Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cr-00364/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cr-00364-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darnell Herring
Defendant
Jerry Lee Sueing
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

Darnell Herring, 

Defendant. ______________________________________

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No. CR 99-364-PHX-RGS

No. CV 04-093-PHX-RGS (JM)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner's Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 To Vacate,

Set Aside, Or Correct Sentence By A Person In Federal Custody for Writ of Habeas Corpus

[Docket No. 106]. In accordance with the Rules of Practice of the United States District

Court for the District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the

Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge

recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of the record, deny the

Petition in part and grant the Petition in part.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 20, 1999, the defendant, Darnell Herring, and Jerry Lee Sueing were charged

by indictment for violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), Possession With Intent to Distribute

Crack Cocaine (Count 1), and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), Using or Carrying a Firearm During and

in Relation to a Drug Trafficking Crime (Counts 2 and 3). Docket No. 7 (Indictment). On

April 5, 2000, Jerry Lee Sueing pleaded guilty to Count 2 of the indictment, Docket No. 47,

and was sentenced to 60 months imprisonment on July 6, 2000. Docket Nos. 56 & 57.

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 On July 27, 2000, upon defense counsel's motion, the court ordered that Herring be

committed to the Bureau of Prisons for the purpose of being examined for competency.

Docket Nos. 60 & 62. On December 6, 2000, the court held a competency hearing in which

it found Herring competent to stand trial. Docket No. 66. On May 29, 2001, in an attempt

to resolve the matter without trial, the parties participated in a settlement conference before

United States Magistrate Judge Lawrence Anderson. Docket No. 77. No settlement was

reached, and the matter proceeded to trial. On June 27, 2001, the jury found Herring guilty

on all three counts of the indictment. Docket Nos. 85 & 86. At sentencing on September 5,

2001, upon oral motion by the government, the court dismissed Count 2 of the indictment

and sentenced Herring to 210 months imprisonment on Count 1 and 60 months imprisonment

on Count 3, with the sentences to run consecutively. Docket Nos. 87 & 88. Herring filed an

appeal alleging insufficient evidence for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for carrying

a weapon during and in relation to a drug sale. Docket No. 104. The Ninth Circuit affirmed

the conviction and Herring filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which was denied. Id.;

Docket No. 106. 

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION

On January 14, 2004, Herring filed the instant Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to

Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (the "Petition"). In

the Petition, Herring raised four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a criminal

defendant has a right to “effective assistance of counsel.” Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In order to determine if

Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel, the court must determine “whether

counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the

trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. The Strickland standard for

ineffective assistance of counsel has two components. A defendant must first demonstrate

that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that counsel made errors so serious that counsel

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The departure is not available where the defendant "has been convicted of an offense under

chapter 71, 109A, 110, or 117, of title 18, United States Code." U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13. The statute

under which Herring was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), Using or Carrying a Firearm During

and in Relation to a Drug Trafficking Crime, is found in chapter 44 of title 18. Thus, the

departure, if otherwise warranted, is available.

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was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed a defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 466

U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. It requires the defendant to show that counsel's conduct “fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 687-688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.

Second, a defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, i.e.,

that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. 466 U.S. at

687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. In other words, “but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.” 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. 

In reviewing counsel's performance, the court must be highly deferential to counsel's

behavior. “[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.

A reviewing court may first consider the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, and if it finds

that the alleged unprofessional conduct would not have changed the result of the proceeding,

it need not consider the performance prong. Id.

A. Ineffective Assistance – Diminished Capacity

Herring argues that his sentencing counsel was ineffective because he did not request

a departure based on U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13. Section 5K2.13 permits departure with respect to

non-violent offenses where the defendant may be suffering from "significantly reduced

mental capacity."1

 The departure is designed "to reflect the extent to which reduced mental

capacity contributed to the commission of the offense." U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13. Although

neither party submitted Herring's Presentence Report ("PSR"), the sentencing transcript

indicates that Herring's mental history was included in the PSR. His attorney also requested

that the Court "give Mr. Herring the minimum sentence possible according to the guidelines."

Sentencing Transcript, p. 17. These references do not, however, adequately describe the

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extent and degree of Herring's alleged reduced mental capacity or enlighten whether it

contributed to the commission of the crime, or that he was so "significantly" impaired as to

qualify for a § 5K2.13 departure. 

Moreover, the decision to grant or deny downward departure is discretionary unless

the district court indicates that its refusal is based on a restriction that is a matter of law.

United States v. Pinto, 48 F.3d 384, 389 (9th Cir.1995). Here, counsel's request for "the

minimum sentence possible," does not establish that the district court was sufficiently

apprised of the potential for a downward departure. The district court therefore may not

have exercised its discretion on this point. Because the record contains documentation of

both the government's and defense counsel's concerns about Herring's mental capacity,

Herring should be resentenced after full consideration of this potential downward departure.

B. Ineffective Assistance – Alleged Incompetence 

Herring alleges that he was incompetent to stand trial and that his attorneys were

ineffective because they failed to have the case dismissed on those grounds. It is clearly

established Supreme Court law that convicting a legally incompetent defendant violates due

process. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-73, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975). To

present a prima facie claim of substantive incompetence, Herring must present facts showing

that at the time of trial or at the time of sentencing, he did not have "'sufficient present ability

to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding'" nor "'a

rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' " Godinez v.

Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 398, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (quoting Dusky v.

United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)). The record does not

establish such facts.

Although Herring refers several times to a psychiatric evaluation performed by a "Ms.

Parris," nowhere does he allege that she found him incompetent. Nevertheless, he complains

of his attorney's request that he be evaluated by the Federal Bureau of Prison's Psychology

Department. See Docket No. 62 (Order for psychiatric evaluation). As reflected in the

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record, Docket No. 66, the trial judge reviewed the psychiatric report and found "that the

defendant does not have a mental disorder and thus he is and will remain competent and able

to participate in the proceedings." Id. Herring offers nothing to contradict this determination

or to show that he was unable to consult with his lawyer and participate in the proceedings

against him.

There is also nothing about these events that support a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel. Rather than laude his counsel for seeking additional information on his

psychiatric condition by filing a Competency Motion, Docket Nos. 60 & 61, he complains

because it was ultimately determined that he was competent to stand trial. However, this

argument is unconvincing. That the report sought by his counsel was ultimately unfavorable

does not render counsel's performance deficient under the first prong of Strickland. 

C. Ineffective Assistance – Failure to Visit 

Herring next alleges that his counsel's performance was deficient because his lawyer

"only came to the jail on one occasion to visit with him. The visit lasted only about thirty

minutes." This was significant, Herring contends, because they were not able to discuss his

psychological examinations and evaluations, thus leaving Herring "unaware if [trial] attorney

Tate even knew that he had been psychologically examined and evaluated." The record does

not corroborate these concerns. While his lawyer may have visited him at jail only once, that

was not their only visit. At sentencing, Herring's lawyer noted that he had met with Herring

at CCA, that he set the matter for a settlement conference before Judge Anderson, that the

potential ramifications of going to trial were explained to him at the settlement conference,

and that he "talked with Mr. Herring again before we started trial. And then we proceeded

to trial because that was his wish." Sentencing Transcript, p. 16. These statements, to which

Herring did not object, establish that Herring spoke with his trial counsel on at least three

different occasions. Also at the sentencing hearing, Herring's counsel made it clear that he

was aware of Herring's past when he referred to his "extensive medical history" and "his

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mental history." Id. at 17. As such, these allegations do not support a finding of deficient

performance.

D. Ineffective Assistance – Failure to Interview Co-Defendant

Herring's final claim is that his counsel was ineffective for failing to interview Jerry

Sueing, his co-defendant. Herring claims that the interview would have established that

Sueing, unbeknownst to Herring, owned and possessed the firearms that led to Herring's

conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). This argument is unavailing. 

As a threshold matter, Herring's hindsight suggestion that his counsel present

additional witnesses does not demonstrate that counsel's performance was constitutionally

deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ("every effort [must] be made to eliminate the

distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged

conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time"); Hendricks v.

Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir. 1995) ("hindsight is a weak standard for fixing

constitutional minima"). Additionally, Herring has the burden of proof under the Strickland

test. See Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). Herring has not met this

burden as he does not offer an affidavit or other evidence that would support his assertion

that Sueing would assume full responsibility for the two weapons found in the vehicle when

they were arrested. Mere speculation that additional witnesses might have provided helpful

information is not enough. See Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.), amended,

253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.2001).

Herring also has not demonstrated prejudice from counsel's alleged failure to present

Sueing's testimony. As the Ninth Circuit held in its decision on his direct appeal, the facts

were sufficient to sustain his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), as the government

provided "sufficient evidence that [Herring] had a gun in his proximately located vehicle .

. . ." Docket No. 105 (Memorandum Decision). This, the court held, was enough to show

he "carried" a gun as that term has been interpreted in Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S.

125, 137 (1998) and United States v. Medina-Chavarin, 147 F.3d 1161, 1162 (9th Cir. 1998).

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In Muscarello, the Court held: "In sum, the 'generally accepted contemporary meaning' of

the word 'carry' includes the carrying of a firearm in a vehicle. The purpose of this statute

warrants its application in such circumstances." Id. at 137; Medina-Chavarin, 147 F.3d

1161, 1162 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, there were two weapons in the vehicle in which Herring

was a passenger. Even if Sueing had testified these weapons were his, the evidence was

more than adequate to sustain the jury verdict. As such, Herring was not prejudiced and

there is no basis for relief on this claim of ineffective assistance. 

III. RECOMMENDATION

For all of the above reasons, THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE RECOMMENDS that

the District Court, after its independent review, issue an Order denying in part and granting

in part Petitioner's Petitioner's Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 To Vacate, Set Aside, Or

Correct Sentence By A Person In Federal Custody for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Docket No.

106], and resentence Petitioner.

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. 

However, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District Court. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to the objections.

If any objections are filed, this action should be designated case number: CV 04-093-PHXRGS. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues.

See United States v. Reyna-Tapia 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

DATED this 5th day of October, 2005.

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