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Parties Involved:
Pulaski County, Arkansas
Appellee
Javonda Scruggs
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1248

___________________________

Javonda Scruggs

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Pulaski County, Arkansas

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

____________

 Submitted: December 17, 2015

 Filed: April 1, 2016

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Before MURPHY, BENTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

KELLY, Circuit Judge.

Javonda Scruggs appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 1

favor of Pulaski County, Arkansas, on claims she brought against the county alleging

The Honorable Joe J. Volpe, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern 1

District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent

of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

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that it discriminated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504), and

retaliated against her in violation of the ADA, Section 504, the Arkansas Civil Rights

Act (ACRA), and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Because we agree with 2

the district court that Scruggs has not established a prima facie case of discrimination

under the ADA or Section 504, or a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA,

Section 504, the ACRA, or FMLA, we affirm.

I. Background

Scruggs worked as a Pulaski County juvenile detention officer from

November 24, 2001, to May 21, 2013. Scruggs suffers from fibromyalgia and

degenerative disc and cervical disease. Beginning in 2008, Scruggs obtained an

annual FMLA certification from her doctor, allowing her to exercise unpaid

intermittent leave. By February 2013, her conditions had deteriorated to the point

that Dr. Mocek, a pain management specialist who had been treating Scruggs, placed

restrictions on her FMLA certification including “no sitting, standing, bending, and

stooping for extended periods” and no lifting of more than 25 pounds. 

One of the requirementslisted in the job description for the position of juvenile

detention officer is the “[a]bility to lift and carry up to 40 [pounds].” Because Dr.

Mocek restricted Scruggs to lifting no more than 25 pounds, county officials placed

Scruggs on continuous, rather than intermittent, FMLA leave. While on FMLAleave,

Scruggs asked Dr. Mocek to issue a new FMLA certification without any restrictions,

but he refused. 

Scruggs also brought claims of race and gender discrimination in violation of 2

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the ACRA, but abandoned these claims in her response to the

county’s motion for summary judgment.

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Scruggs’s FMLA leave expired on May 15, 2013. Before it expired, Scruggs

asked the county for an additional week of unpaid leave to allow her to obtain an

FMLA certification from her rheumatologist, Dr. Chi. Scruggs claims Dr. Chi would

have given her an FMLA certification with no lifting restrictions, but Scruggs never

provided the county with an FMLA certification from Dr. Chi. The county initially

agreed to allow Scruggs the extra week, but on May 21, 2013, decided to terminate

her employment because she could not meet the job requirement of lifting 40 pounds. 

In its termination letter, the county told Scruggs her employment was valuable and

encouraged her to reapply if a change in circumstances allowed her to return to work. 

Scruggs sued the county, and the county moved for summary judgment. The

district court granted the county’s motion. With regard to Scruggs’s discrimination

claim, the district court found Scruggs’s inability to lift up to 40 pounds disqualified

her from working as a juvenile detention officer. As to her retaliation claim, the court

found Scruggs failed to show a causal connection between her use of FMLA and her

termination from her job. This appeal followed. 

II. Discussion

Scruggs first challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the

county on her claims of discrimination under the ADA and Section 504. Our review

of a district court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo. Bahl v. Cty. of Ramsey,

695 F.3d 778, 783 (8th Cir. 2012). We view the evidence in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In order to avoid summary

judgment, Scruggs must offer proof sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact

on each element of her claim on which she has the burden of proof. Olsen v. Capital

Region Med. Ctr., 713 F.3d 1149, 1153 (8th Cir. 2013).

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The ADA and Section 504 make it unlawful to discriminate against a “qualified

individual with a disability” because of the disability. Bahl, 695 F.3d at 783. In 3

order to establish disability discrimination under the ADA, Scruggs must first show

that she “(1) is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) is a qualified individual

under the ADA, and (3) suffered an adverse employment action because of her

disability.” Walz v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 779 F.3d 842, 845 (8th Cir. 2015). Here,

the parties dispute whether Scruggs is a “qualified individual.” To be considered a

qualified individual under the ADA, an employee must “(1) possess the requisite

skill, education, experience, and training for [her] position, and (2) be able to perform

the essential job functions, with or without reasonable accommodation.” Hill v.

Walker, 737 F.3d 1209, 1216 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E.

R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 712 (8th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original)). “Discrimination

includes ‘not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental

limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . unless [the

employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship

on the operation of the business of [the employer].’” Dropinski v. Douglas Cty.,

Neb., 298 F.3d 704, 707 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Heaser v. The Toro Co., 247 F.3d

826, 830 (8th Cir. 2001)) (alterations in original). The district court found Scruggs

was not a qualified individual because she could not perform the essential functions

of her position with or without reasonable accommodation. 

Scruggs disputes that the ability to lift or carry 40 pounds was an essential

function of the position of juvenile detention officer because she did not often have

to do it. Essential functions are those considered fundamental to the position the

disabled person desires. Hill, 737 F.3d at 1217. “A job function may be essential if

the reason the position exists is to perform that function, or if a limited number of

The statutes are “similar in substance” and, except for Section 504’s 3

requirement that there be federal funding involved, our “cases interpreting either are

applicable and interchangeable.” Bahl, 695 F.3d at 783 (quoting Randolph v.

Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 858 (8th Cir. 1999)). 

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employees are available among whom the performance of the job function can be

distributed.” Id. In determining whether a job function is essential, we consider

evidence including what functions the employer thinks are essential, written job

descriptions, how much time an employee spends on the job performing the function,

the consequences of not having the employee performthe function, and whether other

current employees in similar jobs perform the function. Id. 

The county argues that the requirement to be able to lift at least 40 pounds is

related to one of the core purposes of being a juvenile detention officer—the ability

to protect juveniles being supervised from harming themselves and others, including

detention center staff. Although not conclusive, we consider the employer’s

judgment of what constitutes an essential function “highly probative.” Kammueller

v. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 383 F.3d 779, 786 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Alexander v.

Northland Inn, 321 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 2003)). Other evidence supporting the

district court’s conclusion that lifting 40 pounds was an essential function of the

position includesthe written job description, and testimony that all other current staff

members were able to lift 40 pounds. As for the consequences of not requiring

Scruggs to lift 40 pounds, the facility director, Carma Gardner, testified she once had

to hold up a detainee who had attempted to hang himself until another staff member

arrived to assist. Scruggs concedes the job sometimes required her to lift detainees

off the ground and to restrain juveniles, all of whom weigh more than 40 pounds. We

agree with the district court that the ability to lift 40 pounds is an essential function

of the job of a Pulaski County juvenile detention officer. See Dropinski, 298 F.3d at

708–09 (the ability to lift considered an essential function of job even though

employee seldom had to do so). 

Scruggs next argues that she would have been able to perform the essential

functions of a juvenile detention officer with a reasonable accommodation. It is

Scruggs’s burden to make “a facialshowing that a reasonable accommodation would

enable [her] to perform [her] essential job functions.” Id. at 709. Scruggs offers two

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accommodations she insists were reasonable: allow her a week of unpaid leave after

her FMLA leave expired so that she could obtain a different FMLA certification or

move her to the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift. The county argues that neither

accommodation was reasonable. 

An employer is not required to provide the specific accommodation requested

or preferred by an employee. Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan. City, 214

F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 2000). Rather, an employer only has to provide an

accommodation that is reasonable. Id. Scruggs’s first proposed accommodation—a

request for an additional week to obtain an FMLA certification from her

rheumatologist, Dr. Chi—is not a reasonable accommodation. The FMLA only

entitles an employee to twelve weeks of leave per year; it does not entitle an

employee to extended leave once the twelve weeks has been used. See Slentz v. City

of Republic, Mo., 448 F.3d 1008, 1010–11 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Under the FMLA,

twelve weeks of leave is both the minimum the employer must provide and the

maximum that the statute requires.”) (quoting Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide,

Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 937 (8th Cir. 2000)). 

Even if we were to find that extending Scruggs’s FMLA leave was a reasonable

accommodation under the ADA, Scruggs did not carry her burden to show that she

could perform the essential functions of her job with that accommodation. See

Alexander, 321 F.3d at 727 (it is the ADA plaintiff’s burden to show that she could

perform the essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation). 

According to Scruggs, Dr. Chi would have given her a revised FMLA certification

clarifying she could perform all of her job functions. But Scruggs never presented

the certification, and she never produced any documentation to support her claim that

Dr. Chi would have given her a revised FMLA certification. And even if Scruggs

had presented a new FMLA certification from Dr. Chi that lifted any restrictions, the

county was not required to accept Dr. Chi’s FMLA certification over Dr. Mocek’s

certification. “The ADA does not require an employer to permit an employee to

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perform a job function that the employee’s physician has forbidden.” Id. It is not

reasonable to expect an employer to disregard an employee’s treating physician’s

opinion expressly imposing physical restrictions. Id. As for moving her to the 11:00

p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift, Scruggs has made no showing that it would not be necessary

for her to be able to lift 40 pounds on this shift, in contrast to any other shift, in order

to protect juveniles housed in the facility. Accordingly, we conclude Scruggs has

failed to show that a reasonable accommodation was available. 

Finally, Scruggs asserts the county failed to engage in an interactive process

to determine whether a reasonable accommodation was possible. But “[u]nder the

ADA, if no reasonable accommodation is available, an employer is not liable for

failing to engage in a good-faith interactive process.” Battle v. United Parcel Serv.,

Inc., 438 F.3d 856, 864 (8th Cir. 2006). As outlined above, Scruggs did not meet her

burden to show there was a reasonable accommodation available that would not place

an undue burden on the county. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the

county was entitled to summary judgment on her discrimination claim. See

Dropinski, 298 F.3d at 710.

Scruggs also alleged retaliation claims under the FMLA, ADA, Section 504,

and ACRA. To establish unlawful retaliation under any of these four statutes when

there is no direct evidence, Scruggs must first establish a prima facie case by showing

she engaged in a statutorily protected activity, the county took an adverse action

against her, and there was a causal connection between the adverse action and the

protected activity. Hill, 737 F.3d at 1218 (ADA and Section 504 retaliation claim); 4

Phillips v. Mathews, 547 F.3d 905, 912 (8th Cir. 2008) (FMLA retaliation claim). 

“ADA and ACRA claims are reviewed under the same principles.” Battle, 438

4

F.3d at 860–61. 

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Scruggs characterizesthe requestfor additional time to obtain a revised FMLA

certification from Dr. Chi as an ADA accommodation and thus a statutorily protected

activity. See Kirkeberg v. Can. Pac. Ry., 619 F.3d 898, 907–08 (8th Cir. 2010)

(making a request for a reasonable accommodation is protected activity). Scruggs

assertsthe timing of her termination shows a causal connection between her protected

activity and the county’s adverse employment action. As we have concluded,

however, Scruggs’s request for additional time to obtain a new FMLA certification

was not a reasonable accommodation, and therefore it was not protected activity. See

Kirkeberg, 619 F.3d at 907–08. As a result, Scruggs has failed to present a

submissible case of retaliation under the ADA. 

Scruggs also asserts the county violated the FMLA by placing her on

consecutive, rather than intermittent FMLA leave, and then terminating her after her

FMLA expired. “[A]n employee must be able to perform the essential functions of

the job to take intermittent or reduced schedule leave.” Hatchett v. Philander Smith

Coll., 251 F.3d 670, 677 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing 29 U.S.C.§ 2614(a)(1)). And “an

employee is not entitled to restoration if, at the end of the FMLA leave period, the

employee is still unable to perform an essential function of the job.” Id. (citing 29

C.F.R. § 825.214). Because Scruggs was unable to perform an essential function of

her job, the county did not violate FMLA by placing her on consecutive rather than

intermittent leave. And because she still was unable to perform an essential function

of her job at the end of her FMLA leave period, the county did not violate FMLA by

terminating her after her FMLA expired. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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