Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-01369/USCOURTS-caDC-98-01369-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
Respondent
Doretha Gilliam
Respondent
New Valley Corporation
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 7, 1999 Decided October 12, 1999

No. 98-1369

New Valley Corporation,

Petitioner

v.

Doretha Gilliam, Widow of Leonard Gilliam,

Respondent

and

Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,

U.S. Department of Labor

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Benefits Review Board, U.S. Department of Labor

Michael D. Dobbs argued the cause and was on the brief

for petitioner New Valley Corporation.

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Judy L. Woodall argued the cause and was on the brief for

respondent Doretha Gilliam. Janet R. Dunlop, Counsel, U.S.

Department of Labor, entered an appearance.

Before: Wald, Silberman and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: In 1970, Leonard Gilliam injured his

back when he slipped and fell while delivering a candygram

for his employer, Western Union Telegraph Company, now

known as Petitioner New Valley Corporation. As a result, he

suffered a permanent and total disability, for which he received workers' compensation until his death in 1995. New

Valley challenges the award of death benefits to his surviving

wife, arguing that she does not meet the statutory definition

of "widow" because, following his desertion of her and their

ten children, she rebuffed his attempts to return to the

marital home. Finding this argument meritless, we deny the

petition for review.

I.

This case turns on the definition of "widow" in the federal

Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act

("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. ss 901 et seq. (1982). Section 902(16)

of the LHWCA defines "widow or widower" as "only the

decedent's wife or husband living with or dependent for

support upon him or her at the time of his or her death; or

living apart for justifiable cause or by reason of his or her

desertion at such time." 33 U.S.C. s 902(16). The LHWCA

was made applicable to the District of Columbia by the 1928

District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act, former

D.C. Code ss 36-501 et seq. (repealed 1979). Though now

repealed, the 1928 D.C. Act and the federal LHWCA still

govern claims arising from injuries that occurred before July

26, 1982. See Evans Financial Corp. v. Director, Office of

Workers' Compensation Programs, 161 F.3d 30, 32 n.1 (D.C.

Cir. 1998).

The Supreme Court first addressed the LHWCA's definition of widow in Thompson v. Lawson, 347 U.S. 334 (1954),

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holding that legal marriage alone is insufficient to confer

eligibility for survivor benefits. Instead of "assessing the

marital conduct of the parties" under state domestic relations

law, courts must examine the facts of the relationship to

determine if there "is a conjugal nexus between the claimant

and the decedent subsisting at the time of the latter's death."

Id. at 336. Thompson affirmed the denial of benefits to the

claimant because, although legally married to the decedent at

the time of his death, she had made a "conscious choice to

terminate her prior conjugal relationship by embarking on

another permanent relationship." Id. at 337. The claimant's

conduct, the Court said, "severed the bond which was the

basis of her right to claim a death benefit as [decedent's]

statutory dependent." Id. Reasoning that "[t]he very practical considerations of this Compensation Act should not be

subordinated to the empty abstraction that once a wife has

been deserted, she always remains a deserted wife, no matter

what," the Court concluded that a conjugal nexus between the

decedent and his surviving spouse is a necessary prerequisite

to an award of death benefits under the Act.

Shortly after Thompson, this court, in Liberty Mutual

Insurance Co. v. Donovan, 218 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1955),

explained the conjugal nexus test as follows:

[T]he rule is now settled that to be entitled to an award

as a widow a woman must have continued to live as the

deserted wife of an employee who has deserted her;

there must be a bond in reality between husband and

wife in their relation to one another. The essential

ingredient in her claim is her real status, speaking

factually, in respect to the deceased, not the existing

legal formalities of the relationship.

Id. at 862.

With this legal framework in mind, we turn to the marriage

between Leonard and Doretha Gilliam. The parties do not

dispute that at the time of her husband's death, Mrs. Gilliam

was legally married to him but neither living with him nor

financially dependent upon him. Under the Act's definition of

widow, her eligibility for benefits therefore turns on whether

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their estrangement at the time of her husband's death was

"for justifiable cause" or "by reason of his ... desertion." 33

U.S.C. s 902(16).

Following an evidentiary hearing, the Administrative Law

Judge made the following findings of fact, which the parties

do not dispute. Wed on October 31, 1949, the Gilliams

remained legally married until the husband's death some 46

years later. The couple had ten children. They lived in

Washington, D.C.

The ALJ found that shortly after Mr. Gilliam became

permanently disabled as a result of his 1970 work-related

injury, he chose to leave the marital home. Mrs. Gilliam

remained in the marital home, where she has resided ever

since. Mr. Gilliam provided no support for his wife and their

ten children despite her attempts to collect child support

through court proceedings. In 1977, Mr. Gilliam was awarded permanent total disability compensation plus moving expenses. He moved to California but returned to Washington

some four years later.

Attempting to return to the marital home, Mr. Gilliam

contacted his wife for the first time in nearly a decade,

repeatedly saying "he wanted his home back." Never indicating that he wanted to continue the marriage, Mr. Gilliam

intended to reclaim property, not to reconcile the relationship.

Because she considered him a controlling husband and feared

him "to some extent," Mrs. Gilliam refused to allow him to

return. She twice tried to divorce him. She discontinued the

first divorce proceeding at his request and lacked the financial resources to complete the second. In the years leading

up to her husband's death, Mrs. Gilliam sometimes cooked

meals for him, and the couple continued to see each other

socially on family occasions. She never entered into another

relationship.

Finding that at the time her husband died Mrs. Gilliam was

living apart from him "for justifiable cause" (the statute's

requirement) and that she had not severed the "conjugal

nexus" (Thomspon's requirement), the ALJ awarded her

death benefits of roughly $300 a month. New Valley appealUSCA Case #98-1369 Document #469093 Filed: 10/12/1999 Page 4 of 10
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ed to the Department of Labor's Benefits Review Board,

which affirmed the ALJ's decision. In this petition for review, the company challenges the ALJ's findings of a conjugal

nexus and justifiable cause for separation as contrary to law.

II.

We "may reverse a [Benefits Review] Board ruling only for

errors of law or when the Board has exceeded the scope of its

authority in its review of the ALJ." Brown v. I.T.T. Baking

Co., 921 F.2d 289, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The ALJ's findings of

fact "shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence

in the record considered as a whole." 33 U.S.C. s 921(b)(3).

Highly deferential to the factfinder, this substantial evidence

test requires only that the ALJ's findings be supported by

"more than a 'scintilla,' but less than a preponderance of the

evidence." Evans Financial, 161 F.3d at 34. In conducting

our review, we must take account of the statute's presumption

in favor of claimants: "In any proceeding for the enforcement

of a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be

presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the

contrary, that the claim comes within the provisions of this

chapter...." 33 U.S.C. s 920(a). Demonstrating the Act's

"beneficent purposes and humanitarian nature," this presumption requires that we "resolve doubtful questions ... in

favor of the claimants," Burns v. Director, Office of Workers'

Compensation Programs, 41 F.3d 1555, 1562 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

(internal quotation marks omitted), and "construe the Act

liberally" to "avoid[ ] harsh and incongruous results." Stevenson v. Linens of the Week, 688 F.2d 93, 98 (D.C. Cir.

1982).

New Valley, seeking to avoid this "limited and highly

deferential" substantial evidence standard, Cadbury Beverages Inc. v. NLRB, 160 F.3d 24, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal

quotation marks omitted), and conceding that it has no quarrel with the ALJ's fact-finding, attempts to frame its petition

in terms of legal issues. It begins by challenging the ALJ's

conjugal nexus finding, claiming that as in Thompson the

conjugal nexus between the Gilliams had been severed. The

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company points out that Mrs. Gilliam repeatedly rebuffed her

husband's attempts to return to the marital home, twice

began divorce proceedings, "had no further conjugal relations

with her husband" despite his return to the Washington area,

and "did not intend to resume the marital relationship." All

of this, according to New Valley, leads to the inescapable

conclusion that Mrs. Gilliam, like the claimant in Thompson,

"made a conscious decision to sever the conjugal nexus with

her husband and she persisted in her intentions up to the

time of Mr. Gilliam's death."

The ALJ reached a different conclusion, finding that under

all of the circumstances of this case the couple's conjugal

nexus had not been terminated: "The Act does not require

Mrs. Gilliam to condone or forgive the years of desertion and

non-support she endured. Nor must she cohabit with her

husband when he decides to return years later." Not only

does nothing in Thompson require a different result--unlike

the claimant there, Mrs. Gilliam never entered into another

relationship--but the ALJ's conclusion is perfectly consistent

with Matthews v. Walter, 512 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1975), which

upheld a benefits award to a surviving widow despite her

failure to resume living with the decedent once the cause of

their initial separation ceased. As we explained, "[t]his comports with human realities and avoids working undue hardships upon individuals by forcing either the forfeiture of

benefits or the abandonment of a life style to which they had

become accustomed following the justified separation." Id. at

944.

New Valley urges us to adopt a new legal standard for

conjugal nexus. It argues that a deserted wife can preserve

her right to benefits only by taking her husband back whenever he decides to return. According to the company, Mrs.

Gilliam terminated their conjugal nexus by refusing to allow

her husband to return home even though he had left her with

ten children, had given them no support, wished to return

only to reclaim his property, and was "a controlling husband"

feared by his wife. We find nothing in the statute or cases to

require such a Dickensian result. Indeed, the company's

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position conflicts with the Act's "beneficent" and "humane"

purposes.

Despite New Valley's repeated attempts in its brief and at

oral argument to frame its argument as a legal issue, it

cannot escape the basic proposition that conjugal nexus is a

question of fact and that in this case the ALJ's decision finds

ample support in the record. The ALJ found that Mrs.

Gilliam remained in the marital home for more than 35 years;

that she neither entered into another relationship nor

changed her married name; and that she maintained a relationship with her husband through their children, spent holidays with him, and occasionally even cooked meals for him.

The ALJ also found Mrs. Gilliam's initiation of divorce proceedings insufficient to break the conjugal nexus because she

abandoned the first attempt at her husband's behest and

never completed the second due to a lack of financial resources. We find nothing in either fact or law to question the

ALJ's ultimate conclusion that the conjugal nexus between

the couple still existed at the time of Mr. Gilliam's death.

New Valley next alleges that the ALJ ignored the relevant

time period fixed by the Act for ascertaining the existence of

"justifiable cause." According to the company, the husband's

desertion of his family in the early seventies cannot possibly

constitute justifiable cause for Mrs. Gilliam to be living apart

from him at the time of his death almost twenty-five years

later. If desertion by itself automatically constitutes justifiable cause, the company argues, the statute would not treat

desertion and justifiable cause separately, nor would courts

bother to consider the conduct of the parties following the

desertion to determine if a conjugal nexus remained at the

time of death.

No one disagrees with the proposition that the statute fixes

the decedent's death as the proper time for inquiring into the

reasons for a couple's separation. See Matthews, 512 F.2d at

944. Nor does anyone disagree that desertion does not

always amount to justifiable cause for a couple to be living

apart, perhaps years later, at the time of the decedent's

death. See Thompson, 347 U.S. at 337. It does not follow,

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however, that desertion alone could never constitute justifiable cause. We know this because the Supreme Court has

described the LHWCA's definition of "widow" as including a

claimant living apart from her spouse "because of desertion

or other justifiable cause." Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v.

Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 519

U.S. 248, 257 (1997) (emphasis added).

In this case, however, the ALJ did not rely solely on the

husband's desertion. Instead he found that the desertion,

"coupled with Decedent's non-support for the ten children

and his controlling behavior, constitutes justifiable cause for

living apart." (Emphasis added.) In other words, the husband's post-desertion behavior contributed to the ALJ's conclusion that there was justifiable cause for the couple's continued separation. Moreover, nothing in the ALJ's decision

suggests that his justifiable cause conclusion rested on circumstances other than those existing at the time of the

husband's death.

New Valley challenges the ALJ's justifiable cause finding

on a second ground. "Controlling behavior," New Valley

claims, cannot be equated with alcoholism, adultery, severe

mental problems, or physical abuse--the conditions supporting justifiable cause findings in several cases cited by the

company. Courts of Appeals and the Benefits Review Board,

however, have affirmed findings of justifiable cause on less

serious grounds, including grounds less severe than the husband's behavior here. See, e.g., Henderson v. Avondale Marine Ways, Inc., 204 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1953) (finding justifiable cause where mother-in-law objected to claimant and cut

up her clothes); Kennedy v. Container Stevedoring Co., 23

BRBS 33 (1989) (rejecting the notion that justifiable cause is

limited to temporary separations or situations in which a

spouse is fearful of an infectious disease or bodily injury, and

finding justifiable cause where claimant and decedent agreed

to separate because they could not live together amicably);

Denton v. Northrop Corp., 21 BRBS 37 (1988) (finding justifiable cause where couple lived apart because of job requirements).

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Notwithstanding these decisions, New Valley insists that in

this circuit serious misconduct rising to the level of a "matrimonial offense" is needed to sustain a finding of justifiable

cause. In support, New Valley cites Matthews for the proposition that Congress fashioned the justifiable cause provision

based on the law of divorce and separation and that the

phrase is therefore "substantially equivalent to a 'matrimonial

offense.' " New Valley seriously misreads Matthews. The

"matrimonial offense" language in Matthews came from an

earlier case, Weeks v. Behrend, 135 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir. 1943).

Explicitly rejecting Weeks' "narrow construction of 'justifiable

cause,' " Matthews instead looked to "a broader and more

straightforward interpretation" found in other cases. Matthews, 512 F.2d at 944. Matthews explained:

We read Thompson as undermining the narrow construction of "justifiable cause" offered in Weeks. The Court

stated in Thompson that it would not assess "the marital

conduct of the parties. That is an inquiry which may be

relevant to legal issues arising under State domestic

relations law. Our concern is with the proper interpretation of the Federal Longshoremen's Act."

Id. (citation omitted).

In a last-ditch effort to unearth a legal issue in this case,

New Valley urged for the first time at oral argument that in

addition to "conjugal nexus" and "justifiable cause," LHWCA

death benefits turn on whether the surviving spouse had a

reasonable expectation of support from the decedent. Even

were we to consider arguments not raised in the briefs, we

would reject this one. Nothing in either the statute or case

law supports a "reasonable expectation" test. Indeed, under

questioning at oral argument, counsel conceded that there

could be situations in which a widow, although lacking any

expectation of support, might nonetheless be entitled to death

benefits.

III.

In the end, the ALJ's justifiable cause and conjugal nexus

findings are factual determinations reviewable only pursuant

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to the highly deferential substantial evidence standard. Even

where "the facts permit the drawing of diverse inferences,"

the finder of fact "alone is charged with the duty of initially

selecting the inference which seems most reasonable and his

choice, if otherwise sustainable, may not be disturbed by a

reviewing court." O'Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls

Associates, Inc., 380 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1965) (quoting Cardillo

v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 478 (1947)). New

Valley does not argue that the ALJ's findings were unsupported by the record, only that we should reinterpret the

evidence to support the opposite conclusion. But as we have

said many times, "[a]n agency's conclusion may be supported

by substantial evidence even though a plausible alternative

interpretation of the evidence would support a contrary view."

Secretary of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Admin. v.

Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 111 F.3d

913, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Finding ample support for the ALJ's determination that Mrs.

Gilliam qualifies as a widow under the LHWCA, we deny the

petition.

So ordered.

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