Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-03097/USCOURTS-caDC-10-03097-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lisa Locke
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 13, 2011 Decided December 27, 2011 

No. 10-3097 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

 

v. 

LISA LOCKE, ALSO KNOWN AS LISA DAVIS-LOCKE, ALSO 

KNOWN AS LISA DAVIS, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:09-cr-00259-1) 

Mary E. Davis, appointed by the court, argued the cause 

for the appellant. 

Leslie Ann Gerardo, Assistant United States Attorney, 

argued the cause for the appellee. Ronald C. Machen, Jr., 

United States Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III and Thomas 

E. Zeno, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on brief. 

Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON and KAVANAUGH, 

Circuit Judges.

1

 

1

 As of the date the opinion was published, Judge Ginsburg had 

taken senior status. 

USCA Case #10-3097 Document #1349638 Filed: 12/27/2011 Page 1 of 9
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON. 

 KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Lisa Locke 

(Locke or Defendant) appeals her sentence of 60 months’ 

imprisonment resulting from her convictions of possession of 

stolen mail and aggravated identity theft. Locke claims that 

the district court erred when it “failed to consider” two 

mitigating arguments she advanced. Appellant’s Br. at 11. 

Because the record reflects that the district court in fact 

considered both arguments and provided a “reasoned basis” 

for Locke’s sentence, see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 

356 (2007), we affirm. 

I.

Between January 2007 and April 2008, Locke 

participated in a conspiracy to possess stolen mail and present 

forged checks to banks and check-cashing stores throughout 

the Washington, D.C. area. The fifteen-month conspiracy 

caused an actual loss of more than $120,000 but had an 

intended loss of more than $340,000. Locke was subsequently 

charged with conspiracy, see 18 U.S.C. § 371, nine counts of 

possession of stolen mail, see id. § 1708, three counts of 

possession of a forged security, see id. § 513(a), seven counts 

of bank fraud, see id. § 1344, and nineteen counts of 

aggravated identity theft, see id. § 1028A(a)(1). 

On April 27, 2010, Locke and the government entered 

into a plea bargain. Locke agreed to plead guilty to one count 

of possession of stolen mail and one count of aggravated 

identity theft; the government agreed to dismiss all remaining 

counts and not to seek a total sentence of more than 60 

months’ imprisonment. The parties further stipulated to the 

appropriate offense level under the United States Sentencing 

Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or Guidelines) for the possession of 

USCA Case #10-3097 Document #1349638 Filed: 12/27/2011 Page 2 of 9
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stolen mail charge.2

 The government, however, reserved the 

right to seek a four-level increase on the ground that Locke 

was an “organizer or leader” of a conspiracy involving more 

than five participants. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). With this 

four-level increase and with a criminal history category of III, 

her Guidelines range was between 57 and 71 months, 

consecutive to the mandatory minimum sentence of 24 

months on the charge of aggravated identity theft. 

In her sentencing memoranda and during the sentencing 

hearing, Locke argued that a number of mitigating factors 

warranted a below-Guidelines sentence. Locke asked the 

court to consider her “desire to meet with prosecutors and 

report on the crimes of other[] co[-] conspirators.” Def.’s 

Mem. in Aid of Sentencing at 4, United States v. Locke, Cr. 

No. 09-259-01 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2010) (Def.’s Mem.). She 

also asserted that the intended loss calculation was almost 

three times the actual loss and, thus, a Guidelines range based 

on the intended loss, see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, overstated the 

severity of the crime. Def.’s Mem. at 6. The government 

countered that Locke was “the leader of a long running 

conspiracy . . ., causing harm to more than 50 victims,” 

Omnibus Sentencing Mem. at 6, United States v. Locke, Cr. 

 

2

 Specifically, the parties agreed that the base level for the 

offense was six, see § 2B1.1(a)(2), with a twelve-level increase 

because the intended loss exceeded $200,000, see § 2B1.1(b)(1), 

and four additional levels because the crimes involved 50 or more 

victims, see § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B). The parties further agreed to a twolevel decrease for acceptance of responsibility, see § 3E1.1(a), and 

a one-level decrease for timely notice of intent to enter a plea, see § 

3E1.1(b). Locke’s aggravated identity theft charge carried a 

mandatory minimum sentence of 24 months to be served 

consecutively. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(b)(2) (except as otherwise 

provided, “no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this 

section shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment 

imposed on the person under any other provision of law”). 

USCA Case #10-3097 Document #1349638 Filed: 12/27/2011 Page 3 of 9
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No. 09-259-01 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2010), and that, although 

Locke had agreed to provide information about her coconspirators, she had refused to provide information about her 

son and her brother, both of whom had unrelated criminal 

cases pending in D.C. Superior Court. Tr. of Sentencing at 45, 

United States v. Locke, Cr. No. 09-259-01 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 

2010) (Sentencing Tr.) (“We know she knows a lot. She 

didn’t want to talk about everything, so we didn’t want to hear 

from her. That was her choice.”). In light of these factors, the 

government recommended a sentence of 36 months on the 

charge of possessing stolen mail as well as the mandatory 

minimum sentence of 24 months, consecutive, on the charge 

of aggravated identity theft, for a total sentence of 60 months. 

At the sentencing hearing, the district court first 

addressed the appropriate U.S.S.G. range for the possession of 

stolen mail charge. After weighing the evidence regarding 

Locke’s involvement in the conspiracy, the court concluded 

that Locke “should get the four-level increase for her role . . . 

as an organizer or leader of the conspiracy, which involves 

more than five participants.” Id. at 21. Then the court turned 

to Locke’s overall sentence on both charges. In announcing 

the sentence, the district court did not explicitly address each 

of Locke’s arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence. It did, 

however, explain the basis for the sentence it imposed: 

Now, let me focus on the offense here. It’s a very 

serious, significant offense, with an impact on many, 

many victims, and a result and an injury that strikes 

at the heart of commercial and personal interests in 

the community that are of fundamental importance, 

particularly the personal interests, both monetarily, 

but also in terms of privacy and identification 

concerns. Over $120,000 of actual loss occurred, and 

well over $300,000 was the intended or in some 

instances some part of that attempted loss. 

USCA Case #10-3097 Document #1349638 Filed: 12/27/2011 Page 4 of 9
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This was a fairly long-term conspiracy. It didn’t 

take place over just a couple of days or a couple of 

weeks. It extended over many months. It was well 

planned. And that planning and execution included a 

significant role by the [D]efendant. 

And in some ways, . . . I don’t feel that the 

[D]efendant has shown complete acceptance of 

responsibility and remorse. She has for doing bad 

things, but she hasn’t for what seems to me to be the 

totality of the conduct she was engaged in. 

 * * * 

When I consider all of the factors under 3553(a), 

including appropriate punishment, deterrence both 

with respect to Ms. [Locke] and others, protection of 

the public and the community, and everything else 

that is included in the assessment under 3553(a), I 

conclude that the [D]efendant should receive a 

substantial period of incarceration . . . . 

Id. at 49-51. The court sentenced Locke to 60 months’ 

imprisonment: 36 months for possession of stolen mail and 24 

months, consecutive, for aggravated identity theft. While 

acknowledging that it was a “substantial period of 

incarceration,” the court noted that the sentence was “well 

below” the Guidelines recommendation of 24 months for 

aggravated identity theft plus 57 to 71 months for possession 

of stolen mail, “if you take even the low point of that 

[G]uideline.” Id. at 51. 

 Locke now appeals her sentence, claiming that the district 

court erred in “fail[ing] to consider” her unrequited efforts to 

cooperate with the prosecution, Appellant’s Br. at 11, and her 

claim that basing her sentence in part on intended, not actual, 

loss, “substantially overstates the seriousness of the offense,” 

id. at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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II.

In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the 

United States Supreme Court declared the Sentencing 

Guidelines to be advisory only and instructed appellate courts 

to review sentences for reasonableness in light of the factors 

set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. at 244-45, 260-61. After 

Booker, our review of sentencing challenges that have been 

properly preserved is for abuse of discretion under a two-step 

analysis. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). At 

the first step, which is the only one at issue here, “we ensure 

the district court ‘committed no significant procedural error,’ 

which includes ‘failing to adequately explain the chosen 

sentence.’ ” United States v. Akhigbe, 642 F.3d 1078, 1085 

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).3

 The more demanding plain error standard of review 

applies where a defendant fails to raise a claim at his 

sentencing hearing or fails to object to a district court’s ruling. 

See In re Sealed Case, 349 F.3d 685, 690–91 (D.C. Cir. 

2003); United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 286 (D.C. Cir. 

1994). Because Locke did not challenge the adequacy of the 

district court’s statement of reasons below, we review her 

claim for plain error. United States v. Anderson, 632 F.3d 

1264, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Because he did not object to 

the district court’s statements at the sentencing hearing, we 

review [the defendant’s] sentencing-related claims for plain 

 

3

 At the second step, we review the overall reasonableness of the 

sentence to ensure that it is objectively reasonable in light of the 

sentencing factors in section 3553(a). United States v. Wilson, 605 

F.3d 985, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 2010); United States v. Olivares, 473 

F.3d 1224, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The factors in section 3553(a) 

include the nature of the offense, the defendant’s history and the 

need to promote deterrence, avoid unwarranted sentencing 

disparities and provide restitution to any victims. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a). 

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error.”). To prevail under this standard, Locke must 

demonstrate that the district court: (1) committed error; (2) 

that is plain; and (3) that affects her substantial rights. 

Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997). If all 

three conditions are met, and if the error “seriously affect[s] 

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings,” id., an appellate court may then exercise its 

discretion to notice a forfeited error. 

Importantly, this is not a case in which the defendant was 

given no opportunity to object to the district court’s 

sentencing determination at sentencing. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 

51(b) (“If a party does not have an opportunity to object to a 

ruling or order, the absence of an objection does not later 

prejudice that party.”); see also United States v. MojicaRivera, 435 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 2006) (“As [the defendant] 

had no opportunity to object to the conditions of supervised 

release, our review is for abuse of discretion.”); United States 

v. Warden, 291 F.3d 363, 365 n.1 (5th Cir. 2002) (reviewing 

for abuse of discretion challenge to supervised release 

imposed for first time in written judgment). In fact, the 

sentencing judge gave Locke ample opportunity to object. 

After explaining his reasoning, he asked the parties if they 

“know of any reason other than reasons already stated and 

argued why the sentence should not be imposed as I have just 

indicated,” to which Locke’s lawyer replied “[n]othing else, 

[y]our Honor.” Sentencing Tr. at 56. 

 We conclude that the district court committed no error, 

much less plain error, in its statement of reasons for Locke’s 

sentence. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 

3551 et seq., requires the sentencing court “at the time of 

sentencing” to “state in open court the reasons for its 

imposition of [a] particular sentence.” Id. § 3553(c). This 

provision requires that the court provide a “reasoned basis” 

for its decision and consider all “nonfrivolous reasons” 

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asserted for an alternative sentence. Rita, 551 U.S. at 356-57. 

“These requirements serve two primary purposes: they 

develop an adequate record so that appellate courts can 

perform substantive review, and they guarantee that 

sentencing judges continue ‘to consider every convicted 

person as an individual.’ ” In re Sealed Case, 527 F.3d 188, 

191 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 52). That 

said, section 3553(c) does not require “a full opinion in every 

case.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 356. Nor does it require the court to 

address expressly each and every argument advanced by the 

defendant. See id. at 359 (although judge did not “explicitly 

[state] that he had heard and considered the evidence and 

argument [raised by defendant],” explanation was adequate). 

In fact, so long as the judge provides a “reasoned basis for 

exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority,” we 

generally presume that he adequately considered the 

arguments and will uphold the sentence if it is otherwise 

reasonable. Rita, 551 U.S. at 356; United States v. Simpson, 

430 F.3d 1177, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“It is true that the 

district court did not specifically refer to each factor listed in 

§ 3553(a). But we have not required courts to do so.” 

(emphasis in original)); United States v. Ayers, 428 F.3d 312, 

315 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[W]e ordinarily presume a district 

court imposing an alternative non-guidelines sentence took 

into account all the factors listed in § 3553(a) and accorded 

them the appropriate significance.”). 

In this case, Locke has proffered nothing to rebut that 

presumption. To the contrary, the record makes plain that the 

district court carefully considered and evaluated both 

arguments Locke claims it ignored. The court engaged in an 

extended colloquy with Locke’s counsel regarding her 

allegedly thwarted desire to cooperate with the government. 

The court repeatedly asked Locke’s lawyer how the assertion 

should be considered, Sentencing Tr. at 42 (“Then how 

should I take it into account?”), and questioned whether 

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Locke was in fact alleging “some impropriety with respect to 

the plea,” id. The court then confirmed that Locke was asking 

for “a sentencing advantage” based on her “willing[ness] to 

give information.” Id. at 43. It explicitly acknowledged 

Locke’s second argument regarding the gap between the 

actual and intended loss, noting that it was “[t]rue enough” 

that the actual loss was only a third of the intended loss. Id. at 

33. It discounted this point, however, on the basis that much 

of the intended loss was attributable to “unsuccessful check[-] 

cashing efforts” by Locke or her co-conspirators. Id. The 

court reasserted this point in announcing Locke’s sentence. 

See id. at 49 (“Over $120,000 of actual loss occurred, and 

well over $300,000 was the intended or in some instances 

some part of that attempted loss.” (emphasis added)). 

Finally, the court provided a well-reasoned basis for its 

decision. After outlining the seriousness of the offense, the 

length of the conspiracy, the “significant role” played by 

Locke and its doubts about her remorse, it concluded that a 

“substantial period of incarceration” was warranted. 

Sentencing Tr. at 48-52. The court’s discussion of its 

reasoning, which spans more than three pages of the 

transcript, more than satisfies its sentencing obligation. See In 

re Sealed Case, 527 F.3d at 191 (“district judge need not 

consider every § 3553(a) factor in every case”); United States 

v. Wykle, 429 Fed. App’x. 205, 207 (4th Cir. 2011) (“While a 

district court must consider the statutory factors and explain 

its sentence, it need not explicitly reference § 3553(a) or 

discuss every factor on the record.”). 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court. 

 So ordered. 

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