Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-01268/USCOURTS-caDC-05-01268-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Federation of Government Employees, National Border Patrol Council, AFL-CIO
Petitioner
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 20, 2006 Decided May 5, 2006

Reissued June 21, 2006

No. 05-1268

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,

NATIONAL BORDER PATROL COUNCIL, AFL-CIO,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Labor Relations Authority

Kevin M. Grile argued the cause for petitioner. With him

on the briefs were Mark D. Roth and Charles A. Hobbie.

David M. Shewchuk, Attorney, Federal Labor Relations

Authority, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the

brief was William R. Tobey, Acting Solicitor.

Before: SENTELLE, ROGERS and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: The National Border Patrol

Council (“the Union”) petitions for review of an order of the

USCA Case #05-1268 Document #966658 Filed: 05/05/2006 Page 1 of 9
2

Federal Labor Relations Authority (“FLRA” or “the Authority”).

The FLRA found that a firearms training policy change by the

Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (“the Bureau”) did

not have a greater-than-de-minimis effect on the working

conditions of bargaining-unit employees. Because the FLRA

unreasonably deemed the change de minimis in its effect, we

grant the petition.

I.

The Union exclusively represents nonsupervisory, border

patrol employees within the Bureau, a division of the

Department of Homeland Security. Before Congress shifted

them to the recently created Bureau, the employees worked for

the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). The

Bureau succeeded to INS’s obligations under a 1995 collective

bargaining agreement, by which the Union and the Bureau

continue to abide even though it is now expired. The facts of

this case took place during each agency’s tenure as employer.

The bargaining unit includes Basic Trainee Officers

(“BTOs”), essentially first-year probationary employees. BTOs

must meet proficiency standards in firearms skill, physical

fitness, and foreign language capability, among other areas. The

Bureau may terminate BTOs for deficiency in any of these areas

during the probationary period. The Bureau’s firearms policy

sets out the structure of its firearms training program and the

qualifications for trainees’ firearms proficiency.

In 1996, the Union and INS bargained over revisions to the

firearms policy, including aspects of the policy dealing with

training. The revised policy provided for an initial eight-hour

training period followed by proficiency testing. To bring

deficient BTOs into compliance, the revised policy authorized

up to eighty hours of remedial training. During the same period,

USCA Case #05-1268 Document #966658 Filed: 05/05/2006 Page 2 of 9
3

the Union and INS agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding

(“MOU”), which requires the agency to give the Union notice

and an opportunity to bargain over changes to the firearms

policy. A separate bargaining unit of Bureau employees,

represented by a different union, follows the same firearms

policy and training regimen.

INS again revised its firearms policy six years later. In

pertinent part, it reduced the number of authorized remedial

hours for firearms-deficient BTOs from eighty to eight. While

mulling over the changes, INS did not notify, bargain with, or

otherwise consult with the Union. Upon finalization the agency

gave the Union a copy of the revisions. INS claims that by that

time, it had already implemented the reduced remedial training

hours prior to making the policy change official. Indeed, the

Bureau now insists that neither it nor INS ever offered or gave

more than eight hours of remedial firearms training to any BTO

since 1996.

Claiming that INS committed unfair labor practices while

revising the policy, the Union filed a charge with the FLRA in

2002. In the only claim germane to this petition, it asserted that

the Bureau violated both statutory and contractual duties to

provide notice and an opportunity to bargain over the reduction

in remedial training hours. The FLRA General Counsel

subsequently issued a complaint against the Bureau alleging

violations of 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(1) and (5). 

In a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”),

the Bureau argued that the reduction in remedial training hours

would not have a greater-than-de-minimis effect on working

conditions. To prove greater-than-de-minimis effect, the

General Counsel called the Union’s president to testify.

See Social Security Admin. Office of Hearings & Appeals,

Charleston, S.C., 59 FLRA 646, 655 (2004) (placing burden of

USCA Case #05-1268 Document #966658 Filed: 05/05/2006 Page 3 of 9
4

proof on General Counsel). According to the witness, the

Bureau fired at least one BTO for firearms deficiency without

providing the employee more than eight hours of remedial

training. The witness also testified that the Bureau fired at least

one nonbargaining-unit employee—under the same firearms

policy—without granting eighty remedial training hours.

On this evidence, the ALJ found the effect of the hours

reduction “somewhat speculative.” Nevertheless, the ALJ

concluded that evidence showing the Bureau fired even one

BTO after granting only eight remedial training hours sufficed

to exceed the de minimis standard. Having found a greater-thande-minimis effect, the ALJ held that the Bureau had violated

both its statutory duty and its contractual duty under the MOU

to give notice and bargain over the changes.

The Bureau filed exceptions to the ALJ’s ruling, and the

FLRA reversed. In the Authority’s view, the General Counsel

failed to prove that the Bureau had fired any BTO solely for

firearms deficiency without providing eighty remedial training

hours. In addition, the Authority rejected all evidence related to

nonbargaining-unit employees. Accordingly, the Authority held

that the General Counsel did not prove greater-than-de-minimis

effect, and it therefore concluded that the Bureau had no

statutory duty to bargain over the policy revisions. The

Authority also held that the absence of a statutory duty to

bargain precluded a contractual duty under the MOU.

The Union timely petitions this court for review of the

FLRA’s order, challenging the Authority’s application of the de

minimis exception. The Union also argues that even if a change

is de minimis, an agency may still lawfully choose to bargain

over such a change and that the Bureau was required to do so

here in light of a provision in the MOU requiring the Bureau to

bargain “to the fullest extent allowable under law.” It has since

USCA Case #05-1268 Document #966658 Filed: 05/05/2006 Page 4 of 9
5

conceded, however, that it waived this issue by failing to raise

it before the agency. See 5 U.S.C. § 7123(c). Accordingly, we

only address the reasonableness of the FLRA’s application of

the de minimis exception to the firearms policy revisions.

II.

Federal law requires an agency to “negotiate in good faith”

with its employees’ chosen representative. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7116(a)(5). The employer’s duty to bargain, however, extends

only to bargainable issues, not including a range of matters

labeled “management rights.” 5 U.S.C. § 7106; see also Nat’l

Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 437 F.3d 1248, 1249 (D.C.

Cir. 2006). In addition to these explicit exceptions, the FLRA

has interpreted the statute to include an unwritten de minimis

exception, and we have deferred to its interpretation. See Ass’n

of Admin. Law Judges v. FLRA, 397 F.3d 957, 959 (D.C. Cir.

2005) (“AALJ”). Our deference, however, is not without limits:

The FLRA has the burden before this court to “show[] that any

particular application of the de minimis exception is reasonable.”

Id. at 963. Because the Authority has not carried that burden,

we grant the petition for review.

As we stated in AALJ, “[a] de minimis change is not a

proper subject of bargaining not because management has a

‘right’ to make it but because it has no appreciable effect upon

working conditions.” Id. at 962. Accordingly, any policy

change having an appreciable effect on working conditions

cannot find shelter in the de minimis exception. Appreciable

effects may surface not only through actual past effects but also

through likely future effects. The FLRA recognizes these two

avenues of inquiry in its de minimis exception formula: “In

assessing whether the effect of a decision on conditions of

employment is more than de minimis, the Authority looks to the

nature and extent of either the effect, or the reasonably

USCA Case #05-1268 Document #966658 Filed: 05/05/2006 Page 5 of 9
6

foreseeable effect, of the change on bargaining unit employees’

conditions of employment.” United States Dep’t of the

Treasury, IRS, 56 FLRA 906, 913 (2000) (citation omitted).

Following this methodology, the Authority found that the

firearms policy change had a de minimis effect on working

conditions.

The Authority noted “conflicting” testimony regarding

whether the INS first, and the Bureau later, ever offered more

than eight hours of remedial firearms training to any BTO under

either the original or revised policy. The Authority suggested,

however, that since 1996 the agency may have in practice used

the same training policy that it adopted officially in 2002.

Placing great weight on these years of practice, the Authority

reasoned that any adverse effects from the eight-hour cap on

remedial training should have manifested themselves during that

span. The Authority found no actual adverse effects during the

period after 1996 and therefore concluded that the official policy

change in 2002 entailed no reasonably foreseeable effects either.

But the Union contends that the policy change has caused

actual adverse effects. According to unrefuted testimony, the

Bureau terminated at least one BTO for firearms deficiency

without offering the eighty remedial hours. The witness further

testified that some nonbargaining-unit employees, subject to the

same firearms policy, had also been terminated without

receiving more than eight hours of remedial training.

Without discrediting the witness’s testimony, the FLRA

gave it short shrift. Diminishing the importance of the

testimony regarding the BTO’s termination, the Authority found

that the General Counsel failed to prove that firearms deficiency

was the sole cause of the BTO’s termination. The Authority

placed even less weight on the nonbargaining-unit evidence,

issuing a blanket exclusion: “Evidence of any impact on nonUSCA Case #05-1268 Document #966658 Filed: 05/05/2006 Page 6 of 9
7

bargaining unit employees does not serve to establish an impact

on bargaining unit employees.” The Authority mishandled both

pieces of testimony.

Despite accepting the fact that the Bureau likely fired at

least one firearms-deficient BTO without providing eighty

remedial training hours, the Authority appeared to require a

showing that the policy change constituted the sole cause for the

termination. Such an evidentiary requirement would

fundamentally change the nature of the de minimis exception,

which heretofore relieved the employer of any duty to bargain

over “trivia.” AALJ, 397 F.3d at 959. But the specter of

termination is no trivial matter. It is nonsensical to say that a

termination, if due even in part to the policy change, does not

constitute an “appreciable effect upon working conditions.”

The Authority’s error runs deeper, however. Even if the

Bureau terminated the BTO for other reasons, the evidence

demonstrates the existence of reasonably foreseeable effects.

The Authority accepted that at least one BTO—and perhaps

some nonbargaining-unit employees—became eligible for

termination despite not receiving more than eight remedial hours

of firearms training. The fact that one employee became

termination-eligible due to firearms deficiency makes the

likelihood of a future termination much greater. The Bureau’s

policy change drastically reduced every employee’s ability to

remedy a firearms deficiency, thus increasing the likelihood that

a deficient BTO will actually be terminated by the Bureau. This

increased likelihood of termination, confirmed by a past

occurrence, constitutes a reasonably foreseeable effect on

working conditions. Accordingly, a greater-than-de-minimis

effect exists when an employee has become eligible for

termination due to a policy change.

USCA Case #05-1268 Document #966658 Filed: 05/05/2006 Page 7 of 9
8

The FLRA also erred in its treatment of the testimony

regarding the nonbargaining-unit employees. Although we

generally do not presume to tell the Authority which evidence

it should or should not find persuasive, see 5 U.S.C. § 7123(c)

(setting out “substantial evidence” standard), the complete

exclusion of this evidence is baffling. The nonbargaining-unit

employees worked for the same employer, followed the same

firearms policy, and faced the same penalties for firearms

deficiency. The policy change therefore would have struck a

similar chord in both groups. The Authority already faced

evidence that the Bureau terminated at least one BTO who failed

to meet firearms standards. The terminations of similarly

situated, nonbargaining-unit employees provide additional

evidence of concrete effects and confirm the likelihood of future

adverse effects to the bargaining unit. Again, having neither

discredited the testimony nor given reasons for finding it

unpersuasive, the Authority should not have discarded such

evidence.

More than one alarm bell should have alerted the Authority

to the fact that this policy revision had an appreciable effect on

working conditions. When a policy change increases the

likelihood of an employee’s termination, it almost certainly rises

above the level of trivia. In addition, the sheer magnitude of the

policy change should have given the Authority pause. Because

the Bureau trains BTOs initially for only eight hours, eighty

remedial hours would have given laggards ten times that in

additional training to cure the deficiency. Without consulting

the Union, the Bureau unilaterally reduced that number by

ninety percent, from eighty to eight. A change on that order

alone—where the penalty may be termination—pushes the

bounds of the de minimis exception.

In AALJ, we approved the FLRA’s use of the de minimis

exception for a nearly seventy-percent reduction in reserved

USCA Case #05-1268 Document #966658 Filed: 05/05/2006 Page 8 of 9
9

parking spaces. 397 F.3d at 960. But unreserved parking was

plentiful and freely available, and improper parking would not

lead to dismissal. Id. at 964. The same cannot be said in this

case. Here, the Bureau did not replace the eighty remedial hours

with an equivalent, and firearms deficiency would result in

termination. This massive change had a reasonably foreseeable,

greater-than-de-minimis effect on working conditions. Because

we find that the reduction in remedial training hours had an

appreciable effect on working conditions, we conclude that the

FLRA unreasonably applied the de minimis exception. In

addition, because the Authority erroneously relied on the de

minimis exception in determining that there was no violation of

the MOU, we set aside its resolution of the Union’s MOU claim.

III.

For these reasons, we grant the petition for review. We

remand to the Authority for further proceedings not inconsistent

with this opinion.

USCA Case #05-1268 Document #966658 Filed: 05/05/2006 Page 9 of 9