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Parties Involved:
Jermel Pope
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued March 3, 2010

Decided April 14, 2010

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐2669

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

JERMEL POPE,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 08 CR 334

Harry D. Leinenweber,

Judge.

O R D E R

Jermel Pope pleaded guilty to transporting a minor in interstate commerce while

intending that she engage in prostitution, see 18 U.S.C. § 2421, and was sentenced to 100

months’ imprisonment.  He argues on appeal that his below‐guidelines sentence is

procedurally unsound because the district court did not adequately respond to his

argument that he deserved an even lower sentence.  Although he did not need to, the

district court did respond to Pope’s plea for leniency and granted it to a reasonable extent

We affirm the judgment.

Pope’s victim was only about 40 days shy of her eighteenth birthday when he picked

her up at her parents’ house in Wisconsin and drove her to Illinois to work as a prostitute.

Pope photographed his victim in sexually explicit poses and posted those photographs on

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09‐2669 Page 2

the internet.  At least 20 men responded over a two‐week period, and Pope arranged for

them to receive sexual services from his victim in exchange for money.  The victim wrote

Pope that she loved him; he replied that she must remain under his authority and warned

her that he was very “controlling” and would “put a chain around [her] neck . . . if thats

what have [sic] to be done.”

Pope’s sentencing exposure under the guidelines increased considerably because his

victim was a minor.  The district court used U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(a)(4) to set Pope’s base offense

level at 24.  The district court added two levels because Pope used a computer to solicit

customers for his victim, see U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B), two more levels because the offense

involved a commercial sex act, see id. § 2G1.3(b)(4)(B), and two additional levels because

Pope played a supervisory role in the offense, see id. § 3B1.1(c).  Finally, the district court

decreased Pope’s offense level by three levels because he accepted responsibility.  See

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a).  Pope’s offense level of 27 and his criminal history category of VI

produced a guidelines range of 130 to 162 months’ imprisonment, which was above the

statutory maximum sentence of 120 months, see 18 U.S.C. § 2421.  The government wanted

Pope sentenced to the statutory maximum.

Pope argued at sentencing that his guidelines range greatly overstated the

seriousness of his offense; he requested a 46‐month sentence instead.  Had he made his trip

to Wisconsin a mere 40 days later, Pope maintained, his victim no longer would have been a

minor, so the district court would have used U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1(a)(2) to set his base offense

level at 14.  No adjustments would have been available under that guideline for Pope’s use

of a computer or because the offense involved a commercial sex act.  After factoring in his

supervisory role and acceptance of responsibility, Pope’s offense level probably would have

been 13 and his guidelines range only 33 to 41 months.

The district court agreed with Pope that, in light of his victim’s age and the

sentencing consequences that followed, “a small adjustment” would be proper under 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A): “I am . . . aware that it was a month and a half, and it would have

been a much less serious crime. That doesn’t change the seriousness of the crime. It does

seem to me that 3553 does provide some basis for making a small adjustment.”  But the

district court did not go as low as Pope requested.  Although Pope’s victim was almost 18,

the district court explained, her other characteristics enhanced the seriousness of Pope’s

offense.  She was a “mentally abused,” poorly educated “runaway” who had fallen “in

love” with Pope, the district court observed, and Pope took advantage by threatening and

exploiting her.  After reflecting on these competing considerations, the district court

sentenced Pope to 100 months’ imprisonment.

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No. 09‐2669 Page 3

Pope argues on appeal that his sentence is procedurally unsound because the district

court did not conduct a meaningful analysis of his request for a 46‐month sentence in light

of the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and failed to explain why it

chose a 100‐month sentence instead.  A district court should respond to a defendant’s

nonfrivolous argument for a below‐guidelines sentence, although just how much

explanation is required varies depending on the circumstances.  Rita v. United States, 551

U.S. 338, 356‐58 (2007); United States v. Miranda, 505 F.3d 785, 795‐96 (7th Cir. 2007).

Whether a defendant’s sentence is procedurally sound is a question for de novo review.

United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 530 (7th Cir. 2009).

Despite his insistence otherwise, the district court did respond to his argument that

he deserved a below‐guidelines sentence.  What is more, the district court actually granted

his request to a reasonable extent by sentencing him below his guidelines range and below

the statutory maximum.

  The district court reached this conclusion by conducting a meaningful analysis of

the § 3553(a) factors.  At sentencing, Pope focused his argument on the specific statutory

command that a sentence should adequately reflect the seriousness of the offense.  After

contemplating how that statutory goal applied to the facts of Pope’s case, the district court

granted Pope a below‐guidelines sentence because his victim was almost 18.  Pope’s

criticism that the district court neglected to mention all the § 3553(a) factors in checklist

fashion is for naught because the statute does not require a mechanical run‐through of each

sentencing factor.  See United States v. Perez, 581 F.3d 539, 548 (7th Cir. 2009).

The district court also adequately explained why it rejected Pope’s proposed 46‐

month sentence and chose to sentence him to 100 months’ imprisonment instead.

Recognizing that Pope’s guidelines range of 130 to 162 months would have plummeted to

33 to 41 months had the victim not been a scant 40 days away from her eighteenth birthday,

the district court was nevertheless mindful that the sentencing guidelines express a special

concern for commercial‐sex offenders who prey on young, impressionable victims.  See

U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3.  And looking closely at the relationship between Pope and his victim, the

district court saw a manipulative man threatening and sexually exploiting a vulnerable girl

who, although she was almost 18, was also a mentally abused, poorly educated, and

desperate runaway.  These considerations convinced the district court that the crime was

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1

The government also asked the district court to take into consideration Pope’s

extensive criminal history, noting that, by the age of 23, he had “racked up 19 convictions

and 17 criminal history points, a criminal history that normally would take someone a

lifetime, if not more, to gather.”

indeed serious—more serious than Pope’s proposed sentence reflected—and that a 100‐

month sentence was warranted instead.1

  The sentence was therefore procedurally sound.

Reading between the lines, Pope’s real objection seems to be that his sentence is

substantively unreasonable—that the district court’s application of the § 3553(a) factors to

the facts of his case was an abuse of discretion.  See Are, 590 F.3d at 530.  But Pope has not

developed such a challenge.  Nor has he even attempted to surmount the presumption of

reasonableness that attaches to a below‐guidelines sentence.  See United States v. Poetz, 582

F.3d 835, 837 (7th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

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