Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02154/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02154-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jerry V. Rice
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED ~~ UDitecl States Court of Appeau Tenth Circutt 

APR 04 1995 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISH'ER Cl~rk 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 94-2154 

JERRY V. RICE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of New Mexico 

D.C. No. 93-CR-541-JB 

Peter Schoenburg of Rothstein, Donatelli, Hughes, Dahlstrom, Cron 

& Schoenburg, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Paula G. Burnett, Assistant U.S. Attorney (John J. Kelly, United 

States Attorney, with her on the briefs), Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before MOORE, ALDISERT,* and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior Judge for the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-2154 Document: 01019282887 Date Filed: 04/04/1995 Page: 1 
Jerry Rice was convicted of two counts of making a false 

claim for an income tax refund in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287 and 

three counts of making and subscribing a false income tax return 

in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). Although Mr. Rice presents 

several matters for review, we affirm on the substantive issues 

but remand for resentencing. 

According to the government, Mr. Rice, a certified public 

accountant, was the perpetrator of a complicated scheme of tax 

fraud involving several Subchapter S Corporations he established. 

Under federal income tax law, S Corporations are not required to 

file or pay taxes as corporate entities. Income and losses are 

chronicled on the S Corporation's shareholders' individual tax 

returns. However, such entities still must file a quarterly 

statement concerning their employees' withholding and an annual 

unemployment tax return (Forms 941 and 940 respectively) . S 

Corporations, like other employers, must also remit the money 

withheld from their employees' paychecks to the Social Security 

Administration. The Internal Revenue Service keeps track of all 

the transactions from each account based on the corporation's 

Employer Identification Number (EIN) . 

During the tax years 1987, 1988, and 1989, Mr. Rice claimed 

on his Form 1040 Individual Tax Return that more money had been 

withheld by his employer than he owed in taxes. He received 

refunds from the IRS totaling $29,922.00. 

During these three years, Mr. Rice was employed by Jerry v. 

Rice, CPA-PC, and Rice and Associates, CPA-PC, two S Corporations 

he controlled. As corporate president, Mr. Rice was responsible 

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for filling out his own W-2 Forms along with those of all the 

corporate employees. IRS records indicated the S Corporations had 

submitted neither the required employee withholding forms nor the 

money withheld from their employees during the three years in 

question. The IRS believed Mr. Rice committed fraud because he 

received a tax refund based on excessive withholding that was 

never in fact withheld. 

The investigation of Mr. Rice began in September 1990 with a 

routine audit of Southwestern Investments, Inc., another of his S 

Corporations. The IRS issued three summons to Mr. Rice requesting 

he appear before the agency and produce specified corporate 

documents. After Mr. Rice refused, the IRS initiated contempt 

proceedings to force him to comply. At the subsequent contempt 

hearing, the district court rejected each of Mr. Rice's grounds 

for failing to comply with the summonses, including his claim he 

did not have to comply because of his personal Fifth Amendment 

privilege. The indictment, trial, and conviction followed. 

Mr. Rice raises three issues on appeal. First, he claims the 

government improperly was allowed to admit evidence at trial 

concerning his prior assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege at 

the contempt hearing. Second, he argues the district court erred 

by not allowing his expert witness to testify. Third, Mr. Rice 

asserts the court made several errors in applying the sentencing 

guidelines. 

Defendant's Fifth Amendment claim arises because during the 

government's questioning of Charles Duffy, an attorney in the Tax 

Division of the Department of Justice, Mr. Duffy stated: 

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I requested the Court to enforce the summons. In 

other words, I requested the Court to order Mr. Rice to 

appear and comply with the summons and produce the 

documents and give testimony. In response to the motion 

or petition to enforce, Mr. Rice raised various grounds 

supporting his contention that he should not have to 

comply with the three summons. 

And those grounds -- and I think 

seven or eight of them, include 

violate his Fourth Amendment right, 

violate his Fifth Amendment right. 

there's five, six, 

enforcement would 

enforcement would 

Mr. Rice neither objected to Mr. Duffy's statement nor requested a 

curative instruction at any time.l 

Because no objection asserting a violation of the defendant's 

Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege was raised at trial, 

we review this issue for plain error. United States v. Hager, 969 

F.2d 883, 890 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 437 (1992). 

To succeed in this claim, Mr. Rice must demonstrate the comments 

of the government's witness rise to the level of fundamental 

error. "Plain error is 'fundamental error, something so basic, so 

prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have 

been done.'" Id. at 890 (quoting United States v. Henning, 906 

F.2d 1392, 1397 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1069 

(1991)). 

We note initially, the assertion of error here is quite 

unusual because it is predicated upon an invalid exercise of the 

self-incrimination privilege. As the district court held in the 

civil contempt hearing, Mr. Rice could not properly invoke the 

privilege in this case because no corporation possesses such a 

1 Prior to 

objection on 

asserted. 

Mr. Duffy's testimony, the defense raised an 

the grounds of materiality. No other objection was 

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right. United States v. Hansen Niederhauser Co.,· 522 F. 2d 1037, 

1039 (lOth Cir. 1975). This limitation extends to S Corporations. 

Id. Moreover, none of the authority cited to us addresses the 

issue of the propriety of prosecutorial comment on the exercise of 

a nonexistent privilege. 

We do not have to reach the issue of propriety, however, 

because Mr. Rice is attempting to force his case into a box where 

it does not fit. Although it is a hoary rule that the prosecution 

cannot comment at trial on a defendant's post-Miranda decision to 

remain silent, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the rule is 

predicated upon the principle that allowing the prosecution to 

his post-Miranda 

Fifth Amendment 

impeach a defendant's 

silence would penalize 

privilege. The Court 

trial 

the 

testimony 

exercise of 

with 

his 

offered two central reasons in support of 

this holding. First, it postulated, "every post-arrest silence is 

insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to 

advise the person arrested." Id. at 617. The defendant's silence 

may simply have occurred in response to the Miranda warnings and 

in no way indicates his guilt. Second, the Court believed that 

implicit in the Miranda warnings was the notion that their 

exercise "will carry no penalty." Id. at 618. This rule has been 

extended to apply to pre-arrest silence, United States v. Burson, 

952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 

1702 (1992), with the exception that pre-arrest silence may be 

used for impeachment purposes. United States v. Chimal, 976 F.2d 

608, 611 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1331 (1993); 

Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238-40 (1980). 

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Mr. Rice would like this rule extended still further. He 

attempted to invoke the privilege initially during an 

administrative proceeding and later during a civil enforcement 

action. The district court found the privilege did not apply. 

Now, Mr. Rice argues the government cannot describe what occurred 

at the civil contempt hearing -- or at least not that he tried to 

invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. The argument is without a 

rational basis. 

Mr. Rice's attempt to invoke the privilege was unsuccessful 

because it was nonexistent. In Doyle, Burson, and the other 

typical cases in this area, the defendant has successfully 

remained silent. The government attempted to either attach a 

reason why the defendant chose to remain silent, or contended, if 

the story given at trial were true, the defendant would not have 

remained silent. In both circumstances, the government's gambit 

was to use the defendant's decision to remain silent to its 

advantage. This case is qualitatively different. 

Here, the government attempted to demonstrate Mr. Rice's 

theory of what happened was of recent fabrication. Mr. Rice 

argued he sent the necessary forms to the IRS with an incorrect 

EIN, and the IRS subsequently lost them. 

The government contested this evidence on two grounds. 

First, it introduced testimony of IRS internal procedures designed 

to prevent just such an occurrence. Second, the government put 

forth evidence Mr. Rice was previously ordered to produce all 

relevant documents, which would necessarily include the documents 

he was using to support his version of the events at trial. IRS 

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Agent Robert Tarin testified Mr. Rice told him he had complied 

with this order. The government was not taking undue advantage of 

Mr. Rice's silence; it was instead informing the jury that either 

Mr. Rice recently came up with his explanation, or he originally 

failed to produce all the relevant documents. We see no error in 

this instance. 

Mr. Rice next argues the district court erred in refusing to 

admit the testimony of one of his experts. Mr. Rice sought to 

have James J. Everett, formerly employed as an attorney in the Tax 

Division of the Department of Justice and the Internal Revenue 

Service, testify as an expert witness. Requested to make an offer 

of proof, Mr. Rice's counsel indicated Mr. Everett would testify 

that as a former prosecutor, he would not have filed a case 

against Mr. Rice based on the evidence the government had in its 

possession. Additionally, he would state had Mr. Rice failed to 

file in 1987, "a flag would have gone up right then." The 

significance of this statement would have been that because no 

"flag" went up, Mr. Rice must have filed as he claimed. Finally, 

counsel represented Mr. Everett would testify "in his experience 

[this case] seems to be replete with error, mistake, confusion and 

certainly not enough evidence for a jury to convict a man beyond a 

reasonable doubt." 

The court refused to qualify Mr. Everett as an expert, 

stating: "I find that there's absolutely nothing that your expert 

could provide to the Court under Rule 702." The court added, "I 

will reject your request that your expert testimy [sic] in this 

case, consistent with the proffer made by [counsel]." Although 

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not clear because of the error in transcription, we read this 

ruling simply as a refusal to allow Mr. Everett to express 

opinions as an expert, and not as a flat refusal to permit him to 

take the stand. 

This court reviews the trial court's determination of whether 

expert testimony should be admitted under the abuse of discretion 

standard. United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 535 (lOth Cir. 

1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 908 (1988). Federal Rules of 

Evidence 702 provides the applicable standard: 

If scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 

the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 

qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 

of an opinion or otherwise. 

In discussing this rule, the advisory committee noted: 

Whether the situation is a proper one for the use 

of expert testimony is to be determined on the basis of 

assisting the trier. "There is no more certain test for 

determining when experts may be used than the common 

sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be 

qualified to determine intelligently and to the best 

possible degree the particular issue without 

enlightenment from those having a specialized 

understanding of the subject involved in the dispute." 

(citation omitted). See also Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805 (lOth 

Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989), and 3 

Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 

,I 702 [10] (1985). 

In its most recent pronouncement on this rule, the Supreme 

Court noted, under Rule 702, the inquiry of whether expert 

testimony will assist the trier of fact is essentially a question 

of relevance. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 

S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (addressing the relationship of Rule 702 and 

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the "general acceptance" test for scientific evidence from Fzye v. 

United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)). Like all 

evidentiary issues, the trial court has wide discretion in making 

these determinations. 

Applying the appropriate tests, we conclude Mr. Everett was 

really not called upon to supply specialized knowledge but to 

speculate and hypothesize. Traditionally, hypothesis may be an 

appropriate subject for expert testimony when based upon 

conclusions from established evidentiary facts, but here Mr. 

Everett's testimony was to be based entirely on pure surmise. 

Moreover, whether Mr. Everett thought the evidence justified 

the filing of charges is irrelevant. Guided by proper 

instructions, the sufficiency of the evidence is for the jury to 

decide from the facts established at trial. Mr. Everett's notions 

of prosecutorial filing discretion have no bearing upon the 

ultimate jury question. Moreover, he could have testified from 

his personal observations that the IRS had employed a procedure to 

"flag" certain cases, or that files were sometimes lost; but this 

is not the stuff of expert opinion. Thus, we believe the trial 

court properly disallowed his testimony under Rule 702. 

Mr. Rice makes four separate challenges to the district 

court's application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 

First, he argues the district court incorrectly imposed the burden 

of proof on him on a sentencing enhancement issue. The 

Presentence Report recommended increasing the base offense level 

of six by five levels based on a finding that Mr. Rice defrauded 

the government of $41,189.00. The Presentence Report states: 

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The defendant evaded or attempted to evade a minimum of 

$ 11,267.00 in federal income tax and further falsified 

income tax credits, resulting in a fraudulent refund 

being submitted to the defendant in the amount of 

$29,922.00. Accordingly, a total loss of $41,189.00 is 

considered as the loss. 

At trial, the government proved Mr. Rice received three refunds 

totaling $29,922.00. There was no evidence introduced, however, 

concerning any tax loss suffered by the government as a result of 

the defendant's evasion or receipt of the fraudulent refunds. As 

a result, unlike in United States v. Hershberger, 962 F.2d 1548, 

1555-56 (lOth Cir. 1992), the sentencing court could not rely upon 

testimony it heard at trial to determine this issue. 

Mr. Rice argues the burden of proof for sentencing 

enhancements lies with the government. "The government shall bear 

the burden of proof for sentence increases and the defendant 3hall 

bear the burden of proof for sentence decreases. This rule 

requires neither party to prove the negative of a proposition." 

United States v. Kirk, 894 F.2d 1162, 1164 (lOth Cir. 1990); see 

also United States v. Abud-Sanchez, 973 F.2d 835, 838 (lOth Cir. 

1992). At the evidentiary hearing scheduled after Mr. Rice 

objected to the Presentence Report, the district court failed to 

apply this rule, stating instead: 

I agree with Ms. Burnett, Mr. Mcintyre. You're the one 

that took issue with the pre-sentence report, so I 

assume that you have proof to establish what you contend 

is an inaccuracy in the presentence report, so you will 

go forward. 

Mr. Rice's counsel then attempted to demonstrate that the tax loss 

never had been established. The court eventually adopted the 

amount of loss from the Presentence Report which included the 

$11,267.00 minimum tax loss figure. 

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The government argues Mr. Rice did not have the burden of 

proof improperly placed on him. No tax loss adjudication was 

necessary, the government contends, because the "district court is 

empowered to make a reasonable estimate of loss attributable to 

fraud." United States v. McAlpine, 32 F.3d 484, 488 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 610 (1994). 

This court reviews the district court's legal interpretation 

of the sentencing guidelines de novo. United States v. Lowder, 5 

F.3d 467, 470 (lOth Cir. 1993). Mr. Rice correctly notes that the 

government bears the burden of proof for sentence increases, while 

the defendant bears the burden of proof for sentence decreases. 

Kirk, 894 F.2d at 1164. The sentencing guideline for crimes 

involving fraud and deceit, U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(a), contemplates a 

base offense level of six. This level may be adjusted upward 

depending on the amount of the loss involved. U.S.S.G. 

§§ 2Fl.l(b) (1) (A)-(S). This is a sentencing increase within the 

meaning of Kirk, so the government bears the burden of proof. 

"Clearly, the government has the burden to prove the amount of 

loss by a preponderance of the evidence." McAlpine, 32 F. 3d at 

487; see also United States v. Reddeck, 22 F.3d 1504, 1512 (lOth 

Cir. 1994); United States v. Smdth, 951 F.2d 1164, 1168 (lOth Cir. 

1991). The district court's response during the evidentiary 

hearing before sentencing indicates the court incorrectly placed 

the burden on Mr. Rice to contest the government's loss amount. 

In addition, no evidence was introduced concerning the amount 

of taxes Mr. Rice may have avoided. The first calculation of this 

figure was made in the Presentence Report, which was later adopted 

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by the court. The court simply found, "[t]he totai loss to the 

Government, including the minimum taxable income evaded by the 

defendant was §41,189.00." This contested conclusion was not 

founded upon proof by a preponderance of evidence. While the 

government does not have to prove the amount of loss exactly under 

§ 2Fl.l(b) (1), it does have the burden of supporting a sentencing 

increase. 

Second, Mr. Rice argues the district court relied on improper 

grounds in enhancing his sentence by two levels because of the 

"sophisticated means" used in committing his crime. U.S.S.G. 

§ 2Tl.3(b) (2). He argues both the case law and the commentary to 

the sentencing guidelines require a greater degree of 

sophistication and intricacy than occurred in this case. United 

States v. Ford, 989 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. 

Becker, 965 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 

1411 (1993). Additionally, Mr. Rice contends his sentence was 

enhanced under the sophisticated means rubric in part because he 

contested the IRS' ability to require him to produce documents 

during the civil phase of his case. Mr. Rice argues it is 

improper to consider his use of the court system as a basis for 

enhancement under the sophisticated means or any other guidelines' 

provision. U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.l, comment. 

This court accepts the district court's factual findings 

unless clearly erroneous and gives due deference to the sentencing 

court's application of the guidelines to the facts of a particular 

case. United States v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 403, 406 (lOth Cir. 

1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1103 (1991); Lowder, 5 F.3d at 470. 

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·J 

The 1989 edition of the Guideline's Manual was used in this case 

because the offenses occurred between March 26, 1988, and 

March 19, 1990. Both the sophisticated means enhancement under 

§ 2T1.3(b) (2) and the more than minimal planning enhancement under 

§ 2Fl.1(b) (2) (A) are relevant. The Presentence Report applied 

§ 3D1.3, the closely-related counts provision. This section 

requires closely-related offenses to be grouped together. In this 

case, Counts I and II (False Claims for Refund) were grouped 

together, as were Counts III, IV and V (Fraud and False Statement 

under Penalty of Perjury). Section 3D1.3(b) requires, "[w]hen the 

counts involve offenses of the same general type to which 

different guidelines apply (~, theft and fraud) , apply the 

offense guideline that produces the highest offense level." The 

Presentence Report calculated the offense level under both § 2T1.1 

(Tax Evasion) and § 2F1.1 (Fraud or Deceit). Each calculation 

resulted in an offense level of seventeen, and Mr. Rice was 

sentenced accordingly. 

as: 

The commentary to § 2Tl.3 (b) (2) defines "sophisticated means" 

conduct that is more complex or demonstrates greater 

intricacy or planning than a routine tax-evasion case. 

An enhancement would be applied, for example, where the 

defendant used offshore bank accounts or transactions 

through corporate shells. 

This court has yet to address this issue. 

In Ford, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a scheme using a 

Canadian corporation to generate corporate foreign tax payments, 

which were then claimed on a domestic return as foreign tax 

credits, fell within the definition. Ford, 989 F.2d at 351. 

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Similarly, in Becker, 965 F.2d at 390-91, the court approved an 

enhancement for a complicated tax evasion scheme involving a 

private "warehouse bank" designed to circumvent the bank 

regulatory and reporting requirements. 

Only one case has reversed a district court's decision to 

enhance based on sophisticated means. In United States v. Stokes, 

998 F.2d 279, 281-83 (5th Cir. 1993), the court held any 

sophisticated means used in the case were to conceal embezzlement, 

not to hide tax evasion. Ms. Stokes simply did not tell her 

accountant about the income derived from her embezzlement. See 

generally United States v. Charroux, 3 F.3d 827, 836-37 (5th Cir. 

19 9 3) . 

By comparison with the decided cases, Mr. Rice's tax evasion 

scheme was not sophisticated. He merely claimed to have paid 

withholding taxes he did not pay. Although the trial court's 

finding is entitled to deference, we are hard pressed to agree 

with its conclusion. In substance, Mr. Rice's fraud is the 

functional equivalent of claiming more in itemized deductions than 

actually paid. If that scheme is sophisticated within the meaning 

of the guidelines, then every fraudulent tax return will fall 

within that enhancement's rubric. 

Section 2F1.1(b) (2) (A) provides for a two-level enhancement 

for fraud and deceit crimes involving more than minimal planning. 

The conunentary to § 1B1.1 defines "more than minimal planning" as 

follows: 

"More than minimal planning" means more planning than is 

typical for conunission of the offense in a simple form. 

"More than minimal planning" also exists if significant 

affirmative steps were taken to conceal the offense. 

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_, 

"More than minimal planning" is deemed present in any 

case involving repeated acts over a period of time, 

unless it is clear that each instance was purely 

opportune. Consequently, this adjustment will apply 

especially frequently in property offenses. 

In United States v. Williams, 966 F.2d 555 (lOth Cir. 1992), we 

held a computer embezzlement scheme constituted more than minimal 

planning. In United States v. Sanchez, 914 F.2d 206 (lOth Cir. 

1990), a defendant, who on fifteen occasions used a stolen credit 

card he received from his brother, engaged in more than minimal 

planning. Mr. Rice's fraud in this case is similar and falls 

within the sentencing guidelines commentary. 

For three consecutive years, Mr. Rice employed a fairly 

complicated scheme to receive tax refunds .. His actions are more 

calculated and took more planning than simply failing to report 

income. When coupled with the fact he conducted his scheme in 

three consecutive years, there is enough in the record to support 

the district court's finding. 

Moreover, Mr. Rice argues the district court erred in 

enhancing his sentence by two levels under § 3Bl.3 for using a 

special skill in the commission of his crime. Mr. Rice 

acknowledges that an accountant has the type of special skill 

contemplated by the guidelines; however, he contends the district 

court erred by failing to make specific findings he used his 

special skill to significantly facilitate either the commission or 

concealment of his offense. United States v. Gandy, 36 F.3d 912 

(lOth Cir. 1994). 

Section 3Bl.3 provides, "[i]f the defendant ... used a 

special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the 

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commission or concealment of the offense, increase by 2 levels." 

The commentary further defines a "special skill" as "a skill not 

possessed by members of the general public and usually requiring 

substantial education, training or licensing. Examples would 

include pilots, lawyers, doctors, accountants, chemists and 

demolition experts." U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.3, comment. (n.2) (emphasis 

added). 

In Gan~, this court outlined the two-step inquiry under 

§ 3B1.3. First, the government must show the defendant possessed 

a special skill. The requirement is easily met in this case 

because an accountant is one of the listed examples in the 

commentary. Second, the government must show the defendant used 

his special skill to facilitate the commission or concealment of 

his offense. Gandy, 36 F.3d at 915-16. In Gandy, we remanded for 

a further finding of whether the defendant podiatrist used his 

special skill to commit Medicare fraud because we concluded we 

could not determine from the district court's findings or the 

record how the defendant used his special skill to commit fraud. 

Id. at 916. Mr. Rice claims the same result should pertain here 

because the district court did not make a specific finding about 

how he used his CPA skills for his tax evasion. 

Yet, the record, taken as a whole, demonstrates how Mr. Rice 

used his special skills. The district court heard all the 

evidence in the case and presumably in accepting the Presentence 

Report's enhancement under § 3B1.3 agreed with its conclusion. 

Finally, Mr. Rice argues the different enhancements applied 

to increase his sentence all punish him for being an accountant 

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who engaged in tax evasion. He contends the sophisticated means, 

special skill, and more than minimal planning enhancements overlap 

considerably. Applying all of them in this case results in 

improper double counting and a fundamentally unfair cumulative 

sentence. The sentencing guidelines reflect a general policy 

against double counting. This explains their provisions for 

grouping offenses and instances of similar conduct. U.S.S.G. 

§ 1Bl.3, comment. and § 3Dl.2(d). Further, several specific 

guidelines require that a particular circumstance is not to be 

considered twice in calculating a defendant's offense level. See, 

e.g., U.S.S.G. §§ 3Bl.3; 3Al.l, comment. (n.2); 3Cl.l, comment. 

(n. 4) • Case law has also considered double counting 

impermissible. United States v. Flinn, 18 F.3d 826, 829 (lOth 

Cir. 1994); see also Lowder, 5 F.3d at 472. 

This court has recently defined impermissible double counting 

under the sentencing guidelines in this fashion: 

Impermissible double counting or impermissible 

cumulative sentencing occurs when the same conduct on 

the part of the defendant is used to support separate 

increases under separate enhancement provisions which 

necessarily overlap, are indistinct, and serve identical 

purposes. 

Flinn, 18 F.3d at 829. As already noted, Mr. Rice was sentenced 

alternatively under § 2Tl. 3 or § 2Fl.l. Therefore, the 

sophisticated means enhancement of § 2Tl.3(b) (2) cannot be 

considered with the more than minimal planning enhancement of 

§ 2Fl.l(b) (2) (A) for double counting purposes. The only way Mr. 

Rice received an impermissible cumulative sentence is if it was 

improper to enhance his sentence for use of a special skill under 

§ 3Bl.3 with either the sophisticated means or the more than 

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minimal planning enhancements. Yet, each of these enhancements 

serves a distinct purpose. 

The purpose of the special skill enhancement is to punish 

those criminals who use their special talents to commit crime. In 

contrast, the sophisticated means and more than minimal planning 

enhancements are designed to target criminals who engage in 

complicated criminal activity because their actions are considered 

more blameworthy and deserving of greater punishment than a 

perpetrator of a simple version of the crime. We therefore see no 

double counting here. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED IN PART AND 

REVERSED IN PART. The case is REMANDED for resentencing. 

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