Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05128/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05128-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gulf Insurance Company
Appellee
Starlah Nowlin
Appellant

Document Text:

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAlaited States Co~rt ~f Appeals Tenth Circmt 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT NOV 8 1990 

STARLAH NOWLIN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

GULF INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

~ Clerk 

) 

) 

) No. 89-5128 

) (D.C. No. 88-C-40-E) 

) (N.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

Before MCKAY, MCWILLIAMS, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously-that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff Starlah Nowlin appeals from the district court's 

order adopting the findings and recommendations of the United 

States magistrate denying Nowlin's complaint for declaratory 

judgment and granting defendant Gulf Insurance Company's motion 

for Elummary judgment. Nowlin requested the district court charge 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-5128 Document: 010110047854 Date Filed: 11/08/1990 Page: 1 
Gulf with liability for coverage and for providing a defense under 

a business automobile insurance policy owned by the Housing 

Authority of Picher, Oklahoma. 

The appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment de 

novo. Ewing v. Amoco Oil Co., 823 F.2d 1432, 1437 (10th Cir. 

1987); Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 

(10th Cir. 1988). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no 

genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

Nowlin was injured when her automobile was involved in a 

collision with an automobile owned by Earl Lynn Condor, an 

employee of the Housing Authority. Condor's automobile was being 

driven by Jimmy Dale Smith at the time the accident occurred. 

Condor used his own automobile to travel between his assigned jobs 

on behalf of the Housing Authority. For the purpose of the 

declaratory judgment action, the parties stipulated in an agreed 

pretrial order that neither Condor nor Smith was engaged in 

Housing Authority business at the time of the accident. R. Doc. 

11 at 2. 

Under the terms of the policy, the automobiles covered fall 

into two categories designated as "8", "Hired Autos Only", and 

"9", "Nonowned Autos Only." It is category "9" with which we are 

concerned. 

9 = Renowned Autos Only 

Only those autos you do not own, lease, hire, or 

borrow which are used in connection with your business. 

This includes autos owned by your employees or members 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-5128 Document: 010110047854 Date Filed: 11/08/1990 Page: 2 
of their households but only while used in your business 

or your personal affairs. (Bold in original). 

Nowlin claims Condor's use of his own personal automobile in 

the performance of his job-related duties creates an intent on the 

part of the Housing Authority that Condor's automobile be afforded 

coverage at all times. The nexus Nowlin is attempting to create 

is too tenuous and is rejected. 

Generally [the] terms of an insurance policy must 

be considered not in a technical but in a popular sense, 

and they should be construed according to their plain, 

ordinary and accepted use in common speech, unless it 

affirmatively appears that a different meaning was 

intended. 

National Aviation Underwriters. Inc. v. Altus Flying Serv .• Inc., 

555 F.2d 778, 782 (10th Cir. _1977). 

The district court, in denying Nowlin's complaint for 

declaratory judgment and awarding Gulf summary judgment, correctly 

determined that the terms and provisions of the policy were 

unambiguous. The provision of the policy relating to the coverage 

afforded Condor's automobile clearly states his automobile will be 

covered only while used in connection with the business or 

personal affairs of the Housing Authority. 

Nowlin further claims that Gulf should be estopped from 

denying coverage to Condor and Smith because they failed to 

provide Condor with a security verification form. 1 Business 

policies of this type are intended as excess or additional 

coverage and as such are not subject to the provisions of the 

1 A security verification form is a form approved by the State 

Board for property and casualty rates, verifying the existence of 

security required by the Compulsory Insurance Law of the State of 

Oklahoma. 47 o.s. S 7-600(5). 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-5128 Document: 010110047854 Date Filed: 11/08/1990 Page: 3 
Compulsory Insurance Law in the State of Oklahoma. 47 O.S. 

S 7-600.l(B). 

The director of the Housing Authority, Donald Walker, Jr., 

provided Condor with a security verification form which Walker 

prepared on Housing Authority letterhead. The record is devoid of 

any evidence that this action was acknowledged or sanctioned by 

Gulf and therefore cannot be used to charge Gulf with liability. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff's request 

for oral argument is DENIED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-5128 Document: 010110047854 Date Filed: 11/08/1990 Page: 4