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Parties Involved:
Joseph Burton
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 22, 2010

Decided July 23, 2010

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐3332

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

           Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

JOSEPH BURTON,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 08 CR 1055‐1

John W. Darrah,

Judge.

O R D E R

Joseph Burton was found guilty by a jury of possessing a gun after a felony

conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced as an Armed Career Criminal to 235

months’ imprisonment, id. § 924(e)(1).  He filed a notice of appeal, but his newly appointed

lawyers have concluded that the case is frivolous and seek to withdraw.  See Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  Burton has responded to counsel’s motion, see CIR. R. 51(b),

by asking for leave to proceed pro se and identifying the issues he proposes to raise.  We

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09‐3332 Page 2

confine our review to the potential issues discussed in counselʹs facially adequate brief, see

United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973‐74 (7th Cir. 2002), and in Burton’s response.

Burton was visiting a friend, Johnny Martinez, when the two started arguing while

standing outside Martinez’s apartment late at night.  Burton left but returned moments later

brandishing an Argentine‐made handgun.  A neighbor, John Figueroa, saw Burton with the

gun and called 911.  The police were dispatched and arrested Burton, a felon.

Before trial the district judge conducted a conference in chambers with no court

reporter present.  The judge principally addressed motions in limine and elected to

withhold ruling on any disputed motion until trial.  (We know what happened in chambers

because appellate counsel filed a statement under Rule 10(c) of the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure.)

At trial Figueroa testified that he was with his wife and two children in the their

apartment when Burton and Martinez began arguing.  Figueroa noted, after the district

court had overruled Burton’s relevance objections, that his children were under age two and

that Martinez regularly drank alcohol on his stoop.  During Figueroa’s testimony the district

court allowed the government to play the 911 tape; the court reasoned that the tape was

admissible over Burton’s hearsay objection as both a present sense impression and excited

utterance.  See FED. R. EVID. 803(1), (2).  The court also allowed the defense to ask Figueroa if

he had been smoking marijuana at the time of the incident.  But the court stopped Burton

from probing whether Figueroa had lied to prosecutors about his continuing use of

marijuana since, according to government counsel, he never denied current use.

The government also called Dan Sammon and Carlos Meneses, the police officers

who responded to the 911 call.  Both testified that Burton fled when they approached, and

while giving chase they saw him retrieve a gun from his shorts.  Burton was followed to the

attic of an apartment building where he was arrested.  Sammon testified that he heard a

thump‐like sound in that building just before seeing another officer find Burton’s gun on a

stair landing.  Meneses said that no one else ran from them that night.  Burton’s relevance

objection to this comment was overruled.  The district court also precluded Burton from

impeaching Sammon with a police report written by a different officer.

After the parties rested, Burton asked the district court to instruct on mere presence

as a defensive theory.  The parties had stipulated that Figueroa told a government agent

that after he called 911 he saw an unknown man ride up on a bicycle, talk to Burton for a

few minutes, and then leave.  Defense counsel asserted that the cyclist might have been the

person brandishing the gun.  The court refused to give the instruction on the ground that

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there was no evidence supporting Burton’s theory that someone other than him brandished

the weapon.

In their Anders submission, counsel first examine whether Burton could argue that

the district court erred in not creating a contemporaneous record of the chambers

conference.  Counsel assume that it was error to conduct the hearing without a court

reporter present, but the Court Reporter Act, 28 U.S.C. § 753, requires that criminal

proceedings be recorded only when conducted in open court.  See United States v. Hein, 769

F.2d 609, 611 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1536 (7th Cir. 1985);

United States v. Jenkins, 442 F.2d 429, 438 (5th Cir. 1971).  Implementing regulations issued

by the Judicial Conference of the United States do not expand the reach of the statute, nor

does the district court’s management plan for court reporters.  See 6 Guide to Judiciary Policies

and Procedures (Court Reporting) (Feb. 2010); Official Court Reporters Management Plan

(N.D. Ill. 2009).  So the need for a court reporter is not apparent, but even if error occurred it

would not lead to reversal unless the lack of a verbatim record hampers our ability to fairly

evaluate the conduct and result of the chambers conference.  See United States v. Kelly, 535

F.3d 1229, 1240‐43 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Kimmons, 917 F.2d 1011, 1014 (7th Cir.

1990); United States v. Nolan, 910 F.2d 1553, 1560 (7th Cir. 1990).  Burton could not

demonstrate prejudice because nothing of consequence transpired in chambers except that

the district court sorted through the pending motions in limine, granted those which were

unopposed, and set aside the rest for ruling at trial with a court reporter present.  An

appellate claim would thus be frivolous.

Counsel next examine whether Burton might challenge the district court’s

evidentiary rulings.  His lawyers have concluded that any appellate claim would be

frivolous and we agree.  Allowing the jury to hear the 911 call could not have been error

because the call was made as Burton brandished the gun, and observations made during a

911 call can qualify as both present sense impressions and excited utterances.  United States

v. Davis, 577 F.3d 660, 668‐70 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Shoup, 476 F.3d 38, 42‐43 (1st

Cir. 2007); United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2006).  Neither could the trial

judge have erred in stopping Burton from implying that Figueroa lied to prosecutors about

his marijuana use; the district court credited the prosecutors’ representation that Figueroa

never said he had stopped smoking marijuana, and defense counsel did not explain how

Burton could have a good‐faith basis to challenge as a lie a statement that was never made.

See United States v. Adames, 56 F.3d 737, 745 (7th Cir. 1995).  Nor could Burton establish error

in the ruling that kept him from trying to impeach Sammon with a report written by

another police officer.  Defense counsel tried to use the report before getting an admission

that Sammon had adopted it, but a witness cannot be impeached with a statement from a

third party unless the witness has adopted that statement.  Adames, 56 F.3d at 744‐45; United

States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 710 (11th Cir. 1993).  Finally, we see no potential basis to

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challenge the court’s rulings on Burton’s relevance objections.  A trial judge has broad

discretion in determining relevance, United States v. Wilburn, 581 F.3d 618, 624 (7th Cir.

2009), and even if the court erred, the error was harmless because none of the admitted

testimony bore on the facts supporting the conviction, i.e., that Figueroa, Sammon, and

Meneses all saw Burton in possession of the firearm, United States v. Christ, 513 F.3d 762,

774‐75 (7th Cir. 2008).

Counsel also analyze whether Burton could challenge the district court’s refusal to

instruct on mere presence.  Burton would have to show, among other things, that the

instruction was supported by evidence suggesting that he was standing idly by while

someone else engaged in the criminal activity. United States v. Glover, 479 F.3d 511, 519 (7th

Cir. 2007); United States v. Robinson, 96 F.3d 246, 251‐52 (7th Cir. 1996).  Challenging the

court’s ruling would be frivolous because mere presence cannot reasonably be inferred from

evidence that a cyclist arrived at the scene after Figueroa already had seen Burton with the

gun.

Next counsel consider whether Burton could argue that the government presented

insufficient evidence to convict him.  For a conviction under § 922(g)(1), the government

must prove that after incurring a felony conviction the defendant possessed a gun that had

traveled in or affected interstate commerce.  18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); United States v. Morris, 349

F.3d 1009, 1013 (7th Cir. 2003).  Here Burton stipulated to his prior felony, three witnesses

saw him with the gun, and an expert testified that the gun was manufactured in Argentina.

The jury chose to believe these witnesses, and we would not second‐guess its assessments.

United States v. Hampton, 585 F.3d 1033, 1042 (7th Cir. 2009).

Counsel also examine whether Burton could challenge his enhanced sentence under

the Armed Career Criminal Act.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).  Counsel conclude, and we agree,

that any argument about applying the enhancement would be frivolous because Burton has

more than three felonies for residential burglary, a violent felony under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).

See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 578, 599 (1990); United States v. King, 62 F.3d 891, 896

(7th Cir. 1995).  Moreover, it would be frivolous to challenge the length of the sentence as

unreasonable; the term imposed is within the guideline range and thus presumptively

reasonable, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007), United States v. Liddell, 543 F.3d 877,

885 (7th Cir. 2008), and counsel suggest nothing to rebut that presumption.

All of the points Burton discusses in his response to counsel’s submission address

the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.  As noted above,

however, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, and we would not

disrupt the jury’s credibility determinations.  United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 835 (7th

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Cir. 2008).  Burton has not identified a nonfrivolous issue to pursue on appeal, so there is no

purpose in allowing him to proceed pro se.

Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED and the appeal is

DISMISSED.

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