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Parties Involved:
Randall Scott Silkwood
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

RANDALL SCOTT SILKWOOD, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

No; 88-2096 

PILED 

Ut1ited States.Court of Appeals · Tenth Cir·:-.•i:. 

DEC 2 3 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Oklahoma 

· (D.Ca No. 88-20-CR) 

Susan L. Foreman (Michael Gordon Katz, 

with her on the briefs), Denver, 

Appellant. 

Federal Public Defender, 

Colorado, for DefendantRoger Hilfiger, United States Attorney, and Sheldon J. Sperling, 

Assistant U. S. Attorney, Muskogee, Oklahoma, on the brief, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before MOORE, McWILLIAMS, and ANDERSON, Circuit-Judges. 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-2096 Document: 010110195550 Date Filed: 12/28/1989 Page: 1 
· ( Randall Silkwood appeals his conviction for unlawful 

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 

u.s.c. § 922(g)(l) as well as his enhanced sentence of twenty-five 

years without parole, imposed pursuant to 18 u.s.c. § 924(e)(l). 

Mr. S.ilkw.ood claims that the trial court erred when it denied his 

motion to suppress the firearm which he was convicted of 

possessing and his motion. for production of certain Brady 

material. He also asserts that the trial court abused its 

discretion by denying his motions for a mistrial based on the 

testimony of one of the Governmen~•s witnesses and on the 

prosecutor's comments on his failure to testify. Finally, he 

claims that at the sentence enhancement proceeding; he was denied 

both his rights to counsel and to due process. We reject Mr. 

Silkwood's assigriments of error with respect to his conviction. 

We hold, however, that he was improperly denied counsel at the 

sentence enhancement proceeding. We, therefdre, remand this case 

to the trial court for resentencing and direct that court· to 

appoint counsel to represent Mr. Silkwood unless, after proper 

inquiry, Mr. Silkwood waives that right. 

I. FACTS 

On December 9, 1987, Trooper Randy Moore stopped Mr. Silkwood 

in .Durant, Oklahoma, for driving 67 m.p.h. in a 55 m.p.h. zone. 

•J•:-::.:.:,per Moore signaled Mr. Silkwood to leave his van. When they 

fllcj[ between the two vehicles, Mr. Silkwood informed Trooper Moore 

that his license was in the van's glove box and asked if he could 

retTieve it. Trooper Moore and Mr. Silkwood then· walked together 

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Appellate Case: 88-2096 Document: 010110195550 Date Filed: 12/28/1989 Page: 2 
along the passenger side of the van where Mr. Silkwood opened the 

front door and reached into the glove compartment for his 

billfold. While Mr. Silkwood was removing the license from his 

billfold, Trooper Moore noticed part of the butt of a revolver 

protruding from a bank bag~ Trooper Moore then ordered Mr. 

Silkwood to step to the rear of the van, grabb~d the gun, checked 

it, saw that it was loaded, put the revolver in .the waistband of 

his trousers, and placed Mr. Silkwood under arrest. 

Prioi to trial, Mr. Silkwood's attorney moved to ~ithd~aw 

because he had previously represented one of the Government's 

witnesses. The trial court granted this motion just five days 

before trial, and appointed new counsel to represent him at trial. 

Immediately after trial, M·r. Silkwood moved ·to appear pro se for· 

the remainder of his case. The trial court granted this motion by 

minute order without· inquiry or advisement. The Government, 

meanwhi~e, mo~ed for sentence enhancement pursuant to 18 u.s.c. 

§ ~~~(ef(l), alleging that at least three Df Mrj Silkwood's eight 

~1·icr convictions were for violent felonies~ 

At the hearing on the Government's motion for enhancement, 

the court asked Mr .. Silkwoo~ whether, considering the gravity of 

the motion for enhancement, he would like an attorney appointed to 

represent him. Mr. Silkwood refused the offer because he believed 

that his trial counsel had been incompetent. - The court then 

informed Mr. Silkwood that his sentence could be enhanced up to 

fifteen years with a substantial fine and continued the hearing. 

At the subsequent hearing, the court inquired again whether 

Mr. Silkwood wanted an attorney ap·pointed to represent hi!Jl and 

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Appellate Case: 88-2096 Document: 010110195550 Date Filed: 12/28/1989 Page: 3 
informed him generally of the dangers of self-representation. Mr. 

Silkwood rejected the offer because ·he believed that trial counsel 

had spent insufficient time preparing his· case and that he cou-ld 

represent himself more effectively than appointed couns~l. After 

hearing argument on the Government's motion for enhancement, the 

court sentenced Mr. Silkwood to twenty-five years imprisonment 

~v' i t ho u t pa r o 1 e .. 

II. MR. SILKWOOD'S PRE- AND POST-TRIAL MOTIONS 

The Fourth Amendment prohibits a warrantless search, or 

seizure unless it falls within one of the amendment's "few 

specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'' Katz v. 

Llniced States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 _(1967). Under the plain view 

doctrine, one of the recognized exceptions to the Fourth 

Amendment, a police officer who is lawfully· present in a 

p~rticular place may seize prbperty within his plain view if 

"'there is probable cause to·associate the property.with criminal 

activity. 111 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738-39 (1983) (quoting 

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980)). We conduct a de 

novo review to determine whether the trial court properly held 

that ~he plain view doctrine applies in this case. United States· 

v. Stewart, 867 F.2d 581, 584 (10th Cir. 1989). 

The facts of this case clearly support ~he trial court's 

holding. Since Trooper Moore stopped Mr. Silkwood for speeding, 

he was lawfully present at the front passenger side of the van 

when he saw the butt of the revolver. Although the butt of the 

revolver was in pl~in view, the rest of the gun was concealed 

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Appellate Case: 88-2096 Document: 010110195550 Date Filed: 12/28/1989 Page: 4 
inside a bank bag. Oklahoma law prohibits any unauthorized person 

from carrying a concealed weapon. 1 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, 

§ 1289.8 (West 1983). Since the revolver in Mr. Silkwood's van 

was partially concealed, . Trooper Moore had probable cause to 

assJciate it with criminal activity. Under these circumstances, 

1 Ile sei~ure of the revolver clearly falls within the plain view 

exception to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against 

warrantless searches and seizures. The trial court, therefore, 

properly denied ~r. Silkwood's motion to suppress. 

Mr, Silkwood also contends that the trial court erred in 

refusing, after an in camera inspection, to allow him access to 

Trooper Moore's personnel file. He asserts that since Trooper 

Moore admitted at the hearing ~n the motion to suppress that he 

had had citizens' compl~ints filed again~t hi~, the personnel file 

may have contained evidence which would undermine Trooper Moore's 

credibility as a witness. He would then be entitle·d to view this 

evid~nce under the doctrines of Brady v~ Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 

(1963), and United States v. Bagley, 473 u.s~ 667 (1985). At Mr. 

Silkwood's suggestion, we have conducted our own in ca~era 

inspection. of Trooper Moore's personnel file and find that the 

trial court ruled prop~rly in denying Mr. Silkwood access to it 

since it contains no Brady evidence. We have also reviewed Mr. 

Silkwood's claims that the trial court erred in denying his 

motions for a mistrial and find them to be without merit. 

1 The statute excepts from the prohibition on carrying a 

concealed weapon law enforcement officers, registered security 

officers and employees of armored car firms licensed by the 

Corporation Commission. Mr. Silkwood does not fall within any of 

these categories. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2096 Document: 010110195550 Date Filed: 12/28/1989 Page: 5 
Ill. VIOLATION OF MR. SILKWOOD'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL 

Since the Supreme C6urt held in Faretta v. California, 422 

U.S. 806 {1975), that a criminal defendant has the right to appear 

~ se if he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives his 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel, this court has addressed on 

several occasions the inquiry which a trial court must make to 

ensure that the waive~ meets these standard~. See, e.g., United 

States v. Gipson, 693 F.2d 109· {10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 

U.S. 1216 {1983); United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952 {10th 

Cir. 1987); Sanchez v. Mondragon, 858 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1988). 

For the waiver to b~ voluntary, the trial court must inquire into 

the reasons for the defend~nt's. dissatisfaction with his counsel 

to ensure that the defendant is not exercising a choice between 

incompetent or unprepared counsel and appearing~ se. Sanchez, 

858 F.2d at 14.65 •. For a waiver to be knowing and intelligent, the 

trial court· must conduct a "'penetrating and comprehensive. 

examination'" into the defendant's "'apprehension of the nature of 

the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the 

range of allowable- punishments there.under, . possible defenses to 

the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other 

facts essential to a broad understanding o~ the whole matter. 111 

Padilla, 819 F.id at 956-57 (quoting Von Mol~ke v. Gillies, 332 

U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948)). This inquiry must appear in the record. 

Gipson, 693 F.2d at 112.· Our de nova review of the trial court's 

inquiry in this case leads us to the conclusion that Mr. Silkwood 

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Appellate Case: 88-2096 Document: 010110195550 Date Filed: 12/28/1989 Page: 6 
did not voluntarily or knowingly waive his Sixth Amendment· right 

to counsel. 

At the first heating on the Government's motion for sentence 

enhancement, Mr. Silkwood rejected the court's offer to appoint 

courisel because he believed that his trial counsel. had been 

incompetent. 2 At the subseq4ent sentence enhancement proceeding,· 

Mr, Silkwood informed the court that he wanted to proceed ~ se 

because he believed that trial counsel had spent insufficient time 

preparing his case and that he could represent himself more 

effectively. than appointed co~nsel. 3 Rather than inquiring 

2 The following colloquy took place: 

THE couRr: Let me ask you something, you 

lawyer and I let him get out. Don't· 

particularly in light of this motion 

enhancement, don't you think you need a 

represent you? 

fired this 

you think, 

for the 

lawyer to 

MR. SILKWOOD: Not that one if that's the same, you 

know. 

THE COURT: Well, .you and I disagree. You didn't. think 

he did a good job. I thought he did a marvelous job 

under the circumstances, considering what the evidence 

was. You know, yqu may be disappointed with the jury 

verdict, but --

MR. SILKWOOD: No, sir, because if I had been the jury 

at the time I would have found me guilty, toq, due ~o 

the fact there wasn't no evidence presented in my behalf 

at my request. 

3 In · response to the court's inquiry whether he 

appointed counsel to represent him, Mr. Silkwood stated: 

desired 

Yes, sir~ I was intending to address the Court to make 

acknowledgment of the fact, that you asked me if I 

wanted representation, and no disregard to the Court or 

the judicial system or the public defender's office, but 

I feel that the way I was represented at the trial that 

if that was the best that could be appointed, then, it 

would be just to my best knowledge that I feel that I 

(Continued to next page.) 

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Appellate Case: 88-2096 Document: 010110195550 Date Filed: 12/28/1989 Page: 7 
thoroughly into Mr. Silkwood's allegations of incompetence, the 

triil court merely attempted to persuade him that trial counsel 

had done ~n·excellent job in light of the circumstances. The 

trial court, therefore, failed to ensure that Mr. Silkwood was not 

forced to make the Hobson's choice against which Sanchez warns, a 

choice between incompetent or unprepared counsel and appearing E.£_Q 

se. As a result, his choice did not reach the. level of 

voluntariness which Faretta and our cases require. 

The trial c6urt's inquiry was alsb inadequate to ensure that· 

Mr. Silkwood's waiver was knowing and intelligent. Besides its 

gineral statements about the seriousness of sentence enhancement, 

the trial court informed Mr. Silkwood that his sentence "could be 

enhanced up· to . fifteen years and a substantial· fine. 11 This 

statement is not only inadequate but also incoriect. 4 In fact, 

the trial court sentenced Mr. Silkwood to twenty-five years 

(Continued fro~ prior page.) 

could repr~sent-myself ·better than I was represented at 

the trial and these proceeding [sic]. 

Mr. Silkwood later stated: 

Just for the record, Your Hon9r, you make the statment 

[sic] I might be upset with the verdict or outcome. To 

me that has no bearing. _Where I was reflecting my 

attorney.that represented me, was Mr. Wilcoxen, I'm not 

even reflecting that he was-~- I'm·saying he may have 

been ineffective due to the fact of the time and 

circumstances he had ·to prepare the case. You know, he 

was appointed what, six days before my tr1al. He had 

seen me approximately, maybe, one hour. I had his own 

notes to where he filled out his CJS-20 form and. that's 

all he charged. He counseled me for one hour and it 

wasn't even a full hour. He made no opening statements. 

He failed to question any of .my witnesses. 

4 Section 924(e)(l) establishes a penalty of 15 years as a 

minimum, not a maximum, and precludes the sentencing judge from 

granting a suspended or probationary sentence. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2096 Document: 010110195550 Date Filed: 12/28/1989 Page: 8 
without parole. Since the trial court's inqtliry could not have 

ensured that Mr. Silkwood voluntarily; knowingly, and 

intelligently waived his right to counsel, we remand this case for 

resentencing and direct the sentencing court to appoint counsel to 

assist Mr. Silkwood unless, after proper inquiry, Mr. Silkwood 

waives that r i_ght. 

IV. THE DEFINITION OF BURGLARY IN 18 U.SoCe S 924(e). 

Section 924(e) subjects to sentence enhancement any person 

who is convicted for possession of a firearm who has previousiy 

been convicted of three violent felonies or serious drug offenses. 

Section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) includes within the definition of 

"violent felony" any felony ·which "is burglary, arson, or 

extortiori, i~volves use of explosives, or otherwise ihvolves 

conduct that presents a serious potential risk of injury to 

another." The circuits have split over Congress's intended 

definiti.on of "burglary" in 18 U.S.C. §. 924(e) (2) (B) (ii). 

The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have·adopted the common law 

definition of burglary. United States v. Headspeth, 852 F.2d 753, 

758 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Chatman, 869 F.2d 525, 527 

.. 

(9th Cir. 1989). The Fifth and Eighth Circuits, relying on the 

plain language of the statute, have held that where a state 

denominates a crime as burglary,· a· conviction for that crime 

qualifies as a predicate offense for purposes of sentence 

enhancement regardless of whether the underlying condudt involved 

actual or potential violence. United States v. Leonard, 868 F.2d 

1393, 1395 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Portwood, 857 F.2d 

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Appellate Case: 88-2096 Document: 010110195550 Date Filed: 12/28/1989 Page: 9 
1221, 1223-24 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, U.S. , 109 

s. Ct. 2073 (1989) ("The statute says 'burglary,' and we take that 

to mean 'burglary,' however a state may choose to define it."). 

The Third; Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the 

definition of burglary which appeared in the Armed Career Criminal 

Act of 1984 (ACCA), Chap. XVIII of the Comprehensive ~rime Control_ 

Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1803, 98 Stat. 1837, 2185. 

United States v. Palmer, 871 F.2d 1202, 1208 (3d Cir.); cert. 

denied, U.S. ·-----' 110 s. Ct. 233 (1989); United -States v. -·-

'l'a:L lo r, 882 F.2d 101_8, 1027 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. 

Dombrowski, 877 F~ 2d 520, 530 (7th Cir. 1989); 5 United States v. 

!'._till_, 863 F.2d 1575, 1581-82 (11th Cir. 1989). According to that 

definition, "burglary" is "any felony punishable by a term of 

imprisonment exceeding one year and consisting of· entering or 

remaining surreptitiously within a building that is the property 

of another with intent to engage in conduct constituting a Federal 

5 In United States v. Leonard, 868 F.2d 1393, 1396 (5th_ Cir. 

1989), the court cited United States v. Dickerson, 857 F.2d 414 

(7th Cir. 1988) (en banc)j cert. denied, U.S. , 109 s. Ct. 

175 3 ( 198 9), to -· supports 1 ts "plain language" interpretation of 

burglary in§ 924(~). The Dickerson court held that· Dickerson's 

prior convictions ~or residential burglary subjected him to 

enhancement because "all burglaries satisfy the prerequisites of 

§ 9·2 4." rd. at 419. The Dickerson court, the ref ore, seemingly 

adopted a "plain language" view of the definitiqn of burglary. In 

Dombrowski, however, the Seventh Circuit add~essed the question 

whether prior convictions for commercial burglary subject the 

defendant to sentence enhancement.· Rather than concluding that 

commercial burglary satisfies the enhancement statute simply 

because the state denominated it as burglary, the court apopted 

the Eleventh Circuit's approach and held that prior convictions 

for commercial burglary subject the defendant to enhancement 

because they fall within the· ACCA's definition of that term. 

Dombrowski, therefo~e, apparently overruled Dickersori. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2096 Document: 010110195550 Date Filed: 12/28/1989 Page: 10 
or State offense·. 116 Finatly, the First Circuit has declined an 

attempt to discern Congress's intended definition of burglary in 

~ 924(e). United States v. Patterson, 882 F.2d 595, 604 (1st Cir. 

1089) ("We frankly cannot divine how Congress intended to define. 

bu r g la r y . II ) • 

After reviewing the opinions of the circuits which have 

addressed this question, we agree with the reasoning of those 

which define burglary as it appears in the ACCA. The trial court; 

·therefore, should apply that definition when it determines which 

ot Mr. Silkwood's prior burglary convictions should count towards 

enhancement. 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Mr. Silkwood's 

conviction but REMAND this case for resentencing. 

6 The -Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 

§ 104(a), 100. Stat. 449, 458-59 (1986), amended. the definition of 

burglary in the ACCA to include "any crime," rather than "any 

felony." Congress subsequently enacted the Career Criminal 

Amendments Act of 1986, Subtitle I of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of. 

1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1401-1402, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-39 to 

3207-40, to create the current version of§ 924(e). 

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