Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-15263/USCOURTS-ca9-13-15263-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
California Reform Sex Offender Laws
Appellee
John Doe
Appellee
Kamala D. Harris

Chris Kelly
Appellant
Daphne Phung
Appellant
Jack Roe
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN DOE; JACK ROE; CALIFORNIA

REFORM SEX OFFENDER LAWS, on

behalf of themselves and others

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

KAMALA D. HARRIS, Attorney

General of the State of California,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

DAPHNE PHUNG; CHRIS KELLY,

Intervenors-Appellants.

No. 13-15263

D.C. No. 

3:12-cv-05713-

TEH

JOHN DOE; JACK ROE; CALIFORNIA

REFORM SEX OFFENDER LAWS, on

behalf of themselves and others

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

No. 13-15267

D.C. No. 

3:12-cv-05713-

TEH

OPINION

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2 DOE V. HARRIS

KAMALA D. HARRIS, Attorney

General of the State of California,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

DAPHNE PHUNG; CHRIS KELLY,

Intervenors-Appellants,

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Thelton E. Henderson, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted 

September 10, 2013—San Francisco, California

Filed November 18, 2014

Before: Mary M. Schroeder and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit

Judges, and Robert J. Timlin, Senior District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Bybee

* The Honorable Robert J. Timlin, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.

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DOE V. HARRIS 3

SUMMARY**

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s order preliminarily

enjoining provisions of the Californians Against Sexual

Exploitation Act, which seeks, among other things, to

supplement and modernize reporting obligations for

registered sex offenders byrequiring offenders to provide “[a]

list of any and all Internet identifiers established or used by

the person” and “[a] list of any and all Internet service

providers used by the person.” Cal. Penal Code

§ 290.015(a)(4)–(5). 

The panel first agreed with the district court that

registered sex offenders who have completed their terms of

probation and parole enjoy the full protection of the First

Amendment. The panel then held that because the Act

imposes a substantial burden on sex offenders’ ability to

engage in legitimate online speech, and to do so

anonymously, First Amendment scrutiny was warranted. 

Applying intermediate scrutiny, the panel concluded that the

Act unnecessarily chills protected speech in at least three

ways: (1) it does not make clear what sex offenders are

required to report; (2) it provides insufficient safeguards

preventing the public release of the information sex offenders

do report; and (3) the 24-hour reporting requirement is

onerous and overbroad. The panel concluded that appellees

were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment

challenge and that the district court did not abuse its

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 DOE V. HARRIS

discretion in deciding that all the necessary elements for

obtaining a preliminary injunction were satisfied.

COUNSEL

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General; Douglas J. Woods,

Senior Assistant Attorney General; Peter K. Southworth,

Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Robert D. Wilson

(argued), Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney

General of the State of California, Sacramento, California, for

Defendant-Appellant.

James C. Harrison (argued), Margaret R. Prinzing, Remcho,

Johansen & Purcell, LLP, San Leandro, California, for

Intervenors-Appellants.

Michael T. Risher (argued), Linda Lye, American Civil

Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California, Inc., San

Francisco, California; Hanni Fakhoury, Lee Tien, Electronic

Frontier Foundation, San Francisco, California, for

Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

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DOE V. HARRIS 5

OPINION

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

California law has long required registered sex offenders

to report identifying information, such as their address and

current photograph, to law enforcement. Cal. Penal Code

§§ 290.012, 290.015. The Californians Against Sexual

Exploitation (“CASE”) Act sought to supplement and

modernize these reporting obligations by requiring sex

offenders to provide “[a] list of any and all Internet identifiers

established or used by the person” and “[a] list of any and all

Internet service providers used by the person.” Id.

§ 290.015(a)(4)–(5). The Act also requires registered sex

offenders to send written notice to law enforcement within 24

hours of adding or changing an Internet identifier or an

account with an Internet service provider (“ISP”). 

Id. § 290.014(b). Appellees Doe, Roe, and the nonprofit

organization California Reform Sex Offender Laws filed a

complaint alleging that the CASE Act infringes their freedom

of speech in violation of the First Amendment. Appellees

filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which the district

court granted. Kamala Harris, the Attorney General of

California, and Intervenors, the proponents of the CASE Act,

appeal. We hold that the district court did not abuse its

discretion by enjoining the CASE Act. Accordingly, we

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The CASE Act

“California has had some form of sex offender

registration requirement since 1947.” In re Alva, 92 P.3d

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6 DOE V. HARRIS

311, 314 (Cal. 2004). Under current California law, “[e]very

person . . . residing in California, or while attending school or

working in California” who has been convicted of certain

sexual crimes must register with the police or sheriff where

he or she resides on an annual basis. Cal. Penal Code

§§ 290(b)–(c), 290.012(a). The registration law requires even

more frequent updates of violent predators: “[E]very person

who has ever been adjudicated a sexually violent predator . . .

shall, after his or her release from custody, verify his or her

address no less than once every 90 days . . . .” Id.

§ 290.012(b).

In 2012, California voters passed Proposition 35, known

as the CASE Act, which added provisions to California’s sex

offender registration requirements related to Internet usage by

persons subject to the Act. The new sections require covered

persons to provide additional information, including “[a] list

of any and all Internet identifiers established or used by the

person” and “[a] list of any and all Internet service providers

used by the person.” Id. § 290.015(a)(4), (5). The Act also

provides:

If any person who is required to register

pursuant to the Act adds or changes his or her

account with an Internet service provider or

adds or changes an Internet identifier, the

person shall send written notice of the

addition or change to the law enforcement

agency or agencies with which he or she is

currently registered within 24 hours. The law

enforcement agency or agencies shall make

this information available to the Department

of Justice.

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Id. § 290.014(b) (emphasis added).1 The CASE Act defines

the term “Internet identifier” as “an electronic mail address,

user name, screen name, or similar identifier used for the

purpose of Internet forum discussions, Internet chat room

discussions, instant messaging, social networking, or similar

Internet communication.” Id. § 290.024(b). The Act defines

“Internet service provider” as “a business, organization, or

other entity providing a computer and communications

facility directly to consumers through which a person may

obtain access to the Internet.” Id. § 290.024(a).

B. The Proceedings

Appellees represent a class of registered sex offenders

who regularly use the Internet to advocate anonymously on

behalf of sex offenders and to comment on news articles,

forums, and blogs. They filed suit on the day the CASE Act

1 The federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act

(“SORNA”), enacted as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and

Safety Act of 2006, gives the states powerful financial incentives to

maintain a sex offender registry. 42 U.S.C. §§ 16912 (“Each jurisdiction

shall maintain a jurisdiction-wide sex offender registry conforming to the

requirements of this subchapter.”), 16925(a) (providing that a

nonconforming jurisdiction “shall not receive 10 percent of the funds that

would otherwise be allocated for that fiscal year to the jurisdiction under

. . . the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968”). SORNA

requires states to include in their sex offender registries information such

as the registrants’ names and addresses, as well as “[a]ny other

information required by the Attorney General.” Id. § 16914(a). Pursuant

to that authority, in 2008 the Attorney General issued guidelines requiring

states to collect sex offenders’Internet identifiers and addresses. National

Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration, 73 Fed. Reg. 38030, 38055

(July 2, 2008); see also 42 U.S.C. § 16915a(a) (requiring states to obtain

registrants’ Internet identifiers “of any type that the Attorney General

determines to be appropriate”).

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8 DOE V. HARRIS

took effect, asserting that the CASE Act violates their First

Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association and

that the statutory provisions are void for vagueness in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellees

successfully moved for a temporary restraining order. This

temporary restraining order remained in effect until the

district court ruled on Appellees’ motion for a preliminary

injunction. While the motion was pending, the official

proponents of the CASE Act, Chris Kelly and Daphne Phung,

intervened.

After briefing and a hearing, the district court granted

Appellees’ motion for a preliminary injunction in a thorough

order. The district court concluded that the Act is content

neutral, and so determined to review the Act under an

intermediate level of scrutiny. Before beginning its

intermediate scrutinyanalysis, however, the district court first

considered whether it could permissibly adopt a narrowing

construction to clarify ambiguities in the CASE Act. The

district court adopted two narrowing constructions, both of

which were agreed upon by the parties. First, the district

court construed the requirement that registrants provide “[a]

list of any and all Internet service providers used by the

person,” id. § 290.015(a)(5), as requiring registrants to report

only ISPs with which they have an open account at the time

of registration, as opposed to ISPs with which the registrant

does not have an account but that are nevertheless accessed

by the registrant. Second, the district court limited the term

“Internet identifier” to require registrants to report only

identifiers they actually use to engage in “interactive

communication” on a website, and not identifiers they use

solely to purchase products or read content online.

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DOE V. HARRIS 9

Even with these narrowing constructions, however, the

district court determined that the CASE Act is not narrowly

tailored to serve the government’s important interest in

combating human trafficking and sexual exploitation because

“the challenged provisions, when combined with the lack of

protections on the information’s disclosure and the serious

penalty registrants face if they fail to comply with the

reporting requirements, create too great a chilling effect to

pass constitutional muster.” The district court further

concluded that loss of First Amendment freedoms is an

irreparable injury and that “the balance of equities and the

public interest weigh in favor of granting injunctive relief.” 

Accordingly, the district court granted the motion for a

preliminary injunction and enjoined the State “from

implementing or enforcing California Penal Code sections

290.014(b) and 290.015(a)(4)–(6), as enacted by the CASE

Act.”

The State and Intervenors appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard for issuing a preliminary injunction is well

established:

A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction

must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed

on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary

relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in

his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the

public interest.

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10 DOE V. HARRIS

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20

(2008).

The application of this standard in First Amendment cases

involves “an inherent tension: the moving party bears the

burden of showing likely success on the merits—a high

burden if the injunction changes the status quo before

trial—and yet within that merits determination the

government bears the burden of justifying its speechrestrictive law.” Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d

1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, “in the First

Amendment context, the moving party bears the initial

burden of making a colorable claim that its First Amendment

rights have been infringed, or are threatened with

infringement, at which point the burden shifts to the

government to justify the restriction.” Id. at 1116.

We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a

preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Id. at 1115. 

We review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo, and

the district court’s findings of fact for clear error. Id. When

reviewing under this standard, we will not reverse the district

court’s decision “simply because [we] would have arrived at

a different result if [we] had applied the law to the facts of the

case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Appellees’ First Amendment challenge rests on two

premises: first, that registered sex offenders are entitled to

full First Amendment protection, and second, that the Case

Act warrants First Amendment scrutiny. Concluding that

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DOE V. HARRIS 11

registered sex offenders enjoy full First Amendment

protection, and that the Act warrants First Amendment

scrutiny, we apply intermediate scrutiny and conclude, as did

the district court, that Appellees are likely to succeed on the

merits of their First Amendment challenge.2

1. Scope of First Amendment Protection Afforded to

Registered Sex Offenders

As the district court noted, both sides in this litigation

agree that “speech by sex offenders who have completed their

terms of probation or parole enjoys the full protection of the

First Amendment.” We agree, but we think it is important to

understand why, because when a convict’s constitutional

rights are at issue, his present status “on a continuum of

possible punishments” may be a relevant consideration. 

Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

On the one end of the continuum is incarceration, which

“brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many

privileges and rights.” Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285

(1948), overruled on other grounds by McCleskey v. Zant,

499 U.S. 467 (1991). “These constraints on inmates, and in

some cases the complete withdrawal of certain rights, are

‘justified by the considerations underlying our penal

system.’” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524 (1984)

(quoting Price, 334 U.S. at 285). Accordingly, inmates only

2 Because we agree with the district court that Appellees are likely to

succeed on their freedom of speech claims, we decline to address their

vagueness and freedomof association claims. See Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d

573, 575 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[W]e see no reason to decide ab initio

issues that the district court has not had an opportunity to consider. . . .”).

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12 DOE V. HARRIS

“retain[] those First Amendment rights that are not

inconsistent with [their] status as . . . prisoner[s] or with the

legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” 

Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).

Parole (or supervised release, in the federal system)3is

one step removed from imprisonment. “The essence of

parole is release from prison, before the completion of

sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide by certain

rules during the balance of the sentence.” Morrissey v.

Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972). Although parolees

“should enjoy greater freedom in many respects than a

prisoner, . . . the Government may . . . impose restrictions on

the rights of the parolee that are reasonably and necessarily

related to the [Government’s] interests.” Birzon v. King, 469

F.2d 1241, 1243 (2d Cir. 1972). For example, we have

upheld Internet monitoring as a condition of release for

parolees who were convicted of downloading child

pornography. See, e.g., United States v. Quinzon, 643 F.3d

1266, 1272–73 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Goddard, 537

F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008). But, because parolees retain

some of their First Amendment rights we have also struck

conditions of release that unreasonablyburdened those rights. 

See, e.g., United States v. Barsumyan, 517 F.3d 1154,

1161–62 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the sentencing court

plainly erred in imposing a restriction on all computer use as

a condition of supervised release); United States v. Sales, 476

F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a condition of

3

“The federal system has abolished parole, and uses supervised release

to supervise felons after they get out of prison. People on supervised

release have not completed their sentences, they are serving them.” 

United States v. Betts, 511 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2007) (footnote

omitted). 

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DOE V. HARRIS 13

release that required computer monitoring “result[ed] in a far

greater deprivation of [the defendant]’s liberty than [wa]s

reasonably necessary” in light of the nature of the

counterfeiting offense and the defendant’s history and

characteristics).

Probation is less restrictive than parole, though it is still

on the continuum of state-imposed punishments. See

Samson, 547 U.S. at 850 (“[P]arole is more akin to

imprisonmentthan probation is to imprisonment.”); id. (“[O]n

the Court’s continuum of possible punishments, parole is the

stronger medicine; ergo, parolees enjoy even less of the

average citizen’s absolute liberty than do probationers.”

(alteration in original) (quotingUnited States v. Cardona, 903

F.2d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 1990))). Unlike parole, which is

imposed in addition to imprisonment, probation is “meted

out . . . in lieu of[] incarceration.” Cardona, 903 F.2d at 63. 

Although probation is a less restrictive criminal sanction, the

government may still “impose reasonable conditions that

deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by lawabiding citizens.” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112,

119 (2001).

Here, the plaintiffs fall into yet another category. They

are not prisoners, parolees, or probationers. Doe and Roe

were convicted of sex-related crimes more than two decades

ago and have completed their terms of probation and parole. 

Although they remain subject to reporting requirements, sex

offenders like Doe and Roe are no longer on the “continuum”

of state-imposed punishments. Samson, 547 U.S. at 850; see

also Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1181 (9th Cir.

1998) (“Although Williamson’s criminal punishment has

come to an end, he must now register as a sex offender

. . . .”). As we explained in Williamson, sex offender

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14 DOE V. HARRIS

registration “is more properly characterized as a collateral

consequence of conviction rather than as a restraint on

liberty.” Id. at 1183.

Of course, if Doe, Roe, or other sex offenders fail to

follow California’s registration requirements, theyare subject

to criminal sanctions, which in California can be harsh. See

Gonzalez v. Duncan, 551 F.3d 875, 889 (9th Cir. 2008)

(holding that a sentence of 28 years to life under California’s

“three strikes” law for filing a sex offender registration

update three months late violated the Eighth Amendment); id.

at 887–88 (comparingCalifornia’s registration and sentencing

scheme with other states). But such sanctions are not the

same as having parole or probation revoked; rather, they

constitute a new criminal penalty altogether. So while

registered sex offenders suffer from the effects of their

crimes, they are no longer subject to formal punishment. We

accordingly agree with the district court that registered sex

offenders who have completed their terms of probation and

parole “enjoy[] the full protection of the First Amendment.”

2. First Amendment Scrutiny

In evaluating the CASE Act, we must determine in the

first instance whether the Act implicates the First

Amendment. Appellants are correct that, on its face, the

CASE Act does not prohibit speech. But a law may burden

speech—and thereby regulate it—even if it stops short of

prohibiting it. Indeed, “the ‘distinction between laws

burdening and laws banning speech is but a matter of

degree.’” Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664

(2011) (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc.,

529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000)).

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DOE V. HARRIS 15

There can be little doubt that requiring a narrow class of

individuals to notify the government within 24 hours of

engaging in online communication with a new identifier

significantly burdens those individuals’ ability and

willingness to speak on the Internet. See Cal. Penal Code

§ 290.014(b). Of course, that the law targets registered sex

offenders might not be troublesome by itself—federal and

state laws already impose reporting requirements on that

same group, and those laws have not been thought to be

unconstitutional because registrants must spend time to fill

out paperwork that they otherwise might have spent engaging

in First Amendment activities. Cf. Arcara v. Cloud Books,

Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706 (1986) (“One liable for a civil

damages award has less money to spend on paid political

announcements or to contribute to political causes, yet no one

would suggest that such liability gives rise to a valid First

Amendment claim.”).

But the CASE Act burdens sex offenders precisely when

theyare engaged in one activity—communicating through the

Internet. In that respect, this case is similar to Minneapolis

Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,

460 U.S. 575 (1983). There, the state imposed a tax on the

cost of ink and paper, but it exempted the first $100,000

worth of material. As a consequence, only a small number of

large newspaper publishers were subject to the tax. Id. at

578–79. The Supreme Court began with the common-sense

proposition that the government “can subject newspapers to

generally applicable economic regulations without creating

constitutional problems.” Id. at 581. But Minnesota’s special

use tax, the Court determined, was not a generally applicable

economic regulation that merely incidentally burdened

publications in their exercise of free speech. See id. Instead,

it “singled out the press for special treatment” and “applie[d]

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16 DOE V. HARRIS

only to certain publications protected by the First

Amendment.” Id. at 581, 582. The Court thus subjected the

use tax to First Amendment scrutiny rather than analyzing it

as an equal protection issue. See id. at 582, 585 n.7.

Just as the tax on paper and ink in Minneapolis Star

inevitably burdened specific publishers’ ability to engage in

free speech, so too does the CASE Act’s 24-hour reporting

requirement inevitably burden sex offenders’ ability to

engage in protected speech on the Internet. Indeed, the

purpose of the Act is to collect Internet identifiers that sex

offenders use “for the purpose of Internet forum discussions,

Internet chat room discussions, instant messaging, social

networking, or similar Internet communication.” Cal. Penal

Code § 290.024(b) (emphasis added). Moreover, the burden

here is substantial—the Act conditions Internet speech with

a new identifier on a registrant’s affirmative act of sending

written notice to the police within 24 hours. Cf. Lamont v.

Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (holding that a

law requiring addressees of “communist political

propaganda” to request in writing that the mailing be

delivered violated the addressees’ First Amendment rights

because the law imposed an impermissible “affirmative

obligation” and was “almost certain to have a deterrent

effect”). And if that was not enough of a burden, the Act’s

reporting requirement carries with it the threat of criminal

sanctions.

For the very reasons this case is like Minneapolis Star and

Lamont, it is nothing like Arcara, a case urged on us by

Appellants. In Arcara, the Supreme Court held that the First

Amendment was not implicated by the enforcement of a

public health regulation authorizing the government to close

premises used for prostitution merely because the premises at

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DOE V. HARRIS 17

issue were also used as an adult bookstore. 478 U.S. at

704–07. The Court distinguished Minneapolis Star because

the statute in Minneapolis Star “ha[d] the inevitable effect of

singling out those engaged in expressive activity.” Id. at 707. 

By contrast, the closure sanction at issue in Arcara “was

directed at unlawful conduct having nothing to do with books

or other expressive activity.” Id. Here, we cannot say that

the CASE Act has nothing to do with First Amendment

activity. To the contrary, the CASE Act directly and

exclusively burdens speech, and a substantial amount of that

speech is clearly protected under the First Amendment—just

as the Act burdens sending child pornography and soliciting

sex with minors, it also burdens blogging about political

topics and posting comments to online news articles.4

The Act also has the inevitable effect of burdening sex

offenders’ ability to engage in anonymous online speech. 

Appellees allege that the Act allows law enforcement to

disclose their identifying information to the public without

imposing sufficient constraints on law enforcement’s

discretion to do so. The Supreme Court has subjected

speaker regulations—such as disclosure requirements—to

4 Appellants argue that Proposition 35 updates California’s sex offender

registration law to make it a “generally applicable governmental

regulation” of the kind at issue in Arcara because “[f]ar from ‘singling

out’Internet-related activities for special burdens, Proposition 35 seeksto

extend the same registration requirements that apply in the physical world

to the virtual world.” For example, Appellants note, “if a registrant uses

an alias to send a letter to the newspaper editor, he must report that alias

to law enforcement.” But the law’s applicability to both Internet and nonInternet speech only means that the law is more speech restrictive. It does

not make the law “generally applicable” to all speakers like the antiprostitution law in Arcara. Indeed, it is still precisely the same group of

individuals that is singled out.

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18 DOE V. HARRIS

First Amendment scrutiny. For example, in McIntyre v. Ohio

Elections Commission, the Court held that an Ohio statute

that required leafleters to put their names on campaign

literature “undeniably impede[d] protected First Amendment

activity.” 514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995). As the Court explained,

“an author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other

decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of

a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected

by the First Amendment.” Id. at 342. Relying on McIntyre,

the Court similarly held that a Colorado law that required

initiative-petition circulators to wear an identification badge

deterred speech. Buckley v. Amer. Constitutional Law

Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 200 (1999).

We have explained, moreover, that “[a]lthough the

Internet is the latest platform for anonymous speech, online

speech stands on the same footing as other speech—there is

‘no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny

that should be applied’ to online speech.” In re Anonymous

Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844,

870 (1997)). First Amendment scrutiny is thus also

warranted because the Act burdens registered sex offenders’

willingness to engage in anonymous online speech.

Accordingly, because the Act imposes a substantial

burden on sex offenders’ ability to engage in legitimate

online speech, and to do so anonymously, we conclude that

First Amendment scrutiny is warranted.

3. Level of Scrutiny

Having determined that some level of First Amendment

scrutiny is warranted, we now determine which level. In the

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DOE V. HARRIS 19

First Amendment context, the level of scrutiny to be applied

depends upon the “‘content neutrality’ of the statute.” Hill v.

Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719 (2000). Content-based

regulations are subject to the most exacting scrutiny because

the “government has no power to restrict expression because

of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” 

Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 

By contrast, “regulations that are unrelated to the content of

speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.” 

Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). 

So, “[t]he principal inquiry in determining content neutrality

. . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of

speech because of disagreement with the message it

conveys.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791

(1989).

We conclude that the CASE Act is content neutral. On its

face, the Act makes no reference to specific subject matters

or viewpoints. And unlike the registration laws in other states,

California’s CASE Act does not prohibit registered sex

offenders from using particular websites, or any particular

types of communication. Compare Cal. Penal Code § 290 et

seq. with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5 (2013) (banning the use

of commercial social networking websites by any registered

sex offender) and Ind. Code § 35-42-4-12 (2014) (prohibiting

sex offenders from using social networking websites, instant

messaging services, and chat room programs). Instead, the

CASE Act broadly applies to all identifiers that a registrant

uses for online communication, regardless of whether he uses

the identifier to chat, post product reviews, or ask questions

about a credit card bill. In that respect, the law may be broad,

but at least it is content neutral.

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The more difficult question is whether the CASE Act is

subject to strict scrutiny because it makes speaker-based

distinctions. In Ward, the Supreme Court declared that “[a]

regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of

expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental

effect on some speakers or messages but not others.” 491

U.S. at 791. More recently, however, the Court held in

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission that the First

Amendment prohibits “restrictions distinguishing among

different speakers; allowing speech by some but not others.” 

558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010). The Court explained that

“[s]peech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are

all too often simply a means to control content,” and that

“[b]y taking the right to speak from some and giving it to

others, the Government deprives the disadvantaged person or

class of the right to use speech to strive to establish worth,

standing, and respect for the speaker’s voice.” Id. at 340–41. 

The Court thus applied strict scrutiny to the ban on political

speech as a non-content neutral restriction.

Here, although it is true that the Act singles out registered

sex offenders as a category of speakers, it does not target

political speech content, nor is it a ban on speech. See id. at

339 (observing that the restrictions constituted a “ban on

speech” and that “[t]he First Amendment ‘has its fullest and

most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign

for political office’” (citation omitted)). In the context of

laws that burden speech but do not ban it, the test is not

merely whether a law singles out individuals—many speechburdening laws do. The test is whether the speech-burdening

restrictions “are justified without reference to the content of

the regulated speech.” Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320

(1988) (emphasis in original) (quoting Renton v. Playtime

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Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

The Supreme Court’s decision in Turner Broadcasting is

instructive. At issue in that case were rules requiring cable

television systems to devote a portion of their channels to the

transmission of local broadcast television stations. 512 U.S.

at 626. The Court acknowledged that these “must-carry”

provisions “distinguish[ed] between speakersin the television

programming market”—over-the-air broadcasters were

favored, while cable programmers and cable operators were

burdened by the carriage obligations. Id. at 645. 

Nevertheless, the provisions “d[id] so based only upon the

manner in which speakers transmit their messages to viewers,

and not upon the messages they carry.” Id. The Court

reasoned that so long as such speaker distinctions “[we]re not

a subtle means of exercising a content preference,” the

otherwise content-neutral provisions were not subject to strict

scrutiny. Id. Reviewing the statute and its various legislative

findings, the Court was persuaded “that Congress’ overriding

objective in enacting must-carry was not to favor

programming of a particular subject matter, viewpoint, or

format, but rather to preserve access to free television

programming for the 40 percent of Americans without cable.” 

Id. at 646. The Court thus reviewed the must-carry

provisions under an intermediate level of scrutiny. Id. at

661–62.

Here as well, the CASE Act does not target speakers or

the forum in a way that suggests that the restrictions are a

proxy for content regulation. The Act’s purpose is clear: It

is to “combat the crime of human trafficking” and to

“strengthen laws regarding sexual exploitation, including sex

offender registration requirements, to allow law enforcement

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to track and prevent online sex offenses and human

trafficking.” Proposition 35, Californians Against Sexual

Exploitation Act, § 3(1), (3). Although we conclude that the

Act burdens protected speech, nothing in the Act suggests

that the Act’s purpose was to disfavor any particular

viewpoint orsubject matter. We therefore conclude that “the

appropriate standard by which to evaluate the

constitutionality of [the Act] is the intermediate level of

scrutiny applicable to content-neutral restrictions that impose

an incidental burden on speech.” Turner, 512 U.S. at 662.

Our conclusion finds support in the decisions of other

courts that have considered registration requirements similar

to those found in the CASE Act. The Tenth Circuit, for

example, has held that Utah’s reporting law, which requires

sex offenders to provide all Internet identifiers and their

correspondingwebsites, was a “content-neutral regulation . . .

subject to intermediate scrutiny.” Doe v. Shurtleff, 628 F.3d

1217, 1223 (10th Cir. 2010). Similarly, the Seventh Circuit

has held that an Indiana statute, which prohibited certain sex

offenders from using social networking sites, instant

messaging, or chat rooms that are accessible to minors, was

“content neutral because it restrict[ed] speech without

reference to the expression’s content” and was therefore

subject to intermediate scrutiny. Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion

Cnty., Ind., 705 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2013). Other courts

have concluded likewise. See, e.g., Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F.

Supp. 2d 1086, 1093 1107–08 (D. Neb. 2012) (Nebraska

statute that required sex offenders to disclose “remote

communication device identifiers, addresses, domain names,

and Internet and blog sites used” was subject to intermediate

scrutiny); White v. Baker, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1307–08

(N.D. Ga. 2010) (Georgia statute requiring sex offenders to

produce their email addresses, usernames, and password was

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subject to intermediate scrutiny); State v. Packingham, 748

S.E.2d 146, 149–50 (N.C. App. 2013) (North Carolina statute

banning use of social networking sites by sex offenders was

subject to intermediate scrutiny). We join these courts that

have reviewed similar laws, and apply intermediate scrutiny

to the CASE Act.

4. Intermediate Scrutiny Analysis

Content-neutral restrictions on protected speech survive

intermediate scrutiny so long as “‘they are narrowly tailored

to serve a significant governmental interest, and . . . leave

open ample alternative channels for communication of the

information.’” Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v.

Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 

“To satisfy this standard, a regulation need not be the least

speech-restrictive means of advancing the Government’s

interests.” Turner, 512 U.S. at 662. Rather, the test is

whether “the means chosen . . . ‘burden[s] substantially more

speech than is necessary to further the government’s

legitimate interests.’” Id. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799);

see Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of

Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 947 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 

The government must also “demonstrate that the recited

harms are real . . . and that the regulation will in fact alleviate

these harms in a direct and material way.” Turner, 512 U.S.

at 664.

The CASE Act is clearly intended to serve a legitimate

interest. The Act’s stated purpose is to “combat the crime of

human trafficking” and “to strengthen laws regarding sexual

exploitation, including sex offender registration requirements,

to allow law enforcement to track and prevent online sex

offenses and human trafficking.” Proposition 35, § 3(1), (3). 

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The Act declares that protecting people in California “from

all forms of sexual exploitation is of paramount importance.” 

Id. § 2(1). It further recites that “[w]hile the rise of the

Internet has delivered great benefits to California, the

predatory use of this technology by human traffickers and sex

offenders has allowed such exploiters a new means to entice

and prey on vulnerable individuals” and that the Act will

“deter predators from using the Internet to facilitate human

trafficking and sexual exploitation.” Id. § 2(4), (6).

Unquestionably, the State’s interest in preventing and

responding to crime, particularly crimes as serious as sexual

exploitation and human trafficking, is legitimate. We have

observed that there is a “strong link between child

pornography and the Internet, and the need to protect the

public, particularly children, from sex offenders.” United

States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 621 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see also City of L.A. v. Alameda

Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 435 (2002) (plurality opinion)

(“[W]e find that reducing crime is a substantial government

interest . . . .”); Doe v. Prosecutor, 705 F.3d at 698 (“Indiana

is certainly justified in shielding its children from improper

sexual communication.”); Shurtleff, 628 F.3d at 1223 (“We

have no doubt that the State of Utah has a compelling interest

in investigating kidnapping and sex-related crimes.”); White,

696 F. Supp. 2d at 1308 (“[Georgia] has an interest in

protecting against internet abuse of children.”). California

has a substantial interest in protecting vulnerable individuals,

particularly children, from sex offenders, and the use of the

Internet to facilitate that exploitation is well known to this

Court. See, e.g., United States v. Curtin, 588 F.3d 993 (9th

Cir. 2009); United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915 (9th Cir.

2008); United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988 (9th Cir.

2008).

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Although California clearly has a legitimate interest, the

more difficult question is whether the means California has

chosen “‘burden[s] substantially more speech than is

necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.’” 

Turner, 512 U.S. at 662 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799). 

“The Constitution givessignificant protection from overbroad

laws that chill speech within the First Amendment’s vast and

privileged sphere.” Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535

U.S. 234, 244 (2002). The concern that an overbroad statute

deters protected speech is especially strong where, as here,

the statute imposes criminal sanctions. See Virginia v. Hicks,

539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003).

We conclude that the CASE Act unnecessarily chills

protected speech in at least three ways: the Act does not make

clear what sex offenders are required to report, there are

insufficient safeguards preventing the public release of the

information sex offenders do report, and the 24-hour

reporting requirement is onerous and overbroad. We address

each of these concerns in turn.

a. Ambiguities in the Act

First, the Act is unclear as to what it requires registered

sex offenders to provide. The district court—at the urging of

the State—adopted narrowing constructions to clarify the

meanings of “Internet identifier” and “Internet service

provider.” The district court construed the Act’s requirement

that Internet identifiers be reported to require only reporting

of identifiers used to engage in “interactive communication,”

not those used for shopping or reading content. It also

construed the Act to require a registered sex offender to

report a new Internet identifier only once he or she actually

uses the identifier for a communicative purpose. As to ISPs,

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the district court construed the Act to require disclosure only

of ISPs with which registered sex offenders have an open

account, and not friends’ or family members’ accounts or

publicly available WiFi that does not require an account.

Despite the district court’s valiant effort at applying

narrowing constructions, we are reluctant to adopt a

narrowing construction where, as here, the terms of the

statute itself—including its definition section—are

ambiguous and arguably inconsistent. See White, 696 F.

Supp. 2d at 1312 (holding that a statute using the term

“interactive online communication” chilled a sex offender’s

right to anonymous free speech because the term is too

ambiguous). Although we will adopt a narrowing

construction where a contrary construction might raise

“serious constitutional doubts,” we can “impose a limiting

construction on a statute only if it is ‘readily susceptible’ to

such a construction.” Reno, 521 U.S. at 884 (quoting

Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397

(1988)).

First, the Act is not readily susceptible to the district

court’s limitation of the Act to require registered sex

offenders to report only new Internet identifiers that a sex

offender actually uses for a communicative purpose. 

Although it is true that the Act in one place refers only to

“identifier[s] used for the purpose of . . . Internet

communication,” Cal. Penal Code § 290.024(b) (emphasis

added), elsewhere the Act requires registered sex offenders to

provide “[a] list of any and all Internet identifiers established

or used by the person,” id. § 290.015(a)(4) (emphasis added). 

Similarly, the Act is not readily susceptible to the district

court’s limitation of the Act to require registered sex

offenders to report only ISPs with which they have an open

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account. Again, the Act is inconsistent. One provision

requires registered sex offenders to report when they add or

change an “account with an Internet service provider,” id.

§ 290.014(b) (emphasis added), but another provision

requires them to disclose “any and all Internet service

providers used by the person,” § 290.015(a)(5) (emphasis

added).5

And even if the Act were readily susceptible to the

constructions adopted by the district court, our adoption of

those constructions would not necessarily alleviate the

chilling effect caused by the ambiguities in the Act. As the

district court noted, “[t]he uncertainty surrounding what

registrants must report—and the resultant potential chilling

effect—is greater in this case because the [district court’s]

interpretation of the Act is not definitive guidance to

registrants about what they must report” because it “is not

binding on state courts, where the registrants would face

prosecution for failure to register.”

Thus, whether narrowly construed or not, the ambiguities

in the statute may lead registered sex offenders either to

overreport their activity or underuse the Internet to avoid the

difficult questions in understanding what, precisely, they

must report. “This uncertaintyundermines the likelihood that

the [Act] has been carefully tailored to the [State’s] goal of

protecting minors” and other victims. Reno, 521 U.S. at 871.

5 The broader reporting requirement found in § 290.015(a)(5)—

requiring registered sex offenders to report ISPs that they use, which

presumably can include hot spots and open wireless systems—is entirely

consistent with the Act’s definition of the term “Internet service provider”

as any “entity . . . through which a person may obtain access to the

Internet.” Cal. Penal Code § 290.024(a).

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And this uncertainty is particularly troubling because unclear

laws inevitably lead citizens to “‘steer far wider of the

unlawful zone’ . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden

areas were clearly marked.” Grayned v. City of Rockford,

408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (alteration in original) (quoting

Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)).

The State suggests that even if the CASE Act is unclear,

registrants have the opportunity to ask questions when

annually registering in person, and if a registrant makes an

honest mistake, he or she will not be prosecuted because the

law only penalizes knowing failure to register. But

notwithstanding the State’s assurances that it will not

prosecute “honest mistakes,” “we cannot assume that, in its

subsequent enforcement, ambiguitieswill be resolved in favor

of adequate protection of First Amendment rights.” NAACP

v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).

We therefore conclude that the Act’s ambiguities as to

what registrants are required to report, combined with the

criminal sanctions for failure to report, unnecessarily chill

protected speech.

b. Standards for release of identifying information

Second, the Act burdens registered sex offenders’ ability

to engage in anonymous online speech. Our nation has “a

respected tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political

causes.” McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343. This tradition is worth

protecting because “[a]nonymity . . . provides a way for a

writer who may be personally unpopular to ensure that

readers will not prejudge her message simply because they do

not like its proponent.” Id. at 342. “Accordingly, an author’s

decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions

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DOE V. HARRIS 29

concerning omissions or additions to the content of a

publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected

by the First Amendment.” Id.

Although this is not what some might call the classic

anonymous-speech case, where speakers allege they are

required to disclose their identities directly to their audience,

we conclude that the Act nevertheless chills anonymous

speech because it too freely allows law enforcement to

disclose sex offenders’ Internet identifying information to the

public. California’s sex offender registration law provides

that, in general, information provided by registered sex

offenders “shall not be open to inspection by the public.” 

Cal. Penal Code § 290.021. But in order “to allow members

of the public to protect themselves and their children from

sex offenders,” id. § 290.45(a)(2), the Act now provides that

[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,

. . . any designated law enforcement entity

may provide information to the public about

a person required to register as a sex offender

pursuant to Section 290, by whatever means

the entity deems appropriate, when necessary

to ensure the public safety based upon

information available to the entity concerning

that specific person.

Id. § 290.45(a)(1) (emphasis added).6

6 Notably, § 290.45 prohibits law enforcement agencies from

disseminating such information through the Internet. Cal. Penal Code

§ 290.45(c)(1). 

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The problem is that § 290.45(a)(1) contains no standards

for judging what is “necessary to ensure the public safety.” 

Without such standards, the Act impermissibly “plac[es]

unbridled discretion in the hands of a government official or

agency.” City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486

U.S. 750, 757 (1988). In Lakewood, a municipal ordinance

gave the mayor the right to grant or deny applications for

newsrack permits on public property. If the mayor denied the

application, he had to state the reasons for the denial.

According to the Court, “nothing in the law as written

require[d] the mayor to do more than make the statement ‘it

is not in the public interest’ when denying a permit

application.” Id. at 769. The Court rejected the idea that it

should presume the mayor would deny permits “only for

reasons related to the health, safety, or welfare of Lakewood

citizens.” Id. at 770. Without limits “made explicit by

textual incorporation, binding judicial or administrative

construction, or well-established practice,” the constraints on

the mayor’s authority were “illusory.” Id. at 769–70.

We cannot find any constraining principle in § 290.45. 

“Public safety”—like “public interest”—is much too broad a

concept to serve as an effective constraint on law

enforcement decisions that may infringe First Amendment

rights.7See White, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 1311 (expressing

7 For this reason, this case is distinguishable from the Tenth Circuit’s

decision in Doe v. Shurtleff, which upheld the constitutionality of Utah’s

sex offender registration statute. In that case, the Utah legislature

amended its sex offender registration statute after the statute was found

unconstitutional by the district court. Reviewing the amended statute, the

Tenth Circuit determined that Utah had limited law enforcement officials’

use of Internet identifiers to “investigating kidnapping and sex-related

crimes” and only permitted them to share such information “among law

enforcement agencies, not the public at large.” 628 F.3d at 1221, 1225. 

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concern about a law allowing law enforcement to disclose sex

offenders’ Internet identifiers “to protect the public” because

“[i]t is conceivable, if not predictable, that a person in law

enforcement might determine that Internet Identifiers for

offenders ought to be released so that the public can search

for and monitor communications which an offender intends

to be anonymous”). And the promise from the State that it

will use the power appropriately is not sufficient: “[T]he

First Amendment protects against the Government; it does

not leave us at the mercy of noblesse oblige. We would not

uphold an unconstitutional statute merely because the

Government promised to use it responsibly.” United States

v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010).

The State argues that the Act, construed with existing

constraints on law enforcement activities, cabins the

discretion of law enforcement officials to use Internet

identifying information because

to conduct investigation or surveillance,

“specific and articulable facts causing the

officer to suspect that some activity relating to

crime has taken place or is occurring or about

to occur” are required and the suspicion “that

the person he or she intends to place under

surveillance is involved in that activity” is

also required.

Given the limited purposes for which identifiers could be shared among

law enforcement agencies, the court concluded that “the statute include[d]

sufficient restrictions so as not to unnecessarily chill Mr. Doe’s speech.” 

Id. at 1225.

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But these general principles of good police practices for

investigation or surveillance tell us nothing about the kind of

judgment required by § 290.45 for disclosure of information

to the public “when necessary to ensure the public safety.”

We do not believe that law enforcement would ignore

§ 290.45—that section also penalizes law enforcement’s

misuse of sex offenders’ private information. But sex

offenders’ fear of disclosure in and of itself chills their

speech. If their identity is exposed, their speech, even on

topics of public importance, could subject them to

harassment, retaliation, and intimidation. See McIntyre, 514

U.S. at 341–42 (“The decision in favor of anonymity may be

motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by

concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to

preserve as much of one’s privacy as possible.”); Brown v.

Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87,

100 (1982) (holding that disclosure requirements may subject

unpopular minority groups to “threats, harassment, and

reprisals”). Anonymity may also be important to sex

offenders engaged in protected speech because it “provides a

way for a writer who may be personally unpopular to ensure

that readers will not prejudge her message simply because

they do not like its proponent.” McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342;

see also Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088,

1092 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (“Internet anonymity facilitates the

rich, diverse, and far ranging exchange of ideas.”).

We thus agree with the district court that the standards for

releasing Internet identifying information to the public are

inadequate to constrain the discretion of law enforcement

agencies and that, as a result, registered sex offenders are

unnecessarily deterred from engaging in anonymous online

speech.

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c. 24-hour reporting requirement

Third, the Act’s 24-hour update requirement “undeniably

impedes protected First Amendment activity.” McIntyre, 514

U.S. at 355. Although registered sex offenders do not have

to register before they communicate online, theymust register

within 24 hours of using a new Internet identifier—a shorter

time than is given by registration laws in other jurisdictions. 

See, e.g., White, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 1294 (Georgia statute

requiring registrantsto provide updated information within 72

hours). This burden is particularly onerous for sex offenders

who live in remote areas or who, like other citizens, have

multiple Internet identifiers. See Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F.

Supp. 2d. at 1122 (granting a preliminary injunction because

a blog-reporting requirement that “[r]equir[ed] sex offenders

to constantly update the government . . . [wa]s unnecessarily

burdensome and . . . [wa]s likely to deter the offender from

engaging in speech that is perfectly appropriate”).

Moreover, anytime registrants want to communicate with

a new identifier, they must assess whether the message they

intend to communicate is worth the hassle of filling out a

form, purchasing stamps, and locating a post office or

mailbox. The mail-in requirement is not onlypsychologically

chilling, but physically inconvenient, since whenever a

registered sex offender obtains a new ISP or Internet

identifier, he must go somewhere else within 24 hours to mail

that information to the State. Cf. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307

(holding that a law requiring addressees of “communist

political propaganda” to request in writing that the mailing be

delivered “[wa]s almost certain to have a deterrent effect”).

The Act’s 24-hour reporting requirement thus

undoubtedlychills First Amendment Activity. Of course, that

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chilling effect is only exacerbated by the possibility that

criminal sanctions may follow for failing to update

information about Internet identifiers or ISP accounts. See

NAACP, 371 U.S. at 433 (“The threat of sanctions may deter

the[] exercise [of First Amendment rights] almost as potently

as the actual application of sanctions.”).

The 24-hour reporting requirement is not only onerous, it

is also applied in an across-the-board fashion. The

requirement applies to all registered sex offenders, regardless

of their offense, their history of recidivism (or lack thereof),

or any other relevant circumstance. And the requirement

applies to all websites and all forms of communication,

regardless of whether the website or form of communication

is a likely or even a potential forum for engaging in illegal

activity. (If for example a sex offender establishes a

username on a news outlet’s website for purposes of posting

comments to news articles, it is hard to imagine how speedily

reporting that identifier will serve the government’s

interests.) In short, we have a hard time finding even an

attempt at narrow tailoring in this section of the Act. See

White, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 1309 (“A regulatory scheme

designed to further the state’s legitimate interest in protecting

children from communication enticing them into illegal

sexual activity should consider how and where on the internet

such communication occurs.”).

* * *

Because the CASE Act’s requirements are not clear, the

information may be too freely shared with the public, and the

24-hour reporting requirement is onerous and overbroad, we

conclude that Appellees are likely to prevail on their claim

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that the CASE Act unnecessarily deters registered sex

offenders from engaging in legitimate expressive activity.

8

B. Irreparable Harm, Balance of Equities, and the Public

Interest

“Even where a plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of

success on the merits of a First Amendment claim, he ‘must

also demonstrate that he is likely to suffer irreparable injury

in the absence of a preliminary injunction, and that the

balance of equities and the public interest tip in his favor.’” 

Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Klein v. City of San

Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1207 (9th Cir. 2009)). We do not

simply assume that these elements “collapse into the merits

of the First Amendment claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

Here, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in deciding that all the necessary elements for

obtaining a preliminary injunction are satisfied. We have

held that the “‘[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for

even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes

irreparable injury.’” Associated Press v. Otter, 682 F.3d 821,

826 (9th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Elrod v.

Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). A “colorable First

Amendment claim” is “irreparable injury sufficient to merit

the grant of relief,” Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989,

8 Because we conclude that the Act burdens substantially more

protected speech than is necessary, we decline to decide whether

California’s sex offender registration statute actually advances the

government’s legitimate interests. We likewise decline to consider

whether there are ample alternative channels available for registered sex

offenders to speak.

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36 DOE V. HARRIS

1001 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), and

“[i]f the underlying constitutional question is close . . . we

should uphold the injunction and remand for trial on the

merits.” Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656,

664–65 (2004).

As to the balance of equities, we recognize that while the

preliminary injunction is pending, there will be some

hardship on the State. Nevertheless, the balance of equities

favors Appellees, whose First Amendment rights are being

chilled. This is especially so because the Act under scrutiny

imposes criminal sanctions for failure to comply. “Where a

prosecution is a likely possibility, yet only an affirmative

defense is available, speakers may self-censor rather than risk

the perils of trial. There is a potential for extraordinary harm

and a serious chill upon protected speech.” Id. at 670–71.

Finally, the public interest favors the exercise of First

Amendment rights. Although we appreciate the State’s

significant interest in protecting its citizens from crime,

nothing in the record suggests that enjoining the CASE Act

would seriously hamper the State’s efforts to investigate

online sex offenses, as it can still employ other methods to do

so. On the other hand, we “have consistently recognized the

significant public interest in upholding First Amendment

principles.” Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303

F.3d 959, 974 (9th Cir. 2002).

III. CONCLUSION

The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting

Appellees’ motion to preliminarily enjoin provisions of the

CASE Act. The district court’s judgment is

AFFIRMED.

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