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Parties Involved:
Phillip A. Parrish
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

PHILLIP A. PARRISH, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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FILED 

United State;.; Cc tn ol Appeals 

Tl?.tlt.h ch·r.-uit 

FEB 1 31991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-4001 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-68G) 

Ronald J. Yengich, Yengich, ·Rich, Xaiz & Metes, Salt Lake . City, 

Utah, for the Defendant-Appellant. 

Dee Benson, United States Attorney, and Tena Campbell, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Salt Lake City, Utah, for the PlaintiffAppellee. 

Before TACHA, and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and RO'.rTIHGHAM., 

District Judge.* 

TACBA, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant-appellant Phillip Parrish appeals a conviction of 

attempting to possess one kilogram of cocaine with intent to 

distribute in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 841(a)(l), using or 

carrying a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense 

in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 924(c)(1), and possessing 113.4 grams 

* Honorable Edward W. Nottingham, United States District Judge 

for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-4001 Document: 01019725799 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 1 
of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 

u.s.c. S 841(a)(l). Parrish contends the district court erred by: 

(1) denying a motion to suppress evidence found at his apartment 

because the underlying affidavit for the search warrant lacked 

probable cause, (2) finding the evidence was sufficient to support 

the jury's finding that he possessed cocaine with intent to 

distribute and used or carried a firearm in connection with a drug 

trafficking offense, (3) failing to sever Parrish's trial from 

that of his co-defendants, and (4) refusing to instruct the jury 

on the minimum mandatory sentences. We exercise jurisdiction 

under 28 u.s.c. S 1291 and affirm. 1 

On March 7, 1989, Morgan Sayee, an undercover agent with the 

Metropolitan Narcotics Task Force, purchased one ounce of cocaine 

from Laura Snell and her boyfriend, Greg Efron, at the Sunburst 

Apartments in Salt Lake City, Utah. Sayes purchased cocaine from 

Snell and Efron again on March 23. During this transaction, agent 

Sayes told Efron he was going to purchase five kilograms of 

cocaine and asked Efron if he would like to purchase two of them. 

Efron said he would contact his source to see if his source was 

interested. During a telephone conversation between Efron and 

Sayes on March 29, Sayes again indicated he would contact "his 

man" but believed his source would only want to purchase one 

kilogram. Efron told Sayes to call him back in an hour. 

1 After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-4001 Document: 01019725799 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 2 
When Sayes called later that evening, Efron told him to come 

over to the apartment. Sayes drove to the Sunburst Apartments 

followed at a distance by officers from the Metropolitan Narcotics 

Strike Force. When Sayes arrived at the apartment, he noticed the 

bedroom door was closed. Afte r some preliminary negotiations, 

Sayes insisted on examining the money before the transaction went 

any farther. Snell went into the bedroom, making sure the door 

was closed after her. She quickly returned with $14 , 870 in cash. 

After examining the money, Sayes told Efron and Snell he was 

going to get the cocaine. He then walked outside and signaled the 

officers to make the arrest. The officers entered the apartment 

and arrested Efron, Snell, and Parrish, who was hiding in a walkin closet in the bedroom. The officers found a loaded .45. caliber 

pistol on the shelf above Parrish within his reach. His name was 

scratched on the magazine of the pistol. The officers found a 

small amount of cocaine in the closet. In searching Efron 

incident to the arrest, the officers found a key to Parrish's 

apartment. They obtained a telephonic search warrant to search 

that apartment, where they found approximately one-quarter pound 

of cocaine. Although three adults were in Parrish's apartment 

when the officers arrived, none of them was arrested. 

A federal grand jury returned a multi-count indictment 

against Efron, Snell, and Parrish. All three ~ere tried jointly 

before a jury. Parrish was convicted of attempting to possess one 

kilogram of cocaine with intent to distribute, using and carrying 

a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense, and 

possessing 113.4 grams of cocai ne with intent to distribute. 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-4001 Document: 01019725799 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 3 
I. Probable Cause for the Search Warrant 

Probable cause to issue a warrant exists if there are 

"[s]ufficient facts ••• for a reasonably prudent person to 

believe that a search of the described premises would uncover 

evidence of a crime." United States Y...!.. Burns, 624 F.2d 95, 99 

(lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 449 u.s. 954 (1980). Our duty as a 

reviewing court is simply to ensure the magistrate had a 

substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed. Illinois 

Y...!.. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 

Here, the affidavit of Bill McCarthy of the Metropolitan 

Narcotics Strike Force states Efron told Sayes on the telephone he 

would take the cocaine from their transaction to the apartment of 

his source. The affidavit also states Parrish gave the address of 

his apartment to the officers when he was arrested. One of the 

officers present at the arrest, Detective Houseley, testified she 

recognized Parrish's name and address as that of a known narcotics 

trafficker subject to an on-going investigation. She explained 

she had been on a narcotics surveillance at his apartment. Based 

on this evidence, we are convinced the magistrate had a 

substantial basis for concluding there was probable cause for 

issuing the warrant. 

Parrish contends the affidavit is insufficient because it 

contains no specific information indicating evidence of a crime 

would be found at his apartment. In particular, he argues 

Houseley personally had not observed any drug trafficking. The 

mere fact an affidavit does not contain personal knowledge of 

illegal activity at the residence is not fatal to the 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-4001 Document: 01019725799 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 4 
determination of probable cause. See United States ~ Rahn, 511 

F.2d 290, 293 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 423 u.s. 825 (1975). We 

conclude McCarthy's affidavit established probable cause to 

believe cocaine would be found in Parrish's apartment because 

allegations in it would lead a reasonable person to believe 

evidence of a crime would be found. 

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Parrish also contends the evidence was insufficient to 

support the jury's finding that he possessed cocaine with intent 

to distribute and used or carried a firearm in connection with a 

drug trafficking offense. The evidence is sufficient if a 

reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. United States ~ Levario, 877 F.2d 1483, 1485 

(lOth Cir. 1989). We evaluate the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the government, pnited States ~Alonso, 790 F.2d 

1489, 1492 (lOth Cir. 1986), and make all reasonable inferences 

and credibility choices in favor of the jury's conclusions, United 

States~ Massey, 687 F.2d 1348, 1354 (lOth Cir. 1982). 

A. Possession of Cocaine with Intent to Distribute 

Parrish contends there was no evidence he actually possessed 

the cocaine found in his apartment. An individual has 

constructive possession of narcotics if he knowingly holds the 

power and ability to exercise dominion and control over the 

narcotics. United States ~Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 881 (lOth 

Cir. 1987). Exercising dominion and control over a residence 

where contraband is concealed may constitute constructive 

possession of the narcotics. See United States ~Morales, 868 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-4001 Document: 01019725799 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 5 
F.2d 1562, 1573 (11th Cir. 1989). Further, constructive 

possession may be established by circumstantial evidence. 

Culpepper, 834 F.2d at 882. The government, however, must show a 

sufficient nexus between the defendant and the narcotics. Id. 

Here, there is ample evidence to show Parrish exercised 

dominion and control over the apartment where the 113.4 grams of 

cocaine was concealed. This evidence also establishes a 

sufficient nexus between Parrish and the narcotics. When Parrish 

was arrested, he gave the address of this apartment as his own 

address. The government presented evidence that this apartment 

was rented to Parrish at the time of the arrest. Efron, the 

middleman, testified he had been to the apartment numerous times 

to purchase drugs from Parrish. The officers also found various 

documents with Parrish's name on them at the apartment. We are 

convinced there was sufficient evidence of constructive possession 

of the cocaine to find Parrish guilty of violating 

section B4l(a)(1). 

Parrish argues the fact that three adults were found at the 

apartment when the police arrived and that Efron had a key 

suggests there is insufficient evidence to conclude the cocaine 

did not belong to another person with access to the apartment. We 

disagree. Although it is possible to hypothesize from 

circumstantial evidence that another individual may have possessed 

the cocaine found at the apartment, the evidence required to 

support a verdict need not conclusively exclude every other 

reasonable hypothesis and need not negate all possi bilities except 

guilt. Alonso, 790 F.2d at 1493 (quoting United States ~Henry, 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-4001 Document: 01019725799 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 6 
468 F.2d 892, 894 (lOth Cir. 1972)). The evidence only must 

reasonably support the jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Culpepper, 834 F.2d at 881. 

Here, the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to 

conclude only Parrish exercised dominion and control over the 

apartment at the time of the arrest. The apartment had two 

bedrooms, but only one was occupied. The occupied bedroom had 

only one bed and the closet contained only male clothing, 

apparently of one size. Efron testified a woman had been living 

with Parrish at the apartment, but had recently moved out. It is 

clear from this evidence four people were not occupying that 

apartment. This conclusion is corroborated by the statements of 

the three other people present at the apartment when the police 

arrived. They stated they did not live at the apartment and only 

were there to clean the rug. 

Parrish also contends the evidence was insufficient to 

support a conviction for intent to distribute cocaine. We 

disagree. A large quantity of cocaine can be sufficient to 

support a judgment that a defendant intended to distribute the 

drug. See United States ~ Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1532 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 475 u.s. 1128 (1986). Here, the officers 

recovered packaging material, a scale for measuring cocaine, and 

113.4 grams of cocaine from Parrish's apartment. Based on the 

record, we hold the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury 

to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Parrish possessed and 

intended to distribute cocaine. 

Appellate Case: 90-4001 Document: 01019725799 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 7 
B. Using or Carrying a Firearm in Connect-ion with 

g Drug Trafficking Offense 

Parrish contends there was insufficient evidence to conclude 

he used and carried a firearm in connection with the drug 

trafficking offense. Although the indictment charged that Parrish 

used and carried a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking 

offense, he was convicted of carrying ~ using a firearm in 

connection with a drug trafficking offense in violation of 

section 924(c)(l). As we noted in United States~ Gunter, 546 

F.2d 861, 868-69 (lOth Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 u.s. 947 and 

431 U.S. 920 (1977), a "crime denounced in the statute 

disjunctively may be alleged in an indictment in the conjunctive, 

and thereafter proven in the disjunctive.~~ Thus, we will uphold 

the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to find Parrish 

either carried Q£ used a firearm in violation of section 924(c)(l) 

during the attempted drug transaction with Sayes on March 29. 

Because there is sufficient evidence of Parrish's use of the 

firearm, we do not consider whether the evidence also was 

sufficient to support a conviction under section 924(c) for 

carrying a firearm. 

In United States ~ McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669, 675 (lOth Cir. 

1989) (quoting United States v. Matra, 841 F.2d 837, 843 (8th Cir. 

1988)), we held the 11USe" element of section 924(c)(l) is 

satisfied when: (1) the defendant has .. ready access" to the 

firearm, and (2) the firearm was "an integral part of his criminal 

undertaking and its availability increased the likelihood that the 

criminal undertaking would succeed. " The "ready access 11 element 

requires evidence the firearm was avnilable to the defendant in 

8 

Appellate Case: 90-4001 Document: 01019725799 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 8 
the vicinity where the drug trafficking offense took place. see, 

~, United States ~ Moore, No. 89-3199, slip op. at 4 (lOth 

Cir. Nov. 29, 1990) (gun on shelf in bedroom closet and defendant 

in hal'lway sufficient evidence of availability); United States ll:.:.. 

Bullock, 914 F.2d 1413, 1416 (lOth Cir. 1990) (gun within a few 

feet of defendant when he was arrested); United States ll:.:.. CurhY, 

911 F.2d 72, 78-79 (8th Cir. 1990) (gun on floor of unoccupied 

bedroom); United States ll:.:.. Vasquez, 909 F.2d 235, 239 (7th Cir. 

1990) (guns in automobile trunk); United States~ Torres, 901 

F . 2d 205, 217 (2d Cir. 1990) (gun under mattress); United States 

ll:.:.. Evans, 888 F.2d 891, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (guns found with drug 

stash in defendant's apartment after his arrest for s e lling drugs 

on the street), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1325 (1990); United 

States v. Boyd, 885 F.2d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 1989) (gun in 

warehouse office near drug-making activity); United States ~ 

Poole, 878 F.2d 1389, 1393-94 (11th Cir. 1989) (guns in laundry 

room adjacent to kitchen and dining room where drugs and 

paraphernalia were located); United States~ Stewart, 779 F.2d 

538, 539 (9th Cir. 1985) (UZI rifle in trunk of car and defendant 

outside house), cert. denied, 484 u.s. 867 (1987). But see United 

States~ Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 597 (3d Cir. 1989) 

(weapons in trash can on porch insuffcient evidence of use because 

"mere availability of a firearm nearby, as distinguished from its 

open display, is [not] equal to use 'in relation' to an offense"). 

Here, the "ready access " element is satisfied because the 

loaded .45 caliber pistol was on the closet shelf right above 

Parrish. It clearly was within his reach while Efron and Snell 

9 

Appellate Case: 90-4001 Document: 01019725799 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 9 
were engaged in an attempted narcotics transaction on his behalf 

with Sayes. Moreover, the fact Parrish's name was scratched on 

the magazine of the pistol in combination with the location of the 

pistol makes it obvious the pistol was available for Parrish's 

use. We conclude Parrish had ready access to the firearm because 

it was available to him and in his vicinity during the attempted 

drug transaction. 

The second element of the McKinnell test requires a nexus 

between the readily accessible firearm and the drug trafficking 

offense. Firearms are used by narcotics dealers to protect 

themselves, their drugs, and their money. In this way guns 

facilitate the illegal drug activities. See, ~, United States 

~Williams, No. 89-6230, slip op. at 13 (lOth Cir. Dec. 26, 

1990); United States~ Drew, 894 F.2d 965, 968 (8th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 110 s. Ct. 1830 (1990); United States~ LaGuardia, 774 

F.2d 317, 319 (8th Cir. 1985). 2 As the Eighth Circuit has pointed 

out, the "mere presence and ready availability at a house where 

drugs are dealt" is sufficient to establish use of a firearm under 

section 924(c). LaGuardia, 774 F.2d at 319. The cases 

interpreting the requirements of section 924(c) evidence a 

presumption of a nexus between the firearm and offense when an 

individual with ready access to the f irearm i s involved in a drug 

trafficking offense. See, ~, United States ~ Curry, 911 F.2d 

2 The defendant in LaGuardia was convicted under an earlier 

version of section 924(c)(1) that prohibited the use o f a firearm "to commit any felony." Because the "use" element has remained 

the same under the current version of the statute, "the LaGuardia 

case retains precedential value." United States~ Matra, 841 

F.2d 837, 842 n.B (8th Cir. 1988). 

10 

Appellate Case: 90-4001 Document: 01019725799 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 10 
72, 79 (8th Cir. 1990); Evans, 888 F.2d at 896; Poole, 878 F.2d at 

1393. However, a defendant charged w 1'i .. h a drug trafficking 

offense may overcome this presumption by presenting some evidence 

suggesting the firearm was present for a reason other than 

facilitating the drug operation. See, ~, United States ~ 

Sullivan, Nos. 90-7005 et al., slip op. at 58-59 (lOth Cir. Nov. 

11, 1990) (defendant presented evidence indicating guns were part 

of someone else's gun collection). 

Here, the record shows the pistol was present at the 

apartment where Parrish and the others were dealing in drugs. The 

attempted exchange of large sums of illegal narcotics for cash 

indicates a likely connection between the firearm and this 

attempted transaction. As we noted above, there also was 

sufficient evidence of the availability of the pistol to Parrish. 

To rebut the presumption of a nexus between the firearm and the 

drug transaction, Parrish presented no evidence suggesting the 

pistol was present for any purpose other than facilitating the 

transaction. Parrish does not even allege the pistol belongs to 

someone else. Because both elements of the McKinnell test are 

satisfied here, we hold there was sufficient evidence to support 

the defendant's conviction for use of a firearm in violation of 

section 924(c)(l). 

III. Denial of Motion for Separate . Trials 

Parrish contends he should have been tried separately from 

his co-defendants because hearsay statements admitted into 

evidence against them unfairly prejudiced him. A decision to deny 

separate trials will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of 

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Appellate Case: 90-4001 Document: 01019725799 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 11 
discretion. United States ~Eaton, 485 F.2d 102, 106 (lOth Cir. 

1973). Abuse of discretion is shown when the joinder of 

defendants causes actual or threatened deprivation of an 

individual's right to a fair trial. United States ~ Petersen, 

611 F.2d 1313, 1331 (lOth Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 u.s. 905 

(1980). 

Parrish insists Sayes' statement that Efron told him he could 

not obtain cocaine from his source was improperly admitted hearsay 

that prejudiced him. However, the record reveals the trial judge 

deter.mined the statement was not hearsay because it was not 

offered for the truth of the matter asserted. We agree. 

Moreover, at the court's instruction, the government was careful 

to make no reference to Parrish when introducing this evidence . 

We cannot conclude the admission of the statement without 

reference to Parrish deprived him of a fair trial. 

Parrish also argues that the admission of Todd Cronin's 

statement that Efron had told him his drug supplier was upstairs 

asleep deprived him of a fair trial. In admitting this statement, 

the court advised the jury it was admissible only against Efron 

and should not be considered in rendering a verdict against 

Parrish. This limiting instruction was sufficient to protect 

Parrish from any impermissible prejudice. Because neither 

statement deprived Parrish of a fair trial, we _hold the district 

court did not abuse its discretion by not granting separate 

trials. 

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IV. Refusal to Instruct the Jury 

Regarding Mandatory Minimum Sentences 

Parrish contends the district court should have instructed 

the jury about the mandatory minimum sentences for his offenses. 

We disagree. Unless a statute specifically requires jury 

participation in determining punishment, the jury shall not be 

informed of the possible penalties. See United States ~ Greer, 

620 F.2d 1383, 1384-85 (lOth Cir. 1980). We hold a jury 

instruction about mandatory minimum sentences was properly omitted 

because the offenses do not specifically require jury 

participation in sentencing. We AFFIRM the defendant's 

conviction for attempted possession of cocaine with intent to 

distribute, using a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking 

offense, and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. 

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