Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-23-15847/USCOURTS-ca9-23-15847-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Daniel J. Altstatt
Amicus Curiae
Natalie Arroyo
Appellee
Virgina Bass

Rex Bohn
Appellee
Michelle Bushnell
Appellee
County of Humboldt
Appellee
John H. Ford
Appellee
Cyro Glad
Appellant
Blu Graham
Appellant
Humboldt County Board of Supervisors
Appellee
Humboldt County Planning & Building Department
Appellee
Steve Madrone
Appellee
Rhonda Olson
Appellant
Corrine Morgan Thomas
Appellant
Doug Thomas
Appellant
Mike Wilson
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CORRINE MORGAN THOMAS; 

DOUG THOMAS; BLU GRAHAM; 

RHONDA OLSON; CYRO GLAD, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT, 

California; HUMBOLDT COUNTY 

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; 

HUMBOLDT COUNTY PLANNING 

& BUILDING DEPARTMENT; 

MIKE WILSON, Vice Chair, Board of 

Supervisors; REX BOHN, member, 

Board of Supervisors; MICHELLE 

BUSHNELL, member, Board of 

Supervisors; STEVE MADRONE, 

member, Board of Supervisors; JOHN 

H. FORD, Director, Humboldt County 

Planning and Building Department; 

NATALIE ARROYO, in her official 

capacity as Supervisor of Humboldt 

County, 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

No. 23-15847 

D.C. No. 1:22-cv05725-RMI 

OPINION

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2 THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT

VIRGINA BASS, Chair, Board of 

Supervisors, 

 Defendant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Robert M. Illman, Magistrate Judge, Presiding 

Argued and Submitted April 9, 2024 

San Francisco, California 

Filed December 30, 2024 

Before: Richard A. Paez and Jennifer Sung, Circuit Judges, 

and Sidney A. Fitzwater,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Paez 

SUMMARY**

Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the 

district court’s dismissal of a putative class action brought 

* The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for 

the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT 3

by residents of Humboldt County pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, alleging, in part, that the County’s system of 

administrative penalties and fees pertaining to cannabis 

abatement violates the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive 

Fines Clause.

Pursuant to the County Code, illegal cultivation of 

cannabis can carry a daily fine of anywhere between $6,000 

and $10,000. Once the County’s Code Enforcement Unit 

serves a responsible party with a notice of violation 

(“NOV”), the party has ten days to abate all violations or 

face penalties, subject to an appeals process, during which 

the penalties continue to accrue. Plaintiffs contend that the 

County charges landowners with violations based on 

imprecise data, or on the conduct of previous property 

owners. The district concluded that because plaintiffs had 

yet to pay a fine, they lacked standing, the Eighth 

Amendment claim was unripe, and both the facial and asapplied challenges were untimely.

The panel first held that plaintiffs’ claim under the 

Excessive Fines Clause was constitutionally ripe and that 

plaintiffs plausibly alleged a sufficient concrete injury to 

satisfy standing due to the County’s imposition of penalties, 

even before any payment. The continued imposition of 

significant penalties caused plaintiffs emotional and 

psychological distress, and they incurred expenses 

attempting to abate the violations by hiring engineers to 

inspect their property and attorneys to defend them in 

hearings. Prudential ripeness considerations further 

counseled in favor of allowing the litigation to proceed.

The panel found that with one exception, plaintiffs’ 

challenges under the Excessive Fines Clause were 

timely. The statute of limitations begins to run on a claim 

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4 THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT

(whether facial or as-applied) when a plaintiff knows or has 

reason to know of the actual injury, not, as the district court 

found, when the challenged ordinance is enacted. Plaintiffs’ 

facial claim began to run when they received NOVs, which 

was the earliest point at which they could have known of the 

penalties at issue. Because at least some plaintiffs alleged 

they received their initial NOVs within two years of filing 

suit, the panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of 

plaintiffs’ facial challenge as untimely. Several of the 

named plaintiffs also appeared to have timely as-applied 

challenges, although plaintiff Cyro Glad’s as-applied Eighth 

Amendment claim appeared to be untimely because he 

received his initial NOV nearly four years before the suit was 

filed and no daily penalties were imposed within the 

limitations period. The panel, therefore, partially reversed 

the district court’s dismissal of the as-applied excessive fines 

challenges as untimely but affirmed the dismissal with 

respect to Cyro Glad.

Turning to the merits, the panel held that plaintiffs 

alleged a plausible claim for relief under the Excessive Fines 

Clause. Plaintiffs alleged that the administrative penalties, 

which can reach millions of dollars, and the County’s 

demolition orders are punitive, not remedial. They also 

plausibly alleged that the fines were excessive given that (1) 

at least some of the plaintiffs have been charged with 

violations that pre-date their occupation of their respective 

properties; (2) the violations were inaccurately charged or 

were the fault of previous property owners; (3) lesser 

penalties could accomplish the same health and safety goals; 

and (4) the alleged offenses caused no harm beyond a 

technical lack of compliance with the County’s cannabis 

permitting regulations.

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THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT 5 

COUNSEL

Jared McClain (argued), Institute for Justice, Arlington, 

Virginia; Robert Johnson, Institute for Justice, Shaker 

Heights, Ohio; Thomas V. Loran III, Pillsbury Winthrop 

Shaw Pittman LLP, San Francisco, California; Derek M. 

Mayor, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, Sacramento, 

California; for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Pamela K. Graham (argued), Colantuono Highsmith & 

Whatley PC, Pasadena, California; John A. Abaci, 

Colantuono Highsmith & Whatley PC, Sonoma, California; 

Michael G. Colantuono, Colantuono Highsmith & Whatley 

PC, Grass Valley, California; for Defendants-Appellees.

Thomas Q. Swanson, Hilgers Graben PLLC, Lincoln, 

Nebraska, for Amicus Curiae Daniel J. Altstatt.

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge: 

This putative class action arises out of Humboldt 

County’s system of administrative penalties and fees 

involving cannabis abatement. Plaintiffs—residents of 

Humboldt County—filed this action under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, alleging a number of constitutional claims against 

the County. The district court dismissed all claims in their 

entirety on various grounds. We focus only on one of 

Plaintiffs’ claims: that the County’s system of administrative 

penalties and fees violates the Eighth Amendment’s 

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6 THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT

Excessive Fines Clause.1 The district court dismissed that 

claim because it concluded that the claim was not justiciable 

and that it was untimely. For the reasons below, we affirm 

in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

A.

This case concerns Humboldt County’s enforcement of 

its local building and zoning laws, specifically those 

involving cannabis abatement. We briefly discuss the 

relevant provisions of the Code of Humboldt County, 

California (“HCC” or “the County Code”).

Pursuant to the County Code, violations of local building 

and zoning laws are classified into four categories ranging 

from “Category 1” to “Category 4.” HCC §§ 352-3(e)-(h). 

Those violations classified as Category 4 are the most severe 

and carry the greatest penalty: a daily fine of anywhere 

between $6,000 and $10,000. Id. § 352-6(a)(4). As relevant 

here, the illegal cultivation of cannabis, as well as any other 

violation that facilitates the illegal cultivation of cannabis, is 

classified as a Category 4 offense. Id. § 352-3(h).

The County’s Code Enforcement Unit is responsible for 

enforcement. Id. § 352-3(j). Once the Code Enforcement 

Unit determines that a violation has occurred, it serves each 

“Responsible Party” with a “Notice of Violation [(NOV)] 

and Proposed Administrative Civil Penalty.” Id. § 352-7. 

The County Code requires the NOV to contain certain

information, including the name and last known address of 

1 In a separately filed memorandum disposition, we address Plaintiffs’ 

remaining claims. 

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THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT 7

each responsible party and a “description of the specific acts 

or omissions that gave rise to the Violation.” Id. § 352-8.

A responsible party who is served with an NOV must 

abate the violations within ten days or face penalties. Id. 

§ 352-5(b)(1).

2 Indeed, pursuant to the County Code, fines 

are imposed automatically no later than ten days after service 

of the NOV. Id. §§ 352-3(m)(1), 352-5(b)(1). Moreover, in 

the case of “subsequent or ongoing cannabis Violations or 

Violations that exist as a result of or to facilitate illegal 

cultivation of cannabis, the imposition of administrative 

civil penalties will start to accrue after service of [an NOV],” 

unless a tenant (rather than the property owner) is in 

possession of the property. Id. § 352-3(m)(2). The 

imposition of the “penalty” becomes “final” and the Code 

Enforcement Unit “acquire[s] jurisdiction to collect the full 

amount thereof and any and all Administrative Costs and/or 

Attorney’s Fees” ten calendar days after service of the NOV 

unless a responsible party timely appeals. Id. § 352-8(l).

If a responsible party appeals “the determination that . . . 

a Violation has occurred and/or the amount of the 

administrative civil penalty [imposed] . . . , the Code 

Enforcement Unit shall set the matter for hearing before [a] 

Hearing Officer and serve a ‘Notice of Administrative Civil 

Penalty Appeal Hearing’ upon each Appellant.” Id. § 352-9. 

The hearing must be scheduled “no sooner than fifteen (15) 

calendar days after the date on which the Notice of 

Administrative Civil Penalty Appeal Hearing is served on 

2 The County is authorized to issue an additional NOV and impose an 

additional penalty if the violations remain after ninety days. HCC § 352-

5(d). It can additionally “withhold issuance of any licenses, permits and 

other entitlements to a Responsible Party on any project that is subject to 

unpaid administrative civil penalties.” Id. § 352-5(e).

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8 THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT

the Appellant.” Id. § 352-11. The imposition of fines, 

however, does not stop during this period, and can continue 

“up to and including the ninetieth (90th) calendar day,” id. 

§ 352-5(a), following the original “Imposition Date,” id. 

§ 352-3(m).

On appeal, the hearing officer has the authority to 

determine that no violation has occurred and terminate the 

administrative proceedings. Id. § 352-12. If the hearing

officer determines that a violation has occurred or continues 

to exist, they can affirm the civil penalty or reduce it in 

limited circumstances. In no event, however, can the hearing 

officer reduce the penalty “to an amount that is less than the 

minimum amount set forth [in the County Code] for the 

Violation category imposed.” Id. § 352-12(b). For example, 

in the case of Category 4 offenses, the reduction cannot 

result in a penalty lower than $6,000 per day. Id. 

§ 352-6(a)(4). Once the hearing officer’s decision is final, 

the responsible party may seek judicial review. Id. § 352-13.

Finally, once jurisdiction to collect the administrative 

civil penalty is final, the Code Enforcement Unit may serve 

the responsible party with a “Notice of Administrative Civil 

Penalty Assessment” and collect the penalty or impose a lien 

on the property, id. §§ 352-15, 352-16(l), unless the 

responsible party objects and requests additional review by

the County’s Board of Supervisors, id. § 352-16(i).

B.

Plaintiffs are residents of Humboldt County who allege 

that they have been aggrieved by the County’s enforcement 

of its cannabis-abatement regulatory scheme. In general, 

Plaintiffs allege that the County charges landowners with 

violations of the County Code on the basis of (1) imprecise 

images taken from satellites or drones without reasonable 

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THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT 9

suspicion or any further investigation, or (2) the conduct of 

previous owners, which ceased before Plaintiffs purchased 

their respective properties. Plaintiffs also allege that the 

County fails to record the violations of previous owners, 

such that new landowners like Plaintiffs have no actual or 

constructive knowledge of ongoing violations when they 

purchase land. The County nonetheless serves these 

landowners with vague NOVs that fail to properly inform

them of the grounds for the charges or their right to appeal. 

Once served with an NOV, Plaintiffs allege that landowners 

face “immediate costs and immense pressure to settle due to 

the County’s issuance of ruinous fines unsupported by any 

legitimate governmental interest, its refusal to drop baseless 

charges, its undue delay in providing hearings, its denial of 

permits while abatements are pending, and the cost the 

County imposes to prove one’s innocence.”

In October 2022, Plaintiffs filed this action on behalf of 

themselves and others similarly situated in the district court. 

As relevant here, Plaintiffs allege that the County’s system 

of administrative penalties and fees with respect to cannabis 

abatement violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 

Amendment. After Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, 

the County moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The County also requested 

judicial notice of over 500 pages of documents, which the 

court granted.

3

3 Plaintiffs assert that the district court improperly relied on facts it took 

from documents it judicially noticed. Because Plaintiffs’ allegations in 

their amended complaint are sufficient to conclude that their claim is 

justiciable, we do not address the propriety of the district court’s judicialnotice ruling.

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10 THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT

The district court granted the County’s motion to 

dismiss. The district court reasoned that “the [Complaint 

was] overwhelmingly dominated by legal arguments 

couched as factual allegations, unreasonable inferences, 

unwarranted deductions, conclusory assertions, unjustified 

labels, and hyperbole.” With respect to the Plaintiffs’ claim 

under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 

the district court concluded first that Plaintiffs’ claim was

not justiciable because Plaintiffs lacked standing and the 

claim was unripe, and second that their claim was untimely. 

This appeal followed.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

Dismissals under Rule 12(b)(1) are reviewed de novo. See 

Erickson v. Desert Palace, Inc., 942 F.2d 694, 694 (9th Cir. 

1991). “[W]hen standing is challenged on the basis of the 

pleadings, we accept as true all material allegations of the 

complaint, and . . . construe the complaint in favor of the 

complaining party.” Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 

7 (1988) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is also reviewed de 

novo. See Moore v. Mars Petcare US, Inc., 966 F.3d 1007, 

1016 (9th Cir. 2020). At the motion to dismiss stage, “[a]ll 

allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken as true 

and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.” Id.

(citing Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 937 

(9th Cir. 2008)).

III. Discussion

The district court determined that Plaintiffs’ claim under 

the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment was 

not justiciable as well as untimely. We therefore first 

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THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT 11

determine whether Plaintiffs’ claim is justiciable—

specifically, that at least one named plaintiff in the putative 

class has standing to bring such a claim and that the claim is 

ripe—and then determine whether the claim is timely.

4 We 

then consider whether Plaintiffs plausibly allege that the 

County’s system of administrative penalties and fees 

violates the Eighth Amendment. For the reasons below, we 

conclude that (1) at least one plaintiff has standing and their 

claim is ripe; (2) with one exception, Plaintiffs’ claims are 

timely; and (3) Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a violation 

of the Excessive Fines Clause.

A. Standing and Ripeness

The County contends that the Excessive Fines Clause 

claim is not ripe because Plaintiffs have yet to pay a fine. 

The district court, for the same reason, held that all Plaintiffs 

lacked an injury-in-fact under Article III. We conclude that 

Plaintiffs’ claim is indeed ripe and that they have suffered a

cognizable injury.

5

“[S]tanding is an essential and unchanging part of the 

case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. 

Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Its “injury in 

fact” prong requires a plaintiff to demonstrate an “invasion 

of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and 

particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 

hypothetical.” Id. at 560 (cleaned up). A related doctrine, 

ripeness, is “drawn both from Article III limitations on 

4 See Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(en banc) (“In a class action, standing is satisfied if at least one named 

plaintiff meets the requirements.”).

5 Because the County argues—as the district court determined—only that 

the allegations in the amended complaint do not establish that they have 

suffered any injury, we focus on the injury-in-fact prong of standing.

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12 THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT

judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to 

exercise jurisdiction.” Reno v. Cath. Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 

U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993). The ripeness doctrine is designed 

to “separate matters that are premature for review because 

the injury is speculative and may never occur from those 

cases that are appropriate for federal court action.” Portman 

v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1993)

(citation omitted). As a result, “[t]he constitutional 

component of the ripeness inquiry is often treated under the 

rubric of standing and, in many cases, ripeness coincides 

squarely with standing’s injury in fact prong.” Thomas v. 

Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (en banc). In addition, the ripeness doctrine has 

a prudential aspect “guided by two overarching 

considerations: the fitness of the issues for judicial decision 

and the hardship to the parties of withholding court 

consideration.” Id. at 1141 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted).6

Here, in arguing that Plaintiffs’ alleged injury is 

speculative because the fines have not yet been paid, the 

County effectively challenges Plaintiffs’ ability to 

demonstrate an actual injury as well as ripeness. See 

Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(“Whether framed as an issue of standing or ripeness, the 

inquiry is largely the same: whether the issues presented are 

6 The Supreme Court has “cast doubt on the prudential component of 

ripeness in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, [573 U.S. 149 (2014)].” 

Safer Chems., Healthy Fams. v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 943 F.3d 397, 

412 n.8 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Clark v. City of Seattle, 899 F.3d 802, 

809 n.4 (9th Cir. 2018)). Nonetheless, we consider the issue for the sake 

of thoroughness.

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THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT 13

‘definite and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract.’” 

(quoting Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1139).

To begin, the Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive 

bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 

cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. 

amend. VIII. Although we have not previously considered 

constitutional ripeness and the actual injury requirement in 

the context of the Excessive Fines Clause, we have

addressed the issue in other cases involving the Eighth 

Amendment. For example, in 18 Unnamed John Smith 

Prisoners v. Meese, 871 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1989), we

considered whether a correctional facility’s decision to 

“double bunk” inmate-participants in the Department of 

Justice’s Witness Protection Program constituted infliction 

of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment. Id. at 882. In so doing, we recognized that 

“[o]ne does not have to await the consummation of 

threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If the injury is 

certainly impending, that is enough.” Id. at 883 (alteration 

in original) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. 

Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581 (1985)). We nonetheless held that 

the inmates’ Eighth Amendment claim was too speculative 

because (1) there was “no evidence of a concrete injury 

caused by actual overcrowding, intolerable 

conditions, . . . and the like,” and (2) we could not 

“conjecture with any reasonable measure of assurance what 

impact the proposed double bunking would have on the 

inmates.” Id. In other words, the inmates’ claims involved 

“contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, 

or indeed not occur at all.” Id.

Here, by contrast, the factors identified in 18 Unnamed 

John Smith Prisoners counsel in favor of actual injury and 

constitutional ripeness. First, there are clear and concrete 

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14 THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT

injuries stemming from the imposition of the penalties. 

Taking Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true and drawing all 

reasonable inferences in their favor, the continued

imposition of such significant penalties7 has already caused 

Plaintiffs emotional and psychological distress. Plaintiffs 

also allege significant financial uncertainty because of these 

penalties, which the County does not dispute. These alleged

injuries are sufficiently concrete to confer standing and 

establish that Plaintiffs’ claim is ripe. See Chaudhry v. City 

of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1109 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(recognizing emotional distress as a concrete and cognizable

injury); Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 

2017) (holding that allegations of “anxiety, stress, concern, 

and/or worry about [the plaintiff’s] diminished employment 

prospects” presented concrete, cognizable injuries); 

Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 

2010) (holding that “generalized anxiety and stress” can be

sufficient to confer standing). Plaintiffs also allege that in 

the face of continuously imposed fines, they have spent 

money attempting to abate the violations by hiring engineers 

to inspect their property as well as attorneys to defend them 

in hearings. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 

U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013) (recognizing standing where there 

is “a substantial risk that the harm will occur, which may 

prompt plaintiffs to reasonably incur costs to mitigate or 

avoid that harm”) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted)).

Second, unlike in 18 Unnamed John Smith Prisoners, we

can determine with reasonable certainty the impact of the

penalties on Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege that the County 

7 At the upper end, Plaintiffs allege that the penalties imposed by the 

County can reach millions of dollars.

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THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT 15

holds new owners responsible for violations and 

corresponding fines that were based on a prior owner’s 

conduct. The amounts of the daily penalties are readily 

ascertainable from the number of days that have passed since 

the original imposition date. There is an objectively 

reasonable likelihood that these substantial penalties, which 

have already been imposed, financially burden Plaintiffs 

because Plaintiffs will have to pay them in full or settle with 

the County to avoid paying penalties they cannot afford. 

Thus, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a concrete injury, 

and their Eighth Amendment claim is ripe.8

Decisions from our sister circuits addressing 

constitutional ripeness under the Excessive Fines Clause 

support our conclusion. The leading case is Cheffer v. Reno, 

55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995), which relied on our decision 

in 18 Unnamed John Smith Prisoners to conclude that 

“challenges under the Excessive Fines Clause 

are . . . generally not ripe until the actual, or impending, 

8 In reaching the opposite conclusion, the district court relied on several 

other reasons purportedly demonstrating that Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries 

were too speculative. For example, the court suggested that certain 

plaintiffs—specifically, Corinne and Doug Thomas—did not have 

standing because the previous owners of their properties were named as 

responsible parties, not the Thomases. Although the NOV attached to 

the Thomases’ land was addressed to the previous owners, the Thomases 

specifically allege that, even after contacting the County and informing 

them that they were the new owners, the County has nonetheless held 

them responsible for the penalties. Moreover, the County Code itself 

defines a “Responsible Party” as “Any Owner, Beneficial Owner, [or] 

person . . . who has caused, permitted, maintained, conducted or 

otherwise allowed a Violation to occur.” HCC § 352-3(s) (emphasis 

added). Based on this information, and drawing all reasonable

inferences in the Thomases’ favor, the Thomases have plausibly alleged

that the penalties were directed at them.

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16 THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT

imposition of the challenged fine.” Id. at 1523 (emphasis 

added); cf. Club Madonna, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 924 

F.3d 1370, 1381 (11th Cir. 2019) (agreeing that a claim is 

not ripe because the plaintiff “does not allege that the City 

imposed a fine under that provision or that the imposition of 

a fine is immediately forthcoming”). Under this standard, 

Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim is ripe. Under the plain 

terms of the County Code, the penalties have been imposed. 

See HCC § 352-3(m).

Moreover, the very reason the court in Cheffer found the 

claim unripe is not at issue here. In Cheffer, the plaintiffs 

alleged that they “may be arrested and convicted under [the 

relevant statute] and, if so, that they may be subject to the 

maximum imprisonment and civil penalties.” 55 F.3d at 

1524 (emphases added). As a result, the Eleventh Circuit 

concluded that the plaintiffs’ “allegations amount[ed] to 

mere speculation about contingent future events.” Id. Here, 

by contrast, Plaintiffs allege that they have been charged 

with violating the County Code, the daily fine has

automatically accrued, and the County has reiterated on 

multiple occasions that Plaintiffs are responsible for paying 

the fine, thereby reducing the speculative nature of their 

injury.

In response, the County raises two arguments. First, the 

County suggests that the availability of an appeal hearing to 

contest the violation, before any penalty must be paid, 

indicates that Plaintiffs’ allegations about the penalty

“amount to mere speculation about contingent future 

events.” Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1524. And second, the County 

suggests that the authority of a hearing officer and other 

administrative and judicial officers to reduce a penalty 

underscores the contingent nature of the penalties. These 

arguments are unconvincing.

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THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT 17

First, these arguments cannot change the fact that, by the 

time a responsible party obtains an administrative hearing—

which, as Plaintiffs allege, can take years—the penalty will 

already have been imposed. And, unless a hearing is 

requested within ten days of service of the NOV, there will 

be no administrative review before the penalty becomes 

collectable. See HCC § 352-8(l)(i).

Second, given Plaintiffs’ numerous allegations that the 

County has found them responsible and will not remove the 

penalties, there are fewer possible contingencies that could

render Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries speculative. See In re 

Coleman, 560 F.3d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 2009) (“But plan 

completion is a single factual contingency—not a ‘series of 

contingencies’ rendering the decision ‘impermissibly 

speculative.’” (quoting Portland Police Ass’n v. City of 

Portland, 658 F.2d 1272, 1273-74 (9th Cir. 1981))). 

Plaintiffs do not need to demonstrate that it is “literally 

certain” that the harms they identify will materialize; 

therefore, the mere possibility that a hearing officer could 

determine that the penalties imposed were not warranted 

does not render Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries speculative. 

Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414 n.5.

Third, assuming that a hearing officer does not terminate 

the proceedings, the officer’s discretion to reduce any 

penalties is limited. Indeed, according to the County Code, 

the hearing officer cannot reduce the penalty below the 

minimum amount set by the Code for the category of 

violation. HCC § 352-12(b). Here, cannabis-related 

offenses are classified as Category Four violations and carry 

a minimum penalty of $6,000 per day. Id. § 352-6. And 

because Plaintiffs allege that even this minimum amount is 

excessive, the hearing officer’s discretionary authority to

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18 THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT

reduce the fine to that amount does not make Plaintiffs’ 

injuries contingent on the hearing officer’s decisions.

9

And fourth, as a factual matter, Plaintiffs’ allegations 

cast doubt on the impartiality of the hearing officers. Indeed, 

Plaintiffs allege that the hearing officers are biased, such that 

Plaintiffs seem all but certain to face the penalty, even if they 

pursue an administrative hearing.

Our conclusion that Plaintiffs have standing to challenge 

the penalties already imposed upon them—but before 

payment—aligns with our precedents in other preenforcement standing and ripeness cases. In Los Angeles 

Haven Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius, the plaintiff “was the object 

of [a] governmental action,” specifically, “an individualized 

demand for repayment of over $2.3 million.” 638 F.3d 644, 

655 (9th Cir. 2011). We held that this alone was sufficient 

to establish a concrete injury. Id.; see Susan B. Anthony List, 

573 U.S. at 159 (recognizing that a “plaintiff satisfies the 

injury-in-fact requirement” where “‘there exists a credible 

threat’” that the government will enforce the challenged law

(quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 

U.S. 289, 298 (1979)); see also Babbitt, 422 U.S. at 298 

(recognizing that plaintiffs “should not be required to await 

and undergo criminal prosecution as the sole means to 

seeking relief” (quotation omitted)). Similarly, in Hotel 

Employees & Restaurant Employees International Union v. 

Nevada Gaming Commission, we held that “[w]here the 

9 The County points to cases where courts have reduced fines, citing for 

example County of Humboldt v. Appellate Division of Superior Court, 

46 Cal. App. 5th 298, 304-05 (2020). As Plaintiffs argue, however,

“[t]hat a court went beyond the text of the law to reduce mandatory fines 

worth more than a property’s value does not preclude Plaintiffs from 

bringing an Eighth Amendment challenge to the penalties they face.”

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THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT 19

agency has threatened enforcement, the actual 

commencement of administrative enforcement proceedings 

is not necessary” to establish ripeness for a facial challenge 

to a regulatory system. 984 F.2d 1507, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) 

(citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conserv. 

& Dev. Comm’n., 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983)); see also

Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431, 

1435 (9th Cir. 1996) (similar).

Finally, prudential ripeness considerations also counsel 

in favor of allowing the litigation to proceed. As we

observed in Engquist, prudential “[r]ipeness analysis has 

two prongs: the fitness of the issue for judicial review and 

the hardship to the parties if review is withheld.” Engquist 

v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 1000 n.11 (9th Cir. 

2007), aff’d 553 U.S. 591 (2008). With respect to the 

“fitness” prong, we concluded that the constitutional 

challenges in that case “easily satisf[ied] both prongs of the 

ripeness test, as the issues presented are purely legal and 

delay will cause unnecessary hardship.” Id. Here, the issues 

are also purely legal, and at the motion to dismiss stage, we 

take the allegations in the amended complaint as true.

Likewise, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that delay 

in adjudication will cause hardship. For example, Plaintiffs 

allege that the County’s conduct has resulted in such 

coercive force that several of the named plaintiffs have 

needed to “modify [their] behavior to avoid future adverse 

consequences.” Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 

523 U.S. 726, 734 (1998). Plaintiffs also allege that the 

County has used and will continue to impose penalties to 

coerce putative class members into undesirable settlements. 

Plaintiffs finally allege that the unique nature of this 

administrative penalty scheme causes even more fines and 

administrative fees to accrue over time. Cf. id. at 733 

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20 THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT

(suggesting that hardship can be demonstrated when the 

provisions challenged “subject [the plaintiffs] to any civil or 

criminal liability”).

In sum, taking Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true and 

drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor, they have 

plausibly alleged a concrete injury as a result of the County’s 

imposition of penalties, even before any payment. We 

therefore conclude that Plaintiffs’ claim under the Excessive 

Fines Clause is ripe.

B. Timeliness

“Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of 

limitations.” Flynt v. Shimazu, 940 F.3d 457, 461 (9th Cir. 

2019) (quoting Butler v. Nat’l Comm. Renaissance of Cal., 

766 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014)). “Instead, claims 

brought under § 1983 are subject to the forum state’s statute 

of limitations for personal injury suits.” Id. (citation 

omitted). In California, “the relevant period is two years.” 

Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1). “Although state 

law determines the length of the limitations period, federal 

law determines when a civil rights claim accrues.” Knox v. 

Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). “A claim may be 

dismissed as untimely pursuant to a 12(b)(6) motion only 

when the running of the statute of limitations is apparent on 

the face of the complaint.” United States ex rel. Air Control 

Techs., Inc. v. Pre Con Indus., Inc., 720 F.3d 1174, 1178 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). The district court concluded that 

both Plaintiffs’ facial and as-applied Eighth Amendment 

claims were untimely. We disagree.

First, the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ 

facial challenge because it was not brought within two years 

of the law’s enactment. The district court reasoned under 

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THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT 21

Action Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control 

Bd., 509 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2007), that all facial challenges 

against a local ordinance must be brought within two years 

of its enactment. As Plaintiffs correctly argue, however, we 

expressly rejected such a reading in Scheer v. Kelly, 817 F.3d 

1183, 1187 (9th Cir. 2016). There, we recognized that 

Action Apartment Ass’n, Inc. applied only in the context of 

injury to property where “the very enactment of the statute 

[at issue] has reduced the value of the property or has 

effected a transfer of a property interest.” Id. (quoting 

Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1119 (9th Cir. 

2010) (en banc)). By contrast, the statute of limitations 

begins to run on a claim (whether facial or as-applied) when 

a plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the actual 

injury,” not when the challenged ordinance was enacted. Id.

at 1188 (quoting Lukovsky v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 

535 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008)).

At the earliest, Plaintiffs’ facial claim under the 

Excessive Fines Clause began to run when they received 

NOVs, the earliest point at which they could have known of 

the penalties at issue. Because at least some plaintiffs, for 

example the Thomases, allege they received their initial 

NOVs within two years of filing suit, we reverse the district 

court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ facial challenge as untimely.

Second, several of the named Plaintiffs appear to have 

timely as-applied challenges. The Thomases allege that they 

received their initial NOVs within the limitations period, so 

their as-applied challenge is timely. Although Rhonda 

Olson alleges that she received her initial NOVs shortly 

before the limitations period, she could nonetheless 

demonstrate timeliness in several ways. For example, 

because the NOVs were addressed to a different property 

owner, she may be able to prove that she did not know or 

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22 THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT

have reason to know she was subject to these penalties until 

later. The running of the statute of limitations is thus not 

apparent on the face of the complaint. See Air Control 

Techs., 720 F.3d at 1178.

Additionally, even assuming that Olson should have 

known of her injury when she received the initial NOVs, the 

County continued to impose penalties associated with those 

NOVs during the limitations period. “When the continued 

enforcement of a statute inflicts a continuing or repeated 

harm, a new claim arises (and a new limitation period 

commences) with each new injury.” Flynt, 940 F.3d at 462. 

In the excessive fines context, each imposition of a 

challenged fine is a new, distinct injury. See U.S. Const. 

amend. VIII (prohibiting “excessive fines imposed” 

(emphasis added)); cf. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002) (“Each discrete 

discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges 

alleging that act.”). Because Olson alleges that the County 

imposed penalties on her well into the limitations period, and 

each imposition was a new unlawful act, Olson’s as-applied 

challenge is not time-barred.

Finally, Olson may be able to prove that she was subject 

to a distinct unlawful act when, within the limitations period, 

the County issued a new NOV in her name, reimposing 

penalties after she disputed their basis. “Rather than being 

the inevitable consequence of an earlier decision [to issue the 

initial NOV], this decision [to issue a new NOV] was 

[plausibly] the result of ‘independent consideration,’” and is 

therefore separately actionable. RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of 

Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1061 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Knox, 

260 F.3d at 1014). We reverse the district court’s dismissal 

of the Thomases’s and Olson’s as-applied claims as 

untimely.

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THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT 23

Plaintiff Cyro Glad’s as-applied Eighth Amendment 

claim, however, appears to be untimely, even reading his 

complaint with the required liberality. Glad received his 

initial NOV nearly four years before this suit was filed and

no daily penalties were imposed within the limitations 

period. Further, the NOV he received was addressed to him, 

so there is little question that he knew or should have known

he was subject to the penalties at the time he received the 

NOV and for the ninety days during which daily penalties 

were imposed. While Glad may continue to face the 

coercive effects of the heavy penalties, that is not enough to 

make his as-applied claim timely. See, e.g., Garcia v. 

Brockway, 526 F.3d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A] 

continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful 

acts, not by continual ill effects from an original violation.”

(quoting Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 

1981)). We therefore affirm the district court’s order 

dismissing Glad’s as-applied excessive fines claim as 

untimely.

C. Plausible Claim

Next, we turn to whether Plaintiffs allege a plausible 

claim for relief under the Excessive Fines Clause.10

Notably, our court has extended the protections of the 

Excessive Fines Clause to local penalties, fines, and fees. 

See Pimentel v. City of Los Angeles (“Pimentel I”), 974 F.3d 

917, 922 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Pimentel v. City of Los 

10 The district court did not address whether Plaintiffs had alleged a 

plausible claim under the Excessive Fines Clause. Because our review 

is de novo and the issue is purely legal, we exercise our discretion to 

address it in the first instance. See AMA Multimedia, LLC v. Wanat, 970 

F.3d 1201, 1214 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 

850, 868 (9th Cir. 2007)).

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24 THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT

Angeles (“Pimentel II”), 115 F.4th 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 

2024). “To determine whether a fine is grossly 

disproportional to the underlying offense, four factors are 

considered: (1) the nature and extent of the underlying 

offense; (2) whether the underlying offense related to other 

illegal activities; (3) whether other penalties may be imposed 

for the offense; and (4) the extent of the harm caused by the 

offense.” Pimentel I, 974 F.3d at 921. We conclude that 

Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the County’s system of 

administrative penalties and fees violates the Excessive 

Fines Clause.

Plaintiffs allege that the penalties are clearly punitive, 

not remedial as argued by the County. As Plaintiffs allege, 

administrative penalties imposed by the County can reach 

millions of dollars. In the case of Olson, for example, the 

imposed penalty dwarfs the value of her property. And even 

if the penalties serve some remedial purpose, the Supreme 

Court has rejected, on a similar basis, the argument that such 

penalties are not punitive. See United States v. Bajakajian, 

524 U.S. 321, 329 (1998) (“Although the Government has 

asserted a loss of information regarding the amount of 

currency leaving the country, that loss would not be 

remedied by the . . . confiscation of respondent’s 

$357,144.”); see also Pimentel II, 115 F.4th at 1067 (noting 

that only “purely remedial sanctions” are not subject to 

Eighth Amendment scrutiny).

With respect to the four factors identified in Pimentel, 

Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the fines at issue here 

are excessive. To assess the first factor, “[c]ourts typically 

look to the [alleged] violator’s culpability.” Pimentel I, 974 

F.3d at 922. That is, “if culpability is low, the nature and 

extent of [their] violation is minimal.” Id. “It is critical, 

though, that the court review the specific actions of the 

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THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT 25

violator rather than by taking an abstract view of the 

violation.” Id. Here, the underlying offense is a property 

offense related to cannabis cultivation. More importantly, 

and considering the specific actions of the alleged violators, 

the amended complaint alleges that at least some of the 

plaintiffs have been charged with County Code violations 

that pre-date their occupation of their respective properties.

At the time of their purchase and since then, Plaintiffs allege 

that the property was not used and has not been used for any 

cannabis cultivation or operation. In such cases, the nature 

and extent of the alleged violations are minimal. Indeed, 

even if plaintiffs like Olson were aware that the property had 

some past association with cannabis cultivation, Olson 

alleges that she was not aware of outstanding County Code 

violations because the County—contrary to the Code—

failed to record the violations against the properties. HCC 

§ 352-4(c).

Turning to the remaining factors, the second factor—

“whether the underlying offense relates to other illegal 

activities”—supports Plaintiffs, even if the underlying 

offense is related to cannabis cultivation. Pimentel I, 974 

F.3d at 923. Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that such 

violations are either inaccurately charged or the fault of 

previous property owners. Likewise, the third factor—

“whether other penalties may be imposed for the 

violation”—weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor, as the permitting 

violations would carry a smaller fine if not for the tenuous 

nexus to cannabis, elevating the violations to Category 4 

violations. Id. Moreover, it seems clear to us that lesser 

penalties could accomplish the same health and safety goals,

and the County offers no reason to infer otherwise. And 

finally, as to the fourth factor, the “extent of the harm caused 

by the violation,” Plaintiffs have alleged that the offenses 

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26 THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT

here have caused no harm beyond a technical lack of 

compliance with the County’s cannabis permitting 

regulations. Id. As Plaintiffs argue on appeal, “[Olson] 

faces millions in penalties for what is now an empty field.

No harm to the community justifies those penalties.” See 

also Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 340 (noting the absence of an 

“articulable correlation to any injury suffered by the 

government”); Pimentel II, 115 F.4th at 1072 (requiring the 

City to “provide some evidence that the penalty amount was 

actually tethered to the nature and extent of the harm caused 

by nonpayment”).

In addition, Plaintiffs have alleged that the County’s 

demolition orders are unconstitutionally excessive penalties. 

Importantly, the Eighth Amendment covers civil penalties 

like the demolition orders at issue here. See Austin v. United 

States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993) (observing that “a civil 

sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial 

purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving 

either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment” 

(quotation omitted)). Indeed, the removal of structures on a 

property owner’s land is effectively an in rem forfeiture. See

Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146, 154 (2019) (“[C]ivil in rem 

forfeitures fall within the Clause’s protection when they are 

at least partially punitive.” (citation omitted)). 

The County argues that “[a]batement of unlawful and 

potentially unsafe structures (like an unpermitted and 

uninspected tunnel under a [building]) is remedial, not 

punitive.” Plaintiffs respond that the demolition orders also 

“serve to punish and deter unpermitted cannabis 

cultivation.” Although a closer question than the imposition 

of penalties, taking Plaintiffs’ allegations as true and 

drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor, the 

demolition orders are at least partly punitive. Plaintiffs 

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THOMAS V. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT 27

allege that the orders target otherwise lawful structures 

simply because they once had a nexus to illegal cannabis 

cultivation, regardless of their effects on public health and 

safety. In the absence of other justifications, it is plausible 

that the demolition orders—and the significant expenses 

they pose to owners—serve, at least in part, to punish and 

deter unpermitted cannabis cultivation. Thus, for the same 

reasons as the penalties, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that 

the demolition orders violate the Excessive Fines Clause.

IV. Conclusion

Local governments are often at the forefront of 

addressing difficult and complex issues. As a consequence, 

they undoubtedly require flexibility in their decisionmaking. Nonetheless, and as we have recently observed, 

“[t]he government cannot overstep its authority and impose 

fines on its citizens without paying heed to the limits posed 

by the Eighth Amendment.” Pimentel I, 974 F.3d at 925. 

With this important caveat in mind, and for the foregoing 

reasons, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of 

Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED in part, AFFIRMED in part, and

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

Appellants shall recover their costs on appeal.

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