Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00782/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00782-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Internal Revenue Service
Defendant
Rebecca Ann Rued
Plaintiff
Douglas P. Rued
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOUGLAS P. RUED, No. CIV.S-06-0782 FCD DAD PS

REBECCA ANN RUED,

Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,

Defendant.

______________________________/

This matter came before the court on September 15, 2006,

for hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss and a status (pretrial

scheduling) conference. Plaintiffs, proceeding pro se, appeared on

their own behalf. Goud P. Maragani appeared on behalf of defendant

United States (erroneously sued as “Internal Revenue Service”).

Plaintiffs initiated this action against defendant by

filing their one-page complaint on April 12, 2006. The complaint

concerns the Internal Revenue Service’s “assessment of a trust fund

recovery penalty” which, according to the brief complaint, was 

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assessed outside the applicable limitations period. The prayer of

the complaint asks that the penalty be vacated.

Although it does not specify the precise Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure it is brought under, defendant’s motion appears to

seek dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) due to insufficiency of service of process. 

The return of service on file with the court indicates that personal

service was effected as follows: “Internal Revenue Service, by

serving Mary Stokes, Legal Department, authorized to accept service,

4330 Watt Avenue, Sacramento CA 95821.” (Doc. no. 6.) Of course,

delivering a copy of the summons and complaint in this fashion does

not meet all of the various requirements of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(i), the Rule governing service of process on the United

States, its agencies, corporations, officers and employees. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 4(i). Specifically, according to Rule 4(i)(1), service

upon the United States shall be effected:

(A) by delivering a copy of the summons and of

the complaint to the United States attorney for

the district in which the action is brought or to

an assistant United States attorney or clerical

employee designated by the United States attorney

in a writing filed with the clerk of the court or

by sending a copy of the summons and of the

complaint by registered or certified mail

addressed to the civil process clerk at the

office of the United States attorney and

(B) by also sending a copy of the summons and of

the complaint by registered or certified mail to

the Attorney General of the United States at

Washington, District of Columbia, and

(C) in any action attacking the validity of an

order of an officer or agency of the United

States not made a party, by also sending a copy

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 Due to the brief nature of plaintiffs’ complaint, it is 1

unclear to the court whether plaintiffs are “attacking the validity

of an order of an officer or agency of the United States not made a

party” such that Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(C) would apply. Therefore,

out of an abundance of caution, plaintiffs may desire to comply with

paragraphs (A), (B) and (C) of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1). 

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of the summons and of the complaint by registered

or certified mail to the officer or agency.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i). The attempted service of process in this case

does not meet these requirements.1

The court also notes that more than 120 days have passed

since the filing of plaintiffs’ complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(m)(“If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a

defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the

court, upon motion or on its own initiative after notice to the

plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that

defendant or direct that service be effected within a specified

time[.]”).

However, as discussed at the hearing, plaintiffs having

shown good cause for the failure to timely effect service of process,

the court is required to extend the time for service for an

appropriate period. See id. (“if the plaintiff shows good cause for

the failure, the court shall extend the time for service for an

appropriate period”). Specifically, considering plaintiffs’ pro se

status and their initial good faith, though technically deficient,

attempt to complete service of process in a timely fashion, the court

finds good cause for extending the time for service of process thirty

(30) days.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficient service

of process is granted;

2. Plaintiffs’ attempted service of process, proof of

which was filed on July 24, 2006 (Doc. no. 6), is quashed;

3. Plaintiffs shall properly complete service of process

on defendant United States with thirty (30) days of the date of the

September 15, 2006, hearing; and

4. The status (pretrial scheduling) conference is

continued to December 15, 2006, at 10:00 a.m.

DATED: September 15, 2006.

DAD:th

ddad1\orders.prose\rued0782.oah.091506

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