Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02145/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02145-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eddi Ramirez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 14-2145

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

EDDI RAMIREZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 2:12-cr-20068-MPM-DGB-5 — Michael P. McCuskey, Judge.

ARGUED FEBRUARY 25, 2015 — DECIDED JUNE 10, 2015

Before BAUER, FLAUM, and MANION, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. On October 4, 2012, a federal grand

jury indicted Eddi Ramirez for conspiracy to sell or distribute

cocaine and for possession with intent to distribute cocaine in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. § 846. On

December 11, 2013, Ramirez filed a motion to dismiss the

indictment for lack of a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act

(“STA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–74, which the district court denied.

Ramirez now seeks review of that decision. Because we

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conclude that the district court erred in denying Ramirez’s

motion to dismiss, we reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

Ramirez was arrested for conspiracy to distribute cocaine

and possession with intent to sell cocaine on August 31, 2012.

He and ten co-defendants were indicted on October 4, 2012. 

Ramirez was arraigned on October 15, 2012. At the arraignment he pleaded not guilty and the court set the trial date for

December 10, 2012. On Ramirez’s motion, the district court

continued the matter for status to January 24, 2013, making a

§ 3161(h)(7)(A) ends of justice finding that delay was appropriate due to the complexity of the case. At the status conference

on January 24, 2013, the court continued the case to April 5,

2013, making another ends of justice finding to allow counsel

additional time to prepare for trial. At the status conference on

April 5, 2013, Ramirez indicated that he “want[ed] a trial date

now” and would file a motion to sever his case from his codefendants. In response, the court set a briefing schedule for

the motion to sever and rescheduled the trial for June 3, 2013.

Again, the court made an ends of justice finding that this was

a complex case, excluding the time from April 5, 2013, to

June 3, 2013, from the speedy trial clock.

Ramirez filed his first motion to sever on April 10, 2013. On

May 3, 2013, the court held a hearing on the motion and denied

it in the interest of judicial economy. The court then vacated

the June 3 trial date and set a status conference for June 17,

2013, making an ends of justice finding excluding time from

May 3 to June 17, 2013.

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Prior to the status hearing on June 17, 2013, two of

Ramirez’s co-defendants, Erica Kulak and Teravena Kapraun,

pleaded guilty. During the June 17 hearing, four more codefendants, Juan Vorarth, Leonardo Aldape-Hernandez,

Gabriel Lopez-Saucedo, and Jourdan Hullinger, informed the

court of their intentions to enter guilty pleas. Ramirez requested that the court set a trial date and indicated that he

would file another motion to sever from the remaining

defendants in the case. In response, the court scheduled

briefing on the second motion to sever and set a motion

hearing for August 9, 2013, again making an ends of justice

finding.

By the hearing on August 9, 2013, only Ramirez, Felipe

Quinones, Hullinger, and three fugitives remained defendants.

Of the named defendants, at least two were likely to plead out.

Quinones indicated that he would likely be pleading guilty

and, with respect to Hullinger, the government predicted that

her case would likely be resolved by plea. With that in mind,

the court granted Ramirez’s motion to sever as to the three

fugitive co-defendants, but denied it as to Quinones and

Hullinger. The court reasoned that denial as to those two was

appropriate given how few defendants remained on the case,

particularly in light of the possibility that at least one, if not

both, of the remaining co-defendants would not be going to

trial.

After ruling on the motion to sever, the court opened

discussion to setting a new trial date. Ramirez indicated that he

preferred an October trial date to one in February. The court

ruled out October, however, citing its crowded calendar. The

court then set trial for February 3, 2014, and made an ends of

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justice finding that the period of delay from August 9, 2013, to

February 3, 2014, was excluded from the STA time limit. The

court did not identify a specific basis for its ends of justice

finding at that time.

The next status conference took place on November 19,

2013. By then, Quinones had pleaded out. At the conference,

Hullinger informed the court that she would be pleading out

as well, at which point Ramirez again requested a trial date

sooner than February 3, 2014. Citing for a second time the

upcoming holiday calendar and the crowded trial docket, the

court indicated that Ramirez would have to bring a further

motion to sever from Hullinger if he wanted an earlier trial

date.

On December 11, 2013, Ramirez filed a motion to dismiss

for lack of a speedy trial. He argued that district court failed

to make a valid ends of justice finding at the hearing on

August 9, 2013; specifically, Ramirez argued that the district

court continued the case due to its congested calendar in

violation of the STA, which resulted in a delay in excess of

the STA’s seventy-day limitation. The district court denied

Ramirez’s motion and issued an opinion on January 21, 2014.

In the opinion, the court conceded that it discussed its crowded

calendar during the hearing on August 9, 2013, but explained

that its ends of justice finding was actually motivated by the

complexity of the case and the fact that Ramirez was joined

with co-defendants who had not been severed or made speedy

trial demands, not by his court’s calendar.

Ramirez went to trial on February 3, 2014. The jury returned a guilty verdict and judgment was entered on May 23,

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2014. Ramirez appealed, claiming the district court improperly

continued his trial date for six months—from August 9, 2013,

to February 3, 2014—in violation of the STA. 

II. DISCUSSION

Ramirez argues that the district court erred in denying his

motion to dismiss under the STA. We review the district

court’s legal interpretation of the STA de novo, and its decisions

to exclude time for an abuse of discretion. See United States v.

Wasson, 679 F.3d 938, 943 (7th Cir. 2012). Absent legal error, we

will reverse the district court’s decision to exclude time only

where the defendant can show both an abuse of discretion and

actual prejudice. Id. at 943–44.

The STA mandates that a trial of any case in which a plea

of not guilty is entered shall begin within seventy days of the

information or indictment, or from the defendant's appearance

before a judicial officer, whichever date last occurs. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(c)(1). The STA imposes the time restriction “to protect

the defendant from excessive pre-trial delay and incarceration

by the government and to protect the public’s interest in the

speedy resolution of justice.” United States v. Larson, 417 F.3d

741, 746 (7th Cir. 2005). This restriction is not completely rigid,

however: the STA excludes certain periods of time from the

seventy-day clock “[t]o provide the necessary flexibility to

accommodate pretrial proceedings that result in justifiable

delay.” United States v. Napadow, 596 F.3d 398, 402 (7th Cir.

2010). 

Relevant to this case, § 3161(h)(7) of the STA “permits a

district court to grant a continuance and to exclude the

resulting delay if the court, after considering certain factors,

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makes on-the-record findings that the ends of justice served by

granting the continuance outweigh the public’s and defendant’s interests in a speedy trial.” Zedner v. United States, 547

U.S. 489, 498–99 (2006). The factors underpinning an ends of

justice finding “need not be articulated contemporaneously on

the record,” Wasson, 679 F.3d at 946, but must be memorialized, either orally or in writing, by the time the court rules on

a defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 945–46. See also 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(7)(A). If the district court “fails to make the requisite

finding regarding the need for an ends-of-justice continuance,

the delay resulting from the continuance must be counted, and

if as a result the trial does not begin on time, the indictment or

information must be dismissed.” Zedner, 547 U.S. at 508.

During the hearing on August 9, 2013, the district court

made an ends of justice finding pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and excluded the time from the hearing to

February 3, 2014, the new trial date, but did so without

articulating the factors it considered in granting the continuance. The transcript from the August 9 hearing strongly

suggests that the district court’s decision to continue the case

was based on its crowded calendar, a factor wholly impermissible for consideration in support of an ends of justice continuance. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(C). While the district court later

explained in its opinion denying Ramirez’s motion to dismiss

that the case’s complexity, as well as the fact that Ramirez

remained joined with co-defendants who had not demanded

a speedy trial, motivated the continuance, we are not convinced by the court’s post hoc explanations. 

While complexity is an acceptable factor under the STA’s

statutory scheme, see 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii), neither the

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transcript from the August 9 hearing, nor the circumstances of

the case at the time, suggest that complexity actually motivated

the court’s ends of justice continuance. First, the court never

discussed complexity. This is perhaps not entirely surprising

because, by the time of the August 9 hearing, the case had

grown far less complex than it had been at its inception. By

then, all but two of Ramirez’s co-defendants had pleaded out

and there were strong indications that at least one, if not both,

of the remaining co-defendants would plead guilty, as well.

Furthermore, the government, “err[ing] on the side of length,”

estimated that the trial would take at most two weeks, regardless of whether Ramirez was tried alone or with co-defendants.

The government also explained at the August 9 hearing that it

was in the “unique” position of “trying to reduce the amount

of evidence to present” in light of the many defendants who

had pleaded out and who agreed to cooperate against Ramirez.

The district court’s second post hoc identified factor—

Ramirez’s continued joinder with co-defendants who had not

demanded speedy trial—is also not apparent from the hearing

transcript. The court’s discussion of the number of defendants

was in reference to the denial of Ramirez’s motion to sever, not

in reference to setting a trial date. Additionally, the district

court expressly made its ends of justice finding pursuant to

§ 3161(h)(7), not the joinder with co-defendants provision, an

entirely separate basis for exclusion of time, contained in

§ 3161(h)(6).

Instead of either of the purported explanations, the transcript is littered with references to the court’s crowded calendar. The court discussed his packed October calendar repeatedly. The court also described how his docket had grown more

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crowded than usual, despite the fact that he was leaving the

bench the following year. Finally, although the court did not

offer any reason for its failure to offer alternative trial dates in

the months between October and February, the November 19

hearing seems to shed light on the omission. At the November

hearing, the court described his inability to schedule trial

between November and January due to the holiday season

(from Thanksgiving to Martin Luther King Day), in addition to

the court’s already crowded calendar.

As the Supreme Court recognized in Zedner, the built-in

flexibility of the ends of justice continuance has the potential to

“get out of hand,” so “procedural strictness” is necessary to

counteract that danger. Zedner, 547 U.S. at 509. That procedural

strictness requires on-the-record findings that sufficiently

identify the factors that were considered in making an ends of

justice continuance. See United States v. Crawford, 982 F.2d 199,

204 (6th Cir. 1993). Here, we are unable to discern from the

record any permissible factors considered. The district court’s

stated motivations do not comport with the record; the record

only reveals that the district court repeatedly blamed its

crowded calendar for its inability to schedule a sooner trial

date, a factor relied upon in error. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(C)

(“No continuance ... shall be granted because of general

congestion of the court’s calendar.”). And the district court’s

post hoc rationalizations do not cure the error. A judge may not

“grant an ‘ends of justice’ continuance nunc pro tunc, providing

after the fact justification for unauthorized delays.” United

States v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 545 (7th Cir. 1983) (internal citation

omitted).

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III. CONCLUSION

Because we conclude that the district court erred, the sixmonth delay from August 9, 2013, to February 3, 2014, cannot

be excluded from the STA’s seventy-day clock. Properly

included, then, the period from August 9, 2013, to February 3,

2014, brings Ramirez’s delay to at least 178 days, well beyond

the STA’s limit. For this reason, we reverse the district court’s

denial of Ramirez’s motion to dismiss and remand with

instructions to vacate Ramirez’s conviction and order the

release of the prisoner instanter. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (“If

a defendant is not brought to trial within the time limit

required by section 3161(c) as extended by section 3161(h), the

information or indictment shall be dismissed”). 

Mandate to issue instanter. 

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