Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03010/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03010-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mike Johanns
Defendant
Fazal Rahman
Plaintiff

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Fazal Rahman, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Mike Johanns, Secretary, U.S.

Department of Agriculture,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-05-3010-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Defendant's motion to dismiss or transfer the case and

motion to strike. Docs. #18, 23. Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for

default judgment. Doc. #16. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny Plaintiff's

motion for default judgment, grant Defendant's motion to strike, and grant Defendant's

motion to dismiss or transfer. The case will be transferred to the District of Columbia.

I. Background.

On September 30, 2005, Fazal Rahman, appearing pro se, filed a complaint

challenging the settlement agreement reached in the class action Basu v. United States

Department of Agriculture, EEOC #100-A1-7863X, Agency No. 000190 ("Settlement

Agreement"). Doc. #1. The Settlement Agreement subsumed Rahman's individual

employment discrimination claim against the United States Department of Agriculture

("USDA"). Doc. #18 at 3. Rahman objected to the settlement agreement and appealed to the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Id. The EEOC reviewed and

affirmed the administrative judge's finding of a fair and reasonable settlement agreement,

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denied Rahman's request for reconsideration, and advised Rahman that he could file a civil

action in an appropriate United States District Court. Doc. #18 at 3. 

On January 3, 2006, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of venue

or to transfer the case to a proper venue under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Doc. #18. On

January 12, 2006, Plaintiff filed a response to the motion to dismiss or transfer. Doc. #19.

Plaintiff submitted two additional documents, filed on February 22, 2006 and

March 7, 2006, containing, respectively, a copy of an email and copies of letters written by

the president of the USDA Coalition of Minority Employees to officers of the USDA. Docs.

#20, 21. Plaintiff filed a supplemental response to Defendant's motion to dismiss or transfer

on March 14, 2006. Doc. #22. Defendant moves to strike the documents and the

supplemental response. Doc. #23.

II. Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment.

Plaintiff moves for default judgment because Defendant failed to file an answer or

other response to the complaint within sixty days of being served. See Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(a)(1)(B). The answer or other response to the complaint was due December 2, 2005. On

December 1, 2005, the Court granted Defendant an extension of time to file an answer or

other response. Doc. #14. Plaintiff's motion for default judgment will be denied because the

Court granted the extension before the sixty days had expired.

III. Defendant's Motion to Strike.

In the District of Arizona, Local Rule 7.2 governs the form of motions filed in this

Court. The rule additionally provides that a party shall have ten days after a motion is served

to file a responsive memorandum and that the moving party is entitled to file a reply

memorandum. LRCiv. 7.2(c)-(d). No additional filings are authorized unless otherwise

ordered by the court. Lazarescu v. Arizona State University, 230 F.R.D. 596, 600 (D.Ariz.

2005). 

"Pro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants."

King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52,54

(9th Cir. 1995) ("Although we construe pleadings liberally in their favor, pro se litigants are

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bound by the rules of procedure."). In Turney v. Choa, a pro se litigant filed a document

which did "not comply with any of [the] Court's rules regarding motions, in fact, it [was]

nearly impossible for the Court to ascertain whether the document [was] some kind of

motion, or merely an attempt to place exhibits into the record prior to trial." No. CV-05-

2730, 2006 WL 1312531 at *1 (D.Ariz. 2006). The document, "in any event, [did] not

appear to be relevant to the issues" before the court. Id. at *2. The court granted the

defendant's motion to strike the document and instructed the pro se litigant that he may resubmit the exhibits at an appropriate time and in an appropriate manner. Id.

In Lazarescu, a pro se litigant filed a timely response to the defendant's motion to

dismiss and then later filed an additional response. 230 F.R.D. at 598. The plaintiff did not

request, and the court did not grant, leave to file an additional response. Id. at 600. The

court struck the pro se litigant's additional response from the record because the filing was

not valid under LRCiv 7.2(c). See id.

In this case, Defendant moves to strike Documents #20, 21, and 22 because they are

not permitted by LRCiv 7.2. Doc. #23. Plaintiff states that the exhibits in Documents #20

and 21 are "important contextual evidence" supporting his case. Doc. #21. The documents,

however, only regard allegations of general discriminatory actions of the USDA and do not

mention the Settlement Agreement or address the issues in Defendant's motion to dismiss or

transfer. See Docs. #20, 21. As in Turney, Documents #20 and 21 "do not appear to be

relevant" to the issues before the Court and do not comply with LRCiv 7.2. See Turney, 2006

WL 1312531 at *2 ("The Plaintiff should not be filing documents disclosed in routine

discovery with this Court, and now is certainly not the time to submit exhibits for trial.")

Documents #20 and 21 will be stricken without prejudice.

As in Lazarescu, Plaintiff filed a timely response to the Defendant's motion, but he

did not request leave to file an additional response. Plaintiff's supplemental response is not

a valid filing because LRCiv 7.2(c) provides for only one responsive memorandum.

Accordingly, Defendant's motion to strike will be granted. 

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IV. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Transfer.

Defendant also moves, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) and 42

U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(3), to dismiss the case without prejudice or to transfer the case to a proper

venue. Doc. #18.

The general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 govern in civil actions "except as

otherwise provided by law." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); see also Johnson v. Payless Drug Stores

Nw., Inc., 950 F.2d 586, 587 (9th Cir. 1991). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

"provides that '[the] provisions of section 2000e-5(f) through (k) of this title, as applicable,

shall govern' employment discrimination actions." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d)).

The venue provision of Title VII provides as follows: 

[A]n action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the

unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the

judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are

maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved

person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice,

. . . [or] within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal

office.

42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(3). 

Plaintiff's complaint alleges discrimination and unfairness in the Settlement

Agreement. See Doc. #1. Venue would be appropriate in the District of Columbia because

the USDA officials who negotiated and executed the Settlement Agreement are employed

in Washington, D.C., the Settlement Agreement appeals are filed and responses are drafted

in Washington, D.C., and those responsible for implementation of the Settlement Agreement

are employed in Washington, D.C. See Doc. #18 at 5. In addition, the employment records

relevant to the to the non-selections at issue are maintained in Washington, D.C. Id.

Plaintiff contends that because the class action Settlement Agreement concerns class

members from every state, a suit against the Settlement Agreement can be filed anywhere a

plaintiff lives. Doc. #19 at 2. Plaintiff further contends that the District of Arizona is a

proper venue because the relief offer of the Settlement Agreement was made to him when

he was an Arizona resident. Id. at 3. The Court finds that this conclusion would undermine

the intent of 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(3) which "seek[s] to 'limit venue to the judicial district

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concerned with the alleged discrimination.'" Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer

Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 504 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Stebbins v. State Farm Mut. Auto

Ins. Co., 413 F.2d 1100, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). 

Although Plaintiff's right to file an action in district court was granted in respect to the

Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff also included his individual employment discrimination

claims in his complaint. See Doc. #1 Ex. 2. Even if Plaintiff's individual claims may be

reviewed, venue would still not be proper in the District of Arizona. Doc. #18 at 5. The

alleged unlawful practices underlying Plaintiff's individual complaint were committed in

Washington, D.C., and all records relevant to the action are maintained and administered in

Washington, D.C. Id. at 5-6. In addition, Plaintiff would have worked in the Northern

District of California or in the District of Maryland but for the alleged unlawful employment

practices. Id. at 6. 

Plaintiff contends that the District of Arizona is proper because he has demanded a

job in any state he chooses upon prevailing in his claim. Doc. #19 at 3. The venue provision

of Title VII, however, deems venue proper only where the plaintiff would have worked "but

for the alleged unlawful employment practice," and not where the plaintiff might work if he

prevails in the action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). 

Plaintiff additionally contends that venue is proper in Arizona because in August 2004

his individual and class action complaints were decided by an EEOC Administrative Judge

in Arizona. Doc. #19 at 3. Plaintiff cites no authority that supports this proposition.

The Court finds that venue for this action in the District of Arizona is improper under

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) for the reasons stated above. Plaintiff claims that transferring this

case to another district would violate "due process" and "make it practically impossible" for

him to pursue this action. See Doc. #19 at 4. Appropriate venues in which Plaintiff can bring

suit, however, are limited by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) because Title VII is the very statute

which gives him a right of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also Johnson, 950 F.2d

at 587. There is no due process violation in transferring the case because Arizona is not a

proper venue by statute. 

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A federal court generally has discretion whether to dismiss or to transfer the case, but

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) requires a transfer in cases where it is in the "interest of justice."

Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Minnette v. Time Warner,

997 F.2d 1023, 1026 (2d. Cir. 1993) ("Whether dismissal or transfer is appropriate lies within

the sound discretion of the district court."). Because the 90 days given by the EEOC for

Plaintiff to file an action in an appropriate district court have passed, the Court will transfer

this action, in the interest of justice, to the United States District Court for the District

Columbia. See id. at 1027 (transferring a pro se Title VII case to a proper court because the

action could not be re-filed if dismissed).

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's motion for default judgment, Doc. #16, is denied.

2. Defendant's motion to strike, Doc. #23, is granted.

3. The Clerk of the Court shall strike documents #20, 21, and 22 docketed

respectively as "Other Notice," "Memorandum," and "Supplement."

4. Defendant's motion to dismiss or transfer to appropriate venue is granted.

5. The Clerk of the Court shall transfer this action to the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia.

DATED this 21st day of June, 2006.

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