Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01081/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01081-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
P. Copenhaver
Respondent
Donnell Felder
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONNELL FELDER,

 Petitioner,

v.

WARDEN P. COPENHAVER,

 Respondent.

Case No. 1:12-cv-01081-BAM HC

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1 He contends that United States Parole Commission (1) violated his 

due process rights by miscalculating his grid score, and (2) applied the District of Columbia's 2000 

parole guidelines instead of its 1987 guidelines, violating the ex post facto clause.

I. Background

A. The Underlying Convictions and Sentences

On January 2, 1986, while Petitioner and two co-defendants attempted to steal cocaine, their 

victim was shot in the back. A witness identified co-defendant Myles as having provided a gun to 

Petitioner, who shot the victim. Petitioner maintains that he was twenty feet away from the victim 

and did not shoot him. Petitioner was arrested January 17, 1986, and remained in custody until he 

was released on bond on or about September 1, 1986. 

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), both parties consented, in writing, to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate 

Judge to conduct all further proceedings in this case, including the entry of final judgment.

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On December 14, 1986, Petitioner was arrested on charges of drug possession and 

distribution after he sold two foil containers of PCP to an undercover officer. In a search incident 

to arrest, Petitioner was found to possess four additional packets of PCP. Petitioner later explained 

to the parole examiner that having recently been released on bond, he was "in the Christmas spirit." 

Doc. 16-1 at 9.

On September 29, 1987, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia convicted Petitioner 

of distribution of PCP, distribution of marijuana, unlawful possession with intent to distribute PCP, 

and unlawful possession with intent to distribute marijuana, all crimes committed on December 14, 

1986, while Petitioner was free on bond for another pending offense. Petitioner was ultimately 

sentenced to term of imprisonment from 40 months to twelve years.

On November 29, 1989, the D.C. Superior Court convicted petitioner of felony murder 

while armed as a result of the January 2, 1986 shooting. The court sentenced Petitioner to a term of 

twenty years to life imprisonment.

B. Initial Parole Hearing

On November 17, 2009, while Petitioner was confined at USP Pollack in Louisiana, the 

U.S. Parole Commission conducted Petitioner's initial parole hearing using the 1987 D.C. Board of 

Parole Guidelines. Petitioner did not contest that he had four felony convictions in addition to the 

convictions detailed above.

1. Prison Escape

On August 25, 1992, Petitioner and a fellow inmate escaped from LaSalle County Jail in 

Cotulla, Texas. They jammed a lock, escaped through the administration building, stole a sheriff's 

van, and drove away. The van was recovered in San Antonio, Texas. Petitioner remained at large 

until December 14, 1992, when he was arrested in Washington, D.C. Petitioner was convicted of 

escape and sentenced to a 24-month term of imprisonment to be served consecutively to his current 

term. Petitioner explained to the parole examiner that the prison door was open, and they simply 

walked away.

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2. Disciplinary Decisions

On July 31, 2002, Petitioner cursed at staff when they locked up his cellmate, refused to 

identify his property, and tried to incite other inmates to anger. An August 6, 2002 disciplinary 

decision found that he had violated Codes 307 (Refusing an Order) and 312 (Insolence). 

On February 17, 2005, Petitioner was discovered to be hiding six packets of marijuana in 

his waistband. Petitioner admitted the charge but contended that he was simply holding the 

marijuana for another inmate. A March 15, 2005, disciplinary decision found that Petitioner had 

violated Code 113 (Possessing Drugs).

On September 5, 2009, during a prison lockdown, Petitioner yelled obscenities at staff and 

engaged in a contentious discussion regarding cleaning supplies. "When warned about the tone of 

his voice, [Petitioner] stated, "I don't give a fuck about a shot for my language." Doc. 16-1 at 10. 

A disciplinary decision dated September 23, 2009, concluded that Petitioner had violated Codes 

307 (Refusing an Order) and 404 (Using Abusive or Obscene Language).

3. Prior Convictions

On August 16, 1983, Petitioner was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon 

(wrench). On November 15, 1983, he was sentenced to one year probation under the Federal Youth 

Corrections Agency.

On December 30, 1984, Petitioner was charged with attempted unauthorized use of a 

vehicle. He was sentenced to thirty days' work release on April 30, 1985.

On January 17, 1985, Petitioner was charged with theft. On September 24, 1985, he was 

sentenced to three years' probation.

On November 4, 1985, Petitioner was charged with attempted unauthorized use of a vehicle. 

On February 7, 1986, he was sentenced to 180 days' imprisonment.

4. Social and Educational Programming

At USP Pollack in January 2009, Petitioner enrolled in a psychology-based program called 

the Challenge Program. Petitioner had completed ten educational programs while incarcerated, 

including numerous hours preparing to take the GED exam. In 2005, Petitioner became frustrated 

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and discontinued working toward his GED, but with the help of a prison teacher, he had recently reenrolled in the program.

Petitioner received a head injury when assaulted by another inmate at USP Lewisburg. He 

continued to suffer headaches and feelings of paranoia. Participation in the Challenge Program had 

helped Petitioner rebuild his confidence.

A point was deducted from Petitioner's guidelines score for sustained program achievement.

5. Parole Determination

The salient factor score (degree of risk) was 2. Risk points are determined by type of the 

risk associated with the inmate's convictions. Petitioner was assigned one point based on the 

violent nature and use of a weapon in committing the offense for which he was sentenced and one 

point for the relation of the offense to felony drug trafficking.

Petitioner was assigned a point for institutional adjustment, based on his escape and three 

prior disciplinary infractions.

A point was deducted for Petitioner's participation in the Challenge Programs and GED 

classes.

Using this information, the parole examiner assigned a point assessment grid score of 3 (+2 

degree of risk points +1 type of risk points +1 negative institutional behavior points -1 program 

achievement point = 3). The examiner summarized:

[Petitioner] now age 45 is appearing for his Initial Parole Hearing on a life term 

imposed in 1989. Additionally, he has a separate drug conviction that he 

sustained while out on Bond. Finally, he has an escape conviction for a 1992 

incident while he was housed in a County Jail in Texas. That resulted in a 24 

month consecutive sentence. The subject's initial point score is 3 which indicates 

parole should not be granted at the Initial Hearing. The examiner finds no basis to 

render a decision outside the guidelines. Additionally, this examiner believes that 

a Rehearing in 12 months is appropriate for this case. It is noted that he will have 

completed the Challenge Program by that time and another assessment of his 

conduct can be obtained.

Doc. 16-1 at 11.

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The Parole Commission denied parole on February 4, 2010. It continued the matter to 

November 2010, after service of twelve months from the initial hearing date. On October 26, 2010, 

the Parole Commission continued the rehearing to August 2011, because Petitioner had not served 

the minimum term of his sentence at the time of the initial parole hearing.

C. Reconsideration Parole Hearing

On August 15, 2011, while Petitioner was confined at Atwater USP in California, the U.S. 

Parole Commission conducted a second parole hearing using the 1987 D.C. Board of Parole 

Guidelines. Petitioner claimed full responsibility for his actions and expressed remorse for the 

victim's death. Petitioner still maintained, however, that he was 20 feet away from the victim and 

did not fire the gun that killed the victim.

1. Disciplinary Decisions

Since the Initial Parole Hearing, Petitioner incurred an additional disciplinary infraction for 

blackmailing staff (Code 204) at USP Pollack. Petitioner wrote a series of notes to his counselor 

requesting protection in return for money to be paid later. Petitioner's handwriting was identified 

by comparison to known samples. Petitioner denied the infraction. In a decision dated June 29, 

2010, the hearing examiner concluded that Petitioner violated institutional rules. Petitioner was 

confined in segregation for several months thereafter. The parole examiner added a point to 

Petitioner's grid score for this infraction.

2. Challenge Program

After the decision that Petitioner violated institutional rules by blackmailing his counselor, 

he was expelled from the Challenge Program at USP Pollack. He continued to take continuing 

education classes while confined in segregation.

Following Petitioner's transfer to Atwater USP, he was readmitted to the Challenge 

Program. He completed three continuing education programs: U.S. History, Latin Culture Release 

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Program, and Algebra Programming. "He also has continued to try to obtain his GED and states 

that he has completed the necessary hours and will be taking the test again soon." Doc. 16-1 at 25.

A point was deducted from Petitioner's guidelines score for sustained program achievement.

3. Parole Determination

Petitioner's prior grid score was 3. A point was added for his disciplinary infraction, and a 

point was subtracted for sustained program achievement, yielding a current grid score of 3. The 

examiner, who recommended that the Commission deny parole, summarized:

[Petitioner], currently age 47, is applying for a rehearing on a life term for Felony 

Murder while Armed and Drug Charges that were committed separately. The 

subject has a parolable grid score of 3. However, this examiner believes he does 

need to complete additional programs before receiving a parole decision. It is 

noted that the Challenge Program is an excellent program if he was expelled from 

that program as a result of disciplinary infractions he committed at Pollack. The 

subject vehemently denied committing the disciplinary infractions but it is noted 

he was found guilty and this examiner's review of the similarities in the 

handwriting appeared to support the DHO decision. This examiner believes a set 

off of 24 months will allow for full completion of the Challenge program 

including any aftercare program. He also needs to experience a time of infraction 

free incarceration before the Commission should seriously consider releasing him 

on parole.

Doc. 16-1 at 26.

The examiner also explained why the recommendation departed from the guidelines:

A departure from the parole release and rehearing guidelines is found warranted at 

this time because the Commission finds there is a reasonable probability you 

would not obey the law if release[d] and your release would endanger public 

safety. You are a more serious parole risk than indicated by your point score 

because you have not successfully completed the Challenge Program at this point. 

In fact, you sustained a disciplinary infraction where you were found to have 

engaged in attempted blackmail of staff while you were enrolled in the Challenge 

Program. The Commission finds that you need to complete both the Challenge 

Program and your GED prior to the next hearing as well as remaining free of any 

new infractions between now and your next parole hearing.

Doc. 16-1 at 26.

On September 22, 2011, the Parole Commission denied parole and continued for 

reconsideration in August 2013 after 24-months' additional service.

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D. Federal Habeas Petition

Petitioner filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on July 5, 2012. The parties do 

not dispute venue or service.

II. Standard of Review

A federal district court may grant habeas relief if a federal prisoner can establish that he is 

"in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 

2241(c)(3); White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds, 

Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9

th Cir. 2010). Section 2241 generally provides the proper 

method for reviewing the decisions of the U.S. Parole Commission. Benny v. United States Parole 

Comm'n, 295 F.3d 977, 988 (9th Cir. 2002).

A district court's review of a Parole Commission determination is "exceedingly narrow." 

Walker v. United States, 816 F.2d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Horner v. United States

Parole Comm'n, 870 F.2d 1489, 1490 (9th Cir. 1989). Review of parole decision is limited to 

determining whether the Parole Commission acted within its statutory authority or committed a 

constitutional violation. Vargas v. United States Parole Comm'n, 865 F.2d 191, 193 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The Court may not second-guess the Parole Board's exercise of its judgment among the range of 

possible choices and options. Id.; Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1552 (9th Cir. 1986) (en 

banc). "[T]he USPC has full authority to grant, deny, or revoke a District of Columbia offender's 

parole and to impose or modify conditions upon an order of parole." Brown v. U.S. Parole 

Comm'n, 713 F.Supp. 11, 13 (D.D.C. 2010). The Parole Commission is not restricted to making 

decisions strictly within the applicable guidelines and may go outside the guidelines for good cause. 

Rifai v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 586 F.2d 695, 699 (9th Cir. 1978).

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III. Due Process Violation

Petitioner contends that the Parole Commission violated his Due Process rights under the 

Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution when it made the erroneous determinations: (1) that 

Petitioner had five felonies; (2) that Petitioner had two prior commitments greater than 30 days; (3) 

that the scheduled parole review required a twelve-month set off to reach Petitioner's mandatory 

minimum period of incarceration; (4) that Petitioner did not complete the Challenge Program; and 

(5) that Petitioner needed to complete his GED. 

A. Analysis of Individual Factors in Parole Analysis

The Court may not review judgments integral to individual parole decisions, such as the 

nature and circumstances of the underlying offense. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1176 

(9th Cir. 1987). The Commission's "judgments involving a broad range of factors that the 

Commission takes into account in arriving at its decision are committed to the Commission's 

discretion and are unreviewable even for abuse of discretion." Benny, 295 F.3d at 982 (quoting 

Wallace, 802 F.2d at 1551) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the regulations state:

The granting of parole to an eligible prisoner rests in the discretion of the U.S. 

Parole Commission. As prerequisites to a grant of parole, the Commission must 

determine that the prisoner has substantially observed the rules of the institution 

or institutions in which he has been confined, and upon consideration of the 

nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 

prisoner, must determine that release would not depreciate the seriousness of the 

offense or promote disrespect for the law, and that release would not jeopardize 

the public welfare (i.e., that there is a reasonable probability that, if released, the 

prisoner would live and remain at liberty without violating the law or the 

conditions of his parole).

28 C.F.R. § 2.18.

According to Petitioner, he (1) had two felonies and (2) no prior commitments greater than 

30 days; (3) need not have completed the Challenge Program to satisfy the 1987 guidelines; (4) had 

been exempted from educational requirements following his traumatic brain injury; and (5) had 

fully served the mandatory minimum twenty-year term for murder and 40 months for the drug 

charges as of August 27, 2011. Despite Petitioner's many objections to the specific findings 

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comprising the Parole Commission's analysis, under the applicable standard of review, a habeas 

Court may not reweigh the evidence relating to individual factors.

Even if the Court were to address Petitioner’s arguments, the outcome of Petitioner's parole 

hearings would not change. First, the calculation required by the 1987 Guidelines does not 

consider prior felonies, as Petitioner asserts, but bases its calculation on "[p]rior convictions and 

adjudications." 1987 D.C. Parole Guidelines, R. 204.4(a). In addition, Petitioner did not contest 

his four prior convictions at the parole hearing. Contrary to petitioner's contentions, the parole 

assessment accurately reflected that Petitioner had no prior commitments of more than 30 days. 

See Doc. 16-1 at 14 and 17.

Although the Parole Board encouraged Petitioner to complete the Challenge Program and 

his GED, he was given credit at both hearings for his participation in the Challenge Program and 

continuing education programs. In both calculations, a point was deducted from his risk score for 

sustained program achievement, which considered Petitioner's participation in the Challenge 

Program and educational programs such as the GED classes. 

In claiming that he was permanently exempted from educational programs, Petitioner 

overstates his case. After noting that Petitioner was working at or above his potential, the 

educational summary included in the record acknowledged Petitioner's traumatic brain injury and 

stated, "The [traumatic brain injury] impedes [Petitioner's] learning process and he may not benefit 

from the literacy program. [Petitioner] can be permanently exempted from the education program. 

At this time he does not require any accommodations or other modifications for GED testing." 

Doc. 16-1 at 36 (emphasis added). Nothing in the record supports a conclusion that Petitioner ever 

sought exemption from the education program. To the contrary, at the 2009 hearing, Petitioner 

himself stated that he had recently re-enrolled in the GED program following encouragement by a 

teacher. He was still participating in the GED program in August 2011.

Finally, Petitioner complains that, although the 2009 hearing summary provided for a 

rehearing in twelve months (November 2010) (a twelve-month set-off), on October 26, 2010, the 

Parole Commission amended the order to provide for rehearing in August 2011 without 

justification or guideline compliance. The Commission explained that Petitioner had not reached 

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his parole eligibility date when his initial parole hearing was held in November 2009 and therefore, 

he was not entitled to a rehearing until twelve months after his parole eligibility date of August 2, 

2010. "[A]n inmate has no right to a twelve-month set-off, and adherence to the twelve-month 

timeline is not mandatory." Smith v. McGrew, 2013 WL 6002904 at * 7 (C.D.Cal. Nov. 6, 2013). 

In its discretion, the Parole Commission may set any parole reconsideration date it determines to be 

appropriate. Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Hall v. Henderson, 672 

A.2d 1047, 1052 (D.C. 1996). 

B. Due Process in Parole Determination

The Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from taking an individual's life, liberty, or 

property without due process of law. The Fifth Amendment does not create a liberty interest in 

parole, although an independent source, such as state law, may create such an interest. See 

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). The 

District of Columbia's parole statute, which applies in this case, does not create a protected liberty 

interest in a convicted person's conditional release before the completion of his sentence. Board of 

Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373-76 (1987); Ellis v. District of Columbia, 84 F.3d 1413, 1420 

(D.C.Cir. 1996); Price v. Barry, 53 F.3d 369, 370 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Brandon v. District of 

Columbia Board of Parole, 823 F.2d 644, 648 (D.C.Cir. 1987). "The District of Columbia's parole 

statute does not contain mandatory language creating an expectancy of release that rises to the level 

of a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Indeed, the law is well established that the D.C. 

statutory scheme does not create a liberty interest in parole." Thompson v. Veach, 501 F.3d 832, 

836-37 (7th Cir. 2007).

Due process in a parole hearing requires nothing more than "an opportunity to be heard and 

notification of the Board's reasons for denying parole." Bermudez v. Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064, 1066 

(9th Cir. 1991). Petitioner participated in the November 17, 2009, and August 15, 2011, 

conferences, both of which were conducted by videoconference. In 2009, Petitioner was assisted 

by a case manager; in 2011, although Petitioner waived representation, a case manager was 

available throughout the proceedings. At each hearing, Petitioner presented an initial statement 

taking full responsibility for the crime and describing his participation as well as responding to the 

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summaries of disciplinary infractions and participating in the discussions of his program 

achievements. Hearing examiner Lynne E. Jenkins provided a written summary of each hearing.

Accordingly, Petitioner had an opportunity to be heard and the reasons for the Commission's 

decision. Due process required nothing more. Accordingly, Petitioner's due process claim does not 

merit habeas relief.

IV. Ex Post Facto Violation

Petitioner contends that the Parole Board's application of the District of Columbia's 2000 

parole guidelines rather that the 1987 parole guidelines damaged Petitioner by adding months to his 

minimum parole eligibility over the minimum sentence and resulted in an ex post facto violation. 

This claim is factually inaccurate.

The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits "enactments which, by 

retroactive application, increase the punishment for a crime after its commission." Garner v. Jones, 

529 U.S. 244, 249 (2000). A retroactively applied parole regulation or guideline violates the Ex 

Post Facto Clause if it creates a significant risk of a longer period of incarceration than under the 

earlier rule. Id. at 255.

Both the November 17, 2009, determination and the August 15, 2011, determinations

explicitly state that they were scored under the 1987 guidelines of the D.C. Board of Parole. See

Doc. 16-1 at 20 ("The Commission has applied the D.C. Board of Parole's 1987 Guidelines to the 

initial parole decision in your case.") and 29 ("You continue to be scored under the 1987 guidelines 

of the D.C. Board of Parole."). The Court's review of the Parole Commission's decision confirms 

that the Commission appropriately applied the 1987 guidelines. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas 

relief on his ex post facto claim.

V. Certificate of Appealability

A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district 

court's denial of his petition, but may only appeal in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a certificate 

of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides:

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(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a 

district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of 

appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the 

validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial 

a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the 

validity of such person's detention pending removal proceedings.

(c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an 

 appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from—

 (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention 

 complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the 

 applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

 right.

 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which 

 specific issues or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

I 

If a court denies a petitioner's petition, a certificate of appealability may issue only if the 

petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(2). The petitioner must demonstrate "that jurists of reason could disagree with the district 

court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are 

adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Although the petitioner is not required to prove the merits of 

his case, he must demonstrate "something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of 

mere good faith on his or her part." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.

In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the Court's 

determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or 

deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Petitioner has not made the required substantial 

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showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court declines to issue a certificate 

of appealability.

VI. Conclusion and Order

Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED;

2. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment for Respondent; and

3. The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 2, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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