Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02070/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02070-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arturo Rodriguez-Rios
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

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All documents filed in CV-11-2070 will be designated as “CVDoc” and all

documents filed in the related criminal action, CR-08-1442 will be designated as “CRDoc.”

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Respondent/Plaintiff, 

vs.

Arturo Rodriguez-Rios, 

Movant/Defendant. 

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No. CV-11-2070-PHX-SRB (MHB)

CR-08-1442-PHX-SRB

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

This matter comes before this Court upon consideration of a Motion to Vacate

Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 (hereinafter, “2255 motion”), filed on October 24,

2011, by Movant Arturo Rodriguez-Rios. (CVDoc. 1.)1

 Respondent, the United States of

America, filed a Response on January 23, 2012. (CVDoc. 4.) Movant filed a Reply on June

13, 2012. (CVDoc. 14.)

BACKGROUND

A. Trial.

On December 3, 2008, Movant was indicted by a federal grand jury on four felony

counts: Conspiracy to Commit Hostage Taking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1203; Hostage

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Taking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1203 and §2; Possession, Using and Carrying a Firearm

During and in Relation to a Crime of Violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924©) and §2; and

Harboring Illegal Aliens for Financial Gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and

(a)(1)(B)(I) and §2. (CRDoc. 50.) Movant’s trial commenced on April 28, 2009. (CRDoc.

154.) The trial began with Government witness Oscar Pacheco, who testified that he is the

father-in law to Rene Hernandez-Miranda, and that sometime in October, 2008, he received

a call from someone demanding a ransom for the release of Hernandez-Miranda, a Mexican

citizen who had traveled from Mexico into the United States. (CRDoc. 197, Trial Transcript

(“TT”) at 134-155.) Witness Pacheco testified that he called the police, and eventually law

enforcement agents with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) became involved

in the investigation. (Id.)

On November 5, 2008, Phoenix ICE agents were able to use the telephone number

supplied by the alien smugglers, as well as utilize electronic surveillance to locate a house

in Peoria, Arizona where the ransom calls originated. (CRDoc. 197, TT, at 128.) A search

warrant was executed and the ICE agents found numerous illegal aliens present in a room in

the house, including Hernandez-Miranda. (Id.) During the search, ICE Agent Forcum heard

the sound of what he described as metal hitting porcelain, coming from a room at the end of

a hallway. (Id., TT at 172.) He opined that the sound was of gun-metal hitting porcelain and

immediately called out a demand that the person making the sound come out of the room.

(Id., TT at 172.) A person, later identified as Movant, emerged from the back room. (Id.)

ICE agents later confirmed the presence of both a 9-millimeter handgun, and a loaded

magazine submerged in water inside a toilet tank in the hall bathroom from which Movant

had emerged. (CRDoc. 198, TT at 291.) 

At trial, witness Hernandez-Miranda, and another illegal alien present in the Peoria

house, witness Moreno-Garcia, testified that they had traveled from Mexico together,

contracted to pay an alien smuggler to smuggle them across the border, crossed the border

illegally, and were eventually brought to the Peoria house where their smuggling fees were

raised. (CRDoc. 198, TT at 226-250, 327-345.) While at the Peoria house they were

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stripped of most of their clothing including their shoes, confined to a small windowless dark

bedroom and for just over two days were kept under constant guard by Movant, who was

seated in a chair by the door of the room, armed with a loaded handgun. (Id.) Both

witnesses testified that while Movant was brandishing and “playing” with his handgun, he

threatened that if his ransom demands were not met, he would cut his victims into pieces and

flush them down the toilet or tie his victims up, shoot them, and leave their bodies in the

desert. (CRDoc. 198, TT at 244-47, 343-44.) Movant purportedly explained that “he could

shoot [the smuggled aliens] and then he could say that [the smuggled aliens] had come in to

rob his house, because [Movant] had a permit to carry a weapon,” and that, “it was not the

first time, nor was it going to be the last time” that he had done such a thing. (Id., TT at 343.)

At the conclusion of the Government’s case, Movant’s counsel moved for a directed

verdict, and that motion was denied by the Court. (CRDoc.199, TT at 400.) Movant then

testified in his defense, claiming that he was a hostage at the Peoria house as well, and had

been working for the alien smugglers to pay off the balance of his smuggling debt. (Id., TT

at 402-441.) After three days of trial, the jury convicted Movant of all charges. (Id., TT at

507-08.) At sentencing, the Court concluded that, despite the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

calculation, the U.S. Probation Office recommendation, and the Government’s

recommendation, a life sentence for Counts 1, 2, and 3 would represent an “unwarranted

sentencing disparity when [Movant] is compared to his co-defendant Flores-Tirado,” and

instead sentenced Movant to a below-Guidelines sentence of 15 years on Counts 1 and 2, and

a concurrent term of 10 years (the maximum) on Count 4, followed by the mandatory

minimum seven years on Count 3, to be served consecutively. (CRDoc. 200, TT at 19-20.)

B. Appeal.

Movant appealed his conviction and sentence. (CRDoc. 192.) Movant raised the

following two issues on appeal: (1) the court abused its discretion in denying Movant’s

motion to substitute counsel; and (2) the court abused its discretion in sentencing Movant to

264-months in prison. (CVDoc. 4, Exh. 1.) On August 13, 2010, the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals found that the conflict between Movant and his counsel was not extensive nor

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Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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irreconcilable and did not result in a complete breakdown of attorney-client communication,

and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Movant’s motion to

substitute counsel. (Id.) The Court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in sentencing Movant to 264-months in prison and the sentence was not substantively

unreasonable. (Id.) Movant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed, and on October 1,

2010, the Ninth Circuit entered its formal mandate. (Id.)

C. Motion under 28 U.S.C. §2255.

On October 24, 2011, Petitioner filed a timely pro se 2255 Motion. (CVDoc. 1.) In

Grounds 1, 2, and 4 of his 2255 Motion, Movant claims that his trial and appellate counsel

were ineffective because (1) trial counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation

regarding both the background of the Government’s witnesses and Movant’s claim that his

mother paid a portion of his smuggling fee, failed to negotiate a better plea offer from the

Government based upon the information he would have obtained, and failed to advise

Movant about the availability of a “fast-track” plea agreement; (2) trial counsel failed to

conduct an adequate investigation and communicate with Movant, resulting in trial counsel’s

failure to impeach a Government witness with prior illegal entries, and failing to properly

present a reasonable doubt argument to the jury based upon payments made by his mother

to the smugglers; and (4) appellate counsel failed to argue on appeal the lack of evidence

developed during trial, despite having raised the issue during trial. (Id., at 5-9.) Movant’s

third claim for relief is that the Government engaged in misconduct by failing to provide

Movant with Brady2

 material relating to the criminal background of its witnesses, and by

failing to “correct” a statement made by witness Hernandez-Miranda during a pre-trial

deposition that he had not entered the United States prior to this incident. (Id., at 8.)

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MERITS - PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

A federal prisoner may seek relief under §2255 if (1) his sentence was imposed in violation

of the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States; (2) the sentencing court

had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence on the prisoner; (3) the sentence imposed

exceeded the maximum sentence authorized, or (4) the sentence is “otherwise subject to

collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A 2255 petition is an “extraordinary remedy,”

however, and “will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.” Bousley v. United States,

523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) (citation omitted). If a prisoner could have raised a claim on direct

appeal but did not do so, he has “procedurally defaulted” on that claim and cannot present

it in a 2255 petition unless he shows (1) cause for failing to raise it on direct appeal and

“actual prejudice” from that failure or (2) that he is “actually innocent.” Id. at 622 (citations

omitted). A claim is exempt from the procedural default rule, however, if it cannot be

presented without further factual development. Id. at 621. A claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel may fall within this exemption. Masaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 509

(2003). A prisoner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the claim, however, if “the

motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that [he] is entitled to no

relief.” 28 U.S.C. §2255(b). To earn the right to a hearing, a prisoner must “allege specific

facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief.” United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155,

1159 (9th Cir. 1996).

The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was established

by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail

on an ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) that counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. See id. at 687-88.

Regarding the performance prong, a reviewing court engages a strong presumption

that counsel rendered adequate assistance, and exercised reasonable professional judgment

in making decisions. See id. at 690. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires

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that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Moreover, review of counsel’s performance under Strickland

is “extremely limited”: “The test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have

done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether

some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel

acted at trial.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir.), judgment rev’d on other

grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). Thus, a court “must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s

challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s

conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

If the prisoner is able to satisfy the performance prong, he must also establish

prejudice. Strickland, at 691-92; see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000)

(burden is on [petitioner] to show prejudice). To establish prejudice, a prisoner must

demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable

probability” is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. A

court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining

whether prejudice resulted from the alleged deficiencies. See Robbins, 528 U.S. at 286 n.14.

“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient

prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Id. (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

The court shall not grant a prisoner an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the motion and

the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief,

. . .” 28 U.S.C. §2255; See also, Watts v. United States, 841 F.2d 275, 276 (9th Cir. 1928).

A hearing is not required when credibility issues can be conclusively decided on the basis

of documentary testimony and evidence in the record. Id., at 277. A prisoner must “allege

specific facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief.” United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d

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1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1996). See also, Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir.

1989) (vague and conclusory assertions with no supporting facts do not warrant habeas

relief).

CLAIMS

A. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Conduct Adequate Investigation, and Failure to 

Advise Movant of a Fast-Track Plea Offer Constitutes Ineffective Assistance

of Counsel.

Movant claims that his attorney failed to discover the “backgrounds of all material

witnesses and co-defendants.” (CVDoc. 1, at 5.) He claims this information would have

shown that “at least” one of the material witnesses who testified at trial had “various ‘illegal’

entries into the United States.” (Id.) The only evidence he presents to support this claim is

a U.S. Department of Homeland Security Immigration form I-213 that indicates that

Government witness Hernandez-Miranda had entered the United States 3-years prior to the

date of the offense. (CVDoc. 1, at 21-22.) Movant claims that Hernandez-Miranda testified

falsely in his deposition concerning his immigration history. Hernandez-Miranda’s

deposition testimony was not admitted during the trial, and therefore Movant can not show

any prejudice, even if his trial counsel’s performance during the deposition fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness.

Movant also claims that his attorney did not investigate his allegation that payments

were made by his family to “the coyotes in charge of collecting the money in [his] case”

toward his debt for bringing transported to the United States, “suggesting that he was not a

coyote,” but a victim. (CVDoc. 1, at 5.) He presents no evidence, other than his own

assertion, that such a payment or payments were made. Movant testified during the trial that

a partial payment was made by his mother, who was in Mexico, to the alien smugglers.

(CRDoc. 199, TT at 407-409.) The Government, prior to Movant’s testimony, introduced

into evidence an exhibit identified as the “pollo book,” located at the Peoria house, which

identified the names of the aliens held hostage, their destination city, and listed the ransom

moneys paid to the alien smugglers on their behalf. (CRDoc. 198, TT at 315.) Significantly,

although the book listed the names of the two aliens who testified against Movant at trial,

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Hernandez-Miranda and Moreno-Garcia, it did not contain Movant’s name. (CRDoc. 199,

TT at 504.) 

The Ninth Circuit has held that counsel must conduct a “reasonable investigation’ in

order to make informed decisions about how to best represent the client, and must make

“reasonable decisions” about what particular investigation is unnecessary. Hendricks v.

Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). With respect to Movant’s

claim regarding his mother’s smuggling payment, the record does not disclose what

additional evidence existed that his attorney could have obtained to support his trial

testimony. Without some detail about what beneficial additional investigation will reveal,

a defendant cannot meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Hendricks, 70 F.3d at

1042. 

Movant also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because he could have

negotiated a more favorable plea agreement for him had he been in possession of the above

information. This claim fails for the reason that (1) Movant does not set forth what

information was utilized by his counsel in negotiations with the Government to leverage the

best possible plea agreement, and (2) it is pure speculation, in any event, that the

Government’s plea offer would have been any more beneficial had Movant’s counsel been

aware of Hernandez-Miranda’s lie during the deposition, and Movant’s claim regarding the

smuggling-fee payment by his mother. Even if Movant could demonstrate that his trial

counsel didn’t utilize this information during plea negotiations, and erred by not doing so,

he can not demonstrate that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.

Movant also claims that his trial counsel failed to advise him of the availability of a

“fast-track” plea agreement. Movant fails to present any evidence that such a plea agreement

had been tendered to him by the Government. In fact, Respondent asserts in its Response

that Movant was “ineligible for such a plea agreement and was not offered one.” (CVDoc.

4, at 17.) 

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The Court uses the term “suggests” because the “Alien’s Name” is blacked-out on

the top of the form, and in the content of the form, the writer uses both the term “Subject”

and “Victim Hernandez-Miranda” to identify who is being referred to. As the Government

does not refute Movant’s claim that the form is only referring to Hernandez-Martinez when

it discusses prior entries and immigration contact, the Court must assume that the “Subject”

and Hernandez-Martinez are one and the same.

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B. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Conduct an Adequate Investigation and Failure to

Communicate Resulted in Trial Counsel’s Failure to Impeach a Government

Witness, and Failing to Properly Argue Reasonable Doubt to the Jury. 

Movant claims that his trial counsel should have impeached government witness

Hernandez-Martinez during trial with the fact that he had lied during his deposition regarding

his immigration history. Hernandez-Martinez testified in a pre-trial deposition that the first

time he had entered the United States was just prior to his being held hostage by defendant.

(CVDoc. 1, at 20.) The Immigration form I-213, provided by Movant, suggests that

Hernandez-Martinez had entered the United States before in 2005, and had “been

apprehended by Immigration on six occasions.3

” (Id., at 21-22.) As previously stated,

witness Hernandez-Martinez’s deposition was not introduced at trial and thus the jury never

read it. He testified, however.

During his trial testimony, Hernandez-Martinez did not testify that the first time he

entered the United States was just prior to the hostage incident, and he was never asked the

question whether or not he had previously been in the United States, or if he had previously

been apprehended by immigration. Thus, during the trial, he did not lie. The question

presented then, is whether or not Movant’s counsel erred by not trying to impeach

Hernandez-Martinez with his prior illegal entries into the United States. Since HernandezMartinez’s prior illegal entries did not result in a criminal conviction, the only evidentiary

basis for permitting such cross-examination is Fed.R.Evid. 608(b), which permits

impeachment with specific instances of conduct if probative of the witness’s character for

truthfulness or untruthfulness. 

Even if Hernandez-Martinez had in fact illegally entered the United States on prior

occasions, it is difficult to see how that conduct is probative of his character for

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untruthfulness, especially in light of the fact that he admitted during trial entering illegally

just prior to the events he testified about. Furthermore, if Movant’s counsel was permitted

to impeach Hernandez-Martinez with the fact that he had lied in his deposition, he can not

establish what his response would be. If he denied the lie, Movant would be stuck with the

answer, as “specific instances of conduct for the purpose of attacking the witness’ credibility

... may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.” United States v. Brooke, 4 F.3d 1480, 1484

(9th Cir. 1993). If Hernandez-Martinez admitted the lie, Movant can only speculate as to

whether or not Hernandez-Martinez could be rehabilitated on redirect. In light of these

considerations, Movant’s trial counsel’s performance was not objectively deficient.

Even if Movant could demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance in crossexamining Hernandez-Martinez fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, the

evidence against Movant was overwhelming. Both Hernandez-Martinez and Moreno-Garcia

testified consistently that Movant was the person who guarded the room in the house where

they were held for ransom. They both testified that he sat in a chair, held a gun and made

threats. Both made statements to the police about the gun before they had any knowledge

that a gun was located and seized by law enforcement during the search. Movant was

observed by the search team leaving the bathroom of the house in which a gun was found in

the toilet tank. Just prior to Movant emerging from the bathroom, a member of the search

team heard the sound of what he believed was metal hitting porcelain. A chair was located

at the doorway of the room in which the hostages were found. Furthermore, although both

Hernandez-Martinez and Moreno-Garcia were found in the house without shoes and socks,

and testified that those items were taken from them by the kidnappers, Movant was found

wearing shoes. Witnesses also observed Movant to be clean and clean-shaven, distinguishing

him from the hostages who were unshaven and dirty, consistent with having recently walked

through the desert and not having recently bathed. 

Movant claims that his trial counsel did not argue reasonable doubt to the jury. This

claim is belied by the record. Movant’s counsel argued in his closing that the evidence was

insufficient to convict, that the hostage witnesses were mistaken in their identification, and

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that Movant was under duress. (CRDoc. 199, TT at 484-94.) Thus, his trial counsel was not

ineffective during closing argument as Movant claims.

C. The Government Engaged in Misconduct by Failing to Provide Movant with Brady

material.

Movant claims that the Government engaged in misconduct by failing to provide

Movant with Brady material relating to the criminal background of its witnesses, and by

failing to “correct” a statement made by witness Hernandez-Miranda during a pre-trial

deposition that he had not entered the United States prior to this incident. Movant has

procedurally defaulted this claim because he did not raise this issue on appeal. Bousley, 423

U.S. at 614. A claim avoids default if the facts underlying the claim could not be presented

on appeal because of later factual development. Id., at 621. That is not the case here. The

Government contends, and Movant does not dispute, that the discovery provided Movant’s

counsel included the Immigration form I-213 that contained the information about witness

Hernandez-Miranda. (CVDoc. 4, at 21-22; CVDoc. 14, at 9-10.) Movant also claims that

the Government engaged in misconduct by not correcting a statement made by HernandezMiranda during a pretrial deposition. Even if an obligation existed on the part of the

Government to do so, Movant has suffered no prejudice, as the deposition transcript was not

admitted during his trial.

Although Movant has procedurally defaulted this claim, the claim “may [still] be

raised in habeas if he can demonstrate either ‘cause’ and actual ‘prejudice’, or that he is

actually ‘innocent’.” Bousley, 423 U.S., at 622 (citations omitted). Movant has not, however,

demonstrated cause or prejudice, or that he is actually innocent. 

D. Movant’s Appellate Counsel’s Failure to Raise Lack of Evidence on Appeal

Constitutes Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

At the conclusion of the Government’s case during trial, Movant’s trial counsel

moved, pursuant to Rule 29, Fed.R.Crim.P., that the Court direct a verdict based upon the

Government’s failure to present sufficient evidence to convict Movant as charged. (CRDoc.

199, TT at 400.) The Court denied the motion. (Id.) At the conclusion of Movant’s case,

after he testified before the jury that he was not the person guarding the hostages, and that

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he was in fact a hostage himself working off his debt to the kidnappers, Movant’s counsel

again moved pursuant to Rule 29, that the Court direct a verdict. (CRDoc. 199, TT at 453.)

The Court again denied the motion. (Id.) The jury returned with its verdict just 2 hours and

8 minutes after retiring to deliberate. (Id., TT at 502, 506.) 

Movant does not establish that his appellate counsel’s failure to raise lack of evidence

as an issue on appeal falls below an objective standard of reasonableness. Appellate counsel

raised two issues on appeal, and his decision to not raise other issues may have been

strategic, and it may simply have been that appellate counsel did not discern any other errors

to raise. Even if Movant can demonstrate ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, he can

not show that, had the issue of lack of evidence been raised, the appellate court would have

granted relief, especially in light of the strength of the Government’s case against Movant,

as outlined above. Supra, at 10.

CONCLUSION

Movant has not alleged specific facts, if true, that would entitle him to relief, and thus

he has not earned the right to an evidentiary hearing. United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d

1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1996). The motion and the files and records of Movant’s case

“conclusively show that [Movant] is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. §2255. Movant’s

request for a hearing, and request to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence should therefore

be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Movant’s Motion Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (CVDoc.

1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because jurists of reason would not find

it debatable whether the motion states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,

484 (2000).

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72.

DATED this 20th day of July, 2012.

Case 2:11-cv-02070-SRB Document 16 Filed 07/23/12 Page 13 of 13