Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-02182/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-02182-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Auburn
Defendant
Dalton Edward Dyer
Plaintiff
Joshua Eagan
Defendant
Matthew Nichols
Defendant
John Ruffcorn
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DALTON EDWARD DYER, 

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF AUBURN, et. al,

Defendants.

No. 2:21-cv-02182-JAM-JDP

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE

I. BACKGROUND1

This action arises from an October 12, 2018, incident in

which Dalton Edward Dyer (“Plaintiff”) alleges City of Auburn 

Police Officers Joshua Eagan (“Eagan”) and Matthew Nichols 

(“Nichols”) wrongfully detained, searched, beat, tased, and

arrested him. See First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 9. That 

day, Plaintiff was riding in the passenger seat of a friend’s 

vehicle when Officer Eagan arrested the friend on a suspected 

DUI. Id. ¶ 13. After Eagan placed the friend in his patrol 

vehicle, Plaintiff asked for permission to speak to his friend, 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for May 3, 2022.

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which Eagan granted. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. Plaintiff approached the 

back of the vehicle and began talking to his friend. Id. ¶ 15. 

At that point, Officer Nichols arrived on the scene. Id. ¶ 16.

Nichols approached Plaintiff from behind, pushed him up against 

the patrol car, and starting rifling through his pockets. Id. 

Nichols then pinned Plaintiff’s hands behind his back as Eagan 

repeatedly punched him in the face. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff cried 

out various times: “I’m not doing nothing!” Id. ¶¶ 18-19. The 

two officers then grabbed him by his arms and swung him around. 

Id. ¶ 19. Eagan deployed his taser twice, hitting both Plaintiff 

and Nichols and causing both to collapse to the ground. Id.

¶ 20. Thereafter Plaintiff was arrested. Id. ¶ 21. 

In the months following his arrest, Plaintiff alleges 

unidentified officers followed him, stationed cars outside of his 

home, and threatened him on the internet. Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff 

was charged with a misdemeanor count for willful resistance, 

delay, and obstruction of Officers Nichols and Eagan. Id. ¶ 24. 

That misdemeanor will be dismissed contingent upon Plaintiff

obeying all laws through February 10, 2022.2 Id. ¶ 25. 

This lawsuit followed. See Compl., ECF No. 1. In the

operative complaint, Plaintiff asserts seventeen federal and 

state law claims against the City of Auburn, John Ruffcorn, 

Joshua Eagan, and Matthew Nichols (“Defendants”). See generally

FAC. Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss and to

strike. See Mot., ECF No. 11-1. Plaintiff filed an opposition. 

See Opp’n, ECF No. 16. Defendants replied. See Reply, ECF No. 

2 Plaintiff notes in opposition that the charges were in fact 

dismissed. Opp’n at 4.

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17. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part 

and denies in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss and denies 

Defendants’ motion to strike. 

II. OPINION

A. Motion to Strike

A Rule 12(f) motion asks the Court to strike portions of a 

complaint that are “redundant, immaterial, impertinent or 

scandalous.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). However, “[m]otions to 

strike are disfavored and infrequently granted.” Neveu v. City 

of Fresno, 392 F.Supp.2d 1159, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2005). It must be 

“clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible 

bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.” Id. Moreover, 

“courts often require a showing of prejudice by the moving 

party.” Wynes v. Kaiser Permanente Hosp., No. 2:10-cv-00702-MCEGGH, 2011 WL 1302916, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2011).

Here, Defendants move to strike paragraphs 8, 9, and 28 of 

the operative complaint. Mot. at 14-15. According to 

Defendants, paragraph 8 concerns “an unrelated lawsuit”;

paragraph 9 concerns “an unrelated alleged 2017 incident 

involving Defendant Nichols while employed with a different 

agency”; and paragraph 28 alleges “in the months that followed

[Plaintiff’s arrest]” he was “harassed by the police.” Id. at 

14. Defendants contend these paragraphs should be stricken as 

impertinent because they do not bear sufficient connection to the 

events here. Id. at 15.

Plaintiff counters that all the information in these 

paragraphs is relevant. Opp’n at 13-15. Specifically, as to 

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paragraph 9, the allegations that Officer Nichols previously shot 

multiple suspects, shot a police dog, and then tried to cover up 

this misconduct are relevant to the negligent hiring claim. Id.

at 13-14. Additionally, Plaintiff argues these same facts are 

relevant to “his inclination to use excessive force and to lie, 

making paragraph 9 relevant to: Counts I, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, 

IX, XI XII, and XIV.” Id. at 14.

As to paragraphs 8 and 28, Plaintiff contends these are 

relevant to his intentional infliction of emotional distress

(“IIED”) claim. Id. Paragraph 8 references a news article 

entitled Auburn Police Officer Allegedly Threatens Advocate of 

Dalton Dyer, Jr. on Administrative Leave, which describes how

Eagan followed a supporter of Plaintiff home and displayed a 

“white power hand signal.” FAC ¶ 8. Paragraph 28 provides: “In 

the months that followed [Dyer’s] arrest, he was harassed by the 

police. They would station police cars outside of his home and 

would tail him when he would drive. An unknown officer even 

tagged him in a Facebook post on the Placer County Sheriffs 

Association page in a thinly veiled threat.” Id. ¶ 28. 

Plaintiff contends these paragraphs provide evidence of 

Defendants’ extreme and outrageous behavior, an element of an 

IIED claim. Opp’n at 14. Further, Plaintiff argues the “white 

power hand signal” allegation is relevant to Eagan’s “motive to 

not intervene to stop Nichols’ unlawful detention and search, but 

instead to join in by escalating to violence (Counts I, II, VI, 

VII, XIII).” Id. at 15. 

Defendants’ response to these arguments was in the portion 

of their reply brief that went over the Court’s page limit for 

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reply memoranda. See Order re Filing Requirements at 1, ECF No. 

3-2; see also Reply at 9-10. Thus, the Court did not consider 

Defendants’ response. Id. Accordingly, Defendants fail to show

that paragraphs 8, 9, and 28 “could have no possible bearing” on 

the case. See Neveu, 392 F.Supp.2d at 1170. Nor have they shown 

prejudice resulting from inclusion of these paragraphs. See

Wynes, 2011 WL 1302916, at *12. 

Defendants’ motion to strike is denied. 

B. Motion to Dismiss

1. Legal Standard

“To survive a motion to dismiss [under 12(b)(6)], a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). While “detailed factual 

allegations” are unnecessary, the complaint must allege more 

than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. In 

considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally accepts as 

true the allegations in the complaint and construes the pleading 

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. 

v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008). “In sum, for a 

complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory 

‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, 

must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff 

to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th 

Cir. 2009). 

///

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2. Analysis: Federal Claims

a. First Claim

Defendants argue the first Section 1983 claim for 

unreasonable detention, search, and arrest should be dismissed as 

against Eagan for insufficient facts. Mot. at 3. 

“A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a 

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he 

does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative 

acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to 

do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (emphasis 

added). The plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to each 

individual defendant's causal role in the constitutional

deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 

1988) (“Sweeping conclusory allegations will not suffice.”).

Plaintiff insists the following allegations are sufficient 

to show Eagan participated in Nichol’s unlawful detention, 

search, and arrest of Plaintiff: while Nichols forcibly pinned 

Plaintiff’s hands behind his back, Eagan punched Plaintiff in the 

face. Opp’n at 2 (citing to FAC ¶ 17). Eagan “kept swinging,” 

and both officers tried to slam Plaintiff down, after which Eagan 

tased Plaintiff. FAC ¶¶ 18-21. Contrary to Defendants’ 

insistence otherwise, see Reply at 1-2, these allegations, which 

the Court must take as true, are sufficient to allege Eagan’s 

participation in Nichols’ “affirmative acts.” Johnson, 588 F.2d 

at 743. Thus, Defendants’ argument for dismissal of the first 

claim as to Eagan fails.

Defendants add that any portion of the first claim for which 

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Plaintiff attempts to proceed on a malicious prosecution theory 

should be dismissed as redundant to the ninth claim for malicious 

prosecution. Mot. at 4. However, Plaintiff clarifies in 

opposition that he is not proceeding on a malicious prosecution 

theory for this claim. Opp’n at 2. Accordingly, the Court 

grants Defendants’ request to dismiss with prejudice any portion 

of the first claim grounded in a malicious prosecution theory. 

Reply at 2. 

b. Third Claim

Defendants seek dismissal of the third Section 1983 claim 

for a substantive due process violation. Mot. at 4. They argue 

the officers’ actions here fall squarely within the Fourth 

Amendment, rendering the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due 

process claim redundant. Id. (citing to Graham v. Connor, 490 

U.S. 386, 395 (1989) and Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 

(1994)).

Plaintiff does not respond to Defendants’ legal argument

that the Fourth Amendment controls here. See Opp’n at 2-3. 

Instead, he stands on his Fourteenth Amendment claim, insisting 

his allegations state a substantive due process claim. Id. But 

that misses the point. Defendants assert that Plaintiff may not 

bring such a claim in the first instance because the Fourth 

Amendment governs. Because Plaintiff did not address this legal 

argument, the third claim is dismissed. See Resnick v. Hyundai 

Motor America, Inc., Case No. CV 16-00593-BRO (PJWx), 2017 WL 

1531192, at *22, (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2017) (“Failure to oppose an 

argument raised in a motion to dismiss constitutes waiver of that 

argument.”). The Court further finds amendment would be futile 

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and dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. See Eminence Cap., 

LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not 

appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not 

be saved by amendment.”). 

c. Fourth Claim

Defendants contend the fourth Section 1983 claim for 

fabrication of evidence should be dismissed for lack of factual 

support. Mot. at 4-5. To state a fabrication of evidence claim, 

the plaintiff must plausibly allege that: “(1) the defendant 

official deliberately fabricated evidence, and (2) the deliberate 

fabrication caused the plaintiff's deprivation of liberty.” 

Spencer v. Peters, 857 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2017). Here,

Plaintiff asserts Officers Eagan and Nichols falsely claimed that

Plaintiff punched Nichols in order to fabricate probable cause to 

search, detain, and arrest him. Opp’n at 3 (citing to FAC ¶¶ 47-

50). That fabrication, Plaintiff insists, caused his deprivation

of liberty. Id. However, the Court agrees with Defendants that 

these conclusory allegations do not plausibly state a fabrication 

of evidence claim. Reply at 3. In particular, Plaintiff has not 

clearly set forth facts supporting a causal connection between 

the fabricated evidence and the deprivation of liberty. See 

generally FAC. The fourth claim is therefore dismissed without 

prejudice. See Eminence Cap., LLC, 316 F.3d at 1052.

d. Ninth Claim

Defendants argue the ninth Section 1983 claim for malicious 

prosecution should be dismissed for failure to allege favorable 

termination of the misdemeanor charge. Mot. at 5-6. An element 

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of a malicious prosecution claim is “the prior proceeding . . . 

was pursued to legal termination favorable to the plaintiff.” 

McCubbrey v. Veninga, 39 F.3d 1054, 1055 (9th Cir. 1994)

(internal citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged 

favorable termination, as the operative complaint states the 

misdemeanor against him is still ongoing. FAC ¶ 25. Plaintiff 

concedes as much in opposition and requests leave to amend “to 

clarify the dismissal has now occurred.” Opp’n at 4. 

Plaintiff’s ninth claim is therefore dismissed without 

prejudice.3 See Eminence Cap., LLC, 316 F.3d at 1052.

e. Eleventh Claim

Defendants contend the eleventh claim for conspiracy 

pursuant to Sections 1983 and Section 1985 should be dismissed. 

Mot. at 6-7. As an initial matter, Plaintiff notes he is 

withdrawing the Section 1985 portion of this claim. Opp’n at 5. 

The Section 1985 claim is therefore dismissed with prejudice. 

Turning to the Section 1983 claim, “the plaintiff must state 

specific facts to support the existence of the claimed 

conspiracy.” Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th 

Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). The parties dispute whether 

Plaintiff did so here. Mot. at 6; Opp’n at 5. After careful 

review of the operative complaint, the Court agrees with 

3 The Court briefly acknowledges the parties’ dispute about 

whether the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Thompson v. Clark, 

142 S.Ct. 1332 (2022) renders amendment of this claim futile. 

Opp’n at 4; Reply at 4. But because the parties “have not done 

this issue justice by making what is effectively a passing 

reference to it in their briefs . . . the Court declines to take 

it up in that underdeveloped form.” Shen v. Albany Unified Sch. 

Dist., 3:17-cv-02478-JD, 2018 WL 4053482, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 

24, 2018). 

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Defendants that “Plaintiff essentially labeled everything that 

occurred to him as a conspiracy,” and in doing so, does not 

clearly set forth specific facts to support the existence of a 

conspiracy. Reply at 5. Accordingly, the Section 1983 portion 

of the eleventh claim is dismissed without prejudice. See

Eminence Cap., LLC, 316 F.3d at 1052.

f. Thirteenth Claim

Defendants seek dismissal of the thirteenth claim for 

failure to intervene pursuant to Sections 1983 and 1986. Mot. at 

7-8. As an initial matter, Plaintiff notes he is withdrawing the 

Section 1986 portion of this claim. Opp’n at 7. The Section 

1986 claim is therefore dismissed with prejudice. 

“Officers can be held liable for failing to intercede in 

situations where excessive force is claimed to be employed by 

other officers only if ‘they had an opportunity to 

intercede.’” Hughes v. Rodriguez, 31 F.4th 1211, 1223 (9th Cir. 

2022). The Ninth Circuit has instructed the officer must have 

had a “realistic opportunity” to intercede. Cunningham v. Gates, 

229 F.3d 1271, 1290 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Here, Defendants contend Plaintiff did not allege sufficient 

facts to state a failure to intervene claim against either Eagan 

or Nichols. Mot. at 7. Plaintiff, however, points to the 

following allegations: he had been “respectful and cooperative,” 

he “had not broken any laws,” and Eagan had intended to allow 

Dyer to walk home before Nichols arrived. Opp’n at 7 (citing to 

FAC ¶¶ 15-17, 104). Instead, Eagan joined in Nichol’s search and 

detention by punching Dyer in the face and continuously throwing 

punches. Id. (citing to FAC ¶¶ 17, 104, 107). He also deployed 

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his taser. Id. (citing to FAC ¶¶ 18-20, 104-105). For his part, 

Nichols could have stopped Eagan from continuing to throw punches

but did not. Id. (citing to FAC ¶¶ 18-19, 104-105, 107). These 

allegations are sufficient to show each of the officers had a 

realistic opportunity to intervene. Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 

1290.

The Court did not consider Defendants’ response, which was 

in the portion of their reply brief that went over the Court’s 

page limit for reply memoranda. Order re Filing Requirements at 

1; see also Reply at 6. Thus, their motion is denied as to the

Section 1983 portion of the thirteenth claim. 

g. Sixteenth Claim

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s sixteenth Monell

cause of action for lack of factual support. Mot. at 8-9. 

Municipalities may be held liable under Section 1983 for 

constitutional injuries inflicted through a municipal policy or 

custom. Monell v. Dep' t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 

(1978). To properly state a Monell claim, allegations in a 

complaint “may not simply recite the elements . . . but must 

contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair 

notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself 

effectively.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 

631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012).

The parties vigorously dispute whether Plaintiff’s Monell 

custom and practice and his failure to train and supervise claims 

are factually supported. Mot. at 8; Opp’n at 7-8. The Court 

agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s allegations are entirely 

conclusory and therefore insufficient. See FAC ¶¶ 132-134. 

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Plaintiff asks the Court to infer from his experience alone the 

existence of a policy or custom. But that is insufficient to 

state a Monell claim. See e.g., Cain v. City of Sacramento, No. 

2:17-cv-00848-JAM-DB, 2017 WL 4410116, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 

2017) (noting “[d]istrict courts have dismissed complaints where 

a plaintiff alleged a single incident of unconstitutional conduct 

as the basis for their Monell claim”). 

So too with Plaintiff’s failure to train, supervise, and 

discipline claims: the allegations are conclusory and thereby 

insufficient. See FAC ¶¶ 135-136. The sixteenth claim is thus

dismissed without prejudice. See Eminence Cap., LLC, 316 F.3d at 

1052.

3. Analysis: State Law Claims

a. Tenth Claim

Plaintiff states in his opposition brief that the tenth 

claim is withdrawn. Opp’n at 5. This claim is dismissed with 

prejudice.

b. Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Twelfth, Fourteenth, 

and Fifteenth Claims Against the City

As to the City of Auburn, Defendants argue the fifth claim 

for false arrest, sixth claim for battery, seventh claim for 

excessive force, twelfth claim for conspiracy, fourteenth claim 

for IIED, and fifteenth claim for negligent hiring and 

supervision are barred by California Government Code Section 

815. Mot. at 9. 

That Section provides: “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by 

statute: (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether 

such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity 

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or a public employee or any other person.” Cal. Gov. Code § 815, 

subd. (a). This Section “abolished all common law or judicially 

declared forms of liability for public entities, except for such 

liability as may be required by the federal or state 

Constitution . . . [t]hus in the absence of some constitutional 

requirement, public entities may be liable only if a statute 

declares them to be liable.” Cochran v. Herzog Engraving Co., 

155 Cal.App.3d 405, 409 (1984). 

Section 815 bars the fifth, sixth, seventh, twelfth, 

fourteenth, and fifteenth claims directly against the City. Mot. 

at 9. However, Plaintiff clarifies he is bringing vicarious 

liability not direct liability claims against the City and that 

he is doing so pursuant to Section 815.2 not Section 815. Opp’n 

at 8-9. Further, Plaintiff brings forward ample authority 

supporting his position that a municipality can be held 

vicariously liable. Id. at 9. The Court did not consider 

Defendants’ response, which was in the portion of their reply 

brief that went over the Court’s page limit. Order re Filing 

Requirements at 1; see also Reply at 7. 

Accordingly, the fifth, sixth, seventh, twelfth, fourteenth,

and fifteenth claims for direct liability against the City are 

dismissed with prejudice. However, Defendants’ motion is denied

as to those same claims against the City for vicarious liability. 

c. Sixth and Seventh Claims

Defendants additionally argue the seventh claim for 

unreasonable force is redundant to the sixth claim for battery. 

Mot. at 9-10 (citing to Brown v. Ransweiler, 171 Cal.App.4th 516

(2009) and Munoz v. City of Union City, 120 Cal.App.4th 1077 

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(2004)). In opposition, Plaintiff did not address this argument. 

See Opp’n. Indeed, Plaintiff did not discuss Brown or Munoz

whatsoever. Id. Plaintiff’s seventh claim is thus dismissed

with prejudice. See Resnick, 2017 WL 1531192, at *22; see also

Eminence Cap., LLC, 316 F.3d at 1052.

Plaintiff requests leave to amend his sixth claim for 

battery to allege excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. 

Opp’n at 3. Because Defendants’ response was in the portion of 

their reply brief that violated the Court’s page limit, it was 

not considered. Order re Filing Requirements at 1; see also

Reply at 7. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request is granted.

d. Eighth Claim

Defendants contend the eighth claim under the Bane Act is 

factually unsupported. Mot. at 10. 

To state a Bane Act claim, plaintiffs must allege defendant 

had a specific intent to violate their rights. Reese v. Cty. of 

Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018). Defendants 

emphasize Plaintiff does not allege facts indicating any specific 

intent to violate his rights; instead “he merely concludes that 

any detention, search or force used was done with ‘reckless 

disregard’ for his rights.” Mot. at 10. In response, Plaintiff 

directs the Court to his allegation that Eagan and Nichols acted 

with a “reckless disregard” for his rights. Opp’n at 3-4. But 

Plaintiff fails to identify any facts supporting that conclusory 

allegation. Id. What Plaintiff directs the Court to –

paragraphs 29, 70, and 74 – do not contain facts but rather legal 

conclusions. See FAC ¶¶ 29, 70, 74. For instance, Paragraph 29 

states: “The conduct of Defendants OFC. EAGAN and OFC. NICHOLS 

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was willful, wanton, malicious, and done with reckless disregard 

for the rights and safety of MR. DYER and caused MR. DYER to 

suffer physical and emotional injuries.” The Court need not 

“accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 

allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As such, the eighth claim 

is dismissed without prejudice. See Eminence Cap., LLC, 316 F.3d 

at 1052.

e. Twelfth Claim

Defendants likewise argue the twelfth claim for common law 

conspiracy is factually unsupported. Mot. at 10. 

“The elements of an action for civil conspiracy are the 

formation and operation of the conspiracy and damage resulting to 

plaintiff from an act or acts done in furtherance of the common 

design.” Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 7 

Cal.4th 503, 511 (1994). Here, the Court agrees with Defendants 

that no facts support the formation of an agreement to violate 

Plaintiff’s rights. Mot. at 10. In opposition, Plaintiff cites 

to Baker v. State of California, No. CIV-S-05-0589GEBKJM, 2005 WL 

1683671 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2005). Opp’n at 5-6. But Baker does 

not save this claim because the issue here is lack of factual 

support. Id. Indeed, the very paragraphs Plaintiff quotes from 

and directs the Court to are conclusory and devoid of facts. See

Opp’n at 6 (citing to FAC ¶¶ 100-102). In particular, there are 

no facts from which this Court can infer Eagan and Nichols formed 

an agreement. The twelfth claim is therefore dismissed without 

prejudice. See Eminence Cap., LLC, 316 F.3d at 1052. 

f. Fourteenth and Fifteenth Claims

Defendants raise various arguments as to why the fourteenth 

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claim for IIED and the fifteenth claim for negligent hiring and 

supervision should be dismissed. Mot. at 11-13. First, as to 

Police Chief Ruffcorn, Defendants contend these claims are barred 

by the two-year statute of limitations. Id. at 11-12 (citing to 

Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 35 Cal.4th 797, 806 (2005)). 

Here, the alleged injury occurred on October 12, 2018. FAC ¶ 13. 

But Plaintiff first asserted claims against Defendant Ruffcorn in 

the amended complaint filed on January 31, 2022, more than three 

years later. See FAC. Plaintiff does not dispute this in 

opposition. See Opp’n at 9-10. Rather, Plaintiff contends the

statute of limitations tolled under California Government Code 

Section 945.3. Id.

That Section provides: “No person charged by indictment, 

information, complaint, or other accusatory pleading charging a 

criminal offense may bring a civil action for money or damages 

against a peace officer or the public entity employing a peace 

officer based upon conduct of the peace officer relating to the 

offense for which the accused is charged, including an act or 

omission in investigating or reporting the offense or arresting 

or detaining the accused, while the charges against the accused 

are pending before a superior court. Any applicable statute of 

limitations for filing and prosecuting these actions shall be 

tolled during the period that the charges are pending before a 

superior court.” Cal. Gov. Code § 945.3. Defendants argue 

tolling under this Section does not apply because Ruffcorn is not 

the peace officer alleged to have arrested Plaintiff, nor is his 

allegedly wrongful conduct – namely his hiring and supervision of

Nichols - related to the criminal charges. Mot. at 12. 

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Plaintiff insists the opposite. Opp’n at 9-10 (citing to 

Guy v. Lorenzen, 547 F.Supp.3d 927, 950 (S.D. Cal. 2021)). 

Defendants’ response was in the portion of their reply brief that 

violated the Court’s page limit and thus was not considered. 

Order re Filing Requirements at 1; see also Reply at 8-9. 

Plaintiff’s legal arguments therefore went unaddressed, and 

Defendants do not show dismissal is warranted on these grounds. 

Defendants next argue the fourteenth claim against Ruffcorn 

fails because Plaintiff cannot base an IIED claim on negligent 

hiring. Mot. at 12-13. “A cause of action for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress exists when there is (1) extreme 

and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of 

causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, 

emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or 

extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate 

causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous 

conduct.” Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050 (2009). Here, 

Defendants argue Ruffcorn’s negligent hiring of Nichols is not 

intentional conduct, and therefore cannot form the basis of an 

IIED claim. Mot. at 13. Further, Defendants claim this is

redundant to the fifteenth claim for negligent hiring. Id.

Plaintiff responds that his allegations show Ruffcorn acted 

with more than mere negligence but rather “reckless disregard” 

when he hired Nichols. Opp’n at 10-11. Specifically, Plaintiff 

insists “the FAC sufficiently alleges that Ruffcorn hired Nichols 

having reason to know facts that would have led a reasonable man 

to realize that the hire created an unreasonable risk of harm to 

others substantially greater than ordinary negligence.” Id. at 

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11. As such, his claim may proceed on this “reckless disregard” 

theory. Id. Lastly, as to Defendants’ challenge that this claim 

is redundant, Plaintiff points out the elements of each claim are 

distinct and therefore this claim is not redundant. Id. Once 

again, Defendants’ response to Plaintiff’s arguments was in the 

portion of their reply brief which was not considered because it 

violated the Court’s page limit. Order re Filing Requirements at 

1; see also Reply at 9. In failing to address Plaintiff’s

arguments, Defendants do not establish dismissal of the 

fourteenth claim against Ruffcorn is warranted on these alternate

grounds. 

Turning to fifteenth claim for negligent hiring and 

supervision, Defendants again argues this claim fails as against 

the City because it is barred by California Government Code 

Section 815. Mot. at 13. However, as discussed above, Plaintiff 

is not proceeding under Section 815; that is, Plaintiff is not 

trying to hold the City directly liable. Opp’n at 11. Instead, 

he is proceeding on a vicarious liability theory. Id. As the 

Court concluded above: the fifteenth claim is dismissed as to any 

claim of direct liability against the City, but Defendants’ 

motion is denied as to the vicarious liability portion of the 

fifteenth claim against the City.

Finally, as to the fifteenth claim against Ruffcorn, 

Defendants contend Plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts of a 

special relationship between Plaintiff and Ruffcorn. Mot. at 13

(citing to C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist., 53 

Cal.4th 861 (2012)). “Absent such a special relationship, there 

can be no individual liability to third parties for negligent 

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hiring, retention or supervision of a fellow employee, and hence 

no vicarious liability under section 815.2.” William S. Hart, 53 

Cal.4th at 877. Here, Defendants argue there are no facts 

supporting the existence of a special relationship between 

Plaintiff and Ruffcorn. Mot. at 13. The Court agrees. Accord

Fuentes v. City of San Diego, No. 3:16-cv-02871-BEN-JMA, 2017 WL 

2670976, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 20, 2017) (“Plaintiffs generally 

allege that the City and/or SDPD have a duty to protect people 

from harm and exercise care in selection, retention, training, 

and supervision of their employees. However, these alleged 

duties do not resemble the enhanced duties imposed on school 

personnel that formed the basis for their special relationship 

with the minor plaintiff in William S. Hart.”).

Plaintiff’s citations to cases involving the readily

distinguishable contexts of school and jail do not save his claim 

from dismissal. Opp’n at 11-12 (citing to William S. Hart, 53 

Cal.4th at 869 (school) and Giraldo v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 168 

Cal.App.4th 231, 250–51 (2008)(jail)). At most, those cases 

support Plaintiff’s contention that this claim does not fail as a 

matter of law.4 But they do not change the factual deficiencies. 

The fifteenth claim against Ruffcorn is thus dismissed without 

prejudice. See Eminence Cap., LLC, 316 F.3d at 1052.

g. Seventeenth Claim

Defendants argue the seventeenth claim for vicarious 

liability should be dismissed because it is a theory of 

4 Defendants’ response was again in a part of their reply brief 

that violated the Court’s page limit. Order re Filing 

Requirements at 1; see also Reply at 9. The Court did not 

consider it.

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liability, not an independent cause of action. Mot. at 14 

(citing to Gottschalk v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, No. C-12-

4531 EMC, 2013 WL 557010, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013)). 

Plaintiff responds that vicarious liability, while a theory of 

liability, can also be pled as a separate count. Opp’n at 13 

(citing to Goldsmith v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. CV 20-00750-AB 

(JCx), 2020 WL 3966004, at *10 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2020)). 

However, Plaintiff does not explain how this is not redundant to 

the fifth, sixth, seventh, twelfth, fourteenth, and fifteenth 

claims, for which he expressly states he is seeking to hold the 

City liable under a vicarious liability theory. See Opp’n at 8-

9, 11. Nor does he account for the statement in his own cited 

authority that: “vicarious liability is a theory of liability 

that must attach to an underlying claim.” Goldsmith, 2020 WL 

3966004, at *9. The seventeenth claim is therefore dismissed

with prejudice.

C. Sanctions

A violation of the Court’s standing order requires the 

offending counsel, not the client, to pay $50.00 per page over 

the page limit to the Clerk of Court. Order re Filing 

Requirements at 1. Moreover, the Court did not consider 

arguments made past the page limit. Id. Here, Defendants’ reply 

brief exceeded the Court’s page limit by 5 pages. See Reply. 

Defendants’ counsel must therefore send a check payable to the 

Clerk for the Eastern District of California for $250.00 no later 

than seven days from the date of this Order. 

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES

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Defendants’ motion to strike. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

denied in part and granted in part as follows:

1. DENIED as to the first claim against Eagan; 

2. GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE as to any portion of the first 

claim which proceeds on a malicious prosecution theory;

3. GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE as to the third claim;

4. GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to the fourth claim;

5. GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to the ninth claim;

6. GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE as to the Section 1985 portion 

of the eleventh claim;

7. GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to the Section 1983 

portion of the eleventh claim;

8. GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE as to the Section 1986 portion 

of the thirteenth claim;

9. DENIED as to the Section 1983 portion of the thirteenth 

claim;

10. GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to the sixteenth claim;

11. GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE as to the tenth claim;

12. GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE as to the direct liability 

portions of the fifth, sixth, seventh, twelfth, fourteenth, and 

fifteenth claims against the City;

13. DENIED as to the vicarious liability portions of the 

fifth, sixth, twelfth, fourteenth, and fifteenth claims against 

the City;

14. GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE as to the seventh claim but

Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to amend his sixth claim to allege 

excessive force under the Fourth Amendment;

15. GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to the eighth claim;

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16. GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to the twelfth claim;

17. DENIED as to the fourteenth claim against Ruffcorn;

18. GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to the fifteenth claim 

against Ruffcorn; and

19. GRANTED WITH PREUDICE as to the seventeenth claim.

If Plaintiff elects to amend his complaint, he shall file a 

second amended complaint within twenty days (20) of this order. 

Defendants’ responsive pleadings are due twenty days (20) 

thereafter. The Court strongly recommends that Plaintiff consider 

consolidating and/or eliminating many of his seventeen claims for 

relief. A “kitchen sink” approach to pleading in federal court 

usually does not serve the Plaintiff well in the long run. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 21, 2022

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