Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03092/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03092-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carroll Fletcher
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 1, 2008 Decided June 13, 2008 

No. 05-3091 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

NATHANIEL LAW, 

APPELLANT

________ 

Consolidated with 

05-3092, 05-3120 

________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 03cr00311-01) 

(No. 03cr00311-02) 

(No. 03cr00311-04) 

________ 

Robert A. Ratliff argued the cause and filed briefs and 

Jonathan Zucker filed a brief for appellant William Farrell. 

Michael T. Morley argued the cause for appellant 

Nathaniel Law. With him on the briefs was Katherine Leong. 

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Joseph Virgilio, appointed by the court, argued the cause 

and filed the briefs for appellant Carroll Fletcher. 

Katherine M. Kelly, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. 

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, III, Mary B. 

McCord, Kenneth F. Whitted, and George P. Eliopoulos, 

Assistant U.S. Attorneys. John P. Gidez, Assistant U.S. 

Attorney, entered an appearance. 

Before: GINSBURG, BROWN, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM. 

PER CURIAM: Appellants William Farrell, Nathaniel Law, 

and Carroll Fletcher were convicted by a jury of conspiring to 

traffic in narcotics and of numerous related crimes. Each 

appellant raises a number of objections to his convictions and 

sentence. We affirm in all respects except that we reverse 

Farrell’s conviction for conspiring to launder money, one of 

Law’s convictions for distributing cocaine base, and 

Fletcher’s conviction for maintaining a drug residence. The 

cases are remanded to the district court for re-sentencing 

consistent herewith. 

I. Background 

In the fall of 2000, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

launched a three-year investigation into the appellants’ 

trafficking in narcotics. The FBI initially gathered 

information about the appellants’ operations by monitoring 

their communications and learning of several locations they 

used, including a recreation center at 4th St. and Rhode Island 

Ave. N.E. (the Center), the Shiloh Baptist Church at 9th St. 

and P St. N.W., a four-unit apartment building at 2002 

Rosedale St. N.E., an apartment at 200 K St. N.W., and a 

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KFC restaurant at Florida Ave. and North Capitol St. N.E. 

Through its continued monitoring of the appellants’ 

communications and of these locations, the FBI gathered 

evidence against the appellants and others, including Thomas 

Jackson, Ricardo Atcherson, Renaldo Mason, Harry Jackson, 

Ronald Valentine-Bey, and Lynn Cyrus. Thomas Jackson, 

Atcherson, Mason, Harry Jackson, Valentine-Bey, and Cyrus, 

all of whom then provided further information about the 

appellants’ activities, participated in controlled purchases 

from the appellants, and testified at trial. 

The Government introduced compelling evidence that the 

appellants distributed powder cocaine, cocaine base (also 

known as crack cocaine) and heroin on numerous occasions 

and that they did so pursuant to an agreement among 

themselves. For example, Thomas Jackson testified that 

Farrell ordinarily dealt with “the connection,” meaning the 

source of their drugs, but for a time Farrell, afraid the police 

were monitoring his actions, had Fletcher deal with the 

source. During that period, Thomas Jackson bought 15 

kilograms or more of powder cocaine from Fletcher. After 

Fletcher failed to pay the connection as required, Farrell 

resumed control over relations with the connection, and 

Fletcher introduced Thomas Jackson to Farrell so that 

Fletcher “won’t be in the middle of it” anymore. Thomas 

Jackson testified he bought more than three kilograms of 

powder cocaine from Farrell. Harry Jackson testified Fletcher 

sold heroin to him twice and arranged for Farrell to sell 

heroin to him once. Cyrus often bought crack cocaine from 

Fletcher, who was sometimes accompanied by Law. On one 

occasion, Fletcher arranged for Cyrus to buy 62 grams of 

crack cocaine from Law. Mason testified Law sold him at 

least nine kilograms of powder cocaine between late 2000 and 

early 2003 and at least 250 grams of heroin in the summer of 

2003. Mason also testified that when he would ask Law for 

narcotics, Law would first call Farrell, and sometimes Farrell 

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would accompany Law to the transaction; indeed, Law told 

Mason that Farrell was his source. 

Throughout the period of the conspiracy, Karlene 

Thomas owned the Rosedale building, but from 1993 until at 

least September 2001, she relinquished control over the 

building to her former boyfriend, Nathaniel Moore. He in 

turn gave control to Farrell, who made the monthly mortgage 

payment of about $600 in Karlene Thomas’s name and 

collected and kept the rent from the tenants. Law resided in 

apartment #3 in the Rosedale building. In 2002, FBI agents 

arrested Law and then searched his apartment pursuant to a 

valid warrant. The agents discovered various drug-related 

items, such as a scoop, the box to a coffee grinder, and digital 

scales, each with a residue of crack cocaine on it. 

During their search of Law’s apartment, the agents also 

discovered that a key they had seized from Law during his 

arrest fit the lock to apartment #4, which was across the hall 

from Law’s apartment. The agents called Karlene Thomas, 

who consented to their search of that apartment. There they 

found 15 grams of crack cocaine, 17.7 grams of heroin, 

business cards for Farrell and Fletcher, a loaded shotgun, and 

various drug-related items, such as razor blades, syringes, a 

strainer, a coffee grinder that matched the coffee grinder box 

found in Law’s apartment, and digital scales, each with a 

residue of crack cocaine on it. 

FBI agents and Metropolitan Police officers also found 

incriminating evidence when they arrested Farrell and 

searched his home. In November 2003, an officer conducting 

a traffic stop of Farrell seized $3,411, of which $3,030 was in 

bills the FBI had provided to Mason earlier that day for a 

controlled drug purchase from Farrell and Law. About a 

week later, Farrell recovered the $3,411 from the police by 

presenting a receipt for a savings bond in the amount of 

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$10,368, which he had cashed shortly before the money was 

seized. Three days later, agents executed a search warrant at 

Farrell’s home, where they found more than $19,000 in cash, 

$1,100 of which was in bills used by Mason in the 

aforementioned controlled purchase. Agents also found a 

gun, money order receipts in Karlene Thomas’s name for 

mortgage payments on the Rosedale building, and various 

drug-related items, such as plastic baggies, a scale, and paper 

face masks. 

As these facts suggest, and as the jury found, Farrell was 

the leader of the conspiracy. He controlled the Rosedale 

building, at which the appellants conducted some of their 

drug activities. Law and Fletcher often consulted Farrell 

before entering into a transaction. And Farrell managed the 

connection. 

The appellants were arrested late in 2003. A grand jury 

indicted them on a number of charges, as follows: 

• Count 1: Farrell, Law, and Fletcher were charged under 

21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 with conspiring to possess 

with intent to distribute and conspiring to distribute five 

kilograms or more of cocaine, 50 grams or more of 

cocaine base, and 100 grams or more of heroin.1

 

• Count 2: Farrell was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 

with conspiring to launder the proceeds of his drug 

transactions by making mortgage payments on the 

Rosedale building in Karlene Thomas’s name. 

 1

 Count 1 also charged Jeffrey Dunbar and Caul Watson with 

the conspiracy and Count 4 also charged Watson with maintaining 

a drug residence at 200 K St. N.W. The jury acquitted Dunbar and 

Watson pleaded guilty and has not appealed. 

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• Count 3: Farrell, Law, and Fletcher were charged under 

21 U.S.C. § 856 with maintaining a residence (the 

Rosedale building) for the purpose of manufacturing, 

distributing, and using a controlled substance. 

• Count 4: Fletcher was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 856 

with maintaining a residence (the apartment at 200 K St. 

N.W.) for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, and 

using a controlled substance. 

• Count 5: Fletcher was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841 

with distributing 50 grams or more of cocaine base 

through a purchase made by Cyrus. 

• Counts 6-11: Law was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841 

with six counts of distributing five grams or more of 

cocaine base, to wit, six controlled purchases made by 

Atcherson. 

• Count 12: Law was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 860 

with distributing cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a 

school through a controlled purchase made by Atcherson. 

• Count 13: Farrell, Law, and Fletcher were charged 

under 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. § 841 with possessing 

with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine 

base, which was discovered in apartment #4 of the 

Rosedale building. 

• Count 14: Farrell and Law were charged under 21 

U.S.C. § 841 with distributing cocaine through a 

controlled purchase made by Mason. 

• Count 15: Farrell was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841 

with distributing cocaine through a controlled purchase 

made by Valentine-Bey. 

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The jury acquitted Fletcher on Count 3 but convicted the 

appellants of all other counts. In a special verdict, the jury 

also found Farrell was “an organizer or leader” of a drug 

trafficking organization, which increased by four his offense 

level for purposes of sentencing, see U.S. SENTENCING 

GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S.S.G.) § 3B1.1(a) (2007); and that 

Farrell should forfeit assets in an amount equal to the 

proceeds of his drug trafficking offenses in Counts 1, 14, and 

15 ($874,800) and the funds involved in the money 

laundering offense in Count 2 ($28,560), see 21 U.S.C. 

§ 853(a); 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1). 

The district court sentenced Farrell to 324 months in 

prison on each of Counts 1, 13, 14, and 15, and to 240 months 

in prison on each of Counts 2 and 3, all sentences to run 

concurrently. The district court sentenced Law to life in 

prison without release on Count 1 and concurrently to 212 

months in prison on each of Counts 3 and 6-14. Finally, the 

district court sentenced Fletcher to life in prison without 

release on Counts 1 and 5, 240 months in prison on Count 4, 

and 250 months in prison on Count 13, all sentences to run 

concurrently. Law’s and Fletcher’s sentences on Counts 1 

and 5 were enhanced to life in prison without release as 

mandated by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) because they each had 

“two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense.” 

The appellants raise a variety of challenges to their 

convictions and sentences. We address each appellant’s 

arguments in turn. 

II. William Farrell 

Farrell advances several challenges to his convictions and 

sentences. First, he claims the evidence was insufficient to 

support his conviction for conspiring to launder money. We 

agree and therefore reverse that conviction. Second, he 

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argues the district court erred in admitting evidence that he 

had failed to file federal income tax returns. Even if that was 

an error, it was either harmless or moot, depending upon 

which conviction is at issue. Third, Farrell argues the district 

court erred in permitting the use of two particular binder tabs 

accompanying the transcripts of the recorded conversations 

played at trial. We find no such error. Fourth, Farrell 

contends his sentences were unreasonably harsh. This 

contention lacks merit. Finally, Farrell joins both of 

Fletcher’s challenges to the Government’s expert opinion 

testimony, which, as discussed in Part IV, we reject. 

A. The Conspiracy to Launder Money 

At trial, the Government argued and the jury found 

Farrell had agreed with Fletcher to launder the proceeds of 

their narcotics activities by using those proceeds to pay the 

mortgage on the Rosedale building, which was owned by 

Karlene Thomas. Farrell contends the evidence was not 

sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. “We review the 

sufficiency of the evidence de novo, considering it in the light 

most favorable to the government, to determine whether any 

rational trier of fact could have found [the defendant] guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt of all the required elements of the 

crime.” Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 1319, 1322 (D.C. 

Cir. 2007) (en banc). 

The federal money-laundering statute proscribes the 

“conversion of cash into goods and services as a way of 

concealing or disguising the [illegal] wellspring of the cash.” 

United States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 921, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 

(quotation marks omitted).2

 We have emphasized that 18 

 2

 More precisely, the statute in relevant part punishes one who, 

“knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction 

represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts 

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U.S.C. § 1956 “prohibits the laundering of money, not merely 

the spending of money obtained illegally. Thus, the 

Government must prove that [the subject transaction was] 

motivated by a desire to conceal or disguise the source or the 

ownership of the money.” Id. (citation omitted); see also 

United States v. Hall, 434 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2006) (“the 

money laundering statute does not criminalize the mere 

spending or investing of illegally obtained assets”). 

Accordingly, it is generally the case that “[i]f transactions are 

engaged in for present personal benefit, and not to create the 

appearance of legitimate wealth, they do not violate the 

money laundering statute.” United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 

1206, 1213 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted); cf. 

Cuellar v. United States, No. 06-1456, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 

4698, at 15-19 (U.S. June 2, 2008) (holding 

§ 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), which prohibits transportation designed to 

conceal certain attributes of illegally obtained funds, does not 

require proof that defendant attempted to create appearance of 

legitimate wealth, but recognizing such attempt may signal 

violation of money laundering statute and indeed is manner in 

which “classic money laundering” occurs). The statute also 

punishes as a principal anyone who conspires to launder 

money. § 1956(h). 

Farrell argues the evidence was insufficient to show the 

mortgage payments were designed to conceal the source of 

the funds rather than to “profit[] from the excess rental 

income or[ to] maintain[] the premises to further drug 

trafficking.” To be sure, the Government’s evidence “need 

 

or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact 

involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity [while] 

knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part to 

conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the 

ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful 

activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). 

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not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be 

wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of 

guilt.” United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 302 

(D.C. Cir. 1991) (quotation marks omitted). But when faced 

with an innocent explanation sufficiently supported by the 

evidence to create a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s 

guilt, the Government’s burden is to present evidence 

sufficient to dispel that doubt. The need for evidence that 

excludes such an innocent explanation is especially important 

in relation to a charge of money laundering because of the 

fine line between laundering and merely spending illicit 

funds. 

Both of Farrell’s innocent explanations create a 

reasonable doubt about his guilt such that no reasonable jury 

could conclude that Farrell’s purpose in paying the mortgage 

on the Rosedale building was to conceal the source of 

illegally obtained funds. First, the evidence showed that 

Farrell profited from the excess rental income derived from 

the building. The monthly mortgage payment on the 

Rosedale building was about $600. The monthly rent for 

each apartment in the Rosedale building, which Farrell 

collected when he was paying the mortgage, was typically 

$400 or $450. Although all the apartments were not always 

rented, it is easy to see that Farrell’s rental income exceeded 

his mortgage payments, making his decision to take over the 

mortgage a profitable one. Second, the evidence showed 

Farrell maintained the Rosedale building to further his drug 

trafficking, for which maintaining he was in fact convicted on 

Count 3. As detailed below, Farrell’s paying the mortgage 

and collecting the rent were integral to the control he exerted 

over the Rosedale building. In sum, there was ample 

evidence to show Farrell paid the mortgage to gain present 

benefits, not to create the appearance of legitimate wealth. 

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At trial, the Government presented and now points to 

three pieces of evidence intended to show Farrell paid the 

mortgage in order to conceal the source of his funds. We find 

the Government’s evidence insufficient to its task – it neither 

makes for a strong affirmative case nor tends to exclude 

Farrell’s innocent explanations. 

First, the Government notes Farrell paid the mortgage in 

Karlene Thomas’s name rather than in his own. Farrell did 

this sometimes by purchasing a money order in Thomas’s 

name and then making the money order payable to the 

mortgagee, and sometimes by giving the money to Thomas to 

make the payment. The Government cites two decisions in 

which a court of appeals upheld the conviction of a person 

who had laundered money by making a payment in another’s 

name. Those cases, however, involved circumstances that 

tended to exclude the possibility that the defendant was 

merely spending the illicit funds. In neither case was there 

any plausible legitimate reason for using another’s name. In 

both cases the pseudonymous purchase provided the 

defendant no benefit other than a way to convert the illegally 

obtained funds; that is, the purchase merely created the 

appearance of legitimate wealth. Indeed, in one case the 

defendant admitted he was trying to launder the money. See 

Wynn, 61 F.3d at 925-26 (one defendant obtains and uses 

cashier’s checks in other defendant’s name to buy luxury 

vehicle and soon thereafter to pay difference between trade-in 

value of that vehicle and price of another); Hall, 434 F.3d at 

52-53 (defendant bought truck with money order in sister’s 

name and told acquaintance account from which funds came 

was “fictitious ‘inheritance account’ in which the money ‘was 

cleaned’”). 

No such circumstance is present in this case. There was 

a simple, benign reason for paying the mortgage in Thomas’s 

name: Thomas was the mortgagor, making it easier for Farrell 

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to pay the mortgage in her name than to make clear to the 

mortgage company that payments in his name were to be 

applied to her mortgage. And, as discussed above, making 

the mortgage payments provided Farrell with legitimate 

benefits, namely, rental income and a base for his drug 

operation. Therefore, under the circumstances Farrell’s 

decision to pay the mortgage in Thomas’s name does not 

reasonably suggest a purpose to conceal the source of the 

funds. Cf. United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 946 (10th 

Cir. 1991) (insufficient evidence of purpose to conceal where 

defendant purchased cars in daughter’s name but defendant 

was “present at these purchases[, was] readily identified by 

the respective salespersons involved,” and “conspicuously” 

used the cars). 

Second, the Government points to Farrell’s alleged 

“belief that, by paying the mortgage from 1993 to 2001, he 

acquired a property interest in the building.” The 

Government does not, however, explain how this alleged 

belief shows a design to conceal the source of the funds. We 

find this alleged belief has little or no probative value because 

it does not distinguish mere spending from laundering; 

legitimate spending to pay for real estate ordinarily comes 

with the expectation of acquiring a property interest. 

Third, the Government emphasizes that Farrell “refuse[d] 

to deal with government entities regarding the Rosedale 

building, such as paying sanitation bills or helping with tax 

filings, and [refused] to provide Thomas with money to 

handle such bills.”3

 Left again to grope for the significance of 

this allegation, we find none. For starters, this allegation 

 3

 We understand the evidence to show, and the Government’s 

position to be, that Farrell refused to pay for the preparation of “tax 

papers” for the building, not that he refused to pay the taxes on the 

building. 

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relates not to the use (and thus possible cleansing) of the 

illicit funds but rather to the funds’ non-use, the significance 

of which is at best unclear. Moreover, Farrell’s refusal to pay 

sanitation and tax-preparation bills may have reflected 

nothing more than his desire to avoid diminishing the profit 

from his investment in the Rosedale building. If Thomas was 

willing to pay these bills even while Farrell was collecting the 

rent, then Farrell had no incentive to pay them. Or Farrell 

may have avoided paying the bills because he did not want 

his name associated with a building he knew was used for 

drug activities. 

In sum, no reasonable jury could conclude that Farrell’s 

purpose in paying the mortgage on the Rosedale building was 

to conceal the source of illegally obtained funds. We 

therefore vacate Farrell’s conviction on Count 2 for 

conspiring to launder money.4

B. The IRS Records 

Farrell contends the district court erred in admitting into 

evidence certified statements by the IRS that he had not filed 

income tax returns for the years 1998 through 2002. The 

district court admitted these statements not to prove Farrell 

was guilty of tax evasion but rather to rebut Farrell’s 

contention that he had “legitimate income and not illegitimate 

income” from “drug trafficking.” Under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 404(b), evidence of other “crimes, wrongs, or acts is 

not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 

show action in conformity therewith,” but it may be 

admissible for another purpose. Because the introduction of 

such evidence runs the risk the jury will convict the defendant 

 4

 In consequence, we need not reach Farrell’s contention that 

the evidence was insufficient to establish an agreement with 

Fletcher to commit this offense. 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 13 of 43
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simply for being a bad person, the district court must be alert 

to whether the probative value of the evidence is 

“substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,” 

in which case the court must exclude it. FED. R. EVID. 403. 

“We accord substantial deference to the district court’s 

rulings on these issues.” United States v. Lawson, 410 F.3d 

735, 741 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Henderson v. George 

Wash. Univ., 449 F.3d 127, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“the 

appellate court is extremely wary of second-guessing the 

legitimate balancing of interests undertaken by the trial 

judge” pursuant to Rule 403). 

Farrell contends admitting the IRS records violated both 

Rule 404(b) and Rule 403. He argues the IRS records were 

inadmissible under Rule 404(b) because they were “probative 

of nothing more than that [he] just was a tax deadbeat and he 

was a bad citizen.” Farrell argues the evidence was 

inadmissible under Rule 403 because whatever probative 

value it might have had was “substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice,” specifically the risk that the 

evidence would unfairly suggest he was the “type of 

dishonest person” who would deal drugs near a church or 

launder money. As Farrell points out, the district court did 

not give a limiting instruction as to the purpose for which the 

IRS records were admitted. 

We need not decide whether the district court erred, as 

Farrell claims. To the extent the purported errors relate to 

Farrell’s conviction on Count 2 for money laundering, they 

are moot because we reverse that conviction on a different 

ground, supra. To the extent they relate to Farrell’s drugrelated convictions on Counts 1, 3, and 13-15, they were 

harmless. An error is harmless and thus to be disregarded if it 

“does not affect substantial rights.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a); 

see 28 U.S.C. § 2111. 

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In determining whether an error is harmless, the court 

measures the harm in terms of whether the error had 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict, not merely whether the 

record evidence [would be] sufficient absent the error to 

warrant a verdict of guilt. Consequently, an evidentiary 

error is harmless if ... the case is not close .... 

Ashcraft & Gerel v. Coady, 244 F.3d 948, 953 (D.C. Cir. 

2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Of course, “the 

Government bears the burden of proving an error is 

‘harmless.’” United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885, 891 (D.C. 

Cir. 2007). 

In this case, none of the drug charges was “close”; the 

Government presented overwhelming evidence of Farrell’s 

guilt on each drug-related count, to wit: 

Count 1: The Government was required to prove Farrell 

agreed “knowingly or intentionally ... to ... distribute ... or 

possess with intent to ... distribute” five kilograms or more of 

powder cocaine, 50 grams or more of crack cocaine (i.e., 

cocaine base), or 100 grams or more of heroin. See 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii), (b)(1)(B)(i) & 846. We 

detailed in Part I some of the evidence in support of this 

charge: Farrell and Fletcher coordinated their dealings with a 

drug source, their sales of powder cocaine to Thomas 

Jackson, and their sale of heroin to Harry Jackson; Farrell and 

Law jointly sold powder cocaine to Mason; and Law told 

Mason that Farrell was his source for the powder cocaine and 

heroin he was selling to Mason. The evidence in support of 

the other drug counts, which we consider presently, also 

shows Farrell’s participation in the conspiracy. 

Count 3: The Government was required to prove Farrell 

“knowingly open[ed], lease[d], rent[ed], use[d], or 

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maintain[ed]” the Rosedale building “for the purpose of 

manufacturing, distributing, or using” powder cocaine, crack 

cocaine, or heroin. See 21 U.S.C. § 856(a). As detailed in 

Part I, both apartment #3, which was rented by Farrell’s coconspirator Law, and apartment #4, which was evidently not 

rented, contained drugs and drug paraphernalia. Apartment 

#4 also contained links to Farrell, as well as to Fletcher and 

Law, specifically, Farrell’s and Fletcher’s business cards and 

a coffee grinder matching a piece of a coffee grinder in Law’s 

apartment. And although Karlene Thomas was the Rosedale 

building’s owner of record, Farrell had effective control. Not 

only was he collecting the rent from the tenants and paying 

the mortgage, he was also doing the leasing and he excluded 

Thomas by changing the locks on the building. 

Count 13: Much of the evidence that establishes Farrell’s 

guilt under Counts 1 and 3 also proves he knowingly or 

intentionally possessed with intent to distribute the 15 grams 

of crack cocaine found in apartment #4 of the Rosedale 

building – or at least aided and abetted that possession, for 

which he would be liable as a principal. See 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii); 18 U.S.C. § 2. 

Count 14: The Government was required to prove Farrell 

knowingly or intentionally distributed powder cocaine. See

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). On November 25, 2003, 

Mason, who was cooperating with FBI agents, met Law 

outside Law’s aunt’s house, where he gave Law $3,500 in 

marked bills for 125 grams of powder cocaine. Law did not, 

however, give Mason the cocaine at that time; rather, they 

agreed Law would give Mason the drugs later that day at the 

Shiloh Baptist Church. Farrell entered the church some 20 to 

30 minutes after Law had done. Five to ten minutes later, 

Farrell and Law exited the church together and got into 

Farrell’s van. After Mason arrived, Law left Farrell’s van 

carrying a brown paper bag containing powder cocaine, 

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which he gave to Mason in Mason’s car. That night, a 

Metropolitan Police officer conducting a traffic stop of Farrell 

seized $3,411, of which $3,030 was in marked bills the FBI 

had provided to Mason earlier that day for the controlled 

purchase from Law. 

Count 15: As with Count 14, the Government was 

required to prove Farrell knowingly or intentionally 

distributed powder cocaine to Valentine-Bey. On November 

26, 2003, at the direction of FBI agents, Valentine-Bey 

bought 250 grams of powder cocaine from Farrell outside the 

Shiloh Baptist Church. 

Farrell argues the admission of the IRS records showing 

he had failed to file tax returns for several years was 

nonetheless prejudicial because the records “bolstered the 

credibility of the cooperating witnesses whose testimony was 

the core of the government’s proof of the narcotics 

conspiracy.” Farrell’s theory appears to be that, insofar as the 

cooperating witnesses testified about Farrell’s drug activities, 

their testimony was bolstered by the inference Farrell fears 

the jury drew from the IRS records, namely, that Farrell was 

dishonest and therefore the type of person who would deal 

drugs as charged. Farrell advances no reason, however, to 

doubt the credibility of the cooperating witnesses upon whose 

testimony the Government built its case against him, and so 

his objection founders; an error that bolsters the credibility of 

a witness is harmless unless that witness’s testimony is 

“otherwise[ ]suspect.” United States v. Cunningham, 145 

F.3d 1385, 1394 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also United States v. 

Lampkin, 159 F.3d 607, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (error not 

harmless where witness’s credibility “was very much in doubt 

throughout the trial”). 

Farrell’s co-defendant Law, however, has questioned the 

credibility of one of those witnesses, namely, Mason. As 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 17 of 43
18 

described above, Mason testified about his transactions with 

Law and about Law’s relationship with Farrell. Attempting to 

undermine Mason’s credibility, Law argues that “Mason 

made many vague and contradictory statements concerning 

the quantity of drugs he allegedly bought from Mr. Law”; that 

there was evidence contradicting Mason’s testimony about 

where the transactions between Mason and Law occurred; and 

that Mason’s testimony was motivated by his plea bargain, 

under which he would gain leniency from prosecutors for his 

own actions. The connection between Mason’s testimony and 

any general inference of Farrell’s bad character that the jury 

might have drawn from the IRS records is so attenuated that 

the IRS records could not have bolstered Mason’s credibility, 

let alone affected the jury’s decision with respect to Farrell. 

We conclude the admission of the IRS records was, if 

erroneous, harmless with respect to the drug-related charges. 

C. The Binder Tabs 

At trial, the Government played recordings of numerous 

phone calls between Farrell and others. To assist the jury in 

following those recordings, the Government provided tabbed 

binders of transcripts of the recordings. The Government 

contended ten of those recorded conversations were between 

Farrell and drug sources in New York, which in turn showed 

he had a leadership role in the conspiracy. Although the 

transcripts of those ten conversations were labeled as being 

between Farrell and an “Unknown Male,” the Government 

placed seven of them behind a tab labeled “Farrell & NY 

Source #1” and the other three behind a tab labeled “Farrell & 

NY Source #2.” Farrell disputed the Government’s 

contention that he was speaking with drug sources in those 

conversations; the participants had not identified themselves 

in the recordings, and no witness at trial identified the people 

with whom Farrell was speaking. The jury nonetheless 

agreed with the Government, which resulted in the 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 18 of 43
19 

enhancement of Farrell’s sentences by virtue of his leadership 

role in the conspiracy. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). Farrell 

contends the district court, pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Evidence 403, should have refused to let the Government use 

the tabs because their usefulness “was substantially 

outweighed by unfair prejudice.” A “more neutral label, such 

as ‘Farrell & Unknown Male,’” he argues, “would have just 

as effectively assisted the jury in turning to the appropriate 

section within the binder.” We hold the district court did not 

abuse its discretion. 

“The principal risk of indiscriminately permitting the use 

of transcripts by jurors is that ... the jurors may ... transform 

the transcript into independent evidence of the recorded 

statements.” United States v. Holton, 116 F.3d 1536, 1540 

(D.C. Cir. 1997). A district court, however, has discretion to 

permit the use of a transcript “for the limited purpose of being 

used as a jury aid [to] help prevent jury confusion and wasted 

time as a tape is being played,” provided the court uses 

“procedures ... to ensure that the jury does not rely on one 

party’s version of the transcript instead of the tape recording.” 

Id. at 1541-43 (quotation marks omitted); see also United 

States v. Slade, 627 F.2d 293, 302-04 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In 

Holton, we prescribed certain precautionary procedures, 

including instructing the jurors “the tape recording constitutes 

evidence of the recorded conversations and the transcript is an 

interpretation of the tape,” “they should disregard anything in 

the transcript that they do not hear on the recording itself,” 

and if only one party submits a transcript, then “the jury must 

be informed that the transcript is only one party’s version.” 

116 F.3d at 1542-43. Depending upon the circumstances, we 

pointed out, additional procedures may be necessary. See id.

at 1543. 

It is undisputed that the district court gave the requisite 

Holton instructions. Farrell claims the instructions were 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 19 of 43
20 

nonetheless inadequate because they addressed only the 

“transcripts.” The tabs, Farrell says, “were not part of the 

transcript, but were extraneous to the transcript.” In order to 

agree with Farrell, we would have to conclude the district 

court was required to find that, in the absence of an 

instruction specifically addressing the tabs, the jury would 

believe it could consider the tabs as evidence. In light of the 

instructions the district court gave, we conclude the district 

court need not have attributed such a peculiar belief to the 

jury. 

First, the tabs were obviously part of the Government’s 

presentation and organization of the transcripts. More 

important, the clear import of the district court’s instructions 

was that only the tapes were to be considered as evidence of 

the recorded conversations. When the binders were first 

presented to the jury, the court explained: 

The evidence in this case is what you hear on the tape 

recordings, not what is printed on these transcript pages. 

These transcript pages have been prepared and provided 

to you solely for whatever assistance they may be to you 

in identifying the speaker[s] who are speaking or the 

words that are spoken. 

Similarly, after the close of the evidence, the district 

court instructed the jury: “Transcripts of these tape recorded 

conversations have been shown to you solely for your 

convenience ... in identifying the speakers as the[] recordings 

were being played. ... What you hear on the tape[s] 

themselves is evidence in the case.” Although it might have 

been prudent for the district court to expand the Holton

instructions expressly to reach the binders and tabs, we will 

not require district courts to presume the jury lacks common 

sense. We therefore reject Farrell’s challenge to the use of 

the binder tabs. 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 20 of 43
21 

D. The Reasonableness of the Sentences 

Farrell was sentenced to concurrent terms of 324 months 

imprisonment for each offense relating to a quantity of drugs, 

namely, Counts 1 and 13-15. He contends these sentences 

were unreasonable because the district court “failed to take 

into account the increasing[ly] prevalent view that sentences 

based upon the crack cocaine Sentencing Guidelines were 

improperly harsh when compared to those issued for 

involvement with powder cocaine.” 

“[W]e ... review any sentence, whether within the 

[Sentencing] Guidelines range or not, to ensure that it is 

reasonable in light of the sentencing factors that Congress 

specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Dorcely, 

454 F.3d 366, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quotation marks 

omitted).5

 A “sentence within a properly calculated 

Guidelines range is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of 

reasonableness.” Dorcely, 454 F.3d at 376; see Rita v. United 

States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007). 

We reject Farrell’s contention because, contrary to his 

assertion, the district court, when considering the factors 

enumerated in § 3553(a), clearly took account of the 

Guidelines’ disparate treatment of sentences for crack and for 

 5

 Section 3553(a) “tells the sentencing judge to consider (1) 

offense and offender characteristics; (2) the need for a sentence to 

reflect the basic aims of sentencing, namely (a) ‘just punishment’ 

(retribution), (b) deterrence, (c) incapacitation, (d) rehabilitation; 

(3) the sentences legally available; (4) the Sentencing Guidelines; 

(5) Sentencing Commission policy statements; (6) the need to avoid 

unwarranted disparities; and (7) the need for restitution. The 

provision also tells the sentencing judge to ‘impose a sentence 

sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with’ the basic 

aims of sentencing as set out above.” Rita v. United States, 127 S. 

Ct. 2456, 2463 (2007). 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 21 of 43
22 

powder cocaine offenses. Indeed, the district court calculated 

the sentencing range as though Farrell’s offenses involved 

powder rather than crack cocaine. The resulting sentencing 

range was 262-327 months imprisonment, rather than 360 

months to life imprisonment. After noting that Farrell’s 

crimes were not “victimless,” that he was “quite along in 

age,” and that his health was declining, the district court 

settled upon concurrent sentences of 324 months 

imprisonment for each of Counts 1 and 13-15, which was 

well below the Guidelines range for crack cocaine, but within 

(albeit near the high end of) the Guidelines range when crack 

cocaine is treated as powder cocaine. Thus the district court 

accounted for the relative harshness of sentences for crack 

cocaine offenses under the Guidelines; indeed, the court 

eliminated the disparity altogether. 

Though Farrell’s arguments for re-sentencing focus 

almost exclusively upon the Guidelines’ disparate treatment 

of crack and of powder cocaine offenses, he throws the court 

a curveball at the end of his brief. In May 2007, the 

Commission amended the Guidelines to lower by two the 

base offense level for certain crack cocaine offenses, which 

would reduce but not eliminate the disparity. See Sentencing 

Guidelines for United States Courts, 72 Fed. Reg. 28,558, 

28,571-73 (2007); Nat’l Fed. Defender Sentencing Res. 

Counsel, Applying the Crack Amendments 101 (Nov. 1, 

2007), available at http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/crack.pdf.6

 

Farrell asserts these amendments “are indicative of a shift 

 6

 The amended Guidelines took effect on November 1, 2007. 

Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 72 Fed. Reg. at 

28,558. The Commission subsequently voted to give retroactive 

effect to the amendments, effective March 3, 2008. Sentencing 

Guidelines for United States Courts, 73 Fed. Reg. 217, 217, 220 

(Jan. 2, 2008). We express no view as to what effect, if any, these 

amendments have upon Farrell’s sentences. 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 22 of 43
23 

away from the draconian penalties for those involved with 

cocaine, be it of a powder or crack variety.” (Emphasis 

added.) But it does not follow from this recent effort to 

reduce the disparity between the sentences for crack and for 

powder cocaine offenses that the Commission is troubled by 

the sentences for powder cocaine offenses. Obviously, one 

can eliminate the disparity without altering the sentences for 

powder cocaine offenses, as the district court did here. 

Finding Farrell’s arguments without merit, we conclude 

his below-Guidelines sentences were reasonable. 

III. Nathaniel Law 

Law argues the district court erred by denying his motion 

to suppress without holding an evidentiary hearing or 

allowing him to be present. We reject this challenge because 

the district court properly decided the motion as a question of 

law. Law claims the district court improperly denied his 

request for an entrapment instruction. We deny this claim 

because Law offered no evidence of inducement. Law also 

argues his life sentence was unlawful because (1) the district 

court improperly aggregated the amount of drugs involved in 

the conspiracy; (2) the government presented insufficient 

evidence of Law’s involvement in a conspiracy that sold each 

drug quantity; and (3) his prior crimes were not felony drug 

offenses. We reject all three arguments because the district 

court rightly aggregated the drug amounts, the evidence was 

more than sufficient, and Law waived his argument that his 

prior crimes were not felony drug offenses. The government 

concedes that Law’s conviction for selling crack cocaine, 

Count 11, merges with his conviction for selling the same 

drugs near a school, Count 12. Accordingly, we reverse that 

conviction and remand for re-sentencing. Finally, like 

Farrell, Law joins both of Fletcher’s challenges to the 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 23 of 43
24 

Government’s expert opinion testimony, which, as discussed 

in Part IV, we reject. 

A. The Motion to Suppress 

After executing a search warrant on Law’s apartment 

(apartment #3) in the Rosedale building, FBI agents 

discovered a key seized from Law during his prior arrest fit 

the lock of the adjacent unit (apartment #4). Since the 

warrant did not authorize the search of this apartment, they 

asked landlord Thomas for permission to do so. She said the 

apartment was “currently vacant and [was] being used to store 

some furniture and other matters” and Law “might have a set 

of keys to Apartment #4, but could not provide details 

concerning why.” After further discussion, she consented to 

the search of apartment #4. Inside, agents found drugs and 

other incriminating evidence. The district court rejected 

Law’s motion to suppress this evidence without holding an 

evidentiary hearing or allowing him to be present.7

Law argues this was error. A defendant is entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress “only upon 

factual allegations which, if established, would warrant 

relief.” United States v. Thornton, 454 F.2d 957, 967 n.65 

(D.C. Cir. 1971). Under the Due Process Clause, a 

“defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage 

of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his 

presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure,” 

and this can include a suppression hearing. Kentucky v. 

Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987); see United States v. 

Hodge, 19 F.3d 51, 52-53 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, a 

defendant’s presence is not required if the court can decide 

the suppression motion as a matter of law. See Valdez v. 

 7

 At the time, Law was in another state undergoing a 

competency evaluation. 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 24 of 43
25 

Gunter, 988 F.2d 91, 93-94 (10th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, 

the viability of both of Law’s claims – the right to an 

evidentiary hearing and right to be present – turns on whether 

the district court needed to resolve any disputes of material 

fact to decide Law’s suppression motion. 

Law argues the search of apartment #4 violated the 

Fourth Amendment because the agents had no search warrant. 

The district court concluded Thomas had authority to consent 

to the search and, even if she did not, the FBI agents 

reasonably believed she did. The second theory suffices for 

our purposes. “[C]onsent of one who possesses common 

authority over premises or effects is valid as against the 

absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is 

shared.” United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974). 

While a landlord cannot ordinarily consent to a search of a 

tenant’s home, see Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 

616-17 (1961), she can consent to a search of an unleased 

apartment, see United States v. Kelly, 551 F.2d 760, 764 (8th 

Cir. 1977). Even if a landlord does not have authority to 

consent to a search, agents may rely upon her assurance that 

she has such authority, if objective circumstances make 

reliance reasonable. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 

188 (1990). Whether that reliance was reasonable is a 

question of law. United States v. James, 353 F.3d 606, 615 

(8th Cir. 2003). Thus the question for us is whether, under 

Law’s version of events, the FBI agents reasonably relied 

upon Thomas’s representation that apartment #4 was 

unleased. 

According to Law’s motion to suppress, Thomas told the 

agents apartment #4 was “currently vacant and [was] being 

used to store some furniture and other matters” and that Law 

“might have a set of keys.” Under these circumstances, the 

agents reasonably relied on Thomas’s representation that she 

had authority to consent to a search of the apartment. After 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 25 of 43
26 

all, Thomas told them the apartment was “currently vacant,” 

which is the equivalent of being unleased, see WEBSTER’S 

THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2527 (1981) 

(“vacant” means “not filled or occupied by an incumbent, 

possessor, or officer”), and landlords have authority to 

consent to searches of unleased units, see Kelly, 551 F.2d at 

764. It was reasonable for the agents to believe Thomas knew 

the occupancy status of one of only four apartment units in 

her building. Admittedly, Thomas’s inability to explain why 

Law had keys to the apartment makes this a closer case; but 

this fact, taken by itself, was not sufficient to undermine her 

credibility. Law points to United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 

1071 (D.C. Cir. 1991), where this court held the police did 

not reasonably rely on a mother’s consent to search the room 

of her 29-year-old son. But the present case is far different 

because Thomas told the agents no one lived in the apartment. 

In sum, the district court did not err by refusing to hold an 

evidentiary hearing and by denying Law an opportunity to be 

present.8

 

B. The Entrapment Instruction 

Law argues the district court improperly denied his 

request for an entrapment instruction. He was entitled to this 

instruction if there was “sufficient evidence from which a 

reasonable jury could find entrapment.” United States v. 

Glover, 153 F.3d 749, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (alterations 

omitted). We review the district court’s decision not to give 

the instruction de novo, viewing the facts in the light most 

favorable to Law. Id. at 752. 

 8

 We decline to address whether Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 43 ever applies to a suppression hearing, because that 

rule does not require a defendant be present at a “hearing on a 

question of law,” as was the case here. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(3). 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 26 of 43
27 

The entrapment defense protects an “otherwise lawabiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would 

have never run afoul of the law.” Jacobson v. United States, 

503 U.S. 540, 553-54 (1992). This defense “has two related 

elements: government inducement of the crime, and a lack of 

predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in the 

criminal conduct.” Glover, 153 F.3d at 754. If the defendant 

meets the initial burden of proving government inducement, 

the government can rebut by demonstrating he was 

nevertheless predisposed to commit the crime. When a 

government informant buys drugs from a defendant, the 

defendant can show inducement by pointing to “evidence of 

reluctance” to sell the drugs or the informant’s use of 

“persuasive overtures,” beyond those “ordinarily present in a 

drug transaction.” Id. While a government agent’s appeal to 

friendship could, under some circumstances, be a “persuasive 

overture,” we have never found such a plea “sufficiently 

strong” to satisfy this requirement. See United States v. 

Evans, 216 F.3d 80, 90 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 

Nor is this the case to do so. Law sold powder cocaine to 

his friend Mason after Mason had become a government 

informant. Yet, Law had never been reluctant to sell drugs to 

Mason, as he had sold him powder cocaine for several years 

before Mason ever became an informant. Moreover, while 

Law and Mason were longtime friends, Mason denied using 

this friendship to get Law to sell him drugs and Law 

presented no evidence to the contrary. There is similarly no 

evidence to support Law’s claim that Mason used the threat of 

force to induce the drug sale. Law also sold crack cocaine to 

Atcherson and an unnamed informant, but Law points to no 

evidence he was reluctant to make this sale; and, he offers no 

evidence that either Atcherson or the unnamed informant 

appealed to Law’s friendship. Moreover, any negative 

inference that one could draw from the government’s failure 

to tape-record Law’s transactions with Mason and Atcherson 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 27 of 43
28 

cannot make up for Law’s failure to present any evidence of 

entrapment. In sum, Law failed to introduce sufficient 

evidence to meet his initial burden of showing government 

inducement. 

C. The Mandatory Life Sentence 

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) makes it unlawful for anyone 

“knowingly or intentionally ... to manufacture, distribute, or 

dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or 

dispense, a controlled substance.” A defendant convicted of 

violating § 841(a) “shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of 

life imprisonment without release” if the violation involved 

either 50 grams or more of crack cocaine or 5 kilograms or 

more of cocaine powder, and the offender has two or more 

prior convictions for “felony drug offense[s].” The jury 

convicted Law, under 21 U.S.C. § 846, of conspiring, in 

violation of these provisions of § 841, to distribute 50 grams 

or more of crack cocaine (more precisely, of 150 grams or 

more), 5 kilograms or more of powder cocaine, and 100 

grams or more of heroin, and the government showed he had 

been convicted of three prior felony drug offenses. 

Accordingly, the district court imposed a mandatory life 

sentence. Law argues we should overturn this sentence 

because: (1) the district court improperly aggregated the 

amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy; (2) the 

government presented insufficient evidence of Law’s 

involvement in a conspiracy that sold each drug quantity; and 

(3) his prior crimes were not felony drug offenses. We reject 

the first two challenges and find Law waived the third. 

1. The aggregation of drug amounts 

A defendant convicted of conspiring to deal drugs in 

violation of § 846 “shall be subject to the same penalties as 

those prescribed for the offense” in § 841(a). 21 U.S.C. 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 28 of 43
29 

§ 846. Law claims this means the district court can sentence 

a defendant convicted of conspiracy under § 846 only for the 

largest “offense” (violation of § 841(a)) within that 

conspiracy. Thus, if a conspiracy involves five sales of 10 

grams of crack cocaine, the district court can only sentence 

the defendant like someone who sold 10 grams of crack 

cocaine, not like someone who sold 50 grams. Law argues 

the district court erred by allowing the jury to aggregate the 

drug quantities throughout the conspiracy, and then by relying 

on this figure to impose the mandatory life sentence. Since 

Law never raised this argument before the district court, we 

review for plain error. See United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 

764, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 

We join our sister circuits in holding a defendant 

convicted of conspiracy to deal drugs, in violation of § 846, 

must be sentenced, under § 841(b), for the quantity of drugs 

the jury attributes to him as a reasonably foreseeable part of 

the conspiracy. See United States v. Pressley, 469 F.3d 63, 

65-67 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam); United States v. Gori, 324 

F.3d 234, 237 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Pruitt, 156 

F.3d 638, 644-45 (6th Cir. 1998). As the Supreme Court has 

explained, a “single agreement to commit several crimes 

constitutes one conspiracy.” United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 

563, 570-71 (1989). As a result, a single violation of the 

conspiracy statute encompasses all of the crimes reasonably 

foreseeable within that conspiracy. See United States v. 

Walker, 160 F.3d 1078, 1093 (6th Cir. 1998) (a “conspiracy is 

a single violation of the drug laws, and the fact that this 

particular conspiracy was characterized by separate 

transactions is a fact of no legal significance”). Here, the 

conspiracy was dealing drugs, and thus the entire sum of the 

drugs within the conspiracy constituted a single conspiracy 

violation. Accordingly, the district court did not commit 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 29 of 43
30 

plain error by relying on the jury’s aggregated drug quantity 

determination in imposing the life sentence on Law.9

2. The sufficiency of the evidence 

Law argues that even if the jury could aggregate the drug 

sales, the government did not present sufficient evidence that 

he took part in a conspiracy involving the alleged quantity of 

each of the three drug types. In evaluating Law’s sufficiency 

challenge, “[w]e review the sufficiency of the evidence de 

novo, considering it in the light most favorable to the 

government, to determine whether any rational trier of fact 

could have found [Law] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of 

all the required elements of the crime.” Valdes, 475 F.3d at 

1322. 

We find the government presented ample evidence that 

Law took part in a conspiracy involving at least 50 grams of 

crack cocaine, 5 kilograms of powder cocaine, and 100 grams 

of heroin. “The drug conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846, 

dispenses with the usual requirement of an overt act and 

requires only an agreement to commit” a violation of 

§ 841(a). United States v. Baugham, 449 F.3d 167, 171 (D.C. 

Cir. 2006). Farrell supplied Law with drugs to sell, and both 

Fletcher and Farrell accompanied him during drug sales. 

Moreover, Law lived in the Rosedale building, which was a 

distribution center for the conspiracy. Inside of his apartment 

and the adjacent apartment #4, police found drugs, drug 

paraphernalia, and business cards for Farrell and Fletcher. 

 9

 Law’s related Sixth Amendment claims that (1) his trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the aggregation 

argument, and (2) the jury did not find he conspired to sell a 

sufficient quantity of each drug type in a single transaction, fail for 

the same reason. 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 30 of 43
31 

This is more than enough to show Law agreed to distribute 

drugs with Farrell and Fletcher. 

In addition, the government presented overwhelming 

evidence as to the drug quantities in the conspiracy. We 

discuss only the sales in which Law personally participated, 

as those are sufficient to sustain his conviction: 

At least 50 grams of crack cocaine: Cyrus testified Law 

sold him 62 grams of “cocaine,” when Fletcher, Cyrus’s 

regular supplier, went out of town. Law points out Cyrus 

only testified he bought “cocaine” from Law, not specifically 

crack cocaine. However, Cyrus testified: (1) he bought crack 

cocaine from Fletcher approximately 45 times, and over half 

those purchases were of 62 grams; (2) he bought powder 

cocaine from Fletcher only one time; (3) he paid Fletcher 

$2000 for 62 grams of crack cocaine; and (4) he paid Law 

$2000 for 62 grams of “cocaine” on the day in question. The 

jury could have concluded the “cocaine” Cyrus was referring 

to was crack – after all, that is what Cyrus almost always 

bought from Fletcher, at the same price.10 If this is not 

enough, Law sometimes accompanied Fletcher when he made 

crack sales to Cyrus – involvement sufficient to give Law 

reasonable knowledge that the conspiracy sold far more than 

50 grams of crack cocaine. In addition, Law sold Atcherson a 

total of 181.9 grams of crack cocaine over 6 transactions. 

The jury could reasonably have concluded at least some of 

these sales were part of the conspiracy. For example, Fletcher 

was near the scene for one sale and Law entered Fletcher’s 

minivan during this transaction. 

 10 There is also nothing to Law’s argument that this deal was 

not in furtherance of the conspiracy, as the jury had ample evidence 

to conclude Law was simply taking on his co-conspirator’s role. 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 31 of 43
32 

At least 5 kilograms of powder cocaine: Mason testified 

Law sold him between 125 and 250 grams of powder cocaine 

at least once a week between September 2000 and February 

2003, which would total at least 13 kilograms. At another 

point, he testified he bought powder cocaine at least 20 to 30 

times from Law and added that he bought “at least” 9 

kilograms in total. Law challenges Mason’s credibility 

because of this inconsistency and because Mason claimed 

some of the drug buys took place at the Center, even though it 

had been padlocked by 2001. However, Mason never 

claimed he bought cocaine at the Center after it closed. 

Moreover, this is merely an argument about credibility and 

we give “full play to the right of the jury to determine 

credibility.” United States v. Foster, 783 F.2d 1087, 1088 

(D.C. Cir. 1986). Finally, there is little doubt these sales were 

part of the conspiracy, as Mason testified Law told him his 

source was “brother,” which was Farrell’s nickname. 

At least 100 grams of heroin: Mason testified Law sold 

him 250 grams of heroin, which Farrell supplied.11

3. The felony drug offenses 

Law claims the district court improperly imposed a life 

sentence under § 841(b) because his three prior convictions 

were not “felony drug offenses.” We conclude Law has 

waived this objection by failing to raise it to the district court. 

 11 In a footnote in his opening brief, Law suggests the 

insufficiency of the evidence was exacerbated by the prosecutor 

making prejudicial comments during closing argument. While we 

see nothing wrong with the prosecutor’s comments, we treat Law’s 

argument as waived because he failed to develop it. See 

Democratic Cent. Comm. of D.C. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit 

Comm’n, 485 F.2d 786, 790 n. 16 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 32 of 43
33 

21 U.S.C. § 851 establishes the procedural framework for 

deciding whether a defendant had been convicted of a prior 

felony offense. Under § 851(a), the government must file “an 

information” identifying the prior conviction. Under 

§ 851(b), the district court must then tell the defendant he has 

to “affirm[] or den[y] that he has been previously convicted as 

alleged in the information,” and that “any challenge to a prior 

conviction which is not made before sentence is imposed may 

not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.” § 851(b) 

(emphasis added). The defendant must then respond, in 

writing, under § 851(c), which explains, in pertinent part, 

“[a]ny challenge to a prior conviction, not raised by response 

to the information before an increased sentence is imposed in 

reliance thereon, shall be waived unless good cause be shown 

for failure to make a timely challenge.” § 851(c)(2) 

(emphasis added). Here, the government alleged Law had 

been convicted of three prior felony drug offenses and Law 

did not dispute this claim. 

Without citing any authority, Law argues the phrase “any 

challenge to a prior conviction” in subsections (b) and (c)(2) 

refers only to a collateral challenge to a prior conviction, not 

to arguments that the prior conviction was not a felony 

offense. The text of § 851 and its carefully defined 

framework doom his argument. As explained above, the 

government must first allege all aspects of a prior conviction, 

including felony offense status; the court must then tell the 

defendant he has to raise “any challenge”; and, finally, the 

defendant must bring “any challenge” or waive the argument. 

It strains credulity to argue “any challenge” refers only to 

collateral attacks on the prior conviction, as opposed to any 

challenges whatsoever to the government’s claims as to the 

conviction, including allegations about offense status. See

United States v. Brooks, 508 F.3d 1205, 1208-09 (9th Cir. 

2007) (strongly suggesting the § 851 waiver applies to 

challenges to “the validity or nature of [the defendant’s] 

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34 

conviction”) (emphasis added). Indeed, courts have regularly 

held the § 851 waiver applies to arguments that the prior 

conviction has not become final, even though these are not 

collateral challenges. See, e.g., United States v. VanDoren, 

182 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. French, 

974 F.2d 687, 696-97 (6th Cir. 1992) (as amended). 

In this case, the government filed papers, under § 851(a), 

showing Law had been convicted of three felony drug 

offenses. The district court then informed Law, as required 

by § 851(b), that he would waive any challenge he did not 

raise now. Law did not bring “any challenge” under § 851(c). 

Accordingly, since Law did not argue his crimes were not 

felony drug offenses before the district court, and has not 

shown good cause for failing to do so, he may not now raise 

them “to attack the sentence.” § 851(b).12

D. Other Sentencing Issues 

The government concedes Law’s conviction for selling 

crack cocaine to Atcherson, Count 11, merges with his 

conviction for selling the same drugs near a school, Count 12. 

 12 In arguing his prior crimes were not “felony drug offenses,” 

Law relies upon United States v. West, 393 F.3d 1302, 1305 (D.C. 

2005), which held a crime is a “felony drug offense” only if it is 

both punishable by more than one year in prison and characterized 

as a felony by the punishing jurisdiction. However, after oral 

argument in this case, the Supreme Court decided Burgess v. 

United States, 128 S. Ct. 1572 (2008), which rejected the approach 

in West and held a “felony drug offense” is any offense 

“‘punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any 

law of the United States or of a State or foreign country,’” 

regardless of how the punishing jurisdiction classifies it. Id. at 

1573 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 802(44)). Since all of Law’s prior 

convictions were punishable by more than one year in prison, he 

would not have prevailed even if he did not waive this argument. 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 34 of 43
35 

Conviction on both counts violates the Double Jeopardy 

Clause and we vacate the distribution conviction on Count 11 

and remand for re-sentencing. See United States v. Baylor, 97 

F.3d 542, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1996). During re-sentencing, the 

district court should address the inconsistency between Law’s 

Judgment and Commitment Order, which states he was 

convicted for “distribution” on Count 13, and the indictment 

and jury verdict, which charge and find him guilty of 

“possession with intent to distribute.” 

IV. Carroll Fletcher 

We now turn to Carroll Fletcher’s claims. First, Fletcher 

argues that the evidence was insufficient for a jury to convict 

him of Count 4, maintaining a drug residence at 200 K St. 

N.W. The Government concedes on appeal that the evidence 

is in fact insufficient; accordingly, we reverse Fletcher’s 

conviction on that count and remand for re-sentencing. 

Second, Fletcher challenges his mandatory life sentences for 

his convictions on Counts 1 and 5. A life sentence is 

mandatory for certain drug offenders convicted under 21 

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and § 846 who have two prior 

felony drug convictions. Here, the Government relied on 

Fletcher’s 1977 and 1987 drug convictions as the two prior 

felony drug convictions. Fletcher argues that (1) the 1977 

conviction was “set aside” under the Federal Youth 

Corrections Act (FYCA) and (2) the Government did not 

sufficiently prove the conviction because it relied only on a 

docket sheet entry. Even assuming his 1977 conviction was 

set aside under the FYCA, however, the conviction still 

counts for purposes of sentencing under § 841(b). We need 

not decide at this stage whether the Government adequately 

proved the 1977 conviction: We are already remanding 

Fletcher’s convictions for re-sentencing because we are 

reversing his drug-residence conviction; and on remand, the 

Government plans to provide additional proof of Fletcher’s 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 35 of 43
36 

1977 conviction. Third, Fletcher and his co-defendants 

Farrell and Law raise a Confrontation Clause challenge to 

expert witness testimony by a police detective; that argument 

is inconsistent with our precedents. Fourth, Fletcher, Farrell, 

and Law contend that the Government’s expert forensic 

scientist gave improper expert testimony; we reject that claim. 

A. Maintaining a Drug Residence 

The jury found Fletcher guilty of Count 4, maintaining a 

drug residence at 200 K Street in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 856(a)(1). Section 856(a)(1) makes it unlawful to 

“knowingly open, lease, rent, use, or maintain any place, 

whether permanently or temporarily, for the purpose of 

manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled 

substance.” See United States v. Lancaster, 968 F.2d 1250, 

1254 (D.C. Cir. 1992). On appeal, Fletcher argues that the 

evidence shows that another person rented and maintained the 

200 K Street apartment; Fletcher further contends that there 

was no evidence that he owned, leased, lived in, had a key to, 

or had any control over the apartment; the evidence showed 

only that he went there occasionally to carry out drug 

transactions. The Government concedes on appeal that the 

evidence is insufficient to support Fletcher’s conviction on 

this count. Accordingly, we reverse Fletcher’s § 856(a)(1) 

conviction; as the Government acknowledges, we must 

therefore remand Fletcher’s case for re-sentencing. 

B. The Mandatory Life Sentence 

The jury found Fletcher guilty of, among other counts, 

(1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and 

conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, 50 

grams or more of cocaine base, and 100 grams or more of 

heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 (Count 1) and 

of (2) distributing 50 grams or more of cocaine base in 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 36 of 43
37 

violation of § 841 (Count 5). For each of these counts, the 

district court sentenced Fletcher to life imprisonment without 

release – a mandatory sentence for offenders such as Fletcher 

who were convicted under those provisions “after two or 

more prior convictions for a felony drug offense have become 

final.” § 841(b)(1)(A); see also § 846 (“Any person who 

attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this 

subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those 

prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the 

object of the attempt or conspiracy.”). 

Fletcher had two prior felony drug convictions: a 1977 

conviction for possession with intent to distribute a controlled 

substance and a 1987 conviction for conspiracy to distribute a 

controlled substance. He argues that the § 841 and § 846 

mandatory life sentences do not apply to him, however, 

because (1) the 1977 conviction was later “set aside” under 

§ 5021 of the Federal Youth Corrections Act, and (2) the 

Government did not prove his 1977 conviction sufficiently. 

See Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5005 et seq., 

(1976), repealed by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 

1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 218(a)(8), 98 Stat. 1976, 2027. 

Even if we assume Fletcher’s 1977 conviction was set 

aside under the Federal Youth Corrections Act – a question 

we need not decide – the district court still must take it into 

account in determining his sentence under § 841(b). The term 

“set aside” and the related term “expunge” have unfortunately 

not acquired settled meanings. Compare U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, 

cmt. n.10 (conviction removed from criminal record “for 

reasons unrelated to innocence or errors of law” such as a 

conviction removed from criminal record to serve a social 

policy goal, for example “to restore civil rights or to remove 

the stigma associated with a criminal conviction,” is “set 

aside”), with Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 

103, 115 (1983) (under Iowa law, “expunction does not alter 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 37 of 43
38 

the legality of the previous conviction and does not signify 

that the defendant was innocent of the crime to which he 

pleaded guilty”). The FYCA uses the term “set aside” in the 

same way the Sentencing Commission does – to designate a 

conviction removed from a criminal record for policy reasons 

unrelated to innocence or legal error, namely, “to promote the 

rehabilitation of youth offenders.” Tuten v. United States, 

460 U.S. 660, 663-65 (1983). If expungement or set-aside of 

a conviction is designed to allow an individual to make a 

fresh start, then if the individual commits a later crime, he or 

she may forfeit the benefits of the expungement for purposes 

of recidivist sentencing provisions, at least unless Congress 

provides otherwise. For as we have recognized, “[s]ociety’s 

stronger interest is in punishing appropriately an unrepentant 

criminal.” United States v. McDonald, 991 F.2d 866, 872 

(D.C. Cir. 1993). 

Consistent with that principle, some federal recidivist 

provisions expressly exempt expunged or set-aside 

convictions. For example, the federal Sentencing Guidelines 

do not count “expunged” convictions for a defendant’s 

criminal history, although the Guidelines do count set-aside 

convictions. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 4A1.2(j) (2007); see also United States v. Fosher, 124 F.3d 

52, 58 (1st Cir. 1997); Gass v. United States, 109 F.3d 677, 

679-80 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Nicolace, 90 F.3d 

255, 258 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 

1453, 1479 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Levi, 45 F.3d 

453, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (conviction set aside under FYCA 

was “properly included in determining [defendant’s] 

sentence”); United States v. Ashburn, 20 F.3d 1336, 1343 (5th 

Cir. 1994); United States v. McDonald, 991 F.2d at 871-72;

but see United States v. Kammerdiener, 945 F.2d 300, 301 

(9th Cir. 1991). 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 38 of 43
39 

For purposes of sentences imposed under § 841, 

however, Congress has not exempted from the “prior 

convictions” that must be counted those convictions removed 

from a criminal record for policy reasons unrelated to 

innocence or an error of law. The courts of appeals that have 

considered this § 841 question therefore have counted prior 

felony drug convictions even where those convictions had 

been set aside, expunged, or otherwise removed from a 

defendant’s record for such reasons. See, e.g., United States 

v. Norbury, 492 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 2007); United 

States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 194-95 (2d Cir. 2004); 

United States v. Graham, 315 F.3d 777, 783 (7th Cir. 2003); 

cf. United States v. Acosta, 287 F.3d 1034, 1037 (11th Cir. 

2002); United States v. Cisneros, 112 F.3d 1272, 1281-82 

(5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Meraz, 998 F.2d 182, 183-88 

(3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Campbell, 980 F.2d 245, 251 

(4th Cir. 1992). We agree with those courts of appeals and 

reach the same result here. 

We now turn to Fletcher’s argument that the 1977 

conviction was not sufficiently proved. The Government 

must prove the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. See 21 

U.S.C. § 851(c)(1). The Government relied on a docket-sheet 

entry to prove the 1977 conviction, but Fletcher claims that 

the docket sheet was insufficient because it lacks “the 

necessary indicia of reliability.” See United States v. Price, 

409 F.3d 436, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2005). We need not address that 

contention. Because we are reversing Fletcher’s drugresidence conviction, we are already remanding his case for 

re-sentencing. And the Government has informed the court 

that, on remand, it will submit a copy of the judgment and 

order of commitment for Fletcher’s 1977 conviction, 

presumably eliminating any argument about the fact of the 

conviction. If on remand the Government adequately proves 

Fletcher’s 1977 conviction by producing the judgment and 

commitment order, the district court must continue to count 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 39 of 43
40 

the 1977 conviction in determining Fletcher’s sentences for 

Counts 1 and 5. 

C. The Expert Testimony of Detective Thomas 

All three defendants contest the admission of Detective 

Tyrone Thomas’s expert testimony about the typical 

operations of narcotics dealers, arguing that it was testimonial 

hearsay admitted in violation of the Sixth Amendment as 

interpreted in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 

Because the defendants did not object to Thomas’s testimony 

at trial, we review the admission of the testimony only for 

plain error. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); United States v. 

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-37 (1993). Defendants have shown 

no error, much less plain error, because – as we have 

previously held – Crawford does not limit the admissibility of 

expert witness testimony. 

In Crawford, the Supreme Court held that the 

Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment bars the 

introduction of “testimonial” out-of-court statements by 

witnesses who are not subject to cross-examination. See 541 

U.S. at 68-69. The three defendants argue that Detective 

Thomas formed his opinion about the typical operations of 

narcotics dealers over the course of thousands of interviews, 

and that his testimony is in reality the testimony of thousands 

of out-of-court “witnesses” who were not subject to crossexamination. But as this court has previously explained (in a 

case involving this same expert), Crawford “did not involve 

expert witness testimony and thus did not alter an expert 

witness’s ability to rely on (without repeating to the jury) 

otherwise inadmissible evidence in formulating his opinion 

under Federal Rule of Evidence 703.” United States v. 

Henry, 472 F.3d 910, 914 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Here, as in 

Henry, Thomas testified based on his experience as a 

narcotics investigator; he did not relate statements by out-ofUSCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 40 of 43
41 

court declarants to the jury. We therefore find that admission 

of Thomas’s testimony was not error, much less plain error. 

D. The Expert Testimony of Forensic Chemist Waninger 

All three defendants contend that the district court erred 

in denying a motion to strike the expert testimony of Eileen 

Waninger, an FBI forensic chemist. Waninger testified that 

evidence recovered from trash cans behind the Rosedale 

building and from apartments # 3 and # 4 contained residue of 

controlled substances, including cocaine base, cocaine 

powder, and heroin. After allowing the prosecution to recall 

Waninger so she could explain testing procedures in greater 

detail, the district court denied the objection to her testimony. 

We review the district court’s decision to admit the testimony 

under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. 

Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). 

Defendants argue that the district court should have 

barred Waninger’s testimony because the evidence “did not 

establish that her conclusions ... were reliable.” Under 

Daubert, the district court “must focus ‘solely on principles 

and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.’” 

Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 

(quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 

595 (1993)). In acting as gatekeeper, the court “must 

determine first whether the expert’s testimony is based on 

‘scientific knowledge;’ and second, whether the testimony 

‘will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact 

in issue.’” Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592). As this 

court noted in Ambrosini, the Daubert Court outlined four 

factors that the district court could use to evaluate scientific 

validity: “(1) whether the theory or technique can be and has 

been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been 

subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the method’s 

known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether the theory or 

USCA Case #05-3092 Document #1121513 Filed: 06/13/2008 Page 41 of 43
42 

technique finds general acceptance in the relevant scientific 

community.” Id. at 134. The court further emphasized that 

the inquiry is a flexible one; the factors outlined are not 

“necessarily applicable in every case or dispositive; nor are 

[they] exhaustive.” Id. 

Here, Waninger explained that, following FBI 

Laboratory protocol of identifying residue “by more than one 

technique,” she used at least two of the three following tests 

to identify the residue on each item: (1) ion mobility 

spectrometry, (2) infrared spectroscopy, and (3) gas 

chromatography/mass spectrometry. She testified that ion 

mobility spectrometry is an accepted “screening technique” in 

forensic chemistry; that it has been used for “many, many 

years”; that it is regularly used, including in Drug 

Enforcement Agency narcotics testing and airport explosives 

testing; and that a “lot of papers have been written” about its 

use. She testified that infrared spectroscopy, a technique that 

passes infrared light through a sample to determine its unique 

chemical spectra, is used worldwide by forensic chemists to 

detect controlled substances; that she has used it for ten years; 

and that it has “been around a lot longer than that.” Finally, 

Waninger testified about the third technique, gas 

chromatography/mass spectrometry, which allows chemists to 

“separate the components in a mixture and identify the 

chemicals in them based upon their mass spectrum.” She 

testified that the technique is “scientifically accepted,” that 

she has used it for more than 15 years, and that it is widely 

used by forensic chemists for the detection of controlled 

substances. Waninger also explained that she represents the 

FBI on a scientific working group for the analysis of seized 

drugs, and that the group has published recommendations on 

the minimum standards for qualitative identification of the 

presence of a controlled substance using those techniques. 

She further testified that her FBI laboratory followed those 

standards. 

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43 

Waninger’s testimony that all three techniques have been 

established for many years, are widely used, and are accepted 

in the relevant scientific community is sufficient to satisfy the 

“limited” Daubert inquiry. See Ambrosini, 101 F.3d at 134 

(“General acceptance in the relevant scientific community 

may be sufficient to permit the admissibility of expert 

testimony ....”); see also United States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 

144 F.3d 476, 485-86 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that techniques 

including gas chromatography/mass spectrometry are “widely 

used and generally accepted in the fields of analytical and 

forensic chemistry”). We also note the expert’s personal 

experience. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 

137, 148-49, 151-52 (1999). Waninger had worked at the 

FBI’s Quantico lab for ten years, had previously worked as a 

forensic scientist for a state police department for four years, 

and had testified as a forensic chemistry expert at least 40 

times “in federal and state courts throughout all of the United 

States” as well as internationally. The district court did not 

err in admitting her testimony. 

V. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, the judgments of the district 

court are affirmed in part and reversed in part. The cases are 

remanded to the district court for re-sentencing consistent 

with this opinion. 

So ordered. 

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