Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-17-06420/USCOURTS-ca6-17-06420-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gerald Edwin Farmer
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 19a0355n.06

Case Nos. 17-6420/6422

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

 17-6420

GERALD EDWIN FARMER,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent-Appellant.

 17-6422

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

GERALD EDWIN FARMER,

Defendant-Appellee.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF 

TENNESSEE 

BEFORE: GILMAN, SUTTON, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.

SUTTON, Circuit Judge. In 2013, Gerald Farmer pleaded guilty to being a felon in

possession of ammunition. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Based on three prior Tennessee 

convictions, the parties stipulated in the plea agreement that Farmer had three prior violent felony 

 Case: 17-6420 Document: 29-2 Filed: 07/12/2019 Page: 1
Case Nos. 17-6420/6422, Farmer v. United States, et al.

2

convictions and qualified as an armed career criminal. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The district court 

accepted the agreement and imposed a 210-month sentence.

In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed 

Career Criminal Act violates due process. 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015). Relying on Johnson, 

Farmer filed this § 2255 motion, arguing that two of his Tennessee convictions, conspiracy to 

commit aggravated robbery and aggravated assault, no longer qualify as violent felonies under the 

Act and that he should be resentenced. While his petition was pending, this court held that 

Tennessee aggravated burglary, Farmer’s third prior conviction, did not qualify as a violent felony 

because Tennessee’s statute covers more structures than the Act’s enumerated burglary offense

covers. United States v. Stitt, 860 F.3d 854, 858 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Farmer filed a 

supplemental brief asserting entitlement to relief on that additional basis. The government agreed 

that Farmer did not qualify for the sentence enhancement but asked the district court to hold the 

case in abeyance pending any appeal of Stitt. The district court decided not to hold the case in 

abeyance, granted Farmer’s § 2255 motion based on Stitt, and amended his sentence to 120 

months.

The government appealed and asked that we hold the case in abeyance while it sought the 

Supreme Court’s review in Stitt. We agreed to do so. Late last year, the Supreme Court reversed 

this court’s decision in Stitt, holding that the structures covered by Tennessee’s aggravated 

burglary statute fit within the Act’s generic-burglary definition. United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 

399, 406–08 (2018).

The government now asks us to reverse and have the district court reinstate the original

sentence because the Supreme Court’s decision in Stitt undermines the basis for the district court’s 

 Case: 17-6420 Document: 29-2 Filed: 07/12/2019 Page: 2
Case Nos. 17-6420/6422, Farmer v. United States, et al.

3

grant of relief. Farmer does not (and cannot) dispute that he is no longer eligible for relief based 

on the structures Tennessee’s aggravated-burglary statute covers.

Farmer nonetheless urges us to affirm for two reasons. First, he says that a conviction for 

conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery does not count as a violent felony under the elements 

clause because the overt act necessary for a conspiracy need not involve the “use, attempted use, 

or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). 

Second, he contends that his aggravated burglary conviction does not qualify as a burglary under 

the Act for a reason distinct from the issue in Stitt. Generic burglary requires “an unlawful or 

unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a 

crime.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990). If the only thing that enters a structure 

is an instrument, Farmer says, then the act counts as generic burglary only if the defendant used 

the instrument to try to commit the intended felony inside (e.g., sticking a coat hanger through a 

window to snag an item). Meanwhile, he adds, Tennessee’s burglary statute requires only that an 

instrument enter a structure. In Farmer’s view, that makes the Tennessee statute overbroad.

Because the district court had no occasion to consider either argument the first time around, 

we vacate the district court’s decision granting Farmer’s § 2255 motion and remand for the district 

court to consider these arguments.

 Case: 17-6420 Document: 29-2 Filed: 07/12/2019 Page: 3