Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-06-71385/USCOURTS-ca9-06-71385-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mario Jorge Blanco
Petitioner
Michael B. Mukasey
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIO JORGE BLANCO, 

Petitioner, No. 06-71385

v. Agency No. 

M A79-159-176 ICHAEL B. MUKASEY,* Attorney

General, OPINION

Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

October 18, 2007—Pasadena, California

Filed March 3, 2008

Before: Harry Pregerson, Michael Daly Hawkins and

Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Fisher;

Concurrence by Judge Pregerson

*Michael B. Mukasey is substituted for his predecessor, Alberto R.

Gonzales, as Attorney General of the United States, pursuant to Fed. R.

App. P. 43(c)(2). 

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COUNSEL

Michael J. Codner (argued) and Murray D. Hilts, Law Offices

of Murray Hilts, San Diego, California, for the petitioner. 

Anthony C. Payne (argued) and Alison R. Drucker, United

States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the

respondent.

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge: 

Mario Jorge Blanco petitions for review of a final order of

removal, arguing that the Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”) erred in holding that he is an inadmissible alien who

is not eligible for any discretionary relief. The BIA found

Blanco to be ineligible for adjustment of status because he

made a false claim to citizenship when he was detained at the

border, and ineligible for cancellation of removal because he

had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.

Because the BIA’s moral turpitude finding was flawed, we

grant Blanco’s petition as to cancellation of removal, but deny

his petition in all other respects. 

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Blanco is a native and citizen of Argentina who has been

living in the United States since 1978. In 2001, Blanco traveled to Mexico with his wife and a co-worker to deliver a

truckload of furniture. He was stopped by the Border Patrol

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when he applied for admission into the United States. He

presented a California driver’s license, social security card

and various membership cards to the Border Patrol agents, but

did not have immigration documents. The officer at the primary inspection point suspected that Blanco had made a false

claim to U.S. citizenship and referred him to secondary

inspection for further questioning, which led to his being

placed in detention. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)1

 thereafter instituted removal proceedings

against him. 

The INS charged Blanco with being inadmissible under 8

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) as an alien who was not in possession of valid entry documents, and under § 1182(a)(6)

(C)(ii) as an alien who made a false claim to U.S. citizenship

in order to gain entrance to the United States.2 Blanco contested these charges and also applied for various forms of

relief from removal proceedings, including cancellation of

removal available for certain long-time residents under

§ 1229b(b) and adjustment of status under § 1255(i). Blanco

conceded that he was inadmissible as an alien without a valid

visa, but argued that he had never falsely claimed U.S. citizenship at the border. Ruling against Blanco on both charges,

the immigration judge (“IJ”) found Blanco to be inadmissible.

The IJ denied Blanco’s request for adjustment of status

because under then-existing federal regulations, this relief was

unavailable to arriving aliens. The IJ further held that Blanco

was not eligible for consideration for cancellation of removal

because he had been convicted of two crimes involving moral

turpitude, as defined by § 1182(a)(2). Although ordinarily

1On March 1, 2003, the INS was dissolved as an independent agency

within the Department of Justice and its functions were transferred to the

Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub.

L. No. 107-296, § 471, 116 Stat. 2135, 2205. 

2Hereinafter, all statutory citations are to Title 8 of the U.S. Code unless

cited otherwise. 

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cancellation relief is barred if the alien has committed even

one such crime, one of Blanco’s convictions — in 1980, for

receipt of stolen property — was a misdemeanor violation,

which allowed Blanco to remain eligible for cancellation of

removal under the so-called petty offense exception. See

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii). However, because the IJ determined that

another of Blanco’s prior convictions — a 1986 misdemeanor

conviction for false identification to a peace officer under

California Penal Code § 148.9(a) — was also a crime involving moral turpitude, the IJ held that Blanco was not eligible

for the petty offense exception. The IJ ordered Blanco

removed to Argentina. 

Blanco timely appealed to the BIA. The BIA declined to

affirm the IJ’s adjustment of status ruling in light of our intervening decision in Bona v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 663 (9th Cir.

2005), which held that regulations barring arriving aliens

from applying for adjustment of status were invalid. It nevertheless denied Blanco’s adjustment of status application, holding that his false claim of United States citizenship at the

border barred such relief. See § 1255(a). The BIA affirmed

the IJ’s conclusion that Blanco was not eligible for cancellation of removal because he had been convicted of two crimes

involving moral turpitude. Lastly, the BIA denied Blanco’s

request for a remand based on ineffective assistance of his

prior counsel. Blanco filed a timely petition for review before

this court. 

ANALYSIS

We have jurisdiction to review the petition under

§ 1252(b). Because Blanco was not ordered removed as a

criminal alien under § 1182(a)(2), the jurisdictional bar of

§ 1252(a)(2)(C) does not apply. We review questions of law

de novo, including “whether a state statutory crime constitutes

a crime involving moral turpitude.” Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 2005). We review findings of fact by the IJ and BIA for substantial evidence. See

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INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 & n.1 (1992); see

also § 1252(b)(4)(B). Where, as here, the BIA “has reviewed

the IJ’s decision and incorporated portions of it as its own, we

treat the incorporated parts of the IJ’s decision as the BIA’s.”

Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2002).

I.

Blanco argues that the BIA erred in holding that he was not

eligible for cancellation of removal because his misdemeanor

conviction for false identification to a peace officer under

California Penal Code § 148.9(a) is not a crime involving

moral turpitude. We agree. 

[1] In determining whether a conviction qualifies as a crime

involving moral turpitude, we apply the categorical and modified categorical approaches set forth in Taylor v. United

States, 495 U.S. 575, 599-602 (1990).3See Cuevas-Gaspar v.

Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 2005). Under the categorical approach, a crime involves moral turpitude if the

generic elements of the crime show that it involves conduct

that “(1) is base, vile, or depraved and (2) violates accepted

moral standards.” Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063,

1068 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). The Supreme Court has held

that crimes that involve fraud categorically fall into the definition of crimes involving moral turpitude. See Jordan v. De

George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951) (“Without exception . . . a

crime in which fraud is an ingredient involves moral turpitude.”); see also Cerezo v. Mukasey, Nos. 05 74688 & 05-

75213, ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 115184 at *2 (9th Cir. Jan.

3Because the record here does not include any of the documents that

would allow us to conduct a modified categorical analysis, we employ

only the categorical approach. See United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072,

1086 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (noting that when conducting a modified

categorical analysis, the court’s review is “limited to examining the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of

plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge”) (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

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14, 2008); Carty v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir.

2005). 

[2] Whether Blanco was convicted of a crime of fraud

depends on the statutory definition of the crime. In 1986,

Blanco pled guilty to violating California Penal Code

§ 148.9(a), which provides: 

Any person who falsely represents or identifies himself or herself as another person or as a fictitious person to any peace officer . . . upon a lawful detention

or arrest of the person, either to evade the process of

the court, or to evade the proper identification of the

person by the investigating officer is guilty of a misdemeanor. 

[3] The California courts have explained that a violation of

California Penal Code § 148.9(a) occurs whenever any person

falsely identifies himself in a way that would mislead the officer and evade proper identification, including by giving a

false name or date of birth. See In re Ivan J., 88 Cal. App. 4th

27, 30-32 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). To convict a defendant under

the statute, the prosecutor does not need to show that the individual had specific intent to obtain a benefit or cause another

to be liable on his behalf; rather, the prosecutor “need only

establish general intent . . . that the defendant intended to do

the act which forms the basis of the crime, whether or not he

knew that the act was unlawful.” People v. Robertson, 223

Cal. App. 3d 1277, 1281-82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), rev’d on

other grounds by People v. Rathert, 6 P.3d 700, 704-05 (Cal.

2000). Thus a conviction under California Penal Code

§ 148.9(a) requires a showing that the individual knowingly

misrepresented his or her identity to a peace officer, but does

not require that the individual thereby knowingly attempted to

obtain anything of value. 

[4] A crime involves fraudulent conduct, and thus is a

crime involving moral turpitude, if intent to defraud is either

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“explicit in the statutory definition” of the crime or “implicit

in the nature” of the crime. Goldeshtein v. INS, 8 F.3d 645,

648 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Intent

to defraud is not explicitly required by California Penal Code

§ 148.9(a), which requires only the knowing provision of

false information. The element of knowing misrepresentation

does not itself make fraud an element of the crime, however,

because it shows only that “the forbidden act is done deliberately and with knowledge,” and not that the individual acts

with evil intent. See id. (quoting Hirsch v. INS, 308 F.2d 562,

567 (9th Cir. 1962)). Because intent to defraud is not a statutory element of the offense, we must determine whether intent

to defraud is part of the crime’s “essential nature.” Id. at 649.

[5] Our cases hold that intent to defraud is implicit in the

nature of the crime when the individual makes false statements in order to procure something of value, either monetary

or non-monetary. See id. (holding that fraud is not inherent

where crime “does not involve the use of false statements . . .

nor does the defendant obtain anything” of value); see also

Navarro-Lopez, 503 F.3d at 1076 (Reinhardt, J., concurring);

cf. Notash v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 693, 698 (9th Cir. 2005)

(holding fraud not inherent where statute “did not require an

intent to deprive the United States of revenue”). Fraud therefore does not equate with mere dishonesty, because fraud

requires an attempt to induce another to act to his or her detriment. See Black’s Law Dictionary 685 (8th ed. 2004). One

can act dishonestly without seeking to induce reliance. Our

cases have therefore recognized fraudulent intent only when

the individual employs false statements to obtain something

tangible. See, e.g., McNaughton v. INS, 612 F.2d 457, 459

(9th Cir. 1980) (securities); Winestock v. INS, 576 F.2d 234,

235 (9th Cir. 1978) (securities); Bisaillon v. Hogan, 257 F.2d

435, 437 (9th Cir. 1958) (a passport); see also Zaitona v. INS,

9 F.3d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 1993) (a driver’s license); United

States ex rel. Popoff v. Reimer, 79 F.2d 513, 515 (2d Cir.

1935) (naturalization papers); Matter of R-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 29,

38 (BIA 1952) (military deferment). 

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[6] When the only “benefit” the individual obtains is to

impede the enforcement of the law, the crime does not

involve moral turpitude. In Navarro-Lopez, we held that the

crime of misprision of a felony does not involve moral turpitude, even though a conviction for misprision of a felony

under California law requires “knowing interference with the

enforcement of the law with the specific intent to help a principal avoid arrest or trial.” 503 F.3d at 1070. The crime of

false identification to a peace officer under California law

also punishes the “wrongful interference with the administration of justice,” Robertson, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1282, but

notably does not require a showing of specific intent to avoid

arrest or trial. Id. at 1281-82. Although giving a false name or

date of birth to a police officer clearly “violates a duty owed

to society to obey the law and not to impede the investigation

of crimes,” this alone does not make the crime one that

involves moral turpitude, because “[i]f this were the sole

benchmark for a crime involving moral turpitude, every crime

would involve moral turpitude.” Navarro-Lopez, 503 F.3d at

1070-71.4

[7] We hold that because the crime of false identification

to a peace officer does not require fraudulent intent under California law, it is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude under § 1182(a)(2).5

 Accordingly, we remand to the

BIA to consider whether Blanco should be granted cancellation of removal. 

4But see Padilla v. Gonzales, 397 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding

that obstruction of justice is a crime involving moral turpitude); Itani v.

Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that misprision of a felony is a crime involving moral turpitude). Our circuit, however, has

adopted a different approach. See Navarro-Lopez, 503 F.3d at 1074 (misprision of a felony is not a crime involving moral turpitude); see also id.

at 1077-78 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (explaining that “[n]either [Padilla

nor Itani] is persuasive”). 

5Because we hold that Blanco’s crime is not a crime that involves moral

turpitude, we need not address Blanco’s alternative argument that the existence of his conviction was not properly established in evidence before the

IJ. 

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II.

Blanco argues that the BIA erred in holding that he was an

inadmissible alien who was not eligible to be considered for

adjustment of status, based on its finding that Blanco made a

false claim of United States citizenship when he was detained

at the U.S.-Mexico border in 2001. In removal proceedings,

the alien has the burden of establishing that he is “ ‘clearly

and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted and is not inadmissible.’ ” Pichardo v. INS, 216 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000)

(quoting § 1229a(c)(2)(A)). We hold that the BIA’s determination that Blanco made a false claim to citizenship was supported by substantial evidence and so we deny the petition as

to this claim. See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 & n.1. 

The INS charged Blanco with being an inadmissible alien

in part because it alleged he had made a false assertion of U.S.

citizenship when he was stopped by the Border Patrol when

attempting to re-enter the United States. See § 1182(a)(6)

(C)(ii). Blanco disputed that he ever told the Border Patrol

officer that he was a U.S. citizen, insisting that he told the

officer that he was born in Argentina, but “grew up in East

LA.” He also denied admitting to the secondary inspection

officer that he had made a false claim to citizenship. Although

he signed a sworn statement admitting that he had made the

false claim, he testified during his removal proceedings that

he signed it only because the officer told him that he could

“go home” if he signed it, which he thought meant he could

go home to the United States. 

During removal proceedings, the government produced the

sworn statement signed by Blanco. The statement showed that

in response to the question, “Did you declare yourself to be

a United States citizen,” Blanco answered, “Yes.” The government also produced two Border Patrol officers who had

spoken to Blanco during primary and secondary inspection, as

well as the immigration inspector who interviewed and took

Blanco’s sworn statement. The two officers had no indepenBLANCO v. MUKASEY 1885

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dent recollection of Blanco but testified that their contemporaneously created records, which indicated that Blanco had

falsely claimed citizenship, were reliable. The immigration

inspector also did not have an independent recollection of

Blanco, but described how he recorded oral statements during

interviews and obtained signed statements. He testified that he

never told individuals that they could “go home” if they

signed a statement. 

[8] Although Blanco’s account of the misunderstanding

between himself and the border guards — that he only said he

“grew up” in Los Angeles, not that he was “born” there — is

plausible, we hold that the IJ’s decision was supported by

substantial evidence. The record shows that Blanco had motivation to misrepresent himself as a citizen, because he had

previously left the United States without any immigration

documents, had been detained at reentry and warned not to

travel again without proper documentation. Most importantly,

however, Blanco’s own signed statement contradicted his testimony during removal proceedings. Blanco argues here that

his signed statement should not have been admitted into evidence because it was not “voluntary and knowing,” see Choy

v. Barber, 279 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1960) (holding that

“statements made by the alien and used to achieve his deportation must be voluntarily given”), but Blanco’s only support

for this due process argument is that he had to wait as long

as 26 hours between his initial detention and his interview and

that he was provided only bologna and cheese to eat.

Although the deprivation of food and sleep can affect the voluntariness of a confession, see Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433,

441-42 (1961), Blanco has not established that his “will was

overborne,” see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,

226 (1973).6

6Because we are denying the petition as to Blanco’s adjustment of status

claim, we do not address the impact of regulations promulgated by the

Attorney General in May 2006, which transferred authority over adjustment of status applications for arriving aliens from the IJ to the Department of Homeland Security. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1245.2(a)(1) & 245.2(a)(1)

(2006). 

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III.

Blanco lastly argues that the BIA erred when it denied his

request for a remand based on ineffective assistance of his

prior counsel during his removal proceedings. We hold that

Blanco has not shown that his counsel’s performance violated

due process and so we deny the petition as to this claim. See

Ortiz v. INS, 179 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Blanco asserts that his counsel was ineffective because she

failed to move to reopen the record on the day of the IJ’s oral

decision, thereby preventing Blanco’s witness and co-worker,

Eric Jackson, from testifying in his behalf. Jackson, was traveling with Blanco when he attempted to re-enter the United

States at the U.S.-Mexico border and presumably could have

supported his testimony that he did not falsely claim U.S. citizenship. Blanco’s counsel testified that she was not aware of

Jackson’s presence on the final day of the hearing until after

the IJ finished his oral ruling. Blanco and Jackson admitted

that Jackson showed up to testify only after the close of evidence, and after failing to show at two previous merits hearings, but insisted that Blanco’s counsel knew of Jackson’s

presence before the IJ began to deliver his oral ruling. The

BIA held that Blanco’s “former counsel’s actions involving

her failure to present a witness after the evidentiary record has

been closed . . . particularly when the witness at issue failed

to appear at 2 prior hearings where the record remained

open,” did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. 

[9] Individuals in immigration proceedings do not have

Sixth Amendment rights, so ineffective assistance of counsel

claims are analyzed under the Fifth Amendment’s due process

clause. Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir.

2004), amended by 404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2005). Ineffective

assistance of counsel in a removal proceeding is a denial of

due process if the proceeding “was so fundamentally unfair

that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his

case.” Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir.

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2005) (quoting Lopez v. INS, 775 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir.

1985)). Blanco must also show that he was prejudiced by his

counsel’s ineffective performance. See id.; see also Grigoryan

v. Mukasey, No. 05-77020, ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 307455,

at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 5, 2008) (per curiam). 

[10] We conclude that the BIA did not err, because Blanco

has not shown that his counsel’s performance denied him the

“right to a full and fair hearing.” Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d

1014, 1027 (9th Cir. 2004). The record as a whole shows that

Blanco’s counsel diligently examined and cross-examined

witnesses, argued points of law before the IJ and informed

Blanco of his right to appeal. Further, counsel’s performance,

even if ineffective, was not “so inadequate that it may have

affected the outcome of proceedings.” Iturribarria v. INS, 321

F.3d 889, 899-900 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Given that the testimony and written records of several Border Patrol officers, as well as Blanco’s own sworn

statement, contradicted his testimony regarding the false

claim of U.S. citizenship, the testimony of a co-worker as a

supporting witness would not likely have led the IJ to reach

a different outcome. 

CONCLUSION

Because the BIA erred when it held that Blanco’s conviction under California Penal Code § 148.9(a) precluded him

from consideration for cancellation of removal, we GRANT

the petition in relevant part and REMAND so that the BIA

may determine whether Blanco should be afforded any discretionary relief. We DENY the petition as to Blanco’s other

claims.

GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART AND

REMANDED.

Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal. 

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PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, specially concurring: 

I concur with the holding that a violation of California

Penal Code § 148.9(a) is not a crime of moral turpitude. 

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