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Parties Involved:
Curtis Brown
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12339

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CURTIS BROWN, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cr-00046-BJD-LLL-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12339

Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Curtis Brown appeals his sentence of 15 months’ 

imprisonment for threatening to murder a United States judge and 

for mailing threatening communications to a United States judge. 

He argues that the district court violated his Fifth Amendment 

right to due process by failing to orally pronounce the standard 

conditions of supervised release, and that the court erred by failing 

to adequately explain how the supervised release conditions were 

reasonably related to the sentencing factors. After review, we 

affirm. 

I . Background

A federal grand jury indicted Brown on one count of 

threatening to murder a United States judge in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 115, and one count of mailing threatening 

communications to a United States Judge in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 876(C). Specifically, Brown, while a Florida prisoner, sent a letter 

to a United States District Court Judge threatening to kill the judge

and his family due to the judge’s dismissal of a civil matter Brown 

had filed.1 Brown ultimately entered an open plea of guilty to both 

counts. 

1 The district court judge dismissed Brown’s civil case after concluding that 

Brown had been dishonest and abused the judicial process when he stated that 

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23-12339 Opinion of the Court 3

At the sentencing hearing, the district court explained that 

Brown’s advisory guidelines range was 15 to 21 months’ 

imprisonment to be followed by 1 to 3 years’ supervised release. 

Brown’s counsel emphasized that Brown, age 35, had “a very 

challenging upbringing,” that his father had been incarcerated 

throughout much of Brown’s childhood, and that Brown himself 

had been incarcerated since 2006 in Florida for possessing and 

selling cocaine at the age of 18.2 Counsel emphasized that Brown 

had accepted responsibility for his actions in the present case and 

requested a downward variance of “a very modest amount of 

federal prison time.” Brown then made a statement expressing his 

remorse and regret for his actions, and explained that he had simply 

reacted out of frustration and “misunderstanding,” but that he 

would never again engage in such behavior. 

The government, in turn, emphasized that, while Brown 

was being sentenced in absentia3 for his cocaine-related offenses in 

2006, he was charged with committing a violent offense—although 

he had not filed a previous federal complaint or lawsuit related to the same 

matter. 

2 According to the presentence investigation report (“PSI”), in June and July 

2005, Brown sold crack cocaine to undercover officers and officers found crack 

cocaine on his person when they went to arrest him in August 2005. Charges 

resulted from all three incidents.

3 Brown failed to appear for his sentencing.

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-12339

those charges were later dropped.4 The government also pointed 

out that simply because a person is unhappy with a judge’s decision 

does not give them the right to threaten a judge, and that Brown—

who had already served significant time in prison—should have 

“appreciate[d] the consequences of his actions.” But instead, 

Brown wrote a letter “threatening the . . . judge and his family 

about shooting him or his family if he can’t find him. And he even 

ends [the letter] in a postscript with an additional threat about not 

telling anyone else.” The government noted that, although Brown 

was unable to and did not carry out the threat, it did not “change 

the seriousness or the importance of sending” the threat. Thus, the 

government argued that a guideline sentence to run consecutive to 

Brown’s state sentence was appropriate. Finally, the government 

noted that “in some jail calls, [Brown] lamented that we took too 

long to essentially bring him to federal court,” which Brown 

wanted because he had more privileges in federal custody than he 

did in state custody. 

The district court then imposed concurrent terms of 15 

months’ imprisonment for each of the two counts to be followed 

by 3 years’ supervised release, and explained that this sentence 

4 The PSI indicated that, in 2006, Brown was charged in Florida with using a 

firearm during a felony, possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, robbery 

with a deadly weapon, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and grand 

theft of a motor vehicle. However, the charges were later dropped. 

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23-12339 Opinion of the Court 5

would run consecutive to Brown’s state sentence.5 In particular, 

the district court emphasized that the sentence reflected the 

seriousness of the offense and provided adequate deterrence, while 

providing Brown with much needed mental health treatment—

noting Brown’s depression diagnosis.6 The district court also noted 

that the sentence it imposed was not “the most harsh sentence that 

[Brown] [could have] receive[d].” 

The district court explained that, while on supervised 

release, Brown would be required to “comply with the mandatory 

and standard conditions adopted by the court in the Middle District 

of Florida.” In addition, the court explained that Brown would be 

required to comply with certain special conditions, including 

participating in mental health treatment; contributing to the costs 

of the mental health services; cooperating in the collection of DNA; 

refraining from the unlawful use of controlled substances; and 

submitting to periodic drug testing. The district court explained 

that it had considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and that the 

sentence was sufficient but not greater than necessary to serve the 

5 Brown faced a statutory maximum of 20 years’ imprisonment (if the 

maximum term of 10 years’ imprisonment for each count was imposed 

consecutively) and 3 years’ supervised release. 

6 Although Brown’s mental health was noted only in passing during the 

sentencing hearing, his PSI indicated that as a teen he was sent to anger 

management counseling; he was diagnosed between 2007 and 2009 with 

“major depressive disorder,” but he was not presently prescribed any 

medication; and that in 2022 he was diagnosed with antisocial personality 

disorder. 

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6 Opinion of the Court 23-12339

purposes of sentencing. While Brown renewed other unrelated 

objections to the sentence and guidelines calculation, he did not 

object to the supervised release conditions or the statement that he 

would be required to comply with the mandatory and standard

supervised release conditions adopted by the Middle District of 

Florida. Brown appealed. 

II. Discussion

Brown argues that (1) the district court violated his due 

process rights under the Fifth Amendment when it failed to orally 

pronounce all of the mandatory and standard conditions of 

supervised release that it later imposed as part of his written 

judgment, and (2) the district court procedurally erred by failing to 

make an “individualized assessment” and adequately explain how 

the supervised release conditions were reasonably related to the 

sentencing factors. 

Section 3583 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code imposes several 

mandatory conditions of supervised release and provides that the 

court may order further conditions. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).7 The 

Sentencing Guidelines provide for thirteen standard conditions 

7 The mandatory supervised release conditions in the statute include that the 

defendant not commit another crime; make any required restitution; comply

with DNA collection if authorized; refrain from unlawfully possessing a 

controlled substance; refrain from any unlawful drug use; and submit to 

periodic drug testing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).

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that are generally recommended, as well as several special 

conditions.8 U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c), (d).

“[A] district court must pronounce at the defendant’s 

sentencing hearing any discretionary conditions of supervised 

release—that is, any condition of supervised release other than 

those mandatory conditions set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).”

United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231, 1246 (11th Cir. 2023). And 

the failure of the district court to do so violates the defendant’s 

right to due process. Id. at 1247–48. However, this requirement 

does not require the district court to orally pronounce each and 

every individual discretionary condition. United States v. Hayden, 

8 The standard conditions in the sentencing guidelines include that the 

defendant report to the probation office within 72 hours of his release from 

prison; “report to the probation officer as instructed” and answer the officer’s 

questions truthfully; not leave his district of residence without permission 

from the probation officer or the court; reside at a location approved by the 

probation officer and notify the probation officer in advance of any change in 

residence; allow the probation officer to visit and inspect his residence; work 

full time; refrain from associating with other convicted felons or anyone 

engaged in criminal activity; notify the probation officer if the defendant is 

arrested or questioned by police; refrain from possessing or having access to 

guns and ammunition and other dangerous weapons; not agree to act, or 

otherwise act, as a confidential source to law enforcement without permission 

of the court; as determined by the probation officer, notify certain persons or 

organizations that the defendant poses a risk to another; and follow the 

probation officer’s instructions related to supervision conditions. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 5D1.3(c); see also Middle District of Florida Form AO 245B (listing the mandatory 

and standard conditions of supervision for the Middle District of Florida). 

Because Brown does not challenge the imposition of any special conditions, 

we do not discuss them. 

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119 F.4th 832, 838 (11th Cir. 2024). Rather, the “district court may 

easily satisfy this requirement by referencing a written list of 

supervised release conditions,” such as a standing administrative 

order. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th at 1246; see also Hayden, 119 F.4th at 838 

(“A reference to a written list of conditions is enough to afford a 

defendant the opportunity to challenge the conditions of 

supervised release, which is all that due process requires.”).

“We [generally] review the terms of . . . supervised release 

for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Nash, 438 F.3d 1302, 1304 

(11th Cir. 2006). “When a defendant fails to object at sentencing to 

the conditions of supervised release, we ordinarily review for plain 

error.” Hayden, 119 F.4th at 838.

Here, the district court stated at sentencing that Brown 

would be required to comply with the mandatory and standard 

conditions adopted by the court in the Middle District of Florida, 

and Brown did not object to the district court’s failure to describe 

each of the standard conditions. Therefore, “we review his [due 

process] challenge for plain error.” Id.

We conclude that no error, much less plain error occurred. 

Contrary to Brown’s argument, the district court was not required 

to orally pronounce each individual supervised release condition. 

Id. Rather, the district court complied with the oral 

pronouncement requirement when it referenced expressly “the 

mandatory and standard conditions adopted by the court in the 

Middle District of Florida.” Id. This pronouncement provided 

Brown with notice that the court was imposing the standard 

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conditions as adopted by the Middle District of Florida, and at that 

point, Brown had an opportunity to object to those conditions or 

seek clarification as to the nature of each individual condition, but 

he failed to do so. Id. (“A reference to a written list of conditions is 

enough to afford a defendant the opportunity to challenge the 

conditions of supervised release, which is all that due process 

requires.”); Rodriguez, 75 F.4th at 1246 (“By referencing at 

sentencing a written list, the court affords any defendant who is 

unfamiliar with the conditions the opportunity to inquire about 

and challenge them.”). Additionally, as we explained in Hayden, 

“[t]he conditions are listed in the publicly available judgment form 

and track the standard conditions of supervised release in the 

relevant sentencing guideline.” Hayden, 119 F.4th at 839 (citing 

Middle District of Florida Form AO 245B; U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)). The

district court then included those same conditions in Brown’s 

written judgment. Accordingly, there was no due process 

violation. 

Relatedly, Brown argues that the district could failed to 

conduct an individualized assessment and adequately explain the 

reasons for the supervised release conditions it imposed. 

The district court is required at sentencing to “state in open 

court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). We review de novo a challenge to the adequacy 

of the district court’s sentencing explanation under § 3553(c), “even 

if the defendant did not object below.” United States v. Hamilton, 66 

F.4th 1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 2023). “Because § 3553(c) applies to the 

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entire sentence, and the term of supervised release is part of that 

sentence, § 3553(c) necessarily applies to the term of supervised 

release as part of the sentence imposed.” Id. at 1275. However, 

“[n]othing in § 3553(c) requires a district court to make two 

separate explanations—one for the term of imprisonment and one 

for the term of supervised release.” Id. Rather, “a district court’s 

reasoning inevitably supports both the imprisonment and 

supervised release portions of the . . . sentence.” Id. at 1276. In 

other words,

[a] district court need not address each component 

separately so long as it gives a sufficient explanation—

that is, so long as the district court sets forth enough 

to satisfy the appellate court that it has considered the 

parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for 

exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority.

Id. (alterations adopted) (quotations omitted). Importantly, while 

§ 3553(c) may apply to the overall term of supervised release 

imposed, we have never held that the district court must articulate 

how each individual condition of supervised release is related to 

the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.9 

9 Brown relies on the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Rogers, 961 

F.3d 291, 298 (4th Cir. 2020), for the proposition that the district court must 

articulate its reasoning for each of the conditions of supervised release and 

explain how those conditions relate to the relevant sentencing factors. We, 

however, are not bound by the Fourth Circuit’s decision and neither are the 

district courts in this Circuit. See Minor v. Dugger, 864 F.2d 124, 126 (11th Cir. 

1989). Moreover, we find the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning unpersuasive. The 

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Here, the district court complied with the requirements of 

§ 3553(c) and our precedent when it acknowledged that it 

considered the § 3553(a) sentencing factors and emphasized that its 

chosen sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment followed by 3 years’ 

supervised release reflected the seriousness of the offense and 

provided adequate deterrence, while providing Brown with much 

needed mental health treatment. The district court’s explanation 

was adequate to satisfy us that it considered the parties’ arguments 

and the § 3553(a) factors and had a reasoned basis for the sentence 

it chose. Id. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED. 

Fourth Circuit relied on its prior precedent to hold that in order to “adequately 

explain” the sentence, the district court must specifically articulate the reasons 

for imposing the condition. Rogers, 961 F.3d at 297 (citing United States v. 

Wroblewski, 781 F. App’x 158, 162 (4th Cir. 2019), and United States v. McMiller, 

954 F.3d 670, 676 (4th Cir. 2020)). But, unlike the Fourth Circuit, we have 

never held that in order to “adequately explain” a sentence, the district court 

must specifically articulate its reasoning or address each of the sentencing 

factors. See United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005) 

(“[N]othing . . . requires the district court to state on the record that it has 

explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the 

§ 3553(a) factors.). Rather, generally, the district court’s explanation is 

sufficient if it is clear that it considered the relevant sentencing factors together 

with the parties’ arguments. Id. at 1330. In light of our own precedent, we 

decline to follow the Fourth Circuit’s approach. 

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