Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-05-00501/USCOURTS-ca10-05-00501-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Office Depot, Inc.
Petitioner
Romia Pritchett
Respondent

Document Text:

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

PUBLISH APR 11 2005 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ROMIA PRITCHETT, 

on behalf of himself and all other 

individuals similarly situated, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

V. 

OFFICE DEPOT, INC., 

Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 05-0501 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 05-MK-392 (PAC)) 

Darren E. Nadel, Joshua B. Kirkpatrick, John A. Ybarra, and Allan G. King, 

Littler Mendelson, P.C. , Denver, CO, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Joseph J. Zonies, Kritzer/Zonies LLC, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before EBEL, O'BRIEN and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

This case presents a question of first impression: Whether the removal 

provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 

4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (hereinafter "Class Action Fairness 

Appellate Case: 05-501 Document: 010110533938 Date Filed: 08/18/2005 Page: 1
Act" or "the Act"), apply to pending state court cases that were removed after the 

effective date of the Act. On March 18, 2005, we entered an order in this case 

holding that the Act does not apply to pending state cases and denying 

Defendant's Petition for Leave to Appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

We now issue this opinion explaining the reasoning for that order. 

I. Background 

On April 2, 2003, Plaintiff-Appellee Romia Pritchett, acting on behalf of 

himself and all others similarly situated, filed a class action complaint against 

Defendant-Appellant Office Depot, Inc. in the Colorado District Court for the 

County of Denver. Plaintiff, an assistant store manager at an Office Depot retail 

store, alleged that Defendant violated Colorado law by regularly requiring its 

employees to work extra hours without paying overtime. On June 21, 2004, the 

state court certified a class pursuant to Rule 23 of the Colorado Rules of Civil 

Procedure consisting of "[a]ll Assistant Store Managers employed by Office 

Depot, Inc . in the State of Colorado from April 2, 2000. " Trial was set for March 

14, 2005 and discovery commenced. 

Approximately one month before the start of trial, on February 18, 2005 , 

Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act. 119 Stat. at 4. One of the most 

significant features of the new law was that it expanded the subject matter 

jurisdiction of federal courts over class actions in which at least one plaintiff 

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class member was diverse in citizenship from the defendant and where the amount 

in controversy exceeded $5 million. See § 4, 119 Stat. at 9-12 ( codified at 28 

U.S.C. § 1332( d)). If such an action arose in state court, Section 5 of the Act 

permitted removal to federal court in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1446. § 5, 119 

Stat. at 12-13 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1453). 

On March 1, 2005, just two weeks before trial was scheduled to begin, 

Defendant removed this action to the United States District Court for the District 

of Colorado, utilizing the newly-enacted provisions in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d) and 

1453 as a basis for jurisdiction. On March 7, 2005, Plaintiff moved to remand the 

proceedings to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447, arguing that the Class 

Action Fairness Act of 2005 did not apply to actions already pending in state 

courts. The district court agreed, and on March 9, 2005, remanded the case to the 

state court. 

On March 10, 2005 , with trial only four days away, Defendant requested a 

stay in proceedings from the state court so that it could appeal the district court's 

remand order. The state court denied the request and instead delayed the start 

date of the trial one week, to March 21 , 2005. 

On March 14, 2005, Defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal the 

district court's remand order with this court and also filed a motion for an 

emergency stay of the state court proceedings pending appeal. On March 18, 

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2005, we denied the petition for leave to appeal for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction in a brief order and indicated that further elaboration would follow. 1 

That order also dismissed the motion for an emergency stay as moot. We now 

issue this opinion to explain the court's reasoning in the aforementioned order. 

II. Jurisdiction 

Defendant filed its petition for leave to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c), 

which was recently enacted as part of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. § 5, 

119 Stat. at 12. Section 1453( c) is a provision that expressly gives the United 

States courts of appeals discretionary jurisdiction to consider appeals of remand 

orders in certain class action cases specified in the Act, provided that the appeal 

is taken within seven days of the remand order. 28 U.S.C. § 1453( c)(l ). If a 

court of appeals accepts an appeal under subsection ( c )( 1 ), the appellate court is 

given sixty additional days during which to render its judgment. 28 U .S.C. § 

1453(c)(2). 

Here, the petition for leave to appeal was filed well within the seven-day 

time limit, and jurisdiction vested in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals at that 

time. Although we ultimately conclude that we do not have jurisdiction over this 

appeal predicated on the Class Action Fairness Act because this action was 

1

In the order, we stated that Defendant's petition for leave to appeal arose 

under "28 U.S.C. 31453(c)." The statutory citation should have read "28 U.S.C. § 

1453(c)." 

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commenced prior to the effective date of the Act, federal courts always have 

jurisdiction to consider their own jurisdiction. Combs v. Price Waterhouse 

Coopers LLP, 382 F .3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2004). Thus, we have jurisdiction 

to consider our jurisdiction to grant the requested relief in the instant case. 

III. Effective date of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) 

Section 9 of the Act provides that: 

The amendments made by this Act shall apply to any civil action 

commenced on or after the date of enactment of this Act. 

119 Stat. at 14. The date of enactment of the Act is February 18, 2005. Id. at 4. 

This class action began on April 2, 2003 when Plaintiff filed his class action 

complaint with the Colorado District Court. Defendant removed the case to 

federal court on March 1, 2005. Thus, the applicability of the Act turns upon 

whether this civil action was "commenced" on April 2, 2003 (the state court filing 

date), or on March 1, 2005 (the federal court removal date). 

Defendant claims that the case was commenced for purposes of the Act 

when it was removed to federal court. In essence, Defendant argues that when a 

preexisting state action is removed to federal court, it is "commenced" in federal 

court as of the date of removal. Plaintiff argues that the class action commenced 

just once, when it was initially filed in state court on April 2, 2003. Because that 

date precedes the effective date of the statute, according to Plaintiff, this case is 

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not governed by the Act. We agree with Plaintiff's reading of the word 

"commenced." 

Our analysis is governed by traditional rules of statutory construction and 

rules pertaining to federal jurisdiction. Therefore, we look first to the language 

of the statute, which reads as follows: 

The amendments made by this Act shall apply to any civil action 

commenced on or after the date of enactment of this Act. 

§ 9, 119 Stat. at 14. Traditionally, a cause of action is commenced when it is first 

brought in an appropriate court, which here was when it was brought in state 

court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint 

with the court."). When a matter is removed to federal court, it is not 

traditionally viewed as recommenced, nor as a new cause of action. See Kieffer 

v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 398,401 (D. Md. 1958) ("[W]e do not 

usually think of an action as having been commenced in a district court by 

removal."); 14B Charles A. Wright, et£!l_, Federal Practice & Procedure§ 3721, 

at 302 (3d ed. 1998) (noting that removal jurisdiction is unique because it allows 

a federal court to hear a claim over which it has no original subject matter 

jurisdiction and therefore to adjudicate a suit that could never have been 

"commenced" there). Although there exist some unique circumstances in which 

some action other than filing a complaint in court is deemed to "commence" a 

lawsuit, see, e.g., Meisel v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 204 F. Supp. 2d 684, 

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687-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that action under the Administrative Procedure 

Act may be commenced by filing a miscellaneous discovery motion), we view 

these situations as exceptions to the general federal rule that a lawsuit is 

commenced at a discrete moment in time: the filing of the original complaint in a 

court of competent jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3. Of course, some states 

provide that service of process may commence a suit. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. 

§ 52-45a (2003). 

We then look to presumptions that might aid our analysis. It is wellestablished that statutes conferring jurisdiction upon the federal courts, and 

particularly removal statutes, are to be narrowly construed in light of our 

constitutional role as limited tribunals. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 

U.S. 100, 108-109 (1941); United States ex rel. King v. Hillcrest Health Ctr., 264 

F.3d 1271, 1280 (10th Cir. 2001). Thus, if there is ambiguity as to whether the 

instant statute confers federal jurisdiction over this case, we are compelled to 

adopt a reasonable, narrow construction. Here, we find Plaintiff's interpretation 

of the word "commenced" in the Act to be such a construction. 2 

2

We also note that courts apply a presumption against the retroactivity of a 

statute absent a clear congressional intent to the contrary. Landgraf v. USI Film 

Prods., Inc., 511 U.S. 244,280 (1994). However, here, Defendant is not arguing 

for retroactivity in the true sense of the word, where the events giving rise to 

liability occurred prior to the enactment of a statute. See id. Rather, Defendant 

argues that the operative act, removal, occurred after the effective date of the 

( continued ... ) 

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Finally, we turn to legislative history. Although legislative history is 

sometimes suspect as a persuasive interpretative tool, here the progression of 

language in the Act as it moved through Congress is instructive. When the Act 

was originally introduced in the House, the removal provision applied both to 

cases "commenced" on or after the enactment date and to cases in which a class 

certification order is entered on or after the enactment date. See H.R. 516, 109th 

Cong. § 7 (2005). In contrast, neither the Senate version of the bill nor the final 

statute passed by both houses of Congress provided for removal of actions 

certified on or after the enactment date. See S. 5, 109th Cong.§ 9 (2005); § 9, 

119 Stat. at 14. The Senate version and the final statute provided only for 

application of the Class Action Fairness Act to civil actions "commenced" on or 

after the date of the Act. S. 5; § 9, 110 Stat. at 14. It is thus clear that Congress 

initially started out with broader language that could have included a number of 

then-pending lawsuits in state courts. By excising the House provision, Congress 

signaled an intent to narrow the removal provisions of the Act to exclude 

currently pending suits. 3 

2

( • •• continued) 

statute and therefore that the statute applies prospectively. Since Defendant is not 

raising a traditional retroactivity argument, we will not engage in a Landgraf 

analysis. 

3

Both sides have tried to draw support for their positions by comparing the 

language in the Act to comparable language in earlier amendments to the federal 

( continued .. . ) 

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Further, we note that the Congressional Record contains two statements 

from sponsoring legislators indicating that the bill was not designed to apply to 

currently pending lawsuits. See 151 Cong. Rec. S 1080 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) 

(statement of Sen . Dodd) ("[The Act] does not apply retroactively, despite those 

who wanted it to. A case filed before the date of enactment will be unaffected by 

3( ... continued) 

diversity statutes where Congress pegged the effective date provision to 

commencement or removal of an action. However, we do not find those statutes 

particularly helpful here because the language in those earlier statutes cuts both 

ways. For example, when Congress increased the amount-in-controversy 

requirement for diversity jurisdiction from $500 to $2,000, it provided that the 

new law would not "affect the jurisdiction over or disposition of any suit removed 

from the court of any State, or suit commenced in any court of the United States, 

before the passage hereof .... " Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433,437 

( emphasis added). Similarly, Sections 202(b) and 203(b) of the Judicial 

Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 

(1988), which deal with citizenship for diversity purposes of multinational 

corporations, representative parties, and resident aliens, each contain effective 

date provisions applying that act to any "civil action commenced in or removed 

to" to federal court. 

One could argue that because Congress refers only to commencement of a 

suit in some effective date provisions and to commencement or removal in others, 

the two terms are not synonymous. On the other hand, the statutes that refer both 

to commencement and removal limit the "commencement" event to 

commencement of an action in the federal court, which could not be construed to 

include commencement in a state court. Hence, one could argue that Congress in 

those statutes needed to add another jurisdictionally triggering event-removal to 

federal court-that was not necessary here, where the triggering event is the more 

general language of commencement of "any civil action." This more general 

language is arguably broad enough to include actions commenced in state court. 

Because the language from analogous earlier statutes could plausibly support both 

Plaintiff's and Defendant's positions, its relevance to our analysis is substantially 

marginalized. 

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any provision of this legislation."); 151 Cong. Rec. H753 ( daily ed. Feb. 17, 

2005) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) ("Since the legislation is not retroactive, it 

would have absolutely no effect on the 75 class actions already filed against 

Merck in the wake of the Vioxx withdrawal."). 4 Ordinarily, individual floor 

statements are entitled to little weight, but here, where they are consistent with 

and cast light upon the meaning of a specific change in the language between an 

earlier version of the bill and the final Act, the statements confirm our 

construction of the Act. 

IV. Prior precedent 

Defendant argues that there are several district court opinions that adopt its 

broader view of commencement. See Lorraine Motors, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 

Co., 166 F. Supp. 319, 323-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1958) (holding that an action is 

"commenced" on the removal date for purposes of applying a higher amount-incontroversy requirement); Hunt v. Transport Indem. Ins. Co., No. 90-00041, 1990 

\VL 192483, * 5-6 (D. Haw. July 30, 1990) (unpublished) (same). 5 

4

Plaintiff also points to similar statements made by Senator Kennedy and 

Representative Udall. See 151 Cong. Rec. S 1087 ( daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) 

(statement of Sen. Kennedy); 151 Cong. Rec. H741 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) 

(statement of Rep. Udall). However, since neither of these congressmen 

sponsored the legislation and both voted against it, we see little persuasive value 

in their comments. 

5

In both Hunt and Lorraine Motors, the plaintiffs filed their state court suits 

prior to Congress' decision to raise the amount-in-controversy requirement of§ 

(continued ... ) 

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Neither of these cases deal directly with the statute in question, which was 

passed only several weeks ago. Thus, the cases are relevant only by analogy. 

Even then, their persuasive value is diluted, as Plaintiff points out, by the 

presence of contemporaneous contrary authority from other federal district courts. 

See Kieffer, 167 F.Supp. at 402 (holding that action is "commenced" on initial 

filing date in state court and declining to impose higher amount-in-controversy 

requirement imposed prior to removal); Rhinehart v. Cincinnati. Inc., 716 F. 

Supp. 7, 8 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (same). 

Moreover, the courts' reasoning in Lorraine Motors and Hunt actually 

supports Plaintiff's interpretation of the term "commenced." Although the courts 

were interpreting statutory language that is identical to the disputed provision in 

the instant case, there is a major difference between a statute that defines 

additional circumstances in which diversity of citizenship exists (such as the 

5( ... continued) 

1332. Lorraine Motors, 166 F. Supp. at 320; Hunt, 1990 WL 192483, at *l. At 

the time of the initial state filing, each suit would have satisfied the lower federal 

amount-in-controversy requirement. Id. However, the defendants in these cases 

attempted to remove the actions only after Congress had amended the diversity 

statute, and neither suit satisfied the new amount in controversy requirement, 

which was applicable only to cases "commenced" after the effective date of the 

statute. Id. 

Both courts remanded the cases to state court, and held that the actions 

were "commenced" for purposes of applying the new amount-in-controversy 

requirement upon filing of the removal petition, not upon the filing of the initial 

complaint in state court. Lorraine Motors, 166 F. Supp. at 324; Hunt, 1990 WL 

192483, at *6. 

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Class Action Fairness Act) and a statute that increases the amount-in-controversy 

requirement. The latter attempts to restrict federal court jurisdiction, while the 

former attempts to expand it. Both Hunt and Lorraine Motors rely heavily upon 

the principle that removal statutes are to be strictly construed, with all doubts 

resolved against removal. Lorraine Motors, 166 F. Supp. at 324; Hunt, 1990 WL 

192483, at *6. Thus, in those cases, interpreting the term "commenced" as 

referring to the filing of the removal petition would serve that aim by restricting 

the number of preexisting state claims that could be removed. In contrast, such 

an interpretation here would actually permit broader federal court jurisdiction by 

increasing the number of removable actions. 6 Given this, we remain convinced 

that term "commenced" in the Act refers to the initial filing, not the removal date. 

V. Public Policy 

Where the language of a statute is arguably ambiguous, courts also look to 

public policy considerations to cast further elucidation on Congress' likely intent. 

United States v. LaHue, 170 F.3d 1026, 1028 (10th Cir. 1999). Here, we are 

6

We are mindful of the fact that Congress' goal in passing this legislation 

was to increase access to federal courts, and we also recognize that the Senate 

report instructs us to construe the bill's terms broadly. S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 43 

(Feb. 28 , 2005). But these general sentiments do not provide carte blanche for 

federal jurisdiction over a state class action any time the statute is ambiguous. 

While it is clear the Congress wished to expand federal jurisdiction, when that 

expansion is made effective is what is at issue in this case, and that is an issue we 

approach cautiously. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp .. 313 U.S. at 108-109. 

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mindful of the fact that Defendant's argument, if accepted, could have serious 

consequences for both the federal judiciary and our colleagues on the state bench. 

Permitting the Act to apply to currently pending state suits would, in the words of 

the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, "be extraordinarily disruptive of 

many State court proceedings." 151 Cong. Rec. S 1225 ( daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) 

(statement of Sen. Specter). 

As the facts of this case demonstrate, Defendant's interpretation of the Act 

would allow cases to be plucked from state court on the eve of trial. Such 

practices are disruptive to federal-state comity and the settled expectations of the 

litigants. Permitting removal of this case would effectively apply new rules to a 

game in the final minutes of the last quarter, and we find it ironic that Defendant 

seeks countenance for its position from a statute that was designed, in the first 

place, to curtail jurisdictional gaming and forum-shopping. S. Rep. No. 109-14, 

at 4-5. The consequences of Defendant's argument are sufficiently dramatic that 

we are not eager to ascribe those motivations to Congress without a clearer 

expression than we find here. 

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VI. Conclusion 

Because we conclude that removal to federal court does not "commence" an 

action for the purposes of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, the district 

court's remand order is AFFIRMED.

7 

7

Defendant's motion for emergency stay pending appeal is DISMISSED as 

moot. 

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