Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00105/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00105-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
CPI, Corporation
Defendant
Sarah Dryer
Defendant
Jackie Miller
Defendant
Danielle Smith
Plaintiff
Melissa Sullivan
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

DANIELLE SMITH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:05cv105-T

) (WO)

CPI, CORPORATION, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Plaintiff Danielle Smith brings this action under

Alabama state law against defendants CPI, Corp., Jackie

Miller, Melissa Sullivan, and Sarah Dryer for breach of

contract, violation of 1975 Ala. Code § 25-5-11.1 (unlawful

termination for an action to recover benefits), and slander.

The jurisdiction of the court is invoked pursuant to 28

U.S.C.A. § 1332 (diversity of citizenship). According to

Smith, the defendants illegally terminated her employment at

the Sears Portrait Studio in Montgomery, Alabama as a result

of medical problems arising from an injury that she

sustained on the job and then slandered her in front of

customers. The matter is before the court on the

Case 2:05-cv-00105-MHT-DRB Document 19 Filed 04/19/05 Page 1 of 11
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defendants’ motion to dismiss the individual defendants and

for the plaintiff to plead with greater specificity her

charge of slander. For the reasons that follow, the motion

will be denied. 

I. MOTION-TO-DISMISS STANDARD

In considering a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the

court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true, Hishon v.

King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232

(1984), and construes the Complaint in the plaintiff’s

favor. Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993).

“The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer

evidence to support the claims.” Sheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686 (1974). The complaint may be

dismissed “only if it is clear that no relief could be

granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations.” Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73,

104 S.Ct. at 2232. Finally, a motion to dismiss may be

Case 2:05-cv-00105-MHT-DRB Document 19 Filed 04/19/05 Page 2 of 11
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granted as to only part of a Complaint and denied as to the

remainder. See, e.g., Chepstow Ltd. v. Hunt, 381 F.3d 1077

(11th Cir. 2004) (reversing district court’s dismissal of

some of plaintiff’s claims, while affirming dismissal of

other claims); Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d

111, 115 (2d Cir. 1982) (“a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

need not be granted nor denied in toto but may be granted as

to part of a complaint and denied as to the remainder”); see

also 12 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure:

Civil 3d § 1358. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. INSUFFICIENT SERVICE OF PROCESS

The defendants move to dismiss the individual defendants

for insufficient service of process and a consequent lack of

personal jurisdiction. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2),

service upon an individual for whom a waiver has not been

obtained may be accomplished by “delivering a copy of the

summons and of the complaint to the individual personally or

Case 2:05-cv-00105-MHT-DRB Document 19 Filed 04/19/05 Page 3 of 11
1. Miller and Sullivan were district managers at CPI,

and Dryer was a temporary studio manager. 

2. These rules provide that “Every defense, in law or

fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a

claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,

shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto ...

except that the following defenses may at the option of the

pleader be made by motion: ... (2) lack of jurisdiction over

the person, ... (5) insufficiency of service of process....”

3. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (setting out the 120-day time

(continued...)

4

by leaving copies thereof at the individual’s dwelling house

or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and

discretion then residing therein or by delivering a copy of

the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by

appointment or by law to receive service of process.” The

defendants assert that, because no valid method of service

was used with respect to Miller, Sullivan, or Dryer,1

 they

should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and

(5).2

Smith filed her complaint on February 4, 2005, and she

has 120 days to affect service upon the defendants named in

the complaint.3

 Summons were issued to CPI and the

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3. (...continued)

frame during which the defendant(s) should be served with

the summons and complaint, counted from the date of the

complaint’s filing). 

4. Unexecuted summons by Danielle Smith as to Sarah

Dryer (doc. no. 3); unexecuted summons by Danielle Smith as

to Jackie Miller (doc. no. 4). 

5. Return receipt cards for Sullivan and Dryer (doc.

no. 5); return receipt cards for CPI and Miller (doc. no.

6). 

5

individual defendants on February 14, 2005; but the summons

were returned unexecuted for Dryer and Miller on February

22, 2005.4 Nonetheless, the next day, return receipt

cards were docketed as showing service accepted for

Sullivan, Dryer, and Miller.5 The signature affixed to all

of these cards was that of David Mathews, a CPI employee who

drives trucks and collects mail at CPI’s corporate

headquarters in St. Louis, Missouri. According to the

defendants, the individual defendants never appointed

Mathews to accept service of a summons and a complaint on

their behalf. Consequently, the defendants argue, “given

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6. Defendants’ motion to dismiss and for more definite

statement (doc. no. 7), at p. 5. 

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the deficiency in service for the individual defendants,

this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over them.”6

While conceding that service upon Matthews was not

appropriate, Smith correctly points out that, pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), she has 120 days from the date upon

which the complaint was filed to effect service. Since her

complaint was filed on February 4, 2005, she has until June

4, 2005, to serve properly the individual defendants.

Consequently, the defendants’ motion to the extent it seeks

dismissal of the individual defendants for inadequate

service is premature. 

B. MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e), “If a pleading to which a

responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous

that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a

responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite

statement before interposing a responsive pleading.” The

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7. Id., at p.7. 

7

defendants argue that Smith’s charge of slander is deficient

because she “only identifies in general terms who heard the

statement,” and did not state “with particularity which

Defendant made a particular statement and how the statement

was published.” In addition, the defendants argue that “in

Alabama, privilege is an affirmative defense to a claim for

defamation, and a plaintiff must allege facts showing an

absence of privilege where the complaint on its face shows

that the alleged defamatory statement was privileged.”7

In Smith’s complaint, she alleges that district managers

Miller and Sullivan confronted her in mid-to-late August in

the Montgomery store that she managed. They presented her

with a document entitled “Final Written Warning,” and, then,

“[t]hese two (2) individuals within the hearing of ...

customers’ [sic] in the studio, went through the list of

items allegedly violations of company policy committed by

the Plaintiff and each district manager stated in reference

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8. Complaint (doc. no. 1), ¶¶ 17-18. 

9. Id. at ¶¶ 21-25. 

10. Id. at ¶ 35. 

8

to items that what she had done constituted ‘stealing.’”8

Smith’s complaint then proceeds to detail the examples of

stealing alleged against her.9

 Smith’s complaint also states

that, on November 10, 2003, “When the Plaintiff began to get

up her personal items in order to leave, the Defendant Sarah

Dryer, stated in front of customers and employees that the

Plaintiff was stealing by taking the items.”10

To establish a prima-facie case of defamation under

Alabama law, “the plaintiff must show that the defendant was

at least negligent, in publishing a false and defamatory

statement to another concerning the plaintiff, which is

either actionable without having to prove special harm

(actionable per se) or actionable upon allegations and proof

of special harm (actionable per quod).” Nelson v.

Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534 So.2d 1085, 1091 (Ala. 1988).

In addition, the published statements must not be

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privileged. Drill Parts and Service Co., Inc. v. Joy Mfg.

Co., 619 So.2d 1280, 1289 (Ala. 1993). 

In this case, Smith is alleging slander per se, or

“[s]poken words that impute to the person of whom they are

spoken the commission of an indictable criminal offense

involving infamy or moral turpitude.” Nelson, 534 So.2d at

1091. Slander per se includes “[a]n oral publication

imputing a crime of larceny.” Id. at 1091-92. 

Contrary to the defendants’ assertions, Smith’s

complaint provides essential details regarding the alleged

slander. It specifies that each defendant, on a particular

date, accused Smith of stealing in the presence of customers

in the store. This sketches the outlines of a valid claim

for slander. See, e.g., Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v.

Daugherty, 840 So.2d 152 (Ala. 2002) (valid claim of

slander per se where company told customers that former

employee had stolen from company). While the complaint may

not provide the names of the customers to whom the

statements were published, the defendants cite no cases–-and

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the court finds none--to suggest that such particularity is

essential. 

Smith’s complaint also suggests that the defendants’

statements in front of customers regarding Smith’s alleged

stealing were not privileged. See, e.g., Nelson 534 So.2d

at 1095 (no privilege attached to employer’s allegedly

defamatory statement to customer regarding the reason for

former employee’s discharge). There is nothing to suggest

that the defendants had a legitimate interest in making such

a communication to customers or a duty to do so, nor is

there any indication that CPI’s customers had a legitimate

reason for receiving the information. Id. Smith has

therefore pled her defamation claim with adequate

specificity. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, it is ORDERED that the

defendants’ motion to dismiss and for plaintiff to plead her

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defamation claim with greater specificity (doc. no. 7)

is denied.

DONE, this the 19th day of April, 2005.

/s/ Myron H. Thompson

_____________________________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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