Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00298/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00298-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Fresno
Defendant
Corey Evans
Defendant
Cynthia Piombino
Plaintiff
Steve Rocha
Defendant

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CYNTHIA PIOMBINO,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF FRESNO, et al.,

Defendant.

No. 1:24-cv-00298-KES-SAB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS

(Doc. 11)

Defendants City of Fresno, Fresno Police Officer Steve Rocha, and Fresno Police Officer 

Corey Evans move to dismiss certain of plaintiff Cynthia Piombino’s claims pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”), Doc. 11. For the reasons 

set forth below, the motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND 

Piombino alleges she was advocating for an unhoused woman when she was unlawfully 

arrested by Rocha and Evans. Complaint, Doc. 1 ¶ 9. Piombino alleges as follows in her 

complaint1:

Piombino is an advocate for the unhoused and is known to “virtually” all Fresno Police 

personnel. Id. ¶ 4. She regularly monitors encampments, advocates for the rights of unhoused 

1 The factual allegations in the complaint are presumed to be true for purposes of this motion to 

dismiss. See Murguia v. Langdon, 61 F.4th 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2023).

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people with public officials, and regularly posts videos (and other materials) to social media 

documenting “the unfair treatment of the unhoused community” in Fresno. Id. Fresno Police 

Department personnel are familiar with her and recognize her as an advocate for the unhoused 

and a “vocal critic of local law enforcement.” Id.

Rocha and Evans unlawfully confiscated and destroyed an unhoused woman’s belongings, 

ostensibly because some of the woman’s belongings were in a commercial shopping cart. Id. ¶ 9. 

Piombino disagreed with the officers’ actions but respectfully asked them for permission to 

retrieve the unhoused woman’s blankets. Id. ¶ 12. However, she was met with Rocha and Evans’ 

indifference and non sequitur responses. Id. Piombino openly recorded the interaction and 

“attempted to walk around the officers” and take a couple of the woman’s blankets to her. Id.

¶ 13. Rocha and Evans prevented Piombino from obtaining the blankets by “forcefully” grabbing 

her arms, spinning her, and pushing her away before detaining and arresting her. Id. ¶ 14. 

Piombino was cited for violating California Penal Code § 148(a), although no criminal charges 

were ever filed. Id. ¶¶ 14, 15. Rocha and Evans arrested Piombino in retaliation for “questioning 

their authority, criticizing their actions, and advocating for the unhoused woman.” Id. ¶ 14.

Piombino alleges that the court’s order in Kincaid, et al v. City of Fresno, No. 1:06-cv1445 OWW SMS, made clear to the City of Fresno that it cannot capriciously seize and destroy 

the property of unhoused persons. Id. ¶ 10. Nonetheless, the City of Fresno “fails to require its 

police officers to follow the law, and instead encourages the consistent harassment, forced 

relocation, physical abuse, isolation, property deprivation, and marginalization of its unhoused 

population.” Id. ¶ 11. Piombino has witnessed the violation of the constitutional rights of 

Fresno’s unhoused population and has made this known to City of Fresno officials, including

supervisors and high-ranking Fresno Police officers. Id. The City of Fresno’s repeated conduct is 

evidence of policies, customs and practices of the City of Fresno reflecting its antipathy toward 

its unhoused population. Id. 

On March 11, 2024, Piombino filed a complaint alleging the following causes of action: 

(1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force claim against Rocha, Evans, and the City of Fresno; (2) 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 unconstitutional, retaliatory force claim against Rocha, Evans, and the City of 

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Fresno; (3) 42 U.S.C § 1983 unconstitutional and retaliatory detention/arrest claim against Rocha, 

Evans, and the City of Fresno; (4) California Civil Code § 52.1 excessive force claim against 

Rocha, Evans, and the City of Fresno; (5) California Civil Code § 52.1 unconstitutional, 

retaliatory force claim against Rocha, Evans, and the City of Fresno; and (6) California Civil 

Code § 52.1 unconstitutional and retaliatory detention/arrest claim against Rocha, Evans, and the 

City of Fresno. Complaint, Doc. 1. On June 24, 2024, defendants moved to dismiss portions of 

Piombino’s complaint. Motion, Doc. 11. Piombino filed an opposition and a corrected 

opposition to the motion to dismiss. Opposition to Motion, Docs. 12, 13. Defendants timely 

replied. Reply to Motion, Doc. 14. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. 

Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a 

cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In evaluating a motion to 

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court presumes the factual allegations within the complaint to be 

true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Murguia v. Langdon, 

61 F.4th 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Usher v. City of L.A., 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 

1987)).

Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). Under federal notice pleading standards, the complaint must “give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation and quotations omitted). “This simplified 

notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to 

define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 

N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). Though Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, a 

plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–78. “[I]it demands 

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more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. “[B]are assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the 

elements . . . are not entitled to be assumed true.” Id. at 681. “A claim has facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. The complaint must contain 

facts that “nudge [the plaintiff’s] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 570.

If a court dismisses a complaint for failure to state a claim, it should “freely give leave” to 

amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The “underlying purpose of Rule 15 

[is] to facilitate decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (cleaned up). However, a court has 

discretion to deny leave to amend due to “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of 

the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue 

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of 

amendment.” Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss Piombino’s third and sixth causes of action for failure to state 

a claim. Motion, Doc. 11. Defendants also move to dismiss Piombino’s first, second, and third 

causes of action as to the City of Fresno, arguing that the complaint fails to establish Monell

liability as to the City of Fresno on those § 1983 claims.

A. Third Cause of Action

In her third cause of action, Piombino asserts a § 1983 claim for unconstitutional and 

retaliatory detention and arrest in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments against Rocha, 

Evans, and the City of Fresno.2 Complaint, Doc. 1 ¶¶ 29-34. Defendants move to dismiss 

Piombino’s third cause of action on the basis that Rocha and Evans had probable cause to make 

the arrest and therefore the unconstitutional and retaliatory detention and arrest claim fails. 

2 The City of Fresno’s liability on the third cause of action is addressed separately below.

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Motion, Doc. 11 at 10-12.

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must allege that “(1) the conduct 

complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct 

deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right.” Murguia, 61 F.4th at 1106 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Piombino alleges, and defendants do not dispute, 

that Rocha and Evans were acting under color of state law during the detention and arrest of 

Piombino. 

“In the context of a § 1983 action, a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when a person is 

arrested ‘without probable cause or other justification.’” Vanegas v. City of Pasadena, 46 F.4th 

1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 918 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(en banc)). “Probable cause to arrest exists when there is a ‘fair probability or substantial chance 

of criminal activity’ by the arrestee based on the totality of the circumstances known to the 

officers at the time of arrest.” Id. A plaintiff can bring a First Amendment claim against 

government officials who retaliate for engaging in protected speech. Hill v. City of Fountain 

Valley, 70 F.4th 507, 518 (9th Cir. 2023). “To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must establish a 

‘causal connection’ between the government defendant’s ‘retaliatory animus’ and the plaintiff's 

‘subsequent injury.’” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A plaintiff “must 

generally ‘plead and prove the absence of probable cause,’ because the presence of probable 

cause generally ‘speaks to the objective reasonableness of an arrest’ and suggests that the 

‘officer’s animus’ is not what caused the arrest.” Ballentine v. Tucker, 28 F.4th 54, 62 (9th Cir.

2022) (citing Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391 (2019)).

Piombino was detained, arrested, and cited for violating California Penal Code 

§ 148(a)(1). The elements of a § 148(a)(1) violation are: “(1) the defendant willfully resisted, 

delayed, or obstructed a peace officer, (2) when the officer was engaged in the performance of his 

or her duties, and (3) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the other person 

was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties.” Velazquez v. City of Long 

Beach, 793 F.3d 1010, 1018 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Garcia v. 

Superior Court, 177 Cal.App.4th 803, 818 (2009)).

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Defendants argue that the allegations in the complaint “confirm” Rocha and Evans were in 

the process of carrying out their lawful duties, that Piombino interfered with Rocha and Evans’ 

actions, and therefore she delayed and obstructed the performance of their duties. Motion, Doc. 

11 at 10-11. In opposition, Piombino argues that the officers were violating the court’s order in 

Kincaid and that she was arrested when she attempted to walk around the officers to grab the 

woman’s blankets and while she filmed the interaction. Opposition, Doc. 13 at 5. Construing the 

facts in the light most favorable to Piombino, Piombino adequately alleges that Rocha and Evans 

lacked probable cause to arrest her. As pled, Piombino openly and obviously recorded the 

interaction, “walked around” the officers, and was subsequently arrested. Complaint, Doc. 1 

¶¶ 13,14. The complaint does not allege that Piombino disobeyed orders from Rocha and Evans

or that she interfered with Rocha and Evans’ actions. Viewing the complaint’s allegations in the 

light most favorable to Piombino, it is plausible that Piombino did not obstruct the officers’

actions by simply walking around them or by continuing to record the officers and that Rocha and 

Evans therefore lacked probable cause to arrest her. See Smith v. Cnty. of Orange, 678 F. Supp. 

3d 1182, 1199-200 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (denying summary judgment because it was disputed that 

plaintiff, who was recording officers, failed to comply with officers’ orders that she leave, as 

reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff was improperly arrested for making video 

recording).

Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss the third cause of action as to Rocha and 

Evans is denied.

B. Sixth Cause of Action 

In her sixth cause of action, Piombino asserts a violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 

for unconstitutional and retaliatory detention and arrest against Rocha, Evans, and the City of 

Fresno. Complaint, Doc. 1 ¶¶ 47-52. Defendants argue that the complaint does not establish that 

Rocha and Evans interfered with Piombino’s legal rights through threats, intimidation, or 

coercion. Defendants argue that Rocha and Evans had probable cause to arrest Piombino and that

the claim therefore fails as to all defendants. However, as noted above, viewing the complaint’s 

allegations in the light most favorable to Piombino, it is plausible that Rocha and Evans lacked 

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probable cause to detain and arrest her.

Defendants also argue that Rocha and Evans are immune from liability under California 

Government Code section 821.6. A plaintiff may bring a cause of action under California Civil 

Code § 52.1 (“Bane Act”) when “[a] person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, 

interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or 

coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of 

[California].” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b). To sufficiently plead a violation of the Bane Act, “a 

plaintiff must show (1) intentional interference or attempted interference with a state or federal 

constitutional or legal right, and (2) the interference or attempted interference was by threats, 

intimidation or coercion.” Allen v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 67 (2015) (citations 

omitted). “The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper 

means (i.e., ‘threats, intimidation or coercion’), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing 

something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that 

he or she was not required to do under the law.” Cornell v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 17 

Cal. App. 5th 766, 792 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendants argue that Piombino’s Bane Act claim fails because the complaint is devoid of 

evidence that Rocha and Evans interfered with Piombino’s legal rights by threats, intimidation, or 

coercion. Where “an arrest is unlawful and excessive force is applied in making the arrest, there 

has been coercion ‘independent from the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention itself’” that 

is sufficient to state a Bane Act claim. Bender v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 217 Cal. App. 4th 968, 

978 (2013) (quoting Shoyoye v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 203 Cal. App. 4th 947, 958 (2012)). 

Defendants do not challenge that Piombino sufficiently pled excessive force claims against Rocha 

and Evans. “[T]he use of excessive force can be enough to satisfy the ‘threat, intimidation or 

coercion’ element” of a Bane Act claim. Cornell, 17 Cal. App. 5th at 799. “[T]he egregiousness 

required by Section 52.1 is tested by whether the circumstances indicate the arresting officer had 

a specific intent to violate the arrestee’s right to freedom from unreasonable seizure, not by 

whether the evidence shows something beyond the coercion ‘inherent’ in the wrongful detention.” 

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Id. As Piombino alleges she was subjected to excessive force during the unlawful arrest, 

Piombino has sufficiently alleged that her constitutional rights were violated through threats, 

intimidation, or coercion.

Defendants’ argument that Rocha and Evans have immunity under California Government 

Code section 821.6 also lacks merit.3 Motion, Doc. 11 at 12-13. “[P]olice officers sued under 

section 52.1 for false arrest [are] not immune from liability under Government Code section 

821.6.” Venegas v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 153 Cal. App. 4th 1230, 1243 (2007). In their reply, 

defendants attempt to distinguish Venegas by arguing that the sixth cause of action is a Bane Act

claim, not a false arrest claim. However, § 821.6 “does not broadly immunize police officers or 

other public employees for any and all harmful actions they may take in the course of 

investigating crime.” Leon v. Cnty. of Riverside, 14 Cal. 5th 910, 915 (2023). 

The California Supreme Court explained in Leon that § 821.6 immunity “is narrow in the 

sense that it applies only if the conduct that allegedly caused the plaintiff’s injuries was the 

institution or prosecution of an official proceeding” but is “broad in the sense that it applies to 

every such tort claim, whether formally labeled as a claim for malicious prosecution or not.” Id.

at 922. Defendants do not address how Piombino’s injury stems from the “initiation or 

prosecution of proceedings.” Id. at 924. As explained in Leon, § 821.6 immunity does not apply 

to investigations or conduct separate from the prosecution of an official proceeding, id. at 926, 

and § 821.6 therefore does not immunize Rocha or Evans. As such, dismissal of the sixth cause 

of action as to Rocha and Evans is denied.

Defendants’ argument for the dismissal of the City of Fresno is based entirely on its 

argument for dismissal of the claims as to Rocha and Evans. As the motion to dismiss the sixth 

cause of action as to Rocha and Evans is denied, there is likewise no basis for dismissal of the 

claim as to the City of Fresno. 

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion to dismiss the sixth cause of action is 

3 California Government Code section 821.6 provides that a “public employee is not liable for 

injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the 

scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause.”

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denied. 

C. First, Second, and Third Causes of Action Against the City of Fresno 

Defendants also move to dismiss the first, second, and third causes of action as to the City 

of Fresno. Motion, Doc. 11 at 8. Claims for municipal liability are cognizable under § 1983. 

Duarte v. City of Stockton, 60 F.4th 566, 573 (9th Cir. 2023). However, a municipality “cannot 

be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor or, in other words, a municipality cannot be 

held liable under [42 U.S.C. § 1983] under a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Department 

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 797 F.3d 654, 670 (9th Cir. 

2015). To sustain a Monell claim, a plaintiff must show that the action that caused their 

constitutional injury was part of an “official municipal policy of some nature.” Scanlon v. Cnty. 

of Los Angeles, 92 F.4th 781, 811 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Cnty. of Washoe, 843 

F.3d 784, 793 (9th Cir. 2016). “There are four criteria: “(1) [plaintiff] had a constitutional right 

of which [they] were deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounts to 

deliberate indifference to [the plaintiff’s] constitutional right; and (4) the policy is the moving 

force behind the constitutional violation.” Scanlon, 92 F.4th at 811 (internal quotation omitted). 

Municipal liability may be premised on: (1) conduct pursuant to an express policy; (2) a 

longstanding practice or custom; or (3) an act that was committed or ratified by an official with 

policy-making authority. Id. “In limited circumstances, a local government’s decision not to 

train certain employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to the 

level of an official government policy for purposes of § 1983.” Perez v. City of Fresno, 98 F.4th 

919, 931 (9th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[I]n rare instances, 

single constitutional violations are so inconsistent with constitutional rights that even such a 

single instance indicates at least deliberate indifference of the municipality.” Benavidez v. Cnty. 

of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153 (9th Cir. 2021).

Defendants argue that the City of Fresno should be dismissed from these § 1983 claims 

because the complaint alleges a theory of liability based on respondeat superior, for which it

cannot be held liable, and that the City of Fresno can be held liable only for injuries arising from 

official policy or longstanding custom. Motion, Doc. 11 at 8. Piombino denies that her 

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complaint premises the City of Fresno’s liability on a theory of respondeat superior. Opposition, 

Doc. 13 at 4. Instead, Piombino argues that the City of Fresno’s unconstitutional policies are 

evident from its alleged failure “to require its police officers to follow the law,” and its 

“encourage[ment] [of] the consistent harassment, forced relocation, physical abuse, isolation, 

property deprivation, and marginalization of its unhoused population,” despite repeated notice to 

the leadership of the Fresno Police Department. Id. at 4-5 (quoting Complaint, Doc. 1 ¶ 11).

Defendants argue that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient because there are no prior 

instances of conduct by named Fresno Police Department officers and the complaint fails to 

allege how any policies were the moving force behind the injury to plaintiff. Reply, Doc. 14 at 5.

The complaint alleges that the City of Fresno is being sued “for its custom, policies and 

practices that were the moving forces behind the constitutional violations set forth herein” and 

that the “widespread and recurring misconduct could only be reflective of a policy, custom, or 

practice of antipathy” by the City of Fresno towards its unhoused population. Complaint, Doc. 1 

¶ 5, 11. Piombino’s conclusory allegations are insufficient to adequately plead a Monell claim. 

Piombino alleges she has witnessed the Fresno Police Department’s treatment of unhoused people 

and advocates for unhoused people, but she provides no factual allegations beyond the single 

incident at issue in this case. The complaint is devoid of factual allegations regarding other 

instances in which Fresno Police Department officers conducted themselves in a similar manner. 

The complaint’s single instance of alleged misconduct does not establish a pervasive 

custom or practice of constitutional violations sufficient to support a Monell claim. See Nelson v. 

City of Fairfield Police Dep't, No. 2:22-CV-01619-DJC-DB, 2024 WL 3396140, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 

July 12, 2024) (dismissing Monell claim because plaintiff’s reliance on a single instance of 

purported misconduct was not enough to state a custom or practice). Although there is “no per se 

rule for the number of unconstitutional incidents a pleading must identify to establish a practice or 

custom under Monell, . . . [t]he Ninth Circuit and district courts within the Ninth Circuit have 

repeatedly declined to infer a custom [or practice] of constitutional violations based on two 

unconstitutional incidents alone.” Est. of Kong by & through Kong v. City of San Diego, No. 22-

CV-1858-BAS-DDL, 2023 WL 4939370, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2023) (internal quotation 

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marks and citation omitted); see also Oyenik v. Corizon Health Inc., 696 F. App’x 792, 794 (9th 

Cir. 2017) (“[O]ne or two incidents are insufficient to establish a custom or policy[.]”). 

Piombino’s conclusory allegations are insufficient for the court to reasonably infer that the 

practices or customs are of sufficient duration, frequency, and consistency to state a Monell claim. 

Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss the City of Fresno as a defendant as to the 

first, second, and third causes of action is granted, with leave to amend. See AE ex rel. 

Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (leave to amend is appropriate 

because plausible facts supporting a policy or custom can cure deficiencies in Monell claims).

IV. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Doc. 11, is granted in part and denied in part as 

follows:

a. The motion to dismiss the third cause of action as to defendants Rocha and 

Evans is DENIED;

b. The motion to dismiss the sixth cause of action is DENIED;

c. The motion to dismiss the first, second, and third causes of action, as to 

defendant City of Fresno only, is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

2. Piombino shall file an amended complaint, if any, consistent with this Order within 

twenty-one (21) days of the date of entry of the Order. If Piombino does not timely 

file an amended complaint, this action shall proceed on the initial complaint, Doc. 1, 

only as to the remaining causes of action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 2, 2024 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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