Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08153/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08153-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Steve Latoski
Defendant
Mohave, County of
Defendant
Ramon Osuna
Defendant
Kevin Stockbridge
Defendant
Warren Twitchel
Defendant
Vina Yazzie
Plaintiff

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Vina Yazzie, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Mohave, County of, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-08153-PCT-JAT

ORDER 

I. Background and Prior Orders 

 Previously, Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(c). (Doc. 26). Part of Defendants’ motion argued that certain 

counts of the complaint (related to alleged disability discrimination) should be subject to 

judgment on the pleadings because Plaintiff failed to timely exhaust that theory with the 

EEOC. Plaintiff responded and argued that to the extent her exhaustion was untimely, 

she should be entitled to equitable tolling. 

 This Court converted (at Plaintiff’s request) the portion of the motion related to 

exhaustion of the disability theory to a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 

(Doc. 68). In the conversion Order, the Court stated: “IT IS ORDERED that [the] 

pending Rule 12(c), Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings, is hereby converted to a 

Rule 56, Motion for Summary Judgement, as to the issue of exhaustion only.” (Id.). 

 This Court proceeded to rule on the remainder of the Rule 12(c) motion as 

follows: 

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IT IS ORDERED Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 

(Doc. 26) is granted in part as follows: Counts 10 and 11 against Defendant 

Mohave County are dismissed.[footnote omitted] The Motion is denied to 

the extent is seeks judgment on Counts 1-6 for failure to state a claim. The 

Motion remains under advisement regarding whether Plaintiff exhausted 

her disability discrimination claims with the EEOC (thus whether Counts 1-

6 will be dismissed on this basis remains under advisement). Because 

Counts 7-9 were not the subject of the Motion [for] Judgment on the 

Pleadings, they are not dismissed. Counts 10 and 11 against Defendants 

Steve Latoski, Ramon Osuna, Kevin Stockbridge, and Warren Twitchel are 

also not dismissed. 

Doc. 74 at 14. 

 Regarding Counts 1-6, which contain Plaintiff’s claims of disability 

discrimination, within the body of the Order at Doc. 74, the Court concluded that the 

August 14, 2014 charge with the EEOC was untimely based on Plaintiff’s date of 

termination. Doc. 74 at 7. The Court also concluded that Plaintiff had failed to 

established that her untimely August 14, 2014 charge with the EEOC should relate back 

to her timely April 2, 2014, charge with the EEOC. Doc. 74 at 5-7. Thus, for Plaintiff to 

be entitled to pursue Count 1-6, she must establish a basis for equitable tolling to excuse 

her untimely exhaustion with the EEOC. 

II. Equitable Tolling 

 In responding under Rule 56, Plaintiff advanced two arguments for equitable 

tolling: 1) “Plaintiff’s mental state;” and, 2) “failure to understand EEOC filing process.” 

(Doc. 73 at 7-8).1

 “Equitable tolling” allows a deadline to file with an administrative 

agency to be tolled in some circumstances. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 

U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (noting “that filing a timely charge of discrimination with the 

EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, 

like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”). 

 

1

 Plaintiff spends pages 9-15 of her response arguing the merits of her claims. However, because Defendants did not move for summary judgment on the merits of any of the claims, the Court has not addressed those arguments. 

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A. Mental State 

 A deadline to file with an administrative agency may be tolled due to mental 

incompetence, provided certain criteria are met: 

First, a plaintiff must show his mental impairment was an ‘extraordinary 

circumstance’ beyond his control by demonstrating the impairment was so 

severe that either (a) plaintiff was unable rationally or factually to 

personally understand the need to timely file, or (b) plaintiff’s mental state 

rendered him unable personally to prepare [a complaint] and effectuate its 

filing. Second, the plaintiff must show diligence in pursuing the claims to 

the extent he could understand them, but that the mental impairment made 

it impossible to meet the filing deadline under the totality of the 

circumstances. . . . 

Johnson v. Lucent Technologies Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011), as amended

(Aug. 19, 2011) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 

1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010). 

 The evidence Plaintiff offers of a problem with her mental state is “letters from 

friend and neighbors” which purport to document her sleeplessness, loss of appetite and 

other unidentified problems. Doc. 73 at 7.2

 Even assuming this evidence is true, none of 

it rises to the level of plaintiff being unable to rationally or factually understand the need 

to timely file or plaintiff being unable to personally prepare a charge and file with the 

EEOC. See, e.g., Johnson, 653 F.3d at 1010 (noting the plaintiff, though he claimed to be 

of unsound mind and was receiving disability benefits, nonetheless actively participated 

in litigation to advance his interests). 

 As the evidence shows, Plaintiff had counsel during some portion of the relevant 

filing period who could have assisted her. (Doc. 80 at 7). Moreover, despite her alleged 

mental ailments, Plaintiff demonstrated the capacity to understand her rights and actively 

pursued her case. (Doc. 4 at 4, 5, 7, 10). Immediately prior to her termination, Plaintiff 

 

2

 Defendant has objected to the admissibility of this evidence. Doc. 80 at 11. 

While many of these objections are likely well taken, the Court has nonetheless 

considered Plaintiff’s evidence for purposes of this Order. The Court also notes 

Defendants again seek oral argument in their Reply. Because the Court has already held oral argument on this motion, the request is denied. 

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obtained a second drug test and a list of her current medications to provide to Defendants 

Stockbridge and Latoski, which she did on August 6, 2013. (Doc. 4 at 4). On August 15, 

2013, Plaintiff requested a hearing regarding her termination, nine days after she was 

notified of her termination. (Id.) Plaintiff sought out a drug treatment program. (Doc. 4 at 

5). Plaintiff also contacted the Mohave County’s Human Resources Department in 

September or October of 2013 to obtain a copy of their “zero tolerance” drug policy. 

(Doc. 4 at 7). This demonstrates she was able to contest her termination through the 

appeals process within the County. 

 Additionally, on April 2, 2014, Plaintiff was able to file her original charge of race 

and sex discrimination within the EEOC deadline while allegedly under these mental 

impairments. (Doc. 4 at 10). This contradicts Plaintiff’s claim she was unable to 

understand or pursue assistance in filing with the EEOC. (Doc. 44 at 5). Plaintiff offers 

no evidence to support her claim that mental impairments made it impossible to meet the 

filing deadlines for her second EEOC charge of disability discrimination. 

 Thus, Plaintiff has not shown that her mental health issues were so severe that 

equitable tolling would be appropriate. Further, the actions Plaintiff took to pursue her 

rights during the period following her termination belie her claim that she was too 

incapacitated to timely file her discrimination charge with the EEOC. (Doc. 4 at 4, 5, 7, 

10). 

B. EEOC filing process 

Plaintiff claims that her pro se status and the EEOC not being clear with her are a 

second basis for equitable tolling. (Doc. 73 at 8). First, as discussed above, Plaintiff was 

not pro se during the entire time she could have filed with the EEOC. (Doc. 80 at 7). 

 Second, Plaintiff offers no evidence that she was misled by EEOC representatives. 

(Doc. 73 at 7-8). See Josephs v. Pacific Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(allowing equitable tolling only when a pro se litigant who diligently pursued the claim 

was affirmatively misled by the administrative agency responsible for processing the 

charge and relied on the misinformation). Plaintiff’s only evidence of any improper 

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conduct by the EEOC is: “Evidence of the EEOC failing to properly communicate with 

Plaintiff is found in the EEOC’s delay in delivering paperwork to Plaintiff.” (Doc. 73 at 

8). Assuming the EEOC had an unreasonable delay in delivering paperwork, that delay 

does not rise to the level of misinformation. 

 Finally, Plaintiff in fact timely filed with the EEOC. She just did not include any 

claims of disability discrimination in the filing. The timely filing is conclusive evidence 

that Plaintiff knew how to file with the EEOC in a timely manner. Thus, for all of these 

reasons, the Court finds that nothing said or done by the EEOC in this case provides a 

basis for equitable tolling. 

III. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that the motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 26), which 

was converted to a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 68) is granted as to Count 1-6 

(which were still under advisement following the Order at Doc. 74). Because various 

counts remain in this case, the Clerk of the Court shall not enter judgment at this time. 

 Dated this 21st day of December, 2015. 

 

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