Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07112/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07112-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald W. Crandall
Appellant
Paralyzed Veterans of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 12, 1998 Decided June 23, 1998

No. 97-7112

Donald W. Crandall,

Appellant

v.

Paralyzed Veterans of America,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cv01741)

John S. Lopatto, III argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellant.

Elizabeth Sarah Gere argued the cause for appellee. With

her on the brief was Lisa Burns.

Before: Wald, Williams and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Williams.

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Williams, Circuit Judge: Paralyzed Veterans of America

fired Donald Crandall for multiple acts of rudeness to fellow

employees and outside groups working with Paralyzed Veterans. Crandall later disclosed to Paralyzed Veterans that he

had been diagnosed as suffering from manic depression (or

"bipolar disorder"), a disability that he claims caused his

rudeness. He sued Paralyzed Veterans under s 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. s 794(a), alleging that it

had discriminated against him "by reason of" his disability, by

firing him and by failing to reasonably accommodate his

psychological disability. The district court granted summary

judgment for Paralyzed Veterans. First, it ruled that the Act

did not cover the organization at the time of the alleged

discrimination, because it was not at the relevant time "receiving Federal financial assistance," which is a predicate to

liability under s 504. Second, the court held that no reasonable factfinder could have found that Paralyzed Veterans

discriminated on the basis of Crandall's disability, since it had

neither actual nor constructive notice of his disability when it

fired him. We affirm on both grounds.

* * *

Crandall worked as a law librarian for nearly three decades

at a number of firms, including Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard,

McPherson & Hand in Washington, D.C. He left Verner,

Liipfert after suffering a heart attack and associated anxiety

and depression, but through the good offices of Robert Nelson, at one time a managing partner at Verner and later

General Counsel of Paralyzed Veterans, was hired by Paralyzed Veterans in September 1991 for a permanent position

as an "Information Specialist."

Crandall's stay there was not a happy one, for him or his

co-workers: he was soon admonished by supervisors for his

habit of verbal abuse. Nelson stuck up for him, arguing that

Crandall's approach stemmed from his experience "in the law

firm where everybody reacted quickly to everybody." Ultimately, however, Crandall abused the employees of an outside trade association, which sent Paralyzed Veterans a letter

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threatening to cut off access to its library. On September 10,

1992 Paralyzed Veterans drew the line and fired Crandall.

Crandall's written job application materials disclosed no

disability, and he conceded in his deposition that he never told

anyone at Paralyzed Veterans that he had been diagnosed

with or treated for bipolar disorder or any other psychiatric

disorder. In fact, in May 1991 he had been diagnosed as

suffering from bipolar disorder and had been prescribed

Lithium, complementing the Prozac he was already on as a

result of his anxiety/depression diagnosis of the previous

year. Irritable outbursts are apparently among a number of

typical symptoms of the manic phase of bipolar disorder. See

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 328

(4th ed. 1994).

* * *

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. s 794,

provides:

No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the

United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title,

shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from

the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be

subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance....

Crandall was fired on September 10, 1992, but the term of

Paralyzed Veterans' federal grant did not begin until September 11, 1992, according to the funding agency's letter approving the grant. (Paralyzed Veterans did not actually receive

federal funds until August 1993.) The first question is whether the Act covered the dismissal of Crandall at all.

Crandall first seeks to move the date of alleged discrimination forward in time. Because Paralyzed Veterans promised

to pay him through September 30, and for some time after

September 10, 1992 preserved for Crandall an option of

continuing his health insurance with Paralyzed Veterans's

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carrier, he says he should be counted as an employee

throughout that period, pointing to some legal purposes for

which the period of continued insurance access would constitute employment. But the object here is not to measure the

duration of Crandall's employment, but rather to pinpoint the

time of the alleged discriminatory act. And if Crandall was

discriminated against at any time, it was when he was notified

that his employment was terminated, not when his benefits

ceased. Under Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250,

258 (1980), notice of final action fixes the timing of an act of

employment discrimination for statute of limitations purposes,

even when the employee actually works for a long time

thereafter--in Ricks for a full year. Crandall offers no

reason to use a different rule to fix the time of discrimination

for purposes of relating the employer's conduct to the onset

of statutory coverage, and he cites no cases making the

solution turn on the continuation of pay or benefits.

Having failed to move the date of alleged discrimination

forward past September 10, 1992, Crandall next tries to move

the date of Paralyzed Veterans's coverage by the Act backwards in time. Here he argues that because it pledged in

June 1992 in its federal grant application to abide by federal

rules and regulations, it was bound by s 504 even before it

was awarded a grant.

But Paralyzed Veterans's anti-discrimination assurances

and general promise to abide by applicable rules were expressly stated as promises to do so "if the application is

approved." Moreover, although the letter from Legal Services Corporation approving the grant was dated September

4, 1992, the letter made the grant contingent on acceptances

by the grantees (which appear to have occurred on September 14, 1992), and set September 11, 1992 as the starting date

of the grant. Crandall does not explain how Paralyzed

Veterans's contingent promises could have become binding

before it actually bound itself to the grant terms by accepting

the government's offer in the manner it prescribed. Thus

both the formal start of the grant period and Paralyzed

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Veterans's contractual commitment came after the date of

Crandall's dismissal. The district court was correct to hold

that s 504 did not apply at the time of the alleged act of

discrimination. We assume in Crandall's favor, without deciding, that either of those dates was controlling, rather than

Paralyzed Veterans's actual receipt of funds or its start on

the work funded by the grant.1

In any event, s 504 prohibits only discriminatory acts

performed "solely by reason of" the plaintiff's handicap. The

courts of appeals have overwhelmingly agreed that for this

causal link to be shown the employer must have acted with an

awareness of the disability itself, and not merely an awareness of some deficiency in the employee's performance that

might be a product of an unknown disability. They have so

found under both the Rehabilitation Act itself and the analogous provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act

("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. s 12112(a) (providing that no employer

"shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such qualified individual...."). See, e.g., Taylor v. Principal Financial Group,

Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 163 (5th Cir. 1996) ("To prove discrimination [under the ADA], an employee must show that the

employer knew of such employee's substantial physical or

mental limitation."); Morisky v. Broward County, 80 F.3d

445, 447-49 (11th Cir. 1996) (liability under the ADA requires

actual or constructive notice of the disability); Collings v.

Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 1995) (assuming plaintiffs had a medically recognizable drug disability,

they could not make out a case under the ADA where they

could not show that employer was aware of it); Miller v.

__________

1 Crandall points to the publication in the July 29, 1992 Federal

Register of an announcement about the grant. But since the

statement merely expresses the Legal Services Corporation's "intention to award" the grant, see 57 Fed. Reg. 33528 (July 29, 1992),

we do not see how it could support a finding that Paralyzed

Veterans was "receiving Federal funds" as of that date, the condition that triggers s 504 liability.

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National Casualty Co., 61 F.3d 627, 629 (8th Cir. 1995)

(under ADA, "[b]efore an employer must make accommodation for the physical or mental limitation of an employee, the

employer must have knowledge that such a limitation exists."); Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 932

(7th Cir. 1995).

In Hedberg, for example, the plaintiff suffered from primary amyloidosis, a degenerative condition that causes fatigue (and often death). He was fired for poor job performance, including tardiness and laziness, and the tardiness and

laziness may have been a product of his disability. 47 F.3d at

933. Like Crandall, Hedberg had not disclosed the disability

to his employer before he was terminated. The court held

that if Hedberg had been fired just on account of his tardiness and laziness,

[t]he ADA hardly requires that merely because some

perceived tardiness and laziness is rooted in disability, an

employer who has not been informed of the disability,

and who has no reason to know of the disability, is bound

to retain all apparently tardy and lazy employees on the

chance that they may have a disability that causes their

behavior.

Id. at 934.

In an effort to parry Paralyzed Veterans's notice argument,

Crandall points to authority that seems to equate dismissal

for conduct arising from a disability with dismissal "by reason

of" the disability. Here he rests on Teahan v. Metro-North

Commuter Railroad Co., 951 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1991), in which

an alcoholic employee was laid off because of excessive,

alcohol-induced, absenteeism. The employer, whose awareness of the disability was undisputed, defended on the ground

that it could fire a disabled employee when it relied merely on

the symptoms of the disability, and not on the disability itself.

In this context, considering whether the dismissal could have

been "solely by reason of [plaintiff's] handicap," the court said

that "the relevant inquiry" was whether the employee was

discharged solely for conduct caused by the underlying disability. If so, then the employee was discriminated against

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solely by reason of his handicap, in violation of s 504. Id. at

517.

We doubt whether, even apart from the notice issue, Teahan can be read to endorse the general proposition that if a

disability causes poor job performance, and if the poor performance causes dismissal, then the dismissal was "by reason of"

the disability. Such a reading would be in direct conflict with

other circuits. See Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County,

117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir. 1997); Newland v. Dalton, 81 F.3d

904, 906 (9th Cir. 1996); Little v. FBI, 1 F.3d 255, 258-59 (4th

Cir. 1993); Taub v. Frank, 957 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1992). It

seems more probable that the court intended merely to be

sure that employers could not get off the hook by showing

that they bore no discriminatory animus against the disability

itself, independently of their attitude toward its manifestations. This purpose is suggested by Teahan's example of a

limping employee whose limp causes him to make an annoying thumping noise: the employer could not defend firing the

employee for the thumping, rather than the limping, on the

grounds that the employer only cared about thumping. Id. at

516-17.

In any event, whatever the merits of a broad reading of

Teahan for cases where the employer has notice of the

disability, we can see none in the absence of notice. The

Second Circuit could hardly have resolved its hypothetical of

the thumping employee as it did if the employee had no

apparent limp, merely an unexplained tendency to make

irritating noises. Especially in any area where medical appraisals are relatively contestable or contingent on patients'

self-descriptions, dispensing with a notice requirement would

invite employees to manipulate the statutory protection, securing post hoc disability diagnoses that encompass the conduct leading to their firing. (We make the point not because

there is the slightest suggestion that Crandall fabricated his

disability--there is none--but to illustrate the perverse consequences of a rule dispensing with notice.) If the behavior

is "not so obviously [a] manifestation[ ] of an underlying

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disability that it would be reasonable to infer that an employer actually knew of the disability," Hedberg, 47 F.3d at 934,

and the employer has no other notice of the disability, there

can be no actionable discrimination.

On Paralyzed Veterans's motion for summary judgment the

question was whether Crandall had offered evidence from

which a reasonable person could find that Paralyzed Veterans

had any notice, actual or constructive, regarding his disability.

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986);

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). In our

only prior ruling on the form of the notice the plaintiff must

give the defendant, we rejected the proposition that there

must be "precise notice." See Blackwell v. U.S. Dep't of the

Treasury, 830 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Here, too, no great

refinement of the concept of notice is needed, beyond the

bedrock requirement of an adequate, prior alert to the defendant of the plaintiff's disabled status.

Insofar as Crandall claims that his rude behavior itself was

so extreme as to afford notice, we reject his claim. A layman

cannot reasonably be expected to infer a psychiatric disorder

merely from rudeness, given the prevalence of rudeness

without psychiatric disorder. Alternatively, Crandall tries to

satisfy the notice requirement by pointing to conversations

with Nelson (occurring first at Verner, Liipfert and later at

Paralyzed Veterans) arising out of his 1990 application to

Verner, Liipfert's insurer, UNUM, for total disability benefits. The insurer denied the claim and Crandall executed a

release in exchange for a small settlement. In the course of

this he discussed with Nelson the possibility of an administrative appeal of UNUM's decision. But Crandall did not say in

his deposition that he told Nelson of even having claimed a

psychiatric disability. At oral argument Crandall's counsel

repeatedly mentioned the 1991 diagnosis's reference to psychiatric disability, and Nelson's testimony that he did not

recall ever seeing the diagnosis. Despite Crandall's efforts to

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make Nelson's non-recollection look fishy, he offered no reason to suppose that Nelson would have seen the diagnosis in the ordinary

course of his work at Paralyzed Veterans (it was issued four

years after Nelson left Verner, Liipfert). Thus Crandall can

extract nothing useful from Nelson's testimony on the point.

Finally, Crandall points to Nelson's efforts to excuse Crandall's rudeness by reference to his longtime exposure to work

in big law firms. Whatever the merits of this as an explanation of rudeness, we fail to see how Nelson's effort to help his

former colleague hold his job is evidence that Nelson (or

anyone else at Paralyzed Veterans) was aware of Crandall's

disability.

We express no opinion whether, had he shown statutory

coverage and notice, Crandall's claim could otherwise have

survived summary judgment.

* * *

The judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

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United States Court of Appeals

for the district of columbia circuit

No. 97-7112 September Term, 1997

Donald W. Crandall,

Appellant

v.

Paralyzed Veterans of America,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cv01741)

Before: Wald, Williams and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

O R D E R

It is ORDERED by the Court, sua sponte, that the opinion of June 23, 

1998 is amended as

follows:

Page 9, line 2, delete "it", insert "the diagnosis"

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: Eva Brown

Deputy Clerk

Filed June 23, 1998

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