Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-02353/USCOURTS-ca8-15-02353-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Coterel
Appellant
Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc.
Appellee
Crystal Naylor
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-2353

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James Coterel; Crystal Naylor

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., doing business as Safety 1st

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City

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 Submitted: February 9, 2016

 Filed: July 5, 2016

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Before RILEY, Chief Judge, LOKEN and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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RILEY, Chief Judge.

James Coterel and Crystal Naylor’s (appellants) twenty-three-month-old son,

Jacob Coterel, tragically drowned in a pond after climbing out of his crib and leaving

their home in the middle of the night. The appellantssued DorelJuvenile Group, Inc.

(Dorel) for wrongful death under Missouri law, alleging product liability and

negligence arising from a doorknob cover Dorel designed and manufactured and the

appellants used. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.080 (wrongful death). After a six-day trial,

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a jury unanimously found Dorel was not liable for Jacob’s death. The appellants

moved for a new trial, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A), which the district court

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denied. The appellants appeal, and we affirm. 

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I. BACKGROUND

In the fall of 2008, the appellants received a doorknob cover, designed and

manufactured by Dorel, as a gift at a baby shower for Jacob. As Jacob got older, the

appellants began to use the doorknob cover on the front door of their home to stop

Jacob from opening the door. Months later and a week or two before the accident,

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the appellants also installed a chain lock on the front door when Jacob began to get

out of his crib on his own. 

On the night of November 28, 2010, Naylor took Jacob to the emergency room

with a fever. By the time they returned home around midnight, Coterel and Skylin,

the appellants’ daughter, had already gone to bed. Naylor put Jacob to bed in his crib

and spoke with her brother, who was visiting, before going to bed herself. Naylor

testified she locked the tab lock on the doorknob when she went to bed, but forgot to

latch the new chain lock.

At approximately 6:00 a.m. the next morning, Coterel awoke to find the front

door open and Jacob missing. After a frantic search, he found Jacob floating face

The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for the

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Western District of Missouri. 

The district court derived jurisdiction from 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); our

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jurisdiction derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

The doorknob cover consists of two translucent halvesthatsnap together over 3

the doorknob. The cover was designed to spin freely unless the user pressed two

flexible pads on the cover simultaneously, thus making it more difficult for a young

child to open the door. 

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down in a pond fifty yards away. Efforts to revive Jacob proved unsuccessful, and

he died at the hospital a few hours later. The appellants testified that when they

returned home, they discovered the doorknob cover on the floor in two pieces.

The Missouri Department of Social Services assigned Deborah Adair to

investigate Jacob’s death. On November 30, 2010, Adair interviewed Coterel and

Naylor about the accident. Adair noted in her written investigation report thatCoterel

told her Jacob had learned how to defeat the doorknob cover, which prompted the

appellantsto install the chain lock to keep Jacob in the home. At trial, Coterel denied

making thatstatement, testifying Adair may have “misinterpreted” him. Investigators

concluded Jacob’s death was a tragic accident.

On October 16, 2013, the appellants sued Dorel for wrongful death based on

theories of product liability and negligence. Dorel answered, asserting, among others,

affirmative defenses of comparative fault and sole cause. On February 3, 2015,

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about a month before trial, Dorel moved the district court pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 8(c)(2) to treat its comparative-fault defense as a counterclaim for

contribution. The district court denied the motion, indicating by text entry that the

time to bring a counterclaim under the scheduling order had expired. 

Relying on that ruling and Teeter v. Missouri Highway & Transportation

Commission, 891 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Mo. 1995) (en banc), in which the Missouri

Supreme Court decided a defendant could not invoke comparative-fault principlesto

reduce its liability “on account of the fault of one of several beneficiaries of a

wrongful death action,” the appellants moved in limine to exclude any reference or

Under Missouri law, a defendant can argue “the acts of one other than the

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defendant were the sole cause of the accident.” Simpson v. Smith, 771 S.W.2d 368,

373 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).

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argument relating to any comparative fault of the appellants. The district court

granted the motion. 

Before trial, the parties disputed whether evidence of the appellants’ failure to

secure the chain lock and appellants’ prior knowledge of Jacob’s ability to defeat the

doorknob cover was nonetheless relevant to Dorel’s defense. In support of exclusion,

the appellants argued their actions were, at most, contributing causes Dorel could not

raise—not sole cause. The appellants further argued admitting such evidence would

be prejudicial because the verdict form did not provide a mechanism for the jury to

apportion fault. Dorel maintained the evidence wasrelevant to its sole-cause defense

and central to its ability to controvert the appellants’ product-liability and negligence

claims. 

The district court ruled the evidence admissible and consistently overruled the

appellants’ relevance objections at trial. The district court also overruled the

appellants’ hearsay objection to Adair’s testimony regarding Coterel’s statement that

Jacob knew how to defeat the doorknob cover.

At trial, the appellants urged the jury to find Dorel “directly caused or directly

contributed to cause” Jacob’s death. The appellants argued the doorknob cover was

defective and unreasonably dangerous under normal use and that Dorel negligently

designed and sold the cover despite test results that showed the cover was defective. 

Dorel strongly denied responsibility for Jacob’s death. Specifically, Dorel

denied the doorknob cover was defective or unreasonably dangerous when used

properly and even questioned whether the door was closed that night and whether the

cover was on the doorknob at all. Dorel emphasized the packaging for the cover

warned it should not be used without adult supervision and use should stop once the

child could defeat it. In closing, Dorel argued neither the appellants nor anyone else

would think a low-cost doorknob cover was a substitute for a lock and the appellants

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simply failed to use the chain lock they actually had been relying upon since learning

Jacob could defeat the doorknob cover. 

On March 10, 2015, the jury unanimously found Dorel was not liable for

Jacob’s death and rendered a general verdict in Dorel’s favor. The district court

entered judgment the next day. On April 7, 2015, the appellants moved for a new

trial, arguing Dorel “presented impermissible and improper evidence during the

course of the trial which tainted the jury’s verdict.” The district court denied the

motion, and the appellants appeal. 

II. DISCUSSION

The appellants assert the district court erred in admitting evidence Naylor

failed to secure the chain lock the night ofJacob’s death and Coterel knew before that

night that Jacob could defeat the doorknob cover. As the appellants see it, those

evidentiary errors warrant a new trial because they tainted the jury verdict. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings and its

denial of a new trial for clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. See Burris v. Gulf

Underwriters Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 875, 878, 880 (8th Cir. 2015). “[T]he key question

[is] whether a new trial is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” Hallmark

Cards, Inc. v. Murley, 703 F.3d 456, 462 (8th Cir. 2013). We will not disturb the

jury’s verdict unless the appellants show “the district court clearly abused its

discretion by admitting the evidence” and “the error[s] prejudicially influenced the

outcome of the trial.” Regions Bank v. BMW N. Am., Inc., 406 F.3d 978, 980 (8th

Cir. 2005); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 (explaining “no error in admitting or excluding

evidence . . . is ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for

vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order” unless the error

“affect[s] any party’s substantial rights”). 

The appellants have failed to make that crucial showing. Even if we accept,

for purposes of argument,the appellants’ alleged evidentiary errors, the appellants are

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unable to establish those “error[s] prejudicially influenced the outcome of the trial.” 

Regions Bank, 406 F.3d at 980. 

“To determine whether the evidentiary errors discussed above prejudicially

influenced the outcome of the case, we look to the jury’s verdict.” Qualley v.

Clo-Tex Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 1123, 1131 (8th Cir. 2000). The verdict form in this

case, which followed the verdict formthe appellants’ submitted, simply asked the jury

to determine whether it found in favor of the appellants or Dorel on the appellants’

wrongful-death claim. The jury unanimously found for Dorel. “We have no way of 5

determining from this general verdict why the jury found [Dorel] not liable.” Lovett

ex rel. Lovett v. Union Pac. R.R., 201 F.3d 1074, 1080 (8th Cir. 2000). 

Contrary to the appellants’ assertions, on this record, we cannot “know” the

jury used the challenged evidence for an improper purpose and impermissibly

compared fault in some way when deciding Dorel was not liable for Jacob’s death. 

To prevail on their product-liability theory, the appellants had to prove: 

The general verdict form in this case directed the jury to: 5

Complete this form by writing in the name required by your verdict.

On the claim of the Plaintiffs James Coterel and Crystal Naylor

for the death of Jacob Coterel against defendant Dorel Juvenile Group,

Inc., we, the undersigned jurors, find in favor of:

Plaintiffs James Coterel or Defendant Dorel

And Crystal Naylor Juvenile Group, Inc.

The jury entered the word “Defendant.” There were no interrogatories or other

findings that might have indicated the basis for the verdict. 

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(1) the defendant sold a product in the course of its business; (2) the

product was then in a defective condition, unreasonably dangerous when

put to a reasonably anticipated use; (3) the product was used in a manner

reasonably anticipated; and (4) the plaintiff was damaged as a direct

result ofsuch defective condition as existed when the product was sold.

Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Epstein, 239 S.W.3d 667, 671 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). To

prove negligence, the appellants had “to establish [Dorel] had a duty to protect

[Jacob] from injury, [Dorel] failed to perform that duty, and” Dorel’s failure

proximately caused Jacob’s death. Jarrett v. Jones, 258 S.W.3d 442, 448 (Mo. 2008)

(en banc).

In finding Dorel was not at fault, the jury, based on the evidence adduced at

trial, reasonably might have found, among other things, “there was no defect or

negligence” or that appellantsfailed to prove causation orsome other element of their

claims. Regions Bank, 406 F.3d at 980. In light of the general verdict in this case,

the appellants are left to guess about the course and content of the jury deliberations

and “can only speculate whether” any alleged evidentiary error actually prejudiced

them. Id. at 980-81. “Speculation, however, is not a sufficient basis for finding [the

appellants’] substantial rights were affected, and we will not set aside the jury’s

verdict in this case.” Id. at 981; see also Lovett, 201 F.3d at 1080.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm.

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