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Parties Involved:
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
Intervenor
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent
Serramonte Oldsmobile, Inc.
Petitioner
Transcar Leasing, Inc.
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 6, 1996 Decided June 18, 1996

No. 95-1455

SERRAMONTE OLDSMOBILE, INC., D/B/A SERRAMONTE OLDSMOBILE,

SERRAMONTE PONTIAC, SERRAMONTE GMC TRUCKS AND TRANSCAR

LEASING, INC., D/B/A SERRAMONTE SERVICE PLAZA,

PETITIONERS

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE

WORKERS, DISTRICT LODGE 190,

LOCAL LODGE NO. 1414,

INTERVENOR

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application for

Enforcement of an Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

Robert G. Hulteng argued the cause for petitioners, with whom Robert Leinwand was on the briefs.

Robert J. Englehart, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, argued the cause for respondent,

with whom Linda R. Sher, Associate General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy Associate

General Counsel and Margaret G. Neigus, Supervisory Attorney, were on the brief.

David A. Rosenfeld argued the cause and filed the brief for intervenor.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, SILBERMAN and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: In the fall of 1992, after negotiating for several months with the

International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers District Lodge 190, Local Lodge

No. 1414 ("Union"), petitioners Serramonte Oldsmobile ("Oldsmobile") and Serramonte Service

Plaza ("Service Plaza"), two commonly owned automotive facilities, each claimed that an impasse

had been reached in collective bargaining with the Union. Accordingly, on September 2, 1992,

Oldsmobile discontinued bargainingwiththeUnionand unilaterallyimplemented most ofits proposed

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contract terms; Service Plaza proceeded likewise on October 12, 1992. Several months later,

petitioners entirelywithdrewrecognition from the Union and unilaterally implemented further changes

to employee benefit plans and wage structures.

The Union filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board

("Board"). The Board found that Oldsmobile was justified in taking unilateral action on September

2, 1992, because the Union, at that point in its dealings with Oldsmobile, had "engaged in a strategy

of continually avoiding or delaying bargaining." Serramonte Oldsmobile, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. No. 6

at 22 (1995), reprinted in Deferred Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 74. However, the Board did not view

Service Plaza's actionsin the same light. Although the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found that

the Union and Service Plaza had reached an impasse on September 14, 1992, he nevertheless

determined that subsequent statements from the Union's bargaining representative indicated a

willingness to negotiate further. Thus, the Board found that Service Plaza violated the National

Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") by unilaterally implementing its proposed contract terms in October

1992. The Board found no lawful bases for the employers' withdrawals of recognition from the

Union; these actions, along with petitioners' subsequent unilateral actions, were therefore held to

constitute unfair labor practices. Petitioners now seek review of all the Board's unfair labor practice

rulings.

We grant the petition only with respect to Service Plaza's unilateral implementation of its

contract provisions in October 1992. On this issue, we hold that the evidence is insufficient to

support a finding that the impasse reached on September 14th had been broken prior to Service

Plaza's unilateral decision to implement changes. As to the other claims presented in this petition, we

find the Board's determinations to be supported by substantial evidence and fully in accord with

established law. Therefore, the petition for review and the Board's cross-application for enforcement

are each granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Overview

The facts ofthis case are recounted in great detail by the ALJin hisinitial decision (which was

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adopted by the Board in toto). We therefore need only highlight those aspects of the record that are

relevant to this opinion.

During most of the period in question, Service Plaza and Oldsmobile operated as separately

incorporated facilities located within a mile of each other in Colma, California. Oldsmobile was a

self-contained automobile dealership, encompassing retail sales, office, and service areas. Service

Plaza was a complex of two buildings housing four separate vehicle servicing areas, each having its

own carservice pods, equipment, offices, and work areas. As of September 1991, one of the Service

Plaza vehicle service areas was utilized for maintenance on Chrysler-Plymouth automobiles, one for

Nissan-Isuzu, one for Lincoln-Mercury, and one was vacant. Both corporations were owned by Tom

Price, who also held an ownership interest in a separately incorporated, non-union, Mitsubishi

dealership. The Mitsubishi dealership was located in the general vicinity of the two unionized

operations.

The Oldsmobile service technicians had been represented by the Union since at least 1977,

and the most recent collective bargaining agreement was effective from July 16, 1989 until July 15,

1992. However, the Union did not gain certification at Service Plaza until August 9, 1991. The

Service Plaza certificationincluded "[a]llfull-time and regular part-time service technicians, including

Chrysler- Plymouth/Lincoln-Mercuryservice technicians, Nissan-Isuzu service technicians [and other

technicians] employed by the Employer at its Serramonte Service Plaza location in Colma,

California." Decision and Direction of Election 1, 1 (1991), reprinted in Supplemental Appendix

("S.A.") 1. The certification also included a stipulation that specifically excluded from the unit the

service technicians employed at the Mitsubishi dealership. Id. at 4, reprinted in S.A. 4.

During the months preceding the fall of 1992, both Oldsmobile and Service Plaza were in

negotiations with the Union over the terms of proposed collective bargaining contracts.

Compensation and fringe benefits appear to have been the principal points of contention. While the

Union's proposed contracts included hourly wage rates and coverage under specified union-sponsored

health and pension plans, the companies offered flat-rate compensation based on work production

rather than hours worked, and a "cafeteria benefits plan" that included optional health insurance and

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retirement savings plans.

OnSeptember 2, 1992 and October 12, 1992, respectively, bothOldsmobile and ServicePlaza

declared that the negotiations were at an impasse and accused the Union of engaging in dilatory

tactics designed to extend negotiations and prevent implementationofthe employers' proposals. Both

companies unilaterally adopted most of their contract proposals, but held off on making changes to

the employee benefit plans.

In November 1992, owner TomPrice moved the technicians working at his Mitsubishifacility

into the Service Plaza complex and transferred the Lincoln-Mercury technicians to the job site a

quarter of a mile away where the Mitsubishi technicians had worked. Service Plaza informed the

Union by letter that, as a result of the swap in work locations, the company took the position that the

Mitsubishi technicians had become part of the Service Plaza bargaining unit and that the LincolnMercury technicians, while still represented by the Union, were no longer part of the unit.

The Union had not responded to this letter when, on December 23, 1992, Service Plaza

announced that it was withdrawing recognition from the Union because the company had received

a petition, signed by a majority of employees in the reconstituted bargaining unit, expressing the

desire not to be represented by the Union. This petition was signed by 19 technicians (9 Nissan, 6

Mitsubishi, 4 Chrysler-Plymouth) at a time when there were 11 Nissan, 6 Lincoln-Mercury, 12

Chrysler-Plymouth, and 10 Mitsubishi technicians. See Serramonte Oldsmobile, 318 N.L.R.B. No.

6 at 8 n.18, reprinted in J.A. 60. Thus, the petition contained a "majority" of unit employees'

signatures only if the bargaining unit were altered both to include the Mitsubishi technicians and to

exclude the Lincoln-Mercury technicians.

During the course of 1993, Oldsmobile was dissolved as a separate corporate entity and

merged into Service Plaza, and the Oldsmobile technicians were relocated to the Service Plaza

complex. According to the employer, the Oldsmobile technicians became part of the

now-unrepresented Service Plaza unit as a result of the move. Subsequently, Service Plaza

unilaterallyimplemented its employee benefit plansfor bothServicePlaza and Oldsmobile employees,

and made severalother unilateral changes both to the wages paid under the new compensation system

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and to the previously imposed benefit packages.

B. The Board's Decision

The ALJ found that petitioners had committed unfair labor practices by unilaterally

implementing certain changes to terms and conditions of employment without first bargaining to

impasse with the Union. With respect to the negotiations between Service Plaza and the Union, the

ALJ determined that an impasse was indeed reached at the conclusion of an informal, off-the-record

bargaining session held between the parties on September 14, 1992. However, according to the ALJ,

the impasse was broken during a formal bargaining session that followed, because, at that session,

the Union's representative made statements indicating a possible softening of the Union's bargaining

position. Although Service Plaza had argued that the Union's statements were mere "legal posturing,"

the ALJ noted that the company did little during the month following the September 14th meeting

to test the Union's sincerity. Id. at 18-19, reprinted in J.A. 70-71. Thus, having found that no

impasse existed on October 12th, when Service Plaza proceeded to implement its contract terms, the

ALJ found a violation of section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA.

Asto the Oldsmobile negotiations, the ALJfound that, on September 2, 1992, the company's

unilateral implementation of most of the provisions of its contract proposalwasjustified, because the

Union had "engaged in a strategy of continually avoiding or delaying bargaining." Id. at 22,reprinted

in J.A. 74. Nevertheless, the ALJ found that Oldsmobile was without justification in unilaterally

implementing the employee benefits package several months later, because there was insufficient

evidence that the Union had refused to bargain over these subsequent changes.

Finally, the ALJ ruled that Service Plaza's withdrawal of recognition from the Union was

unlawful and that the employer could not avoid its collective bargaining obligationsto the Oldsmobile

employees merely by moving those workers into the Service Plaza complex. Having found that

petitioners did not bargain to impasse with the Union concerning the various unilateral changes made

in 1993, the ALJ determined that all of these changes were unlawful.

On July 31, 1995, the Board entered an order affirming the ALJ's decision and ordering

petitioners to cease and desist the unfair labor practices, reinstate the terms and conditions that

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applied prior to the unilateral changes, make the employees whole for any lossessustained as a result

of the changes, and bargain with the Union upon request.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Impasse in Negotiations Between Service Plaza and the Union

Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the NLRA require parties in a collective bargaining relationship

to negotiate in good faith over mandatory subjects of bargaining, including "wages, hours, and other

terms and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994); see NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp.,

356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). Thus, neither side may take unilateral action with respect to mandatory

subjects of bargaining without first satisfying the duty to bargain. See Litton Fin. Printing Div. v.

NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 198 (1991). However, because the NLRA compels only good-faith bargaining,

not agreement, the parties may reach an impasse in negotiations. At that point, the duty to bargain

has been temporarily satisfied, and "an employer does not violate the [NLRA] by making unilateral

changes that are reasonably comprehended within his pre-impasse proposals." American Fed'n of

Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1968).

Although a good-faith impasse in negotiations temporarily suspends the duty to bargain, the

parties are not permanently relieved of bargaining obligations. See Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv.,

Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 412 (1982) ("As a recurring feature in the bargaining process, impasse

is only a temporary deadlock or hiatus in negotiations which in almost all cases is eventually broken,

through either a change of mind or the application of economic force." (internal quotation omitted)).

Thus, "[w]hen ... a deadlock is reached between the parties, the duty to bargain about the subject

matter of the impasse merely becomes dormant until changed circumstances indicate that an

agreement may be possible." Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 22, 23 (1973) (emphasis

added); see also Civic Motor Inns, 300 N.L.R.B. 774, 775 (1990) (The Board required that there

be an "intervening event ... that would be likely to affect the existing impasse or the climate of

bargaining.").

In this case, the ALJ explicitly found that the parties reached "a genuine impasse in

bargaining" at the conclusion of the informal, off-the-record negotiating session held between

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representatives of Service Plaza and the Union on September 14, 1992. Serramonte Oldsmobile, 318

N.L.R.B. No. 6 at 19, reprinted in J.A. 71. Indeed, the record reveals that the two bargaining

representatives "looked at each other and said, look, we gave it our best shot. Shook hands. And

that was it." Tr. of Hearing at 1209; see also Serramonte Oldsmobile, 318 N.L.R.B. No. 6 at 18,

reprinted in J.A. 70. Thus, the only relevant question is whether, after that point, the circumstances

surrounding the negotiations changed sufficiently to break the impasse.

Although we generally defer to the Board's expertise in evaluating the nuances of the

bargaining process, see Teamsters Local Union No. 639 v. NLRB, 924 F.2d 1078, 1083 (D.C. Cir.

1991), the Board must nevertheless point to "substantial evidence" in the record to support its

conclusion that the impasse was broken, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1994). Here, the ALJ offered

descriptions of the Union's various negotiating postures that fell far short of indicating an intention

to break the parties' impasse. For example, the ALJ noted that the statements of Union lawyer David

Rosenfeld at the formal negotiating session on September 14 "ostensibly represented serious

movement by the Union," and that the Union "was signaling its apparent willingness to accept [the

employer's wage proposal]," and that the Union's actions "seemingly negated the existence ofimpasse

between the parties." Serramonte Oldsmobile, 318 N.L.R.B. No. 6 at 19, reprinted in J.A. 71

(emphasis added). These findings offer about as much as a handful of air. Indeed, the ALJ

recognized that the Union's position "was hardly free from ambiguity," but thought that the Union

lawyer's statements "should have caused [Service Plaza] to contemplate whether the Union was

reconsidering." Id. at 18, reprinted in J.A. 70. The record does not support the ALJ's findings, and

his assumptions about the duty to bargain are simply wrong.

The Board itself has indicated that a party's "bare assertions of flexibility on open issues and

its generalized promises of new proposals [do not clearly establish] any change, much less a

substantial change" in that party's negotiating position. Civic Motor Inns, 300 N.L.R.B. at 776

(internalquotations omitted). Rather, there must be substantial evidence in the record that establishes

changed circumstancessufficient to suggest that future bargaining would be fruitful. In this case, not

a single one of the Union's statements cited by the ALJ actually committed the Union to a new

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position or contained any specific proposals. Instead, the record reflects that the Union's attorney

offered only vague generalities and neither explicitly agreed to any of the employer's proposals nor

offered any specific counterproposals.

Moreover, the ALJ appears to have placed the burden on Service Plaza to "contemplate

whetherthe Unionwasreconsidering." Serramonte Oldsmobile, 318 N.L.R.B. No. 6 at 18,reprinted

in J.A. 70. This statement reflects a clear misunderstanding of the relevant inquiry. Indeed, the ALJ

goes so far as to fault Service Plaza, because, "rather than probing [the Union's] frankness," the

company "merely repeated ... demands for counterproposals." Id. at 19, reprinted in J.A. 71. We

are at a loss to understand exactly how a negotiating party, having reached the end of the line with

its own proposals, can probe the "frankness" of the opposition except by requesting concrete

proposalsfrom the other side. In other words, there is absolutely no basis for requiring a negotiating

partyto probe the sincerityof another party's contentlessstatements after an impasse has alreadybeen

reached. Rather, it is incumbent on the party asserting that the impasse has been broken to point to

the changed circumstances that would justify such a finding. See Civic Motor Inns, 300 N.L.R.B.

at 776 (The Board found that an impasse had not been broken because the party seeking to negotiate

"failed to give a sufficient indication of changed circumstancesto suggest that future bargaining might

be fruitful."). Because the record evidence indicates that any purported changes to the Union's

negotiating position could not have been recognized by any reasonable bargaining agent on the other

side of the table, there can be no doubt that Service Plaza acted lawfully in implementing its proposed

terms on October 12, 1992.

B. Withdrawal of Recognition

Although an incumbent union enjoys a rebuttable presumption that it retains the support of

a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit, Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB,

482 U.S. 27, 38 (1987), Service Plaza nevertheless asserts that its withdrawal of recognition from

the Union on December 23, 1992 was lawful. According to the company, it was free to withdraw

recognition after receiving an employee petition indicating that the Union no longer enjoyed majority

support.

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However, it is undisputed that this petition, which was signed by 19 employees, only

constituted a majority of bargaining unit employeesifthat unit were defined to include the Mitsubishi

employees and exclude the Lincoln-Mercury technicians. Yet, the original unit certification

specifically included "Chrysler-Plymouth/Lincoln-Mercury service technicians" and did not list

Mitsubishi technicians as within the scope of the bargaining unit. Decision and Direction of Election

at 1, reprinted in S.A. 1. In fact, the certification contains a stipulation specifically excluding the

Mitsubishi employees from the unit. Id. at 4, reprinted in S.A. 4.

Service Plaza contends that, because the unit certification refersto technicians "employed by

the Employer at its Serramonte Service Plaza location," id. at 1, reprinted in S.A. 1 (emphasis

added), the employer's decision to switch the job locations ofthe two sets of employeesin November

1992 necessarily altered the bargaining unit. However, neither the certification, nor the stipulation,

indicates that the bargaining unit is based solely on the work location of the technicians or that the

scope of the unit would automatically change with the relocation of the technicians.

Indeed, Service Plaza appears to have recognized that it was actually seeking to reconfigure

the bargaining unit, because the company sent a letter informing the Union of the proposed changes

and requesting that the Union respond. Letter from Robert G. Hulteng to David A. Rosenfeld (Nov.

17, 1992), reprinted in Deferred Joint Exhibits ("J.E.") 24-25. Moreover, in its brief, Service Plaza

goes so far as to assert that, because the Union did not reply to this letter, the Union should be

deemed to have acquiesced to the alteration. Amended Final Brief of Petitioners at 45 n.28. This

contention is absurd. The scope of the bargaining unit is a permissive, not a mandatory, subject of

bargaining, Branch Int'l Servs., Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1092, 1103, enforced, 12 F.3d 213 (6th Cir.

1993), and the Union wastherefore under no obligation to respond to the company'sletter,see BorgWarner Corp., 356 U.S. at 349 (The Court ruled that, as to permissive subjects of bargaining, "each

party is free to bargain or not to bargain, and to agree or not to agree."). As this court has

recognized, "neither an employer nor a union has the unilateral power to modify the scope of the

bargaining unit as determined by the Board, whether following bargaining to impasse or otherwise."

Boise Cascade Corp. v. NLRB, 860 F.2d 471, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Thus, the Union's silence on

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the issue cannot be construed as acquiescence, and Service Plaza was required to get an agreement

from the Union on any change in the scope of the unit, see 1 PATRICK HARDIN, THE DEVELOPING

LABOR LAW 931 (3d ed. 1992) ("Even when the Board has defined a unit, the parties are free to

agree on a negotiated unit different from the certified or recognized unit."), or to seek unit

clarification from the Board, see 29C.F.R. § 102.60(b) (1995). The employer could not change the

unit on its own motion, and it could not compel the Union to bargain over the matter.

Nor can Service Plaza assert that it had a "good-faith doubt" about whether the Union

continued to command majority support. Even accepting, arguendo, that a good-faith doubt

regarding the proper scope of the unit would be sufficient to rebut the presumption of majority

support for the Union, in this case the Board effectively ruled that no such good-faith doubt would

be possible. The ALJ noted that the certification clearly delineated the scope of the unit and that the

parties had stipulated to the exclusion of the Mitsubishi employees. Serramonte Oldsmobile, 318

N.L.R.B. No. 6 at 20 n.59, reprinted in J.A. 72. Given the fact that the Union never agreed to

change the scope of the unit, the Board rightly concluded that the employer could not rely on an

insignificant change of work location to withdraw recognition. Accordingly, the various unilateral

changes imposed by Service Plaza after the withdrawal of recognition were unlawful.

C. Unilateral Implementation of New Benefit Plans for Oldsmobile Employees

Although a negotiating party generally may not unilaterally impose contract terms without

first bargaining to impasse, the Board has recognized an exception when, in response to one party's

"diligent and earnest effortsto engage in bargaining," the other party "insists on continually avoiding

or delaying bargaining." M&M Bldg. & Elec. Contractors, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 1472, 1472 (1982);

accord International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 304 N.L.R.B. 401, 402 (1991); Master Window

Cleaning, Inc., 302 N.L.R.B. 373, 374 (1991), enforced, 15 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1994). Applying

this exception, the Board found that Oldsmobile acted lawfullywhen the companyimplemented most

of the terms of its final contract proposal on September 2, 1992.

At the time it implemented these terms, however, Oldsmobile did not implement a final

proposal on employee health insurance and retirement plans. Instead, on November 13, 1992,

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Oldsmobile submitted revised benefit plans to the Union, and stated that, if the Union so desired,

Oldsmobile would be willing to bargain over the proposed changes. See Letter from Robert G.

Hulteng to David G. Rosenfeld (Nov. 13, 1992),reprinted in J.E. 22-23. The parties held bargaining

sessions on the benefit plans, on December 16 and again on December 30, 1992. At the second

meeting, the Union submitted two counterproposals, which the employer rejected. A third session

was scheduled for February 5, 1993, but it was canceled due to the illness of one of the Union

negotiators. Without further bargaining, the employer then unilaterally implemented its benefit plans

in February and March, 1993. Thus, the relevant question is whether, with regard to the negotiations

over benefit plans, the Union acted in the same dilatory manner it had previously, thereby justifying

another waiver of the impasse requirement.

Petitioners argue that the Union acted no differently than it had earlier in attempting to delay

negotiations over the benefit plans and stall any possible finding of impasse. To support this view,

petitioners note that it took over a month to get the Union to come to the bargaining table in

December 1992, that the Union appeared at the December 16th meeting without any proposals or

counterproposals despite the fact that the Union had known for months what Oldsmobile was

proposing, that the Union's variousinformation requests at the meetings were merelystalltactics, that

the counterproposals offered bythe Union at the December 30th meeting were not made in good faith

because it was transparently clear that the proposals would be unacceptable to Oldsmobile, and that

the Union then invented reasons not to meet beyond the December sessions.

Given the history of delaying tactics by the Union, petitioners' argument has some force.

Nevertheless, we will defer to the Board's interpretation of the scope of the bargaining obligation

under section 8(d) of the NLRA if it is "reasonably defensible." Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S.

488, 497 (1979). Here, the Board reasonably determined that the record evidence did not clearly

show the Union'srefusal to bargain in thisinstance. Rather, as the ALJ explicitly found, the evidence

did not establish which party was responsible for the lapse in bargaining after December 30, 1992.

See Serramonte Oldsmobile, 318 N.L.R.B. No. 6 at 23, reprinted in J.A. 75. Furthermore, while it

is possible that the cancellation of the Februarymeeting was due to bad faith, rather than illness, there

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is certainly no evidence in the record that would require the Board to reach such a conclusion.

Finally, although the employer mayhave acted within itsrightsto reject the Union's counterproposals,

the Board was free to treat these proposals as the by-product of legitimate, good-faith bargaining.

Thus, while the question of whether the Union was engaging in dilatory tactics is not free of doubt,

we find that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the Board's findings.

D. The Appropriate Bargaining Unit for the Oldsmobile Employees

Petitioners contend that the Oldsmobile workers, because they have now been relocated

within the Service Plaza complex, should be deemed to "accrete" into the larger group of allegedly

unrepresented Service Plaza employees. The Board disagreed, finding instead that the Oldsmobile

workers maintained "a sufficient community of interests distinct from those of the [Service Plaza]

bargaining unit employees to constitute a separate appropriate unit." Id. at 26, reprinted in J.A. 78.

As an initial matter, we note that, because the earlier withdrawal of recognition from the

Service Plaza bargaining unit was unlawful, the larger group of employees is not, in fact,

"unrepresented," as petitioners assert. Thus, even if the Oldsmobile employees were to become part

of the Service Plaza unit, they would not lose Union representation; nor would the employer be

relieved of the duty to bargain over their conditions of employment.

More importantly, we can find no basisfor disturbing the Board'sfinding that the Oldsmobile

employees maintained a separate "community of interests" even after the relocation. Section 9(b) of

the NLRA vests in the Board authority to determine "the unit appropriate for the purposes of

collective bargaining." 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1994). Moreover, "[t]he Board's discretion in this area

is broad, reflecting Congress' recognition of the need for flexibility in shaping the bargaining unit to

the particular case." NLRB v. Action Automotive, Inc., 469 U.S. 490, 494 (1985) (internal quotation

and alteration omitted). Thus, "[t]he Board need only select an appropriate unit, not the most

appropriate unit." Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. NLRB, 44 F.3d 1010, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (emphasis

added).

Given this discretion, there is nothing before the court that would justify reversing the Board's

judgment. Petitioners' argument, at bottom, seems to be that, because of the various work location

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moves initiated by the employers, the appropriate bargaining units were destroyed. However, the

premise for this argument isincorrect. As we have already stated, the withdrawal of recognition from

the Service Plaza employees was unlawful, and the Oldsmobile employees continued to exist as an

appropriate bargaining unit. Thus, petitioners claims are specious.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review and the Board's cross-application for

enforcement are granted in part and denied in part.

So ordered.

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