Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00253/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00253-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paul D. Brown
Defendant
Travis W. Grant
Defendant
Willie Maiben
Defendant
Jill Phillips
Defendant
Ronald Vincent Williams
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RONALD VINCENT WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

:

:

:

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 16-00253-KD-C

:

WILLIE MAIBEN, et al.,

Defendant.

:

:

:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Ronald Vincent Williams, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 

filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action was referred to the 

undersigned for appropriate action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local 

Rule 72.2(a)(2)(R). It is recommended that this action be dismissed without 

prejudice, prior to service of process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 

(ii) because the claims are either frivolous or fail to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.

I. Complaint. (Doc. 1).

Plaintiff Ronald Vincent Williams is currently within the custody of the 

Alabama Department of Corrections serving a 20-year sentence for a 2005 

conviction of manslaughter. (Doc. 1 at 6). He brings this § 1983 action against 

Defendants, Detective Willie Maiben, Former Assistant District Attorney Travis 

W. Grant, Assistant District Attorney Jill Phillips, and defense attorney Paul D. 

Brown, for violations of his right to due process secured by the U.S. 

Constitution,

1 for their participation in knowingly conducting criminal 

																																																							 1 Plaintiff specifies he is suing under the Fifth Amendment in connection with his 

due process claim (see Doc. 1); however, as a convicted prisoner, such a due process 

challenge implicates his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fifth 

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proceedings against him (by both prosecuting and sentencing him) under the 

incorrect legal name and birthday. (Doc. 1 at 4-6).

Williams claims his name is “Ronald Williams,” date of birth March 10, 

1963, but that he was knowingly and wrongly prosecuted under the incorrect 

name of “Ronnie Williams,” date of birth March 10, 1962. (Id. at 3). Williams 

contends this misidentification caused him to be sentenced with a criminal 

history (a prior conviction) belonging to “Ronnie Williams.” (Id. at 3-6). 

Williams seeks recognition and clarification from the court as to his legal name 

and birthdate, release from the custody of the Alabama Department of 

Corrections, and monetary damages in the amount of 8.3 million dollars. (Id. at 

7).

II. Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a federal court is required to conduct an 

initial screening of a prisoner complaint against a governmental entity, 

employee, or officer to determine whether the action: (1) is frivolous or 

malicious, (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (3) seeks 

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(b)(1) & (2). A claim is frivolous when it "'lacks an arguable basis either in 

law or in fact.'" Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008), quoting 

																																																																																																																																																																				 Amendment. The court, however liberally construes pro se complaints and holds pro se

complaints “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers..." E.g., 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (citation and 

quotations omitted). As such, the Court will analyze Plaintiff’s claims under the due 

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the inadvertently pled Fifth 

Amendment. See United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622,624–25 (11th Cir.1990) (Courts 

have an “obligation to look behind the label of a motion filed by a pro se inmate and 

determine whether the motion is, in effect, cognizable under a different remedial 

statutory framework.”).

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Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1831-1832, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 

(1989); see also Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding an 

action frivolous when the district court concludes that it has "little or no chance 

of success," because, based on the face of the complaint, the legal theories are 

"indisputably meritless," or the factual allegations are "clearly baseless,"—that is, 

the complaint "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact"), cert. denied, 510 

U.S. 893, 114 S. Ct. 254, 126 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1993) ; see Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 

1349 (11th Cir.) (a case is frivolous when it appears the plaintiff has little or no

chance of success), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1044, 122 S. Ct. 624, 151 L. Ed. 2d 545 

(2001); Clark v. State of Georgia Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 639 (11th 

Cir. 1990) ("A lawsuit is frivolous if the 'plaintiff's realistic chances of ultimate 

success are slight.'") (quotation omitted)). A complaint fails to state a claim when 

it does not include enough factual matter—taken as true—to "'give the defendant 

fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]'" Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 

929 (2007), quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 

(1957). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, the allegations must show 

plausibility. Id. at 557. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. . . . [This standard] asks for more 

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). That is, "[f]actual 

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" 

and must be a "'plain statement' possess[ing] enough heft to 'sho[w] that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557 (second brackets in 

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original). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 

1949. In determining whether a claim is stated, the factual allegations are 

accepted as true, except for conclusory assertions or a recitation of a cause of 

action's elements. Id.; Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997).

When considering a pro se litigant's allegations, the court holds them to a 

more lenient standard than those of an attorney, Tannenbaum v. United States, 

148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), but it does not have "license . . . to rewrite an 

otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order to sustain an action." 

GJR Investments v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), 

overruled on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 710 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(relying on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 

(2009)). Furthermore, a pro se litigant "is subject to the relevant law and rules of 

court including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Moon v. Newsome, 863 

F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 863, 110 S. Ct. 180, 107 L. Ed. 2d 

135 (1989).

III. Discussion.

A. Claims against Defendant Paul D. Brown.

Defendant Paul D. Brown was Williams’ state appointed defense counsel 

during the time this complaint arose, and he, therefore, is not considered a state 

actor for purposes of § 1983 and may not be held liable for damages pursuant to 

§ 1983. 

In order "[t]o sustain a cause of action based on section 1983, [a plaintiff] 

must establish two elements: (1) that [he] suffered a deprivation of rights, 

privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United 

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States, and (2) that the act or omission causing the deprivation was committed by 

a person acting under color of law." Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 

826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir. 1987) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 

“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing the 

lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal 

proceeding.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S. Ct. 445, 70 L. Ed. 2d 

509 (1981) (Public defender “did not act under color of state law in exercising her 

independent professional judgment in a criminal proceeding.”). 

Williams alleges in his complaint that Defendant Brown “knew before 

arguing in to court that the name on the warrant and on the indictment was not 

his client true name and identity.” (Doc. 1 at 4). These allegations relate directly 

to Defendant Brown’s actions and traditional functions as counsel; accordingly, 

Defendant Brown was not acting under color of state law when he served as 

Williams’ trial counsel. Because Defendant Brown was not acting under color of 

state law, Williams cannot properly pursue his claim against Defendant Brown in 

a § 1983 action. See Hall v. Tallie, 597 F. App’x 1042 (11th Cir. 2015) (The 

dismissal of Hall's claim against the Public Defender was appropriate because 

Hall failed to illustrate facts sufficient to show that the Public Defender either 

acted under color of state law or participated in a conspiracy.). Therefore, the 

claims against him are frivolous as a matter of law, and it is recommended that 

they be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 

B. Claims against Defendants Travis W. Grant and Jill Phillips.

In Imbler v. Pachtman, the Supreme Court explained that the common 

law gives absolute immunity in § 1983 actions for activities that are "'intimately 

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.'" 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S. 

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Ct. 984, 47 L. Ed. 2d. 128 (1976); Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 129 S. 

Ct. 855, 860, 172 L. Ed. 2d 706 (2009) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430); accord

Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, prosecutorial 

immunity applies to a prosecutor's actions in initiating a prosecution and 

presenting the state's case. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431. Prosecutors are also immune 

for appearances before a court and conduct in the courtroom, including 

examining witnesses and presenting evidence in support of a search warrant 

during a probable cause hearing. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490-92, 111 S. Ct. 

1934, 1942, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1991); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 126, 118 S. Ct. 

502, 507-08, 139 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1997); see also Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 343. 

Applying these principles, the Eleventh Circuit has observed that "[a] 

prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from allegations stemming from the 

prosecutor's function as advocate." Jones, 174 F.3d at 1281. Such absolute 

immunity "extends to a prosecutor's acts undertaken in preparing for the 

initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his 

role as an advocate for the State." Id. (quotation marks omitted); accord Rowe v. 

City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2002). 

In this case, Williams seeks to hold Defendants Travis W. Grant and Jill 

Phillips liable for their actions in connection with prosecuting him for 

manslaughter. Such claims are not cognizable because they arose in connection 

with the Defendants’ roles as advocates for the state. Thus, Williams’ claims are 

frivolous as a matter of law. 

Moreover, Williams is barred from relief under Heck v. Humphrey, in 

which the Supreme Court held that when an inmate’s allegations rest on the 

validity of his imprisonment, his § 1983 claim does not accrue until that 

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invalidity is proven. 512 U.S. 477, 486-84, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994)

(The Court explained, if "a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily 

imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence," then that § 1983 claim must be 

dismissed unless the conviction has already been invalidated.). Conversely, § 

1983 is the appropriate course of relief for a state prisoner "who is making a 

constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or 

length of his custody." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 36 

L. Ed. 2d 439 (1973). In short, a claim for monetary damages or injunctive relief 

that challenges Williams’ conviction is not cognizable under § 1983. Heck, 512 

U.S. at 483; see also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643, 124 S. Ct. 2117, 158 L. 

Ed. 2d 924 (2004) (explaining that claims challenging the fact of conviction or 

duration of the sentence "fall within the 'core' of habeas corpus," while claims 

challenging the conditions of confinement may be brought in a civil rights action 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500 ("[W]e hold today that when a 

state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical 

imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to 

immediate release . . . , his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus."); see 

also Baker v. City of Hollywood, 391 F. App'x 819, 821 (11th Cir. 2010) (per 

curiam) (allegation that defendants conspired to falsify evidence, deny plaintiff 

effective assistance of counsel, testify falsely at trial, and "improperly 

prosecute[]" plaintiff were barred by Heck); Salas v. Pierce, 297 F. App'x 874, 876 

(11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (district court properly found that "claim against the 

Assistant District Attorney for conspiring with his counsel to coerce him into 

pleading guilty" was barred by Heck because plaintiff failed to allege his 

sentence or conviction had been reversed).

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Success in this action, would necessary imply the invalidity of Williams’

sentence, and Williams has not asserted nor presented any evidence suggesting 

that his "conviction or sentence [has been] reversed on direct appeal, expunged 

by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such 

determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of 

habeas corpus." Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Thus, Williams’ claims against Grant and 

Phillips should be dismissed because they are premature. 

C. Detective Willie Maiben.

The court has interpreted Plaintiff’s complaint to allege that Detective 

Willie Maiben is responsible for knowingly altering Plaintiff’s name from 

“Ronald Williams” (on some unidentified police or legal document) to that of 

“Ronnie Williams” and causing him to be prosecuted under the wrong legal 

identity.2 (Id. at 5). 

Similarly to the claim above, success on the claim against Detective 

Maiben would necessarily imply the invalidity of the outcome of his criminal 

trial and sentencing and, as discussed supra, is barred under Heck. 512 U.S. 477. 

Moreover, Williams’ request for release from confinement is not cognizable in 

this § 1983 action and must, instead, be pursued in habeas corpus. It is, 

therefore, recommended that the claims against Defendant Maiben be dismissed 

as frivolous.3 

																																																							 2 Williams states in his complaint that Detective Maiben “removed the Plaintiff[‘s] 

true name and identity” in retaliation for a conflict between Plaintiff Williams and 

Detective Maiben’s cousin, Oliver Maiben. (Doc. 1 at 5).

3 Notably, this action hangs on the proposition that Plaintiff is not “Ronnie” 

Williams, yet the style of this complaint (authored by Williams) reads: “Ronald Vincent 

Williams/Ronnie Williams #236426.” 

Moreover, Williams appears to dispute the length of his 20-year prison sentence, 

arguing that the time imposed was calculated with the inclusion of a prior conviction 

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IV. Conclusion.

Based upon the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that this action be 

dismissed without prejudice, prior to service of process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) because Plaintiff’s allegations are either frivolous and fail 

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS 

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in 

the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or 

anything in it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this 

document, file specific written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b); S.D. ALA. L.R. 72(c). The parties should 

note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a 

magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and 

recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) 

waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on 

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time 

period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the 

absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain 

error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be 

specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to 

which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in 

																																																																																																																																																																				 belonging to “Ronnie” Williams and not the Plaintiff. (Doc. 1 at 6). However, such a 

claim is meritless, as it is undisputed that Williams is guilty of manslaughter, and 

according to the Ala. Code § 13A-6-3, manslaughter is a class B felony with a sentencing 

range of “not more than 20 years or less than 2.” Ala. Code § 13A-5-6 (1975). Thus, 

Williams’ imposed sentence is legally within the statutory sentencing range for a first 

time offender, as Plaintiff Williams alleges he is.		

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the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed 

determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or 

refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not specific. 

DONE this 21st day of December 2016. 

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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