Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03152/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03152-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles Booker
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 13, 2005 Decided February 3, 2006

No. 04-3152

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

CHARLES BOOKER,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cr00049-01)

Mary E. Davis, appointed by the court, argued the cause and

filed the brief for appellant. 

Thomas S. Rees, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With him on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S. Attorney at the

time the brief was filed, and Thomas J. Tourish, Jr. and

Florence Pan, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Roy W. McLeese, III,

Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and SENTELLE, Circuit

Judge, and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

Concurring opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Charles Booker appeals his

conviction and imprisonment for “constructive possession” of a

firearm. Booker argues there was insufficient evidence to

support his conviction and that his sentence must be vacated and

remanded in light of Booker v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 738

(2005). Because we agree only with Booker’s second argument,

we affirm his conviction for “constructive possession” of a

firearm, but we vacate his sentence and remand to the District

Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I. Background

In January 2004, an undercover officer with the D.C.

Metropolitan Police Department approached Charles Booker and

expressed interest in purchasing some crack cocaine. While the

officer waited in his unmarked car, Booker ran about 50 feet up

the street and returned 10 or 20 seconds later with a Newport

cigarette pack. From the pack, Booker shook out two small

Ziploc bags containing crack cocaine and gave one to the officer

in return for $20 in prerecorded funds. The undercover officer

left, and Booker walked back up the street to re-hide the

Newport pack.

Two or three minutes later, several uniformed officers

arrived to arrest Booker. One member of the arrest team asked

Booker what he was doing outside, and Booker responded that

he was looking for his Newport cigarettes. Officer Michael

Penn, another member of the arrest team, then walked 50 feet up

the street and found Booker’s Newport pack lying on the

ground. When Penn bent down to investigate, he saw a black

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handgun “right beside” the Newport cigarette pack. 

Booker was charged in a four-count indictment for unlawful

distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §

841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (Count One); unlawful possession with

intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §

841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (Count Two); using, carrying, or

possessing a firearm during a drug trafficking offense, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (Count Three); and

unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a person

convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and

924(e)(1) (Count Four). 

At trial, the government introduced evidence that the gun

was loaded, and the Newport pack contained 3.8 grams of

cocaine base, 75% pure. Although Booker’s fingerprints were

on neither the gun nor the Newport pack, the government linked

Booker to the drugs through the undercover officer’s testimony

about the drug sale; the government also introduced evidence

that Booker has previously sold crack using the same modus

operandi (i.e., dispensing crack from a Newport pack in the

same neighborhood). The government then linked the gun to

the drugs by offering photographic evidence of their physical

proximity, and expert testimony that guns and drugs are “like

a marriage. They can’t do without the other.” Unhelpfully, the

photograph is not included in the parties’ submissions in this

case. However, Booker does not contest the government’s

assertion that the gun was lying approximately five inches away

from the Newport pack, nor does Booker contest that the gun

was clean and frost-free, notwithstanding the fact that it was

recovered on a bitterly cold winter evening. 

At the close of the government’s case-in-chief, Booker

moved for a judgment of acquittal. The District Court denied

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the motion. The defendant then called his only witness, a

private investigator, who introduced additional photographs of

the neighborhood in which Booker was arrested. According to

the defendant’s private investigator, Booker was arrested 80

feet—not 50 feet—away from the gun-and-drugs stash. 

Booker did not renew his motion for judgment of acquittal

at the close of all the evidence. On May 10, 2004, the jury

found appellant guilty on all four counts. On May 16, 2004, the

defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal or, in the

alternative, for a new trial. The District Court denied the

motions. 

On October 26, 2004, the District Court imposed a sentence

under the Guidelines of 240 months on Count One, 240 months

on Count Two, 60 months on Count Three, and 360 months on

Count Four. The terms on Counts One, Two, and Four were to

run concurrently, while Count Three was to run consecutively

to all other counts. Thus, the District Court imposed an

aggregate Guidelines sentence of 35 years in prison. Pending

the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker v. United States, 125 S.

Ct. 738 (2005), the sentencing judge also announced a nonGuidelines “alternative sentence”: ten years on Count One, ten

years on Count Two, five years on Count Three, and 15 years on

Count Four. Counts One and Two were to be served

concurrently. Count Four was to be served consecutively to the

ten years on Counts One and Two. Count Three was to be served

consecutively to all other counts. Thus, the District Court

imposed an aggregate non-Guidelines “sentence” of 30 years in

prison. The District Court entered both sentences on the

judgment form.

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II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

A

We will affirm a conviction where “any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Wahl,

290 F.3d 370, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2002). We do not distinguish

between direct and circumstantial evidence, and we give “full

play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the

evidence and draw justifiable inferences of fact.” United States

v. Clark, 184 F.3d 858, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). We “review the evidence of

record de novo, considering that evidence in the light most

favorable to the government.” Wahl, 290 F.3d at 375.

Ordinarily, “an appellant seeking to overturn a jury verdict

for insufficient evidence bears an exceedingly heavy burden.”

United States v. Salamanca, 990 F.2d 629, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

However, where a defendant fails to renew his motion for a

judgment of acquittal (MJOA) under FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a) at

the close of all the evidence, his burden is even heavier: He

“has waived his right to raise a sufficiency of the evidence claim

on appeal” unless “declining to consider the sufficiency of the

evidence on waiver grounds cause[s] a ‘manifest miscarriage of

justice.’” United States v. Thompson, 279 F.3d 1043, 1051

(D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Sherod, 960 F.2d

1075, 1077 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 980 (1992)). We

note that Booker—like the defendants in Thompson and

Sherod—failed to renew his MJOA at the close of all the

evidence. Unlike the defendants in Thompson and Sherod,

however, Booker did renew his MJOA after the jury verdict. 

Insofar as the “miscarriage of justice” standard is intended

simply to ensure that the District Court has the opportunity to

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order an MJOA after receiving all the evidence, see Sherod, 960

F.2d at 1077, Booker’s post-verdict motion may be sufficient to

preserve his objections to the sufficiency of the evidence against

him. We need not determine this issue in the present case,

because for the reasons set forth below, we conclude a rational

juror could have convicted Booker for “possessing” the

handgun. 

B

Booker argues the prosecution did not establish that he

“possessed” a gun for purposes of either Count Three or Count

Four because the gun was not found on his person, no one saw

him holding it, and no fingerprints were recovered from it.

However, we have long held that “possession” for purposes of

both §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(c)(1) “may be either actual or

constructive.” United States v. Alexander, 331 F.3d 116, 127

(D.C. Cir. 2003) (upholding a conviction under § 922(g)(1) on

the basis of “constructive possession”); see also Wahl, 290 F.3d

at 375-76 (upholding a conviction under § 924(c)(1) on the basis

of “constructive possession”). 

We agree with the government that there was ample

evidence to justify the jury’s verdict that Booker “constructively

possessed” the handgun for purposes of both Count Three and

Count Four. “Constructive possession is established with

evidence supporting a finding that the defendant had the ability

to exercise knowing dominion and control over the items in

question.” Wahl, 290 F.3d at 376 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). “Although mere proximity to a gun is

insufficient to establish constructive possession, evidence of

some other factor—including connection with a gun, proof of

motive, a gesture implying control, evasive conduct, or a

statement indicating involvement in an enterprise—coupled with

proximity may suffice.” Alexander, 331 F.3d at 127 (internal

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quotation marks and citations omitted). In this case, several

Alexander-type “plus factors” allowed the jury to infer Booker’s

“connection with [the] gun.” The government’s drug expert

testified that drug dealers have a “motive”—namely, defense of

themselves and their drug stashes—to carry guns. The

undercover police officer watched (through his rearview mirror)

as Booker walked up the street and made “a gesture implying

control” over the gun, which was stashed immediately next to

the Newport pack. Booker then made a “statement indicating

involvement in an enterprise” when he told the arrest team that

he was looking for his Newport cigarettes. Coupled with the

fact that the stash was never more than 50-80 feet away from

Booker, these factors constitute ample evidence to find

constructive possession under Alexander and Wahl. 

Moreover, Booker’s indisputable “dominion and control

over” the drugs, Wahl, 290 F.3d at 376, further supports our

conclusion that he “constructively possessed” the nearby gun.

The government’s drug expert testified about the unique relation

between drug stashes and firearms, stating that one often “can’t

do without the other.” The expert’s testimony accords with our

prior caselaw, which “has frequently recognized that guns and

drugs go together in drug trafficking.” United States v.

McLendon, 378 F.3d 1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also

United States v. Brown, 334 F.3d 1161, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

(noting guns and drugs are often present together, and therefore,

the presence of one can be used to infer the presence of the

other); United States v. Conyers, 118 F.3d 755, 757 (D.C. Cir.

1997) (same); United States v. Payne, 805 F.2d 1062, 1065-66

(D.C. Cir. 1986) (same). Thus, we reaffirm that “evidence of a

defendant’s possession of [guns] can properly be used to show

his connection to [drugs],” McLendon, 378 F.3d at 1113, and

vice versa. See United States v. Evans, 888 F.2d 891, 896 (D.C.

Cir. 1989) (“The government presented evidence that [all three

defendants] were engaged in a common [drug] enterprise. From

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this evidence a jury could reasonably infer that all three shared

direct access to, and dominion and control over, the knapsack,”

which contained both cocaine and guns.), cert. denied sub nom.

Curren v. United States, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990); compare In re

Sealed Case, 105 F.3d 1460, 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding

there was insufficient evidence to support constructive

possession of a gun because it was physically impossible for the

defendant to grab the gun during the drug sale). 

This case differs markedly from In re Sealed Case. There,

the defendant remained inside a restaurant while his brother

conducted a drug sale in a car, which was parked outside the

restaurant. When the police arrested the defendant and his

brother, they discovered a gun under the driver’s seat of the car.

We held there was insufficient evidence to support the District

Court’s conclusion that the defendant “constructively possessed”

the gun because the spatial separation between the defendant,

the gun, and the drugs precluded him from exercising “dominion

and control” over the firearm during the transaction. See id.

Here, by sharp contrast, Booker easily could have grabbed the

gun during the drug sale (either when he went to pick up the

Newport cigarette pack, or when he went back to re-hide it).

The proximity of the gun and the drugs suggest they were

stashed by the same person, as part of “a common [drug]

enterprise,” Evans, 888 F.2d at 895, and the lack of frost and dirt

on the gun suggests it had been stashed recently. Finally,

Booker was a veteran drug-vendor in his high-crime

neighborhood, and he doubtlessly had a motive to carry a gun to

protect himself and his illicit assets. See United States v.

Jefferson, 974 F.2d 201, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (concluding there

“was sufficient evidence that the guns were present ‘to protect

[the] drug traffickers and their investment’”) (quoting United

States v. Anderson, 881 F.2d 1128, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 

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In these circumstances, a rational juror could reasonably

conclude Booker constructively possessed the gun lying next to

his drugs, and it is certainly not a “manifest miscarriage of

justice” to affirm the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we affirm

Booker’s conviction on Count Three and Count Four. 

III. The Sentence

A

Booker and the government agree that the sentencing court

committed a constitutional error by applying the Guidelines as

mandatory. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746; United States v.

Ayers, 428 F.3d 312, 314 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v.

Simpson, 430 F.3d 1177, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Where, as here,

a defendant entered a timely and valid objection to an error

before the District Court, we review his claim under the

harmless error standard. See United States v. Coumaris, 399

F.3d 343, 351 (D.C. Cir. 2005). “To justify reversal of a

conviction under that standard, there must be (1) error, (2) that

‘affect[s] substantial rights’—i.e., that is prejudicial.” United

States v. Perkins, 161 F.3d 66, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting

FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) and citing United States v. Olano, 507

U.S. 725, 731, 734 (1993)). The government bears the burden

of proving that prejudice did not result from the error. See

Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.

In this case, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that

Booker was prejudiced by the sentencing error, as evidenced by

the District Court’s willingness to sentence him to only 30 years

if the Supreme Court rendered the mandatory application of the

Guidelines unconstitutional. What is unclear, however, is the

appropriate remedy. Because “we are to review ‘judgments, not

opinions,’” we have previously held a single judgment (in the

form of a 46-month sentence) imposed under two independent

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rationales was not necessarily erroneous simply because one of

its supporting rationales was erroneous. Simpson, 430 F.3d at

1184 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We

hasten to point out, however, that Simpson did not limit our

review to the four corners of the judgment form. See id. at

1185-90 (extensively reviewing portions of the sentencing

transcript). Thus, Simpson did not hold that a sentencing judge

could render harmless the mandatory application of the

Guidelines by entering a second, independent “judgment” in the

form of an “alternative sentence.” More specifically, we

expressly did not extend our holding to a case—such as this

one—in which the District Court imposed a different

“alternative sentence.” See id. at 1184 n.7 (noting we have

never had an “occasion to consider what the appropriate

disposition would be if the district court had announced a

[Guidelines sentence and an] alternative sentence” of different

lengths).

At oral argument, we called for supplemental briefing on

whether we should simply affirm the District Court’s

“alternative sentence,” or whether we must vacate the

Guidelines sentence and remand for further proceedings. The

government supports the former option, while Booker supports

the latter. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with

Booker. 

B

We note at the outset that “alternative sentencing” is not a

post-Blakely innovation. Doubting the constitutionality of the

Guidelines shortly after their promulgation in 1987, some judges

imposed pre-Guidelines sentences along with “alternative

sentences” that comported with the Guidelines. After the

Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Guidelines in

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), the appellate

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courts disagreed over how to handle differing “alternative

sentences.” Compare United States v. Smith, 888 F.2d 720, 722

n.2 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding an “alternative sentence imposed

under the Sentencing Guidelines is operative” after Mistretta),

with United States v. Feekes, 879 F.2d 1562, 1568 (7th Cir.

1989) (holding it is “incorrect” to argue that an “alternative

sentence . . . sprang into effect” after Mistretta). Neither we nor

the parties could find a Mistretta-era case that analyzed the

standalone legal effect (if any) of an “alternative sentence.” The

Supreme Court never resolved the issue, which soon fell by the

wayside. See United States v. Brittman, 872 F.2d 827, 829 (8th

Cir. 1989) (noting “of course . . . the two-track [sentencing]

procedure [will not] be appropriate in the future”). 

Under the Guidelines, a sentencing judge had no reason to

impose “alternative sentences.” It is therefore unsurprising that

neither we nor the parties could find guidance on “alternative

sentences” in the pre-Blakely caselaw or treatises. After the

Supreme Court cast doubt over the constitutionality of the

federal Sentencing Guidelines, see Blakely v. Washington, 542

U.S. 296, 305 n.9 (2004), at least one appellate court suggested

that sentencing judges should impose an “alternative sentence”

in addition to a Guidelines sentence, pending the Supreme

Court’s decision in Booker. See, e.g., United States v.

Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 353 (4th Cir. 2004) (dicta). However,

the concept of “alternative sentences” did not command

universal acclaim. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 333 F.

Supp. 2d 573, 579 (S.D. W. Va. 2004) (rejecting Hammoud and

holding “alternative sentencing is inconsistent with the judicial

obligation to reach a decision and undermines the role of the

court”). 

The majority of circuits that have considered the question

post-Blakely has held that a lower “alternative sentence”

requires the vacatur of a higher Guidelines sentence and a

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remand for further proceedings. Three circuits have vacated a

Guidelines sentence and remanded for resentencing without

considering whether they could simply affirm a lower

“alternative sentence.” See United States v. Hartfield, 138 Fed.

Appx. 351, 352 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Lampkins, 153

Fed. Appx. 176, 178 (4th Cir. Nov. 3, 2005) (per curiam);

United States v. Jackson, 147 Fed. Appx. 109, 112 (11th Cir.

2005) (per curiam). One circuit adopted the same position in

dicta. See United States v. Cox, 2005 WL 3304022, *4 (6th Cir.

Dec. 6, 2005). A fifth circuit has vacated a Guidelines sentence

and remanded for resentencing in several cases, see United

States v. Michel-Galaviz, 415 F.3d 946, 949 (8th Cir. 2005);

United States v. Thomas, 422 F.3d 665, 669-70 (8th Cir. 2005);

United States v. Storer, 413 F.3d 918, 923-24 (8th Cir. 2005),

while one of its decisions appears inconsistent, United States v.

Merryman, 136 Fed. Appx. 953, 955 (8th Cir. 2005) (per

curiam). One circuit has suggested that it would affirm a lower

“alternative sentence” if all its “triggers” were satisfied. See

United States v. Adair, 2005 WL 2990586, *5-7 (5th Cir. Nov.

8, 2005). Finally, one circuit has held that a lower “alternative

sentence” requires the vacatur of a higher Guidelines sentence

and a remand for the “ministerial task” of amending the

judgment and committal form “to reflect the [lower] alternate

sentence[, which] is the operative sentence.” United States v.

Howe, 139 Fed. Appx. 61, 64 & n.3 (10th Cir. 2005). None of

these cases analyzed the standalone legal effect (if any) of an

“alternative sentence.” Today we address that issue. Because

we conclude an “alternative sentence” is not really a “sentence,”

and because the parties concede Booker was prejudiced by the

mandatory application of the Guidelines, we vacate the sentence

and remand for further proceedings. 

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1

Of course, the District Court may modify or correct a

judgment in accordance with FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (for either a “clear

error” or the defendant’s “substantial assistance”) and FED. R. CRIM.

P. 36 (for a “clerical error”). However, both rules prescribe

C

We begin with the “general rule that there can be only one

final judgment[.] . . . It follows as a necessary consequence of

the general rule that, when a final judgment has once been

entered, no second or different judgment may be rendered . . .,

until the first shall have been vacated and set aside or reversed

on appeal or error. Where a second judgment is entered by a

court after the first judgment has become final the second

judgment is void.” 49 C.J.S. JUDGMENTS § 76, at 150-51

(2005); see also Home Life Ins. Co. of Brooklyn v. Dunn, 86

U.S. 214, 225 (1873) (“To say that there can be two final

judgments . . . involves a solecism.” (emphasis in original));

Badger Pharmacal, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 1 F.3d 621,

625 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting there can be “only one final

judgment per case”); 46 AM. JUR. 2D JUDGMENTS § 9, at 378

(2005) (“A judge, having rendered and signed one final

judgment, has no authority to sign another one. Thus, after a

final judgment has been entered in a ca[]se, the entry of a second

final judgment in the same ca[]se does not vacate the first, and

if there is nothing to show that the first is vacated, then the

second is a nullity.” (footnotes omitted)). 

In the context of criminal sentencing, we have long

recognized “that the pronouncement of sentence constitutes the

judgment of the court.” Gilliam v. United States, 269 F.2d 770,

772 (D.C. Cir. 1959). Therefore, once the court pronounces a

criminal sentence—which constitutes a “judgment”—the court

has no lawful authority to supplement that sentence with a

second one.1

 Because the sentencing judge’s oral

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procedures for such changes, and both rules require the District Court

to incorporate those changes into a single, preexisting judgment. See

United States v. Lewis, 626 F.2d 940, 953 & n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1980);

Poole v. United States, 250 F.2d 396, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Neither

rule empowers the District Court to enter a second, independent

judgment. 

2

 Because the “alternative sentence” is not embodied in a

judgment, we have no occasion to review it under the harmless error

standard. 

pronouncement constitutes the judgment of the court, and

because the sentencing judge may impose one and only one

judgment, the written judgment form is a nullity to the extent it

conflicts with the previously pronounced sentence, id. at 772-73;

see also Hill v. United States ex rel. Wampler, 298 U.S. 460,

464-65 (1936); Lewis, 626 F.2d at 953; Kennedy v. Reid, 249

F.2d 492, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1957).

In this case, the District Court orally instructed the United

States Bureau of Prisons to incarcerate Booker for 35 years

under the then-applicable Guidelines. After pronouncing this

sentence, the District Court had no lawful authority to

pronounce a shorter “alternative sentence” because the District

Court had no lawful authority to enter a second judgment. To

the extent the District Court attempted to reduce or qualify its

pronouncement of a Guidelines sentence by entering a shorter

“alternative sentence” on the judgment form, the court’s original

sentencing pronouncement controls. See, e.g., Lewis, 626 F.2d

at 953; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (“The court may not modify

a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except” under

circumstances not relevant here.).

Accordingly, we hold that Booker’s thirty-five-year

Guidelines sentence was the only sentence the District Court

imposed, and it is the only sentence before us today.2

 Had the

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3

Of course, if the district judge is still satisfied from the record

that the sentence previously announced as an alternative is the

appropriate disposition, it may well be in order to simply sentence on

the record rather than having another full-blown hearing.

parties not stipulated to the fact that Booker was prejudiced by

his Guidelines sentence, we would look to the “alternative

sentence” only to determine prejudice vel non. Cf. United States

v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam)

(holding that “in assessing whether the District Court’s Booker

error was prejudicial, we must determine whether there would

have been a materially different result, more favorable to the

defendant, had the sentence been imposed in accordance with

the post-Booker sentencing regime”); Simpson, 430 F.3d at 1191

(holding an identical “alternative sentence” rendered harmless

the sentencing court’s Booker error). Because Booker’s one and

only sentence was erroneous, and because the parties agree the

error was not harmless, we vacate and remand for further

proceedings. See Ayers, 428 F.3d at 315-16. 

The imposition of a discretionary, post-Booker sentence is

not a “ministerial task.”3 Howe, 139 Fed. Appx. at 64 n.3.

Given Booker’s emphasis on sentencing judges’ discretion, see

125 S. Ct. at 765-69, we cannot instruct the District Court on

remand to enter a judgment imposing a thirty-year sentence.

This disposition comports with accepted appellate practice in

cases—such as those involving federal sentencing—that hinge

on the District Court’s discretion:

It sometimes occurs that, after having considered the lower

court decision and found error, an appellate court merely

reverses or vacates and then remands—that is, it sets the

judgment aside and sends the case back to the lower court

for further proceedings, rather than entering or directing

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entry of judgment for the appellant or petitioner. That is the

appropriate course whenever the finding of error does not

automatically entitle the appellant or petitioner to judgment,

and the appellate court cannot conduct (or chooses not to

conduct) the further inquiry necessary to resolve the

questions remaining in the litigation. Our books are full of

such cases, from Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3 Dall. 6 (1794),

and Clarke v. Russell, 3 Dall. 415 (1799), to Vernonia

School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), and Tuggle

v. Netherland, 516 U.S. 10 (1995).

Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 163, 177-78 (1996) (Scalia, J.,

dissenting). The Stutson majority did not take issue with what

is apparently a self-evident proposition.

To summarize, our ruling in Simpson that the original

judgment could stand is not applicable here. In Simpson we did

not – indeed, could not – vacate the judgment below, as there

was no cognizable error: that is, the judge’s application of the

Guidelines as if mandatory did not affect his judgment. Here,

the error is prejudicial, and the District Court, perhaps wisely,

alerted us to the prejudice resulting from his being forced to

impose a sentence more stringent under the mandatorily applied

Guidelines than he otherwise would have done. Since the error

prejudiced the rights of the defendant, we must vacate the

judgment. We know of no authority that empowers us to require

the district judge to enter the “alternative sentence,” which he

previously recited into the record. It may well be the case,

indeed it is likely, that he will enter the same judgment. Perhaps

he will determine that he need not hold a resentencing hearing

but may simply act upon the record. All those things are for that

court on another day. Our authority is exhausted when we have

vacated the judgment entered on the basis of a prejudicial error.

USCA Case #04-3152 Document #947313 Filed: 02/03/2006 Page 16 of 19
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IV

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the District

Court is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

USCA Case #04-3152 Document #947313 Filed: 02/03/2006 Page 17 of 19
WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring: I concur, 

but note an anomaly and a distinction. The anomaly is 

between this case and ones like United States v. Simpson, 430 

F.3d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In the latter cases, where the 

district court chooses identical alternative sentences (both 

under the Guidelines and under an estimate of the likely 

outcome in the Supreme Court’s then-looming decision in 

Booker v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005)), the defendant 

gets no new judicial consideration at all unless he persuades 

us that the judge’s mindset in imposing the alternative wasn’t 

close enough to what the Supreme Court prescribed in 

Booker. Here, by contrast, where the court imposed different

sentences, the defendant gets at least the chance that the 

district court might grant a sentencing hearing, even though 

(so far as appears) the district court perfectly anticipated the 

nature of its post-Booker discretion. 

The outcome in this case is driven, as the court’s opinion 

shows, by the principle that a sentencing court can impose 

only one judgment. But there may be other ways to skin the 

cat. Although there is a one-judgment principle, there appears 

to be no categorical rule against contingent or alternative 

judgments. In Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), for 

example, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of 

a criminal statute that required individuals who had not paid 

the fees or fines that were part of their sentence by the end of 

their prison terms to remain incarcerated until they had 

“worked off” outstanding balances at the rate of $5 per day. 

Id. at 236. While disallowing such imprisonment where it 

would increase the term of imprisonment beyond the statutory 

maximum for the substantive offense, the Court emphasized 

that its holding did “not deal with a judgment of confinement 

for nonpayment of a fine in the familiar pattern of an 

alternative sentence of ‘$30 or 30 days.’” Id. at 244. 

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2

The present case doesn’t involve a contingent or 

alternative sentence, as the court didn’t include the nonGuidelines sentence in the judgment. And sentence 

contingencies based on anticipated outcomes in Supreme 

Court decisions may, of course, pose different problems from 

contingencies based on the defendant’s conduct. But 

whatever those issues may be, our decision here doesn’t speak 

to the availability of such judgments to solve transition 

problems such as those posed by Booker/Blakely v. 

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 

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