Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-01057/USCOURTS-caDC-94-01057-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chemical Manufacturers Association
Petitioner
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent
Louisiana Environmental Action Network
Intervenor for Respondent
Manasota-88
Intervenor for Respondent
Natural Resources Defense Council
Intervenor for Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 20, 1995 Decided July 9, 1996

No. 94-1042

LOUISIANA ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION NETWORK, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

v.

CAROL M. BROWNER, ADMINISTRATOR,

AND UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENTS

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with

94-1049, 94-1054, 94-1057, 94-1058

On Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Environmental Protection Agency

Henry V. Nickel argued the cause for petitioners Alabama Power Company, et al., with whom

Norman W. Fichthorn and Evelina J. Norwinski were on the briefs. Melvin S. Schulze and Lee B.

Zeugin entered appearances.

David M. Driesen argued the cause for petitioners Louisiana Environmental Action Network, et al.,

with whom Sharon Buccino and David G. Hawkins were on the briefs. A brief was also filed by the

same parties as intervenors.

William H. Lewis, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners Clean Air Implementation Project, et al., with

whom Michael A. McCord, David F. Zoll, Nancy C. Cookson, Susan R. Connella and V. Mark

Slywynsky were on the briefs. A separate brief was also filed by the same parties as intervenors.

Hunter L. Prillaman and K. Denise Grant entered appearances.

Karen L. Egbert, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondents,

with whom Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, was on the brief. Patricia A. Embrey,

Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: BUCKLEY, SENTELLE and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Section 112(l) of the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act

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permitsthe Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to delegate its authority and responsibility to

implement various air-pollution requirementsto a state ifthatstate's programto regulate air pollution

receives the EPA approval. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(l). In a rule-making pursuant to this section, see

40 C.F.R. § 63.90-.96, the EPA established proceduresto use in deciding whether it should approve

state rules or programs and in governing the ramifications ofsuch approval. See 40 C.F.R. § 63.90.

Three petitioners have challenged these "delegation rules," alleging that the rules are illegal for

various reasons, including that the rules violate the Clean Air Act or constitute an improper

delegation of federal power.

We cannot addressthe merits of any of these claims. An Article III court cannot entertain the

claims of a litigant unlessthat partyhas demonstrated constitutional and prudentialstanding,see, e.g.,

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975), and unlessits claimis constitutionally and prudentially

ripe. See, e.g., Office of Com. of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 826 F.2d 101, 104 n.2 (D.C. Cir.

1987). None of these petitioners have demonstrated each of these essential predicates of judicial

review. If, at some later time, one or more of the parties develops a justiciable claim, they will be able

to seek judicial relief. See Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 913-14 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

BACKGROUND

Under the Clean Air Act as amended,see Amendmentsto theCleanAir Act, Pub. L. No. 101-

549, Title III, § 301, 104 Stat. 2531 (1990), as codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1995), the EPA is

authorized and required, inter alia, to "promulgate regulations establishing emissionsstandardsfor"

a full range of major sources of hazardous air pollutants. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d). After establishing

these federal standards, the EPA is authorized to enforce them through appropriate administrative,

civil, or (with the cooperation of the Attorney General) criminal actions. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3).

In addition to mandating federal regulation of emissions of air pollutants, the Act expressly does not

preempt states from adopting and enforcing their own regulations, with certain exceptions not here

pertinent. 42 U.S.C. § 7416. Indeed, section 7412(l) declares that each state may develop and

submit to the Administrator "a program for the implementation and enforcement ... of emissions

standards and other requirements" for covered air pollutants.

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The Act further empowersthe Administrator ofthe EPA to approve or disapprove such state

implementation plans based on statutory criteria, including the adequacy of the authorities contained

in the program to assure compliance by emissionssources with applicable standards, regulations, and

requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(l)(5). In 1993, the EPA promulgated regulations to establish the

standards the EPA will use in determining whether to approve a state's plan. See 40 C.F.R. § 63.90.

These delegation rules, adopted pursuant to section 7412(l), make clear that federal authorities will

enforce an approved state program "in place of " the otherwise applicable federal regulations. Id.

Three groups of petitioners challenge these delegation rules.

The first group, who style themselves "the environmental petitioners," are Louisiana

Environmental Action Network, Manasota-88 and the Natural Resources Defense Council

(collectively "LEAN"). The environmental petitioners claim that the delegation rules do not

adequately comply with the Clean Air Act, arguing that the Act mandates that state standards could

not be lessstringent than applicable federalstandards, and that the delegation rules do not adequately

assure compliance with this congressional mandate. Indeed, these petitioners argue that EPA's rules

permit states to exempt sources of air pollution within their borders from the detailed requirements

of the Clean Air Act.

The second group of petitioners, "the utilities petitioners," are Alabama Power Company, the

Edison Electric Institute, the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, the American Public

Power Association, and a number ofindividual electric utilities(collectively "Alabama Power"). The

utilities petitioners contend that the EPA's rules are invalid because they allow the agency to exceed

its powers under the Act by making federally enforceable standards that are more stringent than the

Act mandates. Alternatively, they contend that if the EPA's rules correctly interpret section 7412(l),

then section 7412(l) is an unconstitutional standardless delegation of power.

The third petition is a joint petition by trade associations, specifically, the Clean Air

Implementation Project, the Chemical Manufacturers Association, and the American Automobile

Manufacturers Association, Inc. (collectively "CAIP"). This petition echoes the claims of Alabama

Power and adds that the delegation rules arbitrarily permit state and federal authorities to compel

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compliance with newly approved, more stringent state regulations without adequate notice under

federal law.

Because these petitions present troubling questions of justiciability, we directed the parties

to file additional briefs on standing. After reviewing the arguments of the parties, we conclude, for

the reasons set out below, that only CAIP even arguably has standing, and that the claim of CAIP is

not prudentially ripe.

DISCUSSION

"Article III of the Constitution confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual "cases' and

"controversies.' " Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). Prudence similarly restrains courts

from hastily intervening into matters that may best be reviewed at another time or in another setting,

see Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967), especially when the uncertain

nature of an issue might affect a court's "ability to decide intelligently." American Trucking Ass'ns,

Inc. v. ICC, 747 F.2d 787, 789-90 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Therefore, before we reach the merits of any

claim, we must first assure ourselves that the dispute lies within the constitutional and prudential

boundaries of our jurisdiction.

These limits on the authority ofthe federal judiciaryhave given rise to several " "doctrinesthat

cluster about Article III... standing[,] mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like ...,' " by

which we test the fitness of controversies for judicial resolution. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (quoting

Vander Jagt v. O'Neal, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring)). Our

standing inquiry focuses on the appropriateness of a party bringing the questioned controversy to the

court. It requires that anyone who would invoke the aid of the courts in resolving a complaint must

allege, at a minimum, an actual or imminent injury personal to the plaintiff that is fairly traceable to

the defendant's conduct and that is likely to be redressed by the requested relief. Allen, 468 U.S. at

751. Having measured LEAN's claim against these standards, we determine that it falls short at the

very first step: LEAN has not demonstrated an imminent injury personal to itself.

In itssupplemental brief addressing the question ofstanding, LEAN argued that, because the

delegation rules permit the EPA not to enforce federal air-pollution standards in a particular state as

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soon as the EPA approves that state's proposed program, the rules permit a potentially harmful

enforcement gap if a state seeks section 7412 approval prior to that state putting its proposed

program into effect. Assuming, for purposes of standing, that LEAN is correct on the merits, see In

re Thornburgh, 869 F.2d 1503, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1989), and that the delegation rules may make it

possible for an "enforcement gap" to develop, we nonetheless conclude that LEAN has not

demonstrated an injury sufficient for standing.

At first glance, LEAN's claimed injury may be thought to collapse of its own unmanageable

size. Fundamental standing doctrine instructs that, "when the asserted harm is a "generalized

grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone

normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction." Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 (citations omitted). In

its supplemental brief, however, LEAN expressly asserted that a delay in enforcing air-pollution

standards in one state should establish an injury personal to its interests because "members of

petitioning groups ... must breathe." Because it is difficult to imagine a grievance more generalized

than one shared by all persons who breathe, we might have declined jurisdiction asto LEAN's claims

on this ground alone were we acting on an uncluttered slate.

The precedentialslate on standing, however, is hardly uncluttered. See Allen v. Wright, 468

U.S. 737, 751-52 (1984). We have previously observed, in a statement based on United States v.

Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973), that

individuals may have standing to challenge an EPA action that will assuredly affect the quality of air

nationwide, even though their claims may be no less general than that articulated here. See Center

for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus, 747 F.2d 1, 3 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Though SCRAP has since been

declared an outlier by the Supreme Court, see Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871,

889 (1990), that Court has not yet explicitly disavowed SCRAP's expansive rationale. Cf. Gersman

v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 975 F.2d 886, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (stating that courts must seek to

reconcile their decisions with existing controlling authority, even when aspects of that authority may

no longer be clearly viable). In light of this precedent, then, we hesitate to deny standing to LEAN

simply because of the general nature of its asserted injury.

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But this precedent hardly compels usto find that LEAN hasin fact established standing in this

case. To demonstrate an injury sufficient for standing, a litigant must show some "invasion of a

legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). At least the petitioners in both SCRAP andCenterfor Auto Safety

challenged agency actions that might have had an imminent and concrete effect on individuals

throughout the country. See SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 672-80 (discussing the challenge to the ICC's

decision to permit railroads throughout the country to increase freight rates); CAS, 747 F.2d at 2-3

(noting that petitioners attacked a plan negotiated between General Motors and the EPA that would

have allowed General Motors not to recall certain makes of vehicles sold throughout the nation). In

contrast, LEAN has not carried its burden of showing either the concreteness or imminence of its

asserted "enforcement gap."

LEAN has not established that an enforcement gap will concretely and personally affect it (or

its members). See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 563. First, if no state seeks "delegation"

of EPA's authority under the challenged rules, no "enforcement gap" can result. Second, even if we

suppose that an enforcement gap may occur in one state, we cannot assume that that gap will affect

areas actuallyfrequented byLEAN's members, asis essentialfor LEAN to assert thistype of concrete

and particularized injury. See, e.g., National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at 887-89; Sierra Club

v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972).

Nor has LEAN established that an enforcement gap is imminent. See Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. at 564 n.2 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). The enforcement gap

feared by LEAN cannot result unless some state seeks, under the delegation rules, to substitute its

own program for otherwise applicable federal regulations. Even if we assume that a state will seek

such substitution, the asserted enforcement gap still cannot develop unlessthe regulations within that

state's programwill not be in effect at the time the EPA might approve the state's program. And even

ifwe assume that both ofthese predicatestake place, LEAN's asserted injury still cannot occur unless

the EPA, despite the lack of state regulations currently in place, nonetheless approves the state's

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program. This multi-tiered speculation must defeat LEAN's claim of injury. See, e.g., O'Shea v.

Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974), as cited in Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 157-58. We thus conclude

that LEAN's asserted "enforcement gap" is not only too vague to establish a concrete injury, but that

it is too remote a possibility to establish an imminent one.

Like LEAN, Alabama Power also does not state a genuine injury that a federal court can

constitutionallyaddress. Alabama Power conceives its injury in terms of the invasion of its rights that

would occur ifthe EPA, under the challenged regulations, approved a state requirement and enforced

it as a federal requirement, even though that requirement was more stringent than the EPA could

implement on its own under the Clean Air Act. Even assuming that the petitioner is correct on the

merits, this claim does not state an injury sufficiently imminent and concrete for constitutional

standing. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560.

The phrasing of the petitioner's own argument on standing illustrates its insufficiency.

Throughout its brief, Alabama Power described the dire consequences that would befall it if a state

were to adopt a requirement more stringent than the EPA itself could promulgate and if the EPA

were then to federalize it. Yet, Alabama Power has identified no statenever mind a state in which

one ofthe utilities petitioners operatesthat has adopted anymore stringent rule which is or is about

to be federalized by the EPA. Instead, it has relied on only hypothetical harms to the petitioning

utilities. Should some state whose laws personally affect any of the utility petitioners actually seek

section 7412 approval for some more stringent state regulation, then perhaps that may establish a

concrete injury. If so, that will be soon enough to determine the merits of this type of claim.

Admittedly, our dismissal of Alabama Power's claim may partake of ripeness as well as of

standing. That ripeness considerations should influence our standing analysis, however, is neither

surprising nor troublesome. As the Supreme Court has observed, these threshold doctrines "relate

... in different though overlapping ways to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a

rigorous or explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an

unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government." Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (quoting

Vander Jagt v. O'Neal, 699 F.2d at 1178) (Bork, J., concurring)). We will examine more closely the

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doctrine of ripeness in our analysis of the justiciability of CAIP's claim.

Moreover, even if we assumed that a state whose regulations would personally affect one of

the utility petitioners would seek federal enforcement of its requirements, the enforcement of state

regulations by state and federal agents, instead ofsolely by state agents, hardly impends certain injury

to Alabama Power. See National Min. Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior, 70 F.3d 1345, 1349 (D.C. Cir.

1995). Alabama Power suggests that federal enforcement of state regulations may mean that, if a

state court voidsthe state air-pollution rule, federal officialsstill may enforce it. It also intimates that

federal officials may enforce state rules more harshly than the state might have chosen to enforce

them. Either of these predictions may be possible, but neither conjecture is so probable as to

convince us that the delegation rules somehow affect the utilities petitionersin their current conduct

to the extent that their "injury" may be deemed actual or imminent at this time. See United

Transportation Union v. ICC, 891 F.2d 908, 911-13 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1024

(1990). See also O'Shea, 418 U.S. at 495-98 (injury from bias of magistrate cannot be imminent

because the bias could not harm petitioner unless he was arrested, tried, and convicted.)

Of the three sets of petitioners, then, CAIP comes closest to establishing justiciability. CAIP

has presented a galaxy of likely circumstances in which its members could be trapped in the

intolerable position of being unable to comply with new state standards that receive EPA approval

under § 7412 shortly before some compliance deadline, thus leaving insufficient time for CAIP's

members to respond accordingly. This statement of injury, unlike the multi-tiered conjectures of

LEAN and of Alabama Power, may in fact approach a showing of injury sufficient for standing. In

the end, however, we need not determine whetherCAIP hasshown constitutionalstanding, asCAIP's

claim is assuredly prudentially unripe.

Although we would be reluctant to pretermit a jurisdictional question in order to reach a

merits question,see Cross-sound Ferry Services, Inc. v. ICC, 934 F.2d 327, 343-46 (D.C. Cir. 1991)

(Thomas, J., concurring), we have no difficulty dismissing a case based on one jurisdictional bar

rather than another. See, e.g., Mississippi Valley Gas Co. v. FERC, 68 F.3d 503, 510 (D.C. Cir.

1995) (rejecting a case on prudential ripeness rather than resolving a standing question); News

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America Pub., Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 805 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Because issues of standing,

ripeness, and other such "elements" of justiciability are each predicate to any review on the merits,

a court need not identify allsuch elements that a complainant may have failed to show in a particular

case. See, e.g., Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 68 F.3d at 510; Office of Com. of United Church of

Christ, 826 F.2d at 104 n.2 (declining to decide whether a matter was constitutionally ripe because

it was prudentially unripe). Moreover, as precedent and prudence counsel us to avoid unnecessary

dicta, see, e.g., Fried v. Hinson, 78 F.3d 688, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1996), especially that on potentially

difficult constitutional questions, see Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,

445 (1988) (citations omitted), we see substantial reason not to review each element of justiciability

in a dispute that we ultimately conclude does not lie within our jurisdiction. With this in mind, we

now turn to the only issue we must decidewhether CAIP has presented a ripe claim.

If a court confronts an institutionalreason why it should not review a petitioner's claimat that

time, the court should reject the claim as not ripe unless "postponing review .... impose[s] a hardship

on the complaining party that is immediate, direct, and significant." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

v. Dole, 802 F.2d 474, 479-80 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. New York v. Dole, 480 U.S.

951 (1987). In this case, any injury demonstrated by CAIP presents the classic institutional reason

to postpone review: we need to wait for "a rule to be applied [to see] what its effect will be."

Diamond Shamrock v. Costle, 580 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also Reno v. Catholic Social

Servs., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2485, 2495-96 (1993) (noting that mere promulgation of an agency regulation

does not make it ripe for challenge). Because we cannot ascertain or predict the specific practical

problemsthat CAIP and its members might face or that might need remedy until the approval ofsome

state's requirement or some other occurrence cements the application and effect of the challenged

delegation rules, we cannot review CAIP's claim now.

Nor is there any pressing concern that compels us to decide this matter at this time. CAIP's

claim itself does not demand immediate relief because the primary injury it alleges "is not a present

hardship resulting from the regulations themselves, but rather a future injury that may result" from

programs that are approved under the regulations. Cronin v. FAA, 73 F.2d 1126, 1133 (D.C. Cir.

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1996). Petitioner nonetheless argues that we must review its claim at this time because the judicial

review provision of the Clean Air Act requires challenges to a rulemaking to be brought within 60

days of the rulemaking. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b). Though the inability of a petitioner to bring its

claim at a later time would indeed pose a significant hardship, see City of Houston v. HUD, 24 F.3d

1421, 1432 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1994), we do not believe that CAIP will be so barred.

We have held in other cases involving the confrontation between a statutory bar and a claim

not yet prudentially ripe that a "time limitation on petitions for judicial review ... can run only against

challengesripe for review." Baltimore Gas &Elec. Co. v. ICC, 672 F.2d 146, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1982);

see also Eagle-Picher, 759 F.2d at 913-14. Our reading of 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) does not contradict

this precedent. The provision itself allows a petition to be brought after the initial time limit if that

petition is "based solely on grounds arising aftersuch sixtieth day," assuming that such petition isfiled

within sixty days of such new grounds arising. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b). If federal enforcement of

state-adopted regulations provide the grounds necessary for proper judicial review in this type of

case, then those grounds cannot have arisen until at least some problematic state regulation has

received the EPA approval necessary for such federal enforcement. In this particular case, of course,

CAIP has not demonstrated that any such event has occurred. Consequently, until its claim ripens,

the statutory time bar has not begun to run.

CONCLUSION

As a number of courts have observed, the threshold issues of constitutional standing and

judicial prudence, though nominally distinct, often blur in practice. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,

94-97 (1968); Winpisinger v. Watson, 628 F.2d 133, 139-40 & n.31 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 446

U.S. 929 (1980). Such unclarity, however, rarely undermines the soundness of judicial results.

Unless a party has demonstrated all the elements of a justiciable claim, no court need review it.

Because none of these petitioners have established both standing and ripeness, none have

demonstrated that we can and should review at this time the merits of their claims.

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