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Parties Involved:
Michael Moore
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 18-11207

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 8:17-cr-00354-CEH-CPT-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

MICHAEL MOORE, 

a.k.a. Michael Paul Moore, 

a.k.a. Michael P. Moore, 

a.k.a. Michael Nelson, 

a.k.a. Michael Paul Nelson, 

a.k.a. Michael P. Nelson, 

a.k.a. Chris Smith, 

a.k.a. Corey Sims, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(May 13, 2020)

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Before WILSON, MARTIN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Michael Moore appeals his below-guidelines 188-month sentence for being 

a felon in possession of a firearm. Moore asserts the district court erred in denying 

him an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction and that the district court 

erroneously believed it lacked the authority to give a reduction. Additionally, 

Moore contends his prior convictions under Fla. Stat. § 893.13 do not qualify as 

serious drug offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). After 

review, we affirm Moore’s sentence.

I. DISCUSSION

A. Acceptance of Responsibility

A two-level reduction applies if the defendant “clearly demonstrates 

acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). The guidelines 

commentary provides “[t]his adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant 

who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential 

factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses 

remorse.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), comment. (n.2). It further states that, if a 

defendant proceeds to trial, acceptance-of-responsibility reductions should only 

occur in “rare situations,” such as “where a defendant goes to trial to assert and 

preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt.” Id. 

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The district court is in a unique position to evaluate whether a defendant has 

accepted responsibility for his acts, and we will not set aside such a determination 

“unless the facts in the record clearly establish that the defendant has accepted 

responsibility.” United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1022-23 (11th Cir. 

2005). The defendant bears the burden of proving he accepted responsibility. Id.

at 1023.

The district court did not clearly err in finding Moore did not meet his 

burden of showing he clearly accepted responsibility for his offense and his case 

was not one of the “rare circumstances” where a defendant who went to trial 

warranted a reduction. See United States v. Tejas, 868 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 

2017) (reviewing the district court’s denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility 

reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 for clear error). Moore conceded he was a 

convicted felon and that he possessed a firearm, but he did not stipulate to the 

interstate commerce element. See United States v. Green, 873 F.3d 846, 852 (11th 

Cir. 2017) (stating to prove a defendant was a felon in possession of a firearm, the 

Government is required to prove (1) the defendant was a convicted felon when he 

had possession of the firearm; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm; 

and (3) the firearm traveled in interstate commerce). While Moore never explicitly 

denied this element, his actions at trial show he was not ready to concede the issue. 

Moore objected to the admission of business records being offered to show the 

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firearm traveled in interstate commerce. By objecting to this evidence, Moore was 

challenging the ability of the Government to satisfy its burden of proof as to this 

element. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.2). Therefore, Moore did not elect to 

go to trial solely to raise the defense of necessity.

While Moore distinguishes between objections made to dispositive versus 

non-dispositive evidence, citing United States v. Gonzalez, 70 F.3d 1236, 1239 

(11th Cir. 1995), this is a distinction without difference. Moore’s challenge to the 

admissibility of the Government’s exhibits was an attempt to avoid a determination 

that the firearm had moved in interstate commerce, which the Government had to 

prove because Moore had not stipulated to it. And while Moore claims this 

evidence was not essential to the Government’s case because it could have proven

the element by other means, that is immaterial to the fact that Moore put the 

Government to its burden at trial and then contested its evidence. Thus, the district 

court did not clearly err in finding that, by challenging evidence offered to show 

his guilt, Moore had not clearly demonstrated acceptance of responsibility for the 

crime charged.

Moore’s argument the district court erroneously believed that challenging an 

element of an offense at trial barred an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction is 

also unpersuausive. See United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217, 1255 (11th Cir. 

2001) (stating we review de novo a defendant’s claim the district court mistakenly 

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believed it lacked the authority to grant a reduction under the guidelines). Before 

denying the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, the court recognized “that a 

Defendant may still have the acceptance of responsibility reduction even if he goes 

to trial . . . under certain reasons.” The court further discussed the enumerated 

reasons listed in the Guidelines commentary, even listing potential situations not 

listed in the commentary itself. Further, the court explained its decision, noting 

that “[Moore] did not admit the interstate nexus,” and “because he did put the 

Government to its burden of proof at trial . . . he is not entitled to the reduction.” 

Thus, the record does not support that the district court made an error of law as to 

the availability of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. Rather, the district 

court determined that Moore was not entitled to a reduction under the facts here. 

Accordingly, the district court was within its discretion to determine that 

Moore’s objection showed Moore had not accepted responsibility for his acts. As 

the record reflects the district court understood its discretion in granting or denying 

a reduction, no misunderstanding of authority occurred. See Hansen, 262 F.3d at 

1257. We affirm the district court’s denial of the acceptance-of-responsibility 

reduction.

B. Fla. Stat. § 893.13

We review whether a conviction qualifies as a serious drug offense under the 

ACCA de novo. United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2016). 

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Convictions under Fla. Stat. § 893.13 qualify as a “serious drug offense” under the 

ACCA. United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2014). In Smith, 

we also analyzed and rejected the necessity of a mens rea element in the 

underlying crime to qualify as a serious drug offense under the ACCA. Id. 

Moore’s arguments his prior convictions under § 893.13 were not serious 

drug offenses are foreclosed by Smith. While Moore claims that Smith was 

wrongly decided, this Court is bound to follow it until it is overruled by the 

Supreme Court or this Court en banc. See United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 

1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, we are bound by our holding in Smith

and affirm the district court’s determination that Moore’s prior convictions under 

Fla. Stat. § 893.13 were serious drug offenses under the ACCA. 

II. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm Moore’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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