Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_05-cv-06013/USCOURTS-arwd-6_05-cv-06013-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Derrick Hobson
Plaintiff
Captain Steed
Defendant

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

DERRICK HOBSON PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 05-6013

 

CAPTAIN STEED, GARLAND

COUNTY DETENTION CENTER DEFENDANT

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Derrick Hobson, a former inmate of the Garland County Detention Center, brings this pro

se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hobson contends his constitutional rights

were violated when he was not promptly released from incarceration after the dismissal of the

criminal charges against him.

On June 17, 2005, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 10). By order

entered on July 28, 2005 (Doc. 14), Hobson was directed to complete, sign, and return an

attached questionnaire that would serve as his response to the summary judgment motion. On

August 5, 2005, plaintiff's response to the court’s questionnaire (Doc. 16) was filed. The

summary judgment motion is currently before the undersigned for issuance of this report and

recommendation.

I. BACKGROUND

Captain Mel Steed is the supervisor in charge of the Garland County Detention Center

(GCDC). Deft’s Ex. 1 at ¶ 3. Steed maintains that Garland County has a policy in effect that

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requires all persons who are detained to be released immediately upon receipt of notification

from a judicial officer that the detention should be terminated. Id. at ¶ 4. 

Steed asserts that any person detained in the detention facility who can be released either

by direction of the court or by citation is released promptly. Deft’s Ex. 1 at ¶ 5. Steed indicates

it is the policy of Garland County to strictly comply with all orders of Circuit Judges and District

Judges in connection with the release of inmates. Id. at ¶ 6. In the event a Circuit Judge or a

District Judge orders that an inmate be released, he is to be released promptly. Id. Steed asserts

that upon receipt of a written order from a Circuit Judge or District Judge concerning the

disposition of charges, the Garland County policy requires the order to be noted on the booking

card and the inmate to be released promptly. Id. at ¶ 7.

On June 26, 2004, Hobson was arrested by the Hot Springs Police Department and

charged with theft by receiving over $2,500. Plaintiff’s Response (hereinafter Resp.) at ¶ 6. On

January 11, 2005, the Honorable Tom Smitherman entered an order remanding the charge of

unauthorized use of a vehicle to district court. Id. at ¶ 7(A).

According to Hobson, the unauthorized use of a vehicle charge was related to the theft

by receiving charge. Resp. at ¶ 7(B). Specifically, he states:

I bought a vehicle in which I was given a Bill of Sale. The police said the vehicle

was reported stolen and charged me with theft over $2500. After sitting in jail

7 months, Judge Smitherman saw I abided by the law in purchasing the vehicle.

he remanded the case to District Court as Unauthorized Use. I continued to plead

my innocence and was ultimatly (sic) found so. Long overdue, you can see why

I wanted my freedom returned to me promptly. 

Id. 

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On January 14, 2005, the prosecuting attorney’s office filed with the District Court of

Garland County, Arkansas, a motion to nolle prosequi. Resp. at ¶ 8. On January 14, 2005, an

order was entered by the District Judge granting the motion to nolle pros the unauthorized use

of a vehicle charge. Id. at ¶ 9. 

The order dismissing the charge directed the clerk to provide a copy of the order of

dismissal to the Sheriff of Garland County. Resp. at ¶ 10. At approximately 11:40 a.m. on

January 14, 2005, the order was faxed from the Garland County District Court to the GCDC. Id.

at ¶ 11.

Although Captain Steed asserts by affidavit that this order was never brought to his

attention, deft’s ex. 1 at ¶ 15, Hobson disagrees asserting he personally notified Steed, resp. at

¶ 12. Hobson maintains he also brought it to Steed’s attention through contact with subordinate

officers and grievances. Id. 

According to Hobson, he received a copy that same day. Resp. at ¶ 8. He indicates he

finds it difficult to believe he received it before the supervisor would be notified. Id. Hobson

states he made several copies of the order and showed officers and sent it twice to Steed. Id. at

¶ 10. 

After not being released, Hobson states that when he was called to the nurse’s office, he

passed Steed’s office and notified him that the criminal charge had been dismissed. Resp. at ¶

13 & 19. Hobson indicates Steed promised to get back to Hobson. Id. at ¶ 13. Since he knew

Steed did not work the weekends and it was only an hour or so until shift change, Hobson states

he became more persistent. Id. 

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Hobson maintains that he was told by Deputy Grinness, per Steed, to not send any more

grievances and if Hobson caused any problems he would be locked down. Resp. at ¶ 10 & ¶ 13.

However, Hobson asserts he continued to write grievances, following the rules in the handbook,

and through his persistence was eventually released. Id. at ¶ 10 & ¶ 14. Hobson also states

Deputy Dodge assisted in getting him released by taking Hobson’s papers to the sargent at the

time. Id. at ¶ 15.

Hobson’s booking card reflects he was scheduled for court on January 20, 2005, at 9:00

a.m. to be arraigned on the municipal charge of unauthorized use of a vehicle. Resp. at ¶ 18. 

Hobson notes that the order was not recorded on his booking card and Steed never got back to

Hobson even after being told of the dismissal of the criminal charges. Id. at ¶ 5. Hobson

remained in custody until January 17, 2005. Id. at ¶ 20. 

On paper, Hobson agrees Garland County has no policy of detaining individuals after an

order has been entered dismissing their criminal charges; However, he contends Steed and his

subordinates “exercised a practice of continuing to detain” him. Id. at ¶ 22. Hobson maintains

if the Garland County policy called for him to be released promptly upon receipt of the order of

nolle prosequi, he should have been released on January 14, 2005, the day the order was

received. Resp. at ¶ 21. He maintains if the policy is as stated by Steed it is not effective. Id.

at ¶ 2 & ¶ 21. As this happened to him without anyone being disciplined, Hobson questions what

is to stop it from happening again. Id. at ¶ 21. 

Hobson believes Steed deliberately failed to release him. Resp. at ¶ 16. See also Resp.

at ¶ 23. Hobson asserts that soon after he filed his first case Hobson v. Steed, civil no. 04-6148,

filed November 15, 2004, he had problems receiving mail on time, getting a copy of his file, and

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getting anything accomplished at Garland County. Id. at ¶ 16. Hobson states he always wrote

grievances to Steed. Id. Hobson indicates he verbally expressed his problems whenever he came

in contact with Steed. Id. Hobson indicates Steed would reply: “I am the head of this facility.

I know what I am doing.” Id. If this is true, Hobson states Steed also knew what he was doing

when he detained Hobson against his rights. Id. 

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986), the record "show[s] that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Once a party moving for summary

judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the non-moving party to set forth

specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists."

National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999).

The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "They must show there is sufficient

evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor." National Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)).

"A case founded on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary

judgment." Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). 

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III. DISCUSSION

Defendant maintains he is entitled to summary judgment. He contends the continued

detention of Hobson until the Monday following the Friday dismissal of the criminal charge

against him was regrettable but the result of negligence or inattentiveness. Defendant states he

regrets the event occurred; However, he asserts the continued detention was not the result of any

policy, practice, or custom of Garland County. Had the policy been complied with, defendant

maintains Hobson would have been promptly released. While someone made a mistake,

defendant maintains it was not him nor was the mistake made pursuant to a custom or policy of

the county.

"To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [a plaintiff] must show [1] a deprivation

[under color of law] of [2] a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or the laws

of the United States." Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir.1999). "[A] public

official is liable under § 1983 only 'if he causes the plaintiff to be subjected to deprivation of his

constitutional rights.'" Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 61 L. Ed. 2d 433

(1979)(citation omitted).

The undisputed facts show that the charges against Hobson were dismissed on January

14, 2005, and the order of dismissal was faxed to the GCDC at 11:40 a.m. that day. It is also

undisputed that Hobson was not released until January 17, 2005. 

The question here is whether Hobson’s continued detention after the criminal charges

against him were dismissed violated his constitutional rights. Baker, 443 U. S. at 142. “Claims

alleging the excessive detention of one who has established the right to be released are typically

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analyzed under the Due Process Clause.” Golberg v. Hennepin County, 417 F.3d 808, (8th Cir.

2005).

In Golberg, the Eighth Circuit said its prior opinions dealing with the “plaintiff’s liberty

interest in a timely release . . . suggest[ed] that the right to release from initially lawful detention

is based upon the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, rather than the

[reasonableness standard of the] Fourth Amendment. But whatever the federal constitutional

right or rights at issue[,]” the Eighth Circuit stated it cases stood for the proposition that the

plaintiff “must show [the defendant] was deliberately indifferent to that right to avoid summary

judgment dismissing [his] § 1983 claim.” Golberg, 417 F.3d at 811. If the right at issue was

substantive due process, a question the Golberg court felt unnecessary to resolve on the case

before it, the court noted the plaintiff “must also satisfy the demanding ‘shocks-the-conscience’

standard for substantive due process liability.” Golberg, 417 F.3d at 811 at n. 3. 

In Golberg, the plaintiff, Alexandra Golberg, appeared before a Minnesota state court

judge in response to a felony fraud complaint. Golberg, 417 F.3d at 810. The criminal

proceeding was continued but the judge ordered her to be booked into the Hennepin County

Adult Detention Center before her release. Id. When she was being booked, it was discovered

she had two outstanding warrants that required her to post bail before release. Id. Golberg

remained in custody at the detention center for thirty-two hours. Id. Ten hours of this time

occurred after her father had posted the required bail. Id.

Golberg sued Hennepin County and Sheriff Patrick McGowan. Golberg, 417 F.3d at 810.

The district court granted summary judgment in the defendants’ favor. Id. The Eighth Circuit

affirmed. Id. In affirming, the court noted Sheriff McGowan and his staff did not fail to

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implement a court-ordered release. Id. at 811. It noted she had failed to establish who at the

sheriff’s office was responsible for permitting her to arrange for bail, who received the bail,

determined its adequacy, or released her. Id. The court stated she had failed to allege any

member of the detention center staff “was deliberately indifferent to her right to be released after

posting bail.” Id. at 812. The court stated that Sheriff McGowan had no personal involvement

in her booking and subsequent detention. Id. 

It concluded that the record established that the “County’s failure to process Golberg 

more promptly was mere negligence and therefore cannot satisfy the standard of criminal

recklessness needed to prove that Sheriff McGowan (or any other [detention center] employee)

was deliberately indifferent to Golberg’s constitutional rights.” Id. The court also stated her

claim failed because “she presented no evidence that the administrative procedures adopted by

the County violated federal law on their face[,] or were intended to deprive detainees of their

constitutional rights[,]” or that County “action was taken with ‘deliberate indifference’ as to its

known or obvious consequences.” Id. (citation omitted). 

In Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703 (8th Cir. 2004), after partially serving a term of

imprisonment, Daryl Davis’ conviction was reversed and he acquired pre-trial detainee status.

Id. at 706. Davis was brought before a judge on April 22, 1999, and entered an Alford plea. Id.

The judge imposed a one year sentence with credit for time served. Id. As Davis had already

served approximately one and one-half years, and there were no warrants or holds on him, the

judge ordered him released immediately. Id. at 706-707. 

Despite the judge’s order, county officials took Davis back to jail to await transfer back

to the Missouri state correctional facility, Fulton. Davis, 375 F.3d at 707. Davis remained at the

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county jail for four days and then was transported back to Fulton. Fulton was not provided with

a copy of Davis’ judgment and sentence order although Davis personally had a copy. Id. at 707.

“Davis repeatedly protested his continued incarceration but was ignored, met by

indifference, or admonished for refusing to accept responsibility for his crime.” Davis, 375 F.3d

at 708. Davis was not released until fifty-seven days after he had been ordered released. Id. at

709. The court noted it had “recognized a protected liberty interest in being free from wrongful,

prolonged incarceration.” Davis, 375 F.3d at 712. 

The Eighth Circuit referred to its earlier case of Young v. City of Little Rock, 249 F.3d 730

(8th Cir. 2001). In Young, the plaintiff was arrested on a Saturday afternoon when a warrant

check showed she was wanted for failing to comply with the conditions of her probation. Young,

249 F.3d at 732. The plaintiff’s sister-in-law, however, was the individual who was wanted and

had used the plaintiff’s name as an alias. Id. 

It was not until the plaintiff was at the county jail that the arresting officer discovered the

mistake. Young, 249 F.3d at 732. When the arresting officer attempted to rectify the situation,

his superiors decided a judge would have to resolve the issue at a probable cause hearing on

Monday. Id. At the hearing, the judge ordered her released. Id. 

Instead of releasing her, county officials put her in a holding cell for thirty minutes and

then chained her to other prisoners, transported her back to the jail, strip searched her, and then

released her. Young, 249 F.3d at 732-33. The case went to a jury trial and the jury returned a

verdict in Young’s favor for two separate periods of incarceration. Id. at 733. The first period

of incarceration was the thirty minutes she was detained in a holding cell after the judge ordered

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her released. Id. The second period of incarceration was the time she was sent back to the jail

and strip searched. Id. 

The Eighth Circuit upheld the jury verdicts. In doing so, it stated: 

The liberty of the individual is at stake here. A citizen had been arrested,

erroneously as it turned out, and a court had ordered her released. The court’s

order had not been followed. Instead, a process of administrative foot-dragging

took place, characterized by gross indignities.

Young, 249 F.3d at 736. 

In Davis, the Eighth Circuit stated it had held in Young “that even a thirty-minute

detention after being ordered released could work a violation of a prisoner’s constitutional rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Davis, 375 F.3d at 713. It also noted that in Slone v.

Herman, 983 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1993), it had held that once:

Judge Ely's order suspending Slone's sentence became final and nonappealable,

the state lost its lawful authority to hold Slone. Therefore, any continued

detention unlawfully deprived Slone of his liberty, and a person's liberty is

protected from unlawful state deprivation by the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, contrary to defendants' misplaced assertions,

Slone's liberty interest was clearly established because it was based on a final and

nonappealable court order. Whether or not defendants agreed with the order or

thought that it was lawful does not diminish Slone's liberty interest or make his

liberty interest less clear. 

Id. at 110 (citations omitted).

In Davis, the defendants argued that the case was about whether or not they had a duty

to investigate Davis’ claim of wrongful incarceration. Davis, 375 F.3d at 714. The Eighth

Circuit held that even if they accepted the defendants’ position, that many circuits had recognized

the necessity of investigation under certain circumstances. Id. at 716. The court noted that the

Third Circuit in Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 686 (3d Cir. 1993), in the context of an Eighth

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amendment prolonged incarceration claim, stated that “‘[d]eliberate indifference has been

demonstrated . . . where prison officials were put on notice and then simply refused to investigate

a prisoner’s claim of sentence miscalculation.’” Davis, 375 F.3d at 716 (quoting Moore, 986

F.2d at 686). The Davis court continued by stating:

In any event, whatever haziness obscures the exact contours of a duty to

investigate burns off once the authorities know that they have no basis for

detention. Unlike his prisoner, the jailer has the means, the freedom, and the duty

to make necessary inquiries. While not a surety for the legal correctness of a

prisoner’s commitment, he is most certainly under an obligation, often statutory,

to carry out the functions of his office. Those functions include not only the duty

to protect a prisoner, but also the duty to effect his timely release.

Davis, 375 F.3d at 716. 

It also noted that Davis’ case was not that “he had a constitutionally protected interest in

the defendants’ investigation of his claim that he was entitled to release.” Davis, 375 F.3d at

717. Instead, his claim was that “his prolonged incarceration after being ordered released

violated his right to liberty, which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due

process of law. The defendants’ failure to investigate pertains not to the protected interest

alleged by Davis but to their state of mind.” Id.

The Eighth Circuit held that Davis would have to prove “the defendants were deliberately

indifferent to his plight in order to prevail on his Fourteenth Amendment claim.” Davis, 375

F.3d at 718. Proof would include “evidence of the duration of Davis’s wrongful incarceration

and the nature and frequency of his protests.” Id. Additionally, it noted Davis would attempt to

demonstrate that “instead of making any inquiries, the defendants either ignored Davis or

reprimanded him for his ‘criminal thinking.’” Id. at 719. See also Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764

(9th Cir. 2004)(Issues of fact as to whether implementation or application of county policy

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resulting in plaintiffs being detained for periods ranging from twenty-six to twenty-nine hours

after the court had authorized their release from jail was unreasonable under the circumstances

and amounted to deliberate indifference to the detainees’ constitutional rights).

In this case, we believe genuine issues of fact preclude entry of summary judgment in

favor of Steed. As noted above, the undisputed facts show that the order dismissing the criminal

charges against Hobson was faxed to the detention center on the morning of Friday, January 14,

2005. The undisputed facts also establish Hobson was not released until Monday, January 17,

2005. 

If these two facts were the only ones that supported Hobson’s claim against Steed, we

would have little difficulty in concluding there were no genuine issues of material fact as to

whether Steed acted with deliberate indifference. Negligence, whether gross negligence or not,

cannot form the basis of a claim under § 1983. 

Defendant offers the court his own affidavit in which he acknowledges the detention

facility received the order by fax shortly after it was signed on January 14th. Deft’s Ex. 1 at ¶ 13.

He then merely states the order was not brought to his attention and for some unknown reason

was never brought to the attention of the Sargent in charge; Nor, according to Steed, was it made

known to detention facility personnel that Hobson was to be released immediately. Id. at ¶ 14

& ¶ 15. Defendant offers no explanation of how faxes from the court are normally processed,

where the fax machine is located, whether the fax was reviewed the day received or not until the

following Monday, etc. Defendant also asserts that he had no contact with Hobson concerning

his continued detention following receipt of the order nol prossing the charges. Id. at ¶ 7 & ¶ 8.

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In contrast, Hobson has asserted, under penalty of perjury, the following: he repeatedly

brought the dismissal of the charges to the attention of jail personnel; he filed multiple

grievances; he personally informed Steed on Friday, January 14th, of the dismissal of the charges;

Steed promised to look into the dismissal of the charges; while the adopted policy regarding the

process of release orders may on its face appear constitutional, the policy was not applied or

implemented in a reasonable manner in his case; and that Hobson was threatened with lock-down

if he continued to file grievances or protest his incarceration. 

At the summary judgment stage, we “must view the facts and inferences in the light most

favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” Craighead v. Lee, 399 F.3d 954, 960 (8th

Cir. 2005). We believe Hobson has met his burden of identifying specific facts creating a triable

controversy. Crossley v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1113 (8th Cir. 2004). Whether

the conduct described by Hobson occurred and whether the conduct constitutes deliberate

indifference, constitute issues of fact.

 IV. CONCLUSION

I therefore recommend that defendant’s motion for summary judgment be denied.

The parties have ten days from receipt of the report and recommendation in which

to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

DATED this 6th day of October 2005.

/s/ Bobby E. Shepherd 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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