Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-01307/USCOURTS-caDC-02-01307-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
S.A. Storer and Sons Co.
Petitioner
Secretary of Labor
Respondent

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 14, 2003 Decided March 19, 2004

No. 02-1307

S.A. STORER AND SONS CO.,

PETITIONER

v.

SECRETARY OF LABOR,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission

Roger L. Sabo argued the cause for the petitioner.

John Shortall, Attorney, United States Department of Labor, argued the cause for the respondent. Joseph M. Woodward, Associate Solicitor, and Ann S. Rosenthal, Counsel,

United States Department of Labor were on brief. Charles

F. James, Attorney, United States Department of Labor,

entered an appearance.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-1307 Document #810654 Filed: 03/19/2004 Page 1 of 16
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Before: HENDERSON, TATEL and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: S.A. Storer

and Sons Co. (Storer) petitions for review of the citation it

received from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), alleging that it had violated the Occupational

Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act or Act)1

 by failing to

protect its employees from two fall hazards as they performed masonry work. Storer contested the citation, which

required the Secretary of the United States Department of

Labor (Secretary), from whom OSHA receives its rulemaking

and enforcement authority, to prove the violation at a hearing

before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (Commission).2

The citation was affirmed by the ALJ and ultimately by the

Commission, which denied review of the ALJ’s decision.

Storer claims the Secretary erroneously interpreted the applicable OSHA regulations. We agree in part; accordingly, we

vacate the Commission’s order and remand to that body for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

The OSH Act is ‘‘designed ‘to assure so far as possible TTT

safe and healthful working conditions’ for ‘every working man

and woman in the Nation,’ ’’3

 and generally obligates an

employer to furnish a workplace ‘‘free from recognized hazards that are TTT likely to cause death or serious physical

harm.’’ 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). In furtherance of the Act’s

overriding objective, the Secretary is authorized to promulgate and enforce workplace safety regulations, see id.

§§ 655(b), 658–59, 666, which authority she has largely dele1 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq.

2 Am. Wrecking Corp. v. Sec’y of Labor, 351 F.3d 1254, 1261 (D.C.

Cir. 2003).

3 Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499

U.S. 144, 147 (1991) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)); see also Am.

Wrecking Corp., 351 F.3d at 1260.

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gated to OSHA. A.J. McNulty & Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 283

F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing 65 Fed. Reg. 50,017

(2000)); see also Am. Wrecking Corp. v. Sec’y of Labor, 351

F.3d 1254, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2003). OSHA compliance officers

inspect workplaces regularly and, if warranted, issue citations

for violations of OSHA’s regulations. A.J. McNulty & Co.,

283 F.3d at 330.

At issue are OSHA’s regulations designed to provide fall

protection for construction workers, see 29 C.F.R.

§§ 1926.451, 1926.501; specifically, the protective measures

required when an employee performs ‘‘overhand bricklaying’’4

while on a scaffold. Id. § 1926.451(g)(1)(vi). Paragraph

(g)(1) of section 1926.451 provides that ‘‘[e]ach employee on a

scaffold more than 10 feet (3.1 m) above a lower level shall be

protected from falling to that lower level.’’ Id.

§ 1926.451(g)(1). Section 1926.451(g)(1)(vi) requires that an

employee doing overhand bricklaying ‘‘from a supported scaffold shall be protected from falling from all open sides and

ends of the scaffold (except at the side next to the wall being

laid) by the use of a personal fall arrest system or guardrail

system.’’ Id. § 1926.451(g)(1)(vi). The meaning of the exception is the central issue in this case, as becomes clearer below.

Storer is a masonry contractor operating in Ohio and

Michigan. It has been doing business for over 40 years and

currently has approximately 80 to 90 employees on its payroll.

In May 2001 Storer was hired by Bostleman Corporation (the

general contractor) to perform the masonry work for the

construction of a Farmer Jack’s grocery store, located at the

corner of Cherry and Bancroft Streets in Toledo, Ohio. Four

masons and three mason tenders carried out the work, which

4 ‘‘Overhand bricklaying’’ is ‘‘the process of laying bricks and

masonry units such that the surface of the wall to be jointed is on

the opposite side of the wall from the mason, requiring the mason to

lean over the wall to complete the work. It includes mason tending

[assisting the bricklayers by, inter alia, maintaining supplies of

bricks and mortar] and electrical installation incorporated into the

brick wall during the overhand bricklaying process.’’ Id.

§ 1926.450(b).

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involved erecting the building’s load-bearing, concrete-block

walls and ultimately putting a brick veneer on the building.5

When completed, the building measured 191 feet wide and

291 feet long and its walls were comprised of approximately

32,000 concrete blocks.

While Farmer Jack’s was under construction, two OSHA

compliance officers, Todd Jensen and Walter Visage, paid an

unannounced visit to the site. On June 14, 2001 Jensen and

Visage drove past the Farmer Jack’s site—and observed what

they thought were potential fall hazards—while returning to

their office from an inspection at another location. Their

observations prompted them to investigate further; accordingly, they parked their car on a side street at a distance of

50 yards from the site and used a handheld video recorder to

document what they saw.

They observed at least five Storer employees on a scaffold

laying the concrete blocks of the building’s south-facing wall.

The employees were not tied off, that is, they were not using

a personal fall arrest system,6

 and the scaffold lacked guardrails. The scaffold, which was located at the top of a mezzanine level approximately 14 feet above ground and which was

inside the building’s footprint,7

 consisted of two ‘‘frames’’

(each approximately six feet tall). The employees stood on

the bottom frame while they worked, which put them approximately six feet above the mezzanine level. The placement of

the scaffold required the masons to lay the concrete blocks by

the ‘‘overhand bricklaying’’ method.8

 That is, after setting

5 The OSHA violations at issue here arose in connection with the

laying of concrete blocks to erect the building’s exterior walls.

6 A ‘‘personal fall arrest system’’ is ‘‘used to arrest an employee’s

fall’’ and ‘‘consists of an anchorage, connectors, a body belt or body

harness and may include a lanyard, deceleration device, lifeline, or

combination of these.’’ 29 C.F.R. § 1926.450(b).

7 Nearby power lines prevented the scaffold from being placed

outside the building.

8 OSHA’s regulations define ‘‘overhand bricklaying’’ as the ‘‘process of laying bricks and masonry units.’’ 29 C.F.R. § 1926.450(b).

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each concrete block in mortar, the masons had to lean over

the wall in order to strike the joints (i.e., work the mortar

into the interstices between the blocks using a concave tool)

on the wall’s face because the scaffold faced the inside of the

wall under construction.

From their vantage point, Jensen and Visage identified two

potential fall hazards that the employees working on the

scaffold were exposed to. The first was a window opening in

the wall under construction. They recorded Storer’s employees laying concrete blocks near the window opening; the

video shows one employee standing in front of the opening

and another walking by it. The second hazard was the

‘‘materials staging area’’—i.e., the area used to store both the

concrete blocks to be installed and a large vat of mortar—

located on the scaffold at the western end of the wall and

running perpendicular to it. One employee stood at the edge

of the scaffold next to the mortar vat while another lifted

concrete blocks onto the staging area from below. Both

locations—the window opening and the materials staging

area—were unguarded, that is, there was no fall protection.

The OSHA officials then decided to inspect the Farmer Jack’s

site; they spoke with members of both Bostleman and Storer

management as well as a consultant to Bostleman and they

measured the distance to the ground from the two open

areas. According to their measurements, the window opening in the wall exposed the Storer employees to a fall of 19.5

feet and those employees in the materials staging area risked

a fall of 20 feet.

On August 1, 2001 OSHA cited Storer, alleging that Storer

had violated 29 C.F.R. § 1926.451(g)(1) by failing to provide

fall protection for its employees on the scaffold. The citation

proposed a $6,000.00 penalty for Storer’s ‘‘repeat’’9

 violation.

The ALJ determined, not surprisingly, that concrete blocks are

masonry units. See Sec’y of Labor v. S.A. Storer & Sons Co., 19

O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2077, 2002 WL 31041865, at *3 (ALJ 2002).

9 The citation was labeled ‘‘repeat’’ because Storer had been

previously cited for a ‘‘substantially similar’’ violation of 29 C.F.R.

§ 1926.451(g)(1). See S.A. Storer & Sons Co., 2002 WL 31041865,

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Storer contested the citation, which triggered the hearing

before the ALJ. See 29 U.S.C. § 659(c).

On March 1, 2002 the ALJ held a one-day hearing in

Toledo, after which he affirmed the citation. See Sec’y of

Labor v. S.A. Storer & Sons Co., 19 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2077,

2002 WL 31041865, at *1, *6–7 (ALJ 2002). Before the ALJ,

Storer contended that it was exempt from having to protect

its employees from the two fall hazards identified by Jensen

and Visage—the unguarded window opening and materials

staging area—because the employees were performing overhand bricklaying. Id. at *1. In his decision, the ALJ agreed

that Storer’s employees were performing overhand bricklaying but concluded that the overhand bricklaying exception

offered Storer no defense because the employees were not

laying blocks at the window opening or in the materials

staging area.10 Id. at *3. Storer additionally maintained that

it had complied with the fall protection standard by establishing a ‘‘controlled access zone’’ (CAZ) on the mezzanine level.

Id. at *4. The ALJ disagreed, explaining that, under the

governing regulations, ‘‘the use of a CAZ as an alternative

means of fall protection is not applicable in this case.’’11 Id.

at *5. The ALJ therefore affirmed the citation and assessed

a $3,500.00 penalty. Id. at *6–7.

Storer petitioned the Commission for discretionary review

of the ALJ’s decision, see 29 C.F.R. § 2200.91, but the

Commission declined and instead, on September 5, 2002,

adopted the ALJ’s decision. See 29 U.S.C. § 661(j). Storer’s

at *5–6. The earlier citation involved an unguarded scaffold located

more than ten feet above ground at another worksite in Toledo. Id.

at *6.

10 With respect to the materials staging area, the ALJ also

rejected Storer’s claim that the mortar vat and concrete blocks

served as adequate fall protection. Id. at *4. Storer has not

challenged that determination.

11 The ALJ held that, under section 1926.451, an employer may

not use a CAZ to protect its employees performing overhand

bricklaying while on a scaffold. Id.; see discussion infra at II.B.

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petition for review of the Commission’s order is now before us

pursuant to 29 U.S.C § 660(a).

II.

The resolution of this case is governed by the ordinary

standard of review of an administrative agency’s action with

one exception. See A.J. McNulty & Co., 283 F.3d at 331;

Montgomery KONE, Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 234 F.3d 720, 722

(D.C. Cir. 2000). We review the actions of two separate

entities charged with different regulatory functions under the

OSH Act: the Secretary promulgates and enforces regulations while the Commission exercises the fact-finding and

adjudicatory authority. Montgomery KONE, Inc., 234 F.3d

at 722. We will not disturb the Commission’s factual findings

if they are ‘‘supported by substantial evidence on the record

considered as a whole,’’ 29 U.S.C. § 660(a); A.J. McNulty &

Co., 283 F.3d at 331; we also leave its legal conclusions intact

unless they are ‘‘arbitrary, capricious, TTT or otherwise not in

accordance with law.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 706(a)(2); A.J. McNulty &

Co., 283 F.3d at 331. An agency’s interpretation of its own

regulations is entitled to ‘‘substantial deference’’ and even

receives ‘‘ ‘controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or

inconsistent with the regulation.’ ’’12 Here, only the Secretary’s interpretations receive this level of deference because

she alone ‘‘has authority to make enforcement decisions and

to render definitive interpretations of OSHA regulations.’’

A.J. McNulty & Co., 283 F.3d at 331 (citing Martin v.

Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144,

151–57 (1991)). The Commission ‘‘has no more authority to

depart from the Secretary’s interpretations of OSHA regulations than do we,’’ S.G. Loewendick & Sons, Inc. v. Reich, 70

12 Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)

(quoting Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965)); see Martin v.

Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 150–

51 (1991) (‘‘court should give effect to agency’s interpretation TTT so

long as the interpretation ‘sensibly conforms to the purpose and

wording of the regulations’ ’’ (quoting N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v.

Porter County Chapter of Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc., 423

U.S. 12, 15 (1975))).

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F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and its interpretation of the

OSHA regulations is treated like that of the ‘‘nonpolicymaking’’ district court. Martin, 499 U.S. at 154; Molineaux v.

United States, 12 F.3d 264, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Storer does

not contest the findings of fact;13 the interpretations at issue

were advanced by the Secretary before the Commission and

in her brief to us.14 See Secretary’s Post-hearing Brief at 6–

7; Respondent’s Br. at 14–18.

Keeping these principles in mind, we turn to Storer’s two

claims. Storer first alleges that the Commission’s affirmance

of the OSHA citation for violating the fall protection standard

at the window opening cannot stand because it erroneously

interprets the exception contained in section

1926.451(g)(1)(vi). Second, Storer challenges the Commission’s affirmance of the OSHA citation for the violation of the

fall protection standard at the materials staging area, asserting that the Commission erroneously concluded that Storer

did not meet the fall protection requirement by establishing a

CAZ on the mezzanine level.

A.

The Commission agreed with the Secretary that Storer did

not fit section 1926.451(g)(1)(vi)’s exception from fall protection for overhand bricklayers working on a scaffold next to

the wall being built because its ‘‘employees were not engaged

in overhand laying of concrete blocks at the window opening.’’

S.A. Storer & Sons Co., 2002 WL 31041865, at *3. Storer

13 In its opening brief, Storer stated that ‘‘[t]he factual findings

are not in dispute.’’ Petitioner’s Br. at 15.

14 See Martin, 499 U.S. at 157 (‘‘Secretary’s interpretation of

OSH Act regulations in an administrative adjudication, however, is

agency action, not a post hoc rationalization of it’’ and ‘‘the Secretary’s litigating position before the Commission is as much an

exercise of delegated lawmaking powers as is the Secretary’s promulgation of a workplace health and safety standard’’ (emphasis in

original)); S.G. Loewendick & Sons, Inc., 70 F.3d at 1298 (‘‘Secretary certainly has the authority to offer definitive interpretations in

the context of litigation’’).

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charges that, in so concluding, the Commission effectively

‘‘eliminate[d]’’ the exception. Petitioner’s Br. at 18–19. In

Storer’s view, the exception means just what it says: no fall

protection is required ‘‘at the side next to the wall being laid,’’

including at any opening in the wall. Id. The Secretary

views the matter differently.

In her brief, the Secretary supplies a more thoroughgoing

explication of the exception than the one she put forth before

the Commission. Respondent’s Br. at 14–18. The Secretary

now explains that the exception ‘‘reflects a practical accommodation’’ and is thus ‘‘limited’’ to the situation in which ‘‘the

presence of a guardrail between the mason and the wall being

laid would interfere with or prevent the process of setting and

mortaring the masonry.’’ Id. at 14 (internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, the Secretary tells us, ‘‘if there is an

opening TTT where wall is not being laid, then no deviation

from the mandate that each employee performing [overhand]

bricklaying shall be protected from falling is justified.’’ Id. at

15 (internal quotation omitted). The Secretary further asserts that Storer finds an ‘‘unlimited exemption’’ in a ‘‘mere

parenthetical,’’ which ‘‘swallow[s]’’ the general requirement

for fall protection and is ‘‘without practical or policy justification, does not promote worker safety, and must be rejected.’’

Id. at 12, 17–18.

We believe the Secretary’s interpretation does not ‘‘ ‘sensibly conform[ ] to the purpose and wording of the regulation[ ].’ ’’ See Martin, 499 U.S. at 151 (quoting N. Ind. Pub.

Serv. Co., 423 U.S. at 15). Section 1926.451(g)(1)(vi) provides

that an employee performing overhand bricklaying from a

scaffold must be protected from falling—by way of a personal

fall arrest system or a guardrail—‘‘from all open sides and

ends of the scaffold TTT except at the side next to the wall

being laid.’’ 29 C.F.R. § 1926.451(g)(1)(vi) (emphasis added).

Under the plain language of the regulation, then, an employer

need not provide fall protection for an overhand bricklayer

‘‘at the side [of the scaffold] next to the wall being laid.’’ Id.

When OSHA promulgated the regulation in 1996, it explained

that ‘‘[p]aragraph (g)(1)(vi) of the final rule provides that fall

protection (i.e., a personal fall arrest system or guardrail) be

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provided on all open sides and ends of scaffolds from which

employees are performing overhand bricklaying operations

and/or related work, except those sides and ends next to the

wall being laid.’’ Safety Standards for Scaffolds Used in the

Construction Industry, Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 46,026,

46,066 (Aug. 30, 1996), available at 1996 WL 491490.

The Secretary, however, interprets the exception to mean

that fall protection is required ‘‘at the side next to the wall

being laid’’ except where it would interfere with or prevent

the performance of the masonry work.15 See Secretary’s

Post-hearing Brief at 6; Respondent’s Br. at 15. By reading

paragraph (g)(1)(vi) to require fall protection at the side next

to the wall being laid except where it would impede masonry

work being performed there, the Secretary inverts the plain

language of the exception, which unmistakably says that is

the one place that fall protection is not required. Because

the Secretary’s interpretation is incompatible with the exception’s plain language, we cannot accept it. See Thomas

Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994); S.G.

Loewendick & Sons, Inc., 70 F.3d at 1294–96.

The Secretary maintains that her interpretation is supported by the preamble to the regulation, which states in

part, ‘‘[t]he requirements for fall protection will apply at

openings such as TTT openings in the walls of the structure

surrounding the platform.’’ 61 Fed. Reg. at 46,066. Read in

its entirety, however, the preamble provides that ‘‘[p]aragraph (g)(1) does not apply where there are no ‘open sides or

ends’ on the scaffold,’’16 but ‘‘will apply at openings such as

hoistways, elevator shafts, stairwells, or similar openings in

15 The Secretary’s counsel confirmed this view at oral argument.

Recording of Oral Argument at 18:03 (‘‘[T]he fall protection is

required everywhere that actual overhand bricklaying is not being

conducted.’’).

16 ‘‘Open sides and ends’’ are generally those ‘‘edges of a platform

that are more than 14 inches (36 cm) away horizontally from a

sturdy, continuous, vertical surface (such as a building wall) or a

sturdy, continuous horizontal surface (such as a floor), or a point of

access.’’ 29 C.F.R. § 1926.450(b).

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the scaffold platform, or openings in the walls of the structure

surrounding the platform.’’ Id. (emphasis added). Thus the

preamble refers to the fall protection requirement applicable

to openings in a scaffold that is otherwise ‘‘completely enclosed,’’17 not to the fall protection required for overhand

bricklayers working at the side of a scaffold next to the wall

being laid. Id. Moreover, in contrast to that part of the

preamble applicable to a ‘‘completely enclosed’’ scaffold, the

portion of the preamble dealing specifically with paragraph

(g)(1)(vi) is unqualified: it provides simply that ‘‘fall protection TTT [must] be provided on all open sides and ends of

scaffolds TTT except those sides and ends next to the wall

being laid.’’ See id. (emphasis added).

The Secretary also contends that the ‘‘unlimited exemption’’ Storer advocates would ‘‘deny[ ] fall protection to all

masons working on scaffolds’’ and is ‘‘without practical or

policy justification.’’ Respondent’s Br. at 12, 18. Regarding

the Secretary’s first contention, not only does the Secretary

distort Storer’s position—it seeks to do only what the words

of the exception allow it to do, see 29 C.F.R.

§ 1926.451(g)(1)(vi)—but Storer can hardly be blamed if

OSHA’s wording falls wide of its mark. Diamond Roofing

Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 528

F.2d 645, 649 (5th Cir. 1976) (‘‘If a violation of a regulation

subjects private parties to criminal or civil sanctions, a regulation cannot be construed to mean what an agency intended

but did not adequately express.’’). The Secretary may be

dissatisfied with the regulation’s current formulation; if so,

OSHA can amend or eliminate it. But she cannot do so by

ascribing a meaning to words they simply do not have. As to

the Secretary’s second allegation, it is her own interpretation

that disregards the policy justifications supporting the exception. As the Secretary recognizes, see Respondent’s Br. at 15

n.8, two practical considerations undergird the exception from

the fall protection standard for overhand bricklayers working

17 According to OSHA, a scaffold is ‘‘completely enclosed’’ if ‘‘no

perimeter face of the scaffold [is] more than 14 inches from a wall.’’

61 Fed. Reg. at 46,066.

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at the side of the scaffold next to the wall being laid: first,

the use of a conventional fall protection system often is

infeasible; second, such a system may itself pose a fall

hazard. OSHA has explained that

[w]hile the use of guardrails, body belts, body harnesses,

and safety nets is allowed during overhand bricklaying,

the use of such systems often is not feasible. Guardrails

pose obvious interference problems and safety nets cannot be attached to many load-bearing or other brick walls

as such walls are not capable of supporting the loads

imposed by a net system. Body belt/harness systems

often become entangled in close quarters and in those

cases where suitable anchorages can be found, lanyards

and lifelines pose serious tripping hazards to the mason

tenders who could themselves trip and go over the

edge.18

According to OSHA’s own observations, then, requiring fall

protection along the side of the scaffold next to the wall being

laid, except where the bricklayers are in fact working at any

moment (as the Secretary’s interpretation purports to require), raises a serious feasibility issue and may even increase

the fall hazard.19

18 Safety Standards for Fall Protection in the Construction Industry, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 51 Fed. Reg. 42,718, 42,722

(Nov. 25, 1986), available at 1986 WL 116297; see also Safety

Standards for Fall Protection in the Construction Industry, Final

Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 40,672, 40,688 (Aug. 9, 1994), available at 1994

WL 411799 (a conventional fall protection system ‘‘sometimes is not

feasible when overhand bricklaying and related operations are

taking place’’ because ‘‘guardrails may interfere with the performance of work; safety net systems often cannot be safely attached to

or supported by the structure; and personal fall arrest systems

often become tangled or pose serious trip and fall hazards’’).

19 The fall protection standard applicable to overhand bricklaying

performed from a scaffold and the standard applicable to the same

work but performed from other elevated surfaces found their way

into different subparts of OSHA’s regulations applicable to the

construction industry: the standard for overhand bricklaying from

a scaffold ended up in subpart L, see 29 C.F.R. § 1926.451(g)(1)(vi),

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The Secretary’s interpretation of her regulations must ‘‘reflect clear, rational decisionmaking that gives regulated members of the public adequate notice of their obligations.’’ S.G.

Loewendick & Sons, Inc., 70 F.3d at 1297. Neither the

Secretary’s nor the Commission’s interpretation of the exception contained in paragraph (g)(1)(vi) does so. Because the

Commission erroneously interpreted paragraph (g)(1)(vi), see

S.A. Storer & Sons Co., 2002 WL 31041865, at *3, we vacate

its order with respect to the window opening area of the wall

being laid. S.G. Loewendick & Sons, Inc., 70 F.3d at 1292,

1298.20 We now turn to Storer’s challenge regarding the

materials staging area of the scaffold.

while the standard for overhand bricklaying from other elevated

surfaces is included in subpart M, see 29 C.F.R. § 1926.501(b)(9).

The two-branched standards nevertheless grew from a common

policy stalk. In its proposed subpart L standards for scaffolds

(published in the Federal Register on the same day as its proposed

subpart M standards), OSHA explained that the ‘‘[r]equirements to

protect employees performing overhand bricklaying operations from

supported scaffolds are provided in § 1926.501 [in subpart M],’’

Safety Standards for Scaffolds Used in the Construction Industry,

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 51 Fed. Reg. at 42,680, 42,707

(Nov. 25, 1986), available at 1986 WL 116296, which suggests that

at one point the fall protection standards for overhand bricklaying—whether performed from a scaffold or another elevated surface—reflected common concerns. That the two standards continue

to reflect common concerns is plain from OSHA’s statement in the

preamble accompanying the subpart L regulations that ‘‘[p]aragraph (g)(1)(vi) of the final rule is consistent with § 1926.501(b)(9),

which addresses fall protection for employees performing overhand

bricklaying while on elevated surfaces other than scaffolds.’’ 61

Fed. Reg. at 46,066. Given this statement, plus the fact that OSHA

offered no other justification for excepting fall protection ‘‘at the

side next to the wall being laid,’’ 29 C.F.R. § 1926.451(g)(1)(vi), we

cannot but conclude that the exception reflects the same safety and

feasibility concerns that underlie the subpart M fall protection

standard for overhand bricklaying. To be clear, however, we do not

embrace any policy preference. The Secretary is free, so far as the

court is concerned, to advance one objective (safety) instead of

another (efficiency). The Secretary cannot do so, however, through

an interpretation that flouts the exception’s plain language.

20 At oral argument, Storer asserted that its employees were

doing overhand bricklaying along the building’s western wall near

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B.

Storer also maintains that it provided fall protection at the

materials staging area by establishing a CAZ on the mezzanine level. Petitioner’s Br. at 20. The gist of Storer’s

position appears to be that CAZs ‘‘are specifically permitted

when used to control access to areas where overhand bricklaying and related work are taking placeTTTT The regulations for [CAZs] do not make an exception for when overhand

bricklaying is performed from scaffolds. Nor could

[they]TTTT’’ Id. at 13–14; see also id. at 20. The Commission rejected this argument, S.A. Storer & Sons Co., 2002 WL

31041865, at *4, and so do we; it founders because it disregards the plain language of the applicable regulations. See

29 C.F.R. §§ 1926.451(g)(1)(vi), 1926.500(a)(2)(i),

1926.501(b)(9) note.

OSHA’s fall protection regulations provide that an employer may, in certain instances, see id. § 1926.501(b)(2)(i), (9)(i),

(12)-(13), safeguard its employees working in construction

areas by establishing a CAZ, an area where access is restricted and ‘‘certain work TTT may take place without the use of

guardrail systems, personal fall arrest systems, or safety net

systems.’’ Id. §§ 1926.500(b), 1926.502(g). Under subpart M

the materials staging area. But when pressed as to where in the

record there was support for the assertion, Storer’s counsel stated,

‘‘I don’t know that the record specifically states it.’’ Recording of

Oral Argument at 22:26. He referred the court to still images

taken from the OSHA video which were used as exhibits at the

hearing before the ALJ. Id. Not only do the images fail to show

that Storer employees were working on the wall near the materials

staging area but Storer employees’ testimony is to the contrary.

Joint Appendix 177, 221, 247. Moreover, Storer did not raise the

issue in either of its briefs, see Corson & Gruman Co. v. NLRB, 899

F.2d 47, 50 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (‘‘We require petitioners and

appellants to raise all of their arguments in the opening brief to

prevent ‘sandbagging’ of appellees and respondents and to provide

opposing counsel the chance to respond.’’)—indeed, its opening brief

tends to contradict the position Storer’s counsel took at oral argument. See Petitioner’s Br. at 9, 10, 13, 20.

USCA Case #02-1307 Document #810654 Filed: 03/19/2004 Page 14 of 16
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of Part 1926, such a zone may be used to protect employees

‘‘performing overhand bricklaying and related work 6 feet (1.8

m) or more above lower levels.’’ Id. § 1926.501(b)(9)(i).

Storer’s position might have had some appeal if the quoted

provision were all that OSHA said about an employer’s

obligation to protect overhand bricklayers from falling. But

it is not.

Instead the regulations do precisely what Storer claims

they do not: they prevent an employer from using a CAZ to

protect employees from falling while they perform overhand

bricklaying from a scaffold. See id. §§ 1926.451(g)(1)(vi),

1926.500(a)(2)(i), 1926.501(b)(9) note; see also 61 Fed. Reg. at

46,066; Safety Standards for Fall Protection in the Construction Industry, Final Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 40,672, 40,689 (Aug.

9, 1994), available at 1994 WL 411799. Subpart M makes

clear that its fall protection standard does not apply to

employees working while on a scaffold: ‘‘[r]equirements related to fall protection for employees working on scaffolds are

provided in subpart L.’’ 29 C.F.R. § 1926.500(a)(2)(i). Moreover, the very regulation in subpart M which allows for the

use of a CAZ to protect overhand bricklayers includes the

following ‘‘Note,’’ ‘‘[b]ricklaying operations performed on scaffolds are regulated by subpart L—Scaffolds of this part.’’ Id.

§ 1926.501(b)(9); see also 59 Fed. Reg. at 40,689 (‘‘OSHA

agrees that it is appropriate for bricklaying performed from

scaffolds to be regulated under subpart L, Scaffolds, rather

than under subpart M and, accordingly, the Agency is adding

a note to subpart L which so indicates.’’). The pertinent

provision in subpart L, paragraph (g)(1)(vi), does not allow

the use of a CAZ to protect employees from falling; instead it

provides that ‘‘employees performing overhand bricklaying

operations from a supported scaffold shall be protected from

falling TTT by the use of a personal fall arrest system or

guardrail system.’’ 29 C.F.R. § 1926.451(g)(1)(vi). The Commission thus properly rejected Storer’s claim that the CAZ on

the mezzanine level constituted sufficient fall protection for

its employees working at the materials staging area of the

scaffold. See id.

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III.

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the Commission’s

order and remand to that body for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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