Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01815/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01815-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Antolin Andrews
Plaintiff
Tom L. Carey
Defendant

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

Antolin Andrews,

Plaintiff, No. Civ. S 02-1815 FCD PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

Tom L. Carey,

Defendant. 

-oOoPlaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel and

in forma pauperis in a civil rights action.

The case proceeds on the August 20, 2002, complaint. 

Plaintiff claims telephone use policies at California State

Prison - Solano (Solano) violate his rights of access to the

courts, equal protection and due process. Plaintiff pursued an

administrative grievance through the third level of review after

these policies prevented his telephonic participation in

proceedings in the Los Angeles County Superior Court in May and

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June of 2002. Defendant denied the grievance at the second level

of review.

The complaint seeks a jury trial, a declaration of

plaintiff’s rights, and costs of suit.

Defendant seeks summary judgment and plaintiff opposes. 

Plaintiff moves for costs.

Standard on Summary Judgment

A party may move, without or without supporting affidavits,

for a summary judgment and the judgment sought shall be rendered

forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(c). 

An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A fact is

“material” if it affects the right to recover under applicable

substantive law. Id. The moving party must submit evidence that

establishes the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

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the affidavits, if any’” that the moving party believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id.

at 323. If the movant does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue, the movant need only point to the absence of evidence to

support the opponent’s burden. To avoid summary judgment on an

issue upon which the opponent bears the burden of proof, the

opponent must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits,

or by the “‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. The opponent’s

affirmative evidence must be sufficiently probative that a jury

reasonably could decide the issue in favor of the opponent. 

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Inc. v. Zenith Radio

Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). When the conduct alleged

is implausible, stronger evidence than otherwise required must be

presented to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 587.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides that “supporting and opposing

affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth

such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the

matters stated therein.” Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has

held that the opponent need not produce evidence in a form that

would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the questions are (1) whether

the evidence could be submitted in admissible form and (2) “if

reduced to admissible evidence” would it be sufficient to carry

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the party’s burden at trial. Id. at 327. Thus, in Fraser v.

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003), objection to the opposing

party’s reliance upon her diary upon the ground it was hearsay

was overruled because the party could testify to all the relevant

portions from personal knowledge or read it into evidence as

recorded recollection.

A verified complaint based on personal knowledge setting

forth specific facts admissible in evidence is treated as an

affidavit. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1995);

McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1987). A verified

motion based on personal knowledge in opposition to a summary

judgment motion setting forth facts that would be admissible in

evidence also functions as an affidavit. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134

F.,3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th

Cir. 2004).

Defects in opposing affidavits may be waived if no motion to

strike or other objection is made. Scharf v. United States

Attorney General, 597 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1979) (incompetent

medical evidence).

Undisputed Facts

The following facts are undisputed. 

March 25, 2002, plaintiff filed a third amended complaint in

Andrews v. Bank of America, et al., Los Angeles County Superior

Court No. BC25785, against defendants Bank of America, Gateway,

Inc., Joseph Munoz, Pacific Bell Pacific Telesis, Pacific Bell

Telephone Company and United Parcel Service. The pleading sought

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tort damages for infliction of emotional injury and contributing

to wrongful imprisonment. Demurrers or motions to strike had

been sustained as to all three previous complaints. All

defendants filed demurrers to the third amended complaint based

on litigation immunity, California decisional law requiring a

convict prove his innocence before seeking such damages, and

other grounds. The demurrers were granted and plaintiff did not

move to set aside the judgment, nor did he appeal.

Inmates at Solano may make telephonic court appearances,

using staff telephones, if a court has issued an order

identifying the time and date of the appearance. Plaintiff had

obtained a court order in Andrews v. Bank of America authorizing

plaintiff to appeal by telephone “for all future scheduled

appearances.” The court ordered the Department of Corrections

“to allow [plaintiff] to utilize the telephone under existing

policies for access to the court.” The order did not specify a

date or time for any appearance. 

May 2, 2002, plaintiff filed a grievance requesting

arrangements be made for him to appear telephonically May 29,

2002. The May 15, 2002, informal response to the grievance

denied the request on the ground plaintiff needed a court order

specifying date and time of appearance. Plaintiff did not apply

to the court for such order.

Arranging for inmates to use staff telephones for court

appearances is time consuming and expensive. Requiring a

specific court order assures inmates receive access only when the

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court actually needs them to be present. It prevents inmates

from obtaining access to staff telephones through manipulation.

Analysis

Defendant seeks summary judgment on plaintiff’s access to

the courts claim on the grounds that a prisoner’s constitutional

right of access to the courts does not extend to superior court

tort suits for damages against private entities, plaintiff’s

failure to appear telephonically at the demurrer hearing was not

causally linked to dismissal of the action, and plaintiff’s

lawsuit was frivolous or meritless. 

Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the

courts. See Lewis v. Carey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); Bounds v.

Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276 (9th

Cir. 1995); Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 1994); Ching

v. Lewis, 895 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). This may

include an obligation to provide photocopies and ink pens, where

such services and materials are necessary to an action or appeal. 

Hiser v. Franklin, 94 F.3d 1287, 1294 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1996); Allen

v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 1995). To establish a

violation of his right of access, a prisoner must show he

suffered an “actual injury,” i.e., “actual prejudice with respect

to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to

meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S.

at 348; see also Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 1999);

Vandelft, 31 F.3d at 796; Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir.

1990) (per curiam). The right of access to the courts is limited

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to non-frivolous direct criminal appeals, habeas corpus

proceedings, and § 1983 actions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 n. 3 &

354-55; Madrid, 190 F.3d at 995.

Plaintiff does not contest defendant’s evidence or argument

and defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s

access to the courts claim. 

Defendant seeks summary judgment on plaintiff’s equal

protection claim. The Fourteenth Amendment right to equal

protection survives incarceration. See e.g., Baumann v. Arizona

Dep’t of Corrections, 754 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1985). Typically,

where the plaintiff does not allege a violation of a fundamental

right or the existence of a suspect classification, he must show

defendants’ policies did not bear a rational relation to a

legitimate penological purpose. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78

(1987); Coakley v. Murphy, 884 F.2d 1218 (9th Cir. 1989); Mass.

Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). Plaintiff

has the burden of establishing the challenged policy is

unconstitutional. See Hause v. Vaught, 993 F.2d 1079 (4th Cir.

1993); Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1992); Dixon v.

Kirby, 210 F. Supp. 792 (S.D. W. Va. 2002); Williams v. Price, 25

F. Supp. 2d 605 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 

Defendant submits evidence the rule at Solano governing use

of staff telephones for court appearances is rationally related

to the legitimate penological purposes of efficient prison

administration and deterring inmate manipulation. Plaintiff

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offers nothing to counter this evidence and defendant is entitled

to summary judgment on plaintiff’s equal protection claim. 

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s due

process claim as well. To establish a deprivation of procedural

due process, plaintiff must allege an identified state actor

denied him of a specific liberty interest, which may arise

independently under the due process clause or as freedom from

state deprivation or restraint imposing “atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life,” without due process. Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S.

472, 483-84 (1995). Plaintiff asserts that a protectible

interest may arise under state law, and here Penal Code § 2601

(which allows inmates to “initiate civil actions”) creates an

interest sufficient to support his due process claim. Plaintiff

offers nothing, however, to meet Sandin’s requirement of showing

his inability to use the telephone for appearance at the demurrer

hearing May 29, 2002, amounted to an “atypical and significant

hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.” Summary judgment for defendant on the due process claim

should be granted.

Plaintiff moves for costs of suit, arguing he accomplished a

change in prison policy through litigating this action. Summary

judgment should be entered for defendant; plaintiff is not the

“prevailing party” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) and is not

entitled to an award of costs.

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Accordingly, the court hereby recommends defendant’s

February 3, 2005, motion for summary judgment be granted and

plaintiff’s April 13, 2005, motion for costs be denied.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Within 10 days after being

served with these findings and recommendations, any party may

file written objections. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” 

The district judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings

and recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: August 15, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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