Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00126/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00126-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Atwater Police Department
Defendant
Jamar Evans
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMAR JAMES EVANS, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

ATWATER POLICE DEPARTMENT, )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-07-126 OWW/DLB 

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 41) 

On December 7, 2006, Plaintiff Jamar James Evans, proceeding

in pro per, filed a Complaint against the Atwater Police

Department in the Merced County Superior Court. The action was

removed to this Court. 

The Complaint “is brought for damages and other appropriate

relief under 42 USC § 1983 for violation of the plaintiff’s

federal civil rights by the defendants [sic], whose actions were

taken under color of state law.” The Complaint alleges:

7. On or about December 1, 2006, plaintiff

was arrested by defendant and charged under

section PC415(3) and PC602(L). In arresting

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the plaintiff, defendant Snyder, used

physical force which was clearly excessive in

light of the circumstances existing at the

time of the arrest.

8. Plaintiff alleges that the discretionary

arrest of plaintiff, by defendant Snyder was

in direct violation of section 42 USC § 1983. 

Plaintiff alleges that on December 1, 2006

that [sic] he had requested for a store clerk

to call the police to report violent behavior

of said store clerk. Plaintiff alleges that

when the defendant Atwater Police Department

arrived that he was asked to sit on the curb

of the store front. 

9. Plaintiff alleges that after he had

identified himself by driver’s license and

explaining that he did not believe the matter

warranted or had exacerbated to the need of

plaintiff sitting on the curb; [sic] Officer

Snyder exited the Valero Station at Bellvue

and Shaffer and commanded the other officer

to arrest the plaintiff.

10. Plaintiff alleges that when he asked why

he was being arrested Officer Snyder stated:

‘Kelly has placed you under a citizen’s

arrest and for saying that you were going to

kill her.’ Plaintiff was searched for

weapons, asked to place his hands of the top

of his head, spread his legs, and then hand

cuffed [sic].

11. Defendant, Atwater Police Department,

used excessive force with the intent to

inflict unnecessary harm upon the plaintiff

and such use of force caused physical and

mental injuries to the plaintiff.

12. Plaintiff alleges that his arrest by the

defendant, Atwater Police Department, with

the use of excessive force was in violation

of his right under the Fourth Amendment of

the United States Constitution to be free

from unreasonable arrest and his right under

the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States

Constitution to due process of law. 

Plaintiff’s arrest was made under color of

authority of defendant, Atwater Police

Department, as a police officer for the City

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of Atwater.

13. Plaintiff alleges that the violation of

his constitutional rights was caused by the

implementation of a custom, policy, or

official act of defendant, City of Atwater.

14. Plaintiff alleges that on or about

August 8, 2006 that he had filed an

exhaustion of administrative remedies

complaint after being harassed and detained

by the Atwater Police Department for JayWalking. On November 22, 2006, plaintiff had

a face-to-face meeting with Sergeant Mike

Keeler about the situation. Plaintiff

alleges that defendant has decided that the

complaint is resolved without a resolution.

15. Plaintiff has suffered damages in the

amount of ($20,000,000.00) in lost wages and

in the amount of ($3000.00) in additional

out-of-pocket expenses, incurred as a result

of his arrest with excessive force. In

addition, plaintiff has suffered humiliation

and emotional distress as a consequence of

being arrested with excessive force. 

Pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, plaintiff seeks an

award of attorney’s fees and costs incurred

in bringing this action.

Wherefore, plaintiff seeks

($100,000,000,000.00) in damages, together

with such relief as the court may deem

appropriate.

On February 4, 2008, Defendant filed a motion for summary

judgment. Defendant noticed the motion for hearing on March 10,

2008. By Minute Order filed on February 5, 2008, the hearing was

continued to March 24, 2008. By Minute Order filed on March 10,

2008, the hearing on the motion again was continued to April 7,

2008. 

Plaintiff has not filed a written opposition to the motion

for summary judgment. On March 12, 2008, Plaintiff filed a

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motion for leave to file an Amended Complaint. On March 18,

2008, after the time to file an opposition to the motion for

summary judgment had expired, Plaintiff filed a motion for

extension of time to respond to Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment. Essentially, Plaintiff sought leave to amend to allege

only state law tort claims against Defendant and thereby obtain

remand of this action to the Merced County Superior Court. By

Order filed on March 24, 2008 (March 24 Order), both motions were

denied (Doc. 52). Leave to amend was denied because Plaintiff

has not demonstrated “good cause” within the meaning of Rule 16,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, even if he had demonstrated

good cause, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that leave to amend

should be granted under Rule 15(a). Because leave to amend was

denied, Plaintiff’s motion for extension of time to file an

opposition to the motion for summary judgment was denied as moot. 

Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion for summary judgment was due

on March 14, 2008. No explanation was provided why an opposition

could not have been timely filed. At the hearing of the motion

for summary judgment Plaintiff appeared telephonically at his own

instance and without timely utilizing and obtaining advance

permission to do so from the Court. At the April 7, 2008

hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff was

permitted to present oral arguments concerning the application of

California Governmetn Code § 945.3 and was fully heard. See

discussion infra.

A. GOVERNING STANDARDS.

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Summary judgment is proper when it is shown that there

exists “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. A fact is “material” if it is relevant to an

element of a claim or a defense, the existence of which may

affect the outcome of the suit. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v.

Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th

Cir.1987). Materiality is determined by the substantive law

governing a claim or a defense. Id. The evidence and all

inferences drawn from it must be construed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. 

Even though Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to

Defendant’s motion as required by Rule 56-260, Local Rules of

Practice, summary judgment may not be granted on that ground

alone. See Henry v. Gill Industries, Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950

(9 Cir.1993). The initial burden in a motion for summary th

judgment is on the moving party. The moving party satisfies this

initial burden by identifying the parts of the materials on file

it believes demonstrate an “absence of evidence to support the

non-moving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 325 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party

to defeat summary judgment. T.W. Elec., 809 F.2d at 630. The

nonmoving party “may not rely on the mere allegations in the

pleadings in order to preclude summary judgment,” but must set

forth by affidavit or other appropriate evidence “specific facts

showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. The nonmoving

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party may not simply state that it will discredit the moving

party’s evidence at trial; it must produce at least some

“significant probative evidence tending to support the

complaint.” Id. A plaintiff’s verified complaint may be

considered as an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment if

it is based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts

admissible in evidence. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.14

(9 Cir.2000). As explained in Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. th

Fritz Companies, 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-1103 (9 Cir.2000): th

The vocabulary used for discussing summary

judgments is somewhat abstract. Because

either a plaintiff or a defendant can move

for summary judgment, we customarily refer to

the moving and nonmoving party rather than to

plaintiff and defendant. Further, because

either plaintiff or defendant can have the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, we

refer to the party with and without the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial rather

than to plaintiff and defendant. Finally, we

distinguish among the initial burden of

production and two kinds of ultimate burdens

of persuasion: The initial burden of

production refers to the burden of producing

evidence, or showing the absence of evidence,

on the motion for summary judgment; the

ultimate burden of persuasion can refer

either to the burden of persuasion on the

motion or to the burden of persuasion at

trial.

A moving party without the ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial - usually, but not

always, a defendant - has both the initial

burden of production and the ultimate burden

of persuasion on a motion for summary

judgment ... In order to carry its burden of

production, the moving party must either

produce evidence negating an essential

element of the nonmoving party’s claim or

defense or show that the nonmoving party does

not have enough evidence of an essential

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element to carry its ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial ... In order to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion on the motion,

the moving party must persuade the court that

there is no genuine issue of material fact

....

If a moving party fails to carry its initial

burden of production, the nonmoving party has

no obligation to produce anything, even if

the nonmoving party would have the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial ... In such a

case, the nonmoving party may defeat the

motion for summary judgment without producing

anything ... If, however, a moving party

carries its burden of production, the

nonmoving party must produce evidence to

support its claim or defense ... If the

nonmoving party fails to produce enough

evidence to create a genuine issue of

material fact, the moving party wins the

motion for summary judgment ... But if the

nonmoving party produces enough evidence to

create a genuine issue of material fact, the

nonmoving party defeats the motion.

In Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School District, supra, 237

F.3d at 1031, the Ninth Circuit held:

[T]he district court may determine whether

there is a genuine issue of material fact, on

summary judgment, based on the papers

submitted on the motion and such other papers

as may be on file and specifically referred

to and facts therein set forth in the motion

papers. Though the court has discretion in

appropriate circumstances to consider other

materials, it need not do so. The district

court need not examine the entire file for

evidence establishing a genuine issue of

material fact, where the evidence is not set

forth in the opposing papers with adequate

references to that it could conveniently be

found.

The question to be resolved is not whether the “evidence

unmistakably favors one side or the other, but whether a fairminded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the

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evidence presented.” United States ex rel. Anderson v. N.

Telecom, Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9 Cir.1995). This requires th

more than the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in

support of the plaintiff’s position”; there must be “evidence on

which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. 

The more implausible the claim or defense asserted by the

nonmoving party, the more persuasive its evidence must be to

avoid summary judgment.” Id. 

B. DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS.

DUF 1: The incident giving rise to this litigation 

occurred on December 1, 2006.

DUF 2 & 3: On December 1, 2006, Jamar Evans visited the 

convenience store located at the Valero service station, 100 East

Bellvue Road, Atwater, California.

DUF 4: Kelly Miller, employed at the Valero service 

station, was working as a sales clerk on December 1, 2006, when

Jamar Evans entered the store.

DUF 5: Jamar Evans lived behind the service station and

was a frequent customer at the convenience store.

DUF 6: During his December 1, 2006, visit to the Valero

convenience store, Evans became irritated due to delay in making

his purchase.

DUF 7: Evans made comments to Kelly Miller about the 

delay.

DUF 8: Kelly Miller reported that the comments made by 

Evans were threatening.

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DUF 9: After the comments were made to Miller by Evans,

Miller demanded that Evans leave the premises.

DUF 10: Evans did not leave as requested.

DUF 11: When Evans did not leave the store, Miller told 

Evans that the police would be called if he did not leave the

property.

DUF 12: Evans replied that he would wait outside, and 

remained on the Valero property.

DUF 13: Evans waited for the police to arrive.

DUF 14: When Officer Snyder of the Atwater Police 

Department arrived, Evans was still on Valero property.

DUF 15 & 16: Officer Snyder contacted Evans and started

his investigation. Officer Snyder also made contact with Miller.

DUF 17: During Officer Snyder’s investigation, Kelly

Miller effectuated a citizen’s arrest of Evans for threatening to

kill her in violation of California Penal Code § 415(3) and for

trespass in violation of California Penal Code § 602(l).

DUF 18: Officer Snyder took Evans into custody under 

the citizen’s arrest effected by Kelly Miller.

DUF 19: Evans was taken into custody without incident.

DUF 20: Evans did not resist arrest.

DUF 21: Evans fully cooperated with Officer Snyder.

DUF 22: No force was used to take Evans into custody.

In support of DUF 22, Defendants refer to Evans’ deposition

testimony:

Q. When you were pat searched, did the

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officer injure you in any way?

A. No.

Q. When you were pat searched, did the

officer do anything to cause you pain?

A. No.

Q. When the handcuffs were placed on you

wrist [sic], did the officer do anything to

cause you pain?

A. You know, squeezed the handcuffs really,

really tight. I was in the back seat of the

car. I had, you know, the welts and

everything on my arm, on my wrist.

Q. When you were placed in the handcuffs,

did you feel the handcuffs were too tight?

A. Uh-huh. And I asked them to loosen them,

and it was like we’re just going down to the

Atwater jail which is right down the street

is what they explained to me, so just deal

with it until you get there. And I said I’m

not going to say no more.

...

Q. As Officer Snyder escorted you to his

patrol vehicle, did he touch you in any way

as he walked you to the vehicle?

A. Just that police assistance to the car,

head under the thing. I don’t want to be

NYPD Blue crime unit or whatever. I don’t -

I don’t - he placed me in the car. I was

escorted to the car. He had a hand on me.

Q. As he escorted you to the car, did he do

anything to cause you pain?

A. No.

Q. As he helped you into the vehicle, did he

do anything to cause you pain?

A. No.

Q. As he helped you into the vehicle, did he

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do anything to cause you pain?

A. No. 

Q. As he helped you into the vehicle, did he

do anything rough with you?

A. No.

...

Q. As you were escorted to the vehicle, was

Officer Snyder rough with you in any way?

...

A. The handcuffs were way too tight and I

was just placed in the vehicle. I’m just

emotionally distressed at this point. 

...

Q. From the time that the handcuffs were

placed on you until they were removed, did

you ever - did you complain more than the

single time about them being too tight?

A. Absolutely not.

Q. How long did you have the handcuffs on?

...

A. About 40 minutes.

...

Q. Once you got to the Atwater Police

Department, Officer Snyder help you out of

the vehicle or did you get out under your own

power?

A. He helped me out.

Q. As he helped you out of the vehicle, did

he do anything to cause you pain?

A. No. 

...

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Q. As Officer Snyder walked you into the

Atwater Police Department, did he do anything

to cause you pain?

A. No.

...

Q. When the Latino officer took you to the

cell with the bathroom, did he handle you in

a rough manner?

A. I remember he scared me to death because

I thought he was going to do something for me

banging on the door for him having stood

there. He came with the attack posture and I

was - I just felt immediately threatened by

him, and I remember like, hey, I just have to

use the bathroom, you turned around,

whatever. And I don’t think that he touched

me or tried to handcuff me or anything like

that. He just opened the door, stood back,

and then I walked out and he guided me to a

cell which was in between the middle cell. 

So there was - you know, three cells and he

guided me to the last cell in the corridor.

Q. And he never attacked you?

A. He didn’t attack me.

Q. Did he do anything to cause you pain?

A. Sitting there about to have my bladder

bust and wouldn’t open the door.

Q. Anything else?

A. That’s it.

...

Q. What made you believe that your wrists

were injured as a result of the handcuffs

being too tight?

A. I can exaggerate and I can say that I do

have carpal tunnel because you can see all

the paperwork that I do, but just the welts,

you know, the indents ... on my wrists from

the handcuffs were on my wrist all the while

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that I was there. They were still there. I

mean I don’t know. I don’t thing that’s so

uncommon. [DT 153-157; 161-162; 164-165; 167]

DUF 23: After being taken into custody, Evans was 

transported to the Atwater Police Department.

DUF 24: Evans was charged on December 1, 2007 with 

violating California Penal Code §§ 415(3) and 602(l).

DUF 25: Evans was appointed a public defender.

DUF 26: The underlying criminal matter is still

pending.

DUF 27: Plaintiff’s lawsuit names only the Atwater 

Police Department as a defendant.

DUF 28: The Complaint alleges a single claim - a right

to recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

DUF 29: To support his Section 1983 claim, Evans 

alleges excessive force was used during his arrest in violation

of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution.

DUF 30: The Complaint fails to allege facts indicating 

how the Atwater Police Department’s alleged policies have

anything to do with Evans’ claimed deprivation and resulting

damages.

DUF 31: The only reference in the Complaint to a policy 

is the conclusory statement “... custom, policy, or official act

of the City of Atwater.”

DUF 32: Evans alleges in his Complaint that a cause of 

his constitutional deprivation resulted from a “... custom,

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policy, or official act of the City of Atwater.”

DUF 33: The allegation in Evans’ Complaint regarding a 

“... custom, policy, or official act of the City of Atwater”

causing Evans to suffer a deprivation of his constitutional

rights is conclusory and unsupported by any fact.

DUF 34: Evans has not and cannot establish any facts

that show a policy of the City of Atwater that caused him to

suffer any constitutional deprivation.

DUF 35: Evans has not and cannot establish any facts 

that show a custom, procedure, or official act causing a

deprivation.

As support for DUF 34 and 35, Defendant refers to

Plaintiff’s January 2, 2008 deposition:

Q. Let’s go back to the Notice of Deposition

and documents. Request number eight asks for

documents evidencing, illustrating or

describing any Atwater Police Department

custom in use on - it says December 12 ,

th

2006, it should say December 1 , 2006, in st

which any officer’s conformance cause you to

suffer a constitutional deprivation. Do you

have any documents that are responsive to

that category?

A. I don’t have any documents.

Q. Are you aware of the existence of any

documents that would show a [sic] Atwater

Police Department custom that was in use on

December 1 , 2006 which conformance would st

cause you to suffer a constitutional

deprivation?

A. I don’t have any documents.

Q. Are you aware of any custom that was in

use on December 1 , 2006 in which the st

conformance with the custom would cause you a

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constitutional deprivation?

A. Yes.

Q. What custom are you aware of?

A. Arresting customers on hearsay, arresting

citizens of Atwater based on hearsay.

Q. Anything else?

A. That would probably be it.

Q. Request number nine asks for documents

evidencing, illustrating or describing any

Atwater Police Department policy in effect on

December 1 , it says the 12 , but you know st th

we’re talking about the 1 of 2006, in which st

any officer’s conformance caused you to

suffer a constitutional deprivation. Did you

bring any documents with you responsive to

that request?

A. I don’t have any documents.

Q. Are you aware of the existence of any

documents responsive to that request?

A. I’m not quite certain, but I believe that

their policies for effecting an arrest based

on a citizen’s arrest would probably show

what their policy is in a situation like

that. I don’t have a copy or any evidence

illustrating it.

Q. Do you know if there is any document that

exists that would show any Atwater Police

Department policy in effect on December 1 ,

st

2006 in which the conformance would cause a

constitutional violation?

A. It would probably be contained within

their training manuals.

Q. Do you know if it exists though?

A. I don’t know if it exists because I

haven’t received a copy of it.

Q. Do you contend that there was some

Atwater Police Department policy in effect on

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December 1 , 2006 in which the conformance st

with the policy would cause you a

constitutional deprivation.

A. I would just make an assumption.

Q. Don’t want you to assume.

A. Right. So I would not assume anything

and say that I don’t have evidence and I

don’t know what their policy is.

Q. Number ten or request number ten asks for

documents evidencing, illustrating or

describing any Atwater Police Department

procedure in effect on December 12 , 2006, th

which we know we’re talking about December

1 , 2006, in which any officer’s conformance st

caused you to suffer a constitutional

deprivation. Do you have any documents that

fit that category?

A. I have the police report and that would

be the only documented evidence that I have

of the procedures that they followed to cause

me a constitutional deprivation.

Q. Do you contend that the police report

contains information or a description of

facts which would indicate a procedure was

followed that caused you a constitutional

deprivation?

A. Accepting the hearsay statement of Kelly

Miller and immediately just arresting me on

the words that she stated.

Q. Anything else?

A. I don’t think they followed the procedure

correctly in effectuating the arrest because

when I was arrested the police officers

walked back into the store and Kelly walked

over to the police car with the citizen’s

arrest warrant. She was alone and basically

could, you know, say whatever she wanted, do

whatever she wanted. She walked to the car,

she says, Jamar, I’m placing you under

citizen’s arrest. There were no witnesses or

no one standing by her. So she basically

took on the posture of a police officer and

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the police - two police officers that were

there inside of the store. 

...

Q. And we’ve talked about any documents that

you believe exist that would evidence,

illustrate or describe any Atwater Police

Department policy in effect on December 1 ,

st

2006 in which any officer’s conformance

caused you to suffer a constitutional

deprivation, and that’s the police report,

correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And you’re not aware of any other

documents that would fit this category,

correct?

A. Correct.

Q. Are you aware of any Atwater Police

Department procedure that was in effect on

December 1 , 2006? st

A. The call response. Kelly called, they

respond. I don’t know. I’m not being

facetious, but that was the procedure that

they had followed. Kelly called the police,

they responded.

Q. Right. I understand that’s what

happened, but are you aware of any procedure

that was in effect by the police department

on December 1 , 2006? st

A. No. [DT 89-93; 95-96] 

DUF 36: The Complaint does not name any Atwater police 

officers as defendants.

DUF 37: The Complaint names a single defendant, the

Atwater Police Department.

DUF 38: The Complaint does not name any fictitious 

defendants.

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Although the proper Defendant in this action is the City of 1

Atwater, Defendant did not move for substitution of the proper

Defendant and did not seek summary judgment on this ground. 

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DUF 39: The Atwater Police Department is the law 

enforcement agency of the City of Atwater.

DUF 40: The City of Atwater is a general law city 

existing under the laws of the State of California.

DUF 41: The Complaint alleges that “... defendant 

Atwater Police Department was, and is, a municipal corporation or

local government duly organized under the laws of the State of

California ....”

DUF 42: Evans did not plead compliance with the 

California Government Claim presentation requirement, nor did he

offer an excuse for not complying.

DUF 43: Evans did not submit a government tort claim to

the Atwater Police Department or the City of Atwater prior to

commencing this lawsuit.

DUF 45: Evans did not plead any “policy maker” was 

responsible for his alleged damages.

C. MERITS OF MOTION.

1. Application of Monell.

Because the Complaint does not name any defendants other

than the Atwater Police Department, Defendant asserts that

Plaintiff’s claim is limited to municipal liability under Section

1983.1

Local government entities and local government officials

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acting in their official capacity can be sued for monetary,

declaratory, or injunctive relief, but only if the allegedly

unconstitutional actions took place pursuant to some “policy

statement, ordinance, or decision officially adopted and

promulgated by that body's officers....” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). Alternatively, if no formal

policy exists, plaintiffs may point to “customs and usages” of

the local government entity. Id. A local government entity

cannot be held liable simply because it employs someone who has

acted unlawfully. Id. at 694. See also Haugen, 351 F.3d at 393

(“Municipalities cannot be held liable under a traditional

respondeat superior theory. Rather, they may be held liable only

when "action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature

caused a constitutional tort.... [T]o establish municipal

liability, a plaintiff must prove the existence of an

unconstitutional municipal policy.”). 

To prevail in a civil rights claim against a local

government under Monell, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-part

test: 

(1) The local government official(s) must have

intentionally violated the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights;

(2) The violation must be a part of policy or custom and

may not be an isolated incident; and

(3) There must be a link between the specific policy or

custom to the plaintiff’s injury.

Id. at 690-92. There are a number of ways to prove a policy or

custom of a municipality. A plaintiff may show (1) “a

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longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the ‘standard

operating procedure’ of the local government entity;” (2) “the

decision-making official was, as a matter of state law, a final

policymaking authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy in the area of decision;” or (3) “the

official with final policymaking authority either delegated that

authority to, or ratified the decision of, a subordinate.” 

Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that a municipal policy “may be

inferred from widespread practices or evidence of repeated

constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officers

were not discharged or reprimanded.” Id. 

A municipality may still be liable under Monell for a single

incident where: (1) the person causing the violation has “final

policymaking authority;” (2) the “final policymaker” “ratified” a

subordinate’s actions; or (3) the “final policymaker” acted with

deliberate indifference to a subordinate’s constitutional

violations. Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 1999).

Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on

this claim because the Complaint alleges no facts from which it

may be inferred that Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional injury

was caused by any custom or policy of the Atwater Police

Department. 

It is well established in the Ninth Circuit that an

allegation based on nothing more than a bare averment that the

official’s conduct conformed to official policy, custom or

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 Even though no state law claims are alleged in the 2

Complaint, Defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that

they are barred by Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the claim

requirement of the California Government Claims Act and on the

ground that Officer Snyder is immune from liability for false

arrest or false imprisonment when he took Plaintiff into custody

based on Kelly Miller’s citizen’s arrest, Kinney v. County of

Contra Costa, 8 Cal.App.3d 761 (1970). No state law claims for

relief are alleged in the Complaint and Officer Snyder is not named

as a defendant. Summary judgment on these grounds is unnecessary.

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practice suffices to state a Monell claim under Section 1983 for

purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See

Karim Panahi v. L.A. Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir.

1988); Shah v. County of L.A., 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1986);

Guillory v. County of Orange, 731 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir.

1984). That the Complaint does not allege facts to support the

conclusory allegation of custom or policy does not ipso facto

entitle Defendant to summary judgment on this claim.

Defendant has carried its burden of production explained in

Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, supra, 210 F.3d

at 1102-1103. Defendant, through Plaintiff’s deposition

testimony, has shown that the Plaintiff has no evidence of any

custom, policy, practice or procedure of the Atwater Police

Department caused any use of excessive force in Plaintiff’s

arrest. Plaintiff presented nothing at the April 7, 2008 hearing

from which it may be inferred that Plaintiff has any evidence to

support liability under Monell. Further, Plaintiff’s deposition

testimony establishes as a matter of law that no excessive force

was used to effect the arrest of Plaintiff on December 1, 2006.2

D. PLAINTIFF’S ORAL OPPOSITION.

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During the April 7, 2008 hearing on Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, Plaintiff was permitted to present oral

argument in opposition to the motion, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s

failure to timely oppose the motion. See Rule 78-230(c), Local

Rules of Practice: “No party will be entitled to be heard in

opposition to a motion at oral arguments if opposition to the

motion has not been timely filed by that party.” 

Plaintiff argued that the federal court lacks jurisdiction

to hear his Section 1983 action. Plaintiff relied on California

Government Code § 945.3. Because the criminal case against him

did not terminate in his favor until after Plaintiff filed this

action, Plaintiff contends that Section 945.3 precluded him from

bringing this action until then.

Plaintiff’s position is without merit. California

Government Code § 945.3 provides:

No person charged by indictment, information,

complaint, or other accusatory pleading

charging a criminal offense may bring a civil

action for money or damages against a peace

officer or the public entity employing a

peace officer based upon conduct of the peace

officer relating to the offense for which the

accused is chargeed, including an act or

omission in investigating or reporting the

offense or arresting or detaining the

accused, while charges against the accused

are pending before a superior court.

Any applicable statute of limitations for

filing and prosecuting these actions shall be

tolled during the period that the charges are

pending before a superior court.

...

Nothing in this section shall prohibit the

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filing of a claim with the board of a public

entity, and this section shall not extend the

time within which a claim is required to be

presented pursuant to Section 911.2.

In Harding v. Galceran, 889 F.2d 906 (9 Cir.1989), cert. th

denied, 498 U.S. 1082 (1991), the Ninth Circuit held:

[A]lthough section 945.3 may not prohibit a

potential plaintiff from bringing a section

1983 claim against a peace officer while

criminal actions are pending, section 945.3's

tolling provision may still apply to toll the

limitations period while criminal actions are

pending against the potential plaintiff.

...

... [W]e conclude that the provision of

section 945.3, which absolutely prohibits a

party from bringing a civil action against a

peace officer while state criminal charges

are pending against that party, is contrary

to the purposes of section 1983. 

Accordingly, as applied here, the prohibition

in paragraph one of section 945.3 must fall

under the Supremacy Clause. 

Id. at 908. 

Harding establishes that the pendency of Plaintiff’s

criminal proceedings did not preclude Plaintiff from filing his

Section 1983 complaint and does not negate federal jurisdiction

over Plaintiff’s Section 1983 action. 

Plaintiff also intimates that the pendency of the criminal

proceedings contravenes the requirement that he first timely and

fully comply with the claim requirement of the California

Government Claim Act before he can allege state law tort claims

against Defendant. Plaintiff essentially seeks reconsideration

of the March 24 Order that denied him leave to amend for, among

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 In the Summary of Pleadings section in the Scheduling 3

Conference Order filed on June 27, 2007 (Doc. 16), it is stated:

5. Plaintiff states that on April 27, 2007,

Sergeant Mike Wheeler, who is alleged to be a

major actor in the abuse at the Atwater Police

Department, came to Plaintiff’s house to

arrest him on a warrant that named Plaintiff

as an ‘alias.’ Plaintiff states that he was

further harassed and harangued. Plaintiff

state that when he asked to review the warrant

for his arrest, he was told by Wheeler, ‘Who

does he think he is? He thinks he’s some sort

of street lawyer or something!’ Plaintiff

states that he was handcuffed in front of his

home for nearly thirty minutes when dispatch

returned confirmation that Plaintiff was

warrantless, and the suspect was already in

state custody.

The Scheduling Conference Order further states: “The parties do not

presently contemplate filing any amendments.” During Plaintiff’s

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other reasons, futility because Plaintiff’s proposed Amended

Complaint did not allege timely and complete compliance with the

state tort claim requirement. 

Plaintiff’s position is belied by the final paragraph of

Section 945.3. The failure to file a tort claim within the

statutorily prescribed period may result in dismissal of an

action. See Witkin, 3 California Procedure, § 247 (4 Ed.). th

At the hearing Plaintiff made a confused argument that he

had recently filed a tort claim with Defendant’s counsel. 

Plaintiff made no showing that he complied with the government

claim presentation requirements before commencing this lawsuit. 

Consequently, Plaintiff’s belated attempt to file a tort claim

does not negate summary judgment for Defendant and does not

compel reconsideration of the March 24 Order. 

3

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deposition taken on January 2, 2008, Plaintiff testified that he is

“also alleging that on August 8, 2006, approximately 7:46 p.m. that

the claimant was harassed and arrested or detained with

unreasonable force under the objective reasonableness standard

citing Graham v. Connor (1989) 490 US 386, comma, 104 L.Ed.2d 443,

comma, 109 S. period, court, period, 1865.” [DT 89]. Plaintiff has

not sought leave to amend to add either set of allegations to the

complaint in this action. Discovery in this action closed in

January, 2008. These claims are not properly asserted in this

action. 

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 CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above:

1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED;

2. Counsel for Defendant shall prepare and lodge a form of

order and judgment consistent with this Memorandum Decision

within five (5) days following the date of service of this

decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 8, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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