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Parties Involved:
Sandra Durant
Appellant
James Neneman
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FI LED 

United Scates Court of Appeals 

,..,.nth f:irrni, 

SEP 11 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

SANDRA DURANT, Personally and ) 

on Behalf of the Heirs at Law ) 

of CHARLES N. DURANT, Deceased, ) 

and SANDRA DURANT, as Adminis- ) 

tratrix of the Estate of ) 

CHARLES N. DURANT, Deceased; ) 

and JAMES E. TASSIN, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

JAMES NENEMAN, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

Nos. 88-1615 

88-1617 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Kansas 

D.C. Nos. 87-2592S and 87-2591 

Steven Hornbaker (Craig J. Altenhofen with him on the briefs) of 

Harper, Hornbaker & Altenhofen, Chartered, Junction City, Kansas, 

for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Paul Hasty, Jr., (Jeffrey L. Lauersdorf with him on the brief) of 

Wallace, Saunders, Austin, Brown & Enochs, Chtd., Overland Park, 

Kansas, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-1615 Document: 01019899413 Date Filed: 09/11/1989 Page: 1 
Plaintiffs Sandra Durant and James E. Tassin appeal from an 

order dismissing their complaints for damages. Ms. Durant, widow 

of Charles N. Durant, and Mr. Tassin claimed the negligence of 

defendant James Neneman caused the death of Mr. Durant and 

injuries to Mr. Tassin. Plaintiffs filed a civil action in the 

United States District Court for the District of Kansas, asserting 

diversity jurisdiction. 1 Albeit reluctantly, the court dismissed 

the complaints believing the result was compelled by Feres v. 

United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). We disagree and reverse 

because this is not the type of case to which Feres applies. 

The immunity established in Feres attaches only when an 

action has been brought against the government under the Federal 

Tort Claims Act. Whil'e policy reasons underlying Feres and its 

progeny also provide an immunity for military actors, the 

conditions which give rise to the application of that immunity are 

not present in this case. We hold that this intra-military 

immunity should not be applied to shield military personnel from 

common-law actions based on their nonmilitary conduct. 

The underlying allegations of fact in this case are simple. 

At the time of the incident, both Mr. Durant and Mr. Tassin were 

engaged in a physical training exercise, apparently in military 

formation, running on a street on the Fort Riley, Kansas, military 

base. Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Neneman, in uniform and driving 

1Mr. Tassin also asserted federal question jurisdiction. It is 

claimed in Mr. Tassin's complaint that he is a ''citizen" of the 

State of Kansas. In Ms. Durant's complaint, filed by the same law 

firm, it is averred that defendant Neneman is a "citizen" of the 

State of Kansas. We, consequently, make no determination whether 

Mr. Tassin's assertions of diversity or federal question 

jurisdiction are valid. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1615 Document: 01019899413 Date Filed: 09/11/1989 Page: 2 
his private vehicle, ran into ·both Mr. Durant and Mr. Tassin. 2 

Mr. Durant died as a result of his injuries, but Mr. Tassin 

recovered. 

Plaintiffs subsequently filed separate civil actions against 

Mr. Neneman solely in his individual capacity upon theories· of 

negligence. Defendant moved to dismiss the actions on the ground 

that the complaints failed to state claims because he is immune 

from suit. Defendant argued that because the injured parties were 

soldiers engaged in military activity at the time of the accident, 

Feres required dismissal. 

The trial court agreed. The district court held that because 

the injured parties were engaged in military activity at the time 

they were allegedly struck by the defendant, Feres required 

dismissal of the action. This conclusion was prompted by the 

holding in United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987), that the 

military status of the tort-feasor is irrelevant in the Feres 

analysis. Not only do we believe Feres inapposite, we also think 

the trial court's reliance upon the Johnson principle was 

incorrect. 

To explain our reasoning, we must first turn briefly to 

Feres. The case was actually three separate actions under the 

Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for damages. Common to each case 

was the "fact underlying the three cases . that each claimant, 

while on active duty and not on furlough, sustained injury due to 

negligence of others in the armed forces." Feres, 340 U.S. at 

2 rt is undisputed that Mr. Neneman was on his way to his duty 

assignment at the time of the incident. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1615 Document: 01019899413 Date Filed: 09/11/1989 Page: 3 
138. The Court concluded ~that the Government is not liable under 

the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the 

injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident 

to service." Id. at 146. 

From this holding stems the first of what we recognize as two 

prongs of a doctrine of immunity which courts have come to call 

"the Feres doctrine." The first prong consists of those cases in 

which a plaintiff connected with the military asserts liability 

against the United States under the FTCA for injury arising out of 

activity which is incident to service. These are true Feres 

cases, and in an unbroken line from Feres, courts have granted 

immunity to federal defendants upon Feres rationales. 

The second prong consists of those cases in which liability 

is asserted by servicemen against military actors for acts 

committed within the context of military service. From these 

cases has developed what we refer to as "the doctrine of intramilitary immunity." While courts employ Feres rationales in 

applying intra-military immunity, it cannot be said accurately 

these are true Feres cases because the claims asserted are not 

founded upon the FTCA and the liability of the United States is 

not implicated. We believe this is an important distinction too 

often blurred, yet necessary to a reasoned analysis of the 

doctrines of immunity which flow from Feres. We therefore eschew 

reference to the second prong as. "Feres doctrine cases.'' 

Nevertheless, the concept of intra-military immunity does have its 

roots in part of the rationale of Feres. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1615 Document: 01019899413 Date Filed: 09/11/1989 Page: 4 
Feres is grounded upon three broad rationales. 3 First, 

"[t]he relationship between the government and the members of its 

armed forces is 'distinctively federal in character.'" Feres, 340 

U.S. at 143 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 

332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947)). Second, "statutory veterans' benefits 

'provid[e] an upper . limit of liability for the Government as to 

service-connected injuries.'" Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690 (quoting 

· Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 

(1977)). Third, suits by a service member against the government 

"would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the 

expense of military discipline and effectiveness." United 

States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 

The doctrine of intra-military immunity is an outgrowth of 

the third Feres rationale that decries the propriety of civilian 

courts delving into military matters and calling to bar military 

decisions and institutions. Illustrative is Chappell v. Wallace, 

462 U.S. 296 (1983), the seminal case applying the doctrine of 

intra-military immunity. In Chappell, the Court considered a 

claim for damages by enlisted military personnel against their 

superior officers. The plaintiffs alleged the officers violated 

plaintiffs' constitutional rights and discriminated against them 

on account of race. The Court, guided by Feres rationale, refused 

to allow ·application of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 

Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), to create a 

3we reiterated these rationales in a recent application of the 

Feres doctrine, Shaw v. United States, 854 F.2d 360, 362 (10th 

Cir. 1988). 

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Appellate Case: 88-1615 Document: 01019899413 Date Filed: 09/11/1989 Page: 5 
constitutionally founded claim by a soldier against his commander. 

The court stated: 

The special nature of military life, the need for 

unhesitating and decisive action by military officers 

and equally disciplined responses by military personnel, 

would be undermined by a judicially created remedy 

exposing officers to personal liability at the hands of 

those they are charged to command. Here, as in Feres, 

we must be. concern[ed] with the disruption of "[t]he 

peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his 

superiors" that might result if the soldier were allowed 

to hale his superiors into court. 

Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304. In accord with Chappell, courts have 

granted immunity to persons whose military authority is the basis 

for a plaintiff's claim of liability. See Miller v. Newbauer, 

862 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1988); Bois v. Marsh, 801 F.2d 462 (D.C. 

Cir. 1986); Trerice v. Summons, 755 F.2d 1081 (4th Cir. 1985). 

Additionally, courts have also extended intra-military immunity 

to persons not actually supervising the plaintiff, but 

nonetheless exercising military responsibility. See Stauber v. 

Cline, 837 F.2d 395 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 55 

(1988) (defendants were plaintiff's coworkers); Hass v. United 

States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975) (defendants were civilian 

employees who operated a stable for military purposes); Mattos v. 

United States, 412 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1969) (defendant was same 

rank as injured person but driving the truck in which party was 

riding during a military exercise). In the cases rejecting 

liability of military commanders or persons exercising purely 

military functions, the courts have generally expressed concern 

for preserving the harmonious relationships within the military 

establishment. For the same reason, courts have been reluctant 

to entertain civil rights actions involving military personnel. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1615 Document: 01019899413 Date Filed: 09/11/1989 Page: 6 
Miller v. Newbauer, 862 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1988); Bois v. Marsh, 

801 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Martelon v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1348 

(10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985). Thus, our 

evolving jurisprudence has created a zone of protection for 

military actors, immunizing actions and decisions which involved 

military authority from scrutiny by civilian courts. It is our 

conclusion, however, that this zone was never intended to protect 

the personal acts of an individual when those acts in no way 

implicate the function or authority of the military. We can find 

nothing that would dictate a contrary conclusion. 4 

We find most helpful the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in 

BrOwn v. United States, 739 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. 

denied, 473 U.S. 904 (1985). In deciding whether intra-military 

immunity would be granted to certain defendants, the court focused 

upon the nature of the defendants' conduct. 

In Brown, plaintiff's son, a black soldier, was subjected to 

a mock lynching by several noncommissioned officers while he 

4The district court relied upon Johnson to support its conclusion 

that the military nature of the tort-feasor's conduct is 

irrelevant to whether he may be sued by a soldier. Yet, Johnson 

holds only that a soldier may not sue the government even if the 

government employee who caused an injury was not in military 

service. The Court in no way dealt with the circumstances under 

which one soldier may sue another. Moreover, even though Johnson 

is supported by all three Feres rationales, only the military 

discipline rational applies to intra-military immunity. As the 

Court noted: "[M]ilitary discipline involves not only obedience 

to orders, but more generally duty and loyalty to one's service 

and to one's country. Suits brought by service members against 

the Government .•• have the potential to undermine military 

discipline in the broadest sense of the word." Johnson, 481 U.S. 

at 691. We fail to perceive how .an action against a soldier who 

was not engaged in military conduct can threaten military 

discipline. Because Johnson deals only with a suit by a soldier 

against the United States, its holding is inapposite to this case. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1615 Document: 01019899413 Date Filed: 09/11/1989 Page: 7 
attended an off-duty party. Plaintiff sued the United States, the 

soldiers who participated in the lynching episode, and the 

commanding officer for civil rights violations. While upholding 

the dismissal of the action against the United States and the 

commanding officer on Feres grounds, the court held the individual 

soldiers subject to suit. The court determined the most 

appropriate aspect of liability is the "military purpose or 

mission" of those acts. Brown, 739 F.2d at 368. Looking at the 

actions of the defendant noncommissioned officers, the court 

stated: "The activity that is at issue in this claim is of a 

distinctly non-military nature: the alleged participation of a· 

group of men at a holiday weekend drinking party in the mock 

lynching of a young black man." Brown, 739 F.2d at 369. In 

taking this focus, the court recognized neither the institution of 

the military itself nor the exercise of command authority was 

implicated in the defendants' alleged actions. Thus, immunity was 

not required. We endorse this view. 

While civilian courts have a legitimate concern for 

protecting the harmony of the military establishment to prevent an 

erosion of discipline, we do not believe this concern should be 

extended to claims that arise outside the military function. When 

a soldier commits 

liable to another, 

responsibility for 

an act that would, in civilian life, make him 

he should not be allowed to escape 

his act just because those involved were 

wearing military uniforms at the time of the act. When military 

personnel are engaged in distinctly nonmilitary acts, they are 

acting, in effect, as civilians and should be subject to civil 

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Appellate Case: 88-1615 Document: 01019899413 Date Filed: 09/11/1989 Page: 8 
authority. Mindful of the Supreme Court's observation in Feres 

that courts should not create causes against the military when 

they have not been recognized in the past, we nonetheless believe 

that common-law actions between military persons for distinctly 

nonmilitary acts break no new ground. Except for the penumbra of 

Feres, there would be no question that the defendant in this case 

could be called to task for his alleged acts. The only qu~stion 

is whether he was performing a military act at the time of the 

incident. 

The issue thus devolves into whether the act of driving to 

his duty station was a military act. We think not. If one were 

to view this question as synonymous with whether the act of 

driving was ''incident to military service," the answer would have 

to be different. 5 Indeed, it is hard, if not impossible, to 

decide at what point actions leading to the performance of a 

military task are not incidental to that end. Yet, if one focuses 

on the military purpose or mission of the defendant's conduct 

precipitating plaintiff's claim in the context of a need to 

protect military integrity, harmony, or authority, one must decide 

the mere act of driving to work, without more, is not the 

performance of a military act. 

In our judgment, the trial court erred in dismissing the 

causes on immunity grounds. We hold that within the peculiar 

5we distinguish this case from Shaw where we held that an injury 

sustained while driving to one's place of duty was an injury 

incident to military service. Shaw is a classic Feres case which 

applies the strict rationales Feres mandates. As we have already 

noted, intra-military actions giving rise to the issue of military 

immunity ~re judged by different standards. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1615 Document: 01019899413 Date Filed: 09/11/1989 Page: 9 
circumstances of this case, the act out of which defendant's 

alleged negligence arose was not a military act; hence, the 

defendant was not entitled to a claim of military immunity. The 

judgments of the district court are REVERSED AND REMANDED for 

further proceedings. 

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