Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05239/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05239-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Appellant
St. Francis Xavier Church
Appellee
St. Francis Xavier Parochial School
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 25, 1997 Decided July 18, 1997 

No. 96-5239

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

APPELLANT

v.

ST. FRANCIS XAVIER PAROCHIAL SCHOOL AND 

ST. FRANCIS XAVIER CHURCH,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 94cv00314)

Barbara L. Sloan, Attorney, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, argued the cause for the appellant. J. Ray 

Terry, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, was on brief.

Anthony P. Interdonato argued the cause for the appellees. 

James T. Reilly was on brief.

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Before: SENTELLE and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges, and 

BUCKLEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

Separate concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge

SENTELLE.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: In a complaint 

naming two defendantsSt. Francis Xavier Parochial School 

(School) and St. Francis Xavier Church (Church)the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) initiated an 

action alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities 

Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (ADA). The district court 

dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

because the School (where the alleged discriminatory acts 

took place) did not have enough employees to be covered 

under the ADA. In so holding, the district court rejected the 

EEOC's argument that the employees of the School and the 

Church, along with the employees of the non-party St. Francis Xavier Day Care Center (Day Care Center), should be 

aggregated in determining coverage under the ADA. Because coverage under the ADA forms an element of the 

plaintiff's cause of action rather than a prerequisite to the 

district court's jurisdiction, the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Although we would be 

free to affirm the district court (assuming we agreed there 

were insufficient employees for ADA coverage), on the different legal ground of failure to state a claim, we decline to do 

so. At this stage of the litigation it is not possible to 

determine if the employees of the School, the Church and the 

Day Care Center should be considered together or, as the 

district court concluded, separately. Accordingly, dismissal 

was premature and we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

In August 1992 the School placed an advertisement in the 

Washington Post for the position of part-time music teacher. 

Roberta Stein, who suffers from multiple sclerosis and is 

confined to a wheelchair, telephoned the School to inquire 

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about the position. The content of the ensuing conversation 

is in dispute. Stein claims that Mildred Sherill, the School 

principal's secretary, first scheduled an interview with Stein 

but then canceled it after Stein inquired whether the building 

was wheelchair accessible. The School and the Church claim 

that the position had already been filled at the time Stein 

called and that, although Stein was told the building was not 

wheelchair accessible, this fact had nothing to do with her not 

being interviewed.

In February 1994 the EEOC filed an action claiming that 

the School and the Church had violated the ADA by failing 

to reasonably accommodate Stein in failing to provide a 

wheelchair-accessible interview site, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12112(b)(5)(A), and by discriminatorily refusing to hire 

Stein on the basis of her disability, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In 

their Answer and Pre-Trial Statement, the School and the 

Church claimed they did not have the requisite 25 employees 

to be considered an "employer" under the ADA.1 Before trial 

the district court directed the parties to submit briefs on 

ADA coverage. In its briefs to the district court, the EEOC 

contended that the employees of the School should be aggre-

__________

1

In relevant part, an "employer" under the ADA is "a person 

engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more 

employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar 

weeks in the current or preceding year." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). 

Because the alleged discriminatory acts took place within two years 

of the effective date of the ADA, the threshold number of employees in this case is 25 rather than 15. Id. In addition to claiming 

they were not covered because of insufficient employees, the School 

and the Church also argued they were not an "industry affecting 

commerce." The district court rejected that argument with respect 

to the School and noted that the facts were inconclusive with 

respect to the Church. The School and the Church have not made 

the "affecting commerce" argument in their briefs to this court. 

The School and the Church also argued that they are not covered 

by the ADA because they fall under the ADA's express exemption 

for religious institutions. 42 U.S.C. § 12187. The district court did 

not address the religious institution exemption because it dismissed 

the case on independent grounds. JA 22.

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gated with the employees of the Church and the employees of 

the non-party Day Care Center. The district court treated 

the briefs of the School and the Church as a motion to dismiss 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Concluding that the employees 

should not be aggregated and that, even if they were, the 25 

employee threshold would still not be met, the district court 

vacated the previously established trial dates and dismissed 

the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

On appeal the EEOC argues that the district court erred in 

failing to aggregate the employees of the School, the Church 

and the Day Care Center. If the employees are aggregated, 

then, according to the EEOC, the 25 employee threshold will 

be met.

II.

The question whether the School and the Church have 

enough employees to be covered under the ADA does not 

affect the jurisdiction of the district court. Because the claim 

arises under the laws of the United States and is neither 

"immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining 

jurisdiction" nor "wholly insubstantial and frivolous," Bell v. 

Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946), the district court has 

federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) was therefore erroneous.

We acknowledge that at least three circuits have treated 

the question whether an employer has sufficient employees to 

be covered under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 

U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Title VII),2as jurisdictional. 

McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home, 834 F.2d 930, 

932-33 (11th Cir. 1987); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 

1335 (6th Cir. 1983); Dumas v. Town of Mount Vernon 

Alabama, 612 F.2d 974, 979-80 (5th Cir. 1980); see also 

__________

2 Reference to Title VII cases is proper here. Except for the 25 

employee threshold applicable for two years following enactment of 

the ADA, see supra note 1, the ADA and Title VII have identical 

coverage provisions on the required number of employees. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

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Rogers v. Sugar Tree Prod., Inc., 7 F.3d 577, 579 (7th Cir. 

1993) (treating required number of employees under Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, as 

jurisdictional). Nevertheless, none of the courts has explained why the question is jurisdictional. Nothing in Title 

VII (or the ADA) expressly limits the district court's subject 

matter jurisdiction. More important, circuit precedent points 

in the opposite direction. In Haddon v. Walters, 43 F.3d 

1488 (D.C. Cir. 1995), we addressed an analogous coverage 

issue under Title VII. In Haddon a chef employed at the 

White House brought a Title VII claim against the White 

House Chief Usher. Whether the plaintiff was a covered 

employee under Title VII turned on whether the White 

House qualified as an "executive agenc[y] as defined in section 105 of Title 5." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). The district 

court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the White House did not qualify as an 

executive agency within the meaning of section 2000e-16. 

We agreed that the White House did not qualify but rejected 

the district court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction. In 

so concluding, we relied on the Supreme Court's statement in 

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. at 682:

Jurisdiction ... is not defeated ... by the possibility 

that the averments might fail to state a cause of action 

on which petitioners could actually recover.... Whether the complaint states a cause of action on which relief 

could be granted is a question of law and just as issues of 

fact it must be decided after and not before the court has 

assumed jurisdiction over the controversy. If the court 

does later exercise its jurisdiction to determine that the 

allegations in the complaint do not state a ground for 

relief, then dismissal of the case would be on the merits, 

not for want of jurisdiction.

This statement is equally applicable here. If the School and 

the Church are not covered under the ADA, this fact does not 

preclude the district court from asserting jurisdictionalthough of course it would be fatal to the EEOC's claim on the 

merits. Cf. Kleiman v. Department of Energy, 956 F.2d 335, 

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339 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (district court has jurisdiction over claim 

beyond scope of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, but must 

dismiss for failure to state claim); 2 Moore's Federal Practice

§ 12.30[1] (3d ed. 1997) ("Subject matter jurisdiction in federal-question cases is sometimes erroneously conflated with a 

plaintiff's need and ability to prove the defendant bound by 

the federal law asserted as the predicate for reliefa meritsrelated determination.").

Although the district court erroneously dismissed the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), we could nonetheless affirm 

the dismissal if dismissal were otherwise proper based on 

failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). See Haddon, 43 F.3d at 1491. To prevail on a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 

12(b)(6), the School and the Church must show "beyond doubt 

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 

claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, we may consider only the facts 

alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or 

incorporated in the complaint and matters of which we may 

take judicial notice.3See Lovelace v. Software Spectrum, 

Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (5th Cir. 1996). Moreover, we 

__________

3 The district court considered the parties' pretrial statements as 

well as four memoranda prepared by the parties. We too would 

consider these materials were we presented with a true Rule 

12(b)(1) jurisdictional issue. See Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 

227, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (materials aliunde pleadings can be 

considered on Rule 12(b)(1) motion), vacated on other grounds, 482 

U.S. 64 (1987). Because the ADA coverage issue is not jurisdictional, however, we are limited to considering the pleadings and the 

attachments thereto. Although we would be permitted to go beyond the pleadings were we to consider the issue before us as a 

motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, we decline to do so. The defendants here did not move for 

dismissal; rather the district court directed the parties to brief the 

coverage issue and, treating the defendants' briefs as a Rule 

12(b)(1) motion, dismissed the case sua sponte. Thus we do not 

have before us material that the parties would have properly 

submitted on summary judgment.

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must accept the EEOC's factual allegations as true, see 

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994), and draw all 

inferences in the EEOC's favor. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 

U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

Applying these principles to this case, we believe that the 

EEOC has adequately stated a claim with respect to the 

number of employees required for ADA coverage. In its 

Complaint, the EEOC alleged, "At all relevant times ... St. 

Francis Xavier Parochial School and St. Francis Xavier 

Church ... have continuously been doing business in the 

District of Columbia, and have continuously had at least 25 

employees." JA 25. The School and the Church entered 

general denials, JA 32, but because we must accept the 

EEOC's allegations as true at this stage in the proceedings, 

dismissal for failure to state a claim is improper.

The district court concluded that the employees of the 

School and the Church (and the Day Care Center) could not 

be aggregated under a test utilized by the National Labor 

Relations Board to determine whether multiple entities 

should be considered as a single employer in labor disputes. 

JA 10-17 (applying test from Radio & Television Broad. 

Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broadcast Serv. of Mobile, 

Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965)). Based on the pleadings, 

however, we have nothing upon which to evaluate the four 

factors of the Radio Technicians test: (1) interrelation of 

operations, (2) common management, (3) centralized control 

of labor relations and (4) common ownership or financial 

control. Accordingly, we have no basis upon which to affirm 

the district court. From the pleadings we cannot even determine whether the School, the Church and the Day Care 

Center are distinct legal entities capable of being sued in 

their own names.

Nor do the parties' other submissions provide persuasive 

evidence on the issue. In its brief to this court the EEOC 

states "there is no evidence that the school exists as a legal 

entity separate from the church." Appellant's Opening Br. at 

16 n.7. Yet the EEOC took the inconsistent action of naming 

the School as a separate defendant in its Complaint. Even 

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going beyond the pleadings, then, we cannot answer a question of utmost importancewhether the School (and the Day 

Care Center) are distinct legal entities or whether they are 

merely parts of one legal entitythe Church. If the defendants comprise only one legal entity there may well be no 

need to apply Radio Technicians at all. Because the Supreme Court described the Radio Technicians test in terms 

of nominally rather than legally distinct entities, 380 U.S. at 

256, we think the door is at least open to apply the test to 

entities that have different names (a condition satisfied 

here)even if they are not legally distinct (a condition that 

may or may not be satisfied here).4 We note, however, that 

we have applied the test only where there were separate legal

entities. See Geiger Ready-Mix Co. of Kansas City v. 

NLRB, 87 F.3d 1363, 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying test to 

four concrete plants, each owned by separate company); 

Local 627, International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. 

NLRB, 595 F.2d 844, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (applying test to 

two subsidiary corporations); United Tel. Workers v. NLRB,

571 F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir.) (applying test to parent corporation and four subsidiaries), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 827 (1978); 

Local No. 627, International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. 

NLRB, 518 F.2d 1040, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (applying test to 

two subsidiary corporations), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on 

other grounds sub nom. South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local 

No. 627, International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 425 U.S. 

800 (1976).5 Further development of the record is therefore 

__________

4 Leaving the door open allows the possibility that a single legal 

entity could, under Radio Technicians, encompass divisions that are 

sufficiently independent of one another to warrant being treated as 

distinct employers within the meaning of the employment discrimination statutes. Such cases are perhaps rare but we see no reason 

to think they are non-existent.

5 The cases in which we have applied the Radio Technicians test 

have all involved business corporations. We have found no cases in 

this circuit or elsewhere applying the test to a religious corporation. 

Because a religious corporation can possess unique attributes, see 

generally Paul G. Kauper and Stephen C. Ellis, Religious Corporations and the Law, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1499 (1973), it may be the case 

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required on remand before the Radio Technicians test can be 

properly applied, if it needs to be applied at all.

* * *

The EEOC's claim arises under the laws of the United 

States and properly states a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. We therefore reverse the district court's dismissal 

under Rule 12(b)(1). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) would be 

improper on this record. On remand the district court must 

determine whether the alleged discriminatory action was 

taken by an "employer" within the meaning of the ADA. 

Whether the determination can be made at the summary 

judgment stage or only after a trial on the merits is unknown 

at this stage. In any event the record must be further 

developed, particularly on the question whether the Church, 

the Day Care Center and the School are distinct legal entities, before the court can decide the aggregation question.6

So ordered.

__________

that even where there are multiple religious entities, aggregation 

(or non-aggregation) of employees in employment discrimination 

cases should not be resolved under Radio Technicians. Although 

we express no opinion on the question, we note that the question to 

be answered by the district court on remand may be sui generis.

6

If the district court concludes that aggregation is proper, the 

number of employees should be counted by the method recently 

adopted by the Supreme Court in Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. 

Enter. Inc., 117 S. Ct. 660 (1997).

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SENTELLE, Circuit Judge, concurring: I concur in my colleagues' carefully reasoned opinion but write separately only 

to express my misgiving about a point of previously established circuit law; that is, that the question of the number of 

employees goes to sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 

12(b)(6) as opposed to jurisdiction, disposable under Rule 

12(b)(1). I agree with the majority that Haddon v. Walters,

43 F.3d 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1995), impels us to treat this as a Rule 

12(b)(6) question rather than a jurisdictional one. Although I 

served on the panel in Haddon, I have become increasingly 

convinced that Haddon was incorrectly decided. Again, as 

the majority notes, three other circuits have treated the 

employee numbering requirement drawn from the Title VII 

provision of 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. as jurisdictional. 

McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home, 834 F.2d 930, 

932-33 (11th Cir. 1987); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 

1335 (6th Cir. 1983); Dumas v. Town of Mount Vernon 

Alabama, 612 F.2d 974, 979-80 (5th Cir. 1980). While it is 

true, as the majority notes, that none of the courts discussed 

why the question is jurisdictional, I nonetheless believe they 

have it right. While it is also true, as the majority notes, that 

"nothing in Title VII (or the ADA) expressly limits the 

district court's subject matter jurisdiction," Maj. Op. at 5, to 

me it is more important that nothing in Title VII or the ADA 

extends the district court's jurisdiction to cases not involving 

the requisite number of employees. The federal courts being 

courts of limited jurisdiction, I believe that our sister circuits 

are correct in holding that cases without a sufficient number 

of employees fall outside.

Beyond that, given the present state of circuit law, I join 

the majority opinion. I do so with a reservation that some of 

the language may be confusing both as to precedent and for 

the district court on remand. The majority states that "If the 

defendants comprise only one legal entity there may well be 

no need to apply Radio Technicians at all." Maj. Op. at 8 

(emphasis added). Because I can conceive of no set of facts 

on which the defendants would not be a single employer if 

they are merely parts of one legal entity, I am not sure what 

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the majority means by that phraseology. If I were the 

district court, I might find myself confused as to the scope of 

my duties on remand. I hope that if the district court finds a 

single legal entity, its remand duty will be satisfied without 

application of a test that appears to me to be designed 

exclusively for employment cases involving multiple entities. 

Were I sitting as the trial judge, I would consider that my 

proper task on remand. I also wonder what effect the opentextured language will have on circuit precedent as to the 

circumstances in which Radio Technicians applies.

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