Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01889/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01889-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher B. Julian
Appellant
Renee G. Julian
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

CHRISTOPHER B. JULIAN, RENEE G. JULIAN,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1889

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:15-cv-01344-EJD, Senior Judge Edward 

J. Damich.

______________________ 

Decided: August 4, 2016

______________________ 

CHRISTOPHER B. JULIAN, Ararat, VA, pro se.

RENEE G. JULIAN, Ararat, VA, pro se.

MELISSA BAKER, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., ALLISON 

KIDD-MILLER. 

 

Case: 16-1889 Document: 13-2 Page: 1 Filed: 08/04/2016
2 JULIAN v. US

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, CHEN, and STOLL, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Plaintiffs Christopher B. Julian and Renee G. Julian 

filed suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims 

alleging that the government breached an implied contract and/or violated the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 

Clause when the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Virginia dismissed an earlier suit filed

by Plaintiffs under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). In an 

order issued March 10, 2016, the Court of Federal Claims 

dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction and 

failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 

Julian v. United States, No. 15-1344C, 2016 WL 929219, 

at *2–3 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 10, 2016) (Order). In that same 

order, the court denied Plaintiffs’ request that the assigned judge—Senior Judge Edward J. Damich—recuse 

himself from the case. Id. at *3. We find no error in the 

court’s analysis and agree that dismissal was proper. We

therefore affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs’ claims in this case arise from dismissal of 

an earlier case they filed in the Western District of Virginia. On September 16, 2013, Plaintiffs filed suit against 

the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), 

seven federal employees, and one Virginia state employee 

requesting judicial review of the USDA’s decision to deny 

Plaintiffs a Farm Ownership Loan and alleging a variety 

of due process and other tort claims.1 Julian v. Rigney, 

 

1 Specifically, Plaintiffs lodged allegations of negligence, fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, conspiracy, 

Case: 16-1889 Document: 13-2 Page: 2 Filed: 08/04/2016
JULIAN v. US 3

No. 4:13-cv-00054, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38311, at *13 

(W.D. Va. Mar. 24, 2014). The district court dismissed 

Plaintiffs’ claims, with the exception of the request for 

review of the USDA’s decision to deny the loan. Id. at 

*83. The district court subsequently granted the USDA’s 

motion for summary judgment that it acted within its 

authority when it denied Plaintiffs’ loan request. Julian 

v. Rigney, No. 4:13-cv-00054, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

113190, at *18 (W.D. Va. Aug. 15, 2014). The Court of 

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 

decisions, Julian v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 585 

F. App’x. 850, 850–51 (4th Cir. 2014), and the Supreme 

Court denied Plaintiffs’ cert petition, Julian v. U.S. Dep’t 

of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 1901, 1902 (2015).

Plaintiffs then filed suit in the Court of Federal 

Claims seeking damages of $42 million. They alleged that 

the United States government breached an implied contract when the Western District of Virginia dismissed 

their earlier case. Plaintiffs reason as follows: (1) the 

government offered to enter into a contract with private 

citizens through the codification of § 1964(c) of the RICO

Act, which allows persons who suffer injuries to their

business or property through a violation of the RICO Act 

to serve as “private attorneys general” and sue for damages in federal district court, see Agency Holding Corp. v. 

Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987); 

(2) Plaintiffs accepted this offer by filing their complaint 

in the Western District of Virginia; and (3) the government breached the implied contract when the district 

court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims. In the alternative, 

Plaintiffs alleged that the district court’s dismissal effec-

 

racketeering, and violations of the Fair Credit Reporting 

Act. Julian v. Rigney, No. 4:13-cv-00054, 2014 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 38311, at *13 (W.D. Va. Mar. 24, 2014).

Case: 16-1889 Document: 13-2 Page: 3 Filed: 08/04/2016
4 JULIAN v. US

tuated an unlawful “taking” of Plaintiffs’ personal property (i.e., the implied contract) under the Fifth Amendment.

On March 10, 2016, the Court of Federal Claims dismissed Plaintiffs’ action. The court held that it lacked 

jurisdiction to review the Western District of Virginia’s 

dismissal of Plaintiffs’ earlier case and that Plaintiffs 

failed to state a claim for breach of contract or an unlawful taking. Order, 2016 WL 929219, at *2–3. As part of 

the order, Judge Damich denied Plaintiffs’ request that he 

recuse himself because he refused to attest to Plaintiffs 

that he had taken his statutory oath to perform his duties 

under the Constitution.2 Id. at *3.

In response to the Court of Federal Claims’ order, 

Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandamus to this 

court. We converted Plaintiffs’ petition to a notice of 

appeal on April 19, 2016. We have jurisdiction to address 

Plaintiffs’ appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review whether the Court of Federal Claims 

properly dismissed a complaint for either a lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted de novo. Boyle v. United States, 200 F.3d 

1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs bear the burden of 

establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. 

Cir. 2002). We “uphold[] the Court of Federal Claims’ 

evidentiary rulings absent an abuse of discretion.” Id.

Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 

12(b)(6) is proper only when a plaintiff “can prove no set 

 

2 Plaintiffs included this request in a footnote in 

their opposition to the government’s motion to dismiss. 

Judge Damich treated the request as a motion for recusal. 

Id. at *3.

Case: 16-1889 Document: 13-2 Page: 4 Filed: 08/04/2016
JULIAN v. US 5

of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 

relief.” Leider v. United States, 301 F.3d 1290, 1295 (Fed.

Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In reviewing the Court of Federal Claims’ grant of 

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we must assume that all well-pled 

factual allegations in the complaint are true and draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant.” Adams 

v. United States, 391 F.3d 1212, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

The Court of Federal Claims properly found that it 

lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims. While styled as 

breach of contract and takings claims, Plaintiffs’ claims 

are, at bottom, requests that the Court of Federal Claims 

review the Western District of Virginia’s decision to 

dismiss Plaintiffs’ earlier action.3 “The Court of Federal 

Claims does not have jurisdiction to review the decisions 

of district courts . . . relating to proceedings before those 

courts.” Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. 

Cir. 1994). Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiffs now 

argue that the RICO Act is, itself, a money-mandating 

statute conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Federal 

Claims,4 we hold that it is not. See Treviño v. United 

 

3 The Court of Federal Claims also dismissed 

claims it understood Plaintiffs to raise under the due 

process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

Order, 2016 WL 929219, at *2. In their opening brief, 

Plaintiffs make clear that none of their claims “w[ere], or 

[are], based on violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments.” Appellants’ Opening Br. 38. “[T]he party 

who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely 

upon.” The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 

22, 25 (1913). Therefore, we do not address this portion of 

the court’s opinion.

4 See Appellants’ Opening Br. 39 (“As has been consistently argued by Appellants throughout these proceedings 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) is absolutely [a] money 

Case: 16-1889 Document: 13-2 Page: 5 Filed: 08/04/2016
6 JULIAN v. US

States, 557 F. App’x 995, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Hufford v. 

United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 696, 702 (2009).

The Court of Federal Claims’ alternative analysis—

i.e., that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief 

could be granted—was likewise correct. Plaintiffs’ allegations do not establish that any contract existed between 

Plaintiffs and the government. Plaintiffs’ characterization of § 1964(c) of the RICO Act as a contract “offer” is 

false. “[A]bsent some clear indication that the legislature 

intends to bind itself contractually, the presumption is 

that ‘a law is not intended to create private contractual or 

vested rights.’” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison 

Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 465–66 (1985) 

(quoting Dodge v. Bd. of Ed., 302 U.S. 74, 79 (1937)). 

Nothing in the RICO Act suggests it was intended to 

function as a contract offer to private citizens.

Plaintiffs also failed to allege an unlawful taking under the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs contend that their 

RICO Act claim in the Western District of Virginia represented a property right that was taken by the government 

when the district court dismissed the claim. We have 

held that frustration of a legal claim, like that alleged by 

Plaintiffs, is not a compensable taking. See Belk v. United 

States, 858 F.2d 706, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that 

international agreement that barred Iranian hostages 

from bringing legal action could not form the basis of a 

takings claim).

Finally, we hold that Judge Damich did not abuse his 

discretion when he denied Plaintiffs’ motion that he 

recuse himself from the case. See Shell Oil Co. v. United 

States, 672 F.3d 1283, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Consistent 

with the vast majority of courts to consider this issue, we 

 

mandating statute, which provides substantive property 

rights in money damages.”).

Case: 16-1889 Document: 13-2 Page: 6 Filed: 08/04/2016
JULIAN v. US 7

review a judge’s failure to recuse for an abuse of discretion.”). By statute, all federal judges must swear or 

affirm to perform their duties under the Constitution 

before taking office. See 28 U.S.C. § 453. There is no 

requirement that a federal judge later establish that he 

took that oath or affirmation to the satisfaction of any 

particular party.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

Case: 16-1889 Document: 13-2 Page: 7 Filed: 08/04/2016