Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01994/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01994-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Apple Inc.
Appellee
Samsung Electronics America, Inc.
Appellant
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Appellant
Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

APPLE INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant

v.

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., A KOREAN 

CORPORATION, SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS 

AMERICA, INC., A NEW YORK CORPORATION, 

SAMSUNG TELECOMMUNICATIONS AMERICA, 

LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY 

COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellants

______________________ 

2015-1171, 2015-1195, 2015-1994

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of California in No. 5:12-cv-00630-LHK, 

Judge Lucy H. Koh.

______________________ 

Decided: October 7, 2016 

______________________ 

 WILLIAM F. LEE, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and 

Dorr LLP, Boston MA, argued for plaintiff-crossappellant. Also represented by DANA OLCOTT BURWELL,

ANDREW J. DANFORD, MARK CHRISTOPHER FLEMING,

LAUREN B. FLETCHER, SARAH R. FRAZIER, RICHARD WELLS 

O’NEILL; MARK D. SELWYN, Palo Alto CA; THOMAS 

GREGORY SPRANKLING, Washington, DC; RACHEL 

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2 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

KREVANS, Morrison & Foerster LLP, San Francisco, CA; 

ERIK JEFFREY OLSON, Palo Alto, CA. 

 KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & 

Sullivan, LLP, New York, NY, argued for defendantappellants. Also represented by WILLIAM ADAMS, DAVID 

MICHAEL COOPER; BRIAN COSMO CANNON, KEVIN P.B.

JOHNSON, VICTORIA FISHMAN MAROULIS, Redwood Shores, 

CA; JOHN B. QUINN, SCOTT L. WATSON, MICHAEL THOMAS 

ZELLER, Los Angeles, CA.

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, LOURIE, DYK, 

MOORE, O’MALLEY, REYNA, WALLACH, CHEN, HUGHES, and 

STOLL, Circuit Judges.

∗

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge MOORE, in 

which NEWMAN, LOURIE, O’MALLEY, WALLACH, CHEN, and 

STOLL, Circuit Judges, join.

Concurring in the result without opinion Circuit Judge

HUGHES. 

Dissenting Opinion filed by Chief Judge PROST. 

Dissenting Opinion filed by Circuit Judge DYK. 

Dissenting Opinion filed by Circuit Judge REYNA. 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

I. INTRODUCTION

The current appeal results from a patent infringement suit and countersuit between Apple Inc. (“Apple”) 

and Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Electronics 

America, Inc., and Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC (collectively, “Samsung”). Relevant to this en 

 

∗

 Circuit Judge TARANTO did not participate.

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APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 3

banc decision, the district court granted summary judgment that Samsung’s accused devices infringe the asserted claim of U.S. Patent No. 8,074,172 (“the ’172 patent”). 

After a thirteen day trial, the jury found the asserted 

claim of U.S. Patent No. 5,946,647 (“the ’647 patent”) 

infringed, and the district court denied Samsung’s requested judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”). The jury 

also found the asserted claim of U.S. Patent No. 8,046,721 

(“the ’721 patent”) infringed and not invalid and the

asserted claim of the ’172 patent not invalid. The district 

court later denied Samsung’s requested JMOL and entered judgment accordingly.1 Samsung appealed the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment of infringement as to the ’172 patent, denial of JMOL of noninfringement as to the ’647 patent, and denial of JMOL of 

obviousness as to the ’721 and ’172 patents. 

II. PROCEDURAL PROGRESS

A. The Decision to Grant En Banc Review

On February 26, 2016, a panel of this court reversed 

the denial of JMOL with regard to the jury verdict of 

infringement as to the ’647 patent and non-obviousness as 

to the ’721 and ’172 patents. Apple filed a petition for 

rehearing en banc. Apple’s petition argued that the panel 

reversed the jury’s finding of infringement of the ’647 

patent by relying on extra-record evidence “none of which 

 

1 Separately, the jury found that Samsung had not 

infringed the asserted claims of Apple’s ’414 or 

’959 patents. Additionally, the jury found that Apple had 

infringed the asserted claim of Samsung’s ’449 patent but 

had not infringed the asserted claim of Samsung’s 

’239 patent and awarded Samsung $158,400 in damages. 

We reinstate the panel decision as to the appeals relating 

to these issues.

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was of record and that the panel appears to have located 

only through independent research.” Apple Pet. 2. Apple 

argued that this extra-record extrinsic evidence was used 

to modify the agreed to and unappealed claim construction. See, e.g., id. at 8 (“The panel looked to [this extrarecord evidence] to create its own plain meaning of ‘server’ as requiring a ‘stand alone’ program.”). Apple also 

argued that this extra-record evidence was used in “considering the factual question whether Samsung’s phones 

met the ‘analyzer server’ limitation.” See id. at 6, 8 (“The 

panel also relied on dictionary and encyclopedia entries to 

inform its understanding of how the shared library code 

in Samsung’s phones work.” (emphasis in original)). 

Apple also argued that the case should be taken en banc 

because “in an unprecedented decision,” the panel reversed nearly every fact finding by the jury which favored 

Apple. Id. at 1. 

We granted Apple’s en banc petition to affirm our understanding of the appellate function as limited to deciding the issues raised on appeal by the parties, deciding 

these issues only on the basis of the record made below, 

and as requiring appropriate deference be applied to the 

review of fact findings. There was no need to solicit 

additional briefing or argument on the question of whether an appellate panel can look to extra-record extrinsic 

evidence to construe a patent claim term. “The Supreme 

Court made clear that the factual components [of claim 

construction] include ‘the background science or the 

meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant 

time period.’” Teva Pharms., Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 

F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Teva Pharms., 

Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015)). After 

Teva, such fact findings are indisputably the province of 

the district court. We did not need to solicit additional 

briefing or argument to conclude that the appellate court 

cannot rely on extra-record extrinsic evidence in the first 

instance or make factual findings about what such extrinCase: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 4 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 5

sic evidence suggests about the plain meaning of a claim 

term in the art at the relevant time or how such extra 

record evidence may inform our understanding of how the 

accused device operates. We likewise did not need additional briefing or argument to determine that the appellate court is not permitted to reverse fact findings that 

were not appealed or that the appellate court is required 

to review jury fact findings when they are appealed for 

substantial evidence. The panel reversed nearly a dozen 

jury fact findings including infringement, motivation to 

combine, the teachings of prior art references, commercial 

success, industry praise, copying, and long-felt need 

across three different patents. It did so despite the fact 

that some of these findings were not appealed and without ever mentioning the applicable substantial evidence

standard of review. And with regard to objective indicia, 

it did so in ways that departed from existing law.

The dissents, and Judge Dyk’s dissent in particular, 

raise big questions about how aspects of the obviousness 

doctrine ought to operate. But no party—at the panel or 

the petition for rehearing en banc stage—invited this 

court to consider changing the existing law of obviousness. We did not take this case en banc to decide important legal questions about the inner workings of the 

law of obviousness. We have applied existing obviousness 

law to the facts of this case. We took this case en banc to

affirm our understanding of our appellate function, to 

apply the governing law, and to maintain our fidelity to 

the Supreme Court’s Teva decision. 

B. The En Banc Decision

We affirm and reinstate the district court’s judgment 

as to the ’647, ’721, and ’172 patents. We conclude that 

the jury verdict on each issue is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record and that the district court did not 

err when denying Samsung’s respective JMOLs. Accordingly, we vacate the panel opinion and affirm the district 

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court’s judgment with respect to these patents. We reinstate the panel opinion regarding U.S. Patent Nos. 

6,847,959, 7,761,414, 5,579,239, and 6,226,449. In all 

other respects, the panel decision is vacated. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 

III. DISCUSSION

We review a district court’s order granting or denying 

JMOL under the standard applied by the regional circuit. 

In the Ninth Circuit, JMOL “is proper when the evidence 

permits only one reasonable conclusion and the conclusion 

is contrary to that of the jury.” See Monroe v. City of 

Phoenix, 248 F.3d 851, 861 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth 

Circuit explains that “[t]he evidence must be viewed in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all 

reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of that 

party.” Id. The Ninth Circuit reviews a district court’s

decision to grant or deny JMOL de novo. Id. 

A. The ’647 Patent

Apple asserted infringement of claim 9 of the 

’647 patent. The jury found that Samsung infringed and 

awarded Apple $98,690,625. J.A. 40869–79. The district 

court denied JMOL of non-infringement. J.A. 40–48. 

Samsung argues the district court erred in not granting 

its motion for JMOL of non-infringement. Because there 

was substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict, we 

affirm. “Substantial evidence . . . means such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. 

N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). 

Infringement is a question of fact. Lucent Techs., Inc. 

v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 

Our review on appeal is limited to whether there was 

substantial evidence in the record to support the jury’s 

verdict. Id. We presume the jury resolved all underlying 

factual disputes in favor of the verdict. SSL Servs., LLC 

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APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 7

v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 769 F.3d 1073, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

The ’647 patent discloses a system and method for detecting structures such as phone numbers, addresses, and 

dates in documents, and then linking actions or commands to those structures. When the system detects a 

structure in a document, an “analyzer server” links actions to that detected structure. Actions include things 

such as placing a phone call or adding an address to an 

electronic address book. See ’647 patent at 2:21–41. 

Apple asserted claim 9, which depends from claim 1:

1. A computer-based system for detecting structures in data and performing actions on detected 

structures, comprising:

an input device for receiving data;

an output device for presenting the data;

a memory storing information including 

program routines including

an analyzer server for detecting 

structures in the data, and for 

linking actions to the detected 

structures; 

a user interface enabling the selection of a detected structure and a 

linked action; and

an action processor for performing 

the selected action linked to the 

selected structure; and

a processing unit coupled to the input device, the output device, and the memory 

for controlling the execution of the program routines.

9. The system recited in claim 1, wherein the user 

interface enables selection of an action by causing 

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the output device to display a pop-up menu of the 

linked actions.

’647 patent at 7:9–55 (emphasis added). 

Samsung contends no reasonable jury could have 

found infringement based on our constructions of “analyzer server” and “linking actions to the detected structures.” 

We previously addressed the constructions of both terms

in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 

2014) (“Motorola”), a separate litigation involving the 

’647 patent. Our Motorola opinion issued on the parties’ 

final day for presenting evidence at trial in this case. 

J.A. 42. During the Markman hearing, neither Apple nor

Samsung had sought a construction of “analyzer server” 

or “linking actions,” and instead sought to rely on the 

plain and ordinary meanings of those terms. After 

Motorola issued, the parties agreed to give the Motorola

constructions to the jury and reopen evidence to give both 

sides an opportunity to present expert testimony about

the impact of the Motorola constructions on 

’647 infringement. J.A. 43. The jury was instructed as 

follows:

The term “analyzer server” means “a server routine separate from a client that receives data having structures from the client.”

The term “linking actions to the detected structures” means “creating a specified connection between each detected structure and at least one 

computer subroutine that causes the CPU to perform a sequence of operations on that detected 

structure.”

Final Annotated Jury Instrs., No. 22, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 5:12-cv-00630-LHK, (N.D. Cal. Apr. 

28, 2014), ECF No. 1848. Neither side objected to the jury 

instruction and neither side has appealed the constructions given to the jury. We address Samsung’s arguments 

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for each term separately. 

1. Analyzer Server

The only issue on appeal relating to the “analyzer 

server” limitation is whether there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s fact finding that Samsung’s 

accused devices satisfy this limitation under our Motorola

construction. In Motorola, we construed “analyzer server” 

as “a server routine separate from a client that receives 

data having structures from the client.” Motorola, 757 

F.3d at 1304. In Motorola, the court explained: 

We agree with the district court’s construction of 

“analyzer server.” As the district court recognized, the plain meaning of “server,” when viewed 

from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill 

in the art, entails a client-server relationship. 

Consistent with this perspective, the specification 

discloses an analyzer server that is separate from 

the application it serves. The analyzer server is 

part of the “program 165 of the present invention.” 

’647 patent at col. 3, ll. 38–39. Fig. 1 shows the 

program 165 and the application 167 as separate 

parts of a random-access memory (RAM):

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Id. at Fig. 1. Further, the specification states that 

“the program 165 of the present invention is 

stored in RAM 170 and causes CPU 120 to identify structures in data presented by the application 167.” Id. at col. 3, ll. 37–41. Thus, the 

specification describes the analyzer server and the 

application, which it serves, as separate structures.

Id. at 1304–05 (red box annotation to figure added).2 This 

court explained that the ’647 patent’s separate requirement for the analyzer server is met when the “program 165” and “application 167” are stored in “separate 

parts of random access memory.” Id. As we explained, 

Figure 1 of the patent “shows the program 165 and the 

application 167 as separate parts of a random-access 

memory (RAM)” and they are thus “separate structures.” 

Id. Under the Motorola claim construction, the program 

and application satisfied the separate requirement because they were structurally separate, i.e., located in 

different parts of the RAM. In this case, the parties 

agreed that the Motorola construction be given to the 

jury, and neither party appealed that construction.

The panel, however, used extra-record extrinsic evi-

 

2 The district court opinion in Motorola—which we 

affirmed—likewise based its determination of “separate” 

on the fact that the client and analyzer server are located 

in different parts of the memory, also citing Figure 1 of 

the patent: “Had the patent intended the analyzer server 

to be integrated into the application, rather than separate, the program box would logically appear inside the 

application box in Figure 1.” Apple Inc. v. Motorola Inc., 

No. 1:11-cv-08540, 2012 WL 12537293, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 

Mar. 19, 2012).

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dence to modify the agreed upon and unappealed construction of “analyzer server.”3 Panel Op. at 8, 10 n.5. It 

held that Samsung’s accused systems did not infringe 

because “the Samsung software library programs are not 

‘standalone’ programs that run separately.” Panel Op. at 

13. Neither party asked for this changed construction.4 

And there is no foundation in Motorola for it. 

 

3 The panel opinion also used the extra-record evidence to understand the operation of the accused products. See, e.g., Panel Op. at 9 (“In other words, the 

software library program runs as part of the client program. See Program library (software library), Dictionary 

of Computing 391 (4th ed. 1996) (“Usually it is only 

necessary to reference the library program to cause it to 

be automatically incorporated in a user’s program.”) 

(emphasis added).”); id. at 10–11 n.5 (“A client/server 

relationship assumes a ‘clean separation of functions’—

both the client and the server are independently operating programs, each performing separate functions. See, 

e.g., Stephen L. Montgomery, Object-Oriented Information Engineering: Analysis, Design, and Implementation 265 (1994).”). Apple argues that portions of the same 

extra-record evidence not cited by the panel support 

Apple’s position. We make no findings regarding the 

teachings of the extra-record evidence. 

4 Samsung did not argue that the Motorola construction should be expanded or modified to require that 

the “analyzer server” “run separately” or “stand alone” 

from the client application. The only instances where 

Motorola uses the word “separate” are when describing 

locations, such as “separate parts of a random-access 

memory (RAM)” or describing the analyzer server and 

client application as “separate structures.” Motorola, 757 

F.3d at 1304–05. Both parties tried the case and presented appellate arguments based on this understanding.

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The dissents claim that Apple agreed to a new construction during oral argument.5 The dissents take 

Apple’s statement out of context. When Apple’s counsel 

stated that the analyzer server runs separately, he was 

explaining that the analyzer server runs in its own location in memory; the shared library code is not copied into 

and run as part of the client application. See Oral Arg. at 

29:15–30:25. “The big fight was this, this was the big 

fight, does the code from the analyzer server get copied 

and become part of the analyzer server where it is run, or 

is there one copy of the code, and it is run at the analyzer 

server separately at the analyzer server as a part of a 

separate routine.” Id. at 44:55. Apple’s counsel repeatedly and clearly rejected the panel’s suggestion that “separate” means a standalone program which runs separately.

“There is no requirement in the claim interpretation that 

it run as a standalone program.” Oral Arg. at 34:55.6 

Apple argued that the panel’s proposed interpretation of 

“separate” was “a new claim construction that’s actually 

more specific and different than the jury charge. No one 

 

5 Two of the dissents argue Apple agreed to the 

panel’s construction that the analyzer server must “run 

on its own.” Prost Dissent at 21–22; Dyk Dissent at 22. 

We note that Judge Reyna’s dissent does not address this 

issue.

6 See also Oral Arg. at 28:45 (“There is no requirement that it be stand alone.”); id. at 33:15 (“There is 

nothing in the claim interpretation that says it has to be 

stand alone. It says it has to be a separate routine.”); id. 

at 40:15 (“The question is . . . does the claim require a 

completely standalone, separate routine, and this court’s 

Motorola interpretation doesn’t require it, and the claim 

doesn’t require it, but it does require a separate routine.”); 

id. at 44:00 (“There is no requirement legally that it be a 

standalone program.”). 

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has urged you to do that. There is no suggestion that the 

claim interpretation is wrong.” Id. at 45:45.7 Apple reiterated its objection to the panel’s modified construction in 

its Petition for Rehearing.8 

Claim construction was not appealed and we do not 

agree that Apple agreed to the panel’s change to the 

construction of analyzer server. Even Samsung’s counsel 

agreed, “[Apple] is correct that we are not disputing the 

claim construction.” Oral Arg. at 1:12:40. We thus return 

to our Motorola construction which was agreed upon by 

the parties in this case, given to the jury, and not appealed: “analyzer server” is “a server routine separate 

from a client that receives data having structures from 

the client.” We evaluate whether there is substantial 

evidence for the jury’s finding of infringement under that 

 

7 Apple’s counsel explained that to require the analyzer server to be a standalone program “would be taking 

the claim interpretation that was given in the Motorola

case and reinterpreting it to require something more 

specific.” Id. at 44:00; see id. at 46:05–46:25 (“Court: The 

question is what does the claim interpretation mean? 

Apple: No your honor, they haven’t raised that issue. 

There is no issue of claim interpretation, there is no issue 

of whether it was incorrect, there is no issue of whether it 

was given. The only question is, on that charge, was there 

substantial evidence to support the jury’s decision.”). 

8 See Apple Pet. 6 (“[T]he panel relied on non-record 

sources to make its own finding as to [server’s] plain 

meaning. Specifically, the panel ruled that ‘servers’ must 

be ‘‘standalone programs’ that run separately.’”); id. at 7 

n.4 (“But Apple’s counsel was clear that ‘[t]here is no 

requirement that [the analyzer server] be standalone. 

The requirement is that it be a separate routine.’”) (alterations in original). 

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construction.9 

On appeal, Samsung argues no reasonable jury could 

have found its accused devices meet the “analyzer server” 

limitation because the accused devices do not contain a 

server routine “separate” from the client application. 

Samsung Br. 16–25. It argues that “the uncontested 

evidence at trial showed that the Browser and Messenger 

applications each contain their own routines within the 

application for analyzing the data (i.e., performing the 

detecting and linking functions) and do not rely on a 

separate server.” Id. at 18 (emphasis in original). It 

argues that in its accused devices, when a client application needs shared library code, “it will copy it from the 

library and it will run as part of the application.” Id. 

at 19. It cites the testimony of its expert, Dr. Jeffay, that 

“[y]ou go to the library, you take code out of the library, 

you integrate it in your application, and at that point the 

 

9 Two of the dissents allege that the library programs cannot satisfy the analyzer server limitation despite the fact that they are separate programs which 

perform detecting and linking actions in response to a 

client request as required by the claims. Prost Dissent at 

21–22; Dyk Dissent at 20–21. The claim language plainly 

indicates that the client application uses the analyzer 

server to perform the linking and detecting functions. See

’647 patent claim 1. Samsung argued it did not infringe 

because of where the shared library code was used 

(whether it was copied into the client application before 

use), not whether it was used by the client application. 

See, e.g., Samsung Br. 17, 18, 19, 21–22, 24. The concept 

that the analyzer server must be “standalone” or “run on 

its own” or run in isolation apart from a client request has 

no foundation in the ’647 patent, in our prior Motorola 

decision, or in the parties briefs on appeal to this court. 

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library code is no different than any other code in the 

application.” Id. at 21. 

There is no real dispute regarding whether the shared 

library code in the accused devices performs all the 

claimed functionality—the dispute is where it performs 

those functions. Samsung contends the shared library 

code in its devices is copied and incorporated into the 

client application, so when the code is run, it runs as part 

of the client application. Therefore, its shared library 

code is not “separate” from the client application. 

Apple contends the shared library code in Samsung’s 

accused devices is never copied but rather remains at the 

library. It contends that, when a client application wishes 

to use Samsung’s shared library code, the application goes 

to the shared library and uses the code there. Therefore, 

Samsung’s shared library code is “separate” from the 

client. 

We limit our appellate review to the evidence of record before the district court. On this record, we hold that 

substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that 

Samsung’s accused devices contain “a server routine 

separate from a client that receives data having structures from the client.” See Motorola, 757 F.3d at 1304. 

Apple’s expert, Dr. Mowry, testified that the “analyzer 

server” in the accused devices is shared library code, and 

the client applications are the Browser and Messaging 

applications. J.A. 13030:4–22. He testified that Samsung’s shared library code and client applications are 

“separate” because they are located in separate parts of 

memory: “the shared libraries are developed independently of the application” and are “designed to be reused 

across different applications.” J.A. 13035:12–18, 

13036:13–20. He explained that “there’s only one copy of 

the shared library code,” and when client applications in 

Samsung’s accused devices wish to use the library code, 

“those applications go to that code and use it where it is 

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each time they want to access that code.” J.A. 13035:22–

25. He testified that, in the accused devices, one copy of 

shared library code may be shared by “20 or 100” different 

applications, J.A. 13036:13–20, and that, in order for an 

application to use the library code, the application must 

“go to the shared library code in the one place that exists 

in the computer memory hardware to use it.” Id.; see also 

J.A. 13037:1–6 (“It has access to the code and it goes to 

the code where it is and uses it there, and it does that 

each time that it accesses the code.”). Dr. Mowry also 

testified that the client applications and shared library 

code in the accused devices are stored “in a different part 

of the address base.” J.A. 13036:1–2. He concluded that 

the shared library code and client programs in the accused devices are “definitely separate.” J.A. 13036:20. 

On this record, this is substantial evidence to support

the jury’s finding that the accused devices meet the “analyzer server” limitation. Dr. Jeffay provided contrary 

testimony to Dr. Mowry, but the jury was in the best 

position to determine whether it found Dr. Mowry or 

Dr. Jeffay more persuasive. See, e.g., MobileMedia Ideas 

LLC v. Apple Inc., 780 F.3d 1159, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 

(“[W]hen there is conflicting testimony at trial, and the 

evidence overall does not make only one finding on the 

point reasonable, the jury is permitted to make credibility 

determinations and believe the witness it considers more 

trustworthy.”).10 We see no error in the district court’s 

 

10 We leave credibility issues to the jury. We note 

that the district court repeatedly mentioned that Samsung’s expert Dr. Jeffay gave inconsistent testimony 

about a particular limitation. See, e.g., 4/28/14 Tr. 

at 3058:6–10 (“[Dr. Jeffay has] been all over the map 

about what the plain and ordinary meaning of this term is 

. . . . He’s been all over the map.”); id. at 3059:2–3 (“He’s 

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conclusion that substantial evidence supported the jury 

verdict with respect to this limitation.

2. Linking Actions

Samsung also appealed the district court’s denial of 

JMOL of non-infringement based upon the “linking actions” limitation. We hold that there was substantial 

evidence to support the jury’s finding that the accused

devices meet the “linking actions” limitation under our 

construction in Motorola. 

In Motorola, we construed “linking actions to the detected structures” as “creating a specified connection 

between each detected structure and at least one computer subroutine that causes the CPU to perform a sequence 

of operations on that detected structure.” Motorola, 757 

F.3d at 1307. On appeal, Samsung argues there is no 

“specified connection” in the accused devices between a 

user’s request to perform some action and the application 

that ultimately performs the requested action. More 

specifically, Samsung argues the “startActivity()” subroutine—the accused “computer subroutine” in Samsung’s 

 

all over the map on plain and ordinary meaning of analyzer server.”); id. at 3063:17 (“I think that is contrary to 

how he just testified.”); id. at 3072:17–18 (“What’s been 

testified to thus far is misleading.”); id. at 3073:13–17; id. 

at 3076:7–9 (“He was all over the map, he didn’t give an 

opinion on plain and ordinary meaning of analyzer server, 

he’s very inconsistent throughout.”). The district court 

also scolded Dr. Jeffay in its JMOL order for “misleadingly” attempting to argue he had used the Motorola constructions “since the very first day I worked on this case.” 

J.A. 43. A reasonable jury could have concluded that such

inconsistencies negatively impacted the persuasiveness of 

Dr. Jeffay’s opinions.

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 17 Filed: 10/07/2016
18 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

products—does not satisfy the specified connection requirement. Samsung Br. 27. It argues startActivity() 

merely determines which application will perform the 

requested action rather than performing the task itself. 

Id. at 29. Thus, a “specified connection” to the startActivity() subroutine would not infringe because there is no 

connection to the application that ultimately performs the 

task. Id. 

This argument can be illustrated through an example. 

Android (the operating system run on the accused phones) 

phones typically contain multiple applications capable of 

sending emails. When a user inputs a command to send 

an email, the phone prompts the user to select an available application to send the email. There may be two or 

three available applications; the user selects which application to use. Samsung contends this is not a “specified 

connection” because the user’s command is not tied to a 

particular application that performs the command. See

Samsung Br. 28; J.A. 11586:1–11587:6 (trial testimony of 

Dianne Hackborn, Google engineer). It argues there is 

“no evidence of any specified connection between detected 

structures and actions,” Samsung Br. 26 (emphasis added). 

Our claim construction, however, does not require a 

specified connection between detected structures and the 

applications that perform operations on them. It requires 

a specified connection between detected structures and 

the computer subroutine that causes the CPU to perform 

the operations. The district court made this observation 

in its JMOL order: “The Motorola construction of ‘linking 

actions,’ however, requires only that the detected structure be linked to a ‘computer subroutine that causes the 

CPU to perform’ that function.” J.A. 45 (emphasis in 

original). The court quoted and rejected Samsung’s 

argument that “no specified connection exists because 

claim 9 requires that ‘you link the actual program that 

performs that function,’ such as dialing a phone number.” 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 18 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 19

Id. (quoting Dr. Jeffay).

We agree with the district court that Apple presented 

substantial evidence that the accused devices contain a 

specified connection between a detected structure and a 

computer subroutine that causes the CPU to perform a 

sequence of operations. In the accused devices, the detected structure is an object in the data, such as a phone

number or email address. J.A. 10854:11–25, 10858:3–12. 

And the computer subroutine is a method called “startActivity().” J.A. 13040:25–13041:4. Dr. Mowry testified that 

the phone numbers and email addresses form part of an 

Intent object. J.A. 10858:3–12. When a user wishes to 

perform some action in the accused devices (such as place 

a phone call or send an email), a method called setIntent() 

passes the Intent object to the startActivity() subroutine. 

J.A. 13040:6–23.11 Dr. Mowry explained that if a “program wants to open another program, it uses an Intent 

object.” J.A. 10861:4–6. He described startActivity() as 

the “launcher” that launches other programs to perform 

the requested action. J.A. 10858:13–20. For example, if a 

user wishes to make a phone call, the startActivity() 

subroutine launches the user’s selected dialing application. See J.A. 10861:4–10. 

According to Dr. Mowry, startActivity() is “the computer subroutine that causes the CPU to perform a sequence of operations on that detected structure,” as our 

construction requires. J.A. 13040:25–13041:4. Dr. Mowry 

testified that startActivity() is “necessarily” called when a 

user selects a particular action. J.A. 13040:6–23, 

13041:7–16. He explained that “if the user picks a partic-

 

11 Dr. Mowry testified that “the names [of the subroutines] are a little different” depending on the version of 

the accused product. J.A. 10862:16–20.

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 19 Filed: 10/07/2016
20 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

ular option, that information will be passed to another 

procedure shown on the bottom, which is called Start 

Activity, and that is the launcher.” J.A. 10858:13–20. He 

testified that “you get different behaviors from Start 

Activity based on how you fill in the fields in the Intent 

object. So that causes the different actions to occur.” 

J.A. 13042:25–13043:2. A reasonable jury could have 

relied on this testimony to find that Samsung’s accused 

devices meet the linking actions limitation. See J.A. 45 

(“[T]he jury could have determined that startActivity() 

satisfies this limitation because it is admittedly a linked 

subroutine that causes performance of an action.”).12 

In the Ninth Circuit, JMOL “is proper when the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion and the 

conclusion is contrary to that of the jury.” Monroe, 248 

F.3d at 861. Dr. Mowry’s testimony provided substantial 

evidence of infringement. In light of Dr. Mowry’s testimony, we cannot conclude that the evidence permits only 

one reasonable conclusion which is contrary to the jury 

verdict. We see no error in the district court’s denial of 

JMOL of non-infringement. 

The judgment of validity of the ’647 patent was not 

appealed. We affirm the district court’s denial of JMOL 

 

12 Samsung also argues the “specified connection” 

must be in place before the user selects a command to 

begin operations on a detected structure. Samsung 

Br. 31–32. This timing argument is premised on Samsung’s contention that startActivity() does not satisfy the 

specified connection limitation. Because we conclude that 

there is substantial record evidence for this jury finding, 

the timing argument necessarily fails. Regardless, we see 

no timing limitation in the claim, and construction of this 

claim was not appealed. 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 20 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 21

as to this patent.

B. The ’721 Patent

Apple asserted infringement of claim 8 of the 

’721 patent. The jury entered a verdict that claim 8 was 

infringed and would not have been obvious. J.A. 40872, 

40874. Samsung challenges the district court’s denial of 

JMOL that claim 8 would have been obvious. We agree 

with the district court that there was substantial evidence 

to support the jury’s underlying fact findings and that 

these fact findings supported the conclusion that Samsung failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence 

that claim 8 would have been obvious. 

Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying 

facts. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 

F.3d 1342, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2012). When reviewing a 

denial of JMOL of obviousness, where there is a black box 

jury verdict, as is the case here, we presume the jury 

resolved underlying factual disputes in favor of the verdict winner and leave those presumed findings undisturbed if supported by substantial evidence. Id. We then 

examine the legal conclusion de novo in light of those 

facts. Id. at 1357.

In Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 

(1966), and KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 

398, 406 (2007), the Supreme Court set out the framework 

for the obviousness inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 103: 

Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art 

are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the 

pertinent art resolved. Against this background, 

the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject 

matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved 

needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 21 Filed: 10/07/2016
22 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

give light to the circumstances surrounding the 

origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.

A determination of whether a patent claim is invalid 

as obvious under § 103 requires consideration of all four 

Graham factors, and it is error to reach a conclusion of 

obviousness until all those factors are considered. In re 

Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule 

Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1075–76 (Fed. Cir. 2012)

(citing Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 

1476, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).13 Objective indicia of nonobviousness must be considered in every case where 

present. See, e.g., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 

1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[E]vidence rising out of the socalled ‘secondary considerations’ must always when 

present be considered en route to a determination of 

obviousness.” (quoting Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 

713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); Simmons Fastener 

Corp. v. Illinois Tools Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573, 1575 

(Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The section 103 test of nonobviousness 

set forth in Graham is a four part inquiry comprising, not 

only the three familiar elements (scope and content of the 

prior art, differences between the prior art and the claims 

at issue, and level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art), 

but also evidence of secondary considerations when such 

evidence is, of course, present.”). This requirement is in 

recognition of the fact that each of the Graham factors 

helps inform the ultimate obviousness determination. 

 

13 Even though no secondary considerations were 

argued to the Supreme Court in KSR with regard to 

obviousness, the Court explains: “Graham sets forth a 

broad inquiry and invited courts, where appropriate, to 

look at any secondary considerations that would prove 

instructive.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 415.

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 22 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 23

Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1360; Nike, Inc. v. Adidas

AG, 812 F.3d 1326, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that 

evidence of secondary considerations must be examined to 

determine its impact on the first three Graham factors). 

The ’721 patent discloses a portable device with a 

touch-sensitive display that can be “unlocked via gestures” performed on the screen. ’721 patent at Abstract. 

The patent teaches that a “problem associated with using 

touch screens on portable devices is the unintentional 

activation or deactivation of functions due to unintentional contact with the touch screen.” Id. at 1:38–40. “Unintentional activation or deactivation of functions due to 

unintentional contact with the touch screen” is commonly 

referred to as “pocket dialing.” See, e.g., J.A. 10638:9–13 

(Andrew Cockburn) (describing the “pocket dial problem”); 

Apple Br. 25 (“Apple’s ’721 patent discloses a userfriendly solution to the problem of accidental activation of 

mobile touchscreen devices (e.g., ‘pocket dialing’).”). Greg

Christie, an inventor of the ’721 patent, described the 

problem he and his colleagues set out to solve:

[W]e were worried about accidental use, pocket 

dialling [sic], the phone getting shut down accidentally, or since we were going to have all these 

features on the phone, like e-mail and messaging, 

we were worried that, you know, mail could be 

sent accidentally or deleted accidentally or the 

phone would answer itself simply because the 

touch surface – you know, if it was like, like, the 

touch surface against your leg in your pocket, we 

were worried that just, like, you know, jostling 

around, moving around would trigger things on 

the screen.

J.A. 10601:4–13. 

The ’721 patent also describes the importance of making phone activation as “user-friendly” and “efficient” as 

possible. It teaches:

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 23 Filed: 10/07/2016
24 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

Accordingly, there is a need for more efficient, user-friendly procedures for unlocking such devices, 

touch screens, and/or applications. More generally, there is a need for more efficient, user-friendly 

procedures for transitioning such devices, touch 

screens, and/or applications between user interface states (e.g., from a user interface state for a 

first application to a user interface state for a second application, between user interface states in 

the same application, or between locked and unlocked states). In addition, there is a need for 

sensory feedback to the user regarding progress 

towards satisfaction of a user input condition that 

is required for the transition to occur. 

’721 patent at 1:56–67. Mr. Christie testified that the 

ease of the user interface was a central design consideration when developing the slide to unlock feature:

[W]e thought to introduce some sort of definite 

gesture. We knew we wanted to have some instruction. We knew we wanted the interface to be 

obvious to the customer. It would be possibly the 

first experience even in a retail environment. 

They’re deciding whether they want to buy it. 

They pick up this iPhone, you know, it would be 

very bad if they looked at the phone that they had 

heard so much about and they look at it and say “I 

can’t figure out how to use this. I don’t know how 

to unlock it. It’s locked.” At the same time, we 

knew that people would be unlocking their phone, 

you know, tens or hundreds of times a day, so we 

didn’t want the instruction to be, you know, insulting or talk down to the customer. We didn’t 

want it to be cumbersome, something that they 

would grow tired of after a while.

J.A. 10602:6–20. Apple’s expert, Dr. Cockburn, explained 

that there was a tension between preventing pocket 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 24 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 25

dialing and ease of use: “. . . [I]t has to work. It has to 

succeed in preventing accidental activation by mistake. 

But yet it needs to be something that’s easy to do, but not 

so easy that it can occur by accident, and it succeeds in 

that.” J.A. 10639:19–23. 

Apple asserted claim 8, which depends from claim 7, 

against several Samsung devices. These claims recite:

7. A portable electronic device, comprising:

a touch-sensitive display;

memory; 

one or more processors; and

one or more modules stored in the memory 

and configured for execution by the one or 

more processors, the one or more modules 

including instructions:

to detect a contact with the touchsensitive display at a first predefined location corresponding to an 

unlock image;

to continuously move the unlock 

image on the touch-sensitive display in accordance with the 

movement of the detected contact 

while continuous contact with the 

touch-sensitive display is maintained, wherein the unlock image 

is a graphical, interactive userinterface object with which a user 

interacts in order to unlock the 

device; and

to unlock the hand-held electronic 

device if the unlock image is 

moved from the first predefined loCase: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 25 Filed: 10/07/2016
26 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

cation on the touch screen to a 

predefined unlock region on the 

touch-sensitive display.

8. The device of claim 7, further comprising instructions to display visual cues to communicate a 

direction of movement of the unlock image required to unlock the device.

The jury found that Samsung’s accused devices infringed 

claim 8 of the ’721 patent. J.A. 40872. Samsung does not 

appeal this aspect of the verdict. The jury also found that 

Samsung’s infringement was willful and that Samsung 

failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence claim 8 is 

invalid. J.A. 40874. Following the verdict, Samsung 

moved for JMOL that, inter alia, claim 8 would have been 

obvious and Samsung did not willfully infringe the claim. 

The district court denied Samsung’s motion as to obviousness but granted the motion as to willfulness.

Samsung argues claim 8 would have been obvious in 

light of the combination of Neonode and Plaisant. “Neonode” refers to the Neonode N1 Quickstart Guide. 

J.A. 20713. Neonode discloses a mobile device with a 

touch-sensitive screen. It explains that a user may unlock

the device by pressing the power button. After the user 

presses the power button, text appears instructing the 

user to “Right sweep to unlock.” Sweeping right then 

unlocks the unit. J.A. 20725. 

“Plaisant” refers to a video and corresponding twopage paper published in 1992 titled “Touchscreen Toggle 

Design” by Catherine Plaisant and Daniel Wallace. 

J.A. 20742. The authors of the paper conducted an experiment to determine which controls (“toggles”) users prefer 

on wall-mounted controllers for “entertainment, security, 

and climate control systems.” Id. These controllers were 

intended to be installed “flushmounted into the wall or 

the cabinetry.” Id. The authors presented six alternative 

unlocking mechanisms to a group of fifteen undergraduCase: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 26 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 27

ate students, including a “slider toggle” where a user 

could activate the controller by “grab[bing] the pointer 

and slid[ing] it to the other side.” J.A. 20743. The students preferred “toggles that are pushed” over “toggles 

that slide,” and generally ranked the slider fifth of the six 

alternatives. Id. The paper also notes that sliders “were

not preferred,” “sliding is a more complex task than 

simply touching,” and that “sliders are more difficult to 

implement than buttons.” Id. 

On appeal, Apple does not contest that, together, Neonode and Plaisant disclose all the elements of claim 8.14 

Rather, the parties dispute whether a person of ordinary 

skill in the art would have been motivated to combine one 

of the unlocking mechanisms disclosed in Plaisant with 

Neonode. Samsung argues “there was no evidence of any 

kind suggesting that Plaisant’s application to a wallmounted device would lead inventors not to combine 

Plaisant with Neonode.” Samsung Resp. Br. 19–20. Its 

expert, Dr. Greenberg, testified that a person of ordinary 

skill “would be highly interested” in both references 

because “they both deal with touch base systems, they 

both deal with user interfaces.” J.A. 11982:13–17. Dr. 

Greenberg testified that “a person looking at this would 

just think it natural to combine these two, as well taking 

the ideas in Plaisant, the slider, and putting them on the 

Neonode is, is just a very routine thing to think about in 

 

14 There does not appear to be a dispute between the 

parties over whether the two references are prior art and 

within the analogous arts. Of course, concluding that the 

references are within the scope and content of the prior 

art to be considered for obviousness does not end the 

inquiry. Graham makes clear that the obviousness inquiry requires a determination whether the claimed 

invention would have been obvious to a skilled artisan. 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 27 Filed: 10/07/2016
28 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

terms of interaction design.” J.A. 11982:23–11983:2. 

Samsung points to the Plaisant reference which states 

that sliding movement “is less likely to be done inadvertently.” Samsung Br. 35–36 (quoting J.A. 20743). 

Apple counters that a skilled artisan designing a mobile phone would not have been motivated to turn to a 

wall-mounted air conditioning controller to solve the 

pocket dialing problem. Apple Br. 26–27. Its expert, Dr. 

Cockburn, testified that a person of ordinary skill would 

not have been naturally motivated to combine Neonode 

and Plaisant. J.A. 12877:17–21. Dr. Cockburn testified 

that the way the Plaisant controllers “were intended to be 

used was the touch screen would be mounted into a wall 

or into cabinetry and it would be used to control, for 

remote control, office or home appliances, like air conditioning units or heaters.” J.A. 12876:20–23. He also 

explained to the jury that Plaisant itself discloses that 

sliding toggles were less preferred than the other switches 

disclosed. J.A. 12877:7–16. Apple points to Plaisant’s 

teachings that “sliders were not preferred,” “sliding is a 

more complex task,” and “sliders are more difficult to 

implement.” Apple Br. 27–28. Apple argues there was 

substantial evidence for the jury to conclude that there 

would not have been a motivation to combine Plaisant 

and Neonode to arrive at the claimed invention. 

What a prior art reference teaches and whether a 

skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine 

references are questions of fact. See Par Pharm., Inc. v. 

TWi Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1196–97 (Fed. Cir. 

2014); Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. 

Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1303 (Fed. 

Cir. 2010). “Before KSR, we had also consistently treated 

the question of motivation to combine prior art references 

as a question of fact. . . KSR did not change this rule . . . .” 

Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1238–39 (Fed. 

Cir. 2010); id. at 1237 (“[W]hether there was sufficient 

motivation to combine the references” is a “factual isCase: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 28 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 29

sue[].”). The district court determined that a reasonable 

jury could have found that a person of ordinary skill 

would not have been motivated to combine Plaisant and 

Neonode: 

A reasonable jury could infer from [Dr. Cockburn’s] testimony that an ordinary artisan would 

not have been motivated to combine elements 

from a wall-mounted touchscreen for home appliances and a smartphone, particularly in view of 

the “pocket dialing” problem specific to mobile devices that Apple’s invention sought to address. 

Additionally, Dr. Cockburn explained that 

Plaisant “teach[es] away from the use of sliding,” 

because it “tells you not to use the sliding [toggle] 

mechanism.” 

J.A. 55 (citations omitted).15 After noting that what a 

reference teaches is a question of fact, the district court 

discussed the various statements in Plaisant about sliding 

toggles and concluded that substantial evidence supports 

the jury’s fact findings that Samsung failed to establish a 

motivation to combine. J.A. 55–56. We agree with the 

district court that on this record, the jury’s implicit fact 

findings that Plaisant would not have provided a skilled 

 

15 The district court denied JMOL on two discrete 

bases. J.A. 54–56. Because we find substantial evidence 

support for the jury’s fact finding regarding motivation to 

combine, we need not reach the issue of whether Plaisant 

teaches away from the combination. We note, however, 

that, even if Plaisant does not teach away, its statements 

regarding users preferring other forms of switches are 

relevant to a finding regarding whether a skilled artisan 

would be motivated to combine the slider toggle in 

Plaisant with the mobile phone in Neonode. 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 29 Filed: 10/07/2016
30 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

artisan with a motivation to combine its slider toggle 

switch with Neonode is supported by substantial evidence. In addition to the statements in Plaisant, the 

court explained: 

Dr. Cockburn testified, contrary to Dr. Greenberg, 

that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not 

have been motivated to combine the Neonode and 

Plaisant in such a way as to invent claim 8. He 

provided two reasons. First, Plaisant described 

“toggle designs” intended to be used with a “touch 

screen [that] would be mounted into a wall or into 

cabinetry” for controlling “office or home appliances, like air conditioning units or heaters.” A reasonable jury could infer from this testimony that 

an ordinary artisan would not have been motivated to combine elements from a wall-mounted 

touchscreen for home appliances and a 

smartphone, particularly in view of the “pocket 

dialing” problem specific to mobile devices that 

Apple’s invention sought to address.

J.A. 54–55 (citations omitted).

We agree with the district court’s analysis. Because 

the jury found the issue of validity in favor of Apple, we 

presume it resolved the conflicting expert testimony and 

found that a skilled artisan would not have been motivated to combine the slider toggle in Plaisant with the cell 

phone disclosed in Neonode. The question for our review 

is whether substantial evidence supports this implied fact

finding. We conclude that it does. Neonode discloses a 

mobile phone. Plaisant discloses a wall-mounted air 

conditioning controller. The jury had both references 

before it. Although Samsung presents arguments for 

combining the two references, these arguments were 

before the jury. Our job is not to review whether Samsung’s losing position was also supported by substantial 

evidence or to weigh the relative strength of Samsung’s 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 30 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 31

evidence against Apple’s evidence. We are limited to 

determining whether there was substantial evidence for 

the jury’s findings, on the entirety of the record. And 

under the Ninth Circuit standard, we cannot conclude 

that the evidence affords only one reasonable conclusion

and that it is contrary to that of the jury. See Monroe, 248 

F.3d at 861. We agree with the district court: “A reasonable jury could infer from this testimony that an ordinary 

artisan would not have been motivated to combine elements from a wall-mounted touchscreen for home appliances and a smartphone, particularly in view of the 

‘pocket dialing’ problem specific to mobile devices that 

Apple’s invention sought to address.” J.A. 55. 

1. The Objective Indicia of Non-Obviousness

The Supreme Court explained that various factors

“may also serve to ‘guard against slipping into use of 

hindsight,’ and to resist the temptation to read into the 

prior art the teachings of the invention in issue.” Graham, 383 U.S. at 36 (citation omitted). These factors are 

commonly known as secondary considerations or objective 

indicia of non-obviousness. These include: commercial 

success enjoyed by devices practicing the patented invention, industry praise for the patented invention, copying 

by others, and the existence of a long-felt but unsatisfied 

need for the invention. As this court held in Stratoflex: 

Indeed, evidence of secondary considerations may 

often be the most probative and cogent evidence in 

the record. It may often establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the 

prior art was not. It is to be considered as part of 

all the evidence, not just when the decisionmaker 

remains in doubt after reviewing the art.

713 F.2d at 1538–39. Apple introduced evidence of industry praise, copying, commercial success, and long-felt 

need. We presume the jury found that the evidence was 

sufficient to establish each by a preponderance of the 

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32 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

evidence. We find substantial evidence in the record to 

support each of those findings.

a. Industry Praise

Evidence that the industry praised a claimed invention or a product that embodies the patent claims weighs 

against an assertion that the same claimed invention

would have been obvious. Industry participants, especially competitors, are not likely to praise an obvious advance 

over the known art. Thus, if there is evidence of industry 

praise of the claimed invention in the record, it weighs in 

favor of the non-obviousness of the claimed invention. 

See, e.g., Institut Pasteur & Universite Pierre Et Marie 

Curie v. Focarino, 738 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 

(“[I]ndustry praise . . . provides probative and cogent 

evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would not 

have reasonably expected [the claimed invention].”); 

Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 

1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that industry praise, and 

specifically praise from a competitor, tends to indicate 

that the invention would not have been obvious). 

Samsung’s entire appeal regarding the jury’s fact 

finding that industry praise weighed in favor of nonobviousness is contained in one half of one sentence: 

“Indeed, the district court relied solely on generic praise 

not linked to the actual subject matter of the claim . . . .” 

Samsung Br. 37. The district court rejected Samsung’s

argument on this issue, determining that substantial 

evidence supports the jury’s underlying findings in favor 

of “industry praise specifically for Apple’s slide to unlock 

invention.” J.A. 56. It cited numerous internal Samsung 

documents that both praised Apple’s slide to unlock 

feature and indicated that Samsung should modify its 

own phones to incorporate Apple’s slide to unlock feature: 

• PTX 119 at 11: presentation prepared by Samsung’s European design team in June 2009 with 

a picture of the iPhone stating that Apple’s slide 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 32 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 33

to unlock invention is a “[c]reative way[] of solving UI complexity” and that “swiping unlock on 

the screen allows to prevent erroneous unlock,” 

J.A. 50950;

• PTX 121 at 100: Samsung software verification 

group document with a picture of the iPhone 

noting that unlike Samsung’s “Victory” phone, 

the iPhone’s “unlocking standard is precise as it 

is handled through sliding, and it allows prevention of any wrong motion,” and recommending a “direction of improvement” to make it the 

“same as iPhone, [and] clarify the unlocking 

standard by sliding,” J.A. 51289;

• PTX 157 at 19–20: Samsung document with a 

picture of the iPhone recommending improving 

the Samsung phone by making it “easy to unlock, [given that] lock screen always shows 

guide text or arrow like the iPhone” and to 

make the lock icon’s movement “be smooth and 

continuous” like the iPhone, J.A. 57 (JMOL Order citing PTX 157);

• PTX 219 at 14: Samsung document with a picture of the iPhone noting that the iPhone “intuitively indicate[s] the direction and length to 

move when unlocking on the lock screen,” 

J.A. 51603;

• PTX 120 at 28, 84: Samsung document with a 

picture of an iPhone that describes the “Direction of Improvement” as using a defined bar to 

unlock the phone, as is done on the iPhone. The 

same document describes the “Direction of Improvement” as displaying the unlock instruction 

on the screen, as is done on the iPhone. 

J.A. 51028, 51084. 

See J.A. 56–57 (JMOL Order citing several Samsung 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 33 Filed: 10/07/2016
34 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

documents). Such internal documents from the patentee’s 

top competitor represent important admissions, acknowledging the merits of the patented advance over the then 

state of the art and can be used to establish industry 

praise. Dr. Cockburn, Apple’s expert, testified “these 

various Samsung documents recognized the advantages of 

claim 8.” J.A. 57 (citing J.A. 10640–52). 

The court also explained that Apple presented a video 

at trial showing Steve Jobs unveiling the slide to unlock 

feature at an Apple event. When Mr. Jobs swiped to 

unlock the phone, “the audience burst into cheers.” 

J.A. 12879–80 (Andrew Cockburn). The video was shown 

to the jury, and Apple’s expert, an inventor, and Apple’s 

Vice President of Marketing all referenced the video in 

their testimony. See J.A. 57 (JMOL Order citing 4/4/14 

Tr. at 603:6–11 (Greg Christie)); J.A. 12879:17–12880:2 

(Andrew Cockburn); 4/1/14 Tr. at 428:12–17 (Phillip 

Schiller) (“There were many press in attendance at the 

event, and the reaction was enormous.”). 

Samsung does not discuss any of this evidence on appeal. In light of this evidence, we find its argument that 

the district court cited only generic praise of the iPhone, 

and not praise tied to the claimed slide to unlock feature, 

is without merit. The jury was presented with substantial evidence of praise in the industry that specifically 

related to features of the claimed invention, thereby 

linking that industry praise with the patented invention. 

b. Copying

Samsung does not dispute in its briefing that the jury 

heard substantial evidence that it copied the iPhone’s 

claimed features. In other words, Samsung does not 

challenge on appeal that substantial evidence exists in 

the record that Samsung copied Apple’s slide to unlock 

feature, nor does it challenge on appeal that this evidence 

of copying supports a conclusion that claim 8 would not 

have been obvious. Apple cites the same Samsung interCase: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 34 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 35

nal documents for both industry praise and copying, as 

they show evidence of both. The record contains multiple 

internal Samsung presentations given by different Samsung groups at different times stating that the iPhone’s 

slide to unlock feature is better than the various Samsung 

alternatives. See supra J.A. 50950 (PTX 119); J.A. 51028, 

51084 (PTX 120); J.A. 51289 (PTX 121); J.A. 57 (JMOL 

Order citing PTX 157); J.A. 51603 (PTX 219). And many 

of these same presentations conclude that the direction 

for improvement is for Samsung to modify its unlocking 

mechanism to be like the iPhone. See id. This is substantial evidence of copying by Samsung, and it supports the 

jury’s verdict that the claimed invention would not have 

been obvious. 

c. Commercial Success

In its opening appellate brief, Samsung also glosses 

over commercial success, giving it one sentence: “Apple 

made no effort to establish a nexus between commercial 

success and the subject matter of claim 8.” Samsung 

Br. 37. Commercial success requires a nexus to the 

claimed invention. Transocean, 699 F.3d at 1350. We

look to the record to ascertain whether there is substantial evidence for the jury’s fact finding that Apple established a nexus between commercial success and the 

invention in claim 8. 

At trial, Apple’s expert, Dr. Cockburn, testified that 

the iPhone practiced the asserted claim of the ’721 patent, 

and “clearly there’s been commercial success of the 

iPhones that use this invention.” J.A. 12879:20–22; see 

also J.A. 11984:24–25 (“[T]here’s no question that the 

Apple iPhone was a commercial success.”) (Saul Greenberg, Samsung’s expert). Critically, Apple presented 

survey evidence that customers would be less likely to 

purchase a portable device without the slide to unlock 

feature and would pay less for products without it, thus 

permitting the jury to conclude that this feature was a 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 35 Filed: 10/07/2016
36 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

key driver in the ultimate commercial success of the 

products.16 J.A. 21066, 21108. Apple’s Senior Vice President of Worldwide Marketing testified that slide to unlock 

was the very first feature shown in Apple’s original iPhone TV commercial, 4/1/14 Tr. at 433:16–434:18 (Phillip 

Schiller) (citing PTX 180), and the jury saw that commercial during the trial. Id. A reasonable jury could have 

found evidence that Apple’s marketing experts elected to 

emphasize the claimed feature as evidence of its importance. It is likewise reasonable to conclude that advertising that highlights or focuses on a feature of the 

invention could influence customer purchasing decisions. 

And an inventor of the ’721 patent—an Apple Vice President—confirmed that slide to unlock was important 

because it “would possibly be [a customer’s] first experience even in a retail environment” when the customer 

was “deciding whether they want to buy it.” 

 

16 In its reply brief, Samsung argues that Apple’s 

survey evidence “did not even test the ’721 patent for 

smartphones.” Samsung Resp. Br. 21. The claims of the 

’721 patent, however, are not directed to a smartphone, 

but rather to a “hand-held electronic device.” J.A. 685. 

Apple’s survey evidence tested tablets with 7” screens. No 

one argued that a 7” tablet was not a “hand-held electronic device,” nor does this distinction have anything to do 

with the slide to unlock feature. The dissents suggest 

that the survey evidence should be rejected because the 

survey only establishes that customers would prefer to 

purchase a device with a slide-to-unlock feature and that 

such evidence does not demonstrate a nexus to Apple’s 

particular slide-to-unlock mechanism. We decline to 

reach this argument because it was never made in this 

appeal. 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 36 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 37

J.A. 10601:25–10602:22 (Greg Christie).17 Mr. Schiller 

explained the importance of the slide to unlock feature in 

great detail: 

When this ad ran, people hadn’t had the opportunity yet to actually use an iPhone for themselves, and so they’ve never used at this point in 

time a device anything like it. The challenge is 

how do you show people, in a simple, 30-second 

ad, something that gives them a feel for what it’s 

like to use this new generation of Apple’s 

smartphone. And we started the ad with something you’re going to be doing every day, many, 

many times a day, which is to unlock the screen, 

and to do that, you use a simple gesture, slide to 

unlock. And that one gesture, having seen that 

one thing first, you get an instant idea of how 

multitouch works so that you’re doing a gesture 

on the screen, and it does something simple and 

useful to you, and that it’s easy to use. You don’t 

need a manual to figure it out. And that one 

starting point was a great beginning to your understanding of what an iPhone is and what this 

 

17 We have previously recognized that a finding of 

nexus between the commercial success of a product and 

the merits of the patented invention embodied in that 

product can be undermined by factors external to the 

patented invention, such as marketing and advertising. 

See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip 

Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1129–30 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re 

Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Unlike the 

present facts, however, those cases did not involve an 

advertising campaign that specifically stressed and highlighted the patented feature as a way to introduce a new, 

complex product to the public.

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38 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

kind of device can do.

4/1/14 Tr. at 433:1–18. Finally, the video of the crowd 

“burst[ing] into cheers” when Steve Jobs demonstrated 

the slide to unlock feature supports a conclusion that 

consumers valued this particular feature. J.A. 12879:20–

12880:2 (Andrew Cockburn). It is the fact finders’ job to 

assess the probative value of the evidence presented. ProMold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 

1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“It is within the province of 

the fact-finder to resolve these factual disputes regarding 

whether a nexus exists between the commercial success of 

the product and its patented features, and to determine 

the probative value of Pro-Mold’s evidence of secondary 

considerations . . . .”). 

This record overall contains substantial evidence of a 

nexus between the slide to unlock feature and the iPhone’s commercial success, and we are required to give this

jury fact finding deference. It is not our role to reweigh 

the evidence or consider what the record might have 

supported. This commercial success evidence supports 

the jury’s verdict that the claimed invention would not 

have been obvious. 

d. Long-Felt Need

Evidence of a long-felt but unresolved need can weigh 

in favor of the non-obviousness of an invention because it 

is reasonable to infer the need would not have persisted 

had the solution been obvious. There is substantial 

evidence for the jury to have found that there was a longfelt but unresolved need for a solution to the pocket 

dialing problem until Apple’s claimed invention, with its 

slide to unlock feature, solved that problem. Samsung’s 

appeal of the jury’s fact finding of long-felt need was 

limited to a single sentence, which was itself simply a 

quote from George M. Martin Co. v. All. Mach. Sys. Int’l 

LLC, 618 F.3d 1294, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2010): “[w]here the 

differences between the prior art and the claimed invenCase: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 38 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 39

tion are as minimal as they are here, . . . it cannot be said 

that any long felt need was unsolved.” Samsung Br. 37 

(alteration in original). In its brief, there was no application to this case, no analysis of the issue of long-felt need, 

and no citation to any record evidence. 

To the extent that Samsung’s quote should be interpreted as precluding a jury finding of long-felt need 

favoring non-obviousness when the difference between the 

prior art and the claimed invention is small, we reject 

such a categorical rule. This type of hard and fast rule is 

not appropriate for the factual issues that are left to the 

province of the jury. There could be a long-felt need for 

what might be considered a relatively small improvement 

over the prior art—it all depends upon the evidence, and 

it is up to the fact finder to assess that evidence. 

Moreover, we do not understand the quote from 

George M. Martin to be a proclamation of law but instead 

simply an application to the particular facts of that case. 

The quoted language makes clear that the court was 

evaluating the facts in that particular case regarding the 

claimed advances over the prior art, “as minimal as they 

are here.” George M. Martin, 618 F.3d at 1304. And 

importantly, the George M. Martin court explains that the 

“need” had already been met by the prior art devices that

already solved the problem at issue. Id. at 1305. Thus, in 

George M. Martin, not only was the difference between 

the prior art and the claimed invention minimal, but the 

prior art had already solved the problem for which the 

patentee claimed there was a long-felt need. Id. Samsung’s sole argument on long-felt need is thus based on a 

misreading of George M. Martin. 

In this case, there is substantial evidence for the jury’s finding that long-felt need supported the nonobviousness of the claimed invention. Denying JMOL on 

this issue, the district court cited testimony from Apple’s 

expert: “Dr. Cockburn’s testimony that phone designers 

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40 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

had been trying to solve the problem of accidental activation and the ‘pocket dial problem’ before the iPhone 

existed, but had only come up with ‘frustrat[ing]’ solutions.” J.A. 57 (quoting J.A. 10638–39). While the expert 

discusses particular examples in the first person: “I have 

been very frustrated with [the prior art options],” the jury 

could still reasonably find that this testimony was probative of a long-felt need. See J.A. 10638:17–19. 

The district court also cited the testimony of one of 

the inventors, where he discussed concerns over pocket 

dialing.18 In addition to the portion of Dr. Cockburn’s 

testimony cited by the district court, there are other 

portions of his testimony upon which the jury fact finding 

could be predicated. The record contained a document 

 

18 This is how the inventor described the problem to 

be solved:

Q: What was the problem that you guys were 

working on at the time that you came up with the 

’721 invention? 

A: . . . We were worried about accidental use, 

pocket dialling [sic], the phone getting shut down 

accidentally, or since we were going to have all 

these features on the phone, like e-mail and messaging, we were worried that, you know, mail 

could be sent accidentally or deleted accidentally 

or the phone would answer itself simply because 

the touch surface—you know, if it was like, like, 

the touch surface against your leg in your pocket, 

we were worried that just, like, you know, jostling 

around, moving around would trigger things on 

the screen.

J.A. 10600:17–10601:13 (Greg Christie).

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APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 41

(PTX 55) in which Samsung listed all the alternatives to 

the iPhone slide to unlock. See 4/4/14 Tr. at 680:10–

687:15 (Andrew Cockburn). Apple’s expert went through 

several of the alternatives, including the Ripple unlock, 

the glass unlock, and the circle unlock, and explained how 

each of these failed to solve the accidental activation 

problem. Id. The jury could have reasonably found that 

this testimony established long-felt unresolved need. 

In addition, the jury could have found that the same 

internal Samsung documents Apple relied upon for industry praise and copying demonstrate that Samsung compared four of its own rejected alternative unlock 

mechanisms (Kepler, Victory, Behold, & Amythest) to the 

iPhone slide to unlock mechanism, and that Samsung 

concluded the iPhone slide to unlock was better. See, e.g.,

J.A. 51028 (PTX 120 at 28 (“Behold3: Unintentional 

unlock occurs . . . iPhone Lock undone only when sliding 

action is applied to a specific button”)); J.A. 51289 

(PTX 121 at 100 (“Victory: The Screen Lock gets unlocked 

with a slight flick motion”; “iPhone Unlocking standard is 

precise as it is handled through sliding, and it allows 

prevention of any wrong motion”)). The jury could have 

found that these Samsung documents show that Samsung, Apple’s fiercest competitor, was unsuccessfully 

trying to solve the same problem. All of this evidence was 

presented to the jury during the trial in this case. This 

evidence constitutes substantial evidence for the jury fact 

finding that there was a long-felt but unresolved need, 

which Apple’s ’721 patented invention solved. This evidence weighs in favor of non-obviousness.

2. Conclusion on Obviousness of the ’721 Patent

Acknowledging that “it can be important to identify a 

reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary 

skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the 

way the claimed new invention does,” the Supreme Court 

cautioned that “[h]elpful insights, however, need not 

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42 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

become rigid and mandatory formulas.” KSR, 550 U.S. 

at 418–19. The Supreme Court explained: 

The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a 

formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on 

the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents. The diversity of 

inventive pursuits and of modern technology 

counsels against limiting the analysis in this way. 

Id. at 419. “Rigid preventative rules that deny factfinders 

recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary 

under our case law nor consistent with it.” Id. at 421. 

With these principles in mind, we review de novo the 

ultimate legal determination and conclude that it would 

not have been obvious to a skilled artisan to combine the 

prior art to arrive at the claimed invention. 

Common sense and real world indicators indicate that 

to conclude otherwise would be to give in to hindsight, to 

allow the exact ex post reasoning against which the 

Supreme Court cautioned in Graham and KSR. The 

record includes Plaisant and Neonode and all that these 

references teach, including Plaisant’s reference to inadvertent activation, complexity, difficult implementability, 

and that users do not prefer sliders. Though the prior art 

references each relate to touchscreens, the totality of the 

evidence supports the conclusion that it would not have 

been obvious for a skilled artisan, seeking an unlock 

mechanism that would be both intuitive to use and solve 

the pocket dialing problem for cell phones, to look to a 

wall-mounted controller for an air conditioner. The twopage Plaisant paper published in 1992 reported the 

results of a user-preference survey of fifteen undergraduates on six different computer-based switches. That a 

skilled artisan would look to the Plaisant paper directed 

to a wall-mounted interface screen for appliances and 

then choose the slider toggle, which the study found rated 

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APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 43

fifth out of six options in usability, to fulfill a need for an 

intuitive unlock mechanism that solves the pocket dialing 

problem for cell phones seems far from obvious. 

We have considered the jury’s implicit fact findings 

about the teachings of Plaisant and Neonode. We have 

also considered the objective indicia found by the jury

which are particularly strong in this case and powerfully 

weigh in favor of validity. They include copying, industry 

praise, commercial success, and long-felt need. These real 

world indicators of whether the combination would have 

been obvious to the skilled artisan in this case “tip the 

scales of patentability,” Graham, 383 U.S. at 36, or “dislodge the determination that claim [8 would have been] 

obvious,” KSR, 550 U.S. at 426. Weighing all of the 

Graham factors, we agree with the district court on the

ultimate legal determination that Samsung failed to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that claim 8 of 

the ’721 patent would have been obvious. We affirm the 

district court’s denial of JMOL. 

3. Willfulness

Apple appealed the district court’s grant of JMOL 

that Samsung did not willfully infringe claim 8 of the ’721 

patent. The district court’s decision was solely based on 

its determination that Samsung’s defenses were objectively reasonable under the standard from In re Seagate 

Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 

2007). J.A. 63–66. Given the Supreme Court’s recent 

willfulness decision in Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., 

Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016), we remand the willfulness 

issue for the district court to consider under the new

standard in the first instance.

C. The ’172 Patent

Apple moved for summary judgment of infringement 

of claim 18 of the ’172 patent, which the district court 

granted. The jury entered a verdict that claim 18 of the 

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44 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

’172 patent would not have been obvious. Samsung 

challenges the district court’s judgment of infringement 

which was based on the court’s construction of the term 

“keyboard.” It also challenges the district court’s denial of 

JMOL that claim 18 would have been obvious. We affirm 

both the judgment relating to infringement and that 

relating to invalidity. 

The ’172 patent is directed to a method, system, and 

interface for providing “autocorrect” recommendations to 

users inputting text into a portable electronic device. 

’172 patent at Abstract. Claim 18, the only asserted 

claim, recites a graphical user interface comprising “a 

first area” and “a second area” of a touchscreen. The “first 

area” displays the text, or “current character string,” 

input by the user. The “second area” displays both the 

“current character string” and a suggested replacement. 

Claim 18 provides a user with the option to accept the 

suggested replacement or keep the text as inputted. The 

user can accept the suggested replacement by activating a 

key on the keyboard (such as a spacebar) or by performing 

a gesture on the suggested replacement in the second 

area. The user can keep its inputted text by performing a 

gesture on the “current character string” in the second 

area. Claim 18 is recited below.

18. A graphical user interface on a portable electronic device with a keyboard and a touch screen 

display, comprising: 

a first area of the touch screen display 

that displays a current character string 

being input by a user with the keyboard; 

and

a second area of the touch screen display 

separate from the first area that displays 

the current character string or a portion 

thereof and a suggested replacement 

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APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 45

character string for the current character 

string;

wherein;

the current character string in the first 

area is replaced with the suggested replacement character string if the user activates a key on the keyboard associated 

with a delimiter;

the current character string in the first 

area is replaced with the suggested replacement character string if the user performs a gesture on the suggested 

replacement character string in the second 

area; and

the current character string in the first 

area is kept if the user performs a gesture 

in the second area on the current character string or the portion thereof displayed 

in the second area.

Before trial, Apple moved for summary judgment that 

Samsung’s accused devices infringe claim 18 of the 

’172 patent. In response, Samsung disputed only whether 

its accused devices satisfy claim 18’s requirement of a 

“keyboard.” The district court granted Apple’s motion, 

determining that Apple had shown infringement and that 

no reasonable jury could find that Samsung’s accused 

devices fell outside the court’s construction of “keyboard.” 

J.A. 164.

The jury trial proceeded on the issues of validity and 

damages. The jury found claim 18 of the ’172 patent was 

not invalid and awarded Apple $17,943,750 for infringement by Samsung’s accused devices. J.A. 40874–

76. Samsung moved for JMOL, arguing that no reasonable jury could find that claim 18 of the ’172 patent is not 

invalid. In its motion, Samsung argued that claim 18 

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46 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

would have been obvious over the combination of U.S. 

Patent No. 7,880,730 (“Robinson”) and International 

Publication No. WO 2005/008899 (“Xrgomics”). The 

district court denied Samsung’s motion, determining that 

substantial evidence supported the jury’s fact findings 

related to obviousness and concluding that these fact 

findings supported the conclusion that Samsung had 

failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 

’172 patent was invalid. J.A. 67–69.

On appeal, Samsung argues the district court erred by 

denying its motion for JMOL that the ’172 patent would 

have been obvious over Robinson and Xrgomics. Samsung 

also argues the district court erred in construing “a keyboard and a touchscreen display” to encompass both 

physical and virtual keyboards, resulting in the district 

court’s erroneous grant of summary judgment that Samsung’s devices infringe claim 18 of the ’172 patent. We 

consider each argument in turn.

1. Obviousness

Robinson, titled “Keyboard system with automatic 

correction,” is directed to “an enhanced text entry system 

that uses word-level disambiguation to automatically 

correct inaccuracies in user keystroke entries.” Robinson 

at 3:24–26 (J.A. 20910). Xrgomics, titled “Letter and word 

choice text input method for keyboards and reduced 

keyboard systems,” is directed to a “method for entering 

text efficiently by providing letter or word choices.” 

Xrgomics at Abstract (J.A. 21000). The parties presented 

the jury with expert testimony on both references and on 

objective indicia of non-obviousness.

Samsung’s expert, Dr. Wigdor, testified that Robinson 

discloses every limitation of claim 18 of the ’172 patent 

except the limitation requiring a “current character string 

in the first area.” J.A. 12024:5–12025:9. Dr. Wigdor 

further testified that “anyone who’s used a computer since 

the 1970s would be familiar with this idea that . . . as you 

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type, the text shows up at your cursor.” J.A. 12025:1–9. 

He testified that one example of prior art that discloses 

the limitation missing from Robinson, a “current character string in the first area,” is Xrgomics. J.A. 12025:1–11. 

Dr. Wigdor stated that Figure 5 of Xrgomics, like 

claim 18, displays the inputted text “deva” both where the 

user is typing and in the suggestions bar. J.A. 12026:3–

19. He also testified that a person of ordinary skill in the 

art would have combined Robinson with Xrgomics to 

render claim 18 obvious. J.A. 12027:1–21.

Apple’s expert, Dr. Cockburn, disagreed on the scope 

and content of the prior art. He testified that Robinson 

fails to disclose “a series of elements” in addition to lacking the “current character string in the first area” limitation. J.A. 12915:24–12916:15. According to 

Dr. Cockburn, because Robinson does not display the text 

when the user types the characters in the first area, 

Robinson fails to disclose any of claim 18’s options for 

replacing or keeping the “current character string.” In 

particular, he testified that Robinson does not disclose 

that the “current character string in the first area is 

replaced,” either by activating a key on the keyboard or by 

performing a gesture on the suggested replacement, 

because in Robinson, “there was no text there to be replaced.” J.A. 12916:6–13. Likewise, Dr. Cockburn testified that “because the current character string is not there 

[in Robinson], it can’t be kept if the user performs a 

gesture.” J.A. 12916:14–15.

Dr. Cockburn testified that Xrgomics does not disclose 

these missing elements. He testified that Xrgomics is not 

directed to spelling correction, but is a “word completion 

patent,” where a user can “type a series of characters and 

Xrgomics offers alternative words that complete that 

word.” J.A. 12916:22–25. Using the same example as 

Samsung’s expert, Dr. Cockburn testified that Xrgomics 

does not teach correcting the spelling of “deva,” but suggests the words “devastating, devalue, devastate, all of 

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48 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

which are completions of what the user has already 

typed.” J.A. 12917:11–15. He testified that Xrgomics, 

like Robinson, therefore does not disclose “the current 

character string in the first area is replaced with the 

suggested replacement string,” because “[i]n Xrgomics, if 

the user presses the space bar . . . D-E-V-A is kept. 

There’s no replacement.” J.A. 12917:18–12918:2. 

On objective indicia of non-obviousness, Samsung’s 

expert testified, “it’s clear to me that none of those secondary considerations were met.” J.A. 12032:14–15. 

Dr. Wigdor testified that, while the iPhone is commercially successful, it does not have the user interface specifically recited in claim 18. J.A. 12032:17–24. Apple’s expert, 

Dr. Cockburn, disagreed, stating there was “clearly” 

commercial success, testifying that “Samsung has sold 

over 7 and a half million devices that use this technique.” 

J.A. 12918:6–9. Apple introduced survey evidence comparing the willingness of users to buy devices containing 

the patented feature versus those without. J.A. 51440. 

This survey indicated a heightened willingness to buy 

devices with the ’172 patent’s patented feature. Dr. 

Cockburn also testified that Samsung’s internal documents and comments from carriers were evidence of 

industry praise. J.A. 12918:10–13. Dr. Cockburn testified that one such internal Samsung document, J.A. 

51488, reflected T-Mobile’s request that Samsung modify 

its autocorrect technology to adopt the functionality of 

claim 18. J.A. 68 (citing 4/4/14 Tr. at 698–700). A reasonable jury could have construed evidence that Samsung’s carrier customer requested Samsung adopt the 

claimed technology as praise of the claimed feature.

The jury determined that Samsung did not prove by 

clear and convincing evidence that claim 18 was invalid. 

J.A. 40874. The district court determined that substantial evidence supported the jury’s implicit fact findings on 

each Graham factor and that “[i]n light of the jury’s 

factual findings, this Court cannot conclude that there is 

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clear and convincing evidence that it would have been 

obvious, as a matter of law, to bridge the gaps between 

the prior art and claim 18.” J.A. 69. The district court 

reasoned that the jury impliedly found Dr. Cockburn’s 

testimony that Robinson and Xrgomics did not disclose all 

the elements of claim 18 more credible than Dr. Wigdor’s 

opinion, and the jury impliedly accepted Apple’s evidence 

of objective indicia of non-obviousness over Dr. Wigdor’s 

testimony that no such evidence existed. J.A. 67–68. The

district court held that these presumed fact findings were 

supported by substantial evidence and denied Samsung’s 

motion for JMOL. Id. We see no error in the district 

court’s weighing of the Graham factors.

Samsung does not appeal the jury’s finding that Apple’s evidence of objective indicia supports nonobviousness. Samsung’s only mention of the objective 

indicia with regard to the ’172 patent in its opening brief 

appears in a footnote which in its entirety reads: “For the 

same reasons discussed with respect to the ’721 patent 

(see supra at 37), secondary indicia of non-obviousness are 

likewise inapplicable to the ’172 patent.” Samsung Br. 45 

n.5. Samsung’s passing reference to its arguments for an 

entirely different patent, claiming an entirely different 

invention, and concerning different evidence, is hardly 

enough to constitute a meaningful dispute regarding the 

weight of Apple’s evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness or the jury’s fact findings in favor of Apple. 

Apple presented evidence of commercial success and 

industry praise for the ’172 patented invention, which 

supports non-obviousness. Samsung did not dispute this 

evidence or the jury fact findings related to them on 

appeal.

Apple also presented substantial evidence on which a 

reasonable jury could find that the combination of Robinson and Xrgomics failed to disclose every claimed element. 

Apple’s expert, Dr. Cockburn, testified that neither Robinson nor Xrgomics disclose that “the current character 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 49 Filed: 10/07/2016
50 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

string in the first area is replaced with the suggested 

replacement character string,” and that Robinson does not 

disclose replacing text at all. See J.A. 12915:24–12916:15 

(testifying that Robinson does not disclose a “current 

character string in the first area,” replacing text in the 

first area, or keeping text in the first area); 

J.A. 12916:19–12917:17 (testifying that Xrgomics does not 

disclose text replacement at all, but teaches text completion). While Samsung’s expert provided contrary testimony, as the district court observed, with conflicting expert 

testimony before it, “the jury was free to ‘make credibility 

determinations and believe the witness it considers more 

trustworthy.’” J.A. 68 (quoting Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d 

at 1362 (citation omitted)). By finding in favor of Apple, 

the jury impliedly found Apple’s expert’s testimony more 

credible and persuasive than the testimony proffered by 

Samsung. Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1362; MobileMedia, 780 F.3d at 1168. This evidence, together with 

Apple’s evidence of objective indicia of non-obviousness, 

weigh in favor of the legal conclusion that Samsung did 

not prove by clear and convincing evidence that claim 18 

would have been obvious to a skilled artisan. 

Even in cases in which a court concludes that a reasonable jury could have found some facts differently, the 

verdict must be sustained if it is supported by substantial 

evidence on the record that was before the jury. But as an 

appellate court, it is beyond our role to reweigh the evidence or consider what the record might have supported, 

or investigate potential arguments that were not meaningfully raised. Our review is limited to whether fact 

findings made and challenged on appeal are supported by 

substantial evidence in the record, and if so, whether 

those fact findings support the legal conclusion of obviousness. We agree with the district court that there is 

substantial evidence for a reasonable jury to have found 

that there was a gap in the prior art that was not filled by 

the combination of Robinson and Xrgomics, and that the 

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APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 51

entirety of the evidence weighs in favor of nonobviousness. We cannot conclude that the evidence 

affords only one reasonable conclusion contrary to that of 

the jury. See Monroe, 248 F.3d at 861. Weighing the 

Graham factors, we agree with the district court that 

Samsung failed to establish by clear and convincing 

evidence that claim 18 of the ’172 patent would have been 

obvious. We thus affirm the district court’s denial of 

Samsung’s motion for JMOL. 

2. Claim Construction & Infringement

In a single page in its opening brief, Samsung argues 

that the district court erred when it construed the term “a 

keyboard and a touchscreen display” in claim 18 to encompass both physical and virtual keyboards. We disagree. The district court determined that the plain and 

ordinary meaning of the term “keyboard” as used in 

claim 18 and throughout the specification included both 

physical and virtual keyboards. J.A. 162–63. The specification of the ’172 patent discloses graphical user interfaces containing both virtual and physical keyboards. See 

’172 patent at 7:13–15, 7:33–35 (describing embodiments 

containing “a virtual or soft keyboard” or “physical keyboard”). The specification expressly contemplates keyboards that are part of the touchscreen. See, e.g., id.

at 4:11–12 (“The user interfaces may include one or more 

keyboard embodiments displayed on a touch screen.”); id.

at 5:38–39 (“The touch screen 112 may be used to implement virtual or soft buttons and/or one or more keyboards.”); id. at 7:10–15 (describing a touch screen 

containing a virtual or soft keyboard). As recognized by 

the district court, every figure in the ’172 patent that 

depicts a portable electronic device, as recited in the 

preamble of claim 18, includes a virtual keyboard. 

J.A. 162 (citing ’172 patent at figs. 2, 4A–4I, 5A–5B). And 

the specification describes Figure 2, which has a virtual 

keyboard, as “a portable electronic device having a touch 

screen and a soft keyboard.” ’172 patent at 3:15–17 

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52 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

(emphasis added). We see no error in the district court’s 

construction. 

Because Samsung concedes that its accused devices

contain a virtual keyboard and does not otherwise dispute 

infringement of claim 18, we affirm the court’s grant of 

summary judgment that Samsung’s accused devices 

infringe claim 18 of the ’172 patent.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm and reinstate the district court judgment as 

to the ’647, ’721, and ’172 patents. We reinstate the 

portions of the panel decision that pertain to the ’959, 

’414, ’239, and ’449 patents, for which the panel decision 

affirmed the district court’s rulings on all issues of those 

patents. We thus reinstate the district court’s award of 

costs which the panel had vacated. We remand the willfulness issue for the district court to consider under the 

Supreme Court’s Halo standard in the first instance.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs on this appeal. 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 52 Filed: 10/07/2016
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

APPLE INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant

v.

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., A KOREAN 

CORPORATION, SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS 

AMERICA, INC., A NEW YORK CORPORATION, 

SAMSUNG TELECOMMUNICATIONS AMERICA, 

LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY 

COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellants

______________________ 

2015-1171, 2015-1195, 2015-1994

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of California in No. 5:12-cv-00630-LHK, 

Judge Lucy H. Koh.

______________________ 

PROST, Chief Judge, dissenting.

At the outset, I share Judge Dyk’s and Judge Reyna’s 

concerns as to the procedural irregularities surrounding 

this case at the en banc stage. There was no need to take 

this case en banc. However, having done so, the en banc 

court would certainly have benefited from our normal 

practice of allowing further briefing and argument from 

the parties and from hearing the views of amici, such as 

the government.

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 53 Filed: 10/07/2016
2 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

On the merits, I agree with Judge Dyk that KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. significantly reduced the 

evidentiary burden necessary to establish a motivation to 

combine prior art references and held that motivation to 

combine can be found in “any need or problem known in 

the field of endeavor,” not just the problem faced by the 

inventor. 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007). I also agree with his 

concerns regarding the majority’s elevation of secondary 

considerations beyond their historic role, which is that 

secondary considerations take on less importance when 

there is little doubt as to obviousness. See Dow Chem. Co. 

v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 324 U.S. 320, 330 

(1945) (“But these considerations are relevant only in a 

close case where all other proof leaves the question of 

invention in doubt.”); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. RayO-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 279 (1944) (“These factors were 

entitled to weight in determining whether the improvement amounted to invention and should, in a close case, 

tip the scales in favor of patentability.”). 

Aside from these broader legal principles, though, I 

write separately to express concern that the majority 

misapplies the substantial evidence standard of review

with respect to the invalidity analysis, finding evidence in 

the record when there is none to support the jury’s implicit factual findings. With respect to the ’647 patent, the 

majority goes too far by implicitly modifying our prior 

claim construction that is binding on and agreed upon by 

the parties.

In the majority’s view, the existence of any evidence 

that could theoretically support a jury verdict would seem 

to end our substantial evidence review on appeal. But see 

Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 

305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (“Substantial evidence is more 

than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as 

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.”). Indeed, as Judge Reyna forcefully articulates in his dissent today, the majority has abdicated its 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 54 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 3

role in substantial evidence review. For the additional 

reasons discussed below, I respectfully dissent.

DISCUSSION

I 

A 

Under the majority’s analysis, the question with respect to the validity of claim 8 of the ’721 patent is 

straightforward: whether there is substantial evidence to 

support the jury’s implicit finding that there was no 

motivation to combine Neonode and Plaisant. The en 

banc majority relies on the testimony of Apple’s expert, 

Dr. Cockburn, to say that a skilled artisan would not be 

motivated to combine Neonode and Plaisant. In support, 

the en banc majority cites only one fact (that is selfevident from the face of the references themselves): Neonode concerns a portable telephone and Plaisant concerns wall-mounted touchscreen devices. That lone 

statement does not rise to the level of substantial evidence.

Neonode describes a portable phone that may be activated by “[s]weep[ing] right” on the screen. J.A. 20725. 

Plaisant discloses a toggle device for use on a touch 

screen, referred to as a “[s]lider toggle,” which requires a 

user to slide a pointer from one side of the toggle to the 

other in order to activate it. J.A. 20743. Plaisant also 

teaches that an “advantage of the sliding movement is 

that it is less likely to be done inadvertently therefore 

making the toggle very secure (the finger has to land on 

and lift off the right locations).” Id. It is undisputed that 

Neonode and Plaisant are analogous art references that 

together disclose all of the limitations of claim 8. The 

relevant question is whether a skilled artisan would be 

motivated to combine the references to solve the problem 

addressed by the ’721 patent, namely “the unintentional 

activation or deactivation of functions due to unintentionCase: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 55 Filed: 10/07/2016
4 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

al contact with the touch screen.”1 ’721 patent col. 1 ll.

38–40. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 420 (noting that a motivation to combine may be found in “any need or problem 

known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention 

and addressed by the patent”). 

The majority holds that there is no motivation to 

combine Neonode with Plaisant because a person of 

ordinary skill would not turn to Plaisant’s wall-mounted 

 

1 Apple also argued at the district court and on appeal that Plaisant teaches away from using sliders because they were “not preferred” over other toggle devices. 

Apple Br. 27. The majority declined to address teaching 

away, focusing instead on motivation to combine. The 

majority states, however, that “even if Plaisant does not 

teach away, its statements regarding users preferring 

other forms of switches are relevant to a finding regarding 

whether a skilled artisan would be motivated to combine 

the slider toggle in Plaisant with the mobile phone in 

Neonode.” Majority Op. at 22 n.13. This rationale is new. 

It was never before the jury, see J.A. 12876–78, and even 

Apple does not assert that rationale.

In any event, there is no teaching away here. Though 

Plaisant notes that sliders may not be preferred, it also 

describes advantages that sliders have over other toggle 

methods. J.A. 20743. As a matter of law, “the mere 

disclosure of more than one alternative does not amount 

to teaching away from one of the alternatives where the 

reference does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution” presented by the disclosure. 

SightSound Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., 809 F.3d 1307, 

1320 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(citation omitted); see also Allergan, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 

754 F.3d 952, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (stating that “mere 

disclosure of alternative preferences” does not teach 

away).

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 56 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 5

touchscreen to solve the “unintentional activation” problem of a portable phone. The problem with that conclusion is that Apple did not present any evidence to support 

it. Indeed, a review of the entirety of Dr. Cockburn’s 

testimony on motivation to combine reveals the striking 

absence of any evidence that a skilled artisan would not 

look to Plaisant simply because it discloses wall-mounted 

touchscreens:

Q. And can you show us, please, using some 

graphics, remind us what the Plaisant application 

is.

A. Sure. Quickly I’ve got a few slides on Plaisant, 

this is the paper, the two-page paper, it describes 

touch screen toggle designs, so these are on/off 

switches.

And the way they were intended to be used was the 

touch screen would be mounted into a wall or into 

cabinetry and it would be used to control, for remote control, office or home appliances, like air 

conditioning units or heaters.

The publication itself and the video that accompanies it both teach away from the use of sliding. . . . [Plaisant] tells us that toggles that are 

pushed seem to be preferred over toggles that 

slide; and the sliding is more complex than simply 

touching; and also that sliders are harder to implement. 

And the figure at the top shows those results for 

user preference indicating that both of the two designs that they considered, levers and sliders, was 

the least preferred, that’s the slider highlighted in 

red and the lever.

Q. [Samsung’s expert] told this jury that a person 

of ordinary skill in the art would have been natuCase: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 57 Filed: 10/07/2016
6 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

rally motivated to combine the Neonode guide 

with the Plaisant article.

Did you agree with that opinion?

A. No, I do not.

Q. And why do you say that?

A. The patent office, the patent examiner, had all 

of the Neonode guide available to them.

They also had Plaisant, in its complete form, 

available to them, and they commented extensively on Plaisant. There was an extensive discussion 

of Plaisant, and at the end of that discussion, they 

conclude that Plaisant does not, or none of the 

prior art discloses continuous movement of the 

unlock image to order to unlock the device.

J.A. 12876–78 (emphases added to denote portions of the 

testimony relied on by the majority).2

Dr. Cockburn’s statement concerning wall-mounted 

touchscreens did not concern whether a person of ordinary skill would look to Plaisant to solve the problem of 

“unintentional activation”; it was merely a restatement of 

Plaisant’s express disclosure. See J.A. 20742 (“Users see 

the screen flushmounted into the wall or the cabinetry.”).3 

 

2 Apple never even argued to the jury that 

Plaisant’s disclosure being a wall-mounted device had any 

bearing on motivation to combine. See Apple Inc. v. 

Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 5:12-cv-630, Trial Tr. of Apr. 29, 

2014 at 3212–14, ECF No. 1929.

3 The majority only cites Dr. Cockburn’s statement 

that he did not believe there was a motivation to combine 

Neonode with Plaisant but not his subsequent explanation. A court may not treat a conclusory answer without 

any context as evidence. See Telemac Cellular Corp. v. 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 58 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 7

Indeed, leaving aside his reference to the entirely discrete 

issue of teaching away, Dr. Cockburn’s only purported 

rationale for a lack of motivation to combine was that 

both Neonode and Plaisant were before the Patent Office 

during prosecution—a fact that Apple does not rely on 

before us with respect to motivation to combine.

In stark contrast, the jury heard compelling evidence 

that a skilled artisan would be motivated to combine the 

references to solve the problem of unintentional activation. Most importantly, Plaisant itself expressly teaches 

that an “advantage of the sliding movement is that it is 

less likely to be done inadvertently.” J.A. 20743. Indeed, 

this disclosure alone does more than motivate the combination of Plaisant with Neonode—it actually teaches and 

suggests it. 

Samsung’s expert, Dr. Greenberg, explained this to 

the jury when asked whether a skilled artisan would be 

motivated to combine the references:

They both specifically describe how a sliding action is used to prevent accidental activation.

So this is -- you know, a person looking at this 

would just think it natural to combine these two, 

as well taking the ideas in Plaisant, the slider, 

and putting them on the Neonode is, is just a very 

routine thing to think about in terms of interaction design.

J.A. 11982–83. By the end of trial, the jury had thus 

heard from Samsung’s expert, who articulated a specific 

motivation to combine based on the explicit disclosure of 

Plaisant itself, and from Apple’s expert, who gave no 

 

Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 

(holding that conclusory statements offered by experts are 

not evidence).

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 59 Filed: 10/07/2016
8 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

explanation as to why a skilled artisan would not be so 

motivated. 

Nonetheless, the majority finds that there is substantial evidence of a lack of motivation to combine. But a 

reviewing court in our situation must “review the record 

as a whole,” crediting not only evidence favoring the 

nonmovant but also “evidence supporting the moving 

party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to 

the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested 

witnesses.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 

530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the record as a whole makes clear that a 

skilled artisan, starting with the portable phone of Neonode, would have seen a benefit to adding Plaisant’s 

sliders to solve the accidental activation problem described by the ’721 patent.4 See KSR, 550 U.S. at 424. A 

straightforward evaluation of the entire record compels 

only one reasonable conclusion—there is a motivation to 

combine Neonode with Plaisant.

In sum, there is no support in the record for the majority’s conclusion that substantial evidence supports the 

jury’s implicit factual finding that a person of ordinary 

skill in the art would not be motivated to combine Neonode and Plaisant. Substantial evidence may be a 

lenient standard, but it is a standard nonetheless that 

cannot be met with the stark absence of evidence. There-

 

4 Because it is undisputed that Plaisant is analogous art, a hypothetical person of ordinary skill would be 

aware of it. See Mast, Foos, & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 

U.S. 485, 494 (1900) (“[I]n determining the question of 

invention, we must presume the patentee was fully informed of everything which preceded him, whether such 

were the actual fact or not.”); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. 

Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1449–54 (Fed. Cir. 

1984) (collecting cases).

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APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 9

fore, no rational jury could find that a motivation to 

combine the references to arrive at the claimed invention 

was lacking.

B 

Despite the majority’s statement that there is no motivation to combine, the majority does not appear to rest 

its conclusion on that basis. See Majority Op. at 30. 

Instead, the majority goes on to state that it considers 

Plaisant’s teachings, including the reference to “inadvertent activation,” against the evidence of secondary considerations. Id. at 42–43. It is unclear what analytical 

framework the majority has adopted in its analysis and 

whether this goes to the question of motivation to combine. We have only weighed the teachings of a prior art 

reference related to motivation to combine against each 

other in the teaching away context. See, e.g., Galderma 

Labs., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 739 (Fed. Cir. 

2013) (a teaching that a concentration of 0.1% was optimal did not weigh against a teaching that 0.3% concentration was possible); DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic 

Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 

(a teaching expressing a “general preference for an alternative” did not weigh against a teaching). Doing so as 

part of the ultimate legal question of obviousness, as the 

majority does now, is a new approach that neither we nor 

the Supreme Court has sanctioned.

Given the majority’s conclusion (with which I disagree) that there was no motivation to combine references 

in this case, there is no reason for the majority to go on to 

opine on the question of secondary considerations at all—

that discussion is arguably dicta.5 See, e.g., Allergan, Inc. 

 

5 The majority’s assessment of secondary considerations also relies on additional evidence that was not 

presented by Apple to the district court or to us on appeal 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 61 Filed: 10/07/2016
10 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

v. Sandoz Inc., 796 F.3d 1293, 1304–07 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 

(affirming a nonobvious determination based only on 

issues of teaching away and unexpected results); Stryker 

Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., No. 2013-1668, 2016 WL 4729504, 

at *7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 12, 2016) (declining to reach secondary considerations in reaching a determination of nonobviousness), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub 

nom. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 

(2016); In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 

(same). 

In my analysis, however, I conclude that no reasonable jury could find a lack of motivation to combine, so I am 

obligated to consider Apple’s proffered evidence of secondary considerations. Nike, Inc. v. Adidas AG, 812 F.3d 

1326, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

In the history of our court, we have only once held 

that evidence of secondary considerations outweighs 

strong evidence of obviousness. See Transocean Offshore 

Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 

F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In that case, the jury, in view 

of “compelling” evidence, made express findings that 

seven types of secondary considerations supported nonobviousness. Id. at 1349, 1354. However, we acknowledged 

that “[f]ew cases present such extensive objective evidence 

of nonobviousness, and thus we have rarely held that 

objective evidence is sufficient to overcome a prima facie

case of obviousness.” Id. at 1354. This is not a case 

where evidence of secondary considerations is so “exten-

 

in opposition to Samsung’s obviousness evidence, and 

relies on theories that appear nowhere in Apple’s briefs. 

Compare Majority Op. at 31–43 with Apple’s Opp’n to 

Samsung’s Mot. for J. as a Matter of Law Pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) & Mot. to Am. the J. at 18, Apple Inc. 

v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 5:12-cv-630, ECF No. 1908–03 

(“Apple JMOL Opposition”); Apple Br. 29.

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APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 11

sive.” See KSR, 550 U.S. at 426 (“Like the District Court, 

finally, we conclude Teleflex has shown no secondary 

factors to dislodge the determination that claim 4 is 

obvious.”).

When examining evidence of secondary considerations, “courts must exercise care in assessing proffered 

evidence of objective considerations, giving such evidence 

weight only where the objective indicia are attributable to

the inventive characteristics of the discovery as claimed in 

the patent.” In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1079 n.6 

(Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). The proponent of such evidence of secondary considerations, in this case Apple, “bears the burden 

of showing that a nexus exists between the claimed features of the invention and the objective evidence offered to 

show non-obviousness.” WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game 

Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Though the 

existence of such a nexus is a question of fact, which we 

review for substantial evidence, the consideration of 

objective indicia is part of the ultimate determination of 

obviousness which we review de novo. See Agrizap, Inc. v. 

Woodstream Corp., 520 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 

(“Even when we presume the jury found that the objective 

evidence of nonobviousness favored [the patentee], this 

evidence is insufficient to overcome the overwhelming 

strength of [the alleged infringer’s] prima facie case of 

obviousness.”); Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 

485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (agreeing with the 

district court’s conclusion that even substantial evidence 

of various secondary considerations was “inadequate to 

overcome” obviousness as a matter of law). The mere 

existence of evidence of secondary considerations does not 

control the obviousness determination. Richardson-Vicks 

Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

In this case, Apple presented evidence that it contends shows there was commercial success, long-felt need, 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 63 Filed: 10/07/2016
12 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

industry praise, and copying. However, Apple’s evidence 

of commercial success does not establish a nexus with the 

patented feature, and the remaining evidence, even if a 

nexus is assumed, is not sufficient to “tip the scales of 

patentability.” Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 

(1966).

1 

To argue commercial success on appeal, Apple only relies on a portion of a survey introduced to establish the 

value of the “patent-related” slide-to-unlock feature on 

tablets with screens larger than 7 inches, J.A. 21066, 

21108, coupled with Dr. Greenberg’s statement that 

“there’s no question that the Apple iPhone was a commercial success.” J.A. 11984; see Apple Br. 29. This evidence 

does not establish a nexus for commercial success.6

With respect to the survey, it did not ask about the 

slide-to-unlock feature on smartphones, which in the 

survey had screens no larger than 5.5 inches (smaller 

than the surveyed tablet screens). J.A. 21076, 21108. 

Apple does not point to any separate evidence regarding 

the sales of those tablets. As for the success of the iPhone 

device, there is no evidence tying that success specifically 

to the features embodied in the claimed invention. To 

 

6 To find a nexus for commercial success, the majority also relies on testimony by Apple’s Senior Vice President of Worldwide Marketing, a television commercial 

shown to the jury, and additional testimony from Apple’s 

witness, Mr. Christie. Majority Op. at 35–38. Apple did 

not rely on any of that evidence before the district court in 

its JMOL opposition or before us on appeal to support a 

showing of commercial success. See Apple JMOL Opposition 18; Apple Br. 29. These rationales are new. There is 

no need to reach these arguments because they were

never made in this appeal.

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 64 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 13

establish the requisite nexus, there needs to be some 

record evidence to tie the commercial success of a product 

to the slide-to-unlock feature of that product embodying 

the claimed invention. Here, there is none. 

In addition, although Dr. Greenberg testified that the 

iPhone was commercially successful, he continued: “[b]ut 

I’ve seen no evidence that says that that commercial 

success was due to the lock screen.” J.A. 11985. No 

reasonable juror could conclude that Dr. Greenberg’s 

statement that he had seen no evidence of a nexus was 

somehow evidence of a nexus.7 

2 

The remainder of Apple’s secondary consideration arguments consists of long-felt need, industry praise, and 

copying. To show long-felt need, Apple relies on the 

testimony of Dr. Cockburn, who provided a single example 

of a portable phone that he characterized as “entirely 

unintuitive.” J.A. 10638–39. For industry praise, Apple 

relies upon the audience reaction at the first public unveiling of the iPhone. J.A. 12879–80. Finally, Apple 

relies on internal Samsung documents that it argues 

 

7 Apple also argued before the district court, but not 

on appeal, that Dr. Cockburn’s testimony was evidence of 

commercial success for the ’721 patent. See Apple JMOL 

Opposition 18. But Dr. Cockburn only testified that the 

iPhone was commercially successful, not that the iPhone 

was commercially successful because of the slide-tounlock feature. See J.A. 12879 (“Well, clearly there’s been 

commercial success both of the iPhones that use this 

invention, and for the devices that have copied the technique.”). This testimony is also insufficient to establish 

nexus.

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 65 Filed: 10/07/2016
14 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

show both copying and industry praise. See, e.g., J.A.

51289.8

Even assuming that the jury implicitly found a nexus 

between Apple’s evidence and the claimed invention, this 

evidence is insufficient in the face of the strong evidence 

of obviousness. The testimony of an expert testifying as 

to a single example of unsatisfactory prior art is, at best, 

weak. Cf. Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d at 1083 (testimony 

regarding an expert’s experience over ten years). Similarly, Apple’s evidence of applause at its own press event is 

also weak evidence of nonobviousness. See In re Cree, 818 

F.3d 694, 702 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding a company’s press 

release unpersuasive evidence of non-obviousness). 

Finally, though Samsung’s internal documents are probative of copying (and industry praise), they do not move the 

needle in this case. See Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enters., 

Inc., 632 F.3d 1358, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding evidence of copying unpersuasive evidence of nonobviousness).

Considering the totality of the evidence, Apple’s evidence relating to secondary considerations does not “tip 

the scales of patentability.” Graham, 383 U.S. at 36; see 

also Leapfrog Enters., 485 F.3d at 1162 (finding substantial evidence of commercial success, industry praise, and 

long-felt need insufficient to overcome strong evidence of 

obviousness); Richardson-Vicks, 122 F.3d at 1483 (“Evidence of secondary considerations . . . are but a part of the 

‘totality of the evidence’ that is used to reach the ultimate 

 

8 In addition to the evidence cited by Apple and the 

district court, the majority also relies on additional documentation and testimony regarding alternatives to the 

iPhone slide-to-unlock feature to support its conclusion on 

long-felt need. Majority Op. at 40–41. There is no need to 

reach this argument because Apple never cited that

evidence before the district court or before us on appeal. 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 66 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 15

conclusion of obviousness.”). The asserted claim of the 

’721 patent is therefore obvious as a matter of law.9

II

With respect to the ’172 patent, the majority also errs 

in finding substantial evidence in support of the jury 

determination that the ’172 patent is nonobvious. Specifically, the majority’s conclusion regarding the scope and 

content of the prior art relies entirely on out-of-context 

statements by Dr. Cockburn.

The ’172 patent is directed to methods of automatically correcting typographical errors as the user is typing on 

the keyboard of a portable device. In essence, asserted 

claim 18 of the ’172 patent requires that a current “character string,” or text, be displayed in a “first area;” that 

the text, as typed, and suggested “replacement” text be 

 

9 As a basis for affirmance, the majority implies 

that it would be inappropriate to “reverse nearly a dozen 

fact findings.” See Majority Op. at 5. The number of 

underlying findings to a legal conclusion is irrelevant in a 

legal analysis. Reversal of a jury finding of nonobviousness, which we have done not infrequently, usually requires by its very nature the explicit or implicit reversal 

of multiple fact findings. See, e.g., W. Union Co. v. 

MoneyGram Payment Sys., Inc., 626 F.3d 1361, 1368–

1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (reversing jury’s implicit factual 

findings of the scope and content of the prior art, motivation to combine, and evidence of secondary considerations); Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335, 1348–50 

(reversing a jury determination of nonobviousness and, 

implicitly, the underlying factual findings); PharmaStem 

Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1360–67 

(Fed. Cir. 2007) (reversing a jury’s implicit factual findings regarding the scope and teaching of the prior art, 

expectation of success, and secondary considerations).

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 67 Filed: 10/07/2016
16 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

displayed in a second area; and that the replacement text 

be automatically entered in the first area if a certain key, 

such as the space bar, is pressed or if the user touches the 

suggested replacement. Additionally, the user can choose 

to use the current text (as typed) if he touches that option 

in the second area.

Samsung presented evidence at trial through its expert, Dr. Wigdor, that claim 18 of the ’172 patent is obvious in light of the Robinson and Xrgomics prior art 

references. Robinson describes a touchscreen keyboard 

that can automatically correct incorrectly typed text. Dr. 

Wigdor opined that Robinson discloses every aspect of the 

invention except for displaying incorrectly typed text in a 

“first area.” For that missing limitation, he explained 

that “anyone who’s used a computer since the late 1970s 

would be familiar with this idea that . . . as you type, the 

text shows up at your cursor.” J.A. 12025. In addition, he 

pointed to Xrgomics, which describes a text-entry system 

in which the current character string is displayed in a 

first area. J.A. 21049.

The majority does not point to any evidence that 

Xrgomics fails to disclose displaying current text in a first 

area, nor could it because Xrgomics plainly discloses that 

limitation. See J.A. 12025–26. Rather, the majority 

concludes, based on Dr. Cockburn’s testimony, that there 

is substantial evidence that neither Robinson nor Xrgomics discloses the text replacement recited by the asserted 

claim, as distinguished from text completion. That is 

demonstrably incorrect, at least with respect to Robinson.

Dr. Cockburn testified primarily that Robinson fails to 

disclose displaying current text in a “first area.” He then 

used that statement to conclude that Robinson also lacks 

“a series of [other] elements” recited by the asserted 

claim, namely replacing or keeping current text in a first 

area. J.A. 12915–16. In context, Dr. Cockburn’s testimony about Robinson’s missing elements was entirely premCase: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 68 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 17

ised on the absence of a single element—i.e., no text being 

displayed in a first area:

[B]ecause the current character string is not in the 

first area, it is not replaced with the suggested replacement character when the user presses a delimiter.

As you saw, there was no text there [in the first area] to be replaced when a delimiter was pressed.

Similarly, the character -- current character string 

is not in the first area, so it can’t be replaced when 

the user selects a suggested replacement string.

And, again, because the current character string is 

not there [in the first area], it can’t be kept if the 

user performs a gesture. 

J.A. 12916 (emphases added). To be clear, he did not 

testify that Robinson fails to disclose replacing or keeping 

text per se, but only that it fails to disclose replacing or 

keeping text in a first area. 

Indeed, there can be no genuine dispute that Robinson discloses replacing or keeping, in a different area of a 

display, text that the user has input. Robinson is titled 

“Keyboard System with Automatic Correction.” J.A. 

20885 (emphasis added). And, as explained by Dr. 

Wigdor, Figure 1B of the patent shows that a pop-up 

menu includes the text as typed and suggested replacement text:

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 69 Filed: 10/07/2016
18 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

J.A. 20890. Robinson states that “[t]he space key acts to 

accept the default word . . . and enters the [default] word 

. . . in the text output region.” J.A. 20925 (col. 33 ll. 12–

14). In addition, it is possible to “[s]elect[] the [text as 

typed] for output.” Id. (col. 18 l. 10). 

Again, Xrgomics plainly supplies Robinson’s missing 

limitation of displaying current text in a first area. In 

light of the record evidence, a reasonable jury would only 

be able to conclude that taking Robinson and supplying 

that limitation from Xrgomics would result in the claimed 

invention. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, there is 

no evidence—let alone substantial evidence—to support 

the jury’s finding that Robinson and Xrgomics, when 

combined, would not disclose every limitation of the 

asserted claim.

Although the majority does not address motivation to 

combine with respect to the ’172 patent, I also find no 

substantial evidence upon which a reasonable jury could 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 70 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 19

decide that motivation was lacking. Samsung’s expert 

gave unrebutted testimony that “the person of ordinary 

skill in the art, seeing all of the behaviors in Robinson 

and understanding how they work, and then seeing how 

Xrgomics works, would certainly recognize this one missing element that what they type shows up where their 

cursor is. I believe they would combine it.” Apple Inc. v. 

Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 5:12-cv-630, Trial Tr. of Apr. 15, 

2014 at 2019, ECF No. 1717. Apple offered no expert 

testimony to the contrary. See id. at Trial Tr. of Apr. 25, 

2014 at 2902–06, ECF No. 1927. There is no question 

that Robinson and Xrgomics address the same problems 

that arise from typing on a relatively small keyboard. 

And there is nothing to indicate that the asserted combination does more than yield predictable results. Therefore, the only evidence of record demonstrates that all of 

the limitations of claim 18 of the ’172 patent were known 

in the prior art, and combining those features to solve a 

known problem yielded no more than a predictable result. 

See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416 (“[W]hen a patent claims a 

structure already known in the prior art that is altered by 

the mere substitution of one element for another known in 

the field, the combination must do more than yield a 

predictable result.”).

With respect to secondary considerations, Apple argues that the success of the accused Samsung devices, 

coupled with survey evidence that consumers are more 

likely to buy smartphones with “automatic word correction,” J.A. 21108, is evidence of commercial success. 

Apple also asserts that an internal Samsung document 

describing an alternative approach as “jarring,” J.A. 

51488, is evidence of industry praise. However, as with 

the ’721 patent, Apple cites no expert or other testimony 

connecting the survey results to the obviousness inquiry. 

Furthermore, the survey evidence does not speak to 

whether a consumer would be more or less likely to buy a 

device with the specific combination of features recited in 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 71 Filed: 10/07/2016
20 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

claim 18 of the ’172 patent. That is, this evidence does 

not show the required nexus between the patented feature and Samsung’s commercial success. As with the ’721 

patent, any remaining evidence of secondary considerations here is not sufficient to “tip the scales of patentability.” Graham, 383 U.S. at 36.

Accordingly, the asserted claim of the ’172 patent is 

obvious as a matter of law.

III

As for the ’647 patent, the crux of the parties’ dispute 

is the proper application of our construction of the “analyzer server” limitation. We had construed this limitation 

in another case concerning the same patent to mean “a 

server routine separate from a client that receives data 

having structures from the client.” Apple Inc. v. Motorola, 

Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Our previous 

construction of “analyzer server” is not at issue on appeal, 

and the parties agree that it applies in this case. Samsung does not dispute the construction, and, even if Apple 

had disagreed with our construction, it is bound by it. See 

Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 

U.S. 313, 328–29 (1971). The question is whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that, under 

our construction, the accused instrumentalities meet the 

requirement for a “server routine separate from a client.” 

In addition to Judge Dyk’s analysis with respect to 

the ’647 patent in section VIII parts A and B of his dissent, I would add the following.

The majority asserts that, in light of the specification, 

a program that is “structurally separate,” without more, 

satisfies the “‘separate’ requirement.” Majority Op. at 10. 

We did not so cabin the word “separate” in our Motorola 

construction. Because no two program routines may 

physically occupy the same memory at the same time (i.e., 

any two separate program routines are, by definition, 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 72 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 21

separate in storage), the majority’s interpretation effectively and erroneously reads “separate” out of our construction. Relatedly, the majority also fails to give effect 

to the requirement under our construction that the routine is a server routine, not any piece of code. That is 

significant because we relied in Motorola on the plain 

meaning of “server,” which entailed a client-server relationship. See Motorola, 757 F.3d at 1304–05.

As applied to the facts of this case, no reasonable juror could conclude that Samsung’s devices embody the 

“analyzer server” limitation. Apple asserted that pieces of 

software code stored in “shared libraries” are the “analyzer server” that performs the “detecting” and “linking” 

functions.10 Notably, even Apple does not advocate for the 

majority’s view that our construction merely requires the 

shared library code to be “structurally separate.” Apple 

contends that the accused code is “separate” not only in 

its location but also in its development and design to be 

reused across different applications. See Apple Opening 

& Response Br. 16; Oral Argument at 29:21–30:25, 33:35–

34:59, available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oralargumentrecordings?title=Apple&field_case_number_value=2015-

1171&field_date_value2%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D. 

 

10 According to the parties’ experts, a shared library 

is a collection of code that can be accessed by other applications. J.A. 13054 (Apple’s expert); J.A. 11792 (Samsung’s expert). At oral argument, Samsung analogized 

the difference between a server and a shared library to

the difference between a client asking a reference librarian (the server) to perform a task and a client going to the 

library and performing a task by following instructions 

from a book in the library (the shared library). Oral 

Argument at 9:24–10:15.

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 73 Filed: 10/07/2016
22 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

Crucially, the record lacks substantial evidence that 

the shared library code of the accused instrumentalities 

meets our Motorola construction requiring a separate 

server routine. Regarding the “separate” requirement, 

there is nothing in our Motorola construction to indicate 

that the independent development of a program routine or 

reuse across different applications, relied on by Apple, is 

relevant. The only arguably relevant evidence that Apple

relies on is that the accused applications use the shared 

library code at a separate location, which, as noted above, 

is not the only requirement of our construction. Because 

Apple has not offered sufficient evidence to meet our 

claim construction, that alone is sufficient to find noninfringement as a matter of law.

To be sure, Samsung also affirmatively argued why 

the shared library code is not “separate.” Contrary to the 

majority’s assertion, Samsung proffered evidence that the 

code “does not run on its own.”11 Samsung Br. 19. Indeed, Apple’s expert admitted that the shared library code 

is incapable of running “outside of the client application.” 

J.A. 13054. And, as Samsung points out, Apple did not 

explain why the shared library code is a “server” routine. 

See Samsung Br. 18–19, 24. There is simply no evidence 

that the accused instrumentalities rely on a client-server 

architecture. 

 

11 The majority argues that the jury could have 

found Samsung’s expert testimony regarding the meaning 

of “analyzer server” inconsistent, citing the district court’s

criticism of the expert. Majority Op. at 16–17 n.10. The 

court’s remarks, however, were not made in front of the 

jury, and Apple did not argue in its appeal briefing that 

the expert’s testimony was inconsistent. Therefore, there 

is no need to address this point. Regardless of the credibility of Samsung’s expert, Apple’s evidence under our 

previous construction of “analyzer server” is insufficient.

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 74 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 23

In sum, Apple’s evidence only shows, in relevant part, 

that the shared library code is a piece of code located in a 

separate part of memory that is used by other applications. That is not sufficient under our previous construction of “analyzer server” to prove infringement of the ’647 

patent as a matter of law. No reasonable jury could 

conclude otherwise.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, no jury could rationally 

conclude that the ’721 and ’172 patents were not obvious, 

or that Samsung infringed the ’647 patent. Therefore, I 

respectfully dissent. 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 75 Filed: 10/07/2016
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

APPLE INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant

v.

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., A KOREAN 

CORPORATION, SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS 

AMERICA, INC., A NEW YORK CORPORATION, 

SAMSUNG TELECOMMUNICATIONS AMERICA, 

LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY 

COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellants

______________________ 

2015-1171, 2015-1195, 2015-1994

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of California in No. 5:12-cv-00630-LHK, 

Judge Lucy H. Koh.

______________________ 

DYK, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

I 

For the first time in 26 years, this court has taken an 

obviousness case en banc. See In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688 

(Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc). Remarkably, the majority has 

done so without further briefing and argument from the 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 76 Filed: 10/07/2016
2 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

parties, amici, or the government, as has been our almost 

uniform practice in this court’s en banc decisions.1 Failure to ask for the government’s views is particularly 

significant given the ramifications of this issue for the 

U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”). This has 

deprived the parties and amici of the opportunity to 

express their views on these important issues, and has 

deprived this court of the opportunity to consider these 

issues in light of those views.

Obviousness is the most common invalidity issue in 

both district court and post-grant proceedings before the 

PTO.2 The importance of our obviousness jurisprudence 

to the intellectual property community is evidenced by, for 

example, the 38 amicus briefs filed in KSR International 

Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), including an 

amicus brief by the government, and the multiple amicus 

briefs filed in our last obviousness en banc case. The 

present en banc decision will have a significant and 

immediate impact on the future resolution of obviousness 

issues. While purporting to apply established circuit law, 

the majority is in fact making significant changes to the 

law as articulated by the Supreme Court. Indeed, as 

Judge Reyna convincingly points out, it is difficult to 

understand how this case would satisfy the requirements 

for en banc review if the majority’s purpose were not to 

clarify the law. 

The majority states that it takes this case en banc to 

correct the original panel’s reliance on extra-record evi-

 

1 Over the last 10 years, the court extended supplemental briefing or argument from parties in 36 en banc 

cases; in only three cases did we not do so.

2 See 2-5 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.06 (2015) (“The 

nonobviousness requirement of Section 103 is the most 

important and most litigated of the conditions of patentability.”).

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 77 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 3

dence. Maj. Op. at 3–5. This could hardly be the reason 

the majority has granted en banc review, since the panel 

has continuingly expressed willingness, and indeed desire, to eliminate references to any extra-record evidence 

because of concerns raised in Apple’s petition for rehearing and because they were unnecessary to the panel 

opinion.

While for the most part the majority does not express

its shifts in obviousness principles explicitly, an examination of the majority’s opinion makes clear its substantial

impact on the law of obviousness. And that impact will 

not be a positive one, for the principles that the majority 

announces are inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s

decisions in KSR, Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 

(1966), as well as earlier Supreme Court cases, and will 

make proof of obviousness far more difficult. 

The majority complains that the parties themselves 

did not “raise big questions about how aspects of the 

obviousness doctrine ought to operate.” Maj. Op. at 5. 

But that is exactly the point. The majority makes significant changes to the law of obviousness even though these 

important issues are raised by the court sua sponte without the opportunity by the parties and amici to address 

them, or the majority adopts previous panel decisions on 

obviousness that the parties could address only at the en 

banc level. 

I agree with Chief Judge Prost’s dissent, which ably 

points out that even under the majority’s view that the 

issues are factual rather than legal, there is not substantial evidence to support the result the majority reaches on 

the issue of obviousness. The flimsy nature of the evidence found by the majority to support the jury verdict 

emphasizes the dangers of inviting factfinding to dominate the obviousness determination. Quite apart from the 

question whether the jury’s factfinding was supported by 

substantial evidence, is the fact that these asserted 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 78 Filed: 10/07/2016
4 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

factfindings are largely irrelevant to the legal question of 

obviousness.

I write separately to point out the profound changes in 

the law of obviousness that the majority creates and to 

point out the majority’s errors in its approach to claim 

construction of the ’647 patent. 

II 

First, the majority turns the legal question of obviousness into a factual issue for a jury to resolve, both as to 

the sufficiency of the motivation to combine and the 

significance to be given to secondary considerations. 

KSR explicitly rejected the contention that obviousness is always a matter of fact requiring jury resolution. 

In KSR, the patentee argued that the question of motivation to combine was for the jury. See Brief for Respondents, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) 

(No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2989549, at *45. The Supreme 

Court rejected this contention, holding that this question 

was properly resolved on summary judgment because 

“[t]he ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal determination. Where, as here, the content of the prior art, the 

scope of the patent claim, and the level of ordinary skill in 

the art are not in material dispute, and the obviousness of 

the claim is apparent in light of these factors, summary 

judgment is appropriate.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 427 (internal 

citations omitted). Thus, while “the content of the prior 

art, the scope of the patent claim, and the level of ordinary skill in the art” potentially present fact issues, the 

KSR Court determined that the sufficiency of the motivation to combine was not a factual issue, and that in the 

particular case “it was obvious to a person of ordinary 

skill to combine” the prior art. Id. at 424. 

Here too, “the content of the prior art, the scope of the 

patent claim, and the level of ordinary skill in the art are 

not in material dispute,” id. at 427, and there is no indicaCase: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 79 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 5

tion that the combination of the relevant prior art does 

more than yield a predictable result. Yet the majority 

holds that the question of the sufficiency of the motivation

here was a jury question. This is inconsistent with KSR. 

For secondary considerations, Graham and KSR explained that both the significance and the weighing of 

secondary considerations are for the court. Secondary 

considerations “focus attention on economic and motivational rather than technical issues and are, therefore, 

more susceptible of judicial treatment than are the highly 

technical facts often present in patent litigation.” Graham, 383 U.S. at 35–36. The specific holdings in Graham

and KSR themselves demonstrate that both the significance and the weighing of secondary considerations are

legal issues for the court. Even as an appellate court, the 

Supreme Court in Graham determined that “these [secondary] factors do not, in the circumstances of this case, 

tip the scales of patentability.” 383 U.S. at 36. Similarly, 

the KSR Court “conclude[d] [that] Teleflex has shown no 

secondary factors to dislodge the determination that claim 

4 is obvious.” 550 U.S. at 426. Again, the majority’s 

approach—turning the significance of secondary considerations into a factual question—is contrary to Graham and 

KSR.

III 

Second, the majority lowers the bar for nonobviousness by refusing to take account of the trivial nature of 

the two claimed inventions. With respect to the ’721 

patent, the slide to unlock feature was known in the prior 

art (Neonode) and the only innovation is an image associated with the sliding gesture from fixed starting to ending 

points.3 See Maj. Op. 25–27. With respect to the ’172 

 

3 Courts in other countries have uniformly found 

the ’721 patent invalid. See Oral Argument 18:48–19:05 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 80 Filed: 10/07/2016
6 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

patent, the autocorrect feature was known in the prior art 

(Robinson), and the only innovation is displaying contemporaneously the text to be autocorrected. See Maj. Op.

44–47. Such text displays have long been known in the 

prior art (though not specifically in connection with 

autocorrect display). 

Treating such minimal advances over the prior art as 

nonobvious is contrary to KSR, where the Supreme Court 

confirmed that the obviousness doctrine is designed to 

ensure that “the results of ordinary innovation are not the 

subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws.” KSR, 

550 U.S. at 427. On the face of these patents, only ordinary, indeed trivial, innovation is involved. The majority’s holding that these trivial features can render a patent 

nonobvious will have a significant impact on future cases.

IV

Third, the majority concludes that combinations of 

prior art used to solve a known problem are insufficient to 

render an invention obvious as a matter of law. According 

to the majority, there must be evidence of a specific motivation to combine. See Maj. Op. at 28–31. Both aspects of 

these conclusions are contrary to KSR. 

Under KSR, the existence of each patented feature in 

the prior art is alone not sufficient to establish obviousness. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. There must be a reason 

to make a combination. But KSR holds that the reason 

 

(“All the other jurisdictions of the world who have considered the ’721 patent . . . have invalidated it . . . based on 

obviousness from these references.”); HTC Eur. Co. v. 

Apple Inc., [2013] EWCA (Civ) 451 (Eng.); The Hague 

District Court, 24 Aug. 2011, Apple v. Samsung, Docket 

Nos. 396957/KG ZA 11-730 and 396959/KG ZA 11-731; 

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Aug. 

25, 2015, X ZR110/13 (Ger.).

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APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 7

may be found as a matter of law in the solution to a 

known problem. KSR was quite clear that the existence 

of a known problem suffices: “[o]ne of the ways in which a 

patent’s subject matter can be proved obvious is by noting 

that there existed at the time of invention a known problem for which there was an obvious solution . . . .” KSR, 

550 U.S. at 419–20. “[W]hen a patent simply arranges old 

elements with each performing the same function it had 

been known to perform and yields no more than one 

would expect from such an arrangement, the combination 

is obvious.” Id. at 417 (internal quotations omitted). 

“[T]he simple substitution of one known element for 

another” makes the claimed invention obvious. Id. 

In holding that the existence of a known problem is 

sufficient reason to combine prior art references, the 

Court specifically rejected our court’s holding in KSR that 

the existence of a known problem was insufficient. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. App’x 282, 288 (Fed. Cir. 

2005) (requiring that in addition to noting “the problem to 

be solved, . . . the district court was [also] required to 

make specific findings as to whether there was a suggestion or motivation to combine the teachings of [the prior 

art addressed to the same problem] in the particular 

manner claimed”), rev’d, 550 U.S. 398 (2007).

KSR also held, contrary to the majority, that evidence 

of a specific motivation to combine is not required. The 

Court rejected our court’s approach in requiring a “specific 

understanding or principle” that creates a specific motivation to combine. See 550 U.S. at 414. In KSR itself, the 

combination was held obvious despite no “precise teachings” to combine the previous references. See id. at 418. 

Earlier decisions of the Supreme Court relied on by 

KSR reflect the same approach. First, KSR explained 

that United States v. Adams taught that “when a patent 

claims a structure already known in the prior art that is 

altered by the mere substitution of one element for anothCase: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 82 Filed: 10/07/2016
8 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

er known in the field, the combination must do more than 

yield a predictable result.” Id. at 416 (citing 383 U.S. 39, 

40 (1966)). Second, KSR explained that Anderson’s–Black 

Rock v. Pavement Salvage Co. taught that when “two 

[prior art references] in combination d[o] no more than 

they would in separate, sequential operation . . . , while 

the combination of old elements perform[s] a useful function, it add[s] nothing to the nature and quality of the . . . 

already patented, and the patent fail[s] under § 103.” Id. 

at 417 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 396 U.S. 

57, 60–62 (1969)). Finally, KSR explained that Sakraida 

v. Ag Pro, Inc. taught that “when a patent simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it 

had been known to perform and yields no more than one 

would expect from such an arrangement, the combination 

is obvious.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 

425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976)). The KSR Court held that the 

“principles underlying these cases are instructive when 

the question is whether a patent claiming the combination of elements of prior art is obvious. . . . Sakraida and 

Anderson’s–Black Rock are illustrative—a court must ask 

whether the improvement is more than the predictable 

use of prior art elements according to their established 

functions.” Id. Thus, under KSR, the existence of a 

known problem solved by the combination can render that

combination obvious as a matter of law and without 

further evidence of a specific motivation to combine. 

Here, the inventions combine features known in the 

prior art. With respect to the ’721 patent, Apple does not 

dispute, and the majority agrees, that the combination of 

the prior art Neonode and Plaisant references produces 

the claimed invention. Maj. Op. at 27. As discussed 

below, the same is true with respect to the ’172 patent 

(combining the Robinson, Xrgomics, and other prior art 

references). There is no claim that either combination

yielded unpredictable results. Both of the patents also 

address a known problem. With respect to the ’721 paCase: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 83 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 9

tent, the problems are ease-of-use and avoidance of inadvertent activation. With respect to the ’172 patent, the 

problem is the need to see text entries. Contrary to KSR, 

the majority now holds that a known problem is not 

sufficient and that there must be evidence of a specific 

motivation.

V 

Fourth, the majority errs in cabining the relevant 

technology in the field of prior art. The majority invites

the factfinder to dismiss prior art evidence on the theory 

that it concerns a different device than the patented 

invention, even if the references are directed to solving 

the same problem and pertain to a related device. For 

example, with respect to the ’721 patent, the majority 

holds that the jury could dismiss the Plaisant reference 

because it was directed to wall-mounted rather than 

portable devices. Maj. Op. at 28–29. With respect to the 

’172 patent, the majority makes much of the distinction 

between word correction versus word completion, rejecting Xrgomics as relevant prior art on that basis, and 

ignoring the extensive prior art showing text display as a 

routine feature. Maj. Op. at 47–48. 

The Supreme Court in KSR rejected the theory that 

prior art addressing the same problem can be dismissed 

because it concerns a different device. “[I]f a technique 

has been used to improve one device, and a person of 

ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would 

improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his 

or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. In other words, the

question is not whether the art involves precisely the 

same device. The question is whether it addresses the 

same problem within the same general field. “Under the 

correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field 

. . . and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for 

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10 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

combining the elements in the manner claimed.” KSR, 

550 U.S. at 420.

For example, in Graham, the patentee argued that 

prior art disclosing a container for other liquid sprayers

was in a different field of art than the patented insecticide 

sprayer. The Court held that a “restricted . . . view of the 

applicable prior art is not justified. The problems confronting [the patentee] and the insecticide industry were 

not insecticide problems; they were mechanical closure 

problems. Closure devices in such a closely related art as 

pouring spouts for liquid containers are at the very least 

pertinent references.” 383 U.S. at 35. In fact, this principle dates as far back as Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 

248 (1851). In that case, the use of porcelain in a different field was held to be sufficiently related to the use of 

porcelain in doorknobs. Id. at 254.

In short, the proper inquiry is whether the prior art 

references address the same problem in a related area. 

The ’172 patent involves text display for word correction. 

There is no question that the prior art also addresses the 

problem of displaying a typed text so that it can be viewed 

by the user; Xrgomics concerns the related art of text 

completion. The majority concludes that the missing 

element is not present in the prior art Xrgomics device 

because the art is in a different technology, specifically 

text completion as opposed to text correction. Maj. Op. at 

47–48. However, Samsung presented uncontroverted 

evidence, quite apart from Xrgomics, that “anyone who’s 

used a computer since the late 1970s would be familiar 

with this idea” of displaying the full text of what a user is 

typing. J.A. 12024–25. The ’172 patent itself recognizes 

this relatively broad field of prior art, as its specification 

states that the disclosed invention “relate[s] generally to 

text input on portable electronic devices.” ’172 Patent, 

col. 1 ll. 15–16. 

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APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 11

The ’721 patent concerns unlocking touchscreen devices. Here, the prior art dismissed by the majority is, by 

the majority’s own admission, art that concerns the 

general field of touchscreen devices. See Maj. Op. at 42. 

Thus, there is no question that the two prior art references address the same problem in related areas. Nonetheless, the majority urges that “an ordinary artisan 

would not have been motivated to combine elements from 

a wall-mounted touchscreen for home appliances and a 

smartphone, particularly in view of the ‘pocket-dialing’ 

problem specific to mobile devices that Apple’s invention 

sought to address.” Maj. Op. at 31 (quoting the District 

Court’s analysis). The majority errs in two respects. 

First, the ’721 patent is not limited to cell phones or to the 

cell phone pocket-dialing problem, and indeed makes no 

reference to a pocket-dialing problem. The ’721 patent is 

directed to portable devices generally, and to ease of use 

and inadvertent activation with respect to all such devices. Second, the Plaisant prior art was concerned with the 

same problems as the ’721 patent in the field of touch 

screen devices. Plaisant indicated that the study’s “focus 

is on providing . . . systems that are easy for the home 

owner to use.” J.A. 20742. Plaisant also indicated that 

an “advantage of the sliding movement is that it is less 

likely to be done inadvertently.” J.A. 20743. Plaisant was 

thus directed to solving the same problem in the same 

area as the patented invention.4

 

4 Even if the ’721 patent had identified the pocketdialing problem, the Supreme Court in KSR made clear 

that the prior art need not solve all problems or even 

address the specific problems that motivated the patentee. 550 U.S. at 420. Here, moreover, the pocket dialing 

problem would provide an additional reason to combine, 

not a reason not to combine.

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12 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

The majority’s approach will create significant opportunities to dismiss relevant prior art and find almost any 

patent nonobvious by narrowly defining the relevant

technology. In this respect, the en banc decision will work 

a significant change on future cases in the district courts 

and the PTO. 

This change is evident from comparing the majority’s 

holding here to our past jurisprudence. We have previously held that “[a] reference is reasonably pertinent if, 

even though it may be in a different field from that of the 

inventor’s endeavor, . . . [it] logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his 

problem.” In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 

“We therefore have concluded, for example, that an inventor considering a hinge and latch mechanism for portable 

computers would naturally look to references employing 

other housings, hinges, latches, springs, etc., which in 

that case came from areas such as a desktop telephone 

directory, a piano lid, a kitchen cabinet, a washing machine cabinet, a wooden furniture cabinet, or a two-part 

housing for storing audio cassettes.” In re ICON Health & 

Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if cited prior art 

references “are not within the same field of endeavor . . . , 

such references may still be analogous if they are reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the 

inventor is involved.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1481

(Fed. Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Not only does the majority alter our jurisprudence 

with respect to district court proceedings, its approach

would affect patent examiners who are currently instructed that analogous prior art “does not require that the 

reference be from the same field of endeavor as the 

claimed invention.” Manual of Patent Examination 

Procedure § 2141.01(a).

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APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 13

VI 

Fifth, the majority errs in elevating secondary considerations of nonobviousness beyond their role as articulated by the Supreme Court. Secondary considerations 

“without invention[] will not make patentability.” 

Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 278 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Thus, when, as here, a patent is plainly not 

inventive, that is, when the prima facie case of obviousness is strong, secondary considerations carry little 

weight. 

The majority holds that secondary considerations must 

“always” be considered and that even a strong case of 

obviousness involving small advances in the prior art can 

be outweighed by secondary considerations. Maj. Op. at 

22. Here, the majority is quite explicit. It concludes that 

“[t]o the extent that Samsung’s [arguments] should be 

interpreted as precluding a jury finding of long-felt need 

favoring non-obviousness when the difference between the 

prior art and the claimed invention is small, we reject 

such a categorical rule. This type of hard and fast rule is 

not appropriate for the factual issues that are left to the 

province of the jury.” Maj. Op. at 39. In this respect, the 

majority effectively overrules our earlier decision in 

George M. Martin Co. v. Alliance Machine Systems International LLC, which held that “[t]he district court correctly concluded as a matter of law that the differences 

between the prior art and the claimed improvement were 

minimal,” 618 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2010), and that 

“[w]here the differences between the prior art and the 

claimed invention are as minimal as they are here, . . . it 

cannot be said that any long-felt need was unsolved,” id. 

at 1304. The majority’s approach to other secondary 

considerations mirrors its discussion of long-felt need. 

But under Supreme Court authority, secondary considerations are insufficient to outweigh a strong case of obviousness involving small advances over the prior art.

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 88 Filed: 10/07/2016
14 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

KSR and Graham assigned a limited role to secondary 

considerations. KSR required inquiry into secondary 

considerations only “where appropriate.” 550 U.S. at 415

(emphasis added). In Graham, secondary considerations 

are referred to as factors that “might be utilized to give 

light to the circumstances.” 383 U.S. at 17 (emphasis 

added). For example, the Graham Court weighed (in 

evaluating the Scoggin insecticide sprayer patent) that 

despite the presence of “long-felt need in the industry” 

and “wide commercial success” of the patentee, “these 

factors do not, in the circumstances of this case, tip the 

scales of patentability.” 383 U.S. at 35–36. This was so

because in that case the invention “rest[ed] upon exceedingly small and quite non-technical mechanical differences in a device which was old in the art.” Id. at 36. 

Similarly, even though the patentee in KSR introduced 

evidence of commercial success, 550 U.S. at 413, the 

Court dismissed it because it “conclude[d] Teleflex has 

shown no secondary factors to dislodge the determination 

that claim 4 is obvious.” Id. at 426.

Before Graham, the Supreme Court repeatedly held

that courts should give secondary considerations limited 

weight in the ultimate legal determination of obviousness

and that the courts need not consider them where the 

claimed invention represents a small advance and there is 

a strong case for obviousness. For example, Jungersen v. 

Ostby & Barton Co. taught that “[t]he fact that this 

process has enjoyed considerable commercial success . . . 

does not render the patent valid. It is true that in cases 

where the question of patentable invention is a close one, 

such success has weight in tipping the scales of judgment 

toward patentability. Where, as here, however, invention 

is plainly lacking, commercial success cannot fill the 

void.” 335 U.S. 560, 567 (1949) (citations omitted). 

Similarly, in Dow Chemical Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well 

Cementing Co., the Court explained that “petitioner 

claims that the Grebe-Sanford process has filled a longCase: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 89 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 15

felt want and has been a commercial success. But these 

considerations are relevant only in a close case where all 

other proof leaves the question of invention in doubt. 

Here the lack of invention is beyond doubt and cannot be 

outweighed by such factors.” 324 U.S. 320, 330 (1945) 

(citations omitted). Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-OVac Co. cautioned that “[t]hese factors [are] entitled to 

weight in determining whether the improvement amounted to invention and should, in a close case, tip the scales 

in favor of patentability.” 321 U.S. 275, 279 (1944).5

These pre-KSR “decisions remain binding precedent until 

[the Supreme Court] see[s] fit to reconsider them . . . .” 

Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252–53 (1998). 

This case also is not a close one. The combination of 

references, the known problem, the predictable results, 

and the exceedingly small differences from the prior art

make the combination evident and secondary considerations insufficient as a matter of law. 

VII 

Finally, even if secondary considerations in this case 

were legally relevant, the majority fails to compare to the 

 

5 Anderson’s–Black Rock taught that although “[i]t 

is . . . fervently argued that the combination filled a long 

felt want and has enjoyed commercial success[,] . . . those 

matters without invention will not make patentability.” 

396 U.S. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp. similarly taught that “[t]he 

Court of Appeals and the respondent both lean heavily on 

evidence that this device filled a long-felt want and has 

enjoyed commercial success. But commercial success 

without invention will not make patentability.” 340 U.S. 

147, 153 (1950). These cases are cited with approval in 

KSR or Graham. See 550 U.S. at 416–17; 383 U.S. at 6.

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16 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

closest prior art to properly assess the innovation over the 

prior art. Secondary considerations must be directed to 

what is claimed to be inventive, because secondary considerations “without invention[] will not make patentability.” Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 278 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). It requires comparison to prior art that reflects 

known advances. In other words, there must be a demonstrated nexus to the claimed invention—a nexus to what 

is new in comparison to the prior art. Furthermore, the 

proponent of such evidence of secondary considerations, in 

this case Apple, “bears the burden of showing that a 

nexus exists between the claimed features of the invention and the objective evidence offered to show nonobviousness.” WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 

F.3d 1339, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

Our court has previously adopted the closest prior art 

as the relevant comparison for secondary considerations. 

In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals 

USA, Inc., we noted that “the district court found evidence 

of some secondary considerations of nonobviousness . . . . 

To be particularly probative, evidence of [secondary 

considerations] must establish that there is a difference 

between the results obtained and those of the closest prior 

art . . . .” 752 F.3d 967, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (emphasis 

added) (internal quotation marks omitted). In another 

example, in Kao Corp. v. Unilever United States, Inc., we 

observed that while the “district court . . . concluded . . . 

that secondary considerations . . . were sufficient to rebut 

the prima facie case, . . . the district court failed to use the 

closest prior art.” 441 F.3d 963, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2006)

(emphasis added). Thus, ascertaining the significance of 

the innovative leap over the prior art using secondary 

considerations requires a comparison to the closest prior 

art. This framework no longer governs under the majority’s approach.

The majority’s secondary considerations analysis repeatedly compares the ’721 and ’172 patents to inferior or 

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APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 17

non-existent prior art, rather than to the relevant, closest 

prior art. Specifically, the evidence relied upon by the 

majority with respect to the secondary considerations 

makes no comparison, with respect to the ’721 patent, to 

Neonode and the claimed innovation of the image associated with the slide to unlock feature, and with respect to 

the ’172 patent, to Robinson and the claimed innovation of 

displaying the currently typed string of text. 

For example, for commercial success, Apple and the 

majority rely on survey evidence developed for Apple’s 

damages case that consumers are more likely to purchase 

(and pay more for) a phone with a slide to unlock feature 

and an autocorrect function than a phone without these 

features. Maj. Op. at 35–36, 48. However, this is an 

irrelevant comparison because Neonode provides a slideto-unlock feature and Robinson provides an autocorrect 

function. There was no showing of nexus between the 

inventive steps (over the closest prior art) disclosed by the 

’721 and ’172 patents and the surveyed consumer demand. For long-felt but unresolved need, the majority 

compares to an older Nokia device with a very different 

non-touchscreen, button-based unlocking feature, Maj. 

Op. at 40, as well as to Samsung touchscreen unlocking 

mechanisms that do not have the slide-to-unlock feature 

of Neonode, Maj. Op. at 40–41. The majority also cites 

Steve Job’s unveiling of the slide to unlock feature at an 

Apple event and the audience’s cheers as evidence of 

industry praise for the ’721 patent. Maj. Op. at 34. 

Again, however, Apple provides no evidence that this 

praise was specifically for the ’721 patent’s innovative 

step beyond Neonode or even that the audience was 

comprised of industry experts. The majority thus errs in 

elevating such irrelevant comparisons as providing “particularly strong” and “powerful[]” evidence of nonobviousness. Maj. Op. at 43. 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 92 Filed: 10/07/2016
18 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

In summary, the majority decision here materially 

raises the bar for obviousness by disregarding Supreme 

Court precedent.

VIII

A 

Finally, I address the ’647 patent which presents 

issues of infringement rather than obviousness. The 

“analyzer server” limitation requires that the analyzer 

server “run” separately, and there is no substantial evidence that Samsung’s devices embody the “analyzer 

server” limitation because the shared library code does 

not run separately. That the majority substitutes its own 

claim construction (requiring only separate storage) for 

the parties’ agreed construction that the analyzer server 

must “run” separately is both improper and unwise. 

In Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 

the Supreme Court made clear the principle “that a judge, 

in construing a patent claim, is engaged in much the same 

task as the judge would be in construing other written 

instruments, such as . . . contracts.” 135 S. Ct. 831, 833 

(2015). In the contract area, it is established that the 

parties’ interpretation of the contract’s terms is generally 

entitled to significant if not dispositive weight.6 The same 

 

6 “Where the parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is 

interpreted in accordance with that meaning.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts §201(1) (1981). In contract 

interpretation, “it [is] clear that the primary search is for 

a common meaning of the parties, not a meaning imposed 

on them by the law.” Id. cmt. c. “[A]uthority . . . supports 

giving effect to a common meaning shared by both parties 

in preference to” a meaning imposed by the courts. 2 

FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS (3d) § 7.9 (2004). See also 5 

CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (Rev.) § 24.5 (1998) (When “the 

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APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 19

should be true where the parties agree as to the meaning 

of technical terms in infringement litigation, where the 

outcome affects only the particular parties to the dispute. 

The majority here inappropriately declines to give the 

parties’ agreed claim construction any weight, much less 

significant or dispositive weight.

B 

In the original Motorola claim construction, an “analyzer server” must be a “server routine,” consistent with 

the “plain meaning of ‘server.’” 757 F.3d at 1304. That is, 

the analyzer server must run separately from the client 

application it serves. Id. Both parties agreed at oral 

argument to this construction. Apple’s counsel stated

that “we agree actually that [the analyzer server] has to 

be run separately from the client.” Oral Argument at 

29:29–35. Samsung’s counsel likewise agreed that the 

analyzer server “must run” separately from the client. Id. 

at 7:25–26. This agreed-upon construction was reiterated 

by the parties on their petitions for rehearing. Apple 

argued that Samsung’s shared library code is an analyzer 

server because it “runs separately from the client applications it serves.”7 Samsung responded that Apple had 

 

parties attach the same meaning to a contract term . . . , 

the contract is enforceable in accordance with that meaning.”). This principle has been applied as well by the 

Courts of Appeals. See Ahmad v. Furlong, 435 F.3d 1196, 

1203 (10th Cir. 2006) (recognizing the impropriety of “a 

court’s resolving a contractual ambiguity contrary to the 

intent of both contracting parties.”); James v. Zurich-Am. 

Ins. Co. of Ill., 203 F.3d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he 

consistent practical construction given to that provision 

by the parties to the contract controls its terms.”).

7 Apple Inc.’s Corrected Combined Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc 5, ECF No. 93. 

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 94 Filed: 10/07/2016
20 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

failed to show infringement of “an analyzer server that 

ran separately from the program it serves.”8 

Running separately is indeed the only construction 

which is consistent with an “analyzer server” program 

that “receives data having structures from the client,” 

processes the data, and then returns it to the client. 

Motorola, 757 F.3d at 1304–05.9 The so-called “library 

program” present in the accused Samsung device cannot

be an “analyzer server” and thus cannot satisfy the claim 

limitation. The parties’ experts agreed that a library 

program is a collection of code that can be accessed by 

other applications in the accused Samsung device.10 As 

the name implies, a client application can go to the software library and “borrow” (i.e., use) code from the library 

to perform a specific needed task rather than having to 

program that functionality into the client application. As 

we held in Motorola, in the required client-server implementation, the client sends information to an independent 

server which then performs a task using that information 

and sends information back to the client application. See

 

8 Response to Combined Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc 6, ECF No. 97 (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

9 This is consistent with the district court’s finding 

that an analyzer server is “a server routine separate from 

a client that receives data having structures from the 

client,” and is “definitely separate from the [client] applications.” J.A. 46–47 (internal quotation omitted).

10 See J.A. 13054 (Apple expert testifying that software library code is “written as software that any program can go and access and execute”); J.A. 11792 

(Samsung expert testifying that software libraries are 

“bits of code that exist so that all programmers can use 

them”).

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APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 21

757 F.3d at 1304–05. That is not what a library program 

does. 

The majority explicitly rejects the parties’ agreed construction and affirms the infringement verdict on the 

basis of its own claim construction that an “analyzer 

server” requires only separate storage. Maj. Op. at 9–10, 

15. Something which is “stored” separately is not “run” 

separately. The majority’s approach is inconsistent with 

our appellate function. 

The majority claims that the dissent takes Apple’s 

concession that the analyzer server must run separately 

“out of context.” Maj. Op. at 12. Apple’s statement as to 

claim scope was no slip of the tongue. It was repeated 

four times at the oral argument,11 and reiterated explicitly in the Apple petition for rehearing. 

The majority also makes much of Apple’s insistence 

that there is no claim construction requirement that the 

analyzer server be a “standalone” program, and that the 

panel erred in equating running separately with a

standalone program. Running separately and being

standalone may indeed be different concepts (because 

standalone implies that no assistance is provided by other 

hardware or software), but that makes no difference to 

this case. Even if the claim construction does not require 

a standalone program, the analyzer server still “must run 

separately from the program it serves.” Panel Op., 816 

F.3d 788, 796. 

 

11 Oral Arg. at 29:30–35 (“We agree that it has to be 

run separately from the client.”); 30:28–39 (Q: “Did [the 

Apple expert] say it was run separately from the client 

program?” A: “Yes.”); 45:09–11 (“it’s run at the analyzer 

server separately”); 45:27–33 (Q: “[T]he question is 

whether it runs separately.” A: “And Dr. Mowry [Apple 

expert] said it was.”).

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22 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

Separate storage is not separate running. Crucially, 

there is no evidence in the record that shared library code 

runs separately, or is capable of running separately. 

Apple’s expert only testified that the accused code uses 

the shared library code; he admitted that the shared 

library code was incapable of running separately. See J.A. 

13054 (testifying that the shared library code could not 

run “outside of the client application”); Apple Inc. v. 

Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 5:12-cv-630, Trial Tr. of Apr. 28, 

2014 at 3052, ECF No. 1928 (agreeing that the accused 

code “can’t run on its own”); J.A. 13035 (testifying that 

the Samsung applications “go to that code and use it

where it is each time they want to access that code” 

(emphasis added)); J.A. 13036 (“And all those applications 

go to the shared library code in the one place that exists 

in the computer memory hardware to use it.” (emphasis 

added)); J.A. 13037 (testifying that Samsung application 

software “has access to the code and it goes to the code 

where it is and uses it there” (emphasis added)). In other 

words, it is the client, not the analyzer server, that runs 

the library program. The library program is not run 

separately by the analyzer server as required by the 

claim.

C 

There are important reasons why an appellate court 

should not reject the parties’ agreed claim construction. 

In this case as in other patent cases, we are dealing with 

complex technology that is beyond the knowledge of lay 

judges. “[T]he judiciary . . . is most ill-fitted to discharge 

the technological duties cast upon it by patent legislation.” Graham, 383 U.S. at 36. “[C]onsciousness of their 

limitations should make [the courts] vigilant against 

importing their own notions of the nature of the creative 

process . . . .” Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 

320 U.S. 1, 61–62 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 

Substituting the views of lay judges for the agreement of 

the parties, who are intimately familiar with the technolCase: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 97 Filed: 10/07/2016
APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 23

ogy, risks getting the construction quite wrong. This is 

exactly what happened here. The majority got the claim 

construction wrong, as a result of its freelance reinterpretation of “analyzer server” which departs from the parties’ 

agreed-upon construction. It is difficult enough for the 

court to arrive at a claim construction when the parties 

disagree. Courts should be very wary to override the 

parties’ agreement as to claim construction when the 

parties are the experts in the technical matters.

For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

Case: 15-1994 Document: 27-2 Page: 98 Filed: 10/07/2016
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

APPLE INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant

v.

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., A KOREAN 

CORPORATION, SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS 

AMERICA, INC., A NEW YORK CORPORATION, 

SAMSUNG TELECOMMUNICATIONS AMERICA, 

LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY 

COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellants

______________________ 

2015-1171, 2015-1195, 2015-1994

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of California in No. 5:12-cv-00630-LHK, 

Judge Lucy H. Koh.

______________________ 

REYNA, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

The court should not have granted en banc review in 

this case. En banc review is disfavored and granted only 

when necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the 

court’s decisions or when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance. Fed. R. App. Proc. 35(a); 

Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 46 n.14 (1990). This 

case meets neither requirement. The en banc decision 

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2 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

neither resolves a disagreement among the court’s decisions nor answers any exceptionally important question. 

Applying Rule 35, this court has found a variety of 

grounds to support an en banc review. One reason we 

take cases en banc is to overrule precedent. See, e.g., In re 

Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1330, n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016); Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792

F.3d 1339, 1347–49 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Another is to 

consider whether prior decisions remain sound in light of 

later Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, 

Inc. v. Impression Prod., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 726 (Fed. Cir. 

2016); SCA Hygiene Prod. Aktiebolag v. First Quality 

Baby Prod., LLC, 807 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

We also take cases en banc to review whether a panel 

properly interpreted a statute, such as in a case of first 

impression. See, e.g., Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade 

Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We 

have also taken cases en banc to “set forth the law” on an 

issue the Supreme Court has invited us to revisit. See, 

e.g., Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 

F.3d 1020, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The majority opinion 

today does not purport to do any of these.1

Instead, the majority opinion reverses the panel based 

on its disagreement on extremely narrow questions—the 

claim construction of a single patent, whether substantial 

evidence exists to support certain jury factual findings, 

and the ultimate determination of obviousness for two 

patents. The majority opinion is based on a belief that 

the panel’s decision was wrong in its application of existing law to the facts of the case, and in its understanding 

 

1 I agree with Chief Judge Prost’s and Judge Dyk’s

dissents in that the majority’s application of law to the 

facts of this case seems inconsistent with Supreme Court 

precedent on obviousness and substantial evidence. 

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APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 3

of the facts of the case. Neither reason justifies en banc

review. 

Granting en banc review merely because the panel allegedly reached the incorrect result “reduces the ‘exceptional importance’ test” to one based on “result-oriented 

criteri[a].” Bartlett ex rel. Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 

1240, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards, J., joined by Wald, 

C.J. and Circuit Judges R. B. Ginsburg, Mikva, and 

Robinson, concurring in denials of rehearing en banc). 

“The fact that 6 of 11 judges agree with a particular result 

does not invest that result with any greater legal validity 

than it would otherwise have.” Id. at 1243. 

Judges on this court have explained that en banc review should be reserved for matters of exceptional importance or to maintain uniformity in our precedent. 

When a panel opinion “is not viewed as having changed 

the law,” disagreement with the panel’s decision “is not a 

sufficient reason for en banc review.” Dow Chem. Co. v. 

Nova Chems. Corp. (Canada), 809 F.3d 1223, 1227–28 

(Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., joined by Newman, O’Malley, 

and Taranto, JJ., concurring in denial of rehearing en 

banc). En banc intervention should be reserved for actual

conflicts between precedential cases and for cases of 

exceptional importance. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 

F.3d 1293, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Michel, C.J. and Mayer, 

J., concurring).2

 

2 A survey of this issue shows that judges on every 

circuit have agreed that en banc review should be reserved for such circumstances. For example, “if the legal 

standard is correct, then the full court should not occupy 

itself with whether the law has been correctly applied to 

the facts.” Watson v. Geren, 587 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 

2009) (per curiam). “If that were the appropriate course, 

then our dockets would be overloaded with en banc polls 

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4 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

The role of an en banc court is “not simply to secondguess the panel on the facts of a particular case.” In re 

Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 700 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Newman, 

J., joined by Cowen and Mayer, JJ., dissenting). Not 

every error by a panel is “enbancable,” and “[a] panel is 

entitled to err without the full court descending upon it.” 

Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 

1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Lourie, J., concurring in 

denial of rehearing en banc).

Under principles of judicial economy, the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure instruct us to limit our en 

banc review to cases presenting important issues meriting 

the court’s full resources and careful attention. Fed. R. 

App. P. 35.

The decision to grant en banc consideration is unquestionably among the most serious non-merits 

 

contesting a panel’s examination of particular sets of 

facts.” Id. Even if a panel allegedly errs, en banc review 

is not warranted when “the error would at most amount 

to one of misapplication of precedent to the facts at hand.” 

United States v. Nixon, 827 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir. 

1987) (per curiam). 

Disagreement with a panel decision is not a sufficient 

ground for an en banc rehearing. Mitchell v. JCG Indus., 

Inc., 753 F.3d 695, 699 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). “[T]here are standards for granting rehearing en banc, and for obvious 

reasons they do not include: ‘I disagree with the panel 

majority.’” Id. “In considering rehearing requests, the 

inquiry should not be, ‘would I have voted differently than 

the panel majority,’ but rather, ‘is the issue this case 

presents particularly important or in tension with precedent.’” United States v. Foster, 674 F.3d 391, 409 (4th Cir. 

2012) (Wynn, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 

banc).

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APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 5

determinations an appellate court can make, because it may have the effect of vacating a panel 

opinion that is the product of a substantial expenditure of time and effort by three judges and 

numerous counsel. Such a determination should 

be made only in the most compelling circumstances.

Bartlett, 824 F.2d at 1242. 

The issues the majority opinion addresses are not 

such issues, as it claims to apply existing law to the facts 

of the case. The majority opinion does not explore the 

applicability of existing law, or the first interpretation of 

a statute. The opinion does not claim to change the law or 

lead to a greater understanding of the law as its result. 

In sum, the majority’s en banc review is simply a do over. 

My concern here is that we have made exceptional 

something that is unexceptional. I see lurking in this 

matter potential for damage to our system of justice. I 

agree with Justice Cardozo that law should be “uniform 

and impartial,” and that “[t]here must be nothing in its 

action that savors of prejudice or favor or even arbitrary 

whim or fitfulness.” Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of 

the Judicial Process 112 (1921). En banc reviews undertaken on bases that are not of exceptional importance or 

to maintain uniformity in the court’s decisions will create 

jurisprudence based on arbitrary whim and fitfulness. 

The majority opinion is not a response to specific legal 

questions, as is typically the case for an en banc review. 

Indeed, en banc questions were not presented to the 

public, new or supplemental briefing was not ordered, and 

additional oral argument was not held. The majority 

based its “substantial evidence” review on the original 

briefs and record before the court.

Yet, I discern certain legal issues that I believe the 

court could or should have explicitly addressed. I address 

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6 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

two such issues below: substantial evidence and objective 

indicia of nonobviousness. 

1. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

The en banc court reverses the panel’s decision because it disagrees with the panel about whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s implicit factual findings 

underlying its obviousness and infringement verdicts. As 

Chief Judge Prost’s dissent explains, the majority opinion 

misapplies the substantial evidence standard of review. 

It is not apparent what type of substantial evidence 

review standard—if any—the majority opinion applies. 

Merely reciting all of the evidence that arguably tangentially relates to the factual findings at issue is not consistent with the Supreme Court’s case law on substantial 

evidence. See, e.g., Con. Edison Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229–30 (1938).

In reviewing a jury’s obviousness verdict, “we review 

all of the jury’s explicit and implicit factual findings for 

substantial evidence.” Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & 

Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “We 

then examine the legal conclusion of obviousness de novo 

to determine whether it is correct in light of the factual 

findings that we find adequately supported.” Id. (citing 

Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 

The majority opinion implies that any evidence is 

substantial evidence, and that therefore we cannot actually examine the evidence presented to determine whether 

it actually supports the findings it is alleged to support. 

For example, the opinion cites survey evidence that 

consumers would rather purchase devices with a slide-tounlock feature preventing accidental unlocking than 

purchase devices without a feature preventing accidental 

unlocking. Maj. Op. 35–36; J.A. 21066. This evidence is 

cited as substantial evidence of commercial success of the 

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APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 7

’721 patent, which claims a particular slide-to-unlock 

feature. 

But prior art devices, such as the Neonode, included

similar slide-to-unlock features, so evidence of commercial 

success tied to the mere presence of such a feature—and 

not the novel aspects of it—is not substantial evidence of 

commercial success. “Where the offered secondary consideration actually results from something other than 

what is both claimed and novel in the claim, there is no 

nexus to the merits of the claimed invention.” In re HuaiHung Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (emphasis original); see also, e.g., Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enters., 

Inc., 632 F.3d 1358, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“If commercial 

success is due to an element in the prior art, no nexus

exists.”).3 Such survey evidence cannot support an implicit jury finding of any commercial success. 

I believe that a district court or this court, when reviewing whether findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, must actually review the evidence. It 

should determine if it is substantial evidence, as opposed 

to merely evidence. As the majority opinion does not do 

so today, perhaps an en banc opinion explaining this 

court’s role in substantial evidence review is warranted. 

The court en banc could provide guidance on what the 

substantial evidence standard means and how it is applied when we review the factual findings that underlie 

jury verdicts.4

 

3 Samsung argued in its briefing on appeal that 

Apple had not established a nexus between this evidence 

and the slide-to-unlock feature. Samsung Br. 37; see also

Samsung Response & Reply Br. 21. 4 As the case before us demonstrates, different appellate judges can review the same evidence and disagree

whether it is substantial evidence in support of a jury’s 

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8 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 

2. OBVIOUSNESS ANALYSIS 

I see an additional implicit dispute underlying the en 

banc court’s reversal of the panel’s obviousness determinations, one that might have served as proper grounds for 

en banc review in this case. 

The original panel opinion could arguably be interpreted as applying a burden-shifting analysis for determining whether a patent is obvious. For example, it said 

“the prima facie case of obviousness was strong. Apple’s 

evidence of secondary considerations was weak and did 

not support a conclusion that the ’721 patent was nonobvious.” Apple, 816 F.3d at 804. In addition, in his dissent, Judge Dyk cites Supreme Court precedent in 

 

factual findings, and they can interpret the same patent 

and decide on a different claim construction. Judges can 

and often do disagree on results, as demonstrated by the 

frequent number of split panels. 

Here, for example, the majority opinion finds that 

substantial evidence supports an implicit jury factual 

finding of commercial success for the ’721 patent. Maj. 

Op. 38. As an example of such evidence, it cites Apple’s 

expert testimony that “clearly there’s been commercial 

success of the iPhones that use this invention.” Id. at 35. 

In contrast, the panel did not even find this testimony 

worth mentioning in its analysis that no nexus existed 

between Apple’s commercial success evidence and the

merits of Apple’s ’721 patent. Apple Inc. v. Samsung 

Elecs. Co., 816 F.3d 788, 806 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We have 

repeatedly stated that that conclusory testimony does not 

suffice as substantial evidence, see, e.g., Whitserve, LLC v. 

Comput. Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 24 (Fed. Cir. 2012), 

and that evidence of commercial success is not substantial 

evidence unless there is a nexus between it and the 

merits of the claimed invention, see, e.g., Merck & Cie v. 

Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 837 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

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APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 9

making a forceful argument that secondary considerations 

of non-obviousness carry little weight where strong evidence of obviousness exists. 

The majority opinion states that “[a] determination of 

whether a patent claim is invalid as obvious under § 103 

requires consideration of all four Graham factors, and it is 

error to reach a conclusion of obviousness until all those 

factors are considered.” Maj. Op. 22. It notes that 

“[o]bjective indicia of non-obviousness must be considered 

in every case where present.” Id.

We addressed this issue in In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 

F.3d 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2012). We explained that applying a 

burden-shifting framework in district court proceedings 

was inconsistent with this court’s decision in Stratoflex, 

Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 

1983). 676 F.3d at 1076–80. We noted that such a burden-shifting framework only “ma[d]e sense” in the context 

of prosecuting patents before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Id. at 1080 n.7.

It seems to me that the court disagrees over the role

objective indicia play in the court’s analysis of the ultimate determination of obviousness. If so, we should 

candidly address this issue en banc. 

The legal questions I see here include (1) whether an 

obviousness analysis involving secondary considerations 

(or objective indicia of non-obviousness) is a one- or twostep process and (2) how much weight to accord secondary 

considerations in the obviousness analysis.

These are important issues that should be addressed 

in the front room of the courthouse, with all stakeholders 

at the litigation table. Because we failed to do so in this 

case, I respectfully dissent.

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