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Parties Involved:
Gerald Nell Inc.
Petitioner
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 494
Intervenor for Respondent
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent
Joseph G. Podewils
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 13, 2001 Decided December 28, 2001

No. 00-1505

Joseph G. Podewils and Gerald Nell Inc.,

Petitioners

v.

National Labor Relations Board,

Respondent

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,

Local 494,

Intervenor

Petition for Review of an Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

Kevin J. Kinney argued the cause for petitioners. With

him on the briefs was Gene M. Linkmeyer.

Steven B. Goldstein, Attorney, National Labor Relations

Board, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the

brief were Arthur F. Rosenfeld, General Counsel, John H.

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Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong,

Deputy Associate General Counsel, and Julie B. Broido,

Supervisory Attorney.

Matthew R. Robbins argued the cause for intervenor.

With him on the brief was Jonathan M. Conti.

Before: Edwards and Tatel, Circuit Judges, and

Silberman, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

Silberman.

Silberman, Senior Circuit Judge: Joseph G. Podewils and

Gerald Nell Inc. petitioned for review of the National Labor

Relations Board's determination that Local 494 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (the Local) did

not violate section 8(b)(1)(B) of the National Labor Relations

Act1 by fining its member Podewils $100,000 after he went to

work as a supervisor at Gerald Nell. The Board's decision

turns on its finding of fact that the Local was not seeking a

collective bargaining relationship with the company when it

processed an internal charge against Podewils. That finding

is not supported by substantial evidence and therefore we

grant the petition for review.

I.

This case involves the limits on a union's ability to discipline a member who is also performing labor relations supervisory functions. Podewils was a rank-and-file member of the

Local from 1976 to 1997, when he went to work as a manager--running the electrical division--for Gerald Nell Inc. (a

nonunion shop). Before beginning work at Gerald Nell,

Podewils went to the Local's office twice in October 1997 and

filled out an honorary withdrawal card, informing Leon Burzynski, a business representative for the Local, that he was

withdrawing for personal reasons. From October to December 1997, Burzynski, acting on an anonymous tip that Podewils was working at Gerald Nell, sought him out. On Decem-

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1 29 U.S.C. s 153 et seq. (2001).

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ber 1, 1997, Burzynski went to the company's offices to find

Podewils; he claimed his intention was to verify that Podewils

was working there. But the ALJ refused to credit Burzynski, since he could easily have verified Podewils' employment

by a phone call. Burzynski, instead of pursuing the issue

whether Podewils could legitimately withdraw from the Union, asked: "Is there any possibility you being here means

that the electricians here might become union." Podewils

responded "that wouldn't happen here ... that wouldn't be

an option." Burzynski gave Podewils his business card with

his home phone number written on the back, which the ALJ

found was for the purpose of giving Podewils an opportunity

to change his mind. The business representative then went

back to his car and immediately drew up an internal charge

against Podewils for violating several provisions of the

I.B.E.W. Constitution--one violation was for working for a

nonunion employer while still a member of the Union. Podewils did not call Burzynski and the latter filed charges with

the Local two weeks later.

Two months after that, the Local informed Podewils by

letter that he had been charged with violating the I.B.E.W.

Constitution. After a hearing, to which Podewils was invited

but did not attend, the Local informed him that he had been

found guilty and assessed a fine of $100,000. Burzynski

testified that the penalty was proper because Podewils had

already been responsible for over $250,000 of work that

should have been "done union." Podewils sought counsel

after receiving notice of the fine and appealed to the International, which reduced the fine to $10,000, based on Podewils'

salary and the period of time he had worked for Gerald Nell

as opposed to the amount of union work allegedly lost.

Petitioners then filed unfair labor practice charges against

the Local and the International alleging a violation of section

8(b)(1)(A), which makes it unlawful for a labor organization or

its agents "to restrain or coerce ... employees in the exercise

of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title[,]" for

disciplining Podewils after he resigned from the Union and

also a violation of 8(b)(1)(B), which makes it unlawful "to

restrain or coerce ... an employer in the selection of his

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representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining or the

adjustment of grievances...." 29 U.S.C. ss 158(b)(1)(A),

(b)(1)(B).

The ALJ rejected petitioners' contention that Podewils had

effectively resigned from the Union, so he concluded the

Local did not violate section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. He found

that there was no credible evidence to support Podewils'

contention that he mailed the Local a resignation letter it did

not receive. Turning to the section 8(b)(1)(B) allegation, and

applying the three-part test set out in NLRB v. Electric

Workers IBEW Local 340 (Royal Electric), 481 U.S. 573, 585-

89 (1987), the ALJ made the following three findings: Podewils was a section 8(b)(1)(B) "grievance adjuster"; the Local

was seeking to unionize Gerald Nell's employees; and the

$100,000 fine was intended to adversely affect Podewils in the

performance of his section 8(b)(1)(B) duties. The ALJ recommended dismissal of all allegations against the International.

The general counsel, petitioners and the Local all filed

exceptions. The Board adopted the ALJ's recommended

dismissal of the 8(b)(1)(A) allegation as well as the dismissal

of the charges against the International. But the Board

reversed the ALJ's finding that the Local was seeking a

contractual relationship with Gerald Nell. The Board purportedly found no basis for disputing the ALJ's credibility

findings but thought the only evidence supporting the general

counsel's contention that the Local was seeking a collective

bargaining relationship with Gerald Nell was Burzynski's

inquiry. And that remark "standing alone, falls short of the

kind of concrete evidence necessary to show a union is

currently and actually seeking ... a collective bargainingrelationship." Member Hurtgen dissented. Petitioners contest only the Board's determination that the Local did not

violate 8(b)(1)(B).

II.

The law governing this case is undisputed. A union violates 8(b)(1)(B) by disciplining a supervisor who has either

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by coercing an employer only if it has, or is seeking, a

collective bargaining relationship with the employer. See

Royal Electric, 481 U.S. at 590.2 The Board has not adopted

the interpretation of section 8(b)(1)(B) Justice Scalia advanced in his Royal Electric concurrence: that the section

only applies "to circumstances in which there is an actual

contract between the union and affected employer, without

regard to whether the union has an intent to establish such a

contract." Id. at 597 (Scalia, J., concurring). The Board has

said that in the absence of an existing collective bargaining

relationship "the evidence must show that the union engaged

in specific overt acts such as picketing or hand-billing for

recognition, soliciting authorization cards, or making statements to an employer indicating a concrete interest in representing the employer's employees, as opposed to a long-term

objective of organizing employees generally." Plumbers Local 597, 308 N.L.R.B. 733, 733-34 (1992) (emphasis added).

The Board did not purport to alter this articulation of the

applicable legal standard. Instead, the Board, reversing the

ALJ, found that the Local was not in fact actually seeking a

collective bargaining relationship with Gerald Nell--Burzynski's statement was not sufficiently "concrete"--and petitioners claim its finding lacks substantial evidence on the whole

record.

So much would appear straightforward. But counsel for

the Board and for the intervening Local have sought to divert

our attention. The Board argues extensively in its brief that

its finding that Podewils did not resign from the Union is

entitled to deference, despite the fact that petitioners explicitly do not challenge that finding and the resulting determina-

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2 The Supreme Court's opinion carefully limiting 8(b)(1)(B) to the

case of a union that has or is seeking a collective bargaining

relationship with an employer is in part based on the premise that a

union member--particularly a supervisor--has "a right to resign

from a union at any time and avoid imposition of union discipline."

Royal Electric, 481 U.S. at 595 (emphasis added). This case

suggests it may not always be that easy. The ALJ found that each

Local office worker testified that he or she was under no obligation

to explain to Podewils he should resign, not withdraw.

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tion that the Local did not violate 8(b)(1)(A). At oral argument the Board's counsel also suggested that the discipline

meted out to Podewils was not really designed to impact the

employer's selection of a grievance adjuster (although just

how Podewils could manage the electrical division without the

ability to adjust grievances seems obscure). Yet the Board

did not even suggest that ground in its decision.

The intervenor, for its part, argued that Podewils should

not really be considered a grievance adjuster presumably

because that term should be limited to grievances that arise

out of a collective bargaining relationship. See Royal Electric, 481 U.S. at 588 n.12. Intervenor's difficulty is that the

Board did not rest its decision on this reasoning; the Board

assumed that Podewils qualified as a grievance adjuster.

We agree with petitioners. The inferences the Board

draws from the evidence are quite unreasonable and therefore under Allentown Mack Sales & Servs. v. NLRB, 522

U.S. 359, 378 (1998), the Board's finding must be rejected.

See also Warshawsky & Co. v. NLRB, 182 F.3d 948, 953 (D.C.

Cir. 1999). First there is an internal contradiction in the

Board's decision. It purported not to disturb the ALJ's

credibility findings. Yet it rejected the ALJ's conclusion,

based on his refusal to credit Burzynski, that the business

agent personally went to Gerald Nell to confront Podewils

(rather than simply call to verify his employment) for the

very purpose of seeking union recognition. The Board merely stated that it refused to draw an "inference" that the Local

had an "improper retaliatory purpose" because of the personal visit. The question, however, is whether that personal visit

was itself evidence of the Local's attempt to gain recognition

and the Board advanced no reasons to reject the ALJ's

finding, buttressed by his credibility determination, that it

was.

Moreover, the Board also refused to draw any inference

from the fact that Burzynski left his business card and

telephone number with Podewils, rejecting the ALJ's finding

that Burzynski's purpose was to give Podewils a chance to

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ing relationship with the Local. This also seems to be a

rather off-hand rejection of the ALJ's credibility determination, but, in any event, the Board's explanation is ridiculous:

that leaving his card with Podewils was consistent with

"Burzynski's responsibility as a business representative to

communicate with constituent members such as Podewils."

One does not have the impression that Burzynski wished to

communicate with Podewils as his business representative.

Burzynski admitted, moreover, that if Podewils had called

with a change of mind Burzynski would not have filed

charges. The ALJ took that as further evidence linking the

Local's purpose to gain a collective bargaining relationship

with the retaliatory fine against Podewils. The Board reasoned, however, that if Gerald Nell had recognized the Local

the charges would have been mooted since Podewils would no

longer be working for a non-union company. As petitioners

suggest, that reasoning includes a logical flaw; Podewils

would still have violated the I.B.E.W. Constitution, according

to the Local, by his past behavior, so Burzynski's posture can

only support a recognition motive.

Finally, the Board ignores a damaging piece of evidence--

the elephant in the room so to speak--that along with Burzynski's visit and comments to Podewils conclusively establishes that the Local sought a collective bargaining relationship with Gerald Nell and retaliated against Podewils for not

providing it. That evidence is the size and basis for the fine.

Counsel for the Board argues that the reasonableness of an

internal union fine is not a matter which we can consider.

That is so, but we certainly can look at the size and purpose

of the initial fine, as did the ALJ, for the purpose of determining the Local's motivation. And the subsequent modification of the fine by the International, both as to the amount

and basis, is not really relevant to the Local's intent. If

anything, it is damning since it reflects the International's

realization that the Local was in an untenable legal position.

Not only did the Local levy on Podewils the staggering fine

of $100,000, it made clear that the fine was based not on

Podewils' salary, but on the supposed amount of money the

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Local had lost because Gerald Nell was unorganized. We

think it is quite astonishing that the Board ignores this

evidence.

To be sure, as the Board noted, the Local never engaged in

solicitation of authorization cards, picketing or hand-billing,

nor did it demand recognition. But unions often gain recognition--particularly in certain crafts--from the top down, by

simply requesting recognition from a sympathetic manager or

asking a sympathetic manager to help with organizing, which

is exactly what the ALJ determined was the Local's purpose.

That Burzynski did not make a demand for recognition or

engage in public organizational efforts probably reflected a

lack of employee support. It is flatly unreasonable, however,

to conclude, as the Board does, that his solicitation was

somehow not "concrete evidence" that the Local was seeking

a collective bargaining relationship with Gerald Nell--particularly when combined with the balance of the evidence. The

statement itself was not coercive but that hardly detracts

from its probative value as an indication of the Local's

objective.

In light of the whole record, the Board's treatment of

Burzynski's inquiry as not "concrete" enough to establish that

the Local was "actually" seeking a collective bargaining relationship at Gerald Nell is equivalent to an attempted robbery

case where it is argued that a panhandler's "request" for a

contribution is not concrete enough to establish his objective

despite the fact that when he is refused he hits the victim in

the head with a club.

* * * *

Accordingly, the petition for review is granted,

and the case is hereby remanded to the Board for further

proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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