Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-07-06203/USCOURTS-ca10-07-06203-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carroll E. Gregg
Petitioner

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

In re:

CARROLL E. GREGG,

Movant.

No. 07-6203

(D.C. No. 07!CV!864!C)

ORDER

Filed November 13, 2007

Before KELLY, EBEL, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

Movant Carroll E. Gregg, an Oklahoma state inmate proceeding pro se, has

filed a motion for remand. Gregg filed a motion in the district court that

constituted an attempt to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. 

The district court transferred the matter to this court because Gregg had

previously filed a § 2254 petition, but had not obtained authorization from this

court to file another § 2254 petition, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). 

See Coleman v. United States, 106 F.3d 339, 341 (10th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)

(directing district courts to transfer unauthorized second or successive § 2254

petitions to this court in the interest of justice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631). 

Gregg now moves this court for an order remanding the matter to the district

Appellate Case: 07-6203 Document: 010167453 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Page: 1 
-2-

court, arguing that he does not need this court’s authorization to file his proposed

§ 2254 petition in the district court. We deny the motion.

Gregg was convicted in Oklahoma in 1990 of forty-three counts of sexual

abuse of a young girl. In 1997, he filed a § 2254 petition collaterally challenging

that conviction. The district court denied the § 2254 petition, and this court

affirmed that denial. Gregg v. Scott, No. 98-6049, 1999 WL 2515, at *1

(10th Cir. Jan. 5, 1999). In August 2007, Gregg filed a second § 2254 petition in

federal district court, seeking to assert two claims: that he was denied his

constitutional right to have the jury assess his punishment, rather than the trial

judge, and that his trial and appellate attorneys rendered constitutionally

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise this issue at trial or on appeal. 

The district court transferred the matter to this court for authorization, but in lieu

of filing a motion requesting authorization to file his proposed § 2254 petition,

Gregg filed a motion requesting the matter be remanded to the district court.

A district court does not have jurisdiction to address the merits of a second

or successive § 2254 petition until this court has granted the required

authorization under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (“Before

a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district

court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order

authorizing the district court to consider the application.”). In his motion for

remand, Gregg argues his petition is not a “second or successive” petition, and

Appellate Case: 07-6203 Document: 010167453 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Page: 2 
1 To obtain authorization to file a second or successive § 2254 petition, an

applicant must show that he has not raised his claim in a previous habeas petition,

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), and that his new claim either “relies on a new rule of

constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme

Court, that was previously unavailable,” id. § 2244(b)(2)(A), or depends on facts

that “could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due

diligence,” and that would establish by clear and convincing evidence that, “but

for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of

the underlying offense,” id. § 2244(b)(2)(B). 

-3-

thus authorization under § 2244(b) is unnecessary, because he has not previously

raised his proposed claims, nor did he unjustifiably omit them from his prior

§ 2254 petition. Mot. for Remand at 7. This is not, however, the relevant inquiry

in determining whether authorization is required. 

A post-judgment motion must be treated as a second or successive § 2254

petition, and be authorized for filing by a court of appeals under § 2244(b)(3)(A),

if it asserts or reasserts a substantive claim to set aside a petitioner’s criminal

conviction. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530-31 (2005) (analyzing

motion filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)); see also Ochoa v.

Sirmons, 485 F.3d 538, 541 (10th Cir. 2007) (“§ 2244(b) authorization is required

whenever substantively new claims are raised”) (emphasis omitted). Gregg’s

proposed § 2254 petition clearly reasserts substantive challenges to his 1990

conviction. Thus, the district court correctly treated Gregg’s proposed § 2254

petition as a second or successive petition. Gregg has neither sought nor obtained

authorization to file his petition. 

1

Appellate Case: 07-6203 Document: 010167453 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Page: 3 
-4-

The motion for remand is DENIED, and the matter is TERMINATED.

Entered for the Court

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

Appellate Case: 07-6203 Document: 010167453 Date Filed: 11/13/2007 Page: 4