Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10251/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10251-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Ray Camez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DAVID RAY CAMEZ, aka Badman,

AKA Doctorsex,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-10251

D.C. No.

2:12-cr-00004-

APG-GWF-23

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 10, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed October 17, 2016

Before: Susan P. Graber and M. Margaret McKeown,

Circuit Judges, and Rosanna Malouf Peterson,* District

Judge.

Opinion by Judge Graber

* The Honorable Rosanna Malouf Peterson, United States District

Judge for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. CAMEZ

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a criminal judgment in a case in which

the defendant was convicted under the Racketeer Influenced

and Corrupt Organizations Act for continuing crimes that

spanned his 18th birthday.

The panel rejected the defendant’s contention that the

Juvenile Delinquency Act prohibits consideration of the

defendant’s pre-majority conduct as proof of the substantive

crimes, and concluded that the defendant’s conviction must

stand where the district court instructed the jury that it could

convict only if it found that the defendant continued his

participation after turning 18, and the jury’s special verdict

form makes clear that the defendant, in fact, continued his

participation after turning 18.

COUNSEL

Chris T. Rasmussen (argued), Rasmussen & Kang LLC, Las

Vegas, Nevada, for Defendant-Appellant.

William R. Reed (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Elizabeth O. White, Appellate Chief; Daniel G. Bogden,

United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office,

Reno, Nevada; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. CAMEZ 3

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

Defendant David Ray Camez participated in a criminal

enterprise, known as the “carder.su enterprise,” that operated

an online trading post for stolen and counterfeit access

devices and means of identification. The government

indicted him under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act (“RICO”) for continuing crimes that,

according to the government, spanned Defendant’s eighteenth

birthday. The district court instructed the jury that it could

not convict Defendant solely for his pre-majority conduct. 

But the court permitted the jury, over Defendant’s objection,

to consider Defendant’s pre-majority conduct as proof of the

substantive crimes. Defendant argues that the Juvenile

Delinquency Act (“JDA”) prohibits consideration of his premajority conduct as proof of the substantive crimes.

Reviewing de novo the question of statutory interpretation,

United States v. Watson, 792 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 2015),

we hold that the district court’s instruction, which comported

with the law of most circuits that have addressed this issue,

was not erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.1

The carder.su enterprise engaged in unlawful trafficking

of means of identification, real and counterfeit; access

devices; and associated equipment. The enterprise’s

hierarchy included an administrator, moderators, reviewers,

vendors, and members. Defendant was a “member” whose

criminal activities in furtherance of the enterprise included

production of, and trafficking in, counterfeit identification

1

In an unpublished disposition filed concurrently with this opinion,

we reject Defendant’s other challenges to his convictions and sentence.

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4 UNITED STATES V. CAMEZ

documents, possession of counterfeit and unauthorized access

devices, and conspiracyto possess device-making equipment.

The government indicted Defendant on two RICO counts: 

(1) a substantive RICO count of participation in a criminal

enterprise, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); and (2) a

RICO conspiracy count of conspiring to participate in a

criminal enterprise, in violation of § 1962(d). Because the

government alleged both pre-majority and post-majority

conduct, the district court instructed the jury on the effect of

Defendant’s age:

You may not convict Mr. Camez of RICO or

RICO conspiracy based solely on his juvenile

acts. You may convict him only if you find

beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Camez

continued to participate in the Carder.su

organization or the RICO conspiracy after he

turned 18 years of age.[2]

With respect to his pre-majority conduct, Defendant

challenges his conviction on the substantive RICO count

only. A “violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) is established by

proof of (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern

(4) of racketeering activity.” United States v. Fernandez,

388 F.3d 1199, 1221 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “A pattern of racketeering activity, in turn, requires

at least two predicate acts . . . .” Id.

2 We reject, as foreclosed by the plain wording of the instruction,

Defendant’s argument that the instruction is confusing or that it allowed

the jury to convict Defendant solely for pre-majority acts.

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UNITED STATES V. CAMEZ 5

The indictment alleged that Defendant committed three

predicate acts: one when he was 17 years old, and two when

he was 18 years old. In the special verdict form, the jury

selected “proven” for the act committed when Defendant was

17; selected “proven” for one of the acts committed when

Defendant was 18; but declined to select “proven” or

“unproven” for the other act allegedly committed by

Defendant when he was 18.

The JDA “creates a special procedural and substantive

enclave for juveniles accused of criminal acts.” United States

v. Frasquillo-Zomosa, 626 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1980). 

“The purpose of the Act, as amended in 1974, was to enhance

the juvenile system by removing juveniles from the ordinary

criminal justice system and by providing a separate system of

‘treatment’ for them.” Id. “A successful prosecution under

the Act results not in conviction of a crime but rather in

adjudication of a status.” United States v. Araiza-Valdez,

713 F.2d 430, 432 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “The Act does not create a

substantive offense with its own jurisdictional basis, but

rather establishes a procedural mechanism for the treatment

of juveniles who are already subject to federal jurisdiction

because of the commission of acts cognizable under other

federal criminal statutes.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

brackets omitted).

Chapter 403 of Title 18, entitled “Juvenile Delinquency,”

sets forth the procedures for adjudicating juveniles alleged to

have committed acts of juvenile delinquency. “A juvenile

who is alleged to have committed an act of juvenile

delinquency and who is not surrendered to State authorities

shall be proceeded against under this chapter unless [certain

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6 UNITED STATES V. CAMEZ

requirements are met].” 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Section 5031

defines the terms “juvenile” and “juvenile delinquency”:

For the purposes of this chapter, a

“juvenile” is a person who has not attained his

eighteenth birthday, or for the purpose of

proceedings and disposition under this chapter

for an alleged act of juvenile delinquency, a

person who has not attained his twenty-first

birthday, and “juvenile delinquency” is the

violation of a law of the United States

committed by a person prior to his eighteenth

birthday which would have been a crime if

committed by an adult or a violation by such

a person of section 922(x).

In nearly all cases, the application of those definitions is

straightforward. We must look first to the defendant’s age at

the time of indictment. United States v. Doe, 631 F.2d 110,

113 (9th Cir. 1980). If the defendant is under 18, then the

JDA applies. 18 U.S.C. § 5031. If the defendant is 21 or

older, then the JDA does not apply. See Araiza-Valdez,

713 F.2d at 433 (holding that the JDA does not apply to a

defendant indicted at age 24, even though the crimes were

committed when the defendant was 17). If the defendant is

18, 19, or 20 at the time of indictment, then we must ask

whether the alleged crime occurred “prior to his eighteenth

birthday.” 18 U.S.C. § 5031. For most crimes, the age of the

defendant is not subject to dispute and the answer to that

inquiry is simple. If the defendant was under 18 at the time

of the crime, then the JDA applies; if not, then the JDA does

not apply. But for continuing crimes alleged to have occurred

both before and after the defendant turned 18, the statute

provides no clear answer to the question whether the JDA

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UNITED STATES V. CAMEZ 7

applies. We face that situation here, because Defendant was

20 at the time of indictment and because the government

alleged that he committed the crime when he was both 17 and

18.

In these circumstances, courts uniformly have held that

adult prosecution is warranted. See, e.g., United States v.

Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1365 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is well

established that federal courts have jurisdiction over

conspiracies [and other continuing crimes] begun while a

defendant was a minor but completed after his eighteenth

birthday.”); United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464, 1475 (11th

Cir. 1986) (“‘The [JDA] does not, of course, prevent an adult

criminal defendant from being tried as an adult simply

because he first became embroiled in the conspiracy with

which he is charged while still a minor.’” (ellipsis omitted)

(quoting United States v. Spoone, 741 F.2d 680, 687 (4th Cir.

1984))); accord United States v. Strothers, 77 F.3d 1389,

1392 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Doerr, 886 F.2d 944,

969 (7th Cir. 1989). Indeed, Defendant here does not

challenge the fact that he was adjudicated as an adult. 

Instead, he argues only that the JDA implicitly forbids a jury

from considering any of his pre-majority conduct as

substantive proof of the crime.

The District of Columbia Circuit has adopted the view

advanced by Defendant. In United States v. Thomas,

114 F.3d 228, 265–67 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the court held that the

jury may consider only the post-majority acts as proof of

guilt; pre-majority acts may be admitted, if at all, only under

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to help the jury understand

post-majority acts. “[I]t is the adult participation that gives

the district court jurisdiction over the eighteen to twenty-one

year old defendant . . . .” Id. at 266. Accordingly, a

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8 UNITED STATES V. CAMEZ

conviction that rests “in whole or in part on acts committed

as a juvenile” is invalid. Id.

Following the lead of most circuit courts to have

considered the issue, we disagree with the D.C. Circuit’s

analysis and conclusion for at least two reasons. First, as the

Tenth Circuit held:

The problem with Thomas . . . is evident: 

Any decision denying the admissibility of

evidence of an adult defendant’s pre-eighteen

conduct to prove his guilt for continuing

crimes incorrectly suggests that the JDA

changes the substantive standard of criminal

liability for a racketeering enterprise or

conspiracy spanning a defendant’s eighteenth

birthday. We do not read the JDA so broadly.

United States v. Delatorre, 157 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir.

1998). Similarly, our own caselaw strongly suggests that the

JDA does not impose substantive requirements on an adult

prosecution. In Frasquillo-Zomosa, 626 F.2d at 101, we

rejected the defendant’s argument that the government must

prove the defendant’s age: “[N]othing in the legislative

history of the [JDA], its purpose or structural scheme

suggests that Congress intended to add an additional

substantive element to the government’s burden of proof.” 

Compare also Araiza-Valdez, 713 F.2d at 432 (our holding

that the JDA “does not create a substantive offense with its

own jurisdictional basis, but rather establishes a procedural

mechanism for the treatment of juveniles who are already

subject to federal jurisdiction because of the commission of

acts cognizable under other federal criminal statutes”

(internal quotation marks omitted)), with Thomas, 114 F.3d

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UNITED STATES V. CAMEZ 9

at 266 (the D.C. Circuit’s holding that “it is the adult

participation that gives the district court jurisdiction”).

Second, we agree with the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis:

Common sense suggests that Congress did

not intend to bifurcate the prosecution of any

continuing offense which began prior to the

defendant’s reaching the age of eighteen and

continued thereafter. The rule proposed by

[the defendant] would have just this effect. In

the instant case, for example, the government

would have been required to prosecute [one of

the defendants] as an adult for those activities

in which he engaged after his eighteenth

birthday, and, in a separate proceeding before

the juvenile courts, prosecute [him] for those

acts which he did before his eighteenth

birthday. Neither the efficiency of judicial

administration nor the congressional purpose

of extending constitutional protections to

juveniles would be served by such a result.

Cruz, 805 F.2d at 1477.

This case, too, illustrates why Congress could not have

intended the result for which Defendant advocates. The jury

found that Defendant committed two acts of racketeering,

proof that ordinarily suffices for a conviction. Defendant

committed one act when 17 and another act when 18. Under

Defendant’s and the D.C. Circuit’s approach, he would not be

guilty as either a juvenile or an adult. He committed only

one act as a juvenile and therefore never established a pattern

for purposes of a juvenile delinquency proceeding; and he

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10 UNITED STATES V. CAMEZ

committed only one act as an adult and therefore never

established a pattern for purposes of an adult prosecution. 

Nothing in the JDA or in any other statute suggests that

Congress intended to create a loophole resulting in no

rehabilitation or punishment whatsoever for persons who

indisputably committed a serious continuing crime, merely

because the crime happened to span the defendant’s

eighteenth birthday.

Had Congress intended to allow all persons effectively to

start with a clean slate on the occurrence of their eighteenth

birthday, then the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion might have more

support. But we have rejected that reading of the JDA by

holding that a person who is indicted after turning 21 must be

charged as an adult, even for crimes committed when he was

17. Araiza-Valdez, 713 F.2d at 433. That is, criminal acts

committed before turning 18 are not, for that reason alone,

necessarily immune from adult prosecution. In sum, we

adopt the prevailing view that, for prosecution of a defendant

indicted at age 18, 19, or 20, pre-majority acts may be

admitted as substantive proof of a continuing crime such as

the substantive RICO count here.

Our sister circuits have explained why pre-majority

conduct is admissible by analogy to the “contract

‘ratification’ doctrine.” Wong, 40 F.3d at 1366; accord

United States v. Welch, 15 F.3d 1202, 1211–12 (1st Cir.

1993); United States v. Maddox, 944 F.2d 1223, 1233 (6th

Cir. 1993). “[J]ust as a minor legally incapable of entering a

contract may nonetheless be found to have ‘ratified’ a

contract by taking actions after attaining majority consistent

with an intent to be bound by it, so a defendant may ratify his

pre-eighteen participation in a conspiracy[or other continuing

crime] by continued participation after attaining majority.” 

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UNITED STATES V. CAMEZ 11

Wong, 40 F.3d at 1366 (citations omitted); see also id. at

1367 (analogizing to the fact that otherwise time-barred acts

may be used in a prosecution so long as the defendant has not

withdrawn from the conspiracyduring the limitations period).

The sister circuits that have rejected the D.C. Circuit’s

restrictive interpretation of the JDA have offered differing

descriptions of what, if any, limitations the JDA imposes on

an adult prosecution of amajority-spanning continuing crime. 

The First Circuit has held that the jury must be instructed that

it may convict the defendant only if it finds that the defendant

participated in the continuing crime after turning 18. Welch,

15 F.3d at 1211–12; accord Delatorre, 157 F.3d at 1209. 

This is the most restrictive of the various approaches. The

Eleventh Circuit has held that no special jury instruction is

required but that the government must introduce sufficient

evidence that the defendant continued to participate in the

continuing crime after turning 18. Cruz, 805 F.2d at 1476–77

& n.15; accord Doerr, 886 F.2d at 969–70.

The Second Circuit appears to have held that it is enough

for a court to “look to the defendant’s age at the time of the

offense or offenses charged in the indictment”; no evidentiary

inquiry is required by the court or the jury. Wong, 40 F.3d at

1365. That approach finds support in the text of the JDA,

which focuses on the government’s allegations and nowhere

suggests that Congress intended to impose a post-indictment

evidentiary burden. See 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (defining a

“juvenile” “for the purpose of proceedings and disposition

under this chapter for an alleged act of juvenile delinquency”

(emphasis added)); id. § 5032 (“A juvenile alleged to have

committed an act of juvenile delinquency[shall be transferred

to state court unless certain conditions are met].” (emphasis

added)); id.(“[N]o criminal prosecution shall be instituted for

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12 UNITED STATES V. CAMEZ

the alleged act of juvenile delinquency except as provided

below.” (emphasis added)); id. (“A juvenile who is alleged to

have committed an act of juvenile delinquency [shall be

prosecuted under the JDA unless certain conditions are met].”

(emphasis added)). Our own caselaw, too, is consistent with

the Second Circuit’s approach. See Frasquillo-Zomosa,

626 F.2d at 101 (“[N]othing in the legislative history of the

[JDA], its purpose or structural scheme suggests that

Congress intended to add an additional substantive element

to the government’s burden of proof.”); see also Doe,

631 F.2d at 113 (holding that “it is important” that the

juvenile/adult determination “be established at the beginning

of a proceeding and that once fixed it endure throughout”).

We need not—and do not—determine which of those

approaches is correct. The district court here instructed the

jury that it could convict Defendant only if it found that

Defendant continued his participation after turning 18, and

the jury’s special verdict form makes clear that the jury found

that Defendant, in fact, continued his participation after

turning 18. Under any of the three approaches used by our

sister circuits, Defendant’s conviction must stand.

AFFIRMED.

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