Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00892/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00892-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Colette Craan
Plaintiff
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

COLLETTE CRAAN, CASE NO. CV F 07-0892 LJO DLB

Plaintiff, ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS AND ALTERNATIVE MOTION

vs. FOR JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS

(Doc. 16.)

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,

Defendant.

 /

INTRODUCTION

Defendant U.S. ArmyCorps of Engineers (“Corps”) seeks F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6) dismissal

of plaintiffs Collette Craan (“Ms. Craan”) and her minor son Christian Dewey’s (“Christian’s”) tort

claims arising from the Lake Isabella drowning death of Casand Dewey (“Casand”), Ms. Craan’s son

and Christian’s brother. The Corps alternatively seeks a F.R.Civ.P. 12(c) judgment on Ms. Craan and

Christian’s (collectively “plaintiffs’”) claims. Plaintiffs filed no timely opposition papers. This Court

considered the Corps’ alternative motions on the record and VACATES the January 10, 2008 hearing,

pursuant to Local Rule 78-230(c), (h). For the reasons discussed below, this Court DISMISSES with

prejudice plaintiffs’ claims.

BACKGROUND

Lake Isabella

Congress authorized the Corps, an agency of the U.S. Army, to construct the dam at Lake Isabella

for flood control pursuant to the Flood Control Act of 1944 (“FCA”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq. The

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Corps characterizes the project as a “comprehensive plan for flood control.” The Corps continues to

control the dam and gross pool of floodwaters contained in Lake Isabella. 

Casand’s Drowning

On June 25, 2005, Casand, then age 20, drowned when swimming in Lake Isabella. Casand had

been swimming with friends back and forth to a small island about 100 yards off shore. The Coroner’s

Report indicated “drowning” as cause of death and an absence of trauma, violence or apparent septic

process.

Plaintiffs’ Claims

On June 22, 2007, Ms. Craan filed for herself and Christian an administrative claim against the

Corps to claim that Casand was pulled under the water by a “strong hydro suction sediment or current.”

The administrative claim lists contributors to Casand’s death of: (1) overgrown algae; (2) toxic

chemicals; (3) strong undercurrents of which swimmers are unaware; (4) unmarked underwater hazards;

and (5) the Corps’ negligence in Lake Isabella’s construction and maintenance. The administrative claim

further alleges that toxic chemicals caused Casand’s violent medical reaction to slow his breathing and

ability to swim safely.

Also on June 22, 2007, Ms. Craan filed for herself and Christian this action by attaching

substantive portions of the administrative claim to a caption page. On August 15, 2007, the U.S. Army

Claims Service denied Ms. Craan and Christian’s claims. 

The Corps seeks to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims on grounds that: (1) the FCA immunizes the Corps

from liability; (2) plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) plaintiffs lack standing

to assert a wrongful death claim.

DISCUSSION

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss Standards

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) authorizes a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Fundamentally, federal courts are of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S.

375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 341 (1994). “A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case

unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F. 2d 1221,

1225 (9 Cir. 1989). Limits on federal jurisdiction must be neither disregarded nor evaded. Owen th

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Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374, 98 S.Ct. 2396 (1978). A plaintiff bears the

burden to establish that subject matter jurisdiction is proper. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, 98 S.Ct. 2396.

A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) attack on jurisdiction may be facial to confine inquiry to the complaint’s

allegations, or factual to permit a court to look beyond the complaint. Savage v. Glendale Union High

School, 343 F.3d 1036, 1039-1040, n. 2 (9 Cir. 2003). When a defendant challenges jurisdiction th

“facially,” all material allegations in the complaint are assumed true, and the question for the court is

whether the lack of federal jurisdiction appears from the face of the pleading. Thornhill Publishing Co.

v. General Telephone Electronics, 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9 Cir. 1979); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & th

Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3 Cir. 1977). In a factual challenge, a court may rely on evidence

rd

extrinsic to the pleadings and resolve factual disputes relating to jurisdiction. St. Clair v. City of Chico,

880 F.2d 199, 210 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 993, 110 S.Ct. 541 (1989); Roberts v. Corrothers,

th

812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9 Cir. 1987). In addition, a court “need not presume the truthfulness of the th

plaintiffs’ allegations.” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9 Cir. 2000). th

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss Standards

A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings set

forth in the complaint. “When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception

of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not

whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to

support the claims.” Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco

Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9 Cir. 1997). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where th

there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

cognizable legal theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990); Graehling th

v. Village of Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7 Cir. 1995). th

In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must: (1) construe the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine

whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996). “However, conclusory allegations of law and

unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d

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696, 699 (9 Cir. 1998). A court need not permit an attempt to amend a complaint if “it determines that th

the pleading could not possibly be cured by allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v.

N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9 Cir. 1990). th

F.R.Civ.P. 12(c) Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings

F.R.Civ.P. 12(c) authorizes a motion for judgment on the pleadings: “After the pleadings are

closed – but early enough not to delay trial – a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” “A

motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted where it appears the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Geraci v. Homestreet Bank, 347 F.3d 749, 751 (9 Cir. 2003). th

A F.R.Civ.P. 12(c) motion “is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in

dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and

any judicially noticed facts.” Herbert Abstract Co. v. Touchstone Props., Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5 Cir. th

1990) (per curiam). “[T]he central issue is whether, in light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint

states a valid claim for relief.” Hughes v. Tobacco Inst., Inc., 278 F.3d 417, 420 (5 Cir. 2001). th

The standards for deciding F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and F.R.Civ.P. 12(c) motions are the same. Great

Plains Trust v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 313 F.3d 305, 313, n. 8 (5 Cir. 2002). “Pleadings should th

be construed liberally, and judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only if there are no disputed issues

of fact and only questions of law remain.” Hughes, 278 F.3d at 420. 

With these standards in mind, this Court turns to the merits of the Corps’ alternative F.R.Civ.P.

12 motions.

FCA Immunity

The FCA provides a broad grant of immunity to the Corps: “No liability of any kind shall attach

to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place . . .” 33

U.S.C. § 702c (“section 702c”). “It is difficult to imagine broader language. . . . It is thus clear from §

702c's plain language that the terms ‘flood’ and ‘flood waters’ apply to all waters contained in or carried

through a federal flood control project for purposes of . . . flood control, as well as to waters that such

projects cannot control.” United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 605, 106 S.Ct. 3116, 121 (1986). If

injury results from operation of a federal project “for flood control purposes, government immunity is

complete” and applies although the “federal project has multiple purposes and is not intended

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exclusively for flood control.” Morici Corp. v. United States, 681 F.2d 645, 647 (1982). The

“determinative factor” is the project’s “purpose,” and if Congress authorized the project for “flood

control purposes,” the immunity “continues to attach.” Morici, 681 F.2d at 648. The Federal Tort

Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680, did not repeal FCA immunity. Clark v. United

States, 218 F.2d 446, 453 (9 Cir. 1954). th

As the Corps notes, “Congress specifically authorized the project for the Isabella Reservoir on

the Kern River . . . for ‘flood control and other purposes’ in the Flood Control Act of 1944.” Even if

the project was operated at the time of the negligence for a purpose other than flood control, so long as

the damage or injury was not “wholly unrelated” to a Congressionally authorized flood control project,

“a sufficient nexus for purposes of § 702c immunity exists.” McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558,

562, cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052, 109 S.Ct. 112 (1989) (citing Morici, 681 F.2d at 648). The Corps

argues that section 702c immunity attaches with a “sufficient nexus” between flood control and Casand’s

death.

The Corps establishes, and plaintiffs fail to refute, that section 702c immunity applies to the

Corps’ control of the Lake Isabella project. Plaintiffs make no meaningful challenge to section 702c

immunity which protects the Corps from liability from Casand’s death. Under the circumstances,

plaintiffs can allege no facts to avoid section 702c liability.

Sovereign Immunity And Administrative Exhaustion

In addition to section 702c immunity, the Corps argues that it is entitled to traditional sovereign

immunity. 

“The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued.” United

States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 769 (1941). A waiver of traditional sovereign

immunity is not implied but must be unequivocally expressed. See United States v. Testan, 424 U.S.

392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 953-954 (1976). “There cannot be a right to money damages without a waiver

of sovereign immunity.” Testan, 424 U.S. at 400, 96 S.Ct. at 954. “[T]he United States may not be sued

without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United States v.

Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 2965 (1983). 

A party bringing a cause of action against the federal government bears the burden of showing

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an unequivocal waiver of immunity. Holloman v. Watt, 708 F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir.1983), cert.

denied, 466 U.S. 958, 104 S.Ct. 2168, 80 L.Ed.2d 552 (1984). “Thus, the United States may not be sued

without its consent and the terms of such consent define the court's jurisdiction.” Baker v. United States,

817 F.2d 560, 562 (9 Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1204, 108 S.Ct. 2845 (1988). th

The Corps argues that the FTCA is “the only conceivable jurisdictional basis” for plaintiffs’

alleged tort claim. “The FTCA is the exclusive remedy for tortious conduct by the United States, and

it only allows claims against the United States.” Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Craft, 157 F.3d 697, 706

(9 Cir. 1998). The FTCA requires a government tort plaintiff, prior to filing a district court action, to th

present a “claim to the appropriate Federal agency” and the agency’s claim denial. 28 U.S.C. § 2675.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:

The requirement of an administrative claim is jurisdictional. . . . Because the requirement

is jurisdictional, it “must be strictly adhered to. This is particularly so since the FTCA

waives sovereign immunity. Any such waiver must be strictly construed in favor of the

United States.” 

Brady v. United States, 211 F.3d 499, 502 (9 Cir. 2000) (citations omitted.) th

“[I]n the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements

specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.” Mohasco

Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 2497 (1980). “The FTCA bars claimants from

bringing suit in federal court until theyhave exhausted their administrative remedies.” McNeil v. United

States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 1984 (1993).

Plaintiffs here presented an administrative claim against the Corps on the same date they filed

this action. As such, the Corps correctly argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims

in the absence of exhaustion of their administrative claim prior to filing this action. Plaintiffs can allege

no facts to relieve their exhaustion requirements.

Substantive Merits Of Plaintiffs’ Claims

The Corps contends that plaintiffs’ complaint “fails to set forth a prima facie case” in that

plaintiffs lack standing under California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60 (“section 377.60") to

pursue wrongful death claims.

A district court applies the substantive law of the state where the negligent act or omission

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occurred in an FTCA action. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11, 82 S.Ct. 585 (1962). Under

section 377.60(a), a wrongful death action may be pursued by a decedent’s surviving spouse or children,

or if there are no surviving issue, by a person entitled to inherit from decedent by intestate succession.

Section 377.60(b) permits a parent to pursue a wrongful death action if “dependent” on the deceased

child.

The Corps properly faults the complaint’s absence of allegations that Casand had no children and

that Ms. Craan was dependent on Casand to permit Ms. Craan to pursue a wrongful death claim.

In addition, a sibling, such as Christian, is barred to bring a wrongful death action unless the

decedent has no surviving issue or parents. Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60(a); Cal. Prob. Code, §

6402(c). A decedent’s sibling, while a potential heir under California probate law, is ineligible to bring

a section 377.60 wrongful death action if a decedent’s parent survives. Mayo v. White, 178 Cal.App.3d

1083, 1088, 224 Cal.Rptr. 373, 376 (1986).

The Corps correctly notes that since the complaint is clear that Ms. Craan survives as Casand’s

parent, Christian’s wrongful death claim is barred.

The complaint fails to allege necessary allegations to permit plaintiffs to pursue section 377.60

wrongful death claims, and no facts are apparent to revive such claims.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court DISMISSES with prejudice this action due to: (1)

the Corps entitlement to section 702c immunity; (2) plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust administratively their

claims prior to this action; and (3) failure of their claims under section 377.60. This Court DIRECTS

the clerk to enter judgment in favor of defendant U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and against plaintiffs

Colette Craan and Christian Dewey and to close this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 3, 2008 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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