Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-07-04639/USCOURTS-ca4-07-04639-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Salman Khade Abuelhawa
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 07-4639

SALMAN KHADE ABUELHAWA,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge.

(1:07-cr-00018-LMB)

Argued: March 19, 2008

Decided: April 25, 2008

Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, SHEDD, Circuit Judge, and

William L. OSTEEN, Jr., United States District Judge

for the Middle District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge Williams wrote the opinion, in which Judge Shedd and Judge Osteen joined. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Timothy Joseph McEvoy, ODIN, FELDMAN & PITTLEMAN, P.C., Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. David Brian Goodhand, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Chuck Rosenberg,

United States Attorney, Julie Warren, Special Assistant United States

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Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

OPINION

WILLIAMS, Chief Judge: 

Salman Khade Abuelhawa appeals his conviction and sentence for

violating 21 U.S.C.A. § 843(b) (West 1999), which prohibits knowingly or intentionally using a communication facility in committing,

causing, or facilitating the commission of certain felonies, including

drug distribution. Abuelhawa argues that he cannot be convicted of

violating § 843(b) because the drug distribution in question was his

purchase of cocaine for personal use, a misdemeanor, see 21 U.S.C.A.

§ 844(a)(1) (West 1999 & Supp. 2007). He also contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction under § 843(b). Disagreeing with Abuelhawa on both counts, we affirm.

I.

In early 2000, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") began

an investigation into possible cocaine distribution by Mohammed

Said in the Skyline area of Virginia, just outside of Washington, D.C.

During the course of this investigation, in June 2003, the FBI applied

for, and was granted, a Title III warrant to wiretap Said’s cell phone.1

In this case, the wiretap captures "both phone numbers, . . . the time

of the phone call, the date of the phone call, [and] the duration of the

phone call," anytime a call, either incoming or outgoing, occurs

between the wiretapped phone and another phone. (J.A. at 125.)

Agents are also able to "intercept the conversation that occurs"

between the two phones. (J.A. at 125.) The FBI can then subpoena a

telephone company to identify the subscribers of telephones used to

make contact with the wiretapped phone. 

1The term Title III refers to the federal wiretapping statute (Title III of

the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.A.

§§ 2510 et seq. (West 2000 & Supp. 2006)), which permits wiretapping

by federal agents upon a showing of necessity. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518

(West 2000). 

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In July 2003, FBI agents monitoring the wiretap of Said’s cell

phone issued a subpoena in an effort to identify the subscriber with

the cell phone number 703-969-8743. From this subpoena, the FBI

learned that the number belonged to Abuelhawa. Thereafter, the FBI

monitored a series of calls between Said and Abuelhawa that form the

basis of this appeal. 

The wiretap recorded a total of eight calls between Abuelhawa and

Said in early July 2003: the two men spoke twice on July 2, 2003,

three times on July 5, and three times on July 12.2 On July 2, at

approximately 10:12 p.m., Abuelhawa called Said and instructed:

"Bring me the half by the Hilton or do you want me to come to you?"

(J.A. at 318.) An FBI agent as well as an expert witness testified that

Abuelhawa’s reference to "the half," was to a half gram of cocaine.

Said called Abuelhawa back at 10:20 p.m. Said asked Abuelhawa,

"Where are you?," to which Abuelhawa replied, "I am coming to

you." (J.A. at 319.) The call ended with Abuelhawa saying "I have

seen you." (J.A. at 319.) 

On July 5, 2003, the wiretap intercepted three additional calls

between Abuelhawa and Said, beginning at 10:12 p.m. In the first

call, Abuelhawa asked for "[o]ne of the small, 100 type," continuing,

"[l]ike, like that time when you and I, when I saw As’ad."3 (J.A. at

320.) Said answered, "Ah. Ok." (J.A. at 320.) Abuelhawa continued,

"But please for God’s sake, fix it well. May God keep you." (J.A. at

320.) Said responded, "Alright. Alright. Where?" (J.A. at 320.)

Abuelhawa reported that he was still at home, and Said instructed

Abuelhawa to "[w]ait for me in Skyline until I come back [from picking up my sister]." (J.A. at 320.) The Government’s expert witness

testified that the reference to the "100 type" was a reference to one

gram of cocaine, which has a retail value between $80-$120. 

At 11:17 p.m., Said called Abuelhawa to ask his whereabouts.

Abuelhawa responded that he was "almost in the neighborhood" and

asked to meet "[b]y the Eleven." (J.A. at 322.) Said responded, "No.

2These conversations took place primarily in Arabic and were translated by a Government Arabic language specialist prior to trial. Neither

party contests the accuracy of the translations. 

3As’ad was the name of Mohammed Said’s father. 

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No. Meet me out on the street that is after it. . . . In front of the street

from where you are talking to me." (J.A. at 322.) Abuelhawa

responded, "Fine. Ok." (J.A. at 322.) Four minutes later, at 11:21

p.m., Said again called Abuelhawa and asked, "Have your excellency

arrived?" (J.A. at 323.) Abuelhawa responded, "I have arrived man.

. . . but there are two people at that . . . so I drove down a little further." (J.A. at 323.) Said and Abuelhawa discussed this latest development for a moment, with Said instructing Abuelhawa to "go further

down" because "[i]t is better." (J.A. at 323.) Abuelhawa responded,

"Fine. Ok," and Said said, "Alright." (J.A. at 323.) No further phone

calls were intercepted on July 5. 

Finally, on July 12, the FBI intercepted three calls between Said

and Abuelhawa. First, at 8:30 p.m., Abuelhawa called Said and asked,

"Where did the free stuff go? Is it gone?" (J.A. at 324.) Said

responded in the affirmative, and Abuelhawa said, "We should celebrate that it is gone. It was good." (J.A. at 324.) Abuelhawa continued, "May God give you health. So will I see you after an hour?"

(J.A. at 324.) Said said, "[A]lright," and then he asked, "How much

do you need?" (J.A. at 324.) Abuelhawa responded, "A half." (J.A. at

324.) 

At 9:18 p.m., Abuelhawa called Said again, and said, "Ok. Listen.

Make it one of the big ones. The 100 type." (J.A. at 326.) Said

assented and asked Abuelhawa when he would arrive; Abuelhawa

responded, "I am, I am on my way. I am leaving home." (J.A. at 326.)

The two men then agreed to meet at Said’s "store." (J.A. at 326.) At

9:47 p.m., another call occurred between Said and Abuelhawa. (J.A.

at 327.) Said asked where Abuelhawa was; Abuelhawa responded,

"Right here. I am, I am coming to you in two minutes." (J.A. at 327.)

Said expressed his desire to leave the shop, stating, "I really want to

leave this place." (J.A. at 327.) Abuelhawa pleaded, "I am coming to

you man. One minute." (J.A. at 327.) Said relented and told Abuelhawa, "Come. Meet me at the grill. Ok. Bye." (J.A. at 327.) At trial,

testimony from the Government established that Said’s father owned

the Skyline butcher shop and a restaurant called the Skyline Grill,

which were located next door to each other. An FBI agent further testified that the Skyline Grill "is a location where Mohammed Said distribute[d] cocaine." (J.A. at 148.) 

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Based upon these intercepted telephone calls, Abuelhawa was

placed under arrest at his home on October 17, 2003. After being

advised of his Miranda rights, Abuelhawa agreed to speak with the

FBI agents who arrested him and admitted that he purchased cocaine

from Said and a dealer named Issam Khatib. Abuelhawa told the

agents that he originally purchased cocaine, usually in one-half gram

amounts, from Khatib and that Said became his dealer after Khatib

left the business and Said assumed control of Khatib’s customer base.

Abuelhawa further told the agents that he used his cell phone to call

Said’s cell phone in order to buy cocaine in one-half gram amounts

and that he and Said would usually meet outside of the Skyline Grill

to complete the drug transactions. Said would hand the cocaine, in a

tin-foil package, to Abuelhawa through Abuelhawa’s car window.

Abuelhawa gave no statements indicating that he purchased cocaine

on the specific dates of July 5 and July 12. 

On January 25, 2007, a federal grand jury sitting in the Eastern

District of Virginia charged Abuelhawa in a seven-count indictment

with violating 21 U.S.C.A. § 843(b) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West

2000). The indictment charged Abuelhawa with unlawfully, knowingly, and intentionally using a communications facility—a telephone

—in committing, causing, and facilitating the commission of a violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) (West 1999), distribution of cocaine.

Counts Two through Four alleged violations of § 843(b) based upon

the three July 5th phone calls, while Counts Five through Seven

focused on the three July 12th calls. Count One, which was dismissed

prior to trial for reasons not relevant to the appeal, focused on a phone

call made on June 29, 2003. 

Following the close of the Government’s case-in-chief, Abuelhawa

moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. The district court denied the motion, explaining:

You may be right on the July 5 incidents. If that’s all the

government had, if they only had one set of conversations,

I think I’d be granting your motion, but you have a week

later a second round of conversations, and it seems to me

it’s not an unreasonable inference to draw the conclusion

that if the first set of transactions had been unsuccessful,

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you’d have either heard some complaints or something in

the second round. 

(J.A. at 201-02.) 

The jury thereafter convicted Abuelhawa on all six of the remaining counts in the indictment. Abuelhawa followed his oral Rule 29

motion with a later written one, which the district court denied prior

to sentencing. The district court sentenced Abuelhawa to 24 months

probation and a $2,000 fine.4 Abuelhawa timely noted an appeal, and

we possess jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 2006) and 18

U.S.C.A. § 3742(a) (West 2000). 

II.

Abuelhawa pursues two arguments on appeal regarding his conviction. First, Abuelhawa contends that § 843(b) is not violated when an

individual facilitates the purchase of a drug quantity for personal use.

Second, Abuelhawa contends that, even assuming § 843(b) criminalizes such conduct, the Government produced insufficient evidence to

show that a drug distribution occurred on either July 5 or July 12. We

address each contention in turn.

A.

Whether § 843(b) extends to personal-use distributions is a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo, see United

States v. Nelson, 484 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 2007), and we "begin

with the language of the statute," Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534

U.S. 438, 450 (2002). We first "determine whether the language at

issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340

(1997)). "Our inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’" Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc.,

489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)). "The plain meaning of legislation should

4At that time, the district court also merged the convictions for Counts

3 and 4 into Count 2, and the convictions for Counts 6 and 7 into Count

5. 

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be conclusive, except in the rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the

intentions of its drafters." Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242 (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

Section 843(b) makes it "unlawful for any person knowingly or

intentionally to use any communication facility in committing or in

causing or facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting

a felony under any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of

this chapter." 21 U.S.C.A. § 843(b). Abuelhawa was convicted of

committing, causing or facilitating the commission of a violation of

21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1), which criminalizes distribution of controlled

substances.5 This distribution, Abuelhawa notes, was for his personal

use. 

Because there is no dispute that Abuelhawa used a communication

facility (a cell phone) to arrange the drug transactions, we believe this

case can be decided by focusing only on whether Abuelhawa facilitated the commission of a felony. We begin with the recognition that

our sister circuits are divided on the issue facing us; some find that

when a communication facility is used to facilitate a drug sale for personal use, § 843(b) is not violated. See United States v. Baggett, 890

F.2d 1095, 1098 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Martin, 599 F.2d

880, 888-89 (9th Cir. 1979) overruled on other grounds by United

States v. DeBright, 730 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1984).6 These circuits take

5Cocaine is a Schedule II controlled substance, covered by 21

U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) (West 1999). 

6Abuelhawa also cites to United States v. Van Buren, 804 F.2d 888,

892 (6th Cir. 1986) in support of his position. In Van Buren, however,

the Sixth Circuit addressed whether use of a telephone to purchase drugs

for personal use furthered a drug conspiracy, not whether 21 U.S.C.A.

§ 843(b) (West 1999) extends to personal use distributions. Instead, it

appears that the Sixth Circuit does not agree with Abuelhawa. See United

States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir. 1984) ("To prove

‘facilitation,’ the government must show that the ‘telephone call comes

within the common meaning of facilitate-‘to make easier’ or less difficult, or to assist or aid. It is sufficient if a defendant’s use of a telephone

to facilitate the possession or distribution of controlled substances facilitates either his own or another person’s possession or distribution.’"

(quoting United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1032 (5th Cir. Unit B.

Dec. 1981))). 

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the position that "a mere customer’s contribution to the business he

patronizes does not constitute the facilitation envisioned by Congress." Martin, 599 F.2d at 889. In contrast, other circuits have concluded that distributions for personal use are covered by § 843(b). See

United States v. Binkley, 903 F.2d 1130, 1135-36 (7th Cir. 1990);

United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir. 1984);

United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1032 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec.

1981) overruled on other grounds by United States v. Huntress, 956

F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1992).7 The Seventh Circuit, in Binkley, noted the

term "facilitate" "should be given its ordinary meaning, which is, simply, ‘to make easier.’" Binkley, 990 F.2d at 1135 (quoting Phillips,

664 F.2d at 1032). See also McLernon, 746 F.2d at 1106 (same). And,

by placing the focus on the use of a communications device to make

a distribution easier, a defendant’s "subsequent treatment of the

cocaine cannot retroactively diminish [the defendant’s] previous facilitation of . . . [a] cocaine sale." Binkley, 990 F.2d at 1136. 

Although we have not adopted either position, we have previously

indicated our agreement with Phillips, McLernon, and Binkley that,

for purposes of § 843(b), "facilitate" should be given its "common

meaning—to make easier or less difficult, or to assist or aid." United

States v. Lozano, 839 F.2d 1020, 1023 (4th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). Faced directly with the issue confronted in those

cases, we believe those circuits also have the better of the argument

as to whether § 843(b) applies to facilitation of a drug distribution for

personal use.

Section 843(b) has as its essential elements knowing or intentional

use of a communication facility to commit, cause, or facilitate certain

enumerated felonies. The statute does not specify whose felony must

be at issue, just that "a" felony must be facilitated. Cocaine distribu7United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec. 1981)

is binding precedent in both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1422 n.8 (5th Cir. 1996)

(noting that all cases decided by Unit B panels of the Former Fifth Circuit are binding precedent in the Fifth Circuit); Stein v. Reynolds Sec.

Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that decisions by Unit B

panels of the Former Fifth Circuit are binding precedent in the Eleventh

Circuit). 

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tion is a felony, 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1), and Abuelhawa’s use of his

cell phone undoubtedly made Said’s cocaine distribution easier; in

fact, "it made the sale possible."8 Binkley, 903 F.2d at 1136. The fact

that Abuelhawa’s possession of cocaine for personal use may not

itself be a felony, 21 U.S.C.A. § 844(a)(1), is simply irrelevant under

§ 843(b). As the Seventh Circuit explained, 

If, by their use of the telephone, the appellants have made

the distribution of the cocaine easier, they have facilitated it

and violated the statute. What they do with the cocaine after

it is distributed is irrelevant to whether they facilitated the

distribution; the crime is complete long before they either

use or dispose of the cocaine. 

United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 807 (7th Cir. 1994) (internal

citations omitted). 

Abuelhawa believes this result is nonsensical because, if he had

simply approached Said on the street and purchased one-half gram of

cocaine, his conduct would be punishable only as a misdemeanor.

Abuelhawa thus argues it is beyond logic that his use of a cell phone

to contact Said transforms his possession offense into a felony. Congress, however, may well have had reason for such a result: use of

communication facilities makes it easier for criminals to engage in

their skullduggery, and Congress may reasonably have desired to

increase criminal penalties for those who use such means to evade

detection by law enforcement. At any rate, Abuelhawa’s contention

certainly fails to prove that our result is "demonstrably at odds," Ron

Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242 (internal quotation marks omitted), with

congressional intent, best expressed in the plain language of § 843(b),

which references only "a felony." 18 U.S.C.A. § 843(b). 

We thus join the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits in

concluding that persons like Abuelhawa, who facilitate distribution of

8As one of our district courts has stated, "the decisions of the Fifth and

Seventh Circuit appropriately focus on the defendant’s use of a communication facility in the ‘making easier’ of the completion of any felony

under the Controlled Substances Act." United States v. Lewis, 387 F.

Supp.2d 573, 584 (E.D. Va. 2005). 

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a controlled substance to themselves for personal use by using a communication facility, can be prosecuted for violating § 843(b). Quite

simply, "status as buyer[ ] or distributor[ ] is of no consequence

regarding section 843(b); rather, [a defendant’s] status as [a] facilitator[ ] alone gives rise to criminal liability." Kozinski, 16 F.3d at 807.

B.

In the alternative, Abuelhawa contends that the Government failed

to prove a violation of § 843(b) in this case because it failed to show

the occurrence of an actual drug distribution on either July 5 or July

12. Abuelhawa bears a "heavy burden" in contesting the sufficiency

of the evidence supporting a jury verdict. United States v. Beidler,

110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). His conviction must be affirmed if, reviewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the Government, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862-63 (4th Cir.

1996) (en banc). The Government receives the benefit of "all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those sought to be established." United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir.

1982) (citations omitted). 

In contesting the sufficiency of the evidence, Abuelhawa focuses

upon what he categorizes as lacking in the Government’s case: the

actual drugs, the absence of witness testimony or objective evidence

that Abuelhawa and Said ever met on July 5 or July 12, and the lack

of admissions from Abuelhawa that he purchased cocaine from Said

on either July 5 or July 12. Abuelhawa points us to Baggett, in which

the Tenth Circuit required the Government, in a prosecution for narcotics possession, to "put forth some evidence to show that [a defendant] actually possessed heroin on the day in question." Baggett, 890

F.2d at 1096. 

In Baggett, the defendant was charged with possession of heroin on

November 29, 1987. Id. The Government put forth evidence that the

female defendant Baggett made three calls to a drug dealer on that

day to purchase heroin and cocaine at a set location, that a female

emerging from a car registered to Baggett was seen at that set location

entering the drug dealer’s car twice on November 29, and that in

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March 1988 Baggett gave statements to the police that she used heroin during the month of November 1987. Id. In reversing Baggett’s

conviction, the Tenth Circuit proceeded, based upon our opinion in

United States v. Dolan, 544 F.2d 1219 (4th Cir. 1976), to list several

means by which the Government could prove actual possession.

9 Baggett, 890 F.2d at 1096. In Dolan, however, we addressed examples of

evidence the Government could use to prove the identity of a substance in lieu of expert testimony. Dolan, 544 F.2d at 1221. 

The Tenth Circuit read Dolan for the broader proposition that "[i]f

the prosecution is not going to present direct evidence of drug possession, its circumstantial evidence must include some testimony linking

defendant to an observed substance that a jury can infer to be a narcotic." Baggett, 890 F.2d at 1097. See also United States v. Hall, 473

F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 2007) ("While other courts have not gone so far

as to require that evidence include an ‘observed substance that a jury

can infer to be a narcotic,’ there is little doubt that a defendant’s own

inculpatory statements captured on wiretaps must be corroborated by

other circumstantial evidence of possession such that a jury may properly infer the specific drug was actually possessed."). 

While the Tenth Circuit may have extended Dolan’s inexhaustive

list for proving a substance’s identity into a rigid proof requirement

9The Tenth Circuit quoted from the following passage from United

States v. Dolan, 544 F.2d 1219 (4th Cir. 1976): 

[L]ay testimony and circumstantial evidence may be sufficient,

without the introduction of an expert chemical analysis, to establish the identi[t]y of the substance involved in an alleged narcotics transaction. Such circumstantial proof may include evidence

of the physical appearance of the substance involved in the transaction, evidence that the substance produced the expected effects

when sampled by someone familiar with the illicit drug, evidence that the substance was used in the same manner as the

illicit drug, testimony that a high price was paid in cash for the

substance, evidence that transactions involving the substance

were carried on with secrecy or deviousness, and evidence that

the substance was called by the name of the illegal narcotic by

the defendant or others in his presence[.] 

Id. at 1221 (internal citations omitted). 

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for all charges of narcotics possession, we decline to do so. We have

never placed such a burden on the Government, and "we decline to

give a checklist or formula for sufficiency." United States v. Bryce,

208 F.3d 346, 353 (2d. Cir. 2000). 

Instead, when "we look at what facts did exist in this case," United

States v. McCoy, 513 F.3d 405, 412 (4th Cir. 2008), we conclude the

Government produced sufficient evidence of a completed distribution

on both July 5 and July 12. To prove these offenses, the Government

put forth three phone calls on both July 5 and July 12 orchestrating

drug transactions between Abuelhawa and Said. All three calls took

place in short time frames, setting up the exact details of the transaction. No calls were made indicating the transactions failed, and the

July 12 phone calls make no mention that the July 5 transaction was

not consummated. Expert testimony explained that Abuelhawa used

"code words" during the calls indicating his desire to purchase onehalf gram and one gram amounts of cocaine. Abuelhawa told investigators that he normally purchased cocaine in one-half gram amounts

from the Skyline Grill, the business mentioned in the final call on July

12. We think from this evidence, including the confirmatory statements from Abuelhawa that he purchased cocaine from Said, a reasonable jury could infer that Said completed a distribution on both

July 5 and July 12. 

In particular, a reasonable jury could infer that had Said not in fact

distributed cocaine to Abuelhawa on July 5 after indicating that he

was on the very street where he and Said were scheduled to meet, one

of them might have mentioned the failed transaction in the July 12

calls. As to July 12, the final call concludes with Abuelhawa stating

that he is "[o]ne minute" away from Said, (J.A. at 327), and Said

agreeing to meet Abuelhawa at the Skyline Grill, where Abuelhawa

later admitted was his normal destination for cocaine purchases.

Again, viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, we

believe a reasonable jury could certainly have found Abuelhawa

guilty of violating § 843(b) for facilitating Said’s cocaine distribution

on July 12 as well. Given the immediacy of the final call between

Abuelhawa and Said, a reasonable jury could conclude that, if the

transaction was not consummated, a further call would have been

made. 

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Much of Abuelhawa’s argument focuses on the Government’s presentation of only circumstantial evidence to support its case. We have

explained that "as a general proposition, circumstantial evidence may

be sufficient to support a guilty verdict even though it does not

exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence."

United States v. Osborne, 514 F.3d 377, 387 (4th Cir. 2008) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). With this proposition in mind,

and under our deferential standard of review, we conclude that the

Government provided sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. 

III.

Because we hold that § 843(b) criminalizes facilitation of drug distributions for personal use, and that the Government adduced sufficient evidence that Abuelhawa violated § 843(b) on July 5 and July

12, Abuelhawa’s conviction and sentence must be and is

AFFIRMED.

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