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Parties Involved:
James Robert Bailey
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United St.a~s Court of Ap;>eals Tc'!'lt.'l Circuit 

SE? 11 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JAMES ROBERT BAILEY a/k/a 

James Robert Nicholson, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 90-1148 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-395) 

(District of Colorado) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT! 

Before McKAY and SETH, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, Senior District 

Judge.2 

Defendant James Bailey appeals his conviction on four counts 

of unauthorized use of food coupons under 7 u.s.c. § 2024(b) 

(1988) and aiding and abetting another in the unauthorized use of 

food coupons under 18 u.s.c. S 2 (1988). Defendant filed a motion 

for a new trial that was denied by the district court. He was 

sentenced to three years imprisonment on each of the counts, to be 

served concurrently. This appeal followed. 

1 This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the 

case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

2 The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior District Judge for the 

District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-1148 Document: 010110090112 Date Filed: 09/11/1991 Page: 1 
I. 

Defendant and co-defendant Sinnica Nicholson operated Seven 

Seas Seafood, a food store in Denver, Colorado. They were authorized by the United States Department of Agriculture to redeem 

food coupons. USDA initiated an investigation into the possible 

unauthorized use of food coupons after receiving a phone call from 

the manager of the bank where the defendant and Ms. Nicholson had 

opened an account. The bank manager informed USDA agents that he 

was suspicious of defendant and Ms. Nicholson due to the extremely 

large volume of food stamps they had deposited into their account 

and because they were withdrawing the cash shortly after making 

deposits. 

USDA conducted an investigation involving special agents and 

a civilian working as an undercover operative. On July 26, 1989, 

a special agent and the undercover operative entered Seven Seas 

Seafood. They asked defendant if he would redeem food stamps for 

cash. Defendant responded affirmatively and directed them to Ms. 

Nicholson who was in another part of the store. Ms. Nicholson 

exchanged $200 worth of USDA food coupons for $100 in cash. 

On August 4, 1989, the undercover operative entered Seven 

Seas Seafood and contacted defendant. They left the store 

together, entered defendant's automobile, and drove behind the 

store into an alley. The undercover operative informed defendant 

that the food coupons she was about to exchange were stolen. 

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Defendant paid $80 in cash for $160 in food coupons. The undercover operative also stated that she would have more food coupons 

to sell in the future. Defendant indicated that he was willing to 

purchase more coupons. This transaction was recorded through a 

device hidden on the undercover operative and was viewed by two 

federal agents. 

The next exchange occurred on September 15, 1989. Following 

a phone conversation, co-defendant Nicholson met the undercover 

operative at the East Side Food Stamp Office in Denver. Ms. 

Nicholson exchanged $400 for $850 worth of USDA food coupons. The 

undercover operative saw defendant seated on a porch approximately 

one-half block from where the exchange occurred, and observed 

Ms. Nicholson walk toward him after the exchange was completed. 

On September 18, 1989, the undercover operative again met 

Ms. Nicholson at the East Side Food Stamp Office after arranging 

the meeting over the telephone. Ms. Nicholson arrived in a car 

driven by defendant. She and the undercover operative then 

exchanged $500 in cash for $1000 worth of food coupons. After the 

transaction, Ms. Nicholson got back into the car and drove away 

with defendant. This exchange was videotaped and observed by 

federal agents. 

The jury returned a verdict of guilty as to each of these 

transactions. Following a jury trial, appellant moved for a new 

trial on the basis of his allegation that the government failed to 

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Appellate Case: 90-1148 Document: 010110090112 Date Filed: 09/11/1991 Page: 3 
provide a complete transcript of the grand jury proceedings in 

violation of his discovery request. The district court denied the 

motion. 

II. 

Defendant alleges numerous errors that warrant reversal and a 

new trial. His first argument is that the district court erred in 

denying his motion for a new trial due to the failure of the government to produce a complete set of grand jury transcripts. He 

maintains that this alleged failure by the government to comply 

with his discovery request for Jencks Act material prejudiced his 

trial preparation. The government asserts that the only grand 

jury testimony upon which the indictment was based was the testimony of USDA Special Agent Hopko, and that the complete grand jury 

transcript was provided to defense counsel. 

Whether to grant a motion for a new trial is a decision 

within the sound discretion of the district court. We will not 

reverse the court's decision absent a plain abuse of that discretion. United States v. McIntyre, 836 F.2d 467, 472 (10th Cir. 

1987); United States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428, 1455 (10th Cir. 

1987). 

The Jencks Act requires that the government, on motion of the 

defendant, produce any "statement" of a witness it has called that 

relates to the subject matter to which the witness has testified. 

18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1988). This material includes a transcript 

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Appellate Case: 90-1148 Document: 010110090112 Date Filed: 09/11/1991 Page: 4 
J of a witness's testimony before a grand jury. Id.,§ 3500(e)(3); 

United States v. Knowles, 594 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1979). 

Defendant points to passages in the grand jury transcript 

that he contends demonstrate the government did not produce the 

entire grand jury proceedings. The first example involves a 

statement by Agent Hopko that the USDA investigation of defendant 

stemmed from a Denver police complaint about defendant and Ms. 

Nicholson trafficking in food stamps and also possibly trafficking 

in narcotics. The government then asked a question referring to 

"these various episodes, that the Grand Jurors heard about involving drugs" and sought to clarify that no exchange of drugs ever 

occurred. Record, vol. 1, doc. 22, exh. 1 at 3. Defendant 

asserts that this reference indicates that there was earlier grand 

jury testimony. "Various episodes," however, could just as easily 

have been a reference to Agent Hopko's statement about the Denver 

police complaint. Moreover, this excerpt does not demonstrate 

that the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant 

a new trial. 

Defendant also maintains that the government's reference to 

Agent Hopko's prior summary of nine food coupon transactions demonstrates that the witness had testified at a different grand jury 

proceeding about these transactions. Id. at 8. Agent Hopko, however, had summarized the trafficking of food coupons a few moments 

earlier during his testimony on that day, and, thus, his statement 

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Appellate Case: 90-1148 Document: 010110090112 Date Filed: 09/11/1991 Page: 5 
., does not establish that there was prior grand jury testimony. 

Finally, defendant asserts that the Assistant United States 

Attorney improperly tainted the grand jury when, in response to a 

grand juror's concern about the ability of untrustworthy individuals to obtain authorization to redeem food coupons, the AUSA mentioned that defendant had an extensive criminal history but was 

able to obtain authorization. The AUSA immediately cautioned the 

grand jury that they were not to take into consideration defendant's criminal history when deciding whether to return an indictment. Id. at 19-20. In light of the fact that this information 

came out in response to a grand juror's question and that the AUSA 

properly cautioned the grand jury, we cannot conclude that the 

district court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion 

for a new trial. 

III. 

Defendant maintains that the evidence was insufficient to 

support his convictions for wilfully assisting Ms. Nicholson in 

the unauthorized acquisition of food coupons on September 15, 

1989, and September 18, 1989. Evidence is considered sufficient 

to support a criminal conviction if, viewing all the 

evidence--both direct and circumstantial--in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Culpepper, 834 

F.2d 879, 881 (10th Cir. 1987). 

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During the August 4, 1989, exchange of food coupons for cash, 

defendant stated that he was interested in acquiring additional 

food coupons in the future. Further, during the initial exchange 

on July 26, 1989, defendant directed the undercover operative and 

the special agent to Ms. Nicholson in order to consummate the 

exchange. In addition, evidence was presented showing that 

defendant and Ms. Nicholson were authorized to redeem food 

coupons, that they were co-signators on the bank account into 

which they deposited food coupons, that they both deposited 

coupons, and that they both withdrew large amounts cash from that 

account shortly after making deposits. Although defendant did not 

execute the transaction himself on September 18 but drove Ms. 

Nicholson to the site and drove away with her after the exchange 

was completed, a reasonable jury could infer that defendant willfully assisted Ms. Nicholson by transporting her to and from the 

site. Similarly, on September 15, defendant waited one-half block 

from where the transaction occurred, and Ms. Nicholson walked 

towards him after the exchange. Although there was no evidence 

showing that defendant transported Ms. Nicholson to the site, a 

permissible inference from all the evidence presented is that he 

wilfully assisted her. Viewing the evidence and the reasonable 

inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 

the government, we conclude that the jury could find beyond areasonable doubt that defendant wilfully assisted Ms. Nicholson in 

the unlawful acquisition of food coupons on both September 15 and 

September 18. 

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IV. 

Defendant contends that the district court abused its 

discretion by admitting extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent 

statements to impeach Ms. Nicholson. He argues that the evidence 

was improperly admitted because she did not have an adequate 

opportunity to explain the prior statements as required by Rule 

613(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The decision of whether 

to admit evidence is a matter committed to the discretion of the 

district court. United States v. Alexander, 849 F.2d 1293, 1301 

(10th Cir. 1988). 

During the government's case-in-chief, Ms. Nicholson stated 

that defendant did not give her money to purchase food coupons. 

The government sought to impeach her by introducing the testimony 

of government agents who testified that Ms. Nicholson had previously told them that the money came from defendant. Ms. Nicholson 

was given an opportunity to explain her prior statements, record, 

vol. 3, at 263, and the district court properly instructed the 

jury that the testimony of the government agents was for the 

limited purpose of impeaching Ms. Nicholson's credibility, and not 

to establish the truth of the prior statements. Id., vol. 4 at 

339. 3 Under these circumstances, we conclude that the district 

3 The extrinsic evidence presented was the testimony of the 

government agents based on their recollection of their earlier 

conversation with Ms. Nicholson. Record, vol. 4 at 341, 352-53. 

Contrary to defendant's position, Ms. Nicholson was not impeached 

by documentary evidence. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1148 Document: 010110090112 Date Filed: 09/11/1991 Page: 8 
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the agents' testimony of Ms. Nicholson's prior inconsistent statements. 

v. 

Defendant also argues that the district court erred by permitting a government agent to testify about a conversation he 

overheard between Ms. Nicholson and the undercover operative. The 

conversation had been recorded, but the audio tape was inaudible. 

Defendant argues that the admission of the testimony violated Rule 

1004 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because the tape itself was 

the best evidence of the conversation and a proper foundation was 

not presented as to why the tape could not be produced at trial. 

We must determine whether the district court abused its discretion 

in admitting the agent's testimony. Alexander, 849 F.2d at 1301. 

Defendant misapprehends the best evidence rule and the purposes for which the agent's testimony was offered. The best 

evidence rule requires the production of a writing, recording, or 

photograph in order to prove its contents. Fed. R. Evid. 1002. 

In this case, however, the government sought to establish the contents of Ms. Nicholson's conversation with the undercover operative, not the sounds preserved on the tape recording. Therefore, 

the best evidence rule is inapplicable. See United States v. 

Rose, 590 F.2d 232, 237 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 

929 (1979); United States v. Gonzales-Benitez, 537 F.2d 1051, 

1053-54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 429 U.S. 923 (1976). The 

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• 

district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 

agent's testimony. 

VI. 

Defendant's last two contentions are not persuasive. He 

argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a 

mistrial based on a government witness's reference to a "criminal 

history check" in response to a question about the training of the 

undercover operative. Record, vol. 4, at 303. Taken in context, 

this comment referred to the screening of individuals to determine 

their fitness as undercover operatives. The district court's 

denial of defendant's motion for a mistrial was not an abuse of 

discretion. See United States v. Peveto, 881 F.2d 844, 859 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 348 (1989). 

Finally, defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the 

alleged errors require that we vacate his conviction. In light of 

our determination that the district court did not err as defendant 

alleges, cumulative-error analysis is inappropriate. See United 

States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470-71 (10th Cir. 1990). 

The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

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