Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cr-01096/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cr-01096-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rafael Cruz-Ayon
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Rafael Cruz-Ayon,

Defendant. _________________________________

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No. CR 03-1096-PHX-SMM

 CV 05-2576-PHX-SMM (BPV)

ORDER

On September 8, 2006, Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco filed a Report and

Recommendation regarding Defendant’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (the “Motion”) (Dkt. 57.) Judge Velasco recommended that this

Court enter an order denying Claims One and Two of the Motion and granting an evidentiary

hearing on Claim Three. (Id. at 1.) On September 12, and September 21, 2006, the

Government and Defendant, respectively, filed Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation. (Dkt. 58, 59.) 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, this Court must

“make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made,”

and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made

by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391,

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1 The Government’s only objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation is

that the offense level on page 2, line 25, is a typographical error that should be “33,” not “23.” The

Court agrees, and therefore sustains the Government’s objection.

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1394 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Britt v. Simi Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir.

1983)). 

BACKGROUND

On March 8, 2004, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to

Possession with Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)

and 841(b)(1)(A). (Dkt. 23.)

Among other things, the parties stipulated that 4 kilograms of methamphetamine was

readily provable as being in Defendant’s possession for purposes of distribution, and that the

offense level under the Guidelines would be determined only as to this agreed amount. (Dkt.

33 at 2.) Defendant’s guilty plea was conditioned upon the understanding that the maximum

term he could receive was a term of imprisonment of life and a maximum fine of $4,000,000,

and a minimum term of 10 years imprisonment together with a 5 year supervised release term.

(Id. at 1-2.) If the sentence imposed by the Court was consistent with the terms of the plea

agreement, Defendant agreed to waive “any right to appeal or collaterally attack any matter

pertaining to [his] prosecution and sentence.” (Id. at 3.)

Before sentencing, defense counsel filed objections to the Pre-Sentence Investigation

Report (the “PSR”). (Dkt. 31.) Counsel argued that Defendant (i) should have received a minor

role in the offense; (ii) objected to a two-level enhancement for a firearm; and (iii) objected to

not receiving “safety valve” in his Guidelines calculation. (Id.) 

At sentencing, the Court overruled each of Defendant’s objections. (Dkt. 46.) The PSR

was revised following the Court’s findings to reflect a total offense level of 33.1

On October 19, 2004, Defendant was sentenced to a prison term of 135 months, the low

end of the Guidelines range for a total offense level of 33 and a criminal history of I. (Dkts. 35,

46 at 19, 24-28.) During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel raised an issue regarding the

constitutionality of the Guidelines in light of United States v. Detwiler, 338 F.Supp.2d 1166 (D.

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Or. 2004), which holds the Guidelines unconstitutional as a violation of separation of powers

principles (the “Separation of Powers Argument”), and requested that Defendant be permitted

to preserve the issue on appeal. (Dkt. 46 at 19-22.) At the conclusion of sentencing, after

Defendant and counsel for both parties agreed that he had been sentenced in accordance with

the provisions of the plea agreement, the Court ruled that Defendant had knowingly and

voluntarily waived his right to take an appeal or collaterally attack the matter, with the

exception of the Separation of Powers Argument, which Defendant could raise on appeal or by

collateral attack. (Id. at 29-32.)

On February 10, 2005, Defendant filed a “MOTION: to withdraw the plea, or for breach

of contract, (plea agreement), or to reinforce the agreement” (the “Motion to Withdraw Plea”).

(Dkt. 36.) On February 22, 2005, Defendant filed a “MOTION to take an appeal as of right”

(the “Motion to Appeal”). (Dkt. 38.) The Motion to Appeal was originally sent to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals, which returned it to the District Court. (Id.) On February 25, 2005,

the Government responded to the Motion to Withdraw Plea (dkt. 39). On March 8, 2005,

Defendant filed a reply, attaching as exhibits two letters from defense counsel stating that

Defendant had waived his right to file a notice of appeal. (Dkt. 40, Ex. 2.) On March 24, 2005,

the District Court denied Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Plea and Motion to Appeal without

prejudice to Defendant filing a Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 Motion. (Dkt. 41 at 1-3.)

On August 25, 2005, Defendant filed the instant Motion, raising three claims for relief:

(i) Claim One: Fifth Amendment violation by breach of the plea agreement regarding

Defendant’s sentencing range;

(ii) Claim Two: Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations for sentencing Defendant under

mandatory, not advisory, Sentencing Guidelines; and

(iii) Claim Three: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel based on the failure of Defendant’s

attorney to file a notice of appeal. (Dkt. 47 at 4-5.) 

On November 30, 2005, the Government filed a Response to Defendant’s Motion and

an affidavit from defense counsel denying that Defendant directed him to file a notice of appeal.

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2

 As previously stated, except with respect to a minor typographical error, which the Court has

corrected, the Government does not object to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. See

note 1, supra. 

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(Dkts. 53-54.) Defendant submitted a Reply to the Government’s Response, in which he stated

that he directed defense counsel to file a notice of appeal and he failed to do so. (Dkt. 56.) 

After reviewing the filings in this matter, the Magistrate Judge recommended that Claims

One and Two be denied because Defendant waived the right to present both issues on appeal

and by collateral attack. With respect to Claim Three, however, the Magistrate Judge

recommended that the Court enter an order granting an evidentiary hearing to determine

whether Defendant’s assertions – that he told his attorney to file an appeal and that his attorney

refused to do so – are true. (Dkt. 57.) 

DISCUSSION2

Claim One

Defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge’s determination that he validly waived the

right to collaterally attack the sentencing range used to calculate his term of imprisonment.

(Dkt. 59 at 1-4.) In his Objections, however, Defendant relies on the very same arguments he

presented to the Magistrate Judge: (i) his “attorney merely told him to sign the Plea Agreement

and that he would get 87 months as a sentence”; and (ii) he does not read English and his

attorney “never explained me [sic] I was surrendering my right to appeal or collaterally attack

my sentence.” (Dkt. 59 at 3.) After a de novo review of the record and the factual analysis and

legal conclusions of Judge Velasco’s Report and Recommendation, the Court overrules

Defendant’s objections and hereby adopts and incorporates Judge Velasco’s Report and

Recommendation regarding Claim One. See dkt. 57 at 4-7.

Claim Two

Defendant objects to Judge Velasco’s determination that he validly waived the right to

attack his sentence based on the Sixth Amendment violation established in United States v.

Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). (Dkt. 59 at 4-5.) In his Objections, Defendant contends the

Magistrate Judge’s ruling is premature because, if he prevails on his ineffective assistance of

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counsel claim, the Booker argument will become “ripe for judicial process.” (Id. at 4-5.)

Accordingly, Defendant requests that the Court hold “its decision regarding Count Two in

abeyance, until such time as the evidentiary hearing on Count Three is completed.” (Id. at 5.)

For the following reasons, the Court will adopt the Report and Recommendation of Judge

Velasco and deny Claim Two. First, for the reasons set forth by Judge Velasco in denying

Claim One, the Government did not breach the plea agreement. See dkt. 57 at 4-6. Second,

as Defendant acknowledged at sentencing, the sentence he received was consistent with the

terms of the plea agreement. See dkt. 46 at 27-29. Because the Government did not breach the

plea agreement, and the sentence imposed was consistent with the terms of the plea agreement,

Defendant has waived the right to appeal or collaterally attack his sentence on any ground other

than the Separation of Powers Argument. Thus, Defendant has waived the right to raise the

Booker issue set forth in Claim Two. 

Claim Three

 Defendant does not object to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that he receive

an evidentiary hearing on Claim Three, but he does object “[t]o the extent that the Court did

not grant [Defendant’s] third ground claiming that he suffered injury from ineffective

assistance of counsel.” (Dkt. 59 at 5, emphasis in original.) This objection can be

interpreted in two different ways. The Court overrules both interpretations.

The Court overrules a literal interpretation of Defendant’s objection because, by

finding that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on Claim Three, Judge Velasco did find

that Defendant suffered an injury – also referred to as “prejudice” – from his attorney’s

alleged refusal to file a notice of appeal. See United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d

1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2005) (“the defendant does not have to show that he might have

prevailed on appeal to show prejudice, just that he probably would have appealed had his

lawyer asked.”) Thus, Defendant’s objection is misplaced.

The Court overrules Defendant objection if he is asserting that Judge Velasco should

have allowed him to file an appeal, rather than recommending that this Court order an

evidentiary hearing on Claim Three. 

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As stated by the Ninth Circuit, 

If a defendant, even one who has expressly waived his

right to appeal, files a habeas petition after sentencing and

judgment claiming that he ordered his attorney to appeal and his

attorney refused to do so, two things can happen. The district

court can hold an evidentiary hearing to decide whether

petitioner’s allegation is true, and if it is, vacate and reenter the

judgment, allowing the appeal to proceed. Or, if the state does

not object, the district court can vacate and reenter the judgment

without a hearing and allow the appeal to proceed, assuming

without deciding that the petitioner’s claim is true.

Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d at 1198 (emphasis added). As shown below, an evidentiary

hearing is required in the present case because there is a factual dispute as to whether

Defendant ordered his attorney to file an appeal and his attorney refused to do so.

After expressly waiving his right to collaterally attack or appeal his prosecution and

sentence on all issues except the Separation of Powers Argument, Defendant filed the instant

Motion alleging that he ordered his attorney to appeal and that his attorney refused to do so. 

See Dkt. 47 at 5, 9. The Government responded with an affidavit in which Defendant’s

attorney denies that Defendant directed him to file a notice of appeal. (Dkt. 54, Aff. at 2,

¶9.) However, the record is clear that defense counsel preserved an issue for appeal at

sentencing, that Defendant previously filed a Motion to Appeal, demonstrating his concern

and uncertainty over whether an appeal had been filed, and that Defendant submitted letters

from defense counsel stating that Defendant waived the right to file a notice of appeal. (Dkt.

46 at 29-30; Dkt. 38; Dkt. 40, Ex. 2.) The record also contains Defendant’s statement that

he instructed defense counsel to file a notice of appeal at the time he was sentenced and

“way before the 10 days frame expired, but [defense counsel] never did even though he said

he was going to file it.” (Dkt. 56 at 2.) Because the evidence on this issue is in dispute, and

Defendant’s allegations are not palpably incredible, an evidentiary hearing is required on

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Claim Three. See Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d at 1198-99. Thus, the Court adopts the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation on Claim Three.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation

of Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco in its entirety with the exception explained in

footnote one of this Order. (Dkt. 57.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or

Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is DENIED as to Claims One and Two only.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an evidentiary hearing on Claim Three shall take

place on January 11, 2007 at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 605, Phoenix, Arizona, 85003, before

the Honorable Stephen M. McNamee.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall appear in person at the

evidentiary hearing. In order to produce Defendant at the evidentiary hearing, the Court will

issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall send a copy of this

Order to all parties as well as to Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco.

DATED this 23rd day of October, 2006.

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