Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02233/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02233-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carolyn W. Colvin
Appellee
Paul D. Dimmett
Appellant

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐2233

PAUL D. DIMMETT,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social

Security,

Defendant‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Evansville Division.

No. 3:14‐cv‐00095‐RLY‐WGH — Richard L. Young, Chief Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED FEBRUARY 11, 2016— DECIDED MARCH 14, 2016

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and WILLIAMS,

Circuit Judges.

POSNER, Circuit Judge. The plaintiff, who is now 62 years

old, applied in 2011 to the Social Security Administration for

disability benefits. He claimed to be disabled from any gain‐

ful employment by a combination of ailments including

asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), as‐

bestosis, and a heel spur in his right foot. Turned down by

Case: 15-2233 Document: 15 Filed: 03/14/2016 Pages: 9
2 No. 15‐2233

the administrative law judge who heard his case, and then

by the Social Security Appeals Council (which declined to

review the administrative law judge’s decision), he appealed

to the district court, also without success; for on the recom‐

mendation of the magistrate judge to whom the district

judge had referred the case, the district judge affirmed the

denial of benefits without discussion, precipitating this ap‐

peal, which highlights several important recurring issues in

the disability program.

For 33 years before the June day in 2011 on which, short‐

ly after suffering a possible heart attack, he quit his job and

simultaneously applied for benefits, the plaintiff had been a

sheet metal journeyman, work that is conceded to be

“heavy” and beyond his physical capacity to do any longer.

In fact for several years prior to his onset date he had been

given accommodations at work to compensate for his dimin‐

ishing abilities, and as a result was effectively performing

“light” rather than “heavy” work in 2011.

In 2001, while still employed, he’d suspected that he was

being exposed to asbestos on the job. A doctor whom he

consulted concluded from X‐rays of the plaintiff’s lungs, and

from breathing tests, that the plaintiff’s lungs indeed had

scarring “consistent with asbestos exposure.” The doctor al‐

so inferred from the tests a “possibility of decreased lung

volume.” As far as we can tell, the plaintiff hadn’t taken the

doctor’s advice to consult an expert in asbestos‐related dis‐

eases, but around the time of his possible heart attack he had

consulted a doctor about shortness of breath and chest pain

and the doctor had diagnosed COPD and encouraged the

plaintiff to stop smoking. Earlier he had also been diagnosed

Case: 15-2233 Document: 15 Filed: 03/14/2016 Pages: 9
No. 15‐2233 3

and treated for asthma. He used an inhaler to alleviate his

pulmonary distress.

The administrative law judge determined that the plain‐

tiff’s asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease

were “severe impairments,” but noted that the plaintiff had

not been diagnosed with asbestosis and ruled that his heel

spur was not a significant impediment to working. The

plaintiff disagrees with the latter two findings, but his ap‐

peal primarily challenges the administrative law judge’s fur‐

ther finding that the plaintiff’s asthma and chronic obstruc‐

tive pulmonary disease, although they preclude his return‐

ing to his old job as a sheet metal worker, do not disable him

from full‐time employment in jobs involving unskilled me‐

dium work provided that the work doesn’t expose him to

extreme temperatures, humidity, or airborne pollutants.

For asthma to be disabling, the Social Security Admin‐

istration’s regulations require that “attacks ... , in spite of

prescribed treatment and requiring physician intervention,

[must occur] at least once every 2 months or at least six times

a year.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 3.03(B). The ad‐

ministrative law judge ruled that the plaintiff’s asthma

didn’t reach that level. That may be correct, but he failed to

consider the effect of the asthma—which remember he

acknowledged was a “severe” impairment—on the plain‐

tiff’s other impairments, notably his other breathing im‐

pairment: chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. Worse, he

failed even to mention the regulations’ test for determining

whether a claimant’s COPD is presumptively disabling. The

test requires assessment of the patient’s FEV1—forced expir‐

atory volume in one second, id. § 3.02(A)—the volume of air

that a person of a given height can breathe out in one second

Case: 15-2233 Document: 15 Filed: 03/14/2016 Pages: 9
4 No. 15‐2233

after taking a deep breath. The higher the volume, the

healthier the person’s lungs. A pulmonary function test

found that the plaintiff’s FEV1 was only 51 percent of normal

for a person of his height. The administrative law judge did

not discuss whether this implied a low enough FEV1 score to

be presumptively disabling, and also did not discuss how

this low score affected the plaintiff’s residual functional ca‐

pacity for work.

In fact the administrative law judge ignored the plain‐

tiff’s COPD almost entirely when determining what work he

could still perform, and as a result there is no evidentiary

basis for the finding that he’s capable of engaging in medi‐

um work. One might think that even though he can’t do me‐

dium work he can do light or sedentary work. But his age

makes the distinction between medium and light work criti‐

cal: a person of his age who has no skills transferable to light

or sedentary work is presumptively disabled. See 20 C.F.R.

Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, Table No. 1, Rule 201.06; id., Table

No. 2, Rule 202.06.

Having determined to his satisfaction the scope and lim‐

its of the plaintiff’s impairments, the administrative law

judge asked the vocational expert assigned to the case

whether there were jobs that the plaintiff could perform giv‐

en his impairments. The administrative law judge explained

that those impairments ruled out jobs in which the plaintiff

would be exposed to temperature extremes and humidity as

well as to such lung irritants as odors, fumes, dust, and

chemicals. Testifying by phone at the end of the hearing and

thus unfamiliar with the medical testimony, the vocational

expert listed three types of job that he thought the plaintiff

could perform: “order filler,” “self‐service laundry and dry

Case: 15-2233 Document: 15 Filed: 03/14/2016 Pages: 9
No. 15‐2233 5

cleaning attendant,” and “dining room attendant.” Order

filler covers a variety of jobs and tasks, such as: “conveys

materials and items from receiving or production areas to

storage or to other designated areas by hand, handtruck, or

electric handtruck. Sorts and places materials or items on

racks, shelves, or in bins according to predetermined se‐

quence, such as size, type, style, color, or product code. Sorts

and stores perishable goods in refrigerated rooms. Fills req‐

uisitions, work orders, or requests for materials, tools, or

other stock items and distributes items to production work‐

ers or assembly line. ... May use computer to enter records.

May compile worksheets or tickets from customer specifica‐

tions. May drive vehicle to transport stored items from

warehouse to plant or to pick up items from several loca‐

tions for shipment.” U.S. Department of Labor, Dictionary of

Occupational Titles, “Laborer, Stores,” www.occupationalinfo

.org/92/922687058.html (visited March 11, 2016, as were the

other websites cited in this opinion). Neither the vocational

expert nor the administrative law judge discussed whether

the plaintiff, given his pulmonary problems, can move

heavy items, or, given his age, education, and work history,

track work orders and use order‐management software.

The other two jobs mentioned by the vocational expert

should have caused alarm bells to ring in the administrative

law judge’s ears given that he’d instructed the vocational

expert that the plaintiff is incapable of performing jobs that

would expose him to temperature extremes, humidity, and

airborne pollutants. A laundry or dry‐cleaning attendant

will routinely inhale odors, fumes, dust, and chemicals, as

these are jobs that require the employee to perform such

chores as dampening clothes with cleaning solvent and

bleach. And a dining room attendant, among other duties,

Case: 15-2233 Document: 15 Filed: 03/14/2016 Pages: 9
6 No. 15‐2233

carries dirty dishes to the restaurant’s kitchen, where he is

likely to inhale fumes, steam, and odors and be exposed to

heat.

And so we have in this case still another example of fatal‐

ly weak testimony by a vocational expert. See, e.g., Alaura v.

Colvin, 797 F.3d 503, 507–08 (7th Cir. 2015); Browning v. Col‐

vin, 766 F.3d 702, 708–12 (7th Cir. 2014); Hermann v. Social

Security Administration, 772 F.3d 1110, 1112–14 (7th Cir.

2014). Compounding the weakness, both the administrative

law judge, in uncritically accepting the vocational expert’s

testimony, and the vocational expert, in failing to under‐

stand the requirements of the jobs he mistakenly thought the

plaintiff capable of performing, appear to have ignored the

most current manual of job descriptions—the O*NET (see

O*NET, www.onetcenter.org/overview.html). It’s true that

the Social Security Administration, while aware of the obso‐

lescence of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, hasn’t en‐

dorsed the O*NET and in fact is developing its own parallel

classification system. See Social Security Administration, Oc‐

cupational Information System Project, www.ssa.gov/disability

research/occupational_info_systems. html. But this system is

not expected to be rolled out for at least three more years,

leaving a vacuum that the O*NET may fill. And so we point

out that the O*NET entry for “laundry and dry‐cleaning

workers” explains that the worker must “apply bleaching

powders to spots and spray them with steam to remove

stains,” “spray steam, water, or air over spots to flush out

chemicals,” “mix bleaching agents with hot water in vats,”

“mix and add detergents, dyes, bleaches, starches and other

solutions and chemicals,” and “sprinkle chemical solvents

over stains.” O*NET, Laundry and Dry‐Cleaning Workers,

www.onetonline.org/link/summary/51‐6011.00. So the job is

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No. 15‐2233 7

wholly unsuitable for Dimmett. As for a dining‐room at‐

tendant, O*NET lists “stamina” as required (and surely it’s

required by a laundry or dry‐cleaning worker as well—the

most disagreeable of the three jobs for someone with serious

respiratory problems), defining it as “the ability to exert

yourself over long periods of time without getting winded

or out of breath.” O*NET, Dining Room and Cafeteria Attend‐

ants and Bartender Helpers, www.onetonline.org/link/

summary/35‐9011.00. And “order filler” may require techno‐

logical skills that the plaintiff does not have. Id., Order Fillers,

Wholesale and Retail Sales, www.onetonline.org/link/sum

mary/43‐5081.04. And affecting all these jobs, though the

plaintiff’s heel spur is not disabling in itself the pain it causes

would, by further impairing his stamina, further limit his

ability to perform any of them. The administrative law judge

said that the pain wasn’t recurring and wouldn’t interfere

with the plaintiff’s working, but in saying this he ignored

uncontradicted evidence that orthotic shoe inserts would not

give the plaintiff sufficient relief from his pain. And he did

not explain why he found only partially credible the plain‐

tiff’s testimony that the heel spur caused pain that impedes

his daily functioning.

So: the administrative law judge ignored key medical ev‐

idence and the vocational expert ignored the limitations that

the administrative law judge placed on the type of job that

the plaintiff is able to perform. But there is more to criticize

in the handling of this case—there is the rubber stamping of

the vocational expert’s testimony by the magistrate judge

and by the district judge, who upheld the denial of disability

benefits—the district judge without an explanation.

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8 No. 15‐2233

Here is the critical portion of the magistrate judge’s opin‐

ion (omitting citations):

First, Dimmett argues that the ALJ’s determination that

he is capable of working as a “dining room attendant” or

“self‐service laundry/dry cleaning attendant” is incon‐

sistent with the ALJ’s finding that Dimmett cannot work

with “concentrated exposure to temperature extremes,

humidity, odors, fumes, dusts, chemicals, and other res‐

piratory irritants.” Dimmett’s point is well‐taken but does

not require remand.

I agree that the ALJ’s conclusions make strange bedfel‐

lows. A “dining room attendant” is what might commonly

be called a “waiter” or “bus boy”—a person who trans‐

ports food or beverages from a kitchen to a dining area or

dirty dishes from a dining area to a kitchen. And, of

course, it is easy to imagine such work presenting concen‐

trated exposure to temperature extremes and odors. More

intuitively, a “self service laundry/dry cleaning attendant”

is a person who works in a laundromat or dry cleaning fa‐

cility. It is easy to imagine such work presenting concen‐

trated exposure to temperature extremes, humidity, odors,

fumes, and chemicals.

Even so, these seemingly inconsistent conclusions do

not warrant remand. The ALJ based his conclusion ... on

testimony from a vocational expert whom he informed of

Dimmett’s limitations. Accordingly, the ALJ based his con‐

clusion on substantial evidence. ...

Meanwhile, Dimmett has presented only conjecture—

not evidence—supporting his contention that this work is

incompatible with his RFC [residual functional capacity].

Because Dimmett has not called our attention to any evi‐

dence, I cannot find that the ALJ erred by ignoring evi‐

dence contrary to his conclusion.

Case: 15-2233 Document: 15 Filed: 03/14/2016 Pages: 9
No. 15‐2233 9

This is not a reasoned analysis of the plaintiff’s claim

(notice for example the blind reliance on the vocational ex‐

pert’s hamstrung testimony)—and the district judge, in ac‐

cepting the magistrate judge’s recommendation, offered no

analysis at all. Neither judge’s opinion did justice to the

plaintiff’s claim.

The judgment of the district court is reversed with in‐

structions to remand the case to the Social Security Admin‐

istration.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

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