Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-03105/USCOURTS-caDC-10-03105-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joshua Godoy
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 20, 2012 Decided February 5, 2013

No. 10-3105

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

JOSHUA GODOY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cr-00161-1)

Jerry Ray Smith, appointed by the court, argued the cause 

and filed the briefs for appellant.

Angela G. Schmidt, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III,

Elizabeth Trosman, and David S. Johnson, Assistant U.S. 

Attorneys.

Before: TATEL, GARLAND, and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

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GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Over the course of four years, 

Joshua Godoy committed multiple acts of identity theft. He 

acquired birth dates, social security numbers, and the like

from strangers, acquaintances, and even family members. 

With that information, he drained bank accounts, bought cell 

phones on others’ credit, and had Costco ship him a fifty-inch 

plasma screen TV. The government caught him, and Godoy 

quickly pled guilty to the federal crime of mail fraud. See 18 

U.S.C. § 1341. The district court sentenced him to sixty

months in prison followed by thirty-six months of supervised 

release and ordered him to pay $67,764.33 in restitution to his 

victims. Godoy appeals his sentence, and we have jurisdiction 

to hear his appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We affirm 

the district court, with one modification.

I

At the outset, the government argues that Godoy’s plea 

agreement waived his right to this appeal. We might agree if 

we looked only to the language of the plea. Godoy expressly 

waived “the right to appeal his sentence or the manner in 

which it was determined pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742, except 

to the extent that the Court sentences [him] to a period of 

imprisonment longer than the statutory maximum.”1 Godoy’s

sentence is well below the twenty-year statutory maximum for 

mail fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341. But in a colloquy during his

plea hearing, the district court mischaracterized the meaning 

of the waiver in a fundamental way: “[Y]ou have given up 

your right to appeal except should you come to believe after 

consulting with counsel that the Court has done something 

illegal, such as imposing a period of imprisonment longer 

 1 18 U.S.C. § 3742 enables defendants to appeal sentencing 

decisions, but limits their ability to appeal sentences imposed 

pursuant to plea agreements.

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than the statutory maximum.” Transcript of the Plea Hearing 

at 7 (emphasis added.) Taken for its plain meaning—which is 

how criminal defendants should be entitled to take the 

statements of district court judges—the court’s explanation

allows Godoy to appeal any illegal sentence. 

The government asks us to interpret the district court’s 

use of “such as” to mean “limited to.” We decline to do so. 

The phrase “such as” typically indicates that enumerated 

examples are not comprehensive. For instance, when Justice 

Thomas discusses the “rights enumerated in the Constitution, 

such as the freedom of speech,” he is referring to the whole 

set of enumerated constitutional rights, and not just the one. 

McDonald v. City of Chicago, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 

3077 n.15 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

Similarly, in the present case, the category of “something 

illegal” includes the imposition of a sentence that exceeds the 

twenty-year statutory maximum, but it certainly is not limited 

to that. Rather, the category of illegal sentences includes the

types of statutory and constitutional violations Godoy alleges.

“[C]riminal defendants . . . ‘need to be able to trust the 

oral pronouncements of district court judges.’” United States

v. Wood, 378 F.3d 342, 349 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting United 

States v. Buchanan, 59 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 1995)). That

trust is maintained by enforcing their pronouncements in 

situations like this. As Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure requires,

Before the court accepts a plea of guilty . . . the court

must address the defendant personally in open court. 

During this address, the court must inform the defendant 

of, and determine that the defendant understands . . . the 

terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right 

to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.

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FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b). Ideally, such colloquies are 

straightforward. The court explains the waiver provision, and 

the defendant demonstrates that he understands and accepts 

that provision. But when a court mischaracterizes a waiver 

provision “during this address,” a defendant can hardly be 

taken to comprehend, let alone accept. Here, the district court 

inaccurately rephrased the written waiver during the colloquy. 

Therefore, Godoy had no chance to demonstrate that he 

understood and accepted what it meant.

The government could have objected at the hearing to the 

district court’s mischaracterization, but it did not. As a sister 

circuit court has held, “[g]iven the district court judge’s clear 

statements at sentencing, the defendant’s assertion of 

understanding, and the prosecution’s failure to object, we hold 

that in these circumstances, the district court’s oral 

pronouncement controls . . . .” Buchanan, 59 F.3d at 918. We 

apply the same reasoning here. Because the district court’s 

oral pronouncement controls, Godoy’s appeal is not barred.2

II

Turning to the merits of his appeal, Godoy argues that his 

sentence violates 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a), which prohibits prison 

time as a means of rehabilitation. See Tapia v. United States, 

__ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2390 (2011). Godoy also argues 

that he was given a longer prison term than he would have 

received had he been wealthier and thus able to more quickly 

repay the restitution, a disparity that violates the Fifth 

Amendment. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983)

 2 Godoy offers a number of other arguments in support of his 

right to bring this appeal. Since we have already decided the 

question in his favor, we need not address them.

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(sentencing courts cannot subject defendants to imprisonment 

simply because they are too poor to pay fines). Additionally, 

Godoy argues that the district court erred by requiring him to 

enroll in the Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial 

Responsibility Program. 

Arguing that he had no meaningful opportunity to 

challenge the district court’s mistakes, Godoy urges us to 

review his sentence for abuse of discretion. The government 

maintains that plain error review is required. We need not 

choose between the two because the sentence withstands 

scrutiny under both. See United States v. Rubio, 677 F.3d 

1257, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“We need not address the 

standard of review . . . because there was no error—plain or 

otherwise—in the proceedings in the district court.”).

A

First, we determine that Godoy’s § 3582(a) claim fails. 

When meting out sentences, judges must consider the goals of 

punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. See

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).

3 Current law allows judges to employ 

 3 Because we refer to § 3553(a) often, it is useful to set forth 

the relevant portions here:

(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.—The 

court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater 

than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in 

paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining 

the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposed—

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to 

promote respect for the law, and to provide just 

punishment for the offense;

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a wide range of sentencing methods to achieve these goals. 

Rehabilitation, in particular, may come through employment 

training, drug addiction treatment, or a stint in a halfway 

house upon supervised release. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 3563(b); 3583(d). But prison time cannot be a means to the

end of rehabilitation. The relevant provision in the Sentencing 

Reform Act of 1984 states:

The court, in determining whether to impose a term of 

imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is to be 

imposed, in determining the length of the term, shall 

consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the 

extent they are applicable, recognizing that imprisonment 

is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and 

rehabilitation.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court 

has explained, § 3582(a) is designed to send a message to 

sentencing courts: “Do not think about prison as a way to 

rehabilitate an offender.” Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2390.

Godoy asserts that the district court acted upon just such 

a forbidden thought, but the record does not support his 

argument. At sentencing, the district court gave no indication 

that it thought time in prison would aid Godoy’s 

rehabilitation. After discussing the harms that Godoy had 

caused his victims, the court stated that it had to “provide 

 

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the 

defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational 

or vocational training, medical care, or other 

correctional treatment in the most effective 

manner[.]

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

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deterrence” and “send a message” to similar criminals. It also 

noted that “[i]ncapacitation is one of those things that is 

important,” and that the Guidelines required that the court 

look at “retribution.” The district court further emphasized 

that it deemed the Guidelines range of thirty-three to fortyone months insufficient punishment. Finally, the district court 

spent a great deal of time discussing Godoy’s history and 

character—two other § 3553 factors that are unrelated to 

rehabilitation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Of course, the district court discussed the process of 

rehabilitation—as it should have—but only in connection 

with elements of Godoy’s sentence other than imprisonment.

For instance, only after it imposed Godoy’s sixty months’ 

incarceration did the district court turn to the rehabilitative 

portions of the sentence, stating, “you will, I recommend, be 

placed in intensive drug treatment rehab[ during your time in 

prison]. I am directing that upon your release, you be placed 

in intensive psychiatric treatment.” At no point did the district 

court suggest that its talk of rehabilitation related to anything 

other than the treatment of Godoy’s mental health and the 

terms of his supervised release, which is entirely acceptable.

Godoy urges us to disregard what the court said about its 

purposes in sentencing him and look instead to an 

administrative form used to report sentences to the United 

States Sentencing Commission called the Statement of 

Reasons. District courts are required to complete Statement of 

Reasons forms by 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(1):

The Chief Judge of each district court shall ensure that, 

within 30 days following entry of judgment in every 

criminal case, the sentencing court submits to the 

Commission, in a format approved and required by the 

Commission, a written report of the sentence, the offense 

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for which it is imposed, the age, race, sex of the offender, 

and information regarding factors made relevant by the 

guidelines. The report shall also include—

. . . . 

(B) the written statement of reasons for the sentence 

imposed (which shall include the reason for any 

departure from the otherwise applicable guideline range 

and which shall be stated on the written statement of 

reasons form issued by the Judicial Conference and 

approved by the United States Sentencing Commission).

Godoy argues that the Statement of Reasons form 

provides insight into the district court’s mindset at sentencing 

and vindicates his § 3582(a) claim. Other circuits have 

struggled with how to weigh the importance of the Statement 

of Reasons form, see United States v. Denny, 653 F.3d 415, 

421-22 (6th Cir. 2011), but we need not wade into that murky 

water. Regardless of the weight we give it, the Statement of 

Reasons form does not help Godoy’s case. To the contrary, 

the form here is of a piece with the sentencing colloquy. 

The first relevant section of the form, Section IV, 

indicates that the district court imposed a sentence “outside 

the advisory sentencing guideline system.” Because the 

district court went outside the Guidelines altogether, Section 

VI of the form asks the district court its reasons for imposing 

all elements of the sentence, not just the prison term. In

Section VI, the district court checks boxes that completely 

describe the various bases for the entire sentence. Here, the 

district court checked the following:

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• “the nature and circumstances of the offense 

and the history and characteristics of the 

defendant[;]”

• “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal 

conduct[;]”

• “to protect the public from further crimes of 

the defendant[;]”

• “to provide the criminal with needed 

educational or vocational training, medical 

care, or other correctional treatment in the 

most effective manner[;]” 

• “to provide restitution to any victims of the 

offense . . . .”

Rehabilitation was clearly one basis for the sentence, but there 

is nothing on the form that indicates that rehabilitation was a 

factor when the court determined Godoy’s prison time. The 

answers the court gave in Section VI of the form explain the 

entirety of Godoy’s outside-Guidelines sentence—supervised

release included.

B

Next, Godoy argues that the length of his prison time

reflects his poverty and thus violates the due process and 

equal protection principles of the Fifth Amendment. The 

district court, he contends, lengthened his time in prison so 

that he could earn funds to speed the restitution payments he 

owes his victims. Had he greater wealth with which to make 

his payments, he argues, his prison term would have been 

shorter. We need not consider the Fifth Amendment’s 

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application to such treatment. We can find no support for the 

claim that Godoy’s prison term is longer than a wealthy 

person’s term would have been for a similar crime.

The court never drew any link between the goal of 

restitution and Godoy’s prison time. Indeed, the first time the 

district court even mentioned restitution was after it had 

offered a litany of reasons justifying the length of Godoy’s

prison term—a litany that did not include restitution. And the 

district court anticipated that Godoy would be paying his 

restitution bills long after he leaves prison. He is required to 

pay those bills at a rate of $25 a month after he is released 

from prison. Indeed, the district court considered the fact that 

Godoy “agreed to full restitution” to be a factor in his favor, 

not a factor counseling further imprisonment. There is nothing 

in the record to suggest that the district court had restitution in 

mind when it sentenced Godoy to prison.

It would be absurd to think Godoy’s meager earning 

potential in the Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial 

Responsibility Program (IFRP) could motivate the district 

court to keep him in prison. Even if Godoy were to 

immediately begin earning the highest available Bureau of 

Prisons wage—$1.15 per hour for a high-level Federal Prison 

Industries factory job—he would need to work more than 

twenty years of forty-hour weeks, keeping not a cent for 

himself, to pay off his restitution order. See Work Programs, 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/

inmate_programs/work_prgms.jsp (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 

His entire sentence is fifteen years shorter than even that 

ambitious payback timeframe. It would be irrational to 

sentence an offender to prison for the purpose of garnishing 

his IFRP earnings, and we decline to attribute irrationality to 

the district court.

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Once again, Godoy asks us to look to the Statement of 

Reasons form to alter our views of what the district court 

actually said at sentencing about restitution. But again, the 

Statement of Reasons is unhelpful to Godoy’s case. In Section 

VI of the form, the district court stated that it sought “to 

provide restitution to any victims of the offense” when it 

imposed Godoy’s sentence. We find that the most plausible 

reading—indeed, the only rational reading—of this portion of 

the form is that it refers to the district court’s reasons for 

imposing the entirety of Godoy’s sentence. Though the form 

does not provide a space for delineating which portions of the 

sentence were animated by which reasons, we are confident 

that the “restitution” reasoning was related to the imposition 

of the restitution requirements, not to the imposition of prison 

time.

C

Finally, Godoy argues that the district court erred by 

stating that he would be required to enroll in the Bureau of 

Prisons IFRP. Because the government conceded at oral 

argument that Godoy cannot be ordered to enroll in the IFRP, 

we hereby modify his sentence to reflect the fact that 

enrollment is voluntary. Cf. United States v. Boyd, 608 F.3d 

331, 335 (7th Cir. 2010) (modifying a sentence to clarify that 

enrollment in the IFRP is voluntary and affirming as 

modified).

III

As modified, the district court’s sentence is affirmed.

So ordered.

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