Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00857/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00857-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marcellus Butler
Plaintiff
CDCR
Defendant
Webster
Defendant
Wolcott
Defendant

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; REMANDING STATE CLAIMS ~ 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCELLUS BUTLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CDCR, L. WOLCOTT, B.

WEBSTER, 

Defendants.

NO. CV-08-0857-RHW 

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

REMANDING STATE CLAIMS 

 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Ct. Rec.

23). The motion was heard without oral argument. 

On February 8, 2008, Plaintiff filed an action in the Lassen County Superior

Court. Defendants removed the action to the Eastern District of California on April

22, 2008, asserting that removal was proper because Plaintiff was asserting an

Eighth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

In their motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot sustain a § 1983 claim

against Defendants because he cannot show that Defendants acted with deliberate

indifference to his safety needs. Defendants also assert that they are entitled to

qualified immunity.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). There is no genuine issue

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; REMANDING STATE CLAIMS ~ 2

for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to

return a verdict in that party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 250 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of

a genuine issue of fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). 

If the moving party meets it initial burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the

pleadings and “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Id. at 325; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

In addition to showing that there are no questions of material fact, the moving

party must also show that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v.

University of Washington Law School, 233 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9 Cir. 2000). The th

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party

fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim on which the

nonmoving party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court may neither weigh

the evidence nor assess credibility; instead, “the evidence of the non-movant is to be

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477

U.S. at 255.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Plaintiff is an inmate confined at High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”). 

Defendant Webster is a Supervising Cood at HDSP; Defendant Wolcott is a

Sergeant on A Facility at HDSP.

On July 4, 2007, Plaintiff slipped and fell while dumping his food tray after

dinner. There was water on the floor that caused Plaintiff to slip.

Just before Plaintiff slipped and fell, Defendant Wolcott was outside the A

Facility dining hall, performing pat down searches of inmates as they entered and

exited the dining hall. Before the fall, Wolcott did not know that there was any

water on the floor in the area where Plaintiff fell. At that time, Defendant Webster

was working in the A Facility kitchen area. From where she was working, Webster

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; REMANDING STATE CLAIMS ~ 3

could see the general area where Plaintiff slipped, but not the floor. Before the fall,

Webster did not know that there was any water on the floor in the area where

Plaintiff fell. 

The area where Plaintiff fell has a slanted floor that permits water to drain

from the area. In addition, the floor is covered with a textured-cement-like tile,

designed to provide traction and make it not slippery, even when wet.

Before Plaintiff slipped, he saw water on the floor, but did not tell anyone that

the floor was wet. He believed that if he had, someone would have mopped up the

floor.

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Prison officials

enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct violates “clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” James v. Rowland, 606 F.3d 646, 649 (9 Cir. 2010). The Court

th

may grant qualified immunity if “the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown [do

not] make out a violation of a constitutional right” or if “the right at issue was [not]

‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id. (quoting

Pearson v. Callahan, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818 (2009)). 

SECTION 1983 CLAIMS

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Wolcott and Webster were deliberately

indifferent to his safety needs. In Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme Court held that

prison officials may be liable under the Eighth Amendment if he or she is

“deliberately indifferent” to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate. 511

U.S. 825, 829 (1994). It is well-established that “deliberate indifference” entails

something more than mere negligence. Id. In explaining the level of culpability

required to establish deliberate indifference, the Supreme Court stated, 

a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth

Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement

unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; REMANDING STATE CLAIMS ~ 4

health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

and he must also draw the inference. 

Id.

An inmate may be able to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim if he or she 

presents evidence showing that a substantial risk to the inmate was “longstanding,

pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and

the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed

to information concerning the risk and thus ‘must have known’ about it. Id. n. 8. If

this were the case, such evidence could be sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find

that the defendant-official had actual knowledge of the risk.” Id. However, it is not

enough for the trier of fact to merely find that a reasonable person would have

known, or that the defendant should have known.

In Frost v. Agnos, the Ninth Circuit noted that in certain situations, slippery

floors without protective measures could create a sufficient danger to support a

constitutional claim. 152 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9 Cir. 1998). In that case, the inmate th

has been on crutches and had fell and injured himself several times while showering

and the prison guards were aware of this. Id. The Circuit noted that the prison

could have taken reasonable measures to assist the inmate in showering safely,

including providing a chair in the shower, a handicapped bar, or extra guards to

assist him. Id. Notably, in that case, the inmate also alleged that he slipped several

times as he attempted to carry his food-tray while balancing himself on crutches. 

With respect to this claim, the Circuit held that the inmate failed to provide evidence

of deliberate indifference because he never informed the defendants that he was

having trouble with his food tray, and the risk was not obvious enough to infer

subjective awareness of a substantial risk of harm. Id. at 1130.

In Reynolds v. Powell, the Tenth Circuit noted that generally, a slip and fall

case, without more, does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment, but

acknowledged that such a claim would be established where there was sufficiently

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; REMANDING STATE CLAIMS ~ 5

special or unique circumstances that required the court to depart from the general

rule barring Eighth Amendment liability in prison slip and fall cases. 370 F.3d

1028, 1032 (10 Cir. 2004). In that case, the inmate used crutches and he had th

specifically warned defendants that he was at a heightened risk of falling prior to the

incident. Id. The Circuit concluded that the hazard encountered by the plaintiff was

no greater than the daily hazards faced by any member of the general public who is

on crutches, therefore, there was nothing special or unique about the plaintiff’s

situation that would permit him to constitutionalize what was otherwise only a statelaw tort claim. Id.

In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants state in their

Declaration that they did not see any water on the floor nor did they believe that the

area was dangerous. In his response, Plaintiff challenges these assertions and

argues that more discovery is needed to find out exactly what the Defendant’s

responsibilities were on that day. Defendants point out that Plaintiff requested and

received this discovery two years ago. Moreover, the requested discovery would

not lead to relevant information. 

As set forth above, in order to establish his Eighth Amendment claim and

elevate his “slip and fall” claim into a constitutional violation, Plaintiff has to show

that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety needs. To do this,

Plaintiff will need to show that the existence of water on the dining room floors rose

to the level of a condition posing a substantial risk of serious harm to inmate health

or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Plaintiff has failed to establish a disputed

material fact with regard to this issue. 

Plaintiff submitted declarations from kitchen workers who stated the kitchen

crew had been having problems with the over-flow of water, food, and soap to the

dining area, due to the design and the need to transport dripping cups and dishes to

and from the dining and kitchen area. However, these declarations do not create a

question of material fact regarding his deliberate indifferent claim because they do

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; REMANDING STATE CLAIMS ~ 6

not establish the subjective intent of Defendants to harm Plaintiff. 

The undisputed facts are materially indistinguishable from the facts set forth

in Reynolds. As noted in that case, federal courts have consistently held that

slippery prison floors do not violate the Eighth Amendment. See LeMaire v. Maass,

12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir.1993) (noting that “slippery prison floors . . . do not

state even an arguable claim for cruel and unusual punishment”) (quotation omitted);

Denz v. Clearfield County, 712 F. Supp. 65, 66 (W.D.Pa.1989) (finding no Eighth

Amendment violation based on slippery floor in prison cell); Mitchell v. West

Virginia, 554 F.Supp. 1215, 1216-17 (N.D.W.Va.1983) (finding no Eighth

Amendment violation based on slippery floor in prison dining hall); Robinson v.

Cuyler, 511 F.Supp. 161, 162, 163 (E.D.Pa.1981) (finding no Eighth Amendment

violation based on slippery floor in prison kitchen); Tunstall v. Rowe, 478 F.Supp.

87, 88, 89 (N.D.Ill.1979) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation based on greasy

prison stairway); Snyder v. Blankenship, 473 F.Supp. 1208, 1209, 1212-13

(W.D.Va.1979) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation based on pool of soapy

water from leaking dishwasher in prison kitchen), aff'd, 618 F.2d 104 (4th Cir.

1980). Likewise, the undisputed facts in this case are clearly distinguishable from

Frost. In that case, the plaintiff had fallen numerous times and the record

established that the prison guards were aware of this, as opposed to the isolated

incident in this case.

Moreover, it is well established that a supervisor cannot be held liable under

§ 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915

(9 Cir. 2001); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645-46 (9 Cir. 1989). A th th

supervisor may be liable under § 1983 for actions taken by his or her supervisees if

there exists either “(1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional

deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful

conduct and the constitutional violation. Id. Plaintiff has failed to establish a

genuine issue of material fact with respect to either prong.

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; REMANDING STATE CLAIMS ~ 7

Plaintiff has failed to establish that a reasonable jury would find that his

constitutional rights were violated by Defendants Butler and Wolcott. As such,

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment in favor of

Defendants is appropriate.

SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

Plaintiff has also alleged a number of state claims. The Court declines to

extend supplemental jurisdiction to the remaining state claims. Therefore, the state

claims are remanded to Lassen County Superior Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c);

see also Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (“in the

usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of

factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine— judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”); United Mine Workers of Am. v.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES

In a previous Order, the Court directed Defendants to submit a cost bill

related to Plaintiff’s unsuccessful Motion to Compel. In their cost bill, Defendants

indicate that 19.5 hours was expended on responding to the motion to compel. As

the Declaration of Ms. Barlow indicates, however, this figure was not based on

billing records. Defendants did not submit an itemized billing record. Ms. Barlow

also indicated that the Office of the Attorney General charges the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation a flat yearly fee for the work that the

Correctional Law Section performs for the Department. Moreover, Defendants did

not file a Declaration of the attorney who actually worked on the case. There is

nothing in the record for the Court to determine whether the requested fees are

reasonable. As such, the Court declines to award attorneys fees in relation to

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; REMANDING STATE CLAIMS ~ 8

1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 

2. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.

3. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

remaining state claims. The Court remands the state law claims to the Lassen

County Superior Court. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is directed to enter this

Order, forward copies to Plaintiff and counsel and close the file.

DATED this 1 day of July, 2010. st

 s/Robert H. Whaley 

ROBERT H. WHALEY

 United States District Judge

C:\WINDOWS\Temp\notes101AA1\sj.wpd

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