Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-07108/USCOURTS-ca10-94-07108-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tom Lovelace
Appellee
Gary D. Maynard
Appellee
Carl Demetrius Mitchell
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH cmcurr 

CARL DEMETRIUS MITCHELL, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

. ) 

GARY D. MAYNARD, Director ofDepartment of Corrections; ) 

TOM LOVELACE, Inspector General, Department of Corrections; ) 

DELORES RAMSEY; JAMES SAFFLE, Warden, State Prison, ) 

McAlester, Oklahoma; JAMES SORBLES; TED WILLMAN, ) 

Warden, Mack Alford Correctional Center; MICHAEL ) 

CRABTREE, a/k/a Michale Crabtree; SAM KEY, Security Major ) 

at Mack Alford Correctional Center; MICHAEL TAYLOR; ) 

LOUIS LAYTON, Correctional Officer; J. MIKE PRUITT, Unit ) 

Manager, Oklahoma State Penitentiary; BILLY KEY, Law Library ) 

Supervisor, Oklahoma State Penitentiary; GEORGE DUGAN, ) 

Correctional Counselor, Oklahoma State Penitentiary; LARRY ) 

WATSON, CO I, Oklahoma State Penitentiary, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

Jr' I L E JJ ~nited States Court of Appeal5 

Tenth Circuit 

APR 1- 1996 

PATRICK FISHER (''"''"~ 

No. 94-7108 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTIUCT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CV-89-465) 

Jerry L. Colclazier (Amy Rose Colclazier with him on the briefs) ofColclazier & Associates, P.C., 

Seminole, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Warren C. Sutter (W.A Drew Edmondson, Attorney General, with him on the brief), Assistant 

Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before BALDOCK, BRORBY and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 1 
BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Carl Demetrius Mitchell brought suit against fourteen prison officials and employees for 

violations of his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. 1 The district court initially dismissed his complaint as frivolous. Following an appea~ we 

reversed the district court•s ruling and remanded the case for trial. Mitchell v. Maynard, No. 92-

7066, 1992 WL 401593 (lOth Cir. Dec. 23, 1992). On remand, a jury trial was held on Mr. Mitchell•s 

claims, but prior to jury dehberation, the district court granted the appellees judgment as a matter of 

law pursuant to Fed. R Civ. P. 50(a) and dismissed all Mr. Mitchell•s claims. Mr. Mitchell appeals 

this ruling. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 1291 and reverse in part, affirm in part 

and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Mr. Mitchell raises eight issues on appeal: 1) were his Eighth Amendment rights violated by 

the conditions of his confinement at Oklahoma State Penitentiary, deliberate indifference to his 

medical needs, and subjecting him to excessive force; 2) was there 11Some11 evidence to support the 

conviction of the prison disciplinary offense, such that due process requirements are satisfied; 3) was 

he denied due process when the appellees failed to follow the time deadlines and conditions of 

1 Title 42 U.S. C. § 1983 provides: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 

State or Territory or the disctrict of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 

United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 

or inlmunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

2 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 2 
confinement as set forth in the Department of Corrections' policies and regulations; 4) did the trial 

court err by refusing to remove Mr. Mitchell's shackles and leg irons at trial; 5) should each of the 

appellees be held liable for their respective participation in violating Mr. Mitchell's rights; 6) did the 

district court err in preventing testimony at trial on Mr. Mitchell's claims of retaliation for exercise 

of a protected right; 7) is Mr. Mitchell entitled to judgment as a matter of law that his constitutional 

rights were violated, such that the only need for a new trial would be on the issue of damages; and 

8) based upon the trial judge's rulings, and his performance at trial, if a new trial is ordered by this 

Court, is Mr. Mitchell entitled to a change of trial judge? 

We review de novo the grant or denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. 

R Civ. P. 50. Sheets v. Salt Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1387 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 

74 (1995). It is appropriate for a trial court to enter judgment as a matter oflaw "[i]f during a trial 

by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for 

a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." Fed. R Civ. P. 50(a)(l). When reviewing a 

grant or denial of a judgment as a matter oflaw "'we must construe the evidence and inferences most 

favorably to the nonmoving party."' FDIC v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 20 F.3d 1070, 1079 (lOth Cir. 

1994)(quoting Ralston Dev. Corp. v. United States, 937 F.2d 510, 512 (lOth Cir. 1991)). 

A detailed factual background, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. Mitchell, is 

necessary to truly understand the nature of this case. Mr. Mitchell initially was incarcerated at the 

Mack Alford Correctional Center in Stringtown, Oklahoma, for larceny of merchandise. Mr. Mitchell 

spent a great deal of time in the facility's law library where he conducted legal research and assisted 

3 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 3 
other inmates with their legal problems. He claims that as his legal acumen grew so did the animosity 

of prison officials toward him. Warden James Saflle agreed Mr. Mitchell was a "model, nontroublemaking prisoner." 

On May 13, 1988, a riot occurred at the prison. As the riot escalated, the instigators 

barricaded themselves in the South Building, where Mr. Mitchell was housed. The riot lasted three 

:full days and nights. Several hostages were taken and much of the facility was razed. Mr. Mitchell 

says he was asleep when the riot began and that he had nothing to do with what took place, In fact, 

Mr. Mitchell, an African American, after the urging of two guards, attempted to negotiate the release 

of the hostages by approaching the two White Supremacists who claimed total responsibility for the 

riot. When the riot ended, the South Building still contained nearly 100 inmates, approximately fortyone of whom, including Mr. Mitchell, were then transported to the Oklahoma State Penitentiary at 

McAlester. 

Once he arrived at McAlester, Mr. Mitchell was separated from the other inmates, stripped 

of all his clothing and his prescription eyeglasses, and placed in wrist, ankle and belly chains. To 

transport him to his cell, two guards picked him up by his elbows with nightsticks and forced him to 

run across the gravel yard. During this run, he fell to the ground, at which point the guards began 

kicking and stomping him while yelling "get up, nigger, get up." This incident caused him several 

injuries including cuts and bruises and a swollen hand with two immovable fingers. 

His cell, located in the G-unit, had been stripped ofits mattress and bedding. Mr. Mitchell 

4 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 4 
was left naked in the empty 5' x 8' concrete cell. Outside nighttime temperatures were in the 50's and 

the G-unit had no heating. Mr. Saftle had authorized the cells to be stripped, claiming that clothing 

and bedding were privileges. Mr. Saffle also testified clothing could be wrapped around light bulbs 

to start :fires and used to snare and choke the guards. Mr. Saffle further stated the mattresses could 

be used to barricade the doors thus allowing the prisoners to "ambush" the guards and the mattress 

covers could be used to obstruct the plumbing and flood the cells. Mr. Mitchell and the other inmates 

of the G-unit were forced to take cold showers because there was no water heater. Mr. Saftle claims 

a lack of :funding to accommodate the influx of 435 inmates from the Stringfield facility prevented 

him from purchasing the $100 water heater. Mr. Mitchell also was not allowed out ofhis cell for 

nearly four weeks for exercise or any other purpose. In fact, he was only allowed outside his cell on 

two occasions during a five-month period. His eyeglasses were not returned to him for two months, 

during which time he suffered severe headaches due to his visual.condition of presbyopia and the poor 

lighting in his cell. Mr. Mitchell also testified the ventilation within G-unit was inadequate. "You 

could look up and there was garbage in the ventilation deal There was dirt and grass growing in it --

and the air that did happen to pass through that was musty and it was nasty, and it took your breath 

at times." Furthermore, he was only provided toilet paper by the guards one square at a time and 

sometimes they would taunt him or refuse his request. Mr. Saffle said the toilet paper rationing was 

necessary because the inmates could use it to obstruct the plumbing and flood the cells. Mr. Mitchell 

also was not allowed to have a pen or pencil with which to write grievances or legal complaints for 

at least several days. Mr. Saffle said this was because the pencils could be used as "sticking" devices. 

On June 9, 1988, Mr. Mitchell complained about these conditions by filing a written grievance with 

Mr. Saftle. Mr. Saftle denied Mr. Mitchell's grievance. 

5 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 5 
Mr. Mitchell was not formally accused with contributing to the riot until two weeks after his 

transfer to McAlester. Initially, Mr. Mitchell was shown a copy of an officer report which listed Karl 

Goodson as the only witness who would testify against him. Mr. Goodson did not mention seeing 

Mr. Mitchell participate in the riot. Based on this lack of evidence and Investigator Michael Taylor's 

assurance that the report did not accuse Mr. Mitchell of any wrongdoing, Mr. Mitchell signed the 

report and waived his right to call witnesses and to have a staff representative at his disciplinary 

hearing. After Mr. Mitchell signed the report~ a new witness, Louis Layton, was added. Mr. Mitchell 

was provided a copy of the report listing Mr. Layton as a witness eight days before his disciplinary 

hearing. In a signed report, Mr. Layton stated he had Seen Mr. Mitchell throw rocks, although at trial 

he testified he only saw Mr. Mitchell throw one rock, at firefighters and guards during the riot. The 

statement did not give a time or place of the alleged sighting. Mr. Layton also testified at trial that 

at the time of the riot he did not know who Mr. Mitchell was and conceded that the official statement 

he originally prepared for the disciplinary proceedings identifying the prisoners who participated in 

the riot did not inculpate Mr. Mitchell. At tria~ however, Mr. Layton produced an unofficial copy 

of this statement that implicated Mr. Mitchell. As further support, Mr. Layton produced an affidavit 

in which he stated he saw Mr. Mitchell throwing rocks at Stringtown on May 17, 1988 -- an 

impossibility because by that time Mr. Mitchell had already been transported to McAlester. 

Michael Crabtree presided over Mr. Mitchell's disciplinary hearing. Mr. Mitchell challenged 

Mr. Crabtree's impartiality because he had observed many of the offenses committed during the riot, 

his office was located in the building where the riot had started, his desk was charred by a fire during 

the riot, and his stereo was damaged. Mr. Crabtree had also chaired the committee responsible for 

6 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 6 
placing inmates at other prison facilities and in particular he had been responsible for changing Mr. 

Mitchell's placement from medium. security to maximum security. Based on Mr. Layton's testimony, 

Mr. Crabtree found Mr. Mitchell guilty of participating in the riot. Delores Ramsay was responsible 

for reviewing misconduct convictions appealed to the Director of the Department of Corrections. 

At trial, Ms. Ramsay testified that she affirmed Mr. Mitchell's misconduct conviction after conducting 

an investigation outside of the record because the record before her was insufficient on its own to 

affirm his conviction. 

I 

We now turn to Mr. Mitchell's claim the district court erred in granting appellees judgment 

as matter of law on his Eighth Amendment claims. The Eighth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution provides: 11Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 

and unusual punishments inflicted. 11 The Eighth Amendment applies to the states through the 

FourteenthAmendment. SeeRhodesv. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981);Robinson v. California, 370 

U.S. 660 (1962). Mr. Mitchell points to three ways defendants violated his Eighth Amendment 

Rights: 1) the beating by the guards; 2) the conditions of confinement at G-unit; and 3) the 

defendants• dehberate indifference to his medical needs. We will address each allegation in turn. 

In order for the beating by the guards to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, 

Mr. Mitchell must show the guards acted maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing 

harm rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 

U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). In making this determination, it is necessary for us to balance the need for 

7 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 7 
application of force with the amount of force used. Id at 7. This standard "applies regardless of 

whether the corrections officers are quelling a prison disturbance or merely trying to maintain order." 

Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (lOth Cir. 1992). It is not necessary for the plaintiff 

to allege a significant physical injury to state a cause of action. Id The facts, viewed in the light 

most favorable to Mr. Mitchell, show that after he tripped and fell to the ground, he was beaten by 

several guards with night sticks while they shouted racial epithets at him Mr. Mitchell, who was 

naked and shackled at the wrists, ankles and·belly, was particularly vulnerable at the time the attack 

occurred. As a result of the beating, Mr. Mitchell suffered cuts, bruises and a swollen hand-- with 

possibly broken fingers. Even if we find the arrival of the Stringtown inmates at McAlester in the 

wake of the riot constituted an emergency situation, there is no indication Mr. Mitchell had acted 

inappropriately or posed any type of a disciplinary problem or threat prior to or at the time of the 

beating. A reasonable jury could conclude that the guards' behavior falls into the category of 

malicious and sadistic rather than a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. This conclusion 

is supported by Mr. Mitchell's vulnerability at the time ofthe attack, the lack of provocation on his 

part and the guards' use of racial epithets during the beating. 

Rather than disputing the brutality of the beating, the appellees claim Mr. Mitchell must lose 

on this issue because he failed to name the guards responsible for the above activity in his complaint. 

Fed. R Civ. P. lO(a) requires that "in the complaint the title of the action shall include the names of 

all the parties." It has been held a party not properly named in the caption of a complaint may still 

be properly before the court if the allegations in the body of the complaint make it plain the party is 

intended as a defendant; merely naming a party in a brief: however, does not provide adequate notice. 

8 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 8 
See Rice v. Hamilton Air Force Base Commissary, 720 F.2d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 1983). In his brief: 

Mr. Mitchell claims "Defendants Mason and Franklin were identified during discovery pursuant to 

this Court's ruling in Mitchell I." Mr. Mitchell then references his trial brief: which he did not include 

as part of the record on appeal, as support for this identification. As we just stated, even ifhis brief 

did mention the two guards, mere mention in a brief is not adequate grounds on which to hold parties 

liable. The docket statement indicates Mr. Mitchell was granted leave to amend his complaint to add 

two parties, but there is no evidence he did so. We are unable to enter a judgment against parties 

who are not listed in the complaint, were not served notice of the lawsuit and are not properly before 

the court. 

Furthermore, Mr. Mitchell does not include any evidence to link the named appellees to the 

guards' actions. Although he does name the Warden and the Director of the Correctional facilities 

as defendants, supervisor status by itself is insufficient to support liability. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 

362, 376 (1976). Rather, "[p]ersonal participation is an essential allegation in a§ 1983 claim." 

Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (lOth Cir. 1976); see Ruark v. Solano, 928 F.2d 947, 950 

(lOth Cir. 1991) (no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). Because Mr. Mitchell failed to sue 

the parties responsible for the beating and does not allege any personal involvement of the parties 

before the court, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Mr. Mitchell's claims for failure to state 

a cause of action that the beating violated his Eighth Amendment Rights. 

We now address Mr. Mitchell's claim that the conditions of the G-unit, or "the rock", violated 

his Eighth Amendment Rights. This claim is asserted against Gary Maynard, director of the 

9 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 9 
Oklahoma Department of Corrections, and Mr. Saffie, warden at McAlester. The Supreme Court 

first addressed the limitations the Eighth Ametidment "imposes upon the conditions in which a State 

may confine those convicted of crimes" in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 (1981). In 

Rhodes, the court noted that no "static test" can be used by the courts to determine what types of 

conditions violate the Eighth Amendment, but instead the courts "'must draw its meaning from the 

evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' Id at 346 (quoting 

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)). The court then emphasized the 

importance of using objective factors in making a determination as to whether prison conditions were 

cruel and unusual and thus unconstitutional or "restrictive and even harsh" and thus merely a "part 

of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." Rhodes, 45 2 U.S. at 34 7. 

Justice Powell, writing for the majority, held that in order for a condition of confinement to be 

considered cruel and unusual it muSt be either: (a) "grossly disproportionate to the severity of the 

crime" warranting punishment, (b) involve the "the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain" or (c) 

deprive "inmates of the minimal civilized measure oflife's necessities." Id at 347. It is important to 

consider the conditions of confinement as a whole because several deprivations "in combination" may 

constitute a constitutional violation "when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the 

deprivation of a single, identifiable human need, such as food, warmth, or exercise -- for example a 

low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 

294, 304 (1991). Overall, "[t]he [Eighth] Amendment embodies 'broad and idealistic concepts of 

dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency."' Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) 

(quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)). 

10 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 10 
In Wilson, the Supreme Court adopted the deh"berate indifference standard for Eighth 

Amendment claims involving conditions of confinement. Under this standard "courts considering a 

prisoner's claim. must ask both if the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind and if 

the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation." 

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (internal quotations and citation omitted). In the Tenth Circuit "an official or 

municipality acts with deliberate indifference if its conduct (or adopted policy) disregards a known 

or obvious risk that is very likely to result in the violation of a prisoner's constitutional rights." Berry 

v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1496 (lOth Cir. 1990). Deliberate indifference does not require 

a finding of express intent to harm Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Recently the 

Supreme Court held deh"berate indifference requires that the prison official knew of and disregarded 

"an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Farmer v. Brennan,_ U.S._,_, 114 S. Ct. 

1970, 1979 (1994). 

The facts, construed in Mr. Mitchell's favor, indicate Mr. Mitchell was stripped ofhis clothing, 

placed in a concrete cell, with no heat at a time when nighttime temperatures hovered in the midfifties, provided no mattress, blankets or bedding of any kind, deprived of his prescription eyeglasses, 

not allowed to leave his cell for exercise, not provided with writing utensils, not provided with 

adequate ventilation, not provided with hot water, and only sometimes allowed minimal amounts of 

toilet paper. These conditions supposedly lasted for a period of days, weeks and months depending 

on the condition and whether Mr. Mitchell's or Mr. Saffi.e's testimony is believed. The combination 

of these factors is a significant departure from the "healthy habilitative environment" the state is 

required to provide its inmates. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 568 (lOth Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 

11 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 11 
450 U.S. 1041 (1981). In Ramos, we recognized "a state must provide [an inmate with] reasonably 

adequate ventilation, sanitation, bedding, hygienic materials, and utilities (i.e., hot and cold water, 

light, heat, plumbing)." !d. Mr. Mitchell allegedly was denied many of the basic necessities listed 

above by Mr. Safile's express order. A reasonable jury could have concluded Mr. Maynard had 

knowledge of the conditions and condoned them when he upheld Mr. Safile's denial of Mr. Mitchell's 

grievance regarding the conditions of the G-unit. 

Appellees use the testimony of Mr. Safile to assert these deprivations were necessary to 

confront the emergency influx of 43 5 inmates. Appellees stress Mr. Mitchell was part of a group of 

inmates who had been credited with creating a riot that nearly destroyed another prison. Mr. Safile 

testified that in light of the above situation, he ordered several items to be withheld. Mr. Safile 

justified these deprivations by stating: 

To safeguard and be proactive with my particular unit and my staff and in order to 

best serve the public, I made the decision to deprive them of certain things until they 

showed me that they were going to act like men and not become disruptive and tear 

up another unit and cause my staff problems. I continued to give them privileges and 

continued to improve the conditions out there based on their behavior. 

The defendants point to the deference afforded the opinions of prison administrators regarding 

how to maintain internal security. We agree that the opinions of prison administrators carry great 

weight; however, their discretion is not absolute. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22. This deference "does 

not insulate from review actions taken in bad faith and for no legitimate purpose, but it requires that 

neither judge nor jury freely substitute their judgment for that of officials who have made a considered 

choice." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322. In reviewing prison administrators' decisions, we must refrain 

12 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 12 
from usurping the role of prison administrators while protecting the constitutional rights of the 

inmates. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,405 (1974) ("a policy of judicial restraint cannot 

encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims"). 

In a case such as this, where the alleged deprivations are numerous and inhumane, we cannot 

blindly acquiesce to Mr. Saffie's authority. Several of the specific conditions Mr. Mitchell allegedly 

endured have been expressly held to state claims under the Eighth Amendment prohibition against 

cruel and unusual ptmishrnents. In particular we are troubled by the lack of heat combined with the 

lack of clothing and bedding, the deprivation of exercise for an extensive period of time, the lack of 

hot water, the denial of toilet paper, the removal ofhis prescription eyeglasses, the lack of adequate 

ventilation and the denial ofwriting utensils. In Gregory v. Wyse, 512 F.2d 378, 381 (lOth Cir. 

1975), we agreed it was cruel and unusual punishment to keep an inmate naked for twelve days in 

a cell that had been stripped of its bedding, did not have adequate heating, ventilation, lighting or 

furnishing and was seldom cleaned. Mr. Mitchell has alleged he suffered several of the above 

deprivations and others for much longer than twelve days. See also Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 

600 (7th Cir. 1986) (prolonged restriction of exercise that threatens an inmate's physical health might 

violate the Eighth Amendment); Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985) (allegations 

of unsanitary physical conditions, denial of personal hygiene and lack of opportunity to exercise state 

valid claims under the Eighth Amendment); Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 783-84 (9th Cir. 

1985) (poor lighting can support finding ofEighth Amendment violation); Ramos, 639 F.2d at 568 

(state must provide bedding, heat, hot water and hygienic materials); Benter v. Peck, 825 F. Supp. 

1411, 1419 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (denial of prescription eyeglasses can violate the Eighth Amendment 

13 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 13 
when the eyeglasses represent a serious medical need). 

Although there is conflicting testimony between Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Saffle regarding when 

some of the items began to be granted, the time frame ranged from twenty-four hours to five and one 

half months. When conflicting testimony is presented regarding events and motivations, "it is the 

jury's prerogative to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and determine who should be believed." 

Klein v. Grynberg, 44 F.3d 1497, 1504 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 58 (1995); see also 

United States v. Hager, 969 F.2d 883, 888 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 964 (1992) ("The 

credl"bility of a witness and weight of his testimony are for the trier of fact alone."). Once the jury 

decided whom to believe, it could then decide whether these alleged deprivations constituted cruel 

and 1musual punishment. In light ofMr. Mitchell's allegations and evidence the trial court should not 

have granted the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter oflaw. Mr. Mitchell alleged conditions 

that could constitute a violation of his right to be free of cruel and unusual punishments, and it was 

for the jury to. determine the extent of the deprivations and the credibility of the warden and his 

intentions. We reverse the district court's ruling that as a matter oflaw the plaintiff failed to state an 

Eighth Amendment claim regarding the conditions of his confinement. We will not, however, as Mr. 

Mitchell urges, find for him as a matter oflaw on his constitutional claims and remand only for the 

calculation of damages. Rather, we remand for a new trial on the issue because we believe there are 

factual issues regarding the conditions of confinement that should be resolved by a jury. 

Finally, we will address Mr. Mitchell's Eighth Amendment claim regarding his medical needs. 

Mr. Mitchell claims he was not provided adequate medical attention despite a severe illness the first 

14 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 14 
night he was placed in the G-unit. The evidence indicates Mr. Mitchell was cold and shivering as a 

result of the loss ofbody heat, and had sweat and mucus running out of his mouth as well as several 

broken fingers. He also was denied the use of his prescription eyeglasses. The Supreme Court has 

held that failure to provide medical attention can violate the Eighth Amendment for "[a]n inmate must 

rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will 

not be met." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. In Estelle, the Court concluded that "deliberate indifference 

to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, 

proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Id at 104 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In 

Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562 (lOth Cir. 1991), we noted the Supreme Court's clarified deliberate 

indifference standard has two components: "an objective component requiring that the pain or 

deprivation be sufficiently serious; and a subjective component requiring that the offending officials 

act with a sufficiently culpable state ofmind." !d. at 1569 (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298). In 

Wilson, the Supreme Court held that "allegations of'inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical 

care' or of a 'negligent ... diagnos[is ]' simply fail to establish the requisite culpable state of mind." 

·Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297 (citations omitted). 

Mr. Mitchell fails to allege any dehberate indifference. He produces no evidence showing any 

knowledge on the part of the named appellees ofhis condition or that he requested and was denied 

medical care for his injuries the first night. Nevertheless, a guard noticing his condition the second 

night called a nurse who provided Mr. Mitchell with treatment. Mr. Mitchell does not contend that 

he needed additional treatment or that he was denied access to medical treatment. At trial Mr. 

Mitchell testified that he did not request medical help or file a slip requesting care because " [ o ]nee 

15 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 15 
I seen that I wasn't going to be attended to, period, I just left it alone. I just quit -- I seen that I 

wasn't fixing to die, you know, so I seen that I would probably heal, and I just left them alone." This 

admission undermines the seriousness of his condition. If he did not believe his condition serious 

enough to warrant medical treatment, how can he hold the prison officials liable for failing to find his 

condition serious enough to warrant treatment? His failure to alert prison officials to his condition, 

absent any showing ofknowledge on their part renders their failure to attend to his needs at best an 

inadvertent failure to address his medical condition. Regarding the removal of his eyeglasses, again 

he does not allege any evidence to show deliberate indifference resulting in substantial harm Mr. 

Safile stated several reasons why eyeglasses would be removed from inmates. Most importantly, the 

evidence establishes that after Mr. Mitchell complained to prison officials he was having trouble with 

his eyes, he was examined by an optometrist and provided with a new pair of eyeglasses. Finally, Mr. 

Mitchell fails to allege any personal involvement of any of the named defendants in the above 

deprivations. As noted above, personal involvement is an essential allegation in a § 1983 action. 

Bermett, 545 F.2d at 1262-63. For these reasons we affirm the district court's ruling regarding Mr. 

Mitchell's medical neglect claims. 

n 

Mr. Mitchell claims the disciplinary hearing, in which he was found guilty of participating in 

the riot, violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. After the hearing, the disciplinary 

committee revoked his good time credits and :placed him in restrictive confinement. It is well settled 

"that an inmate's hberty interest in his earned good time credits cannot be denied 'without the minima 1 

safeguards afforded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' Taylor v. Wallace, 

16 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 16 
931 F.2d 698, 700 (lOth Cir. 1991) (quoting Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 495 (1985)). The 

Supreme Court has held, however, that "[p ]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal 

prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." 

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). To meet the standards of due process in a 

disciplinary proceeding under Wolff, 

the inmate must receive: (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) 

an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call 

witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written 

statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the 

disciplinary action. 

Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst. v. Hill, ·472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). If there is some 

evidence to support the disciplinary committee's decision to revoke good time credits, then the 

requirements of procedural due process have been met. !d. "Ascertaining whether this standard is 

satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility 

of witnesses or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant conclusion is whether there is any 

evidence that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." !d. at 455-56. The 

decision can be upheld even if the evidence supporting the decision is "meager". Id at 457. 

Mr. Mitchell alleges many ways his due process rights were violated, including the reliability 

of the statement relied on to discipline him and the adequacy ofthe written findings. Our review, 

however, is limited to whether the three steps mandated by Wolff were followed and whether there 

was some evidence to support the disciplinary committee's findings. Mr. Mitchell does not dispute 

that he was given advance written notice of the disciplinary charges. In fact, at least eight days prior 

to his hearing he was given a written copy of the charges indicating he had participated in the riot and 

17 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 17 
listing the names of two guards who would produce evidence against him. He also does not dispute 

he was provided a hearing. He does claim, however, that he was not able to call witnesses and 

present documentary evidence because he was not provided with the exact time and place of the 

conduct he was charged with committing. He signed a form, however, waiving his right to call 

witnesses and to be aided by a staff representative and did not raise this problem during the hearing. 

Finally, Mr. Mitchell challenges the written statement by the fact finder. The committee's written 

report stated Mr. Mitchell was found guilty based on an officer's report "related to this officer". 

Ahhough in this case the report was not confidential, we have found that a written report stating the 

committee found the inmate guilty "in reliance upon confidential witness statements" to be sufficient 

where the offense report explicitly described his conduct and the basis of his punishment was 

participating in a riot. Taylor, 931 F.2d. at 703. The purposes ofthe written finding is "to insure 

adequate review of the proceedings, to protect the inmate against collateral consequences, and to 

guarantee that officials, faced with outside scrutiny, will act fairly." Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d. 

940, 946 (lOth Cir. 1990). In the case at bar, Mr. Mitchell had adequate notice of the conduct he 

was accused of committing and whose statement had incriminated him The lack of more specific 

findings also did not hamper our ability to review the proceeding and its findings. There was some 

evidence supporting the committee's finding, and it is not our job to address the validity of that 

evidence. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of a directed verdict on Mr. Mitchell's due 

process challenge to the administrative hearing. 

m 

Mr. Mitchell next claims his due process rights were violated because defendants failed to 

18 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 18 
follow their own established procedures. He claims inmates have a right to expect prison officials to 

follow their own policies and regulations. See Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d. 589, 610 (7th Cir. 1986); 

Anderson v. Smith, 697 F.2d 239 (8th Cir. 1983). In particular, Mr. Mitchell challenges Mr. 

Crabtree's role as the decision maker in his disciplinary hearing. The Oklahoma Department of 

Corrections "Offender Management and Services Manual" provides: 

Staff persons with direct involvement in a disciplinary case shall be prohibited from 

serving as disciplinary officer, investigator, or staff representative. Neither serving 

the offense report nor awareness of the offense constitutes direct involvement. The 

following activities constitute involvement in the disciplinary process: 

Witnessed the offense or prepared the offense report 

Involved in the events leading to and immediately following the offense. 

Engaged in any activity which may compromise the ability to function objectively, 

e.g., family relationship between staff member writing offense report and investigator. 

Mr. Mitchell challenges Mr. Crabtree's impartiality because Mr. Crabtree allegedly witnessed the riot, 

had some personal property destroyed during it and had chaired a committee which reassigned Mr. 

Mitchell's security status from niedium security to maximum security. Our concern with this issue 

is whether Mr. Crabtree's involvement prevented Mr. Mitchell from a meaningful opportunity to be 

heard. For a fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. 

Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). "When a prisoner asserts a valid challenge to the factfinders' 

neutrality, therefore, judicial review of disciplinary decisions must include an inquiry into whether 

discipline was imposed for an improper purpose." Smith, 899 F.2d at 947. The evidence Mr. 

Mitchell relies on fails to violate the Department of Corrections policy or to prove an improper 

motive for Mr. Crabtree's decision. Although Mr. Crabtree may have witnessed portions of the riot 

from outside the prison, Mr. Mitchell does not allege that Mr. Crabtree witnessed his participation 

19 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 19 
in the riot or had any prior dealings with him Because Mr. Crabtree was outside the prison when the 

riot occurred he was not involved in the events leading up to it and immediately following it. Mr. 

Crabtree did not prepare the offense report, nor was he related to someone who did. Having Mr. 

Crabtree preside over Mr. Mitchell's disciplinary proceeding neither violated the Department of 

Corrections' policies nor prevented Mr. Mitchell from a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 

Mr. Mitchell also challenges the actions ofDelores Ramsey who reviewed his appeal of the 

result of his disciplinary proceeding. Because we found the determination to be based on some 

evidence and thus valid, we need not address the validity of the prison's internal appellate procedure. 

Mr. Mitchell next claims defendants failed to follow their own policies by confining him in the 

conditions addressed under his Eighth Amendment claims. His argument merely repeats the 

deprivations he underwent while confined in the G-unit. We believe these conditions are better dealt 

with under the Eighth Amendment; therefore we will not address them here. 

IV 

Next, Mr. Mitchell challenges the district court's refusal to remove his shackles and leg irons 

at trial The district court denied Mr. Mitchell's request to have an evidentiary hearing to determine 

whether he should remain shackled during the trial. Whether to shackle a defendant during a trial is 

within the sound discretion ofthe district court. United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 867 (lOth Cir.) 

("the decision to impose appropriate means in restraining, even to the point of shackling, a defendant 

lies within the informed discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless that 

20 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 20 
discretion was clearly abused"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986); Snow v. Oklahoma, 489 F.2d 

278, 280 (lOth Cir. 1973) ("[t]he type and necessity of precautionary measures taken during the 

course of trial is within the sound discretion ofthe trial court"). In deciding whether to shackle a 

prisoner during a jlny trial the district court must balance the need to protect the jury, court officers 

and witnesses with any prejudice the shackles could arouse in the jurors' minds. See Lemons v. 

Skidmore, 985 F.2d 354, 357-58 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that prejudice caused by having plaintiff 

appear in handcuffs and leg irons can be overridden by "extreme need"). We agree with appellees that 

because this case was dismissed on a motion for judgment as a matter oflaw, any claim made by Mr. 

Mitchell based on prejudice the shackles may have instilled in the jury is moot because the jury did 

not decide Mr. Mitchell's claims. In other words, the district court's decision could not have resulted 

in any prejudice to Mr. Mitchell. 

v 

Mr. Mitchell next claims each ofthe defendants should be held liable for their respective 

participation in the denial ofhis constitutional rights. We assume from his argument's focus he is 

challenging the appellees' ability to raise the defense of qualified immunity. We were not provided 

with a complete record of the trial proceedings and thus we have no way of knowing whether the 

appellees even properly raised the issue of qualified immunity in the trial court. 

The doctrine of qualified immunity provides that "[w]hen government officials are performing 

discretionary functions, they will not be held liable for their conduct unless their actions violate 

'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

21 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 21 
known."' Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 645 (lOth Cir. 1988) 

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Although qualified immunity is an 

affirmative defense, its protection extends farther than ordinary affirmative defenses. Qualified 

immunity shields a defendant from the burdens of discovery and trial as well as liability. Id But 

"[d]efendants must raise the qualified immunity defense in order to benefit from the substantial shield 

it affords." Quezada v. County of Bernalillo, 944 F.2d 710, 718 (lOth Cir. 1991). The record we 

have before us does not indicate whether or not the appellees raised the defense of qualified immunity 

in the trial court. An appellate court will not address issues not raised in the district court. Lyons v. 

Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 722 (lOth Cir. 1993). Even if defendants had properly raised 

the defense of qualified immunity, however, it would not shield them from Mr. Mitchell's conditions 

of confinement claims because the alleged conditions could be found by a jury to be a violation of a 

clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person should have known. 

VI 

Mr. Mitchell next maintains the district court too narrowly interpreted the pretrial order in 

restricting testimonial evidence on his retaliation claims and the law of the case doctrine precluded 

the trial court from restricting such evidence. Rule 1.7(c), Local Court Rules ofthe United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, provides: 

Counsel for the plaintiff will prepare a pretrial order unless otherwise ordered by the 

Court; said order to contain the results of the conference and advice to the Court 

regarding all facts and legal issues involved, including details of all evidence to be 

presented; and the order shall present all questions of law.... The contents of the 

pretrial order shall supersede the pleadings and govern the trial of the case unless 

departure therefrom is permitted by the Court in the interest of justice. The pretrial 

order shall be approved by all parties .... 

22 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 22 
In the pretrial order Mr. Mitchell stated: 11Whether the defendant's conduct towards the 

plaintiff and the conditions ofplainti:fl's confinement at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary resulted in 

violations of plainti:fl's constitutional right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment?11 The 

district court found the above language did not include the issue of retaliation as an improper motive 

for Mr. Mitchell's transfer and conditions of confinement and did not allow ariy evidence on this issue 

to be presented at trial First, Mr. Mitchell argues the above passage includes the issue of retaliation 

as part of 11 defendant's conduct... The district court is entitled to considerable deference in its 

interpretation and application of its own rules of practice and procedure. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 

626 F.2d 784, 796 (lOth Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 918 (1981); see also Lance, Inc., v. 

Dewco Servs., Inc., 422 F.2d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 1970) (noting 11Local Rules are promulgated by 

District Courts primarily to promote the efficiency of the Court, and that the Court has a large 

measure of discretion in interpreting and applying them11). To hold 11 defendant's conduct11 to include 

retaliation based on Mr. Mitchell's constitutionally protected legal activities and legal assistance to 

other inmates would require an expansive interpretation we are unwilling to give in light of the 

deference owed the district court. Furthermore, Mr. Mitchell's constitutional protection of access 

to the courts is a due process right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and not the Eighth 

Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause which Mr. Mitchell references in the pretrial 

order. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 579. 

Second, Mr. Mitchell argues that the law of the case doctrine prohibited the district court 

from making such a ruling. The law of the case doctrine provides that once an appellate court decides 

an issue the decision will be binding on all subsequent proceedings in the same case. Rohrbaugh v. 

23 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 23 
Celotex Corp., 53 F. 3d 1181, 1183 {lOth Cir. 1995). Mr. Mitchell maintains that our earlier ruling 

in which we reversed the district court's dismiSsal ofhis claims as frivolous is binding on the district 

court. In that opinion, we stated, "factual allegations of retaliation, when combined with his 

allegations challenging the propriety of the disciplinary proceedings, [were] sufficient to state an 

arguable legal and factual claim" Mitchell v. Maynard, No. 92-7066, 1992 WL 401593 *2 (lOth Cir. 

Dec. 23, 1992). Mr. Mitchell's reliance on this passage is misplaced. "Law of the case principles do 

not bar a district court from acting unless an·appellate decision has issued on the merits of the claim 

sought to be precluded." Wilmer v. Board of County Comm'rs of Leavenworth County, 69 F.3d 406, 

409 (lOth Cir. 1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In Mitchell I, we merely stated he 

could state a retaliation claim; it was then up to him to do so. Our statement does not constitute a 

decision that he be unconditionally allowed to bring his claim to trial, nor does it constitute a decision 

that he had already established a valid claim for retaliation. It was still incumbent on him to follow 

the proper procedures to bring his claim before the district court. Because he failed to do so, we 

defer to the district court and affirm its decision to bar Mr. Mitchell's claims of retaliation. 

vn 

Finally, Mr. Mitchell requests that on remand we exercise our inherent power as the 

administrator of appeals and remands to reassign this case to a different district judge. Although 

normally the recusal of a district court judge is addressed at the trial level pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 144 and 455, "[t]he appellate court's authority to reassign exists apart from the judicial 

disqualification statutes." O'Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465, 1475 {lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 493 U.S. 918 (1989); Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 16-18 (1954). In particular, the 

24 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 24 
All Writs Act provides 11 [t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue 

all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages 

and principles oflaw. 11 28 U.S. C. § 1651. We also derive this power from 28 U.S. C. § 2106 which 

provides 11 [t]he Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, 

set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as 

may be just under the circumstances. 11 Respectful of the extraordinary nature of such a request, we 

will remand with instructions for assignment of a different judge only when there is proof of personal 

bias or under extreme circumstances. O'Rourke, 875 F.2d at 1475. 

We agree with Mr. Mitchell that a fair and unbiased tribunal is a basic requirement of due 

process. Mr. Mitchell points to several comments and actions of the trial judge as evidence that 

Judge Seay harbored personal bias against him First, Mr. Mitchell notes that originally the case was 

assigned to Judge Cook. Judge Cook denied appellees' motion to dismiss Mr. Mitchell's complaint 

as fiivolous under 28 U.S. C. § 1915(d). When Judge Cook retired, the case was transfered to Judge 

Seay along with several other prisoner cases. Mr. Mitchell claims that 11 [i]n one fell swoop, Judge 

Seay dismissed each and every prisoner case he had been assigned, even cases which had already been 

determined not fiivolous by Judge Cook, such as the Plaintiff's case. 11 We reversed the dismissal and 

remanded the case for trial After the close of evidence in the jury trial, Judge Seay granted judgment 

as a matter oflawwithout allowingjury deliberations. Mr. Mitchell claims the district court's actions 

in light of the totality of the evidence indicate judicial bias and hostility. However, we have held in 

the context of recusal cases that prior adverse rulings cannot in themselves create grounds for 

disqualification. Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 919 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 940 

25 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 25 
(1993); Glass v. Pfeffer, 849 F.2d 1261, 1268 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

Mr. Mitchell also cites certain comments the judge made as being indicative of his hostility. 

Mr. Mitchell notes that the first issue of business the judge raised was to order Mr. Mitchell and his 

attorney to switch counsel tables with the appellees by stating: 

Well, to begin with, I don't know what he's doing over there. You people ought to 

change, put the plaintiffs counsel over here. You're in the wrong place. Anybody 

who's a prisoner belongs over here so the guards can be close to him, and not over 

close to the jury. Just change right now. Now. 

Mr. Mitchell then draws our attention to Judge Seay's determination not to hold an evidentiary 

hearing before deciding that Mr. Mitchell should remain shackled during the trial. Mr. Mitchell also 

references numerous places in the record where the judge objected to questions or material that 

defense counsel did not object to. This by itsel( however, is within the judge's role of ensuring a fair 

trial. For "a trial judge may exclude or limit questions or testimony sua sponte to expedite the trial, 

and justice still maybe done." United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 881 F.2d 866, 877 (lOth Cir. 

1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1043 (1990). The question is whether there is other evidence to 

suggest that the consistent adverse rulings were an indication of judicial bias or animosity. See id 

At one point Judge Seay interrupted Mr. Mitchell's testimony to state: 

Counsel doesn't object, but I do, as to you talking about something that happened 

years ago. If you are going to talk about alleged inhumane treatment to this plaintiff: 

then let's talk about what happened while he was there and not something that 

happened years before that. It just wastes these poor jurors' time. They are just 

captives here, they are slaves. They are made to come here, and it wastes their time. 

And let's get through what is relevant in this matter and let them make a decision and 

get back to their normal, everyday affairs. And this just wastes their time. 

26 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 26 
Mr. Mitchell also points to a discrepancy in how Judge Seay admitted evidence regarding 

treatment of past prisoners when it benefitted appellees, but denied it when it benefited him Finally, 

Mr. Mitchell states that towards the end of the trial Judge Seay began making "irrelevant personal 

attacks" upon his attorney. As an example Mr. Mitchell cites a colloquy that occurred when Mr. 

Mitchell's attorney requested an opportunity to visit with Mr. Mitchell regarding having his case heard 

out of order: 

THE COURT: And you might talk with somebody who has talked with them, 

like your law partner, who happens -- I think the record is silent, but happens to be 

your wife as well, true? 

MR. COLCLAZIER: Judge I don't think that's relevant to anything in this case. 

THE COURT: No, except that you're not just with her eight hours a day, 

you're with her twenty-four hours a day, since she is your partner in life and your 

partner in your work. You can go ahead and talk with her. 

Because we were only provided with limited pages of the record, it is difficult for us to know 

the context in which these remarks were made or Judge Seay's overall demeanor throughout the trial. 

However, as has been held in the context of recus~ cases, it is not solely the reality of actual bias or 

prejudice but also the appearance ofimproprietythat we must guard against. See Liteky v. United 

States, _._u.s._,_, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1154 (1994). In considering Judge Seay's actions and 

Mr. Mitchell's concerns, we are mindful of the Supreme Court's acknowledgment that "[a] fair trial 

in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of 

actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even -the 

probability ofunfairness." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). We are also mindful that 

"charges of misconduct or prejudice leveled at trial judges 'should not be lightly made and, once 

27 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 27 
made, should not be casually treated by a reviewing court."' United States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507, 

510 (lOth Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. Cardall, 550 F.2d 604, 606 (lOth Cir. 1976), cert. 

denied, 434 U.S. 841 (1977)). 

In United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 785 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 

U.S. 988 (1986), the court advocated a three-part approach to be used in the absence of personal bias 

to determine whether circumstances warrant remanding to a new judge: 

( 1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected upon remand to have 

substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed views or 

findings determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be rejected, (2) 

whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and (3) 

whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any 

gain in preserving the appearance of fairness. 

There is no doubt Judge Seay has on several occasions expressed his view that Mr. Mitchell's 

Eighth Amendment claims are frivolous, a waste of the jury's time and as a matter of law fail to state 

a claim. There is also evidence that some of his statements and actions may cause a reasonable 

person to question whether justice was being done. Furthermore, because we are remanding for a 

new trial on Mr. Mitchell's claim, there would be little unnecessary duplication of effort in having a 

different judge preside over the new trial. Our job is to ensure Mr. Mitchell receives a fair hearing 

from an impartial judge. The history of the case, combined with evidence of Judge Seay's expressions 

ofhis disapproval toward Mr. Mitchell, his attorney and his claims indicate that in order to prevent 

any probability of unfairness or appearance of impropriety we should direct a new judge to hear the 

case on remand. We stress this decision is not based on a finding Judge Seay harbored any personal 

bias or acted improperly, but merely on the conclusion that the interests of justice would be best 

28 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 28 
served by remanding this case with instructions that a different judge be assigned. 

vm 

For the reasons stated above, we REVERSE the district court with respect to Appellant's 

condition of confinement Eighth Amendment claim and REMAND for a new trial, AFFIRM in all 

other respects and direct that on remand a different trial judge be assigned to preside over the 

proceedings. 

29 

Appellate Case: 94-7108 Document: 01019277279 Date Filed: 04/01/1996 Page: 29