Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01431/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01431-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Appellee
Robert J. Cain
Appellant

Document Text:

*

The HONORABLE DAVID S. DOTY, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

1

“Though there are some different threshhold eligibility requirements . . . the

analysis for determining disability is identical under both programs.” Russell v.

Sullivan, 950 F.2d 542, 543 n.2 (8th Cir. 1991).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1431

___________

Robert J. Cain, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of *

Social Security, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Defendant - Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: June 12, 2006

Filed: September 18, 2006

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, and DOTY,*

 District Judge.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Robert Cain applied for disability and supplemental security income benefits

under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.,

1381 et seq.

1

 Cain claims that he has been continuously disabled since June 1, 2001,

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2

The HONORABLE JOHN T. MAUGHMER, United States Magistrate Judge

for the Western District of Missouri

-2-

by a combination of physical and mental impairments -- Crohn’s disease, hepatitis C,

neck and back pain, degenerative bone disease, chronic fatigue, migraine headaches,

depression, anxiety, and impaired memory. After an evidentiary hearing, the

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied the applications, finding that Cain is not

disabled because, though unable to perform his past relevant work due to medically

determinable impairments, he is able to perform the light unskilled jobs of routing

clerk and scale operator. 

Cain then filed this lawsuit seeking judicial review of the agency’s adverse final

decision. Applying the proper standard of review, the district court2

 affirmed the

denial of benefits, concluding that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial

evidence on the administrative record as a whole. See Dolph v. Barnhart, 308 F.3d

876, 877 (8th Cir. 2002). Cain appeals, arguing that the ALJ and the district court

failed to give controlling weight to the opinion of Cain’s treating physician and

improperly discredited Cain’s subjective testimony concerning the impact of his

physical and mental impairments. Applying the same substantial evidence standard

of review, we affirm. 

Medical records reflect that Dr. Charles Spears was one of Cain’s treating

physicians after 1999, primarily prescribing medications to treat Cain’s anxiety and

depression. In November 2003, Dr. Spears completed physical and mental “medical

source statements” (MSS), forms on which Dr. Spears assessed, through a series of

check marks, the impact of Cain’s physical and mental impairments on his physical

strength, posture, manipulative ability, pain, understanding and memory,

concentration and persistence, social interaction, and adaption. At the hearing, a

vocational expert testified that, if the limitations enumerated by Dr. Spears are

credited, Cain cannot perform the work of any occupation and is disabled. 

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Though none of his other treating physicians opined that Cain is unable to

work, Cain argues, as he did to the district court, that the ALJ was obliged to give

controlling weight to the opinions expressed by Dr. Spears on the MSS forms. A

treating physician’s opinion does not automatically control, but we give it controlling

weight “if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence.”

Reed v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). However,

a physician’s medical source statement addresses the applicant’s residual functional

capacity to work, which is a determination the Commissioner must make. See Ellis

v. Barnhart, 392 F.3d 988, 994 (8th Cir. 2005). A treating physician’s checkmarks

on an MSS form are conclusory opinions that may be discounted if contradicted by

other objective medical evidence in the record. See Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801,

805-06 (8th Cir. 2004); Hogan v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir. 2001); Social

Security Ruling 96-2p, Titles II and XVI: Giving Controlling Weight to Treating

Source Medical Opinions (July 2, 1996).

In this case, the ALJ partially discounted Dr. Spears’s opinions reflected on the

MSS forms because (i) Dr. Spears gave no explanation for his physical assessments,

which are not supported by his treatment notes and are inconsistent with the other

medical evidence; (ii) Dr. Spears is not a psychiatrist and performed no structured

psychological evaluation supporting his assessment of Cain’s mental impairments; and

(iii) two consulting specialists, a neurologist and a psychologist, separately examined

Cain and disagreed with Dr. Spears regarding the severity of his physical and mental

impairments. In addition, counsel for the Commissioner argues on appeal that Dr.

Spears’s opinions were inconsistent with Cain’s own testimony regarding his daily

activities (for example, Dr. Spears opined that Cain can “never” see near or far or

distinguish depth perception, whereas Cain testified that he drives a vehicle every day

and regularly watches television). Considering the administrative record as a whole,

as we must, we agree with the district court that substantial evidence supports the

ALJ’s decision to discount the severity of Cain’s limitations reflected on the MSS

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forms completed by Dr. Spears. See Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790-91 (8th Cir.

2005).

Cain next argues that the ALJ erred in discrediting Cain’s subjective testimony

that he suffers from disabling pain, fatigue, and mental impairments. We disagree.

The ALJ’s opinion states that he evaluated Cain’s subjective complaints under the

proper standards. See 20 C.F.R. 416.929(c)(3); Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320

(8th Cir. 1984). The ALJ found that Cain’s “medically determinable impairments

could reasonably be expected to produce pain and other symptoms.” However, the

ALJ discounted Cain’s testimony of “debilitating daily symptoms” because this

testimony was not supported by medical evidence or by other objective evidence of

disabling symptoms, and because Cain’s sporadic work record weighed against his

credibility. “The credibility of a claimant’s subjective testimony is primarily for the

ALJ to decide, not the courts.” Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1218 (8th Cir.

2001). Like the district court, we conclude that the ALJ’s credibility findings are

supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

______________________________

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