Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-02581/USCOURTS-ca8-15-02581-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Raphael L. Donnell
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-2581

___________________________

Raphael L. Donnell,

lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner,

v.

United States of America,

lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent.

____________

On Motion for Authorization to File a Second

or Successive Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

____________

Filed: June 20, 2016

[Published] 

____________

Before WOLLMAN, BOWMAN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Raphael Donnell movesfor authorization to file a second orsuccessive motion

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). He seeks to challenge a sentence that was imposed in

2008 after the district court applied the career-offender sentencing guideline, USSG

§ 4B1.1, in calculating Donnell’s advisory sentencing range. Citing Johnson v.

United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), Donnellseeks to argue that the residual clause

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of USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2) is unconstitutionally vague and that his sentence should be

vacated.

This court may authorize a second or successive motion under § 2255 if the

movant makes a “prima facie showing” that the motion “contain[s] . . . a new rule of

constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme

Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h)(2), 2244(b)(3)(C); see

Kamil Johnson v. United States, 720 F.3d 720, 720 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). A

prima facie showing is “a sufficient showing of possible merit to warrant a fuller

exploration by the district court.” Kamil Johnson, 720 F.3d at 720 (quoting Bennett

v. United States, 119 F.3d 468, 469 (7th Cir. 1997)).

The Supreme Court in Johnson announced a new rule of constitutional law. 

The Court held that the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) was

unconstitutionally vague and that increasing a defendant’s sentence under that clause

violated the constitutional right to due process. In Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct.

1257 (2016), the Court made the new rule of Johnson retroactive to cases on

collateral review.

Donnell seeks to extend Johnson and Welch by urging that the residual clause

of USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2) is also unconstitutionally vague. He further contendsthat the

constitutional rule that he proposes for the sentencing guidelines should be applied

retroactively to cases on collateralreview. Whether an advisory sentencing guideline

is susceptible to a vagueness challenge is an open question in this circuit. See United

States v. Ellis, 815 F.3d 419, 421 (8th Cir. 2016). The issue is reasonably debatable,

and the answer is not dictated by Johnson. Id. Compare, e.g., United States v.

Pawlak, No. 15-3566, 2016 WL 2802723, at *3-4 (6th Cir. May 13, 2016), and

United States v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 2015), with United States v.

Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1193-96 (11th Cir. 2015), and United States v. Lee, No. 13-

10517, 2016 WL 2638364, at *7-10 (9th Cir. May 6, 2016) (Ikuta, J., dissenting). For

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Donnell’s successive motion to succeed, therefore, the post-conviction court must

announce a second new rule that extends Johnson to the sentencing guidelines.

Section 2255(h)(2) says that a second or successive motion must be certified

“to contain” a new rule of constitutional law that has been made retroactive by the

Supreme Court. “To contain” means “to consist of wholly or in part,” to “comprise,”

or to “include.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 491 (2002). Mere

citation of a new rule in a successive motion is not sufficient to justify certification. 

A movant surely cannot be authorized to pursue a claim unrelated to the new rule

simply by citing Johnson and Welch and claiming that his motion “contains” a new

rule. The new rule must have a nexus to the right asserted in the motion.

In determining what nexus isrequired, we must view § 2255(h) in context. The

meaning of § 2255(h)(2) is informed by surrounding and related provisions. We

glean from this context that to satisfy the prerequisites for the filing of a successive

motion, the new rule contained in the motion must be a new rule that recognizes the

right asserted in the motion.

One significant related provision concerns the statute of limitations. 

Ordinarily, a § 2255 motion must be filed within one year of the date when a

conviction becomes final. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). Section 2255(f)(3), however,

establishes an extended statute of limitations of one year from “the date on which the

right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases

on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (emphasis added). Section 2255(h)(2)

should be construed in pari materia with § 2255(f)(3), as the limitations provision

undoubtedly was designed to accommodate second orsuccessive motions authorized

under § 2255(h)(2). Section 2255(h)(2) is thus more naturally understood to require

certification that a successive motion contains a new rule that recognizes the right

asserted in the motion. The structure of the statute counsels against construing

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§ 2255(h)(2) more broadly to authorize the filing of successive motions that are

routinely barred by the statute of limitations. 

The parallel provision for successive state habeas petitions is consistent with

this understanding. Section 2244(b)(2)(A) requires certification that a claim “relies

on” a new rule, and it makessense to interpret § 2255(h)(2) similarly despite a modest

difference in wording. See Bennett, 119 F.3d at 469; cf. United States v. Hamilton,

604 F.3d 572, 574 (8th Cir. 2010). A claim “relies on” a new rule when it is “based

on” a new rule, Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 558 (1998), and this court has

applied that standard to motions for authorization under § 2255(h)(2). Woods v.

United States, 805 F.3d 1152, 1153 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Williams v. United

States, 705 F.3d 293, 294 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). A claim is truly “based on”

a new rule only when the new rule recognizesthe right asserted. See Webster’s Third

New International Dictionary 180 (defining “base” as “the fundamental part of

something: ESSENCE, FOUNDATION”). Where a claim depends on recognition of a

second new rule, the claim is best understood as relying on that second rule for a

grant of relief.

Construing § 2255(h)(2) to require a new rule that recognizesthe right asserted

in the successive motion also aligns with the remainder of § 2255(h). Section

2255(h)(2) is paired with § 2255(h)(1), which concerns authorization for successive

motions based on newly discovered evidence. Where newly discovered evidence is

the ground for authorization, that evidence must be sufficient to justify a grant of

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1). This requirement in § 2255(h)(1) fortifies our

conclusion that a “new rule of constitutional law” that warrants authorization under

§ 2255(h)(2) likewise must be sufficient to justify a grant of relief. It is not enough

for the successive motion to cite a new rule that merely serves as a predicate for

urging adoption of another new rule that would recognize the right asserted by the

movant.

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Donnell’s successive motion seeks to assert a new right that has not been

recognized by the Supreme Court or made retroactive on collateral review. His

motion urges the creation of a second new rule that would apply Johnson and the

constitutional vagueness doctrine to a provision of the advisory sentencing

guidelines. We therefore conclude that the successive motion should not be certified

“to contain” a new rule made retroactive by the Supreme Court as required by

§ 2255(h)(2). Accord In re Stine, No. 16-40505, slip op. at 2-3 (5th Cir. June 2, 2016)

(per curiam); Richardson v. United States, 623 F. App’x 841, 842 (8th Cir. 2015) (per

curiam). But see In re Encinias, No. 16-8038, 2016 WL 1719323, at *2 (10th Cir.

Apr. 29, 2016) (per curiam).

For these reasons, Donnell’s motion for authorization to file a second or

successive motion is denied. 

______________________________

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