Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00834/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00834-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Accu Bite, Inc.
Defendant
Christopher Dushey
Plaintiff
Jeannine Dushey
Plaintiff
Ray Dushey
Plaintiff
Patterson Dental Supply, Inc.
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

RAY DUSHEY, JEANNINE DUSHEY,

and CHRISTOPHER DUSHEY,

NO. CIV. S-06-00834 WBS GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

MOTION TO DISMISS 

ACCU BITE, INC., a Michigan

corporation; PATTERSON DENTAL

SUPPLY, INC., a Michigan

Corporation; and DOES 1

through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Ray Dushey, Jeannine Dushey, and Christopher

Dushey filed this lawsuit in the Superior Court of California in

and for the County of Placer to recover damages for, inter alia,

defendants Accu Bite, Inc. and Patterson Dental Supply, Inc.’s

alleged failure to adhere to the terms of an agreement for future

employment. Defendants removed the case to this court and now

seek to dismiss plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action for negligent

infliction of emotional distress pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and to strike particular requests in the

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complaint for damages and fees pursuant to Rule 12(f). 

Jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs Ray and Jeannine Dushey own a company that

provides dental offices and professionals with supplies and

equipment. (Compl. ¶ 10.) In late July, 2005, plaintiffs

entered into a series of agreements with defendants in which

plaintiffs agreed to (1) relocate to Spokane, Washington to

pursue a similar line of work as defendant Accu Bite’s employees

and (2) transfer their existing client accounts in the

Sacramento, California area to defendant Accu Bite. (Id. ¶ 12.) 

Plaintiffs allege that they fulfilled their end of the bargain by

completing new hire paperwork, relocating their home and business

operations to Spokane, contacting their existing Sacramento area

clients and advising them to do business with defendant Accu

Bite, and providing defendants with “proprietary financial

information regarding their business Dental Plus, their customer

accounts, and other trade secret information.” (Id. ¶ 14, 24.)

However, “[u]nbeknownst to Plaintiffs at the time they

were negotiating . . . , Defendant Patterson Dental was in the

process of acquiring Defendant Accu Bite” and the promised

employment, scheduled to begin on August 29, 2005, never

materialized. (Id. ¶¶ 12(e), 15(a), 16.) Plaintiffs imply that

these two events have some causal connection and further claim

that, had they known about this acquisition, such information

“would have materially affect[ed] their decisions to accept, rely

upon, and act upon the representations and agreement proposed by

[defendant Accu Bite].” (Id. ¶ 21.)

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To recover the expenses incurred and damage suffered as

a result of defendants’ alleged breach, plaintiffs filed suit

based on the following causes of action: (1) Breach of Employment

Contract; (2) Fraud and Deceit; (3) Conversion; (4) Intentional

Interference with Contractual Relations; (5) Intentional

Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage; (6) Negligent

Infliction of Emotional Distress; (7) Unfair Business Practices;

and (8) Common Counts. Specifically, plaintiffs seek to recover

compensation for lost earnings, lost benefits, expenses incurred,

and emotional suffering, as well as punitive damages and

“attorney’s fees [incurred] in attempting to secure the benefits

owed them under the employment contracts.” (Id. ¶¶ 17-18, 35,

Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 3, 6.) 

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss

On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the

allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the pleader. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). The court

may not dismiss for failure to state a claim “unless it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Van Buskirk v.

CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added);

see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). At

the motion to dismiss stage, “[t]he issue is not whether a

plaintiff is likely to prevail ultimately, but whether the

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” 

Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 69 F.3d 669, 673 (2d Cir. 1995)

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(quotation omitted).

Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ sixth cause of

action, for negligent infliction of emotional distress, fails to

state a claim on which relief can be granted. “Negligent

infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort; it

is the tort of negligence to which the traditional elements of

duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages apply.” Ess v.

Eskaton Props., Inc., 97 Cal. App. 4th 120, 126 (2002). 

Accordingly, as part of claim six, plaintiffs assert that

defendants had a duty “to avoid causing severe emotional

distress” because the parties “were engaged in a business

relationship.” (Compl. ¶ 51.) 

 However, the mere fact that parties have entered into

a business agreement does not necessarily establish a duty to

consider each other’s mental state. Cf. Gonzales, 56 Cal. App.

4th at 474 (contractual duty to protect property does “not

include a duty to protect [the plaintiff] from emotional distress

or physical harm”); Butler-Rupp v. Lourdeaux, 134 Cal. App. 4th

1220, 1230 (2005) (observing that recovery of emotional distress

damages, “absent impact or physical injury”, requires violation

of some independent duty on the part of defendants “to avoid

infliction of emotional distress”). Absent some threatened

physical injury, which plaintiffs do not allege as part of their

sixth cause of action, or a contractual duty “to protect

[plaintiffs’] emotional tranquility[,]” which is likewise not

alleged, plaintiffs cannot make out a claim for negligent

infliction of emotional distress. Gonzales, 56 Cal. App. 4th at

474. As the California Supreme Court has observed, “in

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This ruling has no bearing on plaintiffs’ ability to 1

claim emotional distress damages in connection with claims two

and three. See (Compl. ¶¶ 25, 34); Erlich v. Menezes, 21 Cal.

4th 543, 551-52, 554 (1999) (holding that tort damages, including

emotional distress damages, are available where the contract was

fraudulently induced or “the breach is accompanied by a common

law tort, such as . . . conversion”).

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commercial activities that negligently or inadvertently go awry,”

a plaintiff’s damages are limited to contractual remedies. 

Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp., 34 Cal. 4th 979, 991

n.7 (2004). 

Because the court has not yet seen the terms of the

agreement, it cannot say with certainty that defendants did not

undertake a duty to protect plaintiffs’ emotional well-being. On

the other hand, plaintiffs have not alleged that such a duty was

undertaken. Therefore, dismissal of claim six, while warranted,

will be without prejudice and with leave to amend because it is

not clear that plaintiffs cannot allege a set of facts sufficient

to support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional

distress.1

B. Motion to Strike

Defendants also move to strike particular requests for

damages and fees in plaintiffs’ complaint. Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(f) provides that “redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matters” may be “stricken from any

pleading.” Such motions are designed “to avoid the expenditure

of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues

by dispensing with those issues prior to trial . . . .” 

Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir.

1983). However, “[m]otions to strike are generally disfavored.” 

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Abney v. Alameida, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1234 (S.D. Cal. 2004);

Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1478 (C.D. Cal. 1996)

(“Rule 12(f) motions are generally ‘disfavored’ because they are

‘often used as delaying tactics, and because of the limited

importance of pleadings in federal practice.’” (quoting William

W. Schwarzer et al., California Practice Guide: Federal Civil

Procedure Before Trial § 9:375)). If there is any doubt as to

whether the allegations might be an issue in the action, [the]

court[ should] deny the motion.” In re 2TheMart.com, Inc. Sec.

Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d 955, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (citing

Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993)

rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517, 534-35 (1994)).

1. Claim for Attorneys’ Fees

Arguing that California follows the “American Rule”

under which each party must bear their own attorneys’ fees,

defendants move to strike this requested relief. Defendants

point out that in California, a party may not recover attorneys’

fees unless there is a statute, contractual provision, or rule

that authorizes such an award. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021. 

However, the court does not yet have before it a copy of the full

employment agreement allegedly entered into by the parties in

this case (plaintiffs are not required by law to attach these

documents to their complaint). Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 12

(“[P]laintiff may set forth the contract verbatim in the

complaint or plead it, as indicated, by exhibit, or plead it

according to its legal effect.”); see also Securimetrics, Inc. v.

Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. C-05-917, 2005 WL 1712008, at *2-3

(N.D. Cal. July 21, 2005) (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur

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Attorneys’ fees can simply be requested at the 2

appropriate time through a noticed motion. Allstate Ins. Co., 46

Cal. App. 4th at 1797 (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §

1033.5(c)(5)).

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R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1235 (2004)). 

Consequently, the court cannot say with certainty at this time

that attorneys’ fees were not authorized by a contractual

provision in this case. 

Additionally, because plaintiffs are not required to

“plead entitlement to attorney fees as an item of damages in

order to recover them in California[,]” the court questions 2

whether plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees is even the

proper target of a motion to strike, given that the court’s

decision here will have no impact on plaintiffs’ ability to

ultimately recover the relief sought. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Loo,

46 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1797 (1996) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §

1033.5(a)(10)); Cardinale v. La Petite Acad., Inc., 207 F. Supp.

2d 1158, 1163 (D. Nev. 2002) (making the same observation and

denying defendant’s 12(f) motion because “[t]he inclusion of

claims for attorneys’ fees in the Complaint does not constitute

an ‘insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matter’ such that a Motion to Strike

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) is proper”). 

But see Bianchi v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 120 F. Supp. 2d

837, 842 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (striking plaintiff’s request for

attorneys’ fees because the state statute providing for such

relief was preempted by federal law). “The purpose of a motion

to strike is to clean up the pleadings, streamline litigation,

and avoid unnecessary forays into immaterial matters” and it is

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not clear how any of these purposes are served by striking from

the complaint claims that plaintiffs are not even required to

plead. McInerney v. Moyer Lumber & Hardware, Inc., 244 F. Supp.

2d 393, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2002). For these reasons, the court

declines defendants’ invitation to modify the content of

plaintiffs’ pleadings with respect to the request for attorneys’

fees.

2. Claim for Damages Under California’s Unfair

Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §

17203

Defendants also argue that plaintiffs’ prayer for

damages under California’s UCL is improper because plaintiffs

include a request for “incurred damages.” (Compl. ¶ 57.) The

UCL allows plaintiffs to seek restitution--not damages generally. 

Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1144

(2003); Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co., 23 Cal.

4th 163, 173 (2000); see also Tomlinson v. Indymac Bank, F.S.B.,

359 F. Supp. 2d 891, 893 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (noting that the

threshold question when a UCL claim is challenged is “whether the

remedies sought by Plaintiffs are properly characterized as

restitutionary (and thus recoverable), or as compensatory damages

(unrecoverable)”). 

In this context, “‘restitution’ is limited to the

return of property or funds in which the plaintiff has an

ownership interest,” or, put differently, the return of money

obtained through an unfair business practice at the claimant’s

expense. Madrid v. Perot Sys. Corp., 130 Cal. App. 4th 440, 453

(2005). Plaintiffs cannot sue for ill-gotten gains, such as a

non-restitutionary general disgorgement of profits, but they can

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seek the quantifiable sums owed to them by defendants. Korea

Supply, 29 Cal. 4th at 1149-52; Cortez, 23 Cal. 4th at 178; Day

v. AT & T Corp., 63 Cal. App. 4th 325, 339 (1998) (“[Section]

17203 operates only to return to a person those measurable

amounts which are wrongfully taken by means of an unfair business

practice.” (emphasis added)). 

Plaintiffs note in their opposition to this motion that

defendants appropriated plaintiffs’ trade secrets and other

property, for which they were not compensated. These items are

the potential source of a proper claim for restitution under the

UCL. See Rosales v. Citibank, Fed. Sav. Bank, 133 F. Supp. 2d

1177, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“Under Section 17203, . . . the

offending party must have obtained something to which it was not

entitled and the victim must have given up something which he or

she was entitled to keep.”). However, as defendants note, even

if the court adopts the proposed deletions, other language in the

complaint will still preserve plaintiffs’ claims for restitution.

Therefore, because plaintiff cannot recover “damages” under the

UCL and this request is consequently immaterial, the court will

order that paragraph 57 and the phrase “of those damages” in

paragraph 58 be stricken from the complaint. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that 

(1) defendants’ motion to dismiss claim six be, and the

same hereby is, GRANTED. 

(2) defendants’ motion to strike plaintiffs’ request

for attorneys’ fees be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 

(3) defendants’ motion to strike plaintiffs’ request

for “damages” under the UCL be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 

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Paragraph 57 and the phrase “of those damages” in paragraph 58

are hereby ordered stricken from the complaint.

Plaintiff is given 30 days from the date of this order

to file an amended complaint consistent with this order. 

Defendants shall file an answer within 20 days of plaintiff’s

filing of an amended complaint or, if plaintiff does not amend

within the specified period, within 20 days of the deadline for

plaintiff’s amended complaint.

DATED: June 1, 2006

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