Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03966/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03966-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Melissa Abdouch
Appellant
Kathrin Betzing
Appellee
Raina Boyum
Appellee
Vicki Burger
Appellee
Alison Downs
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3966

___________

Melissa Abdouch, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the District of 

* South Dakota.

Vicki Burger; Raina Boyum; Kathrin *

Betzing; Alison Downs, in their *

individual capacities and in their *

capacities as employees of the South *

Dakota Department of Social Services, *

*

Defendants - Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: September 15, 2005

 Filed: October 20, 2005 

___________

Before MELLOY, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Melissa Abdouch brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the

defendants, a group of South Dakota social workers. She alleged that after the

defendants discovered her infant son had seventeen broken bones, they violated her

constitutional rights by removing him from her care for a period of approximately

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The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota.

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seven months. The district court1

 found the defendants entitled to qualified immunity

and granted summary judgment in their favor. We affirm. 

I.

Melissa Abdouch and her husband, Michael Abdouch, lived with their three

children: A.A., B.A., and C.A. On August 8, 2002, Melissa took the youngest child,

eleven week-old C.A., to a cardiologist because of a heart murmur. The cardiologist

took a chest x-ray that revealed multiple fractured ribs. The next day, August 9, the

Abdouch’s family physician informed Melissa that the x-ray had revealed “bone

abnormalities.” He asked her to bring C.A. to a hospital emergency room. A physical

exam and x-rays taken at the emergency room revealed that C.A. had seventeen

fractures including fractures of the ribs and clavicle and of the arms and legs, both

above and below the joints. Despite the severity and extent of C.A.’s injuries, all

doctors involved with the case later concurred that the injuries would not have been

apparent to a lay person. 

Two police detectives interviewed Melissa and Michael, starting at the hospital

and continuing at a police station. The police quickly focused on Michael as the

suspected abuser, although there was little evidence to suggest what role each parent

might have played. Melissa and Michael denied harming C.A. and denied having

knowledge of any abuse. When Michael was later deposed, however, he admitted that

he had anger management issues and that Melissa had encouraged him to seek anger

management help or counseling at about the time that the doctors discovered C.A.’s

injuries. 

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Defendant Alison Downs was the Department’s intake social worker assigned

to the case. She was present at the police station. Downs permitted Melissa to take

C.A. home on August 9 on the condition that Michael not stay at the family’s home.

The following day, August 10, Melissa brought the older children to the

hospital for evaluation. Although neither exhibited signs of abuse, Downs and her

supervisor, defendant Raina Boyum, decided to remove all three children from the

home and place them in a care center. Downs completed a “Child Placement

Agreement and Case Plan” form for each child to authorize the care center to provide

services. In addition to noting C.A.’s severe injuries, Downs noted on the forms that

there was possible sexual abuse. Boyum initialed the forms. There was no evidence

of sexual abuse.

Also on August 10, Downs told Melissa that there would be a temporary

custody hearing the following day and that she would recommend the court send the

three children home with Melissa. On August 11, at the hearing, Downs did not make

the recommendation. After the hearing, Downs and Boyum released A.A. and B.A.

to Michael’s parents and placed C.A. in foster care. Michael returned home to live

with Melissa. Melissa had urged that C.A. be placed with the children’s grandparents,

who were willing to take C.A. into their home and/or move to care for C.A. in a

different location. Following C.A.’s placement in foster care, Melissa and Michael

were each allowed one one-hour supervised visit per week. 

On August 18, Downs completed an information collection form. She marked

boxes to indicate that C.A. had suffered physical abuse in the “head, face, genitals,

stomach or back area.” She marked boxes to indicate that C.A. required “immediate

medical attention,” that there was “no evidence” of sexual abuse, and that there had

been “frequent or increasingly harsh physical contact.” She also marked boxes to

indicate that Melissa was “emotionally handicapped” and had an “uncontrolled mental

illness.” Finally, without noting which caretaker she was referring to, Downs marked

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boxes to indicate that the caretaker had an “unrealistic expectation of [the] child’s

behavior” and did not “believe that there is a problem.”

After Downs and Boyum completed their initial investigation and intake, case

manager Kathrin Betzing and her supervisor, Vicki Burger, took over the case.

According to Betzing and Burger, C.A. did not tolerate the supervised visits from

Michael and Melissa well and screamed and refused to eat after the visits. During one

of Michael’s visits, Michael became frustrated and called C.A. a “little shit.” Melissa

contests the Department’s claim that C.A. did not tolerate her visits well. 

An Assistant Attorney General involved in the case, Anthony Sanchez,

recommended that the Department terminate the supervised visits. Sanchez stated that

Melissa was not cooperative in the abuse investigation and that he did not want her

to have more visits until he knew “what part [Melissa] had in the child’s injuries,

whether she actually caused them or . . . knew [Michael] caused them.” Betzing and

Burger decided in September to terminate the visits. At about the same time, they

decided to seek the termination of Michael’s and Melissa’s parental rights regarding

C.A. 

Melissa testified that she wanted to remain married to Michael and have her

children at home. She initially appeared not to believe that Michael had abused C.A.

She testified that she was told by the Department that she would not regain custody

of her children if she remained married to Michael. She requested that C.A. be tested

for a rare congenital disease that causes brittle bones, osteogenesis imperfecta. C.A.

was tested in late September and found not to have the disorder. Melissa filed for

divorce on October 5, 2000, one week after she received the test results. The divorce

became final on January 20, 2001. The January divorce decree did not resolve any

issues of child custody and visitation between Michael and Melissa. When asked,

Melissa could not say whether she would have filed for divorce if the Department had

not recommended that she do so. 

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Notwithstanding the fact that Melissa filed for divorce, Michael continued to

live with Melissa until just before a state court adjudicatory hearing on October 18.

At the hearing, a state court judge relied on the medical evidence of C.A.’s injuries to

determine that C.A. was an abused or neglected child. After the hearing, C.A.’s

placement in foster care continued, and the two older children returned to the family’s

home to live with Melissa.

Investigators who visited Melissa’s home after Michael moved out reported that

it appeared that a married couple still lived at the home. Further, in discussions with

one of the social workers before Michael moved out, Melissa initially lied about

Michael’s living arrangements. Melissa first stated that Michael had already moved

and that he was living with a friend. When pressed to give the friend’s name,

however, Melissa became flustered and admitted that Michael still lived at home.

Based on this deception, Melissa’s reluctance to believe that Michael had abused C.A.,

and her claimed ignorance that abuse had occurred, the defendants believed that

Melissa had filed for divorce only as a pretext to regain custody of C.A..

A criminal investigation continued throughout this time. A prosecutor, Pam

Tiede, filed an abuse and neglect petition. Michael eventually admitted that he had

treated C.A. roughly, that he “lost his cool,” and that he must have injured C.A.,

although he said he did not purposely injure C.A. In November, he agreed to plead

guilty to simple assault. He entered a guilty plea on February 22, 2001.

Melissa’s visits with C.A. resumed in December 2000. Melissa’s visits were

initially once per week and later twice per week. In January 2001, she was allowed

to take C.A. on home visits. In February 2001, Melissa was permitted to begin taking

C.A. on overnight visits. On March 15, 2001, C.A. was conditionally returned to

Melissa on a full-time basis. Following a custody hearing on June 13, 2001, all

conditions on Melissa’s custody of C.A. were removed.

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Notwithstanding the transitioning of C.A. back into Melissa’s custody, Betzing

and Burger continued to seek termination of Melissa’s parental rights. Before the

June 13 hearing, Prosecutor Tiede told Burger and Betzing that she didn’t believe

there was sufficient evidence to terminate Melissa’s parental rights. At Burger’s and

Betzing’s request, Assistant Attorney General Sanchez took the case from Tiede.

Sanchez reviewed the case, and with Burger and Betzing, decided not to pursue the

termination of rights. They did not notify Melissa of this decision until June 13, the

day of the hearing. At the hearing, the Department sought termination of Michael’s

parental rights and sought continuation of the case against Melissa to permit continued

monitoring of C.A. The court dismissed all proceedings as against Melissa and

deferred the case as to Michael.

Melissa brought her claims in the present action under § 1983. She concedes

that it initially was appropriate for the defendants to remove the children from her

home. She alleges, however, that the defendants continued to seek the termination of

her parental rights after it became clear that the defendants could not make the

showing necessary to terminate her rights. She characterizes this action as a violation

of her right to be free from prosecution without probable cause. She also alleges that

the defendants’ protracted placement of C.A. in foster care deprived her of her liberty

interest in the care and custody of her children. 

As to the prosecution-related claim, the district court found that the social

workers were analogous to prosecutors and therefore entitled to absolute immunity for

their initiation of judicial proceedings against Melissa. As to the alleged violation of

her liberty interest as a parent, the district court found that qualified immunity applied.

We affirm.

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II.

Qualified immunity protects public officials unless their conduct violates

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known. Littrell v. Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 582 (8th Cir. 2004) (“‘officials

are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright

lines.’”) (quoting Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992)).

Qualified immunity is a question of law that we review de novo. Littrell, 388 F.3d at

584-85. In reviewing a grant of qualified immunity, “[t]he sequence of our analysis

is to ask first whether, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts

alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right; and second,

whether, in the specific context of the case, the right was clearly established.” Swipies

v. Kofka, 348 F.3d 701, 703 (8th Cir. 2003).

We have previously recognized that parents have an important but limited

substantive due process right in the care and custody of their children. Manzano v.

South Dakota Dept. of Soc. Servs., 60 F.3d 505, 509-10 (8th Cir. 1995). The right is

limited because the state has a potentially conflicting, compelling interest in the safety

and welfare of the children. Id. at 510 (“‘[T]he liberty interest in familial relations is

limited by the compelling governmental interest in the protection of minor children,

particularly in circumstances where the protection is considered necessary as against

the parents themselves.’”) (quoting Myers v. Morris, 810 F.3d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.

1987)). The right is important because of the need to “curb[] overzealous suspicion

and intervention on the part of health care professionals and government officials,

particularly where the effect of such overzealousness may have the effect of

discouraging parents or caretakers from communicating with doctors or seeking

appropriate medical attention for children with real or potentially life-threatening

conditions.” Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Servs., Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1373 (8th Cir.

1996). 

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The net result of these competing interests is that we must weigh the interests

of the state and child against those of the parents to determine whether a constitutional

violation has occurred. Under this balancing test, the officials’ actions must have been

based on a reasonable suspicion of abuse and must not have been disproportionate

under the circumstances. Id. at 1371-72 (“The difficulty in the present case is not

whether such a reasonable suspicion can be found, but rather, whether the actions

taken by the defendants and the resulting disruption to plaintiffs’ familial relations

with [the child] were so disproportionate under the circumstances as to rise to the level

of a constitutional deprivation.”). 

“The need to continually subject the assertion of this abstract substantive due

process right to a balancing test which weighs the interest of the parent against the

interests of the child and the state makes the qualified immunity defense difficult to

overcome.” Manzano, 60 F.3d at 510. Even where this balancing reveals a

constitutional violation, qualified immunity still applies unless the constitutional

violation was so clear that an objectively reasonable official under the circumstances

would have recognized the disproportionality or lack of reasonable suspicion. In the

present case, we need not reach this second step of the qualified immunity analysis

because we conclude that the defendants’ conduct, viewed in a light most favorable

to the plaintiff, did not violate a constitutional right.

Because Melissa concedes that it initially was proper for the defendants to

remove C.A., her allegations of a constitutional violation focus on her extended

deprivation of custody claim. For a substantial period of time after the discovery of

C.A.’s severe injuries, the defendants did not know which parent harmed C.A.,

whether both parents had a role in harming C.A., or whether the injuries were due at

least in part to one or both parents’ negligence. Even as investigators’ attention

focused on Michael, a clear picture of the abuse and of Melissa’s role in, or

knowledge of, the abuse eluded investigators. This uncertainty caused the defendants

to question Melissa’s ability to care for and protect C.A. 

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The defendants’ actions, however, were not based solely on speculation or

uncertainty. Rather, the defendants reasonably believed that Melissa was not being

honest with them. She attempted to deceive the defendants regarding Michael’s living

arrangements. In addition, from the defendants’ perspective, she appeared reluctant

to believe or admit that Michael had abused C.A. and reluctant to file for divorce.

Also, she continued to live with Michael until shortly before the October 18 hearing.

All of this information, when viewed against the backdrop of C.A.’s serious and

unexplained injuries, clearly shows a basis for the defendants’ reasonable suspicion

that Melissa was complicit in the abuse or guilty of neglect. It was not unreasonable

to hold C.A. in foster care during this time.

Further, the state court’s October 18 decision, following notice and a hearing,

demonstrated the reasonableness of the defendants’ suspicions and did nothing to

vindicate either Melissa or Michael. The court held that C.A. was an abused or

neglected child, not that Michael was guilty nor Melissa innocent. Later, when

Michael agreed to plead guilty, his statements shed little to no light on the events that

caused C.A.’s injuries. The defendants, nevertheless, began to transition C.A. back

into Melissa’s care. 

Melissa’s main complaint appears to be that this transition was slower than

necessary. In balancing the rights of the parents against the interests of the child, we

disagree. The Department was under a duty to protect C.A. and formulate a transition

plan that protected C.A. from any further abuse or neglect. This duty required the

Department to ensure that Michael did not have access to C.A. In that regard, the

divorce was not final until January, and even then, custody issues were not resolved

by the divorce decree. Before that time, visitation had resumed. Home visits and

overnight visits followed, and by March, C.A. was in the plaintiff’s care on a full time

basis. Given these facts, as well as the severity of the injuries and the uncertainties

about Michael’s situation, the deprivation of custody from October 18 until full-time

placement in March was not unreasonable, and certainly did not rise to the level of a

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Melissa argues that various specific actions by the defendants showed personal

animosity. For example, Melissa complains that Downs lied about her intention to

recommend that the children stay with Melissa at the August 11 hearing and that

Downs and Boyum suggested on forms that there was evidence of sexual abuse when

no such evidence existed. Finally, Melissa argues that because the physicians

believed a lay person would not have recognized C.A.’s injuries, she had no notice of

the injuries and should not have been the target of an abuse and neglect investigation.

These arguments are misplaced. As discussed above, no constitutional violation

occurred. Without a violation of constitutional rights, qualified immunity applies

regardless of whether an official harbors personal animosity. Also the fact that C.A.’s

injuries were difficult to detect does not disprove the reasonable suspicion as set forth

above.

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constitutional violation. Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to the protection of

qualified immunity.2

As a final matter, we note that the district court correctly applied absolute

immunity to shield the defendants from liability for initiating or maintaining judicial

proceedings. See Thomason, 85 F.3d at1373 (“To the extent [a state authorized child

welfare agency and its worker] are sued for initiating judicial proceedings, [the

welfare worker’s] role was functionally comparable to that of a prosecutor.”); Myers,

810 F.2d at 1452 (“Accordingly the decision to file charges is protected, even in the

face of accusations of: vindictive prosecution, or reckless prosecution without

jurisdiction, or conspiracy to prosecute for a crime that never occurred.”) (internal

citations omitted); Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1285 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding

that absolute immunity applied to protect a prosecutor who had initiated the

termination of parental rights without notice to the parents).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Appellees’ pending motion to

strike portions of the Appellant’s brief is denied as moot.

______________________________

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