Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_04-cr-01291/USCOURTS-azd-3_04-cr-01291-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Delyne Benally
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Delyne Benally, 

Defendant/Movant

vs.

United States of America, 

Plaintiff/Respondent. 

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No. CR-04-1291-PCT-DGC 

 CV-07-8097-PCT-DGC (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter arises on Movant’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (docket # 98) Respondent has filed a Response. (docket #

103) Movant has not replied and the deadline has passed. 

I. Procedural Background

On December 16, 2004, a federal grand jury in the District of Arizona returned

an indictment charging Movant with one count of Assault with a Dangerous Instrument,

committed in Indian Country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1153 and 113(a)(3), and one count

of Assault Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury, committed in Indian Country, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1153 and 113(a)(6). On March 2, 2005, Movant filed a motion to dismiss Count

1 which the District Judge denied on April 4, 2005. (docket # 23)

On October 11, 2005, Movant’s jury trial commenced with voir dire. (docket # 

52) The trial lasted until October 14, 2005, when the jury acquitted Movant of Count 1 and

found him guilty of Count 2. (docket # 56; Respondents’ Exh. C, Tr. 10/14/05 at 3-4) On

October 20, 2005, counsel for the Government filed a notice of a telephone call from a juror

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indicating that the juror may have performed a background check on Movant in the course

of her employment, but she did not recall this until after she returned home after the trial. 

(docket # 55) Movant filed a motion for a new trial based on this information. (docket # 57)

On January 4, 2006, the District Judge held a hearing at which the juror testified

telephonically. (docket # 72) On January 6, 2006, the District Judge denied Movant’s

motion for a new trial. Movant was sentenced on January 9, 2006. (dockets ## 73, 75)

Movant’s counsel filed no objections to the presentence report and sentencing

recommendations, and Movant made no statements to the court on counsel’s advice. (docket

# 75; Respondent’s Exh. D, Tr. 1/9/06 at 3-5) Movant was committed to the custody of the

Bureau of Prisons for sixty months, to be followed by three years of supervised release. 

(docket # 75; Respondents’ Exh. D, Tr. 1/9/06 at 6; Respondents’ Exh. E) 

On January 10, 2006, Movant appealed his conviction to the Ninth Circuit

challenging the denial of his motion for a new trial. (docket # 74; Respondents’ Exh. F) On

November 15, 2006, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Movant’s conviction. 

(docket # 91)

Thereafter, Movant filed a motion for leave to file a second or successive petition

for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. (docket # 94) On October 1, 2007, the Court, noting

that Movant had never filed a first such motion, construed the motion as a Motion to Vacate

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and denied the motion with leave to amend. (docket # 97) On

October 16, 2007, Movant filed an Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct

Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (docket # 98) raising the following claims: 

(1) Ground One:

(a) counsel was ineffective because “the shirt as evidence was not

tested for DNA;”

(b) Criminal Investigator and Federal Marshal lied under oath about

recording an interview.

(c) The arresting officer lied under oath about entering the residence.

(d) Counsel was ineffective because he influenced Movant by being 

“super optimistic” about winning the case, and conveying that if the 

“higher [charge] was dropped so would the smaller one.”

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(2) Ground Two: The district judge had no witnesses at pretrial and

improperly depended on the probation officer at sentencing.

(docket # 98 at 5-6) Respondent asserts that Movant’s claims are procedurally defaulted or

lack merit. Movant has not filed a reply. Respondent concedes that the § 2255 Motion is

timely, therefore, the Court will not address this issue further. (docket # 103 at 3-4) 

II. Analysis

Movant raises several claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and trial

error. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that these claims are either

procedurally defaulted or lack merit.

A. Procedural Default

Movant did not raise any of his claims of trial error raised in Grounds 1(b), 1(c)

and Ground 2 on direct appeal, therefore, those claims are procedurally defaulted and barred

from review under § 2255. A § 2255 motion is not a substitute for a direct appeal. United

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982); United States v. Dunham, 767 F.2d 1395, 1396

(9th Cir. 1985)(stating that “[s]ection 2255 is not designed to provide criminal defendants

repeated opportunities to overturn their convictions on grounds which could have been

raised on direct appeal.”) The Ninth Circuit has held that: 

Section 2255 may not be invoked to relitigate questions which 

were or should have been raised on a direct appeal from the 

judgment of conviction . . .Or stated another way, grounds which 

were apparent when appellant appealed from his conviction, 

cannot, thereafter, be made the basis for an attack on a motion 

to set aside judgment and sentence.

Hammond v. United States, 408 F.2d 481, 483 (9th Cir. 1969) (internal citations omitted). 

“If a criminal defendant could have raised a claim of error on direct appeal but nonetheless

failed to do so, he must demonstrate both cause excusing his procedural default, and actual

prejudice resulting from the claim of error.” United States v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945

(9th Cir. 1993)(citing Frady, 456 U.S. at 168). “Once the defendant's chance to appeal has

been waived or exhausted, . . . [the court is] entitled to presume he stands fairly and finally

convicted, especially when . . . he already has had a fair opportunity to present his federal

claims to a federal forum.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 164. “Mere conclusory statements in a 

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§ 2255 motion are not enough to require a hearing.” United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190,

1194 (9th Cir.1980) (quotations omitted), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981).

The “cause and prejudice” standard requires the prisoner to show not only that

some “objective factor external to his defense” impeded his efforts to raise the issue as

required by the procedural rule, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991), but also

that the alleged error “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire

trial with error.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 170 (emphasis in original). Otherwise, the defendant

must prove a gross miscarriage of justice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986). 

On direct appeal, Movant did not raise his claims raised in Ground 1(b) and (c)

that the criminal investigator, Federal Marshal, and arresting officer lied under oath. 

(Respondents’ Exh. F) Likewise, Movant did not raise on direct appeal his claim raised in

Ground 2 that the district judge erred by not having witnesses at pretrial and improperly

relied on the probation department during sentencing. (Respondents’ Exh. F) 

Because Movant failed to raise these claims on direct appeal, he is precluded

from raising them in a § 2255 motion. Movant’s claims amount to nothing more than “mere

conclusory statement[s],” and Movant demonstrates neither cause excusing his procedural

default nor actual prejudice resulting from the claim of error. Hearst, 638 F.2d at 1194. 

Likewise, Movant has not shown that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will result if

these claims are not considered. In view of the procedural default, Movant’s claims raised

in Grounds 1(b) and 1(c), and Ground 2 should be denied. 

B. Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Movant properly raises his claims of ineffective assistance counsel in his § 2255

motion. See, United States v. McKenna, 326 F.3d 830, 845 (9th Cir. 2003)(stating that, as a

general rule, the Ninth Circuit does not review challenges to the effectiveness of defense

counsel on direct appeal). Movant claims that trial counsel was ineffective because: (1) he

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1 Movant’s first ground for relief can also be construed as arguing that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to the testimony of the Criminal Investigator, Federal Marshal,

and arresting officer who lied under oath. (docket # 98 at 5) Movant does not provide any

evidence or argument in support of his allegation that these witnesses lied or that counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to the testimony of the foregoing individuals. Movant’s

unsupported, conclusory allegations are not sufficient to support a claim for federal habeas

relief. See, Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th Cir. 1995)(stating that conclusory

allegations with no reference to the record or other evidence do not warrant habeas relief.)

Additionally, because Petitioner fails to allege specific facts showing prejudice, the

reasonableness of counsel’s representation is inconsequential. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,

60 (1985). 

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failed to test a shirt for DNA; and (2) counsel was “super-optimistic” about winning the

case, which influenced Movant.1

 (docket # 98 at 5) 

The controlling Supreme Court precedent on claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a defendant

must show that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and that counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced the petitioner. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d

1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999). To be deficient, counsel’s performance must fall “outside the

wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. When

reviewing counsel’s performance, the court engages a strong presumption that counsel

rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 690. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be

made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of

counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the

time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Review of counsel’s performance is “extremely

limited.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d on other

grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). Acts or omissions that “might be considered sound trial

strategy” do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, petitioner must also establish that he

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

691-92; United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2563 (2006)(stating

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that “a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation is not ‘complete’

until the defendant is prejudiced.”)(emphasis in original). To show prejudice, petitioner

must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Hart, 174

F.3d at 1069; Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 1998). The court may proceed

directly to the prejudice prong. Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1155 n. 3 (9th Cir.

2000)(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). The court, however, may not assume prejudice

solely from counsel’s allegedly deficient performance. Jackson, 211 F.3d at 1155.

1. Counsel’s Influence on Movant

Movant claims that counsel’s optimism about winning the case improperly

influenced Movant. (docket # 98 at 5) Movant does not provide any evidence in support of

this claim. Movant’s unsupported, conclusory allegations are not sufficient to support a

claim for federal habeas relief. See, Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th Cir.

1995)(stating that conclusory allegations with no reference to the record or other evidence

do not warrant habeas relief.) Additionally, because Petitioner fails to allege specific facts

showing prejudice, the reasonableness of counsel’s representation is inconsequential. Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985). 

2. DNA Testing

Movant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain DNA

testing of “the shirt.” (docket # 98 at 5) At trial, the victim’s mother, testified that while she

was cooking dinner on the evening of November 12, 2004, Movant, who had been drinking,

took the victim into the bedroom of the home where they lived with her parents and several

other children. The victim’s mother heard crying and went to the bedroom, but the door was

locked. (Respondents’ Exh. A, Tr. 10/11/05 at 184-188) She knocked for several minutes

before Movant opened the door. When the victim’s mother entered the bedroom, she

observed red marks on the victim’s face and blood on his nose. (Respondents’ Exh. A, Tr.

10/11/05 at 188-189) When the victim’s mother moved Movant’s discarded white t-shirt, she

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saw blood on a blanket and the floor. (Id. at 192-193) Movant had been wearing the white tshirt when he entered the bedroom but was wearing a different gray t-shirt when the victim’s

mother entered the bedroom. (Respondents’ Exh. A, Tr. 10/12/05 at 193) 

The next day, Criminal Investigator Joan Kerr went to Movant’s residence where

one of the victim’s older siblings showed her blankets, towels, and a t-shirt soaking in a tub. 

(Respondents’ Exh. B, Tr. 10/12/05 at 75) Criminal Investigator Kerr noticed blood on the

t-shirt, which she seized as evidence and submitted to the Department of Public Safety

(“DPS”) lab. (Respondents’ Exh. B, Tr. 10/12/05 at 75-76) Courtney Snyder of the DPS lab

tested the shirt and found that the blood on the t-shirt matched the victim’s blood. The

parties stipulated this into evidence. (Respondents’ Exh. B, Tr. 10/12/05 at 76) 

Movant claims that counsel was ineffective because the shirt was not tested for

DNA. Defense counsel has a “duty to make reasonable investigations or to make reasonable

decisions that make particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 

“This includes a duty to investigate the defendant’s ‘most important defense,’ . . . and a duty

adequately to investigate and introduce into evidence records that demonstrate factual

innocence, or that raise sufficient doubt on that question to undermine confidence on the

verdict . . . However, ‘the duty to investigate is not limitless . . . .’” Bragg v. Galaza, 242

F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001)(citations omitted.) Contrary to Movant’s assertion, the

record reflects that Movant’s shirt was DNA tested. Thus, there was no need for counsel to

conduct further investigation to establish what was already in the record. Movant does not

explain why defense counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain additional DNA testing

when the shirt had already been tested. The Government had the shirt tested for DNA, and

the blood found on the shirt matched the victim’s DNA. Movant stipulated to the results of

the DPS testing. (Respondents’ Exh. B, Tr. 10/12/05 at 76) Movant has not established that

counsel was deficient in failing to conduct further investigation of Movant’s shirt. 

Moreover, Movant has not shown that he suffered any prejudice as a result of counsel’s

allegedly deficient performance, accordingly, his claim of ineffective assistance fails. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 

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III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Movant’s allegations of trial error

are procedurally defaulted and that his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel lack merit. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Movant’s Amended Motion to

Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (docket # 98) be

DENIED. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party=s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 1st day of May, 2008.

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