Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-03-02915/USCOURTS-ca7-03-02915-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gregory Davis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1 In the case of Hankton, cocaine base, commonly known as

“crack” cocaine.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

Nos. 03-2345 & 03-2915

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CLARENCE HANKTON and

GREGORY DAVIS,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 01 CR 1—Charles R. Norgle, Sr., Judge.

____________

SUBMITTED MAY 8, 2006—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 7, 2006

____________

Before COFFEY, MANION, AND WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

COFFEY, Circuit Judge. In November of 2002, Clarence

Hankton and Gregory Davis each pled guilty to possessing,

with the intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).1

 At sentencing the government introduced a plethora of evidence concerning the drug and

gang activities of both defendants, resulting in the district judge sentencing Hankton to a term of 300 months and

Davis to 210 months. Both men appealed, see United States

Case: 03-2915 Document: 75 Filed: 09/07/2006 Pages: 8
2 Nos. 03-2345 & 03-2915

2 All except for Hankton who did not respond.

v. Hankton, 432 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2005), and while we

affirmed each of their sentences, we remanded their cases

to the district court in accordance with United States v.

Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 481 (7th Cir. 2005). The district

judge in replying to the remand stated that he would have

given Hankton and Davis the same sentences he had

imposed previously in spite of the newly determined

advisory nature of the Guidelines. United States v. Hankton

and Davis, No. 01-CR-1 (April 21, 2006); see United States

v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, 757 (2005). We invited each of the

defendants respectively to file briefs concerning the reasonableness of the sentences, however, only Davis and the

government responded. After review of the their

arguments,2 we conclude that the sentences of each of the

defendants-appellants’ are reasonable. See United States v.

Newsome, 428 F.3d 685, 686 (7th Cir. 2005); Paladino, 401

F.3d 484.

Our review of a district judge’s sentencing determination is deferential, and we refuse to substitute our judgment

for that of the sentencing judge when dealing with the

question of what sentence should have been imposed upon

a defendant. See United States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 478,

481 (7th Cir. 2005). In addition, a sentence that is imposed

within a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. See United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d

606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005). An appellant may rebut the

presumption of reasonableness by demonstrating that his

sentence would be unreasonable when measured against

the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), such as the

“need for the sentence imposed—(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to

provide just punishment for the offense[s]; (B) to afford

adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the

Case: 03-2915 Document: 75 Filed: 09/07/2006 Pages: 8
Nos. 03-2345 & 03-2915 3

3 Specifically, the trial judge noted Hankton’s top position as

the “King of Kings” in “a violent Chicago street gang heavily

involved in the purchase and sale of cocaine.” This, the judge

reasoned, warranted a 300-month sentence in order to “reflect the

seriousness of Hankton’s crimes, promote respect for the law, and

protect the public from future crimes [by] Hankton.”

public from further crimes of the defendant[s]; and (D) to

provide the defendant[s] with needed educational or

vocational training, medical care, or other correctional

treatment in the most effective manner.” Id. (citing Booker,

543 U.S. at 766).

I. REASONABLENESS OF HANKTON’S SENTENCE

In our disposition of Hankton’s direct appeal, we concluded that the sentencing judge applied the proper Guideline range in calculating Hankton’s sentence, see Hankton,

432 F.3d at 790-97, and accordingly the sentence imposed

is considered presumptively reasonable. See Hankton, 432

F.3d at 789-97; Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d at 608. Hankton

declined our invitation to delineate why the sentence he

received was unreasonable when measured against the

§ 3553(a) factors. Indeed, the trial judge referred to a

number of the factors enumerated in § 3553(a) as integral

to his decision not to alter Hankton’s previously imposed

sentence,3 i.e., even after considering those factors, he

stated he would have given Hankton the same sentence had

he understood the Guidelines to be advisory.

Thus, since the sentencing judge has advised us that he

would have imposed the same sentence post-Booker, and

due to the fact that Hankton has failed to rebut the presumption that his sentence is reasonable, he has failed to

establish plain error. See id. (citing Johnson v. United

States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 137 L. Ed. 2d

718 (1997)).

Case: 03-2915 Document: 75 Filed: 09/07/2006 Pages: 8
4 Nos. 03-2345 & 03-2915

II. REASONABLENESS OF DAVIS’S SENTENCE

Unlike Hankton, Davis has responded to our invitation to

explain his argument as to why he contends his sentence is

unreasonable. In his brief, Davis presents a number of

claims, all of which are without merit.

Davis initially avers that the district court “misunderstood its authority under Booker.” He attempts to support

his bold and unsubstantiated assertion by citing the

sentencing judge’s statement that he failed to “overcome the

rebuttable presumption that his sentence is reasonable.”

However, this court specifically held in United States v.

Mykytiuk, that “any sentence that is properly calculated

under the Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.” 415 F.3d at 608. It is interesting to

note that the sentencing judge properly cited Mykytiuk in

reaching his conclusion that Davis had neither established

that his sentence had been improperly calculated nor that

the presumption of reasonableness had been overcome. It is

clear that the district court’s analysis was directly in line

with our holding in Mykytiuk. See id.

Davis attempts to bolster his argument, arguing that

Mykytiuk should not be considered binding on a sentencing

court, stating that, in Mykytiuk “this court only decided that

a Guidelines sentence is presumed to meet the appellate

standard for review for reasonableness.” However, the

presumption that a correctly calculated Guidelines sentence

is reasonable not only applies to the appellate standard of

reasonableness review, but also serves as a benchmark for

trial judges in evaluating whether or not a Guidelines

sentence is appropriate. It is only when the defendant

provides cogent reasons for a non-Guidelines sentence

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that a sentencing judge need

consider such a sentence. See Dean, 414 F.3d 729-30.

Next, Davis claims that the district court “refused to

consider [his] argument that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553[(a)]

factors support a sentence outside the career offender

Case: 03-2915 Document: 75 Filed: 09/07/2006 Pages: 8
Nos. 03-2345 & 03-2915 5

Guideline range.” We disagree. Even a cursory review of the

sentencing judge’s order on remand, and the findings

therein, reveals that the court thoroughly considered the

§ 3553(a) factors and, in fact, did more than was required

of him under the circumstances. See United States v.

Hankton, No. 01-CR-1, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2006);

United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 472-73 (7th Cir.

2005) (stating that: “Judges need not rehearse on the record

all of the considerations that 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) lists; it is

enough to calculate the range accurately and explain why

. . . the defendant deserves more or less.”). What’s more, to

the extent that Davis’s argument is nothing more than a

collateral attack on his sentence, it fails; for we previously

affirmed the validity of his sentence under the Guidelines

over a year ago. See Hankton, 432 F.3d at 789-96.

In an equally unpersuasive argument, Davis avers that

the district court “incorrectly found that it lacked the

authority to impose a non-Guidelines sentence on the basis

of the disparity between sentences for crack and powder

cocaine.” As an initial matter, we note that Davis intentionally misinterprets the district court’s order of remand when

he states that the court “found that it lacked authority to

impose a non-Guidelines sentence.” Instead of concluding

that it lacked authority to consider a non-Guidelines

sentence, the district court—relying on our decision in

United States v. Gipson, 425 F.3d 335, (7th Cir. 2005),

considered and rejected Davis’s arguments as “unavailing.”

In addition, to the extent that Davis argues either that the

sentencing judge erred in calculating his sentencing range

or should have given him a non-Guidelines sentence based

on the sentencing disparity between powder and crack

cocaine, this argument has been barred by this court’s

recent decision in United States v. Miller, 450 F.3d 270,

274-76 (7th Cir. 2006). In Miller we held that a district

judge is required to abide by the 100-to-1 crack cocaine to

cocaine powder ratio when applying the Sentencing GuideCase: 03-2915 Document: 75 Filed: 09/07/2006 Pages: 8
6 Nos. 03-2345 & 03-2915

4 In a tag-along argument, Davis claims that the district court

incorrectly “relied on plea agreements from some of Davis’ former

co-defendants to support its finding that Davis was responsible for

between 50 and 100 grams of crack cocaine and that he was the

manager or supervisor of a criminal activity.” In our decision in

Davis’s direct appeal we addressed precisely this argument and

held that the plea agreements, along with the plethora of other

evidence establishing guilt adduced at sentencing were enough to

support the sentence the court imposed on Davis. See Hankton,

435 F.3d 792-93. The district judge’s decision not to re-visit this

issue was proper and we decline Davis’s invitation to do so here.

5 As part of his argument, Davis advances the ridiculous notion

that the district judge, by applying the rebuttable presumption in Mykytiuk, considered the Guidelines to be mandatory.

(continued...)

lines to a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 275; (following United

States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v.

Eura, 440 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2006)). In other words, this

court made clear in Miller that a sentencing judge may not

recalculate a Guidelines sentence or impose a lesser, nonGuidelines sentence based on his opinion that the statutory

and/or Guidelines disparity between punishments for crack

cocaine and powder cocaine is unjust or unwarranted. See

id. at 276 (holding that: “A sentence within a properly

ascertained range . . . cannot be treated as unreasonable by

reference to 3553(a)(6)”). Accordingly, Davis’s argument

must fail, for Judge Norgle acted in anticipation of and

furthermore in accordance with Miller when he categorically refused to consider Davis’s argument in favor a nonGuidelines sentence based solely on the disparity between

crack cocaine and cocaine powder in the Guidelines.4

In a final attempt to challenge his sentence as imposed,

Davis states that the district court should have issued a

non-Guidelines sentence based on the factors enumerated

in 3553(a).5

 The main thrust of Davis’s argument concern

Case: 03-2915 Document: 75 Filed: 09/07/2006 Pages: 8
Nos. 03-2345 & 03-2915 7

5 (...continued)

Suffice it to say, the district court did no such thing. Also,

while we see no reason to expound on our holding in Mykytiuk, we

dismiss out of hand Davis’s assertion in his brief that Mykytiuk

“sends the message that a sentence within the Guidelines will

never be reversed . . . .” Our holding in Mykytiuk implies no

such thing. A “rebuttable presumption” is just that, “rebuttable.”

ing 3553(a) is that the district court’s sentencing determination should be found unreasonable due to the fact that his

crimes were “the result of his addiction to marijuana and

alcohol.” The problem is that mere evidence of a preexisting drug and alcohol addiction, without more, falls far

short of rendering a properly calculated Guidelines sentence

unreasonable. Were this not the case, multitudes of criminal defendants who had either used or abused drugs and

alcohol and who failed to receive a reduction in sentence

under the Guidelines could and would in all probability

challenge his sentence as unreasonable on those grounds

alone. This most assuredly is not what the Congress had in

mind when they passed 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The same can

be said for Davis’s other § 3553(a) arguments as well. He

claims he was, at times, “responsible, held legitimate

employment, . . . tried to help his friends and family . . .

[and] was a good father when he was able to be there for his

children.” These arguments likewise do nothing to overcome

the fact that Davis stands convicted of a most serious

criminal drug offense. As the sentencing judge noted, “Davis

attained the rank of ‘Sultan Supreme’ in the [Mickey

Cobras gang], and participated heavily in the purchase and

sale of crack cocaine.” We agree with the district court’s

conclusion that Davis’s sentence properly “reflects the

seriousness of [his] offense, promotes respect for the law,

and protects the public from further crimes.”

Case: 03-2915 Document: 75 Filed: 09/07/2006 Pages: 8
8 Nos. 03-2345 & 03-2915

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the fact that the sentencing judge stated that

he would have imposed the same sentence post-Booker

and because we are of the opinion that Hankton’s and

Davis’s sentences are reasonable, we hold that each of the

defendants has failed to establish plain error. See id. (citing

Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct.

1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997)). We AFFIRM the judgment of

the district court as to each of the defendants-appellants.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—9-7-06

Case: 03-2915 Document: 75 Filed: 09/07/2006 Pages: 8