Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01141/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01141-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Schediwy
Defendant
Laura Strauss
Defendant
Tri-Dam
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRI-DAM,

Plaintiff,

v.

RICHARD SCHEDIWY AND LAURA 

STRAUSS,

Defendants.

__________________________________/

1:11-cv-01141-AWI-MJS

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT AND DENYING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Docs. 64, 72)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Tri-Dam, and Defendants Richard Schediwy and Laura Strauss filed competing 

motions for summary pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Plaintiff filed its motion on 

October 18, 2013, the dispositive motions deadline. Defendants filed their opposition and motion 

on November 8, 2013, three weeks after the dispositive motions deadline. For the following 

reasons Plaintiff‟s motion for summary judgment shall be granted and Defendants‟ motion for 

summary judgment shall be denied.

///

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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Tri-Dam, a joint venture between the South San Joaquin Irrigation District and Oakdale 

Irrigation District, owns and operates the Tulloch Hydroelectric Project No. 2067 located near 

the city of Copperopolis, California, pursuant to a license issued by the Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission (“FERC”). First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) at ¶¶ 3-4. The Tulloch

Project boundary extends approximately 1,619 acres and includes all the land within the 515-foot 

elevation contour surrounding the Tulloch Reservoir. FAC at ¶ 5. FERC first granted Tri-Dam a 

license to operate the Tri-Dam Project on January 1, 1955, for a term ending December 31, 2004. 

FAC at ¶ 8. Article 39 of the license granted Tri-Dam the authority to grant permission for use of 

lands within the Tulloch Project boundary without prior approval of FERC. FAC at ¶ 8; Tulloch 

Reservoir Shoreline Management Plan, December 2002, (“SMP”) at p. 1-1.

FERC requires that each licensee (Tri-Dam) obtain control of all lands needed for 

operation and maintenance of the project. Declaration of Dan Pope, Exhibit B (“FERC License”) 

at p. 35, 114 FERC ¶ 62, 162 (2006). Sixty-one percent of the land within the FERC Project 

Boundary is privately owned, twenty-six percent of the land is owned by the Oakdale and South 

San Joaquin Irrigation Districts and twelve percent is owned by either the state or federal 

governments. SMP at p. 6. Tri-Dam obtained a flowage easement for all of the land within the 

FERC Project boundary in 1956. The easement to Oakdale and South San Joaquin Irrigation

Districts, granted the following uses and purposes:

(a) The right to permanently overflow, flood and cover [the FERC Project Boundary] 

land with flood, slack, or back water created by the erection and operation of the 

Tulloch Dam across the Stanislaus River; 

(b) The right to enter upon said land from time to time to clear, destroy, or dispose of any 

timber or other natural growth, any obstructions, accumulations, trash, filth and any 

other thing which would in any way interfere with the use of said reservoir, or the 

waters therein, or tend to render unsafe or unsanitary either the reservoir created by 

said dam or the margin thereof;

(c) The right to ingress to and egress from said lands for the purposes aforesaid. 

Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Exhibit A, Conveyance of Easement, Doc. 65-1 at p. 4; 

Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Fact (“SSF”) at ¶ 7; SMP at p. 6. This easement 

applied to all property within the 515-foot elevation contour. Id.

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In 2002, Tri-Dam developed Tulloch Reservoir‟s most current Shoreline Management 

Plan (“SMP”)1in anticipation of obtaining a new license for the Tulloch Project. Observing the 

FERC license required Tri-Dam to obtain FERC approval for (1) actions that would in any way 

reduce the storage capacity of Tulloch Reservoir and (2) use of lands within the FERC Project 

Boundary, the SMP recognized there was considerable public interest for development of the 

Tulloch Reservoir shoreline and that some of this development could conceivably have only 

minor impacts on reservoir storage or project operations. Accordingly, the SMP expressed TriDam‟s need to approach FERC for general approval of minor development activities to facilitate 

such activities within the Project Boundary and avoid the need to obtain FERC approval for 

every individual development activity.

The SMP described the minor development activities for which Tri-Dam had requested 

FERC‟s approval. One such minor development activity is the erection of a retaining wall. The 

SMP also outlined an “encroachment” permitting scheme through which parties could apply for 

– and Tri-Dam would issue – permits authorizing a particular use or facility within the FERC 

Project Boundary. According to the SMP, all proposed development activities are subject to 

requirements of applying for and obtaining a Tri-Dam encroachment permit.

On December 23, 2002, Tri-Dam filed an application with FERC for a new license, 

pursuant to sections 4(e) and 15 of the Federal Power Act (FPA, 16 U.S.C §§ 791 et seq.), to 

continue operation and maintenance of the Tulloch Project; the SMP was included as an exhibit 

to the new license application. On February 16, 2006, FERC issued a new license to Tri-Dam 

for a period of 39 years, 11 months subject to the terms and conditions of the FPA, which was 

incorporated into the license by reference. (Between 2004 and 2006, Tri-Dam operated the 

Tulloch Project under an annual license pending the disposition of its new license application.) 

Article 411 of this license approves the SMP. Article 413 gives Tri-Dam the authority to grant 

permission for certain uses and occupancies of project lands and waters, including noncommercial piers, landings and boat docks, without prior FERC approval, and continuing 

 

1 The SMP was submitted by Tri-Dam with its license application in 2002 and remained in effect until FERC 

approved the revised Reservoir Management Plan as directed by the 2006 FERC license. FAC ¶ 11. Thus, the SMP 

was in effect at all times relevant to this action.

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responsibility to supervise and control the uses and occupancies for which it grants permission. 

If a permitted use or occupancy violates any condition imposed by the license or by Tri-Dam, 

article 413 further gives Tri-Dam authority to take any lawful action necessary to correct the 

violation, including canceling the permission to use and occupy the project lands and waters and 

requiring the removal of any non-complying structures and facilities.

Defendants Richard Schediwy and Laura Strauss own real property in Copper Cove 

Estates, located at 4378 Council Trail, Copperopolis, in Calaveras County, California (“Subject 

Property”). Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts (“JSF”) at ¶ 1. Defendants applied with Tri-Dam 

for a permit to build a “concrete block stemwall / slopped back retaining wall at the 515‟ contour 

elevation” in the Tulloch Reservoir. JSF at ¶ 2. On February 28, 2004, Tri-Dam granted 

Defendants‟ application. JSF at ¶ 2; Declaration of Richard Schediwy, Doc. 72-3, (“Schediwy 

Dec.”) at ¶ 2. Defendants‟ contractor installed the entire retaining wall on the Subject Property 

below the 515-foot elevation contour. JSF at ¶ 3. Although there is some disagreement about the 

exact contour elevation of the retaining wall, it is agreed the wall was constructed between the

504 and 506-foot contour lines. Schediwy Dec. at ¶ 2; Schediwy Dec., Exhibit A.

On May 6, 2004, Susan Larson, Tulloch Coordinator, wrote Defendants on behalf of TriDam to demand the removal of the wall constructed in violation of the permit requirements and 

the submission of a compliance proposal by Defendants by May 14, 2004. Doc.72-3, Exhibit A. 

Defendants made contact with Kathleen Norton, U.S. Army Corps Engineer, for direction 

regarding the removal of the retaining wall and informed Ms. Larson of their contact. Schediwy 

Dec. at ¶ 4. Defendants did not submit a compliance proposal as required by Tri-Dam. Schediwy 

Dec. at ¶¶ 4-5. On July 13, 2004, Ms. Larson wrote a letter to Defendants informing them their 

use of the retaining wall as a boat dock was in violation of permit conditions and again urging 

Defendants to submit a proposal that would bring their property into compliance. Schediwy Dec., 

Exhibit C. On July 22, 2004, Defendants informed Ms. Larson that they received instruction 

from Ms. Norton to wait until winter when the water level drops below the five-hundred foot 

mark, remove the existing wall, gently back-fill to restore the original contour, and embark on 

new excavation to accommodate the new retaining wall. Doc. 72-3, Exhibit J. On September 16, 

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2004, Ms. Larson provided Defendants with a copy of the 2002 SMP detailing the application 

process for approval of a retaining wall. Schediwy Dec. at ¶ 11. 

Defendants were unable to engage the services of the contractor who they had hired to 

build the wall. Defendants unsuccessfully attempted to retain six other contractors who could or 

would not accept the job. Schediwy Dec. at ¶ 22. Defendants were unable to secure permission 

from their neighbors to haul the debris, which would be generated by destruction of the wall, 

across their properties. Schediwy Dec. at ¶ 21. Defendants did not submit to Tri-Dam an 

application for a permit to build a new wall nor did they remove the improperly placed wall.

On December 31, 2004 Tri-Dam‟s license to operate the Tulloch Project expired. TriDam for two years thereafter operated under an annual license until a new license was granted on 

February 16, 2006. FERC License at p. 2.

In June 2005, Mr. Schediwy initiated arbitration against his former contractor for breach 

of contract due to the building of the wall that was not in compliance with the Tri-Dam permit. 

On December 12, 2005, Arbitrator Daniel Yamshon issued an award of $43,036.55 to 

compensate Mr. Schediwy for: the payments made to the contractor for the building of the wall, 

expenses incurred by Mr. Schediwy based on the negligent building of the wall, the cost of 

demolition and debris removal. Declaration of Thomas Marrs, (“Marrs Dec.”) Exhibit F. On 

March 7, 2006, the arbitration order was confirmed by the Honorable Calavaras County Superior 

Court Judge William Kelsay. Marrs Dec., Exhibit F. 

On July 8, 2011, Plaintiff filed suit in this court seeking an order permanently enjoining 

Defendants from maintaining a retaining wall that they had unlawfully constructed on the 

Subject Property at the 504-foot to 505-foot contour elevation. The retaining wall is still in place.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense – or the 

part of each claim or defense – on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant 

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving 

party bears the initial burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and 

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identifying those portions of „the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,‟ which it believes demonstrate the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); 

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, 

the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving 

party‟s case.” In re Oracle Corp. Securities Litigation, 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 

Celotex, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 325). If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts 

to the non-moving party to present evidence establishing the existence of a genuine dispute as to 

any material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 

585-86 (1986). To overcome summary judgment, the opposing party must demonstrate a factual 

dispute that is both material, i.e. it affects the outcome of the claim under the governing law, see 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 

630 (9th Cir.1987), and genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party. See Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th 

Cir.1987). In order to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than 

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record 

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 

„genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 587 (citation omitted).

A court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must construe all facts and inferences 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing 

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See 

Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F.Supp. 1224, 1244–45 (E.D.Cal.1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 

898, 902 (9th Cir.1987). 

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff presents three arguments that it asserts entitle it to the requested injunctive relief: 

First, Defendants‟ recovery of damages against their contractor based on their claim that they 

were required to remove the retaining wall requires judicial estoppel of Defendants‟ position that 

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the wall need not be removed. Second, FERC has granted Tri-Dam the authority to approve or 

deny all minor encroachments on the Tulloch Reservoir and requires Tri-Dam to seek removal of 

all unpermitted or non-compliant developments. Third, Tri-Dam‟s broad easement over the 

Subject Property allows it to remove anything which in any way interferes with the use of the 

Tulloch Reservoir. 

A. Judicial Estoppel

Plaintiff asserts that “Defendants are judicially estopped from opposing Tri-Dam‟s 

request that they remove their unauthorized retaining wall because Schediwy benefitted from 

taking the opposite position in an earlier judicial proceeding.” Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 

Judgment (“PMSJ”) at p. 10. The doctrine of judicial estoppel, sometimes called the doctrine of 

preclusion of inconsistent positions, precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one 

position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position. Blix St. 

Records, Inc. v. Cassidy, 191 Cal.App.4th 39, 47 (2010). The application of judicial estoppel is 

not limited to bar the assertion of inconsistent positions in the same litigation, but is also 

appropriate to bar litigants from making incompatible statements in two different cases. Rissetto 

v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1996) (“We now make it 

explicit that the doctrine of judicial estoppel is not confined to inconsistent positions taken in the 

same litigation”); Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Investment Corp., 910 F.2d 

1540, 1548 (7th Cir.1990) (estoppel is even more appropriate where the incompatible statements 

are made in two different cases, since “[i]nconsistent positions in different suits are much harder

to justify” than inconsistent pleadings within one suit). 

The doctrine's dual goals are to maintain the integrity of the judicial system and to protect 

parties from opponents' unfair strategies. See Aguilar v. Lerner, 32 Cal.4th 974, 986 (2004); New 

Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001). Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine 

invoked by courts in their discretion. Id.; see also Yanez v. United States, 989 F.2d 323, 326 (9th 

Cir.1993). Because of its harsh consequences, the doctrine should be applied with caution and 

limited to egregious circumstances. Gottlieb v. Kest, 141 Cal.App.4th 110, 132 (2006); MW 

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Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornametal and Metal Words Co., Inc., 36 Cal.4th 412, 422 

(2005).

The doctrine should apply when: (1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the 

positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was 

successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as 

true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a 

result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake. Jackson v. County of Los Angeles, 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 

183 (1997); Miller v. Bank of America N.A., 213 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 (2013) (citations omitted).

1. The Same Party Has Taken Two Positions.

In the arbitration proceeding between Mr. Schediwy and his former contractor it was 

determined, based on Mr. Schediwy‟s testimony and the testimony of Susan Larson, that the 

retaining wall “needs to be demolished and removed.” Marrs Dec., Exhibit F at p. 10. From the 

face of the arbitration award it is unclear whether or not Mr. Schediwy explicitly indicated that 

the wall would have to be removed but he certainly benefited from that finding as it appears to 

have been the primary contributing factor in Mr. Schediwy‟s recovery. Id. In fact, Mr. Schediwy 

was awarded $28,125.00 to compensate him for the necessary demolition and debris removal. Id. 

at p. 11.

In the case presently before this Court Defendants deny that they have ever refused to 

remove the retaining wall. Amended Answer (“AA”) at ¶ 13. However, Defendants oppose the 

complete removal of the retaining wall, including the footings. Id. Defendants instead support 

what they have called an “alternative mitigation plan,” which proposes using the footings that are 

presently used to support the retaining wall to eventually support a dock once the present 

retaining wall is demolished and a new wall is built in conformity with the terms of the SMP and

any permit issued by Tri-Dam.

Defendants first advanced the position that the wall was required to be removed. 

Defendants now oppose the complete removal of the wall. Although Defendants attempt to 

minimize the difference between these positions, they are, in fact, two different positions.

2. The Positions Were Taken In Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Proceedings

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The Ninth Circuit has held that prior statements made in administrative hearings or in 

arbitration proceedings are appropriate subjects of judicial estoppel. Rissetto 94 F.3d at p. 604; 

PowerAgent Inc. v. Electronic Data Systems Corp, 358 F.3d 1187, 1192-1193 (9th Cir. 2004); 

Admiral Insurance Co. v. Rushmore, 70 F.3d 1277, 1995 WL 693335 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(unpublished); see also, In re Siller, 427 B.R. 872, 886 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Speroni S.p.A. v. 

Perceptron Inc., 12 Fed. Appx. 355, 358 (6th Cir. 2001) (unpublished). The rationale for 

application of judicial estoppel to these situations is that the “truth is no less important to [an 

entity] acting in a quasi-judicial capacity than it is to a court of law.” Rissetto, 358 F.3d at p. 604.

The same rationale applies here.

The arbitration proceeding in question had many of the formal hallmarks of a judicial 

proceeding such as: the ability to call witnesses, the swearing of an oath of truthfulness by the 

parties, and a neutral party presiding over the hearing. Marrs Dec., Exhibit F at p. 4.2

The action before this Court is clearly a judicial proceeding.3

Accordingly, neither the arbitration proceeding nor the action before this court fall 

outside the appropriate scope of judicial estoppel. 

3. The Party Was Successful In Asserting The First Position

A party is successful in asserting a position for purposes of judicial estoppel when a 

position is successful in persuading a fact finder to accept the party‟s position. New Hampshire v. 

Maine, 532 U.S. at p. 750. “Absent success in a prior proceeding, a party‟s later inconsistent 

position introduces no „risk of inconsistent court determinations‟ [citation] and thus poses little 

threat to judicial integrity.” Id. at p. 751 (citations omitted).

The arbitrator in the action between Mr. Schediwy and his former contractor awarded Mr. 

Schediwy $28,125.00 for removal of the uncompleted sea wall based on his claim for the same. 

 

2 The statements made by Mr. Schediwy‟s counsel to his former contractor in the letter attached as Exhibit R to Mr. 

Marrs‟ Declaration were not statements taken in judicial proceedings and are accordingly not considered for 

purposes of judicial estoppel analysis (except to the extent that they are concurrent with what was presented in the 

arbitration hearing).

3 This Court does not find merit to Defendants contention that the statements made in their amended answer are not 

valid evidence. See Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lovelace Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1988); Tamsco Properties, LLC 

v. Langemeier, 2013 WL 246782 at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (slip copy) (“Factual assertions in pleadings, unless 

amended, are considered judicial admissions conclusively binding on the party who made them.”)

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Marrs Dec., Exhibit F. at pp. 4, 10-11. Accordingly, Mr. Schediwy was successful in asserting 

his first position.

4. The Two Positions Are Not Totally Inconsistent

The Ninth Circuit has adopted a liberal approach in interpreting this element of judicial 

estoppel, reflecting its preference that claims be litigated on their merits. See Admiral Ins. Co. v. 

Rushmore, 70 F.3d 1227, 1995 WL 693335 at *3 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished) (Noting that “in 

most cases, [the Ninth Circuit] has declined to preclude the litigants‟ allegedly inconsistent 

claims.). The Supreme Court has indicated that this element is significant when “judicial 

acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create the perception that 

either the first or second court was misled.” Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 170 

(2010). 

Although this Court does not have a transcript of the arbitration hearing, from the limited 

record it appears that Mr. Schediwy sought to recover the cost of removing the improperly 

placed uncompleted retaining wall based on representations from Tri-Dam that the wall would 

have to be removed. Marrs Dec., Exhibit F at p. 4. It appears that in the arbitration hearing that 

the arbitrator and Mr. Schediwy relied upon Ms. Larson‟s testimony that the wall would have to 

be removed. In the case before this Court, Defendants admit that the retaining wall was

improperly placed and that it should be removed from its present location. Defendants dispute 

Tri-Dam‟s demand that they remove the footings that presently support their retaining wall and 

backfill the area to its pre-excavation condition only to excavate again to build a retaining wall in 

compliance with a Tri-Dam permit. The arbitration award is consistent with this stance as it 

provides damages for “demolition and debris removal” not for filling of the land to return it to its 

pre-excavation state. Accordingly, this Court does not believe the positions taken by Defendants 

to be totally inconsistent. 

5. The First Position Was Not Taken As A Result Of Ignorance, Fraud, or Mistake

Although Defendants‟ position was taken in reliance on Tri-Dam‟s insistence that the 

retaining wall be removed, it cannot be said to have been a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake 

that Defendants advanced that position at the arbitration hearing.

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6. Conclusion

The doctrine of judicial estoppel is invoked by courts in their discretion. The position that 

judicial estoppel should be reserved for the most egregious attempts at attaining unfair advantage 

and misleading the court is in line with the Ninth Circuit‟s preference for adjudication on the 

merits. Here, Defendants asserted two distinct but not totally incompatible positions. As a result, 

this Court, in its discretion, will not judicially estop Defendants from arguing that the footings of 

their retaining wall should be permitted to remain intact if they seek and obtain from Tri-Dam a 

permit to build a retaining wall and dock that could make use of the footings as presently located.

B. FERC’s Enforcement Authority Delegated to Tri-Dam

Plaintiff argues that by granting the Tri-Dam license and approving the SMP, “FERC has 

exercised its plenary regulatory authority to prohibit any and all developments with the project 

boundary ... not approved by Tri-Dam.” MSJ at p. 15. Plaintiff asserts that FERC regulatory 

authority over the project boundary alone grants Tri-Dam the right to enforce the terms of the 

SMP against private property owners within the project boundary.4Plaintiff mistakes its duty to 

comply with and enforce the FERC license with a grant of the property rights necessary to 

enforce the license against property owners within the project boundary.

Under the Federal Power Act, FERC has the power to issue licenses to private parties to 

construct and operate dams and similar projects. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 797(e) (West 2000 & West 

Supp.2009). Furthermore, FERC may delegate its responsibility to ensure that the uses of the 

project lands are consistent with the public interest to the licensees. See Union Electric Co., d/b/a 

 

4

Plaintiff cites DiLaura v. Power Authority of N.Y., 786 F.Supp. 241 (W.D. N.Y. 1991) in support of its position 

that FERC has full regulatory authority, however, the DiLaura Court refers to FERC‟s power to enforce conditions 

of the FPA against a licensee in operation of the project. 

The 8th Circuit‟s opinion in Coalition for Fair and Equitable Regulation of Docks on Ozarks v. FERC, 297 F.3d 771 

(8th Cir. 2002), specified that FERC requires licensees to develop project resources and permits them to recruit 

public and private interests to help do so; FERC does not grant licensees the necessary property rights to regulate 

private property within the project boundary.

In VA Timberline, LLC v. Appalachian Power Co., 2008 WL 269544 at *2-4 (W.D. Va. 2008) the court recognized 

the licensee‟s right to grant permits based on the facts that (1) Timberline sought to build its dock within the project 

boundary and (2) the licensee had obtained property rights by way of an easement over the area that specifically 

provided for “remov[al] of ... any and all structures, improvements ... and objects” in the project area. The court 

explained that licensee‟s ability to remove the dock rested on their easement over the property. Id at. *4-5.

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AmerenUE, 90 FERC ¶ 61,249, at *61833 (2000). Here, FERC delegated the regulation of the 

project lands at issue to Tri-Dam in 1956 and further delegated its responsibilities to Tri-Dam

when FERC adopted the SMP. This Court has previously held that “Articles 411 and 413 of TriDam‟s FERC license essentially permit Tri-Dam to regulate certain uses and occupancies of land 

in the FERC Project Boundary without prior FERC approval, in accordance with the SMP. 

However, the license merely gives Tri-Dam authority to do so; it does not give Tri-Dam the right 

to do so.” Tri-Dam v. Yick, 2013 WL 752197 at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (unpublished). To clarify 

this Court‟s holding, Articles 411 and 413 of the FERC license authorize Tri-Dam to issue 

permits for minor encroachments (i.e. Tri-Dam‟s issuance of permits to private landowners does 

not violate Tri-Dam‟s licensure agreement). Article 413 also imposes upon Tri-Dam a duty to 

ensure that lands within the project boundary are not put to a use that violates the FERC license.5

Articles 411 and 413 do not grant Tri-Dam a property right over lands within the project 

boundary.

The inclusion of lands within a project boundary serves the function of indicating that the 

lands are used in some manner for project purposes. However, the mere inclusion of lands within 

a project boundary will not restrict landowner uses, since such inclusion does not itself create or 

alter property rights. See, e.g., PacifiCorp, order on rehearing, 80 FERC ¶ 61,334, at 62,113 

(1997). A licensee is required to acquire and retain all interests in non-federal lands necessary or 

appropriate to carry out project purposes. See id.; Article 5 of FERC License; VA Timberline, 

L.L.C. v. Appalachian Power Co., 343 F. App'x 915, 917 (4th Cir. 2009) (unpublished); 18 

C.F.R. § 4.32. “These interests can be obtained through easement, fee title, leases, and other 

types of conveyances. The instruments of conveyance define the extent of the licensee's right.”

Union Elec. Co., 137 FERC ¶ 61114 at *8 (2011). Further supporting the conclusion that a 

FERC license conveys no interest in property, Title 16 of the United States Code Section 814 

provides that a licensee may, in the appropriate situation, exercise the right of eminent domain to 

secure a right to property necessary to operation of a dam, reservoir or the works appurtenant or 

 

5

16 U.S.C. § 825p creates jurisdiction in the federal courts to enforce FERC licenses against a FERC licensee. U.S. 

v. Southern California Edison Co., 300 F.Supp.2d 964, 985 (E.D. Cal 2004).

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accessory thereto. 16 U.S.C. § 814. There would be no need for the use of eminent domain if the 

FERC license granted the necessary property interest to a licensee to operate the project.

“[A] SMP is only applicable to lands owned or controlled by a licensee, and has no effect 

on shoreline areas in which a licensee has no interest.” Union Electric Co., 137 FERC ¶ 61114 at 

*4. “[A]n entity with unencumbered fee title to lands within the project boundary is free to use 

them as that entity sees fit.” Union Elec. Co., 140 FERC ¶ 61210 (2012); see also Metro 

Hydroelectric Co., LLC v. Metro Parks, 541 F.3d 605, 612-613 (6th Cir 2008) (holding that 

FERC does not convey a property interest to enter land to conduct an activity required by FERC 

to obtain or maintain a FERC license or permit.)

Therefore, Tri-Dam‟s right to enforce the SMP is restricted by the scope of Tri-Dam‟s 

property interest, in this case an easement, in the Subject Property.

C. Tri-Dam Easement

In 1956, the Oakdale Irrigation District and South San Joaquin Irrigation District 

obtained an easement that extends, at its upper bound, to the 515-foot contour elevation of the 

Tulloch Reservoir. RJN, Exhibit A, Doc. 65-1. Defendants were on record notice of the easement 

as evidenced by the title report submitted by Plaintiff6and Defendants‟ Guarantee of Title. Marrs 

Dec., Exhibit S; Schediwy Dec., Exhibit Z. It is undisputed for purposes of this motion that the 

retaining wall was built below both the 515-foot contour line (where the easement begins) and 

the 510-foot contour line (the high water line and height at which the Schediwy permit required 

the retaining wall built). JSF at ¶ 3; Schediwy Dec. at ¶ 2; Schediwy Dec., Exhibit A; Pope Dec. 

at ¶10.

The extent of an easement “is determined by the terms of the grant, or the nature of the 

enjoyment by which it was acquired.” Cal. Civ. Code, §806. With an express easement, as in this 

case, the only interests that are transferred from the grantor to the grantee are the interests 

expressed in the grant and those necessarily incident to the interests. Pasadena v. California-

 

6 Defendants complain that the Title Report is dated March 19, 2013, after the close of discovery. Defendants 

contend that the report is therefore unauthenticated and inadmissible. There is “evidence sufficient to support a 

finding that the item is what the proponent claim it is.” Fed. R. Evid. 901. Additionally, Defendants‟ Guarantee of 

Title is evidence of recordation of the easement attached to Defendants‟ property.

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Michigan Land & Water Co., 17 Cal.2d 576, 579 (1941). An easement, “unless it is ambiguous, 

must be construed by a consideration of its own terms. The meaning and intent thereof is a 

question of law ....” Gray v. McCormick, 167 Cal. App. 4th 1019, 1024 (2008) (citation 

omitted). The owner of the servient estate may make “use of the area the easement covers so 

long as the use does not „interfere unreasonably‟ with the easement's purpose.” Scruby v. Vintage 

Grapevine, Inc., 37 Cal.App.4th 697, 702-703 (1995) (citing Camp Meeker Water System, Inc. v. 

Public Utilities Com. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 845, 867). Certain uses of lands that are restricted by 

easements are deemed to be an unreasonable interference with the land, as a matter of law. See, 

e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Hacienda Mobile Home Park, 45 Cal. App. 3d 519, 528 (1st 

Dist. 1975). Owner of a servient tenement “may not use their property in a way that obstructs the 

normal use of the easement.” Spencer & Morin Properties, Inc. v. Johnson, ___Cal.Supp.___, 

2012 WL 6686093 at *2 (2012) (unpublished) (citing Blackmore v. Pawell, 150 Cal.App.4th 

1593, 1599 (2007).

The easement language, as stated above, grants Plaintiff “[t]he right to overflow the ... 

land, ... enter upon said land ... to clear, destroy, or dispose ... any obstructions ... and any 

other thing which would in any way interfere with the use of said reservoir, or the waters therein, 

or tend to render unsafe or unsanitary either the reservoir created by said dam or the margin 

thereof.” RJN, Exhibit A, Doc. 65-1; SSF at ¶ 7 (emphasis added). This language is onerous but 

unambiguous. Tri-Dam has the right to destroy, clear or dispose of anything that in any way 

interferes with Tri-Dam‟s use of the reservoir or with the waters.

In VA Timberline, LLC v. Appalachian Power Co., the licensee operating the 

hydroelectric development obtained an easement that permitted it to “cut, burn, and/or remove 

... any and all buildings, structures, improvements ... and other objects ... located on the 

premises below the countor the elevation of which is 620 feet.” The licensee quitclaimed all 

interest in its easement permitting it to remove structures within the project boundary to a 

developer “subject to the terms and conditions of its FERC license.” VA Timberline, LLC v. 

Appalachian Power Co. (“Timberline”), 2008 WL 269544 at *4, aff’d 343 Fed.Appx. 915 (4th 

Cir. 2009). The developer then sought to construct a dock that would violate the terms of the 

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SMP. The licensee denied the developer permission to construct the dock. Fourth Circuit 

affirmed the District Court‟s holding that, based on the property rights maintained under the 

easement, rather than the terms of the SMP, the licensee could remove the dock in question. Id at 

*4-5 and p. 918. The easement in the case at bar predates the SMP and is not contemporaneous 

with its terms. Accordingly, it is possible here that a violation of the SMP may not necessarily 

violate Tri-Dam‟s easement. In order to be subject to removal the retaining wall must violate TriDam‟s easement. 

As discussed, the easement provides that Tri-Dam may remove anything which would in 

any way interfere with the use of the reservoir or the waters therein, or that tends to render 

unsafe or unsanitary the reservoir or the margin thereof. Accordingly, in order for Tri-Dam to 

prove a violation of its easement it must adduce some evidence that the encroachment 

complained of actually interferes with one of the aforementioned items. Article 413 of the FERC 

license requires as a condition of licensure that Tri-Dam comply with the SMP. FERC License at 

p. 28. Tri-Dam claims that any violation of the SMP would interfere with Tri-Dam‟s continued 

use of the reservoir since it could result in revocation of its FERC license.

Section 4.4(2) of the SMP states that “[t]he construction of any facility must be 

completed as described in the approved permit and within twelve months from the date of permit 

approval by Tri-Dam . . .” SMP at p. 10. Defendants do not dispute that the construction of their 

wall was not as described in the approved permit and within twelve months of the date of 

approval. JSF at ¶ 3. Defendants therefore are in violation of the SMP. 7 Despite the fact that the 

parties agree that there is evidence of violation of the SMP, Tri-Dam has failed to establish that 

the violation of the SMP would in fact violate the easement. Tri-Dam has submitted no evidence 

to suggest that FERC would revoke its license based on potential encroachments that do not 

 

7 A violation of the SMP has been established. Accordingly, the Court does not need to revisit Plaintiff‟s prior 

contention that SMP Section 6.3(1) was violated merely by constructing a facility below the 510-foot contour line. 

See Doc 32 at pp. 14-15. Mr. Pope‟s declaration in support of Plaintiff‟s motion for summary judgment at ¶ 10 

(stating that some structures are built below the 510-foot contour line) and the Court‟s reading of Section 6.3 (as 

requiring that a facility must not extent more than 40 feet from the shoreline) confirm this Court‟s prior conclusion 

that the SMP is not violated merely because the structure was built below the 510-foot contour line. Doc. 32 at p. 15.

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interfere with the actual operation of the project. The argument that any violation of the SMP is a 

violation of the easement is therefore rejected.

Tri-Dam has submitted undisputed evidence that indicates that the retaining wall was

built at or below the 506-foot contour line. Accordingly, the wall intrudes several feet below 

510-foot contour level; the normal high water level of the Tulloch Reservoir. In doing so, the 

Schediwy structure, in some way, interferes with the waters within the reservoir by displacing 

the normal flow of the waters. 

Since the retaining wall is an obstruction or thing that in some way interferes with the 

waters of the reservoir by existing below the high water mark and displacing the waters it may be 

destroyed or disposed of as permitted the Tri-Dam easement. 

D. Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment

1. Timeliness

Defendants‟ counsel, Ms. Clack, has missed deadlines three times before. After the denial 

of Defendants‟ motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint on December 11, 2012, 

Defendant was required to file an answer within fourteen (14) days. Defendant failed to do so.

On March 30, 2012, Ms. Clack missed the deadline for initial disclosures. Ms. Clack 

eventually filed late initial disclosures.

On April 30, 2013, Judge Snyder issued an order denying Plaintiff‟s request for sanctions 

based on Ms. Clack having missed an expert disclosure deadline. The Court again made clear to 

Defendants that no further delays would be tolerated. The Court reintegrated “Deadlines are

serious. There must be no more delayed responses or missed deadlines in this case.” Despite this 

admonition Defendants again missed a deadline.

The parties proposed on May 14, 2013, a scheduling order with a dispositive motion 

deadline of October 18, 2013. Judge Snyder adopted the proposed scheduling order in whole. 

Defendants moved for Summary Judgment on November 8, 2013. Defendants were three weeks 

late in filing their motion.

Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Section (f)(1)(C) provides that the Court 

may issue any just order, including those authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(vii), if a party or its 

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attorney fails to obey a scheduling or other pretrial order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f)(1)(C). Rule 

37(b)(2)(A)(iii), (vi), and (vii) provide that the court may issue an order striking pleadings in 

whole or in part, rendering default judgment against the disobedient party, or treating as 

contempt of the court the failure to obey any order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(iii),(vi)-(vii). 

2. Effect of Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

This Court has made the determination to grant summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff 

due to the violation of express terms of the easement. Since Defendants‟ motion is based in part 

on an argument that the easement was not violated it cannot be granted. 

Based on Defendants‟ prior and present unexcused and unjustified violations of deadlines 

and scheduling orders and based on the inconsistency of their argument with the with the Court‟s 

findings in the preceding portion of this order, this Court strikes Defendants motion for summary 

judgment.8

E. Permanent Injunction

A claim for permanent injunction requires a plaintiff to show “(1) that it has suffered an 

irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate 

to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff 

and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 

disserved by a permanent injunction.” Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, 503 F.3d 836, 843 

(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).

1. Irreparable Injury

Loss of an interest in real property constitutes an irreparable injury. Park Village Apt. 

Tenants Ass’n v. Mortimer Howard Trust, 636 F.3d 1150, 1159 (9th Cir. 2011); Sundance Land 

Corp. v. Community First Fed‟d Sav. & Lan Ass‟n, 840 F.2d 653, 661 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, a 

failure to enjoin Defendant‟s nonconforming use of the servient tenement would deprive Plaintiff 

of its property rights under its easement.

 

8 Defendants‟ argument regarding the proposed injunction, specifically the potential harm to the lake bed, is 

considered and addressed in the following section.

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Substantial harm to or loss of business constitutes an irreparable injury. Doran v. Salem 

Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975). As this Court held on the same facts in Tri-Dam v. 

Schediwy, 2011 WL 6692587 at *10 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (unpublished), and discussed above, TriDam has adduced evidence showing irreparable injury in the form of a violation of Section 

4.4(2) of the SMP in addition to the permit violation. As discussed above, Tri-Dam‟s failure or 

inability to correct SMP violations places its license to operate the dam in jeopardy.9

2. No Remedy at Law

Monetary damages would not suffice to remedy Defendants‟ violation of the SMP or the 

interference with the waters of the Tulloch Reservoir. Accordingly, Plaintiff has no remedy at 

law.

3. Balance of Hardships

Plaintiff has a strong interest in obtaining an injunction ensuring compliance with its 

FERC license. If Plaintiff fails to gain compliance its FERC license could be subject to 

forfeiture. Defendants do not dispute that their wall was constructed in violation of the permit 

and below the 510-foot contour elevation. Rather, Defendants allege that “Section 4.6 [of the 

SMP] provides for „modification‟ as an option to Tri-Dam for non-complying structures.” 

Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (“Opposition”) at p. 26. Defendants omit from 

their motion the fact that the SMP provides that any one or more of the following could be 

imposed as consequences for failure to comply with SMP regulations: “unwanted construction 

delays, suspension or cancellation of approved applications, increase in fees, modification or 

removal of non-complying structures and restoration of disturbed areas at the owner‟s expense, 

loss of any consideration for future reservoir use applications until the violation is successfully 

resolved.” SMP at p. 11. Although Defendants claim that they did not actually obtain a copy of 

the SMP until they sought to submit a new permit application, it was accessible to them at any 

time. Accordingly, Defendants‟ argument that they were without constructive knowledge is 

unavailing. 

 

9 This Court does not need to determine whether the wall threatens public safety and impedes navigation for 

purposes of establishing an irreparable injury.

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As Plaintiff notes, if this Court refuses to grant injunctive relief Plaintiff will have no 

ability to enforce the SMP or uniformly regulate development on the Tulloch Reservoir. MSJ at 

p. 26. Such a position would render Plaintiff unable to prevent obstructions that could decrease 

the holding capacity of the reservoir and impair its ability to provide electricity, water, and 

recreation to the area, as required by its license and the SMP.

Defendants do not seek to oppose destruction of their wall. Instead they seek to use the 

footings of the existing structure as supports for a new dock; a measure that they claim will 

prevent shoreline erosion. Although Defendants have no legal claim of entitlement to a 

modification of their permit prior to their destruction of the improperly built retaining wall, this 

Court recognizes Defendants‟ concerns of inefficiency at removal of the retaining wall and 

filling of the shoreline only to excavate the recently filled land pursuant to a new permit. Further, 

the court recognizes that any unnecessary excavation in the lake bed that would cause damage to 

the reservoir is a harm that both parties would seek to avoid.

To the extent possible, if the project could be accomplished as Defendants suggest and 

comply with Plaintiff‟s permit procedure this Court believes that equity would be served by such 

a resolution.

Generally, when a court makes a determination upon balancing the equities it considers 

the cost of compliance for a defendant. Here, the monetary cost of compliance for Defendants, 

although relatively high, was awarded to Defendants in 2005. 

Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that the balance of hardships favors the 

Plaintiff.

4. Public Interest Not Disserved

The public has an interest in navigability and safety of the reservoir. In order for Plaintiff 

to ensure that the reservoir is maintained in conformity with SMP requirements it must be able to 

ensure that any interference with the waters of the Tulloch Reservoir be prevented. The public 

would not be disserved by enforcement of the Tri-Dam easement.

Further, the public has an interest in continued operation of the Tulloch Project. Tri-Dam 

could be hindered in that operational goal if no injunction were granted.

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Accordingly, public policy would not be disserved by granting of this injunction. 

5. Scope of Injunction

“The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the [court] to do equity and to 

mold each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has 

distinguished it.” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (citing Hecht Co. v. 

Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)). District Courts are granted wide latitude in shaping equitable

relief. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 570 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2009); Apple Inc. v. 

Psystar Corp., 673 F.Supp.2d 943, 951 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 

Here, Plaintiff has a procedure for the public to obtain encroachment permits for 

properties that fall within the 515-foot contour line. Defendants followed this procedure then, 

due primarily to the fault of Defendants‟ contractor, the structure was built incorrectly. The 

permit procedure provides, as Defendants point out, that a failure to comply with permit 

procedures could appropriately result in modification of the non-complying structure at the 

property owner‟s expense. Equity would support such an outcome to the extent that it is 

consistent with Tri-Dam‟s established permitting procedures. In the event that Defendants are

unable to submit a SMP compliant permit application the foregoing factors support a remedy in 

equity requiring Defendants to completely remove the retaining wall and backfill the excavation 

area to its pre-excavation condition.

V. ORDER

Having concluded that a permanent injunction would be consistent with traditional 

principles of equity, and having considered the four eBay factors to reach that determination, the 

Court hereby finds that the following injunction is both equitable and reasonable to prevent or 

restrain further violation of Plaintiff‟s easement.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Tri-Dam‟s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as 

follows:

1. Defendants are REQUIRED to submit to Tri-Dam and the Army Corps of Engineers 

within 30 days a detailed plan regarding bringing their property into compliance by 

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destroying their retaining wall, including the footings, and filling the property to its preexcavation condition. 

2. Defendants MAY submit to Tri-Dam and the Army Corps of Engineers within 30 days a 

detailed plan regarding bringing their property into compliance by destroying their 

retaining wall down to the footings. This proposal must contain a plan for constructing a 

retaining wall that meets with Tri-Dam‟s requirements and makes use of the presently 

placed footings. Tri-Dam is encouraged but not required to consider granting a permit to 

Defendants as they have proposed.

3. In either case, Tri-Dam is to issue a decision to Defendants regarding the permit 

applications submitted in compliance with this order. 

4. Within 60 days of the entry of Tri-Dam‟s decision on the permit application(s), or as soon 

thereafter as approved by the Army Corps of Engineers, Defendants MUST begin 

demolition of their retaining wall. Defendants are to complete their demolition and 

removal of the debris without unreasonable delay and in no event beyond the one-year 

timeframe provided by Section 4.4(2) of the SMP. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 5, 2014 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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