Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-04115/USCOURTS-ca8-04-04115-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gregory Burns
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-4115

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Eastern District of Missouri. 

Gregory Burns, * 

* [PUBLISHED] 

Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: April 12, 2005

Filed: June 10, 2005

___________

Before COLLOTON, McMILLIAN, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Gregory Burns appeals a sentence of 292 months’ imprisonment imposed by

the district court after Burns pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin,

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), possession of a firearm as a previously

convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession of a firearm

during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

Burns wishes to argue that the sentence imposed was contrary to the Supreme Court’s

recent decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).

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The government has moved to dismiss the appeal based on a paragraph in a

plea agreement executed by Burns and the government. The agreement provides in

relevant part that:

both defendant and the Government hereby waive all rights to appeal all

non-jurisdictional issues including, but not limited to, any issues

relating to: pre-trial motions, hearings and discovery; the negotiation,

taking, or acceptance of the guilty plea; the factual basis for the plea; the

sentence imposed; and the establishment of the Total Offense Level or

Criminal History Category determined by the Court.

(emphasis added). Burns does not assert that Booker claims fall outside the scope of

the appeal waiver, or that the waiver was not knowing and voluntary. He does

contend, however, that the appeal waiver should not be enforced, because his

sentence is “illegal” under Booker, and the imposition of an illegal sentence is a

“miscarriage of justice” that precludes enforcement of an appeal waiver under our

court’s decision in United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert.

denied, 540 U.S. 997 (2003).

Burns was sentenced as a “career offender” under USSG § 4B1.1 after the

district court found that he had sustained two prior convictions for either a crime of

violence or a controlled substance offense. We disagree with Burns’s contention that

the district court violated the Sixth Amendment by sentencing him as a career

offender under the mandatory sentencing guidelines. Booker held that “[a]ny fact

(other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding

the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict

must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”

125 S. Ct. at 756 (emphasis added). Burns points to no fact other than a prior

conviction that increased the maximum authorized sentence in his case, so we

conclude that he has not established a constitutional violation. See United States v.

Marcussen, 403 F.3d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 2005).

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We do believe, however, that Burns has asserted a non-constitutional error

under Booker, because the district court sentenced Burns pursuant to the mandatory

guidelines, rather than under an advisory guideline scheme. In other words, the

district court operated as though it was bound to sentence Burns within a guideline

range of 292 to 365 months (based on a total offense level of 35 and a criminal

history category VI), even though the court could have sentenced him to a lesser term

of imprisonment if there were “reasonable” grounds to do so under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a). See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757, 765. Burns raised an objection based on

Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), at his sentencing hearing, and this

objection may well have been sufficient to preserve a claim of non-constitutional

Booker error. See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 549 (8th Cir. 2005) (en

banc). Because Burns was sentenced at the bottom of the mandatory guideline range,

he perhaps would be entitled to a remand for resentencing if he has not waived his

right to appeal. See United States v. Haidley, 400 F.3d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 2005).

We nonetheless conclude that Burns waived his right to appeal the sentence

imposed and that the waiver is enforceable. We held in United States v. Andis, 333

F.3d 886, that valid appeal waivers generally are enforceable, subject only to an

exception where enforcement would result in a “miscarriage of justice.” While the

court did say that an “illegal sentence” could be a “miscarriage of justice,” we

emphasized that the exception to general enforceability of appeal waivers was

“extremely narrow” and said that “[a]ny sentence imposed within the statutory range

is not subject to appeal.” Id. at 892. For purposes of considering enforcement of

appeal waivers, the Andis court used a specialized meaning of “illegal sentence,” to

wit: a sentence outside the statutory range authorized for the offenses of conviction.

Burns’s sentence was consistent with the statutory provisions; his only argument is

that the district court could have sentenced him elsewhere within the statutory range.

We conclude that this possibility does not establish a “miscarriage of justice” within

the meaning of Andis. Accord United States v. Green, 405 F.3d 1180, 1191-94 (10th

Cir. 2005). This holding is consistent with our decisions in United States v. Killgo,

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1

Our court in Killgo also said that the appeal waiver in that case “did not waive

the application of a constitutional standard of review on appeal,” 397 F.3d at 630 n.4,

and proceeded to review Killgo’s sentence for “unreasonableness” with regard to 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a) as prescribed by Booker. Id. at 630-32. We are not sure what the

Killgo panel meant by a “constitutional standard of review” that was not waived in

Killgo’s plea agreement, because the “reasonableness” standard of review adopted in

Booker was not dictated by the Constitution. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 766 (“[W]e

read the statute as implying this appellate standard of review.”) (emphasis added). 

We are unsure why a defendant’s waiver of a Sixth Amendment claim under Booker

would be enforceable, while his waiver of a non-constitutional claim that a sentence

is unreasonable with regard to § 3553(a) would be unenforceable. In any event,

Burns does not argue that his sentence is “unreasonable” with respect to § 3553(a),

so we need not address whether the appeal waiver in this case would be enforceable

with respect to such an argument.

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397 F.3d 628, 630 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005), and United States v. Fogg, 2005 WL 1186535,

at * 1-2 (8th Cir. May 20, 2005), which enforced appeal waivers with respect to

claims based on Booker.

1

Accordingly, the government’s motion to dismiss the appeal is granted, and the

appeal is dismissed.

 ______________________________

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