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Parties Involved:
Bernard Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 11, 2003 Decided April 11, 2003

No. 01-3141

& No. 01-3142

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

THOMAS FIELDS, A/K/A WOOZIE, AND

BERNARD JOHNSON, A/K/A TADPOLE,

APPELLANTS

–————

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00071–01 & No. 98cr00071–06)

–————

William Jackson Garber, appointed by the court, argued

the cause and filed the briefs for appellant Thomas Fields.

Thomas G. Corcoran, Jr., appointed by the court, argued

the cause for appellant Bernard Johnson. With him on the

brief was Mary-Ellen Noone.

Patricia A. Heffernan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Roy W. McLeese

III and James H. Dinan, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #01-3142 Document #743507 Filed: 04/11/2003 Page 1 of 7
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Before: RANDOLPH and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS.

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: For the third time in two

years, this court considers the case of Thomas ‘‘Woozie’’

Fields and Bernard ‘‘Tadpole’’ Johnson. Fields and Johnson

were each convicted of multiple offenses, including narcotics

conspiracy, RICO conspiracy, armed kidnapping, gang rape,

and attempted murder. On their first appeal, we upheld the

convictions but found that their sentences for narcotics conspiracy violated the Supreme Court’s holding in Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). See United States v.

Fields, 242 F.3d 393 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (‘‘Fields I’’). The

government sought rehearing, citing some language that appeared to exceed the Apprendi rule. On rehearing, we made

clear that Apprendi applies to findings triggering a higher

statutory maximum but not to ones that merely affect a

sentence below a statutory maximum; we directed the district court to resentence the defendants in accordance with

our opinions. See United States v. Fields, 251 F.3d 1041,

1043–44 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (‘‘Fields II’’).

Fields and Johnson now appeal from their resentencing by

the district court. We have carefully considered and now

reject all of their arguments; only one, a new Apprendi

claim, requires a written opinion. Johnson argues (as does

Fields, but the facts involved in the latter’s case add nothing

material, so we focus on Johnson) that the district court

engaged in an improper ‘‘borrowing’’ or melding of statutory

and Sentencing Guidelines provisions for different offenses.

Specifically, the court combined (a) Guidelines provisions

bumping his sentence up on the basis of drug quantities that

it found, rather than a jury (and by a preponderance rather

than beyond a reasonable doubt), with (b) a statutory maximum of life imprisonment derived from his RICO conviction

for armed kidnapping. The result, a sentence of 292 months,

was longer than was available to the court for Johnson’s drug

offenses alone (because of the statute and Apprendi) or for

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his kidnapping conviction alone (because of the Guidelines).

He reasons that because the drug quantities could not have

resulted in a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum of 20

years on the narcotics conspiracy count—as Fields I and

Fields II make clear—those drug quantities also cannot

increase his sentence on the RICO kidnapping count beyond

20 years. The district court rejected this logic and so do we.

* * *

Johnson was convicted of a total of 16 counts, of which the

two most relevant for our purposes are Count 1, narcotics

conspiracy, and Count 3, RICO conspiracy (including, among

other acts, narcotics conspiracy, attempted murder, and

armed kidnapping). At trial the jury had not been charged to

decide drug quantities. At sentencing, however, the judge

found by a preponderance of the evidence that large quantities should be attributed to Johnson, including more than

2,000 kilograms of marijuana, more than 1,600 grams of crack

cocaine, and more than 11,000 grams of PCP. Based on these

findings and the statutory maxima for such amounts under 21

U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, the judge initially sentenced Johnson

to life in prison on the drug conspiracy count.

We reversed the sentence in a straightforward application

of Apprendi. ‘‘[I]n drug cases under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and

846, before a defendant can be sentenced to any of the

progressively higher statutory maximums that are based on

progressively higher quantities of drugs specified in subsections 841(b)(1)(A) or (B), the Government must state the drug

type and quantity in the indictment, submit the required

evidence to the jury, and prove the relevant drug quantity

beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ Fields I, 242 F.3d at 396.

In defense of the district court’s sentencing, the government argued, among other things, that a life sentence was

available for the RICO convictions, under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a),

which provides that RICO violations shall be punishable by

imprisonment for ‘‘not more than 20 years (or for life if the

violation is based on a racketeering activity for which the

maximum penalty includes life imprisonment).’’ 18 U.S.C.

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§ 1963(a). Because the jury found defendants guilty of

armed kidnapping, which can carry a maximum sentence of

life imprisonment under D.C. law, D.C. Code Ann. § 22–2101

(1996), the government urged that the life sentence did not

violate Apprendi. Fields I, 242 F.3d at 397.

We rejected the government’s RICO argument. As we

explained in Fields II, upholding the sentence on that theory

would have required us to speculate about the district court’s

intentions. See Fields II, 251 F.3d at 1046. But we made

clear that ‘‘[o]n remand, the Government will be free to argue

to the District Court that life sentences should be imposed on

the RICO conspiracy count’’ for the act of kidnapping. Id.

On remand, the district court sentenced Johnson to a

prison term of 292 months for armed kidnapping and the

RICO conspiracy act of armed kidnapping. Following the

Sentencing Guidelines (as defendants do not dispute), the

court divided Johnson’s 16 convicted offenses into two groups.

U.S.S.G. §§ 3D1.1, 3D1.2; Re-sentencing Memo (‘‘R.M.’’) at

6, 7. Group 1 included the narcotics conspiracy and the drugrelated RICO racketeering acts. R.M. at 6. Group 2 included the non-drug offenses, namely armed kidnapping and

attempted murder, both in their own right and as RICO

racketeering acts. R.M. at 7.

Still following the Guidelines, the district court computed

the offense level for each group. Based on the drug quantities found by the court, Group 1 had a base offense level of

40, and Group 2 (the non-drug offenses) a level of 30. R.M.

at 6–7. It then correctly selected ‘‘the offense level applicable

to the Group with the highest offense level’’—in this case,

Group 1’s level of 40—as the ‘‘combined offense level.’’

U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4; R.M. at 8. Level 40 results in a sentence

range between 292–365 months, or roughly 24–30 years,

before other adjustments that are irrelevant here.

Because 292 months would exceed the twenty-year statutory maximum under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C) and 846 for

narcotics offenses where the drug quantity is not found by

the jury, the court reduced Johnson’s sentence on the drug

counts to 240 months, or 20 years, consistent with Fields I

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and Fields II. But for the armed kidnapping and the RICO

charge, it imposed sentence terms of 292 months, well within

the life maximum. (The sentences were to be served concurrently, as were all of the sentences other than certain gun

adjustments.)

Johnson argues that the district court’s calculation violates

Apprendi because the drug quantities found by the court—

not the jury—significantly increased his armed kidnapping

and RICO offense levels, and thus his sentence. His theory

is simply another effort to apply Apprendi to sentence-raising

Guidelines decisions within a statutory maximum, the proposition that Fields II clearly rejected. Fields II, 251 F.3d at

1043–44.

Had Johnson been convicted of only the narcotics offense,

without the RICO and armed kidnapping charges, then he

would have a claim to be sentenced under the statutory

maximum for narcotics only. And had he been convicted of

the RICO offense only, then he would have a claim to be

sentenced under the Guidelines provisions for the RICO

offense only. But Johnson was convicted of both offenses

(and plenty of others). The Guidelines section for multipleoffense convictions plainly states that it ‘‘provides rules for

determining a single offense level that encompasses all the

counts of which the defendant is convicted.’’ U.S.S.G. § 3D

(Introductory Comment) (emphasis added). This is the device by which the Guidelines supply an integrated solution for

a defendant found guilty of multiple crimes.

Sentence maximums depend on convictions, and convictions

depend on findings by a jury (unless waived) of the elements

of an offense. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476–77. Where the

drug quantity alters the substantive offense, as it can under

21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, Apprendi applies. See United

States v. Webb, 255 F.3d 890, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2001). But there

is no reason to apply Apprendi to drug quantities affecting

the RICO armed kidnapping sentence, as they are not an

element of that offense. Rather, such quantities may be

proven, like all sentence-affecting facts that are not elements

of the offense of conviction, by a preponderance of the

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evidence. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 246 F.3d 696, 699

(D.C. Cir. 2001) (upholding use of preponderance standard for

drug quantity determination not exceeding statutory maximum); see also United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157

(1997) (allowing even acquitted conduct to trigger enhancements if supported by a preponderance of the evidence). In

this sense, the drug quantities are treated like any other

‘‘relevant conduct’’ under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, which can be

found by the court under a preponderance standard. See

United States v. Smith, 267 F.3d 1154, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

Both sides invoke United States v. Rivera, 282 F.3d 74 (2d

Cir. 2000). It is not altogether clear that it helps the

government, but the government doesn’t need help. Johnson

appears to rely on it for its ‘‘count-by-count’’ approach, see,

e.g., id. at 77 n.3. But Rivera speaks only of ‘‘Apprendi’s

count-by-count approach,’’ alluding to the Apprendi Court’s

insistence that the sentence on a count not exceed the maximum permissible, based on a jury finding of the elements for

that count; thus it did the government no good in Apprendi

that the total of the defendant’s sentences on three counts did

not exceed the total permissible if he’d received the legal

maximum on each. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474; Rivera,

282 F.3d at 77 n.3; United States v. White, 240 F.3d 127, 135

(2d Cir. 2001). No such problem is presented here as the

court sentenced defendants within the statutory maximum on

each count.

* * *

Before the Guidelines, Johnson’s sentence would have been

equally permissible; faced with an array of convictions, including one that authorizes a life sentence, a district court

could constitutionally have exercised its discretion to sentence

the defendant to life in prison based on facts found by the

court. Apprendi itself recognized this. See Apprendi, 530

U.S. at 481–82. The formulaic quality of the Guidelines may

make the innumerable necessary fact findings look like offense elements, but they are not. That is the message of

such cases as Watts and Fields II.

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The judgments of the district court are

Affirmed.

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