Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00005/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00005-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Amie Henderson
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMIE HENDERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-0005 CKD

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying applications for Disability Income Benefits (“DIB”) and

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act 

(“Act”), respectively. For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment and grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, born January 30, 1983, applied in April, 2011 for DIB and SSI, alleging 

disability beginning December 24, 2010. Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 171-181. Plaintiff 

alleged she was unable to work due to anxiety and depression. AT 212. In a decision dated July

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10, 2013, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled.1 AT 9-22. The ALJ made the 

following findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. omitted):

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through June 30, 2012. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since December 24, 2010, the alleged onset date. 

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: depression, 

bipolar disorder, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and 

personality disorder.

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed 

impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

 

1 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to 

disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in 

part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

137, 140-142, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5, 107 S. Ct. at 2294 n.5. The Commissioner bears the 

burden if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to 

perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the 

following nonexertional limitations: the claimant [can] perform 

si8mple [sic] unskilled work with limited public and fellow 

employee contact.

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work.

7. The claimant was born on January 30, 1983 and was 27 years 

old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the 

alleged disability onset date.

8. The claimant has at least a high-school education and is able to 

communicate in English.

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination 

of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a 

framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” 

whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills.

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, 

and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can 

perform.

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from December 24, 2010, through the date of 

this decision.

AT 11-22. 

ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of a consultative examining 

psychologist and improperly assessed plaintiff’s residual functional capacity.

LEGAL STANDARDS

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

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ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

“The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 

Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 

conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 

affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 

also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 

administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 

or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 

1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in 

weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

ANALYSIS

A. Medical Opinions

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of consultative examining 

psychologist Sid Cormier, Ph.D. The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on 

whether they are proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Lester v. 

Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a 

treating professional, who has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an 

individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). 

To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to 

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record, 

and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 

F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be 

rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 

830. While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is 

contradicted by a supported examining professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different 

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independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala , 53 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). In 

any event, the ALJ need not give weight to conclusory opinions supported by minimal clinical 

findings. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999) (treating physician’s conclusory, 

minimally supported opinion rejected); see also Magallanes , 881 F.2d at 751. The opinion of a 

non-examining professional, without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a 

treating or examining professional. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831.

Dr. Cormier performed a comprehensive mental evaluation on August 12, 2011. AT 344-

349. Dr. Cormier assessed plaintiff with moderate impairments in the ability to perform complex 

and detailed work as well as simple and repetitive work, maintain regular attendance, and 

complete a normal workweek without interruptions from her anxiety and depression. AT 348. 

Plaintiff was also found to have moderate to serious limitation in dealing with stresses 

encountered in a competitive work situation and a mild to moderate impairment in the ability to 

interact with coworkers and the general public. No impairment was found with respect to 

sustained concentration, persistence, or pace, and there was no evidence of decomposition in a 

work or work-like setting. Dr. Cormier also opined that plaintiff’s impairments would improve 

significantly if she fully participated in therapeutic services on a regular basis. Id. 

The ALJ accorded little weight to Dr. Cormier’s opinion that plaintiff had moderate 

limitations in the ability to perform simple and repetitive work on the basis that this opinion was 

inconsistent with the opinions of the state agency reviewing physicians and plaintiff’s treating 

physician, based on plaintiff’s subjective complaints. AT 16. In finding that the functional areas 

assessed by Dr. Cormier as moderately impaired were not sufficiently severe non-exertional 

limitations requiring vocational expert testimony, the ALJ also considered that the agency 

definition of moderate means that the plaintiff can still function satisfactorily in that area. AT 17. 

Good weight was accorded to Dr. Cormier’s assessment of mild impairments in her ability to 

interact with coworkers and the general public as consistent with Dr. Cormier’s objective findings 

and consistent with the other record medical opinions.

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As discussed by the ALJ, all of the other record medical opinions assessed plaintiff with 

only mild to moderate limitations. Plaintiff’s treating psychologist, Dr. Kuiper, who began 

treating plaintiff in February 2012, opined on April 12, 2012 that plaintiff had a good ability in all 

functional areas with an unlimited ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple 

instructions. AT 401-403, 461-463. The ALJ accorded Dr. Kuiper’s opinion great weight. AT 

15. State agency psychologist Dr. Schwartz similarly opined in September, 2011 that plaintiff 

was not significantly limited in most functional areas, was only moderately limited in the ability 

to understand and remember and carry out detailed instructions and maintain attention and 

concentration for extended periods, and could remember and carry out simple instructions. AT 

69-70. In May, 2012 state agency psychologist Dr. Meneese assessed plaintiff with moderate 

limitations in some functional areas, not significantly limited in all other areas and concluded that 

plaintiff had no mental limitations precluding performance of simple repetitive routine tasks. AT 

79-88. Substantial weight was accorded the opinions of the state agency psychologists. AT 16. 

In determining the weight to be accorded the various record medical opinions, the ALJ 

discussed in detail plaintiff’s medical records which indicated only minimal and sporadic mental 

health treatment, effectiveness of medication and lack of psychiatric treatment and therapies. AT 

15-20. In light of the unremarkable findings in Dr. Cormier’s consultative examination and the

entire medical record, the court finds no error in the ALJ’s consideration of the record medical 

opinions. 

B. Residual Functional Capacity

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ improperly assessed her residual functional capacity. 

Social Security Ruling 96-8p sets forth the policy interpretation of the Commissioner for 

assessing residual functional capacity. SSR 96-8p. Residual functional capacity is what a person 

“can still do despite [the individual’s] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a) (2003); 

see also Valencia v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (residual functional capacity 

reflects current “physical and mental capabilities”). RFC is assessed based on the relevant 

evidence in the case record, including the medical history, medical source statements, and 

subjective descriptions and observations made by the claimant, family, neighbors, friends, or 

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other persons. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 404.1545(a)(3). When assessing RFC, the ALJ must 

consider the claimant’s “ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements of 

work[.]” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(4). 

The ALJ assessed plaintiff with the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of 

work at all exertional levels, limited to simple unskilled work with limited public and fellow 

employee contact. Plaintiff contends this RFC does not capture all of plaintiff’s mental 

limitations. As discussed above, both state agency physicians found that plaintiff could 

remember and carry out simple instructions. Moreover, as noted by the ALJ, the moderate 

limitations assessed by the state agency physicians indicate that plaintiff is still able to function 

satisfactorily in those areas assessed as moderate. See HALLEX (Hearings Appeals and 

Litigation Law Manual) I-2-5-20 (referencing Form HA-1152, “Medical Source Statement of 

Ability to do Work-related Activities (Mental)”); see also Serna v. Astrue, 2008 WL 5179033 

(C.D. Cal. 2008) (“[M]oderate rating is defined as ‘there is moderate limitation in this area but the 

individual is still able to function satisfactorily.’”). The ALJ’s assessment of plaintiff’s RFC is 

also consistent with the other medical record opinions and plaintiff’s treatment record. For these

reasons, the court finds that plaintiff’s assessed RFC was adequately explained and grounded in 

substantial evidence. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 13) is denied;

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14) is granted; 

and 

3. Judgment is entered for the Commissioner.

Dated: January 7, 2016

4 henderson0005.ss

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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