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Parties Involved:
Thomas Michael Sorensen
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

SEP 21 1990 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk . 

Nos. 89-2253 and 89-2255 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

THOMAS MICHAEL SORENSEN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. Nos. CR 89-178 JB 01 

and CR 89-179 JB 02) 

Submitted on the briefs: * 

William L. Lutz, United States Attorney, and James D. Tierney, 

Assistant U.S. Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for PlaintiffAppellee, 

Tova Indritz, Federal Public Defender, and Peter Schoenburg and 

Stephen P. Mccue, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before MOORE, ANDERSON, and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, 

McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, 

* The parties to this appeal have indicated that oral argument 

is not desired. After examining the briefs and the appellate 

record, this three-judge panel has also determined unanimously 

that oral argument would not materially assist the determination 

of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R, 34.1.9. 

The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 89-2255 Document: 01019847414 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 1 
Thomas Sorensen was charged in two separate indictments· with 

various drug related crimes. Pursuant to a plea agreement, 

Sorensen pled guilty to one count in the first indictment charging 

him with carrying and using a firearm during and in relation to a 

drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l). As 

a part of the plea agreement, Sorensen also pled guilty to one 

count in a second indictment charging him with willfully maintaining a place for the purpose of distributing and using cocaine, in 

violation of 21 u.s.c. § 856(a) and 18 u.s.c. § 2. In return, the 

other charges in the two indictments were dismissed. 

In a Memorandum of Understanding entered into in connection 

with So+ensen's plea of guilty to the charge of carrying and using 

a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, the government 

made no agreement as to sentencing, reserving the right to make 

known to the probation service, for inclusion in the presentence 

report, "any information which the government believes may be 

helpful to the Court." 

In a Memorandum of Understanding entered into in connection 

with Sorensen's plea of guilty to the charge in the second indictment of maintaining a place for the distribution and use of 

cocaine, the government agreed to certain nonbinding recommendations to the court concerning Sorensen's sentence. Specifically, 

the government agreed that Sorensen had clearly demonstrated a 

recognition and acceptance of personal responsibility for his 

conduct, that he was a "minor participant" in the criminal activity alleged in the indictment, and that the court should not 

depart "upward" in determining Sorensen's base offense level. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2255 Document: 01019847414 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 2 
We note at this point that neither Memorandum of Understanding contained a provision that the government would file with the 

district court a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). 1 

18 u.s.c. § 924(c)(l) provides, in part, that a person who 

uses a firearm in relation to any drug trafficking CFime shall, in 

addition to any other sentence, be sentenced to imprisonment for 

five years. The government did not file any motion under 18 

u.s.c. § 3553(e), and, accordingly, Sorensen was sentenced to five 

years imprisonment on his plea of guilty to carrying and using a 

firearm in relation to a drug trafficking charge. He was also 

sentenced to six months imprisonment on his plea of guilty to the 

count in the second indictment charging him with maintaining a 

place for the distribution and use of cocaine. The two sentences 

were to be served consecutively. 

Prior to sentencing, however, Sorensen filed with the 

district court a Motion for Court Ordered Departure Pursuant to 18 

u.s.c. § 3553(e), asking the district court to enter an order 

requiring the government to file a written motion, pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(e), moving the court to depart below the sentence of 

five years required by 18 U,S,C. § 924(c)(l) because of Sorensen's 

1 18 u.s.c. § 3553(e) reads as follows: 

(e) Limited authority to impose a sentence below a 

statutory minimum.--Upon motion of the Government, the 

court shall have the authority to impose a sentence 

below a level established by statute as minimum sentence 

so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in 

the investigation or prosecution of another person who 

has committed an offense, Such sentence shall be 

imposed in accordance with the guidelines and policy 

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant 

to section 994 of title 28, United States Code. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2255 Document: 01019847414 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 3 
"substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of 

another person who has committed an offense." 

In opposition to Sorensen's motion, the government filed a 

motion which stated the reasons why the government declined to 

file such motion. Specifically, the government stated that 

Sorensen was nothing more than a "cooperative arrestee," that his 

cooperation did not lead to the arrest of another, and that 

Sorensen received "other benefits" as a result of the plea agreement. 

As indicated, the district court, in effect, denied 

Sorensen's motion that the government be required to file a motion 

under 18 u.s.ci § 3553(e) and sentenced Sorensen to five years 

imprisonment on his plea of guilty to carrying and using a firearm 

in relation to a drug trafficking crime, such sentence to be in 

addition to the six months sentence imposed on Sorensen's plea of 

guilty to maintaining a place for the distribution and use of 

cocaine. Sorensen appeals the sentences thus imposed. We affirm. 

On appeal, Sorensen raises four issues: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 

3553(e) allows for judicial review of the government's decision 

not to file a motion for the imposition of a sentence below a 

statutory minimum sentence; (2) 18 u.s.c. § 3553(e) violates 

substantive due process in that it allows a court to sentence 

below the statutory minimum sentence only upon the filing of a 

motion by the government; (3) 18 u.s.c. § 3553(e) violates 

procedural due process if there is no judicial review of the 

government's decision not to file a motion; and (4) the 

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Appellate Case: 89-2255 Document: 01019847414 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 4 
government's decision in the instant case not to file a motion 

under 18 u.s.c. § 3553(e) was arbitrary, unfair and in bad faith. 

The parties agree that ours is a de novo review. At the 

outset we note that in the Memorandum of Understanding the government did not agree that it would file a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 

3553(e), nor did it even agree to "consider" the filing of such 

motion if Sorensen gave assistance to the government. This, then, 

is not an instance where the government has allegedly reneged on a 

promise made by it to a defendant and embodied in the plea 

bargain. 

Further, we also note that apparently the "substantial assistance" which Sorensen claims he gave to the government occurred 

prior to the Memorandum of Understanding. In this regard, we 

learn from the record that the Albuquerque police had made an 

undercover purchase of drugs at the home of one Leonard Bromberg, 

and as a result of that sale the police had obtained a search warrant 

home. 

for Bromberg's home 

During the afternoon 

and 

of 

had placed a surveillance on the 

April 5, 1989, Sorensen was 

observed driving to Bromberg's residence, entering the house, and 

exiting soon thereafter. Shortly after he drove away from 

Bromberg's home, Sorensen was stopped by the police, A consent 

search of his car and his brief case disclosed 61.14 grams of 

cocaine, 16 bags with cocaine residue, and a pistol. 

Sorensen was cooperative with the arresting officers and said 

that indeed Bromberg had just "fronted him" with two ounces of 

cocaine. At that time, Sorensen indicated he would assist the 

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Appellate Case: 89-2255 Document: 01019847414 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 5 
police in making their arrest of Bromberg, the police being fearful that Bromberg was armed. Sorensen advised the police that 

Bromberg was, in fact, armed. Further, at the suggestion of the 

police, Sorensen made two phone calls to Bromberg in an effort to 

lure Bromberg out of his residence. Bromberg, however, insisted 

he was too sick to leave. When these efforts failed, a SWAT team 

was called to the scene. Sorensen advised the SWAT team of the 

location of Bromberg's firearm and the security devices in the 

house. At about 9:00 p.m. on April 5, 1989, the officers made a 

forced entrance into Bromberg's home and arrested him without 

incident. So far as we can tell from the record, such was the 

extent of any "assistance" given by Sorensen. 

Much of Sorensen's argument has been rejected in a very 

recent decision by this court in United States v. Kuntz, 908 F.2d 

655 (10th Cir. 1990). In Kuntz, we were concerned with section 

5Kl.1 of the federal sentencing guidelines, which implements 18 

u.s.c. § 3553(e) and reads as follows: 

"Upon motion of the government stating that the 

defendant has provided substantial assistance in the 

investigation or prosecution of another person who has 

committed an offense, the court may depart from the 

guidelines." 

In Kuntz, under a Memorandum of Understanding, the defendant 

agreed to plead guilty, and the government agreed, inter alia, 

"that if the defendant assists the United States that such assistance will be evaluated to· determine whether a motion for 

departure downward is appropriate pursuant to 5Kl.1 of the 

Sentencing Guidelines." 908 F.2d at 656. The government did not 

file any motion, and at sentencing defense counsel argued that the 

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Appellate Case: 89-2255 Document: 01019847414 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 6 
defendant had in fact cooperated with the government and· that 

there should be a downward departure from the guidelines. That 

argument was rejected by the district court. 

On appeal, Kuntz argued that, for various reasons, section 

5Kl.1 violates the due process clause, In rejecting that argument, and affirming the district court, we spoke as follows: 

By their express terms, these provisions [18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(e) and section 5Kl.l] condition the district 

court's consideration of defendant's substantial assistance claim upon a prior motion of the government. 

Defendant's argument is that the government motion 

provision of section 5Kl.l violates due process because 

the "decision by the Government [whether to file a motion] is not monitored or capable of being monitored by 

the trial court on hearing or the Appellate Court on 

review." Brief for Appellant at 14-15. 

Defendant's argument appears to be based on the 

premise that sentencing is an inherently discretionary 

judicial function. We rejected that premise in United 

States v. Thomas, 884 F.2d 540, 543 (10th Cir. 1989). 

Moreover, "Congress' power to control judicial sentencing discretion includes the power to specify the factors 

that a court may consider in setting a sentence." La 

Guardia, 902 F.2d at 1015. Thus, Congress could have 

completely precluded the courts from considering 

defendant's assistance to the prosecution in setting the 

sentence. As the Eleventh Circuit held with respect to 

the government motion provision in section 3553(e), 

which this guideline implements, "[a]ppellant[] 

certainly ha[s] no constitutional right to the availability of the 'substantial assistance' provision, and 

hence no grounds upon which to challenge Congress' manner of enacting it." United States v. Musser, 856 F.2d 

1484, 1487 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 

1145 ( 1989). 

We reject the argument that due process requires 

judicial review of a prosecutor's decision not to file a 

section 5Kl.l motion. Cf. United States v. Huerta, 878 

F.2d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 845 

(1990) (rejecting same argument with respect to section 

3553(e) motions). We do not preclude the possibility 

that "[p]erhaps in an egregious case--a case where the 

prosecution stubbornly refuses to file a motion despite 

overwhelming evidence that the accused's assistance has 

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been so substantial as to cry out for meaningful relief-· 

-the court would be justified in taking some corrective 

action." La Guardia, 902 F.2d at 1017. We do not have 

such a situation before us. Further, such a case should 

be rare because "(t]here are significant institutional 

incentives for the prosecution to exercise sound judgment and to act in good faith in deciding whether to 

make a § 3553(e) [and§ 5Kl.l] motion. The government 

has an interest in encouraging defendants to cooperate 

with law enforcement efforts. The reasonable use of 

substantial assistance motions for those who cooperate 

will make others more likely to do so in the future. In 

addition, because promises to make such motions are 

analogous to plea agreements, a defendant would likely 

not be without recourse in the case of a breach by the 

government." Huerta, 878 F.2d at 93. 

Kuntz, 908 F.2d at 657. 

Suffice it to say, the present case is not the "egregious 

case" referred to in Kuntz. 2 

Further, the fact that the government, pursuant to a plea 

bargain, did file a motion in the case against Leonard Bromberg 

did not require the government to file a 18 u.s.c. § 3553(e) motion in Sorensen's case. In this general regard, the district 

judge, in imposing the six months imprisonment on Sorensen's plea 

of guilty to the court charging him with maintaining a place for 

the distribution and use of cocaine, noted that under 18 U.S.C. § 

3553(a)(6) he was directed "to avoid unwarranted sentence 

disparities among defendants with similar records who have been 

found guilty of similar conduct" and accordingly tried to bring 

into line the total sentences he imposed on Sorensen and Bromberg. 

Judgment affirmed. 

2 As indicated in Kuntz, the Second Circuit in United States v. 

Huerta, 878 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1989) and the Eleventh Circuit in 

United States v. Musser, 856 F.2d 1484 (11th Cir. 1988), have held 

that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) does not violate the constitution. 

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