Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02257/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02257-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Terry Smith
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED 

v. 

TERRY 

PUBLISH FIL~ D 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT 

United States Court of Appeals 

OF APPEAlsnth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

) 

) 

SMITH, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

MAY 2 5 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-2257 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CR 87-431-01) 

Louis P. McDonald, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for 

Appellant. 

DefendantPaula Burnett, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico 

(Don J. Svet, United States Attorney, and James T. Martin, 

Assistant U.S. Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, on the brief), 

for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before MCKAY, Chief Judge, HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge, and BELOT,* 

District Judge. 

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Monti L. Belot, United States District Judge for 

the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-2257 Document: 010110115181 Date Filed: 05/25/1993 Page: 1 
Defendant-appellant Terry Smith, convicted after a jury in 

the District of New Mexico found him guilty of assault with a 

dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm, appeals from the 

district court's denial of his post-conviction motion for a new 

trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. Smith 

contends, inter alia, that the trial judge's comments caused his 

key witness for the hearing on the motion to claim her Fifth 

Amendment privilege and decline to testify. Smith says the 

judge's warning thus violated the rule of Webb v. Tex~s, 409 U.S. 

95 (1972). We disagree and affirm. 

I 

Around midnight on July 10, 1987, an officer of the Navajo 

Division of Public Safety was called to a trailer house in 

Shiprock, New Mexico, to investigate a report of a disturbance. 

Arriving at the trailer, the officer observed a four-wheel-drive 

vehicle, a white GMC "Jimmy," speeding away from the scene. 

During the chase that ensued, an occupant of the Jimmy riding on 

the passenger side of the front seat fired one shot in the 

direction of one of the police vehicles in pursuit. The shot 

pellets struck the passenger side of the windshield of the police 

car. 

Eventually, the Jimmy stopped and police cars stopped nearby, 

the closest one approximately 25 or 30 yards away. Under a 

spotlight, the officers could see a man standing beside the Jimmy. 

The man beside the Jimmy fired a shotgun in the direction of the 

nearest officer, who was standing behind the open driver's side 

door to his vehicle. Though most of the shot pellets hit the 

2 

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front of the police vehicle, several pellets struck the officer's 

face and one hand. The officer was wounded slightly. An 

indictment in the District of New Mexico charged the defendant 

with firing the shot that wounded the officer, and charged his 

brother, Lloyd Smith, with firing the earlier shot from the moving 

vehicle. 

At trial, Terry Smith's defense was that his brother, Lloyd, 

had fired the shots that wounded the officer. Some of the 

government's evidence, primarily the officers' general description 

of the shooter, pointed to the defendant. The officers testified 

that the shooter was too thin to have been the defendant's much 

heavier brother, and that the gunman had worn a white, or 

light-colored, shirt similar to the shirt the defendant was 

wearing when he was arrested the next day. 

The government's case rested largely on the testimony of the 

defendant's ex-girlfriend, Victoria Scott, who had been a 

passenger . h J' 1 in t e immy. Scott testified that the defendant, 

wearing a white shirt, had exited from the truck with two other 

men just before the officer was shot. She said that the defendant 

had stood beside the truck and had fired twice in the direction of 

the police car. Though Scott testified that she was "ducked down" 

in the back seat when the shots were fired, III Supp. R. 95, she 

stated she was certain that Lloyd was not the shooter. Scott's 

testimony, while corroborated by other evidence, thus provided the 

1 

The government acknowledged the importance to its case of 

Scott's trial testimony. At one point a prosecutor requested a 

continuance to locate her because "we can't make a case without 

Victoria Scott." II Supp. R. 4. 

3 

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only positive identification of Terry Smith as the shooter. Scott 

was 15 years old at the time of the shooting, and was 16 when she 

testified at the defendant's trial. 

The defendant and his brother were tried separately. At the 

conclusion of the trial in August 1988, the jury acquitted the 

defendant of assault with intent to murder by use of a dangerous 

weapon, as charged in count one of the indictment, but convicted 

him of a lesser included offense of assault with a dangerous 

weapon with intent to do bodily harm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 113(c). The district court sentenced the defendant to serve 

five years' imprisonment, and we affirmed by an unpublished order 

and judgment. United States v. Smith, No. 88-2737 (10th Cir. Apr. 

10, 1990). 2 

II 

A 

Following the defendant's sentencing, Scott signed two 

affidavits in which she recanted key portions of her trial 

testimony. In one of the affidavits, dated June 29, 1989, Scott 

claimed: "I never stated that it was Terry Smith who did the 

shooting, I was told to duck down when the police were shooting 

over us' so I could not see who was doing the shooting." 

2 

We have been informed that the defendant has completed his 

sentence and no longer is under supervision. Thus we consider sua 

sponte whether the fact that the defendant . has completed his 

sentence moots his appeal. We note that it is well established 

that "a . criminal case is moot only if it is shown that there is no 

possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed 

on the basis of the challenged conviction." Sibron v. New York, 

392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). Given the obvious collateral consequences 

of the defendant's status as a convicted felon we conclude that 

this appeal is not moot. 

4 

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Appellant's Brief App. B. 3 In the same affidavit, Scott also 

claimed that she did not recall saying that the defendant was 

wearing a white shirt on the night of the shooting. Id. 4 In the 

3 

Scott's statement in the affidavit that she had "never 

stated" that Terry Smith did the shooting directly contradicted 

her trial testimony. At trial, Scott testified that at the end of 

the police chase, Terry Smith, the driver, had stopped the Jinuny 

on a dirt road and that the Smith brothers and another man had 

gotten out. III Supp. R. 93. Asked to explain what happened 

next, she gave this account: 

Q. Did you see Terry grab a weapon at that time? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Do you recall which gun he had? 

A. No. 

Q: What happened then? 

A. He stood by the door and started shooting. 

Q. When he got out of the car, did he raise [the 

gun] to his shoulder? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And you said you saw him fire the gun? 

A. Yes. 

Q. How many times? 

A. Twice. 

Q. How far were you -- you were in the back seat 

of the Jinuny at that time, right? 

A. Yes. 

Q. How far was Terry from you when he fired the 

gun? 

A. Just a few feet away. 

Q. 

fire that 

A. 

Q. 

A. 

Q. 

car that 

A. 

Id. at 93-95. 

4 

Miss Scott, in what direction did Terry Smith 

gun? 

(No response. ) 

He didn't fire it up in the air, did he? 

No. 

Did he fire it in the direction of the police 

was directly in back of you? 

Yes. 

At trial, Scott had 

July 10 the defendant 

testified that earlier in the evening of 

had been wearing a "turquoise shirt with 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

5 

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other affidavit, dated June 30, 1990, Scott claimed an FBI agent 

had coerced her into giving false testimony implicating the 

defendant. Id. App. C. 

On August 15, 1990, the defendant filed, pursuant to Rule 33 

of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for a new 

trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. I Supp. R. Doc. 

114. Citing Scott's statements in the affidavits recanting her 

trial testimony, the defendant claimed in general that an FBI 

agent had coerced Scott to identify the defendant falsely as the 

assailant. The motion was assigned to the judge who had presided 

at Terry Smith's trial. He appointed counsel for Scott. I Supp. 

R. Doc. 125. On October 16, 1990, the trial judge held an 

evidentiary hearing on the motion with Scott as the first witness. 

As soon as Scott had answered a few preliminary questions, 

the judge interrupted her, asking: 

THE. COURT: Just a second now. [Counsel], 

are you comfortable with her testifying? 

[WITNESS' COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor, I am. 

I've discussed it with her and basically told her to 

tell the truth, and that's what she says she is doing. 

. . . I've told her about the penalty of perjury, have 

discussed that with her and have told her that it's very 

(Footnote continued): 

stripes." III Supp. R. 83. Scott had testified that later the 

defendant and other men had taken her and another woman to a 

remote area known as Table Mesa. At Table Mesa, Smith testified, 

the defendant had accused her of being an informant, and had 

struck her. Id. at 77-82. Smith testified that after the group 

left Table Mesa, the defendant had put on a white shirt. Id. at 

83-85. 

Scott at first identified a government exhibit, a 

short-sleeved, white tee shirt with yellow piping, as the shirt 

that the defendant had been wearing at the time of the shooting, 

but then seemed less certain of the identification . lg. at 85. 

However, she agreed with a prosecutor that she was certain that 

the defendant had worn either a white or a light-colored shirt at 

the time of the chase and shooting. Id. at 85-86. 

6 

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• 

important that she tell the truth. And I believe that 

she has the capacity to understand that, and she 

intended to do that. 

THE COURT: Here's where I am. Counsel is 

telling me that she's going to recant her testimony from 

the previous trial. If that's the situation, then it 

would seem to me that if she testified at the first 

trial, and she now says that testimony is not correct 

and recants that testimony, she comes squarely under the 

perjury statute and ten years. 

II R. 5-7. The judge then reviewed the affidavits, and continued 

the colloquy with counsel by remarking: 

[THE COURT:] We've got a problem, Counsel. 

[PROSECUTOR]: . . . I 

witness faces considerably more 

making a sworn statement under 

proceeding with regard to perjury. 

think that this 

risks and exposure by 

oath in this court 

. . . That affidavit at this time simply 

constitutes evidence that her prior sworn testimony is 

false. It would be only evidence as to perjury. 

However, ... if she comes here today, and she 

testifies in this court proceeding under oath that what 

she's said previously at the prior court proceeding was 

false, then it's automatically perjury, because there is 

inconsistent sworn testimony under [18 U.S.C. § 1623). 

So I think that she does, by testifying here today, 

expose herself to ... considerably more risk and 

exposure than she faces currently under the affidavit 

that she's submitted at this time. 

[WITNESS' COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I agree with 

that. I have talked to my client at length .... She 

realizes the position that she's in. . . . She will 

state that she felt [coerced], that she was not 

truthful, she felt threatened and that she ... did not 

testify truthfully at that time, and that it bothered 

her so much that it bothered her in school. 

She discussed the matter at length with her 

family, and she wants to come forward regardless of the 

consequences to her. I have advised her of those 

consequences and the position that she's putting herself 

into, and she wants to testify. 

THE COURT: Well, okay. I heard the trial. 

I've been all through everything Mr. Smith has said. 

And my problem is more [of] a judicial problem is that 

my mind is of such a set from having read her affidavit, 

having ·heard her testify before, having heard [the FBI 

agent] testify is that I don't think I'm going to 

believe her. I'm going to have another judge try this. 

7 

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[F]irst of all, I don't think she understands 

that she's probably looking this is a guideline 

sentence, ten years. And she's probably looking, under 

the guidelines , at at least 60 months. 

[T]he easiest thing in the world for 

the government to prove is that you testified one way 

one day, and you're testifying another way today, and 

that equates probably to about -- the sentence is up to 

ten years in prison .... And the thing that bothers 

me is, from reading your affidavit and hearing [the FBI 

agent] and having been through this before, that I'm not 

going to believe you. · 

I don't know -- I'm going to transfer it to 

another judge .... 

II R. 9-12. 

The judge and counsel next discussed the propriety of 

recusal. The judge commented: 

I guess one of the things that bothers me the most is 

that I'm sitting here, in essence, and I, maybe 

ashamedly so, am prejudging her, that I'm not going to 

believe her testimony because I've heard it all once. 

I've heard [the FBI agent]. And it just doesn't make 

any sense what she's saying. And it makes .me feel like 

here I am letting this young lady perjure herself, 

looking at ten years, all for nothing. 

II R. 14. 

Later in this October 16, 1990, hearing, one of the defense 

attorneys noted "for the record" that "my version of the statute 

indicates that the maximum penalty [for perjury] is five years," 

not 10 as the judge had stated. Id. at 16. The judge replied, 

"Five years or ten years. Either one is . a lot of time." 

Id. 

The judge recessed the hearing for some 10 minutes. He 

returned and announced that he was bifurcating the proceedings on 

Smith's motion for a new trial. The judge transferred the motion 

to another ·judge for a determination of whether Scott's testimony 

was in fact false. The judge stated that i 'f the other judge 

8 

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• 

rejected Scott's effort to recant her trial testimony, then "that 

would be the end of the motion . " Id. at 17. However, if the 

other judge were to determine that Scott's trial testimony had 

been false, the motion was to return to the first judge for 

argument and a decision. Id. 

B 

The hearing on the motion for a new trial resumed on November 

1, 1990, before another district judge. Scott was again called as 

a witness, but, after some preliminary questioning, ended the 

interrogation by stating: "I refuse to answer that question on 

the advice of my attorney and I assert my Fifth Amendment rights." 

III R. 16. The judge stated that Scott's affidavits alone were 

not sufficient to warrant a new trial, and denied the motion. Id. 

at 19-20. Smith appeals from the denial of the motion for a new 

trial. 

The defendant contends that the judge's comments at the first 

hearing on the motion for a new trial and his admonition about 

perjury effectively drove his key witness on the motion from the 

stand, and thus violated the rule of Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 

(1972). Smith also contends that the first judge's recusal was 

error and that the second judge, who denied the motion for a new 

trial, committed other errors. 

III 

The paramount issue before us is whether the statements of 

the trial judge violated the principle applied in Webb v. Texas, 

409 U.S. 95 (1972), depriving the defendant of due process and his 

Sixth Amendment right to have compulsory process for obtaining 

witnesses in his favor. 

9 

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In Webb a Texas conviction was reviewed after its affirmance 

by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. After the prosecution 

had rested its case there, the jury was temporarily excused . 

During the recess, the accused called his only witness, who had a 

prior criminal record and was serving a prison sentence. On his 

own initiative, the trial judge admonished the witness as follows: 

"Now you have been called down as a witness in this case 

by the Defendant. It is the Court's duty to admonish 

you that you don't have to testify, that anything you 

say can and will be used against you. If you take the 

witness stand and lie under oath, the Court will 

personally see that your case goes to the grand jury and 

you will be indicted for perjury and the liklihood [sic] 

is that you would get convicted of perjury and that it 

would be stacked onto what you have already got, so that 

is the matter you have got to make up your mind on. If 

you get on the witness stand and lie, it is probably 

going to mean several years and at least more time that 

you are going to have to serve. It will also be held 

against you in the penitentiary when you're up for 

parole and the Court wants you to thoroughly understand 

the chances you're taking by getting on that witness 

stand under oath. You may tell the truth and if you do, 

that is all right, but if you lie you can get into real 

trouble. The court wants you to know that. You don't 

owe anybody anything to testify and it must be done 

freely and voluntarily and with the thorough 

understanding that you know the hazard you are taking." 

409 U.S. at 95-96. 

Webb's counsel objected to these comments, arguing that the 

judge exerted such duress that the witness could not freely and 

voluntarily decide whether to testify for Webb, thus depriving him 

of his defense by coercing his only witness into refusing to 

testify. The Texas trial court overruled the objection, and 

defendant's motion for a mistrial based thereon. The Court of 

Criminal Appeals rejected a claim of violation of due process, 

although it did not condone the manner of the admonition. The 

Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. The Court stated 

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that the fact the witness was willing to come to court to testify 

and refused to do so only after the intimidating comments 

suggested that the comments were the cause of the refusal to 

testify. The Court said that the judge implied that he expected 

the witness to lie and assured him that if he did, he would be 

prosecuted and probably convicted for perjury. The Court reversed 

because of infringement of Webb's due process rights, stating 

that: 

[I]n light of the great disparity between the posture of 

the presiding judge and that of a witness in these 

circumstances, the unnecessarily strong terms used by 

the judge could well have exerted such duress on the 

witness' mind as to preclude him from making a free and 

voluntary choice whether or not to testify. 

409 U.S. at 98. 

We cannot agree that the judge's statements in the instant 

case at the hearing on the motion for a new trial amounted to a 

violation of Webb. At the outset we note that Webb does not 

"stand for the proposition that merely warning a defendant of the 

consequences of perjury demands reversal." United States v. 

Harlin, 539 F.2d 679, 681 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 942 

(1976). To the contrary, as a general rule a court "has the 

discretion to warn a witness about the possibility of 

incriminating" himself or herself. United States v. Arthur, 949 

F.2d 211, 215 (10th Cir. 1991). Judges and prosecutors do not 

necessarily commit a Webb-type violation merely by advising a 

witness of the possibility that he or she could face prosecution 

for perjury if his or her testimony differs from that he or she 

11 

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has given previously. United States v. Gloria, 494 F.2d 477, 

484 - 85 (5th Cir. ) (e n bane ) , cert. denied, 419 U.S. 995 (1974 ) . 

We recognize that a court may abuse its discretion by a 

warning to a witness and thus violate a defendant's constitutional 

rights by "actively" encouraging a witness not to testify, or by 

badgering a witness to remain silent. United States v. Arthur, 

949 F . 2d 211 (6th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Crawford, 

707 F. 2d 44 7, 449 ( 10th Cir. 19 83) (noting " [s] ubstantial 

governmental interference with a defense witness's decision to 

testify violates a defendant's due process rights"). A judge's 

admonition to a witness can violate Webb if it is "threatening" 

and employs "coercive language indicating the court's expectation 

of perjury." Harlin, 539 F.2d at 681. 

Here the judge giving the warning had heard the trial and the 

witness' previous testimony, and thus had a particular basis for 

his remarks. The judge's comments directed to counsel were in 

substance that, having read the witness' affidavit and having 

heard her previously testify at trial, he doubted that he was 

going to believe her. The judge pointed out the strong position 

the government would have in a perjury prosecution where the 

witness testified one way one day, and another way today. II R. 

11 . The witness' attorney told the judge she had discussed the 

possibility of a perjury prosecution with her client. 

In considering whether the judge's remarks were threatening 

or coercive, then, we consider that the witness seems to have been 

aware of the possibility that she would be prosecuted for perjury. 

As one court has observed, "[i]t is hardly a threat for a 

12 

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prosecutor to advise a potential witness who is telling the 

stories with respect to a defendant's criminal involvement, that 

he might be prosecuted for perjury if he testifies falsely." 

Simmons, 670 F.2d at 371. Here, rather than being threatening, 

the colloquy between counsel and the judge focused largely on 

(1) the witness' awareness of a possible perjury prosecution, and 

(2) the judge's decision to recuse himself from the evidentiary 

hearing on the motion for a new trial. We believe that the judge 

"did not use 'unnecessarily strong terms [that could] have exerted 

such duress on the witness' mind as to preclude [her] from making 

a free and voluntary choice whether or not to testify.'" United 

States v. Nunn, 525 F.2d 958, 960 (5th Cir. 1976) (en bane) 

(quoting Webb, 409 U.S. at 98). 

Rather, from our examination of the entire record we conclude 

that the judge's comments were within the range of discretion 

given to a trial judge to warn a witness of the possible 

consequences of perjury. As a part of the justification for the 

judge's actions, we are cognizant that he was faced with a more 

real possibility of perjury than in some cases, in that the 

witness seemed to be preparing to give testimony in direct 

contradiction of her prior trial testimony, making a government 

charge of perjury apparently easy to establish. As noted in 

United States v. Simmons, 670 F.2d 365, 368-69 (D.C. Cir. 1982): 

"Webb thus holds that a defendant is denied due process of law 

when a trial judge, without any basis in the record to conclude 

that a witness might lie, sua sponte admonishes the defendant's 

only witness ... and thereby discourages the witness from 

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testifying II (emphasis added). Here there was a 

disturbing basis in the record for the judge's concern -- the risk 

of a perjury violation by direct contradiction of prior trial 

testimony. 

Of course, each case must be viewed in light of the 

particular circumstances and the specific cormnents made by the 

judge. Here we are persuaded, as was Judge Wald in United States 

v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1334-35 (D.C. Cir. 1982), that such 

warnings about the danger of perjury did not amount to a Webb 

violation. In Blackwell, both the prosecutor and the trial judge 

warned a witness of the consequences of perjury on only one 

occasion. After the warning the prosecutor heard that the witness 

was going to waive her privilege and testify. This was discussed 

with the trial judge. The judge then questioned the witness under 

oath, stating: 

there are always actions of perjury meaning that if you 

lie under oath that you can be sent away on a new 

charge. 

Do you understand that? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

THE COURT: So it is important for everybody to 

tell the truth. I just want you to understand what the 

situation is. All right? 

THE WITNESS: Thank you. 

THE COURT: Do you still wish to take the stand and 

testify? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

694 F.2d at 1334. The court concluded that the "conduct of the 

judge and the prosecutor just recounted does not begin to approach 

the level of misconduct described in Webb v. Texas." Id. at 1335. 

There are other factors to consider here. The witness Scott 

did not make . the crucial statement invoking her privilege against 

self-incrimination before the trial judge. 

14 

Instead, after the 

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judge stated at the motion hearing that he did not think he was 

going to believe her, he announced: "I'm going to have another 

judge try this." II R. 10. A recess of some ten minutes was held 

and the judge announced that another judge would hear the motion, 

and that the proceeding would be bifurcated. Id. at 14. The 

further hearing was to be held several days later and actually did 

not occur until November 1, 1990. 

It was at the hearing before the second judge that the 

witness Scott was called and questioned by defense counsel. She 

then refused to answer any questions, asserting her Fifth 

Amendment rights. III R. 16. This judge held that having 

considered a proffer of defense statements purportedly made by the 

witness, there was insufficient evidence to rebut Ms. Scott's 

trial testimony of August 18, 1988, and the motion for a new trial 

was denied. 

Thus it is apparent that the trial judge recessed the October 

16, 1990, hearing, recused himself, and afforded the witness an 

opportunity to appear before a different judge where she made the 

announcement of her decision that she would not testify. This 

resumed hearing on the motion occurred on November 1, 1990, which 

gave the witness time to consider the matter and confer with her 

attorney. 5 We are convinced that the circumstances as a whole do 

5 

The defendant here argues that the comments by the trial 

judge were exacerbated by the fact that he made a misstatement 

concerning the perjury penalty. We are not persuaded by this 

point. As noted, the error was called to the attention of the 

court and all in attendance by defense counsel during the October 

16 hearing. Before the resumed hearing on November 1, counsel had 

time to advise Scott about the correct penalty for perjury. 

15 

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not amount to a viol ation of t he principle of Webb v. Texas. 

IV 

There are two remaining claims of error which we will 

address: 

Defendant claims that there was prejudicial error in the 

recusal of the trial judge and the transfer of the matter to 

another judge, depriving him of due process. We disagree. Such 

determinations are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Hinman v. 

Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 938 (10th Cir. 1987). Under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 455(a) (1988), a judge is required to disqualify himself "in any 

proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned." Here the judge had noted that he had an impression 

about Scott's testimony which was unfavorable to the defendant, 

based on his prior observance of the trial. He therefore 

expressed concern about prejudging the defendant's motion. In 

these circumstances, his decision to recuse himself was clearly a 

proper step to assure fairness, and in no way an abuse of 

discretion. 

Lastly, the defendant asserts that the second judge, who was 

assigned to conduct the evidentiary hearing, committed several 

procedural errors in considering the motion for a new trial. We 

observe at the outset that the procedure used in this case was 

unusual, because ordinarily the judge who presided at the trial 

hears a subsequent motion for a new trial. However, we have 

concluded that here the trial judge did not abuse his discretion 

in recusing himself from the evidentiary hearing to determine 

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whether Scott perjured herself at trial. Accordingly, we review 

the decision of the second judge to deny the motion. 

After Scott invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege and refused 

to testify, the judge made an oral ruling denying the motion. 

Explaining his ruling, the judge stated that "even accepting the 

affidavits as proffered by [defense counsel], those are 

insufficient to overcome her testimony as reflected in the Court 

proceedings, which is a formal proceeding." The judge further 

made a "finding that the testimony is more probative than 

subsequent events subsequent affidavits made to a private 

investigator." III R. 19. The judge memorialized the ruling from 

the bench in a written order in which he again ruled that "there 

was insufficient evidence before the Court to rebut Ms. Scott's 

trial testimony." IR. Doc. 135. 

Smith contends that the second judge abused his discretion by 

failing "to hold a complete evidentiary hearing" and by failing to 

"provide a complete set of findings of fact." Appellant's Brief 

at 25. We disagree on both counts. Smith was afforded the 

opportunity for an evidentiary hearing; however, the witness who 

had earlier indicated she would recant her trial testimony, 

refused to testify. Further, in this case we believe the judge 

made an adequate record of the basis of his ruling. The judge 

quite clearly decided that the contents of the affidavits were 

insufficient to overcome the witness' trial testimony. We find no 

abuse of discretion by the judge in his determination to deny the 

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motion for a new trial. United States v. Allen, 554 F.2d 398, 403 

(10th Cir. 1977) . 6 

Accordingly, the order denying the defendant's motion for a 

new trial is 

AFFIRMED. 

6 

In Allen, we noted the general requirements for a new trial 

being granted in a criminal case. The newly discovered evidence 

must be more than impeaching or cumulative; it must be material 

to the issues involved; it must be such as would probably produce 

an acquittal; and a new trial is not warranted by evidence which, 

with reasonable diligence, could have been discovered and produced 

at trial. The motion is not regarded with favor and is granted 

only with great caution, being addressed to the sound discretion 

of the trial court. 554 F.2d at 403. 

Here, we understand and accept the judge's conclusion that 

the affidavits alone were insufficient to justify granting the 

motion for a new trial. See United States v. Mackin, 561 F.2d 

958, 961-63 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977). 

18 

Appellate Case: 90-2257 Document: 010110115181 Date Filed: 05/25/1993 Page: 18 
No. 90-2257, United States v. Terry Smith 

BELOT, District Judge, concurring: 

I fully concur in the opinion of Judge Holloway but I write 

separately because I believe this case is distinguishable from 

Webb v. Texas, supra, in several important respects. 

First, the judge's offensive remarks in Webb were made during 

the trial when the defendant was presumed innocent. In this case, 

the district judge's comments were made at a motion for new trial 

which occurred after the defendant had been convicted and after 

this court had affirmed the conviction. Thus, Webb did not 

address the issue presented in this appeal: the extent to which a 

judge presiding over a hearing on a motion for new trial may 

caution a witness who is about to recant her testimony given at 

trial. 

Second, this court has consistently held that motions for new 

trial based on newly discovered evidence are regarded with 

disfavor and granted only with great caution. United States v. 

Youngpeter, F.2d __ , Nos. 91-5193 and 92-5124, (10th Cir. 

Feb. 16, 1993). When the newly discovered evidence consists of a 

recantation, it is the duty of the trial court to be satisfied 

that the challenged testimony was actually false. United States 

v. Bradshaw, 787 F.2d 1385, 1391 (10th Cir. 1986). A trial judge 

may justifiably view such a motion with a jaundiced eye. As this 

court has cautioned, "[r]ecantation of testimony given under oath 

at trial is not looked upon with favor. Indeed, such is generally 

looked upon with downright suspicion." United States v. Ahern, 

612 F.2d 507, 509 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1093 

Appellate Case: 90-2257 Document: 010110115181 Date Filed: 05/25/1993 Page: 19 
(1981). Thus, the district judge had 

conduct an evidentiary hearing to evaluate 

an affi:anative duty to 

both the credibility 

and impact of Scott's recantation, United States v. Page, 828 F.2d 

1476, 1478 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 989 (1987), and he 

could properly draw on his knowledge and observations gained as 

the presiding judge at the original trial. United States v. 

Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 112 (1946); United States v. Ramsey, 761 

F.2d 603, 604 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 

(1986). 

Third, the district judge's conunents cannot be compared in 

content or degree with the "gratuitous" and "unnecessarily strong" 

admonition given by the judge in Webb. Nor can they be taken as 

active encouragement to Scott not to testify or as badgering her 

to remain silent. United States v. Arthur, 949 F.2d 211, 215, 216 

(6th Cir. 1991). Nor do they amount to the coercive and repeated 

threats about perjury which were condemned (but not without 

dissent) in Anderson v, Warden. Maryland Penitentiary, 696 F.2d 

296 (4th Cir. 1982) (en bane). 

Fourth, the witness in~ was unrepresented. Here, Scott 

was represented which, while not in and of itself decisive, 

militates against a finding that Scott's later refusal to testify 

was the product of judicial coercion or other improper conduct by 

the district judge. 

In this case, the district judge knew that Scott intended to 

recant her trial testimony and that he was faced with a witness 

who either had conunitted perjury at the trial or who was prepared 

to do so at the hearing. Thus, the district judge's concern was 

-2-

Appellate Case: 90-2257 Document: 010110115181 Date Filed: 05/25/1993 Page: 20 
not the product of mere suspicion, but of absolute certainty of 

the existence of perjurious testimony. Under the circumstances of 

this case, the district judge had the discretion to inform Scott 

of the consequences of her recantation. It may be that he had the 

obligation to do so, but that is not an issue which requires 

decision. Therefore, I believe the district judge's statements 

and actions were properly within his discretion and not violative 

of Webb. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 90-2257 Document: 010110115181 Date Filed: 05/25/1993 Page: 21 
No. 90-2257, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. TERRY SMITH 

McKAY, Chief Judge, dissenting: 

I respectfully dissent. While I recognize that the trial 

court was faced with a difficult situation, and acted with commendable motives, I conclude that its statements regarding Ms. 

Scott's testimony went further than is permitted under Webb v. 

Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972) .

1 

I 

Judges have a legitimate interest in ensuring that all witnesses are aware of both the nature of the perjury laws and their 

Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, whether or not 

the witness is represented. See. e.g., United States v. Arthur, 

949 F.2d 211, 215 (6th Cir. 1991). Nevertheless, there is an 

inherent tension between this interest and the rights of the 

defendant under Webb. As the Seventh Circuit has stated in the 

context of prosecutors (rather than judges): 

Situations [in which defense witnesses may expose themselves to prosecution] call upon prosecutors to walk a 

narrow path. On the one hand,~ cautions that 11 [s]ubstantial government interference with a defense 

witness' free and unhampered choice to testify violates 

due process." United States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 

703 (5th Cir. 1980). On the other hand, ethical duties 

require prosecutors to warn unrepresented witnesses of 

the risk that the testimony they are about to give may 

be used against them. 

1 I agree with the conclusion in part IV of the majority 

opinion that Defendant's other claims of error are without merit. 

Appellate Case: 90-2257 Document: 010110115181 Date Filed: 05/25/1993 Page: 22 
United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 846-47 (7th Cir. 1991) 

(other citations omitted). I believe that judges must walk the 

2 

same narrow path. 

Because Webb does not, on its face, suggest a simple test for 

distinguishing proper concern from improper intimidation, I look 

to the decisions of other circuits since Webb to discern a pattern. On the one hand, they have established that merely informing the witness of her rights is not error. See Jackson, 935 F.2d 

at 847 (no error where the prosecutor, in the presence of the 

judge and defense attorneys, "simply presented [the witness] with 

2 While Webb itself speaks only of judges, courts have looked 

to Webb in addressing witness intimidation by many different types 

of state actors. Thus, we applied Webb to prosecutors, see 

United States v. Crawford, 707 F.2d 447, 449 (10th Cir. 1983), and 

have phrased the test as whether there is "substantial governmental interference with a defense witness's decision to testify." 

Id. (emphasis added). Other courts have jointly analyzed whether 

"[t]he conduct of the judge and the prosecutor [violated] Webb," 

United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1982), 

and have applied Webb and its progeny to such diverse state actors 

as FBI agents, United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008, 1012-13 

(5th Cir. 1979), IRS agents, United States v. Heller, 830 F.2d 

150, 152, 154 (11th Cir. 1987), prison officials, see United 

States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 702-03 (5th Cir. 1980) (directing 

the trial court, on remand, to investigate a possible due process 

violation resulting from prison officials intimidating inmatewitnesses), and even agents of a different sovereign, United 

States v. Smith, 577 F. Supp. 1232, 1235-36 (S.D. Ohio 1983) 

(intimidation by state police officer in a federal case). 

There is no discernible difference in the standards applied 

to these different officials. Frequently, courts intermingle 

citations to cases involving judges, prosecutors, and other officials in the case law. See, e.g., Heller, 830 F.2d at 152; United 

States v. Risken, 788 F.2d 1361, 1370-71 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 

479 U.S. 923 (1986); Blackwell, 694 F.2d at 1333-34; Harrnnond, 598 

F.2d at 1012. Thus, in determining whether the present record 

shows a Webb violation, I look beyond cases of judicial intimidation to precedent involving prosecutors and other government officials. 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-2257 Document: 010110115181 Date Filed: 05/25/1993 Page: 23 
.. the fact[]" that he was the target of an FBI investigation concerning possible subjects of his testimony); United States v. 

Harlin, 539 F.2d 679, 681 (9th Cir.) (a mere warning of the consequences of perjury does not violate Webb; a violation occurs 

only if the admonition is coercive and indicates the court's 

expectation of perjury), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 942 (1976); United 

States v. Nunn, 525 F.2d 958, 960 (5th Cir. 1976) (no error where 

the trial court explained the perjury laws to a witness who 

claimed ignorance of them and who subsequently declined totestify); United States v. Gloria, 494 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir.) (no 

error where the judge and the prosecutor "merely advised [the witness] of the possibility of prosecution if his testimony materially differed from his prior plea"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 995 

(1974). 

On the other hand, judges and prosecutors may not recommend a 

particular choice to the witness,~ Arthur, 949 F.2d at 215-16 

(district court may not "actively encourage[] a witness not to 

testify or badger[] a witness into remaining silent"; the lower 

court erred by telling the witness, "I think it's not in your best 

interest to testify."), or intimidate a witness with threats or 

statements that they expect perjury. See Anderson v. Warden. 

Maryland Penitentiary. 696 F.2d 296, 299 (4th Cir. 1982) (en bane) 

(habeas granted where the state judge "openly and successfully 

pressed defendant's two key witnesses to change their testimony"), 

cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1111 (1983); United States v. Morrison, 535 

F.2d 223, 228 (3d Cir. 1976) (reversal after the prosecutor 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-2257 Document: 010110115181 Date Filed: 05/25/1993 Page: 24 
repeatedly threatened a defense witness with perjury and drug 

charges if s he testified) ; Berg v. Morris, 483 F. Supp. 179, 183 -

84 (E.D. Cal . 1980 ) (habeas granted where state judge clearly 

indicated his disbel ief of the witness's testimony and threatened 

the witness with perjury charges and parole revocation). If 

judges and prosecutors do instruct a witness on his rights, they 

"can do no more than to advise the witness of the risks he may 

bring upon himself, presenting this advice in a manner calculated 

to engender informed and uncoerced decisionrnaking on the part of 

the witness." Jackson, 935 F.2d ~t 847. 

The majority cites United States v. Simmons, 670 F.2d 365 

(D.C. Cir. 1982), for the proposition that courts have more leeway 

when they have reason to believe that the witness is lying. See 

Maj. Op. at 13-14; Simmons, 670 F.2d at 368. The dissent of 

Justice Blackrnun, however, makes clear that the trial court in 

Webb may have had ample reason to believe that the witness was 

lying. See Webb, 409 U.S. at 99 (Blackrnun, J., dissenting). 

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court summarily reversed, id. at 98, 

without permitting either oral argument or inquiry on remand concerning the evidence of perjury, as Justice Blackmun suggested. 

Id. at 98-99. Under Webb, then, a reason to believe the witness 

is lying is not relevant to the issue of constitutional error. 

Against this backdrop, the parameters of the discretion of 

judges and prosecutors in Webb-type situations become more clear. 

Both judges and prosecutors have an entirely proper interest in 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-2257 Document: 010110115181 Date Filed: 05/25/1993 Page: 25 
r 

ensuring that witnesses are fully aware of their rights and of the 

legal consequences of their testimony. Where, as in this case, 

the potential witness both is young and has a close relationship 

with the defendant, the court has particularly wide discretion in 

ensuring that the witness has made a truly informed decision, with 

full advice from competent counsel. Nevertheless, the decision to 

testify remains up to the witness, and the role of advisor rests 

with her counsel. 

Trial courts are placed in a difficult position when a witness makes a decision to testify which, while fully informed, is 

also very likely to lead to some form of criminal liability. 

Despite the natural desire to dissuade the witness from a decision 

she might bitterly regret in the future, the court must not 

attempt to influence her decision. The court's role is limited to 

being a neutral source of information--not of advice or advocacy. 

Its instructions must be calculated merely to inform--not to persuade, threaten, or coerce. Elaborations beyond that risk running 

afoul of Webb. 

The record in this case clearly shows that the trial court 

went beyond these limits. Faced with a young woman who wished to 

contradict her trial testimony with an implausible story of coercion by an FBI agent, the court explicitly stated that it believed 

she would perjure herself in a lost cause. (See II R. at 14) 

(" [H]ere I am letting this young lady perjure herself, looking at 

ten years, all for nothing.") While the court acted in good faith 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-2257 Document: 010110115181 Date Filed: 05/25/1993 Page: 26 
and with commendable motives , its desire to see Ms. Scott not t e s -

t i f y as proffered was plain. On the face of its statements, it is 

apparent that the court was attempting to dissuade Ms. Scott from 

testifying. Webb does not permit such action, however well -

intentioned. 

The majority's quotation of United States v. Blackwell, 694 

F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1982), Maj. Op. at 14, only underlines the 

Webb violation present in this case. The .trial court in 

Blackwell, as shown by the quotation, merely inquired whether the 

witness was aware of her rights. At no time did the trial court 

in Blackwell suggests its own opinion as to whether the witness 

should testify. The trial court in this case went well beyond 

these limits, and openly sought to persuade the witness to change 

her mind. 

In addition, I cannot agree with the suggestion in the 

special concurrence that Webb is not applicable in this postconviction context. As an initial matter, Webb is about the fundamental right of a defendant to present witnesses on his behalf, 

which was enshrined in our Compulsory Process Clause. I am aware 

of no authority that stands for the proposition that a defendant 

has a lesser compulsory process right in a post-conviction proceeding. Further, while the special concurrence is correct in 

pointing out that a defendant seeking a new trial based on 

recanted testimony faces a formidable burden, that principle 

applies to the trial court's ultimate weighing of the 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-2257 Document: 010110115181 Date Filed: 05/25/1993 Page: 27 
• 

evidence--not to the dimensions of the defendant's compulsory process rights. Finally, I cannot agree that the fact that the witness was represented by counsel militates against finding a Webb 

violation. Where the witness is represented, the trial court has 

less reason to fear that the witness will act in ignorance of the 

legal consequences of her testimony. Indeed, in this case the 

witness's counsel assured the court that the witness had made a 

fully informed decision to testify. That should have been the end 

of the matter. I therefore conclude that the actions of the trial 

court constituted a prima facie violation of Webb. 3 

II 

Having found a Webb violation in this instance, I turn to 

causation, i.e. whether there is "some plausible nexus between the 

challenged governmental conduct and the absence of certain testimany." United States v. Hoffman, 832 F.2d 1299, 1303 (1st Cir. 

1987). This requirement exists because "had the witness been 

unwilling to testify in [defendant's] behalf all along, the 

3 Defendant's counsel did not object to the court's colloquy 

with Ms. Scott at the time it occurred, other than to point out 

the mistaken quotation of the perjury statute. Ordinarily this 

would require me to review only for plain error. The Supreme 

Court, however, has ruled that there is no need for a contemporaneous objection. "The suggestion that the petitioner or his counsel should have interrupted the judge in the middle of his remarks 

to object is, on this record, not a basis to ground a waiver of 

the petitioner's rights." ~' 409 U.S. at 97. The similarity 

of the facts of this case to those in~ constrain me to reach 

the same conclusion here. Contra Blackwell, 694 F.2d at 1340. 

This case is slightly more complex given the overlapping of 

the trial court's decision to recuse itself and its admonitions to 

Ms. Scott. However, I am satisfied that the recusal did not actually take effect until the adjournment of the hearing, so the 

admonitions were delivered by the court in its official capacity. 

7 

Appellate Case: 90-2257 Document: 010110115181 Date Filed: 05/25/1993 Page: 28 
judge's comments, though wrong, could not have been a causati ve 

factor . " Id . The majority argues that causation is not made out 

because the witness invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege two 

weeks after the initial hearing, before another judge . I cannot 

agree. 

I believe that the First Circuit was correct in holding that 

to establish a Webb violation, there must be "some contested act 

or omission [which] (1) can be attributed to the sovereign and (2) 

causes the loss or erosion of testimony which is both (3) material 

to the case and (4) favorable to the accused." Id. Based on the 

trial transcripts and the proffered affidavits, there can be no 

issue of (1), (3), or (4). I therefore focus on prong (2), 

whether the first district judge's actions can fairly be said to 

have caused the witness to decide not to testify. 

In Webb, as in this case, the witness was actually in court 

and on the stand when the admonition was given. Webb, 409 U. S. at 

95. The Supreme Court stated, "The fact that [the witness] was 

willing to come to court to testify in the petitioner's behalf, 

refusing to do so only after the judge's lengthy and intimidating 

warning, strongly suggests that the judge's comments were the 

cause of [the witness's] refusal to testify." Id. at 97. Consequently, the Court summarily reversed without considering the 

issue of causation further. Id. at 98. 

8 

Appellate Case: 90-2257 Document: 010110115181 Date Filed: 05/25/1993 Page: 29 
• 

The facts in this case in several ways are even more clear 

than in Webb. The witness was not only in court but had begun to 

testify. She had given two prior sworn statements in favor of the 

defense, as well as a taped interview, and her attorney represented that she had discussed the matter thoroughly with both her 

attorney and her family. While the subsequent refusal to testify 

was both at a later date and before a different judge, I do not 

view these distinctions as sufficient to distinguish Webb. The 

record contains no evidence suggesting that other intervening 

factors influenced the witness's decision not to testify. Further, since the first district judge only partially recused himself from the case, any possible retrial might have found the witness testifying before him again. 

The standard of causation in~ cases is a light one. The 

conduct in question need only substantially interfere with the 

witness's decision to testify. ~ United States v. Crawford, 707 

F.2d 447, 449 (10th Cir. 1983). Should that occur, there is no 

error only if "the witness [had] been unwilling to testify all 

along." Hoffman, 832 F.2d at 1303. I therefore believe that, as 

a matter of law, there is a "plausible nexus between the challenged governmental conduct and the absence of [the] testimony." 

Id. At a minimum, there is an issue of fact which requires a 

reversal and a remand for a hearing on the issue of causation. 

I would reverse the judgment of the district court. 

9 

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