Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02574/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02574-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Phillip Alexander Johnston
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Harold D. Vietor, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2574

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

Phillip Alexander Johnston, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: June 17, 2004

Filed: July 29, 2004 

___________

Before BYE, BOWMAN, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Phillip Johnston pleaded guilty to a drug conspiracy charge in violation of 21

U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, stipulating he was responsible for more than 160 kilograms

of marijuana and more than five kilograms of a mixture or substance containing

cocaine. Because Johnston had two prior felony drug convictions, the district court1

sentenced him to life in prison. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (dictating a "mandatory

term of life imprisonment without release" for any person who violates § 841 "after

two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense have become final"). We

Appellate Case: 03-2574 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/29/2004 Entry ID: 1793550 
2

Johnston filed a letter brief under Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) citing Blakely v.

Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Even if Blakely applies to the federal

sentencing guidelines, it would not change the outcome here since Johnston pleaded

guilty and stipulated to the relevant facts for sentencing purposes. See Blakely, 124

S. Ct. at 2541. 

-2-

affirmed the sentence on Johnston's direct appeal. United States v. Johnston, 220

F.3d 857, 864 (8th Cir. 2000).

Johnston, acting pro se, subsequently filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate

his conviction raising a host of issues. After the district court appointed him counsel,

he abandoned his pro se issues and raised an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim

in two parts. First, he argued his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to anticipate

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (Johnston pleaded guilty and was

sentenced before the Supreme Court decided Apprendi) and object to the

government's failure to include drug quantity in his indictment. Second, he argued

his counsel should have filed a supplemental brief on direct appeal because the

Supreme Court decided Apprendi while the appeal was still pending. The district

court denied the § 2255 motion, but granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on

both parts of Johnston's ineffectiveness claim.

Reviewing the district court's decision to deny the § 2255 motion de novo, Bear

Stops v. United States, 339 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir. 2003), we conclude the district

court correctly denied the motion. Johnston's counsel was not ineffective in failing

to make an Apprendi-like claim before the Supreme Court decided Apprendi. See

Brown v. United States, 311 F.3d 875, 878 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[C]ounsel's decision not

to raise an [Apprendi-like] issue unsupported by then-existing precedent d[oes] not

constitute ineffective assistance."). Nor was Johnston's counsel ineffective by failing

to file a supplemental brief with us after the Supreme Court decided Apprendi;

Johnston pleaded guilty and stipulated to a drug amount well in excess of the amount

required to trigger the sentence he received,2

 and thus an Apprendi-like claim would

Appellate Case: 03-2574 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/29/2004 Entry ID: 1793550 
3

Although we do not address this claim, we suspect it would likely fail. See

United States v. Rice, 43 F.3d 601, 608 (11th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the claim that a

determination of relatedness under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 in a pre-sentence report is

relevant to the determination of relatedness for purposes of an enhancement under 21

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)).

-3-

have failed even if counsel had filed a supplemental brief. See, e.g., United States v.

Soltero-Corona, 258 F.3d 858, 860 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding failure to allege drug

quantity in indictment was not plain error pursuant to Apprendi where defendant

pleaded guilty and stipulated to a higher drug quantity at his plea hearing).

We decline to address the additional claim raised by Johnston on appeal – a

claim his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to advise us in the direct appeal that

his pre-sentence report had determined his prior convictions were "related" under

United States Sentencing Guideline § 4A1.2 for purposes of calculating his criminal

history – because he never raised the claim in the district court and therefore it could

not be included in the COA. See United States v. Robinson, 301 F.3d 923, 927 (8th

Cir. 2002) (holding issues beyond the scope of a COA are not properly before the

court).3

______________________________

Appellate Case: 03-2574 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/29/2004 Entry ID: 1793550