Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03465/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03465-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tommie Perris Crawford
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

 The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

Nos. 06-3464; 06-3465; 06-3466

___________

*

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States 

* District Court for the District of 

v. * Minnesota. 

*

Tommie Perris Crawford, also known *

as “Baby Crip,” *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 10, 2007

Filed: June 6, 2007

___________

Before MELLOY, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

After his conviction on gun and drug offenses, Tommie Perris Crawford

received permission from the district court1

 to proceed pro se at sentencing. On

appeal, Crawford argues the district court erred in allowing him to represent himself

without first obtaining a competency evaluation. Crawford also contends he did not

knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel and therefore his Sixth

Appellate Case: 06-3465 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/06/2007 Entry ID: 3316603
-2-

Amendment right to counsel was violated. For the reasons stated below, we affirm

Crawford’s conviction and sentence. 

I. BACKGROUND

A grand jury indicted Crawford for three felony offenses: Count 1, possession

with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, a violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1); Count 2, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking

crime, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and Count 3, possession of a firearm by a

felon, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The government filed notice stating its intent

to seek enhanced penalties on Count 1 based upon Crawford’s prior felony drug

conviction. See 21 U.S.C. § 851. With the sentencing enhancement, Crawford faced

a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of ten years (120 months) on Count 1.

See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). For Count 2, Crawford faced a consecutive mandatory

minimum term of imprisonment of five years (60 months). See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

Crawford proceeded to trial with the assistance of two attorneys from the

Federal Public Defender’s Office and was found guilty of all charges. The jury

rendered its verdict on January 9, 2006. Crawford’s trial counsel did not file post-trial

motions within the seven days allowed under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1) and 33(b)(2). After trial Crawford filed numerous pro

se motions, including motions for a new trial and motions for a judgment of acquittal.

On February 17, 2006, Crawford filed a motion to proceed pro se. On April 10, 2006,

at Crawford’s request, Crawford’s appointed counsel moved to withdraw.

On May 11, 2006, the district court issued a consolidated order ruling on

defendant’s motions, including his motion to proceed pro se and his counsel’s motion

to withdraw. The section of the order addressing Crawford’s motion to proceed pro

se is quoted here in full:

Appellate Case: 06-3465 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/06/2007 Entry ID: 3316603
-3-

After the jury reached its verdict, defendant filed a motion to

represent himself pro se. Defendant also requested that his counsel

withdraw from his case so that he may proceed pro se, and his counsel

has moved to withdraw. The Constitution guarantees an accused the

right to self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836

(1975). However, when an accused manages his own defense, he

relinquishes many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to

counsel. Id. at 835. Therefore, in order for a defendant to represen

himself, the defendant must “knowingly and intelligently” forgo those

relinquished benefits. Id.

Here, the Court is satisfied that defendant is “knowingly and

intelligently” relinquishing those benefits. In his moving papers,

defendant clearly and unequivocally declares that he wants to represent

himself and does not want counsel. Further, defendant has filed several

motions pro se, often with accompanying memoranda. Although the

Court finds his legal propositions to be without merit, defendant’s papers

indicate that he is “literate, competent, and understanding,” and that

defendant here is “voluntarily exercising his informed free will” to

proceed pro se. Id. Finally, the Court notes that because defendant did

not request to proceed pro se until after the jury rendered its verdict,

defendant was represented by experienced and competent counsel before,

during and after trial. Therefore, the Court grants defendant’s motion to

proceed pro se. The Court will, however, appoint Attorney Andrea K.

George, of the Office of the Federal Public Defender, as standby legal

counsel to defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Schmitt, 784 F.2d 880,

882 (8th Cir. 1986). 

Order at 10-11 (footnotes omitted). 

Crawford’s sentencing hearing was held on September 21, 2006. At the

beginning of the hearing, the district court confirmed that Crawford was appearing pro

se and that Ms. George was standby counsel. The district court did not engage

Crawford in a colloquy regarding his self-representation. The district court sentenced

Crawford to a total term of imprisonment of 180 months. Crawford received the

Appellate Case: 06-3465 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/06/2007 Entry ID: 3316603
-4-

statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months for Count 1 and a concurrent term of

120 months on Count 3, along with the statutory mandatory minimum consecutive

term of 60 months on Count 2. This appeal followed. 

II. DISCUSSION

Crawford argues the district court erred by allowing him to represent himself

after trial. In presenting his appeal, Crawford assumes he was pro se for post-trial

motions and for sentencing. Crawford first contends the district court should have

examined whether he was competent to waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

He also argues his waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing and intelligent. He

asserts he suffered prejudice as a result of his lack of counsel because an attorney

could have more persuasively argued his post-trial motions and could have capitalized

on the additional discretion allowed to district judges in sentencing after United States

v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether Crawford was without

counsel in relation to post-trial motions. There is nothing in the record that

demonstrates Crawford’s counsel had been relieved of their appointed representation

when post-trial motions were due; they represented Crawford up until the district

court’s May 11 order, when the court granted Crawford’s motion to proceed pro se

and counsel’s motion to withdraw. Indeed, Crawford did not file his motion to

proceed pro se until almost one month after post-trial motions were due. Thus,

Crawford was not pro se for purposes of post-trial motions. While Crawford’s

counsel did not file post-trial motions on his behalf, any arguments based upon that

failure to file should be raised in a proceeding brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

United States v. Santana, 150 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 1998) (explaining that claims

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel should normally be addressed in § 2255

proceedings). Therefore, we consider Crawford’s claims only as they relate to

sentencing.

Appellate Case: 06-3465 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/06/2007 Entry ID: 3316603
-5-

A. Competency Evaluation

Crawford asserts the district court erred by not ordering an evaluation to

determine whether Crawford was competent to waive his right to an attorney.

Crawford contends the district court should have exercised its authority to order a

competency evaluation, even without a request from the government or the defense.

See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a), (b) (stating that a court “shall order” a competency hearing

upon its own motion if “there is reasonable cause to believe” a defendant is not

competent and that a court “may order” a psychological evaluation prior to such a

hearing). 

Before allowing a defendant to waive his right to counsel, a court must be

satisfied that the defendant is competent to do so. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389,

400 (1993). Generally, a court need not sua sponte order an evaluation to determine

a defendant’s competence to waive counsel; “[a]s in any criminal case, a competency

determination is necessary only when a court has reason to doubt the defendant’s

competence.” Id. at 401 n.13. Unless “evidence raises sufficient doubt” about a

defendant’s competence, further inquiry is not required. Branscomb v. Norris, 47 F.3d

258, 261 (8th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Day, 998 F.2d 622, 627 (8th Cir.

1993) (holding that a district court did not err when it did not conduct a competency

hearing prior to allowing a defendant to proceed pro se at sentencing). Whether a

competency evaluation is warranted is a determination within the discretion of the

district court. See United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 1150-51 (2d Cir. 1986).

Here, Crawford’s trial counsel did not request a competency evaluation prior

to the court’s consideration of Crawford’s motion to proceed pro se. The district court

presided over Crawford’s trial and had the opportunity to observe him directly, and

it did not find a competency evaluation necessary. Cf. id. at 1150 (noting that

“deference is owed to the district court’s determinations based on observation of the

defendant during the proceedings”). The district court specifically concluded

Appellate Case: 06-3465 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/06/2007 Entry ID: 3316603
-6-

Crawford was competent, noting that Crawford’s multiple filings in the district court

indicated he was “literate, competent, and understanding.” The district court did not

abuse its discretion by not ordering a competency evaluation.

B. Sixth Amendment Waiver

Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806

(1975), “[i]t is . . . settled law that a criminal defendant has the right to waive his right

to counsel at trial and to represent himself as long as the waiver is both voluntary, and

intelligently and knowingly made.” Meyer v. Sargent, 854 F.2d 1110, 1114 (8th Cir.

1988). This right extends to self-representation at sentencing, as well. See Day, 998

F.2d at 626-27 (considering whether a defendant executed a valid waiver of his right

to counsel before proceeding pro se at sentencing). This Court reviews de novo a

district court’s decision to allow a defendant to proceed pro se. United States v.

Mahasin, 442 F.3d 687, 691 (8th Cir. 2006). 

In reviewing a waiver of a defendant’s right to counsel, this Court will uphold

a waiver and conclude it is knowing and intelligent if either (1) the district court

adequately warns the defendant about the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding

pro se or (2) the record as a whole demonstrates “that the defendant knew and

understood the disadvantages of self-representation.” United States v. Stewart, 20

F.3d 911, 917 (8th Cir. 1994). An on-the-record colloquy exploring the dangers of

self-representation is recognized as the preferred method of substantiating a waiver’s

validity. See Meyer, 854 F.2d at 1114-15 (indicating the court favors “a specific

warning on the record of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation” when

a defendant seeks to proceed pro se). Here, the district court did not engage in a

colloquy with Crawford. The validity of Crawford’s waiver must therefore be

determined by “review[ing] the entire record to determine if the defendant had the

required knowledge from other sources.” United States v. Yagow, 953 F.2d 427, 431

(8th Cir. 1992).

Appellate Case: 06-3465 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/06/2007 Entry ID: 3316603
-7-

In considering the record, we begin with the district court’s order granting

Crawford’s motion to proceed pro se. The district court references Crawford’s many

filings in concluding Crawford was “voluntarily exercising his informed free will” in

deciding to proceed pro se. However, the court does not explain how the filings show

Crawford to be “informed” as to the dangers of self-representation. In its order, the

district court conflates Crawford’s determination to proceed pro se, with his

understanding of the challenges of doing so. One cannot infer from the substance of

the filings that Crawford had the knowledge required to effectively waive his right to

counsel. The district court did not indicate any other grounds supporting its

conclusion that Crawford’s waiver was knowing and intelligent. 

The government does not provide any additional insight into facts and

circumstances demonstrating Crawford possessed the requisite knowledge of the

dangers of pro se representation. The government argues only that the district court

“had confidence that Crawford was aware of the pitfalls of his self-representation and

that he had the required knowledge to represent himself” based upon the district

court’s observations of Crawford at trial and upon the court’s consideration of

Crawford’s filings. The government does not highlight anything about “the particular

facts and circumstances of the case, including the defendant’s background, experience,

and conduct” or “the defendant’s education, his knowledge of or previous contact with

the criminal justice system, his conduct at trial, and his motive for seeking to waive

counsel” that demonstrates Crawford understood the challenges of proceeding pro se.

Yagow, 953 F.2d at 431. 

After a thorough review of the record, we cannot conclude Crawford possessed

the requisite understanding of the challenges of proceeding without counsel to have

knowingly and intelligently waived his right to an attorney. While we recognize “the

Supreme Court [has] adopted a ‘pragmatic approach’ to the issue of Sixth Amendment

waiver of counsel,” Day, 998 F.2d at 626 (quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285,

Appellate Case: 06-3465 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/06/2007 Entry ID: 3316603
-8-

298 (1988)), the record in this case simply does not provide sufficient indication that

Crawford understood “the possible consequences of a decision to forgo the aid of

counsel[.]” Patterson, 487 U.S. at 292-93. Unlike other instances where we have

upheld a court’s decision to permit a defendant to proceed pro se without the preferred

colloquy, there are no “unique circumstances” justifying a determination that

Crawford knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Yagow, 953 F.2d

at 432. For example, Crawford did not display “a sophisticated understanding of the

[sentencing] hearing’s purposes and procedure,” Day, 998 F.2d at 627, nor does it

appear his request for self-representation was an attempt to manipulate the court. Cf.

Meyer, 854 F.2d at 1115 (“One other major factor leading us to the conclusion that

there was no violation of the right to counsel is the fact that the record indicates that

[the defendant’s] actions in moving for replacement counsel midway through the trial

were largely obstructionist.”). Based upon the record before us, we cannot conclude

Crawford’s waiver of counsel at sentencing was valid. 

Our conclusion that Crawford did not effectively waive his right to counsel at

sentencing presents a question this court has not specifically decided: whether such

a violation is subject to harmless error analysis. Dicta in Day can be interpreted as

implicitly endorsing harmless error analysis. The defendant in Day proceeded pro se

at sentencing after objecting to three different attorneys appointed to represent him.

Day, 998 F.2d at 626. In finding that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and

intelligently waived his right to counsel, the Court concluded its analysis by noting

that “there is nothing in the record to suggest that further delay and a fourth appointed

counsel would have produced a different sentence.” Id. at 627. This suggests that

lack of prejudice suffered by a defendant could be relevant. 

Other circuits have explicitly rejected harmless error analysis for Sixth

Amendment violations at sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Virgil, 444 F.3d 447,

455-56 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that Faretta violations, whether at trial or sentencing,

are per se harmful and therefore not subject to harmless error analysis and noting that

Appellate Case: 06-3465 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/06/2007 Entry ID: 3316603
-9-

“every other circuit to consider the issue” does not apply harmless error analysis to

Faretta violations); United States v. Salemo, 61 F.3d 214, 221-22 (3rd Cir. 1995)

(declining to apply harmless error analysis when a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right

to counsel was violated at sentencing). In Virgil, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the

Supreme Court’s decisions finding harmless error inapplicable to the denial of counsel

at trial, United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984), and on appeal, Penson v.

Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 (1988), equally support the conclusion that the lack of counsel

at sentencing cannot be harmless error. Virgil, 444 F.3d at 456. Salemo describes the

right to counsel at sentencing as “among those constitutional rights which are so basic

to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.” Salemo, 61

F.3d at 222 (quotation and alternation omitted). See also United States v. Balough,

820 F.2d 1485, 1490 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding harmless error analysis inappropriate

where a defendant was denied his right to counsel at a hearing on a motion to

withdraw his guilty plea and at sentencing). 

Others have advocated a more nuanced approach. Then-Judge Alito expressed

disagreement with a broad prohibition against applying harmless error analysis in the

context presented here. Salemo, 61 F.3d at 222-23 (Alito, J., concurring). Using the

exact factual scenario in the instant case as his hypothetical—a defendant who did not

validly waive counsel at sentencing but was sentenced to the statutory mandatory

minimum—Judge Alito highlighted the potential problems of such an approach. Id.

at 223 n.1. In such a case, vacating and remanding would result in the imposition of

the same sentence with counsel present—a futile exercise in form over substance. 

The approach taken by the Eleventh Circuit in a slightly different context is

instructive. Golden v. Newsome, 755 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1985), addresses the

concerns raised by Judge Alito’s hypothetical, as well as the facts of this case. Golden

considered whether absconding from custody during trial amounts to an effective

waiver of counsel for sentencing. Id. at 1481. In concluding that escape does not

constitute a valid waiver of counsel, the Eleventh Circuit notes it presumes prejudice

Appellate Case: 06-3465 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/06/2007 Entry ID: 3316603
-10-

when a defendant does not effectively waive counsel at sentencing, unless the court

sentences the defendant to the minimum term of imprisonment allowed by law. Id.

at 1483 n.9. Thus, if the sentencing court lacked the authority to impose a more

lenient sentence than the defendant received, the Eleventh Circuit applies harmless

error review. 

We acknowledge that our sister circuits to consider the issue have concluded

harmless error review is inappropriate when a defendant does not effectuate a valid

waiver of counsel at sentencing, as discussed above. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has

held that harmless error review is never appropriate in waiver-of-counsel cases. See

United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577, 1580 (10th Cir. 1990). This case does not

require such a broad holding, however. Rather, we limit our holding to the unique

circumstance presented here: when the district court lacked the authority to impose a

more lenient sentence than the defendant received. In that limited circumstance, we

agree with the Eleventh Circuit that harmless error review is appropriate. 

We therefore conclude the constitutional error in this case is harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt. Although there was not an effective waiver of counsel at

sentencing, Crawford was sentenced to the minimum term of imprisonment allowed

by statute. Crawford cannot articulate any harm suffered due to his lack of

representation at sentencing because the district court could not have imposed a more

lenient sentence. See Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 125-26 (1996) (stating

that, absent a motion by the government under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), the district court

lacks the authority to sentence below the statutory mandatory minimum sentence).

Crawford’s argument that an attorney could have taken advantage of the discretion

available to sentencing courts after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), is

unavailing. Booker made the United States Sentencing Guidelines advisory, but had

no effect upon statutory sentencing schemes. See United States v. Rojas-Coria, 401

F.3d 871, 874 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that Booker has no impact upon a sentence

determined by a statutory mandatory minimum). Because Crawford’s sentence was

Appellate Case: 06-3465 Page: 10 Date Filed: 06/06/2007 Entry ID: 3316603
-11-

driven by mandatory minimum terms of incarceration defined by statute, there is

nothing any attorney could have done to achieve a more favorable result at sentencing.

The Sixth Amendment violation is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons articulated above, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-3465 Page: 11 Date Filed: 06/06/2007 Entry ID: 3316603