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Parties Involved:
Natalie Meyer
Appellee
State of Colorado
Appellee
Eileen M. Thournir
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth eireuit 

JUL 2 3 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

EILEEN M. THOURNIR, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 89-1082 

) 

NATALIE MEYER, Secretary of ) 

State for the State of Colorado;) 

and STATE OF COLORADO, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Colorado 

D.C. No. 82-C-1716 

David H. Miller (Tamara K. Vincelette and 

Holland & Hart, Denver, Colorado, with 

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 

Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Linda C. Michow of 

him on the briefs), 

of Colorado, Denver, 

Maurice G. Knaizer, Deputy Attorney General (Duane Woodard, 

Attorney General; Charles B. Howe, Deputy Attorney General; and 

Richard H. Forman, Solicitor General, with him on the briefs), 

Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Appellate Case: 89-1082 Document: 01019566221 Date Filed: 07/23/1990 Page: 1 
Before MOORE and MCWILLIAMS,* Circuit Judges, and 

District Judge.** 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

BRATTON, 

*Judge McWilliams attended oral argument, but did not participate 

in the decision. 

**The Honorable Howard C. Bratton, Senior District Judge for the 

United States District Court of New Mexico, sitting by 

designation. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1082 Document: 01019566221 Date Filed: 07/23/1990 Page: 2 
This case challenges the constitutionality of Colorado 

Revised Statutes§ l-4-80l(l)(i) (1980) which provides that a 

person seeking elective office as an unaffiliated candidate must 

be registered in Colorado as an unaffiliated voter for at least 

one year before filing a nomination petition. On cross-motions 

for summary judgment, the district court concluded the statute 

imposed no constitutionally impermissible burden and granted 

summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Secretary of State 

Natalie Meyer. Thournir v. Meyer, 708 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Colo. 

1989). Ms. Thournir has appealed contending the statute violates 

First Amendment freedoms as well as the due process and equal 

protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. We affirm. 1 

The facts are undisputed. Ms. Thournir moved to Colorado 

from California in February 1981, but she did not register as an 

unaffiliated voter until July 14, 1982. On August 19, 1982, she 

filed nominating petitions with the State to run as an 

unaffiliated candidate for Congress. Despite the designation of 

her candidacy, Ms. Thournir had been a member of the Socialist 

Workers Party (SWP) in California since 1976, but Colorado 

election laws in existence at the time would permit voters to 

register only as 

"Unaffiliated." 2 

a "Democrat," a "Republican," or as 

After litigation initiated by the Secretary in 

state court resulted in Ms. Thournir's removal from the ballot 

1Because the election in which Ms. Thournir sought to run has been 

held, the Secretary has moved to dismiss this appeal as moot. We 

disagree. See Barnard v. Chamberlain, 897 F.2d 1059, 1062 n.3 

(lOth Cir. 1990). 

2This limitation on candidacy has not been raised directly in this 

proceeding. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1082 Document: 01019566221 Date Filed: 07/23/1990 Page: 3 
because of her failure to meet the qualifications of Colo. Rev. 

Stat. § l-4-80l(l)(i), Ms. Thournir filed this action under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the statute. 3 Subsequent actions in 

state court involving other candidates and changes in the 

Secretary's rules have significantly moderated the effect of the 

statute on independent candidates in ways not germane here; 

therefore, we approach this case solely on the basis of how the 

statute affects a person in the precise status of Ms. Thournir at 

the time she sought to run as an unaffiliated candidate. 

We review de DQYQ a district court's decision on a motion for 

summary judgment, Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 

F.2d 141, 143 (lOth Cir. 1988). In doing so, we must review the 

record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. R-G 

Denver, Ltd. v. First City Holdings, 789 F.2d 1469, 1471 (lOth 

Cir. 1986). 

The principal question presented for our consideration is 

whether Colo. Rev. Stat. § l-4-80l(l)(i) places a constitutionally 

impermissible burden upon unaffiliated candidates which 

effectively excludes them from the election process. 

Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793 (1983). In reviewing 

this issue, "we must first consider the character and magnitude of 

the asserted injury" to the plaintiff's constitutional right and 

then "identify and evaluate the precise interest" advocated by the 

state to justify any burden state law places on the plaintiff's 

right. Rainbow Coalition v. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 844 F.2d 

3Ms. Thournir did not regain a place on the ballot and did not run 

in the 1982 election. The ultimate disposition has been delayed 

because of prior appeals from, and remands to, the district court. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1082 Document: 01019566221 Date Filed: 07/23/1990 Page: 4 
740, 743 (lOth Cir. 1988) (quoting Anderson, 460 u.s. at 789). 4 

"Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a 

position to decide whether the challenged provision is 

unconstitutional." Anderson, 460 u.s. at 789. 

The right asserted here by Ms. Thournir appears twofold. She 

advocates her individual right to seek office, but she also 

asserts the associational rights of the members of the Socialist 

Workers Party to advocate their political beliefs through the 

aegis of her candidacy. We shall consider the issues separately. 

ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS 

Colorado did not recognize party affiliation other than 

Democrat and Republican in 1982, Thournir v. Meyer, 708 F. Supp. 

at 1185; therefore, Ms. Thournir's membership in the SWP and the 

collective interests of those adhering to membership in that party 

are not legally distinguishable from the interests of the broad 

spectrum of persons claiming no affiliation with the established 

major parties. Under the Colorado statutory scheme, no attempt 

was made to distinguish one group of unaffiliated voters from 

another; therefore, we must assume the generic classification of 

"unaffiliated voter" was protected by the same umbrella of rights 

and interests. 5 

4Ms. Thournir advocates the "strict scrutiny" review we refused to 

follow in Rainbow Coalition, 844 F.2d at 742. Having once 

rejected that doctrine, we are not free to apply it here. 

5current Colorado law is much different. An independent candidate 

can run under any affiliation other than the name of an official 

political party. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-4-80l(l)(a) (Supp. 1989). 

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Appellate Case: 89-1082 Document: 01019566221 Date Filed: 07/23/1990 Page: 5 
Moreover, this generic sameness resulted in the elimination 

or denial of the existence of any political party other than 

Democrat and Republican. Thus, when Ms. Thournir submitted 

herself in candidacy for Congress, she could not carry the banner 

of the Socialist Workers Party. Ms. Thournir and her trial 

counsel recognized this peculiarity of then existent Colorado law 

in district court proceedings. In his recitation of undisputed 

facts during an early hearing, counsel stated: "(Ms. Thournir] 

registered to vote in early July 1982, and she registered as 

unaffiliated as the Socialist Workers Party is not a recognized 

party within the State of Colorado . " (R. Vol. I, doc. 4, at 26). 

In her affidavit for summary judgment, Ms . Thournir stated: 

"Affiant registered in the City and County of Denver as an 

unaffiliated voter. (While Affiant was in fact a member of the 

SWP, A.ffiant was not allowed to register as such because of other 

then-existing Colorado Election Code provisions prohibiting 

registration as anything except 'Democrat', 'Republican', or 

'Unaffiliated')." Id., at 29-30. Indeed, as a purely factual 

matter, there is nothing in the record to suggest Ms. Thournir 

actually sought or was to appear on the ballot as a candidate of 

the Socialist Workers Party, notwithstanding her own ideology and 

claim of party membership. 

We therefore cannot accept Ms. Thournir's thesis that her 

putative candidacy represented a distinct political body of common 

interest which was denied an opportunity to voice its views 

because she was refused a p lace on the ballot. 

view Ms. Thournir's case as we would that of 

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Instead, we must 

a person who 

Appellate Case: 89-1082 Document: 01019566221 Date Filed: 07/23/1990 Page: 6 
maintained no identifiable political affiliation and who simply 

sought an opportunity to stand for public office. 

Indeed, when questioned during oral argument, her counsel 

admitted the community of interest represented by her candidacy 

had to have been all of Colorado's unaffiliated voters. Thus, 

despite the political views and the interests she shared with 

people who claimed membership in the SWP, those views and 

interests were substantially diluted within the whole of the 

diverse views and interests of persons claiming no affiliation 

with the major political parties. Indeed, the peculiar Colorado 

law created the unique situation in which "the rights of voters 

and the rights of candidates do [] lend themselves to neat 

separation." 6 Therefore, we must regard Ms. Thournir's membership 

in the Socialist Workers Party essentially irrelevant to the 

question before us.

7 

So focused, we find ourselves unable to deal with the broad 

issues of associational rights that form the nucleus of Ms. 

Thournir's case. Because of the strictures of then current state 

law and the fact that Ms. Thournir was truly unaffiliated in the 

eyes of that law, we believe there is no legal substance to her 

claim of denial of associational rights. Indeed, we conclude that 

claim is not justiciable. Given her inability to be the candidate 

6aullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972). 

7Ms. Thournir's attack here is dissimilar from the focus of 

Baer v. Meyer, 728 F.2d 471 (lOth Cir. 1984), in which persons 

associated with political groups other than the Democrat and 

Republican parties successfully challenged Colorado's failure to 

grant those groups the same ballot process protections as the 

major parties. We find no support in Baer for Ms. Thournir's case 

as she has framed it. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1082 Document: 01019566221 Date Filed: 07/23/1990 Page: 7 
of a particular voter group, we simply cannot assay the 

associational rights Ms. Thournir attempts to vindicate. While we 

in no way denigrate the significance of those rights, we find no 

vehicle in this case that would allow us to reach them. 

MS. THOURNIR' S INDIVIDUAL RIGHT 

Given our previous analysis, we must now examine the 

durational registration requirement only as it affects all 

individual unaffiliated candidates in Colorado regardless of their 

political ideology. This circumscription of the right involved 

diminishes its magnitude in the balancing test required by Rainbow 

Coalition. 

While the right to freely exchange political thought has 

resulted in a severe limitation of a state's power to affect 

associational and voting rights of political parties, Eu v. San 

Francisco Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 

1013 (1989); Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208 (1986); 

Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 

u.s. 173 (1979), the effects of a state's durational limitations 

on the rights of individual candidates are less clear. 

In Bullock v. Carter, 405 u.s. 134, 142-43 (1972), the Court 

stated it had not "attached such [a] fundamental status to 

candidacy as to 

Bullock Court 

invoke a 

had before 

rigorous standard of review." The 

it a Texas statute that required a 

substantial filing fee as a precondition to qualifying a candidate 

for placement on the ballot. The Court defined the fee as a 

barrier to the candidate's ballot access but not to a citizen's 

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Appellate Case: 89-1082 Document: 01019566221 Date Filed: 07/23/1990 Page: 8 
right to vote. The Court stated, "In approaching candidate 

restrictions, it is essential to examine in a realistic light the 

extent and nature of their impact on voters." Id. at 143. 

So directed, it becomes difficult for us to see how Ms. 

Thournir's removal from the ballot had a significant impact in 

1982 upon the unaffiliated voters of Colorado. See City of 

Akron v. Bell, 660 F.2d 166, 169 (6th Cir. 1981). Ms. Thournir's 

individual candidacy, without a legally recognizable constituency, 

can be accorded no special status under Bullock. Indeed, had the 

converse been true, had she been able to legally claim a 

constituency, the associational rights of those voters would be 

germane to this case because denial of her candidacy would have 

impacted directly upon the voters comprising that constituency. 

Yet, as we have pointed out, the only issue relates to Ms. 

Thournir and her individual right to run for office. In that 

context, we are unpersuaded that the twelve-month registration 

requirement, standing alone, presents an undue burden on the 

rights of a putative candidate. 

Here, the Secretary has established the purpose for 

Colorado's durational requirement is to protect the integrity of 

the party system and to prohibit "frivolous" candidacies. 

Reasonable restrictions on candidacy to accomplish these ends are 

sufficient to uphold the statute. Storer v. Brown, 415 u.s. 724, 

733 (1974); Rosar io v . Rockefeller, 410 u.s. 752, 761 (1973); 

Lubin v. Panish, 415 U. S . 709, 715 (1974); Andress v. Reed, 880 

F.2d 239, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). We believe the one-year 

requirement is not an unreasonable restriction. Cf. City of 

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Appellate Case: 89-1082 Document: 01019566221 Date Filed: 07/23/1990 Page: 9 
Akron, 660 F.2d at 169 (one-year durational residency requirement 

does not impair a candidate's First Amendment rights). 8 

DUE PROCESS CLAIMS 

Ms. Thournir challenges Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-4-BOl(l)(i) as a 

de facto residency requirement prohibited by Dunn v. Blumstein, 

405 U.S. 330 (1972). She maintains the statute evokes the same 

punitive consequence as that proscribed by Dunn. We disagree. 

Those election laws impacting upon the travel freedoms which have 

been invalidated by Dunn are not analogous to the statutes 

imposing burdens on candidacy. Candidacy itself is not a 

fundamental right which is comparable to the right to vote; 

therefore, burdens inflicted upon candidates are not to be 

measured by the same yardstick applied to burdens affecting 

voters. City of Akron, 660 F.2d at 169. 

Ms. Thournir also argues the statute is a "broadly worded 

trap" because "it fails to discriminate between those who have, 

and those who have not, been affiliated with their party" for one 

year. As we have already pointed out, under the 1980 election 

laws from which this case arose, "party" affiliation other than 

that of Democrat or Republican was irrelevant to an "unaffiliated" 

candidate. Consequently, we can find no basis for Ms. Thournir's 

argument, as the statute would not have to provide a means to 

8Ms. Thournir argues the State has no interest in a particular 

person's choice of party affiliation, and that is correct. We do 

not, however, believe that the State is under any burden to pass a 

"less restrictive means" of accomplishing its legitimate purpose 

as that purpose applies to an individual candidate's right to seek 

office. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1082 Document: 01019566221 Date Filed: 07/23/1990 Page: 10 
distinguish the duration of membership in a nonrecognized 

political group. 

Ms. Thournir contends the statute creates an impermissible, 

conclusive presumption that she was not a member of the SWP for 

the necessary one year. We think that argument falls, once again, 

upon the statute's failure to give recognition to the SWP. The 

irrelevance of her party membership as an unaffiliated candidate 

moots any suggestion of an issue based upon impermissible 

conclusions within the statute. 

Ms. Thournir finally argues the State of Colorado 

disenfranchised her and her supporters when, by regulation of the 

Secretary, she was not permitted to run as a write-in candidate. 

The Secretary has pointed out, and Ms. Thournir has admitted, this 

regulation was repealed in 1987; hence this issue is moot. 

Having found no factual substance to, or support for, the 

central issues of this appeal, and having concluded the district 

court correctly analyzed the remaining issues, we AFFIRM the 

judgment of the district court. 

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