Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02695/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02695-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Amador Garcia-Gutierrez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

AMADOR GARCIA-GUTIERREZ, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

FILED 

Unhecl Sc• C.,,,of Apptala 

APPEALS T-,, 0,cuic 

Ff.9 2i f988 

RO.Bar L HOBCKER 

Cleric 

No. 86-2695 

(D.C. No. 86-CR-141) 

(D. Colorado) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

A federal jury convicted defendant, Amador Garcia-Gutierrez, 

for conspiracy to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 u.s.c. 

§ 84l(a)(l) and§ 846, and for distribution of heroin, in 

violation of 21 u.s.c. § 84l(a)(l) and 18 u.s.c. § 2. The charges 

stemmed from defendant's participation as a wholesaler in a heroin 

trafficking organization. 

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court committed 

reversible error when it (1) refused to sever the trials of 

defendant and a codefendant, Edward Lazaro Perez, (2) refused to 

compel the government to disclose the identity of a confidential 

informant, (3) admitted into evidence a recorded telephone 

conversation between coconspirators other than defendant, and 

(4) determined that the government established a proper foundation 

for identifying the voices on the tape of a legally wiretapped 

Appellate Case: 86-2695 Document: 010110027454 Date Filed: 02/22/1988 Page: 1 
conversation. We find no merit in these contentions and affirm 

defendant's convictions. 

The evidence showed a Mexico-supplied heroin operation in 

Denver, Colorado. "Distributors"--Perez, Martinez, Maes, 

Wellington-Mares, Urango, and Santisteven--would place telephone 

orders and then meet with "wholesalers"--Rocha (a.k.a. "Ruben"), 

the Gutierrez-Herrera siblings, and defendant--to pick up the 

heroin. Coconspirator Santisteven testified that she and Urango 

met personally with defendant in February 1986 and agreed to 

distribute heroin for him. Frequently thereafter, until March 7, 

1986, she would place a telephone order to defendant, whom she 

identified as "Manuel," at his residence in Denver. A few minutes 

later she would meet defendant at a prearranged location, and 

there take from him heroin-filled balloons paying him $30 for 

each. She would resell these balloons on the street for $60 each. 

Santisteven's description of her dealings with defendant mirrors 

the pattern of defendant's actions, and that of other distributors 

and wholesalers, as observed and overheard by undercover Denver 

police officers performing surveillance. 

The undercover investigation into this heroin ring commenced 

on September 18, 1985, when Denver Police Lieutenant Tom Sanchez 

was introduced to wholesaler Jose Luis Gutierrez-Herrera (a.k.a. 

"Mario") by a confidential informant. This introduction and 

subsequent contacts between Sanchez and "Mario" culminated in an 

October 1 meeting, in which Lieutenant Sanchez and a fellow 

officer, Detective Miguel Martinez, negotiated the eventual 

purchase of one ounce of pure heroin from "Mario." At this 

-2-

Appellate Case: 86-2695 Document: 010110027454 Date Filed: 02/22/1988 Page: 2 
meeting, "Mario" discussed price, quantity, and quality with the 

officers and then handed a sample of the heroin directly to 

Lieutenant Sanchez. Also present at this meeting, which took 

place in a 1977 red and white Oldsmobile, was defendant. Although 

defendant never spoke, he followed the conversation and made 

constant eye contact with the undercover officers. 

According to Sanchez' testimony, defendant apparently 

accompanied "Mario'' to perform a "showcasing" function: since the 

officers were virtual strangers to "Mario," he brought along a 

fellow member of the heroin ring--defendant--to view the strangers 

and determine, either from defendant's memory or the strangers' 

behavior, whether they were undercover agents. If defendant 

recognized or suspected them, he would signal "Mario" to halt the 

transaction. Defendant neither recognized nor suspected the 

officers and thus allowed the passing of the heroin sample from 

"Mario" to the officers. 

Defendant travelled from Denver to Juarez, Mexico, on 

March 7, 1986. Shortly thereafter, on March 17, 1986, a wiretap 

was authorized and commenced on the telephone at defendant's 

residence in Denver. On April 26, 1986, agents intercepted Call 

Number 375, a conversation between coconspirators Mario Rocha 

(a.k.a. "Ruben''), at the Depew Street number, and an unidentified 

man named "Carlos," in Durango, Mexico. The conversation and 

other information led agents to believe, correctly, that defendant 

would return from Mexico to his Denver residence with a shipment 

of heroin on May 3, 1986. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 86-2695 Document: 010110027454 Date Filed: 02/22/1988 Page: 3 
Police executed a properly-obtained search warrant for the 

defendant's home on May 3. The search resulted in the arrests of 

Rocha and Jose Luis Gutierrez-Herrera and yielded large quantities 

of pure and processed heroin, materials and equipment necessary to 

process heroin, handguns and ammunition, $6,454.21 in United 

States currency, and a notebook which detailed drug transactions 

and information about coconspirators. Defendant was arrested 

shortly thereafter. Defendant's wallet contained an address book 

with the phone numbers for the above-named "distributors,'' as well 

as the phone number in Durango which "Ruben'' had called in Call 

No. 375. 

Based on the surveillance and the fruits of the search, 

defendant was indicted for conspiracy to distribute heroin between 

September 18, 1985, and May 3, 1986, and for distribution of 

heroin on October 1, 1985. He was convicted on both counts and 

now appeals. 

I 

Defendant first contends that the district court improperly 

denied his motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14 to sever his trial 

from that of codefendant Perez. Defendant argues that a single 

conspiracy did not exist, that the criminal acts of Perez were 

unrelated to the crimes of which defendant was accused, and that 

proof in open court of Perez' crimes "spilled over" and improperly 

prejudiced defendant. We disagree. 

Generally, defendants indicted for participation in a 

conspiracy can be tried together, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 

8(b). United States v. Dill, 693 F.2d 1012, 1014 & n.2 (10th Cir. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 86-2695 Document: 010110027454 Date Filed: 02/22/1988 Page: 4 
1982). When a defendant moves for separate trials on the basis of 

possible unfair prejudice, the decision to sever is left to the 

sound discretion of the trial court. Id. at 1015. The trial 

court may consider several factors, including the "considerations 

of economy and expedition in judicial administration," id. at 1014 

n.2, whether there is adequate proof that each defendant's crimes 

are part of a single conspiracy, United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 

571, 589 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1985), and 

the nature and extent of the evidence against each defendant, 

i.e., the "spillover effect." 

In the instant case, defendant cannot adduce any support for 

his contention that his and Perez' crimes were not part of the 

same conspiracy. Further, as recited above, the evidence of 

defendant's guilt was overwhelming. The district court did not 

abuse its discretion by refusing to sever the trial. 

We similarly reject defendant's argument that the admission 

of Perez' post-arrest confession of heroin trafficking violated 

defendant's rights under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 

(1968). Under Bruton, the prosecution commits automatically 

reversible error if it admits into evidence the confession of a 

nontestifying codefendant which also implicates the defendant. 

Id. at 126, 136-37. The Supreme Court, however, has approved the 

admission of a nontestifying codefendant's confession when the 

statement has been redacted to omit any reference to the 

defendant, and the trial court issues a proper limiting 

instruction. Richardson v. Marsh, 55 U.S.L.W. 4509, 4512 (U.S. 

April 21, 1987). In this case, Perez' statement was redacted to 

-5-

Appellate Case: 86-2695 Document: 010110027454 Date Filed: 02/22/1988 Page: 5 
omit any reference to defendant, and the district judge issued an 

explicit limiting instruction. Thus, defendant's Bruton claim is 

without merit. 

II 

Defendant asserts that his defense was impeded by the 

district court's refusal to compel the government to disclose the 

identity of the confidential informant who introduced Lieutenant 

Sanchez to coconspirator Jose Luis Gutierrez-Herrera ("Mario"). 

This unknown informant, claims defendant, possessed some 

unspecified information which, if produced at trial, would have 

exonerated defendant. He cites, in support, Roviaro v. United 

States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). 

Roviaro, however, involved a case in which the informant 

actively engaged in the transaction that formed the basis of the 

indictment. See id. at 64. In the instant case, the informant 

was involved only in a preliminary meeting which played a 

miniscule role in the broad conspiracy charge and no role 

whatsoever in the distribution charge against defendant. When the 

informant's role has no relevance to the transactions which spawn 

the criminal charges, this court has refused to compel disclosure 

of the informant's identity. United States v. Reardon, 787 F.2d 

512, 517 (10th Cir. 1986). 

Further, defendant fails to specify the nature or substance 

of the informant's potentially exculpatory testimony. "[T]his 

court has held that the defendant must present more than mere 

speculation about the possible usefulness of an informant's 

testimony to make the requisite showing." United States v. 

-6-

Appellate Case: 86-2695 Document: 010110027454 Date Filed: 02/22/1988 Page: 6 
Zamora, 784 F.2d 1025, 1030 (10th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). 

We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

refusing to require the government to identify the informant. 

III 

Defendant next challenges the admission into evidence of Call 

No. 375, in which coconspirator Mario Rocha ("Ruben") and an 

unidentified male named "Carlos" discussed defendant's impending 

return to Denver and financial details of the heroin conspiracy. 

Defendant attacks the sufficiency of the foundation for this 

evidence, alleging that the government did not prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the statement was in 

furtherance of a conspiracy or made by a coconspirator. See Fed. 

R. Evid. 80l(d)(2)(E); United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575 (5th 

Cir. 1979) (en bane). The failure to identify "Carlos," alleges 

defendant, created "the inference to the Jury. that it could 

have been the Defendant Amador Garcia-Gutierrez." Appellant's 

Opening Brief at 16. 

We uphold the district court's decision to admit the 

telephone call. The district court found that a conspiracy 

existed, defendant belonged to that conspiracy, and the 

intercepted communications, including Call No. 375, were made in 

the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. These findings, 

which are supported by the record, are sufficient to justify 

admitting the statements. United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 

1313, 1330-31 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980). 

It is of no consequence that the government could not 

identify "Carlos.'' The conversation undeniably indicated that 

-7-

Appellate Case: 86-2695 Document: 010110027454 Date Filed: 02/22/1988 Page: 7 
"Carlos" belonged to the drug conspiracy. See United States v. 

Jennell, 749 F.2d 1302, 1307-08 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 

U.S. 837 (1985); cf. United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 383 

(10th Cir. 1986). Further, any possible prejudice that might have 

resulted from the jury believing that "Carlos" was defendant would 

be harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's 

guilt. We cannot find--and defendant does not cite any evidence--

that the trial court's factual findings on this issue were clearly 

erroneous. See United States v. Correa-Arroyave, 721 F.2d 792, 

795 (11th Cir. 1983). 

IV 

Defendant finally complains that the government laid an 

insufficient foundation for the identification of voices heard 

through the wiretap. The government obtained court authorization 

for mandatory voice exemplars, but it decided instead to rely 

solely on the testimony of Detective Lawrence Subia. Subia had 

heard the tapes of the wiretapped calls "around twelve times," IV 

Supp. R. 549, and he was able to identify the voices on the tape 

based upon his having heard each coconspirator's voice 

independently of the tapes. In addition, Subia used pen register 

and telephone subscriber information in conjunction with physical 

surveillance to confirm his voice identifications. After this 

explanation the district court found that the government had 

established a sufficient foundation to identify the respective 

speakers by name. 

The evidence which the government used is sufficient to 

provide an adequate foundation for voice identification. See 

-8-

Appellate Case: 86-2695 Document: 010110027454 Date Filed: 02/22/1988 Page: 8 
United States v. Cook, 794 F.2d 561, 567-68 (10th Cir.) 

(identification of voices by FBI agent based both on pen register 

evidence and agents' personal familiarity with speakers' voices 

adequate foundation to admit tape-recorded conversations), cert. 

denied, 107 S. Ct. 288 (1986); see also Fed. R. Evid. 90l(a)(5) 

(voice identification as condition to admitting evidence). Once 

this initial foundation is established, the fact that the 

prosecutor did not use voice exemplars or other means to identify 

the speakers goes not to foundation, but to weight and credibility 

of the government's evidence. 

Because the government met the foundation requirement as to 

voice identification through Subia's testimony, the district court 

acted within its discretion in not also requiring the use of voice 

exemplars. "It is axiomatic that the trial judge is vested with 

large amounts of discretion regarding the admission of evidence.'' 

United States v. Boothman, 654 F.2d 700, 703 (10th Cir. 1981). 

AFFIRMED. 

-9-

Entered for the Court 

James K. Logan 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 86-2695 Document: 010110027454 Date Filed: 02/22/1988 Page: 9