Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-14-20688/USCOURTS-ca5-14-20688-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ernest Edwin Chance
Appellee
James Craig Doyal
Appellee
Mike Lloyd Meader
Appellee
Montgomery County
Appellee
James Lee Noack
Appellee
Edwin Earl Rinehart
Appellee
Alan B. Sadler
Appellee
TexCom Gulf Disposal, L.L.C.
Appellant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-20688

TEXCOM GULF DISPOSAL, L.L.C., 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

MONTGOMERY COUNTY; COUNTY JUDGE ALAN B. SADLER; COUNTY 

COMMISSIONER MIKE LLOYD MEADER; COUNTY COMMISSIONER 

JAMES CRAIG DOYAL; COUNTY COMMISSIONER JAMES LEE NOACK; 

COUNTY COMMISSIONER ERNEST EDWIN CHANCE; COUNTY 

COMMISSIONER EDWIN EARL RINEHART, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:13-CV-2789

Before REAVLEY, PRADO, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff TexCom Gulf 

Disposal, L.L.C.’s (“TexCom”) action alleging constitutional violations against 

Montgomery County and several county officials.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 19, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 14-20688 Document: 00513161768 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/19/2015
No. 14-20688

2

I.

TexCom desires to construct and operate a wastewater injection facility 

within Montgomery County and, more than a decade ago, applied for the 

necessary environmental permits.1 In 2011, despite the County’s vigorous 

formal opposition, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”) 

approved TexCom’s application and issued the associated permits. The 

permits were contingent on TexCom’s acquisition of Texas Department of 

Transportation (“TxDOT”) permits providing for access to TexCom’s property

via a certain road, FM 3083. 

TexCom’s initial driveway access permit application was denied based 

on “spacing guidelines”—i.e., the proposed driveway would be too near an 

already existing neighboring driveway. This is a “common occurrence,” merely 

requiring TexCom to seek a routinely granted variance. TexCom applied for 

the variance and expected to receive it in due course. 

County opposition continued. In addition to appealing TCEQ’s decision, 

various officials sought alternative methods of preventing TexCom’s 

operations and realized barring TexCom’s FM 3083 access would do the trick. 

TxDOT rule 11.56 permits cities and counties to, upon request, “assume 

[permitting] responsibility,” see Tex. Admin. Code § 11.56, and county officials

sought to commandeer the permitting authority. Officials described rule 11.56 

delegation as a “tremendous opportunity” that “should not be missed.” Upon 

concluding they could return the power to TxDOT after denying TexCom’s 

application and that they could also eliminate any right to appeal TexCom 

might otherwise have, officials resolved to seize the permitting power.

 

1 As this case was decided following a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “facts” are 

drawn from the complaint and viewed in the light most favorable to TexCom. See Harris 

Cnty. Texas v. MERSCORP Inc., 791 F.3d 545, 551 (5th Cir. 2015).

 Case: 14-20688 Document: 00513161768 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/19/2015
No. 14-20688

3

The County secured the permitting power in January of 2012. Even 

before then, officials began gloating they had found a way to prevent TexCom’s 

operations. Per County Commissioner Mike Meador, delegation “gives us 

control of our destiny.” County Attorney David Walker was even more explicit: 

“This will allow us to permanently deny access to TexCom along FM 3083 . . . 

We’re on our way.” Once the County obtained delegation, however, the County 

did not deny TexCom’s pending variance request. Rather, “recognizing the 

inevitable outcome,” TexCom withdrew its own application.

In an effort to avoid the permitting process altogether, TexCom decided 

to acquire adjacent property that already accessed FM 3083. A 3.5-acre tract 

of land owned by one Bryan Poage bordered both FM 3083 and TexCom’s 

property (the “Poage Tract”). Moreover, it boasted a 45-foot-wide commercial 

driveway that had been very recently approved and constructed. TexCom 

seems to have overlooked a significant, facially evident limitation on the 

permit’s transferability, however. The face of the Poage Tract permit read: 

“The State reserves the right to require a new access driveway permit in the 

event of a material change in land use or change in driveway traffic volume or 

vehicle types.” Further, the application completed in connection with the 

Poage Tract permit indicated the “primary use for the property” was to be 

“Undeveloped Land,” and the form noted immediately thereafter, in all-capital 

letters, “NOTE: ANY FUTURE DEVELOPMENT TO THIS SITE MUST BE 

REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY TxDOT, OR THIS PERMIT WILL 

BECOME NULL AND VOID.”2 

 

2 While the motion to dismiss was pending, the district court ordered the parties to 

provide various documents relating to this litigation, including the Poage Tract permit and 

underlying application. TexCom did not object and provided the requested documents. The 

ordinary rule is that a motion to dismiss is converted to a motion for summary judgment 

where “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, in the Fifth Circuit, trial courts may also consider “documents 

 Case: 14-20688 Document: 00513161768 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/19/2015
No. 14-20688

4

After realizing the Poage Tract permit could conceivably be assumed by 

TexCom, Walker wrote a letter incorrectly asserting that the Poage Tract 

permit was not approved for commercial use. Subsequently, he publicly stated 

the County would seek to prevent TexCom from using the permit and “would 

not put up with any shenanigans.” Despite these signals, TexCom acquired 

the Poage Tract as planned. Though the Poage Tract permit expressly 

authorizes a “commercial access driveway,” Walker’s successor, County 

Attorney, J.D. Lambright, continued to assert that commercial use of the 

driveway was unauthorized.

Thereafter, TexCom applied to the Montgomery County Engineer for the 

permit necessary to build a surface facility. Ultimately, the permit was denied 

because the TCEQ permits authorizing TexCom’s planned facility was 

contingent on approved access to FM 3083. At that time, the County also 

asserted the changed use of the Poage Tract and its driveway required TexCom 

to seek a new driveway access permit.

TexCom sued. Once the district court became familiar with the facts of 

this case, particularly the fact that the County never actually denied TexCom 

any driveway permit application, it ordered TexCom to re-apply for the 

driveway and building permits. The County made clear that no building 

permit would be issued absent approved FM 3083 access and also informed 

TexCom that its driveway access application would be routed through TxDOT, 

the “usual practice” the County had settled upon since taking the permitting 

 

attached to the motion to dismiss . . . that are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are 

central to the plaintiff’s claim.” Scanlan v. Tex. A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 

2003). We first “approv[ed] of that practice” where, as here, “the plaintiffs did not object to, 

or appeal, the district court’s consideration of those documents.” See id. The parties have 

provided no briefing on this issue, and we assume (without deciding) that the “one limited 

exception” recognized in Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2000),

applies here.

 Case: 14-20688 Document: 00513161768 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/19/2015
No. 14-20688

5

power. TexCom submitted the required applications in early 2014, but as 

alleged, “TexCom’s driveway permit application replicated Bryan Poage’s 

application in all substantive aspects.” “TexCom submitted the same technical 

data, drawings, and representations which the County previously approved in 

issuing the Driveway Permit.”

On February 25th, the County denied TexCom’s driveway permit 

application on the recommendation of TxDOT and for reasons provided by 

TxDOT. According to TxDOT, TexCom’s application was denied because it was 

a regurgitation of the Poage Tract application and was not a new application 

that accurately reflected the site to be accessed—a 30.5-acre tract, not a 3.5-

acre tract. Based on this denial, the County also denied TexCom’s building 

permit application.

TexCom filed an amended complaint adding allegations regarding the 

newly denied permit applications. Thereafter, Defendants filed a motion to 

dismiss, which was granted. TexCom’s rejected equal protection and 

substantive due process claims are the subject of this appeal.

II.

A class-of-one equal protection claim requires allegations that (1) the

plaintiff “was treated differently from others similarly situated and (2) there 

was no rational basis for the disparate treatment.” See Stotter v. Univ. of Tex. 

at San Antonio, 508 F.3d 812, 824 (5th Cir. 2007). Successful class-of-one equal 

protection cases are typically marked by “the existence of a clear standard 

against which departures, even for a single plaintiff, [can] be readily assessed.” 

Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 602, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 2153 (2008). 

It is usually upon this basis that courts identify “differential treatment” for 

which the state must provide a rational basis. See id. at 603, 128 S.Ct. at 2154.

 Case: 14-20688 Document: 00513161768 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/19/2015
No. 14-20688

6

Here, three permitting decisions are at issue.3 First, the County refused 

to recognize TexCom’s assumed Poage Tract permit because it concluded the 

permit was rendered null and void upon the change in land use. TexCom has 

not alleged the existence of a single entity or individual that was allowed to 

retain the privileges of an “assumed” driveway access permit, let alone after a 

change in ownership accompanied by a radical change in land use. Second, the 

County denied TexCom’s driveway access permit application because the 

submitted application did not contain necessary information about the 30.5-

acre tract and instead included maps reflecting a 3.5-acre tract. TexCom has 

not alleged that the County has approved similarly deficient applications.4 

Third, the County denied TexCom’s building permit because of TexCom’s 

failure to secure the driveway access permit, a rationale allegedly dictated by 

regulations precluding issuance of building permits where the applicant has 

not satisfied all other requirements. While TexCom alleges that other 

applicants were not subjected to this intensive review and that the regulations 

cited to support denial of the building permits were “not applicable or even in 

effect,” it does not identify these alleged other applicants or allege that the 

same regulations have been overlooked in other specific cases. That is to say, 

we are not directed to a single building-permit applicant who received a 

building permit where other “unmet requirements” barred development. 

 

3 TexCom also asserts that the County’s Rule 11.56 delegation constitutes an equal 

protection violation. Specifically, TexCom argues that “[T]he County’s seizure of drivewaypermitting authority just to obstruct TexCom’s operation epitomizes the type of 

discriminatory treatment that violates the Equal Protection Clause.” While the Rule 11.56 

delegation might be evidence of an equal protection violation, it does not itself constitute

differential treatment of TexCom and cannot be the basis of an equal protection claim.

4 Moreover, the complaint indicates that TexCom’s application was treated precisely 

like all other applicants—it was forwarded to TxDOT for review in accordance with the 

alleged “usual practice.” The documents reflecting the County’s denial of the permit 

application indicate TxDOT, rather than the County, determined denial was proper.

 Case: 14-20688 Document: 00513161768 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/19/2015
No. 14-20688

7

TexCom complains about each of these permitting decisions but provides 

no basis upon which to infer the decisions represent a departure from the norm. 

See Engquist, 553 U.S. at 602, 128 S.Ct. at 2153. TexCom has not alleged a 

plausible class-of-one equal protection claim. 

III.

To state a substantive due process claim, the plaintiff “must allege a 

deprivation of a constitutionally protected right” via a governmental action 

that was not rationally related to any legitimate governmental interest. 

Mikeska v. City of Galveston, 451 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2006). We again 

review the three challenged permitting decisions.5 Assuming TexCom was 

deprived of a constitutionally protected right, we have no trouble identifying a 

rational basis for the County’s actions. 

The first permitting decision complained of, the County’s refusal to 

recognize the “assumed” Poage tract permit, rationally follows from the 

associated change in land use.6 The County had approved driveway access to 

a 3.5-acre plot of land used to store mobile homes on “Undeveloped Land” and 

had a rational basis to require a new application when the driveway would 

instead access a 30.5-acre plot of land hosting a wastewater injection facility. 

The second permitting decision complained of, actual denial of TexCom’s 

driveway access permit application, is also supported by a straightforward 

rational basis—the application’s facial deficiency. Instead of filing a complete 

 

5 TexCom also argues “the County’s decision to seize permitting authority” constitutes 

a substantive due process violation. Delegation did not deprive TexCom of a protected right 

and is not plausibly the basis of a substantive due process claim.

6 TexCom alleged it “proposed” no “change in land use.” (Emphasis omitted.) It now 

argues that any contrary determination represents “an improper resolution of a factual

dispute.” We “draw on . . . common sense” when considering a motion to dismiss. See 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). Transformation of a 3.5-

acre tract dedicated to storage of mobile homes on “Undeveloped Land” into a 30.5-acre tract 

hosting a wastewater injection facility constitutes a material change. 

 Case: 14-20688 Document: 00513161768 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/19/2015
No. 14-20688

8

application relating to the 30.5-acre tract, TexCom instead submitted a 

“driveway permit application [that] replicated Bryan Poage’s application in all 

substantive aspects.” Even the accompanying maps reflected a 3.5-acre tract 

of land rather than a 30.5 tract of land. It is hard to fathom why TexCom 

thought substantial replication was appropriate and easy to see why the 

application was denied.

The third permitting decision complained of, the County’s denial of 

TexCom’s building permit application, also had a clear rational basis. TCEQ

conditioned its approval to operate the facility on driveway access to FM 3083. 

Accordingly, it is rational to impose the same condition on construction of that 

same facility. Otherwise, the County would be granting permission to 

construct a facility with no authorization to operate.

We have identified unproven but conceivable (and rather apparent) 

rational bases for the County’s challenged actions. See Shelton v. City of Coll. 

Station, 780 F.2d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc). It is true, as TexCom 

points out, that we “focus on what actually motivated the conduct” when 

adjudicative, rather than legislative, decisions are at issue. Mahone v. Addicks 

Util. Dist. of Harris Cnty., 836 F.2d 921, 934 (5th Cir. 1988). Even assuming 

the challenged permitting decisions were adjudicative, however, the 

complaint’s allegations do not nudge TexCom’s substantive due process claim 

“across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). 

TexCom has adequately alleged the existence of animus by certain 

County officials toward TexCom’s development project and even a plan, by 

those officials, to use the permitting power to thwart TexCom’s operations 

within the County. TexCom has not plausibly alleged that the discrete 

decisions actually complained of were compelled by improper official animus 

rather than by TexCom’s questionable maneuvering. 

 Case: 14-20688 Document: 00513161768 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/19/2015
No. 14-20688

9

On its face, the Poage permit provides that “[t]he State reserves the right 

to require a new access driveway permit in the event of a material change in 

land use or change in driveway traffic volume or vehicle types.” Indeed, the 

application completed in connection with the Poage Tract permit indicated the 

“primary use for the property” was to be “Undeveloped Land,” and the form 

noted immediately thereafter, in all-capital letters, “NOTE: ANY FUTURE 

DEVELOPMENT TO THIS SITE MUST BE REVIEWED AND APPROVED 

BY TxDOT, OR THIS PERMIT WILL BECOME NULL AND VOID.” 

(Emphasis added.) TexCom’s plan to “assume” the Poage Tract permit was ill 

conceived, and we cannot reasonably infer that animus actually motivated the 

County’s refusal to recognize the “assumed” Poage Tract permit. See Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

The same is true for the County’s denial of TexCom’s court-ordered 

driveway access permit application. We have already observed the deficiency 

of TexCom’s submission. Further, according the complaint, the County 

“forwarded TexCom’s application to TxDOT for review.” This was the “usual 

practice” for all driveway access permit applications after rule 11.56 delegation

went into effect, and the County took “no substantive role in the review” of 

applications so forwarded. Consistent with the system of review described by 

the complaint itself, documents representing the actual denial of TexCom’s 

application indicate TxDOT made the substantive decision that the application 

should be denied. We cannot reasonably infer that the County’s denial of 

TexCom’s permit application was actually motivated by animus.

According to TexCom, “[t]he County further violated TexCom’s due 

process rights by rejecting TexCom’s building permit when one of the County’s 

purported ‘requirements’—[authorized] driveway access—depended upon an 

action that the County refused to take.” We have found implausible allegations 

 Case: 14-20688 Document: 00513161768 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/19/2015
No. 14-20688

10

that the County improperly thwarted TexCom’s attempts to procure a 

driveway access permit. This contingent theory is equally implausible.

IV.

TexCom failed to state a constitutional claim upon which relief could be 

granted. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 14-20688 Document: 00513161768 Page: 10 Date Filed: 08/19/2015