Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01596/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01596-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brenda Hoffman
Defendant
John Hoffman
Defendant
Seth Hoffman
Defendant
Sharon Hoffman
Defendant
Sondra Hoffman
Defendant
Suzanne Hoffman
Defendant
John Oberholtzer
Defendant
Talton
Defendant
Derek Todd
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DEREK TODD, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

OFFICER TALTON B# 410; JOHN 

OBERHOLTZER #A55023; JOHN 

HOFFMAN; BRENDA HOFFMAN; 

SETH HOFFMAN; SHARON 

HOFFMAN; SUZANNE HOFFMAN; and 

SONDRA HOFFMAN, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:13-cv-1596-KJM-EFB PS 

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

 This case, in which plaintiff is proceeding in propria persona, was referred to the 

undersigned under Local Rule 302(c)(21), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff seeks 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915. His declaration makes the 

showing required by 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1) and (2). See ECF No. 2. Accordingly, the request to 

proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

 Determining that plaintiff may proceed in forma pauperis does not complete the required 

inquiry. Pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), the court must dismiss the case at any time if it determines the 

allegation of poverty is untrue, or if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. 

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 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972), a complaint, or portion thereof, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it 

fails to set forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 

(1957)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of 

his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of 

a cause of action’s elements will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are 

true.” Id. (citations omitted). Dismissal is appropriate based either on the lack of cognizable 

legal theories or the lack of pleading sufficient facts to support cognizable legal theories. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations 

of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), 

construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the 

plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). A pro se plaintiff must satisfy 

the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) 

“requires a complaint to include a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds 

upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing 

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 

 Additionally, a federal court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and may adjudicate only 

those cases authorized by the Constitution and by Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The basic federal jurisdiction statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1332, 

confer “federal question” and “diversity” jurisdiction, respectively. Federal question jurisdiction 

requires that the complaint (1) arise under a federal law or the U. S. Constitution, (2) allege a 

“case or controversy” within the meaning of Article III, § 2 of the U. S. Constitution, or (3) be 

authorized by a federal statute that both regulates a specific subject matter and confers federal 

jurisdiction. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962). To invoke the court’s diversity 

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jurisdiction, a plaintiff must specifically allege the diverse citizenship of all parties, and that the 

matter in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Bautista v. Pan American World 

Airlines, Inc., 828 F.2d 546, 552 (9th Cir. 1987). A case presumably lies outside the jurisdiction 

of the federal courts unless demonstrated otherwise. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 376-78. Lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by either party or by the court. Attorneys 

Trust v. Videotape Computer Products, Inc., 93 F.3d 593, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 Plaintiff’s complaint is brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. He alleges that in 

2004, his three-year old daughter resided with defendants Sondra Hoffman (the mother of 

plaintiff’s daughter), John Hoffman and Brenda Hoffman (the daughter’s maternal grandparents), 

and Seth Hoffman and Sharon Hoffman (the daughter’s maternal uncle and aunt). ECF No. 1 at 

5. Plaintiff alleges that on May 4, 2004, Brenda and John1 brought plaintiff’s “daughter to him 

for court ordered visitation with bloody panties.” Id. at 3. The day before plaintiff’s daughter 

was examined by defendant John Oberholtzer, a medical doctor. Id. Plaintiff claims that Dr. 

Oberholtzer concealed the fact that plaintiff’s daughter had been sexually assaulted because he 

wanted Sondra and her family to get away with lewd conduct. Id. at 3, 10. 

 In May 2013, more than nine years later, plaintiff reported to the Vacaville Police 

Department that his daughter was the victim of lewd conduct by Brenda, John, Seth, Sharon 

and/or Sondra. Id. at 4, 8. However, defendant Talton, a Vacaville police officer, refused to 

investigate the lewd conduct, write a report about the incident, or report the incident to Child 

Protective Services or the District Attorney’s Office. Id. Plaintiff claims that Talon wanted the 

other defendants to get away with lewd conduct. Id. at 72. He further claims that Talton 

conspired with the other defendants to violate his and his daughter’s right to equal protection. Id. 

at 3-5. 

 As currently pleaded, the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint fail to satisfy the state action 

requirement. To state a claim under § 1983, plaintiff must allege: (1) the violation of a federal 

constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under 

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 As six of the defendants have the last name Hoffman, the court refers to the Hoffman 

defendants by their first name for ease of reference. 

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the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The complaint does not allege 

that defendants Oberholtzer, John, Brenda, Seth, Sharon, Suzanne, or Sondra were state actors. 

Plaintiff contends, however, that all defendants were acting under color of state law because 

defendant Talon, a police officer, “wanted the other Defendants to get away with sexually 

assaulting the Plaintiff’s daughter after he read the Plaintiff’s report and Defendant Oberholtzer’s 

medical record.” ECF No. 1 at 86. He further argues that the “other Defendants were considered 

to be state actors when they conspired with Defendant Talon.” Id. 

 A private party may be considered to have acted under color of state law when the party 

“is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.” Dennis v. Spartks, 449 U.S. 

24, 27 (1980). To establish joint action between state actors and a private party, a plaintiff must 

establish “an agreement or ‘meeting of the minds’ to violate constitutional rights.” Fonda v. 

Gray, 707 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1983). Mere acquiescence to the wrongful conduct is 

insufficient. Id. Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate that each participant “share[d] the general 

conspiratorial objective.” Id. 

 Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that the defendants had an agreement or 

acted in concert to violate his constitutional rights. Instead, he only alleges that Talon wanted the 

defendants to get away with assaulting his daughter and that the other defendants became state 

actors when they conspired with Talon. These conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish 

that the other defendants were acting under color of state law. 

 Furthermore, plaintiff has failed to allege that any of the defendants violated his right to 

equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. “To state a § 1983 claim for violation of the 

Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must show that he was treated in a manner inconsistent with 

others similarly situated, and that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate 

against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 

425 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff alleges that he “became a disfavored person to 

Defendant Talton when he discovered that Defendant John was a retired Solano County local 

religious leader (Jehovah Witness).” ECF No. 1 at 88. Plaintiff alleges that he is Catholic, that 

no other defendants are Catholic, and that Talton denied him his “right to equal protection of the 

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law as a courtesy to Defendant John.” Id. This “courtesy” was somehow engaged in based upon 

the fact that defendant John and Talon worked in the same building complex. Id. 

 A court cannot “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted 

deduction of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 

988 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff speculates that he was discriminated against because he was a 

different religion than defendant John, and John and Talon worked in the same complex. Such 

speculation is insufficient to demonstrate that plaintiff was discriminated against based upon 

membership in a protected class. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim 

under section 1983. 

 Plaintiff also fails to state a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. To state a claim for 

conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, the plaintiff must establish (1) the existence of a 

conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws; (2) an act in furtherance of 

the conspiracy; and (3) a resulting injury. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (citing Scott v. Ross, 140 F.3d 1275, 1284 (9th Cir.1998)). Furthermore, a plaintiff 

cannot state a conspiracy claim under § 1985 in the absence of a claim for deprivation of rights 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Caldeira v. Cnty. of Kauai, 866 F.2d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(holding that “the absence of a section 1983 deprivation of rights precludes a section 1985 

conspiracy claim predicated on the same allegations”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1989). As 

discussed above, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim under section 1983, and 

also fails to allege facts in support of a conspiracy. Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a claim 

under section 1985. 

 Finally, the court notes that the instant case is simply one of several actions plaintiff has 

filed in this district. Plaintiff has filed at least three other actions against law enforcement 

defendants based on their alleged failure to adequately respond to his allegations of child abuse 

against his children. See Todd v. Briesenick, 2:12-cv-856 MCE GGH PS (E.D. Cal.); Todd v. 

Briesenick, 2:13-cv-752 KJM KJN PS (E.D. Cal.); Todd v. Briesenick, 2:13-cv-2231 JAM CKD 

PS (E.D. Cal). Each case was dismissed with prejudice. See Todd v. Briesenick, 2:12-cv-856 

MCE GGH PS, ECF No. 5; Todd v. Briesenick, 2:13-cv-752 KJM KJN PS, ECF No. 8; Todd v. 

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Briesenick, 13-cv-2231 JAM CKD PS, ECF No. 6. In a fourth action filed subsequent to the 

instant case, plaintiff was declared a vexatious litigant and is now subject to a prefiling screening 

order. See Todd v. Canby, 2:13-cv-1018 GEB AC PS, ECF No. 5. 

 In light of the deficiencies in the complaint, as well as plaintiff’s history of filing frivolous 

actions, it does not appear that the defects of the complaint may be cured by amendment. 

Accordingly, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed without leave to amend pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2). Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (While the court 

ordinarily would permit a pro se plaintiff to amend, leave to amend should not be granted where it 

appears amendment would be futile). 

 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis, 

ECF No. 2, is granted. 

 Further, it is RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed without leave to 

amend and the Clerk be directed to close this case. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: March 31, 2015. 

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