Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00390/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00390-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anthony Lopez
Petitioner
Michael Martel
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY LOPEZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

v. )

)

)

MICHAEL MARTEL, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:10-cv-00390-OWW-JLT HC

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S 

MOTION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS (Doc. 17)

ORDER GRANTING LEAVE FOR

PETITIONER TO FILE SECOND AMENDED

PETITION (Doc. 18)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO FILE LODGED AMENDED PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Doc. 18)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE CASE

ORDER DIRECTING PETITIONER TO FILE

REGULAR STATUS REPORTS

ORDER DIRECTING PETITIONER TO

NOTIFY COURT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

OF ANY FINAL ORDER REGARDING

EXHAUSTION 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Petitioner originally filed his federal petition on January 25, 2010 in the Sacramento Division

of this Court. (Doc. 1). On March 5, 2010, the case was transferred to the Fresno Division. (Doc.

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 1

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8). On March 19, 2010, Petitioner filed a first amended petition raising four claims: (1) failure of

prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence; (2) statute under which Petitioner was convicted was

unconstitutional; (3) Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated by juror misconduct; and (4)

Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated when his conviction was obtained by an

unconstitutional amendment to an indictment. (Doc. 14, pp. 4-5). 

On April 29, 2010, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why the petition should not be

dismissed because it contained no exhausted claims. (Doc. 16). On May 17, 2010, Petitioner filed

the instant motion to stay and also lodged a second amended petition containing two claims: (1) the

trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct violated Petitioner’s federal

constitutional rights; and (2) insufficient evidence was presented to support the conviction. (Doc.

18). Both of these claims are exhausted as they were presented to the California Supreme Court in a

Petition for Review during Petitioner’s direct appeal. (Doc. 14, pp. 326-327). 

DISCUSSION

A. Leave To File Second Amended Petition.

As a preliminary matter, the Court must address whether to permit Petitioner to file the

lodged second amended petition. In so doing, the Court construes Petitioner's lodging of a second

amended petition as an implied motion to file a second amended petition, and, so construed, grants

the motion. 

 A petitioner may amend a petition for writ of habeas corpus once “as a matter of course” and

without leave of Court, before a response has been filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a),

as applied to habeas corpus actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2242 and Rule 11 of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases. Calderon v. United States District Court (Thomas), 144 F.3d 618,

620 (9th Cir. 1998); Bonn v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9 Cir. 1995). Leave of Court is required

th

for all other amendments. Rule Civ. P. 15(a). Here, Petitioner filed his original petition on January

25, 2010. He then filed a first amended petition on March 19, 2010. (Doc. 14). Thus, leave of

Court would be required for filing a second amended petition. 

In deciding whether to allow an amendment, the Court may consider “bad faith, undue delay,

prejudice to the opposing party, futility of the amendment, and whether the party has previously

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 2

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amended his pleadings.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 844-45 (9 Cir.1995) (applying Rule 15(a) th

in a habeas case). Here, no bad faith is apparent from the record. Moreover, Petitioner appears to

have proceeded with reasonable haste in filing his first amended petition as well as his lodged second

amended petition. Since the second amended petition contains only exhausted claims, the

amendment sought by Petitioner cannot be deemed “futile.” Finally, although Petitioner has

previously amended his petition, under the circumstances recounted above, the Court finds that the

Bonin requirements have been substantially met and therefore Petitioner’s implied motion to amend

should be granted. The Clerk of the Court will be directed to file the lodged second amended

petition. 

B. Legal Framework For Staying Habeas Proceedings.

Traditionally, a district court has had the discretion to stay a petition which it may validly

consider on the merits. Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 987-988 (9th

Cir. 1998); Greenawalt v. Stewar7, 105 F.3d 1268, 1274 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1002 th

(1997). However, the Ninth Circuit has held that Taylor in no way granted “district courts carte

blanche to stay even fully exhausted habeas petitions.” Taylor, 134 F.3d at 988 n. 11. Granting a

stay is appropriate where there is no intention on the part of the Petitioner to delay or harass and in

order to avoid piecemeal litigation. Id. In addition, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that it is proper

for a district court, in its discretion, to hold a petition containing only exhausted claims in abeyance

in order to permit the petitioner to return to state court to exhaust his state remedies. Kelly v. Small,

315 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9 Cir. 2004); Ford v. Hubbard, 305 F.3d 875, 882-883 (9 Cir. 2002); James th th

v. Pliler, 269 F.3d 1124, 1126-1127 (9 Cir. 2002); Taylor, 134 F.3d 981. th

Notwithstanding the foregoing, until recently, federal case law continued to require that the

Court dismiss “mixed” petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Rose v. Lundy,

455 U.S. 509 (1982). That changed with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rhines v.

Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). Recognizing that “[a]s a result of the interplay between AEDPA’s 1-

year statute of limitations and Lundy’s dismissal requirement, petitioners who come to federal court

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with ‘mixed’ petitions run the risk of forever losing their opportunity for any federal review of their

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1244(d). 

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U.S. District Court

E. D. California 3

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unexhausted claims,” the Supreme Court held that federal courts may now issue “stay and abey”

orders under appropriate circumstances to permit petitioners to exhaust unexhausted claims before

proceeding with their federal petitions. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 276-277. In so holding, the Supreme

Court noted that the procedure should be “available only in limited circumstances.” 544 U.S. at 277. 

Specifically, the Court said it was appropriate only when (1) good cause exists for petitioner’s failure

to exhaust; (2) petitioner’s unexhausted claims are not “plainly meritless” and (3) there is no

indication that petitioner engaged in “abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay.” Id. at 277-278;

Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9 Cir. 2005). When a petitioner has met these th

requirements, his interest in obtaining federal review of his claims outweighs the competing interests

in finality and speedy resolution of federal petitions. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. 

In a ruling subsequent to Rhines, the Ninth Circuit re-affirmed the vitality of both the Rhines

two-step stay procedure as well as the Kelly three-step stay procedure:

Rhines allows a district court to stay a mixed petition, and does not require that unexhausted

claims be dismissed while the petitioner attempts to exhaust them in state court. In contrast,

the three-step procedure outlined in Kelly allows the stay of fully exhausted petitions,

requiring that the unexhausted claims be dismissed.

King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1139-1140 (9 Cir. 2009). th

There are, however, significant distinctions between the two procedures. First, claims

exhausted during a Rhines stay are not subject to timeliness challenges since the mixed petition

remains pending throughout the stay procedure. Id. at p. 1140. In contrast, any claim exhausted

during a Kelly stay must “relate back” to the claims in the original petition under the doctrine set

forth in Mayle v. Feliz, 545 U.S. 644 (2005), or else be timely filed under the AEDPA’s one-year

statute of limitation. Id. Additionally, petitioners seeking to avail themselves of a Rhines stay must

make the additional showing of good cause, something not required under Kelly. Id. at 1143.

Here, in his motion for a stay, Petitioner expressly invokes the Kelly procedure, indicating

that his lodged amended petition has deleted all unexhausted claims and the remaining two claims

are fully exhausted. (Doc. 17, p. 5). Because the second amended petition, which by this order is

deemed to be the operative pleading, is not a mixed petition and contains only exhausted claims, the

Kelly option is appropriate:

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 4

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“Rhines applies to stays of mixed petitions, whereas the [Kelly] three-step procedure applies

to stays of fully exhausted petitions....” 

King, 564 F. 3d at 1140, quoting Jackson v. Roe, 425 F. 3d 654, 661 (9 Cir. 2005). (Emphasis in th

original). 

As mentioned above, a petitioner seeking a stay under Kelly, as distinct from Rhines, need

not make a showing of good cause. King, 564 F.3d at 1143. Accordingly, since Petitioner has

sought and been granted leave to withdraw the unexhausted claims and proceed only on the

exhausted claims, and has therefore otherwise met the requirements of Kelly, the Court will grant

Petitioner’s motion for a stay of the proceedings and will hold the petition for writ of habeas corpus

in abeyance pending exhaustion of Petitioner’s state remedies.

However, the Court will not indefinitely hold the petition in abeyance. See Taylor, 134 F.3d

at 988 n. 11. No later than thirty (30) days after the date of service of this Order, Petitioner must

inform the Court of the status of the habeas proceedings in state court, including the dates his cases

were filed, the case numbers, and any outcomes. Further, Petitioner must proceed diligently to 2

pursue his state court remedies. Every sixty (60) days after the filing of the initial status report

Petitioner must file a new status report regarding the status of his state court habeas corpus

proceedings. Following final action by the state courts, Petitioner will be allowed thirty (30) days

within which to notify the Court that he has completed his exhaustion process in state court. At that

point, the Court will issue a new briefing schedule regarding the claims in the instant petition. 

Failure to comply with these instructions and time allowances will result in this Court vacating

the stay nunc pro tunc to the date of this order. Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1071.

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s motion to stay the instant proceedings on his habeas petition (Doc. 17), is

GRANTED;

2. Proceedings on the instant petition are STAYED pending exhaustion of Petitioner’s state

remedies;

The filing should be entitled “Status Report.”

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3. Petitioner is DIRECTED to file a status report within thirty (30) days of the date of

service of this order, advising the Court of the status of all pending habeas proceedings filed

in state court, the dates when such cases were filed, and any outcomes;

4. Petitioner is DIRECTED to file a new status report every sixty (60) days after the filing

of the initial status report; and

5. Petitioner is DIRECTED to notify the Court within thirty (30) days of any final order of

the state courts regarding his exhaustion efforts; 

6. Petitioner’s lodged amended petition (Doc. 18), is construed as a motion to file an

amended petition, and, so construed, is GRANTED;

7. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to FILE the lodged second amended petition (Doc.

18); and,

8. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE the case. The

Court will direct the Clerk of the Court to re-open the case when and if the stay is lifted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 24, 2010 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

9j7khi UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 6

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