Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-02312/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-02312-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
Plaintiff
Ward Technical Products, Inc
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY 

CORPORATION, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

WARD TECHNICAL PRODUCTS, INC., 

as administrator of the SPI Control 

Systems Pension Plan, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:22-cv-2312-DAD-SCR 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Pursuant to to Local Rule 302(c)(19), Plaintiff Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s 

(“Plaintiff” or “PBGC”) motion for a default judgment (ECF No. 13) was heard by Magistrate 

Judge Barnes on December 22, 2023. No appearance was made by Defendant or on its behalf. 

The motion remained undecided when this matter was reassigned to the undersigned on August 6, 

2024 (ECF No. 18). The undersigned hereby recommends that the motion be granted. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this action on December 29, 2022. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff brings this 

action under Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), as 

amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461. Plaintiff seeks an order: 1) terminating the SPI Control 

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Systems Pension Plan (hereafter “Pension Plan”); 2) appointing Plaintiff as statutory trustee of the 

Pension Plan; 3) establishing May 31, 2019, as the termination date of the Pension Plan; and 4) 

directing Defendant Ward Technical Products (“Defendant”) and any other person or entity 

having possession, custody, or control of any records, assets, or other property of the Pension 

Plan, to transfer or convey such property to Plaintiff. ECF No. 1 at 1-2. 

Plaintiff is a wholly owned United States government corporation established under 29 

U.S.C. § 1302(a) to administer and enforce the defined benefit pension plan termination insurance 

program under Title IV of ERISA. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 3. Defendant was a California corporation 

located in Vacaville, California and is the plan administrator of Pension Plan. Id. at ¶ 4. The 

Pension Plan was established in 1994 and had three participants. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7. On May 29, 2019, 

the California Secretary of State suspended Defendant’s corporate status. Id. at 15. On 

September 13, 2020, Mr. Charles Ward, the Defendant’s Director, President, and 100% owner 

passed away. Id. at ¶¶ 10, 17. 

Plaintiff filed proof of service on Defendant on April 27, 2023. ECF No. 10. The Court 

had previously granted Plaintiff’s motion to approve alternative service (ECF No. 4) and 

authorized service via the California Secretary of State. ECF No. 9. Plaintiff then requested the 

Clerk of the Court enter default (ECF No. 11), which the Clerk did on June 15, 2023. ECF No. 

13. On June 28, 2023, Plaintiff moved for default judgment. ECF No. 13. Judge Barnes heard 

the motion on December 22, 2024. ECF No. 28. Attorney William Mabry appeared on behalf of 

Plaintiff, and no appearance was made by Defendant or on its behalf. ECF No. 17. The 

undersigned has reviewed and considered the audio recording of the brief motion hearing. 

LEGAL STANDARDS 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governs applications to the court for default judgment. 

Upon entry of default, the complaint’s well-pled factual allegations regarding liability are taken 

as true, while allegations regarding the amount of damages must be proven. See Fair Housing of 

Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002); Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe & 

Concrete Prods., 722 F.2d 1319, 1323 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1 

(1944); Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1977). 

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Granting or denying default judgment is within the court’s sound discretion. Draper v. 

Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 (9th Cir. 1986); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d. 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 

1980). The court considers a variety of factors in exercising its discretion. Eitel v. McCool, 782 

F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Among them are: 

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of 

plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) 

the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute 

concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to 

excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 

Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72 (citing 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 55-05[2], at 55-24 to 55-26). 

ANALYSIS 

1. The Eitel Factors Favor Entry of Default Judgment 

a. Possibility of Prejudice to the Plaintiff 

The first Eitel factor contemplates the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff if a default 

judgment is not entered. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. Prejudice can be established where failure to 

enter a default judgment would leave plaintiff without a proper remedy. Pepsico, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. 

Cans, 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Here, Plaintiff would be left without 

recourse. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Ocean Label, Inc., 2015 WL 237831 at *5 

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2015) (“under 29 U.S.C. § 1342(c), a pension plan can be terminated only by 

consent of the pension plan’s administrator or by decree of a district court ... default makes it 

impossible to terminate the Pension Plan consensually, leaving a court order as the only option.”). 

Since Defendant failed to appear in this action, denial of default judgment would leave Plaintiff 

no remedy. Accordingly, the first factor weighs in favor of default judgment. 

b. Merits of Plaintiff’s Substantive Claims and Sufficiency of the Complaint 

The second and third Eitel factors jointly examine whether the plaintiff has pleaded facts 

sufficient to establish and succeed upon its claims. Pepsico, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1175 (citing 

Kleopping v. Fireman’s Fund, 1996 WL 75314, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 1996)). Plaintiff’s 

motion for default judgment seeks to have the Pension Plan terminated, to have Plaintiff 

appointed as statutory trustee, to establish the termination date of the Pension Plan, and to direct 

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the transfer of records, assets, and property of the Pension Plan to Plaintiff. See Proposed Order 

at ECF No. 14. 

As context, it is worth recounting the Supreme Court’s explanation of Plaintiff PBGC’s 

role and powers: 

PBGC is a wholly owned United States Government corporation, modeled after the 

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The Board of Directors of the PBGC consists of 

the Secretaries of the Treasury, Labor, and Commerce. The PBGC administers and 

enforces Title IV of ERISA. Title IV includes a mandatory Government insurance 

program that protects the pension benefits of over 30 million private-sector American 

workers who participate in plans covered by the Title. In enacting Title IV, Congress 

sought to ensure that employees and their beneficiaries would not be completely 

“deprived of anticipated retirement benefits by the termination of pension plans before 

sufficient funds have been accumulated in the plans.” 

... Section 4042 of ERISA provides that the PBGC may terminate a plan whenever it 

determines that: 

“(1) the plan has not met the minimum funding standard required under section 

412 of title 26, or has been notified by the Secretary of the Treasury that a notice 

of deficiency under section 6212 of title 26 has been mailed with respect to the tax 

imposed under section 4971(a) of title 26, 

“(2) the plan will be unable to pay benefits when due, 

“(3) the reportable event described in section 1343([c])(7) of this title has 

occurred, or 

“(4) the possible long-run loss of the [PBGC] with respect to the plan may 

reasonably be expected to increase unreasonably if the plan is not terminated.” 

29 U.S.C. § 1342(a). 

Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 636–40 (1990) (citations and footnotes 

omitted). 

Plaintiff alleged that the Pension Plan is a single employer, defined benefit plan, covered 

by Title IV of ERISA and that it has three participants. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 5, 7. Plaintiff alleged 

that Defendant’s director used the Pension Plan’s assets to make a series of loans to himself and 

that such loans violated ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules. Id. at ¶¶ 10-13. Plaintiff alleged 

that the Defendant was experiencing cash flow problems and the California Secretary of State 

suspended Defendant’s corporate status on May 29, 2019. Id. at ¶ 15. On or before May 31, 

2019, Defendant ceased all operations and terminated its employees. Id. at ¶ 16. And on 

September 13, 2020, Mr. Ward passed away, which left no one to fund or administer the Pension 

Plan. Id. at ¶ 17. 

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Plaintiff alleged that under 29 U.S.C. § 1342, it is authorized to commence proceedings to 

terminate a plan when it determines the plan is unable to pay benefits, and that Plaintiff has made 

such determination. Id. at ¶¶ 18-19. On September 6, 2022, Plaintiff issued a Notice of 

Determination to Defendant stating it had determined that the Pension Plan will be unable to pay 

benefits when due. Id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiff states the Pension Plan is underfunded by approximately 

$669,830. Id. at ¶ 23. Because Plaintiff and Defendant have not agreed on a termination date for 

the Pension Plan, Plaintiff asks the Court to make the determination under § 1348(a)(4). 

In consideration of Plaintiff’s allegations and the applicable law, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged its claims and that those claims have merit. 

c. Sum of Money at Stake 

In weighing the fourth Eitel factor, “the court must consider the amount of money at stake 

in relation to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1176-

77. The factor weighs against default judgment when a large sum of money is at stake. Eitel, 782 

F. 2d. at 1472. Here, Plaintiff does not seek a monetary award, and this factor does not weigh 

against default judgment. 

d. Possibility of Disputed Material Facts 

The fifth Eitel factor examines whether a dispute regarding material facts exists. Eitel, 

782 F.2d. at 1471-72. Here, Defendant failed to appear leading to an entry of default. Given the 

circumstances of Defendant’s corporate status being suspended and the death of its owner, there 

appears to be no possibility for a dispute of material fact. See Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc. v. 

Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Because all allegations in a well-pleaded 

complaint are taken as true after the court clerk enters default judgment, there is no likelihood that 

any genuine issue of material fact exists”). This factor weighs in favor of a default judgment. 

e. Whether the Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect 

The sixth Eitel factor considers whether a defendant’s failure to answer is due to 

excusable neglect. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. This factor considers due process, ensuring a 

defendant is given reasonable notice of the action. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust 

Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 

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Here, Defendant was properly served with a copy of the complaint. Additionally, the 

request for the Clerk to enter default (ECF No. 11) was served on Defendant. Further, Plaintiff’s 

motion for approval of alternate service set forth that after Defendant’s Director, Charles Ward, 

passed away, counsel attempted to resolve the issues herein by contacting Charles Ward’s son. 

ECF No. 4 at 3. Under the circumstances, it is unlikely that the Defendant’s inaction was the 

result of excusable neglect. Shanghai Automation Instrument Co., Ltd. v. Kuei, 194 F.Supp.2d 

995, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (finding no excusable neglect because the defendants were served 

with the complaint, the notice of entry of default, as well as the papers in support of the instant 

motion). This factor does not weigh against default judgment. 

f. Policy of Deciding Cases on the Merits 

The seventh Eitel factor considers the courts’ general disposition favoring judgments on 

the merits. Eitel 782 F.2d at 1472. The Defendant’s failure to appear has made a judgment on 

the merits impossible. Accordingly, this factor does not weigh strongly against a default 

judgment. In consideration of all the Eitel factors, the undersigned finds the factors weigh in 

favor of granting Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. 

2. The Relief Sought 

Plaintiff seeks a default judgment (1) terminating the Pension Plan, (2) appointing 

Plaintiff as the Pension Plan’s statutory trustee, (3) establishing May 31, 2019 as the Pension 

Plan’s termination date, and (4) directing all persons having possession, custody, or control of any 

records, assets, or other property of the Pension Plan to transfer such items to Plaintiff. ECF No. 

14. As set forth above, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that it may seek to have the Pension Plan 

terminated under 29 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2) and (c) and have itself appointed as the statutory trustee 

under § 1342(b)(1). 

As for the termination date, the Court may establish it under 29 U.S.C. § 1348(a)(4). 

Plaintiff asserts that May 31, 2019 is an appropriate date because the California Secretary of State 

suspended Defendant’s corporate status on May 29, 2019, and by May 31, 2019, Defendant 

ceased all operation and terminated its employees. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 15-16. Plaintiff’s Notice of 

Determination informed that it would seek to have May 31, 2019 established as the termination 

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date. ECF No. 1-2. May 31, 2019 is accordingly an appropriate date. 

As for the transfer of Pension Plan records, assets, and property, the Court finds Plaintiff’s 

request is appropriate. Section 1342(d)(1)(A)(ii) provides that the statutory trustee has the power 

“to require the transfer of all (or any part) of the assets and records of the plan to himself as 

trustee.” The Court finds that this relief too is appropriate. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. 

Beverly Hills South Pacific Surgery Center, 2017 WL 8222633 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2017) 

(establishing plan termination date, appointing Plaintiff as statutory trustee, and ordering transfer 

of assets and records); Ocean Label, Inc., 2015 WL 237831 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2015) 

(same). 

CONCLUSION 

Having considered the Eitel factors, the undersigned finds they weigh in favor of a default 

judgment for Plaintiff. 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (ECF No. 13) be GRANTED, and the Court 

enter Judgment ordering that: 

a. The SPI Control Systems Pension Plan (the “Pension Plan”) is terminated 

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1342(c); 

b. Plaintiff is appointed as statutory trustee of the Pension Plan pursuant to 29 

U.S.C. § 1342(c); 

c. It is established that May 31, 2019, is the termination date of the Pension Plan 

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1348(a)(4); and 

d. The Defendant and any other person or entity having possession, custody, or 

control of any records, assets, or other property of the Pension Plan is directed 

to transfer, convey, and deliver all such records, assets, and other property to 

Plaintiff as statutory trustee of the Pension Plan upon request under 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1342(d)(1). 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) 

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days after these findings and recommendations are filed, any party may file written objections 

with the court. A document containing objections should be titled “Objections to Magistrate 

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed 

within 14 days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive the right to appeal 

the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: December 27, 2024 

 

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