Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00107/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00107-10/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher Patterson
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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PHILLIP A. TALBERT

United States Attorney

BRIAN W. ENOS

Assistant United States Attorney

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401

Fresno, Ca 93721

Telephone: (559) 497-4000

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHRISTOPHER PATTERSON,

Defendant.

Case No: 1:20-cr-00107-DAD-BAM

STIPULATION TO CONTINUE JUNE 8, 2022

STATUS CONFERENCE TO SEPTEMBER 14,

2022; AND ORDER

Ctrm: 8

Hon. Barbara A. McAuliffe

This case is set for a status conference on Wednesday, June 8, 2022. Dkt. 38. On May 13, 2020, 

this Court issued General Order 618, which suspended all jury trials in the Eastern District of California 

“until further notice.” Under General Order 618, a judge “may exercise his or her authority to continue 

matters, excluding time under the Speedy Trial Act with reference to the court’s prior General Order 611 

issued on March 17, 2020 . . . with additional findings to support the exclusion in the Judge’s 

discretion.” General Order 618, ¶ 6 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). In addition, any judge “may order caseby-case exceptions” to General Order 618’s provisions “at the discretion of that Judge or upon the 

request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order 

Case 1:20-cr-00107-BAM Document 40 Filed 05/27/22 Page 1 of 6
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will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). This and 

previous General Orders were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19. 

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 

509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 require specific supplementation. Ends-ofjustice continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his 

findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable 

unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that 

the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public 

and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption created “appreciable difficulty” for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-69; see 

also United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time 

following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). 

///

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The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit much more enduring, “appreciable difficulty” to the 

prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. Recently, the Ninth Circuit enumerated a “nonexhaustive” list of seven factors it found to be “relevant” in considering ends-of-justice Speedy Trial Act 

continuances “in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.” United States v. Olsen, --- F.3d ---, 2021 WL 

1589359 at *7 (9th Cir. Apr. 23, 2021). That non-exhaustive list includes: (1) whether a defendant is 

detained pending trial; (2) how long a defendant has been detained; (3) whether a defendant has invoked 

speedy trial rights since the case’s inception; (4) whether a defendant, if detained, belongs to a 

population that is particularly susceptible to complications if infected with the virus; (5) the seriousness 

of the charges defendant faces, and in particular whether the defendant is accused of violent crimes; (6) 

whether there is a reasons to suspect recidivism if the charges against the defendant are dismissed; and 

(7) whether the district court has the ability to safely conduct a trial. Id. 

In light of the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding 

excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) 

(Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date for this matter’s next status 

conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial 

continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

THE PARTIES HEREBY STIPULATE, through their respective attorneys of record, Assistant 

United States Attorney Brian W. Enos, counsel for the government, and David A. Torres, counsel for 

defendant Christopher Patterson (“defendant”), that this action’s Wednesday, June 8, 2022 status 

conference be continued to Wednesday, September 14, 2022, at 1:00 p.m. The parties likewise ask 

the court to endorse this stipulation by way of formal order.

The parties base this stipulation on good cause. Specifically, 

1. By this stipulation, the parties move to continue the June 8, 2022 status conference until

September 14, 2022, and to exclude time between June 8, 2022 and September 14, 2022, under 18 

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A) & B(iv). 

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2. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The prosecution of this case was reassigned to Assistant United States Attorney, 

Brian W. Enos, on April 26, 2022. The government filed a designation of counsel in this regard 

on this date. Dkt. 37. The government has previously represented that the discovery associated 

with this case has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection 

and copying. The government is in the midst of determining the extent additional information 

exists that should to be produced as supplemental discovery pursuant to Rule 16. This analysis 

should be completed within the next few weeks.

b) As the defense completes its analysis of the discovery produced in this case, 

counsel for the government will work with the defense and HSI’s Bakersfield office to ensure 

that the defense is able to also timely review, upon its request, any electronic evidence in this 

case in accord with relevant provisions of the Adam Walsh Act. As referenced in the Indictment, 

this case involves multiple electronic devices and/or storage media, each of which containing 

voluminous data.

c) Upon the defense’s ability to complete its review of discovery, counsel for the 

parties will meaningfully discuss the extent this case might be resolved short of trial. On this 

end, counsel for the government will prepare and deliver a draft plea agreement to the defense 

for its analysis within the next several weeks. 

d) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to review 

the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review 

discovery for this matter, and to discuss potential resolutions with his client and counsel for the 

government. Defense counsel also needs more time to determine the extent an expert should be 

hired.

e) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

///

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f) The court’s Minute Order dated May 18, 2022 directs the parties “in any request 

for a continuance [to] explain when they will be ready to set a trial date.” Dkt. 38. In response

to this directive, the parties advise the court that they anticipate being ready to set a trial date at 

the continued status conference on September 14, 2022.

g) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

h) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 8, 2022 through September 

14, 2022, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(1)(A) & B(iv) because 

it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of the 

Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of 

the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

3. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: May 27, 2022

By:

PHILLIP A. TALBERT

United States Attorney

/s/ Brian W. Enos

Brian W. Enos

Assistant United States Attorney

(As authorized 5/27/22)

Dated: May 27, 2022 By: /s/ David A. Torres

David A. Torres, Esq.

Attorney for Defendant

 Christopher Patterson

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O R D E R

IT IS ORDERED that the status hearing currently set for June 8, 2022, at 1:00 pm is continued 

until September 14, 2022, at 1:00 pm before Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. If the parties 

do not resolve the case in advance of the next status conference, they shall be prepared to set a trial date 

at the status conference hearing.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the period of time from June 8, 2022 through September 

14, 2022 is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) 

because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the parties’ request on the basis of the 

Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the 

public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 27, 2022 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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