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Parties Involved:
George Don Galloway
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH F I L ~ D 

United Stat~ C~~rt~! Ap?€!lb 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Te-:1th '- :-:-cuL 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT MAY 13 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

ClerL 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

GEORGE DON GALLOWAY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Nos. 90-4008 

91-4189 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-159A) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

David J. Jordan, United States Attorney, Salt Lake City, Utah, and 

Tena Campbell, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, and 

Jill M. Wichlens, Assistant Federal Public Defender, on the brief 

for Defendant-Appellant. 

SEYMOUR and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District Judge.* 

BROWN, District Judge.* 

* The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, United States Senior District 

Judge for the District of Ka n sas, s i tting by d e signa t i on. 

Appellate Case: 90-4008 Document: 010110249157 Date Filed: 05/13/1992 Page: 1
This matter is before the court following our remand to the 

district court. 1 See United States v. Galloway, 937 F.2d 542 (10th 

Cir. 1991). The facts of the case were set forth in our prior 

opinion and will not be repeated here. We remanded the case so 

that the district court could: (1) supplement the record with the 

findings upon which it based its decision to partially close the 

courtroom during the testimony of the complaining witness; (2) 

supplement the record with its findings under Rule 403, Fed.R.Evid. 

as to whether certain evidence was properly excluded; and (3) resentence the defendant in light of a sentencing error conceded by 

the government. The district court entered an order on October 21, 

1991, setting forth its findings on the first two issues. The 

defendant was then resentenced. 

This court subsequently granted the defendant-appellant's 

request to file a supplemental brief in Case Number 90-4008. In 

that brief, appellant argues that the district court's findings are 

not adequate to support the partial closure of the courtroom. The 

government has responded to the brief and contends that the court's 

findings are adequate. 

The district court based the partial closure of the courtroom 

on the following factors: 

1. The victim was 18 years old at the time 

of the offense; 

2. She was still living at home with, and 

dependent on, her parents; 

Neither party has requested oral argument and, after 

examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal . See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 

10th Cir. R. 34.1.9 . The case is therefore ordered submitted 

without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 90-4008 Document: 010110249157 Date Filed: 05/13/1992 Page: 2
3. The alleged crimes involved sexual abuse 

and rape of the young victim; 

4. Failure to partially close the trial 

could harm the victim in view of her age and 

the nature of the crimes charged; 

5. The order of partial closure was narrowly 

drawn to preserve the right of the press and 

the defendant to a public trial, while still 

protecting the victim. 

(Dist. Ct. Findings of Fact at 2.) In view of these factors, the 

court concluded that the United States interest in protecting the 

victim outweighed defendant's right to a public trial. Id. at 3. 

We have considered the factors cited by the district court in 

its decision to partially close the courtroom, and we conclude that 

the defendant's sixth amendment right to a public trial was not 

violated by the court's order. The district court noted that the 

complaining witness in this case was eighteen years old at the time 

of the offense and that she was living with and was dependent upon 

her parents . The court further concluded that the failure to 

partially close the trial could harm the witness in light of the 

nature of the offense and the victim's age. These findings 

indicate the court was concerned that this particular witness was 

susceptible to harm from testifying about the offense in a 

courtroom open to the general public. We do not interpret the 

court's findings as applying a "blanket rule" that such a closure 

would be appropriate in all sex offense cases involving young 

victims. The particular nature of the allegations of sexual abuse 

in this case and the victim's susceptibility to harm were 

considered by the court in making its determination. Cf. Globe 

Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 102 s.ct. 261 3 , 7 3 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-4008 Document: 010110249157 Date Filed: 05/13/1992 Page: 3
L.Ed.2d 248 (1982). The district court's findings in this case 

support the conclusion that the United states had a substantial 

interest in protecting the complaining witness. Cf. Davis v. 

Reynolds, 890 F.2d 1105, 1109 (10th Cir. 1989). 

We note that the district court narrowly tailored its order of 

partial closure to serve the interest outlined above. The order 

sought to exclude only the "curious" from hearing the complaining 

witness's testimony. The order provided that the defendant, his 

attorney, his relatives, the relatives of the complaining witness, 

courtroom personnel and the press could all remain in the courtroom 

during this testimony. The exceedingly narrow scope of this order 

minimized any danger arising from the closure of the courtroom to 

the general public. We conclude that the district court's order 

partially closing the courtroom was proper. 

We have also reviewed the district court's findings of fact as 

they relate to the exclusion of evidence of birth control pills 

found in the complainant's purse. 

that, under appellant's theory, 

We agree with the district court 

the probative value of this 

evidence was limited to the fact that it may have precipitated a 

family dispute. The district court allowed evidence of the dispute 

to come in but excluded evidence of the pills as an unwarranted 

intrusion on the victim's private life. The court also indicated 

that such evidence might confuse or mislead the jury in its 

consideration of the evidence. Under the circumstances, we find 

that the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion 

under Rule 403 in excluding this evidence. 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-4008 Document: 010110249157 Date Filed: 05/13/1992 Page: 4
No. 91-4189 

In No. 91-4189, appellant contends that the sentence imposed 

by the district court was based on a misapplication of the 

sentencing guidelines. After the case was remanded, the district 

court determined the defendant's adjusted offense level under the 

guidelines to be 35. The defendant's criminal history category was 

VI, resulting in a guideline range of 292 to 365 months. The court 

sentenced the defendant to 365 months imprisonment. Appellant 

argues that the sentence was in error because the court incorrectly 

determined his adjusted offense level. The parties agree that the 

issue presented is a question of law that this court reviews de 

novo. United states v. Walker, 931 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1991). 

Guideline§ 2A4.1 is the basic provision applicable to the 

offense of kidnapping. It carries a base offense level of 24. At 

the time the offense in this case was committed, § 2A4. 1 (b) ( 5) 

provided: 

If the victim was kidnapped, abducted, or 

unlawfully restrained to facilitate the 

commission of another offense: (A) increase by 

four levels; or (B) if the result of applying 

this guideline is less than that resulting 

from application of the guideline for such 

other offense, apply the guide! ine for such 

other offense. 

In this case, the defendant concedes that the victim was kidnapped 

to facilitate the commission of two other offenses: sexual abuse 

and extortion. The application of the kidnapping guideline to the 

defendant's offense would have resulted in an adjusted offense 

level of 30. (A base offense level of 24, with a two-level 

enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon and a four-level 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-4008 Document: 010110249157 Date Filed: 05/13/1992 Page: 5
enhancement because the victim was kidnapped to facilitate the 

commission of another offense.) Under the guideline for sexual 

abuse, U.S. S. G. § 2A3. 1, the adjusted offense level for this 

offense would be 35. (A base offense level of 27, with a four-level 

enhancement for display of a dangerous weapon and a four-level 

enhancement because the victim was abducted . ) Citing subsection (B) 

of § 2A4. 1 (b) ( 5) , the district court applied the sexual abuse 

guideline to the defendant's offense because the offense level was 

higher under that guideline than it would have been under the 

kidnapping guideline. 

Appellant makes two arguments in support of his contention 

that the district court misapplied the guidelines. First, 

appellant contends that the rule of lenity requires that the court 

apply the guideline for kidnapping rather than the one for sexual 

abuse. He bases this argument on the proposition that subsection 

(B) of § 2A4 .1 (b) (5) is ambiguous under the facts of this case 

because the kidnapping facilitated two other offenses--sexual abuse 

and extortion--one of which carries a higher offense level than 

kidnapping and one of which is lower. The ambiguity exists, 

according to appellant, because it is not clear under subsection 

(B) whether the guideline for the higher or the lower offense 

should be considered. Appellant argues that subsection (B) is 

unclear as to which "other offense" should be considered in these 

circumstances. 

We find that§ 2A4.l(b) (5) is not ambiguous. When a victim is 

kidnapped in order to facilitate the commission of another offense, 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-4008 Document: 010110249157 Date Filed: 05/13/1992 Page: 6
§ 2A4.l(b) (5) directs the sentencing court to apply the guideline 

with the higher offense as between the kidnapping guideline and the 

guideline for the other offense. The background notes to§ 2A4.1 

explain: 

An enhancement is provided when the offense is 

committed for ransom or to facilitate the 

commission of another offense. Should the 

application of this guideline result in a 

penalty less than the result achieved by 

applying the guideline for the underlying 

offense, apply the guideline for the 

underlying offense (~ § 2A3 .1, Criminal 

Sexual Abuse) . 

The Sentencing Commission's intent to apply the higher of the two 

guidelines is unmistakable. This result is not changed by the fact 

that the defendant commits two offenses in connection with the 

kidnapping. The fact that a defendant may have committed a second 

additional offense cannot relieve him from responsibility for the 

more serious of the offenses. If that were the case, a defendant 

would receive a benefit from the fact that he chose to commit an 

additional offense. Such a result is illogical and would be 

contrary to the plain language of§ 2A4.l(b) (5). 

Appellant's second argument is that the four-level enhancement 

for abduction of the victim(§ 2A3.l(b) (5)) was improperly added to 

his offense level. He contends that such an enhancement amounts to 

cumulative punishment because abduction of the victim is inherent 

in the crime of kidnapping. He insists there is no indication that 

the Sentencing Commission intended this enhancement to be applied 

in a kidnapping case. 

7 

Appellate Case: 90-4008 Document: 010110249157 Date Filed: 05/13/1992 Page: 7
The district court properly determined the defendant's offense 

level under the guidelines. There is no question here that the 

kidnapping was used to facilitate the commission of the offense of 

sexual abuse. Section 2A4.1, the basic guideline provision for 

kidnapping, directs the sentencing court to apply the guideline for 

"such other offense" when the victim is kidnapped to facilitate the 

commission of the other offense. This includes the enhancements 

found in the guideline for the other offense. As the government 

points out, u. s. s. G. § 1B1. 5 clearly describes the Sentencing 

Commission's intended method of implementing cross references in 

the guidelines. That section states: 

Unless otherwise expressly indicated, a 

reference to another guideline, or an 

instruction to apply another guideline, refers 

to the entire guideline, i.e., the base 

offense level plus all applicable specific 

offense characteristics and cross references. 

The sentence imposed by the court was consistent with this 

provision. The guidelines directed the court to apply the fourlevel enhancement for abduction of the victim. This did not 

constitute "cumulative punishment" because the base offense level 

for sexual abuse was determined without regard to whether or not 

the victim was abducted. As we previously noted, the Commission 

clearly intended that the court consider the guideline for a more 

serious offense when a victim was kidnapped to facilitate that 

offense. We reject appellant's argument that the district court 

misapplied the guidelines. Also, we reject the argument that the 

guidelines established by the Sentencing Commission were in excess 

of its statutory authority. 

8 

Appellate Case: 90-4008 Document: 010110249157 Date Filed: 05/13/1992 Page: 8
Conclusion. 

We find no error in the conviction or the sentence. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

9 

Appellate Case: 90-4008 Document: 010110249157 Date Filed: 05/13/1992 Page: 9
NOS. 90-4008, 91-4189 -- UNITED STATES v. GEORGE DON GALLOWAY 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

I am not yet satisfied that the district court has articulated sufficient findings to support its decision to partially 

close the trial during some of the testimony. Specifically, I do 

not think the court's findings "indicate the court was concerned 

that this particular witness was susceptible to harm from testifying" in open court. See supra at 3. I therefore respectfully 

dissent. 

As we pointed out in United States v. Galloway# 937 F.2d 542 

(10th Cir. 1991), a partial closure requires a lesser showing of 

government interest than a total closure. Whereas a judge may not 

close a courtroom to all spectators in the absence of an "overriding interest," a "substantial reason" will suffice for the 

exclusion of some part of the public. Here, the trial court on 

remand stated its interest in "protecting the victim" in view of 

the fact that "failure to partially close the trial could harm the 

victim in view of her age and the nature of the crimes charged." 

(emphasis added) No doubt protecting a witness is a substantial 

reason for closure; indeed, it may even be a compelling reason 

such as would support total closure in certain circumstances. See 

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) 

(compelling interest in protecting physical and psychological 

Appellate Case: 90-4008 Document: 010110249157 Date Filed: 05/13/1992 Page: 10
well-being of youthful witnesses); Davis v. Reynolds, 890 F.2d 

1105, 1110 (10th Cir. 1989). 

The problem here is apparent from the district court's 

inability to say more than that public testimony "could harm" the 

witness. Having failed to inquire into the complainant's psychological background, her level of maturity and understanding, the 

interests of her parent and relatives, or even her desire that her 

testimony be secret or public, see Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 

608 and n . 21 (suggesting that some rape victims may desire to make 

testimony public), the court lacked any reason to believe that 

closure was desirable, let alone necessary, in this case. The 

court's findings state only that the victim was a minor, that she 

lived with her parents (as in fact do most minors), and that the 

alleged crime involved sexual matters. In short, the trial court 

reveals nothing that we did not already know when we remanded the 

case. Cf. Galloway, 937 F.2d at 547 (court must make sufficient 

findings to allow reviewing court to determine if closure was 

proper). Instead of making findings specific to this victim, the 

court stated generalities applicable to all cases involving sexual 

offenses against minor victims. And while the age of the witness 

and the nature of the crime charged are appropriate factors for 

consideration, Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 608, such considerations "support a closure only when they form part of a careful 

case-by-case analysis of each individual situation. " Davis, 890 

F.2d at 1110. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 90-4008 Document: 010110249157 Date Filed: 05/13/1992 Page: 11
The deficiency here is not in the government's asserted 

interest, but rather in the continued failure of the trial court 

to demonstrate that this witness, in this case was susceptible, 

vulnerable, or in need of protection. "Without any inquiry or 

findings concerning the specific condition of the witness in this 

case," a closure order "is essentially equivalent to the blanket 

legislative closure rejected [by the Supreme Court) in Globe 

Newspaper." Davis, 890 F.2d at 1111 (emphasis added). The lower 

standard applicable to partial closures reduces the necessary 

showing of reasons from "compelling" to "substantial," but it in 

no way relieves the court of its duty to evaluate the needs and 

desires of the particular witness in a given case. 

The differences between this case and other cases where 

closures have been upheld are instructive. In Nieto v. Sullivan, 

we affirmed the court's decision to exclude the defendant's 

relatives during the testimony of a witness who told the judge he 

feared retribution. 879 F.2d 743, 749-51 and nn.11, 13 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 957 (1989). The Ninth Circuit 

upheld a partial closure when the trial judge observed a rape 

victim's "apprehension in testifying before [the defendant's] 

family members", who were "making faces and giggling during her 

testimony." United States v. Sherlock, 865 F.2d 1069, 1077 (9th 

Cir. 1989). In the same vein, we reversed the conviction of a 

defendant whose trial for rape was totally closed during the 

-3-

Appellate Case: 90-4008 Document: 010110249157 Date Filed: 05/13/1992 Page: 12
complainant's testimony only because the victim was a minor and 

the defendant would not be prejudiced. Davis, 890 F.2d at 1108-

1111. Unlike Nieto and Sherlock, we have here only the abstract 

potential for harm, and no indication that this particular witness 

would have suffered incrementally from testifying in public,~ 

Globe Newspaper, 457 U. S . at 607 n.19 (measure state's interest in 

protecting against incremental injury of testifying in public). 

It may be that the trial court failed to make the requisite 

findings because it could no longer do so; the court apparently 

did not conduct a relevant inquiry at the time of trial, and 

evidence may since have become unavailable. This is unfortunate, 

but it is totally irrelevant to our consideration of the legal 

issue presented here. The law on trial closures has been evolving 

for some time, and it has been clear with respect to a defendant's 

Sixth Amendment rights since the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in 

Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). Reversal is the 

appropriate remedy for a violation of a defendant's Sixth 

Amendment right to a public trial, Davis, 890 F.2d at 1111; see 

Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 n.9, and I would grant it to Mr. Galloway 

along with a remand for a new trial. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 90-4008 Document: 010110249157 Date Filed: 05/13/1992 Page: 13