Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03459/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03459-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Appellee
Sharon Hatcher
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

 United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3459

___________

Sharon Hatcher, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Arkansas 

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, *

Commissioner of Social * [PUBLISHED]

Security Administration, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: April 16, 2004

 Filed: May 28, 2004

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BYE, Circuit Judge, and MAGNUSON,1

 District

Judge.

___________

MAGNUSON, District Judge.

Appellant Sharon Hatcher appeals from the District Court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of Appellee Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security.

We reverse and remand.

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BACKGROUND

Appellant Sharon Hatcher (“Hatcher”) claims a disability resulting primarily

from fibromyalgia. She applied for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits in

September 1998. Her application was denied both initially and on appeal. She then

sought a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). At the time of the

hearing, she was 46 years old. The ALJ determined that Hatcher could return to her

past work as a telemarketer and denied her application. On the parties’ cross-motions

for summary judgment, the District Court affirmed the ALJ’s decision, and this

appeal followed.

Hatcher has an extensive medical history, documented in a two-volume

administrative record. She was diagnosed with fibromyalgia in 1998. In addition to

fibromyalgia, she suffers from degenerative disk disease in her back, carpal tunnel

syndrome in both wrists, rheumatoid arthritis, and depression. She takes a wide

variety of medication for these various complaints, and appears to visit either a

medical doctor or a psychiatrist more than once per month.

The ALJ determined that Hatcher’s complaints of pain were not entirely

credible. Further, the ALJ discounted the opinion of one of Hatcher’s treating

physicians, Dr. Williams, who opined that Hatcher was unable to work. According

to the ALJ, this opinion usurped the ALJ’s role to determine disability and was in any

event inconsistent with the medical record. The ALJ relied in part on the opinion of

a one-time medical examiner, Dr. Leonard, who found that Hatcher “probably would

be able to hold down gainful employment.” (Admin. Tr. at 24.)

Hatcher contends that the ALJ erred in discounting her treating physician’s

opinion. She argues that all of the medical evidence in the record, aside from that

generated by the Social Security Administration, shows that she suffers from

fibromyalgia and other complaints so severely that she is unable to work. Indeed, she

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testified that she sleeps approximately five hours every day, that she is unable to do

housework, that she does not take a shower unless her husband is at home because

she is afraid of falling in the shower, and that she cannot concentrate or perform any

substantial everyday living tasks.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews the initial decision to deny benefits to determine whether

substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports that decision. Bailey v. Apfel,

230 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

In October 2003, a panel of this Court addressed a situation remarkably similar

to the instant case. Cox v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 606 (8th Cir. 2003). The plaintiff in

Cox applied for disability benefits on the basis of fibromyalgia and costochondritis.

The ALJ disregarded the opinion of Cox’s treating physician, who, like Hatcher’s

physician, opined that Cox was unable to work. The ALJ instead relied on the

opinion of a one-time medical examiner, the same Dr. Leonard on whose opinion the

ALJ in the instant matter relies. The panel ultimately found that the ALJ improperly

disregarded the opinion of Cox’s treating physician. Id. at 609. Further, the panel

determined that the opinion of Dr. Leonard could not constitute substantial evidence

supporting the ALJ’s decision. Id. at 610 (citing Jenkins v. Apfel, 196 F.2d 922, 925

(8th Cir. 1999)). The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment to the

Commissioner, and remanded the case for a determination of whether Cox could find

employment in a competitive national economy, pursuant to McCoy v. Schweiker,

683 F.2d 1138, 1147 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting that residual functional capacity of

claimant “is the ability to perform the requisite physical acts day in and day out, in

the sometimes competitive and stressful conditions in which real people work in the

real world”).

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The instant matter is almost indistinguishable from Cox. Here, as in Cox, the

treating physician opined that Hatcher was unable to work. As in Cox, all of the

treatment notes support Hatcher’s complaints and her claimed limitations. As in Cox,

there is nothing in the record that contradicts Hatcher’s physician’s opinion aside

from the opinion of the ALJ-appointed expert.

Both the ALJ’s determination and the decision on the motions for summary

judgment were issued long before this Court decided Cox. Thus, neither the ALJ nor

the District Court had the benefit of this Court’s analysis in Cox. The ALJ and the

District Court should have the opportunity to review their respective decisions in

light of Cox. The proper remedy is therefore to reverse the decision below and to

remand for consideration of our decision in Cox.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings in conformity with

this opinion and with the decision in Cox v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 606 (8th Cir. 2003).

LOKEN, Chief Judge, dissenting.

Like the district court, I conclude that substantial evidence on the

administrative record as a whole supports the Commissioner’s decision to deny

Sharon Hatcher’s application for Social Security disability benefits. In my view, it

is inherently contrary to our obligation to apply the substantial evidence standard of

review to reverse because this case is “remarkably similar” to our decision in Cox v.

Barnhart, 345 F.3d 606 (8th Cir. 2003), when the administrative record in that case

is not before us. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

______________________________

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