Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-04236/USCOURTS-ca10-93-04236-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
State of Utah
Appellee
Wesley A. Tuttle
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

WESLEY A. TUTTLE, 

Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. No. 93-4236 

STATE OF UTAH I 

Respondent - Appellee. 

ORDER 

Filed June 23, 1995 

Before TACHA and HO~Y, Circuit Judges, and BURRAGE*, District 

Judge. 

*The Honorable Michael Burrage, United States District Judge for 

the Eastern, Northern and Western Districts of Oklahoma, sitting 

by designation. 

On the court's own motion, the opinion filed June 2, 1995 

is modified by the deletion of footnote 6. A corrected opinion 

has been issued. 

Entered for the Court 

PATRICK FISHER, Clerk 

Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 1 
Patrick Fisher 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Office of the Clerk 

Byron White United States Courthouse 

1823 Stout Street 

Denver, co 80257 

June 23, 1995 

Elisabeth Shumaker 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 93-4236, TUttle v. State of Utah 

Filed June 2, 1995 by Judge Holloway 

Please be advised that the court has entered an order 

modifying the captioned opinion by deleting footnote 6. 

A corrected opinion is attached. 

Attachment 

Very truly yours, 

Patrick Fisher, 

Clerk 

By:~~ 

Barbara Schermerhorn 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 2 
WESLEY A. 

v. 

STATE OF 

PUBLISH .... FILED--

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APP~d States Co~~~ Appeall Tenth Carcuat 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

TUTTLE, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

) 

) 

UTAH, ) 

) 

Respondent-Appellee. ) 

No. 

JUN 0 2 i995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

93-4236 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 91-CV-469B) 

Kenneth R. Brown of Salt Lake City, Utah, for PetitionerAppellant. 

J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, State of Utah, 

Salt Lake City, Utah (Jan Graham, Attorney General, with him on 

the brief), for Respondent-Appellee. 

Before TACHA and HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judges, and BURRAGE,* District 

Judge. 

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge. 

*Honorable Michael Burrage, United States District Judge for the 

Eastern, Northern and Western Districts of Oklahoma, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 3 
Petitioner-Appellant Wesley A. Tuttle (Tuttle) appeals from 

the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 

and 2253. 

I 

on September 26, 1983, Sydney Ann Merrick drove up Parley's 

Canyon in Utah on an errand for her employer. State Tr. at 936.1 

At approximately 3:30 p.m. that day, a trucker discovered 

Merrick's body in her car on an off-ramp of Interstate 80 at the 

Parley's Summit Exit in Summit County. Id. at 801-03, 827. She 

had been stabbed to death. 

Tuttle was tried on a charge of first degree murder. He was 

convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. 

The Utah Supreme Court reversed his conviction for insufficient 

evidence of first degree murder and remanded to the trial court 

with instructions to enter a conviction and sentence for second 

degree murder. State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1218-19 (Utah 

1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1018 (1990) .2 On remand the trial 

1 

References to the state trial transcript (State Tr.) and the 

state trial record (StateR.) are to the specific page numbers. 

Because both the transcript and the record are consecutively 

paginated, we omit references to volume numbers. References to 

the federal record are designated ROA (Record on Appeal) . 

2 

While his direct appeal was pending, Tuttle escaped from the 

Utah State Prison. The Utah Supreme Court dismissed his appeal. 

Following Tuttle's return to custody, the Utah Supreme Court 

reinstated his appeal. State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703 (Utah 1985). 

Tuttle was subsequently convicted of escape and that conviction 

was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 

630 (Utah 1986). Neither of these prior decisions are relevant to 

the issues in this current appeal. 

2 

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court sentenced Tuttle to five years to life for second degree 

murder. 

The facts surrounding the murder are generally not in dispute 

and are set forth in detail in the decision of the Utah Supreme 

Court, Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, the Report and Recommendation of the 

magistrate judge, ROA doc. 25, and the Memorandum Decision and 

Order of the district judge, ROA doc. 44. We discuss them as 

necessary in the body of this opinion, but summarize briefly here. 

On the day of the murder, Tuttle, a truck driver, was 

returning to his home in Evanston, Wyoming from Ventura, 

California. State Tr. at 1363, 1711. It is not in dispute that 

Tuttle was in the area of the murder near the time of its 

occurrence and that he saw the victim. What is disputed is 

whether Ms. Merrick was stabbed before Tuttle encountered her. 

Tuttle contends that he found Merrick stabbed and dying in her 

car, and claims he did not phone the police-because of his past 

criminal record. Id. at 1713-17, 1721. 

According to eyewitnesses, the victim's car was towed up 

Parley's Canyon by a truck or truck and trailer. Other testimony 

placed a truck and trailer and car pulled over on the off-ramp at 

Parley's Summit. It was there that Sydney Merrick's body was 

discovered lying in her car. Eyewitnesses testified that they had 

seen a man and a woman near the truck and car. However, only one 

witness, Matthew Fish, could identify that man as the petitioner 

Tuttle. Fish underwent hypnosis about a week after the murder, 

and his posthypnotic testimony is the focal point of this appeal. 

We discuss that testimony in detail below. 

3 

Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 5 
II 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

A. The State Court Proceedings 

In Tuttle's direct appeal, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that 

the trial judge's admission of Fish's hypnotically enhanced 

testimony was error. Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 1211-12. The court 

stated that 11 [a] previously hypnotized witness may take the stand, 

but the witness's testimony must be limited to his or her 

prehypnotic recall as it has been recorded before hypnosis. 11 Id. 

at 1211. Thus the court held, as have courts in other states, 

that hypnotically enhanced testimony is inadmissible and a witness 

who has undergone hypnosis to aid in recall may testify only to 

recorded statements made prior to the hypnosis. See id. at 

1211-12 (collecting cases). In this case, the Utah court held 

that ·Fish's testimony should have been limited to the statement 

which Fish dictated to a secretary a few days prior to the 

hypnosis session. The Utah Supreme Court also concluded that the 

trial judge erred by not allowing Tuttle to present expert 

testimony about the unreliability of hypnotically enhanced 

testimony. Id. at 1212. The Utah court did not determine whether 

the 11 errors violated Tuttle's federal constitutional rights, as 

opposed to simply amounting to evidentiary errors under state law 

n Id. at 1213. 

Tuttle claimed that these two errors violated his 

constitutional rights to confront the witnesses against him and to 

present evidence on his own behalf. However, the Utah Supreme 

Court held that the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable 

4 

Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 6 
doubt. Id. at 1213.3 

B. The Federal Court Habeas Proceeding 

Tuttle filed this federal habeas petition in May 1991 

alleging that (1) admission of the hypnotically enhanced testimony 

of Fish violated his right to confront witnesses against him; (2) 

exclusion of expert testimony on the unreliability of hypnotically 

enhanced testimony violated his right to present evidence on his 

own behalf; and (3) the Utah Supreme Court should not have held 

harmless the errors which had occurred in the state trial. ROA 

doc. 2.4 

The habeas case was referred to a magistrate judge under 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). After some preliminary rulings,S the 

magistrate turned to the merits of Tuttle's habeas petition. He 

first concluded that Tuttle's rights under the Confrontation 

Clause were not violated by the admission of the hypnotically 

3 

The court did not specifically cite Chapman v. California, 

386 U.S. 18 (1967), but it did state that "[e]rrors amounting to 

violations of the federal constitution require reversal unless 

they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 

1213. Thus, the court applied the proper standard for harmless 

error analysis of constitutional violations on direct appeal. 

4 

In this appeal Tuttle does not argue that harmless error 

analysis should not be applied. 

5 

The State filed a motion to dismiss Tuttle's habeas petition 

for failure to exhaust state remedies as required under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. ROA docs. 6 and 11. The magistrate judge examined the 

record and concluded that Tuttle had exhausted his state remedies. 

ROA doc. 20. The State did not object to this conclusion, and 

therefore, the district judge adopted the recommendation of the 

magistrate judge and denied the State's motion to dismiss the 

petition. Id. In this appeal the State does not challenge the 

finding of exhaustion. Moreover, from the record it is clear that 

Tuttle exhausted his state remedies. 

5 

Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 7 
enhanced testimony of Fish. However, he held that the refusal to 

allow Tuttle to present expert testimony to attack the reliability 

of hypnotically enhanced testimony violated Tuttle's rights under 

the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The magistrate judge 

then concluded that this erroneous exclusion of evidence was 

subject to harmless error analysis, but concluded that the error 

was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. He therefore 

recommended that a conditional writ be granted if the state did 

not appeal or commence new trial proceedings within 60 days. 

The district court declined to adopt the magistrate judge's 

recommendation. The judge noted that the State's objection to the 

magistrate's Report and Recommendation went "only to one issue 

whether the [Utah] trial court's error constituted harmless 

error." Memorandum Decision and Order at 5. The district judge 

said that for purposes of harmless error analysis, he assumed that 

both the admission of Fish's posthypnotic testimony and the 

rejection of expert witness testimony on the unreliability of 

posthypnotic testimony were constitutional errors. Id. at 4 n.2. 

The judge then concluded that the admission of the hypnotically 

enhanced testimony was harmless error and further stated: 

Because the court has found that the inclusion of Mr. 

Fish's post-hypnotic testimony was harmless, it follows 

that the improper exclusion of evidence which would 

impeach that testimony is also harmless. Accordingly, 

the court finds that the trial court's refusal to allow 

Tuttle's expert witness to testify was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

Memorandum Decision and Order at 22. Holding the errors to be 

harmless under the standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 

6 

Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 8 
(1967) , the district court denied the petition. 

III 

DISCUSSION 

As noted, the magistrate judge concluded that petitioner 

Tuttle's rights under the Confrontation Clause were not violated 

by the admission of Fish's testimony, reasoning that while 

hypnosis might have made the cross-examination of 

difficult, the record indicated that counsel had the 

Fish more 

opportunity 

to effectively cross-examine Fish and to suggest that his trial 

testimony was unreliable by pointing out his prior inconsistent 

statements. Report and Recommendation at 31-34. However, the 

magistrate judge held that Tuttle's rights under the Compulsory 

Process and Due Process Clauses were violated by the exclusion of 

expert testimony regarding the unreliability of hypnotically 

enhanced testimony. The magistrate judge noted that the Utah 

Supreme Court acknowledged that the state trial judge's ruling, 

which forced Tuttle to choose between presenting expert testimony 

on the unreliability of hypnotically enhanced testimony and 

attacking the accuracy of eyewitness testimony in general, was 

error; and that the ruling had the effect of denying Tuttle the 

right to present expert testimony regarding the unreliability of 

hypnotically enhanced testimony. Report and Recommendation at 

36-37. Under the Chapman standard, the magistrate judge held that 

this exclusion of critical expert testimony was not harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 54-SS. Hence the magistrate 

judge recommended granting a conditional habeas writ. 

7 

Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 9 
The district judge, as noted earlier, assumed that both the 

admission of Fish's posthypnotic testimony and the exclusion of 

expert testimony on the unreliability of that testimony, 

constituted constitutional error, Memorandum Decision and Order 

at 5 n.2, and proceeded directly to his harmless error analysis. 

The judge then reviewed the record and held that the admission of 

Fish's posthypnotic testimony was harmless. He concluded that it 

followed that the improper exclusion of expert testimony 

impeaching Fish's posthypnotic testimony was also harmless. The 

petition was therefore denied. Id. at 22-23. 

We are persuaded to follow the general procedure adopted by 

the district judge. We therefore assume that the errors alleged 

by Tuttle amounted to constitutional violations and we proceed to 

analyze whether these errors were harmless. 

judge 

Harmless Error Analysis 

A. The Standard for Harmless Error Analysis 

in this Habeas Case 

As noted, the Utah Supreme Court and the federal magistrate 

applied the Chapman harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 

standard. However, in the period between the federal magistrate 

judge's report and the district court's decision below, the 

Supreme Court held that the harmless error standard governing 

constitutional errors of the 11 trial type 11 in federal habeas cases 

is the standard from Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 

(1946), rather than the Chapman standard. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 

113 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (1993). Under Kotteakos, the standard for 

determining whether habeas relief must be granted is whether the 

error 11 had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

8 

Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 10 
determining the jury's verdict." Id., quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. 

at 776; see Brewer v. Reynolds, F.3d No. 94-5072, 1995 

WL 148397, at *10 (lOth Cir. April 5, 1995). 

In the opinion below, the district judge recognized that 

Brecht had supplanted the Chapman standard in federal habeas 

cases. Memorandum Decision and Order of December 3, 1993, at 6 

n.4. The judge stated that because Brecht was not decided until 

after his denial of the habeas petition, in his ruling from the 

bench on April 16, 1993, he analyzed "Tuttle's challenge under the 

Chapman standard -- recognizing, of course, that this collateral 

petition is now governed by Brecht." Id. at 6 n.4. 

In Brecht the Supreme Court concluded that Kotteakos was 

"better tailored to the nature and purpose of collateral review 

than the Chapman standard, and application of a less onerous 

harmless-error standard on habeas promotes the considerations 

underlying our habeas jurisprudence." 113 S. Ct. at 1714. 

The principle that collateral review is different 

from direct review resounds throughout our 

jurisprudence. . . . Direct review is the principle 

avenue for challenging a conviction. "When the process 

of direct review--which, if a federal question is 

involved, includes the right to petition this Court for 

a writ of certiorari--comes to an end, a presumption of 

finality and legality attaches to the conviction and 

sentence. The role of federal habeas proceedings, while 

important in assuring that constitutional rights are 

observed, is secondary and limited. Federal courts are 

not forums in which to relitigate state trials." 

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983). 

Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1719. The Court stated that habeas 

petitioners would not be "entitled to habeas relief based on trial 

error unless they can establish that it resulted in 'actual 

prejudice.'" Id. at 1722. 

9 

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During the pendency of the instant appeal, the Supreme Court 

applied and explicated Brecht. In O'Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 

992, 994 (1995), the Court held that "[w]hen a federal judge in a 

habeas proceeding is in grave doubt about whether a trial error of 

federal law had 'substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jukY'S verdict.' that error is not harmless. And. 

the petitioner must win." Id. at 994 (emphasis added). "Grave 

doubt," the Court explained, "mean[sl that, in the judge's mind. 

the matter is so evenly balanced that he feels himself in virtual 

egyipoise as to the harmlessness of the error." Id. (emphasis 

added) . 

The Court based its holding in O'Neal on three 

considerations: (1) precedent which recognized that the common 

law rule placed the burden on the beneficiary of the error to show 

that the error was harmless; (2) the basic purposes underlying 

the writ of ·habeas corpus protecting individuals from 

unconstitutional convictions and.guaranteeing the integrity of the 

criminal process by assuring that trials are fundamentally fair; 

and (3) administrative considerations. Id. at 995-98. The Court 

rejected the assertion that because a habeas proceeding is a civil 

proceeding, and because appellants in civil cases bear the burden 

of showing prejudice, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate 

prejudice in order to prevail. The Court emphasized that: 

[T]he errors being considered by a habeas court occurred 

in a criminal proceeding, and therefore, although habeas 

is a civil proceeding, someone's custody, rather than 

mere civil liability, is at stake. And, as we have 

explained, when reviewing errors from a criminal 

proceeding, this Court has consistently held that, if 

the harmlessness of the error is in grave doubt, relief 

must be granted. We hold the same here. 

10 

Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 12 
Id. at 996 (emphasis in original). 

Thus, under the teaching of O'Neal, if we determine that an 

error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury's verdict, or if we have grave doubt about 

whether the error was harmless, the error was not harmless and the 

habeas petitioner is entitled to relief. 

B. The Harmless Error Standard Applied Here 

Assuming, as the district judge did here, Memorandum Decision 

and Order at 5 n.2, that there were constitutional errors in 

violation of the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory Process 

and Due Process Clauses, we must examine Fish's evidence in light 

of the entire record to determine what its effect on the jury may 

have been. Our harmless error review is de novo. Graham v. 

Wilson, 828 F.2d 656, 659 (lOth Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 

1069 (1988). 

In reviewing the record, we are mindful of what the Court 

held in Kotteakos, speaking through Justice Rutledge: 

But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after 

pondering all that happened without stripping the 

erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was 

not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible 

to conclude that substantial rights were not affected. 

The ingyiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to 

support the result, apart from the phase affected by the 

error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself 

had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in 

grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand. 

Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765 (emphasis added). Thus, our task is 

not merely to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to 

convict Tuttle in the absence of the posthypnotic testimony from 

Matt Fish. Instead, we must determine, in light of the entire 

record, whether Fish's posthypnotic evidence so influenced the 

11 

Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 13 
jury that we cannot conclude that it did not substantially affect 

the verdict, or whether we have grave doubt as to the harmlessness 

of the errors alleged.6 

In Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986), the 

Supreme Court stated that harmless error analysis of Confrontation 

Clause violations "depends upon a host of factors," including" [1] 

the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's 

case, [2] whether the testimony was cumulative, [3] the presence 

or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the 

testimony of the witness on material points, [4] the extent of 

cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, [5] the 

overall strength of the prosecution's case." 

We believe these factors are also relevant to the harmless 

error analysis of the exclusion of expert testimony on the 

6 

At some points in his analysis of the harmless error 

question, the district judge made statements which appear to be at 

odds with the standard laid down in Kotteakos, as emphasized 

above, 328 U.S. at 765. In his Memorandum Decision and Order at 

17, for e~ample, the judge said that testimony by Fish about 

writing on the front of the truck, and specifically the word 

"Apache," may appear important but was cumulative of other 

evidence and that "Mr. Tuttle would have been convicted without 

Mr. Fish's post-hypnotic evidence on these points." The district 

judge also said that "Mr. Tuttle's identification as the driver of 

the truck was clearly established at trial without the use of 

Mr. Fish's post-hypnotic testimony," and the "post-hypnotic 

testimony of Mr. Fish was not necessary for the conviction of Mr. 

Tuttle." Id. at 19. 

As Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65, and O'Neal, 115 S. Ct. at 

995, make clear, the harmless error determination here must be 

made "after pondering all that happened without stripping the 

erroneous action from the whole . . " (Emphasis added) . We 

must proceed with this instruction clearly in mind and determine 

whether the federal trial judge reached the proper result in any 

event. 

12 

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unreliability of posthypnotic testimony. Again, like the federal 

district judge below, we assume that the exclusion of such 

evidence was a constitutional error (an alleged violation of the 

right to compulsory process under the Sixth Amendment and due 

process under the Fourteenth Amendment) . We therefore consider 

the two claims of error together in order to determine whether· the 

alleged errors had substantial influence on the verdict, or 

whether we have a grave doubt that they were harmless. 

1. Matt Fish's Evidence 

Two or three days after the murder of Ms. Merrick, Matthew 

Fish dictated the following statement to a secretary at his place 

of employment: 

Driving up Parley's Canyon I saw a black flat bed truck 

with a goose neck trailer towing a small car with a girl 

in it. The bed on the truck was approximately 25 feet 

long and it was also black 'with wire mesh sides. There 

was some sort of writing on the doors of the truck in 

light blue (or possibly red, white, and blue) . 

They passed me going up Parley's Canyon. I noticed the 

girl seemed very uncomfortable. The truck driver seemed 

to be going very fast. I re-passed them at the top of 

the summit and they were pulled off at the Summit Park 

exit right at the crest of the hill. The truck was 

still connected to the car and the driver of the truck 

walked back to the car, opened up the driver[']s side 

door, put his hand on the roof, and started talking. 

That is the last thing I saw. 

The guy was medium build with a dark baseball cap on 

wearing a light blue shirt, he had a scroungy 

appearance. 

The truck was a new Chevy with glossy black paint. 

There were one or two barrels up against the head board 

and some type of pipe laying in the back of the truck. 

The statement was signed "Matt Fish" and below the signature was a 

notation, "Summit County Lumber," and "649-5533." State R. at 

679. This statement (State Ex. No. 40) was itself offered by the 

13 

Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 15 
prosecution at trial, but an objection by the defense was made 

that Fish's memory had already been refreshed by viewing the 

statement. The Utah trial judge sustained the objection to 

admission of the exhibit itself, but under Utah Rule of Evidence 

803(5) permitted it to be read aloud by Fish as a memorandum of 

recorded recollection, which was done. State Tr. 1074-75. 

Petitioner's counsel did not object to Fish's reading aloud the 

prehypnotic statement. Id. 

On or about October 4, 1983, which was several months before 

Tuttle's trial in April 1984, Fish was placed under hypnosis. 

Detective Evans of the Park City Police Department then questioned 

Fish about what Fish had seen at Parley's Summit. A brief portion 

of the questioning was done by Dr. Michael Decaria, a clinical 

psychologist who conducted the hypnosis. A second officer was 

also present but did not participate in the questioning. See 

State R. at 680-92 (transcript of questioning portion of hypnotic 

session) . 

At trial on April 18, 1984, Fish testified that he left his 

home in Salt Lake at 1:53 p.m. driving a two-ton flatbed lumber 

truck owned by his employer. State Tr. at 1043-44. He stated: 

About 300 yards past Lamb's Canyon I was in the 

slow lane coming up and a black Chevy truck towing a 

white Datsun pulled in front of me and I had to shift 

over to the middle lane. I got about ten yards in front 

of 'em, looked over as I was going by the driver's side, 

tried to look inside the cab, couldn't get a real good 

look at the guy. I was trying to give him a piece of my 

mind for pulling in front of me. 

Id. at 1045. He reiterated that the car he saw being towed was a 

white Datsun and said that there was a young girl inside. Id. at 

1046. He described the girl as having sandy hair in a "pixy 

14 

Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 16 
style 11 cut. When shown a photograph of the victim (State's Ex. 

No. 8), he said that the hair color and style looked like what he 

saw. Id. at 1046-47. 

In his trial testimony, Fish described the truck as 11 a black 

Chevy truck with 'Apache' written on a bug deflector on the front 

of it. 11 State Tr. at 1047. He said he remembered the word 

11 Apache 11 

Because after he swerved in front of me and I went 

on the middle lane and passed him, I got about ten yards 

in front of him and looked in my rear view mirror and 

saw "Apache" written on the bug deflector, and I 

remember thinking what a crazy Indian he was at the 

time. 

Id. When shown photographs of the victim's car (State Ex. No. 3) 

and Tuttle's truck and trailer (State Ex. Nos. 18 and 39), he 

identified them as the ones he saw near Parley's Summit the day of 

the murder. Id. at 1047-48, 1086. 

Fish testified at trial that when he reached the top of the 

summit, maybe 5 to 10 minutes later, he again observed the truck 

and the Datsun. State Tr. at 1050. He said that the truck was 15 

feet from the car and that they were connected by some sort of 

chain or steel line. Id. at 1052. The driver of the truck walked 

along the tow line towards the car. The last thing he saw was the 

man with one hand on the car door and one hand on the roof. Fish 

testified that the man and woman appeared to be talking. He said 

that they were the same man and woman he saw driving up the 

summit. He identified Tuttle in court as the man he saw. Id. at 

1055-56. Fish was the only eyewitness able to identify petitioner 

Tuttle at trial. 

15 

Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 17 
2. The Importance of Fish's ~idence to the Prosecution Case 

The State argues that its "case did not hinge on Fish. He 

was one of many witnesses to the circumstances of the crime." 

Appellee's Brief at 32. However, the record reveals that the 

prosecution considered Fish its most important individual witness. 

In its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress 

Testimony of Matt Fish or Disqualify Matt Fish as a Witness in the 

Defendant's Trial, the State asserted that "[t]he testimony of 

Matt Fish is extremely important evidence that will aid in the 

search for the truth." StateR. at 677 (emphasis added). During 

closing arguments, the State repeatedly emphasized Fish's 

testimony: 

[T]he witness who identified the defendant at the 

scene of the crime. of all the witnesses in this case. 

Matt Fish has the best opportunity to see and observe 

the defendant. The reason he does is he gets to see him 

more often. He sees him three different times. And he 

has a reason for looking for him; because he's mad, 

because he pulled in front of him. He saw the word 

"Apache" and he thinks that's appropriate because a 

crazy Indian's driving. 

He also observes the defendant for the longest 

period of time. Because he's travelling slower. It's 

going to take longer to get by him. He's also 

closer. . . . The defendant's vehicle is in the outside 

lane, Mr. Fish's vehicle is in the inside lane. There 

is nothing between them other than just a few feet of 

open space. 

Mr. Fish pointed him out. Mr. Fish identified the 

defendant as the person who towed Sidney [sic] Merrick 

to her death. 

State Tr. at 1858-59 (emphasis added). 

The defense argued extensively in an attempt to persuade the 

jury to disregard Matt Fish's testimony. See State Tr. at 

16 

Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 18 
1879-83; 1884-1887; 1908; 1909. In rebuttal, the State again 

touted Fish's testimony: 

Let's talk about Matt Fish. I would submit that 

Matt Fish is not the heart of the State's case. He is 

an important witness, certainly. In fact, his testimony 

certainly .adds things that no other witness can 

add .. 

I think it's remarkable what Matt Fish saw. I 

think he did an excellent job. When you look at the 

things that he had right I think his power of 

observation was exceptionally good. . . . 

=I~t:::h!o.::!i:..:.n~k~h~e~d~1;.;. d~~a~r~e:.:lma~r~k....,a=b=.l.::::e~j~o~b,._,_. And as Mr. Adkins 

indicated, he was in the best opportunity to view, he 

was past [sic], or he passed the defendant three times. 

He is going the slowest and he had a reason to pay 

attention. 

State Tr. at 1919-22 (emphasis added). 

In addition, the Utah trial judge recognized that Fish was an 

important witness for the prosecution: "The only witness who has 

identified Mr. Tuttle has been Mr. Matthew Fish .. Mr. Fish 

appeared to be very self-assured, very definite . . n 

Id. at 1577. 

Fish was the only witness who could identify Tuttle in court 

as the man with a girl at the location where the murder occurred, 

and this in-court identification occurred after Fish was 

hypnotized. No other single witness could put all the 

circumstances together the way Fish did in his posthypnotic trial 

testimony. Thus after hypnosis Fish was the strongest, most 

helpful individual witness for the prosecution. 

On the other hand, Fish's prehypnotic statement, dictated two 

or three days after the incident, was read to the jury as noted. 

It gave a substantial part of the details Fish testified to, and 

17 

Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 19 
this evidence was not objected to or challenged as being a product 

of hypnosis. Of course, Fish's prehypnotic statement could not, 

and did not, provide all the details of Fish's posthypnosis trial 

testimony, which included an in-court identification of Tuttle as 

the driver of the truck. But in his prehypnotic statement Fish 

did tell about seeing the black truck and trailer towing a small 

car with a girl in it, and he said that the truck passed him going 

up Parley's Canyon; the girl seemed very uncomfortable; Fish 

repassed them at the top of the Summit and they were still pulled 

off at the Summit Park exit; the truck was connected to the car; 

and the driver of the truck walked back to the car, opened the 

driver's side door, put his hand on the roof, and started talking. 

All of this prehypnotic evidence is properly to be considered as 

part of the prosecution's overall evidence. 

3. The Extent of Cross-Examination and Impeachment Permitted 

The magistrate judge concluded that Tuttle's counsel had the 

opportunity to effectively cross-examine Fish. Report and 

Recommendation at 31-34. However, although the defense was 

allowed to cross-examine Matt Fish extensively, the safeguards to 

insure the reliability of posthypnosis testimony were not all 

followed. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 60-61 (1987); 

Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501, 1508 n.8.7 We feel that 

7 

In Rock the Supreme Court held that an Arkansas rule that 

posthypnotic testimony was per se inadmissible violated a criminal 

defendant's right to testify in his own behalf. In so holding the 

Court noted that the use of procedural safeguards could reduce, 

although perhaps not eliminate, the inaccuracies in testimony that 

hypnosis can cause. 483 U.S. at 60. The Court suggested the 

following guidelines: (1) the hypnosis should be performed by a 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

18 

Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 20 
because of the circumstances surrounding Fish's hypnosis and 

subsequent testimony, the ability to cross-examine Fish was 

impaired. Moreover, the exclusion of expert testimony explaining 

the unreliability of posthypnotic testimony also impeded Tuttle's 

(Footnote continued) : 

psychologist or psychiatrist who is independent of the 

investigation and has special training in the use of hypnosis; 

(2) the hypnosis should be conducted in a neutral setting with no 

one present but the hypnotist and the subject; and (3) all 

interrogation, before, during and after hypnosis, should be tape 

or videorecorded. Id. The Court also noted that "[t]he more 

traditional means of assessing accuracy of testimony also remain 

applicable in the case of a previously hypnotized defendant," 

including verification through corroborating evidence, 

cross-examination, expert testimony, and cautionary instructions. 

Id. at 61. 

In Robison, a federal habeas case, we held that the "use of 

any post-hypnotic testimony is not per se a constitutional error. 

A reviewing court must determine whether safeguards have been 

employed to insure reliability of the testimony to make it 

admissible." 829 F.2d at 1508. We concluded that because the 

state trial judge had found the existence of safeguards in the 

hypnosis and testimony of the witness, and because there was no 

evidence contrary to the judge's finding, that finding was 

entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) 

and Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982). The state judge there 

found the following safeguards: (1) there was a written record of 

the "substance" of the witness's prehypnosis recall; (2) that 

record was preserved; (3) the -trial testimony did not vary from 

the prehypnotic statement; (4) the hypnosis was performed in a 

manner designed to minimize the danger of contamination; and (5) 

a written record of the hypnotic session was made and maintained. 

Robison, 829 F.2d at 1508 n.a. See generally Martin T. Orne, 

David A. Soskis, David F. Dinges, and Emily Carota Orne, 

Hypnotically induced testimony, in Eyewitness Testimony 171 (Gary 

L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., 1984). 

Not all of the above safeguards were followed for the 

hypnosis and testimony of Matt Fish. Although the hypnosis was 

performed by a psychologist, most of the questioning under 

hypnosis was conducted by a police officer, and another police 

officer was present during the session. Moreover, Fish's 

posthypnotic testimony differed significantly from his prehypnotic 

statement. Finally, no videorecording of the session was made, 

and no tape recording of any kind was made of Fish's prehypnosis 

recall. 

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Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 21 
defense. Thus, this factor weighs in Tuttle's favor in the 

harmless error analysis under VanArsdall. 

4. The Overall Strength of the Prosecution Case 

Three of the VanArsdall factors -- whether the evidence is 

cumulative, whether it is corroborated or contradicted, and the 

overall strength of the prosecution's case focus on the 

strength of the evidence as a whole when considered in light of 

proof admitted or excluded in violation of the Confrontation 

Clause or the Compulsory Process or Due Process Clauses. 

Therefore, we will consider them together. 

Fish was the most important individual witness for the 

prosecution. His posthypnotic testimony was more detailed and 

complete than the· testimony of the other eyewitnesses, and only he 

was able to identify Tuttle in court as the driver of the truck. 

However, we must consider the combined strength of the testimony 

presented by other witnesses and Fish's prehypnotic statement, 

taken together with Tuttle's admissions and actions. Considered 

in this light, we are persuaded that the overall strength of the 

prosecution's case is such that the admission of Fish's 

posthypnotic testimony, and the exclusion of expert testimony to 

impeach it, did not have a substantial and injurious effect or 

influence on the jury's verdict, and we do not have grave doubt 

about the harmlessness of the constitutional errors asserted. We 

turn now to our assessment of the combined proof of the 

prosecution. 

Dell Babcock testified that on September 26, 1983, he was 

riding with his boss westbound down Parley's Canyon around 2:30 to 

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Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 22 
3 o'clock. He saw a one-ton dark-coiored truck with a trailer 

towing a car east on Parley's Summit. State Tr. at 968-69. The 

truck had a bug screen that bore the word "Apache." Id. Although 

Babcock testified that he was previously acquainted with Apache 

Oil Field Services, and that he had seen Apache's trucks and other 

similar trucks in the field, he stated that the only time he saw a 

truck with "Apache" on the front was the day of the murder. Id. 

at 967, 971-73. On cross-examination, Babcock said that the car 

was definitely not towed by a chain, but instead by a white or 

yellow tow rope or nylon strap. Id. at 977. He could not 

identify the victim's car from the photograph he was shown, and 

described the vehicle being towed only as a light-colored, 

medium-sized car. Id. at 974. Nor could he say that the truck he 

had seen at Parley's Summit was similar to one in a photograph he 

was shown at trial. Id. at 970. 

David Albrycht testified that on the day of the murder, while 

driving with his wife and proceeding west over Parley's Summit, he 

saw a dark truck with a trailer towing a small white car east up 

the hill. State Tr. at 980-81. He noticed one person in the 

truck and one in the car. Id. at 981. Mr. Albrycht identified 

photographs of the victim's car (State Ex. No. 3) and Tuttle's 

truck and trailer (State Ex. Nos. 18, 19 and 39) as similar to 

those he saw at Parley's Summit. Id. at 982, 987. Mr. Albrycht 

said a 15-20 foot length of chain was connected below the bumper 

of the white car. Id. at 987. Mr. Albrycht described the person 

in the white car as "very young," with 

blonde, but not brown." Id. at 983. 

21 

"dirty blonde hair--not 

When shown a picture of the 

Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 23 
victim (State Ex. No. 7), Mr. Albrycht said that the hair color 

was the same as the hair color of the girl in the white car. Id. 

Mrs. Francis Albrycht testified that around 2:15 or 2:30 on 

September 26, 1983, she saw a blackish or dark blue truck towing a 

small white car about halfway between Parley's Summit and Lamb's 

Canyon. State Tr. at 995-~8. She stated that the car was towed 

by a chain about 20 feet long connected from the truck to the car, 

and that there was a young girl sitting in the driver's seat who 

had "short hair, sort of a dirty bl.onde." Id. at 997, 999. She 

also identified photographs of the victim's car (State Ex. No. 3) 

and the truck and trailer (State Ex. Nos. 19 and 39) as similar to 

the ones she saw near Parley's Summit. Id. at 998, 1001-02. 

From the testimony of the Albrychts the jury had before it 

substantial evidence that a dark-colored truck with a trailer 

attached, using a metal chain, towed a white car similar to 

Ms. Merrick's up Parley's Summit. Babcock's testimony that 

"Apache" was written on the bug screen of the truck linked the 

truck to petitioner Tuttle. On the same point, Kenneth Tuttle, 

petitioner's brother and a co-owner of Apache, testified that only 

two Apache vehicles had "Apache" written on the bug screen, one a 

red one-ton truck, the other a black one-ton truck. State Tr. at 

1124. Petitioner Tuttle was assigned the black one-ton truck. 

Id. at 1125. CUrtis Sessions, another Apache employee, testified 

that this black truck was the one that petitioner was driving when 

he returned to the Apache yard on September 26, 1983, after taking 

a load for Apache to California. Id. at 1197-1199. From all the 

above evidence, the jury could infer that Tuttle was the person 

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Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 24 
who was driving the truck which towed Merrick's car up Parley's 

Sununit. 8 

The testimony of Kent Moffat further strengthened the 

prosecution's case. Moffat was a passenger in a car his father 

was driving up Parley's Summit on the day of the murder. 

State Tr. at 1020. Moffat testified that upon reaching the 

sununit, at approximately 2:30p.m., he observed a man and a woman 

standing between a car and a truck and trailer. Id. at 1021. He 

said "It looked to me first like they were just goofing off, I 

guess. Looked like he was poking her and tickling her, that type 

of deal." Id. at 1021. "And then they were on the other side of 

the passenger door and I noticed him look like he shoved her in 

the car backwards. That's when I realized it was violent." Id. 

at 1021-22. 

Moffat identified photographs of the victim's car (State Ex. 

Nos. 2 and 3) as depicting the car he saw. Id. at 1026-27. When 

shown photographs of Tuttle's truck and trailer (State Ex. Nos. 18 

and 39), Moffat said that they were similar to the ones he saw the 

day of the murder. Id. at 1031-32. Moffat described the man he 

saw as six feet tall or taller, with hair over the collar and a 

receding hair line. State Tr. at 1032. He testified that the man 

had a mustache and facial hair, maybe two or three days' growth. 

8 

The prosecution 

was equipped with 

signs of having been 

1094-96, 1364. 

also introduced testimony that Tuttle's truck 

metal chains and that the victim's car showed 

towed recently by chains or cables. Id. at 

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Id. at 1032-33. In the courtroom Moffat could not identify the 

man he saw at the off-ramp. Id. at 1032-33. 

In light of the above evidence, we feel that Matt Fish's 

posthypnotic testimony identifying the truck driver is cumulative 

of other evidence. Moreover, the substantial circumstantial 

evidence that Tuttle was at Parley's Summit with Ms. Merrick 

before her murder shows that the in-court identification of Tuttle 

by Fish was not essential to the prosecution's case. 

Martha Kerr, an employee of the Utah State Crime Laboratory, 

testified about examinations she performed as a criminalist 

assigned to the serology or hair unit. She examined materials 

from the Datsun and the truck, including hair, nail clippings and 

blood. Kerr said that the rearview mirror taken from the white 

Datsun (State Ex. No. 12), State Tr. at 850, had a reddish-brown 

stain over approximately half of the mirror area, and a hair was 

imbedded in the stain. State Tr. at 1278. The blood from the 

mirror was consistent, as to characteristics considered, with the 

blood in State Ex. No. 47E (Merrick's blood from her autopsy, 

State Tr. at 1280, 1411-12). Kerr compared the hair sample from 

the rearview mirror of the Datsun with hair samples obtained from 

Tuttle in November 1983 and concluded: "Microscopic 

characteristics exhibited by Mr. Tuttle were present in the hair 

from the mirror; therefore, in my opinion the hair on the mirror 

could have originated from Mr. Tuttle." State Tr. at 1299. On 

cross-examination Kerr was asked whether she found "one hair on 

the mirror that [she] testified had characteristics similar to 

24 

Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 26 
[Tuttle's]," and Kerr said: 

1341. 

"That is correct." State Tr. at 

Kerr also testified that among the hair samples taken from 

Merrick's blouse, one had the dyed characteristics of Merrick's 

hair; none had characteristics similar to Tuttle's hair; and 

hairs from Merrick's shirt were from someone other than Tuttle or 

Merrick. State Tr. at 1342-43. Among hair samples from a pillow 

in the Datsun, only one had any similarities to Tuttle's and Kerr 

could not say that this was, or was possibly, from Tuttle. Id. at 

1343. One hair from Merrick's clothing exhibited follicular 

tissue and Kerr felt this hair had been removed by force. Id. at 

1352. Kerr explained that there are various ways hair can be 

forcibly removed by anything that can attach to it and pull it out 

of the follicle, such as if one had used a comb on a twisted rat 

in her hair. Id. at 1356. 

Tuttle's counsel presented testimony from another 

hair examination, Ron~ld Macey. Macey testified 

expert on 

that he had 

examined samples of Tuttle's hair and the individual hair 

represented as having been taken from the mirror of the small 

automobile. State Tr. at 1681. He said this hair "did have some 

similar characteristics to the defendant's hair." However, it 

matched only a few hairs from Tuttle's head, "and it's very 

inconclusive. . It could have been from any one of a number 

of heads." Id. at 1682. Macey analyzed hairs from Merrick's 

clothing and the pillow in her car. The hairs were at least 90% 

Merrick's; there were a few unidentified hairs, none of which 

matched Tuttle's hair standard. Id. at 1683. At least one hair 

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Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 27 
in this group was forcibly extracted and Macey said it was not 

Tuttle's hair. Id. at 1685. The hair from the mirror was also 

examined by Macey and he said it was not forcibly removed. Id. at 

1686. 

Kerr also examined four of Merrick's fingernail clippings and 

found that two of the nails were partially bent back. She found a 

reddish substance identified as human blood, but no hairs or skin 

tissue with the nails. St~te Tr. at 1268-71. 

The State also introduced evidence of flight by petitioner 

Tuttle. Steven Blake, a co-worker of Tuttle's, testified that on 

September 30, 1983, he received a call from Wes Wilson, who was 

his boss, inquiring where Tuttle was. Id. at 1210-11. Blake told 

Tuttle that Wilson wanted him (Tuttle) to return Wilson's call. 

Id. at 1210. Tuttle then went to the office trailer where a phone 

was located. Id. at 1211. 

Wilson testified that he asked Tuttle if anything had 

happened, any minor accident, on the way back from California. 

Tuttle answered "no." State Tr. 1368-69. Wilson told Tuttle that 

he had received a call from the Sheriff's Department, and Wilson 

asked Tuttle again if there was any way he could have cut in front 

of somebody and run them off the road. Tuttle again assured 

Wilson that nothing had happened. Id. Wilson told Tuttle at that 

time that they (people from the Sheriff's Department) were coming 

up to look at the truck the following day. Id. at 1368-69. Blake 

testified that Tuttle left immediately after receiving the call 

from Wilson, and that Tuttle had given no prior indication that he 

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Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 28 
was going to leave Apache. Id. at 1212-13. Blake said that 

Tuttle 

walked from the office trailer over to his trailer, 

which was a fifth wheel type camper trailer, [9] and 

started gathering up everything he owned; toys, boots. 

And they gathered everything together. I mean, they, 

meaning Curtis Sessions and Mike Tuttle and Wes 

Tuttle, [10] and they--I observed them put into the back 

of Wes's little pickup truck a fifth wheel plate that 

tows his fifth wheel trailer. And they--they put that 

in the back of the truck, latched onto the fifth wheel 

trailer, Curtis got on the motor bike that was parked 

underneath the cutaway portion of the camper-trailer and 

started it, and Mike and Curtis loaded up the little 

motorcycle trailer. And they literally packed 

everything up and left in a matter of maybe fiv~ 

minutes. 

Id. at 1211-12. 

The magistrate judge discounted the evidence of flight. He 

said it was significant that petitioner Tuttle turned himself in 

the same day he arrived in Spokane. Report and Recommendation at 

49. Tuttle went to Spokane after leaving Evanston, Wyoming. 

We feel there was ample evidence to justify an instruction on 

flight in the state trial court under Utah law. See State v. 

Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 575 (Utah 1983). Moreover, in the opinion on 

Tuttle's direct appeal, the Utah Supreme Court noted in its 

harmless error analysis the evidence that "[Tuttle] fled both the 

crime scene and Evanston." Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 1214. Our record 

shows that an instruction on flight was given. Instruction 

9 

At the time of the murder Tuttle lived at the Apache yard. 

10 

Mike Tuttle is petitioner's nephew. 

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Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 29 
No. 22, StateR. at 829. Thus substantial evidence of flight by 

Tuttle was before the jury to consider. 

Further, the implausibility of Tuttle's version of events 

strengthened the prosecution's case. Tuttle claimed that on the 

day of the murder, he stopped his truck on the side of the 

off-ramp to take a nap. State Tr. at 1712. After being aroused 

by the sound of a truck on the exit, he went to check his tires. 

Id. at 1713. He noticed a white Datsun 80-100 feet behind his 

truck and "noticed that there was somebody looked they were layin' 

on the seat." Id. at 1713-14. He could see legs coming out the 

Datsun's passenger side and thought someone might have been 

working under the dash. Id. at 1714. Tuttle walked back to the 

car, looked into the driver's side of the car, and saw the body. 

Id. at 1714-15. He ran around to open the passenger side where he 

saw "a person on the seat full of blood." Id. at 1715. He then 

reached in to check for a pulse. Id. at 1716. Tuttle testified 

that 

When I touched When 

hand, it came up with like a reflex 

startled me and scared me. 

Q What did you do then? 

I touched her, her 

to her face. It 

A I jerked back. I pushed back. I touched her. 

Q Okay. When you say you touched her, where did 

you touch her? 

A On her stomach, I believe. 

Id. at 1716-17. Tuttle said that his first impression was to get 

an ambulance, but that after seeing the blood on his hands, he 

thought that no one would believe him. Id. at 1716-17, 1721. 

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On cross-examination, Tuttle testified that he pulled off at 

the Summit Park off-ramp about 2:00, but certainly no later than 

2:10p.m., State Tr. at 1733, 1735, which was prior to the time 

the eyewitnesses claimed to have seen the truck and trailer towing 

the car up the summit. However, the prosecution introduced phone 

company records showing that a phone call was made to Apache from 

a rest stop in Orem, Utah at 1:34 p.m. and that the phone call 

lasted two minutes. Id. at 1157, 1162. Tuttle admitted that he 

made this call. Id. at 1753. The prosecution introduced 

testimony that it is 45.3 miles between that rest stop and the 

Summit Park off-ramp. Id. at 1218. In order to reach the Summit 

Park off-ramp at the time he said he did, Tuttle would have had to 

travel over 80 miles per hour. Tuttle testified that his speed 

between the rest stop and the off-ramp was between 60 and 70. 

Thus, Tuttle could not have arrived at the off-ramp at the time he 

claimed. From all the evidence, the jury could infer that the 

timing was consistent with the prosecution case, and that in light 

of the identification of the truck by Dell Babcock, Tuttle had 

towed the victim up Parley's Summit. 

IV 

CONCLUSION 

We put aside Fish's posthypnotic testimony, for reasons 

explained above, and thus the prosecution's case against Tuttle 

was largely circumstantial, though clearly substantial. This 

factor weighs against a finding of harmlessness. See Velarde v. 

Shulsen, 757 F.2d 1093, 1095 (lOth Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (the 

prosecution's case being entirely circumstantial is a factor which 

29 

Appellate Case: 93-4236 Document: 01019279264 Date Filed: 06/02/1995 Page: 31 
weighs against a conclusion of harmless error). Nevertheless, we 

are persuaded that, considering the whole of the evidence, the 

Van Arsdall factors on harmless error weigh in favor of the 

prosecution. The overall strength of the prosecution's case, 

without Fish's posthypnotic testimony, leads us to this 

conclusion. We are not in grave doubt about our conclusion that 

the trial errors, asserted as constitutional wrongs, did not have 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury's verdict. We therefore hold that those errors, assuming 

they were constitutional violations, were harmless. 

Accordingly, the decision of the district court denying the 

petition for habeas relief is AFFIRMED. 

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