Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03149/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03149-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Office of Personnel Management
Respondent
Dieter Stussy
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DIETER STUSSY,

Petitioner

v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,

Respondent

______________________ 

2014-3149

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. SF-844E-13-0168-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: October 31, 2016 

______________________ 

MICHAEL J. SCHIFF, Michael J. Schiff, A Professional 

Law Corp., Woodland Hills, CA, for petitioner. 

PHYLLIS JO BAUNACH, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., FRANKLIN 

E. WHITE, JR.

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, DYK, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

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2 STUSSY v. OPM

PER CURIAM. 

Dieter Stussy petitions for review of a final order of 

the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”). The Board

affirmed an Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) 

decision denying disability retirement because the application was not timely filed. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Stussy was an employee of the Internal Revenue Service (“agency”) from July 3, 1988, until he was removed on 

October 15, 1993. Stussy grieved his removal, and the 

grievance was resolved by a settlement agreement in 

1994. By the terms of the settlement agreement, Stussy’s 

1993 removal was changed to a resignation effective 

February 15, 1994. 

In February 2012, 18 years later, Stussy filed an application for immediate disability retirement under the 

Federal Employees Retirement System (“FERS”). On his 

application, Stussy listed his date of final separation as 

October 15, 1993. In support of his application, Stussy 

submitted three assessment reports from mental health 

professionals prepared in 1993 and 1994, each stating 

that Stussy had experienced difficulties involving social 

interaction. OPM denied Stussy’s application because it 

did not meet the statutory time limit requiring that an 

application be filed within one year of separation from 

service. 5 U.S.C. § 8453. OPM also determined that 

Stussy did not qualify for a waiver of the deadline because 

he did not establish that he was mentally incompetent at 

the time of his separation or that he became mentally 

incompetent within one year thereafter. Id.

Stussy appealed to the Board. The administrative 

judge (“AJ”) agreed with OPM that Stussy’s application 

for disability retirement was untimely and that the record 

did not support a finding that Stussy was mentally incompetent at any relevant time. The Board denied 

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STUSSY v. OPM 3

Stussy’s petition for review of the AJ’s decision. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

This court will reverse a Board decision only if the 

Board’s action, findings, or conclusions were “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 

in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures 

required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; 

or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(c). 

An application for retirement disability benefits is 

timely if it is filed “before the employee or Member is 

separated from the service or within 1 year thereafter.” 5 

U.S.C. § 8453. An exception to this time limit applies to 

an employee “who, at the date of separation from service 

or within 1 year thereafter, is mentally incompetent if the 

application is filed with the Office within 1 year from the 

date of restoration of the employee or Member to competency or the appointment of a fiduciary, whichever is 

earlier.” Id. 

Stussy first argues that his application was timely because he should be retroactively reinstated to his position 

at the agency due to the agency’s alleged breach of the 

1994 settlement agreement, because the agreement was 

invalid, or because the agency rescinded the agreement. 

The crux of his argument is that, if he is reinstated and 

determined to be a current employee of the agency, then 

his application was timely filed. Stussy presents a litany 

of reasons why the settlement agreement should be 

disregarded. For example, Stussy asserts that despite the 

agency’s agreement to remove all documentation regarding Stussy’s 1993 removal from his employment records, 

the agency later denied his application for enrollment to 

practice before the agency, stating that he was not qualified because he had been removed for violating the agency’s rules of conduct. Stussy separately argues that the 

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4 STUSSY v. OPM

settlement agreement is invalid because the allegedly

hostile work environment and alleged defects of the 

arbitration proceedings coerced him into signing the 

agreement.1 

We see no error in the Board’s refusal to address the 

effectiveness of the settlement agreement. We need not 

determine whether there does exist a forum in which 

Stussy could seek a remedy for the alleged agency breach 

and rescission of the settlement agreement. We simply 

hold that the effectiveness of the settlement agreement is 

beyond the scope of this proceeding. This is not a case 

like Conant v. Office of Personnel Management, 255 F.3d 

1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001), where the agency’s alleged breach 

of the settlement agreement related to the disability 

retirement application itself. See id. at 1377. Under the 

circumstances here, Stussy’s arguments amount to an 

impermissible collateral attack on the settlement agreement. The Board did not abuse its discretion by declining 

to address them. See Johnson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 108 

M.S.P.R. 502, 506 n.5 (M.S.P.B. Apr. 7, 2008) (“If the 

appellant believes that the agency’s decision to remove 

him is inconsistent with the settlement agreement, or 

that he should not be bound by the agreement, he should 

bring a direct proceeding to invalidate or enforce the 

agreement in the proper forum . . . .”). 

Second, Stussy argues that the late filing of his disability retirement application should have been excused 

because he was mentally incompetent between the time of 

his separation and June 2011. “This court’s standard for 

mental incompetence is an inability to handle one’s personal affairs because of either physical or mental disease 

 

1 Stussy also asserts, without explanation, that the 

Board erred by denying his discovery requests related to 

his coercion argument. 

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STUSSY v. OPM 5

or injury.” Rapp v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 483 F.3d 1339, 

1341 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 

The Board reviewed the medical evidence of record, 

including the three mental health assessment reports 

prepared in 1993 and 1994. The Board found that “[e]ach 

of [the reports] concluded that [Stussy] had psychological 

problems and recommended treatment to ameliorate 

those problems, but none of them said anything that 

would support a conclusion that the appellant’s psychological problems rendered him unable to handle his personal 

affairs.” J.A. 5–6. Substantial evidence supports the 

Board’s finding that Stussy was not incompetent.

Stussy asserts that in July 2011, he applied for and 

was later granted a Social Security Administration 

(“SSA”) disability claim which indicated that he had been 

disabled as of February 8, 1993. As we noted in Rapp, 

“mental disability and mental incompetence are not the 

same thing.” 483 F.3d at 1341. The Board did not err in 

finding that Stussy had not shown that he was mentally 

incompetent notwithstanding his SSA award. 

Third, Stussy argues that he is entitled to a presumption of disability because the disability was the reason for 

his separation. See Bruner v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 996 

F.2d 290, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1993). However, the AJ found 

that Stussy was not separated because of a disability, and 

substantial evidence supports that determination. 

Finally, Stussy argues that the agency failed to inform him that he may have been eligible to file a disability claim when it removed him as required by 5 C.F.R. 

§ 844.202(b)(1). Although the Board did not address this 

argument, on its face it has no merit. That provision does 

not apply here because Stussy voluntarily resigned pursuant to the settlement agreement. See Elendu v. Office 

of Pers. Mgmt., 108 M.S.P.R. 1, 3 n.1 (M.S.P.B. Jan. 28, 

2008) (“[T]he appellant voluntarily resigned from federal 

service . . . ; therefore, . . . the [agency] was under no 

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6 STUSSY v. OPM

obligation to inform the appellant of his retirement eligibility and of the time limit for filing an application.”).

We have considered Stussy’s remaining arguments 

and conclude that they are without merit.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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