Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-56038/USCOURTS-ca9-15-56038-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anthem Blue Cross Life and Health Insurance Company
Appellant
Blue Cross of California
Appellant
Ebony Bridewell-Sledge
Appellee
Bettie Perry
Appellee
The WellPoint Companies of California, Inc.
Appellant
The WellPoint Companies, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EBONY BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE; BETTIE

PERRY, as individuals, on behalf of

themselves and all others similarly

situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

BLUE CROSS OF CALIFORNIA, a

California corporation; ANTHEM

BLUE CROSS LIFE AND HEALTH

INSURANCE COMPANY, a California

corporation; THE WELLPOINT

COMPANIES, INC., FKA Doe 1; THE

WELLPOINT COMPANIES OF

CALIFORNIA, INC., FKA Doe 2,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 15-56038

D.C. No.

2:14-cv-04744-

MMM-CW

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2 BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE V. BLUE CROSS OF CAL.

JERMAINE CROWDER; STACEY

KELLAM; TANYA VARNER, as

individuals, on behalf of themselves

and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

BLUE CROSS OF CALIFORNIA, a

California corporation; ANTHEM

BLUE CROSS LIFE AND HEALTH

INSURANCE COMPANY, a California

corporation; THE WELLPOINT

COMPANIES, INC.; THE WELLPOINT

COMPANIES OF CALIFORNIA, INC.;

DOES, 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-56039

D.C. No.

2:14-cv-04747-

MMM-CW

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 3, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed August 20, 2015

Before: Dorothy W. Nelson, Barry G. Silverman,

and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Silverman

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BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE V. BLUE CROSS OF CAL. 3

SUMMARY*

Class Action Fairness Act

The panel affirmed in part, and reversed in part, the

district court’s order remanding one class action to state

court and retaining jurisdiction of a second class action;

held that the two actions should have been viewed as a

single class action when evaluating jurisdiction under Class 

ActionFairness Act (“CAFA”); and remanded with directions

to the district court to treat the class actions as a single

consolidated case and remand it in its entirety to state court.

CAFA’s local controversy exception to its grant of

removal jurisdiction provides that a district court shall decline

to exercise jurisdiction where certain requirements are met so

that class actions with a truly local focus should not be moved

to federal court under CAFA. Only the fourth prong of

CAFA’s local controversy exception – that no similar class

action has been filed against any of the defendants in the

preceding three years – was at issue in the appeal.

The panel held that the state court’s consolidation of the

two class actions prior to removal resulted in a single

consolidated action, and, as such, no “other class action” had

been filed during the three-year period preceding the filing of

the consolidated class action. The panel held, accordingly,

that CAFA’s local controversy exception applied to this

consolidated class action, and the district court was required

to remand the entire class action to state court.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE V. BLUE CROSS OF CAL.

COUNSEL

André E. Jardini (argued) and K.L. Myles, Knapp, Peterson

& Clark, Glendale, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Jermaine Crowder, Stacey Kellam, and Tanya Varner and

Plaintiffs-Appellees Ebony Bridewell-Sledge and Bettie

Perry.

Jeffrey A. Wortman, James M. Harris, Jill A. Porcaro, and

Kiran A. Seldon (argued), Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Los Angeles,

California, for Defendants-Appellants/Appellees Blue Cross

of California, Anthem Blue Cross Life and Health Insurance

Company, The WellPoint Companies, Inc., and The

WellPoint Companies of California, Inc.

OPINION

SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge:

The present appeal involves two similar class actions that

were filed against the same defendants, in the same California

superior court, on the same day thirteen minutes apart, and

that were consolidated by the state court “for all purposes.” 

Despite the fact that the two actions had been consolidated

into a single action, Defendants filed two separate notices of

removal, citing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). The district court, in evaluating

whether it had CAFA jurisdiction over the removed action,

analyzed the consolidated case as though it remained two

separate class actions, and concluded that CAFA’s local

controversy exception applied to the first-filed class action,

Bridewell-Sledge v. Blue Cross of California, but that the

exception did not apply to the second-filed class action,

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BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE V. BLUE CROSS OF CAL. 5

Crowder v. Blue Cross of California. The district court

remanded Bridewell-Sledge to state court while retaining

jurisdiction over Crowder, the anomalous result of which is

that, despite the state court’s consolidation of BridewellSledge and Crowder into a single class action “for all

purposes,” Bridewell-Sledge is now proceeding in state court,

while Crowder is proceeding in federal court.

We hold that it was improper for the district court to view

Bridewell-Sledge and Crowder as two separate class actions

after they had been consolidated by the state court. Under

California law, when two actions are consolidated “for all

purposes,” the two actions are merged into a single

proceeding with only one verdict or set of findings and one

judgment, and the actions are treated as if only one complaint

had originally been filed. See Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp.,

998 P.2d 403, 415 (Cal. 2000); McClure v. Donovan,

205 P.2d 17, 20 (Cal. 1949). Therefore, the BridewellSledge/Crowder consolidated class action should have been

viewed by the district court as a single class action when

evaluating jurisdiction under CAFA. Once it is recognized

that the two cases became one, it is clear that CAFA’s local

controversyexception applies to the consolidated class action,

and, therefore, the district court was required to remand the

entire Bridewell-Sledge/Crowder consolidated class action to

state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A). We affirm in

part, reverse in part, and remand with directions to the district

court to treat the class actions a single consolidated case and

remand it in its entirety to state court.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 20, 2011 at 1:27 p.m., Plaintiffs Ebony

Bridewell-Sledge and Bettie Perryfiled a putative class action

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6 BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE V. BLUE CROSS OF CAL.

in San Francisco Superior Court against Defendants Blue

Cross of California and Anthem Blue Cross Life and Health

Insurance Company, alleging that Defendants failed to

properly pay African-American and female employees at a

wage rate equal to white or male employees working in the

same establishment and performing equal work. The

complaint alleged the following state law causes of action:

(1) employment discrimination – denial of equal paybased on

race – in violation of California’s Fair Employment and

Housing Act; (2) employment discrimination – denial of

equal pay based on gender – in violation of California’s

FEHA; (3) violation of the California’s Equal Pay Act,

California Labor Code § 1197.5; and (4) violation of

California’s Unfair Competition Law, California Business

and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. The Bridewell-Sledge

plaintiffs sought to bring these claims on behalf of themselves

as individuals and on behalf of the following two classes:

“Class A: All African-Americans employed by Defendants

within the State of California from September 2007 through

the present”; “Class B: All female employees employed by

Defendants within the State of California from September

2007 through the present.”

A few minutes later that same day, on October 20, 2011

at 1:41 p.m., Plaintiffs Jermaine Crowder and StaceyKellam,

represented by the same counsel as the plaintiffs in the

Bridewell-Sledge action, filed a putative class action in San

Francisco Superior Court against the same set of defendants

– Blue Cross of California and Anthem Blue Cross Life and

Health Insurance Company – alleging that Defendants have

denied them promotions on account of their race and gender. 

The complaint alleged the following state law causes of

action: (1) employment discrimination – race-based

employment discrimination in job promotions – in violation

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BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE V. BLUE CROSS OF CAL. 7

of California’s FEHA; (2) employment discrimination –

gender-based employment discrimination in job promotions

– in violation of California’s FEHA; and (3) violation of

California’s UCL. Like the Bridewell-Sledge plaintiffs, the

Crowder plaintiffs sought to bring these claims on behalf of

themselves as individuals and on behalf of the following two

classes: “Class A: All African-Americans employed by

Defendants within the State of California from September

2007 through the present”; “Class B: All female employees

employed by Defendants within the State of California from

September 2007 through the present.”

Both actions were subsequently transferred to the Los

Angeles Superior Court. On September 19, 2013, the

Crowder plaintiffs moved pursuant to California Code of

Civil Procedure §§ 404, 404.1, and 1048(a) to consolidate the

Crowder actionwith the Bridewell-Sledge action. Defendants

opposed consolidation. On November 19, 2013, the state

court granted the motion for consolidation and ordered that

the Crowder action and the Bridewell-Sledge action be

“consolidated this date for all purposes.” The state court

further ordered that Crowder would be designated the lead

case, and that all future filings should be made in only that

lead case.

On May 12, 2014, Plaintiffs amended the complaints to

add as additional defendants The WellPoint Companies, Inc.

and The WellPoint Companies of California, Inc. The new

defendants were served with the summons and the amended

complaints on May 21, 2014.

After the addition of The Wellpoint Companies, Inc. – a

non-California citizen – as a defendant, on June 19, 2014,

Defendants removed the Bridewell-Sledge/Crowder

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8 BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE V. BLUE CROSS OF CAL.

consolidated class action to the United States District Court

for the Central District of California pursuant to the Class

Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Despite

the fact that Bridewell-Sledge and Crowder had been

consolidated for all purposes by the state court, Defendants

filed two separate notices of removal – one for the BridewellSledge complaint and one for the Crowder complaint. As had

the state court, the federal district court subsequently

consolidated the two cases for all purposes and for trial.

The district court then entered an Order to Show Cause in

Bridewell-Sledge as to why the case should not be remanded

to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The OSC

directed Defendants to address, among other things, whether

the district court was required to decline jurisdiction under

CAFA’s local controversy exception, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(d)(4)(A). Defendants filed a response to the OSC,

and Plaintiffs filed a reply. In addition, Plaintiffs filed a

motion to remand the two actions to state court.

On August 28, 2014, the district court discharged the

OSC in the Bridewell-Sledge action, concluding that it had

jurisdiction over the action under CAFA and that Plaintiffs

had failed to show that CAFA’s local controversy exception

applied. In particular, the district court noted that for

CAFA’s local controversy exception to apply, Plaintiffs were

required to show that “during the 3-year period preceding the

filing of that class action, no other class action has been filed

asserting the same or similar factual allegations against any

of the defendants on behalf of the same or other persons.” 

The district court explained that Plaintiffs had failed to make

this showing because the record was unclear as to which class

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BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE V. BLUE CROSS OF CAL. 9

action, Bridewell-Sledge or Crowder, was filed first.1 On that

same day, the district court issued an amended OSC in the

Crowder action.

Plaintiffs provided the district court with evidence

showing that the Bridewell-Sledge complaint had been filed

a few minutes prior to the Crowder complaint. On January

14, 2015, the district court entered an order remanding the

Bridewell-Sledge action to state court, concluding that

CAFA’s local controversy exception applied to that action. 

In that order, the district court concluded that the fact that the

two cases had been consolidated had no effect on its removal

jurisdiction analysis, citing Sherman v. Mantle Oil & Gas,

LLC, No. CIV.A. 10-2774, 2011 WL 130240 (E.D. La. Jan.

14, 2011). Shortly thereafter, on January 29, 2015, the

district court discharged the OSC in the Crowder action,

concluding that it had jurisdiction over that action under

CAFA and that CAFA’s local controversy exception did not

apply. Still treating the two actions separately, the district

court reasoned that because the Bridewell-Sledge complaint

had been filed a few minutes prior to the Crowder complaint,

the Crowder action could not satisfy the local controversy

exception’s requirement that “during the 3-year period

preceding the filing of that class action, no other class action

has been filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations

against any of the defendants on behalf of the same or other

persons.”

1 The district court also found that the Bridewell-Sledge plaintiffs had

failed to show that CAFA’s home-state controversy exception applied to

the action. In addition, the district court later denied Plaintiffs’ motion to

remand, concluding that Defendants’ notices of removal were timely and

that Plaintiffs had failed to show that CAFA’s home-state controversy

exception applied to the two actions. These rulings are not at issue in this

appeal.

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10 BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE V. BLUE CROSS OF CAL.

In sum, although consolidated for all purposes into a

single class action by the state court prior to removal, the

district court’s rulings created the incongruous result of

ordering the Bridewell-Sledge action to proceed in state court

and the Crowder action to proceed in federal court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The defendants in Bridewell-Sledge and the plaintiffs in

Crowder both filed petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1453(c)(1) for leave to appeal the district court’s respective

remand orders, which we granted. We review the district

court’s remand orders de novo. Corber v. Xanodyne Pharm.,

Inc., 771 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). “‘We

review the construction, interpretation, or applicability of

CAFA de novo.’” Visendi v. Bank of Am., N.A., 733 F.3d

863, 867 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added) (quoting Nevada

v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 2012)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Removal Jurisdiction Under CAFA

“A defendant generally may remove a civil action if a

federal district court would have original jurisdiction over the

action.” Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 628 (9th Cir.

2015) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). In the present appeal,

Defendants removed the Bridewell-Sledge action and the

Crowder action pursuant to CAFA.

“Congress enacted CAFA in 2005 to ‘curb perceived

abuses of the class action device which, in the view of

CAFA’s proponents, had often been used to litigate multistate

or even national class actions in state courts.’” Corber,

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BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE V. BLUE CROSS OF CAL. 11

771 F.3d at 1222 (quoting Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d

945, 952 (9th Cir. 2009)). “As a threshold matter, CAFA

applies to ‘class action’ lawsuits where the aggregate number

of members of all proposed plaintiff classes is 100 or more

persons and where the primary defendants are not ‘States,

State officials, or other governmental entities against whom

the district court may be foreclosed from ordering relief.’” 

Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., 478 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir.

2007) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)). If these

prerequisites are met, CAFA vests federal courts with original

diversity jurisdiction over a class action “if: (1) the aggregate

amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, and (2) any class

member is a citizen of a state different from any defendant.” 

Id. at 1020–21 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d)(2)). “[U]nder

CAFA, complete diversity is not required; ‘minimal

diversity’ suffices.” Id. at 1021.

The parties do not dispute that the above conditions for

CAFA jurisdiction are met in both Bridewell-Sledge and

Crowder. Rather, the parties’ dispute in this appeal concerns

the applicability of CAFA’s local controversy exception.

B. CAFA’s Local Controversy Exception

CAFA contains several exceptions to its grant of removal

jurisdiction, one of which is the local controversy exception. 

See Serrano, 478 F.3d at 1022–23. The purpose of the local

controversy exception is “to respond to concerns that class

actions with a truly local focus should not be moved to

federal court under [CAFA] because state courts have a

strong interest in adjudicating such disputes. At the same

time, this is a narrow exception that was carefully drafted to

ensure that it does not become a jurisdictional loophole.” 

S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 39 (2005), reprinted in 2005

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12 BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE V. BLUE CROSS OF CAL.

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3; see also Benko v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp.,

789 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We recognize that the

‘local controversy exception’ is a narrow one.”); Coleman v.

Estes Express Lines, Inc., 627 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir.

2010) (per curiam) (“[CAFA’s local controversy exception]

is intended to ‘identify . . . a controversy that uniquely affects

a particular locality’ and to ensure that it is decided by a state

rather than a federal court.” (quoting Evans v. Walter Indus.,

449 F.3d 1159, 1163–64 (11th Cir. 2006))).

CAFA’s local controversy exception, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(d)(4), is as follows:

A district court shall decline to exercise

jurisdiction under [CAFA] . . .

(A)(i) over a class action in which–

(I) greater than two-thirds of the members

of all proposed plaintiff classes in the

aggregate are citizens of the State in

which the action was originally filed;

(II) at least 1 defendant is a defendant–

(aa) from whom significant relief is

sought by members of the plaintiff

class;

(bb) whose alleged conduct forms a

significant basis for the claims

asserted by the proposed plaintiff

class; and

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BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE V. BLUE CROSS OF CAL. 13

(cc) who is a citizen of the State in

which the action was originally filed;

and

(III) principal injuries resulting from the

alleged conduct or any related conduct of

each defendant were incurred in the State

in which the action was originally filed;

and

(ii) during the 3-year period preceding the

filing of that class action, no other class action

has been filed asserting the same or similar

factual allegations against any of the

defendants on behalf of the same or other

persons[.]

If the above conditions are met, a district court is required to

remand the class action back to the originating state court. 

See Benko, 789 F.3d at 1116; Serrano, 478 F.3d at 1022.

“[T]he burden of proof for establishing the applicability

of an exception to CAFA jurisdiction rests on the party

seeking remand, which in this case, as in most cases, is the

plaintiff.” Mondragon v. Capital One Auto Fin., 736 F.3d

880, 883 (9th Cir. 2013). Moreover, “no antiremoval

presumption attends cases invoking CAFA, which Congress

enacted to facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in

federal court.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v.

Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014). To the contrary, “CAFA

should be read ‘with a strong preference that interstate class

actions should be heard in a federal court if properly removed

by any defendant.’” Allen, 784 F.3d at 633 (quoting Dart

Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. at 554).

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14 BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE V. BLUE CROSS OF CAL.

The district court erred in its remand orders by applying

a “strong presumption against removal jurisdiction.” Because

we review the district court’s remand orders de novo, see

Corber, 771 F.3d at 1222, we do not apply this presumption

in our analysis below.

C. Applicability of the Local Controversy Exception

Defendants conceded below and do not challenge on

appeal that both Bridewell-Sledge and Crowder satisfy the

first three requirements of CAFA’s local controversy

exception: (1) that more than two-thirds of the plaintiffs are

citizens of California; (2) that at least one defendant from

whom significant relief is sought and whose alleged conduct

forms a significant basis for the claims is a California citizen;

and (3) that the principal injuries about which Plaintiffs

complain were suffered in California. Therefore, only the

fourth prong of CAFA’s local controversy exception – that no

similar class action has been filed against any of the

defendants in the preceding three years – is at issue in this

appeal.

Defendants argue that the local controversy exception

should not apply to either Bridewell-Sledge or Crowder, and,

therefore, both should remain in federal court. For their part,

Plaintiffs argue that both Bridewell-Sledge and Crowder

should be remanded to state court pursuant to the local

controversy exception. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the

state court’s consolidation of Bridewell-Sledge and Crowder

prior to removal resulted in a single consolidated class action,

and, as such, no “other class action” had been filed during the

three-year period preceding the filing of the consolidated

class action. We agree with Plaintiffs.

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BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE V. BLUE CROSS OF CAL. 15

Although there does not appear to be any circuit court

case on this issue, several district courts have held that “under

certain circumstances, where two actions are consolidated

into a single action, state-ordered consolidation may affect

jurisdiction and removability.” In re MTBE Prods. Liab.

Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 340, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); accord City

of Oakland v. Abend, No. C-07-2142 EMC, 2007 WL

2023506, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2007); Lakewood Prairie,

LLC v. Ibarra Concrete Co., No. CIV.A. 08 C 1200, 2008

WL 3982510, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 27, 2008); see also, e.g.,

Cottman Transmission Sys., LLC v. Bence, No. CIV.A.

03-5467, 2004 WL 98594, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2004)

(collecting cases). In particular, these courts have found that

state court consolidation will affect the district court’s

analysis of removal jurisdiction where the state court’s

consolidation order “destroys the identity of each suit and

merges them into one.” Abend, 2007 WL 2023506, at *3; see

also Bence, 2004 WL 98594, at *2 (determining that state

court consolidation affected the district court’s removal

jurisdiction analysis where the consolidation order “makes

clear that the combined actions are to be treated as if they had

been originally commenced as a single action” (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)). Defendants argue

that these cases are distinguishable from the present appeal

because in each of these cases, the effect of the state court’s

consolidation was to create federal jurisdiction, not to destroy

it. We do not find Defendants’ distinction meaningful. State

court consolidation should not be treated as a one-way street

where it only affects federal jurisdiction if it creates federal

jurisdiction as opposed to nullifying federal jurisdiction.

Prior to removal, the state trial court consolidated

Bridewell-Sledge and Crowder “for all purposes.” Under

California law, when two actions are consolidated “for all

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16 BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE V. BLUE CROSS OF CAL.

purposes,” “the two actions are merged into a single

proceeding under one case number and result in only one

verdict or set of findings and one judgment.” Hamilton,

998 P.2d at 415; accord Sanchez v. Superior Court, 250 Cal.

Rptr. 787, 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (“[T]he pleadings are

regarded as merged, one set of findings is made, and one

judgment is rendered.”). And “the cases are to be treated as

if the causes had been united originally.” McClure, 205 P.2d

at 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This

California law controls because “we look to state law to

determine when an action has been commenced under

CAFA.” McAtee v. Capital One, F.S.B., 479 F.3d 1143, 1145

(9th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, we conclude that under these

circumstances, when examining whether we have federal

jurisdiction over Bridewell-Sledge and Crowder under

CAFA, it is necessary to view Bridewell-Sledge and Crowder

as a single consolidated class action that was united

originally, rather than as two separate class actions filed at

different times.

Once it is recognized that we’re dealing with one

consolidated case, the applicability of CAFA’s local

controversy exception becomes clear. When viewed as a

single consolidated class action that was filed on October 20,

2011, it is undisputed that no other similar class action was

filed against any of the defendants during the preceding threeyear period.2 Accordingly, CAFA’s local controversy

2

In their briefing, Defendants refer to Strong v. Blue Cross of California

– a similar class action involving the same named plaintiffs, defendants,

and lawyers that was pending in state court at the time the complaints in

Bridewell-Sledge and Crowder were filed. Defendants conceded below

that the Strong action was filed on December 28, 2007, which is more than

three years prior to October 20, 2011 – the date that the Bridewell-Sledge

andCrowder complaints were filed. Therefore, the Strong action does not

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BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE V. BLUE CROSS OF CAL. 17

exception applies to the Bridewell-Sledge/Crowder

consolidated class action, and the district court was required

to remand the entire consolidated class action to state court. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A); Benko, 789 F.3d at 1116;

Serrano, 478 F.3d at 1022.

Defendants argue that the state court’s consolidation of

Bridewell-Sledge and Crowder for all purposes does not

affect the court’s CAFA analysis because, they contend, the

relevant inquiry under the fourth prong of the local

controversy exception looks to the filing dates of the original

complaints, and at that time the complaints were two separate

actions. We agree with Defendants that the relevant date

under the fourth prong is the date when the actions were

originally filed, and not some later date, such as the date

when the two actions were consolidated. See McAtee,

479 F.3d at 1146 (“[F]or the purpose of determining CAFA’s

effective date, an action is commenced under California law

when the original complaint in the action is filed . . . .”). 

However, Defendants’ argument fails to consider that when

two actions are consolidated “for all purposes” under

California law, “the cases are to be treated as if the causes

had been united originally.” McClure, 205 P.2d at 20

(internal quotationmarks and citation omitted); accord Kropp

v. Sterling Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 88 Cal. Rptr. 878, 885 (Cal.

Ct. App. 1970) (“[T]he actions are viewed as if the same

plaintiff or plaintiffs had filed a single complaint on joined

causes of action against the same defendant or defendants.”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also

McAtee, 479 F.3d at 1145 (“[W]e look to state law to

determine when an action has been commenced under

affect the applicability ofthe local controversy exception to the BridewellSledge/Crowder consolidated class action.

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18 BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE V. BLUE CROSS OF CAL.

CAFA.”). Thus, when we examine the relevant filing dates

under the fourth prong of CAFA’s local controversy

exception, we should treat the Bridewell-Sledge and Crowder

complaints as if one single complaint had been filed on

October 20, 2011.

In addition, we do not find persuasive Defendants’

reliance on Marple v. T-Mobile Cent., LLC, No. 10-cv-00954-

NKL, 2011 WL 300162 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 27, 2011) and Gibo

v. U.S. Nat’l Ass’n, No. 12-00514 SOM-RLP, 2013 WL

363140 (D. Haw. Jan. 29, 2013). Neither case involved the

consolidation of multiple class actions into a single action by

a state court prior to removal. Marple merely involved a

consolidation by a federal district court after removal for the

purposes of “‘pretrial proceedings.’” 2011 WL 300162, at

*1. Gibo did not involve any consolidation at all, either by

the state court or the federal court.3See 2013 WL 363140, at

*6–7; Lima, 2013 WL 1296757, at *1. Further, in

discounting the effect of the state court’s consolidation of

Bridewell-Sledge and Crowder prior to removal, the district

court below relied on Sherman v. Mantle Oil & Gas, LLC,

No. CIV.A. 10-2774, 2011 WL 130240 (E.D. La. Jan. 14,

2011). We also find Sherman inapt because it involved a

different factual scenario – not as here, the consolidation for

all purposes of two state actions prior to removal.

3

In addition, Gibo is a findings and recommendations issued by a

magistrate judge. See 2013 WL 363140 at *12. When the district court

adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations, it declined to adopt the

magistrate’srecommendations regarding the fourth prong ofCAFA’slocal

controversy exception. See Lima v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., No.

12-00509 SOM RLP, 2013 WL 1296757, at *4 (D. Haw. Mar. 29, 2013).

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BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE V. BLUE CROSS OF CAL. 19

D. CAFA’s Legislative History

Defendants argue that we should consult CAFA’s

legislative history in determining whether there is federal

jurisdiction over the Bridewell-Sledge/Crowder consolidated

class action. Even assuming it were necessary to consult the

legislative history, CAFA’s legislative history supports

remanding the consolidated class action pursuant to the local

controversy exception, and not the position taken by

Defendants.

The legislative history shows that the purpose of the local

controversy exception is “to ensure that state courts can

continue to adjudicate trulylocal controversies in which some

of the defendants are out-of-state corporations.” S. Rep.

109-14, at 28. Defendants concede that Bridewell-Sledge and

Crowder satisfy the first three requirements of the local

controversy exception, meaning that (1) more than two-thirds

of the plaintiffs are citizens of California;

4

(2) at least one

defendant from whom significant relief is sought and whose

alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims is a

California citizen; and (3) the principal injuries about which

plaintiffs complain were suffered in California. A

consolidated class action involving primarily California

plaintiffs and California defendants, with only one defendant

being an out-of-state corporation, and involving injuries

suffered in California constitutes a controversy local to

California. Therefore, allowing a California state court to

continue to adjudicate that consolidated class action would be

entirely in accordance with the purpose of CAFA’s local

controversy exception.

4

Indeed, Defendants concede that all of the plaintiffs are California

citizens.

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20 BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE V. BLUE CROSS OF CAL.

We recognize that the Senate Report provides: “[I]f a

controversy results in the filing of multiple class actions, it is

a strong signal that those cases may not be of the variety that

th[e local controversy] exception is intended to address.” 

S. Rep. 109-14, at 40. But, the Senate Report goes on to

explain that the purpose of the fourth prong of the local

controversy exception is “to ensure that overlapping or

competing class actions or class actions making similar

factual allegations against the same defendant that would

benefit from coordination are not excluded from federal court

by the Local Controversy Exception and thus placed beyond

the coordinating authority of the Judicial Panel on

Multidistrict Litigation.” Id. at 41 (emphasis added). 

Elsewhere the Senate Report explains:

When . . . similar, overlapping class actions

are filed in State courts of different

jurisdictions, there is no way to consolidate or

coordinate the cases. The “competing” class

actions must be litigated separately in an

uncoordinated, redundant fashion because

there is no state court mechanism for

consolidating state court cases. The result is

enormous waste–multiple judges of different

courts must spend considerable time

adjudicating precisely the same claims

asserted on behalf of precisely the same

people. As a result, state courts and class

counsel may “compete” to control the cases,

often harming all the parties involved. In

contrast, when overlapping cases are pending

in different federal courts, they can be

consolidated under one single judge to

promote judicial efficiency and ensure

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BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE V. BLUE CROSS OF CAL. 21

consistent treatment of the legal issues

involved.

Id. at 23 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 3 (“Multiple class

action cases purporting to assert the same claims on behalf of

the same people often proceed simultaneously in different

state courts, causing judicial inefficiencies and promoting

collusive activity.”). The above language shows that the

purpose of the fourth prong of the local controversyexception

and an overall purpose of CAFA is to ensure that similar,

overlapping class actions do not proceed before different state

courts in an uncoordinated, redundant fashion resulting in

inefficiencies. Thus, CAFA sought to create a federal forum

where these cases could be coordinated and consolidated

before one judge to promote judicial efficiency. BridewellSledge and Crowder are similar, overlapping class actions. 

However, prior to removal, they had been consolidated into

a single class action proceeding before one judge that would

result in a single verdict and a single judgment. Allowing

that consolidated class action to proceed in state court is

entirely consistent with CAFA’s goal of ensuring that

overlapping class actions “be consolidated under one single

judge to promote judicial efficiency and ensure consistent

treatment of the legal issues involved.” Id. at 23. Defendants

fail to provide any further judicial efficiency that could be

obtained by removal to federal court.

Finally, Defendants note that the primary purpose of

CAFA is ensuring “‘[f]ederal court consideration of interstate

cases of national importance.’” Standard Fire Ins. Co. v.

Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1350 (2013) (quoting Class Action

Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–2, 119 Stat. 5). This

is true. However, Defendants fail to explain how the present

consolidated class action is a case of national importance. To

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22 BRIDEWELL-SLEDGE V. BLUE CROSS OF CAL.

the contrary, the present consolidated class action appears to

be largely a local California controversy involving routine

employment discrimination claims arising solely under

California law. In sum, CAFA’s legislative history supports

the conclusion that the local controversy exception applies to

the present consolidated class action, and that the BridewellSledge/Crowder consolidated class action should be

remanded to state court.

IV. CONCLUSION

We hold that in evaluating jurisdiction under CAFA, the

district court should have viewed Bridewell-Sledge and

Crowder as a single consolidated class action that was united

originally, and determined that CAFA’s local controversy

exception applies to the entire Bridewell-Sledge/Crowder

consolidated class action. We affirm the district court’s order

remanding the Bridewell-Sledge action, and we reverse the

district court’s order in the Crowder action and remand with

directions to the district court to treat the cases as a single

consolidated case and remand it in its entirety to the Superior

Court of the County of Los Angeles for further proceedings.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

The costs should be borne by the Defendants.

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