Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00539/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00539-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
James D. Shack
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES D. SHACK,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner 

of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-0539 DAD

ORDER

This social security action was submitted to the court without oral argument for ruling on 

defendant’s motion to dismiss.1 For the reasons explained below, defendant’s motion is granted 

and this matter is closed. 

BACKGROUND

According to the briefing filed by the parties, in August of 1997, plaintiff was granted 

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”). (Epps 

Declaration (Dkt. No. 13-1) at 2.2) “While on Social Security, plaintiff was arrested and charged 

 

1 Both parties have previously consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in this action pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (See Dkt. Nos. 3 & 10.)

2

Page number citations such as this one are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF

system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties.

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with murder by the District Attorney for San Diego County.” (Compl. (Dkt. No. 1) at 2.) In 

March of 2004, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) suspended plaintiff’s benefits “due to 

a court order confining Plaintiff after a finding that he was not guilty by reason of insanity and 

was incompetent to stand trial.” (Def.’s MTD (Dkt. No. 13) at 2.) On May 4, 2004, plaintiff 

notified the SSA’s San Diego field office that he would be “under observation” for three years at

the California Department of State Hospitals-Patton. (Id.) Plaintiff requested an appeal form but 

the SSA did not respond to plaintiff’s request. (Compl. (Dkt. No. 1) at 2-3.) 

“Four and one half years after the Social Security Administration stopped paying plaintiff 

. . . plaintiff was convicted” on October 17, 2008. (Id. at 3.) On January 5, 2014, plaintiff “wrote 

the [SSA] a ‘Claim for back payment of social security entitlements the SSA wrongfully 

terminated.’” (Id.) When plaintiff received no response, he mailed the same letter to four SSA 

field offices. (Id.) Plaintiff has not received any response from the SSA. (Id. at 4.)

Plaintiff then filed the complaint in this action on February 24, 2014. (Dkt. No. 1.) On 

September 8, 2014, defendant filed the motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(1) now pending before the court. (Dkt. No. 13.) Plaintiff filed an opposition to 

that motion on December 22, 2014. (Dkt. No. 16.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a defendant to raise the defense, by 

motion, that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of an entire action or of specific 

claims alleged in the action. “A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may 

either attack the allegations of the complaint or may be made as a ‘speaking motion’ attacking the 

existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact.” Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 

594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979).

When a party brings a facial attack to subject matter jurisdiction, that party contends that 

the allegations of jurisdiction contained in the complaint are insufficient on their face to 

demonstrate the existence of jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 

(9th Cir. 2004). In a Rule 12(b)(1) motion of this type, the plaintiff is entitled to safeguards 

similar to those applicable when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is made. See Sea Vessel Inc. v. Reyes, 

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23 F.3d 345, 347 (11th Cir. 1994); Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n. 6 (8th Cir. 

1990). The factual allegations of the complaint are presumed to be true, and the motion is granted 

only if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. Savage v. 

Glendale Union High Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2003); Miranda v. 

Reno, 238 F.3d 1156, 1157 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2001). Nonetheless, district courts “may review 

evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for 

summary judgment” when resolving a facial attack. Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039.

When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion attacks the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, no 

presumption of truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff’s allegations. Thornhill Publ’g Co., 594 F.2d 

at 733. “[T]he district court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any 

evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of 

jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). When a Rule 

12(b)(1) motion attacks the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, plaintiff has the burden 

of establishing that such jurisdiction does in fact exist. Thornhill Publ’g Co., 594 F.2d at 733.

APPLICATION

Defendant’s motion to dismiss argues that plaintiff failed to appeal the 2004 decision by 

the SSA to suspend his benefits due to his confinement. (Def.’s MTD (Dkt. No. 13) at 2.) 

Defendant has supported its motion with a declaration from Krista Epps, Acting Chief of Court 

Case Preparation and Review, Branch 1 of the Office of Appellate Operations, Office of 

Disability Adjudication and Review, Social Security Administration, who declares that “[t]here is 

no record of any appeals by the plaintiff.” (Epps Decl. (Dkt. No. 13-1) at 3.) In light of this 

record, defendant argues that plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff 

does not dispute that administrative remedies have not been exhausted, but instead argues that the 

defendant failed to respond to his requests to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Pl.’s Opp.’n 

(Dkt. No. 16) at 6.) 

The Social Security Act provides for judicial review of agency actions regarding benefits 

under Title II of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Subia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 264 

F.3d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 2001); McNatt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). Judicial 

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review of an administrative decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) may be obtained only after (1) the 

claimant has been party to an administrative hearing held by the Commissioner, and (2) the 

Commissioner has made a final judgment on the claim. See McNatt, 201 F.3d at 1087; Bass v. 

Social Sec. Admin., 872 F.2d 832, 833 (9th Cir. 1988). “A claimant’s failure to exhaust the 

procedures set forth in the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), deprives the district court of 

jurisdiction.” Id. 

A final judgment consists of two elements: the presentment of a claim to the 

Commissioner and the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Johnson v. Shalala, 2 F.3d 918, 

921 (9th Cir. 1993). The presentment requirement is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, but the 

exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, and thus is waivable. Id.; Briggs v. Sullivan, 886 

F.2d 1132, 1138-1139 (9th Cir.1989); Cassim v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1987); 

Hironymous v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 888, 894 (9th Cir. 1986). The “presentment requirement is 

satisfied when an individual makes a claim for benefits, and the [Commissioner] determines that 

the claimant meets the eligibility requirements for those benefits.” Briggs, 886 F.2d. at 1139. 

Presentment can also “be fulfilled by contesting tentative agency determinations.” Cassim, 824 

F.2d at 794. A district court will waive the final decision’s exhaustion element “if, and only if, 

the claimant satisfies a three-part test: the claim at issue must be (1) collateral to a substantive 

claim of entitlement (collaterality), (2) colorable in its showing that refusal to the relief sought 

will cause an injury which retroactive payments cannot remedy (irreparability), and (3) one 

whose resolution would not serve the purposes of exhaustion (futility).” Johnson, 2 F.3d at 921; 

Bass, 872 F.2d at 833; Cassim, 824 F.2d at 795. A claim is collateral “if it is not essentially a 

claim for benefits.” Johnson, 2 F.3d at 921. A claim is colorable if there is a reasonable showing 

‘of irreparable injury . . . that is not wholly insubstantial, immaterial or frivolous.” Id. “The mere 

allegation of a substantive due process violation is not sufficient to raise a ‘colorable’ 

constitutional claim to provide subject matter jurisdiction.” Hoye v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d 990, 992 

(9th Cir. 1992).

Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff’s claim has not been exhausted. Moreover, plaintiff’s 

claim is clearly one for benefits and thus “is not collateral to his substantive claim of entitlement, 

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but rather directly concerns his substantive claim . . . . . [and] administrative proceedings would 

not be futile . . . but would be necessary in order to establish a detailed factual record and permit 

the agency to apply its expertise.” Bass, 872 F.2d at 833. See also Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 

1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003) (“administrative review could fix the alleged errors and the purposes 

of exhaustion would not be served by waiver”); Fournier v. Sebelius, 839 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1085 

(D. Ariz. 2012) (“A complaint is not collateral if it directly concerns the substantive claim for 

benefits.”); cf. Davis v. Astrue, 513 F.Supp.2d 1137, 1146 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“Because plaintiff is 

attempting to overturn SSA policies and regulations . . . a detailed administrative record regarding 

the facts of plaintiff’s individual benefit claim would not assist the court in assessing the merits of 

plaintiff’s contentions.”).

Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss must be granted.3 See Theede v. United 

States, 489 Fed. Appx. 182, 182 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The district court properly dismissed Theede’s 

claims against the Social Security Administration and the Department of Health and Human 

Services because it is clear from the face of the complaint that Theede failed to exhaust

 

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 The court is cognizant of plaintiff’s allegations that he repeatedly wrote to the SSA attempting 

to appeal the suspension of benefits and received no response, although defendant has presented 

evidence that it never received any such request from plaintiff. Nonetheless, because the 

exhaustion requirement at issue here “is a statutorily specified jurisdictional prerequisite” it is 

“something more than simply a codification of the judicially developed doctrine of exhaustion, 

and may not be dispensed with merely by a judicial conclusion of futility.” Weinberger v. Salfi, 

422 U.S. 749, 766 (1975). See also Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 

1, 13 (2000) (“Insofar as § 405(h) prevents application of the ‘ripeness’ and ‘exhaustion’ 

exceptions, i.e., insofar as it demands the ‘channeling’ of virtually all legal attacks through the 

agency, it assures the agency greater opportunity to apply, interpret, or revise policies, 

regulations, or statutes without possibly premature interference by different individual courts 

applying ‘ripeness’ and ‘exhaustion’ exceptions case by case.”); Humana of South Carolina, Inc. 

v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1070, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“Congress has made the judgment that the 

Secretary in the first instance must decide whether any administrative relief is forthcoming”). 

Plaintiff is advised that, in the event he were to pursue exhaustion, he should maintain detailed 

records of his efforts. See generally Kildare, 325 F.3d at 1084 (“Mandamus is an extraordinary 

remedy and is available to compel a federal official to perform a duty only if: (1) the individual’s 

claim is clear and certain; (2) the official’s duty is nondiscretionary, ministerial, and so plainly

prescribed as to be free from doubt, and (3) no other adequate remedy is available.”); McNatt, 

201 F.3d at 1087 (“[i]t would be curious indeed if the Secretary could foreclose judicial review, 

for whatever reason, by merely denying the claimant a hearing”). 

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administrative requirements and obtain a final agency decision.”)4; Bass, 872 F.2d at 833 (“A 

claimant’s failure to exhaust the procedures set forth in the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g), deprives the district court of jurisdiction.”).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 

13) is granted;

2. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed without prejudice; and

3. This action is closed.

Dated: August 7, 2015

DAD:6

Ddad1\orders.soc sec\shack0539.ord.docx

 

4 Citation to this unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion is appropriate pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 

36-3(b).

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