Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00328/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00328-15/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
I. Barrimond
Defendant
J. Capriola
Defendant
City Of Fresno
Defendant
Zella Maye Freeman
Plaintiff
R. Garrison
Defendant
J. Hollins
Defendant
R. Perez
Defendant
A. Simonson
Defendant
Mark A. Yee
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ZELLA MAYE FREEMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF FRESNO, R. GARRISON,

MARK A. YEE, J. CAPRIOLA, I.

BARRIMOND, J. HOLLINS, R.

PEREZ, A. SIMONSON, inclusive,

Defendants.

1:05-CV-0328 OWW SMS

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

1. INTRODUCTION

Defendants bring a motion for reconsideration of a denial of

summary judgment as to Defendant Ian Barrimond (“Sergeant

Barrimond”). A hearing on the motion for summary judgment was

held on October 24, 2006. An order on the motion was issued on

December 26, 2006. (Doc. 105, Memorandum Decision and Order

Granting in Part, Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment.) The underlying case involves Plaintiff Zella Maye

Freeman’s (“Freeman”) allegations that Defendants were

unreasonable in executing a valid search warrant in her home in

violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.

2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 29, 2007 Defendants filed a motion for

Case 1:05-cv-00328-OWW -SMS Document 133 Filed 05/08/07 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The underlying decision on the merits, United States v. 1

Navarro, 959 F. Supp. 1253 (E.D. Cal. 1997), was reversed by

United States v. Navarro, 160 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 1998), cert.

denied 119 S. Ct. 2354, 144 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1999). This reversal

did not affect the district court's denial of reconsideration.

2

reconsideration of the court’s December 26, 2007 order on

Defendants motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 119-1, Defendants’

Motion for Reconsideration.) On February 16, 2007 Plaintiff

opposed the motion. (Doc. 120-1, Opposition.) On February 23,

2007 Defendants replied to Plaintiff’s opposition. (Doc. 122,

Defendants’ Reply.)

3. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"A motion for reconsideration of summary judgment is

appropriately brought under Rule 59(e)." Backlund v. Barnhart,

778 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1985). A motion for

reconsideration is appropriate where the district court (1) is

presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear

error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, (3) if there

was an intervening change in controlling law. See School

District No. 1J, Multnomah County v. Acands, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255,

1263 (9th Cir. 1993). A reconsideration motion should not merely

present arguments previously raised, or which could have been

raised in the initial summary judgment motion. See Backlund, 778

F.2d at 1388 ("The motion was properly denied here because . . .

it presented no arguments that had not already been raised in

opposition to summary judgment."); United States v. Navarro, 972

F. Supp. 1296, 1299 (E.D. Cal. 1997) ("[M]otions to reconsider 1

are not vehicles permitting the unsuccessful party to "rehash"

arguments previously presented... Nor is a motion to reconsider

Case 1:05-cv-00328-OWW -SMS Document 133 Filed 05/08/07 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

justified on the basis of new evidence which could have been

discovered prior to the court's ruling....Finally, "after

thoughts" or "shifting of ground" do not constitute an

appropriate basis for reconsideration.").

4. DISCUSSION

A. A Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists As to Sergeant 

Barrimond’s Reasonableness in Giving the Command to Enter 

Freeman’s House. 

Defendants argue that there is no genuine issue of material

fact regarding the reasonableness of Sergeant Barrimond’s conduct

in executing the warrant under the doctrine of qualified

immunity. In analyzing qualified immunity under the Fourth

Amendment, a court must first ask whether a constitutional

violation occurred at all. If the answer to this question is

yes, the court must then inquire whether the right violated was

“clearly established” by asking whether a reasonable officer

could believe that the defendant’s actions were lawful. See

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

The traditional summary judgment approach should be used in

analyzing the first step of the Saucier analysis: 

A court required to rule upon the qualified

immunity issue must consider, then, this threshold

question: Taken in the light most favorable to the

party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show

the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? 

Where the facts are disputed, their resolution and

determinations of credibility are manifestly the

province of a jury. 

Wall v. County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 2004)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). After this initial

inquiry, the court must then ask whether it would be clear to a

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation

Case 1:05-cv-00328-OWW -SMS Document 133 Filed 05/08/07 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

confronted. Where the reasonableness of the officer’s belief

that his conduct was lawful depends on the resolution of disputed

issues of fact... summary judgment is not appropriate.” Wilkins

v. City of Oakland, 350 F. 3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Defendants argue that based on the undisputed facts in this

case, Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to

establish an essential element of her case against Sergeant

Barrimond. However, on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

the burden is not on Plaintiff to present evidence to establish

an essential element of the case. The burden is on Defendants to

show that there is no genuine dispute as to the facts in the

case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

Defendants further argued that there is no genuine issue of

fact that Plaintiff suffered a constitutional harm by Sergeant

Barrimond’s command to enter the residence in execution of the

valid search warrant. In support of their argument, Defendants

point out that the court noted the officers were in the middle of

gang territory, were waiting for a lengthy period of time before

the door was open, that Plaintiff questioned the officers’

presence, and that Sergeant Barrimond gave a reasonable command

to enter the residence. Defendants argue, as they did in their

motion for summary judgment, that Sergeant Barrimond’s command

does not in any way make the service of the search warrant

unreasonable. 

However, a factual dispute exists as to the circumstances

surrounding the entrance to Plaintiff’s home that determines the

reasonableness of Sergeant Barrimond’s decision to enter. At the

October 24, 2006 hearing on the motion for summary judgment

Case 1:05-cv-00328-OWW -SMS Document 133 Filed 05/08/07 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Defendants argued that Plaintiff refused to open the outer door

of her home to Officers and questioned the presence of police at

her doorstep. Defendants further argued that, given the length

of time the Officers waited, the rushed entry once Plaintiff

opened the outer door was reasonable. However, Plaintiff

provided a different factual account. Plaintiff claimed that the

Officers threatened to shoot her if she did not open the door. 

Plaintiff further stated that she had difficulty opening the door

because she suffers from carpal tunnel syndrome and was

struggling with the lock as a result. Based on Plaintiff’s

allegations, it could be inferred that the officers were not

waiting very long. Plaintiff contends she was endeavoring to

open the door and that the officers ignored her efforts by

threatening to shoot her. A court’s role on summary judgment is

not to weigh evidence or resolve issues; rather it is to

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See,

Abdul-Jabbar v. G.M. Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 1996). 

At the April 2, 2007 hearing on this motion for

reconsideration, several facts were clarified that bear on the

previous order to retain Barrimond in this litigation. Contrary

to the court’s initial belief, no battering ram was used to enter

the residence. The officers did not break the door down upon

entry. Upon execution of the search warrant, Sergeant Barrimond

was not the officer who threatened to shoot Freeman. Sergeant

Barrimond did not touch Freeman upon entry and had no other

contact with her. However, Sergeant Barrimond did give the

command “let’s go” and directed his team to enter the residence. 

The reasonableness of this command depends on resolution of the

Case 1:05-cv-00328-OWW -SMS Document 133 Filed 05/08/07 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

factual dispute between Plaintiff and Defendants. Defendants

argue that Plaintiff was taking too long to open the door and

that a quick entry was necessary. Plaintiff argues that due to

her carpal tunnel condition, she was unable to quickly open the

door, she communicated this information to the officers, and the

officers, nonetheless, conducted a forced entry, which she claims

was unnecessary as she sought to cooperate. Such facts, viewed

in the light most favorable to the non moving party, create a

triable issue of material fact as to Defendant Barrimond’s

reasonableness. 

5. CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 3, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

dd0l0 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00328-OWW -SMS Document 133 Filed 05/08/07 Page 6 of 6