Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03411/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03411-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Appellee
Susan R. Penyweit
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3411

___________

Susan R. Penyweit, *

*

Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * Western District of Missouri.

*

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of * [UNPUBLISHED]

Social Security, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: November 2, 2005

Filed: December 6, 2005

___________

Before BYE, McMILLIAN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Susan R. Penyweit appeals the district court’s1

 order affirming the termination

of disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI). Based

on a February 1995 application for DIB, Penyweit was found disabled as of October

1994 because she met the listing requirements for affective, anxiety, and personality

disorders. In 1997 she applied for and was granted SSI benefits. Following a

continuing-disability review, she was notified in July 2000 that her disability had

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ceased and that her benefits would be stopped in September 2000. After a hearing,

an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that (1) Penyweit’s medically determinable

mental or physical impairments did not meet the listing requirements; (2) her

combined diabetes, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia were not severe, but her

combined paranoid schizophrenia versus dysthymic disorder, recurrent major

depression, and history of dissociative identity disorder were severe; (3) there had

been medical improvement related to her ability to work; (4) she was not entirely

credible; and (5) she had no physical limitations, and her specified mental limitations

did not preclude her past relevant work as a housekeeper or, alternatively, preclude

the performance of other jobs a vocational expert (VE) had identified in response to

the ALJ’s hypothetical. 

We reject Penyweit’s indirect challenge to the ALJ’s credibility findings, as the

ALJ gave multiple valid reasons for finding that Penyweit’s testimony was not fully

credible as to the extent of her symptoms and functional limitations. See Guilliams

v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005) (deference is warranted where ALJ’s

credibility determination is supported by good reasons and substantial evidence). We

also reject Penyweit’s argument that the ALJ should have adopted Dr. C. Ruttan’s July

2002 mental residual-functional-capacity (RFC) findings. The ALJ properly

discounted Dr. Ruttan’s July 2002 mental RFC opinion to the extent it was vague and

inconsistent with her global-assessment-of-functioning rating. See Reed v. Barnhart,

399 F.3d 917, 920-21 (8th Cir. 2005) (this court has upheld ALJ’s decision to discount

treating physician’s opinion when physician’s inconsistent opinions undermine his or

her credibility); Holmstrom v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 715, 721 (8th Cir. 2001) (treating

physician’s vague and conclusory opinion is not entitled to deference). Further, the

ALJ’s opinion clearly reflects that he considered Dr. Ruttan’s July 2002 opinion in

formulating his mental RFC findings, and that he essentially adopted Dr. Ruttan’s

earlier mental RFC opinion because it was closer to the period in question. Having

concluded that Penyweit was properly discredited and that the ALJ properly

discounted in part Dr. Ruttan’s July 2002 mental RFC opinion, we conclude that the

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ALJ’s mental RFC findings were proper. See Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 807

(8th Cir. 2004) (RFC determination).

We also disagree with Penyweit’s contention that the record did not show she

had a medical improvement related to the ability to work. She fails to recognize that

when an impairment’s severity no longer meets a listing, it will be found that the

medical improvement is related to the ability to work. See 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1594(c)(3)(i), 416.994(b)(2)(iv)(A) (2005). Moreover, she does not point to

evidence in the record showing that any of her mental impairments still met the

listings for affective, anxiety, or personality disorders; and even if the record would

support a finding that she met the “A” criteria of the listings at issue--which we find

unlikely--Dr. Ruttan’s July 2002 mental RFC findings indicate that Penyweit would

not have met the “B” criteria. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, §§ 12.04

(Affective Disorders), 12.06 (Anxiety Related Disorders), 12.08 (Personality

Disorders) (2005). 

While there was evidence in the record indicating Penyweit has some

limitations related to her mental diagnoses, the ALJ’s determination that Penyweit

could perform the unskilled jobs the VE identified is supported by substantial

evidence. See Guilliams, 393 F.3d at 801 (standard of review; even if inconsistent

conclusions may be drawn from evidence, Commissioner’s decision will be upheld

if it is supported by substantial evidence on record as whole). Penyweit’s remaining

arguments provide no basis for reversal. Accordingly, we affirm. 

______________________________

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