Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-13-01247/USCOURTS-ca6-13-01247-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Clare

Ken Hibl

Jeremy McGraw
Appellant
Dwayne Miedzianowski
Appellant
Steven Scozzari
Appellee

Document Text:

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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 15a0053n.06

No. 13-1247

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

STEVEN SCOZZARI as Personal 

Representative of the Estate of WILLIAM 

CHRISTI SCOZZARI, Deceased,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CITY OF CLARE, KEN HIBL, a municipal 

agent of City of Clare,

Defendants,

and

CHIEF DWAYNE MIEDZIANOWSKI, as 

Agent for the municipal corporation and as an 

individual, OFFICER JEREMY MCGRAW, as 

an agent of the municipal corporation and as an 

individual, jointly and severally, 

Defendants-Appellants.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 

MICHIGAN

BEFORE: BOGGS, BATCHELDER, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. City of Clare Police Chief Dwayne Miedzianowski

and Officer Jeremy McGraw appeal the district court’s denial of their post-trial renewed motion 

for judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s1Fourteenth Amendment claim of deliberate 

 

1

Plaintiff Steven Scozzari is the brother of decedent William Scozzari. We refer to decedent William 

Scozzari as “Scozzari” and to Steven Scozzari as “Plaintiff.”

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indifference to serious medical needs, asserting that the district court erred in denying their 

qualified-immunity defense. We disagree and AFFIRM.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Trial testimony established that at 11:06 p.m. on September 18, 2007, a resident of the 

Lone Pine Motel called the Clare Police Department and reported that shots had been fired at a 

park near the motel. Chief Miedzianowski was dispatched to the scene at 11:06 p.m. and arrived 

at 11:12 p.m. Miedzianowski observed a man, later identified as William Scozzari, walking 

from the nearby VFW Hall carrying a flashlight and a cane. Miedzianowski testified that after 

Scozzari shined his flashlight in the direction of the police cruiser, Miedzianowski asked him to 

stop; Scozzari responded with an expletive and continued walking. Miedzianowski followed 

Scozzari to Cabin 17 of the Lone Pine Motel. Officer McGraw arrived at 11:21 p.m., after 

Scozzari entered Cabin 17. PID 2638-39, 3997. 

The two Officers approached Cabin 17, knocked on the door, and announced “Police. 

Open Up.” Scozzari eventually opened the door and appeared to be clutching a knife and 

hatchet. McGraw fired a taser when Scozzari took a step forward, but missed Scozzari. Scozzari 

stepped back inside his cabin, the Officers kicked the door, and Scozzari opened the door,

holding a hatchet and knife. The Officers screamed “Drop your weapons,” Scozzari moved 

toward McGraw, and Miedzianowski opened fire. The two Officers fired eleven shots, five of 

which hit Scozzari.

At 11:26 p.m., Miedzianowski reported shots fired and a suspect down. A Mobile 

Medical Response unit (MMR) was dispatched to the scene at 11:27 p.m. At 11:29 p.m., 

Miedzianowski instructs the dispatcher to call the MMR and have them stage at Pettit Park. The 

exact time the paramedics arrived at the park is not clear. At 11:34:50 p.m., Miedzianowski 

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radioed dispatch to send in the ambulance. Paramedic Bryans reached Scozzari and began 

treating him sometime after 11:35 p.m., but was interrupted while police searched Scozzari for 

weapons. The length of the interruption is unknown, but at 11:37 p.m., MMR was treating 

Scozzari and at 11:57 p.m. MMR was en route to the hospital. 

This case was previously before this court on Defendants’ interlocutory appeal of the 

district court’s pretrial denial of qualified immunity; a panel of this court affirmed. Scozzari v. 

Miedzianowski, 454 F. App’x 455 (6th Cir. 2012) (Scozzari I). The case proceeded to trial on 

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim and Fourteenth Amendment claim of denial

of timely medical treatment. Over Plaintiff’s objection, the district court instructed the jury that 

Plaintiff had to prove that Defendants’ deliberate indifference proximately caused his death. The 

jury returned a verdict of no cause of action on both claims.

Plaintiff moved for a new trial. The district court granted the motion, limited to the 

denial-of-medical-treatment claim, on the ground that the proximate-cause jury instruction did 

not comport with the law of this circuit and prejudiced Plaintiff’s case.

2

Defendants moved for relief from the order granting a new trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), 

and renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s medical-treatment claim, 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), asserting that the jury was properly instructed on proximate cause and that, 

even if the instruction was erroneous, they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because 

there was insufficient evidence for a jury to find that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to 

Scozzari’s medical needs. Defendants also argued they were entitled to qualified immunity

because the evidence submitted at trial could not support a finding of the deprivation of a clearly 

 

2 The district court noted that the prejudice to Plaintiff’s case resulting from the erroneous instruction was 

evident from Plaintiff’s closing argument, “The judge has decided and you now know from the instructions 

yesterday, that with regard to our failure to provide medical treatment claim, we would have to prove that that 

failure substantially caused Mr. Scozzari’s death. We can’t prove that.” PID 3017.

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established constitutional right. PID 2158. The district court denied Defendants’ motion, 

affirmed its ruling that the jury instruction was erroneous, and denied Defendants qualified 

immunity. PID 3148.

3

 Defendants appealed and the district court stayed proceedings pending 

our disposition. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Invocation of qualified immunity raises a question of law that we review de novo.

Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1157 (6th Cir. 1996). Government officials may invoke 

qualified immunity as a defense only “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 

818 (1982)). To determine if qualified immunity protects a government official from suit, courts 

engage in a two-step inquiry: 1) whether the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) 

whether that right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Morrison 

v. Bd. of Trs. of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009). Courts may “exercise their 

sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should 

 

3 The district court explained:

It is undisputed that Scozzari’s medical need was serious. He was shot five times and lay 

in a pool of blood. It goes without saying that Scozzari badly needed medical attention. A 

layperson would know that someone lying in a pool of blood after being shot needs medical 

treatment immediately in order to avoid death. And the Officers “do not dispute that they were 

aware that Scozzari had been shot.” Scozzari’s obvious condition satisfies the objective 

requirement of the failure to provide timely medical treatment test. Further it is clear that the 

Officers were well-aware that Scozzari’s condition was serious.

The more complicated question is whether the Officers disregarded the substantial risk of 

serious harm to Scozzari’s health . . . . Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is 

sufficient evidence to satisfy a reasonable jury that the Officers did not respond reasonably to 

Scozzari’s needs.

PID 3160. 

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be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. 

at 236; see also Aldini v. Johnson, 609 F.3d 858, 863 (6th Cir. 2010).

We review de novo the district court’s denial of Defendants’ renewed motion for 

judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b). Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth, 692 F.3d 452, 461 

(6th Cir. 2012) (citing Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 496 F.3d 609, 614 (6th Cir.2007)). 

“The motion may be granted only if in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact for the jury, and reasonable minds 

could come to but one conclusion, in favor of the moving party.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Judgment as a matter of law becomes appropriate when “a party has been fully heard 

on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for 

that party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction

Because Defendants accept the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and raise only 

issues of law, this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. T.S. v. Doe, 742 F.3d 632, 635 

(6th Cir. 2014).

B. Deliberate Indifference

Defendants contend that the evidence at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to 

establish that they were deliberately indifferent to Scozzari’s serious medical need, and that their 

Fourteenth Amendment obligation was only to promptly summon medical care for Scozzari. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires government officials to 

provide adequate medical care to individuals injured while being apprehended by police. Revere

v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (“[T]he due process rights of a [pre-trial detainee] 

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are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner.”); 

Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2008). To establish a violation of the right 

to adequate medical care under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted 

with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 

F.3d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 492 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff 

need not show that the official acted “for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge 

that harm will result.” Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1970)); see also Horn v. Madison Cnty. Fiscal Court, 22 

F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Officials may be shown to be deliberately indifferent to such 

serious needs without evidence of conscious intent to inflict pain.”). “[D]eliberate indifference 

to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that 

risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836.

“Deliberate indifference is not mere negligence. Deliberate indifference requires that the 

defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to [a plaintiff’s] health and 

safety.” Phillips, 534 F.3d at 539. A claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs 

has both objective and subjective components. Id. The objective component requires proof of a

sufficiently serious medical need. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Phillips, 534 F.3d at 539. To 

establish the subjective component, a plaintiff must “allege facts which, if true, would show that 

the official . . . subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the 

[individual], that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk.” 

Comstock, 273 F.3d at 703 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).4 However, a plaintiff need not 

 

4 Our dissenting colleague faults us for not applying a “shocks the conscience” standard as derived from County of 

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998), and as applied by this court in Hunt v. Sycamore Community 

School District Board of Education, 542 F.3d 529, 535–36 (6th Cir. 2008). But “conscience shocking” as an inquiry 

posed in Lewis is not self-defining; rather, it is to be addressed in context, 523 U.S. at 850, as the dissent recognizes. 

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prove that the official acted “for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm 

will result” if the official recklessly disregarded a known risk. Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

835).

Where a deliberate-indifference claim is based on delay of medical care, a constitutional 

violation arises if the injury in question is “so obvious that even a layperson would easily 

recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention,” and the resulting need for treatment was “not 

addressed within a reasonable time frame.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899–

900 (6th Cir. 2004). 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff presented no evidence to indicate that they subjectively 

knew that additional weapons were in Scozzari’s pockets and consciously chose not to retrieve 

the weapons before the paramedics began attending to Scozzari. Defendants cite Williams v. 

City of Grosse Pointe Park, No. 03-73596, 2005 WL 2173686 (E.D. Mich., Sep. 6, 2005), aff’d, 

496 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2007), to support their argument that since they summoned EMS within 

minutes of the shooting, there is no evidence of deliberate indifference. However, Williams is 

distinguishable because there were no intervening delays before medical aid was provided. 

There, the plaintiff was injured when one of the defendant officers fired shots at the stolen 

vehicle the plaintiff was driving while fleeing police. Once the officer realized that the plaintiff 

had been shot, he reported “shots fired,” summoned EMS, and said to the plaintiff “EMS is 

coming . . . just keep breathing man,” “you doing ok,” and “keep breathing, stay with me.” In 

addition, other officers arrived on the scene and attended to the plaintiff’s medical needs and an 

 

When the facts are viewed in a light most favorable to Scozzari, each of the three inquiries in Lewis can be seen as 

favoring Scozzari: Scozzari had no voluntary relationship with the government; and Defendants had enough time to 

bring neighbors of Scozzari’s out of their homes to view Scozzari lying on the ground with weapons in hand, which 

they did without having searched Scozzari for weapons or secured the area in preparation for medical personnel.

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ambulance arrived within seven minutes. Thus, in Williams the defendants were not deliberately

indifferent to the plaintiff’s medical needs. Id. at *2-3, 8.

We acknowledge that this is a closer case than some, and we recognize the problems 

faced by police officers confronted with the necessity of attempting to meet conflicting 

objectives such as securing the scene and summoning EMS, see Pierce v. Springfield Twp., 564 

F. App’x 431 (6th Cir. 2014). However, in this case, a reasonable jury could find that the alleged 

conflicting objectives were carried out in a way that would not meet the standard for qualified 

immunity. The district court correctly concluded that the jury could have found Defendants were 

deliberately indifferent when they failed to search Scozzari for weapons between 11:26:09, when 

Miedzianowski called in that shots were fired, and 11:34, when Miedzianowski instructed 

dispatch to send in the ambulance that was staged nearby. PID 3638-41. And even when the 

paramedics began treating Scozzari, they were called off for a time after a Michigan State Police 

Trooper asked if Scozzari had been searched for weapons. PID 4227.

Further, a jury could conclude that Defendants disregarded the substantial risk of harm to 

Scozzari by engaging in activity unrelated to securing the area in preparation for medical 

personnel to enter. Instead of securing the area and searching Scozzari for weapons, McGraw 

brought neighbors out of their homes to view the fallen Scozzari with weapons in his hand. One 

witness also testified to seeing an officer enter Scozzari’s cabin and retrieve items, which the 

officer then placed near Scozzari. A jury could conclude that, in the face of such a serious 

medical need, Defendants were deliberately indifferent by delaying Scozzari’s access to medical 

treatment for non-medical reasons unrelated to securing the scene. 

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C. Qualified Immunity

Defendants assert they did not violate a clearly established right and are therefore entitled 

to qualified immunity, contending that testimony at trial established that it is standard protocol 

for emergency responders to stage off-site until given the all-clear from police to enter the scene, 

and that paramedic Winnie Bryans testified she would have staged off-site even if 

Miedzianowski had not directed her to do so. However this court has already addressed the 

issue: 

Defendants argue that, even if their behavior amounted to deliberate indifference, 

they are entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established 

when this incident occurred that failing to give medical responders immediate 

access to an injured detainee violates the Fourteenth Amendment. However, a 

constitutional right need not be expressly recognized to be clearly established. To 

the contrary, “‘general statements of the law’ are capable of giving clear and fair 

warning to officers even where ‘the very action in question has [not] previously 

been held unlawful.’” Smith, 430 F.3d at 776–77 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)) (alteration in Smith). See also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 

640 [] (“The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable 

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”); Feathers v. 

Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[A]n action’s unlawfulness can be 

apparent from direct holdings, from specific examples described as prohibited, or 

from the general reasoning that a court employs.” (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 

730, 740–41 (2002)). Reasonable officers would have known, based on this 

Circuit’s precedent, that the obligation to provide adequate medical care to an 

injured detainee is not discharged merely by promptly calling for assistance, but 

extends to ensuring that medical responders are able to access the victim without 

unreasonable delay. 

Scozzari I, 454 F. App’x at 467.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we AFFIRM.

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ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Defendants appeal the district 

court’s denial of their qualified immunity defense as asserted in their renewed motion for 

judgment as a matter of law, and we must determine whether they are entitled to qualified 

immunity, and therefore to judgment. See Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884, 888–89, 892 (2011) 

(holding that a defendant may not appeal an order denying summary judgment on qualified 

immunity grounds after a full trial on the merits, but a defendant may appeal the denial of a 

renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on qualified immunity grounds). To determine 

if a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, we ask whether the facts alleged and the 

evidence produced, when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a 

reasonable juror to find that (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) the right was 

clearly established. Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2008). Because it is 

not clearly established that “engaging in activities that [are] unrelated to securing the area for 

medical personnel” is tantamount to deliberate indifference, as the majority opinion suggests, I 

must dissent here.

For a constitutional right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right must be 

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand what he is doing violates that 

right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Although a pretrial detainee’s 

constitutional right to adequate medical care is clearly established, Ford v. Cnty. of Grand 

Traverse, 535 F.3d 483, 495 (6th Cir. 2008), a pretrial detainee does not have a clearly 

established constitutional right to medical care that is administered without any delay. Rather, 

we have defined “adequate medical care,” in this context, as care that that has not been 

unreasonably delayed. See Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 542 F.3d 529, 539–

43 (6th Cir. 2008); Estate of Owensby v. City of Cincinnati, 414 F.3d 596, 601–03 (6th Cir. 

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2005); Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703, 706 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Hubbard v. 

Gross, 199 F. App’x 433, 437–38 (6th Cir. 2006). 

In this case, to determine whether Defendants unreasonably delayed Scozzari’s medical 

care, we ultimately must decide whether Defendants’ actions were arbitrary. See Hunt, 542 F.3d 

at 535–36.1 Because the majority opinion does not address arbitrariness, it is necessary to 

outline it thoroughly here. Although arbitrariness may seem to be a broad concept, in this 

context arbitrary conduct is only that which “shocks the conscience”; and “[d]eliberate 

indifference that shocks in one environment may not be so patently egregious in another. . . .” 

Id. at 535. “[W]hen executive action is worse than negligent but was not done for the purpose of 

injuring someone or in furtherance of invidious discrimination,” we should consider: (1) the 

voluntariness of the relationship between the government and the injured person, (2) whether the 

government actor was required to act quickly or had time for deliberation, and (3) whether the 

government actor pursued a legitimate governmental purpose. Id. at 536. 2

 

1

“Since the time of our early explanations of due process, we have understood the core of the concept to be 

protection against arbitrary action. . . .We have emphasized time and again that ‘[t]he touchstone of due process is 

protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government,’ whether the fault lies in a denial of fundamental 

procedural fairness or in the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate 

governmental objective. . . . Our cases dealing with abusive executive action have repeatedly emphasized that only 

the most egregious official conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense . . . .” Hunt, 542 F.3d at 

535 (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998) (citations omitted)).

2 Unfortunately, the majority opinion in footnote 4 misapplies Hunt’s three-factor analysis, and applies a 

reasonableness test found in Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703, 706 (6th Cir. 2001), in which this court 

stated that a defendant will prevail against a claim of deliberate indifference if he, instead of recklessly disregarding 

the risk, “reasonably responded to the risk, even if the harm was ultimately not averted.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Although this statement is correct and supports the analysis in Hunt, it does not clearly articulate how we 

should determine whether a defendant’s response to a known risk is “reasonable.” Indeed, it appears that Hunt

expanded Comstock’s analysis to clarify the test for “reasonableness” in a situation like the one currently before us. 

See Hunt, 542 F.3d at 541–42 (“Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994), defines deliberate indifference in 

terms of ‘excessive risk,’ indicating that the need for the risk is being balanced against countervailing 

considerations. Thus, even where the governmental actor is subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm, 

we will be unlikely to find deliberate indifference if his action was motivated by a countervailing, legitimate 

governmental purpose.” (citations omitted)). Thus, the analysis in Hunt, not that in Comstock, is the proper analysis 

to apply here. 

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Our analysis of the latter two factors in Hunt, 542 F.3d at 539–43, is instructive. Relying 

on County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 851–54 (1998), we held that “conduct that 

might offend . . . may still not be considered arbitrary if it was undertaken for a legitimate 

governmental purpose in a crisis requiring immediate response.” Hunt, 542 F.3d at 540. 

Government officials face a higher standard if they have time to deliberate their course of action, 

instead of being forced to act instantaneously. Id. at 539. But if they are reacting to an 

emergency, any indifference on their part generally is not conscience-shocking due to the 

importance of competing obligations and the necessity of giving deference to decisions made in 

haste. Id. at 540. 

Moreover, if a government official’s actions arise out of his “attempt to discharge duties 

which [he] is required by law or public necessity to undertake,” his actions generally cannot be 

considered arbitrary, even if the official “was imprudent in choosing one legitimate goal over 

another.” Id. For example, in Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 513–16 (6th Cir. 

2002), we held that police were not deliberately indifferent when they chose to intervene 

aggressively in a hostage-taking crisis, rather than choosing to continue their stand-off, even 

though the choice resulted in the death of one of the hostages. Even if the police “made a bad 

choice, [their] action . . . did not shock the conscience” because they faced competing legitimate 

objectives. Hunt, 287 F.3d at 541. This analysis is consistent with Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 

825, 837 (1994), which defined deliberate indifference as “excessive risk,” thus indicating that 

the risk taken must be balanced against countervailing considerations. See id. “For [us] to find 

deliberate indifference, therefore, [we] must find not only that the governmental actor chose to 

act (or failed to act) despite a subjective awareness of substantial risk of serious injury, but . . . 

also . . . that he did not act in furtherance of a countervailing governmental purpose that justified 

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taking that risk.” Id. And a countervailing governmental purpose is generally (1) any legitimate 

police duty or (2) any act that, if not performed, could expose a governmental actor to liability. 

See id. at 542–43. 

Here, Defendants were forced to act quickly to perform countervailing governmental 

purposes. Their police duties required that they do several distinct things: (1) seek medical care 

for Scozzari, (2) secure the scene, and (3) gather witness testimony.3 Numerous witnesses 

testified that, immediately following the shooting, Officer Miedzianowski radioed for help, 

saying that shots were fired and the suspect was down. Paramedic Winnie Bryans and Clare 

County Deputy Kyle Kehn testified that Officer Miedzianowski’s instruction to stage emergency 

responders until the scene was secure was standard procedure. And this record, viewed in a light 

most favorable to Plaintiff, clearly shows that MMR was staged for no longer than two minutes. 

While Defendants waited for MMR to arrive, they gathered witness impressions and attempted to 

secure the scene by taking the weapons from Scozzari’s hands and handcuffing him. According 

to the record, both actions were taken and completed in less than nine minutes4; and during seven 

 

3

Police officers generally must gather witness testimony to submit accurate police reports. See Austin v. 

City of Montgomery, 353 F. App’x 188, 189 (11th Cir. 2009) (“The unnamed police officer who responded to the 

scene . . . failed to interview witnesses or file a written report . . . as required by Alabama Code § 32-10-7.”); United 

States v. Gauvin, 173 F.3d 798, 803 (10th Cir. 1999) (Officer testified “that, in making his reports at the scene . . ., 

he interviews witnesses.”); Weimer v. Schraeder, 952 F.2d 336, 340 n.6 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he police officers at 

the accident scene had a duty to prepare an accurate accident report including interviews with available witnesses.”). 

Furthermore, if Defendants had not gathered witness testimony in this case – confirming that Scozzari attempted to 

attack them with weapons – they still might be subject to liability under Plaintiff’s “excessive force” claim, which 

alleged that Defendants were in no immediate danger when they shot Scozzari and that they actually attempted to 

justify their use of force by planting weapons on Scozzari’s body.

4 Dispatch was called at 11:27 p.m., and MMR was “at patient” at 11:35 p.m. Even if we choose to 

discount the MMR report, which recorded the “at patient” time, the CAD Incident Report recorded that MMR was 

sent in at 11:34:50 p.m. Accepting Officer McGraw’s testimony that Officer Miedzianowski waited one minute 

before calling dispatch, less than nine minutes transpired between when Scozzari was shot and when MMR was at 

his side assisting him. Moreover, whether we choose to rely on the MMR report “at scene” time of 11:33 p.m. or 

the CAD Incident Report “ENTR TO STAGE” time of 11:32:23 p.m., the record clearly shows that MMR was 

staged for no longer than two minutes.

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to eight of those minutes, MMR was traveling to the scene, parking the ambulance, unloading 

their equipment, and walking 75 to 200 feet to Scozzari. 

To the extent that the majority opinion suggests that these actions were not performed 

quickly enough or that Defendants failed to adequately secure the scene, which resulted in 

delays, such delays cannot amount to recklessness, but at most, only negligence. See S.L. ex rel. 

K.L. v. Pierce Twnp. Bd. of Trustees, 509 F. App’x 536, 539 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Recklessness is a 

perverse disregard of a known risk.”); Mullins v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 291 F. App’x 

744, 747 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[N]egligence is conduct which falls below the standard established by 

law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.”). Furthermore, although the 

majority opinion suggests that Defendants should not have gathered witness testimony, that 

action cannot be considered “conscience-shocking” because Defendants faced countervailing 

governmental purposes5that justified their actions and the risk those actions imposed on 

Scozzari’s health and safety. See Hunt, 542 F.3d at 541–43. 

Thus, although “general statements of law are capable of giving clear and fair warning to 

officers,” Smith v. Cupp, 430 F.3d 766, 776–77 (6th Cir. 2005), the applicable general statements 

of law here, particularly those found in Hunt, did not give Defendants clear and fair warning that 

their actions related to their police duties would be tantamount to deliberate indifference. Even 

though we have not held specifically that gathering witness testimony is a countervailing 

governmental purpose as defined in Hunt (“competing legitimate governmental purpose”), there 

is no language in Hunt or its progeny that suggests that such action is not a countervailing 

 

5

In this Court’s prior decision in this case, Scozzari v. Miedzianowski, 454 F. App’x 455, 463, 466 (6th Cir. 

2012), the majority concluded, based on the evidence available before trial, that a reasonable jury could find that 

Defendants used excessive force if the evidence at trial revealed that Scozzari did not threaten Defendants with 

weapons and instead Defendants planted weapons on Scozzari’s body to cover up their use of force. However, due 

to the evidence revealed at trial—the evidence that Defendants gathered while waiting for MMR to arrive—a 

reasonable jury could not find that Defendants used excessive force. Because Defendants’ actions therefore were 

necessary to avoid exposure to liability, Defendants “act[ed] in furtherance of . . . countervailing governmental 

purpose[s].” See Hunt, 542 F.3d at 541.

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governmental purpose; therefore, it is not clearly established that such action always amounts to 

deliberate indifference. Moreover, based on the application of Hunt to this case, as outlined 

above, I conclude that Defendants did not violate Scozzari’s due process right to adequate 

medical care because Defendants were not deliberately indifferent toward Scozzari’s medical 

condition. 

Because neither criterion necessary to defeat qualified immunity has been satisfied here, 

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court erred by denying this 

defense and granting a new trial. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the district court and 

grant Defendants’ renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.

I respectfully dissent.

 Case: 13-1247 Document: 41-2 Filed: 01/15/2015 Page: 15