Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00735/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00735-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brook Byerly
Defendant
County of Solano
Defendant
Al Garza
Defendant
David Paulson
Defendant
Joel Thomas Toler
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOEL THOMAS TOLER,

NO. CIV. S-06-735 LKK/DAD

Plaintiff,

v. O R D E R

DAVID PAULSON; COUNTY OF SOLANO; 

AL GARZA; and BROOK BYERLY,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, Joel Thomas Toler (“Toler”), brought suit against

defendants David Paulson (District Attorney for Solano County), the

County of Solano, Al Garza (chief investigator for the Solano

County D.A.’s office), and Brook Byerly (supervising investigator

for the Solano County D.A.’s office) (“defendants”), alleging civil

rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically,

plaintiff avers that defendants retaliated against him, conspired

to violate his civil rights and were inappropriately granted a

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1

 Plaintiff prays for the following relief: (1) compensatory

damages; (2) exemplary and punitive damages; (3) preliminary and

permanent injunctions preventing defendants from further depriving

plaintiff of his constitutional rights; (4) declaratory relief; (5)

attorneys’ fees and costs; (6) and “other and further relief as may

be ordered by the court.” Compl. at 6-7.

2

 All facts are derived from plaintiff’s complaint.

2

search warrant.1

Pending before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The matter is decided based

on the papers and pleadings filed herein and after oral argument.

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff is a licensed bail bondsman and licensed private

investigator with a principal place of business in Fairfield,

California. Compl. at 2. On March 27, 2005, plaintiff filed a

police report with the Fairfield Police Department regarding

threats of physical violence against his children. Id. 

On April 7, 2005, plaintiff came to the Solano County District

Attorney’s Office (“D.A.”), in an attempt “to find out if any

action was going to be taken on the report.” Compl. at 3.

According to sworn testimony from William Godwin, an investigator

for the D.A.’s office, plaintiff appeared “upset,” but later

“calmed down enough for Godwin to take a statement regarding

plaintiff’s report of threats.” Id. Dissatisfied with defendants’

alleged inaction, plaintiff placed an advertisement in a local

Fairfield newspaper on April 12, 2005, which was critical of

defendants and the D.A.’s office. Id. 

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3

 Cal. Penal Code § 76(a)(1)-(2) provides, in pertinent part:

“[e]very person who knowingly and willingly threatens the life of,

or threatens serious bodily harm to, any elected public official,

county public defender, county clerk, exempt appointee of the

Governor, judge, or Deputy Commissioner of the Board of Prison

Terms, or the staff, immediate family, or immediate family of the

staff of any elected public official, county public defender,

county clerk, exempt appointee of the Governor, judge, or Deputy

Commissioner of the Board of Prison Terms, with the specific intent

that the statement is to be taken as a threat, and the apparent

ability to carry out that threat by any means, is guilty of a

public offense, punishable as follows:

(1) Upon a first conviction, the offense is punishable by a

fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by

imprisonment in the state prison, or in a county jail not

exceeding one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment.

 (2) If the person has been convicted previously of violating

this section, the previous conviction shall be charged in the

accusatory pleading, and if the previous conviction is found

to be true by the jury upon a jury trial, or by the court

upon a court trial, or is admitted by the defendant, the

offense is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison.”

3

Plaintiff alleges that on the same day, April 7, 2005,

defendant Byerly spoke to defendant Paulson about preparing a

report regarding plaintiff’s violation of California Penal Code 

§ 76 when he visited the D.A.’s office on April 7, 2005 -

specifically, that plaintiff made threats against a public officer

or office.3

 Compl. at 3. Plaintiff claims the alleged “threat”

was “[d]on’t make me defend my children.” Id. Plaintiff avers

that defendants asked Godwin to prepare a memorandum regarding

Godwin’s encounter with plaintiff during his April 7, 2005 visit,

“even though Godwin did not believe the incident necessitated

preparation of a memorandum.” Id.

 Although the complaint does not make clear, plaintiff appears

to concede that he visited the D.A.’s office again on June 13,

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4

 See County of Solano, et al. v. Toler (Solano Superior

Court Case No. FCS026197).

4

2005. Compl. at 3-4. Plaintiff denies that he made any threats

while visiting the D.A.’s office on this date. Id. Nevertheless,

on June 15, 2005, defendants filed a “Petition of Employer for

Injunction Prohibiting Violence or Threats of Violence against

Employee and Application for Temporary Restraining Order”

(“Workplace Violence Petition”) pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code

§ 527.8 and 527.9.4 Id. at 3. The petition sought to prevent

plaintiff from coming within 500 yards of the D.A.’s office. Id.

Toler’s business was within the 500 yards of the D.A.’s office.

The petition was granted by the Solano Superior Court on the same

day it was filed, June 15, 2005. Id.

Plaintiff contends that it was defendants’ “false statement”

that “Toler had threatened to bring an Uzi to the District

Attorney’s Office” and that Garza was “an expert on workplace

violence,” that formed the basis for defendants’ Workplace Violence

Petition. Compl. at 4. 

On September 22, 2005, plaintiff maintains that he was

standing in the first level of a public parking lot near the D.A.’s

office when defendant Paulson “approached him.” Compl. at 4.

Plaintiff alleges that he did not know it was defendant Paulson

until someone called out Paulson’s name. Plaintiff alleges that

he made no threatening gestures or movements towards defendant

Paulson. Compl. at 4. Plaintiff states that he “did extend his

hand to shake Mr. Paulson’s hand,” but that this meeting was

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 Cal. Penal Code § 166 provides, in pertinent part: 

“Criminal contempts; Punishment for contempt consisting of stalking

(a) Except as provided in subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), every

person guilty of any contempt of court, of any of the following

kinds, is guilty of a misdemeanor:

(4) Willful disobedience of the terms as written of any

process or court order or out-of-state court order, lawfully

issued by any court, including orders pending trial.

(b) 

(1) Any person who is guilty of contempt of court under

paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) by willfully contacting a

victim by phone or mail, or directly, and who has been

previously convicted of a violation of Section 646.9 shall be

punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than

one year, by a fine of five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by

both that fine and imprisonment.

(2) For the purposes of sentencing under this subdivision,

each contact shall constitute a separate violation of this

subdivision.”

5

coincidental and “did not involve any violation of the TRO.”

Compl. at 4. 

Defendants nonetheless sought criminal prosecution of

plaintiff pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 166 for violating the TRO.

Compl. at 4. On October 27, 2005, criminal charges were brought

against plaintiff alleging five violations of Cal. Penal Code 

§ 166.5 (See People v. Toler, (Solano Case No. FCC 227937)).

Compl. at 4.

Plaintiff asserts that on November 3, 2005, defendants

obtained a search warrant that “was based on false or otherwise

inadequate information,” without probable cause for the requested

search warrant, the issuance of which “violated the Fourth

Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Compl. at 4. 

Plaintiff alleges that, “as against the County [of Solano],” “the

acts complained of are indicative and representative of its custom

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and polices,” and that such customs and polices are a result of

“the County’s indifference to prosecution of individuals in

retaliation for their exercise of their constitutional rights.”

Compl. at 5.

Finally, plaintiff complains that a “conspiracy existed among

the Defendants herein and others to deprive Plaintiff of his civil

rights through a concerted campaign to intimidate Plaintiff by

bringing the Petition and the Criminal Case and taking the actions

referenced above.” Compl. at 6.

Both parties agree that there are pending criminal and civil

proceedings. The pending criminal case is scheduled to be tried

on October 27, 2006. The pending Workplace Violence Petition is

scheduled for trial on September 14, 2006. Mot. at 4; Opp’n at 5.

II.

DISMISSAL STANDARDS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint must

be accepted as true. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).

The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every

reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded"

allegations of the complaint. See Retail Clerks Intern. Ass'n,

Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963).

Thus, the plaintiff need not necessarily plead a particular fact

if that fact is a reasonable inference from facts properly alleged.

See id.; see also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 648

(1963)(inferring fact from allegations of complaint).

In general, the complaint is construed favorably to the

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pleader. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). So

construed, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle

him or her to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

73 (1984)(citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). In

spite of the deference the court is bound to pay to the plaintiff's

allegations, however, it is not proper for the court to assume that

"the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she] has not alleged,

or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that

have not been alleged." Associated General Contractors of

California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459

U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

When the legal sufficiency of a complaint's allegations is

tested by a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), review is

limited to the complaint. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

688 (9th Cir. 2001). As a general rule, “a district court may not

consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion.” Id. There are two exceptions to the

requirement that consideration of extrinsic evidence converts a

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to a summary judgment motion: (1)

a court may consider material which is properly submitted as part

of the complaint on a motion to dismiss without converting the

motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, even if the

documents are not physically attached to the complaint, so long as

the documents' authenticity is not contested and the plaintiff's

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6

 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

7

 See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

8

 Defendants argue that if the court chooses not to dismiss

plaintiff’s claims based on either one of these two doctrines,

plaintiff nonetheless fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6). According to

defendants, plaintiff fails to state proper claim under 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1983 or 1985 and that they are entitled to either absolute

immunity or qualified immunity. Id. at 12-15. Finally, defendants

maintain that plaintiff fails to state a “Monell-type” claim

against the County of Solano. Id. at 18.

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complaint necessarily relies on them; and (2) under Fed. R. Evid.

201, a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record.

Id. at 688-89. A court may take judicial notice of matters of

public record without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion

for summary judgment, but may not take judicial notice of a fact

that is subject to reasonable dispute. Id. at 689.

III.

ANALYSIS

Defendants contend that there are several reasons why

plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed. Defendants make two main

arguments - namely, that plaintiff’s claims are barred under the

Younger doctrine,6 or, in the alternative, under the Heck

doctrine.7 Mot. at 4, 6. Defendants also move to dismiss the case

on a number of other bases.8 Plaintiff opposes defendants’ motion

to dismiss. For the reasons provided herein, the instant action

must be stayed under Younger principles.

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9

 Plaintiff did not attempt to make this argument during the

July 24th, 2006 hearing on defendants’ motion to dismiss.

9

A. THE YOUNGER DOCTRINE

Defendants maintain that plaintiff’s complaint should be

dismissed under Younger. Mot. at 4. Plaintiff does not dispute

that there are ongoing civil and criminal proceedings, nor that

these proceedings, “if legitimate, involve important state

interests.” Plaintiff, however, disputes defendants’ contention

that the state proceedings provide him an adequate opportunity to

litigate his federal constitutional claims in the state civil

proceedings. Opp’n at 5.9 In the alternative, plaintiff argues

that even if the Younger doctrine does apply, abstention is

inappropriate as “bad faith prosecution or harassment is present.”

Id. at 6. Below, I explain that the case must be stayed under

Younger.

In order for Younger to apply, a federal court action must

likely interfere with the state proceedings. Younger and its

progeny “generally direct federal courts to abstain from granting

injunctive or declaratory relief that would interfere with pending

state judicial proceedings.” Hirsh v. Justices of the Supreme

Court, 67 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 1995)(citing Younger, 401 U.S.

at 41); Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2004).

The state proceedings can be criminal or civil in nature. See

Younger, 401 U.S. at 41; M&A Gabaee v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency

of L.A., 419 F.3d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 2005). There is a

presumption that when a federal court’s actions may interfere with

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pending state court proceedings, the federal court should abstain

from adjudicating the matter. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,

481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987)(stating “[i]t is a basic doctrine of equity

jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act – and

particularly should not act to restrain a criminal

prosecution--when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law”);

Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977)(stating “[t]he vital

consideration behind the Younger doctrine of nonintervention lays

in the notion of ‘comity,’" that is, a proper respect for state

functions). In the case at bar, there is no doubt that any relief

provided by this court would interfere with the state court

proceedings. In order to prevail on his retaliation claim,

plaintiff must show that these proceedings were instituted

illegitimately and that the TRO was issued without probable cause.

Further, the court must make factual findings which may interfere

with findings that the state court will make in the two pending

trials. Clearly, then, Younger would apply to the instant case

because any relief provided by this court would directly impact the

pending state proceedings.

After determining that a federal court action would likely

interfere with state proceedings, the court must apply a threeprong test. Younger principles apply in an action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 in which a federal plaintiff brings a constitutional

challenge to a state proceeding when: (1) that proceeding is

ongoing; (2) the state proceeding is of a judicial nature,

implicating important state interests; and (3) the federal

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plaintiff is not barred from litigating his federal constitutional

issues in that proceedings. Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965,

984 (9th Cir. 2004). “Absent extraordinary circumstances,

abstention in favor of state judicial proceedings is required” if

those three requirements are met. Hirsh, 67 F.3d at 713. 

Even when Younger is implicated, however, the court is not

“obliged to refrain from intervention where it finds that the state

proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in

bad faith, or where the challenged statute is flagrantly and

patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every

clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against

whomever an effort might be made to apply it.” Gilbertson, 381

F.3d at 983. Bad faith “generally means that a prosecution has

been brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid

conviction.” Baffert v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 621

(9th Cir. 2003)(citation omitted); Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117

(1975). 

The court turns to the facts of the case at bar, the threeprong test derived from Younger, and the bad faith exception

invoked by plaintiff.

1. Whether There are Ongoing State Proceedings

Proceedings are deemed ongoing for purposes of Younger

abstention until state appellate review is completed. Gilbertson,

381 F.3d at 970. Defendants maintain, and plaintiff does not deny,

that there are ongoing state criminal and civil proceedings,

regarding plaintiff’s alleged violations of Cal. Penal Code § 166

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and Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 527.8, respectively. Mot. at 4; Opp’n

at 5. The Workplace Violence Petition is scheduled for trial on

September 14, 2006, and the criminal proceedings are scheduled to

be tried on October 27, 2006. These proceedings have not undergone

state appellate review, and therefore, must be considered ongoing.

See Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 970.

2. Whether the State Proceedings Implicate Important State

Interests

Defendants maintain that the state proceedings in question

implicate important state interests. Defs.’ Mot. at 5. They argue

that the civil Workplace Violence Petition proceedings afford the

“County the opportunity and ability to protect itself and its staff

from potential threats of violence in the workplace.” Id. Thus,

defendants argue that it is “axiomatic that the County, in

exercising its right under the laws of the State of California to

petition for relief under the law, clearly implicates important

state rights.” Defendants also argue that the State’s interest in

prosecuting crimes is “unquestionably an important state interest

in which the federal court should not interfere.” Id. Plaintiff

does not dispute that “the proceedings, if legitimate, involve

important state interests.” Opp’n at 5. Defendants’ point is

well-taken. 

Federal courts have recognized that states have an important

interest in enforcing orders and judgments of their judicial

systems. See Texaco, 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987)(holding that a state

court’s ability to enforce its orders is an important interest);

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see also Juidice, 430 U.S. at 334-37 (holding that “the principles

of abstention under which a federal court must refrain from

interference in certain state court proceedings for reasons of

federalism and comity apply to a case in which the state's contempt

process is involved”). “Younger principles apply to civil

proceedings implicating important state interests.” M&A Gabaee, 419

F.3d at 1039.

State courts also have an important interest in not having

federal courts unnecessarily interfere with pending criminal

proceedings. See Wiener v. County of San Diego, 23 F.3d 263, 267

(9th Cir. 1994)(stating “[i]nterests of comity and federalism

counsel federal courts to abstain from jurisdiction whenever

federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state

judicial proceedings that concern important state interests); Cf.

California Diversified Promotions, Inc. v. Musick, 505 F.2d 278,

282 (9th Cir. 1974)(suggesting that abstention is unnecessary in

circumstances where prospective declaratory or injunctive relief

would not interfere with pending prosecutions). Additionally, a

state’s ability to prosecute crimes and protect its citizens is

clearly an important state interest. See Younger, 401 U.S. at

43-49. In sum, the proceedings at issue are of a judicial nature

and implicate important state interests.

3. Whether the State Proceedings Afford Federal

Plaintiff an Adequate Opportunity to Litigate

Federal Claims

The burden rests on a federal plaintiff to show that he is

barred from raising his federal claims in the state court action.

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Texaco, 481 U.S. at 13; Wiener, 23 F.3d at 267. Federal plaintiffs

“need be accorded only an opportunity to fairly pursue their

constitutional claims in the ongoing state proceedings, and their

failure to avail themselves of such opportunities does not mean

that the state procedures were inadequate.” Juidice, 430 U.S. at

338. Federal courts are not allowed to presume that state courts

are incapable of properly adjudicating federal constitutional

claims, and “when a litigant has not attempted to present his

federal claims in related state court proceedings, a federal court

should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy,

in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.” Texaco,

481 U.S. at 15. “It is the policy of the state [of California]

that contempt citations not be taken lightly, especially criminal

contempt. An alleged contemnor is entitled to the full panoply of

substantive and due process rights in adjudicating even civil

contempt.” People v. Kalnoki, 7 Cal.App.4th Supp. 8

(Cal.App.Super.Ct. 1992)(citation omitted).

Defendants maintain that in defending the criminal and civil

charges against him, plaintiff will have an adequate opportunity

to present his federal constitutional claims in the state court

proceedings. Mot. at 6. Specifically, defendants assert that

plaintiff faces no state constitutional or statutory bar from

arguing defendants’ conduct violated his federal constitutional

rights. Id.

Plaintiff contests the assertion that the state civil court

proceedings will provide him an adequate opportunity to litigate

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his federal constitutional issues. Opp’n at 5. Plaintiff argues

that he will lack the opportunity to litigate “whether the Petition

was initiated in retaliation for his valid exercise of his First

Amendment Rights.” Id. Plaintiff further states, “it does not

appear to be a defense that a restraining order was obtained in

retaliation for the exercise of constitutional rights.” Id. 

As explained below, the court must apply the Younger doctrine

because plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of showing that he

is barred from raising his federal claims in the state court

proceedings. Texaco, 481 U.S. at 13; Wiener, 23 F.3d at 267. 

a. Workplace Violence Petition/TRO Proceedings

Both parties fail to discuss whether a plaintiff may

adequately litigate his or her federal constitutional issues in a

§ 527.8 Workplace Violence Petition/TRO proceeding. Indeed, the

court has found a dearth of authority on this issue. Only one case

appears to reach this issue at all, and based on this authority,

it is unclear whether the § 527.8 proceeding will provide Toler the

opportunity to litigate his federal claims.

In USS-Posco Industries v. Edwards, 111 Cal.App.4th 436 (Cal.

Ct. App. 2003), an appellate court examined defendant’s argument

that the trial court failed to consider whether his § 527.8

petition was “motivated by a desire to retaliate against Edwards

for his prior complaints about racial discrimination in the UPI

workplace,” thereby violating his First Amendment rights of free

speech. Id. at 445. The court in Edwards rejected this argument,

explaining that defendant “never presented this argument to the

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trial court,” and that the court was not required to take up the

issue “on its own initiative.” Id. The court also noted the

defendant failed to provide “direct evidence of a retaliatory

motive on [plaintiff’s] part.” Id. 

The argument may perhaps be made that in dismissing the

argument on these grounds, the court implied that the defendant was

not barred from bringing a constitutional claim at the trial level

had he presented evidence that a retaliatory motive led to the

filing of the § 527.8 petition. It is also fair to conclude,

however, that the appellate court never directly reached whether

a § 527.8 trial would allow plaintiff the opportunity to litigate

and vindicate constitutional claims.

Unfortunately, neither the court nor the parties have found

“unambiguous authority” stating that a defendant cannot litigate

constitutional arguments in the state civil proceedings at issue.

The High Court has instructed that “[a] federal court should assume

that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the

absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.” Texaco, 481

U.S. at 15. Further, because the burden rests on a federal

plaintiff to show that he is barred from raising his federal claims

in the § 527.8 action, id. at 13, and because plaintiff has failed

to meet this burden, the court must conclude that plaintiff will

have an opportunity to seek relief in the civil state proceedings.

b. Section 166 Criminal Contempt Hearing

Under California law, when a defendant is brought before the

court on charges of violating a contempt order, the court “must

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10 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1217 provides: 

“When the person arrested has been brought up or

appeared, the court or judge must proceed to investigate

the charge, and must hear any answer which the person

arrested may make to the same, and may examine witnesses

for or against him, for which an adjournment may be had

from time to time if necessary.”

11 “A violation of Cal. Penal Code § 166 is a misdemeanor and

it is to be prosecuted in the same manner as other misdemeanors

rather than under the provisions for summary contempts.” In re

McKinney, 70 Cal.2d 8, 13 (1968)(citation omitted). Defendants

charged under § 166 “have a state constitutional and statutory

right to a jury trial.” Mitchell v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.3d 1230

(1989).

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hear any answer which the person arrested may make to the

[charges].” Cal Civ. Proc. Code § 1217;10 Dreher v. Superior Court

of Riverside County, 124 Cal.App. 469 (Cal.Ct.App. 1932). In

criminal contempt proceedings, California courts can hear

constitutional challenges to the validity of TROs and injunctive

orders, but only so long as the defendant is not asking the court

to overturn, declare void, or enjoin the order of another court or

department in the same court.11 See People v. Gonzalez, 12 Cal.4th

804, 822 (1996); Hatch v. Superior Court, 80 Cal.App.4th 170

(Cal.Ct.App. 2000)(citing Gonzalez, 12 Cal.4th at 8220); Estrada

v. Ramirez, 71 Cal.App.4th 618, 622 (Cal.Ct.App. 1999)(citing

same). 

In Gonzalez, the city attorney for Los Angeles requested, and

received, an injunction prohibiting gang members from engaging in

certain activities. The prosecutor then sought and obtained

contempt convictions against one of the targets of the

////

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12 The conviction was sought pursuant to Cal. Penal Code 

§ 166.

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injunction.12 Defendant collaterally challenged the order, arguing

that the order was vague and overbroad, and therefore

unconstitutional. The question arose whether the appellate

division could entertain challenges to the validity of an

injunction. The California Supreme Court answered the question in

the affirmative, holding that lower state courts had the authority

to consider defendant’s challenge of the injunction on

constitutional grounds when he was charged in such contempt

proceedings. 

In so holding, the California Supreme Court articulated that

“[a] court with jurisdiction over a cause has jurisdiction to

resolve all issues before it,” and “[t]he validity of the order

defendant is charged with violating is such an issue, for . . .

California law defines misdemeanor contempt as, among other things,

disobedience of an order 'lawfully issued' by a court.” Gonzalez,

12 Cal.4th at 820. The court further stated that “in the contempt

proceeding, the contemner may, for the first time, collaterally

challenge the validity of the order he or she is charged with

violating.” Id. at 819. The court went on to explain that

“[u]nder settled California law, there can be no contempt of a void

injunctive order,” and because California courts have long

recognized the propriety of collateral attacks on void orders, “it

seems evident that the trial court is a proper forum in which to

raise the issue of the validity of the injunction.” Id. at 821.

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An order is unlawful, and therefore unable to produce a valid

judgment of contempt, when it is “in excess of the jurisdiction of

the issuing court.” Id. at 823 (citation omitted). 

Based on the language cited above, it might appear that

plaintiff in the instant case will have an opportunity to litigate

his federal claims in the state criminal proceeding. In its

opinion, however, the California Supreme Court also approvingly

cited two of its previous decisions, which held that “neither the

municipal court nor the appellate department of the superior court

could dissolve or enjoin enforcement of [an] injunction [of another

court].” 12 Cal.4th at 816 (citing Williams v. Superior Court, 14

Cal.2d 656 (1939) and Ford v. Superior Court, 188 Cal.App.3d 737

(1986)). The court explicitly stated that “the authorities cited

by the Court of Appeal certainly establish that neither the

municipal court nor the appellate department of the superior court

could dissolve or enjoin enforcement of the injunction.” 

12 Cal.4th at 816. It appears the relief plaintiff seeks here

would likely require the superior court to declare an order of

another court in its department void. Plaintiff’s allegations that

the Petition and TRO were brought in retaliation of his use of his

First Amendment Rights are tantamount to asserting that the TRO was

issued without probable cause. This appears to be an argument that

California courts cannot entertain in § 166 contempt proceedings.

Again, however, the authority located by this court is less

than “unambiguous,” and plaintiff, who has the burden to show that

he is barred from raising his federal claims in § 166 criminal

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13 The Supreme Court has held that bad-faith prosecution

generally means the kind of “proven harassment or prosecutions

undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of

obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary

circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown.” Kugler, 421

U.S. at 124. The Ninth Circuit has stated that bad faith

“generally means that a prosecution has been brought without a

reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction.” Baffert,

332 F.3d at 621. 

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trial, has failed to do so. Texaco, 481 U.S. at 15 (noting that

the federal plaintiff bears the burden of showing that state

procedural law bars presentation of constitutional claims).

Plaintiff, in fact, fails to direct the court to any authority

supporting his position that he would not have the opportunity to

litigate his federal claims at his § 166 trial. Because “[a]

federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an

adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the

contrary,” Texaco, 481 U.S. at 15, the court must conclude that

plaintiff will have a fair opportunity to litigate his federal

claims in his § 166 trial.

 I now turn to whether any exception applies to prevent the

application of Younger.

4. Whether There is a Bad-Faith Prosecution or Harassment

Plaintiff claims that even if the court finds that he has some

ability to assert his constitutional claims, he believes that his

allegations, if true, “establish abstention is inappropriate as bad

faith prosecution or harassment is present.”13 Opp’n at 6.

The bad faith exception does not apply “because plaintiff’s

allegations fall far short of establishing bad faith of the sort

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14 Plaintiff’s counsel conceded during oral argument that he

could not locate a single case in which a court allowed the badfaith exemption to prevent abstention.

15 In Dombrowski, the court held that “[a] complaint alleging

that state officers invoked, and threatened to invoke, criminal

process without any hope of ultimate success, but only to

discourage plaintiffs' civil rights activities” satisfied the bad21

sufficient to invoke that exception.”14 See Partington v. Gedan,

961 F.2d 852, 861-862 (9th Cir. 1992)(citations omitted). Careful

examination of plaintiff’s complaint leads to the conclusion “there

was no allegation of repeated harassment by enforcement authorities

with no intention of securing a conclusive resolution by an

administrative tribunal or the courts . . . or of pecuniary bias

by the tribunal,” allegations required to invoke the bad faith

exception. Id. Here, plaintiff merely alleges that defendants

filed a civil case that was based on “two false statements,” that

criminal charges were brought in retaliation of his first amendment

rights, and that a search warrant was issued based on false

information. Compl. at 4. Plaintiff fails to allege repeated

harassment, or that defendants did not intend to secure some type

of “conclusive resolution” by the courts. On the contrary,

plaintiff’s allegations suggest that defendants had a reasonable

basis to seek the TRO, and that they had legitimate reasons for

bringing a contempt claim based on a violation of the TRO. 

The court notes that the Supreme Court has rarely applied the

bad faith situation to situations in which abstention would

otherwise be proper. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.

479, 482,(1965).15 The Supreme Court has denied the bad-faith

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faith exemption to the abstention doctrine. The complaint alleged

very serious harassment and retaliation, including: “threatened

state criminal prosecutions, where it is alleged that the measures

taken by the police and the prosecutor, together with repeated

announcements that the plaintiff organization is a subversive or

Communist-front organization whose members must register or be

prosecuted under state statutes, frightened off potential members

and contributors; seizures of documents and records paralyzed

operations and threatened exposure of the identity of adherents to

a locally unpopular cause; notwithstanding the quashing in the

state courts of a particular seizure, the continuing threat of

prosecution portends further arrests and seizures, some of which

may be upheld and all of which will cause the organization

inconvenience or worse; and threats were made to enforce statutory

provisions other than those under which indictments had been

brought, there being no immediate prospect of a final state

adjudication as to those other provisions.” Dombrowski, 380 U.S.

at 488-89.

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exemption in numerous instances where plaintiff alleged many more

facts suggesting bad faith or harassment. See Allee v. Medrano,

416 U.S. 802, 804 (1974)(rejecting bad faith claim based on

allegations of repeated police brutality against farm workers);

Juidice, 430 U.S. at 332 (rejecting bad faith claim based on

unreasonable use of state's contempt procedures to harass); Hicks

v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 340 (1975)(rejecting bad faith claim

based on repeated seizures of an allegedly obscene movie); Moore

v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 432 (1979)(rejecting bad faith claim based

on impermissible bias by state judiciary). Based on the facts

alleged by plaintiff, the court concludes that the bad-faith

exception does not apply.

5. Stay Versus Dismissal

Plaintiff requests that this court stay rather than dismiss

the matter because he seeks damages. Defendants take issue with

this request, arguing that “comity does not dictate a stay versus

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a dismissal.” Reply at 4. 

Typically when abstention under Younger is appropriate, and

plaintiff seeks injunctive or declaratory relief, “a district court

cannot refuse to abstain, retain jurisdiction over the action, and

render a decision on the merits after the state proceedings have

ended. Rather, Younger abstention requires dismissal of the

federal action.” Confederated Salish v. Simonich, 29 F.3d 1398,

1402 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, however, plaintiff seeks equitable

relief, attorney’s fees, and monetary damages premised on the same

set of facts. The Ninth Circuit has instructed that “federal

courts should not dismiss actions where damages are at issue;

rather, damages actions should be stayed until the state

proceedings are completed.” Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 968. Damages

actions are “different from actions that seek only declaratory

relief in two important respects: The relief is not discretionary,

and it may not be available in the state proceeding.” Canatella v.

State of California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The Circuit Court has also recently explained that “it makes

sense for the federal court to refrain from exercising jurisdiction

temporarily” because “[t]his allows the federal plaintiff an

opportunity to pursue constitutional challenges in the state

proceeding . . . while still preserving the federal plaintiff’s

opportunity to pursue compensation in the forum of his choice.”

Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 981. Furthermore, “[t]o stay, rather than

dismiss, does not constitute abnegation of judicial duty. On the

contrary, it is a wise and productive discharge of it. There is

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only postponement of decision for its best fruition.” Id.

(citation omitted). 

Based on binding authority, the court concludes that a stay

in this action is appropriate so that “neither the federal

plaintiff’s right to seek damages for constitutional violations nor

the state’s interest in its own system is frustrated.” Id. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

The matter is STAYED pending the conclusion of the

state civil and criminal proceedings. The parties are directed to

notify the court within ten (10) days of the conclusion of the

state court proceedings, at which time a Status Conference will be

scheduled.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: July 26, 2006.

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