Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02421/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02421-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Udi Fishman
Petitioner
Gary Swarthout
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

UDI FISHMAN, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

GARY SWARTHOUT, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:13-cv-02421-GGH 

ORDER1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He was convicted of burglary, attempted false imprisonment, 

unlawful use of tear gas, and possession of a deadly weapon. Petitioner was sentenced to a prison 

term of 5 years. Petitioner challenges his conviction on the following grounds: 1) the trial court’s 

failure to give a unanimity instruction on his burglary charge violated the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments; 2) the trial court’s exclusion of impeachment evidence violated petitioner’s Sixth 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights; 3) the trial court’s ruling preventing disclosure of emails 

between a witness and her attorney violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; and 4) 

the trial court’s restitution order violated his due process rights. Respondent has filed an answer 

 

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 Both parties have consented to have the undersigned preside in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

section 636(c). 

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and petitioner has filed a traverse and a motion for discovery. (ECF Nos. 18, 26.) Upon careful 

consideration of the record and the applicable law, the court denies the petition and denies 

petitioner’s motion for discovery. 

BACKGROUND 

In its unpublished memorandum and opinion affirming petitioner’s judgment of 

conviction on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the 

following factual summary: 

Juan Trejo first met defendant in 1998, when defendant solicited a 

bid from Juan to build a 340–foot–long retaining wall on 

defendant's property in Los Gatos.[N.1] After Juan built the wall, 

he continued to do various work for defendant over the years. In 

2006, he rebuilt the wall after a big part of it collapsed. Juan and 

defendant thereafter were involved in litigation involving an 

engineering firm and the manufacturers of the stone used in the 

wall. The litigation ultimately settled in 2009, with Juan receiving 

$540,000 and defendant receiving $290,000. (The money paid to 

Juan was apparently for amounts defendant owed him for 

rebuilding the wall.) 

[N.1] We refer to Juan by his first name to distinguish him 

from his wife, Christine Trejo, to whom we will also refer 

by her first name. 

After the settlement, the relationship between Juan and defendant 

deteriorated. Juan claimed he loaned defendant $45,000, but then 

refused to give defendant any more money after defendant said he 

needed “all of it” and that “everybody got rich, except me.” 

Defendant claimed that work remained for Juan to do on his 

property and the $45,000 Juan gave him was not a loan but 

repayment for sums defendant had advanced to Juan's employees 

on Juan's behalf while the wall was being rebuilt. 

On September 16, 2009, Juan's wife, Christine, was at their home in 

Placer County with her brother-in-law, George Obregon; Juan was 

working in the Bay Area. A van with what turned out to be fake PG 

& E magnetic placards on the side drove onto the property and 

around to the back of the house. It was later determined that the van 

had mismatched license plates on it, both of which belonged to 

other vehicles. Defendant was the driver. 

Upon seeing the van, Christine went out the back door and 

approached the van. Defendant, who was wearing sunglasses, an 

orange safety vest, and a hat, told Christine he was there to do an 

audit. She told him to stay there, she was going to get her husband, 

but as she walked back toward the house she discovered he was 

following her. When she told him to stay there again, he told her he 

had left the audit in the van and he had to go get it. 

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From the house, Christine watched defendant get back in the van 

and start to drive off. She locked the door and called out to 

Obregon, who was in the bathroom. She watched as defendant 

appeared to be driving off the property but then stopped, parked the 

van again, and this time approached the front of the house. 

Christine went to the front door and saw defendant approaching the 

front stairs with a red canister in his hand. As she yelled at him to 

get rid of the canister, he came up to her, telling her that if she 

would hold the audit he would get rid of the canister. As she 

reached to take the audit from him, he sprayed her in the face with 

pepper spray. She stepped back and screamed for Obregon to help 

her. Then she turned and tried to run, but fell to the floor. 

Defendant followed her into the house, and when Obregon came 

out, approached defendant, and asked him what was going on, 

defendant sprayed Obregon in the face with the pepper spray as 

well. A struggle between the two men ensued, and in an attempt to 

get defendant off Obregon, Christine hit defendant with a bottle and 

then stabbed him with a knife. She then ran outside and called 911. 

While waiting for the police, she got in the van and saw cardboard 

laid down in the back, along with some rope. A wooden table leg 

altered with a weighted end and a tennis ball covering the end was 

later found in the van. 

Defendant was ultimately charged with attempted murder, burglary, 

attempted kidnapping, two counts of unlawful use of tear gas, and 

possession of a deadly weapon (the table leg). At trial, he admitted 

going to the Trejos' house in disguise, but he claimed it was only so 

Juan would come open the gate so they could talk. He also testified 

that when he came to the front door, Christine suddenly raised her 

hand with a knife in it and stabbed him in the forearm. He claimed 

the pepper spray discharged when he was trying to defend his face 

from Christine's attack. He also claimed that Christine then ran into 

the house, and when he stepped in the house to see who she was 

talking to, Obregon lunged at him and knocked him down. He 

testified that he probably pressed the trigger on the pepper spray 

again “by reflection” when Obregon knocked him down. 

The jury acquitted defendant of attempted murder and attempted 

kidnapping but convicted him of burglary, attempted false 

imprisonment (a lesser included offense of attempted kidnapping), 

both counts of unlawful use of tear gas, and possession of a deadly 

weapon. The trial court sentenced defendant to five years in prison. 

Defendant timely appealed.[N.2] 

[N.2] We consolidated defendant's appeal from the 

judgment (case No. C067955) with his later appeal from a 

postjudgment restitution order (case No. C069267). On 

appeal, defendant has not raised any issue regarding the 

restitution order, so we will affirm that order without further 

discussion. 

People v. Fishman, 2013 WL 542032, at **1–2 (February 8, 2013). The California Court of 

Appeal affirmed the judgment. Id. at *9. On March 18, 2013, petitioner filed a petition for 

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review with the California Supreme Court, which was summarily denied on May 15, 2013. 

Resp’t’s Lod. Docs. 5, 6. Petitioner filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in this 

court on November 21, 2013. ECF No. 1. 

DISCUSSION 

I. AEDPA Standards 

 The statutory limitations of federal courts’ power to issue habeas corpus relief for persons 

in state custody is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The text of § 2254(d) states: 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim- 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

 As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court has recently held and reconfirmed “that § 

2254(d) does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have 

been ‘adjudicated on the merits.’” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 785 (2011). Rather, 

“when a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it 

may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any 

indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Id. at 784–85, citing Harris v. 

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265, 109 S.Ct. 1038 (1989) (presumption of a merits determination when it 

is unclear whether a decision appearing to rest on federal grounds was decided on another basis). 

“The presumption may be overcome when there is reason to think some other explanation for the 

state court's decision is more likely.” Id. at 785. 

The Supreme Court has set forth the operative standard for federal habeas review of state 

court decisions under AEDPA as follows: “For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), ‘an unreasonable

application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.’” Harrington, 

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131 S.Ct. at 785, citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000). “A state 

court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Id. at 786, 

citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140 (2004). 

Accordingly, “a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . 

could have supported[] the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible 

fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the 

holding in a prior decision of this Court.” Id. “Evaluating whether a rule application was 

unreasonable requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the more 

leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.’” Id. Emphasizing the 

stringency of this standard, which “stops short of imposing a complete bar of federal court 

relitigation of claims already rejected in state court proceedings[,]” the Supreme Court has 

cautioned that “even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion 

was unreasonable.” Id., citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166 (2003). 

 The undersigned also finds that the same deference is paid to the factual determinations of 

state courts. Under § 2254(d)(2), factual findings of the state courts are presumed to be correct 

subject only to a review of the record which demonstrates that the factual finding(s) “resulted in a 

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding.” It makes no sense to interpret “unreasonable” in § 

2254(d)(2) in a manner different from that same word as it appears in § 2254(d)(1) – i.e., the 

factual error must be so apparent that “fairminded jurists” examining the same record could not 

abide by the state court factual determination. A petitioner must show clearly and convincingly 

that the factual determination is unreasonable. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338, 126 S.Ct. 

969, 974 (2006). 

 The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the objectively 

unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court authority. 

Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002). Specifically, the petitioner “must 

show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

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justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786–787. “Clearly 

established” law is law that has been “squarely addressed” by the United States Supreme Court. 

Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125, 128 S.Ct. 743, 746 (2008). Thus, extrapolations of 

settled law to unique situations will not qualify as clearly established. See e.g., Carey v. 

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76, 127 S.Ct. 649, 653–54 (2006) (established law not permitting state 

sponsored practices to inject bias into a criminal proceeding by compelling a defendant to wear 

prison clothing or by unnecessary showing of uniformed guards does not qualify as clearly 

established law when spectators’ conduct is the alleged cause of bias injection). The established 

Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional principles, or other 

controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules binding only on 

federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 9, 123 S. Ct. 362, 366 (2002). 

When a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects some claims but does not 

expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to rebuttal, that 

the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1091 

(2013). However, if the state courts have not adjudicated the merits of the federal issue, no 

AEDPA deference is given; the issue is reviewed de novo under general principles of federal law. 

Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated awareness 

of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early, 537 U.S. at 8, 123 S.Ct. at 365. Where 

the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in dispute in any reasoned opinion, the 

federal court will independently review the record in adjudication of that issue. “Independent 

review of the record is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method 

by which we can determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” 

Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

II. Unanimity Instruction 

Petitioner contends the trial court’s failure to give a unanimity instruction on his burglary 

charge violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The California Court of Appeal 

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rejected this claim as follows: 

Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the 

jurors that they had to unanimously agree on which act constituted 

the entry necessary to convict him of burglary and on what felony 

he intended to commit when he entered. We disagree on both 

points. 

“In a criminal case, a jury verdict must be unanimous.... 

Additionally, the jury must agree unanimously the defendant is 

guilty of a specific crime. [Citation.] Therefore, cases have long 

held that when the evidence suggests more than one discrete crime, 

either the prosecution must elect among the crimes or the court 

must require the jury to agree on the same criminal act. [Citations.] 

[¶] This requirement of unanimity as to the criminal act ‘is intended 

to eliminate the danger that the defendant will be convicted even 

though there is no single offense which all the jurors agree the 

defendant committed.’ ... [¶] On the other hand, where the evidence 

shows only a single discrete crime but leaves room for 

disagreement as to exactly how that crime was committed or what 

the defendant's precise role was, the jury need not unanimously 

agree on the basis or, as the cases often put it, the ‘theory’ whereby 

the defendant is guilty. [Citation.] The crime of burglary provides a 

good illustration of the difference between discrete crimes, which 

require a unanimity instruction, and theories of the case, which do 

not. Burglary requires an entry with a specified intent.[N.8] 

(Pen.Code, § 459.) If the evidence showed two different entries 

with burglarious intent, for example, one of a house on Elm Street 

on Tuesday and another of a house on Maple Street on Wednesday, 

the jury would have to unanimously find the defendant guilty of at 

least one of those acts. If, however, the evidence showed a single 

entry, but possible uncertainty as to the exact burglarious intent, 

that uncertainty would involve only the theory of the case and not 

require the unanimity instruction.” (People v. Russo (2001) 25 

Cal.4th 1124, 1132–1133.) 

[N.8] The required intent is the intent to commit larceny or 

any felony. (Pen.Code, § 459; People v. Yarbrough (2012) 

54 Cal.4th 889, 892.) 

The foregoing passage from Russo, which defendant acknowledges, 

disposes of the latter half of his unanimity argument. He insists, 

however, that it does not. Specifically, he “does not dispute this 

state of the law as it relates to the crime of general offense 

burglary,” but he argues that “the state of the evidence as to [his] 

use of the pepper spray and the entry into the house required the 

giving of a unanimity instruction ... to ensure that all the jurors 

agreed on the specific felonious intent underlying the burglary 

charge.” He contends that is so in this case because “there was not 

sufficient evidence to support a finding that [he] entered the house 

with intent to commit ... attempted kidnapping,” and therefore “the 

verdict on the burglary count was necessarily predicated on a 

finding that [he] entered with the intent to unlawfully use pepper 

spray,” but “there were two instances of [his] use of pepper 

spray”—one at the threshold (against Christine) and one inside the 

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house (against Obregon). He contends that if Christine's testimony 

is credited, the first use of pepper spray occurred when he had not 

yet entered the house, which left only the theory that he entered the 

house with the intent to use the spray again, which he contends was 

not supported by sufficient evidence. From this line of reasoning, 

he concludes that the jury was misled because “the jury was 

instructed that [it] did not need to agree on the underlying intent.” 

Frankly, we cannot make any sense whatsoever of the foregoing 

argument. Russo makes clear that no unanimity instruction is 

necessary on the felonious intent element of burglary, and it admits 

of no exception. On the evidence here, and in light of the jury's 

verdicts, it appears the jurors decided that defendant entered the 

Trejos' house with the intent to unlawfully use the pepper spray he 

was carrying. Whether there was sufficient evidence that defendant 

harbored that intent, under Russo no unanimity instruction was 

required on the intent element of the burglary charge. Accordingly, 

the latter half of defendant's unanimity argument is without merit. 

We reach the same conclusion with respect to the first half of his 

unanimity argument—that the jurors should have been instructed 

they had to unanimously agree on what act constituted the entry for 

purposes of the burglary charge. Defendant bases this argument on 

the premise that “there were two separate and distinct acts upon 

which the prosecutor based the burglary charge: 1) the spraying of 

[Christine] while [defendant] stood outside the threshold of the door 

and some of the spray itself was alleged to have entered the house; 

and 2) the entry of [defendant] into the house after he sprayed 

[Christine].” The prosecutor argued no such thing, however. 

Defendant's assertion that the prosecutor offered the jury alternative 

theories of what constituted the entry for purposes of the burglary 

charge is based on a single statement the prosecutor made to the 

jury in closing argument, but defendant fails to quote the 

prosecutor's statement in its entirety. When the prosecutor's entire 

statement to the jury is considered, it is apparent that he was not 

distinguishing between two possible manners of entry; rather, he 

was discussing the intent element of the crime, arguing to the jury 

that while defendant's “ultimate purpose was ... the intended kidnap 

or killing of [Christine],” the jury could find that he committed 

burglary by entering with the intent to unlawfully use pepper spray 

because of the fact that “he entered th[e] threshold with the pepper 

spray and then continued, pursued her, and used it again on ... 

Obregon.” 

With the prosecutor's argument properly in context, it is apparent 

that the prosecutor did not offer the jury the choice of two different 

entries in determining whether defendant committed burglary. Even 

assuming for the sake of argument, however, that notwithstanding 

the prosecutor's theory the jury could have chosen between the 

entry of the pepper spray and the entry of defendant himself as the 

means of entry, no unanimity instruction was necessary here 

because, as the People point out, “[a] unanimity instruction is not 

required where the offenses are so closely connected to form a 

single transaction.” (People v. Thompson (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 

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843, 851.) This exception “‘applies when the defendant offers 

essentially the same defense to each of the acts, and there is no 

reasonable basis for the jury to distinguish between them.’ ” (Ibid.) 

Such was the case here. 

Defendant contends the single transaction exception to the 

requirement of a unanimity instruction does not apply here because 

his “conduct was the source of much dispute at trial” and “[i]n 

setting forth proper jury instructions, the court cannot ignore the 

defense evidence.” While both of these propositions are true, they 

do not support defendant's conclusion that a unanimity instruction 

was required. Under the principles explained in Russo, a unanimity 

instruction was necessary only if the evidence left open the 

possibility that defendant committed two distinct burglaries and 

there was a danger that the jury might have found him guilty 

without agreeing on which burglary he committed. That possibility 

did not exist here. If the jurors had credited defendant's version of 

events, they would not have found him guilty of any burglary at all. 

On the other hand, if the jurors credited the prosecution's 

evidence—as they did—they could have found him guilty of only 

one burglary because the two supposed entries were so closely 

connected in time and space that there was no reasonable basis for 

the jury to distinguish between them. Under these circumstances, no 

unanimity instruction was necessary. 

Fishman, 2013 WL 542032 at **7–9. 

Petitioner repeats the arguments he made on his state court direct appeal here in his 

federal petition. First, he contends the jury should have been given a unanimity instruction on 

which act constituted the entry necessary to convict him of burglary. That is, whether the jury 

relied on petitioner’s act of spraying Ms. Trejo while he stood outside the threshold of the door or 

petitioner’s act of physically entering the house. The question of whether a unanimity instruction 

on this issue was necessary is a matter of state law and thus not a reviewable in a federal habeas 

proceeding. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68, 112 S.Ct. 475 (1991). As the California 

Court of Appeal noted, “where the offenses are so closely connected to form a single transaction,” 

a unanimity instruction is not required. See People v. Thompson, 36 Cal. App. 4th 843, 851 

(1995). Furthermore, as a matter of state law, no unanimity instruction is necessary on the 

felonious intent element of burglary. See People v. Russo, 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132–33 (2001). 

Petitioner also appears to contend, from a federal perspective, that the jury was required to 

unanimously agree on which felony he intended to commit to satisfy the “intent” requirement of 

burglary. Distinguishing between the facts necessary to satisfy the required elements of the 

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charged offense from those facts that show the means by which the elements are established, the 

United States Supreme Court has held that juror unanimity is not required with respect to the 

theory underlying the criminal charge. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631–32, 649, 111 S.Ct. 

2491 (1991) (“We have never suggested that in returning general verdicts the jurors should be 

required to agree upon a single means of commission, any more than the indictments were 

required to specify one alone.”, citing McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449, 110 S.Ct. 

1227 (1990) (Blackman, J., concurring) (There is no constitutional requirement that “the jury 

reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict.”) ; Jeffries v. 

Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1195 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that it is “irrelevant” whether the jurors 

unanimously agree on which of the alternative means was employed to commit the crime). In 

Schad, the Supreme Court held that in reaching a verdict of first degree murder, the jury did not 

have to unanimously agree whether premeditation or felony murder supplied the requisite element 

for the conviction. 

The denial of petitioner’s claim by the California Court of Appeal was not an 

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court authority. Accordingly, this claim 

is denied. 

III. Evidentiary Rulings 

Petitioner contends his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated because 

the trial court (1) improperly excluded evidence relating to the Trejos’s character for truthfulness 

and (2) prevented disclosure of emails sent by Ms. Trejo through her work email to her attorney. 

Although cloaked in terms of erroneous state evidentiary rulings, petitioner appears to claim that 

these errors violated his right to present a defense under Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 

126 S.Ct. 1727 (2006) and his right to an opportunity for effective cross-examination under Davis 

v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, L.Ed.2d 347 (1974).2 It appears that some of these 

claims were not exhausted. Nonetheless, the court denies the petition on the merits pursuant to 28 

 

2

 To the extent petitioner claims these evidentiary rulings are erroneous under state law, again, 

those claims are not cognizable on federal habeas review. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67 (“[F]ederal 

habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.”) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). 

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U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). 

A. Applicable Legal Standards 

A district court may not collaterally review a state court evidentiary ruling unless it 

violates federal law, either by violating a specific constitutional provision or by infringing upon 

the due process right to a fair trial. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 

29 (1984). “State and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish 

rules excluding evidence from criminal trials.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324, 

126 S.Ct. 1727, 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006) (quotations and citations omitted); see also Montana v. 

Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996) (plurality opinion) (holding 

that due process does not guarantee a defendant the right to present all relevant evidence). This 

latitude is limited, however, by a defendant's constitutional rights to due process and to present a 

defense, rights originating in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and by 

extension, the Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine using the evidence acquired. Holmes, 

547 U.S. at 324. “While the Constitution prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules 

that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to 

promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative 

value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 

potential to mislead the jury.” Id. at 326; see also Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 43 (holding that the 

exclusion of evidence does not violate the Due Process Clause unless “it offends some principle 

of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 

fundamental.”). “[T]he Constitution permits judges to exclude evidence that is repetitive, only 

marginally relevant or poses an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues.” 

Holmes, 547 U.S. at 326–27. The defendant, not the state, bears the burden to demonstrate that 

the principle violated by the evidentiary rule “is so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 

people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 47 (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). 

 Turning to the Sixth Amendment, as the Ninth Circuit has explained in applying Supreme 

Court authority, the right to cross-examine a witness is not unfettered: 

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A defendant’s right to cross-examine adverse witnesses is not 

unlimited, though. “[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an 

opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination 

that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the 

defense might wish.” “The Supreme Court has held that a 

Confrontation Clause violation occurs when a trial judge prohibits 

any inquiry into why a witness may be biased.” However when 

some inquiry is permitted, “trial judges retain wide latitude . . . to 

impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination.” “No 

Confrontation Clause violation occurs ‘as long as the jury receives 

sufficient information to appraise the biases and motivations of the 

witness.’” 

Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 518 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted and emphasis 

original). “‘[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that 

he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a 

prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness.’” Murdoch v. Castro, 365 F.3d 699, 705 (9th 

Cir. 2004), quoting Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231, 109 S.Ct. 480 (1988). Accordingly, 

the defendant has met his burden when he has shown that “‘[a] reasonable jury might have 

received a significantly different impression of [a witness'] credibility had ... counsel been 

permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination.’” Id., quoting Delaware v. Van 

Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). 

 With respect to petitioner’s claims that he was the denied the opportunity to crossexamine witnesses with information his lawyer already had in his possession, the proper 

Constitutional amendment to review is the Sixth Amendment. However, the appropriate federal 

claim for review concerning denial of discovery of some emails is that established by Holmes—

the Fourteenth/Fifth Amendments due process right to present a defense. Although the material 

which petitioner claims was denied him might have been used on cross-examination, it is the 

discovery of the information in the first instance which is at issue. The undersigned will therefore 

explore the Holmes issue for this latter claim. 

B. Analysis 

1. Alleged Molestation and Prior Litigation 

Petitioner contends his Sixth Amendment right were violated when the trial court 

excluded evidence that Juan Trejo had been accused of molesting his stepdaughter (Christine 

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Trejo’s daughter) and evidence that, in connection with a civil lawsuit filed against them, the 

Trejos had reneged on a settlement agreement and fraudulently transferred real property prior to 

filing for bankruptcy. The Court of Appeal rejected these claims on direct appeal as follows: 

A 

Alleged Molestation 

In their motions in limine, the People sought to exclude evidence 

that in 1996, Juan had been charged with molesting his 

stepdaughter (Christine's daughter). At a preliminary hearing in 

that case, an investigator had testified that Christine told her that 

Juan initially denied the molestation but then admitted to Christine 

that he had touched the alleged victim on the chest and private area. 

When the investigator talked to Juan, however, he denied touching 

the alleged victim with any sexual intent. Eventually, the case was 

dismissed for insufficient evidence. The People told the court that 

they believed Christine would maintain the molestation never 

occurred and Juan continued to deny the conduct. The People also 

noted that while they had not interviewed the alleged victim (who 

was now an adult), they were informed that the defense had 

interviewed her and she had recanted her allegations. The People 

acknowledged that, if proven, the molestation would constitute 

criminal conduct involving moral turpitude and would therefore be 

relevant for impeachment purposes, but they argued that the 

defense should be precluded from offering evidence relating to the 

alleged molestation because “[r]eference to these matters will 

necessarily create a mini-trial on the credibility of the allegations.” 

For his part, in his motions in limine defendant sought admission of 

the alleged molestation, arguing that it was relevant to impeach 

both Juan and Christine. Defendant asserted cursorily that “[t]he 

admission of this relevant evidence of impeachment ... would not 

involve an undue consumption of time.” 

At the hearing on the in limine motions, defense counsel told the 

court he was “not going to retry the [molestation] case” and that he 

intended to prove the molestation “by the law enforcement officer 

who interviewed the alleged victim ... and ... by the statement of the 

law enforcement officer that he [sic] took from Christine Trejo.” 

The People responded that retrial of the “whole thing” would be “a 

necessity” because “[t]hese are huge explosive allegations that are 

highly prejudicial to anybody if they are thrown out there.” 

The trial court ruled that the evidence would not be admitted, 

concluding that the probative value of the evidence was not going 

to outweigh its prejudicial effect. The court first suggested that Juan 

was not a particularly important witness because he “was nowhere 

near the scene of this particular incident when it occurred.” The 

court then stated that “allowing this issue to be explored is going to 

be unduly consumptive of the court's time” and “allegations of a 

sexual nature between an adult male and a juvenile female are 

explosive and raise prejudices by people, such that it may be 

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difficult for them to focus on what the issues are at hand as opposed 

to these particular issues.” The court observed that the People 

would “have to essentially relitigate those issues of the sexual abuse 

allegations which ended up in a dismissal of the charges.” The court 

also observed that it did not “admit a lot of [this type of 

impeachment] evidence in any circumstance” and that it did not 

“like” this type of evidence.[N.3] The court closed, however, by 

stating that it had “weighed the balance of the probative value 

versus the prejudicial effect and the consumption of the court's 

time, and on that ground I am going to deny the motion to admit 

that evidence.” 

[N.3] The court referred to the evidence as “Wheeler 

evidence,” for People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, in 

which the California Supreme Court clarified that nonfelony 

conduct involving moral turpitude is admissible to impeach 

a witness in a criminal case, subject to the court's discretion 

to exclude the evidence under Evidence Code section 352 if 

its probative value is substantially out-weighed by its 

potential for prejudice, confusion, or undue consumption of 

time. (Wheeler, at p. 295.) 

On appeal, defendant contends the trial court “erred in several ways 

in regard to the molestation evidence.” Specifically, defendant 

contends the trial court: (1) understated the importance of Juan's 

testimony to the prosecution's case; (2) “did not consider the 

impeachment value of the evidence for Christine”; (3) erroneously 

determined that the evidence would be unduly time consuming; (4) 

effectively “create[d] an automatic exclusion of evidence of prior 

sexual misconduct”; (5) “incorrectly held that the defense would 

have to prove the allegations of prior misconduct by a 

preponderance of the evidence”; and (6) “did not exercise its 

discretion under the law, relying instead on its prior position against 

the admission of Wheeler evidence.” Defendant also suggests that 

the trial court's ruling violated his Sixth Amendment right to 

present a defense. 

Notwithstanding defendant's seriatim challenges to the trial court's 

ruling, the issue before us can be framed much more simply, as 

follows: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding 

evidence of the alleged molestation under Evidence Code section 

352 on the ground that the probative value of the evidence was 

outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice and the fact that its 

admission would necessitate undue consumption of time? We 

conclude the answer to that question is “no.” 

In Wheeler, the Supreme Court explained the task faced by a trial 

court considering the admission of evidence of prior acts of moral 

turpitude to impeach a witness in a criminal case, as follows: 

“When exercising its discretion under Evidence Code section 352, a 

court must always take into account, as applicable, those factors 

traditionally deemed pertinent in this area. [Citations.] But 

additional considerations may apply when evidence other than 

felony convictions is offered for impeachment. In general, a 

misdemeanor—or any other conduct not amounting to a felony—is 

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a less forceful indicator of immoral character or dishonesty than is a 

felony. Moreover, impeachment evidence other than felony 

convictions entails problems of proof, unfair surprise, and moral 

turpitude evaluation which felony convictions do not present. 

Hence, courts may and should consider with particular care whether 

the admission of such evidence might involve undue time, 

confusion, or prejudice which outweighs its probative value.” 

(People v. Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 296–297.) 

Here, the trial court carefully conducted the analysis required by 

Wheeler and reasonably determined that the probative value of the 

evidence that Juan allegedly molested his stepdaughter was 

outweighed by considerations of undue prejudice and undue 

consumption of time. The trial court did not, as defendant asserts, 

create an automatic exclusion of evidence of prior sexual 

misconduct or refuse to exercise its discretion by relying on a 

preconceived animosity toward this type of impeachment evidence. 

Rather, the court accurately determined that allegations of sexual 

molestation of a minor in a case that has nothing to do with that 

subject would create a very real possibility of undue prejudice. 

More important, the court recognized that allowing defendant to 

elicit evidence relating to the molestation allegations would have 

required the People to respond with a substantial amount of 

additional evidence seeking to refute those allegations. Based on 

defense counsel's offer of proof, defendant wanted to present 

evidence that Christine's daughter accused defendant of certain 

inappropriate touching and that Christine told the police 

investigator that Juan reluctantly admitted to her that he touched the 

child, although Juan denied to the investigator that he touched her 

with any sexual intent. If that evidence had been admitted, the 

People could have been expected to examine both Juan and 

Christine at length about what happened, as well as what they told 

the investigator and why. The People also could have been expected 

to call the alleged victim to testify about what happened, as well as 

what she told the investigator and why. And in the end, there was 

no guarantee, or even a reasonable expectation, that there would 

have been sufficient evidence to convince the jury that Juan 

molested Christine's daughter or that Christine lied about it—both 

acts of moral turpitude. 

Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in refusing to admit evidence regarding the alleged 

molestation. We likewise conclude that the exclusion of this 

evidence did not violate defendant's constitutional right to present a 

defense. 

B 

Prior Litigation 

In his motions in limine, defendant sought the admission of 

evidence of certain prior civil litigation relating to Juan's 

construction business. According to defendant, in 1993 an 

individual (Greenough) sued the Trejos for breach of contract. A 

settlement was reached, but (according to defendant) Juan failed to 

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abide by its terms. Thereafter, in 1994, Greenough obtained a 

judgment against the Trejos in the amount of $52,876.74. About 

five months later, the Trejos quitclaimed certain real property in 

Santa Clara to Juan's mother. [N.4] Greenough's attorney attempted 

to enforce the judgment, but the Trejos refused to provide a list of 

their assets and thereafter obtained a discharge in bankruptcy in 

December 1995. 

[N.4] In fact, the quitclaim deed showed it was executed in 

April 1992 but not recorded until April 1995. 

Defendant argued that the foregoing evidence should be admitted 

for impeachment because “[r]eneging on a settlement agreement is 

... an act of moral turpitude.” Defendant also argued that Christine 

had denied she had any interest in Juan's construction business but 

the court found otherwise. Finally, defendant suggested that the 

Trejos had committed an act of moral turpitude by refusing to 

provide a list of their assets and by transferring property to Juan's 

mother “for no consideration.” Defendant represented that he would 

call Greenough's attorney to testify on the matter. 

At the hearing on the in limine motions, the People asserted that the 

prior litigation was “remote” and that if the evidence came in, it 

would “have to be rebutted.” Defense counsel argued that what he 

wanted to present was the “sequential time line in terms of when 

the judgment was entered, when Mr. Trejo declared bankruptcy and 

when the property was quit claimed because that is a pretty clear 

trail.” In effect, as the trial court later clarified, defense counsel 

wanted to “prove a fraudulent transfer.” 

The trial court ruled that the evidence was barred by section 1101, 

subdivision (b) of the Evidence Code because it was “conduct on a 

single occasion that is to be used to show bad character or 

disposition to commit certain acts.” The court also ruled under 

Evidence Code section 352 that the prior incident was “so remote in 

time and ... so susceptible of leading this off on an area that has 

little if anything to do with the facts of this case.” Accordingly, the 

trial court denied defendant's motion to admit the evidence. 

On appeal, defendant contends the trial court “erred in its relevancy 

determination” because “[u]nder Evidence Code section 1100, 

specific instances of misconduct are admissible to prove a witness's 

character trait.” Defendant also contends the court abused its 

discretion in excluding the evidence under Evidence Code section 

352 because the incident was not remote when compared to “the 

past history between the Trejos and Mr. Fishman” and because 

presentation of the evidence would have taken less than an hour in a 

trial that lasted over three weeks. 

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding 

the evidence under Evidence Code section 352. [N.5] As for the 

issue of remoteness, the proximity of the prior incident to the outset 

of defendant's relationship with the Trejos is immaterial. What 

mattered here was the proximity of the prior incident to the time of 

trial. Recall that defendant sought to use this evidence to impeach 

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the Trejos' anticipated testimony by showing prior acts of moral 

turpitude, which (in his view) would have given the jury a reason to 

doubt the veracity of their testimony. The trial court did not act 

unreasonably in determining that the alleged transfer of property to 

avoid enforcement of a money judgment in 1995 was remote for 

purposes of impeaching the Trejos' testimony at a trial over 15 

years later. 

[N.5] Because of this conclusion, we need not address the 

alternate basis the trial court offered for excluding the 

evidence. 

Also, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to determine 

(implicitly) that presentation of evidence relating to the prior 

litigation would have necessitated an undue consumption of time 

and created a danger of confusing the issues or misleading the jury. 

By his offer of proof, defense counsel indicated he wanted to offer 

the testimony of Greenough's attorney essentially to prove that the 

Trejos fraudulently transferred real property to Juan's mother 

without consideration to protect the property from enforcement of 

the judgment. The quitclaim deed, however, showed that it was 

signed three years before it was recorded, well before the judgment. 

In the trial court, defense counsel asserted his belief that the date of 

the signature was “a fraudulent act also and bankruptcy fraud.” 

Under these circumstances, the People reasonably could have been 

expected to respond to the introduction of the testimony about the 

underlying litigation and the quitclaim deed by eliciting further 

evidence from other witnesses about the circumstances in which the 

deed was made, whether there was consideration to support it, and 

related matters, all in an effort to refute any conclusion that the 

transfer was fraudulent. Under these circumstances, the risk of 

undue consumption of time and diverting the jury from the issues in 

the case, combined with the remoteness of the prior incident, 

reasonably justified the trial court's decision to exclude the 

evidence of the prior litigation. 

Fishman, 2013 WL 542032 at **2–5. 

 As to petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to adequate cross-examination, this evidence 

was only marginally relevant and would have posed an undue risk of harassment, prejudice and 

confusion of the issues. The probative value of this evidence related only to the credibility of the 

Trejos. Indeed, Mr. Trejo, the target of the molestation allegations, was not even at the scene or 

house at the time of the attack. With regard to the Greenough litigation, petitioner was not a party 

to that lawsuit and thus the relevance of that lawsuit is also remote. Additionally, both pieces of 

evidence would require proof that they actually occurred. The allegations of molestation against 

Mr. Trejo were never decided before a trier of fact. The alleged victim recanted the allegations 

and Mrs. Trejo stood firm claiming the incidents never happened. As to the Greenough litigation, 

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petitioner’s trial counsel intended to prove at trial that the Trejos completed a fraudulent transfer 

shortly before filing for bankruptcy. In essence mini trials on this evidence would have had to 

occur and there was substantial risk for misleading the jury and confusing the issues. The crossexamination sought is the epitome of an undue taking of time to accomplish it, as well as the 

injection of undue prejudice. 

 Petitioner’s counsel cross-examined Mr. Trejo with prior inconsistent statements as well 

as describing the context of the litigation involving petitioner. In addition, Ms. Trejos was crossexamined with e-mails she had sent regarding the subject matter of the criminal prosecution here 

in question. The focus of the court’s inquiry is to determine whether the exclusion of the 

evidence was AEDPA unreasonable. Given the thoughtful consideration of the crossexamination issues here, and the allowable exceptions to unfettered cross-examination, petitioner 

reasonably had an opportunity for effective cross-examination without mention of the molestation 

allegations and the Greenough litigation. Certainly the state courts were not unreasonable in their 

conclusion to exclude the proffered impeachment. 

2. Ms. Trejo’s Emails Sent Through Her Work Server 

Petitioner contends his Fourteenth Amendment right, and perhaps his Sixth Amendment 

right by extension, were violated by the trial court’s decision not to disclose “‘all’ of the public emails of his accuser . . . .” (ECF No. 1, at 9). The Court of Appeal rejected this claim on direct 

appeal, stating as follows: 

This case originally was assigned to Judge Mark Curry for all 

purposes. On August 23, 2010, defense counsel disqualified Judge 

Curry under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. Two days later, 

Christine Trejo, who was employed in the family law department of 

the court, used the court's e-mail system to exchange some e-mails 

with Judge Curry's courtroom clerk about the disqualification and 

what would happen next. 

After Judge James Garbolino was assigned to the case in Judge 

Curry's place, he apparently learned of the e-mails and disclosed 

them to both sides. In their motions in limine, the People moved to 

exclude the e-mails as irrelevant. For his part, defendant moved to 

admit the e-mails as impeachment evidence, claiming they showed 

Christine was “using her position as an employee at the Placer 

County Superior Court in order to inappropriately exert her 

influence in the case,” which defendant asserted was “an act [of] 

moral turpitude.” Defendant also requested discovery of “[a]ll eCase 2:13-cv-02421-GGH Document 30 Filed 03/25/15 Page 18 of 23
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mails from Christine Trejo's work e-mail at the Placer County 

Superior Court regarding [his] current criminal case.” 

The court (Judge Garbolino) determined that Christine's “actions 

[we]re susceptible of inquiry to determine whether or not anything 

ha[d] occurred which could or might influence the outcome of this 

case within the system.” Accordingly, on October 27, 2010, the 

court ordered that “all communications originated by [Christine] 

through the Placer County Superior Court e-mail system 

commencing with September 16, 2009 [the date of the underlying 

incident], be made available to the court in camera.” In its order, the 

court stated that after identifying “any e-mails ... wherein the 

subject matter of the case is mentioned in any manner,” the court 

would “determine if there is any potential issue regarding privacy 

or confidentiality.” The court would then reveal all of the e-mails to 

Christine's attorney and entertain any claim of privilege as to those 

e-mails. The court “retain[ed] the discretion to invite all counsel to 

brief and argue the applicability of privilege to any communications 

otherwise deemed potentially relevant by the court.” After culling 

out any e-mails the court determined were privileged, the court 

would then release any potentially relevant but unprivileged e-mails 

to the parties. 

Ultimately, the court identified numerous e-mails “that arguably 

related to the Fishman case.” Among those, the court identified 

over 40 e-mails as containing privileged communications between 

Christine and her attorney. The court also identified one e-mail 

from Christine to the court's human resources department that 

contained health-related privileged information. (That e-mail “dealt 

with [Christine's] communication to HR concerning health issues 

and available employee benefits.”) After his review of those emails, Christine's attorney claimed privilege, and the court 

sustained that claim. Accordingly, the court did not turn the 

privileged e-mails over to the parties, but did turn over an 

unidentified number of potentially relevant e-mails that were not 

privileged. 

In July 2011, defendant's appellate counsel filed an application to 

augment the record on appeal. Among other things, he asked that 

the clerk's transcript be augmented to include “[t]he emails obtained 

by the trial court as a result of its Order dated October 27, 2010.” 

Specifically, he requested that the e-mails disclosed to the parties 

should be made part of the record on appeal and the e-mails 

withheld as privileged should be forward to this court under seal. 

We granted defendant's motion to augment. Because the original 

printouts of the privileged e-mails the trial court had reviewed had 

not been preserved, the court had to “reconstruct the group of 

privileged emails from the database used prior to trial.” The court 

was able to retrieve all of the e-mails that had been withheld on the 

basis of attorney-client privilege but was unable to locate the one email that had been withheld as containing privileged health 

information. 

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On appeal, defendant asserts that the “[t]he trial court erred in 

holding that [Christine] had any privilege to prevent the disclosure 

of her emails, which had been sent over the government email.” 

* * * 

[A]s we have noted already, defendant asserts that “[t]he trial court 

erred in holding that [Christine] had any privilege to prevent the 

disclosure of her emails, which had been sent over the government 

email.” In other words, he claims that the circumstances of 

Christine's communications with her attorney prevented the 

attorney-client privilege from attaching to those communications. 

In support of this claim of error, defendant relies solely on Holmes 

v. Petrovich Development Company, LLC (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 

1047, which he contends held that “a person, who knows that the 

computer used [to send e-mail] is not secure and may be examined 

in the normal course of business, has waived any privilege to the 

contents of the transmittal.” That was not the holding in Holmes, 

however. In Holmes, this court held that an employee could not 

claim attorney-client privilege over e-mails she sent to her attorney 

over her employer's computer “after being warned that [the 

computer] was to be used only for company business, that e-mails 

were not private, and that the company would randomly and 

periodically monitor its technology resources to ensure compliance 

with the policy.” (Id. at pp. 1068–1069.) 

Here, defendant points to no similar evidence about the policies 

governing the court's computer system and what Christine knew 

about those policies. Furthermore, defendant points to nothing in 

the record to show that he ever challenged the trial court's 

determination that the e-mails were privileged. Had he done so, 

perhaps the record would have been more developed on the 

circumstances surrounding Christine's use of the court's computer 

system to communicate with her attorney. As it is, the record on 

appeal contains no such information. 

It is fundamental that a judgment challenged on appeal is presumed 

correct and the appellant bears the burden of affirmatively 

demonstrating error. (E.g., People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 

Cal.App.4th 524, 549.) Here, defendant seeks to show that under 

the principles set forth in Holmes, the trial court erred in sustaining 

Christine's claim of privilege as to her communications with her 

attorney using the court e-mail system. To make that showing, 

defendant would have to point to evidence demonstrating that 

Christine had reason to know that her communications with her 

attorney over that e-mail system would not be confidential. He has 

not done so. All we know is that Christine used her employer's email system. That is not enough to carry defendant's burden of 

affirmatively demonstrating trial court error in sustaining 

Christine's claim of privilege. Accordingly, we find no such error. 

[N.7] 

[N.7] In reaching this conclusion, the content of the e-mails 

that were withheld as privileged is irrelevant. Accordingly, 

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we need not review the e-mails themselves to reject 

defendant's claim of error. 

Fishman, 2013 WL 542032 at **5–7. 

 Petitioner contends the trial court’s refusal to disclose to the parties Ms. Trejo’s emails 

with her attorney violated his right to present a defense. As explained above, judges may exclude 

evidence that is repetitive. Holmes, 547 U.S. at 326–27. The emails petitioner seeks here are 

merely repetitive and cumulative evidence attacking Ms. Trejo’s credibility. At trial, petitioner’s 

counsel made clear that Ms. Trejo’s credibility was central to the case. Petitioner’s counsel 

attacked that credibility with, among other things, numerous disclosed emails Ms. Trejo sent to a 

Placer County courtroom clerk requesting information regarding the case. Petitioner’s counsel 

argued that the emails created an appearance of impropriety and that Ms. Trejo, as an employee 

of the court, knew this contact was improper. As a result, petitioner was given an opportunity to 

present a complete defense—that Ms. Trejo was a liar, evidenced by her allegedly improper 

contacts with other Placer County Superior Court personnel. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on 

this claim simply because a few privileged emails were not disclosed. 

 The application of the attorney-client privilege in this case was not disproportional to the 

need to present a defense in this case, and thus did not run afoul of Holmes. That the attorneyclient privilege applied to the undisclosed emails is a matter of state law determined by the state 

courts after in camera review. Nothing in the context of the facts, or the case law requiring this 

court to be bound by rulings on state law, Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76, 126 S.Ct. 602 

(2005), would permit this federal court to arrive at an opposite conclusion. Moreover, the 

privilege is a weighty one and should not be dismissed simply because an opponent thinks his 

impeachment case might get better if these privileged communications were to be disclosed. 

 All evidentiary claims should be denied. 

IV. Restitution 

Petitioner contends the trial court’s restitution order violates the 14th Amendment. As 

respondent notes, it appears this claim is unexhausted because petitioner did not present it to the 

California Supreme Court. See Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 5. Nevertheless, the court may deny an 

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unexhausted claim on the merits without regard to a petitioner’s failure to exhaust. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(2); Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that an unexhausted 

petition may be denied on the merits “when it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise 

even a colorable federal claim”). As such, the court denies this unexhausted claim on the merits 

because an order to pay restitution is not cognizable on federal habeas review as it does not affect 

the fact or duration of petitioner’s sentence. See United States v. Thiele, 314 F.3d 399, 401–02 

(9th Cir. 2002) (finding challenge to restitution fine not cognizable on habeas review). 

V. Motion for Discovery 

In conjunction with his traverse, petitioner filed a motion for discovery regarding 

respondent’s assertions that 1) the state court’s decision upholding the exclusion of impeachment 

evidence was not unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and 2) the state 

court’s decision upholding the trial court’s ruling on Christine Trejo’s privilege objection to 

disclosure of her employee emails was not an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law. Because the court denies petitioner’s claims for the reasons discussed above, 

petitioner’s motion for discovery is denied.3

CONCLUSION 

 Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, this court must 

issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. A 

certificate of appealability may issue only “if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitution right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). For the reasons set forth in this Order, a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right has not been made in this case. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Petitioner’s motion for discovery is denied; 

2. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1 ) is denied; 

3. This case is closed; and 

 

3

 Again, this court could not invalidate the state court’s finding that the attorney-client privilege 

applied; discovery would not alter that fact. Nor would discovery be permitted under the 

principles of Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388 (2011). See Lewis v. Ayers, 2011 WL 2260784 

(E.D. Cal. 2011). 

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4. The court declines to issue a certificate of appealability referenced in 28 U.S.C. § 

2253. 

Dated: March 25, 2015 

 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

GGH:016/Fish2421.hc 

Case 2:13-cv-02421-GGH Document 30 Filed 03/25/15 Page 23 of 23