Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_05-cv-00540/USCOURTS-almd-1_05-cv-00540-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dale Medical Center
Defendant
Nancy Hawkins
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

 It is not entirely clear from the wording of Count I that the ADA claim asserted by plaintiff

is a termination claim. However, defendant treated this count as asserting such a claim. Plaintiff

does not object to this characterization of the claim and clearly states this basis for her claim in her

response for summary judgment, i.e., that “Defendant failed to accommodate her disability and the

failure to accommodate lead [sic] to work deficiencies that lead [sic] to her termination.” (Doc. #

20, p. 12). Accordingly, the court likewise treats Count I as a failure-to-accommodate termination

claim. Additionally, plaintiff asserts in both Counts I and II that defendant treated her in a “hostile

and harassing manner.” However, the court concludes that plaintiff does not raise a separate hostile

environment claim because: (1) defendant moved for summary judgment on all claims and offered

evidence negating the existence of a hostile environment (see Doc. # 15 and Doc. # 17, ¶ 25) and

plaintiff presented no responsive argument suggesting that she brings hostile environment claims;

and (2) the factual allegations of the complaint do not state a claim for hostile environment

harassment on the basis of either age or disability. 

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

NANCY HAWKINS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:05CV540-SRW

) (WO)

DALE MEDICAL CENTER, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In this action, plaintiff Nancy Hawkins brings two claims against defendant Dale

Medical Center. Hawkins asserts that defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her

disability (impaired vision) when it terminated her employment instead of offering her

reasonable accommodation1

 and, further, that defendant discriminated against her on the

basis of her age (62) when it terminated her employment. This action is presently before the

court on the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant. Upon consideration of the

motion, the court concludes that it is due to be granted.

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2

 As it is required to do, the court has viewed the evidence presented on the motion for

summary judgment in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Welch v. Celotex Corp., 951 F.2d

1235, 1237 (11th Cir. 1992). The court considers any objections not made to the use or admissibility

of evidence waived for purposes of this motion. Davis v. Howard, 561 F.2d 565, 570 (5th Cir.

1977). Plaintiff’s hearsay objection to Fitzgerald’s testimony (Doc. # 20, p. 2) is without merit and

is overruled.

2

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff Nancy Hawkins was born on August 27, 1941. Plaintiff’s corrected vision is and

was, at all times relevant to this complaint, 20/300. Because of her vision, plaintiff must use a

magnifying glass to read average print. She cannot drive and cannot read telephone books, even

with the magnifying glass, but “can’t think of anything else that’s significant” that she is unable to

do because of her vision limitations. (Hawkins depo., pp. 26-27, 39).

Defendant Dale Medical Center is a health care facility in Ozark, Alabama. It includes a tenbed unit – New Day Senior Health – which provides psychiatric care and treatment for older

patients. Dale Medical Center contracts with SeniorHealth, Inc., an independent management

services company, to manage the unit. SeniorHealth employs Sandra Fitzgerald (formerly Sandra

Smolinski) as the Director of Nursing for the New Day unit. (Fitzgerald aff., ¶¶ 1-2; Simmons aff.,

¶¶ 1-2).

In January 2003, Fitzgerald and Leonard Smolinski interviewed plaintiff for the sole social

worker position on the unit. During the interview, plaintiff indicated that she had a vision problem

and used a magnifying glass to read. In response to a query regarding whether plaintiff needed

anything else to help her perform the job, plaintiff responded that she would not know until she

began work. Plaintiff was hired for the position. Fitzgerald was plaintiff’s supervisor until February

2004. (Hawkins depo., pp. 11-18, 37; Fitzgerald aff., ¶ 11). 

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Shortly after she began work, plaintiff told Fitzgerald that she “needed the computer

adjusted” so that she could enlarge the type, so that she could see to read and make corrections on

the computer. Fitzgerald either did not respond or said that she would “look into it.” She did not

make the requested adjustment. Thereafter, plaintiff did not make any further requests regarding

the computer she uses for “daily work.” Plaintiff also used a second computer, the “on-line”

computer. The monitor for the on-line computer was placed “up high” so that plaintiff could not see

the monitor unless she stood and placed her magnifying glass on the monitor screen. Without doing

so, plaintiff could not tell whether what she was typing was correct, so plaintiff was required to stand

up and bend down, which was tiring and uncomfortable. Plaintiff told Fitzgerald several times over

the course of her employment that the configuration of the on-line computer was a problem for her.

Fitzgerald’s only response was that it was a problem for Fitzgerald also. (Hawkins depo., pp. 27-30).

Plaintiff asked Fitzgerald at least weekly if plaintiff could have a computer that she could “enlarge.”

(Id., pp. 35-36).

Plaintiff was also required to use a printed form for progress notes. The form had lines that

had to be filled in. Plaintiff could read the form with her magnifying glass, but it was difficult for

her to fill in the form because of the size of the spaces. When plaintiff spoke with Fitzgerald about

her difficulty in completing the form, Fitzgerald made no response other than to tell plaintiff that

she would see what she could do. Plaintiff enlarged the form on the copier so that she could read it

and fill it in accurately. However, a few months into plaintiff’s employment, Debra Douglas – a

representative from the management company who was “directly above” Fitzgerald – told plaintiff

that the enlarged form did not meet the company’s standards. Douglas told plaintiff that she thought

she could put the form on a disk so that plaintiff could manipulate it on the computer; however, she

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4

never did so. After the discussion with Douglas, plaintiff did not speak with anyone at Dale Medical

Center about the form. (Hawkins depo., pp. 30-34, 48-50).

Within 72 hours of a patient’s admission to the New Day unit, plaintiff was supposed to

complete a psychosocial assessment and record it on a five-page form which was then used by the

treatment team, including other health care professionals, to determine the needs of the patient.

Plaintiff completed the psychosocial form by hand, with difficulty. She used a notebook in which

each question was in large print, and the pages were in page protectors. Plaintiff used a dry erase

marker or grease pencil to fill out the answers or write notes on the page. She then would take the

notebook back to her desk and use it to complete the psychosocial assessment form by using her

magnifying glass and inserting her pen between the form and the lens so that she could fill in the

blocks on the form. Using this technique, plaintiff was able to complete the psychosocial assessment

forms adequately. (Fitzgerald aff., ¶ 3; Simmons aff., ¶4; Hawkins depo., pp. 34-35).

On September 12, 2003, Fitzgerald gave plaintiff a memorandum listing twenty-one patients

with discharge dates between June 4, 2003 and September 4, 2003 as to whom plaintiff had not yet

completed the psychosocial assessment. Fitzgerald’s handwritten note on the memorandum stated,

“These assessments must be completed and filed in the charts immed[iately]. In the future, please

have in chart no later than 3rd day of admission.” Plaintiff does not recall speaking to Fitzgerald

about the memorandum or giving her any explanation for the delinquency. On October 7, 2003,

Fitzgerald gave plaintiff another memorandum listing past due psychosocial assessments. This

memorandum listed delinquent assessments for forty-four patients, sixteen of which were carried

over from the previous list. Plaintiff did not discuss the memorandum with Fitzgerald and did not

offer any explanation for the delinquencies. Defendant could not bill for the psychosocial

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5

assessments until the forms were completed. (Hawkins depo., pp. 51-55 and Exhibits 8 and 9).

Barbara Todd-Floyd, a registered nurse who worked on the unit during plaintiff’s tenure, saw

that plaintiff “had great difficulty in reading a writing due to her vision problems.” Plaintiff told

Todd-Floyd about a computer program she used at home that would be helpful in allowing plaintiff

to use the computers at work more easily. Todd-Floyd spoke to Fitzgerald about purchasing the

computer program. Fitzgerald responded that the hospital would “not go for that financially.” When

Todd-Floyd stated, “If you don’t ask they won’t give it to you,” Fitzgerald looked at Todd-Floyd

and said, “Bobbie,” and laughed. (Todd-Floyd aff., p. 2). Fitzgerald complained to Todd-Floyd that

plaintiff was “not getting certain work done,” including a “‘Level I’ report that had to be done before

a patient could be discharged for return to the nursing home.” (Id., p. 1). However, according to

Todd-Floyd, the “Level I” report could not be done “until you were aware a patient is ready for

discharge, because of the constant changes in medication by physicians that would require[] these

reports to be redone each time a medication was changed.” (Id., pp. 1-2).

Plaintiff was also responsible for conducting daily group therapy sessions with patients,

which were required to last at least forty minutes. Plaintiff was responsible for documenting the

sessions on progress notes in each patient’s medical record. Some mental health technicians

reported to Fitzgerald that some of plaintiff’s group therapy sessions did not occur at all and others

lasted only five minutes, even though plaintiff documented them as a full hour. Fitzgerald

confirmed on the treatment logs that there were many days when no treatment was conducted at all.

Plaintiff sometimes failed to document her therapy sessions properly, and the defendant, therefore,

could not bill for the treatment. According to Fitzgerald, the social worker should begin discharge

planning shortly after the patient’s needs are first assessed. Plaintiff often failed to begin discharge

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6

planning early enough, resulting in increased length of stay for the patients. Some of plaintiff’s

patients were discharged without a completed “Zung” or “GDS” assessment which, according to

plaintiff, are part of the admission assessment. Fitzgerald observed plaintiff being “abrupt, short and

rude” with co-workers. Some of plaintiff’s co-workers complained to Fitzgerald that plaintiff

“talked down to them” and was unapproachable and unhelpful. Fitzgerald also saw plaintiff treat

the psychiatric patients curtly and ask sensitive questions of the patients without taking precautions

to protect their privacy. (Hawkins depo., pp. 19-21; Simmons aff., ¶¶ 5-6; Fitzgerald aff., ¶¶ 7-9).

In January 2004, Fitzgerald met with plaintiff to conduct plaintiff’s annual performance

evaluation. During the evaluation, plaintiff and Fitzgerald discussed plaintiff’s numerical score on

each objective or goal. Plaintiff’s total numerical score on the evaluation was “80,” which fell in

the middle of the scoring range for “Consistently Meets Standards and Competencies.” During the

evaluation, Fitzgerald raised performance deficiencies with plaintiff. Plaintiff specifically recalls

that Fitzgerald spoke with her about “not seeing the families” and about being “rude to the staff” but

does not recall whether she raised other deficiencies. According to Fitzgerald, she discussed a

number of performance deficiencies with plaintiff. Plaintiff did not dispute these deficiencies during

the meeting, nor did she offer her vision problems as an excuse or ask for help in performing her job

responsibilities. After the evaluation, Fitzgerald included these deficiencies in a written corrective

action plan. According to plaintiff, Fitzgerald presented the written plan to plaintiff on January 14,

2004, “a day or so” after plaintiff’s evaluation, and said, “This is what we talked about.” (Hawkins

depo., pp. 50, 55-60; Fitzgerald depo., pp. 19-20, 22-24; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7, performance

evaluation; Exhibit 10 to Hawkins depo.; Fitzgerald aff., ¶ 10). 

The corrective action plan listed five deficiencies: (1) “Defensive attitude and difficulty

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getting along with other staff members. Difficulty functioning as a team member;” (2) “lack of

involvement in treatment planning and revision;” (3) “inadequate family contact and family therapy

sessions;” (4) “inadequate individual therapy sessions;” and (5) “discharge planning not done in

timely manner.” The plan also included corresponding “corrective action” for each of the listed

deficiencies. Although plaintiff did not agree with the listed deficiencies, she did not voice any

objection to Fitzgerald. (Exhibit 10 to Hawkins depo.; Hawkins depo., pp. 58-60). 

In February 2004, Fitzgerald turned over supervision of plaintiff to Jennifer Simmons, the

nurse manager of the unit, who was an employee of the hospital. Fitzgerald testified that she did so

because plaintiff’s supervision should have been under the nurse manager initially and because

plaintiff had been “abrupt and sometimes short” with Fitzgerald and Fitzgerald believed that plaintiff

might think that Fitzgerald had a “personal issue” with plaintiff. (Fitzgerald depo., pp. 16-18).

According to Todd-Floyd, “[n]ot only did Ms. Fitzgerald lose supervisory authority over the

Plaintiff, but over all of the other employees in our department sometime in the January, 2004 time

frame.” (Todd-Floyd aff., p. 2). Fitzgerald testified that, in the beginning, she supervised both the

social worker and the activities therapist because the nurse manager was not yet familiar with their

duties. (Fitzgerald depo., p. 16).

In April 2004, Simmons concluded that plaintiff’s performance was not improving, and

issued a second corrective action plan. The corrective action plan implemented by Simmons

again listed five specific deficiencies: (1) “continue to receive [complaints] from staff that

Nancy is difficult to approach with questions or concerns. Continues to have difficulty

functioning as a team member;” (2) “lack of involvement in treatment planning and

revision;” (3) inadequate family contact and family therapy sessions or inadequate

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8

documentation of such;” (4) inadequate individual therapy sessions or inadequate

documentation of such;” and (5) “discharge planning continues to be deficient without noted

improvement.” The plan listed corresponding corrective action, and indicated that Simmons

would reassess the deficiencies in thirty days. Plaintiff disagreed with the listed deficiencies

but – when Simmons went over the corrective action plan with plaintiff on April 8, 2004 –

did not indicate any disagreement, offer any explanation or state that she needed any

assistance from Simmons to correct the deficiencies. Plaintiff told Simmons that she agreed

to correct the deficiencies within the time limit. (Simmons aff., ¶ 9; Exhibit A to Simmons

affidavit; Exhibit 10 to Hawkins depo.; Hawkins depo., pp. 62-64). On April 12, 2004,

Simmons gave plaintiff a memo listing seven discharged patients with past-due psychosocial

assessment reports. Plaintiff did not have any discussion with Simmons about the

memorandum, but completed these reports by April 14, 2004 and indicated that she had done

so. (Hawkins depo., pp. 64-65 and Exhibit 13).

In May 2004, Simmons pulled a sample of plaintiff’s patient charts and found that

plaintiff was still significantly behind in her documentation. After consulting with Human

Resources, she decided to terminate plaintiff’s employment. She explained to plaintiff that

she was being terminated because she had not corrected the deficiencies in the January and

April corrective action plans. Plaintiff did not voice any disagreement with Simmons’

assessment that plaintiff had not improved her performance. (Simmons aff., ¶ 10; Hawkins

depo., pp. 65-67). 

THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

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A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the

court the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions that it believes show an absence of any genuine

issue of material fact. Hairston v. Gainesville Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 913 (11th Cir. 1993).

In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the Court held that if a party opposing

summary judgment “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to their party’s case, and on which their party will bear the burden of proof

at trial,” summary judgment shall be granted.

[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue . . . Rule 56(e) . . . requires the nonmoving party to go beyond

the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the “depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,” designate “specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial. . . We do not mean that the nonmoving party

must produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to

avoid summary judgment. . . . Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment

motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in

Rule 56 except the mere pleadings themselves. . . .”

Id. at 324.

 For summary judgment purposes, an issue of fact is “material” if it is a legal element

of the claim, as identified by the substantive law governing the case, such that its presence

or absence might affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). An issue of fact is “genuine” if the record taken as a whole could lead a

rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Electrical Industrial

Company v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The court must view the

evidence, and all factual inferences properly drawn from the evidence, in the light most

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3

 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Texas Department of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).

10

favorable to the nonmoving party. Welch v. Celotex Corp., 951 F.2d 1235, 1237 (11th Cir.

1992); Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987). It is improper for

this court to weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations; instead, “the

evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn

in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Where a reasonable fact finder may “draw more

than one inference from the facts, and that inference creates a genuine issue of material fact,

then the court should refuse to grant summary judgment.” Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d

923, 933-34 (11th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). 

DISCUSSION

ADEA Termination Claim

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) makes it “unlawful for an

employer to . . . discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 623(a)(1). Plaintiff claims that defendant discriminated against her by terminating her

employment on the basis of her age. The McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework3

 was

established by the Supreme Court for evaluating a Title VII plaintiff’s claims of

discrimination where, as here, there is no direct evidence of discrimination. See Combs v.

Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1527-28 (11th Cir. 1997). This burden-shifting

framework applies to claims of discrimination under the ADEA. Cofield v. Goldkist, Inc.,

267 F.3d 1264, 1267 n. 6 (11th Cir. 2001); Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024

Case 1:05-cv-00540-SRW Document 26 Filed 05/31/06 Page 10 of 20
11

(11th Cir. 2000). 

 The plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case of discrimination. Burdine, 450

U.S. at 252-53; Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177, 1183 (11th Cir.1998); Combs, 106 F.3d

at 1527-28. A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing

that she: “(1) was a member of the protected age group, (2) was subjected to adverse

employment action, (3) was qualified to do the job, and (4) was replaced by or otherwise lost

a position to a younger individual.” Chapman, supra, 229 F.3d at 1024. “Establishment of

the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully

discriminated against the employee. If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff’s evidence, and

if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the

plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case.” Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at

254); Walker, supra.

If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer has the burden of

producing “legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the challenged employment action.”

Combs, 106 F.3d at 1528 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). “To satisfy this

intermediate burden, the employer need only produce admissible evidence which would

allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been

motivated by discriminatory animus.” Combs, 106 F.3d at 1528 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S.

at 257). If the employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision,

the mandatory inference of discrimination arising from the prima facie case is destroyed.

Walker, 158 F.3d at 1184. The plaintiff must then produce evidence “including the

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12

previously produced evidence establishing the prima facie case, sufficient to permit a

reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by the employer were not the real

reasons for the adverse employment decision.” Combs, 106 F.3d at 1528. 

Defendant challenges only the third element of the prima facie case, arguing that

plaintiff cannot demonstrate that she was qualified for the position because her job

performance has not met the expectations of her employer and her employment tenure has

not been sufficiently long to permit an inference that she was qualified for her position.

However, in this case, there is evidence that – despite the problems identified by Fitzgerald

during plaintiff’s performance evaluation and shortly thereafter in the initial written

corrective action plan and – plaintiff received a performance evaluation score of 80 out of

a possible 95, which placed her performance squarely in the category of “Consistently Meets

Standards and Competencies.” (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7, performance evaluation; Hawkins

depo., pp. 56-59). This evidence is sufficient to permit an inference that plaintiff was at least

minimally qualified for the position. See Hall v. Dempsey, 111 F.Supp.2d 1208 (M.D. Ala.

2000)(“To prove that he was qualified, Plaintiff need only show that he met the minimum

qualifications of the job.). Thus, defendant is not entitled to prevail on the basis of plaintiff’s

failure to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.

Defendant further argues that it has articulated legitimate reasons for plaintiff’s

termination and plaintiff cannot establish pretext. The corrective action plan implemented

by Simmons in April listed five specific deficiencies: (1) “continue to receive [complaints]

from staff that Nancy is difficult to approach with questions or concerns. Continues to have

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13

difficulty functioning as a team member;” (2) “lack of involvement in treatment planning and

revision;” (3) inadequate family contact and family therapy sessions or inadequate

documentation of such;” (4) inadequate individual therapy sessions or inadequate

documentation of such;” and (5) “discharge planning continues to be deficient without noted

improvement.” (Exhibit A to Simmons affidavit; Exhibit 10 to Hawkins depo.). Simmons,

the decisionmaker, states:

Despite this Action Plan, Ms. Hawkins’ performance did not improve. In May

2004, I pulled a sampling of her patient charts and found that Ms. Hawkins

was still significantly behind in her documentation. After consulting with

Human Resources, I decided to terminate her employment because of these

continuing performance deficiencies.

(Simmons aff., ¶ 10). The court concludes that defendant has met its burden of articulating

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination. 

Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to summary judgment appears to be directed entirely to

her disability discrimination claim. However, plaintiff’s argument on the issue of pretext is

relevant to her ADEA claim as well. Plaintiff argues:

Plaintiff contends that the fact she passed her 90-day evaluation for her

probationary period and came off of probation and then got an “consistently

meets standards and competency” evaluation on January 9th of 2004,

subsequently, one or two days later she received a laundry list of alleged

deficiencies and this mysterious transfer of management from Ms. Fitzgerald

to Ms. Simmons, even though Plaintiff asserts the evidence and testimony

indicated Ms. Fitzgerald continued to be the department head and ultimate

authority, all fits in what is described Alpert case, where the jury could

reasonable find this is “impossibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies and

contradictions” in the Defendants offered testimony for the reasons of

termination.

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4

 Plaintiff cites Alpert v. Decob Office Environments, Inc., 206 F.3d 1280 (2001) at 1287-

88. (Plaintiff’s brief, p. 11). The citation is inaccurate, and the court has been unable to locate this

case by another means. 

14

(Plaintiff’s brief, Doc. # 20, pp. 11-12)(quoted as in original).4

The fact that plaintiff received a numerical score placing her evaluation in the range

of “consistently meets standards and competency” just prior to the first corrective action

plan does not establish pretext. It is undisputed that Fitzgerald discussed the performance

deficiencies outlined in the plan during the evaluation. Additionally, the circumstances of

the transfer of direct supervision from Fitzgerald to Simmons do not suggest any basis for

concluding that the reasons articulated by Simmons for plaintiff’s termination are pretextual.

Plaintiff has failed to identify any evidence of record sufficient to establish pretext, and the

court has found none. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s

age discrimination claim. 

ADA Termination Claim

The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) provides that an employer may not

discriminate against an individual with a disability because of that disability with respect to

“job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee

compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42

U.S.C. § 12112(a). “To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a

plaintiff must show: (1) she is disabled; (2) she is a qualified individual; and (3) she was

subjected to unlawful discrimination because of her disability.” Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207

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5

 See also Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir. 1999)(“[T]o state

a prima facie case of “failure to accommodate” disability discrimination, a plaintiff who has suffered

an adverse employment action must show that: (1) she was or is disabled; (2) the defendant was

aware of her disability; (3) she was otherwise qualified for her job, . . . ; and (4) the disability caused

the adverse employment action . . . .”)(citations omitted).

6

 But see Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 100 F.3d 1281, 1283 (7th Cir.

1996)(McDonnell Douglas framework is applicable to an ADA disparate treatment claim, but not

to an ADA reasonable accommodation claim); Fenney v. Dakota, Minnesota& Eastern Railroad Co.,

327 F.3d 707, 711-12 (8th Cir. 2003)(same).

15

F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2000).5

 In the Eleventh Circuit, the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework applies to claims of failure to accommodate under the ADA. See id. at

1365 (a failure-to-accommodate termination case)(citing Hilburn v. Murata Electronics North

America, Inc., 181 F.3d 1220. 1226 (11th Cir. 1999)); Boone v. Rumsfeld, 2006 WL 531303

(11th Cir. Mar. 6, 2006)(applying McDonnell Douglas framework to a failure-toaccommodate termination claim under the Rehabilitation Act, after noting that such a claim

is governed by the same standard as ADA employment discrimination claims).6

Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of termination in

violation of the ADA because: (1) she cannot establish that she was qualified; and (2) she

cannot establish that she was terminated because of her disability. As to the “qualified”

element, defendant argued in its initial brief only that plaintiff cannot demonstrate that she

was qualified for the position because her job performance has not met the expectations of

her employer and her employment tenure has not been sufficiently long to permit an

inference of her qualification for the position. (See Doc. # 17, p. 11). Plaintiff countered

this argument with evidence that she received a January 2004 performance rating of

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7

 Defendant has made no argument in this motion that plaintiff cannot establish that she was

physically capable of performing the essential functions of the position, with or without reasonable

accommodation. Instead, defendant concedes that plaintiff has a disability, but argues that plaintiff’s

termination “was not related to any protected characteristic.” (Doc. # 17, p. 11). 

8

 In its reply brief, defendant recited the proper statutory definition. However, it continued

to assert that plaintiff was not qualified because she “never performed her job satisfactorily” and

because of her “repeated failure to meet performance expectations.” (See reply brief, Doc. # 24, pp.

7-8). As noted above, the evidence that plaintiff’s performance was evaluated as “consistently meets

standards and competencies” is sufficient to overcome this argument.

16

“Consistently Meets Standards and Competencies.” In defendant’s motion and plaintiff’s

response, neither party presented argument addressing the actual issue with regard to this

prong of the prima facie case, i.e., whether plaintiff meets the statutory definition of a

“qualified individual” for purposes of an ADA claim. This definition does not equate to the

term “qualified” as used in the formulations of the prima facie cases for claims of disparate

treatment under the ADEA or Title VII. Under the ADA, a “qualified individual” means “an

individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform

the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds . . . .” 42

U.S.C. § 12111(8).7

 The court concludes that defendant has not adequately challenged this

element of the prima facie case and is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of

plaintiff’s lack of qualification.8

To prove the third prong of her prima facie case – i.e., that she was subjected to

unlawful discrimination because of her disability – plaintiff must present facts which would

permit a reasonable inference of discrimination. See Cotton v. Hospital Housekeeping

Systems, Ltd., 2005 WL 2654354, * 5 n. 4 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 18, 2005). Since plaintiff

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9

 The only evidence offered by plaintiff to prove this point is the affidavit testimony of

Barbara Todd-Floyd. Todd-Floyd testified:

17

complains of discriminatory termination, she must present evidence sufficient to permit an

inference that “[she] was terminated because of [her] disability.” Id. at * 5 (emphasis in

original). However, the ADA does not require that plaintiff establish that her disability was

the sole reason for discharge; instead, “the ADA imposes liability whenever the prohibited

motivation makes the difference in the employer’s decision, i.e., when it is a ‘but for’ cause.”

McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corporation, 99 F.3d 1068, 1076 (11th Cir. 1996).

The court concludes that the evidence of record is insufficient to permit a trier of fact

to reasonably determine that plaintiff’s disability was a “but for” cause of defendant’s

decision to terminate her employment. Plaintiff has produced evidence that her vision

limitations caused her difficulty in reading and writing which made completing

documentation more tedious for her. She has also testified that she requested assistance from

her employer – adjustment of the computers so that she could see them more easily and/or

enlargement of the type, and permission to use an enlarged font on standard forms – that

would have made it easier for her to complete the documentation, and that defendant failed

to provide the requested accommodation. Additionally, there is evidence that plaintiff’s

failure to complete required documentation in a timely manner was a primary reason for the

defendant’s decision to terminate her employment. However, plaintiff has produced no

admissible evidence that would permit a reasonable inference that her failure to complete

documentation for patient records in a timely manner was caused by her visual impairment.9

Case 1:05-cv-00540-SRW Document 26 Filed 05/31/06 Page 17 of 20
Ms. Simmons became angry with the Plaintiff, Nancy Hawkins-Kahn because of her

inability to get reports done on time. It is my opinion that as Nancy Hawkins-Kahn

had difficulty in getting those reports done based to a great extent on Ms. HawkinsKahn’s inability to effectively see, because of the computer limitations and the small

print on the documents. 

* * * * *

It is my opinion that the major reason she was behind and had difficulty is

simply because of the limitation of her vision and lack of proper computer programs

and documents to assist her in her work.

On the date, Ms. Hawkins-Kahn was terminated, it is my opinion that things

that were said and done by Ms. Simmons because she was angry for the failure of the

“Level I” reports not being completed.” Ms. Simmons further got angry at Ms.

Hawkins-Kahn because of the social history documents that were not completed.

(Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3). Defendant has moved to strike Todd-Floyd’s opinion testimony that:

(1) plaintiff was terminated because her supervisor became angry about Plaintiff’s failure to

complete certain reports, and (2) the “major reason” plaintiff was behind on completing the reports

was “because of limitation of her vision and lack of proper computer programs and documents to

assist her in her work.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) requires that the party opposing summary judgment

“set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The

Eleventh Circuit has “‘consistently held that conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts

have no probative value.’” Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir.

2000)(quoting Evers v. General Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 985 (11th Cir. 1985)); see also Miller

v. Citizens Security Group, Inc., 116 F.3d 343, 346 (8th Cir. 1997)(“A conclusory statement in an

affidavit, however, cannot create a genuine issue of material fact which precludes summary

judgment.”). Todd-Floyd’s affidavit provides no factual detail to support her conclusion that

Simmons was “angry” on the day she terminated plaintiff’s employment or her conclusions

regarding the reasons that Simmons was angry and, thus, the conclusions have no probative value.

Additionally, the factual statements in Todd-Floyd’s affidavit are insufficient to support ToddFloyd’s broad conclusion that plaintiff’s visual impairment is the reason that plaintiff was behind

on her documentation. Accordingly, the court will grant defendant’s motion to strike and will not

consider Todd-Floyd’s unsupported opinion testimony. The court has considered the remainder of

the affidavit.

18

In other words, while plaintiff has demonstrated that her impairment caused her to be slower

in completing forms, she has not produced competent evidence permitting the conclusion that

Case 1:05-cv-00540-SRW Document 26 Filed 05/31/06 Page 18 of 20
10 In the deposition excerpts before the court, plaintiff did not testify that her failure to

complete required documentation in a timely manner was because of her vision problems.

Additionally, she testified that when her supervisors placed her on the two corrective action plans

she did not offer her vision impairment as an explanation or tell them that she needed assistance to

comply with the requirement for timely documentation. (Hawkins depo., pp. 53-55, 59-60, 62-67).

Plaintiff further testified that her current employer, Laurel Oaks Behavioral Center, moved her from

one unit to another and reduced her hours because she was “not able to keep abreast of the

paperwork,” and that her vision limitations “didn’t have anything to do with” her inability to keep

up with the paperwork at Laurel Oaks. (Id., pp. 80-83).

19

it caused her to be so slow that she was unable to meet her employer’s requirements.10 This

evidentiary gap is fatal to plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff has failed to make a connection between

her impairment and her performance deficiencies and, thus, cannot demonstrate that her

disability was a “but for” cause of her termination. Since plaintiff has not produced evidence

permitting an inference that her termination was based on her disability, defendant is entitled

to summary judgment on plaintiff’s ADA claim.

Additionally, as discussed above, plaintiff has not produced evidence sufficient to

establish that any of the reasons advanced by defendant for plaintiff’s termination are

causally related to her disability. Thus, the reasons articulated by Simmons for plaintiff’s

termination are legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for purposes of plaintiff’s ADA claim.

As noted above with regard to plaintiff’s ADEA claim, the evidence of record is insufficient

to demonstrate that these reasons are pretextual. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is

ORDERED that defendant’s motion to strike (Doc. # 23) is GRANTED as to the

conclusory testimony in Todd-Floyd’s affidavit, as set forth supra n. 8.

Case 1:05-cv-00540-SRW Document 26 Filed 05/31/06 Page 19 of 20
20

It is further ORDERED that defendant’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED. A separate judgment will be entered.

DONE, this 31st day of May, 2006.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00540-SRW Document 26 Filed 05/31/06 Page 20 of 20