Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-14-40947/USCOURTS-ca5-14-40947-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arthur Joyal Barker
Appellant
Ruth Brouwer
Appellee
Joyce Francis
Appellee
Thomas Maciel
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-40947

Summary Calendar

ARTHUR JOYAL BARKER,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

RUTH BROUWER, Medical Practitioner; JOYCE FRANCIS, Vocational 

Nurse; THOMAS MACIEL, Registered Nurse,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 9:12-CV-10

Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Arthur Joyal Barker, Texas prisoner # 1290750, appeals the district 

court’s summary judgment dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action filed 

against various medical personnel in the Eastham Unit of the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice. In his § 1983 complaint, Barker alleged that 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 29, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 14-40947

2

the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs after 

he informed them that he was having chest pains and difficulty breathing. 

We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo. Xtreme 

Lashes, LLC v. Xtended Beauty, Inc., 576 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 2009). 

Summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 

The standard required to succeed on a deliberate-indifference claim is 

“extremely high,” and Johnson has not met it here in connection with his claim 

that Ruth Brouwer ignored his sole complaints of chest pain and difficulty 

breathing. See Domino v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 

(5th Cir. 2001). Even if Brouwer did not treat his complaints and instead told 

Barker to submit a medical request form in connection with these symptoms, 

there is no evidence that Barker had a history of a heart condition, that he had 

been diagnosed with a heart condition, or that he was on any medication for a 

heart condition. Just prior to Barker’s complaints, Brouwer had taken 

Barker’s vital signs, and they were normal. Thus, Barker has not shown 

deliberate indifference as to Brouwer. 

With respect to Barker’s claims against Joyce Francis that she ignored 

his complaints of chest pains, the record reflects that she administered two 

EKGs, took his vitals, and reported her findings to a physician’s assistant, who 

determined the course of treatment. Barker has failed to show that she ignored 

his complaints, refused treatment, “or engaged in any similar conduct that 

would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” 

Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985).

Finally, Barker has not shown that Thomas Maciel, a nurse, was 

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. During a morning visit, 

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No. 14-40947

3

Maciel examined Barker, took his vital signs, manipulated the chest wall, and 

determined that an EKG was not necessary. Maciel reported his findings to a 

doctor. At a visit later that afternoon, Barker reported that his chest pain had 

decreased. Maciel took Barker’s vitals and reported his findings to a 

physician’s assistant. Barker’s complaint that Maciel should have performed 

additional testing or treatment amounts to a disagreement with medical 

treatment, which does not constitute a constitutional violation. See Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976); see also Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 

292 (5th Cir. 1997). 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Barker, defendants

were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 

Barker’s motion for the appointment of appellate counsel is denied.

AFFIRMED; MOTION DENIED.

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