Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-08030/USCOURTS-ca10-93-08030-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Katresa Marie Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH FILED 

United States Court ot Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 0 4 1995 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

PAMELA JONES, 

KATRESA MARIE JOHNSON, 

MARK J. SCOTT, JR., 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

Defendants-Appellants. 

PATRICK FISHER - Clerk 

Nos. 93-8022 

93-8030 

93-8031 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Wyoming 

(D.C. No. 92-CR-027-B) 

Joseph D. Welton, Detroit, Michigan, for Pamela Jones, DefendantAppellant. 

Cyril C. Hall, Pontiac, Michigan, for Katresa Marie Johnson, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Joseph P. McCaffery (Julia N. Whalen with him on the brief), 

Chicago, Illinois, for Mark J. Scott, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. 

John R. Green, Assistant United States Attorney (David D. 

Freudenthal, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), 

Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, and 

DAUGHERTY, District Judge.* 

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge. 

* The Honorable Fred Daugherty, Senior United States District 

Judge for the Western, Eastern and Northern Districts of Oklahoma, 

sitting by designation. 

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Mark Scott, Pamela Jones and Katresa Johnson appeal their 

convictions for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to 

distribute it in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a) (1), and 

for possession with intent to distribute over 200 kilograms of 

cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 

We affirm the conspiracy and possession convictions of Mr. Scott 

and Ms. Jones and reverse the convictions of Ms. Johnson. 

I. 

On March 15, 1992, Wyoming Highway Patrolman Daniel J. Dyer 

clocked a Lincoln Continental driving 76 miles per hour in a 65 

mile per hour zone. Officer Dyer signaled for the car to stop by 

turning on his overhead lights and headlights. The car did not 

stop immediately, but instead continued for approximately one mile 

past an entrance-exit ramp, finally stopping on an overpass where 

Officer Dyer could not safely approach the driver's side. Before 

approaching the car, Officer Dyer verified that it was not stolen. 

Officer Dyer noted that the car had California license plates 

and was rented from Budget Rent-A-Car (Budget) . There were two 

occupants, a driver, Pamela Jones, and a passenger, Katresa 

Johnson. Officer Dyer also observed three small pieces of luggage 

on the back seat. After admonishing Ms. Jones for speeding, 

Officer Dyer asked for her driver's license and the rental car 

agreement. He also inquired about their destination. Ms. Jones 

replied, "Well, we're just coming from Los Angeles and we're going 

back to Detroit. " Rec. , vol. VII, at 145. Ms. Jones also told 

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Officer Dyer that they had flown from Detroit to Los Angeles but, 

because they ran out of money, decided to drive back to Detroit. 

Officer Dyer noticed that a Mr. Scott, rather than Ms. Jones, 

appeared as the renter on the contract. Ms. Jones identified Mr. 

Scott as her cousin. 

Officer Dyer then returned to his car to check the status of 

Ms. Jones' driver's license. After receiving an ambiguous 

response from dispatch, Officer Dyer returned to the car and 

informed Ms. Jones and Ms. Johnson that they would have to wait 

until dispatch clarified whether the license was suspended. He 

then checked Ms. Johnson's license, which was valid. 

Meanwhile, Officer Dyer became suspicious that the car might 

be transporting contraband. He described numerous factors which 

contributed to this suspicion: 1) the car was a large rental 

automobile; 2) Ms. Jones and Ms. Johnson were driving from Los 

Angeles to Detroit, two cities associated with high drug usage; 3) 

Ms. Jones and Ms. Johnson, purportedly returning from a two week 

vacation in Los Angeles, had purchased one-way plane tickets to 

Los Angeles and had three, relatively small pieces of luggage in 

the back seat; 4) Mr. Scott rented the car for their return trip, 

allegedly because Ms. Jones and Ms. Johnson had run out of money 

on their vacation; 5) the car did not immediately stop, and when 

it did, it stopped in an area where it was unsafe for the officer 

to approach the vehicle from the driver's side; 6) the picture of 

Ms. Jones appeared more sophisticated on her driver's license; and 

7) Ms. Jones was not nervous, suggesting that she may have been 

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stopped under similar circumstances previously. Consequently, 

Officer Dyer asked Ms. Jones whether there were any drugs in the 

car. She responded negatively. He then asked, "Well, you don't 

mind if I took [sic] a quick look in the trunk then, do you?" 

Rec., vol. VII, at 150. She refused, stating that her teachers 

had instructed that the police do not have the right to look in 

vehicles. Officer Dyer was persistent, arguing, "[Y]ou don't want 

me to think you got something in there, do you?" Id. at 151. Ms. 

Jones firmly resisted his requests. 

At this time, dispatch reported that Ms. Jones' license had 

been suspended. Officer Dyer issued Ms. Jones a citation for 

driving under suspension and asked Ms. Johnson to drive Ms. Jones 

to the sheriff's office to post a $220 bond. While en route, 

Officer Dyer asked the local drug enforcement agents to meet them 

at the sheriff's office. 

Once at the station, Officer Dyer asked Ms. Jones about the 

contents of the trunk. She claimed that she was carrying new 

luggage holding clothes. In a separate conversation, Officer Dyer 

asked Ms. Johnson, "What do you have in the trunk there? Pamela 

Jones said you had wicker chairs." She replied, "Wicker chairs? 

Well, wha,tever she said is what we got in there. " Rec. , vol. VII, 

at 155. Ms. Jones made several credit card calls from memory upon 

arrival at the police station. 

Officer William Gallatin, a member of the Wyoming Drug Task 

Force, informed Ms. Shelly Lucas, a manager in the Los Angeles 

Budget office from which the car had been rented, that police 

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stopped the car for speeding, the driver of the vehicle had a 

suspended license, and the authorized driver, Mr. Scott, was not 

present when Officer Dyer stopped the car. Ms. Lucas asked police 

to seize the car on Budget's behalf. 

Officer Gallatin also spoke with Ms. Jones. She became 

visibly nervous after he identified himself as a narcotics agent. 

During this conversation, Ms. Jones told Officer Gallatin that she 

and Ms. Johnson had been visiting relatives in Los Angeles for two 

weeks, that they ran out of money, and that her cousin rented them 

a car for their return trip. She also claimed to be unemployed. 

Officer Gallatin then told Ms. Jones and Ms. Johnson that 

they were seizing the car and inventorying the contents. Both 

became visibly upset. Ms. Johnson appeared on the verge of tears. 

Officer Gallatin then asked if a black suitcase on the back seat 

belonged to either of them. Both denied ownership. The officers 

opened the suitcase to discover several "bricks" of cocaine. The 

police arrested Ms. Jones and Ms. Johnson. The officers 

subsequently found over 200 kilograms, or 440 pounds, of cocaine 

in closed luggage in the back seat and trunk of the car. 

The government's investigation revealed that Ms. Jones and 

Ms. Johnson used cash to purchase one-way tickets on Northwest 

flight 51 for $628 each. They departed from Detroit for Los 

Angeles at 7:00 p.m. on March 12, 1992. Mr. Scott departed from 

Detroit for Los Angeles later that evening on Northwest flight 

339. He purchased a round-trip ticket on an American Express card 

for $1,252. Mr. Scott rented the car that Ms. Jones was driving 

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from the Budget Rent-A-Car at LAX Airport on March 12 at 11:56 

p.m. He then checked into the Howard Johnson Motel. 

At trial, Special Agent Susan Mathison of the Drug 

Enforcement Administration ("DEA") office in Detroit testified 

that when contacted by the Wyoming agents, she was involved in an 

ongoing investigation concerning Mr. Derek Washam and Ms. Jones. 

As part of this investigation, Agent Mathison placed a pen 

register on various telephone numbers associated with Derek 

Washam. A telephone number associated with Ms. Jones appeared 

repeatedly on the pen register. For example, in a one week period 

a few days before Ms. Jones trip to Los Angeles, there were 

eighteen calls between Washam-related numbers and Pamela Jones' 

number. Mr. Scott's telephone number also appeared on the pen 

register which revealed four calls between the Washam residence 

and the Scott residence on March 12, 1992. Mr. Scott called a 

Washam-related pager number several times between March 7 and 

March 13, 1992, including three calls from Mr. Scott's room at 

Howard Johnson's. The address book in Mr. Scott's possession when 

he was arrested contained the pager number. 

The district court denied Ms. Jones' and Ms. Johnson's motion 

to suppress the evidence seized from the car, concluding that 

neither defendant had standing to contest the search of the car. 

A jury convicted Mr. Scott, Ms. Jones, and Ms. Johnson on both the 

conspiracy and the possession charges. Defendants appeal, arguing 

insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions, Fourth Amendment 

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violations, Sixth Amendment violations, and various evidentiary 

errors. 

II. 

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 

1. Ms. Johnson 

A. Conspiracy 

Ms. Johnson claims that the evidence was insufficient to 

sustain her conviction for conspiracy to possess cocaine with 

intent to distribute. We review the sufficiency of the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the government to determine whether 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Chatman, 

994 F.2d 1510, 1514 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 230 

(1993). To support a conspiracy conviction, "the government must 

show that there was an agreement to violate the law, that the 

defendant knew the essential objectives of the conspiracy, that 

the defendant knowingly and voluntarily took part in the 

conspiracy, and that the conspirators were interdependent." 

United States v. Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560, 1563 (lOth Cir. 1992) 

(citing United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 668 (lOth Cir. 

1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1288 (1993)). While the jury may 

draw reasonable inferences from direct or circumstantial evidence, 

an inference must be more than speculation and conjecture to be 

reasonable, and "caution must be taken that the conviction not be 

obtained 'by piling inference on inference.'" United States v. 

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Butler, 494 F.2d 1246, 1252 (lOth Cir. 1974) (quoting Direct Sales 

Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711 (19443)). As we recently 

stated, an inference is reasonable only if the conclusion flows 

from logical and probabilistic reasoning: "'If there is an 

experience of logical probability that an ultimate fact will 

follow from [sic] a stated narrative of historical fact, then the 

jury is given the opportunity to draw a conclusion because there 

is a reasonable probability that the conclusion flows from the 

proven facts.'" United States v. Jones, Nos. 93-4240, 94-4030, at 

10 (lOth Cir. filed (quoting Tose v. First Pennsylvania 

Bank, N.A., 648 F.2d 879, 895 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 

893 (1981)). "'A jury will not be allowed to engage in a degree 

of speculation and conjecture that renders its finding a guess or 

mere possibility. Such [an inference] is infirm because it is not 

based on the evidence.'" Id. (quoting Sunward Coz:p. v. Dun & 

Bradstreet, Inc., 811 F.2d 511, 521 (lOth Cir. 1987)). 

Ms. Johnson was a passenger in a vehicle caught transporting 

drugs. To meet its burden, the government must prove guilty 

knowledge: an implicit or explicit agreement to enter into a known 

conspiracy with a known objective. Mere knowledge that drugs are 

present in a vehicle, without additional evidence to support a 

reasonable inference of a knowing agreement to distribute them, is 

insufficient to sustain a conspiracy conviction. See United 

States v. Sanchez-Mata, 925 F.2d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 1991). For 

the reasons set out below, we are persuaded that the government 

failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable 

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doubt the requisite agreement between MS. Johnson and the other 

conspirators. 

A thorough review of the record reveals that Ms. Johnson was 

a passenger in a car, driven by her cousin Ms. Jones, which was 

stopped en route from Los Angeles to Detroit and was carrying over 

200 kilograms of cocaine. Ms. Johnson flew to Los Angeles with 

Ms. Jones on a one-way ticket purchased with cash. The only 

evidence Officer Dyer offered regarding Ms. Johnson's behavior was 

a question which we view as a normal response in the context of a 

roadside stop: "Why don't you just let us go?" Rec., vol. VII, at 

152. Ms. Jones responded to Officer Dyer's requests to search the 

car, and Ms. Jones fabricated the story regarding their two week 

vacation in Los Angeles. Ms. Johnson remained silent during these 

discussions. Although MS. Jones' license was invalid, Ms. Johnson 

held a valid license, and Officer Dyer ordered Ms. Johnson to 

drive Ms. Jones to the police station. When Detective Gallatin 

told Ms. Johnson that they were seizing the car upon Budget's 

request, she became "nervous" and was "on the verge of crying." 

Rec., vol. VIII, at 58. Ms. Johnson denied ownership of the piece 

of luggage in the back seat of the car in which the officers first 

discovered drugs. Ms. Johnson's personal effects were found on 

the back seat of the car in another piece of luggage which did not 

contain any cocaine. None of Ms. Johnson's personal effects were 

found in the trunk of the car. Nor was Ms. Johnson carrying keys 

to the car or the trunk of the car when arrested. Upon arrest, 

Ms. Johnson asked Ms. Jones for a telephone number and a credit 

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card number to complete a phone call. During the inventory of Ms. 

Johnson's belongings, the police found only $1.44 in her 

possession. Investigators did not find Ms. Johnson's fingerprints 

on any of the cocaine bricks. 

These facts clearly establish that Ms. Johnson traveled with 

Ms. Jones and was a passenger when Officer Dyer stopped the car 

for violating the speed limit. But mere presence, as a passenger, 

in a car found to be carrying drugs is insufficient to implicate 

the passenger in the conspiracy. United States v. Riggins, 15 

F.3d 992, 994 (lOth Cir. 1994). Likewise, mere association with 

conspirators does not support a conspiracy conviction. Chatman, 

994 F.2d at 1515; United States v Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 669 (lOth 

Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1288 (1993); United States v. 

Austin, 786 F.2d 986, 988 (lOth Cir. 1986). 

From the evidence, no reasonable jury could infer beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Ms. Johnson knew of the cocaine's presence 

in the car.l There is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, 

indicating she knew the car contained cocaine or that she 

participated in a common plan to distribute it. While 200 

kilograms is a large amount of cocaine to be carrying in a car, 

all the cocaine was contained in closed luggage. Neither Officer 

Dyer nor Officer Gallatin suggested that a discernible smell 

1 Even evidence showing Ms. Johnson's knowledge that drugs were 

present in the car would not support the conspiracy conviction. 

Merely riding in a car with knowledge that it contains illegal 

drugs is insufficient evidence to uphold a conspiracy conviction. 

United States v. Sanchez-Mata, 925 F.2d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 

1991) . 

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contributed to their suspicions. Ms. Johnson was not in 

possession of keys to the car or trunk when arrested, suggesting 

that she did not have control over the car or the contents of the 

trunk. Although two bags in the back seat contained cocaine, Ms. 

Johnson's personal effects were not in either bag, and the cocaine 

was not in plain view. The only evidence that could raise an 

inference of knowledge was Ms. Johnson's nervous and upset 

demeanor when Officer Dyer told her that the car would be seized. 

However, this is a plausible reaction from even an innocent 

bystander who had been detained by the police for close to two 

hours, who had been escorted to the police station, and who had 

just been told that police would search and seize the car in which 

she was riding. 

It may be reasonable to infer from the evidence that Ms. 

Johnson suspected illegal activity. She flew from Detroit to Los 

Angeles on a one-way ticket, paid for with cash, presumably by 

someone else. And Ms. Johnson deferred to Ms. Jones' description 

of their travel plans and the contents of the trunk. Mere 

suspicion of illegal activity, however, is insufficient to prove 

participation in a conspiracy. Austin, 786 F.2d at 988-89. One 

does not become a participant in a conspiracy merely by 

associating with conspirators known to be involved in crime. 

Chatman, 994 F.2d at 1515 (citing Evans, 970 F.2d at 669); United 

States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 585 (lOth Cir. 1984), cert. 

denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1985). One must agree to participate in 

order to be convicted for conspiracy. 

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The key question therefore is the adequacy of the evidence to 

sustain an inference that Ms. Johnson agreed, either implicitly or 

explicitly, to enter into a known conspiracy. There is a 

conspicuous lack of direct or circumstantial evidence supporting 

an inference of an explicit agreement to participate in the 

conspiracy. While Mr. Scott and Ms. Jones were linked to the 

conspiracy through a common denominator, the pen registers showing 

frequent communication with Derek Washam immediately before and 

after the March 15 stop, Ms. Johnson was never implicated in such 

evidence. There is no evidence of Ms. Johnson's presence at any 

meetings with Mr. Scott and Ms. Jones. Nor is there evidence of 

Ms. Johnson's participation in drug-related negotiations or 

transactions. 

We must determine whether, absent evidence supporting an 

inference that Ms. Johnson knew of the cocaine's presence, her 

passenger status in a vehicle transporting cocaine coupled with 

the reasonable inference that she suspected illegal activity 

support an inference that Ms. Johnson implicitly agreed to 

participate in the conspiracy. We do not believe they do. A 

survey of cases from other circuits supports our conclusion that 

insufficient evidence exists to draw the requisite inference that 

could implicate Ms. Johnson in the conspiracy. 

When courts have sustained conspiracy convictions for 

passengers, an additional piece of evidence not present in this 

case grounded reasonable inferences of an agreement. In United 

States v. Carter, 14 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. 

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Ct. 156 (1994), the defendant, a passenger in a van driving from 

Arkansas and stopped in Memphis, was charged with and convicted of 

conspiracy after the police found 437 pounds of marijuana in the 

van. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the passenger's conspiracy 

conviction because the driver and passenger told conflicting 

stories, supporting an inference that they were trying to deceive 

the officer; the passenger repeatedly tried to walk away from the 

van, suggesting that he was trying to "keep the police from 

discovering the marijuana;" and the two had been driving together 

for a considerable amount of time with a very strong odor of 

marijuana emanating from the van. Id. at 1150, 1156-57. From 

these facts, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the passenger knew 

of the existence and scope of the conspiracy and actively 

participated therein. Although in the instant case Ms. Jones and 

Ms. Johnson did, as in Carter, drive together for a considerable 

length of time, the contraband was odorless. Nor did Ms. Johnson 

actively try to deceive Officer Dyer or divert his attention. The 

strongest reasonable inference that we can draw is that Ms. 

Johnson suspected illegal activity. 

The Fifth Circuit has interpreted conflicting statements, 

frequently combined with nervousness or implausible stories, as 

sufficient evidence from which to infer a passenger's agreement to 

participate in a known conspiracy with a known objective. In 

United States v. Pineda-Ortuno, 952 F.2d 98 (5th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 112 S. Ct. 1990 (1992), the border patrol stopped a car in 

which the defendant was a back seat passenger. When an agent 

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inspected the vehicle, he felt something under the back seat which 

turned out to be cocaine and a loaded weapon. The Fifth Circuit 

upheld the passenger's conspiracy conviction given evidence that 

he told a conflicting story, appeared nervous, hovered 

aggressively over the officer as he was searching the back seat, 

shared driving responsibilities, and received payment for driving 

the car. Id. at 101-02; see also, ~' United States v. Shabazz, 

993 F.2d 431, 433, 441-42 (5th Cir. 1993) (sufficient evidence to 

sustain possession charges where passenger was owner of car, gave 

statement conflicting with driver's statement, was nervous, and 

became anxious when officer began searching the side of car where 

drugs were found). In the present case, Ms. Johnson never lied to 

the police. She did not tell any stories that conflicted with 

those of Ms. Jones. She did not appear nervous or anxious until 

police informed her at the station of the search and seizure of 

the rental car. We view her reaction as a natural one for a 

cross-country traveler who had been detained by the police for 

close to two hours and who found herself in the custodial 

environment of a police station with no money and about to lose 

her mode of transportation. 

In another Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Limones, 8 

F.3d 1004 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1562 (1994), 

the defendant, Mr. Fuentes, was not a passenger in a vehicle 

transporting cocaine when arrested but had been a passenger in a 

car involved in drug transactions prior to arrest. The court 

rejected Mr. Fuentes insufficient-evidence claim because he had 

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been an active participant in drug-related negotiations and 

transactions: an address book linked Mr. Fuentes to other 

conspirators; Mr. Fuentes found a buyer for the cocaine and 

negotiated the sale; and he was to receive $1000 for "the deal." 

Id. at 1009. There is no evidence that Ms. Johnson participated 

in any negotiations for sale of the cocaine. Nor is there 

evidence that Ms. Johnson received payment for her participation 

in any drug dealings. In fact, she only possessed $1.44 when 

arrested. 

The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Johnson, 18 F.3d 641 

(8th Cir. 1994), found the evidence sufficient to sustain a 

passenger's conspiracy conviction where the passenger rode over 

five hundred miles in a car transporting cocaine; the passenger's 

clothing and personal effects were found in an open bag containing 

cocaine; and the bag containing the cocaine and the passenger's 

personal effects also contained two weapons, one of which was in 

plain view. The Eighth Circuit concluded that "a fact finder 

could determine that it would be unreasonable for [the driver] to 

have had Johnson [the passenger] accompany him on a trip to Texas 

and, more importantly, place three kilograms of cocaine and two 

firearms in a bag containing Johnson's clothing unless Johnson 

knew about the cocaine." Id. at 647. Although, in the instant 

case, Ms. Johnson traveled a significant distance with Ms. Jones, 

her personal effects were not found in any piece of luggage 

containing cocaine, all bags holding cocaine were closed, none of 

the cocaine bricks were visible, and Ms. Johnson had no apparent 

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access to or control over the trunk. Unlike the situation in 

Johnson, there is no evidence here that Ms. Johnson knew or should 

have known that cocaine was present in the car. 

In these cases, evidence of conflicting stories, active 

attempts to divert officers' attention from the stopped vehicle, 

participation in drug transactions, or knowledge of and control 

over drugs, in addition to the defendant's status as a passenger 

in a vehicle transporting drugs, reasonably supported inferences 

that the defendant agreed to participate in the conspiracy. None 

of these factors are present in Ms. Johnson's case. A review of 

several other circuit court decisions, reversing conspiracy 

convictions for insufficient evidence on facts more incriminating 

than ours, provides added support to our conclusion that the 

evidence here is insufficient to sustain Ms. Johnson's conspiracy 

conviction. 

The Third Circuit, for example, reversed a passenger's 

conspiracy conviction even though the passenger told police a 

story inconsistent with the driver's, placed his luggage in the 

trunk where a suspiciously altered compartment held the drugs, 

appeared nervous, and removed the keys from the ignition, 

presumably to prevent the police from searching the trunk. United 

States v. Terselich, 885 F.2d 1094, 1098 (3d Cir. 1989). In the 

instant case, Ms. Johnson did not tell a conflicting story; nor 

did she attempt to obstruct the officer's access to the trunk. 

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In arriving at its conclusion in Terselich, the Third Circuit 

relied on United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1977), 

where the court reversed a passenger's conviction despite evidence 

of phone calls to his residence from the residence of a 

conspirator. The court concluded that "in the absence of ... 

some evidence that he [passenger] engaged in telephone or other 

communication of a conspiratorial nature, no factfinder could find 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Cooper was a member of the . . . 

conspiracy." Id. at 254-55. In Cooper, the defendant clearly 

called and received calls from the horne of a known conspirator. 

Ms. Johnson, on the other hand, was conspicuously absent from the 

phone records which helped link Mr. Scott and Ms. Jones as coconspirators. 

In United States v. Rosas-Fuentes, 970 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 

1992), the passenger asked the police officer whether anything had 

been found in the car's tank. The police officer responded, 

"'Well you tell me,'" and the passenger responded, "'Well, yes.'" 

Id. at 1381. This conversation, coupled with a nervous demeanor 

and an implausible explanation for travel plans, provided 

insufficient evidence to implicate the passenger in a conspiracy. 

The evidence in our case is less incriminating. Ms. Johnson did 

not ask Officer Dyer whether anything had been found in the car. 

In fact, she did not initiate any conversation with Officer Dyer. 

Ms. Jones, rather than Ms. Johnson, fabricated the story regarding 

their travel plans. 

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The Ninth Circuit has also reversed convictions on evidence 

more inculpatory than the evidence in our case. In United States 

v. Penagos, 823 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1987), the defendant was not a 

passenger when arrested, but undercover narcotics agents observed 

him, prior to arrest, as a passenger in a vehicle involved in drug 

transactions. In that case, additional evidence that the 

defendant looked up and down the street while conspirators loaded 

drugs into a vehicle, placed and received, alongside a clearly 

implicated conspirator, 45 to 60 minutes of phone calls from a 

public telephone following what appeared to be a drug-related 

meeting, and briefly met with two convicted conspirators, was held 

insufficient to support the defendant's conspiracy conviction. Id. 

at 347-48. In another Ninth Circuit case, drug agents arrested a 

passenger in a vehicle carrying suspiciously significant amounts 

of cash. United States v. Lopez, 625 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1980). 

Although the defendant was present in a house where drug-related 

negotiations took place, accompanied conspirators to the scene of 

the drug transaction, and admitted to the arresting officer that 

he "knew what was going down," the court concluded the evidence 

was insufficient to support the conspiracy conviction because 

there was.no clear evidence that the defendant actually 

participated in the negotiations or deliveries. Id. at 896. The 

evidence against Ms. Johnson is much less incriminating than the 

evidence in Penagos and Lopez. 

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Finally, in United States v. Pena, 983 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 

1993), the passenger was asleep when the police stopped the driver 

for speeding. The passenger and the driver told the police 

inconsistent stories about their trip. The evidence also revealed 

that the passenger had accompanied the driver from Houston to 

Columbus, was promised an airline ticket from Columbus to Texas, 

and "felt" that there was probably something illegal going on. 

Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit reversed a conviction for aiding 

and abetting in the possession of cocaine with intent to 

distribute, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to show 

that the passenger knew there was cocaine in the car or took any 

steps to aid in its transportation or delivery.2 While the facts 

in our case are somewhat reminiscent of those in Pena, the 

passenger there additionally told a conflicting story. No such 

evidence has been offered in the case against Ms. Johnson. If the 

facts in Pena are insufficient to support an inference of an 

implicit agreement, then the less incriminating facts in this case 

are likewise insufficient to support such an inference. 

2 Although Pena involves an aiding and abetting conviction 

while, at the moment, we are interested solely in Ms. Johnson's 

conspiracy conviction, both crimes require at a minimum that the 

passenger was a knowing participant. The Sixth Circuit concluded 

that the evidence was insufficient to support an inference that 

the passenger knowingly assisted in the possession or 

transportation of cocaine. Pena, 983 F.2d at 73. A similar 

inference also would be necessary to support a conspiracy 

conviction. Therefore, the reasoning the Sixth Circuit employed 

in Pena is identical to that it would have embraced had conspiracy 

been the charge. Evidence insufficient to support the aiding and 

abetting conviction would likewise be insufficient to support a 

conspiracy conviction based on the same facts. 

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The latter cases share two characteristics. First, they 

reverse conspiracy convictions based on insufficient evidence. 

Second, they do so notwithstanding evidence more incriminating 

than that in our case. We hold that the evidence here is 

insufficient to support Ms. Johnson's conspiracy conviction, and 

we reverse and remand to the district court to vacate the 

conviction and sentence. 

B. Possession of Cocaine with Intent to Distribute 

Ms. Johnson also challenges her substantive conviction for 

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute pursuant to 21 

U.S.C. § 84l(a) (1). In order to convict a defendant of 

possession, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant knowingly possessed cocaine with the specific 

intent to distribute. United States v. Hager, 969 F.2d 883, 888 

(lOth Cir.) (citing United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 372 (lOth 

Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 437 (1992)). Possession of 

narcotics may be actual or constructive. A defendant is deemed to 

have constructive possession of narcotics if the government 

proves, through direct or circumstantial evidence, knowing 

"ownership, dominion or control over the narcotics and the 

premises where the narcotics are found." Hager, 969 F.2d at 888. 

A defendant can also be implicated by aiding and abetting a 

co-defendant in the possession of cocaine with intent to 

distribute. 18 U.S.C. § 2. To be guilty of aiding and abetting, 

a defendant must willfully associate with the criminal venture and 

aid such venture through affirmative action. United States v. 

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Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461, 1470 (lOth Cir. 1991) (citing United 

States v. Zamora, 784 F.2d 1025, 1031 (lOth Cir. 1986), cert. 

denied, 112 S. Ct. 882 (1992)). The government must prove, 

through direct or circumstantial evidence, more than mere presence 

at the scene of the crime even if coupled with knowledge that the 

crime is being committed. Esparsen, 930 at 1470. While evidence 

of "relatively slight moment may warrant a jury's finding of 

participation," Zamora, 784 F.2d at 1031 (quoting United States v. 

Garguilo, 310 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1962)), a defendant "may not 

stumble into aiding and abetting liability by inadvertently 

helping another in a criminal scheme unknown to the defendant." 

Hanson, 1994 WL 651126, at *2. 

The lack of evidence to support Ms. Johnson's conspiracy 

claim is equally dispositive of her claim that the evidence is 

insufficient to support her conviction on the possession charges. 

As discussed above, there is no evidence to support, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, an inference that Ms. Johnson knew of the 

cocaine's presence. Consequently, actual possession cannot 

underlie Ms. Johnson's possession conviction. Nor is there 

sufficient evidence to support an inference of constructive 

possession. None of Ms. Johnson's personal effects were found in 

luggage holding cocaine; when arrested, Ms. Johnson was not in 

possession of keys to the car or trunk; and she was not a renter 

or authorized driver of the rental car. Finally, there is 

insufficient evidence to sustain Ms. Johnson's possession 

conviction with an aiding and abetting argument. There is no 

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evidence that Ms. Johnson knowingly agreed to participate in the 

conspiracy or willfully furthered the venture through positive 

action. We therefore hold that the evidence is insufficient to 

support Ms. Johnson's possession conviction. Because retrial is 

barred by double jeopardy, United States v. Daily, 921 F.2d 994, 

1011 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 405 (1991); United 

States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403, 1428 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. 

denied, 113 S. Ct. 285 (1992); United States v. Doran, 882 F.2d 

1511, 1526 (lOth Cir. 1989), we do not address Ms. Johnson's 

remaining substantive claims. 

2. Mr. Scott 

A. Conspiracy 

Mr. Scott challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

sustain his conspiracy conviction. The evidence shows that Mr. 

Scott flew from Detroit to Los Angeles on March 12, 1992, a few 

hours after Ms. Jones and Ms. Johnson departed for Los Angeles. 

He rented the car in which police discovered the cocaine. Mr. 

Scott returned to Detroit on March 15. He lied to Special Agent 

Barrett in a taped telephone call, claiming that he had returned 

the rental car on March 13 because the audio-tape player in the 

car was not functioning correctly. The evidence overwhelmingly 

shows that Mr. Scott did not return the car on March 13 and that 

Budget did not regain physical control of the car before it was 

stopped on March 15. Furthermore, Agent Barrett testified that an 

inventory of the car's contents revealed a bag of 42 cassettes, 

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one of which was in the tape player. Mr. Scott was represented by 

lawyers who had worked for Derek Washam, the object of an ongoing 

DEA investigation since August 1991. When arrested, Mr. Scott 

possessed a business card with these lawyers' names and 

handwritten advice on how to respond in the event of a DEA stop. 

When Mr. Scott made his first appearance in court, represented by 

one of Mr. Washam's lawyers, Derek Washam was present in the 

courtroom. The pen register on Washam-related phone numbers 

revealed four phone calls from the Washam residence to the Scott 

residence the day all defendants traveled to Los Angeles. Ms. 

Jones' residence frequently appeared on the pen register during 

the same general time period. The room receipt from the Howard 

Johnson motel indicated several calls to a Washam-related pager 

number. When arrested, the address book that Mr. Scott was 

carrying contained the pager number. 

This evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 

clearly support Mr. Scott's conspiracy c~nviction. This 

conclusion is consistent with our holding in United States v. 

Markopoulos, 848 F.2d 1036 (lOth Cir. 1988). In that case, the 

defendant rented the car in which the border patrol discovered 148 

pounds of marijuana; traveled to New Mexico prior to the departure 

of the driver, and made several phone calls from his hotel to the 

driver. We found this evidence sufficient to sustain Mr. 

Markopoulos' conviction. Id. at 1038, 1040. Mr. Scott flew to 

Los Angeles and rented the car. Both of these acts furthered the 

conspiracy's objectives, supporting an inference that Mr. Scott 

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knowingly and voluntarily agreed to participate in the conspiracy. 

The timing of Mr. Scott's trip to Los Angeles, his rental of a 

large car, and the lies he told regarding the rental return date 

support an inference that Mr. Scott knew of the objectives and 

scope of the conspiracy. Mr. Scott's presence on the pen 

registers, the increased telephone activity between Washam-related 

and Scott-related phone numbers during early to mid-March 1992, 

and the connections between Mr. Washam's lawyers and Mr. Scott 

heighten the plausibility of such inferences. His interdependence 

with the other conspirators, namely Ms. Jones, is self-evident; 

given Mr. Scott's integral role in renting the car. Accordingly, 

we affirm Mr. Scott's conspiracy conviction. 

B. Possession of Cocaine with Intent to Distribute 

Mr. Scott also appeals his possession conviction, arguing 

insufficient evidence. His conviction rests solely on an aiding 

and abetting theory. Evidence sufficient to support Mr. Scott's 

conspiracy conviction, including evidence that he knowingly and 

willfully agreed to participate in the criminal venture and 

overtly furthered the criminal venture by flying to Los Angeles 

and renting the car, is also sufficient to support Mr. Scott's 

possession conviction. Accordingly, we affirm. 

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III. 

FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE 

1. Motion to Suppress Seizure of Cocaine 

Ms. Jones appeals the district court's denial of her motion 

to suppress the cocaine seized from the car. Fourth Amendment 

rights are personal. United States v. Rascon, 922 F.2d 584, 586 

(lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 926 (1991). A district 

court cannot suppress evidence unless the movant proves that a 

search implicates personal Fourth Amendment interests. Id. An 

illegal search or seizure only harms those with legitimate 

expectations of privacy in the premises searched. United States 

v. Roper, 918 F.2d 885, 886-87 (lOth Cir. 1990). Whether a movant 

has a legitimate expectation of privacy and therefore has standing 

to contest a particular search is an issue of law that we review 

de novo. United States v. Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d 1271 (lOth Cir. 

1990) . 

We have held that a defendant in sole possession and control 

of a car rented by a third party has no standing to challenge a 

search or seizure of the car. United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 

1371, 1374-75 (lOth Cir. 1984). The record here reveals that Ms. 

Jones did not rent the car; Mr. Scott did. Nor was Ms. Jones 

authorized to drive the car. Although she argues that she was 

authorized to drive the car as an employee of Your Way, Inc., the 

alleged corporation on behalf of which Mr. Scott rented the car, 

we are not persuaded by this argument. Mr. Scott, during a 

recorded conversation with Agent Barrett, admitted that Your Way, 

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Inc. is "more or less [a] dormant" corporation. Rec., val. IX, at 

239. Ms. Jones told Officer Gallatin that she was unemployed, 

rec., val. VIII, at 179, and no one refuted that testimony at 

trial. Under our holding in Obregon, Ms. Jones did not have a 

legitimate expectation of privacy in the rented car and 

consequently does not have standing to challenge the search of the 

car or the seizure of the cocaine therein. We affirm the district 

court's denial of Ms. Jones' motion to suppress the evidence 

seized during the search of the rental car. 

2. Detention After Initial Stop 

Ms. Jones also claims that her detention after the initial 

stop constituted a seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

She does not contest the validity of her initial stop for 

speeding. To determine the validity of a roadside detention, we 

balance the intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights against the 

importance of the government interests involved. United States v. 

Arango, 912 F.2d 441, 446 (lOth Cir. 1990) (citing United States 

v. ShakPe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985)), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 924 

(1991) . An ordinary traffic stop is a limited seizure and is more 

like an investigative Terry stop than a custodial arrest. United 

States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 815 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. 

denied, 112 s. Ct. 1168 (1992). we therefore assess the 

reasonableness of traffic stops under the principles set forth in 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Under Terry, the actions of the 

police must be justified at their inception and reasonably related 

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to the circumstances which originally justified their 

interference. Id. at 20. Although we review the district court's 

factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard, Walker, 933 

F.2d at 815, the ultimate determination of reasonableness under 

the Fourth Amendment is a determination of law that we review de 

novo, id. (citing United States v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509, 1513-14 

(lOth Cir. 1990)), cert. denied, 501 S. Ct. 1207 (1991). 

An officer conducting a routine traffic stop may legitimately 

detain a driver while requesting a driver's license and vehicle 

registration, running a computer check, and issuing a citation. 

United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (lOth Cir. 1988) 

(citing United States v. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d 1127, 1130 (lOth Cir. 

1985)); Obregon, 748 F.2d at 1376. Once the driver produces a 

valid license and proof that she is entitled to operate the car, 

the driver must be permitted to proceed. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 

1519. Subsequent or concurrent detentions for questioning are 

justified only when the officer has "reasonable suspicion 'of 

illegal transa~tions in drugs or of any other serious crime.'" 

Id. (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498-99 (1983) 

(plurality opinion)). "Whether such an investigative detention is 

supported by an objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal 

activity does not depend upon any one factor but on the totality 

of the circumstances." United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1555 

(lOth Cir. 1993). 

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Officer Dyer detained Ms. Jones for approximately thirty 

minutes following the original stop for speeding. During that 

entire time, Officer Dyer awaited a respons~ from dispatch 

regarding the status of Ms. Jones' license. Dispatch ultimately 

informed Officer Dyer that Ms. Jones' license was suspended. On 

the rental contract, Mr. Scott appeared as the authorized driver. 

Ms. Jones never proved that she was entitled to operate the rental 

car. According to Guzman, an officer may detain a driver until 

assured that the driver's license is valid and the driver is 

legitimately operating the vehicle. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1519. 

Because Officer Dyer never received such assurances, the duration 

of the detention was justified. 

Concurrent with this legitimate investigative detention, 

however, Officer Dyer questioned Ms. Jones regarding the 

transportation of contraband. This questioning is justified only 

if Officer Dyer reasonably suspected that Ms. Jones was 

transporting drugs. At trial, Officer Dyer identified several 

factors heightening his suspicion that the car may have been 

transporting drugs, including the size of the car, the fact that 

both Los Angeles and Detroit are known for high drug usage, the 

lack of luggage for an alleged two week trip, Ms. Jones' 

reluctance to stop the car, the location of the stop, her 

inability to prove authorization to operate the car, and apparent 

familiarity with such stops. In Arango, an analogous case 

regarding a traffic stop for speeding, we concluded that the 

combination of the driver's inability to prove lawful possession 

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of the vehicle and the officer's skepticism regarding the amount 

of luggage provided reasonable suspicion to justify an inquiry 

related to the transportation of contraband. Arango, 912 F.2d at 

447. We have also identified failure to promptly stop an 

automobile in response to flashing police lights, United States v. 

Walraven, 892 F.2d 972, 975 (lOth Cir. 1989), and the fact that 

defendants were traveling from and to known drug areas, United 

States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 891 (lOth Cir. 1986), as factors 

supporting reasonable suspicion. Given such precedent, and 

considering the "totality of the circumstances," we conclude that 

Ms. Jones' further roadside detention for questioning was 

supported by reasonable suspicion and, therefore, was legitimate. 

IV. 

SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL 

On September 4, 1992, the government filed a motion to 

disqualify Alvin L. Keel, attorney for Ms. Jones, and Timothy S. 

Crawford, attorney for Ms. Johnson, arguing that the attorneys' 

connections with Derek Washam presented an inherent danger of 

conflict of interest. After a hearing, the district court granted 

this motion, concluding that continued representation raised "a 

serious potential conflict of interest." Rec., vol. V, at 254. 

The court suspended Mr. Keel and Mr. Crawford, along with their 

respective local counsel, for ten days and appointed the federal 

public defender, the assistant public defender, and two local 

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attorneys as interim counsel. On October 5, the court reinstated 

Mr. Keel and Mr. Crawford upon Ms. Jones' and Ms. Johnson's 

request. Defendants proceeded to trial on October 20. Mr. Scott 

argues that the disqualification of Mr. Crawford and Mr. Keel was 

unconstitutional because it 1) deprived Ms. Jones and Ms. Johnson 

of their right to counsel of choice and 2) denied Mr. Scott his 

right to effective assistance of counsel. 

Although standing was not raised by either party, we may 

raise sua sponte the threshold issue of whether Mr. Scott has 

standing to bring such Sixth Amendment claims. Alexander v. 

Anheuser-Busch Cos., 990 F.2d 536, 538 (lOth Cir. 1993). The 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a personal right. 

States v. Partin, 601 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1979) 

United 

(citing 

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)), cert. denied, 446 

U.S. 964 (1980). A defendant thus does not have standing to raise 

the Sixth Amendment claims of a co-defendant. Partin, 601 F.2d at 

1006; see also United States v. Adams, Nos. 92-6001, 92-6221, 1992 

WL 279227, at *3 (lOth Cir. Oct. 5, 1992). Neither Ms. Jones nor 

Ms. Johnson challenges the disqualifications on appeal. Their codefendant, Mr. Scott, may not vicariously assert their rights. We 

therefore hold that Mr. Scott does not have standing to challenge 

the disqualification of the attorneys on grounds that the 

disqualification deprived his co-defendants of their right to 

counsel of choice. 

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Mr. Scott also contends that his personal Sixth Amendment 

rights were implicated because the disqualification denied him the 

ability to plan and pursue a joint defense. While Mr. Scott has 

standing to bring this claim, we nonetheless conclude the claim is 

meritless. It is undisputed that during the ten-day disqualification period, Mr. Scott's attorneys were free to communicate with 

Ms. Jones' and Ms. Johnson's appointed interim attorneys, thereby 

affording Mr. Scott the uninterrupted opportunity for a joint 

defense. Although the disqualified attorneys were prohibited from 

communicating with Ms. Jones and Ms. Johnson, they could 

communicate with their former clients' appointed attorneys "to 

advise them of the defenses," rec., vol. V, at 258, further 

assuring the continuity of any joint defense strategy. Moreover, 

Mr. Scott's argument that he was deprived of a joint defense 

appears rather vacuous considering that he denied knowing either 

co-defendant. See rec., vol. IX, at 242-43. We hold that Mr. 

Scott was not denied effective assistance of counsel. 

v. 

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES 

1. Hearsay 

Evidentiary rulings are committed to the discretion of the 

trial court and are reviewed only for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Zimmerman, 943 F.2d 1204, 1211 (lOth Cir. 1991). While 

we review evidentiary rulings by considering the record as a 

whole, Boren v. Sable, 887 F.2d 1032, 1034 (lOth Cir. 1989), 

deference to the trial judge is heightened when reviewing rulings 

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on hearsay questions, id. at 1033. This court applies a harmless 

error standard when reviewing trial courts' rulings on hearsay 

objections resting solely on the Federal Rules of Evidence. 

United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1253-55 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 238 (1991). A harmless error is one that 

does not have a substantial influence on the outcome of the trial; 

nor does it leave one in grave doubt as to whether it had such 

effect. Id. at 1255. 

Mr. Scott argues that the district court committed reversible 

error in admitting evidence over two hearsay objections. The 

first concerns Ms. Lucas' testimony regarding the "closing 

information" on Budget's car rental contracts generated on 

April 14, 1992 (closing contracts). The government offered into 

evidence Budget's closing contracts which indicated in the "Time 

in" blank that the Lincoln Continental had been returned on March 

13, exactly 24 hours following rental. The defense did not 

object, presumably because this broke the link between Mr. Scott's 

rental of the car and the March 15 stop. However, Ms. Lucas, a 

manager from the LAX Budget office, explained why the closing 

contracts may not have accurately reflected the time of the car's 

return. She testified that, in the normal course of business, a 

rental contract that is in "limbo," as in the instant case, is 

frequently closed for revenue purposes "as of one day" in Budget's 

computer system. Rec., vol. IX, at 67. The defense objected to 

this evidence on grounds that the "Time in" entry on the closing 

contracts was self-explanatory. The court overruled this 

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objection because Ms. Lucas, as a manager, could legitimately 

testify regarding procedures followed in the ordinary course of 

business. Mr. Scott does not appeal this ruling. However, Ms. 

Lucas further testified that Mr. Scott called Ms. Harrison, 

Budget's general manager, at the end of March or the beginning of 

April, claiming that he had kept the car for only one day. On 

April 14, following Mr. Scott's phone call, Budget closed the 

contract. Mr. Scott's attorney objected to Ms. Lucas' testimony 

of the phone conversation as hearsay. The district court 

overruled his objection on grounds that Ms. Luc"as should be 

permitted to testify regarding the regular course of business. 

Mr. Scott now alleges that this ruling constitutes reversible 

error, arguing that the "Time in" entry is self-evident proof of 

his returning the car on March 13. We disagree. 

Even if the district court erroneously admitted testimony of 

the contents of Mr. Scott's and Ms. Harrison's conversation, we 

nonetheless conclude that the admission of this testimony was 

harmless error. The only objectionable hearsay testimony was the 

substance of the conversation between Ms. Harrison and Mr. Scott. 

Yet, in a recorded conversation with Agent Barrett, Mr. Scott 

claimed that he had told Budget that he should have only been 

charged for one day. Furthermore, Ms. Lucas had already 

testified, without objection, that Mr. Scott had called at the end 

of March or the beginning of April, claiming that he had returned 

the car on March 13. Given such properly admitted testimony, we 

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find it difficult to understand how the admission of this evidence 

could have harmed Mr. Scott's case. 

Furthermore, even though Mr. Scott claimed that he returned 

the car on March 13 because of a broken tape player, the record 

contains much evidence, independent of this conversation, which 

tends to establish that Mr. Scott did not return the car on March 

13. Although Ms. Lucas testified that the closing contracts 

indicated the car was "returned" on March 13, she never testified 

that Budget regained physical control of the car on March 13. 

Instead, she explained that the "Time in" entry "doesn't 

necessarily mean that a car was turned in that particular day." 

Rec., vel. IX, at 102. Ms. Lucas testified that when Officer 

Gallatin contacted her on March 15 to inquire whether Ms. Jones or 

Ms. Johnson had authorization to drive the car, she checked the 

outstanding contract on the computer which, in contrast to the 

closing contracts, did not indicate in the "Time-in" blank that 

the car had been returned. After a thorough review of the 

inventory sheets and the log sheets, no one at Budget had 

knowledge of the car being returned to LAX Airport between March 

12 and March 15. The "Time in" blank remained empty for a 

considerable time thereafter. In fact, when the government 

requested documents at the end of March or the beginning of April, 

Budget had not yet generated the closing contracts. Mr. Scott's 

closing contract indicated that he returned the car exactly 24 

hours after its rental, further suggesting that the entry was, as 

Ms. Lucas testified, a bookkeeping convention rather than an 

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accurate reflection of the car's return. Ms. Lucas also testified 

that it is Budget's policy to accept the customer's alleged date 

of return for revenue purposes. In the instant case, the closing 

contracts, giving deference to the customer, reflected Mr. Scott's 

claim that he returned the car on March 13. The closing contracts 

nonetheless indicated that Budget assessed a substantial 

unauthorized drop charge, implying that it never accepted Mr. 

Scott's allegations that the car was returned to LAX. Ms. Lucas 

also described, in some detail, the various check-in and inventory 

procedures, noting that there was no record of Mr. Scott availing 

himself of any of these procedures and further noting that if Mr. 

Scott had returned the car, it would have been extremely difficult 

for the car to have left the lot absent notice by one of the 

attendants. Finally, the government played for the jury a timelapsed video tape of the Budget office and parking lot at LAX on 

the days in question, and the return of the car was not reflected 

on the tape. Even absent Ms. Lucas' testimony regarding the phone 

conversation, a reasonable juror could conclude that the closing 

contracts' "Time in" entries did not accurately represent when the 

car was returned to Budget. The admission of this testimony was 

harmless. 

Mr. Scott also alleges Alamo Rent-A-Car documents found among 

Ms. Jones' belongings during the car's inventory were irrelevant 

hearsay, and their admission is reversible error. These documents 

referred to several vehicles rented by Derek Washam for an 

unreasonably long period and returned with unreasonably high 

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mileage. When the government offered these documents into 

evidence during trial, the defense conceded their authenticity but 

objected to their relevance. Rec., vol. VIII, at 140-41. The 

defense did not raise a hearsay objection at trial. Id. In 

general, the failure to object to the introduction of evidence is 

deemed a waiver of the objection absent plain error. United 

States v. Mcintyre, 997 F.2d 687, 699 (lOth Cir. 1993), cert. 

denied, 114 s. Ct. 736 (1994). A plain error is one that is 

"'obvious or . seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings.'" United States v. 

Thody, 978 F.2d 625, 631 (lOth Cir. 1992) (quoting United States 

v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157 (1936)). The admission of the evidence 

here does not amount to plain error under this standard. 

Mr. Scott also challenges the Alamo documents' relevance. 

The decision to admit or exclude evidence is within the sound 

discretion of the trial court and is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. Chatman, 994 F.2d at 1515. This evidence, like the 

pen registers admitted without objection, tends to prove Ms. 

Jones' affiliation with Derek Washam. We hold that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Alamo 

documents. 

2. Display of Cocaine 

The government displayed over 200 pounds of cocaine during 

trial. Mr. Scott argues that this evidence was more prejudicial 

than probative and was cumulative. The government argues that Mr. 

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Scott failed to object on these bases and therefore waived the 

issue for appeal. A review of the record refutes the government's 

argument. In anticipation of the display of cocaine, Mr. Scott's 

attorneys objected to its admission on the grounds that the 

prejudicial effect of displaying the actual cocaine was more 

prejudicial than probative. Rec., vol. VIII, at 37. They 

reiterated this objection when the cocaine was formally offered 

into evidence and also contended the evidence was cumulative. Id. 

at 77. Evidence notwithstanding an objection under Fed. R. Evid. 

403 is reviewed for abuse of discretion.3 Whalen v. Unit Rig, 

Inc., 974 F.2d 1248, 1252 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. 

Ct. 1417 (1993). Although we have never squarely addressed 

whether the display of large quantities of cocaine in a drug 

conspiracy case is more prejudicial than probative, other circuits 

have held that such decisions are within the sound discretion of 

the trial court. See United States v. Gonzalez, 933 F.2d 417, 426-

28 (7th Cir. 1991) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

permitting display of 2,248 kilograms of cocaine in drug 

conspiracy case); United States v. Arango-Correa, 851 F.2d 54, 58 

(2d Cir. 1988) (trial court did not abuse its discretion under 

Fed. R. Evid. 403 in permitting display of 500 pounds of cocaine 

in drug conspiracy case); United States v. Peyro, 786 F.2d 826, 

3 Federal Rule of Evidence 403 states: "Although relevant, 

evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 

issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 

delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 

evidence." 

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830 (8th Cir. 1986) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

permitting display of 10.5 kilograms of cocaine). We likewise 

conclude that the display of the cocaine was not an abuse of 

discretion in this case. 

3. EXQert Testimony 

We review the admission of expert testimony under an abuse of 

discretion standard. United States v. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d 452, 

459 (lOth Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Vreeken, 803 F.2d 

1085, 1091 (lOth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1067 (1987)); 

United States v. Barbee, 968 F.2d 1026, 1031 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

During trial, the government asked Special Agent Barrett to 

estimate the value of a kilogram of cocaine in Wyoming. Mr. 

Scott's attorney objected to the testimony as irrelevant hearsay. 

The court overruled these objections. Agent Barrett then 

testified that the street rate for a kilogram of cocaine in 

Wyoming in March 1992 was $25,000. Mr. Scott appeals the 

admission of this testimony, questioning its relevance and 

claiming that it is more prejudicial than probative. 

We have admitted expert testimony regarding the street value 

of cocaine. See, ~. Fitzgerald v. United States, 719 F.2d 

1069, 1070 (lOth Cir. 1983) (admission of expert testimony 

establishing that drugs in questions had aggregate street value of 

$18,400). Other circuits have held that expert testimony 

regarding the value of drugs is relevant to prove the drugs were 

intended for distribution. See United States v. Tapia-Ortiz, 23 

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Appellate Case: 93-8030 Document: 01019290296 Date Filed: 01/04/1995 Page: 38 
F.3d 738, 741 (2d Cir.}, cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 206 (1994}. We 

therefore hold that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting Agent Barrett's testimony. 

We REVERSE for insufficient evidence MS. Johnson's 

convictions on both the conspiracy and possession counts. We 

AFFIRM MS. Jones' and Mr. Scott's convictions on both counts. 

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Appellate Case: 93-8030 Document: 01019290296 Date Filed: 01/04/1995 Page: 39