Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-07011/USCOURTS-ca13-15-07011-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert J. Macak
Appellant
Robert A. McDonald
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ROBERT J. MACAK,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-7011

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 13-2418, Judge William A. 

Moorman.

______________________ 

Decided: February 10, 2015

______________________ 

ROBERT J. MACAK, Kankakee, IL, pro se.

SOSUN BAE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also 

represented by JOYCE R. BRANDA, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

ALLISON KIDD-MILLER; BRIAN D. GRIFFIN, Y. KEN LEE, Office of 

General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans 

Affairs, Washington, DC. 

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MACAK v. MCDONALD 2

______________________ 

Before WALLACH, TARANTO, and HUGHES, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Appellant Robert Macak appeals the August 29, 2014, 

decision of the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) affirming the decision 

of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”) “denying 

entitlement to initial disability ratings in excess of twenty 

percent each for cervical degenerative arthritis; frozen left 

shoulder secondary to cervical degenerative arthritis; and 

frozen right (major) shoulder also secondary to cervical 

degenerative arthritis beginning November 18, 2003.” 

Macak v. McDonald, No. 13-2418 (Vet. App. Aug. 29, 

2014) (Resp’t’s App. 8–16) (“Decision”). Because Mr. 

Macak only presents questions of fact and the Veterans 

Court’s decision was not based on an interpretation of a 

statute or regulation, this court lacks jurisdiction to 

address his appeal. 

BACKGROUND

I.

Mr. Macak served on active duty in the United States 

Army from 1983 to 1986. In October 1991, Mr. Macak 

filed a claim of entitlement to service-connected benefits 

for disabilities of the neck, spine, right hand, and right 

arm caused by a truck accident during his service in 

Germany in 1985. In May 1993, a Veterans Affairs (“VA”) 

regional office (“RO”) denied Mr. Macak’s claims and 

classified them as arthritis of the neck, spine, right arm, 

and hand. Mr. Macak subsequently filed a Notice of 

Disagreement (“NOD”) and appealed the RO’s decision to 

the Board. 

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MACAK v. MCDONALD 3

In March 1999, the Board issued a decision denying 

Mr. Macak’s entitlement to service-connected benefits for 

“arthritis of multiple joints, including the spine, right 

hand and right arm.” Decision, at 2 (internal citation and 

quotation omitted). Mr. Macak appealed the decision to 

the Veterans Court, which vacated the Board’s decision 

and remanded the claims. 

In September 2001, “the Board remanded Mr. Macak’s 

claim for further development.” Id. (citation omitted). 

The VA subsequently obtained an October 2001 VA 

treatment record that explained “Mr. Macak’s right and 

left shoulders had ‘restriction of movement up to halfway 

on flexion and abduction.’” Id. (internal citation and 

quotation omitted). Upon undergoing VA medical 

examinations of the spine and joints in November 2003, 

Mr. Macak was “diagnosed with ‘frozen shoulders both 

sides.’” Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted). A 

January 2004 MRI of Mr. Macak’s spine indicated that it 

exhibited a “normal alignment subsequent to his 

discectomy with ‘moderate spinal stenosis noted at C6-

7.’”1 Id. 

In March 2004, the RO granted Mr. Macak 

entitlement to service connection for cervical spondylosis2

of the spine, assigning a ten percent disability rating 

effective October 4, 1991, and a twenty percent disability 

1 C6 (6th Cervical Vertebra) is the sixth of seven 

cervical vertebrae in the neck, supporting the head and 

providing articulation of the head and neck above the 

thoracic vertebrae and the other caudal vertebrae of the 

spinal column. 

2 Cervical spondylosis is a degenerative joint disease 

affecting the cervical vertebrae, intervertebral disks, and 

surrounding ligaments and connective tissue, sometimes 

with pain or paresthesia radiating along the upper limbs 

as a result of pressure on the nerve roots. 

 

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MACAK v. MCDONALD 4

rating effective November 1, 2003. Id. Following this 

decision, in April 2004, Mr. Macak again submitted a 

NOD. Id. 

In April 2005, pursuant to 38 C.F.R . § 4.30, “the RO 

issued a rating decision granting a temporary 100% 

convalescent rating, effective April 16, 1992, to August 31, 

1992, as a result of ‘surgical treatment’ for a spine 

disability.”3 Id. at 2–3. In addition, the RO granted a 

3 38 C.F.R. § 4.30) states: 

A total disability rating (100 percent) will be 

assigned without regard to other provisions 

of the rating schedule when it is established 

by report at hospital discharge (regular 

discharge or release to non-bed care) or 

outpatient release that entitlement is 

warranted under paragraph (a)(1), (2) or (3) 

of this section effective the date of hospital 

admission or outpatient treatment and 

continuing for a period of 1, 2, or 3 months 

from the first day of the month following 

such hospital discharge or outpatient 

release. The termination of these total 

ratings will not be subject to § 3.105(e) of 

this chapter. Such total rating will be 

followed by appropriate schedular 

evaluations. When the evidence is 

inadequate to assign a schedular evaluation, 

a physical examination will be scheduled and 

considered prior to the termination of a total 

rating under this section.

(a) Total ratings will be assigned under this 

section if treatment of a service-connected 

disability resulted in:

 

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MACAK v. MCDONALD 5

twenty percent disability rating for cervical degenerative 

arthritis effective September 1, 1992. Id. at 3. Finally, 

the RO assigned a ten percent disability rating for 

quadriparesis4 of the left upper extremity, right lower 

extremity and left lower extremity, effective October 4, 

1991. 

After the RO’s rating decision, Mr. Macak submitted a 

statement of disagreement concerning the effective dates 

and disability ratings assigned. Id. at 3. The RO 

interpreted this as a substantive appeal of Mr. Macak’s 

March 2004 rating decision. In October 2007, the Board 

issued a decision denying higher initial disability ratings 

for cervical spine spondylosis and for left and right frozen 

shoulders, and remanded several issues to the regional 

office for a Statement of the Case. Id. Mr. Macak 

subsequently appealed this decision to the Veterans 

Court. 

In April 2009, the parties entered into a joint motion 

to vacate the Board’s decision regarding the Board’s

denial of Mr. Macak’s claims for increased initial 

disability ratings in excess of twenty percent for cervical 

spine spondylosis and frozen left and right shoulder. Id. 

The Veterans Court granted the parties’ motion in May 

2009. 

On remand, in February 2010 the Board remanded 

the issues that were the subject of the joint motion––Mr. 

Macak’s entitlement to increased initial ratings for 

cervical spine spondylosis and for left and right frozen 

shoulders. Id. Subsequently, in May 2010, “Mr. Macak 

(1) Surgery necessitating at least one month 

of convalescence (Effective as to outpatient 

surgery March 1, 1989.). 4 Quadriparesis, also called tetraparesis, is a 

muscular weakness affecting all four limbs. 

 

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MACAK v. MCDONALD 6

underwent a VA medical examination for cervical 

degenerative arthritis and bilateral frozen shoulders.” Id. 

at 4. After the examination, the RO issued a 

supplemental statement of the case (“SSOC”). However, 

in November 2010, the Board again remanded the issues 

on appeal for additional development. In December 2010, 

the RO issued another SSOC. 

In April 2013, the Board denied Mr. Macak’s claims 

for entitlement to disability ratings in excess of twenty 

percent for both cervical degenerative arthritis and a

frozen left shoulder.5 The Board found nothing in the 

record to indicate Mr. Macak’s pain was beyond what was 

contemplated by the diagnostic criteria used for rating 

Mr. Macak’s spine disability. 

The Board awarded a thirty percent disability rating 

prior to November 18, 2013, for Mr. Macak’s frozen right 

shoulder. However, it denied entitlement to a rating in 

excess of twenty percent after November 18, 2013. Mr. 

Macak subsequently appealed the Board’s decision to the 

Veterans Court. 

II.

On appeal to the Veterans Court, the court concluded 

Mr. Macak “failed to demonstrate that the Board clearly 

erred in denying entitlement to higher initial disability 

evaluations for cervical degenerative arthritis and frozen 

bilateral shoulders.” Decision, at 8. The court found the 

5 The Board found Mr. Macak’s frozen left shoulder 

did not warrant a disability rating greater than twenty 

percent because a May 2010 examination noted his range 

of motion was pain free on forward flexion and abduction 

to sixty degrees, which is greater than the range of motion 

that warrants a rating in excess of twenty percent. 

 

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MACAK v. MCDONALD 7

Board’s selection of a diagnostic code6 was not arbitrary, 

capricious or an abuse of discretion. Finally, the court 

concluded the Board “provided a statement of reasons or 

bases for its decision adequate to enable [Mr. Macak] to 

understand the precise basis for the Board’s decision.” Id. 

On September 4, 2014, Mr. Macak filed a motion to 

the Veterans Court for single judge reconsideration, and 

asked for oral argument. On September 26, 2014, the 

court denied Mr. Macak’s motion, stating it had 

“previously considered the matter and [] declined to set 

oral argument following careful consideration of the law 

and the Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure.” Macak 

v. McDonald, No. 13-2418 (Vet. App. Sep. 26, 2014)

(Resp’t’s App. 4–5) (“Order”). The court found the Board’s 

August 29, 2014 decision did not overlook or 

misunderstand any points of law or fact. The court 

entered judgment on October 17, 2014. Mr. Macak 

appeals to this court. 

DISCUSSION

I. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Address Mr. Macak’s 

Claims 

This court’s jurisdiction to review Veterans Court 

decisions is limited by statute. Under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), 

this court may review “the validity of a decision of the 

[Veterans] Court on a rule of law or of any statute or 

regulation . . . or any interpretation thereof (other than a 

determination as to a factual matter) that was relied on 

by the [Veterans] Court in making the decision.” 

Therefore, this court decides “all relevant questions of 

law” and sets aside any regulation or interpretation of the 

Veterans Court that is “(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 

6 Diagnostic coding is the translation of written 

descriptions of disease, disorders, illness and injuries into 

codes from a particular classification. 

 

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MACAK v. MCDONALD 8

of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) 

contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or 

immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 

authority, or limitations, or in violation of a statutory 

right; or (D) without observance of procedure required by 

law.” Id. § 7292(d)(1).

This court reviews the Veterans Court’s legal 

determinations de novo. Rodriguez v. Peake, 511 F.3d 

1147, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The “Veterans Court’s legal 

determinations regarding the validity of a law or any 

interpretation thereof” is reviewed without deference. Id. 

However, this court is expressly prohibited from 

reviewing factual findings or applications of law to fact 

that do not present a constitutional issue. 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(d)(2) (stating absent a constitutional issue, this 

court “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual 

determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as 

applied to the facts of a particular case”).

In his appeal, Mr. Macak does not argue the Veterans 

Court erred in its interpretation of any statute or 

regulation in denying his appeal. Additionally, Mr. 

Macak does not present any constitutional issues. 

Finally, the Veterans Court’s decision was not based on 

the interpretation of any statute or regulation and it did 

not make a decision on a rule of law. Accordingly, this 

court does not possess jurisdiction over his arguments. 

Mr. Macak first argues the court erred in failing to 

consider his motion for reconsideration. Specifically, Mr. 

Macak argues “[t]he court misinterpreted [his] dispute [] 

den[ying] clarification by oral argument.” Pet’r’s Br. 1. 

Second, Mr. Macak contends “he has repeatedly proved 

evidence was not only fabricated by doctors but crucial 

evidence was being omitted constantly by [the] VA.” Id. 

A court’s decision to grant or deny oral argument is 

discretionary. “The district courts are entitled to make 

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MACAK v. MCDONALD 9

rules limiting oral argument.” U.S. v. One 1974 Porsche 

911-S Vehicle Identification No. 9114102550, 682 F.2d 

283 (1st Cir. 1982) (citation omitted); cf. Goodbar v. 

Banner, 599 F.2d 431 (Fed. Cir. 1979) (stating that where 

issues were clear and case was not complex, request for 

oral argument would be denied). The Veterans Court 

concluded that “Rule 35(e) of [its] Rules of Practice and 

Procedure requires that a motion for reconsideration state 

‘the points of law or fact that the party believes the Court 

has overlooked or misunderstood.’” Order at 1. 

According to the court, “[b]ased on a thorough review of 

the pleadings and the record on appeal, . . . the single 

judge memorandum decision did not overlook or 

misunderstand any points of law or fact.” Id. 

Here, Mr. Macak does not argue the Veterans Court 

misinterpreted any rule of law, regulation or statutory 

provision. To the extent Mr. Macak’s appeal can be 

construed to challenge the Veterans Court’s conclusion 

that his motion for single judge reconsideration did not 

raise any issues requiring the court to grant oral 

argument, he contests the Veterans Court’s application of 

law to the facts of this case. However, because this court 

lacks jurisdiction to review “a challenge to a law or 

regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case,” 38 

U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2), it cannot address this issue. 

As to Mr. Macak’s contention regarding doctors’ 

fabrication of his records and the VA’s omission of 

evidence, the Veterans Court concluded Mr. Macak “failed 

to demonstrate that the 1983 and 1986 records––which, 

. . . predate the effective dates for the claims on appeal––

are relevant.” Decision, at 6. The court also determined 

that it did “not appear from the record that [Mr. Macak] 

adequately identified such records.” Id. at 6–7. Here, Mr. 

Macak’s claims solely raise issues of fact. Because his 

contentions constitute “a challenge to a factual 

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MACAK v. MCDONALD 10

determination,” this court does not have jurisdiction to 

entertain this issue. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). 

Finally, Mr. Macak argues the VA failed to satisfy its 

duty to assist him in obtaining medical records. 

Specifically, he contends medical records obtained by the 

“Chicago regional office disappeared” and “not once did 

[the] Chicago Office answer to where [the] files went.” 

Pet’r’s Br. 1. Under 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a)(1), “[t]he 

Secretary shall make reasonable efforts to assist a 

claimant in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate 

the claimant’s claim for a benefit under a law 

administered by the Secretary.” However, the Board’s 

determination of whether the VA satisfied its duty to 

assist is a finding of fact the Veterans Court reviews for 

clear error.7 See Nolen v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 183, 184 

(2000) (stating the determination whether the duty to 

assist was complied with will involve making factual 

determinations); see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 

49, 52 (1990). Here, similar to his previous argument, 

Mr. Macak’s contention presents a pure question of fact. 

Thus, Mr. Macak’s appeal is dismissed for lack of 

jurisdiction. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is 

DISMISSED

No costs. 

7 The Veterans Court determined the Board did not 

clearly err in concluding the Secretary satisfied his duty 

to assist the appellant in obtaining relevant records.

 

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