Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-19-03154/USCOURTS-ca7-19-03154-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Altom Transport, Inc.
Appellee
Michael Stampley
Appellant

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 19-3154

MICHAEL STAMPLEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ALTOM TRANSPORT, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14-cv-03747 — Manish S. Shah, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED APRIL 9, 2020∗ — DECIDED MAY 1, 2020

____________________

Before BAUER, FLAUM, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. This case demonstrates the wisdom

of the old Russian proverb popularized by President Reagan:

“Trust, but verify.” Michael Stampley, the owner-operator of 

a tractor-trailer, provided hauling services for Altom 

∗ We have elected to decide this appeal without oral argument as the 

briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments. See

Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

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2 No. 19-3154

Transport, Inc. Altom agreed to pay Stampley 70% of the 

“gross” revenues that it collected for each load he hauled. Altom also agreed to give Stampley a copy of the “rated freight 

bill” or a “computer-generated document with the same information” to prove that it had properly paid Stampley for 

each load. Importantly, the contract granted Stampley the 

right to examine any underlying documents used to create a

computer-generated document. Regardless of whether 

Stampley exercised that right, however, the contract required 

him to bring any dispute regarding his pay within thirty days.

Several years after he hauled his last load for Altom, 

Stampley filed a putative class action lawsuit alleging that Altom had shortchanged him and similarly situated drivers by

not paying them a portion of the gross revenues it had collected on their loads. The district court eventually certified a

class and held that Altom’s withholdings had indeed violated 

the terms of the contract. However, concerned that the provision requiring all contests to his pay be made within thirty

days would bar his claim, Stampley moved for summary 

judgment on that issue before the class received notice. 

The district court subsequently denied Stampley’s motion 

for summary judgment and granted Altom’s motion to decertify the class. It also later granted Altom’s motion for summary judgment and held that Stampley’s individual claims 

were barred. Stampley now appeals both the district court’s 

decertification order and the entry of summary judgment for 

Altom. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

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I. Background

Stampley owns and operates his own semi-tractor. Altom 

is an interstate motor carrier that leased Stampley’s equipment and services during two separate periods, most recently

from September 2012 to March 2014. The Motor Carrier Act of 

1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793, and the regulations 

promulgated thereunder govern the relationship between 

owner-operators like Stampley and carriers such as Altom. 

Those rules required that the agreement between Stampley 

and Altom contain certain terms.

For example, 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(d) compels contracts between parties like Altom and Stampley to specify exactly how 

owner-operators like Stampley are to be paid. Specifically, the 

regulation directs:

[t]he amount to be paid by the authorized carrier for equipment and driver’s services shall be 

clearly stated on the face of the lease or in an addendum which is attached to the lease. ... The 

amount to be paid may be expressed as a percentage of gross revenue, a flat rate per mile, a 

variable rate depending on the direction traveled or the type of commodity transported, or 

by any other method of compensation mutually 

agreed upon by the parties to the lease....

Id.

Likewise, to allow drivers like Stampley to verify they received the right pay, § 376.12(g) (“the Truth-in-Leasing regulations” or “TIL”) requires carriers like Altom to supply drivers “a copy of the rated freight bill, or, in the case of contract 

carriers, any other form of documentation actually used for a 

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shipment containing the same information that would appear 

on a rated freight bill.” Id. § 376.12(g). The TIL also demand 

that drivers be permitted:

to examine copies of the carrier’s tariff or, in the 

case of contract carriers, other documents from 

which rates and charges are computed, provided that where rates and charges are computed from a contract of a contract carrier, only 

those portions of the contract containing the 

same information that would appear on a rated 

freight bill need be disclosed.

Id.

In light of these requirements, the parties’ contract guaranteed that Stampley would be paid 70% of gross revenues.

The contract also included the following provision, as required by the TIL:

In order that [Stampley] may verify the accuracy of all payments made pursuant to this 

Agreement, where payment is predicated upon 

a percentage of gross revenues, ALTOM 

TRANSPORT shall present [Stampley] with

copies of rated freight bills, or a computer-generated document containing all of the same information, for all shipments transported in or 

with Equipment leased pursuant to this Agreement. [Stampley] shall have the right to examine 

copies of ALTOM TRANSPORT’s tariffs or rate 

schedules at ALTOM TRANSPORT’s home office during reasonable business hours. In those 

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No. 19-3154 5

circumstances when [Stampley] is given a computer-generated document rather than a copy of 

a freight bill, [Stampley] shall have the right to 

examine the source document(s) from which 

such computer-generated information was 

compiled, under the same conditions. However, 

ALTOM TRANSPORT shall have the right to 

block out or obliterate all references on such 

freight bills, source document(s), tariffs and rate 

schedules as to the identity of customers, shippers and consignees. [Stampley] shall have 

thirty (30) days from receipt to contest, in writing, the information contained on any rated 

freight bill or computer-generated document. 

Following this thirty (30) day period, 

[Stampley] shall waive all rights to contest the 

validity or accuracy of any/all payments made 

pursuant to this Section 9.

Altom elected to equip Stampley with computer-generated documents, rather than copies of rated freight bills, for 

the entire period of the contract. None of the documentation, 

however, contained information regarding the tank washes 

that Altom charged its clients for.1 Likewise, the revenue from 

these tank washes was not included in the “gross” revenues

of which Stampley was entitled to receive 70%. Importantly,

however, Stampley never contested any of his pay within

thirty days of receiving the computer-generated documents

associated with each payment. Nonetheless, when he later 

1 A tanker-trailer carried all the loads that Stampley drove for Altom, 

which often must be washed before used to carry another load.

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discovered Altom’s omissions, Stampley filed this putative 

class action seeking to recover the additional pay.

At the same time he filed his complaint, Stampley moved

for class certification. Altom answered, denying the material 

grounds for liability and asserting its own counterclaim. 

Stampley answered Altom’s counterclaim and moved for 

summary judgment on the same claim a week later. Stampley

also filed a memorandum and multiple exhibits in support of 

his motion to certify a class at that time.

Several months later, Stampley filed a “renewed” motion 

for class certification that was identical in all material respects 

to the first. In view of that filing, the district court dismissed 

the first motion for class certification as moot. The case transferred from Judge Bucklo to Judge Shah less than a week later.

Judge Shah subsequently entered a minute order that, among 

other things, (1) ordered Stampley not to file any further class 

certification motions and (2) set a consolidated briefing schedule for the pending renewed motion for class certification and 

motion for summary judgment. The case then proceeded into 

fact discovery.

Shortly thereafter, Stampley moved to amend and limit 

the class definition to those owner-operators who hauled 

shipments “for which Altom collected payment for tank 

washes.” He explained that the tank wash amounts “ma[de]

up the overwhelming common issue to the class.” The court 

took this motion under advisement along with the two other 

pending motions, all of which it resolved in September 2015.

While it denied Stampley’s motion for summary judgment 

on Altom’s counterclaim, the district court granted the motion 

to certify the class in part, certifying the following class:

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No. 19-3154 7

All equipment owner-operators in the United

States who, during the period June 15, 2010 to 

the present, had or have owner-operator agreements that identify Altom Transport, Inc. as the 

carrier, hauled shipments pursuant to such 

agreements for which Altom collected payment 

for tank washes, and who did not object within 

30 days of payment for such hauls to the exclusion of the tank-wash funds from “gross.”

This remained the class definition until the court decertified 

the class in February 2018.

After Altom unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment on the grounds that “gross” excluded any money Altom 

received from tank-wash charges, it moved to decertify the 

class, arguing that given the question of whether “gross” included tank washes had been decided in Stampley’s favor, 

common issues no longer predominated in the case. All that 

was left, according to Altom, were individual determinations 

as to why each class member had not given notice during the 

required thirty-day period. Amid briefing on that motion, 

Stampley filed another motion for summary judgment asserting that the 30-day notice period did not apply at all. Altom

responded by noting that Stampley’s motion violated the rule 

against one-way intervention. Stampley subsequently moved 

to stay the briefing until after the class had received notice; 

however, the court denied the motion.

In February 2018, the court denied Stampley’s motion for 

summary judgment and granted Altom’s motion to decertify 

the class. After a motion for reconsideration and an attempt to 

substitute a new class representative failed, Altom moved for 

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summary judgment on Stampley’s individual claims. The district court granted that motion, denied a putative class member’s motion to intervene, entered judgment in Altom’s favor, 

and dismissed Altom’s counterclaim for lack of supplemental 

jurisdiction. Stampley now appeals, arguing that the district 

court abused its discretion by decertifying the class, and erred 

in granting Altom’s motion for summary judgment.

II. Discussion

As an initial matter, we review a district court’s grant of a 

motion for summary judgment de novo, interpreting all facts 

and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. O’Brien v. Caterpillar Inc., 900 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 

2018). Regarding decisions to certify or decertify a class, we 

review them for an abuse of discretion. See Payton v. Cty. of 

Carroll, 473 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2007). Such an abuse may 

occur “when a district court commits legal error or makes 

clearly erroneous factual findings.” Bell v. PNC Bank, Nat’l

Ass’n, 800 F.3d 360, 373 (7th Cir. 2015). “Our review is deferential, but exacting: ‘A class may only be certified if the trial 

court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites’ for class certification have been met.” Id. (quoting CE 

Design, Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 723 

(7th Cir. 2011)).

Decertification

Although Altom moved to decertify the class on a host of 

grounds, the district court elected to grant the motion only on 

the basis that Stampley was an inadequate class representative. Thus, we turn our attention to that question. 

It is well-established that a district court must find that 

“the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect 

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the interests of the class” before it may allow a case to proceed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). “A named plaintiff who has serious 

credibility problems or who is likely to devote too much attention to rebutting an individual defense may not be an adequate class representative.” CE Design Ltd., 637 F.3d at 726. 

Here, the district court focused on Stampley’s decision to 

move for summary judgment on whether the contract’s 30-

day dispute period barred his claim. The district court first 

noted, correctly, that Stampley’s decision to do so before notice had gone out to the class raised the specter that the class 

would have to be decertified pursuant to the rule of one-way 

intervention. See, e.g., Costello v. BeavEx, Inc., 810 F.3d 1045, 

1058 (7th Cir. 2016) (urging “plaintiffs to exercise caution 

when seeking a ruling on the merits of an individual plaintiff's claim before the district court has ruled on class certification”). The district judge then explained that, given those possible repercussions, he understood the motion as an attempt 

to expand the class by procuring a ruling that drivers like 

Stampley, who admitted that he had never attempted to contest his payments, did not in fact have to contest the payments 

within thirty days to proceed with the suit.2 Considering that 

fact, the court determined that Stampley no longer had any 

interest in representing the class as certified.

We cannot conclude that the representation finding was an 

abuse of discretion. The record shows that Stampley clearly 

focused on protecting his own claim against a contractual defense, rather than representing the class as constituted. In2 This was also supported by a discussion on the record at a status 

hearing.

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deed, the record consistently supports the district court’s understanding that the motion for summary judgment prior to 

class notice was an attempt to moot the need for that notice, 

taking into account that the class would be amended and expanded if Stampley had been successful. Thus, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in finding Stampley an inadequate class representative and decertifying the class. With 

that, we turn to the substance of Stampley’s summary judgment motion.

Summary Judgement

Although Stampley made multiple arguments before the 

district court as to why the 30-day dispute period did not bar 

his claim, the only question on appeal is whether or not the 

contract required Stampley to challenge his payments within 

thirty days of receiving them, even if the documents he received did not include all the information they were supposed 

to. The district court ruled that his failure to do so barred his 

claims.3 We agree.

“[T]he interpretation of an established written contract is 

generally a question of law for the court ....” Int’l Prod. Specialists, Inc. v. Schwing Am., Inc., 580 F.3d 587, 594 (7th Cir. 

2009). And we must interpret the contract according to the 

law of the state in which the contract was formed. See Bourke 

v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 159 F.3d 1032, 1036 (7th Cir. 1998). 

Here, there is no dispute that Illinois law therefore controls.

In Illinois, “[t]he primary objective in construing a contract 

is to give effect to the intent to the parties.” Gallagher v. Lenart, 

3 Stampley does not dispute that if his contractual claim is barred, his 

other claims are also barred given they derive from the contract.

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874 N.E.2d 43, 58 (Ill. 2007). We “must initially look to the language of a contract alone, as the language, given its plain and 

ordinary meaning, is the best indication of the parties’ intent.” 

Id. Similarly, “a contract must be construed as a whole, viewing each part in light of the others.” Id. 

In any contractual dispute, “the threshold inquiry is 

whether the contract is ambiguous.” Bourke, 159 F.3d at 1036 

(citing Ford v. Dovenmuehle Mortg. Inc., 651 N.E.2d 751, 755 (Ill. 

1995)). “A contract will be considered ambiguous if it is capable of being understood in more sense than one.” Farm Credit 

Bank of St. Louis v. Whitlock, 581 N.E.2d 664, 667 (Ill. 1991). 

“However, a contract is not rendered ambiguous merely because the parties disagree on its meaning.” Thompson v. Gordon, 948 N.E.2d 39, 48 (Ill. 2011). Importantly, we must resolve 

any ambiguity in a contract against the drafter—here, Altom. 

See Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 693 N.E.2d 358, 368 (Ill. 

1998). But we cannot read a contract provision into a nullity. 

See Thompson, 948 N.E.2d at 47 (“A court will not interpret a 

contract in a manner that would nullify or render provisions 

meaningless, or in a way that is contrary to the plain and obvious meaning of the language used.”). We now address the 

parties’ contract.

Within 15 days of Stampley’s submission of the necessary 

documents, Altom was “to settle with [Stampley] with respect 

to services provided under this Agreement.” To ensure that 

Stampley could verify the accuracy of all payments to him—

and as required by the TIL, see 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(g)—the contract contained a provision (“the Inspection Clause”) that 

specified:

where payment is predicated upon a percentage 

of gross revenues, ALTOM TRANSPORT shall 

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12 No. 19-3154

present [Stampley] with copies of rated freight 

bills, or a computer-generated document containing all of the same information, for all shipments transported in or with Equipment leased 

pursuant to this Agreement. ... In those circumstances when [Stampley] is given a computergenerated document rather than a copy of a 

freight bill, [Stampley] shall have the right to examine the source document(s) from which such 

computer-generated information was compiled 

[at ALTOM TRANSPORT’s home office during 

reasonable business hours.]

That said, the contract also contained a provision (the “30-

Day Clause”) that put a limit on Stampley’s ability to contest 

any payment made to him:

[Stampley] shall have thirty (30) days from receipt to contest, in writing, the information contained on any rated freight bill or computergenerated document. Following this (30) day 

period, [Stampley] shall waive all rights to contest the validity or accuracy of any/all payments 

made pursuant to Section 9.

Stampley only ever received computer-generated documents with his pay and never disputed or requested to view 

the source documents within thirty days. Thus, Stampley may 

only proceed with his claim if the 30-Day Clause does not apply to bar his claim.

Unlike as he did below, Stampley does not argue that the 

30-Day Clause is unconscionable and therefore void on public 

policy grounds. Rather, he argues only that, because of the 

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No. 19-3154 13

context of the contract’s language and the TIL under whose 

shadow it was bargained, the 30-Day Clause cannot apply,

seeing that Altom did not deliver a computer-generated document “containing all of the same information” as the rated 

freight bill, i.e. they omitted the tank wash charges Altom collected.

At first glance, there appear to be two different ways to 

read the contract. The first way, which Stampley champions, 

reads the 30-Day Clause to mean that the 30-day dispute period only begins once Altom furnishes Stampley with the 

rated freight bill or a computer-generated document containing exactly the same information as the rated freight bill submitted to Altom’s client, with a few specific exceptions. With 

respect to the specific language of the contract, it would have 

us add “containing all the same information” after “document” in the 30-Day Clause. By contrast, the view advanced 

by Altom and adopted by the district court reads the 30-Day 

Clause as beginning to run as soon as Stampley receives any 

“rated freight bill” or any “computer-generated document,” 

regardless of whether or not the computer-generated document reflects exactly the same information as the rated freight 

bill.

Stampley urges us to pick the first, contending that his 

reading is consistent with the rest of the contract, as well as 

the TIL. The problem with Stampley’s view is that it would 

essentially eviscerate the 30-Day Clause. Under Stampley’s

approach, even the slightest change from the rated freight 

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bill4 to the computer-generated document—even a scrivener’s 

error—would leave the 30-Day Clause inapplicable and allow 

Stampley to challenge his pay at any time.

We cannot analyze a contract to annul any part of it, so we 

must read the 30-Day Clause such that the 30-day period began to run as soon as Stampley received any computer-generated document purporting to have the same information as 

the rated freight bill would have. Indeed, the plain language 

of the 30-Day Clause calls for the same result. It states that it 

applies to “any/all payments made pursuant to Section 9,” 

necessarily including those paid in conjunction with 

Stampley’s receipt of a computer-generated document that 

lacked the same information as the rated freight bill.

This result allies with our recent decision in Mervyn v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., which held that a similar clause—“Financial 

entries made by Ace on payment documents shall be conclusively presumed correct if not disputed by Mervyn within 30 

days after distribution”—barred the driver from later disputing his payments, despite his contention that they contained 

inaccurate information. 882 F.3d 680, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2018)

(brackets omitted). We agree with the district court that “the 

parties bargained for a limited window of time to have payment disputes and [Stampley] was bound to that bargain” regardless of whether the computer-generated document 

Stampley received contained all the information within the 

rated freight bill. Stampley’s counterarguments are unpersuasive.

4 “Rated freight bill” is a term that neither the contract nor TIL ever 

defines but appears to be colloquially understood as referring to the total 

invoice submitted to Altom’s customers.

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First, Altom’s provision of an insufficient computer-generated document neither prevented Stampley from exercising 

his right under the Inspection Clause to examine the underlying documents, nor from challenging his payments. The Inspection Clause allowed Stampley to ensure that his payments included 70% of all the charges Altom collected for 

each load, not just 70% of what Altom claimed he was entitled 

to collect from. Indeed, that aligns with the goal of the Truthin-Leasing regulations, which were enacted “to promote the 

stability and economic welfare of the independent trucker 

segment of the motor carrier industry, and to eliminate or reduce opportunities for skimming and other illegal practices.” 

Lease and Interchange of Vehicles, 43 Fed. Reg. 29,812 (July 

11, 1978).

Thus, although Altom certainly had an obligation to provide Stampley with an appropriate computer-generated document, Stampley had the ability to verify that document and

the obligation to raise any disputes to his pay within thirty

days. Stampley could therefore either simply trust the documents he received or inspect the underlying documents to verify they were correct. The record and his argument on appeal

demonstrates that Stampley knew the tank washes were taking place, and consequently could have verified whether they 

were included in his pay by reviewing the underlying documents as he was entitled to. At that point, he could have challenged their exclusion, so long as he did so within thirty days 

of each payment.5 By choosing simply to trust the documents 

5 But, as we suggest infra, if those underlying documents were fabricated or altered to mislead Stampley, that would likely significantly 

change our analysis. Nothing in the record before us, however, indicates 

fraud here.

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he received, and not to verify them, or to challenge the exclusion of tank wash funds from his payments until long after 

the 30-day period expired, Stampley has forfeited his opportunity to do so now.

Second, because Stampley admits that he never requested 

the underlying documentation for any of the computer-generated documents he received, the hypothetical situation in 

which Altom would have brought him the wrong documents 

even if he had asked for them cannot save his claim. If Altom 

had in fact given Stampley insufficient or altered documents 

after he invoked his rights under the Inspection Clause, that 

fraud could be grounds for excusing his failure to exercise his 

right to challenge the payment within thirty days. But those 

are not the facts here, and a hypothetical situation without 

support in the record cannot save Stampley’s claim now.

Third, and finally, nothing in the Truth-in-Leasing regulations militates a different result. As noted above, the TIL were

designed to reduce the power imbalance between interstate 

carriers and owner-operators. While the contract appears to 

be weighted heavily in Altom’s favor, it is not unconscionable. 

The contract gave Stampley thirty days to contest any payment he received, and while that is not long, Stampley has 

abandoned any argument that the period is unconscionable. 

Similarly, nothing about the contract or Altom’s payments to 

Stampley suggests that Altom was making a provisional payment to Stampley. Altom paid what it believed it owed 

Stampley, without condition. Stampley then had 30 days to 

check that payment was correct, and if he believed it was not, 

to challenge it in writing. The fact that he later realized Altom 

should have been paying him for the tank washes it charged 

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No. 19-3154 17

its customers for under the contract does not change our conclusion.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district court’s 

decertification order and entry of summary judgment for Altom.

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