Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-14-70036/USCOURTS-ca5-14-70036-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Danny Paul Bible
Appellant
William Stephens, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-70036

DANNY PAUL BIBLE, 

 Petitioner - Appellant

v.

WILLIAM STEPHENS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL 

JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION, 

 Respondent - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:13-CV-200

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Petitioner-Appellant Danny Paul Bible (“Bible”) was convicted of capital 

murder in Texas and sentenced to death. He now seeks a certificate of 

appealability (“COA”) from the district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. 

Because Bible has failed to make a substantial showing of a denial of a 

constitutional right, we deny his application for a COA.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 25, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I.

In June 2003, Bible was convicted of a capital murder that he committed 

in 1979. He was sentenced to death, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 

affirmed his conviction in 2005.1 The federal district court, on habeas review, 

ably set out the relevant facts and procedural history as follows: 

On May 27, 1979, a man found the blood-covered body of 20–year–

old Inez Deaton along the slope of a bayou in Houston, Texas. The 

victim was not wearing pants, and her underwear had been 

partially torn from her body. Her corpse bore signs of a violent 

attack. Someone had stabbed her eleven times with an ice pick. 

Bruises covered her head. Her partially clothed state, along with 

vaginal and anal trauma, indicated that someone had sexually 

assaulted her. The physical evidence suggested that her killer had 

dragged her corpse to the location and then positioned her body by 

spreading her legs apart.

A few days before, Mrs. Deaton had stopped by the house next door 

to where Bible lived to use the telephone. Mrs. Deaton was a young 

mother and friend of Bible’s sister. The neighbor suggested that 

she use the telephone at Bible’s home. Another neighbor saw Mrs. 

Deaton enter Bible’s house. No one ever saw Mrs. Deaton alive 

again.

Around the time of Mrs. Deaton’s funeral, Bible disappeared. Over 

the next two decades Bible lived a life of extreme violence. He fled 

to Montana and Wyoming where he entered into an abusive 

relationship with a woman. He committed aggravated kidnappings 

and theft in Montana. Returning to Texas, he committed rapes and 

murders. In 1984, he pleaded guilty to a separate murder. After 

his release on parole, Bible sexually assaulted his five young 

nieces.

On November 7, 1998, Bible burst into Tera Robinson’s hotel room 

in Louisiana and violently sexually assaulted her. Subsequently, 

the police arrested him in Florida where he confessed to various 

prior crimes. On December 16, 1998, Bible gave the Louisiana 

police a statement admitting to the attack on Ms. Robinson, 

 

1 Bible v. State, 162 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

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although he claimed not to remember the actual sexual assault. 

During that questioning, he informed the Louisiana police that he 

had murdered Mrs. Deaton. The police in Louisiana contacted 

authorities in Texas.

Bible then gave two additional tape-recorded statements on 

December 18. In the first, Bible confessed to having killed Mrs. 

Deaton. Bible remembered that he was watching television when 

Mrs. Deaton came to the door. He immediately grabbed her and 

forced her to have sex with him. She resisted and they struggled. 

Bible remembered strangling her and using a knife on her. He 

remembered putting her in the trunk of a car and dumping her 

body. However, Bible claimed that he could not remember the 

actual sexual assault or murder. In a second statement on the 

same day, Bible confessed to raping a woman in 1983 and then 

killing her and her baby. Later, Bible confessed to numerous 

sexual offenses against his five young nieces between 1996 and 

1998.

In March 2001, the State of Texas charged Bible by indictment 

with capital murder for the aggravated rape and murder of Mrs. 

Deaton. Before trial, Bible’s attorneys moved to suppress his police 

statements. After holding a hearing, the trial court denied Bible’s 

motion to suppress.

Testimony in the guilt/innocence phase of trial lasted only two 

days. Witnesses described the circumstances surrounding Mrs. 

Deaton’s disappearance. Family members testified about 

suspicious acts by Bible after Mrs. Deaton went missing. The 

State’s case, however, turned on what was called “the most 

compelling, most believable, best evidence you can ever have in a 

criminal case:” a confession. Other than Bible’s suspicious acts 

immediately after Mrs. Deaton’s disappearance, only his 

confession connected him to her killing. The jury found Bible guilty 

of capital murder.

Jurors decided Bible’s sentence by answering three questions: (1) 

did Bible act deliberately, (2) would he constitute a future threat 

to society, and (3) did mitigating circumstances warrant that he 

receive a life sentence? Bible’s attorneys faced a herculean task in 

defending against a death sentence. The prosecution’s case 

portrayed Bible as an extremely violent man who showed little 

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hope of rehabilitation. Through his confessions and testimony from 

his victims, the prosecution recounted Bible’s decades of 

lawlessness. In an unremitting history of violence toward women 

and children, Bible had repeatedly committed sexual assaults and 

kidnappings. He admitted that he had raped his own stepdaughter 

while holding a knife to his wife’s throat. He had raped an elevenyear-old girl in Montana. He beat girlfriends. He had committed 

robberies and theft. He sexually assaulted his young nieces while 

on parole from a lengthy prison sentence. His behavior did not 

improve as he aged. Most importantly, the prosecution showed 

that Bible had killed at least four times.

Against that background, trial counsel tried to show that Bible 

could control his behavior in a highly structured environment. The 

defense argued that Bible had only committed two minor 

infractions during seventeen years of prior incarceration. A 

minister testified that he had a spiritual encounter with Bible and 

that Bible had completed a religious education course.

The jury answered Texas’ special issue questions in a manner 

requiring the imposition of a death sentence.

Through appointed counsel, Bible challenged his conviction and 

sentence on automatic direct appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal 

Appeals. Appointed counsel raised sixteen points of error. On May 

4, 2005, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in a published 

opinion. Bible v. State, 162 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 

Bible’s conviction became final when the time for filing a petition 

for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court expired 

on August 2, 2005.

Under Texas law, state appellate and habeas review run 

concurrently. Through appointed habeas counsel, Bible filed a 

state application for a writ of habeas corpus on March 8, 2005. 

Bible’s state habeas application raised seven grounds for relief. 

Bible’s prior attorneys submitted affidavits responding to his 

claims of ineffective representation. The state habeas court signed 

the State’s proposed findings and conclusions without alteration. 

Based on the lower court’s order and its own independent review, 

the Court of Criminal Appeals denied habeas relief. Ex Parte 

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Danny Paul Bible, WR–76,122–01, 2012 WL 243564 (Tex. Crim.

App. Jan. 25, 2012) (unpublished).2

Bible then filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, asserting eight 

grounds for relief.3 The district court denied his petition and refused to grant 

a COA on any issue.4 Bible now seeks a COA on two issues.

II.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)

governs this habeas proceeding.5 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, a federal habeas 

petitioner cannot appeal the district court’s denial of his petition without first 

obtaining a COA, which requires the petitioner to make “a substantial showing 

of the denial of a constitutional right.”6 At the COA stage, unlike full appellate 

review, “[w]e look to the District Court’s application of AEDPA to petitioner’s 

constitutional claims and ask whether that resolution was debatable amongst 

jurists of reason. This threshold inquiry does not require full consideration of 

the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the claims. In fact, the statute 

forbids it.”7

If a district court has rejected a claim on the merits, “the showing 

required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must 

demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment 

of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.”8 If the district court has 

rejected a claim on procedural grounds, the petitioner must “show[], at least, 

 

2 Bible v. Stephens, No. 4:13-CV-200, 2014 WL 5500722, at *1-3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 

2014).

3 Id. at *3.

4 Id. at *32.

5 Trottie v. Stephens, 720 F.3d 231, 239 (5th Cir. 2013). 6 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

7 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003).

8 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000).

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that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would 

find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural 

ruling.”9

We evaluate the debatability of [the petitioner’s] constitutional 

claims against the backdrop of the AEDPA’s highly deferential 

standard. Under the AEDPA, a federal court may not grant habeas 

relief unless the petitioner has first exhausted state remedies with 

respect to the claim at issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To prevail, the 

habeas petitioner must prove that the state court’s constitutional 

adjudication resulted in either a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States, or a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). . . . When ruling on a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the federal district court must 

defer to the state court’s factual findings, Moody v. Quarterman,

476 F.3d 260, 267–68 (5th Cir. 2007), and consider only the record 

that was before the state court, Cullen v. Pinholster, ––– U.S. ––, 

131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398, 179 L. Ed. 2d 557 (2011).10

Finally, “[w]hile the nature of a capital case is not of itself sufficient to 

warrant the issuance of a COA, in a death penalty case ‘any doubts as to 

whether a COA should issue must be resolved in [the petitioner’s] favor.’”11

III.

Bible seeks a COA on two issues: (1) whether his death sentence violates 

the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 

because his current physical disabilities objectively render him no future 

danger to anyone, and (2) whether his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 

 

9 Id. (emphasis added).

10 Garza v. Stephens, 738 F.3d 669, 673-74 (5th Cir. 2013).

11 Ramirez v. Dretke, 398 F.3d 691, 694 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hernandez v. Johnson, 

213 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2000)).

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object to a physical demonstration of Bible’s November 7, 1998 rape by the 

prosecutor during the punishment phase. No reasonable jurist would debate 

either of these claims.

A.

For Bible’s first claim, he asserts that following his conviction and 

sentence, the prison van transporting him to death row was involved in an 

automobile collision that left both drivers dead and caused Bible to sustain 

severe injuries. Among other medical problems, he claims to suffer from 

permanent disabilities in the form of severe pain throughout his body, the 

inability to lift his arms without support, severe headaches, regular blackouts, 

and chronic exhaustion.12 He argues that his debilitating physical problems

have caused him to be wheelchair bound and objectively render him no longer 

a future danger to anyone and that executing him would therefore constitute 

cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.

Restated, Bible’s claim is that the Eighth Amendment forbids the 

execution of an offender who, though physically capable of posing a future 

danger at the time of trial and sentencing, becomes physically incapable of 

posing a future danger after trial, even though that offender remains mentally 

competent. Bible has pointed to no opinion by any court setting out such a rule 

of constitutional law. As the federal district court, on habeas review, explained:

Requiring a jury to predict an inmate’s future threat is a common 

feature in criminal sentencing. However, the Supreme Court has 

never held that a death-row inmate is entitled to another future 

dangerousness determination several years after his sentencing. 

 

12 The State argues that Bible’s assertions regarding his physical health and prognosis 

are essentially self-serving and do not establish whether he may, in fact, present a future 

danger, but we need not reach that issue.

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This Court cannot grant relief on these claims without creating a 

“new rule” of constitutional law . . . .13

We concur.

Bible argues that his claim is merely an extension of principles set out

in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005), and 

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 91 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1986). We 

disagree. Both of those cases concerned the offender’s mental capacity, not 

physical capabilities, and their rationale is fundamentally different from the 

reasoning put forward by Bible.

In Roper, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 

the death penalty for offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes 

were committed, based in part on the fact that juvenile offenders are less 

mature and more irresponsible than adults; that they are “more vulnerable or 

susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer 

pressure”; and that “the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of 

an adult” and their personality traits are “more transitory, less fixed.”14 In 

Ford, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death 

penalty for an offender who becomes insane after sentencing, based in part on 

the highly questionable “retributive value of executing a person who has no 

comprehension of why he has been singled out and stripped of his fundamental 

right to life” and “the natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at killing one 

who has no capacity to come to grips with his own conscience or deity.”15

Bible has never argued that he lacked mental capacity at the time of his 

offense or that he lacks mental capacity now. His claim rests entirely on his 

diminished physical capabilities. Because no rule of constitutional law 

 

13 Bible v. Stephens, 2014 WL 5500722 at *10 (citations omitted, emphasis in original).

14 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70.

15 Ford, 477 U.S. at 409.

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prohibits the death penalty under these circumstances, no reasonable jurist 

would debate this issue. Accordingly, we deny a COA on this claim.

B.

Next, Bible argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to the prosecutors’ physical demonstration of Bible’s 1998 rape of Tera 

Robinson during the punishment phase of the trial. Under Strickland v. 

Washington,16 we apply a two-pronged test to claims of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. First, the petitioner must “show that trial counsel’s representation 

was deficient—that is, it ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’”17

Second, the petitioner “must demonstrate prejudice: a ‘reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.’”18 AEDPA deference raises the bar for an ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim even higher:

The pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the 

Strickland standard was unreasonable. This is different from 

asking whether defense counsel’s performance fell below 

Strickland’s standard. Were that the inquiry, the analysis would 

be no different than if, for example, this Court were adjudicating a 

Strickland claim on direct review of a criminal conviction in a 

United States district court. Under AEDPA, though, it is a 

necessary premise that the two questions are different. For 

purposes of § 2254(d)(1), “an unreasonable application of federal 

law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”

[Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 

2d 389 (2000)]. A state court must be granted a deference and 

latitude that are not in operation when the case involves review 

under the Strickland standard itself.19

 

16 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

17 Charles v. Stephens, 736 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 688).

18 Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

19 Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011).

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Thus, under AEDPA, we may not grant federal habeas relief on a claim 

which the state court has already determined to be meritless “so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s 

decision.”20

The federal district court examined the relevant facts and concluded that 

Bible is not entitled to relief on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim:

During the punishment phase of trial, the State presented 

testimony and evidence concerning the sexual assault Bible 

committed that led to his arrest. In his police statement, Bible 

admitted that he broke into Tera Robinson’s Louisiana motel room, 

restrained her, and tried to stuff her into a duffle bag, but claimed 

that he did not specifically remember sexually assaulting her. The 

State played for the jury Bible’s audiotaped confession. When the 

State called Ms. Robinson to the stand, she testified that Bible

forcibly pushed open her motel room door when she cracked 

it open after hearing a knock; that [Bible] grabbed her by the 

throat slammed her against the wall, and lifted her off the 

ground; that [Bible] threw her onto a bed, climbed on top of 

her, and pinned her down by straddling her and holding 

down her arms; that [Bible] ripped off her shirt and took off 

his pants and then straddled “her over her chest” and forced 

his penis into her mouth; that [Bible] “slid down” Robinson 

after forcing her to perform oral sex on him and then forced 

his penis into her vagina; that [Bible] tied Robinsons ankles 

and wrists after sexually assaulting her; and that [Bible] 

attempted to stuff her into a duffle bag.

State Habeas Record at 407; Tr. Vol. 22 at 49–74.

As Ms. Robinson testified, the two prosecutors acted out the 

assault. The prosecutors’ demonstration “comprised ten pages of 

Robinson’s thirty-eight pages of testimony.” State Habeas Record 

at 407. As Ms. Robinson described the attack, Ms. Siegler 

apparently lay down on the counsel table while Mr. Goodhart 

pinned her arms down with his knees, straddled her, and 

 

20 Id. (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 158 

L. Ed. 2d 938 (2004)).

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otherwise positioned himself as Bible did. Later during Ms. 

Robinson’s testimony, Ms. Siegler replicated how she looked after 

Bible had tied her. Also, the prosecutors apparently also acted out 

Ms. Robinson’s description of how Bible tried to stuff her into a 

duffle bag.

Trial counsel did not object to the in-court demonstration, though 

in his state habeas affidavit he said: “I wish I had[.]” State Habeas 

Record at 351. Even so, trial [counsel] did not think objecting 

would make any difference: “I doubt that the trial court would have 

sustained that objection and further doubt that the Court of 

Criminal Appeals would reverse a case based on that 

demonstration at a punishment hearing in a death penalty case.”

State Habeas Record at 351.

Bible claims that trial counsel provided ineffective representation 

by not objecting to the demonstration. Bible argues that “[t]he 

prosecutors’ dramatic reenactment had no purpose except to 

inflame the passions of the jury. It was wholly unnecessary to 

assist the jury in visualizing the scene, or ascertaining the 

calculated nature of Bible’s actions, the degree of force Bible used, 

or Bible’s physical mastery of victim.” (Docket Entry No. 5 at 61). 

Because the jury had already heard Bible’s confession to some of 

the events, and Ms. Robinson’s testimony filled in any gaps, Bible 

argues that “the reenactment was either so conspicuously 

prejudicial or of such magnitude as to fatally infect the trial and 

deprive the defendant of due process[.]” (Docket Entry No. 5 at 61).

The state habeas court found no deficient performance by trial 

counsel. The state habeas court suggested that it would not have 

sustained any objection because the demonstration “logically 

assisted the jury in understanding and visualizing Robinson’s 

testimony concerning [Bible’s] actions, his degree of force, and 

Robinson’s physical positions and helplessness during the attack.”

State Habeas Record at 408. In fact, the state habeas court 

concluded that the demonstration “was necessary to counter 

[Bible’s] attempt to minimize the amount of force he used during 

the assault and his self-serving claim that he did not remember 

the assault and had been drinking heavily[.]” State Habeas Record 

at 422. Also, the “in-court demonstration was necessary and 

admissible to show [Bible’s] calculated actions, his degree of force, 

and his physical mastery of Robinson.” State Habeas Record at 

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422. Echoing the mechanics of Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 403, the state 

habeas court stated “the probative value of the reenactment of 

[Bible’s] rape of Robinson was not substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice, and any emotional and prejudicial 

aspects of the reenactment were substantially outweighed by the 

helpful aspects of the reenactment.” State Habeas Record at 422.

On federal habeas review, this Court’s concern is not whether the 

prosecution’s dramatic reenactment was proper under state rules 

of procedure, consistent with proper courtroom decorum, 

permissible in federal court, or in keeping with the prosecutor’s 

solemn duty as officers of the court. This Court’s concern is 

whether the state court’s adjudication was unreasonable, which 

requires Bible to show “that there was an error well understood 

and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at ––––, 131 S. Ct. at 

786–87. Here, Bible had confessed to attacking Ms. Robinson, but 

stopped short of admitting that he had sexually assaulted her. Ms. 

Robinson provided detailed testimony that adequately allowed 

jurors to understand the violence and brutality associated with the 

rape. While the prosecutors’ theatrics possibly drew Bible’s assault 

into sharper focus, Bible makes a good argument that the jurors 

already had before them the essential features of the episode.

Still, the state courts considered the evidentiary basis for Bible’s 

proposed objection and essentially found that any objection would 

have been overruled. Importantly, the prosecutors’ dramatization 

of the attack was superfluous and came before jurors in the midst 

of a highly prejudicial punishment phase. Jurors had to consider 

Bible’s life-long violence which involved repeated murders and 

sexual assaults. Given Bible’s unremitting violence, the state 

courts would not be unreasonable in finding no federal 

constitutional error in the prosecutors’ demonstrative actions. 

Bible, therefore, has not shown that the state court’s rejection of 

this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).21

Having examined the record, we conclude that the federal district court’s 

summary of the facts is accurate, and we also conclude that its analysis is 

 

21 Bible v. Stephens, 2014 WL 5500722 at *15-17.

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fundamentally correct under the standards set out above. Because Bible 

cannot show that the state court unreasonably resolved his ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim relating to the prosecutors’ demonstration of 

Bible’s 1998 rape, he cannot prevail on this claim under AEDPA’s deferential 

standard. No reasonable jurist would debate this issue, and we therefore deny 

a COA as to Bible’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

IV.

Because all of Bible’s arguments lack merit, his request for a COA is 

hereby DENIED.

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