Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03799/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03799-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Amanda K. Tankersley
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the District of Nebraska, adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Honorable

David L. Piester, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Nebraska.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3799

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District

* of Nebraska.

Amanda K. Tankersley, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: June 18, 2004

Filed: July 13, 2004

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Before SMITH, BEAM, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Amanda Tankersley appeals her conviction for being a felon in possession of

a firearm. The issue on appeal is whether Tankersley's underlying burglary

conviction is an adequate predicate offense for the felon-in-possession charge. We

find that it is, and affirm the district court.1

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I. BACKGROUND

Tankersley's underlying conviction was for felony burglary in California state

court. She pled guilty and received a suspended sentence, a fine, restitution,

community service, and three-years probation. During her three years of probation,

Tankersley failed to appear for several probation hearings, and once had her

probation revoked and a bench warrant was issued for her arrest. After she was

arrested and finally appeared, her probation was reinstated but transferred to

Nebraska. While on probation in Nebraska, she was arrested and charged with being

a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Tankersley moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that under California law,

a suspended sentence does not constitute a judgment and therefore it cannot be used

as the predicate felony for felon in possession of a firearm. The district court denied

the motion, and Tankersley entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving her right to

appeal the predicate-felony issue.

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo the district court's decision to deny a motion to dismiss.

United States v. King, 351 F.3d 859, 867 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 72 U.S.L.W.

3749 (U.S. June 14, 2004) (No. 03-1539). Defendant argues that this circuit's

decision in United States v. Stallings, 301 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2002), precludes her

California conviction from operating as a predicate offense for 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

In Stallings, we held that a suspended sentence is not a "judgment" under California

law, for purposes of applying a federal drug sentencing enhancement. 301 F.3d at

922. Stallings did not involve the federal gun statute at issue here.

We disagree with Tankersley's interpretation of the effect of Stallings on her

case. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person who

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has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year" to possess a firearm. The statute does not require that the

defendant must have actually served the one year in prison. All it requires is that the

offense be punishable by incarceration for over one year. Felony burglary is such an

offense. And Tankersley was convicted of felony burglary when she pled guilty to

felony burglary. The law of the forum determines what constitutes a conviction, see

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), and under California law, a guilty plea results in a conviction.

Stephens v. Toomey, 338 P.2d 182, 184 (Cal. 1959); see also People v. Banks, 348

P.2d 102, 106 (Cal. 1959) (holding that a guilty plea results in a "conviction" for

purposes of a recidivism statute).

Stallings does not change this. In Stallings, the defendant had pled nolo

contendere to the underlying conviction, rather than guilty, as Tankersley did here.

Furthermore, the Stallings court noted that the defendant's underlying probation had

not been revoked, which precluded a judgment from being entered under California

law. 301 F.3d at 922. Section 922 requires a prior conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The record indicates that a conviction was entered against Tankersley. Indeed, we

fail to see how Tankersley could have been placed on probation and subject to its

restrictions without an underlying conviction. Accordingly, Stallings is

distinguishable and does not control the outcome here. 

III. CONCLUSION

Tankersley was convicted of burglary in California, a predicate felony for

purposes of Section 922(g)(1), regardless of the sentence actually imposed. See

United States v. Sample, 136 F.3d 562, 564 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that guilty plea

to a felony drug offense was a predicate felony under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), even

though defendant had not yet been sentenced for the prior felony conviction).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court.

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