Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04941/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04941-25/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pacific Award Metals, Inc.
Counter-claimant
United States Gypsum Company
Counter-defendant

Document Text:

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1 Award has stated that it will withdraw its counterclaim for unfair competition. 

Pursuant to that representation, Award is directed to file a dismissal of that counterclaim

within five days of the date of this Order.

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES GYPSUM COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

 PACIFIC AWARD METALS, INC.,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-04941 JSW

ORDER GRANTING UNITED

STATES GYPSUM COMPANY’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT RE NONINFRINGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of the motion for summary

judgment filed by Plaintiff United States Gypsum Company (“USG”). Having considered the

parties’ pleadings, relevant legal authority, and having had the benefit of oral argument, the

Court HEREBY GRANTS USG’s motion. 

In its motion, USG argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the false

marking counterclaim filed by Defendant Pacific Award Metals, Inc. (“Award”) with respect to

U.S. Patent No. 5,131,198 (the “‘198 Patent”), which relates to corner beads for drywall

construction and particularly to corner beads having an outer paper layer.1 

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BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background.

On November 19, 2004, USG filed this infringement action alleging that Award

infringed the ‘198 Patent. On December 20, 2004, Award answered and filed a counterclaim

for, inter alia, false marking. In its counterclaim, Award alleged that USG falsely marked its

products with the ‘198 Patent when USG “knew the protective coating on its paper-faced corner

bead products has a thickness that, as measured from the surface of the paper to the top of the

protective coating, is substantially less than 0.001 inches.” (Declaration of Thomas W. Jenkins

(“Jenkins Decl.”), Ex. 10 at p. 11, ¶ 21.) 

On November 2, 2005, the Court held a hearing to construe the two disputed claim terms

of the ‘198 Patent. At that hearing, Award contended that the thickness of the protective coating

should exclude any protective coating that penetrated the surface of the front paper layer. USG

argued to the contrary and claimed that the thickness of the protective coating should include

protective coating that penetrated the surface of the front paper layer. 

On November 8, 2005, the Court issued its Claim Construction Order, in which it

rejected USG’s proposed construction of the thickness limitation. The Court construed the

disputed term to mean: “The protective coating penetrates some of the fibers at the surface of

the front paper layer and measures about 0.001 inches to 0.005 inches in thickness on the front

surface of said front paper layer, said thickness excluding penetration depth of said protective

coating.” (Claim Construction Order at 9:10-13.)

USG conceded that, under the Court’s construction, Award’s products did not literally

infringe the ‘198 Patent but maintained that Award’s products infringed under the Doctrine of

Equivalents. USG also continued to mark its paper-faced corner bead products with the ‘198

Patent. (Declaration of Val Perrine (“Perrine Decl.”), ¶ 13; Jenkins Decl., Ex. 5 (Perrine Depo.

at 591:24-592:18).) 

On March 1, 2006, the Court granted Award’s motion for summary judgment and found

that the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel precluded USG from claiming infringement by

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2 Mr. Radford was the operations manager at BeadeX and then at USG from

1993 through 2000. (Radford Decl., ¶ 1.) Mr. Radford was Mr. Dunham’s supervisor.

Mr. Dunham worked at BeadeX and USG from April 1969 through August 2003. 

(Jenkins Decl., Ex. 4 (Dunham Depo. V. 1 at 9:12-10:11.).) From 1985 through 1995, Mr.

Dunham was the Supervisor of Maintenance and Production for the BeadeX nose coated

paper-faced corner bead products. (Dunham Decl., ¶ 2.) Thereafter, Mr. Dunham was a

Technical Manager for new product development at BeadeX and then at USG. (Id.) 

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equivalence. Following that Order, USG stopped marking its nose coated paper-faced corner

bead products with the ‘198 Patent. (Perrine Decl., ¶ 13.)

B. Factual Background.

The following facts are undisputed. The ‘198 Patent was issued on July 21, 1992 to

inventors James Ritchie and Don King and was assigned to their employer BeadeX. (Jenkins

Decl., Ex. 1.) After the ‘198 Patent issued, BeadeX began to mark its nose coated paper-faced

corner bead products with the ‘198 Patent. (Jenkins Decl., Ex. 2 (Ritchie Depo at 27:21-28:1).) 

At some point thereafter, BeadeX began to outsource the coating process and discovered that the

protective coating applied by its vendor to the nose coated paper-faced corner bead products

measured less than 0.001 inches above the surface of the paper. (Declaration of Craig Radford

(“Radford Decl.”), ¶ 3; Declaration of Wesley Dunham (“Dunham Decl.”), ¶ 7.)2

Notwithstanding this discovery, BeadeX continued to mark these products with the ‘198 Patent.

In approximately 1994, USG entered into a relationship with BeadeX whereby BeadeX

supplied USG with nose coated paper-faced corner beads to be sold under USG’s private labels. 

Those products were marked with the ‘198 Patent. (Perrine Decl., ¶ 4-7; Jenkins Decl., Ex. 5

(Perrine Depo. at 232:6-12, 232:20-233:4).) USG eventually acquired BeadeX for

approximately $75 million. After the acquisition, USG continued to place the ‘198 Patent on its

nose coated paper-faced corner bead products and, as noted above, continued to do so until after

the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Award on the Doctrine of Equivalents issue. 

The Court addresses additional facts in its analysis.

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ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standards Applicable to Summary Judgment.

A principal purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to identify and dispose of

factually unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). 

Summary judgment is proper when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56©). “In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court may not weigh the

evidence or make credibility determinations, and is required to draw all inferences in a light

most favorable to the non-moving party.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir.

1997).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. An issue of fact is “genuine” only if there is

sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A fact is “material” if it may affect the

outcome of the case. Id. at 248. 

If the party moving for summary judgment does not have the ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial, that party either must produce evidence that negates an essential element of

the non-moving party’s claims or must show that the non-moving party does not have enough

evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. Nissan Fire

& Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). Once the moving party

meets his or her initial burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its

own evidence, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e). In order to make this showing, the non-moving party must “identify with

reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” Keenan v. Allan, 91

F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). If the non-moving party fails to point to evidence precluding

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3 Section 292 is penal in nature and, therefore, must be strictly construed. 

Mayview Corp. v. Rodstein, 620 F.2d 1347, 1359 (9th Cir. 1980)

4 The district court in Clontech concluded that the doctrine of equivalents could

not be applied to determine if an article was “patented.” See Clontech Labs., Inc. v.

Invitrogen Corp., 263 F. Supp. 2d 780, 792 (D. Del. 2003). The Federal Circuit’s opinion

does not expressly address this issue. Because the parties in this case do not dispute the

“unpatented” element, the Court presumes for purposes of this motion that Award has

established the second and third elements. The Court notes, however, that, in the instant

case, USG essentially takes the position that the products in question are substantially

covered or equivalently covered in making its functionality argument. These facts

distinguish this case from Clontech. The Court addresses the import of this position in

resolving the issue of whether there is evidence of an intent to deceive the public.

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summary judgment, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323.

B. Legal Standards for False Marking.

Whoever marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in advertising in connection with

any unpatented article, the word “patent” or any word or number importing that

the same is patented for the purpose of deceiving the public; ... [s]hall be fined

not more than $500 for every such offense.

35 U.S.C. § 292(a).3 In order to prevail on its false marking counterclaim, Award must

demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that USG (1) used a mark “importing that an

object is patented (2) falsely affixed to (3) an unpatented article (4) with the intent to deceive the

public.” Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005); accord

Mayview Mayview Corp. v. Rodstein, 620 F.2d 1347, 1359-60 (9th Cir. 1980).

The first step in a false marking analysis is to determine whether an article is unpatented,

i.e., that the article is “not covered by at least one claim of each patent with which [it] is

marked.” Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1352. To do that, “the claim in question must be interpreted to

ascertain its correct scope, and then it must be ascertained if the claim reads on the article in

question.” Id.4 

“Intent to deceive is a state of mind arising when a party acts with sufficient knowledge

that what it is saying is not so,” i.e., that an article so marked is in fact patented, “and

consequently that the recipient of its saying will be misled into thinking that the statement is

true.” Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “Intent

to deceive ... is established in law by objective criteria.” Id. Thus, “‘the fact of

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misrepresentation coupled with proof that the party making it had knowledge of its falsity is

enough to warrant drawing the inference that there was a fraudulent intent.’” Id. (quoting Norton

v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795-96 (C.C.P.A. 1970)) (emphasis in original). That is to say, if a

party states that an article marked with a patent is covered by the patent when it knows it is not,

one can infer that an intent to deceive existed.

However, to show the requisite knowledge of falsity a plaintiff in a false marking case

“must show by a preponderance of the evidence that [the defendant] did not have a reasonable

belief that the articles were properly marked (i.e. covered by a patent). Absent such proof of

lack of reasonable belief, no liability under the statute ensues.” Id at 1352-53. Normally, the

question of whether “conduct rises to the level of statutory deception is a question of fact.” Id.

at 1353.

C. Evidentiary Rulings

USG moves to strike certain paragraphs of the Declaration of Andrew Shores, submitted

by Award in opposition to USG’s motion. USG contends that the opinions set forth in the

Shores declaration were not timely disclosed in his initial expert report and, accordingly, should

not be considered. The Shores declaration is offered by Award to show that USG’s belief that

its products were covered by the ‘198 Patent was unreasonable because if USG had conducted

an investigation using any of the methods described by Dr. Shores, USG would have known the

products were not covered by the ‘198 Patent, even under the construction USG proposed. 

Award also contends, in opposing the motion to strike, that the report was submitted to counter

a rebuttal report from USG’s expert, Mr. Klass. However, USG did not rely on Mr. Klass’

opinions in moving for summary judgment on this issue. 

Since it filed its false marking claim, Award has known that it would bear the burden of

establishing that USG intended to deceive the public and, thus, knew its products were not

covered by the ‘198 Patent. Moreover, Award has known since the parties began briefing the

issue of claim construction, that USG contended that the thickness limitation should be

measured to include protective coating that penetrated the surface of the front paper layer. 

Award also has known since that time that USG contended that the purpose of the protective

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coating was to prevent surface abrasion. In light of these facts, Award’s claims of surprise and

its contentions regarding USG’s purportedly belated disclosure of a “reasonable mistake”

defense ring hollow. 

The opinions set forth in the Shores declaration bear directly on issues for which Award

bears the burden of proof in its affirmative claim for relief against USG. Award has not

provided the Court with a substantial justification for failing to disclose these opinions in

Shores’ initial expert report. Accordingly, the Court finds USG’s objections well taken and

shall not consider the Shores declaration in deciding this motion. 

Award also seeks to introduce testimony from Charles Klass that it contends it was

unable to submit with its opposition because of deposition scheduling. USG opposes this

request and asserts that Award created the delay by not agreeing to conduct the deposition

earlier. Because USG’s only basis for objection to this testimony is the scheduling issue, and

because USG has submitted additional testimony from Mr. Klass directed to the testimony

offered by Award and has presented argument on the points raised by Award in submitting the

testimony, the Court GRANTS Award’s request to submit the late testimony and shall consider

both parties’ submissions.

D. USG Is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Award’s False Marking Claim.

It is undisputed that as of approximately 1993, the protective coating on USG’s nose

coated paper-faced corner bead products measured less than 0.001 inches above the surface of

the paper. The parties dispute whether USG intended to deceive the public when, despite its

knowledge of this fact, it continued to mark the products in question with the ‘198 until March

1, 2006. Although Award’s claims of false marking relate to USG, what BeadeX knew and did

is relevant to this dispute to the extent USG later relied on representations from BeadeX. 

There are obvious disputes between the parties about who at BeadeX told what to whom

and when, with respect to whether or not the products should be marked. For example, Mr.

Dunham claims he told senior management at BeadeX that he believed the products did not fall

within the ‘198 Patent, although he was unsure if he ever communicated his views to Mr.

Ritchie or Mr. King, the named inventors on the ‘198 Patent. (Jenkins Decl, Ex. 4 (Dunham

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Depo. V. 1 at 46:4-47:4, 48:16-25).) Mr. Radford denies Mr. Dunham made that claim. 

(Compare Dunham Decl., ¶ 9 with Radford Decl., ¶ 4.) The Court does not find these disputes

to be material in light of the undisputed fact that, as properly construed by this Court, the nose

coated paper-faced bead products did not fall within the literal claims of the ‘198 Patent as of

approximately 1993. What is material to the resolution of this motion, is why and on what basis

USG formed its belief that the patents were marked properly with the ‘198 Patent

notwithstanding the fact that the protective coating above the surface was less than 0.001 inches. 

That essentially calls for an inquiry into the reasonableness of USG’s belief of its proposed

claim construction. 

To meet its burden on summary judgment, USG proffers testimony from Mr. Radford

who attests that, after BeadeX learned that the protective coating measured less than 0.001

inches above the surface of the paper, members of the BeadeX Defect Reduction Committee

discussed the issue. Mr. Radford states this committee reviewed the ‘198 Patent and read it to

call for a penetrating protective coating. According to Mr. Radford, because it appeared that the

thickness of the protective coating, including penetration depth, fell within the range identified

in the ‘198 Patent, the committee concluded that the products continued to read on the claims of

the ‘198 patent. (Radford Decl., ¶ 3; Jenkins Decl., Ex. 3 (Radford Depo. at 34:22-35:8).) 

Mr. Radford also attests that “based on visual observation and the performance of the

product, we estimated a coating penetration depth of about 3-4 mils, about halfway through the

paper,” which in his understanding met the claims of the ‘198 Patent. (Radford Decl., ¶ 3.) 

USG also presents evidence that the specifications BeadeX provided to outside vendors,

directed to the thickness of the coating, did not contain a specification relating to the thickness

of the coating over and above the top surface of the paper. (See Jenkins Decl., Ex. 4 (Dunham

 Depo. V. 1 at 139:24-143:15).) But USG also introduces evidence from Mr. Dunham, a

member of this committee, in which he claims “all the members of the BeadeX team, including

Mr. Ritchie, understood our invention to require a layer of protective material that exceeded the

paper’s thickness by about 0.001 to 0.005” inches. (Jenkins Decl., Ex. 16 at ¶ 10.) There is no

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evidence in the record that Mr. Ritchie’s opinion on this issue was communicated to anyone at

USG. 

Mr. Perrine, USG’s current director of Marking and Finishing Systems, testified that

when USG and BeadeX entered into the private label distribution relationship, he was advised

by Mr. Ritchie and other members of BeadeX management that the products were “patented

under” the ‘198 Patent. (Perrine Decl., ¶¶ 1-2; Jenkins Decl., Ex. 5 (Perrine Depo. at 46:18-

47:7).) Mr. Perrine also attests that during this relationship, BeadeX continued to mark the

products with the ‘198 Patent, that USG relied on BeadeX for the factual details to be included

on the USG private labels, and that no one at BeadeX suggested that there was any reason the

‘198 Patent should not be on the labels. (See, e.g., Perrine Decl., ¶¶ 3-4; Jenkins Decl., Ex. 5

(Perrine Depo. at 52:9-53:25).) 

Mr. Perrine’s testimony as to what he was told by BeadeX is supported by Mr. Ritchie’s

testimony that he “was under the assumption at the time [that USG and BeadeX were

contemplating a business relationship] that [the products were] within this portion of the

patent,” and that he was confident that he communicated to Mr. Perrine that the product was

patented. (Jenkins Decl., Ex. 2 (Ritchie Depo. at 29:19-30:14).) Mr. Ritchie also testified that

he never told anyone at USG that the products did not practice the patent because he did not

know “it had fallen outside the patent until very recently when Award explained to him how the

thickness of the coating fell outside of the – of this patent.” (Id. at 33:15-21.) USG also

provides testimony from Mr. Dunham that because Mr. Ritchie knew more about the ‘198

Patent than he did, Mr. Dunham would rely on Mr. Ritchie’s opinion as to what was covered by

the patent. (Jenkins Decl., Ex. 6 (Dunham Depo. V. 4 at 103:7-25).)

USG also asserts that when it acquired BeadeX, it conducted an independent evaluation

of whether the nose coated paper-faced corner bead products were covered by the ‘198 Patent. 

According to the record, the independent evaluation consisted of Mr. Perrine’s reliance on what

he was told by Mr. Ritchie and others at BeadeX, namely that the products were covered by the

‘198 Patent. (See, e.g., Perrine Decl., ¶ 5; Jenkins Decl., Ex. 5 (Perrine Depo. at 310:14-17).) 

The evaluation did not consist of any formal analysis of the thickness of the protective coating

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material. (Jenkins Decl., Ex. 5 (Perrine Depo. at 312:1-313:3, 316:5-15, 317:2-9).) Rather, in

addition to what he had been told by Mr. Ritchie and others at BeadeX, Mr. Perrine relied on his

27 years of experience in the building industry and his experience with coating on drywall

paper. (Perrine Decl., ¶ 6; Jenkins Decl., Ex. 5 (Perrine Depo. at 315:5-316:4).) Based on that

experience, and knowing that the patent called for penetrating coating and some “visual

observation”, Mr. Perrine “believed that the total coating thickness on the BeadeX products was

at least 1-3 mils.” (Perrine Decl., ¶ 6; see also Jenkins Decl., Ex. 5 (Perrine Depo. at 316:15-

317:1, 317:10-318:22).) USG also relies on the fact that it acquired BeadeX for approximately

$75 million to negate an intent to deceive the public, asserting it would have been unreasonable

to pay that much for a company if the products in question did not have patent protection. 

(Perrine Decl., ¶ 7.) 

Finally, in approximately August 2004, before this case was filed and well before the

Court construed the claims of the ‘198 Patent, USG proffers evidence that it reviewed scanning

electron photomicrographs (“SEMs”) of cross-sections of its nose coated paper-faced corner

bead products. (Perrine Decl., ¶ 12 and Ex. 1.) According to Mr. Perrine he was advised by the

person who conducted the analysis that those SEMs show that the protective coating had a total

thickness, including penetration depth, of approximately 0.002 inches, which is also supported

by evidence put forth by Award. (Id.; see also Jenkins Decl., Ex. 5 (Perrine Depo. at 114:1-

115:21; 118:25-119:8; 334:2-15); Declaration of Nicole S. Cunningham (“Cunningham Decl.”),

Ex. D (Perrine Depo. at 121:14-123:19.) Because, as USG interpreted the ‘198 Patent, this

thickness fell within the scope of the claims, USG continued to mark its paper-faced corner bead

products with the ‘198 Patent. (Perrine Decl., ¶ 12.) 

In an effort to rebut USG’s contentions that it reasonably believed the products to be

covered by the ‘198 Patent, Award suggests that Mr. Perrine is not a person of ordinary skill in

the relevant art, so that his beliefs cannot establish a reasonable belief that the products were

covered by the Patent. (Cunningham Decl., Ex. C (Klass Depo. at 32:23-34:15), Ex. D (Perrine

Depo. at 130:18-137:3).) Award also proffers the testimony of Mr. Klass, who testified he

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5 Attached to the Declaration of Colbern Stuart in Support of Award’s Motion

for Administrative Relief for Leave to Submit Recent Deposition Testimony..

6 The Court notes that this is the only evidence that Award proffers that

suggests USG had an improper motive in continuing to mark its products with the ‘198

Patent. The rest of the evidence presented speaks to the reasonableness of USG’s

construction of the claims of the ‘198 Patent.

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would not rely solely on a visual observation to determine the thickness of the coating. (5/12/06

Klass Depo. at 105:2-22.)5

Award also proffers the declarations of Mr. Dunham and Mr. Walker, who were

members of Defect Reduction Committee and who deny that the committee discussed whether

the products still were covered by the ‘198 Patent. They also deny the conclusions Mr. Radford

claims the committee reached. (See Dunham Decl., ¶¶ 16-19; Declaration of Rick Walker

(“Walker Decl.”), ¶ 6.) Mr. Dunham attests that he was under the impression that Mr. Radford

agreed with his opinion that the products were not covered, but that he awaited further direction

from Mr. Radford. (Dunham Decl., ¶ 9.) Mr. Dunham also testified that he “just voiced [his]

opinion to [senior management] and expected they would know what to do with it,” but

conceded that Mr. Ritchie as president of the company would be responsible for decisions made

and that he, Mr. Dunham, would rely on Mr. Ritchie’s opinion as to whether the products should

be marked with the ‘198 Patent. (Jenkins Decl., Ex. 6 (Dunham Depo. V. 4 at 102:1-103:25).)

Mr. Dunham also declares that after he expressed his opinions, he was advised by Mr.

Radford that BeadeX did not want to spend the money associated with obtaining a new patent

and would take the position that the thinner coatings were covered. Mr. Dunham claims that he

advised Mr. Radford this was an untenable position. (See Dunham Decl., ¶¶ 10-14.)6 

Award also tries to show USG’s belief was unreasonable by proffering evidence to show

that Mr. Ritchie believed “we needed a minimum of 0.001 of an inch to provide necessary water

and sanding resistance.” (Cunningham Decl., Ex. A (“Ritchie Depo. at 84:4-13); see also id.

(Ritchie Depo. at 39:18-40:9, 43:3-16, 45:3-14, 83:9-18, 84:4-13 (discussing his belief that a

minimum layer of coating above the surface was required).) Mr. Ritchie also testified, however,

the fact that Award had determined BeadeX was outside the patent came as a surprise to him. 

(Id. at 55:15-19).) 

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Award also puts forth evidence that, with respect to another aspect of the ‘198 Patent,

Mr. Perrine acted “conservatively” and removed that patent number from some products that he

believed could be read to not fall within the scope of that aspect of the ‘198 Patent. 

(Cunningham Decl., Ex. D (Perrine Depo. at 325:12-326:16.) Award argues that this

conservative view belies the reasonableness of USG’s view with respect to the thickness

limitation. Finally, with respect to USG’s argument that it would not have acquired BeadeX for

$75 million if its products had not been patented, Award proffers Mr. Ritchie’s testimony that,

at the time USG acquired BeadeX, he believed the value of the ‘198 Patent had diminished. 

(Cunningham Decl., Ex. A (Ritchie Depo. at 34:10-14).)

Award also argues that after the Court construed the ‘198 Patent in November 2005,

USG’s decision to continue to mark the products with the ‘198 Patent was improper. Award

contends that USG’s argument that the products functioned in substantially the same way,

notwithstanding what it contends is an insubstantial difference with respect to the thickness

limitation, they would fall within the claims of the ‘198 Patent. Although the thickness

limitation is the focus of the instant motion, the Court also construed protective coating to

mean: “The material applied to the front paper layer to reinforce said front paper layer and to

provide surface protection against abrasion.” (Claim Construction Order at 7:17-18.) Award

does not put forth any evidence to suggest that a function of the protective coating taught by the

‘198 Patent is not to provide surface protection against abrasion. 

Considering all of these facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most

favorable to Award, as it must, the Court concludes that these facts simply do not give rise to a

disputed issue of fact as to whether between 1993 and March 1, 2006, USG intended to deceive

the public when it marked its nose coated paper-faced corner bead products with the ‘198

Patent. Accordingly, the Court concludes that USG is entitled to judgment in its favor on the

false marking claim. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, USG’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 12, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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