Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cr-00168/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cr-00168-18/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Marvin Ballard
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES of AMERICA

Plaintiff,

vs.

JOHN MARVIN BALLARD

Defendant.

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05-cr-00168-DLJ

06-cr-00283-DLJ

ORDER

On December 4, 2007, the Court heard argument on defendant

John Ballard's motion to dismiss the superseding indictment in

case number 06-cr-00283, to unseal the grand jury record for the

indictment, and to strike surplusage from the indictment. 

Arguments were also heard on additional motions to dismiss the

indictment, and as to the government’s petition that he has

violated the terms of his supervised release in case number 05-

cr-00168.

Jan David Karowsky appeared on behalf of John Ballard;

Samuel Wong appeared for the government. Having considered the

arguments of counsel, the papers submitted, the applicable law,

and the record in this case, the Court hereby DENIES Ballard's

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motion to unseal the grand jury record, DENIES Ballard’s motion

to dismiss the indictment for improper influence of the grand

jury, and DENIES the motion to strike surplusage from the

indictment. The Court refrains from ruling on the other motions

at this time.

I. BACKGROUND

A grand jury returned a two-count superseding indictment on

September 6, 2007, charging Ballard with two counts of a scheme

to conceal a material fact, 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1). Count One

alleges that on May 30, 2006, Ballard reported to his probation

officer that he went to the public library to reserve a book

entitled Plum Island and did not report that he had also checked

out a book on child sexual psychology. Count Two alleges that on

June 1, 2006, Ballard concealed from his probation officer the

fact that he purchased a children’s fashion magazine from Tower

Bookstore.

The superseding indictment contains the following

“introductory allegations” about Ballard’s past criminal history: 

Ballard was convicted in 2000 of traveling interstate to engage

in sexual acts with a minor, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b);

in 2004 he was returned to custody for violating two conditions

of his supervised release, namely use of an online computer

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service to access images of minor females and correspondence with

a convicted child molester for purposes of facilitating his

access to minor females; in 2005 Ballard was convicted of a

charge of making false statements to his probation officer while

on supervised release when he falsely told the officer that his

purpose in using an online computer service was to access his

email. The introductory allegations further state that Ballard

was on supervised release as of May 26, 2006 and that he had

received instructions on the conditions of his supervised

release.

Ballard moves to strike from the indictment the allegations

about his criminal history, claiming that it is surplusage. 

Ballard moves to dismiss the superseding indictment on due

process grounds, alleging that the government improperly

influenced the grand jury by informing them of Ballard’s criminal

history. Ballard also moves to unseal the record of the grand

jury’s proceedings to discover whether the government used his

criminal history improperly to influence the grand jury.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Introductory Allegations Are Not Surplusage

Rule 7(d) authorizes the court to strike surplusage from an

indictment “to protect a defendant against prejudicial or

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inflammatory allegations that are neither relevant nor material

to the charges.” United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 544-45

(9th Cir. 1983). Allegations in the indictment that are never

read to the jury are not prejudicial and therefore need not be

stricken. United States v. Hedgepeth, 434 F.3d 609, 613 (6th

Cir. 2006). 

Language in the indictment which covers information which

the government, in good faith, intends to prove at trial cannot

be stricken as surplusage, no matter how prejudicial it may be. 

United States v. Lavin, 504 F. Supp. 1356, 1362 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 

The prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its

own choice; i.e. a criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit

his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as the

Government chooses to present it. Old Chief v. United States,

519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997).

While some courts have a practice of providing a copy of the

indictment, or reading it verbatim to the jury, this Court does

not. The Court, according to its usual practice, will not give a

copy of the indictment to the jurors, and will screen irrelevant,

prejudicial material from the jury, including any unnecessary

contents of the indictment. There is, therefore, no surplusage

in the indictment. See Hedgepeth, 434 F.3d at 613. Issues

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regarding what the jury will see or hear can be resolved at trial

or by motions in limine. Nothing will be stricken in the

superseding indictment. 

B. The Superseding Indictment Can Not Be Dismissed Because the

Government Exposed the Grand Jury to No Improper Evidence.

An indictment returned by a legally constituted nobiased

grand jury, like an information drawn by a prosecutor, if valid

on its face, is enough to call for a trial of the charge on the

merits and satisfies the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. 

Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 349 (1958). An indictment

valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the ground that

the grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent

evidence. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974). 

Dismissal of an indictment is appropriate if it is

established that prosecutorial misconduct substantially

influenced the grand jury’s decision to indict or if there is

grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from the

substantial influences of violation. Bank of Nova Scotia v.

United States, 487 U.S. 250, 256 (1988)(citing United States v.

Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986)). A defendant must show that (1)

there has been improper conduct by the prosecutor, and (2) that

there is at least grave doubt that the decision to indict was

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free from the substantial influences of the misconduct. The

relevant inquiry therefore focuses not on the degree of

culpability of the prosecutor, but on the impact of his

misconduct on the grand jury’s impartiality. United States v.

Sear, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1392 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Ballard argues that the revelation of his criminal history

to the grand jury, which revelation is indicated by the

introductory allegations of the indictment, was misconduct on the

part of the government. The government, however, points out that

it is charged with proving the materiality of the facts Ballard

concealed from his probation officer. The materiality of the

fact that Ballard failed to disclose the fact that he had checked

out a book on child sexual psychology must be established by the

government. The government maintains that evidence of Ballard’s

prior conviction of traveling across state lines to have sex with

a minor is relevant evidence as to the element of materiality. 

Cf. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 187. Such evidence may also be

relevant to the fact that he acquired the children’s fashion

magazine. The grand jury is not rendered biased by exposure to

relevant evidence essential to the prosecutor’s case. Cf. Sears,

719 F.2d at 1392. Dismissal of the indictment is unwarranted.

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C. The Record of the Grand Jury Proceedings Can Not be Unsealed

Because Ballard’s Need Does Not Outweigh the Need for Secrecy

The seal of the grand jury record may thwart the court’s

evaluation of a possible Fifth Amendment violation. Fed. R.

Crim. P. 6(e)(2)(B), (3)(E)(i). A defendant may request that the

court order disclosure of the grand jury proceedings. Fed. R.

Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(ii). A court may grant discovery of the

grand jury record where the defendant has shown a particularized

need for the record that outweighs the need for grand jury

secrecy. United States v. Murray, 751 F.2d 1528, 1533 (9th Cir.

1985).

Ballard is unable to show any particularized need for the

record of the grand jury, inasmuch as he has failed to show any

likelihood that there was any prosecutorial misconduct during the

grand jury proceedings. Without any particularized need for the

record, Ballard can show no need that outweighs the need for

grand jury secrecy. Cf. Murray, 751 F.2d at 1533.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Ballard's motions to unseal

the grand jury record, to dismiss the indictment, and to strike

surplusage are DENIED. Ballard has not made the requisite

showing of prosecutorial misconduct. The alleged surplusage is

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neither irrelevant nor prejudicial.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Date: December 11, 2007

______________________________

D. LOWELL JENSEN

United States District Judge

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