Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-03174/USCOURTS-caDC-94-03174-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Edward Tyrone Farley
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 24, 1995 Decided December 22, 1995

Nos. 92-3127 and 94-3174

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

EDWARD TYRONE FARLEY,

APPELLANT

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 91cr00488-05)

Jonathan S. Zucker, appointed by the court, argued the cause for the appellant.

S. Hollis Fleischer, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for the appellee. Eric H.

Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman and Margaret A.

Flaherty, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief.

Before: BUCKLEY, SENTELLE and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Appellant Edward Farley and two of his

codefendants entered "wired" guilty pleas whereby none of them received the benefit of the

government's plea offer unless all three of them agreed to plead guilty. Before sentencing and again

after sentencing Farley moved to withdraw his plea. The district court denied the motions. It also

denied Farley's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in

connection with his guilty plea and his attempt to withdraw it. We affirm.

I. Background

In November 1991 Farley and five others were named in a thirteen-count superseding

indictment charging conspiracy to distribute cocaine base (crack) and multiple counts of distribution

of crack and distribution of crack within 1,000 feet of a school. A jury trial for Farley and two

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1Another codefendant, Tammy Brown, pleaded guilty on February 19, 1992. On February 20,

1992 the government dismissed the charges against the fourth codefendant, Mike Love. That

same day the government dismissed all counts against the fifth codefendant, Jeffrey Bonner, and

later filed an information charging Bonner with distribution of a controlled substance. 

2When Farley filed his motion, rule 32(d) provided: "If a motion for withdrawal of a plea of

guilty ... is made before sentence is imposed, the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a

showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason. At any later time, a plea may be set aside

only on direct appeal or by motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255." In 1994 the text of rule 32(d) was

moved to rule 32(e) with minor stylistic changes. Here we refer to the rule as rule 32(d). 

codefendants, Mark Love and Ricardo Love, was scheduled to begin on February 20, 1992.1 At a

pretrial motions hearing that morning, Farley's lawyer addressed the district court:

[B]efore we start any motions, the government has made a wired offerthis morning,

which no one has discussed with their clients. It was just made this morning, and it

certainly, I think, would behoove us to explore it. I'm going to make a request that

... the Court would break until possibly ... immediately after lunch, and allow counsel

and all three clients [Farley, Mark Love and Ricardo Love] ... to discuss this since it

isthey're all contingent upon one another.

Supplemental Appendix (S.A.) § A, 7 (emphasis added). The court recessed and the government

offered Farley and the Loves a wired plea arrangement. All three agreed to plead guilty. Farley

agreed to plead guilty to distribution of fewer than five grams of crack in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

841(b)(1)(C).

The court reconvened that afternoon and wasinformed that Farley and the Loves had agreed

to plead guilty. The court then conducted a hearing pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. The

government proffered the evidence it had against Farley: On June 19, 1991 a confidential informant

met with Farley and one of Farley's codefendants, Tammy Brown, and Farley sold the informant 2.3

grams of crack for $300; Brown apparently had arranged the deal. Farley agreed with the summary

and admitted his guilt. The court accepted Farley's guilty plea and the Loves' pleas as well. No one

brought up at the rule 11 hearing the fact that the pleas were wired.

Over two months later and before sentencing, Farley told his lawyer he wanted to withdraw

his plea. His lawyer filed a Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d) motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea

because, according to Farley, he was innocent and the government would suffer no prejudice if the

plea were withdrawn.2 According to Farley, he pleaded guilty because he feared his codefendants

would testify against him. On May 6, 1992, the date scheduled for sentencing, the court held a

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hearing on Farley'srule 32(d) motion. Farley's lawyer explained to the court that Farley did not allege

a defect in the rule 11 proceeding but instead based his motion solely on his belated assertion of

innocence. The court concluded that Farley simply had a change of heart, denied his rule 32(d)

motion and sentenced him to 63 months' imprisonment. Farley filed a timely notice of appeal. In

September 1992 we ordered Farley's appealheld in abeyance pending the disposition ofthe 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 challenge Farley anticipated filing. Nine months later, in June 1993, Farley finally filed a

section 2255 motion raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from his guilty plea.

In November 1993 Farley filed a pleading styled in part a "supplement" to his pending section

2255 motion and in part a "motion to reconsider" his rule 32(d) motion, which had been denied

eighteen months earlier. In the motion for reconsideration Farley for the first time claimed defects

in the rule 11 proceeding. He argued that rule 11(e) (requiring disclosure of plea agreement) was

violated because the parties never told the court at the rule 11 hearing that the pleas were wired. He

also argued that rule 11(d) (requiring court to determine voluntariness of plea) was violated insofar

as the court did not make a specific inquiry regarding whether his plea was knowing and voluntary

in light of its wired nature.

On November 8, 1994 the district court denied Farley's motion for reconsideration and his

ineffective assistance claims. Farley timely appealed and we consolidated the section 2255 appeal

with his May 1992 appeal, originally held in abeyance. Farley raises two issues. First, he contends

he should be permitted to withdraw his plea because of the alleged defectsin the rule 11 proceeding.

Second, he contends his plea should be set aside because his lawyer rendered ineffective assistance.

II. Plea Withdrawal Based on Alleged Defects in the Rule 11 Proceeding 

Farley arguesthat the district court abused its discretion in not allowing him to withdraw his

plea because the court had not been advised that the pleas were wired and thus did not sufficiently

examine whether Farley's plea was knowingly and voluntarily made.

A. 

We first determine the appropriate standard ofreview. Rule 32(d) distinguishes between preand post-sentencing attempts to withdraw guilty pleas. The rule first provides that a district court

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may grant a pre-sentence motion to withdraw "upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just

reason" and we review for abuse of discretion the denial of the motion. United States v. Ford, 993

F.2d 249, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1993). After sentencing, however, a plea "may be set aside only on direct

appeal or by motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255," Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d), and the defendant must meet

a more stringent standard than the "obviously more lenient "fair and just' standard." United States

v. Watley, 987 F.2d 841, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1993). On direct appeal the defendant must show that

withdrawal of his plea is necessary to correct a "manifest injustice." Id. at 847-48. To prevail under

section 2255 the defendant must show that the plea proceeding wastainted by "a fundamental defect

which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice" or "an omission inconsistent with the

rudimentary demands of fair procedure." Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962).

We disagree with Farley that his rule 11 defect claim should be reviewed for abuse of

discretion under the "fair and just" standard because the claim was not raised before sentencing.

Although Farley filed a rule 32(d) motion before sentencing, the motion was based entirely on his

claim of innocence and the lack of prejudice to the government should his plea be withdrawn. The

district court denied the motion on May 6, 1992after Farley's lawyer expressly represented at the

rule 32(d) hearing that Farley did not allege any defect in the rule 11 proceedingand sentenced

Farley that day. Eighteen months later Farley filed a "motion to reconsider" the denial of his rule

32(d) motion. It was in his post-sentencing motion that Farley first argued he should be allowed to

withdraw his plea based on the defective rule 11 proceeding. Although the district court ruled on the

merits of the new claim, it lacked jurisdiction to do so because Farley's motion for reconsideration,

filed eighteen months after entry of judgment, was untimely. See United States v. Cook, 670 F.2d

46, 48 (5th Cir.) (to be timely, motion for reconsideration must be filed within period allotted for

noticing of appeal, i.e., ten days after entry of judgment in criminal case), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 982

(1982); United States v. Miller, 869 F.2d 1418, 1421 (10th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v.

Russo, 760 F.2d 1229, 1230 (11thCir. 1985) (same). Moreover, the district court lacked jurisdiction

to entertain Farley's motion qua rule 32(d) motion because the rule expressly provides that after

sentencing a plea may be set aside only on direct appeal or via a section 2255 motion. See United

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3There may be a third reason the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motion to

reconsider: the May 1992 notice of appeal may have divested the district court of jurisdiction

over the plea withdrawal motion and hence jurisdiction to entertain a subsequent motion to

reconsider. Compare United States v. Christy, 3 F.3d 765, 767 (4th Cir. 1993), and United

States v. Vroman, 997 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) with United States v. Gargano, 826

F.2d 610, 611-12 (7th Cir. 1987), and United States v. Greenwood, 974 F.2d 1449, 1467-69 (5th

Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2354 (1993). 

4The government points out that Farley's rule 11 defect claim should be treated as a section

2255 claim and therefore reviewed under the Hill v. United States, supra, standard. Only section

2255, the government maintains, could have conferred jurisdiction on the district court to review

Farley's rule 11 claim, see rule 32(d); moreover, we held Farley's appeal in abeyance so he could

pursue section 2255 relief. Indeed, his section 2255 motion and motion to reconsider flowed

from the same claimthat he misunderstood the wired nature of his plea and therefore did not

knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty. Nevertheless, we need not decide whether Farley's rule 11

claim is more appropriately reviewed under the section 2255 standard as opposed to the "manifest

injustice" standard: Farley does not meet the "manifest injustice" standard and therefore he

necessarily would not meet the section 2255 standard, see United States v. Rivera-Ramirez, 715

F.2d 453, 456-57 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984), assuming the two

standards differ. See United States v. Watson, 548 F.2d 1058, 1063-64 (D.C. Cir. 1977)

(suggesting application of two standards to same set of facts might lead to different results). But

see C. Wright, 3 Federal Practice and Procedure § 539, at 211 (2d ed. 1982) (suggesting both

standards lead to identical results). 

States v. Todaro, 982 F.2d 1025, 1028 (6th Cir.) (per curiam) (district court lacked jurisdiction to

entertain under rule 32(d) post-sentencing motion to withdraw plea), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2424

(1993); United States v. Baker, 790 F.2d 1437, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).3 Accordingly we will

not review the merits of Farley's appeal from the denial of his "motion to reconsider." Id.

Instead we consider Farley's rule 11 defect claim on direct appeal. See id. We do so for this

reason: Had we not held his May 1992 appeal in abeyance, Farley would have been able to then raise

his rule 11 defect claim. His consolidated appeal represents, in part, his first opportunity to argue

before us that the rule 11 proceeding was deficient. Cf. United States v. Liboro, 10 F.3d 861, 864

(D.C. Cir. 1993). Because we review Farley's rule 11 claim on direct appeal, we must determine

whether Farley satisfies the "manifest injustice" standard.4 For the following reasons we conclude

he does not.

B.

The relevant rules here are rules 11(d) and 11(e)(2). Rule 11(d) requires the district court to

determine that a guilty plea is "voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart

from a plea agreement." Rule 11(e)(2) requires "disclosure of the [plea] agreement" to the district

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court at the time the plea is entered and "is properly read to mean that all "material terms' (or material

"details' or "elements') of the agreement must be disclosed." United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245,

249 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 857 (1991). "There is no standard short of requiring full

disclosure of all material details of plea agreements that can reliably guarantee that guilty pleas are

knowing and voluntary and fully understood by the parties." United States v. Roberts, 570 F.2d 999,

1007 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

On the facts of this case we cannot conclude that setting aside Farley's plea is necessary to

correct a manifest injustice because any variance from rule 11's provisions was harmless, at most.

See rule 11(h) (harmless error). We first note that although Farley claims he is innocent (despite

having acknowledged his guilt at the rule 11 hearing and to the probation officer), he offers nothing

more than his assertion to support his innocence. His "claim of innocence falls well short of

presenting a legallycognizable defense to the chargesto which he pled guilty." United States v. Cray,

47 F.3d 1203, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1995). As we there noted in reviewing the denial of a pre-sentence

withdrawal motion, "A defendant appealing the denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea, unlike

a defendant who has not first pled guilty, must do more than make a general denial in order to put

the Government to its proof; he must affirmatively advance an objectively reasonable argument that

he is innocent...." Id.

Second, and more important, the district court adequately fulfilled its duty under rule 11(d).

The court expressly asked Farley if he understood that he had a right to a jury trial and that he waived

that right by pleading guilty. Farley answered in the affirmative. And the court expressly asked

Farley whether "anyone" had threatened him or whether "anyone else" had forced him "in any way"

to plead guilty. Joint Appendix (J.A.) § A, 13. Farley answered in the negative. Farley thus

acknowledged that his plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. See United States v. Clements,

992 F.2d 417, 418-20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 316 (1993); United States v. Morrow, 914

F.2d 608, 613-14 (4th Cir. 1990). "[T]he representations of the defendant [at a plea hearing] as well

as anyfindingsmade bythe judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent

collateral proceeding" and the defendant's "declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of

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5We have no doubt that the wired element of Farley's plea agreement was a material one. The

Supreme Court has observed that "a prosecutor's offer during plea bargaining of adverse or

lenient treatment for some person other than the accused ... might pose a greater danger of

inducing a false guilty plea by skewing the assessment of the risks a defendant must consider." 

Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 n.8 (1978) (dictum). In the case of a wired plea,

"[q]uite possibly, one defendant will be happier with the package deal than his codefendant(s); 

looking out for his own best interests, the lucky one may try to force his codefendant(s) into

going along with the deal." Caro, 997 F.2d at 659. Because a wired plea presents a greater risk

of coercion than an independent plea, the district court should be informed during the rule 11

proceeding so that it can assess fully the voluntariness of the plea. Daniels, 821 F.2d at 78-80

(rule 11(e)(2) requires government to disclose wired nature); Caro, 997 F.2d at 659-60 (same); 

Clements, 992 F.2d at 420 (wired nature "should be stated to the court"). 

verity." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977); see Key v. United States, 806 F.2d 133,

136 (7th Cir. 1986). Significantly, our review of the rule 11 transcript shows that Farley expressed

no reluctance when questioned by the court. Cf. United States v. Daniels, 821 F.2d 76, 79-80 (1st

Cir. 1987). But see United States v. Caro, 997 F.2d 657, 660 (9th Cir. 1993) (because circuit

precedent required district court to make more careful voluntarinessinquirywhen dealing with wired

plea, failure to disclose wired nature necessitated remand for hearing on whether codefendants

coerced appellant to plead guilty).

In concluding that the failure to disclose, and to inquire about, the wired aspect of Farley's

plea constituted at most harmless error, we necessarily reject Farley's proposed rule that the district

court must undertake a special voluntariness inquiry when faced with a wired plea. For one thing,

we fail to see what Farley would have gained from a more extensive inquiry. The district court asked

Farley whether "anyone" had threatened him or whether "anyone else" had forced him "in any way"

to plead guilty. Farley had the opportunity to express his concern or misunderstanding at that time.

Had he expressed reluctance and put the court on notice, a more searching inquiry would have been

warranted. See United States v. Abreo, 30 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 681

(1994).5

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel/Conflict of Interest

In his section 2255 motion Farley argued that his lawyer rendered ineffective assistance

regarding the taking of his guilty plea and his attempt to withdraw it. To prevail on his sixth

amendment claim Farley must demonstrate two things. First, he must show that his lawyer's

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6We note that there is nothing in the record other than Farley's assertions to substantiate his

claim that his lawyer gave such misadvice. To the contrary, the record casts a wide shadow of

doubt on Farley's allegation. Farley submitted an affidavit below in which he said, "I agreed to

plead guilty only because I understood that I would not be able to have a trial unless my

co-defendants also agreed to a trial." S.A. § C, 2. Nowhere in the affidavit did Farley say that his

lawyer told him either that he had to plead guilty or that he could not request a jury trial. The

only mention of what his lawyer advised was: "[H]e advised me that I should plead guilty to the

charges." Id. at 1 (emphasis added). That advice was not unreasonable, or uncommon, especially

in light of the charges Farley faced. Moreover, Farley explained at the rule 32(d) hearing: "[M]y

understanding given to me by attorney [sic], was we couldn'tcouldn't none of us do anything

without the other ones...." J.A. § C, 16-17 (emphasis added). That advice was in fact correct as

to a plea of guilty; all three codefendants had to accept the plea arrangement or else none could. 

But whether Farley's lawyer further advised that Farley could not go to trial if one of the Loves

pleaded guilty is another matter altogether. Understandably the district court was not convinced

that an evidentiary hearing on the issue was warranted eighteen months after Farley entered his

plea. As the district court found at the rule 32(d) hearing, Farley simply had a change of heart. 

Having had an opportunity to observe and interrogate Farley at the rule 11 and rule 32(d)

hearings, the district court credited neither Farley's alleged misunderstanding of the wired plea

arrangement nor his belated assertion of innocence.

Moreover, there is an inconsistency in logic in Farley's assertion that he thought he could

not go to trial unless his codefendants also agreed to plead not guilty. If he understood that

everyone had to plead guilty or else no one could, and he does not appear to have misunderstood

that, then any one of the defendants, by refusing to plead guilty, would have mandated trials for

all three as Farley himself could have ensured by not agreeing to the wired plea. In short the only

decision requiring the defendants' unanimity was the decision to plead guilty. We can appreciate

that the district court was unmoved when Farley alleged at the rule 32(d) hearing that he thought

he had no choice but to plead guilty. First, Farleyno stranger to the criminal justice system, see

infrahad acknowledged at the rule 11 hearing that he understood both that he had the right to a

jury trial and that he waived that right by pleading guilty. Moreover, his original rule 32(d)

motion claimed simply that he "only entered his plea of guilty because he was fearful that the

co-defendants would testify against him." J.A. § B, 2. 

performance was deficient, i.e., that his lawyer's "representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Second, he must show

that his defense was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Id. at 687. To show prejudice when

challenging a guilty plea on the ground of ineffective assistance, "the defendant must show that there

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would

have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). We conclude that Farley

cannot satisfy the Strickland-Hill standard.

A.

Farley first claims his lawyer misadvised him that he had to plead guilty if his codefendants

pleaded guilty or at least failed to make sure that Farleydid not have that misunderstanding.6 Second,

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he complains hislawyer failed to disclose to the court at the rule 11 hearing that the pleas were wired.

In short, he claims that as a result of his lawyer's deficiencies he entered his plea with the

misunderstanding that he had no right to a jury trial. We disagree.

If indeed Farley had such a misunderstanding it should have evaporated during the rule 11

colloquy. Again, Farley expressly acknowledged at the rule 11 hearing that he understood he had a

right to a jury trial and that he waived that right by pleading guilty. See supra Part IIB. More to the

point, having reviewed the record, we cannot conclude there is a reasonable probability that Farley

would have insisted on going to trial but for the alleged misunderstanding and failure to disclose.

Farley pleaded guilty to one count of distribution of fewer than five grams of crack. He faced a

conspiracy charge (and thus the possibility of an increased sentence based on any coconspirator's

drugs) as well as multiple counts charging distribution of crack within 1,000 feet of a school. Farley

was informed before his plea that one coconspirator, Tammy Brown, had already agreed as part of

her plea agreement to testify against him. And the government evidently had audio tapes of the drug

transactions charged in the indictment; the government represented below that Farley, the Loves and

their lawyerslistened to the tapes while they discussed the plea arrangement. Even if we were to look

just at the charge to which he pleaded guilty, it appears the government had a relatively

straightforward and compelling case: An informant bought drugs from Farley in the presence of

codefendant Brown and the government was prepared to call both the informant andBrown to testify

at Farley'strial. Moreover, the district court was troubled by Farley's criminal history which included

multiple drug convictions. Farley faced a stiff sentence under the guidelines had he been convicted,

not to mention a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Finally,

Farley has not proffered even a hint of any defense, much less a suggestion that he could have

succeeded had he gone to trial. See United States v. Horne, 987 F.2d 833, 836 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 114 S. Ct. 153 (1993); see also United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 58 (D.C. Cir.),

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 942 (1990). 

To sum up, Farley's mere allegation that he would have pleaded not guilty and gone to trial

had his lawyer adequately informed him is not sufficient to overcome the prejudice prong of Hill v.

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Lockhart. Horne, 987 F.2d at 836. Because Farley has not established a reasonable probability that

he would have insisted on going to trial, we reject his ineffective assistance claim.

B.

Farley attempts to repackage the ineffective assistance claim into an "actual conflict of

interest" claim. The argument here is that Farley's lawyer had to hold back in the initial rule 32(d)

motion for fear of revealing that he (the lawyer) engaged in "malpractice" by allegedly misadvising

Farley that he could not go to trial if his codefendants did not want to and by failing to disclose at the

rule 11 hearing that the pleas were wired. If Farley could show that an actual conflict of interest

adversely affected hislawyer's performance, prejudice would be presumed. See Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 692; Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-50 (1980). But there are problems with his argument.

First, Farley never raised a conflict of interest claim below. While his section 2255 motion

asserted that his lawyer rendered ineffective assistance by "filing a perfunctory [rule 32(d)] motion,

which cited unidentified "ethical' considerations that prevented more vigorous advocacy on

Defendant's behalf," J.A. § D, ¶ 5(d), we have no doubt on this record that the ethical considerations

that troubled his lawyer went to the fact that Farley, after already having admitted his guilt to the

court and the probation officer and in the face of overwhelming evidence against him, decided to

change his mind and claim innocence. Farley's conflict of interest claim, with its talk of malpractice

and presumption of prejudice, is a far cry from his claim below about the caliber of the rule 32(d)

motion.

Second, Farley has notshown that hislawyershould have been concerned about a malpractice

claim had the lawyer drafted the rule 32(d) motion along the lines Farley now claims he should have.

Both the misadvice and nondisclosure claims are proxies for Farley's central contention that he did

not knowingly and voluntarily waive hisright to a jury trial. The lawyer, without impugning himself,

could have argued that Farley misunderstood what he had heard about the wired plea offer and

therefore did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial. Likewise the lawyer, who

did inform the court about the wired offer hours before the rule 11 hearing, could have raised an issue

about the government's failure to tell the court at the rule 11 hearing that the pleas were wired. In

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either case, Farley has not shown that a conflict of interest affected his lawyer's representation in

preparing and arguing the rule 32(d) motion. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349.

With Farley's conflict of interest claim out of the picture, we are left with a straightforward

Strickland challenge to hislawyer's performance on the rule 32(d) motion. Here Farley loses because

he cannot show there is a reasonable probability that a more thorough rule 32(d) motion would have

convinced the district court to set aside his plea. Even assuming that the lawyer held back in the rule

32(d) motion to protect himselfand there is nothing in the record to warrant that assumptionthe

misadvice and nondisclosure issues ultimately were brought to the court's attention (the former via

Farley's testimony at the rule 32(d) hearing, the latter via the motion to reconsider filed by Farley's

current lawyer) and the court did not think either of them sufficiently compelling to warrant setting

aside Farley's plea even under rule 32(d)'s pre-sentencing "fair and just" standard.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

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