Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02326/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02326-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wesley Barber
Plaintiff
Cliff Simpson
Defendant
Unadell Turner
Defendant

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision *

without oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h). 

Defendants also move to dismiss certain claims under 1

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7); however,

because of the ruling herein these issues need not be decided.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WESLEY BARBER, )

) 2:05-cv-2326-GEB-DAD

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

CLIFF SIMPSON, and )

UNADELL TURNER, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendants move to dismiss this action for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, or alternatively, for failure to exhaust tribal

court remedies. Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the issue 1

whether the Washoe Tribal Court exceeded the lawful limits of its

jurisdiction. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff and Defendants are enrolled members of the Washoe

Tribe of Nevada and California. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 5-6.) Plaintiff

alleges he “currently resides on, and exercises sole possession of a

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“Individual aboriginal title . . . [is] established when 2

an Indian shows that either [he] or [his] lineal ancestors

continuously occupied a parcel of land, as individuals, before the

land was withdrawn from entry for settlement.” 42 C.J.S. Indians

§ 69 (citing United States v. Kent, 945 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Individual aboriginal title “involves mere possession not

specifically recognized as ownership . . . and is not a property

right but amounts to a right of occupancy . . . .” Id. (citing

Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955)).

“Where an allotment is held in trust the title to and 3

control over the land remain in the United States, in trust for the

use and benefit of the allottee . . . . The allottee has equitable

title and the right to exclusive possession of the allotted land,

subject to the supervisory power of the government.” 42 C.J.S.

Indians § 85 (citing Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598 (1970),

and St. Marie v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 237 (S.D. Cal. 1938)).

2

distinct portion of [an eighty acre parcel of land located in Alpine

County, California,] consisting of approximately five acres known as

‘425 Barber Road, Marleeville, California.’” (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff

asserts “ownership of 425 Barber Road and a continuing right to

possess the property pursuant to the doctrine of ‘individual

aboriginal title.’” (Id. ¶ 11.) Defendants assert a “superior right 2

to possess 425 Barber Road on the ground that the property is [part of

an allotment] owned by the United States of America in trust for the

benefit of Defendants and other individuals not including the

Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 11.) 3

“Defendants brought a ‘Complaint for Eviction’ against

Plaintiff in the Washoe Tribal Court,” which sought “to establish and

enforce their allegedly superior right of possession.” (Id. ¶ 12.) 

Plaintiff filed a “Special Appearance to Dispute Jurisdiction of the

Washoe Tribal Court,” in which he argued the tribal court lacked

jurisdiction “because the United States is an indispensable party to

such adjudication.” (Id. ¶¶ 13, 15.) The Washoe Tribal Court

determined it had subject matter jurisdiction over the action. (Id.

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¶ 14.) Plaintiff subsequently filed “an interlocutory appeal to the

Inter-Tribal Court of Appeals in Reno, Nevada,” which “ruled that the

Washoe Tribal Court had subject matter jurisdiction of the tribal

court litigation between Defendants and Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶¶ 13-14;

Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A.) 

The Washoe Tribal Court held a bench trial in the eviction

action, during which Plaintiff and Defendants testified and several

exhibits were admitted into evidence. (Defs.’ Mot. Ex. C.) Based on

the evidence presented, the Washoe Tribal Court concluded “that the

United States of America owns the property in trust for the benefit of

Defendants and that Plaintiff has no individual aboriginal rights in

the property.” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 17; Defs.’ Mot. Ex. C.) The Washoe

Tribal Court granted Defendants “the right and authority to evict

Plaintiff” from the property. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 18; Defs.’ Mot. Ex. C.) 

Plaintiff appealed the Washoe Tribal Court judgment to the InterTribal Court of Appeals, but an appellate decision has not yet issued. 

(Defs.’ Mot. Ex. F.) 

On November 17, 2005, Plaintiff filed this federal action,

seeking a judgment declaring “the Washoe Tribal Court exceeded the

proper limits of its jurisdiction in purporting to adjudicate the

disputed ownership of 425 Barber Road, which is real property in which

the United States of America claims and interest.” (Pl.’s Compl.

¶¶ 20, 22.) In addition, Plaintiff seeks judgment declaring that the

tribal court judgment is void and not entitled to recognition because

the tribal court lacked jurisdiction, and that Plaintiff “enjoys a

continuing right to possess 425 Barber Road” until Plaintiff obtains

“a lawful adjudication.” (Id. ¶¶ 21-22, 25-27.) Plaintiff also

requests preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting Defendants

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from enforcing the tribal court judgment and interfering with his

possession of 425 Barber Road. (Id. ¶¶ 21-28.) 

On January 26, 2006, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss 

for, inter alia, lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to

exhaust tribal court remedies. (Defs.’ Mot. at 2-7, 9-10.) On

February 27, 2006, Plaintiff filed what he characterized as a related

motion for summary judgment on all his claims. (Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J.

at 2.) An Order issued February 28, 2006, vacated the motion because

it was not timely noticed for hearing as required by the Local Rules. 

However, it was later determined that one of the issues in the summary

judgment motion should be considered simultaneously with the dismissal

motion. (See Order, March 16, 2006, at 1.) An Order filed March 16,

2006, set forth a briefing schedule for the parties to address that

issue; specifically, whether the tribal court exceeded the lawful

limits of its jurisdiction. (Id. at 2.) In accordance with that

schedule, Plaintiff filed an Opening Brief on March 3, 2006, Defendant

filed a Response Brief on April 10, 2006, and Plaintiff filed a Reply

Brief on April 17, 2006. 

DISCUSSION

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Defendants acknowledge “[f]ederal courts have subject matter

jurisdiction to determine whether a tribal court has exceeded the

limits of its jurisdiction,” but contend this Court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction because the Washoe Tribal Court did not in fact

exceed the limits of its jurisdiction. (Defs.’ Mot. at 3.) Plaintiff

rejoins that whether the tribal court lacked jurisdiction “goes to the

merits of Plaintiff’s claims, not the subject matter jurisdiction of

this Court.” (Pl.’s Reply at 2.) Plaintiff asserts “the question

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whether a person must submit to the civil jurisdiction of a tribal

court is one that must be answered by reference to federal law and is

a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 3.) 

Subject matter jurisdiction is determined by the allegations

in the complaint, “not upon the facts as they may turn out, or by a

decision of the merits.” Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S.

103, 105 (1933). When a complaint alleges “facts stating a colorable

claim that the [tribal court] . . . exceeded [its] powers under

federal law, common or otherwise,” Imperial Granite Co. v. Pala Band

of Mission Indians, 940 F.2d 1269, 1272 n.5 (9th Cir. 1991), “a

federal court may determine under [28 U.S.C.] § 1331 whether a tribal

court has exceeded the lawful limits of its jurisdiction,” Nat’l

Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852-53

(1985). See also FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1314

(9th Cir. 1990) (stating “the question of tribal court jurisdiction is

a federal question”). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges “the Washoe Tribal Court

exceeded the proper limits of its jurisdiction in purporting to

adjudicate the disputed ownership of 425 Barber Road, which is real

property in which the United States of America claims an interest.” 

(Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 20.) In light of these allegations, the Court has

subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to determine

whether the tribal court exceeded the lawful limits of its

jurisdiction. See Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 852-52. In addition,

the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s other claims

for declaratory and injunctive relief, all of which are premised on a

lack of tribal court jurisdiction, because these claims “are so

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related . . . that they form part of the same case or controversy

under Article III.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 

II. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants argue Plaintiff has not exhausted tribal court

remedies because Plaintiff appealed the final Washoe Tribal Court

judgment, but the Inter-Tribal Court of Appeals has not yet decided

that appeal. (Defs.’ Mot. at 9.) Plaintiff asserts “jurisdiction is

not a live question” in the pending appeal because “the Inter-Tribal

Court of Appeals already . . . ruled [on interlocutory appeal] that

the tribal court has jurisdiction over [the eviction] action.” (Pl.’s

Opp’n at 6, n.3 (citations and quotation marks omitted).) Plaintiff

contends he has exhausted tribal court remedies because the Washoe

Tribal Court and Inter-Tribal Court have both been “given a full

opportunity to determine their own jurisdiction, and they

unequivocally made determinations in favor of such jurisdiction.” 

(Id. at 6.) 

“[T]he Supreme Court [has] held that a party must exhaust

tribal court remedies before a federal district court may entertain a

challenge to tribal jurisdiction.” Yellowstone County v. Pease, 96

F.3f 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing National Farmers, 471 U.S.

at 857). Consequently, “a federal court must give the tribal court a

full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction, which includes

exhausting opportunities for appellate review in tribal court.” 

Boozer v. Wilder, 381 F.3d 931, 852 (9th Cir. 2005). The Washoe

Tribal Court determined it had jurisdiction over the eviction action,

and the Inter-Tribal Court of Appeals affirmed the Washoe Tribal Court

decision on interlocutory appeal. (See supra page 2.) Therefore,

tribal remedies have been exhausted because the tribal court “has had

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a full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction and to rectify

any errors it has made.” See Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857. 

IV. Tribal Court Jurisdiction

Plaintiff argues the Washoe Tribal Court exceeded the lawful

limits of its jurisdiction by adjudicating the eviction action brought

by Defendants against Plaintiff to obtain possession of allotted land

held by the United States in trust for the benefit of Defendants. 

(Pl.’s Opening Brief at 4.) Plaintiff contends the tribal court

lacked jurisdiction because “the United States was an indispensable

party . . . [but] was in fact not a party (and could not be made a

party) to the proceedings . . . .” (Id. at 7.)

“[A] long line of cases . . . have consistently held that,

whenever Indian tribes or individual Indians sue to recover either

tribal land or individual allotments, the United States is not an

indispensable party.” Oneida Indian Nation of New York State v.

County of Oneida 434 F. Supp. 527 (1977) (collecting cases); Puyallup

Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 1983)

(stating “the rule is clear in [the Ninth] Circuit and elsewhere that,

in a suit by an Indian tribe to protect its interest in tribal lands

. . . [the United States] is not an indispensable party in whose

absence litigation cannot proceed”); Fort Mojave Tribe v. LaFollette,

478 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1973) (same); Skokomish Indian Tribe v.

E.L. France, 269 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1959) (same); Choctaw &

Chickasaw Nations v. Seitz, 193 F.2d 456, 458 (10th Cir. 1952) (same). 

Consequently, Indians and Indian tribes may maintain actions to

protect their interest in Indian lands without joining the United

States as a party. Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations, 193 F.2d at 458

(“Indians and Indian tribes . . . [may] maintain actions with respect

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to their lands, although the United States would not be . . . a

party.”); Fort Mojave Tribe, 478 F.2d at 1018 (“Without joining the

United States, an Indian tribe may sue in its own right to protect its

interest in restricted land.”); Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. S.

Rhode Island Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798, 812 (D.C.R.I. 1976)

(“Indians and Indian tribes . . . [may] maintain [a] legal action to

vindicate an asserted claim to land . . . in the absence of the United

States as a party.”). 

Consequently, the United States was not an indispensable

party to the Washoe Tribal Court eviction action brought by Defendants

to protect their interest in Indian trust land. Although Plaintiff

relies on Imperial Granite Co., 940 F.2d at 1272 n.4, for an opposite

conclusion, the litigation involved in Imperial Granite is

distinguishable from that in the Washoe Tribal Court. In Imperial

Granite, “the litigation was instituted by non-Indians for the purpose

of effecting the alienation of tribal or restricted lands, not by

individual Indians or a tribe seeking to protect Indian land from

alienation.” See Puyallup Indian Tribe, 717 F.2d at 1255, n.1. 

Unlike Imperial Granite, Defendants brought the Washoe Tribal Court

action to protect, not alienate, Indian trust lands. See id. (stating

that the United States is not an indispensable party to a suit

instituted by Indians to protect their interest in tribal lands). 

Since Plaintiff advances no other arguments as to why the Washoe

Tribal Court exceeded the lawful limits of its jurisdiction, his

motion for summary judgment on this issue is denied. 

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion to dismiss this federal action for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to exhaust tribal remedies

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is denied. Further, since the tribal court did not exceed its

jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on this issue

and Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are 

denied. Therefore, the Clerk’s Office is directed to enter judgment

in favor of Defendants. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 5, 2006

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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