Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-02283/USCOURTS-ca10-93-02283-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
New Mexico Attorney General
Appellee
State of New Mexico
Appellee
Walter Watson
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS VDited States Court of Ap='cab Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

WALTER WATSON, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF NEW MEXICO and 

NEW MEXICO ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

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JAN 1 8 1995 

PATRICK FISHER - Clerk 

No. 93-2283 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. 90-0005 JB) 

Roger A. Finzel, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Petitioner-Appellant. 

Gail MacQuesten, Assistant Attorney General (Tom Udall, Attorney General, with her on the brief), Santa Fe, New Mexico, 

for Respondent-Appellee. 

Before KELLY, Circuit Judge, and SETH and McWILLIAMS, Senior 

Circuit Judges. 

McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 93-2283 Document: 01019290251 Date Filed: 01/18/1995 Page: 1 
On January 4, 1990, Walter Watson filed a petition under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the 

District of New Mexico. In the petition, Watson alleged that 

he had been convicted in a state court of New Mexico for 

sexual contact of a minor and sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a one-year mandatory parole upon release. As 

grounds for relief from the conviction and sentence thus 

suffered, Watson urged four grounds: (1) the state statute 

under which he was convicted, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-13 

(1978), is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (2) the 

state failed to meet its burden of proof by failing to prove 

the crime charged; (3) the information failed to give notice 

of the crime charged; and (4) ineffective assistance of 

counsel both in the state trial court and the state appellate 

court. 

By answer, the state admitted that Watson was in its 

custody or control as of the date the petition was filed and 

that it appeared that the "issues raised in the Petition have 

been exhausted because Petitioner currently has no available 

state mechanism for obtaining review of the merits of his 

claims." The answer concluded by averring that Watson failed 

to "state a constitutional claim cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254. 11 

Later, New Mexico filed a motion to dismiss certain of 

petitioner's claims based, in part, on procedural default. 

The magistrate thereafter denied the motion to dismiss and 

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Appellate Case: 93-2283 Document: 01019290251 Date Filed: 01/18/1995 Page: 2 
heard Watson's claims on their merits.1 In the proposed 

findings and recommended disposition, the magistrate found 

that Watson had failed to allege facts which, if proven, 

would entitle him to relief and recommended that Watson's 

claims be dismissed with prejudice. The district court 

thereafter adopted the magistrate's findings and recommendation and dismissed the petition with prejudice. Watson 

appeals. Some background facts are necessary to put the 

matter in focus. 

On August 12, 1987, Watson was charged in the District 

Court for the Ninth Judicial District of New Mexico with 

sexual contact of a minor in violation of state law. On 

November 24, 1987, a jury convicted Watson on the charge and 

1 The magistrate determined that petitioner's failure to 

exhaust state remedies was not fatal to his federal habeas 

appeal based on his interpretation of the rule set forth in 

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989), and later clarified in 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 u.s. 722 (1991) , that: 

In habeas, if the decision of the last state court 

to which the petitioner presented his federal 

claims fairly appeared to rest primarily on resolution of those claims, or to be interwoven with 

those claims, and did not clearly and expressly 

rely on an independent and adequate state ground, a 

federal court may address the petition. Id. at 735. 

Based on the above quoted language, the magistrate determined 

that since the state district court, the last court to which 

Watson presented his federal claims, did not clearly and 

expressly rely on independent and adequate state grounds, 

federal jurisdiction was presumed. 

However, in this regard, footnote 1 of Coleman states 

that the above-quoted rule does not apply if "petitioner 

failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the 

petitioner would be required to present his claims in order 

to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred. In such a case there is a procedural 

default for purposes of federal habeas regardless of the 

decision of the last state court to which petitioner actually 

presented his claims." Id. at 735, n. 1 (emphasis added). 

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Appellate Case: 93-2283 Document: 01019290251 Date Filed: 01/18/1995 Page: 3 
on February 5, 1988, he was sentenced to imprisonment for 

eighteen months to be followed by one-year mandatory parole. 

A notice of appeal to the New Mexico Court of Appeals was 

filed on March 4, 1988. On appeal, counsel raised a single 

issue challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. On May 3, 

1988, the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed Watson's 

conviction and ordered Watson to commence serving his sentence. 

On March 20, 1989, Watson filed a pro se petition for 

habeas corpus in the District Court for the Ninth Judicial 

District of New Mexico, raising the same grounds for relief 

as he subsequently raised in his federal habeas corpus action, which grounds have been set forth above. On July 21, 

1989, the state district court denied Watson's petition. 

Watson thereafter did not appeal that judgment to the New 

Mexico Supreme Court, as he could have under New Mexico Rules 

of Appellate Procedure 12-501, which provides that where a 

petition for habeas corpus is denied by a district court, the 

petitioner has thirty days to thereafter seek certiorari 

review by the New Mexico Supreme Court. 

On appeal, Watson argues that the district court erred 

in dismissing his petition, and that, at the very least, he 

was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. New Mexico's initial 

position is that Watson is in procedural default and cannot 

raise the matters which he sought to raise in federal district court because, having raised the identical issues in 

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Appellate Case: 93-2283 Document: 01019290251 Date Filed: 01/18/1995 Page: 4 
his state habeas corpus proceeding, which petition, as indicated, was denied, he did not thereafter avail himself of 

the provisions of New Mexico Rules of Appellate Procedure 12-

501 under which he could have petitioned the Supreme Court of 

New Mexico for review of the district court's denial of his 

petition. Alternatively, New Mexico argues that the issues 

sought to be raised in Watson's petition in federal district 

court are without merit. Under the described chronology, we 

must first consider New Mexico's initial position that Watson 

is in procedural default and cannot raise in federal district 

court the matters which he sought to raise. In this regard, 

see Ballinger v. Kerby, 3 F.3d 1371, 1374 (lOth Cir. 1993), 

where we said, "[R)espondent raises the issue of procedural 

default, which we must resolve before considering the merits." 

Dulin v. Cook, 957 F.2d 758 (lOth Cir. 1992) is virtually on all fours with the instant case. In Dulin, the petitioner in federal district court had previously filed a 

petition for habeas corpus in the Utah state district court. 

The state district court denied Dulin's petition and on appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. Utah law provided 

that the petitioner was entitled to seek certiorari review by 

the Utah Supreme Court of the decision of the Utah Court of 

Appeals within thirty days after its entry. Id. at 759. 

However, the petitioner failed to seek the requisite discretionary review by the Utah Supreme Court, and, having 

failed to exhaust his state court remedies, the federal 

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Appellate Case: 93-2283 Document: 01019290251 Date Filed: 01/18/1995 Page: 5 
district court held that petitioner was procedurally barred 

from raising the matters which he sought to raise in federal 

district court. Id. On appeal, we affirmed, in effect, the 

district court's holding that petitioner was procedurally 

barred from raising the issues which he sought to raise, but 

remanded the case to the district court to determine whether 

there was "cause and prejudice" for the default. Id. at 760. 

In accord with Dulin, see Ballinger v. Kerby, 3 F.3d 

1371 (lOth Cir. 1993), where Ballinger, the petitioner in 

federal district court, challenged his criminal conviction in 

a state court in New Mexico. 

holding in Dulin, which 

In Ballinger, we discussed our 

discussion parallels the above 

analysis. In line therewith, we concluded in Ballinger that 

"[T]herefore, petitioner's [Ballinger's] claim of a federal 

due process violation, raised before the state trial court in 

his state petition, was procedurally defaulted by his 

failure to obtain timely review by the New Mexico Supreme 

Court." 3 F.3d at 1374. That fits our case, too. Accordingly, Watson, by his failure to seek timely state supreme 

court review of the denial of his habeas corpus petition by 

the state district court, failed to exhaust the available 

state court remedies and his claims are now procedurally 

defaulted for purposes of federal habeas review. 

Watson argues, alternatively, that should we find procedural default, we should remand for a hearing on the issues 

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. I 

" 

of "cause and prejudice" for the default, or whether to enforce the procedural default rule would result in a "miscarriage of justice."2 Specifically, on the "cause" issue, 

Watson alleges that he was ignorant of the procedures that he 

was supposed to follow and that the library at the Las Cruces 

Correctional Facility was inadequate for him to learn the 

correct procedures. 

In Dulin, 957 F.2d at 760, we reiterated our adoption of 

the Supreme Court's "cause and prejudice" standard announced 

in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991): 

In all cases where a state prisoner has defaulted 

his federal claims in state court pursuant to an 

independent and adequate state procedural rule, 

federal habeas review is barred unless the prisoner 

can demonstrate cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of 

federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice. 

Coleman, 501 u.s. at 750. 

In order to satisfy the "cause" standard, Petitioner 

must show that "some objective factor external to the defense" impeded his compliance with New Mexico's procedural 

rules. Dulin, 957 F.2d at 760 (quoting McClesky v. Zant, 499 

2 Watson did raise the issue of miscarriage of justice in 

the federal district court in Petitioner's Response to 

Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, Case No. 93-2283, Record on 

Appeal § 17, p. 9. As indicated above, because the district 

court did not find that Watson had procedurally defaulted for 

purposes of federal habeas review, this issue was not addressed. In light of our disposition in this case, we conclude that Watson should be granted the opportunity to 

present evidence on this issue upon remand. Cases involving 

a fundamental miscarriage of justice "are extraordinary instances when a constitutional violation probably has caused 

the conviction of one innocent of the crime." McClesky v. 

Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 ( 1991) (citation omitted) . -7-

Appellate Case: 93-2283 Document: 01019290251 Date Filed: 01/18/1995 Page: 7 
U.S. 467, 493 (1991)). Moreover, as further noted in Dulin, 

petitioner's alleged lack of knowledge must be due to a lack 

of reasonable access to the rules as distinguished from basic 

ignorance of the rules or the law. 957 F.2d at 760.3 

As indicated above, Watson claimed that he was ignorant 

of the procedures that he was supposed to follow and that the 

library at the Las Cruces Correctional Facility was inadequate for him to learn the correct procedures. Since the 

district court in our case did not find procedural default, 

these matters were not addressed. Thus, as was the case in 

Dulin, Petitioner should be afforded the opportunity to prove 

these circumstances did in fact exist. 

Judgment vacated and case remanded for further proceedings consonant with this opinion. 

3 The "cause and prejudice" standard applies to pro se 

prisoners such as Watson, just as it applies to prisoners 

represented by counsel. See Dulin, 957 F.2d at 760; Rodriguez v. Maynard, 948 F.2d 684, 687 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

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