Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-02515/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-02515-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles G. Reece
Petitioner
Gary Swarthout
Respondent

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES G. REECE,

Plaintiff,

v.

GARY SWARTHOUT,

Defendant.

Case No. 13-cv-02515-SI 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

INTRODUCTION

Charles G. Reece filed this pro se action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 to challenge an August 31, 2010 parole denial decision by the Board of Parole Hearings 

(BPH). For the reasons discussed below, the action will be dismissed because the court lacks 

jurisdiction to entertain a habeas petition challenging that parole denial decision. 

BACKGROUND

The petition for writ of habeas corpus alleged three claims for relief. The court dismissed 

two claims1and found cognizable a claim that Reece's right to be free from ex post facto laws was 

violated when the BPH denied him parole and set his next parole hearing in five years pursuant to 

California Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(3), as amended by Proposition 9 in 2008. Docket # 9. The 

amendment of § 3041.5 brought about by Proposition 9 allowed the BPH to lengthen the interval 

 

1

The court dismissed a claim that Proposition 9 did not apply to non-murderers as factually 

meritless and dismissed a claim challenging the evidence used to find Reece not suitable for parole 

as barred by Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011). Docket # 9 at 5-7. 

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between parole suitability hearings. In Reece's case, the BPH set his next parole hearing date in 

five years, whereas under the former law the BPH could not have set his next parole hearing date 

more than two years after the last parole hearing date. The detriment of having to wait a longer 

period for the next parole hearing was the harm that allegedly violated Reece's rights under the Ex 

Post Facto Clause. 

On November 4, 2013, this action was stayed to await resolution of a case pending in the 

Ninth Circuit that presented a controlling question of law. Id. at 7-8. The stay was lifted on May 

7, 2015, when that Ninth Circuit case was dismissed. See Docket # 10. Shortly thereafter, the 

Ninth Circuit decided another case, Nettles v. Grounds, 788 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2015), regarding 

habeas jurisdiction. This court thought Nettles presented at least the strong possibility that 

dismissal of this action would be required, and invited the parties to brief their views on the 

impact of Nettles. See Docket # 11 at 1-2. The parties then filed briefs discussing Nettles.

DISCUSSION

The question now before the court is whether habeas jurisdiction exists for Reece’s claim 

for relief. In answering this question it is important to keep in mind the nature of the 

constitutional violation at issue in Reece's petition. His claim of an ex post facto violation is based 

on the increased interval between parole hearings and is not based on any change in the 

substantive standards for parole suitability.

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

Habeas jurisdiction is an “implicit exception” from the “otherwise broad scope” of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983.2 Nettles, 788 F.3d at 999 (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79 (2005)). 

Nettles v. Grounds attempted to resolve some ambiguities as to when claims must be 

 

2

"Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 

of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 

injured." 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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brought in a habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and when claims must be brought in a civil 

rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "[R]elief is available to a prisoner under the federal habeas 

statute only if success on the claim would 'necessarily spell speedier release' from custody, which 

Skinner suggested would include termination of custody, acceleration of the future date of release 

from custody, or reduction of the level of custody." Nettles, 788 F.3d at 1001 (citing Skinner v. 

Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 533-34 & n.13 (2011)). Earlier Ninth Circuit cases indicating "that the writ 

of habeas corpus may extend to claims that, if successful, would merely be likely to or have the 

potential to lead to a speedier release" were "superceded by the Supreme Court's rulings." Id. 

Nettles stands for the proposition that, to be cognizable in habeas, a claim has to necessarily 

accelerate release – not just likely or merely potentially accelerate release – from confinement if 

successful. See id. at 1000-01. 

Nettles applied its necessarily-spells-speedier-release rule to an indeterminately-sentenced 

life prisoner who sought restoration of 30 days of lost time credits and expungement of the rule 

violation report that led to the loss of time credits. See id. at 1002. Nettles determined that habeas 

jurisdiction was not established because neither form of relief would necessarily accelerate the 

prisoner's release from prison, or terminate his custody, or reduce his level of custody. See id. at 

1002-04. Significantly, one could not determine that the restoration of time credits would 

necessarily affect the duration of the prisoner's confinement because the prisoner had not yet been 

found suitable for parole and it was unknown what his term would be if he was at some future date 

found suitable for parole. Id. at 1003. "Without knowing how many years Nettles will serve 

before the Board finds him suitable for parole or the length of his base term, we cannot conclude 

that restoration of the lost good-time credits would necessarily affect the duration of Nettles's 

confinement if and when the Board finds him suitable for parole." Id. at 1004. The court also 

rejected the argument that habeas jurisdiction existed because the expungement of the rule 

violation report would remove "roadblocks to parole" suitability; although the rule violation report 

"will likely have some effect on the Board's consideration, there is no basis for concluding that the 

expungement of this report from the record will 'necessarily spell speeder release'" or reduce his 

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level of custody. Id. at 1003. 3

Interestingly, Nettles has not been cited by any court in this circuit to dismiss a habeas 

petition challenging a parole denial decision. (This is not entirely surprising because Nettles was 

decided less than five months ago, and because there are now fewer habeas actions challenging 

parole denial decisions. Habeas actions challenging parole denials dwindled after the Supreme 

Court's decision in 2013 in Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, ended the availability of a habeas 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a parole denial.) One Ninth Circuit case 

since Nettles did conclude that a prisoner asserting due process and equal protection challenges to 

a parole hearing had to pursue his claims in a civil rights rather than a habeas action, but that case,

Erler v. Bisbee, 2015 WL 5172853 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2015), is of limited value because it did not 

cite Nettles and was an unpublished decision. In Erler, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 

court’s dismissal of a civil rights action, holding that the prisoner’s challenges to his parole 

hearing did belong in a civil rights rather than habeas. Id. at *1. Because the prisoner sought a 

new hearing and not immediate or speedier release, success in the action would not necessarily 

demonstrate the invalidity of the prisoner’s continued confinement or its duration. Id.

Turning to the case at hand, success in this action for Reece would not necessarily affect 

the duration of his confinement. If an ex post facto violation is found, the remedies available in 

habeas could include an order requiring the BPH to hold a new hearing at a date sooner than 

otherwise scheduled. But ordering him released from custody, or setting his parole release date,

would not be an appropriate remedy because Reece has never been found suitable for parole and 

his base term has never been set by the BPH. If Reece is not suitable for parole, an order for his 

 

3 Nettles also considered the case of a prisoner who was attempting to challenge a gang validation 

decision and concluded that challenge could go forward in a habeas action. This was so because 

the Ninth Circuit panel in Nettles was “bound by the determination” of an earlier panel in Bostic v. 

Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir 1989), that “a prisoner can seek expungement of an 

incident from his disciplinary record when that would lead to speedier release from disciplinary 

segregation.” Nettles, 998 F.3d at 1005. Bostic had held that “[h]abeas corpus jurisdiction is also 

available for a prisoner’s claims that he has been subjected to greater restrictions of his liberty, 

such as disciplinary segregation, without due process of law.” Bostic, 884 F.2d at 1269. This 

portion of Nettles is not relevant to Reece’s case, because Reece was not put in disciplinary 

segregation or otherwise subjected to a greater restriction of his liberty as a result of the lengthier 

interval between his parole hearing dates. 

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release from prison would give him an unwarranted windfall for the alleged error of setting the 

next parole hearing too many years away.4 “[W]ithout knowing how many years [Reece] will 

serve before the Board finds him suitable for parole or the length of his base term,” this court 

cannot conclude that a determination that an ex post facto violation occurred will necessarily affect 

the duration of Reece’s confinement. See Nettles, 788 F.3d at 1004. If an ex post facto problem 

exists for Reece, it is with regard to the frequency of the parole suitability hearings and not with 

regard to the substance of the parole suitability decision at the most recent hearing. Regardless of 

whether the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits the BPH from lengthening the intervals between 

parole suitability hearings, the potential ex post facto problem here does not concern the inmate’s 

parole suitability. Success on the ex post facto claim might potentially accelerate release from 

custody, but only if several contingencies materialize, i.e., if the next parole suitability hearing is 

set sooner than five years after his last hearing, if Reece is found suitable at that hearing, and if

Reece’s base term would be completed sooner than the five-year interval after his last hearing. 

Nettles, however, held that habeas jurisdiction is not established where the claim merely has the 

potential to accelerate release from confinement, as is the situation with Reece's ex post facto

claim. 

Reece is in the same situation as the Nettles plaintiff: he is an indeterminately sentenced 

prisoner not yet found suitable for parole and for whom a base term has not yet been set. It cannot 

be said that accelerating the next parole hearing date will necessarily result in an earlier release 

date for Reece. See Nettles, 788 F.3d at 1002-04. Habeas jurisdiction therefore is absent under the 

 

4

The possibility that the extended interval between parole hearings will result in a prisoner who is 

currently suitable for parole being kept in prison just to wait for the next parole hearing to be held 

in 3-15 years is ameliorated by the amended version of California Penal Code § 3041.5, which 

provides two routes to quicker consideration than the regularly scheduled subsequent parole 

hearing dates. First, section 3041.5(b)(4) now gives the board discretion to advance the date of the 

next parole hearing “when a change in circumstances or new information establishes a reasonable 

likelihood that consideration of the public and victim’s safety does not require the additional 

period of incarceration of the prisoner provided” by the statutory deferral periods. Second, section 

3041.5(d)(1) now allows an inmate to petition the board to “exercise its discretion to advance a 

hearing . . . to an earlier date, by submitting a written request to the board, with notice, upon 

request, and a copy to the victim which shall set forth the change in circumstances or new 

information that establishes a reasonable likelihood that consideration of the public safety does not 

require the additional period of incarceration of the inmate.”

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reasoning of Nettles.

 In theory, it should be possible for Reece to file a civil rights action to assert his Ex Post 

Facto Clause claim. There are two potential obstacles to such an action, which he should bear in 

mind in determining whether to spend the money to file a new civil rights action. First, Reece's 

efforts to exhaust state court remedies may preclude him from litigating the same claims in a civil 

rights action because state habeas proceedings can have issue or claim preclusive effects on later 

§ 1983 actions. See Silverton v. Dep't of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir. 1981) (state 

habeas proceeding precludes identical issue from being relitigated in subsequent § 1983 action if 

state habeas court afforded full and fair opportunity for issue to be heard); Gonzalez v. California 

Dep't of Corr., 739 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 2014) (extending rule of Silverton to cover claim 

preclusion as well as issue preclusion). Second, the Ninth Circuit has already rejected a facial 

challenge to Proposition 9's changes to the frequency of parole hearings in California. See Gilman 

v. Schwarzenegger, 638 F.3d 1101, 1108-11 (9th Cir. 2011) (although extensive changes to 

frequency of parole hearings required by Proposition 9 appeared to create a significant risk of 

prolonging plaintiffs’ incarceration, court concluded that availability of advance hearings to board 

precluded relief because such availability sufficiently reduced the risk of increased punishment for 

prisoners).

Although a district court may construe a habeas petition by a prisoner attacking the 

conditions of his confinement as pleading civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Wilwording 

v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971), the court declines to do so here. The difficulty with 

construing a habeas petition as a civil rights complaint is that the two forms used by most 

prisoners request different information and much of the information necessary for a civil rights 

complaint is not included in the habeas petition filed here. Examples of the potential problems 

created by using the habeas petition form rather than the civil rights complaint form include the 

potential omission of intended defendants, potential failure to link each defendant to the claims, 

and potential absence of an adequate prayer for relief. Additionally, there is doubt whether the 

prisoner is willing to pay the civil action filing fee of $ 350.00 (plus a $50.00 administrative fee) 

rather than the $5.00 habeas filing fee to pursue his claims. The habeas versus civil rights 

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distinction is not just a matter of using different pleading forms. A habeas action differs in many 

ways from a civil rights action: (1) a habeas petitioner has no right to a jury trial on his claims, (2) 

the court may be able to make credibility determinations based on the written submissions of the 

parties in a habeas action, (3) state court (rather than administrative) remedies must be exhausted 

for the claims in a habeas action, (4) the proper respondent in a habeas action is the warden in 

charge of the prison, but he or she might not be able to provide the desired relief when the prisoner 

is complaining about a condition of confinement, and (5) damages cannot be awarded in a habeas 

action. While a prisoner may think he has found a loophole that allows him to save hundreds of 

dollars – by filing a habeas petition with a $5.00 fee rather than the usual $350.00 filing fee (plus 

$50.00 administrative fee) for a civil action – the loophole proves unhelpful because he ultimately 

cannot proceed in habeas and will be charged the regular civil action filing fee to challenge 

conditions of confinement. It is not in the interest of judicial economy to allow prisoners to file 

civil rights actions on habeas forms because virtually every such case, including this one, will be 

defective and require additional court resources to deal with the problems created by the different 

filing fees and the absence of information on the habeas form. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this action for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED for lack 

of jurisdiction. The dismissal is without prejudice to petitioner filing a civil rights action under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, preferably using the court's civil rights complaint form. The clerk shall close the 

file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 14, 2015

________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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