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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
A. Leonard Varah
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

A. LEONARD VARAH, MICHAEL W. STRAND, 

and GALEN J. ROSS, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

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FIL~D U "ted Stares Court of Appcab nl 1- c· ·~- Te!~~l 1rcut... 

DE~ 1 8 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 87-2320 

87-2354 

87-2355 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. Nos. CR86-0063-01J, 02J & 03J) 

Sheila Ginsberg Reisel & Steven Boyd Menack, of Phillips, Nizer, 

Benjamin, Kr~ & Ballon, New York City, New York, for ~· Defendant-Appellant A. Leonard Varah. 

John T. Caine, of Richards, Caine & Allen, Ogden, Utah, for 

Defendants-Appellants Michael w. Strand and Galen J. Ross. 

Richard A. Stacy, United States Attorney, Frances Leland Pico, 

Assistant United States Attorney & w. Brice Lahue, Special 

Assistant United States Attorney, Cheyenne, Wyoming, Jacob H. 

Stil1man, Associate General Counsel, Richard A. Kirby, Assistant 

General Counsel, Joseph H. Harrington, Attorney, & Rada L. Potts, 

Attorney, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C. for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before TACHA, BALDOCK and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

This order reflects our reluctance to make merits 

dispositions while post-trial motions remain pending in district 

Appellate Case: 87-2320 Document: 01019326266 Date Filed: 07/30/1992 Page: 1
court. Defendants-appellants were convicted of conspiracy to 

commit mail fraud, 18 u.s.c. § 371. Defendant Varah also was 

convicted of mail fraud and securities fraud. 18 u.s.c. § 1341; 

15 u.s.c. § 77q, 77x. Defendants Ross and Strand also were 

convicted of aiding and abetting mail fraud, 18 u.s.c. §§ 2, 1341. 

In August 1987, the district court sentenced the defendants before 

resolving post-trial motions filed in June 1987. The defendants 

then filed their notices of appeal from the judgments; the 

post-trial motions have yet to be resolved. 1 

These appeals were set for oral argument in September 1988. 

Oral argument was vacated. After a jurisdictional inquiry in 

November 1988, we retained jurisdiction, but partially remanded 

the cases to the district court for a decision on the pending 

post-trial motions. Our partial remand occurred in January 1989. 

In March 1991, a motions panel of this court again directed the 

district court to rule on the post-trial motions and enter a final 

order in ninety days. In October 1991, the district court had not 

resolved the post-trial motions, and a motions panel vacated our 

partial remand and set the cases for oral argument in January 

1992. 

Usually, a defendant must appeal a judgment of conviction 

within ten days after its entry. Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(b). However, 

1 Only rarely should sentencing precede resolution of timely filed post-trial motions pending at the time of sentencing because 

resolution of those motions may affect the underlying verdict. 

s:e U~ited States v. Hocking, ~41 F.2d 735, 736 (7th Cir. 1988) 

( It ~s not only senseless to ~pose sentence while reserving the 

possibility of granting an acquittal or new trial but also fraught with jurisdictional complications."). 

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Appellate Case: 87-2320 Document: 01019326266 Date Filed: 07/30/1992 Page: 2
if judgment has been entered, but a timely filed motion for arrest 

of judgment, Fed. R. Crim. P. 34, or for a new trial on any ground 

other than newly discovered evidence, Fed. R. Crim P. 33, is 

pending, a defendant may appeal within ten days after entry of an 

order denying such motions. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b). Likewise, if 

judgment has been entered, but a motion for new trial on the 

ground of newly discovered evidence is filed ten days before or 

after judgment is entered, a defendant may appeal ten days after 

entry of an order denying the motion. Id. 

A motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered 

evidence may be made within two years after final judgment. Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 33. However, if an appeal is pending, the appeal 

divests the district court of jurisdiction to grant the motion, 

although the district court may consider the motion and either 

deny it on the merits or certify to the court of appeals its 

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Appellate Case: 87-2320 Document: 01019326266 Date Filed: 07/30/1992 Page: 3
intention to grant the motion. 2 Id.; United States v. Cronic, 466 

u.s. 648, 667 n.42 (1984); United States v. Palmer, 766 F.2d 1441, 

1445 (lOth Cir. 1985). 

"Final judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The 

sentence is the judgment." Berman v. United States, 302 u.s. 211, 

212 (1937); Hill v. Wampler, 298 u.s. 460, 464 (1936); ~ller v. 

Aderhold, 288 u.s. 206, 210 (1933). Title 28 u.s.c. § 1291 and 

2 Several cases have considered the jurisdiction of the court 

of appeals and the district court when an appeal from a criminal 

judgment is pending at the court of appeals and the defendant 

files a motion at the district court for a new trial on the ground 

of newly discovered evidence. In such cases, the motion 

presumably has been filed after the time for filing a notice of 

appeal from the the judgment has run. These cases recognize that 

the filing of a notice of appeal limits the jurisdiction of the 

district court. See United States v. Ellison, 557 F.2d 128, 132 

(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 u.s. 965 (1977). In such cases, 

this court will: 

deny any motion to remand without prejudice, permitting 

the parties to proceed before the trial court on the 

motion, and grant a renewed motion to remand after the 

trial court has indicated its intent to grant the motion 

for a new trial. If the trial court denies the motion 

for a new trial, it can do so without a remand from this 

court and appeal may be taken therefrom and consolidated 

with the original appeal if still pending. 

Garcia v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 737 F.2d 889, 890 (lOth 

Cir. 1984). See also United States v. Miller, 869 F.2d 1418, 

1419-20 (lOth Cir. 1989) (court of appeals partially remanded case 

when district judge certified that he would reconsider denial of 

motion for new trial). If the original appeal has been withdrawn 

or otherwise decided, the denial will be considered as an 

independent appeal. United States v. Hays, 454 F.2d 274, 275 (9th 

Cir. 1972). In such circumstances, we are cautious not to remand 

without assurance that the motion will be granted, for we have 

held that an unconditional remand of the case by the court of 

appeals to the district court terminates our jurisdiction over the 

appeal from the judgment. United States v. Siviglia, 686 F.2d 

832, 836 (lOth Cir. 1981), aff'd on reh'g en bane, 686 F.2d 836 

(lOth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 u.s. 918 (1983). ~1 we may consider thereafter is an appeal from the grant or denial of the 

motion for a new trial. Id. 

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Fed. R. App. P. 3 & 4 provide for a direct appeal of the judgment, 

notwithstanding that the district court has not resolved timely 

filed post-trial motions. Recognizing this, we recently 

considered the effect of certain post-trial motions on a timely 

filed notice of appeal from a judgment in criminal case. We held 

"that when a defendant files a motion that tolls the time for 

appeal, the motion holds the notice of appeal in abeyance and the 

notice becomes effective upon the disposition of the motion ... 

United States v. Jackson, No. 90-2288, slip. op at 5-6, 1991 WL 

237557 (lOth Cir. Nov. 21, 1991). Thus, a notice of appeal filed 

after a judgment, but before district court disposition of certain 

post-trial motions, 3 is effective. See United States v. Cortes, 

895 F.2d 1245, 1246-47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 2191 

(1990). Contra United States v. Davis, 924 F.2d 501, 506 (3rd 

Cir. 1991). But by holding the notice of appeal in abeyance, we 

allow the district court to consider claims of error so that we 

may review a criminal judgment which is final in the practical 

sense. See Jackson, No. 90-2288, slip op. at 7. 

Based upon Jackson, we must hold these appeals in abeyance 

until the district court rules on the post-trial motions. 

Accordingly, we VACATE these appeals from the January 1992 oral 

argument calendar and again partially REMAND the case to the 

district court, for the limited purpose of allowing that court to 

3 These post-trial motions include: (1) a timely-filed motion 

in arrest of judgment or for a new trial on any ground other than 

newly discovered evidence, or (2) a motion for a new trial based 

upon newly discovered evidence filed ten days before or after 

entry of judgment. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2320 Document: 01019326266 Date Filed: 07/30/1992 Page: 5
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consider and rule upon all pending post-trial motions on or before 

February 4, 1992. At the conclusion of such proceedings, a 

supplemental record shall be filed in this court. We trust that 

it will not be necessary to resort to an extraordinary writ to 

gain compliance with this order. In all other respects, we retain 

jurisdiction over these appeals. 

SO ORDERED. 

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