Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-23-03057/USCOURTS-caDC-23-03057-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Angelo Riley
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 15, 2024 Decided September 6, 2024

No. 23-3057

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

MICHAEL ANGELO RILEY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:21-cr-00628-1)

Christopher Macchiaroli argued the cause for appellant. 

With him on the briefs was Emma Mulford.

Mark Hobel, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause 

for appellee. With him on the brief were Chrisellen R. Kolb

and Nicholas P. Coleman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: PILLARD, CHILDS and GARCIA, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge PILLARD.

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PILLARD, Circuit Judge: Michael Riley, an experienced

former Capitol Police officer, appeals his conviction for 

obstruction of a federal grand jury investigation of the 

January 6, 2021, attack on the United States Capitol. The day 

after the attack, Riley tipped off one of the rioters that 

“everyone who was in the [Capitol] building is going to be 

charged” and urged him to “take down” a Facebook post

acknowledging that he had been inside the building. When 

Riley learned his communication with that individual might 

be investigated, he tried to cover it up by deleting direct 

messages from his Facebook account and calls from his 

phone’s call log. A jury convicted Riley of one count of 

obstruction of an official proceeding in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1512(c)(1) based on the deletions but was unable to reach a 

verdict on another obstruction count based on the underlying 

tip. The court sentenced him to a period of probation and a 

fine.

Riley appeals his conviction. His central claim is that the 

government failed to establish that an official grand jury 

proceeding was foreseeable or that he deleted his Facebook 

direct messages to affect any such proceeding. He asserts 

various other trial errors that he links to those asserted 

shortcomings. We have considered each of Riley’s 

challenges and, because none succeeds, we affirm.

I.

A.

Capitol Police Officer Michael Riley was on duty near 

the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021, when thousands 

of people converged there in an effort to halt the certification 

of the electoral count. The following morning, Riley posted 

on Facebook that “[e]very protester that assaulted an officer 

yesterday, committed property damage, and broke into the 

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Capitol building should be charged federally in district court. 

If we don’t send a message, it will surely happen again.” 

Trial Tr. 29:23-30:1 (J.A. 451-52). Within an hour of that 

post, Riley learned that his Facebook friend Jacob Hiles had 

uploaded and commented in detail on a video recorded during 

the riot. Hiles’s post described the video as portraying “the 

craziest, most violent part of what [he] witnessed earlier at the 

Capitol building,” Trial Tr. 20:20-21 (J.A. 442), and claimed

that he, “like hundreds or thousands of other people,” was

caught up in a crowd that was “funneled” into the Capitol 

Building on January 6. Trial Tr. 27:4, 11-14 (J.A. 449). In a 

private message, Riley responded to Hiles: “Hey Jake, im

[sic] a capitol police officer who agrees with your political 

stance. Take down the part about being in the building they 

are currently investigating and everyone who was in the 

building is going to [be] charged. Just looking out!” GX 202

(J.A. 1163).

Riley continued to communicate with Hiles on Facebook

for several days. The pair exchanged hundreds of messages 

discussing the law enforcement investigation into the riots and 

personal matters like their shared interest in fishing. On 

January 16, Riley messaged Hiles that “[t]heyre arresting 

dozens of people aday. Everyone that was in the building,

engaged in violent acts, or destruction of property...and 

theyre all being charged federally with felonies.” GX 202 at 

57, United States v. Riley, No. 21-628 (D.D.C. June 29, 2022)

(ellipsis, spelling, and punctuation as in original); see 

Indictment ¶ 13.b. (J.A. 19); Trial Tr. 46:11-14 (J.A. 941). 

Then, on January 20, Hiles wrote Riley that the FBI had 

arrested and interviewed him. He revealed that the “FBI was 

very curious that I had been speaking to you” and “[i]f they 

haven’t already asked you about me, they are gonna.” Trial 

Tr. 89:17-19 (J.A. 511). 

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The next day, Riley deleted his entire string of Facebook 

messages with Hiles and removed two calls with Hiles from 

his cell phone’s call log. He then sent a message to Hiles, 

which he did not delete: 

Hey, Jake, another mutual friend was talking about 

you last night. I tried to defend you, but then he 

showed me a video of you in the Capitol smoking 

weed and acting like a moron. . . . I was shocked 

and dumbfounded since your story of getting 

pushed in the building with no other choice now 

seems not only false, but is a complete lie. I feel 

like a moron for believing you. . . . I was so mad 

last night. I deleted all your posts. But I wanted to 

text you this morning and let [you] know that I will 

no longer be conversing with you.

Trial Tr. 99:10-24 (J.A. 521).

Four days later, the Capitol Police Office of Professional 

Responsibility sent Riley a letter informing him that a 

disciplinary complaint had been filed against him. Riley 

shared the letter with his union representative and, when the 

representative asked whether Riley knew what the complaint 

was about, he replied: “If I had to guess, for telling [Hiles] to 

take down [a video] from the Capitol breach. But I did it on 

private message, so it should be like a private conversation, 

but who knows. He told me that he told the FBI that he talked 

to me.” Trial Tr. 109:2-6 (J.A. 531). 

B.

A federal grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted 

Riley on two felony counts of obstruction of an official 

proceeding in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512. Section 

1512(c)(1) imposes liability on anyone who “corruptly alters, 

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destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other 

object . . . with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or 

availability for use in an official proceeding.” Section 

1512(b)(2)(B) imposes liability on anyone who “knowingly 

uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another 

person” to do the same. The statute defines “official 

proceeding” to include, among other things, federal court 

proceedings, such as a federal grand jury. 18 U.S.C. § 

1515(a)(1)(A). 

The indictment charged Riley with attempting to impair 

the availability of evidence for use by a federal grand jury 

investigating the January 6 breach of the U.S. Capitol.

Indictment ¶¶ 2, 19-22 (J.A. 16, 20-21). Count One alleged 

that Riley did so by urging Hiles, in violation of section 

1512(b)(2)(B), to take down a Facebook post acknowledging

that he had been inside the Capitol building during the riot. 

Count Two alleged that Riley deleted his own Facebook 

messages to destroy evidence of his advice to Hiles, in 

violation of section 1512(c)(1). 

Riley unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment, 

arguing that it failed to identify a foreseeable “official 

proceeding” that he intended to obstruct because it only 

referenced a “law enforcement investigation,” which Riley 

contended the relevant provisions do not protect. The district 

court held that the indictment adequately alleged that Riley 

intended to make evidence unavailable to a federal grand jury 

that foreseeably was or would be convened to investigate 

crimes committed during the breach of the Capitol on January 

6. The court noted that the statute defines “official 

proceeding” to include “a proceeding before . . . a Federal 

grand jury,” Order at 3-4, United States v. Riley, No. 21-628 

(D.D.C. June 29, 2022), ECF No. 37 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §

1515(a)(1)(A)) (J.A. 149-50), and reasoned that Riley’s 

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challenge to the charges’ reference to a “federal investigation” 

ignored the indictment’s “detailed factual allegations” which 

specify that the referenced “federal investigation” was the 

January 6 probe “for which a federal grand jury was convened 

in the District of Columbia,” id. at 2, 5 (J.A. 148, 151).

Seeking support for his theory that no grand jury was 

foreseeable when he deleted his messages, Riley sought to 

compel pretrial discovery from the government about the 

scope and timing of the grand jury referenced in the 

indictment. The district court granted the motion in part. The 

court required the government to produce information about 

when a grand jury was convened and whether the Capitol 

Police were aware of it. But the court denied as irrelevant

Riley’s request for information about prosecutions of 

unlawful entries to the Capitol before the events of January 6, 

2021.

The government accordingly informed defense counsel 

that it had convened a grand jury on January 8, 2021, “largely 

for the purpose of considering Capitol attack cases,” J.A. 102 

(quoting May 13, 2022, DOJ Ltr. at 1), and it supported that 

assertion with a sample January 6 indictment returned by that 

grand jury. When a question arose during the trial testimony 

of the government’s witness, Special Agent Hart, as to 

whether he had personal knowledge of the timing of the grand 

jury proceeding, the district court chose to take judicial notice

of the undisputed fact that “[a] federal grand jury was 

empaneled in the District of Columbia on January 8th, 2021, 

and it considered matters related to the events of the United 

States Capitol on January 6, 2021.” Trial Tr. at 163:2-6 (J.A. 

775). 

The jury found Riley guilty on Count Two based on his 

deletion of his own messages but did not reach a verdict on 

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Count One based on his advice to Hiles to take down his 

Facebook post, resulting in a mistrial and dismissal of that 

count. Following trial, the district court addressed Riley’s 

motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial on the 

count of conviction. Those motions largely recapitulated 

Riley’s earlier motion to dismiss, this time claiming that the 

government’s evidence identified neither a foreseeable 

official proceeding nor the requisite nexus between that

proceeding and Riley’s deletion of his messages. The district 

court denied the motions and sentenced Riley to 24 months’ 

probation, a $10,000 fine, and a $100 special assessment. 

Riley now appeals his conviction on Count Two. We 

have jurisdiction over the appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

review de novo legal questions that the defendant preserved, 

United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 2010);

as to unpreserved claims, our review is limited to any plain 

error in the district court’s judgment, United States v. 

Webster, 102 F.4th 471, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2024); Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 52(b).

II.

Riley’s sole count of conviction is for obstruction of an 

official proceeding in violation of section 1512(c)(1). The 

government defends the jury’s verdict on the ground that it 

lawfully charged and proved that Riley destroyed evidence of 

his communications with Hiles with intent to impair that 

evidence’s availability to a grand jury empaneled to consider 

crimes committed in connection with the January 6 attack on 

the Capitol.

Section 1512(c)(1) makes it a felony offense to 

“corruptly” destroy a record “with the intent to impair the 

object’s integrity or availability for use in an official 

proceeding.” The proceeding need not have been “pending or 

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about to be instituted at the time of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1512(f)(1). However, to establish the requisite intent to 

obstruct, the government must allege and prove that an 

official proceeding was at least foreseeable to the defendant 

when he engaged in the obstructive conduct. See Arthur 

Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 707-08 (2005) 

(holding that knowingly corruptly persuading another to 

destroy records to interfere with an official proceeding in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A) requires proof that the 

proceeding was, if not “pending or about to be instituted,” at 

least foreseen when the defendant acted); see also Marinello 

v. United States, 584 U.S. 1, 4, 13 (2018) (holding that 

“corruptly... endeavoring to obstruct or impede the due 

administration of the Internal Revenue Code” in violation of 

26 U.S.C. § 7212 requires that the obstructed proceeding is at 

least “reasonably foreseeable” by the defendant when he 

engaged in the obstructive conduct). All circuits that have 

considered the issue agree that section 1512(c) requires at 

least a “reasonably foreseeable official proceeding.” United 

States v. Lonich, 23 F.4th 881, 905 (9th Cir. 2022) (collecting 

cases). The government must also show that the allegedly 

obstructive conduct “ha[d] a relationship in time, causation, or 

logic with the proceeding[],” such that the defendant knew his 

intentional acts “ha[d] the natural and probable effect of 

interfering” with the proceeding. See United States v. 

Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 707-08.

This appeal raises five challenges to Riley’s conviction. 

Riley’s core theory is that the government failed to allege or 

prove his obstructive intent because it did not identify any 

foreseeable January 6 grand jury proceeding nor how Riley’s 

deletion of his direct messages would tend to interfere with 

that proceeding. The record is to the contrary. Riley was a 

veteran Capitol Police officer concededly aware of the role of 

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grand juries in the criminal process, and his own messages 

showed he expected felony prosecutions of unauthorized 

entrants into the Capitol building on January 6. The 

indictment’s allegations and the trial evidence sufficed to 

show that it was reasonably foreseeable that at least one grand

jury would be—and was—empaneled to hear evidence of 

crimes relating to the January 6 Capitol breach. They also 

showed that Riley knew his deletion of records of his 

communications with Hiles would tend to impair the 

availability of that evidence to the grand jury. Because each 

of Riley’s challenges rests on that core, flawed argument, 

each fails.

A.

Riley first challenges the sufficiency of the indictment. 

A defendant in a criminal case may move to dismiss an 

indictment before trial for “lack of specificity” and “failure to 

state an offense,” Fed R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(iii), (v), 

including when the statute under which he is charged does not 

apply to his alleged conduct. See Hamling v. United States, 

418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974). 

Riley argues that the district court should have dismissed 

the indictment for failure to allege obstruction of an “official 

proceeding,” such as a federal grand jury proceeding. See 18

U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1)(A) (defining “official proceeding” for 

purposes of section 1512 to include a federal grand jury). As 

Riley reads it, the indictment alleges only obstruction of a 

general law enforcement investigation, which he asserts the 

statute does not cover. The government does not address 

whether a bare law enforcement investigation is an “official 

proceeding” for purposes of section 1512 but defends the 

sufficiency of the indictment on the ground that it alleges 

intentional obstruction of a grand jury proceeding.

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We hold that the indictment adequately alleges that Riley 

intentionally acted in a manner he knew had the likely effect 

of obstructing a reasonably foreseeable grand jury. In 

particular, it states that he sought to make evidence 

unavailable to the federal criminal investigation into the 

January 6 Capitol breach “for which a federal grand jury was 

convened in the District of Columbia.” Indictment ¶ 2 (J.A. 

16). And it quotes his direct message to Hiles warning that 

everyone who “was in the building” was “being charged 

federally with felonies,” GX 202 at 57, United States v. Riley, 

No. 21-628 (D.D.C. June 29, 2022); Indictment ¶ 13.b. (J.A. 

19),—a type of federal charge requiring a grand jury. We 

further hold that the indictment alleges the requisite nexus 

between that grand jury proceeding and Riley’s deletion of 

direct messages with Hiles. Count Two, the sole count of 

conviction, alleged that Riley “deleted his [own] Facebook 

direct communications with [Hiles]” with the intent to make

those messages unavailable to a grand jury investigating 

January 6. Indictment ¶¶ 2, 22 (J.A. 16, 21). That suffices to 

charge a violation of section 1512(c)(1). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 

7(c); United States v. Ballestas, 795 F.3d 138, 148-49 (D.C. 

Cir. 2015). 

Riley argues that the indictment is legally insufficient 

because it improperly equates a general law enforcement 

investigation, which is not an official proceeding under 

section 1512, with a grand jury proceeding, which is. But a 

federal grand jury proceeding is “an ex parte investigation to 

determine whether a crime has been committed.” United 

States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1974). The

indictment expressly identifies the criminal investigation 

conducted by the FBI and U.S. Capitol Police into the events 

of January 6 as one for which a “federal grand jury was 

convened in the District of Columbia,” and, more broadly, 

alleges facts showing Riley anticipated felony prosecutions of 

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unauthorized entrants to the Capitol building on January 6. In 

sum, it adequately alleged a foreseeable federal grand jury 

proceeding to investigate offenses like Hiles’s and determine 

charges, which Riley intended to obstruct by destroying 

evidence of his advice to Hiles. 

B.

Riley next argues that the government’s trial evidence 

was insufficient to support the verdict. When assessing the 

sufficiency of the evidence, we “review the evidence de novo, 

but consider it in the light most favorable to the government.

We will affirm a guilty verdict where any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” United States v. Shi, 991 F.3d 198, 205 

(D.C. Cir. 2021) (formatting modified); see also Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Riley contends there was 

insufficient evidence of either a foreseeable official 

proceeding or a nexus between that proceeding and his 

deletion of Facebook messages. We hold that the evidence, 

considered in the light most favorable to the government, 

readily supports the jury verdict. 

The district court instructed the jury that the “official 

proceeding that is alleged to be the object of Count Two is a 

federal grand jury proceeding resulting from the January 6 

breach of the U.S. Capitol,” and that “the official proceeding 

must be a grand jury proceeding, not simply an FBI 

investigation.” Jury Instructions at 4-5 (J.A. 1026-27). The 

jury responded with a guilty verdict on Count Two. The trial 

record, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, 

readily supports a rational jury finding that the requisite 

“official proceeding” was foreseeable to Riley.

To establish that the Facebook messages Riley sought to 

conceal related to an “official proceeding” under section 

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1512, the government’s evidence showed that Riley, a veteran 

Capitol Police officer, had reason to think that a grand jury 

would investigate January 6 crimes like Hiles’s unauthorized 

entry into the Capitol. For example, Riley posted on 

Facebook on January 7 that riot participants “should be 

charged federally in district court,” and direct messaged Hiles

that “everyone who was in the building is going to [be]

charged.” Trial Tr. 29:23-30:1 (J.A. 451-52); Trial Tr. 37:1-4 

(J.A. 459). Days later, Riley direct messaged Hiles that 

various categories of January 6 offenders, including everyone 

who “was in the building,” was “being charged federally with 

felonies,” GX 202 at 57, United States v. Riley, No. 21-628 

(D.D.C. June 29, 2022); see Trial Tr. 46:11-14 (J.A. 941). 

During cross-examination, Riley acknowledged that, based on 

his law enforcement experience, he understood that “a grand 

jury makes charging decisions for felonies” and that he 

“foresaw felonies being charged” for those who entered the 

Capitol on January 6. Trial Tr. 64:24-25 (J.A. 959); Trial Tr. 

66:4-22 (J.A. 961); see generally United States v. Ahrensfield, 

698 F.3d 1310, 1326 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that 

foreseeability of a grand jury proceeding was supported by 

evidence of the defendant’s law enforcement experience and 

familiarity with grand jury procedures). 

Riley responds that no more than a general law

enforcement investigation was foreseeable. His own 

messages undercut that argument. A jury could reasonably 

infer from Riley’s having warned Hiles that “dozens of 

people” were “being charged federally with felonies”—

including “everyone that was in the building”—that Riley 

knew felony charges were imminent and, based on his 

experience, that a federal grand jury would have to bring 

those charges. GX 202 at 57, United States v. Riley, No. 21-

628 (D.D.C. June 29, 2022); Trial Tr. 46:11-14 (J.A. 941). 

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Riley also objects that he was ultimately “indicted by a 

separate grand jury” from the one the government accuses 

him of obstructing. Riley Br. 39-40. He claims the 

conviction must be vacated because the particular grand jury 

the indictment identifies was not the grand jury empaneled 

months later that eventually indicted him for obstruction. 

Section 1512, however, does not require proof that Riley was 

indicted by the grand jury he obstructed, nor that the one he 

obstructed was “pending or about to be instituted at the time 

of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1). What the statute 

requires is that a grand jury proceeding was foreseeable to 

Riley when he deleted his messages in an effort to obstruct it. 

See Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 707-08. The evidence 

shows it was.

Riley next argues that because he learned that Hiles was 

charged with misdemeanors before he deleted his messages, 

the government failed to prove it was foreseeable that a 

federal grand jury, which is unnecessary for misdemeanor 

charges, would become involved in Hiles’s case or seek 

Riley’s messages. See Trial Tr. 46:20-47:10 (J.A. 941-42)

(Hiles messaging Riley about his misdemeanor warrants). 

Again, the evidence at trial supports an inference that Riley 

anticipated a grand jury proceeding even after Hiles’s arrest 

on misdemeanor charges. Riley testified, for example, that he 

was aware that federal criminal cases sometimes “began as 

misdemeanors and ended as felonies.” Trial Tr. 70:23-73:19 

(J.A. 965-68). He also discussed Hiles’s case on January 20 

with another friend on Facebook, opining in response to that 

person’s reference to Hiles’s misdemeanor warrants “I 

thought everyone was getting charged with felonies.” Trial 

Tr. 92:13-16 (J.A. 514). There is no evidence that Riley no 

longer thought so when he deleted the messages and call log 

from his Facebook account. 

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Riley finally insists that, even if he could have foreseen a 

grand jury investigating Hiles for entering the Capitol, the 

evidence was inadequate because the material he deleted fell 

outside the foreseeable scope of such an investigation. We 

are unpersuaded. A grand jury’s investigatory scope 

foreseeably includes attempts to obstruct its own proceedings. 

A Capitol Police officer’s messages with a January 6 offender

would fall within the scope of a grand jury convened to 

investigate crimes relating to the Capitol breach; indeed, 

Riley knew that any January 6 grand jury would cast a wide 

net and warned Hiles that investigators were “going through 

everything.” Trial Tr. 53:1-2 (J.A. 475). Riley himself 

testified that he deleted the messages within a day of learning 

of the FBI’s interest in him, in part because he was 

“concerned that the FBI was going to think . . . that I had 

something to do with January 6.” Trial Tr. 97:6-9 (J.A. 992). 

A jury could thus rationally infer that it was foreseeable to 

Riley that a January 6 grand jury investigation might

eventually seek his messages with Hiles.

To prove the nexus between Riley’s acts and a 

foreseeable grand jury, the government showed that Riley 

understood that interference with a grand jury’s investigation 

of January 6 was a “natural and probable effect” of his 

deletion of his direct messages with Hiles. See Aguilar, 515 

U.S. at 599. On January 7, Riley suggested Hiles take down 

his Facebook post acknowledging having entered the Capitol 

building, cautioning Hiles that “[t]hey are currently 

investigating and everyone who was in the building is going 

to [be] charged.” Trial Tr. 37:1-4 (J.A. 459). The two men 

continued to exchange Facebook messages until Hiles was 

arrested and told Riley on the evening of January 20th that 

“[t]he FBI was very curious that I had been speaking to you.” 

Trial Tr. 89:17-19 (J.A. 511). Early the following morning, 

Riley deleted his entire Facebook message string with Hiles.

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Trial Tr. 101:2-103:11 (J.A. 523-25). Riley also removed 

from his call log records of his phone calls with Hiles. Trial 

Tr. 103:12-105:24 (J.A. 525-27). He then sent private 

Facebook messages to other people who knew the two of 

them had spoken, distancing himself from Hiles.

Riley insists that his deletion of messages could not have

affected the January 6 grand jury because, by the time he 

deleted them, the FBI had identified Hiles, charged him, and 

searched his phone. A defendant need not, however, be 

“successful in impeding or obstructing justice . . . so long as 

his acts had the natural and probable consequence of 

interfering with” a foreseeable official proceeding. United 

States v. Martinez, 862 F.3d 223, 238 (2d Cir. 2017), vacated 

on other grounds by Rodriguez v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 

2772 (2019); accord United States v. Pugh, 945 F.3d 9, 22 

(2d Cir. 2019). Moreover, even after Hiles was caught, Riley 

expressed concern that law enforcement would think he had 

“something to do with January 6.” Trial Tr. 97:6-9 (J.A. 992). 

That evidence supports an inference that, even after Hiles was 

arrested, Riley sought to hide his messages from the grand 

jury.

Riley’s post-argument submission of the Supreme 

Court’s recent decision in Fischer v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 

2176 (2024), does not resuscitate his challenge. Fischer reads 

section 1512(c)(2)’s residual clause to prohibit conduct that 

“impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official 

proceeding of records, documents, [or] objects . . . or 

attempted to do so.” Id. at 2190. If anything, Fischer affirms 

that Riley’s offense—destroying evidence pertinent to a grand 

jury investigation—is exactly the type of conduct covered by 

section 1512(c).

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C.

Riley further asserts the verdict cannot stand because the 

government’s trial evidence materially diverged from the 

allegations of the indictment. He argues that the proof 

constructively amended and prejudicially varied from the 

indictment. Because Riley raised neither challenge in district 

court, we review his claims for plain error only. See United 

States v. Lawton, 995 F.2d 290, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 52(b). 

The doctrines regarding amendments and variances have 

distinct roles. 

An amendment deprives the defendant of the “right to be 

tried upon the charge in the indictment as found by the grand 

jury and hence subjected to its popular scrutiny.” Gaither v. 

United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1071-72 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 

When an indictment is amended either explicitly (by the trial 

judge) or constructively (by evidence and jury instruction),

the allegations are altered without the approval of the grand 

jury. Stirone v. United Sates, 361 U.S. 212, 215-16, 218-19

(1960); United States v. Lorenzana-Cordon, 949 F.3d 1, 4 

(D.C. Cir. 2020). To support a claim of constructive 

amendment, the defendant must “show that the evidence 

presented at trial and the instructions given to the jury so 

modified the elements of the offense charged that the 

defendant may have been convicted on a ground not alleged 

by the grand jury’s indictment.” Lorenzana-Cordon, 949 

F.3d at 5-6 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. 

Toms, 396 F.3d 427, 436 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). Because “the 

concept of harmless error has not been applied to 

amendments,” no showing that an amendment was prejudicial

is required. Lorenzana-Cordon, 949 F.3d at 4-5 (quoting 

Gaither, 413 F.2d at 1072). Riley acknowledges that the jury 

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instructions comported with Count Two of the Indictment.

See Riley Br. 39. His constructive amendment claim thus 

fails at the gate.

A variance, in contrast, is a mismatch between the 

allegations of the indictment and the proof, which “deprive[s] 

the defendant of notice of the details of the charge against him 

and protection against reprosecution.” Gaither, 413 F.2d at 

1072. In a variance case, “the charging terms of the 

indictment are left unaltered, but the evidence offered at trial 

proves facts materially different from those alleged in the 

indictment.” Lorenzana-Cordon, 949 F.3d at 4 (quoting 

Gaither, 413 F.2d at 1071). We will reverse a conviction 

based on a variance only if the error has a “substantial and 

injurious effect or influence” on the jury’s verdict. 

Lorenzana-Cordon, 949 F.3d at 4. 

Riley asserts that the government’s proof at trial of his 

“desire to protect himself” varied from the indictment’s tacit 

focus on a desire to protect Hiles. Riley Br. 54. But the 

indictment did not spell out Riley’s underlying motive, nor 

did it need to. Establishing the requisite state of mind—intent 

to interfere with the availability of evidence for use in an 

official proceeding—does not depend on evidence of the 

defendant’s personal reasons for engaging in such

interference. The distinction Riley sees could not support a 

claim of variance.

The indictment alleged that Riley meant to obstruct a 

foreseeable January 6 grand jury proceeding. As we 

explained, the evidence readily supports those allegations. 

Riley’s messages formed the heart of the government’s case 

at trial, and did not differ from the indictment, which quoted 

many of those same messages. See Indictment at 2-5 (J.A. 

17-20). And the fact that Riley was eventually charged by a 

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separate grand jury from the one specified in the indictment 

does not constitute a variance. The indictment alleged that 

Riley anticipated that felonies would be charged for conduct 

like Hiles’s, and that Riley deleted his messages with an 

intent to obstruct a federal grand jury resulting from the 

January 6 breach of the U.S. Capitol. Indictment ¶¶ 2, 13

(J.A. 16, 18-19). As it happened, more than one such grand 

jury was convened. The jury instructions tracked the 

indictment’s allegations, and the evidence at trial proved the 

conduct took place as alleged.

D.

Riley next objects to the district court’s partial denial of 

his pretrial motion to compel discovery. We review the 

district court’s discovery orders for abuse of discretion, 

United States v. Butler, 924 F.2d 1124, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1991), 

and we “will not reverse unless the alleged error resulted in 

prejudice to the defendant[]’s substantial rights,” United 

States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 444 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

Riley claims the district court abused its discretion in 

denying discovery of documents related to specifics about the 

grand jury proceeding identified in the indictment, including 

the origin and charged scope of that proceeding. But whether 

that grand jury ultimately indicted Hiles (or Riley) is 

immaterial to the jury’s finding that Riley sought to obstruct 

it. Riley also seeks “any internal communications between 

FBI agents as part of their investigation,” which Riley argues 

could, if they confirmed the FBI already knew Hiles had been 

in the Capitol building, tend to rebut the nexus between 

Riley’s message deletions and any grand jury investigation of 

Hiles. But Riley also wanted to protect himself, not just

Hiles. And, in any event, Riley does not explain how internal 

FBI communications could bear on what Riley knew or 

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intended in January 2021. Riley has not shown that the 

district court’s partial denial of discovery was an abuse of 

discretion, nor has he identified any resultant prejudice.

Riley also objects that the district court took judicial 

notice during trial that a January 6 grand jury was empaneled 

and began proceeding as soon as January 8, 2021. Trial Tr. 

163:2-13 (J.A. 775). Contrary to Riley’s contention on 

appeal, the district court’s judicial notice relied only on 

judicial records already disclosed to him. Trial Tr. 125:4-12 

(J.A. 737); see Veg-Mix, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Ag., 832 F.2d 

601, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (allowing courts to take judicial 

notice of official court records). And, as we note above in 

connection with Riley’s claim of evidentiary insufficiency, 

the government was required to prove only that Riley’s 

conduct had a nexus to a foreseeable official proceeding. 18 

U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1). The district court accordingly acted 

within its sound discretion in denying discovery into the 

precise scope of the federal grand jury convened on January 8 

to charge felonies committed in connection with the January 6 

attack on the Capitol. 

Riley also claims that the government violated the Jencks 

Act by withholding “internal communications between FBI 

agents”—specifically, prior statements of Special Agent Hart 

that Riley surmises must exist because Hart testified at trial as 

a witness familiar with the January 6 grand jury. See Riley 

Br. 51; Riley Reply Br. 23. The Jencks Act imposes an 

affirmative duty on the government to disclose any prior 

“statement” made by a prosecution witness that “relates to the 

subject matter as to which the witness has testified.” 18 

U.S.C. § 3500(b). But the government need not “sift through 

every record” in the absence of a defendant’s “colorable 

claim” that the government withheld “a specific document or 

set of documents contain[ing] Jencks statements.” United 

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States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Because 

Riley failed to timely make any colorable Jencks Act claim in 

the district court that might have encompassed prior 

statements of Hart, his claim is unpreserved and subject to 

plain-error review. United States v. Brodie, 871 F.2d 125,

130 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 

Riley did not seek potential Jencks material regarding 

Special Agent Hart until the trial was completed and appeal 

contemplated. In a post-trial letter to the government

objecting that it had not met its discovery obligations, Riley’s 

counsel requested certain items. As relevant here, counsel 

asserted that, because Special Agent Hart was one of the 

government’s principal witnesses relating to the grand jury 

investigation into the January 6 crimes, and because defense 

counsel had asked the government before trial to review the 

FBI messaging system for Jencks Act material, counsel 

thought the “scope” of the government’s production of Hart’s 

messages “should have been significant.” Riley Discovery 

Ltr. at 2 (J.A. 1150). The absence of any prior statement by 

Hart in what the government produced apparently led defense 

counsel to the belated inference that the government withheld 

material in its possession in violation of the Jencks Act. That 

inference alone does not show any substantial prejudice that 

could support a determination of plain error. 

E.

Finally, Riley asserts that the district court’s conduct of 

the trial “gave the appearance of partiality” requiring reversal. 

Riley Br. 55. That claim is entirely baseless. “The threshold 

for a showing of bias is high,” United States v. Carson, 455 

F.3d 336, 355 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (quoting United 

States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per 

curiam)), reserved for circumstances that “reveal such a high 

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degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment 

impossible.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 

(1994). Nothing Riley identifies comes close to meeting that 

high bar. 

Many of Riley’s arguments in favor of reassignment for 

purposes of any further proceedings boil down to 

disagreements with the district judge’s rulings. Unfavorable 

rulings, however, “almost never constitute a valid basis for a 

bias or partiality motion,” and none of the examples Riley 

provides tends to support any allegation of bias. Liteky, 510 

U.S. at 555 (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 

563, 583 (1966)). Riley also complains the district judge was 

unduly critical of his legal arguments throughout the trial, 

evidenced by comments from the bench that he views as harsh 

or dismissive. Riley ignores, however, that the government, 

too, drew critical comments from the district court. More 

importantly, none of the comments Riley cites was stated in 

the jury’s presence or aimed at the defendant or the merits of 

his case. Every comment Riley identifies appears to be a 

genuine and fair effort to keep counsel on track and probe 

their arguments. See Carson, 455 F.3d at 358-59. The 

district court’s occasional expressions of skepticism, not 

limited to positions taken by the defense, were entirely 

appropriate means of focusing the advocates on the issues in 

dispute in a manner helpful to the court.

We reject the contention that the district judge evinced 

partiality in overseeing his case.

III.

For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

So ordered.

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