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Parties Involved:
Carlos Ferrer
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-12905

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CARLOS FERRER, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cr-00116-WWB-EJK-2

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-12905

Before WILSON, LAGOA, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Carlos Ferrer appeals his four months’ sentence, to be followed by three years of supervised release, imposed following his 

conviction for conspiracy to commit bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1349. 

On appeal, he argues that the district court erred in its application 

of the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. The government 

moves to dismiss the appeal, arguing that Ferrer knowingly and 

voluntarily waived his right to appeal as part of his plea agreement. 

We review the validity and scope of an appeal waiver 

de novo. King v. United States, 41 F.4th 1363, 1366 (11th Cir. 2022). 

Sentence appeal waivers are enforceable if they are made knowingly and voluntarily. Id. at 1367. To enforce a waiver, “[t]he government must show that either (1) the district court specifically 

questioned the defendant concerning the sentence appeal waiver 

during the Rule 11 colloquy, or (2) it is manifestly clear from the 

record that the defendant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver.” United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351 

(11th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Boyd, 975 F.3d 1185, 1192 

(11th Cir. 2020) (noting that the “touchstone for assessing” if a sentence appeal waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily “is 

whether ‘it was clearly conveyed to the defendant that he was giving up his right to appeal under most circumstances’” (alterations 

adopted) (emphasis in original) (quoting Bushert, 997 F.2d at 

1352-53)). “We have consistently enforced knowing and voluntary 

appeal waivers according to their terms.” United States v. Bascomb, 

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24-12905 Opinion of the Court 3 

451 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006). “An appeal waiver includes 

the waiver of the right to appeal difficult or debatable legal issues 

or even blatant error.” United States v. Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d 

1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005). 

Here, Ferrer’s plea agreement with the government stated, 

under a section numbered B.7 and titled: “Defendant’s Waiver of 

Right to Appeal the Sentence,” that: 

The defendant agrees that this [c]ourt has jurisdiction 

and authority to impose any sentence up to the statutory maximum and expressly waives the right to appeal [his] sentence on any ground, including the 

ground that the [c]ourt erred in determining the applicable guidelines range pursuant to the United 

States Sentencing Guidelines, except (a) the ground 

that the sentence exceeds the defendant applicable 

guidelines as determined by the [c]ourt pursuant to 

the United States Sentencing Guidelines; (b) the 

ground that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum penalty; or (c) the ground that the sentence violates the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution; 

provided, however, that if the government exercises 

its right to appeal the sentence imposed . . . then the 

defendant is released from his waiver and may appeal 

the sentence . . . . 

Ferrer signed and dated the plea agreement at the bottom, and he 

also initialed each page of the agreement—including the page containing the appeal waiver provision. 

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-12905

At his change of plea hearing, Ferrer agreed, under oath, that 

his initials and signature were on the plea agreement. He also confirmed that he had read the agreement and reviewed it with his 

attorney, did not need any more time to review it, and did not have 

any questions. After informing Ferrer of the various rights he was 

giving up by pleading guilty, the district court specifically asked 

Ferrer whether he understood that he was agreeing to waive his 

right to appeal his sentence “in accordance with the limitations outlined in paragraph B.7 of [the] plea agreement” and Ferrer agreed 

that he did. At the end of the colloquy, Ferrer stated that had no 

objections or questions and reiterated that he wished to plead 

guilty. “There is a strong presumption that the statements” Ferrer 

“made during [this] colloquy [we]re true.” United States v. Medlock, 

12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994). Given the district court’s discussion of the appeal waiver provision and its reference to the specific 

paragraph that contained the waiver’s exceptions, we are satisfied 

that “the district court specifically questioned [Ferrer] concerning 

the sentence appeal waiver,” Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351, and that “it 

was clearly conveyed to [Ferrer] that he was giving up his right to 

appeal under most circumstances,” Boyd, 975 F.3d at 1192 (alterations adopted) (quoting Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1352-53). 

Ferrer’s appeal does not fall into any of the waiver’s exceptions either. In fact, the text of the waiver provides that the waiver 

“includ[es]” any argument “that the [c]ourt erred in determining 

the applicable guidelines range pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines . . . ”—the exact challenge Ferrer now brings on 

appeal. Furthermore, at sentencing, the district court sentenced 

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24-12905 Opinion of the Court 5

Ferrer to four months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three 

years of supervised release, which was below the applicable guidelines range the district court calculated. Ferrer does not argue that 

his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment or exceeds the relevant statutory maximum, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1349, and the government has not appealed. Thus, none of the exceptions apply to 

permit this appeal to proceed. 

For these reasons, we conclude that Ferrer knowingly and 

voluntarily waived his right to appeal his sentence and his challenges on appeal fall within the scope of that waiver. Accordingly,

we GRANT the government’s motion to dismiss. See Bascomb, 

451 F.3d at 1294; Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351.

DISMISSED.

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