Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02241/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02241-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Secretary of Health & Human Services
Appellee
Billy D. Walker
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

. F J~Q)~OB.p?C&ls Un1ted STent!l Circuit 

SEP 0 5 1991 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ERT L. HOECKER 

ROB Clerk TENTH CIRCUIT 

BILLY D. WALKER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

SECRETARY OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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No. 90-2241 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. 89-998 SC) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Gary J. Martone, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

William J. Lutz, United States Attorney, Ronald F. Ross, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Gayla Fuller, 

Chief Counsel, Region VI, Karen J. Sharp, Chief, Social Security 

Branch, and Randal S. Finch, Assistant Regional Counsel, United 

States Department of Health and Human Services, Dallas, Texas, for 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-2241 Document: 01019294827 Date Filed: 09/05/1991 Page: 1 
Billy D. Walker appeals from an order of the district court 

affirming the Secretary of Health and Human Services' 

determination that he is not entitled to disability insurance 

benefits or supplemental security income benefits under the Social 

Security Act (the Act), 42 u.s.c. §§ 423(a), 1381a. The 

Secretary's determination was based on Walker's employment at the 

time of his hearing. Walker argues that he is entitled to a trial 

work period under the Act and that he was engaged in such trial 

work. We limit our review to his claim for disability insurance 

benefits, because under statutory amendments made by the 

Employment Opportunities for Disabled Americans Act, Pub. L. No. 

99-643, 100 Stat. 3574 (1986), effective July 1, 1987, trial work 

provisions no longer apply to claims for supplemental security 

income benefits. 1 Walker neither addresses these amendments nor 

offers any arguments for the recognition of a trial work period 

for the supplemental security income program under the current 

statutory language. 2 

Walker applied for benefits on October 2, 1987, alleging 

disability since February 1987, due to degenerative disc disease 

1 Individuals who previously qualified for a trial work period 

now apparently automatically qualify for special benefits under 42 

U.S.C. § 1382h. Walker has not raised before us his eligibility 

for such benefits, so we will not address his supplemental 

security income benefits claim. See Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 

673, 676 (lOth Cir. 1990) (appellate court will not reach out and 

decide nonjurisdictional issue not raised by appealing party), 

cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 1622 (1991). 

2 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-2241 Document: 01019294827 Date Filed: 09/05/1991 Page: 2 
and ulcers. The applications were denied initially and on 

reconsideration. Walker then sought review by an administrative 

law judge (ALJ). 

While awaiting a hearing before an ALJ, Walker returned, in 

April 1988, to his work as a truck driver out of economic 

necessity. Walker's previous employer would not rehire him, but 

Walker found a job with another employer, who permitted him to 

work his own hours and take time off as his medical condition 

required. 3 He was still employed as a truck driver at the time of 

his hearing on September 27, 1988. At the hearing, Walker 

testified that he planned to continue working as a truck driver 

for as long as he could. 

The ALJ, in determining that Walker was not disabled, denied 

benefits at the first step of the five-step sequential process set 

forth by the Social Security Administration to evaluate disability 

claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Specifically, the ALJ found 

that Walker had engaged in substantial gainful activity since 

April 1988 by virtue of his work as a truck driver. The Appeals 

Council denied Walker's motion for reconsideration, and the 

Secretary's decision then became final. Walker filed a timely 

motion for review of the Secretary's decision in accordance with 

42 u.s.c. § 405(g). The district court affirmed the Secretary's 

decision, and this appeal followed. 

Walker argues on appeal that despite his return to work as a 

truck driver in April 1988, he was still disabled as defined by 

3 Walker testified that several times his employer had to drive 

him back to town when Walker could not complete a haul. Adm. R. 

at 32. 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-2241 Document: 01019294827 Date Filed: 09/05/1991 Page: 3 
the Act. According to Walker, his work as a truck driver 

constituted a trial work period which should not have been 

considered by the Secretary in determining his eligibility for 

benefits. The Secretary contends that a trial work period applies 

only after a claimant has been adjudged disabled, and because 

Walker was not adjudged disabled before his return to work as a 

truck driver, such work could be considered in assessing his 

eligibility for benefits. We review whether the Secretary applied 

the correct legal standards. Bernal v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 297, 299 

(lOth Cir. 1988). 

A trial work period is designed to enable an individual to 

test his or her ability to return to work without losing 

disability insurance benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592(a). Under 

the Act, "any services rendered by an individual during a period 

of trial work shall be deemed not to have been rendered by such 

individual in determining whether his disability has ceased in a 

month during such period." 42 u.s.c. § 422(c)(2). "A period of 

trial work . • . shall begin with the month in which [the 

claimant] becomes entitled to disability insurance benefits." 42 

u.s.c. § 422(c)(3) (emphasis added). A trial work period ends 

with the ninth month in which services are performed or, if 

earlier, with the month in which disability ceases. 42 u.s.c. 

§ 422(c) (4) (A) & (B). 

Under the precise language of the Act, entitlement to 

disability insurance benefits triggers a trial work period. Thus, 

the crucial question in this case is whether an individual can be 

"entitled" to benefits and, therefore, eligible for a trial work 

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Appellate Case: 90-2241 Document: 01019294827 Date Filed: 09/05/1991 Page: 4 
period before the individual is adjudged disabled and is actually 

receiving benefits. The district court, in affirming the ALJ's 

decision that a trial work period was not available to Walker for 

his work activity as a truck driver, cited the Sixth Circuit's 

decision in Mullis v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 991, 993 (6th Cir. 1988) ("a 

'trial work period' only applies after a person has been adjudged 

disabled"). On appeal, Walker urges that we look to the ruling of 

the Seventh Circuit in McDonald v. Bowen, 818 F.2d 559 (7th Cir. 

1986). In McDonald, the court, construing the precise language of 

the Act, held that "[w]hen an individual has been disabled for 

five consecutive months and suffers from an impairment which can 

be expected to last for a continuous period of twelve months, that 

person is entitled to disability benefits." Id. at 563 (emphasis 

added). Therefore, according to the court, an individual can 

return to work after a period of five months, yet before an award 

of benefits, and still be eligible for an award inasmuch as the 

return to work can be considered a trial work period and not 

evidence of the individual's capabilities. Id. at 563-64. 

We note that the Social Security Administration, in 

Acquiescence Ruling 88-3(7), has directed that the holding in 

McDonald is to apply only within the Seventh Circuit. According 

to the Social Security Administration, McDonald is inconsistent 

with its policy that if an individual returns to work after a 

five-month waiting period, yet before twelve months from the onset 

of the injury, and before an award of disability benefits, the 

work activity may be considered as evidence of the individual's 

ability to engage in substantial gainful activity within the 

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Appellate Case: 90-2241 Document: 01019294827 Date Filed: 09/05/1991 Page: 5 
twelve-month period following the onset of injury. See 

Acquiescence Ruling 88-3(7) (citing Social Sec. Ruling 82-52). 

Although Social Security rulings, like Acquiescence Ruling 

88-3(7), do not have the force and effect of law, ~ Paxton v. 

Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 856 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 

1988), they constitute Social Security Administration 

interpretations of its own regulations and the statute which it 

administers, see Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1457 (9th 

Cir. 1989). Accordingly, Social Security rulings are entitled to 

deference except when they are plainly erroneous or inconsistent 

with the Act. Id. 

In our view, the Social Security Administration's rejection 

of the Seventh Circuit's position in McDonald is inconsistent with 

the language of the Act and, therefore, Acquiescence Ruling 88-

3(7) is entitled to no deference. Under the Act, every insured 

individual under the age of sixty-five is entitled to disability 

insurance benefits if that individual has filed an application for 

benefits and has been under a disability as defined in the Act for 

a period of five consecutive months. See 42 u.s.c. § 423(a)(1) & 

(c)(2). The Act defines disability as an impairment "which has 

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not 

less than twelve months." 42 u.s.c. § 423(d)(1). As the court in 

McDonald held, a fair reading of the Act indicates that an 

individual who suffers from an impairment that has lasted, or is 

expected to last, twelve months is entitled to disability 

insurance benefits, as well as a trial work period, after waiting 

five months. See McDonald, 818 F.2d at 563-64. Contrary to the 

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Appellate Case: 90-2241 Document: 01019294827 Date Filed: 09/05/1991 Page: 6 
Secretary's position, the language of the Act does not suggest 

that an individual has to be adjudged disabled and actually 

receiving benefits to be entitled to a trial work period. 

A number of district courts that have considered this issue 

have reached the same conclusion. See, ~' Tepfer v. Secretary 

of Health & Human Servs., 712 F. Supp. 156, 158-159 (W.O. Ark. 

1989); Martell v. Heckler, 568 F. Supp. 729, 731 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 

1983); Goldstein v. Harris, 517 F. Supp. 1314, 1316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 

1981); Campbell v. Califano, 483 F. Supp. 1306, 1307 (E.D. Pa. 

1980); McMillen v. Califano, 443 F. Supp. 1362, 1367-68 (N.D.N.Y. 

1978); see also 3 Social Security: Law and Practice, § 45.86 at 

66 (1987) (criticizing the Secretary's position). Like the court 

in McDonald, these district courts also relied on the plain 

language of the Act. Tepfer, 712 F. Supp. at 158-59 (citing 

McDonald); Martell, 568 F. Supp. at 731 n.2; Goldstein, 517 

F. Supp. at 1316-17; Campbell, 483 F. Supp. at 1307; McMillen, 443 

F. Supp. at 1367. 

We have sympathy for what the Secretary seeks, a 

"straightforward" approach that is "easy to administer," McDonald, 

818 F.2d at 564, but the Secretary's position is not in accordance 

with the plain language of the Act. Neither is the Secretary's 

approach consistent with the Act's attempt "to strike a balance 

between paying benefits to people who are disabled and encouraging 

them to return to work as soon as physically possible." Id. 

Applying the plain language in its ordinary sense, as the McDonald 

court did, encourages persons to return to work as soon as 

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Appellate Case: 90-2241 Document: 01019294827 Date Filed: 09/05/1991 Page: 7 
possible by allowing them to test their ability to work without 

penalty. 

Because the Secretary and the district court erred in not 

considering Walker's trial work period argument, we must VACATE 

the judgment of the district court and REMAND the case to the 

Secretary. The Secretary will have to determine whether Walker's 

work, beginning April 1988 and thereafter, actually constituted a 

trial work period as Walker claims. To make this determination, 

the Secretary must decide whether Walker was disabled, as defined 

in the Act, for five consecutive months before he commenced work 

in April 1988. If Walker was eligible for a trial work period at 

the time he commenced work in April 1988, then his work for nine 

months thereafter cannot be considered in determining his 

eligibility for disability insurance benefits. In that event, the 

Secretary presumably will also determine whether Walker's 

"disability . . . ended at [some] time during the trial work 

period if the medical or other evidence shows that [Walker was] no 

longer disabled." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592(e)(2). 

VACATED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent 

herewith. 

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