Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03078/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03078-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Grand Jury

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 22, 2007 Decided June 22, 2007

No. 06-3078

IN RE: GRAND JURY

Consolidated with

06-3095

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 06mc00057)

(No. 06mc00159)

Before: ROGERS and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM: This case raises a question that, surprisingly,

has not yet been decided by this court: whether federal grand

jury witnesses, after they have testified, are entitled to examine

the transcripts of their own testimony. Applying Federal Rule

of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(E)(i), we hold that grand jury

witnesses are entitled to review the transcripts of their own

testimony in private at the U.S. Attorney’s Office or a place

agreed to by the parties or designated by the district court.

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I.

During a criminal investigation of a company and its

employees, the Government issued multiple grand jury

subpoenas for the testimony of two corporate employees. The

first employee testified on three occasions. Approximately two

months after the employee’s third grand jury appearance, the

employee was subpoenaed to testify a fourth time. The

employee sought to review his prior grand jury testimony – in

particular asking for copies of the transcripts of the prior three

grand jury appearances. The Government, which keeps copies

of grand jury transcripts and tapes, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(1),

denied that request. The employee then filed a motion in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia to

compel disclosure of the transcripts. The district court denied

the motion, and the employee appealed. In the meantime, the

employee subsequently testified a fourth time.

The second employee testified once and then was

subpoenaed to testify again. The employee sought to review her

prior grand jury testimony and asked for a copy of the transcript

of the first grand jury appearance. The Government denied that

request. Following the Government’s denial, the employee filed

a motion in the district court to compel disclosure of the

transcript of the prior grand jury testimony. The district court

denied that motion, and the employee appealed. In the

meantime, this employee testified a second time.

II.

For two alternative reasons, the Government says that the

court lacks jurisdiction over both employees’ appeals. First, the

Government argues that the district court’s denials of the

employees’ motions for their grand jury transcripts are not “final

decisions” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Second, the Government

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contends that the employees’ appeals are moot because the

employees have completed their testimony before the grand

jury. We disagree with both of the Government’s jurisdictional

points. The Government also argues the second employee’s

appeal is untimely; we disagree.

A.

Section 1291 vests courts of appeals with jurisdiction over

“appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the

United States . . . , except where a direct review may be had in

the Supreme Court.” The Government maintains that the district

court’s orders denying the witnesses access to their own grand

jury transcripts are not “final decisions” under § 1291.

No court of appeals has directly answered the question

whether a district court order denying a witness access to

transcripts of his or her own testimony (as opposed to a party

seeking access to transcripts of someone else’s testimony) is

appealable as a final decision. In arguing against appellate

jurisdiction, the Government analogizes this situation to cases

involving witnesses’ motions to quash grand jury subpoenas on

privilege or other grounds. The Government advances this

analogy because a witness ordinarily cannot appeal from a

denied motion to quash a grand jury subpoena until the witness

first refuses to comply with the subpoena and is held in

contempt. See, e.g., United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532-33

(1971). According to the Government, the same prerequisite

should apply to a witness’s appeal of a denied motion for access

to grand jury transcripts (in other words, the witness first should

refuse to comply with a subpoena and be held in contempt). But

the Government’s argument has a gaping hole: A witness who

has already testified will not necessarily be subpoenaed for

future grand jury testimony – and thus may not have an

opportunity to be held in contempt in order to appeal an order

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1 In cases where the disclosure motion was part of a broader

challenge to the evidence presented to the grand jury or to the integrity

of the grand jury proceedings (challenges that are not usually

entertained pre-indictment), some appellate courts have declined to

entertain the motion at least until after indictment or conviction. See

United States v. Schiff, 874 F.2d 705, 706 (9th Cir. 1989); In re 1985

Grand Jury Proceedings, 785 F.2d 593, 594-95 (8th Cir. 1988); In re

denying access to the transcript of prior grand jury testimony.

For example, what about access to the transcript of a witness’s

final appearance before the grand jury? Or what about the grand

jury witness who testifies only once? Under the jurisdictional

rule that the Government would have us adopt, such parties

would be out of luck in seeking to appeal denied motions for

access to transcripts of their testimony. The Government’s

attempted analogy therefore does not hold up. Cf. Cobbledick

v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 329 (1940) (“Due regard for

efficiency in litigation must not be carried so far as to deny all

opportunity for the appeal contemplated by the statutes.”).

For purposes of appellate jurisdiction, this case is analogous

to cases where a party seeks access to the grand jury transcripts

of the testimony of other witnesses. As Justice Rehnquist

explained, an order denying such third parties access to a

transcript “disposes of all of the contentions of the parties and

terminates a separate proceeding pending before the grand jury

court [and] is therefore appealable as a ‘final decision’ under 28

U.S.C. § 1291.” Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw.,

441 U.S. 211, 233 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see id. at

215-17; see also United States v. Miramontez, 995 F.2d 56, 57,

59 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1993); Wisconsin v. Schaffer, 565 F.2d 961, 965

& n.1 (7th Cir. 1977); Gibson v. United States, 403 F.2d 166,

167 (D.C. Cir. 1968); cf. In re Grand Jury 95-1, 118 F.3d 1433,

1434, 1436 (10th Cir. 1997); In re Federal Grand Jury

Proceedings, 760 F.2d 436, 437-38 (2d Cir. 1985).1 So too in

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Grand Jury Matter Impounded, 703 F.2d 56, 59-60 (3d Cir. 1983).

2

 If the witness is again subpoenaed, the witness then refuses to

testify without access to the prior transcript, and the district court for

some reason denies access to the transcript, then there could be delay

caused by an appeal. In such a case, however, the witness would be

in contempt for refusing to testify – and even the Government agrees

there is appellate jurisdiction in those circumstances.

this case. Here, as in cases involving third-party disclosure

motions, appellate consideration of the access issue alone is

unlikely to significantly delay the grand jury investigation.2

Here, as in cases involving third-party disclosure motions, the

requesting witness may have no opportunity to be held in

contempt if the request is denied. And here, as in cases

involving third-party disclosure motions, the district court’s

order terminates a separate proceeding before the grand jury

court.

This case is also analogous to the situation where a third

party seeks to interpose a privilege objection to subpoenas

issued to other witnesses – such as a client who objects to a

subpoena issued to his or her attorney. In those cases, the party

holding the privilege has no opportunity to be held in contempt

because it is not the subpoenaed party. The courts therefore

have generally considered district court orders denying such

motions to be final decisions for purposes of appellate

jurisdiction. See, e.g., Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 9-

10, 12-13 (1918); In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46, 48 n.1 (D.C.

Cir. 1997); Impounded, 277 F.3d 407, 410-11 & n.3 (3d Cir.

2002); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Manges), 745 F.2d 1250,

1251 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1984); see also 2 SARA SUN BEALE &

WILLIAM C.BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 9:39,

11:18 ¶ 3 & n.4 (2d ed. 2005). The same rationale applies here

because the requesting party may have no opportunity to be held

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in contempt in order to obtain appellate review.

In sum, we hold that the district court’s denials of the

employees’ disclosure motions constitute “final decisions” over

which this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

B.

The Government alternatively contends that this court lacks

jurisdiction over the employees’ appeals because the cases are

moot. According to the Government, the employees requested

disclosure of their transcripts in order to prepare for subsequent

grand jury appearances. Because both employees went ahead

and testified again before the grand jury, the Government argues

that the employees no longer need the transcripts of their prior

testimony.

This argument is closely related to the Government’s initial

jurisdictional contention. Under the Government’s theory, the

witness seeking to appeal the denial of a disclosure motion must

refuse to comply with an outstanding subpoena and be held in

contempt; and if the witness testifies instead of defying the

subpoena, the disclosure issue becomes moot. The primary

problem for the mootness version of the Government’s

contempt-as-prerequisite-for-appeal argument is that a witness

has an interest in reviewing his or her grand jury transcript even

when the witness has finished testifying. Here, for example, the

employees have expressed concern that their prior testimony

may have included inadvertent inaccuracies or inconsistencies,

and they want to review the transcripts to correct those

inaccuracies or inconsistencies. Correcting the record is not a

pointless gesture. The Government otherwise could use a

witness’s inaccurate or inconsistent testimony as a basis, at least

in part, for a criminal prosecution of that witness or someone

else. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a), (c) (inconsistent statements). In

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addition, federal law explicitly provides a mechanism for a

witness to timely recant prior grand jury testimony. See id.

§ 1623(d). Yet witnesses would have difficulty taking full

advantage of this statutory recantation right without access to

transcripts of their own grand jury testimony. Contrary to the

Government’s theory, moreover, a witness’s interest in

reviewing transcripts of past testimony could well increase after

any subsequent testimony; that’s because the possibility of

inaccurate or inconsistent testimony tends to increase the more

a witness testifies. See Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059,

1079 (9th Cir. 1972). In short, because a witness’s interest in

reviewing transcripts of his or her prior grand jury testimony

does not end as a result of any subsequent grand jury testimony,

the employees’ appeals here are not moot. Cf. Church of

Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12-13 (1992);

FTC v. Browning, 435 F.2d 96, 97-98 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

C.

The Government also maintains that one of the two appeals

here was untimely under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.

The second employee filed a notice of appeal 49 days after the

district court entered the order denying the disclosure motion.

The Government argues that this employee missed the 10-day

deadline for filing a notice of appeal in a “criminal case” under

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b). See id. 4(b)(1)(A)

(“In a criminal case, a defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed

in the district court within 10 days after the later of: (i) the entry

of either the judgment or the order being appealed; or (ii) the

filing of the government’s notice of appeal.”). The employee

counters that Rule 4(a)’s 60-day deadline applies here; that rule

governs the filing of a notice of appeal in a “civil case” in which

the United States is a party. See id. 4(a)(1)(A)-(B) (“In a civil

case, . . . [w]hen the United States or its officer or agency is a

party, the notice of appeal may be filed by any party within 60

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days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.”).

Is this grand jury matter a “criminal case” or a “civil case”

for purposes of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4? The

intuitive answer would be that the grand jury matter is a criminal

case; after all, the prosecutor uses a grand jury in order to

conduct investigations into possible criminal offenses. But for

purposes of the appellate deadlines in Rule 4, that intuitive

answer does not square with the text of the Rule or with the

decided cases from other courts of appeals.

This Rule 4 issue has arisen in three distinct contexts:

(i) motions by third parties for disclosure of grand jury

materials; (ii) appeals of contempt citations after parties have

refused to comply with grand jury subpoenas on privilege or

other grounds; and (iii) motions by third parties based on

privilege grounds to quash or modify grand jury subpoenas

issued to other parties. In the context of motions by third parties

for disclosure of grand jury materials, two courts of appeals

have expressly addressed the question; both courts concluded

that the 60-day “civil case” deadline in Rule 4(a) applies. See In

re Special Grand Jury 89-2, 450 F.3d 1159, 1168-69 (10th Cir.

2006); Miramontez, 995 F.2d at 57-58. In the context of appeals

from civil contempt citations for refusing to comply with grand

jury subpoenas, the Government agrees that the 60-day “civil

case” deadline in Rule 4(a) applies. See Tr. of Oral Arg. Jan. 22,

2007 at 40; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 795 F.2d

226, 230 (1st Cir. 1986). Of course, in such cases, the witness

has an incentive to appeal immediately to obtain relief from

ongoing contempt sanctions. In the context of motions to quash

subpoenas issued to other parties, four courts of appeals have

expressly addressed the question, with two circuits holding that

the 60-day “civil case” deadline in Rule 4(a) applies and two

holding that the “criminal case” deadline in Rule 4(b) applies.

Compare Impounded, 277 F.3d at 410-11 (applying Rule 4(a));

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and Manges, 745 F.2d at 1251 (applying Rule 4(a)), with In re

Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 and 89-4, John Doe 89-129, 902

F.2d 244, 247 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying Rule 4(b)); and In re

Grand Jury Proceedings (Company X), 835 F.2d 237, 238-39

(10th Cir. 1987) (applying Rule 4(b)).

In the various cases, courts generally have based their

decisions on a combination of textual and policy considerations.

Here, our analysis of Rule 4 leads us to the conclusion that the

60-day “civil case” deadline of Rule 4(a) applies to appeals of

first-party grand jury disclosure motions. To begin with, the text

of Rule 4(b) uses the term “defendant.” On its face, that

provision cannot logically apply to a grand jury proceeding for

the simple reason that there is no “defendant” in a grand jury

proceeding. See Impounded, 277 F.3d at 410-11. Moreover, the

policy argument that some courts have cited in applying the 10-

day deadline notwithstanding Rule 4’s text – namely, to avoid

delaying the grand jury investigation – does not apply in this

transcript-disclosure context. For example, appeals in cases

involving motions to quash can delay the investigation because

the witness often will not testify until the appeals process has

run its course. Cf. Company X, 835 F.2d at 238-39. By contrast,

appeals in cases such as this one involving only motions for

disclosure of transcripts – and not also a refusal to testify that

triggers contempt proceedings – do not threaten to significantly

delay the prosecutor and grand jury from continuing their

investigation. Consistent with the text of Rule 4, the case law

from other circuits in analogous areas, and the fact that the

policy arguments applicable to motion-to-quash cases do not

apply in this context, we hold that Rule 4(a)’s 60-day deadline

applies here. The court therefore has jurisdiction to consider the

second employee’s appeal.

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3 See Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 222-23; Pittsburgh Plate

Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399-400 (1959); United

States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 678-79, 682 (1958).

4

 As regards the first employee, the district court stated:

It will always be the case that access to grand jury

transcripts of prior testimony will aid a subject and

his counsel, particularly when being questioned on

more than one occasion over a period of time about

facts surrounding the same or related events. If these

III.

With the jurisdictional issues resolved, we turn to the

substantive issue raised by the two witnesses: Does Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(E)(i) entitle witnesses to

obtain access to the transcripts of their own grand jury

testimony? 

At a hearing before the district court, the employees,

through counsel, advised the district court that, before their

reappearances, they sought access to the transcripts of their prior

grand jury testimony in order to avoid the possibility of

inconsistent statements occasioned by the passage of years since

the events in question and many months since their prior grand

jury appearances, to aid counsel in advising them, and

potentially to allow them to take advantage of recantation

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1623. In addition, one of the employees

asserted, based on the prosecutor’s statements to his counsel,

that he was a “subject” and thus his actions were within the

scope of the ongoing investigation. In denying the motions for

disclosure, the district court found, upon applying the standard

for third-party access to grand jury transcripts,3

 that neither

employee had shown a particularized and compelling need that

outweighed the interests in maintaining grand jury secrecy.4

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concerns were deemed to outweigh the policy of

grand jury secrecy, the Court would find itself in the

position of ordering disclosure with frequency to any

person called to appear more than once before a

grand jury. The Court also finds merit in the

Government’s argument that releasing grand jury

testimony transcripts to corporate employees

jeopardizes the integrity of the grand jury process by

discouraging employees from testifying fully and

openly for fear of retaliation from corporate

employers. 

Mem. Op. May 16, 2006, at 7 (footnote omitted and emphasis added).

As regards the second employee the district court stated:

Having found that in order to compel

disclosure of her prior grand jury transcript Petitioner

must show a particularized need that outweighs the

need for grand jury secrecy, and that Petitioner’s

articulated need to avoid inconsistent statements is

not sufficiently compelling or particularized to

outweigh the need for grand jury secrecy in an active

and ongoing investigation, the Court will deny

Petitioner’s request for an order compelling

production of the transcript of her prior grand jury

testimony.

Mem. Op. May 1, 2006, at 6.

On appeal, the employees contend in their briefs that they

“seek only access to the transcripts of their prior grand jury

testimony.” Appellants’ Br. at 11; see also id. at 43; Reply Br.

at 20. Although their briefs also discuss why they are entitled to

copies of the transcripts, Appellants’ Br. at 23-24, appellants’

counsel expressly conceded during oral argument that if the

employees were granted access to the transcripts, then they

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5

 During oral argument on January, 22, 2007 (Tr. at 14), the

following colloquy occurred:

The Court: Can I ask you one question on the merits,

which is would you be satisfied by a right to

review the transcript as opposed to obtain the

transcript? In other words, the witness is

allowed to go to the offices of the prosecutor

and to review the transcript?

Appellants’ Counsel: Yes, Your Honor.

would not need to obtain copies of the transcripts of their prior

grand jury testimony.5 Consequently, if this court holds that the

employee-witnesses were improperly denied an opportunity to

review – to have access to, as distinct from obtaining copies of

– the transcripts of their prior grand jury testimony, then the

court has no occasion to opine further. The employees have

repeatedly made clear that their needs would be fully met

through having access only. We consider this legal question de

novo. See In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 883-84 (D.C. Cir.

1998); In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1997);

cf. United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 427, 442

(1983).

Federal prosecutors use grand juries to assist their

investigations of possible federal crime. See Sells Eng’g, Inc.,

463 U.S. at 423. By employing a grand jury (and only by

employing a grand jury), a federal prosecutor may issue

subpoenas for witnesses and documents, backed up by penalties

of contempt and other potential sanctions for non-compliance.

When using the grand jury, a prosecutor also may question a

witness without the witness’s attorney present – a great tactical

advantage to the prosecutor in obtaining the truth from

recalcitrant witnesses. For those and other reasons, the grand

jury is considered a vital prosecutorial tool for investigation of

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possible federal crimes.

To help encourage grand jury witnesses to testify honestly

and without fear and thereby assist the investigation’s search for

truth, the other parties in the room for a witness’s testimony –

the prosecutors, the grand jurors, and the court reporters or

transcribers if any – are under an obligation of secrecy with

respect to grand jury proceedings. The witnesses themselves are

not under an obligation of secrecy, however. As Wigmore

explained and as Rule 6 provides, the theory of grand jury

secrecy is that “the witness is guaranteed against compulsory

disclosure; the privilege must therefore be that of the witness,

and rests upon his consent.” 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2362 (McNaughton

rev. 1961) (“WIGMORE”); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2)(A)-

(B); cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6, Advisory Committee Notes, 1944

Adoption, Note to Subdivision (e) (“rule does not impose any

obligation of secrecy on witnesses”).

The grand jury secrecy question has become somewhat

more complex in modern times because, as a result of a rule

change in 1979, the Federal Rules now mandate that grand jury

proceedings be transcribed or taped. See Fed. R. Crim. P.

6(e)(1); 1 BEALE & BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE

§ 4:9 ¶ 2. Government attorneys keep the transcripts and tapes

of grand jury proceedings, and the Government cannot disclose

those transcripts or tapes absent a court order or except in

circumstances expressly specified by Rule 6. See Fed. R. Crim.

P. 6(e)(1), (3)(A)-(E).

On occasion, a third party will request copies of the grand

jury transcripts of another witness’s testimony, often for use in

a separate legal proceeding such as a related civil case. See,

e.g., Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 213, 216-17. On other

occasions, as here, the witnesses may seek access to the

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transcripts of their own testimony. See, e.g., In re Sealed

Motion, 880 F.2d 1367, 1368, 1370-71 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div.,

1989).

For authorized disclosure of grand jury materials under

Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i), a threshold requirement is that the disclosure

be “preliminar[y] to or in connection with a judicial

proceeding.” That prerequisite is satisfied in this case; indeed,

the Government does not dispute that the grand jury

investigation is a “judicial proceeding” for these purposes,

which makes sense given that the district court itself convenes

and supervises the grand jury proceedings. Therefore,

disclosure here would be “in connection with a judicial

proceeding.” Cf. In re 1979 Grand Jury Proceedings, 479 F.

Supp. 93, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (“well settled that a grand jury

hearing is a ‘judicial proceeding’ within the scope of Rule 6(e)”

and therefore Rule 6(e) may “support disclosure ‘in connection

with’ the grand jury’s own proceedings”) (internal quotation

omitted). Alternatively, disclosure here may be considered

“preliminary” to a judicial proceeding – namely, preliminary to

a possible criminal trial – which would similarly give courts

authority to order disclosure in response to first-party requests.

See United States v. Mayes, 670 F.2d 126, 129 (9th Cir. 1982)

(“We need not decide whether a grand jury proceeding is ‘a

judicial proceeding’ under Rule 6(e), as it seems clear that grand

jury proceedings are at least preliminary to a judicial

proceeding.”); 1 BEALE & BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND

PRACTICE § 5:11 ¶ 3 (“[G]rand jury proceedings are generally

‘preliminary to’ criminal court proceedings . . . .”); 2 SUSAN W.

BRENNER &LORI E.SHAW,FEDERAL GRAND JURY:AGUIDE TO

LAW AND PRACTICE § 18:6 (2006) (“It is . . . likely that the

Court would find that a grand jury investigation is ‘preliminar[y]

to’ a judicial proceeding, which would allow disclosure to

proceed under Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i).”) (alteration in original); cf.

United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 477, 479-80 & n.2 (1983)

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(criminal prosecution would be judicial proceeding under Rule

6); United States v. Bates, 627 F.2d 349, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

Under either interpretation of “preliminarily to or in

connection with a judicial proceeding,” the bottom line here is

the same: The federal courts have the authority under Rule

6(e)(3)(E)(i) to order disclosure to grand jury witnesses of their

own transcripts. The more difficult question is when courts

should do so.

As to that issue, the text of Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) simply

provides that a “court may authorize disclosure – at a time, in a

manner, and subject to any other conditions that it directs – of a

grand-jury matter: (i) preliminarily to or in connection with a

judicial proceeding.” The text does not say whether and when

grand jury witnesses may obtain access to transcripts of their

own grand jury testimony. For that and other reasons, the scope

of Rule 6 is an area “badly in need of comprehensive legislative

attention.” 1 BEALE & BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND

PRACTICE § 5:1 ¶ 4. Until that happens, however, we have no

choice but to decide the legal question before us: Are grand jury

witnesses never entitled to have access to the transcripts of their

prior testimony? Are they always entitled to access to the

transcripts? Are they entitled to access only in certain

circumstances?

Although this court has not addressed the issue, several

courts of appeals have previously considered whether a grand

jury witness can obtain access to the transcript of his or her own

testimony, usually in terms of obtaining transcript copies. The

Ninth Circuit and the former Special Division for the Purpose of

Appointing Independent Counsels held that grand jury witnesses

are entitled in certain circumstances to obtain a copy of their

grand jury transcripts. See In re Sealed Motion, 880 F.2d at

1368, 1370-71; Bursey, 466 F.2d at 1080; see also United States

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v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-30 (3d Cir. 1954), cited in In re

Sealed Motion, 880 F.2d at 1372-73 & n.8. By contrast, a

divided Fourth Circuit panel and the First Circuit held that grand

jury witnesses are not entitled to obtain copies of their

transcripts; two other courts of appeals seem to have reached the

same conclusion. See Bast v. United States, 542 F.2d 893, 894,

896 (4th Cir. 1976) (applying particularized need standard); In

re Bianchi, 542 F.2d 98, 100 (1st Cir. 1976); see also In re

Grand Jury Subpoena, 72 F.3d 271, 273-75 (2d Cir. 1995);

United States v. Scrimgeour, 636 F.2d 1019, 1025 (5th Cir.

1981). In a divided panel decision, the Seventh Circuit held that

grand jury witnesses may not obtain copies of the transcripts of

their own testimony, although that case was later reheard by the

en banc Seventh Circuit, which evenly split on the question. See

United States v. Clavey, 565 F.2d 111, 114-15 (7th Cir. 1977),

vacated and rev’d en banc in part, 578 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir.

1978). On occasion, the courts have considered whether the

witness has alternative means to review the prior testimony.

See, e.g., Bursey, 466 F.2d at 1080 & n.11; Rose, 215 F.2d at

629-30. Otherwise the right to a copy has been examined in

terms of preventing a miscarriage of justice, see, e.g., Rose, 215

F.2d at 629, or fundamental fairness inherent in due process

inasmuch as the prosecutor has access to the transcripts, see,

e.g., Bursey, 466 F.2d at 1079-80; In re Sealed Motion, 880 F.2d

at 1371-73. For their part, several commentators have argued,

without distinguishing between having access and obtaining a

copy, that a witness should be entitled to the grand jury

transcript of the witness’s own testimony in some circumstances

– e.g., after the grand jury process has concluded and the witness

is subpoenaed to testify at trial. See COUNCIL FOR COURT

EXCELLENCE, THE GRAND JURY OF TOMORROW 69-72 (2001);

see also George Edward Dazzo, Opening the Door to the Grand

Jury: Abandoning Secrecy for Secrecy’s Sake, 3 D.C. L. REV.

139, 164-65 (1995) (suggesting a rebuttable presumption

favoring pretrial access by a defendant).

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In accord with the open-ended text of Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) and

the general analytical approach of the cases from other circuits,

the parties here agree that we must weigh the competing

interests of the Government and grand jury witnesses. That

approach is consistent, moreover, with the way that the Supreme

Court has weighed the competing interests for and against

disclosure when assessing third-party requests for the secret

transcripts of the testimony of other witnesses. See Sells Eng’g,

Inc., 463 U.S. at 442-44; Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 221-23.

We begin with the interests of grand jury witnesses. Grand

jury witnesses obviously want to ensure that the transcripts of

their testimony accurately convey their recollections. A grand

jury witness is typically nervous and may make mistakes in

testimony, without always realizing it at the time (and especially

without an attorney present in the grand jury to help identify

inadvertent errors). Grand jury witnesses often are asked

numerous questions about specific names, dates, places,

meetings, conversations, and the like. In their search for the

truth, prosecutors tend to fire the questions rapidly and

aggressively, and sometimes ask variations of the same question

repeatedly. See Bursey, 466 F.2d at 1079; 1 BEALE & BRYSON,

GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 5:5 ¶ 3. It therefore is not

uncommon for a witness to testify honestly but inaccurately on

certain points. See Bursey, 466 F.2d at 1079. It also is not

uncommon for a witness to intentionally provide false

testimony, but that does not affect our point as to the interests of

honest witnesses. If a witness’s testimony includes inaccuracies

or inconsistencies, the Government might use those inaccuracies

or inconsistencies against the witness – for example, either

during the witness’s reappearance before the grand jury or in a

prosecution of the witness or someone else. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.

§ 1623(a) (inconsistent statements as basis for perjury

conviction). Witnesses therefore have a great interest in

ensuring that their recollections are accurately reflected in the

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transcripts. A witness’s general interest in reviewing the

transcript is strongly reinforced by federal law, which expressly

allows witnesses to timely recant prior grand jury testimony

without legal penalty. See id. § 1623(d). A witness would have

difficulty taking full advantage of the statutory recantation

provision, however, without obtaining prompt access to

transcripts of their own testimony. In cases where the witness

may testify again in the same investigation, as here, the witness

has an additional reason to review the transcript of the prior

testimony: to help prepare for the upcoming testimony. See

Bursey, 466 F.2d at 1079. That last interest is no longer

implicated in this particular case because the two employees

have apparently completed their grand jury testimony.

On the other side of the ledger, the Government advances

two basic rationales for denying witnesses access to their own

transcripts: maintaining grand jury secrecy and preventing

witness intimidation.

Grand jury secrecy rules prevent the public or others from

learning what a grand jury witness said to the grand jury. The

guarantee of secrecy thus encourages witnesses to testify

candidly. But the secrecy rationale does not apply when a

witness seeks access to a transcript of his or her own grand jury

testimony. Indeed, it seems illogical to cite grand jury secrecy

as the basis for denying a witness’s access to the transcript of his

prior grand jury testimony. Preventing a third party from

reviewing a witness’s grand jury testimony is essential to

guarantee secrecy to witnesses; preventing the witness from

reviewing the witness’s own testimony is entirely unnecessary

to guarantee secrecy to witnesses. See In re Sealed Motion, 880

F.2d at 1368, 1370-72 & n.6 (“[G]overnment’s interest in

nondisclosure was a non sequitur when a grand jury witness

moves for a copy of his own testimony because the right to

secrecy in a grand jury proceeding belongs to the grand jury

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19

witness and the witness is already cognizant of his

testimony . . . .”) (internal citation omitted); see also Rose, 215

F.2d at 628-30 (disclosure to witness who testified “would not

subvert any of the reasons traditionally given for the

inviolability of Grand Jury proceedings”); Clavey, 565 F.2d at

121 (Swygert, J., dissenting) (“A review of the reasons

traditionally advanced for justifying the veil of secrecy upon

grand juries shows that none dictates that a witness should be

denied a copy of his own testimony.”); Bast, 542 F.2d at 898

(Wyzanski, J., dissenting) (any dangers that generally justify

grand jury secrecy do not apply to witness’s request to access

transcript of his grand jury testimony). For this reason, the

Supreme Court’s “particularized need” standard, which the

Court crafted to deal with third-party requests for secret

transcripts of other witnesses’ testimony, does not apply in this

first-party context. See In re Sealed Motion, 880 F.2d at 1370-

73 & n.6; see also, e.g., Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. at 420, 443-

44; Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 216-17, 222-23; Pittsburgh

Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 396, 399-400

(1959); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677,

678-79, 682 (1958).

To be sure, the Government is concerned about grand jury

witnesses (or their attorneys) who disclose information to other

grand jury witnesses (or their attorneys) with the purpose of

obstructing the criminal investigation. The Government

identifies joint defense agreements among attorneys as a threat

to the integrity of the grand jury process. But denying witnesses

access to their own transcripts to help prevent witnesses from

talking to others makes little sense to begin with – and makes

even less sense given that grand jury witnesses are under no

legal obligation of secrecy. A grand jury witness is legally free

to tell, for example, his or her attorney, family, friends,

associates, reporters, or bloggers what happened in the grand

jury. For that matter, the witness can stand on the courthouse

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steps and tell the public everything the witness was asked and

answered. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2)(A)-(B); Fed. R. Crim. P.

6, Advisory Committee Notes, 1944 Adoption, Note to

Subdivision (e) (“rule does not impose any obligation of secrecy

on witnesses”). The secrecy rules therefore are no justification

for denying witnesses access to their own transcripts.

The Government also expresses concern about witness

intimidation. Here, the Government is on firmer ground. We of

course agree with the Government that witness intimidation (and

the fear of it) remains a serious problem in our criminal justice

system. See Illinois v. Abbott & Assocs., 460 U.S. 557, 566-67

n.11 (1983); 1 BEALE & BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND

PRACTICE § 5:12 ¶ 7. And if a witness could routinely obtain a

copy of the grand jury transcript, the Government theorizes that

an interested party could in turn pressure the witness to obtain

the transcript and to give it to that third party. See United States

v. John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. 102, 125 (1987) (Brennan, J.,

dissenting) (“[A] rule of automatic access would expose grand

jury witnesses to potential intimidation by making it possible for

those with power over the witness to monitor his or her

testimony.”) (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis altered); In

re Alvarez, 351 F. Supp. 1089, 1090-91 (S.D. Cal. 1972). The

Government further suggests that the witness’s fear of being

forced to disclose the transcript to a threatening third party could

deter witnesses from testifying freely and candidly in the first

place.

Regardless of whether the possibility of witness

intimidation would justify denying copies of transcripts, an issue

we need not decide, the Government’s witness intimidation

argument lacks force with respect to a witness’s merely

reviewing the transcript in private at the U.S. Attorney’s office

or a place agreed to by the parties or designated by the district

court. Grand jury witnesses are not substantially more likely to

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21

face pressure to divulge information about their grand jury

testimony if they can review their transcript in private than if

they have to recall their testimony from memory. To take a

simplistic example, if an individual tracks down a grand jury

witness and asks, “Did you dime me out to the grand jury?” the

witness’s answer – some variation of yes, no, I’m not talking

about it, or my lawyer told me not to talk about it – is not

realistically affected by whether the witness can review the

transcript at a secure location. The Government’s compelling

interest in preventing witness intimidation therefore does not

support denying the witness the opportunity to review the

transcript of his prior grand jury testimony.

In sum, grand jury witnesses have a strong interest in

reviewing the transcripts of their own grand jury testimony. The

Government has little good reason to prevent witnesses from

reviewing their transcripts. Weighing the interests of witnesses

and the Government, we therefore hold that the grand jury

witnesses are entitled under Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) to review

transcripts of their own grand jury testimony in private at the

U.S. Attorney’s Office or a place agreed to by the parties or

designated by the district court. We leave to the sound

discretion of the district court whether to permit the witnesses’

attorneys to accompany the witnesses as they review their

transcripts and whether to allow the witnesses or their attorneys

to take notes. Because our holding on the right of access affords

the employees complete relief, we need not and do not resolve

the issue of whether witnesses also have a right to obtain a copy

of the transcripts of their prior testimony, leaving that issue for

another day. Accordingly, because the district court erred in

applying the third-party standard, supra note 3, we reverse the

orders denying the employees’ motions for disclosure of the

transcripts of their prior grand jury testimony to the extent that

they were denied access.

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