Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00067/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00067-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Dorothy Jean Small
Plaintiff

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1

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOROTHY JEAN SMALL,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner 

of Social Security,

Defendant.

 1:14-cv-67 BAM

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

(Doc. 7)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Dorothy Jean Small (“Plaintiff”), filed the instant action on January 16, 2014.

(Doc. 1). Defendant, Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant”), filed a Motion to Dismiss 

the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing the complaint is 

untimely. (Doc. 7). Plaintiff filed an opposition. (Doc. 8). The matter is currently before the 

Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to the Honorable 

Barbara A. McAuliffe, United States Magistrate Judge.1

///

 

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Both parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge. (See, Docs. 5 & 6).

Case 1:14-cv-00067-BAM Document 9 Filed 01/16/15 Page 1 of 7
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FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff filed an application for benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act on

January 5, 2012. (Doc. 7-2 at 4). The claim was denied on May 2, 2012, upon reconsideration on 

August 30, 2012, and was also denied after a hearing with Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) G. 

Ross Wheatley on June 11, 2013. (Doc. 7-2, pgs. 4 and 13).

On November 7, 2013, the Appeals Council sent Plaintiff a notice of its denial of her 

appeal and adopted ALJ Wheatley’s decision. The notice also informed Plaintiff that she had 

sixty days to file a civil action to review the Appeals Council’s decision. (Declaration of Robert 

Weigel, at ¶3(a); Ex. 2). The Appeals Council allows five days for mailing (Weigel Dec., Doc. 7-

3 at Ex. 2), and the parties agree that Plaintiff had until January 13, 2014, to file her appeal. 

Plaintiff did not do so. Instead, on January 3, 2014, Plaintiff requested an extension of time with 

the Appeals Council to file her civil action. (Weigel Dec. at ¶ 3(b)). She did not file the appeal in 

this Court until January 16, 2014, three days after the deadline. On March 24, 2014, the Appeals 

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for additional time to file a claim. (Weigel Dec. at ¶ 3(b); Doc. 

7-4 at Exh. 3.)

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint 

on the grounds that it “fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To state a claim for 

which relief may be granted, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In ruling on a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, courts may consider not only the allegations of a 

complaint, but also the exhibits attached thereto and any concessions made by the plaintiff. See,

Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir.1995) (citing Cooper v. Bell, 628 

F.2d 1208, 1210 n. 2 (9th Cir.1980)) (“When a plaintiff has attached various exhibits to the 

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complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining whether dismissal pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) was proper without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.”).

Here, the Commissioner contends that dismissal is required because Plaintiff failed to file 

her complaint within the 60–day statute of limitations provided by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Although 

the statute of limitations defense is usually raised in an answer to a complaint, it may be raised in 

a motion to dismiss “only when the running of the statute is apparent from the face of the 

complaint.” U.S. ex rel. Air Control Techs., Inc. v. Pre Con Indus., Inc., 720 F.3d 1174, 1178 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (quoting Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 

(9th Cir. 2010)). “A motion to dismiss based on the running of the statute of limitations period 

may be granted only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not 

permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 

68 F.3d 1204, 1206–07 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In order 

to dismiss a claim as untimely on a 12(b)(6) motion, it must “appear[ ] beyond doubt that the 

plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim.” Id. at 1207.

DISCUSSION

1. Untimely Complaint

Judicial review of the Commissioner's administrative decisions is governed by Section

405(g) and (h) of the Social Security Act, which reads in relevant part:

(g) Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, 

irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of 

such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after 

the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further 

time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.

(h) The findings and decision of the Commissioner after a hearing 

shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such 

hearing. No findings of facts or decision of the Commissioner shall 

be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency 

except as herein provided. No action against the United States, the 

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Commissioner, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought

under section 1331 or 1346 of Title 28 to recover on any claim 

arising under this subchapter. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Section 405(g) and (h) therefore operate as a statute of limitations setting the time period

in which a claimant may appeal a final decision of the Commissioner. Bowen v. City of New

York, 476 U.S. 467, 479 (1986); Vernon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1987). As the

time limit set forth in Title 42 of the United States Code section 405(g) is a condition on the

waiver of sovereign immunity, it must be strictly construed. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 479; See, e.g.,

Fletcher v. Apfel, 210 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming summary judgment in favor of

Commissioner for untimely filing of one day); Atherton v. Colvin, No. CV13-4870-AS, 2014 WL 

580167 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2104) (dismissing complaint filed four days late); Davila v. 

Barnhart, 225 F.Supp.2d 337 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (granting motion to dismiss complaint filed one 

day late because “60–day limit is a waiver of sovereign immunity which must be strictly 

construed”). “The limitations to final decisions and to a sixty day filing period serve to compress 

the time for judicial review and to limit judicial review to the original decision denying benefits, 

thereby forestalling repetitive or belated litigation of stale eligibility claims.” Anderson v. Astrue, 

2008 WL 4506606 *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2008).

2. Equitable Tolling

In the opposition, Plaintiff argues that the appeal should be permitted to proceed under the 

principles of equitable tolling. Specifically, counsel argues that Plaintiff had been abandoned by 

her prior attorney, and had difficulty finding new counsel to represent her. As soon as Plaintiff’s 

counsel had agreed to represent her, he sent the extension request to the Appeals Council. He 

asserts that he, and other attorneys at his firm, have sent in similar requests in hundreds of cases 

for numerous years and the requests have always been approved. Counsel states that he did not 

take it for granted that the request would be granted, however, because of the routine nature of the 

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request, and the agency’s prior practice of finding that these circumstances constitute good cause, 

the complaint was not filed until January 16, 2014. (Doc. 8. pgs. 3-6). The government did not 

file a reply to the Plaintiff’s opposition.

In certain rare circumstances, the doctrine of equitable tolling allows a plaintiff to avoid 

the statute of limitations. Supermail Cargo Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d at 1206. “Generally, a 

litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his 

way.” Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1414, 1419 (2012) 

(quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)) (emphasis omitted). Equitable tolling 

is only warranted where “litigants are unable to file timely documents as a result of external 

circumstances beyond their direct control.” Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1052 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (quoting Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008)) (alterations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

Indeed, section 405(g) has been strictly construed to permit extensions of time only by the

Commissioner pursuant to Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations sections 404.911 and

416.1411, or by a Court applying traditional equitable tolling principles in cases where the

equities in favor of tolling the limitations period are so great that deference to the agency's

judgment is inappropriate. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. at 479-82. “Generally, equitable 

circumstances that might toll a limitation period involve conduct (by someone other than the 

claimant) that is misleading or fraudulent.” Turner v.Bowen, 862 F.2d 708, 710 (8th Cir. 1988). 

For example, in Bowen v. City of New York, the court applied equitable tolling because plaintiffs 

were prevented from filing because of “the Government's secretive conduct.” Bowen, 476 U.S. at 

481. Likewise, in Vernon, the court reasoned that equitable tolling was appropriate because the 

plaintiff had allegedly been told by an employee of the Social Security Administration that the 

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deadline would be extended. Vernon, 811 F.2d at 1275. In contrast, in Turner v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 

708 (8th Cir. 1988), the court did not find equitable tolling applicable because the plaintiff was 

not “unusually disadvantaged in protecting his own interests” despite his being illiterate and

unrepresented when he received the letter from the Appeals Council denying his benefits and 

informing him of his right to file a civil action. Turner, 862 F.2d at 709.

Given this standard, Plaintiff has not established that this is a “rare case” that justifies 

equitable tolling. Here, there is no evidence presented that Plaintiff was diligent in finding an

attorney as she waited until January 3, 2014, to hire current counsel.2 Similarly, there is no 

allegation involving conduct (by someone other than the claimant) that is misleading or 

fraudulent, or that the government engaged in secretive conduct. Instead, “a Social Security 

claimant should not rely on the possibility of an administrative extension of time, but rather must 

file suit timely to ensure judicial review.” Stone v Heckler, 778 F. 2d 645, 648 (11th Cir. 1985); 

accord Waller v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 168 Fed. Appx 919, 920-21 (11th Cir. 2006). Other courts 

have reached the same conclusion. Vasquez v. Colvin, No. 14-00910-DFM, 2014 WL 5761133 

(N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2014) (faxing a request for an extension of time one day before deadline does 

not constitute exceptional circumstances); Lazerson v. Colvin, No. 13–2832, 2014 WL 967048, at 

*5 (N.D.Cal. Mar.6, 2014) (seeking new counsel during 60–day period after denial of 

reconsideration not deemed to be extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling). 

Here, Plaintiff had ten days from January 3, 2014, when the request for extension was 

filed, until January 13, 2014, to file the instant complaint. However, a complaint was not filed.

These facts do not establish extraordinary circumstances since there were no circumstances 

warranting equitable tolling.

 

2

Plaintiff did not submit her own declaration outlining the circumstances surrounding her legal representation or 

what attempts she made to find legal counsel prior to hiring current counsel. The outcome in this case would not 

change even assuming that the representations that Plaintiff’s counsel made in his declaration on this topic are true.

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When granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court is generally required 

to grant a plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless 

amendment would be futile. Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 

242, 246-47 (9th Cir.1990). In determining whether amendment would be futile, a court examines 

whether the complaint could be amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal “without 

contradicting any of the allegations of [the] original complaint.” Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 

F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir.1990). Leave to amend should be liberally granted, but an amended 

complaint cannot allege facts inconsistent with the challenged pleading. Id. at 296-97.

In this case, Plaintiff does not offer any grounds on which she could further amend the 

complaint to allege an equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Therefore, Defendant’s 

Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED without leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss this action under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in 

favor of the Defendant, Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of Social Security and against 

Plaintiff, Dorothy Jean Small. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 15, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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