Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02706/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02706-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arturo Faro
Respondent
Gordon H. Gantz
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GORDON H. GANTZ,

 Petitioner,

 v.

 ARTURO FARO, Probation Department,

Respondent. /

No. C05-02706 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Petitioner Gordon H. Gantz’s (“Petitioner” or “Gantz”) Second

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

(Docket No. 1.) The Court ordered Respondent to show cause as to why the Petition should

not be granted on the basis of Petitioner’s cognizable claims. Respondent filed an answer

accompanied by a memorandum and exhibits contending that the Petition should be denied. 

Petitioner did not file a traverse. The matter is submitted. For the following reasons, the

Court DENIES the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 19, 2003, a jury convicted Petitioner of making a false bomb threat, in

violation of California Penal Code § 148.1(c). The state trial court sentenced Petitioner to

three years of probation.

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate

District, which affirmed the conviction in an unpublished, reasoned opinion filed April 6,

2005. On June 15, 2005, the California Supreme Court denied review. On July 1, 2005,

Petitioner filed the instant petition. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

I. The Underlying Offenses

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The facts underlying the charged offenses are set forth in the California Court of

Appeal’s opinion and are undisputed by both parties. (See Resp.’s Exh. 5.) 

Around midnight on November 13, 2002, Lawrence McCoy

experienced a disturbing encounter on the San Francisco Muni

Underground. McCoy boarded a trolley car at the Castro Street Station. 

There McCoy encountered defendant, who was “yelling and making . . .

threatening comments” directed at McCoy and other passengers. The

comments were anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic. Defendant spoke of “killing

the Pope, killing Jews, or killing Roman Catholics.” Defendant, described

by McCoy as “older,” seemed very drunk. “He was arguing with

everybody. He was standing up and pointing to people . . . just mumbling a

bunch of stuff that made no sense.”

McCoy became angry and followed defendant off the trolley at the

stop at Fifth and Market. He followed defendant to O’Farrell Street near

Cyril Magnin Street, where McCoy saw defendant make a call on a pay

phone. He heard defendant say into the phone, “Fuck you bitch, or

something like that.”

McCoy watched defendant hang up and walk “a half a block to a

hotel at 516 O’Farrell. McCoy followed him and argued with him, because

defendant had threatened him on Muni.

Meanwhile, other facts develop from another perspective. Around

12:30 a.m. on November 13, 2002, the night desk clerk at the Layne Hotel,

Dennis Reindel, received a phone call. The Layne Hotel is at 545 Jones

Street, right around the corner from the Shawmut Hotel at 516 O’Farrell. 

The caller told Reindel “that there is a bomb in the hotel and it’s going to go

off in 15 minutes.” The caller was male, with a “high-pitched voice, [that

of an] older gentleman, somewhat slurred, under the influence of

something.” Reindel became angry and yelled at the caller, who yelled

back, “Fuck you, you son of a bitch,” and hung up.

Reindel called the police. Officers Muselman and Michaud were

dispatched to the Layne Hotel. On the way they stopped at the Shawmut

Hotel, where they knew defendant lived. They saw defendant walking into

the Shawmut Hotel, and followed him in.

McCoy, who was still nearby after his argument with defendant,

came up to the Shawmut Hotel door and waved Michaud outside. 

Muselman stayed inside with defendant, who was “very loud, ranting

nonstop.” Outside, McCoy told Michaud about his experience with

defendant on the Muni trolley car. McCoy also identified defendant to

Michaud.

Muselman and Michaud took defendant to the Layne Hotel in their

patrol car. Muselman stayed with defendant in the car while Michaud went

inside and spoke to Reindel. Michaud told Reindel he was going to go back

to the patrol car and call Reindel on a cell phone, and see if Reindel could

recognize a voice.

Back in the car, Michaud called Reindel on a cell phone and held the

phone up to defendant, who was talking nonstop. Reindel listened to a

defendant’s voice and recognized it immediately. It was the same voice that

had made the bomb threat. Reindel testified, “It sounded exactly the same,

the same high pitch, slurred . . . I could just tell it was the same.” Michaud

testified defendant had a “unique voice.”

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People v. Gantz, No. A103072, 2005 WL 768762 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2005), at *1-2

(footnotes omitted).

II. The Trial

At trial, in addition to the evidence set forth above, the trial court admitted evidence

of a prior uncharged criminal act through the testimony of Pushpa Patel, whose family

owned and operated the Layne Hotel. The Court of Appeal summarized Mrs. Patel’s

testimony as the following.

[O]n November 24, 1999, she parked her car on Jones Street and was

walking uphill toward the Layne Hotel with her children. An older white

male called out to her. She identified the man as defendant. Ms. Patel

became concerned because of what the man said, grabbed her children, and

ran into the Layne Hotel. Later that day a man called the hotel. The man

told Ms. Patel he was going to throw a Molotov cocktail into the hotel. 

She recognized the voice as belonging to the man who called out to her on

the street — defendant. Defendant had made several calls to the hotel.

Gantz, 2005 WL 768762, at *3. The trial court admitted this evidence on the issues of

motive, identity and intent and instructed the jury accordingly. (Resp.’s Exh. 8 at 209.)

The trial court further provided the jury with CALCIC No. 3.30, Concurrence of

Act and General Criminal Intent, stating: 

In the crime of Penal Code section 148.1, subsection (c), making a false

bomb threat, there must exist the union or joint operation of act or conduct

and general criminal intent. General criminal intent does not require an

intent to violate the law. When a person intentionally does that which the

law declares to be an act or crime, he is acting with general criminal intent,

even though he may not know that his act or conduct was unlawful. 

(See Resp.’s Exh. 8 at 214.) The trial court then instructed the jury, pursuant to California

Penal Code § 148.1(c):

As to the false bomb report, any person who maliciously informs any

other person that a bomb or other explosive [has] been or will be placed or

secreted in any public or private place, knowing that the information is

false, is guilty of making a false bomb report. In order to prove such a

crime, each of the following elements must be proved: 

1. A person informed another person that a bomb or other explosive has

been or will be secreted in any public or private place.

2. The person made such a statement with malicious intent.

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3. The words malice and maliciously mean an intent to vex, annoy, or

injure another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act.

3. The person knew the information was false.

(See id. at 214-15.)

On February 19, 2003 the jury found Petitioner guilty of making a false bomb

threat, in violation of California Penal Code § 148.1(c).

LEGAL STANDARD

This Court will entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “[o]n behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(a). However, this Court may not grant a petition with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim

“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States[.]” Id. § 2254(d)(1).

 The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1) have

independent meaning. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). A state court’s

decision is contrary to federal law if it “failed to apply the correct controlling authority

from the Supreme Court.” Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting

Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1077 (2000); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at

405–07; LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 667–68 (9th Cir. 2000). If a state court

directly contravenes a Supreme Court decision on a question of law, or if it reaches a

conclusion that contradicts a Supreme Court decision with materially indistinguishable

facts, it is contrary to federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

A federal court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry in a habeas case

should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was

“objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. The “objectively unreasonable” standard does not

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equate to “clear error” because “[t]hese two standards . . . are not the same. The gloss of

clear error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear

error) with unreasonableness.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (citation

omitted). This standard of review, however, does not relieve a federal court from its duty

to examine and analyze the state court’s application of federal law.

In determining whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court looks to the

decision of the highest state court to address the merits of a petitioner’s claim in a

reasoned decision. LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 669 n. 7. If constitutional error is found, habeas

relief is warranted only if the error had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.’” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)).

ANALYSIS

I. Jury Instruction

Petitioner argues that he was deprived of due process because the trial court

instructed the jury on general intent under CALJIC No. 3.30. This, Petitioner contends,

permitted the jury to convict him of making a false bomb threat without finding beyond a

reasonable doubt that he had acted maliciously, as is required under Penal Code §

148.1(c). Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim.

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must

show that the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72; Cupp v.

Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973). The instruction may not be judged in artificial

isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial

record. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. In other words, the court must evaluate jury

instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire

trial process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) (citing Henderson v.

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 The Court of Appeal also held that the issue was waived because Petitioner failed to object to CALJIC No. 3.30

in the trial court.

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Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)).

While the Court of Appeal did not discuss Petitioner’s federal right to due process,

it did consider and reject Petitioner’s claim that the CALJIC No. 3.30 instruction, which

focused on general intent, undermined the requirement that the jury find that petitioner

acted maliciously.1

 Specifically, the Court of Appeal held that Petitioner’s claim was

unavailing because malice is a sub-set of general intent. Thus, the jury instructions did not

relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving malice and were not cause for jury

confusion. As the Court of Appeal stated:

We do agree with defendant that the prosecution had the burden of proving that

he made the bomb threat maliciously. (See People v. Cheaves (2003) 113

Cal.App.4th 445, 453.) But we do not agree that CALJIC No. 3.30, supra, in

any way relieved the People of this burden. The jury was specifically

instructed that it had to find malice to convict defendant. They did so,

properly, in the context of the general intent instruction — as malice is really a

subset of general intent. (See People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 84-86.) 

And defendant did not dispute the threat was made with malice — i.e., was not

a prank or joke. Defendant simply claimed he did not make the threat, and the

desk clerk’s voice identification was intrinsically suspect.

(See Resp.’s Exh. 5 at 5.) 

Here, to make out his due process claim, Petitioner again assumes that malice

requires elements of proof beyond that required for a general intent crime. However, a

state court’s interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the

challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus. Bradshaw v. Richey,

546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629 (1988). Here, as noted above,

the Court of Appeal concluded, based on California case law, that malice is a subset of

general intent in California. This holding is binding on the Court. (See Resp.’s Exh. 5 at

5.) Petitioner cannot, therefore, show that malice requires elements of proof beyond that

required for a general intent crime. 

Still, the Court reviews the record to determine if the prosecution was relieved of its

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burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt such that the

instruction infected the entire trial and violated Petitioner’s right to due process. See

Estelle, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). Here, the Court cannot so find. At trial the jury was

instructed that a defendant in a criminal action is presumed innocent until the contrary is

proven and was instructed twice on reasonable doubt. (See Resp.’s Exh. 8 at 211, 214.) 

The trial court also instructed the jury on the elements of the crime, which included the

requirement of malice and a definition of malice. There is no indication that the jury was

confused by the instructions or had any impression that the prosecution was relieved of its

burden of proving malice. Therefore, given the totality of the record in this matter and the

Court of Appeal’s conclusion that malice is a sub-set of general intent, the Court cannot

find that the jury instruction violated Petitioner’s due process rights. The Court of

Appeal’s analysis was not, therefore, contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

federal law.

II. Admission of Mrs. Patel’s Testimony

Petitioner next argues that the trial court erred in admitting Mrs. Patel’s testimony

of Petitioner’s prior bad act because it did not go to show identity, intent or motive and

was more prejudicial than probative. Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on

this claim.

The admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas review unless a specific

constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is of such magnitude that the result is a

denial of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Henry v. Kernan, 197

F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999); Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986). Failure to comply with state rules of evidence is neither a

necessary nor a sufficient basis for granting federal habeas relief on due process grounds. 

See Henry,197 F.3d at 1031; Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). 

While adherence to state evidentiary rules suggests that the trial was conducted in a

procedurally fair manner, it is certainly possible to have a fair trial even when state

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standards are violated; conversely, state procedural and evidentiary rules may countenance

processes that do not comport with fundamental fairness. See id. (citing Perry v. Rushen,

713 F.2d 1447, 1453 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984)). The due process

inquiry in federal habeas review is whether the admission of evidence was arbitrary or so

prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. See Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d

1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995); Colley, 784 F.2d at 990. Thus, only if there are no permissible

inferences that the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process. 

See Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. 

Here, the trial court admitted Mrs. Patel’s testimony under California Evidence

Code § 1101, which provides that “evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his or her

character . . . is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified

occasion.” Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(a). Section 1101, however, does not make

inadmissible:

evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when

relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident . . . )

other than his or her disposition to commit such an act.

Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(b). The trial court also gave a limiting instruction, stating that the

evidence was not to be considered to “prove that Defendant is a person of bad character, or

that he has a disposition to commit the crime,” but instead was to be considered only

insofar as it weighed on Defendant’s plan, intent, identity or motive. (See Resp.’s Exh. 8

at 209.) 

The admission of this evidence, especially in light of the limiting instruction, did

not violate Petitioner’s due process rights. See Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613 (9th

Cir. 1990) (holding that the admission of uncharged crimes does not violate due process

where the trial court gave limiting instruction to jury, jury was able to weigh witness’

credibility and evidence was relevant to defendant’s intent). The Court of Appeal

correctly explained why permissible inferences regarding Petitioner’s intent could be

drawn from Mrs. Patel’s testimony. On this issue the Court of Appeal noted:

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[t]he Molotov cocktail threat is sufficiently similar to the telephone bomb

threat. They were both made by an older man with a unique voice,

threatening a similar firebombing. Ms. Patel positively identified the voice

as belonging to defendant. The two threats were made to the same hotel,

over which defendant seemed fixated. His threat to firebomb the Layne

Hotel was certainly sufficiently similar to his telephonic threat that there

was a bomb in that same hotel. Only a few years earlier, the Molotov

cocktail threat was not too remote in time. And the probative value of the

evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial impact, within the meaning

of Evidence Code section 352.

Gantz, 2005 WL 768762, at *7. In addition, the jury was able to weigh Mrs. Patel’s

credibility. Furthermore, the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction as to the proper

purpose of this evidence. See Aguilar v. Alexander, 125 F.3d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 1997)

(holding that juries are presumed to follow the trial court’s limiting instructions with

respect to purposes for which evidence is admitted).

Because the jury could draw permissible inferences from Mrs. Patel’s testimony

regarding, at a minimum, Petitioner’s intent, the admission of such evidence did not

violate Petitioner’s right to due process. There is nothing in the record that indicates that

the admission was arbitrary or so prejudicial as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. 

Instead, the trial court considered the evidence and admitted it with an appropriate limiting

instruction. On this claim, therefore, the California Court of Appeal’s denial of

Petitioner’s claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of

Habeas Corpus. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 25, 2008 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GANTZ,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ARTURO FARO et al,

Defendant.

 /

Case Number: CV05-02706 JSW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S.

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on April 25, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing

said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office

delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Gordon H. Gantz

41 Sutter STreet # 1853

San Francisco, CA 94104-4905

Dated: April 25, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Jennifer Ottolini, Deputy Clerk

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