Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01354/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01354-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Miguel Angel Barajas
Defendant
Guillermina Carrizales
Defendant
J & J Sports Productions, Inc.
Plaintiff
Village Sports Bar & Grill
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

J & J SPORTS PRODUCTIONS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MIGUEL ANGEL BARAJAS, ET AL.,

Defendants.

No. 1:15-cv-01354-DAD-JTL

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES

(Doc. No. 24)

J & J Sports Productions, Inc. (―plaintiff‖) filed suit against Miguel Angel Barajas and

Guillermina Carrizales (―defendants‖), the owners and operators of Village Sports Bar and Grill, 

on September 2, 2015, alleging defendants violated multiple federal statutes—as well as state 

laws—when they broadcast a boxing match for which plaintiff owned the exclusive nationwide 

commercial distribution rights. (Doc. No. 1.) Specifically, plaintiffs alleged the following causes 

of action: (1) violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605, (2) violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553, (3) conversion, and 

(4) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq. On January 29, 2016, 

plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment on the grounds that defendants failed to answer 

plaintiff’s duly served complaint. (Doc. No. 19.) On March 7, 2016, Magistrate Judge Jennifer 

L. Thurston issued findings and recommendations recommending plaintiff’s motion for default 

judgment be granted. (Doc. No. 23.) Plaintiff filed the current motion for attorneys’ fees and 

costs on the following day. (Doc. No. 24.) On April 27, 2016, the court adopted Magistrate 

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Judge Thurston’s findings and recommendations. (Doc. No. 27.) Judgment in favor of plaintiff 

was entered on that day as well. (Doc. No. 28.) Pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), the current 

motion for attorney’s fees and costs was submitted upon the record and briefs on file. (Doc. No. 

26.)

I. Introduction

Plaintiff possessed the exclusive right to the nationwide commercial distribution of 

“„Mayhem‟ Floyd Mayweather, Jr. v. Marcos Rene Maidana, II WBC Lightweight Championship 

Fight Program” (―the Program‖) televised on September 14, 2013. On April 27, 2016, the court 

entered default judgment against defendants, holding defendants broadcasted the Program at 

Village Sports Bar & Grill without paying the requisite fees to plaintiff, thus violating 47 U.S.C. 

§ 605. (Doc. Nos. 23, 27.) Plaintiff now seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,797.50 and 

costs in the amount of $1,191.05 pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii).

II. Discussion

a. Attorney‟s Fees

Reasonable attorney’s fees are recoverable under 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii). The court 

determines the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees by applying the ―lodestar‖ method. Ferland 

v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001). The lodestar is calculated by 

multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a 

reasonable hourly rate. Id. ―In determining reasonable hours, counsel bears the burden of 

submitting detailed time records justifying the hours claimed to have been expended.‖ Chalmers 

v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986). ―Where the documentation of hours 

is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly.‖ Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 

U.S. 424, 433 (1983). A district court should also exclude from the lodestar fee calculation any 

hours that were not ―reasonably expended,‖ such as hours that are excessive, redundant, or 

otherwise unnecessary. See id. at 434; see also J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Napuri, No. C 10-

04171 SBA, 2013 WL 4428573, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013).

The district court must determine a reasonable hourly rate, considering the experience, 

skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees. Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1210. Reasonable 

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hourly rates are calculated by reference to ―prevailing market rates in the relevant community,‖ 

with a special emphasis on fees charged by lawyers of ―comparable skill, experience, and 

reputation.‖ Davis v. City of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1546 (9th Cir. 1992) vacated on 

other grounds by 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993). Generally, the forum district represents the 

relevant legal community. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992); see also 

Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008) (determining that ―generally, 

the relevant community [for the prevailing market rate] is the forum in which the district court 

sits‖); Mendenhall v. Nat‟l Transp. Safety Bd., 213 F.3d 464, 471 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled 

on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding the same).

The fee applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence ―that the requested 

rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of 

reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.‖ Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 

n.11 (1984). ―Affidavits of the plaintiff[’s] attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees 

in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the 

plaintiff[’s] attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.‖ United

Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Napuri, 

2013 WL 4428573, at *2.

Here, plaintiff requests a total of $2,797.50 in attorney’s fees. (Doc. No. 24-1, 

Declaration of Thomas P. Riley (―Riley Decl.‖), Exh. 1 at 10.)1 These fees consist of 3.15 hours 

of work at $500.00 per hour by Thomas P. Riley, Esq. (―Riley‖), 0.30 hours of work performed 

by an unidentified ―associate attorney‖ at $275.00 per hour, and 11.4 hours of work by an 

unidentified ―administrative assistant‖ at $100.00 per hour. (Id.)

Plaintiff submits the declaration of attorney Riley in support of its fee request and a chart 

describing the services rendered and hours billed. (Riley Decl. at ¶¶ 5–7, Exh. 1.) However, the 

entries in the chart are not based on contemporaneous billing records; instead according to 

attorney Riley’s declaration, ―[b]illable hours for legal services [were] reconstructed by way of a 

 

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Page numbers refer to ECF page number.

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thorough review of the files themselves‖ after services were rendered. (See id. at ¶ 6.) Riley 

declares that, ―[h]aving handled thousands of commercial signal privacy over the last decade and 

a half, we are most capable of calculating billable hours for legal services rendered. Our rates for 

legal, administrative, and paralegal time are well within the prevailing market rates for the 

Central District of California.‖ (Id.) Riley further states that he has been practicing law for over 

two decades, and that his firm has specialized in the civil prosecution of signal piracy claims 

since 1994. (Id. at ¶¶ 3–4.)

―Absent the submission of detailed contemporaneous time records justifying the hours 

claimed to have been expended on this case, the [c]ourt gives little weight to the figures provided 

by [p]laintiff.‖ Napuri, 2013 WL 4428573, at *2; see also Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Be, No. 

11-CV-01333-LHK, 2011 WL 5105375, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011) (―Without actual billing 

records, . . . the Court gives little weight to . . . figures‖ in a chart ―reconstructing‖ billable time); 

Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. White, No. C 11-01331 CW (JSC), 2011 WL 6749061, at *2 (N.D. 

Cal. Dec. 6, 2011) (―Because the billing records were not created contemporaneously, the Court 

finds that they are inherently less reliable‖); Zynga Game Network Inc. v. Erkan, No. 09-03264

SC, 2010 WL 3463630, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2010) (denying motion for attorneys’ fees 

where plaintiff failed to attach ―actual billing records‖).

Further, plaintiff’s showing regarding the hourly rates charged by the attorneys and staff 

in this case is ―woefully inadequate.‖ Napuri, 2013 WL 4428573, at *2. Plaintiff has made no 

effort to demonstrate that the hourly rates charged are reasonable in the Eastern District of 

California. Instead, attorney merely Riley declares that the rates are ―well within the prevailing 

rates for the Central District of California,‖ and attaches the Laffey Matrix to support this 

assertion, which establishes prevailing market rates in the ―District of Columbia.‖ (See Riley 

Decl., Exh. 2.) However, the Eastern District of California is clearly neither the Central District 

of California nor the District of Columbia. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to establish the 

prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community. See Gates, 987 F.2d at 1405. Plaintiff 

has not submitted an affidavit from any attorney that worked on this case or from any other 

attorney attesting to the prevailing rates in the Eastern District of California for similar services 

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by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation. See Davis, 976 F.2d at 

1546. Similarly, plaintiff has not submitted any evidence of hourly rate determinations in other 

similar cases in the Eastern District of California setting the rate of the attorneys seeking fees. 

See Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d at 407; see also Napuri, 2013 WL 4428573, at *2. Attorney 

Riley’s declaration, without any supporting evidence, fails to meet plaintiff’s burden to establish 

that the attorney billing rates sought are the prevailing market rates for the Eastern District of 

California.

Additionally, plaintiff offers no information or documentation justifying the rates 

requested, such as the curriculum vitae, résumé, or even the identities of the individuals who 

worked on this case other than Attorney Riley. As such, the court cannot determine the 

comparable skill, experience, and reputation of the attorneys involved. Davis, 976 F.2d at 1546. 

There is no indication whether the unidentified independent ―associate attorney‖ who worked on 

this case is admitted to practice law in California and, if so, when he or she was admitted to the 

practice of law. (See Riley Decl. at ¶ 7.) Nor has plaintiff provided a description of the 

―associate attorney’s‖ educational background or litigation experience.

For these reasons the court concludes that plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of 

demonstrating that the requested fee award is reasonable. Accordingly, plaintiff’s request for 

attorneys’ fees will be denied without prejudice.

b. Costs

47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii) requires that the court award ―full costs . . . to an aggrieved 

party who prevails.‖ Here, plaintiff seeks costs in the amount of $1,191.05, consisting of $400.00 

for the complaint filing fee, $120.00 for service of process charges, $21.05 for courier charges, 

and $650.00 for investigative expenses. 

Plaintiff provides no authority for the recovery of its investigative fees. Moreover, many 

courts have refused to award such pre-filing investigative fees to the prevailing party. See, e.g., 

Napuri, 2013 WL 4428573, at *3; Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Piacente, No. C-10-3429 CW 

(JCS), 2011 WL 2111467, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Schrader 

Rest. Corp., 485 F. Supp. 2d 422, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Further, plaintiff has provided no

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documentation to support the amount sought for courier charges.

Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to meet its burden to support its 

request for costs for the investigative expenses and courier charges. Plaintiffs request for costs 

will be granted as to $520.00 for the filing fee and service of process costs, and denied as to all 

other claimed costs.

III. Conclusion

For the above stated, plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees and costs (Doc. No. 24) is granted 

in part and denied in part as follows:

a. Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees is denied without prejudice to the filing of 

a properly supported motion within twenty-one days of the date of this order;

b. Plaintiff’s motion for costs is granted in part and denied in part without 

prejudice to the filing of a properly supported motion as to the denied costs 

within twenty-one days of the date of this order; and

c. Defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff’s cost in the amount of $520.00.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 18, 2016 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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