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Parties Involved:
Thomas Burgess
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-15805

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 9:11-cr-80012-KLR-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

THOMAS BURGESS, 

a.k.a. Bobo, 

a.k.a. Bubba, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(October 1, 2015)

Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Thomas Burgess, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his 

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motion for a reduced sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), based on 

Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines and the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 

(“FSA”). After review of the parties’ brief and the record, we affirm. 

I

Mr. Burgess was indicted by a federal grand jury in January of 2011, for 

possession of 50 grams or more of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Mr. Burgess pled guilty and admitted to 

possessing 74.97 grams of crack cocaine. Under the 2010 advisory guidelines, he 

had a total offense level of 25 and a criminal history category of V, which resulted 

in an advisory imprisonment range of 100-125 months. Based on the thenapplicable statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months, however, Mr. 

Burgess’ advisory guideline range was 120-125 months in accordance with 

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(c)(2). The district court sentenced him to 125 months’

imprisonment in July of 2011.

In November of 2014, Mr. Burgess filed his instant § 3582(c)(2) motion, 

seeking a two-level reduction in his offense level based on Amendment 782, and 

arguing that, under Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012), his mandatory 

minimum should be lowered to 60 months. 

The government acknowledged that Amendment 782 applied to Mr. 

Burgess, but it maintained that, based on the statutory mandatory minimum in 

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effect at the time Mr. Burgess was sentenced, his term of imprisonment could not 

be reduced to less than 120 months. See D.E. 85 at 1.

The district court denied Mr. Burgess’ motion, stating as follows:

Upon motion of the Defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for a 

reduction in the term of imprisonment imposed based on a guideline 

sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered and made 

retroactive by the United States Sentencing Commission pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 994(u) [sic], and having considered such motion, and 

taking into account the policy statement set forth at USSG § 1B1.10 

and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the 

extent that they are applicable, 

IT IS ORDERED that the motion [ ] is DENIED.

D.E. 86 (boldfaced type omitted). Mr. Burgess now appeals.1

II

Mr. Burgess presses three arguments on appeal. We address them in order.

First, Mr. Burgess maintains that his mandatory minimum sentence should 

be lowered from 120 months to 60 months. He contends that the district court 

denied his § 3582(c)(2) motion based on an erroneous belief that his 120-month 

mandatory minimum sentence still applied. Mr. Burgess is mistaken.

A district court may modify a sentence if the defendant “has been sentenced 

to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been 

 

1 “We review a district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), based on a subsequent change in the sentencing guidelines, for abuse of 

discretion.” United States v. Brown, 332 F.3d 1341, 1343 (11th Cir. 2003). 

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lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” § 3582(c)(2). A modification under § 

3582(c)(2), however, “does not constitute a de novo resentencing.” United States 

v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2000). Rather, in addressing whether a 

defendant is eligible for a reduced sentence under § 3582(c)(2), a district court 

considers only the effect of the applicable guideline amendment, leaving “all 

original sentencing determinations . . . unchanged.” Id. (emphasis in original). As 

a result, even if a retroactive amendment alters a defendant’s offense level, he is 

ineligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief if the amendment would “not have the effect of 

lowering [his] applicable guideline range because of the operation of another 

guideline or statutory provision (e.g., a statutory mandatory minimum term of 

imprisonment).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, comment. n.1(A). See also United States v. 

Glover, 686 F.3d 1203, 1207–08 (11th Cir. 2012) (concluding that the district court 

did not have the authority to reduce the defendant’s sentence under Amendment 

750 because the sentence was based on a mandatory minimum sentence of life 

imprisonment); United States v. Mills, 613 F.3d 1070, 1078 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The 

law is clear that a sentencing court lacks jurisdiction to consider a § 3582(c)(2) 

motion, even when an amendment would lower the defendant’s otherwiseapplicable Guidelines sentencing range, when the defendant was sentenced on the 

basis of a mandatory minimum.”). 

Here, it is undisputed that Amendment 782 applies to Mr. Burgess. 

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Nevertheless, his mandatory minimum remains at 120 months, and his new 

guideline range cannot go below 120 months. See Glover, 686 F.3d at 1207; Mills, 

613 F.3d at 1078. Moreover, the FSA does not apply to lower Mr. Burgess’ 

mandatory minimum sentence from 120 months to 60 months, because the FSA 

does not come within the scope of § 3582(c)(2), as it is “not a guidelines 

amendment by the Sentencing Commission, but rather a statutory change by 

Congress.” United States v. Berry, 701 F.3d 374, 377 (11th Cir. 2012). In sum, 

the district court did not have the authority to reduce Mr. Burgess’ mandatory 

minimum sentence under either Amendment 782 or the FSA. 

Second, Mr. Burgess argues that the district court abused its discretion by 

not explicitly considering the § 3553(a) factors. Again, we disagree. We have 

explained that a district court is not required to explicitly discuss the role that each 

§ 3553(a) factor plays in a sentencing decision. See e.g., United States v. Robles, 

408 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e would not expect the district court in 

every case to conduct an accounting of every § 3553(a) factor[.]”); United States v. 

Eggersdorf, 126 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that a district court 

does not commits “reversible error by failing to articulate specifically the 

applicability-if any-of each of the section 3553(a) factors, as long as the record 

demonstrates that the pertinent factors were taken into account by the district 

court.”). 

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The district court stated that it considered the § 3553(a) factors in its order 

denying Mr. Burgess’ requested for a sentence reduction. That statement suffices. 

Finally, Mr. Burgess contends that the district court failed to consider certain 

mitigating factors that he discussed in his § 3582(c)(2) motion, including his need 

for arm surgery and his desire to return home to support his family. This argument 

also fails, because the district court stated that it had, in fact, considered Mr. 

Burgess’ motion. Id. 

III

We affirm the district court’s order denying Mr. Burgess’ motion for a 

reduced sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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