Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00999/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00999-10/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
M. Evans
Respondent
Silverio Reyes Martinez
Petitioner

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SILVERIO REYES MARTINEZ,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-07-0999 FCD GGH P

vs.

M. EVANS, et al., 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with a petition for writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner filed the original petition on May 16,

2007, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Petitioner

challenges his 2001 conviction for one count of forcible lewd acts upon a minor and five counts

of non-forcible lewd acts. Petitioner is serving a sentence of 30 years to life. 

On August 4, 2008, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that this

action is barred by the statute of limitations. Following the November 13, 2008, hearing on the

motion, the court determined that an evidentiary hearing was required to address the equitable

tolling issues of 1) petitioner’s ability to speak, read or write English; and 2) lockdowns at the

prison. On November 18, 2008, the court denied respondent’s motion to dismiss without

prejudice to its consideration following resolution of the factual issues at the evidentiary hearing.

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On April 20, 2009, the evidentiary hearing was held regarding this motion. 

Accordingly, the court reinstates respondent’s motion to dismiss. While the issue of equitable

tolling is close, after carefully considering the record, the court recommends that the motion be

denied.

The statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petitions is set forth in 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1):

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

On June 18, 2003, the California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s petition for

review. Respondent’s Exhibit F. Petitioner’s conviction became final ninety days from June 18,

2003, or September 16, 2003, when the period for petitioning the United States Supreme Court

for certiorari expired. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-1159 (9th Cir. 1999). Petitioner had

one year from that date to file a timely federal petition. The instant action, filed May 16, 2007, is

not timely unless petitioner is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling.

Section 2244(d)(2) provides that the time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation. 

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Petitioner’s first state habeas petition was filed in the Sacramento County

Superior Court. Respondent’s Exhibit G. The petition is file stamped October 25, 2004, but

signed by petitioner on October 18, 2004. Id. The petition does not contain a proof of service. 

Id. On December 9, 2004, the Superior Court denied the petition. Id., Exhibit H. On February

3, 2005, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal. 

Respondent’s Exhibit I. On February 24, 2005, the California Court of Appeal denied this

petition. Respondent’s Exhibit J. On April 7, 2005, petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in

the California Supreme Court. Id., Exhibit K. On March 15, 2006, the California Supreme

Court denied the petition. Id., Exhibit L.

On July 19, 2006, petitioner filed another habeas corpus petition in the

Sacramento County Superior Court. Id., Exhibit M. On August 29, 2006, the Superior Court

denied this petition. Id., Exhibit N. On October 26, 2006, petitioner filed a second petition in

the California Supreme Court. Id., Exhibit O. On April 25, 2007, this petition was denied. Id.,

Exhibit P. 

Giving petitioner the benefit of the doubt and finding his first state habeas petition

filed on October 18, 2004, pursuant to the mailbox rule, he is not entitled to statutory tolling

because he failed to file this petition before the limitations period ran on September 15, 2004. 

Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001) (a state petition filed after the limitations

period has run does not re-start the clock).

The one year statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition may be equitably

tolled if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a

petition on time.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). The prisoner must

show that the “extraordinary circumstances” were the cause of his untimeliness. Stillman v.

LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003). “Indeed, the threshold necessary to trigger

equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v.

Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). Petitioner “bears the burden of showing that this

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extraordinary exclusion should apply to him.” Id.. Determining whether equitable tolling applies

is a “fact-specific” inquiry. Fry v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling due to inadequate law

library access caused by lockdowns and because he does not speak English. While limited law

library access caused by protracted lockdowns may be grounds for equitable tolling, petitioner

must demonstrate that limited law library access actually hindered his ability to file a timely

federal petition. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999).

In Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006), the Ninth Circuit

found that a “non-English speaking petitioner seeking equitable tolling must, at a minium,

demonstrate that during the running of the AEDPA time limitation, he was unable, despite

diligent efforts, to procure legal materials in his own language or translation assistance from an

inmate, library personnel, or other source.” 449 F.3d at 1070. 

Petitioner’s declaration attached to his opposition contains background

information to the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing: 

4. When I was first brought to Salinas Valley State Prison I was considered Level

IV–High Security. I was only allowed to be on the yard twice a month. 

Frequently I was on lock-down and unable to go to the law library or out on the

yard at all. Sometimes we had only 2-3 hours between lockdowns lasting a

month.

5. After my appeal was denied in June 2003, my appointed attorney wrote to me. 

She said that we had lost the appeal and that there was no more she could do for

me; I would have to represent myself. She did not tell me about habeas corpus or

tell me that I had only one year to file a petition in federal court.

6. I wrote to the Innocence Project. They sent me a questionnaire that I filled out

and returned to them. I waited but did not receive a response until years later. 

7. I also asked my family to help me find a lawyer. My mother, Maria Reyes,

contacted an attorney in the Sacramento area. The attorney said that it would be

$3000 just to read the transcripts and record in my case. My mother did not have

the money to do that.

8. I asked many inmates at the prison to help me, but they were all too busy with

other cases. Finally, sometime in 2004, I found “Red Bear” (I don’t know his real

name). He told me to go to the law library and get materials on habeas corpus. 

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9. I went to the library but there was no information on habeas corpus in Spanish. 

One of the inmates that worked at the library spoke Spanish. He gave me the

habeas corpus form in English but did not tell me I had one year to file the forms. 

There were no notices posted in Spanish regarding deadlines for filing habeas

petitions.

10. Red Bear filled out the habeas forms for me. When I was ready to copy the

paperwork at the law library in the fall of 2004, I could not go because the A yard

was on lockdown and I did not have a court deadline. I filed the petition as soon

as I could.

The court will now summarize the relevant evidence/testimony from the

evidentiary hearing.

At the hearing, the parties stipulated that petitioner was on lockdown from

September at Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP) for 141 days between September 16, 2003, and

September 15, 2004. RT at 2. The parties further stipulated that from September 16, 2004, until

May 16, 2007, petitioner was on lockdown for 244 additional days. RT at 2. The parties

stipulated that there is no record that petitioner asked for or received permission to access the

prison library while he was on lockdown. RT at 2. 

Petitioner himself testified through an interpreter. Petitioner also required an

interpreter for the portion of the evidentiary hearing when he was not testifying. Petitioner

testified that at his criminal trial, he required an interpreter. RT at 5. He testified that he

communicated with his state appellate lawyer in Spanish. RT at 5. He also testified that he

cannot really read English. RT at 5.

At the hearing, petitioner’s testimony supported what was contained in his

declaration quoted above. He testified that after he lost his appeal, his appellate attorney told

him that if he wanted to continue challenging his appeal, he would have to do it on his own. RT

at 6. Petitioner testified that his appellate attorney advised him that he could pursue a challenge

to his conviction by filing a habeas corpus petition, but she did not tell him how to do that. RT at

20. Petitioner also testified that he first learned that he would have to present a habeas corpus

\\\\\

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 This testimony appears conflicting, but the issue at evidentiary hearing was not whether

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petitioner knew he needed to file a habeas petition at some time, but rather when and how to do

it.

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petition to continue challenging his judgment when he talked to Red Bear. RT at 25.1

After petitioner learned that his appeal had been denied, he began looking for

someone to help him pursue his challenge to his conviction. RT at 7. His family could not

afford an attorney, so sometime in 2003 he wrote a letter to the Innocence Project in Spanish. RT

at 7-8. After receiving no response, he had another inmate help him write a second letter to the

Innocence Project in English. RT at 9. Petitioner never heard back from the Innocence Project. 

RT at 10. 

Petitioner testified that he also asked inmates at SVSP to help him challenge his

conviction. RT at 11. He testified that he asked four inmates and finally was referred to an

inmate named Red Bear. RT at 11. Red Bear spoke a little Spanish and agreed to help him. RT

at 11-12. Red Bear told petitioner to go to the law library and get the forms for a habeas corpus

petition. RT at12. At the law library, petitioner asked one of the inmate clerks who spoke

Spanish for the form. RT at 12. The form was in English. RT at 12. After getting the form, he

gave it to Red Bear who filled it out for him. RT at 13. Neither Red Bear nor the Spanish

speaking inmate library clerk told petitioner about the AEDPA deadline. RT at 14. Petitioner

did not learn about the AEDPA deadline until his present attorney told him about it. RT at 14.

At the hearing, the parties stipulated that the law library at Salinas Valley State

Prison (SVSP), where petitioner was incarcerated during all relevant times, did not contain legal

materials in Spanish. RT at 2. In particular, the SVSP contained no copy of the AEDPA in

Spanish. RT at 2. John Burk, the Senior Librarian at SVSP from 1987-2006, testified that the

law library contained no court forms, including habeas corpus petitions, in Spanish. RT at 31,

37. Mr. Burk also testified that for the past five years, the legal materials at the SVSP law library

were computerized. RT at 34. None of the computerized legal materials were in Spanish. RT at

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 The undersigned is not suggesting that prisons have a duty to have complete law 2

libraries in several languages. Nor is the undersigned suggesting that the law libraries must have

a multitude of forms in a multitude of languages. Indeed, this federal court, and many others, do

not accept forms in a foreign language, so what good would it do to have the forms in a foreign

language. The inmate would still have to find someone to translate the matter onto an English

form. This is a case involving equitable tolling, not the required composition of prison law

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35. 

Mr. Burk also testified that the SVSP law library had 3 inmate clerks and a library

technical assistant (LTA), all with knowledge of the standard legal forms. RT at 35. Mr. Burk

testified that petitioner’s LTA did not speak Spanish. RT at 38. If one of the inmate clerk’s did

not speak Spanish, then the practice was for the LTA to ask a Spanish speaking inmate already in

the law library to assist if a Spanish speaking inmate required assistance. RT at 39-40. Mr. Burk

testified that the inmate clerks were allowed to only reference assistance, i.e. they could not do

legal research for other inmates. RT at 36. 

The court now considers whether petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling

pursuant to Mendoza, supra. After observing petitioner at the hearing, it is clear that he is a nonEnglish speaker. The real issue is whether he acted with due diligence to “procure legal

materials in his own language or translation assistance from an inmate, library personnel, or other

source” during the limitations period, i.e. from September 2003-September 2004. Mendoza, 449

F.3d at 1070.

Petitioner could not have procured legal materials in his own language because

SVSP had none. Petitioner also could not have obtained assistance from library personnel

because the law library contained no habeas corpus forms or legal materials in Spanish. Because

petitioner’s LTA did not speak Spanish, he could not have obtained translation assistance from

her. It does not appear that petitioner could have obtained translation assistance from the inmate

clerks, assuming any spoke Spanish, as they were only allowed to provide reference assistance. 

Therefore, petitioner’s only option was to obtain translation assistance from another inmate or

source.

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libraries. One could infer from Mendoza that equitable tolling will become the rule rather than

the exception for foreign language speaking prisoners, but that is the path Mendoza has charted. 

Also one wonders why illiteracy per se is insufficient to invoke equitable tolling, but [English]

illiteracy caused by a foreign language problem is sufficient. The undersigned is not permitted,

however, to depart from the wide “foreign language” path created by Mendoza. 

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As discussed above, after his conviction became final, petitioner began his efforts

to continue challenging his conviction by writing letters to the Innocence Project. He wrote his

first letter in 2003. At this time, petitioner’s family also sought to hire private counsel but could

not afford to do so. When these efforts failed, petitioner then began seeking help from other

inmates. After talking to four inmates, he found Red Bear who told petitioner that he would help

him. After obtaining Red Bear’s assistance in 2004, during the limitations period, Red Bear

prepared petitioner’s first state habeas petition. Once petitioner obtained the assistance of Red

Bear, he began diligently pursuing his collateral remedies. 

The efforts described above demonstrate due diligence by petitioner during the

limitations period to obtain language translation assistance in challenging his conviction. At the

hearing, respondent argued that petitioner should only be granted equitable tolling for efforts he

made to file his habeas petition. In other words, respondent argued that petitioner was not

entitled to equitable tolling for the time spent writing letters to the Innocence Project or while his

family sought to hire private counsel. Because the law library contained no legal materials in

Spanish, the court finds that he is entitled to equitable tolling for the time spent attempting to

seek assistance from counsel, i.e. private counsel and the Innocence Project. By seeking to hire

counsel petitioner was, in effect, seeking the translation assistance discussed in Mendoza. 

Petitioner cannot be faulted because he did not first seek assistance from other inmates in his

efforts to obtain collateral relief. 

 Accordingly, because petitioner acted with due diligence during the limitations

period in seeking assistance in the preparation of his post-collateral challenges to his conviction,

the court finds that he is entitled to equitable tolling pursuant to Mendoza, supra. Petitioner also

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argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling due to lockdowns at the law library. However,

because the law library had no habeas corpus forms in Spanish, petitioner cannot argue that the

lockdowns hindered his ability to get to the law library to do legal research. At the evidentiary

hearing, petitioner made no showing that the lockdowns impacted his ability to obtain the habeas

corpus form or otherwise obtain copies requested by Red Bear. Petitioner is not entitled to

equitable tolling on this ground.

Because petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling, respondent’s motion to dismiss

should be denied.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondent’s August 4, 

2008, reinstated motion to dismiss (no. 17) be denied and respondent be ordered to file an answer

to the amended petition. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 06/25/09

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

mart999.mtd

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