Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03090/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03090-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tarik Settles
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 13, 2008 Decided June 27, 2008 

No. 06-3090 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

TARIK SETTLES, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 05cr00059-01) 

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs was 

A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. 

Muyiwa Bamiduro, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeffrey A. 

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III and Florence 

Pan, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

USCA Case #06-3090 Document #1124149 Filed: 06/27/2008 Page 1 of 8
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Before: GINSBURG, BROWN, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges. 

 Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge 

KAVANAUGH. 

 KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: A jury convicted Tarik 

Settles of unlawfully possessing a firearm and ammunition as 

a convicted felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The District 

Court sentenced Settles to 57 months of imprisonment 

followed by three years of supervised release. Settles appeals 

his sentence, arguing that the District Court 

(i) unconstitutionally relied on acquitted conduct in 

determining the appropriate sentence and (ii) committed 

procedural error under the Supreme Court’s Booker line of 

cases by presuming that a sentence within the advisory 

Sentencing Guidelines range was reasonable. Because our 

precedents establish that a sentencing court may consider 

acquitted conduct at sentencing, and because the District 

Court here did not impermissibly apply a presumption of 

reasonableness to a within-Guidelines sentence, we affirm. 

I 

The jury convicted Tarik Settles of one count of unlawful 

possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, 

but it acquitted him of possession with intent to distribute 

cocaine and of using or carrying a firearm during a drugtrafficking offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 

 The statutory maximum for Settles’s felon-in-possession 

conviction was 10 years. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). Under 

the advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, Settles’s Guidelines 

range for the felon-in-possession conviction was 37 to 46 

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months of imprisonment. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 

MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A); U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A. 

The probation office’s presentence investigation report 

recommended an enhancement for conduct of which the jury 

had acquitted Settles: using or possessing a firearm in 

connection with possessing with intent to distribute cocaine. 

See § 2K2.1(b)(6). As a result of that enhancement, the 

adjusted Guidelines range was 57 to 71 months of 

imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A. 

 After hearing arguments from the parties, the District 

Court agreed with the probation office and found that the 

Government had proved by a preponderance of the evidence 

that Settles had possessed the gun in connection with 

possessing with intent to distribute cocaine. Therefore, the 

District Court found the advisory Guidelines sentencing range 

to be 57 to 71 months. The District Court then considered the 

sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), heard defense 

counsel’s arguments regarding those factors, and listened to 

Settles’s request for leniency. The District Court ultimately 

sentenced Settles to 57 months in prison followed by three 

years of supervised release. 

II 

 On appeal, Settles argues that the District Court’s upward 

adjustment to his base offense level under the advisory 

Guidelines violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights 

because the adjustment was based on conduct of which he had 

been acquitted. He also argues that the District Court 

committed procedural error under the Booker line of cases by 

treating the Guidelines range of 57 to 71 months as 

presumptively reasonable. 

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The Supreme Court recently set forth the limited role of 

appeals courts in reviewing sentences: We review a sentence 

under an abuse of discretion standard, ensuring both that the 

District Court did not commit a “significant procedural error” 

and that the sentence is substantively reasonable. Gall v. 

United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). In assessing 

procedural compliance, we ensure that the District Court did 

not: incorrectly calculate the advisory Guidelines range, fail 

to consider the § 3553(a) factors, rely on clearly erroneous 

facts, treat the advisory Guidelines as mandatory, or fail to 

explain the chosen sentence and any deviation from the 

advisory Guidelines range. Id. 

A 

 Settles argues that the District Court violated the Fifth 

and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution by considering 

conduct of which he had been acquitted in calculating the 

advisory Guidelines range and determining his sentence. 

Settles contends in particular that the District Court’s reliance 

on acquitted conduct increased his advisory Guidelines range 

from 37-46 months to 57-71 months and that the District 

Court took that acquitted conduct into account in imposing a 

sentence within the advisory Guidelines range. As Settles 

concedes, however, long-standing precedents of the Supreme 

Court and this Court establish that a sentencing judge may 

consider uncharged or even acquitted conduct in calculating 

an appropriate sentence, so long as that conduct has been 

proved by a preponderance of the evidence and the sentence 

does not exceed the statutory maximum for the crime of 

conviction. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156-57 

(1997); United States v. Brown, 516 F.3d 1047, 1050-51 

(D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 371 

(D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 636 

(D.C. Cir. 1992); see also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 

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241, 247 (1949). Under those cases, there is no Fifth 

Amendment due process problem with this long-standing 

sentencing practice. As to the Sixth Amendment, moreover, 

the District Court’s reliance on acquitted conduct in 

calculating the Guidelines range no longer poses a problem 

because the post-Booker Guidelines are only advisory. For 

Sixth Amendment purposes, the relevant upper sentencing 

limit established by the jury’s finding of guilt is thus the 

statutory maximum, not the advisory Guidelines maximum 

corresponding to the base offense level. And the Supreme 

Court has “never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise 

broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory 

range.” United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005). 

In short, because the conduct in question was proved by a 

preponderance of the evidence and because Settles’s sentence 

did not exceed the statutory maximum of 10 years, the 

District Court’s consideration of acquitted conduct in 

sentencing him did not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendment. 

 To be sure, we understand why defendants find it unfair 

for district courts to rely on acquitted conduct when imposing 

a sentence; and we know that defendants find it unfair even 

when acquitted conduct is used only to calculate an advisory 

Guidelines range because most district judges still give 

significant weight to the advisory Guidelines when imposing 

a sentence. At his sentencing, Settles himself cogently 

explained the point directly to the court: “I just feel as 

though, you know, that that’s not right. That I should get 

punished for something that the jury and my peers, they found 

me not guilty.” May 19 Tr. at 29. Many judges and 

commentators have similarly argued that using acquitted 

conduct to increase a defendant’s sentence undermines 

respect for the law and the jury system. See, e.g., Watts, 519 

U.S. at 170 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“At the least it ought to 

be said that to increase a sentence based on conduct 

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underlying a charge for which the defendant was acquitted 

does raise concerns about undercutting the verdict of 

acquittal . . . .”); United States v. Baylor, 97 F.3d 542, 549-51 

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (Wald, J., concurring specially). 

For those reasons, Congress or the Sentencing 

Commission certainly could conclude as a policy matter that 

sentencing courts may not rely on acquitted conduct. But 

under binding precedent, the Constitution does not prohibit a 

sentencing court from relying on acquitted conduct. 

That said, even though district judges are not required to 

discount acquitted conduct, the Booker-Rita-Kimbrough-Gall

line of cases may allow district judges to discount acquitted 

conduct in particular cases – that is, to vary downward from 

the advisory Guidelines range when the district judges do not 

find the use of acquitted conduct appropriate. Cf. Kimbrough 

v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 570 (2007) (“The 

Government acknowledges . . . that, as a general matter, 

courts may vary from Guidelines ranges based solely on 

policy considerations, including disagreements with the 

Guidelines.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration 

omitted). Because the District Court here chose not to vary 

below the advisory Guidelines range, however, we need not 

and do not decide that question. 

B 

Settles correctly argues that a “sentencing court does not 

enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the Guidelines 

sentence should apply.” Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 

2456, 2465 (2007). At the outset, we recognize the surface 

incongruity of a system in which district courts cannot apply a 

presumption of reasonableness to a within-Guidelines 

sentence, while appellate courts can and do apply a 

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presumption of reasonableness to a within-Guidelines 

sentence. See id.; Dorcely, 454 F.3d at 376 (“[A] sentence 

within a properly calculated Guidelines range is entitled to a 

rebuttable presumption of reasonableness” on appeal.). In any 

event, the District Court in this case applied no such 

presumption. Rather, the court arrived at Settles’s withinGuidelines sentence only after it had reviewed the presentence 

investigation report; properly calculated the advisory 

Guidelines range; and considered the § 3553(a) sentencing 

factors, the parties’ arguments, and Settles’s plea for leniency. 

Settles relies on two of the District Court’s statements to 

argue that the court inappropriately applied a presumption of 

reasonableness to the advisory Guidelines range. 

First, after properly calculating the advisory Guidelines 

range, the District Court stated that it would “[t]hen . . . turn 

to 3553” and consider “whether there are other factors here 

that would suggest that the Court should administer or impose 

a lesser sentence.” May 19 Tr. at 34. Settles takes those 

unremarkable statements to show the District Court’s belief 

that the advisory Guidelines created a presumptively correct 

sentencing range that “then” had to be overcome by other 

factors to justify a variance. But the court said nothing of the 

sort. Rather, it merely took the advisory Guidelines range as 

a “starting point” and “then considered whether the § 3553(a) 

factors warrant a sentence either within or outside this range.” 

United States v. Lawson, 494 F.3d 1046, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 

2007). 

Second, after hearing the parties’ sentencing arguments, 

the court concluded as follows: “I can’t find in your situation 

a basis to . . . depart downward from the guidelines which I 

think under the law is a reasonable one which brings me out 

to the bottom of the guidelines.” May 19 Tr. at 41 (emphases 

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added). That statement does not suggest that the District 

Court applied a presumption of reasonableness to the advisory 

Guidelines range that Settles had to overcome. Rather, the 

court’s statement that it “think[s]” the range is “reasonable” 

demonstrates the court’s independent judgment that a withinGuidelines sentence in this case was reasonable and 

appropriate. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596-97. 

* * * 

We affirm the District Court’s judgment. 

So ordered. 

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