Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-07004/USCOURTS-caDC-05-07004-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Delta Air Lines, Inc.
Appellee
Constance S. Richards
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 13, 2006 Decided July 14, 2006

No. 05-7004

CONSTANCE S. RICHARDS, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF

LOUISE T. STEVENS, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHER

PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED,

APPELLANT

v.

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv03368)

Leonard N. Bebchick argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellant.

Frederick C. Schafrick argued the cause for appellee. With

him on the brief was Daniel O. Hanks.

Before: RANDOLPH and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

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2

1

 Montreal Protocol No. 4 to the Warsaw Convention, which

took effect in March 1999, repealed the weight requirement. See

Montreal Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification

of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air signed at

Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1929, as Amended by the Protocol Done at The

Hague on Sept. 28, 1955, Sept. 25, 1975, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 105-20,

at 22-23, 2145 U.N.T.S. 36 (entered into force Mar. 4, 1999). The

entire Warsaw Convention has now been superseded. See Convention

for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air,

May 28, 1999, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-45, 1999 WL 33292734

(entered into force Nov. 4, 2003).

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from the

judgment of the district court dismissing a class-action

complaint. The main question is whether the court abused its

discretion in refusing to certify the class, because the suit was

predominately or exclusively for monetary damages, contrary to

the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2),

and because common questions of law or fact did not

predominate, as Rule 23(b)(3) requires. 

I.

In January 1999, Louise T. Stevens, the original plaintiff in

this case, lost a single piece of luggage on the last leg of an

international flight terminating in Atlanta, Georgia. She filed a

claim with Delta Air Lines, seeking $1044 as the fair-market

value of her luggage and its contents. Delta wrote to Stevens

that because her “journey involve[d] international travel,

liability for loss [of her baggage] is governed by [the Warsaw

Convention]” – the treaty limiting the liability of air carriers for

the international air transport of people and property. See

Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to

International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929 (“Warsaw

Convention”), 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (reprinted in 49

U.S.C. § 40105 note).1

 Delta informed Stevens that its liability

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3

2

 The dates correspond to the end of the two-year statute of

limitations of Warsaw Convention art. 29 and the day before the

repeal of the Convention provisions requiring air carriers to record

baggage weight. See supra note 1.

for the loss of her luggage “is based on the weight of the

checked luggage and is limited to the actual value of the

property not to exceed $20.00 per kilogram.” See Warsaw

Convention art. 22(2). The letter continued: “Since [Delta’s]

maximum allowable weight is thirty-two kilograms per bag, our

check for $640.00, which is the maximum reimbursement, will

be mailed under separate cover.” When Stevens received the

check, she deposited it.

Relying on Cruz v. American Airlines, Inc., 193 F.3d 526

(D.C. Cir. 1999), Stevens brought a class-action suit against

Delta. Cruz held that an air carrier could not invoke the Warsaw

Convention’s liability limitation for lost or damaged luggage

unless the carrier recorded the weight of the luggage on the

passenger luggage tickets. Id. at 530; see Warsaw Convention

art. 4(4). Stevens alleged that Delta did not do this as a matter

of practice and was therefore liable for the full amount of the

lost or damaged property. The putative class consisted of people

who, between December 17, 1997, and March 3, 1999,2

 received

from Delta less than the fair-market value of their lost or

damaged luggage on the ground that the Warsaw Convention

limited Delta’s liability. The parties stipulated that the

purported class consisted of about 3000 people. The complaint

requested a declaratory judgment stating that Delta unlawfully

availed itself of the Warsaw Convention’s limitations and was

liable for the fair-market value of class members’ luggage. The

complaint also sought an award of damages for each class

member equal to the difference between the value of his luggage

and the amount Delta paid him. Delta filed an answer and then

moved for summary judgment, asserting the affirmative defense

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4

of accord and satisfaction to Stevens’s claim. Stevens crossmoved for partial summary judgment on the ground that Delta

was not entitled to the defense.

 While these motions were pending, the district court

granted Stevens’s motion to file an amended class-action

complaint. In this First Amended Complaint, Stevens asked the

court to declare “that Delta [has] (i) unlawfully availed itself of

[the Warsaw Convention’s] liability limit . . . and (ii) is liable

for the fair value of such lost or damaged luggage.” Stevens

also requested an injunction requiring Delta to process each

class member’s claims for lost or damaged luggage and “to pay

each class member compensation for his or her loss or damage

in an amount not less than the difference between what Delta in

good faith determines is the fair value of such loss or damage

and the amount heretofore paid . . . plus compensatory interest

on the amount of such loss or damage.” Such an injunction,

Stevens alleged, would merely require Delta to carry out its duty

as a common carrier. In the alternative, Stevens sought “an

award of damages . . . in an amount equal to the difference

between the fair value of [each class member’s] lost or damaged

checked baggage and the lesser amount paid them by Delta” for

those who wished “to contest Delta’s determination of fair

value” or for the class as a whole, if the court did not award

injunctive relief. As in the original complaint, Stevens alleged

that the class was proper under Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2).

The district court denied the parties’ motions for summary

judgment because Delta’s accord-and-satisfaction defense

presented genuine issues of material fact. Stevens then moved

for class certification. She argued that the class was “a classic

illustration of a 23(b)(2) class . . ., seek[ing] appropriate final

injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to the class as a

whole.” In so arguing, Stevens withdrew the portion of her First

Amended Complaint that sought, in the alternative, an award of

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3

 Richards argued, as to Rule 23(b)(3), that either federal

common law, as embodied in U.C.C. § 3-311, or Georgia state law

governed Delta’s accord-and-satisfaction defense. This eliminated,

according to Richards, the need for individual factual inquiries or the

possibility that varying state laws would apply to the defense.

damages. Delta countered that the complaint still was

exclusively or predominately for monetary damages.

Constance S. Richards, having been substituted as plaintiff

upon Stevens’s death, moved “to enlarge” the previous classcertification motion. Still pressing certification pursuant to Rule

23(b)(2), Richards also sought certification under Rule 23(b)(3)

– as a fallback if her Rule 23(b)(2) motion failed – because

common questions of law and fact predominated over any

individual issues.

The district court denied class certification. It found that

Richards satisfied the Rule 23(a) requirements of numerosity,

commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation, but

failed to satisfy either Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3). The court

reasoned that she “effectively seeks a declaratory judgment that

Delta owes monetary damages and an injunction requiring Delta

to pay them.” Citing In re Veneman, 309 F.3d 789, 790 (D.C.

Cir. 2002), the court held that Rule 23(b)(2) certification “is not

appropriate where plaintiff’s claims are predominately for

monetary relief.” As to Rule 23(b)(3), the court explained that

“the plaintiff must show that ‘questions of law or fact common

to the members of the class predominate . . . and that a class

action is superior to other available methods for the fair and

efficient adjudication of the controversy.’” (quoting FED.R.CIV.

P. 23(b)(3)). Richards failed to meet this standard because

“Delta’s accord and satisfaction affirmative defense . . . will

require the application of varying state laws and a case-by-case

factual inquiry.” Richards moved for reconsideration,3

 and the

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district court denied her petition.

Richards then settled her individual claim with Delta,

“releas[ing Delta of] any and all individual claims” but

preserving “any other claim, defense, or right that either party or

any putative class member might have in respect of this

litigation, including Plaintiff’s class claim.” Having denied

class certification, the district court dismissed the suit. Richards

appeals solely on the ground that the court improperly denied

class certification.

II.

There is some doubt about our jurisdiction although the

parties do not mention the subject. Richards settled her personal

claim with Delta. She was the only class representative. Does

this render the appeal from the denial of class certification

moot? The issue is an open one in this circuit, see Walsh v.

Ford Motor Co., 945 F.2d 1188, 1191 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1991), and

in the Supreme Court, see U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445

U.S. 388, 404 n.10 (1980).

 A case may become moot “when the issues presented are

no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest

in the outcome.” Id. at 396 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395

U.S. 486, 496 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A

class representative has two legally cognizable interests: “One

is the claim on the merits; the other is the claim that he is

entitled to represent a class.” Id. at 402. When the first of these

interests expires, the class representative’s ability to appeal a

denial of class certification depends on his “‘personal stake’ in

the class certification claim.” Id.

We know, because the Supreme Court has told us, that

when a class representative’s claims expire involuntarily, the

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4

 Geraghty sought an order invalidating parole guidelines.

The district court treated his complaint as a habeas corpus petition and

held that Rule 23 applied therefore only by analogy. Geraghty v. U.S.

Parole Comm’n, 429 F. Supp. 737, 740 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (citing

United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1125 (2d Cir.

1974)). The Third Circuit reversed, characterizing the claim as one for

declaratory relief and finding Rule 23 applicable. 579 F.2d 238, 243,

252 (3d Cir. 1978). In the Supreme Court, Geraghty argued that his

class action came within Rule 23(b)(2). See Br. of Resp’t at 23, U.S.

Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, No. 78-572 (Jul. 15, 1979)

(“[R]espondent followed the suggestions made by the Court in prior

cases and brought this case as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).

class representative still “retains a ‘personal stake’ in obtaining

class certification sufficient” to appeal a denial of class

certification entered before the representative’s claims expired.

Id. at 404; see also Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank, Jackson, Miss. v.

Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 336-40 (1980). The representative has at

minimum an interest in “spreading [the] litigation costs among

numerous litigants with similar claims.” Geraghty, 445 U.S. at

403; see also Roper, 445 U.S. at 334 n.6, 336.

We see no difference between those who voluntarily settle

individual claims and those who have their individual claims

involuntarily extinguished, provided the litigant retains the same

interests identified by the Court in Geraghty, a Rule 23(b)(2)

case,4 and in Roper, an action under Rule 23(b)(3). So long as

the plaintiff retains a “personal stake” in “shift[ing] to successful

class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses” incurred as

the purported class representative, the plaintiff has a sufficient

interest to appeal the denial of class certification. Roper, 445

U.S. at 334 n.6, 336; see Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 403. Other

circuits agree. See Potter v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 329 F.3d

608, 613-14 (8th Cir. 2003); Toms v. Allied Bond & Collection

Agency, Inc., 179 F.3d 103, 105 (4th Cir. 1999); Love v.

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Turlington, 733 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1984). Of course, a

plaintiff who, in the settlement agreement, relinquishes “any and

all” of his claims, including class claims, or agrees to dismiss

the entire “action,” has ceded any interest he once had and can

no longer appeal a denial of class certification. Walsh, 945 F.2d

at 1190-91; accord Toms, 179 F.3d at 105-06; Dugas v. Trans

Union Corp., 99 F.3d 724, 728-29 (5th Cir. 1996); see also

Potter, 329 F.3d at 614.

In settling her individual claim, Richards did not extinguish

all of her interest in the class claim against Delta. Rather, she

released Delta only of “any and all individual claims that she

might have” had. Richards and Delta stipulated that the

settlement of Richards’s “individual claims” was not “in

derogation of any other claim, defense, or right that either party

or any putative class member might have in respect of this

litigation, including Plaintiff’s class claim.” This was sufficient

for Richards to retain a personal stake in the class claim,

including the interest in shifting attorney fees and other

litigation costs. We therefore have jurisdiction to consider the

merits of Richards’s challenge to the district court’s refusal to

certify her proposed class.

III.

To obtain class certification, a class plaintiff has the burden

of showing that the requirements of Rule 23(a) are met and that

the class is maintainable pursuant to one of Rule 23(b)’s

subdivisions. See FED.R.CIV. P. 23(b); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.

Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613-14 (1997); Love v. Johanns, 439

F.3d 723, 727 (D.C. Cir. 2006); McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 741

F.2d 1406, 1414 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The district court

concluded that Richards satisfied the requirements of Rule

23(a), but not Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3) – the two Rule 23(b)

subdivisions she relied upon. Our review is for abuse of

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discretion or legal error. See Garcia v. Johanns, 444 F.3d 625,

631 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 578,

586 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).

Rule 23(b)(2) permits class actions seeking final injunctions

or corresponding declaratory relief for the entire class. Unlike

class actions for monetary relief under Rule 23(b)(3), there are

no additional requirements of notice and opt-out rights, see FED.

R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A), (B), and the plaintiff need not establish

that a class action would be superior to individual actions or that

common legal and factual questions predominate. See In re

Veneman, 309 F.3d 789, 792 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

As to Rule 23(b)(2), the district court found that Richards

“effectively seeks a declaratory judgment that Delta owes

monetary damages and an injunction requiring Delta to pay

them.” Such a request rendered Rule 23(b)(2) certification

improper. A court may certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2)

only when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to

act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making

appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory

relief with respect to the class as a whole.” FED. R. CIV. P.

23(b)(2). Subsection (b)(2) was not intended to “extend to cases

in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or

predominantly to monetary damages.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23

advisory committee notes; see In re Veneman, 309 F.3d at 792.

If recovery of damages is at the heart of the complaint,

individual class members must have a chance to opt out of the

class and go it alone – or not at all – without being bound by the

class judgment. But when injunctive relief benefits the entire

class, this option is less important; an injunction prohibiting a

defendant’s action against “the class as a whole” would halt the

action regardless whether some of those affected might have

withdrawn from the suit if given the option. See In re Veneman,

309 F.3d at 792. Thus, when the relief sought would simply

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5

 While we may not – and do not – inquire into the strength or

weakness of the merits of Richards’s class-action claim, Eisen v.

Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974), “‘the class

determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in

the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action,’”

Gen. Tele. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (quoting

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

serve as a foundation for a damages award, see Bolin v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 978 (5th Cir. 2000); Lukenas v.

Bryce’s Mountain Resort, Inc., 538 F.2d 594, 595-96 (4th Cir.

1976), or when the requested injunctive or declaratory relief

merely attempts to reframe a damages claim, see In re Sch.

Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1008 (3d Cir. 1986), the class may

not be certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2).

Richards sought, on behalf of her proposed class, a

declaratory judgment that Delta wrongly availed itself of the

Warsaw Convention’s baggage-liability limit and “is liable for

the fair value of such lost or damaged baggage,” and an

injunction requiring Delta to process each class member’s

baggage claim and “to pay each class member compensation for

his or her los[t] or damage[d]” baggage equal to the difference

between the fair value of the baggage and the amount Delta

paid.5

 Though framed in terms of declaratory and injunctive

relief, this class claim is for monetary damages. “Almost

invariably . . . suits seeking (whether by judgment, injunction,

or declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a sum of money

to the plaintiff are suits for ‘money damages,’ as that phrase has

traditionally been applied, since they seek no more than

compensation for loss resulting from the defendant’s breach of

legal duty.” Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson,

534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002) (quoting Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487

U.S. 879, 918-19 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (internal

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6

 Her requested relief raises an issue unnecessary to resolve.

The general rule is that injunctive relief will not issue when an

adequate remedy at law exists. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,

43-44 (1971); accord Nat’l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68

F.3d 1428, 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Here an award of damages to each

class member in an amount equal to the difference between what Delta

paid and the fair value of each person’s luggage would provide an

adequate legal remedy. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255

(1993) (“Money damages are, of course, the classic form of legal

relief.”); accord Great-West Life & Annuity, 534 U.S. at 210. 

7

 Declaratory relief under Rule 23(b)(2) must correspond to

“final injunctive relief,” so that “as a practical matter [the declaratory

relief] affords injunctive relief or serves as a basis for later injunctive

relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee notes. 

8

 There is a split among circuits on how a court determines

whether monetary relief predominates in a Rule 23(b)(2) class suit.

Compare Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th

Cir. 1998) (“[M]onetary relief predominates in (b)(2) class actions

unless it is incidental to requested injunctive or declaratory relief.”);

Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 296 F.3d 443, 447-50 (6th

Cir. 2002); Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 812 (11th Cir. 2001);

Lemon v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local No. 139, 216 F.3d

quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). The injunction

and declaration Richards seeks is no exception. No matter how

she phrases it, what she wants is a judicial decree directing Delta

to pay the class members the damages each is due.6

 Yet the rule

has long been that “[a] plaintiff cannot transform a claim for

damages into an equitable action by asking for an injunction that

orders the payment of money.”7

 Jaffee v. United States, 592

F.2d 712, 715 (3d Cir. 1979); see also In re Arthur Treacher’s

Franchisee Litig., 689 F.2d 1137, 1144-45 (3d Cir. 1982);

Schlosser v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 250 F.2d 478, 480-81

(7th Cir. 1958); Sims v. Stuart, 291 F. 707, 707-08 (S.D.N.Y.

1922) (L. Hand, J.).8

 

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577, 580-81 (7th Cir. 2000), with Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter

R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 162-67 (2d Cir. 2001) (adopting a more ad hoc

balancing approach to whether monetary damages predominate);

Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 949-50 (9th Cir. 2003). The issue is

not presented in this case. The “monetary relief [here] is effectively

the sole remedy sought.” Bolin, 231 F.3d at 978; see In re

Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 416 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The

question whether the proposed class members are properly seeking

[declaratory or injunctive] relief is antecedent to the question whether

that relief would predominate over money damages.”). 

9

 The amended complaint stated that if the class were certified

under (b)(1) or (b)(2), there might come a time “possibly” when “a

supplemental and subclass” could be certified under (b)(3). But

Richards withdrew this contingent claim when she moved for class

certification.

We also agree that Richards was not entitled to maintain a

Rule 23(b)(3) class action, which requires that “questions of law

or fact common to” class members “predominate over any

questions affecting only individual members, and that a class

action is superior to other available methods for the fair and

efficient adjudication of the controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P.

23(b)(3). Throughout the proceedings in the district court – in

the original and amended complaints, and in motions and

memoranda – the plaintiff sought class certification only

pursuant to subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2).9 Not until three years

into the litigation, after Delta had filed its opposition to the

motion for class certification and months after discovery on this

question had closed, did Richards suggest the prospect of a

(b)(3) class. That was far too late and, for that reason alone, the

district court would have been warranted in denying certification

under Rule 23(b)(3). The local rules require class action

complaints to identify the subsection of Rule 23 “under which

the suit is claimed properly to be maintained as a class action.”

LCvR 23.1(a)(1); see Cruz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 356 F.3d 320,

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329-30 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Even when Richards eventually

brought up Rule 23(b)(3), she never made clear what exactly she

had in mind. Without invoking Rule 23(c)(4)(A), cf. Castano v.

Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996), her

motion for class certification stated that it would be

“inappropriate” to have “damage awards for members . . .

considered or disposed of on a class action basis.” On the other

hand, she stated in the same document that “a common forum

for contesting the amount of damages should be afforded to

plaintiffs who elect to reject a Delta compensation offer.” To

confuse matters even more, Richards’s opening brief in this

court seems to abandon the “common forum” idea and states

instead that if a class member is “dissatisfied with an ultimate

Delta offer or non-offer of compensation” then the member

“could choose to institute an individual and separate damage

action in a forum of the member’s choosing.” Br. for Appellant

9. Yet she now insists that the relief sought on behalf of this

proposed (b)(3) class is the same as the relief sought for her

(b)(2) class – which, as we have discussed, includes an

injunction ordering Delta to pay each class member the damages

due. Given this state of affairs we are “unable to conclude that

it has been clearly demonstrated . . . that a class action was the

superior method for resolving this controversy.” McCarthy v.

Kleindienst, 741 F.2d 1406, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

Affirmed.

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