Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-01373/USCOURTS-caDC-08-01373-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Respondent
James Lichoulas Jr.
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 14, 2010 Decided May 28, 2010

No. 08-1373

JAMES LICHOULAS, JR.,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of Orders 

of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Brian A. Davis argued the cause for the petitioners. 

Kenneth L. Wiseman, Mark F. Sundback, Gia V. Cribbs and

Jennifer L. Spina were on brief.

Jennifer S. Amerkhail, Attorney, Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission, argued the cause for the respondent. Thomas R.

Sheets, General Counsel, Robert H. Solomon, Solicitor, and

Carol J. Banta, Attorney, were on brief.

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and GARLAND, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: James

Lichoulas, Jr. petitions for review of Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission (FERC or Commission) orders that terminate his

USCA Case #08-1373 Document #1247060 Filed: 05/28/2010 Page 1 of 19
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license to operate a hydropower project attached to a historic

six-story mill building in Lowell, Massachusetts. Lichoulas

argues that FERC’s use of the implied surrender doctrine to

terminate his license was arbitrary and capricious. He also

argues that FERC engaged in impermissible ex parte contacts

and abused its discretion in denying him an evidentiary hearing. 

Unpersuaded, we deny the petition. 

I.

In 1986 FERC issued Lichoulas a license “to construct,

operate and maintain the Appleton Trust Project” (Project) under

Part I of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a et seq. 

James Lichoulas, Order Issuing License (Minor Project), 36

F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,047, 63,133 (July 18, 1986). The Project was

designed to generate up to 346 kilowatts of electricity when

water from the Hamilton Canal passes through two turbinegenerators on its way to the Lower Pawtucket Canal.

In a letter to Lichoulas dated March 6, 19971

 FERC noted

that the Project had been inactive since January 6, 1996. It

requested that he submit plans for future operation by May 15,

1997. In June 1997, before Lichoulas responded, a fire damaged

the property on which the Project is located. Despite the

damage, on September 22, 1997 Lichoulas told FERC the

Project would be “up and running” near the end of March 1998. 

Letter from James T. Lichoulas, Jr., Appleton Trust, to Victoria

Kaye, FERC. In a March 24, 1998 letter to FERC, however,

Lichoulas pushed back the target date to Summer 1998.

FERC followed up on March 2, 1999, writing to Lichoulas

that he had failed to keep the Commission updated and

requesting that he do so before April 16, 1999. Receiving no

1

While the letter was addressed to the “Appleton Trust,” the

entity through which Lichoulas obtained the Project license, we do not

hereinafter distinguish between Lichoulas and Appleton Trust. 

USCA Case #08-1373 Document #1247060 Filed: 05/28/2010 Page 2 of 19
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response, FERC sent Lichoulas a letter on July 8, 1999

expressing “uncertainty” that he would ever resume operation. 

Letter from Hossein Ildari, Chief, Engineering Compliance

Branch, FERC, to James Lichoulas at 1. It requested that

Lichoulas submit within forty-five days either a plan for

resuming operation or “a petition for the voluntary surrender” of

his license. Id. Fifty-seven days later, on September 3, 1999,

Lichoulas responded with an itemized repair plan and an

estimated completion date of February or March 2000. FERC

approved his plan on October 27, 1999.

In October 2000, approximately seven months after

Lichoulas’s estimated date of resumed operation, he arranged

with the city of Lowell (City) to demolish several buildings on

or adjacent to the Project property that posed a potential fire

hazard. The demolition exposed asbestos, of which remediation

began in August 2001. 

FERC staff visited the Project on July 24, 2002 and saw its

roof caved in and debris littering its works. They also learned

that, while the Project had recently generated power “for a short

time,” it “had to be shut down due to vibrations.” Letter from

Anton J. Sidoti, Regional Engineer, FERC New York Regional

Office, to James Lichoulas, Jr. at 1 (July 31, 2002). In a letter

dated July 31, 2002 FERC requested that Lichoulas provide a

repair schedule within ten days. Lichoulas made a progress

report forty-seven days later, on September 16, 2002, stating that

the Project would be operable by March 2003. But he soon

revised his estimate to May 2003. In a March 17, 2003 letter

FERC responded, “As you have been previously advised, failure

to operate the project is a violation of the terms and conditions

of your license.” Letter from Anton J. Sidoti, Regional

Engineer, FERC New York Regional Office, to James

Lichoulas, Jr., Appleton Trust. It told him to resume operation

by May 30, 2003 and provide a status report to FERC by June

15, 2003. 

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In a letter dated September 5, 2003 FERC told Lichoulas he

had failed to comply with its March mandates. It said he was in

violation of section 10(c) of the FPA. See 16 U.S.C. § 803(c)

(“licensee shall maintain the project works in a condition of

repair adequate . . . for the efficient operation of said works in

the development and transmission of power”). Accordingly, it

said, “the Commission may revoke your license or take other

enforcement actions.” Letter from Hossein Ildari, Division of

Hydropower Administration and Compliance, to James

Lichoulas, Jr. at 2 (Sept. 5, 2003). It told Lichoulas he could

stave off such action by filing “a plan and schedule for the

resumption of project operation” within twenty-one days. Id. at

1. Lichoulas responded approximately six months later, telling

FERC staff by telephone that he would submit a plan to resume

operation by March 26, 2004. But FERC received no such plan

and its subsequent telephone calls went unanswered and

unreturned. Thus, on September 23, 2004, FERC told

Lichoulas: 

Since you have not made the necessary repairs to your

project to resume operations and the project has not

operated regularly since November 1994, pursuant to

standard article 16 of your license and section 6.4 of

the Commission’s regulations, we consider the project

to be abandoned and that it is your intent to surrender

your license. Thus, the Commission may terminate

your license under an implied surrender proceeding.

Letter from John Estep, Division of Hydropower Administration

and Compliance, to James Lichoulas, Jr. at 1. 

Lichoulas responded in a letter dated December 1, 2004. 

He apologized for the “lack of proper response regarding the

status” of the Project. Letter from James T. Lichoulas, Jr. to

Secretary, FERC (Dec. 1, 2004). He said “[t]he primary

problem was that the [Project property] ha[d] been undergoing

a major selective demolition . . . . During that process, asbestos

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was discovered. The asbestos removal and clean up process

went on and on for the last several years.” Id. He said it was his

“plan to understand [sic] and develop a full scope of work by

early March 2005.” Id. According to FERC, however,

“Lichoulas never submitted this information.” James Lichoulas

Jr., Order Terminating License by Implied Surrender, 124

F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,255, ¶ 12 (Sept. 18, 2008) (Termination Order).

In July 2006 FERC received notice that in April 2006 the

City had obtained the Project property by eminent domain as

part of an “Urban Revitalization and Development Plan.” See

Letter from Stephen Crane, Urban Renewal Project Manager, to

Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FERC (July 20, 2006).

According to the City, at the time of the taking the Project was

not functioning; “in fact,” it said, “the entire property [wa]s in

a significant state of disrepair.” Id.

On March 23, 2007 FERC issued Lichoulas a “Notice of

Termination of License by Implied Surrender and Soliciting

Comments, Protests, and Motions to Intervene.” Docket No. P9300-017 (Mar. 23, 2007). Lichoulas protested on April 19,

2007, arguing that the Project’s dormancy did not reflect an

intent to abandon or surrender it but instead resulted

unavoidably from the demolition, the asbestos remediation and

the City’s exercise of eminent domain. To establish his intent

to restore the Project to operation, Lichoulas submitted a letter

of intent between him and an engineering firm providing for the

rehabilitation of the Project if he retained his FERC license and

regained the property from the City. He also represented that he

had a bank line of credit ready to finance the rehabilitation. He

asked FERC to hold an evidentiary hearing to explore these and

other facts. 

At the same time, Lichoulas fought the City’s taking of the

Project property. In April 2007 he filed a lawsuit in the United

States District Court for the District of Massachusetts alleging

the taking violated the FPA because the property contained a

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FERC-licensed hydropower project. Lichoulas v. City of Lowell,

Mem. of Decision and Order, C.A. No. 07-10725-RWZ, at 1 (D.

Mass. Mar. 31, 2008) (D. Mass. Order). The district court

dismissed the claim “without prejudice to plaintiff refiling th[e]

action after the conclusion of the FERC proceedings.” Id. at 5-6

(capitalization omitted). The First Circuit affirmed. Lichoulas

v. City of Lowell, 555 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 2009). Lichoulas

filed a similar suit, including a lis pendens motion, in

Massachusetts state court in March 2009. Lichoulas v. City of

Lowell, Order Den. Pl.’s Mot. for Lis Pendens and Allowing

Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, No. 09-MISC-396099-KFS, 2009 WL

1639726, at *1 (Mass. Land Ct. June 11, 2009) (Mass. Land Ct.

Order). The state court dismissed the case for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. Id. at *3.

Meanwhile, over the course of 2008, while working through

the implied surrender process, FERC received communications

from the office of U.S. Congresswoman Niki Tsongas, in whose

district the Project lies. Tsongas sent letters in March and July

requesting procedural updates, which FERC provided. Also, on

August 6, Tsongas herself telephoned FERC’s Acting Director

of External Affairs. Later on August 6, Tsongas’s office sent

the Acting Director an email with a memorandum attached. The

memorandum was addressed to Tsongas from one of her staff. 

It recommended that the Congresswoman call FERC to “put

pressure on the Commission to either (a) provide an update on

the timetable for issuing the Order which terminates

[Lichoulas’s] License, or (b) promptly issue an Order which

terminates the license.” Mem. from Kate to NT at 1 (attached

to email from Brian Martin, District Director, Office of

Congresswoman Niki Tsongas, to Patricia Schaub, FERC (Aug.

6, 2008)) (Tsongas Memo). According to FERC, the email with

attachment was placed in its “non-decisional record” of this

matter. James Lichoulas, Jr., Order Den. Reh’g, 125 F.E.R.C.

¶ 61,195, ¶ 21 (Nov. 20, 2008) (Order Den. Reh’g). The Office

of External Affairs received another email from Tsongas’s office

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on August 18, which, according to FERC, merely “ask[ed] about

the status of the case” and it responded accordingly. Id.

On September 18, 2008 FERC terminated Lichoulas’s

license. Termination Order, 124 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,255. It

concluded that he had impliedly surrendered the license pursuant

to 18 C.F.R. § 6.4 and standard license article 16. Id. ¶¶ 18-26;

see Form L-15, Terms and Conditions of License for

Unconstructed Minor Project Affecting the Interests of Interstate

or Foreign Commerce, 54 F.P.C. 1792, 1888 (1975) (Article 16). 

The order also denied his request for an evidentiary hearing. 

Termination Order, 124 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,255, ¶ 24. Lichoulas then

requested rehearing and FERC denied that request on November

20, 2008. Order Den. Reh’g, 125 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,195. It repeated

its conclusions that he had impliedly surrendered his license and

that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary. Id. ¶¶ 12-17. It

also rejected his argument that FERC’s contacts with Tsongas’s

office were prohibited communications, stating that they were

“[p]rocedural inquiries.” Id. ¶ 21 (alteration in original).

Lichoulas timely petitioned this court for review. See 16 U.S.C.

§ 825l(b). 

II.

Lichoulas argues that we should vacate the Termination

Order and the Order Denying Rehearing because (1) FERC’s

implied surrender determination was arbitrary and capricious,

(2) FERC engaged in prohibited “off-the-record

communications” while adjudicating the matter and (3) FERC

abused its discretion by denying him an evidentiary hearing. 

FERC contests all three arguments and also maintains we are

without jurisdiction to review its action because Lichoulas lacks

Article III standing. We address standing first and then reach,

seriatim, Lichoulas’s three arguments.

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A. Standing

To have standing Lichoulas must show injury in fact,

causation and redressability. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA

v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 564 F.3d 462, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2009);

Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898-900 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 

FERC argues Lichoulas cannot show redressability because “he

has already, separately, lost ownership of and access to the

Project.” Resp’t’s Br. 23. It asserts that “Lichoulas has offered

no reason to believe that reversal of the license termination

would cause the City to return the Project property to him or

otherwise to allow him access to repair and operate the Project.” 

Id. at 24. Because the City obtained the Project property by

eminent domain, it argues, reversal of FERC’s orders will not

yield the redress Lichoulas seeks.

FERC’s argument fails because it addresses the wrong

injury. The injury of which Lichoulas complains here is the

termination of his license to operate the Project. FERC directly

caused this injury and we can redress it by vacating its orders. 

Lichoulas does not challenge his “lost ownership of and access

to the Project” here; he challenged that injury in separate suits

regarding the City’s exercise of eminent domain. See Lichoulas

v. City of Lowell, C.A. No. 07-10725-RWZ (D. Mass.);

Lichoulas v. City of Lowell, No. 09-MISC-396099-KFS (Mass.

Land Ct.). The crucial question here is whether granting his

petition would redress the injury caused by FERC—namely, the

termination of Lichoulas’s license. Plainly it would. Indeed, “if

the complainant is ‘an object of the action (or foregone action)

at issue’—as is the case . . . nearly always in review of an

adjudication—there should be ‘little question that the action or

inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing

or requiring the action will redress it.’” Sierra Club, 292 F.3d

at 900 (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561-62). 

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Moreover, that FERC’s license termination has caused

Lichoulas injury is clear because of its effect on his prospects

for regaining ownership of and access to the Project. “‘A

significant increase in the likelihood that the [litigant] would

obtain relief that directly redresses the injury suffered’ will

suffice for standing.” Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v.

Manson, 414 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Utah v. Evans,

536 U.S. 452, 464 (2002)). In his eminent domain litigation,

Lichoulas argued the City’s taking violated the FPA because he

holds a valid FERC license. See Lichoulas, 555 F.3d at 12; D.

Mass. Order at 1; Mass. Land Ct. Order, 2009 WL 1639726, at

*3. Accordingly, both the federal and state courts in

Massachusetts have noted that the resolution of Lichoulas’s

petition to us will have a significant impact on his eminent

domain challenges. D. Mass. Order at 4 (“[T]he validity of

[Lichoulas’s] license lies at the heart of this case.”); Mass. Land

Ct. Order, 2009 WL 1639726, at *2 (“[T]he issue at the heart of

this dispute is whether Plaintiff’s FERC license was valid at the

time of [the] taking . . . . If Plaintiff is successful before the DC

Circuit, then his challenge to Defendant’s taking will lie under

the FPA.”). Thus, should Lichoulas succeed here, he will

significantly increase the likelihood of prevailing in his eminent

domain challenges and therefore make it more likely that he will

regain “ownership of and access to the Property.” This suffices

for redressability and ultimately, because injury in fact and

causation are not in question, for standing.2

2

FERC’s invocation of Klamath Water Users Ass’n v. FERC, 534

F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir. 2008), does not affect our conclusion. In that

case, an electricity customer challenged FERC’s decision that a

utility’s license did not restrict its rates. Id. at 737. We held that the

customer lacked standing because California’s and Oregon’s utility

commissions, not FERC, controlled the rates and thus a favorable

ruling by us would not provide redress. Id. at 740. Thus, that was not

a case where “an order directed to [FERC would] significantly

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B. Implied Surrender

We turn to Lichoulas’s challenge to FERC’s termination of

his license via the implied surrender doctrine. We review a

FERC order under the familiar “arbitrary and capricious”

standard. Wis. Pub. Power, Inc. v. FERC, 493 F.3d 239, 256

(D.C. Cir. 2007); see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). “Under this

deferential standard, we must affirm the Commission’s orders as

long as it has ‘examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a

satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational

connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Wis.

Pub. Power, 493 F.3d at 256 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n

of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43

(1983)) (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted). In

applying this standard, we defer to the Commission’s reasonable

application of its precedent but will not approve an unreasoned

departure therefrom. Williams Gas Processing - Gulf Coast Co.

v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1335, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 

FERC regulations and the standard articles of Lichoulas’s

license provide for implied surrender. Specifically, 18 C.F.R.

§ 6.43

 provides that if a licensee

shall cause or suffer essential project property to be

removed or destroyed, or become unfit for use, without

replacement, or shall abandon, or shall discontinue

good faith operation of the project for a period of three

increase the chances of favorable action by a non-party” because there

was no reason to think that FERC’s decision would affect either state’s

decision. Id.

3

18 C.F.R. § 6.4 applies to projects, like Lichoulas’s, “of not

more than two thousand horsepower installed capacity.” 16 U.S.C.

§ 803(i); see 18 C.F.R. § 6.4; Order Issuing License, 36 F.E.R.C.

¶ 62,047. 

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years, the Commission will deem it to be the intent of

the licensee to surrender the license.

Article 16 of the license contains language virtually identical to

section 6.4 and, in addition, provides for implied surrender if the

licensee “shall . . . refuse or neglect to comply with the terms of

the license and the lawful orders of the Commission.” 54 F.P.C.

at 1888; see Order Issuing License, 36 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,047,

63,134 (license “subject to the articles set forth in Form L-15

(October 1975) . . . except Article 15”). 

FERC’s application of implied surrender has evolved over

time. In 1993 it noted that it had “only rarely had to resort to the

implied-surrender procedure to address a licensee’s failure to

live up to the obligations of its license.” Mont. Power Co., 62

F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,166, 62,143 (1993). In a footnote, it elaborated

that “[s]uch cases have included situations where licensees had

abandoned project operation a number of years earlier, had sold

the project without prior Commission approval and then been

dissolved as a corporate entity, or had otherwise abandoned the

project facilities and could not be located.” Id. at 62,143 &

n.41. Those examples proved to be less than comprehensive,

however, when in 1999 the Commission applied the doctrine in

Fourth Branch Assocs. (Mechanicville) v. Niagara Mohawk

Power Corp., 89 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,194, 61,597-98 (1999), reh’g

denied, 90 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,250 (2000), pet. for rev. denied, 253

F.3d 741 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In that case, two FERC licensees

were “at loggerheads” after the collapse of several agreements

regarding their joint hydropower project. Id. at 61,596. Niagara

Mohawk Power Corporation (Niagara Mohawk) wanted to

transfer or surrender the license. Id. Fourth Branch Associates

(Fourth Branch) wanted to continue as a licensee and “restore

the project to full operation.” Id. at 61,592. FERC found

implied surrender. Id. at 61,598. It first noted that “[t]he

doctrine has typically been invoked when the licensee, by action

or inaction, has clearly indicated its intent to abandon the

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project, but has not filed a surrender petition.” Id. at 61,597. 

But it also made clear that “the key element is the licensee’s

failure to live up to the obligations of its license.” Id. at 61,597-

98. It noted that Fourth Branch lacked financing, did not own

the project property and had been evicted from the site. Id. at

61,593. Thus, FERC concluded that, because “Niagara Mohawk

d[id] not want to operate the project, and [Fourth Branch’s]

desire to continue as a licensee [wa]s evidently not matched by

an ability to carry out the license terms,” implied surrender

applied. Id. at 61,598. FERC recently reaffirmed this expanded

application of the doctrine, stating “the key element [of implied

surrender] is the licensee’s failure to live up to the obligations

of its license, and we have implied surrender even where the

licensee has expressed an interest in continuing to operate the

project.” John C. Jones, 123 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,053, ¶ 13 (Jan. 23,

2008). 

Here, FERC determined that Lichoulas’s actions and—more

important—inaction manifested that he had “abandoned good

faith operation of his project” and thus impliedly surrendered his

license. Termination Order, 124 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,255, ¶ 25; see 18

C.F.R. § 6.4; Article 16, 54 F.P.C. at 1888; Order Den. Reh’g,

125 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,195, ¶14. It cited over a decade of project

dormancy as well as Lichoulas’s consistent failure to meet his

repair schedules or even timely respond to the Commission’s

inquiries. Termination Order, 124 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,255, ¶ 20;

Order Den. Reh’g, 125 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,195, ¶ 14 n.19. It also

noted that the City’s taking of the Project property “makes any

possibility of repairing the project and resuming operations even

less likely.” Termination Order, 124 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,255, ¶ 21.

Lichoulas counters that his inchoate efforts to repair the Project

do not reveal intent to abandon it but instead reflect a series of

obstacles beyond his control, including fire, demolition, asbestos

abatement and the City’s exercise of eminent domain. 

According to him, “the vast weight of the record evidence is that

[he] very much wishes to retain the Project, and is fully capable

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of returning it to operation (as he has done in the past) if

permitted to do so.” Pet’r’s Br. 37. In response, FERC

maintains that it considered the obstacles Lichoulas identified

but they “fail to negate the conclusion that [his] inaction

demonstrated a clear intent to abandon the project.” Order Den.

Reh’g, 125 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,195, ¶15. 

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that FERC’s

application of the implied surrender doctrine here was not

arbitrary and capricious; the Commission “examine[d] the

relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its

action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found

and the choice made.’” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting

Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168

(1962)). The orders reflect reasoned application of FERC’s

precedent, which makes clear that “the key element” for implied

surrender “is the licensee’s failure to live up to the obligations

of its license,” Fourth Branch, 89 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,194, 61,597-

98,4

 and that the implied surrender doctrine may be applied

“even where the licensee has expressed an interest in continuing

to operate the project,” John C. Jones, 123 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,053,

¶ 13. Given Lichoulas’s consistent unwillingness or inability to

meet his own repair schedules or timely respond to FERC, it

4

Lichoulas attempts to distinguish Fourth Branch by noting that

the licensee in that case had been unable to “obtain the financing

necessary to refurbish, expand, and operate the project.” Pet’r’s Br.

42-43 n.114 (quoting Fourth Branch, 89 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,194, 61,593). 

He insists that he has financing to complete his repairs and has

executed a letter of intent with an engineering firm to carry them out. 

Id. This distinction, however, does not make Fourth Branch

inapposite. Here, as in Fourth Branch, FERC found implied surrender

from the licensee’s inability or unwillingness to follow through on his

commitments to the Commission as a licensee. Conditional

agreements with banks and engineers do little to affect that analysis,

given Lichoulas’s history. 

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reasonably concluded that he had “abandoned good faith

operation of his project.” Termination Order, 124 F.E.R.C.

¶ 61,255, ¶ 25; see 18 C.F.R. § 6.4; Article 16, 54 F.P.C. at

1888; Order Den. Reh’g, 125 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,195, ¶14. And

while it is true that the Project suffered unforeseen setbacks, the

correspondence between Lichoulas and FERC reveals that it was

not those setbacks as much as Lichoulas’s repeated failure to

follow through on his commitments that led to the termination. 

See supra Part I. Thus, on these admittedly unusual facts, we do

not believe that FERC’s application of the implied surrender

doctrine was arbitrary and capricious.

C. Ex Parte Communications

FERC regulations provide that, generally, “no person

outside the Commission shall make or knowingly cause to be

made to any decisional employee . . . any off-the-record

communication.”5

 18 C.F.R. § 385.2201(b). The prohibition

does not apply, however, to “[p]rocedural inquiries, such as a

request for information relating solely to the status of a

proceeding, unless the inquiry states or implies a preference for

a particular party or position, or is otherwise intended, directly

or indirectly, to address the merits or influence the outcome of

a proceeding.” Id. § 385.2201(c)(5)(i); see also Elec. Power

Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 391 F.3d 1255, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2004)

(ostensibly procedural inquiry “‘may in effect amount to an

5

As defined by 18 C.F.R. § 385.2201(c)(4), 

Off-the-record communication means any communication

relevant to the merits of a contested on-the-record

proceeding that, if written, is not filed with the Secretary

and not served on the parties to the proceeding in

accordance with Rule 2010, or if oral, is made without

reasonable prior notice to the parties to the proceeding and

without the opportunity for such parties to be present when

the communication is made. 

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indirect or subtle effort to influence the substantive outcome of

the proceedings’” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-880, pt. 2, at 20

(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2212, 2229)). If a

decisional employee receives an off-the-record communication,

FERC must “place the communication [(if written)] or [a]

summary [(if oral)] in the public file associated with, but not

part of, the decisional record of the proceeding.” 18 C.F.R.

§ 385.2201(f)(2). FERC must also instruct the source of a

written off-the-record communication to serve it on all record

parties. Id. § 385.2201(f)(4). An “off-the-record written

communication from a non-party elected official” is not

prohibited under the regulations but FERC must place a copy of

any such communication in the “decisional record.” Id.

§ 385.2201(e)(1)(iv), (g)(1).

Even if FERC receives an ex parte communication that

violates 18 C.F.R. § 385.2201, the court will not undo FERC’s

action unless “‘the agency’s decisionmaking process was

irrevocably tainted so as to make the ultimate judgment of the

agency unfair.’” Press Broad. Co. v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1365, 1369

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Prof’l Air Traffic Controllers Org. v.

FLRA, 685 F.2d 547, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (footnote omitted));

see Freeman Eng’g Assocs., Inc. v. FCC, 103 F.3d 169, 184

(D.C. Cir. 1997). Press Broadcasting is particularly instructive. 

In that case, the FCC reversed its decision to cancel a

broadcasting permit after receiving ex parte communications

from Senate staff and representatives of the permit holder, which

“discussed the substance of the cancellation” and sought advice

from FCC officials on how to obtain reversal. Press Broad., 59

F.3d at 1368. A competing broadcasting company protested,

arguing that the ex parte contacts had tainted the adjudication. 

Id. Although it was undisputed that the permit holder had

violated the FCC’s ex parte rules, we held that the contacts were

not fatal to the agency’s decision because the “contacts extended

only to persons who played no role in the Commission’s

ultimate decision.” Id. at 1369. The contacts had not

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“impermissibly ‘intruded into the calculus of consideration of

the individual decisionmaker’” and had not irrevocably tainted

the adjudication. Id. at 1370 (quoting Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v.

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 714 F.2d 163, 170-71 (D.C. Cir.

1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)). We emphasized that

“an improper attempt to influence an adjudication is not a

concern if it does not reach the ultimate decision maker” and

that “‘judicial evaluation of [ex parte] pressure must focus on

the nexus between the pressure and the actual decision maker.’”

Id. (quoting ATX, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 41 F.3d 1522,

1527 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original)). 

Lichoulas argues that FERC received prohibited off-therecord, ex parte communications from Congresswoman Tsongas

and members of her staff.6

 Specifically, he points to an August

6

FERC contends that Lichoulas waived this argument because he

did not seek rehearing after the Commission rejected it for the first

time in the Order Denying Rehearing. Resp’t’s Br. 40; see 16 U.S.C.

§ 825l(b) (“No objection to the order of the Commission shall be

considered by the court unless such objection shall have been urged

before the Commission in the application for rehearing unless there is

reasonable ground for failure so to do.”); Cal. Dep’t of Water Res. v.

FERC, 306 F.3d 1121, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[I]f an order on

rehearing modifies the results of the earlier order in a significant way

adverse to a party, that party must seek a rehearing of the order before

filing a petition for judicial review.”). FERC is wrong. Lichoulas

objected to the alleged off-the-record communications in a filing

captioned “Response to Off-the-Record Communications and Request

for Disclosure of Oral Off-the-Record Communications,” dated

September 5, 2008, which predated the Termination Order. He

repeated his objection in his rehearing request. The Order Denying

Rehearing did not “modif[y] the results” of the Termination Order,

Cal. Dep’t of Water Res., 306 F.3d at 1125; it merely addressed an

argument the Termination Order had rejected sub silentio. The fact

that FERC failed to address his argument in the first instance does not

mean he must press it yet again at the agency level.

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6, 2008 telephone conversation and an August 18, 2008 email

from Tsongas’s office. FERC counters that those contacts were

“procedural” and thus not “off-the-record communications”

under Commission regulations. Order Den. Reh’g, 125 F.E.R.C.

¶ 61,195, ¶ 21. But Lichoulas claims FERC’s position is belied

by an August 6 email with attachment from Tsongas’s office,

which references a telephone call, “the purpose [of which]

would be to put pressure on the Commission to either (a)

provide an update on the timetable for issuing the Order which

terminates [Lichoulas’s] License, or (b) promptly issue an Order

which terminates the license.” Tsongas Memo. Lichoulas says

this is strong evidence that the August 6 phone call and August

18 email were not procedural but were instead prohibited offthe-record communications under 18 C.F.R. § 385.2201.7

According to him, “it is clear that the primary purpose of those

communications . . . was to put political pressure on FERC to

terminate [his] license, which FERC promptly did.” Pet’r’s Br.

30.

Lichoulas’s argument fails because even assuming

arguendo the challenged contacts violated FERC regulations,

there is no indication that they influenced the ultimate decision

makers. FERC has stated that “none of the members of the

Commission” reviewed the email with attachment before

approving the order terminating Lichoulas’s license and

therefore no member was influenced by it. Order Den. Reh’g,

125 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,195, ¶ 21 & n.26. And although the

Commissioners may have been aware of Tsongas’s other

contacts, Oral Arg. Recording at 39:14-39:35, without having

reviewed the email with attachment they had no reason to

7

Lichoulas does not object to FERC’s handling of the email with

attachment itself; he concedes that the Commission properly processed

them under section 385.2201(f)(2).

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conclude that her inquiries were anything but procedural.8

Moreover, Lichoulas’s charge of improper influence is

undermined by the fact that the first identified contact from

Tsongas’s office came in March 2008, while FERC first told

Lichoulas that he had impliedly surrendered his license over

three years earlier, in September 2004. In sum, there is no

indication here of a “nexus” between alleged pressure from

Tsongas’s office and the Commission’s ultimate decision; nor

is there any indication that Tsongas’s contacts “impermissibly

intruded into the [Commission’s] calculus of consideration.”

Press Broad., 59 F.3d at 1370 (internal quotations and emphasis

omitted). We conclude, therefore, that Tsongas’s ex parte

contacts did not irrevocably taint FERC’s decision to terminate

Lichoulas’s license.

D. Evidentiary Hearing

“In general, FERC must hold an evidentiary hearing only

when a genuine issue of material fact exists, and even then,

FERC need not conduct such a hearing if [the disputed issues]

may be adequately resolved on the written record.” Cajun Elec.

8

To the extent Lichoulas suggests the Commissioners were in fact

aware of pressure from Tsongas’s office and FERC has prevaricated

or misled the Court, see Reply Br. 25-26, we note that 

[i]t would take considerably more than the unsupported

allegation in a brief to show that the Commission or any one

of its members failed to act impartially. Under the

well-settled presumption of administrative regularity, courts

assume administrative officials “to be men [and women] of

conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a

particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own

circumstances.” 

La. Ass’n of Indep. Producers & Royalty Owners v. FERC, 958 F.2d

1101, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35

(1975)) (first alteration added).

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Power Co-op, Inc. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 173, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

(internal citations and quotations omitted) (modification in

original). “We review FERC’s decision to deny an evidentiary

hearing for an abuse of discretion.” Id. 

Lichoulas has not identified any issue he could explore at an

evidentiary hearing that could not be adequately addressed on

the papers. He argues that a hearing would yield evidence of his

subjective intent to restore the Project. But this case involves

implied surrender, which the Commission decides objectively. 

See 18 C.F.R. § 6.4 (“the Commission will deem it to be the

intent of the licensee to surrender the license”) (emphasis

added). At bottom, Lichoulas’s complaint is with the legal

conclusion FERC has drawn from the facts. An evidentiary

hearing is not warranted simply because he disagrees with that

conclusion and FERC did not abuse its discretion in declining to

provide one. 

For the foregoing reasons, we deny Lichoulas’s petition.

So ordered.

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