Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-00006/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-00006-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Diane Callans
Plaintiff
Dale Morioka
Defendant
United States Postal Service
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DIANE CALLANS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, DALE

MORIOKA, and DOES 1-100,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-00006 SBA

ORDER

[Docket No. 19]

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss individual Defendant

Morioka pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(5) for defects in service of process [Docket No. 19].

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is an adult female resident of San Francisco. Compl. at ¶ 4. From 1987 until

sometime in 1997, she worked for the United States Postal Service ("USPS") in a craft position. Id.

at ¶¶ 11-12. Defendant Dale Morioka was Plaintiff's supervisor at all relevant times. Id. at ¶ 6.

Plaintiff was served with a Notice of Removal from her position on April 11, 1996. Id. at ¶

13. The Complaint does not clearly explain the reasons for this first Notice of Removal. Plaintiff

was notified that her effective date of removal would be July 26, 1996. Id. The notice was later

rescinded for procedural due process reasons, and Plaintiff was permitted to return to work. Id. 

In mid-June 1997, Plaintiff took a leave of absence from her position to care for her ill

mother in Hawaii. This leave was approved by one of her supervisors, Shirley King. Id. at ¶ 12.

However, Plaintiff did not request permission from Dale Morioka. Id. at ¶ 16. On July 25, 1997,

Morioka issued Plaintiff a Proposed Notice of Removal. Id. at ¶ 17. Plaintiff states that she was

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unable to respond to this notice on account of her extended absence to care for her mother, but that

"at all times [she] kept her immediate supervisor, King, advised as to what was happening in

Hawaii." Id. 

On August 15, 1997, Defendant Morioka issued a Letter of Decision, removing Plaintiff

from her position at the Postal Service. Id. at ¶ 18. The letter stated that: 

Your failure to properly document and/or inform your supervisors of your

inability to report to duty shows a total disregard of postal rules and

regulations. Your failure to respond to correspondence requesting that

you return to duty or submit medical documentation to support your

absence further demonstrates your inability or unwillingness to abide by

postal rules and follow the instructions of your supervisor. In addition,

your failure to respond to the charges in the Notice of Proposed Removal

further demonstrates your lack of commitment to your job at the postal

service. Based on the above, you have clearly demonstrated that you are

not a potential candidate for rehabilitation. Therefore, your removal is

necessary to promote postal service efficiency.

Id. On August 18, 1997, Plaintiff filed a Step 2 Grievance Appeal. Id. at ¶ 19. She stated that she

was out of town on an emergency, was being treated for a stress disorder, and expected to be able to

return to work shortly. Id. 

On September 4, 1997, Plaintiff filed an Appeal through her union alleging disability and age

discrimination. Id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiff subsequently withdrew her appeal, but states that she "clearly

articulated a desire to proceed with the grievance arbitration procedure on her claims of wrongful

termination and discrimination." Id. at ¶ 21. Plaintiff asserts that she was "trapped in a procedural

morass" for the next six years, at which point arbitration finally began. Id. at ¶ 20.

On October 14, 2003, and November 20, 2003, testimony and evidence were heard on

Plaintiff's claims for wrongful termination and discrimination by an arbitrator. Id. at ¶ 22. 

Supplemental briefing was ordered, Plaintiff states that a formal decision was to be made on or

before January 12, 2004. No decision had been made as of the date that the complaint was filed. Id. 

Plaintiff remained on "absent without leave" status throughout the period in which her

administrative appeal and arbitration were ongoing. Id. at ¶ 23. According to Plaintiff, "the entire

grievance and arbitration system, ostensibly created to resolve, quickly and efficiently, disputes such

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as [hers], failed." Id. at ¶ 25.

On January 3, 2006, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint alleging two causes of action: (1)

that all Defendants violated her Constitutional right to Due Process and Equal Protection and she is

entitled to relief under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403

U.S. 388 (1971); and (2) that Defendants Morioka and Does 1-100 "set the official policies, customs,

and practices for the USPS that were the moving force behind Plaintiff's constitutional injuries," and

thus these Defendants are subject to supervisory liability. Id. at ¶¶ 31-41.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides for motions to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff always bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. 

In effect, the court presumes lack of jurisdiction until plaintiff proves otherwise. Kokkonen v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994). 

District courts have jurisdiction over properly pleaded Bivens actions. However, a defendant

is still free to move pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss the complaint if it is not otherwise

jurisdictionally proper. See Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 563 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994).

B. Rule 12(b)(5)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) provides for motions to dismiss for insufficiency of

service of process. Where the validity of service is contested by Rule 12 motion, the burden is on

plaintiff. "Once service is challenged, plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that service was

valid under Rule 4." Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2004). 

ANALYSIS

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court

should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) motion first. This prevents a court without jurisdiction from

prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th

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Cir. 2001) ("The court's dismissal of a plaintiff's case because the plaintiff lacks subject matter

jurisdiction is not a determination of the merits and does not prevent the plaintiff from pursuing a

claim in a court that does have proper jurisdiction."). 

Defendant argues that this Court should dismiss Defendant Morioka for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, because Title VII is the exclusive remedy for a federal employee alleging

workplace discrimination. See Motion at 5 (citing Carlson v. Veneman, 2002 WL 413807 at *1

(N.D. Cal. 2002)). Therefore, Defendant argues, Plaintiff should have brought a Title VII claim, and

such a claim may only be brought against the government, not against an individual supervisor. 

This may or may not be a valid argument as to why Plaintiff should lose on the merits, but

Defendant offers no authority whatsoever for the proposition that the unavailability of a Bivens

action for workplace discrimination against a federal employee means that the Court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction. See Janicki Logging Co., 42 F.3d at 563 (holding that although plaintiff could

not state a cause of action, the district court was not deprived of jurisdiction). 

However, the Court may consider sua sponte whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.

"Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the

subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). This Court believes that

it may lack jurisdiction because Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 

As a federal employee, Plaintiff is subject to the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA). 

The purpose of that statute was to "create a single unified personnel policy which [takes] into

account the requirements of all the various laws and goals governing Federal personnel

management." Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). The

Ninth Circuit has held that a federal employee, falling under the CSRA, has in most instances

adequate administrative remedies which preclude recovery under Bivens:

Congress created the framework for federal personnel policy in the CSRA.

"The CSRA contains an 'elaborate remedial system that has been constructed

step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations.'"

Blankenship, 176 F.3d at 1195 (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 388). When

allegedly unconstitutional conduct falls within the broad confines of the

CSRA, courts lack jurisdiction to hear a Bivens action based on the conduct.

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See Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 840 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Collins v. Bender, 195 F.3d 1076, 1077-1078 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).

Neither party raised or briefed the issue of whether Plaintiff is precluded from

raising a Bivens action because the CSRA provides adequate administrative remedies. 

Accordingly, the Court orders supplemental briefing on the following questions: 

1. Whether Title VII is Plaintiff's exclusive remedy, and, assuming that Title VII is

Plaintiff's exclusive remedy, why that deprives this Court of subject matter

jurisdiction. The parties are ordered to provide the Court with relevant authority on

both questions.

2. Whether Plaintiff is covered by the CSRA and, if so, whether that strips the Court

of subject matter jurisdiction over her Bivens action. Again, the parties shall

provide the Court with relevant authority.

B. Sufficiency of Service of Process

A. Defendant United States Postal Service

In order to bring suit against the United States or its agencies, Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(i) must be complied with. See Motion at 3. This rule provides that service

must be effected by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the United

States Attorney for the district in which the action is brought, or to an Assistant United

States Attorney or clerical employee designated by the United States Attorney, or by

sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail

addressed to the civil process clerk at the office of the United States Attorney. Plaintiff

must also send a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail

to the Attorney General of the United States in Washington D.C. Finally, where an

employee or agency of the United States is sued, Plaintiff must send a copy of the

summons and complaint by registered or certified mail to the employee or agency. Service

must be made within 120 days after filing of the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

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Plaintiff has produced proof that she hand-delivered the summons and complaint to

the local United States Attorney's Office on April 18, 2006, and to Defendant Morioka,

apparently at his home address, on April 20, 2006. See Docket No. 13. This service was

timely: the complaint was filed on January 3, 2006, and service in mid-April was within the

120-day deadline. However, Plaintiff did not send a copy of the summons and complaint

by mail to the Attorney General's office in Washington, nor did she serve the United States

Postal Service, within the 120-day timeline. On November 27, 2006, Plaintiff filed

Additional Proof of Service, showing that Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, and United

States Attorney Kevin Ryan, were served with the summons and complaint by certified

mail on November 21, 2006. See Docket No. 30. On November 30, 2006, Plaintiff filed

Supplemental Proof of Service, showing that the United States Postal Service headquarters

was served with the summons and complaint by certified mail on that day. Docket No. 32. 

Obviously this service was untimely. 

The Court can dismiss an action for failure to properly or timely serve the

complaint. See Rule 4(m) ("If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a

defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court . . . shall dismiss the

action without prejudice as to that defendant or direct that service be effected within a

specified time; provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court shall

extend the time for service for an appropriate period."). See also Reynolds v. United States,

782 F.2d 837, 838 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming dismissal of action for failure to timely serve

defendant, despite plaintiff's protestations of good faith, which "boiled down to the fact that

[counsel] had failed to read the Rules of Civil Procedure"). 

Plaintiff contends that it made a reasonable effort to effect service, and that

Defendants had actual notice of the lawsuit and cannot claim prejudice from any technical

defect in service. See Television Signal Corp. v. City & County of San Francisco, 193

FRD 645, 646 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ("Good cause generally means plaintiff attempted service

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but did not complete it; plaintiff was confused about the requirements for service; or

plaintiff was prevented from serving defendants by factors beyond his control. It is

examined by considering: (1) whether the delay resulted from inadvertence or whether a

reasonable effort to effect service has occurred; (2) whether defendant has been prejudiced

by the delay; or (3) whether plaintiff has moved for an enlargement of time to effect service

under FRCP 6(b)."). It is clear that Plaintiff was not prevented from properly effecting

service by factors beyond her control. She was represented by counsel, so the Court sees

no reason for confusion about the requirements for service. Plaintiff offers no explanation

for her failure to fully comply with the requirements of Rules 4(i) and 4(m), instead

asserting that she made a reasonable effort and that is enough. 

Defendant argues persuasively that Plaintiff's lack of diligence in completing

service justifies dismissal. Defendant informed Plaintiff in July and August 2006 that there

were defects in service. See Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 3-6. Plaintiff then e-filed proofs of the original

service in October 2006, and made some effort to cure the identified defects by serving the

Attorney General's office in late November 2006. Despite receiving notice in writing from

opposing counsel of the requirements for service on the government, Plaintiff still failed to

fully comply with the Rules. 

It does not appear that Defendants have been prejudiced by the defects in service. 

The same day that the proofs of service were e-filed by Plaintiff, Defendant filed the instant

Motion to Dismiss; Defendants have had actual notice of this lawsuit since July 2006. But

Plaintiff's apparent decision to treat the rules casually cannot constitute good cause for

delay. See Tuke v. United States, 76 F.3d 155, 156 (7th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the Court

GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5) as to the United States

Postal Service. 

Rule 4(m) provides that the Court should dismiss without prejudice and allow

Plaintiff an additional specified period of time within which to complete service. 

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Accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without prejudice as to the Postal Service. 

However, Plaintiff is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why the Court should not dismiss

the complaint with prejudice as to Defendant United States Postal Service: even if Plaintiff

were to properly serve the government, the law is clear that a government agency cannot be

sued in a Bivens action. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994). Absent a waiver of

sovereign immunity, the Bivens remedy exists solely against individual federal officials,

not against the United States. See Kreines v. United States, 33 F.3d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir.

1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1148 (1995); Thomas-Lazear v. F.B.I., 851 F.2d 1202, 1207

(9th Cir. 1988). Thus, even if Plaintiff were to properly serve the Postal Service, the Postal

Service would presumably immediately file a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim,

which would apparently be meritorious. Plaintiff is ordered to provide any reason why it

would not be futile re-file and properly serve the complaint on the Postal Service, given

that her cause of action against it appears to be barred.

B. Defendant Morioka

Where a plaintiff sues a federal officer in his individual capacity in a Bivens action,

she need not serve the United States Attorney or the Attorney General as required under

Rule 4(i). See Vaccaro v. Dobre, 81 F.3d 854, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1996). Service of an

individual defendant is governed by Rule 4(e), not 4(i). Under Rule 4(e), service can be

accomplished by "delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual

personally or by leaving copies thereof at the individual's dwelling house." Rule 4(e)(2). 

Plaintiff filed proof that Defendant Morioka was served by a process server at an

address that appears to be his dwelling on April 20, 2006. Docket No. 13. This individual

service was proper pursuant to Rule 4(e), and squarely falls within the 120 days allowed

for service. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5) is DENIED

as to Defendant Morioka. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the parties shall file

supplemental briefing on the questions discussed above within ten days of the date of this

Order. At that point, the Court will take Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Defendant

Morioka for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under submission. If the Court later decides

that oral argument is necessary, the clerk shall schedule such argument and inform the

parties. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Defendant

United States Postal Service for insufficient service of process is GRANTED. The Postal

Service is dismissed from this lawsuit without prejudice. However, Plaintiff is ordered to

show cause, within ten days of the date of this Order, why the Postal Service should not be

dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for insufficient

service of process is DENIED as to Defendant Morioka. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 12/1/06 

 SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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