Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03889/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03889-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Israel C. Ramirez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13‐3889

ISRAEL C. RAMIREZ,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 11‐cv‐719‐JPG — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED AUGUST 5, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 25, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and MANION, Circuit

Judges.

WOOD, Chief Judge. In 2008 Israel Ramirez pleaded guilty

to possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. His presen‐

tence investigation report classified him as a career offender

based on two earlier state convictions for assault. Despite the

fact that his convictions were for “intentional, knowing, or

reckless” assault, counsel did not object to the PSR’s charac‐

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2 No. 13‐3889

terization, and the district court sentenced Ramirez as a ca‐

reer offender. In so doing, the court treated the Texas convic‐

tions as crimes of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s re‐

sidual clause, which defines as a “crime of violence” for

purposes of career‐offender status at sentencing any federal

or state offense punishable by imprisonment of more than

one year “that otherwise involves conduct that presents a

serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”  

Ramirez retained new counsel and moved to vacate his

sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that sentencing

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the career‐

offender designation. The district judge denied the motion

and, because postconviction counsel failed to keep Ramirez

informed about the postconviction proceedings, Ramirez did

not submit a timely request for a certificate of appealability.

He tried filing a late request, but when it was dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction, he moved under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(b)(6) for relief from the judgment. He argued

that postconviction counsel was ineffective for causing him

to miss the appeal deadline (among other reasons). The dis‐

trict judge denied the motion, on the belief that there is a rig‐

id rule under which there is no right to counsel on collateral

review. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991).

This would have been correct before the Supreme Court’s

decisions in Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013), and Mar‐

tinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). In those two decisions,

however, the Court significantly changed its approach to

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at initial‐review

collateral proceedings. We conclude that the argument

Ramirez raises is cognizable under Rule 60(b), see Gonzalez v.

Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), and thus that a remand is re‐

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No. 13‐3889 3

quired so that the district court may consider the merits of

his contentions.  

I

This appeal arises out of a series of events that began

with Ramirez’s two convictions in Texas. According to an

offense report tendered by the prosecution at Ramirez’s first

Texas plea hearing, Ramirez had run in front of his wife’s

moving car, opened the passenger door, and gotten into the

car. When his wife stopped to wave down a police officer, he

grabbed her by her hair and punched her in the mouth. Ac‐

cording to the offense report prepared for the second Texas

prosecution, Ramirez went to his wife’s house and banged

on her door. When she refused to let him in, he broke the

house windows and her car windshield, and then kicked in

the front door, pulled her hair, and knocked her to the floor.

He grabbed her arm and started to drag her away. These in‐

cidents led to two separate indictments for “intentionally,

knowingly, or recklessly” causing “bodily injury” to his wife

by “striking her with his hand”; Ramirez pleaded guilty in

both cases. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(1) (1999).  

In 2008 Ramirez pleaded guilty to the conviction that

gives rise to this proceeding—possessing marijuana with in‐

tent to distribute. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Ramirez’s presen‐

tence investigation report listed, among other convictions,

the two incidents in which he had assaulted his wife; it spec‐

ified that he had been charged with assault to a family

member for striking his wife with his hand. The probation

officer concluded that these two “crimes of violence” ren‐

dered Ramirez a career offender. See U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.1(a);

4B1.2(a). Ramirez’s lawyer did not contest the probation of‐

ficer’s conclusion.  

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In the course of determining Ramirez’s advisory sentenc‐

ing range, the district court agreed with that assessment. The

career‐offender designation resulted in a guidelines impris‐

onment range of 262 to 327 months. (Without career‐

offender status, the range would have been 151 to 188

months. See U.S.S.G. SENT. TABLE (2008).) The court sen‐

tenced Ramirez to a within‐guidelines term of 300 months’

imprisonment.  

On appeal, Ramirez’s trial counsel moved to withdraw

under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We reject‐

ed that motion on the ground that a colorable challenge to

Ramirez’s career‐offender classification existed. United States

v. Ramirez, No. 09‐1815 (7th Cir. Nov. 4, 2009). The govern‐

ment conceded error, admitting that the documents before

the district court did not establish that Ramirez had been

convicted of crimes of violence. Brief for Appellee at 12,

United States v. Ramirez, 606 F.3d 396 (7th Cir. 2010) (No. 09‐

1815). Rejecting that concession, we affirmed the conviction.

We first held that the Texas assault statute was divisible

(meaning that there were three ways in which it might be

violated—through intentional, knowing, or reckless behav‐

ior). On appeal, however, the plain‐error standard applied.

That left Ramirez with the burden of showing that he had

been convicted under the “reckless” branch of the statute.

He failed to do so for lack of evidence, and so his sentence

for the drug offense stood. United States v. Ramirez, 606 F.3d

396, 398 (7th Cir. 2010).

At that point, Ramirez obtained new counsel, who filed a

motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 asserting, as relevant here,

that trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing for failing to

object to Ramirez’s classification as a career offender. The

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No. 13‐3889 5

district judge denied the motion and declined to issue a cer‐

tificate of appealability because, he wrote, Ramirez (still) had

not produced any documents to show that he had been con‐

victed of reckless assault and thus had not shown that he was

prejudiced by counsel’s omission. The proceeding went

awry, however, when postconviction counsel let Ramirez

down in three ways: he did not inform Ramirez of the

court’s decision; he failed to file any postjudgment motions;

and he failed to file a notice of appeal.

Once he learned that counsel had deserted him, Ramirez

filed an untimely pro se notice of appeal from the sec‐

tion 2255 motion denial; we dismissed for lack of appellate

jurisdiction. Ramirez v. United States, No. 13‐3511 (7th Cir.

Jan. 21, 2014); see 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a); Bowles v. Russell, 551

U.S. 205, 210–11 (2007). Ramirez then moved to vacate the

district court’s judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Proce‐

dure 60(b)(6), arguing that the ineffectiveness of his post‐

conviction counsel—who had failed to request any of the

Texas‐court documents and worse, had deserted him—

constituted an extraordinary circumstance warranting the

reopening of the judgment. The district judge denied the

Rule 60(b)(6) motion because, he wrote, the right to counsel

does not extend to proceedings under section 2255, and be‐

cause Ramirez still had not shown that he was prejudiced by

any of trial counsel’s omissions because he never produced

any documents showing he had been convicted of nonvio‐

lent assault. Ramirez appealed the denial of his Rule 60(b)(6)

motion, and this court certified for appeal the question

whether trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing. We also

instructed the parties to address whether the district court

abused its discretion in denying Ramirez’s Rule 60(b)(6) mo‐

tion in light of Trevino and Martinez.

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II

Ramirez argues that the district court did commit an

abuse of discretion when it denied his Rule 60(b)(6) motion.

One way in which a court may take a decision that lies out‐

side the boundaries of its discretion is by basing that deci‐

sion on a material error of law. Ramirez asserts that the dis‐

trict court incorrectly relied on Coleman’s absolute rule that

counsel’s performance on a postconviction motion can never

justify relief from a judgment, rather than on Trevino and

Martinez. Relying on such cases as Nash v. Hepp, 740 F.3d

1075 (7th Cir. 2014), the government replies that these new

cases at most amount to a mundane change in the law that

does not amount to an extraordinary circumstance for pur‐

poses of Rule 60(b)(6). It also argues that Trevino, Martinez,

and Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012) (a third case in the

new line), apply only to petitions for relief filed by state

prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, not to motions filed by

federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

A

The first question we must address is whether Ramirez

was entitled to use a Rule 60(b) motion, or if he has in reality

filed an unauthorized second or successive petition without

the necessary permission of this court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244,

2255(h). If this was a proper use of Rule 60(b), the next ques‐

tion is whether Ramirez has shown enough to earn a consid‐

eration of his arguments on the merits.  

We are satisfied that Ramirez’s motion was not a dis‐

guised second or successive motion under section 2255, and

thus may be evaluated on its own merit. Ramirez is not try‐

ing to present a new reason why he should be relieved of ei‐

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No. 13‐3889 7

ther his conviction or his sentence, as provided in 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255(a). He is instead trying to reopen his existing section

2255 proceeding and overcome a procedural barrier to its

adjudication. Recall that on direct appeal this court found

enough merit in Ramirez’s claims that we rejected counsel’s

Anders submission and required the case to go forward. Ap‐

pellate counsel never obtained the relevant records from the

Texas courts, however, and so the appeal failed for lack of

proof. When Ramirez sought to remedy these failures in a

motion under section 2255, postconviction counsel failed to

remedy that critical omission, despite the central role that it

had played in our disposition of the direct appeal. We do not

know if that omission was intentional or not, although if the

records had been unfavorable to Ramirez, it is hard to see

why the prosecutor did not obtain them. Most importantly,

postconviction counsel abandoned Ramirez on appeal, thus

depriving him of the opportunity to pursue his Sixth

Amendment claims.  

Gonzalez held that in rare circumstances, a motion under

Rule 60(b) may be used by a prisoner. There the Court con‐

firmed that “Rule 60(b) has an unquestionably valid role to

play in habeas cases.” 545 U.S. at 534. But that role is re‐

stricted. The “movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6)

[must] show extraordinary circumstances justifying the re‐

opening of a final judgment.” Id. at 535 (internal quotation

marks omitted). A change in law alone will not suffice for

this purpose. Id. at 536 (change in Supreme Court’s interpre‐

tation of the AEDPA statute of limitations did not qualify);

Nash, 740 F.3d at 1078; Hill v. Rios, 722 F.3d 937, 938 (7th Cir.

2013); see also Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2014)

(“for relief to be granted under Rule 60(b)(6), ‘more’ than the

concededly important change of law wrought by Martinez is

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required—indeed, much ‘more’ is required”); but see Adams

v. Thaler, 679 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2012) (stating that change in

decisional law effected by Martinez did not justify use of

Rule 60(b); not discussing any other equitable considera‐

tions).

We agree with the Third Circuit’s approach in Cox, in

which it rejected the absolute position that the Fifth Circuit’s

Adams decision may have reflected, to the effect that inter‐

vening changes in the law never can support relief under

Rule 60(b)(6). The Third Circuit held instead that “interven‐

ing changes in the law rarely justify relief from final judg‐

ments under 60(b)(6).” 757 F.3d at 121. It explained that it

had “long employed a flexible, multifactor approach to Rule

60(b)(6) motions, including those built upon a postjudgment

change in the law, that takes into account all the particulars

of a movant’s case.” Id. at 122. In fact, it pointed out, this po‐

sition may not be inconsistent with that of the Fifth Circuit,

which reviewed other equitable factors in a later case similar

to Adams before rejecting the petitioner’s claim. See Diaz v.

Stephens, 731 F.3d 370 (5th Cir. 2013).  

Rule 60(b)(6) is fundamentally equitable in nature.

See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847,

863–64 (1988); Di Vito v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 361 F.2d

936, 939 (7th Cir. 1966); see also 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,

ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE § 2857 at 321 (3d ed. 2012). It thus requires

the court to examine all of the circumstances, bearing in

mind the need for the party invoking the rule to demonstrate

why extraordinary circumstances justify relief. Pertinent

considerations include, though are not limited to, a change

in the Supreme Court’s approach to the fundamental rules

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No. 13‐3889 9

for deciding habeas corpus cases; the diligence of the peti‐

tioner; whether alternative remedies were available but by‐

passed; and whether the underlying claim is one on which

relief could be granted.  

In Nash, for example, we noted a number of factors that

showed collectively that extraordinary circumstances for

purposes of Rule 60(b)(6) did not exist, despite the change in

law brought about by Martinez, Maples, and Trevino. Nash

could have appealed notwithstanding the actions of his

counsel, because the court itself instructed him about the

proper measures to take. (Wisconsin law treats postconvic‐

tion relief in an unusual way, insofar as it allows defendants

to raise a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel simultaneously

with a direct appeal.) Where Nash “easily could have reme‐

died counsel’s omission and started the plenary postconvic‐

tion process anew,” 740 F.3d at 1079, there was no abuse of

discretion in denying Nash’s motion under Rule 60(b)(6).

Similarly, in Hill the petitioner chose not to file a petition for

rehearing with this court or a petition for certiorari with the

Supreme Court, after he failed to persuade a panel that his

remedy under section 2255 was inadequate. As we put it

there, “[a] litigant who bypasses arguments on appeal can‐

not depict his own omission as an ‘extraordinary’ event that

justifies post‐judgment relief.” 722 F.3d at 938‒39. Further‐

more, Hill had never alerted this court during his earlier ap‐

peal that he had filed an earlier motion under section 2255

and that was why he was seeking to take advantage of the

safety‐valve clause of section 2255(e). See generally Webster

v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1135–39 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc). It

ill behooved him to seek a new opportunity to raise points

that he could have advanced earlier. We thus found no

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abuse of discretion in denying Hill’s motion under Rule

60(b)(6).  

Nash and Hill follow Gonzalez’s admonition that extraor‐

dinary circumstances will exist only rarely. At the same

time, however, as the Third Circuit said in Cox, “rarely” does

not mean “never.” Like the petitioner in Nash, Ramirez

points to his abandonment by counsel as the extraordinary

circumstance that justifies re‐opening his section 2255 pro‐

ceeding. Unlike Nash, however, the remainder of the equi‐

ties in Ramirez’s case do not undermine his application for

relief. No one—not a court, not his lawyer—informed him

about an alternative path to relief after his postconviction

lawyer abandoned him and left him with only a jurisdiction‐

ally‐out‐of‐time appeal. Ramirez did not conceal pertinent

information from the court. The district court’s decision on

his Rule 60(b)(6) motion, dated November 19, 2013, was

based on a clear error of law: the court dismissed his effort to

raise a claim about the assistance of postconviction counsel

with these words:

Next, Ramirez argues he is entitled to relief because

his habeas counsel was ineffective. The right to effec‐

tive assistance of counsel, however, does not extend

to § 2255 proceedings. Cannon v. United States, 326 F.

App’x 393, 395 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. §

2254(i)).1 As such, Ramirez is not entitled to relief

based on his counsel’s performance.

                                                  1 We note that section 2255 does not include any counterpart to 28

U.S.C. § 2254(i), which provides that “[t]he ineffectiveness or incompe‐

tence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post‐conviction pro‐

ceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under

section 2254.” Thus, if anything, the right that Ramirez is trying to assert

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No. 13‐3889 11

At the time the court wrote those words, all three of the Su‐

preme Court decisions on which Ramirez relies were on the

books: Maples was handed down on January 18, 2012; Mar‐

tinez on March 20, 2012; and Trevino on May 28, 2013. The

court’s error of law was therefore plain.

B

The change in law between Coleman, on the one hand,

and Martinez, Maples, and Trevino on the other, plays only a

part in our evaluation of Ramirez’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion. The

ineffectiveness of his postconviction attorney is the other

critical point. Martinez held that the procedural default that

occurred when Martinez’s postconviction counsel did not

raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in his state

collateral proceeding would not bar his petition under 28

U.S.C. § 2254, where “the state collateral proceeding was the

first place to challenge his conviction on grounds of ineffec‐

tive assistance.” 132 S. Ct. at 1313. The Court explained that

“if, in the [State’s] initial‐review collateral proceeding, there

was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective,”

procedural default would not “bar a federal habeas court

from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at

trial.” Id. at 1320 (emphasis added). In Martinez, state law re‐

quired the petitioner to wait until the initial‐review collateral

proceeding before raising such a claim. A year later, in Tre‐

vino, the Court extended Martinez’s holding to cases in

which the state did not require defendants to wait until the

postconviction stage, but “[t]he structure and design of the

                                                 

should be easier to maintain under section 2255. It is also notable that

Maples, Martinez, and Trevino were all decided under section 2254, not‐

withstanding the language of subpart (i).  

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12 No. 13‐3889

[state] system in actual operation ... [made] it virtually im‐

possible for an ineffective assistance claim to be presented

on direct review.” 133 S. Ct. at 1915. The question is whether

these holdings apply to some or all federal prisoners who

bring motions for postconviction relief under section 2255.

We already have answered this in the affirmative, in Choice

Hotels Intern., Inc. v. Grover, 792 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2015),

where we wrote that “[a]lthough Maples and Holland [v. Flor‐

ida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010)] were capital cases, we do not doubt

that their holdings apply to all collateral litigation under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 or § 2255.” Id. at 755. A closer look at the issue

convinces us that this position was correct.

In Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003), the Su‐

preme Court considered the case of a man who did not raise

any claim relating to ineffectiveness of trial counsel on his

direct appeal, and so was trying to raise such an argument in

a motion under section 2255. The United States argued that

the ineffectiveness claim was procedurally defaulted, be‐

cause Massaro could have raised it on direct appeal. The Su‐

preme Court rejected that position and held instead that

there is no procedural default for failure to raise an ineffec‐

tive‐assistance claim on direct appeal, even if new counsel

handles the direct appeal and even if the basis for the claim

is apparent from the trial record. Id. at 503–04. Indeed, the

Court criticized the practice of bringing these claims on di‐

rect appeal, because “the issue would be raised for the first

time in a forum not best suited to assess those facts.” Id. at

504. This court has been equally if not more critical of the

practice of trying to raise ineffective assistance claims on di‐

rect appeal:

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No. 13‐3889 13

Raising ineffective assistance on direct appeal is im‐

prudent because defendant paints himself into a cor‐

ner. We’ve explained why the contention is doomed

unless the contention is made first in the district court

and a full record is developed—which happens occa‐

sionally but did not happen here. Yet although the

argument has trifling prospect of success, the defense

has much to lose. ... [W]hen an ineffective‐assistance

claim is rejected on direct appeal, it cannot be raised

again on collateral review. ...  

Ever since Massaro the judges of this court have regu‐

larly asked counsel at oral argument whether the de‐

fendant is personally aware of the risks of presenting

an ineffective‐assistance argument on direct appeal

and, if so, whether defendant really wants to take that

risk. We encourage counsel to discuss that subject

with the defendant after argument and to consider

withdrawing the contention. We asked that question

at oral argument of this appeal, and counsel assured

us that Flores is aware of the risks and wants the con‐

tention resolved now. That is his prerogative, foolish

though the choice seems to the judiciary.

United States v. Flores, 739 F.3d 337, 341–42 (7th Cir. 2014).

See also, e.g., United States v. Moody, 770 F.3d 577, 582 (7th

Cir. 2014) (ineffective assistance claim “should be pursued in

a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255”); United

States v. Bryant, 754 F.3d 443, 444 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[a] claim of

ineffective assistance need not, and usually as a matter of

prudence should not, be raised in a direct appeal, where ev‐

idence bearing on the claim cannot be presented and the

claim is therefore likely to fail even if meritorious”); United

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14 No. 13‐3889

States v. Harris, 394 F.3d 543, 558 (7th Cir. 2005) (“only the

rarest and most patently egregious of ineffective assistance

claims are appropriately brought on direct appeal”); United

States v. Trevino, 60 F.3d 333, 338 (7th Cir. 1995) (“we have

often cautioned that a defendant who presents an ineffective

assistance claim for the first time on direct appeal has little to

gain and everything to lose”).

Because the federal courts have no established procedure

(such as the one Wisconsin uses, for instance) to develop in‐

effective assistance claims for direct appeal, the situation of a

federal petitioner is the same as the one the Court described

in Trevino: as a practical matter, the first opportunity to pre‐

sent a claim of ineffective assistance of trial or direct appel‐

late counsel is almost always on collateral review, in a mo‐

tion under section 2255. There may be rare exceptions, as

Massaro acknowledged, for a case in which trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness “is so apparent from the record” that it can

be raised on direct appeal or even noticed by the appellate

court on its own. 538 U.S. at 508–09. But Ramirez’s is not one

of them.

Even if this is so, the government argues, we should not

apply the principles set forth in Martinez and Trevino because

they involved petitions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, not

motions under section 2255. The government’s position finds

some support in dicta from United States v. Lee, 792 F.3d 1021

(8th Cir. 2015). But Lee turned on an antecedent problem: the

petitioner’s motion under Rule 60(b) there was properly de‐

nied because it required precertification under section

2244(b)(3) and the court of appeals refused to take that step.

The court also noted that Lee had not been diligent: instead

of presenting his supporting evidence in his motion under

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No. 13‐3889 15

section 2255, he just included a footnote saying that such ev‐

idence could be provided later. 792 F.3d at *4. The court also

indicated that Martinez and Trevino might be limited to sec‐

tion 2254 cases, but that comment was not necessary to the

result.  

Neither Martinez nor Trevino suggested that, for these

purposes, the difference between sections 2254 and 2255 was

material. What does matter is the way in which ineffective

assistance of counsel claims must be presented in the partic‐

ular procedural system. This varies among the states, and

between the states and the federal system, but we already

have explained why in the great majority of federal cases,

ineffectiveness claims must await the first round of collateral

review. Moreover, if review were to be more restricted on

either the state or the federal side, federalism concerns sug‐

gest that it would be the state side. Most of the rules that

govern petitions under section 2254 are mirrored in section

2255, including importantly the procedure for handling sec‐

ond or successive petitions. We can think of no reason why

Martinez and Trevino should be read in the way the govern‐

ment advocates.  

The same principles apply in both the section 2254 and

the section 2255 contexts, as this case illustrates. Ramirez

was effectively unable to raise his ineffective assistance

claim until collateral review because he was in the typical

situation of needing to develop the record more fully before

he could proceed.  

As we already have noted, postconviction counsel failed

to notify Ramirez that the district court had denied his sec‐

tion 2255 motion, and this omission allowed the deadline for

filing a notice of appeal to lapse. See Ramirez v. United States,

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16 No. 13‐3889

No. 13‐3511 (7th Cir. Jan. 21, 2014). Counsel’s abandonment

deprived Ramirez of the ability to press his ineffective‐

assistance argument on appeal. See Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 923–

24 (holding that attorney abandonment is extraordinary cir‐

cumstance allowing federal court to disregard state proce‐

dural bar to hearing habeas petition); Holland, 560 U.S. at

652–53. We see no reason to distinguish between actions at

the state level that result in procedural default and the con‐

sequent loss of a chance for federal review, and actions at the

federal level that similarly lead to a procedural default that

forfeits appellate review. See Washington v. Ryan, 789 F.3d

1041, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that counsel’s

abandonment can be extraordinary circumstance when

abandonment resulted in lost ability to appeal); Mackey v.

Hoffman, 682 F.3d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 2012) (relief available

under Rule 60(b)(6) when federal habeas corpus petitioner

has been grossly neglected by counsel “in a manner amount‐

ing to attorney abandonment”).

C

All that remains is to determine whether the argument

left hanging after counsel abandoned Ramirez has “some

merit.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. We think it does. Ramirez

argues that trial counsel performed deficiently at sentencing

by failing to object to his classification as a career offender,

and that this prejudiced him because, based on the record in

the district court, the underlying convictions were not, cate‐

gorically, crimes of violence. See Begay v. United States, 553

U.S. 137 (2008).

We agree with Ramirez that trial counsel’s performance

was deficient. An attorney’s failure to object to an error in

the court’s guidelines calculation that results in a longer sen‐

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No. 13‐3889 17

tence for the defendant can demonstrate constitutionally in‐

effective performance. See United States v. Jones, 635 F.3d 909,

916 (7th Cir. 2011). Ramirez points out that sentencing coun‐

sel believed at the time that Ramirez had the requisite con‐

victions to make him a career offender. But by that time, Be‐

gay had been decided and counsel should have known that

the two Texas convictions were suspect. See Begay, 553 U.S.

at 141. Counsel also said that he unsuccessfully had tried to

get the Texas records. He complained that he would have

had to subpoena them from the Texas county in which

Ramirez was convicted, and that this “would have been ex‐

tremely difficult to do and time consuming.” This lack of de‐

sire to uncover the truth was deficient. See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984); Wilson v. Mazzuca, 570

F.3d 490, 502 (2d Cir. 2009) (deficient performance includes

errors arising from “oversight, carelessness, ineptitude, or

laziness”). (Ramirez’s new counsel obtained the records with

little difficulty, and they are now available to this court.)

The next question is whether counsel’s deficiency preju‐

diced Ramirez. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–94; Pidgeon v.

Smith, 785 F.3d 1165, 1171 (7th Cir. 2015). The Texas statute

under which Ramirez was twice convicted criminalizes “in‐

tentional, knowing, or reckless” assault. The district court

concluded that counsel’s performance did not prejudice

Ramirez because Ramirez never met his burden to show that

he was convicted of nonviolent assault. The parties also de‐

bate whether Ramirez could make that showing now. But at

the time of sentencing, it was the government’s burden, not

Ramirez’s, to show (using acceptable materials) that

Ramirez’s earlier convictions were for knowing or intention‐

al conduct, not reckless actions. See Johnson v. United States,

559 U.S. 133, 137 (2010) (without evidence to suggest other‐

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18 No. 13‐3889

wise, sentencing judge must presume conviction rested on

the least serious act in divisible statute). In his ineffective as‐

sistance claim, Ramirez needed to show only that his sen‐

tence would have been different had counsel objected to his

characterization as a career offender. See Jones, 635 F.3d at

916. As the government conceded on direct appeal, it could

not meet its burden: neither the charging papers nor the plea

colloquy shed any light on which version of assault was the

basis for Ramirez’s two Texas convictions. Brief for Appellee

at 12, United States v. Ramirez, 606 F.3d 396 (7th Cir. 2010)

(No. 09‐1815); see Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276,

2281–82 (2013); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 24–25

(2005). Any objection by counsel would have been sustained.  

Resisting this conclusion, the government directs us to

two statements made by Ramirez’s ex‐wife in which she de‐

scribes how he attacked her. Because these statements, to

which Ramirez stipulated at the plea hearing, depict a vio‐

lent crime, the government asserts that he was not preju‐

diced by counsel’s failure to object to the PSR. See Shepard,

544 U.S. at 24–25; Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599–

600 (1990); United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 405 (7th Cir.

2009). But those statements shed light only on “what the de‐

fendant did,” not “what crime the conviction represents.”

Ramirez, 606 F.3d at 398. They do not clarify whether

Ramirez was charged with and convicted of intentional,

knowing, or reckless assault. Just because he might have

been convicted of the more serious conduct does not mean

necessarily that he was; it is commonplace for defendants to

be convicted on a lesser offense than the facts would have

supported. We are left with a record in which none of the

permissible documents reveals which of the three possible

states of mind was used for Ramirez’s convictions.

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No. 13‐3889 19

See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 24–25; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599–600;

Woods, 576 F.3d at 405.

We note in closing that Ramirez was classified as a career

offender under § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause. See Ramirez,

606 F.3d at 398 (writing that Texas’s assault offense “does

not have, as an element, the use or threatened use of physi‐

cal force, and it is not specifically enumerated in the Guide‐

line, so it can be a crime of violence only under the residual

clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2)”). In Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct.

2551 (2015), the Supreme Court held that the identically

worded residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act is

unconstitutionally vague. Compare U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)

with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). We have interpreted both

residual clauses identically, see United States v. Billups, 536

F.3d 574, 579 n.1 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Upton, 512

F.3d 394, 404 (7th Cir. 2008) (abrogated on other grounds by

United States v. Miller, 721 F.3d 435, 443 (7th Cir. 2013); Unit‐

ed States v. Rosas, 410 F.3d 332, 335–36 (7th Cir. 2005), and so

we proceed on the assumption that the Supreme Court’s rea‐

soning applies to section 4B1.2 as well. This is a point, how‐

ever, that neither side has briefed, and it may warrant atten‐

tion on remand. We note that the U.S. Sentencing Commis‐

sion is now seeking comments on a proposal to change the

guideline language to make it conform to Johnson. See U.S.

Sentencing Commission News Release, “U.S. Sentencing

Commission Seeks Comment on Revisions to Definition of

Crime of Violence,” http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/

files/pdf/news/press‐releases‐and‐news‐advisories/press‐

releases/20150807_Press_Release.pdf. We leave any issue

about the effect of Johnson on the Guidelines for another day.

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20 No. 13‐3889

III

We conclude that Ramirez’s situation fits the framework

articulated in Maples, Trevino and Martinez. The district court

was apparently unaware of those decisions and thus cate‐

gorically denied Ramirez’s motion under Rule 60(b)(6) with‐

out discussing how postconviction counsel’s performance

affected the integrity of the proceedings. We agree with

Ramirez that this amounted to an abuse of discretion. We

therefore VACATE the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion and

REMAND with instructions to grant the Rule 60(b) motion

and reopen the proceedings under section 2255. The record

is insufficient to determine if Ramirez has other qualifying

convictions that might support affirmance of the sentence on

other grounds. That and other pertinent issues may be raised

on remand.  

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