Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02926/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02926-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald Rogers
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 

C-404 United States Courthouse 

1929 Stout Street 

Denver Colorado 80294 

November 27, 1990 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: No. 88-2926; USA v. Rogers 

(Lower Docket: CR-88-81-A) 

Dear Clerk and Counsel: 

Attached is a copy of an order entered in the captioned case 

today, together with a copy of the court's correct opinion. 

Please substitute the enclosed opinion for the erroneous opinion 

which you previously received. 

RLH/tas 

Enclosure 

Appellate Case: 88-2926 Document: 01019733724 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 1 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

DONALD ROGERS a/k/a NEW YORK, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ORDER 

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Filed November 27, 1990 

No. 88-2926 

Before SEYMOUR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and KANE,* District 

Judge. 

*The Honorable John L: Kane, Jr., Senior Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by 

designation. 

Before releasing its opinion in the captioned case for 

filing, the court amended footnote 7 at page 5 of the opinion. 

Nevertheless, the clerk mistakenly filed and published a 

prel~inary draft instead of the court's final, correct opinion. 

-continuedAppellate Case: 88-2926 Document: 01019733724 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 2 
Page 2 of 2 

Case No. 88-2926 

Upon consideration whereof, the court orders as follows: 

1. The mandate in this case is recalled and the opinion 

filed March 26, 1990, is withdrawn. 

2. The court's correct opinion is filed this date, nunc 

pro tunc to March 26, 1990. 

3. The mandate, including the court's correct opinion, 

shall be reissued forthwith. 

Entered for the Court, 

Appellate Case: 88-2926 Document: 01019733724 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 3 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

M.4f:? 4 G 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Cler.~ 

v. No. 88-2926 

DONALD ROGERS a/k/a NEW YORK, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR 88-SlA) . 

D. Blair Watson, Assistant U.S. Attorney (Robert E. Mydans, u.s. 

Attorney, with him on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, I Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Joseph L. Wells, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Attorney for DefendantAppellant. 

Before SEYMOUR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and KANE,* District 

Judge. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Appellant, Donald Rogers, was found guilty by a jury and 

convicted of one count each of engaging in racketeering activities 

and conspiracy to participate in such activities in violation of 

* Hon. John L. Kane, Jr., Senior Judge, U.S. District Court for 

the District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-2926 Document: 01019733724 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 4 
18 u.s.c. §§ 1961, 1962(c) and (d), possession of heroin with 

intent to distribute, conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to 

distribute, and interstate travel to facilitate the conspiracy in 

violation of 21 u.s.c. § 84l{a)(l), 21 u.s.c. § 846, 18 u.s.c. 

§ 1952(a)(3), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The district court determined 

the sentencing guideline1 range for the most serious offenses to 

be 151 to 188 months, and sentenced Rogers to concurrent prison 

terms of 156 months for four of the counts and a concurrent term 

of 60 months on the remaining count, followed by five years' 

supervised released. 

On ·appeal, Rogers contends that his Fifth Amendment privilege 

against self-incrimination was violated when he was not given a 

Miranda 2 warning at the beginning of or during his presentence 

interview by a probation officer following trial. He also 

contends that his right to a speedy trial was violated, and that 

the district court abused its discretion when it denied Rogers' 

motion for severance. We affirm. 

I. 

ADMISSIONS DURING PRESENTENCE INTERVIEW 

Following Rogers' trial, the court ordered the U.S. Probation 

Office to prepare a presentence report, and briefly discussed that 

process in advance with Rogers' counsel, in Rogers' presence, 

after the jury was discharged. See R. Vol. XV at 1078. U.S. 

1 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 

§§ 1Bl.l-7Al.4 (Nov. 1989} [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. 

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2926 Document: 01019733724 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 5 
Probation Officer Donald T. Riggs prepared the report, and 

interviewed Rogers as a routine part of the process. During the 

interview Rogers admitted to trafficking in twenty-four ounces of 

heroin within the charged enterprise, rather than the five ounces 

specified in the indictment against him. R. Vol. XVI at 2, 10-12, 

17; R. Supp. Vol. II, Tab 520, Count 27. There is a dispute as to 

what quantity was proved at trial. According to Rogers, the only 

reason he admitted to the twenty-four ounces was his belief that 

the admission was required as part of his acceptance of 

responsibility in order to obtain the two-point reduction in his 

3 base offense level allowed by the U.S.S.G. § 3El.l. 

In his initial draft of the presentence report, Riggs 

attributed to Rogers the entire thirty kilograms of heroin 

possessed and distributed by the drug ring as a whole, and 

calculated· a base offense level based on that amount. When 

Rogers' counsel objected, see R. Vol. XVI at 2-4, Riggs revised 

the report and calculated the base offense level using the twenty3 That section provides: 

"{a} If the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition 

and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct, reduce the offense 

level by 2 levels. 

'-'(b) A defendant may be given consideration under this 

section without regard to whether his conviction is 

based upon a guilty plea or a finding of guilt by 

the court or jury or the practical certainty of 

conviction at trial. 

"(c) A defendant who enters a guilty plea is not 

entitled to a sentencing reduction under this 

section as a matter of right." 

u.s.s.G. § 3El.l. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2926 Document: 01019733724 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 6 
four ounces to which Rogers had admitted. 4 The quantity was 

multiplied by seven to reflect the number of times it could be 

"cut" for street distribution. 5 The probation officer's use of 

the twenty-four ounces to which Rogers admitted in his interview, 

instead of the five ounces mentioned at one part of the indictment 

potentially increased Rogers' sentence by four years, even after 

the two-point downward adjustment in the offense level which 

Rogers was allowed for accepting responsibility.6 The district 

court accepted the classifications recommended in the presentence 

report and imposed them for sentencing purposes. 

Rogers now contends that his Fifth Amendment privilege 

against self-incrimination was violated in this process, in two 

4 The mechanics of the sentencing guideline process in general, 

and in drug-related offenses in particular, are explained in 

United States v. Thomas, &84 F.2d 540, 541-42 {lOth Cir. 1989) and 

United States v. Shorteeth, 887 F.2d 253, 256-57 {lOth Cir. 1989). 

5 Although Rogers contested the "seven" multiplier at 

sentencing, and uses figures in his appellate brief which ignore 

the multiplier, Principal Brief of Defendant/Appellant at 13, he 

does not raise the matter as an issue on appeal. 

6 The respective base offense levels under the sentencing 

guidelines for 35 {5 ounces multiplied by 7) and 168 (24 ounces 

multiplied by 7) ounces of heroin are, respectively, 30 and 34. 

U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(c){5), (7}. The probation officer used the base 

offense level of 34. He then adjusted the level downward two 

levels to 32, pursuant to u.s.s.G. § 3El.l, to reflect Rogers' 

acceptance of responsibility for his criminal conduct. Rogers' 

criminal history placed him in category III. The sentencing range 

in that category for offense level 32 is 151 to 188 months. 

U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A, sentencing table. The district court 

accepted the adjusted offense level of 32 and criminal history 

category of III indicated in the presentence report for sentencing 

purposes, and imposed the sentence of 156 months with 5 years' 

supervised release. With the same two-point adjustment for 

acceptance of responsibility, to offense level 28, the sentencing 

range for the 5 ounces (multiplied by 7) specified in the charge 

against Rogers would be 97 to 121 months. Id. Theoretically, 

then, Rogers' admission may have increased his sentence by more 

than four years. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2926 Document: 01019733724 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 7 
ways: first, by a perceived requirement under § 3El.l that he 

further incriminate himself, or be "punished'' by not receiving the 

two-point reduction, and second, by the probation officer's 

failure to give him a Miranda warning regarding the consequences 

of any admissions. He states: 

11 For the sake of receiving a reduction of two 

levels, the Appellant incriminated himself from a base 

level of 24 to a base level of 32. Thus Appellant 

unwittingly placed himself in a 'damned-if-you-do ·and 

damned-if-you-don't' position . It is this dilemma which 

Appellan t contends has violated his Fifth Amendment 

privilege against self-incriminat ion. 

• • • Where the probation office extracts 

incriminating information without warning the defendant 

of the consequences, the confession should not be 

considered voluntary. The information obtained should 

not be used to enhance the defendant's sentence as was 

done her e . Appellant would submit that in the coercive 

setting of a probation department interview, a defendant 

is entitled to Miranda warn i ngs and the presence of 

counsel." 1 

7 The right to counsel urged by Rogers would be governed 

primarily by the Sixth Amendment; however, Rogers mounts no Sixth 

Amendment argument. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches 

at the initiation of formal proceedings, and continues through all 

critical stages of the proceedi ngs , including sentencing. See 

Patterson v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 2393-94 (1988); Michigan 

v . Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629-35 ( 1986); Moran v . Burbine, 475 

U.S. 412 , 428-32 (1986) ; Estel le v. Smith, 451 U.S . 454, 470 n.14 

(1981); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 481 -87 (1978); Mempa 

v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1967}. Three circuits have held 

that a defendant does not have a Sixth Amendment right to be 

represented by counsel at a presentence interview. See United 

States v. Jackson, 886 F.2d 838, 843-44 (7th Cir. 1989 );-srown v. 

Butler, 811 F.2d 938, 941 (5th Cir. 1987); Baumann v. United 

States, 692 F.2d 565, 577-78 (9th Cir. 1982). Essentially for the 

same reasons set forth in this opinion with respect to Rogers' 

Fifth Amendment arguments, we join those circuits and hold that a 

routine post-conviction presentence interview is not a "critical 

stage" of the proceedings at which a defendant has a Sixt h 

Amendment right to be represented by counsel. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2926 Document: 01019733724 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 8 
Principal Brief of Defendant/Appellant at 8, 11-12. 

Rogers' argument faces two hurdles at the outset. First, in 

the proceedings below Rogers did not specifically object on 

constitutional grounds to the use of his admissions, although he 

complained about unfairness. R. Vol. XVI, pp. 10-12. Thus, our 

review is limited to plain error, or the exercise of supervisory 

power. See Newman v. United States, 817 F.2d 635, 637 n.3 {lOth 

Cir. 1987); United States v. Cheama, 783 F.2d 165, 168 (lOth Cir. 

1986). 

Second, it is highly disputed whether Rogers admitted 

anything in his presentence interview which had not already been 

proved at trial. The district court specifically found, at the 

time of sentencing, that "the trial testimony would have permitted 

commencing with a base offense level of 34; and if Mr. Rogers was 

candid and open and helpful after trial, in my opinion he would 

:;ot have elevated himself from some lesser level to that. so I 

certainly agree, in this case I don't believe that there's been 

any adverse effect by virtue of the candor which resulted in 

deduction of two offense levels based upon acceptance of 

responsibility." R. Vol. XVI at 17. The district court's fact 

findings to the evidence must be accepted on appeal unless they 

are clearly erroneous. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d). 

However, in its brief on appeal, the government has not 

identified the evidence at trial which established that Rogers 

trafficked in twenty-four ounces of heroin, and our review of the 

record has failed to identify any direct evidence to that effect. 

There is, of course, substantial evidence with respect to the 

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Appellate Case: 88-2926 Document: 01019733724 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 9 
existence of a conspiracy, a large drug organization, and very 

substantial amounts of heroin in which the organization 

trafficked. But, at another point in the sentencing hearing the 

district court expressly rejected the government•s argument that 

Rogers should be held accountable for amounts of heroin 

distributed by the conspiracy as a whole, stating: 

"Now, there is, of course, a basis for your presentation 

to the Court, Mr. Wintery, but it•s largely a 

circumstantial basis. We know that Lisa was active, we 

know that she accompanied her husband, we know the 

relationship to Mrs. Robinson, but we really don't know 

precisely what was said among them or what Mr. Rogers 

observed, and so forth, and it just rests too much on 

inference for me to be willing to elevate the base 

offense level in a way that would have such consequences 

in the case so I'm just going to approach that 

conservatively." 

R. Vol. XVI at 8. Thus, although the evidence at trial can be 

construed to support the district court's finding, as an 

. alternative ground for our affirman~e of the sentence imposed by 

the district court we elect to address the merits of Rogers• 

constitutional argument. 

Certain facts form an important backdrop for our analysis. 

The record affirmatively shows that Rogers volunteered the 

information about trafficking in twenty-four ounces of heroin. R. 

Vol. XVI at 2, 10-12, 17. There is no contention in this case of 

overreaching by the probation officer. Rogers does not argue that 

the probation officer attempted to extract a confession of other 

criminal activity, or coerced, cajoled, or prodded Rogers, or 

otherwise impaired or fettered the exercise of Rogers' Fifth 

Amendment right to silence. Indeed, Officer Riggs' decision to 

revise his original draft by reducing the quantity of heroin to 

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Appellate Case: 88-2926 Document: 01019733724 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 10 
the amount admitted by Rogers suggests both an absence of purpose 

to find ways to increase Rogers' punishment, and a lack of 

interrogation along those lines. At most, Rogers ' · contention is 

that he had a subjective belief that the availability of a 

two-point downward adjustment in his offense level for acceptance 

of responsibility compelled him to admit to additional criminal 

activity. 

Rogers' counsel was not present at the presentence interview, 

but was not excluded. That is, he apparently could have been 

present if he had wished. There is no allegation that Rogers' 

counsel did not know that Rogers would be interviewed , and we must 

assume that the interview was expected , and its purpose, including 

the nature and structure of the repo rt being compiled, was known. 

See R. Vol . XV at 1078. Rogers' counsel displayed a good working 

knowledge of the entire process at the sentencing hearing, see R. 

Vol. XVI at 2-17, as well as prior thereto , in the presentation of 

his objections to the draft presentence report . 

The Fifth Amendment provides that 11 [nJo person . shall be 

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 

U.S. Canst. Amend. V. "A defendant does not lose this protect ion 

by reason of his conviction of a crime," Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 

U.S. 420 , 426 (1984), and "the availability of the privilege does 

not tur n upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is 

invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the 

exposure i t invites." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 49 {1967); see 

United States v . Jones, 640 F.2d 284, 287 {lOth Cir. 1981). Thus, 

the Supreme Court has held, for exampl e, that the protections of 

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Appellate Case: 88-2926 Document: 01019733724 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 11 
the Fifth Amendment apply to the penalty phase of a capital murder 

trial, even though the defendant has been convicted of the crime 

of murder. Estelle v. Smith, 451 u.s. 454, 462-63 (1981); see 

United States v. Jones, 640 F.2d at 287 ("There is no question but 

that the Fifth Amendment does offer protection in the sentencing 

process ... ). However, the general rule ls that 

11 [t]he Fifth Amendmen t privilege against compelled 

self incrimination is not self-executing. At least 

where the government has no substantial reason to 

believe that the requested disclosures are likely to be 

incriminating, the privilege may not be relied upon 

unless it is invoked in a timely fashion . .. 

Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 559 (1980} (emphasis 

added); see Garner v. United States, 424 u.s. 648, 653-656 (1976). 

The prophylactic Miranda "requirement of specific warnings creates 

a limited exception to the rule that the privilege must be 

claimed." Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. at 560 (emphasis 

added). But, "the exception does not apply outside the context of 

the inherentl y coercive custodial interrogations for which it was 

designed." Id. 

A. 

A routine post-conviction presentence interview by a 

probation offi cer does not constitute the type of inherently 

coercive situation and interrogation by the government for which 

the Miranda rule was designed. That is true even though the 

defendant is in custody and the consequence of an admission migh t 

be more severe punishment. A mul titude of reasons support this 

conclusion. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2926 Document: 01019733724 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 12 
The purpose of the presentence report, including associated 

interviews, is neither prosecutorial nor punitive. It is 

essentially neutral in those respects. The probation officer acts 

as an agen t of the court fo r the purpose of gathering and 

classifying information a nd informing the court in the exercise of 

its sentencing responsibility. 8 For this reason alone the Seventh 

Circuit has recently held that the Fifth Amendment is not 

implicated in a presentence interview. United States v. Jackson, 

886 F.2d 838, 842 n .4 (7th Cir. 1989) ("(W]e do not believe that a 

federal probation officer acts on behalf of the prosecution . The 

custodial statements made by Jackson, which arguabl y exposed h im 

to serious consequences, were not made to someone acting on behalf 

of the government prosecutors. Thus, the fifth amendment was no t 

implicated."); see United States v. Belgard, 694 F . Supp. 1488, 

1495-97 (D . Or. 1988) (discussing the probation officer's role and 

duties in the preparation of a presentence report both before and 

after the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984). 

A presentence interview does not constitute "an i nterrogation 

environment created for no purpose other than to subjuga te 

the individual to the will of his examiner." Miranda v. Arizona, 

8 18 U.S.C. § 3552 and Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Crimina l 

Procedure govern the preparation and use of presentence reports, 

in conjunction with U.S.S.G. §§ 6Al.l , p.s., and 6Al . 2 , p.s. The 

sentencing court may consider an extremely wide range of 

information pertaining to a convicted defendant, United States v. 

Beaulieu, No. 88-2586, §lip op . {Jan. 10, 1990), F.2d , 

(lOth Cir. 1990); 18 U. S . C. § 3661 (formerry- 18 u.s.c. ~77) , subject to certain constitutional constraints. See 

Roberts v. United States, 445 u.s. at 556; Un ited States v . 

Tucker , 404 u.s. 443, 446 -49 (1972); Unite d State s v. Strayer, 846 

F.2d 1262, 1267 (lOth Cir. 1988); United States v. Graves, 78 5 

F.2d 870, 872-76 (lOth Cir. 1986). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2926 Document: 01019733724 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 13 
384 u.s. 457. Nor does the interview present the "coercion 

inherent in custodial interrogation [which] derives in large 

measure from an interrogator's insinuations that the interrogation 

will continue until a confession is obtained." Minnesota v. 

Murphy, 465 U.S . at 433. There is no mystery about the contours 

of the presentence report process. The categories of information 

sought, and even the headings on the presentence report, are 

standardized, well documented , publicized, and accessible to 

defendants through their counsel or otherwise.9 

Since the presentence report process is familiar and 

predictable, and defendants, having just gone through a trial, are 

represented by counsel in most cases, it is a fair assumption that 

defendants will be advised by counsel prior to a presentence 

interview. Counsel will either know or can easily learn the date 

of the interview, and there is no rule which excludes counsel's 

presence at the interview. In this case, f o r example , virtually 

the first thing the court did after discharging the jury was to 

address Rogers and his counsel about the presentence repor t 

process. R. Vol. XV at 1078. It is not surprising, therefore, 

that no claim is made here of government action to circumvent 

counsel in order to gain some advantage. 

9 See 18 u.s.c. §§ 3552, 3553; Fed. R. Crim. P . 32{c ); see also 

Division of Probation, Administrative Office of the United States 

Courts, Presentence Investigation Reports Under the Sentencing 

Reform Act of 1984 64-69 (1987), reprinted in Federal Judicia l 

Center, Guideline Sentencing Orientation tab H ( 19 87). See 

generally United States v. Bel gard, 694 F. Supp. at 1502-16 

(several documents explaining the presentence report appended t o 

the court's opinion) . 

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The interview normally is voluntary. That is, as in this 

case, the defendant is usually not under court order to submit to 

an interview with the probation officer, and can refuse altogether 

to be interviewed. 10 Most of the information on the presentence 

report is gathered from other sources in any event. 

Furthermore, at that stage of the proceedings defendants are 

conversant with their Fifth Amendment rights. See Michigan v. 

Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974) ("at this point in our history 

virtually every schoolboy is familiar with the concepti if not the 

language, of the [Fifth Amendment]."). Most defendants receive 

Miranda warnings prior to being charged, knowledgeably exercise 

their right to remain silent at trial, and have requested and been 

allowed a jury instruction on the point, all of which is true in 

Rogers• case. SeeR. Vol. XIII at 719-39; R. Vol. XIV at 1061-63; 

Supp. R. Vol. II at Tab 520, Instruction 19. Rewarning the 

defendant at the beginning of a voluntary presentence interview 

might underscore the need for caution, perhaps even induce 

silence, see Moran v. Burbine, 475 u.s. 412, 427 (1986), but it 

does not serve the purpose of advising the defendant of a 

previously unknown right to "exert some control over the course of 

the interrogation." rd. at 426. "[W]e have never read the 

Constitution to require that the police supply a suspect with a 

flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in 

deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights." Id. at 422. 

10 18 u.s.c. § 3552(b) permits a court-ordered study of a 

defendant which may or may not require an interview. 18 u.s.c. 

§ 3552(c) specifically authorizes a court-ordered psychiatric or 

psychological examination of the defendant. 

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For part or all of the foregoing reasons two circuits have 

held that a defendant is not entitled to a Miranda warning at a 

post-conviction presentence interview. See United Stat es v. 

Jackson, 886 F.2d at 841-42 n.4; Baumann v . United States, 692 

F.2d 565 , 575-77 (9th Cir. 1982); see also United States v . 

Belgard , 694 F. Supp. at 1497. And, in a related context, three 

circuits have held that a post-conviction presentence interview 

does not constitute "a critical stage" of the proceedings at which 

a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to be r.epresented by 

counsel . See United States v. Jackson, 886 F . 2d at 843-44; Brown 

v. Butler, 811 F . 2d 938, . 941 (5th Cir. 1987) ; Baumann v. United 

States, 692 F . 2d at 577-78; cf . Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 u.s. 

475 , 489 (1978); Mempa v . Rhay , 389 U. S . 128, 134 (1967) . 

Rogers relies upon Estelle v . Smith, 451 U.S . 454 (1981); 

United States v~ Chitty, 760 F.2d 425 (2d Cir . ), cert. denied, 4~4 

u.s. 945 (1985); and Jones v. Cardwell, 686 F . 2d 754 (9th Cir. 

1982). Both Estelle v. Smith and United States v. Chitty involved 

information obtained by a psychiatrist in a court-ordered pretrial 

competency examination. In Estelle v. Smith that information was 

used by the government to carry its burden of proof at the penalty 

phase of a capital murder trial. The Supreme Court concluded that 

the failure to provide the defendant with Miranda warnings prior 

to the psychiatric examination, or to notify the defendant's 

counsel i n advance as to the scope of the interview and allow 

counsel to advise the defendant as to the "significant decision of 

whether to submit to the examination and to what end the 

psychiatrist ' s findings could be employed , 11 Estelle v. Smith, 451 

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U.S. at 471, violated Miranda as well as the defendant's Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 466-71. United States v. 

Chitty did not involve a capital punishment case, but the facts 

are otherwise very much like those in Estelle v. Smith. For the 

many reasons stated above, we regard those cases as 

distinguishable from a post-conviction presentence interview. The 

Supreme Court expressly cautioned in Estelle v. Smith that it did 

"not hold that the same Fifth Amendment concerns are necessarily 

presented by all types of interviews and examinations that might 

be ordered or relied upon to inform a sentencing determination." 

Id. at 469 n.l3 (emphasis added). In Jones v. Cardwell, a panel 

of the Ninth Circuit applied the Fifth Amendment to a presentence 

interview with a probation officer where the interview was ordered 

by the court and the interviewer intentionally sought a confession 

of additional criminal activity. The court stated: 

"He [the defendant] was instructed that he had no 

choice but to answer the questions put to him by the 

probation officer. Because the state was aggressive in 

extracting a confession from appellee without warning 

him of the consequences, we hold that appellee's 

confession, in the setting in which it occurred, was 

involuntary." 

Jones v. Cardwell, 686 F.2d at 757. 

The facts in Jones v. Cardwell are sufficiently different 

from the case before us to permit the case to be distinguished. 

Moreover, Jones was succeeded by the Ninth Circuit opinion in 

Baumann v. United States, supra, which directly supports our 

holding in this case. 

Finally, we note that the possibility of adverse consequences 

flowing from an admission to a probation officer is not in and of 

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Appellate Case: 88-2926 Document: 01019733724 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 17 
itself the test for triggering the application of Miranda. In 

Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984), a convict on probation 

was under court order to report to his probation officer and to 

answer all questions truthfully. The officer purposely asked 

questions intended to elicit a confession incriminating the 

individual for a rape and murder. The information extracted by 

the probation officer was used to charge and convict the 

defendant. No Miranda warning was required in that situation 

because the defendant was not in custody, id. at 429, but as a 

practical matter the situation was more coercive and the potential 

consequences were far graver than those presented by a routine 

presentence interview where there is custody but no interrogation 

seek ing to incriminate for another crime. For the many reasons 

stated, we hold that Miranda warnings are not requ~red prior to 

ioutine postconv~ction presentence interviews. 

B. 

Alternatively, Rogers argues that u.s.s.G. § 3El.l presents 

defendants with a constitutionally impermissible Hobson's choice 

which threatens an enhanced sentence (i.e., a denial of the twolevel reduction) unless the defendan t confesses to acts which 

could lead to an even greater sentence. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 

U.S. at 468 ("the privilege is fulfilled only when a criminal 

defendant is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent unless he 

chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and 

to suffer no penalty .•• for such silence'") (quoting Malloy v. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2926 Document: 01019733724 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 18 
Hogan, 378 u.s. 1, 8 (1964)) (emphasis added); United States· v. 

Garcia, 544 P.2d 681, 684-85 (3d Cir. 1976). 

The argument proceeds from a faulty premise. The burden of 

proof for establishing entitlement to a reduc tion of the offense 

level for acceptance of responsibility is on the defendant, who 

must establish the mitigating factor by a preponderance of the 

evidence. See United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234, 

1238-39 (4th Cir.)f cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 346 (1989); United 

States v. Ligon, 716 F. Supp. 1009, 1011 (W. D. Ky. 1989). 

However, qualification for the reduction may arise from a variety 

of 

11 

things. 11 In this case, following his conviction Rogers sought 

The application notes relating to § 3E.l.l provide: 

"1. In determining whether a defendant qualifies for 

this provision, appropriat e considera tions include, 

but are not limited to, the following: 

(a) voluntary termination or withdrawal 

criminal conduct or associations; 

from 

(b) voluntary payment of restitution prior to 

adjudication of guilt; 

(c) voluntary and truthful admission to 

authorities of involvement in the offense and 

related conduct; 

(d) voluntary surrender to authorities promptly 

after commission of the offense; 

(e) voluntary assistance 

recovery of the fruits 

of the offense; 

to authorities in the 

and instrumentalities 

(f) voluntary resignation from the office or 

position held during the commission of the 

offense; and 

(g) the timeliness of the defendan t 's conduct in 

manifesting the acceptance of responsibility . 

[footnote continued ... ] 

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a reduction by timely admitting his involvement in the conspiracy. 

Although we do not decide the question because it is not before 

us, t hat kind of admissi on and acceptance of responsibility (if 

otherwi se acceptable to the sentencing court which has discreti on 

on the point, see United States v. Smitherman, 889 F.2d 189, 192 

(8 t h Cir. 1989); U.S.S.G. § 3El.l, comment (n.S)), may satisfy t h e 

sentencing guidelines without going beyond the actual charge a nd 

proof at trial. In other words, Rogers was not necessarily 

required to disclose unproved, uncharged possession and 

distribution of heroin -in the amount stated in order to satisfy 

§ 3El. l . See generally United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 

455, 459 (lst Cir. 1989). 

Furthermore, the denial of a downward adj ustment und er 

§ 3El . l does not constitute a penalty or an enhancement of 

sentence. There is a difference between increasing t he severi ty 

of a sentence for failure to demonstrate remorse and refusing t o 

grant a reduction from the prescribed base offense level . "'It i s 

one t hing to extend leniency to a defendant who is willing t o 

cooperate with the government; it is quite another thing t o 

administer additional punishment to a defendant who by his sil ence 

[ • •• footnote continued) 

2. Conviction by trial does not preclude a defendant 

from consideration under this section. A defendant 

may manifest sincere contri tion even if he 

exercises his constitutional r i ght to a trial . 

This may occur, for example, where a defendant goes 

to tri a l to assert and preserve issues that do not 

relate to factual guilt (~, to make a 

constitutional challenge to a statute or a 

challenge to the applicability of a statute to his 

conduct) ... 

U.S.S . G. § 3El.l, comment (nn. 1, 2). 

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has committed no additional offense.'" United States v. Stratton, 

820 F.2d 562, 564 (2d Cir. 1987) ({quoting United States v. 

Bradford, 645 F.2d 115, 117 {2d Cir. 1981)) (quoting United States 

v. Ramos, 572 F .2d 360, 363 n.2 (2d Cir. 1978))); see also Damiano 

v. Gaughan, 770 F .2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Brown, 

761 F.2d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir. 1985); Mallette v. Scully, 752 F.2d 

26, 30 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Belgard, 694 F. Supp. at 

1497-98. 

In short, U.S.S.G. § 3El.l neither ''compelled" Rogers to 

incriminate himself nor, if he had chosen silence, would t he 

denial of a reduction under that section have constituted a 

penalty in violation of Rogers' Fifth Amendment rights. Thus, 

Rogers' Fifth Amendment rights were not violated by his unwarned 

interview with the probation officer simply because he sought a 

~eduction under § 3EL.1~ 

II. 

RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL 

The Speedy Trial Act, 18 u.s.c. §§ 3161-74, requires that the 

trial of a defendant shall commence within seventy days from the 

filing of the indictment, or from the date the defendant has 

appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such 

charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. Various enumerated 

periods of delay may be excluded from the seventy-day computation. 

18 u.s.c. § 316l(h) . 

In this case( among other exclusions, the district court 

excluded the period of time relating to the pendency of Rogers' 

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motion to dismiss on grounds that the Speedy Trial Act had been 

violated. With that exclusion, the seventy-day period was 

satisfied in Rogers' case. Without the exclusion seventy-seven 

days would have elapsed, and the Act would have been viol ated. 

Rogers contends that time attributed to motions to dismiss on 

speedy trial grounds may not be excluded from calculations of the 

seventy-day period. 

Section 316l(h) provides in part: 

"The following periods of delay shall be excluded 

in computing ·the time within which • • • the trial of 

any such offense must commence: 

(1) Any period of delay resulting from other 

proceedings concerning the defendant , including but 

not limited to--

(F) delay resulting from any 

motion, from the f iling of the motion 

the conclusion of the hearing on, 

prompt disposition of, such motion ." 

18 u.s.c. § 316l(h)(l)(F) (emphasis added). 

pretrial 

through 

or other 

Three circuits have considered this issue and have rejected 

the argument advanced by Rogers on this issue . See United States 

v. Brown, 736 F.2d 807, 809-10 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 

u.s. 1064 (1986); United States v. Tedesco, 726 F.2d 1216, 1221 

(7th Cir. 1984) ; United States v. Stafford , 697 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 

(11th Cir . 1983) . In Stafford, the Eleventh Circuit observed: 

"[W ]e need look no further than the explicit l anguage of 

Section 136l(h)(l)(F), which excludes the period during 

the pendency of 'any motion.' A motion to dismiss--

regardless of the grounds upon which it is based--is a 

motion like any other motion, and thus falls within the 

express exclusion of (F). 11 

Id . at 1372. See generally Henderson v . United States, 476 u.s. 

321 , 326 (1986) ("The plain terms of the statute appear to exclude 

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all time between the filing of and the hearing on a motion whether 

that hearing was prompt or not . "). 

We agree with the circuits which have spoken on this issue, 

and hold that the delay caused by filing a motion to dismiss for 

violating the Speedy Trial Ac t may be excluded pursuant to the 

terms of 18 U.S .C. § 316l(h)(l)(F) in computing the time within 

which the trial of any such offense must commence . Accordingly , 

the trial court did not err in hol ding that the Speedy Trial Ac t 

was not violated in Rogers' case. 

III. 

MOTION FOR SEVERANCE 

Rogers argues that he should not have been tried jointly with 

Patricia Wi lliams . He states that out of a total of fourteen 

coun~s charged ag~inst Williams and Rogers~ only three were 

rel ated, and the only temporal connection between the two . was a 

period of time in 1987. It was not alleged or even implied that 

t he two defendants knew each other or had ever met, only that they 

were involved in the same conspiracy and enterpr ise. Roge rs 

further argues that there were no fewer than five witnesses, who 

were on the witness stand for long periods of time, whose 

testimony had nothing to do with Rogers . And, he argues that, 

although the court gave cautionary instructions to the jury on no 

less than thirteen occasions ( including each time a n instruction 

was requested by counsel for Rogers) to the effect that spec ific 

items of evidence did not rel ate to Rogers, but only to Williams, 

"[i]t is alarming that a Rule 105 instruction wou l d have 

to be requested so often and granted. Further , that 

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even though the Rule had been granted, the bell had been 

rung and the eyes had seen. You cannot erase a memory 

just because someone tells you to." 

Principal Brief of Defendant/Appellant at 20. 

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 

"Two or more defendants may be charged in the same 

indictment or information if they are alleged to have 

participated in the same act or transaction or in the 

same series of acts or transactions constituting an 

offense or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in 

one or more counts together or separately and all of the 

defendants need not be charged in each count . 11 

Fed. R. Crim. P . 8(b). The test for a proper joinder is a common 

thread to each of the defendants. See United States v. McClain, 

823 F.2d 1457, 1467 (llth Cir. 1987). This l i nk between joined 

defendants may be established by common evidence as to various 

counts. See United States v. Lynch, 800 F.2d 765, 767 (8th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094 (1986); United States v. Erwin, 793 

F.2d 656, 665 t5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S . . 991 (1986). In 

conspiracy cases, the general rule is that persons indicted 

together shoul d be tried together. See United States v. Pack, 773 

F.2d 261, 266 (lOth Cir. 1985). And, in general, in reviewing the 

denial of a motion to sever "we strike a balance i n favor of joint 

trials." United States v. Manner, 887 F.2d 317 , 324 (D.C. Cir. 

1989) . 

The counts common to Williams and Rogers were central to this 

case: engaging in racketeering activities and conspiracy to engage 

in the enterprise , and conspiracy to distribute heroin. The 

evidence showed that both Williams and Rogers were wholesale 

distributors of heroin to the criminal enterprise, and that each 

traveled or caused others to travel from California to Oklahoma on 

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repeated occasions to distribute heroin. The evidence was strong 

as to both defendants, and sufficiently strong against Rogers to 

dispel any argument that he was convicted only because of a 

spillover effect from evidence relating to Williams. Severance is 

justified only in the most extreme cases. See United States v . 

Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 870-71 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied , 476 u.s. 

1184 (1986). This is not one of those cases. 

"The trial court's decision on the motion for severance wi ll 

not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of abuse of discretion." 

United States v. Pack, .773 F.2d at 266-67; accord United States v. 

Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 667 ( l Oth Cir. 1989); United States v. 

Lane, 883 F.2d 1484 , 1498 (lOth Cir. 1989). The district court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying Rogers' motions for 

severance. 

IV. 

CONCLUSION 

We have considered all of Rogers' arguments. For the reasons 

stated above, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. 

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