Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-04146/USCOURTS-ca10-93-04146-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Grove Lawrence Flower
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

JUL 0 7 1994 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ROBERT L. HOECKER Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

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Plaintiff-Appellee, 

No. 93-4146 

v. 

GROVE LAWRENCE FLOWER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah 

(D.C. No. 93-CR-19-A) 

Robert Breeze, Salt Lake City, Utah for Defendant/Appellant. 

Stewart C. Walz, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Salt Lake City, Utah 

(Scott M. Matheson, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Mark K. Vincent, 

Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, with him on the brief) for 

Plaintiff/Appellee. 

Before BRORBY and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and COOK, Sr. District 

Judge.* 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable H. Dale Cook, Sr. District Judge, of the Northern 

District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-4146 Document: 01019283602 Date Filed: 07/07/1994 Page: 1 
Defendant-Appellant Grove Lawrence Flower appeals his 

conviction of possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 922 (g) (1). 18 U.S.C. § 921(a) (20) defines what prior 

felony convictions may be used as predicate convictions for a 

§ 922(g) (1) offense, and§ 921(a) (20) states that a prior felony 

should not be used if it has been expunged or set aside or if the 

defendant has been pardoned or had his civil rights restored with 

regard to such conviction. Flower argues that the government 

failed to prove that his prior convictions were not expunged or 

set aside and that he has not been pardoned or had his civil 

rights restored as to such convictions. Thus, Flower asserts that 

the government failed to prove an essential element of a 

§ g22(g) (1) offense. 

Whether a prior conviction meets the definition of 

§ 921 (a) (20), and is therefore properly admitted in a § 922 (g) (1) 

case, is an ultimate legal determination to be decided by the 

trial judge. Here, the record is clear that Flower has not had 

his civil rights restored for the predicate convictions. 

Additionally, Flower failed to raise adequately an issue as to 

whether such predicate convictions had been set aside or expunged 

or that he had been pardoned. Hence, we find no error in the 

district court's decision to allow evidence of his prior 

convictions to be introduced for the purpose of satisfying the 

government's burden under§ 922(g) (1). Accordingly, we affirm. 

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Appellate Case: 93-4146 Document: 01019283602 Date Filed: 07/07/1994 Page: 2 
BACKGROUND 

In September 1992, Flower was found guilty of being a felon 

in possession of a pistol and a rifle, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922 (g) (1). Section 922 (g) (1) states, in relevant part, that: 

It shall be unlawful for any person . 

who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by 

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year 

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or 

possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; 

or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been 

shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 

A crime punishable for a term exceeding one year is defined in 18 

U.S.C. § 921(a) (20) .

1 The definition expressly does not include 

"[a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for 

which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored 

unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil 

rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, 

possess, or receive firearms." Id. Whether a prior conviction 

1 18 U.S.C. § 921(a) (20) provides: 

The term "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 

exceeding one year" does not include-

(A) any Federal or State offenses pertaining to 

antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of 

trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation 

of business practices, or 

(B) any State offenses classified by the laws of the 

State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of 

imprisonment of two years or less. 

What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be 

determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in 

which the proceedings were held. Any conviction which has 

been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been 

pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be 

considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless 

such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights 

expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, 

possess, or receive firearms. 

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Appellate Case: 93-4146 Document: 01019283602 Date Filed: 07/07/1994 Page: 3 
constitutes a predicate conviction under § 921(a) (20) is 

determined according to the law of the jurisdiction in which the 

predicate conviction occurred. Beecham v. United States 1 114 U.S. 

1669/ 1670 (1994). 

Flower 1 S prior felony convictions included two third-degree 

felonies: nondwelling burglaries committed in Utah in 1981 and 

1983. In pretrial motions/ Flower presented several reasons why 

his prior felony convictions should not be used as predicate 

convictions under§ 922(g) (1). First 1 Flower proffered Utah Code 

§ 76-10-512 for the proposition that felons can possess guns for 

h ' 2 untlng. Flower also argued that a 1984 amendment to Article 1 1 

Section 6 of the Utah Constitution3 gives individuals in Utah the 

right to keep and bear arms and that this amendment applies to 

felons and non-felons. Finally/ Flower asserted that Utah does 

not deprive felons of the rights to vote and hold public office 1 

2 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(1) provides that: 

(a) . . . any person who has been convicted of any crime of 

violence under the laws of the United States 1 the state 1 or 

any other state/ government 1 or country, or who is addicted 

to the use of any narcotic drug/ or any person who has been 

declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his 

possession or under his custody or control any dangerous 

weapon as defined in this part. 

(b) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a class 

A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or 

sawed-off shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree felony. 

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-512 excepts from the prohibition in § 76-

10-503: 

3 

(3) Any resident or nonresident hunters with a valid hunting 

license or other persons who are lawfully engaged in hunting. 

Utah Constitution Article 1, Section 6, as amended, provides: 

The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms 

for security and defense of self, family, others, property, 

or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not 

be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the 

legislature from defining the lawful use of arms. 

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Appellate Case: 93-4146 Document: 01019283602 Date Filed: 07/07/1994 Page: 4 
although he acknowledged that they are precluded from serving on 

juries. Record on Appeal, Vol. Vat 10; Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-

7(2) ( 11 A person who has been convicted of a felony is not 

competent to serve as a juror. 11 ). All of these arguments, of 

course, go to whether Flower's civil rights have been restored 

with regard to his prior felony convictions. Although Flower 

argued that the government had the burden of proving a negative--

proving that his civil rights had not been restored-- the district 

court treated this as a matter of an affirmative defense and 

imposed upon Flower the burden of proving that his civil rights 

had been restored. Thus, the district court denied Flower's 

motion for a judgment of acquittal based upon the government's 

failure to prove that his prior convictions had not been expunged 

or set aside, that he had not been pardoned, and that his civil 

rights had not been restored. The district court denied the 

motion and ruled that Flower bore the burden of proving the status 

of his prior convictions. Flower was convicted and sentenced to 

thirty months incarceration and three years supervised release. 

DISCUSSION 

We review de novo the district court's legal conclusion 

that the § 921 (a) (20) exceptions, as applied to § 922 (g) (1), 4 

4 We note that the § 921(a) (20) definition of a 11 conviction 

exceeding one year 11 is used in other sections of Title 18, such as 

the sentence enhancement provision§ 924(e) (1), and in the United 

States Sentencing Guidelines, such as U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 Application 

Note 6. We express no opinion on § 921(a) (20) 's application to 

provisions other than to§ 922(g) (1). 

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Appellate Case: 93-4146 Document: 01019283602 Date Filed: 07/07/1994 Page: 5 
constitute affirmative defenses. See United States v. Burns, 934 

F.2d 1157, 1159 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1246 

(1992). 

The government argues that our decision in United States v. 

Shunk, 881 F.2d 917 (lOth Cir. 1989), decided the issues in this 

case because in Shunk, we listed the elements the government must 

prove in a§ 922(g) (1) case as follows: 

(1) The defendant was convicted of a felony; 

(2) Thereafter the defendant knowingly possessed a 

firearm; and 

(3) The defendant's possession of the firearm was in or 

affecting commerce. 

Id. at 921. Because Shunk "stipulated to the existence of the 

first element," we did not elaborate or discuss in depth what 

constitutes a predicate felony conviction in§ 922(g) (1) cases. 

Id. Shunk holds that the government must prove that the defendant 

was convicted of a felony; however, it does not describe the role 

that the § 92l(a) (20) definition plays in the analysis or who must 

initially raise the issue of the predicate conviction's continuing 

vitality. These are issues of first impression in this circuit. 5 

5 Contrary to the government's assertion, we did not decide 

this issue in United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 482 (1993). In Wicks, we held that "in 

sentence enhancement proceedings under ... [§] 924(e), once the 

government has established the fact of a prior conviction based on 

a guilty plea, the defendant has the entire burden of providing 

[sic] the invalidity of the conviction." Id. at 978. Wicks 

attempted collaterally to attack on constitutional grounds the 

validity of his prior convictions by challenging their use as 

predicate offenses for sentence enhancement under § 924. The 

instant case is distinguishable, however, because Flower has not 

collaterally attacked his prior convictions or their validity; he 

instead challenges the government's failure to prove the 

continuing vitality of the convictions with respect to 

§ 922(g) (1). For the same reason, the Supreme Court's decisions 

in Parke v. Raley, 113 S.Ct. 517, 525-26 (1992), and Custis v. 

United States, 114 S.Ct. 1732, (1994), are distinguishable. 

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Nothing in the plain language of§§ 922(g) (1) or 921(a) (20) 

suggests that the § 921(a) (20) definition constitutes an 

affirmative defense. In fact, the title to 18 U.S.C. § 921 is 

11 Definitions. II The beginning of § 921 (a) (20) states that II [t] he 

term 'crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 

year' does not include II Section 921 (a) (20) 's effect is 

narrowly to delineate which prior convictions properly may be used 

in a§ 922(g) (1) case as predicate convictions. As such, 

§ 921(a) (20) is simply a legal definition that defines 11 conviction 

for a term exceeding one year. 11 Our approach to treat 

§ 921(a) (20) as a legal definition is consistent with the approach 

taken, at least implicitly, by several other courts. See United 

States v. Owens, 15 F.3d 995, 997 (11th Cir. 1994) (a prior felony 

conviction for violation of § 922(g) (1) is defined by 

§ 921(a) (20)); United States v. Frushon, 10 F.3d 663, 665-66 (9th 

Cir. 1993) (referring to § 921(a) (20) as a definitional phrase), 

cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2175 (1994); Martin v. United States, 989 

F.2d 271, 273 (8th Cir.) (interpreting the amended definition of 

conviction for purposes of § 922), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 475 

(1993); United States v. Cassidy, 899 F.2d 543, 545 (6th Cir. 

1990) (interpreting the 11 definition of the term 'crime punishable 

by a term exceeding one year' set forth at 18 U.S.C. 

§ 921(a) (20) 11 ). 

6 

6 But see United States v. Essick, 935 F.2d 28, 31 (4th Cir. 

1991) (holding that 11 a prior 'conviction,' i.e., one for which the 

civil right to possess a firearm has not been restored, is an 

element of a 922(g) (1) violation11 ). The Fourth Circuit clarified 

its position in United States v. Clark, 993 F.2d 402, 406 (4th 

Cir. 1993), where it stated that 11 the lack of a restoration of 

civil rights and the right to possess a firearm is not an element 

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Our approach is also consistent with the Supreme Court's 

discussion in Beecham interpreting§ 921(a) (20)'s choice of law 

provision. The Beecham Court stated: 

The choice-of-law clause [of§ 921(a) (20)] defines the rule 

for determining "[w]hat constitutes a conviction." The 

exemption clause says that a conviction for which a person 

has had civil rights restored "shall not be considered a 

conviction." Asking whether a person has had civil rights 

restored is thus just one step in determining whether 

something should "be considered a conviction." 

. The exemption clause does not simply say that a 

person whose civil rights have been restored is exempted from 

§ 922(g) 's firearms disqualification. It says that the 

person's conviction "shall not be considered a conviction." 

The effect of postconviction events is therefore, under the 

statutory scheme, just one element of the question of what 

constitutes a conviction. 

[W]e recognize that in enacting the choice-of-law 

clause, legislators may have been simply responding to our 

decision in Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 

103 (1983), which held that federal law rather than state law 

controls the definition of what constitutes a conviction, not 

setting forth a choice-of-law principle for the restoration 

of civil rights following a conviction. 

Beecham, 114 S.Ct. at 1671-72 (internal citations omitted) .7 

Because § 921(a) (20) is definitional, it is the trial judge's 

responsibility to determine as a matter of law whether a prior 

conviction is admissable in a§ 922(g) (1) case. Any motions, 

arguments, or factual presentations related to this issue should 

therefore be heard and considered outside the presence of the 

jury. The judge's ultimate decision to admit, or not to admit, a 

of the offense stated in§ 922(g). It is simply a component of 

the definition of the element that the accused have 'been 

convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment 

exceeding one year.'" 

7 The issue before the Beecham Court was whether a state's 

restoration of civil rights to a federal felon served to bring the 

felon's prior conviction under the exemptions in § 921(a) (20). 

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prior conviction as a predicate crime under§ 922(g) (1) may rest 

upon a factual evidentiary showing; just as many other substantive 

legal questions rest upon factual showings. See Kungys v. United 

States, 485 U.S. 759,, 772 (1988) ("[A] lthough the materiality of a 

statement rests upon a factual evidentiary showing, the ultimate 

finding of materiality turns on an interpretation of substantive 

law .. [;] it is the court's responsibility to interpret the 

substantive law, [therefore,] we believe [it is proper to treat] 

the issue of materiality as a legal question.") (quoting United 

States v. Abadi, 706 F.2d 178, 180, (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 

U.S. 821 (1983)). See also United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 

874 (lOth Cir. 1994) (Fourth Amendment suppression hearing case in 

which trial judge determined the admissability of evidence after 

conducting an evidentiary hearing) . 

As a practical matter, requiring the government to negate the 

possibility, in every§ 922(g) (1) case, that each defendant's 

prior convictions had been expunged or set aside, that a pardon 

had been granted, or that civil rights had been restored, would 

impose an onerous burden. A defendant ordinarily will be much 

better able to raise the issue of whether his prior convictions 

have been expunged or set aide, whether a pardon has been granted, 

or whether civil rights have been restored. Thus, if a defendant 

believes that one of the prior convictions that the government 

seeks to use as a predicate conviction under§ 922(g) (1) does not 

meet the legal definitional requirements of § 92l(a) (20), it will 

be up to the defendant to challenge the admissibility of such 

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conviction. Any such challenge must be made with specificity. 8 A 

mere conclusory challenge mimicking the language of the statute 

will not suffice to put the court on notice of what objection the 

defendant is asserting to the use of the prior conviction. Cf. 

United States v. Garcia, 994 F.2d 1499, 1505 (lOth Cir. 1993); 

United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1008 (lOth Cir. 

1992). If the defendant adequately objects to the introduction of 

a prior conviction because it has been expunged or set aside or 

because the defendant was pardoned or has had civil rights 

restored, we will review de novo the district court's legal 

decision as to the admissibility of such prior conviction and we 

will review the court's underlying factual findings for clear 

error. However, if a defendant does not adequately object to the 

introduction of a predicate conviction, we will review the 

introduction of such conviction as a predicate felony under 

§ 922(g) (1) only for plain error. 

In this case, Flower adequately objected to the government's 

use of his prior convictions on the ground that his civil rights 

had been restored with regard to those convictions. Flower 

alerted the court, with specificity, to his argument that several 

identified provisions in Utah statutory and constitutional law had 

8 Of course, government attorneys, as officers of the court, are 

obliged to do justice. Thus, they have a duty to advise the court 

of the existence of any definitional exception that would 

disqualify the use of a prior conviction for purposes of 

§ 922(g) (1) to the extent that the government has knowledge of any 

information that may tend to establish such a disqualification. 

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Appellate Case: 93-4146 Document: 01019283602 Date Filed: 07/07/1994 Page: 10 
restored his civil rights. This presents a purely legal issue 

9 and, because it was adequately raised, we review it de novo. 

Flower's counsel advised the court "that the only disability 

that we're aware of that is imposed on [convicted felons] is that 

h I ' ' ,, 10 t ey can t serve on JUrles. Record on Appeal, Vol. Vat 10; 

See also, Flower's Memo in Support of Motion for Acquittal, Record 

on Appeal, Vol. I, Doc. 66 at 24; Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-7(2) ("A 

person who has been convicted of a felony is not competent to 

serve as a juror."). Because we have held that the rights to 

vote, serve on a jury, and hold public office, as well as the 

right to possess firearms, must all be restored under § 92l(a) (20) 

before a prior conviction may be excluded on the basis of 

restoration of civil rights, Flower cannot prevail on this issue. 

United States v. Maines, 20 F.3d 1102, 1104 (lOth Cir. 1994). The 

acknowledgment that Flower has not had restored his right to sit 

on a jury is an acknowledgment that his civil rights have not 

adequately been restored to disqualify the use of those 

convictions as predicate convictions for the§ 922(g) (1) charge. 

With regard to whether Flower had been pardoned for the prior 

convictions or whether his prior convictions have been expunged or 

set aside, Flower did not make an adequate objection below. Other 

9 The district court admitted the prior conviction under the 

erroneous conclusion that § 921(a) (20) constitutes affirmative 

defenses to§ 922(g) (1). We may uphold the district court's 

decision, however, under any ground that the record supports. 

Scivally v. Time Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 101, 103 (lOth Cir. 1983). We 

look to Utah law to determine whether Flower's civil rights were 

restored by operation of Utah law. 

1° Flower's counsel also advised the court that Utah does not 

deprive felons of their rights to vote or hold public office. 

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than reiterating the statutory language, Flower made no specific 

showing, nor even a specific factual allegation, that any of his 

prior convictions had been expunged, set aside, or that he had 

been pardoned as to them. Because a mere conclusory objection is 

inadequate, Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d at 1008, we review this 

issue only for plain error. We find nothing in the record to 

indicate that Flower received a pardon, expungement, or set aside 

of any of the predicate convictions. Indeed, Flower himself makes 

no such factual assertion. Consequently, we hold that admitting 

Flower's prior convictions as predicate convictions for the 

§ 922(g) (1) charge was not plain error. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 

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