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Parties Involved:
Gerard Gary Garcia
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT . 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appelle~,-

·ore 2 c, 1.989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 88-2557 

v. 

GERARD GARY GARCIA, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of ~ew Mexico 

(D.C. No. 88-043-JB) 

Stephen P. Mccue, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Joe M. Romero, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney (William L. 

Lutz, Unit~d States Attorney, with him on the brief), Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appeliee. 

Before ANDERSON and EaEL, Circ~it Judges, and RUSSELL, District 

Judge.* 

* The Honorable David L. Russell, United States District Judge 

for ·the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-2557 Document: 010110280396 Date Filed: 12/29/1989 Page: 1
EBEL, ·circuit Judge. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2557 Document: 010110280396 Date Filed: 12/29/1989 Page: 2
This case requires us to consider whether the guidelines 

promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission apply to 

vioJacions oE the Assimilc1tive Crimes Act. 1 We conclude that the 

sentencing guidelines apply t6 assimilative crimes, but that the 

sentence imposed may no-t exceed any maximum sentence and may not 

fall below any mandatory minimum s~ntence that is required under 

the law of the state in which the crimes occur. We further hold 

that -the commentary to§ 2X5.l of the sentencing guidelines, whic~ 

"require(s]" courts to apply guidelines applicable to analogous 

federal crimes in determining sentences Eor assimilative crimes, 

ha~ n0 legal effect to the extent that it exceeds the lessrestrictive mandate of the Sentencing Reform Act of 19~4 to give 

only "due regard" to analogous federal sentencing guidelines. 

Finally, we conclude that the district court's gujdeiines senten6e 

in this case is permissible because it is within the range 

permitted· under New Mexico law. 

1 The Assimilative Crimes Act provides: 

Whoeyer within or upon any of the places now existing or 

hereafter reserved or acquired as provided in section 7 

of this title, is guilty of any act or omission which, 

al though ,not made punishable by any enactm~t of 

Congress, would be punished if committed or omitted 

within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory, 

Possession, or District in which such place is situated, 

by the laws thereof in force at the time of stich act or 

omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and subject 

to a like punishment. 

18 U.S.C. § 13 (1982) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 13(a) 

(1988)). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2557 Document: 010110280396 Date Filed: 12/29/1989 Page: 3
Facts 

On December 7, 1987, defendant Gerard Gary Garcia, an 

American Indian, struck and killed an American Indian pedestrian 

while driving a piciup truck on the Acoma Pueblo Reservation. The 

accident was caused, at least in part, by defendant's use of 

alcohol. R. Vol. II at 9. Defendant pled guilty to the 

assimilative New Mexico crime of involuntary rnanslaughter, 2 in 

violation of 18 u.s.c·. S 13 (1982). 3 Prior to the entry of his 

2 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-3(8). 

J Defendant's guilty plea and the July 15, 1988 information upon 

which his guilty plea is based state that defendant's conduct also 

amounted to a violation of the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1153. Section 1153 provides, in relevant part: 

(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or 

property of another Indian or other person any of the 

following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, ., and a felony under section 661 of this title within the 

Indian country, shall be subject to. the ·same law -and 

penalties as all other persons committing any of the 

above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 

United States. · 

(b) Any offen~e referred to in subsection (a) of this 

section that is not defined and punished by Federal law 

in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United 

States shall be defined and punished in accordance with 

the laws of the State in which such offense was 

committed as are in force at the time of such offense. 

18 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. V 1987) (current version at 18 U.S.C. 

5 1153 (1988)). 

We are unable to determine whether the district court based 

1ts sentence on the Indian Major Crimes Act or on the Assimilative 

=rimes Act, since the sentence refers to both. However, both 

)arties treat the sentence as having been based on the 

\ssimilative Crimes Act. We accept that characterization for 

)urposes of this opinion because of our conclusion that the 

;entencing guideline for the federal crime of involuntary 

1anslaughter would be appropriately applied to determine the 

' [Footnote continued ... ] 

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Appellate Case: 88-2557 Document: 010110280396 Date Filed: 12/29/1989 Page: 4
y r 1 ea, defendant filed a motion asking the court to declare 

stitutional the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, as amended, 

S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (Supp. IV l':l87) (current version at 

S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1988)) & 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Supp. IV 

R. Doc. 7. The district court granted the motion, 

uding that the Sentencing Reform Act violated the 

itutional principle of separation of- powers and expressing an 

ional concern that the guidelines violated the Due Process 

~- R. Doc. 40. The district court then sentenced defendant 

18-month prison term pursuant to the sentencing law in 

t prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. However, the 

ict court also imposed an alternative sentence putsuant to 

~ntencing Reform Act, to take effect if the Act was found to 

1~ ·tutionai. The alternative sentence was a piison term of 

1ths-~ plμs one year of supervised release, during which 

Jant would be required to underg9 rehabilitation for alcohol 

R. Doc. 41. Because the guidelines have been held to be 

.tutional, the alternative guidelines sentence is the 

ice that must be appl.ied against defendant. 4 

footnote continued] 

ice for the assimilative New Mexico crime of involuntary 

lug~ter. Thus, the sentence would be the same under either 

;,c. § 13 or 18 u.s.c. § 1153. 

· Government argues that this case may be moot because the' , of Prisons had is~ued an Operations Memorandum dated 

ry 2, 1989, which suggested that the Bureau would, on an 

111 basis, apply the non-guidelines sentence in a situation 

a court had imposed both a non-guidelines sentence and an 

ative guidelines sentence. Appellee's Br. at 4. However, 

strict court's judgment in this case explicitly provided 

he alternative guidelines sentence would apply "in the event 

nt1 cing Reform Act of 1984 is found to be constitutional." 

(Footnote continued ... ] 

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Appellate Case: 88-2557 Document: 010110280396 Date Filed: 12/29/1989 Page: 5
Discussion 

I. The Purposes of the Assimilative Crimes Act and the 

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 

The Assimilative Crimes Act applies to offenses committed on 

Indian reservations. United States v. Pinto, 755 F.2d 150, 154 

(10th Cir. 1985). "'l'he purpose or: the Assimilative Crimes Act is 

to provide a method of punishing a crime committed on government 

reservations in the way and to the extent that it would. have been 

punishable if committed within the surrounding jurisdiction. The 

Act fills in gaps in federal criminal law by providing a set of 

criminal laws for federal enclaves." United states v. Sain, 795 

F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). See also 

United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 2£6, ~93 (1958); James 

Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 101 (1940); Uni.ied States 

v; Press Publishing Co., 219. U.S. l, 10 (1911). 

The Se~tencing Reform Act of 1984 was.enacted to achieve 

gre2icer uniformity in the sentencing of federal crimes. Its 

--·-----------

[ ... footnote continued] 

R. Doc. 41. In light of the Supreme Court's decision that the 

Sentencing Feform Act does not violate the separation-of-powers 

principle, Mistretta v. United States, U.S. , 109· S. Ct. 

647, 102 L. Ed. 4d 714 (1989), and this court's holding that the 

Act does .not violate the Due Process Clause, United States v. 

Thomas, 884 F.2d 540 (10th c;ir. 1989), the alternative guidelines 

sentence is· the one that must be applied under the express terms 

of the district court's judgment. Therefore, the case is not 

moot. Moreover, a memorandum dated February l, 1989, from 

Assistant Attorney General Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., the head of 

the Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice, 

indicated that a consensus had been reached within the Department 

of Justice, including the Bureau of Prisons, to the effect that if 

a court imposed an alternative sentence based on the guidelines, 

the Bureau of Prisons would apply that alternative guidelines 

sentence. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2557 Document: 010110280396 Date Filed: 12/29/1989 Page: 6
provisions ''are designed to structure judicial sentencing 

discretion, eliminate indeterminate sentencing, phase out parole 

release, and make cr·iminal sentencing fairer and more certain." 

S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1984 U.S. 

Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, ~248. The Sentencing Reform Act 

provides that ''[e]xcept a~ otherwise specifically provided, a 

defendant who has been tound guilty of an offense described in any 

Federal statut~. . shall be sentenced in accordance with the 

provisions of this chapter." 18 u.s.c. § 355l(a) (Supp. V 1987) 

(current version at 18 u.s.c. § 355l(a) (1988)). In the case of 

assimilative crimes, ft is difficult to achieve fully the 

Sentencing Reform Act's goal of federal sentencing uniformity 

because the punishments for particular state offenses often vary 

significantly among ·the states. Therefore, it is not always· 

possible ·to achieve uniformity in federal sentences for similar 

assimilative crimes that are c.ommitted in different states, and, 

at the same time, promote the Assimilative Crime Act's goal of 

intrastate sentencing uniformity. 

The guidelines adopted pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act 

do not 4dequately take into account the tension between the two 

policies of federal sentencing uniformity and intrastate 

sentencing uniformity. The guidelines focus primarily on the goal 

of federal sentencing uniformity. The commenta't·y to § 2X5 .. 1 of 

the guidelines provides that in the case of assimilative crimes, 

the court imposing the sentence ''is required to determine if ~here 

is a sufficiently analogous offense guideline, and, if so, to 

apply the guideline that is most analogous." Although applying_ 

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Appellate Case: 88-2557 Document: 010110280396 Date Filed: 12/29/1989 Page: 7
analogous federal guidelines in determining sentences for 

assimilative crimes promotes federal sentencing uniformity, it 

ignores entirely the objective of intrastate sentencing uniformity 

underlying the Assimilaiive Crimes Act. 

Where two statutes are ".'"capable of co-existence, it is the 

duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional 

intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective."'" 

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1985) (quoting 

Begional Rail Reorganization Act Cases~ 419 U.S. 102, 133-34 

(1974) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, ·417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974))). 

See also 2A J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction 

§ 51 .02 (C. Sands 4th ed .. rev. 1984). Her~, the Sentencing Reform 

Act expressly authorizes courts to interpret it so as to achieve 

harmony, to the extent possible, with other statutes. The 

Sentencing Reform Act .states that its provisions apply "[e)xcept 

as·otherwise specifically provided;" 18 U.S.C. § 355l(a). We 

conclude that the Assimilative Crimes Act "specifically 

provide[s)," within the meaning of 18 u.s.c. § 355l(a), that the 

sentencing for assimilative crimes is to be det~rmined in 

accordance with state law so that the defendant is "subject to a 

like punishment." 18 U.S.C. § 13. 

However, state law generally specifies only the outer maximum 

and minimum sentences. that a judge may impose and vests with the 

judge considerable discretion to determine an appropriate sentence 

withi11 those limits. Within the permitted range, it is impossible 

to determine with certainty the sentence that a state judge would 

impose. As a result, the Assimilative Crimes Act's goal of· 

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Appellate Case: 88-2557 Document: 010110280396 Date Filed: 12/29/1989 Page: 8
intrastate sentencing uniformity is inherently limited by the lack 

of specificity of state sentencing law. It is within this 

permitted range that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the 

senten~ing guidelines may act to promote federal uniformity. 

Federal judges, like their state counterparts, can only be 

required to. impose sentences for assimilative crimes that fall 

~ithin the maximum and minimum terms permitted under state law. 

Efforts to duplicate every last nuance of the sentence that would 

be imposed in st~te court has never been required. For example, 

federal courts need not foliow state parole policies, including 

provisions for ·good time credits. See,~, United States v. 

Binder, 76.9 F.2d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1985); Pinto, 755 F.2d at 154; 

United States v. Vaughan, 682 F.2d 290, 294-95 (2d Cir.),·cert. 

denied, 459 U.S. 946. (1982); United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 988, 

'992-93 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 852 (1978). In 

addition, Con9reis has expressly made applicable to assimilative 

crimes the federal provision requiring that a special monetary 

assessment be imposed on convicted persons. 18 U.S.C. § 3013(d) 

(Supp. V 1987) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3013(d) (198.8)). 

Therefore, we hold th~t _the Assimilative Crimes Act requires 

courts to impose sentences for assimilative 6rimes that fall 

within the maximum and minimum terms established by state law. 

However, within the range of discretion pe;mitted to a state 

judge, a federal judge should apply the federal sentencing 

guidelines to the extent possible. 

In addition to the exception clause of§ 355l(a), discussed 

above, the Serttencing Reform Act also provides that where there. is 

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no applicable sentencing guideline, the court is to have "due 

regard'' for sentences prescribed by the guidelines for .similar 

offe11ses and offenders. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (Supp. V 1987) 

(current version at 18 O.s~c. § 3553(b) (1988)). The use of the 

phrase "due regard" suggests that Congress recognized that, in the 

absence of an applicable guideline foi a particul~r crime, courts 

should not automatically apply the guidelines for similar 

offenses. In contrast, the commentary to§ 2X5.l of the 

guidelines requires courts to apply "sufficiently analogous" 

guidelines. The commentary is too restrictive and is not 

authorized by the statute. Therefore, we hold that to the extent 

the commentary to§ 2X5.l exceeds the statutory mandate to have 

"due regard" for analogous sentencing·guidelines, the commentary 

is of. no legal ef feet. 

Our views expressed herein are in agreement with the few 

cases th.at have considered similar issues. Two cases have. agreed· 

that the Sentencing·Reform Act does not manifest a clear intent to 

repeal the '' 1 ike punishment" clause of the Ass imi lat i ve Crimes 

Act. United States v. Richards, No. 88-9005M-0l (D. Kan. Oct. 21, 

1988) (magistrate's memorandum and order) (available on Westlaw at 

1988 WL i23140; available on .Lexis at 198a U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

15101); United States v. Policastro, No. 89-244M-3 (E.D.N.C: July 

11, 1~89) (magistrate's memorandum and order). -~ third case has 

noted that "while the reforms enacted·by the Sentencing Reform Act 

are broad, there are circumstances in which a defendant convicted 

in a federal district court is not properly sentenced under the 

guidelines." United States v. Norguay, 708.F. Supp. 1064, 1066 

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Appellate Case: 88-2557 Document: 010110280396 Date Filed: 12/29/1989 Page: 10
(D. Minn. 1989) (concluding that the Sentencing Reform Act does 

not clearly.express an intent for defendants convicted of crimes 

under the Indian Major Crimes Act to be sentenced under the 

federal sentencing guidelines instead of the provisions of the 

Major Crimes Act). 

This court considered a similar situation in United States v. 

Du1~1~, '.:l • => F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1976). In Dunn, the court 

considered whether state sentencing law or the Youth Corrections 

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (repealed 1984), governed the sentencing of 

an 6ssimilafive crime committed by a youth offender. The court 

concluded that a federal court may apply the Youth Correction Act 

in determining the sentence for an assimilative crime, but, in 

order to ensure that the purposes underly~ng the Assimilative 

Cri~es Act are honored~ the .sentence may not exceed the maximu~ 

period allowed under relevant state la-w. Dunn, 545 F.2d at 1283 .. 

By following that approach, the court was able to !lglve(] maximum 

comfort to the basic intent of Congress as contained in" the Youth 

Corrections Act and the As~imilative Crimes Act. Id. 

II. The District Court's Guidelines Sentence 

In light of our earlier holding that the sentences for 

assimilative crimes must fall within the maximum and minimum terms 

provided for under state l~w, we now proceed to consider whether 

the district court's guidelines sentence in this case is within 

the range permitted under New· Mexico law. New Mexico law provides 

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Eur a "basic sentence" of 18 months for involuntary manslaughter. 

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-lS(A). However, New Mexico judges are 

authorized to alter the basic sentence based on "any mitigating or 

aggravating circumstances surrounding the offense or concerning 

the offender." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-15.l(A). The amount of 

that alteration cannot exceed one-third of the basic sentence. 

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-15.l(C). The guideline for the federal 

crime of involuntary manslaughter, which was apparently applied by 

the district court in d~termining its alternative guidelines 

sentence, provides for a base offense level of 14 for involuntary 

manslaughter resulting from conduct that was reckless. 5 The 

sentences for crimes with a base offense level of 14 rarige from 15 

months to 46 months, ·aepending on various aggr~vating and 

mitigating factors. 

Although New Mexico does preclude the consid~ration of 

certain aggravating cir~umstances in imposing sentence, appellant 

ha~ made no showing here that the districit co~rt improperly 

considered any of those circumstances in computing his sente0ce 

under the guidelines. 6 The district court in this case applied 

5 'l'he commentary to§ 2Al.4 provides that "(a] homicide resulting 

from driving· ... while under the influence of alcohol or drugs 

ordinarily should be treated as reckless.". 

6 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-15.1(8) provides tha~ the sentencing 

judge "shall not consider the use of a firearm or prior felony 

convictions as aggravating circumstances for the purpose of 

altering the basic senten.ce." Presumably, the purpose of 

§ 31-18-15.1(8) is to take into account the fact that other ·New 

Mexico statutory provisions provide for specific sentence 

enhancements based on the use of a firearm and prior felony 

convictions. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-18-16, 31-18-16.1~ 

31-18-17. Appellant was not charged here with any assimilative 

crime based on those specific enhancement provisions . . -12-

Appellate Case: 88-2557 Document: 010110280396 Date Filed: 12/29/1989 Page: 12
the mitigating and aggravating factors provided in the Sentencing 

Reform Act and the guidelines in determining the guidelines 

sentence and arrived at a sentence of 18 months, plus one year of 

supervised rele~se. Because the 18-month sentence is clearly 

within the range permitted under New Mexico law, it is consistent 

with the policy of intrastate sentencing uniformity underlying the 

Assimilative Crimes Act. Because the sentence is based on an 

application of the sentencing guidelines, it also furthers the 

objectives of federal uniformity underlying the Sentencing Reform 

Ace. Further, New Mexico law provides for a mandatory one-year 

parole term tor persons convicted of involuntary manslaughter. 

See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-3(8) (defining involuntary manslaughter 

as a fourth-degree telon~); N.M. Stat. Ann. 31-21-lO(C) (requiring 

one-year parole term. for persons convic~ed of a fourth-degree 

felony). Therefore, the guidelines sentence imposed by the 

disttict court was lawfui. 

In sum, we hold that the Assimilative Cri~ei Act falls within 

the exception ~lause of 18 u.s.c. S 355l(a). Therefore, a 

sentence for an assimilati~e crime must satisfy the "like 

punishment" clause of the Assimilative Crimes Act, which requires 

that the sentence fall within the maximum and minimum terms 

provided under· state law. We further hold that the commentary to 

§ 2X5.l ot the guidelines, which "require[s)" courts to apply 

analogous guidelines in sentencing assimilative crimes, has no 

legal effect to the extent that it exceeds the less-restrictive 

mandate of the Sentencing Reform Act to have "due regard''_for 

analogous sentencing guidelines. Fi~ally, we conclude that the 

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district cour.t's guidelines sentence in this case was permissible 

because it 1s within the range permitted under New Mexico law and 

because it. is apparently based on analogous guidelines and falls 

within the range of discretion permitted by state law. Therefore, 

the September 23, 1988 judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED. 7 

7 We note that defendant raised the issue of whether the 

sentencing guidelines apply to assimilative crimes for the first 

time on appeal. Therefore, if we had concluded that the district 

court erred in sentencing defendant, we would have had to address 

whether the district court committed a "plain error(]" that would 

warrant reversal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). However, in light 

of our conclusion that the district court did not err in 

sentencing defendant, there is no plain-error issue to decide. 

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