Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03023/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03023-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Clayton Albers
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

Ual&ld Stltll Court of Appeals Tench Ctrcult 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 2 3 1996 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 95-3023 

CLAYTON ALBERS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 93-10020-01) 

Clerk · 

D. Blair Watson, Assistant United States Attorney (Jackie N. Williams, United States 

Attorney, with him on the brief), Wichita, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Susan L. Foreman, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Michael G. Katz, Federal Public 

Defender, with her on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before PORFILIO, HOLLOWAY and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 95-3023 Document: 01019278212 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 1 
This is a timely direct appeal from the defendant/appellant's conviction and life 

sentence for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine with intent to distribute in 

violation of21 U.S.C. § 846; possession or distribution of ephedrine knowing, or having 

reasonable cause to believe, that it would be used to manufacture methamphetamine, 21 

U.S.C. § 841(d)(2); and manufacture of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in 

violation of21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

Defendant Clayton Albers was originally indicted on February 24, 1993, along with 

Michael Marino, Janet Raisner, Patrick Cambron, Joe Vergilio, Jack Francis, and Anthony 

Feher. James Randa was added as a conspirator in the second superseding indictment. All 

seven of the others indicted eventually entered guilty pleas and defendant Albers proceeded 

to trial in November and December of 1993. That first trial resulted in a mistrial because the 

jury could not reach a verdict. In a second trial in September 1994, defendant Albers was 

convicted on all three counts of a third superseding indictment. He received a life sentence 

and now brings this appeal. 

I 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

A 

The government presented evidence at trial tending to show that the original 

defendants, who all had entered guilty pleas, were involved in a venture to manufacture 

methamphetamine for distribution. Patrick Cambron, a nephew of defendant Albers, was the 

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first prosecution witness. Cambron testified that while incarcerated in California in 1990, 

he was told by another inmate some of the basics of making methamphetamine. Cambron 

decided to try to get involved in manufacturing methamphetamine after his release. 

To do so, Cambron needed to find a source for ephedrine, a precursor chemical. In 

February 1991, shortly after his release, Cambron attended the wedding of his brother in 

Houston. Defendant Albers, who lived in Wichita, Kansas, and had not seen Cambron in 

several years, also attended the wedding. Defendant and Cambron conversed at the wedding 

reception. Cambron testified that he learned then that defendant Albers had started a 

fertilizer business in Wichita called Agri-Data. During this conversation Cambron brought 

up the possibility of obtaining ephedrine to be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. 

Cambron told defendant that after manufacture, each pound of methamphetamine would be 

worth about $10,000. Cambron testified that defendant said he was interested and that if 

Cambron came up with the money he should call defendant. (XII R. at 80-82.) Cambron 

told defendant that as a legitimate reason for ordering ephedrine, the cover story could be that 

it could be used in poultry feeds. (ld.a. at 83.) 

Cambron testified that he contacted others and raised ten thousand dollars from 

Michael Marino and Jack Francis with which to purchase ephedrine. Cambron and Marino 

flew to Wichita to meet with defendant. (I.d.. at 86-92.) Upon frrst arriving in Wichita, 

Cambron met with defendant at a restaurant. Cambron said that he agreed that defendant 

would be paid $50,000 and that Stuber, a business partner of defendant in Agri-Data, would 

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be paid $15,000 out ofthe proceeds if the ephedrine could be obtained. Stuber later joined 

them at the restaurant. (Id.. at 94-95.) Among other things, defendant Albers, Cambron, and 

Stuber discussed what explanation could be given for ordering quantities of ephedrine, 

including Cambron's idea of saying it was to be used as poultry feed and the suggestion 

discussed by defendant and Stuber that they could say it was to be used in the fertilizer 

business as a plant growth regulator. (ld. at 92-96.) Later Cambron introduced defendant 

to Marino, and $10,000 was given to defendant by Marino for the cost of the chemical. (I d. 

at 98.) Marino soon returned to his home in California, but Cambron stayed in Wichita at 

defendant's apartment for several weeks to obtain the chemical, during which time he was 

frequently in the offices of Agri-Data in Wichita. 

Cambron began trying to find a chemical company from which to purchase ephedrine. 

Cambron tried telling one company that he wanted ephedrine to use in poultry feed, but that 

company advised him that the FDA did not approve of that use of ephedrine. Cambron 

eventually contacted a chemical supplier in New Jersey which said that it could provide 

ephedrine. Defendant then made arrangements by telephone to initiate an order for four 

drums of ephedrine, for which a company check from Agri-Data was issued. Defendant 

signed a form indicating he was aware that ephedrine was a precursor chemical subject to 

drug trafficking laws and that the ephedrine was to be used as a plant growth regulator in the 

company's business. (ld. at 316-18; XIV R. at 930.) The supplier contacted the DEA, 

which told him to fill the order but to let the DEA know if a second order was placed. 

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The ephedrine was shipped to Agri-Data in four barrels in mid-May 1991. Cambron 

had gone several times to Agri-Data's facility in Belle Plain where the fertilizer plant and 

storage tanks were. (Id. at 102.) Cambron and defendant were present when the delivery 

was made to the Belle Plain facility, and Cambron testified that he immediately removed the 

identifying labels from the barrels to prevent employees from speculating about why the 

company had ordered ephedrine. In court, Cambron identified the four drums which were 

exhibits. (XII R. at 113.) Cambron said that in the middle of the following night, Cambron 

and defendant went back to the plant and, according to Cambron, repackaged the chemical 

in cardboard box~s. Cambron said they checked the barrels for tracers or tracking devices. 

Cambron said defendant Albers held each drum and tipped it up, and Cambron sifted through 

it with his hands to make sure there was nothing in the powder. They refilled the barrels with 

potash and a very small amount of ephedrine to provide credence for the cover story that the 

ephedrine was being used in fertilizer. (XII R. at 111-18.) (Cambron's testimony that 

defendant Albers returned with him late at night to the plant and went through the drums was 

flatly denied by defendant.) (XIV R. 939.) 

Cambron then shipped the boxes of ephedrine to Marino in California and traveled 

there separately. The ephedrine was used by Francis and perhaps others to manufacture a 

large quantity of methamphetamine. Cambron was involved in distribution of much ofthe 

methamphetamine manufactured from the ephedrine. Cambron eventually sold about 80 

pounds of methamphetamine for a total of approximately $800,000. (Id. at 128-29, 212.) 

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Cambron testified that he sent, directly or through others involved in the scheme, $37,000 

in eight separate wire transfers to defendant. (l.d.. at 134-37.) Cambron also arranged for the 

shipment to defendant of a Federal Express package containing $15,000. In addition, 

Cambron testified that defendant traveled to California at least once to receive more of the 

proceeds, getting about $20,000 on that occasion. (Id.. at 132-34, 139-42.) Mike Marino and 

Joe Vergilio gave testimony regarding their involvement in some of these payments to 

defendant. As discussed below, there was also evidence introduced during crossexamination of the defendant that he received a cashier's check for $5,000 on another 

occasion. (XIV R. at 984-986.) 

Two former employees of Agri-Data testified that during the summer of 1991 

defendant brought a large amount of cash to the office. Sarah Downey was the bookkeeper 

for Agri-Data from the time of its formation in late 1990 until March 1992. (XIII R. at 

4 71-72.) Ms. Downey testified that the company was experiencing constant cash shortages 

during the spring and summer of 1991. (Id. at 476.) She said that once during this time she 

told defendant that some bills were due, including one for a purchase of fertilizer, and that 

the company did not have the funds to pay these bills. Defendant told her he would take care 

of it. He left the office and returned a short time later with a large amount of cash, which she 

estimated to be about $15,000. She testified that defendant said he did not want to deposit 

the cash into the bank because the bank would have to report a cash deposit of over $10,000. 

(Id.. at 477-78.) She said that defendant asked several employees if they would write checks 

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on their personal accounts and take some of the cash so that the company could deposit their 

checks instead of cash. A customer's check was received shortly thereafter, however, and 

the idea oftaking checks from employees was never implemented. (Id. at 478-79, 482.) 

A few weeks after receipt of the ephedrine, Cambron was arrested in California for 

attempting to trade methamphetamine for marijuana. Released on bond, Cambron continued 

selling methamphetamine. Cambron returned to Wichita sometime in late July or early 

August, 1991, and stayed with defendant for about a week. Cambron said that he, defendant 

and Stuber discussed a second purchase of ephedrine during this time and planned to try to 

buy twice as much as they had the first time. (XII R. at 143-46.) Cambron testified that he 

later sent $10,000 to defendant for a second purchase. He said that he arranged through Joe 

Vergilio to have a friend ofVergilio's, Vickie Arias, deliver the money to Wichita in late 

August, 1991. (ld. at 149-153.) Cambron said that he talked with defendant on the telephone 

to arrange for defendant to meet Arias at the airport and, after her arrival, had a telephone 

conversation in which defendant confirmed receipt of the money. (ld. at 152-53.) Vergilio 

testified about participating in these arrangements. Vergilio also testified that Cambron had 

lived with him during parts of the summer of 1991. He said that he once received a 

telephone call from defendant in which defendant first asked for Cambron, who was not there 

at the time, and then asked Vergilio to tell Cambron to hurry and send the money for the 

second purchase. (XIII R. at 586-87.) 

Vickie Arias testified that she flew to Wichita at the request ofVergilio and Cambron 

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and delivered money to defendant, although she believed the amount had been only about 

$2,500. (Id. at 333-37, 343; XIII R. at 597.) The manager of the Motel 6 in Wichita 

identified a registration card that had been filled out on August 23, 1991, which was then 

shown to the jurors. Defendant later testified that he registered for a room after meeting 

Arias at the airport because she was "tipsy," but defendant denied that he received any 

money from Arias or that her trip had anything to do with ephedrine or methamphetamine, 

to his knowledge. Defendant said that Arias had arrived very early in the morning, about 

5:30 or 6:00a.m. XIV R. at 946-48 994-97. 

An officer of the chemical supply company testified about filling the first order for 

ephedrine. He testified that he first talked on the telephone with someone identifying himself 

as Pat concerning the company's ability to supply ephedrine, and the next day received a 

telephone call from someone identifying himself as Clayton. He also testified that a second 

order for ephedrine was placed by defendant which was dated August 29, 1991, and received 

by his company on September 4, 1991. (This second order was for 100 kilograms as in the 

first order, rather than the larger amount which had been discussed.) The supplier was 

instructed by the DEA not to fill the second order. (Id. at 322-24.) 

Over the Labor Day weekend, 1991, just after placing the second order for ephedrine, 

defendant went to California again. According to Cambron, defendant met there with 

Cambron and others involved in the scheme to discuss Cambron's arrests (he had been 

arrested a second time by then) and the second order for ephedrine. (Id. at 157, 322-24; 

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XIII R. at 519.) Cambron, Vergilio and Marino all testified that the group, including 

defendant, met first at a restaurant and then went to a motel room to continue their 

discussions in greater privacy. 

Officer Michael Clark testified that he was with the Wichita Police Department and 

was assigned to work with the DEA task force. As a result of the ephedrine supplier's 

notification to the DEA about Agri-Data's second order for ephedrine, the task force began 

an investigation. On September 5, 1991, just after defendant returned from California, 

Officer Clark and DEA Agent Stansbery came to Agri-Data's Wichita office to inquire about 

the orders for ephedrine. (XIII R. at 657-58.) The two officers interviewed defendant and 

Scott Stuber. Officer Clark testified that defendant's language was very calm but his hands 

were shaking very much. (ld. at 659.) Defendant told the officers that the ephedrine had 

been used in an experimental fertilizer program and showed them field maps purporting to 

show where the mixture containing ephedrine had been applied to crops. Clark testified that 

defendant told them that all of the ephedrine had been used and that the experiment was the 

idea ofDr. Joe Waters, an agronomist who had served as a consultant for Agri-Data. (ld. at 

660-61.) When asked about Patrick Cambron, defendant said that he had not seen Cambron 

since the wedding in Houston in February. (l.d... at 662-63.) 

Officer Clark later went to Agri-Data's Belle Plain facility and asked Donald Guthrie, 

the employee in charge there, about the ephedrine. Guthrie showed Clark the four barrels. 

Although defendant had said that the ephedrine had been dumped out of the barrels and 

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mixed with potash, the barrels were not empty. (ld. at 665-68.) The barrels were later 

seized, and chemical analysis revealed that the barrels contained mainly potash and less than 

1% ephedrine. (XIV R. at 782-84.) 

Officer Clark also testified that records of long distance telephone calls from five 

sources had been obtained and analyzed. The records were from the Agri-Data office in 

Wichita, defendant's residence, Agri-Data's mobile telephone, the residence of Joe Vergilio 

in California, and Mike Marino's residence in California. (XIII R. at 685.) A chart 

summarized the results of the analysis, showing the date and time that each call had been 

made, the length of time elapsed during the call, and the total number of calls between each 

of the Wichita numbers and each of the California numbers. This evidence showed that 

frequent contact was being made between Wichita and the two California residences during 

the relevant time period, although of course such evidence could not discern between calls 

made to or by defendant and those made to or by Cambron during the time that he was in 

Wichita. Among the calls shown by these records were two from the Agri-Data mobile 

phone to Vergilio's residence, one on August 21, 1991, and the second one two days later. 

Officer Clark first testified that this second call had been made at 4:47p.m. (khat 688), but 

then testified that he had made a mistake and that the records actually showed that this call 

had been placed at 4:47a.m. on August 23rd (id.. at 712, 739). The Motel6 registration card 

showed that defendant had registered there on August 23rd. (l.d.. at 688-89.) 

Dr. Joe Waters was a prosecution witness. He testified that he is an agricultural 

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consultant with a Ph.D. in soil science and agronomy. (XIII R. 741.) He said agronomy 

basically is the growing of plants and the structure of plants and producing crops, and soil 

science is a study of soils and the interaction of chemicals in soils and fertilizers to produce 

the crop. Dr. Waters said he has approximately five years of background in chemistry. (ld. 

at 741-42.) Dr. Waters said that he knew defendant Albers because he and Scott Stuber 

acquired Waters' services and those of an associate of his to become their consultants in 

about 1991. Waters testified that he did not provide any fertilizer formulas to Albers that 

contained or utilized a drug known as ephedrine. (ld. at 743.) 

Dr. Waters testified that in the last seven or eight years he had spent probably 60% 

of his time in research on fertilizers alone and plant growth regulators. (ld. at 743.) He said 

that in addition to his own experimentation in fertilizer and compounds that enhanced plant 

growth regulators, he had read scientific studies and conclusions of others in that area. (I d. 

at 744.) He has worked with some of the better consultants in the United States, and he said 

that he is recognized as the number three consultant in California. (ld. at 745.) He has 

co-authored a "Western Fertilizer Handbook" used as a text in 15 universities. He testified 

he has never heard of a drug known as ephedrine being used as a plant growth regulator. 

(ld.) Dr. Waters said that what they were trying to do with Agri-Data was to use modem 

technology used in the United States to put preplant fertilizer down with the seed. (ld. at 

7 4 7.) He added that if a fertilizer test for a new combination of ingredients for fertilizer was 

to be conducted, and someone else's land is to be used, you must have the landowner's 

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permission before the test is conducted. If the wrong product was being tested, the soil could 

be sterilized and basically ruined in testing. (M.. at 749.) 

Cambron was rearrested on the California charges of attempting to trade 

methamphetamine for marijuana and was imprisoned there from January to September 1992. 

He was contacted there about cooperating with the investigation of Agri-Data. He initially 

declined. However, upon learning that others were being subpoenaed to appear before a 

grand jury in Wichita, he contacted law enforcement. Then, after being subpoenaed himself, 

he implicated defendant. As part of his cooperation with the government, he agreed to place 

telephone calls to the defendant which the authorities tape recorded. He identified the 

transcripts of two of these recorded conversations, which took place on October 20, 1992, 

and November 4, 1992. The tapes were then played for the jury during his testimony and 

were replayed, at least in part, during the government's cross-examination of the defendant. 

(XII R. at 162-181.) 

Much of the recorded conversations was rather cryptic, and Cambron was asked to 

explain portions of them. The portions of the conversations which the government 

emphasized dealt with the pending grand jury investigation. In the first call Cambron 

informed Albers that grand jury subpoenas had been received by his then wife, Michelle 

Cambron, and by Janet Raisner, who was Marino's wife. He also told defendant that agents 

had interviewed Joe Vergilio at his home. (VI Supp. R.) Cambron told defendant that the 

agents had asked Vergilio about wire transfers, to which defendant responded, "Oh, you're 

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kidding." 

In the second taped conversation, Cambron informed defendant that Michelle 

Cambron, Janet Raisner, and Joe Vergilio had indeed testified before a grand jury in Wichita. 

Cambron said that he had talked with Michelle after her return from Wichita and told 

defendant a few subjects he had learned that the grand jury had probed. (VIII Supp. R.) 

These included the "little meeting that took place in a motel room," which Cambron testified 

was a reference to the meeting which had occurred on defendant's second trip to California. 

{XII R. at 179.) Defendant had again responded with "You're kidding." (As discussed 

below, defendant testified that on his second trip to California he met with Cambron and 

others in a restaurant, but denied that he went with the group to continue the meeting at a 

motel room.) Defendant later mused, "Where did that ever come up at? How did it ever 

come up?" 

Cambron then is heard on the tape telling defendant that the authorities had 

photocopies of wire transfers. Defendant's response was, "Oh shit. Is that right?" After 

Cambron responded simply, "Yeah," defendant said in the taped conversation: "Well, 

somebody's sure doing a lot of talking." Cambron also told defendant in this conversation 

that the grand jury had asked about "some kind of initial deal of ah ... 50 here, 15 there? 

You know?" Defendant's only response to that was, "Okay." Cambron testified that this had 

been a reference to the original agreement that defendant would receive $50,000 of the 

proceeds from methamphetamine sales and Stuber would receive $15,000. (XII R. at 179-

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180.) Early in this second conversation, defendant is heard telling Cambron to "be careful 

ofwhat you say." Cambron responds by saying, "Well, gonna do that, but I'll let you know 

I've got my big phone system on." (ld.) Cambron testified that he had had several 

conversations with defendant when he had been in Wichita concerning a "tap detector" and 

"about we need devices." (XII R. at 162.) 

B 

As noted earlier, the initial indictment of defendant Albers and the other original 

defendants occurred on February 24, 1993. After the first trial produced a mistrial, the 

second trial occurred in September 1994. There, defendant Albers testified he was unaware 

of Cambron's plan to use the ephedrine to manufacture methamphetamine. Defendant 

testified that Cambron had persistently and enthusiastically advocated experimenting with 

ephedrine in fertilizer. Defendant said that he eventually consented partly because he wanted 

to convince Cambron to come to work for Agri-Data and thought that agreeing to his 

suggestion would serve as an inducement to Cambron. (XIV R. at 927.) He testified that 

Cambron seemed knowledgeable about chemicals and that he knew Cambron had worked 

with chemicals in his father's hazardous waste disposal business and when he had worked 

with a company that serviced swimming pools. (ld.. at 917.) 

Defendant's position was that Patrick Cambron had tricked him into ordering the 

ephedrine by touting the prospect of using it experimentally as fertilizer, and that Cambron 

then stole the ephedrine from the Belle Plain storehouse and shipped it to California for the 

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purpose of methamphetamine manufacturing. Defendant admitted that he had gone to the 

storehouse late at night and emptied the contents of the barrels into bins filled with potash, 

but explained that it was not unusual for him to work that late and that he wanted to keep the 

experiment a secret from most of his employees in case it turned out well and became a 

commercially valuable formula. (XIV R. at 934-38). Defendant said that after he had used 

the conveyor belt to dump the ephedrine into the potash bins, he then scooped a few 

shovelfuls of the potash and ephedrine mixture back into the barrels to have samples. 

Defendant further testified that the potash and ephedrine mixture was later liquefied in 

preparation for its use on crops. Defendant Albers and Stuber both testified that the mixture 

defendant had made with potash was applied to customers' fields. 

Defendant testified that the money he received by wire was in repayment for a 

$20,000 loan he had made to Cambron. Defendant Albers said that Cambron had told him 

that he had decided to return to California and go into the garage door business instead of 

becoming an employee of Agri-Data. Cambron asked for the loan to get him started in the 

business and said he could repay the money in a short time because he was owed that much 

by his brother. Defendant said that Cambron had even promised to repay him double the 

amount of the loan and did eventually send him $37,000, as the government's evidence of 

wire transfers had shown. (l.d... at 938.) 

Defendant admitted having made two trips to California during the summer months 

after the ephedrine had been received. He said that he made the first trip because Cambron 

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had invited him to visit California, and he decided to do so since he had been planning a trip 

to Las Vegas anyway and could easily visit California at the same time. Defendant produced 

a hotel receipt from Las Vegas showing that he had been there on the night of July 13, 1991. 

(ld.. at 941-42.) He said that he won about $22,000 gambling in Las Vegas and had bragged 

about his good fortune when he returned to Wichita, showing the money around the office. 

(ld. at 943.) Defendant said that his second trip to California, over the Labor Day weekend 

of 1991, was in response to calls he had received from several people telling him that 

Cambron had been arrested and was in a lot of trouble. Defendant admitted meeting with 

Cambron and others at a restaurant during this California trip, but denied that he went with 

the group to a motel room to continue the discussions, as others had testified. 

Defendant admitted meeting Vickie Arias at the airport in late August, but said that 

she had come only to retrieve the objects Cambron had left behind after his week-long visit 

earlier that month. (ld. at 946-949.) He said that Cambron had called him to explain that he 

was sending someone after his possessions. 

Defendant also testified about his interview with Officer Clark and DEA Agent 

Stansbery just after his return from California, on September 5, 1991. Defendant said that 

he had explained to them the experimental use of ephedrine that he had conducted. He 

denied having told the agents that Dr. Waters had come up with the formula for the ephedrine 

mixture; he testified that he had told the agents instead only that the ephedrine had been 

added to a formula Dr. Waters had earlier developed. He admitted that he lied about not 

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having seen Cambron in several months. He said that he was shocked and confused at the 

sudden mention of Cambron's name at the end of the interview and concerned about 

Cambron because ofwhat he had just learned about Cambron's arrests in California. (ld.. at 

956.) 

On cross-examination defendant admitted that he did not know how Cambron would 

have learned about fertilizers while working with hazardous waste disposal and in swimming 

pool maintenance. (ld.. at 970.) He said that the $20,000 he had loaned Cambron was part 

of approximately $33,000 that he had been keeping in his vacuum cleaner at home. 

Defendant said that he preferred keeping cash at home to keeping it in a bank just for the 

convenient access to the cash, not because he admittedly owed the government several 

thousand dollars in back taxes. He admitted that he was aware that the government could 

levy on bank accounts to collect back taxes, however. (ld.. at 976-77.) Defendant reaffirmed 

that the total he had received from Cambron was $37,000. Confronted with a cashier's check 

in the amount of $5,000 he had received and deposited in June 1991, which the government 

showed had been purchased by Michael Marino, defendant testified that he had no 

recollection of receiving the check and no explanation for it. (ld.. at 984-87.) Defendant 

conceded that it would have been a "rare event" for him to have received a cashier's check 

in this amount made to him personally. (I d. at 1041.) 

Scott's Stuber's testimony was generally consistent with that of defendant Albers in 

explaining the decision to order the ephedrine for experimental purposes. Stuber testified 

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that after defendant Albers got back from his Houston trip, Albers and Stuber met with 

Patrick Cambron at a Denny's restaurant in Wichita. Cambron suggested that Agri-Data 

might investigate the use of ephedrine as a plant growth regulator. (XIV R. 846.) It 

"stemmed" from Joe Waters to defendant Albers, Albers then had talked to Patrick Cambron, 

and Cambron then talked to Albers in Houston about the ephedrine experiment. (Id. at 845.) 

Stuber said that he had researched literature on fertilizers and found very little information 

except a single reference in one journal indicating that the ephedrine idea had potential. 

Stuber testified that Agri-Data did ultimately decide to experiment with ephedrine. (!d.. at 

848-49.) Stuber admitted that permission had not been sought from the landowners where 

the experimental mixture was said to have been applied. (ld. at 883-84.) Stuber said that he 

could not identify the landowners or the locations of their fields without consulting records. 

Stuber testified that he had not consulted with Dr. Waters or with anyone else regarding 

Cambron's idea for the ephedrine experiment. Stuber said he never agreed with defendant 

Albers or Cambron or anyone else to manufacture methamphetamine or to procure ephedrine 

knowing it would be used to manufacture methamphetamine. (ld. at 863.) Stuber said that 

he was not involved in sending ephedrine to California to be made into methamphetamine 

and that he did not believe defendant Albers was so involved. (tiL. at 895-96.) 

After defendant Albers' convictions at the second trial, at sentencing Albers was given 

a four-level enhancement for being a leader or organizer of the criminal activity, which was 

challenged below and is disputed on appeal, and a two-level enhancement for obstructing 

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justice by giving perjured testimony, which is not challenged. He received a life sentence. 

II 

THE CLAIM OF ERROR UNDER FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(l) 

Defendant testified in his own defense at trial. His first contention on appeal is that 

during cross-examination, the prosecutor made impermissible use of his prior conviction. 

Having conceded in a motion in limine that defendant's previous felony conviction for theft 

of property held in trust was admissible for purposes of impeachment under Fed. R. Evid. 

609(a)(1), defense counsel chose to reveal the essential facts of the conviction himself during 

defendant's dire<;t examination: 

Q: Now, when you were in South Dakota did you get in trouble? 

A: Yes, I did. 

Q: Would you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what you were 

convicted of? 

A: I was convicted of grand theft property in trust. 

Q: Did you go to prison as a result of that? 

A: Yes, I did. 

Q: For how long? 

A: 33 months. 

(XIV R. at 912-913.) 

On cross-examination, the following exchange occurred when the prosecuting 

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attorney turned to the subject of Albers' prior theft conviction: 

Q: Now, was it when you were in Western Fidelity Life that you had the little 

problem with the law that resulted in a felony conviction? 

[Albers' attorney MONNAT]: May we approach, Your Honor? 

Objection. 

THE COURT: On what grounds? 

MR. MONNAT: Beyond the scope. 

THE COURT: Beyond the scope. Overruled. 

Q: [By the prosecutor, Mr. Watson] What company did you work for when 

you were convicted of grand theft? 

A: Crop insurance companies in South Dakota. 

Q: And that conviction concerned you taking farmers' money for crop 

insurance and not sending the premiums or the applications back to the 

insurance company. didn't it? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And everything was all right until. of course. storm comes up and the 

farmers' crops are destroyed and you haven't sent in any insurance premiums. 

right? 

MR. MONNAT: Objection, Your Honor, that the underlying facts are 

irrelevant. 

THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 

Q: (By Mr. Watson) Isn't that what happened? 

THE COURT: Admit the question for purposes of testing the witness's 

credibility. 

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Q: (By Mr. Watson) That's what happened, wasn't it? 

A: Yes. 

(ld. at 964-65; emphasis added). 

Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in permitting the government to develop 

the underlying facts regarding his South Dakota conviction relying, inter alia, on United 

States v. Wolf, 561 F.2d 1376 (lOth Cir. 1977), which years ago staked out the limits on use 

of a prior conviction under Fed. R. Evid. 609(a). The rule provides: 

For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, ( 1) evidence 

that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be 

admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or 

imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was 

convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime 

shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting 

this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and (2) evidence 

that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved 

dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. 

In Wolf we adhered to the already well-established rule prohibiting examination into 

the underlying facts of prior convictions in recognition ofthe extremely high potential for 

unfair prejudice posed by such evidence. Judge Pickett explained that: 

Ordinarily, it is improper for the prosecution to examine into the details of the 

crime for which the accused was convicted. The cross-examination should be 

confined to a showing of the essential facts of convictions, the nature of the 

crimes, and the punishment. Care should be taken to protect the accused as far 

as possible from being convicted because of past conduct and not the crime for 

which he is being tried. 

561 F.2d at 1381. 

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The government says that the defense failed to object specifically underFed. R. Evid. 

609 to the questioning, making the ruling reviewable only for plain error. The objection as 

originally worded did not cite the rule or make a specific objection under it. The initial 

objection that the cross-examination was "[b ]eyond the scope," presented only the general 

theory of the limitations under Rule 609. But as the prosecutor moved on to bear down on 

the damaging facts underlying the prior conviction, the objection was spelled out and did 

make clear the defendant's objection that "the underlying facts are irrelevant"; i.e., the taking 

of farmers' money for crop insurance, not sending the premiums to the insurance company, 

and storm damage resulting in the farmers having uninsured losses. The objection was stated 

clearly under the Wolf rationale that "the underlying facts are irrelevant." (XIV R. at 965; 

emphasis added.) 1 

The defendant's objection to developing the damaging "underlying facts," brought 

home the essence of defendant's position to the court and the prosecutor early on. The 

objection was overruled and the details were left before the jury, which the judge said was 

"for purposes of testing the witness's credibility." However, the defendant was entitled to 

the protection of the rule that only the prior conviction, its general nature, and punishment 

of felony range were fair game for testing the defendant's credibility. The further damaging 

1We also note that in Wolfwe cited with approval United States y. Harding, 525 F.2d 

84, 88-89 (7th Cir. 1975), in which then-Circuit Judge, now Justice, Stevens said: "The rule 

that it is error to inquire about the details of prior criminal conduct is so well established that 

such error is cognizable despite the absence of any objection by defense counsel." 

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details the prosecutor spelled out were not. Developing such underlying facts violated the 

limitations of Rule 609(a)(1) and Wolf. See also United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165, 

1176 (5th Cir. 1986) (after showing of previous offenses, cross-examination properly limited 

to exclude attempted questions about "particular facts of ... previous offenses")( emphasis 

added). Here, the objection was made adequately clear and error occurred when it was 

overruled and the inadmissible details were left before the jury. 

We must, therefore, determine whether the error was harmless. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111. 

In doing so, we are guided by the venerable teachings of Kotteakos v. United States, 328 

U.S. 750 (1946), which applied the similar statutory predecessor to § 2111. In particular we 

follow the Court's familiar instruction on harmless error analysis: 

If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not 

influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment 

should stand, except perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional norm 

or a specific command of Congress. But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, 

after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from 

the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is 

impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected. The inquiry 

cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from 

the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself 

had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction 

cannot stand. 

ld. at 764-65 (footnote and citation omitted). 

In applying the Kotteakos test of harmless error, we note first that the prosecutor 

improperly bore down heavily on the inadmissible damaging facts underlying the prior 

conviction when he cross-examined defendant Albers. And, as defendant argues, the 

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prosecutor repeated them in his final argument. On the other hand, we have before us the 

impressive strength of the array of documentary and testimonial evidence against defendant 

Albers showing his involvement in the conspiracy and the methamphetamine venture, and 

persuasive evidence contradicting and impeaching Albers as detailed in Part I, supra. 

The defendant's version of the facts, which the jury obviously did not believe, 

inherently lacked credibility. First, the defendant's testimony was that he and his partner 

decided to embark on the experimental use of ephedrine despite the lack of any reason to 

believe that the substance had agricultural usefulness. Although they had sought out the 

highly capable assistance of ari expert, Dr. Waters, on previous occasions, they decided on 

the claimed ephedrine experiment without consulting anyone. And to implement this 

program they were willing to invest first $10,000, then a like amount on a second occasion 

at a time when their company was in strained financial circumstances. All this was 

supposedly based on the enthusiastic recommendation of Cambron, who had no experience 

in agriculture generally or fertilizers specifically, and in the hope that conducting the 

experiment would induce Cambron to accept employment with Agri-Data. This latter hope, 

of course, could not even conceivably have pertained to the decision to order a second 

shipment of ephedrine because Cambron had moved back to California more than three 

months before the second order was made. The purported decision to loan $20,000 to 

Cambron from his "vacuum cleaner" cache -- allegedly made before the claimed good 

fortune of winning some $20,000 gambling in Las Vegas-- and Cambron's alleged generous 

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offer to repay the loan and an additional $20,000 in a short time, both are similarly difficult 

to accept. Defendant's explanation for bringing a large amount of cash into the office-- the 

claimed gambling winnings -- was not supported by the testimony of the two former 

employees who testified for the prosecution, even though defendant testified that he bragged 

exuberantly about his good fortune. 

Defendant's inability to recall receiving the $5,000 cashier's check, receipt of which 

he admitted would have been a "rare event" for him, weighs heavily against his story. 

Defendant's explanation that Cambron had sent Vickie Arias by airplane from California 

merely to pick up personal items he had left behind, in addition to its facial implausibility, 

left the impression that the sequence of events --the call to Vergilio's residence, Arias' 

arrival, the 4:47a.m. call to Vergilio's residence immediately following her arrival, and the 

placement of the order for the second shipment of ephedrine just days later-- was merely a 

string of coincidences. 

Continuing to review carefully all of the evidence, we note defendant's highly 

incriminatory expression of surprise and dismay in the recorded telephone conversation with 

Cambron when informed that the government had asked about wire transfers when 

interviewing Vergilio and his warning to Cambron at the beginning of the second 

conversation to be careful in what was said. Defendant also admitted lying to the 

investigators in his first contact with them when asked about Cambron. And there was also 

the testimony by Officer Clark that Albers said Dr. Waters had suggested a fertilizer 

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experiment with ephedrine and testimony by Dr. Waters, denying such a suggestion was 

made by him and stating he had never heard of such a use of ephedrine. We also think it 

significant in this context that facts underlying the prior conviction which were improperly 

developed did not involve a controlled substance offense. Finally, the jury was instructed that 

the prior conviction was not to be considered as evidence of guilt in this case. 

We are mindful, of course, that the jury's verdict here must have rested very heavily 

on the credibility determinations that the jurors made and that the erroneously developed 

facts constituted an improper additional weapon in the government's attack on this 

defendant's credibility. Nevertheless, on this record we are satisfied that the error in 

developing the details underlying the prior conviction here would have had very slight, if 

any, effect on the jury's verdict and therefore was harmless. See United States v. Wolf, 561 

F.2d at 1382 (citing Kotteakos); see also Tuttle v. State ofUtah, 57 F.3d 879, 884 (lOth Cir. 

1995) (applying harmless error standard ofKotteakos). 

III 

THE CLAIM OF ERROR UNDER TOME 

Defendant next argues that the district court erred in admitting evidence of prior outof-court statements made by two of the government's witnesses. In both instances the 

evidence was admitted under Fed. R. Evid. 80I(d)(l)(B), which provides: 

A statement is not hearsay if-- (I) the declarant testifies at the trial or 

hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the 

statement is ... (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to 

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rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication 

or improper influence or motive .... 

Defendant concedes that his cross-examinations of the two witnesses raised a charge 

of recent fabrication or improper motive. Defendant's argument that the statements were 

nevertheless erroneously admitted is based on the "pre-motive" requirement. Under the 

"pre-motive" requirement, a prior consistent statement is not admissible unless the prior 

statement was made before the motive to fabricate arose. At the time of trial, this circuit had 

only recently rejected the pre-motive rule, but that holding was reversed by the Supreme 

Court during the pendency of this appeal. United States v. Tome, 3 F.3d 342 (lOth Cir. 

1993), ~, 115 S.Ct. 696 (1995). The Supreme Court held in Tome that Rule 801(d)(l)(B) 

incorporated the pre-motive requirement of the common law. Thus, a witness's prior 

consistent statement may not be admitted to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper 

motive unless the out-of-court statement was made before the alleged motive to fabricate or 

the alleged improper influence or motive arose. 

Although the trial court's rulings were correct when made, it is clear that the Supreme 

Court's holding in Tome must be applied here. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 

(1987) (new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be retroactively applied to all 

criminal convictions pending on direct review or not yet final at the time of its 

pronouncement); United States v. Lan~, 81 F.3d 955, 962 (lOth Cir. 1996). On this point, 

the government's argument in its totality consists of the statement that the district court could 

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not have abused its discretion by adhering to the law as it then existed. This of course is 

clearly unpersuasive. The Griffith rationale and l&ng make it very clear that we must apply 

the Tome decision of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, we must determine if the trial court's 

rulings were incorrect under the pre-motive rule we must follow. 

The first of the two challenged rulings concerned testimony of one of the investigating 

officers, Officer Clark, in which he was permitted to relate a prior consistent statement by 

one of the prosecution's key witnesses, Patrick Cambron. Clark had contacted Cambron 

while the latter had been imprisoned in California in 1992 to see if he would cooperate with 

the investigation. Cambron had refused. After his release from prison in October 1992, 

however, Cambron had called the DEA to express his change of mind and willingness to 

cooperate. Defense counsel's cross-examination of Cambron, the first witness in the trial, 

had effectively demonstrated that Cambron had lied under oath before, had frequently lied 

to gain an advantage, and had avoided exposure to a potential life sentence by entering into 

his plea agreement with the government. The cross-examination had essentially implied that 

Cambron's testimony which implicated Albers had been fabricated. 

To rebut this charge of recent fabrication or improper motive, the government offered 

Officer Clark's testimony about his October 1992 interview with Cambron. Defense counsel 

made a timely objection and argued that the motive for Cambron to fabricate had already 

arisen by the time he offered to cooperate with Officer Clark. (XIII R. at 669-74.) The 

government did not then contest this premise of defendant's argument, but now argues that 

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defendant's cross-examination established that Cambron's motive to fabricate arose after the 

statements to Officer Clark in connection with the formal plea agreement and Cambron's 

hope that the government would still file a motion for reduction of his sentence under 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 3 5. We are unpersuaded. Cambron had admitted in his testimony that he 

did not agree to talk with law enforcement until he had become afraid that all the others 

involved in the conspiracy would testify against him. (XII R. at 217.) We find no reason to 

doubt that Cambron's statements to Clark came after Cambron had a motive to falsify. 

Consequently, we think it clear that under the Supreme Court's Tome ruling we must regard 

as error the overruling of defendant's objection. 

The testimony of Officer Clark which was admitted as a result of this first ruling 

consisted of the following: 

Q: Can you tell us during the -- I believe you said the October 19th or 20th 

statement of 1992, you took from Mr. Cambron, can you tell us generally what 

it was he said concerning his involvement with the Defendant and the 

ephedrine? 

A: He said that he had met with the Defendant, that they had discussed getting 

these chemicals. 

Q: By these chemicals, you mean what? 

A: Meaning the ephedrine. Discussed getting the ephedrine. Hiding the fact 

that they were getting it by saying they were going to put it in a fertilizer, and 

then they would ship it to California where it would be made into 

methamphetamine and that there could be large profits made. 

(XIII R. at 675.) 

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The second piece of evidence admitted at trial as a prior consistent statement and 

challenged here concerned a letter which Mike Marino had written to the trial judge. On 

direct examination Marino had testified that while he had been in Wichita with Cambron to 

deliver the money for the first purchase of the ephedrine to the defendant, defendant had 

made a statement that Marino had taken as a threat. Defendant's statement, according to 

Marino's testimony, had been to the effect that because he had been in prison twice before, 

"if we were to get busted and tell on him that we'd be through." (XIII R. at 529-30.) 

As with Cambron, defense counsel cross-examined Marino vigorously regarding the 

benefits of his plea agreement and his previous denial of any involvement in a 

methamphetamine conspiracy. Defense counsel then asked defendant if he had ever before 

told law enforcement personnel about defendant's threatening statement. Marino said that 

he had told Officer Clark and another officer. (ld.. at 545.) On re-direct examination the 

prosecution was allowed to have Marino read the letter now in question to the jury. The 

letter was primarily focused on Marino's complaints about the performance of his attorney. 

The statement for which the letter was admitted was: "I want to testify on Clayton Albers 

but I am worried he might do something to me." (ld.. at 574.) Defense counsel had objected 

to this evidence both on the grounds of the pre-motive rule under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(l)(B) 

and that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 

effect under Rule 403. (Id. at 555, 564-65.) The court overruled the objection on the 

grounds that the letter was a prior consistent statement and also decided sua sponte to instruct 

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the jury that the letter was to be considered only as pertaining to Marino's credibility and not 

for the truth of the matter asserted. (ld. at 565-67.) Rule 801(b)(1)(B) currently permits a 

properly admitted prior statement to be considered for the truth of the matter asserted, not 

just as bearing on credibility. Tome, 115 S.Ct. at 701. 

The letter at issue was written after Marino's guilty plea had been accepted and after 

he had been sentenced. Defendant argues, as he did at trial, that Marino still had a possible 

motive to fabricate as he was asking the court to appoint him a new lawyer and allow him 

to appeal his sentence. Defendant also raised at trial the fact that Marino hoped to have the 

government file a motion on his behalf for reduction of his sentence. The district judge 

apparently concluded that Marino had a motive to falsify at the time that he wrote the letter 

because the judge expressly based his ruling on our opinion in Tome, as he had with 

Cambron's prior statement. (XIII R. at 565.) There is no argument to the contrary by the 

government. Thus we feel that the statement in issue was made when the declarant had a 

motive to falsify. It follows that the admission of the statement was error under the new rule 

ofTome.2 

2The government argues, however, that the Marino statement was admissible in any 

event because under the court's limiting instruction to consider the letter only as it pertained 

to Marino's credibility, the letter was not hearsay at all. We disagree. This argument would 

severely undercut the holding of Tome by allowing otherwise inadmissible evidence to be 

heard under a limiting instruction. We think this would be inconsistent with much of the 

reasoning of Tome. 

The Court there reviewed the prevailing common law before the adoption of the 

Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court noted that it was well established that the common 

law permitted prior inconsistent statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication only if the 

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Accordingly, we must determine whether the erroneous admission of the parts of the 

evidence discussed above was harmless. With respect to the statement of Cambron to 

Officer Clark, we note that defense counsel mounted a vigorous cross-examination of 

Cambron, effectively attacking his credibility. Defense counsel ably developed the factual 

context showing that Cambron could have been motivated by his hope of receiving leniency 

when he made these statements to Officer Clark. The jury simply chose to believe that 

Cambron was testifying truthfully, despite defense counsel's efforts to show why the jurors 

should not believe Cambron's testimony. We think that the statement to Officer Clark played 

an insignificant role in that assessment. 

With respect to the Marino letter and the threat which defendant suggests was made, 

we likewise feel that the admission ofthe evidence was harmless error. Evidence of a threat 

certainly can have a substantial impact. As to the Marino letter, however, the disputed 

evidence merely repeated previous testimony that a threat had been made.· An erroneous 

repetition of such evidence clearly must be expected to have less influence on the jury than 

prior statement had been made before a motive to falsify had arisen and permitted the 

statement to be received only for the limited purpose of supporting the witness's credibility, 

not for the truth of the matter asserted in the prior statement. Tome, 115 S.Ct. at 700-01. 

Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(l)(B) dropped the limitation on the use ofthe evidence but, the Court 

held, did not alter the pre-motive requirement. 

The government now suggests that the rule, sub silentio, also modified the common 

law rule by incorporating an exchange whereby the proponent of the evidence could forego 

the advantage of the rule's unrestricted use of the prior statement and in return be relieved 

of the pre-motive requirement. It is sufficient to say that nothing at all in the language of the 

rule or the accompanying commentary provides support for the contention that the common 

law rule has been so substantially amended by Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). 

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an error which injects something like this into the trial when it otherwise would have 

remained unknown to the jury. Considering that the prior statement by Marino in the letter 

is only one sentence out of a lengthy trial, and in view of the overall case against defendant 

Albers, we feel this error was harmless. 

In sum, the two evidentiary matters which were admitted in violation of the 

pre-motive rule and Tome, we hold to have been harmless error. 

IV 

THE CLAIM OF ERROR IN THE COURT'S QUESTIONING 

OF A GOVERNMENT WITNESS 

We next consider defendant's contention that the district court created an appearance 

of partiality by its questioning of one of the government's witnesses. We review the 

propriety of a judge's examination of a witness for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Latimer, 548 F.2d 311,314 (lOth Cir. 1977). 

The witness in question is Donald Guthrie, who was the manager of Agri-Data's Belle 

Plain facility, where the barrels of ephedrine were delivered. Direct, cross, re-direct, andrecross examination of Guthrie had been completed before the judge began asking questions. 

In his direct examination Guthrie had testified, among other things, that defendant had called 

him twice at Agri-Data's Belle Plain warehouse from Agri-Data's Wichita office regarding 

the shipment of ephedrine in May. Guthrie testified that defendant had called him once to 

tell him that he was expecting a delivery of chemicals from a delivery service and wished to 

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be notified when the chemicals arrived. Guthrie said that the second call came on the day 

of the delivery when defendant called to tell Guthrie that the delivery service had confirmed 

that the shipment had come in and would be delivered to Belle Plain later that day. (XIII R. 

at 401-02.) The witness said that it was unusual for Mr. Albers to have done this. 

After receipt of the barrels of ephedrine Guthrie said he asked defendant on several 

occasions what the material would be used for and that he first received non-committal 

responses, until finally defendant told him that the chemical was to be used on crops. (ld. 

at 404-05.) Guthrie was later interviewed by DEA agents at the Belle Plain facility and 

testified about that discussion, which culminated in the execution of a search warrant and the 

seizure of the barrels in which the ephedrine had originally been shipped. Guthrie testified 

that the following day he showed a copy of the search warrant to defendant, and Guthrie 

described defendant's reaction. Guthrie said that defendant began pacing the floor and acted 

'~ittery." (ld. at 408.) He went on to say that defendant responded to the fact that the DEA 

agents had seized the barrels by chuckling to himself and saying, "Well, they're not going 

to find anything in 'em." (ld. at 408-09.) 

After some general questions about the processes involved in creating special fertilizer 

blends, Guthrie was asked: "Did you ever know of any blend that was done at Agri-Data that 

contained ephedrine?" He replied that he did not. (l.d... at 414.) On cross-examination 

Guthrie admitted that he had testified in "previous proceedings related to this case" (i.e., the 

first trial) and had been interviewed by government investigators without ever mentioning 

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that defendant had chuckled when he said that the DEA agents would not find anything in 

the barrels. (I.d.. at 445-46.) On re-direct examination, the prosecutor asked if Guthrie had 

been asked previously whether defendant chuckled, and Guthrie said he had not been asked. 

The prosecutor then asked: "Did he chuckle?" Guthrie repeated that defendant had 

chuckled, acted jittery, and paced around. (ld. at 449-50.) These were the only questions 

asked on re-direct (except a preliminary question as to whether Guthrie had reviewed his 

prior testimony and a brief repetition of whether Guthrie had been asked the question before, 

after Guthrie asked for clarification of the question). On re-cross examination defense 

counsel asked one question: whether anyone had asked Guthrie about chuckling in this trial 

when he volunteered that in his direct testimony, to which Guthrie said that he had not been 

asked that. (Id. at 450.) 

Defense counsel then announced that he had no more questions, and the judge 

immediately asked: "Are you making this up, that he chuckled and was nervous?" (ld.) 

Guthrie said he was not. (ld.) The court then went on to ask a series of questions. This 

covers almost nine pages of the transcript.3 

We have carefully reviewed this questioning by the judge and conclude that he did not 

abuse his discretion. The trial judge's authority to question witnesses is, of course, beyond 

dispute. Fed. R. Evid. 614(b). It is equally clear, however, that in exercising this power a 

judge must take care not to create the appearance that he or she is less than totally impartial. 

3The questioning by the trial judge is reproduced as an appendix to this opinion. 

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In arguing that the court's interrogation of Guthrie exceeded proper bounds, created an 

appearance of partiality, and so constituted an abuse of discretion, defendant invokes our 

observation that "[i]nterrogation ofwitnesses by a judge in a criminal case creates a unique 

risk that the judge will be perceived as an advocate." United States v. Orr, 68 F.3d 1247, 

1250 (lOth Cir. 1995), ~denied, 116 S.Ct. 747 (1996). 

In contending that the trial judge's actions were within the bounds of propriety, the 

government notes these related comments by this court: 

"It cannot be too often repeated, or too strongly emphasized, that the function 

of a federal trial judge is not that of an umpire or of a moderator at a town 

meeting. He or she sits to see that justice is done in the cases ... and to see 

that a case on trial is presented in such way as to be understood by the 

jury . . . . [A federal trial judge] should not hesitate to ask questions for the 

purpose of developing the facts; and it is no ground of complaint that the facts 

so developed may hurt or help one side or the other." 

United States v. Jones, 730 F.2d 593, 598 (lOth Cir. 1984) (quoting Simon v. United States, 

123 F.2d 80, 83 (4th Cir.), cert.denied, 314 U.S. 694 (1941)). As the Advisory Committee 

noted in proposing Rule 614: 

The authority of the judge to question witnesses is also well established. The 

authority is, of course, abused when the judge abandons his proper role and 

assumes that of advocate, but the manner in which interrogation should be 

conducted and the proper extent of its exercise are not susceptible of 

formulation in a rule. The omission in no sense precludes courts of review 

from continuing to reverse for abuse. 

Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 614(b), 28 U.S.C.App., p. 886 (citations omitted). We 

have noted the propriety of questioning by the court to clarify testimony but have 

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consistently warned that the judge must not become an advocate for either side. 4, Orr, 

68 F.3d at 1250; United States v. Latimer, 548 F.2d at 314. 

We have considered the judge's interrogation complained of in light ofthe principles 

of our precedents. We cannot agree that the judge by his questioning abused his discretion 

or committed error by his questioning that impaired defendant's right to a fair trial. 

v 

CON SID ERA TION OF THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT 

OF THE TRIAL ERRORS 

Defendant also argues that even if the. errors taken individually were harmless, 

nevertheless he was denied a fair trial by their cumulative effect. Because we have found 

that errors did occur at trial, we agree that we must .carefully consider this contention of 

cumulative error. Our method of analysis is as follows: 

A cumulative-error analysis merely aggregates all the errors that 

individually have been found to be harmless, and therefore not reversible, and 

it analyzes whether their cumulative effect on the outcome of the trial is such 

that collectively they can no longer be determined to be harmless. Unless an 

aggregate harmlessness determination can be made, collective error will 

mandate reversal, just as surely as will individual error that cannot be 

considered harmless. The harmlessness of cumulative error is determined by 

conducting the same inquiry as for individual error -- courts look to see 

whether the defendant's substantial rights were affected. 

United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470 (lOth Cir. 1990) (en banc).4 

4This standard of course applies to non-constitutional errors. If any of the errors were 

constitutional, the stricter standard of harmless beyond a reasonable doubt would apply. 

Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1470 n. 6 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). 

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We carefully considered the errors we have treated in Parts II and III and there held 

them harmless under Kotteakos. We conclude likewise that the effect of the errors in 

aggregation was slight, if any, and therefore was harmless for reasons we discussed in detail 

in Parts II and III. 

VI 

THECHALLENGETOTHEFOURLEVELENHANCEMENT 

OF THE OFFENSE LEVEL 

Finally, defendant contests the life sentence imposed, claiming error in the district 

court's enhancement in his offense level as a leader or organizer of criminal activity 

involving at least five people under§ 3Bl.1 ofthe Sentencing Guidelines ("USSG"). The 

enhancement under this provision resulted in a four level increase in Albers' offense level 

and that in tum led to a life sentence. On appeal defendant challenges only the finding or 

conclusion that he was an organizer or leader; he concedes that the activity involved more 

than five persons. 

In appeals involving the Sentencing Guidelines, we review the district court's factual 

fmdings only for clear error, giving "due deference to the district court's application of the 

guidelines to the facts." 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); United States v. Torres, 53 F.3d 1129, 1142 

(lOth Cir.}, cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2599 (1995). "However, a challenge to the conclusion 

reached that one is a supervisor as defined in the Guidelines is primarily legal, and the trial 

court's determination on it is reviewed under a de novo standard." United States v. Brown, 

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995 F.2d 1493, 1501 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 353 (1993). See generally United 

States v. Roberts, 898 F.2d 1465, 1468-69 (lOth Cir. 1990) (standard of review under 

Guidelines depends on relationship of the facts to the guidelines standard being applied and, 

like our circuit's previous standard for reviewing mixed questions of fact and law, varies 

from clearly erroneous to de novo depending on whether the inquiry is primarily factual or 

primarily involves consideration of legal principles). The severity of this enhancement, we 

have noted, "deserves an appropriate level of scrutiny ... to insure it is warranted in a 

particular case." Torres, 53 F.3d at 1143 n.l4. 

Here we are convinced that we face a record which clearly lacks evidence to support 

a finding or conclusion that defendant Albers was a leader or organizer of the criminal 

activity under the test that applies, the government bearing the burden of proof. United 

States v. Owens, 70 F.2d 1118, 1129 (lOth Cir. 1995). We feel this calls for a de novo 

review of the trial judge's primarily legal conclusion that defendant Albers was a leader or 

organizer of the venture. United States v. Brown, 995 F .2d at 1501. In any event, if the 

determination should be reviewed as a fact fmding under the clearly erroneous standard, the 

fmding was clear error on this record. See United States v. Owens, 70 F.3d 1118, 1129 (lOth 

Cir. 1995). 

The Guidelines provision applicable to this enhancement states, in pertinent part: 

Based on the defendant's role in the offense, increase the offense level 

as follows: 

(a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity 

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that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 

4levels. 

(b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer 

or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was 

otherwise extensive, increase by 3 levels. 

USSG § 3Bl.1 (1994). Commentary to this provision supplies some guidance to its intended 

use: 

Factors the court should consider include the exercise of decision making 

authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the 

recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of 

the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the 

nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority 

exercised over others. There can, of course, be more than one person who 

qualifies ~ a leader or organizer of a criminal association or conspiracy. This 

adjustment does not apply to a defendant who merely suggests committing the 

offense. 

USSG § 3Bl.1, comment. (n. 3) (1994). 

The government bears the burden of proof as to any findings necessary to support a 

sentence enhancement. Torres, 53 F.3d at 1142. Here, the government presented no new 

evidence at the sentencing hearing, relying on the trial evidence, as it may. The district judge 

granted the enhancement, stating: 

Now, I heard the evidence in this case and there's no question in my 

mind, and I so find, that Mr. Albers was a leader or organizer in this criminal 

scheme. As [prosecuting attorney] Mr. Watson has correctly pointed out, 

probably the two most culpable individuals were Mr. Cambron and Mr. 

Albers. But assuming the truth of the testimony, that Mr. Cambron initiated 

the idea of making the methamphetamine, it was Mr. Albers who provided the 

means by which the methamphetamine was to be made. Without Mr. Albers' 

access to the L-ephedrine[,] which was a material that you can't go out to the 

local feed store or hardware store and buy, this methamphetamine could not 

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have been manufactured, and it's absolutely clear from the evidence that it was 

the essential ingredient in the manufacture of the methamphetamine. So 

there's just simply no question in terms of the facts, Mr. Wilson [addressing 

defendant's new counsel], that Mr. Albers was a leader in this and that this--

and that there were more than five people involved in the scheme and, 

therefore, I find that this enhancement was appropriate and that the 

Government has not only proved it by a preponderance of the evidence which 

is the Government's burden, but by beyond a reasonable doubt because this 

was evidence that was brought out in the trial and which the jury accepted 

under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, so there's simply no question 

about that. So the first objection is overruled. 

(XV R. at 19-20.)5 

Much of the evidence the government now cites to support the enhancement, like the 

findings of the judge, suggests that defendant played an important or essential role in the 

scheme. This is insufficient because, as our precedents instruct, the sentencing court should 

remain conscious that "the gravamen of this enhancement is control. organization. and 

responsibility for the actions of other individuals," and the enhancement is "not for important 

or essential figures." Torres, 53 F.3d at 1142 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. 

Roberts, 14 F.3d 502, 519 (lOth Cir. 1993)); and see United States v. Litchfield, 959 F.2d 

1514, 1523 (lOth Cir. 1992). The government contends that defendant attempted to control 

Cambron during the meeting in California over the Labor Day weekend, when everyone else 

present at the meeting, according to Cambron, was urging him to begin using some caution 

5The court's reference to the jury's verdict is unpersuasive on the enhancement issue. 

The jury decided such issues as whether defendant was a knowing participant in the 

conspiracy, not whether he committed any of the particular kinds of acts which may support 

the enhancement for having been a leader or organizer of the criminal venture. 

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because ofhis two arrests and erratic behavior. (XII R. at 157-58.) This did not amount to 

supervising Cambron in the conspiracy to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. 

The government also argues that defendant made decisions, such as the decision to use the 

cover story that the ephedrine would be used in an experimental fertilizer program. However 

the evidence is insufficient to show whether this idea originated with defendant Albers, with 

Cambron, or with Stuber, and which of them made the decision, or whether it was made 

jointly. (XII R. at 95-96.) 

We are convinced that the evidence clearly established that Cambron was the leader 

of this conspiracy. As the judge noted, the evidence was that Cambron initiated the idea of 

manufacturing methamphetamine, having learned about the ephedrine ingredient from Larry 

Rosson while in jail, Rosson suggesting that Cambron call Marino. (XII R. 193-95.) 

Government witness Cambron also admitted it was all his idea to approach defendant Albers 

in Houston about ephedrine. (XII R. 207.) Before going to Wichita, Cambron knew the 

price of a drum of ephedrine and how many pounds were in a drum. (J.d... at 202.) Cambron 

acquired a manual of chemical companies and did the calling to inquire about the availability 

of ephedrine. (I d. at 105.) Cambron recruited Marino, and other key participants were either 

recruited by Cambron or by Marino. (ld. at 87-88, 195; XIII R. at 497-503, 582-85; III 

Supp. R. at 5.) Various parts of the methamphetamine operation were carried out in 

California after the ephedrine arrived there from Wichita by several defendants other than 

Albers-- Cambron, Marino, Marino's wife Janet Raisner, Francis, and Vergilio. Jack Francis 

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was manufacturing methamphetamine for the group. (XII R. 126-133, 141.) 

It is true that there can be more than one leader, as the Guidelines commentary states. 

Here, however, the evidence is clear that Cambron was the primary figure and that while 

Albers played a critical role in obtaining ephedrine, he did not supervise others nor organize 

the activities. We have vacated enhancements under this Guidelines provision despite 

stronger evidence than is present here. In United States v. Owens, 70 F.3d at 1127-29, the 

defendant supplied cocaine to his nephews on credit, derived profits from the trafficking, 

helped to teach others to cook cocaine powder into crack cocaine, counseled one of the 

dealers on how to "take care of' a customer who had complained of the quality of the 

product, and personally delivered cocaine at times. Nevertheless we held that: "[a]t most, 

this evidence shows Nick Owens was deeply involved in the conspiracy, first as a supplier 

and later as a courier; it does not show he led or organized the conspiracy." liL at 1129. We 

concluded that the fmding that Nick Owens was a leader or organizer was clearly erroneous. 

liL 

In United States v. Roberts, 14 F.3d 502 (lOth Cir. 1993), the district court had made 

a three level enhancement of the offense level of Jackie Wood, who was the fiancee of the 

alleged ringleader. The three level enhancement under § 3B 1.1 (b), quoted above, applies to 

one who is a manager or supervisor, but not an organizer or leader. The district court had 

found that Wood had a long relationship with Roberts, the alleged ringleader, and described 

her role as "distributing, delivering, assisting in making arrangements for 

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methamphetamine," and also found she had "acted as a source of methamphetamine to 

promote this activity in Casper, Wyoming." 14 F.3d at 523. We held that these findings 

were not clearly erroneous but did "not constitute evidence of decision-making authority or 

control over a subordinate necessary to conclude Ms. Wood was a supervisor or manager." 

J.d.. (emphasis in original). See also Litchfield, 959 F.2d at 1523. We held that the 

enhancement was without record support and vacated that portion of the sentence. Similarly, 

in this case the finding that Albers was an essential figure is not clearly erroneous, but as a 

matter of law it is insufficient to support the enhancement. 

The government also contends that Albers claimed a right to a larger share of the 

profits than others. There is evidence that he did profit from the venture, but the division of 

the profits among the others was not shown. The government says defendant Albers received 

at least $89,000, and cites Marino's testimony denying he was paid money from the proceeds 

and saying he was paid for Cambron's living at his house. (Brief of Appellee at 44; XIII R. 

at 537.) But the pot was much larger, government witness Cambron testifying he sold 

approximately $800,000 worth of methamphetamine produced from the amount of ephedrine 

shipped to Marino (XII R. 212), and the shares in the large profits actually received or 

claimed by the participants other than defendant Albers were not shown.6 Thus the record 

6The evidence summarized in Part I indicates Albers received about $77,000 in 

proceeds after the methamphetamine was manufactured from the ephedrine. He also got 

$10,000 for the cost of the second unsuccessful order of ephedrine. Cambron testified 

another $20,000 had been sent to defendant Albers when the second order for ephedrine was 

being planned, but that defendant Albers said later he lost this money in the stock market. 

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as to this factor of a claim of a larger share of profits was unclear. In his statement on the 

enhancement, quoted above, the trial judge made no finding or mention of any claim of a 

larger share of profits by defendant Albers. We must reject this as a theory to support the 

enhancement. 

We are convinced that the four-level enhancement for defendant's role in the offense 

was error and that this portion of the sentence must be vacated. We do not set aside the 

separate enhancement related to perjured testimony which was not appealed. 

Accordingly the convictions are AFFIRMED, the sentence is VACATED, and the 

case is REMANDED for resentencing in accordance with this opinion. 

Even if these sums are added to the $77,000 figure so as to make a total of payments of 

$107,000, there is doubt as to what part was proceeds paid to Albers and what was for the 

cost of payments for ephedrine. Most significantly, the absence of evidence on the division 

of the some $700,000 of the remainder of the $800,000 of proceeds from methamphetamine 

sales by Cambron prevents any conclusion as to whether defendant Albers claimed or 

received a larger share than the other participants in the unlawful venture. See United States 

v. Owens, 70 F.3d at 1129 (evidence that profits were split equally does not support 

enhancement under this provision). 

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APPENDIX 

The interrogation by the district judge which is challenged on appeal by 

defendant Albers was as follows: 

THE COURT: I have just a couple of questions. Are you making this up, that 

he chuckled and was nervous? 

A: No, sir, no. 

THE COURT: Now, I may have gotten my dates wrong, Mr. Guthrie. You 

worked at the Belle Plain facility until I think you said March of 199 --

A: Two. 

THE COURT: Two. 

A: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Okay. And you started to work there, when was it? 

A: November of'89. 

THE COURT: Okay. Now, was Mr. Albers involved with Agri-Data during 

that entire period? 

A: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Okay. And this incident involving the barrels, that is when the 

barrels were delivered, occurred, when was that, Counsel? What day were the barrels 

delivered, Mr. Monnat? 

MR. MONNAT: May 15th of 1991. 

THE COURT: May 15th. From the time you began working at Agri-Data in 

November of 1989 until this incident ofMay 1991, how many other instances, if any, can 

you recall where Mr. Albers called you one or more times with respect to deliveries of things 

to the plant? · 

A: Chemicals? As to chemicals or of anything? 

THE COURT: Well, as to chemicals. 

A: As to chemicals, this is -- like I was statin' earlier, there was one previous time that we 

did have some chemicals delivered to the plant, and like I stated before, I don't recall who 

it was delivered from and what brand or what type of chemical it was. Then this particular 

situation. Then as far as 2,4-D, Clayton could have called me, I just don't recall, as to that 

customer that was wanting this particular 2,4-D. I don't recall if it was the customer himself 

or Clayton or Scott or whoever that called me to pick up this 2,4-D for the customer and 

deliver it directly out to the fields to be used. 

THE COURT: All right. Now, I'm unclear, after the ephedrine was delivered 

on May 15, 1991, I am unclear when you asked the Defendant, you say four or five times, 

what the ephedrine was -- or the chemical was? 

A: Was going to be used for. 

THE COURT: Was going to be used for? 

Appellate Case: 95-3023 Document: 01019278212 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 46 
A: It was over a course of weeks or a month or so. I honestly couldn't tell you, Your Honor, 

as to the specific time or date or anything like this. It was just over a course of a period of 

time. Just, for example, there was another individual that was involved with Agri-Data, that 

was Mark Thomas, and even Mark Thomas questioned --

:MR. MONNAT: I object to any hearsay from Mark Thomas. This is probably 

unresponsive. 

1HE COURT: Why don't you just tell me about what Mr. Albers was saying 

and what you were saying to him. 

A: Like I said, it was over a course of several weeks or months, I honestly -- like I was 

saying before, I couldn't give you specific days or times, but there was several times where 

I asked Clayton what was the purpose of the chemical or what we was gonna use it for. And 

like I stated before is that on one occasion Clayton just raised his shoulders like that, and that 

was the only answer I recall getting out of him on one particular situation. And another time 

he answered directly back, said I don't know. And it wasn't-- like I stated before, it was not 

until the last time I asked him about it he said we was gonna use it on crops, and I just left 

it at that. I didn't raise a question about the chemicals any more. 

THE COURT: Was it-- I take it that during the period of time from 1989 to 

1991 you had previous conversations with Mr. Albers concerning things at the facility and 

operation of the plant? 

A: Yes, sir. Matter of fact, ifthere was a chain of command, if you don't mind me using that 

term, Clayton was my -- I looked at Clayton as my main boss. I went to Clayton the majority 

of the time before I went to Scott. I asked Clayton majority of the time for his opinion 

instead of Scott Stuber's. 

THE COURT: In the previous times that you had asked Mr. Albers for his 

opinion had he given you his opinion directly or had he shrugged his shoulders and not been 

-- not responded to you directly? 

:MR. MONNAT: Your Honor, may we approach, please. 

THE COURT: No, you may not. 

:MR. MONNAT: I object to the question. 

THE COURT: You may object and you may sit down, sir. 

A: As to as to the previous times before these situations? 

THE COURT: Yes. 

A: As to if Clayton didn't give me a straight answer, I don't recall. Usually Clayton and I, 

we had a pretty good working relationship. He was pretty much open and honest with me. 

And it was vice versa as far as that goes. There was only one situation where him and I, we 

had a disagreement, and that had to do with the firing of an employee. 

THE COURT: All right. Now, when he did tell you what this was to be used 

for, which I take it was -- and I'm not trying to put words in your mouth. You tell me. 

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·, 

A: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: A month or so. Are you saying after you had-- after the 

ephedrine had been delivered and you first inquired about it or --

A: The very first time? 

THE COURT: Right. I'm trying --

A: As to when I asked Clayton what the chemicals were for? 

THE COURT: Right. 

A: I'll be honest with you, I couldn't give you a straight answer on that, Your Honor. I don't · 

know if it was that week or the week following or it could have been a month later. I 

honestly couldn't tell you. I couldn't give you -- I just remember specifically asking Clayton 

several times as to what was the purpose of this chemical. 

THE COURT: Well, my-- I think my main area of concern is whether you 

have a recqllection of it being like you asked him three or four times in a two day period or 

whether it was over a longer period? 

A: It was over a longer period. 

THE COURT: And it was at the last-- the last time you asked him that he told 

you what? 

A: That it was going to be used on crops. 

THE COURT: Did he indicate anything else to you at that time? 

A: No, sir. 

THE COURT: Did he --

A: None whatsoever. 

THE COURT: -- indicate anything about what kind of crops? 

A: No, sir. 

THE COURT: Where? 

A: No, sir. 

THE COURT: Why it was going to be used on crops? 

A: No, sir. 

MR. MONNAT: Your Honor, I apologize, but I have to object to the Court's 

question and I'd request to approach the bench. 

THE COURT: Please sit down, Mr. Monnat. Your objection is noted. 

Nothing other than it was just going to be used on crops? 

A: That is correct, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: Now, I'm unclear, at some point in time, we've had, what is it, 

Exhibit 10 --

A: The field maps here. 

THE COURT: Right. 

A: Yes, sir. 

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THE COURT: I don't understand how that gets tied into this. 

A: Okay. If you don't mind a long lengthy discussion as--

THE COURT: Please don't make it long and lengthy. 

A: Okay. 

THE COURT: Did you prepare that? 

A: No, sir. It was not prepared by me personally. 

THE COURT: Well, what is it? What is it exactly? 

A: Okay. When a customer gives our company a call that he requests a soil test or a tissue 

test on a specific field, the employees we send out to do the soil test, they would draw these 

maps up--

THE COURT: Okay. 

A: -- personally themselves and then they would bring them back to this office. That way 

we got records exactly where the field location is and what field we are referring to for 

application. 

THE COURT: All right. And does that document reflect when something was 

put on the field? 

A: The only thing as far as a date, it just gives a year. It does not give no specific month or 

date. 

THE COURT: Does it indicate who prepared it? 

A: As far as an employee's name, sir, no, sir. And it's been too long where I could not 

recognize the writing. And we, majority of the time, as far as on the field maps, either it was 

done by John Ottley, Steve Ash, then on occasions we did have our hired hands do it 

themselves. So it could be a number of people involved in that. 

THE COURT: Do you as the manager of the plant have any independent 

knowledge, apart from Exhibit 10, that something supposedly or allegedly or in fact 

containing ephedrine --

A: Was put on the field? 

THE COURT: --was ever put on a field? 

A: No, sir, not to my knowledge whatsoever until this situation came up. 

THE COURT: Just a couple of final questions. After the search warrant was 

served, which would have been when? 

A: What was the date? October --

THE COURT: Sometime in October of 1991. 

A: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: You went this to see Mr. Albers the following day about the 

search warrant? 

A: Yes, sir. First thing in the morning. 

THE COURT: And it was at that time that he told you that he had come to the 

plant at 2 a.m. alone. Is that correct, alone? 

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A: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: And had mixed the ephedrine with potash? 

A: Yes, sir. He did not give me no specific day or time or month. 

THE COURT: That was where I was confused. 

A: No, sir. 

THE COURT: Did he indicate when he had done that at all? 

A: No, sir. 

THE COURT: Did I understand you to say when Mr. Monnat was questioning 

you that there were times when deliveries would be made, what, after hours? 

A: Well, to be honest with you, Your Honor, there was no such hours at the plant, because 

when you're in agriculture you work as when the crop is needed. 

THE COURT: I'm sure that's true. 

A: So there was no specific set time. Like Mr. Monnat said, it was not definitely 8 to 5 or 

anything like that. 

THE COURT: I understand that. But I'm just asking you, did Mr. Albers 

indicate in any way to you that he was at the plant to accept a delivery or give you any other 

explanation other than he was there alone at 2 a.m. and mixed these chemicals, products? 

A: That is correct. 

THE COURT: Nothing else was said--

A: Nothing else. 

THE COURT: about why he was there? 

A: No, sir. 

THE COURT: --about why he was there? 

A: No, sir. 

THE COURT: And one final question. When you went out with the DEA to 

take these samples, when was that? · 

A: I don't know if I wrote a date down here or not without looking. I'm sorry. I honestly 

couldn't tell you, Your Honor, as to --

THE COURT: Was it in the fall of 1991? 

A: There is a date back here, but I don't know if the date that is back here has to do with the 

time when we went out to the fields, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: All right. I'm trying to figure out, you didn't-- you worked 

there until March of 1992, so it must have been sometime in the fall of 1991? 

A: That is correct. Yes, sir. Like I stated earlier, it was early fall because the fields were 

being prepared for that year's crop. 

THE COURT: I see. Okay. Thank you very much, sir. Do you have any 

questions in light of mine? 

MR. WATSON: I do, just a couple, as to 10. 

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