Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-01325/USCOURTS-caDC-04-01325-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Environmental Integrity Project
Petitioner
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent
Stephen L. Johnson
Respondent
Natural Resources Defense Council
Intervenor
Sierra Club
Intervenor

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify the

Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the

bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 23, 2007 Decided June 19, 2007

No. 04-1323

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL AND

SIERRA CLUB,

PETITIONERS

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND

STEPHEN L. JOHNSON, ADMINISTRATOR,

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENTS

AMERICAN FOREST AND PAPER ASSOCIATION INC., ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with

Nos. 04-1325, 04-1328, 06-1140

On Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Environmental Protection Agency

James S. Pew argued the cause for petitioners NRDC, et al.

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2

With him on the briefs was John D. Walke, Amanda C. Leiter

and David G. McIntosh entered appearances.

Russell S. Frye argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioner Louisiana-Pacific Corporation.

Thomas E. Starnes and L. Eden Burgess were on the brief

for amici curiae State and Territorial Air Pollution Program

Administrators and Association of Local Air Pollution Control

Officials in support of petitioners.

David S. Gualtieri, Attorney, and David Gunter, Attorney,

U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondent.

With them on the brief were John C. Cruden, Deputy Assistant

Attorney General, and Michael W. Thrift, Counsel, U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency.

Claudia M. O’Brien argued the cause for industry

intervenors in support of respondent. With her on the brief was

Cassandra Sturkie. Brock R. Landry, Guy J. Sternal, Paul H.

Amundsen, and William F. Lane entered appearances.

Peter L. de la Cruz was on the brief for amicus curiae

Formaldehyde Council, Inc. in support of respondents.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and ROGERS and

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: These are consolidated petitions

for review of two final rules promulgated by the Environmental

Protection Agency in 2004 and 2006 under Section 112 of the

Clean Air Act (“CAA”), 42 U.S.C. § 7412, to regulate

hazardous air pollution from processing plywood and composite

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1

 See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air

Pollutants: Plywood and Composite Wood Products, 69 Fed. Reg.

45,944 (July 30, 2004) (“2004 Rule”); National Emission Standards

for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Plywood and Composite Wood

Products; List of Hazardous Air Pollutants, Lesser Quantity

Designations, Source Category List, 71 Fed. Reg. 8342 (Feb. 16,

2006) (“2006 Rule”).

wood products (“PCWP”).1 PCWP sources use heat and

pressure to bond wood material, usually with resin, to form a

panel or other engineering product. The outputs from PCWP

processes include veneer, particleboard, oriented strandboard,

hardboard, fiberboard, medium density fiberboard, as well as

other products. As a result of the PCWP process, at least six

primary hazardous air pollutants (“HAPs”) are released into the

air. HAPs are defined in the CAA as “pollutants which present,

or may present . . . a threat of adverse human health effects . . .

or adverse environmental effects whether through ambient

concentrations, bioaccumulation, deposition, or otherwise.” 42

U.S.C. § 7412(b)(2). 

The Environmental Petitioners—the Natural Resources

Defense Counsel, the Sierra Club, and the Environmental

Integrity Project (together, “NRDC”)— contend that EPA has

failed to adhere to the statutory requirements to set emission

standards for listed HAPs. They also contend that EPA

exceeded its authority in creating a risk-based subcategory and

in extending the deadline for complying with emission

standards set by the 2004 Rule. Pursuant to EPA’s request

following this court’s decision in Sierra Club v. EPA, 479 F.3d

875 (D.C. Cir. 2007), we vacate and remand the 2004 Rule

insofar as it fails to set emission standards for listed HAPs;

neither the NRDC nor industry intervenors object, although

each seeks an additional remedy, which we will leave for EPA’s

consideration. We hold that EPA lacked authority to create a

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low-risk subcategory and to extend the compliance deadline and

therefore grant NRDC’s petitions on those issues and vacate

those provisions of the rules.

Louisiana-Pacific Corporation also petitions for review of

the two rules. It contends that EPA was arbitrary and capricious

in declining to create a separate subcategory for wet/wet

hardboard presses and to establish a variance procedure.

Finding no arbitrary or capricious action by EPA, we deny the

petition.

I.

The relevant statutory provisions and the regulatory

background of the 2004 and 2006 Rules are as follows.

A.

Until 1990, Section 112 of the CAA directed EPA to use

health-risk-based regulations for air pollution. Thus, Congress

directed EPA to establish risk-based air pollution standards that

provided an “ample margin of safety to protect public health.”

42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1990). In 1990, Congress

determined that the risk-based approach had “worked poorly.”

National Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 233 F.3d 625, 633-34 (D.C. Cir.

2000). Over the course of twenty years, EPA had promulgated

only seven standards. H.R. REP. NO. 101-490, pt. 1, at 151,

reprinted in 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT

AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 3175 (1993) (“LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY”). Concerned, then, that EPA had failed to adequately

regulate toxic emissions, see S. REP. NO. 101-228 (1989),

reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,supra, at 8338, Congress

adopted the current version of Section 112 to require technology

based standards in place of the previous risk-based standards.

See Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 857

(D.C. Cir. 2001). Additionally, EPA no longer had discretion

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to set emission standards for individual sources, nor to set

whatever standards EPA deemed adequate. 

Section 112, as amended, provides that EPA “shall

promulgate regulations establishing emission standards for each

category or subcategory of major sources . . . [and that these]

standards . . . shall require the maximum degree of reduction in

emissions.” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).

Section 112 thus mandates that EPA list and establish emission

standards for each category and subcategory of “major sources”

that emit one or more of over 100 HAPs. Id. § 7412(b), (c), (e).

The standards “shall require the maximum degree of reduction

in emissions” of HAPs that EPA, “taking into consideration the

cost of achieving such emission reduction, and any non-air

quality health and environmental impacts and energy

requirements, determines is achievable for new or existing

sources.” Id. § 7412(d)(1), (2). The standards for “major

sources” of HAPs must reflect the “maximum reduction in

emissions which can be achieved by application of [the] best

available control technology.” S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 133,

reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,supra, at 8473. Congress

also specified the degree of control, namely, the maximum

achievable control technology (“MACT”), which sets a floor for

MACT emissions — a minimum degree of emissions reductions

that HAP sources must achieve under the technology-based

standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3). For new sources, the

MACT floor “shall not be less stringent than the emission

control that is achieved in practice by the best-controlled similar

source, as determined by the [EPA],” Id. § 7412(d)(3); for

existing sources, the MACT floor shall be no less stringent than

“the average emission limitation achieved by the best

performing 12 percent of the existing sources (for which the

Administrator has emissions information).” Id. Congress also

set the compliance date:

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After the effective date of any emissions standard,

limitation or regulation . . . the Administrator shall

establish a compliance date or dates for each category

or subcategory of existing sources, which shall provide

for compliance as expeditiously as practicable, but in

no event later than 3 years after the effective date of

such standard . . . . 

42 U.S.C. § 7412(i)(3)(A) (emphasis added). 

Congress further envisioned that there would be

circumstances where a “source category” could appropriately be

exempted (“delisted”) from MACT emission standards.

Subsection 112(c)(9)(B)(i) provides that:

(B) The Administrator may delete any source category

from the list under this subsection, on petition of any

person or on the Administrator’s own motion,

whenever the Administrator makes the following

determination or determinations, as applicable:

 (i) In the case of hazardous air pollutants

emitted by sources in the category that may result

in cancer in humans, a determination that no

source in the category (or group of sources in the

case of area sources) emits such hazardous air

pollutants in quantities which may cause a

lifetime risk of cancer greater than one in one

million to the individual in the population who is

most exposed to emissions of such pollutants

from the source (or group of sources in the case of

area sources).

42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(i) (emphasis added).

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B.

The 2004 Rule regulates “total HAP” emissions from the

process units within each PCWP source. 69 Fed. Reg. at

45,946, 45,949. In view of Sierra Club v. EPA, 294 F.3d 155,

161 (D.C. Cir. 2002), which held that EPA could not set a “no

emission reduction” standard for existing sources for listed

HAPs, we need not review how EPA established the MACT

floors for a source other than to note that EPA determined that

“the only way in which PCWP [sources could] currently limit

HAP emissions” was through add-on controls. 69 Fed. Reg. at

45,968. 

As relevant to the petitioners’ remaining challenges, the

2004 Rule created a PCWP “low risk” subcategory, pursuant to

§ 112(c)(9)(B), which included sources that met the statutory

criteria and additional requirements, such as annual emissions

testing and reporting, set forth in the 2004 and 2006 Rules. 69

Fed. Reg. 45,955; 71 Fed. Reg. 8344-49. Subject to

acknowledged omissions, EPA determined that the sources in

the low-risk subcategory did not emit carcinogens in excess of

the statutory ceiling, namely, in amounts resulting in a lifetime

cancer risk exceeding one in a million to the most-exposed

individual; that they did not emit non-carcinogens in amounts

exceeding a level adequate to provide an ample margin of safety

to protect public health; and that no source emitted any HAP or

combination of HAPs in amounts resulting in an adverse

environmental effect as defined in subsection 112(a)(7). 69

Fed. Reg. at 45,946, 45,953-54. Where site specific data was

unavailable, EPA used standards ten times more protective of

human health to analyze model emissions data for potentially

low-risk facilities. Id. at 45,954. Eight sources met the criteria

initially and EPA contemplated that others also would be

relieved of all emission reduction requirements upon EPA

approval of their low-risk eligibility. Id.

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The 2006 Rule, as relevant, reset the MACT standard

compliance date from October 1, 2007 to October 1, 2008. The

2004 rule had set the earlier compliance date. After the NRDC

requested reconsideration of the low-risk subcategory and the

delisting of sources under the 2004 Rule, EPA proposed

amendments to the 2004 Rule, which concerned such matters as

the definition of “affected source,” “plywood and composite

wood products manufacturing facility” (among others),

procedures for the low-risk demonstration process, and other

permitting and timing issues. 70 Fed. Reg. 44,012, 44,014 (July

29, 2005). After receiving comments, EPA concluded that the

changes to the emission testing requirements in the 2004 Rule

had caused many sources to postpone emissions tests necessary

to demonstrate eligibility for the low-risk subcategory and to

identify their MACT compliance options. 71 Fed. Reg. at 8357-

58. Therefore, EPA determined to allow PCWP sources

additional time to comply with what it characterized as

“substantial” changes to the 2004 Rule. Id. at 8357. 

II.

 

We first address, as a threshold issue, industry intervenors’

challenge to the NRDC’s standing under Article III of the

Constitution. Industry intervenors contend specifically that the

NRDC failed to allege a sufficiently “concrete and

particularized” or “actual and imminent” injury and thus failed

to show an injury-in-fact. This contention fails. 

The NRDC claims associational standing to represent their

individual members. Consequently, it must demonstrate that at

least one member would have standing under Article III to sue

in his or her own right, that the interests it seeks to protect are

germane to its purposes, and that neither the claim asserted nor

the relief requested requires that an individual member

participate in the lawsuit. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver.

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Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1977); Sierra Club v. EPA, 292

F.3d 895, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Such a member, therefore,

must meet three-prong test set out in Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992), by showing (1) an injury in

fact that is actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;

(2) an injury that is fairly traceable to the EPA’s challenged

action; and (3) the likelihood that a favorable decision will

redress the member’s concerns. Id. 

In Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services,

528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000), the Supreme Court held that

“environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when

they aver that they use the affected area and are persons ‘for

whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be

lessened’ by the challenged activity.” Industry intervenors

ignore this precedent. In Laidlaw, the affidavits referred to

observations of pollution and alterations of behavior as a result

of the risk of pollution in an affected area. 528 U.S. at 181-84.

Two members of the petitioning organizations live near PCWP

facilities that are exempt as low-risk facilities from all HAP

controls. Holly Clark, a member of NRDC, states that she lives

near the exempt facility in Rocklin, California. She monitors

the air quality reports and on particularly polluted days she cuts

back on her outdoor activities, including her gardening, and she

does not drive her car. In the past 17 years she has seen the

horizon become visibly smoggier; although she was once able

to see the Sacramento skyline, she no longer can. Karen

Kirkwood, a member of the Sierra Club, states that emissions

from a nearby low-risk PCWP facility “diminish the enjoyment

that [her] family . . . derive[s] from outside recreational

activities, including gardening, walking, working with animals,

and sitting on the back porch.” These are the kinds of harms

that the Supreme Court in Laidlaw determined were sufficient

to show injury-in-fact because the member-affiants use or live

in areas affected by the PCWP sources, and are persons “‘for

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whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area [are]

lessened’ by the challenged activity.” 528 U.S. at 183. 

Therefore, because NRDC members meet the Lujan test for

standing, we reject industry intervenors’ challenge and hold that

the NRDC has standing to challenge the 2004 and 2006 rules.

III.

In reviewing the challenges to the final rules, our review of

EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act follows the familiar

standard set out in Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837

(1984). If Congress has directly spoken to the precise question

at issue and the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the

matter; the court, as well as EPA, must give effect to the

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Id. at 842-43. If,

however, the court determines that Congress has not directly

addressed the precise question at issue, and the statute is silent

or ambiguous, then the court must determine whether EPA’s

interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute. Id. 

A.

Following the decision in Sierra Club, 479 F.3d 875, EPA

requested a remand of the 2004 Rule to the extent it failed to

establish emission standards for listed HAPs. In Sierra Club,

the court held that EPA’s failure to set floors for existing small

tunnel brick kilns and existing and new periodic brick kilns

violated CAA Section 112(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3), noting

that in National Lime, 233 F.3d at 633-34, the court had held

unlawful EPA’s “no control” emission floors for categories in

which the best performers used no emission control technology.

Sierra Club, 479 U.S. at 878. In the instant case, using the same

rationale, the NRDC challenged EPA’s failure to set emission

standards for listed HAPs that PCWP plants emit. EPA

declined to do so on the rationale that these HAPs are not

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controlled with technology. See 68 Fed. Reg. 1276, 1285 (Jan.

9, 2003); 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,949 (Table 1); id. at 45,967-68.

However, the fact that one form of control does not control

emissions does not excuse EPA from finding other means to

achieve that result. National Lime, 233 F.3d at 633-34.

B.

The thrust of the NRDC challenge to EPA’s establishment

of a low-risk subcategory is based on the proposition that EPA

cannot do an end-run around the statutory scheme enacted by

Congress. First, the low-risk subcategory contravenes the plain

text of subsections 112(c)(2) and (d)(1), which indicate that

Congress intended EPA to create categories and subcategories

as a step toward establishing emission standards. Thus,

subsection 112(d)(1) provides that EPA “shall promulgate

regulations establishing emission standards for each category or

subcategory of major sources and area sources of hazardous air

pollutants.” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1). Hence, the NRDC

maintains, Congress never intended EPA to create a category or

subcategory “whose defining characteristic is that its members

will never be subject to emission standards.” Second, EPA’s

authority under Section 112(d)(1) to establish categories and

subcategories for sources does not authorize it to ignore

subsection 112(c)(2)’s requirement that EPA establish emission

standards for the low-risk subcategory; otherwise, the NRDC

contends, emissions would be allowed that Congress has

expressly prohibited. Third, because Section 112 categories,

“[t]o the extent practicable . . . shall be consistent with the list

of source categories established pursuant to [Section 111],” 42

U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1), the NRDC contends that when EPA acts

under Section 112(d)(4) to establish emission standards it

should only be looking to “classes, types, and sizes” of sources,

as mentioned in Section 112(d)(1). Fourth, the NRDC points to

legislative history indicating that Congress did not intend EPA

to base subcategories on risk. See House Debate (May 23,

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1990), Comm. Print S. Prt. 103-38, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY, supra, at 2725. 

EPA itself states in the 2004 Rule that “[a]t the time of the

1990 Amendments, Congress did not consider it necessary to

provide express relief for additional groups such as low-risk

PCWP facilities, beyond those defined by traditional category

and subcategory criteria.” 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,990. Nonetheless

EPA maintains its interpretation of its authority under

subsection 112(c)(1) is reasonable because nothing in the CAA

limits EPA’s authority to subcategorize as the NRDC suggests.

Congress allowed EPA to establish categories and subcategories

“as appropriate,” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1). Because emission

levels from PCWP sources are so low as to be of negligible

harm to human health and the environment, EPA maintains the

PCWP category was particularly well suited to

subcategorization based on risk, and that it stands to reason that

EPA should eliminate unnecessary and costly regulatory

controls. 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,985. Although finding no

correlation between the facilities it identified as low-risk and the

factors it had previously applied to subcategorize facilities,

based on considerations such as technology, process, product,

and emissions characteristics, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,990-91, EPA

maintains that its broad discretion allows it to consider other

factors and that Congress recognized that in certain instances a

risk-based approach can be appropriate. 

That EPA may have broad subcategorization authority,

however, does not authorize EPA to sidestep what Congress has

plainly prohibited. Whatever factors EPA might properly

consider for subcategorization, it has no authority to create a

low-risk subcategory scheme that allows harmful emissions in

a manner contrary to Congress’s statutory scheme. Section

112(c)(9)(B) provides that EPA may delete from its source list

“any source category.” (emphasis added) Not only is the riskUSCA Case #04-1325 Document #1047976 Filed: 06/19/2007 Page 12 of 19
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based exemption for a subcategory contrary to the plain

language of the statute, but EPA also failed to make the required

statutory determination that no source in the category, rather

than in the low-risk subcategory, emits HAPs “in quantities

which may cause a lifetime risk of cancer greater than one in

one million to the individual in the population who is most

exposed to emissions . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(i). EPA

responds that Congress used the words “category” and

“subcategory” interchangeably, but fails to demonstrate that

Congress did not mean what it said in subsection

112(c)(9)(B)(i). See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075,

1088-89 (D.C. Cir. 1996). While neither word is defined in the

statute, the absence of a statutory definition does not render a

word ambiguous. SEC v. Goldstein, 451 F.3d 873, 878 (D.C.

Cir. 2006). The “words of the statute should be read in context,

the statute’s place in the overall statutory scheme should be

considered, and the problem Congress sought to solve should be

taken into account” to determine whether Congress has

foreclosed the agency’s interpretation. PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA,

362 F.3d 786, 796 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 

As a matter of the plain text, “subcategory” is a subset of

“category,” as EPA has previously recognized. 64 Fed. Reg. at

56,494. Read in the context of subsection 112(c)(9), Congress’s

use of the words suggests that they have different meanings; in

Section 112 at various points Congress specified both

“category” and “subcategory” alone, and also used the

combined phrase “category or subcategory” where appropriate.

Regardless of whether or not Congress may have used the two

words interchangeably in other subsections—EPA cites

subsections 112(e)(4) and (f)(2)(A)—does not necessarily show

that in subsection 112(c)(9)(B), “as a matter of historical fact,

Congress did not mean what it appears to have said, or that, as

a matter of logic and statutory structure, it almost surely could

not have meant it.” New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880, 889 (D.C.

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Cir. 2006); see also New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 41 (D.C. Cir.

2005). As the NRDC point outs, because subsection 112(c)(9)

involves carcinogens, limiting delistings to source “categories,”

as distinct from “subcategories,” accords with Congress’s

tighter restrictions on carcinogenic HAPs. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.

§ 7412(f)(2)(A). By contrast, EPA’s interpretation would make

the words redundant and one of them “mere surplusage,” which

is inconsistent with a court’s duty to give meaning to each word

used by Congress. See, e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19,

31 (2001). 

Because EPA’s interpretation of Section 112(c)(9) as

allowing it to exempt the risk-based subcategory is contrary to

the plain language of the statute, EPA’s interpretation fails at

Chevron step one.

C.

In the 2006 Rule, EPA extended by one year the

compliance date for the emission standards established in the

2004 Rule in light of what it characterized as “substantial”

changes made in the 2006 Rule. 71 Fed. Reg. at 8357, 8372.

Only the 2004 Rule, effective September 28, 2004, set the

emissions standards for PCWPs. Consequently, the NRDC

contends, under the plain language of the statute, the

compliance date may be no later than October 1, 2007. We

agree.

Subsection 112(i)(3)(A) provides, in relevant part, that:

After the effective date of any emissions standard,

limitation or regulation . . . the Administrator shall

establish a compliance date or dates for each category

or subcategory of existing sources, which shall provide

for compliance as expeditiously as practicable, but in

no event later than 3 years after the effective date of

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such standard . . . . 

42 U.S.C. § 7412(i)(3)(A) (emphasis added). Where Congress

used the terms “emissions standard, limitation, or regulation”

earlier in the subsection, but specified only “such standard” as

the trigger for the three-year compliance period, Congress made

clear that only the effective date of Section 112 emissions

standards matters when determining the maximum compliance

date. EPA’s policy argument that extensions of time for

compliance should be allowed across the board whenever it

determines that “substantial” changes and amendments have

been made is not what Congress envisioned. Congress stated it

wanted “expeditious[]” compliance, which is inconsistent with

the notion that EPA has authority to “reset the compliance

deadlines” for compliance with Section 112 standards anytime

it adjusts reporting terms. It also addressed EPA’s concern by

authorizing EPA to make source-by-source extensions under

subsection 112(i)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(i)(3)(B), on which

EPA does not rely. 

EPA persists that the reference in subsection 112(i)(3)(A)

to “limitation or regulation” recognizes that sources must

comply with more than an emissions standard, namely,

requirements for work practices, maintenance, reporting and

monitoring, startup, shutdown, and malfunctions. This

indicates, EPA maintains, that Congress authorized it to grant

sources additional time to comply with the whole “regulation”

and not just with the “emission standards.” 42 U.S.C. §

7412(i)(3)(A). EPA’s interpretation, however, is inconsistent

with Congress’s policy as reflected in the plain language of

subsection 112(i)(3)(A). Not only did Congress indicate it

wanted “expeditious[]” compliance with emission standards, it

set an outer limit of three years after emissions standards took

effect and referred only to “such standard” for the compliance

date trigger, and not to the limitations or regulations mentioned

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earlier in the subsection. Further, Congress enumerated specific

exceptions to the three-year maximum, which indicates that

Congress has spoken on the question and has not provided EPA

with authority under subsection 112(i)(3)(B) to extend the

compliance date in the 2006 rule. See also 42 U.S.C. §

7412(i)(4), (6)-(8). “Where Congress explicitly enumerates

certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional

exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of a contrary

legislative intent.” TRW Inc., 534 U.S. at 28. 

D.

Turning to the question of remedy, consistent with

Allied-Signal, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, 988 F.2d 146, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1993), in the case of

an inadequately supported rule, the decision whether to vacate

depends on “the seriousness of the [rule’s] deficiencies (and

thus the extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly) and

the disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself

be changed.” Id. at 150-51. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 167

F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1999); National Lime, 233 F.3d at 635.

As to the seriousness of the deficiencies in this case, because the

CAA does not permit EPA to set a “no emission reduction”

standard for listed HAPs, create a low-risk subcategory, or

extend the deadline for sources to comply with the requirements

of the 2004 Rule, EPA could not justify those choices by

shoring up its reasoning on remand. The agency’s errors could

not be more serious insofar as it acted unlawfully, which is

more than sufficient reason to vacate the rules.

Vacatur would be disruptive if it set back achievement of

the environmental protection required by the CAA. As the

court explained in Davis County Solid Waste Management v.

EPA, 108 F.3d 1454, 1458-59 (D.C. Cir. 1997), “the more

equitable and appropriate course for this court to take is to

retain the . . . emission guidelines . . . on remand” because

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“vacating the guidelines [would] result in an eighteen month

period in which greater . . . emissions [would] occur than would

occur [if the court] remand[ed] for further rulemaking without

vacating.” PCWP sources emit at least 19,000 tons per year of

organic HAPs, including 330 tons of acrolein and 3,400 tons of

formaldehyde; they also emit 50,000 tons of hydrocarbons and

over 10,000 tons of deadly particulate matter. 69 Fed. Reg. at

45,956. Although the MACT floor standards in the 2004 Rule

are inadequate to the extent emission standards are not set for

all listed HAPs, the rules provide protection from the HAPs for

which EPA did establish such standards. 

However, vacatur of the challenged provisions will not

adversely affect public health or the environment. By granting

EPA’s motion for a partial vacatur and remand of those portions

of the 2004 Rule setting “no emission reduction” floors for

certain HAPs for PCWP plants, there is no adverse effect on

environmental protection as these provisions provide none, as

the NRDC points out. See Envtl. Pet’rs’ Resp. to EPA’s Mot.

for Voluntary Partial Vacatur and Remand at 1. By vacating the

low risk subcategory and the compliance date extension, PCWP

facilities will be subject to the other provisions of the rules,

including the compliance date set in the 2004 Rule, resulting in

greater protection to public health and the environment.

Accordingly, we vacate the challenged provisions of the 2004

and 2006 Rules. We decline to set a two year limit on EPA’s

proceedings on remand as the NRDC requests; mandamus

affords a remedy for undue delay. We also decline to require

EPA, as industry intervenors request, to provide affirmative

relief raised in their post-brief and post-argument pleadings as

these are matters for EPA’s evaluation in the first instance. Cf.

Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C.

Cir. 1975). 

IV.

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Louisiana-Pacific Corporation (“L-P”) petitions for review

of the 2004 and 2006 Rules based on EPA’s refusals to establish

a separate subcategory for its presses and, alternatively, to

provide a variance procedure. Essentially, L-P contends that

EPA unjustifiably ignored key differences between L-P’s

wet/wet press process, which requires an employee to remain in

the press area when hardboard mats are created in order to

prevent them from sticking together, and other press processes,

which do not require human intervention, and can thus use a

variety of controls, such as enclosing the press area, to comply

with the emission standards set for the category under the 2004

Rule. Because Congress has vested EPA with subcategorization

authority under Section 112(c)(1), and its exercise of that

authority involves an expert determination, L-P carries a heavy

burden to overcome deference to the agency’s articulated

rational connection between the facts found and the choices

made. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 374

(D.C. Cir. 2002); cf. Lignite Energy Council v. EPA, 198 F.3d

930, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 

EPA followed the principle that PCWP equipment should

be classified “according to its function,” 69 Fed. Reg at 45,948,

and relied on three factors in placing the L-P facility in the same

category as other PCWP facilities: (1) use of the same inputs to

create its products—in particular, the same resins—as other

PCWP facilities; (2) competition in the same markets as other

PCWP facilities; and (3) similar levels of HAP emissions.

Creating a subcategory for L-P would, EPA concluded, give L-P

a competitive advantage over other facilities, Summary of

Public Comments and Responses at 2-53 (Feb. 2004). L-P does

not dispute that the three factors show similarity with other

PCWP facilities. Rather L-P contends that it will experience

greater costs in complying with the MACT floor. But cost is

not a factor that EPA may permissibly consider in setting a

MACT floor. See National Lime, 233 F.3d at 640. To the

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extent that L-P maintains that it cannot comply with the MACT

floor based on complete enclosure and capture of emissions

because it cannot enclose its presses, L-P also relies on an

incorrect premise that the MACT level of emissions reduction

is invalid if it is based on control technology that a source

cannot install. The 2004 Rule does not require a source to use

any particular method to achieve compliance: if L-P cannot use

enclosure and capture, it may utilize other compliance

techniques. Hence, L-P fails to show that EPA was arbitrary or

capricious in refusing to create a subcategory for it. 

L-P’s variance objection fares no better. Section 112(i)

allows for a certain number of exceptions and compliance

extensions, but none applies to L-P’s situation, 42 U.S.C.

§ 7412(i)(3)-(6). The CAA also does not require EPA to allow

a variance. The Clean Water Act cases on which L-P relies are

inapposite because in those cases, the court held that EPA was

authorized to establish categorical limitations by regulation but

that, because the statute also appeared to require one set of

limitations to be set source-by-source, “some allowance [must

be] made for variations in individual plants.” E.I. duPont de

Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 128 (1977). That

rationale does not apply because Section 112(d)(1) explicitly

requires regulation by category or subcategory. 

Accordingly, we deny L-P’s petition. We also decline to

address its post-brief and post-argument request for affirmative

relief. Cf. Oljato, 515 F.2d 654.

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