Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02175/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02175-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jim MacDonald
Respondent
Miguel Rodriguez
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

JIM MacDONALD, Warden1,

Respondent.

No. 2:15-cv-2175 CKD P

ORDER &

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This action proceeds on the petition filed October 19, 2015, in 

which petitioner challenges his 2006 conviction for sex offenses. (ECF No. 1.) Before the court 

is respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as time-barred. (ECF No. 10.) Petitioner has filed 

an opposition to the motion, and respondent has filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 13 &14.) For the 

reasons set forth below, the undersigned will recommend that respondent’s motion be granted.

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1 An inmate filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus must name the state officer who has 

custody of the petitioner as the respondent. Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 cases. 

Normally, the person having custody of an incarcerated petitioner is the warden of the prison in 

which the petitioner is incarcerated. Brittingham v. United States, 982 F.2d 378, 379 (9th Cir.

1992). Thus the Clerk of Court will be directed to substitute Jim MacDonald, Warden of La 

Palma Correctional Center, as respondent. (See ECF No. 10 at 1, n.1.)

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 23, 2006, in the Shasta County Superior Court, petitioner was convicted of two 

counts of forcible rape, one count of forcible sodomy, and one count of forcible oral copulation. 

(Lod. Docs.21-2.) He was sentenced to a determinate state prison term of 24 years. (Lod. Doc. 

2.)

Petitioner appealed his conviction and, on October 7, 2008, the California Court of 

Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the judgment. (Lod. Doc. 2.) Petitioner sought review 

in the California Supreme Court, which denied review without prejudice on January 14, 2009. 

(Lod. Docs. 3-4.)

Petitioner filed six pro se post-conviction collateral challenges, all petitions for writs of 

habeas corpus, in the state courts.3 The first petition was filed on January 10, 2013, and the last 

was filed on March 26, 2015. (Lod. Docs. 5-15.) The sixth and final petition was denied on June 

10, 2015. (Lod. Doc. 16.)

Petitioner filed the instant action on October 12, 2015. (ECF No. 1.) 

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UNDER THE AEDPA

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the Antiterrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 

320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). The AEDPA imposed a 

one-year statute of limitations on the filing of federal habeas petitions. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244 

provides as follows:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application 

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the 

latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking 

 

2 Respondent’s Lodged Documents. See ECF No. 11. 

3

These petitions are given the benefit of the “mailbox rule,” Habeas Rule 3(d), in which a 

prisoner’s pro se habeas petition is “deemed filed when he hands it over to prison authorities for 

mailing to the relevant court.” Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Huizar v. Carey, 273 

F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 2001). The mailbox rule applies to federal and state petitions alike. 

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such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an 

application created by State action in violation of the Constitution 

or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was 

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been 

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or 

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise 

of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State 

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward 

any period of limitation under this subsection. 

The AEDPA statute of limitations is tolled during the time a properly filed application for 

post-conviction relief is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The statute of limitations 

is not tolled during the interval between the date on which a decision becomes final and the date 

on which the petitioner files his first state collateral challenge. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 

1006 (9th Cir. 1999). Once state collateral proceedings are commenced, a state habeas petition is 

“pending” during a full round of review in the state courts, including the time between a lower 

court decision and the filing of a new petition in a higher court, as long as the intervals between 

petitions are “reasonable.” See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 192 (2006); Carey v. Saffold, 536 

U.S. 214, 222-24 (2002).

ANALYSIS

I. Commencement of the Running of the Limitation Period

Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the limitation period begins to run on “the date on which the 

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review.” See Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001). The statute 

commences to run pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(A) upon either 1) the conclusion of all direct criminal 

appeals in the state court system, followed by either the completion or denial of certiorari 

proceedings before the United States Supreme Court; or 2) if certiorari was not sought, then by 

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the conclusion of all direct criminal appeals in the state court system followed by the expiration 

of the time permitted for filing a petition for writ of certiorari. Wixom, 264 F.3d at 897 (quoting 

Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 348 (8th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1187 (1999)).

Here, petitioner appealed his judgment of conviction. The California Supreme Court 

denied review on January 14, 2009. The time to seek direct review ended on April 14, 2009, 

when the 90-day period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme 

Court expired. Supreme Court Rule 13. The one-year limitations period began to run the 

following day, April 15, 2009. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 

Fed. R. Civ. P 6(a)). Thus the last day to file a petition was on April 14, 2010, plus any time for 

tolling. 

In opposition to the motion, petitioner argues that the limitations period began to run after 

the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), which issued on 

June 17, 2013. On April 2, 2014, petitioner filed a habeas petition in the Shasta County Superior 

Court seeking to reduce his sentence based on Alleyne, which held that any fact that increases the 

mandatory minimum sentence for a crime must be submitted to the jury. (Lod. Doc. 11.) On 

May 7, 2014, the superior court denied the petition. (Lod. Doc. 12.) On July 7, 2014, petitioner 

asserted an Alleyne claim in a petition to the state court of appeal, which denied the petition on 

July 31, 2014. (Lod. Docs. 13-14.) Petitioner then raised the claim in a petition to the state 

supreme court, which denied review on June 10, 2015. (Lod. Docs. 15-16.)

In the instant federal action, petitioner challenges his sentence based on Alleyne. (ECF 

No. 1.) He argues that, because he filed his federal petition within one year of exhausting his

claim in the state courts, his claim is timely. (ECF No. 13.) 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(C), the one-year limitation period for an application for a 

writ of habeas corpus may run from “the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme 

Court and made retroactively applicable on collateral review.” (Emphasis added.) This 

provision does not apply to the rule announced in Alleyne, which is not retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review. Hughes v. United States, 770 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that 

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the Supreme Court has not made Alleyne retroactive to cases on collateral review); see, e.g., 

Lemus v. U.S., 2015 WL 5123616, *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2015) (petitioner whose conviction 

became final in 2010 “cannot avail himself of the rule in Alleyne because the rule cannot be 

applied retroactively.”). 

Petitioner argues that Alleyne is a “watershed rule of criminal procedure” that implicates 

the fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding and thus must be applied retroactively. 

(ECF No. 13 at 10.) However, the Ninth Circuit rejected this view in Hughes. 770 F.3d at 818 

(“[W]e conclude that Alleyne . . . does not fall within the procedural ‘watershed’ exception” so as 

to have retroactive effect).4

Petitioner commenced this federal habeas action on October 12, 2015, more than five 

years past the AEDPA deadline. Absent tolling, the petition is untimely. 

II. Tolling

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application 

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim 

is pending shall not be counted toward” the one-year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

The tolling provision of § 2244(d)(2) can only pause a clock not yet fully run; it cannot 

“revive” the limitations period once it has run (i.e., restart the clock to zero). Thus, a state court 

habeas petition filed beyond the expiration of AEDPA’s statute of limitations does not toll the 

limitations period under § 2244(d)(2). See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 

2003); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, all of petitioner’s state petitions were filed after the one-year limitations period 

ended on April 14, 2010. His first state petition was filed on January 10, 2013, nearly three years 

after the deadline, and was explicitly found untimely by the Shasta County Superior Court. (Lod. 

Doc. 6.) Because these state petitions cannot toll the running of the already-run statute, petitioner 

 

4 Moreover, on state habeas review, the Shasta Superior Court found Alleyne inapplicable to 

plaintiff’s sentence under California law, writing: “The Alleyne case is one interpreting federal 

law related to sentencing and Rodrigues’ reliance upon it is misplaced. California amended its 

own sentencing law to address the Cunningham/Apprendi/Blakeley decisions in order to allow for 

the trial court’s review and decision-making on the low, middle and upper terms. Defendant 

Rodrigues was sentenced following this legislative action.” (Lod. Doc. 12.) 

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is not entitled to statutory tolling. 

Nor is the federal petition entitled to equitable tolling, which requires a petitioner to 

demonstrate that (1) he had been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) some extraordinary 

circumstance prevented him from filing on time. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 

(2010). Petitioner must show that the “extraordinary circumstance” was the cause of the 

untimeliness. See Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). Equitable tolling is 

“unavailable in most cases.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002), citing 

Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, petitioner has shown neither 

diligence nor “extraordinary circumstance” such as to warrant equitable tolling. 

Thus the undersigned will recommend that the petition be dismissed as time-barred. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. The Clerk of Court shall substitute Jim MacDonald, Warden, as respondent in the 

docket of this action; and

2. The Clerk of Court shall assign a district judge to this action.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10) be 

granted and this case closed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: May 6, 2016

2/ rodr2175.mtd_fr

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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