Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03133/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03133-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pili C. Greenfield
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 23, 2000 Decided April 6, 2001

No. 98-3133

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Pili C. Greenfield,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00067-01)

Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was A. J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Elizabeth Carroll, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher and Roy W.

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McLeese, III, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Mary-Patrice

Brown, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Rogers and Garland,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: Pili Greenfield pled guilty to the

charge of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute

cocaine base. Greenfield asked the district court to depart

downward from the sentence required by the United States

Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.), asserting that he had committed the offense while suffering from significantly reduced

mental capacity. The district court declined to grant the

requested departure. Finding no error in the court's application of the Guidelines, we affirm.

I

Greenfield was arrested during a January 1998 police raid

on a house in which cocaine base was being packaged for sale.

A grand jury initially indicted him for possession with intent

to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of

21 U.S.C. ss 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Greenfield later

pled guilty to a superseding information charging him with

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. s 371.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(b)(1),

the United States Probation Office submitted a presentence

report (PSR) to the court. The report concluded that, under

the Sentencing Guidelines, the applicable sentence in Greenfield's case was 60 months' imprisonment.1 Greenfield filed a

memorandum seeking a downward departure from the guide-

__________

1 Based on Greenfield's offense level and criminal history, the

PSR determined that the applicable guideline range was 87-108

months. PSR p 56. However, because 18 U.S.C. s 371 authorized

a maximum sentence of only 60 months, and because that sentence

was less than the minimum of the applicable guideline range,

U.S.S.G. s 5G1.1(a) dictated that the court apply the 60-month

sentence. See PSR p 56.

line sentence on the ground that he suffered from significantly reduced mental capacity, pursuant to U.S.S.G. s 5K2.13.

According to the memorandum, Greenfield suffered from

depression, which contributed to his participation in the drug

conspiracy. Def.'s Mem. in Aid of Sentencing at 7.

At the sentencing hearing, Greenfield called as his only

witness Dr. Clark Hudak, a Ph.D. in clinical social work and

the director of a drug treatment program. Hudak had

previously treated Greenfield in 1995-96, and reexamined him

in April 1998 at the request of defense counsel. A copy of

Hudak's written report was also admitted into evidence.

Hudak testified that when he first saw Greenfield in 1995,

he diagnosed him as suffering from depression. At the same

time, Hudak learned that Greenfield was using marijuana

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heavily. Hudak consulted with a staff psychiatrist who confirmed the diagnosis of depression and placed Greenfield on

medication. Sentencing Hr'g Tr. at 21. After nine months to

a year of therapy, Hudak found that Greenfield was responding "pretty well" and discharged him from the treatment

program. Id. at 22.

Hudak testified that he did not see Greenfield again until

April 1998, three months after his arrest. Id. at 25. Greenfield told Hudak that he had stopped taking his medication

soon after leaving the treatment program in 1996, and that he

had quickly resumed using drugs. Id. at 25-26. Hudak's

"impression ... was that [Greenfield] was still suffering from

a depression[, and] that he was also addicted to marijuana

and cocaine." Id. at 30. Hudak testified that "when a person

gets ... depressed," he can "get involved in very selfdestructive behaviors," and that "knowing his history, I believe that's the direction that [Greenfield] went until he was"

arrested. Id. at 26.

On cross-examination, Hudak testified that "in some cases,

if a depression is severe enough, ... it can impair one's

capacity" and "could significantly reduce someone's mental

capacity." Id. at 31-32. Hudak conceded, however, that he

had "no idea" what Greenfield's "mental condition was in

January of 1998." Id. at 33. Hudak further testified that

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Greenfield's drug use was voluntary, id. at 31, that once he

stopped taking his medication it was predictable that Greenfield "would return to drugs as a way to self medicate for his

depression," id. at 33, and that his use of drugs was "a

contributing factor to his reduced mental state." Id. at 34.

After the parties completed their examinations, the district

court undertook its own inquiry. The court asked Hudak to

explain the various degrees of depression and their associated

treatments, and to relate them to defendant's condition. Id.

at 35-38. Hudak said that when he saw Greenfield in 1995-

96, he did not recommend the kind of treatment, including

hospitalization, that would be indicated for severe depression.

Id. at 37-38. After further probing by the court, Hudak

described Greenfield's depression as "moderate." Id. at 39.

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the district

court denied Greenfield's request for a departure under

s 5K2.13. "[T]here is simply no basis to depart," the court

said. "With respect to this matter of depression[,] ...

viewed ... in the most favorable light, ... the testimony

actually given by [Hudak] mandates that the court not take

into consideration diminished capacity." Id. at 52. The court

imposed the 60-month guideline sentence, with accompanying

recommendations that Greenfield be placed in a "boot camp,"

rather than a typical prison facility, and that he be permitted

to enter a drug treatment program. Id. at 54.

II

This court may review a district court's refusal to depart

downward from an applicable guideline range only to determine whether the sentence was imposed "in violation of law"

or "as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing

guidelines." 18 U.S.C. s 3742(a)(1), (2); see United States v.

Leandre, 132 F.3d 796, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v.

Sammoury, 74 F.3d 1341, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1996). We must

"accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they

are clearly erroneous," and "give due deference to the district

court's application of the guidelines to the facts." 18 U.S.C.

s 3742(e). If a district court refuses to depart because it

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"mistakenly believes [it] lacks authority to do otherwise," its

sentencing decision is reviewable as an incorrect application

of the Guidelines. Sammoury, 74 F.3d at 1344. If the court

"correctly understands [its] discretionary authority to depart

downward when a particular mitigating circumstance exists,

[but] make[s] a clearly erroneous factual finding that the

circumstance does not exist," the resulting sentence may also

have been imposed as a result of an incorrect application of

the Guidelines. Id. at 1344; see Leandre, 132 F.3d at 800.

The relevant version of U.S.S.G. s 5K2.13, which is entitled

"Diminished Capacity," provides:

If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while

suffering from significantly reduced mental capacity not

resulting from voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants, a lower sentence may be warranted to reflect the

extent to which reduced mental capacity contributed to

the commission of the offense, provided that the defendant's criminal history does not indicate a need for

incarceration to protect the public.

U.S.S.G. s 5K2.13, p.s. (1997).2 As we have previously noted,

this guideline contains five eligibility criteria. A district court

may depart downward under s 5K2.13 if the defendant: "(1)

has committed a non-violent offense, (2) while suffering from

'significantly reduced mental capacity,' (3) that was not

caused by the voluntary use of [drugs or] other intoxicants,

(4) where the defendant's mental incapacity 'contributed to

the commission of the offense,' (5) so long as the defendant's

criminal record does not indicate a need for imprisonment to

protect public safety." Leandre, 132 F.3d at 800.

__________

2 Amendments to s 5K2.13, effective November 1998 (after

Greenfield was sentenced), clarified the conditions for a departure

under the guideline as well as the meaning of "significantly reduced

mental capacity." See U.S.S.G. s 5K2.13 & comment., n.1 (1998);

U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 583. Neither party urges application of

the revised guideline or suggests that it would have any effect on

the disposition of this appeal.

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There is no question that the district court understood that

it had discretion to depart under s 5K2.13 if each of the five

criteria were met.3 Defendant contends, however, that the

court "failed to consider ... Greenfield's individualized facts

and circumstances in weighing his diminished capacity departure request," and that "there is nothing in th[e] record to

indicate that the district court determined whether the requirements for a s 5K2.13 departure had been met." Greenfield Br. at 9. Neither charge is true. The court heard

extensive testimony regarding defendant's individual facts

and circumstances, and personally examined the expert witness about Greenfield's psychological condition. Following

the testimony, the court concluded, on the record, that the

requirements for application of s 5K2.13 had not been met.

See Sentencing Hr'g Tr. at 52.

Greenfield also argues that the district court misunderstood

the law regarding the third and fourth criteria for departure

under s 5K2.13. In support, he relies on the judge's statement that Hudak's testimony "mandates that the court not

take into consideration diminished capacity." Id. at 52. According to defendant, the court was "apparently referring to

testimony by the defense expert that Greenfield was addicted

to drugs," and wrongly concluded that such an addiction

required the court to deny a departure. Greenfield Br. at 5-

6. Citing United States v. Leandre, Greenfield argues that as

__________

3 Defendant's appellate briefs do not dispute this point, and the

entire focus of the sentencing hearing was on whether the criteria

were met. Although, as discussed below, the district court concluded that Hudak's testimony "mandates that the court not take into

consideration diminished capacity," Sentencing Hr'g Tr. at 52 (emphasis added), in context it is clear that the court used the word

"mandates" to indicate that s 5K2.13's criteria were not met. Indeed, the court prefaced its conclusion with an equivalent formulation: "[T]here is simply no basis to depart." Id. at 52. See United

States v. Shark, 51 F.3d 1072, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that

judge's statement, that "I don't see any basis on what I've heard so

far that gives me any leeway," indicated "that the judge appreciated

his discretion [to depart] but thought that he had not been presented with any reason to exercise it").

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long as reduced mental capacity did not itself "result[ ] from

voluntary use of drugs," a "departure under section 5K2.13

might remain available if a defendant's drug use contributed

only in part to a crime, because his mental infirmity may have

also played a role." 132 F.3d at 806. Greenfield asserts that

Hudak's testimony met these requirements, and that in failing to comprehend them, the district court misapplied the

guideline's third criterion (regarding voluntary drug use), as

well as its fourth (regarding the contribution of defendant's

mental capacity to the commission of the offense).

We need not dwell on whether Hudak's testimony satisfied

the third and fourth criteria of s 5K2.13, however, because

there is nothing in the district court's statement to suggest

that its decision was based on those criteria--or on Hudak's

testimony regarding drug use at all. The court did not

specify which criteria defendant failed, and there is no reason

to assume it was referring to these two. As we have stressed

before with respect to refusals to depart, "the appellant ...

has the initial responsibility to ensure that the district court

explains its reasoning for the record, and appellant neglected

that responsibility when he failed to object to the district

court's ruling. Under these circumstances, we assume 'that

the district court kn[ew] and applie[d] the law correctly'...."

United States v. Pinnick, 47 F.3d 434, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

(quoting United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 927 F.2d 489, 491

(9th Cir. 1991)).

In any event, in this case it is clear that the sentencing

court's focus was not on the testimony regarding Greenfield's

drug use and its relation to the third and fourth criteria, but

rather on Hudak's testimony about Greenfield's mental condition and its relation to the second criterion of s 5K2.13: the

requirement that the defendant have committed the offense

while suffering from "significantly reduced mental capacity."

Greenfield's evidence failed to demonstrate that his mental

capacity was significantly reduced, and that it was significantly reduced at the relevant time.

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ty" under s 5K2.13. See United States v. Watkins, 179 F.3d

489, 500 (6th Cir. 1999) (affirming refusal to depart where,

although defendant introduced evidence that he suffered from

"depressive disorder," no evidence "reflected his alleged diminished capacity"); see also United States v. Withers, 100

F.3d 1142, 1148 (4th Cir. 1996) (same); cf. United States v.

Edwards, 98 F.3d 1364, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Nor is the

guideline satisfied even by testimony that the depression

manifested itself in "reduced" mental capacity. Rather, the

words of the guideline require evidence that the defendant's

mental capacity was "significantly" reduced. U.S.S.G.

s 5K2.13; see United States v. Webb, 49 F.3d 636, 639 (10th

Cir. 1995) (reversing s 5K2.13 departure where, although

defendant's psychiatric reports documented a history of mental problems, "they do not address or lead to the conclusion

that defendant suffered from 'significantly reduced mental

capacity' "); see also United States v. Frazier, 979 F.2d 1227,

1230 (7th Cir. 1992) (same). Moreover, defendant's mental

capacity must have been significantly reduced at the time he

committed the offense. See United States v. White, 71 F.3d

920, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Frazier, 979 F.2d at 1230.

The sentencing court's own examination of Hudak makes

clear that its focus was on Greenfield's claim of significantly

reduced mental capacity, rather than on the implications of

his drug use. The court did not ask Hudak a single question

about drug use. Rather, it inquired extensively into the

nature and severity of Greenfield's mental disorder, and

asked Hudak to explain what the treatment prescribed for

defendant indicated about the level of severity. Sentencing

Hr'g Tr. at 35-39. In response, Hudak categorized Greenfield's depression as "moderate," id. at 39, and testified that

the consulting psychiatrist had prescribed an antidepressant,

id. at 22, characterized by the PSR as "mild," PSR p 41.

Nothing in Hudak's response to the court's inquiries would

have supported a finding of "significantly" reduced mental

capacity.

Nor was there anything in Hudak's direct or crossexamination testimony that would have supported such a

finding. Although Hudak testified that "in some cases, if a

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depression is severe enough, ... it can impair one's capacity"

and "could significantly reduce someone's mental capacity,"

Sentencing Hr'g Tr. at 31 (emphasis added), he never testified that this was so in Greenfield's case. To the contrary, he

testified that Greenfield's depression was only moderate, "on

a scale of mild at the least, moderate in the middle, and then

severe." Id. at 39. Moreover, Hudak failed altogether to

offer an opinion about Greenfield's mental condition at the

time of the offense, conceding that he had "no idea ... what

[Greenfield's] mental condition was in January of 1998." Sentencing Hr'g Tr. at 33.

Hudak's written report was equally deficient. Although

the report stated that "Greenfield suffers from a depressive

disorder" and that without proper treatment his judgment

"becomes impaired," App. 36, Hudak did not indicate the

severity of that impairment nor tie it to an evaluation of

Greenfield's mental capacity. Indeed, the contents of the

report cut strongly against a finding of significantly reduced

mental capacity. Hudak reported that:

[Greenfield] seemed to be experiencing mild anxiety

related to his pending legal matters. He was oriented

[as] to person, place and time, and there was no evidence

of any psychotic behavior past or present. His recent

and remote memory were intact; his thinking was clear

and organized; and he seemed to be functioning at an

above average level of intelligence. There was clear

evidence of tendencies toward impulsivity; however, he

appeared to not be at risk for suicidal or homicidal

behavior.

Id. at 35. Whether or not this description necessarily precludes a finding of diminished capacity, it surely does not

support such a finding, and there is no evidence in the record

that does. Moreover, like his testimony, Hudak's report does

not even venture a guess as to Greenfield's mental capacity

on the day he committed the crime.

In light of the clear focus of the district court's questioning

of Hudak, and of the content of his testimony, we have no

doubt that the court's reference to "the testimony actually

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given" was a reference to Hudak's testimony regarding defendant's mental capacity. For the same reason, it is clear that

the court's conclusion, that Hudak's testimony "mandates that

the court not take into consideration diminished capacity,"

expressed its view that the expert had failed to say anything

that would have permitted a departure for diminished capacity under s 5K2.13. Given the complete dearth of evidence to

meet s 5K2.13's second criterion, there was nothing "incorrect" about the court's conclusion, 18 U.S.C. s 3742(a)(2).

See Frazier, 979 F.2d at 1230 (vacating departure where,

although mental health evaluation diagnosed defendant as

having depression, it did not "conclud[e] that the defendant

'suffered from significantly reduced mental capacity' when

she committed her offense"); see also Webb, 49 F.3d at 639

(same); cf. Leandre, 132 F.3d at 803 (noting that "a bare

showing of reduced mental capacity, without more, is insufficient to authorize a court to depart," and that "[a]bsent some

causal link, the sentencing judge would misapply the Guidelines by granting a departure"); United States v. Cantu, 12

F.3d 1506, 1511 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that "a defendant

bears the burden of proving the appropriateness of a downward departure").

III

The district court neither misapprehended its authority

under, nor otherwise misapplied, the Sentencing Guidelines.

Accordingly, the judgment of that court is

Affirmed.

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