Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00605/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00605-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jammy Demond Bell
Petitioner
Grant Culliver
Respondent

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAMMY DEMOND BELL, :

AIS 168174,

:

Petitioner,

:

vs. CA 07-0605-WS-C

:

GRANT CULLIVER,

:

Respondent.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Jammy Demond Bell, a state prisoner presently in the custody of the

respondent, has petitioned this Court for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is challenging the validity of his November 5,

2003 second-degree receiving stolen property conviction in the Circuit Court

of Washington County, Alabama. On December 16, 2003, Bell was sentenced

to twenty-five (25) years imprisonment under Alabama’s Habitual Felony

Offender Statute. Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal

by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on June 25, 2004, by unpublished

memorandum opinion. Bell v. State, 919 So.2d 1240 (Ala.Crim.App. 2004)

(table). Petitioner’s application for rehearing was denied on July 16, 2004, Bell

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v. State, 920 So.2d 609 (Ala.Crim.App. 2004) (table), and, on January 14,

2005, the Alabama Supreme Court denied Bell’s petition for writ of certiorari,

Ex parte Bell, 924 So.2d 800 (Ala. 2005) (table). Petitioner filed a Rule 32

petition in the Circuit Court of Washington County, Alabama collaterally

attacking his conviction and sentence on February 25, 2005. The trial court

denied the petition on September 6, 2006, following an evidentiary hearing.

On February 23, 2007, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the

denial of Bell’s Rule 32 petition. Petitioner’s application for rehearing was

denied by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on March 16, 2007 and, on

July 27, 2007, the Alabama Supreme Court denied Bell’s petition for writ of

certiorari, Ex parte Bell, So.2d , 2007 WL 2152903 (Ala. 2007).

In his petition before this Court, filed August 27, 2007, Bell raises the

following grounds which he claims entitle him to relief:

(1) trial counsel was ineffective (a) in failing to object and establish a

prima facie case with respect to the prosecutor’s peremptory strikes in

accordance with Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d

69 (1986); (b) in failing to challenge for cause a potential juror who did not

reside in the county and district where the crime occurred; (c) in failing to

object to the trial court administering the oath to the petit jury; (d) in failing to

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 2 of 54
1 Petitioner actually lists each ground of ineffective assistance of trial counsel

separately in the petition, listing these issues as grounds one through eight. (See Doc. 1)

2 Petitioner raises these claims as grounds nine and ten of his petition. (See Doc. 1)

3

request and object to the lack of jury instructions regarding Bell’s statement

to Officer Vanessa Barnett that was admitted into evidence; (e) in failing to

object to the trial court having improper contact with the jury; (f) in failing to

advise Bell of the advantages and disadvantages of taking the witness stand;

(g) in failing to object to the use of prior convictions during sentencing; and

(h) in failing to inform petitioner of the risks of proceeding pro se;

1

(2) appellate counsel was ineffective (a) in failing to challenge the trial

court’s denial of a continuance; and (b) in failing to preserve and raise in a

motion for new trial his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel;2

(3) he was deprived of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by

the trial court’s action in rendering judgment and imposing a sentence without

establishing venue;

(4) the oath to the petit jury was not administered in the manner

prescribed by Alabama law thereby depriving petitioner of his Fourteenth

Amendment rights; and 

(5) the sentence imposed exceeded the maximum authorized by law. 

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The respondent has admitted that the instant petition has been timely

filed (Doc. 8, at 9) and that petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies

(see id.). Respondent does claim, however, that this Court is procedurally

barred from reaching the merits of Bell’s claims of lack of venue and the

failure to properly administer the oath to the petit jury and that petitioner has

failed to establish that the decisions of Alabama’s state courts regarding the

remaining issues were contrary to federal law or an unreasonable application

of the law to the facts of his case. This case is ripe for a decision by this Court.

This cause is before the Court on the petition and respondent’s answer,

with attachments. A careful review of the record has been completed and it is

determined that it contains sufficient facts upon which the issues under

consideration may be properly resolved. Therefore, no evidentiary hearing is

required.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On August 28, 2003, Bell was indicted on one count of receiving

stolen property in the second degree in violation of § 13A-8-18 of the Code of

Alabama. (Doc. 8, Exhibit A, INDICTMENT) Petitioner was arraigned on this

charge on September 17, 2003, appearing with counsel and entering a not

guilty plea. (Doc. 8, Exhibit A, Case Action Summary Sheet; see also Doc. 8,

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5

Exhibit A, Transcript of Proceedings on September 17, 2003, at 7-11) 

2. On October 20, 2003, the trial court granted defense counsel’s

motion to withdraw to the extent that he was relieved of being “trial counsel.”

(Doc. 8, Exhibit A, Transcript of Proceedings on October 20, 2003, at 14; see

also T.T. 24 (“Ben Kelly, an attorney practicing before the bar in the First

Circuit has been appointed by the Court to be advisory counsel to Mr. Bell.”))

However, the court instructed counsel that he would “be on call to assist Mr.

Bell at any appropriate time when either called on by Mr. Bell or by the

Court.” (Id. at 14-15; see also id. at 15 (“On that, you are not required by the

Court to file any motion or take any other action except sit by him and give

assistance when called on.”)) Bell informed the trial court that he required no

assistance. (Id. at 15) “I don’t want nobody sit by me. I had rather have nobody

sit by me but my own counsel, me.” (Id.) However, after the striking of the

jury and the denial of Bell’s Batson challenge to the striking of two black

jurors (T.T. 34-36), petitioner requested that Ben Kelly, Esquire be allowed to

serve as his attorney in the trial of the case as opposed to serving in an

advisory capacity (T.T. 42); the court granted this request (T.T. 43).

MR. KELLY: Judge, Mr. Bell has informed me he

wishes me to do the opening statement in his case, and also

asked me to write a motion to dismiss and motion to suppress.

And there needs to be some determination as to my roll in the

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case, as far as, am I now back [as] the attorney of record, fully,

or am I just going to do [the] opening? I just need to know.

THE COURT: Let me just ask Mr. Bell. Now, Mr. Bell

at the settlement docket you indicated that you did not wish to

have an attorney to represent you, and even overruled the Court

when the Court advised you that Mr. Kelly would be required to

stay in this case as advisory counsel to you, and he would not

participate in the trial unless you called upon him.

Do you now wish Mr. Kelly to represent you in this

matter[?]

MR. BELL: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is that what you want to do?

MR. BELL: Yeah.

THE COURT: Any objection by the State?

MR. KEAHEY: Yes, sir I feel that the defendant, by

doing this, has now put Mr. Kelly in a position of going forward

with a case I don’t think he can be prepared to try, therefore,

giving the defendant the opportunity of suing Mr. Kelly at the

conclusion of the case if he is convicted, whereas under an

advisory capacity, the standard for Rule 32 is totally different.

As far as I have been able to understand the law is virtually

nonexistent. If he gets him in at this time, the first motion Mr.

Kelly will have to ask for is a . . . continuance, and we’re ready

to go forward.

THE COURT: Anything else by Mr. Bell?

MR. BELL: No, sir. I object to his –

THE COURT: I know you’re going to object to his

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objection. Anything concrete?

MR. BELL: I am legally allowed to have an attorney

represent me; knowing, competent attorney. As such, he was the

original attorney in this case, and I . . . feel like I know he

represent me to the best of his knowledge in this case.

THE COURT: All right. Let me state for the record that

the defendant has put himself in this position of having counsel

who was[], initially in an advisory status, who has done no trial

preparation, as far as subpoenaing witnesses or other things

because of the defendant’s insistence he would represent himself

in this trial.

Therefore, I’m going to allow Mr. Kelly to participate

fully in the trial to the extent of a regular attorney in the case,

with the understanding, for the record, that Mr. Bell has placed

you in that position without any fault of your own in this case.

MR. KELLY: Yes, sir. Judge, I would move for a

continuance based on the fact I am not ready.

THE COURT: Denied.

(T.T. 42-44; see also T.T. 44-45 (“Ladies and gentlemen, there has been a

slight change of plan in this case. Mr. Kelly has, up to this point, been advisory

counsel to Mr. Bell, the defendant in this case. From this point, Mr. Bell has

asked the Court to allow Mr. Kelly to participate fully in the case as attorney

of record for the defendant. And the Court has allowed that. Mr. Kelly will be

participating from this point.”)) 

3. During the trial, Patrick Thomas, an associate minister at Faith

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3 Thomas estimated the value of the equipment as being $900.00. (T.T. 51)

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Temple Holiness Church in August of 2002, testified that the church owned

a PA system, more specifically an amplifier and speakers, and that he never

gave Bell the permission to possess this equipment. (T.T. 46-49) The

equipment was stolen from the church’s revival tent which was located in

Washington County, Alabama. (See T.T. 50-52) The day after this equipment

went missing in August of 2002, Thomas reported the crime to the authorities.

(See T.T. 49)3

 Thomas admitted on cross-examination that he did not see Bell

take the equipment nor did he ever see the equipment in Bell’s possession.

(T.T. 53) However, it is clear from Thomas’ testimony that the witness did go

to the defendant (his cousin) and talk to him about the missing equipment.

(T.T. 50)

4. Timothy Lofton testified that in August of 2002 Bell offered to

sell him some speakers for $50.00. (See T.T. 55-59) When Lofton showed no

interest in buying the speakers (T.T. 59), Bell paid Lofton gas money and tried

to sell the speakers first in Mount Vernon (id.) and then in Saraland (T.T. 59-

60). According to Lofton, Bell sold the speakers to a guy in a parking lot

outside of a pawn shop in Saraland. (T.T. 60) In addition, Lofton identified the

amplifier taken from the Faith Temple Holiness Church’s revival tent as being

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4 MR. KELLY: Judge, I renew my objection that anything

said by Vanessa Barnett be excluded because, previously, the

Court has already ruled that those statements which are very

similar to the statements made to Officer Barnett, Mike Barnett,

would be excluded because they have not been provided to the

defense. It’s the same statement.

THE COURT: Response by the State for the record.

MR. KEAHEY: Under Rule 16.1, the only statements the

State intends to offer are discoverable to the defendant. We didn’t have

them. We should have had them, though. Mr. Barnett had them. We did

not know about them until today. They were properly excluded by the

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in Bell’s possession. (T.T. 80)

5. In his own defense, Bell denied receiving any stolen property

and denied ever meeting, much less knowing, Timothy Lofton. (T.T. 85-86)

Bell admitted that he had two prior felony convictions, one for second-degree

robbery and the other for third-degree burglary. (T.T. 89; see also T.T. 90

(“Were you guilty of those offenses? [] Yes, I was. That’s the reason I didn’t

take it to trial, I pleaded guilty to it. I was wrong. And this why I took this to

trial, I am not guilty.”)) 

6. In rebuttal, Vanessa Barnett testified that Bell told her that he

found the stereo equipment in the woods and took it and sold it. (T.T. 99; see

also T.T. 106 (Chief Mike Barnett’s testimony that Bell told him that “he did

not steal the amplifier equipment from the church, but he found it in the woods

next to the tent. States he took it to town and sold it.”))4

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Judge. The defendant chose to take the stand, chose to make those

statements admissible in rebuttal.

THE COURT: The objection is noted and overruled. The

statements are admissible for the purpose offered by the State.

(T.T. 100-101)

10

7. Bell made a closing statement over his attorney’s advice that it

would not be in his best interests to make a closing argument. (See T.T. 117)

During his closing, Bell told the jury that he was actually guilty of theft of

property as opposed to receiving stolen property. (See T.T. 129 (“[A]t my

client’s insistence, he wants me to renew a motion to dismiss the indictment

based on the fact that he is charged with receiving stolen property, and he

testified in closing that he is actually guilty of theft of property.”); T.T. 140 (“I

feel like that I should be charged with something that I did do, and receiving

stolen property is something I did not do. And I testified at trial that I was

guilty of stealing the property, but the owner of the property never pressed any

charges on me.”))

8. The petit jury found Bell guilty of second-degree receipt of

stolen property on November 5, 2003. (T.T. 134; see also T.T. 134-135 (jury

was polled regarding its guilty verdict))

9. Bell was sentenced to twenty-five (25) years imprisonment on

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December 16, 2003. (T.T. 137-146; see T.T. 144-145( “[T]he Court finds that

you should be sentenced in this case to a period of twenty-five years

confinement in the State penitentiary.”))

10. Petitioner filed a direct appeal from his conviction and sentence

in the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. (See Doc. 8, Exhibit B) Bell raised

two issues on direct appeal: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for

judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s case-in-chief; and (2) the trial

court erred in allowing the prosecution to introduce the substance of an

incriminating oral statement given by him to law enforcement personnel

because same was not disclosed to the defense prior to trial. (Id. at 2) The

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Bell’s conviction and sentence

by unpublished memorandum opinion entered on June 25, 2004. Bell v. State,

919 So.2d 1240 (Ala.Crim.App. 2004) (table).

The evidence adduced at trial indicated the following.

Patrick Thomas, the former associate minister at Faith Temple

Holiness Church in Washington County, testified that the

Church was holding a tent revival in early August of 2002.

According to Thomas, who stated that he and Bell are firstcousins, an amplifier and speakers turned up missing on August

1, 2002. Thomas testified that he reported the stereo equipment

missing the following day; he further stated that he spoke with

Bell about the stereo equipment, but that the stereo equipment

was never returned. According to Thomas, Bell did not have

title or permission to possess the speakers or amplifier; Thomas

further stated that he never authorized Bell to sell them at a

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pawn shop. Thomas stated that the speakers and amplifier had

been purchased a few weeks earlier, and that the value of the

speakers was $300 and the value of the amplifier was $600.

Timothy Lofton testified that he was an acquaintance of

Bell’s. According to Lofton, Bell approached him in August of

2002 and offered to sell him a speaker for $50. Lofton stated

that he accompanied Bell to the woods and saw a large box

speaker that Lofton characterized as a 15, a term which he stated

indicated the size of the speaker. Lofton stated that he told Bell

that he did not want to purchase the speaker. According to

Lofton, Bell put the speaker and an amplifier in Lofton’s truck;

gave him some gas; and asked if he could drive him to Mount

Vernon. Lofton stated that when they arrived in Mount Vernon,

Bell went into the barber shop and attempted to sell the stereo

equipment there; according to Lofton, the man at the barber

shop stated that he did not want to buy them but that he would

buy them later. Lofton testified that Bell then asked Lofton to

drive him to Saraland; that Bell tried to pawn the stereo

equipment at a pawn shop in Saraland but could not because he

did not have his identification; that Bell tried to get him to pawn

the stereo equipment in [Lofton’s] name but that he refused; and

that Bell sold the stereo equipment to an individual in the

parking lot of the pawn shop for $200. Lofton denied any

involvement in the taking of the stereo equipment or having ever

possessed the stereo equipment.

Michael Barnett, Chief of the McIntosh Police

Department, and his wife, Vanessa, who was apparently

employed by some law-enforcement agency in Washington

County, both testified as rebuttal witnesses. They said that Bell

had requested to speak with them; that Bell was seeking to gain

leniency in the stolen-property case by providing information on

an unrelated capital-murder case, and that he made admissions

to them about the stolen-property case. According to Vanessa,

Bell told [her] he knew what had happened was wrong, that he

had gotten the [stereo equipment]. At the time he didn’t know it

was stolen. He had found it at the edge of the woods in a dump

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or something. He took it and got rid of it. He sold it. Chief

Barnett testified that Bell stated that he did not steal the

amplifier equipment from the church, but he had found it in the

woods next to the tent. [He] [s]tated he took it to town and sold

it.

I.

Bell contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain

his conviction because, he says, the only evidence connecting

him to the crime was the uncorroborated testimony of Lofton

who, Bell argues, was an accomplice.

Section 12-21-222, Ala. Code 1975, states:

A conviction of [a] felony cannot be had

on the testimony of an accomplice unless

corroborated by other evidence tending to connect

the defendant with the commission of the offense,

and such corroborative evidence, if it merely

shows the commission of the offense or the

circumstances thereof, is not sufficient.

In Gavin v. State, [Ms. CR-99-1127, Sept. 26, 2003]

 So.2d (Ala. Crim. App. 2003), this Court stated: 

Before § 12-21-222 is invoked, it must

clearly appear that the witness is an accomplice,

and it is the defendant’s burden to prove that a

witness is an accomplice, unless the evidence

shows without dispute that the witness is an

accomplice. Whether a witness is an accomplice

may be a question of law or fact, depending upon

the circumstances of the case. When there is a

doubt or dispute concerning the complicity of a

witness and the testimony is susceptible to

different inferences on that point, the question [of

whether the witness is an accomplice] is for the

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jury. When a witness denies willing participation

in the crime charged against the defendant, the

issue of his being an accomplice is a question of

fact for the jury.

 So.2d at .

In Cumbo v. State, 368 So.2d 871 (Ala. Crim. App.

1978), this Court stated:

Where there is no conflict in the testimony, the

question of whether a witness is an accomplice is

a question of law for determination by the trial

court. But where there is doubt or dispute whether

a witness is in fact an accomplice, the question is

for the jury and not the trial court. Where the

issue of whether the state’s witness was an

accomplice is for the jury, the denial of the

accused’s motion to exclude the state’s evidence

for lack of corroboration is not error.

368 So.2d at 876-877.

Here, Lofton presented conflicting testimony as to at

what point he began to believe that the stereo equipment was

stolen. Lofton testified that Bell approached him and offered to

sell him a speaker; that Bell took him to a location in the woods

where the stereo equipment was located; that he declined to

purchase the speaker; that he took Bell to two different

communities where Bell attempted to sell the stereo equipment;

that he declined to pawn the stereo equipment in his name as

Bell did not have any identification; and that he was present

when Bell sold the stereo equipment to a man in the parking lot

of a pawn shop. According to Lofton, he was not charged with

any crime related to the stereo equipment, but he did talk to the

police and fill out a police report. We also note the following

exchange at trial:

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[Defense Counsel]: You went with him to

sell it; is that correct?

[Lofton]: Yes, sir.

[Defense counsel]: Why did you go with

him if you knew it was stolen?

[Lofton]: I didn’t know it was stolen at

th[at] time.

[Defense counsel]: At what point did you

know it was stolen?

[Lofton]: When he tried to sell it for cheap.

[Defense counsel]: Let me ask you this:

You mean to tell me that my client is charged

with an offense that you participated in and knew

– you knew it was stolen whenever you said it

was offered at a cheaper price, correct?

[Lofton]: Yeah.

[Defense counsel]: What did you do at that

point?

[Lofton]: I told him I didn’t want to buy it.

[Defense counsel]: You went on with him

to another place, did you not?

[Lofton]: I didn’t know it was stolen then.

[Defense counsel]: At what point did you

know it was stolen?

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[Lofton]: When he tried to get me to pawn

it in my name.

Later, the following exchange occurred:

[Defense counsel]: All right. The truth is

you knew, at the time you saw those speakers in

the woods, they were stolen, didn’t you?

[Lofton]: (No response)

[Defense counsel]: Let me remind you you

are under oath today.

[Lofton]: Not really, He said they was his,

he didn’t have nowhere to put them.

There was conflicting evidence as to whether Lofton was

an accomplice in the charged offense; thus, Bell’s motion for a

judgment of acquittal was properly denied. Therefore, Bell is not

entitled to any relief on this claim.

II.

Bell contends that the trial court erred in allowing the

State to introduce evidence of an oral statement he allegedly

made to law enforcement that was not provided to him prior to

trial.

As noted previously, during the State’s case-in-chief, the

State called Chief Barnett to testify. When Chief Barnett began

to testify about a conversation he had [] with Bell in December

of 2002, Bell objected and the trial court heard arguments

outside of the hearing of the jury. Chief Barnett revealed to the

trial court that [a]t one point Mr. Bell stated to me, he stated that

he did not steal the amp equipment from the church, but he had

found it in the woods and took it to town and sold it. Bell’s

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initial grounds of objection were that the statement was made as

part of a settlement negotiation and that the testimony was

prejudicial and irrelevant; the trial court overruled the objection,

the jury was brought back into the courtroom, and the trial

resumed. Chief Barnett answered affirmatively when asked if

Bell made a statement regarding the amplifier and speaker; the

prosecutor then asked what Bell had told Chief Barnett, Bell

objected and the following exchanged then occurred outside of

the hearing of the jury:

[Defense counsel]: Judge, I object unless

he said he had made a statement. Is there a written

statement he made? It hasn’t been produced to us.

THE COURT: All right. Response.

[Prosecutor]: Yes, sir. The response is it’s

not signed or written. [Chief Barnett] has it.

[Defense counsel]: If it’s written down and

any type of admission, then the defendant is

entitled to it. We’re entitled to that in discovery,

Judge. If we had not been provided that in

discovery, it’s to be excluded. It cannot be

presented in court.

THE COURT: Response by the State.

[Prosecutor]: I thought that was what the

suppression hearing was about, Judge. He had it.

[Defense counsel]: We have not been

provided this in discovery. . . . Judge, says

statements of defendant: None.

[Prosecutor]: I don’t have one in my file.

That’s fine.

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THE COURT: The objection is sustained.

The state concluded its case-in-chief without any further

mention of Bell’s alleged statements.

However, Bell testified on his own behalf, and denied

knowing, meeting with, or offering to sell Lofton the stereo

equipment. He further denied any knowledge of or having ever

been in possession of the stereo equipment. On crossexamination, Bell denied telling Chief Barnett or Vanessa

Barnett that he was in possession of the stereo equipment.

The State then called Vanessa Barnett as a rebuttal

witness; Bell objected on the ground that any testimony

regarding alleged statements he had made had not been provided

to him. The State argued that the testimony was rebuttal and

admissible for impeachment; that Rule 16.1 only required the

production of statements the State intended to use at trial; that

it was being used in rebuttal; and that [o]nce he took the stand,

surely he should have known we’re going to use it at that time

if he denied it. The trial court overruled Bell’s objection.

Vanessa Barnett then testified that Bell initiated the

discussion, that Bell stated that he wanted to make a deal in his

case in exchange for testimony regarding a capital murder, and

that Bell told me he knew what had happened was wrong, that

he had gotten the [stereo equipment]. At the time he didn’t know

it was stolen. He had found it at the edge of the woods in a

dump or something. He took it and got rid of it. He sold it.

During Vanessa’s testimony -- outside of the hearing of

the jury -- Bell again renewed his objection to the testimony of

his statements to law enforcement. The trial court again

overruled the objection. Bell requested that the jury be

instructed that the statements were only admissible to impeach

his credibility and were not to be considered as substantive

evidence of his guilt; the trial court informed the parties that that

matter would be discussed at the charge conference to be held

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later that day.

Chief Barnett was also recalled and testified, over

objection, that Bell had stated to him that he did not steal the

amplifier equipment from the church, but he had found it in the

woods next to the tent. Stated he took it to town and sold it.

Rule 16.1, Ala.R.Crim.P., provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Statements of Defendant. Upon written

request of the defendant, the prosecutor shall,

within fourteen (14) days . . .

(2) Disclose the substance of any oral

statements made by the defendant, before or after

arrest, to any law enforcement officer, official, or

employee which the state/municipality intends to

offer in evidence at the trial.

Rule 16.5 provides, in pertinent part:

If at any time during the course of the

proceedings it is brought to the attention of the

court that a party has failed to comply with this

rule or with an order issued pursuant to this rule,

the court may order such party to permit the

discovery or inspection; may grant a continuance

if requested by the aggrieved party; may prohibit

the party from introducing evidence not disclosed;

or may enter such order as the court deems just

under the circumstances.

In Minnis v. State, 690 So.2d 521 (Ala. Crim. App.

1996), this Court found that a statement by the defendant to

police officers should have been disclosed to defense counsel

before trial; however, this Court stated:

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The appellant did not seek a continuance or

request a recess. As we noted in McLemore v.

State, 562 So.2d 639, 645 (Ala. Cr. App. 1989):

Under the circumstances

presented here, . . . it appears that

either a recess or continuance

would have been sufficient to

protect the appellant’s interests and

permit him to review and evaluate

this particular evidence in the same

manner as had he received this

information prior to trial. Having

failed to make any showing to the

contrary and having failed to

request either a continuance or

recess, the appellant cannot claim

error on the part of the trial court in

denying his request to exclude the

evidence.

690 So.2d at 527.

In Pettway v. State, 607 So.2d 325 (Ala. Crim. App.

1992), this Court stated:

This Court has repeatedly stated that it views the

failure to comply with the discovery principles

embodied in Rule 16, A.R.Crim.P. [] with

particular disfavor and condemnation. We have

also made it clear, however, that not every

violation of Rule 16 requires the suppression of

the undisclosed evidence. Instead, Rule 16.5 gives

a trial judge a number of options to consider in

imposing sanctions on a party who has failed to

comply with the court’s discovery order.

[]

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 20 of 54
21

Whether and to what extent a trial court

imposes sanctions for non-compliance with Rule

16 rest within the sound discretion of the court.

607 So.2d at 330-31. In McLemore v. State, 562 So.2d 639 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1989), this Court stated:

This court is aware that the Alabama

Supreme Court has, in two cases, held that the

prosecutor’s failure to comply with a Rule 1[6] []

discovery order mandated a reversal. Both of

these cases, however, involved the failure to

provide extrajudicial statements of the defendant

and apparently involved facts from which the

Supreme Court concluded that a reversal was the

only sanction which would accomplish the goals

of the discovery rules. We note that neither of

those cases contained any discussion of the other

sanctions for nondisclosure contained in Rule . .

. [16.5] We, therefore, find those cases

distinguishable from the case at bar.

562 So.2d at 646.

We find it unnecessary in this case to decide whether the

State’s failure to disclose the contested testimony violated Rule

16, as Bell contends. Here, Bell offered no explanation as to

how he was prejudiced by the timing of the State’s disclosure of

the substance of the statement. There is no allegation in Bell’s

brief on appeal, and there is no indication in the record, that Bell

was denied the opportunity to negotiate a plea with the State or

that he declined any plea offer by the State based on his lack of

knowledge about the statement. Bell learned of the statement

outside of the hearing of the jury during the State’s case-in-chief

and the trial court refused to allow the State to introduce the

testimony at that time. Then, during the defense’s presentation

of its case, when the State attempted to elicit the testimony in

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 21 of 54
22

response to Bell’s testimony, the trial court conducted a

thorough hearing on Bell’s motion to suppress before the

evidence was ever presented to the jury. Bell did not seek a

recess after learning of the substance of the statement, and he

was allowed to conduct a thorough cross-examination of Chief

Barnett and Vanessa regarding the statement and the

circumstances surrounding the statement. Bell sought only the

most extreme remedy -- suppression of the evidence. Although

he later sought a limiting instruction from the trial court, it does

not appear that he ever received an adverse ruling on that

request; rather, the trial court stated that the limiting instruction

would be discussed in the charge conference. The charge

conference is not included in the record on appeal; further, Bell

did not object to the lack of a limiting instruction after the trial

court’s oral instructions to the jury. Thus, we conclude that the

trial court’s rulings did not constitute an abuse of that court’s

discretion.

For these reasons, we find no error in the trial court’s

ruling on Bell’s motion to suppress the statement.

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is

affirmed. 

(Doc. 8, Exhibit D (most internal citations and quotation marks omitted;

footnotes omitted)) Bell’s application for rehearing (Doc. 8, Exhibit E) was

overruled by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on July 16, 2004 (Doc.

8, Exhibit F). Bell’s petition for writ of certiorari (Doc. 8, Exhibit G) was

denied by the Alabama Supreme Court on January 14, 2005 (Doc. 8, Exhibit

H).

11. Bell filed a Rule 32 petition in the Circuit Court of Washington

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 22 of 54
23

County, Alabama collaterally attacking his conviction and sentence on

February 25, 2005. (Doc. 8, Exhibit I) In his brief in support of the Rule 32

petition, Bell asserted that he was deprived of his constitutional right to

effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; that the trial court was

without jurisdiction to render judgment or impose sentence; and that the

sentence imposed exceeds the maximum authorized by law. (Doc. 8, Exhibit

I, Grounds In Support of Petition For Post Conviction Relief Pursuant to Rule

32)

12. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on August 4,

2006. (Doc. 8, Exhibit I, Transcript of Rule 32 Proceedings) During this

proceeding, petitioner reiterated his closing argument admission that he took

the property, as opposed to receiving stolen property. (See Tr. 22 (“And the

owner said he never pressed any charges on me and advised Nick Reed he

didn’t want to press no charges on me, and told everybody else not to press

charges on me, leave the issue alone, he was going to let God handle it. I

admitted to him I had tooken (sic) the property. And I told Ben Kelly that.”)

Tr. 36 & 37 (“But he [Timothy Lofton] knew it was stolen, or taken by me, or

could have known. It was evidence where he could have known or should have

known. And he went with me to sell it. . . . I was actually guilty of stealing the

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 23 of 54
5 Bell testified that Faith Temple Holiness Church was a church in Mount Vernon,

Alabama which is located in Mobile County (Tr. 29-30) but admitted on cross-examination that

the church had set up a tent for a revival on his property in Washington County (Tr. 46-48).

24

property instead of receiving stolen property.”); Tr 41 (“False convict me,

make sure I be false convicted for receiving, something I didn’t do. I didn’t

receive no property, I stole the property, it was on my own land. I took it.”);

cf. Tr. 99 (petitioner’s trial counsel, Ben Kelly, testified that Bell’s “contention

through the whole trial[] was that they could not convict him of receiving

stolen property because he was the one that stole it.”))5

 On September 6, 2006,

the trial court entered the following order denying Bell’s Rule 32 petition:

Prior to the presentation of testimony, the Petitioner was

required to give notice to the Court of all the claims he was

alleging. The majority of the allegations involved a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. The Petitioner’s counsel at trial

was Ben Kelly. Specifically, the Petitioner alleged that his trial

counsel: (1) failed to establish a prima facie Batson challenge;

(2) failed to challenge a juror due to the juror allegedly being a

Mobile County resident; (3) failed to object to the trial court

administering the oath to the jury rather than the circuit clerk;

(4) failed to request jury instructions on the issue of statements

made by the Petitioner; (5) failed to object to the trial court’s

alleged improper contact with the jury; (6) failed to advise the

Petitioner of the disadvantages of taking the witness stand; [and]

(7) failed to object to the use of prior convictions during

sentencing.

The Petitioner also alleged that his appellant (sic) counsel

was ineffective for the following reasons: (8) appellant (sic)

counsel failed to raise the issue on appeal concerning the trial

court’s denial of the Petitioner’s motion to continue[;] and[] (9)

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 24 of 54
25

appellant (sic) counsel failed to raise the issue of trial counsel’s

ineffective assistance of counsel.

In addition, the Petitioner also alleged that the trial court

committed the following errors: (10) the trial court was without

jurisdiction because venue was not established; (11) the

sentence exceeded the maximum provided by statute; (12) the

trial court allowed the Petitioner to proceed without being

informed of the risk of proceeding pro se; (13) that the trial

court should have given a jury instruction concerning an alleged

accomplice; (14) the trial court failed to dismiss the

indictment[;] and[] (15) the state failed to prove value of the

stolen property as contained in the indictment.

In regard to the Petitioner’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, specifically, the allegation that trial

counsel failed to establish a prima facie Batson challenge based

on racially biased questions asked by the prosecutor, the Court

is of the opinion that said allegation is due to be denied. During

the jury selection process, Petitioner was acting pro se pursuant

to his own request. The Honorable Ben Kelly was only advisory

counsel at the time the jury was selected. As such, any failure to

establish a prima facie Batson challenge was without fault of

trial counsel. Furthermore, the court is of the opinion that the

alleged racially biased questions referred to by the Petitioner are

common questions used during voir dire, and as such, a prima

facie Batson challenge would not have been established.

In regard to the Petitioner’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel in that his trial counsel failed to challenge

juror Roy Lee Barnes because, allegedly, Mr. Barnes is a Mobile

County resident, the Court is of the opinion that said allegation

is due to be denied. During the jury selection process, the

Petitioner was acting pro se. Furthermore, based on the evidence

presented, the trial court is of the opinion that said juror is a

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 25 of 54
6 The evidence at the Rule 32 hearing established that Barnes was a resident of

Calvert, Alabama. (Doc. 8, Exhibit I, Tr. 50) Calvert is in Washington County, Alabama.

26

resident of Washington County, Alabama.6 As such, the

allegation is without merit.

In regard to the Petitioner’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel in that trial counsel failed to object to the

trial court administering the oath to the jury, the Court is of the

opinion that said allegation is due to be denied. Rule 18.5 of the

Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the trial

court to administer the oath to the jury.

In regard to the Petitioner’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel in that trial counsel failed to request jury

instructions on the issue of statements made by the Petitioner,

the Court is of the opinion that said allegation is due to be

denied. The Petitioner failed to establish any prejudicial effect

of the lack of said request. In addition, the court is of the opinion

that any such limiting instruction would have been ineffective

due to the Petitioner’s own closing argument in which he

admitted to the jury that he stole the items in question.

In regard to the Petitioner’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel in that trial counsel failed to object to

allegedly improper contact with the jury, the Court is of the

opinion that said allegation is due to be denied. The Petitioner

failed to establish any prejudicial effect of any alleged contact

or that any such contact prejudiced the verdict. 

In regard to the Petitioner’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel in that trial counsel failed to advise the

Petitioner of the disadvantages of taking the witness stand,

specifically regarding the use of prior convictions, the Court is

of the opinion that said allegation is due to be denied. The Court

is of the opinion that the Petitioner was adequately aware of the

risk of taking the witness stand. The Court is also of the opinion

that the Petitioner took the stand pursuant to a strategy that he

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 26 of 54
27

formed. During his testimony, the Petitioner attempted to show

that in his two prior convictions he was guilty and therefore,

pled guilty. It appeared to the Court that the Petitioner tried to

convince the jury that since he did not plead guilty in this case,

that he was not guilty. As such, the Petitioner’s allegation is

without merit.

In regard to the Petitioner’s claim of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel in the (sic) failed to raise on

appeal an issue regarding the trial court’s denial of a motion to

continue, the Court is of the opinion that said allegation is due

to be denied. Prior to trial, the trial court held two colloquies

with the Petitioner regarding the trial of his case and his

representation by trial counsel. Pursuant to said colloquies, the

trial Court informed the Petitioner that his case would be tried

on the specific date. As such, the Court is of the opinion that the

denial of the motion to continue was not an abuse of discretion.

Therefore, the Petitioner’s allegation is without merit.

In regard to the Petitioner’s claim of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel in that counsel failed to raise on

appeal the issue of ineffective assistance of [trial] counsel, the

Court is of the opinion that said allegation is due to be denied.

Specifically, the Court is of the opinion that trial counsel

provided sufficient representation to the Petitioner. Furthermore,

during the hearing on the petition, appellate counsel for the

Petitioner, Glenn Davidson, Esquire, testified, based on his

experience and his review of the trial transcript, trial counsel for

the Petitioner did a sufficient job in his representation and

therefore, he did not feel it was a legitimate issue to be raised.

As such, this allegation is without merit.

In regard to the Petitioner’s claim that the trial court was

without jurisdiction because venue was improper or not

established, the Court is of the opinion that said allegation is due

to be denied. Based on the evidence offered at trial and based on

the testimony elicited from the Petitioner during the hearing on

his petition, the court is of the opinion that venue was proper in

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 27 of 54
28

Washington County. As such, the allegation is without merit.

In regard to the Petitioner’s claim that the court imposed

a sentence which exceeds the maximum provided by law, the

Court is of the opinion that said allegation is due to be denied.

The Petitioner received a twenty-five year sentence. Pursuant to

the Alabama Habitual [Felony] Offender Act, a conviction of a

class C felony with two prior convictions provides for a term of

imprisonment for life of for any term not more than ninety-nine

years but not less than fifteen years. As such, the allegation is

without merit. 

In regard to the Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred

in allowing the Petitioner to proceed pro se without informing

him of the risks, the Court is of the opinion that said allegation

is without merit. On two occasions this court conducted a

colloquy with the Petitioner regarding his legal representation.

As such, the allegation is due to be denied.

In regard to the Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred

by having inappropriate contact with the jury, the Court is of the

opinion that said allegation is without merit. The Petitioner has

failed to establish how any alleged contact with the jury was

prejudicial. Therefore, said allegation is without merit.

In regard to the allegation that the trial court erred in not

instructing the jury concerning the testimony of an alleged

accomplice, the Court is of the opinion that said allegation is

without merit. Specifically, the Petitioner argued that the trial

court should have given an instruction regarding the testimony

of Timothy Lofton. The Petitioner claims that Mr. Lofton was

an accomplice and therefore, the jury should have been

informed of such. Mr. Lofton testified at trial and was subjected

to a lengthy cross[-]examination by trial counsel regarding his

involvement with the Petitioner which sufficiently revealed any

bias or motivation that the witness may have had. As such, the

allegation is without merit.

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 28 of 54
7 Because this Court has previously set forth the trial court’s decision, almost in its

entirety, it will not do so again.

29

In regard to the allegation that the trial court erred in

failing to dismiss the action because there was no victim, the

Court is of the opinion that said allegation is without merit.

Based on the evidence presented at trial, the property at issue

was owned by Faith Temple Holiness Church. Furthermore, the

evidence revealed that the Petitioner did not have permission to

possess said property. Therefore, the allegation is without merit.

In regard to the allegation that the trial court erred in

failing to dismiss the action because the state failed to

sufficiently prove value, the Court is of the opinion that said

allegation is without merit. During the trial, the state proved

value by their witness, Patrick Thomas, in which he stated he

had purchased the items in question for approximately nine

hundred dollars. As such, said allegation is without merit.

It is the ORDER of this Court that the Petitioner’s Rule

32 petition should be and is hereby denied.

(Doc. 8, Exhibit I, ORDER) 

13. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial

court’s denial of Bell’s Rule 32 petition by unpublished memorandum

decision. (Doc. 8, Exhibit L) That opinion reads, in relevant part, as follows:

To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of counsel claim,

the appellant must show that his counsel’s performance was

deficient and that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced

him. See Brown v. State, 663 So.2d 1028 (Ala. Crim. App.

1995) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.

2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). In its order denying the petition,

the circuit court found as follows:7

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 29 of 54
30

...

The record supports the circuit court’s findings, and we adopt

them as part of this memorandum.

With regard to Claim 3, we also note that the appellant

was acting pro se at the time the jury was sworn. Therefore, he

is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

With regard to Claim 5, the appellant argues that his trial

counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he did not object

on the ground that the jury had sent a written question to the trial

court. However, he did not establish that trial counsel knew

about the question. In his original petition, he asserted that the

trial court did not consult with him or with his trial counsel

about the question. During the evidentiary hearing, the appellant

merely asserted that, “I was not aware of it, but my lawyer

probably was.” Therefore, the appellant has not shown that his

counsel’s performance was deficient in this regard. Accordingly,

he did not satisfy his burden of pleading and proof with regard

to this claim. See Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b), Ala.R.Crim.P., and

Strickland.

With regard to Claim 7, the certified copies of the

appellant’s previous convictions contain indications that he was

in fact represented by counsel during those proceedings.

However, during the evidentiary hearing, the appellant testified

that, in his previous cases, he had dismissed his attorneys and

represented himself. Even taking the appellant’s testimony at the

evidentiary hearing as true, it appears that he waived his right to

counsel in the previous cases. Therefore, those convictions were

properly used to enhance his sentence. Accordingly, trial

counsel did not render ineffective assistance in this regard.

Finally, with regard to Claim 10, the appellant was

sentenced on December 16, 2003. However, the record on

appeal was not certified as complete until January 27, 2004.

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 30 of 54
31

[I]n any cases in which the defendant is convicted

after the date this opinion is released, an

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must be

presented in a new trial motion filed before the

30-day jurisdictional time limit set by Rule

24.1(b), Ala.R.Crim.P., expires, in order for that

claim to be properly preserved for review upon

direct appeal.

[]

When a defendant makes a claim of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and that

claim cannot reasonably be presented in a new

trial motion filed within the 30 days allowed by

Rule 24.1(b), Ala.R.Crim.P., the proper method

for presenting that claim for appellate review is to

file a Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P., petition for postconviction relief.

In this case, appellate counsel did not have access to the record

on appeal in time to raise ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel

claims within 30 days after the appellant was sentenced.

Therefore, appellate counsel did not render ineffective

assistance in this regard.

For these reasons, the appellant was not entitled to relief

on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.

II.

The appellant also argues that the trial court did not have

jurisdiction to render a judgment and impose a sentence in his

case because the State allegedly did not prove venue. Although

he couches his claim in jurisdictional terms, it is actually a non[-

]jurisdictional claim that is precluded because he could have

raised it at trial and on appeal, but did not.

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 31 of 54
32

III.

The appellant further argues that the trial court did not

have jurisdiction to render a judgment and impose a sentence in

his case because the trial court rather than the circuit clerk

administered the oath [to] the petit jury. However, we addressed

a similar claim in Fortner v. State, 825 So.2d 876, 880 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2001), as follows:

A trial court’s failure to administer the oath to a

jury venire, while reversible error, does not rob

the trial court of its jurisdiction to render

judgment and to impose sentence against a

defendant. We therefore narrow our reading of

Hamlett, overrule our decision in Nix, and find

that a petitioner’s claim that the jury venire, or the

petit jury, was not properly sworn is not

jurisdictional and is waivable.

Also, in Brooks v. State, 845 So.2d 849, 850-52 (Ala.Crim.App.

2002), we held:

As to Brooks’s claim that the trial court

lacked jurisdiction to render the judgment or to

impose the sentence because, he says, the petit

jury was never sworn, we find that Brooks has

failed to plead sufficient facts to show that this

claim is, in fact, jurisdictional and, therefore, that

it, too, is time-barred by Rule 32.2(c).

It is well settled that [t]he failure to

administer the oath to the jury renders the jury’s

verdict a nullity, . . . and that if the jury or any

member thereof was not sworn, it was not the

verdict of a jury. However, in Ex parte Deramus,

721 So.2d 242 (Ala. 1998), the Alabama Supreme

Court recognized that there is a difference in a

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 32 of 54
33

situation in which no oath is given to jurors at all

and a situation in which there is merely a defect in

the oath. In Deramus, the jury venire was

administered an oath before voir dire

examination, but the petit jury was not

administered an additional oath after it was

empaneled. The Alabama Supreme Court

characterized this as a defective-oath situation,

not a no-oath-at-all situation, and recognized that

any defect in the administration of the oath is

reversible error only if some objection was taken

. . . during the progress of the trial, based on [that]

defect[.] Because the appellant had not objected

to the defect during trial, the Court held that the

appellant’s claim that his conviction was void

because the petit jury had not been sworn had

been waived. Similarly, this Court has held that

claims that the venire was not sworn before voir

dire examination are waivable, thus implicitly

recognizing that such situations are also

defective-oath situations and not no-oath-at-all

situations. Because only non[-]jurisdictional

issues can be waived, it is clear that any claim

based on a defect in an oath is non[-]jurisdictional

and, therefore, is subject to the procedural bars in

Rule 32.2. On the other hand, a claim that no oath

was administered at all -- i.e., the jury venire and

petit jury were not sworn -- would be a

jurisdictional issue because, as noted above, a

verdict rendered by jurors who have never been

sworn is a nullity.

In this case, Brooks has not alleged that no

oath was administered at all; thus, he has not

pleaded facts sufficient to show that his issue is

jurisdictional. Brooks alleges that the petit jury

was not sworn, but he does not allege that the

venire was not sworn. In fact, in his brief to this

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 33 of 54
34

Court, Brooks maintains that the practice in

Houston County is to administer the oath to the

venire on Monday before trials begin on Tuesday.

Brooks’s claim is based on an alleged defect in

the oath, a non[-]jurisdictional claim subject to the

procedural bars in Rule 32.2. Because, as noted

above, Brooks’s petition was filed long after the

expiration of the two-year period of limitations,

this claim is time-barred by Rule 32.2(c), and

summary denial of this claim was also proper.

Similarly, in this case, the appellant has not alleged that

this is a case in which no oath was administered at all. Rather,

he alleges that the trial court administered the oath instead of the

clerk. Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, the appellant’s

claim is a non[-]jurisdictional claim that is precluded pursuant

to Rule 32.2, Ala.R.Crim.P.

IV.

Finally, the appellant argues that his sentence exceeds the

maximum authorized by law or is otherwise not authorized by

law because the trial court erroneously sentenced him as a

habitual offender. Specifically, he contends that he was not

represented by counsel during the prior convictions that were

used to enhance his sentence. Initially, we note that the certified

copies of the appellant’s prior convictions contain indications

that he was represented by counsel during each of those

proceedings. However, during the evidentiary hearing, the

appellant testified that, in his previous cases, he had dismissed

his attorneys and represented himself. Even taking the

appellant’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing as true, it

appears that he waived his right to counsel in the previous cases.

Therefore, those convictions were properly used to enhance his

sentence. Accordingly, his argument is without merit.

For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s

judgment.

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 34 of 54
35

(Doc. 8, Exhibit L, at 3 & 7-13 (internal quotation marks and footnotes

omitted; most internal citations omitted; footnote added)) Petitioner’s

application for rehearing (Doc. 8, Exhibit M) was overruled on March 16,

2007 (Doc. 8, Exhibit N); however, his petition for writ of certiorari to the

Alabama Supreme Court (Doc. 8, Exhibit O) was granted on May 4, 2004 with

respect to the ground alleging failure to prove venue (Doc. 8, Exhibit P). On

July 27, 2007, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. Ex parte Bell, So.2d , 2007 WL

2152903 (Ala. 2007).

Bell petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. In his

petition, he alleged that the holding of the Court of Criminal

Appeals that his claim that the State had failed to prove venue

was non[-]jurisdictional conflicted with this Court’s statement

in Ivey v. State, 821 So.2d 937, 950 (Ala. 2001), that proof of

venue is jurisdictional. We granted the writ to clarify whether an

issue of venue in a criminal case is jurisdictional. 

This Court in Ex parte Culbreth . . . addressed the

difference between a jurisdictional requirement and a venue

limitation, stating:

Jurisdiction is [a] court’s power to decide

a case or issue a decree. [] In deciding whether [a

petitioner’s] claim properly challenges the trial

court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, we ask only

whether the trial court had the [requisite]

constitutional and statutory authority[.] Venue, in

contrast, addresses [t]he county or other territory

over which a trial court has jurisdiction.

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 35 of 54
36

Venue can be waived, and any objection to

improper venue is waived if not timely raised.

[]

In Ex parte Seymour, 946 So.2d 536 (Ala. 2006), we

recognized the subject-matter jurisdiction of the circuit court,

stating:

Under the Alabama Constitution, a circuit

court shall exercise general jurisdiction in all

cases except as may be otherwise provided by

law. The Alabama Code provides that [t]he circuit

court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of

all felony prosecutions[.]

[]

Bell was convicted of the offense of second-degree

receiving stolen property, a Class C felony. Thus, the circuit

court had subject-matter jurisdiction over Bell’s trial.

Venue, on the other hand, does not impact a circuit

court’s subject-matter jurisdiction; it limits the territory in which

a case can be tried. Section 15-2-2, Ala.Code 1975, provides:

Unless otherwise provided by law, the venue of all public

offenses is in the county in which the offense was committed.

Thus, § 15-2-2 identifies in which trial court a case can be

prosecuted, but it does not limit the jurisdiction of the trial court.

This Court recognizes that there are cases, including Ivey v.

State, supra, that state that proof of venue is jurisdictional;

however, our holdings in Ex parte Seymour and Ex parte

Culbreth implicitly overruled those decisions insofar as their

statements regarding the jurisdictional nature of venue are

concerned.

Bell’s claim that the State did not prove venue is a claim

addressing whether the State’s evidence satisfied § 15-2-2,

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 36 of 54
37

Ala.Code 1975, i.e., whether the State proved that the offense

Bell is accused of committing occurred in Washington County

so that venue is appropriate there; it is not a claim that impacts

the trial court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court of Criminal

Appeals properly concluded that Bell’s claim was non[-]

jurisdictional. Additionally, because a challenge to venue is

waivable, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ application of the

procedural bars that the claim could have been but was not

raised at trial and that the claim could have been but was not

raised on appeal, was proper.

The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is

affirmed.

Id. at *1-*2 (internal quotation marks omitted; many internal citations

omitted). 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Procedural Default Doctrine.

1. In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115

L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), the Supreme Court stated that it would "not review a

question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court

rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and

adequate to support the judgment." Id. at 729, 111 S.Ct. at 2553-2554. This

rule applies whether the state law ground is procedural or substantive. Id. at

729, 111 S.Ct. at 2554. The doctrine applies to bar federal habeas review

when a state court declines to address a petitioner's federal claims because the

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 37 of 54
38

petitioner fails to meet a state procedural requirement. Id. at 729-730, 111

S.Ct. at 2554; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53

L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) (federal courts must honor legitimate state trial and

appellate procedural rules when enforced by state courts and must decline to

review on the merits claims that the state treats as barred absent a showing of

cause for non-compliance with such rules and resulting prejudice); Alderman

v. Zant, 22 F.3d 1541, 1549 (11th Cir.) ("Pursuant to the doctrine of procedural

default, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas corpus relief, who fails to raise

his federal constitution[al] claim in state court, or who attempts to raise it in

a manner not permitted by state procedural rules is barred from pursuing the

same claim in federal court absent a showing of cause for and actual prejudice

from the default."), cert. denied sub nom. Alderman v. Thomas, 513 U.S.1061,

115 S.Ct. 673, 130 L.Ed.2d 606 (1994). "In these cases, the state judgment

rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds." Coleman, 501

U.S. at 730, 111 S.Ct. at 2554 (citations omitted).

2. The application of the independent and adequate state ground

doctrine in the habeas context is grounded in concerns of federalism and

comity. Id.

Without the rule, a federal district court would be able to do in

habeas what this Court could not do on direct review; habeas

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39

would offer state prisoners whose custody was supported by

independent and adequate state grounds an end run around the

limits of this Court's jurisdiction and a means to undermine the

State's interest in enforcing its laws.

Id. at 730-731, 111 S.Ct. at 2554.

 3. An additional consideration comes to the fore when the

independent and adequate state ground supporting a petitioner's custody is a

state procedural default. Id. at 731, 111 S.Ct. at 2554. The Supreme Court has

long held

that a state prisoner's federal habeas petition

should be dismissed if the prisoner has not

exhausted available state remedies as to any of his

federal claims. (citations omitted) This

exhaustion requirement is also grounded in

principles of comity; in a federal system, the

States should have the opportunity to address and

correct alleged violations of state prisoners'

federal rights.

 . . .

[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the

State's procedural requirements for presenting his

federal claims has deprived the state courts of an

opportunity to address those claims in the first

instance. A habeas petitioner who has defaulted

his federal claims in state court meets the

technical requirement for exhaustion; there are no

state remedies any longer "available" to him.

(citations omitted) In the absence of the

independent and adequate state ground doctrine in

federal habeas, habeas petitioners would be able

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 39 of 54
40

to avoid the exhaustion requirement by defaulting

their federal claims in state court. The

independent and adequate state ground doctrine

ensures that the States' interest in correcting their

own mistakes is respected in all federal habeas

cases.

Id. at 731, 732, 111 S.Ct. at 2554-2555, 2555.

4. In the habeas context, federal courts are to "presume that there

is no independent and adequate state ground for a state court decision when the

decision 'fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven

with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible

state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion.'" Id. at 735, 111

S.Ct. at 2557 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-1041, 103 S.Ct.

3469, 3476-3477, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983)); see Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255,

263, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 1043, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989) ("[A] procedural default

does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review

unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case 'clearly and

expressly' states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar."). In all other

cases, the presumption is not applicable. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 739, 111

S.Ct. at 2559. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d

334 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the Harris v. Reed presumption is

inapplicable to a claim that is never presented to the state courts. Id. at 299,

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41

109 S.Ct. at 1069 ("The rule announced in Harris v. Reed assumes that a state

court has had the opportunity to address a claim that is later raised in a federal

habeas proceeding."). Moreover, the presumption "looks through"

unexplained orders to the last reasoned decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 804, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 2595, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991).

Where there has been one reasoned state

judgment rejecting a federal claim, later

unexplained orders upholding that judgment or

rejecting the same claim rest upon the same

ground. If an earlier opinion "fairly appear[s] to

rest primarily upon federal law," Coleman, 501

U.S., at 740, 111 S.Ct., at 2559, we will presume

that no procedural default has been invoked by a

subsequent unexplained order that leaves the

judgment or its consequences in place. Similarly

where . . . the last reasoned opinion on the claim

explicitly imposes a procedural default, we will

presume that a later decision rejecting the claim

did not silently disregard that bar and consider the

merits.

501 U.S. at 803, 111 S.Ct. at 2594. Also, the presumption may not be applied

in cases in which the state court opinion did not, at a minimum, discuss the

federal grounds at issue." Tower v. Phillips, 7 F.3d 206, 211 (11th Cir. 1993)

("Coleman and Ylst lead us to conclude that we may not assume that had the

state court issued an opinion, it would have ignored its own procedural rules

and reached the merits of this case. In fact, the most reasonable assumption is

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42

that had the state court ruled, it would have enforced the procedural bar.").

Finally, "where a state court has ruled in the alternative, addressing both the

independent state procedural ground and the merits of the federal claim, the

federal court should apply the state procedural bar and decline to reach the

merits of the claim." Alderman v. Zant, supra, 22 F.3d at 1549.

5. When a petitioner has procedurally defaulted a claim, a federal

court is barred from reaching the merits of that claim unless the petitioner "can

demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged

violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claim[] will

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman, supra, 501 U.S. at

750, 111 S.Ct. at 2565. The cause and prejudice standard applies "uniformly

to all independent and adequate state procedural defaults." Id. at 750-751, 111

S.Ct. at 2565.

In procedural default cases, the cause

standard requires the petitioner to show that

"some objective factor external to the defense

impeded counsel's efforts" to raise the claim in

state court. (citation omitted). Objective factors

that constitute cause include "'interference by

officials'" that makes compliance with the state's

procedural rule impracticable, and "a showing that

the factual or legal basis for a claim was not

reasonably available to counsel." (citation

omitted). In addition, constitutionally

"[i]neffective assistance of counsel . . . is cause."

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43

(citation omitted). Attorney error short of

ineffective assistance of counsel, however, does

not constitute cause and will not excuse a

procedural default. (citation omitted). Once the

petitioner has established cause, he must show

"'actual prejudice' resulting from the errors of

which he complains." (citation omitted). 

 

 

Federal courts retain the authority to issue

the writ of habeas corpus in a further, narrow

class of cases despite a petitioner's failure to show

cause for a procedural default. These are

extraordinary instances when a constitutional

violation probably has caused the conviction of

one innocent of the crime. We have described

this class of cases as implicating a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. (citation omitted).

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493-494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d

517 (1991).

6. In his answer, respondent asserts that Bell’s claim that the trial

court lacked venue is procedurally barred since it constitutes a nonjurisdictional issue that could have been raised at trial or on appeal and that his

claim pertaining to the failure to properly administer the oath is barred under

those same procedural rules. (Doc. 8, at 19)

7. It is clear to the undersigned that Bell has procedurally defaulted

his venue claim because he did not raise it at trial or on appeal; however, it is

not as clear that Bell has defaulted his claim related to the oath administered

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8 Petitioner’s own Rule 32 testimony underscores Thomas’ trial testimony, Bell

stating that he the equipment was on his very own property in Washington County and that he

44

to the petit jury because the last Alabama court to consider the issue (the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals) did not specifically identify the

procedural bar (or bars) it was relying upon under Rule 32.2 in declining to

address the merits of this issue. Accordingly, this Court simply considers

whether the trial court correctly determined that this claim has no merit.

 8. Turning to the issue of cause and prejudice, even assuming cause

for the petitioner’s procedural default of his venue claim, petitioner would not

be entitled to a merits-review of this claim by this Court because he cannot

establish prejudice. Specifically, Bell has not established, through citation to

applicable case law and the record, that Alabama’s appellate courts would

have granted him relief with respect to this claim had it been properly

preserved for their review. This is because venue was clearly established in

this case. As noted by the Alabama Supreme Court, venue for all public

offenses is proper in the county in which the offense was committed. Patrick

Thomas testified that the stereo equipment was stolen from his church’s

revival tent in Washington County, Alabama (see T.T. 50-52), and Timothy

Lofton testified that in August of 2002, Bell showed him stereo equipment in

some woods off River Road in Washington County, Alabama (see T.T. 59).8

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 44 of 54
stole the equipment.

45

Therefore, venue was proper in Washington County, Alabama.

9. The fundamental miscarriage of justice/actual innocence

exception does not apply in this case because petitioner has not satisfied the

Murray v. Carrier standard. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 106 S.Ct. 2639,

91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). That standard requires Bell to show that “a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is

actually innocent.” 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. at 2649-2650. To be credible,

a claim of actual innocence “requires petitioner to support his allegations of

constitutional error with new reliable evidence--whether it be exculpatory

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical

evidence--that was not presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324,

115 S.Ct. 851, 865, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995); see also id. at 327, 115 S.Ct. at

867 (“To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it is

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the

light of the new evidence.”). Bell has not come forward with any evidence

which establishes his actual innocence and thereby undermines his conviction

for second-degree receiving stolen property. His insistence that he is actually

guilty of theft of property, rather than receiving stolen property, does nothing

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46

to help his cause given the nature of the State’s evidence which established

petitioner’s guilt of receiving stolen property. See Mills v. State, 581 So.2d

1126, 1127 & 1128 (Ala.Crim.App. 1987) (“Where the evidence is undisputed

that the appellant committed the theft, he cannot be convicted of receiving the

same stolen property from that theft. . . . The only evidence in the case sub

judice implicating the appellant in the actual burglary was the testimony of the

State’s rebuttal witness, Jackie Neal Hill. The principle that someone cannot

be convicted of receiving stolen property when the evidence proves that he

participated in the theft ‘is inapplicable where, as here, the evidence does not

show that the appellant participated in the theft. “That he may have done so

cannot be reasonably doubted, but there is no definite evidence to that effect.”’

The State’s evidence sufficiently proved that the appellant was guilty of

receiving stolen goods.”). Accordingly, this case is not one of those rare cases

in which the actual innocence exception is applicable. 

B. Merits Discussion of Collateral Petition Claims.

10. Bell filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief in this

Court on or about August 27, 2007, and therefore, his case clearly is governed

by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (AEDPA). Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402, 120 S.Ct. 1495,

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 46 of 54
9 Based upon the facts as found by the Alabama courts in their decisions, it is clear

that no argument can be made that the decisions of any of those courts was based upon an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented to the state courts. 

More to the point, since this Court must presume as correct the determinations of all factual

issues made by the Alabama courts, petitioner simply cannot rebut that presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence. The state courts’ findings are based upon what a

reasonable jury could have found the evidence to be. 

47

1518, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 530 (11th

Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 956, 122 S.Ct. 357, 151 L.Ed.2d 270 (2001).

As amended, § 2254 now provides:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim— 

 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.9

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2) (footnote added). Moreover, the Act, as

amended, presumes as correct all determinations of factual issues made by a

State court and places the burden upon the petitioner of rebutting such a

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e).

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48

11. In Williams v. Taylor, supra, the Supreme Court held that 

§ 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to

grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to

claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ

may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied— the statecourt adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) “was contrary to . . . clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States,” or (2) “involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Under

the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on

a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the

Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the

“unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the

Supreme Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts

of the prisoner’s case. Id. at 412-413, 120 S.Ct. at 1523; see Bottoson, supra,

234 F.3d at 531 (“In addition, a state court decision involves an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent ‘if the state court either unreasonably

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 48 of 54
49

extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to

a new context where it should apply.’”). 

12. In this case, the Alabama courts reached the merits of

petitioner’s ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims and his

claim that his sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law. Bell cannot

establish his entitlement to relief under § 2254(d)(1) & (d)(2) with respect to

either of these issues. In this regard the undersigned notes generally that

petitioner has not and cannot show, under the “contrary to” clause, that the

Alabama courts, arrived at any conclusions opposite to those reached by the

Supreme Court of the United States on any question of law or decided the case

differently than the Supreme Court did in a previous case presenting a set of

materially indistinguishable facts. Moreover, as indicated above, under the

“unreasonable application” clause, petitioner has not and cannot establish that

the Alabama courts, though recognizing the correct governing principles from

the Supreme Court’s decisions, unreasonably applied those principles to the

facts in this case. Here, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, in its decision

on collateral review, specifically recognized the applicability of Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), to

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 49 of 54
10 While the trial court, in its decision, did not specifically cite to Strickland v.

Washington, it is clear from a reading of the decision that the court was well aware of the

guiding principles set down by the Supreme Court in the Strickland case in reaching its decision

on the ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised. Cf. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123

S.Ct. 362, 365, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) (“Avoiding these pitfalls does not require citation to our

cases-indeed, it does not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning

nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.”).

11 Specifically, petitioner makes no Apprendi claim. See Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). This is no doubt because the Supreme

Court in Apprendi, and later in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159

L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), specifically exempted from jury consideration and determination the “fact

of a prior conviction[.]” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301, 124 S.Ct. at 2536; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490,

120 S.Ct. at 2362-2363 (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and

proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 

50

petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel,10 and

reasonably applied the principles outlined in that case to the facts of

petitioner’s case in finding that counsel did not provided constitutionally

ineffective assistance at trial or on appeal.

13. Turning to the remaining ground of the instant petition that was

addressed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on collateral review,

specifically Bell’s claim that his sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by

law, the undersigned would note that petitioner makes no argument that there

is any federal law applicable to this claim which establishes that his sentence

exceeds the maximum authorized by law.11 More importantly, petitioner’s

claim is baseless under Alabama law. In this case, petitioner admitted during

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12 “Sentences for felonies shall be for a definite term of imprisonment, which

imprisonment includes hard labor, within the following limitations: [] For a Class A felony, for

life or not more than 99 years or less than 10 years.” Ala.Code § 13A-5-6(a)(1).

51

his trial that he had two prior felony convictions and the evidence submitted

by the State during sentencing tended to establish that Bell had three prior

felony convictions prior to being convicted of the instant offense of receiving

stolen property in the second degree, a Class C felony. See Ala.Code § 13A-8-

18(b) (“Receiving stolen property in the second degree is a Class C felony.”).

Petitioner’s twenty-five year is well within the range of punishment for an

individual with either two or three prior felony convictions who thereafter

commits a Class C felony. Compare Ala.Code § 13A-5-9(b)(1) (“In all cases

when it is shown that a criminal defendant has been previously convicted of

any two felonies and after such convictions has committed another felony, he

or she must be punished as follows: On conviction of a Class C felony, he or

she must be punished for a Class A felony12[.]”) with Ala.Code § 13A-5-

9(c)(1) (“In all cases when it is shown that a criminal defendant has been

previously convicted of any three felonies and after such conviction has

committed another felony, he or she must be punished as follows: On

conviction of a Class C felony, he or she must be punished by imprisonment

for life or for any term of not more than 99 years but not less than 15 years.”).

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 51 of 54
13 To the extent it is petitioner’s argument that un-counseled guilty plea convictions

were improperly used to enhance his sentence, this Court merely reiterates the supported finding

of the Alabama courts that the evidence of record reflects that petitioner was represented by

counsel with respect to those prior convictions (Doc. 8, Exhibit A, Attachments to State’s

Amended Notice of Prior Felony Convictions). See Terry v. State, 719 So.2d 263, 265

(Ala.Crim.App. 1997) (“[A]n uncounseled felony conviction may not be used to enhance

punishment for a subsequent offense . . . unless it is shown that the accused waived the right to

counsel[.]”).

14 Petitioner’s argument that it was constitutional error for the trial court to

administer the oath to the petit jury has no merit. As pointed out by the trial court in denying

Bell’s Rule 32 petition, Rule 18.5 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically

allows the trial court to administer the oath to the petit jury. Ala.R.Crim.P. 18.5(a) (“The court

shall either remind the jurors that they are still under oath, or may give the jurors the following

oath: ‘You do solemnly swear, or affirm, that you will well and truly try all issues joined

between the defendant[] and the State of Alabama and render a true verdict thereon according to

the law and evidence, so help you God.’”); see also Ala.R.Crim.P. 12.1(c)(2) (“On the opening

day of the term, or on such other day as the venire shall have been summoned to appear, the

judge presiding shall proceed to organize the court, by: Administering or causing to be

administered to the jurors the following oath as required by law: ‘Do you and each of you

solemnly swear or affirm that you will well and truly answer all questions propounded to you

touching your general qualifications as a juror, or qualifications as a grand juror or petit juror,

and that you will well and truly try all issues and execute all writs of inquiry submitted to you

and true verdicts render according to the law and evidence, so help you God?’”). It was proper,

therefore, for the trial judge to administer the oath to the petit jury, as opposed to requiring the

clerk of court to perform this function as petitioner contends.

52

Therefore, the undersigned simply cannot find that the state court adjudication

was contrary to any applicable federal law nor can it be found that the state

court unreasonably applied any relevant precedent.13 Moreover, it is not

debatable among reasonable jurists that the result of which petitioner

complains is incorrect. Stated differently, it is not debatable among reasonable

jurists that the appellate court’s rejection of petitioner’s excessive sentence

argument is inherently incorrect.14

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53

CONCLUSION

The Magistrate Judge is of the opinion that petitioner’s rights were not

violated in this cause and that his request for habeas corpus relief should be

denied.

The instructions which follow the undersigned’s signature contain

important information regarding objections to the report and recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

DONE this the 24th day of January, 2008.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-00605-WS-C Document 11 Filed 01/24/08 Page 53 of 54
54

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION, AND

FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

l. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must,

within ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with

the Clerk of this court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual

findings of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)©); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en

banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate

Judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in

a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),

by filing a ‘Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation’

within ten days after being served with a copy of the recommendation,

unless a different time is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to which objection is

made and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall submit to

the district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation should be

reviewed de novo and a different disposition made. It is insufficient to

submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate judge,

although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to submit a

brief in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection. 

A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals;

only the district judge's order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable Where Proceedings Tape Recorded). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 and FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge finds that the tapes and original

records in this case are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this

recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will pay the

cost of the transcript.

_s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY____________ 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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