Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05147/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05147-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Howard Ray
Appellee
Darrell Ray Tucker
Appellant

Document Text:

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

AUG 141991 

DARRELL RAY TUCKER, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

HOWARD RAY, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-5147 

(N.D. Oklahoma) 

(D.C. No. 89-978) 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Darrell Ray Tucker appeals the dismissal, on grounds of abuse 

or successiveness, of his second petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus. In his first habeas proceeding, Mr. Tucker alleged that 

the State of Oklahoma violated the Double Jeopardy clause of the 

United States Constitution when it separately tried him for armed 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-5147 Document: 010110132073 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 1 
robbery and kidnapping when those crimes were tied to the same 

event, i.e., the armed robbery of a drug store in Tulsa, Oklahoma, 

on March 16, 1968. We addressed that contention in our opinion 

filed on August 25, 1989, Tucker v. Makowski, 883 F.2d 877 (10th 

Cir. 1989). This second habeas proceeding was filed by Mr. Tucker 

on December 7, 1989. In it he alleges that he was sentenced under 

the wrong statute and that a sentence under the correct statute 

would have been a maximum of 10 years, whereas he is now serving a 

sentence of 10 to 30 years. He bases his argument on Title 21 

o.s. § 52.2, as explained by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 

Appeals in Wilson v. State, 471 P.2d 468 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970). 

The Oklahoma state courts refused to entertain Mr. Tucker's 

present argument on grounds of procedural bar, holding that the 

issue should have been raised on direct appeal. The United States 

Magistrate Judge recommended that Mr. Tucker's habeas proceeding 

be dismissed on the ground that he had made no sufficient showing 

of an inability to bring the claim in his first petition, hence, 

the second petition was abusive. Mr. Tucker objected to the 

magistrate's report and recommendation. The district court, 

erroneously observing that no objection had been filed, adopted 

the report and recommendation, and dismissed. It is apparent that 

the court's decision, which required a de novo review, is 

unaffected by the presence or absence of an objection. 

Since imprisonment for up to 20 years longer than permitted 

by state law could raise fundamental miscarriage questions, we 

have reviewed the merits of Mr. Tucker's petition. They are 

without substance, however. 

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Appellate Case: 90-5147 Document: 010110132073 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 2 
Title 21 O.S. § 52.2 provides: 

S 52. Second offense after conviction of petit larceny 

or attempt to commit offense 

Every person who, having been convicted of petit 

larceny, or of an attempt to commit an offense which if 

perpetrated, would be punishable by imprisonment in the 

penitentiary, commits any crime after such conviction, 

is punishable as follows: 

2. If such subsequent offense is such that upon a 

first conviction the offender would be punishable by 

imprisonment in the penitentiary for any term less than 

for life, such person is punishable by imprisonment in 

such prison for the longest term prescribed upon a 

conviction for such first offense. 

(Emphasis added). In order to invoke this statute, Mr. Tucker 

describes his robbery conviction as "ATTEMPTED 2nd Degree 

Burglary." Opening Brief of Petitioner at 1, 11 2. Such a 

characterization is necessary, of course, since the statute in 

question speaks of petit larceny or "an attempt." However, Mr. 

Tucker was not convicted of attempted burglary or attempted 

robbery. Tucker has not included any documents relating to his 

armed robbery charge and conviction in the record on appeal. 

However, there are significant references on the subject. 

According to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Tucker was 

convicted of the completed offense of armed robbery. See Tucker 

v. State, 481 P.2d 167, 168 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971). Mr. Tucker 

acknowledges that fact in his brief in support of post-conviction 

relief in Oklahoma with respect to the issue ultimately raised in 

his first habeas proceeding. That document is attached to his 

first petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the district 

court on December 13, 1985, case no. 85-C-1098E. R. Vol. I, Tab 

1. 

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Appellate Case: 90-5147 Document: 010110132073 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 3 
In short, we have studied Mr. Tucker's argument and conclude 

that he has misconstrued both the statute and the case upon which 

he relies, and that the district court did not err in dismissing 

this second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, 

the order of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-5147 Document: 010110132073 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 4