Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-50141/USCOURTS-ca9-15-50141-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carlos Herrera-Rivera
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CARLOS HERRERA-RIVERA,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-50141

D.C. No.

3:14-cr-00653-BEN

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 6, 2016*

Pasadena, California

Filed August 12, 2016

Before: A. Wallace Tashima, Barry G. Silverman and

Susan P. Graber, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Silverman;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Graber

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a conviction for possession of

methamphetamine with intent to distribute, vacated the

sentence, and remanded for further proceedings.

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing on the

defendant’s motion to suppress, where the motion was not

supported by a declaration from someone with knowledge

who was available for cross-examination at a hearing on the

motion, as required by the Southern District of California’s

Local Criminal Rule 47.1.

The panel held that the defendant’s contention that the

district court erred in applying Batson’s framework on his

challenge to the government’s striking the only AfricanAmerican juror is not supported by the record. 

The panel held that the district court did not clearly err in

denying a minor-role reduction at sentencing.

The panel held that the district court’s failure, in applying

an obstruction of justice enhancement, to explicitly find that

the defendant’s testimony was willful and material is plain

error affecting the defendant’s substantial rights.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA 3

Regarding the defendant’s contention that the government

failed to disclose its suspicion that the defendant was a longtime pedestrian narcotics smuggler, resulting in prejudice at

trial and at sentencing, the panel held that there was no basis

for reversal where counsel chose not to raise a valid objection

on this purely factual question. 

Judge Graber concurred in all respects except that she

would affirm the enhancement for obstruction of justice

because the defendant has not satisfied the requirements of

plain error review.

COUNSEL

Thomas P. Matthews, Law Office of Thomas P. Matthews,

San Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

D. Benjamin Holley, Assistant United States Attorney; Peter

Ko, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate

Section, Criminal Division; Laura E. Duffy, United States

Attorney; Office of the United States Attorney, San Diego,

California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

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4 UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA

OPINION

SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge:

Carlos Herrera-Rivera appeals his jury trial conviction for

possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and the 120-month

sentence imposed by the district court. Herrera-Rivera

contends that the district court erred by denying his request

for an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress, denying

his Batson challenge without conducting an appropriate

Batson analysis, and denying a minor-role reduction. He

further contends that the government withheld evidence,

resulting in prejudice both at trial and at sentencing. We

reject each of these contentions. However, we agree with

Herrera-Rivera that the district court plainly erred by

applying an obstruction of justice enhancement to his

sentence without making the express findings required by

United States v. Castro-Ponce, 770 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Accordingly, we affirm the conviction, vacate the sentence,

and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

I. Background

A. Facts

On February 13, 2014, an Intercalifornias bus was

referred to secondary inspection at the Highway 86 Indio

Border Patrol Station in Westmoreland, California. United

States Border Patrol agents boarded the bus, performed an

immigration inspection, and checked the bags in the overhead

compartment to make sure that each belonged to someone on

the bus. A few rows from the back of the bus, agents found

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UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA 5

an unclaimed backpack. Inside, they found six bundles

wrapped in black electrical tape. A subsequent laboratory

analysis showed that the bundles contained more than a

kilogram of methamphetamine.

Herrera-Rivera was sitting a few rows behind the bag and

had crossed the United States-Mexico border earlier that

morning. Agents searched Herrera-Rivera’s person, with his

consent, and discovered black marks on his stomach that they

believed were residue from electrical tape. Agents also

performed a search, with consent, of two cell phones they

found in Herrera-Rivera’s possession, that contained text

messages appearing to arrange a rendezvous and payment for

Herrera-Rivera’s return trip to Mexico.

The Border Patrol agents arrested Herrera-Rivera and

placed him in a holding cell. A few hours later, Drug

Enforcement Administration agents arrived at the Border

Patrol Station, read Herrera-Rivera his Miranda rights, and

interviewed him. Herrera-Rivera told the agents that when he

crossed the border that morning, he ran into a friend who

gave him a cell phone and sixty dollars and told him to get on

a bus to Calexico. When Herrera-Rivera arrived in Calexico,

his friend told him to get on the Intercalifornias bus. HerreraRivera also told the agents that he believed there were

narcotics on the bus because he knew his friend was involved

in trafficking.

The government filed a one count information charging

Herrera-Rivera with possession of methamphetamine with

intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

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6 UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA

B. Motion to Suppress

Herrera-Rivera filed a motion to suppress his statements,

arguing that the Border Patrol and DEA agents conducted a

deliberate two-step interrogation, in violation of Missouri v.

Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), and United States v. Williams,

435 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2006). The government’s response

was supported by two declarations, the first signed by a

Border Patrol agent and the second by a DEA agent, attesting

to its version of the facts surrounding Herrera-Rivera’s arrest. 

Herrera-Rivera, on the other hand, filed a declaration signed

by his lawyer, stating that counsel believed the facts alleged

in the motion were true, based on his conversations with

Herrera-Rivera.

The district court denied Herrera-Rivera’s motion to

suppress without holding an evidentiary hearing. The court

ruled that it was not required to hold a hearing because

Herrera-Rivera had failed to support his motion with a

declaration by someone with knowledge who was available

for cross-examination, as required by the Southern District of

California’s Local Criminal Rules. The court then found,

based on the agents’ declarations, that Herrera-Rivera was not

in custody when he was questioned by Border Patrol. Thus,

no Miranda warning was required, nor had there been any

impermissible two-step interrogation.

C. Voir Dire

Herrera-Rivera proceeded to trial. At the close of voir

dire, the government used a peremptory strike to remove

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UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA 7

Juror 101from the venire. Herrera-Rivera raised a Batson

challenge, arguing that Juror 10 was the only AfricanAmerican male in the jury pool. The government explained

that it struck Juror 10 because it believed he might be

sympathetic to the defense. In support, it stated that Juror 10

had been convicted of assault and that his mother, father, and

brother were drug users. The district court denied the Batson

challenge, saying that “it appears there is a nondiscriminatory

basis for the challenge. It doesn’t appear to be pretextual.” 

The court later expanded on its ruling, saying:

[J]ust to make sure we have a clear record,

[defense counsel] had made a Batson

challenge to the government’s exclusion of

Juror No. 10, I believe. It seemed to me that

it was pretty clear that there was a prima

faci[e] showing of race. He was the only

black male juror in the pool, and [defense

counsel] so pointed out. . . However, [the

government] stated a race neutral – what I

thought was a race neutral, nondiscriminatory

basis for [the] challenge. And given the

witness’s answers, it appeared to me that the

exclusion was not based on racial grounds, but

rather based on his experiences in the past.

1

In his brief, Herrera-Rivera claims that the government used

peremptory strikes to remove two African-American jurors. This is

incorrect. The record shows that there were two African-Americans in the

jury pool, one male and one female. The government struck Juror 10, the

male. It did not strike Juror 29, the female. Moreover, Herrera-Rivera

raised only one Batson challenge in the district court.

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8 UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA

D. Trial

The government’s case-in-chief consisted, in large part,

of the facts detailed above. Herrera-Rivera testified in his

own defense, and told the jury the following: He left his

home in Mexico on February 12, 2014 because he was having

a fight with his wife. His plan was to go to Las Vegas to stay

with his sister. He crossed the border on February 13, 2014,

and was sent to secondary inspection and strip-searched. 

After crossing the border, he ran into his cousin, who gave

him sixty dollars to help him get to his sister’s home. 

Herrera-Rivera then boarded a bus to Los Angeles, where he

could catch a connecting bus to Las Vegas.

Herrera-Rivera also told the jury that he did not know

anything about the bag and that he did not make the

incriminating statements to the DEA agents. His personal

cell phone would not work in the United States and,

consequently, he had borrowed the second phone from a

friend. But he had not sent the incriminating text messages. 

Moreover, the black marks on his stomach were paint that he

had gotten on his skin while painting a fence the day he left

home.

The government was able to impeach parts of HerreraRivera’s testimony, using his prior statements to the Border

Patrol and DEA agents, statements he made during a second

interview a few months after his arrest, and the testimony of

a Border Patrol agent who claimed that Herrera-Rivera had

not been strip-searched when he crossed the border.

On December 11, 2014, the jury found Herrera-Rivera

guilty.

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UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA 9

E. Sentencing

The district court imposed sentence on March 23, 2015. 

At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the district court

asked the parties whether Herrera-Rivera was entitled to a

minor-role reduction. Herrera-Rivera had not specifically

requested a minor-role reduction in his sentencing paper. 

However, when prompted, Herrera-Rivera’s lawyer said that

he would “defer to the court,” that there was no direct

evidence of possession, and that Herrera-Rivera was likely an

intermediate figure tasked with transporting the

methamphetamine from one point to another. The

government opposed the reduction, arguing that the burden

was on Herrera-Rivera to prove that he was a minor

participant and that his word was not credible. Moreover, the

government told the court that Herrera-Rivera “came to [the

government’s] attention and was on [its] radar because there

was a look-out on him being a long-time pedestrian narcotics

smuggler.” When the district court observed that it was

hearing this information for the first time, defense counsel

interjected and said, “And, for the record, I didn’t know of it,

either. I know he crossed for work purposes daily, but I

wasn’t aware of any information that he was crossing drugs

before.” However, counsel did not raise any formal

objection, move to strike, complain about a lack of discovery,

seek a continuance, or anything of the sort. The district court

denied the minor-role reduction, saying “I don’t think that

there is sufficient evidence before this court for the court to

find that after looking at the totality of the circumstances, the

defendant was substantially less culpable than the average

participant.”

The government then argued that an obstruction of justice

enhancement was warranted because Herrera-Rivera had

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10 UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA

committed perjury at trial. Defense counsel responded that

the enhancement was not justified, as it would unfairlypunish

Herrera-Rivera for exercising his right to testify. The district

court applied the enhancement, saying:

[T]he defendant has the right to testify . . . and

the defendant has a right to present a defense. 

But the defendant does not have a right to

either attempt to mislead the court or to

commit perjuryor to obstruct the proceedings. 

And I recall his testimony. And I remember

when he was testifying, thinking to myself

that it was – to put it kindly, tenuous at best.

The district court calculated a guidelines range of

235–293 months and sentenced Herrera-Rivera to 120

months.

II. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review

the district court’s denial of Herrera-Rivera’s request for an

evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress for an abuse of

discretion. See United States v. Wardlow, 951 F.2d 1115,

1116 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). We review de novo

whether the district court properly applied Batson. See

United States v. Alvarez-Ulloa, 784 F.3d 558, 565 (9th Cir.

2015). A district court’s minor-role determination is

reviewed for clear error. See United States v. RodriguezCastro, 641 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2011). We ordinarily

review a district court’s factual findings for purposes of an

obstruction of justice sentence enhancement for clear error. 

See United States v. Castro-Ponce, 770 F.3d 819, 821 (9th

Cir. 2014). Because Herrera-Rivera did not object to the

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UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA 11

district court’s findings on the obstruction of justice

enhancement, we review those findings for plain error. See

Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial

rights may be considered even though it was not brought to

the court’s attention.”); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,

732–37 (1993). Under the plain error standard of review,

“reversal is warranted only where there has been (1) error;

(2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and

(4) where the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v.

Pelisamen, 641 F.3d 399, 404 (9th Cir. 2011). We agree with

Herrera-Rivera that, under this standard, the district court’s

failure to make express factual findings to support the

enhancement was plain error.

III. Discussion

A. The Motion to Suppress

Herrera-Rivera argues that the district court abused its

discretion by denying his request for an evidentiary hearing

on his motion to suppress. The Southern District of

California’s Local Criminal Rule 47.1 states that “[c]riminal

motions requiring a predicate factual finding must be

supported by declaration(s).” S.D. Cal. Crim. R. 47.1(g)(1). 

“Each declarant in support of and in opposition to criminal

motions must be made available for cross-examination at the

hearing of the motion.” S.D. Cal. Crim. R. 47.1(g)(4). 

Furthermore, “[t]he court need not grant an evidentiary

hearing where either party fails to properly support its motion

or opposition.” S.D. Cal. Crim. R. 47.1(g)(1).

Herrera-Rivera’s motion was not supported by a

declaration from someone with knowledge who was available

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12 UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA

for cross-examination at a hearing on the motion. Rather,

defense counsel filed his own declaration stating that he

believed the facts alleged in the motion were true, based on

his conversations with Herrera-Rivera. We have previously

held that a declaration signed by counsel is insufficient to

meet the requirements of the Central District of California’s

equivalent local rule,2

see Wardlow, 951 F.2d at 1116, and we

follow that holding today. Because Herrera-Rivera failed to

meet the requirements of Rule 47.1, there were no contested

issues of fact, properly joined, that necessitated holding an

evidentiary hearing to resolve the motion. Thus, the district

court did not abuse its discretion by denying the request for

a hearing.

B. The Batson Challenge

Herrera-Rivera argues that the district court erred by

failing to conduct step three of the required three-step Batson

analysis. “Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the

venire violates a defendant’s right to equal protection because

it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to

secure.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986). In

ruling on a Batson challenge, a district court must apply a

three-part framework:

2 The Central District of California’s equivalent local rule states: “A

motion to suppress shall be supported by a declaration on behalf of the

defendant, setting forth all facts then known and upon which it is

contended the motion should be granted. The declaration shall contain

only such facts as would be admissible in evidence and shall show

affirmatively that the declarant is competent to testify to the matters stated

therein.” Wardlow, 951 F.2d at 1116 n.1 (alteration omitted) (quoting

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Central

District of California R. 9.2 (1985)).

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UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA 13

First, a defendant must make a prima facie

showing that a peremptory challenge has been

exercised on the basis of race; second, if that

showing has been made, the prosecution must

offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror

in question; and third, in light of the parties’

submissions, the trial court must determine

whether the defendant has shown purposeful

discrimination.

Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747 (2016). “The court

cannot simply accept the prosecutor’s reasons as facially

neutral and stop there; it must make an explicit determination

at the third step.” Alvarez-Ulloa, 784 F.3d at 565.

Herrera-Rivera’s contention that the district court erred in

applying Batson’s framework is not supported by the record. 

On the contrary, the district court explicitly found that the

government’s proffered reasons for striking the only AfricanAmerican male from the panel were not pretextual and that

the strike was based on the juror’s having a criminal history

and having family members who used drugs, rather than on

his race. There is no evidence in the record that the

government was concerned about Juror 10’s race, and

Herrera-Rivera cannot point to panelists not struck who were

similarly situated to Juror 10. See id. at 567 (noting that

“failure to strike similarly situated venire members can

ground a conclusion that purposeful discrimination

occurred”). Although several potential jurors reported that

they had family members who used drugs, none revealed that

they had been convicted of a crime. Thus, the government’s

concern that Juror 10 might be sympathetic to the defense due

to his prior conviction and relationship to drug users did not

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14 UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA

apply with equal force to any juror who was permitted to

serve.

C. The Minor-Role Reduction

Herrera-Rivera argues that the district court erred by

denying a minor-role reduction. A defendant qualifies for a

minor-role reduction if he is “substantially less culpable than

the average participant.” Rodriguez-Castro, 641 F.3d at

1193. “In addition, it is well established that the defendant

bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to a downward

adjustment based on his role in the offense.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and alteration omitted).

The district court did not clearly err by finding that

Herrera-Rivera failed to carry his burden of showing that he

was entitled to a minor-role reduction. As is noted above,

Herrera-Rivera did not request a minor-role reduction at

sentencing. Rather, the district court raised the issue on its

own. And, when prompted by the court, defense counsel

stated only that he would “defer to the court,” that there was

no direct evidence of possession, and that Herrera-Rivera was

likely an intermediate figure tasked with transporting the

methamphetamine from one point to another. In light of

counsel’s sparse presentation, we agree with the district court

that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that

Herrera-Rivera was “substantially less culpable than the

average participant.” Id.

D. The Obstruction of Justice Enhancement

Herrera-Rivera argues that the district court erred by

enhancing his sentence without making express findings on

each element of obstruction of justice, as required by United

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UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA 15

States v. Castro-Ponce, 770 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 2014). A

defendant’s base offense level may be increased by twolevels if the defendant “willfully obstructed or impeded, or

attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of

justice. . . “ U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. However, for perjury to be

deemed obstruction, the district court must make express

findings that: “(1) the defendant gave false testimony, (2) on

a material matter, (3) with willful intent.” Castro-Ponce,

770 F.3d at 822.

In Castro-Ponce, we held that a district court’s failure to

make the required findings on each element of perjury is

reversible error.

Absent a requirement of express findings on

all three prongs necessary for perjury to

amount to obstruction of justice, we would

have to speculate about the district court’s

legal conclusions on obstruction. Rather than

engage in such speculation, we require the

fact-finder to make those determinations

explicitly for our review.

Id. Where the district court fails to make express factual

findings of perjury, the defendant’s substantial rights to take

the stand and testify in his own defense may be chilled,

calling the fairness and integrity of the proceedings into

question. As we explained in Castro-Ponce:

Obstruction of justice is a serious charge, and

requires serious proof. To enhance a

guidelines sentencing range based on

obstruction of justice, which often results in

more time served in prison, a district court

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16 UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA

must make explicit findings that not only did

the defendant give false testimony, but also

that the falsehoods were willful and material

to the criminal charges. We decline to adopt

a more forgiving standard, which could have

the unintended consequence of chilling a

criminal defendant’s willingness to take the

stand and give testimony in his or her defense. 

To require explicit findings on elements

needed for the obstruction of justice

enhancement helps ensure reliability and

reviewability of a sentencing decision.

Id. at 823.

A good argument can be made that Castro-Ponce applies

too rigid of a rule. However, whatever one might think of the

correctness of Castro-Ponce, no one can doubt its clarity. In

fact, it could not be clearer: the district court must make

express findings on each element of perjury, in the first

instance, before applying an obstruction of justice

enhancement based on a defendant’s testimony at trial. And

as a three-judge panel, we are bound by that holding. See

Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc). Moreover, we note that our approach today is

consistent with our precedents prior to Castro-Ponce, see

United States v. Jimenez-Ortega, 472 F.3d 1102, 1103–04

(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that “we must remand where the

district court failed to make a finding on” materiality), as well

as the approach taken by some of our sister circuits. See

United States v. Kamper, 748 F.3d 728, 748 (6th Cir. 2014)

(reasoning that presuming that the elements of perjury are

satisfied in the absence of specific findings in the district

court raises the risk of “undermining a criminal defendant’s

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UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA 17

constitutional right to testify on his own behalf”); United

States v. Massey, 48 F.3d 1560, 1573–74 (10th Cir. 1995)

(requiring the district court to make findings on willfulness

and materiality).

Herrera-Rivera argued that the obstruction of justice

enhancement should not be applied to his sentence because it

would unfairly punish him for exercising his right to testify. 

The district court rejected this argument and applied the

enhancement, stating that it remembered Herrera-Rivera’s

trial testimony and that it was “to put it kindly, tenuous at

best.” Even if we were to deem this an express finding that

Herrera-Rivera gave false testimony, the fact would remain

that the district court failed to explicitly find that the

testimony was also willful and material. We require the

district court to make express findings as to each element of

perjury in order to preserve the fairness and integrity of the

sentencing process. Failure to do so here is plain error

because, as we have explained above, it affects HerreraRivera’s substantial rights. For these reasons, we conclude

that the sentence must be vacated.

The government concedes the error. It argues, however,

that the error did not affect Herrera-Rivera’s substantial rights

because the district court ultimately imposed a sentence

below the advisory Guidelines range. We reject this

contention. As the Supreme Court recently held, “[w]hen a

defendant is sentenced under an incorrect Guidelines

range—whether or not the defendant’s ultimate sentence falls

within the correct range—the error itself can, and most often

will, be sufficient to show a reasonable probability of a

different outcome absent the error.” Molina-Martinez v.

United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016). Because we see

no reason to depart from Molina-Martinez, we vacate the

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18 UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA

obstruction of justice enhancement and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

E. Undisclosed Evidence

Herrera-Rivera contends that the government failed to

disclose its suspicion that he was a long-time pedestrian

narcotics smuggler, resulting in prejudice at trial and at

sentencing. The government responds that the challenged

evidence was, in fact, disclosed. This dispute stands in stark

contrast to the other issues raised by this appeal in that it

presents a purely factual, as opposed to legal, question. 

Unlike, for example, the obstruction of justice enhancement

we vacated above, we cannot simply read the record and

determine whether things proceeded as they should have

under our precedents. If this were the task, we could

determine whether there has been a violation of Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the rules of discovery, see

Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 16, or due process, see United States v.

Vanderwerfhorst, 576 F.3d 929, 935 (9th Cir. 2009). But this

is not what we are asked to do. Instead, we are asked to

determine, in the first instance, whether or not the

government disclosed its suspicions about Herrera-Rivera’s

past border crossings.

Defense counsel supposedly believed—maybe correctly,

maybe not—that the government had potentially withheld

evidence to which he was entitled. However, defense counsel

did not object to the district court considering the information

during sentencing or ask for a continuance so that he could

investigate and determine whether anything had been

withheld. Nor did defense counsel file a motion for new trial,

arguing that the government had withheld material evidence

in violation of Brady or the rules of discovery. Instead, he

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UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA 19

simply observed that he had not previously heard of the

government’s suspicions, was content to allow the district

court to go forward with sentencing, and then raised this

undeveloped issue for the first time on appeal.

“[T]he contemporaneous-objection rule prevents a litigant

from ‘sandbagging’ the court—remaining silent about his

objection and belatedly raising the error only if the case does

not conclude in his favor.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S.

129, 134 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is

exactly what has occurred here. Counsel opted to proceed

with sentencing armed with the information he had. Even

assuming he could have raised a valid objection (a totally

speculative assumption at that) counsel chose not to do so. If

counsel’s choice can be shown to have been both deficient

performance and prejudicial, an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim can be asserted on collateral review. However,

it is no basis to reverse in this direct appeal.

F. Reassignment on Remand

Herrera-Rivera requests that we assign his case to a

different district court judge on remand. “Although we

generally remand for resentencing to the original district

judge, we remand to a different judge if there are unusual

circumstances.” United States v. Quach, 302 F.3d 1096, 1103

(9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). No such

circumstances are present here.

IV. Conclusion

AFFIRMED in part; VACATED in part; and

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

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20 UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA

GRABER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in

part:

With respect to the claim that the district court erred by

enhancing Defendant’s sentence for obstruction of justice, I

would affirm because Defendant has not satisfied the

requirements of plain error review. In all other respects, I

concur.

Defendant did not raise to the district court, and therefore

did not preserve, his claim regarding the sentencing

enhancement for obstruction of justice. “We review

unpreserved claims of procedural error at sentencing for plain

error.” United States v. Quintero-Junco, 754 F.3d 746, 749

(9th Cir. 2014). Plain error review requires the defendant to

show: (1) that there was an error; (2) that the error was plain;

(3) that the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights;

and (4) that the error “seriously affected the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 

United States v. Macias, 789 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2015),

cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1168 (2016) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Moreover, the defendant, not the government,

“bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” 

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). Defendant

has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate prejudice.

To support the obstruction-of-justice enhancement, the

district court was required to make express findings that

“(1) the defendant gave false testimony, (2) on a material

matter, (3) with willful intent.” United States v. CastroPonce, 770 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The district court erred by not making all

three findings expressly, and the error was plain. But the

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UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA 21

analysis cannot stop there; those are only the first two of the

four elements of reversible plain error.

In my view, the district court did find—albeit in

colloquial terms—that Defendant had testified falsely and

that he did so with willful intent. When applying the

sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice, the court

stated that, although “the defendant has the right to testify,

. . . the defendant does not have a right to either attempt to

mislead the court or to commit perjury or to obstruct the

proceedings.” The court’s clear meaning was that Defendant

did attempt to mislead the court, commit perjury, and obstruct

the proceedings. And the court further commented that

Defendant’s testimony “was—to put it kindly, tenuous at

best”; that’s a polite way to say that he lied.

As to the third requirement, materiality, the court did not

make a finding. But on this record there can be no doubt that

Defendant’s willfully false testimony related to a material

issue. Defendant repeatedly denied that the drug-filled

backpack was in his possession and denied that he had

brought the backpack onto the bus. Despite Defendant’s

testimony, the jury found that the backpack was his. The

false testimony went to the heart of the case.

The majority makes two mistakes, in my view. The first

is to rely on precedent pertaining to an incorrect Guidelines

calculation, Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct.

1338 (2016). Maj. op. at 17–18. This case is not about an

incorrect calculation; it is about the applicability of an

enhancement that (like the underlying range) was correctly

calculated.

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22 UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA

The majority’s second mistake is its failure to analyze

fully the third and fourth elements of plain error review. I

agree with the majority that the length of the sentence

imposed is not the proper measure and that the government’s

argument in that regard is unpersuasive. Maj. op. at 17–18. 

But we have an independent obligation to review the entire

record to determine whether Defendant has met his burden to

show prejudice. The majority’s failure to do so puts us at

odds with at least one sister circuit. See United States v.

Chibuko, 744 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam)

(reviewing for plain error a district court’s erroneous failure

to make the requisite findings to support an obstruction-ofjustice sentencing enhancement and affirming on the ground

that “the record as a whole” demonstrated that the lack of

more detailed findings caused no prejudice).1 There is no

good reason to create a circuit split; our sister circuit’s

holistic approach is consistent with our own precedent that

we review for plain error an unpreserved claim of a

procedural flaw at sentencing and that actual prejudice is

required for a defendant to obtain a remand.

Although the majority purports to apply the plain-error

framework, the practical effect of its holding is to require a

remand in every case in which a district court applies the

obstruction of justice enhancement but makes incomplete

findings. The majority reasons generically that a defendant’s

“substantial rights” to take the stand and testify “may be

1

See also United States v. Martinez, 547 F. App’x 559, 563 (5th Cir.

2013) (per curiam) (unpublished) (applying the same analysis and

affirming on the ground that “the record demonstrate[d] that [the

defendant’s] testimony was false, material, and willful”). But, pursuant

to Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, unpublished opinions issued after January 1,

1996, are not precedential except in limited circumstances that do not

apply here.

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UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA 23

chilled” when the district court fails to make express factual

findings of perjury and that this chilling effect calls into

question the fairness and integrity of the proceedings. Maj.

op. at 15. That reasoning would apply automatically in every

similar case and it abdicates our responsibility to examine

actual prejudice, that is, to determine whether a particular

failure to make a particular finding made any difference to

the application of the enhancement to a particular defendant. 

The majority nowhere undertakes that required review.

Nor does Castro-Ponce, 770 F.3d at 821–22, support the

majority’s reasoning or result. We did not review for plain

error in that case, so it does not control. Instead—presumably

because Castro-Ponce had objected below to the imposition

of the obstruction enhancement—we reviewed for clear error

the findings that the district court made and reviewed de novo

that court’s characterization of the defendant’s conduct as

constituting obstruction of justice. Id.2 Unlike Defendant

here, Castro-Ponce did not have to demonstrate prejudice. 

The majority’s wholesale importation of the Castro-Ponce

discussion, without considering the plain error context in

which the question arises here and without coming to grips

with the requirement that Defendant show actual prejudice,

eviscerates the plain error standard. In essentially every

plain-error case, we depart from the standard of review

otherwise employed when the defendant preserved the issue. 

By ignoring that distinction, the majority’s reasoning

conflicts not only with the analysis applied by our sister

circuit in identical circumstances, but also with our own

plain-error precedents.

2

In fact, none of the cases cited by the majority at pages 16–17 reviewed

for plain error; all reviewed for preserved error.

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24 UNITED STATES V. HERRERA-RIVERA

Because the district court found that Defendant’s

testimony was willfully false, and because the record

demonstrates that Defendant’s testimony was false, related to

a material matter, and willful, he cannot satisfy his burden to

show that the district court’s error—making incomplete

findings—was prejudicial. Accordingly, the third and fourth

elements of reversible plain error are lacking. The error did

not affect Defendant’s substantial rights, and the error did not

seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

the proceedings. I therefore dissent from the majority’s

contrary holding.

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