Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01298/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01298-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ted Anderson
Appellant
Brighton, Colorado, City of
Not Party
Martha Derda
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH / FlLEDfAPP~b 1 d States court o UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAU te Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MARTHA DERDA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

BRIGHTON, COLORADO, CITY OF, 

Defendant, 

and 

TED ANDERSON, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

APR 2 8 1995 

PATRICK FISH£R 

Clerk 

No. 94-1298 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 93-N-2678) 

Christina M. Habas, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

R.C. Stephenson, Denver, Colorado (S. Morris Lubow, Denver, 

Colorado, with him on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Circuit Judge, ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, and 

SHADUR,* District Judge. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable Milton I. Shadur, Senior Judge, United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-1298 Document: 01019282112 Date Filed: 04/28/1995 Page: 1 
Defendant-appellant Ted Anderson, the city manager for the 

City of Brighton, Colorado, appeals from the denial of his motion 

for summary judgment. The district court concluded that Anderson 

lacked qualified immunity for his decision to terminate the 

employment of the plaintiff-appellee, Martha Derda. We reverse 

and remand. 

BACKGROUND 

Ms. Derda was employed by the City of Brighton as a 

recreation coordinator from October 9, 1989, through March 29, 

1993. On March 30, 1993, she was appointed facility manager for 

the Brighton recreation center. At all times relevant to this 

case, Mr. Anderson was the Brighton City Manager. Mr. Anderson 

apparently told Ms. Derda that she was on probation for six months 

in her new position as facility manager, in accordance with 

Brighton's personnel policies and procedures, as set forth in its 

employee handbook. 

The City received complaints about Ms. Derda's performance of 

her duties as facility manager. As a result, Mr. Anderson met 

with the Brighton City Attorney, Margaret Brubaker, on July 20, 

1993, to discuss Ms. Derda's employment situation. Ms. Brubaker 

informed Mr. Anderson of the procedures to be followed in 

terminating a probationary employee, and Mr. Anderson subsequently 

terminated Ms. Derda's employment with the City. Mr. Anderson has 

stated that he terminated Ms. Derda because she failed to properly 

train the recreation staff, sufficiently schedule recreation 

programs, or solve problems which arose. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 94-1298 Document: 01019282112 Date Filed: 04/28/1995 Page: 2 
Ms. Derda brought this action initially in state court, 

claiming that she did not receive prior notice of the charges 

against her, that she was never told the reasons for her 

discharge, that she was never given an opportunity to respond to 

the charges or to consult with counsel prior to her discharge, and 

that she received no pretermination hearing. She claimed 

violations of her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, 

Article II of the Colorado Constitution, Section 31-4-211 of the 

Colorado Revised Statutes, and various policies and procedures 

contained in Brighton's employee handbook. She named as 

defendants Mr. Anderson and the City of Brighton. Defendants 

removed the matter to federal district court. Ms. Derda then 

filed a motion seeking to remand the case back to the state court 

and Mr. Anderson filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground 

that he was entitled to qualified immunity. 

The district court denied both motions. This appeal involves 

only the propriety of the denial of Mr. Anderson's motion for 

summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. 

DISCUSSION 

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government 

officials performing discretionary functions generally are 

shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

-3-

Appellate Case: 94-1298 Document: 01019282112 Date Filed: 04/28/1995 Page: 3 
We review the denial of summary judgment de novo, applying 

the same legal standard as the district court. Romero v. Fay, 45 

F.3d 1472, 1475 (lOth Cir. 1995). "Special rules apply when a 

defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity in a summary 

judgment motion." Cummins v. Campbell, 44 F.3d 847, 850 (lOth 

Cir. 1994); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991); 

Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 779 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

When a defendant raises qualified immunity in a motion for summary 

judgment, the plaintiff "must initially make a twofold showing." 

Cummins, 44 F.3d at 850. She must first show that the defendant's 

"alleged conduct violated the law." Id. Second, she must show 

"'that the law was clearly established when the alleged violation 

occurred.'" Id. (quoting Hinton, 997 F.2d at 779). In meeting 

that burden, the plaintiff "must articulate the clearly 

established constitutional right . with specificity." Romero, 

45 F.3d at 1475. It is insufficient simply to "identify in the 

abstract a clearly established right and allege that the defendant 

has violated it." Id. While Siegert normally demands this twopart inquiry, we have recognized that in certain cases, the 

Siegert framework has proven difficult to apply because the 

threshold "constitutional violation" analysis may run together 

with the "clearly established" analysis. Martinez v. Mafchir, 35 

F.3d 1486, 1490 (lOth Cir. 1994). This is such a case. 

If the plaintiff fails to make the twofold showing, the 

defendant prevails. Hannula v. City of Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129, 

131 (lOth Cir. 1990); Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs. v. Losavio, 

847 F.2d 642, 646 (lOth Cir. 1988). If the plaintiff succeeds, 

-4-

Appellate Case: 94-1298 Document: 01019282112 Date Filed: 04/28/1995 Page: 4 
the burden shifts to the defendant to make the usual summary 

judgment showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact 

and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Cummins, 44 F.3d at 850. "'Whether an asserted federal right was 

clearly established at a particular time . . . presents a question 

of law . . . [that] must be resolved de novo on appeal.'" Romero, 

45 F.3d at 14 (quoting Elder v. Holloway, 114 S. Ct. 1019, 1023 

(1994)) (alteration in original). However, as in all summary 

judgment contexts, "we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party." Bisbee v. Bey, 39 F.3d 1096, 

1100 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

In arguing that she had a clearly established property right 

in her job, which could not be taken from her without due process, 

Ms. Derda relies primarily on Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-4-211(2), 

which provides: 

City manager - powers and responsibility. 

(2) Officers and employees appointed by the city 

manager may be removed by him at any time for cause. 

The decision of the city manager in any such case shall 

be final. 

Identical language also appears in section 1.01 of the Brighton 

employee handbook. Ms. Derda asserts that this language, which 

makes no distinction between probationary and nonprobationary 

employees, confers upon her a protected interest in her job. 

In so arguing, she relies upon Cleveland Board of Educ. v. 

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), Ewers v. Board of County Comm'rs, 

874 F.2d 736 (lOth Cir. 1989), Bailey v. Kirk, 777 F.2d 567 (lOth 

Cir. 1985), Clouser v. City of Thornton, 676 F. Supp. 228 (D. 

-5-

Appellate Case: 94-1298 Document: 01019282112 Date Filed: 04/28/1995 Page: 5 
Colo. 1987), and DeBono v. Vizas, 427 F. Supp. 905 (D. Colo. 

1977). In Loudermill, the Supreme Court emphasized the 

"straightforward" point that "the Due Process Clause provides that 

certain substantive rights--life, liberty, and property--cannot be 

deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures." 

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541. Property interests themselves, 

however, are not created by the Constitution; rather, "'they are 

created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or 

understandings that stern from an independent source such as state 

law .. ~ '" Id. at 538 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 

U.S. 564, 577 (1972)); see also Bailey, 777 F.2d at 573 

(" [p]laintiff's property interest in his employment is created, 

defined and governed by state law"). 

In Loudermill, the Supreme Court applied these general 

principles, holding that an Ohio statute which permitted 

classified civil servants to retain their employment "'during good 

behavior and efficient service'" and which prohibited dismissal 

"'except . for ... misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance 

in office,'" conferred upon such employees a protected property 

interest. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538-39 (quoting Ohio Rev. Code 

Ann. § 124.34). Furthermore, the Court held that the property 

interest so conferred was unaffected by the fact that the statute 

itself provided termination procedures; rather, the property 

interest created by the statute was protected by constitutional 

due process safeguards. Id. at 541. 

Following Loudermill, we held in Bailey, a case involving 

Oklahoma law, "that a public employee, who could not be suspended 

-6-

Appellate Case: 94-1298 Document: 01019282112 Date Filed: 04/28/1995 Page: 6 
except for cause, had a property interest in continued employment, 

even though the city's suspension provisions may not provide for a 

right of appeal." Bailey, 777 F.2d at 574. We similarly held in 

Ewers v. Board of County Comm'rs, 874 F.2d 736 (lOth Cir. 1989), a 

case involving New Mexico law, that "[b]y its explicit terms, that 

an employee cannot be discharged except for cause, the [county 

personnel] manual has used the language as in Loudermill which, 

without dispute, meant that the discharged employee 'possessed 

property rights in continued employment.'" Id. at 739 (quoting 

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538-39). 

Only two cases, DeBono and Clouser, have specifically 

addressed section 31-4-211(2). In DeBono, a pre-Loudermill 

decision, the plaintiff, a suspended policeman, argued "that the 

words, 'for cause,' [in section 31-4-211 (2)] create a 

constitutionally protected property right to continued 

employment." DeBono, 427 F. Supp. at 907. The district court 

rejected that argument, holding that "the second senter: -= [of 

section 31-4-211(2)] makes both the nature of Plaintiff's interest 

in his employment and the legislative intent regarding the city 

manager's power to remove an employee of a non-home rule city very 

clear." Id. at 908. Finding that the statute gave to the city 

manager complete and final authority to terminate employees, the 

district court held that section 31-4-211(2) did not create a 

property interest in continued employment. 

In Clouser, decided after Loudermill, a discharged city 

employee again invoked section 31-4-211(2) to establish a property 

interest in his employment. The defendants moved for summary 

-7-

Appellate Case: 94-1298 Document: 01019282112 Date Filed: 04/28/1995 Page: 7 
judgment, relying on DeBono. The court, however, concluded that 

Loudermill had undermined DeBono's holding that the statute's 

second sentence--providing that the city manager's decision was 

final--indicated that no property right was conferred: 

[U]nder Loudermill, a property right in continued 

employment may exist regardless of whether the procedure 

for deprivation of that right is described as 'final.' 

I am therefore unable to conclude at this stage of the 

proceedings that § 31-4-211 fails to provide the 

plaintiff with a property interest in continued 

employment with the defendant city. 

Clouser, 676 F. Supp. at 231. 

Thus, DeBono held in 1977 that the second sentence of section 

31-4-211(2) defeated a claim of a property interest in continued 

employment, and Clouser held in 1987 that DeBono's reasoning on 

that point had been undermined by Loudermill. Neither case, 

howev, .:, clearly held that the statute conferred a property 

interest in a city employee's continued employment. 

Ms. Derda invokes the trilogy of Loudermill, Bailey, and 

Ewers, and argues that Clouser clearly overruled DeBono, to 

support her argument that she had a protected property interest in 

her job by virtue of section 31-4-211(2) which, she claims, only 

permits dismissals for cause. She further argues that her 

probationary status in the facility manager position is irrelevant 

to the existence of that property interest, because in Patrick v. 

Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1245 (lOth Cir. 1992), we held that a 

statute's failure to distinguish between probationary and 

permanent employees permitted an arguably probationary employee to 

claim a protected property interest under the statute. We 

disagree. 

-8-

Appellate Case: 94-1298 Document: 01019282112 Date Filed: 04/28/1995 Page: 8 
We reject Ms. Derda's argument because we reject the premise 

from which it proceeds. Ms. Derda assumes that section 

31-4-211(2) is the same kind of statute which was involved in 

Loudermill, Bailey and Ewers. Arguably, it is not. The state 

statute held to confer a property right in Loudermill was an Ohio 

statute explicitly directed to the rights and duties of civil 

servants. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538-39 (citing Ohio Rev. Code 

Ann. § 124.11 (1984)). Similarly, the county personnel policy 

manu~l in Ewers clearly involved termination procedures for county 

employees, providing, "[e]mployees can not be discharged without 

cause." Ewers, 874 F.2d at 739. Bailey likewise involved 

sections of the relevant city personnel policies and procedures 

manual. None of these cases considered whether a statute or 

manual provision which addressed the powers and responsibilities 

of the city manager could nonetheless confer on employees a 

protected property interest in employment. "[T]he title of a 

statute or section can aid in resolving an ambiguity in the 

legislation's text." INS v. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, 

Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 189 (1991); see also Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 

U.S. 714, 723 (1989). The statute's title--"City manager--powers 

and responsibility"--as well as its language--"[o]fficers and 

employees appointed by the city manager may be removed by him at 

any time for cause"--suggest that the Colorado legislature did not 

intend this particular statute to confer upon city employees any 

interest in their jobs. Rather, the legislature may have intended 

to clarify the powers of the city manager. The second sentence of 

the statute arguably reflects this intent, inasmuch as it directly 

-9-

Appellate Case: 94-1298 Document: 01019282112 Date Filed: 04/28/1995 Page: 9 
addresses the city manager's authority: "The decision of the city 

manager . shall be final." 

Further, as we have indicated, the only two cases to 

explicitly address section 31-4-211(2) discuss the significance, 

if any, of the last sentence of the section, and suggest that 

Loudermill undermines the argument that the last sentence dilutes 

any property interest conferred by the first sentence. They do 

not clearly state that the statute in question confers a property 

(8th Cir.) (finding qualified immunity where no prior cases 

interpreted particular application of state statute), cert. 

denied, 494 U.S. 1056 (1989); Johnson v. Brelje, 701 F.2d 1201, 

1210 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding qualified immunity where no prior 

cases addressed the significance of particular statute involved) . 

It is at least unclear whether section 31-4-211(2) is 

intended to confer on employees an interest in continued employment. As indicated, to defeat Mr. Anderson's motion for summary 

judgment, Ms. Derda must establish with specificity both that her 

termination violated a constitutional right and that the right 

violated was clearly established at the time of the violation. 

Given the uncertainty concerning the appropriate interpretation of 

section 31-4-211(2), we conclude that Ms. Derda has, at a minimum, 

failed to establish the second part of the required twofold 

showing: she has failed to demonstrate that any right violated 

was clearly established at the time she was terminated. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 94-1298 Document: 01019282112 Date Filed: 04/28/1995 Page: 10 
• 

For the foregoing reasons, the denial of Mr. Anderson's 

motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is 

REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for proceedings consistent 

herewith. 

17'"'7 - tr • , 

-11-

Appellate Case: 94-1298 Document: 01019282112 Date Filed: 04/28/1995 Page: 11