Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03183/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03183-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wicahpe George Milk
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3183

___________

United States of America, *

*

 Appellee, *

* Appeal From the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of South Dakota.

Wicahpe George Milk, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 14, 2006

Filed: May 12, 2006

___________

Before COLLOTON, HEANEY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

This case involves a homicide that occurred on the Pine Ridge Indian

Reservation. Following a jury trial, Wicahpe George Milk (Wicahpe) was convicted

of second-degree murder for killing Arlen Bissonette. The district court1

 sentenced

Wicahpe to 135 months in prison, to be followed by three years of supervised release.

On appeal, Wicahpe challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, and further contends

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that he is entitled to a new trial on account of evidentiary errors and prosecutorial

misconduct. Lastly, he argues that his sentence is unreasonable. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

We recount the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, as we

are required to do. In the afternoon of October 15, 2004, Wicahpe, Bissonette, and

several others were at Wicahpe’s residence drinking and socializing. At some point,

Curtis Milk, Wicahpe’s father, arrived with Petan Milk, Wicahpe’s brother. Curtis,

who was intoxicated, tried to start a fight with Bissonette, but was unsuccessful.

Instead, many of the revelers moved the party away from Curtis, reconvening at Larry

Bettelyoun, Sr.’s house. Shortly thereafter, Curtis also arrived at the house. Curtis

became hostile again, causing a number of people, including Bissonette, to leave and

return to their prior venue. Curtis and Wicahpe remained at Bettelyoun, Sr.’s house.

After some time passed, Wicahpe returned to his residence. He was visibly

upset, and complained that his father was treating him badly while he was at

Bettelyoun, Sr.’s. According to Larry Bettelyoun, Jr., Wicahpe’s face had red marks

on it and looked as if he had been assaulted. Wicahpe told Bissonette that Curtis still

wanted to fight Bissonette, and Wicahpe encouraged Bissonette to do so.

Bissonette then left with Jeff Curry to confront Curtis. Bissonette entered

Bettelyoun, Sr.’s residence and attacked Curtis. Bissonette, a muscular young man

many years Curtis’s junior, beat Curtis badly, leaving him bloody and barely

conscious. The wounds sustained by Curtis were consistent with blows from brass

knuckles carried by Bissonette.

Bissonette then returned to Wicahpe’s residence, and told Wicahpe that he had

“handled that for him.” (Trial Tr. Vol. I at 89.) This prompted Wicahpe and Petan

to go back to Bettelyoun, Sr.’s house. They entered that home to see their father lying

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in a pool of blood on the floor, gurgling and laboring for breath. When Wicahpe saw

this, he told his brother Petan that they should “get” those responsible, presumably

referring to Bissonette. (Id. at 51.) The two then took Bettelyoun, Sr.’s car back to

Wicahpe’s residence. 

Wicahpe then arrived at the house, driving so quickly and recklessly that he

rammed the porch of the house and nearly hit a person who was standing outside. He

went inside and saw Bissonette still there. Wicahpe, upset, began questioning

Bissonette about what had happened to his father. Wicahpe picked up a long knife

from the counter and broke the telephone. Wicahpe and Bissonette exchanged words

for a short time before Petan entered, holding what was described as some type of

stick or shaft. At that point, Wicahpe, Petan, Bissonette, and Curry began to fight.

In the struggle, both Bissonette and Curry were stabbed by Wicahpe and struck by

Petan. Bissonette’s injuries included two stab wounds, which punctured his lung and

his kidney. Bissonette also sustained significant head trauma from Petan’s attack.

He died later that night. An autopsy attributed the death to the stab wounds with the

possibility that the head trauma was a contributing factor.

Wicahpe and Petan were jointly charged by indictment with committing

second-degree murder in Indian country and aiding and abetting each other to do the

same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1153, and 2. Both went to trial. At trial,

Wicahpe’s primary defense was that of self-defense. His theory was that Bissonette

was known to be very violent when he was drinking, and when it appeared that

Bissonette was becoming combative, Wicahpe felt it necessary to stab him to protect

himself. In support of this theory, Wicahpe presented evidence that Bissonette had

attacked someone in a vehicle earlier in the day by opening the vehicle’s door and

then punching and kicking the occupant. Testimony also established that Bissonette

had chased another person, Ben Long Wolf, while trying to fight him. Wicahpe’s

evidence also included the fact that Bissonette had brutally attacked his father

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moments before the stabbing, leaving Curtis with severe and serious injuries that

appeared to be the result of a brass knuckle assault.

In further support of his self-defense theory, Wicahpe sought to introduce

evidence of another assault Bissonette had perpetrated years earlier. According to

Wicahpe, he, Bissonette, and Mike Ten Fingers had been playing a card game in

1999. When Bissonette lost, he became upset and stabbed Ten Fingers several times

with an instrument resembling an ice pick. The district court did not admit this

evidence, however, ruling that its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial

effect. In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that this assault happened

roughly five years before the stabbing, and that in the meantime, Bissonette and

Wicahpe had remained close friends, which suggested Wicahpe was not scared of

Bissonette. Moreover, the court held that admitting this evidence might lead to a

collateral mini-trial, confusing the jury.

Following a two-day trial, Wicahpe was convicted of second-degree murder.

Petan was acquitted of all charges. At sentencing, both parties agreed on the

guidelines range of 135 to 168 months. Wicahpe moved for a downward departure

based on victim conduct. The government informally asked for consideration of an

upward departure based on the use of a weapon, and because the guidelines had

increased the second-degree murder penalty subsequent to this incident. After

considering those motions, the presentence report, and statements made at the

sentencing hearing, the district court determined that a guidelines sentence was

appropriate, based on the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Wicahpe was

sentenced to 135 months in prison, to be followed by three years of supervised

release. This appeal followed.

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ANALYSIS

On appeal, Wicahpe contends that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal

on all charges because he acted in self-defense. In the alternative, he suggests that

the evidence established only that he was guilty of some form of manslaughter, not

second-degree murder. Next, Wicahpe argues that it was reversible error to exclude

the evidence that Bissonette had violently assaulted Ten Fingers five years earlier

because that evidence was essential to Wicahpe’s state of mind. Wicahpe also argues

that the prosecutor engaged in serious misconduct by knowingly presenting perjured

testimony and by making improper remarks in his closing argument and rebuttal.

Lastly, Wicahpe believes that the unique circumstances of his case make a guidelines

sentence unreasonable.

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In considering whether a motion for judgment of acquittal was properly denied,

we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, granting all

reasonable inferences that are supported by that evidence. United States v. Cline, 570

F.2d 731, 733 (8th Cir. 1978). Although a federal defendant bears the burden of

production on the issue of self-defense, once that burden is met, the government must

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.

United States v. Scout, 112 F.3d 955, 960 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v.

Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 842 n.12 (11th Cir. 1985)); see also United States v. Deon,

656 F.2d 354, 355 (8th Cir. 1981) (noting that once the issue of self-defense is raised,

the burden shifts to the government to disprove the theory).

Wicahpe agrees that the district court correctly instructed the jury on the issue

of self-defense. That instruction noted that it was the government’s burden to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that Wicahpe was not acting in self-defense. The court

further instructed the jury that self-defense was defined as follows:

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If a person reasonably believes that force is necessary to protect himself

or another person from what he reasonably believes to be unlawful

physical harm about to be inflicted by another and uses such force, then

he acted in self defense or defense of another person.

However, self defense which involves using force likely to cause death

or great bodily harm is justified only if the person reasonably believes

that such force is necessary to protect himself or another person from

what he reasonably believes to be a substantial risk of death or great

bodily harm.

(Final Instruction No. 2.)

Wicahpe’s theory at trial was that Bissonette was volatile and violent when

drinking, and that he was forced to arm himself with a knife and stab Bissonette to

save himself. Having reviewed the record, we find substantial evidence presented to

the jury that tended to negate the idea that Wicahpe acted in self-defense. For

instance, before leaving his wounded father, Wicahpe told his brother Petan that they

should “get” Bissonette. (Trial Tr. Vol. I at 51.) The two then commandeered

another person’s car to return to Wicahpe’s house, driving so erratically that they hit

the porch of the house before stopping. Wicahpe then entered the house, armed

himself with a knife, and verbally confronted Bissonette until Petan entered with his

weapon. Thereafter, Wicahpe attacked Bissonette with the knife, stabbing him twice.

From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that Wicahpe’s intent was to hurt

or kill Bissonette to avenge the maltreatment his father suffered. 

Wicahpe further contends that even if he is not entitled to an outright judgment

of acquittal, he is only guilty of some form of manslaughter, not second-degree

murder. He rests this argument on two bases: (1) that he has an “imperfect” selfdefense, and (2) the evidence of provocation overwhelmingly rebuts any suggestion

that he killed Bissonette with malice aforethought.

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An imperfect self-defense involves the defendant’s unreasonable use of deadly

force to thwart an assault. Rinehart v. Brewer, 561 F.2d 126, 132 (8th Cir. 1977).

This may be proven by evidence that: (1) the defendant unreasonably but truly

believed that deadly force was necessary to defend himself, or (2) the defendant

inadvertently caused the victim’s death while defending himself in a criminally

negligent manner. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 201 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th

Cir. 2001) (explaining differing theories of imperfect self-defense claims); United

States v. Manuel, 706 F.2d 908, 915 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); see also United States v.

Brown, 287 F.3d 965, 975 (10th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a defendant may commit

involuntary manslaughter “if he acts in self-defense but is criminally negligent in

doing so”). A defendant who proves an imperfect self-defense does not have the

requisite mens rea to be guilty of second-degree murder. Rinehart, 561 F.2d at 132.

The defense does not exonerate the defendant of culpability for a homicide, but

justifies only a manslaughter conviction. Id.

Principally for the reasons stated above, Wicahpe has failed to show that he is

entitled to an acquittal of second-degree murder on his imperfect self-defense claim.

An imperfect self-defense claim is premised on the view that some action was

necessary for the defendant to protect himself. But in this case, the evidence, when

viewed in the prosecution’s favor, showed that it was actually Wicahpe who initiated

the assault with the intention of fighting, hurting, or killing Bissonette. This is

inconsistent with a self-defense claim, be it a perfect or imperfect one.

Wicahpe also maintains his innocence on the charge of second-degree murder

based on provocation. “It is well established that if the defendant had enough time

between the provocation and the killing to reflect on his or her intended course of

action, ‘then the mere fact of passion would not reduce the crime below murder.’”

United States v. Bordeaux, 980 F.2d 534, 537-38 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting Collins v.

United States, 150 U.S. 62, 65 (1893)). In this case, the time between Wicahpe’s

emotional response to his father’s injuries and the stabbing mitigates against a viable

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2

The trial transcript reveals nothing that Bissonette said or did to incite

Wicahpe during their pre-fight conversation. 

-8-

provocation defense. After seeing his wounded father, Wicahpe set out to find

Bissonette. Once Wicahpe arrived, he and Bissonette spoke before engaging in a

fight.2

 Driving to a different location and then verbally confronting an intended

victim for some time before assaulting him is inconsistent with the claim that

Wicahpe acted impulsively without any self-control. Moreover, Wicahpe’s assault

did not begin until Petan entered the house, holding a weapon. Taken together with

the evidence that Wicahpe was seeking revenge, this supports the inference that

Wicahpe maintained enough self-control to plan an attack with Petan, in which Petan

would make a delayed entrance while Wicahpe stalled.

II. EVIDENCE OF BISSONETTE’S PRIOR BAD ACTS

Wicahpe next contends that the district court committed reversible error by

excluding evidence that Bissonette had violently stabbed a mutual acquaintance five

years earlier. Wicahpe attempted to introduce this evidence under Federal Rule of

Evidence 404(b), as relevant to Wicahpe’s state of mind for self-defense. The

government contends that the evidence is inadmissible as a specific instance of

conduct. We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.

United States v. Waloke, 962 F.2d 824, 829-30 (8th Cir. 1992).

Rule 404(a)(2) permits inquiry into a victim’s character, and Rule 405(b)

allows that proof to come by way of specific instances of prior conduct “[i]n cases in

which character or a trait of character . . . is an essential element of a charge, claim,

or defense.” (Emphasis added.) In Waloke, this court recognized that in a selfdefense case, evidence of the victim’s violent character, as proven through specific

prior acts, may be admissible. Waloke, 962 F.2d at 830. We affirmed the exclusion

of such evidence in Waloke because the district court was within its discretion to

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prohibit the evidence under Rule 403. Id. Thus, the government’s contention that

evidence of a victim’s prior bad acts are never admissible is incorrect.

The question remains, however, whether the evidence was properly excluded

pursuant to Rule 403. The district court engaged in an explicit analysis of whether

to admit this prior assault evidence. It first determined that there was a significant

risk of a mini-trial on the assault, since there was no prior conviction, and the only

witnesses were Wicahpe and the victim. The court also viewed the probative value

of the evidence as weak, since the defendant wanted to use the five-year-old assault

by Bissonette, someone with whom he had remained close friends, to show that he

feared Bissonette on the day of the stabbing. Thus, the court refused to admit this

evidence.

We find Waloke to be instructive in this case. There, the defendant assaulted

someone after a day of drinking. The defendant sought to introduce evidence that his

victim had engaged in prior acts of violence. The district court refused the evidence

because of concern that it would trigger “collateral mini trials” on the bad acts. Id.

at 830. Instead, the court permitted the defendant to present evidence that the

defendant had a reputation for violence, without reference to specific acts. Noting

that the district court “has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of

evidence,” our court found no abuse of that discretion in excluding the prior act

evidence. Id.

Similarly here, the district court refused to allow evidence of a specific violent

act, but permitted evidence related to the victim’s reputation for aggression and

violence. Moreover, there were concerns about the temporal proximity of the prior

assault, which occurred five years earlier. As the district court noted, its probative

value on the issue of Wicahpe’s fearful state of mind was minimal, considering that

he and Bissonette had remained friends during the time between the assault on Ten

Fingers and the stabbing. Further, the defense presented evidence that Bissonette had

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engaged in two assaults on the very day of the stabbing, one of which was the brutal,

violent attack on Wicahpe’s father moments earlier. We question whether stale

evidence of an adolescent assault would be anything more than cumulative

considering the evidence that was actually admitted. Thus, we find no abuse of

discretion in the exclusion of the assault evidence.

III. CLAIMS OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

A. Presentation of false testimony

Wicahpe first asserts that the government knowingly presented perjured

testimony. The prosecution may not solicit perjured testimony to secure a conviction

or allow testimony that it knows is false to remain uncorrected. United States v.

Martin, 59 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 1995). To establish a constitutional violation

arising from the use of false testimony, “the testimony must have been perjured, the

government must have known it was, and there must have been a reasonable

likelihood that the perjured testimony affected the jury’s determinations.” United

States v. Boone, 437 F.3d 829, 840 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Martin, 59 F.3d at 770).

Wicahpe directs us to three instances in which, according to him, the

government presented “diametrically opposed testimony on several material facts.”

(Def.’s Br. at 43.) First, he states that while some witnesses said that Wicahpe looked

and talked like he had been beat up by Curtis, Larry Bettelyoun, Sr. testified that no

had fight transpired between Wicahpe and his father. Next, Wicahpe contends

somebody must have lied about Bissonette’s assault on Curtis, because Curry testified

there was a fight, while Bettelyoun, Sr. stated it was an unprovoked attack. Lastly,

a prosecution witness stated that Bissonette smoked marijuana that night, but Dr.

Donald Habbe, who performed the autopsy, concluded from the toxicology report that

Bissonette had not done so.

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As to the first matter, Bettelyoun, Sr. testified about what he saw transpire

between Curtis and Wicahpe, and others testified about their observations of Wicahpe

after he had left Bettelyoun, Sr.’s house. It is not inconceivable that Wicahpe had not

fought with his father, yet appeared to his friends and acted as if he had, or more

likely, that the extremely intoxicated Bettelyoun, Sr. simply had not seen or recalled

the fight. On the question of whether Curtis had been in a fight with Bissonette or

simply attacked by him, Curry’s version of the events is clearly not identical to

Bettelyoun Sr.’s, but minor inconsistencies do not establish that the government

knowingly presented perjured testimony. The same can be said for Dr. Habbe’s

testimony. When compared with witness Cory DeLeon, who said she had given

Bissonette marijuana that night, there is an inconsistency. While it is unusual that a

toxicology report would not show the presence of marijuana if a person ingested it,

we question both the materiality of this inconsistency and whether it could be

considered the product of presenting knowingly perjured testimony. We thus decline

Wicahpe’s invitation to conclude these inconsistencies require reversal.

B. Improper closing argument and rebuttal

Wicahpe next argues comments made by the government in closing argument

and rebuttal were prejudicially improper. The prosecutor suggested in closing that

Wicahpe’s defense attorney was trying to “mislead” the jury with the “red herring”

evidence that Bissonette had brass knuckles on him the day of the stabbing. (Trial

Tr. Vol. II at 296, 320-21.) The prosecutor also referred to his twenty-plus years of

experience in the United States Attorney’s office as giving him the insight that the

facts are not what the lawyers say they are. He followed this comment by again

stating that Wicahpe’s lawyer was pointing the jury to red herrings to “distract you[,]

to take you off the path.” (Id. at 321.) The prosecutor finally implored the jury not

to let Wicahpe’s lawyer “twist those facts” or “con you.” (Id. at 325-26.)

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1. Propriety of the comments

“To obtain a reversal for prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must show

that (1) the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, and (2) such remarks prejudiced the

defendant’s rights in obtaining a fair trial.” United States v. King, 36 F.3d 728, 733

(8th Cir. 1994). If we find the comments were improper, we consider the cumulative

effect of the improprieties, the strength of the evidence against the defendant, and

whether the district court took any curative action. United States v. Beckman, 222

F.3d 512, 526 (8th Cir. 2000). This analysis is altered in Wicahpe’s case because his

attorney did not object to the improper comments or move for a mistrial on this basis,

and the district court took no curative action sua sponte. The error is thus

unpreserved, United States v.Griffin, 437 F.3d 767, 769-70 (8th Cir. 2006), and we

review for plain error, United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993).

The author of this opinion has no hesitancy in finding the comments made by

the prosecutor to be inappropriate. This court has previously admonished counsel for

focusing personal attacks on defense counsel. In United States v. Lopez, 414 F.3d

954, 960 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc), the district court sustained an objection to the

prosecutor’s reference to defense counsel’s “slick tactics.” Although we agreed that

this comment alone did not warrant a mistrial, we noted that such conduct by a

prosecutor was “improper.” Id.; cf. United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1502 (8th

Cir. 1996) (“Referring to defendants as ‘bad people’ simply does not further the aims

of justice or aid in the search for truth, and is likely to inflame bias in the jury and to

result in a verdict based on something other than the evidence.”). Similarly, in United

States v. Holmes, 413 F.3d 770, 775 (8th Cir. 2005), our court reversed a conviction

for prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor used closing argument and rebuttal

“to focus on the conduct and role of [the defendant’s] attorney rather than on the

evidence of [the defendant’s] guilt.” The prosecutor in Holmes, as here, suggested

that the defense attorney was distracting the jury with red herrings, and insinuated

that the attorney and defendant had conspired to fabricate a defense. The Holmes

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court found it “particularly disturbing” that the improper comments were made during

rebuttal, when the defendant had no opportunity to respond. Id. at 776.

The government argues that if the prosecutor’s comments were improper at all,

they were fair, invited responses to the defendant’s closing. I disagree. In Wicahpe’s

closing, he focused on the fact that Bissonette had brass knuckles. While the

prosecutor might have considered this a red herring, it was central to Wicahpe’s claim

of self-defense, as he would feel the necessity to use more force if he knew or had

reason to know that Bissonette used dangerous weapons. The government directs us

to the vigorous, sometimes personal, argument made in Petan’s closing. That,

however, cannot excuse the prosecutor for comments directed at Wicahpe’s lawyer.

2. Effect of any misconduct

Even where this court finds that the government has committed misconduct,

we must determine its cumulative effect, the strength of the evidence against the

defendant, and whether the district court cured any error. Beckman, 222 F.3d at 516.

Although this analysis is altered slightly because we are reviewing for plain error, see

United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (stating plain error

standard), both inquiries consider whether the defendant was substantially prejudiced

by the error.

In this instance, we find the cumulative effect of the errors do not require

reversal. As detailed more fully above, the government established that Wicahpe

stabbed Bissonette in retaliation for Bissonette’s attack on Wicahpe’s father.

Eyewitnesses testified that Wicahpe sought revenge upon seeing his father injured.

He recklessly drove a vehicle at a high rate of speed until he reached Bissonette’s

location. Upon entering the residence, Wicahpe armed himself with a knife, broke

the telephone, and after a short time, stabbed Bissonette. Wicahpe argues that Petan’s

acquittal shows that the evidence against him was weak, but the evidence presented

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against Petan was quite different than the evidence presented against Wicahpe.

Accordingly, although we find the prosecutor’s comments improper, we nonetheless

affirm Wicahpe’s conviction.

IV. WICAHPE’S SENTENCE

Wicahpe lastly claims his 135-month sentence, which was the low end of his

guidelines range, was unreasonable because his circumstances required a sentence

outside the guidelines. Because our circuit has held that a guidelines sentence is

“presumptively reasonable,” United States v. Davidson, 437 F.3d 737, 741 (8th Cir.

2006) (citing United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005)), the burden

is upon Wicahpe to show that the sentence should have been lower, considering the

factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He may do so by showing “the district

court failed to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight,

gave significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or otherwise committed

a clear error of judgment.” Davidson, 437 F.3d 741.

We find nothing in the record to indicate that the district court committed error

in imposing a guidelines sentence. The district court noted the seriousness of the

offense, Wicahpe’s age, history of substance abuse, and lack of criminal history. The

court went on to specifically state that it believed a guidelines sentence was

reasonable and appropriate given the § 3553(a) factors. We agree, and thus affirm the

sentence.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the conviction and sentence in this

case.

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge, with whom COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, joins,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I concur in all of Judge Heaney’s opinion, except Part III.B.1, and I concur in

the judgment. I write separately because I respectfully disagree with the analysis in

Part III.B.1 of Judge Heaney’s opinion regarding the propriety of the prosecution’s

comments during closing argument and rebuttal.

“An advocate is permitted considerable latitude in responding to his opponent’s

arguments.” United States v. Beaman, 361 F.3d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting

United States v. Schwartz, 655 F.2d 140, 142 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)). First,

taken in context, I find the prosecution’s “red herring” comments, ante at 11, to be

part of a proper argument asking the jury to reject Milk’s self-defense argument. The

prosecution argued in closing:

Folks, that is an intentional killing. You are going to have to sift

through this evidence, as I said. There’s a lot of extraneous evidence.

Ben Long Wolf. So he had a dispute with Arlen Bissonette’s brother

because he went with his girlfriend, or something. Honestly, what does

that have to do with this? Does that in some fashion justify murdering

this guy? Does it really have any pertinence to it? Don’t decide this fact

no matter how hard anybody comes up here and asks you to, this never

had to happen. Had Wicahpe Milk and Petan Milk not gone over to Jr.’s

house, they are on the fight, ready to murder, we wouldn’t be here today.

They could call the police; they could do any number of things that are

legal, but they sure couldn’t go over there and kill the guy.

There’s an old expression they call something a red herring. It’s

from detective novels. It’s something to sort of take you off the trail,

mislead you, keep you from focusing on what really happened. Kind of

a false clue. Well, I would suggest to you that there’s been a defense of

red herrings here. We have heard hours of testimony about the assault

on Curtis Milk. And you know there was an assault on him. He was

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beat up. But it has nothing legally significant to do with what happened

in this case, and with what is your duty as jurors in terms of the evidence

that you need to consider. It was a separate event; it happened at a

separate location; and again, could have been handled by the police; all

they had to do was be called. Could have been not handled at all, not

that I am saying that that should have been what happened, but it

sometimes does. But what couldn’t be done was retaliation.

Trial Tr. Vol. II at 296-97.

The prosecution returned to this theme during rebuttal:

When Ms. Thomas [Wicahpe’s counsel] was speaking, she made

a couple comments that I found interesting, one of which is that, well,

people could have done different things all day long. Well, you know

that’s true. People could have done different things all day long and

people did some things that day that they shouldn’t have done. But none

of those other people murdered anybody; none of those other people

stabbed anybody with a knife; none of those other people nailed

somebody over the head with a club. Yeah, they did some things they

shouldn’t have, but that’s not what is before you today. As I said before,

you get these red herrings, things to distract you to take you off the path,

take you away from the facts in the case. But you heard the facts in the

case and there’s no question, there’s no question whatsoever but that

Petan Milk and Chops [Wicahpe] Milk came into that house, came into

Larry Junior’s house, came in there to kill Arlen Bissonette, and did so.

Trial Tr. Vol. II at 320-21.

In contrast to the prosecutorial comments we held to be improper in Holmes

and Lopez, I do not think the “red herring” comments here can be fairly read as

attempts to cast aspersions on defense counsel. In Holmes, the prosecution repeatedly

referred to the defense counsel by name with statements such as “Mr. Moss needs to

make sure that they get their stories straight,” and once called defense counsel’s

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arguments “red herrings.” 413 F.3d at 775. We explained why these comments were

improper:

We think that these various comments referring personally to Mr. Moss

and the necessity for Mr. Moss to “get his stories straight,” taken as a

whole and in the context of the rebuttal argument, show that the

government attorney was accusing defense counsel of conspiring with

the defendant to fabricate testimony. These types of statements are

highly improper because they improperly encourage the jury to focus on

the conduct and role of Mr. Holmes’s attorney rather than on the

evidence of Mr. Holmes’s guilt. Such personal, unsubstantiated attacks

on the character and ethics of opposing counsel have no place in the trial

of any criminal or civil case.

Id.

Unlike Holmes, the prosecution in the instant case did not repeatedly refer to

defense counsel by name or imply that defense counsel had conspired to fabricate

evidence. Rather, the prosecution referred to defense counsel by name just once, and

then only to agree with a statement made by defense counsel. Although the term “red

herring” was used both in Holmes and in the instant case, the implication of the term

here was not that defense counsel fabricated evidence, but rather that focusing on the

murder victim’s assault of Wicahpe’s father was not a basis to find Wicahpe innocent

of murder. I certainly agree with Judge Heaney, ante at 12-13, that it was a valid

strategy for the defense to focus on the brass knuckles found in Bissonette’s

possession after his death and the wounds on Curtis Milk’s face and to ask the jury

to conclude that Wicahpe feared a dangerous weapon. However, it was equally valid

for the prosecution to argue to the jury that what happened to Curtis did not excuse

the killing of Arlen Bissonette. Finding no “personal, unsubstantiated attacks on the

character and ethics of opposing counsel,” Holmes, 413 F.3d at 775, nor any

accusations of “slick tactics,” Lopez, 414 F.3d at 960, in these “red herring”

comments by the prosecution, I do not find them to be improper.

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3

The verb “con” can mean “swindle” or “manipulate,” as well as the less

pejorative “persuade, cajole.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.

2005).

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Next, in rebuttal closing argument, the prosecution referred to 23 years of

experience in the U. S. Attorney’s Office. While it can be a risky practice for the

prosecution to cite personal experience to bolster an argument, our precedent does not

suggest that the reference to experience was improper in this instance. In United

States v. Grey Bear, 883 F.2d 1382, 1392 (8th Cir. 1989), for example, the

prosecution stated during closing argument, “Don’t you think over the years of

experience we have picked up a little bit of sense of what rings true in a criminal

investigation and what rings true in a case?” After examining the context of that

statement, we held that “the government’s arguments were within permissible limits

and did not imply that the government possessed knowledge concerning facts not in

evidence.” Id. In the instant case, the prosecutor stated that his 23 years of

experience taught him that “the Judge instructs you on the law” and “facts are what

you hear from the witnesses up on the witness stand, not from the lawyers saying

what the facts are.” Trial Tr. Vol. II at 320. In referring to his experience, the

prosecutor was emphasizing two fundamental precepts governing jury trials, not

implying the possession of knowledge concerning facts not in evidence. Therefore,

I would not find the prosecution’s reference to his experience to be improper in this

instance.

Finally, I find that the prosecution’s closing references to defense counsel’s

alleged attempt to “twist those facts” and “con you,” Trial Tr. Vol. II at 325-26, fall

closer to the line demarcated by Holmes and Lopez. Although the phrase “con you”

in particular can carry some pejorative connotations,3

 in context these comments were

also part of an argument to the jury to reject the defense’s invitation to dwell on

evidence that was extraneous to the prosecution’s theory of the case. Because the

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comment here was fleeting and ambiguous and passed without an objection that

might have clarified it, I would not find it to be improper in this case.

In conclusion, I do not find the challenged comments by the prosecution to be

improper when taken in context. Therefore, I would not reach the question of

whether the comments prejudiced the defendant’s rights in obtaining a fair trial. See

King, 36 F.3d at 733. Accordingly, while I agree that these comments would

not be grounds for reversal even if improper, I respectfully disagree with Judge

Heaney’s analysis in Part III.B.1 regarding the propriety of the prosecution’s

comments in closing argument and rebuttal.

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