Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-99007/USCOURTS-ca9-09-99007-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Graham S. Henry
Appellant
Charles L. Ryan
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GRAHAM S. HENRY,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

CHARLES L. RYAN,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 09-99007

D.C. No.

2:02-CV-00656-

SRB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 18, 2012—San Francisco, California

Filed June 19, 2013

Before: Raymond C. Fisher, Richard C. Tallman,

and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Fisher

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2 HENRY V. RYAN

 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

*

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

SUMMARY

*

Habeas Corpus/Death Penalty

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a

28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging a

conviction and capital sentence for murder, kidnapping,

robbery, and theft.

The panel first exercised its discretion to deny petitioner’s

Brady claim on the merits, despite a procedural default issue,

then held that notes the prosecution withheld were not

material to the guilty verdict. See Brady v. Maryland, 373

U.S. 83 (1963).

The panel also held that petitioner was not diligent in

securing the facts supporting his claim that photographic

evidence produced by the state before trial was altered, and

that some photos had been omitted and not produced during

discovery. The panel further held that the state’s suppression

of evidence was not the cause of petitioner’s failure to

comply with state procedural rules so as to excuse the

procedural default of this claim.

The panel denied petitioner’s Napue claim on the merits,

despite a procedural default issue, because petitioner had not

established that a detective knowingly provided false

testimony that the prosecution knew the testimony would be

inaccurate. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).

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HENRY V. RYAN 3

The panel next denied a certificate of appealability as to

petitioner’s claim of juror misconduct when the jurors

allegedly considered extrinsic evidence (two jurors performed

an experiment to test one of petitioner’s contentions) because

petitioner could not show that the alleged misconduct had a

substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.

The panel granted a motion to expand the certificate of

appealability, then affirmed the district court’s denial of relief

as to petitioner’s claim that the state courts applied an

unconstitutional causal nexus test when considering

mitigating evidence of petitioner’s history of alcohol abuse,

for lack of a substantial and injurious effect on the sentence.

The panel affirmed the denial of petitioner’s claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present

mitigating evidence of petitioner’s childhood sexual abuse

and mental illness, because the state court reasonably

concluded that petitioner failed to show prejudice.

COUNSEL

Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender, Robin C. Konrad

(argued) and Amy E. B. Kapp, Assistant Federal Public

Defenders, Phoenix, Arizona, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General, Kent Cattani, Chief

Counsel, Criminal Appeals/Capital Litigation Section, and

Jonathan Bass (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Appeals/Capital Litigation Section, Tucson, Arizona, for

Respondents-Appellees.

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4 HENRY V. RYAN

 The district court certified the first and third claims pursuant to Fed. R. 1

App. P. 22(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Henry seeks certificates of

appealability on the second and fourth claims.

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge:

Graham Saunders Henry was convicted by a jury of firstdegree murder, kidnapping, robbery and theft. The Arizona

trial court imposed a sentence of death in 1988 and on

resentencing in 1995. After pursuing a direct appeal and state

postconviction relief (PCR), Henry filed a habeas petition in

federal district court. The district court denied the petition,

and Henry appeals.

Henry raises four claims on appeal: (1) that the state’s use

of perjured testimony and its suppression of material

evidence violated his constitutional rights under Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Napue v. Illinois,

360 U.S. 264 (1959); (2) that he was denied a fair trial

because jurors engaged in misconduct by conducting an outof-court experiment; (3) that the state court employed an

unconstitutional causal nexus test when considering

mitigating evidence offered at sentencing; and (4) that his

resentencing counsel was constitutionally ineffective. We 1

hold that Henry’s claims are either procedurally defaulted or

without merit and therefore affirm the district court’s denial

of habeas relief.

BACKGROUND

Henry and his acquaintance, Vernon Foote, embarked on

a road trip from California to Arizona and consumed large

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HENRY V. RYAN 5

quantities of alcohol along the way. Their vehicle broke

down outside Las Vegas, and they were towed to the

Sportsman Lounge in Henderson, Nevada, where they

continued to consume alcohol.

Henry testified that at the Sportsman Lounge, Foote

informed him that an older man – Roy Estes – agreed to

transport them to Arizona in Estes’ truck in exchange for $50.

When Estes, Henry and Foote left Henderson in Estes’ truck,

Henry contends he was too tired to drive, so he “took a big

chug-a-lug of whiskey,” crawled in the camper of Estes’ truck

and fell fast asleep while Foote drove the vehicle. Henry

woke up about two hours later when Foote made a hard turn

on a dirt road and, from the truck’s camper, Henry heard

Foote and Estes arguing in the truck’s cab. From the truck’s

camper, Henry saw Foote hit Estes, stop the truck, drag Estes

out of the truck over a berm to a bank near bushes and start

punching Estes. Henry crawled out of the camper and saw

Foote pull a knife out of Estes. Henry further testified that he

ran up to the bank to help Estes and dragged him away from

Foote and towards the shade, where Estes died.

The state, however, offered a different narrative at trial.

The state presented evidence that Henry drove the vehicle to

the crime scene. The state also presented evidence that Henry

and Foote together dragged Estes up the berm to a bush,

where Estes was stabbed before being dragged by Henry to a

larger bush, where Estes’ body was hidden from the roadway.

See State v. Henry, 176 Ariz. 569, 574–75 (Ariz. 1993)

(recounting Henry’s and the state’s conflicting accounts of

the events).

Henry testified that after he realized Estes was dead, he

started shouting at Foote and got in the truck to leave. Foote

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6 HENRY V. RYAN

 Henry testified that he began using this alias to avoid being linked to 2

an outstanding arrest warrant in his name.

also jumped in the truck, and they pulled away from the

scene. Shortly thereafter, Henry was pulled over for driving

down the wrong side of a divided highway. Foote and Henry

quickly made an agreement that if Foote did not tell the

police Henry’s real name, Henry would not to tell the police

that Foote had killed Estes.

Henry gave the police his fishing license with the name

“Harold S. Williams” and was arrested for driving while

intoxicated, blowing a .182 on a Breathalyzer. A few days 2

later, while Henry was still detained for drunk driving, a

detective addressed Henry by his real name. Henry then told

the detective that Foote had killed Estes and agreed to lead

officers to the crime scene.

Henry and Foote were tried separately. The jury

convicted Henry of first-degree murder, kidnapping, robbery

and theft. Henry was sentenced to death for the murder.

Following a direct appeal and three PCR petitions in state

court, Henry filed this federal habeas petition. The district

court concluded that Henry was not entitled to evidentiary

development or habeas relief.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court’s denial of Henry’s habeas

petition de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. See

Carrera v. Ayers, 699 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2012) (en

banc). We review the denial of a request for an evidentiary

hearing for an abuse of discretion. See Wood v. Ryan,

693 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Dismissals based on

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HENRY V. RYAN 7

procedural default are reviewed de novo. See Robinson v.

Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1099 (9th Cir. 2010).

Because Henryfiled his federal habeas petition after April

24, 1996, he must not only prove a violation of his

constitutional rights but also satisfy the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) with respect

to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court. See

Fenenbock v. Dir. of Corr. for Cal., 692 F.3d 910, 916 (9th

Cir. 2012). Under AEDPA, a court may not grant habeas

relief with respect to any such claim unless the state court’s

decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or was “based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). We review the last reasoned state court decision

addressing the claim in question. See Crittenden v. Ayers,

624 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2010).

DISCUSSION

I. BRADY/NAPUE CLAIMS

At trial, the prosecution relied on crime scene

photographs taken by the state and on footprint evidence

(from testimony interpreting the state’s photographs) to

support its theory that Henry was an active participant in

Estes’ murder rather than a mere bystander to the crime. The

state presented two witnesses who testified about the crime

scene photographs: Detective Patterson, who investigated the

crime scene and testified that he took all of the crime scene

photographs, and Bernell Lawrence, who was qualified as an

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8 HENRY V. RYAN

expert tracker and testified about the footprints shown in the

photographs.

Disputing the prosecution’s evidence, Henry testified that

he was asleep in the truck camper and awoke only when he

heard Foote and Estes fighting. Henry said that Foote alone

dragged Estes over a sand berm to a bush and that he ran to

the bush to find that Foote had stabbed Estes, at which time

Henry dragged Estes away from Foote and into the shade. At

trial the defense relied on the crime scene photographs to

support Henry’s innocence, cautioning the jury to look at

“every picture” admitted into evidence and to “look very

carefully at the[] prints.”

In his federal habeas petition, Henry asserted three due

process violations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963), and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959): (1) that

the state withheld notes created by his codefendant, Foote,

which included a drawing of the crime scene; (2) that the

state altered and suppressed photos of the crime scene; and

(3) that the state knowingly presented false testimony during

trial. The first two claims assert violations of Brady, which

“hold[s] that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence

favorable to an accused upon request violates due process

where the evidence is material either to guilt or to

punishment.” 373 U.S. at 87. The third claim asserts a

violation of Napue, which holds that a conviction violates a

defendant’s due process rights when it is obtained by the

state’s knowing presentation of false testimony. 360 U.S. at

269.

Henry did not present these due process claims to the state

court. The district court denied the first claim on the merits

and the second and third claims as procedurally barred and on

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HENRY V. RYAN 9

the merits. The court issued a certificate of appealability on

these issues. We address each claim in turn.

A. Codefendant Foote’s Notes

Henry states that when he requested records from the

Mohave County Sheriff’s Office as part of his federal habeas

proceedings, he received notes Foote created, which include

a drawing of the crime scene, that the state withheld during

trial. Henry argues that the drawing corroborates his account

of the crime because in the drawing, Foote’s footprints appear

on either side of Estes’ tracks, while Henry’s footprints

extend from behind the vehicle to the bush where Estes was

stabbed. Henry contends that the state’s suppression of

Foote’s notes violated his due process rights under Brady.

1. Procedural Default

The parties disagree about whether the procedural default

rule bars this claim. We need not reach this issue, however,

because the merits of the claim have been fully briefed, and

the district court assumed that it was not barred and reached

the merits of the claim. We therefore exercise our discretion

to deny the claim on the merits as permitted by 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(2). See Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 777

n.10 (9th Cir. 2012).

2. Merits

To prove a Brady violation, Henry must show (1) that the

evidence at issue is favorable to him because it is exculpatory

or impeaching; (2) that it was suppressed by the state, either

willfully or inadvertently; and (3) that it was material. See

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280–82 (1999). We

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10 HENRY V. RYAN

 See Ariz. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) (providing a hearsay exception for “[a] 3

statement that . . . a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would

have made only if the person believed it to be true because, when made,

it was so contrary to the declarant’s proprietary or pecuniary interest or

had so great a tendency to invalidate the declarant’s claim against

someone else or to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability”

(emphasis added)).

assume without deciding, as did the district court, that Foote’s

notes are favorable and were suppressed and analyze only

whether any suppression was material.

To establish materiality, Henry must show that the state’s

“nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable

probability that the suppressed evidence would have

produced a different verdict.” Id. at 281. Henry argues that

the suppressed evidence is material because its disclosure

would have allowed him to present evidence corroborating

his version of events and discrediting the state’s theory.

We are not convinced. First, to be material under Brady,

evidence must be admissible as evidence “or capable of being

used ‘to impeach a government witness.’” United States v.

Kohring, 637 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United

States v. Price, 566 F.3d 900, 911–12 (9th Cir. 2009)).

Foote’s notes, including markings on Foote’s drawing that

indicate the paths taken by him, Estes and Henry, appear to

be hearsay. See Ariz. R. Evid. 801(a), (c). Henry argues that

these notes would be admissible under the “statement against

interest” exception. However, Foote’s notes and drawing 3

reflect his efforts to show he was innocent of Estes’ murder

and to shift guilt to Henry. They cannot reasonably be

considered a statement made against Foote’s interest.

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HENRY V. RYAN 11

Second, even if they were admissible at trial, the drawing

and notes taken together are substantially more incriminating

of Henry than exculpatory. Foote’s notes accuse Henry of

killing Estes and profess Foote’s own innocence. They also

state, contrary to Henry’s testimony at trial, that Henry was

in the truck cab rather than the camper during the drive to the

crime scene, and the drawing reflects this assertion as well.

Although the drawing slightly undermines the state’s theory

of how the murder occurred, it does not corroborate Henry’s.

Additionally, the drawing is practically indecipherable, and

its source – an individual who was also charged with the

murder of Estes – is not particularly trustworthy. Therefore,

this evidence has very little exculpatory value and does not

present a “reasonable probability” of altering the verdict. See

United States v. Diaz-Rodriguez, 478 F.2d 1005, 1008 (9th

Cir. 1973) (“A new trial is not automatically required

whenever the prosecution’s files subsequently reveal[]

evidence of possible utility to the defense but of unlikely

weight in altering the verdict.”).

Third, although Henry argues that “[t]he bulk of the

State’s case against Henry rested upon footprints,” the

footprint evidence was only one aspect of the state’s case;

significant other circumstantial evidence existed that

supported the jury’s verdict. The prosecution relied on

evidence showing that Henry left the scene of the crime and

failed to tell the police about the murder even after he was

asked about it. The state also relied on the testimony of

Estes’ landlord, who suggested that Estes was not taken from

his apartment willingly. It relied on evidence showing that

Foote was substantiallymore intoxicated than Henry, tending

to suggest that Foote would not have been driving, and

evidence showing that Henry, who claimed he had not driven

to the crime scene and had been asleep during the trip, was

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12 HENRY V. RYAN

able to direct the police to its precise location. It also

introduced evidence showing that although Henry stated that

after Foote stabbed Estes, there was “blood all over,” blood

was found on Henry’s clothes but not on Foote’s.

Furthermore, the jury did not have to believe the state’s

theory of the crime scene to convict Henry. The state court

instructed the jury that it could convict Henry of first-degree

murder either under a premeditation theory or under a felonymurder or accomplice theory. Therefore, even if the jury

believed Henry’s story that he did not drag Estes up the berm

along with Foote, it could have convicted him under a felonymurder or accomplice theory.

In sum, Henry’s Brady claim regarding the state’s

suppression of Foote’s notes fails because Henry cannot

establish that the allegedly suppressed evidence was material

to the guilty verdict. The admissibility of the evidence is

questionable, the notes are more incriminating than

exculpatory and significant other evidence existed supporting

the jury’s guilty verdict. For these reasons, we affirm the

district court’s denial of this claim. We also affirm the

district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing on this claim

because Henry has not established that the facts he alleges, if

proven, would entitle him to relief, nor has he pointed to

“additional evidence that would be presented if an evidentiary

hearing were held. In short, no abuse of discretion appears.”

Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 1052 (9th Cir. 2011).

B. Alteration and Omission of Crime Scene Photos

Henry states that in 1991, during PCR proceedings, his

investigator David Abbott noticed that certain negatives were

missing from the rolls of film that the state had produced

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HENRY V. RYAN 13

upon his request. Nearly two decades later, during Henry’s

federal habeas proceedings, Henry retained a photograph

analysis expert, David Hill. Hill conducted a computerenhanced analysis of several photographic trial exhibits and

concluded that the photographic evidence produced by the

state before trial was altered and that some photographs had

been omitted and not produced to Henry during discovery.

Henry argues that the state’s alleged actions violated his due

process rights under Brady.

1. Procedural Default

The district court denied this claim as procedurally

defaulted and, in the alternative, on the merits. Arizona Rule

of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a) precludes post-conviction

relief on any claim that could have been raised on direct

appeal or in a prior PCR petition. Henry argues that

notwithstanding Rule 32.2(a), this claim would not be

procedurally barred in state court under the exceptions to

Rule 32.2(a) articulated in Rule 32.1(e) and (h), and thus the

procedural default rule does not apply.

Rule 32.1(e) permits a defendant to bring a PCR petition

if newly discovered facts exist that were diligently secured by

the defendant and that “probably would have changed the

verdict or sentence.” We agree with the district court that

Henry was not diligent in securing the facts upon which he

now relies. His claim is not based on new evidence provided

by the state but rather on new analysis of evidence that has

been available to him for more than 20 years. Henry has not

alleged that any facts were revealed during his habeas

proceedings that provided the impetus for analyzing these

photographs. Indeed, as he states in his opening brief,

“[s]ince his conviction, Henry has consistently maintained

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14 HENRY V. RYAN

that . . . the State misrepresented and withheld crime scene

photographs.” He simply chose not to take any action to

develop this claim until more than 20 years after trial.

Therefore, no avenue for relief exists under Rule 32.1(e).

Rule 32.1(h) permits a defendant to bring a PCR petition

if he can demonstrate “by clear and convincing evidence that

the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish

that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt.”

We agree with the district court that the evidence Henry has

presented does not meet this high threshold, particularly

given the ample evidence of his guilt that existed beyond the

footprint and photographic evidence. Therefore, no avenue

for relief exists under Rule 32.1(h).

In sum, because Henry’s claim would be procedurally

barred in state court under Rule 32.2(a), and he has not

identified any applicable exceptions toRule 32.2(a), his claim

is procedurally defaulted.

2. Cause and Prejudice

“[F]ederal habeas review of [a procedurally defaulted

claim] is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for

the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged

violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to

consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage

of justice.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).

Henry argues that he can “overcome any alleged default for

failing to present his claim in state court because he can show

cause and prejudice based on the merits of his claim itself.”

It is true that cause and prejudice may sometimes be

established on the merits of a Brady claim itself, with cause

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HENRY V. RYAN 15

and prejudice corresponding respectively to the suppression

and materiality elements of a Brady claim. See Strickler,

527 U.S. at 282 (“In this case, cause and prejudice parallel

two of the three components of the alleged Brady violation

itself.” (emphasis added)). It is not the case, however, that a

defendant is excused from failing to raise a Brady claim in

state court every time he can prove that material was

suppressed by the state and may materially affect the verdict.

Rather, the state’s suppression establishes cause only when it

is the reason for his failure to develop facts in state court

proceedings. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004).

Here, the state’s alleged suppression of omitted

photographs was not the reason for Henry’s failure to develop

facts in state court. In 1991, Henry’s investigator testified

that he noticed that photographs were missing from the rolls

produced by the state. In 1995, Henry himself complained

that the prosecution altered and failed to produce crime scene

photographs. Henry’s opening brief acknowledges that he

had been making these allegations “for years.” It is true that

Henry first had the photos analyzed in 2008, but the

government’s suppression did not cause that delay; Henry

was clearly aware of the state’s alleged Brady violation long

before federal habeas proceedings commenced.

Contrary to Henry’s contentions, Banks, 540 U.S. 668,

and Strickler, 527 U.S. 263, do not hold that suppression

establishes cause for a procedural default even if the

defendant alleged and had evidentiary support for a Brady

claim long before federal proceedings began. The Supreme

Court has long stated that “the existence of cause for a

procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the

prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the

defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s

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16 HENRY V. RYAN

procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488

(1986). In Strickler, the state’s suppression established cause

for the defendant’s procedural default because the defendant

neither knew about, nor had any evidentiary support to

advance, a Brady claim before initiating federal habeas

proceedings. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 283, 286, 287.

Likewise in Banks, the suppressed evidence did not come to

light until after the petitioner initiated federal habeas

proceedings. See Banks, 540 U.S. at 675. In both of these

cases, the state’s suppression was the reason for the

defendants’ failure to raise and develop their claims in state

court, as it was not until federal proceedings that the

defendants had a basis for believing that a Brady violation

had occurred or had any evidentiary basis for such a claim.

Here, by contrast, Henry not only suspected but alleged

and had evidentiary support for his claim more than a decade

before commencing federal habeas proceedings. Banks and

Strickler therefore do not mandate that the state’s suppression

establishes cause for Henry’s failure to raise a Brady claim in

state court. Henry’s proposed rule, under which suppression

always establishes cause, would permit a defendant who

knows of wrongdoing by the state to wait to bring such a

claim until he is in front of the judicial forum that he feels

would be most sympathetic to his claim. This would

undermine the vital purposes served by the procedural default

rule, such as finality, accuracy and efficiency of judicial

decisions, and it would allow criminal defendants to

circumvent the most appropriate forum for adjudicating such

claims – state court. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 490–91.

Henry has not established that the state’s suppression of

evidence is the reason for his failure to comply with state

procedural rules. He therefore has not established cause to

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HENRY V. RYAN 17

excuse his procedural default, and the procedural default rule

bars federal habeas review of this claim. For this reason, we

affirm the district court’s denial of this claim. We also affirm

the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing because

the claim does not rely on “a factual predicate that could not

have been previously discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii).

C. Knowing Presentation of False Testimony

At trial, Detective Patterson testified that he left several

footprints when he walked up the berm while investigating

the crime scene. Detective Patterson identified these

footprints in the photographic exhibits offered at trial. The

prosecution argued that, since Detective Patterson left the

footprints that led up the berm, then Henry must have left the

set of footprints that paralleled those left by Foote and Estes.

As a result, Detective Patterson’s testimony supported the

state’s theory that Henry and Foote together dragged Estes

from the truck to the sand berm where they killed him.

Disputing Detective Patterson’s testimony, Henry testified

that he made the footprints that led up the berm when he

jumped out ofthe back of Estes’ truck. During federal habeas

proceedings, Henry retained Joel Hardin to review Hill’s

enhanced crime scene photos and the related trial testimony.

Hardin concluded:

The footprint evidence contained in the

photograph exhibits supports and generally

substantiates what Henry testified to at his

trial, that Henry, not Patterson, made the

footprints in question.

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18 HENRY V. RYAN

The footprint in the roadway that Patterson

testified was made by him was, in fact, made

by Henry. Henry also made the double berm

prints visible in the photographs as he ran

from the road, jumped into the berm, jumped

again, and entered the desert area. The

footprints in the berm are not Patterson’s

footprints, as he entered then left the desert

area, as he testified.

Because Hill’s computer-enhanced photographs and Hardin’s

report suggest that Henry made the footprints leading from

the back of the truck, Henry argues that Detective Patterson

must have knowingly presented false testimony in violation

of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).

1. Procedural Default

As with Henry’s Brady claim asserting the state’s

suppression of crime scene photographs, this claim relies on

new analysis of evidence that has been in Henry’s possession

for decades. Also as with his Brady claim, it merely provides

proof of accusations Henry has made since trial. Thus, we

are skeptical that this claim is not barred by the procedural

default rule. Nevertheless, the parties focused on the merits

of Henry’s Napue claim, as did the district court’s order

denying habeas relief. We therefore exercise our discretion

to deny the claim on the merits as permitted by 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(2). See Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 777 n.10.

2. Merits

A defendant’s due process rights are violated when a

conviction is obtained through the knowing use of false

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HENRY V. RYAN 19

testimony. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 326 n.1

(1983). “A claim under Napue will succeed when ‘(1) the

testimony (or evidence) was actually false, (2) the

prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony

was actually false, and (3) the false testimony was material.’”

Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005)

(en banc)). The district court rejected Henry’s Napue claim

for two reasons. First, it concluded that Henry provided no

evidence that Detective Patterson knew his testimony was

false, as opposed to simply incorrect or in dispute. Second,

it concluded that even if Detective Patterson’s testimony was

false, Henry failed to demonstrate that the prosecution knew

or should have known it was false. Henry argues that the

district court erred in both of these conclusions. Although he

does not argue that the prosecution knew that Detective

Patterson’s testimony was false, he argues that Detective

Patterson knew his testimony was false and that Detective

Patterson’s knowledge must be imputed to the prosecution.

We need not reach the question of whether Detective

Patterson’s knowledge must be imputed to the prosecution,

because we agree with the district court that Henry has not

established that Patterson knowingly provided false testimony

during trial. Although Henry has provided evidence rebutting

Patterson’s version of the facts, he has provided no evidence

that Patterson knew his testimony was inaccurate at the time

he presented it, rather than Patterson’s recollection merely

being mistaken, inaccurate or rebuttable. Henry’s conclusory

assertion that, because Patterson must have known where he

stepped while investigating the crime scene, any testimony

inconsistent with the truth must be not only inaccurate but

also perjured does not constitute evidence sufficient to make

out a Napue claim.

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20 HENRY V. RYAN

We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of this

claim. We also affirm the district court’s denial of an

evidentiary hearing because the facts underlying this claim

could have been previously discovered through diligence on

Henry’s part. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Decades before

his federal habeas proceedings, Henry alleged that Detective

Patterson “lied” during his trial testimony. The facts

underlying this claim were developed not by analyzing

evidence that was produced in federal habeas proceedings,

but rather by David Hill and Joel Hardin’s analysis of

evidence that had been in Henry’s possession for years.

Thus, the factual predicate for this claim could previously

have been discovered through diligence.

II. JUROR MISCONDUCT

 Henry argues that an out-of-court experiment conducted

by two jurors violated his Sixth Amendment rights to an

impartial jury and to a verdict based on evidence that is

subject to confrontation and assistance of counsel. See

Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471–73 (1965) (holding

that a jury’s consideration of extraneous evidence violates a

criminal defendant’s right to trial by jury).

A. Background

Henry first became aware of potential juror misconduct

issues in 2000, when Henry’s investigator interviewed several

men and women who had served on Henry’s jury more than

a decade earlier. A juror told the investigator that two other

jurors had performed an experiment to test Henry’s

contention that he could hear Foote and Estes arguing from

the camper of Estes’ truck. After driving a similar vehicle

down a gravel road, these jurors concluded that Henry could

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HENRY V. RYAN 21

not have heard an argument occurring in the truck’s cab.

They shared their results with other members of the jury.

Henry asserted a claim of juror misconduct in his petition

for state postconviction relief. The state trial court – Judge

Steven F. Conn, the same judge who had presided over the

trial – rejected Henry’s claim. Among other things, the trial

court questioned whether the jurors’ experiment was material

to the outcome of the trial: the evidence was relevant only to

Henry’s credibility, and even without the evidence Henry was

already “one of the most inherently incredible witnesses [the

court] has ever seen testify in a courtroom.” The Arizona

Supreme Court denied review without comment. The federal

district court also rejected this claim, declined to grant an

evidentiary hearing and declined to issue a certificate of

appealability.

B. Analysis

We also deny a certificate of appealability. To obtain a

certificate of appealability, Henry must demonstrate that the

issue is debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could

resolve the issues differently or that the questions raised are

adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. See

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir.

2000). He has not made this showing. Even assuming Henry

could satisfy § 2254(d) – a question we need not and do not

reach – Henry plainly cannot show that the alleged

misconduct had a “substantial and injurious” effect on the

verdict. See Sassounian v. Roe, 230 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir.

2000) (applying the Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619

(1993), “substantial and injurious” standard on habeas review

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22 HENRY V. RYAN

 As noted, a court may not grant habeas relief with respect to any claim 4

resolved on the merits in state court unless the state court’s decision was

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States” or was “based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

of a juror misconduct claim). The district court therefore 4

properly declined to certify this claim.

Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit cases finding prejudicial

juror misconduct have involved far different circumstances.

The Supreme Court, for instance, has found juror misconduct

to warrant reversal in cases involving extended external

influences on jurors or confirmed juror bias – neither of

which is present here. See Tong Xiong v. Felker, 681 F.3d

1067, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2012). Similarly, the circumstances

in this case are readily distinguishable from cases in which

we have concluded that juror misconduct warranted a new

trial.

First, the extraneous information the jury considered was

not inherently inflammatory, nor had it already been excluded

from trial as unduly prejudicial. Cf. Mancuso v. Olivarez,

292 F.3d 939, 953 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Juror misconduct cases

in which habeas relief has been granted often involve the

jury’s receipt of information excluded from trial as unduly

prejudicial such as evidence of the facts surrounding a

defendant’s prior conviction, bad reputation, or propensity to

violate the law.”); Sassounian, 230 F.3d at 1104, 1112

(reversing a special circumstance jury verdict where it was

reached after the jury improperly considered evidence that

had not been presented at trial because it had been ruled

inadmissible); Rodriguez v Marshall, 125 F.3d 739, 744 (9th

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HENRY V. RYAN 23

 Henry argues, under § 2254(d)(2), that the state court’s adverse 5

credibility finding was unreasonable. To the extent his argument is also

applicable to our harmless error analysis, we reject Henry’s contention.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (providing that “a determination of a factual

issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct”); Ortiz v.

Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 936 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that credibility

determinations are factual issues presumed to be correct under AEDPA).

In both the habeas and direct review contexts, federal courts give

Cir. 1997) (“We have granted a new trial where the jury

receives extraneous information that is ordinarily excluded

from trial as inflammatory or unduly prejudicial.”), overruled

on other grounds by Payton v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 815,

828–29 & n.11 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).

Second, extraneous information is less likely to be

prejudicial when, as in this case, it “merely confirmed what

any reasonable juror already knew.” United States v.

Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 888 (9th Cir. 1981); see also

Rodriguez, 125 F.3d at 745 (discounting claim of prejudice

when extrinsic evidence considered was within the common

knowledge of most reasonable jurors). Here, the state trial

court reasonably found that the extraneous information about

whether a person lying in the camper of a truck could hear an

argument occurring in the cab fell within the common

knowledge of most jurors.

Third, Henry’s credibility was already thoroughly

impeached at trial, making the extraneous information

cumulative. See Tong Xiong, 681 F.3d at 1078 (upholding as

reasonable the state court’s factual determination that the

petitioner was not prejudiced by the jury’s consideration of

extrinsic evidence because a witness’s credibility was so

impeached at trial that extrinsic evidence further impeaching

his credibility was merely cumulative).5

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24 HENRY V. RYAN

deference to trial courts’ witness credibility findings. See, e.g., Tong

Xiong, 681 F.3d at 1078 (accepting the state court’s observation that a

witness’s “credibility regarding his inability to recall prior testimony had

already been impeached at trial, to the point where it had been deemed

‘comical’”); United States v. Hanley, 190 F.3d 1017, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999)

(“[W]e must accord special deference to the trial judge’s impression of the

impact of the alleged misconduct.” (quotation mark omitted)), superseded

by regulation on other grounds; Bagnariol, 665 F.2d at 885 (“The trial

judge is uniquely qualified to appraise the probable effect of information

on the jury . . . . He or she observes the jurors throughout the trial, is

aware of the defenses of asserted, and has heard the evidence.”).

Furthermore, even considering only the facts Henry admitted at trial,

the jury had good reason to question his credibility. He left the scene of

a murder without reporting it to the police, provided false identification to

the police and agreed not to tell the police about a murder and then

reneged on that agreement once it was advantageous for him to do so.

Fourth, as noted earlier, the evidence supporting Henry’s

guilt was substantial, and the jury could have convicted him

under a felony-murder or accomplice theory even if it

believed Henry’s story that he was in the camper of the truck

and did not join Foote in dragging Estes up the berm. See

United States v. Montes, 628 F.3d 1183, 1186, 1190 (9th Cir.

2011) (rejecting a juror misconduct claim where “the

prosecution presented overwhelming evidence” of the

defendants’ guilt).

In sum, the jurors’ alleged consideration of extrinsic

evidence could not have had a “substantial and injurious”

impact on the verdict. We therefore decline to issue a

certificate of appealability.

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HENRY V. RYAN 25

 Here, an evidentiary hearing to determine whether juror misconduct 6

occurred is unnecessary. For purposes of analyzing this claim, we

assume, as did the district court, that the jury considered extrinsic

evidence as Henry alleges. Thus, the only disputed issue is the prejudice

caused by the alleged misconduct.

C. Evidentiary Hearing

Even assuming Henry could satisfy § 2254(d), the district

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Henry’s request

for an evidentiary hearing. “An evidentiary hearing is not

mandated every time there is an allegation of jury misconduct

or bias.” United States v. Angulo, 4 F.3d 843, 847 (9th Cir.

1993). Although a hearing might be useful in determining

whether a defendant’s allegations that jurors engaged in

misconduct are true, courts may not inquire about the

subjective impact of such misconduct on the jury. See Fed.

R. Evid. 606(b); Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 778 (9th Cir.

2007) (“Juror testimony about consideration of extrinsic

evidence may be considered by a reviewing court, but juror

testimony about the subjective effect of evidence on the

particular juror or about the deliberative process may not.”).6

Thus, we have underscored the limited utility of an

evidentiary hearing in determining whether consideration of

extrinsic evidence was prejudicial. See, e.g., Montes,

628 F.3d at 1189 (“The only question left to be answered was

how [the extrinsic evidence] could have influenced the

verdict, and that is a question that cannot be answered

through juror testimony.”).

Henry does not point to any additional evidence that

could be properly pursued at an evidentiary hearing to show

that the alleged misconduct had a substantial and injurious

influence on the verdict. The district court therefore did not

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26 HENRY V. RYAN

 The district court also denied a certificate of appealability. We grant 7

Henry’s motion to expand the certificate of appealability to encompass

this claim because the claim “is one upon which reasonable jurists could

disagree.” Williams v. Ryan, 623 F.3d 1258, 1270 (9th Cir. 2010).

abuse its discretion. See Rhoades, 638 F.3d at 1037

(“Rhoades points to no additional evidence that would be

presented if an evidentiary hearing were held. In short, no

abuse of discretion appears.”); Gandarela v. Johnson,

286 F.3d 1080, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 2002).

III. CAUSAL NEXUS CLAIM

Henry argues that the Arizona courts applied an

unconstitutional causal nexus test when considering

mitigating evidence of his history of alcohol abuse, in

violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to

individualized sentencing. He contends that the state courts

improperly refused to consider this evidence because of the

absence of a causal connection between the evidence and the

crime, violating his constitutional rights under Lockett v.

Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604–06 (1978), Eddings v. Oklahoma,

455 U.S. 104, 113–15 (1982), Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S.

274, 283–87 (2004), and related decisions. These cases hold

that requiring a defendant to prove a nexus between

mitigating evidence and the crime is “a test we never

countenanced and now have unequivocally rejected.” Smith

v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 45 (2004) (per curiam). The district

court denied Henry’s causal nexus claim.7

A. Background

Henry presented evidence of his history of substance

abuse at sentencing and resentencing. He testified that he

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HENRY V. RYAN 27

 The trial court appointed Dr. Fox at defense counsel’s request to 8

conduct a presentence mental health examination of Henry under Rule

26.5 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides: “At

any time before sentence is pronounced, the court may order the defendant

to undergo mental health examination or diagnostic evaluation. Reports

under this section shall be due at the same time as the pre-sentence report

unless the court orders otherwise.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.5.

was a heavy drinker for decades, consuming between a fifth

and a half-gallon of bourbon a day. His criminal records

showed two drunk driving arrests in 1976. His probation

officer reported in 1982 that his “future prognosis [wa]s poor

considering his criminal activities related to excessive use of

alcohol.” On the day Estes was murdered, Henry had a blood

alcohol level of 0.182. He testified that in 1985 he tried both

Alcoholics Anonymous and medication to treat his chronic

alcoholism.

Henry also presented a report by Dr. Walter Fox, M.D.8

Dr. Fox diagnosed Henry with “alcohol dependence,”

concluded that a longitudinal view of Henry’s life showed “a

pattern of continuous heavy use of alcohol throughout the

adult years” and reported that Henry’s “violent behavior and

criminal activities” appeared to be so entwined with his

“excessive use of alcohol” that “one should consider them as

existing together to both predict and explain [his] behavior.”

These “violent behavior[s] and criminal activities” included

a robbery in 1969, a motorcycle accident in 1975,

commission of involuntary manslaughter in 1977, a shooting

in 1985 and the murder of Estes in 1986.

Both the state trial court and the Arizona Supreme Court

treated Henry’s intoxication at the time of the crime as a

statutory mitigating factor under Arizona Revised Statutes

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28 HENRY V. RYAN

§ 13-703(G)(1) (1997). In addition, the Arizona Supreme

Court addressed Henry’s history of alcohol abuse as follows:

Defendant also claims that the court

improperly failed to find his intoxication and

history of alcohol and drug abuse as

non-statutorymitigating factors. With respect

to the former, the court found that defendant’s

intoxication at the time of the homicide

impaired his capacity to appreciate the

wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his

conduct to the requirements of the law under

A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1). It would have been

redundant to count this evidence again as

non-statutory mitigation. We find insufficient

proof of historical substance abuse, but in any

event, this would provide no additional

mitigation without evidence of a causal

connection to the crime. See State v.

Medrano, 185 Ariz. 192, 195-96, 914 P.2d

225, 228-29 (1996); Bible, 175 Ariz. at 609,

858 P.2d at 1212.

State v. Henry, 944 P.2d 57, 67–68 (Ariz. 1997). Henry

moved for reconsideration, arguing that the court’s

imposition of a causal nexus requirement was

unconstitutional under Lockett and Eddings, but the court

summarily denied the motion.

The federal district court also rejected Henry’s causal

nexus claim. The district court concluded that there was no

constitutional violation because the Arizona Supreme Court

had found Henry’s history of alcohol abuse unproven. It

ruled that the Arizona Supreme Court’s “reference to a causal

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HENRY V. RYAN 29

 We also assume without deciding that Henry preserved his argument 9

that the Arizona Supreme Court’s finding of insufficient proof of historical

substance abuse was an unreasonable determination of the facts under

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Compare AlohaCare v. Hawaii, Dep’t of Human

Servs., 572 F.3d 740, 744–45 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that arguments

raised for the first time on appeal are waived, absent exceptional

circumstances), with United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088,

1095 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that “it is claims that are deemed waived or

forfeited, not arguments” (citing Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534

(1992))).

connection represented at most an alternative basis for

discounting chronic alcohol abuse as a mitigating

circumstance.”

B. Analysis

To obtain habeas relief on this claim, Henry must: (1)

satisfy AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); (2) prove that the

Arizona courts committed causal nexus error; and (3) show

that the error had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the sentence. See Stokley v. Ryan,

705 F.3d 401, 404–05 (9th Cir. 2012) (order) (citing

Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 3997 (1987) (referencing

harmless error in connection with the exclusion of

nonstatutory mitigating evidence)). Even assuming that

Henry could satisfy the first two requirements, we affirm the

denial of habeas relief because Henry has not shown that any

error would have “had substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining” the sentence. Brecht, 507 U.S. at

623.9

At the time of the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision

affirming Henry’s death sentence, Arizona law required a

sentencing court to “impose a sentence of death if the court

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30 HENRY V. RYAN

 Henry minimizes the aggravating factors, arguing that they were not 10

overwhelming because the sentencing court found that he was not the

actual killer and did not intend or attempt to kill the victim. The Arizona

Supreme Court, however, held that Henry was “an active, intentional

participant in the killing.” State v. Henry, 944 P.2d at 67; see also State

v. Henry, 863 P.2d 861, 880 (Ariz. 1993) (holding that “the evidence that

two people dragged the victim up the berm, that Henry’s clothes were

spattered with blood, that he drove off immediately after the stabbing, and

that he failed to immediately tell officers about the victim, supports not

only a finding of reckless indifference to human life, but also a conclusion

that Henry was an active, intentional participant in the killing”).

finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances

enumerated in subsection F of this section and that there are

no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for

leniency.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703(E) (1997). Arizona law

also provided that “[o]n review, the supreme court shall

independently review the trial court’s findings of aggravation

and mitigation and the propriety of the death sentence.” Id.

§ 13-703.01.

Here, the state courts found two aggravating factors: a

prior felony involving the use or threat of violence under

Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-703(F)(2), and an offense

committed in expectation of pecuniary gain under

§ 13-703(F)(5). The first factor was based on Henry’s 1970

conviction for the armed robbery of a Kentucky Fried

Chicken at which he had been employed. The second factor

was based on a finding that Henry and Foote murdered Estes

to steal his truck. The state courts found one mitigating 10

factor – that Henry’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness

of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements

of law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to

constitute a defense to prosecution, because of his

consumption of alcohol on the day of the murder. See id.

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HENRY V. RYAN 31

§ 13-703(G)(1). The trial court and the supreme court agreed

that the mitigation was not sufficiently substantial to call for

leniency. Accordingly, they sentenced Henry to death.

We conclude that the additional mitigating evidence of

Henry’s history of alcohol abuse would not have had a

substantial and injurious effect on the sentence for several

reasons. First, in imposing the death penalty, the Arizona

courts already considered Henry’s intoxication at the time of

the murder as a mitigating factor. Given the similar nature of

the mitigation, the additional evidence of Henry’s historical

alcoholism would have had minimal mitigating value. If the

state courts concluded that intoxication with a causal

connection to the crime was not sufficient to call for leniency,

it is highly doubtful that they would have considered

alcoholism without a causal connection to be sufficient.

Second, although evidence of a defendant’s background

or character is clearly relevant and probative even in the

absence of a causal connection to the crime, see Lambright v.

Schriro, 490 F.3d 1103, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam),

state courts are free to consider the absence of a causal

connection when assessing the quality and strength of such

evidence, see Schad v. Ryan, 671 F.3d 708, 723 (9th Cir.

2011) (per curiam). Our review of the record in this

particular case shows that the Arizona courts would not have

given this evidence significant weight under any

circumstances.

Third, this case is readily distinguishable from those in

which we have treated evidence of a history of substance

abuse as significantly mitigating. We have found a history of

substance abuse to be substantially mitigating when it has

been combined with other mitigating evidence. See Correll

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32 HENRY V. RYAN

 Indeed, Henry’s historical alcoholism might have been considered

11

aggravating as well as mitigating, depending on the perspective of the

sentencing court.

v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 944, 952–54 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding

that the defendant’s “mental health disorders, psychiatric

commitments, drug abuse history, brain injury, and

family dysfunction” “amounted to classic mitigating

circumstances”); Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1179 (9th

Cir. 2005) (“If proven to be true during future evidentiary

hearings, this alleged history of substance abuse, emotional

problems, and organic brain damage is the very sort of

mitigating evidence that ‘might well have influenced the

jury’s appraisal of [Earp’s] moral culpability.’” (alteration in

original) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398

(2000))); Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868, 875, 878 (9th

Cir. 2001) (holding that mitigating evidence of the

defendant’s “troubled childhood, his history of substance

abuse, and his mental and emotional problems” “would have

been extremely important to the jury in its effort to decide

whether to impose the death penalty or a sentence of life in

prison”). Henry’s evidence, by contrast, stands alone, was

similar to evidence already considered by the sentencing

courts and was of limited probative value.11

In sum, even assuming the state courts committed causal

nexus error, the error did not have a substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the sentence. We affirm

the denial of habeas relief on Henry’s causal nexus claim.

VI. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Henry claims that his lawyer for resentencing, Gerald

Gavin, provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing

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HENRY V. RYAN 33

to investigate and present mitigating evidence of Henry’s

childhood sexual abuse and mental illness.

A. Background

The record at resentencing contained indications that

Henry was sexually abused by his father. Henry’s juvenile

court records reported that Henry’s father sexually abused

him during the summer of 1961, when Henry was 15. The

presentence investigation report said that Henry “engaged in

a homosexual relationship with his father.” During the guilt

phase of the trial, Henry referred to having been “raped” by

his father when he was 12 years old. These indications

notwithstanding, Gavin apparently made no effort to

investigate the sexual abuse issue further. Nor did Gavin

draw the court’s attention to the evidence already in the

record during resentencing.

The resentencing record also contained indications that

Henry suffered from mental health problems. The juvenile

court records reported that Henry’s mother tried to have him

committed for psychiatric treatment in 1961. They quoted

from a 1961 psychological evaluation in which Dr. P.K.

Brown diagnosed Henry with “hysterical character disorder”

and found “some impairment of functioning due to emotional

disturbance,” “hysterical defenses and psychopathic

tendencies,” and impulsive behavior caused by emotional or

sexual stimulation. They also quoted from a 1962

psychological evaluation in which Dr. Seymour Harris

diagnosed Henry with “a personality character disorder over

which he has fairly good control but which occasionally leads

to certain hysterical acting out behavior.” The record further

contained Dr. Fox’s 1988 psychiatric evaluation, prepared for

the original sentencing. Dr. Fox diagnosed Henry not only

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34 HENRY V. RYAN

 Instead, Gavin tried, unsuccessfully, to obtain court approval to retain 12

an expert to prepare a life history and “psychological read” on Henry to

present a stronger case in mitigation. The trial court rejected the request,

saying that it “could justify the expenditure of an expert to do a

psychological evaluation [or] . . . of an investigator to go out and try to

find mitigation that could be presented to the Court but as far as having an

expert just to synopsize things and present it to me in a way that I can

understand, I don’t need to pay someone to do that. That’s what I do.”

The court said it was “not ruling out the possibility of granting a request

for the appointment of a specific expert to do a specific thing,” but Gavin

did not put forth any subsequent request for appointment of an expert to

perform a mental health evaluation. It appears that Henry was opposed to

any mental health evaluation.

with alcohol dependence, as noted earlier, but also with

“Probable Antisocial Personality Disorder with Histrionic

Features,” although Dr. Fox also noted “superior

intelligence,” no indication of “abnormal perceptions,” no

evidence of any “substantive intellectual deterioration” and

that Henry “was certainly not psychotic.” Notwithstanding

these indications of mental health problems, Gavin did not

retain a mental health expert to provide additional mitigating

evidence at resentencing.12

Gavin’s resentencing strategy was twofold. First, he

incorporated the evidence and his predecessor’s arguments

from the original sentencing. Gavin thus incorporated the

mitigation arguments presented by defense attorney Ken

Everett at the original sentencing – diminished capacity at the

time of the murder due to intoxication, Henry’s history of

alcohol abuse, Henry’s intelligence, Henry’s troubled and

traumatic upbringing, psychological and mental problems

stemming from Henry’s upbringing, Henry’s compassion for

other people, Henry’s minor participation in Estes’ murder,

Henry’s inability to foresee the risk to Estes’ life, the cost of

administering the death penalty, the preciousness of human

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HENRY V. RYAN 35

life, Henry’s remorse, Henry’s cooperation with police and

the unconstitutionality of the death penalty. Second, Gavin

introduced additional mitigating evidence regarding Henry’s

good conduct in prison subsequent to the original sentencing,

including testimony that Henry did legal research for other

inmates.

In his sentencing arguments, Gavin, in addition to

incorporating Everett’s arguments, emphasized the disparity

of sentences (Foote received at 15-year sentence following a

guilty plea), ongoing doubt over whether Foote was more

responsible for Estes’ murder, the barbarity of the death

penalty, the value of Henry’s life, the unconstitutionality of

the death penalty, the physical pain caused by lethal injection

and the public cost of death penalty administration.

The resentencing court considered Dr. Fox’s report but

rejected Henry’s mental health problems as a nonstatutory

mitigating factor. The court then reimposed the death penalty

after finding two aggravating circumstances – that Henry’s

1970 conviction for armed robbery qualified as an

aggravating factor under Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-

703(F)(1) and (F)(2), and that Henry committed the crime in

expectation of pecuniary gain under section 13-703(F)(5).

The court also found one mitigating factor – that Henry’s

capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the

time of the crime was sufficiently impaired by alcohol under

section 13-703(G)(1).

Henry raised penalty phase ineffective assistance of

counsel in his state postconviction relief proceedings. In

support of his petition for relief, Henry presented a report

from Dr. Gwen Levitt, a forensic psychiatrist retained for

those proceedings. Henry did not cooperate with Dr. Levitt’s

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36 HENRY V. RYAN

 Dr. Levitt also opined that Henry was incompetent to participate in the 13

state postconviction relief proceedings.

evaluation, so Levitt was unable to interview Henry or

conduct any tests on him. Dr. Levitt reviewed other evidence

in the case, however, including Henry’s juvenile court records

and Dr. Fox’s report. Based on her review, Dr. Levitt opined

that Henry likely suffered from “a long standing Depressive

Disorder Not Otherwise Specified, Alcohol Dependence (in

remission), Paranoid Personality Disorder, and Antisocial

Personality Disorder.” She added that “a diagnosis of Ruleout Delusional Disorder should also be considered.” Levitt

expressed her views “with caution” due to her inability to

interview Henry.13

In the last reasoned state court decision on the claim, the

state trial court rejected Henry’s penalty phase ineffective

assistance of counsel claim, finding neither deficient

performance nor prejudice. On the question of prejudice,

Judge Conn said: “Even keeping in mind the significantly

lower standard for proving mitigation than aggravation at a

capital sentencing, the Cour[t] can say unequivocally that its

resentencing decision in this case would have been the same

even if it had been presented with the report of Dr. Levitt.”

The federal district court also rejected Henry’s penalty

phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as well as his

request for an evidentiary hearing.

B. Analysis

As with Henry’s other claims, to obtain relief Henry must

both prove a constitutional violation and satisfy AEDPA. To

prove a constitutional violation for ineffective assistance of

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HENRY V. RYAN 37

 To satisfy § 2254(d)(1), Henry must show that the state court’s 14

application of Strickland was unreasonable. See Harrington v. Richter,

131 S. Ct. 770, 785–87 (2011). This is a high standard: “A state court’s

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so

long as ‘fair-minded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state

court’s decision.” Id. at 786 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S.

652, 664 (2004)).

counsel, Henry must show (1) “that counsel’s performance

was deficient,” and (2) “that the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984). To satisfy AEDPA, Henry relies on

§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2). He argues under § 2254(d)(1) that

the Arizona Superior Court’s decision rejecting this claim on

state postconviction review was an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law. He also argues under

§ 2254(d)(2) that the state court’s decision was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts.

1. Unreasonable Application of Clearly Established

Federal Law

Henry has not shown that the state court unreasonably

applied Strickland. Even assuming Gavin performed

deficiently (a question we need not and do not reach), the

state court’s conclusion that Henry failed to show prejudice

was not objectively unreasonable.14

“To assess prejudice, we consider the mitigating evidence

that was presented along with the new mitigating evidence

and reweigh all of it against the aggravating evidence to

determine whether there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that it

would have produced a different verdict.” Samayoa v. Ayers,

649 F.3d 919, 928 (9th Cir. 2011). “The likelihood of a

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38 HENRY V. RYAN

 Henry apparently intended to establish a factual basis for prejudice 15

through an evidentiary hearing in federal district court. He argued in his

amended habeas petition that he would “seek factual development and

expansion of the record to establish this prejudice evidence at the

appropriate time.” He never did so, however, and Cullen v. Pinholster,

131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011), now bars such a hearing unless Henry can

satisfy § 2254(d), something he has not done. See Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d

1104, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that review under § 2254(d)(1) is

limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the

claim on the merits). Given that Henry has not satisfied § 2254(d), the

district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Henry’s request for

an evidentiary hearing.

different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.”

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 792.

Henry has failed to present any additional mitigating

evidence of childhood sexual abuse, life history, family

background or, with the exception of Dr. Levitt’s report,

mental health problems. As the district courtstated, “[w]hile

Petitioner faults counsel for failing to obtain family

background and mental health mitigation, he does not

disclose such evidence or the source of such evidence to this

Court, or suggest that it was available at the time of

resentencing.” Henry assertsthat he has “presented evidence

of significant, humanizing mitigation information that was

never investigated or presented at sentencing,”, but he has not

actually done so.15

Rather, Henry proffers a mitigation case that differs from

the case presented at resentencing in only two respects: (1)

counsel would have emphasized the sexual abuse evidence

already in the record; and (2) counsel would have presented

Dr. Levitt’s report. It is highly unlikely that these differences

would have affected the sentence.

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HENRY V. RYAN 39

 This is not to say that counsel could not have done more to draw the 16

court’s attention to the evidence. In Lambright, 490 F.3d at 1125, we

explained that a “sentencing judge cannot be expected to comb the record

looking for mitigating factors.” This is not a case, however, in which the

evidence of sexual abuse was likely to have escaped the notice of the

sentencing court.

The sexual abuse evidence was already in the record, and

thus presumably already considered by the resentencing

court. The evidence, moreover, provided few details of the 16

alleged sexual abuse and no discussion of any effects of the

abuse on Henry’s long-term mental health. It therefore had

little potential to affect the sentence.

Dr. Levitt’s report was also unlikely to sway the

sentencing court. It is true that, whereas Dr. Fox diagnosed

Henry only with alcohol dependence and probable antisocial

personality disorder with histrionic features, Dr. Levitt

concluded that Henryalso likelysuffered from depressive and

paranoid personality disorders, and might also suffer from

delusional disorder. Unlike Dr. Fox, however, Dr. Levitt did

not interview or examine Henry or perform any tests on him.

Dr. Levitt thus expressed her views “with caution.” The

Levitt report does not appear to depart substantially from Dr.

Fox’s report, but even if it did so, Henry does not explain

why the resentencing court would have given greater weight

to Dr. Levitt, who did not examine Henry, than to Dr. Fox,

who did.

In sum, the new evidence Henry proffers is sparse and of

limited mitigating value. The state court thus reasonably

concluded that its resentencing decision would have been the

same even if it had been presented with this additional

evidence. Accordingly, the state court’s determination that

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40 HENRY V. RYAN

Henry failed to establish prejudice was not an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law.

2. Unreasonable Determination of the Facts

Henry’s contention that state postconviction review court

based its denial of his penalty phase ineffective assistance of

counsel claim on an unreasonable determination of the facts

under § 2254(d)(2) is also without merit. Henry asserts that

the state court unreasonably determined the facts when it

gave Dr. Levitt’s psychiatric evaluation “no weight at all”

because Dr. Levitt was unable to conduct a personal interview

with Henry.

This argument fails because it misreads the record. The

state court said that it was “skeptical about the validity of a

report done without any contact with the subject of the

report,” but did not say that it would give the report no

weight. The court instead appears to have given the report

little weight, and it was not objectively unreasonable for the

court to have done so. Thus, the state court did not

unreasonably determine the facts.

In sum, Henry has satisfied neither § 2254(d)(1) nor

§ 2254(d)(2). We therefore affirm the district court’s denial

of habeas relief on Henry’s penalty phase ineffective

assistance of counsel claim.

CONCLUSION

We grant Henry’s motion to expand to the certificate of

appealability to cover his causal nexus claim and deny

Henry’s motion to expand the certificate of appealability to

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HENRY V. RYAN 41

cover his juror misconduct claim. We affirm the district

court’s denial of habeas relief.

AFFIRMED.

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