Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-15-13515/USCOURTS-ca11-15-13515-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
W. A. Griffin
Appellant
Lockheed Martin Corporation
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-13515

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-00267-AT

W. A. GRIFFIN, MD, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

versus

LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION,

 Defendant - Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(April 11, 2016)

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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JILL PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Proceeding pro se, Dr. W.A. Griffin appeals the district court’s grant of 

judgment on the pleadings under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 

1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). After careful consideration, we affirm.1

I.

Dr. Griffin, who operates a dermatology practice in Atlanta, Georgia, treated 

a patient insured under a Lockheed Martin Corporation (“Lockheed”) sponsored 

group health benefit plan (the “Plan”).

2 Dr. Griffin is an out-of-network provider 

under the Plan. She required the patient to execute an assignment of benefits that 

“assign[ed] and convey[ed]” to her “all medical benefits and/or insurance 

 

1 Dr. Griffin’s motion for expedited consideration, a three-judge panel, and a published 

opinion is also pending before us. We deny her motion. Her request for a three-judge panel is

moot because our rules provide that she is entitled to a three-judge panel. See 11th Cir. R. 34-2, 

34-3(e). As regards her request for a published opinion, our rules provide that “[a]n opinion 

shall be unpublished unless a majority of the panel decides to publish it.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2. In 

this case, the panel decided not to publish. While our rules do permit a party to file a motion 

requesting that a previously unpublished order be published, they provide that the motion shall 

be granted only if the panel unanimously agrees to publish. 11th Cir. R. 36-3. Construing Dr. 

Griffin’s motion as requesting publication under Rule 36-3, the request is premature, and we 

deny it. Further, we deny her request for expedited consideration as moot.

2 On a review of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, we accept the well-pled

allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to Dr. Griffin. See 

Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). We may consider the 

Assignment of Benefits because Dr. Griffin attached the document to the complaint, making it “a 

part of the [complaint] for all purposes.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). We also consider Lockheed’s 

Master Plan Document and Summary Plan Description, which Lockheed attached to its answer, 

because these documents are central to Dr. Griffin’s complaint and their authenticity is 

undisputed. Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134-35 (11th Cir. 2002). 

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reimbursement, if any, otherwise payable . . . for services rendered from [Dr. 

Griffin], regardless of [her] managed care network participation status.” Legal 

Assignment of Benefits (Doc. 1).3 The assignment stated that it is “valid for all 

administrative and judicial review under . . . ERISA.” Id.

The Plan is an employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA that provides its 

participants with medical-related benefits. Lockheed is the plan sponsor, and Blue 

Cross Blue Shield of Georgia (“BCBSGA”) is the claims administrator. The 

Master Plan Document set forth the terms and conditions of the agreement between 

Lockheed and its employee participants. It contains an alienation clause that 

prohibits a plan participant or beneficiary from assigning “benefits provided under 

the Plan[] . . . except to a provider of services for which payment is due.” Master 

Plan Document at 9 (Doc. 4-1). 

Dr. Griffin’s patient was insured under the Plan. Pursuant to the patient’s 

assignment, Dr. Griffin submitted a claim to BCBSGA, which was denied. Dr. 

Griffin filed an administrative appeal with BCBSGA, which was also denied. She 

then demanded BCBSGA submit her claim to an independent review organization 

for external review. BCBSGA never responded to her request.

Dr. Griffin sued Lockheed in federal court, bringing causes of action under 

ERISA for (1) unpaid benefits, (2) breach of fiduciary duty, and (3) breach of 

 

3 Citations to “Doc.” refer to docket entries in the district court record in this case. 

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contract based on Lockheed’s breach of its fiduciary duty. Lockheed filed an 

answer and then a motion for judgment on the pleadings. While the motion for 

judgment on the pleadings was pending, Dr. Griffin sought leave to amend her 

complaint to add an additional cause of action based upon co-fiduciary liability 

under ERISA. The district court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings

and denied the motion to amend, concluding that (1) Dr. Griffin failed to state a 

claim against Lockheed for unpaid benefits under the Plan because Lockheed 

lacked discretion to award the benefits at issue and (2) Dr. Griffin lacked statutory 

standing to pursue the other causes of action because the assignment from her 

patient transferred only the right to bring a claim for unpaid benefits. The district 

court then entered a judgment dismissing the case. This appeal followed. 

II.

We review de novo an order granting judgment on the pleadings. Cannon v. 

City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2011). “Judgment on the 

pleadings is appropriate where there are no material facts in dispute and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. In reviewing an order 

granting judgment on the pleadings, “we accept as true all material facts alleged in 

the non-moving party’s pleadings, and we view those facts in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party.” Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 

1335 (11th Cir. 2014). In addition, “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent 

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standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and are liberally construed.” Bingham 

v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

III.

We begin by considering the district court’s determination that Dr. Griffin 

failed to state a claim against Lockheed for unpaid benefits. We agree with the 

district court that Dr. Griffin failed to state a claim against Lockheed for unpaid 

benefits because Lockheed lacked discretion to award the benefits at issue. 

ERISA permits a plan participant or beneficiary to bring a civil action “to 

recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan.” 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1132(a)(1)(B). Dr. Griffin acquired derivative standing to sue under ERISA for 

unpaid benefits by obtaining a written assignment from her patient of the right to 

payment of medical benefits. See Conn. State Dental Ass’n v. Anthem Health 

Plans, Inc., 591 F.3d 1337, 1347 (11th Cir. 2009). 

For a plaintiff to state a claim for unpaid benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B), the 

defendant must have discretion to award the benefits at issue. In other words, 

“[t]he proper party defendant in an action concerning ERISA benefits is the party 

that controls administration of the plan.” Garren v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. 

Co., 114 F.3d 186, 187 (11th Cir. 1997). Proof of the entity that controls the 

administration of the plan “may come from the plan document, but can also come 

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from the factual circumstances surrounding the administration of the plan, even if 

these factual circumstances contradict the designation in the plan document.” 

Hamilton v. Allen-Bradley Co., Inc., 244 F.3d 819, 824 (11th Cir. 2001).

Dr. Griffin asserts that Lockheed is a proper defendant because it had 

discretion to award the benefits at issue. More specifically, she asserts that the 

plan documents show that Lockheed shared authority with BCBSGA to pay 

benefits and determine claims. We disagree. The Master Plan Document reflects

that Lockheed had no responsibility for determining whether benefits are payable 

under the Plan or the amount of benefits payable. Instead, BCBSGA alone had the 

authority to make these determinations. The Master Plan Document gave

Lockheed the authority to supervise “[t]he administration of the Plan . . . except to 

the extent delegated to a Claims Administrator.” Master Plan Document at 4 (Doc. 

4-1) (emphasis added). The Master Plan Document in turn delegated to the claims 

administrator—that is, BCBSGA—the responsibility “for determining whether 

benefits are payable under a Plan [and] determining amounts of benefits, if any, 

payable under the Plan.” Id. at 5; see id. at 26 (explaining the “claims 

administrator . . . is responsible for determining whether benefits are payable under 

the Plan, determining the amount of benefits payable, if any, and deciding appeals 

of denied claims for benefits”). The Master Plan Document also made clear that 

the claims administrator had “full discretionary authority to interpret and construe 

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the terms of the Plan, which interpretation shall be final, conclusive, and binding 

on all parties.” Id. at 5.4

Because the plan documents show that Lockheed lacked discretionary 

authority to determine Dr. Griffin’s claim for reimbursement and there is no factual 

allegation that Lockheed actually took part in the payment of claims generally or in 

the denial of Dr. Griffin’s claim, we hold that Lockheed was not the proper party 

defendant to the cause of action for unpaid benefits. Accordingly, the district court 

correctly dismissed this cause of action. 

B.

We now turn to whether the district court properly dismissed Dr. Griffin’s 

remaining causes of action for lack of standing. In Count 2, Dr. Griffin sued for 

breach of fiduciary duty, but ERISA limits the right to sue for breach of fiduciary 

duty to plan participants, plan beneficiaries, plan fiduciaries, and the Secretary of 

Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). In Count 3, Dr. Griffin sued for breach of contract 

and sought equitable relief, but under ERISA only plan participants, plan 

beneficiaries, and plan fiduciaries may bring a civil action to obtain equitable relief 

to redress a practice that violates ERISA or the terms of a plan. Id. § 1132(a)(3). 

 4 Dr. Griffin suggests that the Summary Plan Description shows that Lockheed Martin 

retained authority to determine benefits. But the language she relies on shows only that 

Lockheed Martin retained discretion to make eligibility determinations about who qualified as a 

plan participant or beneficiary, not that Lockheed Martin retained discretion to make claims

determinations for eligible participants. 

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Dr. Griffin asserts that she acquired derivative standing to bring these causes of 

action through her patient’s assignment. We disagree. 

An assignee may obtain derivative standing through a written assignment 

from a plan participant or plan beneficiary. See Gables Ins. Recovery v. Blue 

Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 813 F.3d 1333, 1339 (11th Cir. 2015). Dr. 

Griffin’s patient agreed only to “assign and convey . . . all medical benefits and/or 

insurance reimbursement.” Legal Assignment of Benefits (Doc. 1). Nothing in the 

assignment transferred the patient’s right to bring a cause of action for breach of 

fiduciary duty or to seek equitable relief to redress a practice that violates ERISA 

or the terms of the Plan. Because the patient never transferred to Dr. Griffin these 

rights, the district court correctly determined that Dr. Griffin lacked standing to 

assert the causes of action set forth in Counts 2 and 3.

IV.

We conclude that the district court properly granted Lockheed’s motion for 

judgment on the pleadings. Accordingly, we affirm.

5

 

AFFIRMED. 

 

5 Dr. Griffin also argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to amend her 

complaint to add an additional cause of action under ERISA. We review the district court’s 

denial of a motion to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion, but we review de novo whether 

the proposed amendment to the complaint would be futile. See Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 

799, 802-03 (11th Cir. 1999). Because Dr. Griffin lacked standing to bring her co-fiduciary 

liability claim, the proposed amendment would be futile. Thus, the district court properly denied 

the motion to amend. 

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