Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-16-05018/USCOURTS-caDC-16-05018-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Neil Kornze
Appellee
Janice M. Schneider
Appellee
Silver State Land, LLC
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 13, 2016 Decided December 16, 2016

No. 16-5018

SILVER STATE LAND, LLC,

APPELLANT

v.

JANICE M. SCHNEIDER, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, LAND AND MINERALS MANAGEMENT,

AND NEIL KORNZE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRINCIPAL 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cv-00717)

Paul B. Smyth argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant. John F. Henault, Jr. entered an appearance.

Jeffrey S. Beelaert, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were 

John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General, and William B. 

Lazarus and David C. Shilton, Attorneys.

Before: HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: In September 2011, the 

City of Henderson, Nevada (the “City” or “Henderson”) 

executed an agreement with the Las Vegas National Sports 

Center (“Sports Center”) to construct sports venues on a 480-

acre parcel of federally-owned public land. Under the 

agreement, Sports Center was to serve as the developer and

work with the City in designing the project. In exchange, the 

City agreed to request the Bureau of Land Management 

(“Bureau”) in the Department of Interior (“Department”) to 

convey the public land to the developer. After completion of 

the project, the developer was to transfer ownership of the 

land and the sports complex to the City, and the City would 

lease back the venues to the developer. 

After reviewing the City’s request, the Bureau agreed to

conduct a modified competitive auction of the land. The City 

accepted the Bureau’s terms and then substituted Appellant 

Silver State Land, LLC (“Silver State”), a controlled affiliate 

of Sports Center, as the designated bidder. In April 2012, the 

Bureau announced that Silver State would be the designated 

bidder in a sealed-bid sale because it had agreed “to develop 

the property for public recreation and commercial uses 

approved by the City.” Joint Appendix (“JA”) 371. Under the 

modified bidding process, Silver State had the right to match 

the highest bid.

On June 4, 2012, Silver State submitted the only bid, 

which was accepted by the Bureau. On November 28, 2012, 

Silver State paid the balance of money due in connection with 

the sale and asked the Bureau to issue the patent for the land

so that Silver State could record it. Within hours after Silver 

State transferred the funds to the Bureau, Sports Center 

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terminated its agreement with Henderson. On November 29, 

2012, Henderson requested the Bureau to cancel the public 

land sale because the developer had backed out of its 

agreement to build the sports complex. In January 2013, the 

City filed an action in Nevada state court against the 

developer. However, the parties settled the state court 

litigation in March 2013. Silver State agreed to give the City 

$4.25 million after it received and recorded the patent, and the 

City agreed to withdraw its objection to the land sale. Silver 

State also agreed not to pursue the sports complex project, or 

any other development, in Henderson.

After reviewing the matter, the Department determined 

that the Bureau should not give Appellant a patent for the 

land. Silver State filed suit in District Court to challenge the 

Department’s action. Appellant contended that the 

Department — through the Appellee, the Assistant Secretary 

for Land and Minerals Management (“the Secretary”) —

violated the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 

1976 (“the Act”) by canceling the land sale more than thirty 

days after Appellant paid for the land. 

The District Court held that the Secretary had plenary

power to terminate the land sale because consummation of the 

sale would have been contrary to law. See Silver State Land, 

LLC v. Schneider, 145 F. Supp. 3d 113 (D.D.C. 2015). The 

District Court agreed with the Secretary that the Bureau had 

authorized a modified competitive land auction, giving special 

preference to Appellant, only because of the public benefits 

that the sale was to produce. Those public benefits were to 

come from the agreement that Appellant had signed with

Henderson to build a sports complex, which was supposed to 

attract jobs and tourism to the region. However, after 

Appellant obtained the benefit of the modified competitive 

auction, it broke off the agreement with Henderson. The 

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District Court therefore accepted the Secretary’s position that 

issuing the patent to Appellant would be contrary to the public 

benefits requirement needed to authorize a modified 

competitive auction. The court granted summary judgment to

the Secretary and Silver State now appeals.

We affirm the judgment of the District Court. We hold 

that the Secretary had plenary power to terminate the land 

sale, and that the Act did not constrain the Secretary’s power. 

We reject Appellant’s claim that the Secretary’s action was 

arbitrary and capricious. Appellant’s Agreement with the City

was the sole justification for the special auction. However, the 

auction sale was rendered unlawful when Sports Center

terminated the agreement. Finally, we hold that Appellant did 

not suffer a Due Process Clause violation because it never 

acquired a property interest in the land.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory and Regulatory Background

Appellee, the Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals 

Management of the Department of the Interior, oversees the

Bureau of Land Management. The scope of the Bureau’s 

authority over federal public lands is defined by a patchwork 

of statutes. An 1812 statute established the General LandOffice, located in the Department of the Treasury, with the 

power “to superintend, execute and perform, all such acts and 

things, touching or respecting the public lands of the United 

States.” Act of Apr. 25, 1812, ch. 68, § 1, 2 Stat. 716, 716. 

When Congress created the Department of the Interior in 

1849, it directed “the Secretary of the Interior [to] perform all 

the duties in relation to the General Land Office . . . now 

discharged by the Secretary of the Treasury.” Act of Mar. 3, 

1849, ch. 108, § 3, 9 Stat. 395, 395. In 1946, Congress 

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established the Bureau of Land Management and charged it 

with performing “[t]he functions of the General Land Office.” 

1946 Reorganization Plan No. 3, § 403(a), 60 Stat. 1100. The 

result of this reorganization is the current statutory 

authorization for the Bureau:

The Secretary of the Interior or such officer as 

he may designate shall perform all executive 

duties appertaining to the surveying and sale of 

the public lands of the United States, or in 

anywise respecting such public lands, and, 

also, such as relate to private claims of land, 

and the issuing of patents for all grants of land 

under the authority of the Government.

43 U.S.C. § 2. The Supreme Court, interpreting the

Department and the General Land Office’s statutory 

authorizations, has held that “the Department has been 

granted plenary authority over the administration of public 

lands.” Best v. Humboldt Placer Min. Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336 

(1963). 

Although the Department enjoys plenary authority “as a 

general rule,” this authority may be constrained if there is

“some specific provision to the contrary in respect to any 

particular grant of public land.” Corp. of the Catholic Bishop 

of Nesqually v. Gibbon, 158 U.S. 155, 167 (1895). One such 

provision is at issue in this case: the Federal Land Policy and 

Management Act of 1976. The Act declares that its provisions 

shall “be construed as supplemental to and not in derogation 

of the purposes for which public lands are administered under 

other provisions of law.” 43 U.S.C. § 1701(b). The Act 

outlines certain procedures that govern the sale of public land.

It requires, inter alia, sales of public land to “be conducted 

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under competitive bidding procedures to be established by the 

Secretary.” 43 U.S.C. § 1713(f). 

Pursuant to § 1713(f), the Department has promulgated 

regulations governing competitive bidding. In accordance 

with the statute’s default rule that public land sales “shall be 

conducted under competitive bidding procedures,” id., the 

Department’s regulations require that the “general procedure 

for sales of public lands” is a competitive public auction. 43 

C.F.R. § 2710.0-6(c)(3)(i). However, if certain conditions are 

met, the Department may deviate from the general procedure 

and use either a direct sale or a modified competitive sale. 43 

C.F.R. § 2710.0-6(c)(3)(ii), (iii). To use a modified 

competitive sale, the Department must determine that “it is 

necessary in order to assure equitable distribution of land 

among purchasers or to recognize equitable considerations or 

public policies.” 43 C.F.R. § 2711.3-2(a).

The Act prescribes a timeline for the Secretary to follow

when issuing a patent to the winning bidder in either a 

competitive or modified competitive bidding process:

The Secretary shall accept or reject, in writing, 

any offer to purchase made through 

competitive bidding at his invitation no later 

than thirty days after the receipt of such offer 

. . . . Prior to the expiration of such periods the 

Secretary may refuse to accept any offer or 

may withdraw any land or interest in land from 

sale under this section when he determines that 

consummation of the sale would not be 

consistent with this Act or other applicable 

law.

43 U.S.C. § 1713(g). 

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B. Factual and Procedural Background

Las Vegas has never been home to a major league sports 

franchise. Texas real estate developer Chris Milam sought to 

capitalize on this opportunity. In 2011, Milam’s Las Vegas 

National Sports Center signed a Master Project Agreement

(“the Agreement”) with the City of Henderson, Nevada. The 

Agreement specified that Henderson would nominate a 480-

acre tract of federal public land in the city for sale to Sports 

Center pursuant to the Southern Nevada Public Land 

Management Act. Under the Agreement, Sports Center 

promised to “plan, design, develop, construct, complete and 

operate” a major sports complex for professional teams in a 

number of sports, including basketball, soccer, football, and 

baseball. JA 122. The Agreement also provided that if either 

Henderson or Sports Center “determines that the Project is not 

viable . . . the City or [Sports Center] shall have the right to 

terminate this Agreement” prior to the date that the United 

States issues the land patent conveying the federal land to 

Sports Center. JA 129; see also JA 120, 122.

In accordance with the Agreement, Henderson nominated

the tract of land “for sale under the Bureau of Land 

Management (BLM) Direct Sale Process as set forth in 43 

CFR 2711.3-3.” JA 109. Citing the “formal Project 

Agreement” with Sports Center, Henderson’s nomination 

letter to the Bureau estimated that constructing the four 

facilities would create “approximately 10,000 immediate 

construction jobs” and “provide employment for an estimated 

4,000 employees.” Id. According to Henderson, an open-bid 

auction would “unduly jeopardize” the project by inviting 

speculative bidding and delaying the process. JA 110. 

Henderson therefore requested that the Bureau “immediately 

offer[] the subject parcels for direct sale” to Sports Center. JA 

111. 

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Because the Bureau found that Henderson’s nomination 

did “not rise to the level of a ‘public project’ as contemplated 

by [43 C.F.R. § 2711.3-3],” the Bureau concluded that a 

direct sale to Sports Center would be inappropriate. JA 113.

However, the Bureau committed to “pursue a modified 

competitive sale” in accordance with 43 C.F.R. § 2711.3-2(a). 

JA 114. 

Henderson requested that the Bureau name Appellant,

Silver State, as the designated bidder with the right to meet 

the highest bid. JA 358. Accordingly, on April 4, 2012, the 

Bureau published a Notice of Realty Action in the Federal 

Register announcing the modified competitive auction and 

naming Appellant as the designated bidder. JA 370–71. In the 

Notice, the Bureau justified the modified competitive auction 

because “Silver State Land LLC and the City of Henderson 

have developed an agreement that provides for long-term 

public benefits to the City and local residents.” JA 371. The 

Bureau also explained that “[w]ithin 30 days of the sale, the 

[Bureau] will, in writing, either accept or reject all bids 

received.” JA 371. The Notice also advised that the Bureau 

could “withdraw any parcel of land or interest therein from 

sale” if the Bureau determined that “the sale would be 

inconsistent with any law.” JA 373.

On June 4, 2012, the Bureau held the modified 

competitive auction. Appellant was the sole bidder at 

$10,560,000 — the appraised value of the land. JA 381; see 

also JA 156 (appraising the “total property value” at 

$10,560,000). In accordance with the requirements detailed in 

the Notice of Realty Action, Appellant also included a 

certified check for twenty percent of its bid, roughly 

$2,000,000. JA 381. Eight days later, on June 12, 2012, the 

Bureau accepted Appellant’s bid, and directed Appellant to 

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pay the remaining eighty percent of the purchase price by 

December 3, 2012. JA 390. Appellant complied and 

transmitted the balance to the Bureau on November 28, 2012. 

JA 404.

Hours after completing the purchase, Appellant delivered 

a letter to the City of Henderson terminating the Agreement

with Henderson because, in Appellant’s view, “the overall 

project is not viable.” JA 409; see also JA 451. Early the 

following morning, the City Attorney for Henderson emailed 

the Bureau, requesting that the Bureau “immediately 

withdraw the roughly 480 acres the City nominated for Silver 

State Land LLC pursuant to 43 CFR 2711.3-1.” JA 411. The 

e-mail also alleged that “the City believes that Silver State 

Land LLC fraudulently induced the City and the federal 

government to sell it land.” JA 411. In a follow-up letter that 

same day, the City Attorney further explained that Henderson 

had requested the modified competitive sale “based upon the 

Agreement and the repeated representations and assurances” 

of the developer, Sports Center, and Appellant. JA 413. 

Henderson requested that the Bureau refrain from issuing the 

land patent to Appellant. JA 414. Subsequently, the Bureau 

and Appellant agreed to several extensions of the date on 

which the Bureau was to issue the patent. JA 428, 656. 

On January 28, 2013, Henderson filed suit in Nevada 

state court against Appellant, JA 431, alleging that Appellant

“made numerous false and misleading representations to the 

City” in order to induce the land sale, JA 456. The state court 

dismissed without prejudice Henderson’s fraud claim, but 

denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss other contract claims. 

City of Henderson v. Milam, No. A-13-675741-B (Nev. Dist. 

Ct., Clark Cty., Feb. 28, 2013). On March 13, 2013, Appellant

and Henderson agreed to a settlement, under which 

Henderson would be paid $250,000 immediately, and 

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$4,250,000 after Appellant received and recorded the patent 

to the land. JA 674. Henderson agreed to withdraw its 

objection to the sale, and to “[t]ake no further action to 

impair” the sale. JA 676. The developer agreed that neither he 

nor any entity he was affiliated with — including Appellant

— would ever “seek to or engage in any business activities or 

development activities within Henderson.” Id. Henderson 

informed the Bureau of the resolution of the civil suit, and 

sent a copy of the settlement agreement to the Bureau. JA 

670.

On May 10, 2013, the Bureau issued a Recommendation 

Memorandum to Appellee, the Assistant Secretary for Lands 

and Minerals Management. JA 667. The Bureau 

recommended that the Secretary “assert jurisdiction over this 

matter pursuant to 43 C.F.R. § 4.5(a) and direct the [Bureau] 

to: (i) not issue the patent to Silver State, or its successors or 

assigns, (ii) terminate the sale, and (iii) refund any monies 

still held by the Department in connection with this sale.” Id. 

The Bureau cited “[t]he Secretary’s and [Appellee’s] (as 

designated by the Secretary) broad authority over the 

disposition of the public lands up to the point of patent 

issuance” to justify the termination of the sale. JA 671. The 

Bureau described the “public benefits [Henderson] wished to 

promote through the [Bureau’s] use of a modified competitive 

sale process [that] no longer exists as evidenced by the 

Settlement Agreement.” Id. Because the basis for the 

modified competitive sale — the Agreement between 

Henderson and Appellant — had dissolved, and the civil 

settlement precluded its resurrection, the Bureau recognized 

that it “would not have agreed to utilize a modified 

competitive process” under such circumstances. Id. In a 

Decision Memorandum, the Secretary adopted and approved 

the Bureau’s Recommendation Memorandum, rendering “the 

final decision by the U.S. Department of Interior.” JA 664.

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Appellant subsequently filed suit in the District Court 

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Appellant claimed 

that (1) the Secretary lacked authority to terminate the sale 

under 43 U.S.C. § 1713, the Federal Land Policy and 

Management Act of 1976; (2) the Secretary’s decision was 

arbitrary and capricious; and (3) the Secretary was legally 

obligated to issue the land patent. JA 13–16. Appellant filed a 

motion for summary judgment in which it also asserted that 

the Secretary terminated the land sale without affording it due 

process. Motion for Summary Judgment, Silver State Land, 

LLC v. Beaudreau, No. 1:13-cv-00717 (D.D.C. Sept. 2,

2014). The Secretary filed a cross motion for summary 

judgment. The District Court granted the Secretary’s cross 

motion and denied Appellant’s motion. The court held that the 

Secretary “has authority to terminate the sale of public land, 

even after acceptance of a purchase offer, where 

consummation of the sale would be contrary to law.” Silver 

State Land, LLC, 145 F. Supp. 3d at 126. The court rejected 

Appellant’s argument that the Federal Land Policy and 

Management Act contravened the Secretary’s plenary 

authority. Id. at 128–33. The court also rejected Silver State’s 

argument that the termination was arbitrary and capricious as 

well as its Due Process Clause argument. Id. at 133–41. 

Appellant then filed this appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

We review the District Court’s denial of Appellant’s 

motion for summary judgment de novo. Friends of Animals v. 

Jewell, 824 F.3d 1033, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2016). “In reviewing 

de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment on 

[the Department’s] administrative decisions, we directly 

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review those decisions.” Mount Royal Joint Venture v. 

Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 745, 753 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing 

Castlewood Prods., LLC v. Norton, 365 F.3d 1076, 1082 

(D.C. Cir. 2004)). An agency’s action withstands review 

under the Administrative Procedure Act unless it is “arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 

B. The Secretary’s Authority

The Secretary properly exercised her plenary authority 

when she terminated the land sale to Appellant. The 

Department of the Interior’s authorizing legislation delegates 

“all executive duties appertaining to the surveying and sale of

the public lands” to the Secretary or his designee. 43 U.S.C. § 

2. That delegation includes the authority to terminate a land 

sale using a modified competitive auction where the basis for 

the modified auction dissipates. This proposition is confirmed 

by a consistent line of Supreme Court precedent interpreting 

the Department’s enabling legislation. See Hoefler v. Babbitt, 

139 F.3d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1998) (referring to the “wall of 

authority” confirming the Department’s “plenary authority 

over the administration of public lands”).

In Cameron v. United States, the Supreme Court 

explained that the Secretary of the Interior “is charged with 

seeing that [the] authority [of the Land Department] is rightly 

exercised to the end that valid claims may be recognized [and] 

invalid ones eliminated.” 252 U.S. 450, 460 (1920). The 

source of that authority derives from “general statutory 

provisions,” including the Department’s enabling legislation. 

Id. at 459; see also Orchard v. Alexander, 157 U.S. 372, 382

(1895) (“[T]he rulings of this court since the act of 1836 [are] 

in favor of the power of the general officers of the land 

department to review and correct the action of the subordinate 

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officials in all matters relating to the sale and disposal of 

public lands.”).

The Court laid the precedential foundation for the 

Secretary’s authority to “eliminate[]” invalid claims,

Cameron, 252 U.S. at 459, in Knight v. United Land Ass’n:

[I]f, when a patent is about to issue, the 

secretary should discover a fatal defect in the 

proceedings, or that by reason of some newlyascertained fact the patent, if issued, would 

have to be annulled, and that it would be his 

duty to ask the attorney general to institute 

proceedings for its annulment, it would hardly 

be seriously contended that the secretary might 

not interfere and prevent the execution of the 

patent. He could not be obliged to sit quietly 

and allow a proceeding to be consummated 

which it would be immediately his duty to ask 

the attorney general to take measures to annul.

142 U.S. 161, 178 (1891) (quoting Pueblo of San Francisco, 5 

Pub. Lands Dec. 483, 494 (D.O.I. 1887)). Contrary to 

Appellant’s assertion that Knight turned on “a land sale 

statute long since repealed,” Br. for Appellant at 37, the cited 

statute has been incorporated into the Department’s current 

statutory authorization. Knight, 142 U.S. at 179 (citing Act of 

Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 108, 9 Stat. 395, 395); see also Part I.A, 

supra (explaining the legislative and organizational history of 

the Department). Knight thus makes it clear that the Secretary 

may take jurisdiction over a land sale, prior to issuing a land 

patent, to invalidate a defective transaction. 

The Secretary’s authority to cancel an invalid land sale 

extends at least until the issuance of the land patent. 

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“Generally speaking, while the legal title remains in the 

United States, the grant is in process of administration, and 

the land is subject to the jurisdiction of the land department of 

the government.” Mich. Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U.S. 

589, 592 (1897). The Supreme Court, citing Cameron, later

confirmed the Secretary’s authority to cancel a “lease 

administratively for invalidity at its inception,” even after the 

lease had been issued. Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 476 

(1963) (“With respect to earlier statutes containing no express 

administrative cancellation authority, this Court, in Cameron 

v. United States . . . found such authority to exist.”). The 

Secretary’s action here, taken before the patent had issued to 

Appellant, falls comfortably within the period for her to 

exercise this authority.

In this case, the Secretary terminated an invalid land sale 

prior to issuing the patent. As discussed in Part I.A, supra, 

“[s]ales of public lands . . . shall be conducted under 

competitive bidding procedures” unless certain requirements 

are met. 43 U.S.C. § 1713(f). The Bureau’s regulations permit 

a deviation from a competitive public auction only where “the 

authorized officer determines it is necessary in order to assure 

equitable distribution of land among purchasers or to 

recognize equitable considerations or public policies.” 43 

C.F.R. § 2711.3-2(a). Here, the Bureau’s published Notice of 

Realty Action made it plain that the Bureau approved a 

modified competitive sale solely because of the Agreement 

between Henderson and Appellant. JA 371 (“Silver State 

Land LLC and the City of Henderson have developed an 

agreement that provides for long-term public benefits to the 

City and local residents.”). As the Bureau explained in its

Recommendation Memorandum, “but for the now-terminated 

Development Agreement . . ., the [Bureau] would not have 

agreed to utilize a modified competitive process.” JA 671. 

The Bureau also explained that, given the civil settlement’s 

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prohibition on Appellant “engag[ing] in any business 

activities or development activities within Henderson,” JA 

676, the public benefits contemplated by the Agreement 

would not be realized, JA 671. Having recognized this “fatal 

defect in the proceedings,” Knight, 142 U.S. at 178 — the 

vitiated public benefits required to deviate from a competitive 

auction — the Secretary was well within her authority to 

cancel the sale. 

C. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976

Appellant’s principal argument is that the procedural 

requirements for public land sales under the Federal Land 

Policy and Management Act of 1976 supplant the Secretary’s 

plenary power to terminate an invalid land sale. Br. for 

Appellant at 14–20, 43–49. Section 203(g) of the Act requires 

the Secretary to “accept or reject . . . any offer to purchase 

made through competitive bidding . . . no later than thirty 

days after the receipt of such offer.” 43 U.S.C. § 1713(g). 

“Prior to the expiration of [those thirty days] the Secretary . . . 

may withdraw any land or interest in land from sale under this 

section when he determines that consummation of the sale 

would not be consistent with this Act or other applicable 

law.” Id. (emphasis added). The Department’s regulations 

parrot the same statutory language. 43 C.F.R. § 2711.3-1(f) 

(“Prior to the expiration of [the thirty day period] the 

authorized officer may . . . withdraw any tract from sale . . . 

.”) (emphasis added). Appellant argues that the Secretary 

acted contrary to the statute and regulation by “withdrawing 

the land from sale” after thirty days. Br. for Appellant at 14. 

Appellant is wrong because the Secretary did not 

“withdraw” the land from sale. And she was not required to 

follow the timeline prescribed by 43 U.S.C. § 1713(g) when 

she terminated the sale. As explained in the Recommendation 

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Memorandum, the Secretary “terminate[d] the sale process” 

to Appellant, JA 670; she did not “withdraw any land or 

interest in land from sale.” There is a legally relevant 

distinction between these two terms.

The Act defines “withdrawal” as “withholding an area of 

Federal land from . . . sale . . . under some or all of the general 

land laws, for the purpose of limiting activities under those 

laws in order to maintain other public values in the area.” 43 

U.S.C. § 1702(j). To withdraw, then, means to withhold the 

parcel of land from sale entirely, not to cancel a specific sale 

to a specific buyer. The Secretary took the latter action. The 

Bureau explicitly noted in its Recommendation Memorandum 

that “the parcel remains designated for disposal” and that the 

Bureau may “offer[] the parcel after such renomination 

pursuant to the procedures found at 43 C.F.R. part 2711.” JA 

672. Because the Secretary did not withdraw the land, she was 

not bound by the thirty day provision of 43 U.S.C. § 1713(g). 

Accordingly, Section 1702(j) of the Act does not limit the 

Secretary’s plenary power. See 43 U.S.C. § 1701(b) (“The 

policies of this Act shall become effective only as specific 

statutory authority for their implementation is enacted . . . and 

shall then be construed as supplemental to and not in 

derogation of the purposes for which public lands are 

administered under other provisions of law.”).

Appellant cites another provision from the Act, as well as 

a Bureau regulation, to argue that after Appellant “submitted 

the remaining purchase price, the Secretary incurred a 

ministerial duty to deliver the patent.” Br. for Appellant at 34. 

Appellant cites 43 U.S.C. § 1718, which requires that “[t]he 

Secretary shall issue all patents . . . after any disposal 

authorized by this Act.” Br. for Appellant at 17. The problem 

with this argument is that the land sale here would not have 

been a “disposal authorized by this Act” because the Act 

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authorizes a modified competitive sale only when “the 

Secretary determines it necessary and proper” to fulfill certain 

public policy goals. 43 U.S.C. § 1713(f). After Appellant 

dissolved the Agreement, the modified competitive sale was 

no longer “authorized” by the Act. Because 43 U.S.C. § 1718

only calls on the Secretary to issue patents authorized by the 

Act, it did not vest Appellant with any right to receive a 

patent after transmitting final payment.

In further support of its “ministerial duty” argument, 

Appellant cites a Bureau regulation providing that, “[u]ntil the 

acceptance of the offer and payment of the purchase price, the 

bidder has no contractual or other rights against the United 

States.” Br. for Appellant at 34 (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 2711.3-

1(g)). However, as the District Court correctly noted: “This 

regulation merely delineates when an offeror has no 

contractual rights, and not when contractual rights do attach. 

Furthermore, to the extent this regulation may confer any 

contractual right upon an offeror whose offer has been 

accepted, the regulation is silent as to what those rights may 

be.” Silver State Land, LLC, 145 F. Supp. 3d at 131 n.14. We 

agree that the Bureau’s regulation does not eliminate the 

authority of the Secretary to cancel an invalid land sale after 

final payment has been transmitted.

D. Appellant’s Arbitrary and Capricious Claim

Appellant argues that the Secretary’s termination of the 

sale was arbitrary and capricious “because [she] failed to 

consider relevant factors and [acted] contrary to evidence.” 

Br. for Appellant at 20. Appellant advances four arguments in 

support of this claim: (1) the Secretary’s decision turned 

solely on unproven fraud allegations against Appellant; (2) 

the Secretary ignored the Nevada state court’s dismissal of 

Henderson’s fraud claims; (3) the Secretary failed to cite any

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of the three bases for withdrawing a sale listed in 43 C.F.R. § 

2711.3-1(f)(1)–(3); and (4) the broken Agreement did not 

justify the termination of the sale. Id. at 21–25. These 

arguments lack merit.

Appellant’s first two arguments fall flat because they rest 

on an erroneous reading of the Recommendation 

Memorandum upon which the Secretary relied. It is true that 

the Memorandum cites “questions [that] have arisen regarding 

Silver State’s intent with respect to [the Agreement] and 

whether it ever intended to develop the facilities.” JA 671. 

Appellant fails to recognize, however, that the Memorandum 

offers additional justifications for recommending termination 

of the sale. Most importantly, the Memorandum cites the fact 

that “the relationship Henderson had with Silver State . . . no 

longer exists as evidenced by the Settlement Agreement.” Id.

The Memorandum goes on to explain that “but for the nowterminated Development Agreement . . . the [Bureau] would 

not have agreed to utilize a modified competitive process.” Id.

In other words, the Secretary’s decision did not rise or fall on 

the existence of Appellant’s alleged fraud. Rather, 

Appellant’s abrogation of the Agreement, which was the sole

basis of the public benefits needed to justify a modified 

competitive sale, was more than enough to justify the 

termination. 

Appellant’s third argument, that the Secretary failed to 

comply with 43 C.F.R. § 2711.3-1(f), is incorrect. That 

regulation only specifies the circumstances under which the 

Secretary “may withdraw any tract from sale.” 43 C.F.R. § 

2711.3-1(f) (emphasis added). It is irrelevant whether the 

Secretary “failed to address any of the three limited bases for 

withdrawing a sale in 43 C.F.R. § 2711.3-(f)(1)-(3),” Br. for 

Appellant at 25, because that regulation is inapposite here, as 

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the Secretary did not withdraw the land from sale. See Part 

II.C, supra (distinguishing withdrawal from termination). 

Appellant’s fourth argument — that the dissolved 

Agreement did not justify the termination of the sale — also 

misses the mark. Appellant claims that the Agreement “did 

not guarantee that development of the proposed project would 

actually occur.” Br. for Appellant at 28; see JA 129 (“[T]he 

City or [Sports Center] shall have the right to terminate this 

Agreement.”). This is true, but irrelevant. The Bureau of Land 

Management approved a modified sale because of Appellant’s 

proposal to build a major sports complex and bring the 

corresponding public benefits to Henderson. JA 114. 

Henderson, in accepting the modified competitive sale, told 

the Bureau that the stadium development would “help support 

meaningful economic diversification for southern Nevada.” 

JA 115. After Appellant pulled out of the Agreement, the 

Bureau reasonably concluded that the promised public 

benefits of the project would not be realized. That the 

Agreement was terminable by either party has no bearing on 

the Secretary’s decision to cancel the sale to Appellant when 

the premise for the sale was vitiated. 

E. Appellant’s Due Process Claim

Appellant’s final claim is that the Secretary violated its

rights under the Due Process Clause because the Secretary 

“never provided Silver State notice and the opportunity to be 

heard before withdrawing the Land from sale.” Br. for 

Appellant at 34. This claim fails both because the Secretary 

did not “withdraw” the land from sale and because Appellant 

never acquired a “protected interest in ‘property’ or ‘liberty.’” 

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999) 

(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV). Appellant repeats its 

argument that it had an “administrative right to receive the 

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patent [that] vested with its payment of the remaining 

purchase price into escrow.” Br. for Appellant at 33. For the 

reasons discussed supra Part II.C, neither the statute (43 

U.S.C. § 1718) nor the regulation (43 C.F.R. § 2711.3-1(g)) 

invoked by Appellant conferred any property rights on 

Appellant. We cannot find a Due Process Clause violation 

here because Appellant never acquired a protected interest in 

property or liberty.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of 

the District Court.

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