Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cr-00052/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cr-00052-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rodrigo Elizalde Camacho
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

DAVID W. SPENCER

Assistant United States Attorney

501 I Street, Suite 10-100

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 554-2700

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

RODRIGO ELIZALDE CAMACHO,

 Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:20-CR-00052-JAM

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

FINDINGS AND ORDER

DATE: June 16, 2020

TIME: 9:15 a.m.

COURT: Hon. John A. Mendez

On March 23, 2020, the Court continued the status conference scheduled for April 14, 2020, to 

June 16, 2020, in compliance with General Orders 611 and 612. See ECF No. 9. This Court issued 

General Order 611 on March 17, 2020, suspending all jury trials in the Eastern District of California 

scheduled to commence before May 1, 2020. This Court issued General Order 612 on March 18, 2020, 

inviting District Judges to continue all criminal matters to a date after May 1, 2020, excluding time 

under the Speedy Trial Act with reference to General Order 611, with additional findings to support the 

exclusion in the Judge’s discretion. General Orders 611 and 612 were entered to address public health 

concerns related to COVID-19.

Although General Order 611 addresses the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

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exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id.

at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—the General Order requires specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances 

are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of 

justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a 

speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets 

forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice 

served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in 

a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Order excludes delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 14, 2020.

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2. In a minute order issued March 23, 2020, the Court continued the April 14, 2020, status 

conference to June 16, 2020 at 9:15 a.m. “keeping in compliance with General Orders 611 and 612.” 

ECF No. 9. 

3. By this stipulation, the parties move to exclude time between April 14, 2020, and June 

16, 2020, under Local Code T4. 

4. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) On March 17, 2020, defendant made his initial appearance in this case, waived his 

right to indictment, entered a plea of Not Guilty to the Information (ECF No. 1), and was 

released on bond and conditions of pretrial release. See ECF No. 4.

b) The government anticipates producing discovery consisting of investigative 

reports, photographs, and other documents in the near future. Due to mandatory telework as a 

result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government’s ordinary processes for processing and 

producing discovery have been disrupted and delayed.

c) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review the charges in this case 

and the forthcoming discovery, to conduct investigation, to consult with her client, and to 

otherwise prepare for trial.

d) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

e) The government does not object to the continuance.

f) In addition to the public health concerns cited by General Order 611 and 

presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in 

this case because counsel have been encouraged to telework and minimize personal contact to 

the greatest extent possible. It would be difficult to avoid personal contact should the status 

hearing have proceeded as originally scheduled.

g) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

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h) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 14, 2020 to June 16, 2020, 

inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] 

because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of 

the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest 

of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

5. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: April 10, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ DAVID W. SPENCER

DAVID W. SPENCER

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: April 10, 2020 /s/ Lexi Negin

Lexi Negin

Counsel for Defendant 

RODRIGO ELIZALDE 

CAMACHO

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED this 10th day of April, 2020.

 /s/ John A. Mendez

THE HONORABLE JOHN A. MENDEZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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