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Parties Involved:
Eric Behrens
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

ERIC BEHRENS, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 16-8002 

(D.C. Nos. 2:15-CV-00089-NDF and 

2:10-CR-00280-NDF-1) 

(D. Wyo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

_________________________________ 

Before KELLY, McKAY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

After his direct appeal proved unsuccessful, Eric Behrens sought relief under 

28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court denied Behrens’ § 2255 motion and his request 

for a certificate of appealability (COA). Behrens now asks us for a COA so he can 

appeal the district court’s decision. Because Behrens fails to “demonstrate that 

reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of” his Sixth Amendment 

claim “debatable or wrong,” we deny Behrens’ request for a COA and dismiss the 

appeal. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

 *

 This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the 

case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive 

value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

May 17, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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BACKGROUND

Four days before Behrens’ trial on federal drug charges was scheduled to 

begin, his trial counsel advised Behrens that he wasn’t prepared for trial and asked 

whether Behrens would be “willing to postpone the matter.” United States v. 

Behrens, 551 F. App’x 452, 460 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (Ebel, J., concurring 

in part and dissenting in part). Behrens acquiesced and trial counsel moved for a 

continuance, asserting he needed more time to prepare. Id. 

The trial court denied the motion for continuance. But when Behrens 

personally told the trial court that he was concerned about counsel’s level of 

preparedness, trial counsel admitted to the court that Behrens’ concerns were not 

unfounded: trial counsel had yet to contact a previously identified witness whose 

importance he initially overlooked. Id. at 460-61. 

By all indications, trial counsel’s failure to contact this potential witness was 

an oversight, not a strategic decision. See id. at 457 (majority opinion) (“Whether this 

delayed realization [regarding the witness’ importance] was the result of devoting 

time to other matters or [trial counsel’s] own misapprehension is not clear.”). Even 

the government recognized as much. See id. at 460-61 (Ebel, J., concurring in part 

and dissenting in part). Nevertheless, the trial court characterized Behrens’ concerns 

as implicating matters of trial strategy—matters it entrusted to counsel’s discretion. 

Id. at 461. So when trial counsel sought to withdraw from the case, the district court 

denied his request. But it did grant Behrens’ subsequent request to proceed pro se. Id. 

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The jury ultimately found Behrens guilty of one count each of conspiring to 

possess with intent to distribute and to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and (b)(1)(A); and possessing methamphetamine with 

intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). Facing a 

240-month prison sentence, Behrens appealed. In relevant part, he argued that his 

decision to represent himself at trial was involuntary “because he was forced to 

choose between appearing pro se or proceeding with unprepared counsel.” Behrens, 

551 F. App’x at 456. 

The majority of a divided panel of this court disagreed. Although the majority 

recognized that trial counsel admitted “he had yet to contact one witness whose 

importance he had not yet realized,” it reasoned that counsel still had time—“albeit at 

the last minute”—to contact that particular witness. Id. at 457. Thus, the majority 

concluded, “counsel could have provided reasonably effective assistance,” and 

Behrens’ decision to proceed pro se was voluntary. Id. 

After this court affirmed his convictions, Behrens sought post-conviction relief 

under § 2255. In relevant part, he asserted that appellate counsel was ineffective in 

failing to seek a limited remand to the trial court for purposes of expanding the 

record to support Behrens’ involuntary-waiver-of-counsel claim.1

 During that 

remand, Behrens said, appellate counsel could have provided an affidavit or 

 1

 Behrens also raised three additional grounds for relief in his motion. But in 

his application for COA, Behrens focuses solely on his claim that appellate counsel 

was ineffective in failing to provide an adequate record to support Behrens’ 

involuntary-waiver argument. Accordingly, we limit our discussion to that claim. 

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testimony from trial counsel in which trial counsel admitted to being unprepared for 

trial. Armed with that additional evidence, Behrens posited, the divided panel that 

rejected his involuntary-waiver argument on direct appeal would have reached a 

different result. 

The district court found Behrens’ ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel 

claim meritless and denied his § 2255 motion. And because the district court found 

that Behrens failed to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right,” it also denied his request for a COA. R. vol. 1, 155 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2)). 

DISCUSSION

Behrens argues that we should grant his request for a COA because the district 

court erred in rejecting his ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim. We may 

grant Behrens’ request only if he “demonstrate[s] that reasonable jurists would find 

the district court’s assessment of” that claim “debatable or wrong.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 

484. 

In support of his Sixth Amendment claim, Behrens provided the district court 

with a sworn affidavit in which he recounted a recent telephone conversation with 

trial counsel. During that conversation, Behrens attested, trial counsel stated that if 

“appellate counsel [had] been granted a limited remand,” trial counsel “would have 

testified that he was unprepared for trial.” R. vol. 1, 35. This evidence, Behrens 

argued, likely would have changed the outcome of his direct appeal. 

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The district court disagreed. First, it criticized Behrens for failing to provide 

any evidence beyond his own sworn affidavit that suggested trial counsel might have 

testified to his own unpreparedness. Second, it suggested that the record directly 

contradicted that assertion. 

For instance, the district court noted, trial counsel explicitly informed the trial 

court “that he was ready to proceed.” R. vol. 1, 150. Moreover, the district court 

maintained, “trial counsel essentially said that [any witnesses he failed to contact] 

were witnesses that Behrens wanted him to contact, but that counsel did not believe 

were necessary.” Id. Thus, the district court reasoned that “nothing in the record . . . 

suggest[ed] that Behrens’ trial counsel would provide a sworn affidavit stating he 

was unprepared to go to trial, when he was unwilling to state on the record at the time 

of the request for continuance that he was unprepared to go to trial.” Id. And because 

the record contained no evidence suggesting trial counsel would have testified to his 

own unpreparedness, the district court concluded, Behrens couldn’t demonstrate that 

appellate counsel’s failure to expand the record to contain such nonexistent testimony 

constituted deficient performance. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 

(1984) (explaining that defendant seeking to establish ineffective assistance of 

counsel must “[f]irst . . . show that counsel’s performance was deficient”). 

The district court’s analysis is problematic in two respects. First, we question 

the district court’s finding that the only witnesses trial counsel said he failed to 

contact were those he “did not believe were necessary.” R. vol. 1, 150. This 

characterization of the record overlooks an undisputed fact: whether “the result of 

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devoting time to other matters or his own misapprehension,” trial counsel admitted he 

“had yet to contact one witness whose importance” trial counsel realized on the eve 

of trial. Behrens, 551 F. App’x at 457. 

Second, we question the district court’s finding that the record belies Behrens’ 

assertion that trial counsel was willing to testify he was unprepared for trial. True, 

trial counsel did initially state before voir dire that he was prepared to proceed. But 

when the trial court questioned him about Behrens’ concerns, trial counsel was fairly 

candid about his own unpreparedness: trial counsel acknowledged, “[T]here are 

witnesses . . . that I haven’t yet called or interviewed”; admitted, “[F]or the last two 

months I have been working on other matters”; and allowed, “I can understand 

[Behrens’] concerns.” Behrens, 551 F. App’x at 460 (Ebel, J., concurring in part and 

dissenting in part). 

Under these circumstances, Behrens’ sworn statement that trial counsel said he 

was willing to testify to his own unpreparedness isn’t “wholly incredible.” United 

States v. Estrada, 849 F.2d 1304, 1307 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting Blackledge v. 

Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)). Nor is it “contradicted by the files and records 

before the court.” Putnam v. United States, 337 F.2d 313, 315 (10th Cir. 1964). Thus, 

the district court should have accepted it as true for purposes of evaluating Behrens’ 

Sixth Amendment claim. See id. We must do the same. See Owens v. United States, 

483 F.3d 48, 57 (1st Cir. 2007) (“If a district court dismisses a § 2255 claim without 

holding an evidentiary hearing, we take as true the sworn allegations of fact set forth 

in the petition ‘unless those allegations are merely conclusory, contradicted by the 

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record, or inherently incredible.’” (quoting Ellis v. United States, 313 F.3d 636, 641 

(1st Cir. 2002))). 

Nevertheless, we are constrained to agree with the district court’s 

conclusion—however cursory it might be—that Behrens failed to establish there was 

a reasonable probability he would have prevailed on direct appeal but for appellate 

counsel’s failure to obtain a limited remand for the purpose of expanding the record. 

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“The defendant must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.”); see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) 

(explaining that two-part Strickland test applies to allegations of ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel). 

The only evidence that Behrens suggests appellate counsel might have added 

to the record on remand is trial counsel’s statement that “he was unprepared for 

trial.”2

 R. vol. 1, 35. The problem is that Behrens fails to provide any details 

 2

 Because Behrens proceeds pro se, we liberally construe his filings. See Garrett v. 

Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). Thus, we might 

generously read Behrens’ request for a COA to suggest that appellate counsel was 

also ineffective in failing to expand the record to include an affidavit from Behrens 

stating that, immediately before Behrens asked to proceed pro se, trial counsel 

informed him that he still hadn’t contacted the witness he told the trial court he 

would contact. The district court didn’t evaluate this argument—perhaps because 

Behrens’ § 2255 motion didn’t squarely present it. And we typically won’t address an 

argument advanced for the first time in a request for a COA. See United States v. 

Viera, 674 F.3d 1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 2012). In any event, Behrens doesn’t assert 

that he told appellate counsel about trial counsel’s disclosure. Thus, we decline to 

grant a COA on this basis. See United States v. Miller, 907 F.2d 994, 999 (10th Cir. 

1990) (explaining that “[t]he reasonableness of an attorney’s decision not to conduct 

an investigation is directly related to the information the defendant has supplied” 

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regarding trial counsel’s alleged unpreparedness. It is possible that in admitting he 

was unprepared, trial counsel was alluding to new and different deficiencies that 

weren’t already before this court when a divided panel affirmed Behrens’ 

convictions. Or perhaps trial counsel was simply referring to facts the panel majority 

had before it but found unproblematic, e.g., that trial counsel failed to realize that a 

previously identified witness was important to his theory of the case until the eve of 

trial, and that “for the last two months,” trial counsel had “been working on other 

matters.” Behrens, 551 F. App’x at 460 (Ebel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 

part). 

Without more information about the testimony trial counsel might have been 

willing to provide, we can’t say that reasonable jurists would debate the district 

court’s conclusion that Behrens failed to establish there was a reasonable probability 

that the result of his direct appeal would have been different but for appellate 

counsel’s failure to expand the record to include that testimony. See Slack, 529 U.S. 

at 484; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Accordingly, we deny Behrens’ request for a 

 

(quoting Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 1986))); see also Davis 

v. Roberts, 425 F.3d 830, 834 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that we may deny COA on any 

basis that finds support in the record). 

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COA and dismiss the appeal. 

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge 

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