Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06229/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06229-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Don Lee Dycus
Not Party
Mary Kay Dycus
Appellee
Judy K. Sills
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED sTATEs couRT oF APPEALS F I r J E n 

Unitm Statei'&urt oUppoa.ls FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Tenth Circuit 

In re: DON LEE DYCUS, M.D., 

Debtor, 

JUDY K. SILLS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

MARY KAY DYCUS, in her capacity as 

Administratrix of the Estate of 

Don Lee Dycus, M.D., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

SEP O 5 1991 

) ROBERT L. HOECKER 

) Clerk . ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 90-6229 

) (D.C. No. CIV-90-270-T) 

) (W.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR, EBEL, Circuit Judges, and BABCOCK,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable Lewis T. 

District Court for 

designation. 

Babcock, District Judge, 

the District of Colorado, 

United States 

sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-6229 Document: 010110084284 Date Filed: 09/05/1991 Page: 1 
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff appeals from an order of the district court sitting 

as an appellate court in bankruptcy, which remanded this case to 

the bankruptcy court for further findings regarding the date 

plaintiff had actual knowledge of the filing of debtor's Chapter 7 

bankruptcy proceeding. 

Debtor was plaintiff's employer and trustee of the employees' 

pension and profit sharing trust. He withdrew all the funds from 

the trust, allegedly without plaintiff's knowledge or approval, 

prior to commencing his bankruptcy proceeding. Plaintiff was not 

listed as a creditor in the bankruptcy proceedings and did not 

receive any formal notice regarding the filing of proofs of claim 

or objections to discharge. Debtor had given plaintiff a 

promissory note, which apparently covered only part of her 

interest in the trust funds, around the time he commenced his 

bankruptcy proceedings. 

Two years after debtor filed for bankruptcy, plaintiff 

commenced an action in state court seeking to collect on the 

promissory note. Debtor responded that plaintiff's claim was 

subject to his bankruptcy proceeding. Plaintiff then commenced 

the present proceeding alleging her claim was nondischargeable. 

The bankruptcy court held that plaintiff's claim was not 

discharged because, although she may have known of the bankruptcy 

filing, she had not received formal notice of the bar date. 

On appeal, the district court held that pursuant to Yukon 

Self Storage Fund v. Green (In re Green), 876 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-6229 Document: 010110084284 Date Filed: 09/05/1991 Page: 2 
1989), a creditor in a Chapter 7 proceeding with actual knowledge 

of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy but not the bar date, 

would nonetheless be subject to having its claim discharged should 

it not file a proof of claim prior to the bar date. Therefore, 

the district court held that "[w]hether plaintiff's knowledge was 

received in time to file a proof of claim and request for 

determination of dischargeability is the determinative issue." 

Rec. No. 6 at 4. The court remanded the case to the bankruptcy 

court for a finding as to the date of plaintiff's knowledge. 

On appeal, we have sua sponte raised the issue of whether, 

because of the remand order, we have jurisdiction over this 

appeal. The parties have responded and argue alternatively that 

either we have jurisdiction because the remand was not for 

significant further proceedings or, if we do not have 

jurisdiction, the parties can cure the defect by filing a joint 

stipulation as to the date of plaintiff's knowledge. 

This court has jurisdiction from "all final decisions, 

judgments, orders, and decrees" entered by the district court when 

it is acting as an appellate court in bankruptcy. 28 u.s.c. 

§ 158(d). In order for the district court's decision to be 

considered final for purposes of appeal, it must end the 

litigation and leave nothing to be done but to execute on the 

judgment. State Bank of Spring Hill v. Anderson (In re Bucyrus 

Grain Co.), 905 F.2d 1362, 1366 (10th Cir. 1990). 

A district court's decision is not final if it remands a 

bankruptcy action for "'significant further proceedings.'" Coats 

State Bank v. Grey (In re Grey), 902 F.2d 1479, 1481 (10th Cir. 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-6229 Document: 010110084284 Date Filed: 09/05/1991 Page: 3 
1990)(quoting Homa, Ltd. v. Stone (In re Commercial Contractors, 

Inc.), 771 F.2d 1373, 1375 (10th Cir. 1985)). We have held that a 

remand to the bankruptcy court for de novo hearings constitutes 

significant further proceedings, see In re Commercial Contractors, 

771 F.2d at 1374-75, as does a remand for additional findings of 

fact concerning the dispositive issue in a case, see In re Grey, 

902 F.2d at 1481, and a remand for a determination of the amount 

of a claim, see In re Bucyrus Grain, 905 F.2d at 1366. 

We reject plaintiff's contention that a district court 

decision is appealable despite a remand order if legal issues 

predominate. We adhere to the traditional view that the district 

court's order must end the litigation and leave nothing to be done 

except to execute on the judgment. See In re Commercial 

Contractors, 771 F.2d at 1375 (citing Suburban Bank of Cary Grove 

v. Riggsby (In re Riggsby), 745 F.2d 1153, 1155-56 (7th Cir. 

1984)). 

Here, the district court remanded the case for a finding of 

one additional fact--the date plaintiff knew of the bankruptcy 

proceedings. However, the determination of this date will not, by 

itself, finally resolve the district court's concerns on remand. 

Once the date is established, the bankruptcy court must next 

decide, in 1 accordance with the district court's order, whether, 

based on the date of her knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings, 

plaintiff could reasonably have been expected to file a timely 

proof of claim and request for determination of dischargeability. 

1 Because we have 

express any opinion 

determination of the 

no jurisdiction over this action, we 

as to the correctness of the district 

controlling law at this time. 

4 

do not 

court's 

Appellate Case: 90-6229 Document: 010110084284 Date Filed: 09/05/1991 Page: 4 
Thus, the district court's order did not end the litigation and 

was not a final appealable order. Both factual and legal 

determinations remain to be made by the bankruptcy court. We 

cannot say the remand was not for significant further proceedings. 

Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-6229 Document: 010110084284 Date Filed: 09/05/1991 Page: 5