Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03468/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03468-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Mose McElrath
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3468

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Richard Mose McElrath, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 10, 2005

Filed: May 24, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, BRIGHT, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

___________

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

The government charged Richard Mose McElrath in a one-count indictment

alleging that he conspired to possess with the intent to distribute more than fifty

grams of cocaine base. Before trial, McElrath filed a discovery motion and a motion

to suppress evidence. The district court1

 denied both motions. After the trial, the jury

found McElrath guilty. At sentencing, the district court overruled McElrath’s

objections to the presentence investigation report. The district court sentenced

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McElrath as a career criminal offender to 360 months imprisonment. McElrath

appeals and argues there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty, the

district court erred in refusing to suppress evidence of the drugs seized, and the

government provided incomplete discovery. McElrath also raises several sentencing

issues, arguing the government engaged in sentencing entrapment, the district court

erred in using a prior state conviction as a predicate offense under the career offender

provisions, and the district court violated United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738

(2005), by sentencing him as a career offender. We affirm McElrath’s conviction, but

vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.

I. Background

FBI agent David Rapp worked with local police in investigating McElrath.

The police decided to have a confidential informant, Scott Hester, purchase drugs

from McElrath. Hester had worked as an informant for the police in the past.

Hester called McElrath and asked to meet with him. The police gave Hester

$1,000 in marked bills and equipped him with a recording device. Hester purchased

one ounce of crack cocaine from McElrath and Terrina Lyod in Minneapolis. After

the purchase, Hester turned over one ounce of crack to Officer Bart Hauge. A second

controlled purchase took place over a week later, where Hester purchased two ounces

of crack from McElrath for $1,800 in marked bills. A third controlled purchase took

place several weeks later, where Hester purchased two more ounces of crack from

Lyod in exchange for $1,800 in marked bills.

The police arrested McElrath and Lyod. The police searched McElrath and

found $3,450 in his pocket. The police executed a search warrant of McElrath’s

business in Minneapolis. The police also executed a search warrant at McElrath’s

residence and found a white bag containing powder cocaine in a bush near the rear

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deck and a bullet proof vest in the bedroom. The police also discovered traces of

cocaine on a scale and recovered $8,020 in cash.

The government charged McElrath in a one-count indictment alleging that he

conspired to possess with the intent to distribute more than fifty grams of cocaine

base. The government filed an information notifying McElrath that he was subject

to a twenty-year mandatory minimum penalty due to a prior controlled substance

conviction.

Before trial, McElrath filed a discovery motion. McElrath also moved to

suppress evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrants. The magistrate judge

recommended denial of the motions, and the district court adopted the

recommendation and denied the motions.

After trial, the jury found McElrath guilty. The district court sentenced

McElrath as a career criminal offender, based on his two prior convictions, to 360

months imprisonment. McElrath filed a timely notice of this appeal.

II. Discussion

McElrath first argues he is entitled to a new trial, because he demanded, but did

not receive, discovery of all exhibits the government intended to use at trial and

documents upon which the exhibits were based. McElrath has waived this issue as

he did not raise the issue before the district court.

McElrath next argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress

the evidence. When reviewing suppression motions, we review the district court’s

factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v.

Sheikh, 367 F.3d 756, 762 (8th Cir. 2004). 

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McElrath argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the

evidence, because the search warrants do not contain a description of probable cause

to believe that evidence of illegal activity would be found. The police executed two

search warrants, one at McElrath’s business and one at McElrath’s residence. The

affidavits in support of the search warrants each described McElrath’s position as a

leader of a gang, the Gangster Disciples. The affidavit in support of the search

warrant issued for McElrath’s business included information that a confidential

reliable informant had observed large amounts of cocaine inside the store in the

previous weeks. The affidavit noted that police had conducted surveillance at the

store and confirmed activity consistent with drug trafficking. The affidavit in support

of the search warrant issued for McElrath’s residence described information received

from a confidential reliable informant that McElrath had distributed crack cocaine

with the assistance of gang members. The affidavit also noted that police had

observed several known members of the Gangster Disciples coming and going from

the residence. We affirm, because the applications for search warrants show

probable cause.

McElrath also contends the district court erred in denying his motion to

suppress the evidence, because the federal officer’s participation in the search was

improper. McElrath never raised the issue of the federal officer’s participation in the

search of his residence, therefore he has waived the issue. See United States v.

Frazier, 280 F.3d 835, 845 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting that “under Fed. R. Crim. P.

12(b)(3) a suppression issue must be raised before trial, and the failure to raise the

issue in a timely pretrial motion results in “waiver” of the matter under Rule 12(f)).

McElrath next argues the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find him

guilty. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United

States v. Parker, 364 F.3d 934, 943 (8th Cir. 2004). In reviewing the sufficiency of

the evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,

resolve evidentiary conflicts in favor of the government, and draw all reasonable

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inferences from the evidence in support of the jury’s verdict. United States v.

Ramirez, 350 F.3d 780, 783 (8th Cir. 2003). We will reverse only if no reasonable

jury could have found the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

McElrath argues the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find him guilty,

asserting that the government used an inherently unreliable confidential informant

with no corroborating witnesses. The government’s witnesses, however, were all

thoroughly cross-examined by McElrath’s counsel. In addition, we must draw the

reasonable inference (based on the guilty verdict) that the jury found the

government’s witnesses credible. Id. This court has noted that “[i]t is not the

province of this Court to reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses when

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.” United States v. AguilarPortillo, 334 F.3d 744, 747 (8th Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted). We affirm.

McElrath also argues the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find him

guilty, because the government failed to have a witness identify exhibit 39 as cocaine

base or crack. A chemist, however, testified and created a lab report that identified

the substance as crack. In addition, even without the evidence that McElrath claimed

was not identified as cocaine base, the government still proved that McElrath sold

crack on two other occasions weighing in excess of fifty grams. We reject this claim.

McElrath next raises several sentencing issues. First, McElrath argues the

government engaged in sentencing entrapment, because Hester, at the urging of the

police, initiated contact with and coaxed McElrath to sell crack. McElrath failed to

raise this claim of sentencing entrapment before the district court and has waived this

issue. See United States v. Overstreet, 5 F.3d 295, 297 (8th Cir. 1993) (refusing to

address defendant’s claim of sentencing entrapment because the argument was not

raised with the district court).

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Next, McElrath argues his state controlled substance conviction should not

have been used under the career criminal offender provisions, because an FBI agent

was impermissibly involved in the investigation. This issue lacks merit, because the

Supreme Court has determined that, except for convictions obtained in violation of

a defendant’s right to counsel, a defendant in a federal sentencing proceeding has no

constitutional right to collaterally attack the validity of his previous state convictions

which are used to enhance his sentence. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994).

This court has applied the Supreme Court’s holding to federal sentencing proceedings

where the sentencing court is considering whether the defendant is a career offender

under the sentencing guidelines. See Moore v. United States, 178 F.3d 994 (8th Cir.),

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 943 (1999). 

McElrath also argues that the district court erred in sentencing him under the

career offender guidelines, which, McElrath contends, are no longer valid postBooker. We have already decided that, post-Booker, the career offender guidelines

are constitutional and may be applied. See United States v. Nolan, 397 F.3d 665 (8th

Cir. 2005) (finding of a prior conviction, triggering the mandatory minimum sentence

under the Armed Career Criminal Act, does not raise a Booker issue); United States

v. Marcussen, 403 F.3d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 2005) (determining that a prior conviction

does not need to be submitted to a jury or proved beyond a reasonable doubt and

sentences under the career offender guidelines “do[] not involve a Sixth Amendment

violation”).

Although the district court may apply the career offender guidelines, the

government, at oral argument, conceded error under Booker. The district court

(understandably) treated the Guidelines as mandatory. Having preserved a timely

Blakely objection below, McElrath is entitled to a resentencing hearing at which the

district court treats the Guidelines as advisory. Accordingly, we remand this case to

the district court for resentencing consistent with Booker.

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Finally, McElrath has raised several issues in his pro se briefs. We have

carefully reviewed the pro se briefs and determine that the briefs do not raise any

meritorious issues.

III. Conclusion

We affirm McElrath’s conviction, but vacate the sentence and remand the case

for resentencing.

______________________________

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