Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00452/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00452-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Choice Hotels International, Inc.
Plaintiff
Key Hotels of Atmore II, LLC
Defendant
Anand Patel
Defendant
Dipan Patel
Defendant
Sarju Patel
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

CHOICE HOTELS 

INTERNATIONAL, INC. 

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 Plaintiff, 

vs. CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-452-CG-B 

KEY HOTELS OF ATMORE II, 

LLC; ANAND PATEL; DIPAN 

PATEL; and SARJU PATEL, 

 Defendants. 

ORDER and DEFAULT JUDGMENT 

 This matter is before the Court on a motion for default judgment and 

accompanying memorandum in support filed by Choice Hotels International, Inc. 

(“Plaintiff”) in this action against Key Hotels of Atmore II, LLC; Anand Patel; Dipan 

Patel; and Sarju Patel (“Defendants”). (Doc. 18; Doc. 19). For the reasons set forth 

below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s motion is due to be GRANTED. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff is a Delaware corporation. (Doc. 1, ¶ 1). Its principal place of 

business is in Maryland and is licensed to conduct business in Alabama. Id. 

Plaintiff has been in the business of operating hotels and motels since the 1930s 

and has become one of the largest and most successful lodging franchisors in the 

world, which includes the QUALITY® family of marks.1 Id. at ¶¶ 13–17. The 

 

1 Plaintiff is the registrant of United States Trademark Registration No. 0,886,881 

for the mark QUALITY; No. 1,050,372 for the mark QUALITY for use in connection 

with the provision of hotel, motel, and restaurant services; No. 1,183,294 for the 

Case 1:16-cv-00452-CG-B Document 20 Filed 11/09/16 Page 1 of 18
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QUALITY® family of marks have become widely associated, in the minds of the

consuming and general public, with goods and services offered by Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 

52. Plaintiff, its predecessors, and franchisees have worked to instill and use its 

marks in association with the highest value of hotel and motel services. Id. at ¶ 48. 

Defendants Anand Patel, Dipan Patel, and Sarju Patel are natural persons residing 

within the Southern District of Alabama and are members of Key Hotels of Atmore 

II, LLC. Id. at ¶¶ 3–5. Defendant Key Hotels of Atmore II, LLC is a limited 

 

mark QUALITY INN for use in connection with the provision of hotel, motel, and 

restaurant services; No. 1,534,820 for the mark QUALITY HOTEL for use in 

connection with the provision of hotel and restaurant services; No. 1,769,488 for the 

mark QUALITY RESORT for use in connection with the provision of hotel and 

motel services; No. 2,729,999 for the mark Q QUALITY INN + design for use in 

connection with the provision of hotel and motel services; No. 2,732,875 for the 

mark Q QUALITY SUITES + design for use in connection with the provision of 

hotel and motel services; No. 2,946,054 for the mark Q QUALITY + design for use in 

connection with the provision of hotel and motel services, hotel and motel 

reservation services for others, and online hotel and motel reservation services for 

others; No. 3,053,888 for the mark QUALITY SUITES for use in connection with 

the provision of hotel and motel services, hotel and motel reservation services for 

others, and online hotel and motel reservation services for others; No. 3,448,436 for 

the mark QUALITY INN & SUITES for use in connection with the provision of 

hotel and motel services, hotel and motel reservation services for others, and online 

hotel and motel reservation services for others; No. 3,448,437 for the mark Q 

QUALITY INN & SUITES + design for use in connection with the provision of hotel 

and motel services, hotel and motel reservation services for others, and online hotel 

and motel reservation services for others; No. 3,435,885 for the mark Q QUALITY + 

design for use in connection with the provision of hotel and motel services, hotel and 

motel reservation services for others, and online hotel and motel reservation 

services for others; No. 3,569,789 for the mark Q QUALITY HOTEL + design for use 

in connection with the provision of hotel and motel services, hotel and motel 

reservation services for others, and online hotel and motel reservation services for 

others; and No. 3,837,912 for the mark Q (stylized) for use in connection with hotel 

and motel services, hotel and motel reservation services for others, online hotel and 

motel reservation services for others, and providing a complimentary breakfast to 

hotel guests. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 11–44; Doc. 1-2 to Doc. 1-14). Plaintiff contends that each 

registration is incontestable under Section 15 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1065. 

See (Doc. 1).

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liability company organized under the law of the State of Alabama regularly

engaging in the provision of hotel-motel services at 1610 South Main Street, 

Atmore, Alabama 36502 (“the Motel”). Id. at ¶ 2.

On September 30, 2011, Plaintiff and Defendants entered into a Franchise 

Agreement (“the Agreement”). (Doc. 1-15). The Agreement permitted Defendants

to operate a QUALITY INN® franchise at the Motel and licensed the QUALITY® 

family of marks to Defendants for the duration of the Agreement. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 53–

54). The Agreement required Defendants make monthly franchise fee payments 

and pay service charges unto Plaintiff on an ongoing basis. Id. at ¶ 56. Defendants

failed to satisfy these two obligations at some point prior to June 27, 2013. Id. 

Plaintiff notified Defendants of their breaches and provided an opportunity to cure. 

Id. at ¶ 58. Defendants did not cure their breaches. On August 29, 2013, Plaintiff 

notified Defendants that it was terminating the Agreement and that, per paragraph 

11 of the Agreement, Defendants were no longer authorized to use the QUALITY® 

family of marks. Id. at ¶¶ 55, 61. Defendants were to immediately discontinue use 

of the QUALITY® family of marks in any manner and pay unto Plaintiff 

$86,390.33. Id. at ¶¶ 63, 65. Plaintiff made Defendants aware that further use of 

the QUALITY® family of marks by Defendants would constitute trademark 

infringement. Id. at ¶ 64. In spite of the August termination letter, Defendants

continued to use the QUALITY® family of marks in, around, and in publicity for the 

Motel. Id. at ¶¶ 67–68.

Plaintiff then filed an arbitration claim against Defendants. On May 7, 2016, 

the American Arbitration Association issued Plaintiff an award totaling $95,870.73. 

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(Doc. 1, ¶¶ 70). Despite termination of the Agreement as of August 29, 2013 and 

subsequent arbitration, Defendants continued to make unauthorized use of the 

QUALITY® family of marks in, around, and in publicity with the Motel. Id. at 

¶¶71–72. A site inspection on July 22, 2016 established that Defendants’ 

unauthorized use continued at least through that date. Id. at ¶73.

Plaintiff initiated this action on August 26, 2016. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff asserts 

three Counts in its Complaint: (1) federal trademark infringement in violation of § 

32(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114; (2) federal unfair competition in 

violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); and (3) trademark 

infringement/unfair competition in violation of Alabama common law. Plaintiff 

served a copy of the Summons and Complaint on Sarju Patel on September 7, 2016 

(Doc. 13); Anand Patel on September 11, 2016 (Doc. 14); Key Hotels of Atmore II, 

LLC on September 11, 2016 (Doc. 15); and Dipan Patel on September 17, 2016 (Doc. 

12). Defendants did not respond. The Clerk entered default on October 13, 2016. 

(Doc. 14).

In its Motion for Default Judgment, Plaintiff requests that Defendants be 

permanently enjoined from further use of the QUALITY® family of marks and be 

awarded statutory damages, which include profits realized by Defendants, damages 

suffered by Plaintiff, costs, and attorneys’ fees. The Court will discuss each count

and remedy sought in turn after setting forth the standard for analyzing Plaintiff’s 

motion.

II. ANALYSIS

“In this Circuit, ‘there is a strong policy of determining cases on their merits 

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and we therefore view defaults with disfavor.’” Virgin Records America, Inc. v. 

Lacey, 510 F. Supp. 2d 588, 590 (S.D. Ala. 2007) (quoting In re Worldwide Web 

Systems, Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003)). Even so, it is well understood 

that a court “has the authority to enter default judgment for failure ... to comply 

with its orders or rules of procedure.” Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th 

Cir. 1985). 

Where, as here, a defendant has failed to answer, appear, or otherwise 

acknowledge a suit after service, entry of a default judgment may be appropriate. 

Rule 55 itself provides for entry of default and default judgment when a defendant 

“has failed to plead or otherwise defend” against a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). 

Indeed, courts have entered default judgments against defendants who have failed 

to defend a claim of trademark infringement against them following proper service 

of process. See, e.g., Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Hybrid Conversions, Inc., 817 F. 

Supp. 2d 1351 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (issuing a default judgment awarding damages and 

instituting a permanent injunction in a trademark infringement action); Alfa Corp. 

v. Alfa Mortg. Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (issuing a default 

judgment granting damages and a permanent injunction in a trademark 

infringement action brought under the Lanham Act and Alabama common law); 

PetMed Express, Inc. v. MedPets.Com, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (S.D. Fla. 2004) 

(entering a default judgment awarding damages and a permanent injunction in a 

trademark infringement case). “In short, then, ‘[w]hile modern courts do not favor 

default judgments, they are certainly appropriate when the adversary process has 

been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.’” Virgin Records America, 

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Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d at 591 (quoting Flynn v. Angelucci Bros. & Sons, Inc., 448 F. 

Supp. 2d 193, 195 (D.D.C. 2006)).

As established above, Plaintiff completed service of process on Defendants. 

Defendants did not respond. Upon Plaintiff’s motion, the Clerk made an entry of 

default, but this entry alone does not necessarily entitle Plaintiff to a default 

judgment. It is well established that a default is not an admission of liability 

establishing a right to recover. Default is merely “an admission of the facts cited in 

the Complaint, which by themselves may or may not be sufficient to establish a 

defendant’s liability.” Pitts ex rel. Pitts v. Seneca Sports, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 

1357 (S.D. Ga. 2004). More simply, “a default judgment cannot stand on a 

complaint that fails to state a claim.” Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 

1353, 1370 n. 41 (11th Cir. 1997). If the facts within the complaint establish 

liability, then the Court must determine appropriate damages. Where all essential 

evidence is of record, an evidentiary hearing on damages is not required. See S.E.C.

v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1232 n.13 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Rule 55(b)(2) speaks of 

evidentiary hearings in a permissive tone.... We have held that no such hearing is 

required where all essential evidence is already of record.”) (citations omitted); see 

also PetMed Express, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1223 (entering default judgment, 

permanent injunction, and statutory damages in a Lanham Act case without a 

hearing). 

A. Federal and Common Law Trademark Infringement (Claims I and III)

Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act attaches liability for trademark 

infringement when a person “use[s] in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, 

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copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark” which “is likely to cause confusion, 

or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). In a successful 

trademark infringement claim, a plaintiff establishes that (1) defendant used 

plaintiff’s mark in commerce, (2) without plaintiff’s consent, and (3) defendant’s 

mark is likely to cause consumer confusion or result in mistake. Int’l Cosmetics 

Exch., Inc. v. Gapardis Health & Beauty, Inc., 303 F.3d 1242, 1249 (11th Cir. 2002); 

see also Alfa Corp., 560 F. Supp. 2d at 1174 (applying this three part test to a

default judgment for trademark infringement). The elements of an Alabama statelaw infringement claim are the same as they are under the Lanham Act. Alfa 

Corp., 560 F. Supp. 2d at 1175 (citing Arthur Young, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 

579 F. Supp. 384, 389 (N.D. Ala. 1983)).

Plaintiff’s Complaint establishes that Plaintiff is the registrant of the 

QUALITY® family of marks. Defendants were no longer authorized to use the 

QUALITY® family of marks after August 29, 2013. Even so, Defendants continued 

to use Plaintiff’s marks in operation of the Motel. The mark Defendants continued 

to operate the Motel under is in fact a QUALITY® mark. Their unauthorized use of 

the mark is sure to lead consumers to believe that the Motel is actually affiliated 

with Plaintiff. Additionally, Defendants made no attempt to respond to or defend 

against this action, although provided notice. Defendants’ “course of conduct 

amounts to a deliberate and intentional failure to respond, which is just the sort of 

dilatory litigation tactic for which the default judgment mechanism was created.” 

Virgin Records America, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d at 592. Therefore, the Court 

concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to default judgment on Count 1 of the Complaint. 

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Further, Plaintiff is entitled to default judgment on the common law trademark 

infringement claim in Count III since Alabama’s elements are the same as under 

the Lanham Act.2

B. Federal Unfair Competition (Count II)

Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act creates a cause of action for unfair 

competition. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). To succeed on a claim of unfair competition, a 

plaintiff must establish “(1) it had prior rights to the mark at issue, and (2) the 

defendant adopted a mark or name that was the same, or confusingly similar to, 

plaintiff’s mark such that consumers were likely to confuse the two.” Alfa Corp., 

560 F. Supp. 2d at 1174 (citing Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 

1188, 1193 (11th Cir. 2001)).

As established above, Plaintiff’s Complaint establishes that it is the 

registrant of the QUALITY® family of marks. Little question exists that Plaintiff 

has priority since Defendants sought a franchise from Plaintiff. The mark 

Defendants used and continue to use is a holdover from prior authorized use, so 

confusion is certain. Defendants’ deliberate and intentional failure to respond 

further justifies default judgment in this matter. Virgin Records America, Inc., 510 

 2 Plaintiff styles Count III as a claim of “Common Law Trademark/Unfair 

Competition”; however, the elements Plaintiff speaks to under Count III go to a 

claim of trademark infringement. Further, Plaintiff relies on “the arguments and 

evidence cited [in its] federal infringement claim” section to support default 

judgment on Count III. (Doc. 16, p. 9). The Court deduces that Plaintiff does not 

raise a separate common law claim of unfair competition. Support for this 

deduction is grounded in the principle that “Alabama does not recognize a commonlaw tort of unfair competition.” Alfa Corp., 560 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. Indeed, 

Plaintiff heavily relies on Alfa Corp. to support the present motion and, therefore, is 

aware no such action lies under Alabama’s common law. To the extent Plaintiff 

does, in fact, raise such a claim, it is DENIED for the reasons just stated.

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F. Supp. 2d at 592. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to default 

judgment on Count II.

C. Remedies

Plaintiff seeks four different remedies: (1) a permanent injunction against 

Defendants, (2) a destruction order, (3) recovery of Defendants’ profits and 

Plaintiff’s damages for the period of infringement, and (4) attorneys’ fees and costs. 

The Court will address each in turn.

1. Permanent Injunction

Plaintiff moves the Court for a permanent injunction requiring the following: 

(1) Defendants be permanently and forever enjoined from using the QUALITY® 

family of marks; (2) Defendants immediately remove all signage or indicia bearing 

the QUALITY® family of marks from the Motel; and (3) Defendants file a sworn 

statement of compliance which specifically states the date upon which they ceased 

use of the QUALTIY® family of marks at the Motel. (Doc. 16, pp. 11–12).

The Lanham Act confers the “power to grant injunctions, according to the 

principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable, to

prevent the violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the 

Patent and Trademark Office.” 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a). An issuing court may require a 

defendant to serve upon a plaintiff “a report in writing under oath setting forth in 

detail the manner and form in which the defendant has complied with the 

injunction.” Id. Equitable principles require a plaintiff seeking a permanent 

injunction establish four elements: “(1) it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) 

remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to 

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compensate for that injury; (3) considering the balance of hardships between the 

plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) the public interest 

would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” Angel Flight of Ga., Inc. v. 

Angel Flight of America, Inc., 522 F.3d 1200, 1208 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing eBay Inc. 

v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).

“‘[I]rreparable injury include[s] loss of control of reputation, loss of trade, and 

loss of goodwill.’” Sylvan Learning Inc. v. Learning Solutions, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 

1284, 1299 (S.D. Ala. 2011) (quoting Ferrellgas Partners, L.P. v. Barrow, 143 F. 

App’x 180, 190 (11th Cir. 2005)). As the court in Ferrellgass explained,

[t]he most corrosive and irreparable harm attributable to trademark 

infringement is the inability of the victim to control the nature and 

quality of the defendants’ goods. Even if the infringer’s products are of 

high quality, the plaintiff can properly insist that its reputation should 

not be imperiled by the acts of another.

Ferrellgas, 143 F. App’x at 190–91 (citation omitted). It is not necessary that actual 

damage to a plaintiff’s reputation be established because “the loss of control of one’s 

reputation by the adoption of a confusingly similar mark [ ] supplies the substantial 

threat of irreparable harm.” Id. at 191.

In this case, Defendants’ infringement affords them unfettered use of the 

QUALITY® family of marks. This robs Plaintiff of any control or input into actions 

directly bearing on its reputation and goodwill. Plaintiff claims that this has

exposed and continues to expose it to irreparable injury. (Doc. 1, ¶ 97). The Court 

agrees. Moreover, Defendants continue to display Plaintiff’s trademarks at the 

Motel. At a minimum, Defendants’ display is sure to cause confusion because 

consumers have no reasonable means of establishing that the Motel is not affiliated 

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with Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has satisfactorily 

established irreparable injury.

The Court is also satisfied that Plaintiff has shown that no adequate remedy 

at law exists. “It is generally recognized in trademark infringement cases that [ ] 

there is not adequate remedy at law to redress infringement ....” Tally-Ho, Inc. v. 

Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1029 (11th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). In 

fact, a holdover franchisee’s continued use of a trademark establishes that money 

damages are inadequate. Hospitality Intern., Inc. v. Sitaram, Inc., 2013 WL 

6798927, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 23, 2013).

Considering the balance of hardships, it has been established that 

Defendants continue to operate the Motel under the QUALITY® family of marks. 

Plaintiff stands to lose goodwill so long as Defendants continue their infringement

since consumers could easily believe the Motel is affiliated with Plaintiff. Should 

consumers be dissatisfied with a stay at the Motel, they might provide a bad review 

or not stay with a QUALITY® family of marks franchise again. All along, Plaintiff 

would have no control over the outcome of a visit. In contrast, injunctive relief 

would not be focused on curtailing all operations of the Motel, just the unauthorized 

use of Plaintiff’s trademarks. Defendants have no right to operate under the 

QUALITY® family of marks, and “therefore could suffer no legitimate hardship by 

being forced to stop that which [they] ha[ve] no right to do.” Tiramisu Intern. LLC 

v. Clever Imports, LLC, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1288 (S.D. Fla. 2010). Therefore, the 

undersigned is satisfied the balance of hardships tips in favor of Plaintiff.

As to the final element, “the ‘public interest’ relevant to the issuance of a 

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permanent injunction is the public’s interest in avoiding unnecessary confusion.” 

Angel Flight, 522 F.3d at 1209. Prohibition of Defendants’ further use of Plaintiff’s 

trademarks will certainly benefit the public by eliminating any possible confusion 

regarding Defendants’ affiliation with the QUALITY® family of marks.

Given that Plaintiff has demonstrated all four elements, the Court finds that 

a permanent injunction foreclosing Defendants’ trademark infringement is, in fact, 

“the order of the day.” Angel Flight, 522 F.3d at 1209. Defendants are hereby 

permanently enjoined from use of the QUALITY® family of marks as set out below.3

2. Destruction of QUALITY® Family of Marks in Defendants’ Possession

Plaintiff requests that the Court issue an order requiring that Defendants 

destroy any item in their custody or control bearing the QUALITY® family of 

marks.4 (Doc. 16, p. 12). Under the Lanham Act, a court may order infringing 

items “delivered up and destroyed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1118. Of course, a prerequisite to 

such an order is that a plaintiff establish a valid claim of infringement. This 

prerequisite is established above. 

However, courts are reluctant to issue a destruction order when a plaintiff’s 

right against infringement is adequately protected by a permanent injunction. See

Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 85, 112 (D. Conn. 2014) (finding 

a destruction order unnecessary when a permanent injunction issues); Neva, Inc. v. 

Christian Duplications Int’l, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1533, 1549 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (same). 

 3 Therefore, the Court need not determine whether Plaintiff is due an injunction 

based on Count II or Count III.

4 Plaintiff requests destruction as part of the injunction, but as explained, 

destruction of infringing items is a separate remedy under the Lanham Act.

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This reluctance, however, is not without exception. “[W]hen a defendant has 

defaulted, an order pursuant to § 1118 may be issued in addition to a permanent 

injunction when necessary to protect plaintiff’s interest.” Diesel S.P.A. v. Does, 

2016 WL 96171, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2016) (ordering delivery and destruction of 

infringing products because “the [d]efendants ... failed to appear in th[e] action, and 

because th[e] [c]ourt ha[d] no assurance that [the] [d]efendants w[ould] comply with 

the terms of the permanent injunction”); S & S Brands, Inc. v. Seaford Stop & Shop 

Inc., 2014 WL 3871396, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2014) (“[B]ecause the defendant has 

defaulted, the court cannot determine the extent of destruction that may be 

necessary, and ... is unable to obtain representations from Defendant [ ] that [it] 

will comply with the injunction.”); Hammerhead Entertainment, LLC v. Ennis, 2011 

WL 2938488, at *10 (E.D. Va. July 19, 2011) (issuing a destruction order 

contemporaneously with an injunction when the defendant defaulted). 

Given Defendants’ default status, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s interests are 

more adequately protected with a permanent injunction and a § 1118 order.

Plaintiff, however, does not request that Defendants deliver up the infringing items

but merely asks for Defendants to destroy them. Given Defendants’ disregard for 

legal proceedings and ongoing infringement, the Court finds the more prudent 

measure is for Defendants to deliver up and Plaintiff ensure destruction. Therefore, 

a delivery and destruction order under § 1118 should issue. Plaintiff shall provide 

notice to the Court and Defendants unto whom delivery should be made. 

Defendants will have thirty (30) days from such notice to make delivery as set forth 

below.

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3. Profits and Damages

The registrant of a trademark who successfully establishes a defendant’s 

infringement of that mark is entitled, “subject to the provisions of sections 1111 and 

1114 ..., and subject to the principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant’s profits 

[and] (2) any damages ....” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Recovery for infringement is

“cumulative, that is, the court may award the registrant both its damages and the 

infringer’s profits.” Inmuno Vital, Inc. v. Golden Sun, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 

1362 (S.D. Fla. 1997). Section 1117 “confers upon the district court a wide scope of 

discretion to determine the proper relief due an injured party.” Burger King Corp. 

v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 1999). 

Presently, Plaintiff seeks to recover both damages and profits. But as 

Plaintiff points out, Defendants’ default status makes calculating either

problematic. To be sure, royalties cannot be properly calculated because 

Defendants have made unauthorized use of the QUALITY® family of marks from 

August 29, 2013 through at least July 22, 2016. So, Defendants must identify the 

date upon which they ceased use of the QUALITY® family of marks in order to 

calculate royalties. Additionally, without documentation from Defendants, there is 

no way to know what profits Defendants realized from their unauthorized use of the 

QUALITY® family of marks. Therefore, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a), the Court 

finds Defendants shall provide an accounting of gross profits and a declaration as to 

when they ceased using the QUALITY® family of marks in writing and under oath 

as set forth below.

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4. Costs and Attorneys’ Fees

As with damages, the Lanham Act allows a registrant who establishes a 

defendant’s trademark infringement to collect costs and attorneys’ fees. 15 U.S.C. § 

1117(a). With respect to attorneys’ fees, the statute specifies that a court may 

award them “in exceptional cases.” Id. “Exceptional cases are those where the 

infringing party acts in a malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful manner.” 

Planetary Motion, 261 F.3d at 1205 (citation omitted).

To begin with, the plain language of § 1117(a) makes clear that the higher 

standard for attorneys’ fees does not apply to costs. Plaintiff as the prevailing party 

is, therefore, due to recover qualifying costs incurred in this action. As to attorneys’

fees, Plaintiff has established that Defendants made unauthorized use of the 

QUALITY® family of marks. Defendants have had ample notice to cease use of the 

QUALITY® family of marks but persist in their unauthorized use. It is this 

continued use that demonstrates the deliberate and willful nature of Defendants’

infringement. Thus, Plaintiff, the prevailing party, is also entitled to reasonable 

attorneys’ fees. However, as Plaintiff points out, several matters remain 

unresolved. The total attorneys’ fees and costs are certain to change. The Court, 

therefore, reserves ruling on the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs due 

until a later time.

III. CONCLUSION

In consideration of the above, the Court hereby FINDS as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 18) is GRANTED.

2. A permanent injunction ISSUES as follows:

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a. Defendants, their officers, agents, employees, representatives, 

subsidiaries, successors, assigns, and any persons or entities in 

active concert or participation with Defendants, shall be and 

hereby are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED and restrained from 

using any of the QUALITY® family of marks as set forth in 

footnote 1 or any mark confusingly similar thereto in connection 

with the advertising, promotion, or sale of any product or 

service.

b. Defendants, their officers, agents, employees, representatives, 

subsidiaries, successors, assigns, and any persons or entities in 

active concert or participation with Defendants, shall be and 

hereby are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED and restrained from 

operating or doing business under any name or mark that is 

likely to give the impression that the Motel is licensed by 

Plaintiff.

c. Defendants are required to IMMEDIATELY remove any and all 

QUALITY® branded signs, placards, and source indicators from 

the Motel located at 1610 South Main Street, Atmore, Alabama 

36502. 

d. Within thirty (30) days of this Order, Defendants shall file with 

the Court and serve on counsel for Plaintiff a written statement 

made under oath setting forth all of the steps taken to comply 

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with this Order.5

3. Plaintiff is ORDERED to serve notice to Defendants where all items 

to be destroyed are to be delivered within ten (10) days of entry of this 

Order.

4. Defendants are ORDERED to deliver up to Plaintiff for destruction all 

items, products, labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, 

and/or advertisements in their possession or control bearing any of the 

QUALITY® family of marks as described in footnote 1 or any mark 

confusingly similar thereto within thirty (30) days of receiving service 

of notice from Plaintiff as to where such items are to be delivered.

5. Defendants are ORDERED to submit within thirty (30) days of this 

Order a report in writing and under oath setting forth the following: 

(1) the date upon which Defendants ceased use of the QUALITY® 

family of marks at the Motel and (2) an accounting of all gross profits 

received at the Motel from August 29, 2013 through the date 

Defendants ceased use of the QUALITY® family of marks. The parties 

shall notify the Court when said accounting is concluded. Upon 

conclusion of the accounting, the Court will order additional relief as 

the Court considers appropriate, at which time a final judgment will 

issue. Should the Court find a hearing necessary to determine the 

nature and amount of any damages or profits, the parties will be 

 5 Any writing herein required by Defendants need not be individually submitted by 

each Defendant but can be made by all acting in unison. 

Case 1:16-cv-00452-CG-B Document 20 Filed 11/09/16 Page 17 of 18
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notified.

The Clerk is directed to mail two copies of this Order, one by certified mail, 

return receipt requested, and the other by first class mail, to Defendants at the 

address where each received service of process, to wit: 

1. Key Hotels of Atmore II, LLC at 3960 Wimbledon Park, Mobile, AL 

36608;

2. Anand Patel at 3960 Wimbledon Park, Mobile, AL 36608; 

3. Dipan Patel at 6401 Canebrake Road, Mobile, Alabama 36695; and

4. Sarju Patel at 108 East Oak Ridge Place, Brewton, AL 36426.

DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of November, 2016.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:16-cv-00452-CG-B Document 20 Filed 11/09/16 Page 18 of 18