Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-06408/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-06408-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gail Lewis
Respondent
Vang Cha Yang
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

—o0o—

VANG CHA YANG, )

)

Petitioner, )

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v. )

)

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GAIL LEWIS, Warden, )

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Respondent. )

 )

1:02-CV-06408 LJO JMD (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS 

[Doc #1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This action has been referred to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72-302.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant

to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Fresno, entered on February 18,

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28 All subsequent Exhibit references are to the exhibits attached to Respondent’s Answer, unless otherwise

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1999. See Respondent’ Answer to Petition of Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ex. A. Following a jury 1

trial, Petitioner was found guilty of violations of California Penal Code sections 261(a)(2) [rape],

264.1 [rape in concert], 288(b)(1) [false imprisonment], 286(c) [sodomy], and 286(d) [sodomy in

concert] involving three victims. Id. In addition, Petitioner was found guilty of committing these

crimes for the benefit of a street gang pursuant to 186.22(b)(1). Id. Petitioner was subsequently

sentenced to 94 years and four months in prison. Id.

Thereafter, Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal with the California Court of Appeal,

Fifth Appellate District, (hereinafter “5 DCA”) and filed an appellate brief on December 17, th

1999. The People filed a responsive brief on April 20, 2000. On August 9, 2001, the Fifth DCA

reversed judgment on four counts as lesser included charges and affirmed the judgment as to the

remaining charges. Ex. D. On September 12, 2001, Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Review

in the California Supreme Court. Ex. E. Said petition was denied on November 14, 2001. Ex. F.

On November 12, 2002, Petitioner filed the above-captioned federal habeas petition,

alleging 12 claims including: conviction based on insufficient evidence; improper admission of

evidence; improper exclusion of witness testimony; several claims of improper jury instructions;

cumulative error; several claims of improper sentencing; and cruel and unusual punishment.

On March 31, 2003, Respondent filed an answer to the petition.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court adopts the facts as summarized by the 5 DCA in its opinion dated August 9, th

2001:

On April 5, 1998, a Sunday night, 14-year-old Maney asked her friends Kia (12 years old)

and Kaoying (13 years old) to go cruising with her ex-boyfriend Sim, and some friends. The

girls joined a carload of young men, which eventually included Money (driving), Sim, Lor,

Boomee, Xee and Heavy, all members of the Mongolian Boys Society (MBS) gang. After

driving around for a while, Money parked at a Motel 6. Someone told the girls to get out of the

car and go to room 115. The girls entered room 115 and saw that more men were inside,

including MBS members Bolo and Bubbles. Defendant who was 24 years old and known as

“Diamond,” was also in the motel room at some point. Additional men occupied the adjoining

room, number 116.

Later that night, Kia saw Maney taken into the bathroom. Kia became nervous when

Maney stayed in there for a long time. Maney was in the bathroom with Sim and Bolo when

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Bolo confronted her for allegedly “talking shit” about the MBS. She denied doing so, and Sim

attempted to defend her. Sim and Bolo agreed to resolve the dispute by arm wrestling. If Sim

lost, he would allow Bolo to “pimp” the girls. Bolo was the “shot caller” in the gang, and the

other members of the gang were supposed to do as he said. Sim apparently lost the arm wrestling

match because Kia saw men going in and out of the bathroom while Maney was inside. Four

men raped Maney during this time, before midnight. When Maney emerged from the bathroom,

here eyes were red and she looked “freaked out.” Maney told Kia the men were going to rape her

and Kaoying, and she was sorry she had brought them there.

Kaoying was raped next. Bubbles approached her and repeatedly tried to kiss her. When

she continued to resist, Bubbles pushed her against the wall and told her she was not going home. 

Bubbles continued to harass her, and Lor began pressuring her to be with Xee. When Kaoying

refused, Lor told her she could be with Xee or with Bubbles. Kaoying opted to be with Xee, but

resisted physical contact with him. Subsequently, Lor told her “do it with Xee then nothing else

is going to happen....Just do him or do everyone.” Kaoying then understood Lor was directing

her to have sexual intercourse with Xee, and if she did not, she would have to have sex with all

the others. A crowd of men gathered around and told Kaoying it’s “either him or...us.” Kaoying

agreed to have sex with Xee but no one else.

Lu Vang (Louie) came to the motel shortly after midnight with Xee and Bubbles. There

were 15 to 20 people there, including three girls – Maney, Jennifer and one whose name he could

not remember (Kia). Louie saw men going in and out of the restroom. A short while after

arriving, he entered the bathroom and found Kaoying inside. She thought Louie was there to

rape her, told him “no,” and began to cry. Louie asked what was wrong and Kaoying told him

she had been raped. Louie was afraid of the other men and told her he could not take her home. 

He stayed in the bathroom with Kaoying for awhile to keep the others out.

When he left the bathroom, Louie saw Kia having sex with someone in the hallway by the

closet in the room, and assumed they were boyfriend and girlfriend. Other people were standing

around teasing, making jokes and throwing ice on them. Louie left Bubbles at the motel and

went home.

According to Kia, the gang told her if she did not agree to have sex with Lor, she would

have to have sex with all the men. After having sex with Lor, six men, including Nippy, Money,

Bolo, Bubbles, Balloon, and a man she did not know by name, raped Kia. The rapes were

committed in two groups, about five hours apart. Kia could not recall specific details or an order,

but Nippy followed Lor, and the man whose name she did not know was last. The first two or

three raped her at about 12:30 a.m. The others raped her at about 5:30 a.m. Sim and others

threatened that the girls would be taken to Washington, pimped and killed if they did not

cooperate. Bolo told Kia he would eventually take her home, but first he was going to pimp her

to as many men as he wanted. Bolo also committed sodomy on Kia despite her plea to be left

alone. In addition, at one point Bolo made Kia get on top of him, and Money told her to perform

fellatio on him while Bolo raped her. She complied because she was afraid that if she did not,

they would kill her. At some point, Balloon hit Kia with his hand, leaving a bruise on her arm.

Sometime on Monday, a maid came by to clean the room. A man opened the door and

exchanged wet towels for clean towels. The dirty towels were spotted with blood.

Monday evening, after Kia was in the bathroom for the second time, Bolo came to

Kaoying and told her that his “homeboy” Diamond liked her. Bolo told her to have sex with

defendant, who stood a few feet away. She refused and asked Bolo to take her home. Bolo said

he would if she had sex with defendant, but numerous others would rape her if she refused. 

Defendant took Kaoying into the bathroom and raped her. Afterward, Balloon went into the

bathroom and raped her. Kaoying kept fighting Balloon off until he told her to take a shower

with him, promising nothing else would happen. In the shower, Balloon tried to get Kaoying to

bend over, but she refused. Balloon pushed Kaoying down by the shoulders and orally copulated

her. After Balloon left, Kaoying showered, dressed, and left the bathroom.

At around 6:00 p.m. Monday evening, Louie returned to see if Kaoying was still there. 

All three girls were present, as well as the men. Kaoying approached Louie and they went into

the bathroom, where Kaoying again told him she wanted to go home and gave him her phone

number. As they talked, Kia and Maney joined them and asked Louie to call their parents. Louie

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memorized Maney’s telephone number because they decided her parents were the most likely to

be home. Louie then sat on the bed for awhile so as not to arouse suspicion, and subsequently

left. After thinking about it for about 20 minutes, Louie called Maney’s house. He told Maney’s

brother where the girls were located.

After Louie left, Kia pretended to faint, hoping the men would leave them alone because

they were tired and had not slept. When she did so, most of the men left, except for Balloon,

Sim, Money and Xee. Kia was placed on the bed and Kaoying fell asleep next to her. She awoke

and heard Sim talking on the telephone telling the other person to come and get the girls and take

them to Spokane, Washington, in the morning. Maney had previously told her that the men said

they were going to sell the girls to old men for $2,000. Kaoying noticed Maney was gone and the

door to an adjoining room was open. Kaoying closed her eyes, and when she opened them, she

saw a man touching Kia’s thigh. Kaoying told him to stop and then she told Kia to wake up, and

she did so. After they were fully awake, Maney came back crying. Maney told them that there

were five older men in the next room. Sim told Maney that if the girls would have sex with these

men, he would take them home and not let them be taken to Washington.

Kaoying did not believe they would be taken home, but Maney implored her to believe

Sim because it’s “the only chance we’ve got.” Maney and Kia went into the other room, and the

man who had been touching Kia told Kaoying to take off her pants. Kaoying complied because

she believed this was her only hope of avoiding being taken to Spokane. Kaoying told him she

did not want to have sex. However, the man got on top of her by the bathroom area and had sex

with her. Kaoying began to cry and told the man to stop. A short while later the man stopped

and got off of her. Afterward, Kaoying put on her clothes and took another shower. Eventually

the three girls were back in the room standing together. Sim told them there was one more man

left, and that one of them had to “take him.” None of the girls wanted to do it, and as they

debated who should do it, the police knocked on the door.

Officers were called to the Motel 6 to locate possible runaways, particularly Maney. 

When they arrived at about 12:30 a.m. Tuesday, only Sim, Xee, and Money were in room 115

with the three girls. Balloon ran into room 116 because he did not have his pants on, and Money

was asleep in bed. Sim and Xee were standing wearing only their pants with the belts undone. 

There was a mattress on the floor outside the bathroom. Clothes and used condoms were

scattered around, and the room smelled strongly of semen. The officer spoke to one of the men

who said he was just hanging out with friends and denied having had sex. He claimed his cousin

and some friends had been in the room prior to his arrival, and the used condoms were on the

floor when he and his friends arrived. The girls did not tell the police what had occurred because

they were afraid. They also felt ashamed and did not want their parents to know what had

happened.

Balloon’s pants were on the floor near a desk. His wallet was in the pants pocket,

chained to a belt loop. While the police were talking to Sim, Xee, and Money outside, the girls

discussed what they were going to say and concocted a story about being in Visalia. Also during

this time, Maney and Kia discussed taking Balloon’s wallet. Kai wanted to tell what happened

even though Maney and Kaoying did not want to do so. Kia wanted the wallet as evidence, and

Maney took it with her. The wallet contained a photograph of defendant and Balloon.

Maney’s father came to the motel and picked up the three girls. They lied and told him

nothing had happened. The girls made up a story that they had been kidnaped by several men

and taken to a pink motel in Visalia, where they were locked in the bathroom and asked for sex. 

The girls maintained their story that they had not been raped. They claimed they escaped and

called Sim, who picked them up and drove them to the Motel 6. When Maney’s dad questioned

the story, they claimed they hitchhiked to Visalia. When Maney’s father confronted Kia stating

he knew they were lying, Kia admitted they had been raped. In an effort to conform the events to

the initial lie, the girls claimed that all the rapes took place in one night after returning from

Visalia.

Maney’s father called the Clovis police. He also believed they should not disclose the

rapes because of the danger to their families. The girls told Officer Henderson that four Asian

men had kidnaped them and pressured them for sex. They claimed they were driven to a motel in

Visalia and locked in the bathroom, but eventually escaped and called Sim to pick them up. 

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Henderson sensed the girls were holding back information, however , he did not push the

interview because the girls seemed exhausted.

Kaoying’s school identification card was found in room 115 of Motel 6 and turned over

to Clovis police. After policed determined the Visalia motel described by the girls did not exist,

the officers confronted Maney, who then admitted they had been gang raped in room 115. 

Kaoying and Kia also admitted they had been raped.

Once it was determined no kidnap had occurred in Clovis, the investigation was

transferred to Fresno, and arrangements were made for a sexual assault exam. The exams

revealed findings consistent with the history given by the girls. Although sperm was found in all

three victims, none was linked to defendant.

After the incident, Sim called Maney and threatened her with prostitution and death if she

did not return Balloon’s wallet.

The girls finally told their entire story to the grand jury under penalty of perjury. While

staying at a safe house, the girls met with Detective Brenda Trobaugh and told her they wanted to

tell the whole truth. Kaoying gave Trobaugh a statement consistent with her trial testimony. 

Afterward, Kaoying, Kia and their families moved to a safe house and eventually out of town.

Defendant was arrested on April 24, 1998. He initially claimed he did not know why he

was arrested. Moments later, he stated he had read the police reports, which he obtained from

the wife of codefendant Ker Hang. Defendant was in a gang in 1994, and had witnesses who

could verify his alibi at the time of the rapes. He also pointed out that while one of the victims

had described an ORB tattoo on his (Diamond’s) arm, he had no such tattoo, and thus did not

match the description. Defendant also initially claimed he had never gone by the nickname

“Diamond.” When pressed, defendant admitted he used that name during the time he was a gang

member. He stated his alibi was Gerry (Julie) Yang, his girlfriend. However, defendant claimed

he did not know Julie’s phone number or address. Defendant appeared unusually calm during his

police interview.

Detective Mart located 16-year-old Julie Yang on April 28, 1998. Julie stated she knew

“Diamond,” and before Mart mentioned why he was there, she said defendant could not have

been present during the rapes because she was with him that night. She volunteered to give Mart

a page in her daily planner, which contained detailed notes of her activities with defendant during

the first weekend in April, including specific timing of a telephone conversation. When Mart

asked to see the rest of her planner, Julie became belligerent and uncooperative. Mart obtained

the planner from Julie’s mother. The remainder of the planner did not contain similar detail.

Defendant rented a room at the London Motel on February 15, 1998. However, he was

not listed on the registry during April 1998. Also, as of March 28, 1998, the Motel 6 on Parkway

Drive prohibited defendant from renting a room because he had previously done so for minors.

Eleven days after the rapes, Kia went to the doctor complaining of vaginal pain and

itching. The doctor noted minimal physical findings and believed Kia’s problems stemmed from

the emotional issues consistent with the history of recent rape.

Gang expert John Chandler confirmed the gang membership of most of the men involved

in the rapes, including defendant, Sim, Money, Balloon, Xee, Bolo, Bubbles, Nippy, Boomee,

Gangsta, Heavy, Lor, and Cat. In a letter recovered from Bolo’s home, he wrote, “Mongolian

Boys Society pimping is my game, Bolo is my name.” Although defendant denied being a

current gang member, he exchanged letters discussing gang activity with gang members in

prison.

Defendant admitted he had been previously convicted of two robberies.

Defense

The Defense focused on the victims’ initially false reports and implied the victims either

willingly participated in prostitution at the motel or were willingly being “sexed into” the gang.

Defendant’s parents testified as alibi witnesses that defendant was home Monday night,

April 6, 1998.

Tou Her, a man of Hmong descent with a PhD in sociology, testified that in the Hmong

culture it is not uncommon for a 12- to 15-year old girl to marry a man in his 20's. However, Her

also testified that there is a realization in the Hmong community that a girl must be of legal age

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to marry. In the Hmong tradition, a ritualized form of elopement was recognized where a man

could take home the woman he wanted to marry and then send word to her family afterward. 

However, such a taking was not supposed to be against the woman’s will. Prostitution is not

prevalent in the Hmong culture, and would bring shame not only to the girl’s family, but the

entire clan. According to Her, many Hmong youth are assimilated into American culture. Gang

members in particular do not conform to traditional Hmong culture. Membership in Hmong

street gangs is totally an American concept, and not true to the Hmong culture from Laos.

Defendant testified and admitted prior convictions for robbery, receiving stolen property,

and cocaine sales while in possession of a gun. He also admitted having been a member of the

MBS, but claimed he “jumped out” in 1994. Defendant claimed minimal association with gang

members after that, such as a passing hello or giving them a ride. On the weekend of March 27,

1998, the weekend before the events in this case, defendant gave a ride to Scissors and Bolo. 

They ran into some girls at a Laundromat, picked them up, drove around awhile, then went to the

Motel 6 where defendant rented a room for the girls because they had no place to go. Defendant,

Bolo and Scissors left the girls alone in the room and left, and defendant never returned. He

denied knowing the girls were raped in the room that night.

On April 4, 1998, at about 3:30 p.m., defendant tried to rent a room at the Motel 6 to be

by himself and avoid the pressures of his family, girlfriend, and parole officer, but he was denied

a room. He left and picked up his girlfriend, Julie, and went to Thong’s (Bubbles’) house, where

they watched two movies. He gave Jennifer and Crystal a ride to the Motel 6, where he stayed

for a short time and left to drive Julie home at around 8:30 p.m. Defendant testified in detail as

to his actions after he dropped off Julie at her home. He went to sleep, received a brief call from

Julie around 10:50 p.m., got up at 4:00 a.m., had some coffee and went to work. Defendant

arrived home about 2:00 p.m., played with his dog, went to Julie’s house, watched two movies at

Thong’s house, and took Julie home. However, Julie was locked out, so he took her to the

London Motel where they rented a room and spent the night.

The next day (Monday) , defendant dropped Julie off, went home, took his family

members to a wedding, and came home at about 2:00 p.m. He played with his dog and went to

Julie’s house at 4:00 p.m. They drove around, ran into Heavy, and gave him a ride to Motel 6,

where they waited for 15 minutes, and then drove him home. Defendant and Julie went to a

barbecue in the park, then he dropped everyone off and went home at 9:15 p.m. Defendant

talked to his girlfriend on the phone for an hour before going to bed. He was awakened in the

middle of the night by a phone call from the police asking him to pick up Sim, a juvenile, from

the motel.

Defendant learned he was a suspect in the rape case on April 23, 1998, when he saw the

police report at his niece’s house. Defendant was arrested at home the next day. Contrary to

Detective Mart’s testimony, defendant testified he gave Mart Julie’s phone number. Although

defendant admitted knowing gang members, he denied knowledge of most of their monikers and

gang status. Defendant denied raping Kaoying or seeing anyone else rape Kaoying or Kia.

Rebuttal

Fourteen-year-old Linda C. testified she skipped school with her friends Linda H. and

Pang in March of 1998. They ran into defendant at a Laundromat. The three girls agreed to go

driving with defendant in his car, along with Bolo and Scissors. Before getting into the car, the

girls asked to be brought back by 7:00 p.m. After going to the park, defendant drove to Money’s

house where the three men spoke with Money on his front porch. When the three got back into

defendant’s car, defendant began talking about going to a motel. None of the girls asked to be

taken to a motel. After driving to a Motel 6, defendant rented a room and everyone went inside. 

The men left them there alone, and the girls watched television. Sometime later, a group of men

arrived, including defendant, Bolo, Sim, Money, Balloon, Boomee, Nippy, Lor, and at least four

others. Defendant then left. After awhile the girls asked to be taken home, but were not allowed

to leave. Money sat in front of the door, blocking it. Subsequently, five men, including Bolo,

Balloon, Nippy and Sim, raped Linda C. The girls were not permitted to leave until the next day.

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DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375 fn. 7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as

guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the

Fresno County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly the Court has jurisdiction over this action.

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries

v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) th, quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th

Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after its enactment). The

instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its

provisions.

II. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C . § 2254(a).

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the AEDPA. Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003). Under the AEDPA, a petition for habeas corpus will not be

granted unless the adjudication in question “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71; Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

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As a threshold matter, this Court must “first decide what constitutes ‘clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

71, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining “clearly established Federal law,” the Court

looks to the “holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [Supreme Court] decisions as of the time of the

relevant state-court decision.” Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. “In other words, ‘clearly

established Federal law’ under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth

by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

72, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S.

at 72. “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at

413.

This Court may not issue the writ simply because in its independent judgment the state

court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly; for a writ to

issue, ‘that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making

the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly

established federal law was ‘objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to

or involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9 Cir. 1996) th . Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the

states, ninth circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a

state court decision is objectively unreasonable. See Duhaime v. DuCharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-

01 (9 cir. 1999) th.

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AEDPA requires that this court give considerable deference to state court decisions. The

state court’s factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Moreover, we are

bound by a state’s interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9 Cir. th

2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003).

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

A. Ground One – Insufficient Evidence

1. Factual Background

In his first claim, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erroneously denied his claims of

insufficient evidence, both as to the “in concert” element of counts 5, 8, and 12 and of the “force”

element of count 2. Petitioner claims that evidence of his aiding and abetting the gang-type

sexual attack was insufficient to constitute in-concert participation, and that there was no

evidence to support a finding of “force or violence” necessary to support a conviction.. Ex. D at

13, 17.

2. State Court Review

Petitioner’s insufficient evidence claims were first presented on direct appeal to the Fifth

DCA, which denied said claims in a reasoned opinion on August 9, 2001. See Ex. D. The

claims were then presented to the California Supreme Court in a petition for review and

summarily denied on November 14, 2001. See Ex. F. The California Supreme Court, by its

“silent order” denying review of the 5 DCA’s decision, is presumed to have denied the claim th

presented for the same reasons stated in the opinion of the 5 DCA. th Y1st v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 803 (1991).

a. The “in-concert” claim:

The Fifth DCA found that Petitioner’s claim failed in light of longstanding California law

holding that liability for in-concert sexual assault attaches to those who aid and abet the crime. 

See Ex. D, citing People v. Lopez, 116 Cal.App.3d 882, 886-88 (1981) and People v. Champion,

9 Cal.4th 879, 933 (1995) (overruled on other grounds by People v. Ray, 13 Cal.4th 313, 369, fn.

2 (1996). The court found that:

the evidence not only places [Petitioner] at the scene, it establishes he committed

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the ‘concrete act’ of raping Kaoying immediately before his co-conspirator

entered and committed an additional rape and oral copulation. This evidence

amply supports the in-concert findings because defendant clearly aided Balloon’s

sexual assaults.[citation omitted] Defendant and other gang members aided each

other by executing their plan to isolate the girls at the motel and intimidate them

by the overwhelming numbers of men in the room and their refusal to let them

leave. Defendant’s presence added to this intimidation factor. Further, by having

raped Kaoying immediately before Balloon entered the bathroom, he further broke

down Kaoying’s will to resist, thereby aiding Balloon in his efforts to sexually

assault her. Answer, Ex. D, at 15.

b. The “force” claim:

The Fifth DCA similarly found that there was sufficient evidence of “force or violence”

to support defendants rape conviction (count two). The court pointed to the “significant

testimony of both force and violence committed upon each captive victim during the in-concert

sexual offenses” Ex. D at 17. And the court noted that Petitioner failed to cite to any authority

supporting his position that the force and violence committed by his accomplices did not apply to

his own acts. Id. at 18.

“In light of the prior conduct, Kaoying knew that if she did not comply with

defendant’s requests she would be forced to do so by the others. Consequently,

the evidence establishes defendant’s rape was committed by means of force and

violence. The tone had been set. Kaoying was not required to physically resist

defendant and risk physical injury by MBS gang members to sustain the jury

finding that his rape was accomplished by means of force or violence. [citations]” 

Id.

3. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claim

In reviewing sufficiency of evidence claims, California courts expressly follow the

Jackson standard articulated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See People v. Johnson,

26 Cal.3d 557, 575-578 (1980); see also People v. Thomas, 2 Cal.4th 489, 513 (1992). Pursuant

to the Supreme Court’s holding in Jackson, the test in determining whether a factual finding is

fairly supported by the record is as follows:

“[W]hether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 781 (1990).

Sufficiency of evidence claims are judged by the elements defined by state law. Jackson,

443 U.S. at 324, n.16. This Court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual

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findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986). This

presumption of correctness applies to state appellate determinations of fact as well as those of the

state trial courts. Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir. 1990). Although the presumption

of correctness does not apply to state court determinations of legal questions or mixed questions

of law and fact, the facts as found by the state court underlying those determinations are entitled

to the presumption. Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 539, 597 (1981).

This Court cannot find that the Fifth DCA’s conclusion was unreasonable. There was

substantial evidence of both of Petitioner’s “in-concert” participation in the assault and of the use

of “force or violence.” With respect to the “in-concert” claim, the state appellate court record

reflects that Petitioner acted in concert with the other gang members in carrying out the sexual

assaults. Petitioner and other gang members executed a plan to isolate their victims in the motel

room and intimidate them with their overwhelming numbers and their refusal to let the victims

leave. Petitioner’s presence in the motel room clearly added to this intimidation factor.

Moreover, by taking the concrete step of raping Kaoying immediately before Balloon

entered the bathroom, Petitioner further broke down the Kaoying’s will to resist, thereby aiding

Balloon in his efforts to sexually assault her. Kaoying testified that she took off her pants at

Petitioner’s request because she knew that if she refused the other men would have forced her to

do so. The evidence of petitioner’s presence in the motel room during the sodomy committed by

Bolo of Kia further supports a finding that he acted in concert with the other gang members in

the commission of these offenses.

With respect to the “force” claim, as the Fifth DCA notes, Petitioner’s argument “ignores

significant testimony of both force and violence committed upon each captive victim during the

in-concert sexual offenses that occurred over a period of two days.” Ex. D at 17. Throughout the

ordeal, the victims were subject to numerous threats and acts of violence. They were pushed

against walls, forced into the bathroom and physically prevented from leaving, struck with belt

and fist, and ordered to have sexual intercourse with one person or face rape by the group. 

Efforts to leave the motel room were similarly met with force and violence. The attackers posted

guards at the door to prevent escape. When one victim attempted to run out the door, she was

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grabbed by the neck and threatened with a screwdriver. When the victims attempted to escape

through the window, they were pulled back into the room. The victims’ pleas to be taken home

were refused. In light of this prior conduct, Kaoying knew that if she did not comply with

Petitioner’s requests, she would be forced to do so by the others. “The tone had been set. 

Kaoying was not required to physically resist defendant and risk physical injury by MBS gang

members to sustain the jury finding that his rape was accomplished by means of force or

violence.[citations]” Ex. D at 18.

In light of this significant evidence of both “in concert” participation and “force or

violence,” Petitioner’s insufficiency of evidence claim fails.

B. Ground Two – Improper Admission of Evidence

1. Factual Background

At trial, the state sought to present evidence of Petitioner’s involvement in a similar gang

rape at the same Motel 6 the week prior to the events leading to his arrest. Over Petitioner’s

objections, the trial court permitted the introduction of this evidence. Following his conviction,

Petitioner appealed to the Fifth DCA, claiming that the trial court’s admission of this evidence

was a violation of his due process rights. Ex. E at 6. The Fifth DCA rejected this claim. 

2. State Court Review

The state appellate court first noted that – while evidence of prior conduct is not

admissible to prove the conduct of the accused on the specified occasion – prior conduct

evidence is properly admitted to establish some fact other than a person’s character or disposition

such as intent or common scheme and plan. Ex. D at 25, citing Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(a),(b). 

The Fifth DCA then analyzed admission of the evidence under California law and due process. 

The court noted the many similarities between the charged incident and the prior incident, and

the close proximity of the events. Ex. D at 27-28. Petitioner had asserted a defense on the

ground that the girls were voluntarily prostituting themselves at the motel, and had denied

ongoing membership in the MBS gang. The court found that this evidence was highly probative

both as a counter to the voluntary prostitution defense and to establish Petitioner’s ongoing gang

membership. It tended to show an established plan or scheme where MBS gang members

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conspired to commit sexual offenses for the benefit of the gang. Id. The court also found that

any prejudice was minimal, as the evidence was no more inflammatory than the charged

offenses. For these reasons, the Fifth DCA found that the probative nature of the evidence in

question outweighed any potential prejudice.

3. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claim

Generally, the admissibility of evidence is a matter of state law, and is not appropriate for

federal habeas corpus review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (“We have stated

many times that ‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’”), quoting

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-49 (1993)

(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“mere error of state law, one that does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation, may not be corrected on federal habeas”); Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520,

530 (9 Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1091 (1991) th (“incorrect” evidentiary rulings are not the

basis for federal habeas relief)..

Petitioner asserts that the introduction of evidence of other bad acts is impermissible

under McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1380-1385 (9 Cir. 1993) th , and Michelson v. United

States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948). However, these cases are inapposite. Michelson simply

states the general rule, since codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence (Rule 404), that evidence

of prior acts is not permissible if used to demonstrate mere propensity. Similarly, McKinney

holds that “the use of ‘other acts’ evidence as character evidence is not only impermissible under

the theory of evidence codified in the California rules of evidence...and the Federal Rules of

Evidence...but is contrary to firmly established principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence.”

993 F.2d at 1380 (emphasis added). These cases do not address a case such as this, where the

evidence was admitted for some other legitimate purpose (to refute Petitioner’s denial of gang

affiliation and defense of voluntary prostitution, as well as to show common scheme and plan).

Indeed, both the California and Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly permit the

introduction of such evidence. Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(b); Fed. Rules Evidence 404(b). It is a

“widely recognized principle that similar but disconnected acts may be shown to establish intent,

design, and system.” Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941) (citing Wigmore, Evidence, 3d.

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Ed., Vol. II, § 363). Moreover, the alleged error here does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation. As discussed by the Fifth DCA, the evidence in question was highly

probative on issues related to both Petitioner’s gang identity and his defense that the victims had

voluntarily prostituted themselves. Nor was this probative value substantially outweighed by the

danger of prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, as the evidence was no more

inflammatory than the offenses with which Petitioner was charged.

The state appellate court’s rejection of this claim was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of established Federal law. Nor was it an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore Petitioner’s

claim is denied.

C. Ground Three – Improper Exclusion of Witness Testimony

1. Factual Background

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of a defense witness

on the basis that the witness’ assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege left the prosecution with

insufficient ability to cross-examine him. He argues that this exclusion deprived him of his

rights to due process, a fair trial, to present evidence, and compulsory process.

The court adopts the facts as related by the Fifth DCA:

During a foundational hearing under (Cal.) Evidence Code section 402,

Sim testified on direct examination that the police released him from the Motel 6

to defendant’s custody early in the morning on Tuesday, April 7, 1998. Sim had

been at the motel since Monday evening, and testified defendant had not been

present. Sim denied he had “pimped” Maney and denied that defendant was in the

gang with him. Sim also claimed Maney was prostituting herself. On crossexamination, Sim admitted he hung out with defendant once in awhile. However,

when asked whether he had been at the motel the weekend before, Sim asserted

his Fifth Amendment privilege. Sim also refused to answer questions regarding

what he told his ex-girlfriend, Anna Vang, about the weekend of April 6 . The th

prosecutor made an offer of proof that Anna Vang’s diary indicated Sim had told

her “they pimped Maney” on the weekend of April 6 . The prosecutor also th

indicated that the evidence they had of Sim’s association with defendant was the

incident on the weekend of March 26 .

th

The court determined Sim’s assertions of his right against selfincrimination severely restricted the prosecutor’s ability to cross-examine on

important issues in the case....

The court made it clear to defense counsel that it’s ruling was based on the

current status of the case, and stated, “I am prepared to change that if [either] the

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witness [] changes his position on testifying as to those important points, or you

bring me case authority which indicates [a more appropriate] remedy....” Defense

counsel noted he had no other authority, and when he interviewed Sim in the

presence of his attorney, “it appeared he was going to speak freely about the

events on the 4 , 5 , and 6 .” Defense counsel then focused on preventing Anna th th th

Vang’s testimony and excluding her diary entries, which could severely damage

the defense theory that the victims were freely prostituting themselves. 

Afterward, defense counsel did not offer any solutions or request a different

remedy for the problem posed by Sim’s unwillingness to speak freely about the

events on the 4 , 5 , and 6 .

th th th

2. State Court Review

Defendant appealed to the Fifth DCA, claiming that the trial court had improperly held

that Sim retained his privilege against self-incrimination and excluded his testimony. The Fifth

DCA rejected Petitioner’s claims. It first noted that the court had not in fact ruled that Sim

retained his privilege. It had simply ruled that a witness cannot refuse to answer questions on

cross-examination that are within the scope of questions answered on direct examination. 

Petitioner retained the option to ask the court to compel Sim to testify, at the risk his testimony

might be stricken. Defense counsel chose not to exercise that option Ex. D at 35 (“It is evident

defense counsel made the wise tactical choice to forego Sim’s testimony.”). The Fifth DCA then

held that, even assuming the trial court had ruled that Sim had a valid privilege, any error was

waived by virtue of the fact that Petitioner failed to object to the assertion of privilege at trial. Id.

at 37 (“Defendant did not argue or contend Sim could not validly assert the privilege, and does so

for the first time on appeal. Generally a theory of error for exclusion of evidence cannot be made

for the first time on appeal, and the matter is deemed waived.”). Finally, the state appellate court

held that even assuming the trial court had ruled on Sim’s privilege and that Petitioner had not

waived error, Petitioner failed to show error in the court’s so ruling. The court noted that Sim

had charges pending on similar conduct, and it was logical for Sim to conclude that his testimony

could possibly be used against him in his upcoming trial.

3. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claim

Because Petitioner failed to timely object to the exclusion of Sim’s testimony at trial, this

Court will not review Petitioner’s claim. Federal courts “will not review a question of federal

law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is

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independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991); LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9 Cir. 2001) th. If

the court finds an independent and adequate state procedural ground, “federal habeas review is

barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice,

or demonstrate that the failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of

justice.” Noltie v. Peterson, 9 F.3d 802, 804-805 (9 Cir. 1993) th ; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Park

v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9 Cir. 2000) th.

Here, the Court of Appeal, on direct review, held that Petitioner had waived his claim by

failing to object at the sentencing hearing. Ex. D at 37. Thus, the Court of Appeal applied the

contemporaneous objection bar. This Court finds that the contemporaneous objection rule is

applied independent of federal law. See Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 957-58 (9 Cir. th

1999) (recognizing and applying California’s contemporaneous objection rule in affirming denial

of a federal petition on the ground of procedural default); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 842-

43 (9 Cir. 1995) th (sustaining the state court’s finding of procedural default where defendant

failed to make any objection at trial). This Court further finds that the contemporaneous

objection rule is also “adequate.” California Courts have consistently applied the

contemporaneous objection rule. Melendez v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9 Cir. 2002) th (“We

held more than twenty years ago that the rule is consistently applied when a party has failed to

make any objection to the admission of evidence.”) (citing Garrison v. McCarthy, 653 F.2d

374,377 (9 Cir. 1981); Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d at 957-58; Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d at

th

842-43).

Petitioner has made no attempt to demonstrate cause and prejudice or that a miscarriage

of justice will result should the Court not consider the claim. Accordingly, the Court rejects

Petitioner’s claim as procedurally barred.

D. Ground Four – Improper Jury Instructions

1. Factual Background

Petitioner claims the trial court erred by failing to give certain clarifying instructions

regarding the in-concert and force elements of Cal. Penal Code section 264.1. Petitioner argues

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CALJIC 10.01, as given by the trial court, provides:

The defendant [is] accused [in Count[s] [2 & 5] of having committed the crime of rape by

acting in concert in violation of section 264.1 of the Penal Code.

Every person who voluntarily acting in concert with another person by force or violence

and against the will of the victim [personally] [or] [by aiding and abetting the other person]

commits the crime of rape as defined in these instructions, is guilty of the crime of rape by acting

in concert in violation of Penal Code section 264.1.

The phrase “acting in concert” means two or more persons acting together in a group

crime and includes not only those who personally engage in the act constituting the crime but also

those who aid and abet a person in accomplishing it. To establish that a defendant voluntarily

acted in concert with another person, it is not necessary to prove there was any prearrangement,

planning or scheme.

“Against the will of the victim” means without the consent of the alleged victim.

[It is not necessary that a person who aids and abets the perpetrator have physical contact

with the victim.]

In order to prove this crime, each of the following elements must be proved:

1. A person committed the crime of rape

2. That person did so while voluntarily acting in concert with another person; and

3. The defendant [personally] [or] [by aiding and abetting another person] committed the

rape by force or violence and against the will of the alleged victim”

The court instructed on aiding and abetting as follows:

A person aids and abets the [commission] [or] [attempted commission] of a crime when

he or she,

1. With knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and

2. With the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission

of the crime, and

3. By act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.

[A person who aids and abets the [commission] [or] [attempted commission] of a crime

need not be present at the scene of the crime.]

[Mere presence at the scene of a crime which does not itself assist the commission fo the

crime does not amount to aiding and abetting.]

[Mere knowledge that a crime is being committed and the failure to prevent it does not

amount to aiding and abetting.]

cd 17

that (1) the instructions improperly directed the jury to make an in-concert finding if it found

defendant was an aider and abettor; and (2) the court was obligated to define “force” as used in

the instructions.

At the conclusion of trial, the trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 10.01. 

2

Petitioner neither objected to this instruction nor requested any clarifying instructions be given.

2. State Court Review

Petitioner’s improper jury instruction claim was first raised in his appeal to the Fifth

DCA. The state appellate court denied the claim. The court first held that Petitioner had waived

any claim of defect in this jury instruction by failing to object or to request clarifying

instructions. Ex. D at 18, 23. The court further found that CALJIC 10.01 was a correct

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instruction on the law and responsive to the evidence, and that the trial court was not under an

obligation to provide clarification sua sponte on the term “force,” as it did not have a technical

definition in the context of Cal. Penal Code §264.1. Finally, the Fifth DCA held that, even

assuming that (a) the instructions were in error, and (b) the error was not waived, Petitioner was

nonetheless not entitled to relief because any error was harmless. The court noted the

“overwhelming evidence of force and violence used during the gang assaults,” and the “ample

evidence...that defendant was present and participated personally in a sexual assault.” Ex. D at

23. In light of this evidence, the court found that “it is not reasonably probable defendant would

have received a more favorable outcome” if clarifying instructions on “force” and the distinction

between aiding and abetting and in-concert participation were given. Id.

3. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claim

The Court finds Petitioner’s claim to be without merit. First, to the extent it is based on

the interpretation of state law these claims are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (“We have stated many times that ‘federal habeas

corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’”), quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-49 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“mere error

of state law, one that does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, may not be corrected

on federal habeas”). The 5 DCA ruled that the instructions used in this case were entirely th

correct under state law. Federal courts are bound by state court rulings on questions of state law. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 942 (1989) th.

Moreover, review by this Court is inappropriate in light of Petitioner’s failure to timely

object at trial. See discussion, supra, section C(3) at 15-16. Federal courts “will not review a

question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests upon a state law

ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991); LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th

Cir. 2001). If the court finds an independent and adequate state procedural ground, “federal

habeas review is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the procedural default and

actual prejudice, or demonstrate that the failure to consider the claims will result in a

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fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Noltie v. Peterson, 9 F.3d 802, 804-05 (9 Cir. 1993) th ;

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9 Cir. 2000) th.

Here, the Fifth DCA, on direct review, held that Petitioner had waived his jury instruction

claims by failing to object. Ex. D at 18, 23. Thus the state court of appeal applied the

contemporaneous objection bar. This Court finds that the contemporaneous objection rule is

applied independent of federal law. See Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 957-58 (9 Cir. th

1999)(recognizing and applying California’s contemporaneous objection rule in affirming denial

of a federal petition on the ground of procedural default); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 842-

43 (9 Cir. 1995) th (sustaining the state court’s finding of procedural default where defendant

failed to make any objection at trial). Further, as Respondent submits, and this Court finds, the

contemporaneous objection rule is also “adequate.” California Courts have consistently applied

the contemporaneous objection rule. Melendez v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9 Cir. 2002) th

(“We held more than twenty years ago that the rule is consistently applied when a party has failed

to make any objection to the admission of evidence.”)(citing Garrison v. McCarthy, 653 F.2d

374, 377 (9 Cir. 1981 th ); Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d at 957-58; Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d at

842-43.

Petitioner has made no attempt to demonstrate cause and prejudice or that a miscarriage

of justice will result should the Court not consider the claim. Accordingly, the Court rejects

Petitioner’s claim as procedurally barred.

E. Ground Five – Jury Instructions (Directed Verdict)

1. Factual Background

In his fifth ground for relief, Petitioner claims the “in concert participation” instructions

violated his right to due process and trial by jury by directing the jury to make an in concert

finding if it found that Petitioner aided and abetted the sexual offenses committed by others. 

(Pet. Att; Ex. E at 11)

2. State Appellate Review

The Fifth DCA rejected Petitioner’s contention that Jury instruction 10.01 directed an “in

concert” finding if aiding and abetting was established. The court found that Petitioner’s reading

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of the jury instruction was incomplete, and that a full reading did not support his contention of

directed verdict on the issue of “in concert” participation:

Defendant parses the instruction in an attempt to show it is theoretically possible

the instruction could be applied to a person who aided and abetted the crime but

did not act in the group crime. However, read as a whole, the instruction requires

that the person either personally or as an aider and abettor, “voluntarily act[] in

concert with another person by force or violence and against the will of the

victim[.]” (CALJIC No. 10.01). As further defined, “ ‘acting in concert’ means

two or more persons acting together in a group crime....” (CALJIC No. 10.01; see

People v. Calimee (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 337, 341).

Ex. D at 24. Moreover, the court found that any error was harmless – there was no reasonable

possibility that the jury was mislead or misapplied the jury instruction in this case, as defendant

not only aided and abetted others by his presence in the hotel room, but also participated in a

rape. Id.

3. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claim

Due Process denies the state the power to deprive the accused of liberty unless it proves

beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the charged offense. Carella v. California, 491 U.S.

263, 265-66 (1989), citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Jury instructions that

relieve states of this burden violate defendant’s due process rights by subverting the presumption

of innocence and invading the truth-finding province of the jury. Id., citing Francis v. Franklin,

471 U.S. 307 (1985) and Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). An instruction which

creates a mandatory presumption – one which “both alone and in the context of the overall

charge, could have been understood by reasonable jurors to require them to find the presumed

fact if the State proves certain predicate facts” – is constitutionally defect. However, this error is

subject to the harmless error rule. Id. 

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show that

the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). Additionally, the instruction may not be

judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole

and the trial record. Id. The court must evaluate jury instructions in the context of the overall

charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.

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CALJIC 2.50 states “evidence of other crimes has been admitted to show a characteristic method, plan or

scheme; it may not be considered to show bad character or criminal disposition.” CALJIC 2.50.1states “evidence of

another crime may not be considered unless the jury finds defendant committed such a crime by a preponderance of

the evidence.” CALJIC 2.50.2 defines “preponderance of the evidence.”

cd 21

152, 169 (1982), citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). Furthermore, even if it is

determined that the instruction violated the petitioner’s right to due process, a petitioner can only

obtain relief if the unconstitutional instruction had a substantial influence on the conviction and

thereby resulted in actual prejudice under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)

(whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict); see also Hanna v. Riveland, 87 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9 Cir. 1996) th.

In this case there is nothing in the record which supports Petitioner’s claim. Petitioner

fails to point to any authority supporting his position that CALJIC 10.01 directs an “in concert”

verdict solely on the basis of aiding and abetting. Nor has Petitioner demonstrated that the jury

instruction “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Indeed, as noted by the Fifth DCA, there was ample evidence for the jury

to find that Petitioner was an in concert participant in the sexual assault. Petitioner was not an

absentee aider and abettor, but was present in the hotel room and personally participated in

raping one of the victims. For these reasons, Petitioner’s claim is denied.

F. Ground Six – Jury Instructions (Evidence of Prior Crimes)

1. Factual Background

Petitioner challenges the instructions given to the jury regarding the consideration of

evidence of other crimes to prove common plan under Cal. Evid. Code section 1101(b). 

Petitioner claims that the instruction permitted the jury to convict him on the sole basis of prior

crimes proved by preponderance of the evidence, in violation of due process. At the close of

trial, the trial court instructed the jury regarding evidence of prior crimes pursuant to CALJIC

Nos. 2.50, 2.50.1, and 2.50.2. Petitioner timely objected to the instructions.

3

2. State Court Review

The Fifth DCA rejected petitioner’s claim regarding these jury instructions. Citing

People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694 and People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, The

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state appellate court stated that “a preponderance of evidence standard has long been applied

when determining the truth of evidence of other crimes as circumstantial evidence of intent or

motive. Evidence of other crimes is a mere ‘evidentiary fact’ that need not be proven beyond a

reasonable doubt as long as the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the truth of the

‘ultimate fact’ of the defendant’s knowledge or intent....” Ex. D at 29-30. The court went on to

find:

[E]ach case starts with the premise that a criminal has a due process right to have

each fact necessary to the conviction proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The

cases merely recognized that: (1) this burden was not diminished by an instruction

that other crime evidence need only be proven by a preponderance of the

evidence, and (2) when CALJIC Nos. 2.50 and 2.50.1 are viewed in context with

CALJIC Nos. 2.90 and 2.01, it is not reasonably likely that the jury found the

necessary elements of the charged offense true on a standard less than beyond a

reasonable doubt. [citations omitted].

Id. at 30. 

3. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claim

This Court’s review is limited to determining whether the state court unreasonably

applied clearly established Supreme Court law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Delgado v. Lewis, 223

F.3d at 979-80. Constitutional Due Process requires that the State prove all elements of the

offense charged and all facts necessary to establish each of those elements beyond a reasonable

doubt. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-278; U.S. Const., amends. V, VI, XIV. 

Evidence of past crimes is not admissible for the purpose of demonstrating defendant’s bad

character or criminal disposition. See, e.g. Fed. Rules Evidence Rule 404(a). However, evidence

of other acts may be admitted for some other legitimate purpose, such as to demonstrate

knowledge, intent, or common plan or scheme. See, e.g. Id., Rule 404(b). Similar act evidence

is relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant

was the actor. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988).

This evidence of prior acts need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt – proof by a

preponderance of the evidence is sufficient. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 73-74 (“To the

extent that the jury may have believed McGuire committed the prior acts and used that as a factor

in its deliberation, we observe that there was sufficient evidence to sustain such a jury finding by

a preponderance of the evidence.” (emphasis added) (citing Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690); See

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also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987); see also Dowling v. United States, 493

U.S. 342, 348 (1990) (evidence of prior acts for which defendant had been acquitted in previous

criminal trial allowed in subsequent civil trial on preponderance standard). Where evidence of

prior acts is admitted, however, the court should give a limiting instruction informing the jury of

the narrow purpose for which it has been admitted. United States v. Bradshaw, 690 F.2d 704 (9

th

Cir. 1982), cert. denied 463 U.S. 1210. Proper limiting instructions can reduce or eliminate

prejudice which would otherwise occur. United States v. O’Brien, 601 F.2d 1067, 1070 (9 Cir. th

1979). The adequacy of jury instructions is determined by examining them in their entirety. 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991).

This Court cannot find that the state courts’ decisions are contrary to or unreasonable

apply relevant Supreme Court precedent. The cases cited by Petitioner correctly state the general

rule that the State must prove all elements of the offense charged, and must persuade the finder

of fact “beyond a reasonable doubt” of the facts necessary to establish each of those elements. 

See e.g. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993). However, in the cases cited by

Petitioner, the trial courts’ instructions impermissibly shifted the burden of persuasion on an

element of the offense. See, e.g. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985). Here, the instruction

in question did not lessen the State’s burden on any element of the offenses charged. Instead,

they specifically limited the jury’s consideration of the evidence of Petitioner’s prior acts to

“establish[ing] characteristic method, plan or scheme.” CALJIC 2.50. Petitioner fails to cite any

authority in support of his contention that evidence offered for such purposes must be proven by

anything beyond a preponderance standard. Indeed, such an interpretation of due process is

foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s holdings in Estelle, Huddleston and Bourjaily. Consequently,

Petitioner’s claim is denied.

G. Ground Seven – Jury Instruction (Witness Credibility)

1. Factual Background

Citing Amendments Five and Fourteen to the United States Constitution, Petitioner

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CALJIC No. 2.21.2 reads as follows:

“A witness, who is willfully false in one material part of his or her testimony, is to be distrusted in others. 

You may reject the whole testimony of a witness who willfully has testified falsely as to a material point, unless,

from all the evidence, you believe the probability of truth favors his or her testimony in other particulars.”

cd 24

argues that CALJIC No. 2.21.2, authorizing the jury to evaluate witness credibility on a 4

probability standard, violated his due process rights to proof beyond a reasonable doubt of his

guilt. Ex. E at 14-15. 

2. State Appellate Review

Petitioner first raised this claim on direct appeal to the Fifth DCA. On August 11, 2001,

the appellate court rejected Petitioner’s claim, holding that CALJIC No. 2.21.2 has “consistently

been held to be a statement of law and appropriately given when there is an evidentiary basis to

support it.” (Ex. D at 39). The Fifth DCA noted that – in light of instructions given to the jury

on the presumption of innocence, the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, the duty to base its

decision on consideration of all the evidence, and the duty to consider all instructions as a whole

– the instruction on witness credibility did not work to lessen the prosecutor’s burden of proof

beyond the required “reasonable doubt” standard.

3. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claim

This Court’s review is limited to determining whether the state court unreasonably

applied clearly established Supreme Court law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Delgado v. Lewis, 223

F.3d at 979-80. Admission of evidence and instructions of state law are a state law concern, not

cognizable in federal habeas proceedings unless the state trial court’s decision is error rising to

the level of a due process violation. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67. Constitutional Due

Process requires that the State prove all elements of the offense charged and all facts necessary to

establish each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.

275, 277-278; U.S. Const., amends. V, VI, XIV. In evaluating jury instructions, the federal court

looks to the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process to

determine whether the instructions in question so infected the entire trial process such that the

resulting conviction violates due process rendering the trial fundamentally unfair. Id. at 72; see

also United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1468 (9 Cir), cert. denied 479 U.S. 844 (1986) th.

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This Court rejects Petitioner’s claim. Viewed in context, it cannot be said that CALJIC

2.21.2 “by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). Petitioner must

establish that “‘there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged

instruction in a way’ that violates the constitution.” Id. (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S.

370, 380 (1990)). When viewed in the context of the instructions as a whole, the willfully false

witness instruction did not render Petitioner’s conviction constitutionally invalid. The

instruction applied to all witnesses, and did not single out Petitioner.

Moreover, the text of the willfully false witness instruction itself undermines Petitioner’s

argument. It specifically instructs the jury that it may choose to believe some of the testimony of

a witness it finds to be willfully false. Because the jury “remained free to exercise its collective

judgment to reject what it did not find trustworthy or plausible,” the instruction could not be

applied in a way that challenged the constitution. Cupp, 414 U.S. at 149.

For the above reasons, Petitioner’s claim with respect to CALJIC 2.21.2 is denied.

H. Ground 8 – Cumulative Error

1. Factual Background

Petitioner claims that the cumulative impact of errors at trial denied him his constitutional

right to due process and a fair trial. Ex. E at 16.

2. State Court Review

Petitioner first asserted this claim before the Fifth DCA. The state appellate court

rejected Petitioner’s claim, stating:

In a separately headed argument, defendant also argues the cumulative

effect of the alleged trial errors discussed above deprived him of a fair trial. 

(People v. Ryner (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1075, 1087; People v. Williams (1971)

22 Cal.App.3d 34, 40, 58). However, since we have rejected defendant’s various

claims of error, it follows there could be no “cumulative effect of errors” in this

case. (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 269).

3. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claim

The cumulative impact of errors at trial may result in a violation of due process entitling a

petitioner to federal habeas relief. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 487, n.15 (1978) (“the

cumulative effect of the potentially damaging circumstances of this case violated the due process

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guarantee of fundamental fairness....”); ( Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 531, n. 8 (1982)

(“Conceivably, habeas relief could be justified only on the basis of a determination that the

cumulative impact of the four alleged errors so infected the trial as to violate respondent’s due

process rights.”); United States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576, 595 (9 Cir. 1983) th (“a court may find

unfairness – and thus prejudice – from the totality of counsel’s errors and omissions.”). 

However, this is not a case where there have been a series of errors which aggregate to a

violation of Due Process. Here, the Fifth DCA correctly held that each of Petitioner’s claims of

error was invalid. Because this Court concurs with the judgment of the state appellate courts as

to these individual claims of error, it likewise agrees that there can be no cumulative error of

Constitutional magnitude.

I. Ground 9 – Sentencing under Cal. Penal Code section 667.6

1. Factual Background

Petitioner’s Ninth count alleges that the trial court improperly sentenced him under Cal.

Penal Code § 667.6 on a number of counts. He contends that it was improper for the court to

impose sentence pursuant to § 667.6(c) on counts 8 (oral copulation in concert) and 12 (sodomy

in concert) and pursuant to § 667.6(d) on count 5 (rape in concert) and 8 (oral copulation in

concert).

Following his conviction, the trial court sentenced petitioner pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code

§667.6(c) to full consecutive terms for count 8 and count 12. The trial court likewise sentenced

Petitioner to full consecutive terms under Cal. Pen. Code §667.6(d) on counts 5 and 8.

2. State Appellate Review

a. The Fifth DCA

Petitioner appealed his sentencing under Penal Code sections 667.6 (c) and (d) to the

Fifth DCA as follows:

i. Counts 8 and 12 (Cal. Pen. Code §667.6(c))

Petitioner contended with respect to these two counts that 667.6 was inapplicable because

the jury’s determination of his guilt may have been predicated on the theory of threat of future

harm. Petitioner argued that while sections 288(a) (oral copulation in concert) and 286(d)

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FEAR OF THE IMMEDIATE BODILY INJURY OF [THE VICTIM]....”

cd 27

(sodomy in concert) permit conviction “where the act is accomplished against the victim’s will

by threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim,” section 667.6 only covers crimes that

are achieved on the basis of threat of immediate harm. Petitioner asserted that it was sufficiently

uncertain whether the verdicts rested upon immediate or future conditional threats, and that

therefore 667.6 sentencing was improper.

The Fifth DCA rejected Petitioner’s claim, finding that the language of the verdict itself5

did not support Petitioner’s claim of uncertainty as to the immediacy of the threatened harm. Ex.

D at 41. The appellate court also found that the jury’s verdicts on other counts demonstrated that

the jury could not have convicted Petitioner based on a theory of future retaliation. Id.

As discussed earlier, the jury found the in-concert rape counts were committed by

means of force or violence. No instructions permitted these convictions based on

a threat of future retaliation. It is inconceivable the jury could rationally find the

rapes were committed by force or violence but that the other crimes, specifically

the in-concert sodomy and oral copulation, were committed by means of threat of

future retaliation. For example, consider the rape and oral copulation of Kaoying

by Balloon. The rape perpetrated by Balloon followed defendant’s rape of

Kaoying. After the rape, Balloon tricked Kaoying into taking a shower with him. 

During this time, Balloon physically pushed Kaoying down by her shoulders and

forced her to commit an act of oral copulation. It is not reasonably possible the

jury could find Balloon’s rape was by means of force or violence, but the oral

copulation that immediately followed was by a threat of future retaliation. Rather,

the jury must be deemed to have made a finding the oral copulation and sodomy

were committed by means of force or violence within the meaning of section

667.6 when it rendered its verdicts. (People v. Ashmus 54 Cal.3d 932, 1011

(1991)).

Id. at 41-42.

ii. Counts 2 and 5 (Cal. Pen. Code § 667.6(d))

With respect to counts 2 and 5, Petitioner contended that the trial court erred by imposing

mandatory consecutive sentences pursuant to Penal Code section 667.6(d). He argued that,

because the physical acts were committed not by Petitioner but by another person (Balloon), it

would be unfair to impute to Petitioner an opportunity to reflect upon acts committed by this

other person. Petitioner further argued that the record did not support a finding of opportunity to

reflect on the part of Balloon because there was no evidence of a concrete break in activity or

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course of conduct.

The Fifth DCA rejected Petitioner’s claim. It first noted that the argument that it is

“unfair” to apply section 667.6(d) liability for one who’s liability is derivative as an aider and

abettor is a matter for the Legislature. As written, section 667.6(d) specifically includes the

offenses for which Petitioner was convicted, and nothing in its legislative history indicates a

legislative intent to require that defendant personally commit one of the listed sexual offenses to

be subject to full and consecutive sentencing. Ex. D at 42-43, citing People v. Farr, 54

Cal.App.4th 835, 845 (1997).

The Fifth DCA went on to find that there was sufficient evidence of “separate occasions”

to support sentencing under section 667.6(d). First, with respect to count 2 (Balloon’s rape of

Kaoying), the court noted that the rape occurred subsequent to Petitioner raping the victim. The

change in attackers constituted a “separate occasion” under section 667.6(d). Ex. D at 43-44,

citing People v. McPherson, 86 Cal.App.4th 527, 530 (2001). With respect to count 5 (Balloon’s

oral copulation of Kaoying), the Fifth DCA found as follows:

The evidence supports the court’s implied finding that the oral copulation

occurred on a “separate occasion.” After Balloon raped Kaoying on the floor, he

told her to take a shower with him, promising nothing else would happen. In the

shower, Balloon tried to get Kaoying to bend over, but she refused. Balloon then

pushed her down by her shoulders and forced her into an act of oral copulation. 

These facts demonstrate that after raping Kaoying, Balloon “had a reasonable

opportunity to reflect upon his...actions and nevertheless resumed sexually

assaultive behavior.” (§ 667.6(d)). Balloon changed locations from the floor to

the shower by cajoling Kaoying into changing locations. He then attempted to

commit either another rape or an act of sodomy of Kaoying in a bent over,

standing position. When this attempt failed because she would not cooperate,

Balloon resumed his sexual assault by forcing Kaoying down towards his penis

for an act of oral copulation. (People v. Irvin, 43 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1071 (1996)).

Ex. D at 44.

b. The State Supreme Court

Following the rejection of his appeal by the Fifth DCA, Petitioner appealed to the

California Supreme Court. In addition to reiterating the arguments made to the state appellate

court, Petitioner also added the following argument: “the determination that the offenses rested

upon qualifying grounds under section 667.6 must be made beyond a reasonable doubt; the

absence of any determination beyond a reasonable doubt constitutes federal constitutional error.” 

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Ex. E at 18, citing U.S. Const. Amend. 5; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The

state supreme court denied review on November 14, 2001.

3. Analysis

Federal habeas corpus review is limited to determining whether the state court’s decision

“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71; Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

A criminal defendant is entitled to “a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every

element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.

Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995) (citing U.S. Const. Amend. V, VI). Any fact other than prior

conviction that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment,

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227,

243, n. 6 (1999). The Fourteenth Amendment makes the same rule applicable with regard to

state criminal statutes. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000).

a. Counts 8 and 12 (Cal. Pen. Code § 667.6(c))

Petitioner argues that because the convictions could have been predicated on facts (the

threat of future harm) not covered by section 667.6(c), sentencing under 667.6(c) was

inappropriate. This Court rejects Petitioner’s claim. First, the decision of the state court was not

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As the Fifth DCA found, while a conviction for the offenses

in question might be based on the threat of future harm, Petitioner’s conviction was not. The

very language of the jury verdict indicates, Petitioner was convicted on counts 8 and 12 “BY

MEANS OF FORCE, VIOLENCE, DURESS, MENACE, OR FEAR OF THE IMMEDIATE

BODILY INJURY OF [THE VICTIM]....” (emphasis added). Thus the very language of the

verdict places Petitioner’s crimes within section 667.6(c). Moreover, the Fifth DCA’s finding

that the jury could not have convicted Petitioner on a theory of future violation is not

unreasonable in light of the jury’s determination that other offenses – committed during the same

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sequence of events – were committed by the use of force or violence.

Moreover, the Fifth DCA’s opinion is not contrary to clearly settled Supreme Court law. 

Petitioner cites Apprendi v. New Jersey in support of his claim. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court

held invalid a New Jersey penal statute that permitted a judge to base sentence enhancement on

findings made by the judge under a preponderance of the evidence standard. The Supreme Court

held that – with the exception of prior convictions – any facts resulting in an enhancement

beyond the statutory maximum required jury findings beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530

U.S. at 494-95.

The findings of the Fifth DCA are not contrary to this holding. As the DCA notes,

Petitioner was convicted upon jury findings beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed these

acts of sexual assault “by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of the immediate

bodily injury of [the victim]....” And the jury’s verdicts on related charges stemming from the

same sequence of events were based on the use of force or violence. “It is inconceivable the jury

could rationally find the rapes were committed by force or violence but that the other crimes,

specifically the in-concert sodomy and oral copulation, were committed by means of threat of

future retaliation.” Ex. D at 41. Petitioner’s convictions on counts 8 and 12 were based on the

jury’s determination of the use of force, violence, or immediate threat of harm. This places him

squarely within the provisions of Penal Code section 667.6(c), and means that, for Apprendi

purposes, the facts necessary to support the full and consecutive sentencing were determined by a

jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

b. Counts 2 and 5 (Cal. Pen. Code § 667.6(d)

For a defendant to be sentenced to consecutive terms under to 667.6(d), the crimes

involved must “involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions.” Cal.

Pen. Code § 667.6(d). To constitute “separate occasions,” it is sufficient that the perpetrator had

an opportunity to reflect upon but chose to resume his sexually assaultive behavior.

Petitioner argues that he should not have been subject to section 667.6(d) liability because

he had no “opportunity to reflect” on the offenses committed by his co-perpetrator (Balloon), and

that, his co-perpetrator did not have an opportunity to reflect between raping and orally

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copulating his victim. Ex. E at 19. To the extent Petitioner challenges the DCA’s finding that

under California law an in-concert participant in the listed offenses may be liable under section

667.6(d), such review is beyond the purview of this Court. Under the AEDPA, federal courts

sitting in habeas corpus review are bound by a state’s interpretation of its own laws. Souch v.

Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9 Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied,

th

537 U.S. 1149 (2003). Moreover, the Fifth DCA’s finding was not an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). California courts recognize that a violent sexual assault made up of varied

types of sex acts committed over time may constitute more than one sexual encounter. Ex. D at

43, citing People v. Irvin, 43 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1070-1071 (1996). And there was ample

evidence to support a finding that Balloon had time to reflect on his actions between raping and

orally copulating his victim. After having raped her, he told her to take a shower with him,

promising nothing else would happen. In the shower, he attempted to get her to bend over, but

she refused. Only at that point did he push her down by her shoulders and force her into an act of

oral copulation. The change in locations and the attempt to commit another sexual act in the

shower before the forced oral copulation are more than sufficient to support a determination that

the perpetrator had an opportunity to reflect between acts.

With respect to Petitioner’s Apprendi claim, this Court agrees with Respondent that the

Fifth DCA’s decision was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly settled

Supreme Court law “as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at

413. As Respondent points out, the Apprendi holding applies on its face to facts which increase

the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481 (“We should

be clear that nothing in this history suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise

discretion – taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender – in

imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute.”). Because Petitioner was not

sentenced beyond the maximum sentence on each count (plus those enhancements found to be

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Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), United States v. Booker,

543 U.S. 220 (2005), and Cunningham v. California, 127 S.Ct. 856 (2007) call this interpretation into question and

more broadly define what constitutes the “maximum sentence” for Apprendi purposes. To the extent Penal Code

section 667.6(c) and (d) fall under this expanded interpretation, however, our review is nonetheless foreclosed by

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).

cd 32

true by the jury), the sentence does not conflict with Apprendi.6

J. Ground 10 – Sentencing under 667.6 and “Three Strikes”

1. Factual Background

The trial court sentenced Petitioner both to full consecutive sentences under section 667.6

and a doubled sentence under the “three strikes” recidivism statute. In his petition for review of 

the decision of the Fifth DCA, Petitioner argues that “the absence of any clear language

addressing cumulative application renders the provisions unconstitutionally vague” violating due

process and rendering it impossible for counsel to provide effective assistance. Ex. E at 21,

citing U.S. Const., Amends. V, VI, and XIV; United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123.

2. State Appellate Review

Petitioner’s federal claims were first raised in his state supreme court petition for review

of the Fifth DCA’s decision. He did, however, raise his vagueness claim with the DCA as a

matter of state due process. Regardless, the California Supreme Court’s rejection of Petitioner’s

petition for review constitutes exhaustion of state remedies for purposes of federal habeas

review. The Fifth DCA rejected Petitioner’s vagueness claim, finding that the challenged

statutes were not ambiguous and were not mutually exclusive.

[667.6] is designed to punish multiple aggravated sexual offenses more

harshly by mandatory full, consecutive sentences. In conjunction, the Three

Strikes law is designed to punish recidivist offenders more harshly. A similar

argument was rejected in People v. Ervin (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 259, 264

(disapproved on other grounds in People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 947,

fn. 11) [footnote omitted]: “the three strikes law and section 667.61 serve

different objectives – the former punishes recidivism, the latter aggravated sex

offenses – and there is simply no reason for suggesting that a recidivist criminal

ought to be rewarded because his latest offense is sufficiently heinous to bring

him within the provisions of section 667.6

More recently, a similar argument was rejected by our Supreme Court in

People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 157-158: “Defendant also contends that

application of both the Three Strikes law and section 667.71 is contrary to the

Legislature’s intent....Unlike defendant, we find that the statutes disclose a

legislative intent that the Three Strikes law apply in addition to section 667.61....”

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Defendant fails to point to any language in the Three Strikes law or section

667.6 that supports a conclusion different from the conclusions reached in Ervin

and Murphy. Consequently his contention is rejected.

Ex. D at 45-46.

3. Analysis

Petitioner asserts that the provisions of Cal. Penal Code section 667.6 and the Three

Strikes Law are unconstitutionally vague. Ex. E at 21, citing U.S. Const., amends. V, VI, XIV;

United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979). Due process requires that a state give its

citizens fair notice of potentially incriminating conduct. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41,

56 (1998). Adequate notice is no less required in sentencing statutes. “[V]ague sentencing

provisions may pose constitutional questions if they do not state with sufficient clarity the

consequences of violating a given criminal statute. [citations].” Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123

(1979). In United States v. Evans for example, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of an

indictment for concealing and harboring illegal aliens due to the vagueness of the penalty. The

Court found the statute so vague as to the penalty that the Court could not determine the penalty

without going beyond “the necessary and proper judicial function of construing statutes” and

instead “filling gaps so large that doing so becomes essentially legislative....” Evans, 333 U.S.

483, 486-487 (1948). 

This Court does not find that the state courts’ determination as to Petitioner’s vagueness

claim is unreasonable in light of this precedent. Far from ambiguous, the Three Strikes statute

explicitly states that it will apply “in addition to any other enhancement or punishment

provisions which may apply...” (Pen. Code § 667(e) (emphasis added)), and that it will apply

“[n]otwithstanding any other law...in every case in which a defendant has a prior felony

conviction....” (Id. § 667(f)(1) (emphasis added)). This language is sufficiently clear as to the

cumulative impact of the Three Strikes law to survive constitutional scrutiny. Therefore

Petitioner’s claim is denied.

K. Ground 11 – Sentencing: Enhancement for Prior Conviction

1. Factual Background

Petitioner’s sentence was enhanced under California Penal Code section 667(a), which

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In relevant part, the indictment alleged: “PRIOR CONVICTION – SERIOUS PRIOR: It is further alleged

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that prior to the commission of each of the offenses charged herein, the said defendant, VANG CHA YANG, was in

Fresno County Superior Court No. 457761-5 on or about August 13, 1992, convicted of a serious felony, to wit:

Section 211 of the Penal Code, within the meaning of Sections 667.5" The correct provision was 667(a).

cd 34

provides for a five-year enhancement for each prior serious felony conviction. Petitioner alleges

error because the indictment failed to identify the correct Penal Code section with respect to the

enhancement. Petitioner claims that the misidentification in the indictment deprived him of 7

adequate notice in violation of his due process rights.

2. State Appellate Review

Petitioner first raised this claim as a matter of state law error before the Fifth DCA, which

rejected the claim. The state appellate court found that although the indictment did indeed cite

the wrong penal code section, it clearly charged a serious prior felony conviction within the

meaning of Penal Code section 667(a). Ex. D at 51. The court noted that a reference to the

incorrect penal statute can be overcome by factual allegations adequate to inform the defendant

of the crime charged. Id., citing People v. Haskin, 4 Cal.App.4th at 1439. The court further

noted that given sufficient notice, a judgment modification is only warranted where a defendant

has been mislead to his prejudice. Id., citing People v. Neal, 159 Cal.App.3d 69, 73 (1984);

People v. Thomas 43 Cal.3d 818, 830-831 (1987); People v. Wandick, 227 Cal.App.3d 918, 926-

927 (1991).

The court rejected Petitioner’s claim in the first place because he had failed to even allege

prejudice. Moreover, the court found that the facts did not support any finding of prejudice.

Defendant admitted the truth of the prior serious felony conviction. He

was informed and stated he understood the consequence of his admission to be an

additional five-year enhancement of his sentence. In addition, he failed to object

at sentencing to the imposition of the five-year enhancement. Consequently, the

record dispels any notion that defendant was prejudiced by the erroneous Penal

Code designation in the indictment. It is not reasonably probable that the alleged

error played any role in his decision to admit the truth of the enhancement

allegation. (See e.g., People v. McClellan 6 Cal.4th 367, 381 (1993)).

Ex. D at 52.

Following the rejection of his appeal by the Fifth DCA, Petitioner made the same

argument in his Petition for Review to the California Supreme Court, citing not only violations of

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of the indictment or information or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant

to his prejudice.”

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California law but of Constitutional due process. Ex. E at 21-22, citing U.S. Const., amends. V,

VI, and XIV; Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. at 476. 

The California Supreme Court’s denial of review exhausts Petitioner’s state court remedies for

purposes of the present petition.

3. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claim

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant a fundamental right “to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.” Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378,

1380 (9 Cir. 1986) th . The Supreme Court holds that a criminal defendant is entitled to reasonable

notice and an opportunity to be heard on a recidivism charge even though due process does not

require that he be given notice prior to trial on the substantive offense. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S.

448 (1962), citing Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443, Reynolds v. Cochran, 365 U.S. 525

(1961). However, a mere error in citation, absent any prejudice to the defendant, does not require

reversal. See U.S. v. Fekri, 650 F.2d 1044, 1046 (9 Cir. 1981) th, citing Williams v. United States,

168 U.S. 382. If a defendant is not prejudicially misled by the error in citation, the error is not

sufficient grounds for reversal. U.S. v. Clark, 416 F.2d 63, 64, citing Fed. Rules of Crim. Pro.,

Rule 7(c).

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This Court finds that the decision of the Fifth DCA was not unreasonable in light of

relevant precedent. Petitioner fails to articulate any discernable prejudice suffered on account of

the misidentification of penal code provisions. Rather, the record is clear that, despite the

misidentification of statutory provisions Petitioner was aware of the penalty he was facing. See

Ex. D at 52.

Petitioner reliance on Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991) is misplaced. In Lankford,

the Supreme Court held that due process was violated where, at the time of sentencing, defendant

and his counsel did not have adequate notice that the judge might impose a sentence of death. At

the time of sentencing the state informed the court that it would not seek the death penalty, and

there was no discussion of the death penalty as a possible sentence at the sentencing hearing. 

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Only after the hearing had concluded did the trial judge indicate his belief that defendant’s

crimes warranted more severe punishment and mention the possibility of a death sentence. The

facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable. As the Fifth DCA noted, Petitioner was

“informed and stated he understood the consequence of his admission to be an additional fiveyear enhancement of his sentence.” Ex. D at 52.

Neither does Apprendi v. New Jersey dictate a different result. Citing Jones v. United

States, the Court in Apprendi states “any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the

maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven

beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added). By its terms, Apprendi exempts

prior convictions from this Constitutional notice requirement. Moreover, nothing in Apprendi

holds that a defect in the indictment cannot be cured through adequate notice to defendant.

For the above reasons, Petitioner’s claim is hereby rejected.

L Ground 12 – Cruel and Unusual Punishment

1. Factual Background

Petitioner contends that his sentence of 94 years for participating in the gang sexual

assaults of two minors after having been convicted of a serious felony violates state and federal

prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. Ex. E at 22.

2. State Court Review

Petitioner first brought this claim on direct appeal to the Fifth DCA. The Fifth DCA

analyzed Petitioner’s claim under state law, following the test for disproportionality set forth in

In re Lynch, 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 (1972). The court analyzed a number of factors: (1) the degree of

danger the offender or offense pose to society; (2) how the punishment compares with

punishments for more serious crimes in the same jurisdiction; and (3) how the punishment

compares with punishment for the same offense in other jurisdictions. Ex. D at 52, citing Lynch,

8 Cal.3d at 425-427.

Considering Factor 1, the Fifth DCA first noted the significant public safety hazard posed

by Petitioner. “Defendant acted in concert to commit the crimes to entertain and enrich a

criminal street gang, the existence of which presents a serious danger to public safety. The facts

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are particularly offensive due to the number of assailants and victims, the youth of the victims,

and the duration of the ordeal. Despite defendant’s attempt to minimize the seriousness of his

conduct, it is clear his offenses are extremely serious and he poses a serious danger and threat to

vulnerable young girls.” Id. At 53.

The court then addressed the heinousness of Petitioner’s conduct citing significant state

law authority in support of upholding lengthy sentences for violent sex offenders. Id., citing

People v. Wallace, 14 Cal.App.4th 651, 666 (1993) [283 years and 8 months sentence not cruel

and unusual]; People v. Huber, 181 Cal.App.3d 601, 633 (1986) [106 years and 4 months

sentence not cruel or unusual]; People v. Bestelmeyer, 166 Cal.App.3d 520, 531 (1985) [129

years sentence not cruel or unusual for violent sex offender]; People v. Brown, 28 Cal.APp.4th

591, 601 [full consecutive terms for eight rapes resulting in sentence of 107 years was proper].

The court further noted that Petitioner’s sentence had been doubled due to his recidivism,

and noted that habitual offender statutes have long withstood constitutional claims of cruel or

unusual punishment. Id. at 54.

With regard to Factor 2, the Fifth DCA rejected Petitioner’s comparison of his

punishment to that of a murderer as inappropriate, in light of the fact that he was convicted under

California’s Three Strikes law, which punishes not only current offenses, but also recidivism.

Considering Factor 3 – punishment for similar offenses in other jurisdictions – the Fifth

DCA found that Petitioner had failed to meet his burden of showing that his punishment was

more extreme than punishments in other jurisdictions with recidivist statutes. Id. at 55, citing

People v. Ingram, 40 Cal.App.4th at 1416 (date) (“We simply note California’s Three Strikes

scheme is consistent with the nationwide pattern of substantially increasing sentences for

habitual offenders.”).

3. Analysis

A criminal sentence that is not proportionate to the crime for which a defendant is

convicted may indeed violate the Eighth Amendment. However, outside of the capital

punishment context, “the eighth amendment ‘forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly

disproportionate to the crime.’” United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9 Cir. 1992) th,

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28 In Harmelin, defendant received a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for possession

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of more than 650 grams of cocaine (his first felony offense). Stressing the serious nature of the offense, the Supreme

Court held that defendant’s sentence did not meet the threshold factor of “gross proportionality.” 

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(quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., joined by O’Connor

and Souter, JJ., concurring) (constituting the holding of the court)). The threshold for such an

inference of disproportionality is high. 

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Id. Generally, so long as the sentenced imposed by the

state court does not exceed statutory maximums, the sentence will not be considered cruel and

unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. United States v. McDougherty, 902 F.2d

569, 576 (9 Cir. 1990) th.

With respect to recidivism statutes such as California’s Three Strikes law, the Supreme

Court recognizes that “States have a valid interest in deterring and segregating habitual

criminals.” Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 27 (1992). Courts evaluating proportionality of a

sentence must “recognize that legislatures may punish recidivists more severely than first-time

offenders.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 296. Recidivism statutes have consistently been

upheld against constitutional challenges, including challenges on eighth amendment grounds. 

Parke, 506 U.S. at 27, (citing Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560). 

This Court finds that the state courts’ determination of this issue was neither contrary to

nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Petitioner fails

to cite any Supreme Court authority supporting his position that a 94-year sentence under these

circumstances is disproportionately high. Petitioner instead argues that because the sentence

imposed was more severe than that possible for a first-degree murder conviction, it must be held

disproportionate. Granted murder is a more grave crime than rape. See Coker v. Georgia, 433

U.S. 584, 598 (“Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral

depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder.”). 

But Petitioner’s comparison ignores both the fact that he was convicted of multiple counts of

sexual assault involving multiple young victims, and that his sentence was enhanced due to his

recidivism in the form of past convictions for: being under the influence of a controlled

substance (while a minor); robbery (1992); possession for sale of cocaine (1993); and receipt of

stolen property (1994).

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A 94-year sentence does not raise an inference of gross disproportionality to Petitioner’s

current crimes in light of his criminal history. See, e.g. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957

(1991) (plurality opinion) (upholding sentence of life without possibility of parole for first

offense possession of 672 grams of cocaine). The Fifth DCA’s conclusion that Petitioner’s

sentence was not grossly disproportionate to his crime was not an unreasonable application of or

contrary to clearly established federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on his Eighth Amendment claim.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas

corpus be DENIED and the Clerk of the Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the Honorable Lawrence J.

O’Neill, United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636

(b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California.

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after

service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(c). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Y1st, 951

F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991) th.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 19, 2007 /s/ John M. Dixon 

0c08b7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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