Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-23-02996/USCOURTS-ca3-23-02996-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dwayne W. Sherman
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 23-2996

____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DWAYNE W. SHERMAN,

 Appellant

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Criminal No. 1:20-cr-00157-001)

District Judge: Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson

____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

on October 31, 2024

Before: HARDIMAN, PHIPPS, and FREEMAN, Circuit 

Judges

(Opinion filed: January 16, 2025)

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2

Michael A. Consiglio

Carlo D. Marchioli

Office of United States Attorney

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Sylvia H. Rambo United States Courthouse

1501 N 6th Street, 2nd Floor

P.O. Box 202

Harrisburg, PA 17102

Counsel for Appellee

Thomas A. Thornton

Frederick W. Ulrich

Office of Federal Public Defender

100 Chestnut Street

Suite 306

Harrisburg, PA 17101

Counsel for Appellant

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________

FREEMAN, Circuit Judge.

A jury tried and convicted Dwayne Sherman of money 

laundering, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and 

conspiracy to distribute cocaine. He was sentenced to 262 

months’ imprisonment. In this appeal, he argues that the 

evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, the 

government’s proof of the drug conspiracy at trial 

impermissibly varied from the charge in the indictment, and 

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3

the District Court erred at sentencing in finding that his drug 

offense involved possession of a dangerous weapon. For the 

following reasons, we will affirm the judgment. 

I

A grand jury returned an indictment charging Sherman 

with several offenses related to drug trafficking in Central 

Pennsylvania. The operative indictment charged him with six 

counts of money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

1956(a)(2)(B); one count of conspiracy to possess with the 

intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and one count of conspiracy to launder 

money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). The drugconspiracy charge arose from events alleged to have occurred 

in Pennsylvania, California, and elsewhere from on or about

2012 to May 2018. 

At trial, the government presented evidence of 

Sherman’s drug trafficking activities. Paul Alston, a drug 

dealer in Lancaster, testified that he met Sherman in early 2013

and started buying his weekly supply of cocaine from him. 

Sherman told Alston that he got his cocaine from California, 

and he sold one or two kilograms of cocaine to Alston each 

week starting in summer 2013. Sherman stopped selling to 

Alston in March 2014 when Sherman found a tracking device 

on his vehicle and feared that he was under investigation by 

law enforcement. 

The government also presented evidence that Sherman 

dropped off large quantities of drug proceeds to individuals in 

Harrisburg on three occasions between October 2015 and 

January 2016. (The six money-laundering counts of the 

indictment corresponded to these three drops—two counts per 

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4

drop.) On each occasion, Sherman handed over cash

($277,000, $170,000, and $108,000, respectively) that was 

destined for Mexico. Sherman and the informants used coded 

language when discussing the money drops, and Sherman 

drove evasively and used other countersurveillance techniques

when leaving the drops. 

FBI informant Ruben Martin testified that he received 

the cash from Sherman during the first and third money drops.1

 

Before each of those drops, Martin called Sherman and used 

the code phrase “on behalf of your brother” to arrange the 

meeting. App. 279, 452.

During the first drop, Sherman put two bags into the 

backseat of Martin’s vehicle. Martin asked how many “titles” 

were in the bags, and Sherman replied that there were 277, 

which meant the bags contained $277,000. App. 314–15. 

Martin used the term “titles” because his cover for drug 

trafficking was a company that transported cars on car carriers. 

After Martin received the cash from Sherman, he turned it over 

to FBI agents, who counted and logged it before returning it to 

Martin. Back in his role as a co-conspirator, Martin arranged 

with contacts in Mexico to deliver the cash (minus a 

commission) to a courier in San Diego. The FBI surveilled that 

exchange and others as the money continued to change hands. 

Ultimately, the FBI recovered much of the money from a 

vehicle it stopped just before it crossed the border into Mexico. 

Agents recovered nearly $208,000 in sealed bags floating in 

the vehicle’s gas tank. 

1 “Ruben Martin” is the pseudonym the witness was permitted 

to use at trial due to safety concerns.

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The second and third money drops began in the same 

way: An FBI informant called Sherman to arrange a meeting,

and FBI agents observed as the informant received bags of cash 

from Sherman in Harrisburg. The FBI then shepherded the 

cash and the informant to San Diego, where the informant 

passed the cash to someone else who drove the cash toward the 

Mexican border. Although the FBI surveilled the vehicles until 

just before they crossed the border, agents did not intercept the 

vehicles containing the cash from the second and third drops. 

At trial, Martin testified that the drug proceeds from the 

money drops belonged to a Mexican drug trafficker named 

Carlos Beltran. In January 2016, after Sherman’s second 

money drop, Martin traveled to Tijuana to meet with Beltran. 

They met at a casa de cambio (a currency exchange business) 

owned by a man who works as a broker for Beltran and other 

members of Mexican drug cartels. Beltran asked Martin to 

expand his role by carrying money and drugs to additional 

regions of the United States. Beltran said he had millions of 

dollars in New York and hundreds of thousands of dollars in 

the Harrisburg area. Because the money from Sherman’s first 

drop got seized, Beltran said he wanted Martin to transport 

money in smaller quantities in the future to minimize the risk. 

The two men met again at the same Tijuana casa de 

cambio in early April 2016. During that meeting, Beltran 

asked Martin to use his trucks to deliver 50 to 60 pounds of 

methamphetamine or heroin to Sherman in Harrisburg. Beltran 

explained that he could fly drugs from Mexico to Los Angeles

and then to New York. During this conversation, Beltran 

referred to Sherman as his partner. He specified that Sherman 

would pay Martin for the drugs at the time of delivery and that 

Martin would keep a percentage of the money. This plan never 

materialized. 

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The jury also heard that Sherman was arrested for drug 

offenses in California later in April 2016. Police in Los 

Angeles County surveilled him as he purchased two kilograms 

of cocaine and about 15,000 pills from a DEA informant. They 

arrested him, and he admitted having the cocaine and pills in 

his car. (He thought the pills were oxycontin, but most of them 

turned out not to contain any controlled substance.) At trial in 

the instant case, the government did not connect the drugs 

Sherman bought in Los Angeles County to Beltran, but it 

presented evidence that Sherman crossed the United StatesMexico border four weeks before his Los Angeles County 

arrest. That was one of Sherman’s fourteen United StatesMexico border-crossings between 2012 and 2018. 

Finally, an IRS criminal investigator testified that he 

examined bank records for accounts held by Sherman and his 

wife. Sherman’s account activity from 2014 through mid-2016 

showed no indication of legitimate employment, such as 

payroll or paycheck deposits. However, it showed frequent 

cash deposits in amounts up to $6,500, totaling about $49,000 

over that 28-month period. Sherman’s wife’s small business

account activity reflected very few business expenses but 

numerous cash deposits of between $100 and $8,000. The cash 

deposits to that account totaled roughly $160,000 over a threeyear period from 2014 to 2017. 

The IRS investigator testified that banks are required to 

report any cash withdrawal or deposit of more than $10,000 to 

a Federal Crime Enforcement Network. Additionally, federal 

law requires any individual who transfers, sends, or carries 

more than $10,000 into or out of the United States to report that 

activity to federal agencies, which use the reports for law 

enforcement purposes. In the investigator’s experience, drug 

traffickers know about those reporting requirements. When 

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United States currency is exchanged or handed over to another 

person at a casa de cambio in Mexico, those transactions are 

not reported to United States law enforcement agencies. Thus, 

those transactions are not subject to investigation. 

After the government rested its case, Sherman testified 

in his own defense. He admitted that he sold cocaine in 

Lancaster between 2012 and 2014, and “maybe sometimes in 

[20]15.” App. 439. He also admitted making the three money 

drops in 2015 and 2016, though he claimed he did not know 

the money was drug-related and made the drops at the request 

of his brother, who lived in Mexico. He also claimed not to 

know what his brother did for work. Sherman said he obtained 

the money from his brother’s associate in Virginia, and he did 

not ask where the money came from because “if you start 

asking questions, then people start thinking you’re telling and 

you’re trying to set somebody up.” App. 434. Nonetheless, he 

acknowledged knowing it was “[m]ost likely” that the money 

came from criminal activity, and when asked why he did not 

openly state the amount of cash when he had phone calls about 

the money drops, he explained that “the phones could be 

tapped, traced, whatever, so you just don’t talk like that on the 

phones.” App. 450.

Sherman admitted that on the date of his April 2016 

arrest in California, he had purchased two kilograms of cocaine 

to resell to others. He also admitted that he drove to Mexico 

and California in his pickup truck, which was equipped with a 

hidden trap. He had the trap installed by someone in Mexico 

and used it to hide valuable items. Between January and May 

2018, he crossed the United States-Mexico border an estimated

twelve times. 

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Sherman testified that his wife kept a few handguns in 

their house during the periods when he stored the cash for the 

money drops in his home. The guns were locked in a safe but 

accessible to him as a means of protecting his home. He 

acknowledged that his wife and children could be in danger if 

people knew he was storing hundreds of thousands of dollars 

in the family’s home, and he testified that he would do anything 

in his power to protect his family from danger.

The jury found Sherman guilty on all counts. He filed 

a motion for a new trial, challenging the weight and the 

sufficiency of the evidence. The District Court denied the 

motion but vacated Sherman’s convictions for three of the 

substantive money-laundering counts. It concluded that the 

pairs of money-laundering counts charged for each money 

drop were separate means of committing a single offense. 

At sentencing, the District Court found that Sherman 

possessed a firearm in connection with a drug offense. It relied 

on Sherman’s trial testimony that handguns were present and 

accessible to him in his house when he was also storing large 

quantities of drug proceeds there. Accordingly, over 

Sherman’s objection, the Court applied the Sentencing 

Guidelines’ dangerous-weapon enhancement. U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(b)(1). It then calculated a Guidelines range of 262 to 

327 months’ imprisonment, and imposed a sentence of 262 

months’ imprisonment. Sherman timely appealed. 

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II2

Sherman challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting each count of his conviction. Although we exercise 

plenary review of the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, “that 

plenary review is greatly tempered by giving substantial 

deference to the jury’s finding of guilt.” United States v. 

Lacerda, 958 F.3d 196, 225 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979)). Accordingly, “[w]e 

review the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution 

to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found 

proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. 

Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en 

banc) (cleaned up).

A

To convict Sherman of money laundering under 18 

U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), the government had to prove that he 

“(1) attempted to transport funds from the United States to 

Mexico, (2) knew that these funds represented the proceeds of 

some form of unlawful activity, e.g., drug trafficking, and (3) 

knew that such transportation was designed to conceal or 

disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or 

the control of the funds.” Regalado Cuellar v. United States, 

553 U.S. 550, 561 (2008) (cleaned up); 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1956(a)(2)(B)(i). The third element “requires proof that the 

purpose—not merely effect—of the transportation was to 

2 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 18 

U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 

and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

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10

conceal or disguise a listed attribute” of the money. Regalado 

Cuellar, 553 U.S. at 567. 

In Regalado Cuellar, the government obtained a 

conviction under § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) by presenting evidence 

that the defendant hid drug-trafficking proceeds while 

transporting them from the United States to Mexico. Id. at 

553–54 (recounting that law enforcement found $81,000 in 

cash in a secret compartment covered with animal hair under 

the rear floorboard of the defendant’s vehicle, bundled in 

plastic bags and duct tape). At trial, the government also 

introduced testimony that transporting money secretly is 

consistent with drug smuggling. Id. at 567. But it “failed to 

introduce any evidence that that the reason drug smugglers 

move money to Mexico is to conceal or disguise a listed 

attribute of the funds.” Id. (emphasis added). Absent evidence

of purpose, the Supreme Court concluded that no reasonable 

jury could have found concealment or disguise was the purpose 

of the transportation. Id. at 568.

Sherman argues that his case is on all fours with 

Regalado Cuellar and his convictions for money laundering 

and the related conspiracy must be vacated. Not so. Sherman’s 

trial record contains what was lacking at Regalado Cuellar’s 

trial: evidence of purpose to conceal the nature or source of the 

funds. In the light most favorable to the prosecution, the 

evidence shows that Sherman was a long-time drug trafficker

in Central Pennsylvania. He sent over $500,000 of drugtrafficking proceeds to Mexico for his partner Beltran.

3

 He did 

3 Despite Sherman’s argument to the contrary, a reasonable 

jury could infer from the trial evidence that he knew the funds 

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so by making three money drops to people he did not know but 

who identified themselves using code phrases. He also used 

coded terms when discussing the money to thwart the law 

enforcement agencies that had reason to tap his phone. And he 

sought to evade law-enforcement surveillance when travelling 

to make the money drops. Sherman, like other drug traffickers, 

knew how to handle money without making a financial paper 

trail that would tip off law enforcement to his illegal activity. 

He was careful to make no bank transactions of more than 

$10,000 cash, and he sent large quantities of cash across the 

Mexican border secreted in traps or gas tanks. The cash was 

delivered to Beltran and converted to Mexican currency at a 

Mexican casa de cambio to further disguise the origin and 

nature of the funds. Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury 

could conclude that the purpose of transporting the money 

from the United States to Mexico was to conceal its nature or 

source.

Sherman also argues that the government did not prove 

he knew the illicit purpose of transporting the money from the 

United States to Mexico. He points to his trial testimony, 

where he admitted suspecting the money came from criminal 

activity but denied having actual knowledge of the money’s 

criminal origins. But the District Court properly instructed the 

jury that it could rely on circumstantial evidence to find that 

Sherman had actual knowledge of the illicit purpose, orit could 

find knowledge from Sherman’s willful blindness. See

Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 425, 431, 433–34

from the money drops were bound for Mexico. Sherman 

admitted making the money drops as a favor for his brother in 

Mexico, and Martin testified that the cash belonged to 

Sherman’s partner drug-trafficker who resides in Mexico.

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(permitting knowledge to be proven in a drug-conspiracy case 

based on actual knowledge or willful blindness). Willful 

blindness “is deemed to satisfy a scienter requirement of 

knowledge” where “the defendant himself [was] subjectively 

aware of the high probability of the fact in question[.]” Id. at 

420 n.2 (quoting United States v. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 255 

(3d Cir. 2000)). Here, Sherman testified that he did not ask his 

brother where the money-drop cash came from because that 

would sound like a set-up, and he admitted thinking that the 

cash was “[m]ost likely” from criminal activity, App. 450.

Based on that evidence, a reasonable jury could find that 

Sherman was willfully blind to the illicit purpose of 

transporting the cash.

B

The drug-conspiracy count of the indictment charged 

Sherman with conspiring with unnamed individuals to 

distribute and possess with intent to distribute at least 500 

grams of cocaine from 2012 to May 2018 in the Eastern 

District of Pennsylvania, the Middle District of Pennsylvania, 

the Southern District of California, and elsewhere. The trial 

evidence easily supported the conviction. Sherman admitted 

selling cocaine in Lancaster (in the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania) from 2012 to 2014 and possibly 2015. Alston 

testified that he bought up to two kilograms of cocaine from 

Sherman each week during that period and that Sherman got 

the cocaine from California. There was also considerable 

evidence that Sherman conspired with Beltran, his brother, or 

both to deliver drug proceeds from Harrisburg to Mexico in 

2015 and 2016. During those deliveries, Sherman passed the 

drug proceeds to individuals in Harrisburg (in the Middle 

District of Pennsylvania), those individuals passed the money 

to others in Los Angeles (in the Southern District of 

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California), and then the money made its way to Mexico. 

Additionally, Sherman admittedly bought cocaine in Los 

Angeles County (in the Southern District of California) in 

April 2016 with the intent of reselling it, and he frequently

drove his trap-equipped truck between Pennsylvania, Mexico, 

and California during the relevant years. This is ample 

evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer that 

Sherman and others “could not have carried out their activities 

except as the result of a preconceived scheme or common 

understanding.” United States v. Bailey, 840 F.3d 99, 108 (3d 

Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).

III

Next, Sherman argues that the government’s evidence 

of the drug conspiracy impermissibly varied from the charge 

in the indictment. Instead of proving one conspiracy, Sherman 

argues that the government presented only evidence of three 

unrelated conspiracies: one with Alston from 2013 to 2014, a 

second with Beltran from October 2015 to January 2016, and 

a third with individuals in California in April 2016. 

“A defendant alleging a variance between a single 

conspiracy charged in an indictment and the proof presented at 

trial must demonstrate, first, that there was such a variance and, 

second, that the variance prejudiced one of his substantial 

rights.” United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 345 (3d Cir. 

2002) (quoting United States v. Quintero, 38 F.3d 1317, 1337 

(3d Cir. 1994)). We need not address whether there was a 

variance because, even if the conduct alleged varied from the 

conduct proven, it did not prejudice Sherman’s substantial 

rights.

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The rule against variances has at least three purposes. 

United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 291 (3d Cir. 2007). First, 

it protects a defendant’s right “not to be tried en masse for the 

conglomeration of distinct and separate offenses committed by 

others.” Id. (quoting United States v. Schurr, 775 F.2d 549, 

553 (3d Cir. 1985)). In that way, it seeks to prevent a jury from 

“transfer[ring] guilt from one alleged co-schemer to another”

or permitting evidence of other defendants’ actions in a 

separate conspiracy to spill over into its consideration of the 

evidence against the defendant. Id. (cleaned up). Second, “the 

rule ensures that a defendant has adequate notice of the charges 

being brought against him.” Id. (citing Perez, 280 F.3d at 345).

Third, it “helps to minimize the danger that the defendant may 

be prosecuted a second time for the same offense,” based on “a 

principle akin to double jeopardy.” Id. (quoting Schurr, 775 

F.2d at 554).

Sherman does not argue that he suffered prejudice

related to any of these three purposes. Instead, he argues that 

the variance prejudiced his substantial rights by (1) permitting 

the government to introduce prejudicial evidence of extravenue conduct that would otherwise have been inadmissible 

under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), and (2) putting him at risk of being 

convicted by jurors who did not agree on the same conspiracy. 

Neither argument is availing. 

A

Sherman’s first prejudice argument relates to his pretrial motion to dismiss the drug-conspiracy count for lack of 

venue. In that motion, he argued that the drug-conspiracy 

count involved conduct with no connection to the Middle 

District of Pennsylvania. But the government can generally 

prosecute a conspiracy offense “in any district in which such 

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15

offense was begun, continued, or completed,” 18 U.S.C. § 

3237(a), or “wherever a co-conspirator has committed an act 

in furtherance of the conspiracy,” United States v. Renteria, 

903 F.3d 326, 329 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Perez, 280 F.3d at

329). Because the indictment alleged that at least part of the 

conspiracy took place in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, 

the District Court denied the motion. 

On appeal, Sherman does not challenge the District 

Court’s venue ruling directly. Instead, he argues that the 

variance between the indictment and the trial evidence led to 

the admission of prejudicial, extra-venue propensity 

evidence—specifically, his 2016 drug arrest in Los Angeles 

County (in the Southern District of California) and his dealings 

with Alston in Lancaster (in the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania). In his view, his dealings with Beltran 

constituted the only drug trafficking conspiracy properly 

before the Middle District of Pennsylvania jury. And he argues 

that evidence of extra-venue conduct was the only evidence 

supporting that the conspiracy with Beltran involved cocaine

as opposed to some other controlled substance. 

We disagree. First, the evidence he challenges was not 

evidence of other crimes. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (governing 

the use of “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act”). It 

was evidence of the crime charged in the indictment: a cocainetrafficking conspiracy that spanned six years and at least three 

judicial districts. If believed, it directly proved that Sherman

acted with others to distribute or possess with intent to 

distribute cocaine. Cf. United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 

248 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that evidence of an uncharged 

crime is intrinsic evidence of the charged offense—and need 

not be analyzed under Rule 404(b)—“if it directly proves the 

charged offense” (cleaned up)). Second, while Sherman is 

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correct that no evidence specified that the money drops he 

made between October 2015 and January 2016 involved 

cocaine proceeds, the jury was free to infer the identity of the 

drug from other evidence—including his cocaine sales to 

Alston in 2012 and 2013 and his purchase of two kilograms of 

cocaine in California in April 2016. Sherman points to no 

authority (and we know of none) that the government only can 

charge conspiracies that involve conduct in a single district. 

Here, the government charged a cross-district conspiracy and 

the District Court admitted evidence proving that conspiracy. 

The admission of that evidence did not prejudice Sherman’s 

substantial rights.

B

Sherman also contends that evidence of three 

conspiracies prejudiced his right to a unanimous verdict. He 

argues that the government put him “at risk of being convicted 

where jurors based their finding of guilt on different potential 

conspiracies.” Appellant’s Br. at 57.4

We discern no prejudice to Sherman’s right to a 

unanimous jury. The District Court instructed the jury of its 

duty to reach a unanimous verdict. It also correctly instructed 

4 Sherman argues that the prejudice to his right to a unanimous 

verdict was exacerbated by two aspects of trial: the 

government’s closing argument about unanimity and the 

District Court’s failure to give a specific unanimity instruction 

sua sponte. He did not object to the closing argument or the 

lack of a specific unanimity instruction during trial, and on 

appeal he makes no independent claims of error based on these 

aspects of trial.

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the jury that it could not convict Sherman of the drugtrafficking conspiracy unless it found that he knowingly joined 

an agreement with at least one other person who shared the 

intent to distribute or possess with intent to distribute cocaine. 

See United States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 2010).

5

 

After deliberating, the jury convicted Sherman of conspiracy 

to distribute or possess with intent to distribute cocaine from 

on or about 2012 to May 2018. It also unanimously agreed that 

the object of the conspiracy was to distribute or possess with 

intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. Given the 

instructions, the verdict, and the evidence admitted at trial

(which included Sherman’s admitted cocaine sales, his 

admitted money drops amounting to over $400,000 in cash, 

and his arrest in possession of over two kilograms of cocaine), 

we are unpersuaded that the jury was not unanimous as to 

Sherman’s guilt of the charged conspiracy. 

IV

Lastly, Sherman challenges the District Court’s finding 

that he possessed a dangerous weapon in connection with a 

drug offense. Based on that finding, the Court imposed the 

dangerous-weapon sentencing enhancement. U.S.S.G. 

5 To the extent that Sherman contends that the jury needed to 

be unanimous about the identity of his co-conspirators, he is 

incorrect. See United States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810, 823 (3d 

Cir. 1996) (“[T]he law of conspiracy . . . generally has not 

required the jury to unanimously agree on the identity of the 

defendant’s co-conspirators.”); Boria, 592 F.3d at 481 (stating 

the elements of conspiracy, which do not include the identity 

of the other conspirator(s)).

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§ 2D1.1(b)(1) (providing for a two-level increase to a 

defendant’s base offense level “[i]f a dangerous weapon 

(including a firearm) was possessed” in connection with 

certain offenses involving drugs). We review the factual 

finding for clear error. United States v. Denmark, 13 F.4th 315, 

317–18 (3d Cir. 2021). 

Relying on Sherman’s testimony that he had access to 

handguns in his house when he stored drug proceeds there, the 

Court found a sufficient connection between Sherman’s 

constructive possession of the guns and the drug trafficking 

conspiracy. The record supports this finding, so there is no 

clear error. See Henderson v. United States, 575 U.S. 622, 626 

(2015) (“Constructive possession is established when a person, 

though lacking . . . physical custody, still has the power and 

intent to exercise control over the object.”). 

* * *

For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 

District Court’s judgment. 

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