Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-02422/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-02422-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cargill, Inc.
Defendant
Les Iceton
Defendant
Patrick Mapelli
Defendant
Delora Marshall
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DELORA MARSHALL,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CARGILL, INC., PATRICK 

MAPELLI LES ICETON, 

and DOES 1 through 100, 

inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 08-02422 WHA

ORDER: (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO REMAND; (2) DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL

NOTICE; (3) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS; AND

(4) DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

INTRODUCTION

In this wrongful-termination action, plaintiff Delora Marshall seeks to remand the matter

to state court. Defendants Patrick Mapelli and Les Iceton move to dismiss plaintiff’s first

through sixth claims as to themselves as individuals. Defendant Cargill, Inc., moves for

judgment on the pleadings with respect to plaintiff’s seventh claim. The central issue on the

motion to remand is whether the complaint fails to state a claim against defendant Mapelli,

whose presence destroys complete diversity and subject-matter jurisdiction. For the reasons

stated below, this order holds that plaintiff cannot state a claim against the individual

defendants. This order finds that the complaint states a claim as to the corporate defendant. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to remand is DENIED. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the

individual defendants is GRANTED. Defendant Cargill’s motion for judgment on the pleadings

is DENIED. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The complaint states that Marshall went on disability leave in “November 2006” (Compl. ¶ 31). 

Presumably, the complaint meant to state that Marshall went on disability leave in November 2007, as it

consistently states that Mapelli became Marshall’s supervisor in March 2007 and cites Mapelli’s conduct as the

impetus behind Marshall’s leave.

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STATEMENT

This order must accept all well-pled allegations in the complaint as true. 

Plaintiff Delora Marshall is a citizen of California. Defendant Cargill, Inc., is a Delaware

corporation and has its principal place of business in Minnesota. Defendant Patrick Mapelli is a

citizen of California and defendant Les Iceton is a citizen of Minnesota. 

Cargill is a large, privately held company that purchases, processes, and distributes

grain and other agricultural commodities. Plaintiff Delora Marshall was employed by Cargill

for twenty years as a secretary and later as an administrative assistant at its office in

Newark, California. Defendant Patrick Mapelli is a property manager at Cargill who became

Marshall’s supervisor in March 2007. 

According to the complaint, Mapelli created a hostile work environment for Marshall

by giving her substandard performance reviews, falsely accusing her of errors, documenting her

arrivals, departures, breaks, and conversations with other employees, and disciplining her for

going home to change her clothing after occasional outbreaks of incontinence. 

In November 2007, plaintiff went on disability leave and was diagnosed with

work-related stress. She subsequently submitted a formal complaint regarding Mapelli to the

human resources manager at the Newark office. Marshall returned to work in March 2008. 

Shortly thereafter, a consultant hired by Cargill, Chris Newman, arrived to conduct an

investigation of Marshall’s complaint. Marshall requested her attorney’s presence during her

interview with Newman, but Newman informed her that this was prohibited by written

Cargill policy. Marshall later learned that a written policy does not in fact exist. 

Mapelli terminated Marshall’s employment on April 3, 2008. Marshall then filed this action in

California state court on April 9 against defendants Cargill, Mapelli, and Iceton.1

The complaint alleged: (i) age discrimination; (ii) failure to prevent age discrimination;

(iii) disability discrimination; (iv) wrongful termination; (v) retaliation; (vi) retaliation in

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For the Northern District of California

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 Defendants Mapelli and Iceton did not join in defendant Cargill’s petition for removal. According to

Cargill, the individual defendants had not been served notice when the petition was filed. Parties who have not

been served are not required to join in a petition for removal. Salveson v. W. States Bankcard Ass’n,

731 F.2d 1423, 1429 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff does not dispute this point. 

3

 Unless indicated otherwise, internal citations are omitted from all quotations.

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violation of public policy; and (vii) coercion in the negotiation of terms and conditions of

employment in violation of Labor Code Section 923. The first through fifth claims alleged

violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. Plaintiff’s claims are asserted

against all defendants except for the seventh claim, which is asserted only against

defendant Cargill.

Defendant Cargill answered the complaint on May 7, 2008. It then removed this action

to federal court on May 12, contending that defendant Mapelli had been fraudulently joined and

that diversity jurisdiction is therefore proper. On May 14, defendants Mapelli and Iceton filed

this motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first through sixth claims as to themselves as individuals. 

Defendant Cargill simultaneously moved for judgment on the pleadings with respect to

plaintiff’s seventh claim. Plaintiff moved to remand on May 15.2

ANALYSIS

1. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND.

A. Legal Standard.

A defendant may remove a civil action from state court to federal court if original

jurisdiction would have existed at the time the complaint was filed. 28 U.S.C. 1441(a). 

The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant bears the burden

of establishing proper removal. Here, defendant has the burden of showing that diversity

jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. 1332 — namely, that plaintiff has different state citizenship

from all properly named defendants. “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt

as to the right of removal in the first instance,” such that courts must resolve all doubts as to

removability in favor of remand. Gaus v. Miles Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).3

If a defendant establishes fraudulent joinder, the presence of a non-diverse or resident

defendant will not defeat diversity jurisdiction. To prove fraudulent joinder, a defendant must

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show that “the plaintiff fail[ed] to state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and the

failure is obvious according to settled rules of the state.” McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp.,

811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987). A defendant “need not show that the joinder of the

non-diverse party was for the purpose of preventing removal” but must demonstrate instead

“that there is no possibility that the plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of action in state

court against the alleged sham defendant.” Good v. Prudential Ins. Co., 5 F. Supp. 2d 804, 807

(N.D. Cal. 1998) (Wilken, J). In determining whether a defendant has been fraudulently joined,

the court may consider information outside the pleadings. Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co.,

139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). 

B. The Complaint Fails to State a Claim 

Against the Individual Defendants.

Defendant Cargill argues that removal to federal court is proper because defendant

Mapelli is a “sham” defendant against whom plaintiff fails to state a claim. Plaintiff concedes

that her first through fifth claims cannot be asserted against the individual defendants. 

Plaintiff argues that her sixth claim, however, can be maintained against Mapelli as an

individual defendant. This claim alleges retaliation in violation of public policy. 

Defendant argues that this claim can only be asserted against employers and does not allow for

individual liability. For the reasons below, this order agrees with defendant.

First, plaintiff incorrectly states that Mapelli can be held individually liable as

an employer. She cites Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 178 (1980), and

Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 91 (1990), in support of her proposition. These decisions

recognized that employers may be liable on retaliatory discharge claims that violate

public policy. They did not, however, establish individual liability or state that individuals

could be deemed “employers.” 

Plaintiff next argues that Mapelli fits the definition of “employer” in the California

Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order that governed her employment and, thus, can be

held individually liable. This authority is inapposite, inasmuch as the sixth claim does not

involve an IWC wage order or the California Labor Code. Rather, the claim is “pursuant to the

public policy and common law of the State of California” (Compl. ¶ 68). Plaintiff specifically

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 Plaintiff states that her employment was governed by IWC Wage Order No. 4. This wage order

defined an employer as: “any person as defined in Section 18 of the Labor Code, who directly or indirectly,

or through an agent or any other person, employs or exercises control over the wages, hours, or working

conditions of any person.” Section 18 of the Labor Code defined person as any “person, association,

organization, partnership, business trust, limited liability company, or corporation.” According to defendant,

IWC Wage Order No. 1 in fact applied to plaintiff’s employment. Regardless, both wage orders contained the

same definition of “employer.”

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alleges that defendants violated public policy by retaliating against her for opposing unlawful

employment practices based on age and disability discrimination. Age and disability

discrimination are governed by FEHA — not the IWC Wage Orders. See Cal. Gov. Code

12940, et seq.; Cal. Code Regs. Title 8, 11010. Moreover, even in the wage-and-hour context,

the California Supreme Court has narrowly construed the IWC definition of “employer” and

refrained from imposing individual liability on supervisors. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Bement,

36 Cal. 4th 1075, 1086–88 (2005). For these reasons, this order rejects plaintiff’s argument.4

Plaintiff fails to cite any authority that individuals can be liable for common law claims

of retaliation. The California Supreme Court recently held that individuals cannot be liable for

retaliation under FEHA. Jones v. The Lodge at Torrey Pines P’ship, 42 Cal. 4th 1158, 1160

(2008). Although Jones did not expressly abrogate individual liability for common law claims,

it was not presented with that precise issue. Faced with a similar issue but in a different

context, the California Supreme Court refused to hold individuals liable for common law claims

for wrongful termination where FEHA did not impose individual liability for discrimination. 

Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal. 4th 640, 664 (1998). 

Gaw v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 2008 WL 111238, *2 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (Illston, J.),

cited by defendant, confronted this precise issue. In considering a motion to remand, Gaw held

that individuals cannot be liable for retaliatory claims alleging violation of public policy. 

It reasoned that “when the statute that gives rise to a claim does not impose individual liability

‘[i]t would be absurd to . . . then allow essentially the same action under a different rubric

[i.e., under the common law].’” Ibid. Gaw is persuasive and this order agrees with

its reasoning. 

Lastly, plaintiff argues that even if her sixth claim is dismissed as to the individual

defendants, there are other viable claims that she can state against Mapelli — namely,

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 Plaintiff requests judicial notice of administrative complaints submitted to the Department of

Fair Employment and Housing, which asserted harassment claims against defendant Mapelli. Plaintiff argues

that the administrative complaints placed Mapelli on notice of a potential harassment claim. Because potential

claims not stated in the civil complaint are irrelevant for purposes of this motion, so too is judicial notice of the

administrative complaints. Accordingly, plaintiff’s request is denied.

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 Plaintiff requests attorney’s fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1447(c), which provides that “[a]n order

remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney’s fees,

incurred as a result of the removal.” Because this order denies plaintiff’s motion to remand, plaintiff’s request

for attorney’s fees is moot.

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harassment and defamation. As noted above, however, a fraudulent joinder analysis examines

whether a plaintiff has already stated a cause of action against a resident defendant. 

Moreover, “[w]hether an action should be remanded must be resolved by reference to the

complaint at the time the petition for removal was filed.” Kruso v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp.,

872 F.2d 1416, 1426 n.12 (9th Cir. 1989). Because plaintiff never stated causes of action for

harassment or defamation in the complaint, such hypothetical claims cannot defeat a showing

of fraudulent joinder. Accordingly, the merits of these claims need not be evaluated.5

This order concludes that the complaint fails to state a cause of action against

defendant Mapelli. Defendant has met its burden in establishing fraudulent joinder. For the

above-stated reasons, plaintiff’s motion to remand is hereby DENIED. Of course, this ruling

does not preclude plaintiff from filing an action against the individual defendants in state court

on the as-yet-unasserted claims.6

2. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS.

Defendants Mapelli and Iceton move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims as to themselves

as individuals. A motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) tests for the legal sufficiency of the

claims alleged in the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484

(9th Cir. 1995). All material allegations of the complaint are taken as true and construed in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 340

(9th Cir. 1996). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not

need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his

‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right

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 Cargill answered the complaint on May 7, 2008. The pleadings are therefore closed and defendant’s

motion for judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). Plaintiff does not argue otherwise.

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to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955,

1964–65 (2007).

For the reasons discussed above, the complaint fails to state a claim against the

individual defendants. Defendants’ motion to dismiss defendants Mapelli and Iceton is

hereby GRANTED.

3. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS.

Defendant Cargill moves for judgment on the pleadings with respect to plaintiff’s

seventh claim. “After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial,

any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion for

judgment on the pleadings is evaluated according to virtually the same legal standard as a

motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6), in that the pleadings are construed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Brennan v. Concord EFS, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 1127,

1130–31 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (Walker, J.). “Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving

party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be

resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v.

Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990).7

Plaintiff’s seventh claim alleges that defendant Cargill violated California Labor

Code 923. This statute grants the individual employee “the full freedom of association,

self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms

and conditions of his employment.” It also guards against interference or coercion by an

employer in the designation of such representatives. 

Plaintiff argues that defendant violated Section 923 by preventing her from having her

attorney present during an interview investigating her formal complaint of Mapelli. 

Defendant contends that these allegations fail to establish a claim. For the following reasons,

this order disagrees.

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First, for Section 923 to apply, the investigational interview must have involved

negotiation of the terms and conditions of plaintiff’s employment. Defendant argues that the

interview did not. It cites Robinson v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 1131–32

(1986), which construed “terms and conditions” narrowly and held that an employee does not

have the right under Section 923 to have an attorney present during performance evaluations. 

Plaintiff’s investigational interview was not a performance evaluation. Rather, it related

to her formal complaint about management. Although briefly mentioned as a logical

correspondent to performance evaluations, Robinson did not extend its holding to

employee complaints. Id. at 1132. Moreover, Robinson involved a plaintiff who requested

the presence of his attorney any time the employer discussed the quantity or quality of his work. 

Id. at 1130. Here, plaintiff made one request to have her attorney present. The reduction in

corporate efficiency with which Robinson was concerned is inapplicable.

Turning to statutory construction, Robinson defined “terms and conditions”

tautologically and is of little help. Id. at 1132. Nutter v. City of Santa Monica,

74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 303 (1946), however, interpreted “negotiate” as meaning “to confer

regarding terms and conditions governing . . . employment . . . which, so far as agreed upon,

would be incorporated in a contract.” Plaintiff’s formal complaint accused Mapelli of “ageism”

and “nepotism” (Compl. ¶ 32). This alleged conduct may have violated terms and conditions

found in plaintiff’s employment contract. It would be premature to conclude otherwise based

only on the pleadings. 

With respect to the right protected by Section 923, Montalvo v. Zamora,

7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 75 (1970), held that an employee “has the right to designate an attorney or

other individual to represent him in negotiating terms and conditions of his employment [so]

that his discharge for so doing constitutes a violation of Labor Code [S]ection 923.” 

An employer, however, does not violate the statute by refusing to negotiate with the attorney

so designated. Ibid.

Defendant contends that it cannot be liable under this section because plaintiff has not

alleged a causal nexus between her termination and her request for an attorney’s presence. 

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Indeed, plaintiff’s seventh claim does not expressly state that her employment was terminated

because she requested her attorney’s presence. While the decisions cited by defendant held that

an employer may be liable for discharging an employee because he or she designates a

representative, none stated that such an allegation is a prerequisite for liability. In fact,

Montalvo was much broader, holding that a violation of the statute occurs in discriminating

against an employee for exercising his or her right to designate a representative. Ibid. 

Plaintiff’s specific allegation is that defendant interfered with her right under

Section 923 when a consultant falsely informed her of a written Cargill policy prohibiting

her attorney’s presence. Elsewhere in the complaint, plaintiff alleges age and disability

discrimination and cites numerous examples of discriminatory behavior by defendant

(Compl. ¶¶ 39–59). This order refuses to determine, based on the pleadings, that the

consultant’s misinformation was not part of the broader pattern of discrimination borne

by plaintiff. Moreover, the complaint alleges wrongful termination and retaliation

(id. at 60–72). Although plaintiff did not explicitly allege that she was fired for requesting

her attorney’s presence, it would be premature to conclude that her request played no role in

her termination given the proximity in time between the two events. 

Lastly, allowing employers to provide employees with false information that interferes

with their right to associate with or to designate a representative runs counter to the

public policy of the state, as declared by Section 923. The statute recognizes that in dealing

with employers, “the individual organized worker is helpless to exercise actual liberty of

contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and

conditions of employment.” Employees receive little protection under this statute if they may

be intentionally misled by their employers.

Accordingly, defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion to remand this matter to state court

is DENIED. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims as to the individual defendants

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is GRANTED. Defendant Cargill’s motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the

seventh claim is DENIED.

An amended complaint asserting additional claims against the individual defendants will

have no effect on subject-matter jurisdiction, as plaintiff’s motion to remand must be considered

based on the pleadings when the petition for removal was filed. Moreover, because plaintiff’s

first through sixth claims cannot be asserted against individual defendants, the defects of such

claims cannot be cured through amendment. Accordingly, leave to amend is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 20, 2008. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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