Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03455/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03455-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sheila Ann Anton
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

 The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

2

 The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3455

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Sheila Ann Anton, * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 13, 2004

Filed: August 16, 2004

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, SMITH, Circuit Judge, and DORR,1

 District Judge.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Sheila Anton pleaded guilty to possession of 864 pills containing a total of

51.84 grams of pseudoephedrine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). The district

court2

 sentenced Anton to seventy months' imprisonment pursuant to the United

States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") § 2D1.11. Anton appeals her sentence

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contending that she should have received a safety-valve reduction and a downward

departure. We affirm.

I. 

On July 10, 2002, law enforcement officers apprehended Anton at a Wal-Mart

in Dubuque, Iowa. Police had discovered that Darlis Lyle Miller and Anton had

purchased eighteen boxes of pseudoephedrine tablets from the store. After police read

Anton her Miranda rights, Anton admitted that she bought pseudoephedrine pills with

Miller and traded the pills for methamphetamine. Anton also admitted to purchasing

large quantities of pseudoephedrine tablets from several discount stores over the prior

year. Anton used personal checks to purchase the pseudoephedrine, and she was

always accompanied by Miller. There was no evidence that Anton ever participated

in methamphetamine manufacturing or distributing activities.

Anton was initially charged in state court. She entered into an agreement with

the state prosecutor in which she was to receive a deferred judgment. When Anton

appeared in state court to enter her plea, the state prosecutor notified her that her state

charges had been dismissed and that her case was referred to the United States

Attorney’s Office for prosecution. 

On October 11, 2002, Anton and Miller were charged in a one-count

indictment with possessing pseudoephedrine–a List I Chemical–knowing, intending,

and having reasonable cause to believe it would be used to manufacture

methamphetamine, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). Trial was set for December

2, 2002. 

Anton pleaded guilty on December 31, 2002. The district court entered

judgment and sentenced Anton to seventy months' imprisonment on September 19,

2003. Anton was sentenced pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.11, thus the court found that

Anton was not eligible for a two-level reduction under § 2D1.1(b)(6) ("safety-valve

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 The five criteria included in the Guideline specify that: 

(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point, as

determined under the sentencing guidelines; 

(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or

possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another

participant to do so) in connection with the offense; 

(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any

person; 

(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor

of others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines

and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in

21 U.S.C. § 848; and 

(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has

truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the

defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the

same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that

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guideline") or a § 2D1.1(a)(3) ("mitigating-role cap") base-offense-level cap. The

court declined to grant Anton's motions for a downward departure. Anton timely

appealed. 

II.

A. "Safety Valve" Sentence Reduction

Anton contends that she should have received a safety-valve reduction under

U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 because she met the criteria provided. We review

de novo a district court's interpretation and application of the Guidelines. United

States v. Hampton, 346 F.3d 813, 814 (8th Cir. 2003). 

A defendant sentenced under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 is eligible for a two-level

sentence reduction if she meets certain criteria listed in § 5C1.2 of the Guidelines and

her offense level is 26 or greater. United States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260, 1273 (10th

Cir. 2000).3

 Here, it is undisputed that Anton meets the § 5C1.2 criteria. However, the

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the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or

that the Government is already aware of the information shall not

preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied

with this requirement. 

U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(1)–(5).

-4-

district court found that Anton was not eligible for the two-level reduction in

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 because she was sentenced under § 2D1.11. We agree. Section

2D1.11 does not provide for a two-level reduction if the criteria from § 5C1.2 are

met. Saffo, 227 F.3d at 1273; U.S.S.G. § 2D1.11. We also note that safety-valve relief

is intended to avoid imposition of mandatory minimum sentences. Anton's sentence

under 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) did not involve imposition of a mandatory minimum

sentence. 

"When construing the Guidelines, we look first to the plain language, and

where that is unambiguous we need look no further." United States v. Ashley, 342

F.3d 850, 852 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 676 (7th

Cir. 2000); United States v. Mann, 315 F.3d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Unless the

sentencing guidelines provide a special definition of the particular term whose

meaning is in issue, we give the language of the guidelines its ordinary meaning.").

Although § 2D1.1 expressly provides for a possible two-level reduction, the plain

language of the applicable Guideline section–§ 2D1.11–makes no mention of the twolevel safety valve reduction. We will not presume the Sentencing Commission

intended otherwise.

Anton was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). Section 841(c)(2) requires

her to be sentenced pursuant to § 2D1.11 of the Guidelines. Section 2D1.1 is

inapplicable to the offense to which Anton pleaded guilty. Accordingly, we reject

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4

 Because we conclude that § 2D1.1 is inapplicable in the present case, we will

not address Anton's argument concerning a mitigating-role adjustment. 

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Anton's argument that she should have received a sentence reduction under the safety

valve provision of the Guidelines.4

B. Downward Departure

Anton also argues that the district court erred in denying her motion for a

downward departure which was based upon the county prosecutor's recommendation

for probation. Anton also requested that the district court depart downward pursuant

to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. She maintains that her case is outside the heartland of offenses,

principally because of the application of the Guidelines to her case. She also notes the

apparent incongruity in the Guidelines because a convicted manufacturer of

methamphetamine can establish eligibility for safety-valve reduction while the

possessor of precursors cannot.

The Sentencing Commission has recognized that there will be exceptional

cases. The Introduction to the Guidelines explains:

The Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat each guideline as

carving out a "heartland," a set of typical cases embodying the conduct

that each guideline describes. When a court finds an atypical case, one

to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct

significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a

departure is warranted." 

Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 93 (1996) (quoting 1995 U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A,

intro. comment. 4(b)). 

Anton contends that the sentencing record is not clear as to whether or not the

district court believed it had the discretion to depart. Anton points to the court's

language:

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[The district court]: All right. The Court is now ready to make its ruling

on the departure motion with the multiple prongs . . . . The Court

declines the invitation to depart downward finding this case does not fall

outside the heartland of cases . . . . Based on the downward departure

based on the State plea agreement, the Court finds that there is no basis

to depart . . . . I also find no basis to depart because of the application of

the guidelines . . . . Again, this case is not so unusual that it falls outside

the heartland of cases, so the Court will not be departing in this case . .

. . 

[Government]: . . . Just to clarify, you recognize your authority to depart. You

just chose not to.

[The district court]: Exactly.

(Sentencing Transcript at 35–38). 

The district court refused to depart, and a rational reading of the record

indicates that the court was quite clear about its authority to do so. "A refusal to

depart by a sentencing court that is aware of its authority to do so is not appealable."

United States v. Booker, 186 F.3d 1004, 1007 (8th Cir. 1999). Given the clarity of the

record, we will not review the court's downward departure denial.

IV. 

For the reasons indicated, we affirm Anton's sentence. 

______________________________

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