Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-01109/USCOURTS-ca8-14-01109-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mediacom Communications Corporation
Appellee
Mark Minnihan
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-1109

___________________________

Mark Minnihan

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Mediacom Communications Corporation

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines

____________

 Submitted: November 13, 2014

 Filed: March 9, 2015 

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, BEAM and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Mark Minnihan sued his former employer, Mediacom Communications

Corporation (Mediacom), alleging discrimination in violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 etseq., and

the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code Chapter 216. The district court1

The Honorable James E. Gritzner, Chief Judge, United States District Court

1

for the Southern District of Iowa.

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concluded Minnihan was not a qualified individual for the purposes of the ADAAA

and the ICRA, granted summary judgment in favor of Mediacom, and dismissed the

complaint. Minnihan appeals, and we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

Minnihan worked for Mediacom, a communications company, and its

predecessor, for more than thirty years. From July 2001 until May 2011, Minnihan

was a technical operations supervisor (TOS) in Mediacom's Ames, Iowa, facility. 

As a TOS, Minnihan's primary responsibilities were to supervise, train, and

support the technicians installing cable and internet services in customers' homes, as

well as to respond to customers' service needs. As part of these responsibilities,

Minnihan was required to perform thirteen to fourteen Quality Control checks (QCs)

on each technician under his supervision each quarter. Mediacom wanted TOSs to 2

conduct QCs independently. The way Minnihan performed QCs before he was

restricted from driving, and the way all other TOSs conducted QCs, was to go to the

job site after a technician completed a job to inspect the technician's work and

determine if the technician was meeting Mediacom's standards. Minnihan's duties

also required him to supervise his technicians by doing "tech ride-alongs," where

Minnihan would observe technicians performing installation and service calls on the

job site. 

Another part of Minnihan's job was to respond to customer complaints, or

escalated trouble calls. When Mediacomreceived such a complaint, either a different

technician or the supervising TOS of the original technician would drive to the

customer's home, discuss the complaint, and fix the technical issue if it had not

From 2008 to 2011 Minnihan was in charge of approximately twelve or 2

thirteen technicians. 

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already been resolved. Other duties of the TOS position included: being on call

twenty-four hours a day, and seven days a week to respond to cable outages;

conducting accident investigations when field technicians were involved in an

accident; performing unannounced safety checks on technicians; delivering

equipment to technicians in the field; or accompanying technicians taking Mediacom

vehicles in for repairs.

To facilitate his job, Mediacom provided Minnihan, and all individuals in the

TOS position, a company vehicle, which they expected the TOSs to use while driving

to and from work, performing their responsibilities during the day, and responding

to outages after regular work hours. Mediacom and Minnihan dispute exactly how

much of Minnihan's time was spent working out in the field, but at a minium

Minnihan agrees fifty percent of his working hours were spent outside of the office. 

On December 1, 2009, Minnihan experienced a seizure at work, and as a result

wasrestricted from driving for six months. Iowa law prohibits an individual who has

experienced a seizure from driving "until that person has not had an episode of loss

of consciousness or loss of voluntary control for six months." Iowa Admin. Code r. 

761-600.4(4). Mediacom accommodated Minnihan's December 2009 seizure and

subsequent restriction from driving by reallocating his driving responsibilities to

other employees. This included having Minnihan ride along with the technicians he

wassupervising to get to job sites,sometimes having other employees drive Minnihan

to job sites, and reassigning some of Minnihan's responsibilities to other employees. 

Minnihan testified that his assistant, Dave Hutchison, and another employee, Thor

Carlstrom, were already performing some of his duties that involved driving–mainly

QCs–before his driving restriction began. To complete the QCs not already being

covered, while his driving was restricted, Minnihan would perform QCs in the

technicians' presence during tech ride-alongs.

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On March 30, 2010–before Minnihan's driving restriction from the December

2009 seizure had expired–Minnihan experienced another seizure at work, which

triggered a new six-month driving restriction. After Minnihan's March 2010 seizure, 

Bobby Gadams, Senior Manager of Human Resources for Mediacom's west Iowa

region; Pamela Wellman, Senior Director of Human Resources; Judith Mills, Vice

President of Human Resources; and Steve Purcell, Regional Vice President for the

west Iowa region, discussed the situation and determined that Mediacom could no

longer accommodate Minnihan. On May 7, 2010, Gadams sent a letter to Minnihan

informing him that Mediacom could no longer offer him an accommodation for his

driving restriction because driving was an essential function of the TOS position. In

the letter, Mediacomgave Minnihan fourteen days to apply for positions at Mediacom

which did not require driving. Minnihan did not apply for other positions at

Mediacom during the fourteen-day time period and, on May 20, 2010, Pamela

Walker,Minnihan's attorney,sent Mediacoma letter on Minnihan's behalf threatening

legal action unless Minnihan was allowed to remain employed with Mediacom in the

TOS position.

From May 25, 2010, to July 25, 2010, Mediacom, Minnihan, and his attorney,

corresponded regarding Minnihan's situation. Additionally, Gadams, Tim Adreon,

Minnihan's direct supervisor, and Rod Cundy, Adreon's supervisor, met with

Minnihan on July 20, 2010, to discuss comparable non-driving jobs Minnihan could

apply for. Minnihan also received a memo at this meeting, which provided

information about two available non-driving positions in the Des Moines office, and

stated that if Minnihan did not apply for a position, or did not accept a position once

offered, his employment with Mediacom would be terminated on July 26, 2010. 

There were no open positions in the Ames facility at that time. Gadams encouraged

Minnihan to use company time to learn about the available positions, and expressed

his wish that Minnihan stay with Mediacom. 

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On July 25, 2010, Minnihan sent Gadams an email indicating that he did not

feel the two suggested positions were feasible because they were located in Des

Moines. Minnihan's email also recommended three alternatives. First, he suggested

Mediacom continue to accommodate him in the TOS position until October when his

driving restriction would be lifted. Second, Minnihan inquired about taking Family

Medical Leave (FMLA) until October. Finally, he suggested his current TOS

position be restructured to include only non-driving duties. After receiving this

email, Mediacomdecided to continue to accommodate Minnihan until October, since

it was only a few months away and they wished to retain a long-term valued

employee. Additionally, Mediacom realized that if Minnihan did take FMLA leave

until October they would be even more burdened, since they would not be able to fill

his position during the interim period. On October 4, 2010, Minnihan's doctor

cleared him to drive, and Minnihan resumed all his regular duties as a TOS. 

On April 5, 2011, Minnihan experienced a third seizure at work, and was again

restricted from driving for six months. Following Minnihan's April 2011 seizure,

Mediacom decided to transfer Minnihan to the Des Moines office as a Network

Operations Center (NOC) Operator, a non-driving position with the same pay and

benefits as the TOS position. After this offer was communicated to Minnihan,

Minnihan's attorney sent a letter to Mediacom stating that a transfer to a position in

Des Moines was not a reasonable accommodation because Minnihan's driving

restriction made him unable to commute to work in Des Moines. Mediacom

completed the paperwork to transfer Minnihan to the NOC position in Des Moines

on April 14, 2011.

From April 15, 2011, to May 16, 2011, Mediacom gave Minnihan time to

decide if he would accept the transfer to Des Moines and arrange transportation, or

to submit paperwork to take FMLA leave. On April 26, 2011, Minnihan did not

report to work for the NOC position in Des Moines. Later that same day, Wellman

sent Minnihan a letter detailing possible transportation options between Ames and

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DesMoines,including the name of another Mediacomemployee who commuted from

Ames to Des Moines that Minnihan could ride with, and a list of websites that

contained information on rideshares and public transportation between Ames and Des

Moines. On April 27, 2011, Minnihan sent an email to Wellman asking whether there

were any jobs that he could do out of the Ames office, and alternatively suggesting

again that Mediacom restructure his TOS position in Ames to make it non-driving,

and hire a second TOS to handle the responsibilities that required driving. Wellman

replied to Minnihan on April 29, 2011, stating that there were no open non-driving

jobs in Ames with comparable pay to his TOS position. Wellman also responded that

creating a second TOS position would cause Mediacom undue hardship, and was not

a reasonable accommodation.

On May 2, 2011, Mediacom sent Minnihan a letter stating that if he did not

report for work at his new NOC position in Des Moines, or submit paperwork for

FMLA leave by May 10, 2011, that his employment would be terminated. On May

16, 2011, a letter terminating Minnihan's employment was sent to Minnihan by

Mediacom. The letter noted that Minnihan had neither reported for work, called in

to report an absence, nor applied for medical leave, and that the reason for his

termination was his recurring absences without notice or approved leave.

After Minnihan's employment with Mediacomwasterminated, he filed a claim

with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC) and the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging Mediacom discriminated against him in

violation of the ICRA and the ADAAA. After receiving his right to sue letters from

the ICRC and the EEOC, Minnihan filed suit against Mediacom in Iowa state court. 

Mediacom timely removed the action to federal court. Mediacom filed a motion for

summary judgment, arguing that Minnihan was not a qualified individual for the

purposes of disability law because he could not perform the essential functions of his

job. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mediacom. Minnihan

appeals. 

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo the district court's grant ofsummary judgment, viewing the

record in the light most favorable to Minnihan, the non-moving party. Kallail v.

Alliant Energy Corporate Servs., Inc. 691 F.3d 925, 929 (8th Cir. 2012). We must

affirm the grant of summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact,

and the movant, Mediacom, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 929-30.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In resisting the motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving

party must produce "sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to

return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249

(1986). "[E]vidence [that] is merely colorable, [ . . . ] or is not significantly probative"

cannot be the basis for a denial of summary judgment. Id. at 249-50 (internal

citations omitted).

B. ADAAA and ICRA Claims 3 4

In 2008, Congress amended parts of the Americans with Disabilities Act 3

(ADA), largely to clarify what qualified as a disability, and the updated law is now

called the ADAAA. For the purposes of the instant appeal, the analysis remains the

same under the ADA or the ADAAA. Accordingly, these terms are used

interchangeably throughout this opinion.

Minnihan makes claims of disability discrimination under both the ADAAA 4

and the ICRA. In the past, disability claims under the ICRA have been analyzed in

accord with the ADA. Kallail, 691 F.3d at 930. The district court and both parties

operated under the assumption that, with respect to Minnihan's case, the ICRA was

still in agreement with the ADAAA, since it is undisputed that Minnihan suffered

from a disability. Accordingly, we analyze Minnihan's ICRA claim in accord with

his ADAAA claim, but we otherwise make no legal or factual determinations about

the ICRA's relation to the ADAAA. 

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To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADAAA, a plaintiff

must show that (1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADAAA; (2) he

was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without a

reasonable accommodation; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action

because of his disability. E.E.O.C. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d 561, 568 (8th

Cir. 2007). In order to be a qualified individual for the purposes of the ADAAA, the

plaintiff must "(1) possess the requisite skill, education, experience, and training for

[the] position, and (2) be able to perform the essential job functions, with or without

reasonable accommodation." Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707,

712 (8th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). Additionally, the inquiry of whether an

employee is a qualified individual is not limited to the employee's existing job, but

instead, under certain circumstances, may also include other company jobs that the

disabled employee desires. Cravens v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas City,

214 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir. 2000). Mediacom argues that Minnihan was not a

qualified individual because he was not able to perform the essential functions of his

job, with or without a reasonable accommodation. Minnihan asserts that the district

court erred in concluding that driving was an essential function of the TOS position. 

He contends that he was able to perform the essential functions of his position with

a reasonable accommodation.

Essentialfunctions are "the fundamental job duties ofthe employment position

the individual with a disability holds or desires." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). To

determine whether a job function is essential, we consider factors from the ADA

implementing regulations, including:

(i) [t]he employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii)

[w]ritten job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing

applicants for the job; (iii) [t]he amount of time spent on the job

performing the function; (iv) [t]he consequences of not requiring the

incumbent to perform the function; . . . [and] (vii) [t]he current work

experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 

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Kallail, 691 F.3d at 930 (first, second, third, fourth and sixth alterations in original).

Although Minnihan makes a showing of contesting each of the above listed factors,

he fails to produce sufficient evidence that is more than merely colorable or that is

significantly probative enough to raise a genuine issue of material fact. The only

factor Minnihan arguably comes close to genuinely contesting is the fourth, the

consequences of not performing the function. 

During the time Minnihan was legally restricted from driving, Mediacom

accommodated Minnihan by allowing him to remain in the TOS position without

driving. The time period during which Mediacom accommodated Minnihan 5

illustratesthe consequence of Minnihan not performing the function of driving in the

TOS position. The parties disagree about the effect Minnihan's accommodation had

on the company. Adreon and Hutchison testified that they and other employees

worked additional hours in order to complete Minnihan's driving-related duties. 

Hutchinson also testified that he worked additional hours to make up for time spent

driving Minnihan to locations off-site. Minnihan does not dispute that other

employees had to put in extra time due to his driving restriction, but disagrees with

how much additional time they worked, or how often other employees drove him to

jobs off-site. However, Minnihan conceded in his affidavit, that during the period he

was restricted from driving, there were times when he would have to ask other

employees to perform tasks for him, or have other employees drive him to an off-site

location. 

Minnihan argues further that the mere fact Mediacomwas able to accommodate

him is evidence that driving was not an essential function of the TOS position. He

relies on Kammueller v. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 383 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 2004) for the

Aside from Minnihan, Mediacom had never previously exempted an 5

individual in the TOS position from driving for longer than a few weeks.

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proposition that Minnihan being able to "function effectively" as a TOS during the

time he was restricted from driving supports a finding that driving was not in reality

an essential function of the TOS position. In Kammueller, the court reversed the trial

court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer after finding a genuine

issue of material fact existed as to the consequences of the employee not performing

a job function. The employee, a driver/guard for an armored truck company, had

been previously accommodated, due to a disability, and exempted from the

employer's requirement of being able to lift up to fifty pounds. Several months after

laying off fifty employees, the employer decided it could no longer accommodate the

employee's lifting restriction, and he wasterminated. Id. at 783. Ultimately, the court

in Kammueller concluded that there was a material question of fact asto whether "the

consequences of excusing [the employee] fromcertain job functions were sufficiently

severe to consider those job functions essential." Id. at 787.

However, Kammuelleris distinguishable fromthe instant case. In Kammueller,

the employee was exempted from the lifting requirement for a period of six years. 

Just months before he was terminated, the employer agreed to continue the

employee's accommodation, even after a significant reduction in force. Then, for

unexplained reasons, the employer changed its mind and decided to enforce the lifting

requirement against the employee, thus resulting in his termination. In the instant

case, Mediacom exempted Minnihan from driving off and on for a total period of ten

months. Unlike in Kammueller, Mediacom did not abruptly and inexplicably change

its mind about accommodating Minnihan; Mediacom informed Minnihan within the

first five months of his driving restriction that it would be unable to permanently

accommodate his driving restriction. More importantly, there was no evidence in

Kammueller that the employee's accommodation resulted in other employees having

to assume additional duties, or work additional hours. In Minnihan's case, even

though he disputes the amount of extra time other employees worked due to his

accommodation and how often it was necessary for him to work in the field, he

conceded that while he was restricted there were times when he would have to ask

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employees to perform tasks for him, or have an employee drive him to a job off-site. 

Thus, Kammueller does not bear the weight Minnihan attempts to place on it. 

At bottom, for established public policy reasons, "[a]n employer does not

concede that a job function is non-essential simply by voluntarily assuming the

limited burden associated with a temporary accommodation, northerebyacknowledge

that the burden associated with a permanent accommodation would not be unduly

onerous." Rehrs v. Iams Co., 486 F.3d 353, 358 (8th Cir. 2007) (alteration in

original) (quotation and internal quotation omitted). We have held that "to find

otherwise would unacceptably punish employers from doing more than the ADA

requires, and might discourage such an undertaking on the part of the employers."

Id. (quotation omitted). For these important reasons, Minnihan's arguments that

Mediacom was able to conduct business while accommodating him does not raise a

material question of fact on this issue. 

"The employer's judgment about an essential job function is considered highly

probative." Knutson v. Schwan's Home Serv., Inc., 711 F.3d 911, 914 (8th Cir. 2013)

(internal quotation omitted). But, the employer's judgment is not conclusive. 

Kammueller, 383 F.3d at 786. In the instant case, it is undisputed that Mediacom

considered driving an essential function of the TOS position. The essential nature of

driving to the TOS job is further illustrated in the written job description for the

position. While the ability to drive is not specifically listed, the TOS job description

states "[v]alid driver's license with good driving required." J.A. at 471 (emphasis

added). Furthermore, many of the specific responsibilities set out in the job

description could only be performed on location in customers' homes, which supports

a finding that driving was an essential function of the job. See Dropinski v. Douglas

Cnty, Neb., 298 F.3d 704, 708-09 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding certain job functions were

essential, even though theywere not listed in the written job description, because they

were inherently required to perform the written job functions). 

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We have held that a task may be an essential function even if the employee

performs it for only a few minutes each week, and even if other employees are

available to perform the task for the disabled employee. See Summerville v. Trans

World Airlines, Inc., 219 F.3d 855, 858-59 (8th Cir. 2000). Neither party, nor the

district court, established with any specificity how much time Minnihan, or any TOS,

spent actually driving. While it is unclear how much time Minnihan spent driving in

the TOS position, it is clear from the record that the time Minnihan spent driving

facilitated his ability to be out in the field, which Minnihan agreed was where he

spent at least fifty percent of his working hours. Minnihan's allegation that the

instancesin which he wasrequired to leave the office to complete his responsibilities

were "rare" is of no consequence in our analysis, because it is the general experience

and expectations of all individuals in the TOS position, not Minnihan's personal

experience, which establishes the essential functions of the job. Dropinski, 298 F.3d

at 709. Given all these factors, we find that driving was an essential function of the

TOS position.

Even with our finding that driving was an essential function of the TOS

position, Minnihan could still be considered a qualified individual for the purposes

of the ADAAA and the ICRA, if he made a facial showing that he was able to

complete the essential function of his job with or without an accommodation. Kallail,

691 F.3d at 932. Minnihan makes no such showing. Iowa law made it illegal for

Minnihan to drive, an essential function of his job, during the time of his restriction,

and no accommodation could change that. He contends that restructuring his TOS

position to only include non-driving duties would have been a reasonable

accommodation. Although restructuring is one ofthe possible accommodations under

the ADAAA, an employer "is not required to reallocate the essential functions of a

job." Dropinski, 298 F.3d at 707 (quotation omitted). Additionally, we have held

that "an accommodation that would cause other employees to work harder, longer, or

be deprived of opportunities is not mandated" under the ADA. Rehrs, 486 F.3d at

357. Minnihan conceded that during the time Mediacom accommodated him other

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employees had to perform tasks for him, or drive him to off-site locations. He also

conceded that other employees at times had to work additional hours as a result of his

accommodation. 

Thus, given that driving was an essential function of the TOS position, and that

Minnihan was unable to complete thisfunction with a reasonable accommodation, we

find that Minnihan was not a qualified individual under the ADAAA and the ICRA. 

Accordingly, Minnihan failed to present a prima facie case of disability

discrimination and Mediacom was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

6

C. Reasonable Accommodation and Mediacom's Engagement in the

Interactive Process

Lastly, Minnihan asserts that Mediacom failed to offer Minnihan a reasonable

accommodation or engage in the interactive process in good faith. We disagree.

There is no per se liability under the ADA if an employer fails to engage in the

interactive process. Cravens, 214 F.3d at 1021. However, at the summary judgment

stage "the failure of an employer to engage in an interactive process to determine

whether reasonable accommodations are possible is prima facie evidence that the

employer may be acting in bad faith." Id. (quotation omitted). An employee with a

disability must show the following elements to establish his employer failed to

participate in the interactive process:

(1) the employer knew about the employee's disability; (2) the employee

requested accommodation or assistance for his or her disability; (3) the

Minnihan also argued that the district court erred in finding that he had not

6

suffered an adverse employment action when Mediacomdecided to transfer Minnihan

to the non-driving NOC position in Des Moines. Since we have already determined

that Minnihan failed to establish a prima facie case for disability discrimination, we

decline to address this issue.

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employer did not make a good faith effort to assist the employee in

seeking accommodation; and (4) the employee could have been

reasonably accommodated but for the employer's lack of good faith.

Id. It is not disputed that Mediacom knew about Minnihan's disability, and that

Minnihan requested assistance for his disability. Minnihan argues that Mediacom

failed to participate in an interactive process because it did not determine how to

retain him in the TOS position. However, "a disabled individual is not entitled to an

accommodation of his choice." Rehrs, 486 F.3d at 359. As discussed above,

Mediacom was not required to restructure the TOS job to accommodate Minnihan,

because it would have required Mediacom to reallocate essential functions of the job. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Minnihan, the record is clear that

Mediacom made a good faith effort to assist Minnihan in finding a reasonable

accommodation. Several members of Mediacom's Human Resources department, as

well as Minnihan's supervisors, spoke with him over a period of months regarding

possible accommodations. In addition to responding to his inquires about the

availability of other positions in the Ames office and the possibility of restructuring

his TOS position, Mediacom provided Minnihan with information about other jobs

within the company, as well as giving him time on the job to apply for other positions.

This evidence shows that Mediacom did engage in an interactive process with

Minnihan to find an accommodation.

In fact, not only did Mediacom engage in an interactive process, the record

shows Mediacomoffered Minnihan a reasonable accommodation, which he declined

to accept. We have found that in certain situations, reassignment to a vacant position

can be a reasonable accommodation, where the employee can perform the essential

functions of the new position. Cravens, 214 F.3d at 1017-20. Reassignment is not

required of employers in every instance, however, and is "an accommodation of last

resort" when the employee cannot be accommodated in his existing position. Id. at

1019. In the case of a reassignment, the employer is not required to create a new

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position or move other employees from their jobs in order to open up a position. Id. 

Rather, reassignment to another position is a required accommodation only if there

is a vacant position for which the employee is otherwise qualified. Id.

Because Minnihan could not drive–an essential function of the TOS

position–with or without a reasonable accommodation, Mediacomcould not, and was

not required, to accommodate him in the TOS position. Given this situation,

transferring Minnihan to a different position wasthe only reasonable accommodation

available. However, Minnihan declined to accept Mediacom's transfer to the NOC

position by failing to report for work, or request leave time, and as a result he was

terminated. In order for an employee to prevail on an ADA claim where the employer

has offered the employee reassignment as a reasonable accommodation, "the

employee must offer evidence showing both that the position offered was inferior to

[his] former job and that a comparable position for which the employee was qualified,

was open." Rehrs, 486 F.3d at 359 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). 

Minnihan provides no evidence that the NOC position was inferior to the TOS

position, and the record is clear that there were no comparable, non-driving positions

open in the Ames office during the time Minnihan and Mediacom were engaged in

the interactive process to find a reasonable accommodation. Thus, Minnihan has

failed to show that Mediacom did not offer him a reasonable accommodation.

III. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set out above, we affirm. 

______________________________

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