court

is again unpersuaded. Dr. Spindell found Plaintiff’s I.Q. score to be a “significant underestimate

of his actual abilities” caused by the presence of significant language difficulties despite the

presence of a professional interpreter. (AR 231). While Plaintiff may be somewhat mentally

impaired, even if his I.Q. score of seventy-eight were an accurate assessment, Plaintiff’s mental

impairment would still fail to qualify as severe under the governing regulations. See 20 C.F.R.

pt. 404, app. 1, subpt. P, § 112.05 (mental impairments based on retardation require a full scale

IQ of 59 or less, or a full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment

imposing additional and significant limitation). 

The ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s mental impairment was not severe draws support

from the psychological assessment of Dr. Spindell, and to a lesser extent from Dr. Garcia. (AR

19). While the ALJ did examine the records from Dr. Parayno, he found them to be insufficient

to infer that Plaintiff suffered from a severe impairment. (AR 19). Given that Plaintiff bears the

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burden in establishing the severity of his impairment, and in the absence of medical evidence

suggesting that the alleged impairment is severe, the Court finds the ALJ’s decision to be a

rational interpretation based on substantial evidence and free from legal error. Burch, 400 F.3d

676, 680-81.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. 

Accordingly, this Court DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in

favor of Defendant Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security and against Plaintiff,

Mee Xiong.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 4, 2011 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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