Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03028/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03028-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Leonard R. Fazio
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3028

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Southern

* District of Iowa.

Leonard R. Fazio, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: January 10, 2007

Filed: May 29, 2007

___________

Before WOLLMAN, BEAM, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Leonard Fazio appeals his conviction and sentence for one count of mail fraud

and two counts of wire fraud. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343. We affirm in part, reverse

in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Fazio is a licensed real estate broker with his own RE/MAX franchise in Des

Moines, Iowa. In this capacity, Fazio also attended to third-party properties for outof-state mortgage companies, concerning himself with foreclosures, relocations and

repossessions. The mortgage companies directed him to check on property

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occupancy, to get possession of properties with "cash-for-keys" deals, and to provide

the selling mortgage company an opinion on the estimated value of a particular

property. Homecomings Financial was one of the companies that hired Fazio to

perform such third-party work. Homecomings would either enlist Fazio to sell the

third-party property "as is," or would direct Fazio to rehabilitate the property by hiring

a contractor to do painting and repairs. If rehabilitation was necessary, Fazio would

hire and pay the contractors, and submit reimbursement requests to Homecomings.

Fazio submitted several such requests for reimbursement to Homecomings,

which requests provide the basis for the mail fraud charges. According to Fazio's

employees (who were government witnesses), Fazio directed them to fabricate or

inflate bills for reimbursement. Allison Bice, Fazio's office manager from 2001

through 2004, testified that Fazio directed her to inflate bills, and to "get as much

money out of Homecomings as . . . possibl[e]." Bice testified that Fazio felt the thirdparty property business was not terribly profitable, and this was a way to recoup

losses. Heather Dyar, who worked as a bookkeeper in the office, testified that when

she noticed that Bice's invoices were inflated, she expressed concern to Fazio that a

crime was being committed. Fazio brushed her off. He told her that no one could tell

him what to charge for his services, and that this was not an uncommon practice in the

third-party property market. Diana Pastor, one of Fazio's real estate agents, testified

that Fazio had told Bice to bill Homecomings the "maximum" amount–meaning the

highest amount that Homecomings would pay for a particular service, based on a list

supplied to the local agents. Fazio does not contest that Homecomings was billed

excess amounts, and in some cases for work not performed by contractors. However,

Fazio contends that he did not know that Bice was submitting inflated bills and that

he did not direct her to do so.

The wire fraud charges stem from Fazio's handling of the listing for a

Homecomings' acreage in New Virginia, Iowa. Homecomings retained Fazio to do

a broker price opinion on the property, and he opined that the property was worth

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$40,000 "as is" or $80,000 if rehabilitated. Homecomings opted to sell it without

rehabilitation, and directed Fazio to list it for $59,900. Fazio attempted several times

to buy it for himself, but each offer was summarily rejected by Homecomings. Fazio

directed Dyar, who was assisting him with the electronic offer submissions, to call

Homecomings and ask why the offers were being rejected. A Homecomings

representative told Dyar that it was company policy not to sell to listing agents. Dyar

testified that upon hearing this news, Fazio directed her to submit offers to

Homecomings in Candy Olson's name. Olson was Fazio's girlfriend at the time.

Homecomings accepted "Olson's" offer to buy the property for $48,000. Shortly after

Homecomings accepted this offer, but before closing, Fazio marketed the property and

secured an offer from John Jordan to buy the property for $110,000. The sale required

some repair work to be performed, including trash removal, roof repairs, new

carpeting, painting and drywall work.

Olson testified that she did not know that Fazio had submitted an offer in her

name. She testified that he told her that she signed papers with regard to the offer

when she was in the hospital recovering from brain surgery, but she did not remember

doing so. Other witnesses testified that Olson knew all along that Fazio was buying

the property in her name, and that she hoped to profit from it. And in fact, she did

profit. Fazio secured a loan through his realty company's line of credit for

approximately $45,000 for Olson's November purchase of the New Virginia real

estate. Fazio intended to pay off the loan and realize a substantial profit from the

Jordan transaction. Olson testified that he offered to pay her $2,000 for letting him

use her as a conduit.

Unfortunately for Fazio, his relationship with Olson soured in the midst of these

various transactions. Olson attended the closing on the New Virginia property alone

and has never turned over the proceeds of the transaction to Fazio. Her personal

attorney testified that she kept $31,000 of the proceeds for herself and gave him the

remainder to keep in his trust account. The attorney testified that he made a few

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The district court credited Fazio for the amount that Olson's attorney paid to

the United States Marshal's office, $45,035, and ordered Fazio to pay the balance,

$13,115. The government indicated at sentencing that the $45,035 would be remitted

to Homecomings.

2

Fazio requested that this court remand for a hearing on the recusal issue in the

district court, which request we denied.

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disbursements from the account for bills which needed to be paid (including Olson's

tax obligations as a result of the transaction, and $2,000 in reimbursements to Jordan

for deficiencies in the property). The attorney testified that he wrote a check to the

United States Marshal's office for the remaining balance in the account.

A jury convicted Fazio of two counts of wire fraud in connection with the sale

of the New Virginia land, and one count of mail fraud for an inflated reimbursement

request. Specifically, the jury found that Fazio submitted by mail a fraudulent request

for reimbursement for $1,650 for work done by a contractor to remove trash from a

property in Des Moines. The two counts of wire fraud related to the offer Fazio faxed,

purportedly on Olson's behalf, and the money wired to Homecomings at closing, also

allegedly on Olson's behalf. 

After disposal of post-trial motions, including a motion for new trial, the district

court sentenced Fazio to twenty-four months' imprisonment, imposed a $40,000 fine,

and ordered $58,1501

 in restitution to Homecomings. Fazio appealed. Shortly

thereafter, Fazio's counsel discovered that the trial judge's wife was the first cousin of

Olson's buyer Jordan, who had also been a government trial witness. Counsel also

discovered that the trial judge had commented to Jordan, after trial but prior to

sentencing, that Fazio would likely receive jail time for breaking the law. 

Using this "newly discovered evidence," Fazio asked the district court, a second

time, for a new trial. The trial judge immediately recused himself and the matter was

referred to this court.2

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On appeal, Fazio contends that he is entitled to a new trial because of the trial

court-witness relationship or, at least, because the trial judge should have recused

himself prior to pronouncing the sentence. Fazio additionally argues that the district

court should have ordered a pre-trial evidentiary hearing on his assertion that a

conflict of interest existed because his initially retained attorney was married to an

assistant United States Attorney (AUSA). With regard to the trial, Fazio argues there

was insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdicts, that there were evidentiary

errors at trial, and that there were several errors with regard to his sentence.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Recusal

Fazio argues that the trial judge's failure to inform the parties that his wife's first

cousin was a government witness seriously affected the fairness and integrity of his

trial. He also asserts that at a minimum, the trial judge should have recused himself

prior to sentencing because of the comment he made that Fazio would receive jail time

for breaking the law.

It is unclear what our standard of review should be for this issue, which has two

separate components: (1) the district court's implicit decision during trial not to

disclose his relationship to Jordan or recuse, and (2) the district court's failure to

recuse for the sentencing proceeding after making the "jail" comments to Jordan.

Fazio seems to admit that we review the second component for plain error. We hold,

however, that the first component–the district court's implicit decision not to disclose

and recuse–should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, which would be our

standard had this decision been made on the record. See Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d

638, 648 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (abuse of discretion standard for district court's

decision not to recuse).

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We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to recuse

during Fazio's trial. Fazio concedes that the trial judge was not required by 28 U.S.C.

§ 455(b) to disclose that his wife was a cousin to one of the witnesses. Section 455

requires a judge to recuse himself when a material witness is related within the third

degree to the judge or his spouse. Id. § 455(b)(5). A first cousin is considered the

fourth degree of relationship. However, Fazio argues that section 455(a) does require

recusal in these circumstances. Section 455(a) provides that any judge "shall

disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be

questioned." Id. § 455(a). Fazio cites our decision in Moran in support of his

arguments.

In Moran, one of the defendants admitted at her deposition that she and the

district court judge knew each other socially for over twenty-one years, and during

those years they had visited one another's homes on various occasions. Upon learning

of this relationship, the plaintiff asked the district court to recuse, which request the

district court denied without comment. On appeal, we noted that section 455(a) does

not require scienter, or an actual bias, but instead it contains a purely objective

standard. Moran, 296 F.3d at 648. We reiterated that the key ingredient in a section

455(a) recusal case is avoidance of the appearance of impropriety, as judged by

whether the average person on the street might question the judge's impartiality. Id.

In light of the longtime and relatively close social relationship between a party to the

proceeding and the trial judge, we remanded to the district court for a more thorough

(than an order without comment) consideration of the recusal issue. Id. at 649.

Moran is not dispositive for a number of distinguishing reasons. First and

foremost, the questioned relationship was between the trial judge and a party, not

simply a witness. And despite Fazio's attempts to paint Jordan as a material witness

for the government, an examination of the record belies this assertion. Jordan's

testimony was actually more favorable to Fazio than the government. He testified that

he bought the New Virginia property for its listed price of $110,000, that he was quite

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happy with the property, and that it was his understanding that the property was an

investment for both Olson and Fazio. The key issue in the fraud counts relating to the

New Virginia property was whether Olson was a willing participant in the transaction.

Jordan's testimony helped Fazio in that regard. Jordan also testified that he was a

longtime friend of Fazio's. His testimony, including cross-examination and redirect

examination consisted of twenty-six pages within a voluminous transcript. Jordan's

relationship to the Fazio trial is much less significant than the Moran party was to that

proceeding.

Moran is also distinguishable because the record suggested a "fractious

relationship between the district court and Moran's attorneys." Id. at 649. A careful

review of the record suggests no such conflict in Fazio's trial proceedings. We admit

that the trial court's handling of this matter was wanting. Ideally, once the trial judge

realized that one of the witnesses was his wife's cousin, he should have disclosed the

possible conflict to the parties. See id. ("We find particularly worrisome the district

court's failure to disclose this conflict himself, as permitted by section 455(e)."). In

the district court's defense, it is quite possible that he was unaware of the issue until

after trial started. Nonetheless, disclosure would have been preferable, regardless of

whether doing so during trial would have been cumbersome. However, we cannot say

that the trial judge's failure to do so was an abuse of discretion.

Fazio also complains that the pre-sentence comments the trial judge made to

Jordan require that he be disqualified from the sentencing of Fazio. As noted above,

we review this issue for plain error. Before an appellate court can correct an error not

raised at trial, it must find that there was plain error that affected substantial rights.

Even then, an appellate court may exercise its discretion to notice the error only if the

error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial

proceedings. United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 550 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 126

S. Ct. 266 (2005). The judge, in response to Jordan's inquiry, told Jordan that Fazio

would get jail time because he broke the law. We find no error in the district court's

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We also doubt that the current offering is really "newly discovered evidence."

We question whether the relationship was not something that could have been

discovered prior to trial, especially considering Jordan's friendly relationship with

Fazio. 

-8-

failure to recuse for sentencing. Instead, we find that this comment, from an

experienced federal trial judge, merely reflected the reality of the situation in light of

the federal Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Ture, 450 F.3d 352, 357

(8th Cir. 2006) (reversing district court's decision to give only probation when the

Guidelines called for at least twelve months of incarceration); United States v. Givens,

443 F.3d 642, 645-46 (8th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the district court's sentence of "time

served" when defendant had served no time and a Guidelines range of twenty-four to

thirty months applied).

In addition to the two-part recusal issue, there is one more matter we must

consider before moving on to Fazio's remaining arguments. The recusal issue was

first raised in Fazio's second motion for new trial, based on newly discovered

evidence, filed with the district court after the notice of appeal had been filed. Of

course, once the notice of appeal was filed, the district court was without jurisdiction

to take any further action in the case. As a result, the motion for new trial is still

pending. In light of our decision that the district court did not err by not recusing

during trial or at sentencing, we find that the motion for new trial should be denied.3

In view of the fact that we are also remanding to the district court for reasons

discussed infra, we direct the district court to deny the still-pending motion for new

trial.

B. Conflict of Interest

A few months after Fazio was indicted, he raised an allegation regarding a

potential conflict of interest through a motion to dismiss. Fazio argued his Sixth

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was adversely implicated because

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his initially retained defense counsel was married to an AUSA who was allegedly

involved in the early investigation of the criminal charges against him. The district

court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss and denied it without an evidentiary

hearing, finding that the allegations of conflict of interest were too speculative and

that Fazio could point to nothing in the record indicating that Fazio's case was

adversely affected by the relationship. The court also found that no substantive

information about the case was exchanged by the AUSA and her husband defense

attorney.

We review the district court's refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing on a

potential conflict of interest for an abuse of discretion, Covey v. United States, 377

F.3d 903, 909 (8th Cir. 2004), and find none. We agree with both the government and

the district court that the conflict claims were too speculative to warrant an evidentiary

hearing. Fazio's current counsel was retained within weeks after his indictment. And

though the AUSA in question was the attorney who took the initial call indicating that

a local real estate agent might be engaged in unlawful practices, the AUSA instructed

the caller to contact the FBI. When the matter was referred from the FBI back to the

United States Attorney's office, the AUSA immediately recused herself from the

matter. There was no evidence that any substantive information about the case passed

between Fazio's initial defense counsel and his AUSA spouse. Accordingly, we find

no abuse of discretion and reject Fazio's arguments on this point.

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We have also considered, and reject, Fazio's assertion that there was no

evidence that the mail was used to transmit the documents at issue in Count 2. We

agree with the government that there was sufficient evidence of use of the mail.

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C. Trial Errors

Fazio argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict and that

the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. For a sufficiency challenge,

we view the evidence, and all of its inferences, in the light most favorable to the

verdict. United States v. Lee, 451 F.3d 914, 916 (8th Cir. 2006). We reverse only if

no reasonable jury could find Fazio guilty of the charges. United States v. Walker,

393 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 463 (2005). While Federal Rule

of Criminal Procedure 33(a) authorizes a district court to "vacate any judgment and

grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires," a motion for new trial based on

the weight of the evidence is generally disfavored, and the district court's authority to

grant a new trial should be exercised sparingly and with caution. United States v.

Johnson, 474 F.3d 1044, 1050-51 (8th Cir. 2007).

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, we find

that a reasonable jury could have convicted Fazio of the charged offenses. With

regard to the mail fraud,4

 Bice testified that Fazio directed her to inflate billings. Dyar

testified that she questioned Fazio about the problem, but that he brushed her off by

essentially saying that everybody does it. Pastor also testified that Fazio had directed

Bice to get the most money out of Homecomings as possible. Fazio's counsel attacked

Bice's credibility during the defense case, but the jury obviously believed Bice, at least

in part. It was entitled to do so, and was certainly not unreasonable in doing so.

Similarly, with regard to the wire fraud and the New Virginia property, Candy

Olson testified that she did not know that Fazio was buying the property in her name,

that she did not sign the faxed offer, and that she did not understand what was going

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on with this property until she closed on the property. Pastor testified that she thought

the property was worth much more than Fazio's submitted price opinion, and that

Fazio told her he was going to price the property low and "steal" it from

Homecomings. In his defense, Fazio assiduously presented evidence that impugned

Olson's and Pastor's credibility and contradicted their assertions. We concede that

there were numerous inconsistencies between Olson's testimony and other evidence

in the case. However, to convict Fazio of these charges, the jury had to find that

Olson was an unwilling participant in the transaction. The jury was entitled to believe

the testimony of Olson in this regard, and it apparently did so. We cannot say that this

was unreasonable.

For mostly the same reasons, we do not fault the district court for refusing to

exercise its limited discretion to grant Rule 33 relief. There was evidence to support

the verdict. It may or may not have been the same verdict we would have rendered

had we sat on the jury. However, what the district court, or appellate court, thinks of

a defendant's guilt or innocence is of little import if there is sufficient evidence to

support the jury's guilty verdict. The jury watched and heard each witness testify,

viewed the documentary evidence, and came to a conclusion about who and what to

believe. Fazio contends that because the jury acquitted him on some of the counts, it

must have had reasonable doubt on the remaining counts. We disagree, and believe

instead that the jury carefully performed its duty by not simply rendering a blanket

verdict on all counts. We, too, have carefully examined the record and find no error

that should have been rectified by the operation of Rule 33. 

We next turn to Fazio's allegations of error with regard to various evidentiary

rulings. We review the trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.

United States v. Edelmann, 458 F.3d 791, 809 (8th Cir. 2006) (bad act evidence);

United States v. Chauncey, 420 F.3d 864, 875 (8th Cir. 2005) (defendant's proffered

relevant evidence), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1480 (2006). Fazio argues that there was

prejudicial error when the jury heard evidence of other bad acts, specifically, that he

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had submitted inflated claims for repayment outside of the times alleged in the

indictment and that he committed an ethical violation. Prior to trial, the district court

sustained Fazio's counsel's motion in limine to exclude other "bad act" evidence.

However, on direct examination, Bice testified about occasions wherein Fazio had

directed her to submit inflated bills, and some of those instances were outside of the

charged time frame. The district court gave a cautionary instruction immediately after

Bice was finished testifying. The second incident occurred during Pastor's testimony,

wherein she testified that she thought it was an ethical violation for Fazio to advertise

the New Virginia property as his own listing before Olson had closed on the purchase

of the property. Following an objection and discussion outside of the jury's presence,

the district court instructed the jury to disregard Pastor's answer regarding the ethical

violation.

The government argues that it did not purposefully elicit testimony in violation

of the motion in limine, that the evidence was relevant to give the jury a full picture

of the criminal conduct, and that any error was adequately cured by the district court's

prompt instructions. We agree with the government's characterization of this evidence

and find that the district court's remedy cured any possible prejudice. Bice testified

that she worked for Fazio from February 2001 through March 2004, and that during

that time period, she routinely submitted inflated bills to Homecomings. Pastor

volunteered extra information when asked about whether she ran an ad for the New

Virginia property. The district court took prompt remedial action with regard to both

comments, and further gave the jury an "other bad acts" instruction in the final jury

instructions. No abuse of discretion occurred with regard to this evidence.

Fazio's final argument with regard to trial error is that he was denied his Sixth

Amendment right to testify and present a defense when the district court precluded

him from testifying about the sexual orientation of a previous witness, who was also

one of his former employees. Fazio testified on direct examination about how he

came to hire this agent:

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And without sounding too egotistical, she was a terrible Realtor at Iowa

Realty. A lot of it was her lifestyle. A lot of it she just didn't come

across good to people. She's very smart, very educated, and the most she

ever made in real estate was $16,000, and I just knew she had more

potential than that.

On cross-examination, the government followed up, asking Fazio if this agent

was unsuccessful before coming to work for him, and Fazio reiterated that she "wasn't

doing very well" at her former job, but that she has become a productive agent with

his training. On redirect, Fazio's counsel again began questioning him about this

agent's "lifestyle issues." At this point the government objected, and after some

colloquy with the trial judge, the court excluded it as irrelevant. Counsel for Fazio

argued that the government opened the door to this line of reasoning, and that Fazio

was trying to enhance his own credibility by pointing out that he hired her in spite of

her problems.

Subject to reasonable restrictions, the Sixth Amendment does grant the accused

the right to present relevant evidence in his favor. Chauncey, 420 F.3d at 875. The

district court found, however, that the proffered evidence was not relevant. We agree.

We also find that Fazio did manage to testify that the agent had "lifestyle" issues, a

common euphemism for referring to someone with a homosexual orientation. And,

Fazio's stated reason for wanting to introduce the evidence–to bolster his own

credibility by showing the jury that he hired the agent because he thought she had

good sales potential despite her previous low sales performance–was satisfied by his

other testimony. Fazio clearly testified that the agent had been a low performer at

Iowa Realty when he hired her. We, like the district court, fail to see the relevance of

Fazio's opinion that the reason she had not previously been a successful agent was

somehow related to her sexual orientation. This contention is without merit.

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D. Sentencing

Fazio makes several arguments relating to his sentence. He first contends that

the district court wrongly found facts to support the amount of loss and the abuse of

trust enhancement in violation of the Sixth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). We have repeatedly rejected similar

arguments since the Supreme Court decided Booker, and will do so in this instance

as well. E.g., United States v. Hines, 472 F.3d 1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 2007) (per

curiam) (noting that under Booker and this court's post-Booker precedent judicial factfinding is permissible at sentencing so long as the district court understands that the

Sentencing Guidelines are advisory). Because the district court treated the Guidelines

as advisory, Fazio's argument fails.

Fazio next alleges that the district court's determination of total loss in the case,

which impacted his Guidelines range, was incorrect. We review the district court's

interpretation of loss as used in the Guidelines de novo, and its calculation of loss for

clear error. United States v. Craiglow, 432 F.3d 816, 820 (8th Cir. 2005). Under the

clearly erroneous standard, we will affirm the trial court's decision unless it is not

supported by substantial evidence, was based on an erroneous view of the law, or we

are left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made after reviewing the entire

record. United States v. Wallraff, 705 F.2d 980, 987 (8th Cir. 1983).

The district court calculated the amount of loss as follows: Fazio/Olson

purchased the New Virginia property for $48,000, and then prior to closing on this

sale with Homecomings, obtained a subsequent offer to purchase for $110,000–a

difference of $62,000. The court deducted a total of $3,500 for roofing repairs and

the new carpet installed at the New Virginia property. The court further deducted

$2,000 for a payment made to Jordan for additional repairs after he bought the

property. Accordingly, the loss calculation for the wire fraud was set at $56,500. The

district court then added in $1,650 for the mail fraud reimbursement count. The final

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loss to Homecomings was calculated at $58,150. Because the loss was between

$30,000 and $70,000, Fazio's offense level was increased by six levels. United States

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(b).

Fazio argues that he spent close to $25,000 on improvements that should be

deducted from the loss calculation. The district court rejected Fazio's assertion that

he spent this much on repairs to the property, finding that the only repairs to the

property supported by the record were for roof repair and new carpeting, which he

calculated to be $3,500. 

We agree with Fazio that the record supports more than $3,500 in repairs. The

roof repairer testified at trial that he billed Fazio approximately $4,600 and was paid

this amount. Olson testified that trash removal, painting, and drywall work were

performed on the property before it was sold to Jordan. Jordan also indicated that

when he first looked at the property, there was much trash (old cars and appliances)

that needed to be removed. So, it seems clear that the district court's credit to Fazio

of $3,500 is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. The roof repair alone

was more than that, and it is undisputed that this amount was paid by Fazio. However,

assuming arguendo that all of Fazio's assertions about the cost of repairs to the New

Virginia house are true–$25,000 as advocated in his brief–this does not change the

Guidelines calculation of between $30,000-$70,000 in loss. Subtracting $25,000 from

$58,150 still leaves a loss calculation of $33,150.

Thus, in order for us to reverse on this issue, we must agree with Fazio's other

arguments about the district court's loss calculation. In this regard, Fazio argues that

he personally received no benefit from the New Virginia sale. We agree that the

record is clear that Fazio in no way profited from the New Virginia transaction. He

is still paying on the original $45,000 note from Polk County Bank. But that does not

mean Homecomings did not suffer a loss. Generally, loss under the Guidelines is the

greater of actual or intended loss, and the court need only make a reasonable

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estimation. United States v. Scott, 448 F.3d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 2006). Fazio was

convicted by the jury for misrepresenting to Homecomings that Olson bought the

property, when it was actually him, and for failing to disclose that he had another offer

for substantially more money before the Homecomings-Olson transaction closed. If

relations between Olson and Fazio had not soured, he very likely would have made

a significant profit on the transaction. The fact that due to his personal circumstances

he did not profit from the transaction does not preclude Homecomings from suffering

either an actual or intended loss.

Fazio also argues that the loss calculation fails to take into account the amount

of money that the quick sale to Olson saved Homecomings, if for example, it had been

required to market the property for an extended period of time. Fazio's arguments fail

because we cannot fault the district court for failing to speculate about the amount of

money that Homecomings may have saved because of the quick sale to Olson.

We grant particular deference to the district court's loss calculations because of

its "unique ability to assess the evidence and estimate the loss." Id.; U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1,

cmt. n. 3(C). We find that the district court has made a reasonable estimation of loss

in this case, despite our conclusion that Fazio should have been credited with more

that $3,500 in repairs to the property. All of the district court's remaining conclusions

are supported by substantial evidence in the record, and the resulting estimation of

loss between $30,000 and $70,000 is reasonable. Accordingly, we deny Fazio's

arguments on this point.

Fazio next challenges the district court's application of a sentencing

enhancement for an abuse of a position of trust. We review the district court's

conclusion that Fazio occupied a position of trust for clear error. United States v.

Erhart, 415 F.3d 965, 972 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1181 (2006). A

position of public or private trust is characterized by professional or managerial

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discretion, and the abuse of trust enhancement applies where the offender has abused

discretionary authority entrusted to the defendant by the victim. Id.

The district court applied the enhancement because of Fazio's position as a real

estate agent retained by Homecomings, an out-of-state company relying on him to be

honest and forthright with them. In Erhart, we affirmed the application of an

enhancement as applied to a chiropractor who submitted inflated claims to insurance

companies. Id. at 972. We rejected the Erhart defendant's argument that the insurance

companies permitted him little professional discretion because they closely scrutinized

his billings, noting that the fraud "continued as it did precisely because the insurance

companies trusted Erhart and the accuracy of the claims that he supplied them." Id.

Similarly, Fazio argues that Homecomings set many of the parameters of their

business relationship, and that he therefore did not occupy a position of trust. We

disagree and find that the district court did not clearly err in applying the abuse-oftrust enhancement. Like the chiropractor in Erhart, Fazio was responsible for

representing past events truthfully to a remote reimbursing company. And, with

regard to the New Virginia property, Homecomings clearly indicated that it would not

sell to its listing agents. Fazio easily sidestepped that requirement by filling in another

person's name on the offer, when he was obviously the person buying the New

Virginia property. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Fazio occupied

and abused a position of trust. 

Fazio next argues that his sentence was unreasonable. A sentencing court acts

unreasonably if it fails to consider a matter of relative importance, gives undue weight

to an improper or irrelevant matter, or arrives at a sentence outside of the range

justified by the facts of the case. United States v. Medearis, 451 F.3d 918, 920 (8th

Cir. 2006). Fazio argues that the district court gave significant weight to the following

improper or irrelevant factors: acquitted conduct, his failure to admit wrongdoing, and

submitting inconsistent financial statements to the probation office.

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We note that the district court followed the sentencing procedure set forth in United

States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1002-03 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 276 (2005),

in fashioning Fazio's sentence. Based on many factors, including the loss calculation

and the abuse-of-trust enhancement, the district court determined that the Guidelines

range was eighteen to twenty-four months. The district court considered the factors

set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and sentenced Fazio to twenty-four months–the high

end of the Guidelines range.

Our reasonableness review is akin to the abuse of discretion standard.

Medearis, 451 F.3d at 920. The sentencing transcript reflects that the district court did

consider all of the things that Fazio complains about. However, it was within its

discretion to do so. Accordingly, we find that the court did not act unreasonably in

refusing to sentence Fazio below the Guidelines range. We find no abuse of discretion

in the district court's ultimate sentence of twenty-four months' imprisonment.

Finally, Fazio contends that the district court erred in ordering him to pay

$13,115 in restitution to Homecomings. In determining whether to order restitution,

the district court shall consider the amount of loss sustained by the victim, the

financial resources and earning ability of the defendant, and any other factors deemed

appropriate by the district court. United States v. Berndt, 86 F.3d 803, 808-09 (8th

Cir. 1996). 

The district court set the restitution amount the same as the loss

amount–$58,150, but reduced that award by the amount that Olson's attorney paid to

the United States Marshal's office, $45,035, and ordered Fazio to pay the balance,

$13,115. We have previously found that in setting the loss amount at $58,150, the

district court erred in not giving Fazio appropriate credit for repairs made to the New

Virginia property. Although denial of credit was not enough to make a difference for

purposes of the loss calculation under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, it does make a difference in

the restitution. While the record is not entirely clear as to the amount Fazio should

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be credited for repairs, it is clearly more than the $3,500 applied by the district court.

The amount may not equal exactly $13,115, but our review of the record indicates that

Homecomings will be adequately made whole when the government remits to it the

$45,035 held by the Marshal's office. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's

award of restitution. 

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm Fazio's conviction and sentence, and remand to the district court to

deny the motion for new trial and vacate the award of restitution. 

______________________________

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