Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00802/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00802-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alexander Javier Jasso
Petitioner
Greg Lewis
Respondent

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEXANDER JAVIER JASSO,

Petitioner,

v.

GREG LEWIS,

Respondent.

Case No. 14-cv-00802-JD 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

The Court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. Respondent 

filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it, and lodged exhibits

with the Court. Petitioner filed a traverse. The petition is denied.

BACKGROUND

A jury found petitioner guilty of attempted first degree murder, assault with a 

semiautomatic firearm, willfully shooting at an occupied building, and gang-related street 

terrorism. People v. Jasso, 211 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1356 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). The jury found 

that petitioner attempted to murder Alejandro Múñoz, but acquitted him of attempted first degree 

murder of Rafael Múñoz Flores. Id. The jury also found true various enhancements that petitioner 

committed the offenses for the benefit of a street gang. Id. The California Court of Appeal 

affirmed the judgment in a published opinion. Id. at 1378. The California Supreme Court denied 

a petition for review. Resp. Exs. G, H.

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of the crime as follows:

I. Prosecution Case

The prosecution presented the following facts at trial. On the night 

of March 29, 2009, defendant, accompanied by his girlfriend Tara 

Meehan and his friend Robert Hornbeak, drove to a McDonald’s 

restaurant in the Monterey County town of Prunedale. Defendant 

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looked toward the well-lit interior of the restaurant and saw Múñoz 

and his brother Flores. Defendant was a member of the Norteño 

criminal street gang and recognized Múñoz as a member of the 

Sureño criminal street gang. He recognized Múñoz personally; in 

addition, Múñoz was wearing a blue sweatshirt, and blue is a color 

that Sureño gang members use to identify themselves.

Defendant reacted negatively to Múñoz’s presence. Hornbeak 

wanted him to ignore Múñoz and let the car’s occupants get 

something to eat elsewhere, but defendant, according to Hornbeak’s 

testimony, said, “I’m gonna get this fool” or “I gotta get this guy.” 

Defendant maneuvered his large vehicle out of the restaurant’s 

drive-through lane, circled around in the parking lot, and parked by 

one of the restaurant’s windows. He racked the slide of a gun he 

had in the car and fired one shot. It passed through the restaurant 

window, causing Múñoz, Flores, and a woman identified in court as 

Jane Doe to duck or drop to the floor. The restaurant manager, who 

was Múñoz’s wife, called 9–1–1. She would later identify 

defendant as the vehicle driver in a photographic lineup and in court.

Sheriff’s deputies arrested defendant at his residence. On the 

premises they found a gun, which was hidden in defendant’s 

bedroom. The deputies also found a quantity of ammunition in the 

bedroom. They did not find defendant’s vehicle on the premises, 

but found it a few days later on property on which a friend lived. It 

was “away from everything, out of sight” behind a tree and 

concealed by a tarpaulin and plywood sheets.

A criminalist who testified as an expert on firearms answered yes to 

the prosecutor’s question whether the bullet recovered from the 

crime scene was in “very poor condition.” The authorities did not 

attempt to match it to defendant’s gun. The expert testified that the 

gun could not be fired until its slide had been pulled back to 

chamber a round. Because of a missing part, the gun could be fired 

with about one-third of the normal trigger pulling force needed. The 

“harder trigger pull [is] a safety measure,” he explained, but this gun 

lacked the needed part. As a result, some 4.25 to 4.5 pounds per 

square inch of pulling force would discharge the weapon, whereas 

ordinarily about 12 pounds per square inch would be required. In 

general, however, the gun worked normally, and it was of 

“reasonably high quality.

Because defendant was the subject of a gang-related charge and 

numerous gang-related allegations, the prosecution presented 

evidence of his ties to the Norteño gang. A witness qualified as an 

expert in street gangs generally and the Norteños in particular 

testified that gangs like the Norteños have an honor-based culture 

and thus prize displays of dominance over other similar gangs and, 

conversely, take harshly to insults or other acts that they perceive as 

demeaning to them. The Norteños’ archrival is the Sureño criminal 

street gang. The Norteños use certain motifs to identify and 

promote the gang. These include the number 14, the color red, the 

logos of the San Francisco Giants professional baseball team, and 

the iconic huelga eagle that is the symbol of the United Farm 

Workers agricultural labor union. (Huelga is Spanish for a labor 

strike.) Norteños also use tattoos and hand gestures to identify 

themselves and to intimidate or ward off other gangs.

Defendant bore a one-dot tattoo on one arm and a four-dot tattoo on 

the other, registering his identification with the Norteños’ favored 

number 14 (the letter “N” is the fourteenth letter of the alphabet). In 

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his bedroom sheriff’s deputies found a red blanket with the logo of 

the San Francisco 49ers professional football team, red bandanas, a 

T-shirt with the huelga eagle, and CD–ROM covers with the title 

“Northern Cali Killas” (Cali being an abbreviation of California), 

and a man in red holding an Uzi machine gun. A cap modeled on 

the uniform of the New York Yankees professional baseball team 

was red instead of the Yankees’ traditional blue. A San Francisco 

Giants cap was white with red letters instead of the Giants’

traditional black and orange. Hornbeak testified that he was making 

prideful Norteño gestures to Múñoz and Flores before defendant 

fired his shot, and that Múñoz and Flores were laughing at Hornbeak 

for doing so.

Inside defendant’s vehicle, sheriff’s deputies found CD–ROM 

covers with the words “Northern Exposure,” the huelga eagle, and 

one dot followed by four dots. According to the testimony of a 

sheriff’s department detective, the CD–ROMs featured the 

performances of gang-associated musicians who performed music 

listened to by Norteño gang members. The friend who was hiding 

defendant’s vehicle for him was dressed in a red shirt and red tennis 

shoes with red shoelaces when the deputies went to the property. 

The same detective testified that as he prepared to book defendant 

into jail, defendant “told me he was a Norteño” for the jail’s housing 

assignment purposes.

The prosecution’s expert witness on gangs testified that in his 

opinion defendant was an active member of the Norteños. The 

witness testified that defendant, despite his youth, had a long history 

of associating with the Norteños in various parts of California and 

that he was an active Norteño on the day of the crimes. He also 

testified that defendant fired the shot in the direction of Múñoz and 

Flores to promote the Norteños’ interests.

Questioned by sheriff’s investigators following his arrest, in an 

interview that was recorded and played for the jury, defendant 

acknowledged that his gun discharged toward Múñoz and Flores, 

but insisted that he fired it “accidentally” and did not intend to shoot 

at anyone. He claimed that he did not rack the gun’s slide to load a 

round into the chamber for firing. Defendant was acquainted with 

Múñoz and did not like him but “wanted [only] to fight him ... [and] 

not shoot him” after seeing him at the restaurant. He denied making 

any gang gestures toward Múñoz and Flores.

II. Defense Case

The defense presented the following facts at trial, at which 

defendant testified on his own behalf.

Before defendant shot at Múñoz, the two exchanged insults outside 

the restaurant, although they were not gang-related. Nor did the two 

exchange gang signals. However, defendant knew that “they called 

him [Múñoz] a southerner,” meaning a member of the archrival 

Sureño street gang. Defendant parked his vehicle and could see 

Múñoz, who was now inside the restaurant. Defendant and 

Hornbeak, still in defendant’s vehicle, gestured to Múñoz to come 

outside, and Múñoz, who was seated and talking on a telephone, 

started laughing at defendant. “I got kind of mad,” defendant 

testified, and so, in what was “the worst mistake of my life,” “I got 

the weapon” “to show it to him,” meaning Múñoz. Defendant did 

this to “kind of fit in, to look tough.” “It went off,” defendant 

testified, but “I never meant for a bullet to be fired from that 

weapon.” “If I wanted to kill him, I could have kept shooting.” 

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Defendant did not pull back the gun slide to chamber a round, so 

Hornbeak—who said he heard a semiautomatic gun being cocked 

from the area of the driver’s seat—must have misinterpreted the 

sound. Nor did defendant tell Hornbeak that he intended to “get this 

guy,” in the words of the prosecutor during cross-examination.

The reason defendant took his vehicle to another location, some 

three to four days later, was to have his friend’s father fix a damaged 

bumper.

Defendant admitted to being a Norteño gang member “[a]t one 

point” and retaining a degree of interest in the Norteños’ lifestyle 

and imagery, as shown by the paraphernalia found at his residence 

and in his car (although he associated the huelga eagle with the late 

César Estrada Chávez, the well-known labor leader who co-founded 

the United Farm Workers union, rather than with the Norteños); he 

had called himself a Norteño earlier in his life. But he denied being 

actively involved with any gang after “maybe [age] 17 at the latest.” 

FN4 For example, he acquired his Norteño dot tattoos at age 14, 

and only to be “cool.” Even when he considered himself an active 

Norteño, his activities consisted of “just girls, weed, and partying,” 

but not gang-related crimes. He might own more blue clothing than 

red and in general he had “real plain tastes, so I’m used to wearing 

... black shirts or white shirts and just regular jeans.” He also denied 

identifying himself as a Norteño during his jail booking. Instead, he 

had requested to be placed with the general population and not with 

the separate housing set aside for Norteños. In addition, he admitted 

to having juvenile delinquency adjudications and juvenile probation 

violations, and he acknowledged that a juvenile court judge had 

once imposed a gang-related probation condition “telling me that I 

had to stop hanging around with the group of friends that I [had].”

FN4. Defendant was 18 years old when he fired the shot into 

the restaurant.

Defendant did not consider his friend Hornbeak to be a Norteño, but 

he knew, and for a while had associated with, at least five people in 

Monterey County whom he considered to be gang members or 

probable gang members. He obtained his gun in Visalia (Tulare 

County) “for protection” and ammunition for it because he had once 

been shot at in Prunedale and, regarding the gun itself, because “I 

thought it was cool” to have it.

Defendant was evasive in answering his lawyer’s question whether 

his being fired upon had happened only shortly before his own 

gunplay at the restaurant, but he admitted that “it wasn’t that long” 

beforehand. He further testified on direct examination that he told 

the sheriff’s department detective who questioned him that he and 

the victim were rival gang members, and in his testimony he implied 

that he believed the victim was a Sureño: “I have some friends that 

... live by him, so they know him real well” and “[t]hey said that he 

might be a southerner.” He amplified that he and the victim “just 

didn’t like each other,” and this was so “because a friend of mine 

that lives right next to him ... has problems with him.” He also 

testified that he had fired the gun before the fateful encounter at the 

restaurant and that it had not discharged accidentally before.

Hornbeak testified that he and defendant went to a residence after 

the shooting. Defendant handed him the gun but it started to fall 

from Hornbeak’s grasp. Hornbeak squeezed the trigger 

inadvertently and the gun discharged. Hornbeak did not testify 

about the amount of gripping strength it took for this accident to 

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happen.

Jasso, 211 Cal. App. 4th at 1357-61.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the 

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication 

of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first 

prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual 

determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the first 

clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by 

[the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the 

Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court authority, falling under 

the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the 

Supreme Court’s decisions but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s 

case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be 

“objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination will 

not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state-court proceeding.” See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres v. 

Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, in conducting its analysis, the federal 

court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings, and the petitioner bears the 

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burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

The state court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the "last reasoned decision" of the 

state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 

1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to 

consider the petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Nunnemaker at 

801-06; Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

As grounds for federal habeas relief, petitioner asserts that: (1) his right to due process was 

violated when the prosecutor engaged in misconduct; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to 

support the gang enhancement findings.

I. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument by: (1) 

asserting that California higher courts had found defendants guilty under similar facts; (2) shifting 

the burden of proof to petitioner to prove that the gun fired accidentally; and (3) alleging that 

petitioner fabricated the claim that the gun fired accidentally after speaking with his attorney and

incorrectly stating that petitioner never told police the shooting was accidental when petitioner did 

make such a statement.

Legal Standard

Prosecutorial misconduct is cognizable in federal habeas corpus. The appropriate standard 

of review is the narrow one of due process and not the broad exercise of supervisory power. 

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). A defendant’s due process rights are violated 

when a prosecutor’s misconduct renders a trial “fundamentally unfair.” Id.; Smith v. Phillips, 455 

U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (“the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial 

misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor”). Under Darden, the 

first issue is whether the prosecutor’s remarks were improper; if so, the next question is whether 

such conduct infected the trial with unfairness. Tan v. Runnels, 413 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 

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2005). A prosecutorial misconduct claim is decided “‘on the merits, examining the entire 

proceedings to determine whether the prosecutor’s remarks so infected the trial with unfairness as 

to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929 

(9th Cir. 1995); see Trillo v. Biter, 769 F.3d 995, 1001 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Our aim is not to punish 

society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor; rather, our goal is to ensure that the petitioner received 

a fair trial.”).

Factors which a court may take into account in determining whether misconduct rises to a 

level of due process violation are: (1) the weight of evidence of guilt, compare United States v. 

Young, 470 U.S. 1, 19 (1985) (finding “overwhelming” evidence of guilt) with United States v. 

Schuler, 813 F.2d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 1987) (in light of prior hung jury and lack of curative 

instruction, new trial required after prosecutor’s reference to defendant’s courtroom demeanor); 

(2) whether the misconduct was isolated or part of an ongoing pattern, see Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 

F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1987); (3) whether the misconduct relates to a critical part of the case, see 

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (failure to disclose information showing 

potential bias of witness especially significant because government’s case rested on credibility of 

that witness); and (4) whether a prosecutor’s comment misstates or manipulates the evidence, see 

Darden, 477 U.S. at 182. Moreover, “[o]n habeas review, constitutional errors of the ‘trial type,’

including prosecutorial misconduct, warrant relief only if they ‘had substantial and injurious effect 

or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir.

2012) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993)).

A. Court Decisions Supporting Petitioner’s Guilt

1. Background

During closing argument the prosecutor stated to the jury:

The Defendant shot a gun at human beings who were in an occupied 

McDonald’s restaurant. The shooting alone, by itself, clearly proves 

the intent to kill [the victims]. Just that shooting alone. I’m not just 

saying that, the California Supreme Court says this. It says that the 

act of purposely firing a gun at another human being, at close range, 

provides the inference that the shooter acted with the intent to kill. 

The shooting alone proves the Defendant’s intent. That’s it. [¶] 

The Defendant’s shooting into an occupied McDonald’s at [the 

victims] proves his intent, proves that he wanted to kill [the victims].

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Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) at 2737-38. Later the prosecutor argued:

[H]e pulled that trigger while that gun was pointed at [the victims]. 

That proves intent to kill.

One shot, two victims, equals attempted murder. Based on the 

evidence that we had, that is enough. One shot, two victims, that’s 

attempted murder for both those victims. [The] Supreme Court said, 

intent to kill two different victims can be inferred from evidence that 

the Defendant fired a single shot at the two victims, both of whom 

were visible to the Defendant. That’s what we have here.

Another, appellate--California appellate court said: Defendant’s act 

of firing a .22 caliber rifle, toward a victim, from approximately 20 

yards away, and in a manner that could have inflicted a mortal 

wound, had the bullet been on target, was sufficient to support an 

inference of intent to kill. The fact that the defendant was 

unsuccessful in killing the victim, or abandoned his efforts after one 

shot, did not mean that he lacked the requisite intent. Kind of sums 

it up right there.

RT at 2740.

Petitioner’s trial counsel objected during a break in the prosecutor’s argument and moved 

for a mistrial. RT at 2766-67. The trial court noted the problem with the argument stating, “the 

Court’s opinion of that has always been that those are the type of discussions that should take 

place at the time of instructions.” RT at 2767. However, the trial court held that while the 

prosecutor’s remarks were novel they did not warrant a mistrial. RT at 2767-68.

2. Discussion

The California Court of Appeal noted the unique nature of the claim and after discussing 

state law at length found the prosecutor had erred:

The parties did not cite any case, and we have found almost no case 

anywhere in the United States, that directly and substantively 

addresses the type of remarks the prosecutor made to the jury.

. . . 

Defendant here argues that the prosecutor “improperly inject[ed] 

additional facts purportedly within his knowledge into the case, and 

usurp[ed] the court’s function to instruct the jury on the law, and the 

jury’s function to apply that law to the facts it determined.” He is 

correct that the remarks ran the risk of committing the usurpation he 

discerns. The California Supreme Court and the California Court of 

Appeal are, respectively, the highest and second-highest echelons of 

the state court system. The prosecutor erred in invoking their 

authority. He should not have invoked the authority of any court that 

one or more jurors could surmise outranks the trial court. A fortiori, 

he should not have implied that the California Supreme Court would 

expect the jury to return a guilty verdict. This he did when he said: 

“The shooting alone, by itself, clearly proves the intent to kill [the 

victims]. Just that shooting alone. I’m not just saying that, the 

California Supreme Court says this. It says that the act of purposely 

firing a gun at another human being, at close range, provides the 

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inference that the shooter acted with the intent to kill. The shooting 

alone proves the Defendant’s intent. That’s it.”

Although, as noted, we have found scant authority on this matter, we 

regard this problem as similar to the misconduct disapproved in 

Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 

L.Ed.2d 231 (Caldwell). In Caldwell, “a prosecutor urged the jury 

not to view itself as determining whether the defendant would die, 

because a death sentence would be reviewed for correctness by the 

State Supreme Court.” (Id. at p. 323, 105 S.Ct. 2633.) The 

prosecutor told the jury that “‘your decision is not the final 

decision’” (id. at p. 325, 105 S.Ct. 2633) because it “‘is 

automatically reviewable by the [Mississippi] Supreme Court’” (id. 

at pp. 325–326, 105 S.Ct. 2633). Caldwell held that “it is 

constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a 

determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that 

the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the 

defendant’s death rests elsewhere.” (Id. at pp. 328–329, 105 S.Ct. 

2633.)

In sum, “Caldwell error occurs ... when the remarks to the jury 

concerning its role in the sentencing process are inaccurate or 

misleading in a way that allows the jury to feel less responsible than 

it should for the sentencing decision.” (People v. Elliott (2012) 53 

Cal.4th 535, 556, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 59, 269 P.3d 494.) Our own 

Supreme Court reached the same conclusion many years before 

Caldwell. In a case that also considered capital jury sentencing 

verdict issues, the court stated that “argument misinform[ing] the 

jury as to the power of this court” (People v. Morse (1964) 60 

Cal.2d 631, 650, 36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, italics deleted) 

presents the risk that jurors would believe the high court “could 

substitute its judgment” (ibid.) for the jury’s.

In this case, the risk is rather that jurors might believe the high court 

had already done the jury’s work and made the jury’s choice for it. 

Their commonality lies in the risk of telling the jury that its role is 

less significant than it is: in Caldwell because the Mississippi 

Supreme Court would reassess any decision the jury made to impose 

a death sentence, and here because the California Supreme Court or 

the California Court of Appeal would expect the jury to find 

defendant guilty under the facts the prosecution had presented.

Caldwell’s holding was narrow inasmuch as the court’s analysis 

rested on Eighth Amendment considerations that apply to the death 

penalty. (See Caldwell, supra, 472 U.S. at pp. 329–330, 105 S.Ct. 

2633.) The same may also be true of People v. Morse, supra, 60 

Cal.2d 631, 36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33. Nevertheless, along with 

the main parallel between those cases and this one, other 

observations that the Caldwell court made also apply to the situation 

before us.

Caldwell mentioned the obvious: “jurors often might not 

understand” “the institutional limits on what an appellate court can 

do.” (Caldwell, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 330, 105 S.Ct. 2633.) The 

jurors here may have thought that appellate courts are allowed to 

reverse jury verdicts of acquittal or are allowed to send messages 

telling juries what to do in particular cases.

Caldwell identified another risk: that a jury “might ... wish to ‘send a 

message’ of extreme disapproval for the defendant’s acts.” 

(Caldwell, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 331, 105 S.Ct. 2633.) Again, 

Caldwell had in mind the decision whether to impose a death 

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sentence, but the point remains valid in any case in which 

prosecutorial remarks create a risk that the jury will conclude that a 

high court is assuming some responsibility for the jury’s decision. 

A witness testified in this case that there were some 6,000 Norteños 

in Monterey County and “in the neighborhood of” 120,000 Norteños 

or Norteño associates in northern California. Those are alarming 

and probably surprising statistics, which the witness soon followed 

by explaining that the Norteños’ crimes include “robbery, 

carjacking, murder, weapons [possession], narcotic sales, identity 

theft, [and] kidnapping.” Such dramatic testimony could help nudge 

jurors toward embracing the prosecutor’s argument for convicting 

defendant even if they had misgivings about the state of the 

evidence, if they felt that the verdicts to be rendered had already 

been settled to some extent by the California Supreme Court or 

Court of Appeal.

The foregoing risk was made all the greater by the prosecutor’s 

remark, in effect, that the state was just going through the motions in 

trying defendant because the case against him was so strong. He 

said, “We are here because the Defendant has this right to this 

process. And it’s a right that everybody in this country has, and it’s 

a right that should never be given up. And that is the only reason we 

are here, because he has this right.” He reiterated shortly after the 

foregoing remark that “the only reason he was here [sic], is just 

because the Defendant has this right. The Defendant also has a right 

to an attorney.... [Defense counsel] is a very good attorney, and he’s 

done the best he can ... with this case. But the fact is, you’re only as 

good as your case. I even admit that as a prosecutor, we’re only as 

good as the facts that we have. This was a very good case. We had a 

lot of evidence.”

Still another risk Caldwell identified is that a “capital sentencing 

jury”—but this may be said of many juries considering serious 

felony charges—“is made up of individuals placed in a very 

unfamiliar situation and called on to make a very difficult and 

uncomfortable choice. They are confronted with evidence and 

argument on the issue of whether another should die”—or, as in this 

case, another’s penal fate short of a death sentence—“and they are 

asked to decide that issue on behalf of the community.... [¶] This 

problem is especially serious when the jury is told that the 

alternative decision-makers are the justices of the state supreme 

court. It is certainly plausible to believe that many jurors will be 

tempted to view these respected legal authorities as having more of a 

‘right’ to make such an important decision than has the jury.” 

(Caldwell, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 333, 105 S.Ct. 2633.) Little more 

need be added to this observation except that the prosecutor’s 

remarks about the California Supreme Court and Court of Appeal 

created similar risks here.

In one respect, the prosecutor’s remarks posed a greater risk than did 

the remarks that People v. Morse, supra, 60 Cal.2d 631, 36 Cal.Rptr. 

201, 388 P.2d 33, disapproved. In Morse, the court could take 

comfort in its reflection that “[w]ords of instruction of the trial judge 

are more likely to effect prejudice than the words of argument of the 

prosecutor.” (Id. at p. 650, 36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33; see also, 

e.g., People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 441, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 

461, 161 P.3d 3.) But that axiom can be carried only so far and 

remain meaningful. If one or more jurors knew that the California 

Supreme Court and Court of Appeal outrank the trial court, that 

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axiom would lose its vigor, because they might understand the 

prosecutor’s argument as inviting them to follow higher authority, as 

he interprets it, rather than the trial court’s instructions.

In sum, invoking the authority of the higher courts as the prosecutor 

did constituted error.

Jasso, at 1364-69.

After concluding that the prosecutor’s statements constituted error, the California Court of 

Appeal held that the error was harmless: 

As stated, the prosecutor committed misconduct in arguing that the 

California Supreme Court and the California Court of Appeal had 

affirmed convictions on facts similar to those of this case . . . . The 

prosecutor’s actions were, however, harmless under any standard—

under that of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.

Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, applying to infringement of federal 

constitutional guaranties, and which requires that the state show that 

the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and that of 

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243, applying 

to errors under state law, in which a defendant must show that there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for the asserted error, the 

outcome would have been more favorable to him or her. The case

against defendant was strong. There was no obvious reason for 

defendant to fire a gunshot at another person merely because that 

individual and a neighbor whom defendant knew did not get along. 

Rather, the evidence was that defendant, a Norteño street gang 

member, knew that Múñoz, one of the three victims, was a rival 

Sureño street gang member. Defendant told his passengers that he 

was going to confront Múñoz. Instead of entering the restaurant to 

fight Múñoz, as defendant’s self-serving statements about intent 

would have it, defendant parked his car, looked through the 

restaurant window at Múñoz and his brother Flores, and fired a 

round with sufficient accuracy that it penetrated the window, 

although it failed to wound either man.

The prosecutor’s references to higher courts ran the risk of being 

perceived as conveying instructions that conflicted with those given 

by the trial court. This possibility requires us to consider 

defendant’s claim, at least in passing, as one of instructional error, 

even though the objectionable words came from the prosecutor and 

not the trial court.

We recognize that there was at one time, and may still exist, a view 

that even strong evidence can seldom overcome certain types of 

instructional error for purposes of prejudice analysis—at least those 

that “effectively prevent the jury from finding that the prosecution 

failed to prove a particular element of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” (People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 491, 76 

Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869.) Doing so would mean that the 

reviewing court, not the jury, was assessing the facts of the case and, 

in effect, improperly trying the defendant, thereby violating the 

defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. (People v. Hagen

(1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 682, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563 (conc. 

and dis. opn. of Kennard, J.); People v. Concha (2010) 182 

Cal.App.4th 1072, 1086, fn. 9, 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 272.)

If we evaluate defendant’s claim through the prism of instructional 

error, we must still find the error harmless, because the California 

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Supreme Court has held that, under United States Supreme Court 

precedent, sufficiently strong evidence may overcome the 

aforementioned types of instructional errors for purposes of 

prejudice analysis. (Flood, supra, at pp. 497–503, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 

180, 957 P.2d 869; see Concha, supra, at pp. 1085–1086, 107 

Cal.Rptr.3d 272.) Thus, the prosecutor’s action in referring to the 

higher courts of California was harmless under Chapman, Watson, 

or Flood.

Jasso, at 1372-73.

In Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015), the Supreme Court recently clarified the 

standard to be used on habeas review of a state court’s harmlessness analysis. If a state court finds 

an error harmless, that determination is reviewed under the deferential AEDPA standard. This 

means that relief is not available for the error “unless the state court’s harmlessness determination 

itself was unreasonable.” Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2199 (quoting Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119

(2007)). In other words, a federal court may grant relief only if the state court’s harmlessness 

determination “was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded agreement.” Id. (quoting 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). And if the federal court determines that the state 

court’s harmless error analysis was objectively unreasonable, it also must find that the error was 

prejudicial under Brecht before it can grant relief. See Fry, 551 U.S. at 119-20 (§ 2254(d)(1) did 

not displace Brecht).

The Ninth Circuit recently addressed the issue of prosecutorial misconduct on habeas 

review in Deck v. Jenkins, 768 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2014). In Deck, the petitioner challenged a 

conviction of an attempted lewd act upon a child for which he had been arrested in a sting 

operation when he arrived at a location to meet an underage girl with whom he believed he had 

been exchanging online message when in fact he had been communicating with law enforcement. 

Id. at 1018-19. During closing argument the prosecutor stated that he did not have to prove that 

petitioner was going to commit a lewd act on the day he was arrested, rather even if he was just 

meeting the child to “break the ice” and follow up next week, or in two weekends or at some point 

in the future to commit a lewd act, then he was guilty. Id. at 1019. The California Court of 

Appeal found that the prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating the law, but that the 

misconduct was not prejudicial and denied relief. Id. at 1020-21. The district court denied 

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petitioner’s habeas petition, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit found that the 

argument that petitioner lacked the intent to commit a lewd act during the first meeting was central 

to his defense, and petitioner was prejudiced when the prosecutor made his improper arguments 

concerning the law. The Ninth Circuit also noted that the evidence of petitioner’s temporal intent

to commit the crime was not overwhelming and the trial court did not correct the prosecutor’s 

misstatement. Id. at 1027, 1029. While the jury asked a question related to this issue, no answer 

was provided because a juror was excused for sickness requiring the jury to restart deliberations 

from the beginning. Id. All of these factors and especially the jury request for clarification that 

went unanswered left the Ninth Circuit with “grave doubt” regarding the prosecutor’s comments 

and whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. Id. 

at 1031. 

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Davis was issued after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Deck, 

which used a slightly different standard. This Court must review the state court’s harmless error 

determination under AEDPA and relief is not available for the error “unless the state court’s 

harmlessness determination itself was unreasonable.” Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2199. The California 

Court of Appeal discussed the error and the overwhelming evidence presented against petitioner 

and found the error harmless. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief because the California 

Court of Appeal’s harmlessness determination was not unreasonable. 

There are some similarities between this case and Deck that raise concern regarding 

petitioner’s conviction. In both cases the state courts found that the prosecutor committed 

misconduct in closing argument, and the improper statements concerned a key aspect of the 

petitioner’s defense. In Deck, the Ninth Circuit was particularly concerned with a jury question 

that the trial court did not answer regarding the disputed issue.

In this case during deliberations, the jury asked, “Please clarify-does the act of firing a 

weapon in the direction of a person constitute ‘intent to kill’ under the law. Please define ‘intent 

to kill.’” Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 445. The trial court responded, “For counts 1 & 2, PC 

664/187 the intent requirement for defendant is a specific intent to kill & the jury must decide the 

factual issues surrounding the act(s) of defendant.” Id. While the trial court in Deck did not

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answer the jury’s question, the trial court in this case was clear that the jury must decide the 

factual issue of whether petitioner had the specific intent to kill.

In addition, the jury was properly instructed that nothing the attorneys say is evidence, 

including closing argument. CT at 450. There are no allegations that the jury instructions 

regarding attempted murder or the intent requirement were improper. A review of these jury 

instructions demonstrates that they were correct. CT at 456, 470-71. The jury is presumed to 

follow the instructions given. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000). 

The evidence against petitioner in this case was overwhelming which further undermines 

his argument that the prosecutor’s few statements had a substantial and injurious effect on the 

verdict. As discussed above, there was a great deal of evidence that petitioner was in a gang, 

observed the victims who were in a rival gang, and brandished his gun and fired one shot at them. 

Petitioner’s own testimony corroborates much of the prosecution’s case. While petitioner denied 

that he made gang gestures with his hands, he testified that he was waving his hand at the victims. 

RT at 2177. Petitioner stated he was waving his hand so that the victims would come outside and 

then they could fight. RT at 2178. When the victims did not exit the restaurant, petitioner 

testified that he became mad and retrieved the gun to show it to them and communicate that he 

was not scared. RT at 2180. Petitioner testified it was at this time the gun accidentally went off. 

Id. Witnesses testified that the bullet hit the window of the restaurant. RT at 989-90. Plaintiff 

also testified that he was involved with the gang from the ages of fourteen to seventeen, but not 

when the incident occurred, when he was eighteen years old. RT at 2202-03. Petitioner also 

testified that he believed that one of the victims was part of the rival gang. RT at 2226. Looking 

at the overwhelming evidence presented against petitioner and at his own testimony, the Court is 

not left with grave doubt that the prosecutor’s statements affected the jury’s verdict. 

Based on the abundant evidence that petitioner intended to shoot at the victims for gang 

reasons, that the jury was properly instructed, and that the trial court correctly and specifically 

answered the jury’s question, the Court finds that the state court’s harmlessness determination was 

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not unreasonable.1 This claim is denied.

B. Shifting Burden of Proof

i. Background

During closing argument the prosecutor stated to the jury:

Obviously, you know the defense. It was just an accident. I didn’t 

mean to pull the trigger. It was just an accident. But when you start 

to go down the facts of everything that shows that he committed this 

crime, intentionally and personally. All of the decisions that he 

made versus an accident, you can compare the evidence of what 

happened to what he said - - the accident - - all you’re left with is his 

self-serving, incredible, unreliable, unbelievable statement. That’s 

it. There’s no other evidence.

And when [defense counsel] gets up here and argues to you, you ask 

for him to fill in this part of it, ask for him to fill this in with the 

facts, with the evidence that proved that. It’s not there, based on all 

of the evidence that was presented there.

RT at 2758.

Petitioner’s counsel moved for a mistrial and outside of the jury’s presence, the trial court 

denied the motion stating, “The Court is confident that the instructions that have been read to the 

jury emphasize and repeat, on a number of occasions, the fact that the burden is solely with the 

Prosecution.” RT at 2766.

Later during his rebuttal argument the prosecutor again discussed petitioner’s defense and 

stated, “We don’t have any evidence showing that there’s an accident. There is no issue. . . . 

where is the evidence? Where is the evidence for the column on the right-hand side[?]” RT at 

2795. It appears that the prosecutor was referring to a display in the courtroom that summarized 

the evidence. Jasso, at 1370. Petitioner’s counsel objected, and the trial court stated to the jury:

The Court does want to, again, re-emphasize, as we have said 

 

1

The jury recessed to begin deliberations at 11:54 a.m. and were then excused for lunch. CT at 

273. They returned with a verdict at 5:04 p.m. Id. The length of jury deliberation may be 

examined when assessing harmlessness. “‘Longer jury deliberations weigh against a finding of 

harmless error because lengthy deliberations suggest a difficult case.’” United States v. Lopez, 

500 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1036 

(9th Cir. 2001)); see, e.g., Lopez, at 846 (jury’s deliberation for 2.5 hours on illegal reentry case 

suggested any error in allowing testimony or commentary on defendant’s post-arrest silence was 

harmless); Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d at 1036 (jury deliberation for 4 days supported inference that 

impermissible evidence affected deliberations).

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throughout the trial, that the Prosecution has the burden of proving 

each and every element, in this particular case, which includes intent 

and all the other elements. The Defense does not need to prove 

anything in this particular case.

RT at 2795.

Finally, petitioner’s counsel objected unsuccessfully to the prosecutor’s following 

statement:

Once again, if that evidence was there, if there actually was 

evidence of an accident, [defense counsel], as good an attorney as he 

is, would have presented it, but there is no evidence. . . . We [don’t] 

hear any evidence that there was an accident, because it was not 

there, because it was not an accident. 

RT at 2795-96.

ii. Discussion

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim:

This comment did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct. There is 

“‘[a] distinction ... between the permissible comment that a 

defendant has not produced any evidence, and on the other hand an 

improper statement that a defendant has a duty or burden to produce 

evidence, or a duty or burden to prove his or her innocence.’” 

(People v. Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 939, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 366, 

281 P.3d 361.) The former is permissible because a prosecutor 

generally is permitted to remark on the state of the evidence at 

closing argument. (E.g., People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056, 

1077, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 355, 273 P.3d 546.) “[T]he prosecutor may 

comment ‘“on the state of the evidence, or on the failure of the 

defense to introduce material evidence or call logical witnesses....”‘” 

(People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1277, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 

117 P.3d 544.)

Under these principles, the Supreme Court rejected a claim similar 

to defendant’s, including a reference to blanks on a chart, in People 

v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 192, 229 P.3d 101. 

There, the prosecutor repeatedly challenged the basis for the defense 

theory. He remarked: “‘I have a blank paper because I’m not sure 

exactly what the defense is yet. I’m going to sit here like you and 

listen to [defense counsel]. I don’t know what he’s going to say.’” 

(Id. at p. 739, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 192, 229 P.3d 101.) Later, the 

prosecutor jibed that he was “‘waiting to hear what the defense 

was.’” (Ibid.)

Redd rejected a claim that the foregoing remarks shifted the burden 

of proof to the defendant. “[T]he prosecutor’s comments merely 

highlighted his observation that there seemed to be no coherent 

defense to the charges” (People v. Redd, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 740, 

108 Cal.Rptr.3d 192, 229 P.3d 101), which, although Redd did not 

say so explicitly, was a permissible comment on the state of the 

evidence.

To be sure, the prosecutor’s argument at one point that there was no 

evidence that defendant’s discharge of the gun was accidental was 

belied by defendant’s testimony and his statement to police, in 

which he maintained he did not intend to fire the gun. But at the 

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outset the prosecutor acknowledged defendant’s testimony that the 

shooting was accidental, while dismissing it as “self-serving, 

incredible, [and] unreliable.” In our view, the prosecutor was 

arguing that there was no evidence of accident beyond defendant’s 

self-serving statements, including the one that the prosecutor had 

acknowledged earlier in the argument. There was no misconduct 

under the circumstances as far as this claim is concerned.

Jasso, at 1370-71.

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the denial of this claim was an unreasonable 

application of Supreme Court authority. The prosecutor’s statements were acceptable in light of 

petitioner’s testimony that firing the gun at the victims was an accident. “A prosecutor may, 

consistent with due process, ask a jury to convict based on the defendant’s failure to present 

evidence supporting the defense theory.” Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1034 (9th Cir.

2005); see also United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d 511, 521–22 (9th Cir. 1998) (prosecutor 

did not shift the burden of proof in commenting on defendant’s failure to produce evidence). 

Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit has recognized, “a prosecutor may comment on the absence of 

evidence even when such evidence was available, but inadmissible, so long as there is sufficient 

evidence to support the prosecutor’s version of events.” Menendez, 422 F.3d at 1034. A 

constitutional problem may arise if the comment is phrased so as to call attention to the 

petitioner’s own failure to testify, Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d at 522, but that is not an issue here. 

“Since [petitioner] did in fact testify at trial, the prosecutor’s comment cannot be said to have 

shifted the burden of proof.” Id. Because petitioner testified at trial and the prosecutor was 

questioning petitioner’s testimony and defense, there was no misconduct, and this claim is denied.

C. Fabrication of Evidence after Speaking with Counsel and Prosecutor’s Misstatement

The California Court of Appeal set forth the background and denied this claim:

Defendant’s argument that the prosecutor implicitly accused defense 

counsel of helping defendant change his story in order to render a 

false account of events also does not rise to the level of prosecutorial 

misconduct. The prosecutor argued, over defendant’s objection, that 

defendant “wouldn’t tell [the authorities] where he got” the gun but 

then “his attorney comes forward and he says[,] Well, I’d better tell 

you, I got it from Casper....” He also argued, over defendant’s 

objection, that “[w]e know it wasn’t an accident.” “[H]e gets up 

there and tells you on the stand” that he fired the weapon 

accidentally but “[n]ot once did he say to the police it was an 

accident. He doesn’t say that once.”

To the extent that the garbled reference to “Casper” communicated 

anything to the jury at all, the prosecutor was not accusing defense 

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counsel of encouraging defendant to make false statements, but 

rather was attempting to comment that defendant changed his story. 

The same is true of the prosecutor’s statement that defendant’s claim 

that he accidentally discharged the gun was a newfound assertion. 

“The prosecutor did not directly accuse defense counsel of 

encouraging defendant to lie, but even to the extent the statements 

swept counsel up in defendant’s asserted lies, this was not an 

improper comment in the context of this case, in which defendant’s 

story changed drastically during trial preparations.” [Citations 

omitted.]

Jasso, at 1371-72.

The state court opinion was not objectively unreasonable. The state court noted that the 

prosecutor did not directly accuse trial counsel of encouraging petitioner to lie, rather it was noted 

that the story changed, which was an accurate reflection of the evidence. Even assuming that the 

prosecutor erred, petitioner has not shown that this minor statement had a substantial and injurious 

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.

Petitioner also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he argued that 

petitioner never told police that the gun discharged by accident. The California Court of Appeal 

noted that this was prosecutorial misconduct because it was an erroneous description of the 

evidence. Jasso, at 1372. Petitioner did tell police in an interview that the gun fired accidentally. 

Petitioner testified at trial that he originally told the police he was not involved, but then told them 

repeatedly that it was an accident. RT at 2192-94. Id. 

Despite being misconduct, this misstatement did not have a substantial and injurious effect 

on the jury’s verdict. In closing argument, petitioner’s trial counsel noted on several occasions 

that petitioner told the police officers it was an accident. RT at 2782-83. Petitioner’s trial counsel 

stated to the jury, “[the prosecutor] says that nowhere did [petitioner] ever tell the officers that it 

went off accident[ally]. And you saw the video. [Petitioner] repeatedly says it was [an] accident. 

I didn’t mean to do it. I didn’t mean to do it. And he said it over and over again . . . .” RT at 

2771. 

The jury was also properly instructed that nothing the attorneys say is evidence, including 

closing argument. CT at 450. The jury is presumed to follow the instructions given. Weeks, 528 

U.S. at 234. When the prosecutor made the misstatement, trial counsel objected, and the trial 

court stated to the jury, “Ladies and gentlemen, the objection will be noted. Again, you are the 

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judges of the evidence and the evidence that’s been presented.” RT at 2746. The prosecutor’s 

isolated misstatement did not rise to a due process violation to warrant habeas relief, especially in 

light of the evidence implicating petitioner. It was undisputed that the gun was fired towards the 

victims while petitioner was holding it. There was also a great deal of evidence that petitioner 

intended to fire at one of the victims because he was a rival gang member, and not that shooting 

was an accident, as petitioner asserts. For all these reasons, this claim is denied. 

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Petitioner next contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the gang benefit 

allegations and the separate conviction for criminal street gang terrorism.

Legal Standard

The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 

charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A state prisoner who alleges that the 

evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a 

rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt therefore states a constitutional claim, 

see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979), which, if proven, entitles him to federal habeas 

relief, see id. at 324. 

The Supreme Court has emphasized that “Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas 

proceedings . . . .” Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062, 2064 (2012) (per curiam) (finding 

that the Third Circuit “unduly impinged on the jury’s role as factfinder” and failed to apply the 

deferential standard of Jackson when it engaged in “fine-grained factual parsing” to find that the 

evidence was insufficient to support petitioner’s conviction). A federal court reviewing 

collaterally a state court conviction does not determine whether it is satisfied that the evidence 

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992). 

The federal court “determines only whether, ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Payne, 982 F.2d at 338 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

319). Only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 

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has there been a due process violation. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d at 338.

Discussion

The jury found true that petitioner committed the offenses for the benefit of a criminal

street gang, pursuant to California Penal Code section 186.22(b)(1). Section 186.22(b)(1) 

penalizes “any person who is convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of, at the direction 

of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or 

assist in any criminal conduct by gang members. . . .” Petitioner was also found guilty of criminal 

street gang terrorism in violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 186.22(a), which penalizes “[a]ny person 

who actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in 

or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or 

assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang. . . .”

The California Court of Appeal set forth the relevant law and found sufficient evidence to 

support the jury’s findings:

A. Gang Benefit Allegations

There was ample evidence of defendant’s Norteño connections and 

of the value to the gang of his shooting at a member of the rival 

Sureños. Defendant picks at aspects of the testimony of the 

prosecution’s gang expert, identifying some of them as irrelevant, 

distracting, or otherwise substantially more prejudicial than 

probative (Evid.Code, § 352), and essentially calling the testimony 

conjectural and without evidentiary support. (See People v. Moore

(2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 405–406, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 280, 247 P.3d 

515.) But considering the testimony as a whole, which we must do 

for purposes of sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis, even if 

defendant is correct about some aspects of the expert’s testimony, 

other aspects were valuable. The gravamen of the expert’s 

testimony was an explanation of the Norteños’ honor-based culture, 

their rivalry with the Sureños, and the motifs that active Norteño 

members use to identify themselves. This provided valuable 

background for other witnesses’ testimony about defendant’s 

possession of a wide variety of Norteño paraphernalia and his 

admission to the sheriff’s detective that he was a Norteño. In 

addition, as we have noted, defendant knew Múñoz to be a Sureño, 

Múñoz was dressed in the blue Sureño color when defendant shot at 

him, and there was no obvious reason for one person to shoot at 

someone he barely knew on the basis defendant gave for committing 

this crime, i.e., that Múñoz’s neighbor, who was a friend of 

defendant, and Múñoz did not like each other.

B. Criminal Street Gang Terrorism Conviction

As noted, defendant was convicted in count eight of criminal street 

gang terrorism in violation of subdivision (a) of section 186.22 . . . . 

. “As the statutory text indicates, the gang crime has three elements: 

(1) ‘[a]ctive participation in a criminal street gang, in the sense of 

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participation that is more than nominal or passive,’ (2) ‘“knowledge 

that [the gang’s] members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of 

criminal gang activity,”‘ and (3) ‘the person “willfully promotes, 

furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of 

that gang.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Mesa (2012) 54 

Cal.4th 191, 197, 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 2, 277 P.3d 743.)

. . .

There was sufficient evidence of the elements of the crime. We 

have described the ample evidence that defendant was active in the 

Norteños. Regarding the second element of the crime, defendant 

insists that his Norteño-related activities were not those of a fullfledged member and that there was no evidence he knew what the 

Norteños were about. The evidence that defendant knew about the 

nature of the Norteño organization, however, comes from the array 

of gang paraphernalia he possessed, his prior probation condition to 

avoid gangs, and, most stark of all, his willingness to shoot at a 

Sureño for no good reason. Regarding the third element, the gang 

expert’s testimony sufficed to establish that defendant shot in the 

direction of Múñoz and Flores to promote the Norteños’ interests.

Jasso, at 1376-78 (footnote omitted).

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief because he has not shown that the California Court 

of Appeal unreasonably applied Supreme Court authority in denying this claim. There was 

sufficient evidence for any rational juror to find the essential elements of the crime and the 

enhancements beyond a reasonable doubt. The gang expert testified about the nature of the gang 

rivalry between the Norteños and the Sureños and how shooting at a rival gang member is part of 

the gang culture. There was also sufficient evidence that plaintiff was associated with the gang. 

Plaintiff even testified that he was involved with the gang from the ages of fourteen to seventeen, 

but not when the incident occurred when he was eighteen years old. RT at 2202-03. Despite 

plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to believe that 

petitioner was still involved with the gang. Petitioner also testified that he believed one of the 

victims who was shot at, was part of the rival gang. RT at 2226. The California Court of 

Appeal’s denial of this claim was not an unreasonable application of Jackson, therefore this claim 

is denied.2

 

2

Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in this case. Petitioner has not alleged any 

material fact, which he did not have a full and fair opportunity to develop in state court, and 

which, if proved, would show petitioner’s entitlement to habeas relief. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 

131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (scope of record for 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) inquiry limited to record 

that was before state court that adjudicated claim on the merits).

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III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court 

that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of 

appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 11(a).

A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the 

certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. Id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district 

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) 

is straightforward: [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000).

Here, petitioner has made no showing warranting a certificate and so none is granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. A Certificate 

of Appealability is DENIED. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 14, 2015

______________________________________

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEXANDER JAVIER JASSO,

Plaintiff,

v.

GREG LEWIS,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-00802-JD 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on October 14, 2015, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by 

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Alexander Javier Jasso ID: AH-8635

Pelican Bay State Prison

PO Box 7500

Crescent City, CA 95531 

Dated: October 14, 2015

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

LISA R. CLARK, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable JAMES DONATO

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