Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-01432/USCOURTS-caDC-01-01432-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
California Nurses Association
Intervenor
Community Hospitals of Central California
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 9, 2002 Decided July 25, 2003

No. 01-1432

COMMUNITY HOSPITALS OF CENTRAL CALIFORNIA,

D/B/A UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

CALIFORNIA NURSES ASSOCIATION,

INTERVENOR

On Petition for Review and Cross–Application

for Enforcement of an Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

G. Roger King argued the cause for petitioner. With him

on the brief was Daniel H. Bromberg.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #01-1432 Document #762785 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 1 of 16
2

James M. Oleske, Jr., Attorney, National Labor Relations

Board, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the

brief were Arthur F. Rosenfeld, General Counsel, John H.

Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong,

Deputy Associate General Counsel, and David Habenstreit,

Supervisory Attorney. Anne M. Lofaso, Attorney, entered

an appearance.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and ROGERS and TATEL,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Chief Judge: A union representing nurses

charged the new owner of a hospital with an unfair labor

practice when it refused to recognize and to bargain with the

union. The National Labor Relations Board held the new

owner was a successor employer, the nurses at the hospital

constituted an appropriate bargaining unit, and the employer,

in declining to deal with the union, did not rely upon a goodfaith reasonable doubt about the union’s majority status. The

Board also held certain provisions of the employer’s handbook

for employees likely to chill protected activity and therefore

unlawful. We uphold the decision of the Board and grant its

application for enforcement with respect to all matters except

the employee handbook, as to which we grant the employer’s

petition for review.

I. Background

For some years Community Hospitals of Central California

(Community), a private non-profit company, operated two

hospitals in the Fresno, California area, while the County of

Fresno operated Valley Medical Center (VMC) and other

medical facilities in the County. Nurses working at VMC

were the majority of bargaining Unit 7, which included nurses

at other facilities operated by the County. Unit 7 was

represented by the California Nurses Association (CNA or

the Union) for more than 20 years.

In October 1996 Community acquired VMC and renamed it

University Medical Center (UMC). In connection with the

USCA Case #01-1432 Document #762785 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 2 of 16
3

acquisition, Community instituted various changes at UMC.

In brief, Community consolidated many administrative and

support services with those of its other hospital facilities, and

by its own account ‘‘replaced VMC’s traditional, hierarchical

facility-based management model with a flattened, servicebased system-wide ‘shared governance’ management structure.’’ Community also allowed nurses to transfer between

UMC and its other facilities.

In August 1996, when it was becoming apparent that

Community might acquire VMC, the Union demanded that

Community recognize and bargain with it. Community acknowledged receipt of the demand, but refused to recognize

or to bargain with the Union. The Union filed an unfair labor

practice charge and the General Counsel issued a complaint

alleging that Community had violated § 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). The Regional

Director on his own initiative added an allegation that the

maintenance of certain provisions in Community’s employee

handbook was an unfair labor practice in violation of § 8(a)(1)

of the Act.

An Administrative Law Judge held (1) Community was a

successor employer to the County, contrary to Community’s

argument that there was not ‘‘substantial continuity’’ between

VMC and UMC; (2) the Unit 7 nurses at UMC constituted an

appropriate bargaining unit, notwithstanding Community’s

argument that the Unit 7 nurses at UMC shared a community of interest with the nurses at its other hospitals; and (3) in

failing to recognize the Union, Community did not have or

rely upon a good-faith reasonable doubt regarding the Union’s majority status. Cmty. Hosps. of Cent. Cal., 335

N.L.R.B. No. 87, at 15–24 (2001) (Order). The ALJ also held

that (4) Community’s handbook violated the Act, as alleged.

Id. at 24–25. The Board affirmed and substantially adopted

the findings and decision of the ALJ,* id. at 1–6, over

* The Board held Community was required by the ‘‘successor bar

rule’’ of St. Elizabeth Manor, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 341, 344 (1999), to

bargain with the Union for a reasonable period of time, regardless

of any doubt or actual evidence it may have had regarding the

USCA Case #01-1432 Document #762785 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 3 of 16
4

Chairman Hurtgen’s dissent with regard to the employee

handbook issue. Id. at 6–9.

II. Analysis

‘‘A [1] successor employer is required to recognize and

negotiate with the bargaining agent of the predecessor’s

employees if [2] the bargaining unit remains appropriate and

[3] the successor does not have a good faith doubt of the

union’s continuing majority support.’’ Trident Seafoods, Inc.

v. NLRB, 101 F.3d 111, 114 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Community

challenges the Board’s application of each element in this

formula, arguing (1) it was not a successor employer; (2) Unit

7 was not an appropriate bargaining unit after the acquisition;

and (3) Community did have and did rely upon a good-faith

reasonable doubt in refusing to recognize or to bargain with

the Union. Community also claims the Board lacked jurisdiction to rule upon the propriety of its employee handbook, and

that in any event the relevant provisions were not unlawful.

We must affirm the Board’s order unless ‘‘the Board’s

[factual] findings are not supported by substantial evidence,

or TTT the Board acted arbitrarily or otherwise erred in

applying established law to the facts of the case.’’ Tradesmen Int’l, Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1137, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

Questions of law we review with deference to the Board’s

expertise. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822,

829 (1984).

A. Successorship

A new employer is a successor to a former employer ‘‘if

there is substantial continuity between the enterprises’’ of the

two, Pa. Transformer Tech., Inc. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 217, 222

(D.C. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The

Union’s majority status. Order at 2. The Board has since overruled St. Elizabeth Manor. See MV Transp., 337 N.L.R.B. No. 129

(2002). The General Counsel therefore does not pursue the point,

relying instead upon the Board’s alternate holding that Community

did not have or rely upon a good-faith reasonable doubt about the

Union’s majority status. Order at 2.

USCA Case #01-1432 Document #762785 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 4 of 16
5

Board’s standard for determining substantial continuity is set

forth in Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482

U.S. 27, 43 (1987). There the Court stated with approval the

factors the Board uses:

whether the business of both employers is essentially the

same; whether the employees of the new company are

doing the same jobs in the same working conditions

under the same supervisors; and whether the new entity

has the same production process, produces the same

products, and basically has the same body of customers.

The Board assesses these factors, no single one of which is

dispositive, from the perspective of the employees involved.

Id. In this case the Board found Community ‘‘operates an

acute care health facility, in the same location, using essentially the same equipment [as had the County]. The general

pool of patients remains the same and they are treated in the

same [treatment units].’’ Order at 15. Furthermore, there

was no hiatus between the closing of VMC and the opening of

UMC, id., and the two organizations employed many of the

same supervisors. Id. at 16.

In arguing it was not a successor employer, Community

does not deny the factual predicate upon which the Board

based its decision. Instead it identifies a number of facts it

claims cut against the Board’s finding of substantial continuity: the change from public to private management; the new

supervisory and management structure; changes in the

duties, compensation, and benefits of the nurses at the hospital; changes in the nurses’ shift schedules and in the organization of support functions; and the adoption of a ‘‘partner

model’’ of patient care.

The Board’s decision is nonetheless supported by substantial evidence. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340

U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (‘‘The substantiality of evidence must

take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from

its weight’’). The Board reasonably found that the nurses at

UMC continued to do the same jobs, in the same location,

using the same equipment, and treating the same patients as

they had before the acquisition, and that the nature of the

USCA Case #01-1432 Document #762785 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 5 of 16
6

employer’s business – an acute health care facility – remained

the same. Moreover, the Board’s decision is in accord with

precedent. See Asseo v. Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc., 900

F.2d 445, 451 (1st Cir. 1990) (successor where hospital is

‘‘engaged in the same business of providing health care

services to substantially the same community’’ as had predecessor and employees ‘‘perform substantially the same functions’’); NLRB v. New Medico Health Care Ctr. of Mich.,

Inc., No. 91–5271, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 30424, at *8–9 (6th

Cir. Dec. 20, 1991) (unpublished, per curiam) (substantial

evidence of continuity where nursing care center continued

‘‘uninterrupted and in the same facility,’’ ‘‘[e]mployees [sic]

responsibilities remained the same,’’ and new employer ‘‘continued to care for the same patients without a substantial

change in operation’’); NRNH, Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. 300, 2000

NLRB LEXIS 652, at *37 (2000) (substantial continuity found

where ‘‘entities engaged in the same business, long-term

nursing care,’’ providing for the same patients in same building under ‘‘almost all of the same supervisors’’); Hosp. San

Francisco, Inc., 293 N.L.R.B. 171, 172, 1989 NLRB LEXIS

129, at *8 (1989) (similar).

The change from public to private ownership of the hospital

does not undermine the Board’s finding that Community was

a successor. For the contrary proposition, Community invokes Lincoln Park Zoological Society v. NLRB, 116 F.3d

216, 220 (7th Cir. 1997), in which the court observed that

‘‘there is a readily apparent contrast between a large public

employer TTT and a relatively small private entity.’’ The

contrast was apparent on the facts of that case because ‘‘the

represented workforce was diminished by 97 percent’’ and,

the court speculated, ‘‘hiring and firing practices, as well as

pay and benefit packages, may be different under a closely

managed private entity.’’ Initially we note that because the

successorship issue was undisputed in Lincoln Park Zoological Society, these statements are dicta. Even if they were

not dicta, they clearly would not be applicable in this case.

Here there was no significant change in the size of the

workforce. Community identifies no evidence in the record

USCA Case #01-1432 Document #762785 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 6 of 16
7

to distinguish between itself and the County with respect to

hiring and firing practices.

Nor do the changes in hours, wages, benefits, and management to which Community points cast doubt upon the Board’s

finding of substantial continuity. See Harter Tomato Prods.

Co. v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 934, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (changes in

‘‘size, wages, benefits, training, customer base, managerial

philosophy, and supplier contracts’’ do not preclude finding of

substantial continuity when other factors support continuity);

United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, Local 152,

768 F.2d 1463, 1473–74 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (change of some

managerial and supervisory personnel, reduced number of

shifts, and minor modifications in production and job assignments did not support Board’s finding lack of continuity).

Likewise, the types of changes in working conditions Community claims to have made are consistent with a finding of

substantial continuity. See Pa. Transformer, 254 F.3d at 223

(significant reduction in number of ‘‘job classifications’’ and

increase in ‘‘employee responsibility and flexibility’’ not controlling when ‘‘employees continue to do the same workTTTT

us[ing] the same skills and expertise’’).

Community contends the change it made in the patient care

model used at the hospital instituted a new ‘‘production

process’’ within the meaning of the Fall River Dyeing test.

We disagree. The critical point, as the Board notes in its

brief, is that the hospital ‘‘continued to function as a fullservice, acute-care hospital where registered nurses used the

same skills and equipment to provide care for the same

general patient population.’’ In sum, the nurses are doing

substantially the same work; only their reporting and supervisory structure has changed. We do not think that amounts

to a change in the ‘‘production process.’’

B. Bargaining Unit

In reviewing the Board’s selection of a bargaining unit, we

are mindful that ‘‘the Board need only select an appropriate

unit, not the most appropriate unit.’’ Serramonte Oldsmobile,

Inc. v. NLRB, 86 F.3d 227, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In addition,

the Board’s decision in this case is bolstered by two presumpUSCA Case #01-1432 Document #762785 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 7 of 16
8

tions. First, a bargaining unit limited to a single facility is

presumptively appropriate. Manor Healthcare Corp., 285

N.L.R.B. 224, 224–25 (1987). This presumption may be rebutted by a showing based upon such factors as ‘‘geographic

proximity, employee interchange and transfer, functional integration, administrative centralization, common supervision,

and bargaining history.’’ W. Jersey Health Sys., 293

N.L.R.B. 749, 751 (1989). Second, a group of employees with

a significant history of representation by a particular union

presumptively constitute an appropriate bargaining unit.

Trident Seafoods, 101 F.3d at 118. To rebut this presumption requires a showing of ‘‘compelling circumstances’’ sufficient to ‘‘overcome the significance of bargaining history.’’

Children’s Hosp. of San Francisco, 312 N.L.R.B. 920, 929

(1993) (ALJ opinion); see Defereit Paper Co. v. NLRB, 235

F.3d 581, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The Board relied upon these

two presumptions, Order at 1, 18–20, in determining that a

bargaining unit consisting of the former Unit 7 nurses at the

hospital was appropriate.

Community argues first that the presumptions do not apply

in this case because there never was a bargaining unit

consisting only of Unit 7 nurses at the hospital; Unit 7

comprised nurses both at VMC and at other County-operated

facilities. Second, Community claims a bargaining unit consisting only of the Unit 7 nurses located at UMC is not

appropriate, and any presumption to the contrary is rebutted,

because it has ‘‘fully integrated’’ UMC into its other operations. In support of the latter point, the employer relies upon

(1) the geographic proximity of UMC to Community’s other

facilities; (2) the ‘‘great deal of employee interchange among

[its] facilities’’; (3) its ‘‘integrated management structure’’

with ‘‘system-wide managerial responsibilities’’ and centralized administrative support; and (4) the elimination of certain

service functions at UMC, which according to Community,

means that a work stoppage at one of its facilities could ‘‘have

a significant adverse impact upon the continuity of patient

care’’ at the other facilities.

Community’s first argument would have us distinguish

between a previously recognized bargaining unit and a subset

USCA Case #01-1432 Document #762785 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 8 of 16
9

of such a bargaining unit, limiting the presumption of appropriateness to the former. Community provides no authority

for this distinction and, as the Board points out in its brief, it

is inconsistent with our precedent. See Int’l Union of Elec.,

Radio & Mach. Workers, AFL–CIO–CLC, 604 F.2d 689, 696

(D.C. Cir. 1979) (affirming Board’s finding subset of historic

bargaining unit has relevant bargaining history).

That takes us to the question whether the evidence that

Community had fully integrated UMC’s operations with those

of its other facilities is sufficient to rebut the twin presumptions. We readily conclude it is not because we find persuasive Board precedent precisely on point. In Children’s Hospital of San Francisco two hospitals had merged. The

nurses at Children’s Hospital had long been represented by

the CNA as part of a multi-employer unit. 312 N.L.R.B. at

921 & n.2. After the merger, the employer centralized and

consolidated many administrative, management, and training

functions, and equalized wages and benefits across the two

hospitals. Id. at 923–26. It also withdrew recognition from

the CNA on the ground that, because the greater number of

nurses were at the other hospital, and they were not unionized, the CNA no longer enjoyed majority status. Id. at 924.

The Board held that the nurses at Children’s Hospital alone

were an appropriate bargaining unit:

Children’s Hospital had a single facility employing registered nurses, and it dealt continuously with the Union as

the representative of those nurses in that facility. That

long term relationship was reasonably relied on by the

[ALJ] in finding that — where the proffered unit choices

are a unit consisting of the facility in which the bargaining relationship had existed and a unit encompassing that

facility and another which lacked a similar bargaining

history — the single facility is an appropriate unit.

Id. at 920. The same is true in this case.

C. Good Faith Reasonable Doubt

Community raised as an affirmative defense that its refusal

to bargain with the Union was based upon its good-faith

USCA Case #01-1432 Document #762785 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 9 of 16
10

reasonable doubt about the Union’s majority status. A goodfaith doubt is ‘‘a genuine, reasonable uncertainty about

whether [the Union] enjoy[s] the continuing support of a

majority of unit employees.’’ Allentown Mack Sales & Serv.,

Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 367 (1998); see Order at 21. The

employer has the burden of proof on this issue, Scepter, Inc.

v. NLRB, 280 F.3d 1053, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2002), and it must

prove not only that it had such a doubt but also that it

refused to recognize the union upon the basis of that doubt.

Miller Waste Mills, Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. 466, 2001 NLRB

LEXIS 485, at *18 (2001).

The ALJ, relying heavily upon Community’s failure to

respond to the General Counsel’s subpoena calling for documents relating to its claim of a good-faith reasonable doubt,

Order at 23, 18, found that (1) Community did not act in good

faith; (2) any doubt it had was not well-founded and was

unreasonable; and in any event (3) Community did not rely

upon such a doubt in refusing to recognize the Union. Id. at

21–24. Community claims each of these findings was erroneous.

We think the Board reasonably concluded Community

failed to demonstrate that, when it refused to bargain with

the Union, it relied upon such doubt as it may have had about

the Union’s majority status. That is reason enough to hold

the employer committed an unfair labor practice; we need

not concern ourselves with Community’s first two claims of

error.

Community disputes the ALJ’s finding that ‘‘the record

fails to demonstrate who made the decision [not to recognize

and bargain with the Union] and why it was made.’’ Order at

23. According to the employer, ‘‘the undisputed record evidence demonstrates that [its] Board of Directors TTT decided

not to recognize and bargain with CNA after receiving input

from [a committee formed to study the issue] and outside

counsel.’’ Community points to a host of evidence it claims

demonstrates that its decision was based upon its doubts

about the Union’s majority status. Although a great deal of

that evidence arguably supports its contention that a goodUSCA Case #01-1432 Document #762785 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 10 of 16
11

faith doubt would have been reasonable in the circumstances,

none of it shows that its decision in fact was based upon such

a doubt. For example, the testimony of nurses working at

UMC that they and many of their co-workers were dissatisfied with the Union, while relevant to whether those nurses

may have doubted the Union’s majority status, is not relevant

to the inquiry whether the employer made its decision based

upon any such doubt.

Although Community contends that the decision not to

recognize the Union was made by its board of directors, there

is no direct evidence in the record indicating when, how, or

even whether the directors made such a decision, or indeed

ever considered the matter. In the absence of any such

evidence, which is peculiarly within Community’s control –

and which the General Counsel had subpoenaed – the ALJ

was justified in inferring that if produced, the evidence would

have been unfavorable to the employer. Cf. United States v.

Young, 463 F.2d 934, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (‘‘if a party has it

peculiarly within his power to produce witnesses whose testimony would elucidate the transaction, the fact that he does

not do it permits an inference that the testimony, if produced,

would have been unfavorable’’). Community argues that

inference was inappropriate because the General Counsel

neither responded to its attempts to negotiate a mutually

agreeable redaction of documents responsive to the subpoena

nor sought enforcement of the subpoena. The ALJ would

have been justified in drawing the adverse inference, however, even if no subpoena had been issued. Moreover, the

result would have been the same even if he had not drawn the

inference. Community had the burden of showing it relied

upon a good-faith reasonable doubt; absent evidence of its

reliance, the ALJ had no need of an adverse inference to find

the employer did not meet its burden of proof.

Community objects that by demanding information about

its decision the Board was seeking to pry into the internal

deliberations of its directors and to require it to disclose

assertedly privileged documents. We find this argument

singularly unpersuasive. Initially we note that a party holding privileged information that could establish a claim or

USCA Case #01-1432 Document #762785 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 11 of 16
12

defense as to which it has the burden of proof always faces

the difficult choice whether to produce that information.

Moreover, Community’s problem in this case is entirely of its

own making; the only reason the proceedings of its board of

directors are at issue is that it never responded to the CNA’s

request to bargain by explaining that it doubted the Union’s

majority status.

Instead of providing direct evidence of a decision by its

board of directors, Community points to testimony by members of an ad hoc committee it formed to determine whether

to recognize the Union, and claims the full board decided not

to recognize the Union upon the recommendation of this

committee. In addition to being circumstantial, the testimony – primarily that of Michael McGinnis, Community’s Chief

Financial Officer, and of Eileen McCloskey, its human resources manager – is not particularly helpful to the employer.

Although Ms. McCloskey did state her understanding that

the committee’s recommendation was based in part upon the

Union’s alleged minority status, Mr. McGinnis clearly suggested that any fear the CNA would be a minority union was

based upon the UMC nurses being a minority of the full

complement of nurses (‘‘whole work force’’) at Community’s

three hospitals. As we have seen, however, the Unit 7 nurses

at UMC were by themselves an appropriate bargaining unit.

The possible minority status of the Union within a larger unit

has no bearing upon whether Community was required to

recognize and bargain with the Union; and a decision of the

board of directors based upon the recommendation of the

committee would be founded not upon a good-faith reasonable

doubt but upon a misconception.* Under these circumstances, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding

that Community failed to carry its burden.

* At oral argument the court raised the question whether an

employer’s erroneous belief that a union does not represent a

majority of employees in the bargaining unit is a ‘‘good-faith

reasonable doubt’’ when that belief is based upon a mistake of law

about the size of the bargaining unit. Because Community did not

argue the point before the Board and on brief before us, however,

we need not decide it.

USCA Case #01-1432 Document #762785 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 12 of 16
13

D. The Employee Handbook

The Board found that Community violated § 8(a)(1) of the

Act by maintaining Rules 1 and 8 in its Employee Handbook.

Those rules respectively prohibit ‘‘[i]nsubordination, refusing

to follow directions, obey legitimate requests or orders, or

other disrespectful conduct towards a [supervisor] or other

individual,’’ and ‘‘[r]elease or disclosure of confidential information concerning patients or employees.’’ The Board was

concerned that an employee might interpret the term ‘‘disrespectful conduct’’ in Rule 1 to include solicitation of union

support or ‘‘concerted employee protest of supervisory activity,’’ and that such protected activity might be chilled as a

result. Order at 4. The Board was also concerned that an

employee might think Rule 8 prohibited discussion of such

subjects as wages and other terms of employment. Id. at 5.

There is no evidence in the record that the handbook provisions actually chilled the protected activity of any employee.

Community raises the threshold objection that the Board

should not have passed upon this allegation because it was

not ‘‘factually related to’’ any of the allegations in the unfair

labor practice charge with which the Union initiated this

proceeding, see Lotus Suites, Inc. v. NLRB, 32 F.3d 588, 589

(D.C. Cir. 1994); Nickles Bakery of Ind., Inc., 296 N.L.R.B.

927, 928 (1989). Community admits it failed timely to raise

this issue at the hearing before the ALJ. Nevertheless,

Community argues the relatedness requirement is ‘‘jurisdictional,’’ and can therefore be raised at any time. Not so.

The exception to the rule that an objection to an agency

decision must be timely raised before the agency in order for

the court to grant review is limited to jurisdictional challenges ‘‘that concern the very composition or constitution of

an agency.’’ Mitchell v. Christopher, 996 F.2d 375, 378 (D.C.

Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Community’s

challenge clearly is not of that nature; accordingly, its objection, not having been timely made, is forfeit.

We therefore turn to Community’s objection to the merits

of the Board’s decision. The Board holds that the ‘‘mere

maintenance’’ of a rule ‘‘likely to have a chilling effect’’ upon

USCA Case #01-1432 Document #762785 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 13 of 16
14

employees’ rights to engage in activity protected by § 7 of

the Act is an unfair labor practice. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326

N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998). Where the Board ‘‘faithfully applies this standard TTT we will enforce its rulings,’’ but

‘‘where the NLRB adopts an unreasonable or otherwise indefensible interpretation of’’ the requirements of the Act, we

will not. Adtranz ABB Daimler–Benz Transp., Inc. v.

NLRB, 253 F.3d 19, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

Here the Board held Rule 1 was likely to discourage

‘‘concerted employee protest of supervisory activity’’ and ‘‘vigorous proselytizing for or against a union.’’ Order at 4.

Community maintains that, like the rule in Adtranz prohibiting ‘‘abusive or threatening language,’’ 253 F.3d at 25 – which

we found, contrary to the Board, was lawful, id. at 25–28 –

Rule 1 is designed merely to ‘‘maintain a civil and decent

workplace,’’ id. at 25, and is well tailored to meet that goal

without chilling protected speech or conduct.

We agree. The Board objected chiefly to the Rule’s prohibition of ‘‘other disrespectful conduct.’’ When read in context, however, that prohibition clearly does not apply to union

organizing activity – including ‘‘vigorous proselytizing’’; it

applies to incivility and outright insubordination, in whatever

context it occurs. Although Community’s employees are

perhaps unlikely to know the term ejusdem generis, they no

doubt grasp as well as anyone the concept it encapsulates:

The ‘‘other disrespectful conduct’’ to which Rule 1 refers is

clearly conduct of a piece with ‘‘insubordination’’ or ‘‘refusing

to follow directions [or to] obey legitimate requests or orders.’’ The Board’s suggestion that employees would consider ‘‘vigorous proselytizing for or against a union,’’ or other

protected activity, ‘‘insubordinate’’ within the condemnation of

Rule 1, is implausible. In short, to quote the Board itself in a

more realistic moment, ‘‘any arguable ambiguity’’ in the rule

‘‘arises only through parsing the language of the rule, viewing

the phrase TTT in isolation, and attributing to the [employer]

an intent to interfere with employee rights.’’ Lafayette Park

Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. at 825.

USCA Case #01-1432 Document #762785 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 14 of 16
15

The Board’s concern with respect to Rule 8 was that

employees might understand the ‘‘[r]elease or disclosure of

confidential information’’ to include the revelation of ‘‘information concerning terms and conditions of employment, including wages,’’ Order at 5, the sharing of which is useful,

indeed perhaps essential, to successful self-organizing. Community again argues the rule must in reason be read more

narrowly to prevent disclosure only of ‘‘sensitive patient and

business information,’’ and not to prohibit discussion with

other employees or with union organizers of information

about the terms of one’s own employment.

Again we agree. The Board’s objection to this provision

appears to rest chiefly upon the possibility that an employee

might believe the rule prohibits him from revealing information, such as wages or a disciplinary record, concerning

himself. Unlike the provision at issue in Brockton Hospital

v. NLRB, 294 F.3d 100, 106–07 (D.C. Cir. 2002), however, the

rule covers only ‘‘confidential’’ information. Confidential information is information that has been communicated or

acquired in confidence. A reasonable employee would not

believe that a prohibition upon disclosing information, acquired in confidence, ‘‘concerning patients or employees’’

would prevent him from saying anything about himself or his

own employment. And to the extent an employee is privy to

confidential information about another employee or about a

patient, he has no right to disclose that information contrary

to the policy of his employer. Cf. Aroostook County Reg’l

Opthalmology Ctr. v. NLRB, 81 F.3d 209, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(‘‘The Board does not question [a hospital’s] right to require

employees to protect patient privacy’’).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Community’s petition for review

is granted and the Board’s application for enforcement denied

insofar as each concerns the Board’s holding that Rules 1 and

8 of Community’s employee handbook violated the Act. In all

USCA Case #01-1432 Document #762785 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 15 of 16
16

other respects the petition is denied and the application for

enforcement granted.

So ordered.

USCA Case #01-1432 Document #762785 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 16 of 16