Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-15-40013/USCOURTS-ca5-15-40013-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Armando Bardales
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-40013

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff–Appellee,

versus

ARMANDO BARDALES,

Defendant–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:12-CR-897

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Armando Bardales appeals his convictions of, and concurrent sentences

for, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a kilogram or more of heroin, 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 19, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 15-40013

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possession with intent to distribute a kilogram or more of heroin, and importation of a kilogram or more of heroin. Although he contends that the district 

court erred in excluding expert testimony concerning his diminished mental 

capacity, he does not brief the standards that apply in determining whether 

the testimony was admissible. Nor does he identify any error in the district 

court’s reasons for excluding the testimony―i.e., that expert opinion concerning

ability to form criminal intent is inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, that the requirements of Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 

509 U.S. 579 (1993), were not met, and that the expert failed to produce an 

adequate expert report. Accordingly, Bardales has waived the issue. See FED.

R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A); United States v. Stalnaker, 571 F.3d 428, 439-40 (5th 

Cir. 2009); Brinkmann v. Dall. Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 

(5th Cir. 1987).

Bardales claims that the district court should have taken into account 

his diminished mental capacity in determining that he did not qualify for the 

safety valve under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. He asserts that his mental condition was 

part of his history and characteristics that the district court was required to 

consider. 

We review the district court’s application of the guidelines de novo and 

its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Harris, 597 F.3d 242, 250 

(5th Cir. 2010). The same standard of review is applied to challenges regarding 

the statutory safety valve. See United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143, 145 

(5th Cir. 1996). A district court’s decision that a defendant is ineligible for a 

safety valve reduction because he did not fully and truthfully debrief is a factual finding that we review for plain error. See United States v. McElwee, 646 

F.3d 328, 345 (5th Cir. 2011). “A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is 

plausible, considering the record as a whole.” United States v. King, 773 F.3d 

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48, 52 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1865 (2015) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted).

Bardales presents no authority for conflating the requirements that the 

district court first calculate the correct guidelines range, then consider that 

range and the other factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)―including the defendant’s history and characteristics―in determining the sentence. See Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 & n.6 (2007). While calculating the guideline 

range, the court must find the existence of a number of factors before applying 

the safety valve, including that “the defendant has truthfully provided to the 

Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the 

offense or offenses.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5); § 5C1.2(a)(5). 

The district court considered Bardales’s claim that his mental condition 

prevented him from fully debriefing, but the court found that he failed truthfully to inform the government about his offenses in that he denied knowledge 

of the heroin. Bardales has not shown that the court’s finding of a less-thantruthful debriefing was implausible in light of the record as a whole. Indeed, 

the finding is supported by the jury’s determination that Bardales knowingly 

committed the offenses. Therefore, he has not shown that the court clearly 

erred in finding that he failed truthfully to debrief, see United States v. MorenoGonzalez, 662 F.3d 369, 375 (5th Cir. 2011), and thus he fails to show that the 

court erred in denying the safety valve, see § 5C1.2(a)(5).

Bardales similarly claims that the court erred by failing to take into 

account his diminished mental capacity in deciding that he was not entitled to 

the downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. Because he did not 

raise that argument in the district court, our review is for plain error. See 

United States v. Flora-Ochoa, 139 F.3d 1022, 1023 (5th Cir. 1998). To show 

plain error, Bardales must show a forfeited error that is clear or obvious and 

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that affects his substantial rights. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 

135 (2009). If he makes such a showing, we have the discretion to correct the 

error but should do so only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings. See id. 

Even assuming―purely for the sake of argument―that the district court 

erred by failing to consider Bardales’s mental condition in determining 

whether to grant the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, the error did 

not affect his substantial rights, because he received the statutory minimum 

120-month sentence. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(i); 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(A). 

The district court was unable to sentence him below the statutory minimum in 

the absence of a motion by the government for substantial assistance or the 

application of the safety valve. See United States v. Krumnow, 476 F.3d 294, 

297 (5th Cir. 2007). 

Likewise, to the extent Bardales suggests that the sentence is substantively unreasonable because it does not account for his mental illness, he cannot show that any error affected his substantial rights, because he received the 

statutory minimum. See id. He thus fails to establish plain error. See Puckett, 

556 U.S. at 135. 

AFFIRMED.

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