Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-03120/USCOURTS-caDC-94-03120-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sharon M. Shepherd
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

-

Argued October 15, 1996 Decided December 6, 1996

No. 94-3120

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT

v.

SHARON M. SHEPHERD, A/K/A SHARON S. ORTEGA,

APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE

-

Consolidated with

Nos. 94-3126, 94-3143, 94-3144

-

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cr00010-01)

(No. 94cr00010-02)

-

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant/cross-appellee Sharon M. Shepherd.

Barbara R. Miller, appointed by the court, argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant/cross-appellee Marvin Binion.

Vicki S. Marani, Attorney, U.S. Department ofJustice, argued the cause for appellee/cross-appellant.

Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney, Julie J. Shemitz, and Kathleen A. Felton, Attorneys, U.S.

Department of Justice, were on the briefs.

Before: WILLIAMS, ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

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1At trial, Sharon Shepherd was referred to by her alias, Sharon Ortega. On appeal, we use her

legal name, Shepherd. 

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: In these consolidated appeals, appellants Sharon Shepherd1and

MarvinBinion challenge their convictions bya jury of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent

to distribute fifty or more grams of crack cocaine and 500 or more grams of powder cocaine, and

distribution of 500 or more grams of powder cocaine. Shepherd also challenges her convictions for

distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine and for using or carrying a firearm during and in

relation to a drug trafficking crime. Because we conclude that Shepherd was entitled to enter a plea

to the indictment, we remand her case to allow her to so plead; hence, we do not reach her other

contentions. Binion's contentions regarding the denial of a continuance to obtain new counsel, the

denial of lesser included offense instructions, and the sufficiency of the evidence of conspiracy, are

meritless. In a cross-appeal, the government challenges appellants' sentences, citing United States

v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1445 (1996), for the proposition

that a government agent's insistence on purchasing crack cocaine rather than powder cocaine is

insufficient to establish "sentencing entrapment." In light of Walls, we remand both cases for

resentencing.

I. 

The evidence at trialshowed that on three occasionsin the fall of 1993 Sharon Shepherd sold

crack cocaine and powder cocaine to Mark Ross, a Special Agent of the Drug Enforcement

Administration ("DEA") posing as a crack cocaine dealer. The first sale occurred on September 30,

after a confidential informant arranged for Ross to purchase four ounces of crack cocaine from

Shepherd. That day, Ross drove to an office building at 7835 Eastern Avenue, N.W., and met

Shepherd, who was waiting outside. Shepherd told Ross that the crack cocaine had not yet arrived

but that he should put the money for the drugsin her handbag. When Shepherd opened her handbag,

Ross saw a 9 mm handgun without a magazine or clip in it. Shepherd explained that she needed the

gun because, as a woman, she had to protect herself and was "afraid she might get ripped off or

something." Ross refused to "front" the money, wanting first to see what he was buying. Shepherd

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then went into 7835 Eastern Avenue and entered a door marked "People's Tax Service," a tax

preparation service owned by Marvin Binion. While Shepherd was inside, Binion also went into the

building. Shepherd shortly returned with powder cocaine and told Ross that it had not yet been

"cooked" into crack cocaine. Ross stated that he wanted to buy crack cocaine, and Shepherd

promised to cook the powder in her apartment in Southwest Washington, D.C. At that time,

Shepherd told Ross that Binion was the source of her drug supply. Later that day, when the crack

cocaine wasready, Shepherd paged RossfromBinion's office. Ross returned to Eastern Avenue and

purchased approximately 100 grams of crack cocaine from Shepherd.

The second sale took place on November 18, 1993. When Ross returned to 7835 Eastern

Avenue, Shepherd told him that the drugs had not yet arrived and went into the building. While

Shepherd was inside, Ross saw Binion go in and out of the building. Shepherd returned to Ross,

showed him some powder, and then went back into the building. Emerging a few minutes later,

Shepherd told Rossthat it would take a little while to cook the cocaine because the microwave oven

in Binion's office was in use. Later that day, Ross purchased four ounces of crack cocaine from

Shepherd.

The third sale, on December 8, 1993, involved a kilogram of powder cocaine. Shepherd had

explained to Ross that her supplier did not want to deliver the drugs as crack cocaine, but had

promised to do the cooking herself. On December 8, Ross drove back to Eastern Avenue with the

drug money. Shepherd went inside the Eastern Avenue building, and upon returning, told Ross that

half the kilogram was gone, but he could buy the remainder. Before Ross could buy the drugs,

however, Shepherd reported that the remaining half kilogramwas gone but thatsomeone would bring

another kilogramshortly. Ross left, and within a few minutes, returned upon learning from Shepherd

that a new kilogram had arrived. After Shepherd and Binion got into Ross' car, Binion handed a bag

to Shepherd, who pulled out another brown bag containing approximately 990 grams of powder

cocaine. Shepherd gave the bag to Ross, and after looking inside, Ross got out of the car, ostensibly

to get drug money from the car trunk. Ross signaled nearby agents, who arrested Shepherd and

Binion.

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2

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), 841(b)(1)(B)(ii), 846. 

3

Id. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(iii); 18 U.S.C. § 2. 

4

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). 

The agents recovered from Binion's office a microwave oven, two razor blades and baking

soda near the microwave, and a balance beam scale on which there was a plastic bag containing

mannitol, a substance used to cook powder cocaine into crack cocaine. They also found about two

grams of powder cocaine in a briefcase belonging to Binion. At Shepherd's apartment, agents found

the gun that Ross had seen in Shepherd's handbag on September 30 and a digital scale with white

powder on it. 

Shepherd and Binion were indicted for conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with intent to

distribute, fifty or more grams of crack cocaine and 500 or more grams of powder cocaine;2

distribution of fifty or more grams of crack cocaine on September 30 and November 18, 1993;3and

distribution of 500 or more grams of powder cocaine on December 8, 1993. A third defendant,

GabrielZapata, was also indicted for the conspiracy and distribution of 500 or more grams of cocaine

charges. In addition, Shepherd was indicted for using and carrying a firearm on September 30, 1993,

during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime.4

A jury found Shepherd guilty on all counts, and Binion guilty of conspiracy and distribution

of 500 or more grams of powder cocaine on December 8, 1993; the jury acquitted Binion of the drug

sales on September 30 and November 18, 1993. The jury found Zapata not guilty. The district court

sentenced Shepherd to concurrent terms of 60 months' imprisonment for the distribution and

conspiracy convictions, and a consecutive term of 60 months for the firearms conviction; the court

sentenced Binion to concurrent terms of 63 months' imprisonment for the distribution and conspiracy

convictions. 

II.

Shepherd contendsthat the district court abused its discretion in rejecting her request to plead

guilty to the indictment. Under a plea agreement with the government, Shepherd would have testified

about her codefendants' involvement in the charged offenses, and the government would have

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5 The government acknowledged in its brief, and at oral argument in this court, that it had

agreed to recommend a departure for Shepherd from both the Sentencing Guidelines and the

mandatory minimum sentence. 

6 U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 provides, in relevant part:

Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial

assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed

an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines. 

7

18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) provides, in relevant part:

Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a

sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence so as to reflect

a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another

person who has committed an offense. 

recommended to the departure committee of the United States Attorney's Office that it file a motion

requesting downward departures from the Sentencing Guidelines and the mandatory minimum

sentences.5 Any prejudice to her codefendants that might have resulted from her mid-trial plea, she

maintains, should have been addressed by cautionary instructions, not by a summary rejection of her

plea.

At the end of the first day of trial, while Agent Ross, the government's first witness, was

testifying on direct examination, Shepherd's counsel advised the district court that Shepherd had

reached an agreement with the government to plead guilty to the indictment and to testify for the

government against her codefendants. Acknowledging that a mid-trial plea was unusual, counsel

explained that Shepherd had agreed to plead several months earlier, but, intimidated by her

codefendants, had changed her mind several times. Counsel stated that Shepherd had decided that

afternoon to cooperate with the government, and with the court's approval, would be debriefed by

the government that evening and change her plea the following morning. In return, the government

would recommend that the departure committee seek a sentencing departure below both the

Sentencing Guidelines provision, see U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1,6and the mandatory minimum sentence, see

18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).7 The district court rejected the plea request. Our review is for abuse of

discretion. See United States v. Maddox, 48 F.3d 555, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v.

Washington, 969 F.2d 1073, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 922 (1993).

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It has long been recognized that " "plea bargaining[ ]' is an essential component of the

administration of justice." Santobello v. NewYork, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971); see also Maddox, 48

F.3d at 558. Not only does "[i]t lead[ ] to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal

cases," Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1970)),

often affording the government additional leverage in prosecuting other crimes, but it allows

defendants who wish to acknowledge their guilt "to spare themselves and their familiesthe spectacle

and expense of protracted courtroom proceedings." United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 584

(1968). While a defendant has "no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted," Santobello, 404

U.S. at 262; Maddox, 48 F.3d at 558, "the fact that ... guilty pleas may occasionally be rejected

hardly implies that all defendants may be required to submit to a full-dress jury trial as a matter of

course." Jackson, 390 U.S at 584. In this circuit, the district court may reject a plea, but in so doing,

it "must provide a reasoned exercise of discretion in order to justify a departure from the course

agreed on by the prosecution and defense.' " Maddox, 48 F.3d at 558 (quoting United States v.

Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1973)); see also Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262. The district

court gave four reasons for rejecting Shepherd's plea request, and we address each in turn.

First, the district court noted the timing of the request: "It comes rather late in the middle of

the trial." Had the plea come up "a week or two or three" before the trial, the court stated that it

would not have had "any trouble" with the plea. Clearly, the lateness of Shepherd's request to plea

was a proper factor for the court to consider. But given the weighty interests of the defendant and

the government at stake, it is also significant that Shepherd's request came at the beginning of trial

with a plausible explanation for the delay. When Shepherd requested to plea, the government's first

witness was still undergoing direct examination. As her counsel explained, the delay was caused in

part by Shepherd's fear of her co-defendants, who were incarcerated in the same detention facility,

and what would happen to her if she were to testify against them; the district court expressed no

doubt about this explanation. As cases in other circuits demonstrate, it would hardly have been

unreasonable for the court to have accepted Shepherd's plea. For example, in United States v. Pierro,

32 F.3d 611, 616 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 919 (1995), the First Circuit rejected a

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defendant's contention that the district court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial when his

codefendant abruptly pleaded guilty after eighteen days of trial and agreed to testify for the

government, concluding that there was no unfair prejudice to the defendant. The Seventh Circuit

reached a similar conclusion in United States v. Thomas, 774 F.2d 807, 809-10 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.

denied, 475 U.S. 1024 (1986), where a codefendant changed his plea and testified for the government

nine days into a sixteen-day trial.

Second, the district court concluded that "it would prejudice the other defendantsto have one

of them capitulate in the middle of the trial and I don't want that prejudice to occur." The court did

not precisely identify the nature of the prejudice, but, obviously, causing codefendants to reassess

their trial strategy at mid-trial is an appropriate and serious concern. The district court did not

suggest, however, that the prejudice to Shepherd's codefendants would have been unfair,see Pierro,

332 F.3d at 617 & n.5, much less that any unfair prejudice to them could not have been resolved or

mitigated through other means. Shepherd had been considering whether to plead for some time, and

her codefendants might have been aware of this possibility, although, admittedly there is no direct

evidence in the record to show that they were. Still, as the First Circuit observed, where a "newly

pleaded defendant takes the witness stand and testifies against the remaining defendants ... the court

ordinarily can proceed with the trial after appropriately instructing the jury concerning the change of

plea and the newly proffered testimony." Id. at 617; see also Thomas, 774 F.2d at 809.

Furthermore, the government supported Shepherd's plea request, and her codefendants expressed no

objection on the record. Absent any indication that the potential prejudice would have been unfair,

the district court's concern about prejudice appears less weighty than its comment suggests.

Third, the district court concluded that by pleading to the indictment, Shepherd would have

been no better off. Under the terms of the agreement, the government promised only to write a letter

to the U.S. Attorney's departure committee describing any assistance Shepherd might provide and

recommending the filing of a departure motion based on her substantial assistance. Because the

agreement assured neither that the government would file the motion nor that the district court would

grant it, the district court reasoned that the potential benefit to Shepherd was merely "conjectural."

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8 At the time of Shepherd's sentencing, the district court could depart below the mandatory

minimum sentence only on motion by the government pursuant to 18 U.S.S.G. § 3553(e). As

amended September 13, 1994, the district court may, in limited circumstances not relevant here,

depart sua sponte from the mandatory minimum. See id. § 3553(f) (Supp. 1995). 

Yet the absence of a guarantee that Shepherd's sentence would have been reduced did not mean that

the plea agreement offered her no benefit. Based on the government's evidence, Shepherd and her

counsel could reasonably anticipate the likelihood of her conviction on all counts. Had Shepherd

been able to plead, on the other hand, she would have had the opportunity to assist the government

and qualify for more favorable sentencing treatment. The district court's assurance, were Shepherd

convicted, that it would take her offer to plea into account at sentencing was unsatisfactory from

Shepherd's perspective. Her counsel pointed out that the district court's promise was "not going to

do her any good" because she would face at least the mandatory minimum sentence for the drug

convictions. Only by assisting the government would Shepherd have been eligible for a departure

below the mandatory minimum.8 Under the circumstances, the decision whether to risk that her

sentence might not be reduced after she pleaded to the indictment and testified against her

codefendants was for Shepherd to make, not the district court.

Finally, the district court expressed concern that because Shepherd had "gone back and forth"

on whether to plead, there was a possibility that she might change her mind again, claiming coercion.

The court did not expand on what coercion it had in mind. Shepherd's indecision, explained in part

by her fear of her codefendants, did not necessarily mean that she would claim coercion thereafter.

As this court recognized in Maddox, a defendant's initial reticence or denial of factual guilt does not

preclude the subsequent entry of a guilty plea. 48 F.3d at 559-60. If the voluntariness of the

proffered plea is at issue, "the court must at least exercise its discretion to ascertain whether its ...

concerns[about the defendant's earlier position] have been addressed." Id. at 560. The district court

gave no indication why a Rule 11 inquiry would not have afforded the appropriate means by which

to verify the voluntariness of Shepherd's plea. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d); see also Washington, 969

F.2d at 1077. 

For these reasons we are constrained to conclude that the district court's explanation for

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9 Because the government presented sufficient evidence to support Shepherd's firearm

conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), there is no bar to her pleading to count three of the

indictment. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1978). 

rejecting Shepherd'srequest to plead guilty failsto overcome her interest and the public'sinterest that

are at stake. The resulting prejudice to Shepherd cannot be dismissed as insubstantial. Although

"[p]rejudice is more readily apparent where the rejection of the plea leads to conviction of a greater

offense than that offered in a plea agreement," id. at 1079, prejudice still may exist when the

defendant is ultimately convicted of the same offenses to which she attempted to plead guilty.

Maddox, 48 F.3d at 560. Shepherd did not lose the opportunity to avoid conviction on certain

offenses, but she did lose the opportunity to assist the government and thereby place herself in a

position to have hersentence reduced below the mandatoryminimum. Just as the "remote possibility"

of collateral consequencesresulting fromadditional convictions constitutes prejudice, id.,so doesthe

possibility that beneficialsentencing consequences were foreclosed. By rejecting her request to plead

guilty, the district court frustrated Shepherd's ability to qualify for more favorable sentencing

treatment when the court itself was constrained by law to offer no more than what Shepherd deemed

to be an inadequate alternative. Especially in view of the government's promise to submit a letter to

the departure committee recommending the filing of a departure motion, the prejudice is plain.

Accordingly, we remand Shepherd's case with instructions to vacate the judgment of

conviction in order to allow her to enter a guilty plea to the indictment nunc pro tunc, and for

resentencing.9 Upon acceptance of Shepherd's plea, the district court shall determine whether it is

more likely than not that if Shepherd had been allowed to plead and testify against her codefendants,

the departure committee would have found thatshe provided substantial assistance and filed a motion

for a downward departure fromthe Sentencing Guidelines and the mandatoryminimumsentencesfor

the drug offenses. Cf. United States v. Goossens, 84 F.3d 697, 704 (4th Cir. 1996). 

III.

Turning to Binion's challengesto his convictions, our discussionis brief because his challenges

clearly lack merit.

Continuance. We find no abuse of discretion by the district court in denying Binion's motion

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for a continuance four days before trial in order to obtain new counsel. Binion's motion to continue

the trial "to a date when Attorney R. Kenneth Mundy can try the case" was based on his desire to

dismiss his counsel Robert Mance; Binion felt uncomfortable with Mance and lacked confidence in

his handling of the case. Binion informed the court that while he had had "a lot of conflicts" with

Mance on strategy, he had a "very good relationship" with Mundy, who had represented him at

arraignment. Alternatively, Binion requested that Mance be allowed to withdraw and that he be given

the opportunity to retain new counsel. Mance, in turn, acknowledged that his relations with Binion

had become "very strained" and that Binion lacked confidence in his judgment. The government did

not oppose the motion: the continuance would not disturb the schedule for pretrial motions and the

government sought a one-week continuance because a trial prosecutor had to attend to a family

illness. Further, according to the government, neither codefendant opposed a brief continuance, and

Mundy would be available for trial in ten days, on April 25, 1994. The district court denied the

continuance because of the lateness of Binion's request, the difficulties in rescheduling the court's

calendar and the witnesses, and the court's confidence in Mance's competence to represent Binion.

Although the Sixth Amendment guarantees that "a defendant must be afforded a reasonable

opportunity to secure counsel of his own choosing," United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489

(D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979), the right to retain counsel of one's choice "is

not boundless," and must be balanced against the "judicial system's interest in expeditious

proceedings." United States v. Poston, 902 F.2d 90, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Burton, 584 F.2d

at 489. In view of the factors that the district court should consider when deciding whether to grant

a continuance to substitute counsel, Burton, 584 F.2d at 490-91; see Poston, 902 F.2d at 97, it is

clear that there are no compelling circumstances here as would demonstrate an abuse of discretion.

See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983). Nothing in the record suggests that the district court

could not have reasonably concluded that althoughBinion may have preferred other counsel, Mance,

whom Binion retained, was "competent and well-equipped" to handle Binion's defense. Even on

appeal, Binion pointsto no specific instance in which he disagreed with Mance regarding his defense.

Given the public's "strong interest in the prompt, effective, and efficient administration of justice,"

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Poston, 902 F.2d at 96 (quoting Burton, 584 F.2d at 489), the district court properly considered its

crowded calendar, which included two multiple-defendant trials set for early the next month.

Furthermore, the fact that Mundy had represented Binion at arraignment suggests that Binion could

have determined Mundy's availability for trial at an earlier time. 

Lesser included offense instruction. We find meritless Binion's contention that the district

court erred in denying hisrequest for lesser included offense instructions. Although the government

introduced evidence that the DEA agentsfound two grams of cocaine inBinion's briefcase on the day

of his arrest, it did not indict Binion for the two grams, and there was no evidence that the cocaine

to be distributed included the two grams. To the contrary, Binion testified that those drugs were for

his personal use. Hence, the district court properly denied Binion's request that the jury be instructed

on the lesser included offense of simple possession of cocaine or of conspiracy to possess cocaine.

See United States v. Harley, 990 F.2d 1340, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 885

(1993).

Sufficiency of evidence of conspiracy. Likewise, Binion's challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine is meritless. Viewed in the light most favorable

to the government, United States v. Monroe, 990 F.2d 1370, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1993), the evidence

showed that on two occasions, Shepherd sold crack cocaine outside the Eastern Avenue building

when Binion was inside, and on a third occasion, Binion personally participated in the sale of a large

amount of powder cocaine to Agent Ross. For each drug sale, Shepherd walked in and out of the

Eastern Avenue building, and except for the last occasion when the sale was aborted by her arrest,

Shepherd usedBinion's office before finallypresenting the crack cocaine forsale to Ross. During their

initial drug transaction Shepherd told Ross that Binion was the source of her drug supply, and later

advised Ross that her supplier did not want to sell the drugs as crack cocaine. But Binion's offices

contained the equipment and supplies used to convert powder cocaine into crack cocaine, and he

admitted that he knew that Shepherd and his secretary smoked crack cocaine in his office. From this

evidence the jury could reasonably find that Shepherd and Binion conspired to distribute crack

cocaine. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); see also United States v. Wood, 879 F.2d

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927, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 

IV. 

The government's cross-appeal challenges the lawfulness of Shepherd's and Binion's sentences.

United States v. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1994). Citing Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, decided

after appellants' sentencing, the government contends that the district court erred as a matter of law

in imposing sentences below the mandatory minimum for crack cocaine convictions. Accepting as

true the district court's finding that Shepherd sold crack cocaine only after Agent Ross insisted on

purchasing crack cocaine rather than powder cocaine, the government maintains that, under Walls,

these facts do not establish a valid sentencing entrapment claim, assuming that such a claim is viable

after Walls.

In sentencing appellants, the district court declined to impose the sentences applicable to

convictionsinvolving crack cocaine and instead imposed sentences applicable to convictions involving

powder cocaine because the court found that Agent Ross' insistence on purchasing crack cocaine

after Shepherd presented him with powder cocaine was specifically designed to manipulate her

sentence. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. at 111. Such "outrageous" manipulation by a government agent,

the district court concluded, was groundsfor sentencing Shepherd asthough she had been convicted

of powder cocaine crimes. Id. The district court relied on two theories, "sentencing entrapment,"

which focuses on whether outrageous official conduct "overcomes the will of an individual

predisposed only to" engaging in lesser crimes, and "sentencing factor manipulation," which involves

"outrageous government conduct that offends due process." Id. at 110. Finding that Shepherd was

predisposed on September 30 and November 18, 1993, only to distribute powder cocaine, the court

applied the mandatoryminimumand Sentencing Guidelines provisions "that would have been applied

absent the manipulative conduct of the agent ...." Id. (applying U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(9) and 21

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)). In sentencing Binion, the district court applied the same provisions. While

acknowledging that it could consider the evidence in support of the two crack cocaine distribution

counts of which Binion had been acquitted, see United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 635-36 (D.C.

Cir. 1992), the court found that Binion only possessed powder cocaine and concluded that Binion

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was responsible only for what the court had attributed to Shepherd, namely, the distribution of

powder cocaine rather than crack cocaine.

In Walls, this court rejected the contention that insistence by government agentsthat cocaine

be delivered in crack formconstitutes "sentencing entrapment." 70 F.3d at 1329. Observing that "the

SupremeCourt has warned against using an entrapment defense to controllaw enforcement practices

ofwhich a court might disapprove," id. (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973)),

the court stated that "[t]he main element in any entrapment defense is [ ] the defendant's

"predisposition'"whetherthe defendant was an "unwaryinnocent" or, instead, an"unwarycriminal"

who readily availed himself [or herself] of the opportunity to perpetrate the crime.' " Id. (quoting

Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988) (quoting Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,

372 (1958))). Consequently, where the defendants "showed no hesitation in committing the crimes

for which they were convicted," an entrapment defense is unavailable. Walls, 70 F.3d at 1329. The

two defendants, the Walls court observed, "could hardly be described asinnocents[:]" the fact "[t]hat

they would have sold powder cocaine had the agents not negotiated for crack proves only that [the

defendants] were predisposed to commit both offenses. ... [The defendants] distributed crack cocaine

when given the chance." Id. "If the propriety of the agents' conduct had any significance," the Walls

court added, it would only arise if the agents' conduct were "so outrageous that due process

principles would absolutely bar the government from involving judicial processes to obtain a

conviction." Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "Without "coercion, violence or

brutality to the person,' we ruled in United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1476 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 464 U.S. 908 (1983), there could be no due process violation." Walls, 70 F.3d at 1330. The

court therefore rejected the contentionsthat the agents' insistence on purchasing crack cocaine rather

than powder cocaine would entitle the defendants to reversal of their convictions for crack cocaine

or that such conduct would provide any constitutional basisto reduce theirsentences. Id. "Whatever

vitality the outrageous-conduct defense might have for [setting aside a defendant's conviction] ... we

conceive of no basisfor allowing this defense, orsome variant ofit, to reduce a defendant'ssentence."

Id. at 1329-30.

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10 The district court stated that it was not departing from the mandatory minimum or the

Sentencing Guidelines, but instead simply applying the appropriate penalties that would have

applied absent the agent's manipulative conduct. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. at 111. Hence, we have

no occasion to consider the impact, if any, of Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996), on

the conclusion in Walls with respect to the district court's authority to depart from the Sentencing

Guidelines where there is a claim of manipulative conduct by a government agent. 

In view of the similarity of the circumstances between Walls and the instant case, Walls is

dispositive.10 When Agent Ross stated that he would buy only crack cocaine, Shepherd willingly,

without hesitation, converted the powder cocaine into crack cocaine before completing the sale.

Although the district court here, unlike the court in Walls, found that Shepherd was predisposed to

sell powder cocaine, not crack cocaine, thereby constraining the magnitude of Binion's criminal

responsibility, Walls requires the conclusion that the district court erred as a matter of law. Walls

makes clear that in this circuit a request by a government agent for crack cocaine upon a seller's

delivery of powder cocaine, without more, does not establish a claim of "sentencing entrapment."

Id. at 1230.

Accordingly, we remand both casesto the district court, in Shepherd's case with instructions

to vacate the judgment of conviction to allow her to enter a plea to the indictment and for

resentencing, and in Binion's case for resentencing; for each appellant, the district court must

determine the quantity of drugs attributable as a result of her or his participation in the conspiracy.

See United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 application

n.2.

USCA Case #94-3120 Document #239279 Filed: 12/06/1996 Page 14 of 14