Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-09-07316/USCOURTS-ca4-09-07316-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Orrandy Goodwyn
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 09-7316

ORRANDY GOODWYN, a/k/a Randy,

a/k/a White Boy, a/k/a Trash,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.

James R. Spencer, Chief District Judge.

(3:96-cr-00041-JRS-8)

Argued: January 26, 2010

Decided: February 26, 2010

Before MOTZ, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Motz

wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Agee

joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Richard Daniel Cooke, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellant. James Brian Donnelly, PRICE, PERKINS,

Appeal: 09-7316 Doc: 31 Filed: 02/26/2010 Pg: 1 of 6
LARKEN & DONNELLY, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Neil H. MacBride, United States

Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.

OPINION

DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:

In 1997, after pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute

powder and crack cocaine, Orrandy Goodwyn received a 264-

month prison sentence. Eleven years later, relying on 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) and the retroactive crack cocaine

amendment to the United States Sentencing Guidelines

("U.S.S.G." or "Guidelines"), Goodwyn moved for a reduction of his sentence to time served. The district court granted

the motion in part, reducing Goodwyn’s term of imprisonment by two years, to 240 months. More than seven months

later, Goodwyn asked the court to reduce his sentence further.

The court treated the request as a motion for reconsideration,

which it granted, again reducing Goodwyn’s sentence by two

years, to 216 months. For the reasons that follow, we hold that

the district court lacked the authority to grant the motion for

reconsideration.

I.

Goodwyn pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute powder

and crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846(a)(1)

(2006). On March 18, 1997, the district court sentenced him

to 264 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised

release.

On March 24, 2008, Goodwyn filed a pro se motion for

reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and

the crack cocaine amendment to the Guidelines. U.S.S.G. app.

C, amends. 706, 711. Section 3582(c)(2) permits sentence

2 UNITED STATES v. GOODWYN

Appeal: 09-7316 Doc: 31 Filed: 02/26/2010 Pg: 2 of 6
modification "in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range

that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission." Id. § 3582(c)(2). Goodwyn’s conspiracy conviction

involved an otherwise unspecified drug quantity in excess of

1.5 kilograms of cocaine base, which, at the time, triggered a

base offense level of 38. The Sentencing Commission subsequently lowered the sentencing range applicable to his offense

conduct and applied the amendment retroactively. U.S.S.G.

app. C, amends. 706, 711. Therefore, the district court had the

discretion, but not the obligation, to reduce Goodwyn’s sentence on this ground. Id. § 1B1.10.

In his motion, which the Government opposed, Goodwyn

highlighted his troubled childhood, efforts to obtain an education, position in a prison landscaping job, and lack of disciplinary infractions while incarcerated. On October 14, 2008,

the district court granted the motion in part, reducing Goodwyn’s sentence to 240 months’ imprisonment.

Almost eight months later, on June 1, 2009, Goodwyn

(again pro se) wrote the court asking it to reduce further his

term of imprisonment. In an effort to persuade the court that

he posed no danger to the public, Goodwyn wrote that he had

been "classified Out Custody which means [he is] in the presence of citizens each and every day." He asked to be released

so that he could take care of his family.

Construing the June letter as a motion for reconsideration,

the district court granted the motion and further reduced

Goodwyn’s sentence to 216 months’ imprisonment. In doing

so, the court explained that it had "reviewed additional information regarding Goodwyn’s post-conviction rehabilitation

efforts, and [that] this information decrease[d] any concerns

[the court] may have had about his continuing danger to the

public."

The Government timely noted this appeal.

UNITED STATES v. GOODWYN 3

Appeal: 09-7316 Doc: 31 Filed: 02/26/2010 Pg: 3 of 6
II.

The law closely guards the finality of criminal sentences

against judicial "change of heart." United States v. Layman,

116 F.3d 105, 109 (4th Cir. 1997); see also, e.g., Johnson v.

United States, 544 U.S. 295, 309 (2005) ("[T]he United States

has an interest in the finality of sentences imposed by its own

courts."); United States v. Fields, 552 F.3d 401, 405 (4th Cir.

2009) ("Congress limited the reach of [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, which governs sentence modification,]

because it wanted to promote openness and finality in sentencing."); United States v. Caraballo, 552 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir.

2008) ("Finality is an important attribute of judgments and,

typically, once a pronounced sentence in a criminal case

becomes final and unappealable, it may not be modified.");

United States v. Abreu-Cabrera, 64 F.3d 67, 73 (2nd Cir.

1995) ("As a result of Congress’ desire to provide finality to

sentencing, . . . [the district court may not act upon] second

thoughts [regarding the severity of a defendant’s sentence], no

matter how well intentioned.").

Section 3582, which governs the imposition of federal

prison sentences, embraces this principle, providing that a

court’s imposition of a term of imprisonment "constitutes a

final judgment." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b). This statute states that

a district court "may not modify a term of imprisonment once

it has been imposed" unless the Bureau of Prisons moves for

a reduction, the Sentencing Commission amends the applicable Guidelines range, or another statute or Rule 35 expressly

permits the court to do so. Id. § 3582(c); see also United

States v. Cunningham, 554 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2009)

("[T]here is no ‘inherent authority’ for a district court to modify a sentence as it pleases; indeed a district court’s discretion

to modify a sentence is an exception to [§ 3582’s] general rule

[barring modification].").

In accord with this framework, the district court clearly

acted within its authority in granting Goodwyn’s first motion

4 UNITED STATES v. GOODWYN

Appeal: 09-7316 Doc: 31 Filed: 02/26/2010 Pg: 4 of 6
to modify his sentence. As explained above, 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2) and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 expressly sanctioned this

relief. We must determine whether these (or any other) provisions also permitted the district court to reduce Goodwyn’s

sentence a second time, almost eight months after the first

reduction. We conclude that they did not.

We note at the outset that the Director of the Bureau of

Prisons did not move to reduce Goodwyn’s sentence. Nor

does Goodwyn claim that Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure provides any basis for the grant of his

motion for reconsideration. Rule 35 authorizes only the correction, "[w]ithin 14 days after sentencing," of "arithmetical,

technical, or other clear error," unless the defendant merits a

reduction for substantial assistance. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a),

(b).* Thus, that Rule provides Goodwyn no support.

Moreover, Goodwyn cannot point to any federal statute that

expressly authorized his motion for reconsideration; no such

provision exists. See United States v. Dotz, 455 F.3d 644, 648

(6th Cir. 2006) ("In the sentencing context, there is simply no

such thing as a ‘motion to reconsider’ an otherwise final sentence . . . ."); United States v. Aguirre, 214 F.3d 1122, 1124

(9th Cir. 2000) ("While district courts generally have ‘inherent authority’ to decide motions for reconsideration and

rehearing of orders in criminal proceedings, [§ 3582]

expressly limits the court’s authority in sentencing.").

To overcome this deficiency, Goodwyn urges us to read

silence as permission. Specifically, he argues that the limited

*Of course, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to

motions under § 3582. This is so because § 3582 motions—which seek

only to alter terms of imprisonment—are criminal in nature. See, e.g.,

United States v. Byfield, 522 F.3d 400, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam);

United States v. Fair, 326 F.3d 1317, 1318 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam);

United States v. Arrango, 291 F.3d 170, 171-72 (2nd Cir. 2002) (per

curiam); United States v. Alvarez, 210 F.3d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 2000) (per

curiam). 

UNITED STATES v. GOODWYN 5

Appeal: 09-7316 Doc: 31 Filed: 02/26/2010 Pg: 5 of 6
allowance for sentence modification in § 3582(c)(2) implies

authority for the grant of his motion for reconsideration. Section 3582(c)(2) does not expressly provide that a court may

grant only one sentence modification, but neither does it in

any way suggest that a court may grant more than one modification. As the clear intent of § 3582 is to constrain postjudgment sentence modifications, we hold that this silence

precludes the interpretation of § 3582(c)(2) charged by Goodwyn, an interpretation that would permit unlimited motions

for reconsideration over an unspecified period of time. To

hold otherwise would subvert the statute’s overriding purpose.

When the Sentencing Commission reduces the Guidelines

range applicable to a prisoner’s sentence, the prisoner has an

opportunity pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) to persuade the district

court to modify his sentence. If the result does not satisfy him,

he may timely appeal it. But he may not, almost eight months

later, ask the district court to reconsider its decision.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the June 23, 2009

order granting Goodwyn’s motion for reconsideration and

reducing his sentence to 216 months’ imprisonment. We

remand the case for reinstatement of the 240-month sentence

imposed in the October 14, 2008 order.

VACATED AND REMANDED

6 UNITED STATES v. GOODWYN

Appeal: 09-7316 Doc: 31 Filed: 02/26/2010 Pg: 6 of 6