Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01347/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01347-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Lorna Manlolo Wolf
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

/nit.eel States Court of Appeal:· 

"""".-,f.'-, ('~ ... ~ ... :+ 

FEB 17 1988 

ROBER'f L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

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v. Nos. 87-1346 

87-1347 

ROY WOLF and LORNA MANLOLO WOLF, 

a/k/a LORNA MANLOLO MCDEVITT, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Wyoming 

(D.C. No. CR86-0067-01K) 

(D.C. No. CR86-0067-02K) 

Marvin J. Johnson, Edwards & Johnson, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for 

Defendants-Appellants. 

Richard A. Stacey, United States Attorney, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before ANDERSON, McWILLIAMS and BALDOCK. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Roy and Lorna Wolf were indicted on one count of second 

degree murder, in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 1111, 1 and aiding and 

1 18 u.s.c. § llll(a) provides: 

Murder is the unlawful killing of a human 

being with malice aforethought. Every murder 

perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any 

Appellate Case: 87-1347 Document: 010110018168 Date Filed: 02/17/1988 Page: 1 
2 abetting second degree murder, in violation of 18 u.s.c § 2 •. A 

jury found both defendants guilty as charged. Roy Wolf was 

sentenced to confinement for eighty years, with a minimum of 

twenty-five years to be served, and specially assessed fifty 

dollars. Lorna Wolf was sentenced to confinement for eighty 

years, with a minimum of twenty years to be served and deportation 

to the Philippines mandatory upon her release, and specially 

assessed fifty dollars. 

Appellant-defendant Roy Wolf was a Staff Sergeant in the 

United States Air Force stationed at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in 

Cheyenne, Wyoming. He is married to appellant-defendant Lorna 

Wolf, who joined him with their family at the base in August, 

1985. Their family consisted of three children from Lorna's prior 

marriage, Lorena McDevitt; Lisa McDevitt, and Jackie McDevitt, and 

a fourth child resulting from her marriage to Roy. 

2 

other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, 

and premeditated killing; or committed in the 

perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any 

arson, rape, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated 

from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously 

to effect the death of any human being other than 

him who is killed, is murder in the first degree. 

Any other murder is murder in the second degree. 

18 u.s.c. § 2 provides: 

(a) Whoever commits an offense against the 

United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, 

induces or procures its commission, is punishable 

as a principal. 

(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done 

which if directly performed ·by him or another 

would be an offense against the United States 

is punishable as a principal. 

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In July of 1986, Jackie became ill. She complained of a 

stomachache, vomiting and diarrhea. Lorna took Jackie to two 

different doctors during the end of July and the beginning of 

August. Neither diagnosed a perforated bowel, but told Lorna that 

Jackie had acute gastroenteritis. One of the doctors made a 

follow-up telephone call to the Wolf residence during the second 

week of August to ask how Jackie was feeling, and Lorna told him 

that Jackie's health seemed to be ''fine." During July and August 

of 1986, Esther Gerrish, a friend of Lorna's, repeatedly urged 

Lorna to seek medical attention for Jackie because of her 

continuing illness. Lorna told her that she was waiting for money 

from her ex-husband, Jackie's natural father, to take Jackie for 

medical treatment. All military personnel and their families have 

free access to emergency care available at the base seven days a 

week, twenty-four hours a day. 

During the weekend of August 30, 1986, Gina Tobar, a family 

friend, had dinner at the Wolf home. She testified that she 

witnessed both Lorna and Roy hit Jackie in the face and pull her 

hair after dinner because Jackie was so ill that she was unable to 

eat or to ask to be excused from the table. Gina said that Roy 

then put Jackie in the backyard with the dog, and later immersed 

her in a bathtub of cold water. On September 1, 1986, Gina 

Tobor's husband, Sergeant Franklin Tobor, called emergency medical 

personnel to the Wolfs' house after Roy called him to tell him 

that Jackie was dead. When they arrived, they found Lorna 

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clutching Jackie tightly. Jackie was dead and her abdomen was 

unusually distended. 

An autopsy revealed that the cause of death was sepsis, a 

blood poisoning condition caused by peritonitis which resulted 

from a perforated bowel. Dr. Jill Gould, a forensic pathologist 

and a deputy coroner with the Denver County Coroner's Office, took 

microscopic sections of several organs in Jackie's body, 

especially those around the bowel and the perforation, and some 

gross tissue samples. She also took external photographs of 

Jackie at the autopsy, but did not take photographs of the 

internal tissues. In addition, Dr. Gould discerned that Jackie 

had suffered a severe neck injury, occurring between four hours 

and two days prior to her death. She also found fifty-nine 

bruises and abrasions covering Jackie's body. 

Defendants appeal on several grounds. First, they allege 

that they were denied due process because the government failed to 

produce gross tissue samples from Jackie's corpse after a court 

order was issued requiring production of all relevant medical 

evidence. Second, they maintain that the trial court erred in 

admitting statements against them under the coconspirator 

exception to the hearsay rule, Fed. R. Evid. 80l(d)(2)(E), 3 based 

on its summary finding that the statements were made "in 

furtherance" of a conspiracy between Roy and Lorna Wolf to commit 

3 Fed. R. Evid. § 80l(d)(2)(E) provides: 

Admission of a party-opponent: The statement is 

offered against a party and is ••. a statement 

by a coconspirator of a party during the course 

and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 

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child abuse, to conceal that abuse and to not seek a~equate 

medical treatment for Jackie. In the alternative, Roy Wolf claims 

that the trial court erred in admitting those statements because 

they were hearsay which did not fit within the coconspirator 

exception. Finally, the Wolfs propose that their due process 

rights were violated by the government's misconduct in coercing 

witnesses to testify in its favor, resulting in a fundamentally 

unfair trial. We reject these contentions and affirm for the 

reasons set forth below. 

I • 

Defendants allege that the government violated their 

constitutional rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1969), 

by failing to provide them with gross tissue samples of the 

deceased. In Brady, the Supreme Court held that "suppression by 

the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 

violates due process where the evidence is material either to 

guilt or to punishment •• r .'' Id. at 87; accord United States 

v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674 (1985). Where the defendant has made 

a specific request and the evidence is withheld, the verdict will 

be set aside if "the suppressed evidence might have affected the 

outcome of the trial." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 

(1976). The Supreme Court has defined evidence as material where 

it creates "a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability 

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sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." United States 

v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; accord United States v. Page, 828 F.2d 

1476, 1479 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 s. Ct. 510 (1987). 

Where the evidence is material such that the omission deprived the 

defendant of a fair trial, the verdict must be set aside due to 

the constitutional violation. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 

108. If the means of obtaining the exculpatory evidence has been 

provided to the defense, however, a Brady claim fails, even if the 

prosecution does not physically deliver the evidence requested. 

United States v. Dupuy, 760 F.2d 1492, 1501 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Consequently, to establish a Brady violation, the defense 

must prove that: (1) the prosecution suppressed the evidence; (2) 

the evidence would have been favorable to the accused; and (3) the 

suppressed evidence is material. See United States v. Latimer, 

780 F.2d 868, 871 (10th Cir. 1985). In determining whether a 

Brady violation occurred, this court must not view the suppressed 

evidence in isolation, but instead must review it in light of the 

entire record. Trujillo v. Sullivan, 815 F.2d 597, 613 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 296 (1987) ("Implicit in the 

standard of materiality is the notion that the significance of any 

particular bit of evidence can only be determined by comparison to 

the rest."). The court must examine both inculpatory evidence and 

exculpatory evidence. Id. 

In the instant case, the prosecution did not conceal evidence 

of the gross tissue samples. The district court ordered that "the 

defendants' motion for order compelling medical discovery be, and 

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the same is, hereby granted to the extent that only the medical 

evidence, slides, tests, etc., in the government's possession or 

at the Denver Coroner's office, or at the Fitzsimmons' base 

facilities in Colorado shall be produced; ••• " Rec. vol. I, 

doc. 21 at 3. In compliance with the discovery order, the 

prosecution gave defense counsel the autopsy report made by the 

coroner, Dr. Jill Gould. The autopsy report listed gross tissue 

samples as evidence collected during the examination. Autopsy 

Report, Ct. Ex. 20 at 11-12. Thus, the defense clearly had notice 

of the existence of that evidence. At oral argument before this 

court, the government represented that it had instructed defense 

counsel to contact the coroner directly for any physical evidence 

that might be needed at trial. The government further represented 

that it also called, with the approval of defense counsel, 

defendant's medical expert, Dr. Eckert, and asked the doctor to 

call the coroner for any information or evidence necessary for his 

trial testimony. Because the prosecution did not suppress the 

evidence, there was no Brady violation. 

II. 

Defendants allege that the district court erred by failing to 

provide the rationale underlying its determination that certain 

statements were admissible against the defendants under the 

coconspirator exception. These statements were made by nonconspirator declarants concerning what members of the conspiracy, 

Roy and Lorna, had revealed regarding the conspiracy. Once the 

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government presents evidence of the conspiracy, the trial court 

must make a factual determination that the government has 

established, by a preponderance of the evidence, the following 

elements: (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the defendant against whom 

the declaration is offered was a member of the conspiracy; and (3) 

the statement was made in the course of and in furtherance of the 

conspiracy. United States v. Hernandez, 829 F.2d 988, 993 (10th 

Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Peterson, 6li F.2d 1313, 1330-

31 (10th Cir. 1979)). In making this determination, the court may 

consider the hearsay statements as well as the independent 

evidence presented. Bourjaily v. United States, 107 s. Ct. 2775, 

2782 (1987). 

The district court in a separate hearing prior to trial held 

the evidence admissible on the ground that: 

there is 'substantial, independent' evidence that a 

'conspiracy,' or 'combination' between the defendant 

Roy Wolf and Lorna Wolf existed; that they were 

members of the conspiracy; that the statements 

were made in the course of and in furtherance of 

the conspiracy involving possible abuse or the 

possible attempt to cover up abuse and failure 

to seek adequate medical attention. 

Rec. vol. I, doc. 43 at 4. In making its determination, ~he 

district court reviewed the independent evidence of the conspiracy 

presented by the government: photographs of the deceased child 

which depict injuries, such as a grossly distended stomach and 

numerous bruises; statements of other witnesses regarding alleged 

prior acts of child abuse or neglect; and testimony of the 

defendants' friends who had seen Jackie prior to her death and had 

become concerned for her health after observing Jackie's bloated 

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stomach and general p~or appearance. Id. at 3-4. He found that 

the conspiracy involved "possible abuse or the possible attempt to 

cover up abuse and failure to seek adequate medical attention." 

Id. at 4. Consequently, the trial court made the requisite 

findings of fact regarding the conspiracy based upon the 

appropriate evidence. The court is not required to make 

additional findings to explain the rationale. See United States 

v. Davis, 766 F.2d 1452, 1458 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 

908 (1985). 

Defendant Roy Wolf argues in the alternative that the trial 

court erred in admitting certain statements against him under the 

coconspirator exception because those statements were not made "in 

furtherance" of the conspiracy, but rather were "mere narratives" 

and therefore inadmissible as beyond the scope of the 

coconspirator exception. Mere narratives are "statements relating 

to past events, even those connected with the operation of the 

conspiracy where the statement serves no immediate or future 

conspiratorial purpose." 4 D. Louisell & c. Mueller, Federal 

Evidence§ 427 (1980); see,~, United States v. Gomez, 810 F.2d 

947, 953 n.6 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 s. Ct. 2488 (1987) 

((citing United States v. Traylor, 656 F.2d 1326, 1332 (9th Cir. 

1981) (quoting United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1077 (9th 

Cir. 1975)) (stating that "mere narratives" are statements by a 

coconspirator which "'were either mere conversations or 'casual 

admissions of culpability to someone [they] had decided to 

trust"'); United States v. Posner, 764 F.2d 1535, 1538 (11th Cir. 

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1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2915 (1986) (recognizing that 

evidence which "spilled the beans'' regarding the conspiracy could 

not be considered to have advanced any objective of the 

conspiracy); United States v. Foster, 711 F.2d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 

1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103 (1984) (defining mere 

narratives as those statements which do not seek to induce the 

listener to deal with or further the conspiracy). 

Conversely, statements are admissible under the coconspirator 

exception if they are intended "'to promote the conspiratorial 

objectives."' United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 384 (10th 

Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1270 

(6th Cir. 1982)). The statements need not actually have furthered 

the conspiracy to be admissible. United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 

at 384 (recognizing that this circuit has ''no talismanic formula 

for ascertaining which conspirator's statements are 'in 

furtherance' of the conspiracy"). Statements made by a 

coconspirator to allay suspicions are admissible. United States 

v. Miller, 664 F.2d 94, 98 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 

854 (1982) {citing United States v. James, 510 F.2d 546, 549-50 

' 

(5th Cir. 1975)). Similarly, concealment of the crime done in 

furtherance of the main criminal objectives of the conspiracy 

falls within the coconspirator exception. United States v. 

Howard, 770 F.2d 57, 61 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Pennett, 

496 F.2d 293, 296 (10th Cir. 1974). In United States v. 

Grunewald, the Supreme Court noted that concealment furthers the 

main criminal objectives where "the successful accomplishment of 

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the crime necessitates concealment." Grunewald v. United States, 

353 U.S. 391, 405 (1957). Conversely, concealment after the main 

conspiracy has ended falls beyond the purview of the coconspirator 

exception. United States v. Silverstein, 737 F.2d 864, 867 (10th 

Cir. 1984). 

Under the coconspirator rule, the determination of whether to 

admit hearsay evidence is within the discretion of the trial 

judge. See United States v. Hernandez, 829 F.2d at 994-95; United 

States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d at 383. This court, therefore, will not 

reverse the conviction unless the district court abused its 

discretion. Id. (citing United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360 

(10th Cir. 1984)). 

Defendant Roy Wolf contends that five statements were 

erroneously admitted against him. 4 We consider each of those 

statements. First, Esther ·Gerrish testified that she noticed that 

Jackie had a patch over her eye, and asked Lorna the reason for 

the patch: 

Q. Now, did you have occasion at that time to 

ask either Lorna or Roy about the injury to 

Jackie's eye?-

A. I asked Lorna. It was preseason, it was a 

softball game or practice for a softball game, 

preseason, and I asked Lorna what happened to 

Jackie. 

Q. Would you tell the jury what Lorna told you 

about the matter? 

A. She told me she fell, and then when we started 

discussing the stitches, how may stitches she had, 

4 All five statements are admissible against Lorna Wolf as 

admissions against party-opponent pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 

80l(d)(2)(A). 

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and other things, she told me what happened, how--

I asked her, how did Jackie fall, and that's when she told 

me--

Q •. Would you tell the jury what Lorna told you? 

A. She told me that she was downstairs, and Roy came 

downstairs and told her to go upstairs, because Jackie was 

bleeding. 

When she went upstairs, Jackie had a washcloth over her 

eye, and Lorna told me that Jackie had her--her eye was 

bleeding, and that what happened, what she told me what 

happened, was that Roy said that Jackie was on his lap, 

sitting on his lap, and she was fidgeting, he wanted her 

to stay still, and she couldn't, so, she urinated 

on him, so he shoved her off of his lap, and she 

hit her eye on a piece of furniture, ••• 

Rec. vol. IV at 75-76. However, Gina Tobor testified that when 

she saw the same patch on Jackie's eye and asked Lorna how she had 

hurt her eye, Lorna gave an inconsistent response: 

Q. Do you remember seeing a cut over Jackie's eye 

at one time? 

A. Yes, when I met Lorna, I see some cut on her 

head, Jackie Lyn, in the right .side. 

Q. Was it over her eye? 

A. Yeah, in the right side, on the eye, and Lorna 

told me about that, she said--

Q. What did she say? 

A. She said that Roy hit Jackie Lyn, and he pushed 

her in the bed, that's why Jackie Lyn, she have a 

cut in the head, and then they bring Jackie 

off base, they don't--they--they wouldn't ask 

questions about Jackie Lyn, why she have cut on 

the head ••• Lorna said she don't want her 

husband to get her in trouble, so, they decided 

to take Jackie Lyn of~ base, in a hospital. 

Rec. vol. IV at 117. The contradictory explanations for the same 

injury to Jackie reveal that Lorna was attempting to divert 

suspicion from herself and to conceal the abuse in order to 

continue the conspiracy. The efficacy of the statements is 

irrelevant. Moreover, they indicate Lorna's failure to get 

adequate medical care for Jackie in accord with the conspiracy. 

Consequently, both statements are admissible against Roy under the 

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coconspirator exception because statements made by one 

conconspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy are attributed to 

each member of the conspiracy. United States v. Morris, 623 F.2d 

1245, 148 (10th Cir. 1980). 

Roy also contested the admissibility of a statement by Lorna 

to Esther Gerrish regarding the reason that the Wolfs failed to 

take Jackie to the hospital for her stomach distension. Several 

times throughout the summer, Esther Gerrish repeatedly exhorted 

Lorna to take Jackie to the doctor. As the summer wore on, Esther 

developed an antagonistic relationship with Lorna due to her 

concern about Jackie's rapidly deteriorating health and her 

suspicion of child abuse. At trial, Esther Gerrish testified 

regarding Lorna's malevolent neglect for Jackie's poor health: 

Qo Do you recall seeing Jackie again at another 

softball game? 

A. Uh·-huh. 

Q. How much later? 

A. Sometime in August. 

Q. As a result of your conversation with Jackie, 

did you confront Lorna? 

A. Yes o 

Q. When? 

Ao Right when I was still holding Jackie, later 

on, towards the end of the game. 

Q. What did you say to Lorna? 

A. I asked her, I think I know why you won't take 

Jackie to the hospital, and she didn't say anything, 

and I said, you won't take her because Roy hit 

her again, and she said yes, and I told her, you 

have to start thinking about Jackie, because she's 

going to get sicker and sicker, and what's going 

to happen, what is more important, taking Jackie 

to the hospital, or worrying about what's going to 

happen to Roy. 

And she just stood there, she didn't stay (sic) 

nothing, and then I was still holding Jackie, talking 

to her, and Roy walked up and took Jackie away from 

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me, and they left, and she didn't say anything, she 

didn't even reply, she just walked away. 

Rec. vol. IV at 81-82. Lorna's nonverbal response to Esther 

Gerrish's accusations is admissible against Lorna as an adoptive 

admission. 5 Her adoptive admission was a means by which she 

concealed the conspiracy in light of the context of the 

declarant's statement. The declarant was accusing one of the 

c~nspirators, Lorna, of covering-up child abuse. When confronted, 

Lorna did not reveal the conspiracy, but instead continued to 

cover-up by walking away. Consequently, it is a statement in 

furtherance of the conspiracy and therefore is admissible against 

Roy Wolf under the coconspirator exception. 

One week later, Esther Gerrish saw the Wolfs at a softball 

game and noticed that Jackie was still ill. She again questioned 

Lorna about her failure to take Jackie to a doctor: 

Q. As a result of your conversation with Jackie at 

that time, did you, again confront Lorna? 

A. Yes, but--

Q. What did you say to Lorna? 

A. I asked her, I asked her, Lorna, how come you 

haven't taken Jackie to the hospital, and she said 

that she was waiting for the girl's dad to send 

them some money so they could take her off base . 

. Rec. vol. IV at 83. This statement is admissible against Roy 

under the coconspirator exception because it is a statement which 

allayed Esther Gerrish's suspicions. See United States v. Miller, 

5 This is admissible against Lorna as an adoptive admission 

pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 80l(d)(2)(B). Where a person hears, 

understands and has the opportunity to deny an accusatory 

statement made in his presence, the statement and his failure to 

deny it are admissible against him as an adoptive admission. 

United States v. Coppola, 526 F.2d 764, 769-70 (10th Cir. 1975). 

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664 F.2d at 98. Moreover, by satisfying Esther Gerrish's concerns 

regarding Jackie's-health, Lorna covered up the conspiracy and 

indicated her unwillingness to seek necessary medical treatment 

for Jackie, thereby permitting continuance of the conspiracy. 

Another statement claimed inadmissible by Roy concerned a 

visit to the house by Gina Tobar. When Gina visited the Wolfs and 

saw Jackie lying on the floor, she testified that she asked Lorna 

why Jackie was lying there: 

Q. Now, Gina, I would like to have you remember 

forward a little bit, do you remember about the 

middle of July of 1986, and being over at Lorna 

and Roy's house? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Do you remember seeing little Jackie there at 

that time? 

A. I seen Jackie Lyn in the middle of July, when 

I visit Lorna in morning, I see Jackie Lyn laying 

on the floor, and then I asked my friend Lorna why 

she is laying down there, and she says, she was sick. 

Q. Did she say why she was sick? 

A. She said Roy hit Jackie Lyn in the stomach. That's 

why she was laying down there, for whole days. 

Rec. vol. IV at 118. This statement was inadmissible against Roy 

under the coconspirator exception because it is a mere narrative 

and does not further the conspiratorial objectives of abusing the 

child or covering-up the abuse. See United States v. Posner, 764 

F.2d at 1538. 

Although this statement was erroneously admitted against Roy, 

its admission did not constitute reversible error. See Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 103(a)(l). Where evidence of the defendant's guilt is 

proved by overwhelming evidence, an erroneous ruling may be 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Harrington v. California, 395 

U.S. 250, 254 (1969); see,~, United States v. Morales-

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Qionones, 812 F.2d 604, 610 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. 

Bibbero, 749 F.2d 581, 584 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 

1103 (1985). Moreover, there is no reversible error where the 

declarant testifies in court and is subject to cross-examination, 

regardless of whether opposing counsel actually questions the 

declarant. See United States v. Whalen, 526 F.2d 1117, 1119 (10th 

Cir. 1975). 6 After a thorough review of the entire record, this 

court finds that because there is overwhelming evidence of Roy 

Wolf's guilt, any hearsay statements erroneously admitted against 

Roy constituted harmless error. 

III. 

Finally, the Wolfs allege that the government misconduct in 

threatening witnesses to coerce their testimony in favor of the 

6 Although not addressed by the defendants on appeal, the 

government asserts in its brief that the confrontation clause was 

not violated and that there was no confrontation clause problem 

like that presented in United States v. Bruton, 391 U.S. 123, 124 

(1968). We agree. In Bruton, a co-defendant, Evans, told a 

postal inspector that he and petitioner had committed a robbery. 

Id. at 124. The postal inspector testified that the co-defendants 

had committed the robbery. Id. Evans did not take the stand. 

Id. at 136. Although limiting instructions were given to 

disregard the confession as against petitioner, petitioner argued 

nonetheless that his sixth amendment rights under the 

confrontation clause were violated. Id. The Supreme Court held 

that because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite 

instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating 

extrajudicial statements in determining petitioner's guilt, 

admission of Evans' confession in the joint trial violated 

petitioner's right of cross-examination secured by the 

confrontation clause. Id. at 136-37. 

Neither Bruton nor the confrontation clause was violated in 

this case because the declarant, Roy Wolf and Lorna Wolf all 

testified and were subject to cross-examination. See Nelson v. 

O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); United States v. Shepherd, 739 F.2d 

510 (10th Cir. 1984). 

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government violated the Wolfs.' due process rights, resulting in 

fundamental error. They propose that the Air Force Office of 

Special Investigations threatened two witnesses, Franklin and Gina 

Tober, with Gina Tobor's deportation if they refused to provide 

favorable testimony for the government. 

Admission of testimony is within the trial court's 

discretion. United States v. Rothbart, 723 F.2d 752, 755 (10th 

Cir. 1983). This court will not deem the admission in error 

unless the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the 

testimony of those two witnesses. See id. We find that the trial 

court properly admitted the testimony because the evidence was 

relevant under Fed. R. Evid. § 403, and defense counsel had the 

opportunity, which he exercised, to fully cross-examine the 

witnesses on the issue of alleged coercion. See United States v. 

Neal, 718 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 818 

(1984). Thus, the jury was informed of the circumstances under 

which the written statements and testimony were given and was free 

to give the information whatever weight it desired, as well as to 

determine the credibility of the witnesses. See United States v. 

Shelton, 736 F.2d 1397, 1402 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 

857 (1984). Moreover, the two witnesses testified that they were 

not coerced by the Office of Special Investigation. See rec. vol. 

Vat 38. Because the trial court did not erroneously admit the 

testimony of these witnesses, it did not commit fundamental error 

in violation of the Wolfs' due process rights. 7 

7 The government raised the issue of whether defendants have 

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AFFIRMED. 

standing to raise the due process claim. Because we find no error 

by the trial court resulting in a due process violation, we 

decline to decide this issue. 

-18-

Appellate Case: 87-1347 Document: 010110018168 Date Filed: 02/17/1988 Page: 18