Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-22-01052/USCOURTS-caDC-22-01052-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Amazon Services LLC
Petitioner
United States Department of Agriculture
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 3, 2023 Decided July 26, 2024

No. 22-1052

AMAZON SERVICES LLC,

PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of an Order 

of the Department of Agriculture

William Brendan Murphy argued the cause for petitioner. 

With him on the briefs were Alison R. Caditz and Lawrence 

Reichman.

Brad Hinshelwood, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were 

Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, and Mark B. Stern, Attorney.

Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, WALKER, Circuit 

Judge, and ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SRINIVASAN.

USCA Case #22-1052 Document #2066738 Filed: 07/26/2024 Page 1 of 19
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SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge: The Plant Protection Act and 

the Animal Health Protection Act authorize the Department of 

Agriculture to penalize entities that “aid, abet, cause, or 

induce” the unlawful importation of plant and animal products. 

This case arose from overseas sellers’ shipments of plant and 

animal products to Amazon fulfillment centers in the United 

States for eventual distribution to domestic consumers. Federal 

agents seized the packages and determined that they contained 

noncomplying products. The Department concluded that 

Amazon, by making available its fulfillment centers and 

providing associated fulfillment services, had aided, abetted, 

caused, or induced the overseas sellers’ unlawful importations. 

The Department imposed a $1 million fine against Amazon.

We set aside the Department’s order. As the Supreme 

Court recently explained, civil aiding-and-abetting liability 

generally attaches only to conscious and culpable participation 

in unlawful conduct. The Plant Protection Act and Animal 

Health Protection Act incorporate that settled understanding. 

While overseas sellers might use Amazon’s fulfillment service 

in furtherance of unlawfully importing their products, 

Amazon’s mere provision of a neutral service does not amount 

to conscious and culpable participation in the sellers’ 

wrongdoing. We therefore grant Amazon’s petition for review.

I.

A.

The Plant Protection Act (PPA) seeks to ensure the 

“detection, control, eradication, suppression, prevention, [and] 

retardation of the spread of plant pests or noxious weeds.” 7 

U.S.C. § 7701(a). The Animal Health Protection Act (AHPA) 

similarly aims to ensure the “prevention, detection, control, and 

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eradication of diseases and pests of animals.” Id. § 8301(a). 

To those ends, the PPA and AHPA authorize the Secretary of 

Agriculture to prohibit or restrict the importation of plant and 

animal products, respectively, as necessary to prevent the 

introduction of diseases into or the dissemination of diseases in 

the United States. Id. §§ 7712(a), 8303(a)(1). Both statutes 

allow the Secretary to impose civil and criminal penalties on 

persons who violate the statutes or the Secretary’s 

implementing regulations. Id. §§ 7734, 8313; see also id.

§§ 7702(19), 8302(16). 

A person imports a covered product by “mov[ing]” it into 

“the territorial limits of the United States.” Id. §§ 7702(5), 

8302(7). And, of particular relevance here, the statutes define 

“mov[ing]” a covered product to include, among other actions, 

“aid[ing], abet[ting], caus[ing], or induc[ing]” the “carrying, 

entering, importing, mailing, shipping, or transporting” of the 

covered product into the United States. Id. §§ 7702(9)(B), 

8302(12)(B). In other words, a person who aids, abets, causes, 

or induces the importation of a covered product in violation of 

the PPA or AHPA is herself liable for violating the statute.

When the Department of Agriculture suspects that a 

person has violated either statute, it may initiate enforcement 

proceedings by filing an administrative complaint. See 7 

C.F.R. §§ 1.131, 1.133(b)(1). The proceeding is assigned to an 

agency administrative law judge (ALJ) who makes an initial 

decision. Id. § 1.132. Parties can appeal the ALJ’s decision to 

the Department’s Judicial Officer, id. § 1.145(a), who exercises 

authority delegated by the Secretary and acts as the agency’s 

final adjudicator, id. § 2.35(a).

The Department may impose civil penalties if it 

determines that a person violated either statute or an 

implementing regulation, plus criminal penalties if it finds that 

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the person did so “knowingly.” 7 U.S.C. §§ 7734(a)–(b), 

8313(a)–(b). When imposing a civil penalty, the Department 

determines the amount—up to $500,000 for all non-willful 

violations adjudicated in a single proceeding brought under 

either Act, see id. §§ 7734(b)(1)(A), 8313(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I)—

based on a combination of mandatory and discretionary factors. 

In particular, the Secretary “shall take into account the nature, 

circumstance, extent, and gravity of the violation” and “may 

consider” the violator’s ability to pay, the effect of a penalty on 

the violator’s ability to continue doing business, the violator’s 

history of violations, the degree of the violator’s culpability, 

and “any other factors the Secretary considers appropriate.” Id.

§§ 7734(b)(2), 8313(b)(2).

B.

Petitioner Amazon Services LLC operates an online store 

that sells both Amazon’s own products and third parties’ 

products. Third parties source their own products and make 

their own pricing decisions, but pay a fee to Amazon for the 

right to offer their products on Amazon’s store. Amazon, in 

turn, processes customer payments and distributes sales 

proceeds.

Third-party sellers can fulfill orders—that is, deliver 

products to Amazon customers—themselves or can instead pay 

an additional fee to use Amazon’s fulfillment service, called 

“Fulfillment by Amazon.” A participant in Fulfillment by 

Amazon registers for the service and then ships its product to 

an Amazon fulfillment center. Amazon stores the product until 

it is sold. When a customer purchases a product enrolled in 

Fulfillment by Amazon, Amazon selects the product from its 

fulfillment center inventory, packages it, and ships it directly 

to the customer.

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Amazon requires third-party sellers to enter into a business 

agreement through which they assume responsibility for 

“comply[ing] with all applicable laws.” Amazon Services 

Business Solutions Agreement, J.A. 252, 264. Amazon’s 

online portal reiterates to sellers: “It is your responsibility to 

comply with all import and export laws and to ensure the 

imported goods comply with applicable laws and regulations. 

You may not import prohibited or restricted products without 

all required permits and authorizations.” Importing and 

Exporting Inventory, Amazon Seller Central (Dec. 26, 2016, 

12:15 AM), https://sellercentral.amazon.com/gp/help/

G201468520, J.A. 305. The portal then specifies: “For 

example, the import of certain agricultural, food products, 

alcohol, plants and seeds, fish and wildlife products, or 

medication into certain countries may be prohibited or 

restricted.” Id., J.A. 306. The portal also instructs sellers to 

“[r]egister as an [importer of record] with customs authorities 

in the country where you are importing inventory” and explains 

that “Amazon, including [its] fulfillment centers, will not serve 

as the [importer of record] for any shipment of [fulfillment 

service] inventory.” Id., J.A. 306.

C.

In September 2019, the Department’s Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Service began enforcement proceedings 

against Amazon for allegedly importing plant and animal 

products in violation of the PPA and AHPA. The Service based 

its complaint on multiple instances in which U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection agents seized packages containing plant and 

animal products that had been shipped from abroad by 

participants in Fulfillment by Amazon and addressed to 

Amazon fulfillment centers in the United States. The facts are 

undisputed. 

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First, in March 2015, federal agents at a San Francisco 

international mail facility seized approximately thirteen 

packages of beef, pork, and poultry products from China that

lacked the importation certificates necessary for those products 

under the regulations. See 9 C.F.R. §§ 94.4, 94.6, 94.9, 94.12. 

The packages had been shipped by Yummy House Hong Kong, 

a participant in Amazon’s fulfillment service, and were 

addressed to an Amazon fulfillment center in California. 

Second, in July 2015, federal agents at a Los Angeles 

international mail facility seized three packages containing

poultry products from China that similarly lacked the required

importation certificates. See id. § 94.6. The packages had been 

shipped by Deng Dan, another participant in Amazon’s 

fulfillment service, and were addressed to another Amazon 

fulfillment center in California. 

Finally, in March 2016, federal agents at a San Francisco 

international mail facility seized three packages containing

kaffir lime leaves from Thailand. As a plant of the subfamily 

Aurantioideae, kaffir lime leaves were unlawful to import for 

commercial sale under the regulations then in place. See 7 

C.F.R. § 319.19(a) (2016). The packages had been shipped by 

X-Sampa Co., also a participant in Amazon’s fulfillment 

service, and were addressed to an Amazon fulfillment center in 

Illinois. 

The Service’s complaint alleged that Amazon had 

unlawfully imported the products described above in violation 

of the PPA and AHPA. Complaint ¶¶ 2.1–2.8, 2.17–2.18, J.A. 

13–14, 16. The proceeding was assigned to an ALJ, and the 

parties cross-moved for summary judgment. 

The ALJ granted the Service’s motion. In re: Amazon 

Services LLC, No. 19-J-0146 (U.S.D.A. May 3, 2021), J.A. 

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390–439. He concluded that Amazon had unlawfully 

“import[ed]” the products by aiding, abetting, causing, or 

inducing their unlawful importation. Id. at 24, J.A. 413. The 

ALJ rejected Amazon’s contention that it could not be liable 

because it was unaware that the third-party sellers had failed to 

adhere to the statutes and regulations. Emphasizing that the 

Department has “liberally interpreted” the terms “aid,” “abet,” 

“cause,” and “induce,” he opined that neither “bad intent” nor 

“any mens rea at all” were required to find liability. Id. at 28–

29, J.A. 417–18. And the ALJ reasoned that Amazon had 

played an “active” role in the unlawful importations insofar as 

it “had an ongoing business relationship with the foreign thirdparty sellers it intended to profit or otherwise benefit from,” id. 

at 23–24, J.A. 412–13, and “cho[se] to enter into agreements 

with foreign sellers to market, sell, and distribute” covered 

products “into American homes,” id. at 27, J.A. 416. The ALJ 

ordered Amazon to pay a $1 million civil penalty: the statutory 

maximums of $500,000 under the PPA and $500,000 under the 

AHPA. 

Amazon appealed to the Judicial Officer, who affirmed the 

ALJ’s decision. In re: Amazon Services LLC, PPA/AHPA 

Docket No. 19-J-0146, 2022 WL 722724 (U.S.D.A. Feb. 2, 

2022). The Judicial Officer concluded that, contrary to 

Amazon’s position, the phrase “aid, abet, cause, or induce” in 

the PPA and AHPA requires neither substantial assistance nor 

knowing assistance. Id. at *8–14. Based on that interpretation, 

the Judicial Officer found that Amazon’s conduct fell within 

the scope of the statutes. Id. at *14. Alternatively, the Judicial 

Officer explained that he would reach the same result even on 

Amazon’s reading of the statute because the record showed that 

Amazon “did substantially assist the importation[s]” and “had 

knowledge.” Id.

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Amazon filed a timely petition for review in this court. See

28 U.S.C. § 2344. We have jurisdiction under the Hobbs 

Administrative Orders Review Act, id. § 2342(2), as 

supplemented by the PPA, 7 U.S.C. § 7734(b)(4), and AHPA, 

id. § 8313(b)(4)(A).

II.

Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), we 

review the Department’s order to determine whether it is 

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, not in accordance 

with law, or unsupported by substantial evidence.” Taylor v. 

USDA, 636 F.3d 608, 613 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted); see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), 

(E). Amazon argues that the Department’s order is not in 

accordance with law because, contrary to the Department’s 

interpretation, the statutory phrase “aid, abet, cause, or induce” 

applies only if the conduct in question amounts to knowingly 

and substantially assisting an unlawful importation. Amazon 

next contends that the Department lacked substantial evidence 

for its alternative conclusion that, even on Amazon’s reading 

of the statutes, Amazon’s conduct constituted knowing and 

substantial assistance. We agree with Amazon on both scores.

A.

1.

We first consider what it means to “aid, abet, cause, or 

induce” an importation of goods in violation of the PPA and 

AHPA. 7 U.S.C. §§ 7702(9)(B), 8302(12)(B). The statutes do 

not define the phrase “aid, abet, cause, or induce,” or any of its

individual terms. But as the Supreme Court recently explained 

at length in its decision in Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U.S. 

471 (2023), those terms carry a well-established legal meaning 

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when used—as they are in the PPA and AHPA—to establish

civil liability for aiding and abetting unlawful conduct.

Statutory “terms like ‘aids and abets’ are familiar to the 

common law, which has long held aiders-and-abettors 

secondarily liable for the wrongful acts of others.” Id. at 484. 

“We generally presume that such common-law terms ‘bring the 

old soil with them’” when used in statutes. Id. at 484–85 

(alterations omitted) (quoting Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 

729, 733 (2013)). 

What is the content of that “old soil” when it comes to 

aiding-and-abetting liability? The Supreme Court in Twitter

identified a “conceptual core that has animated aiding-andabetting law for centuries: that the defendant consciously and 

culpably ‘participate[d]’ in a wrongful act so as to help ‘make 

it succeed.’” Id. at 493 (alteration in original) (quoting Nye & 

Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949)). And while 

“[a]iding and abetting is an ancient criminal law doctrine,” id. 

at 488 (alteration in original) (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, 

N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 

181 (1994)), the understanding of its scope in the criminal law 

“has substantially influenced its analog in tort,” id. As a result, 

when the “phrase ‘aids and abets’” is used in a statute imposing 

civil liability, it “refers to a conscious, voluntary, and culpable 

participation in another’s wrongdoing.” Id. at 493.

The relevant phrase in the PPA and AHPA—“aid, abet, 

cause, or induce”—contains the words “cause” and “induce” in 

addition to “aid” and “abet.” 7 U.S.C. §§ 7702(9)(B), 

8302(12)(B). The inclusion of “cause” and “induce” in that 

phrase does not expand the scope of secondary liability beyond 

the traditional core of aiding-and-abetting liability. In fact, 

“cause” and “induce” are among “[t]he most common” verbs 

used to impose aiding-and-abetting liability. See 2 Wayne R. 

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LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 13.2(a) (3d ed. 2023). It 

is true that the words “cause” and “induce,” if construed in 

isolation, could range beyond “conscious, voluntary, and 

culpable participation in another’s wrongdoing.” Twitter, 598 

U.S. at 493. After all, one can causally contribute to 

wrongdoing without consciously and culpably participating in

it—think, for instance, of a cab driver who unknowingly gives 

a thief a ride to the store he aims to rob. “But we read statutory 

terms in context, not in isolation.” Woodhull Freedom Found. 

v. United States, 72 F.4th 1286, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 2023). So 

when the words “cause” and “induce” appear in a phrase like 

“aid, abet, cause, or induce,” we interpret “cause” and “induce”

consistently with their neighbors “aid” and “abet” and with the 

“point of aiding and abetting”—“to impose liability on those 

who consciously and culpably participated in the tort at issue.” 

Twitter, 598 U.S. at 506; see Woodhull, 72 F.4th at 1298–99. 

That understanding reflects that “courts have long 

recognized the need to cabin aiding-and-abetting liability to 

cases of truly culpable conduct.” Twitter, 598 U.S. at 489. If 

“aiding-and-abetting liability were taken too far,” the Supreme 

Court cautioned in Twitter, “then ordinary merchants could 

become liable for any misuse of their goods and services, no 

matter how attenuated their relationship with the wrongdoer.” 

Id. Or “those who merely deliver mail or transmit emails could 

be liable for the tortious messages contained therein.” Id. Or 

“mostly passive actors like banks” could “become liable for all 

of their customers’ crimes by virtue of carrying out routine 

transactions.” Id. at 491. To avoid those kinds of outcomes, 

the Supreme Court emphasized, courts have long sought “to 

ensure that liability fell only on those who had abetted the 

underlying tort through conscious, culpable conduct.” Id. at 

492 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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2.

In defending the imposition of liability against Amazon in 

this case, the Department construes “aid, abet, cause, or 

induce” in the PPA and AHPA in a manner incompatible with 

the understanding of aiding-and-abetting liability recognized 

by the Supreme Court in Twitter. According to the 

Department, the PPA and AHPA allow for imposing aidingand-abetting liability on a strict-liability basis, without any 

need to show knowledge of the primary violator’s wrongdoing. 

But one cannot “consciously and culpably” participate “in 

another’s wrongdoing,” id. at 493, if one is not “conscious” 

of—does not know of—the wrongdoing in the first place. So 

for the Department’s interpretation of aiding-and-abetting 

liability to prevail, the Department must show that the PPA and 

AHPA are exceptions to the general understanding that the 

“phrase ‘aids and abets’ in [a statute] refers to a conscious, 

voluntary, and culpable participation in another’s 

wrongdoing.” Id. The Department’s effort to do so is 

unpersuasive.

a.

The Department chiefly relies on our court’s decision in 

Federal Express Corp. v. U.S. Department of Commerce, 39 

F.4th 756 (D.C. Cir. 2022). There, we considered an argument 

that a “statute’s civil aiding and abetting prohibition plainly 

requires a culpable mind.” Id. at 767. The challenge contended 

that an agency’s imposition of aiding-and-abetting liability on 

a strict-liability basis was ultra vires—i.e., foreclosed by the 

statute. We rejected the challenge. See id. at 767–72. The 

Department argues that, if an agency’s strict-liability 

understanding of civil aiding-and-abetting liability was 

permissible in Federal Express, it should be permissible here 

as well. We disagree.

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As an initial matter, because the challenge in Federal 

Express was an ultra vires claim, we applied an especially 

“exacting standard . . . confined to ‘extreme’ agency error.” Id. 

at 764. “An ultra vires challenge, in other words,” we 

explained, “is essentially a Hail Mary pass.” Id. at 765 

(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). So even if 

the agency’s strict-liability interpretation of aiding-andabetting liability in Federal Express was not “the type of 

blatant error necessary for an ultra vires challenge to succeed,” 

id. at 767, there is no need for Amazon to satisfy that kind of 

“Hail Mary” standard here. Amazon, that is, need not “show 

more than the type of routine error in statutory interpretation” 

that suffices under normal APA review. Id. at 765 (internal 

quotations marks omitted).

Not only did this court in Federal Express sustain the 

agency’s strict-liability understanding under a markedly more 

agency-forgiving form of review, but the Federal Express

court also considered the question before the Supreme Court 

issued its decision in Twitter. Whereas the Federal Express

court had perceived a measure of uncertainty on whether the 

common law of civil aiding-and-abetting liability “requires a 

culpable mind,” id. at 767; see id. at 770–71, the Supreme 

Court in Twitter later identified a “conceptual core that has 

animated aiding-and-abetting liability for centuries: that the 

defendant consciously and culpably participated in a wrongful 

act.” 598 U.S. at 493 (alteration and internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Also, Federal Express must be situated in the statutory 

context it evaluated. The statutes involved here—the PPA and 

AHPA—do not implicate national security and foreign policy 

in the same central way as the 2018 Export Controls Act, the 

statute at issue in Federal Express: that law specifically

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restricts exports that contribute to the military potential of 

foreign countries. See 39 F.4th at 759–61. This court in 

Federal Express concluded that “rotely imposing common-law 

principles” was “especially inapt for a statute so deeply tied to 

foreign policy and national security.” Id. at 771.

For all those reasons, Federal Express does not stand in 

the way of adhering to Twitter’s prescription that the “phrase 

‘aids and abets’” as used in the PPA and AHPA “refers to a 

conscious, voluntary, and culpable participation in another’s 

wrongdoing.” 598 U.S. at 493. 

b.

The Department next relies on the statutory structure of the 

PPA and AHPA. The Department emphasizes that those

statutes authorize criminal penalties only for a “person that 

knowingly” violates their prohibitions, 7 U.S.C. 

§§ 7734(a)(1)(A), 8313(a)(1)(A), but allow for civil liability 

without the same explicit condition that a violation be knowing,

id. §§ 7734(b)(1), 8313(b)(1). The express “knowingly” 

condition for criminal penalties and the absence of any such 

express condition for civil penalties, to the Department, means 

it can exact civil penalties on a strict-liability basis. That 

understanding is fortified, according to the Department, by the 

statutes’ grant of discretion to consider (or not) a violator’s 

“degree of culpability” in setting the amount of a civil penalty. 

Id. §§ 7734(b)(2), 8313(b)(2). That allowance, the Department 

believes, reinforces its authority to impose civil penalties 

without any level of culpability. 

The Department’s structural argument is unavailing. Even 

assuming the presence of a “knowingly” condition for criminal 

penalties and the absence of that condition for civil penalties 

implies that civil penalties can be imposed on a strict-liability 

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basis, that understanding may be true for primary violations 

without necessarily also being true for secondary—i.e., aidingand-abetting—violations. The Department, that is, may be able 

to impose civil penalties on primary violators, such as those 

who themselves carry goods into the United States, on a strictliability basis. Indeed, Amazon concedes as much. But that 

does not mean that someone who secondarily assists such a 

primary violator can likewise be subject to civil penalties 

regardless of a culpable state of mind. Rather, secondary 

aiding-and-abetting liability, per the Supreme Court’s decision 

in Twitter, requires culpable, conscious participation in 

wrongdoing. 598 U.S. at 493. And that remains true even if 

the structure of the statute means that some violators—primary 

violators—can be subject to civil penalties on a strict-liability 

theory.

c.

The Department seeks to distinguish Twitter based on 

certain text contained in the statute involved in that case. 

Twitter construed the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism 

Act (JASTA), which imposes civil liability on “any person who 

aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance,” 

an act of international terrorism. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2). And 

“Congress provided additional context by pointing to 

Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (CADC 1983), as 

‘provid[ing] the proper legal framework’ for ‘civil aiding and 

abetting . . . liability.’” Twitter, 598 U.S. at 485 (first alteration 

in original) (quoting JASTA, Pub. L. No. 114-222, § 2(a)(5), 

130 Stat. 852, 852 (2016)). Our court’s decision in Halberstam

concluded that, for civil aiding-and-abetting liability to attach, 

the aider-abettor must have “knowingly and substantially 

assist[ed] the principal violation.” 705 F.2d at 477. Congress 

in JASTA thus not only pointed specifically to our decision in 

Halberstam, but it also included in JASTA’s aiding-andUSCA Case #22-1052 Document #2066738 Filed: 07/26/2024 Page 14 of 19
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abetting provision the phrase “by knowingly providing 

substantial assistance,” the standard set out in Halberstam. 18 

U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2).

While the statutes in this case, the PPA and AHPA, do not 

contain that additional text, the settled understanding of aidingand-abetting liability set forth in Twitter still controls. Twitter 

turned centrally on the longstanding meaning of the statutory 

phrase “aids and abets,” id. § 2333(d)(2), not on the “additional 

context” provided in JASTA by the reference to Halberstam

and the inclusion of text echoing Halberstam’s standard, 598 

U.S. at 485. That is why the decision in Twitter emphasized

the “conceptual core that has animated aiding-and-abetting 

liability for centuries.” Id. at 493. 

Twitter accordingly sets forth a general rule about the use 

of the phrase “aids and abets” in a statute, one untethered to the 

additional text included in JASTA: “The phrase ‘aids and 

abets’ in [JASTA], as elsewhere, refers to a conscious, 

voluntary, and culpable participation in another’s 

wrongdoing.” Id. (emphasis added). “Elsewhere” includes the 

PPA and AHPA, and the words “aid” and “abet” in those 

statutes thus carry the same meaning as in JASTA. The upshot 

is that a person “aids, abets, causes, or induces” an unlawful 

importation under the PPA and AHPA only if she consciously 

and culpably participates in the importation.

d.

In its final argument for its strict-liability interpretation of 

aiding-and-abetting liability under the PPA and AHPA, the 

Department makes an appeal for deference under the Chevron 

framework. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Supreme Court, 

however, recently overruled Chevron, holding that “courts 

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need not and under the APA may not defer to an agency 

interpretation of the law simply because a statute is 

ambiguous.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 

2244, 2273 (2024). That holding governs here and precludes 

us from deferring to the Department’s interpretation under the 

now-overruled Chevron framework.

B.

Having concluded that, contrary to the Department’s 

interpretation, a person aids, abets, causes, or induces an 

unlawful importation under the PPA and AHPA only if she

consciously and culpably participates in it, we next consider 

whether we can sustain the Department’s order based on its 

alternate conclusion that Amazon knowingly and substantially 

assisted the unlawful importations at issue here. See In re: 

Amazon, 2022 WL 722724, at *14. We cannot. The record 

does not contain substantial evidence from which a reasonable 

factfinder could conclude that Amazon consciously and 

culpably participated in the unlawful importations.

To start, recall the ways in which Amazon assisted

Yummy House, Deng Dan, and X-Sampa, the overseas sellers 

who shipped the covered plant and animal products in violation 

of the PPA and AHPA. Those sellers participated in Amazon’s 

fulfillment service, a routine business service offered to all 

third-party sellers. Through that service, Amazon agreed to 

store the sellers’ products in its fulfillment centers until the

products were sold and then to package and ship the products 

to customers upon a sale. Amazon allegedly knew that Yummy 

House, Deng Dan, and X-Sampa would ship plant and animal 

products to the fulfillment centers because the sellers registered 

those products with the fulfillment service. Amazon also knew 

about the regulations restricting the importation of plant and 

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animal products, as demonstrated by the information Amazon

provides in its online portal for sellers. 

None of those facts support a finding that Amazon 

consciously and culpably participated in the sellers’ unlawful 

importations. There is no indication that Amazon was aware 

of the violations. Indeed, the “only affirmative conduct” 

undertaken by Amazon was offering and operating its 

fulfillment service. See Twitter, 598 U.S. at 498 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Nothing in the record suggests that 

Amazon gave Yummy House, Deng Dan, or X-Sampa “any 

special treatment or words of encouragement” or “took any 

action at all” with respect to the unlawful acts. Id. The facts 

establish only that third-party actors used Amazon’s fulfillment 

service to import products in violation of the PPA and AHPA. 

The mere operation of a neutral fulfillment service that makes 

it easier for third-party sellers to import products into the 

United States—and even to do so unlawfully—is not conscious 

and culpable involvement in the wrongdoing.

The Supreme Court’s analysis in Twitter is highly

instructive. The defendants there operated social-media 

platforms used by a terrorist organization in furtherance of its 

perpetration of unlawful acts. The Court allowed “that bad 

actors” may be “able to use platforms like defendants’ for 

illegal—and sometimes terrible—ends.” Id. at 499. But that 

did not justify treating the defendants as aiders and abettors. 

After all, “the same could be said of cell phones, email, or the 

internet,” yet the Court “generally [did] not think that internet 

or cell service providers incur culpability merely for providing 

their services to the public” or that “such providers would 

normally be described as aiding and abetting, for example, 

illegal drug deals brokered over cell phones—even if the 

provider’s conference-call or video-call features made the sale 

easier.” Id. 

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The Court emphasized the error in “focusing . . . primarily 

on the value of defendants’ platforms to” the terrorist 

organization, “rather than whether defendants culpably 

associated themselves with [the organization’s] actions.” Id. at 

504. And the Court attached significant “weight to defendants’ 

arm’s-length relationship with” the organization—“which was 

essentially no different from their relationship with 

their . . . other users—and their undisputed lack of intent to 

support” the wrongdoing. Id. It thus was not enough “that 

defendants supplied generally available virtual platforms that 

[the organization] made use of, and that defendants failed to 

stop [the organization] despite knowing that [it was] using 

those platforms.” Id. at 505. 

Here, then, it is not enough for the Department to show 

that Amazon supplies a generally available fulfillment service 

that may be of substantial value to third-party sellers, and that 

Amazon knew about the use of the service by Yummy House, 

Deng Dan, and X-Sampa, to sell their products to American

consumers. Amazon did not purport to involve itself more 

closely with the commercial activity of those sellers than with 

that of “other users” of its fulfillment service. Id. at 504. Nor 

did the Department provide evidence that Amazon had an 

“intent to support” those sellers’ unlawful practices. Id. The 

Department’s finding of liability “rests less on affirmative 

misconduct and more on an alleged failure” to stop Yummy 

House, Deng Dan, and X-Sample from using Amazon’s 

infrastructure in importing products unlawfully. Id. at 499–

500. Such “passive nonfeasance” does not amount to 

conscious and culpable participation in the circumstances. Id. 

at 500.

The “fundamental question of aiding-and-abetting 

liability,” the Supreme Court summarized, is: “Did defendants 

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consciously, voluntarily, and culpably participate in or support 

the relevant wrongdoing?” The answer in Twitter was no. The 

answer here is the same.

* * * * *

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petition for review, 

vacate the Department’s order, and remand to the agency for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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