Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03577/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03577-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Roy Bass
Not Party
Jerala Grayson
Appellant
John McAllister
Appellee
Chris Porter
Appellee
Bob Ross
Appellee
Michael Sharum
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3577

___________

Jerala Grayson, as personal *

representative for the Estate of *

Daniel Neal Grayson, *

*

Plaintiff/Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court, Western District

* of Arkansas.

Bob Ross, individually and in his *

official capacity as a Crawford *

County Sheriff, *

*

Defendant/Appellee, *

*

John McAllister, individually and in his *

official capacity as a Crawford County *

Deputy; Chris Porter, individually and *

in his official capacity as a Crawford *

County Deputy, *

*

Defendants/Appellees, *

*

Roy Bass, individually and in his *

official capacity as a Crawford County *

Deputy, *

*

Defendant, *

*

Michael Sharum, individually, *

*

Defendant/Appellee. *

___________

Appellate Case: 04-3577 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/19/2006 Entry ID: 2068978
-2-

Submitted: November 18, 2005

Filed: July 19, 2006 

___________

Before ARNOLD, BEAM, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Daniel Neal Grayson (Grayson) died October 15, 2000, following selfmutilation while incarcerated in the Crawford County Detention Center (jail). Jerala

Grayson (Appellant), as the personal representative of Grayson's estate, sued the

Crawford County Sheriff and three of the jailers in their individual and official

capacities. An amended complaint altered the list of defendants, adding arresting

officer Michael Sharum, in his individual capacity, and dismissing jailer Roy Bass.

The suit alleged violations of Grayson's right to medical treatment and to due

process, as secured by the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution, redressable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as violations of rights

secured by the Constitution of the State of Arkansas, redressable under the Arkansas

Civil Rights Act of 1993. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of

the Crawford County Sheriff, finding that the individual capacity claim failed because

it was undisputed that the Sheriff was not aware that Grayson was incarcerated until

Grayson had already seriously injured himself. Appellant does not appeal this finding.

The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff and

the remaining jailers in their official capacities, finding that Appellant's claim for

failure to train or for unlawful policy or custom violations failed. The district court

ruled that Officer Sharum was entitled to qualified immunity, and granted summary

judgment in his favor. Finally, the district court granted qualified immunity to the two

remaining jailers, Chris Porter and John McAllister, for the decision to accept Grayson

Appellate Case: 04-3577 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/19/2006 Entry ID: 2068978
-3-

into the jail (intake), but not for their subsequent actions or the timeliness of

summoning medical attention (post-intake monitoring). The case proceeded to a jury

trial, resulting in a verdict in favor of Porter and McAllister.

Appellant appeals the grant of qualified immunity to Sharum, the partial grant

of qualified immunity to Porter and McAllister, and the grant of summary judgment

on the official capacity claims as to the Sheriff, Porter, and McAllister. In addition,

Appellant contends that the jury was improperly instructed on the standard of care

under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993. Finally, Appellant questions the district

court's exclusion of evidence regarding the Arkansas State Jail Standards. We affirm

in part.

I. BACKGROUND

At oral argument, Appellant conceded that there was no Fourth Amendment

claim; thus, the facts regarding the arrest are merely provided as background. Because

the district court granted qualified immunity on the intake procedure, we view those

facts in the light most favorable to Appellant, the non-moving party. Robinson v.

White County, Ark., 2006 WL 1805978, at *4 (8th Cir. July 3, 2006). The claims for

post-intake monitoring proceeded to trial, and we recount the facts in the light most

favorable to the jury verdict. Smith v. Ferrel, 852 F.2d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1988).

A. The Arrest

On October 15, 2000, a little after 2:00 p.m., Van Buren, Arkansas, Police

Officer Michael Sharum responded to an accident report involving a vehicle in a

creek. He found Grayson standing next to the creek, soaking wet, and reporting that

his vehicle was going to "blow up." Sharum tried to arrest Grayson for driving while

intoxicated, and Grayson became combative. Sharum, struggling to gain control of

Grayson, struck Grayson on the head with his duty weapon, and then Grayson

Appellate Case: 04-3577 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/19/2006 Entry ID: 2068978
-4-

cooperated with the arrest. Sharum placed Grayson in the back of his unit and

transported him to the jail.

B. The Intake

Following the arrest, Sharum drove his vehicle into the sallyport at the jail. He

walked with Grayson into the jail and had Grayson sit on a bench in handcuffs.

Sharum told the jailers that he was "pretty sure" Grayson was under the influence of

some narcotic. Sharum also told the jailers that he would have to come back later to

perform a blood draw for a toxicology screening and asked that Grayson be changed

into dry clothing. While he was filling out a probable cause sheet, Sharum observed

Grayson calmly sitting on the bench, coherently answering questions from the jailers

about his name, address, date of birth, and social security number. Sharum also spoke

to Grayson's mother, who explained that Grayson had a history of methamphetamine

use. Sharum left the jail. At the time of their interactions, Sharum was not sure if

Grayson was actually experiencing any hallucinations, such as Grayson's reported

belief that his vehicle would "blow up." When Grayson arrived at the jail, he

appeared normal, was responsive and attentive, and did not display any signs that he

was having hallucinations. 

Grayson was brought to the jail at approximately 2:30 p.m., shortly before the

first shift ended at 3:00 p.m. Corporal Bobby Josenberger was supervising jailers Roy

Bass and Gena Bowles. When Gena Bowles first observed Grayson, he was sitting

quietly on a bench in handcuffs. She had a difficult time getting his attention. She

asked him if he had been doing drugs, and he replied that he had lost something.

Bowles initially refused to accept Grayson, and Sharum complained to her that taking

Grayson to the hospital would take a lot of time. Bowles told Josenberger that she

thought Grayson should not be booked into the jail, but should be taken to the

hospital. Bowles called Grayson's mother, and put his mother on the phone with

Josenberger. 

Appellate Case: 04-3577 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/19/2006 Entry ID: 2068978
-5-

After talking to Grayson's mother, Josenberger conferred with Sharum and

Corporal John McAllister. Because McAllister would be supervising the next shift

starting at 3:00 p.m., McAllister visually evaluated Grayson to determine whether to

accept him at the jail. He asked Grayson if he had been doing drugs, and Grayson told

McAllister that he had lost his straw. McAllister decided to book him into the jail,

stating that the jail had booked detainees in worse condition. Bowles told McAllister

that she thought that Grayson would become more intoxicated, but he assured her that

Grayson would be all right. McAllister was not informed that Grayson had been

struck in the head or that Grayson had claimed his vehicle was going to explode.

Bass, McAllister, and a third jailer accompanied Grayson to the dressing room

inside the jail. Grayson complied with their instructions and changed into a dry prison

uniform by himself. At approximately 2:55 p.m., Bass, jailer Chris Porter, and

McAllister escorted Grayson to Cell 7, which was used as an observation cell for

prisoners who were intoxicated, to make sure that a jailer could readily observe him.

C. The Post-Intake Monitoring

Jailers Chris Porter and Lacy Ree worked the afternoon shift that day, from 3:00

p.m. to 11:00 p.m., with McAllister supervising. When Grayson entered Cell 7, Porter

did not notice anything that caused him concern.

Sharum returned to the jail at 4:30 p.m. to take Grayson's blood. Again, at that

time, Sharum observed that Grayson was not acting abnormally and Sharum did not

observe evidence that Grayson was hallucinating. Sharum read Grayson his rights on

implied consent for drug testing, and Grayson stated that he did not understand,

would not submit to testing, and did not want to sign anything. McAllister

accompanied Sharum to witness the reading of the implied consent form and noticed

that Grayson was acting like he did not want to be disturbed, a not-uncommon

Appellate Case: 04-3577 Page: 5 Date Filed: 07/19/2006 Entry ID: 2068978
-6-

reaction to the implied consent form, but nothing about the event signaled that

Grayson needed to go to the hospital.

Porter was stationed at a desk located in a hallway common to all cells,

approximately fifteen to twenty feet from Cell 7. Porter checked on all men in the jail

at 3:05 p.m. and at 4:00 p.m. and noticed nothing unusual about Grayson. Until 5:00

p.m., Grayson was quiet and behaved normally.

However, at 5:00 p.m., Grayson's behavior changed. He began to scream, a

behavior Porter characterized as not unusual for intoxicated inmates. Porter notified

McAllister, who responded to Cell 7. McAllister saw Grayson sitting on the floor

with his shirt off, screaming and rubbing his eyes with the palms of his hands.

McAllister called Grayson by his first name. Grayson stopped and agreed to relax and

calm down. McAllister left Cell 7 and instructed Porter to put Grayson on a fifteenminute watch. McAllister went to the front of the jail and telephoned the jail

administrator to let him know that there was an inmate screaming and rubbing his

eyes. The administrator told McAllister to keep an eye on the inmate, which

McAllister considered already accomplished by the fifteen-minute watch.

At 5:15 p.m, Porter noted that Grayson had taken off his clothes and was still

screaming. At 5:23 p.m., Grayson was standing in Cell 7 and sweating. At 5:30 p.m.,

Porter noticed a small pool of blood on the floor. Grayson was bent over with his

back to the door, so Porter contacted McAllister.

Sharum and Van Buren Police Officer Griffin came to the jail at the jailers'

request at 5:36 p.m. When Sharum arrived, Grayson was naked and covered in blood

and sweat. Sharum, Griffin, Porter, and McAllister entered Cell 7 together and

discovered that Grayson had succeeded in mutilating himself and was attempting to

harm himself further. McAllister pulled Grayson from Cell 7 into the hallway in a

face-down position and tried to restrain Grayson by lying across the back of Grayson's

Appellate Case: 04-3577 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/19/2006 Entry ID: 2068978
-7-

knees. While on top of Grayson, McAllister radioed Ree to summon an ambulance,

the Sheriff, and the jail administrator. Porter immediately tried to grab Grayson's hand

to prevent him from harming himself further. A prolonged struggle ensued, in which

Sharum's arm was broken, and his shoulder dislocated.

According to the jail logs, an ambulance was called at 5:52 p.m., sheriff's

deputies arrived at 5:58 p.m., and the ambulance had arrived and medical technicians

were treating Grayson by 6:00 p.m. At 6:09 p.m., Grayson had stopped breathing and

at 6:22 p.m., he was transported out of the jail and to the Crawford County Emergency

Room. Grayson died of excited delirium as a result of acute methamphetamine

intoxication and physical struggle, with idiopathic cardiomyopathy as a contributing

condition.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Qualified Immunity

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the

same standards as the district court. Robinson, 2006 WL 1805978, at *2. Because the

district court granted summary judgment based on qualified immunity, we also

employ the qualified immunity standard:

"Government officials who perform discretionary functions are entitled

to qualified immunity unless their alleged conduct violated clearly

established federal constitutional or statutory rights of which a

reasonable person in their positions would have known. We analyze

[the] qualified immunity issue in two steps. First, we ask whether the

facts as asserted by the plaintiff show the officer's conduct violated a

constitutional right. If the answer is no, we grant qualified immunity. If

the answer is yes, we go on to determine whether the right was clearly

established. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a

Appellate Case: 04-3577 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/19/2006 Entry ID: 2068978
-8-

right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted."

Id. at *3 (quoting Wright v. Rollette County, 417 F.3d 879, 884 (8th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 1338 (2006)).

Under the first step of the qualified immunity analysis, determining whether

there has been a constitutional violation, the Fourteenth Amendment affords pre-trial

detainees at least as much protection as the Eighth Amendment does to convicted

prisoners; therefore, we employ the Eighth Amendment's deliberate-indifference

standard. Crow v. Montgomery, 403 F.3d 598, 601 (8th Cir. 2005). Thus, Appellant

must show, (1) objectively, that the conditions of Grayson's confinement "posed a

substantial risk of serious harm" and, (2) subjectively, that the defendants "actually

knew of but disregarded, or were deliberately indifferent to, [Grayson's] health or

safety." Id. at 602. Under the first prong of the deliberate indifference standard, "an

objectively serious medical need or a deprivation of that need . . . must be either

obvious to the layperson or supported by medical evidence, like a physician's

diagnosis." Aswegan v. Henry, 49 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 1995).

Under the second step of the qualified immunity analysis, we look to whether

it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation

he confronted. Robinson, 2006 WL 1805978, at *2.

Appellate Case: 04-3577 Page: 8 Date Filed: 07/19/2006 Entry ID: 2068978
1

Sharum's admittedly callous remark to Bowles about the amount of time

involved in taking Grayson to the hospital is not a violation of Grayson's

constitutional rights. Even if the remark arguably pressured Bowles to accept Grayson

as an inmate, McAllister ultimately made the decision whether to book Grayson and

he did not hear the remark.

-9-

1. Michael Sharum

Appellant conceded any Fourth Amendment claims. However, Appellant

contends that Sharum is not entitled to qualified immunity, because he declined to

take Grayson to the hospital. 

a. Violation of a Constitutional Right

First, we consider whether Sharum was deliberately indifferent to an objectively

serious medical need to determine whether Sharum violated Grayson's constitutional

rights.1

 Turning to step one of the deliberate indifference inquiry, we cannot say that

it would be obvious to a layperson that Grayson required immediate medical attention

at the time Sharum transported him to the jail, therefore he did not have an

"objectively serious medical need." Aswegan, 49 F.3d at 464. Sharum observed

Grayson's reactions to his vehicle in the water and used his service weapon to subdue

Grayson, but, once arrested, Grayson sat calmly in the back of the patrol car, followed

directions, answered questions posed, and remained quiet and seated on a bench inside

the jail.

Under step two of the deliberate indifference inquiry, Sharum knew that

Grayson was likely under the influence of methamphetamine, but the record reflects

Sharum was unsure whether Grayson was hallucinating. Therefore, Sharum did not

subjectively know that Grayson required medical attention. Sharum was not

deliberately indifferent to Grayson's medical needs, and thus did not violate Grayson's

constitutional rights. Sharum is entitled to qualified immunity.

Appellate Case: 04-3577 Page: 9 Date Filed: 07/19/2006 Entry ID: 2068978
-10-

b. Clearly Established

Even assuming that Sharum was deliberately indifferent to Grayson's

constitutional rights, it would not be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted, because Grayson's medical needs were not

objectively serious. Grayson had not been diagnosed by a physician, cf. Buckley v.

Rogerson,133 F.3d 1125, 1127 (8th Cir. 1998) (involving inmate in prison mental

hospital who "was diagnosed and treated for chronic schizophrenia or schizophrenialike psychosis"), nor did Grayson exhibit symptoms that were obvious to the

layperson. Cf. Coleman v. Rahija,114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997) (discussing

symptoms of early labor, including bleeding, which were easily recognizable with

external examination). Grayson was initially combative when arrested, but once

Sharum subdued him, he was calm both in the patrol car and in the jail. Therefore,

Sharum is entitled to qualified immunity based on the intake.

2. Chris Porter

Chris Porter was not involved in the decision to accept Grayson at the jail;

therefore, he could not have violated Grayson's constitutional rights based on

Grayson's intake and is entitled to qualified immunity for the intake. 

3. John McAllister

a. Violation of a Constitutional Right

First, we consider whether McAllister was deliberately indifferent to an

objectively serious medical need. In determining whether Grayson had an objectively

serious medical need, absent a physician's diagnosis, we look to whether it would be

obvious to a layperson that Grayson required immediate medical attention.

Confronted with a calm, non-combative person sitting on a bench answering

Appellate Case: 04-3577 Page: 10 Date Filed: 07/19/2006 Entry ID: 2068978
-11-

questions, a layperson would not leap to the conclusion that Grayson needed medical

attention, even if he were aware that Grayson had taken methamphetamine.

Under step two of the deliberate indifference inquiry, McAllister was aware that

Grayson was likely under the influence of methamphetamine. However, he did not

know the amount of methamphetamine taken or the time that it was taken. Nor could

he readily determine the degree of Grayson's intoxication, because Grayson would not

answer questions about his drug use and, indeed, later refused to consent to a blood

draw. Grayson's behavior at the time of the intake did not suggest a high degree of

intoxication. Therefore, McAllister did not subjectively know that Grayson required

medical attention and was not deliberately indifferent to Grayson's medical need.

b. Clearly Established

Even assuming that McAllister's decision to override Bowles' objection to

accepting Grayson amounted to a violation of Grayson's constitutional rights, we must

also determine whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted. Though the Supreme Court has recognized

that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs" violates the proscription against

cruel and unusual punishment, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), it would

not be clear to a reasonable officer that admitting Grayson to the jail was unlawful.

At the time of the intake, Grayson had no obvious injuries. McAllister was

unaware that he had been struck in the head or that Grayson had been concerned about

exploding vehicles. His answers to questions were normal; he gave his name, address,

date of birth, and social security number as requested. When asked about taking

drugs, he said that he had lost his straw. He complied with the jailers and changed

into a dry uniform without assistance. Again, Grayson had not been diagnosed by a

physician, cf. Buckley,133 F.3d at 1127, nor did Grayson exhibit symptoms that were

obvious to a layperson. Cf. Coleman, 114 F.3d at 784. It would not be clear to a

Appellate Case: 04-3577 Page: 11 Date Filed: 07/19/2006 Entry ID: 2068978
-12-

reasonable officer that it would be unlawful to accept into custody a calm, compliant

inmate who answered routine questions coherently, but became evasive when asked

about drug use. Therefore, McAllister is entitled to qualified immunity based on the

intake.

B. Official Capacity Claims

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment, employing

the same standard as the district court. Groves v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 438 F.3d 872,

874-75 (8th Cir. 2006). Appellant's official capacity claims are tantamount to suing

Crawford County. Official-capacity liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 occurs only

when a constitutional injury is caused by "a government's policy or custom, whether

made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent

official policy." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Because

Monell specifically rejected liability based solely on respondeat superior, id. at 691,

"[a] supervisor is not vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an employee's

unconstitutional activity." White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1994). Rather,

official-capacity liability must be based on deliberate indifference or tacit

authorization. Id. 

1. Failure to Train

 Liability for failure to train arises "only where the failure to train amounts to

deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into

contact." City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1988). Appellant argues

that the Crawford County Sheriff failed to train the jailers, but both McAllister and

Porter were trained in the Basic Jail Standards Training Course. Appellant has

advanced no evidence or case law that this training was deliberately indifferent to

Grayson's rights, and we decline to hold Sheriff Ross liable in his official capacity.

Appellate Case: 04-3577 Page: 12 Date Filed: 07/19/2006 Entry ID: 2068978
-13-

2. Policy or Custom

Policy or custom official-capacity liability is imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only

for "constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though

such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official

decisionmaking channels." Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. Appellant argues that

Crawford County had a custom of booking inmates who were hallucinating and that

this custom deprived Grayson of his constitutional rights, pointing to the following

evidence: Bowles' initial refusal to book Grayson, McAllister's statement that inmates

had been booked who were more intoxicated, and Bowles' and Sharum's references

to other inmates who were paranoid, picking at their skin and feeling like they had

bugs crawling on them, as a result of methamphetamine use. 

Bowles refused to book Grayson because "he just wasn't there," but could not

offer a more specific explanation. McAllister's statement that inmates more

intoxicated than Grayson had been booked is hardly surprising, considering that

Grayson was coherent, compliant and cooperative when he was booked. Finally,

having inmates in custody experiencing symptoms of the after-effects of

methamphetamine use does not evidence an official practice of booking inmates who

were hallucinating without providing medical care. Appellant did not present

evidence that these other inmates posed a danger to themselves or were not medically

evaluated. Because there were no facts supporting a policy or custom of denying care

to inmates' serious medical needs, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on the

official capacity claims.

Appellate Case: 04-3577 Page: 13 Date Filed: 07/19/2006 Entry ID: 2068978
2

The jury was instructed as follows:

The Plaintiff claims that the constitutional rights of Daniel Grayson were

violated after he was arrested and booked into the Crawford County

Detention Facility. You are instructed as a matter of law that Mr.

Grayson had the constitutional right to be provided with medical care if

there was a known, serious need for medical care.

Your verdict must be for the Plaintiff and against the Defendants if all of

the following elements have been proved by a preponderance of the

evidence. First, that Daniel Grayson had a serious need for medical

treatment; second, that the Defendants were aware of Daniel Grayson's

serious need for such medical care; third, that the Defendants, with

deliberate indifference, failed to provide the medical care needed; and

fourth, that as a direct result, Daniel Grayson was damaged.

If any of the above elements has not been proved by the preponderance

of the evidence, then your verdict must be for the Defendants.

A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as

requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person

would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.

Deliberate indifference is established only if there is actual knowledge

of a substantial risk that Daniel Grayson required medical treatment and

if the Defendants disregarded that risk by intentionally refusing or failing

to take reasonable measures to deal with the problem. Mere negligence

or inadvertence does not constitute deliberate indifference.

Trial Tr., vol. 3, at 495-96.

-14-

C. The Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993

At trial, the jury found that Porter and McAllister were not deliberately

indifferent to Grayson's constitutional rights. While the instructions2

 are consistent

with federal Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment protections for pre-trial detainees, see

Appellate Case: 04-3577 Page: 14 Date Filed: 07/19/2006 Entry ID: 2068978
-15-

Crow, 403 F.3d at 601, the Arkansas Constitution may require a different standard of

care. Though we have previously determined that deliberate indifference applies

"under article II, section 9 of the Arkansas Constitution," which prohibits cruel and

unusual punishment and thus "essentially mirrors the Eighth Amendment of the

United States Constitution," Hufford v. Ross, No. 98-3772, slip op. at 3 (8th Cir. May

26, 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished), we decline to extend the deliberate indifference

standard to all claims brought by pre-trial detainees and hereby direct the Clerk of

Court to certify the following question to the Supreme Court of Arkansas: Does the

conscious indifference standard announced in Shepherd v. Washington County, 962

S.W.2d 779 (Ark. 1998), afford greater protection to pre-trial detainees than the

federal deliberate indifference standard?

D. The Arkansas State Jail Standards

We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Bistrup, 449 F.3d 873, 882 (8th Cir. 2006). "Jail standards, although

helpful and relevant in some cases, do not represent minimum constitutional

standards." Johnson v. Busby, 953 F.2d 349, 351 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). The

district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the Arkansas State Jail

Standards. 

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court's grant of qualified immunity to Sharum, partial

grant of qualified immunity to Porter and McAllister, grant of summary judgment on

the official-capacity claims, and exclusion of evidence regarding the Arkansas State

Jail Standards.

The Clerk of Court is directed to certify the following question to the Supreme

Court of Arkansas: Does the conscious indifference standard announced in Shepherd

Appellate Case: 04-3577 Page: 15 Date Filed: 07/19/2006 Entry ID: 2068978
-16-

v. Washington County, 962 S.W.2d 779 (Ark. 1998), afford greater protection to pretrial detainees than the federal deliberate indifference standard?

______________________________

Appellate Case: 04-3577 Page: 16 Date Filed: 07/19/2006 Entry ID: 2068978