Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-01337/USCOURTS-caDC-11-01337-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Erie Brush & Manufacturing Corp.
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent
Service Employees International Union Local 1
Intervenor for Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 15, 2012 Decided November 27, 2012 

No. 11-1337 

ERIE BRUSH & MANUFACTURING CORP., 

PETITIONER

v. 

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 

RESPONDENT

SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 1, 

INTERVENOR

Consolidated with 11-1416 

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application 

for Enforcement of an Order of the 

National Labor Relations Board 

 Irving M. Geslewitz argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for petitioner. 

USCA Case #11-1337 Document #1406710 Filed: 11/27/2012 Page 1 of 13
2 

Zachary R. Henige, Attorney, National Labor Relations 

Board, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the 

brief were John H. Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, 

Linda Dreeben, Deputy Associate General Counsel, and 

Robert J. Englehart, Supervisory Attorney. 

 Leslie Ward argued the cause and filed the brief for 

intervenor. 

 Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, HENDERSON and 

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges. 

 Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SENTELLE. 

SENTELLE, Chief Judge: Erie Brush & Manufacturing 

Corporation (“Erie”) petitions for review of a National Labor 

Relations Board (“NLRB” or “the Board”) decision finding 

that Erie violated section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor 

Relations Act (“the Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5). See 

Erie Brush & Manufacturing Corp. and Service Employees 

International Union, Local 1, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 2011 WL 

3860605 (Aug. 9, 2011) (“Board Decision”). NLRB crosspetitions for enforcement of its order. Erie challenges the 

Board’s finding of unlawful refusal to bargain, arguing that 

the parties were at a bargaining impasse. Alternatively, Erie 

argues that even if we uphold the Board’s finding of an unfair 

labor practice, the bargaining remedy imposed exceeded the 

Board’s authority. Because we conclude that substantial 

evidence does not support the Board’s decision, we grant the 

petition for review and vacate the Board’s decision and order. 

We need not decide the challenge to the Board’s remedy. 

USCA Case #11-1337 Document #1406710 Filed: 11/27/2012 Page 2 of 13
3 

I. BACKGROUND 

Erie manufactures washing and polishing brushes at its 

facility in Chicago, Illinois. The Seventh Circuit enforced a 

previous NLRB order requiring Erie to recognize and bargain 

with the Service Employees International Union, Local 1 

(“the Union”) for at least one year. NLRB v. Erie Brush & 

Manufacturing Corp., 406 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2005). Erie 

began negotiations with the Union on June 28, 2005. At the 

parties’ first meeting, the Union’s chief negotiator, Charles 

Bridgemon, asked that the parties discuss noneconomic issues 

before economic ones, and Erie’s chief negotiator, Irving M. 

Geslewitz, agreed. Between June 28, 2005 and March 31, 

2006, the parties met on eight occasions and reached 

agreement on all noneconomic issues except two: union 

security and arbitration of grievances. The Union insisted on 

including union security and arbitration clauses in the 

contract. Erie was equally committed to an open shop and 

opposed to arbitration. During the meetings, Bridgemon 

repeatedly told Geslewitz that the Union had no room to 

compromise on union security or arbitration, calling those 

issues “make or break on [the] whole contract” and saying 

that the Union “can’t work on these things” and “there 

wouldn’t be a contract without a union security clause.” 

Geslewitz was just as adamant, refusing to agree to a contract 

that contained union security or arbitration provisions. 

At the March 31 meeting, Bridgemon repeated a previous 

offer to modify his position on arbitration if Geslewitz would 

agree to change the contract’s no-strike provision, but 

Geslewitz again declined the offer. Bridgemon, according to 

his own testimony, told Geslewitz that he felt the parties were 

at an impasse on union security and arbitration, and Geslewitz 

agreed. Bridgemon suggested mediation, and Geslewitz said 

he would consult with Erie’s president on the prospect of 

USCA Case #11-1337 Document #1406710 Filed: 11/27/2012 Page 3 of 13
4 

mediation even though he saw no potential middle ground on 

those two issues. 

The parties next corresponded in a series of emails, 

beginning on April 5, 2006, when Geslewitz wrote to 

Bridgemon that Erie would not agree to mediation because 

neither party was willing to compromise on union security or 

arbitration, rendering mediation futile. Over a month later, on 

May 10, Bridgemon responded and suggested they negotiate 

economic issues and come back to the noneconomic ones. On 

May 26, Geslewitz asked whether the Union’s positions on 

union security or arbitration had changed, because otherwise 

further negotiations would be pointless. Bridgemon’s May 31 

response stated that he was “willing to continue to discuss the 

union security and arbitration issues with the local,” and he 

again requested a meeting. Geslewitz’s June 1 email asked 

whether Bridgemon had authorization to change his position 

and if so, whether he had a proposal to offer. A day later, 

Bridgemon said he had “some give on the arbitration issue” 

but not on union security, and declined to provide a proposal. 

Geslewitz responded that it was still pointless to meet unless 

union security was on the table, and that he wanted more 

information in the form of a proposal. 

 

Nine days later, on June 16, the Union threatened to file 

an unfair labor practice charge, and shortly thereafter, the 

parties scheduled a meeting for July 24. But on July 5, an 

employee who was a member of the bargaining unit delivered 

to Erie’s president a handwritten document signed by 18 of 21 

bargaining unit employees. The document stated (in Spanish) 

that the employees of Erie (most of whom have Spanish 

surnames) did not want to be represented by the Union. 

Based upon this petition, Geslewitz informed Bridgemon that 

Erie was withdrawing recognition and canceling the July 24 

meeting. 

USCA Case #11-1337 Document #1406710 Filed: 11/27/2012 Page 4 of 13
5 

After the Union brought unfair labor practice charges, the 

Board’s General Counsel issued a complaint. An NLRB 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Erie had 

violated section 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to bargain with the 

Union between May 10 and June 21, 2006. Board Decision at 

12 (ALJ Op.). The ALJ held that this refusal to bargain 

tainted the employees’ decertification petition, so that Erie’s 

withdrawal of recognition of the Union also violated section 

8(a)(5) and (1). Id. 

Erie filed exceptions to the ALJ’s findings. A divided 

Board affirmed the ALJ’s findings and order with only minor 

modifications. See id. at 1–5 (Board Op.). Member Hayes 

dissented from the Board’s decision, stating that because the 

parties were at a bona fide impasse on union security and 

arbitration, he would reverse the ALJ’s finding of unlawful 

refusal to bargain. Id. at 9 (Dissenting Op.). 

 

As a remedy, the Board ordered Erie to cease and desist 

from refusing to bargain. Id. at 4–5 (Board Op.), 13 (ALJ 

Op.). The Board ordered Erie to recognize and bargain with 

the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of Erie 

employees for at least six months. Id. Finally, the Board 

required Erie to physically post and electronically distribute a 

notice announcing that Erie would no longer engage in 

violations of the Act. Id. 

Erie petitions this court for review, arguing that the 

Board’s finding of unlawful refusal to bargain was not 

supported by substantial evidence in the record. In addition, 

Erie challenges the propriety of the Board’s affirmative 

bargaining order. 

USCA Case #11-1337 Document #1406710 Filed: 11/27/2012 Page 5 of 13
6 

II. DISCUSSION 

Section 8(a)(5) of the Act prohibits an employer from 

“refus[ing] to bargain collectively with the representatives of 

his employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). The obligation to 

“bargain collectively” requires “the employer and the 

representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times 

and confer in good faith with respect to . . . the negotiation of 

an agreement,” but it “does not compel either party to agree to 

a proposal or require the making of a concession.” Id. § 

158(d). The bargaining obligation is suspended temporarily 

when the parties reach a lawful impasse. Serramonte 

Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 86 F.3d 227, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

A lawful impasse “occurs when ‘good faith negotiations have 

exhausted the prospects of concluding an agreement.’” 

TruServ Corp. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 1105, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 

2001) (quoting Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 NLRB 475, 478 

(1967)). In other words, impasse exists if the parties “are 

warranted in assuming that further bargaining would be 

futile.” Id. (quoting Wycoff Steel, Inc., 303 NLRB 517, 523 

(1991)) (internal quotation mark omitted). A violation of 

section 8(a)(5) results in a derivative violation of section 

8(a)(1), which makes it unlawful for an employer “to interfere 

with . . . employees in the exercise of” their section 7 rights. 

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1); see id. § 157; Wayneview Care Center 

v. NLRB, 664 F.3d 341, 347 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 

This court must affirm Board findings if they are 

“supported by substantial evidence on the record considered 

as a whole.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). Though our review of 

NLRB decisions is “highly deferential,” Parsippany Hotel 

Management Co. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 413, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1996), 

we will not “merely rubber-stamp NLRB decisions.” Avecor, 

Inc. v. NLRB, 931 F.2d 924, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Indeed, we 

bear the “responsibility to examine carefully both the Board’s 

USCA Case #11-1337 Document #1406710 Filed: 11/27/2012 Page 6 of 13
7 

findings and its reasoning.” Id. (quoting Peoples Gas System, 

Inc. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). 

With this responsibility in mind, we turn our attention to 

the Board’s finding that Erie unlawfully refused to bargain 

with the Union. Erie objects to this finding, arguing that the 

parties were at a bargaining impasse on March 31, 2006, after 

their final in-person meeting. After review of the record, we 

conclude that the record evidence not only does not support 

the Board’s finding, but uniformly supports Erie’s position. 

 

Impasse on a single critical issue can create an impasse 

on the entire agreement. See CalMat Co., 331 NLRB 1084, 

1097 (2000). A party asserting impasse based on a single 

issue must show that: first, a good-faith bargaining impasse 

actually existed; second, the single issue involved was 

critical; and third, “the impasse on this critical issue led to a 

breakdown in the overall negotiations.” Id. The Board does 

not dispute that Erie established the second CalMat factor: 

union security was a critical issue. See Board Decision at 2; 

Resp’t Br. at 26. 

On the first factor, the Board found that Erie failed to 

establish the existence of a good-faith bargaining impasse 

before May 10. The Board explained that Bridgemon’s 

suggestion of mediation on March 31 “show[ed] that he did 

not believe that further bargaining over either issue would be 

futile.” Board Decision at 2. The Board took Bridgemon’s 

promise to continue discussing the issues with the Union as 

evidence that the Union’s positions on union security and 

arbitration were “gradually softening.” Id. at 3. 

The Board’s finding of no impasse on union security or 

arbitration, however, is unsupported by substantial evidence. 

Considerations bearing on the existence of an impasse include 

USCA Case #11-1337 Document #1406710 Filed: 11/27/2012 Page 7 of 13
8 

“the bargaining history, the good faith of the parties in 

negotiations, the length of the negotiations, the importance of 

the issue or issues as to which there is disagreement, [and] the 

contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state 

of negotiations.” TruServ, 254 F.3d at 1114 (quoting Taft, 

163 NLRB at 478) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this 

case, the evidence overwhelmingly points to the existence of 

an impasse on March 31. The parties had negotiated over a 

period of ten months, and had agreed to discuss noneconomic 

issues before moving on to economic ones. At no point 

during the ten month negotiation did either party propose a 

compromise on union security or arbitration that was 

acceptable to the other party. The Board did not rely on any 

bad faith by the parties, see Resp’t Br. at 26 n.8, and it did not 

question the importance of union security or arbitration. Both 

parties understood bargaining to be at an impasse on March 

31: Bridgemon, the Union’s bargaining representative, 

explicitly stated that he viewed the negotiations as being at an 

impasse, and Geslewitz, the company’s representative, 

agreed. 

The Board pointed to two pieces of evidence in its 

finding of no impasse. First, the Board took Bridgemon’s 

suggestion of mediation to mean that Bridgemon considered 

further bargaining on union security and arbitration 

potentially productive. But we have held that “a vague 

request by one party for additional meetings, if 

unaccompanied by an indication of the areas in which that 

party foresees future concessions, is . . . insufficient to defeat 

an impasse where the other party has clearly announced that 

its position is final.” TruServ, 254 F.3d at 1117. On March 

31, Bridgemon offered no possibility of future concessions on 

union security or arbitration. In fact, quite to the contrary: 

Bridgemon explicitly stated that the parties were “at impasse” 

on union security and arbitration, told Geslewitz that he had 

USCA Case #11-1337 Document #1406710 Filed: 11/27/2012 Page 8 of 13
9 

no room to compromise on those issues, and suggested an 

arbitration proposal that Erie had already repeatedly rejected. 

Even assuming the Union’s recycling of an already-declined 

arbitration proposal constituted a “softening” of its position 

on arbitration, the Union had not budged on union security as 

of March 31. We agree with the Board’s dissenting member 

that the “mere invocation” of mediation does not “somehow 

magically ward[] off a deadlock.” Board Decision at 8 

(Dissenting Op.). 

Second, the Board relied upon Bridgemon’s statement 

that he would continue discussing the issues with the Union. 

Id. at 3 (Board Op.). But Bridgemon made no such statement 

on March 31. Bridgemon made a promise to continue 

discussing the issues with the Union on March 3, but on 

March 31, he made no such promise, and stated that he 

considered the negotiations at an impasse. Bridgemon made a 

similar promise on May 31, but we have recently reiterated 

that the Board cannot rely on a party’s “post-impasse 

conduct” to find no impasse. Laurel Bay Health & 

Rehabilitation Center v. NLRB, 666 F.3d 1365, 1375 (D.C. 

Cir. 2012). Even if Bridgemon had made a contemporaneous 

promise, a negotiating agent’s bare promise to continue 

discussing with his principal the topics of negotiations does 

not imply any moderation in the party’s position. See id.

(finding impasse where the union representative’s statements 

“did not actually commit the [u]nion to a new position or 

contain any specific proposals” (quoting Serramonte, 86 F.3d 

at 233) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). 

Before the court, counsel for the NLRB attempts to 

distinguish TruServ, in which we found impasse even though 

the union disagreed that the parties were at impasse, TruServ, 

254 F.3d at 1117–18, on the ground that “the Union here did 

more than simply say the parties weren’t at impasse.” Resp’t 

USCA Case #11-1337 Document #1406710 Filed: 11/27/2012 Page 9 of 13
10 

Br. at 23. NLRB’s position is undermined by the 

inconvenient fact that the Union here not only did not say that 

the parties “weren’t at impasse” on March 31, its 

representative said — out-loud and in-person — that they 

were “at impasse.” This fact makes it even more obvious than 

it was in TruServ that the parties were at impasse. Thus, the 

Board’s finding regarding the first CalMat factor, that no 

good faith impasse existed, is not supported by substantial 

evidence in the record, for the evidence “practically shouted 

impasse” on March 31. Laurel Bay, 666 F.3d at 1375 n.13. 

Turning our attention to the third CalMat factor, whether 

the critical issue impasse led to an overall breakdown in 

negotiations, the Board found that even if the parties had 

reached a good faith impasse on union security or arbitration, 

Erie failed to show that the impasse led to a breakdown in 

negotiations. Board Decision at 4. Once again, substantial 

evidence does not support this finding. Each party made clear 

throughout the negotiations leading up to March 31 that it 

would not sign a contract that adopted the other party’s 

position on union security. Both parties considered union 

security “make or break” on the entire contract. As in 

CalMat, the critical issue “pervaded the negotiations” and the 

parties’ “positions never changed.” 331 NLRB at 1098. The 

Board’s claim that one of the parties would decide to change 

its position on union security “was not based on the record 

evidence; rather, the Board relied on its intuitive belief that, 

upon further bargaining, each side would have made 

additional concessions.” TruServ, 254 F.3d at 1116. Such 

rank speculation cannot form the basis of a sound 

administrative finding, for we have emphasized that “each 

party, not the Board, determines at what point it ceases to be 

willing to compromise.” Id. “You never know” is no 

substitute for substantial evidence. 

USCA Case #11-1337 Document #1406710 Filed: 11/27/2012 Page 10 of 13
11 

At oral argument, the Union pressed the position that 

impasse cannot be found if the parties have not negotiated 

over economic issues. But the Board expressly refused to rest 

its decision on that proposition. Board Decision at 4 n.8. 

Though we seriously doubt the correctness of the Union’s 

position, we need not reach that issue. “The courts may not 

accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalization for agency 

action; Chenery requires that an agency’s discretionary order 

be upheld, if at all, on the same basis articulated in the order 

by the agency itself.” Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United 

States, 371 U.S. 156, 168–69 (1962) (citing SEC v. Chenery, 

332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)); see also Jochims v. NLRB, 480 

F.3d 1161, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 

All record evidence supports the proposition that the 

parties’ diametrically opposed positions on union security 

“presented . . . an insurmountable obstacle to an agreement.” 

Richmond Electrical Services, Inc., 348 NLRB 1001, 1003 

(2006). Because “the parties’ failure to agree on this issue 

destroyed any opportunity for reaching a . . . collectivebargaining agreement,” CalMat, 331 NLRB at 1098, the 

impasse on union security led to a breakdown in overall 

negotiations. Therefore, the record evidence clearly 

demonstrates that Erie met its burden of showing that the 

parties were at an impasse on the critical issue of union 

security on March 31, 2006. 

The Board found that “even if the parties were at a 

momentary impasse . . . , it was broken well before [Erie] 

finally agreed in late June to resume bargaining.” Board 

Decision at 3 n.7. This finding is not supported by substantial 

evidence. An impasse is considered broken only if “the party 

asserting that the impasse has been broken” points to 

“substantial evidence in the record that establishes changed 

circumstances sufficient to suggest that future bargaining 

USCA Case #11-1337 Document #1406710 Filed: 11/27/2012 Page 11 of 13
12 

would be fruitful.” Serramonte, 86 F.3d at 233. According to 

the Board, Bridgemon’s assurance on May 31 that he would 

continue discussing union security and arbitration with the 

Union showed changed circumstances sufficient to break the 

impasse. But this communication is entirely inadequate to 

break the impasse. It did not “commit[] the Union to a new 

position or contain[] any specific proposals.” Id. (“[A] 

party’s ‘bare assertions of flexibility on open issues and its 

generalized promises of new proposals’” do not represent 

“‘any change, much less a substantial change’ in that party’s 

negotiating position.” (quoting Civic Motor Inns, 300 NLRB 

774, 776 (1990))). A negotiator’s promise to do that which he 

has already and always done — discuss the bargaining issues 

with his principal — offers nothing more than “a handful of 

air,” id., and demonstrates no change in circumstances. 

The Board also relied upon Bridgemon’s June 2 

statement that he had room to move on arbitration to show 

changed circumstances. First, this communication regarding 

arbitration self-evidently fails to show changed circumstances 

regarding the parties’ impasse on the critical issue of union 

security. In fact, Bridgemon’s June 2 email stated that he did 

not “have any give” on union security. Second, Bridgemon’s 

communication did not actually demonstrate changed 

circumstances on any impasse over arbitration. In the June 2 

email, Bridgemon wrote: “I do have some give on the 

arbitration issue . . . [, but] I don’t have a counter[-proposal] 

at this point.” This statement constitutes a “bare assertion[] of 

flexibility” devoid of any specific proposals and is insufficient 

to break a bargaining impasse. Id. In short, the Board’s 

finding that the Union established changed circumstances 

sufficient to break any impasse is unsupported by substantial 

evidence in the record. 

 

USCA Case #11-1337 Document #1406710 Filed: 11/27/2012 Page 12 of 13
13 

Because Erie and the Union were at a lawful impasse on 

at least the critical issue of union security from March 31 

through the end of the parties’ relevant communications, Erie 

was relieved of the duty to bargain during that time period. 

See id. at 232 (“[A] good-faith impasse in negotiations 

temporarily suspends the duty to bargain.”). Thus, Erie did 

not unlawfully refuse to bargain. The Board’s decision 

finding that Erie violated section 8(a)(5) and (1) was not 

supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

Erie argues alternatively that the Board erred in imposing 

a bargaining order as a remedy and reminds us that we have 

often told the Board that such an order is an extraordinary 

remedy that may not be imposed in run-of-the-mill cases. See 

Vincent Industrial Plastics, Inc. v. NLRB, 209 F.3d 727, 738 

(D.C. Cir. 2000). While this proposition is true enough, we 

have no occasion to examine the question in the present case, 

as our decision on the merits issue of impasse moots any issue 

as to the propriety of remedy. Nor need we discuss the 

Board’s cross-petition for enforcement of the order since our 

merits decision renders that petition moot. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petition for 

review, vacate the Board’s decision and order, and deny the 

Board’s cross-petition for enforcement. 

So ordered.

USCA Case #11-1337 Document #1406710 Filed: 11/27/2012 Page 13 of 13