Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00581/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00581-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Freightliner LLC
Defendant
Fresno Truck Center
Defendant
Juan Ruelas
Plaintiff
Sacramento Truck Center
Defendant

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUAN M. RUELAS, an 

individual,

NO. CIV. S-07-581 LKK/DAD

Plaintiff,

v.

O R D E R

FREIGHTLINER, LLC, a

Delaware Limited Liability

Company; FRESNO TRUCK

CENTER dba SACRAMENTO

TRUCK CENTER, a California

Corporation,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, Juan M. Ruelas, has brought suit against

defendants, Freightliner LLC (manufacturer) and Fresno Truck Center

d/b/a/ Sacramento Truck Center (retailer), for alleged breaches of

warranty of his tractor trailer under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty

Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12, and the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty

Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1791 et seq, and related state claims.

Pending before the court is defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, which argues that the plaintiff’s tractor trailer is not

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1 The facts set forth in this section are undisputed unless

otherwise noted. Each party objects to various pieces of

evidence that the opposing party has presented. Some of the

evidence to which the parties object is irrelevant to the

court’s analysis of the summary judgment motion. To the

extent that the evidence is relevant, the objections are

OVERRULED. 2 Plaintiff disputes the truth of the terms of these documents,

especially the terms stating Plaintiff would take delivery of

2

covered by either federal or state warranty acts. The court

resolves the motion on the parties’ papers and after oral argument.

For the reasons explained below, the motion for summary judgment

is granted.

I. Facts1

Plaintiff, Juan M. Ruelas, purchased a 2005 Freightliner

Classic XL Tractor, VIN 1FUJAPCK45DN58143 from defendant, Fresno

Truck Center d/b/a/ Sacramento Truck Center, on March 24, 2006. 

Defendant’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) ¶ 1. 

Plaintiff initiated the purchase and acted as a “strawman” in

order to get the proper financing for the vehicle on behalf of

his brother-in-law, George Cruz. SUF ¶ 12. At the time of

purchase, Mr. Cruz told the salesman that he needed a truck “to

haul heavy equipment” and selected a commercial vehicle with a

gross vehicle weight rating of 52,000 pounds (a shipping weight

of 17,341 pounds and an unladen weight of 17,000 pounds). SUF

¶¶ 14, 4.

Defendants assert that at the time of the purchase,

plaintiff executed a number of documents, including a Vehicle

Buyers Order, a Retail Installment Contract-Security Agreement,

and a Request for Tax Waiver.2 SUF ¶ 5. Defendants argue that

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the truck in Verdi, Nevada and that Plaintiff was not going

to use the tractor trailer for personal purposes. See

Plaintiff’s Separate Statement In Opposition to the

Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“SS”) ¶

5.

3

the terms of these documents forbid the purchaser from using the

property for personal purposes and allowed purchaser to avoid

paying a Federal Excise Tax or California State Sales Tax on the

Vehicle due to its delivery in Verdi, Nevada. SUF ¶¶ 8, 11. 

Defendants maintain the Vehicle was delivered to plaintiff in

Verdi, Nevada on March 24, 2006. SUF ¶ 10. Plaintiff asserts

he was told to sign such documents in order to avoid sales tax

on the purchase and that he actually took delivery and

possession of the vehicle in Sacramento, California at the

Sacramento Truck Center Dealership. SS ¶¶ 5, 10. 

George Cruz, on whose behalf the plaintiff purchased the

vehicle, intended to use the vehicle for commercial trucking and

intended to start his own trucking business. SS ¶ 15; see also

Declaration of George Cruz In Support of Plaintiff Juan Ruelas’

Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (“Cruz Decl.”) ¶¶ 2,

9. After purchase, he used the vehicle to haul loads. Id. ¶ 9.

He drove the vehicle “around the country,” hauling loads,

approximately 95-97 percent of the time that he used the

vehicle. Id. His wife occasionally accompanied him and, when she

did, they slept in the vehicle and kept personal belongings in

it. Id. They also used it to visit friends and family. Id.

Following possession and use of the truck, plaintiff

alleges he discovered nonconformities in the vehicle and that

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defendants failed to conform the vehicle to applicable

warranties. SUF ¶ 16.

On January 25, 2007, plaintiff filed his complaint in

Sacramento Superior Court against defendants. SUF ¶ 17. 

Plaintiff alleged breach of express and implied warranty under

both the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the Song-Beverly

Warranty Act. SUF ¶ 17. On March 23, 2007, defendants removed

the case to this court.

II. Standard for Summary Judgment

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated

that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); See also Adickes v. S.H. Kress &

Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Sicor Limited v. Cetus Corp., 51

F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1995).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis

for its motion, and identifying those

portions of "the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if

any," which it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here

the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be

made in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers

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to interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for

discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party's case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. "[A]

complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id. at

323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986); See also First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv.

Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Sicor Limited, 51 F.3d at 853. 

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts

in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material,

in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; See also First

Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 954

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(9th Cir. 1998). The opposing party must demonstrate that the

fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect

the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Owens v. Local

No. 169, Assoc. of Western Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347,

355 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific

Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and

that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

Anderson, 477 U.S. 248-49; see also Cline v. Industrial

Maintenance Engineering & Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1223, 1228

(9th Cir. 1999).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." 

First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 290; See also T.W. Elec. Serv.,

809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to

'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see

whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's

note on 1963 amendments); see also International Union of

Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman Local Union No. 20 v. Martin

Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).

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In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court

examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. 

Rule 56(c); See also In re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d

1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999). The evidence of the opposing party

is to be believed, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party,

see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)). 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

"must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as

a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

III. Analysis

Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that

the protections of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act or the

California Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act do not apply to

plaintiff’s tractor trailer. Despite drawing all reasonable

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inferences from the facts before the court in favor of

plaintiff, for reasons stated below, the court grants the motion

for summary judgment.

A. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act Claims

The plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the defendants

breached a written warranty and breached an implied warranty, in

violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-

12. The defendants assert that the Act does not apply to

plaintiff’s vehicle and therefore that the plaintiff’s claims

under the Act are barred. As explained below, the court agrees

and grants the defendants’ motion on these claims. 

The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act establishes minimum

standards for express and implied warranties for goods and

offers consumers remedies when the warranties are found to be

inadequate. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2304-2310. The Act applies only to

warranties that pertain to consumer products. Id. § 2302(e). A

“consumer product” is “any tangible personal property which is

distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal,

family, or household purposes....” Id. § 2301(1); see also 16

C.F.R. § 700.1(a) (defining “consumer product” similarly).

Neither the percentage of sales nor the use to which a product

is put by any individual buyer is determinative. 16 C.F.R. §

700.1(a). If it is unclear whether a particular product is

covered by the Act, courts should resolve the ambiguity in favor

of coverage. Id.

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Although there appears to be no Ninth Circuit case on the

issue, both the plain language of the statute and other courts’

holdings indicate that the “normal” use of a vehicle is

determined by considering the specific class to which the

vehicle belongs, rather than the plaintiff’s use of his

particular vehicle. See, e.g., Waypoint Aviation Services Inc.

v. Sandel Avionics, Inc., 469 F.3d 1071 (7th Cir. 2006);

Stoebner Motors, Inc. v. Automobili Lamborghini S.P.A., 459 F.

Supp. 2d 1028, 1032 (D. Haw. 2006); Najran Co. for Gen.

Contracting & Trading v. Fleetwood Enter., Inc., 659 F. Supp.

1081, 1099 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Walsh v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 449

N.Y.S.2d 556 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982). 

In Waypoint, the Seventh Circuit examined whether

classification of an airplane as a non-consumer product was

appropriate even if its principal use was for personal purposes. 

Waypoint, 469 F.3d at 1072. The court concluded that the plane

could be a consumer product based on the normal use of the type

of airplane found across its particular sub-class. Id. at 1073. 

The court explained that analysis of whether an item is a

“consumer product” should be done within these particular

subcategories instead of across broad classes. Id.

Particularly, the court said that categories such as “airplanes”

and “motor vehicles” are too broad, but that the analysis should

be done in a more “fine-grained” manner over individual

subcategories. Id. The court opined that within the category

of motor vehicles, “locomotives, military tanks, commercial

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tractor-trailer rigs...are not consumer products.” Id. (italics

added); see also Walsh, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 557 (holding that a

tractor trailer was not a consumer product under the Act). 

Despite the plaintiff’s argument to the contrary, Waypoint does

not support the proposition that the court should inquire into

the plaintiff’s use of his particular vehicle to determine

whether it is properly covered by the Act. Rather, the court

must consider whether the subclass of vehicles to which the

plaintiff’s vehicle belongs is normally used as a consumer

product.

In determining the “normal” use for a class of products,

courts often turn to a common sense understanding of the

product. See Russo v. NCS Pearson, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 981,

998 (D. Minn. 2006) (concluding that SAT preparation materials

did not appear to resemble the consumer products listed in the

Federal Register or the legislative history of the Act); Clark

v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1037, 1043 (M.D. Ala.

1989) (adopting a similar approach to conclude that a

prefabricated home resembles real property for the purposes of

the Act and therefore is not a “consumer good”). Courts also

consider the manufacturer’s description of the product and how

it is advertised, as well the purpose for which it was designed.

See, e.g., People ex rel. Mota v. Central Sprinkler Corp., 174

F. Supp. 2d 824, 829-30 (C.D. Ill. 2001); Essex Ins. Co. v.

Blount, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 722, 723 (E.D. Tex. 1999). 

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The plaintiff argues that the court should consider the

purchaser’s actual use of the product as evidence of normal use,

citing to Balser v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 512 F. Supp. 1217

(N.D. Ga. 1981). The plaintiff in Balser brought claims under

the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act for an airplane he bought. Id. at

1217. The court held that the purchaser’s actual use of his

individual product was the “determining factor” of whether a

product was a consumer product. Id. at 1219. This holding,

however, appears inconsistent with other courts’ interpretations

of the statute and the plain language of the statute itself, as

discussed above. This is particularly relevant because the

Balser court itself cautioned that there was “no controlling

authority and little persuasive authority to guide it” in

arriving at its holding. See id. Moreover, the Federal

Regulations interpret the Act to refer to the use of a “type of

product,” indicating that the court’s inquiry should not be

focused on an individual plaintiff’s personal use of his

product. 16 C.F.R. § 700.1(a). To the extent that Balser’s

holding contradicts this approach, the court declines to follow

it. 

Because the Act only applies to consumer products, a

component of the plaintiff’s claims is that his vehicle is a

consumer product under the Act; this is an element for which he

bears the burden of proof at trial. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2302.

Therefore, the defendants’ motion must succeed if a reasonable

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jury could not conclude based on the evidence before it that the

plaintiff has borne his burden on this issue. 

The plaintiff has presented two types of evidence to

support his allegation that his vehicle is a consumer product.

First, he presents evidence of recreational use of tractor

trailers by some collectors and enthusiasts. See Declaration of

Jessica D. Lew In Opposition to Defendants’ Motion (“Lew Decl.”)

¶¶ 2-3, Exh. B-C. Second, he presents evidence that Mr. Cruz

slept in the vehicle and kept his personal belongings in it, and

that he used it to visit friends and family. See Cruz Decl. ¶ 9. 

Based on the evidence before the court, no reasonable jury could

conclude that the plaintiff has borne his burden to prove that

the vehicle was a commercial vehicle. First, his evidence of Mr.

Cruz’s personal use of the vehicle is immaterial, as the court’s

inquiry must focus on the normal use for the class of tractor

trailers, as explained above. Even if Mr. Cruz’s personal use of

the vehicle were relevant, the evidence before the court hardly

supports the plaintiff’s position, as it appears clear from Mr.

Cruz’s statements that his and his wife’s personal use of the

vehicle was incidental to his use of it for commercial purposes.

See Cruz Decl. ¶ 9; Declaration of Joseph Whitecavage in Support

of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Whitecavage Decl.”)

¶ 2, Exh. A (deposition of Mr. Cruz, in which he stated that he

intended to use the vehicle for commercial purposes and that use

never changed). 

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What remains, then, are two newspaper articles which

depict individuals’ hobbies of restoring, collecting, and

showing tractor trailers. See Lew Decl. ¶¶ 2-3, Exh. B-C. This

evidence, again, hardly supports the plaintiff’s position, as

the articles describe the vehicles being used for commercial

purposes primarily. See id. ¶ 2, Exh. B. 

The defendant has presented evidence from John Michel, a

salesperson and Sales Manager of Freightliner tractor trailers,

that these vehicles are normally purchased and used for

commercial hauling. See Declaration of John Michel In Support of

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Michel Decl.”) ¶¶ 10-

11. The court also notes that the only courts that appear to

have considered the question of whether a tractor trailer is a

consumer product under the Act have concluded that it is not.

See Waypoint, 469 F.3d at 1072; Walsh, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 557.

Considering the plaintiff’s evidence in light of the

defendants’ contrary evidence but drawing every inference in

favor of the plaintiff, the court must conclude that no

reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff has shown that his

vehicle was a “consumer product” under the Act. The court thus

will grant the defendants’ motion as to these claims, which are

counts three and four of the plaintiff’s complaint.

B. The Court’s Jurisdiction Over Pendant State Claims

What remains are plaintiff's claims under the state statute

and alleged violations of the California Commercial Code. In his

opposition, the plaintiff argues that even if summary judgment

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is granted on his four causes of action, the complaint should

not be dismissed because the court may retain jurisdiction over

these claims. 

It is true that the court could retain jurisdiction over

the plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. The exercise of

supplemental jurisdiction is usually mandatory, unless it is

prohibited by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) or falls under one of the

exceptions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Executive Software

N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 24

F.3d 1545, 1555-56 (9th Cir. 1994). Under section 28 U.S.C.

1367(c), a court may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a related state claim if “(1) the claim raises

a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim

substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which

the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district

court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are

other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” Id.

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367). In deciding whether to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction, “the ultimate inquiry for the courts

[is] whether the assertion of pendent jurisdiction ‘best

accomodate[s] the values of economy[,] convenience, fairness and

comity.’” Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1556. Generally, when

a case was removed, it is preferable to remand the case to state

court rather than dismiss the plaintiff’s claims, in order to

minimize possible unfairness to the plaintiff. See CarenegieCase 2:07-cv-00581-LKK-DAD Document 18 Filed 02/27/08 Page 14 of 15
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Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 352 (1988); cf.

Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1167 n. 3 (9th Cir.

2002). 

Here, given that the court grants defendants’ motion on the 

claim over which the court has original jurisdiction, the

Executive Software facts weigh strongly in favor of the court

not exercising jurisdiction over the case. See also 28 U.S.C. §

1367. Although no party has presented evidence of the possible

injury to the plaintiff of dismissing the case rather than

remanding it to state court, the most prudent disposition is

remand.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, defendants’ motion for

summary judgment with respect to all the plaintiff’s claim under

the federal statute is GRANTED. 

This action is REMANDED to state court. 

The Clerk is directed to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 27, 2008.

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