Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01018/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01018-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William E. Blakeman
Appellant
Sheriff Leo Kennedy
Appellee

Document Text:

*

The Honorable Edward J. McManus, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1018

___________

William E. Blakeman, *

*

Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Northern

v. * District of Iowa.

*

Sheriff Leo Kennedy, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

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Submitted: May 19, 2006

Filed: May 23, 2006

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Before MELLOY, FAGG, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Iowa inmate William E. Blakeman appeals the district court’s*

 adverse grant

of summary judgment in Blakeman's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Having reviewed the

record de novo, see Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000) (standard

of review), we conclude dismissal was proper, see Auman v. United States, 67 F.3d

157, 161-62 (8th Cir. 1995) (appellate court reviews judgments, not opinions, and

may affirm on any ground supported by record regardless of whether counsel urged

it or district court considered it). 

Appellate Case: 05-1018 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/23/2006 Entry ID: 2047774
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We conclude Blakeman’s recitations are insufficient to demonstrate Kennedy

had personal knowledge of Blakeman needing and not receiving seizure medication.

See Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174, 176 (8th Cir. 1995) (general responsibility

for supervising operations of prison is insufficient to establish personal involvement

required to support liability); Fruit v. Norris, 905 F.2d 1147, 1151 (8th Cir. 1990)

(supervisors are not liable for Eighth Amendment claims brought under § 1983 on

respondeat superior theory; supervisors must be personally involved in, deliberately

indifferent to, or tacitly authorize constitutional violation).

To the extent Blakeman’s complaint can be read to sue Kennedy in his official

capacity, and assuming Kennedy qualifies as a policymaker, we conclude Blakeman

identified no unconstitutional custom or policy which caused him to be denied needed

seizure medication. See Ware v. Jackson County, 150 F.3d 873, 880 (8th Cir. 1998)

(official policy involves deliberate choice to follow course of action made from

various alternatives by official who maintains final authority to establish

governmental policy); Morton v. City of Little Rock, 934 F.2d 180, 182-84 (8th Cir.

1991) (official-capacity claim against individual city official must be based on

existence of city policy or custom causing constitutional violation).

Finally, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Blakeman’s initial motion for appointed counsel. The issue of Kennedy’s

involvement was not complex and it was within Blakeman’s knowledge. See Davis

v. Scott, 94 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1996) (factors district courts should consider in

deciding whether to appoint counsel in civil case include factual and legal complexity

of the case, presence or absence of conflicting testimony, and plaintiff’s ability to

investigate facts and present claim). Accordingly, we affirm.

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Appellate Case: 05-1018 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/23/2006 Entry ID: 2047774