Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50182/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50182-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark Robert Kiefer
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARK ROBERT KIEFER,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-50182

D.C. No.

3:11-cr-03038-JM-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Jeffrey T. Miller, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 15, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed July 24, 2014

Before: Harry Pregerson, Stephen Reinhardt,

and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Nguyen

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2 UNITED STATES V. KIEFER

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a sentence imposed following the

defendant’s guilty plea to receiving child pornography in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252.

The panel held that U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 neither violates the

separation of powers doctrine nor conflicts with 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553. The panel held that the district court’s application of

a two-level enhancement for the use of a computer under

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(6) does not result in impermissible

double counting. The panel concluded that because the

district court properly applied § 2G2.2, the defendant lacks

standing to challenge the constitutionality of the five-year

mandatory minimum codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1), as

it did not affect his sentence.

COUNSEL

Ezekiel E. Cortez, San Diego, California, for DefendantAppellant.

Anne Kristina Perry (argued), Assistant United States

Attorney, Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney, Bruce R.

Castetter, Assistant United States Attorney, United States

Attorney’s Office, San Diego, California, for PlaintiffAppellee.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. KIEFER 3

OPINION

NGUYEN, Circuit Judge:

Sentencing in child pornography cases can be

controversial.1In this case, however, it is not. Mark Robert

Kiefer was indicted and, pursuant to a plea agreement,

pleaded guilty to one count of receiving child pornography in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252. Under the plea agreement,

Kiefer reserved the right to appeal the constitutionality of

§ 2G2.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines

(“U.S.S.G.”) and the five-year mandatoryminimum sentence

codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1). The district court

sentenced Kiefer to sixty-three months imprisonment

pursuant to § 2G2.2 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553.

We conclude that § 2G2.2 neither violates the separation

of powers doctrine nor conflicts with § 3553. Further, we

hold that the district court’s application of a two-level

enhancement for the use of a computer under § 2G2.2(b)(6)

does not result in impermissible double counting. In so

holding, we join a number of our sister circuits that have

addressed this question and unanimously reached the same

conclusion. Finally, because the district court properly

applied § 2G2.2, Kiefer lacks standing to challenge the

constitutionality of the five-year mandatory minimum as it

did not affect his sentence. We affirm.

 

1

See, e.g., Melissa Hamilton, Sentencing Adjudication: Lessons from

Child Pornography Policy Nullification, 30 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 375, 387

(2014); United States v. Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 964–66 (9thCir. 2011)

(Berzon, J., concurring).

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4 UNITED STATES V. KIEFER

BACKGROUND

A

On July 14, 2011, a grand jury returned a five-count

indictment charging Kiefer with four counts of receiving

child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and

one count of possessing child pornography in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). On March 1, 2012, Kiefer and the

government entered into a written, conditional plea

agreement. Kiefer agreed to plead guilty to one count of

receiving child pornography in violation of § 2252(a)(2). But

Kiefer entered into the plea agreement “with the express

purpose of reviewing on appeal the constitutionality” both of

the five-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C.

§ 2252(b)(1) and of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2.

On February 5, 2013, Kiefer filed a motion challenging

the constitutionality of the mandatoryminimum sentence and

§ 2G2.2. On April 19, 2013, the district court denied the

motion. The district court concluded that Kiefer lacked

standing to challenge the five-year mandatory minimum

because his sentence was “unaffected” by the statutory

mandatory minimum.

On the same date, the district court sentenced

Kiefer—pursuant to § 2G2.2 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553—to

sixty-three months imprisonment, a seven-year period of

supervised release, and a $100 special assessment. On April

24, 2013, the district court entered judgment. Kiefer timely

appealed.

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UNITED STATES V. KIEFER 5

B

In sentencing Kiefer, the district court calculated the

sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines as follows:

Base Offense

Level:

22 (under § 2G2.2(a)(2))

Specific Offense

Characteristics:

+2 (under § 2G2.2(b)(2), for

materials involving prepubescent

minors and minors under the age

of twelve);

+4 (under § 2G2.2(b)(4), for

materials portraying sadistic or

masochistic conduct or other

depictions of violence);

+2 (under § 2G2.2(b)(6), for the use

of a computer); and

+5 (under § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D), for an

offense involving more than 600

images).2

After applying a three-level downward adjustment under

§ 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility, the court calculated

a Total Offense Level of 32, and a sentencing range of

between 121 and 151 months (i.e., between 10 and 13 years).

 

2

 On this appeal, Kiefer does not challenge the five-level enhancement

under § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D).

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6 UNITED STATES V. KIEFER

Sua sponte, the district court then applied a six-level

downward departure pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553, resulting

in a Total Offense Level of 26 and a Sentencing Guidelines

range of between 63 and 78 months. Essentially, the district

court “reduc[ed] the advisory guideline range by almost 50

percent” and then sentenced Kiefer to the low-end: 

sixty-three months imprisonment.

JURISDICTION

The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3231. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“We review questions of standing de novo.” Douglas

County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1499 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Likewise, “[w]e review the constitutionality of a Sentencing

Guideline de novo.” United States v. Ellsworth, 456 F.3d

1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2006). “We review the district court’s

interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its

factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Tanke,

743 F.3d 1296, 1306 (9th Cir. 2014).

DISCUSSION

I

Because the district court sentenced Kiefer pursuant to

§ 2G2.2, he has standing to challenge the constitutionality of

this section. However, we can quickly dispose of his

arguments on appeal.

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UNITED STATES V. KIEFER 7

First, Kiefer argues broadly that § 2G2.2 violates the

separation of powers doctrine.3In Mistretta v. United States,

the United States Supreme Court rejected an analogous

challenge. See 488 U.S. 361, 380–84 (1989) (dismissing

argument as “more smoke than fire”). In addition, the

Supreme Court later held that the Sentencing Guidelines are

advisory only. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233

(2005) (“We have never doubted the authority of a judge to

exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a

statutory range.”); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.

338, 350 (2007) (“The Commission’s work is ongoing. The

statutes and the Guidelines themselves foresee continuous

evolution helped by the sentencing courts and courts of

appeals in that process. . . . [The Commission] may obtain

advice from prosecutors, defenders, law enforcement groups,

civil liberties associations, experts in penology, and others. 

And it can revise the Guidelines accordingly.”); United States

v. Davis, 739 F.3d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A]s a

doctrinal matter the Supreme Court rejected a separation of

powers challenge to the Commission’s structure and authority

in [Mistretta] . . . .”).

Second, Kiefer argues that § 2G2.2 is inconsistent with

18 U.S.C. § 3553. This challenge also fails. As a preliminary

matter, § 3553 is a federal statute and not a constitutional

provision. Regardless, the district court here sua sponte

applied a six-level downward departure in consideration of

the factors set forth in § 3553. As applied to Kiefer’s

sentence, § 2G2.2 in no way conflicts with § 3553.

3 While styled as an “as applied” challenge, Kiefer’s constitutional

arguments are largely facial in nature; indeed, they are not even

necessarily limited to § 2G2.2 but instead attack the U.S.S.G. generally.

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8 UNITED STATES V. KIEFER

II

Importantly, Kiefer concedes that he was not sentenced

pursuant to the five-year mandatory minimum under

§ 2252(b)(1). Consequently, he acknowledges that he has

standing to challenge the statutory mandatory minimum only

if the district court erred in its application of § 2G2.2. 

According to Kiefer, if the court properly had calculated the

applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, he would have faced

a sentencing range below the mandatoryminimum. Thus, we

now turn to the district court’s application of § 2G2.2 to the

undisputed facts.4

A

Kiefer argues that the two-level enhancement for the use

of a computer under § 2G2.2(b)(6) results in impermissible

double counting.

5 Kiefer points out that the statute under

which he was convicted, § 2252(a)(2), criminalizes the

knowing receipt of child pornography “using any means or

facility of interstate or foreign commerce or that has been

mailed, or has been shipped or transported in or affecting

interstate or foreign commerce, or which contains materials

which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any

means including by computer.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)

 

4

 “There is an intracircuit split as to whether the standard of review for

application of the Guidelines to the facts is de novo or abuse of discretion. 

There is no need to resolve this split where, as here, the choice of the

standard does not affect the outcome of the case.” Tanke, 743 F.3d at

1306 (citations omitted).

5 The district court considered the notion that the “use-of-a-computer

enhancement in this case is suggestive of double counting” in sua sponte

applying the six-level downward departure under § 3553.

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UNITED STATES V. KIEFER 9

(emphasis added). Kiefer admits that the statute prohibits the

receipt of child pornography through means other than the

use of a computer but contends that those other means are not

subject to an enhancement under § 2G2.2(b)(6).

This argument has been roundly rejected by our sister

circuits. As the Second Circuit observed in United States v.

Reingold, “the use of a computer is not essential to the act of

distributing child pornography. A person can traffic in child

pornography without using a computer much like one could

commit a robbery without the use of a gun.” 731 F.3d 204,

226 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Therefore, the application of § 2G2.2(b)(6) does

not result in impermissible double counting because the

increase in a defendant’s sentence for use of a computer

accounts for harm that is not fully reflected in the base

offense level.

Again, we find the reasoning of the Second Circuit

persuasive:

[T]he digital revolution, which may be

responsible for more child pornography

crimes’ being committed by computer, has

aggravated rather than mitigated the harms

associated with such crime. By making it

easier to retrieve and distribute child

pornography, computers have expanded the

market for child pornography, which in turn

fuels a greater demand for a product that can

only be produced by abusing and exploiting

children. Moreover, once child pornography

is circulated by computer, it becomes almost

impossible to remove or destroy. In such

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10 UNITED STATES V. KIEFER

circumstances, it was hardly unreasonable,

much less double counting,for the Sentencing

Commission to conclude that the base offense

level applicable to all distributors of child

pornography—even those who share items

non-electronically—should be enhanced for

persons who commit the crime by using a

computer.

Id. (citations omitted).6

Every other circuit court to have addressed this question

has reached the same conclusion. See United States v.

Richardson, 713 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he

statutory language ‘including by computer’ does not require

computer use to violate the statute: using a computer is just

one example of a manner in which child pornography can be

transmitted, and [the defendant] would have violated the

statute had he transported child pornography ‘by any means’

affecting interstate commerce.”); United States v. Lewis,

6 But see id. (“[T]his court has expressed reservations about the

§ 2G2.2(b)(6) enhancement because, now that so many child pornography

crimes are committed by computer, the enhancement applies in virtually

every case so as to have the flavor of double counting.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)); Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 965 (Berzon, J., concurring)

(“[A]n unduly deferential application of § 2G2.2 will lead to the vast

majority of offenders being sentenced to near the maximum statutory

term. Because of the history of Congressional involvement, the base

offense level for possession of child pornography is already a relatively

high 18 (compared to 10 for the same offense in 1991). Enhancements for

the use of a computer, depictions of prepubescent minors, portrayal of

sadistic or masochistic conduct and the involvement of over 600

images—all of which apply in a majority of cases and some of which

apply in more than 90% of them—add up to create an effective base

offense level of 31.”).

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UNITED STATES V. KIEFER 11

605 F.3d 395, 403 (6th Cir. 2010) (“The fact that the statute

articulates computer use as one means of transporting the

proscribed depictions does not mean that use of a computer

is a required element of the crime. . . . [T]he U.S.S.G.

§ 2G2.2(b)(6) enhancement for using a computer aims at

punishing a distinct harm beyond the mere transmission of

child pornography.”); United States v. Tenuto, 593 F.3d 695,

698 (7th Cir. 2010) (“To violate the statute, it was not

necessary that he use a computer. He could have chosen to

mail or fax the material; he could have carried it on a train or

simply walked it across state lines.” (citation omitted)); see

also United States v. Artello, --- F. App’x ---, 2014 WL

1316304, at *4 (11th Cir. Apr. 3, 2014); United States v.

Ballard, 448 F. App’x 987, 989–90 (11th Cir. Dec. 15, 2011);

United States v. Miller, 318 F. App’x 701, 703 (10th Cir. Apr.

1, 2009).

Today, we follow our sister circuits in holding that the

application of the two-level enhancement for the use of a

computer under § 2G2.2(b)(6) does not result in double

counting. As such, in Kiefer’s case, the district court

properly applied this enhancement.

B

Similarly, Kiefer next argues that the district court’s

application of two additional enhancements—§ 2G2.2(b)(2)

for materials involving prepubescent minors and minors

under the age of twelve, and § 2G2.2(b)(4) for materials

portraying sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions

of violence—results in double punishment. We disagree.

Kiefer conjoins two distinct findings, two distinct harms,

and two distinct enhancements. First, with respect to the

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12 UNITED STATES V. KIEFER

application of § 2G2.2(b)(2), the district court found that

“some of the images . . . indisputably and unassailably show

girls much less than 12 years of age.” Second, with respect

to the application of § 2G2.2(b)(4), the court made the

following finding: “[T]hese images are amongst the most

heinous and disturbing that I’ve seen as a judge, and I’ve

handled many of these cases . . . . I think it is appropriate for

these horrific images to be distinguished from images of

minors merely depicted as naked.” In sum, the district court

applied one enhancement based on the age of the victims and,

properly, a second enhancement based on the depiction of

violence.

We already have rejected this argument made in an

analogous context in United States v. Holt, 510 F.3d 1007

(9th Cir. 2007). In Holt, the defendant pleaded guilty to

possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2252A(a)(5)(B). Id. at 1009. The district court imposed the

four-level enhancement for sadistic or masochistic conduct

pursuant to § 2G2.2(b)(4) and a two-level enhancement for a

vulnerable victim pursuant to § 3A1.1(b). Id. at 1010. The

victim depicted was a “very young child,” a “two- or

three-year-old.” Id. at 1011. The defendant argued that the

district court improperly “double counted” and applied these

enhancements for the same harm, “namely, the extreme pain

that necessarily would have been experienced by a very

young child depicted in the pornography.” Id. at 1011.

In rejecting the defendant’s argument, we stated:

Both the sadistic conduct and vulnerable

victim enhancements account for the pain

experienced by a young, small victim of child

pornography, but the enhancements also

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UNITED STATES V. KIEFER 13

account for distinct characteristics of the

crime: the sadistic conduct enhancement

accounts for the pleasure necessarily

experienced by the perpetrator, while the

vulnerable victim enhancement accounts for

the inability of the victim to resist sexual

abuse. Because the two enhancements

account for these distinct wrongs, it was

proper, and no abuse of discretion, for the

district court to apply both to the challenged

criminal conduct.

Id. at 1012.

Likewise, here, the district court’s application of the

challenged enhancements to Kiefer’s sentence did not result

in double counting because they account for two “distinct

wrongs.” While § 2G2.2(b)(2) seeks to account for the

particular harm to and vulnerability of young children under

the age of twelve, § 2G2.2(b)(4) recognizes that especially

egregious sexual abuse of the children depicted may warrant

greater punishment. Therefore, the district court properly

enhanced Kiefer’s sentence both for possessing images

involving children under twelve years old, and because these

images were “amongst the most heinous and egregious that

[he’s] ever seen” and must “be distinguished from images of

minors merely depicted as naked.”

C

Finally, because we conclude that the district court

properly applied § 2G2.2, Kiefer lacks standing to challenge

the constitutionality of the five-year mandatory minimum

sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1). This is because, as

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14 UNITED STATES V. KIEFER

the district court recognized, the statutory five-year

mandatory minimum had no effect on Kiefer’s sentence. See

United States v. Johnson, 886 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1989)

(“[The defendants], who were sentenced to eight and ten

years respectively, were not affected by the [five-year]

mandatory minimum provision of the statute. They lack

standing to challenge that aspect of [the statute].”).

AFFIRMED.

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