Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07335/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07335-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joseph P. Norelli
Petitioner
SFO Good-Nite Inn, LLC
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Docket Nos. 3, 14, and 15.

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Docket No. 4.

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Docket No. 20.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH P NORELLI,

 Petitioner,

 v.

SFO GOOD-NITE INN,

Respondent. /

No. C06-07335 MJJ

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY

INJUNCTION

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Petitioner Joseph P. Norelli’s Petition For a Temporary Injunction Under

Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j)1

 (“the Act”) and Motion to Try

Section 10(j) Injunction on the Basis of the Administrative Record.2

 Mr. Norelli is the Regional

Director of Region 20 and brings this action for, and on behalf of, the National Labor Relations

Board (“Petitioner” or “Board”). Petitioner seeks a temporary injunction restraining Respondent

SFO Good-Nite Inn, LLC (“Respondent”) from engaging in unfair labor practices pending the final

disposition of the matters now pending before the Board. Respondent opposes the petition for a

temporary injunction,3

 but does not oppose the motion to try the injunction on the basis of the

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Docket No. 21.

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General Counsel for Petitioner amended the Complaint at the hearing on April 18, 19, and June 13, 2006. (Pet. Ex.

B.) The Complaint alleges that Respondent unlawfully threatened employees with a reduction in hours, threatened to

withhold approval of a vacation request, promised benefits, interrogated employees, solicited employees to sign an anti-union

petition, and threatened employees with termination for opposing an anti-union petition. The Complaint also alleges that

Respondent terminated the employment of two housekeeping employees because they refused to sign an anti-union petition.

Finally, the Complaint alleges that Respondent unlawfully withdrew recognition from the Union during the term of the

contract and that withdrawal of recognition was unlawful because it relied on a tainted employee petition as the putative

evidence of loss of majority support. (Pet. Ex. B.)

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administrative record.4 For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Petition for a Temporary

Injunction and GRANTS the Motion to Try the Injunction on the Basis of the Administrative

Record.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 14, November 22, and December 15, 2005, Unite Here! Local 2 (“the Union”)

filed the original charge, amended charge, and second amended charge, respectively, with the Board. 

 (Petition (“Pet.”) Ex. B, Decision.) The Union alleged that Respondent had committed certain

violations of the Act. On March 1, 2006, the Board issued a Complaint and notice of hearing

charging that Respondent had engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of sections 8(a)(1), (3),

and (5) of the Act. (Pet. Exs. C, D, and E.)5 Administrative Law Judge, Jay R. Pollack (“the ALJ”),

heard the case on April 18 through April 20, on May 23, and on June 13, 2006. The ALJ issued his

decision on September 28, 2006. (Pet. Ex. B, ALJ Decision.)

The ALJ concluded that Respondent had violated: (1) section 8(a)(1) of the Act by

threatening employees with loss of benefits or promising employees benefits in order to obtain

support for an anti-union petition; (2) sections 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging two

employees in order to discourage union activities and membership; and (3) sections 8(a)(5) and (1)

of the Act by withdrawing recognition from and refusing to bargain with the Union. (Id. at ¶. 10-

11.)

The ALJ recommended issuance of an Order that Respondent cease and desist from: (1)

threatening employees with loss of benefits or promising benefits in order to discourage union

membership; (2) discharging employees in order to discourage union membership; (3) withdrawing

recognition from the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative; (4) refusing to meet and

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On October 26, 2006, Respondent filed exceptions to the ALJ’s decision. Petitioner timely filed a brief in support

of the ALJ’s decision. 

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bargain with the Union; and (5) interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise

of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. (Id.) The ALJ also recommended, among other things,

that Respondent take affirmative action to: (1) meet and bargain with the Union; (2) offer certain

discharged employees full reinstatement with back-pay, and (3) post a notice of the Order. (Id. at p.

12.) 

This case’s procedural posture differs from many others in which an injunction is sought.

Rather than asking for an injunction as a precursor to an ALJ’s adjudication on the merits, Petitioner

asks for an injunction as a precursor to a decision on the merits by the National Labor Relations

Board (“NLRB”). However, because Respondent has appealed6

 the ALJ’s decision to the NLRB,

the petition for a temporary injunction is not moot. See Aguayo v. S&F Market Street Healthcare

LLC, 179 L.R.R.M. 2393 (C.D. Cal. 2006).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court derives the factual summary that follows from the administrative record of the

evidentiary hearing conducted before the ALJ.

Respondent is the owner and operator of a hotel near the San Francisco International Airport. 

(General Counsel (“GC”) Ex. 1.) At the time Respondent acquired the hotel in March 2004, the

Union was the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the hotel’s housekeeping and

maintenance employees. (Id.; Board Transcript (“Tr.”) at 8.) Prior to Respondent’s acquisition of

the hotel, Respondent’s predecessor and the Union had agreed to a one-year extension of the existing

collective bargaining agreement (“the Agreement”) through November 2004. Upon acquisition of

the hotel, Respondent agreed to assume responsibility of the Agreement. (Id.) 

The Union sent a notice of its intent to change the Agreement on August 3, 2004. (Pet. Ex.

B. at p. 3.) Respondent and the Union subsequently agreed to preserve the status quo of the

Agreement during their contract negotiations. Section 47 set forth the term of the Agreement and

provided,

This Agreement shall be in effect for the period commencing

December 5, 1999 and continuing to and including November 30,

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The employees that had not paid Union dues were Yolanda Gies (“Gies”), Maria Maldonado (“Maldonado”),

Christina Valencia (“Valencia”), Daisy Arana (“Arana”), and Mei-Yun Wu (“Wu”). (Id. at p. 3.) 

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Vargas served as the Spanish interpreter. (Id. at p. 3.) 

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2003. At least ninety (90) days prior to November 30, 2003 either

party may serve notice upon the other by Certified Mail, of a desire to

terminate, change, or modify this Agreement, or any part thereof. In

the event no such notice is given, this Agreement shall be renewed

from year to year after the expiration date hereof, subject to written

notice of termination or modification ninety (90) days prior to any

subsequent anniversary date of the Agreement. For the purpose

hereof, December first (1st) of each year, commending December 5,

1999 shall be deemed the anniversary of this Agreement. If, prior to

the expiration date, following the submission of such notice, unless

time is mutually extended, the parties fail to reach an Agreement, then

either party shall be free to strike or lock out.

Upon receipt of such notice, it is agreed by both parties that

negotiation will commence within fifteen (15) days. In the event a

new wage settlement is not agreed upon by November 30, 2003 this

Agreement shall continue beyond the expiration date thereof for such

period of time as parties are engaged in negotiating such successor

Agreement.

(Respondent (“Resp.”) Ex. 10.) The parties agree that the Agreement was in effect through the time

that Respondent withdrew recognition of the Union. (Tr. 795-803, 886; Pet. Ex. B at p. 9.) 

Prior to Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition, Respondent and the Union engaged in

contract negotiations on March 11, August 23, and September 7, 2005. (Pet. Ex. B. at p. 3.) The

parties had a future negotiation scheduled for September 27, 2006. (Tr. 862; Respondent (“Resp”)

Ex. 17.) During the negotiations, among other issues, the parties discussed Respondent’s financial

difficulties, Respondent’s failure to make employee trust fund contributions, and the Union’s

demand that Respondent discharge certain housekeepers7

 unless they joined the Union as required

under the Agreement. (Id.) The Union provided Respondent with an application for membership in

the Union for the housekeepers to sign. (Id.) 

On August 31, 2005, Respondent’s general manager, Afzal Chaudry (“Chaudry”), and

banquet manager, Naomi Vargas (“Vargas”), met with Respondent’s employees to read a memo

describing the employees’ union dues obligations. (Id.)8 Chaudry told the employees that they had

to pay fees and dues to the Union pursuant to the existing Agreement. (Id.) The same day, Chaudry

called housekeepers Maldonado and Valencia into a separate meeting. (Id.) Valencia testified that

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At the time of the meeting, Respondent’s employees were not receiving Union health benefits because Respondent

was in arrears in making trust fund contributions. (Id. at p. 3.) 

10Taloma was also asked to sign the petition by Parwander Kaur, a non-Union front desk employee. (Id. at p. 4.)

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Chaudry told them that the employees owed the Union $400 and that if they failed to pay, then the

Union would have them fired. (Id.) According to Valencia, Chaudry said that the Union was no

good, that the Union was costing Respondent a lot of money, that Chaudry did not know why the

employees wanted the Union, and that Respondent would give the employees paid vacation and

health benefits. (Id.)9

 Chaudry told the employees that she did not want to pressure them, but that

they could sign a petition to “de-unionize” the hotel. (Id.) Chaudry told them to have lunch and

then to come back and sign “the paper.” (Id.) Neither Valencia or Maldonado returned or signed an

anti-union petition. (Id. at ¶¶ 3-4.) Later the same day, Vargas asked Valencia whether she would

sign the paper and why the employees did not want to “de-unionize.” (Id. at p. 4.) 

Additional employees testified regarding Respondent’s conduct. Housekeeper Margarita

Taloma (“Taloma”) testified that Respondent’s assistant manager, Leah Aquino (“Aquino”), asked

her to sign an anti-union petition in late August 2005. (Id.) According to Taloma, Aquino stated

that Taloma’s situation might not be as good if the hotel remained unionized and that the Union

might only let Taloma work part-time. (Id.) Aquino said she could only help Taloma if Taloma

signed the petition. (Id.) Taloma refused. (Id.) In September 2005, Aquino went to Taloma’s home

and again asked Taloma to sign the petition. (Id.) Taloma again refused to sign. (Id.)10 

On September 6, 2006, Consuelo Contreras (“Contreras”), an employee responsible for

inspecting the quality of the housekeepers’ work, spoke with housekeeper Xian Tan (“Tan”) about

the Union. (Id.) Contreras urged Tan not to sign the anti-union petition and spoke in favor of union

representation. (Id.) Later that day, Chaudry and Respondent’s owner, Eric Yokeno (“Yokeno”),

asked Contreras why she was telling employees not to sign the petition to de-unionize and warned

her she could be fired for doing so on work time. (Id.) Chaudry and Yokeno then questioned

Contreras about whether she was unfairly scheduling employees by favoring Hispanic housekeepers

over Asian housekeepers. (Id.) Contreras denied any favoritism. (Id.) However, as a result of the

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11Chaudry testified that he called Contreras to determine which housekeepers to terminate. (Id. at p. 5.) According

to Chaudry and Aquino, Chaudry told Contreras that the layoffs were a result of a seasonal business slow down. (Id.)

Chaudry stated that Contreras suggested to layoff Maldonado and Valencia for performance reasons. (Id.) However,

Contreras denied that Chaudry ever asked her opinion as to which employees should be laid off. (Id.) Contreras also testified

that Valencia and Maldonado performed well. (Id.) Chaudry did not adequately explain to the ALJ why he had laid off

employees in the past due to seasonal business slow downs, but decided this time to permanently terminate Maldonado and

Valencia. (Id. at ¶. 5-6.) Chaudry also did not adequately explain to the ALJ why he did not recall Maldonado or Valencia

(which would have been consistent with past practice) when the hotel experienced an unexpected increase in occupancy from

September 16 to September 24, 2006. (Id. at p. 6.) 

12The Agreement requires layoffs be based on seniority. (Id.) However, Respondent argued to the ALJ that the

employees at issue were all probationary employees and therefore seniority did not apply. (Id.) The ALJ found that

Respondent had a legitimate business reason to layoff housekeepers in September 2005 due to business slow-downs, but the

ALJ found that Maldonado and Valencia were chosen for layoffs for unlawful reasons. (Id. at p. 5.) 

13At the Board hearing, Respondent contended that it did not assist the employees in de-unionizing. Kaur, a nonunion front desk employee, testified that she helped housekeeper Sadat Jiminez (“Jiminez”) write a petition stating that the

employees no longer wished to be represented by the Union. (Id. at p. 6.) Kaur also testified that part-time housekeeper,

Ermelina Mariazeta (“Mariazeta”) had also expressed a desire to be non-union and that Mariazeta started a petition on

September 3, 2005. (Id.) Mariazeta testified that she left the petition for others to sign. (Id.) Eleven employees signed the

petition after Mariazeta. (Id.) Another petition was signed by employee Juan Reyes (“Reyes”). (Id.) The parties stipulated

that a total of 12 employees signed petitions prior to September 14, which would constitute a majority of the bargaining unit

employees. (Id.) The ALJ did not find any evidence that Kaur, Jiminez, or Mariaseta were acting on behalf of Respondent

in assisting with the non-union petitions. (Id.) 

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meeting Chaudry assumed Contreras’ scheduling duties. (Id.)11 

On September 7, 2006, Chaudry again met with Valencia and Maldonado. With Contreras

interpreting, Chaudry terminated Valencia and Maldonado. (Id.) Valencia inquired why two other

lower-senority employees, Gies and Wu, were being retained. (Id.) Chaudry responded by

informing Valencia there was no seniority system. (Id.)12

Also on September 7, 2006, the Union and Respondent attended another negotiation meeting

and exchanged bargaining proposals. (Id.) Although Respondent indicated that further negotiations

would not be fruitful due to Respondent’s existing financial difficulties, Respondent agreed to

engage in a future bargaining session after September 7. (Id. at ¶. 4-5.) However, no further

bargaining session occurred. (Id.) On September 14, 2005, Respondent withdrew recognition from

the Union claiming that a majority of the employees stated they no longer wished to be represented

by the Union. (Pet. Ex. B at p. 3.)13

On October 4, 2006, employee Luz Verdin (“Verdin”) went to Aquino’s office to inquire

about Verdin’s pending vacation request. (Id. at p. 5.) Aquino told Verdin they would make a deal;

Verdin would sign the petition to de-unionize and Aquino would sign Verdin’s vacation request. 

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(Id.) Aquino informed Verdin that most of the employees had already signed. (Id.) Verdin signed

the petition and Aquino approved Verdin’s vacation request. (Id.) Neither the petition or the

vacation request contained the date of October 4, 2006, but instead bore a back-date of September

14, 2006. (Id.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

Section 10(j) of the Act provides that, in response to a request for interim relief from the

Board’s Regional Director (“the Director”), the district court “shall have jurisdiction to grant to the

Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(j). 

Section 10(j) was enacted by Congress to provide interim injunctive relief protecting the integrity of

the collective-bargaining process while the NLRB resolves an unfair labor practice charge. Miller v.

California Pacific Medical Center, 19 F.3d 449, 459-60 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc). In adjudicating a

section 10(j) request, the district court “should rely on traditional equitable principles to determine

whether interim relief is appropriate.” Scott ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Stephen Dunn & Assoc., 241 F.3d

652, 660 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Miller, 19 F.3d 449). 

To secure relief under section 10(j), the Regional Director must show “either (1) a

combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm, or (2) the

existence of serious questions going to the merits, the balance of hardships tipping sharply in its

favor, and at least a fair chance of success on the merits.” Miller, 19 F.3d at 456 (quoting Senate of

Cal. v. Mosbacher, 968 F.2d 974, 977 (9th Cir. 1992)). If the Court finds probable success on the

merits, then the possibility of irreparable harm is presumed. Id. at 459. If, however, the Court finds

only a fair chance of success on the merits, the Court must engage in a balancing of hardships. Id. 

This formulation reflects the traditional “sliding scale” of equity jurisprudence where “the required

degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases.” United States v.

Odessa Union Warehouse Co-op, 833 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1987). 

In Miller, this traditional formulation was modified in one respect. In the context of a section

10(j) petition, the court must evaluate the traditional equitable criteria “through the prism of the

underlying purpose of section 10(j), which is to protect the integrity of the collective bargaining

process and to preserve the Board’s remedial power while it processes the charge.” Miller, 19 F.3d

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at 459-60. Thus, the Board’s ability to meaningfully adjudicate disputes arising within its

jurisdiction must be balanced against the respondent’s showing of hardship. Id. at 460. Appropriate

injunctive relief under section 10(j) can include cease-and-desist orders and interim bargaining

orders. Stephen Dunn & Assoc., 241 F.3d at 660-61.

ANALYSIS

I. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

At the outset, the Court must evaluate the Petitioner’s likelihood of success in the underlying

NLRB action to determine the propriety of issuing a temporary injunction pending the NLRB’s

decision. To establish a likelihood of success, Petitioner relies on the charge-supporting evidence,

the testimony presented to the ALJ, and the subsequent findings and recommendations made by the

ALJ. Respondent argues that disputed legal and factual issues undermine Petitioner’s showing of

success on the merits and preclude this Court from deferring to the views of the ALJ and Petitioner. 

In assessing whether the Regional Director has met its likelihood of success burden, it is

necessary to factor in the district court’s lack of jurisdiction over unfair labor practices, and the

deference accorded to NLRB determinations by the courts of appeals. See N.L.R.B. v. City Disposal

Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829 (1984) (“[O]n an issue that implicates [the Board’s] expertise in labor

relations, a reasonable construction by the Board is entitled to considerable deference[.]”); Ford

Motor Co. v. N.L.R.B., 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979) (“Of course, the judgment of the Board is subject to

judicial review; but if its construction of the statute is reasonably defensible, it should not be rejected

merely because the courts might prefer another view of the statute.”). While the district court is not

required to defer to the Board in deciding whether interim relief is “just and proper,” it should

evaluate the probabilities of the complaining party’s success in light of the fact that ultimately, the

Board’s determination on the merits will be given considerable deference. Reichard v. Foster

Poultry Farms, 425 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (citations omitted). By the same token,

because it is the Board and not the district court which has primary responsibility for declaring

federal labor policy, even on an issue of law, the district court should be hospitable to the views of

the General Counsel, however novel. Miller, 19 F.3d at 460 (citation omitted).. 

“[T]he Regional Director can make a threshold showing of likelihood of success by

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producing ‘some evidence’ to support the unfair labor practice charge, ‘together with an arguable

legal theory.’” Scott, 241 F.3d at 662 (citing Miller, 19 F.3d at 460). Essentially, the Regional

Director must demonstrate “‘a better than negligible chance of success’” to get into the injunction

game. Reichard, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 1094 (citing Scott, 241 F.3d at 662). “If the respondent

concedes the substance of the unfair labor practice charge, or if the Board demonstrates that it is

likely to prevail on the merits, we presume irreparable injury. If the charge is disputed, or if the

Board has only a fair chance of succeeding on the merits, the court must consider the possibility of

irreparable injury.” Miller, 19 F.3d at 460 (citing United States v. Nutri-Cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394,

398 (9th Cir. 1992)).

In this case, the Court also considers the unique procedural posture of the action. Here, the

ALJ has already rendered a decision and Petitioner seeks an injunction pending a decision on the

merits by the NLRB. As a result, in addition to Petitioner’s underlying charge and supporting

evidence, the Court may also consider the ALJ’s underlying factual and legal determinations. In

such procedural instances, the district court does not sit in review of the ALJ’s decision. Aguayo,

179 L.R.R.M. 2393 at 2399 (citing Bloedorn v. Francisco Foods, Inc., 276 F.3d 270, 288 (7th Cir.

2001)). Rather, the district court should consider the ALJ’s opinion as relevant to the propriety of

section 10(j) relief. Id. Assessing the likelihood of success calls for a predictive judgment about

what the Board is likely to do with the case. Id. Since the ALJ is the Board’s first-level decisionmaker and has presided over the merits hearing, the ALJ’s factual and legal determinations supply a

useful benchmark against which the Regional Director’s prospects of success may be weighed. 

Bloedorn, 276 F.3d at 288. (citing Hoffman v. Inn Credible Caterers, Ltd., 247 F.3d 360, 367 (2d

Cir. 2001); Silverman v. J.R.L. Food Corp., 196 F.3d 334, 337-38 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam);

Rivera-Vega v. ConAgra, Inc., 70 F.3d 153, 161 (1st Cir. 1995); Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc., 517

F.2d 33, 37 n. 7 & 40 n. 11 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Willms v. The Guard Publishing Co., 2001 WL

34038572 at *2 (D. Or. 2001) (stating “the decision by the ALJ adds considerable weight to the

probability of the Regional Director’s success on the merits.”). Having outlined the legal principles

which govern Petitioner’s claim, the he Court now turns to Petitioner’s likelihood of success on each

of the alleged violations.

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A. Threats and Promises in Violation of Section 8(a)(1)

Petitioner has demonstrated that it is likely to prevail on the merits as to the alleged

violations of section 8(a)(1). Miller, 19 F.3d at 460. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act prohibits employers

from interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in

Section 7 of the Act. Petitioner has offered evidence of violations by Aquino, Chaudry, and

Yokeno.

In support of the contention that Aquino promised benefits to an employee if the employee

abandoned union support, Petitioner relies on Taloma’s testimony. Taloma testified that Aquino

promised to “help” Taloma if she agreed to sign the petition. (Tr. 72-73.) See Fabric Warehouse,

294 N.L.R.B. 189, 191 (1989) (finding promises of benefits linked to getting rid of a Union “clearly

tend to undercut support for the Union [and] . . . that [such] statements violate[] Section 8(a)(1) of

the Act.”) Similarly, in support of the charge that Aquino threatened an employee with loss of hours

if the employee did not sign an anti-union petition, Petitioner again relies on Taloma’s testimony. 

Taloma testified that Aquino threatened that Taloma’s situation might be worse with the Union

because Taloma’s hours might be reduced to part-time. (Tr. 68-69); see Healthcare and Retirement

Corp. of Am., 307 N.L.R.B. 52 (1996); Reeves Brothers, Inc. Bishopville Finishing Div., 320

N.L.R.B. 1082 (1999); El Rancho Market, 235 N.L.R.B. 61 (1978). Lastly, there is evidence

supporting the charge that Aquino threatened to withhold approval of an employee’s vacation

request if the employee did not sign an anti-union petition, because Vargas testified that Aquino told

Vargas they would make a deal, and that Aquino would sign Vargas’ vacation request in exchange

for Vargas signing the anti-union petition. (Tr. 128-29); see Frank Leta Honda, 321 N.L.R.B. 482

(1996). 

Next, Petitioner offered evidence in support of Chaudry and Yokeno’s violations of section

8(a)(1). Specifically, Contreras testified that Chaudry and Yokeno threatened her with termination

for speaking in favor of union representation, and for encouraging a fellow employee not to sign the

anti-union petition during work time. (Tr. 248-49.) However, Chaudry contradicted himself when

he testified at the hearing that he was not aware of any rule against discussion of Union matters at

work. (Tr. 48-49.) 

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Furthermore the Court notes that the ALJ considered the parties’ evidence and found

Petitioner’s evidence more credible. In doing so the ALJ substantiated each instance of

Respondent’s conduct and concluded Respondent had violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act. (Pet. Ex.

B at ¶. 6-7.) Having considered the proffered evidence and the ALJ’s determinations, which are

relevant in evaluating Petitioner’s ultimate prospect of success, the Court finds that Petitioner has

demonstrated that it is likely to prevail on the merits as to the alleged violations of section 8(a)(1). 

B. Discharges in Violation of Section 8(a)(3)

Petitioner asserts that it has also demonstrated that it is likely to prevail on the merits as to

the alleged violations of section 8(a)(3). Miller, 19 F.3d at 460. Respondent counters that it had a

legitimate reason to discharge housekeepers Valencia and Maldonado. Respondent also contends

that Petitioner has failed to meet its prima facie burden of establishing that the housekeepers were

engaged in “protected activity” of which Respondent was aware. 

Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to, by discrimination in

regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment, encourage or

discourage membership in any labor organization. In evaluating alleged wrongful discharges under

section 8(a)(3), the Board has set forth a test of causation turning on employer motivation. Wright

Line Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S.

989 (1982); N.L.R.B. v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 404 (1983) (approving the

analytical framework set forth in Wright Line.). To establish that an employer unlawfully

discharged an alleged discriminatee, the General Counsel must show, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that the protected activity was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision to discharge

that employee. Once the General Counsel has made this required showing, the burden shifts to the

Respondent to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have taken the same

action even in the absence of the protected union activity. Id. In establishing a prima facie case of

unlawful motivation, proof of such discriminatory motivation can be based on direct evidence of

such union animus or can be inferred from circumstantial evidence based on the record as a whole. 

Robert Orr/Sysco Food Services, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 123 (2004). To support an inference of unlawful

motivation, the Board looks to such factors as inconsistencies between the proffered reasons for the

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discipline and other actions of the employer, disparate treatment of certain employees compared to

other employees with similar work records or offenses, deviations from past practice, and proximity

in time of the discipline to the union activity. Id. (citing Embassy Vacation Resorts, 340 NLRB No.

94 (2003)).

Here, Petitioner has presented sufficient evidence that Respondent discharged housekeepers

Maldonado and Valencia because of their union activities. In establishing a prima facie case,

Petitioner points to Valencia’s testimony. Valencia testified that on August 31, 2005, Chaudry

called Maldonado and Valencia into a separate meeting and told them that they owed the Union

money, the Union was no good, the Union was costing Respondent a lot of money, Chaudry did not

know why the employees wanted the Union, and Respondent would give the employees paid

vacation and health benefits. (Tr. 161-64.) Chaudry told the housekeepers that she did not want to

pressure them, but that they could sign a petition to “de-unionize” the hotel. (Id.) Chaudry told

them to have lunch and then to come back and sign “the paper.” (Id.) Neither Valencia or

Maldonado returned or signed an anti-union petition. (Id.) According to Valencia, on September 7,

2006, Chaudry again met with Valencia and Maldonado. (Tr. 163-65.) With Contreras interpreting,

Chaudry terminated Valencia and Maldonado. (Id.) Valencia inquired why two other lowersenority employees, Gies and Wu, were being retained and Chaudry responded by informing

Valencia there was no seniority system.

In response, Respondent argues that no anti-union petition existed as of August 31, 2005,

therefore Respondent could not have known of Maldonado or Valencia’s protected activity of

refusing to sign the anti-union petition. Further, relying on Chaudry’s testimony, Respondent

contends that it had legitimate reasons to terminate the two housekeepers because Contreras had

identified them as poor performers. (Tr. 635.) The ALJ found Respondent’s evidence unconvincing

for a number of reasons.

First, the ALJ found Chaudry to be “shifting and evasive” regarding the reasons for Valencia

and Maldonado’s discharge. (Pet. Ex. B at p. 4. ) As a result, he concluded that Chaudry was an

unreliable witness. (Id.); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 312 N.L.R.B. 674 (1993). Second, the ALJ

concluded that Respondent never adequately explained why it decided to terminate rather than layoff

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the two housekeepers in accordance with its previous practice. (Id. at p. 7.) Third, Contreras

contradicted Chaudry and testified that she never identified Valencia or Maldonado as poor

performers or recommended them for termination. (Tr. 233-35, 240.) Fourth, the ALJ found that

Respondent did not follow its past practice of using seniority in selecting employees for layoffs and

did not follow its policy of recalling them when business needs required their service nine days later. 

(Tr. 8.) Finally, as to the existence of the anti-union petition on August 31, 2005, the ALJ concluded

that an anti-union petition did exist by relying on the testimony of Valencia over Chaudry. (Pet. Ex.

B at p. 3.) Therefore, while Respondent’s business status may have served as a legitimate reason for

discharging the housekeepers, Respondent failed to rebut Petitioner’s “strong prima facie case that

Valencia and Maldonado were selected for termination because of their protected activities of not

joining in the effort to ‘de-unionize’ the hotel.” (Id. at p. 8.) Accordingly, the ALJ’s findings that

Respondent’s defense was pre-textual “leaves intact the strong prima facie case.” (Id.) (citing

Limestone Apparel Corp., 255 N.L.R.B. 722 (1981); California Gas Transport, 347 N.L.R.B. No.

118 (2006)).

The ALJ found that Respondent’s defense was pretextual. Upon an independent review of

the record, the Court finds that Petitioner has submitted evidence to support the finding that

Respondent was unlawfully motivated in terminating the two housekeepers. Therefore, based upon

its review of the record, the Court finds that Petitioner has established the pretextual nature of

Respondent’s defense. Respondent’s defensive evidence contains contradicted testimony and

unexplained inconsistencies. Moreover, the evidence in the record supports a finding that

Respondent was unlawfully motivated by union animus in discharging the two housekeepers. As a

result, the Court finds that Petitioner has demonstrated that it is likely to prevail on the merits of the

section 8(a)(3) allegations.

C. Withdrawal of Recognition in Violation of Section 8(a)(5) 

 Petitioner argues that the “contract bar” applies therefore Respondent’s withdrawal of

recognition from the Union during the term of the parties’ contract was unlawful as a matter of a

law. Petitioner also argues that even if Respondent was free to question the Union’s status, it was

unlawful for Respondent to rely on employee expressions of union disaffection that were tainted by

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Respondent’s unfair labor practices. Respondent argues, as it did unsuccessfully to the ALJ, that the

contract bar does not apply, and that there is insufficient evidence to find that the employees’ antiunion petition was tainted. 

1. Contract Bar

The parties do not dispute that the Agreement was in effect through the time that Respondent

withdrew recognition of the Union, and that the term of the Agreement was set forth in section 47. 

(Tr. 795-803, 886; Pet. Ex. B at p. 9.) Furthermore, the parties had contractually agreed to preserve

the status quo during their contract negotiations. However, the parties disagree as to whether the

contract bar precludes Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition. In particular, Petitioner argues that

the initial three-year contract was extended by virtue of section 47, requiring the agreement to stay

in effect while the parties were negotiating a successor agreement, therefore Respondent was barred

from withdrawing until negotiations had ended. Respondent counters that Petitioner’s interpretation

of the contract bar rule would require the parties to engage in indefinite contract negotiations thereby

precluding any challenge to the incumbent Union. 

Under the contract bar rule, once an employer and a union enter into a valid collective

bargaining agreement, the majority status of the union is irrebuttably presumed for the duration of

the contract, not to exceed three years. General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962);

Montgomery Ward & Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 346, 348-49 (1962); Westwood Import Co. Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,

681 F.2d 664, 666 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). The rule is designed “to promote industrial

stability between contractual partners and to afford employees a reasonable opportunity to change or

eliminate their bargaining representative.” East Mfg. Corp., 242 NLRB 5, 6 (1979). In order to

protect the bargaining atmosphere, the rule is applied “even if a majority of the employees withdraw

their support.” Pioneer Inn Associates v. N.L.R.B., 578 F.2d 835, 838 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation

omitted). The Board has stated, “we cannot interpret our contract-bar rules in such a way as to

permit employers or certified unions to take advantage of whatever benefits may accrue from the

contract with the knowledge that they have an option to avoid their contractual obligations and

commitments through the device of a petition to the Board for an election.” Montgomery Ward &

Co., 137 N.L.R.B. at 348-49. 

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Here, the ALJ found that Respondent unlawfully withdrew recognition from the Union at a

time when it could not lawfully challenge the Union’s majority status. (Pet. Ex. B at p. 9.) The ALJ

relied on Respondent’s admission that the contract “was in place up until the time we withdrew

recognition.” (Id.) In addition to Respondent’s admission, the Court notes that section 47 of the

Agreement specifically states that the Agreement “shall continue beyond the expiration date thereof

for such period of time as parties are engaged in negotiating such successor Agreement.” (Resp. Ex.

10.) Because the parties were engaging in contract negotiations, and intended to continue those

negotiations on September 27, 2006, the term of the contract had not expired at the time Respondent

withdrew recognition on September 14, 2006. (Tr. 862; Resp. Ex. 17.) Since the contract had not

expired, the contract bar would preclude Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition.

Respondent argues that its withdraw recognition was appropriate and relies on Cind-R-Lite,

239 N.L.R.B. 1255 (1979). In Cind-R-Lite, the Board stated that in order to serve as a bar to a

petition, a contract must have an expiration date apparent from the face of the contract without resort

to parol evidence. Cind-R-Lite, 239 N.L.R.B. at 1256. In finding the contract bar inapplicable, the

NLRB cited to the fact that the contract at issue had no fixed duration and could continue

indefinitely. Id. at 1256. The current case is factually distinguishable. Here, the Agreement

contained an explicit termination date followed by the possibility of subsequent extensions. (Resp.

Ex. 10.) The Agreement does not contemplate an indefinite term. Rather, Respondent and the

Union bargained and agreed to extend the term of the Agreement to include the time frame of those

negotiations, up to, and including September 27, 2006. (Id.) Once those negotiations failed, the

parties contemplated a termination of the Agreement. (Id.) Accordingly, unlike the term of the

agreement in Cind-R-Lite, the term of the Agreement in the current case contemplated a termination

at some point. 

Because the parties agreed to continue negotiating up to, and including, September 27, 2006,

the Agreement had not expired. Since the Agreement had not expired, Respondent was precluded

from withdrawing recognition of the Union. Given this evidence, the ALJ’s decision, and the

principle that district courts should be hospitable to the views of the General Counsel, however

novel, the Court finds that Petitioner has demonstrated that it is likely to prevail on the merits of the

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section 8(a)(5) allegations. Miller, 19 F.3d at 460. 

Assuming arguendo that the contract bar did not preclude Respondent’s withdrawal of

recognition, the Court now turns to whether Respondent’s alleged unfair labor practices tainted the

anti-union petition.

2. Tainted Anti-Union Petition

Petitioner contends that even if Respondent was free to withdraw recognition of the Union on

September 14, 2006, the withdrawal was still unlawful because the anti-union petition was a product

of Respondent’s illegal threats, promises, and terminations. Respondent argues that it had majority

support when it withdrew recognition of the Union, and that it was improper for the ALJ to disregard

that majority support. 

An employer is not privileged to withdraw recognition of the union unless it has actually lost

the support of a majority of employees. See Levitz Furniture, 333 NLRB 717, 717-18 (2001). In

Levitz Furniture, the Board stated, 

The presumption of continuing majority status essentially serves two

important functions of Federal labor policy. First, it promotes

continuity in bargaining relationships .... The resulting industrial

stability remains a primary objective of the Wagner Act, and to an

even greater extent, the Taft-Hartley Act. Second, the presumption of

continuing majority status protects the express statutory right of

employees to designate a collective-bargaining representative of their

own choosing, and to prevent an employer from impairing that right

without some objective evidence that the representative the employees

have designated no longer enjoys majority support.

Id. at 723. The Board also recognized that it would continue to use its well-established policy that

employers may not withdraw recognition in a context of unremedied unfair labor practices tending

to cause employee disaffection with the union. Williams Enterprises, 312 N.L.R.B. 937, 939-40

(1993), enfd, 50 F.3d 1280 (4th Cir. 1995). In cases involving unfair labor practices other than a

general refusal to bargain, the Board has identified several relevant factors in determining whether a

causal relationship exists between unremedied unfair labor practices and the subsequent expression

of employee disaffection with an incumbent union. Id. at 939. These evidentiary factors include: (1)

the length of time between the unfair labor practices and the withdrawal of recognition; (2) the

nature of the illegal acts, including the possibility of their detrimental or lasting effect on employees;

(3) any possible tendency to cause employee disaffection from the union; and (4) the effect of the

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unlawful conduct on employee morale, organizational activities, and membership in the union. Id.

(citing Master Slack Corp., 271 N.L.R.B. 78, 84 (1984); Olson Bodies, 206 N.L.R.B. 779 (1973)). 

An employer may not avoid the duty to bargain by a loss of majority status caused by its own unfair

labor practices unless it can show that “the unfair labor practices did not significantly contribute to

such a loss of a majority or to the factors upon which a doubt of such a majority is based.” N.L.R.B.

v. Williams Enterprises, Inc., 50 F.3d 1280, 1288 (4th Cir. 1995).

In this case, Petitioner has offered, and the ALJ found, multiple instances of unfair labor

practices occurring prior to Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition. (Pet. Ex. B. at p. 10.) In

applying the four evidentiary factors, the ALJ noted that Respondent had unlawfully terminated

housekeepers Valencia and Maldonado immediately prior to its withdrawal of recognition, and that

Respondent had made unlawful threats and promises to multiple employees in an attempt to obtain

support for an anti-union petition. (Id.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that Respondent could “not

rely on an expression of disaffection by its employees which is attributable to its own unfair labor

practices directed at undermining support for the union” and that Respondent’s withdrawal of

recognition therefore violated sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.

Respondent makes two arguments against Petitioner’s evidence and the ALJ’s findings

regarding the anti-union petition. First, Respondent argues that its conduct was consistent with

Board law prohibiting an employer from bargaining with a union that has lost majority support,

citing Dura Art Stone, Inc., 346 N.L.R.B. No. 14 (2005). The Court finds Respondent’s authority

inapposite. In Dura Art Stone, the Board upheld an ALJ’s finding that a union and an employer

violated the Act by continuing their negotiations and executing a collective-bargaining agreement

when they had knowledge of employee disaffection petition establishing the Union’s loss of majority

status. Id. There, the union and employer received untainted objective evidence that the majority of

employees no longer desired the union’s representation at a time just prior to the existing contract’s

expiration, when no election petition could be filed. Id. Knowing that no petition could be filed, the

employer and union unlawfully thwarted the majority will and entered into a new three-year

contract. Id. Here, unlike Dura Art Stone, Petitioner produced evidence tending to prove that the

employee’s union disaffection was a product of Respondent’s own unfair labor practices. Because

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Respondent’s unfair labor practices may have affected the Union’s support, Dura Art Stone is

inapposite on this record. 

Second, Respondent argues that the ALJ did not make the necessary findings of fact to

disregard the actual signatures on the anti-union petition. More specifically, Respondent argues for

an evidentiary standard requiring “specific proof” of a causal relationship between the unfair labor

practice and the ensuring loss of union support, citing Lee Lumber & Building Material Corp. 322

N.L.R.B. 175 (1996), Quazite Corp., 323 N.L.R.B. 511 (1997), and Quazite Div. of Morrison

Molded Fiberglass Co. v. N.L.R.B., 87 F.3d 493 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The Court finds that neither

decision changes the standard for determining causation. Therefore, as more fully explained below,

the decisions relied upon by Respondent are factually distinguishable on the record before the Court.

In Lee Lumber & Building Material Corp., the Board expanded on the term, “specific

proof,” in a footnote, and cited to the four evidentiary factors set forth in Williams Enterprises, 312

NLRB at 939, and Master Slack Corp., 271 NLRB at 84. Lee Lumber, 322 N.L.R.B. at 177 n. 16. 

(Pet. Ex. B at p. 10.) Accordingly, there is no basis for Respondent’s argument that there is a

heightened “specific proof” standard that is independent of the four evidentiary factors. Here, as

required, the record indicates that the ALJ considered and applied the four evidentiary factors. 

There is no evidence that the ALJ applied an incorrect standard in reviewing the allegedly tainted

anti-union petition. Furthermore, Respondent has failed to cite authority that the term, “specific

proof,” creates a more strict evidentiary standard than the application of the four factors articulated

in Master Slack Corp at its progeny. 

Quazite is similarly inapposite. In Quazite, the record was unclear as to whether the NLRB

ever considered the employer’s defensive explanation for the union’s loss of support. Quazite, 87

F.3d at 497. There, in reviewing the NLRB’s finding of unlawful withdraw of recognition, the

Appellate Court specifically noted the NLRB’s failure to apply the four evidentiary factors. Id. The

Appellate Court stated, 

We have no indication in this case, however, that the Board applied

these factors or for that matter any factors. Indeed, apart from the

conclusory statement that the employer’s unfair labor practices “were

the type of violations that tend to undermine the Union's status in the

employees’ eyes ... and did so,” the Board provided no explanation for

its key finding that “the withdrawal of recognition occurred in an

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atmosphere and context poisoned by Respondent’s commission of

unfair labor practices which had the effect of contributing significantly

to the Union's loss of majority among the bargaining unit employees.” 

Id. (citing Quazite Corp., 315 N.L.R.B. at 1080). On remand from the Appellate Court, the NLRB

applied the factors and concluded there was an insufficient nexus between the respondent’s unfair

labor practices and the allegedly tainted anti-union petition. Quazite Corp., 323 N.L.R.B. 511, 511

(1997). In support of its conclusion, the NLRB made a series of findings. Id. at 512. First, the

NLRB noted the remoteness in time between the respondent’s unfair labor practices and the

employees’ union disaffection. Id. (stating that the parties continued to bargain for 2 more months

after the respondent’s unfair labor practices). Second, the NLRB relied on the ALJ’s finding that the

respondent did not engage in bad-faith bargaining during the bargaining process. Id. Third, the

NLRB acknowledged that the respondent’s remaining unfair labor practices were isolated to

employees who worked at a different facility. Id. 

In contrast to Quazite Corp., here the record indicates that the ALJ considered Respondent’s

defensive explanations for the Union’s loss of support. In rejecting Respondent’s defensive

explanations, the ALJ specifically noted the nexus between unfair labor practices and resulting union

disaffection. (Pet. Ex. B at p. 10.) Also unlike Quazite Corp., here there was no finding by the ALJ

that Respondent’s unfair labor practices were isolated to certain employees who worked at a

different facility. To the contrary, the ALJ found that most of Respondent’s unfair labor practices

occurred at the hotel and that each unfair labor practice involved employees who worked there. (Id.) 

Accordingly, the current case is factually distinguishable to Quazite Corp. 

In the Court’s view, the record amply supports a finding of a causal relationship between

Respondent’s unfair labor practices and the subsequent expression of employee disaffection with the

Union. Williams Enterprises, 312 N.L.R.B. at 939. In considering the relevant factors, first, the

Court finds that the union disaffection occurred shortly after a series of Respondent’s unlawful

threats, promises, and terminations. Id. The Court finds the length of time between Respondent’s

unfair labor practices and the union disaffection compelling. Second, in considering the nature of

Respondent’s acts, the Court concludes that promising benefits, threatening to cut hours, and

engaging in terminations of pro-union employees, are acts that would have a detrimental and lasting

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effect on other employees. Id. Third, given the small population of employees at the hotel,

Respondent’s actions would have a strong tendency to cause employee disaffection with a union. 

Fourth, the Court finds that under the totality of the circumstances there is evidence that

Respondent’s unlawful conduct had the effect of stifling union support. Accordingly, there is

sufficient evidence to conclude the anti-union petition was tainted by antecedent unlawful conduct. 

Considering the evidence, and the ALJ’s findings, the Court finds that Petitioner has demonstrated

that he is likely to prevail on the merits of the section 8(a)(5) allegation.

In conclusion, the Court finds that Petitioner has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success

of prevailing on the merits of the section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) allegations. Not only has Petitioner

offered evidence, but the ALJ has made his own findings supporting Petitioner’s allegations. Since

assessing the likelihood of success calls for a predictive judgment about what the Board is likely to

do with the case, the Court finds the ALJ’s determinations to be a useful benchmark against which

the Regional Director’s prospects of success may be weighed.

II. Irreparable Harm

In addition to likelihood of success on the merits, Petitioner must show that a temporary

injunction is necessary to avoid irreparable harm. Petitioner contends that irreparable harm is

presumed because it has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. Aside from the

presumption, Petitioner states that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a temporary

injunction because Respondent’s conduct will undermine the employees’ free exercise of rights

guaranteed by section 7 of the Act. Respondent argues that Petitioner’s delay in seeking a section

10(j) temporary injunction is evidence that no irreparable harm will occur. The Court finds

petitioner’s arguments to be well taken. 

As discussed above, Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the

merits on each of the alleged violations. Therefore, the Court will presume irreparable injury. 

Miller, 19 F.3d at 461 (“[i]f the Board demonstrates that it is likely to prevail on the merits, we

presume irreparable injury.”); see also Nutri-Cology, 982 F.2d at 398. In statutory enforcement

cases where the government has met the “probability of success” prong of the preliminary injunction

test, courts presume it has met the “possibility of irreparable injury” prong because the passage of

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the statute is itself an implied finding by Congress that violations will harm the public. Miller, 19

F.3d at 459 (citations omitted). 

Although further inquiry into irreparable injury is not required, the Court notes that even

without the presumption described above, Petitioner has sufficiently established irreparable harm. 

The charge supporting evidence and the ALJ’s findings demonstrate that Respondent has engaged in

a series of coercive acts that would severely harm future union efforts. The Court finds that

Respondent’s conduct would impair the employees’ rights under the Act by causing an erosion of

support from the Union, by impairing the effectiveness of the Union, by making it difficult to

enforce union rules and regulations, and by making it difficult to preserve the collective bargaining

process. Bloedorn, 276 F.3d at 298-99; Moore-Duncan v. Horizon House Developmental Services,

155 F. Supp. 2d 390, 396-97 (E.D. Pa. 2001). These are the precise harms that section10(j)

injunctions were meant to protect against by ensuring the alleged unlawful conduct will not succeed

in destroying a union before the NLRB can make a decision. Accordingly, the Court finds that

Petitioner has sufficiently established irreparable harm.

III. Balance of Hardships

Petitioner argues that the balance of the hardships tips in its favor because without injunctive

relief, the Union and the employees will continue to suffer deprivation of their rights under the Act

while the unfair labor proceeding runs its course. Petitioner maintains that Respondent will suffer

no harm through the imposition of an interim bargaining order that merely restores the status quo

ante. Respondent disagrees and insists that Petitioner’s delay in seeking relief undermines

Petitioner’s hardship claim. Respondent also argues that one of the discharged housekeepers,

Maldonado, has left the United States and therefore does not stand to benefit from the proposed

interim relief. Lastly, Respondent explains that an injunction would force Respondent to cancel the

employees’ existing healthcare, to incur additional attorneys’ fees associated with the bargaining

process, and to fire its current innocent employees if Maldonado and Valencia are reinstated.

When considering the balance of hardships, the court must take into account the probability

that declining to issue the injunction will permit the allegedly unfair labor practice to reach fruition

and thereby render meaningless the Board’s remedial authority. Miller, 19 F.3d at 460. Where the

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Petitioner and the Respondent each make a showing of hardship, the court must exercise its sound

discretion to determine whether the balance tips in Petitioner’s favor. Id.

The Court, in the exercise of its discretion, concludes that the balance of hardships tips in

favor of the Petitioner. An interim bargaining order would merely restore the status quo and require

Respondent to bargain with the Union in good faith to an agreement or a bona fide impasse. At such

a point, Respondent could withdraw union recognition, provided that the employees’ collective

decision to do so is untainted by unlawful labor practices. An order requiring Respondent to cease

threatening employees with loss of benefits or promising employees certain benefits, in order to

discourage union membership would have little hardship on Respondent. Requiring Respondent to

offer to reinstate Valencia and Maldonado has minimal hardship on Respondent compared to the

proposition of unemployment for the two housekeepers. Respondent’s comparative hardships are far

outweighed by the hardship faced by the employees as the result of continued violations of their

fundamental rights under the Act. In light of their fundamental rights, and because failure to issue

an injunction would allow the unfair labor practice to continue, Petitioner demonstrated that the

balance of hardships tips in its favor.

IV. The Public Interest

Petitioner contends that the issuance of an injunction will serve the public interest and further

the purposes of the Act by ensuring that an unfair labor practice will not succeed because the Board

takes too long to investigate and adjudicate” the case. Miller, 19 F.3d at 460. Respondent does not

substantively address a countervailing public interest that would be harmed by granting the

temporary injunction. 

As discussed above, Petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. In

statutory enforcement cases where the government has met the “probability of success” prong of the

preliminary injunction test, courts presume it has met the “possibility of irreparable injury” prong

because the passage of the statute is itself an implied finding by Congress that violations will harm

the public. Id. at 459. Accordingly, the Court finds that the public interest is advanced by the

granting of a temporary injunction. 

CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that temporary relief is just and proper to protect

the integrity of the Act while the NLRB resolves an unfair labor practice charge. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j). 

The Court GRANTS the Petition for a Temporary Injunction and GRANTS the Motion to Try the

Injunction on the Basis of the Administrative Record.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pending the final disposition of the matters now pending

before the National Labor Relations Board, Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, assigns and

all persons acting in concert or participation with it cease and desist from:

(1) Threatening employees with loss of benefits or promising benefits, in order to 

discourage union membership or activities;

(2) Discharging employees or laying off employees, in order to discourage union 

activities and union membership;

(3) Withdrawing recognition from the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining 

representative of the Respondent’s employees in the appropriate bargaining unit;

(4) Refusing to meet and bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining 

representative of Respondent’s employees in the appropriate bargaining unit with respect to rates of

pay, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment including contributions to

health insurance, union security, and wages;

(5) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in

the 

exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pending the final disposition of the matters now pending 

before the National Labor Relations Board, Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, assigns and

all persons acting in concert or participation with it, shall take the following affirmative steps: 

(1) Within five (5) days of the issuance of this Order, offer in writing, immediate interim 

reinstatement to Christina Valencia and Maria Maldonado to their former position at their previous,

wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment, displacing, if necessary, any workers

hired or reassigned to replace them;

(2) Upon request, meet at reasonable times and bargain in good faith with the Union as 

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the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its employees in the appropriate bargaining

unit, with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of

employment until either a good-faith lawful impasse or an understanding on a new

collective-bargaining agreement is reached and, if such an understanding is reached, embody such

understanding in a signed agreement. The obligation to meet and bargain shall be for a reasonable

period of time, not to exceed 90 days from the issuance of this Order and it shall, in no event,

constitute less than three (3) negotiating sessions that are attended by all necessary parties. Nothing

in this Order shall interfere with the parties’ statutory right to engage in a lawful strike and/or a

lawful lockout, nor require Respondent to rescind any changes in terms and conditions of

employment that were implemented after September 14, 2005, without bargaining in good faith with

the Union. The appropriate bargaining unit is: all employees covered by the collective-bargaining

agreement between Respondent and the Union, effective by its terms until November 20, 2004, as

extended;

(3) Post copies of this Order at Respondent’s South San Francisco, California facilities in 

all locations where notices to employees are customarily posted; maintain these postings during the

Board’s administrative proceeding free from all obstruction and defacement; grant all employees

free and unrestricted access to the posting; and grant to agents of the Board reasonable access to

Respondent’s South San Francisco, California facilities to monitor compliance with the posting

requirement; and

(4) Within twenty (20) days of the issuance of this Order, file with the Court, with a copy 

served on the Regional Director for Region 20 of the Board, a sworn affidavit from a responsible

official of Respondent, setting forth with specificity the manner in which Respondent is complying

with the terms of the Order, including the locations of the posted documents and proofs of mailing.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 100 days of the entry of this Order, the parties 

shall file a joint statement informing the Court of the status of this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated: March 1, 2007 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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