Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01352/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01352-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Orrville, Ohio
Petitioner
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Respondent
Pike Island Hydro Associates
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 10, 1998 Decided June 30, 1998

No. 97-1352

City of Orrville, Ohio and

Pike Island Hydro Associates,

Petitioners

v.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,

Respondent

On Petition for Review of Orders of the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Carolyn Elefant argued the cause for the petitioners.

Paul V. Nolan was on brief.

Larry D. Gasteiger, Attorney, Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission, argued the cause for the respondents. Jay L.

Witkin, Solicitor, and John H. Conway, Deputy Solicitor,

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, were on brief.

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Timm L. Abendroth, Attorney, Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission, entered an appearance.

Before: Silberman, Henderson and Rogers, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: Pike Island

Hydro Associates (PIHA) formerly held the permit, and the

City of Orrville formerly held the license, for a hydroelectric

project at the Pike Island Locks and Dam (the Pike Island

project) on the Ohio River. PIHA challenges an order issued

by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or

Commission) that amends the license for a hydroelectric

project at the New Cumberland Locks and Dam (the New

Cumberland project)--a project approximately thirty miles

upriver of the Pike Island project. See City of New Martinsville, W. Virginia, 73 F.E.R.C. p 62,030 (1995) (hereinafter

Amending Order), aff'd on reh'g, 78 F.E.R.C. p 61,304 (1997).

Orrville challenges a FERC order that denied it permission

to intervene in the administrative proceeding that produced

the license amendment. See City of New Martinsville, W.

Virginia, 73 F.E.R.C. p 61,241 (1995) (hereinafter Intervention Order), aff'd on reh'g, 78 F.E.R.C. p 61,304 (1997). We

dismiss both challenges because we conclude that (1) PIHA is

not "aggrieved" by the Amending Order, (2) we lack jurisdiction to consider one of Orrville's claims regarding the Intervention Order and (3) Orrville's other claim is meritless.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 27, 1989 the Commission issued an order

authorizing the award of licenses to develop hydroelectric

generating facilities at sixteen dams on rivers that collectively

constitute the upper Ohio River Basin. See Allegheny Elec.

Coop., 48 F.E.R.C. p 61,363 (1989) (hereinafter Licensing

Order ), aff'd sub nom. DOI v. FERC, 952 F.2d 538 (D.C.Cir.

1992). Orrville was awarded the license to construct the Pike

Island project. See City of Orrville, Ohio, 48 F.E.R.C.

p 61,359 (1989). The City of New Martinsville, West Virginia

was awarded the license to build the New Cumberland project. See City of New Martinsville, W. Virginia, 48 F.E.R.C.

p 61,360 (1989). New Martinsville's license required it to

continuously spill over, around or through the New Cumberland Locks and Dam a minimum of 4,000 cubic feet of water

per second (ft 3/sec) from November 1 through June 30 and

15,000 ft 3/sec from July 1 through October 31. See Amending Order, 73 F.E.R.C. p 62,030, at 64,037. While the mandatory spillflows decreased the amount of water available for

power generation purposes, they increased the dissolved oxygen (DO) content of the water downstream of the dam,

ensuring that downstream DO levels did not fall below 6.5

milligrams per liter (mg/l)--the level below which adverse

environmental impacts could be expected. See Licensing

Order, 48 F.E.R.C. p 61,363, at 62,327.

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On June 18, 1993 New Martinsville asked the Commission

to replace the mandatory spillflows required by its license

with a more dynamic alternative: real-time monitoring of

downstream DO levels, accompanied by mitigative spillflows

when needed to prevent levels from falling below 6.5 mg/l.

While this request was pending, Orrville surrendered its

license for the Pike Island project, effective October 20, 1993,

citing an inability to commence construction by the deadline

the license imposed. See City of Orrville, Ohio, 64 F.E.R.C.

p 62,200 (1993). Shortly thereafter, PIHA applied for and

received a preliminary permit for the Pike Island project,

effective date February 1, 1994.1 See Pike Island Hydro

__________

1 A preliminary permit differs from a license in several important respects. Unlike a license, a permit does not entitle its holder

to construct a hydroelectric facility. Cf. 16 U.S.C. s 817 (making it

unlawful to construct hydroelectric project in navigable waters of

United States without "license" issued pursuant to provisions of

Federal Power Act). Instead, the permit merely secures the permittee's place at the front of the line of potential applicants for the

project license while it gathers the data necessary to support its

application. See id. ss 797(f), 798; cf. Washington Pub. Power

Supply Sys. v. FPC, 358 F.2d 840, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (noting that

purpose of preliminary permit "is to afford protection to the entrepreneur willing to invest his time and money in determining exactly

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Assocs., 66 F.E.R.C. p 62,065 (1994). The permit was issued

for a period of three years, expiring "either 36 months from

the effective date or on the date that a development application which is accepted for filing is submitted by the permittee,

whichever occurs first." Id. at 64,173.

Subsequently, the Commission allowed PIHA to intervene

in the ongoing administrative proceeding regarding New

Martinsville's license, and, acceding to PIHA's request, the

Commission declared the commencement of a formal amendment proceeding. Consistent with 18 C.F.R.

s 2.1(a)(1)(iii)(C) (1997) and the requirements of the Federal

Power Act, 16 U.S.C. s 797(e), the Commission advertised

the license amendment proceeding by publishing the following

notice:

Article 402 of the project license requires a continuous

mitigative spillflow release of 15,000 cubic feet per second from the project during the period from July

through October, to ensure maintenance of 6.5 milligrams per liter of dissolved oxygen (DO) throughout the

downstream pool. The City of New Martinsville requests to substitute real-time monitoring and project

operation adjustments to detect and alleviate low DO

concentrations in the Ohio River downstream from the

project for the continuous spillflow requirement.

Hydroelectric Applications, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,905, 19,909

(1995). The notice was published in the April 21, 1995 edition

__________

where and in what form to propose construction of a project which

will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or

developing a waterway and the improvement and utilization of

water power development"), rev'd on other grounds, Udall v. FPC,

387 U.S. 428 (1967); Town of Summersville, W. Va. v. FERC, 780

F.2d 1034, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("A preliminary permit is issued to

enable a permittee to study an inchoate proposal that may be

licensed in the future. A license application, on the other hand, is

an assessment of the present legality and feasibility of a definite

project.") (emphasis original). A preliminary permit also has a

much shorter life span than a license. Whereas a preliminary

permit cannot extend beyond a three-year period, see 16 U.S.C.

s 798, a license can be effective for up to fifty years, see id. s 799.

of the Federal Register and the May 3, 1995 editions of two

newspapers located in the vicinity of the New Cumberland

project. The notice also alerted parties wishing to intervene

in the proceeding and/or comment on the proposed amendment to do so by June 2, 1995. Id.

The Commission subsequently determined that the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. ss 4321 et seq.

(NEPA), required preparation of an Environmental Assessment (EA) before action could be taken on New Martinsville's

application for a license amendment. Thus, on July 26, 1995

the Commission issued a draft EA with a request for comments, followed by a notice in the August 1, 1995 edition of

the Federal Register:

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A draft environmental assessment (DEA) is available

for public review. The DEA is for an application to

amend the license for the New Cumberland Hydroelectric Project. The application is to reduce the spillflow

requirement at the project....

Notice of Availability of Draft Environmental Assessment

[Project No. 6901-026 West Virginia], 60 Fed. Reg. 39,164

(1995).

PIHA commented on both the proposed license amendment

and the draft EA. In September 1995 it submitted additional

comments on the draft EA, analyzing certain technical data

New Martinsville had failed to provide it with earlier.2 In a

letter to the Commission dated September 13, 1995, PIHA

complained about this and other lapses by New Martinsville

in serving it with copies of documents and data submitted in

support of the proposed license amendment. See Letter from

Dunlevy to Secretary Cashell of 9/13/95. PIHA also noted

that New Martinsville, in violation of 18 C.F.R. ss 385.2005,

385.2010 (1997), had yet to serve PIHA with a copy of certain

data submitted to the Commission and requested that the

amendment proceeding be held in abeyance until PIHA was

__________

2 Pursuant to Commission regulations, each participant in a

proceeding must serve every other participant (including intervenors) with a copy of any data or documents the participant submits

to the Commission. See 18 C.F.R. s 385.2010(a)(1), (e)(1) (1997).

provided with a copy of, and given an opportunity to comment

on, the data. Id.

While the document containing the data PIHA sought was

placed in the public record on October 4, 1995, the Commission did not respond to PIHA's letter or mail it a copy of the

document until November 16, 1995--exactly one month after

the Director, Division of Project Compliance and Administration, issued an order approving amendment of New Martinsville's license consistent with the recommendations contained

in the final EA. See Amending Order, 73 F.E.R.C. p 62,030,

at 64,037-71. The final EA examined three options: (1) a

"no-action" alternative, leaving the spillflow requirements of

the license unchanged, (2) a licensee alternative, requiring

real-time monitoring of DO levels and corrective spilling

whenever downstream DO levels fell below 6.5 mg/l, and (3) a

FERC alternative, mandating year-round spillflows of 4,000

ft 3/sec along with continuous real-time monitoring of downstream DO levels and mitigative spilling whenever necessary

to keep DO levels above 6.5 mg/l. Id. at 64,038. Because it

appeared to provide the greatest assurance that downstream

DO levels would not fall below 6.5 mg/l, the final EA recommended adoption of the FERC alternative. Id. The final

EA did not consider the cumulative impact of each of the

alternatives on development of the Pike Island project, noting

that no license or license application for the project was then

outstanding and observing that "preliminary hydropower permits do not constitute reasonably foreseeable actions and,

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therefore, cannot be given the same attention as license

applications, amendments, or existing projects." Id. at 64,-

047-48.

Unhappy with this result, on November 15, 1995 (the day

before a copy of the New Martinsville data was mailed to it)

PIHA requested rehearing by the Commission, asserting five

grounds for reversal of the Division Director's order. That

same day, Orrville simultaneously moved to intervene and

also requested rehearing.3 In support of its intervention

__________

3 The motion to intervene was necessary because only an intervenor in, or other party to, a proceeding may seek a rehearing on

the final decision. See 18 C.F.R. s 385.713(b) (1997).

motion, Orrville argued that the notices of the amendment

proceeding failed to apprise it (and other members of the

interested public) that the amendment would adversely affect

the development and operation of the Pike Island project.

Further, it argued that since surrendering the license for the

Pike Island project in 1993, its interest in the project had

been revived, both by a fire and explosion in 1995 that

damaged its sole generating facility and by proposed legislation that would allow it to seek reinstatement of its surrendered license. Nonetheless, on December 1, 1995 the Commission Secretary issued an order denying Orrville's motion

for late intervention.4 See Intervention Order, 73 F.E.R.C.

p 61,241. Orrville promptly requested rehearing.

While both Orrville's and PIHA's rehearing requests were

pending, PIHA's preliminary permit expired on January 31,

1997. Approximately six weeks later, the Commission issued

an order denying both PIHA's and Orrville's rehearing requests. See City of New Martinsville, W. Virginia, 78

F.E.R.C. p 61,304 (1997) (hereinafter Rehearing Order).

Both PIHA and Orrville now timely petition for review of that

order pursuant to section 313(b) of the Federal Power Act, 16

U.S.C. s 825l (b).

II. DISCUSSION

A. PIHA's Claims

PIHA raises both procedural and substantive objections to

the Commission's amendment of New Martinsville's license.

As to the former, it claims that New Martinsville did not

serve it with a copy of certain technical data submitted in

support of the proposed amendment, as required by 18 C.F.R.

s 385.2010, and PIHA was therefore "deprived of an opportunity to comment in a fully informed manner on the proposed

amendment." Pet'rs Br. 26. As to its substantive objection,

PIHA contends that the Commission violated section 10 of

__________

4 The Secretary also rejected Orrville's rehearing request inasmuch as only a party to a proceeding may request rehearing. See

Intervention Order, 73 F.E.R.C. p 61,241.

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the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. s 803(a), because it failed

to consider the effect reduced spillflows at the New Cumberland project would have on the potential development of the

Pike Island project. The Commission responds to each of

PIHA's claims on the merits and also argues that the expiration of PIHA's permit extinguished its interest in the Pike

Island project, depriving PIHA of standing.5 Separation of

powers principles oblige us to address the Commission's

standing argument first, see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better

Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012 (1998), which we find dispositive.

Section 313(b) of the Federal Power Act provides that

"[a]ny party to a proceeding ... aggrieved by an order issued

by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a review of

such order ... in the United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia." 16 U.S.C. s 825l (b). "The requirement of aggrievement serves to distinguish a person with a

direct stake in the outcome of a litigation from a person with

a mere interest in the problem." North Carolina Utils.

Comm'n v. FERC, 653 F.2d 655, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (internal

quotations and ellipses omitted). Nevertheless a party does

not acquire such a "direct stake in a litigation" simply by

participating in the antecedent administrative proceedings

whence the litigation arises; it must establish its constitutional and prudential standing. See Louisiana Energy & Power

Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("A party

__________

5 The Commission's brief can be read to urge dismissal on

either mootness or standing grounds. See Resp't Br. 26-27 & n.13.

Because PIHA's preliminary permit expired before it petitioned for

review, however, its claims are properly disposed of on standing,

rather than mootness, grounds. See SunCom Mobile & Data, Inc.

v. FCC, 87 F.3d 1386, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that "critical

time for Article III standing analysis" is date on which petition for

review is filed); cf. Garden State Broad. Ltd. Partnership v. FCC,

996 F.2d 386, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[B]ecause Garden State appealed before the FCC disqualified its license application, we uphold the

Commission on the ground of mootness rather than standing.").

Nonetheless, mootness cases may be instructive insofar as "[m]ootness and standing are related concepts." Garden State Broad., 996

F.2d at 394.

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is 'aggrieved' under this statute [16 U.S.C. s 825l] if it

satisfies both the constitutional and prudential requirements

for standing."); Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC, 489

F.2d 1207, 1212 n.12 (D.C.Cir.1973) ("[T]he fact that a person

is a party in agency proceedings does not require that he be

allowed to seek judicial review of the agency's action; he

must still satisfy judicial standing requirements."), vacated on

other grounds, 420 U.S. 395 (1975); cf. Inner City Press v.

Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, 130 F.3d 1088, 1089

(D.C. Cir. 1997) ("We publish this opinion to emphasize that

participation in administrative proceedings before the Board

of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, like such participation before any agency, ... does not, without more, satisfy

a petitioner's Article III injury-in-fact requirement."); United

States v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 694 F.2d 793, 800 n.25

(D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Although participation in the [administrative] proceeding below may be an inflexible prerequisite to be

a 'party aggrieved' ... it does not follow that participation in

and of itself provides a springboard for judicial review, for the

party still must meet judicial standing requirements.").

To establish its Article III standing, a party must demonstrate the following:

(1) that [it has] suffered an "injury in fact"--an invasion

of a judicially cognizable interest which is (a) concrete

and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) that there [was] a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained

of--the injury [was] fairly traceable to the challenged

action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court;

and (3) that it [is] likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable

decision.

Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1163 (1997). "[W]hen the

[party] is not himself the object of the government action or

inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is

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ordinarily 'substantially more difficult' to establish." Lujan

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992).

Charitably construed, PIHA's submissions suggest that two

of its interests have been adversely affected by the amended

New Cumberland project license: (1) PIHA's "procedural

right" to comment on certain documents submitted in support

of the license amendment; (2) PIHA's interest in development of the Pike Island project.6 With respect to PIHA's

asserted procedural right, however, the alleged infraction of

18 C.F.R. s 385.2010(e) is not alone sufficient to establish

injury in fact. See Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94

F.3d 658, 664-65 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("The mere violation of a

procedural requirement thus does not permit any and all

persons to sue to enforce the requirements."). Instead, "[a]

party who would complain that agency action has violated the

Constitution, a statute, or a regulation, must be adversely

affected by that action." Capital Legal Found. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 711 F.2d 253, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Thus,

"[i]njury in fact, caused by the substance of an agency action

or inaction, is an essential element" of a petitioner's standing.

Id. (emphasis added); accord Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

at 573 n.8 ("We do not hold that an individual cannot enforce

procedural rights; he assuredly can, so long as the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened

concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his

standing."); Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 19 (D.C.

Cir. 1987) ("Since plaintiffs lack standing to challenge [the

agency's] substantive actions, they indeed lack standing to

challenge procedural defects in the process that produced

those actions."); California Ass'n of Physically Handicapped, Inc. v. FCC, 778 F.2d 823, 827 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1985)

("[Petitioner] must allege an underlying substantive stake in

the result of the decision in order to assert standing based on

a procedural default.").

PIHA'S substantive interest is in the development and

operation of the Pike Island project. Yet, we conclude that

this interest is too attenuated, and therefore its injury too

__________

6 In assessing PIHA's standing, we note at the outset that we

are hindered by PIHA's failure to address the matter in its briefs.

speculative, to satisfy the requirements of Article III.7 We

find support for our conclusion in two cases that considered

challenges to licensing decisions of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). First, in Free Air Corp. v. FCC,

130 F.3d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1997), we held that a disappointed

applicant for an FM radio broadcast license did not possess

Article III standing to challenge the FCC's award of that

__________

7 Indeed, even before the January 31, 1997 expiration of PIHA's

permit, the Congress enacted the following legislation, casting at

least some doubt on PIHA's status as a preferred applicant for the

Pike Island project license:

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standing the time period specified in section 13 of the Federal

Power Act (16 U.S.C. 806) that would otherwise apply to the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Project No. 3218 [the

Pike Island project], the Commission shall, at the request of

the licensee for the project [Orrville], reinstate the license

effective September 25, 1993, and extend the time period

during which the licensee is required to commence the construction of the project so as to terminate on September 24,

1999.

Act of Oct. 9, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-257, 110 Stat. 3171. While

Orrville conceded at oral argument that it has not yet exercised its

rights under this provision, and while there is some question

whether the provision could be read to displace PIHA from its

preferred position without further agency action, cf. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist. v. FERC, 730 F.2d 1509, 1512 (D.C.

Cir. 1984) ("But in spite of the [statutory] preference for public

ownership, once a permit is issued, whoever has the permit has

priority at the licensing stage over all competitors, be they public or

private."), the provision would at least appear to have provided the

Commission a ground to cancel PIHA's permit. See 18 C.F.R.

s 4.83 (1997) ("The Commission may also cancel a permit for other

good cause shown after notice and an opportunity for hearing.").

Moreover, Commission precedent suggests that it would refrain

from issuing PIHA a license for the project in advance of September 24, 1999. See City of Santa Clara, California, 19 F.E.R.C.

p 62,323 (1982) (in proceeding to issue preliminary permit, Commission noted that if the Congress subsequently acted to foreclose

development by permittee, it would thereafter simply deny application submitted by permittee).

license to another party. In so doing, we observed that,

although "the grant of a broadcasting license forecloses later

opportunities to compete in a possible new licensing proceeding[,] ... such a foreclosure is too speculative an injury for

Article III standing." Id. at 449. Second, in Suncom Mobile

& Data, Inc. v. FCC, 87 F.3d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1996), we held

that a prospective applicant for a 220 MHz transmission

network license lacked Article III standing to challenge the

FCC's (1) denial of its request for a declaration that its

envisioned network qualified for a regulatory exemption from

the FCC rule proscribing ownership of multiple 220 MHz

licenses for service in a single 40-mile area and (2) denial of

its request for a waiver of the customary eight-month construction deadline:

SunCom alleged no actual, existing interest in the licenses for which it made the two requests nor even a contract

to acquire such but only an intent to purchase unidentified licenses sometime in the future, after FCC approval

and station construction. Based on the allegations before the Commission, we see no likelihood that SunCom

stood to suffer the kind of concrete, probable harm from

the Commission's denials that Article III requires.

Id. at 1388.8

Like the prospective applicant in SunCom, PIHA does not

possess a license for the Pike Island project and has not

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applied for such a license. Moreover, like the disappointed

applicant in Free Air, PIHA may not be eligible to secure the

__________

8 In certain circumstances, we have held that a disappointed

license applicant may have standing to challenge the license awarded. See, e.g., Orange Park Florida T.V., Inc. v. FCC, 811 F.2d 664

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (allowing competitor for license to challenge FCC

approval of amendment of another competitor's license application

and award because, in absence of alleged FCC error in approving

amendment, petitioner might have remedied deficiencies in its own

application and reapplied for license). We have also found that a

disappointed bidder may have standing to challenge a contract

award. See, e.g., National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 883

F.2d 1038, 1052-54 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (allowing disappointed bidder to

challenge award on ground agency errors resulted in award to

Pike Island license, see supra note 8, and even if it were,

success on its claim here would not result in the reinstatement of its preliminary permit and would not increase the

likelihood that it will ultimately be licensed to build and

operate the Pike Island project.9 In other words, even if

PIHA applies for the Pike Island project license in the future,

at that point its rights will be identical to those of any other

applicant. Therefore, any adverse effect New Martinsville's

amended license may have on PIHA's interest in the Pike

Island project is too speculative, generalized and remote to

satisfy the requirements of Article III.10 See Platte River

Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maintenance Trust v.

FERC, 962 F.2d 27, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("Allegations of injury

based on predictions regarding future legal proceedings are

... too speculative to invoke the jurisdiction of an Article III

Court.... Because [petitioner] has demonstrated no current

or even impending injury, we agree ... that [petitioner] lacks

standing to petition for review of the Commission's order.")

(internal quotations and brackets omitted).

B. Orrville's Claims

Orville contends that, in rejecting its late intervention

motion, the Commission erred in two respects: (1) rather

__________

successful bidder rather than disappointed bidder), cert. denied, 496

U.S. 936 (1990). Those cases are inapposite here, however, because, even were we to set aside the license amendment, it would

not make PIHA's interest in the Pike Island project any less

speculative and it would not improve PIHA's opportunity to apply

for the Pike Island project license in the future.

9 Even if PIHA still had a valid preliminary permit for the Pike

Island project, it is far from apparent that this interest alone would

be sufficiently concrete to meet the injury-in-fact test of Article III.

Cf. Town of Summersville, 780 F.2d at 1038-39 ("The preliminary

permit is actually only a minor threshold hurdle for the applicant,

and the grant of a preliminary permit is in no respect an indication

of the merits of a license proposal.").

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quirements, we need not address its prudential standing. See Free

Air Corp., 130 F.3d at 448 n.1.

than assess Orrville's motion according to the five factors set

forth in 18 C.F.R. s 385.214(d)(1) (1997), the Commission

applied an "extraordinary circumstances" test; (2) even if

applicable, the Commission misapplied the "extraordinary

circumstances" test because it failed adequately to consider

the actual (as opposed to presumed) prejudice to the parties,

the burden on the Commission and the delay and disruption

that would have resulted from allowing Orrville to intervene.

The Commission responds that the "extraordinary circumstances" test applies and that it fully considered all of the

factors required by that test. A brief discussion of the

pertinent regulations sets the stage.

(1) Regulatory Context

Pursuant to the Commission's regulations, an entity must

file with the Commission a motion to intervene in any proceeding in which it seeks to become a party. See 18 C.F.R.

s 385.214(a)(3) (1997). The public notice that advertises the

commencement of a proceeding also establishes the date by

which a motion to intervene must be filed. See id.

s 385.210(b). Even after that deadline has passed, however,

an entity may submit a motion for "late intervention." Id.

s 385.214(b)(3). In that instance, the motion must contain, in

addition to the materials and representations required to

support a timely intervention motion, a showing of "good

cause why the time limitation should be waived." Id.

Although necessary, a showing of "good cause" may not

alone be sufficient to grant a late intervention motion. Rather, the Commission "may consider" not only "whether ... (i)

The movant had good cause for failing to file the motion

within the time prescribed," but also whether:

(ii) Any disruption of the proceeding might result from

permitting intervention;

(iii) The movant's interest is not adequately represented by other parties in the proceeding;

(iv) Any prejudice to, or additional burdens upon, the

existing parties might result from permitting the intervention; and

(v) The motion conforms to the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section.

Id. s 385.214(d)(1). Cf. Covelo Indian Community v. FERC,

895 F.2d 581, 586 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Under FERC's regulations, 'good cause' for failing to file a timely motion to

intervene was only one of [several] factors to be weighed

when considering whether late intervention should be allowed.").

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Further, when a late intervention motion is filed after the

proceeding to which the motion is addressed has produced a

final decision, the Commission has repeatedly stated that it

will act favorably on the motion only in extraordinary circumstances:

When late intervention is sought after issuance of an

order disposing of an application ... the prejudice to

other parties and burden upon the Commission of granting late intervention are substantial. In such a situation,

... extraordinary grounds must be presented to warrant

favorable action on a request for late intervention.

Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist., 50 F.E.R.C. p 61,409,

at 62,262 (1990) (footnotes omitted); accord City of Seattle,

Washington, 72 F.E.R.C. p 61,023 (1995) (similar), aff'd on

reh'g, 75 F.E.R.C. p 61,319 (1996); Albert Rim Hydroelectric

Assocs., 65 F.E.R.C. p 61,187 (1993) (similar); Central Vermont Pub. Serv. Corp., 53 F.E.R.C. p 61,204 (1990) (similar);

Adirondack Hydro Dev. Corp., 46 F.E.R.C. p 61,312 (1989)

(similar); Hy-Tech Co., 29 F.E.R.C. p 61,130 (1984) (similar).11

__________

11 While, for the reasons set forth below, we lack jurisdiction to

decide Orrville's first claim, we note in passing that its suggestion--

that logically, the "extraordinary circumstances" test renders meaningless the "good cause" showing required by 18 C.F.R.

s 385.214(b)(3) and (d)(1)(i), see Pet'rs Reply Br. 2 n.1--is simply

wrong. By its own terms, the "extraordinary circumstances" test

applies only to a post-decisional intervention motion. Cf. NorAm

Gas Transmission Co., 83 F.E.R.C. p 61,142 (1998) (finding "good

cause" to permit late intervention where motion filed one day after

deadline but before decision rendered). In addition, to the extent

Orrville means to suggest by its argument that the Commission

Here, the Commission Secretary denied Orrville's motion

because she found that Orrville did not present any "extraordinary grounds to justify favorable action by the Commission." City of New Martinsville, W. Virginia, 73 F.E.R.C.

p 61,241 (1995) (footnote omitted). On rehearing, the Commission agreed:

When late intervention is sought after the issuance of

an order disposing of an application, as is the case here,

the entity seeking intervention must demonstrate extraordinary circumstances to justify favorable action by

the Commission. The Secretary denied [Orrville's] motion[ ] for late intervention, concluding that [it] had failed

to demonstrate such extraordinary circumstances.

On rehearing, [Orrville] reiterate[s][its] contention that

the public notices of the [proceeding] and the draft of the

EA did not adequately describe the amendment proposal.

__________

could not supplement or refine the test set forth in its regulations

by adjudication, it is plainly mistaken. See Pet'rs Reply Br. 2-3.

An agency's choice of which regulatory vehicle (rulemaking or

adjudication) is the more appropriate means to refine a standard

"lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative

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agency." SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947); accord

NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) ("[T]he choice

between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance with

the [agency]'s discretion."); Lineas Aereas del Caribe v. DOT, 791

F.2d 972, 978 (D.C.Cir.1986) (rejecting petitioner's "inexplicabl[e]"

argument that FAA could not promulgate contested rule by adjudication rather than rulemaking; "[T]he FAA flies by the book when

it develops and applies a policy in an adjudicatory proceeding and

announces that it will also apply the policy prospectively.").

Orrville also suggests that Wolverine Power Co., 43 F.E.R.C.

p 61,514, at 61,971-72 (1988), supports application of the "good

cause" standard set forth in 18 C.F.R. s 385.214(d)(1) to a late

intervention motion. It is mistaken. First, as the Commission

notes, its Weber Basin decision post-dates Wolverine Power and

constitutes the controlling test. Further, Wolverine Power is distinguishable because the Commission's grant of the contested motion for late intervention in that case would not have significantly

prejudiced the other parties nor burdened the Commission.

We do not agree. The purpose of the notice is to alert

the public to the general nature of the proposed action;

it does not identify all potential issues that may arise in

the proceeding. Nor does the notice of the environmental document do that. If more detailed information is

needed for an entity to determine whether, or to what

extent, it may be affected by the proposal, it is the

entity's responsibility to seek out that information.

The notices sufficiently alerted the public that New

Martinsville wanted to amend the spillflow requirements

of its license. The notice of the availability of the draft

EA, issued July 25, 1995, well before the issuance of the

Division Director's order, provided additional information

on the amendment proposal.... The burden is on [Orrville] to act affirmatively to protect [its] interests. [Its]

failure to do so in this proceeding until after the Division

Director issued his order is not an extraordinary circumstance warranting such late intervention. We therefore

affirm the Secretary's denial of late intervention and the

resulting rejection of [Orrville's] rehearing request[ ]. In

any event, [Orrville's] arguments on the merits of the

license amendment are similar to those raised by Pike

Island Hydro, which we address next.

Rehearing Order, 78 F.E.R.C. p 61,304, at 62,309 (footnotes

omitted). In a footnote, the Commission also rejected Orrville's contention that the notices of the amendment proceeding should have been published in newspapers circulated in

the vicinity of the City of Orrville, Ohio, observing that the

notice was distributed as required by the Federal Power Act

and that it was also published in the Federal Register. See

id. at 62,309 n.14.

(2) Applicability of Extraordinary Circumstances Test

Orrville contends that the Commission erred by requiring a

showing of "extraordinary circumstances" instead of adhering

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to the "good cause" standard set forth in the Commission's

regulations, i.e., 18 C.F.R. s 385.214(d)(1)(i). While the Commission has not challenged our jurisdiction to decide Orrville's

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claim, we must nonetheless be certain of it before proceeding

to the merits. See Liquid Carbonic Indus. Corp. v. FERC,

29 F.3d 697, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting court's independent

obligation to assure itself of petitioner's standing even if

respondent does not challenge it); Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at

1012.

While Orrville is an "aggrieved party" with respect to the

Commission's denial of its late intervention motion,12 its claim

as to the inapplicability of the "extraordinary circumstances"

test founders on another jurisdictional shoal. Section 313(b)

of the Federal Power Act recites, in relevant part, that "[n]o

__________

12 Unlike PIHA, Orrville has standing to challenge the denial of

its late intervention motion. See Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. FERC, 730 F.2d 1509, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("It would be

grossly unfair to deny judicial review to a petitioner objecting to an

agency's refusal to grant party status on the basis that the petitioner lacks party status. Such a petitioner must obviously be considered a party for the limited purpose of reviewing the agency's basis

for denying party status."). Orrville does not have standing to

challenge the merits of the Commission's decision to amend New

Martinsville's license, however, because it was not a "party" to the

proceeding. See Water Transp. Ass'n v. ICC, 819 F.2d 1189, 1192

(D.C. Cir. 1987) ("When intervention in agency adjudication or

rulemaking is prerequisite to participation therein, standing to seek

judicial review of the outcome will be denied to those who did not

seek--or who sought but were denied--leave to intervene.") (emphasis added); id. at 1192 n.28 ("Standing to challenge a denial of

intervention, however, rests on a different footing. In [S.C. Loveland Co., Inc. v. United States, 534 F.2d 958, 960 n.1 (D.C. Cir.

1976)], we refused 'party aggrieved' status to one whose petition to

intervene was denied by the commission, id., but because we found

the denial improper, we remanded with directions to allow the

intervention. Id."). Moreover, because Orrville's standing extends

only to its intervention claims, which are entirely separate from

PIHA's claims on the merits, PIHA cannot piggyback on Orrville's

standing. Cf. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d

1228, 1232 (D.C.Cir.1996) ("For each claim, if constitutional and

prudential standing can be shown for at least one plaintiff, we need

not consider the standing of the other plaintiffs to raise that claim.")

(emphasis added).

objection to the order of the Commission shall be considered

by the court unless such objection shall have been urged

before the Commission in the application for rehearing unless

there is reasonable ground for failure so to do." 13 16 U.S.C.

s 825l (b). We have thus held that "[p]arties seeking review

of FERC orders must petition for rehearing of those orders

and must themselves raise in that petition all of the objections

urged on appeal." Platte River Whooping Crane Critical

Habitat Maintenance Trust v. FERC, 876 F.2d 109, 113

(D.C.Cir.1989) (emphasis original). These statutory requirements "are strict and go well beyond judicially-imposed standards requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies

prior to the exercise of federal court jurisdiction." Id. at

112-13. As a result, we have held that "[n]either FERC nor

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ments." Id. at 113; accord Kelley v. FERC, 96 F.3d 1482,

1487 (D.C.Cir.1996) ("We have emphasized repeatedly that we

must construe strictly this express statutory limitation on the

jurisdiction of the courts.") (internal quotations and brackets

omitted).

After scouring Orrville's rehearing request, we find in it no

suggestion that the Commission Secretary erred in applying

an "extraordinary circumstances" test to Orrville's late intervention motion.14 Indeed, most of the argument in the rehearing petition assumes that Weber Basin not only applies

but controls. See, e.g., Request of the City of Orrville and the

Village of Yorkville for Reh'g of Notice Den. Interventions

__________

13 Orrville has not suggested, and we cannot ourselves conceive

of, any "reasonable ground" for its failure to present its arguments

to the Commission and thus the statutory exception to exhaustion

recognized in section 313(b) is unavailable. Cf. Platte River Whooping Crane, 962 F.2d at 35 n.3 (declining to search for grounds on

which to apply statutory exception where "[n]o one argues that the

exception applies here").

14 Our review of Orrville's rehearing petition has been hampered by the fact that Orrville has reproduced in the Joint Appendix only the odd-numbered pages of its petition for rehearing. We

assume that were we to review the even-numbered pages, the result

would be the same.

and Rejecting Reqs. for Reh'g, 25 ("Moreover, the circumstances that exist in this case when applied to Weber and

other similar instances provide more than adequate justification for the Commission to grant the Ohio Municipalities

interventions."). Thus, in its rehearing petition Orrville argued that its late intervention motion should be granted

according to the "extraordinary circumstances" test set forth

in Weber Basin, whereas Orrville now argues that its motion

should have been granted despite Weber Basin and the

"extraordinary circumstances" test. See Pet'rs Reply Br. 2-3

("[T]he Commission's 'extraordinary circumstances' test ...

as developed in Weber Basin violates its own rules governing

late intervention and represents an abuse of discretion.").

Accordingly, because it was not raised in its rehearing petition, we are without jurisdiction to consider Orrville's claim as

to the inapplicability of the "extraordinary circumstances"

test. Cf. Kelley, 96 F.3d at 1488 ("Suffice it to say that an

argument 'implicit' in prior requests before the Commission's

staff does not satisfy the strict standard of s 313(b).").

(3) Commission's Application of Extraordinary

Circumstances Test

Having disposed of all of the petitioners' claims, save one,

on jurisdictional grounds, we now consider the only remaining

question; whether the Commission properly applied the "extraordinary circumstances" test here.15 To succeed on this

claim, Orrville must show that the Commission abused its

discretion. See Covelo Indian Community, 895 F.2d at 587

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(9th Cir.1990); cf. S.C. Loveland Co., 534 F.2d at 960 n.1

(remanding matter to agency after finding ICC abused its

__________

15 While the matter is not free from all doubt, Orrville arguably

raised this claim in its rehearing petition, thereby satisfying the

requirements of section 313(b) of the Federal Power Act and

establishing our jurisdiction to decide the question. See Request of

the City of Orrville and the Village of Yorkville for Reh'g of Notice

Den. Interventions and Rejecting Reqs. for Reh'g, 31-35 (subheading entitled, "GRANTING THE INSTANT INTERVENTIONS

WILL CAUSE NO DISRUPTIONS, DELAY, BROADENING OF

THE ISSUES, OR PREJUDICE").

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discretion in denying party right to intervene in administrative proceedings); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.

Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (in considering whether agency abused its discretion, "court must consider whether the

[agency] decision was based on a consideration of the relevant

factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment"). We will "uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if

the agency's path may reasonably be discerned." Motor

Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463

U.S. 29, 43 (1983).

The "extraordinary circumstances" test, as the Commission

reasonably construes it, is a refinement of the five-factor test

set forth in 18 C.F.R. s 385.214(d)(1). Cf. Amerada Hess

Pipeline Corp. v. FERC, 117 F.3d 596, 600 (D.C.Cir.1997)

(court defers to reasonable agency interpretation of its own

regulations). The Commission has determined that the prejudice to other parties and the burden on the Commission--

relevant considerations pursuant to 18 s 385.214(d)(1)(iv)

(1997)--are likely to be "substantial" whenever a postdecisional late intervention motion is granted. Cf. Central

Vermont, 53 F.E.R.C. p 61,204, at 61,817-18 ("The potential

for prejudice to the other parties, and the burden on the

Commission, are substantial when late intervention is sought

after issuance of an order disposing of a proceeding.").

Moreover, while the Commission has indicated a willingness

to consider the other factors set forth in 18 C.F.R.

s 385.214(d)(1) before acting on a post-decisional late intervention motion, it has nowhere suggested that it must consider each of these factors where a party fails to satisfy the

threshold requirement of "extraordinary circumstances" for

its delay. Indeed, even the text of 18 C.F.R. s 385.214(d)(1)

does not compel consideration of each of the factors; it

merely states that the Commission "may consider" them.

Nor is the Commission obligated to make independent findings on each of the factors set forth in its regulation. Cf.

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 417 (1971)

(formal findings on each of several factors not normally

required in absence of statute or regulation requiring findings).

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As a result, we find no abuse of discretion in the Commission's denial of Orrville's intervention motion. The Commission considered and found unpersuasive Orrville's explanation

for its failure to move timely for intervention and we find no

"clear error of judgment," Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,

401 U.S. at 416, in the Commission's determination that

Orrville failed to demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances"

for its tardiness. The Commission also concluded that Orrville's arguments were "similar" to those advanced by

PIHA.16 Further, in applying the "extraordinary circumstances" test, the Commission presumed that the prejudice to

New Martinsville and burden on it would be substantial were

it to permit Orrville to intervene at such a late date. Each of

these findings reflects consideration of one of the factors set

forth in 18 C.F.R. s 385.214(d)(1) and none weighed in favor

of granting Orrville's application. No more was required of

the Commission. Thus, while Orrville asserts that no disruption or prejudice would have resulted from its intervention

and that its interests were "paramount" and inadequately

represented by other parties, the Commission was not required to accept or respond to these self-serving assertions,

especially in light of Orrville's failure to make the requisite

threshold showing of "extraordinary circumstances." Cf. Frizelle v. Slater, 111 F.3d 172, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("While the

Board [of Correction of Military Records] could have explained its reasons for rejecting Frizelle's arguments in more

detail, an agency decision need not be a model of analytic

__________

16 The similarity in Orrville's arguments and PIHA's arguments

is apparent from their rehearing requests. Compare City of Orrville's Mot. to Intervene and Reh'g Req., 6-7 ("The elimination of a

... hydroelectric project at the Pike Island [Locks and Dam] ... is

an extreme form of mitigation that clearly is not best adapted to the

comprehensive development of the Ohio River."), with Request of

Pike Island Hydro Assocs. for Reh'g of Order Am. New Cumberland Spill Flow Requirement, 39 ("THE UTILIZATION OF THE

WATER RESOURCES AT THE PIKE ISLAND L[OCKS] &

D[AM] IN THE OPERATION OF THE NEW CUMBERLAND

PROJECT IS NOT BEST ADAPT [sic] TO THE COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OHIO RIVER.").

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precision to survive a challenge. A reviewing court will

uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path

may reasonably be discerned.") (internal quotations and

bracket omitted).

III. CONCLUSION

For the preceding reasons, we hold that PIHA is not

"aggrieved" by amendment of New Martinsville's license, that

Orrville failed to preserve its claim respecting the applicability of the "extraordinary circumstances" test and that Orrville

failed to demonstrate that the Commission abused its discretion in assessing the merits of its untimely intervention

motion. Accordingly, PIHA's and Orrville's joint petition is

dismissed with respect to all jurisdictionally defective claims

and is denied with respect to Orrville's claim that the Commission abused its discretion in failing to find that "extraordinary circumstances" warranted granting Orrville's late intervention motion.

So ordered.

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