Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04151/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04151-14/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nestor C. Domingo
Plaintiff
Patrick R. Donahoe
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The Postal Service failed to address this claim in its motion to dismiss, and argued

unpersuasively at the motion hearing that the claim should be dismissed based on res judicata. See

Order re MTDs at 23. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NESTOR C. DOMINGO,

Plaintiff,

 v.

PATRICK R. DONAHOE,

Defendant. /

No. C13-04151 CRB

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Pro se plaintiff Nestor Domingo has brought a series of lawsuits against his former

employer, the United States Postal Service (“Postal Service”). See Civil Action No. C11-

5333 CRB (“Domingo I”); Civil Action No. C13-4150 CRB (“Domingo II”); Civil Action

No. C13-4151 CRB (“Domingo III”). The Court granted summary judgment for the Postal

Service in Domingo I in October 2013. See Order re MSJ in Case No. C11-5333 CRB (dkt.

145). Following a February 2014 order dismissing all of Domingo II and most of Domingo

III, the only claim remaining in any of the three cases was for violation of the Rehabilitation

Act in connection with the Postal Service’s demand that Domingo attend a third fitness for

duty exam (“FFDE”) after, he alleged, his treating mental health specialists had cleared him

to work. See Order re MTDs (dkt. 44); Compl. (dkt. 1) at 17.1

 The Postal Service now

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 Domingo suggests at a couple of different points in his Opposition brief that his “rights to

privacy of his personal medical information and records under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments”

are also at issue. See, e.g., Opp’n (dkt. 120) at 2, 11. He is incorrect. His Complaint never raised those

issues, and this Court’s February 2014 Order specified that the Rehabilitation Act claim was the only

one remaining. See generally Compl.; Order re MTDs at 27-28. Indeed, Domingo elsewhere in his

Opposition brief acknowledges that “One issue remains on whether the Defendant’s 3rd FFDE

requirement on Plaintiff is an impermissible medical inquiry in violation of Rehabilitation Act despite

the unequivocal reports and assurances from Plaintiff’s medical mental health’s specialists that the

Plaintiff is fit for duty.” Opp’n at 3. 

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 Domingo’s EEO complaint and litigation history vis-a-vis the Postal Service are detailed

elsewhere. See, e.g., Order on MTDs at 2-8; See Order re MSJ in Case No. C11-5333 CRB at 1-3. This

section includes only facts relevant to Domingo’s Rehabilitation Act claim.

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 Domingo objects to the use of his deposition transcript, arguing that the Postal Service “had

the transcript more than a month before [he] was properly notified of its availability,” and that he did

not have an interpreter present for his deposition. Opp’n at 22-23. Domingo previously moved to

suppress the use of his deposition, and Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James denied that motion without

prejudice. See Motion to Suppress (dkt. 88); Discovery Order (dkt. 89). This Court also denies

Domingo’s effort to bar the use of his deposition. First, Domingo fails to demonstrate any prejudice

stemming from the alleged administrative issues he encountered accessing his deposition transcript.

Moreover, Domingo was aware as of December 18, 2014 that the deposition transcript was available,

see Domingo Decl. (dkt. 121) Ex. X at 2, the Postal Service offered him nearly two months to review

it and make corrections, and Domingo failed to make any corrections, Second Wang Decl. (dkt. 124)

¶ 4; Ex. K. (Domingo also objects to the Second Wang and Second Saba declarations, arguing that they

are late under Civil Local Rule 7-2. See Objections (dkts. 126, 127). Those declarations are permissible

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moves for summary judgment on the one remaining claim. See generally MSJ (dkt. 108).2

Because the Postal Service’s demand that Domingo attend a third FFDE was job-related and

consistent with business necessity, the Court will grant summary judgment for the Postal

Service.

I. BACKGROUND3

A. Domingo’s Job

Domingo worked as a rural letter carrier for the Postal Service from about 1990 to

2008. Gibbs Decl. (dkt. 109) Ex. D. As a rural letter carrier, Domingo’s duties included

sorting mail, receiving and loading mail, delivering mail, collecting mail, furnishing routine

information concerning postal matters to customers, and preparing daily trip reports. Saba

Decl. (dkt. 111) Ex. B. Domingo testified in his deposition that some of his deliveries

involved personal interaction with customers, as when express and priority mail required a

customer’s signature, or another business on his route requested delivery directly to the

receptionist. Wang Decl. (dkt. 112) Ex. A at 43:7-44:20 (Domingo depo.).4

 Assignments or

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under Civil Local Rule 7-3(c).) Second, the Postal Service offered to make an interpreter available for

Domingo’s deposition, and Domingo did not request one. See Second Wang Decl. Ex. L (“On October

3, 2014 and in my letter dated September 26, 2014, I offered to make a Tagalog interpreter available for

your deposition, upon plaintiff’s request. To date, I have not received such a request, and thus, I will

assume that you do not require the services of an interpreter at the deposition.”). Domingo proceeded

with his deposition without requesting to stop due to a need for an interpreter. Second Wang Decl. ¶

3. Moreover, Domingo testified at his deposition that at least fifty percent of his college classes were

conducted in English, that “most” of his high school classes were taught in English, that he worked for

17 years at a bank where the business was conducted in English, and that there were no interpreters

present for any of his appointments at Kaiser. Id. Ex. I at 24:6-25:4, 27:16-30:5; Ex. J at 230:21-231:4.

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adjustments to routines—including special deliveries, late receipt of mail to be delivered,

need for coverage for absent employees—occurred daily and throughout the day. Saba Decl.

¶ 5. Postal employment requires regular and ongoing communication between coworkers, as

well as continuous supervision and instruction from supervisors. Id. 

B. Postal Service Policy on Fitness for Duty Examinations

The purpose of Postal Service fitness for duty examinations is to ascertain whether an

employee is medically capable of meeting the requirements of his job. Saba Decl. Ex. A at 1. 

The Postal Service’s policy provides that “Management may request a fitness-for-duty

examination and repeat examinations as necessary to safeguard the employee and coworkers

when there is concern about an employee’s ability to perform his or her job, based on the

observations of a supervisor, manager, or medical personnel.” Id. The policy states the

following about psychiatric examinations:

The psychiatric examination is not under usual circumstances requested

without a prior, general fitness-for-duty examination. As a result of the initial

fitness-for-duty examination, the examining physician may determine that there

is the need for additional evaluation concerning the employee’s mental status. 

If so, the employee is required to submit to a mental status evaluation.

Id. at 8.

C. Domingo’s Fitness For Duty Examinations

On April 19, 2007, Napa Postmaster Patricia Santos-Armstrong contacted Aftim Saba,

M.D., then the Associate Medical Director of the Medical Unit for the Postal Service’s Bay

Valley District, about Domingo’s behavior. See Saba Decl. Ex. C. Santos-Armstrong’s

email explained that Domingo had a conflict with a co-worker that had become so intense

that the co-worker asked that his work area be moved away from Domingo’s; that Domingo

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stated that he heard voices coming from the back of his vehicle; that several carriers reported

that they felt uncomfortable and threatened by Domingo and that they “[b]elieve he is both

angry and crazy, and concerned that he [may] still be carrying a gun”; and that Domingo’s

behavior had changed from friendly to “extremely withdrawn and non-communicative.” Id.

Dr. Saba responded that it appeared that a fitness for duty examination was appropriate, and

asked Santos-Armstrong to fill out a Form 2492 (Request for Fitness-for-Duty Examination)

and to include any “other relevant info such as statements from co-workers or supervisors.” 

Id. 

An April 24, 2007 Form 2492 includes a letter from Domingo’s co-worker, Melanie

Tull, and his supervisor, Jeff Tillotson. Id. Ex. D. Tull wrote that Domingo asked her what

she was doing at his house (when she had presumably not been there), that he told a coworker that he heard voices coming from the back of his vehicle, that “before he stopped

talking to everyone, he would always think people were talking about him,” and that she was

concerned about his “snap[ping] at any moment” and his ownership of a gun. Id. at 2-3. 

Tillotson described how Domingo would not look at him or “acknowledge that he has even

heard me when I greet him,” that another carrier had asked to be moved to another area

because he was afraid of Domingo, who “was acting strange,” and that “most of the carriers

do not feel comfortable in the work environment around [Domingo].” Id. at 4.

On May 2, 2007, Tillotson sent Domingo a letter directing him to report for a fitness

for duty examination with Dr. Saba on May 3, 2007, “to evaluate whether you are capable of

safely performing the duties and responsibilities of your position.” Saba Decl. Ex. E. On

May 3, 2007, Dr. Saba conducted a fitness for duty exam of Domingo. Saba Decl. ¶ 8. Dr.

Saba states in his declaration that Domingo told him that he was being harassed, and that the

main example of that harassment is that “he heard voices all the time.” Id. Specifically:

According to Mr. Domingo, these voices came from underneath the dashboard

of his postal delivery vehicle . . . and the voices discussed his activities in

detail, such as where Mr. Domingo made a U-turn, when and where he ate

lunch, and what mail he delivered, as well as aspects of his personal life, such

as his balding, discussions he had with his wife at home, and that his son is

“retarded.” Mr. Domingo also reported that he heard voices while walking

down the ramp at the Franklin Station and that “they” were discussing him all

the time. At home, Mr. Domingo heard his neighbors discussing his work and

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 Domingo subsequently testified that his postal vehicle was in fact not equipped with a CB

radio. Wang Decl. Ex. A at 46:21-47:18.

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private affairs. Mr. Domingo told ne that he believed that he was being

bugged.

Id. Dr. Saba concluded that Domingo suffered from delusion. Id. ¶ 9. He found that

Domingo had poor judgment and “no insight,” and that Domingo’s mental state could

potentially impact the safety of his co-workers and customers. Id. Dr. Saba deemed

Domingo not fit for duty pending a fit for duty exam by a psychiatrist. Id.; Ex. F (“I agree

there are significant issues noted and therefore . . . Mr. Domingo needs a Psychiatric FFD

done ASAP.”). 

Dr. Saba scheduled Domingo to be evaluated by Dr. Stephen Raffle, M.D., a boardcertified psychiatrist. Id. Dr. Saba wrote a letter to Dr. Raffle, authorizing Dr. Raffle to do a

psychiatric evaluation of Domingo, and summarizing the events that led to the referral. Saba

Decl. Ex. H. He specifically asked Dr. Raffle to determine “in what mental capacity this

employee can perform and whether Mr. Domingo is a threat to himself or others.” Id. at 3. 

On May 8, 2007, Domingo was given a copy of Dr. Saba’s May 4, 2007 letter as well as the

Medical Unit’s file on Domingo. Saba Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. I.

On two occasions in June and July of 2007, on his own initiative, Domingo visited

psychologist Robert Kaplan, Ph.D., to get a further opinion on his fitness for duty. Saba

Decl. ¶ 16. Dr. Kaplan was not Domingo’s treating psychologist. Id. Ex. K. During his

interview with Dr. Kaplan, Domingo denied that he heard voices “all the time,” but said that

he on three occasions heard voices that sounded like they were coming from a CB radio in

his postal vehicle. Id. Ex. K at 194-95.5

 Domingo denied many of the comments Dr. Saba

attributed to him, and described his long history of problems with Tillotson. Id. at 1196-98. 

Dr. Kaplan administered psychological testing, and reported that Domingo “may have tried

to present himself in a positive light, possibly minimizing faults or problems.” Id. at 197. 

But he found that there was no suggestion of “psychotic, paranoid, impulsive or delusional

thoughts or behaviors.” Id. Dr. Kaplan concluded that Domingo suffered from depression

and anxiety but that he “is psychologically fit to resume his full duties as a regular rural

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 Domingo brought Dr. Kaplan’s report to his examination with Dr. Raffle, and Dr. Raffle

considered the report and forwarded it to Dr. Saba. Saba Decl. Ex. J at 284, 303; see also id. at 299

(“The apparent fact he has not told Dr. Kaplan or the doctors at Kaiser about the onset of his beliefs [of

persecution] indicates . . . some effort on his part to minimize the irrational component and deceive the

individuals who are trying to help him.”).

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carrier.” Id. at 199.

On August 9, 2007, Dr. Raffle performed the psychiatric fitness for duty examination

of Domingo that Dr. Saba had authorized; it included a psychiatric interview and

psychological testing. Saba Decl. ¶ 13, Ex. J.6

 Dr. Raffle documented in an August 15, 2007

report that Domingo denied telling Dr. Saba about hearing voices, but reaffirmed his belief

that he was being bugged; he asserted that Tillotson and Tull had installed a “squawk box” in

his vehicle and were thus able to overhear everything he said and did. Id., Ex. J at 289. Dr.

Raffle noted that Domingo’s thinking was “fragmented” at times and that Domingo became

tangential and circumstantial in his thought production. Id., Ex. J at 295. Domingo’s

responses in the psychological testing resulted in a “Fake-Good” profile, indicating that

Domingo was trying to hide the existence of genuine psychopathology. Id., Ex. J at 296. Dr.

Raffle concluded that Domingo was suffering from delusional beliefs of persecution and

paranoid psychosis. Id. ¶ 14, Ex. J at 300. He diagnosed Domingo with “Psychotic

Disorder NOS [not otherwise specified] paranoid type with delusions and hallucinations,”

and concluded that Domingo was “not fit for duty and will not be fit for the indefinite

future.” Id. ¶ 15, Ex. J at 298, 303. He explained that Domingo’s delusional beliefs

interfered with his ability to interact with others and that his mental condition caused

emotional instability: “due to his paranoid psychosis, [Domingo] is not able to make the

adjustments to routines during the day. He is more likely to misperceive directives and

constructive criticism as persecution. . . . This creates conflict between him and his

coworkers and superiors.” Id., Ex. J at 302. Dr. Raffle did not consider Domingo a current

threat, but stated that Domingo’s condition “is potentially unstable and individuals with

paranoid delusional disorders are more likely to have the delusional system ripen and perhaps

have that translate to violent behavior towards self or others.” Id., Ex. J at 302-03.

On August 27, 2007, Dr. Saba forwarded Dr. Raffle’s report to Dr. Kaplan. See Saba

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Decl. Ex. L (“Please review Dr. Raffle[’s] report and provide your narrative comments and

reasoned medical opinion on why you have reached a different conclusion”). On November

12, 2007, Dr. Kaplan responded to Dr. Saba, disputing Dr. Raffle’s findings. See Saba Decl.

Ex. M at 2 (“I do not concur with Dr. Raffle’s diagnosis of Psychotic Disorder, NOS, nor do

I concur with his opinion that Mr. Domingo has been trying to deceive this examiner.”). He

reiterated his opinion that Domingo “does possess the emotional and mental stability to

perform his job as a rural mail carrier, as long as he is not under the supervision of Mr.

Tillotson.” Id. at 3. He concluded that Domingo was fit for duty, despite suffering from

depression, which “could benefit from antidepressant medications and ongoing treatment.” 

Id.

D. Medical Records in this Case

Dr. Kaplan’s report stated that, following Domingo’s May 2007 examination by Dr.

Saba, Domingo visited his primary physician at Kaiser and was referred to outpatient

services at Kaiser, “which he now attends on a regular basis.” Saba Decl. Ex. K at 193. Dr.

Kaplan reported that Domingo “was evaluated by three separate mental health professionals

at Kaiser, and, unlike Dr. Saba, none of these professionals diagnosed Mr. Domingo as

having any type of thought disorder, psychosis, paranoid ideation, delusions or auditory

hallucinations.” Id. Dr. Kaplan’s report includes excerpts from notes of three encounters at

Kaiser, but does not attach the referenced records. Id. at 195-96; Saba Decl. ¶ 20, 27. No

details about the information which Domingo relayed to his Kaiser providers was included in

Dr. Kaplan’s report. See Ex. K at 193-96 (the notes do reference occupation-related stress). 

Dr. Saba states in his declaration that, aside from the report from Dr. Kaplan, he never

received any records from any mental health professional assessing Domingo’s ability to

perform his job duties. Saba Decl. ¶ 27 (“Mr. Domingo never sent me or the Medical Unit

any documentation suggesting that his Kaiser mental health treatment providers had assessed

his fitness [for] duty and determined him to be capable of performing his duties, or otherwise

disagreed with my opinions or those of Dr. Raffle.”).

Domingo does not claim to have submitted any medical records to the Postal Service,

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suggesting instead that he authorized the Postal Service to access his Kaiser medical records

and that the Postal Service failed to do so. See Opp’n at 1 (“The issue is whether the

Defendant can show a legitimate job-related and business necessity for its action after

considering Plaintiff’s recent medical records that Defendant . . . could have reviewed before

requiring Plaintiff to a 3rd FFDE.”); see also id. at 21 (“The Postal Service did not even

review Plaintiff’s medical records until they requested them on February 2015.”). Domingo

points to two categorizes of authorizations. 

First, Domingo asserts that he authorized Dr. Raffle to access his medical records for

one year. Opp’n at 6. There is a dispute of fact about this. Compare Domingo Decl. ¶ 9

(“Dr. Raffle had me sign an authorization to my medical records before he started

interviewing me on August 9, 2007.”); and Gibbs Decl. Ex. B at 2 (October 1, 2008 letter

from Domingo to Mary Weidig at the Postal Service: “Nestor Domingo provided Dr. Raffle

access to his medical and psychiatric records at Kaiser”); with Reply (dkt. 124) at 9

(“evidence shows that the consent that plaintiff signed at his August 9, 2007 examination

with Dr. Raffle was a consent to allow Dr. Raffle to conduct the FFDE and to release the

results of Dr. Raffle’s assessment to the Postal Service.”) (citing Second Saba Decl. ¶ 6; Ex.

U (consent form Domingo signed on August 9, 2007); and Saba Decl. Ex. J (Raffle Report

referencing consent to evaluate and share results with Postal Service)). For the purposes of

this Motion, the Court accepts Domingo’s version of the facts. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at

255.

Second, Domingo asserts that he “executed several authorizations to his medical

records at Kaiser to the Postal Service for a duration of one year on September 2007 so that

the Postal Service’s assigned EEO investigator, Linda Ruggiero could investigate Plaintiff’s

EEO complaints.” Opp’n at 6. But those authorizations limit disclosure of Domingo’s

Kaiser records to Linda Ruggiero, the EEO investigator assigned to EEO Case No. 4F-945-

0179-07, and specified that Ms. Ruggiero “may use the health information authorized on this

form for the following purposes: EEO Complaint Investigation.” Patterson Decl. (dkt. 110)

¶ 3, Ex. A. The Ruggiero releases, therefore, did not provide the Postal Service with access

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 The record before the Court contains just two documents that could possibly be characterized

as Kaiser records. Domingo attaches both to his declaration. See Domingo Decl. Exs. V, W. A July

2009 letter from Dr. Brown and Dr. Wilson of Kaiser states that Domingo’s “primary mode of treatment

has been participation in our Job Stress Group,” since June 2007. Patterson Decl. Ex. B. It states that

Domingo met with an individual therapist “as needed” and “spoke briefly with the group leaders after

the group, as needed” and that they “have found no evidence of psychosis or other major mental disorder

which would prevent him from performing his usual duties as a postal employee.” Id. An August 2009

letter from Dr. Mary Spence at Kaiser states that she met with Plaintiff for four sessions (between May

2007 and August 2009), upon his referral for occupational stress and anxiety. Id. Ex. C. Dr. Spence

asserted that “[a]t no time during this period to date has there ever been any evidence or suggestion that

Mr. Domingo has a psychotic disorder or any psychotic symptoms.” Id. Both letters post-date the date

that the Postal Service demanded a third FFDE and the date of termination.

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to all of Domingo’s Kaiser records. 

Importantly, even assuming that the Postal Service could have accessed Domingo’s

Kaiser records via the consent form Domingo signed with Dr. Raffle, Domingo has not

identified any entry or note in those records that demonstrates that his Kaiser doctors had

unequivocally cleared him for duty. See Reply at 5-6.7

 The Postal Service also notes that

there is no evidence that Domingo completed mental health treatment by January 2008, and

that, in fact, Dr. Kaplan in November 2007 described Domingo’s treatment as “ongoing.” 

See Saba Decl. Ex. M at 3.

E. Domingo’s Termination and this Litigation

Dr. Saba asserts in his declaration that he reviewed the reports of Dr. Raffle and Dr.

Kaplan, and Dr. Kaplan’s November 2007 letter. Saba Decl. ¶ 24. Although he agreed with

Dr. Raffle’s conclusions, Dr. Saba “treated Dr. Kaplan’s report as a second opinion,” and, in

order to resolve the conflicting opinions of Dr. Raffle and Dr. Kaplan, determined that a third

opinion with a different psychiatrist was necessary. Id. 

On January 3, 2008, Dr. Saba sent Domingo a list of five psychiatrists and asked

Domingo to choose one for his “third opinion psychiatric evaluation at USPS expense.” Id.

¶ 25; Ex. N. Domingo failed to respond, and Dr. Saba sent him a second letter on January

23, 2008. Saba Decl. ¶ 25; Ex. O. Domingo agreed to attend a third fitness for duty exam

and proposed two psychiatrists, not included on Dr. Saba’s list, for the examination. Saba

Decl. ¶ 25. Dr. Saba was unable to find a listing for one doctor, and the other was

unavailable due to his own medical condition. Id. On April 11, 2008, the Postal Service

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 Domingo argues that there is a dispute of fact about his actual date of termination. Opp’n at

10. If there is such a dispute, it is not material. 

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asked Domingo to select one of the five psychiatrists originally included in Dr. Saba’s

January 3, 2008 letter. Wang Decl. Ex. D. Domingo did not respond, and on May 1, 2008,

the Postal Service sent Domingo’s then-lawyer a letter stating, “If I do not hear back from

you today with the name of the doctor that Mr. Domingo has chosen from the list of five that

Dr. Saba sent him (months ago), I have instructed Dr. Saba to choose the doctor with the

soonest availability.” Wang Decl. Ex. E. Domingo did not respond, and Dr. Saba scheduled

a fitness for duty exam with Dr. Lieberman on May 15, 2008. Saba Decl. ¶ 26. Dr. Saba

notified Domingo of this appointment on May 6, 2008. Saba Decl. Ex. P. Domingo did not

appear for the scheduled fitness for duty exam. Saba Decl. ¶ 26. 

On September 18, 2008, the Postal Service issued a Notice of Proposed Separation,

explaining that because Domingo refused to attend the third opinion fitness for duty exam, he

was still deemed unfit for duty. Gibbs Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. A. Domingo responded to the Notice,

asserting that none of his mental health providers agreed with Dr. Saba or Dr. Raffle,

although he did not refer to any of his providers by name or include any medical records,

letters, or reports with his letter. Gibbs Decl. Ex. B at 2, 3 (“Nestor Domingo’s doctors at

Kaiser continue to regularly see him. From the start to this date, none of these highly

regarded mental professionals agree with [Drs. Saba or Raffle].”). On October 10, 2008, the

Postal Service issued a Letter of Decision—Notice of Proposed Separation, determining that

separation was appropriate. Gibbs Decl. Ex. C. Pursuant to the Letter of Decision,

Domingo’s termination was effective October 26, 2008. Id., Ex. D.8

The Rehabilitation Act claim at issue here stems from one of six EEO proceedings

Domingo commenced against the Postal Service. See Mot. at 14-16. Following the Court’s

February 2014 order, it is the only claim remaining. See Order re MTDs. The Postal Service

now moves for summary judgment on it. See generally MSJ. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court can grant a motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows that there

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is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a). A principal purpose of summary judgment “is to

isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323-24 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict” for either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. at

248-49 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288 (1968)). To

determine whether a genuine dispute as to any material fact exists, the court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 255.

In determining whether to grant or deny summary judgment, it is not a court’s task “to

scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275,

1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted). Rather, a court is entitled to rely on the

nonmoving party to “identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes

summary judgment.” See id.

III. DISCUSSION

The ADA sets limits on when a qualified employer may require a medical

examination to determine whether an employee has a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4); 29

C.F.R. § 1630.14(c). Inquiries are permissible so long as they are “job-related and consistent

with business necessity.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has explained that “[t]he business necessity

standard is quite high,” Cripe v. City of San Jose, 261 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2001), and the

burden of establishing business necessity falls on the employer, Fredenburg v. Contra Costa

Cnty. Dept. of Health Serv., 172 F.3d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir. 1999). Nonetheless, courts “will

readily find a business necessity if an employer can demonstrate that a medical examination

or inquiry is necessary to determine . . . whether the employee can perform job-related duties

when the employer can identify legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons to doubt the

employee’s capacity to perform his . . . duties.” Conroy v. New York State Dept. of Corr.

Servs., 333 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2003). 

Domingo’s Complaint alleged that the Postal Service’s insistence on his attending a

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third fitness for duty for exam after “Plaintiff’s treating mental health professionals provided

unequivocal clearances that Plaintiff is fit for duty . . . and . . . did not suffer from medical

condition that would affect safety to himself or to others, or would otherwise interfere with

his ability to perform as a rural letter carrier” was an impermissible disability-related inquiry

in violation of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA guidelines. Compl. at 17-21. But the

evidence did not support Domingo’s allegations. Domingo did not supply the Postal Service

with “unequivocal clearances” from treating mental health specialists. Domingo provided

the Postal Service with a report from a consulting physician, Dr. Kaplan, which referenced

but did not include records of Domingo’s Kaiser treatment. See Saba Decl. Ex. K at 195-96. 

Certainly, Dr. Kaplan’s report concluded that Domingo was fit for duty. Id. at 199 (“it

is my opinion that Mr. Domingo is psychologically fit to resume his full duties as a regular

mail carrier.”). But that report was bookended by fitness for duty exams by Dr. Saba and Dr.

Raffle. Dr. Saba reported that Domingo told him that “he heard voices all the time” and that

Domingo believed that he was being harassed. Saba Decl. ¶ 8. Dr. Saba found Domingo

delusional and a potential risk to the safety of his co-workers and customers. Id. ¶ 9. Dr.

Raffle reported that Domingo believed that he was being bugged with a “squawk box,” had

“irrational and delusional” beliefs that he was being persecuted, and had tangential and

circumstantial thought production. Id. ¶ 13, Ex. J at 288-89, 300. Moreover, Dr. Raffle

found Domingo’s condition “potentially unstable” and capable of ripening into violence. Id.

at 301. The Postal Service had also received other evidence calling into question Domingo’s

ability to perform his duties. Domingo’s co-worker, Tull, stated that Domingo told a coworker that he heard voices coming from the back of his vehicle, and that she was concerned

about his “snap[ping] at any moment.” Saba Decl. Ex. D at 2-3. His supervisor, Tillotson,

described how Domingo would not look at him, that one carrier was afraid of Domingo, who

“was acting strange,” and that “most of the carriers do not feel comfortable” around him. 

Id. at 4.

There was therefore a conflict between the accounts of Dr. Kaplan on the one hand

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 The Court thus rejects Domingo’s assertion that “[d]uring the relevant time period in this claim,

no conflicting opinions existed.” See Opp’n at 21; see also id. at 23 (“By way of Dr. Saba’s judicial

admission in his declaration that he was just reviewing Plaintiff’s medical records for the first time after

they were just recently subpoenaed on February 2015, the Defendant cannot argue that conflict of

opinions between doctors existed and necessitated the required 3rd FFDE on Plaintiff.”). The conflict

came from Dr. Kaplan’s report, not from Domingo’s medical records.

10 Indeed, Domingo testified that he could not recall if he had ever requested any of his treating

mental health providers to evaluate whether he was fit for duty. Wang Decl. Ex. A at 80:12-82:25.

13

and of Dr. Saba, Dr. Raffle, Tull and Tillotson on the other.9 Domingo argues that

“Defendant has the duty to obtain Plaintiff’s most recent medical records if they believe that

is what they need but failed to do so.” Opp’n at 19, 20, 25. But Domingo points to no

relevant authority establishing that legal duty. See id. at 19 (relying on regulation and two

cases involving ALJ’s duties to develop record in social security cases). Nor has he pointed

to any evidence that his medical records in early 2008, when the Postal Service ordered the

third fitness for duty exam, contained an unequivocal determination that he was fit for duty.10

Nevertheless, even assuming that the authorization Domingo signed for Dr. Raffle allowed

the Postal Service to obtain Domingo’s Kaiser records, and even assuming that those records

contained an unequivocal determination that Domingo was fit for duty (or that he had

successfully completed mental health treatment), there would still be a conflict with the

evidence provided by Dr. Saba, Dr. Raffle, Tull and Tillotson.

Dr. Saba’s decision to obtain a third opinion fitness for duty examination as a means

of resolving that conflict was entirely appropriate. See Saba Decl. ¶ 24. The Ninth Circuit

has held that an employer may request another fitness for duty examination where a first

examination found the employee unfit, and the employee subsequently submits a report by a

treatment provider stating that the employee is fit. See Brownfield v. City of Yakima, 612

F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2010). Domingo seeks to distinguish Brownfield, arguing that he

“never had an outburst, never had an altercation, was never described to be out of control, did

not have job performance or attendance problem.” Opp’n at 12. In fact, there is evidence

that Domingo had an altercation with a coworker, see Saba Decl. Ex. C (describing conflict

with coworker that “became so intense that the other worker requested” to move), and that

his coworkers “[b]elieve he is both angry and crazy,” id. But the business necessity standard

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can be met even before an employee’s work performance declines if there is significant

evidence that could cause a reasonable person to inquire whether an employer is capable of

performing his job. See Brownfield, 612 F.3d at 1146. An employee’s ability to handle

reasonably necessary stress and to work with others is an essential function of any position. 

See Owusu-Ansah v. Coca-Cola Co., 715 F.3d 1306, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Domingo’s position required that he interact with customers,

Wang Decl. Ex. A at 43:7-44:20, make adjustments to his routines, and communicate with

his coworkers, Saba Decl. ¶ 5. There was significant evidence that could cause a reasonable

person to inquire whether Domingo was capable of continuing to work as a rural letter

carrier. See Brownfield, 612 F.3d at 1145 (citing approvingly Mickens v. Polk County Sch.

Bd., 430 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1280 (M.D. Fla. 2006), which held that “psychological

examination of an employee is both job-related and consistent with a business necessity if

that employee exhibits even mild signs of paranoid or agitated behavior that causes the

school administration to question the employee’s ability to perform essential job duties”);

Rodriguez v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cnty., Fl., — F. Supp. 3d —, 2014 WL 5100635, at

*3-4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 2014) (“Defendant’s requirement that Dr. Jones, who conducted the

first FFD evaluation, re-evaluate Plaintiff before her return to work was reasonable.”). There

was also some cause to be concerned about the safety of Domingo’s coworkers and

customers, further justifying a third fitness for duty exam. See Saba Decl. ¶ 9; Saba Decl.

Ex. J at 302-03; Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 515 (7th Cir. 2000) (“We have

stated that where inquiries into the psychiatric health of an employee are job related and

reflect a concern with the safety of employees, the employer may . . . require that the

employee undergo a physical examination designed to determine his ability to work.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The Postal Service’s demand that Domingo attend a third fitness for duty exam was

job-related and consistent with business necessity. It was not a violation of the

Rehabilitation Act.

//

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Postal Service’s Motion for

Summary Judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 13, 2015 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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