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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Daryl Warren
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2681

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Daryl Warren

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

____________

 Submitted: March 13, 2015

 Filed: June 5, 2015

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Before MURPHY and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges, and HARPOOL, District 1

Judge.

____________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

An undercover agent working for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms

and Explosives (ATF) recruited Daryl Warren and two other men, Michael Twitty and

The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the

1

Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation. 

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Robert Washington, to rob a home in St. Louisreportedly being used to store cocaine. 

After Warren, Twitty, and Washington had agreed to the robbery, they were arrested

and charged with various drug and firearm offenses. A jury convicted Warren of

conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §

841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. § 846, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug

trafficking conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and being a felon in

possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 18 U.S.C. §

924(a)(2). The district court sentenced Warren to 211 months imprisonment

2

followed by a five year term of supervised release. Warren appeals, raising several

arguments related to the investigation, the trial evidence, and his sentence. We

affirm.

In 2009 the ATF implemented Operation Gideon, a series of undercover sting

operations designed to arrest criminals who were robbing locations where drugs were

stored. Rather than planting drugs in such locations with the expectation of making

arrests, the ATF developed an alternative technique. Undercover ATF agents would

describe a fictitious location to suspects and support plans for gaining access to it. 

When suspects were later about to carry out such a plan, they were arrested. The ATF

used this technique in St. Louis, Missouri from April to June 2013 following

increased violence in drug related robberies.

 

The investigation and arrest of Warren involved two confidential informants

and Richard Zayas, an undercover ATF agent. On May 21, 2013 the confidential

informants purchased an ounce of cocaine fromWarren's cousin, Robert Washington.

The informants subsequently introduced Washington to Zayas, who purchased

another ounce of cocaine fromWashington. During this purchase, Zayas claimed that

he was a disgruntled drug courier looking for a crew to help him rob a Mexican drug

The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, Chief Judge, United States District Judge

2

for the Eastern District of Missouri. 

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cartel of large amounts of cocaine. Washington said that he knew people who were

"involved in this type of activity" and agreed to organize a meeting with them at a

future date. 

On June 3, 2013 Washington introduced Zayas to Warren and Michael Twitty

in a grocery store parking lot. Zayas told them his cover story: he was a cocaine

courier for a group of Mexican drug dealers and was unhappy with the pay he was

receiving. He was interested in robbing the Mexican drug dealers to make up for his

low pay. Zayas claimed that a few times each month he would receive a call from

Mexican dealers informing him that they had some drugs ready for transportation at

a particular house. He would have a few minutes to pick up the drugs or they would

be moved to a new location. They told him that on entry to the house he would see

two Mexican men, one of whom would be carrying a pistol. The other man would go

to a back room and retrieve five to six kilograms of cocaine to give to Zayas, then tell

him where to make the delivery. Zayas claimed that each time he went to the house,

he could see anywhere from 20 to 22 kilograms of cocaine stored in a back room. As

Zayasfinished telling the story, Warren declared that "they could handle the robbery"

and he had "one more guy" who would help out.

The group convened again the next day. On behalf of "his people," Warren

asked Zayas where the house was located, what it looked like, how many guards

would be present outside, and whether there would be only one man guarding the

cocaine in the back room. After Zayas answered the questions, Warren agreed to use

a "trap car" with a secret back seat compartment to transport the cocaine from the

house. One of the confidential informants asked whether there would be any

problems "unloading" the cocaine, and Warren replied, "nah, nah, man we good." 

The group then discussed who would enter the house first and who would follow

behind, and everyone agreed to commit the robbery the following afternoon. When

asked for his final thoughts on the plan, Warren replied, "I think it's pretty good. It's

gonna be like a little shootout though." 

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When they gathered on June 5, 2013, Warren told Zayas that a fourth man

would meet them at the cocaine house and that he would instruct that man after they

arrived. Although Zayas wanted to meet the fourth man before the robbery to ensure

he understood the plan, Warren emphasized, "I'm the orchestrator. I'm the

orchestrator. [I will tell] him know what to do." Warren also declared that if

anything went wrong at the house, he "didn't need [his] people taking no fall for

nothing, if you know what I'm saying." Zayas then showed Warren, Twitty, and

Washington how to operate the hidden compartment of the "trap car." As he opened

the compartment, ATF officers emerged from a nearby parking lot and arrested them. 

The officers searched Warren's car and found a semiautomatic pistol and an assault

rifle, both loaded. Two pairs of gloves, a red bandana, and two knives were found in

the glove compartment. 

A grand jury returned a five count indictment against Warren, Washington, and

Twitty. Warren was charged in three counts for conspiring to possess with intent to

distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 846, possessing a

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) and § 924(a)(2). While Washington and Twitty pled guilty, Warren

proceeded to trial. At a pretrial conference, the government moved to introduce Rule

404(b) evidence pertaining to Warren's prior convictions for possession of a

controlled substance and felon in possession of a firearm in 2007, drug trafficking

and possession of a controlled substance in 2001, and possession of a controlled

substance in 1999. The district court granted the motion, concluding that the

convictions qualified as "other act" evidence of Warren's guilt under Rule 404(b).

During jury selection the government struck two black jurors, Juror 5 and Juror

21, and Warren challenged the strikes under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 

In defending the peremptory strikes, the government argued that Juror 5 and Juror 21

were the only members of the panel who had not answered any general questions

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during voir dire. The district court agreed with the government, finding that both

jurors had failed to respond to questions asked by counsel during voir dire and that

this silence was a nondiscriminatory reason for the strikes.

While Warren did not testify at trial, Zayas and the two confidential informants

testified about his involvement in the conspiracy to rob the home. Over Warren's

renewed objections, the government introduced evidence of his prior convictions

under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The district court instructed the jury not to

consider the evidence as proof of his criminal propensity, but only as proof of his

knowledge and intent. It then instructed on Warren's entrapment defense, stating that

the "law allows the government to use undercover agents, deception, and other

methods to present a person already willing to commit a crime with the opportunity

to commit a crime, but the law does not allow the government to persuade an

unwilling person to commit a crime." The jury convicted Warren of all counts. 

At sentencing Warren objected to portions of his presentence report, arguing

that he was a victim of sentencing entrapment because "no drugs were ever involved

in this case" and he did not have the ability to distribute over 15 kilograms of cocaine. 

The district court overruled the objections, sentencing Warren to 211 months

imprisonment followed by a five year term of supervised release. Warren now

appeals his conviction and sentence. He contendsthat the government failed to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not entrapped. He also assertsthat the reverse

sting operation was outrageous government conduct in violation of the Fifth

Amendment and that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior

convictions under Rule 404(b), denying his Batson challenges, and incorrectly

calculating the amount of cocaine for which he was responsible. 

Warren first argues that the government presented insufficient evidence to

support the jury's finding that he had not been entrapped. We review de novo the

sufficiency of the evidence, resolving conflicts in favor of the government, viewing

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the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and accepting all

reasonable inferences that support the verdict. See United States v. Martin, 777 F.3d

984, 992 (8th Cir. 2015). The entrapment defense "recognizes that law enforcement

officers go too far when they implant in the mind of an innocent person the

disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they

may prosecute." United States v. Williams, 720 F.3d 674, 697 (8th Cir. 2013). 

Entrapment has two elements: government inducement and a lack of predisposition

on the part of the defendant to engage in the crime. Mathews v. United States, 485

U.S. 58, 62 (1988). 

Inducement occurs when the government creates a substantial risk that an

otherwise law abiding person will commit a criminal offense. United States v. Myers,

575 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2009). While inducement takes many forms, it requires

more than a favorable opportunity to commit a crime. United States v. Bugh, 701

F.3d 888, 893 (8th Cir. 2012). Predisposition, the "principal element" of the defense,

focuses on whether the defendant was an "unwary innocent" or an "unwary criminal"

who readily accepted the chance to commit the crime. Williams, 720 F.3d at 697. 

Since the district court instructed the jury on the entrapment defense, the government

had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not induce the crime

or that Warren was predisposed to commit the crime. See Bugh, 701 F.3d at 893 n.5.

Warren asserts that the government induced his participation in the robbery and

that he was not predisposed to commit the crime. The evidence at trial, however,

showed that the government had simply offered him an opportunity to commit the

robbery and that he had eagerly embraced it. See Bugh, 701 F.3d at 893. Minutes

after Zayas told the group his cover story, Warren stated that "they could handle the

robbery" and he had "one more guy" who would help. Warren then questioned Zayas

about the location of the house and agreed to use the "trap car" to transport the drugs

from that location. He took charge again at the final meeting and explained that he

was the "orchestrator" and that he had recruited a fourth man to help carry out the

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robbery. Absent government threat, coercion, cajoling, and the like, the evidence at

trial supported a finding that the government did not induce Warren other than by

making the crime available to him. See, e.g., United States v. Abumayyaleh, 530 F.3d

641, 646–47 (8th Cir. 2008).

Even if the government had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it

did not induce the crime, the evidence at trial showed that Warren was predisposed

to commit it. Notably Washington, rather than a government agent, recruited Warren

since he had already been "involved in this type of activity." This indicated that

Warren "possessed the requisite predisposition prior to the [g]overnment's

investigation." United States v. Brooks, 215 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2000). He had

met with Zayas on his own accord and accepted the opportunity presented without

hesitation. See United States v. Young, 613 F.3d 735, 748 (8th Cir. 2010); see also

United States v. Searcy, 284 F.3d 938, 943 (8th Cir. 2002). With Warren's prior

convictions for drug trafficking and possession, his ready response to minimal

inducement indicates criminal inclination. See Myers, 575 F.3d at 805; see also

Williams, 702 F.3d at 697. Because a reasonable jury could find that the evidence at

trial proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Warren was predisposed to participate in

the robbery and that the government did not induce his participation in the crime, his

entrapment defense has not succeeded. See Bugh, 701 F.3d at 894. 

For the first time on appeal, Warren also argues that the fictitious nature of the

operation made the investigation so outrageous as to warrant dismissal of the

indictment. Outrageous government conduct claims involve alleged defects in the

"institution of the prosecution," questions of law a court should decide before trial. 

United States v. Jorgensen, 144 F.3d 550, 561 (8th Cir. 1998). If the defense is not

made in a pretrial motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

12(b)(3), it is therefore waived absent good cause. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3);

United States v. Mausali, 590 F.3d 1077, 1080–81 (9th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases). 

Warren thus waived his outrageous government conduct defense by failing to raise

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it before trial. See United States v. Henderson-Durand, 985 F.2d 970, 973 (8th Cir.

1993). Although relief from waiver may be granted when a defendant shows good

cause for his failure to raise the issue in a timely manner, Warren has not offered any

such explanation. See id. at 973–74. We thus decline to review the merits of this

claim.

Warren next asserts that the district court erred in admitting evidence of his

prior convictions. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). We review the admission of "other act"

evidence for an abuse of discretion and reverse "only when the evidence clearly had

no bearing on the case and was introduced solely to show defendant's propensity to

engage in criminal misconduct." United States v. Young, 753 F.3d 757, 767 (8th Cir.

2014). Other act evidence may be admitted to prove "motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." Fed.

R. Evid. 404(b)(2). The evidence must be relevant, proved by a preponderance of the

evidence, more probative than prejudicial, and similar in kind and close in time to the

crime charged. Young, 753 F.3d at 768. 

Warren contends that the district court abused its discretion by admitting

evidence of his prior crimes because they were not close in time to the charged

crimes. His oldest conviction was in 1999 for possession of a controlled substance,

nearly fifteen years before these similar charges of conspiring to possess with intent

to distribute cocaine. Although there is no absolute rule about remoteness in time,

we have upheld the introduction of fifteen year old convictions that were similar to

the crime charged. See United States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688, 702 (8th Cir. 2011). 

Even more remote convictions have been upheld when a defendant has been in

custody for much of the intervening time period. See United States v. Strong, 415

F.3d 902, 905–06 (8th Cir. 2005) (sixteen years); United States v. Walker, 470 F.3d

1271, 1275 (8th Cir. 2006) (eighteen years); United States v. Williams, 308 F.3d 833,

836–37 (8th Cir. 2002) (twenty years). Here, Warren wasimprisoned or on probation

from May 1999 until November 2004, and again from August 2007 until August

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2012. He had been out of prison for only five years before committing the offenses

at issue here. See Walker, 470 F.3d at 1275. Under these circumstances, the 1999

conviction was not so remote in time asto render the district court's decision an abuse

of discretion. See, e.g., Yielding, 657 F.3d at 702. 

We also reject Warren's argument that the Rule 404(b) evidence was more

prejudicial than probative. Evidence of his prior convictions for possession of a

controlled substance and drug trafficking had substantial probative value on the

issues of knowledge and intent. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 401 F.3d 886, 894

(8th Cir. 2005). The district court limited any prejudice to Warren by giving a

limiting instruction, directing the jury not to consider the evidence as proof of his

character or criminal propensity, but only as proof of his knowledge and intent. See

United States v. Brumfield, 686 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2012). We thus conclude that

the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the Rule 404(b) evidence. 

Warren further argues that the district court erred in denying his Batson

challenges after the government struck two black jurors, Jurors 5 and 21. The

Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the use of peremptory challenges to strike jurors

solely on the basis of race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85. If a party makes a prima facie

showing that a peremptory strike is race based, the proponent must provide a race

neutral reason for the strike. United States v. Ellison, 616 F.3d 829, 832 (8th Cir.

2010). The district court must then decide whether the objecting party has shown

purposeful race discrimination. Id. Since those findings turn on credibility

determinations, they are due great deference and our review is for clear error. Id.

Throughout voir dire, Jurors 5 and 21 were the only potential jurors who

remained silent during the general questions asked by the district court, the

government, and defense counsel. They did not volunteer information regarding their

views on law enforcement or knowledge of controlled substances. Nor did they

respond to questions about any familiarity with the issues in the case. The only time

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they spoke was when the district court asked them whether they were employed. 

Juror 21 replied that she had worked as a dishwasher, and Juror 5 answered that she

had worked at a printing company. The prosecutor subsequently struck both. In

response to Warren's objections, the prosecutor stated that Jurors 5 and 21 "were the

only two jurors on the entire panel [who] did not answer any of the general

questions." Although both jurors answered direct questions about their employment,

the prosecutor argued that such information "should have been [included] on [their]

questionnaire to begin with, but they did not answer." The court agreed with the

prosecutor, finding that the silence of Jurors 5 and 21 was a race neutral reason for

the peremptory strikes. 

Warren now argues that silence is not a race neutral reason for striking a juror. 

We disagree. Passivity, inattentiveness, and confusion are common race neutral

reasons for striking jurors. See, e.g., Young, 753 F.3d at 780–82. Silence is a similar

reason, for it too reflects "body language and demeanor" rather than race, id. at 780

n.7, and a party should not be required to assume the risk of a juror about whom little

information has been made available, see McCurdy v. Montgomery Cnty., 240 F.3d

512, 521–22 (6th Cir. 2001). The district court recognized as much in denying

Warren's objections, finding that the government was unable to glean any relevant

information about Juror 5 or Juror 21 because of their silence. We afford great

deference to such a finding, see Ellison, 616 F.3d at 832, and thus conclude that the

district court did not err in denying the Batson challenges to the government's

peremptory strike of Jurors 5 or 21, see United States v. Meza-Gonzalez, 394 F.3d

587, 593–94 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853, 865–69 (8th

Cir. 2008) (en banc) (affirming denial of Batson challenge where juror's silence was

a reason for peremptory strike).

Finally, Warren raises a sentencing entrapment claim. He asserts that the

district court sentenced him as for a conspiracy to distribute at least 15 kilograms of

cocaine, far exceeding the quantity he would have been able to distribute. See

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U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3). Sentencing entrapment occurs when government "conduct

leads an individual otherwise indisposed to dealing in a large quantity [of] controlled

substance to do so, and the result is a higher sentence." United States v. Martin, 583

F.3d 1068, 1073 (8th Cir. 2009). The critical question is whether the defendant was

"predisposed to deal only in small quantities of drugs." United States v. Ruiz, 446

F.3d 762, 775 (8th Cir. 2006). To make out this defense a defendant must prove that

he had neither the intent nor the ability to deal in the quantity of drugs alleged by the

government. Id. Sentencing entrapment is a factual finding reviewed for clear error. 

See id. 

The evidence at trial showed that Warren had expected to steal at least 15

kilograms of cocaine and that he had the ability to distribute that amount. After he

learned that the targeted location contained 20 to 22 kilograms of cocaine, an

undercover agent asked him whether there would be any problems "unloading" the

drugs. Warren replied, "nah, nah, man we good." Given this unequivocal statement,

Warren cannot show that he had neither the intent nor the ability to distribute at least

15 kilograms of cocaine. See Ruiz, 446 F.3d at 775–76; see also Searcy, 284 F.3d at

942–43. Nor can he show that he was predisposed to deal only in small quantities of

cocaine. As his prior convictions show, Warren was a convicted drug dealer who was

released from prison only five years before the conduct at issue here. See United

States v. Booker, 639 F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Hunt, 171

F.3d 1192, 1196 (8th Cir. 1999). The district court thus did not clearly err in

sentencing Warren based on a conspiracy to distribute over 15 kilograms of cocaine.

To the extent Warren argues in passing that sentencing entrapment claims

"should be submitted to the jury as part of the entrapment instruction," see United

States v. Cortes, 732 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2013), the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure require more. Under Rule 28(a)(8)(A), an appellant must adequately

explain his "contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and

parts of the record on which the appellant relies." Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). Since

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Warren has failed to go beyond a cursory assertion of this argument in his opening

brief and made no mention of it in his reply brief or at oral argument, we refuse to

consider the merits of the issue. See United States v. Chipps, 410 F.3d 438, 446–47

(8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gonzales, 90 F.3d 1363, 1369–70 (8th Cir. 1996).

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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