Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00491/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00491-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mobile County Revenue Commission
Defendant
Susan Shears
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 Defendant elected not to file a reply brief within the designated time frame. (See

docs. 29, 35.) As such, this Motion is taken under submission based on the principal briefs and

exhibits filed by each side.

2 The Court is mindful of its obligation under Rule 56 to construe the record,

including all evidence and factual inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

See Skop v. City of Atlanta, GA, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007). Thus, plaintiff’s evidence

is taken as true and all justifiable inferences are drawn in her favor. That said, plaintiff’s brief

repeatedly takes unwarranted liberties with the record by making factual characterizations that

exaggerate the facts presented in the cited record excerpts. The Court’s duty to consider the

record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant does not encompass counsel’s factual

representations that are not supported in the record materials cited. See, e.g., Massachusetts

School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar Ass’n, 142 F.3d 26, 40 (1st Cir. 1998) (despite

generous Rule 56 standard, reviewing court need not “swallow plaintiff’s invective hook, line,

and sinker; bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like

need not be credited”) (citation omitted); Taylor v. Holiday Isle, LLC, 561 F. Supp.2d 1269,

1275 n.11 (S.D. Ala. 2008) (“Unadorned representations of counsel in a summary judgment brief

are not a substitute for appropriate record evidence.”).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SUSAN SHEARS, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 07-0491-WS-C

 )

MOBILE COUNTY REVENUE )

COMMISSION, )

 )

Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc.

26). The Motion has been briefed and is ripe for disposition.1

I. Background Facts.2

This Title VII retaliation action arises from plaintiff Susan Shears’ employment

relationship with defendant Mobile County Revenue Commission. Shears has worked for the

Revenue Commission for approximately 17 years in the capacity of Reproduction Tech I. 

Case 1:07-cv-00491-WS-C Document 45 Filed 10/03/08 Page 1 of 14
3 According to Shears, the job duties of an Engineering Tech I are similar to those

of a Reproduction Tech I, except that Engineering Tech I employees also plat “splits,” which

occur when only a portion of a particular parcel of real property is sold. (Id. at 30.)

4 Shears has sought to include a copy of this agreement in the summary judgment

record by filing a pleading styled, “Motion to File Exhibit in Opposition Summary Judgment

Underseal [sic]” (doc. 34). Given the confidential and sensitive nature of the settlement

agreement, the Motion to File Under Seal is granted. The Clerk’s Office is directed to seal

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 18 (doc. 34-2), with access limited to the parties and court personnel.

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(Shears Dep., at 23-24.) In this position, Shears does “whatever is needed,” including customer

service and clerical functions; however, her primary job duty is to plat deeds, which consists of

“tak[ing] a legal description and plat[ting] that particular information to whatever particular

parcel [of real property] that person is trying to obtain.” (Id. at 24.) Two other employees at the

Revenue Commission hold the same job and perform the same duties that Shears does. (Id. at

28.)

In 2005, Shears filed an administrative Charge of Discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission. (Shears Dep., at 28-29.) In that Charge, she asserted

that the Revenue Commission had discriminated against her on the basis of her race (AfricanAmerican) by denying her a promotion to the position of Engineering Tech I. (Id. at 29-30.)3

After Shears filed this EEOC Charge, she and the Revenue Commission participated in a

mediation session before the EEOC on or about November 16, 2005. That mediation yielded a

confidential settlement agreement that resolved Shears’ EEOC Charge in its entirety.4 The terms

of that agreement are largely immaterial to these proceedings; however, it is significant that (a)

the Revenue Commission agreed to pay Shears’ tuition for “basic mapping” training; and (b)

both Shears and Revenue Commissioner Marilyn Wood executed the settlement agreement on

November 16, 2005. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 18; Wood Dep., at 7.)

On November 17, 2005, the very next day after execution of the EEOC settlement

agreement, Wood called Shears in to a meeting with Wood, Paul Gurganus (Shears’ direct

supervisor), and Wayne Turner (Gurganus’s supervisor). (Shears Dep., at 31-32, 35; Wood

Dep., at 7-8.) At that meeting, Wood told Shears that she “didn’t have to file a lawsuit” and that

Case 1:07-cv-00491-WS-C Document 45 Filed 10/03/08 Page 2 of 14
5 Defendant’s witnesses dispute Shears’ account of the November 17 meeting in

several respects; however, for Rule 56 purposes, plaintiff’s version of the facts is accepted as

true and all reasonable inferences from the record are drawn in her favor. In any event, Shears’s

supervisor, Gurganus, allowed that Shears “may have been told ... that problems could be

worked out if she would bring them to ... our attention, instead of just filing an EEOC charge.” 

(Gurganus Dep., at 13.)

6 This Exhibit (like many others submitted by plaintiff) does not appear to have

been properly authenticated in plaintiff’s summary judgment submission. Notwithstanding this

omission, it appearing that these exhibits can be reduced to admissible form at trial, they will be

considered on summary judgment. See Rowell v. BellSouth Corp., 433 F.3d 794, 800 (11th Cir.

2005) (“On motions for summary judgment, we may consider only that evidence which can be

reduced to an admissible form.”); U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Yellow Freight System,

Inc., 296 F. Supp.2d 1322, 1327 n. 2 (S.D. Ala. 2003) (“Documents must generally be properly

authenticated to be considered at summary judgment, unless it is apparent that those documents

can be reduced to admissible, authenticated form at trial.”).

7 For its part, the Revenue Commission maintains that the purpose of the November

17 meeting was to implement the EEOC settlement by informing Shears that defendant was

ready and willing to assist her in obtaining the training that would enable her to be considered

for promotion. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 16; Wood Dep., at 8-9.) As Wood put it, “We just told her this

was the plan that was based on the EEO agreement.” (Wood Dep., at 12.) Of course, for

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Shears “could have c[o]me to her” with her concerns. (Shears Dep., at 32.)5

 Shears perceived

Wood’s statements in the presence of Shears’ supervisors to be “very intimidating and

harassing,” particularly given her understanding that there should be no discussion about the

EEOC Charge or related events following the successful mediation. (Id. at 35.) According to

Shears, the Revenue Commission managers at that meeting went over the additional training that

Shears was to receive as well as the chain of command she was to utilize if she had further

problems. (Id. at 36.) Shears’ testimony is that she was “reprimanded” at that meeting and that

Gurganus indicated that he “had to keep tabs on” her because she had filed an EEOC Charge. 

(Id. at 70-71.) Shears further testified that she felt that she was being punished at the meeting for

having filed an EEOC Charge, that she felt humiliated, and that she was reduced to tears. (Id. at

66-67.) In a subsequent letter to Wood, Shears characterized the meeting as making her “feel

embarrassed and ashamed that [she] had exercised [her] right to file an EEOC charge.” 

(Plaintiff’s Exh. 3.)6

 In that same letter, Shears wrote that she had been “lectured concerning

factual matters which were disputed during the EEOC Mediation.” (Id.)

7

Case 1:07-cv-00491-WS-C Document 45 Filed 10/03/08 Page 3 of 14
summary judgment purposes, plaintiff’s account of the November 17 meeting is credited and

defendant’s conflicting version is not.

8 Gurganus sets the figure even higher, testifying that he had 27 or more meetings

with Shears concerning errors in 2005-2006. (Gurganus Dep., at 30.)

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According to Shears, in the wake of that November 17 meeting, she “was criticized and

called in meetings all the time” in a manner that “was just awful.” (Shears Dep., at 38.) Shears

characterizes the criticism as “just a lot of nitpicking stuff ... just making life unbearable.” (Id. at

39.) When Shears made errors, those errors were brought to her supervisor, Gurganus, rather

than bringing them to her to be corrected. (Id. at 38, 46.) By contrast, when other employees in

the mapping department made errors, those errors were taken to the employees directly to be

corrected. (Id. at 46-47; Kinman Dep., at 10; Vickers Dep., at 8-10.) Thus, Shears felt that,

following the EEOC proceeding, she was treated less favorably than her co-workers. (Shears

Dep., at 68.) Shears’ evidence is that she had never been scrutinized this heavily by the Revenue

Commission before, and that other employees were not receiving this degree of scrutiny. 

(Plaintiff’s Exh. 3.) As an example of this unfavorable treatment, Shears complains that “they

were watching me when I went on break and when I came back from break.” (Shears Dep., at

40.) Wood acknowledges that Gurganus met with Shears eight different times to discuss her

performance between mid-November 2005 and mid-March 2006;8

 however, she attributes the

admittedly “high” frequency of such meetings to a sudden increase in Shears’ error rate in

platting deeds and performing mapping functions. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 16.) Defendant had never

documented problems with Shears’ error rate prior to her EEOC Charge. (Wood Dep., at 40-41.) 

Likewise, defendant was unable to point to any documentation concerning errors made by

plaintiff’s co-workers, Geneva Kinman and Nina Vickers, even though both of them admittedly

did make platting errors from time to time. (Id. at 47.)

 Shears was summoned to another meeting with Wood, Turner and Gurganus on February

15, 2006. Although the purpose of the meeting is disputed (plaintiff says it was to reprimand

her, defendant says it was to examine the status of her training pursuant to the EEOC settlement),

it is undisputed that the meeting did not go smoothly. Shears maintains that she was criticized

for a lack of initiative in seeking out training opportunities. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 8.) Wood

Case 1:07-cv-00491-WS-C Document 45 Filed 10/03/08 Page 4 of 14
9 The service rating system applicable to Revenue Commission employees provides

four gradations of performance which are, in descending order, as follows: exceptional, high

quality, satisfactory, and unsatisfactory. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 2.) Thus, the June 2006 downgrade of

Shears’ service rating from “high quality” to “satisfactory” lowered her from the second highest

to the third highest of the four rating categories.

10 This is so even though plaintiff’s co-workers, Geneva Kinman and Nina Vickers,

both testified that they were unaware whether platting errors were even considered in service

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maintains that Shears “was argumentative and disrespectful” and “belligerent,” and documented

such conduct with a memorandum to Shears’ personnel file. (Wood Dep., at 17-22; Plaintiff’s

Exh. 5.) That memorandum, which was signed by Wood, Gurganus, and Turner, specifically

noted Shears’ belligerence and disrespectfulness, and further stated that she had failed to show

initiative to obtain the training that might render her eligible for promotion. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 5.) 

Documentation was also placed in Shears’ file concerning other workplace incidents, including

at least one occasion that Gurganus conceded was “very petty,” based on Shears’ failure to

attend a “birthday breakfast” in the office because she was on the phone with a taxpayer. 

(Gurganus Dep., at 39, 41.) There is no indication that other Revenue Commission employees

were written up for similarly “petty” episodes.

The Revenue Commission assigns service ratings to its employees on an annual basis to

measure job performance and establish “if the person is actually doing their job.” (Turner Dep.,

at 11-12.) Service ratings may affect an employee’s ability to secure a promotion, and the

difference between a “satisfactory” employee and a “high quality” employee would be

considered in determining which of them was promoted. (Id. at 15-17.) Before filing her EEOC

Charge, Shears’ service rating had consistently been “high quality” for several years. (Gurganus

Dep., at 25.) In June 2006, however, the Revenue Commission lowered Shears’ service rating to

“satisfactory.” (Shears Dep., at 43; Plaintiff’s Exh. 2.)9

 Defense witnesses offered differing

takes on the reasons for that modification. Wood justified this downgrade primarily by reference

to “the attitude that she has and the initiative that [defendant] opened the door for her and she

didn’t take,” but also mentioned an increase in Shears’ error rate during the evaluation period. 

(Wood Dep., at 31, 36-37.) By contrast, Gurganus cited only the error rate issue as the reason

for the “satisfactory” rating. (Gurganus Dep., at 17.)10 Although Shears’ salary and benefits

Case 1:07-cv-00491-WS-C Document 45 Filed 10/03/08 Page 5 of 14
rating determinations. (Kinman Dep., at 8; Vickers Dep., at 9.) However, defendant’s evidence

is that Shears made 27 documented errors in the 2005-2006 period, while Kinman and Vickers

made just 5 or 6 each. (Gurganus Dep., at 18-21.)

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were not reduced, the lowering of her service rating would reasonably be expected to diminish

her opportunities for promotion at the Revenue Commission or for transfer to other departments

within the Mobile County system, albeit without categorically disqualifying her from all

promotions. (Shears Dep., at 44-45, 69; Wood Dep., at 56-57, 60-61.) Upon learning of the

service rating downgrade, Shears protested to the Revenue Commission that this change was

retaliatory for her EEOC Charge and initiated formal grievance procedures. (Plaintiff’s Exhs. 13

- 15.)

Shears remains employed at the Revenue Commission today. However, her supervisor’s

supervisor, Wayne Turner, testified that Shears’ future with that organization looks “not good ...

[b]ecause of her attitude.” (Turner Dep., at 56.) That said, so long as she continues to perform

her job at a satisfactory level or better, Turner indicated that Shears’ job at the Revenue

Commission will remain available to her. (Id. at 82.) Wood’s position is that she would not

want to recommend Shears for another job because of her “attitude” and “not showing the

initiative to learn new aspects of the job.” (Wood Dep., at 51.) However, between the time that

Wood became Revenue Commissioner in December 2001 and the November 2005 EEOC

mediation, Wood documented no problems with Shears’ attitude or lack of initiative. (Id. at 53-

54.) Only after the EEOC mediation did this documentation and criticism commence.

Ultimately, Shears filed a new EEOC Charge alleging retaliation on or about September

22, 2006. (Defendant’s Exh. O.) That retaliation charge culminated in this lawsuit, wherein

Shears alleges that the Revenue Commission violated Title VII by retaliating against her for

engaging in the protected activity of filing an EEOC Charge in 2005 relating to her non-selection

for the Engineering Tech I job. The Revenue Commission now moves for summary judgment on

this retaliation action.

II. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no issue as to any material fact

and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The

Case 1:07-cv-00491-WS-C Document 45 Filed 10/03/08 Page 6 of 14
11 See also Sullivan v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 170 F.3d 1056, 1059 (11th

Cir. 1999) (“retaliation is a separate offense under Title VII; an employee need not prove the

underlying claim of discrimination for the retaliation claim to succeed”).

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party seeking summary judgment bears “the initial burden to show the district court, by reference

to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at

trial.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party

has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show the existence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to make 'a sufficient showing

on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,' the

moving party is entitled to summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317 (1986)) (footnote omitted). “In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden,

the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the

truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable

inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999

(11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Summary judgment is justified only

for those cases devoid of any need for factual determinations.” Offshore Aviation v. Transcon

Lines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). 

The Eleventh Circuit has expressly rejected the notion that summary judgment should

seldom be used in employment discrimination cases because they involve issues of motivation

and intent. See Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 2004). Rather, “the

summary judgment rule applies in job discrimination cases just as in other cases. No thumb is to

be placed on either side of the scale.” Id. at 1086 (citation omitted).

III. Analysis.

Title VII bars an employer from retaliating against an employee “because he has opposed

any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made

a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or

hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); see Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents,

212 F.3d 571, 586 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Retaliation is a separate violation of Title VII.”).11 In the

absence of direct evidence, Title VII retaliation claims turn on the familiar McDonnell Douglas

Case 1:07-cv-00491-WS-C Document 45 Filed 10/03/08 Page 7 of 14
12 Rowell’s burden of establishing a prima facie case is not heavy. See Crapp v.

City of Miami Beach, 242 F.3d 1017, 1020 (11th Cir. 2001) (“the prima facie requirement is not

an onerous one”). 

13 On the latter point, Eleventh Circuit precedent provides that “[t]he burden of

causation can be met by showing close temporal proximity between the statutorily protected

activity and the adverse employment action.” Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361,

1364 (11th Cir. 2007). The record taken in the light most favorable to Shears reflects that the

Revenue Commission subjected her to a campaign of harassment and intimidation beginning the

day after the successful mediation of her 2005 EEOC Charge. As such, the “close temporal

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burden-shifting analysis applicable to other Title VII claims. The plaintiff first must establish a

prima facie showing of retaliation, after which “the employer has an opportunity to articulate a

legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the challenged employment action as an affirmative defense

to liability. ... The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving retaliation by a preponderance

of the evidence and that the reason provided by the employer is a pretext for prohibited

retaliatory conduct.” Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008);

see also McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1375 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining burden-shifting

framework in the retaliation context).

A. Shears Has Established a Prima Facie Case of Retaliation.

“A prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII requires the plaintiff to show that: (1)

she engaged in an activity protected under Title VII; (2) she suffered an adverse employment

action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action.” Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Butler v.

Alabama Dep’t of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209, 1212-13 (11th Cir. 2008) (“To establish a claim of

retaliation under Title VII or section 1981, a plaintiff must prove that he engaged in statutorily

protected activity, he suffered a materially adverse action, and there was some causal relation

between the two events.”) (citing Goldsmith, 513 F.3d at 1277); McCann, 526 F.3d at 1375.12 

The Revenue Commission prudently concedes that Shears can satisfy the first and third

elements. In particular, defendant acknowledges that Shears engaged in statutorily protected

activity in the 2005 EEOC proceedings, and that the close temporal proximity between the time

of the protected activity and the allegedly adverse actions is sufficient to establish a causal

connection. (Defendant’s Brief (doc. 28), at 10, 21.)13 Nonetheless, the Revenue Commission

Case 1:07-cv-00491-WS-C Document 45 Filed 10/03/08 Page 8 of 14
proximity” threshold is plainly satisfied for purposes of plaintiff’s prima facie case of retaliation.

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insists that Shears’ prima facie case of retaliation fails because she has not shown that she

suffered an adverse employment action. The Court disagrees.

In 2006, the Supreme Court decided Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,

548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006), which unveiled an expansive adverse

action standard under which a Title VII retaliation plaintiff need show only that “a reasonable

employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context

means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination.” 126 S.Ct. at 2415. Four months ago, the Eleventh Circuit had occasion to

examine and apply Burlington in Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2008). The

Crawford panel deemed the Burlington standard to be “decidedly more relaxed” and a “more

liberal view” of the adverse action needed to sustain a Title VII retaliation cause of action than

that adopted by this Circuit previously. Id. at 973-74. In that regard, the appellate court

explained that, “[u]nder the holding of Burlington, the type of employer conduct considered

actionable has been broadened from that which adversely affects the plaintiff’s conditions of

employment or employment status to that which has a materially adverse effect on the plaintiff,

irrespective of whether it is employment or workplace-related.” Id. at 973. In the postBurlington world, Crawford explained, a retaliation plaintiff is no longer required to show

“either an ultimate employment decision or substantial employment action to establish an

adverse employment action for the purpose of a Title VII retaliation claim.” Id. at 974. 

Significantly, the Crawford panel construed Burlington as “strongly suggest[ing] that it is for a

jury to decide whether anything more than the most petty and trivial actions against an employee

should be considered materially adverse to him and thus constitute adverse employment

actions.” Id. at 974 n.14. The Burlington standard and its application in Crawford bodes ill for

employers such as the Revenue Commission seeking summary judgment based on the “adverse

employment action” prong of the prima facie test in Title VII retaliation cases.

Notwithstanding the extremely permissive test ushered in by Burlington, the Revenue

Commission urges the Court to find that Shears has flunked this aspect of her prima facie

burden. Taken in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the record reflects that in the wake

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14 To expose the infirmity of defendant’s position, one need look no further than the

reduction in Shears’ service rating. Crawford itself involved a fact pattern in which the plaintiff

received an unfavorable performance review that affected her eligibility for a merit pay increase

after complaining of race discrimination. The Crawford panel emphatically determined that

there was “no doubt but that Crawford suffered a materially adverse action” in this respect. 529

F.3d at 975. After all, the appellate court reasoned, “[s]uch conduct by an employer clearly

might deter a reasonable employee from pursuing a pending charge of discrimination or making

a new one.” Id. The same is true here. The record reflects that Shears desperately wanted a

promotion. By lowering her service rating to “satisfactory,” the Revenue Commission

substantially impaired her chances of receiving such a promotion. A reasonable employee might

be deterred from pursuing or making a charge of discrimination based on that conduct by an

employer; therefore, even if all of the other alleged retaliatory acts are discounted, the reduction

in service rating by itself would be sufficient to satisfy the Burlington standard, as construed by

the Eleventh Circuit in Crawford. The Revenue Commission’s reliance on pre-Burlington case

law for the proposition that a negative job evaluation does not satisfy the adverse employment

action requirement in the absence of a loss of pay or benefits is misguided, inasmuch as

Burlington jettisoned the legal premise on which each of those decisions was predicated. See

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of her protected activity, the following purportedly retaliatory acts occurred: (a) Shears was

called into meetings with upper management, rebuked for filing an EEOC Charge instead of

following the chain of command, and told that she was expected to give 100% to her job; (b)

Shears’ work was subjected to much more intense scrutiny than it ever had been previously in

her 14 years of employment at the Revenue Commission, with her supervisor admittedly

“keeping tabs on her” following the EEOC mediation; (c) her work was constantly criticized in a

manner that it never had been previously and to a much greater degree than that of her

colleagues; (d) the Revenue Commission began documenting her personnel file extensively,

including write-ups of incidents that her direct supervisor acknowledged were “very petty”; and

(e) her service rating was lowered from “high quality” to “satisfactory,” which could reasonably

be expected to curtail her opportunities for promotion or transfer. Under Burlington and

Crawford, the Court readily finds that a jury could properly determine that a reasonable

employee would have found these alleged acts, taken in the aggregate, to be materially adverse,

such that a reasonable employee well might have been dissuaded by those acts from making or

supporting a charge of discrimination against the employer. Therefore, Shears has made the

requisite prima facie showing of an adverse employment action. The Revenue Commission’s

arguments to the contrary are without merit.14

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Crawford, 529 F.3d at 973-74 (“the Burlington Court effectively rejected the standards applied

by this court ... that required an employee to show either an ultimate employment decision or

substantial employment action to establish an adverse employment action for the purpose of a

Title VII retaliation claim”). “The two standards are distinct and different and, as noted, the

Burlington standard applies to a wider range of employer conduct.” Id. at 974 n.14.

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B. Genuine Issues of Fact Remain on the Question of Pretext. 

Shears having made a prima facie showing of retaliation under Title VII, the burden of

production shifts to the Revenue Commission to articulate legitimate nonretaliatory reasons for

the challenged actions. Defendant maintains that none of its conduct about which Shears is

complaining was retaliatory. With respect to the November 17, 2005 meeting, defendant’s

evidence is that this meeting was convened to implement the terms of the EEOC settlement, not

to criticize, reprimand or intimidate Shears. As for the increased scrutiny of her job performance

and frequent meetings concerning errors, the Revenue Commission’s evidence reflects that

Shears was treated no differently than other employees and that the frequency of meetings was

high for Shears because there was a considerable increase in her mapping error rate, which

defendant attributes to Shears attempting to do more difficult work that she did not know how to

do. Defendant explains the “satisfactory” service rating in June 2006 by pointing to Shears’

error rate and her failure to get along with others. The Revenue Commission’s explanations and

supporting evidence suffice to satisfy its modest burden of production, and plaintiff does not

suggest otherwise. See Vessels v. Atlanta Independent School System, 408 F.3d 763, 769-70

(11th Cir. 2005) (employer’s burden is exceedingly light, and is satisfied as long as employer

articulates clear and reasonably specific non-discriminatory basis for its actions).

Defendant having articulated legitimate nonretaliatory reasons for the conduct at issue,

the McDonnell Douglas analysis hinges on plaintiff’s ability to make a sufficient showing of

pretext to reach a jury. See Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir. 2008)

(“It is the plaintiff’s burden not merely to raise a suspicion regarding an improper motive, but

rather to demonstrate there is a genuine issue of material fact that the employer’s proffered

reason for [the adverse employment action] was pretexual.”). To create a genuine issue of

material fact on the question of pretext, Shears must “demonstrate that the proffered reason was

not the true reason for the employment decision.” Jackson v. State of Alabama State Tenure

Case 1:07-cv-00491-WS-C Document 45 Filed 10/03/08 Page 11 of 14
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Com’n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care

System, Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006) (“To show pretext, a plaintiff must come

forward with evidence, including the previously produced evidence establishing the prima facie

case, sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by the

employer were not the real reasons for the adverse employment decision.”) (internal quotations

and citations omitted). She may do that “either directly by persuading the court that a

discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the

employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Jackson, 405 F.3d at 1289; see also

Brooks v. County Com'n of Jefferson County, Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006)

(quotation omitted). Shears argues in her summary judgment brief that the Revenue

Commission’s stated reasons for the adverse actions are not believable; therefore, in order for

her retaliation claim to withstand summary judgment, her evidence “must reveal such

weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies or contradictions in the employer's

proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy

of credence.” Vessels, 408 F.3d at 771 (citations omitted).

Plaintiff identifies numerous disputed facts in the evidence that tend to undermine and

cast doubt on defendant’s stated reasons for the challenged conduct. With respect to the

November 2005 meeting, if Shears’ account is believed and defendant’s representatives berated

her for filing an EEOC Charge, instructed her to utilize the chain of command rather than filing

lawsuits, and admonished her that she was expected to give 100% on the job, a reasonable jury

could conclude that defendant’s stated justification for the meeting as being to implement the

EEOC settlement was not credible. As for the increase in job scrutiny, if plaintiff’s evidence is

believed there was no dramatic increase in the number of mapping errors she was making and

she was performing normal work (not more difficult work), suggesting that defendant’s stated

reason for its dozens of performance-related meetings with her in the months following the

EEOC mediation were not undertaken because of deteriorating performance, but instead in

retaliation for her EEOC proceedings. It is a jury question as to whether Shears was treated

differently than her peers (Kinman and Vickers) because her mapping errors were far more

extensive, or whether there really was no significant difference in performance between them

and Shears was treated differently simply because of her EEOC Charge. A jury could

Case 1:07-cv-00491-WS-C Document 45 Filed 10/03/08 Page 12 of 14
15 See Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 126 F.3d 1380, 1388 (11th Cir. 1997)

(“[t]here is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be

made based upon the materials before it on summary judgment. Rather, the onus is upon the

parties to formulate arguments ....”) (citation omitted); Pinto v. Universidad De Puerto Rico, 895

F.2d 18, 19 (1st Cir. 1990) (“the court is under no duty to exercise imagination and conjure what

a plaintiff might have alleged, but did not, and do counsel's work for him or her”); Fisher v. Ciba

Specialty Chemicals Corp., 238 F.R.D. 273, 299 n.57 (S.D. Ala. 2006) (where party has not

articulated a theory for liability, “the Court will not formulate their arguments for them”); Stone

v. Allen, 2007 WL 4209262, *1 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 27, 2007) (“Courts are not obligated to read a

party’s mind or to construct arguments that it has failed to raise and that are not reasonably

presented in the court file.”).

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reasonably find that the “satisfactory” service rating was retaliatory given inconsistencies among

defendant’s witnesses as to the reasons for that rating (which Gurganus attributed solely to

mapping errors, while Wood touted both errors and attitude) and given the conflicting evidence

as to whether plaintiff’s error rate had in fact increased.

Perhaps there is an effective rebuttal to plaintiff’s pretext arguments. But defendant did

not address the pretext prong of the McDonnell Douglas test in its summary judgment brief. 

Defendant has not argued that Shears failed to proffer sufficient evidence to create a genuine

issue of material fact regarding whether the Revenue Commission’s articulated reasons are

pretextual. This Court will not undertake to formulate defendant’s summary judgment

arguments for it.15 Accordingly, given that Shears has marshaled evidence and argument making

a colorable showing of pretext, and given defendant’s failure to counter that showing with any

evidence or argument of its own, the Court finds that plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial on her

claims that she was subjected to retaliation in violation of Title VII for having engaged in the

protected activities of filing an EEOC Charge alleging racially discriminatory promotion

practices at the Revenue Commission, and participating in an EEOC mediation session relating

to that charge.

IV. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, and especially the abundance of genuinely disputed

material facts, defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 26) is denied. Additionally,

Plaintiff’s Motion to File Exhibit Under Seal (doc. 34) is granted, and the Clerk of Court is

directed to seal Plaintiff’s Exhibit 18 (doc. 34-2), with access limited to parties and court

Case 1:07-cv-00491-WS-C Document 45 Filed 10/03/08 Page 13 of 14
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personnel.

This action remains set for Final Pretrial Conference before the undersigned on October

7, 2008 at 9:30 a.m., with jury selection to follow on October 28, 2008.

DONE and ORDERED this 3rd day of October, 2008.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-00491-WS-C Document 45 Filed 10/03/08 Page 14 of 14