Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03145/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03145-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of the Navy
Respondent
Yong I. Fenlon
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

YONG I. FENLON,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,

Respondent

_____________________ 

2014-3145

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. SF-0432-04-0076-X-1.

______________________ 

Decided: February 5, 2015

______________________ 

 YONG I. FENLON, Carlsbad, California, pro se. 

 LAUREN S. MOORE, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by

STUART F. DELERY, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., REGINALD 

T. BLADES, JR. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and DYK, Circuit Judges.

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2 FENLON v. NAVY

PER CURIAM. 

Yong I. Fenlon (“Fenlon”) appeals from the decision of 

the Merit Systems Protection Board (“the Board”) dismissing the Department of the Navy’s (“the Navy”) petition for enforcement (“PFE”) as settled. Fenlon v. Navy, 

No. SF-0432-04-0076-X-1, 2014 WL 5320065 (M.S.P.B. 

June 12, 2014) (“Opinion”). Because the Board did not 

err, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Fenlon worked as a financial management analyst for 

the Navy when she was removed from her position. She 

appealed her removal to the Board, but in 2004, Fenlon 

and the Navy entered into a settlement agreement (“the 

2004 agreement”). The 2004 agreement resolved “any and 

all other matters related to Ms. Fenlon’s employment 

with the Navy.” Resp’t’s App. (“App.”) 18–19. Notably, it 

stated that Fenlon would “resign her position with the 

Navy effective 8 February 2003” and “w[ould] not apply 

for nor accept a position with the Department of the Navy 

any time in the future.” Id. at 21. As part of the settlement, the Navy paid Fenlon $40,000, among other consideration. 

In 2008, Fenlon applied for and accepted a budget analyst position with the Navy aboard the Marine Corps

Installation West, Camp Pendleton, California. The Navy 

became aware of Fenlon’s appointment and, in 2011, filed 

a PFE at the Board to enforce the 2004 agreement. 

In 2012, the Board’s administrative judge (“AJ”) issued a recommendation in which he granted the Navy’s 

PFE. See id. at 1–10. The AJ found that Fenlon breached 

the 2004 agreement when she applied for and accepted a 

position with the Navy in 2008. Id. at 7. The AJ dismissed as unsupported Fenlon’s argument that the 2004 

agreement was void and violated Department of Defense 

regulations. Id. at 8. In addition, the AJ found that 

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FENLON v. NAVY 3

Fenlon did not act in good faith because she failed to 

notify the Navy when she accepted her new position and 

she failed to request a job that excluded Navy activities 

pursuant to the terms of the 2004 agreement. Id. “Because the essence of the agreement for the Navy was 

[Fenlon’s] resignation and her agreement never to apply 

for or accept future employment with the Navy, [the AJ] 

recommend[ed] that the Navy be granted its requested 

relief to enforce the agreement” and referred the matter to 

the Board’s Office of General Counsel. Id. at 10. 

On May 16, 2013, Fenlon and the Navy submitted a 

second settlement agreement to the Board (“the 2013 

agreement”). In the 2013 agreement, Fenlon agreed to 

resign from her budget analyst position, and the Navy 

agreed to withdraw its PFE. By final order dated June 

12, 2014, the Board dismissed the Navy’s PFE as settled. 

Opinion at *1. In its decision, the Board found that the 

“[2013] agreement is lawful on its face; that the parties 

freely entered into it; and that the subject matter of the 

case . . . is within the Board’s jurisdiction.” Id. 

Fenlon timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

The scope of our review in an appeal from a Board 

decision is limited. We can only set aside the Board’s

decision if it was “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) 

obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or 

regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by 

substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). 

On appeal, Fenlon asks us to vacate the 2013 agreement, ostensibly arguing that she lacked capacity when 

she entered into the agreement: “Please Cancelled Considerations for Settlement Agreement between April 30, 

2013 and dated May 16, 2013. Because discriminated 

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4 FENLON v. NAVY

against when it I have been diagnosed by doctors with a 

diseases problem. . . . I got forced to signed and I did not 

read has been settled because of dangerous symptoms of 

Thyroid Cancer Stage of my disease.” Pet’r’s Br. 5 (emphases removed). The Navy responds that Fenlon has 

neither challenged the terms of the 2013 agreement nor 

challenged the Board’s determination that the 2013 

agreement was valid and binding, and thus does not 

formally address Fenlon’s incapacity argument. See, e.g., 

Resp’t’s Br. 10–12. 

Nonetheless, we conclude that Fenlon’s argument

fails, and that the Board did not err in determining that 

the 2013 agreement “is lawful on its face” and that “the

parties freely entered into it.” Opinion at *1. “One who 

attacks a settlement must bear the burden of showing 

that the contract he has made is tainted with invalidity . . 

. .” Asberry v. USPS, 692 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1982) 

(quoting Callen v. Pa. R.R. Co., 332 U.S. 625, 630 (1948)). 

Fenlon claims that her medical condition prevented 

her from entering into the 2013 agreement, but Fenlon 

failed to make any such argument before the Board. As 

we said in connection with another effort to challenge a 

settlement agreement on appeal from the Board’s approval of the agreement, “[o]ur precedent clearly establishes 

the impropriety of seeking a reversal of the [B]oard’s 

decision on the basis of assertions never presented to the 

presiding official or to the [B]oard.” Sargent v. Dep’t of 

Health & Human Servs., 229 F.3d 1088, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 

2000). Moreover, and most important, Fenlon had adequate representation throughout the Board proceedings 

and settlement negotiations. App. 1, 13. The Board’s

determination was therefore not incorrect, and the 2013 

agreement was therefore lawful. 

Fenlon also argues that the Board erroneously failed 

to conduct a hearing, citing various statutes and regulations, including 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, the Equal Pay Act, 

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FENLON v. NAVY 5

and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, among others, arguing 

that she was entitled to a hearing. Pet’r’s Br. 7. But 

those statutes and regulations are inapposite, as MSPB 

rules and procedures are prescribed in 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201 et 

seq. Those rules do grant an employee the right to a 

hearing, id.; 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1), but if the appellant 

waives her right to a hearing, then the Board need not 

provide one, see Callahan v. Navy, 748 F.2d 1556, 1559 

(Fed. Cir. 1984) (“All indications, therefore, lead to the 

conclusion that Congress intended the hearing to be for 

the employee’s benefit. Nonetheless, if the employee 

forfeits the right which Congress conferred, he must 

forego the benefits.”). Here, Fenlon neither requested a 

hearing nor challenged the lack of a hearing before the 

full Board. Resp’t’s Br. 7. Instead, Fenlon voluntarily 

entered into a settlement agreement with the Navy, and 

the Navy’s PFE was dismissed as settled. Opinion at *1–

2. Accordingly, the Board did not err. 

CONCLUSION

We have considered Fenlon’s remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, 

the decision of the Board is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED

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