Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00328/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00328-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
I. Barrimond
Defendant
J. Capriola
Defendant
City Of Fresno
Defendant
Zella Maye Freeman
Plaintiff
R. Garrison
Defendant
J. Hollins
Defendant
R. Perez
Defendant
A. Simonson
Defendant
Mark A. Yee
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ZELLA MAYE FREEMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF FRESNO; R. GARRISON

(F.P.D. Badge No. 78); MARK A

YEE (F.P.D. Badge No. 692);

J. CAPRIOLA (F.S.O. Badge No.

7622); I. BARRIMOND (F.S.O.

Badge No. 1153); J. HOLLINS

(F.S.O. Badge No. 2346); R.

PEREZ (F.S.O. Badge No. 6169);

A. SIMONSON (F.S.O. Badge No.

9364), inclusive,

Defendants.

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1:05-cv-00328 OWW SMS

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS PURSUANT

TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)

AND/OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

FOR A MORE DEFINITE

STATEMENT (FED. R. Civ. P.

12(e).

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants City of Fresno (“City”), R. Garrison (“Officer

Garrison”), and Mark A. Yee (“Officer Yee”) move to dismiss

Zella Maye Freeman’s (“Plaintiff”) complaint for failure to state

a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and in the

alternative, for a more definite statement pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(e). (Doc. 13, City Defs.’ Mem.). Defendants J.

Capriola, I. Barrimond, J. Hollins, R. Perez, and A. Simonson

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(collectively, “County Defendants” or “County Officers”), move to

dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) and for a more definite statement pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(e) as to Plaintiff’s claim under Cal. Civ. Code § 43. 

(Doc. 14, County Defs.’ Mem.). Plaintiff opposes the motions. 

(Doc. 17, Pl.’s Opp. to City; Doc. 18, Pl.’s Opp. to County).

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises out of an alleged incident that occurred on

February 19, 2004, at the residence of Plaintiff, who is a

seventy-five-year-old African-American woman. (Doc. 1, Compl.

¶ 3). Plaintiff alleges that police officers belonging to a

Multi-Agency Gang Enforcement Consortium (“M.A.G.E.C.”) unit used

excessive force in entering and searching her home. Plaintiff

alleges she was injured by the officers, and that they violated

her constitutional rights because of her race and gender. (See

id., Ex. A at “Attachment A”). Plaintiff filed her Complaint on

March 8, 2005, alleging the Defendant peace officers violated

42 U.S.C. § 1983 protecting her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights against unreasonable search and seizure by state

officials. Plaintiff also alleges various “state causes of

action” that are grouped together in a single sentence, including

violation of Cal. Civ. Code §§ 43 and 52.1, assault, battery,

false imprisonment, trespass, and intentional infliction of

emotional distress. (Id. at ¶ 26).

The City Defendants moved to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s

claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on March 30, 2005. 

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(Doc. 13, City’s Mem. 4-14). In the alternative, the City

Defendants moved for a more definite statement pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(e). (Id. at 14-5). Plaintiff opposed. (Doc. 17,

Pl.’s Opp. to City). The City Defendants replied. (Doc. 19,

City’s Reply).

On April 4, 2005, the County Defendants moved to dismiss

Plaintiff’s state law claims only. (Doc. 14, County’s Mem. 2). 

The County Defendants also moved for a more definite statement as

to Plaintiff’s claim under Cal. Civ. Code §§ 43 and 52.1. 

Plaintiff opposed. (Doc. 18, Pl.’s Opp. to County). The County

Defendants did not reply.

Oral argument was heard on May 9, 2005. Wesley E. Stupar,

Esq., of Nuttall & Coleman appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. 

Harvie Ruth Schreiber, Esq., appeared on behalf of the City

Defendants. James J. Arendt, Esq., of Weakley, Ratcliff, Arendt

& McGuire, LLP, appeared on behalf of the County Defendants. 

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff alleges that on February 19, 2004, at around noon,

City of Fresno and Fresno County peace officers, who were members

of the M.A.G.E.C. unit, “demanded entry into [her] residence,

threatening to shoot [her] if [she] did not open the door.” 

(Doc. 1, Compl. Ex. A at “Attachment A”). Plaintiff was

babysitting three children, all under five years of age, at the

time. Plaintiff alleges she suffered injuries, both physical and

mental, as a result of the invasion. Plaintiff alleges the

course of events as follows:

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9. Defendant R. GARRISON, came to Plaintiff’s front

door demanded entry into Plaintiff’s residence, and

threatened to shoot Plaintiff if she did not open the door

quickly enough.

10. After moving the minor children away from the

door, Plaintiff opened the door under great physical,

emotional, and mental duress.

11. Defendant R. GARRISON, and the named FSO Officers,

then invaded Plaintiff’s residence, with their weapons

drawn, knocked Plaintiff onto the floor, and hurt Plaintiff.

12. Plaintiff was concerned about the safety of the

minor children in her care.

13. Defendant R. GARRISON, in callous disregard of the

injuries Plaintiff had sustained, ordered Plaintiff to

quickly stand up, under threat of force. Plaintiff was

unable to stand up on her own.

14. Defendant R. GARRISON, and the named FSO Officers,

searched Plaintiff’s residence, detained her under threat of

force and seized Plaintiff’s son’s locked safe, as well as

Plaintiff’s registered .32 caliber handgun, which she

lawfully owned.

15. Defendant R. GARRISON, and the named FSO Officers,

did not apologize to Plaintiff for committing said acts;

rather, as they were leaving, Defendants sarcastically and

cruelly told Plaintiff to, “Have a good day.”

16. As a proximate result of said acts, Defendants,

and each of them, caused Plaintiff to suffer significant and

residual pain and injury to her arms, legs, hips and pelvic

area, and have aggravated Plaintiff’s bad heart condition

and high blood pressure. Plaintiff was denied her

constitutional, statutory and legal rights as stated below,

and has suffered significant and residual general and

special damages, including by [sic] not limited to, severe

mental and emotional distress, severe concern as to her

personal safety, false imprisonment, loss of liberty,

trespass to Plaintiff’s residence and possessions, fear,

humiliation, embarrassment, discomfort, anxiety, medical and

related expenses of approximately %5,800, and future medical

and emotional distress in a sum according to proof.

(Doc. 1, Compl.).

In a statement by Plaintiff she attaches to the Complaint,

Plaintiff further alleges the officers “trampled over [her]

legs.” (Doc. 1, Compl. Ex. A at “Attachment A;” see also Compl.

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¶¶ 9, 13). Plaintiff asserts she believes the officers’ actions

“were performed...in purposeful discrimination against [her] age,

physical ability, gender and race.” (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that the officers obtained a search

warrant, for which Officer Yee, a City Defendant, was the

affiant, but that the search warrant lacked probable cause, was

overbroad, and lacked particularity. (Id. at ¶ 19). Plaintiff

alleges no facts that explains why the search warrant lacked

probable cause or the circumstances surrounding the issuance of

the warrant.

Plaintiff attaches an “Amended Claim for Damages,” dated

September 3, 2004 (“Government Tort Claim”), that she filed with

the City of Fresno. Attached to the Government Tort Claim is a

statement by Plaintiff in support for her claim for damages

(“Attachment A”) and a “Follow-Up Report” that purportedly

relates to the search warrant. Among the defendants named in

this lawsuit, the following are listed as “assisting personnel”

on the Follow-Up Report: City Defendant R. Garrison, and all

County Defendants (i.e., J. Capriola, J. Barriond, J. Hollins, R.

Perez, and A. Simonson). 

IV. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to attack a

complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is

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disfavored and rarely granted: “[a] complaint should not be

dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him

to relief.” Van Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980

(9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). In deciding whether to

grant a motion to dismiss, the court “accept[s] all factual

allegations of the complaint as true and draw[s] all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” TwoRivers v. Lewis,

174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“The court need not, however, accept as true allegations

that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by

exhibit. Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations

that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or

unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,

266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). For

example, matters of public record may be considered under Fed. R.

Evid. 201, including pleadings, orders and other papers filed

with the court or records of administrative bodies. See Lee v.

City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Conclusions of law, conclusory allegations, unreasonable

inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact need not be

accepted. See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624

(9th Cir. 1981). 

B. Motion for a More Definite Statement Pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(e).

A motion for a more definite statement pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(e) attacks the unintelligibility of the complaint, not

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simply the mere lack of detail, and is only proper when a party

is unable to determine how to frame a response to the issues

raised by the complaint. A court will deny the motion where the

complaint is specific enough to apprise the defendant of the

substance of the claim being asserted. Bureerong v. Uvawas,

922 F. Supp. 1450, 1461 (C.D. Cal. 1996); see also Famolare, Inc.

v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal.

1981) (finding a Rule 12(e) motion proper “only where the

complaint is so indefinite that the defendant cannot ascertain

the nature of the claim being asserted”). A motion for a more

definite statement is proper only where the complaint is “so

vague or ambiguous that the opposing party cannot respond, even

with a simple denial, in good faith or without prejudice to

himself.” Cellars v. Pacific Coast Packaging, Inc., 189 F.R.D.

575, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (internal quotations and citation

omitted); see also Sagan v. Apple Computer Inc., 874 F. Supp.

1072, 1077 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (citing Van Dyke Ford, Inc. v. Ford,

399 F. Supp. 277, 284 (E.D. Wis. 1975)) (“A Rule 12(e) motion is

more likely to be granted where the complaint is so general that

ambiguity arises in determining the nature of the claim or the

parties against whom it is being made.”); Boxall v. Sequoia Union

High Sch. Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 1979)

(finding a motion for a more definite statement should not be

granted unless the defendant literally cannot frame a responsive

pleading). 

“Rule 12(e) is designed to strike an unintelligibility

rather than want of detail.... A motion for a more definite

statement should not be used to test an opponent’s case by

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requiring him to allege certain facts or retreat from his

allegations.” Palm Springs Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Desert Hosp.,

628 F. Supp. 454, 464-65 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (quoting Juneau Square

Corp. v. First Wis. Nat’l Bank, 60 F.R.D. 46, 48 (E. D. Wis.

1973)). A Rule 12(e) motion “is likely to be denied where the

substance of the claim has been alleged, even though some of the

details are omitted.” Sagan, 874 F. Supp. at 1077 (citing

Boxall, 464 F. Supp. at 1113-14).

This liberal standard of pleading is consistent with Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2) which allows pleadings that contain a “short and

plain statement of the claim.” Both rules assume that the

parties will familiarize themselves with the claims and ultimate

facts through the discovery process. See Sagan, 874 F. Supp. at

1077 (“Motions for a more definite statement are viewed with

disfavor and are rarely granted because of the minimal pleading

requirements of the Federal Rules.”). If the detail sought by a

motion for a more definite statement is obtainable through

discovery, the motion should be denied. See McHenry v. Renne, 84

F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1996) (granting 12(e) motion where

complaint “does not provide defendants with a fair opportunity to

frame a responsive pleading”); see also Sagan, 874 F. Supp. at

1077 (“Parties are expected to use discovery, not the pleadings,

to learn the specifics of the claims being asserted.”); Beery v.

Hitachi Home Elec. (Amer.), Inc., 157 F.R.D. 477, 480 (C.D. Cal.

1993) (finding motion for a more definite statement should be

denied if the detail sought is obtainable through discovery); 

Federal Savings and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Musacchio, 695 F. Supp.

1053, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (finding that if plaintiff’s

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1 Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall

be liable to the party injured in an action at law,

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,

except that in any action brought against a judicial

officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s

judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be

granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or

declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of

this section, any Act of Congress applicable

exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be

considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 

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complaint meets the notice requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, and

defendants are provided with a sufficient basis to respond, the

proper avenue for eliciting additional detail is through

discovery); Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Brothers Stores, Inc.,

525 F. Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (“A motion for a more

definite statement should not be granted unless the defendant

cannot frame a responsive pleading.”); CMAX, Inc. v. Hall,

290 F.2d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 1961).

C. Civil Rights Claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

“Section 1983 provides for liability against any person

acting under color of law who deprives another ‘of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’

of the United States.”1 S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana,

336 F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

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2 “There is certainly no constitutional impediment to

municipal liability. ‘The Tenth Amendment’s reservation of

nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a

federal-court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of

unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment.’”

Monell, 436 U.S. 691 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,

291 (1977)). There is no “basis for concluding that the Eleventh

Amendment is a bar to municipal liability.” Id. (citing

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976); Lincoln County

v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890)).

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1. Suits Against Local Governments: The Monell

Doctrine.

Local governments are “persons” subject to suit for

“constitutional tort[s]” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 Haugen v.

Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n. 55 (1978)). “[T]he

legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 compels the

conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other

local government units to be included among those persons to whom

§ 1983 applies.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Local governments can

be sued for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where

such suits arise out of unconstitutional actions that implement

or execute a “policy statement, ordinance, or decision officially 

adopted and promulgated by that body's officers....” Id. 690-1. 

If no official policy exists, “customs and usages” may fulfill

this element of a § 1983 claim against a local government. Id. 

A local government’s liability is limited, however. 

Although a local government can be held liable for its official

policies or customs, it will not be held liable for an employee’s

actions outside of the scope of these policies or customs. “A

municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a

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tortfeasor -- or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held

liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell,

436 U.S. at 691. “A local government may not be sued under

§ 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. 

Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom,

whether made by its law-makers or by those whose edicts or acts

may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the

injury that the government as an entity is responsible under

§ 1983.” Id. at 694.

To prevail on a § 1983 complaint against a local government

under Monell, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-part test: 

(1) The local government official(s) must have

intentionally violated the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights;

(2) The violation must be a part of policy or custom and

may not be an isolated incident; and

(3) A nexus must link the specific policy or custom to the

plaintiff’s injury.

See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-92.

2. Suits Against Governmental Officials

(a) Official-Capacity Suits

“[Section] 1983 claims against government officials in their

official capacities are really suits against the governmental

employer because the employer must pay any damages awarded.” 

Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1023 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing

Ky. v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)); see also Doe v.

Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997)

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(finding that “a suit against a state official in his official

capacity is no different from a suit against the [official’s

office or the] State itself”) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). “As the Supreme Court

has stated, ‘official-capacity suits...generally represent only

another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an

officer is an agent.’” Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles,

167 F.3d 514, 524 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Graham, 473 U.S.

at 165). “‘As long as the government entity receives notice and

an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all

respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the

entity.’” Ruvalcaba, 167 F.3d at 524 n.3 (quoting Graham,

473 U.S. at 166.). 

(b) Personal-Capacity Suits

“‘Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability

upon a government official for actions he takes under color of

state law.’” Dittman v. Cal., 191 F.3d 1020, 1027 (9th Cir.

1999) (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 165); see also Hafer v. Melo, 

502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (finding that “[p]ersonal capacity suits

seek to impose liability on state officials for acts taken under

color of state law”); Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 749 (9th

Cir. 1995). In setting forth the distinctions between personal

and official capacity suits, the Supreme Court said: 

Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal

liability upon a government official for actions he

takes under color of state law. See, e.g., Scheuer

v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-238 (1974).

Official-capacity suits, in contrast, “generally

represent only another way of pleading an action

against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”

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3 Immunity is not absolute, as the Ninth Circuit has

explained: 

This court has held that, when a public official acts

in reliance on a duly enacted statute or ordinance,

that official ordinarily is entitled to qualified

immunity. See Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d

1200, 1210 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that “an officer

who reasonably relies on the legislature’s 

determination that a statute is constitutional should

be shielded from personal liability”). The existence

of an authorizing statute is not dispositive,

however. Qualified immunity does not extend to a

public official who enforces a statute that is

“patently violative of fundamental constitutional

principles.” Id. at 1209.

Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1027.

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Monell[], 436 U.S. at 690, n. 55 []. As long as the

government entity receives notice and an opportunity

to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all

respects other than name, to be treated as a suit

against the entity. Brandon, 469 U.S., at 471-472.

It is not a suit against the official personally, for

the real party in interest is the entity. Thus,

while an award of damages against an official in his

personal capacity can be executed only against the

official’s personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to

recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity

suit must look to the government entity itself.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). 

“While the plaintiff in a personal-capacity suit need not

establish a connection to governmental ‘policy or custom,’

officials sued in their personal capacities, unlike those sued in

their official capacities, may assert personal immunity defenses

such as objectively reasonable reliance on existing law.”3 Pena

v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Graham,

473 U.S. at 166-167). Individuals are not immune under the

doctrine of qualified immunity if they violated “clearly

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established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “A victory in such a suit is a

‘victory against the individual defendant, rather than against

the entity that employs him.’” Cerrato v. San Francisco

Community College Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 1994)

(quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 166-67).

D. State Law Claims Against Public Entities and the

California Tort Claims Act.

Plaintiff brings the following state law claims against

Defendants: violation of her statutory civil rights under Cal.

Civ. Code § 43 and 52.1, assault, battery, false imprisonment,

trespass, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The

California Tort Claims Act governs tort claims against public

entities and their officials. See Cal. Gov. Code § 810 et seq. 

The California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”) requires plaintiffs to

present a written claim to the public entity allegedly

responsible for their damage before initiating suit on the cause

of action. Cal. Gov. Code § 945.6. 

Under the California Tort Claims Act, no suit for “money or

damages” may be brought against a public entity until a written

claim has been presented to the public entity and the claim

either has been acted upon or is deemed to have been rejected. 

Hart v. Alameda County, 76 Cal. App. 4th 766, 778 (Cal. Ct. App.

1999). The CTCA requires a plaintiff to file a timely tort claim

with the public entity; if the claim is not timely, the public

entity may reject the claim.

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If a claimant fails to timely file a claim with the public

entity, and its claim is consequently rejected by the public

entity for that reason, courts are without jurisdiction to hear

the claimant’s cause of action. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. County

of Santa Clara, 187 Cal. App. 3d 480, 487 (1986); Moyer v. Hook,

10 Cal. App. 3d 491, 492-3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Carr v. State of

Cal., 58 Cal. App. 3d 139, 144-6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Williams

v. Mariposa County Unified Sch. Dist., 82 Cal. App. 3d 843, 848-9

(Cal. Ct. App. 1978). For causes of action for death, personal

injury, or injury to personal property, a claimant must file a

claim within six months of the accrual of the cause of action. 

Cal. Gov. Code § 911.2. 

The CTCA also permits the filing of an application to file a

late claim for certain claims: “[w]hen a claim that is required

by Section 911.2 to be presented not later than six months after

the accrual of the cause of action is not presented within that

time, a written application may be made to the public entity for

leave to present that claim.” Cal. Gov. Code § 911.4. The

CTCA’s six-month limitations period applies to causes of action

for death, personal injury, or injury to personal property. Id.

at § 911.2. If a claimant fails to timely file a petition to

file a late claim, courts are without jurisdiction to hear the

cause of action. 

The overall policy of the claim requirements and time

limitations of the California Tort Claims Act are to: (1) “give

the governmental entity an opportunity to settle just claims

before suit is brought;” (2) “permit the entity to make an early

investigation of the facts on which a claim is based, thus

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enabling it to defend itself against unjust claims and to correct

the conditions or practices which gave rise to the claim;” and

(3) “avoid multiple suits arising out of the same transaction or

occurrence and thus further[] the goal of judicial economy.” 

Greyhound Lines, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 487 (quoting Gehman v.

Super. Ct., 96 Cal. App. 3d 257, 262, 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979),

disapproved on other grounds by Dept. of Transportation v.

Super. Ct. (“Frost”), 26 Cal.3d 744, 759 n. 5 (1980)).

V. ANALYSIS

A. The City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

§ 1983 Claims.

The City Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983

claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). First, the City

argues that Plaintiff fails to state a Monell claim against the

City. Second, the City argues (a) that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

against Officer Yee should be dismissed for failure to meet

pleading requirements for claims alleging lack of probabl cause

in obtaining a search warrant; and (b) Officer Garrison should be

dismissed based on qualified immunity. Third, the City argues

that Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim because she fails to

allege “in specific terms how each named defendant is involved,

and how each named Plaintiff has been harmed.” (Doc. 13,

Pl.’s Opp. to City 13).

//

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4 The City also argues that it cannot be held liable under

§ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. The City’s argument

regarding respondeat superior is conceptually indistinguishable

17

1. Whether Plaintiff states a Monell claim against

the City.

The City Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a

Monell claim against the City. The City argues that Plaintiff

fails to plead the existence of a policy or custom, and that

Plaintiff was injured as a result of implementation of that

custom. 

Local governments are “persons” subject to suit for

“constitutional tort[s]” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Haugen,

339 F.3d at 854. The City, as a local government, is therefore

subject to suit under § 1983. However, local governments can

only be sued where the claims arise out of unconstitutional

actions by their employees that implement or execute a “policy

statement, ordinance, or decision officially adopted and

promulgated by that body’s officers....” Monell, 436 U.S. at

690-1. Plaintiff here fails to allege that her constitutional

rights were violated by the implementation of a policy or custom. 

Plaintiff argues in her opposition brief only that “[i]t is

believed that discovery will support, among others, that the CITY

OF FRESNO, had a long-standing practice of negligently training

and supervising its officers who were assigned to the MAGEC

unit.” (Doc. 17, Pl.’s City Opp. 4). Because Plaintiff does not

allege in her complaint that she was injured by implementation of

this purported “long-standing practice,” however, her argument

fails.4

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from its argument regarding Plaintiff’s failure to plead a proper

Monell claim and will not be considered separately. See Monell

436 U.S. at 691 (noting that although a local government can be

held liable for implementation of its official policies or

customs, it cannot be held liable for an employee’s actions

outside the scope of these policies or customs on respondeat

superior theory).

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Defendant City’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

against Defendant City is GRANTED with leave to amend.

2. Whether Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claim Against

Defendants Garrison and Yee Should Be Dismissed.

The City Defendants first argue that Plaintiff fails to

state a claim against Officer Yee because Plaintiff fails to meet

the heightened pleading standard purportedly required for claims

under § 1983 based on constitutional torts with a necessary

element of wrongful motive, including where the plaintiff alleges

lack of probable cause in issuing a search warrant, as here. The

City Defendants also argue Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983

claim against Officer Yee because Plaintiff fails to allege

sufficient facts regarding the issuance of the search warrant as

required under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). The City

next argues that Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against

Officer Garrison because, based on the facts alleged in the

Complaint, he is entitled to qualified immunity. 

(a) Heightened Pleading Standard.

The City Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

against Officer Yee for obtaining a search warrant without

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probable cause should be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to

meet the heightened pleading standard that purportedly applies in

cases in which subjective intent is an element of the

constitutional tort action. Such actions include those where the

plaintiff alleges the affiant officer obtained the search warrant

without probable cause. Plaintiff appears to make such an

allegation against Officer Yee. The City cites Branch v.

Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1991), to support its

argument that the Ninth Circuit “established a heightened

pleading standard for a plaintiff to establish that the Defendant

knowingly or recklessly misled the magistrate” who issued the

search warrant. (Doc. 13, City’s Mem. 7-8). Branch v. Tunnell,

however, has been overruled and is no longer good law. Galbraith

v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002); see also

Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 495 (9th Cir. 2003) (“In

Galbraith, we overruled Branch on the basis of intervening

Supreme Court precedent. [citation] Heightened pleading standards

no longer apply to constitutional claims involving improper

motives.”); Morgan v. United States, 323 F.3d 776, 780 (9th Cir.

2003). The City has been previously warned not to mis-cite and

misrepresent the law. 

Galbraith held that a heightened pleading standard is not

required for § 1983 claims where the underlying constitutional

tort action involves improper motive, including when a plaintiff

alleges the affiant officer misled the magistrate. 307 F.3d at

1125-6. The court held that only a short and plain statement

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief is required for

§ 1983 claims, as stated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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8(a)(2). The only exception is that when fraud or mistake is

alleged, a heightened pleading standard is required Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 9(b). Id. (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523

U.S. 574 (1998); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506

(2002)).

The City’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

against Officer Yee on heightened pleading grounds is DENIED. 

(b) Whether Plaintiff States a § 1983 Claim Against

Officer Yee under Franks v. Delaware.

The City Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to adequately

state a § 1983 claim against Officer Yee as required by Franks v.

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1975). The City Defendants appear to

confuse this argument with their argument that a heightened

pleading standard is required for claims alleging lack of

probable cause in obtaining a search warrant. 

Franks requires a plaintiff who is claiming violation of

§ 1983 for unlawful search based on lack of probable cause to

allege facts supporting an allegation of fraud or

misrepresentation by the affiant officer in obtaining the warrant

from the magistrate. More specifically, Franks holds that, where

a substantial preliminary showing is made that “a false statement

knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the

truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and

if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of

probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing he

held at the defendant’s request.” Id. at 155-6. Although the

issue in Franks dealt with circumstances under which an

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evidentiary hearing may be required and did not directly address

the issue of sufficiency of pleading, its holding affects

pleading requirements for civil rights actions against officers

who are alleged to have obtained a search warrant without

probable cause. The Court found that there is “a presumption of

validity with respect to the search warrant,” and that therefore,

“[t]o mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger’s attack

must be more than conclusory....” Id. at 171 (emphasis added). 

Furthermore: 

There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of

reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must

be accompanied by an offer of proof. They should point out

specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that is

claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a

statement of supporting reasons. 

Id.

Here, Plaintiff alleges no more than a conclusory statement

that the search warrant, issued based on Officer Yee’s affidavit,

lacked probable cause. Not only does Plaintiff allege no facts

regarding the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the

warrant, Plaintiff alleges no fraud or misconduct by Officer Yee. 

(See Doc. 1, Compl. ¶ 19). Also, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to

“point out specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that

is claimed to be false,” as required by Franks. 

The City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983

claim against Officer Yee for failure to meet pleading

requirements under Franks is GRANTED with leave to amend.

//

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(c) Whether Officer Garrison is Entitled to

Qualified Immunity.

The City Defendants next argue that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

against Officer Garrison should be dismissed because Officer

Garrison is entitled to qualified immunity based on the facts

alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Individuals are not immune

under the doctrine of qualified immunity if they violated

“clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which

a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 

The City Defendants argue that the alleged actions of Garrison

were reasonable (thus entitling him to qualified immunity) by

virtue of the fact that he was acting pursuant to a search

warrant issued to investigate gang-related activity.

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,

allegations in the pleadings are construed in a light most

favorable to the Plaintiff. Defendant Garrison cannot establish

that he has qualified immunity based on Plaintiff’s allegations

here. It is not clear from Plaintiff’s allegations that Officer

Garrison did not violate clearly established constitutional

rights or acted reasonably under the totality of the

circumstances. Plaintiff alleges that Garrison (with the other

Defendant officers) threatened to shoot Plaintiff (a seventyfive-year-old woman) if she did not open the door; knocked

Plaintiff to the floor; trampled and injured her; and then

ordered Plaintiff to stand up when she was not able to do so on

her own. These allegations overcome Garrison’s claim of

qualified immunity because, as alleged, such actions were not

//

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5 In support of its argument, the City cites and quotes

extensively from a recently-decided United States Supreme Court

case, Muehler v. Mena, 125 S.Ct. 1465 (2005). Muehler held that

officers executing a search warrant seeking weapons and evidence

of gang membership acted reasonably in (1) detaining the occupant

for 2-3 hours while conducting the search and (2) exercising

reasonable force to effect the detention. Id. at 1470. Muehler,

however, does not help the City’s argument. Muehler did not hold

the officers were entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading

stage; instead Muehler was an appeal from a jury verdict. 

Furthermore, the Muehler court focused on the Defendant officers’

detention of the Plaintiff by placing her in handcuffs; there

were no allegations or evidence that the Plaintiff was trampled,

as is alleged here.

23

reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.5

Officer Garrison cannot establish qualified immunity based

on the facts Plaintiff alleges. The City’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Officer Garrison on the grounds

of qualified immunity is DENIED.

3. Whether Plaintiff Fails to State a § 1983 Claim

Against Officers Garrison and Yee because She

Fails to Identify the Harm Caused by Each

Defendant.

The City Defendants next argue that Plaintiff fails to state

a § 1983 claim against Officers Garrison and Yee because she

fails to allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved and precisely how Plaintiff was harmed by each. 

(Doc. 13, City’s Mem. 13). 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires that pleadings contain a

“short and plain statement of the facts.” While there is no

heightened pleading standard for civil rights actions, unless

fraud or mistake is alleged (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)), a

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complaint must nevertheless allege sufficient facts from which

notice can be gleaned by each party. In order to state a claim

for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs must link each

named Defendant with some affirmative act or omission that

demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff’s federal rights. Although

federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged

to support claims under § 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County

Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). In short, the

allegations must enable the responding party to frame a response.

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts specific to each

defendant, with the exception of Garrison, whom she alleges

threatened to shoot her if she did not open the door (Compl. ¶ 9)

and ordered her to stand up when she was physically unable to do

so (id. at ¶ 13). Although these allegations are sufficient for

Garrison to frame a response, some of the paragraphs in the

Complaint describing the incident remain ambiguous. It is not

clear, for example, whether it was Garrison or one of the County

Officers who knocked Plaintiff down. (Compl. ¶ 11 (“Defendant

R. Garrison, and the named FSO Officcers, then invaded

Plaintiff’s residence, with their weapons drawn, knocked

Plaintiff onto the floor, and hurt Plaintiff.”)). In addition,

Plaintiff alleges no facts as to the actions of each of the

individual County Defendants.

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege a “short and plain

statement of the facts,” as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)

and instead makes conclusory allegations with a few facts that

are not all attributable to a particular defendant. A Plaintiff

must allege some facts to support a claim under § 1983. The

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complaint does not provide sufficient notice and does not enable

each defendant (including the County Defendants) to frame a

response.

The City’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds that

Plaintiff failed to plead specific acts as to each Defendant is

GRANTED with leave to amend.

B. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s State Law

Claims.

Plaintiff alleges the following state law claims against all

defendants: violation of her statutory civil rights under

Cal. Civ. Code § 43 and 52.1, assault, battery, false

imprisonment, trespass, and intentional infliction of emotional

distress. (Doc. 1, Compl. ¶ 26). The City Defendants and County

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims. 

The City Defendants move to dismiss the state law claims on

four grounds. First, the City Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s

state law claims against the City should be dismissed because

those claims are based on negligence and no cause of action based

on negligence can be maintained against a public entity, unless a

duty is specifically created by statute. (Doc. 13, City’s Mem.

4-5). Second, the City Defendants argue that all tort claims

against Officer Yee should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed

to name Yee in her September 3, 2004, Government Tort Claim

against the City pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act

(Cal. Gov. Code § 945.4). (Id. at 5). Third, the City

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Government Tort Claim does not

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address the defective search warrant, and Plaintiff cannot now

bring tort claims against Yee that arise out of the allegedly

defective warrant. (Id.). Plaintiff offers no substantive

response to these arguments, and argues only that: 

Plaintiff believes that her Complaint sufficiently states

the elements of each alleged cause of action, and

sufficiently describes the Defendants and the part which

each defendant played with respect to those causes of

action. 

(Doc. 17, Pl.’s Opp. to City 4).

The County Defendants move to dismiss on the sole basis that

Plaintiff’s state law claims are barred by the California Tort

Claims Act (Cal. Gov. Code §§ 905, 905.2, 945.4) for failure to

file a timely government tort claim with the County of Fresno. 

Plaintiff concedes that her state law claims are time-barred as

to the County Defendants only.

1. City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

State Law Claims.

First, the City Defendants argue that no common law

negligence claim can be maintained against a public entity absent

a statute establishing a duty. The California Tort Claims Act

governs the liability of state and local governmental entities

for tort claims. See Cal. Gov. Code § 810 et seq; see also

Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority, 31 Cal.4th 1175,

1183 (2003) (“[D]irect tort liability of public entities must be

based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at

least creating some specific duty of care....”). Section 815 of

the California Government Code provides that a public entity is

not liable for injury arising out of an act or omission except as

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provided by statute. Plaintiff has not alleged an independent

statutory basis for imposing on the City liability for

Plaintiff’s state negligence claims, as required by California

law. Plaintiff also does not identify any statutory basis in its

brief.

The City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s state law

claims as to the City on sovereign immunity grounds is GRANTED

with leave to amend.

Second, the City Defendants argue that all tort claims

against Officer Yee should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed

to name Officer Yee in her Government Tort Claim brought pursuant

to the California Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff’s Government Tort

Claim is attached to her Complaint as Exhibit A. California law

provides that no suit based in tort may be brought against a

public entity until a written claim has been presented to the

public entity and the claim either has been acted on or rejected. 

Hart, 76 Cal. App. 4th at 778. The California Tort Claims Act

further provides that courts are without jurisdiction to hear a

plaintiff’s cause of action against a public entity if the

plaintiff failed to timely file a claim pursuant to the Act. 

Greyhound Lines, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 487. 

Plaintiff filed a timely claim with the City of Fresno

pursuant to this requirement. However, Officer Yee is not named

in the claim. Section 910 of the California Government Code

provides the requirements for a claim presented to a local entity

//

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6 Section 910 provides: 

A claim shall be presented by the claimant or by a

person acting on his or her behalf and shall show all

of the following:

(a) The name and post office address of the claimant.

(b) The post office address to which the person

presenting the claim desires notices to be sent.

(c) The date, place, and other circumstances of the

occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the

claim asserted.

(d) A general description of the indebtedness,

obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far

as it may be known at the time of presentation of

the claim.

(e) The name or names of the public employee or

employees causing the injury, damage, or loss, if

known.

(f) The amount claimed if it totals less than ten

thousand dollars ($10,000) as the date of

presentation of the claim, including the estimated

amount of any prospective injury, damage, or loss,

insofar as it may be known at the time of the

presentation of the claim, together with the basis

of computation of the amount claimed. If the

amount claimed exceeds ten thousand dollars

($10,000), no dollar amount shall be included in

the claim. However, it shall indicate whether the

claim would be a limited civil case.

28

pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act.6 Among the

requirements is to include the “name or names of the public

employee or employees causing injury, damage, or loss, if known.” 

Cal. Gov. Code § 910(e). California courts employ two tests to

determine the sufficiency of a claim presented to a governmental

entity. City of San Jose v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara County, 12

Cal.3d 447, 456-7 (1974). Where there has been some compliance

with all the required elements, but the compliance has been

defective, courts employ the substantial compliance test. Id. at

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456. Where there has been a failure to comply entirely with a

particular statutory requirement, a more stringent standard is

applied. Id. (“‘[S]ubstantial compliance cannot be predicated

upon no compliance.’”) (citing and quoting Hall v. City of Los

Angeles, 19 Cal.3d 198, 202 (1941)). 

The City Defendants do not explicitly argue that Plaintiff

here failed to comply with the statutory requirement under Cal.

Gov. Code § 910 to name employees. Moreover, the City Defendants

make no argument as to the applicable standard to apply in

evaluating the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Government Tort Claim

here as it applies to Officer Yee. 

However, the statutory requirement regarding naming the

involved officials is flexible; it states the employees only need

be named “if known.” Cal. Gov. Code § 910(e). Because Plaintiff

complied with Section 910(e)’s requirement to name the known

employees involved, the “substantial compliance” standard

applies. The City Defendants cite no authority or cases that

allow dismissal of a government tort claim for failure to name

each and every individual involved. Plaintiff’s failure to name

Officer Yee in her Government Tort Claim is not fatal to her tort

claims against Officer Yee.

The City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s state law

claims against Officer Yee on the grounds it is barred by the

California Tort Claims Act is DENIED.

Third, the City Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s state law

claims against Officer Yee should be dismissed because

Plaintiff’s Government Tort Claim does not address the adequacy

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of the search warrant. As stated above, California courts employ

two tests to determine the sufficiency of a claim presented to a

governmental entity. City of San Jose, 12 Cal.3d at 456-7. 

Defendant Yee has identified no statutory requirement that the

tort claim discuss each and every fact related to the claimant’s

claim. All that is required by Section 910 is “a general

description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or

loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of

presentation of the claim.” Cal. Gov. Code § 910(d). 

Plaintiff’s claim, attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint at

Exhibit A, contains a page and a half long description of the

events that occurred on February 19, 2004, and that gave rise to

her cause of action. She does not explicitly mention the

adequacy of the search warrant in that statement. However, the

statutory requirement is that the injury and damage be described

“so far as it may be known.” The substantial compliance test

applies. Plaintiff’s Government Tort Claim stated facts relating

to the search of a resident allegedly conducted by members of a

M.A.G.E.C. unit. While Plaintiff did not explicitly refer to a

search warrant, the allegations were sufficient to put the City

on notice that the issues of probable cause in issuing the search

warrant and justification for the search are contested. 

The City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s state law

claims against Officer Yee on the grounds that Plaintiff’s

Government Tort Claim failed to explicitly address the adequacy

of the search warrant is DENIED. 

Fourth, the City Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to

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plead the required elements of all state law causes of action. 

Plaintiff’s state law claims are stated in a single sentence in

her complaint:

The aforementioned actions violate Plaintiff’s statutory

rights, pursuant to Civil Code sections 43 and 52.1 and

constitute assault, battery, false imprisonment, trespass,

and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

(Doc. 1, Compl. ¶ 26). Plaintiff does not separate these claims

into separate causes of action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires

a short and plain statement of the facts. The general principles

of notice pleading require that the complaint sufficiently allege

facts to enable the responding party to frame a response. 

Plaintiff’s single sentence addressing about five or six state

law causes of action fails to meet basic notice pleading

standards. Plaintiff must allege each state law claim in a

separately pleaded claim.

The City’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims on

the grounds Plaintiff failed to meet basic notice pleading

requirements is GRANTED with leave to amend.

2. County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

State Law Claims.

The County Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s state law

claims against all County Defendants should be dismissed pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff failed to file a

government tort claim with Fresno County and Plaintiff’s state

law claims are therefore barred by the California Tort Claims

Act. As discussed above, the California Tort Claims Act requires

a plaintiff to file a timely tort claim with the public entity

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before bringing suit in the proper court. Cal. Gov. Code §

945.6. If a claimant fails to timely file with the public

entity, courts are without jurisdiction to hear the claimant’s

cause of action. Greyhound Lines, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 487. In

its opposition, Plaintiff concedes that her state law claims,

against the County Defendants only, are barred by the California

Tort Claims Act. (Doc. 18, Pl.’s Opp. to County 2).

The County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s state

law claims against the County Defendants on the basis that they

are barred by the California Tort Claims Act is GRANTED with

prejudice. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons stated herein:

The City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983

claim against the City pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

for failure to state a Monell claim is GRANTED with leave to

amend;

The City Defendants’ request to strike punitive damages as

to the § 1983 claim against the City is MOOT, but shall not

be realleged;

The City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983

claim against Officer Yee pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to meet

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pleading standards under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154

(1975), is GRANTED with leave to amend; the City Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Officers

Garrison and Yee on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to

plead specific acts as to each Defendant is GRANTED with

leave to amend; the City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Officers Garrison and Yee

on all other grounds is DENIED;

The City’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims

against the City on sovereign immunity grounds is GRANTED

with leave to amend; the City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s state law claims against Officers Garrison and

Yee on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to meet basic notice

pleading requirements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) is GRANTED

with leave to amend; the City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s state law claims on all other grounds is DENIED;

The County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s state

law claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the

grounds that the claims are barred by the California Tort

Claims Act is GRANTED with prejudice;

The Defendants’ Motions for a More Definite Statement

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) regarding Plaintiff’s Cal.

Civ. Code. § 43 are MOOT.

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SO ORDERED. 

DATED: June _7__, 2005. 

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER 

______________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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