Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02182/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02182-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Arno Kuntz
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

p UBL I SH Uflited Scares Courr of Appeals 

Tench Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUl lJ 1990 

TENTH CIRCUIT .ROBERT L HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 89-2182 

ROBERT ARNO KUNTZ, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Cou rt 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. 89-122-JB) 

Charles Louis Roberts, El Paso, Texas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Rhonda P. Backinoff, Assistant U.S. Attorney (William L. Lutz, 

United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Albuquerque, New 

Mexico , for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before HOLLOWAY , Chief Judge, LOGAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge . 

Appellate Case: 89-2182 Document: 01019439349 Date Filed: 07/16/1990 Page: 1 
In this appeal, defendant Robert Arno Kuntz challenges the 

constitutionality of section 5Kl.l of the federal sentencing 

guidelines. Defendant also alleges that the court below erred in 

not conducting a presentence evidentiary hearing on his claim of 

diminished capacity, and that he was denied effective assistance 

of counsel at sentencing. We uphold the challenged guidelines 

section and affirm the sentence. 

I 

After defendant was indicted on one count of possession with 

intent to distribute more than one hundred kilograms of marijuana, 

he entered into a Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Guilty 

Plea with the prosecution, pursuant to which he entered a plea of 

guilty to an information charging him with possession with i ntent 

to distribute less than one hundred kilograms of marijuana in 

violation of 21 u.s.c. §§ 84l(a)(l) and 84l(b)(l)(C). The 

Memorandum of Understanding provided " that the defendant and the 

United States agree that if the defendant assists the United 

States t hat such assistance will be evaluated to determine whether 

a motion for departure downward is appropriate pursuant to 5Kl.l 

of the Sentencing Guidelines.'' I R. tab 17 ~ 4. The government 

never filed a motion to depart downward. 

When the case carne before the district court for sentencing, 

defense counsel argued in camera that defendant's willingness to 

cooperate with the prosecution shquld be considered. In open 

court, defense counsel presented evidence designed to show that 

defendant suffered from diminished capacity at the time of the 

offense. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2182 Document: 01019439349 Date Filed: 07/16/1990 Page: 2 
The court found that there was no need for a further 

evidentiary hearing and proceeded to sentencing. It accepted a 

stipulation in the Memorandum of Understanding that defendant was 

entitled to a reduction of two offense levels for acceptance of 

responsibility, see United States Sentencing Commission, 

Guidelines Manual, § 3£1.1 (Nov. 1989) (hereinafter u.s.s.G.), and 

sentenced defendant to sixty-three months in prison, the maximum 

sentence for defendant's adjusted offense level of twenty-four and 

criminal history category of I. 

This appeal followed. 

II 

The government argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to 

consider defendant's challenge to section 5Kl.l of the guidelines. 

We have held that Hwhen a sentence is within the guideline range 

and is not imposed in violation of l aw, or as a result of an 

incorrect application of the guidelines, then the district court's 

refusal to exercise its discretion to depart downward from the 

guideline range is not appealable. " 

F.2d 1524, 1530 (lOth Cir. 1990) 

United States v. Davis, 900 

(footnotes omitted). 

Nonetheless, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to hear this 

appeal, because the challenge is not to the judge's exercise of 

discretion under the statutory sentencing framework but to the 

constitutionality of the framework itself. The appeal is from a 

sentence allegedly ''imposed in violation of law" under 

§ 3742(a)(l), and is therefore properly before us. United States 

v. La Guardia, F.2d , 1990 WL 50806 at 1 (1st Cir. 1990). 

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Appellate Case: 89-2182 Document: 01019439349 Date Filed: 07/16/1990 Page: 3 
Section 5Kl.l provides that "[u]pon motion of the government 

stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in 

the investigation or prosecution of another person who has 

committed an offense , the court may depart from t he guidelines." 

(emphasis added). The section implements 18 u.s.c. § 3553(e), 

which provides that "[u]pon motion of the Government , the court 

shall have authority to impose a sentence below a level 

established by statute as minimum sentence so as to reflect a 

defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or 

prosecution of another person who has committed an offense." 

(emphasis added). 

By their express terms, these provisions condition the 

district court's consideration of defendant's substantial 

assistance claim upon a pr ior motion of the government . 

Defendant's argument is that the government motion provision of 

section 5Kl.l violates due process because the "decision by the 

Government [whether to file a motion] is not monitored or capable 

of being monitored by the trial court on hearing or the Appellate 

Court on review." Brief for Appellant at 14-15. 

Defendant's argument appears to be based on the premise that 

sentencing is an inherently discretionary judicial function. We 

rejected that premise in United States v. Thomas, 884 F.2d 540, 

543 (lOth Cir. 1989). Moreover, "Congress' power to control 

judicial sentencing discretion includes the power to specify the 

factors that a court may consider in setting a sentence." La 

Guardia, F.2d at , 1990 WL 50806 at 4. Thus, Congress 

could have completely precluded the courts from considering 

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Appellate Case: 89-2182 Document: 01019439349 Date Filed: 07/16/1990 Page: 4 
defendant's assistance to the prosecution in setting the sentence. 

As the Eleventh Circuit held with respect to the government motion 

provision in section 3553(e), which this guideline impl ements, 

11 [a]ppellant[] certainly ha[s] no constitutional right to the 

availability of the 'substantial assistance' provision, and hence 

no grounds upon which to challenge Congress' manner of enacting 

it." United States v. Musser, 856 F.2d 1484, 1487 (llth Cir. 

1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1145 ( 1989 ). 

We reject the argument that due process requires judicial 

review of a prosecutor's decision not to file a section 5Kl.l 

motion. Cf. United States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 

1989), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 845 ( 1990) (rejecting same 

argument with respect to section 3553~e) motions). We do not 

preclude the possibility that "[p ]erhaps in an egregious case--a 

case where the prosecution stubbornly refuses to file a motion 

despite overwhelming evidence that the accused's assistance has 

been so substantial as to cry out for meaningful relief--the court 

would be justified in taking some corrective action." La Guardia, 

F.2d at , 1990 WL 50806 at 6. We do not have such a 

situation before us. Further, such a case should be rare because 

"[t]here are significant institutional incentives for 

the prosecution to exercise sound judgment and to act in 

good faith in deciding whether to make a § 3553(e) [ and 

§ 5K1.1] motion. The government has an interest in 

encouraging defendants to cooperate with law enforcement 

efforts. The reasonable use of substantial assistance 

motions for those who cooperate will make others more 

likely to do so in the future. In addition, because 

promises to make such motions are analogous to plea 

agreements, a defendant would likely not be without 

recourse in the case of a breach by the government." 

Huerta, 878 F.2d at 93. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2182 Document: 01019439349 Date Filed: 07/16/1990 Page: 5 
Defendant also urges that the government motion provision 

violates the separation of powers. This argument is merely a 

variant of the due process claim, and we reject it for the same 

reasons . See also id. at 91-93. 

Thus we conclude that section 5Kl.l of the Sentencing 

Guidelines is constitutional. Accord La Guardia , F.2d at 

1990 WL 50806 at 8; United States v . Lewis, 896 F.2d 246, 

249 (7 t h Cir. 1990); United States v. Francois, 889 P.2d 1341, 

1344 (4th Cir . 1989), cert. denied, 110 S . Ct . 1822 (1990); United 

States v . Grant , 886 F.2d 1513, 1514 (8 th Cir. 1989); United 

States v . Ayarza, 874 P.2d 647, 653 (9th Cir . 1989), cert. denied, 

110 s. Ct . 847 {1990); cf. Huerta, 878 F . 2d at 94 (§ 3553(e)); 

Musser , 856 F.2d at 1487 {same) . 

III 

Defendant argues that the district court erred in failing to 

order an evidentiary hearing on the issue of defendant 's mental 

capacity at the time of the offense. Diminished capacity is an 

appropriate ground for downward depar ture from the guidelines. 

See U.S . S .G. § 5K2.13 p.s. at 5.47. We have not considered 

whether, given that the sentencing court's discretionary decision 

not to depart from the guidelines is unreviewable , the court's 

refusal to order an evidentiary hearing on an issue relevant to a 

possible departure is reviewable. We do not reach this question 

today, however , because no request for an evidentiary hearing was 

made to the sentencing court. Accordingly, defendant has waived 

whatever procedural objection he may have had. See United States 

v . Velasquez , 868 F.2d 714, 715 (5th Cir . 1989) . 

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Appellate Case: 89-2182 Document: 01019439349 Date Filed: 07/16/1990 Page: 6 
IV 

Finally, defendant claims that he was denied effective 

assist ance of counsel at sentencing. Defendant asserts that his 

appointed counsel should have presented defendant's substantial 

assistance and diminished capacity claims in "more detail, 11 11 in 

writing ," and earlier in the proceeding, Brief for Appellant at 

30; but he does not suggest that there is a ny relevant evidence 

that was not presented to the court in timely fashion. Similarly, 

defendant urges that his counsel should have objected in writing 

to the presentence report and objected urnore strongly" when the 

judge " refused" to hold an evidentiary hearing on diminished 

capacity , id.; but, again, he does not argue that any rel evant 

objection was not made, or that any evidence would have been 

offered at an evidentiary hearing that is not already in the 

record. This claim is clearly frivolous . 

AFFIRMED . 

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