Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02749/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02749-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Karen Friday
Appellee
Milton A. Gilles
Appellant
Dwight Reynolds
Appellee
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

P U B L I S H 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MILTON A. GILLES, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

Uo' pl L ~ D 

Jftd SfttsB Court of Appea.Js r enth Cfrcuit 

JUN 2 2 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

V • ) No. 86-2749 

) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and) 

KAREN FRIDAY, M.D., and ) 

DWIGHT REYNOLDS, M.D., ) 

individually and as employees,) 

servants and agents of the ) 

VETERANS ADMINISTRATION ) 

HOSPITAL, enterprise, an ) 

agency of the UNITED STATES ) 

GOVERNMENT, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. NO. CIV-86-0347-A) 

Stan Twardy, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Eleanor Joyce Darden Thompson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma (William S. Price, United States Attorney, Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, was with her on the brief), for 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, and SETH, McKAY, LOGAN, SEYMOUR, 

MOORE, ANDERSON, TACHA, BALDOCK, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge 

Appellate Case: 86-2749 Document: 01019871119 Date Filed: 06/22/1990 Page: 1 
Invoking the Federal Tort Claims Act, the plainti~f Milton A. 

Gilles alleged that physicians at the Veterans Administration (VA) 

Hospital in Oklahoma City committed medical malpractice and caused 

him to sustain personal injuries. The alleged wrongful acts 

occurred between an initial hospital visit on September 21, 1981, 

and Gilles' discharge from the hospital in 1985. 

The trial judge's order, IR. Item 21, held that the original 

complaint had been rendered a nullity because the First Amended 

Complaint made no reference to the original complaint. The proper 

subject of the proceedings was held to be the First Amended 

Complaint and no cause had been shown why timely service of it had 

not been made on the United States pursuant to Rule 4(j) 

Fed. R. Civ. P., and thus the case was dismissed as to the 

Government. The order stated further that the court lacked 

jurisdiction as to the claims asserted against the VA by virtue of 

the provisions of 38 U.S.C. § 2679 [sic] 1 and lacked jurisdiction 

as to the two doctors due to the provisions of 38 u.s.c. § 4116. 

A divided panel of this court affirmed in an unpublished 

order and judgment. We granted rehearing en bane and vacated the 

panel order. En bane reconsideration has been on the briefs and 

record only since the facts and legal argument are adequately 

presented therein and the decisional process would not be aided 

significantly by oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(3); 

10th Cir. R. 34.1.8, 34.1.9. We affirm in part, reverse in part, 

and remand. 

1 

We assume the district court intended to cite 28 u.s.c. 

§ 2679(a). 

2 

Appellate Case: 86-2749 Document: 01019871119 Date Filed: 06/22/1990 Page: 2 
I 

Gilles filed his original complaint on February 14, 1986, 

naming the United States of America (Government) as the only 

defendant, which commenced the action. Rule 3, Fed. R. Civ. P. 

The complaint was timely filed within the six-month period 

following the August 23, 1985, administrative denial of the tort 

claim and thus in compliance with 28 u.s.c. § 240l(b) of the 

Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Service was properly made via 

certified mail on the Attorney General on February 19, 1986. This 

same postal service was used to serve the United States Attorney 

in Oklahoma City, but was not proper because Rule 4(d)(4), Fed. R. 

Civ. P., requires "delivering" the summons and complaint to the 

United States Attorney. In response, the u. S. Attorney's Office 

wrote counsel for Gilles on February 27, 1986, informing him that 

the service on the United States Attorney was defective. Brief of 

Appellees at 13. 

Before the Government answered Gilles filed a First Amended 

Complaint on May 15, 1986. Since the Government had not filed any 

responsive pleading, the amendment was proper "as a matter of 

course" under Rule 15(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. The amended complaint 

retained the United States as a defendant, but Gilles added as 

defendants the VA and the two physicians, Dr. Friday and Dr. 

Reynolds, individually and as employees, servants, and agents of 

the VA Hospital. 

Service of the amended complaint was properly made on the 

United States Attorney within 94 days (May 19) after the filing of 

the original complaint, and within 98 days (May 23) on the 

Attorney General. This was all within the 120-day period allowed 

3 

Appellate Case: 86-2749 Document: 01019871119 Date Filed: 06/22/1990 Page: 3 
by Rule 4(j), Fed. R. Civ. P. In the hearing on the Government's 

motion to dismiss, the Assistant U.S. Attorney stated that 

"Service was properly perfected of the Amended Complaint in late 

May." II R. at 2. On July 23 the Government filed a motion for 

additional time to plead or answer, which the district court 

granted on July 29. The Government moved to dismiss on August 19, 

1986. 

After a hearing the district court granted the Government's 

motion to dismiss. The court dismissed on different bases as to 

different defendants. The VA was dismissed as an improperly named 

defendant as FTCA claims based on services rendered by the VA must 

be pursued against the Government as the named defendant. 28 

U.S.C. § 2679(a). II R. at 12-13. The court found that the case 

should be dismissed as to the two physicians because of immunity 

provided by 38 U.S.C. § 4116. Id. Gilles requested leave to 

amend his complaint to state that the two physicians were 

independent contractors, rather than employees of the VA. The 

district judge did not expressly deny such leave, though he stated 

that "it's too late to talk about after-knowledge of independent 

contractor status." Id. 2 

2 

The status of the two physicians named as defendants is 

unclear. The two complaints identified Karen Friday, M.D., as an 

employee of the VA hospital. The amended complaint named Friday 

and Dwight Reynolds, M.D., as defendants who negligently caused 

injury to Gilles in their individual capacity and as employees, 

servants or agents of the VA. 

The only pleading filed by the Government, its motion to 

dismiss, states that "the two physicians were acting within the 

scope of their authority as employees and are entitled to immunity 

afforded by 38 U.S.C. § 4116(a)." I R. Item 8, Government's 

Motion to Dismiss at 6, ~ 2. In response to the motion to 

dismiss, Gilles stated that subsequent inquiries revealed that 

Friday and Reynolds "are not employees of the United States or the 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

4 

Appellate Case: 86-2749 Document: 01019871119 Date Filed: 06/22/1990 Page: 4 
The district judge found that the original complaint had not 

been served on the U.S. Attorney in accordance with the 

requirements of Rule 4(d)(4), Fed. R. Civ. P. IR. Item 21, 

District Court Order at 2. He referred to the May 15, 1986, 

filing of the First Amended Complaint and said it added parties 

but "made no reference to the original Complaint." Order at 2. 

He concluded that the "original Complaint then was rendered a 

nullity." Order at 2. Accordingly, the Order said the proper 

subject of the proceedings on the motion to dismiss was the First 

Amended Complaint, of which service had been perfected on the 

United States. Id. The Order stated that the court should 

dismiss pursuant to Rule 4(j), Fed. R. Civ. P., "no cause having 

been shown why timely service was not perfected on the United 

States of America." Order at 2. The court held that as to the 

Government, it lacked jurisdiction because the action had not been 

brought and service perfected within the six-month period after 

the administrative denial of the claim as required by 28 u.s.c. 

§ 240l(b); that it lacked jurisdiction of the "VA due to the 

provisions of 28 u.s.c. § 2679, and as to the two doctors by 

reason of 38 U.S.C. § 4116. 

(Footnote continued): 

Veterans Administration, but are instead independent contractors 

providing cardiac care to VA patients as individual physicians, 

and/or under a teaching contract with the University of Oklahoma. 

" IR. Item 9, Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to 

Dismiss and Brief in Support Thereof at 6. 

At the proceeding on the motion to dismiss, the Government 

attorney stated: "[I]t is our contention they [Friday and 

Reynolds] are agents of the United States, therefore should not be 

sued individually." II R. at 3. At this hearing Gilles again 

informed the court about the independent contractor status of the 

two physicians. He also asked to amend for the second time so as 

to properly name them as defendants in this. capacity. 

5 

Appellate Case: 86-2749 Document: 01019871119 Date Filed: 06/22/1990 Page: 5 
On appeal a panel affirmed, one judge dissenting. 

en bane on the briefs was granted. 

II 

Rehearing 

First, we consider the question raised by the district 

judge's ruling as to whether this suit was timely commenced under 

the requirements of the FTCA as to the United States. The statute 

provides that a tort claim against the United States shall be 

forever barred unless, inter alia, action is begun within six 

months after the date of mailing of notice of final denial of the 

claim by the agency to which it was presented. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 240l(b). 

The facts on this point are undisputed. The letter of final 

denial of the claim of plaintiff Gilles by the Veterans 

Administration was dated August 23, 1985. IR. Item 1, Complaint, 

Ex. A. The original complaint of plaintiff under the FTCA against 

the Government was filed February 14, 1986. This filing of the 

complaint commenced the civil action under the provisions of Rule 

3, Fed. R. Civ. P. See Isaacks v. Jeffers, 144 F.2d 26, 28 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 781 (1944). Accordingly, the action 

was timely begun as an FTCA suit within the requirements of 28 

u.s.c. § 240l(b). 

The order of dismissal holds that the action was dismissed 

"due to plaintiff's failure to bring the action and perfect 

service thereupon'' within the six-month period as required by 28 

u.s.c. § 240l(b). Thus we also consider the further point whether 

service was timely perfected. 

It has been noted that "[p]rior to the 1983 amendments, Rule 

4 [Fed. R. Civ. P.] did not make any specific provision for a time 

6 

Appellate Case: 86-2749 Document: 01019871119 Date Filed: 06/22/1990 Page: 6 
period within which service was to be accomplished. Where there 

was unreasonable delay in serving process, however, the action was 

subject to dismissal under Rule 4l(b) for failure to prosecute." 

2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,, 4.46, p. 4-432. This was the type of 

rule applied in Isaacks, 144 F.2d at 28, where the court stated 

that the "conduct of a plaintiff subsequent to the filing of a 

complaint might be such as would constitute an abandonment of the 

action." However, with the 1983 amendments, the "Time Limit for 

Service" of process was spelled out by the proviso that ''[i]f a 

service of summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant 

within 120 days after the filing of the complaint and the party on 

whose behalf such service was required cannot show good cause why 

such service was not made within that period, the action shall be 

dismissed as to that defendant ... II Rule 4, Fed. R. Civ. P. 

Here again the facts are not in dispute. As noted, within 94 

days after filing of the original complaint the United States 

Attorney was properly served and within 98 days the Attorney 

General was properly served, 3 this however being service of the 

First Amended Complaint. It was because of this service of the 

amended complaint that the district judge held service defective 

and dismissed. 

We must disagree with that reasoning and the dismissal based 

on it. We are not persuaded that the filing on May 15, 1986, of 

the First Amended Complaint rendered the original complaint "a 

nullity" in the sense of destroying the timely commencement of the 

3 

We note again that at the hearing on the motion 

the Assistant U. S. Attorney stated: "Service 

perfected of the Amended Complaint in late May." II 

7 

to dismiss, 

was properly 

R. at 2. 

Appellate Case: 86-2749 Document: 01019871119 Date Filed: 06/22/1990 Page: 7 
action accomplished by filing of the original complaint. If the 

amended complaint had stated a distinctly new claim based on 

different facts, we would have a different case. It is true that 

a "pleading that has been amended under Rule 15(a) supersedes the 

pleading it modifies and remains in effect throughout the action 

unless it subsequently is modified." 6 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, 

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CIVIL 2d § 1476, p. 556. However, 

the Treatise significantly notes further: "But the date on which 

the original pleading was filed continues to be relevant if the 

amended pleading relates back under Rule 15(c) . " Id. at 559. 

(Emphasis added; footnote omitted.) We are convinced that the 

amendment here comes within the provision for relation back in 

Rule 15(c), Fed. R. Civ. P., and that the commencement of suit 

effected by the filing of the original complaint was not destroyed 

by filing of the amended complaint. 

Rule 15(c), Fed. R. Civ. P., provides that: "Whenever the 

claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the 

conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be 

.set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to 

the date of the original pleading." The record here shows that 

the amended complaint came clearly within this general provision 

for relation back to the date of the original complaint -- which 

was within the six-month time limit after administrative denial of 

the tort claim for commencement of the action in accordance with 

28 U.S.C. § 240l(b). Here both the original and amended 

complaints contain almost identical portions entitled "Gravamen Of 

Complaint," averring that the United States, through its agents 

and employees, negligently treated plaintiff Gilles with resulting 

8 

Appellate Case: 86-2749 Document: 01019871119 Date Filed: 06/22/1990 Page: 8 
irreparable damage to his health so that his heart condition 

became inoperable and his life expectancy has been considerably 

diminished. See I R. Item 1 at 2-3; IR. Item 3 at 3. The two 

complaints are grounded on the same nucleus of operative facts, 4 

and thus, within the meaning of Rule 15(c), the claim asserted in 

the amended complaint arose out of the same "conduct, transaction, 

or otcurrence ... " This being the case, Rule 15(c) provides that 

the amendment "relates back to the date of the original pleading." 

Hence the amended complaint did not destroy or abandon the timely 

commencement of the action, but related back and preserved it. 

Thus the relation back of the amended complaint to the date 

of the original complaint preserved the timeliness of commencement 

of suit. While the amended pleading and its averments became the 

controlling substantive statement of the claim against the 

Government thereafter, see Fritz v. Standard Security Life Ins. 

Co. of New York, 676 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982), the service 

4 

The gravamen of the original and amended complaints and the 

five causes of action stated therein are parallel and stated in 

the same order. In both, Gilles alleges that Veterans 

Administration (VA) Hospital, through its agents and employees, 

willfully, recklessly, negligently, and incompetently treated him 

for a heart disorder. All acts committed by the hospital's 

medical staff arose from Gilles' initial visit to the hospital on 

September 21, 1981, and the appointments commencing on September 

22. 

Gilles claims that in the course of treatment, the VA failed 

to properly diagnose his condition for approximately one year and 

a half; failed to properly treat him for a period of over three 

years and nine months because of misdiagnosis; failed to provide 

treatment by competent and appropriate physicians and cardiac 

specialists; and subjected him as a guinea pig to dangerous and 

unnecessary electrophysiology procedures. The five causes of 

action in both the original and amended complaints address the 

same specific acts as subunits of the Gilles' diagnostic and 

treatment history as a VA patient. The two complaints differ only 

in that the amended complaint provides more detail about the 

specific events and it identifies more physician-actors, including 

the two named as defendants. 

9 

Appellate Case: 86-2749 Document: 01019871119 Date Filed: 06/22/1990 Page: 9 
made in May 1986 of the amended complaint was proper and there was 

no procedural defect because the original complaint was not served 

again on the Government. In fact, where an amended pleading 

supersedes the original complaint, "subsequent service of the 

superseded prior or original pleading is improper " 3 

MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 11 15.08 [7] at p. 15-95 (citing Phillips 

v. Murchison, 194 F.Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)). 

Rule 15(a) further carries particular requirements as to 

timeliness of notice of institution of suit where there is a 

change in the amended complaint as to the party against whom the 

claim is asserted in order for relation back to occur. See 

Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986). Here the United States 

was named as a defendant in both the original and amended 

complaints. But in any event, the Government had such notice of 

the institution of the suit by the filing on February 14, 1986, of 

the original complaint. That complaint arose out of the same 

conduct, transaction, or occurrence as did the amended complaint. 

Further the original complaint was delivered by mail to the United 

States Attorney, with certified mail delivery on him on February 

18, 1986, shown of record. IR. Docket Sheet at 2. Similarly, 

mailing of the original complaint to the Attorney General is shown 

of record, with delivery date of February 19, 1986. Id. Since 

the requirement of Rule 15(c) that the amended pleading and 

original pleading arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or 

occurrence was satisfied, under the concluding provisions of Rule 

15(c), "the delivery or mailing of process to the United States 

Attorney, or the United States Attorney's designee, or the 

Attorney General of the United States " satisfied the 

10 

Appellate Case: 86-2749 Document: 01019871119 Date Filed: 06/22/1990 Page: 10 
remaining requirements as to notice. For such purposes of notice 

under Rule 15(c), "it is notice and not service that Rule 15(c) 

requires. Schiavone, 106 S.Ct. at 2385 ('The linchpin is notice, 

and notice within the limitations period.')." Montgomery v. u. s. 

Postal Service, 867 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir. 1989). In light of 

such compliance with the terms of Rule 15(c), relation back "flows 

as a consequence of the application of the Rule." Anderson v. 

Deere & Co., 852 F.2d 1244, 1248 (10th Cir. 1988). 

In sum, the action was timely commenced with filing of the 

original complaint; the Government had timely notice of the suit; 

the amended complaint was properly filed as a matter of right and 

arose out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence as the 

original pleading; service was properly perfected, within the 

120-day time requirement of Rule 4(j), of the amended complaint; 

and that complaint related back to date of the commencement of 

suit by the filing of the original complaint. Hence the dismissal 

of the case as to the Government must be reversed. 

III 

The dismissal of the action as to the Veterans Administration 

was not in error. The Veterans Administration itself is not 

suable. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a). 

As to the two doctors, they were added as defendants by the 

First Amended Complaint filed in May 1986. In that amended 

complaint, Gilles alleged that the doctors were employees, 

servants and agents of the VA Hospital. At the hearing on the 

Government's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's attorney orally 

requested leave to amend to allege that the two physicians were 

independent contractors, II R. 6, and referred to depositions 

11 

Appellate Case: 86-2749 Document: 01019871119 Date Filed: 06/22/1990 Page: 11 
apparently to be taken in which this matter would be covered. The 

district judge did not state any express ruling on the motion. We 

find no justification in this record for not granting leave to 

amend in this respect. This was still before the Government 

answered and under the general rule, such leave should be freely 

given. Fernan v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Polin v. Dun & 

Bradstreet, Inc., 511 F.2d 875, 877 (10th Cir. 1975). 

Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal as to the two doctors and 

remand to permit reconsideration of the motion to amend after 

discovery develops the facts and when the possibility of a claim 

against the doctors as independent contractors may be evaluated. 

IV 

In sum, the dismissal as to the Veterans Administration is 

AFFIRMED. As to the United States and as to Doctor Friday and 

Doctor Reynolds, the dismissal is REVERSED and the case is 

REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

12 

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No. 86-2749 - MILTON A. GILLES v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al. 

SETH, Circuit Judge, with whom ANDERSON and BRORBY, Circuit 

Judges, join, dissenting: 

I must respectfully dissent from the position taken by the 

majority. 

In this Federal Tort Claims Act suit, plaintiff Milton A. 

Gilles alleges that doctors at a Veterans Administration hospital 

in Oklahoma City committed medical malpractice thereby causing him 

to sustain personal injuries. The trial judge dismissed the 

plaintiff's suit, holding that the action was time barred and that 

the plaintiff could not proceed against certain of the named 

defendants. 

Before the plaintiff filed this suit he submitted an 

administrative claim to the Veterans Administration as required by 

the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The Veterans Administration 

denied the plaintiff's claim on August 23, 1985. Pursuant to the 

FTCA, 28 u.s.c. § 240l(b), the plaintiff was required to bring his 

medical malpractice suit within six months of the date of denial 

of his claim, or by February 24, 1986. The plaintiff filed a 

timely complaint on February 14, 1986. The service of this 

complaint, however, did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4) 

which requires that the complaint and summons be personally 

delivered to "the United States attorney for the district in which 

the action is brought or to an assistant United States attorney or 

clerical employee designated by the United States attorney 

ti 

Appellate Case: 86-2749 Document: 01019871119 Date Filed: 06/22/1990 Page: 13 
The plaintiff urges that Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4)'s 

requirement of personal service on a United States Attorney or 

designee is ''archaic" and a "throw-back." We note, however, that 

when Congress amended Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 in March of 1987, the 

personal service requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4) was left 

intact. It is not within our province to re-amend the Rule by 

deleting the personal service provision. The Ninth Circuit has 

held in Whale v. United States, 792 F.2d 951, 953 (quoting Borzeka 

v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 444, 447 (9th Cir.)), that 

"failure to comply with, Rule [4(d) 's] personal 

service requirement does not require dismissal 

of the complaint if (a) the party that had to 

be served personally received actual notice, 

(b) the defendant would suffer no prejudice 

from the defect in service, (c) there is a 

justifiable excuse for the failure to serve 

properly, and (d) the plaintiff would be 

severely prejudiced if his complaint were 

dismissed." 

In the present case there is no justifiable excuse advanced 

for the plaintiff's failure to perfect service of process. 

Indeed, an Assistant United States Attorney contacted plaintiff's 

counsel in February of 1986 to inform him that service upon the 

United States Attorney by mail was defective in this action 

brought against the United States. When plaintiff's counsel was 

so advised, he had more than two months in which to cure the 

service defect before the 120-day period for service provided by 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j) had run. Nevertheless, plaintiff's counsel 

did not cure the service defect. Accordingly, dismissal of the 

2 

Appellate Case: 86-2749 Document: 01019871119 Date Filed: 06/22/1990 Page: 14 
action commenced by the complaint of February 14, 1986 was 

appropriate. 

On May 15, 1986, the plaintiff filed a pleading entitled 

"First Amended Complaint." Although this complaint was so styled, 

it did not in any other way refer to the original complaint nor 

recite that it was an amendment. It added new parties. Since the 

statute of limitations had run on the plaintiff's FTCA suit on 

February 24, 1986, the complaint of May 15, 1986 which reads as a 

new independent complaint was filed out of time and was therefore 

time barred. 

The plaintiff urges that the second complaint relates back to 

the date of filing of the timely first complaint under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15(c). I cannot agree. "An amended pleading that is 

complete in itself and neither refers to nor adopts any portion of 

the prior pleading supersedes the latter." 3 J. Moore & J. Lucas, 

Moore's Federal Practice~ 15.08[7] (2d ed. 1988). Thus, when the 

plaintiff filed his second complaint he commenced a new action and 

with additional parties defendant. Since this new action was not 

timely under 28 U.S.C. § 240l(b), the trial court was without 

jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiff's claims. 

The majority seems to assume at the outset of its analysis 

that the second complaint is "an amended complaint.'' When this is 

done the doctrine as to "amended complaints'' follows as a matter 

of course, and no further discussion is needed. Thus the 

reference in the majority opinion to "Catch 22'' is based on such 

an assumption. Plaintiff could file a new complaint "as a matter 

3 

Appellate Case: 86-2749 Document: 01019871119 Date Filed: 06/22/1990 Page: 15 
of right." The second complaint with the new parties and no 

reference whatever to the original complaint reads and apparently 

was an attempt to start anew. The most the majority can say is 

that it is similar to the original complaint. A reading of each, 

in my view, leads to the conclusion reached by the trial court and 

I would affirm. 

4 

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