Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00806/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00806-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pedro Baldovinos
Petitioner
Paul Copenhaver
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PEDRO BALDOVINOS,

 Petitioner,

v.

PAUL COPENHAVER (Warden),

 Respondent.

Case No. 1:13-cv-00806-SKO HC

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

On May 28, 2013, Petitioner Pedro Baldovinos, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the imposition of 

disciplinary sanctions by a Disciplinary Hearing Officer arising from Petitioner's role in a prison 

riot. As grounds for granting the writ, Petitioner asserted (1) a Fifth Amendment due process 

violation of double jeopardy arising from his having been twice subjected to disciplinary hearings 

for the same incident; (2) a Fifth Amendment due process violation arising from the defective 

investigation of the incident giving rise to the disciplinary hearings; (3) actual innocence; (4) the 

Bureau of Prison's lack of jurisdiction over the alleged disciplinary infractions, which occurred at a 

contract institution; and (5) a biased Disciplinary Hearing Officer. After screening the petition in 

accordance with Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District 

Courts ("Habeas Rules"), the Court dismissed all grounds except the Disciplinary Hearing Officer's 

authority over disciplinary proceedings for a prisoner whose misconduct occurred in a penal facility 

Case 1:13-cv-00806-SKO Document 20 Filed 06/12/15 Page 1 of 6
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not operated by the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). The Court now denies the petition on the 

remaining ground.

I. Factual Background

In December 2003, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri sentenced 

Petitioner to 140 months' imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine 

(21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846) and criminal forfeiture (21 U.S.C. § 853).

On January 31, 2009, Petitioner was serving the 2003 sentence at the Reeves County 

Detention Center ("RCDC") in Pecos, Texas, a non-federal facility holding federal prisoners 

pursuant to an agreement with the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). From January 31 through February 

5, 2009, Petitioner participated in a riot at RCDC. 

On September 23, 2010, a jury found Petitioner guilty of conspiracy to commit mutiny or 

riot at a federal correctional facility (18 U.S.C. §§ 1792 and 371); aiding and abetting mutiny or riot 

at a federal correctional facility (18 U.S.C. §§ 1792 and 2); and aiding and abetting the use of fire to 

commit a federal felony (18 U.S.C. §§ 844(h) and 2). The federal district court sentenced him to a

166-month sentence for those convictions.

On June 21, 2011, a BOP Disciplinary Hearing Officer conducted a disciplinary hearing and 

concluded that Petitioner had committed the prohibited act of "Conduct Which Interferes with the 

Orderly Running of the Institution Most Like a Code 104, Rioting," in violation of BOP 

Disciplinary Code § 199. As a result, the Hearing Officer disallowed 41 days of Petitioner's good 

conduct time.

II. BOP Disciplinary Authority

In the sole remaining ground of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner contends 

that the BOP lacked authority to discipline him for behavior committed in an institution not 

operated by the BOP.

In support of his contention, Petitioner relies on a September 16, 2009 letter from the BOP's 

regional counsel, denying Petitioner's claim for property lost or damaged when he was transferred 

from RCDC to the Federal Correctional Center in Oakdale, Louisiana. See Doc. 1 at 13, 17. 

Petitioner does not articulate precisely why he believes that the BOP's denial of his property loss 

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claim due to Petitioner's failure to allege negligence, wrongful action, or omission of a government 

employee supports a conclusion that the BOP lacked authority to discipline him for his actions at 

RCDC. To the extent that Petitioner intended to rely on the letter only to establish that RCDC is 

not operated by the BOP, his argument is not dispositive as to the BOP's authority to discipline him. 

That Petitioner was incarcerated in an institution (RCDC) not operated by the BOP is not disputed: 

the issue is whether the fact of his placement in a non-BOP facility removed his misconduct from 

the BOP's disciplinary authority.

To determine whether the BOP correctly construed the scope of its authority in disciplining 

Petitioner for his conduct at RCDC, the Court must first determine whether "Congress has directly 

spoken to the precise question at issue." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense 

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). No apparent statutory authority states that only inmates 

confined to BOP-operated institutions are subject to BOP discipline. See 18 U.S.C. § 4001(b)(2) 

("The Attorney General may . . . classify the inmates; and provide for their proper government, 

discipline, treatment, care, rehabilitation, and reformation"); 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)(3) ("The Bureau 

of Prisons, under the direction of the Attorney General, shall—(3) provide for the protection, 

instruction, and discipline of all persons charged with or convicted of offenses against the United 

States"). When a statute expressly leaves a gap for an agency to fill with its rulemaking authority, 

the agency's regulations must receive "controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or 

manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 

Respondent contends that 28 C.F.R. § 541.2, as revised in 2011, "clearly indicates that the 

[BOP disciplinary] program is applicable to all inmates in BOP custody, sentenced or unsentenced, 

including inmates held in a facility that contracts with the BOP." Doc. 16 at 6. Petitioner counters 

that since the disciplinary infraction at issue here occurred in 2009, the 2011 revision is 

inapplicable, and that under the prior version of the regulation, the BOP lacked authority to 

discipline Petitioner for his behavior at RCDC. Although the Court agrees that the 2011 revision 

did not apply in 2009, it disagrees with Petitioner's conclusion that the BOP lacked authority to 

discipline him in 2009.

///

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Prior to the 2011 revision, the applicable regulation read:

So that inmates may live in a safe and orderly environment, it is necessary for 

institution authorities to impose discipline on those inmates whose behavior is not 

in compliance with Bureau of Prisons rules. The provisions of this rule apply to 

all persons committed to the care, custody, and control (direct or constructive) of 

the Bureau of Prisons.

28 C.F.R. § 541.10(a) (2010) (emphasis added).

Despite the regulation's breadth and generality, it is neither an arbitrary statutory 

interpretation nor manifestly contrary to the statute. Plaintiff does not dispute that he was 

incarcerated at RCDC pursuant to his 2003 federal sentence. By virtue of his original sentence, 

Petitioner was committed to the care, custody, and control of the BOP, which controlled his

placement for incarceration at RCDC. The BOP placed federal prisoners, including Petitioner, at 

RCDC pursuant to its agreement with the entity operating RCDC. As such, Petitioner remained 

under constructive control of the BOP, which retained control over his placement, including the 

ability to relocate Petitioner to another institution, either one operated by the BOP, or one housing 

prisoners serving federal sentences pursuant to an agreement with the BOP.1 

The regulation applicable in 2009, 28 C.F.R. § 541.10(a), authorized the BOP to impose 

discipline on all persons committed to the care, custody, and control (direct or constructive) of the 

Bureau of Prisons. Accordingly, the Court denies the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

III. Certificate of Appealability

A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district 

court's denial of his petition, but may only appeal in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 

537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a certificate 

of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides:

 

1

In fact, the BOP subsequently transferred Petitioner to several different penal institutions.)

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(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a 

district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of 

appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the 

validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial 

a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the 

validity of such person's detention pending removal proceedings.

(c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an 

 appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from—

 (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention 

 complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the 

 applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

 right.

 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which 

 specific issues or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

I 

If a court denies a petitioner's petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability 

"if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or 

that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Although the 

petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate "something more than 

the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his . . . part." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 

338.

In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the Court's 

determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or 

deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Petitioner has not made the required substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court declines to issue a certificate 

of appealability.

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IV. Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED;

2. The request for an evidentiary hearing be DENIED; and

3. The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment for Respondent.

The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 11, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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