Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-18-15135/USCOURTS-ca9-18-15135-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.
Amicus Curiae
Alexia Herrera
Appellee
Zumiez, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALEXIA HERRERA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ZUMIEZ, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18-15135

D.C. No.

2:16-cv-01802-SB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Stanley Allen Bastian, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 4, 2019

San Francisco, California

Filed March 19, 2020

Before: Richard A. Paez, Marsha S. Berzon, and 

Ryan D. Nelson, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Paez;

Concurrence by Judge Berzon;

Concurrence by Judge R. Nelson

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2 HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC.

SUMMARY*

California Employment Law

The panel affirmed in part, and reversed in part, the 

district court’s decision in a putative class action alleging 

that Zumiez, Inc. failed to pay employees at its California 

retail stores reporting time pay for “Call-In” shifts.

While this appeal was pending, the California Court of 

Appeal decided Ward v. Tilly’s, Inc., 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461 

(Ct. App. 2019), review denied (May 15, 2019), which held 

that reporting time pay must be paid in a closely analogous 

situation, an outcome consistent with the district court’s 

denial of Zumiez’s motion for judgment on the pleadings 

here. 

The panel followed Ward’s controlling interpretation of 

state law, and affirmed the district court with respect to the 

reporting time pay claim. Following Ward, the panel 

concluded that, under subsection (5)(A) of California’s 

Wage Order 7, a requirement that employees call their 

manager thirty minutes to one hour before a scheduled shift 

constitutes “reporting for work.” The panel held that the 

district court correctly determined that the plaintiff stated a 

claim for reporting time pay when she alleged that she was 

scheduled for a shift, expected to work, incurred costs or 

arranged her other obligations and planned activities to make 

herself available, and then was not permitted to work.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC. 3

Plaintiff also asserted an “hours worked” minimum wage 

claim for unpaid wages for the time that employees spent 

calling their managers for Call-In shifts. Construing the 

facts alleged in the complaint as true and in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party, the panel held that 

plaintiff alleged a claim for unpaid wages where plaintiff 

alleged that she and other employees were required to call 

their managers thirty minutes to one hour before their CallIn shifts, alleged that these calls were required three to four 

times per week and lasted five to fifteen minutes, and, 

critically, alleged that employees could be disciplined for 

failing to comply with the Call-In shift policy. The panel 

concluded that the allegations pled were sufficient to defeat 

Zumiez’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Plaintiff and putative class members sought 

indemnification for phone expenses incurred in calling 

Zumiez before Call-In shifts. The panel held that under 

California law, to state a claim for reimbursement of phone 

expenses turns on whether it was necessary that the 

employees make calls and do so with phones that were not 

provided by the company. The panel further held that 

plaintiff failed to include specific, non-conclusory facts 

about how she made the calls or what costs she incurred. 

Accordingly, the panel reversed the district court’s denial of 

judgment on the pleadings as to the indemnification claim, 

and remanded for the district court to allow plaintiff leave to 

amend the complaint to include more specific allegations.

Because plaintiff’s remaining claims were derivative of 

plaintiff’s reporting time pay, minimum wage, and 

indemnification claims, the panel affirmed the denial of the 

motion for judgment on the pleadings on the remaining 

claims, to the extent the district court determined they related 

to the reporting time pay and minimum wage claims.

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4 HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC.

Judge Berzon concurred, and wrote separately to respond 

to Judge R. Nelson’s concurrence. She wrote that where, as 

here, the panel is following the only state appellate opinion 

on point and there was no reason to think the state Supreme 

Court, which denied review of that appellate question, would 

disagree, then certifying the issue was unwise. She 

concluded that no issue of federalism was at stake here that 

was not inherent in the existence of diversity jurisdiction.

Judge R. Nelson concurred. He agreed that the decision 

to follow the decision in Ward accorded with this sound 

constitutional principle, but he wrote further that by 

publishing without first seeking the views of the California 

Supreme Court, the panel risked undermining cooperative 

judicial federalism.

COUNSEL

John F. Querio (argued), Felix Shafir, and Scott P. Dixler, 

Horvitz & Levy LLP, Burbank, California; Nathan W. 

Austin and Evan D. Beecher, Jackson Lewis P.C., 

Sacramento, California; for Defendant-Appellant

Cody Kennedy (argued) and Stanley D. Saltzman, Marlin &

Saltzman, LLP, Agoura Hills, California, for PlaintiffAppellee.

Mark D. Kemple and Ryan C. Bykerk, Greenberg Traurig, 

LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Amicus Curiae 

Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.

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HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC. 5

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

California law requires employers to provide partial 

compensation (“reporting time pay”) to retail employees 

who report for work but are not actually provided work. 

Alexia Herrera (“Herrera”) filed this putative class action 

alleging that Zumiez, Inc. (“Zumiez”) failed to pay 

employees at its California retail stores reporting time pay 

for “Call-In” shifts. As alleged, an employee scheduled for 

a Call-In shift must make herself available to work during 

the shift and then call her manager thirty minutes to one hour 

before the shift or, if she works a shift immediately before 

the Call-In shift, contact her manager at the end of that shift. 

At that time—either during the call or during the post-shift 

contact—the manager tells the employee whether she will be 

required to work during the Call-In shift. If the employee 

does not work, Zumiez does not pay the employee. Herrera 

also alleged related claims for failure to pay minimum wages 

and failure to indemnify expenses for phone calls employees 

needed to make to comply with the Call-In policy.

Zumiez moved for judgment on the pleadings. The 

district court denied the motion. This interlocutory appeal 

followed.

While this appeal was pending, the California Court of 

Appeal decided Ward v. Tilly’s, Inc., 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461 

(Ct. App. 2019), review denied (May 15, 2019). Ward held 

that reporting time pay must be paid in a closely analogous 

situation, an outcome consistent with the district court’s 

denial of Zumiez’s motion for judgment on the pleadings 

here. Because there is no “persuasive data” to convince us 

that the California Supreme Court would decide otherwise, 

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6 HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC.

we follow Ward’s “controlling interpretation of state law” 

and affirm with respect to the reporting time pay claim. 

Tomlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 1065, 1069 n.7 (9th Cir. 

1981); see also West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 

237 (1940). With respect to the other claims, we affirm in 

part and reverse in part.

I.

Herrera filed a putative class action against Zumiez, a 

Washington corporation with retail stores in California. We 

summarize the relevant facts as alleged in Herrera’s First 

Amended Complaint. 

From August 2014 through March 2015, Herrera worked 

as a Sales Associate at a Zumiez retail store in Chico, 

California. Zumiez scheduled Herrera and other employees 

for work according to two scheduling policies. First, Zumiez 

scheduled employees for “Show-Up” shifts, requiring the 

employees to report for the scheduled work shift by 

physically showing up at a Zumiez store.

Second, Zumiez scheduled employees for “Call-In” 

shifts. If the employee was scheduled for a Show-Up shift 

immediately before a Call-In shift, the employee had to wait 

until the end of the Show-Up shift to ask her manager if she 

would be required to work the scheduled Call-In shift. If the 

employee was not scheduled to work a Show-Up shift 

immediately before a Call-In shift, then the employee was 

required to make a phone call to her manager between thirty 

minutes and one hour before the scheduled Call-In shift. The 

employee would then wait for the manager to determine 

whether the employee would be permitted to work during the 

scheduled shift. Phone calls for Call-In shifts generally 

lasted five to fifteen minutes. 

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HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC. 7

Whether she had a shift before the Call-In shift or not, 

the employee was required to be available to work the CallIn shift. The employee could be subject to discipline for not 

working Call-In shifts for the same reasons she could be 

disciplined for not working Show-Up shifts. The employee 

could not schedule classes or doctor appointments, or work 

for other employers during the Call-In shift, and she had to 

make child or elder care arrangements under the assumption 

she would work. Employees were not paid for Call-In shifts 

unless they were permitted to work and were not paid for the 

time they spent on the phone with their managers. Herrera 

and other employees were scheduled for Call-In shifts three 

to four times per week; they worked approximately half of 

these shifts. 

Herrera alleged the following causes of action: (1) failure 

to pay reporting time wages for Call-In shifts; (2) failure to 

pay minimum wage; (3) failure to keep required records; 

(4) failure to provide accurate wage statements; (5) failure to 

pay all earned wages upon separation from employment; 

(6) failure to indemnify expenses for phone calls made for 

Call-In shifts; (7 and 8) unfair business practices under 

California’s Unfair Competition Law; and (9) civil penalties 

pursuant to California’s Private Attorneys General Act 

(“PAGA”). Zumiez moved for judgment on the pleadings 

on all of Herrera’s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(c).

The district court denied Zumiez’s motion as to all 

claims. First, the district court held that “‘report for work’ 

may be accomplished telephonically,” so Herrera had stated 

a reporting time pay claim. The district court did not address 

liability for reporting time pay where a Call-In shift 

immediately follows a Show-Up shift. Second, drawing 

inferences in Herrera’s favor, the district court found that the 

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8 HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC.

complaint plausibly alleged that employees were subject to 

their employer’s control during phone calls, so Herrera had 

stated a minimum wage claim. The district court recognized 

that factual questions remained to determine whether 

employees were subject to their employer’s control during 

calls. Third, the district court found that Herrera had alleged 

that Zumiez had constructive knowledge that employees 

would use cell phones or otherwise incur expenses when 

making the calls, so Herrera had stated an indemnification 

claim. 

The parties agreed that the claims for failure to keep 

required records, failure to provide accurate wage 

statements, failure to pay all earned wages upon separation 

from employment, unfair business practices, and civil 

penalties under PAGA (collectively, the “remaining 

claims”) were derivative of the other claims. Accordingly, 

the district court denied judgment on the pleadings as to 

those claims as well. 

The district court then granted Zumiez’s motion to 

certify its order denying judgment on the pleadings for 

interlocutory appeal, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), noting that the 

“not otherwise appealable order . . . ‘involves a controlling 

question of law as to which there is substantial ground for 

difference of opinion,” namely “does the wage order require 

workers to physically come to the workplace in order to 

report?” Zumiez then filed a petition for permission to 

appeal, identifying the question sought to be appealed as 

“[w]hether an employee must physically present himself or 

herself at the workplace in order to ‘report for work’ and 

thereby qualify for reporting time pay under California law.” 

We granted the petition and this appeal ensued.

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HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC. 9

II.

We review de novo an order on a Rule 12(c) motion for 

judgment on the pleadings. Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 

922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). We accept all factual allegations 

in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party. Id. As under a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a Rule 12(c) motion for 

judgment on the pleadings is properly granted only when, 

“taking all the allegations in the pleadings as true, the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971, 978–

79 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal citation omitted).

III.

We have diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332 and apply California law. See Klingebiel v. Lockheed 

Aircraft Corp., 494 F.2d 345, 346 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1974). In 

California, wage and hour claims are governed by two 

sources of authority: provisions of the Labor Code, enacted 

by the Legislature, and a series of wage orders, adopted by 

the Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”). Troester v. 

Starbucks Corp., 421 P.3d 1114, 1119 (Cal. 2018), as 

modified on denial of reh’g (Aug. 29, 2018). The California 

Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (“DLSE”) is the 

state agency empowered to enforce the wage orders. 

Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 995 P.2d 139, 142 (Cal. 

2000). The California Supreme Court has said “[t]ime and 

again” that courts should construe the wage orders “to favor 

the protection of employees.” Troester, 421 P.3d at 1119 

(quoting Augustus v. ABM Sec. Servs., Inc., 385 P.3d 823, 

827 (Cal. 2016)). Wage Order No. 7-2001 (“Wage Order 

7”), which regulates the wages, hours, and working 

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10 HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC.

conditions in the mercantile industry, applies here.1 Cal. 

Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11070.

A. Reporting Time Pay

Herrera alleges that Zumiez failed to comply with the 

reporting time pay requirements of Wage Order 7 by 

denying employees compensation for Call-In shifts when 

employees made themselves available for work during 

scheduled shifts, called or contacted Zumiez at an appointed 

time, and were told they would not be permitted to work. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11070(5). 

Pursuant to section (5) of Wage Order 7, which is 

entitled “Reporting Time Pay,” “[e]ach workday an 

employee is required to report for work and does report, but 

is not put to work or is furnished less than half said 

employee’s usual or scheduled day’s work, the employee 

shall be paid for half the usual or scheduled day’s work” in 

an amount no less than two hours’ wages and no more than 

four hours’ wages. Id. § 11070(5)(A). The parties dispute 

whether calling one’s employer at an appointed time before 

a scheduled shift constitutes “report[ing] for work” under 

this provision.2

1 Wage Order 7-2001 governs “all persons employed in the 

mercantile industry,” except for employees working in “administrative, 

executive [managerial], or professional capacities.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 

8, § 11070(1)(A). Herrera’s claims pertain to the pay of non-exempt 

retail workers.

2 The parties also dispute whether reporting for a scheduled Call-In 

shift that immediately follows a Show-Up shift constitutes “reporting for 

work” under subsection (5)(B) of Wage Order 7. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, 

§ 11070(5)(B) (requiring pay “[i]f an employee is required to report for 

work a second time in any one workday and is furnished less than two 

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HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC. 11

1. Ward v. Tilly’s, Inc.

While this appeal was pending, the California Court of 

Appeal published Ward v. Tilly’s, Inc., 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d 

461. Ward addressed a question closely similar to one in this 

case: whether retail store employees were due reporting time 

pay pursuant to Wage Order 7 when they contacted the store 

two hours before their Call-In shift (i.e., “on-call” shift) 

started—as required by their employer—and were told not 

to come to work. Ward, 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 463–65. The 

court “conclude[d] that the on-call scheduling alleged . . . 

triggers Wage Order 7’s reporting time pay requirements,” 

reasoning that such shifts “burden employees, who cannot 

take other jobs, go to school, or make social plans during oncall shifts—but who nonetheless receive no compensation 

. . . unless they ultimately are called in to work. This is 

precisely the kind of abuse that reporting time pay was 

designed to discourage.” Id. at 463–64.

The dissent in Ward maintained that the drafters’ intent 

behind the wage order was to require a worker to physically 

appear at the workplace to qualify for reporting time pay. Id.

at 479–80. Relying on the “plain meaning of the word 

‘report,’” Ward, 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 480 (quoting Casas v. 

Victoria’s Secret Stores, LLC, No. CV 14-6412-

GW(VBKx), 2014 WL 12644922, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 

2014)), the partial dissent reasoned that reporting for work 

required “physically showing up at the place ready to work,” 

Ward, 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 480 (quoting Casas, 2014 WL 

(2) hours of work on the second reporting”). Because the district court 

did not consider this claim, we do not address it here. On remand, the 

district court may address this claim as appropriate. 

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12 HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC.

12644922, at *3), by definition excluding Call-In shifts from 

the wage order’s reporting time pay requirements.

The California Supreme Court denied a petition for 

review in Ward. We follow Ward to resolve the parties’ 

dispute about the meaning of “report for work” under 

subsection (5)(A) of Wage Order 7. As a federal court, we 

are not “free to choose [our] own rules of decision whenever 

the highest court of the state has not spoken.” Am. Tel. & 

Tel. Co., 311 U.S. at 236. Instead, “[w]here an intermediate 

appellate state court rests its considered judgment upon the 

rule of law which it announces, that is a datum for 

ascertaining state law which is not to be disregarded by a 

federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data 

that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.” 

Id. at 237; Torrance Nat. Bank v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 251 

F.2d 666, 669 n.6 (9th Cir. 1958) (“This decision on local 

law by a highly respected intermediate court of appeal must 

be accorded great weight.”). “This is the more so where, as 

in this case, the highest court has refused to review the lower 

court’s decision.” Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. at 237; see 

also Ogden Martin Sys., Inc. v. San Bernardino Cty., 932 

F.2d 1284, 1289 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We are less strictly 

compelled to follow intermediate appellate decisions when 

those decisions have not been appealed to the state’s highest 

court.”). Even if it is arguable that the California Supreme 

Court “will at some later time modify the rule . . . [i]n the 

meantime the state law applicable to these parties and in this 

case has been authoritatively declared by the highest state 

court in which a decision could be had.” Am. Tel. & Tel. 

Co., 311 U.S. at 238.3

3 In Segal v. Aquent LLC, a district court held that calling in to work 

on assigned workdays is reporting for work within the meaning of the 

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HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC. 13

Zumiez argues that we should not follow Ward because 

there is persuasive data that the California Supreme Court 

would reach a different conclusion. As we shall explain, we 

are aware of no such persuasive data. Alternatively, Zumiez 

argues that we should certify the question of interpreting 

Wage Order 7’s reporting time pay provision to the 

California Supreme Court—even though the California 

Supreme Court recently denied a petition for review in 

Ward, which presented that very question. See Am. Tel. & 

Tel. Co., 311 U.S. at 237. Notably, there are no conflicting 

California Courts of Appeal decisions. See Contra Pooshs 

v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 561 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 

2009) (certifying a question where multiple California 

Courts of Appeal decisions spanning the course of two 

decades had produced split decisions); Estrella v. Brandt, 

682 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir. 1982) (certifying a question 

where three California Courts of Appeal had construed the 

meaning of the applicable statute in different ways). 

Because we are the first federal appellate court to address 

this issue, there is no “sharp split of authority between the 

California Courts of Appeal and the Ninth Circuit regarding 

the proper interpretation of” state law. Emery v. Clark, 604 

F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2010) (certifying a question where 

statute. No. 18-cv-346-LAB (JLB), 2018 WL 4599754, at *5 (S.D. Cal. 

Sept. 24, 2018). In contrast, Casas v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, LLC, held 

that the reporting-time provisions of the wage order do not provide a 

remedy for employees who are required to call in to work but then not 

permitted to work. No. CV-14-6412-GW (VBKx), 2014 WL 12644922, 

at *6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2014). Disagreement among federal district 

courts does not persuade us that the California Supreme Court would 

decide the question differently than the California Court of Appeal, 

especially as it had the chance to do so after the district court decisions. 

See Daniel v. Ford Motor Co., 806 F.3d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(recognizing that we “must adhere to state court decisions—not federal 

court decisions—as the authoritative interpretation of state law”).

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14 HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC.

“a conflict [had] been recognized by courts on both sides of 

the precedential divide”). We decline to certify the question 

because we have no reason to doubt that the California 

Supreme Court would reach an outcome consistent with 

Ward.

2. Principles of Interpretation

California’s “wage orders are to be accorded the same 

dignity as statutes.” Troester, 421 P.3d at 1119; see also 

Watkins v. Ameripride Servs., 375 F.3d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 

2004) (recognizing that wage orders are “quasi-legislative 

regulations that are to be interpreted in the same manner as 

statutes”). Thus, we apply California’s “usual rules of 

statutory interpretation.” Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior 

Court, 273 P.3d 513, 527 (Cal. 2012); see also CPR for Skid 

Row v. City of Los Angeles, 779 F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir. 

2015) (recognizing that our court “appl[ies] California’s 

rules of statutory construction” to California law). 

California case law requires that we give effect to the IWC’s 

purpose of protecting employees:

When construing the Labor Code and wage 

orders, we adopt the construction that best 

gives effect to the purpose of the Legislature 

and the IWC. Time and again, we have 

characterized that purpose as the protection 

of employees—particularly given the extent 

of legislative concern about working 

conditions, wages, and hours when the 

Legislature enacted key portions of the Labor 

Code. In furtherance of that purpose, we 

liberally construe the Labor Code and wage 

orders to favor the protection of employees.

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HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC. 15

Troester, 421 P.3d at 1119 (internal citations and quotations 

omitted); see also Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 276 

(Cal. 2010); Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., Inc., 978 P.2d 

2, 8 (Cal. 1999); Ward, 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 467 (recognizing 

and applying the principle of construing wage orders to 

protect employees).

Statutory interpretation under California law begins with 

the words themselves, giving them “their plain and 

commonsense meaning,” because the words of a legal text 

“generally provide the most reliable indicator of [the 

enacting body’s] intent.” Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Prods., 

Inc., 155 P.3d 284, 289 (Cal. 2007). If the “language is clear 

and unambiguous our inquiry ends.” Id. “[W]hen the 

language is susceptible of more than one reasonable 

interpretation, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, 

including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to 

be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, 

contemporaneous administrative construction, and the 

statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.” Nolan v. 

City of Anaheim, 92 P.3d 350, 352 (Cal. 2004).

Furthermore, Ward recognized that earlier-enacted 

California statutes can be applied to later adopted 

technologies without compromising principles of legislative 

intent. 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 469–71. “[I]n construing statutes 

that predate their possible applicability to new practices or 

technology, ‘courts have not relied on wooden construction 

of their terms.’” Id. at 469 (quoting Apple Inc. v. Superior 

Court, 292 P.3d 883, 887 (Cal. 2013)). In one such instance, 

for example, the California Supreme Court concluded that 

although the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act was “enacted in 

1990, almost a decade before online commercial transactions 

became widespread,” that fact did not preclude the statute’s 

application to such transactions. Id. at 887–87. Similarly, 

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16 HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC.

the California Court of Appeal has interpreted the phrase 

“members’ names [and] addresses” in a provision of the 

Corporations Code enacted in 1978 to include “e-mail 

addresses,” even though e-mail had not become a form of 

widespread and instantaneous communication at that time, 

because “the legislative purpose of the statute indicate[d] the 

Legislature would have intended the inclusion of e-mail 

addresses in the original statute had it anticipated the 

existence of such.” WorldMark, The Club v. Wyndham 

Resort Dev. Corp., 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 546, 556–58 (Ct. App. 

2010); see also O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 

72, 104–05 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding that an online news 

magazine constitutes a “periodical publication” under a law 

that was enacted before digital magazines).

Ward recognized and applied these principles of 

interpretation under California law. 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 

467–75. We do so as well.

3. “Report for Work”

The parties dispute, in this interlocutory appeal, whether 

“report for work” under subsection (5)(A) of Wage Order 7 

includes calling one’s manager thirty minutes to one hour 

before a scheduled shift, as Herrera argues it does. Zumiez 

argues that one can only “report for work” in person and 

therefore only an employee’s physical presence may trigger 

the reporting time pay requirement. The California Court of 

Appeal resolved this dispute in Ward.

First, the California Court of Appeal considered the 

plain language of Wage Order 7 and determined that “the 

text of Wage Order 7, alone, is not determinative of the 

question.” 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 468. In Wage Order 7, 

“report for work” is not modified by terms such as 

“physically” or “at the workplace.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, 

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HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC. 17

§ 11070(5)(A). Ward recognized that dictionary definitions 

of “report” point in both directions. 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 

468–69. Some definitions “have a spatial element,” 

suggesting physical presence; whereas other definitions 

“focus on the reporter’s intent, rather than his or her 

location.” Id. (emphasis in original); see also Report, 

Oxford Living Dictionaries: English, available at 

https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/report (last 

visited Sept. 27, 2019) (defining “report” as to “[p]resent 

oneself formally as having arrived at a particular place or as 

ready to do something”) (emphasis added). 

Zumiez argues that the definition of “work” is “the place 

where one is employed,” so “report for work” means 

physically showing up at that place. Zumiez acknowledges, 

however, that work has other common meanings, such as 

“activity in which one exerts strength or faculties to do or 

perform.” Because one can report to a place or for a task, 

Ward found that the plain language of the text remains 

susceptible to more than one meaning, making the language 

alone therefore not dispositive. There is no persuasive basis 

for believing that the California Supreme Court would 

decide otherwise. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. at 237.

Second, the California Court of Appeal turned to the 

regulatory history and purpose of the reporting time pay 

provision of Wage Order 7. Ward, 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 469–

75. The court concluded that at the time that Wage Order 7 

was enacted—in 1943—telephonic reporting had not been 

contemplated, but that “[t]he contemporaneous 

understanding of ‘report for work’ is not dispositive.”4 Id. 

4 Zumiez argues that the California Court of Appeal erred in 

concluding that statutory interpretation principles allow for 

“evolutionary arguments,” citing to New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 

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18 HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC.

at 469. Instead, the California Supreme Court “constru[es] 

statutes that predate their possible applicability to new 

practices or technology,” id. (quoting Apple, 292 P.3d at 

887), by determining “how the [enacting body] would have 

handled the problem if it had anticipated it.” Id. (quoting 

People v. Butler, 451 Cal. Rptr. 2d 150, 151 (Ct. App. 

1996)). Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal looked 

to the history and purpose of Wage Order 7’s reporting time 

pay requirement and found the history “reveals . . . that the 

IWC’s purpose in adopting reporting time pay requirements 

was two-fold: to ‘compensate employees’ and ‘encourage 

proper notice and scheduling.’” Id. at 472–72 (quoting 

Murphy, 155 P.3d at 295) (alteration omitted). Therefore, 

the California Court of Appeal determined, “had the IWC 

considered the issue, it would have concluded that 

telephonic call-in requirements trigger reporting time pay.” 

Id. at 473. 

In reaching this conclusion, Ward drew a straight line 

from determinations made by the IWC in 1942 and 1943 to 

the applicability of reporting time pay to call-in scheduling 

practices today. In 1942, reporting time pay requirements 

were contemplated as “a penalty” for employers who 

arranged “to have plenty of workers around for all 

emergencies” without pay; the premise of the requirements 

S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019), and J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 

938, 950 (9th Cir. 2010). But federal principles of statutory 

interpretation cannot replace state principles of statutory interpretation. 

Those cases involved federal subject matter jurisdiction whereas here, 

we have diversity jurisdiction. We are guided by how the California

Supreme Court would interpret a California wage order. CPR for Skid 

Row, 779 F.3d at 1104. “Under California law, the ‘fundamental task’ 

of statutory interpretation is ‘to determine the [enacting body’s] intent so 

as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’” Id. (quoting People v. Cornett, 274 

P.3d 456, 458 (Cal. 2012)). 

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was that “[a]llowing a large number of workers to come to 

the plant when there is little or no work for them is serious 

abuse.” Id. at 471–72 (citing Kidd, Chairman, Comment on 

the Rep. of the Wage Bd. for the Canning and Preserving 

Industries (July 21, 1942)). In 1943, the year that a reporting 

time pay requirement was added to Wage Order 7, a 

reporting time pay requirement was also added to the wage 

order governing the housekeeping industry. Id. With 

respect to that wage order, the IWC considered—and 

rejected—“an employer request that employees who resided 

at the workplace be paid” fewer hours of reporting time pay 

because such employees did not lose time traveling to and 

from their workplace. Id. Accordingly, the California Court 

of Appeal reasoned in Ward, the contemporary call-in 

practice “ha[s] much in common with the specific abuse the 

IWC sought to combat by enacting a reporting time pay 

requirement,” because it “creates no incentive for employers 

to competently anticipate their labor needs and to schedule 

accordingly.” Id. at 473. “Like requiring employees to 

come to a workplace at the start of a shift without a guarantee 

of work, unpaid on-call shifts . . . create a large pool of 

contingent workers whom the employer can call on if a 

store’s foot traffic warrants it, or can tell not to come in if it 

does not, without any financial consequence to the 

employers.” Id. At the same time, even where no 

transportation cost or significant lost time is incurred, in both 

the on-site and call-in shift situations, there are “tremendous 

costs on employees” because, among other things, “they 

cannot commit to other jobs or schedule classes during those 

shifts” and “must make contingent childcare or elder care 

arrangements, which they may have to pay for even if they 

are not [permitted] to work.” Id.

Therefore, Ward concluded, “[A]n employee need not 

necessarily physically appear at the workplace to ‘report for 

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20 HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC.

work.’ Instead, ‘report[ing] for work’ within the meaning of 

the wage order is best understood as presenting oneself as 

ordered. ‘Report for work,’ in other words . . . is defined by 

the party who directs the manner in which the employee is 

to present himself or herself for work—that is, by the 

employer.” Id. at 475.

Zumiez’s two principle arguments to the contrary were 

addressed by the California Court of Appeal and determined 

to be unavailing. Zumiez first argues that the purpose of 

reporting time pay is to compensate employees for the 

transportation costs of arriving at work, citing to IWC 

statements and meeting minutes from the 1940s, 1960s, and 

1970s, as well as DLSE policy manuals and opinion letters. 

While avoiding the cost of transportation was one motivating 

factor, it was never the only one; the IWC explicitly found 

that reporting time pay was necessary “in order to 

compensate the employee for transportation costs and loss 

of time.” Indus. Welfare Comm’n, Minutes of a Meeting of 

the Industrial Welfare Commission of the State of California 

Held Apr. 5, 1943 (1943). Ward squarely addressed the 

“suggestion that reporting time pay was intended only to 

compensate employees for travel time and expense,” and 

rejected it, reasoning that the argument 

[could not] be squared with the exception in 

the reporting time pay provision for shifts 

cancelled for reasons beyond the employer’s 

control. This exception makes sense only if 

reporting time pay was intended to impose a 

penalty for overscheduling—not if reporting 

time pay was intended only to compensate 

employees for travel time and expense. Put 

simply, employees’ travel time and expenses 

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HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC. 21

are not reduced because the employer has a 

good reason for canceling a shift.

Ward, 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 475. Zumiez and Abercrombie 

& Fitch Stores, Inc., appearing as an amicus curiae, next 

highlight that phone technology existed in 1943 and yet the 

wage order does not mention phones. The California Court 

of Appeal rejected this argument also. Id. at 470 (“[A]n 

omission [of mention of telephonic reporting in Wage Order 

7] is not surprising because neither the practice of on-call 

scheduling nor the cell phone technology that makes such 

scheduling possible existed when the IWC adopted the 

reporting time pay requirement in the 1940s.”) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Ward rejected 

Zumiez’s (and amicus’s) historical argument and there is no 

“persuasive data,” Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. at 237, to 

suggest the California Supreme Court would reach a 

different conclusion concerning the regulatory history and 

purpose of Wage Order 7. 

Third, the California Court of Appeal in Ward

recognized that its conclusion about reporting time pay for 

call-in shifts is consistent with Augustus, 385 P.3d 823, a 

recent California Supreme Court decision. Ward, 243 Cal. 

Rptr. 3d at 475–77. There, the California Supreme Court 

held that a policy in which employees were required to carry 

a device, such as a pager or cell phone, during their breaks 

so that they could be reached by their employer was 

“irreconcilable with employees’ retention of freedom to use 

rest periods for their own purposes,” and did not satisfy the 

wage order’s rest period requirement. Augustus, 385 P.3d at 

832. Although Augustus addressed rest periods, not 

reporting time pay, the California Court of Appeal’s reliance 

on Augustus is pertinent to our prediction concerning 

whether the California Supreme Court is likely to disagree 

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22 HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC.

with Ward. See Ward, 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 477. As alleged 

by Herrera, Zumiez’s Call-In shift practice imposes similar 

significant restrictions on employees’ off-duty time to those 

in Augustus, by limiting “how employees can use their time 

. . . [30 minutes] before an on-call shift, when they must be 

available to contact [Zumiez].” Id.

Fourth, the California Court of Appeal considered the 

retail employer’s public policy arguments and found them 

unpersuasive. Ward, 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 477–79. One of 

the policy arguments considered by the California Court of 

Appeal is also argued here: that unsuccessful bills the 

California Legislature considered during the 2015-16 

session would have provided the relief that Herrera seeks. 

See S.B. 878, 2015-16 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016); Assemb. B.

357, 2015-16 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015). That the Legislature 

considered bills to address the issue of pay for Call-In shifts, 

Zumiez argues, shows that the existing wage order does not 

include pay for such shifts through the reporting time pay 

provision. The majority in Ward was unpersuaded by the 

policy argument based on unsuccessful bills for two reasons: 

first, “[t]he proposed legislation went further than the 

reporting time pay provision of Wage Order 7,” and 

therefore would not have been unnecessarily duplicative of 

this construction of the reporting time pay provision; and, 

second, before the decision in Ward, federal district courts 

“ha[d] split over the applicability of Wage Order 7 to on-call 

shifts,” and the legislature may have wanted to resolve the 

uncertainty.5 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 479. 

Ward also acknowledged a third, related reason to reject 

the argument resting on unsuccessful bills, which we also 

find compelling: unenacted bills are of “little value” to 

5 See supra n.3.

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courts. Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento Cty. 

Bd. of Supervisors, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480, 492 (Ct. App. 1968) 

(“The light shed by such unadopted proposals is too dim to 

pierce statutory obscurities.”); see also Rucho v. Common 

Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2524 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) 

(“[W]hat all these bills have in common is that they are not 

laws.”); Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. State Air Res. Bd., 

216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 694, 713 (Ct. App. 2017) (recognizing 

there are “limited circumstances under which an unenacted 

bill is relevant”). Arguments based on unenacted bills are 

unpersuasive because we do not know why a specific bill 

was not passed. A legislature can decide not to enact a bill 

because it disagreed with that proposal. But there are a host 

of other reasons why a legislature may not enact a bill, 

including that the legislature thought the bill superfluous 

given existing law. 

Again, we are unpersuaded that the California Supreme 

Court would reach a different conclusion than did Ward with 

regard to Zumiez’s argument concerning the recent 

unsuccessful bill. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. at 237.

In sum, following Ward, we conclude that, under 

subsection (5)(A) of Wage Order 7, a requirement that 

employees call their manager thirty minutes to one hour 

before a scheduled shift constitutes “report[ing] for work.” 

Here, Herrera has alleged that she was scheduled for a shift, 

expected to work, incurred costs or arranged her other 

obligations and planned activities to make herself available, 

and then was not permitted to work. See Ward, 243 Cal. 

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24 HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC.

Rptr. 3d at 473–74. The district court correctly determined 

that Herrera has stated a claim for reporting time pay.6

B. Hours Worked

Herrera also asserts a claim for unpaid wages for the time 

that employees spent calling their managers for Call-In 

shifts. Employers “shall pay . . . not less than the applicable 

minimum wage for all hours worked” pursuant to section 

4(B) of Wage Order 7. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11070(4)(B). 

“‘Hours worked’ means the time during which an employee 

is subject to the control of an employer, and includes all the 

6 Zumiez also argues that Herrera’s reporting time claim fails 

because her complaint did not base the claim on laws that afford a private 

right of action. We disagree. Required payments for reporting time are 

wages. See, e.g., Murphy, 155 P.3d at 295 (citation omitted); Shine v. 

Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 676, 681–82 (Ct. App. 2018); 

see also DLSE Operations & Procedures Manual (2007) § 4.5.1.1.1. 

Employees have a private right of action to recover any unpaid wages, 

Cal. Labor Code § 1194, including reporting time pay, see Ward, 243 

Cal. Rptr. 3d at 463–64, 479 (permitting a private right of action for 

reporting time pay to proceed). Herrera cited Cal. Labor Code § 1194 in 

her complaint. (And, in any event, an “imperfect statement of the legal 

theory supporting the claim asserted” is not fatal to a pleading. Johnson 

v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam) (reversing 

a grant of summary judgment for defendants that was premised on the 

plaintiffs’ failure to invoke the specific statute at issue).) Accordingly, 

we conclude there is a private right of action to recover reporting time 

pay, and Herrera sufficiently stated it in her complaint.

Zumiez likewise contends—for the first time on appeal—that 

Herrera’s claim for failure to maintain required records was not based on 

laws that afford a private right of action. This is a derivative claim the 

parties agree rises or falls with the other claims. See infra III.D. 

Moreover, Herrera’s complaint roots this claim in Cal. Labor Code 

§ 1174.5 and Wage Order 7. Plaintiffs have a private right of action to 

enforce a statute, such as section 1174.5, that requires compliance with 

a wage order.

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HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC. 25

time the employee is suffered or permitted to work, whether 

or not required to do so.”7 Id. § 11070(2)(G). Zumiez 

argues that the calls are not compensable as “hours worked” 

under Wage Order 7 because Herrera has not alleged 

sufficient facts to establish that employees were subject to 

Zumiez’s control during the calls.8

Whether an employee is subject to her employer’s 

control is a fact-intensive inquiry. “The level of the 

employer’s control over its employees, rather than the mere 

fact that the employer requires the employees’ activity, is 

determinative.” Morillion, 995 P.2d at 146; see also Frlekin 

v. Apple Inc., S243805, 2020 WL 727813, at *10 (Cal. Feb. 

13, 2020) (reaffirming Morillion’s holding and 

“emphasiz[ing] that whether an activity is required remains 

probative in determining whether an employee is subject to 

the employer’s control”). “[A]n employee who is subject to 

an employer’s control does not have to be working during 

7 All of California’s wage orders contain the same definition of 

“hours worked,” with the exception of two wage orders that use 

additional language, so we consider interpretations of “hours worked” 

from the wage orders with identical definitions. See Morillion, 995 P.2d 

at 142.

8 Initially, Zumiez also argued that the time spent making the calls 

was de minimis. During the pendency of this appeal, the California 

Supreme Court held that California’s wage and hour statutes and 

regulations have not adopted the de minimis doctrine. Troester, 421 P.3d 

at 1116 (holding that several “off the clock” minutes per shift are 

compensable). Therefore, Zumiez no longer argues that the de minimis 

rule forecloses Herrera’s claim but purports that it may make further de 

minimis arguments after fact development in the district court because 

Troester left open the possibility that there could be “circumstances 

where compensable time is so minute or irregular that it is unreasonable 

to expect the time to be recorded.” Id. We express no views on any such 

argument. 

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26 HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC.

that time to be compensated[.]” Morillion, 995 P.2d at 143 

(recognizing that the “suffered or permitted to work” clause 

does not limit the “control” clause in the definition of “hours 

worked”). For example, in Morillion v. Royal Packing Co.,

where an employer required agricultural workers to meet at 

a designated location and travel to and from the fields in 

company buses, the California Supreme Court concluded the 

workers were subject to their employer’s control during time 

spent waiting for and riding the buses. Id. at 147. Time the 

workers spent transporting themselves to the employerdetermined departure points, however, was not 

compensable. Id. at 141 n.2. That the workers would have 

to commute to work even if their use of the company buses 

were not mandated did not sway the California Supreme 

Court. Id. at 146. Similarly, the court was unpersuaded by 

the workers’ ability to “engage in limited activities such as 

reading or sleeping on the bus” because the workers could 

not “use the time effectively for their own purposes,” such 

as to “drop off their children at school, stop for breakfast 

before work, or run other errands requiring the use of a car.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Zumiez implies the DLSE has stated that calls to an 

employer are not compensable. The opinion letter Zumiez 

cites, however, addresses the factors to consider in 

determining whether “on-call” time for employees working 

on “standby” status, such as hospital workers, is sufficiently 

restrictive to constitute “hours worked.” Cal. Div. of Labor 

Standards Enf’t, Opinion Letter on “On-Call” Time-Beepers 

1 (Mar. 31, 1993), https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/opinions/

1993-03-31.pdf. That is not the situation here.9 See Cal. 

9 Even if standby pay were at issue, the DLSE left open the question 

of whether standby time, during which an employee may have to call her 

employer, is compensable. Id. at 4–5. The DLSE maintained, “[t]he 

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HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC. 27

Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11070(5)(D); see also Ward, 243 Cal. 

Rptr. 3d at 468 (treating a required call to an employer as 

“reporting for work” under Wage Order 7 and not as standby 

work that is not subject to the reporting pay requirements of 

Wage Order 7). 

Construing the facts alleged in the complaint as true and 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, see 

Fleming, 581 F.3d at 925, Herrera has alleged a claim for 

unpaid wages. Herrera alleged facts about Zumiez’s control 

over the calls, as well as the timing, frequency, and duration 

of the calls: she alleged that she and other employees were 

required to call their managers thirty minutes to one hour 

before their Call-In shifts, alleged that these calls were 

required three to four times per week and lasted five to 

fifteen minutes, and, critically, alleged that employees could 

be disciplined for failing to comply with the Call-In shift 

policy. Although Zumiez attempts to reframe the calls as 

merely checking one’s schedule, Herrera alleged that the 

calls were scheduled and an employee making a call before 

a Call-In shift was doing so because she was scheduled and 

required to do so. See Ward, 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 478 

(rejecting the same argument because, “as pled in plaintiff’s 

complaint, [the employer] did not merely require employees 

to check their schedules as a necessary predicate to getting 

to work on time—it required employees to call in exactly 

two hours before the start of on-call shifts,” as part of their 

bottom-line consideration is the amount of ‘control’ exercised by the 

employer over the activities of the worker.” Id. at 4. Further, the DLSE 

emphasized that a factor in determining whether an unpaid “on-call” or 

standby requirement for employees is possible is whether there is “a 

reasonable and longstanding industry practice” of uncompensated oncall time. Id. at 5. There is no evidence of such a practice in the retail 

industry in the record before us.

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28 HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC.

employment). The allegations pled are sufficient to defeat 

Zumiez’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

C. Indemnification

Herrera and putative class members seek 

indemnification for phone expenses incurred in calling 

Zumiez before Call-In shifts. Under California law, “[a]n 

employer shall indemnify his or her employee for all 

necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee 

in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties, or 

of his or her obedience to the directions of the employer[.]” 

Cal. Lab. Code § 2802(a). Zumiez contends Herrera failed 

to plead sufficient factual allegations to support the claim. 

Ascertaining whether an expense is “necessary” 

“depends on the reasonableness of the employee’s choices.” 

Gattuso v. Harte-Hanks Shoppers, Inc., 169 P.3d 889, 897 

(Cal. 2007). For example, where an employer is required to 

indemnify employees’ automobile expenses, the employer 

does not have to indemnify unnecessary extra automobile 

expenses that are incurred based on the choice of car and 

fuel. Id. at 898; see also Townley v. BJ’s Rests., Inc., 249 

Cal. Rptr. 3d 274, 279 (Ct. App. 2019).

“[W]hen employees must use their personal cell phones 

for work related calls, [California] Labor Code section 2802 

requires the employer to reimburse them.” Cochran v. 

Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 407, 409 (Ct. 

App. 2014) (footnote omitted); see also Richie v. Blue Shield 

of Cal., No. C-13-2693 EMC, 2014 WL 6982943 (N.D. Cal. 

Dec. 9, 2014). If the use of the personal cell phone is 

mandatory, then reimbursement is always required, 

regardless of whether the employee would have incurred cell 

phone expenses absent the job. Cochran, 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 

at 412 (“Otherwise, the employer would receive a windfall 

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HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC. 29

because it would be passing its operating expenses on to the 

employee.”); contra Pyara v. Sysco Corp., No. 2:15-cv01208-JAM-KJN, 2017 WL 928715, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 

9, 2017) (denying class certification where employees were 

provided company-issued phones for business but also 

communicated with supervisors with their personal cell 

phones); Dugan v. Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., SA CV 16-

1125 PA (FFMx), 2016 WL 9173459, at *1, 4 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 

Nov. 29, 2016) (dismissing claim for indemnification of 

personal cell phone expenses made from a workplace where 

there was no policy requiring employees to use their 

personal cell phones and the employees could have made the 

calls from their employer’s store phones). To comply with 

section 2802, “the employer must pay some reasonable 

percentage of the employee’s cell phone bill.” Cochran, 176 

Cal. Rptr. 3d at 412. 

Thus, whether Herrera alleged sufficient facts to state a 

claim for reimbursement of phone expenses turns on whether 

it was necessary that the employees make calls and do so 

with phones that were not provided by the company.10 

Herrera alleged that phone calls pursuant to the Call-In 

policy were required and occurred when employees were not 

at the workplace. Although that suggests that she may have 

been required to use a personal cell phone and incur related 

costs, Herrera failed to include specific, non-conclusory 

10 Zumiez protests that Herrera did not allege it was necessary to use 

a cell phone to comply with the call-in policy, suggesting that employees 

could use free communications services like WhatsApp or Skype. But 

using WhatsApp or Skype often requires personal expenses associated 

with internet service and a phone or computer, for which a ruling 

consistent with Cochran might require reimbursement of a portion of the 

bills. 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 412–13 (holding that reimbursement of 

mandatory work-related cell phone calls is required even where the 

employee has an unlimited phone plan).

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30 HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC.

facts about how she made the calls or what costs she 

incurred. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s denial 

of judgment on the pleadings as to the indemnification claim. 

On remand, the district court may grant Herrera leave to 

amend the complaint to include more specific allegations.

D. Remaining Claims

Both parties and the district court agree that the 

remaining claims—failure to keep required records; failure 

to provide accurate wage statements; failure to pay all earned 

wages upon separation from employment; unfair business 

practices under California’s Unfair Competition Law; and 

civil penalties pursuant to PAGA—are derivative of, and rise 

or fall with, Herrera’s reporting time pay, minimum wage, 

and indemnification claims. Accordingly, we affirm the 

denial of the motion for judgment on the pleadings on the 

remaining claims, to the extent the district court determines 

they relate to the reporting time pay and minimum wage 

claims.

IV.

The order denying the motion for judgment on the 

pleadings is affirmed with respect to Herrera’s claim for 

reporting time pay, failure to pay minimum wage, and the 

related remaining claims. The order is reversed with respect 

to Herrera’s claim for indemnification. The case is 

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and 

REMANDED.

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HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC. 31

BERZON, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in the majority’s opinion in full. I write 

separately to respond briefly to Judge Nelson’s concurrence.

Judge Nelson asks future Ninth Circuit panels to 

consider certifying the question answered by Ward v. Tilly’s, 

Inc., 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461 (Ct. App. 2019), review denied 

(May 15, 2019), and this opinion to the California Supreme 

Court. He also questions the panel’s decision to publish a 

precedential opinion in this case.1 To the degree Judge 

Nelson’s suggestions rest on the notion that such 

certifications should be routine or that publication of 

precedential opinions in diversity cases is inappropriate, his 

suggestions bear comment.

We have diversity jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1332. Diversity jurisdiction is, of course, 

provided for by the Constitution and has been decreed by 

Congress. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Judiciary Act 

of 1789, Ch. 20 §§ 9-13, 1 Stat. 73, 73-78. Critics of 

diversity jurisdiction have long expressed their skepticism of 

the propriety and scope of this grant of jurisdiction. See, e.g., 

Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between 

United States and State Courts, 13 Cornell L.Q. 499, 520–

30 (1928). Although many judges wish diversity jurisdiction 

would go away, it has not.

Litigants therefore are entitled to file diversity cases with 

us or to remove on diversity grounds cases filed in state 

courts. Such cases are not second-class proceedings in the 

federal courts, nor do we implicate federalism concerns by 

1 Under this court’s internal procedures, any judge on a panel can 

require publication. 9th Cir. Gen. Order 4.3.

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32 HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC.

treating them coequally with other cases (as long as we apply 

state law as required by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 

64 (1938)).

In diversity cases, as in others, “[w]e invoke the 

certification [to state court] process only after careful 

consideration and do not do so lightly.” Murray v. BEJ 

Minerals, LLC, 924 F.3d 1070, 1072 (9th Cir. 2019) (en 

banc) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Certification statutes are quite useful, as they allow federal 

courts to seek guidance from state courts on difficult and 

novel state law issues. But their overuse can overburden state 

courts unnecessarily, creating federalism friction of their 

own. Such overuse also can foster two-bites-at-the-apple 

litigation tactics, where a party files a diversity case in 

federal court or removes the case to federal court, and then, 

if dissatisfied with the federal court’s interpretation of state 

law, presses for certification of the question to the state 

Supreme Court.2 Where, as here, we are following the only 

state appellate opinion on point and have no reason to think 

the state Supreme Court, which denied review of that 

appellate opinion, will disagree, certifying the issue is 

unwise.

Nor is there a compelling basis for preferring a 

nonprecedential opinion in this circumstance. This court 

does often decide state law cases in nonprecedential 

memorandum dispositions, as our rulings on state law issues 

are not ultimately dispositive—the state courts may later 

disagree. But here, where the issue is one likely to recur in 

federal courts and we have clear guidance from the state 

courts, refusing to publish is supremely inefficient. The legal 

2 That concern is not present here, as the plaintiffs filed the case in 

federal court.

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issue likely would have to be relitigated in federal district 

courts and in this court were we not to issue a precedential 

opinion, as the call-in and show-up procedures at issue here 

have become increasingly common.3

In short, no issue of federalism is at stake here that is not 

inherent in the existence of diversity jurisdiction.

R. NELSON, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in the panel’s decision affirming in part, 

reversing in part, and remanding this case to the district court 

because our precedent requires it. The California Court of 

Appeal’s opinion in Ward v. Tilly’s, Inc., 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d 

461 (Ct. App. 2019), review denied (May 15, 2019), is a 

“controlling interpretation,” Tomlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 

1065, 1069 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981), of California law which we 

must follow absent “convincing evidence” that the 

California Supreme Court would decide the issue differently 

than the Ward majority did. Ryman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 

505 F.3d 993, 994 (9th Cir. 2007).

But the Ward opinion’s interpretation of “report for 

work” is just one possible interpretation of that language in 

Wage Order No. 7-2001. That interpretation was only 

agreed to by two panel members of the California Court of 

Appeal. Ward, 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 462–63. The third panel 

member, Justice Egerton, dissented and offered a plausible 

3 Federal district courts have already faced the “report for work” 

question several times. See Segal v. Aquent LLC, 18-cv-346, 2018 WL 

4599754, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2018); Casas v. Victoria’s Secret 

Stores, LLC, CV-14-6412, 2014 WL 12644922, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 

2014).

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34 HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC.

alternative interpretation. See id. at 479–80 (Egerton, J., 

concurring and dissenting). And at least one other court 

reached the same conclusion that Justice Egerton did. Casas 

v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, LLC, No. CV 14-6412-

GW(VBKx), 2014 WL 12644922 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2014).

Given the differing approaches to the underlying legal 

question, and absent certification to the California Supreme 

Court, the more prudent course would be not to publish an 

opinion in this case.1 True, our decisions on questions of 

state law are not binding on California state courts. See In 

re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1401–02 (9th Cir. 1984) (en 

banc). But by deciding this issue in a published opinion, the 

Ward majority’s pronouncement of California state law now 

binds any federal district court in the Ninth Circuit that might 

disagree with Ward—as one previously did, Casas, 2014 

WL 12644922, at *3—because district courts do “not have 

the authority to ignore circuit court precedent . . . .” 

Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1211 (9th Cir. 

2016) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The 

opinion also binds future Ninth Circuit panels on the merits 

“in the absence of any subsequent indication from the 

[California] courts that our interpretation was incorrect.” 

Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 884 n.7 

(9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The problem, I fear, is that our decision to publish will 

preclude California courts from telling us if we got it wrong. 

This published opinion may incentivize future plaintiffs to 

bring their state law cases in federal court, where the 

outcome is likely to be more favorable and more certain. 

This incentive, in turn, could prevent cases from percolating 

1 The decision to publish requires just one judge to vote that 

publication is “necessary.” 9th Cir. Gen. Order 4.3 (2014).

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HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC. 35

in the California state courts, foreclosing the state courts 

from weighing in on the issue. If California state courts are 

deprived the opportunity to provide “subsequent indication 

[to us] . . . that our interpretation [of California law] was 

incorrect,” In re Watts, 298 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002), 

cooperative judicial federalism is undermined.2

Should my fears materialize, future panels may consider 

certifying the question to the California Supreme Court. See 

Troester v. Starbucks Corp., 680 F. App’x 511, 512–13 (9th 

Cir. 2016), certified question answered, 421 P.3d 1114 (Cal. 

2018) (certifying state law question to California Supreme 

Court that prior Ninth Circuit panel decided in published 

opinion); see also Wilson v. Workman, 577 F.3d 1284, 1323 

(10th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Future 

panels of this court likewise remain free to certify the 

question . . . .”). We have already certified a state law 

question en banc, even without the “sharp split of authority,” 

Emery v. Clark, 604 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2010), typical 

of certification cases. See Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 

924 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc), certified 

question accepted, No. OP 19-0304, 2019 WL 2383604 

(Mont. June 4, 2019) (“Because of the importance of the 

state law question, and the potential of different outcomes in 

2 Indeed, we often “decide state law cases in nonprecedential 

memorandum dispositions,” J. Berzon Concurrence at 32, without 

treating diversity cases as “second-class proceedings,” id. at 31. That is 

what we should have done here because a single divided intermediate 

appellate state court decision in Ward hardly constitutes “clear guidance 

from the state courts” warranting publication. Id. at 32. Publication may 

be warranted in many diversity cases, but not where it may well prevent 

other state courts from providing the “clear guidance” we seek. 

Whatever efficiency federal courts may gain from publication here, see 

id., is thus outweighed by risks of undermining cooperative judicial 

federalism with state courts.

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36 HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC.

federal and state courts, we have elected to certify the issue 

to the Montana Supreme Court”).

Ultimately, this important state law question may need 

to be certified, not as a matter of course, but to seek clear 

guidance and to help “build a cooperative judicial 

federalism.” Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 

(1974). This federalism demands “a proper respect for state 

functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is 

made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a 

continuance of the belief that the National Government will 

fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to 

perform their separate functions in their separate ways.” 

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). Such respect 

preserves states’ autonomy and protects their power to 

interpret their own laws differently than we might otherwise 

decide to, provided that they do so within the bounds set by 

federal law. Our decision to follow the majority’s decision 

in Ward accords with this sound constitutional principle. 

Yet by publishing without first seeking the views of the 

California Supreme Court, we risk undermining cooperative 

judicial federalism, with potentially wide-ranging 

consequences.

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