Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02205/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02205-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Thomas D. Casey
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Scott O. Wright, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable John

T. Maughmer, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-2205

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Western

v. * District of Missouri.

*

Thomas D. Casey, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 5, 2010

Filed: February 17, 2010

___________

Before BYE, RILEY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

After the district court1

 denied his motion to suppress a firearm seized from his

person and statements he made to police, Thomas D. Casey pleaded guilty to being

a felon in possession of a firearm, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his

suppression motion. Following sentencing and entry of judgment, Casey filed this

appeal challenging the denial of his suppression motion. We affirm.

Appellate Case: 09-2205 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/17/2010 Entry ID: 3634811
-2-

We review the denial of a suppression motion de novo and the underlying

factual determinations for clear error. See United States v. Sallis, 507 F.3d 646, 649

(8th Cir. 2007). At the suppression hearing, the government presented evidence that

the firearm was discovered during a traffic stop, after a Peculiar, Missouri police

officer stopped the vehicle in which Casey was a passenger because its windshield

was cracked. The car’s owner received a citation under Peculiar Ordinance

§ 385.010, which prohibits the driving of a vehicle “in such defective mechanical

condition as to be reasonably likely, because of such defective mechanical condition,

to cause damage to persons or property while being so driven.”

Based on the hearing testimony and plain language of section 385.010, we

conclude it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that driving a car with

a cracked windshield violated section 385.010. See United States v. Guel-Contreras,

468 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 2006) (district court’s witness credibility determinations

are virtually unassailable on appeal); United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th

Cir. 2005) (question is not whether driver actually violated Motor Vehicle Code, but

whether objectively reasonable police officer could have formed reasonable suspicion

that driver was committing violation; police officers are not expected to interpret

traffic laws with subtlety and expertise of defense attorney); United States v. RamosCaraballo, 375 F.3d 797, 800-01 (8th Cir. 2004) (vehicle stop is reasonable if it is

supported by probable cause to believe traffic violation, however minor, has

occurred). Therefore, Casey’s argument that Missouri statutes do not prohibit

operating a vehicle with a cracked windshield is unavailing. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 09-2205 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/17/2010 Entry ID: 3634811