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Parties Involved:
CF&I Steel Corporation
Respondent
Department of Labor
Petitioner
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Respondent

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ELIZABETH H. DOLE, SECRETARY ) 

OF LABOR, ) 

) 

Petitioner, ) 

) 

vs. ) No. 

) 

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ) 

REVIEW COMMISSION, ) 

) 

Respondent, ) 

) 

CF&I STE~L CORPORATION, ) 

) 

Intervenor-Respondent. ) 

DEC 2 2 1989 

~OBERT L. fiOECI<"J3R 

Clerk 

86-2641 

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF . 

THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION 

(OSHRC No. 79-4786f 

John Shortall, Attorney, United States Department of Labor (George 

R. Salem; ~olicitor of Labor, Cynthia L. Attwood, Associate · 

Solicitor for Occupational Safety and Health, Joseph M. Woodward, 

Counsel for Appellate Litigation, Andrea C. Casson, Assistant 

Counsel for Appellate Litigation, with him on the brief), 

Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. 

L. Carey Unkelbach (John D. Faught, on the brief), Englewood, 

Colorado, for Intervenor-Respondent. 

Before*MOORE and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges and DAUGHERTY, District 

Judge. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Frederick A. Daugherty, Senior United States 

District Judge for the Western District of'Oklahoma, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 86-2641 Document: 010110192541 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 1 
The Secretary of Labor (Secretary) appeals fro~ a decision of 

the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (Commission) 

vacating a citation charging- CF&I Steel Corporation (CF&I) with 

willfully violating 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029(g)(3). That regulation 

governs employee exposure to coke oven emissions. The Secretary 

argues that CF&I violated the Occupational Safety and Health Act 

(OSHA) by failing to ~tilize atmospheric testing, as envisioned by 

OSHA regulations, to insure that respirators worn by its employees 

fit properly. The Secretary further contends that her 

interpretation of OSHA regulations is entitled to deference. In 

contrast, CF&I favors the Commission's interpretation of OSHA 

·regulations, which holds that ~tmospheric testing is not required 

to insure respirator fit, and contends that the Commission's. 

interpretation is entitled to deference. 

Our jurisdiction arises under 29 u.s.c. § 660(b). We hold 

that, in the face of conflicting regulatory interpretations, 

deference is properly-accorded to the interpretation of the 

Commission. Finding the Commission's interpretation of coke oven 

respiratory regulations to be reasonable, we affirm. 

I. 

CF&I.operated a steel plant near Pueblo, Colcirado. As part 

-of its steel-making operation, the company produced co~e, a coal 

derivative, to fuel its blast furnaces. Coke production creates 

carcinogenic vapors which are dangerous to workers' health. 

Acting pursuant to OSHA, the Secretary promulgated regulations 

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setting the maximum allowable emissions for coke ovens and 

mandating the use of respirators whenever that level was exceeded. 

See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029. These regulations were 

upheld following a challenge by CF&I and other coke producers. 

See American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 

1978), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980). 

In order to perform their protective function, respirators 

must be fitted properly on eadh employee. Although there are 

several ways to test a respirator for proper fit, two methods are 

relevant to this case: 1) positive/negative pressure testing 

whereby the employee places the respirator on his face, inhales or 

exnales, and checks for any leakage of air along the seal; and, 2) 

~tmvspherib testing in which the employee wears a respirator in a 

room filled with noxious vapors, commonly known as "banana oil" 

va~ors, and tries to detect the odor. 

CF&I conducted a training program in respirator usage for its 

coke oven employees. A training film was produced and shown 

instructing employees how to perform the positive/negative 

pressure test. CF&I also conducted atmospheric testing for its 

employees, twenty-eight of whom detected the odor of banana oil. 

CF&I allowed these twenty-eight employees to return to work with 

the same respirator. 

The Secretary qited CF&I for failing to equip the twentyeight employees who detected banana oil with respirators that fit. 

The ALJ affirmed the citation and, finding CF&I a willful 

violator, fined the corporation $10,000. On appeal, the 

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Appellate Case: 86-2641 Document: 010110192541 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 3 
Commission reversed the ALJ, holding that 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1910.10i9(g)(3) only enunciates a training ~tandard for 

respirator usage, not a testing standard for respirator fit. 

II. 

A. 

Normally, an administrative agency's interpretation of a 

statute is entitled to considerable deference and should be 

disturbed only if unreasonable. See Chapman v. Department of 

Health & Human Serv., 821 F.2d 523, 527 (10th Cir. 19.87); Such 

deference is particularly appropriate where an agency interprets 

irs own admini~trative regulations. See Edwards v. Califano, 619 

F.2d 865, 868 (10th Cir. 1980). Even when two equally reason~ble 

interpretations are present, the reviewing court must defer to the 

interpretive choice of the administrative agency. Brennan v. 

OSHRC & Kesler, 513 F.2d 553, 554 (10th Cir. 1975) (Kesler). 

In ·the instant case, the Secretary and Commission disagree 

over the proper interpretation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029(g)(3). 

The Secretary contends that the regulation requires atmospheric 

testing to assure that each employee is properly fitted with a· 

respirator while the Commission interprets the regulation as 

requiring atmospheric testing only in the course of training 

employees on the proper application of _respirators. The question 

therefore arises: When the Secretary and Commission disagree over 

the interpretation of an OSHA regulation, which view prevails, 

i.e., to whom is deference owed? 

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Appellate Case: 86-2641 Document: 010110192541 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 4 
Whether judicial deference under OSHA is accorded to the 

regulatory interpretations of the Secretary or the Commission is 

an issue upon which the federal circuits are split._ 

-Fifth, and Seventh Circuits defer to the Secretary. 

The First, 

See United 

Steelworkers of Am. v. Schuylkill Metals Corp., 828 F.2d 314, 319-

20 (5th Cir. 1987); Brock v. Chicago Zoological Soc'y, 820 F.2d 

SJU'.:J, 912 (7th Cir. 1987); Donovan v. A. Amorello & Sons, 761 F.2d 

61, 64-66 (1st Cir. 1985). See also Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Oil 

Co., 796 F.2d 533, 537, 537 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (deferring to 

Secretary over Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission in 

case brought under Federal Coal Mine Safety and Health Act). In 

contrast, the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits 

defer to the Commission. See Brock v. Bechtel Power Corp., 803 

F.2d 999, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 1986); Usery v. Hermitage Concrete 

Pipe Co., 584 F.2d 127, 132 (6th Cir. 1978); Marshall v. Western 

Electric, 565 F.2d 240, 244 (2d Cir. 1977); Brennan v. OSHRC, 513 

F.2d 713, 715-16 (8th Cir. 1975); Brennan v. Gilles & Catting, 

Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1261-62 (4th Cir. 1974). 

The Secretary cites our decision in Kesler, 513 F.2d at 553, 

for the proposition that this circuit defers to the Secretary's 

regulatory interpretation over that of the Commission. In Kesler, 

we were faced with a dispute between the Secretary and Commission 

over the effective date of an abatement order under OSHA and 

concluded that the Secretary's regulatory interpretation was 

proper. Id. at 558. However, contrary to the arguments advanced 

by the Secretary in the instant case, this court in Kesler did not 

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Appellate Case: 86-2641 Document: 010110192541 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 5 
reach its conclusion.merely by adopting the Secretary's reasonable 

interpretation; we considered.the respective views of the 

Secretary and Commissio'n and found the Commission's interpretation 

unsupported by the regulatory language. The result of Kesler 

should not be mistaken as an endorsement of an approach which 

always defers to the Secretary over the Commission. For in the 

subsequent case of Marshall v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 577 F.2d 126, 

131 (10th Cir. 1978), we adopted the legal conclusions of the 

Commission over those proposed by the Secretary. Thus, the 

question of whether, in the face of conflicting regulatory 

interpretations, deference properly is accorded to the Secretary 

or Co~ission has not been addressed in the circuit. 

B. 

Statutory authorization for the Occupational .Safety and 

He.al th Review .Commission is provided in 29 U.S. C. § 661. Composed 

of persons specially qualified "by reason of training, education, 

or experience," 29 U.S.C. § 66l(a), the Commission serves in an 

adjudicative capacity whenever an employer elects.to challenge a 

citation issued by the Secretary. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c). However, 

as evidenced by the split within the federal circuits, whether the 

Commission or Secretary is empowered with final interpretive 

authority over OSHA reg~lations remains unclear from the statutory 

language. We therefore consult the legislative history behind the 

Commission as a ''secondary source" to help us determine the 

Commission's statutory powers vis-a-vis the Secretary. · See Miller 

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v. Commissioner, 836 F.2d 1274, 1282-84 (10th Cir. 1988) (reliance 

on legislative history is more justifiable where statute is 

unclear and legislative history is .consulted with specific 

question in mind). Because the legislative history concerning the 

Commission's enactment is relatively uniform and clear, such 

history provides a reliable indicator of Congressional intent and 

should be accorded weight by this court. See id. at 1282. 

When first proposed, the Occupational Safety and Health Act 

vested the power to adjudicate alleged safety violations with the 

Secretary. See S. 2193, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1969), -

reprinted in Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 

1st Sess., Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and 

Health Act of 1970, at 11-13 (1971) (Legislative History). 

However, in response to business concerns that combining 

prosecutorial and adjudicative authority in the Secretary would 

produce decisions.biased against employers, Congress created the 

Commission by adopting a floor amendment which withdrew· 

adjudicative authority from the Secretary. See id. at 463-64. 

Congress envisioned the Commis~ion as an autonomous, independent 

and quasi-judicial body. Id. at 462, 465. Subsequent judicial 

interpretation has emphasized that the prosecutorial power vested 

in the Secretary remains separate and distinct from the 

adjudicative power vested in the Commission. See,~-, Cuyahoga 

Valley Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 474 U.S. 3, 7 (1985) (per 

curiam) (Commission's review of Secretary's decision to dismiss 

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Appellate Case: 86-2641 Document: 010110192541 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 7 
citation constituted an improper encroachment upon the Secretary's 

prosecutorial prerogative). 

Congress sought to endow the Commission with the normal 

complement of adjudicative powers possessed by traditional 

administrative agencies. Legislative History at 462, 465; Gilles 

& Cotting, 504 F.2d at 1262. Such an adjudicative function 

necessarily encompasses the power to "declare" the law. Id. at 

1261-62. Accordingly, where the Secretary has failed to convey 

the meaning of an OSHA regulation to those charged with construing_ 

it, and where the Commission has given the regulation an 

interpretation well ~ithin the'plain meaning of the terms of the 

regulation, we will defer to the interpret_ation of the Commission. 

See Brennan v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d at 715-16. If the Secretary 

believes that the Commission has int_erpreted a regulation in a 

manner inconsistent with OSHA's goals, it may be necessary to 

.amend or clarify that regulation. See id. at 716. 

Two circuits rely upon a footnote in Potomac Electric Power 

Co. v. Director, OWCP, 449 U.S. 268, 278 n.18 (1980), for the 

proposition that the Commission's interpretations are not entitled 

to deference because the Commission is only charged with 

adjudication. Schuylkill, 82&_F.2d at 319; Chicago Zoological, 

820 F.2d at 912. Potomac Electric involved an injured worker's 

claim for benefits under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers's 

Compensation Act. 33 u.s.c. § 901-950. The ALJ and the Benefits 

Review Board departed from the settled construction of the Act and 

determined that the injured claimant was entitled to an ongoing 

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recovery. Potomac Electric, 449 U~S. at 272. The Supreme Court 

held that the Board's interpretation contravened the plain 

language of the Act, its legislative history and all prior 

decisional ~uthority and consequently reversed the D.C. Circuit's 

decision upholding the Board's interpretation. Id. at 279-80. 

Included in footnote 18 of the Court's opinion was the following 

dicta: ''It should also be noted that the Benefits Review Board is 

not a policymaking agency; its interpretation of the IHWCA thus is 

not entitled to any special deference from the courts." Id. at 

278 n.18. 

This language makes specific reference to the Benefits Review 

Board created under the Longshoremen's Compensation Act; it would 

be presumptuous for us to extend the Supreme Court's language 

outside the context in which it arose. Moreover, the structural, 

historical and theoretical differences between the Review Board 

and the Commission further distinguishes this case from Potomac 

Electric. The Longshoremen's Compensation Act mandates 

nonaccusatory adjudication of injured workers' claims whereas OSHA 

requires accusatory proceedings that may result in substantial 

penalties. While the Commission. resulted from Congressional 

concern that the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions not be 

vested in one governmental entity, no such concerns are implicated 

by the Longshoremen's Compensation Act where the prosecutorial 

function is carried_ out by a private citizen. The need for a 

strict separation of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions is 

therefore far more acute in the case of OSHA than under the 

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Longshoremen's Compensation Act. Compa~e Potomac Electric, 449 

U.S. at 278 n.18 (no deference to adjudicative agency in action 

brought by claimant under Longshoreman's Compensation Act) with 

Cuyahoga Valley, 474 U.S. at 7 (Secretary's prosecutorial function 

under OSHA must remain separate and distinct from Commission's 

adjudicative role). See generally Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: -- . 

Separation of Functions in the Federal Administrative Agencies, 81 

Colum. L. Rev. 759, 803 (1981). 

Although we hold that, under OSHA, deference is properly 

accorded to the regulatory interpretations of the Commission, we 

recognize that·another result may prevail under a different 

statutory framework~ We further stress that our holding not be 

construed as a carte blanche for the Commission to overturn 

settled regulatory interpretations of the Secretary. The 

Secretary's unique policy and rulemaking role requires that her 

regulatory interpretations be accorded substantial weight by the 

Commission and contravened only if clearly wrong or in the 

presence of genuine ambiguity. Because we find the regulations in 

l~~ instant case to be ambiguous, we defer to the .interpretation 

enunciated by the Commission, insofar as it is reasonable. 

III. 

Employee exposure to coke oven emissions is governed by 29 

C.F.R. § 1910.1029. Generally, compliance with permissible 

exposure limits may not be achieved by the use of respirators 

except in limited cases where abatement is not technologically 

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feasible. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029(g)(l). Where respirators are 

necessary, however, the employer shall select, provide and assure 

the· use of the appropriate respirator based upon the airborne 

concentration of coke oven emissions. Id. With respect to 

training and testing of respirators, OSHA regulations provide in 

pertinent part: 

(3) Respirator program. The employer shall 

institute a respiratory protection prdgram in 

accordance with§ 1910.134 of this part. 

(4) Respirator usage. (i) The employer shall 

assure that the respirator issued to the 

employee exhibits ·minimum facepiece leakage 

and that the respirator is fitted properly. 

29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029(g}(3), (4)~ The incorporated S 1910.134, 

e,; r it led "Res pi ra tory Protection," contains general regulations 

governing respirator use in all industries and includes a 

discussion of atmospheric testing: 

For the safe use of any respirator, it is 

essential that the user be properly instructed 

in its selection, use, and maintenance. Both 

supervisors and workers shall be so instructed 

by competent persons. Training shall provide 

the men an opportunity to handle the 

respirator, have it fitted properly, test its 

face-piece-to-face seal, wear it in normal air 

for a long familiarity period, and, finally, 

to wear it in a test atmosphere. 

29 C.F.R. § 1910.134(e)(5) (emphasis supplied). The Secretary 

argues tha~ the incorporation of§ 1910.134 into§ 1910.1029(g)(3) 

mandates atmospheric testing to insure the proper fit of each 

empioyee's respirator. Conversely, the Commission held that 

§ 1910.134(e)(5) is merely a training standard only _applicable 

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Appellate Case: 86-2641 Document: 010110192541 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 11 
when teaching employees how to apply their respirators, not a 

testing standard to insure proper fit. 

Safety legislation is to be liberally construed to effectuate 

the congressional purpose of improving health and safety in the 

workplace. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 13 (1980). 

Moreover, OSHA regulations provide that general standards 

supplement specific ones by fiiling thoie gaps remaining after the 

promulgation of specific standards. Texas E. Prod. Pipeline Co. 

v. OSHRC, 827 F.2d 46, 49 (7th Cir~ 1987); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.S(c). 

Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the Commission's 

interpretation of§ 1910.1029(9)(3) in this case was unreasonable. 

The plain wording of the incorporated §l910.134(e)(5) prescribes 

that atmospheric.testing is mandated in the ''training" of 

employees. The Commission therefore concluded reasonably that 

CF&I was not required to utilize ongoing atmospheric testing to 

insure the proper fit of each employee's respirator. While it is 

certainly possible to reach an alternate interpretation of the 

ambiguous regulatory language contained in 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029, 

,-1e defer to the interpretation chosen by the Commission. If the 

Secretary maintains that a different result should prevail under 

OSHA, she should amend or clarify these regulations through the 

rulemaking process~ 

AFFIRMED. 

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