Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00979/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00979-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeh Johnson
Defendant
John Kerry
Defendant
Loretta Lynch
Defendant
Charisse Phillips
Defendant
Iris Santos
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IRIS SANTOS,

Plaintiff,

v.

LORETTA LYNCH, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00979-SAB

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 

(ECF Nos. 23, 24, 25, 27, 28)

On April 8, 2016, Defendants Jeh Johnson, John Kerry, Loretta Lynch, and Charisse 

Phillips (“Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 23.) Plaintiff Iris Santos

(“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition on June 7, 2016. (ECF No. 16.) Defendants filed a reply on 

June 15, 2016. (ECF No. 25.) All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States 

Magistrate Judge for all purposes. (ECF Nos. 7, 8.) Oral argument on the motion to dismiss was 

heard on June 22, 2016. Wahida Noorzad was present for Plaintiff; and Audrey Hemesath 

appeared telephonically for Defendants. The Court allowed the parties to file simultaneous 

supplemental briefing regarding the application of Cardenas v. United States of America, No. 13-

35957, 2016 WL 3408047 (9th Cir. 2016), to the instant case. (ECF No. 26.) On June 24, 2016, 

Defendants filed their supplemental brief. (ECF No. 27.) On June 27, 2016, Plaintiff filed her 

supplemental brief.1 (ECF No. 28.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants‟ motion to 

 

1

Plaintiff‟s supplemental brief reiterates her arguments from her opposition brief and the hearing.

Case 1:15-cv-00979-SAB Document 29 Filed 06/29/16 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

dismiss is granted without leave to amend.

I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a complaint in this matter on June 25, 2015. (ECF No. 1.) On March 31, 

2016, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 20.) 

 Plaintiff is a United States citizen who filed I-130 immigrant visa petitions on behalf of 

her parents, Carlos Santos (“Mr. Santos”) and Maria Ramos (“Mrs. Santos”) with the United 

States Citizenship and Immigration Service (“USCIS”) on May 24, 2013. (FAC ¶ 18.) The 

USCIS approved the petitions and transferred the cases to the United States Department of State 

for further processing. (FAC ¶ 18.) The cases were then sent to the United States Embassy in 

Guatemala (“U.S. Embassy”) for visa processing. (FAC ¶ 18.) 

On February 9, 2015, the U.S. Embassy denied visas to Mr. Santos and Mrs. Santos

because they were inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) for having lived unlawfully in 

the United States for a period exceeding 1 year. (FAC ¶¶ 1, 33.) On September 8, 2015, the 

consular officer denied immigrant visas to Mr. and Mrs. Santos under INA § 212(A)(9)(B)(i)(II) 

and also denied Mr. Santos‟s visa because he was inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(6)(E), which 

states that “[a]ny alien who at any time knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or 

aided any alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law is in admissible.” 

(FAC ¶¶ 1, 39.) 

Plaintiff brings four claims in her complaint: 1) Defendants‟ decision is not supported by 

the record and arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act; 2) Defendants‟ 

decision violated the Immigration & Nationality Act; 3) Defendants‟ decision violated Plaintiff‟s 

substantive due process rights under the Constitution; 4) a claim for injunctive relief; and 5) a 

claim for declaratory relief. (FAC ¶¶ 44-57.) Plaintiff is seeking attorneys‟ fees and costs 

pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412. (FAC ¶¶ 58-61.) 

II.

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may file a motion to dismiss on 

Case 1:15-cv-00979-SAB Document 29 Filed 06/29/16 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

the grounds that the complaint lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. In addition, “[t]he Court must 

dismiss the action when “the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing 

jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); In re Dynamic 

Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss on 

the grounds that a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A 

complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not 

require „detailed factual allegations,‟ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In assessing the sufficiency of a 

complaint, all well-pleaded factual allegations must be accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-

79. However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678.

Under Twombly and Iqbal “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This 

requires factual content for the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the alleged misconduct. Id. A complaint stops short of the line between probability and the 

possibility of relief where the facts pled are merely consistent with a defendant‟s liability. Id. 

Further, while the court is to accept all “well pleaded factual allegations” in the complaint as 

true, id. at 679, it is not bound to accept as true labels, conclusions, formulaic recitations of the 

elements of a cause of action or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555. Finally, the conclusory allegations in the complaint are not entitled to the 

presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. 

III.

DISCUSSION

Defendants seek dismissal for all of Plaintiff‟s claims under Federal Rule of Civil 

Case 1:15-cv-00979-SAB Document 29 Filed 06/29/16 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Procedure 12(b)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim. Defendants argue that the doctrine of consular 

nonreviewability precludes this Court from reviewing a consular officer‟s decision to issue or 

refuse immigrant visas. 

The Immigration & Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1181, et seq., gave consular officials the 

authority to issue or withhold visas. 8 U.S.C. § 1201; Li Hing of Hong Kong, Inc. v. Levin, 800 

F.2d 970, 971 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit has consistently upheld the principle that a 

consular official‟s decision to issue or withhold a visa is not subject to judicial review. Li Hing 

of Hong Kong, 800 F.2d at 970. On the other hand, an exception to the principle of consular 

non-reviewability exists where the denial of a visa implicates the constitutional rights of 

American citizens. Bustamante v. Mukaskey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008). When a 

U.S. citizen raises a constitutional challenge to the denial of a visa, that person is entitled to a 

limited judicial inquiry regarding the reason for the decision. Id. at 1062. If the reason given is 

“facially legitimate and bona fide[,]” the inquiry ends there. Id.

Here, Plaintiff asserts that her claims for relief implicate her fundamental liberty interest 

in her family life. Plaintiff argues that she has a protected liberty interest in her right to live as

an adult child with her parents in the United States. In Bustamante, the Ninth Circuit held that 

freedom of choice “in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the 

Due Process Clause.” 531 F.3d at 1062. However, subsequently, the Supreme Court stated in a 

plurality opinion that “[o]nly by diluting the meaning of a fundamental liberty interest and 

jettisoning our established jurisprudence could we conclude that the denial of Berashk‟s visa 

application implicates any of [his spouse‟s] fundamental liberty interests.” Kerry v. Din, 135 S. 

Ct. 2128, 2138 (2015) (plurality opinion). The Court notes that the Ninth Circuit‟s recent 

decision in Cardenas v. United States, No. 13-35957, 2016 WL 3408047 (9th Cir. 2016), does 

not alter the requirement that a plaintiff must show that the denial of a visa implicates the 

constitutional rights of an American citizen in order for the exception to the doctrine of consular 

non-reviewability to apply. 

Plaintiff cites Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) in support of her 

Case 1:15-cv-00979-SAB Document 29 Filed 06/29/16 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

argument that she has a liberty interest in her family life and family unity. The Supreme Court 

recognized that “[t]his Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of 

marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 499 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Supreme 

Court struck down a city ordinance that limited occupancy of a single-family house to members 

of a single, nuclear family on the ground that “[d]ecisions concerning child rearing ... long have 

been shared with grandparents or other relatives.” Id. at 505-06. The appellant was convicted of 

a criminal offense because her family did not fit the nuclear family that the ordinance required. 

Id. at 496. However, Moore is inapposite to the instant case as this case is regulating the 

issuance of visas to alien parents of an adult child. 

Plaintiff argues that “[t]here is no support for Defendant‟s proposition that the due 

process rights under the constitution[ ] are implicated only where the U.S. citizen‟s right to 

reside with his or her spouse are implicated.” (ECF No. 24 at 12.)2 Defendants argue that a 

marriage relationship is not the equivalent of an adult child-parent relationship. Defendants cite 

Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.Supp.2d 1, 26 (D.D.C. 2010), in which the District Court of the 

District of Columbia found that “all circuits to address the issue have expressly declined to find a 

violation of the familial liberty interest where state action has only an incidental effect on the 

parent‟s relationship with his adult child, and was not aimed specifically at interfering with the 

relationship.” Plaintiffs have not provided any authority, and the Court is not aware of any 

authority, that an adult child has a constitutional interest in living in the United States with his or 

her noncitizen parents. The Court finds that the Ninth Circuit‟s use of the phrase “in matters of 

marriage and family life” when finding procedural due process protection for marriages in the 

context of the denial of a visa or admission and exclusion of aliens has not extended, and does 

not extend to adult children living with their alien parents in the United States. The Court notes 

that the Federal Government is not attempting to forbid parents and adult children from living 

together. Plaintiff remains free to live with her parents anywhere in the world where they are 

 

2 The Court‟s references to page numbers are the ECF page numbers that are stamped at the top of the page.

Case 1:15-cv-00979-SAB Document 29 Filed 06/29/16 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

permitted to reside.

At the hearing on June 22, 2016, and in her June 27, 2016 supplemental brief, Plaintiff 

argued that because the Citizen and Immigration Service (CIS) allows a quicker turn-around of 

visa applications for spouses and parents of United States‟ citizens than for other relatives, an 

adult child‟s right to live with her alien parents in the United States should be the equivalent of 

spouses. In order for an alien to obtain an immigrant visa to enter and permanently reside in the 

United States, “the alien must fall within one of a limited number of immigration categories.” 

Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S.Ct. 2191, 2197 (2014) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a)-(b)). 

The parents, spouses, and unmarried children under the age of 21 of United States‟ citizens fall 

within the “immediate relatives” category. See Scialabba, 134 S.Ct. at 2197 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 

1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1101(b)(1)). The five less-favored categories are called “preference” 

categories for “family-sponsored immigrants” and are “distant or independent relatives of 

[United States‟] citizens, and certain close relatives of [legal permanent residents]. Scialabba, 

134 S.Ct. at 2197 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a)(1), 1153(a)(1)-(4)). However, the fact that the 

Executive Branch includes parents and spouses of United States‟ citizens in the “immediate 

relatives” category for purposes of visa applications does not mean that an adult child has a 

liberty interest in their parents living in the United States. 

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not have a liberty interest as an adult child 

to live in the United States with her parents. As the denials of Mr. and Mrs. Santos‟s visa 

applications do not implicate Plaintiff‟s liberty interest in family life, there is no process due to 

her under the United States Constitution. The Court does not need to conduct any further review 

of the reasons for the consular official‟s denials of Mr. and Mrs. Santos‟s visa applications.

Even if the Court was to find that Plaintiff stated a liberty interest in living in the United 

States as an adult child with her parents, Plaintiff has failed to allege that the reasons offered by 

the consular official for denying her parents‟ visa applications were not “facially legitimate and 

bona fide.” Bustamante, 531 F.3d at 1062; Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2140 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 

The Ninth Circuit in Cardenas found that based on the Din concurrence there are two 

components to the “facially legitimate and bona fide” test:

Case 1:15-cv-00979-SAB Document 29 Filed 06/29/16 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

First, the consular officer must deny the visa under a valid statute of 

inadmissibility. [Din, 135 S.Ct. at 2140-41] (consular officer's citation to § 

1182(a)(3)(B) “suffices to show that the denial rested on a determination that 

Din's husband did not satisfy the statute's requirements,” and “the Government's 

decision to exclude an alien it determines does not satisfy one or more of [the 

statutory conditions for entry] is facially legitimate under Mandel”). Second, the 

consular officer must cite an admissibility statute that “specifies discrete factual 

predicates the consular officer must find to exist before denying a visa,” or there 

must be a fact in the record that “provides at least a facial connection to” the 

statutory ground of inadmissibility. Id. at 2141. Once the government has made 

that showing, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the reason was not bona 

fide by making an “affirmative showing of bad faith on the part of the consular 

officer who denied [ ] a visa.” Id.

See Cardenas, 2016 WL 3408047, at *6.

Here, the consular officer who denied Mr. and Mrs. Santos‟s visa applications determined 

that they were ineligible for visas under § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality 

Act because they lived unlawfully in the United States for a period exceeding 1 year. The 

consular officer also denied Mr. Santos‟s visa application under § 212(a)(6)(E), because as an 

alien, Mr. Santos knowingly encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided an alien to enter or 

to try to enter the United States in violation of law. 

Plaintiff concedes that “the consular officer in this case provided a facially legitimate 

reason for denying visas to Plaintiff‟s parents, [so] the “facially legitimate” prong of the 

Bustamante test is satisfied.” (ECF No. 24 at 13.) The consular officer cited a valid

admissibility statute that “specifies discrete factual predicates the consular officer must find to 

exist before denying a visa.” Cardenas, 2016 WL 3408047, at *6 (quoting Din, 135 S.Ct. at 

2141). The burden then shifts to Plaintiff to make an “affirmative showing of bad faith on the 

part of the consular officer who denied [ ] a visa.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that the consular officer acted in bad faith in denying visas to Mr. and 

Mrs. Santos because the record showed that Mr. and Mrs. Santos were not inadmissible under 

INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). Plaintiff argues that Mr. and Mrs. Santos qualified for the bona fide 

asylum exception to inadmissibility under INA § 212(a)(9)(B), and they applied and received 

employment authorization in the United States prior to April 1, 1997, and continued to receive 

employment authorization until they left the United States on September 29, 2013. Plaintiff also 

argues that the consular officer acted in bad faith because the consular officer only found that 

Case 1:15-cv-00979-SAB Document 29 Filed 06/29/16 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Mr. Santos was inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(6)(E) for allegedly assisting Mrs. Santos to 

enter the United States illegally after the complaint was filed in this Court. 

However, the Court notes that Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to establish that the 

consular officer who denied Mr. and Mrs. Santos‟s applications did so in bad faith. See

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. As Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged with sufficient particularity an 

affirmative showing of bad faith on the part of the consular officer who denied Mr. and Mrs. 

Santos‟s visa applications, the Court may not second-guess the consular officer‟s decision by 

analyzing the reasons for the denials of Mr. and Mrs. Santos‟s visa applications. See Din, 135 S. 

Ct. at 2141 (explaining that courts may not look for additional factual details behind a decision to 

deny a visa application “beyond what its express reliance on [the statute] encompassed.”). 

Generally, leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires. Eminence 

Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003). “This policy is „to be 

applied with extreme liberality.‟” Id. (quoting Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 

F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001)). Leave to amend should be freely given in the absence of any 

apparent or declared reason, such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the 

movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue 

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, 

etc. Id. at 1051-52. Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of the other factors, there exists a 

presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend. Id. at 1052. “Dismissal with 

prejudice and without leave to amend is not appropriate unless it is clear on de novo review that 

the complaint could not be saved by amendment.” Id. at 1052 (citing Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 

1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996)).

The Court finds that leave to amend would be futile, because Plaintiff cannot allege facts 

in an amended complaint to establish that the denials of Plaintiff‟s parents‟ visa applications 

implicate the constitutional rights of Plaintiff. Accordingly, Defendants‟ motion to dismiss is 

granted, and Plaintiff‟s complaint is dismissed without leave to amend.

\ \ \

\ \ \

Case 1:15-cv-00979-SAB Document 29 Filed 06/29/16 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

IV.

ORDER

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants‟ motion to dismiss is GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff‟s claims are DISMISSED without leave to amend; and

3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 29, 2016 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-00979-SAB Document 29 Filed 06/29/16 Page 9 of 9