Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01801/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01801-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of the Army
Respondent
Randy Allen Estes
Petitioner
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

RANDY ALLEN ESTES,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________ 

2016-1801

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. PH-4324-15-0268-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: August 25, 2016

______________________ 

RANDY ALLEN ESTES, College Park, MD, pro se. 

KATHERINE MICHELLE SMITH, Office of the General 

Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, 

DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G.

POLISUK. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Case: 16-1801 Document: 27-2 Page: 1 Filed: 08/25/2016
2 ESTES v. MSPB

Randy Estes (“Mr. Estes”) seeks review of a decision 

of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”) dismissing his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Estes v. Dep’t of 

Army, No. PH-4324-15-0268-I-1, 2016 WL 556648 

(M.S.P.B. Feb. 10, 2016). Specifically, the Board found 

that the Department of the Army (“Army”) was not a coemployer under the Uniformed Services Employment and 

Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”) (codified 

at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–33) and that, therefore, it lacked 

jurisdiction. For the reasons explained below, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Mr. Estes was employed by The Informatics Applications Group, Inc. (“TIAG”) after leaving his active-duty 

service with the Army. See Estes v. Dep’t of Army, PH4324-15-0268-I-1, 2015 WL 4558557 (M.S.P.B. July 23, 

2015). Once hired by TIAG, Mr. Estes was released from 

active duty and placed into a reserve status with the 

Army. TIAG contracts with the Army to provide contract 

personnel in support of the Army’s mission. On June 12, 

2012, Mr. Estes was selected by TIAG to service a contract with the Army.

Before the Administrative Judge, Mr. Estes testified

that, on or about April 4, 2013, representatives from 

TIAG met with representatives from the Army to discuss 

Mr. Estes’s poor performance. Army officials informed 

Mr. Estes’s supervisors at TIAG that they were dissatisfied with his performance and wanted him removed. 

TIAG removed Mr. Estes from the assignment and terminated his employment with TIAG.

Mr. Estes appealed this termination to the Board on 

March 21, 2015, claiming that the Army exerted sufficient 

influence over TIAG such that it is properly considered 

his co-employer under the USERRA. Mr. Estes alleged 

that the Army influenced TIAG to remove him from his 

position in retaliation for engaging in protected uniformed 

Case: 16-1801 Document: 27-2 Page: 2 Filed: 08/25/2016
ESTES v. MSPB 3

service and failed to provide Mr. Estes due process in that 

removal.

The Administrative Judge dismissed the case for lack 

of jurisdiction, finding that, even where the agency demands a contract employee be removed from the agency’s 

premises, the agency does not create a relationship sufficient to support jurisdiction under the relevant statutes. 

Mr. Estes filed a petition for review of the initial decision, 

and the Board denied the petition for review and affirmed 

the initial decision, which became the Board’s final decision pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). See Estes, 2016 

WL 556648, at ¶ 1. 

DISCUSSION

We review de novo the MSPB’s determinations on jurisdiction, but review for substantial evidence factual 

findings that underlie the MSPB’s jurisdictional analysis. 

See Younies v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 662 F.3d 1215, 1218 

(Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Parrott v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 519

F.3d 1328, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). “The Board’s jurisdiction is not plenary; rather, it is limited to actions designated as appealable to the Board ‘under any law, rule, or 

regulation.’” Prewitt v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 133 F.3d 885, 

886 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a)). Mr. 

Estes has the burden of establishing the Board’s jurisdiction. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a)(2); see also Kirkendall v. 

Dep’t of Army, 479 F.3d 830, 846 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting 

that USERRA should be broadly construed, and any 

“interpretive doubt” should be “resolved in the veteran’s 

favor”).

The jurisdiction question before us hinges on whether 

substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that 

the Army was not a co-employer of Mr. Estes under the 

USERRA. 38 U.S.C. § 4304(4)(A)(ii) provides the definition of the term “employer” as it is used throughout the 

USERRA: “[T]he term ‘employer’ means any person, 

institution, organization, or other entity that pays salary 

Case: 16-1801 Document: 27-2 Page: 3 Filed: 08/25/2016
4 ESTES v. MSPB

or wages for work performed or that has control over 

employment opportunities, including . . . the Federal 

Government.” If the Army exercised direct control over 

the employment decisions of TIAG, it would be a coemployer within the meaning of the statute and the Board 

would have jurisdiction to adjudicate Mr. Estes’s underlying claims.

In this case, the Administrative Judge made a number of relevant factual findings. Of particular importance 

was the finding that “[w]hat actions TIAG ultimately took 

in regard to their employees was their decision alone, not 

the agency’s.” Estes, 2015 WL 4558557. This conclusion 

was reached after a hearing on the matter at which the 

Administrative Judge heard testimony from Mr. Estes, as 

well as his supervisors at TIAG and at the Army. Mr. 

Williams and Mr. Wang were employees of the Army who 

met with Mr. Estes when he arrived at the Army on 

contract from TIAG. The Administrative Judge credited 

the testimony of Mr. Williams and Mr. Wang indicating

“that they were not given the opportunity to accept or 

reject appellant’s employment with TIAG and saw [that] 

meeting only as an opportunity to meet the individual 

selected by TIAG to service the contract and to familiarize 

TIAG’s selectee with the operation and requirements of 

the agency.” Id. Mr. Estes characterized the meeting as 

an interview, but the Administrative Judge found that, 

“at [that] meeting, there were none of the usual trappings 

of a job interview.” Id.

The Administrative Judge also found that TIAG could 

have offered Mr. Estes “‘bench time’ pay” after Mr. Estes 

was removed from the agency contract and was waiting 

for another contract opportunity to arise. Id. Mr. Estes 

even admitted in his testimony before the Administrative 

Judge that TIAG paid “bench time” pay to employees not 

working on a specific contract but waiting to be placed 

into active service on a contract. Id. The Administrative 

Judge further found that “[n]othing in the evidence sugCase: 16-1801 Document: 27-2 Page: 4 Filed: 08/25/2016
ESTES v. MSPB 5

gests that the agency demanded that TIAG fire the appellant altogether.” On appeal, Mr. Estes presents no reason 

for us to conclude these factual findings and credibility 

determinations were in error, nor are we able to discern 

any error from our review of the record.

Any reliance Mr. Estes may place on the April 4, 

2013, meeting in which Army personnel discussed Mr. 

Estes’s performance with his supervisor at TIAG is misplaced. As the Administrative Judge determined, “the 

agency may voice its dissatisfaction with the performance 

of a contractor employee without creating a co-employer 

relationship.” Id.; see also Silva v. Dep’t of Homeland 

Sec., No. DC-4324-08-0776-I-1, 2009 WL 3047237, at *369 

(M.S.P.B. Sept. 23, 2009) (finding that “the government 

will not automatically be deemed to be the ‘employer’ of 

all contractor personnel under 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)” as 

“USERRA speaks in terms of ‘control’ over employment

opportunities”).

It is true that, depending upon the circumstances, an 

agency could exercise sufficient control over an employee’s 

continued employment status that it would become a coemployer. For example, if an agency knows it is the only 

entity hiring contractors from a third party company and 

the agency states that a contractor is no longer welcome 

on any of its contracts, the agency could be deemed to 

exercise control over the employee’s continued employment status because the third party company would have 

nowhere else to place the contractor and would therefore 

have no choice but to fire him. Alternatively, an expression of dissatisfaction by an agency could be so powerful 

and controlling that it forces the third party company to 

terminate the employee’s status at the company. In this 

case, however, the Administrative Judge made findings of 

fact that justify the conclusion that no such level of control was exercised with respect to Mr. Estes. The full 

record demonstrates that TIAG independently decided to 

terminate Mr. Estes because (1) it could not place him on 

Case: 16-1801 Document: 27-2 Page: 5 Filed: 08/25/2016
6 ESTES v. MSPB

another contract that met his skill set and salary, and (2) 

it felt Mr. Estes did not understand what it meant to be a 

contractor supporting the government.

CONCLUSION

Because jurisdiction in this case requires a finding 

that the Army had “control over employment opportunities,” see 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A)(ii), and because we find 

that the Administrative Judge’s findings to the contrary

are supported by substantial evidence, we affirm. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

Case: 16-1801 Document: 27-2 Page: 6 Filed: 08/25/2016