Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01224/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01224-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Raymond W. Vance
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

Unit.ed States Court of Appeals · 'I'enth Circuit 

FEB 211989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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No. 88-1224 

RAYMOND W. VANCE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 87-CR-117-B) 

Carl Hughes (Michael E. Grant, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him 

on the briefs), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the DefendantAppellant. 

David O'Meilia (Tony M. Graham, United States Attorney, and Susan 

w. Pennington, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), 

Assistant United States Attorney, for the Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before LOGAN, SETH, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-1224 Document: 01019739949 Date Filed: 02/21/1989 Page: 1 
This appeal is from an order of the district court requiring 

defendant Raymond Vance to pay restitution in the amount of 

$212,098.35 to the Bank of Oklahoma, and $42,610.93 to the Century 

National Bank of Oklahoma. Both banks are located in Pryor, 

Oklahoma. The issue raised on appeal is whether the district 

court abused its discretion in ordering restitution for the amount 

of the total loss to the banks, rather than limiting restitution 

to the amounts directly associated with the two counts of the 

indictment to which Vance pleaded guilty. We hold that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the 

restitution order and affirm. 

Vance owned and operated a recreational vehicle sales lot in 

Chouteau, Oklahoma. In 1985 Vance entered into a floor plan 

financing agreement with the Bank of Oklahoma (BOK). The 

agreement provided that BOK would finance 100 percent of the 

purchase price of certain recreational vehicles in exchange for a 

security interest in those vehicles. Upon the sale of a vehicle, 

Vance was to reimburse BOK the amount of money borrowed for that 

vehicle including interest. Vance secured a similar financing 

arrangement with the Century National Bank of Oklahoma (Century 

Bank), also located in Pryor, Oklahoma. Pursuant to a floor plan 

agreement, Century Bank also financed the purchase price of 

recreational vehicles in exchange for Vance's execution of a 

promissory note and security interest agreement in favor of 

Century Bank. 

Vance violated the terms of the floor plan agreements by 

selling vehicles covered by the plans and failing to remit the 

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Appellate Case: 88-1224 Document: 01019739949 Date Filed: 02/21/1989 Page: 2 
proceeds to BOK and Century Bank. Vance was indicted on six 

1 counts of bank fraud under 18 u.s.c. § 1344. Each count of the 

indictment recited a vehicle that was sold in violation of one of 

the floor plan agreements. Vance entered a plea of guilty to 

Counts II and VI of the indictment pursuant to a plea agreement 

with the United States Attorney. All other counts of the 

indictment were dismissed. The judgment of the district court 

imposed a suspended sentence of five years and ordered as a 

condition of probation that Vance make restitution for the full 

loss sust~ined by the two banks as a result of the entire scheme 

covered by the original indictment: $212,098.35 to BOK and 

$42,610.93 to Century Bank. 2 

1 Section 1344, in relevant part, imposes criminal penalties 

upon one who "knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme 

or artifice • • • to defraud a federally chartered or insured 

financial institution." 18 u.s.c. § 1344(a). 

2 The district court's order does not specify whether the 

condition of probation was imposed under the relevant provision of 

the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 u.s.c. § 3579 

(renumbered as 18 u.s.c. § 3663 effective November 1, 1986), or 

the relevant provision of the Probation Act, 18 u.s.c. § 3651 

(repealed effective November 1, 1987). This circuit recently held 

that a victim's recovery under the VWPA is not limited to the 

amount charged in the indictment relating to particular counts of 

the offense. United States v. Hill, 798 F.2d 402, 405 (10th Cir. 

1986). Thus, if the judge proceeded under the VWPA, he was well 

within his discretion to order restitution for the full amount of 

loss to the banks. 

The district judge, however, did not mention the VWPA and did 

not make any of the detailed factual findings that are required 

under that Act. Additionally, the court's judgment parallels the 

structure and requirements of the Probation Act. Section 3651 

limits probation to five years and makes restitution, within the 

discretion of the court, a "condition thereof.'' The court's 

judgment stated that "you [Vance] will be placed on probation for 

a period of five years with the special condition thereto that you 

make restitution." 

(Footnote Continued on Following Page) 

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Appellate Case: 88-1224 Document: 01019739949 Date Filed: 02/21/1989 Page: 3 
Counts II and VI of the indictment related to specific 

vehicles involved in the fraudulent scheme. The total loss 

related to those vehicles was $28,600. Vance challenges the 

restitution order, claiming that it should have been limited to 

the $28,600 directly associated with Counts II and VI of the 

indictment. 

The Government argues that Vance failed to object to the 

court's order of restitution at sentencing and therefore waived 

his right to review. The sparse record designated in this case 

makes it impossible to determine whether Vance effectively waived 

his right to review. Because the imposition of an illegal 

sentence would constitute plain error, we assume but do not decide 

that the objection was preserved for review by this court. See 

Fed R. Crim. P. 52(b); c. Wright, 3A Federal Practice and 

Procedure, S 851, at 294-95 (2d ed. 1982). 

The imposition of restitution rests within the discretion of 

the trial court. See Herzfeld v. United States Dist. Court, 699 

F.2d 503, 505-06 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983). 

A restitution order will not be overturned absent an abuse of 

discretion. Cf. United States v. Richard, 738 F.2d 1120, 1122 

(Footnote Continued from Previous Page) 

The Seventh Circuit recently discussed the interplay between 

the two acts. "The VWPA does not supersede section 3651; rather, 

it complements the section. Thus, restitution as a condition of 

probation still is governed by section 3651 while restitution as 

part of an executed sentence is available for offenses committed 

after January 1, 1983 under section 3579." United States v. 

Mischler, 787 F.2d 240, 245 (7th Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted). 

Because the district judge did not make the findings necessary 

under the VWPA, and the sentencing order echoed the Probation Act 

by imposing restitution as a condition of probation, we assume 

that the district judge ordered restitution under section 3651. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1224 Document: 01019739949 Date Filed: 02/21/1989 Page: 4 
(10th Cir. 1984) (discussing review of restitution order under 

VWPA). 

The Probation Act provides, in relevant part, as follows: 

Upon entering a judgment of conviction • . • any 

court ••• when satisfied that the ends of justice and 

the best interest of the public as well as the defendant 

will be served thereby, may suspend the imposition or 

execution of sentence and place the defendant on 

probation for such period and upon such terms and 

conditions as the court deems best. 

The period of probation .•• shall not exceed five 

years. 

While on probation and· among the conditions 

thereof, the defendant --

May be required to pay a fine in one or 

several sums; and 

May be required to make restitution or 

reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages 

or loss caused by the offense for which 

conviction was had • • • • 

18 U.S.C. § 3651 (repealed effective November 1, 1987). 

The issue here is whether the phrase "caused by the offense 

for which conviction was had" limits the discretion of the trial 

judge to order that the defendant pay restitution only for the 

amounts associated with the counts to which the defendant pleaded 

guilty. We decline to follow the circuits that define that phrase 

in such narrow terms. See, ~' United States Y..!. Black, 767 F.2d 

1334, 1342-44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1022 (1985); 

United States Y..!. Johnson, 700 F.2d 699, 701 (11th Cir. 1983). 3 

3 The Eleventh Circuit remanded Johnson -to assure th·at 

restitution was not awarded for counts to which defendants were 

acquitted or mistried. Although not presented for review here, 

do not reject the portion of the holding suggesting that an 

acquittal may be enough to bar restitution. 

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We 

we 

Appellate Case: 88-1224 Document: 01019739949 Date Filed: 02/21/1989 Page: 5 
join the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, which hold that when 

the original indictment charged a conspiracy or fraudulent scheme, 

the restitution order may permissibly encompass all losses related 

to the scheme or conspiracy and need not be limited to those 

associated with the counts to which the defendant pleaded guilty. 

See United States v. Woods, 775 F.2d 82, 88 (3d Cir. 1985); United 

States v. McMichael, 699 F.2d 193, 195 (4th Cir. 1983); United 

States v. Davies, 683 F.2d 1052, 1054 (7th Cir. 1982). 

Here, Vance perpetrated a scheme to defraud BOK and Century 

Bank. Although the scheme was furthered by separate acts of 

failing to report the sales of specific recreational vehicles in 

violation of the floor plan agreements, "[i]t is the overall 

scheme that is central to all the counts [charged in the 

indictment] and gives rise to the victims' financial loss." 

United States Y..:. Woods, 775 F.2d at 88. We therefore hold that 

the scheme as a whole may be treated as a unitary offense for the 

purpose of determining restitution under section 3651. 

Restitution under the Probation Act "serves an important 

rehabilitative function because it requires a defendant to 

acknowledge guilt and accept responsibility for his or her 

actions." United States Y..:. Whitney, 785 F.2d 824, 825 (9th Cir. 

1986), amended, 838 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1988) (amendment not 

affecting quoted portion); see also Davies, 683 F.2d at 1055. In 

our view, interpreting the term ''offense" broadly to encompass all 

the acts of a scheme to defraud -- thereby permitting a sentencing 

judge to order restitution up to the entire amount associated with 

the fraudulent scheme rather than limiting restitution to the 

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Appellate Case: 88-1224 Document: 01019739949 Date Filed: 02/21/1989 Page: 6 
amounts associated with the counts to which a defendant pleaded 

guilty -- furthers the rehabilitative purposes of the Probation 

Act. 

Furthermore, a broad interpretation of the scope of the 

sentencing judge's discretion under the Probation Act avoids 

unnecessary restrictions in the plea bargaining process. We agree 

with the Seventh Circuit that: 

Restriction of restitution as proposed by the 

defendant would severely restrict plea-bargaining in 

multicount indictment cases, because the Government 

would be prohibited from entering plea bargains as to 

some counts if that would eliminate restitution for 

further illegal proceeds, even though receipt of such 

proceeds was acknowledged by the defendant, as here. It 

would also require the Government to obtain indictments 

with hundreds of counts in cases ••• where the scheme 

is one of widespread but individually small acts of 

fraud. 

Davies, 683 F.2d at 1055. 

In Davies the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of a 

multicount indictment for mail fraud. The court held that 

restitution could properly be awarded 

in the amount of actual damage and loss to the victim, 

even if that exceeds the amount in the counts pleaded 

to, when (a) the defendant has obtained the proceeds as 

part of an ongoing scheme to defraud which extends over 

time, and (b) the amount of the damages to the victim 

has been established with specificity and admitted to by 

the defendant in the indictment, the plea agreement, and 

plea and presentence proceedings. 

Id. at 1054. 

In this case, Vance obtained proceeds as part of an ongoing 

scheme to defraud BOK and Century Bank. Vance does not contest 

the amount owed to either bank. Further, the -plea agreement 

between Vance and the Government clearly stated that sentencing 

discretion remained with the trial court: 

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Appellate Case: 88-1224 Document: 01019739949 Date Filed: 02/21/1989 Page: 7 
There are no agreements whatsoever as to what sentence 

your client will or should receive pursuant to the plea 

agreement. In other words, sentencing will remain in 

the total discretion of the trial court judge. 

Accordingly, pursuant to the terms of this agreement, 

your client faces a maximum punishment of ten (10) 

years' imprisonment and/or faces the imposition of a 

maximum fine of $SOO,OOO.OO and a $100 special 

assessment. Finally, there will be no agreements or 

understandings regarding this plea agreement other than 

those set forth in this document. 

(emphasis in original). We therefore hold that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution for the 

entire amount Vance obtained in the fraudulent scheme. 

Although the court can properly order restitution in an 

amount representing the total loss to the victims of a crime under 

the Probation Act, the federal rules may require that the 

defendant first be given notice that restitution is a possibility 

prior to entering a guilty plea. See Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(c). A 

1985 amendment to rule 11 requires that before accepting a plea of 

guilty, in addition to informing the defendant of the possible 

maximum penalty and the mandatory minimum penalty, the judge must 

inform the defendant, and determine that the defendant 

understands, "that the court may also order the defendant to make 

restitution to any victim of the offense. 114 

4 Rule ll(c) provides in relevant part that "[b]efore accepting 

a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the 

defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, 

and determine that the defendant understands • • . the nature of 

the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum 

penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty 

provided by law, including the effect of any special parole term 

and, when applicable, that the court may also order the defendant 

to make restitution to any victim o~.-the offense • ·~ •• " Fed. R. 

Crim. P. ll(c). The adoption of the VWPA appears to be the reason 

for amending rule 11. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 advisory 

committee's note (1985 amendment). It is not clear, however, what 

(Footnote Continued on Following Page) 

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Appellate Case: 88-1224 Document: 01019739949 Date Filed: 02/21/1989 Page: 8 
Again, the sparse record designated in this case makes it 

impossible to determine whether the judge informed Vance of the 

possibility of restitution under the Probation Act at the time of 

taking the plea. Assuming that the judge failed to inform Vance 

of the possibility of restitution, we hold any such error to be 

harmless.s See United States Y..!. Pomazi, 851 F.2d 244, 251 (9th 

Cir. 1988) (failure to give notice of restitution under VWPA held 

harmless when defendant had prior notice of possible fine in 

excess of restitution amount ultimately ordered.) 

(Footnote Continued from Previous Page) 

effect this amendment was intended to have regarding the Probation 

Act. Although the language of rule 11 fails to distinguish 

between restitution under the VWPA and under the Probation Act, it 

does specifically state that the judge is required to give notice 

when restitution "may also" be ordered. Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(c)(l) 

(emphasis added). This may be interpreted to require that the 

judge inform the defendant of restitution only when there is a 

possibility of restitution in addition to the mandatory minimum or 

possible maximum penalty provided for the offense to which the 

defendant is pleading. The VWPA authorizes restitution in 

addition to any other penalty provided by law. Alternatively, the 

Probation Act authorizes restitution only as a condition of 

probation arising from the suspension of the imposition or 

execution of the defendant's sentence. Hence, under the VWPA, 

restitution may be ordered in addition to a sentence, while under 

the Probation Act, restitution may be ordered only in lieu of the 

sentence. · 

The fact that at the time of the 1985 amendment the Probation 

Act was scheduled to be repealed on November 1, 1986, see 

Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 

tit. 2, S 212 (a) ( 2), 98 Stat·. 1976, 1987, may explain the failure 

to mention the rule's effect on notice under the Probation Act. 

At least one circuit has noted the requirement of informing 

the defendant of the possibility of restitution under rule 11 

without distinguishing between restitution under the VWPA and 

restitution under the Probation Act or deciding explicitly whether 

the rule 11 requirement applies to both. See United States v . .. Grewal, 825 F.2d 220 (9'th.-Cir. 1987). 

5 Rule ll(h) provides that "[a]ny variance from the procedures 

required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights 

shall be disregarded." Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(h). 

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Appellate Case: 88-1224 Document: 01019739949 Date Filed: 02/21/1989 Page: 9 
Here, Vance's petition to enter a plea of guilty specifically 

states that his attorney informed him of the possibility of 

restitution under the VWPA. Vance was therefore clearly aware of 

the possibility of restitution despite any lack of formal notice 

from the court. There is nothing in the record to indicate that 

Vance's plea would have been different had the court notified him 

of restitution under the Probation Act. Further, Vance was 

informed of a possible fine of $500,000 in the plea agreement 

letter, an amount well below the $254,709.28 restitution amount 

ultimately ordered, and Vance was specifically on notice that 

sentencing would remain "in the total discretion of the trial 

court judge." The district court's order that Vance pay 

restitution as a condition of probation is therefore AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1224 Document: 01019739949 Date Filed: 02/21/1989 Page: 10 
No. 88-1224, UNITED STATES v. VANCE 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

I respectfully dissent. The language of the Federal 

Probation Act, 18 u.s.c. S 3651, is clear: restitution may be 

ordered only for damages "caused by the offense for which 

conviction was had." Here, conviction was had on the two counts 

to which Vance pleaded guilty, and the plain language of the 

statute limits restitution to damages charged in those two 

counts. 1 Conviction was not had, and could not be had, on the 

four counts that were dismissed. See United States v. Orr, 691 

F.2d 431, 432 (9th Cir. 1982) ("restitution [can] be ordered only 

for amounts in counts upon which conviction was had and not for 

amounts set· forth in dismissed counts, since a conviction for a 

greater amount could not have been had"). When the meaning of a 

criminal statute is plain, the statute will not be construed to 

include anything beyond its letter. See, ~' United States v. 

Sparrow, 635 F.2d 794, 796 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 

1004 (1980). And doubts about the meaning of a criminal statute 

are resolved in favor of the defendant. United States v. Bass, 

404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971). The majority's construction violates 

these rules. 

The majority does not rely upon any legislative history to 

circumvent the plain language of S 3651; it does so by focusing on 

1 A guilty plea is "itself a conviction; nothing remains but 

give judgment and determine ptinishment." Boykin v. Alabama, 

U.S. 238, 242 (1969); see also United States v. Crockett, 812 

626, 629 (10th Cir. 1987).~-

to 

395 

F.2d 

Appellate Case: 88-1224 Document: 01019739949 Date Filed: 02/21/1989 Page: 11 
the word "offense," ignoring the words "for which conviction was 

had," concluding that the "offense" was the total scheme to 

defraud the banks. But a conviction was not. had for the total 

"offense," even giving that word a broad interpretation, because 

the government voluntarily dismissed four counts of the indictment 

constituting part of the "offense." 

If the term "offense" is not limited by the ''conviction was 

had" phrase, there is nothing in the unitary scheme theory to 

prevent an order of restitution based on counts for which the 

defendant was acquitted. Although the majority appears to 

disclaim such a result by noting that "acquittal may be enough to 

bar restitution," ante 5 n.3 (emphasis added), the logic of its 

interpretation of S 3651 is to the contrary. I do not see how the 

"conviction was had" words of limitation.can be read· out ·the 

section when dealing with a plea bargain and read back in when 

dealing with an acquittal. All of the cases I have found that 

directly confront the issue have held that an acquittal bars 

restitution on the particular count under S 3651. United States 

v. Pollak, 844 F.2d 145, 152 (3d Cir. 1988) (using unitary scheme 

notion to award restitution on counts on which defendant was 

acquitted "would be at odds with the significance of an acquittal 

in our criminal jurisprudence") (footnote omitted); United States 

v. Johnson, 700 F.2d 699, 701 (11th Cir. 1983) ("In a multiple 

count indictment, restitution is restricted to the counts that 

result in conviction," not those for which the defendants "were 

acquitted or mistried."); United States v. Brown, 699 ·F.2d 704, 

711 (5th Cir. 1983). 

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Appellate Case: 88-1224 Document: 01019739949 Date Filed: 02/21/1989 Page: 12 
I also believe that our prior case law at least implicitly 

accepts the narrower reading I would give S 3651. United States 

v. Hill, 798 F.2d 402, 405 (10th Cir. 1986), involved the Victim 

and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 u.s.c. S 3579(a) (now 

codified at 18 u.s.c. S 3663(a)). We there held that restitution 

under the VWPA was not limited to amounts specified in the 

indictment or particular counts of an offense, but we stressed 

that "the VWPA does not contain [§ 365l's] limiting language." 

798 F.2d. at 405. We also stated that the main objective of the 

VWPA is compensatory and that the "decision of a prosecutor to 

indict a defendant and the manner in which a defendant is indicted 

have little, if anything, to do with the objectives of the VWPA." 

Id. Finally, we noted that "[w]hile the VWPA provisions provide 

the district courts greater latitute in compensating crime 

victims, the VWPA also imposes several procedural requirements 

which were not in effect under the Federal Probation Act." Id. at 

406. 

The VWPA does have a number of protections not present in 

S 3651, which justifies a very different construction of the two 

acts. Under the VWPA the court, in determining whether to order 

restitution, considers in addition to the amount of the victim's 

loss, "the financial resources of the defendant, the financial 

needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's 

dependents, and such other factors as the court deems 

appropriate." 18 u.s.c. S 3664(a). Before the court acts it must .. 

disclose this information to the defendant, and "[a]ny dispute as 

to the proper amount or type of restitution shall be resolved by 

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Appellate Case: 88-1224 Document: 01019739949 Date Filed: 02/21/1989 Page: 13 
the court by the preponderance of the evidence." Id. § 3664(c) & 

(d). 

I believe that departure from the plain meaning of the 

statute to permit a restitution order in excess pf the amounts 

charged in the counts on which there was conviction can only be 

justified on the basis of enforcing a bargain struck by agreement 

between the defendant and the government. See, ~' United 

States v. Suter, 755 F.2d 523, 527 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 

U.S. 1103 (1985); United States v. Green, 735 F.2d 1203, 1205 (9th 

Cir. 1984); United States v. Davies, 683 F.2d 1052, 1053, 1055 

(7th Cir. 1982); Phillips v. United States, 679 F.2d 192, 194 (9th 

Cir. 1982). Requiring the agreement of the defendant ensures that 

the decision is a voluntary and knowing waiver of important 

rights. See Brady v. United States, ·397 u;s. 742, 748 (1970); 

Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243. 

There can be no explicit bargain without a meeting of minds. 

Therefore, I could not hold that lack of notice to Vance on the 

amount of restitution he might be required to pay in excess of 

that set out in the counts to which he pleaded guilty could be 

harmless error. The circuits adopting the majority's view of 

§ 3651 might not require an explicit agreement to the larger 

restitution total, but they clearly require more specific notice 

of the amount of restitution that might be ordered than Vance 

received here. 2 The Seventh Circuit's rule implementing the 

2 The plea agreement was on a standardized printed form 

containing several pages, only part of which would be applicable 

to Vance. On page 3 the form referenced that Vance might have to 

pay restitution under the VWPA; on page 2 it stated he might be 

Continued to next page 

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Appellate Case: 88-1224 Document: 01019739949 Date Filed: 02/21/1989 Page: 14 
unitary scheme theory, enunciated in United States v. Davies, 683 

F.2d 1052 (7th Cir. 1982), and quoted by the majority, presupposes 

notice to the defendant of the amount he may be called upon to 

pay. See id. at 1054 (amount of damages must be "admitted to by 

the defendant in the indictment, the plea agreement, and plea and 

presentence proceedings"). In Davies, the plea agreement itself 

provided for restitution as a condition of probation and the 

defendant acknowledged the amount of loss caused by his fraud 

before the court accepted his plea. Id. at 1053, 1055; see also 

United States v. Paul, 783 F.2d 84, 88-89 (7th Cir. 1986) 

(possibility of restitution was raised and discussed during plea 

hearing; restitution order modified on appeal to conform to amount 

defendant admitted during plea hearing). 

In United States v. Woods, 775 F.2d 82, 83 (3d Cir. 1985), 

relied on by the majority, "the likelihood of a restitution order 

and its extent were fully explained to [the defendant] by the 

district court before accepting the plea." In rejecting the 

defendant's contention that he should be permitted to withdraw his 

guilty plea, the Third Circuit stated that 

"there can be no question on this record but that 

defendant was told in unequivocal terms that restitution 

would be imposed as a part of probation. The lengthy 

colloquy before the plea was accepted could not be 

clearer. It is also significant that after the district 

court stated its intention to impose restitution, it 

afforded the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his 

plea and go to trial. Thus, the court did not accept 

the plea until after the defendant indicated he 

Continued from previous page 

subject to a fine as high as $500,000. The 

about § 3651 or any amount of restitution. 

Agreement at 2, 3. 

-5-

form said nothing 

R. Tab Min 12/14 Plea 

Appellate Case: 88-1224 Document: 01019739949 Date Filed: 02/21/1989 Page: 15 
understood that restitution would be ordered and that he 

had the option of asking for a trial." 

Id. at 86.' The implicit notice requirement of Woods was 

formalized in United States v. Hawthorne, 806 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 

1986). In Hawthorne, the Third Circuit held that 

"[W]here a plea is sought on a count(s) on which 

restitution in an amount exceeding that charged in the 

particular count(s) may properly be imposed, the 

government must in the course of negotiating the plea, 

inform the defendant of the possibility that restitution 

will be required so as to afford the defendant a full 

opportunity to assess adequately all the consequences 

prior to entering a plea of guilty. In the absence of a 

provision for restitution in the plea agreement, the 

district court must, prior to accepting the plea, inform 

the defendant of the possibility of its imposition 

before a subsequent order of restitution in an amount 

exceeding that charged in the count(s) to which the 

defendant pleaded may be sustained." 

Id. at 499. 

The. majority also relies on the Fourth Circuit's opinion in 

United States v. McMichael, 699 F.2d 193 (4th Cir. 1983). In 

McMichael, although restitution apparently was not mentioned until 

the sentencing hearing, the district court 

"recessed the proceedings to allow time for McMichael, 

his attorney, and the government's attorney to determine 

how much had been embezzled and whether McMichael would 

be willing to repay that amount. When the parties 

returned, McMichael's counsel advised the court that his 

client would agree to an order of restitution and that 

the amount of restitution should be $14,119.06. 

McMichael, himself, stated that the Bank of Virginia was 

entitled to at least $14,119.06 in restitution and that 

he wanted the court to order the repayment of that 

amount as a condition of probation." 

Id. at 194. 

Section 3651 has now been repealed, and perhaps because of 

that this case is of no great moment except to Vance. But I write 

.in dissent because legal principles applicable to the construction 

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Appellate Case: 88-1224 Document: 01019739949 Date Filed: 02/21/1989 Page: 16 
of criminal statutes and procedural protections are slighted by 

the majority opinion. I would limit the restitution order to the 

amounts expressed in the counts to which Vance pleaded guilty. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1224 Document: 01019739949 Date Filed: 02/21/1989 Page: 17