Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03663/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03663-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald Leonard Sturgis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

 ___________

 No. 06-3458

 ___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Robert Leon Roberson, *

*

Appellant. *

 ___________

Appeals from the United States

 No. 06-3663 District Court for the

 ___________ District of Minnesota.

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Donald Leonard Sturgis, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: September 25, 2007

Filed: February 7, 2008

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Before WOLLMAN, HANSEN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

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WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge. 

Robert Leon Roberson and Donald Leonard Sturgis appeal their sentences as

unreasonable on the grounds that the district court failed to adequately consider the

factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) or to enunciate its reasons under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).

They also argue that the district court deprived them of their Sixth Amendment rights

by basing their sentences on drug quantities not found by a jury and challenge the

appellate presumption of reasonableness. Also at issue is the district court’s reliance

on the 100:1 disparity between powder and crack cocaine quantities in the sentencing

guidelines. Additionally, Sturgis raises two arguments pro se. Although the district

court did not err under then-current precedent, we now vacate the sentences and

remand for resentencing. 

I. Background

The defendants were each convicted of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or

more of cocaine base (“crack cocaine”) and of aiding and abetting possession with

intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine. Based on the involvement of

509 grams of crack cocaine, Sturgis was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment and

Roberson was sentenced to 198 months. The first time they appealed, we upheld their

convictions but remanded for resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543

U.S. 220 (2005). United States v. Roberson, 439 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 2006). At each

resentencing hearing, the district court again based the guidelines range on 509 grams

of crack cocaine. Upon being resentenced to the same terms, the defendants again

appealed.

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II. Analysis

We review a sentence to ensure that it is reasonable in light of the factors in 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a) and will not reverse unless the district court abused its discretion.

United States v. Donnelly, 475 F.3d 946, 955 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v.

Thundershield, 474 F.3d 503, 507 (8th Cir. 2007). On appeal, a sentence within the

guidelines is presumptively reasonable. Donnelly, 475 F.3d at 955; see Rita v. United

States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007) (permitting the use of non-binding appellate

presumptions). We review the district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines

de novo. Thundershield, 474 F.3d at 507. 

The first step in the sentencing process is to determine the proper guidelines

range for the defendant’s sentence. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007);

Thundershield, 474 F.3d at 506-07. A court should then consider whether a departure

or a variance is appropriate and apply the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Gall, 128

S. Ct. at 596-97; Thundershield, 474 F.3d at 506-07. Indications that the sentence

may be unreasonable include: failing to consider a relevant and significant factor,

giving significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, and imposing a sentence

outside the guidelines range that is clearly in error and unjustified by the facts.

Donnelly, 475 F.3d at 955. 

A. Determining the Guidelines Range

The district court properly based the guidelines range on 509 grams of crack

cocaine, which resulted in a base offense level of 36, and did not err in rejecting

defendants’ argument that it instead use a quantity of 50 grams, which would have

resulted in a base offense level of 32. See United States Sentencing Commission,

Guidelines Manual, § 2D1.1(c) (2003). The base offense level in cases involving

aiding-and-abetting and conspiracy convictions must reflect all of the relevant

conduct. Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1). The jury found both defendants guilty of conspiracy to

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distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine and of aiding and abetting one another

to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine. Defendants did

not dispute, either at trial or on appeal, that the government offered into evidence

approximately 509 grams of crack cocaine. Even if the actual possession of the drugs

could be partitioned between the defendants, it would not affect the calculation of the

applicable guidelines range because all the drugs possessed by both constitute relevant

conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(1).

The defendants incorrectly argue that the district court violated their Sixth

Amendment rights by basing their sentences on drug quantities not found by a jury.

A judge may not impose a sentence greater than the maximum sentence that would be

allowed based on the findings made by the jury and the facts admitted by the

defendant. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 232 (2005); United States v. Idriss,

436 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 2006). Under the now-advisory guidelines, a district court

may still find its own facts that enhance the base offense level of the guidelines range,

so long as the statutory maximum is not surpassed. Idriss, 436 F.3d at 948, 950-51;

see Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465-66. Contrary to Roberson’s mischaracterization of the

verdict, the jury found that the defendants possessed 50 grams or more of crack

cocaine, which is punishable by no less than 10 years and no more than life in prison.

21 U.S.C. § 341(b). The district court was therefore empowered to impose a sentence

that considered judicially found facts so long as the sentence did not exceed life

imprisonment. 

B. § 3553

Defendants challenge their sentences as unreasonable because the district court

failed to adequately consider the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and failed to

adequately explain the reasons for the sentence as required by § 3553(c). After

determining the appropriate guidelines range, the district court must consider the

factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Thundershield, 474 F.3d at 506-07. At

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sentencing, the court must “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the

particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). This does not mean that the district court

must issue a full opinion in every case, but it “should set forth enough to satisfy the

appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis

for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2468.

The appropriate length of the statement will vary by case and may be relatively brief

if the district court rests its decision on the Sentencing Commission’s reasoning and

“decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case.” Id. More may be

appropriate in an atypical situation or in response to non-frivolous arguments for a

different sentence. Id. While it is preferable that district courts address each §

3553(a) factor at sentencing, that degree of specificity is not necessarily required.

United States v. Otterson, 506 F.3d 1098, 1100 (8th Cir. 2007). 

Regarding Sturgis, the district court adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors

and adequately explained its reasons under § 3553(c). It noted that the guidelines

range in the absence of a career offender enhancement would have been 292 to 365

months, and that after such enhancement the range became 360 months to life. The

court also noted that none of the factors in § 3553(a)(2) or any other part of the statute

justified a lower sentence, especially because Sturgis chose to commit this crime

despite having a family and serving 30 years of probation that he had received from

a prior conviction instead of imprisonment. After further discussion of Sturgis’s

status as a career offender and his unwillingness to become a law-abiding citizen, the

court concluded that the 360-month sentence was “justified under the statutory

factors” and therefore reimposed that sentence. Although the district court did not

address the kinds of sentences available or the need for restitution, neither of those

considerations was particularly applicable in this case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3) &

(7). We are satisfied that the district court considered the arguments that Sturgis

advanced regarding the sentence to be imposed and that the sentence it imposed was

a reasonable one. 

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Regarding Roberson, the district court also adequately considered the § 3553(a)

factors and adequately explained its reasons under § 3553(c). The district court

addressed the need for uniformity in sentences for similar crimes discussed in §

3553(a)(6). Likewise, it expressly stated that the sentence reflected the factors

discussed in § 3553(a)(2). The court also referred to some portions of the presentence

report that discussed Roberson’s personal and family data, which are relevant under

§ 3553(a)(1). Continuing, the district court observed that, referring to background,

conduct in prison, and family situation, 

these are all things that lead to the conclusion that a sentence in the midrange rather than at the very bottom of the guideline range is a fair

sentence. It takes into account the seriousness of the actual criminal

conduct in this case, and the need to protect the community. It’s just

punishment. And it’s necessary in view of all the appropriate sentencing

considerations.

Roberson Resentencing Hr’g Tr. 31-32. The district court’s statements, although

perhaps a bit abbreviated, satisfy us that it adequately considered Roberson’s

arguments and then reached a reasonable decision. 

C. Consideration of the Crack/Powder Sentencing Disparity

The district court ignored Roberson’s and Sturgis’s arguments for lighter

sentences based on the 100:1 disparity between crack and powder cocaine under the

guidelines. Previously, we have expressly refused to authorize such a consideration.

United States v. Spears, 469 F.3d 1166, 1176 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (“[N]either

Booker nor § 3553(a) authorizes district courts to reject the 100:1 quantity ratio and

use a different ratio in sentencing defendants for crack cocaine offenses.”), vacated

and remanded, 2008 WL 59232 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2008) (No. 06-9864 ) (remanding for

further consideration in light of Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007)).

Kimbrough held that the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion by considering

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the disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentences. Id. More specifically, a

district court acts within its discretion if it considers the crack/powder disparity in

finding that a within-guidelines sentence is “‘greater than necessary’ to serve the

objectives of sentencing.” Id. at 564 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2007)). 

We do not believe, though, that Kimbrough means that a district court now acts

unreasonably, abuses its discretion, or otherwise commits error if it does not consider

the crack/powder sentencing disparity. True, the Supreme Court took a dim view of

the extent of the disparity and was supportive of the Commission’s efforts to reduce

it, see Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 564, 567-68, but it did not appear to mandate that

district courts consider the disparity in all sentences for crimes involving crack

cocaine. Accordingly, we decline to go beyond the facial holding in Kimbrough by

requiring that district courts consider the crack/powder disparity.

Normally, a district court that is aware of an argument does not abuse its

discretion by not considering it. United States v. Miles, 499 F.3d 906, 909-10 (8th

Cir. 2007). When a district court does not consider an argument because it is unaware

of its power to do so, however, a remand is appropriate. See, e.g., United States v.

Lewis, 249 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 2001). In Lewis, we could not determine from the

record whether the district court was aware of its authority to grant a downward

departure, and thus we remanded the case to allow the district court to exercise its

discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny the downward departure. Id. In this

case, the district court said nothing in either Roberson’s or Sturgis’s sentencing

hearing about the disparity. It is unclear whether the district court declined to use its

discretion in the requested manner because of then-current Eighth Circuit precedent

or because it did not find that the disparity warranted any variance from the

guidelines. We therefore vacate the sentences and remand to the district court so that

it may reconsider the sentences in light of Kimbrough.

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D. Other Arguments

Our disposition of the sentences renders moot the argument regarding the

alleged improper presumption of reasonableness applied by the district court. 

In his pro se brief, Sturgis argues that the career offender sentence enhancement

violates the Sixth Amendment because the jury is not required to find beyond

reasonable doubt that the prior convictions actually occurred. The argument is

without merit. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005). In his pro se

reply brief, Sturgis further argues that his prior convictions should not have been

considered because he did not receive pretrial notice under 21 U.S.C. § 851. This

assertion is also without merit. 

The sentences are vacated and the cases are remanded to the district court for

further proceedings. 

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