Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01679/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01679-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Roger E. Chavez
Petitioner
Ron Davis
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROGER E. CHAVEZ, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

RON DAVIS, 

Respondent. 

Case No. 16-cv-1679-TEH 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

Petitioner, Roger E. Chavez, proceeds with a pro se Petition 

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The original 

petition was dismissed with leave to amend and Petitioner has 

filed an amended petition. 

I 

In 1993 Petitioner was sentenced to 16 years to life in 

state prison for second degree murder. Parole was denied in 2010 

by the Board of Parole Hearings (“BPH”). 

II 

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment 

of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). It shall “award the writ or issue 

an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ 

should not be granted, unless it appears from the application 

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that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.” 

Id. § 2243. 

Petitioner argues that the imposition of a disproportionate 

term and the failure to set a specific parole release date 

violates his rights. 

In 2011, the United States Supreme Court overruled a line of 

Ninth Circuit precedent that had supported habeas review in 

California cases involving denials of parole by the BPH and/or 

the governor. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011). The 

Supreme Court held that federal habeas jurisdiction does not 

extend to review of the evidentiary basis for state parole 

decisions. Because habeas relief is not available for errors of 

state law, and because the Due Process Clause does not require 

correct application of California's “some evidence” standard for 

denial of parole, federal courts may not intervene in parole 

decisions as long as minimum procedural protections are provided. 

Id. at 220-21. Federal due process protection for such a statecreated liberty interest is “minimal,” the determination being 

whether “the minimum procedures adequate for due-process 

protection of that interest” have been met. The inquiry is 

limited to whether the prisoner was given the opportunity to be 

heard and received a statement of the reasons why parole was 

denied. Id. at 221; Miller v. Oregon Bd. of Parole and Post–

Prison Supervision, 642 F.3d 711, 716 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The 

Supreme Court held in Swarthout that in the context of parole 

eligibility decisions the due process right is procedural, and 

entitles a prisoner to nothing more than a fair hearing and a 

statement of reasons for a parole board's decision.”). This 

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procedural inquiry is “the beginning and the end of” a federal 

habeas court's analysis of whether due process has been violated 

when a state prisoner is denied parole. Swarthout at 220. The 

Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that after Swarthout, substantive 

challenges to parole decisions are not cognizable in habeas. 

Roberts v. Hartley, 640 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2011). 

To the extent Petitioner challenges the 2010 parole denial, 

this petition appears to be untimely. Petitioner has failed to 

address this issue in the amended petition. Regardless, he is 

not entitled to relief. Petitioner argues that the BPH erred 

with respect to state laws and procedures by failing to set a 

specific parole release date. 

Petitioner’s argument that the BPH violated state law and 

procedures only raises an issue of state law. As set forth in 

Swarthout the federal due process protections do not include 

adherence to California procedures. Challenges to the BPH’s 

enactment of state laws and procedures must be presented in state 

court. Petitioner states that he presented his claims in state 

court but his challenges were all denied. This Court cannot 

overrule state court decisions or find that California courts 

incorrectly interpreted state law. 

Regardless, Petitioner was sentenced to 16 years to life so 

there is a possibility that he will never be paroled. 

California's parole scheme contemplates that a prisoner sentenced 

to a term of years to life must be found suitable for parole 

before a parole date can be set. Criteria for determining 

whether a prisoner is suitable for parole are set forth in 

California Penal Code section 3041(b) and related implementing 

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regulations. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402. If, pursuant 

to the judgment of the panel, a prisoner will pose an 

unreasonable danger to society if released, he must be found 

unsuitable and denied a parole date. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 

2402(a). The BPH does not sentence petitioner; only the 

sentencing court can do that. The BPH cannot revise sentences; 

it can only act within California law to set parole dates, if 

prisoners sentenced to an indeterminate term are found suitable 

for parole at all. 

Petitioner also argues that the denial of parole violated 

the Eighth Amendment. As noted above, petitioner was sentenced 

to 16 years to life in prison for second degree murder. 

Petitioner has not identified any authority that such a sentence 

for second degree murder violates the Eighth Amendment. His 

sentence is consistent with state law and is not excessive or 

disproportionate under clearly established Supreme Court 

authority. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) 

(“'Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality 

between crime and sentence”'; “'[r]ather, it forbids only extreme 

sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime”'); 

see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95 (1991) 

(upholding sentence of life without the possibility of parole for 

possession of 672 grams of cocaine by first time offender); 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-77 (2003) (affirming 25 years 

to life sentence under Three Strikes law for petty theft of 

$153.54 worth of videotapes). These Supreme Court decisions 

indicate that the term petitioner has served to date for the 

crime of first degree murder is not so disproportionate as to 

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violate the Eighth Amendment or due process. 

III 

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown the 

petition is DISMISSED for the reasons set forth above. Because 

reasonable jurists would not find the result here debatable, a 

certificate of appealability (“COA”) is DENIED. See Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000) (standard for COA). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 6/8/2016 

________________________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge 

G:\PRO-SE\TEH\HC.16\Chavez1679.dis.docx

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