Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_04-cv-01131/USCOURTS-almd-2_04-cv-01131-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Catheron Pate
Plaintiff
West Publishing Corporation
Defendant

Document Text:

1. Pursuant to an order dated August 22, 2005 (Doc.

No. 20), Pate’s claims of retaliation and breach of

contract were dismissed.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

CATHERON PATE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:04cv1131-T

) (WO)

WEST PUBLISHING )

CORPORATION, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION

Plaintiff Catheron Pate, an American woman of Korean

descent, brings this lawsuit against defendant West

Publishing Corporation under two federal statutes: Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§

1981a, 2000e through 2000e-17 (“Title VII”); and Civil

Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981

(“1981”).1

 Pate claims that she was terminated from her

employment with West because of her race and sex, and

that she was subjected to a hostile-work environment.

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 1 of 30
2

Jurisdiction over Pate’s Title VII claim is proper under

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(3), and over her § 1981 claim

under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343. 

Having reviewed the factual record in detail, the

court concludes, for reasons given below, that West’s

motion for summary judgment should be granted.

I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under Rule 56,

the party seeking summary judgment must first inform the

court of the basis for the motion, and the burden then

shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate why summary

judgment would not be proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also Fitzpatrick v. City of

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 2 of 30
3

Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-17 (11th Cir. 1993)

(discussing burden-shifting under Rule 56). The nonmoving party must affirmatively set forth specific facts

showing a genuine issue for trial and may not rest upon

the mere allegations or denials in the pleadings. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e).

The court’s role at the summary-judgment stage is not

to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the

matter, but rather to determine only whether a genuine

issue exists for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In doing so, the court must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor

of that party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

II. BACKGROUND

The following facts are construed in Pate’s favor as

the non-moving party: Pate was hired by West as an

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 3 of 30
2. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

21), Exhibit D, Affidavit of Chris Parton, p. 1.

3. Id., Exhibit A, deposition of Catheron Pate(“Pate

deposition”), pp. 150-151.

4

academic account manager in January 1998. She received

numerous awards and reward trips for her outstanding

performance, and never received less than a rating of

“far exceeds expectations” on her performance

evaluations.2

Pate and approximately 2,000 other West employees

attended the company’s annual national sales conference

from January 28 to February 1, 2004, at an Arizona hotel.

On January 30, after a dinner at which alcohol was

served, many employees congregated in the hotel bar.3

Pate and a group of approximately 13 other West employees

engaged in an “adult” conversation that included

discussion of who wore underwear and who did not. Two

white male employees placed their hands inside Pate’s

jeans; another white male employee touched Pate’s

breasts; a white female employee asked Pate to return to

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 4 of 30
4. Pate deposition, p. 156.

5. Pate deposition, p. 175.

6. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

21), Exhibit B-1, notes of investigation conducted by

Rebecca Rocke (“Rocke investigation notes”), p. 2

(conversation with Wayne Leuthmers).

5

the employee’s room to touch her breasts; and a second

white female employee walked around the bar asking others

if they wanted to touch her breasts.4

 

Pate pulled the belt buckles of two male employees,

completely removing the belt of one of the men. At a

certain point, Pate gestured for Rodney Buhrsmith, a

senior director of strategic marketing, to approach.

Apparently at the urging of a white male employee who

suggested that they determine whether Buhrsmith was

wearing underwear, Pate pulled Buhrsmith’s sweatpants to

his knees, revealing to the group that he was not, in

fact, wearing underwear.5

 Buhrsmith pulled his pants up,

laughed, and returned to his room shortly thereafter.6

In the middle of the night, Buhrsmith awoke and realized

that he had “lost an opportunity to show good

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 5 of 30
7. Rocke investigation notes, p. 3 (conversation

with Rodney Buhrsmith).

8. Id.

6

leadership.”7 The next morning, he instructed Pate and

the employees who had witnessed the events of the

previous evening to meet with him after one of the

conference sessions. At that meeting, he advised the

employees that, while he had personally not been

humiliated by Pate’s behavior, any employee who felt

uncomfortable had a right to talk to management.8

 Pate

stood and apologized for her behavior. She subsequently

sent an e-mail to the group that read:

“Hello Everyone,

“I would like to again sincerely

apologize to Rodney and to those of you

present last night for my behavior.

This unfortunate incident has made me

seriously re-evaluate my thoughts on

what is and is not appropriate. I have

absolutely no excuse for my actions. I

promise you that I will behave with the

utmost professionalism and respect that

my managers and co-workers deserve from

this day forward.

“Again,

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 6 of 30
9. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

21), Exhibit A-5, Pate apology e-mail.

10. Rocke investigation notes, p. 3 (conversation

with Rodney Buhrsmith).

11. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

21), Exhibits F, G, and I, Affidavits of John Lim, Wayne

Luethmers, and Tony Buscemi.

12. West Publishing Corporation, defendant in this

action, forms part of the Thomson corporation, a provider

of electronic and print information.

(continued...)

7

“I sincerely apologize.

“Catheron Pate”9

Buhrsmith explained what had happened to the director

of the academic segment, the West division in which Pate

was employed.10 At least three of the male employees,

including one of the men whose belt Pate had pulled, also

complained of her behavior to West management.11 All of

these reports reached Rebecca Rocke, a West human

resources manager who did not attend the conference. 

West’s Code of Business Conduct and Ethics contains

the following discussion of discrimination:

“Workplace discrimination and harassment

will not be tolerated. ... Thomson12 has

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 7 of 30
12. (...continued)

http://west.thomson.com/overview/.

13. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

21), Exhibit A-17, Code of Business Conduct and Ethics,

p. 164.

8

zero tolerance for harassment.

Harassment generally means offensive

verbal or physical conduct that singles

out a person to the detriment or

objection of that person. Harassment

covers a wide range of conduct, from

direct requests of a sexual nature to

insults, offensive jokes or slurs, and

results in a hostile work environment.

... Reports of harassment will be

promptly and thoroughly investigated in

as confidential a manner as possible.

We will take immediate and appropriate

action if harassment is determined to

have occurred.”13

Disciplinary action for violations of the code is also

described:

“Thomson strives to impose discipline

for each Code violation that fits the

nature and particular facts of the

violation. A failure by any employee to

comply with laws or regulations

governing company business, this Code or

any other company policy may result in

disciplinary action up to, and

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 8 of 30
14. Id., p. 173.

15. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

21), Exhibit B, affidavit of Rebecca Rocke (“Rocke

affidavit”).

16. Pate deposition, p. 286.

17. Rocke investigation notes, p. 3 (conversation

with Rodney Buhrsmith); Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment (Doc. No. 21), Exhibit E, affidavit of Rodney

Buhrsmith, p. 3. 

9

including, termination, and if

warranted, legal proceedings.”14

While conducting her investigation, Rocke spoke with

Pate and Buhrsmith and with other employee-witnesses to

the events in question.15 Pate, who has never denied her

actions, was assured by Rocke that, as an “award-winning

person,” she would be “all right.”16 Pate was nonetheless

fearful for her position, and asked Rocke for permission

to ask others present at the scene to call and explain to

Rocke the context in which she had acted. Rocke agreed,

and two individuals called her, including Buhrsmith, who

did not personally wish to see Pate fired.17 However,

another employee felt uncomfortable with Pate’s entreaty,

and communicated her discomfort to Rocke, who

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 9 of 30
18. Rocke affidavit, p. 5; Pate deposition, pp. 286-

288.

19. Pate deposition, pp. 188-189.

20. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

21), Exhibit A-13, Transcript of unemployment insurance

benefits hearing (“UIB hearing transcript”), p. 56.

21. Rocke affidavit, p. 6.

10

subsequently told Pate not to discuss the matter and to

stop urging other employees to call on her behalf.18 

During Rocke’s investigation, Pate never mentioned

that other employees had put their hands down her jeans,

touched her breasts, or invited her to touch another’s

breasts.19 The most that Pate communicated to Rocke was

that “there were other things that had happened that

evening.”20 Based on her investigation, Rocke recommended

Pate’s termination. This course of action was approved

by Pate’s immediate supervisor, the director of her

division, and by the senior director of human resources,

and reviewed by two members of West’s upper management.21

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 10 of 30
22. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

21), Exhibit K, deposition of Ira Tiffenberg (“Tiffenberg

deposition”), pp. 92-93.

11

Pate was terminated on December 12, 2004, and her

position was filled by a white male employee.22 Pate

filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that

she was terminated while “white male and female employees

had engaged in similar or more inappropriate conduct

without having had any kind of disciplinary action.” In

a letter dated August 20, 2004, the EEOC requested that

Pate provide additional information within ten days in

order to avoid a determination that West had not

discriminated against her. The EEOC wrote to Pate that,

“Despite your assertion that other employees engaged in

inappropriate behavior at the same National Sales

Conference ..., you have not supplied any names of such

persons.” Pate did not supply names of the persons she

alleged had also engaged in inappropriate behavior at the

conference, and the EEOC issued a right to sue notice.

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23. UIB hearing transcript, pp. 47-48.

24. Rocke affidavit, p. 7.

25. Because Title VII and § 1981 “have the same

requirements of proof and use the same analytical

framework,” the court will “explicitly address the Title

VII claim with the understanding that the analysis

applies to the § 1981 claim as well.” Standard v.

A.B.E.L. Servs., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998). 

12

It was not until her subsequent unemploymentinsurance-benefits hearing that Pate first described the

other employees’ alleged inappropriate behavior at the

conference,23 and, perhaps most significantly, Pate did

not even name these employees until after she initiated

this lawsuit; she finally named them in her responses to

Wsst’s discovery requests in this litigation.24

III. DISCUSSION 

Under both Title VII and § 1981, it is, in general,

illegal for an employer to discriminate against its

employees because of their race or sex. 42 U.S.C.A.

§ 2000e-2(a)(1); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.25 

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 12 of 30
13

A. Hostile-Work Environment

In order to establish a hostile-work environment

claim, Pate must show that (1) she belongs to a protected

group; (2) she has been subject to unwelcome harassment;

(3) the harassment was based on a protected

characteristic, such as her sex or race; (4) the

harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter

the terms and conditions of employment; and (5)

imposition of liability on the defendant is appropriate.

Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., 347 F.3d 1272, 1279-

1280 (11th Cir. 2003).

With regard to the fourth element, the Supreme Court

has “made it clear that conduct must be extreme to amount

to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.”

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).

Conduct will not be considered sufficiently hostile and

pervasive, so as to alter the terms and conditions of

employment, merely because an employee believes it to be

so; instead, the work environment “must be both

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 13 of 30
26. Pate testified:

“Q: Is there any claim at all in this

case that relates to anything having to

do with your employment at West, up

until the time of your termination?

“A: No.”

Pate deposition, p. 67.

27. Pate testified:

(continued...)

14

objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a

reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one

that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.” Id. at

787.

Pate has not responded in any way to West’s motion

for summary judgment on her hostile-work-environment

claim, much less come forward with specific facts showing

a genuine issue for trial; indeed, the record suggests

that Pate intended to abandon this claim.26 Regardless,

the claim is not supported by any evidence. Pate has

testified that she was completely satisfied with every

aspect of her employment until she was terminated.27

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 14 of 30
27. (...continued)

“Q: Up until the time of your

termination, were you completely

satisfied with every aspect of your

employment at West?

“A: Yes. I loved my job, everyone loved

me. It was great.”

Pate deposition, p. 67.

15

Therefore, summary judgment will be granted on Pate’s

hostile-work-environment claim. See Fitzpatrick, 2 F .3d

at 1115-16 (“For issues ... on which the non-movant would

bear the burden of proof at trial, ... the moving party

[for summary judgment] simply may show[]--that is,

point[] out to the district court--that there is an

absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's

case.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

B. Race and Sex Discrimination

Pate’s race and sex discrimination claims are

governed by the familiar burden-shifting analysis of

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Under the McDonnell Douglas approach, a plaintiff has the

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 15 of 30
16

initial burden of establishing a prima-facie case of

unlawful employment discrimination by a preponderance of

the evidence. Id. at 802; Young v. General Food Corp.,

840 F.2d 825, 828 (11th Cir. 1988). If the plaintiff

establishes a prima-facie case, the burden then shifts to

the defendant to rebut the presumption by articulating

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its employment

action. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024

(11th Cir. 2000). The defendant has the burden of

production, not of persuasion, and thus does not have to

persuade a court that it was actually motivated by the

reason advanced. See, e.g., Texas Dep’t of Cmty Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-55, 258 (1981); McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 

Once the defendant satisfies this burden of

production, “the presumption of discrimination is

eliminated and ‘the plaintiff has the opportunity to come

forward with evidence, including the previously produced

evidence establishing the prima facie case, sufficient to

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 16 of 30
17

permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the

reasons given by the [defendant] were not the real

reasons for the adverse employment decision.’” Chapman,

229 F.3d at 1024 (citations omitted). The plaintiff may

meet this burden by persuading the court that a

discriminatory reason more than likely motivated the

defendant or by demonstrating that the proffered reason

for the employment decision is not worthy of belief.

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; see also Young, 840 F.2d at

828.

To establish a prima-facie case of race or sex

discrimination, Pate must show: (1) she is a member of a

protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position;

(3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4)

she was replaced by a person outside her protected class

or was treated less favorably than a similarly-situated

individual outside her protected class. Maynard v. Bd.

of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003). The

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 17 of 30
18

court will assume that Pate has established a prima-facie

case.

West has also met its burden of coming forward with

a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the

challenged action: namely, that Pate violated the

company’s policies against sexual harassment. Therefore,

the critical question is whether Pate has produced, or

pointed to, sufficient evidence that West's stated reason

is a pretext for retaliation. Pate asserts that pretext

is indicated (1) by West’s failure to follow its own

guidelines in disciplining her and (2) because West

failed to investigate similarly situated employees who

acted inappropriately at the conference. 

West’s Disciplinary Procedures: The evidence before

the court suggests that West’s disciplinary procedures

are remarkably ill-defined, notwithstanding the phrase

“zero tolerance for harassment” featured in the company’s

Code of Business Conduct and Ethics. The senior director

of human resources who approved of the decision to

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 18 of 30
28. The record reflects:

“Q: You have located the Disciplinary

Action for Code Violation. ...

Based on those documents, what is

your understanding of West’s policy

as it relates to disciplining

employees?

“A: Basically, that Thomson would

impose discipline for each

violation specifically to this Code

of Conduct, depending upon if it

fits the nature and the facts of

the violation.

“Q: Are there any criteria or

explanations or any more

information that would give an

employee or a manager guidance as

to how to evaluate the

circumstances according to that

policy?

“A: Not in this particular information

right here.

“Q: Is there any information anywhere

that would set forth those

(continued...)

19

terminate Pate--now the vice president of human resources

at West--could identify no guidelines or criteria used by

West in determining and applying appropriate levels of

discipline for employee misconduct.28 

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 19 of 30
28. (...continued)

guidelines or criteria?

“A: I’m not aware right now.

...

“Q: What would Human Resources use to

determine the level of discipline?

“A: Information regarding the situation

and judgment.”

Tiffenberg deposition, p. 31-33.

29. Pate deposition, p. 139.

20

Members of West’s management, including the

investigator herself, gave Pate misleading information

about the level of discipline she faced. The director

for West’s academic division--the senior manager involved

in the decision to terminate Pate--reassured Pate at the

conference that she would receive only a letter of

reprimand for her behavior.29 

While Pate has produced evidence that the processes

and interactions leading to her termination were opaque

and misleading, these flaws do not render her termination

discriminatory in violation of Title VII or § 1981. It

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 20 of 30
30. The core of Pate’s complaint about West’s alleged

(continued...)

21

is well settled that “federal courts do not sit to

second-guess the business judgment of employers.” Combs

v. Plantation Patterns, Meadowcraft, Inc., 106 F.3d 1519,

1543 (11th Cir. 1997). Rocke’s investigation and West’s

decision to terminate Pate may not have adhered to

transparent guidelines, but they are not required by

either Title VII or § 1981 to do so. The court is “not

in the business of adjudging whether employment decisions

are prudent or fair. Instead, [this court's] sole concern

is whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a

challenged employment decision.” Damon v. Fleming

Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th

Cir. 1999); see also Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall

Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984).

(“The employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a

bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no

reason at all, as long as its action is not for a

discriminatory reason.”).30

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 21 of 30
30. (...continued)

failure to follow its own procedures concerns the

testimony of the vice president of human resources, who

described an “improvement process” consisting of a verbal

warning, a written warning, and a final warning.

Tiffenberg deposition, p. 33. However, the record

reflects that this process applies to performance issues

within the company, not disciplinary issues. Id.

Moreover, West would not be in violation of Title VII or

§ 1981 even if it failed to follow its own guidelines, so

long as it did not do so in a discriminatory way. 

22

Disparate Treatment: Pate asserts that West’s

failure to investigate the employees who also behaved

inappropriately at the conference suggests that the

company’s stated reason for her termination is

pretextual. Pate can establish pretext by showing that

similarly situated or comparator employees were “involved

in or accused of the same or similar conduct yet are

disciplined in a different, more favorable manner,”

Anderson v. WBMG-42, 253 F.3d 561, 564 (11th Cir. 2001),

or were not disciplined at all. 

The acts that Pate describes--including co-workers

placing their hands inside her jeans--are certainly

similar in nature to the conduct for which she was

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 22 of 30
31. Pate testified:

“Q: Tell me who complained about Derek

Moreton sticking his hands down

your pants.

“A: I don’t know who complained about

that. I didn’t complain about it.

“Q: Tell me who complained about Chris

Parton sticking his hands down your

pants.

“A: I didn’t complain about that

either.

“Q: Tell me who complained about Dan

Serlin touching your breasts.

(continued...)

23

investigated and ultimately terminated. And the fact

that Pate admitted her conduct, whereas no other employee

did, has no bearing on whether there is legal

significance to West’s failure to investigate employees

“involved in or accused of the same or similar conduct.”

Id.

However, Pate admits that she never reported or

complained about inappropriate behavior other than her

own during Rocke’s investigation.31 Pate did not want to

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 23 of 30
31. (...continued)

“A: I did not complain about that. I

had asked Derek Moreton to call

Rebecca Rocke for me to talk to her

about what had happened.

“Q: Tell me who complained about Aimee

Egan asking you to come to her room

and feel her breasts.

“A: I didn’t complain about that

either.

“Q: Tell me who complained about

Carolyn Strawbridge walking around

and asking people if they wanted to

touch her breasts.

“A: I didn’t complain about that.”

Pate deposition, pp. 188-189.

32. Pate said, “I did not want to get anyone in

trouble. I did not think that I was going to be fired.

I was not going to give anyone else a letter of

reprimand, or anything else that may or may not happen.

And the reason that I wanted Rebecca to do a thorough

(continued...)

24

“rat” on others and apparently believed that other

employees at the scene, including those who themselves

potentially faced investigation for inappropriate acts,

would come forward and accurately report all relevant

acts to the investigator.32 As a result, West first

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 24 of 30
32. (...continued)

investigation, like she should have, is so that she could

possibly get that information from someone else so that

I would not be the person to rat them out.” Pate

deposition, pp. 190-191.

33. The record reflects:

“Q: Does it concern you that you may

have employees that remain employed

by the Defendant that have also

violated this policy and have not

been terminated?

“A: Possibly.

(continued...)

25

learned the names of employees who Pate alleges acted

inappropriately at the 2003 conference in discovery

responses filed in this litigation. 

West maintains that, because it lacked knowledge of

these alleged actions at the time of Pate’s termination,

Pate cannot identify a single similarly situated white or

male employee who was treated more favorably. Yet this

is precisely what Pate has now done; she has named

employees who may have acted inappropriately at the

conference, and she has elicited testimony that those

employees have not been investigated, as she was.33 This

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 25 of 30
33. (...continued)

“Q: Do you intend on investigating the

allegations that Ms. Pate brought

forth in her deposition yesterday?

“A: I think at this late date – I mean,

we’re talking, you know, 18 months

from the events. I don’t know that

an investigation would be

appropriate at this point.

“Q: So the fact that it happened 18

months ago, it doesn’t concern you

that someone who is employed may

have stuck his hands down Ms.

Pate’s pants?

“A: I think it concerns me. I think

trying to get at this point in time

accurate information and an

understanding of exactly what

happened when there were

discussions – Ms. Pate had an

opportunity to come forward during

the initial investigation and

provide any of that information.

Prior to her being terminated,

there was absolutely no information

provided, and nobody else involved

in this whole investigation came

forward.... So I think it’s

extremely difficult to investigate

at this point.

Tiffenberg deposition, pp. 95-96.

26

evidence shifts the focus of the comparator analysis from

Case 2:04-cv-01131-MHT-SRW Document 44 Filed 01/03/06 Page 26 of 30
34. Id.

27

Pate’s termination--which West has defended as resulting

from Pate’s violation of company policy--to the

investigation that led to that termination. In other

words, Pate has produced evidence of disparate treatment,

and in order to avoid a conclusion that the decision not

to investigate suggests pretext, West must defend its

decision by offering some legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for it.

West’s corporate representative has testified that

the company does not intend to investigate Pate’s

allegations because too much time has passed since the

events in question.34 This is the entirety of the

evidence on the record, from either party, concerning

West’s decision not to investigate. The bare fact that

time has passed since alleged misconduct took place does

not establish conclusively that an employer’s decision

not to investigate that misconduct is legitimate and nondiscriminatory, or, for that matter, otherwise. Here,

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28

however, West need only articulate a reason for the

difference in treatment and then Pate bears the burden of

proof to show otherwise, see Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-55,

258 (the defendant has the burden of production, not of

persuasion, and thus does not have to persuade a court

that it was actually motivated by the reason advanced);

and Pate has failed to produce or point to any evidence

suggesting that West’s only stated reason for not

investigating other employees--distance in time--is not

credible or is motivated by discriminatory intent. See

Fitzpatrick, 2 F .3d at 1115-16 (“For issues ... on which

the non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial,

... the moving party [for summary judgment] simply may

show[]--that is, point[] out to the district court--that

there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party's case.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Nothing suggests whether West investigates employee

claims only up to a certain point in time after a

precipitating event and, if so, how the time-bar rule is

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applied; nor is there evidence that West was less

thorough in its investigation of the circumstances

surrounding the complaint against Pate than it was in

other circumstances, and that, but for this failure, West

would have learned of the other alleged instances of

sexual misconduct before Pate was terminated. Without

such evidence, the court cannot attribute a

discriminatory purpose to West’s statement that it has

not investigated the other alleged instances of sexual

misconduct only because it first learned of them so long

after the alleged misconduct. And if no discriminatory

intent can be discerned in that decision, then Pate has

no evidence to suggest that West’s stated reason for her

termination is pretextual. 

One ill-advised interaction, which Pate and many of

her colleagues perceived as a joke, cost Pate a wellpaying job which she loved and at which she clearly

excelled. This is a steep cost, but it is not an

impermissible one under Title VII and § 1981, for Pate

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has failed to show that it was exacted because of her

race or her sex. Accordingly, summary judgment on Pate’s

race and sex discrimination claims will be granted.

An appropriate judgment will be entered.

DONE, this the 3rd day of January, 2006.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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