Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03105/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03105-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ivan T. Joseph
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 9, 1999 Decided March 5, 1999

No. 96-3105

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Ivan T. Joseph,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No.88cr00090-01)

Evelina J. Norwinski, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Santha Sonenberg,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Ivan T. Joseph, appearing pro se, was on the briefs for

appellant.

USCA Case #96-3105 Document #420869 Filed: 03/05/1999 Page 1 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Barbara A. Grewe, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were

Wilma A. Lewis, United States Attorney, John R. Fisher,

Mary-Patrice Brown, Thomas C. Black and Karen L. Melnik, Assistant United States Attorneys.

Before: Wald, Henderson and Randolph, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Wald.

Wald, Circuit Judge: Appellant Ivan T. Joseph was convicted in 1988 for several criminal offenses including violation

of 18 U.S.C. s 924(c)(1), which mandates a prison term of five

or more years for anyone who "uses or carries a firearm"

"during and in relation to" a drug trafficking crime. The

conviction was affirmed on appeal. See United States v.

Joseph, 892 F.2d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Six years later Joseph

filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. s 2255 to vacate, set aside, or

correct his sentence, arguing that the evidence presented at

trial was insufficient to support a s 924(c)(1) conviction and

that the jury instruction defining "using" was flawed in light

of Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). He now

appeals the district court's denial of the s 2255 motion, see

United States v. Joseph, 939 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1996),

repeating the same arguments. Joseph presents two new

arguments as well--that the jury instruction defining "carrying" a firearm was flawed in light of the recently decided case

of Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998),1 and

that the indictment itself did not follow the statutory description of the offense. We agree with the district court's

disposition of the "using" instruction and sufficiency claims

and hold further as to the "carrying" claim that Muscarello

does not render erroneous the "carrying" instruction and that

the indictment was proper.

I. Background

Joseph and his younger brother Lawrence Mayers (also

known as Shawn Joseph) arrived by train at Union Station in

__________

1 We ordered the parties to address the effect of Muscarello. See

United States v. Joseph, No. 96-3105 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 1, 1998) (per

curiam).

Washington, D.C. on February 23, 1988. At the time they

came under police observation Mayers carried a tote bag.

The brothers walked to a public telephone and Joseph placed

a call. Police officers Detective Curley and Sergeant Brennan approached them and began to converse with them. In

the course of their conversation Curley received permission

from Mayers to search the tote bag. Because Mayers had

(falsely) told the officers that he was only seventeen years

old, Curley also sought and obtained consent for the search

from Joseph. As Curley began the search Joseph reached

into the bag, asking that the search be conducted elsewhere,

and stating, "I have underwear and things in the bag." After

moving to a less trafficked part of the train station, Curley

continued the search. He found a loaded gun and 70.55

grams of crack cocaine in the tote bag.2

USCA Case #96-3105 Document #420869 Filed: 03/05/1999 Page 2 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Joseph and Mayers were tried jointly before a jury on four

counts: (1) possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in

violation of 21 U.S.C. ss 841(a), (b)(1)(A)(iii) and 18 U.S.C.

s 2; (2) using and carrying a firearm during and in relation

to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C.

s 924(c)(1)3; (3) possession of an unregistered firearm in

__________

2 Additional facts concerning the events at Union Station are set

out in our opinion in Joseph's direct appeal. See Joseph, 892 F.2d

at 120-21.

3 Subsection (c)(1) has been amended in ways not relevant to this

case since Joseph was indicted. It currently provides in full:

Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or

drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug

trafficking crime which provides for an enhanced punishment if

committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or

device) for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United

States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the

punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years, and

if the firearm is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun,

or semiautomatic assault weapon, to imprisonment for ten

years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or a destructive

device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm

muffler, to imprisonment for thirty years. In the case of his

violation of D.C. Code s 6-2311(a); and (4) possession of

ammunition for the unregistered firearm in violation of D.C.

Code s 6-2361. With respect to the s 924(c)(1) charge, the

jury instructions included the following:

This offense has three elements which the government

must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable

doubt.

First, that on or about the date alleged in the indictment, the defendants used or carried a firearm.

Second, that the defendants had knowledge that what

they were using or carrying was a firearm.

Third, that they did so during and in relation to the

commission of a drug trafficking crime.

The term "use" means to employ or avail oneself of.

The term "carry" means to bear on or about one's

person, or to be convenient of access or within reach.

Transcript 6/21/88 at 185 (emphasis added). Joseph was

convicted on all four counts, Mayers only on the first.4

Joseph received concurrent sentences of ten years, one year,

and one year for the first, third, and fourth counts, respectively. As required by s 924(c)(1), a consecutive five year

term was imposed for the second count.

__________

second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, such

person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years,

and if the firearm is a machinegun, or a destructive device, or

USCA Case #96-3105 Document #420869 Filed: 03/05/1999 Page 3 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to life

imprisonment without release. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not place on probation or suspend

the sentence of any person convicted of a violation of this

subsection, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under

this subsection run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment including that imposed for the crime of violence or

drug trafficking crime in which the firearm was used or

carried.

4 On direct appeal we explained the verdict on the ground that

the jury "apparently conclud[ed] that the physical possession by the

younger brother represented no more than his performing the duty

of a conduit for appellant." Joseph, 892 F.2d at 125 n.3.

Joseph unsuccessfully challenged his conviction on several

grounds on direct appeal. He argued, inter alia, that the

evidence was insufficient to support the s 924(c)(1) conviction

on either the "using" or "carrying" grounds. Explaining that

sufficiency under one prong was enough to sustain the conviction, and without deciding whether there was sufficient evidence that Joseph "used" a firearm, the court held that "the

evidence fits well within the statutory meaning of 'carrying'

as defined in our recent decision in United States v. Evans,

888 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1989)." Joseph, 892 F.2d at 125-26.

Quoting Evans to explain the meaning of "carry," the court

continued: "When a person 'has a present ability to exercise

dominion and control over' a firearm and further has the

firearm 'within easy reach and available to protect him during

his ongoing [drug trafficking] offense,' [ ] he has rather

plainly committed the act Congress intended to preclude by

the passage of the statute." Id. at 126 (first brackets in

original).

In 1995 the Supreme Court rejected as too broad this

circuit's definition of "uses" in the s 924(c)(1) context. We

had held that " 'one uses a gun, i.e., avails oneself of a gun,

and therefore violates [s 924(c)(1)], whenever one puts or

keeps the gun in a particular place from which one (or one's

agent) can gain access to it if and when needed to facilitate a

drug crime.' " Bailey, 516 U.S. at 141 (quoting United States

v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (in banc)). The

Supreme Court said, to the contrary, "use" requires "active

employment of the firearm." Id. at 144.

Like many others before and after him, Joseph responded

to the Supreme Court's Bailey decision by collaterally attacking his s 924(c)(1) conviction in a 28 U.S.C. s 2255 motion.

Joseph argued that, under Bailey, his conviction was based

on insufficient evidence of "uses or carries" and rested on an

improper jury instruction about the meaning of "use." The

district court rejected his sufficiency argument by explaining

that in a case where two acts are charged in the conjunctive

and "where a jury has two or more bases of conviction, and

the evidence on one basis is insufficient, a conviction will

nevertheless be upheld if the evidence was sufficient on the

alternative basis." United States v. Joseph, 939 F. Supp. at

USCA Case #96-3105 Document #420869 Filed: 03/05/1999 Page 4 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

USCA Case #96-3105 Document #420869 Filed: 03/05/1999 Page 5 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

27 & n.3 (citing Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 56

(1991); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970)). The

district court reasoned that this principle applied to Joseph

because Bailey only involved the "use" prong of s 924(c)(1)

and thus did not undermine this court's prior holding on

direct appeal that the evidence was sufficient to sustain

Joseph's conviction under a "carry" theory. See id. at 28.

Nor was the district court persuaded by Joseph's objections

to the jury instruction on "use," even though that instruction

did not use the Supreme Court's phrase "active employment

of the firearm." The court considered the instruction adequate because it defined "use" by other phrases which the

Supreme Court considered the functional equivalent of "active

employment"--i.e., "to employ" and "to avail oneself of." Id.

The court relied on a specific passage from Bailey to that

effect:

The word "use" in the statute must be given its "ordinary

or natural" meaning, a meaning variously defined as "[t]o

convert to one's service," "to employ," "to avail oneself

of," and "to carry out a purpose or action by means of."

These various definitions of "use" imply action and implementation.

516 U.S. at 145 (citations omitted; brackets in original;

emphases added).

Joseph now appeals the denial by the district court of his

s 2255 motion, and raises dual objections to the "carry"

charge as well.

II. Discussion5

A.Use of the Conjunctive in the Indictment

Joseph claims error in the fact that the indictment used the

conjunctive ("used and carried") while the statute uses the

disjunctive ("uses or carries"). This is not an error:

__________

5 In this section we do not distinguish between arguments raised

by Joseph himself in his pro se briefs and by the federal public

defender on Joseph's behalf.

The appellant contends that ... where legislative definition of a crime sets forth disjunctively a number of acts,

the commission of any one of which will be a violation of

the statute, the prosecution may in a single count of an

indictment or information charge several or all of such

acts in the conjunctive and under such charge make

proof of any one or more of the acts, proof of one alone,

however, being sufficient to support a conviction. This is

correct....

District of Columbia v. Hunt, 163 F.2d 833, 837-38 (D.C. Cir.

1947) (citing Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625 (1896)).

This rule applies to s 924(c)(1) indictments drafted in the

conjunctive, which can support a conviction if the jury is

charged and the violation is proved disjunctively. See United

USCA Case #96-3105 Document #420869 Filed: 03/05/1999 Page 6 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

States v. Dickey, 102 F.3d 157, 164 n.8 (5th Cir. 1996). Using

the conjunctive in the indictment protects the defendant's

right to be informed of the charge(s) he faces:

Frequently a statute will specify various ways in which a

particular crime may be committed. It is enough to

allege one of these ways without negativing the others.

Or the pleading may allege commission of the offense by

all the acts mentioned if it uses the conjunctive "and"

where the statute uses the disjunctive "or." But if the

indictment or information alleges the several acts in the

disjunctive it fails to inform the defendant which of the

acts he is charged with having committed, and it is

insufficient.

1 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure

s 125, at 563-65 (1999) (footnotes omitted).

B.The "Use" Jury Instruction

We agree with the district court's rejection of Joseph's

argument that the "use" instruction was flawed. The jury

instruction did not need to use the specific phrase "active

employment." Rather, it only needed to convey the meaning

of that phrase to assure that a conviction would satisfy

Bailey. We easily find that the instruction here did so by

using two other phrases from the dictionary meaning of "use"

USCA Case #96-3105 Document #420869 Filed: 03/05/1999 Page 7 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

that the Supreme Court itself cited as conveying its correct

meaning. See Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145.

C.The "Carry" Jury Instruction

Joseph's objection to the "carry" instruction demands more

attention. As this court's discussion of Evans in Joseph's

direct appeal demonstrates, our circuit law has previously

defined "carry" by focusing on present access and control.

See supra p. 5; see also United States v. Toms, 136 F.3d 176,

181 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("the weapon must be convenient of

access and within reach"); United States v. Anderson, 881

F.2d 1128, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (challenge to the same

"carry" definition as given at Joseph's trial "almost frivolous"

under plain error standard).6 Joseph argues that Muscarello

v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998), added a further

restriction on the meaning of "carry," requiring that a gun be

physically "conveyed" by the defendant.7

In Muscarello, the Court upheld "carry" convictions

against a defendant who kept a gun in his locked glove

__________

6 For simplicity we refer herein to our circuit's previous definitions of "carry" as the "Evans definition," recognizing that other

cases have employed variations on the Evans language.

7 This argument was not raised at trial, on direct appeal, or

before the district court on the s 2255 motion because Muscarello

was decided by the Supreme Court after the district court ruled on

the s 2255 motion. The government argues that Joseph has procedurally defaulted this claim by not raising it earlier and that he

must therefore demonstrate "cause and prejudice" or "actual innocence." Joseph asks us to apply the much laxer harmless error

standard under the supervening-decision doctrine.

In United States v. Perkins, 161 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the

court examined procedural default issues in the s 924(c)(1) context

in great detail, but ultimately found it unnecessary to resolve them.

We do likewise. Even under the standard Joseph requests and

which is most favorable to him--harmless error--the conviction

survives. See id. at 74. Harmless error review of a jury instruction cannot cause a reversal in the absence of error and, as we

explain, Muscarello does not render the "carry" instruction improper.

compartment as he drove to a drug sale and two defendants

who stored guns in the trunk of the car they rode in to a drug

sale. See Muscarello, 118 S. Ct. at 1914. The Court recognized that "the word 'carry' has many different meanings."

Id.; see also id. at 1915 (referring to the twenty-sixth definition of "carry" in the Oxford English Dictionary). Its holding, hence, was confined to determining that the word's

"primary" meaning, involving conveyance and moving, created a proper basis for a conviction under s 924(c)(1). That

meaning, it held, was satisfied by placing firearms in an

inaccessible part of a car which the defendants drove or rode

in.

Given the vehicular situation it was addressing, it is not

surprising that the Muscarello opinion repeatedly emphasized

USCA Case #96-3105 Document #420869 Filed: 03/05/1999 Page 8 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the centrality of the concept of conveyance to its decision.

Indeed, it was only the fact that the inaccessible guns had

been hidden in a moving vehicle that gave credence to its

conclusion that the defendants were "carrying" them. From

this emphasis, however, Joseph would have us conclude that

proof of personal conveyance is a necessary element of any

conviction under the statute's "carry" prong. But the Court

never suggested that the meaning it applied in Muscarello is

the only one that Congress intended to reach by making

"carry" a part of the statute. To the contrary, Muscarello

explains that "a gangster might 'carry' a gun (in colloquial

language, he might 'pack a gun') even though he does not

move from his chair." Id. at 1915-16. The statute would be

satisfied in this non-conveyance scenario because of an alternative "meaning that suggests support rather than movement

or transportation...." Id. at 1915.

Our Evans definition of "carry" is satisfied by proof of

dominion and control and ready accessibility to a gun during

a drug crime. That definition may vary in some aspects from

the support-based definition cited in Muscarello, but again

Muscarello does not state that its "support" example is the

only legitimate variation from personal or vehicular "conveyance" that satisfies the statute. Language in Muscarello is

cited by Joseph for the proposition that either physical posUSCA Case #96-3105 Document #420869 Filed: 03/05/1999 Page 9 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

session or conveyance in a vehicle is a prerequisite to "carrying":

The question before us is whether the phrase "carries a

firearm" is limited to the carrying of firearms on the

person. We hold that it is not so limited. Rather, it also

applies to a person who knowingly possesses and conveys

firearms in a vehicle, including in the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car, which the person accompanies.

Id. at 1913-14. We think the better contextual reading of

this passage is that the Court was simply setting up a

contrast between a circumstance that everyone would agree

amounts to "carrying" and the facts of the Muscarello case in

order to illuminate the precise issue it was confronting.

Thus, what Muscarello tells us is that conveyance-based and

support-based definitions are proper under the statute, but it

certainly does not tell us that all other definitions--such as

the Evans formula--are improper, especially as applied to the

facts of this case. We note especially the Court's endorsement of the term's application to the placement of the gun in

a location which allows the person to "accompany" it in its

journey. If, as here, the gun is in a tote bag rather than a

glove compartment but the defendant "accompanies" it nonetheless and maintains dominion over and access to it, surely

the Court's concept of "carrying" is satisfied.

Moreover, there are other indications in Muscarello that

the Evans definition would meet the Court's approval. The

Court looked to the purpose of including "carry" in the

statute, explaining that Congress sought to "combat the

'dangerous combination' of 'drugs and guns,' " id. at 1916

(quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993)),

and to "persuad[e] a criminal to leave his gun at home." Id.

From these perspectives, surely Congress would want to

reach those whose employment of firearms satisfies the "carry" definition given at Joseph's trial ("to bear on or about

one's person, or to be convenient of access or within reach").

Employing Muscarello's phrasing, "[i]t is difficult to say that,

considered as a class," such people "are less dangerous, or

USCA Case #96-3105 Document #420869 Filed: 03/05/1999 Page 10 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

less deserving of punishment, than those who carry handguns

on their person." Id. at 1916-17. The Court also stated that

" '[c]arry' implies personal agency and some degree of possession...." Id. at 1917. Our Evans definition meets these

requirements.

We conclude that the only change in the definition of

"carry" in our circuit worked by Muscarello is an expansion.

When a firearm is not "carried" under the still valid Evans

definition, a conviction may now be obtained if the defendant

conveys the firearm by car within the meaning of Muscarello.

Joseph argues less strenuously that, even if the jury instruction in his case does not conflict with Muscarello for lack

of a personal or vehicular conveyance requirement, the instruction still allowed an unlawful conviction for what the

Supreme Court called "transporting" a firearm. In defining

"transport," the Court explained that it "implies the movement of goods in bulk over great distances," pointing to the

use of a parcel delivery service as an example. See id. In

that example, the Court noted that only the truck driver "has

'carried' the package in the sense of 'carry' that we believe

Congress intended." Id. The Court also distinguished the

two terms "carry" and "transport" by noting that " '[c]arry'

implies personal agency and some degree of possession,

whereas 'transport' does not have such a limited connotation...." Id. Given the trial court instruction's emphasis on

access in defining "carrying," no conviction based on "transporting" would have been allowed.

We therefore hold that the "carry" instruction in Joseph's

trial was proper. Because there was no error, the conviction

survives this challenge.

D.Sufficiency of the Evidence

In an argument closely related to the "carry" jury instruction claim, Joseph contends that the evidence was insufficient

for a s 924(c)(1) conviction on either a "use" or "carry"

charge. On direct appeal, we said that "[o]n an indictment

charged in the conjunctive, when there is evidence sufficient

to support conviction on one of the acts charged, the conviction will not be disturbed for lack of sufficiency of the

evidence." Joseph, 892 F.2d at 125.8 We reviewed the

evidence, concluded that it was sufficient under the Evans

definition of "carry,"9 and said that whether it was sufficient

under the "use" prong was therefore irrelevant. See id. at

125-26. That decision dooms Joseph's claim of insufficiency

here. Had our understanding of "carry" at the time of the

appeal proved too expansive under Muscarello, as Joseph

argues, we would have had to revisit the sufficiency question

and give careful scrutiny to Joseph's claim. But we are

satisfied the Evans definition remains good law. Thus, since

Bailey addressed the "use" prong only, and Muscarello does

not invalidate our view of "carry," the conclusion reached in

Joseph's direct appeal in 1989 that there was sufficient evidence of "carrying" remains sound.

USCA Case #96-3105 Document #420869 Filed: 03/05/1999 Page 11 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

III. Conclusion

Because Joseph has highlighted no errors in his trial and

conviction, the denial of his 28 U.S.C. s 2255 motion is

affirmed.

So 

ordered.

__________

8 We relied for this proposition on Turner v. United States, 396

U.S. 398 (1970). Turner closely paralleled this case in that it

involved a narcotic statute phrased in the disjunctive ("to purchase,

sell, dispense, or distribute....") and an indictment substituting

"and" for the statutory "or." See id. at 402 & n.2. The Court

explained that "[t]he general rule is that when a jury returns a

guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive ... the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect

to any one of the acts charged." Id. at 420.

9 We reached this conclusion because the jury convicted Joseph

on the firearm possession count (plainly on a constructive or joint

possession theory), he "was at all relevant times within a few steps

of, and usually no more than an arm's span from, the firearm," and

the possession convictions supported the conclusion that he "carried" the gun knowingly and in relation to the drug trafficking

crime. Joseph, 892 F.2d at 125-26.

USCA Case #96-3105 Document #420869 Filed: 03/05/1999 Page 12 of 12