Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01764/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01764-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Koninklijke Philips N.V.
Appellant
Philips Electronics North America Corporation
Appellant
Zoll Medical Corporation
Cross-Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V., PHILIPS 

ELECTRONICS NORTH AMERICA 

CORPORATION,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

ZOLL MEDICAL CORPORATION,

Defendant-Cross-Appellant

______________________ 

2014-1764, 2014-1791

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

District of Massachusetts in No. 1:10-cv-11041-NMG, 

Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton.

______________________ 

Decided: July 28, 2016

______________________ 

J. MICHAEL JAKES, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, 

Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Washington, DC, argued for 

plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by KATHLEEN 

DALEY, LUKE MCCAMMON, DAVID MROZ, JASON LEE 

ROMRELL, ROBERT SHAFFER, SUSAN TULL. 

DAVID ISAAC GINDLER, Irell & Manella LLP, Los Angeles, CA, argued for defendant-cross-appellant. Also repreCase: 14-1764 Document: 58-2 Page: 1 Filed: 07/28/2016
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2

sented by ALAN J. HEINRICH; DAVID C. MCPHIE, Newport 

Beach, CA. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, DYK, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

HUGHES, Circuit Judge. 

Philips sued Zoll for infringement of numerous patents related to external defibrillators. Zoll counterclaimed for infringement of its own patents covering 

related technology. The parties presented their cases to a 

jury, which found, among other things, that both parties’ 

patents are not invalid, both parties directly infringe the 

asserted patents, but Zoll does not contributorily infringe 

the asserted Philips patents. The district court denied all 

motions for judgment as a matter of law, and both parties 

appeal these denials. For the reasons set forth below, we 

affirm-in-part, reverse-in-part, and vacate-in-part the 

district court’s judgment. We remand the case for further 

proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Philips and Zoll both manufacture and sell external 

defibrillators. Defibrillators are electronic devices that 

apply an electrical shock to a person’s heart for therapeutic purposes. Defibrillators are commonly used to treat 

ventricular fibrillation, which occurs when the muscle 

fibers of a person’s heart contract without coordination. 

Application of an electrical shock interrupts the irregular 

contractions, allowing the heart to return to its normal 

rhythm of contraction. 

“External” defibrillators are defibrillators that are not 

implanted in a person’s body. Because they are provided 

outside of the person’s body, external defibrillators must 

deliver the electrical shock indirectly, as applied to the 

surface of the person’s skin. In addition, because the 

electrical shock must pass through the person’s skin and 

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thorax before reaching the person’s heart, external defibrillators generally need to operate at higher voltages 

and/or currents than implanted defibrillators. 

This application of high levels of electricity to the surface of a person’s skin to treat a time-sensitive medical 

condition introduces numerous challenges, which the 

patents-in-suit address.

A. Waveform Patents

Philips asserted a first group of patents that we will 

refer to as the “waveform” patents. These are: U.S. 

Patent 5,607,454; U.S. Patent 5,749,905; and U.S. Patent 

6,047,212.

In the most general sense, the waveform patents are 

directed to controlling the waveform of the electrical 

shock that is delivered to a subject person’s body. The 

waveform patents explain that one challenge with external defibrillators is that of subject variability. With 

implanted defibrillators, only a single person is ever the 

subject of the device, so the device can be precisely tuned 

to deliver the ideal electrical shock to that subject. But an

external defibrillator may be used on multiple subjects, 

each with a distinct body composition. The differences 

between different subjects’ hearts, the differences between the electrical impedance created by different subjects’ thoraxes, and other body composition differences 

mean that an ideal external defibrillator would be capable 

of providing different electrical shocks. But configuring 

the various parameters of the electrical shock, e.g., the 

initial voltage and duration of the initial voltage phase, 

can be a complicated technique that typically can only be

executed by a trained professional. 

The waveform patents aim to address this challenge 

by providing an external defibrillator that can automatically vary the electrical shock based on the body composition of the subject, eliminating the need for a trained 

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operator. See ’454 patent, col. 3 ll. 37–40. The waveform 

patents disclose that an external defibrillator can be 

configured to detect an “electrical parameter” of the 

subject, such as the electrical impedance of the subject’s 

thorax, and then adjust the electrical shock based on this 

monitored electrical parameter. See id. at col. 3 ll. 44–53.

Philips asserted the following claims of the waveform 

patents against Zoll: ’454 patent claim 51; ’905 patent 

claims 4 and 8; and ’212 patent claims 1 and 5. See J.A. 

108–11.

B. Self-Test Patents

Philips asserted a second group of patents that we 

will refer to as the “self-test” patents. These are: U.S. 

Patent 5,800,460 and U.S. Patent 5,879,374. 

The self-test patents are directed to an external defibrillator’s capability to test its own functional status without human intervention. External defibrillators prior to 

the self-test patents tended to be deployed in high-usage 

environments, such as a hospital emergency room, where 

they could be tested regularly to ensure their operability. 

But in low-usage environments, such as an emergency 

medical vehicle or in a stationary deployment in an office 

building, regular testing was inconvenient. 

The self-test patents aim to address this challenge by 

providing a self-testing capability within an external 

defibrillator. See ’460 patent, col. 1 ll. 44–48. The selftesting capability allows the external defibrillator to 

periodically, e.g., once per day, test the functionality of its 

components, e.g., that its battery is sufficiently charged. 

See id. at col. 1 ll. 38–48. The external defibrillator 

provides a visual and/or audible indicator of the self-test 

results. See id. at Abstract.

Philips asserted the following claims of the self-test 

patents against Zoll: ’460 patent claim 7; and ’374 patent 

claims 42–43 and 67–68. See J.A. 105–06.

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C. Electrode Patent

Zoll asserted U.S. Patent 5,330,526, which is directed 

to an electrode for use with an external defibrillator. 

Prior to the ’526 patent, it was common practice to 

provide an electrolytic gel on the surface of the electrodes 

of an external defibrillator. After soaking into the subject’s skin, the electrolytes in the gel would provide a

conducting path from the electrodes through the outer 

surface of the subject’s skin. This allowed the electrical 

shock to easily pass into the subject’s body instead of 

dissipating on the surface of the subject’s skin. It was 

common to provide the electrodes and electrolytic gel to 

have an electrical resistance of less than 1 ohm, thereby 

heightening this conductivity factor. 

The ’526 patent discloses that this very low resistance 

characteristic of the electrode and electrolytic gel can 

actually be disadvantageous. In particular, use of very 

low resistance electrodes and electrolytic gel demonstrated that some burning occurs on the subject’s skin at the 

outer edge of the electrolytic gel. See ’526 patent, col. 1

l. 57–col. 2 l. 7. As a result, the ’526 patent discloses 

various configurations of the electrode and electrolytic gel, 

each configuration having an electrical resistance of at 

least 1 ohm. See id. at col. 2 ll. 16–49.

Zoll asserted claims 1, 8–9, 11–12, 19, and 24–25 of 

the ’526 patent against Philips. See J.A. 115.

D. District Court Proceedings 

The district court submitted various issues of infringement and validity to a jury, but bifurcated all damCase: 14-1764 Document: 58-2 Page: 5 Filed: 07/28/2016
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ages issues for a later trial. The jury made the following 

determinations.1

First, the jury found each of the following claims of 

the waveform and self-test patents not invalid: ’454 

patent claim 51; ’905 patent claims 4 and 8; ’460 patent 

claim 7; and ’374 patent claims 42–43 and 67–68. See J.A. 

112–13.

Second, the jury found that Zoll directly infringed 

each of the following claims of the waveform and self-test 

patents with at least one of its products: ’454 patent 

claim 51; ’905 patent claims 4 and 8; ’212 patent claims 1 

and 5; ’460 patent claim 7; and ’374 patent claims 42–43 

and 67–68. See J.A. 105–11.

Third, the jury found that Zoll had neither contributorily nor inducedly infringed any of the following claims of 

the waveform and self-test patents with any of its products: ’454 patent claim 51; ’905 patent claims 4 and 8; 

’460 patent claim 7; and ’374 patent claims 42–43 and 67–

68. See J.A. 105–11. 

Fourth, the jury found that Philips directly infringed 

each of the following claims of the ’526 patent with at 

least one of its products: claims 1, 8–9, 11–12, 19, and 

24–25. See J.A. 115. The jury further found that each of 

these claims was not invalid. See J.A. 116.

Philips and Zoll moved for judgment as a matter of 

law on each of the foregoing grounds on which it did not 

prevail. The district court summarily denied JMOL 

without discussion. 

 

1 The jury made findings on several other issues 

presented by Philips and Zoll. See J.A. 104–16. Because 

the parties do not appeal those additional issues, we do 

not address them further in this opinion.

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Philips and Zoll appeal those denials. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2). See Robert Bosch, 

LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 

2013) (en banc).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews denial of a JMOL motion according 

to the law of the regional circuit. Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. 

Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 

The First Circuit reviews the grant or denial of JMOL de 

novo. See Soto-Lebron v. Fed. Express Corp., 538 F.3d 45, 

56 (1st Cir. 2008). “Courts may only grant a judgment 

contravening a jury’s determination when the evidence 

points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the 

moving party that no reasonable jury could have returned 

a verdict adverse to that party.” Marcano Rivera v. 

Turabo Med. Ctr. P’ship, 415 F.3d 162, 167 (1st Cir. 2005)

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

We address Philips’s and Zoll’s arguments in the following order. First, we address Zoll’s cross-appeal as to 

invalidity and direct infringement of the waveform and 

self-test patents in parts III. and IV., respectively. Second, we address Philips’s appeal as to indirect infringement of the waveform and self-test patents in part V. 

Third, we address Philips’s appeal as to indefiniteness of 

the electrode patent in part VI. Finally, we address 

Philips’s appeal as to the admission of evidence in part 

VII.

III. INVALIDITY OF WAVEFORM AND 

SELF-TEST CLAIMS

The jury found claims of Philips’s waveform and selftest patents not invalid over various prior art references. 

Zoll contests these verdicts as discussed below.

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A. Waveform Claims 

The jury found that claims 4 and 8 of the waveform 

’905 patent were not anticipated by U.S. Patent 5,432,686 

(Kroll). Claim 4 recites the following:

A method for delivering electrotherapy to a 

patient through electrodes connected to an energy 

source, the method comprising the following steps:

discharging the energy source across the electrodes to deliver electrical energy to the patient in 

a multiphasic waveform;

monitoring a patient-dependent parameter 

during the discharging step;

shaping the waveform so that an initial parameter of a waveform phase depends on a value 

of the electrical parameter.

Claim 8 is dependent on claim 4. Anticipation is a question of fact, ArcelorMittal France v. AK Steel Corp., 700 

F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and we will overturn the 

jury’s verdict only if “the evidence points so strongly and 

overwhelmingly in favor” of anticipation that “no reasonable jury could have returned” the jury’s verdict of no 

anticipation, Marcano Rivera, 415 F.3d at 167. Zoll 

argues that no reasonable jury could conclude that Kroll 

fails to disclose each of the features of claim 4. We disagree. 

Kroll discloses a method for delivering electrotherapy 

to a subject. The method illustrated in Figure 7 of Kroll

includes a step 94 of beginning delivery of energy from a 

capacitor into the subject’s body, a step 96 of waiting for 

the capacitor discharge voltage to decay a “given percentage,” and a step 104 of continuing to discharge energy 

from the capacitor but with a reversed polarity. See Kroll, 

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Fig. 7, col. 9 ll. 46–68. This is further illustrated in the 

marked up Figure 2 of Kroll shown below:2

As shown, discharging of the energy across the subject’s 

body begins at some starting voltage (step 94), discharging continues until some predefined “given percentage” of 

the starting voltage has been dissipated (step 96), and 

then the polarity of the voltage is reversed and the discharging of the energy continues (step 104). The initial 

discharging of the energy constitutes a first phase of 

discharge 32, while the reverse-polarity discharge of the 

energy constitutes a second phase of discharge 34. 

Kroll suggests that the “given percentage” that triggers the end of the first phase of discharge is optimally 

44% of the starting voltage level. See Kroll, col. 9 ll. 55–

 

2 Our markup includes the Y axis label for “voltage,” the labeling of the “first phase” and “second phase,” 

and the labeling of the steps 94, 96, and 104. 

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58. Importantly, the “given percentage” is a value calculated from mathematical equations of physiology, which 

are not specific to the subject being treated during execution of the method. See Kroll, Abstract, col. 6 ll. 16–40.

It is indisputable that Kroll discloses the “discharging” step of claim 4. The question is whether Kroll monitors a “patient-dependent parameter” and then “shap[es] 

the waveform so that an initial parameter of a waveform 

phase” is based on that “patient-dependent parameter.”

In some sense, the voltage being dissipated into the 

subject’s body in Kroll is a “patient-dependent parameter.” When the method of Kroll is performed, the subject’s 

body forms part of a closed circuit that is arranged in the 

following series: the defibrillator (which sets the current 

and has an inherent electrical resistance); the first electrode; the patient’s body (which has a subject-specific 

electrical resistance as discussed previously); the second 

electrode; and back to the defibrillator. Because voltage 

and resistance are directly related to one another by 

Ohm’s law—voltage = current × resistance—and because 

the current is fixed by the defibrillator, the voltage dissipating into the subject’s body is at least in part dependent 

on the patient’s own particular electrical resistance. 

Thus, the dissipating voltage in Kroll might be considered

a “patient-dependent parameter.” And because the method of Kroll requires observing the dissipating voltage level 

so as to stop dissipation when it reaches the “given percentage,” Kroll arguably discloses the “monitoring” step of 

claim 4.

It is less clear that Kroll discloses the “shaping” step 

of claim 4. The Kroll method stops dissipation in the first 

phase at 44% of the starting voltage, and the method then 

begins dissipation in the second phase at that same 

voltage level (with the current flowing in the opposite 

direction). Therefore, Zoll argues, voltage is a “patientdependent parameter,” and because the initial voltage 

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level of the second phase of dissipation is based on a 

percentage value of that parameter, Kroll discloses the 

“shaping” step of claim 4. 

But that incorrectly describes what occurs in the Kroll

method. In Kroll, the first phase of dissipation always 

ends at 44% (or some other predetermined “given percentage”) of the starting voltage of the first phase. Neither the 44% value nor the starting voltage is dependent 

on the subject being treated. See Kroll, col. 4–6. Rather, 

these characteristics are computed absent a patientspecific resistance value. See id. at col. 6 ll. 41–46.

Therefore, the starting voltage and the ending voltage of 

the first phase are not dependent on the subject being 

treated. Because the starting voltage of the second phase 

is the same as the ending voltage of the first phase, it too 

does not depend on the subject being treated. So, the 

subject-specific electrical resistance does not change the 

starting or ending amplitudes of the waveform. Instead, 

it will affect how quickly the voltage dissipates, essentially shortening or lengthening the time of the first phase 

and the second phase (the x-axis in Figure 2 of Kroll).

Thus Kroll discloses fixed, non-subject-specific starting and ending voltages for the waveform, and incidentally the waveform may be compressed or stretched in time 

in a patient-dependent way. The parties did not dispute 

the meaning of “shaping the waveform,” and the district 

court did not expressly construe this language. J.A. 101–

03. Whether Kroll’s method discloses the “shaping” step 

of claim 4 is a factual question left to the jury for resolution based on the ordinary meaning of the claims. Both 

Philips and Zoll presented expert evidence to explain why 

this incidental compressing/stretching of the waveform is 

or is not sufficient disclosure of the “shaping” step of 

claim 4. The jury found that it is not, and Philips’s evidence in support thereof is sufficient for a reasonable jury 

to reach the same conclusion. See J.A. 5046–50. Because 

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claim 8 depends on claim 4, the evidence is also sufficient 

to support the verdict of no anticipation for claim 8.

Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of 

JMOL of invalidity as to claims 4 and 8 of the waveform 

’905 patent.

B. Claim 7 of the ’460 Self-Test Patent

The jury found that claim 7 of the self-test ’460 patent 

was not anticipated by U.S. Patent 5,579,234 (Wiley). 

Claim 7, including its dependencies on claims 1, 5, and 6,

recites the following:

A method of performing a self-test in an external defibrillator, the method comprising the following steps: 

generating a test signal automatically; 

turning on a power system within the external 

defibrillator in response to the test signal; and

performing a plurality of automatic self-tests 

within the external defibrillator for determining 

the status of the defibrillator;

wherein the performing step comprises performing said plurality of automatic self-tests within the external defibrillator on a schedule;

wherein the performing step comprises performing a first automatic self-test on a first periodic schedule;

wherein the performing step comprises performing a second automatic self-test on a second 

periodic schedule.

Zoll argues that no reasonable jury could conclude that 

Wiley fails to disclose each of these features. We agree.

Wiley discloses various methods for automatically 

testing an electronic device during periods of non-use. See

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Wiley, Abstract. As relevant here, Wiley discloses with 

respect to Figure 4A a method of testing an electronic 

device that includes both an hourly power-on at step 210 

and a daily “autotest” at step 236. See Wiley, Fig. 4A, 

col. 6 ll. 21–30, col. 7 ll. 25–43. The device powers itself 

on every hour to perform a “CPU Test” at step 210. See

id. at Fig. 4A, col. 6, ll. 21–31, col. 7 ll. 14–24. During this 

hourly “CPU Test,” “the CPU performs its standard 

power-up self-tests internal to the particular type of CPU” 

at step 210. Id. at col. 6 ll. 21–23. The device then checks 

if it is the proper time of day to perform the daily “autotest.” See id. at col. 7 ll. 14–17. If so, then the device 

(once daily) “begins a series of primary autotest functions 

236,” which can include testing whether various memory 

resources and specialized microprocessors are working 

properly. Id. at col. 7 l. 32–col. 8 l. 11.

Therefore, Wiley on its face discloses both the “first 

automatic self-test on a first periodic schedule”—the 

hourly CPU test—and the “second automatic self-test on a 

second periodic schedule”—the more extensive daily 

“autotest”—of claim 7. Philips counters that the hourly 

“CPU test” is not an automatic self-test at all, but rather 

a sort of precursor for determining whether the daily 

“autotest” can be performed. See Philips Reply Br. 48–49. 

But it is undeniable that both the hourly test and the 

daily test are automatic, periodic, self-tests by the device. 

The only evidence that Philips presented to the contrary 

was the following exchange between Philips’s attorney 

and its expert witness:

Q: . . . But can we also discuss [Wiley] with respect to what it doesn’t show?

A: It does not show at all the second periodic selftest on the second periodic schedule.

Q: Is that because it only has a single periodic 

schedule?

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A: That’s right. There’s only one schedule 24 

hours and multiple tests conducted on this one 

schedule.

J.A. 5095. This amounts to nothing more than Philips’s 

expert plainly claiming that the hourly “CPU Test” does 

not exist, even though it unmistakably does. Philips 

points to nowhere in the trial record where it presented to 

the jury its presently proffered theory that the “CPU 

Test” is somehow not a test but rather a precursor to a 

test. In contrast, Zoll did present the jury with an explanation of both the hourly and daily self-tests in the Wiley 

disclosure. See J.A. 2858–59.

Therefore, the evidence overwhelmingly favors the 

conclusion that Wiley discloses both of the self-tests 

recited in claim 7. Wiley describes two periodic, automatic self-tests, and Zoll’s expert explained this to the jury in 

clear terms. Philips’s only rebuttal was a factually incorrect, conclusory statement by its expert witness. See, e.g., 

MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc., 780 F.3d 1159, 1172 

(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Conclusory statements by an expert, 

however, are insufficient to sustain a jury’s verdict.”);

Intellectual Sci. & Tech., Inc. v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 589 F.3d 

1179, 1185–86 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (conclusory statement by 

expert, standing alone, insufficient to support jury finding 

of fact). Zoll’s expert explained how Wiley disclosed the 

other elements of claim 7, and Philips does not contend 

that Wiley fails to disclose any of those other features. 

Philips also argues that even if Wiley discloses all of 

the steps of claim 7, Wiley does not anticipate because it 

does not disclose performing each step in the order specified in the claim. But we generally do not construe method claims to require a specific ordering of the steps unless 

the claims explicitly recite or implicitly require such an 

ordering. See Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve 

Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Philips 

made no request at the district court for a narrowing 

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construction of claim 7 that would require the steps of the 

method to be performed in any particular order, and we 

see nothing in the language of that claim to warrant such 

a construction on appeal. 

Therefore, even drawing all inferences from the trial 

evidence in Philips’s favor, no reasonable jury could have 

found that Wiley fails to anticipate claim 7. As such, we 

reverse the district court’s denial of JMOL of invalidity as 

to claim 7 of the self-test ’460 patent.

C. Claim 43 of the ’374 Self-Test Patent

The jury found that claim 43 of the self-test ’374 patent was not anticipated by the VIVAlink product brochure. Claim 43 recites the following:

An external defibrillator comprising: 

a high-voltage delivery system; and

a self-test system, the self-test system comprising a test signal generator and a fail-safe visual display. 

Zoll argues that no reasonable jury could conclude that 

VIVAlink fails to disclose each of these features. We 

agree. 

The VIVAlink brochure is a product brochure describing the VIVAlink AED defibrillator device. Among other 

features, the VIVAlink brochure notes the “Ease of 

Maintenance” of the VIVAlink AED. J.A. 14942. Under 

that heading, the VIVAlink brochure explains:

While the VivaLink AED is dormant, the microprocessor will automatically check the conditions 

of the battery, the electrodes/electrode cables and 

the internal electronics every 24 hours. On a 

weekly basis, it will automatically check the capacitor, the charging circuit and the high voltage 

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cations, an audible and visual warning (Maintenance Alert) is triggered. Audible warnings will 

last until the batteries are exhausted but the visual warning signal will remain indefinitely. The 

visual warning signal can be clearly seen simply 

by looking at the VivaLink AED.

J.A. 14942. According to Zoll, this self-testing procedure 

discloses the “test signal generator” of claim 43, and the 

visual warning discloses the “fail-safe visual display.” 

Whether the visual warning of the VIVAlink brochure 

discloses the “fail-safe visual display” of claim 43 depends 

on the meaning of that claim feature. The district court 

did not provide any explicit construction for that claim 

term. J.A. 101–03. The specification of the ’374 patent 

suggests that the “fail-safe” feature requires the visual 

display to continue displaying some visual indicator even 

if the electrical power to the device is lost. See ’374 patent, col. 5 ll. 34–39 (“The status indicator should be failsafe so that the indicator will indicate an inoperable 

status if the system monitor should fail.”), col. 5 l. 66–

col 6 l. 5 (“The primary advantages of the visual display of 

the preferred embodiment are its low power requirements 

and the fact that it is powered by an AC signal rather 

than a DC signal. This latter point assures the display’s 

fail-safe nature, since the shutter of the middle plate 66 

cannot be maintained opaque without the active involvement of the system monitor generating the AC signal.”). 

Philips urges a narrower construction of “fail-safe visual display.” According to Philips, a display is fail-safe 

not just by maintaining a visual indicator when electrical 

power is lost, but by affirmatively displaying a negative 

indicator (like “NOT OK”) when the electrical power is 

lost. See Philips Reply Br. 42–46. According to Philips, 

the visual warning of the VIVAlink brochure may continue displaying a positive indicator (like “OK”) when the 

electrical power is lost if that was the status indicator at 

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the time of power loss. Therefore, according to Philips, 

the visual indicator of the VIVAlink brochure is not a 

“fail-safe visual display.”

But neither the broad language of claim 43 nor the 

general description of the fail-safe visual display in the 

specification of the ’374 patent requires such a narrow 

meaning of “fail-safe.” It is certainly possible that a “failsafe” display may actively change from a positive to a 

negative indicator if electrical power is lost, but this is not 

required by the claims. “Fail-safe” simply requires that a 

visual indicator persists even if the device loses electrical 

power. The VIVAlink brochure clearly discloses this.

Philips’s alleged evidence supporting its narrower 

claim construction is unpersuasive. Philips cites primarily to its own expert’s testimony discussing the visual 

display of Zoll’s defibrillator device as part of the infringement case. See Philips Reply Br. 42–44. Evidence 

regarding the characteristics of the accused products is 

not pertinent to define the scope of the asserted claims. 

The only actual evidence that Philips presented to the 

jury regarding the visual warning of VIVAlink was the 

following statement by Philips’s expert witness about the 

VIVAlink brochure: 

Yes. This is very, very short, you know, a few 

pages brochure. And the relevant part for this 

consideration is right here. This is the only information available. So this does not really disclose the entire self-test because it does not teach 

how to make or use self-test. It does not disclose 

fail-safe visual display. More importantly, it does 

not disclose turning on of the power systems in response to a test signal, which is a critical part of a 

self-test.

J.A. 5095–96 (underlining added). This conclusory statement does nothing more than state Philips’s preferred 

conclusion that the claim feature is not disclosed by the 

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prior art. It provides no evidence on which the reasonable 

jury could rely. See MobileMedia, 780 F.3d at 1172. And 

Zoll did explain the visual warning of VIVAlink to the 

jury and why it is “fail-safe.” See J.A. 2864–65. Therefore, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that the

VIVAlink visual warning that “will remain indefinitely” 

despite exhaustion of the batteries is a “fail-safe visual 

display.”

Philips seeks to buttress its position by arguing that 

the VIVAlink brochure does not enable a fail-safe visual 

display. See Philips Reply Br. 46–47. But Philips’s expert 

said nothing whatsoever about enablement of the “failsafe visual display” feature; his statement that VIVAlink 

“does not teach how to make or use” was directed strictly 

at the “self-test” feature, not the “fail-safe visual display.” 

See J.A. 5095–96. In any event, such a conclusory statement is insufficient to prove lack of enablement of a prior 

art reference. See MobileMedia, 780 F.3d at 1172. 

Therefore, we conclude, based on the evidence presented at trial, that no reasonable jury could have found 

that the VIVAlink brochure fails to anticipate claim 43. 

As such, we reverse the district court’s denial of JMOL of 

invalidity as to claim 43 of the self-test ’374 patent.

D. Claims 42 and 67–68 of the ’374 Self-Test Patent

The jury found that claims 42 and 67–68 of the ’374

self-test patent were not obvious over the Zoll PD1400 

defibrillator. Claim 42 recites the following:

A method for automatically determining and 

indicating an operational status of an external defibrillator, the method comprising the following 

steps: 

generating a test signal within the external 

defibrillator automatically and periodically;

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performing a self-test in response to the test 

signal; and

indicating the operational status of the defibrillator based on a result of the self-test;

the generating, performing, and indicating 

steps being performed prior to any attempted use 

of the defibrillator.

Claim 67 is an independent claim that recites a similar method as claim 42. Claim 68 is dependent on claim 

67. Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying 

questions of fact, see Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, 

Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009), and we review 

the ultimate conclusion of obviousness de novo and the 

underlying factual findings, implicitly in favor of the 

verdict, under the regional circuit’s reasonable jury 

standard, see Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 

F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Zoll argues that the 

PD1400 defibrillator renders each of claims 42 and 67–68 

obvious. We disagree.

Zoll alleges that the only feature of claims 42 and 67–

68 differentiating them from the prior art is that the 

claims require the self-testing to be done “automatically,” 

i.e., not in response to a human pushing a button. See

Zoll’s Principal Br. 36–39. Philips does not refute this 

characterization. See Philips’s Reply Br. 50–54. Instead, 

Philips argues that the automation of the self-tests was a 

non-obvious improvement. And Philips points to numerous indicia of non-obviousness supporting this conclusion. 

The evidence supporting the jury’s verdict of no invalidity is considerable. Philips’s expert witness explained 

that the Patent Office considered and rejected the position 

that user-initiated self-testing renders the claims obvious. 

J.A. 5097. Philips’s expert testified that designing an 

automatic self-test prior to user intervention presented 

challenges in managing battery power consumption that 

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were not obvious to overcome. J.A. 1827, 1839–40. 

Philips’s witnesses testified that the automatic self-test 

feature was critical in allowing the defibrillators to be 

stowed unsupervised in public spaces. J.A. 1817, 1828–

29, 1407–10, 2026–27. Philips’s expert witness testified 

that the self-test feature, allowing for public and unsupervised stowage of the defibrillators, met a long-felt but 

unmet need. J.A. 5101–02. Philips demonstrated market 

success of its defibrillators incorporating the automatic 

self-test feature, that success stemming in part from the 

ability to sell the defibrillators over-the-counter and for 

home use. J.A. 1355, 2030–31.

All of this evidence taken together provides ample basis from which a reasonable jury could conclude that

claims 42 and 67–68 would not have been obvious over 

user-instigated self-testing defibrillators. Zoll’s counterargument and accompanying evidence put forward the 

position that automating user-instigated self-tests to run 

automatically would have been obvious. But this does not 

render the sum of the evidence supporting the opposite 

conclusion somehow lacking. We will therefore not disturb the ultimate legal conclusion that the claims would 

not have been obvious over the PD1400 defibrillator and 

other user-instigated self-testing devices.

Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of 

JMOL of invalidity as to claims 42 and 67–68 of the selftest ’374 patent.

IV. DIRECT INFRINGEMENT OF THE WAVEFORM 

AND SELF-TEST CLAIMS

The jury found that Zoll directly infringes numerous 

claims of the waveform and self-test patents. Zoll contests the jury’s verdict on two general grounds: first, that 

Zoll’s devices do not perform the features of some of the 

claims; second, that even if Zoll’s devices perform the 

features of the claims, Zoll is not the party using the 

devices in a directly infringing way. Infringement is a 

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question of fact that we review under the regional circuit’s 

reasonable jury standard. See AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, 

Inc., 633 F.3d 1042, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Marcano 

Rivera, 415 F.3d at 167. 

A. Waveform Claims – Claim Construction

The jury found that Zoll directly infringes claim 51 of 

the ’454 waveform patent and claims 4 and 8 of the ’905 

waveform patent. Zoll argues that this verdict was in 

error because the district court presented an incorrect 

construction of those claims to the jury. We disagree.

The waveform claims recite “A method for applying 

electrotherapy to a patient” in the preamble, a step of 

“discharging the energy source,” and a step of “monitoring 

[a patient-dependent / an] electrical parameter during the 

discharging step.” The district court construed the “discharging” and “monitoring” steps to mean, respectively, 

“the step of discharging the energy source” and “measuring one or more times.” J.A. 101.

Zoll argues that this construction was in error. Zoll 

argues that recitation of “applying electrotherapy” in the 

preamble means that the “discharging” step includes 

discharging only a therapeutic level (i.e., a high voltage or 

current) of electrical shock, and does not include discharging any non-therapeutic level (i.e., a low voltage or current) of electrical shock. According to Zoll, devices such as 

its own that first deliver a non-therapeutic level of electrical shock as a “test pulse” and then a therapeutic level of

electrical shock do not infringe, at least if the “monitoring” step is performed only during the test pulse.

But Zoll’s claim construction is not correct. The ordinary meaning of the claim language does not suggest the 

narrow construction of the “discharging” step that Zoll 

argues. The phrase “applying electrotherapy” in the 

preamble simply provides a setting for the method as a 

whole, not any sort of clear narrowing of the “discharging” 

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step as Zoll proffers. Zoll notes that the ’454 patent 

identifies a prior art reference, Kerber, that uses test 

pulses. See ’454 patent, col. 3 ll. 9–19. But there is nothing in this discussion to suggest that the ’454 patent 

disclaims any use of separate test pulses in its disclosed 

techniques, which, according to the patent, are distinguished by automatic monitoring and shaping (or other 

fine-tuning) of the waveform of the electrical energy 

delivered to the patient during discharge itself. See, e.g., 

’454 patent, col. 3 ll. 45–54. This passage identifies that 

the use of test pulses was known, but it does not state 

that the use of test pulses was incompatible with the 

invention of the ’454 patent. See Ventana Med. Sys., Inc. 

v. Biogenex Labs., Inc., 473 F.3d 1173, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 

2006) (“[G]eneral statements by the inventors indicating 

that the invention is intended to improve upon prior art” 

techniques, without more, “will not be interpreted to 

disclaim every feature of every prior art device discussed 

in the ‘BACKGROUND ART’ section of the patent.”). 

Similarly, the discussion of the prior art Bell reference in the prosecution history of the ’905 patent simply 

indicates that the Bell reference did not perform any 

“monitoring” step during an electrical discharge, because 

the waveform was determined based on a patient weight 

value input into the defibrillator prior to discharge. J.A. 

9186 (patentee arguing that “[s]ince it delivers a quantity 

of energy determined by a selection made by the operated 

prior to delivery of the shock, the Bell device does not 

adjust energy delivered to the patient based on a value of 

an electrical parameter monitored during discharge, as 

required by” the claims). That is, the patentee did not 

argue that Bell fails to anticipate because a separate test 

pulse prior to a therapeutic discharge is excluded by the 

claims, but instead argued that Bell fails to disclose 

monitoring during discharge, which is required by the 

claims. This makes no disclaimer of use of test pulses as 

part of the “discharging” step.

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Neither the ordinary meaning of the claim language 

nor the intrinsic record show any merit in Zoll’s overlynarrow construction of the “discharging” step of the 

waveform method claims. Therefore, Zoll’s claim construction arguments provide no basis to overturn the 

district court’s denial of JMOL of no infringement as to 

claim 51 of the ’454 waveform patent and claims 4 and 8 

of the ’905 waveform patent.

B. Waveform Method Claims

Zoll alternatively argues that even if its defibrillator 

devices can be used to infringe the waveform method 

claims, Zoll does not use those devices in a directly infringing way. We disagree. 

Claim 51 of the ’454 patent and claims 4 and 8 of the 

’905 patent require “discharging the energy . . . to the 

patient.” Therefore, only the party that performs the 

therapeutic method on a subject patient can directly 

infringe. 

Philips presented various elements of evidence 

demonstrating that Zoll used its defibrillator devices on 

subject patients. Zoll’s fact witness testified that Zoll 

conducted clinical trials on its defibrillator devices. J.A. 

1953. That same witness explained that Zoll performed 

these clinical trials to establish points of comparison 

between the Zoll defibrillators and competing products for 

the purpose of generating marketing material. J.A. 1969. 

Other of Zoll’s marketing materials stated that Zoll had 

performed “human clinical studies” involving testing on 

more than 2,800 patients. J.A. 14569. Zoll’s fact witness 

explained that Zoll’s clinical testing involved testing on

actual human subjects and testing on products already on 

sale. J.A. 2484. Zoll’s expert witness further confirmed 

that clinical testing of the products by Zoll would involve 

testing on human subjects. J.A. 1687.

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While Zoll notes that the first set of clinical trials referenced by its witnesses were performed outside the 

statutory damages period, J.A. 1952–53, see 35 U.S.C. 

§ 286 (“[N]o recovery shall be had for any infringement 

committed more than six years prior to the filing of the 

complaint or counterclaim for infringement in the action.”), Zoll demonstrates no such deficiency as to the 

other clinical trials that it admits to performing. And 

while Zoll claims that some of its clinical testing may 

have been protected under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (“It shall 

not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or 

sell within the United States or import into the United 

States a patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably 

related to the development and submission of information 

under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, 

use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.”), 

Zoll’s witnesses admitted that the testing was performed 

to generate marketing materials and on products already 

on sale—thus not for the purpose of receiving approval 

from the Food and Drug Administration.

Therefore, the jury’s verdict of direct infringement of 

the waveform method claims was supported by several 

independent elements of evidence showing that Zoll 

infringed the waveform method claims during its own 

product testing and trials. For this reason, and because 

we previously found no merit in Zoll’s claim construction 

arguments on the same claims, we affirm the district 

court’s denial of JMOL of no direct infringement as to 

claim 51 of the ’454 waveform patent and claims 4 and 8 

of the ’905 waveform patent.

C. Waveform Device Claims

The jury found that Zoll directly infringes claims 1 

and 5 of the ’212 waveform patent. Zoll argues that this 

verdict was in error, because Zoll does not use its defibrillator devices in a directly infringing way. We disagree. 

Claim 1 recites the following:

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An external defibrillator comprising:

an energy source;

first and second electrodes in electrical communication with the exterior of a patient; [and]

a controller . . . . 

Claim 5 is dependent on claim 1. 

Zoll first argues that Philips presented insufficient evidence establishing that Zoll uses its defibrillator products 

in an infringing way. However, the evidence presented by 

Philips and discussed for the waveform method claims is 

also sufficient for the jury to conclude that Zoll’s use of its 

defibrillator devices, i.e., the performance of testing and 

trials of its defibrillator products, directly infringed the 

waveform device claims.

Zoll also argues that, because the claims require a defibrillator with electrodes “in electrical communication 

with the exterior of a patient,” Zoll does not directly 

infringe by making or selling its defibrillator products. 

Philips argues that Zoll infringes the waveform device 

claims through making and selling its defibrillator products because the claim language of “in electrical communication with the exterior of a patient” is functional 

language that does not limit the scope of the claims. 

Under this reasoning, the accused devices would not need 

to be in contact with a subject to infringe the claims, so 

Zoll would directly infringe the claims by simply making 

and selling its defibrillator devices. 

Philips cites various precedents of this court as to why 

we should read “in electrical communication with the 

exterior of a patient” out of the claims. Philips argues 

that this language is alternatively a statement of intended use, the reading of a method step into device claims, or 

a nonsensical incorporation of a human being into the 

claim scope. But none of these arguments evade the fact 

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that “in electrical communication with the exterior of a 

patient” recites a clear, coherent limitation of the “first 

and second electrodes.” The electrodes must be attached 

to a subject patient in order for a defibrillator device to 

come within the scope of the waveform device claims. 

Philips would have us read the claims as if they recited 

“first and second electrodes” configured to be placed in

“electrical communication with the exterior of a patient,” 

or something to that effect. But that is not what the 

claims recite. The claims must be interpreted according 

to their clear, ordinary meaning. See Ancora Techs., Inc. 

v. Apple, Inc., 744 F.3d 732, 734–35 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

Under that meaning, the electrodes must be in electrical 

communication with a subject patient, and Zoll does not 

infringe those claims by making and selling its defibrillator devices.

Therefore, Philips presented sufficient evidence to 

support the jury’s verdict of direct infringement as to 

Zoll’s use of its defibrillator devices during product testing 

and trials, but not as to Zoll’s making and selling of its 

defibrillator devices. We affirm the district court’s denial 

of JMOL of no direct infringement on this basis as to 

claims 1 and 5 of the ’212 waveform patent.

D. Self-Test Method Claims

The jury found that Zoll directly infringes claim 7 of 

the ’460 self-test patent and claims 42 and 67–68 of the 

’374 self-test patent.3 Zoll argues that this verdict was in 

error, because Philips presented insufficient evidence that 

Zoll uses its own defibrillators in a directly infringing 

way, and that Zoll’s sale of its defibrillator devices do not 

 

3 Because we find that claim 7 of the ’460 self-test 

patent is invalid, we do not reach the direct infringement 

issue as to that claim.

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directly infringe these self-test method claims. We disagree. 

These claims recite a method for performing various 

self-test techniques in a defibrillator device. Claim 67 of 

the ’374 self-test patent, for instance, recites the following: 

A method for testing and indicating an operational status of an external defibrillator comprising the following steps:

generating a test signal within the external 

defibrillator automatically and periodically;

performing a plurality of self-tests in response 

to the test signal to determine the operational status of a plurality of components of the defibrillator, the tests being performed without human 

intervention prior to any attempted use of the defibrillator; and

indicating the operational status of the defibrillator in response to at least one of the self-tests.

Zoll first argues that Philips presented insufficient evidence that Zoll uses its own defibrillator devices in a 

directly infringing way. But the record includes ample 

evidence on which the jury could rely in order to conclude 

that Zoll’s product testing and trials involved use of the 

defibrillator devices in a way that directly infringes the 

self-test method claims. A Zoll employee admitted that 

Zoll performs testing of its products, including the selftest functionality, prior to sale to verify that they function 

properly. J.A. 1897–98, 2481–84. Philips presented test 

reports by Zoll regarding its testing of the self-test feature. J.A. 13615–19, 13774–76. Philips’s expert witness 

explained to the jury the significance of both of these 

pieces of evidence. J.A. 1897–99. This was a sufficient 

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clude that Zoll directly infringed the self-test method 

claims by its pre-sale product testing.

Zoll next argues that it does not directly infringe the 

self-test method claims by making or selling its defibrillator devices, because it is some other party, e.g., Zoll’s 

customers, that actually perform the steps of the claims. 

Zoll’s point is that the steps of the self-test method claims, 

such as “generating a test signal within the external 

defibrillator automatically and periodically,” are steps 

that are performed on an ongoing basis after Zoll has 

already sold the defibrillator device to another party. So, 

Zoll must not be the party performing the directly infringing use of the self-test method claims.

It is true that a party that sells an apparatus capable 

of performing a patented method is generally not liable 

for direct infringement if that infringing act comes to 

pass. See Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 

F.3d 1306, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Instead, the direct 

infringer would be the party who put that apparatus to 

use to perform the patented method. See Ericsson, Inc. v. 

D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 

But this case presents the complicating detail that Zoll

may sell the defibrillators configured to automatically

perform the self-test method claims without any additional intervention by Zoll’s customers. Compare J.A. 1899, 

with J.A. 5266, 7055, 12143–49. Philips argues that such 

“automatic” infringement establishes direct infringement 

by the seller of the apparatus, relying on SiRF Technology, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, 601 F.3d 1319 

(Fed. Cir. 2010). But Philips’s argument seeks to extend 

the holding in SiRF to a place where we have previously 

declined to take it:

Contrary to Ericsson’s assertions, our decision in 

SiRF did not create direct infringement liability 

whenever an alleged infringer sells a product that 

is capable of executing the infringing method. 

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Our decision in SiRF is not applicable here because all of the steps of the method in claims 1 

and 2 of the ’215 patent are performed on the end 

product, which is controlled by a third party. See 

SiRF, 601 F.3d at 1331. Unlike the method in 

SiRF, there are no steps automatically performed 

by equipment controlled by [the selling party]. In 

fact, none of our decisions have found direct infringement of a method claim by sales of an end 

user product which performs the entire method, 

and we decline to do so here.

Ericsson, 773 F.3d 1221–22. We again decline to extend 

the scope of direct infringement to the point that Philips 

advocates. As in Ericsson, all of the steps of the self-test 

method claims are performed by the defibrillator devices, 

wholly out of the control of Zoll. Furthermore, there is 

considerable conflict in the record as to whether Zoll’s 

defibrillator will actually automatically perform the selftest method claims upon sale to a Zoll customer, or 

whether some further activation and installation steps 

are required by the purchaser before the defibrillator will 

perform those methods. As such, we do not find this to be 

an appropriate case in which to establish direct infringement liability for a seller of an apparatus that may perform patented methods.

Therefore, Philips presented sufficient evidence to 

support the jury’s verdict of direct infringement as to 

Zoll’s own use of its defibrillator devices during product 

testing and trials, but not as to Zoll’s alleged use of the 

self-test method claims by sale of its defibrillator products. We affirm the district court’s denial of JMOL of no

direct infringement on this basis as to claims 42 and 67–

68 of the ’374 self-test patent.

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V. INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT OF THE WAVEFORM 

AND SELF-TEST CLAIMS

The jury found that Zoll does not contributorily infringe claim 51 of the ’454 waveform patent, claims 4 and 

8 of the ’905 waveform patent, claim 7 of the ’460 self-test 

patent, and claims 42–43 and 67–68 of the ’374 self-test 

patent.4 A party is liable for contributory infringement 

under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) if: 1) “there is direct infringement,” 2) “the accused infringer had knowledge of the 

patent,” 3) “the component has no substantial noninfringing uses,” and 4) “the component is a material part of the 

invention.” Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 1321, 

1326 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Philips argues that, based on the 

evidence presented at trial, no reasonable jury could have 

concluded that any of these four requirements were not 

met by Zoll for the waveform and self-test patents. We 

address each of the four requirements in turn.

A. Direct Infringement

Philips alleges that customers of Zoll performed the 

requisite acts of direct infringement for the contributory 

infringement claim against Zoll. Zoll responds that 

Philips failed to prove that any of Zoll’s customers actually performed this direct infringement. 

In preceding portions of this opinion, we have already 

explained that sufficient evidence demonstrated that Zoll 

infringed each of the contested waveform and self-test 

method claims when performing testing and trials on its 

own defibrillator devices in the manner in which they 

were intended to operate. A Zoll employee testified that 

Zoll controls about 50% of the North American hospital 

 

4 Because we find that claim 7 of the ’460 self-test 

patent and claim 43 of the ’374 self-test patent are invalid, we do not reach the contributory infringement issue 

as to those claims.

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market and about 40% of the ambulance market. J.A. 

1953. Therefore, for the jury to conclude that the direct 

infringement requirement of the contributory infringement claim was not met, it would have had to conclude 

that not a single one of Zoll’s customers in this sizable 

share of the market used the devices for their intended 

purposes as Zoll itself does. Absent any evidence suggesting such a strange occurrence, this is not a conclusion 

that could be reached by a reasonable jury.

Therefore, lack of direct infringement cannot stand as 

the basis for the jury’s verdict of no contributory infringement.

B. Knowledge

Philips alleges that Zoll had the requisite knowledge 

of the waveform and self-test patents as of 2008 based on 

an infringement contention letter that Philips delivered to 

Zoll. Zoll alleges that these infringement contentions 

were not sufficiently specific to establish the requisite 

knowledge, and that Zoll had a good faith belief in noninfringement.

Section 271(c) “require[s] a showing that the alleged 

contributory infringer knew that the combination for 

which his component was especially designed was both 

patented and infringing.” Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top 

Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964); see also Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 365 F.3d 1054, 

1061 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Zoll undoubtedly knew about the 

waveform and self-test patents and Philips’s allegation of 

infringement as of the date of Philips’s infringement 

letter, dated 28 July 2009. J.A. 12706–13. The July 2009 

letter specifically identifies the ’460 self-test patent and 

’374 self-test patent and refutes some previously discussed theory of invalidity. J.A. 12710. The July 2009 

letter further discusses two family member patents of the 

’454, ’905, and ’212 waveform patents, those family member patents having considerably similar claims as the 

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asserted waveform patents. J.A. 12706. The July 2009 

letter also addressed the same non-infringement contention as to the waveform patents that Zoll ultimately 

raised at trial. J.A. 12706.

Zoll argues that its good faith belief in noninfringement negates the knowledge requirement, pointing to its arguments against the direct infringement 

verdicts discussed supra at 20–29. For the claims of the 

’454 waveform patent and the ’905 waveform patent, we 

find that Zoll’s belief in non-infringement, based on its 

reasonable claim construction argument, does negate the 

knowledge requirement of contributory infringement. 

The Supreme Court has explained that if an accused 

infringer “reads the patent’s claims differently from the 

plaintiff,” and if “that reading is reasonable,” then the 

accused infringer should not be liable for indirect infringement. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 

S. Ct. 1920, 1928 (2015). While we ultimately concluded 

that Zoll’s claim construction argument against the jury’s

direct infringement verdict for the waveform claims was

incorrect, see supra at 21–23, that argument was based on 

a reasonable interpretation of the claims in light of the 

specification and the prosecution history. Because this 

belief in non-infringement was reasonable, it is a sufficient basis on which to ground the jury’s implicit finding 

of insufficient knowledge for contributory infringement. 

But for the claims of the ’374 self-test patent, Zoll’s 

non-infringement contentions amounted to nothing more 

than an allegation that Zoll’s customers, not Zoll, were 

using the Zoll defibrillator devices in a directly infringing 

way. See supra at 26–29. This is not a defense to the 

knowledge requirement for contributory infringement 

because it evinces that Zoll knew it was potentially contributing to direct infringement of the ’374 self-test patent. Therefore, Zoll had the requisite knowledge of the

’374 self-test patent and infringement as of July 28, 2009. 

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Philips suggests that Zoll had this knowledge even 

earlier. A Zoll employee admitted to being notified of 

Philips’s allegations of infringement as early as 2008. 

J.A. 1958–59, 1978–80. The July 2009 letter also is 

clearly a continuation of some ongoing discussion between 

counsel for Philips and Zoll. However, Philips does not 

direct our attention to any proof of this earlier 2008 

infringement contention, and we cannot assume that it 

was presented to the jury given that it does not appear in 

the record before us. Therefore, we are limited to saying 

that no reasonable jury could have concluded that Zoll 

lacked knowledge of the ’374 self-test patent and Philips’s 

allegations of infringement as of July 2009.

Accordingly, as of July 2009, lack of knowledge of the 

patents and infringement cannot stand as the basis for 

the jury’s verdict of no contributory infringement for the

claims of the ’374 self-test patent. However, lack of 

knowledge of the patents and infringement can stand as 

the basis for the jury’s verdict of no contributory infringement for the claims of the ’454 waveform patent and 

the ’905 waveform patent.

C. Substantial Non-Infringing Use

Philips alleges that the Zoll defibrillators do not have 

any substantial non-infringing use for the self-test features. In response, Zoll identifies several allegedly noninfringing uses that it claims the jury could have relied on 

to reach its verdict.

An accused contributory infringer will not be held liable for such infringement if the “component” or “material 

or apparatus” that that party sells is “suitable for substantial noninfringing use.” § 271(c); see also Ricoh Co., 

Ltd. v. Quanta Comput. Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1337 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008). A complication arises when the asserted 

patent claims cover only one aspect or feature of the 

“component” or “material or apparatus” that the accused 

contributory infringer sells. See Ricoh, 550 F.3d at 1337–

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40. That complication is present in this case, because the 

self-test features that are covered by the ’374 self-test 

patent are general features of the composite defibrillator 

devices.

In such cases, we have sought to assure that the accused contributory infringer is not “‘permitted to escape 

liability as a contributory infringer merely by embedding 

[the infringing apparatus] in a larger product with some 

additional, separable feature before importing and selling 

it.’” Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 

1320 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Ricoh, 550 F.3d at 1337

(modifications in Lucent)). To reach this end, we have 

sought to determine whether the infringing component is

“‘separate and distinct’” from other functions of the composite product. Fujitsu, 620 F.3d at 1330 (quoting i4i Ltd. 

P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 849 (Fed. Cir. 

2010), aff’d on other grounds, 564 U.S. 91 (2011)). In the 

cases where we have directly addressed this issue, we 

have generally been fairly liberal in finding the accused 

components separate. See Fujitsu, 620 F.3d at 1330–31 

(finding message fragmentation feature of wireless access 

point devices separate and distinct from other features of 

those devices); i4i, 598 F.3d at 848–49 (finding XML 

editor separate and distinct from other features of Microsoft Word); Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1321 (finding datepicker tool separate and distinct from other features of 

Microsoft Outlook); Ricoh, 550 F.3d at 1336–40 (vacating 

district court finding that optical disk drive has substantial non-infringing uses apart from patented disk-writing 

technology).

For the self-test patents, Zoll argues that the jury 

could have found a substantial non-infringing use in the 

form of either automatic self-tests running on a single 

periodic schedule or self-tests running only when instigated by a user. Zoll’s Principal Br. 63–64. 

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As to the user-instigated self-tests, a reasonable jury 

could only conclude that this is a “separate and distinct” 

feature from the automatic, periodic self-test feature. In 

Fujitsu, we considered a similar argument regarding the 

message fragmentation feature in IEEE 802.11 wireless 

access point devices. See Fujitsu, 620 F.3d at 1330. 

There the accused contributory infringer argued that 

disabling packet fragmentation was a substantial noninfringing use. See id. We held that disabling the patented feature altogether was a separate and distinct 

mode of operation. See id. 

In the present case, [the accused contributory infringer] argues that because a user can turn off 

the infringing features, then there are substantial 

noninfringing uses. However, it is undisputed 

that, when activated, the product is infringing. 

Whether a user activates fragmentation is relevant to the extent of direct infringement, but does 

not establish substantial noninfringing uses.

Id. at 1331. This logic applies even more so here, where 

the record clearly shows that creation of the patented 

automatic, periodic self-tests was a key aspect of the 

products and allowed their proliferation in the marketplace. Therefore, no reasonable jury could find disabling 

of this critical self-test feature to be anything but a separate and distinct mode of operation for the defibrillator 

devices. 

Zoll’s arguments regarding the use of a single periodic 

schedule for self-tests in its devices is inapposite, because 

only claim 7 of the ’460 self-test patent requires more 

than one schedule for periodic self-tests, and we have 

already found that claim invalid.

Therefore, a substantial non-infringing use cannot 

stand as the basis for the jury’s verdict of no contributory 

infringement for the claims of the ’374 self-test patent.

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D. Material Part of the Invention

Philips argues that the self-test features are material 

parts of the defibrillator devices, and Zoll does not contest 

the point. We also think the point is incontestable, and 

thus lack of materiality cannot stand as the basis for the 

jury’s contributory infringement verdict.

* * * 

Based on the foregoing, we find that no reasonable jury could have reached the actual jury’s verdict of no 

contributory infringement by Zoll, but only as to the 

claims of the ’374 self-test patent. Therefore, we reverse 

the district court’s denial of JMOL of contributory infringement as to claims 42 and 67–68 of the ’374 self-test 

patent, and we affirm the district court’s denial of JMOL 

of contributory infringement as to claim 51 of the ’454 

waveform patent and claims 4 and 8 of the ’905 waveform 

patent.

VI. INDEFINITENESS OF ELECTRODE CLAIMS

The jury found that claims 1, 8–9, 11–12, 19, and 24–

25 of the ’526 patent were not invalid. Philips argues that 

this verdict was in error, either because no reasonable 

jury could find the claims are not indefinite, or because 

the district court improperly instructed the jury on the 

standard for indefiniteness. We agree with Philips’s 

latter argument. 

Claim 1 of the ’526 patent recites, in part:

An electrode for transcutaneously delivering 

defibrillation pulses to a patient’s heart, the electrode comprising:

a conducting plate . . . , and

a layer of electrolytic gel comprising a concentration of an electrolyte that produces a combination series resistance of two of said electrodes, 

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when measured with the electrodes configured in 

a series circuit with a 50 Ω resistance, and with 

the electrolytic gel layer of each electrode in contact with that of the other electrode, that is greater than 1 Ω when a 200 Joule defibrillation pulse 

is discharged into the series circuit . . . . 

Independent claim 24 recites a similar feature, and all of 

the other asserted claims are dependent on one of these 

two independent claims. 

The above-quoted language of claim 1 attempts to 

cover the inventive discovery of the ’526 patent, i.e., that 

low resistance of the electrode’s electrolytic gel is beneficial to a point, but not below 1 ohm of resistance. In order 

to specify this scope of claim coverage, claim 1 essentially 

instructs the reader to take a defibrillator device, place 

the two electrodes together with the electrolytic gel between them—thus omitting the human subject from the 

circuit—arrange 50 ohms resistance in series with the 

electrodes, and then apply 200 joules of electrical energy 

into this circuit. With this configuration, the electrical 

resistance across the series of two electrodes and electrolytic gel should be more than 1 ohm.

“The Supreme Court has instructed that ‘a patent is 

invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the 

specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution 

history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those 

skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.’” 

SimpleAir, Inc. v. Sony Ericsson Mobile Commc’ns AB, 

820 F.3d 419, 432 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Nautilus, Inc. 

v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014)). 

The Supreme Court laid out this standard, the need to 

inform with reasonable certainty, in Nautilus, which 

effected a change in the law over our previous standard 

for determining indefiniteness: “amenable to construction” or “insolubly ambiguous.” See Dow Chem. Co. v. 

Nova Chems. Corp., 803 F.3d 620, 630–31 (Fed. Cir. 

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2015). “Indefiniteness is a question of law that we review 

de novo, subject to a determination of underlying facts,” 

Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 811 F.3d 

1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted), 

which we review under the regional circuit’s reasonable 

jury standard, Marcano Rivera, 415 F.3d at 167. 

Philips argues that the claim scope is insufficiently 

definite to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2. In particular, 

because neither the claims nor the specification clarify 

what temperature the procedure should be performed at, 

how old the electrodes should be, or how many previous 

electrical shocks should have been applied with the electrodes, the asserted claims of the ’526 patent fail to specify the scope of the claims to a sufficiently reasonable 

degree of clarity. Philips provided expert testimony 

showing a significant degree of variance in measured 

resistance as each of these factors changed. 

But we do not find this evidence to be so clearly in favor of finding the claims indefinite that we think it appropriate to overturn the jury’s verdict. The jury could 

have discounted Philips’s experimental results and expert 

testimony regarding room temperature because the 

experiments were performed at an energy level (150 

joules) different from the level specified by the claims (200 

joules). The jury could have viewed the evidence on 

number of sequential shocks and age of the electrodes as a 

relatively minor source of imprecision in the claims. It is 

uncontested that the resistance of the electrodes only 

increases as the number of sequential shocks and age of 

the electrodes increases. Therefore, the lack of precision 

for having not specified these parameters would only 

create a lack of clarity for an ordinary artisan if the 

electrodes showed a resistance less than, but close to, the 

1 ohm cutoff. Even then, the jury could have credited the 

opinion of Zoll’s expert witness, who testified that an 

ordinary artisan would understand the age of the electrode to be bounded by its date of expiration and the 

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number of sequential shocks to most likely be the first 

such shock. 

Therefore, while the lack of precise bounds on these 

three parameters may mean that the claims do not specify 

their scope with absolute precision, we cannot say that 

the evidence overwhelmingly proves by clear and convincing evidence that the claims fail to specify their bounds 

with reasonable certainty. For this reason, we do not

reverse the district court’s denial of JMOL of indefiniteness.

On the other hand, this elucidation of ambiguity in 

the scope of the claims does raise concern as to the charge 

the jury received prior to reaching its verdict. In instructing the jury on the indefiniteness count, the district court 

stated the following:

In this case, Philips contends that the claims of 

Zoll’s ’526 patent are invalid because the language 

of the claims is indefinite. To prevail on that contention, Philips must show by clear and convincing evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the 

art would not understand what is and is not covered by the claims of Zoll’s patent.

The amount of detail required for a claim to be 

definite depends on the particular invention, the 

prior art, and the written description contained in 

the patent. Absolute clarity is not necessary. Rather, only claims that are insolubly ambiguous are 

indefinite. The claim language need only be as 

precise as the subject matter permits. Furthermore, the fact that a person of ordinary skill in 

the art would have to engage in some experimentation to determine the scope of the claim does not 

render the claim indefinite so long as the experimentation is not undue or excessive.

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J.A. 5336. The district court presented these instructions 

to the jury prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Nautilus, which explains why the language of “insolubly ambiguous” was included in those instructions. Philips 

argues that this instruction—“only claims that are insolubly ambiguous are indefinite”—was rendered legally 

incorrect by Nautilus and resulted in a prejudice to 

Philips.

This court “will set aside the jury verdict, ‘if the movant can establish that those instructions were legally 

erroneous, and that the errors had prejudicial effect.’” 

Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361, 

1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 135 

S. Ct. 1920 (2015) (quoting Sulzer Textil A.G. v. Picanol 

N.V., 358 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

It is without dispute that the “insolubly ambiguous” 

standard is legally erroneous after Nautilus. See Dow, 

803 F.3d at 630–31. The only significant question in this 

case is whether the inclusion of the reference to the 

“insolubly ambiguous” standard in the broader instructions on indefiniteness thereby effected a prejudice on 

Philips. We conclude that it did. While we have not 

clarified the relationship between “insolubly ambiguous” 

and “reasonably certain,” it must be admitted that the 

“insolubly ambiguous” standard is a harder threshold to 

meet than the post-Nautilus standard. Thus, if the jury 

actually applied the “insolubly ambiguous” standard, then 

it would be fair to conclude that the jury instructions 

prejudiced Philips, especially in light of the extensive case 

on indefiniteness that Philips presented—even though not 

sufficient to merit JMOL.

Zoll argues that, taken in the broader context of the 

jury instructions (as quoted above), the reference to the 

“insolubly ambiguous” standard was innocuous and not 

prejudicial. While there may be some factual scenario 

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where the reference to “insolubly ambiguous” is nonprejudicial, this is not that case. Here, the sentence, 

“Rather, only claims that are insolubly ambiguous are 

indefinite,” is the strongest, most forceful statement in 

the entire instructions on indefiniteness. It seems almost 

certain that amidst the back-and-forth, give-and-take of 

the remainder of the jury instructions on indefiniteness, 

the jury would gravitate to the single, definitive statement in the instructions. Furthermore, this sentence is 

juxtaposed with, “Absolute clarity is not necessary,” and 

connected with “rather, only,” which slants the playing 

field against a finding of indefiniteness in a way that is no 

longer appropriate after Nautilus. On this basis, we find 

that the district court’s reference to the insolubly ambiguous standard was prejudicial. 

Therefore, while we do not find Philips’s case on indefiniteness to be so overwhelming as to mandate a reversal 

of JMOL, we believe that the jury instructions incorporating the pre-Nautilus standard for indefiniteness warrant 

setting aside the jury verdict of no invalidity for indefiniteness. We affirm the district court’s denial of JMOL of 

invalidity for indefiniteness, we reverse the district 

court’s denial of a new trial on invalidity for indefiniteness, we vacate the jury verdict of no invalidity, and we 

remand the case for a new trial on invalidity for claims 1, 

8–9, 11–12, 19, and 24–25 of the ’526 patent.5

 

5 At trial, the only question of invalidity presented 

to the jury was indefiniteness. As discussed in the next 

section, an alleged prior art device, the Marquette electrode, might support additional theories of invalidity of 

the claims of the ’526 patent. If so, those questions should 

also be presented to the jury at a new trial on invalidity.

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VII. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

The district court excluded evidence related to two 

distinct elements of prior art that Philips desired to 

present to the jury as grounds for prior art-based invalidity of the ’526 patent claims. Philips argues that each of 

these exclusions was in error and warrants the relief of a 

new trial on invalidity.6 This court reviews evidentiary 

rulings under the law of the regional circuit, see AbbVie 

Deutschland GmbH & Co., KG v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 

759 F.3d 1285, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2014), which the First 

Circuit reviews for abuse of discretion, see Acosa-Mestre v. 

Hilton Int’l of Puerto Rico, Inc., 156 F.3d 49, 56–57 (1st 

Cir. 1998). 

Philips attempted to present evidence related to a prior art device, the Marquette Responder 1200 electrode. 

To show that the Marquette electrode was an invalidating 

prior art reference on sale prior to the ’526 patent’s priority date, Philips garnered three pieces of evidence: deposition testimony of an employee of Marquette Electronics, 

J.A. 5680–89; a Marquette Electronics sales report, J.A. 

5676–79; and a Food and Drug Administration premarketing filing, a “510(k)” application, J.A. 5629–75. In 

denying the Marquette electrode as a ground of prior art 

invalidity, the district court stated:

After consideration of the parties’ supplemental 

memoranda with respect to the 510K notifications 

to the Food and Drug Administration, Dockets No. 

522 and 523, the Court agrees with Zoll that such 

 

6 Because we have already granted Philips the requested relief of a new trial on invalidity for the ground of 

indefiniteness in the preceding section, this section addresses only what grounds the district court may consider 

appropriate to be presented to the jury in that new invalidity trial. 

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notifications are not prior art under the Patent 

Act, and Zoll’s motion to exclude is therefore allowed. 

J.A. 5005. The district court then excluded the Marquette 

electrode 510(k) application “as well as any testimony 

that intends to rely upon” that 510(k) application.

This court has repeatedly clarified that oral testimony 

can be used as the primary basis for evidencing prior artbased invalidity. See, e.g., TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 812 F.3d 1295, 1301–02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 

Lazare Kaplan Int’l, Inc. v. Photoscribe Techs., Inc., 628 

F.3d 1359, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The question to be 

answered when such an invalidity defense is proffered is 

whether the oral testimony is sufficiently corroborated by 

other evidence. See TransWeb, 812 F.3d at 1301–02. This

question is analyzed under a rule of reason approach and 

is a question of fact. See Fleming v. Escort Inc., 774 F.3d 

1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 

Here, Philips attempted to use the Marquette electrode as a prior art device, not the 510(k) application as a 

prior art publication. See J.A. 5009–10. Philips intended 

to use the testimony of the Marquette employee to establish the Marquette electrode as an invalidating prior art 

device on public sale prior to the priority date of the ’526 

patent. The sales report and 510(k) application were 

presented as evidence to corroborate this oral testimony of 

the Marquette employee. Therefore, the relevant legal 

question was whether the Marquette employee’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated, not whether the 510(k) 

application was publicly available. By excluding the 

Marquette electrode evidence without answering the 

relevant legal question, the district court abused its 

discretion. See Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. 

Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 n.2 (2014) (“‘A district 

court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its 

ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly 

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erroneous assessment of the evidence.’” (quoting Cooter & 

Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990))). However, while this necessitates that we vacate the district 

court’s denial of Philips’s motion for a new trial, we do not 

think that it is so clear that a new trial on validity using 

the Marquette electrode is appropriate. It may be that 

the evidence provided to corroborate the Marquette employee’s oral testimony is insufficient under our case law. 

Because this is a question of fact, we must remand the 

issue for determination by the district court in the first 

instance. And the question of corroboration is generally a 

question left to the jury, unless the district court concludes that there is insufficient corroboration as a matter 

of law. See Adenta GmbH v. OrthoArm, Inc., 501 F.3d 

1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

Philips also attempted to present a prior art invalidity 

defense based on a 510(k) application for the PhysioControl Fast-Patch. The district court excluded this 

evidence in the same passage quoted above. For this prior 

art defense, though, Philips attempted to use the 510(k) 

application as a prior art publication in its own right. 

“When considering whether a given reference qualifies as 

a prior art ‘printed publication,’ the key inquiry is whether the reference was made ‘sufficiently accessible to the 

public interested in the art’ before the critical date.” Voter 

Verified, Inc. v. Premier Election Sols., Inc., 698 F.3d 

1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Cronyn, 890 

F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). 

Philips theorizes that some member of the public 

could have found out about the application, requested it 

from the FDA, and then received it, because the confidentiality of the application had expired prior to the priority 

date of the ’526 patent. But this relies on a considerable 

amount of conjecture that is not supported by the record. 

As to this particular 510(k) application, Philips presented 

no evidence of indexing or cataloguing, which, while not 

prerequisites, serve as hallmarks of public accessibility. 

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See Voter Verified, 698 F.3d at 1380. While the record 

shows that a third-party did request the 510(k) application using a Freedom of Information Act request prior to 

the priority date of the ’526 patent, J.A. 5586, the record 

also shows that the FOIA requester did not receive the 

510(k) application until after the ’526 patent’s priority 

date, J.A. 5585. The fact that the application was not 

received by a member of the public until then further 

supports the district court’s implicit determination that 

the Physio-Control 510(k) application was not sufficiently 

available to the public prior to the priority date of the ’526 

patent. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in excluding this evidence from the invalidity 

trial.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s 

denial of a new trial based on exclusion of the PhysioControl 510(k) application evidence, we vacate the district 

court’s denial of a new trial based on exclusion of the 

Marquette electrode device evidence, and we remand to 

the district court for a determination of whether the 

testimony as to the Marquette electrode is sufficiently 

corroborated to proceed in a new invalidity trial.

VIII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, we act on the district 

court’s judgments as follows:

we affirm the district court’s denial of JMOL of invalidity as to claims 4 and 8 of the waveform ’905 patent;

we reverse the district court’s denial of JMOL of invalidity as to claim 7 of the self-test ’460 patent;

we reverse the district court’s denial of JMOL of invalidity as to claim 43 of the self-test ’374 patent;

we affirm the district court’s denial of JMOL of invalidity as to claims 42 and 67–68 of the self-test ’374 patent;

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we affirm the district court’s denial of JMOL of no direct infringement as to claim 51 of the ’454 waveform 

patent and claims 4 and 8 of the ’905 waveform patent;

we affirm the district court’s denial of JMOL of no direct infringement as to claims 1 and 5 of the ’212 waveform patent;

we affirm the district court’s denial of JMOL of no direct infringement as to claims 42 and 67–68 of the ’374 

self-test patent;

we reverse the district court’s denial of JMOL of contributory infringement as to claims 42 and 67–68 of the 

’374 self-test patent;

we affirm the district court’s denial of JMOL of contributory infringement as to claim 51 of the ’454 waveform patent and claims 4 and 8 of the ’905 waveform 

patent;

we affirm the district court’s denial of JMOL of invalidity for indefiniteness for claims 1, 8–9, 11–12, 19, and 

24–25 of the ’526 patent; 

we reverse the district court’s denial of a new trial on 

invalidity for indefiniteness for claims 1, 8–9, 11–12, 19, 

and 24–25 of the ’526 patent; 

we vacate the jury verdict of no invalidity for claims 1, 

8–9, 11–12, 19, and 24–25 of the ’526 patent; 

we remand the case for a new trial on invalidity for 

claims 1, 8–9, 11–12, 19, and 24–25 of the ’526 patent; 

we affirm the district court’s denial of a new trial 

based on exclusion of the Physio-Control 510(k) application evidence; 

we vacate the district court’s denial of a new trial 

based on exclusion of the Marquette electrode device 

evidence; and

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we remand to the district court for a determination of 

whether the testimony as to the Marquette electrode is 

sufficiently corroborated to proceed in a new invalidity 

trial.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART, 

VACATED-IN-PART, AND REMANDED

COSTS

No costs.

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