Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02036/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02036-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alvaro Lazcano-Leon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued July 8, 2015

Decided October 26, 2015

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 14-2036

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ALVARO LAZCANO-LEON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division.

No. 13 CR 775-1

Ronald A. Guzmán,

Judge.

O R D E R

Alvaro Lazcano-Leon pleaded guilty to being in the United States without 

permission after his removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), and was sentenced within the 

guidelines range to 55 months in prison. He argues on appeal that the government 

delayed its § 1326(a) prosecution for 43 months until he had fully served a state sentence 

for drug trafficking. As a consequence, he says, he was denied an opportunity to 

persuade the district court to impose a sentence that would run at least in part 

concurrently with his state sentence. The remedy he seeks is a reduction in his federal 

sentence by the length of this delay in charging him. We disagree. The district court was 

not required to award any discount for Lazcano-Leon’s state incarceration or any delay 

in the federal prosecution. The district court, as it acknowledged, could have given him a 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 14-2036 Document: 32 Filed: 10/26/2015 Pages: 4
No. 14-2036 Page 2

discount as a matter of discretion but rejected this argument in mitigation. That choice 

was not an abuse of discretion. We affirm the sentence.

In 1994, after serving a federal sentence for possessing over 270 grams of heroin 

with intent to distribute, Lazcano-Leon was deported to his native Mexico. In 2000, he

returned illegally to the United States. In 2010 he was sentenced to eight years in prison 

by an Illinois court after he pleaded guilty to delivering a kilogram of cocaine to an 

undercover police officer. He was paroled in 2013 after serving just 43 months. Before his 

release the Illinois Department of Corrections had notified Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (which had lodged a civil detainer), and ICE agents took custody.

A month later Lazcano-Leon was indicted on the § 1326(a) charge. He pleaded

guilty. A probation officer calculated a total offense level of 21 and criminal-history 

category of III, yielding a guideline imprisonment range of 46 to 57 months. The total 

offense level included a 16-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) because 

Lazcano-Leon had been deported after his 1994 heroin-trafficking conviction.

At the sentencing hearing, the defense focused on what it called a “cruel” policy 

by the government to withhold a § 1326(a) charge until after the target had served his 

state sentence. The defense argued that Lazcano-Leon should get a discount for the 43 

months he served on the state drug conviction because, as shown by the date of the ICE 

detainer, someone in the government had known about the defendant’s unlawful 

presence in the United States that entire time. The defense argued that if the government 

had brought the § 1326(a) charge when the state drug charge was filed, Lazcano-Leon 

would have tried to resolve the federal charge first (so that a conviction in state court 

would not count toward his criminal-history score) and would have asked either the 

federal court or the state court to run his sentences concurrently. Counsel represented 

that Lazcano-Leon had reentered the United States to help his family.

The government asked for a within-guidelines sentence, arguing that 

Lazcano-Leon should not receive a break for his state incarceration because that term 

was punishment for a different crime.

The district court adopted the probation officer’s proposed findings and imposed 

a 55-month term of imprisonment. In rejecting the argument that Lazcano-Leon should 

receive a discount for his state imprisonment, the judge did not see “a basis for giving 

him credit for any time that he has served in state court” because he was “selfish” in 

committing crimes that hurt others and “our communities.” The judge reasoned that 

Case: 14-2036 Document: 32 Filed: 10/26/2015 Pages: 4
No. 14-2036 Page 3

Lazcano-Leon’s drug crimes were significant and that a desire to be near and to help 

family could not excuse trafficking drugs after crossing the border illegally. Drug 

trafficking, the judge continued, is “a particular disease” that fuels crime and gang 

activity in neighborhoods where drugs are sold. The judge concluded that protecting the 

public from recidivist drug offenders like Lazcano-Leon was the most significant 

sentencing factor.

On appeal Lazcano-Leon first argues that the sentencing court committed a 

procedural error by not explaining why it rejected his argument for a discount, yet 

elsewhere in his brief he concedes that the sentencing court in fact addressed his 

argument. That concession is sound since the court’s reasoning was clear. So 

Lazcano-Leon’s appeal really rests on his further contention that the sentence imposed is 

substantively unreasonable. He contends that the district court was required to give a 

discount for the 43 months he served on his state drug conviction because the 

government intentionally delayed bringing a § 1326(a) charge.

The substantive reasonableness of a sentence is reviewed for abuse of discretion 

in light of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Castro-Alvarado, 755 F.3d 

472, 477 (7th Cir. 2014). As part of the sentencing judge’s duty to weigh a defendant’s 

arguments in mitigation, the sentencing judge has the discretion to consider a delay in 

charging a defendant under § 1326(a) as one factor in deciding the appropriate sentence. 

See United States v. Estrada-Mederos, 784 F.3d 1086, 1091 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. 

Garcia-Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 568 (7th Cir. 2013).

Lazcano-Leon’s argument misunderstands the nature of discretion. A sentencing 

court is not required to accept an argument in mitigation, and here the judge concluded 

that other § 3553(a) factors outweighed defendant’s contention about the timing of the 

§ 1326(a) indictment. See United States v. Filipiak, 466 F.3d 582, 583 (7th Cir. 2006) (district 

court must consider arguments under § 3553(a) for sentence below guideline range but is 

not compelled to accept them). The judge emphasized the need to protect the public 

from Lazcano-Leon as a recidivist drug offender, his two prior drug convictions, and his 

commission of new crimes after returning to the United States unlawfully. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(1) & (2)(C); see also United States v. Horton, 770 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(explaining that sentencing court had discretion to give one § 3553(a) factor less weight 

than others); Garcia-Segura, 717 F.3d at 568 (same).

Lazcano-Leon implies that the government’s timing was in bad faith, but he 

presented no evidence of bad faith. Calling the government’s decision to wait 

Case: 14-2036 Document: 32 Filed: 10/26/2015 Pages: 4
No. 14-2036 Page 4

“egregious” and “unreasonable,” as he does, ignores that the choice when to charge a 

defendant is a matter of prosecutorial discretion. See United States v. Segal, 495 F.3d 826, 

833 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Jarrett, 447 F.3d 520, 525 (7th Cir. 2006). Lazcano-Leon 

points to nothing in the record suggesting that the government relied on an 

impermissible factor such as race or religion in choosing to charge him only after he had 

served his state sentence. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); United 

States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 899–900 (7th Cir. 2008). Lazcano-Leon committed unrelated 

crimes in different jurisdictions (state and federal), and he cites no authority for the 

argument that the federal government was required to bring the § 1326(a) charge sooner. 

See Garcia-Segura, 717 F.3d at 569 (“[Defendant’s] state sentence was for drug and 

firearm possessions, convictions in no way related to his federal offense of unauthorized 

presence in the United States after removal.”).

Lazcano-Leon asserts that the sentencing judge’s decision was unreasonable 

because the judge found that the delay was “intentional” and “that there is a policy of 

delaying charges,” which had deprived him of serving his sentences concurrently. The 

judge acknowledged that Lazcano-Leon lost the opportunity to seek concurrent 

sentences because of the delay but not that he was entitled to concurrent sentences.

There is no reason to assume that federal prosecutors would have interfered with 

Lazcano-Leon’s state drug prosecution by taking him out of state custody to proceed 

first with the federal charge even if he had been charged immediately with violating 

§ 1326(a). And there is no support for Lazcano-Leon’s assumption that the state court 

would have run his sentence concurrently.

Lazcano-Leon disagrees with the judge’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors, but the 

record shows that the judge addressed and rejected his argument that he should receive 

a discount for the government’s delay in charging him. The judge provided a sufficient 

explanation that other factors warranted a within-guidelines sentence. Because 

Lazcano-Leon has shown no abuse of discretion, we AFFIRM his sentence.

Case: 14-2036 Document: 32 Filed: 10/26/2015 Pages: 4