Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50506/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50506-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pablo Alvarez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

PABLO ALVAREZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 14-50506

15-50047

D.C. No.

3:14-cr-01748-GPC-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Gonzalo P. Curiel, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 10, 2016

Pasadena, California

Filed September 1, 2016

Before: Richard R. Clifton, Consuelo M. Callahan,

and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Clifton

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2 UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s restitution order in

a case in which the defendant pled guilty to knowingly

transporting illegal aliens. 

The panel rejected the defendant’s contention that the

Supreme Court’s decision in Paroline v. United States, 134

S. Ct. 1710 (2014), undermines this court’s holding in United

States v. Batson, 608 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 2010), that restitution

can be imposed as a condition of supervised release. Because

Paroline did not establish that restitution is a punishment, the

defendant could not succeed on his argument that the district

court violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),

by imposing restitution based on facts not found by a jury.

The panel rejected the defendant’s contention that the

company from whom the defendant rented a car that was

damaged while a co-defendant was transporting the aliens

therein was not a victim of the offense. The panel held that

the causal nexus between the crime of transporting aliens and

the resulting damage to the car is not too attenuated, and that

restitution to the rental car company is appropriate.

The panel held that the government did not breach the

plea agreement by pursuing restitution even though the

agreement did not mention it, where the government pursued

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ 3

restitution subsequent to the defendant’s clear statement that

he expected to have to pay it.

The panel held that the district court’s failure to advise

the defendant at his change of plea hearing that he may be

subject to restitution was harmless.

COUNSEL

Jodi D. Thorp (argued), San Diego, California, for DefendantAppellant.

Daniel E. Zipp (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Peter Ko, Chief, Appellate Section, Criminal Division; Laura

E. Duffy, United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s

Office, San Diego, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Pablo Alvarez and a co-defendant were

arrested by Border Patrol officers while transporting aliens

who were in the United States illegally. Alvarez was driving

his own Chevrolet, and his co-defendant was driving a Ford

that Alvarez had rented. Border Patrol officers had set up

spike strips along the road on which Alvarez and his codefendant were traveling, and when Alvarez hit the spikes

and came to an abrupt halt, Alvarez’s co-defendant was

unable to stop the Ford before it crashed into the Chevrolet. 

The crash caused significant damage to the rental car.

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4 UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ

Alvarez pleaded guilty to transportation of aliens in the

United States illegally in exchange for the government’s

promise to recommend a custodial term on the low end of the

sentencing guideline range and a special assessment fee of

$100.00. The plea agreement did not provide for restitution,

but the presentence report recommended that Alvarez be

required to pay for the cost of repairing the rental car. At his

sentencing hearing, Alvarez acknowledged responsibility for

the damage to the rental car and accepted his responsibility to

pay restitution for the damage. Later, however, Alvarez

changed his position, and at a subsequent hearing he argued

that restitution was improper. The district court disagreed

and ordered that Alvarez pay restitution for the damage to the

rental car in the amount of $2,900.

On appeal, Alvarez argues that the Supreme Court’s

decision in Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014),

established that restitution is a form of punishment. He

contends, therefore, that restitution cannot be imposed as a

condition of supervised release under the relevant statutes. 

For the same reason, he argues that restitution cannot be

imposed based on facts not found by a jury under Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Alvarez also urges us to

find that the rental company, San Diego Rent-A-Car, was not

a victim of his offense, that the government breached the plea

agreement, and that the district court erred in declining to

order specific performance as a remedy for its failure to

adequately inform him of the potential consequences of a

guilty plea. We conclude that restitution is not clearly a form

of punishment and can be imposed as a condition of

supervised release. We also conclude that the government

did not violate the plea agreement and that the district court

did not abuse its discretion. We affirm.

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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ 5

I. Background

On the morning of May 22, 2014, Border Patrol agents

observed a blue Ford Taurus and a red Chevrolet Astro pull

up near a group of seven suspected illegal aliens hiding on a

hillside near a park in San Diego, California. According to a

Border Patrol agent on the scene, three of the aliens entered

the Chevrolet, which was driven and owned by defendant

Pablo Alvarez, and four entered the Ford, which was driven

by Alvarez’s co-defendant. Alvarez had rented the Ford from

San Diego Rent-A-Car earlier that day. The cars drove away

at a high rate of speed, with Alvarez in the lead.

One of the Border Patrol agents followed the cars out of

the park, while others went ahead to set up a spike strip to

interdict the vehicles further down the road. As Alvarez

approached the location where the spike strip had been set up,

one of the Border Patrol agents activated the emergency

lights on his vehicle and signaled to Alvarez to pull over. 

Alvarez attempted to comply but could not stop the Chevrolet

before hitting the spike strip. The car’s tires deflated, and the

car came to an abrupt stop. The driver of the Ford, who had

been driving closely behind Alvarez, was unable to brake in

time and collided with the Chevrolet. The collision caused

significant damage to the Ford.

Border Patrol agents placed both drivers and all seven

illegal aliens under arrest. Alvarez waived his rights and

provided a statement to a Border Patrol agent on the scene.

A month later, the United States charged Alvarez with

knowingly transporting illegal aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1324(a)(1). Alvarez pleaded guilty in exchange for a

promise from prosecutors that they would recommend

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6 UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ

sentencing for Alvarez at the low end of the advisory

guideline. As will be detailed below, the plea agreement

referred to restitution but did not provide that restitution

would be recommended.

Alvarez appeared before a magistrate judge for a change

of plea. During the colloquy, the court informed Alvarez that

he was facing a maximum term of three years of supervised

release and a maximum fine of $250,000. Alvarez responded

that he understood that those were the maximum penalties he

faced by pleading guilty to violating 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1). 

The court did not inform Alvarez that he could face

restitution for the damage to the Ford.

The presentence report submitted by the probation office

recommended restitution to San Diego Rent-A-Car in the

amount of $9,114.03. In response, Alvarez filed a sentencing

memorandum agreeing that restitution was appropriate in this

case but questioning the amount. The government

subsequently filed a sentencing summary chart that

recommended a custody term range but was silent regarding

restitution.

Alvarez appeared before the district court for sentencing

on October 31, 2014. At the hearing, the government did not

recommend restitution. However, Alvarez’s attorney

conceded that the damage to the Ford would not have

occurred but for Alvarez’s transportation of undocumented

aliens. Defense counsel further conceded that “restitution is

appropriate in this case.” Alvarez also personally addressed

the court and stated, “I know I do have to pay restitution for

the vehicle that was damaged. I know that for a fact, and I

have no problem doing that.” The district court proceeded to

calculate the sentencing guideline range and imposed a

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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ 7

sentence of thirteen months of custody. The court then

continued the hearing on restitution and ordered the

government to provide additional information regarding the

damage to the Ford.

Before the restitution hearing took place, the court

appointed Alvarez new counsel. Alvarez’s new counsel

argued for the first time that the government had breached the

plea agreement by recommending restitution and that

restitution was not available as a condition of supervised

release. The district court rejected that argument, and

imposed restitution in the amount of $2,900. This appeal

followed.

II. Discussion

A. Restitution can be imposed as a condition of

supervised release

Alvarez first argues that restitution cannot be imposed as

a condition of supervised release following the Supreme

Court’s decision in Paroline, 134 S. Ct. 1710. We review the

legality of a restitution order de novo and the factual findings

supporting the order for clear error. United States v. BrockDavis, 504 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2007).

In United States v. Batson, 608 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 2010),

we held that restitution can be imposed as a condition of

supervised release under the authority of 18 U.S.C. § 3583

(the Supervised Release Statute) and 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b) (the

Probation Statute). Id. at 635. The Supervised Release

Statute grants federal courts the authority to order a condition

of supervised release so long as the condition is “reasonably

related” to the considerations in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1) and

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8 UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ

3553(a)(2)(B)–(D), both of which set forth factors that courts

can take into account in imposing a sentence. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583. The factors set forth in § 3553(a)(1) are “the nature

and circumstances of the offense and the history and

characteristics of the defendant,” and the factors set forth in

§ 3553(a)(2)(B)–(D) are “the need for the sentence imposed

. . . (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;

and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or

vocational training, medical care, or other correctional

treatment in the most effective manner.” The Supervised

Release Statute excludes from consideration those factors set

forth in § 3553(a)(2)(A), which provide that courts may

impose a sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense,

to promote respect for the law, and to provide just

punishment for the offense.” None of these three factors can

form the basis for a condition of supervised release.

The Supervised Release Statute does not specifically

mention restitution, but it does permit courts, within limits

including those described above, to impose “anycondition set

forth as a discretionary condition of probation” in the

Probation Statute as a condition of supervised release. 

18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). One condition the Probation Statute

sets forth as a discretionary condition of probation is

restitution. 18 U.S.C § 3563(b)(2). Thus, as we held in

Batson, “the Supervised Release Statute, together with the

Probation Statute, unambiguouslyauthorizes federal courts to

order restitution as a condition of supervised release for any

criminal offense . . . for which supervised release is properly

imposed.” Batson, 608 F.3d at 635.

Alvarez argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in

Paroline undermines our conclusion in Batson by

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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ 9

establishing that restitution is a form of punishment, meaning,

according to Alvarez, that it is therefore excluded as a

permissible condition of supervised release under § 3583. In

Paroline, the Court noted that a restitution order requiring a

possessor of child pornography to pay for damages caused by

the actions of thousands of other independent possessors and

distributors of child pornography could potentially raise

issues under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth

Amendment. 134 S.Ct. at 1726. In so noting the Court

observed that “[t]he primary goal of restitution is remedial or

compensatory, but it also serves punitive purposes.” Id.

(internal citations omitted).

Later, however, Paroline clearly stated that restitution is

fundamentally “remedial and compensatory” and repeatedly

referenced restitution’s remedial nature when emphasizing

the need to compensate victims for harms suffered as a result

of a crime. See, e.g., id. at 1726 (“Just as it undermines the

purposes of tort law to turn away plaintiffs harmed by several

wrongdoers, it would undermine the remedial and penological

purposes of § 2259 to turn away victims in cases like this.”). 

That there might sometimes be a secondary punitive motive

in imposing restitution does not make restitution into a form

of punishment proscribed by the Supervised Release Statute.

Indeed, the observation that restitution may have some

punitive purposes is nothing new in our circuit. In United

States v. Green, 722 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2013), we noted that

we have described restitution as a “hybrid, with ‘both

compensatory and penal purposes,’” but concluded that even

so, restitution is not “clearly” punishment. Id. at 1150

(quoting United States v. Rich, 603 F.3d 722, 729 (9th Cir.

2010)). Thus, Paroline is not “clearly irreconcilable” with

our prior circuit authority authorizing restitution as a

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10 UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ

condition of supervised release, and Batson remains good

law. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir.

2003) (holding that a panel may disregard circuit precedent

only when “the reasoning or theory of our prior circuit

authority is clearlyirreconcilable with the reasoning or theory

of intervening higher authority.”).

Because Paroline did not establish that restitution is a

punishment, Alvarez also cannot succeed on his argument

that the district court violated Apprendi by imposing

restitution based on facts not found by a jury. As we stated

in Green, the Ninth Circuit “has categorically held that

Apprendi and its progeny . . . don’t apply to restitution.” 

722 F.3d at 1149. For the reasons stated above, Paroline is

not “clearly irreconcilable” with that authority, and Green is

still viable precedent. See Miller, 335 F.3d at 892; United

States v. Eyraud, 809 F.3d 462, 471 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We

held in Green that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

(2000), does not apply to restitution orders, and Paroline does

not invalidate that holding.”).

B. San Diego Rent-A-Car was a victim of Alvarez’s

offense

Next, Alvarez argues that restitution is improper because

San Diego Rent-A-Car was not a victim of his offense. 

Under the applicable statutes, restitution can be imposed

“only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the

basis for the offense of conviction.” Hughey v. United States,

495 U.S. 411, 413 (1990).1 The Ninth Circuit has rejected a

1 The Hughey opinion interpreted the restitution provisions of the Victim

and Witness Protection Act of 1982, which is not at issue in this case. 

495 U.S. at 413. However, in Batson, we held that Hughey applies

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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ 11

“but for” standard of causation in restitution, and held that

instead, “restitution is proper only for losses directly resulting

from the defendant’s offense.” United States v. Meksian,

170 F.3d 1260, 1262 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States

v. Tyler, 767 F.2d 1350, 1351 (9th Cir. 1985)). “It is clear

from our cases that the phrase ‘directly resulting’ means that

the conduct underlying the offense of conviction must have

caused a loss for which a court may order restitution, but the

loss cannot be too far removed from that conduct.” United

States v. Gamma Tech Indus., Inc., 265 F.3d 917, 928 (9th

Cir. 2001).

Alvarez argues here that San Diego Rent-A-Car’s loss

was not caused by the specific conduct that was the basis for

the offense to which he pleaded guilty, but rather by the

Border Patrol’s decision to use a spike strip to stop his flight. 

Alvarez misunderstands the inquiry under our case law. In

United States v. Reed, 80 F.3d 1419 (9th Cir. 1996), we

confirmed that the Hughey standard applied to limit

restitution to conduct that is “an element of the offense of

conviction.” Id. at 1420. In accordance with that principle,

we overturned a lower court decision granting restitution to

the owners of vehicles damaged in a crash that occurred in

the process of apprehending the defendant, who ultimately

pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Id.

Reed concluded that “fleeing the police is not part of the

conduct underlying [Reed’s] offense of conviction and thus

cannot serve as the basis for a restitution order.” Id. at 1421. 

In contrast, Alvarez pleaded guilty to a violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), which makes it a crime to “transport[], or

move[] or attempt[] to transport or move [an] alien within the

equally to awards of restitution imposed as a condition of supervised

release. 608 F.3d at 636–37.

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12 UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ

United States by means of transportation or otherwise” with

knowledge or in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien is

in the United States illegally. As transportation is an element

of the crime to which Alvarez pleaded guilty, restitution does

not fall afoul of the limitations established by Hughey and

Reed.

Nor does the causal chain between Alvarez’s offense and

the damage to the car “extend so far, in terms of the facts or

the time span, as to become unreasonable.” Gamma Tech,

265 F.3d at 928. While the Border Patrol’s use of a spike

strip was an intervening cause of the damage to the Ford, a

“[d]efendant’s conduct need not be the sole cause of the loss”

to the victim for restitution to be appropriate. Id. at 928. 

Rather, the law requires that “any subsequent action that

contributes to the loss, such as an intervening cause, must be

directly related to the defendant’s conduct.” Id. “[W]e have

approved restitution awards that included losses at least one

step removed from the offense conduct itself.” Id.

Here, the damage to the Ford was no more than one step

removed from Alvarez’s crime. As noted above, Alvarez’s

crime involved transporting aliens, which made it reasonably

foreseeable that the instrument of transportation (i.e., the car)

would be damaged in its commission. Therefore, the causal

nexus between the crime of transporting aliens and the

resulting damage to the car in which the aliens were being

transported “is not too attenuated,” and restitution is

appropriate. Id.

C. The government did not breach the plea agreement

Alvarez also argues that the government breached his plea

agreement by requesting restitution even though the

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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ 13

agreement did not mention it. We review a claim that the

government has breached the terms of a plea agreement de

novo. United States v. Whitney, 673 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir.

2012).

The sequence of events leading up to the district court’s

ultimate restitution order is important here. The plea

agreement stated that the crime to which Alvarez was

pleading guilty carried a maximum of 10 years in prison, a

maximum $250,000 fine, a mandatory special assessment of

$100 per count, and a term of supervised release of no more

than three years. It did not specifically warn that Alvarez

may be required to pay restitution, but it did mention

restitution twice. First, in a subsection on supervised release,

the agreement provided that Alvarez would not attempt to

reduce any term of supervised release until he has “fully paid

and satisfied any special assessments, fine, criminal forfeiture

judgment and restitution judgment.” Second, the agreement

included a provision in which Alvarez promised to waive, “to

the full extent of the law, any right to appeal or to collaterally

attack the conviction and sentence, including any restitution

order.”2

Restitution first came up in Alvarez’s sentencing in the

presentence report, which recommended that Alvarez pay

$9,114.03 in restitution for the damage done to the car. The

government did not ask for restitution until Alvarez raised it

himself at the sentencing hearing. At that hearing, Alvarez’s

attorney told the court that “restitution is appropriate in this

case” because “there was an actual loss to someone,” and

contested only the amount of restitution that the presentence

2 The government has not sought to enforce an appeal waiver or argued

that we should dismiss this appeal on that basis.

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14 UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ

report had recommended. Alvarez himself then told the court

that he knew that he would have to pay restitution for the

damaged Ford and that he did not have any problem doing so. 

The district court agreed that restitution would be appropriate

and asked the government for its position on the appropriate

amount. As noted above, the court ultimately ordered

restitution in the amount of $2,900.

“Plea agreements are subject to contract-law standards of

interpretation.” United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1387

(9th Cir. 1986). Thus, “[i]n determining whether a plea

agreement has been broken, courts look to what was

reasonablyunderstood by [the defendant]when he entered his

plea of guilty.” Id. (quoting United States v. Travis, 735 F.2d

1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1984)). The reasonable expectations of

the defendant can be ascertained through “the objective proof

on the record.” Id.

In Kamer, we held that the defendant had shown a

reasonable expectation that restitution would not be imposed

when the district judge indicated multiple times that there

would be no restitution and when “subsequent to signing the

plea agreement [the defendant] told the judge it was his

understanding that no restitution would be imposed.” Id. at

1388–89. Moreover, the restitution amount in Kamer was “in

the millions,” and was therefore “material enough to demand

express inclusion in the plea agreement.” Id. at 1389 (quoting

United States v. Garcia, 698 F.2d 31, 36 n.4 (1st Cir. 1983)).

Here, in contrast, Alvarez told the judge at the initial

sentencing hearing, “I know I do have to pay restitution for

the vehicle that was damaged. I know that for a fact, and I

have no problem doing that.” In addition, the total restitution

ordered was under $3,000. Under these circumstances, it is

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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ 15

clear that Alvarez reasonably understood that he could be

required to pay restitution. The government did not breach

the agreement bypursuing restitution subsequent to Alvarez’s

clear statement that he expected to have to pay it.

D. The district court’s failure to advise Alvarez that he

may be subject to restitution was harmless

Finally, Alvarez argues that the district court erred in

imposing restitution even though it failed to warn him at his

change of plea hearing that the imposition of restitution was

a possible consequence of his guilty plea. We review the

adequacy of a Rule 11 plea colloquy de novo. United States

v. Minore, 292 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2002).

Where restitution is a possible penalty for a crime, Rule

11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that

a defendant be advised of the court’s authority to impose

restitution before the court can accept a guilty plea. Fed. R.

Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(K). Here, the government concedes that

the court’s failure to advise Alvarez of its power to impose

restitution at the change of plea hearing constituted error. 

However, any variance from Rule 11 “is harmless error if it

does not affect substantial rights.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h). 

Under our case law, “a district court’s failure to advise the

defendant of the possibility of restitution [does] not constitute

reversible error where the defendant was advised he was

subject to a fine in an amount in excess of the restitution

imposed.” United States v. Crawford, 169 F.3d 590, 592 (9th

Cir. 1999). The judge in this case informed Alvarez that he

could face a fine of up to $250,000, which is far more than

the $2,900 in restitution he was ultimately required to pay. 

Thus, the Rule 11 error was harmless.

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16 UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ

Moreover, the court acknowledged the mistake at the

sentencing hearing and offered Alvarez the opportunity to

withdraw his plea. Alvarez argued that this remedy was

insufficient and instead requested specific performance in the

form of a sentence that did not provide for any restitution. 

The district court concluded that specific performance was

“unavailable” after noting that there was a “disconnect”

between the harm of a possible involuntary plea and a remedy

that would “limit the options that are otherwise available for

supervised release.” Alvarez now argues that the district

court erred in failing to recognize its discretion not to impose

restitution.

Because the district court’s failure to advise Alvarez of

the possibility that he might face restitution was harmless, the

court was under no obligation to offer him any remedy for the

error. See Crawford, 169 F.3d at 592–93. It nevertheless

offered him the opportunity to withdraw his plea agreement,

which is the standard remedy for a Rule 11 violation. See

McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 472 (1969) (“[A]

defendant whose plea has been accepted in violation of Rule

11 should be afforded the opportunity to plead anew.”). A

district court also has “the opportunity, at its discretion, to

render harmless its earlier oversight bydeleting the restitution

portion of [a] sentence” imposed in violation of Rule

11(b)(1)(K). United States v. Rogers, 984 F.2d 314, 318–19

(9th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added). However, the district court

is not required to offer that option, and the decision of the

district court here not to eliminate restitution was well within

its discretion. 

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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ 17

We affirm the district court’s order of restitution in the

amount of $2,900.

AFFIRMED.

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