Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00900/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00900-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Barry A. Bausman
Plaintiff
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BARRY A. BAUSMAN, 

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS AND 

REHABILITATION,

 Defendant.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00900-DAD-EPG-PC

 

ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO EITHER:

(1) FILE A SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT NOT EXCEEDING 25 

PAGES;

(2) NOTIFY THE COURT THAT HE IS 

WILLING TO PROCEED WITH 

THE FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT FOR A RLUIPA; OR, 

(3) NOTIFY THE COURT THAT HE 

STANDS ON THE FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT AS

FILED

 

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE 

(ECF No. 11)

I. BACKGROUND

Barry A. Bausman ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 and the Religious Land Use and 

Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (ARLUIPA@), 42 U.S.C. ' 2000cc-1. On June 12, 2014, 

Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action, which was dismissed with leave to 

amend. (ECF No. 9.) In the Order dismissing the Complaint, Plaintiff was instructed to file an 

Case 1:14-cv-00900-DAD-EPG Document 15 Filed 05/04/16 Page 1 of 13
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amended complaint of no more than 25 pages addressing the deficiencies in the Complaint. On 

March 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), along with nearly 700 

pages of “exhibits.” (ECF No. 11.) The Court notes that the FAC is substantially similar to the 

Complaint, although it has been updated to reflect new citations to the California Code of 

Regulations and elaborates on the theory of Plaintiff‟s equal protection claim.1

For the reasons described below, this FAC fails to state a claim based on constitutional 

rights because it names the CDCR only, and the CDCR is not a proper defendant for this type 

of claim. However, the Court gives Plaintiff leave to amend and notes that Plaintiff appears to 

state viable claims if they were asserted against a proper Defendant, who would be an 

individual person who was involved in depriving the Plaintiff of constitutional rights. The 

Court finds that Plaintiff‟s First Amended Complaint does state a claim against Religious Land 

Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”) against the CDCR. Plaintiff can

now choose to go forward on the RLUIPA claim against the CDCR, can amend his complaint 

to add individual defendants consistent with instructions below, or can stand on his complaint 

and this Court will issue findings and recommendations consistent with this order to the District 

Judge. 

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a). 

The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally Afrivolous or malicious,@ that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

' 1915A(b)(1),(2). ANotwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or 

appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

 

1 The FAC and Complaint also appear to be substantially similar to a Complaint that was filed in the case 

Villapondo v. Beard, Case No. 1:14-cv-00823-LJO-DLB-PC. Several of the pleadings in that case also reference 

Plaintiff or declarations and appeals filed by Plaintiff. That case was dismissed without prejudice on a motion to 

dismiss on January 4, 2016. 

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A complaint is required to contain Aa short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 

1949 (2009), citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). 

While a plaintiff=s allegations are taken as true, courts Aare not required to indulge unwarranted 

inferences.@ Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to >state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal 556 U.S. at 678. 

While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

To state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must set forth sufficient factual allegations to 

state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 

F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Id. 

III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility 

and State Prison in Corcoran, California, in the custody of the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), where the events at issue in the Complaint allegedly 

occurred. Plaintiff names the CDCR as the sole defendant. 

The gravamen of the FAC is that the CDCR implemented a Notice of Change of 

Regulations 13-01 (“NCR 13-01”) on December 10, 2013, which Plaintiff asserts is 

unconstitutional because it violates Plaintiff‟s and other Native American inmates‟ First 

Amendment rights to practice their Native American religion by disallowing the possession 

and/or acquisition of religious artifacts and other items integral to participation in daily Native 

American cultural, traditional, ceremonial, and spiritual life. He also alleges that NCR 13-01 

violates the protections of RLUIPA because it places a burden on his ability to practice his 

religion. Plaintiff alleges that prison staff have informed him that they would begin to “actively 

seek out, confiscate and destroy any religious property” once the policy took effect. (FAC ¶ 6, 

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pg. 8, ECF No. 11.)

Plaintiff also claims that NCR 13-01 violates the Fourteenth Amendment‟s equal 

protection clause, because it favors conventional religions, such as Christianity and Islam, and 

one alternative religion, Wicca, which is predominately Caucasian in membership. In 

particular, Plaintiff contends that NCR 13-01 expands the number of approved items that other 

religions may possess, while contracting the number of items approved for Native American 

religious use. In further violation of the equal protection clause, Plaintiff alleges that NCR 13-

01 fails to incorporate a grandfather clause for previously approved and acquired religious 

artifacts, while granting such protection for inmates possessing non-religious items. 

Plaintiff requests injunctive relief via a court order finding NCR 13-01 unconstitutional 

and instructing the state to rescind or amend NCR 13-01.

IV. PLAINTIFF=S CLAIMS

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the 

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 

redress.

42 U.S.C. ' 1983. ASection 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal 

Constitution and laws.@ Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(internal quotations omitted). 

A. Sovereign Immunity

As an initial matter, the FAC names the CDCR as the sole defendant in this action. The 

CDCR is not a proper defendant. The Eleventh Amendment contains “a general bar against 

federal lawsuits brought against a state.” Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1065-66 (9th 

Cir. 2010), citing Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The Eleventh 

Amendment erects a general bar against federal lawsuits brought against a state. However, suits 

against a state official are an exception to this bar. Under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, suits 

against an official for prospective relief are generally cognizable, whereas claims for 

retrospective relief (such as damages) are not.”). While “[t]he Eleventh Amendment does not 

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bar suits against a state official for prospective relief,” suits against the state or its agencies are 

barred absolutely, regardless of the form of relief sought. Id.; see also Pennhurst State Sch. & 

Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Buckwalter v. Nevada Bd. of Medical 

Examiners, 678 F.3d 737, 740 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2012). This protection extends to the CDCR. 

Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The district court correctly 

held that the California Department of Corrections and the California Board of Prison Terms 

were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”).

Thus, to appropriately pursue his § 1983 claims alleging that his constitutional rights 

were violated, Plaintiff must seek only prospective injunctive relief against a state official in his 

or her official capacity. Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 

1997) (“[T]here is one exception to this general rule: When sued for prospective injunctive 

relief, a state official in his official capacity is considered a „person‟ for § 1983 purposes.”). 

While Plaintiff is seeking prospective injunctive relief because he seeks to require CDCR to 

rescind or amend the policies set forth in NCR 13-01, he has not named any individual state 

official as a defendant. The Court will thus provide Plaintiff with leave to amend the FAC and 

name an appropriate defendant for his § 1983 claims.

2

 Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 

248 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Appellees correctly note on appeal that Lucas failed to name individual 

defendants in his complaint, and that his action, as currently written, is barred by state 

immunity.”).

As Plaintiff considers whether to amend his complaint to allege a § 1983 claim against 

an individual, he is advised that “[l]iability under [§] 1983 arises only upon a showing of 

 

2

Plaintiff may, however, be able to pursue his RLUIPA claim against the CDCR, provided that he only seeks 

injunctive relief, rather than monetary damages. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 298 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., 

dissenting) (“In arguing that „a waiver of sovereign immunity to other types of relief does not waive immunity to 

damages,‟ the majority appears to accept that equitable relief is available to RLUIPA plaintiffs.”); Oklevueha 

Native American Church of Hawaii, Inv. v. Holder, 676 F.3d 829, 840 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The provision could be 

read as authorizing only injunctive relief, and therefore „does not so clearly and unambiguously waive sovereign 

immunity to private suits for damages that we can „be certain that the States in fact consents to such a suit.‟”); 

Rupe v. Cate, 688 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1047 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“Accordingly, the Court finds that RLUIPA requires 

state recipients of federal funds to waive immunity only as to suits for injunctive relief.”); Mauwee v. Donat, Case 

No. 2:06-cv-00122-RCJ-VPC, 2009 WL 3062787, at *15 (D. Nev. Sept. 18, 2009) (“Although the Ninth Circuit 

has not ruled on the issue, the weight of authority in the sister Circuits overwhelmingly favors the conclusion that 

RLUIPA operates as a waiver of sovereign immunity as to equitable relief only.”).

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personal participation by the defendant. A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional 

violations of . . . subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or 

knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. There is no respondeat superior

liability under [§] 1983.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations 

omitted). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant, through his or her own individual 

actions, violated Plaintiff=s constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Corales v. Bennett, 

567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). Supervisory personnel may not be held liable under section 

1983 for the actions of subordinate employees based on respondeat superior, or vicarious 

liability. Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Lemire v. California 

Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 

693 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). “A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or 

she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal 

connection between the supervisor‟s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” 

Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Snow, 681 F.3d at 989) (internal quotation marks omitted);

accord Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074-75; Lacey, 693 F.3d at 915-16. “Under the latter theory, 

supervisory liability exists even without overt personal participation in the offensive act if 

supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of 

constitutional rights and is the moving force of a constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d 

at 977 (citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

This law should give the Plaintiff guidance in amending his complaint. If he chooses to 

file an amended complaint, it should name specific people who were directly involved in the 

decision to institute, implement and apply NCR 13-01 or otherwise directly deprive the 

Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. 

B. Free Exercise Claim – First Amendment

AInmates . . . retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive 

that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.@ O=Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 

342, 348 (1987) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The protections of the Free 

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Exercise Clause are triggered when prison officials substantially burden the practice of an 

inmate=s religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct that he sincerely believes is 

consistent with his faith. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008); Freeman v. 

Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part by Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85.

“The right to exercise religious practices and beliefs does not terminate at the prison door. The 

free exercise right, however, is necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration, and may be 

curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison security.” 

McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987). “To prevail on [a] Free Exercise claim, 

Plaintiffs must allege facts plausibly showing that the government denied them „a reasonable 

opportunity of pursuing [their] faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners 

who adhere to conventional religious precepts.‟” Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t Corr. & Rehab., 707 

F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013). A prisoner‟s free exercise rights may also be “limited by 

„institutional objectives and by the loss of freedom concomitant with incarceration.‟” Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that he participates in a Native American Spiritual Circle (“NASC”). 

As part of this participation, members of the NASC use a variety of religious items for prayers 

and other ceremonial purposes. The policies enumerated in NCR 13-01, however, would forbid 

the possession of many of these items. It is unclear whether this policy has been implemented 

or whether any items specifically in Plaintiff‟s possession have been seized or forbidden at this 

point. Plaintiff does allege, however, that prison staff have told him that they will be actively 

enforcing this policy and will confiscate and/or destroy any prohibited items, if found. Plaintiff 

also contends that the list of approved items for “conventional” religions, such as Christianity 

and Islam, has been expanded while the list of approved items for Native American spiritual 

practices has been contracted.

These allegations are sufficient to state a claim that Plaintiff has been denied a 

reasonable opportunity to engage in conduct that he believes is consistent with his faith. 

For these reasons, the court finds that Plaintiff would state a cognizable First Amendment claim 

for violation of the Free Exercise Clause if he were able to name a proper defendant who was 

involved in issuing or implementing this policy. As explained above, however, the claim is not 

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stated against a proper defendant at this time.

C. RLUIPA Claim

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (ARLUIPA@) 

provides:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious 

exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . , 

even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, 

unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden 

on that personB

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling

 government interest.

42 U.S.C. ' 2000cc-1. To state a RLUIPA claim, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating 

that a defendant substantially burdened the exercise of his religious beliefs. Warsoldier v. 

Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2005). In any RLUIPA claim, one must first identify 

the “‟religious‟ exercise allegedly impinged upon,” and then ask “whether the prison regulation 

at issue „substantially burdens‟ that religious exercise.” Greene v. Solano Cnty. Jail, 513 F.3d 

982, 987 (9th Cir. 2008). 

As with Plaintiff‟s free exercise claim, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the policies 

enunciated in NCR 13-01 place a substantial burden on the exercise of his religious activities, 

including the use of Native American religious items for participation in his NASC. The Court 

finds that Plaintiff states a cognizable RLUIPA claim and that it may be asserted against the 

CDCR.

D. Equal Protection Claim

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated 

alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249 

(1985); Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891. An equal protection claim may be established by showing 

that Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff based on his membership in a 

protected class, Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 702-

03 (9th Cir. 2009); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071,1082 (9th Cir. 2003), Lee v. City of Los 

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Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001), or that similarly situated individuals were 

intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, 

Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601-02, 128 S.Ct. 2146 (2008); Village of 

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073 (2000); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. 

Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); North Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 

478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff claims that NCR 13-01 violates the Fourteenth Amendment‟s equal protection 

clause in two ways. First, it favors conventional religions, such as Christianity and Islam, and 

one alternative religion, Wicca, which is predominately Caucasian in membership. In 

particular, Plaintiff alleges that NCR 13-01 “preserves and expands the new and previously 

approved items allowed to be possessed by those religions, while specifically omitting 

previously approved Native American cultural, traditional, ceremonial and spiritual artifacts 

and items.” Second, Plaintiff alleges that inmates who possess religious items are being treated 

differently from inmates who possess non-religious items such as keyboards, TVs and 

typewriters, because inmates with non-religious items are allowed to keep items that were 

procured before being disallowed, whereas NCR 13-01 does not incorporate a “grandfather 

clause” allowing inmates to keep previously approved religious artifacts and items. 

Each of these constitutes a separate basis for an equal protection claim. In the first 

instance, Plaintiff is asserting that he belongs to a protected class composed of followers of 

Native American spiritual beliefs and is arguing that he is receiving less favorable treatment 

compared to followers of Christianity, Islam, or Wiccan spiritual beliefs because the items they 

use receive fewer restrictions. In the second instance, Plaintiff is asserting that he belongs to a 

protected class composed of followers of Native American spiritual beliefs and is arguing that 

he is receiving less favorable treatment than all other inmates who use or possess non-religious

items such as typewriters and televisions. 

The first basis adequately alleges an equal protection claim because it alleges that 

similarly situated prisoners (i.e., prisoners whose faith requires the use or possession of 

religious items) are being treated differently (i.e., Native American adherents have access to 

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fewer items than Christian adherents). The second basis, however, does not allege an equal 

protection claim because it is not comparing groups that are similarly situated. The comparison 

between Native American adherents and all other inmates fails because Plaintiff‟s ability to 

keep religious items has no connection or relationship with the ability of other inmates to keep 

non-religious items. 

Plaintiff thus alleges facts to demonstrate that he was intentionally treated differently

than other similarly situated inmates. Therefore, Plaintiff would state a claim for relief for 

violation of his right to equal protection if he were to name a proper individual defendant. As 

with his free exercise claim, however, Plaintiff fails to name a proper defendant for this claim

at this time.

E. Violation of State Law

Plaintiff brings state law claims against the CDCR for “establish[ing] and enforc[ing] a 

deadline that is prior to the rule-making hearing by which comments may be submitted for 

them to be considered by the agency.” A violation of state law is not sufficient to state a claim 

for relief under ' 1983. To state a claim under ' 1983, there must be a deprivation of federal 

constitutional or statutory rights. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Although the court 

may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, Plaintiff must first have a 

cognizable claim for relief under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. ' 1367.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has 

original jurisdiction, the district court Ashall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other 

claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 

controversy under Article III [of the Constitution],@ with specific exceptions. “Pendent 

jurisdiction over state claims exists when the federal claim is sufficiently substantial to confer 

federal jurisdiction, and there is a „common nucleus of operative fact between the state and 

federal claims.‟” Brady v. Brown, 51 F.3d 810, 816 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Gilder v. PGA 

Tour, Inc., 936 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir.1991)). A[O]nce judicial power exists under ' 1367(a), 

retention of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is discretionary.@ 

Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court has 

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cautioned that Aif the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be 

dismissed as well.@ United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

In this instance, the Court has found cognizable federal claims based on the facts in the 

FAC. Therefore, at this juncture, the Court shall exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff=s state law claims that form part of the same case or controversy as Plaintiff=s 

cognizable federal claims.3

V. CONCLUSION

The Court has found that the FAC states a RLUIPA claim against defendant CDCR. It 

also states state law claims, which can proceed in light of the federal RLUIPA claim. The FAC

states other § 1983 claims, but only against the CDCR who is not a proper defendant. 

Plaintiff may either (1) tell the Court that Plaintiff wants to proceed with the First 

Amended Complaint on the RLUIPA claim and state claims, (2) file a Second Amended 

Complaint adding proper individual defendants for the § 1983 claims, or (3) tell the Court that 

Plaintiff wishes to stand on the First Amended Complaint as filed.4 

If Plaintiff chooses to file a Second Amended Complaint, that complaint will supersede 

the First Amended Complaint and the Court will screen the Second Amended Complaint in 

full. Should Plaintiff choose to file a Second Amended Complaint, it should be brief, Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of 

Plaintiff=s constitutional or other federal rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Jones v. Williams, 297 

F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter . . . to >state a 

claim that is plausible on its face.=@ Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff 

should state clearly, in his own words, what happened and how each defendant‟s actions 

violated the particular right described by Plaintiff. Plaintiff should name each defendant and 

explain what happened, describing personal acts by the individual defendant that resulted in the 

 

3At this stage of the proceedings, the court makes no determination about the viability of Plaintiff=s state law

claim.

4

If Plaintiff chooses to stand on the First Amended Complaint as filed, the Magistrate Judge will recommend 

dismissal, by the District Judge, of the claims found noncognizable in this order.

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violation of Plaintiff‟s rights. Plaintiff should also describe any harm he suffered as a result of 

the violation. Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it 

is not for the purpose of adding new defendants for unrelated issues.

Given that Plaintiff must comply with Rule 8(a), which requires a complaint to contain 

Aa short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,@ and 

based on the nature of Plaintiff‟s claims, twenty-five pages is more than sufficient for Plaintiff 

to identify his claims and set forth specific facts in support of those claims. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff =s Second Amended Complaint may not exceed twenty-five pages in length, and it will 

be stricken from the record if it violates this page limitation. 

The Court notes that Plaintiff has attached nearly 700 pages of exhibits to the FAC. 

While exhibits are permissible, Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c), they are not necessary in the federal 

system of notice pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Moreover, the attachment of voluminous 

exhibits to a complaint serves only to confuse the record, burden the Court, and slow down the 

screening and review process. Thus, in filing his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff 

should not attach exhibits or other documents unless they are essential to his claim. If this 

action reaches a juncture at which the submission of evidence is appropriate and necessary 

(e.g., summary judgment or trial), Plaintiff will have the opportunity at that time to submit his

evidence. 

If Plaintiff decides to file a Second Amended Complaint, he is reminded that an 

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F. 3d 

896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2012) (en banc), and it must be complete in itself without 

reference to the prior or superseded pleading. Local Rule 220. Once an amended complaint is 

filed, the prior complaint no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended 

complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must 

be sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled ASecond

Amended Complaint,@ refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under 

penalty of perjury. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1. The Clerk=s Office is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

and,

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall 

either:

a. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended 

complaint and is instead willing to proceed only on the RLUIPA claim 

against defendant CDCR, as well as state law claims; or,

b. File a Second Amended Complaint no longer twenty-five pages curing 

the deficiencies identified in this order, in particular adding proper 

individual defendants;

c. Notify the Court in writing that he stands on the First Amended 

Complaint as filed, in which case the Court will issue findings and 

recommendations to the United States District Judge assigned to this 

case consistent with this opinion.

Should Plaintiff choose to amend the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff shall caption 

the amended complaint “Second Amended Complaint” and refer to the case number 1:14-cv0900-DAD-EPC-PC. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action may be dismissed 

for failure to comply with a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 3, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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