Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00347/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00347-10/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Thomas Stephen Gunn
Petitioner
James A. Yates
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 First filed in 2006 in the Eastern District of California, the action was transferred to the

Northern District and received herein in January 2007. 

2 Petitioner was convicted of two counts of committing lewd acts with a child under 14

years (Cal. Pen. Code, § 288(a)), one count of attempting to commit a lewd act with a child

under 14 years (§§ 664/288(a)), three counts of exhibiting harmful matter to a minor with the

intent of seduction (§ 288.2(a)), three counts of annoying or molesting a minor (§ 647.6(a)), and

two counts of possession of sexual images of a minor (§ 311.11(a)). The jury also found true

allegations that Petitioner committed a lewd act against more than one victim and that he was

a stranger to the victim or befriended the victim for the purpose of committing the lewd act 

(§§ 667.61(e)(5), 1203.066(a)(3) & (7)). 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS STEPHEN GUNN,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES A. YATES, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 07-0347 SI (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

(Docket Nos. 41 & 42)

INTRODUCTION

This is a federal habeas corpus action filed by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254.1

 For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied. 

BACKGROUND

In 2002, a Mendocino Superior Court jury convicted Petitioner of various sexual crimes

against children under the age of fourteen, possession of sexual images of children, and

exhibition of harmful matter to a minor.2

 The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a determinate

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3 Petitioner requires the use of a hospital bed and in-home care services because he is

“severely overweight (345 pounds) and suffers from congestive heart failure, diabetes,

arrhythmia, and sleep apnea.” (Ans., Ex. 6 at 7; Ex. 2, Vol. 9 at 810.)

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term of six years, and a consecutive indeterminate term of thirty-years to life in state prison.

Petitioner appealed. The California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District affirmed the

conviction. (Ans., Ex. 6 at 33.) The California Supreme Court denied petitions for review and

for writ of habeas corpus. (Id., Exs. 8 & 10.) 

Evidence was presented at trial in support of the charges that Petitioner committed sexual

offenses against Maria, age 6, Sara, age 9, Felicia, age 11, and Destinee, age 11. Prior bad act

evidence of Petitioner’s 1983 sexual molestation of another victim, Naomi, age 7, also was

presented at trial. The state appellate court summarized the facts as follows:

Maria was born in 1996. At all times relevant to this appeal, she lived in a Ukiah

house with her seven year old brother, Tamara (Mother), and maternal

grandmother (Grandmother). [Petitioner] lived in an apartment building behind

Maria’s house.

....

[On May 24, 2002] Maria told Mother that she watched a movie “today” at

[Petitioner’s] house in which “this girl, she sucked a guy’s dick.” Mother had

never heard Maria use this expression. Mother then asked Maria if anything else

happened in the movie. Maria replied that the man “stuck his” penis in the girl's

anus and vagina. Mother asked Maria why she was watching the movie, and

Maria replied “[Petitioner] wanted her to.” Maria also said that she and

[Petitioner] were alone in his apartment while the movie was playing on his video

cassette recorder. Mother telephoned the police, who arranged to have a detective

contact her.

Three days later, May 27, 2004, Mother and Maria were returning from a visit

with friends. Maria was crying. She told Mother she got a bump on her head

when she fell on [Petitioner]’s wheelchair while trying to get out of his house.

She alo said [Petitioner] asked her to touch his penis while they were watching the

movie, but she refused. Mother could feel a bump on Maria’s head.

On May 30, 2004, Detective Kevin DeVries interviewed Maria . . . Maria told

Detective DeVries that [Petitioner] told her to watch a movie. As she described

the movie to DeVries, a boy took off a girl’s clothes. While the movie was

playing, Maria was on the floor and [Petitioner] was on his bed, touching his penis

through his purple shorts. He told her to put her mouth on his penis. She refused

and left his apartment. She got a bump on her head when she fell in his house.

[Petitioner] had never before shown her a movie or asked her to touch him.

On June 5, 2002, the police searched [Petitioner]’s apartment. A hospital bed3

 and

entertainment center containing a television and video cassette recorder were in

the living room. A computer with an attached camera was in a second room. The

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police seized the computer, floppy discs, videotapes, digital video discs (dvd’s),

photographs of young girls, and a photo of a young woman orally copulating an

animal. Five of the videotapes depicted a man and woman engaging in sexual

intercourse and oral copulation.

....

Victims Sara and Felicia C. 

Felicia was born in 1991. Her sister, Sara, was born in 1993. Between January

and June 2002 their mother had Valerie W. take care of them. Valerie has a

daughter, Destinee, born in 1991, who is a friend of the sisters. Valerie was

[Petitioner]’s in-home caregiver, and occasionally took the three girls with her to

[Petitioner]’s apartment. They played computer games and watched television

when they visited and once made a music video.

Several of the photographs and computer discs seized during the June 5 search of

[Petitioner]’s apartment depicted Sara, Felicia and Destinee. A computer forensic

analyst recovered images from the hard drive of [Petitioner]’s computer in which

the faces of these girls had been “morphed,” or superimposed, on naked or near

naked adult female bodies. Detective DeVries then contacted the sisters’ mother

and showed her these photos and images.

After seeing the depictions, the sisters’ mother asked them if anything had

happened during their visits to [Petitioner]’s apartment. Felicia replied that

[Petitioner] had taken nude pictures of them and Destinee; they had watched

movies of people engaged in sexual acts on his computer and television;

[Petitioner] had asked her to sit on his penis, which she did; and he had licked

Sara and Destinee’s vaginas. Sara agreed with Felicia and added that [Petitioner]

had asked the three girls to touch each other.

On July 22, 2002, Detective DeVries interviewed Felicia and Sara. In the

interview Felicia stated: On two occasions when Valerie had taken the three girls

with her to [Petitioner]’s apartment but while Valerie was out of the apartment, he

instructed Felicia to take off all her clothes and then took pictures of her using a

camera on his computer. He told her she had a “beautiful body,” and he wanted

her to touch his penis. She did so reluctantly, and he said “that felt good.” His

pants were “down” at the time. He also told her not to tell anybody what had

happened. He licked Destinee’s vagina, but she would not allow him to touch her

vagina. He gave her a banana that he wanted her to put by her crotch, but she

refused. He also showed the girls videos on his television or computer depicting

a man and woman engaged in sexual activities. While they watched the movie, he

played with his exposed penis.

In her interview Sara stated: The three girls were alone with [Petitioner] in his

apartment only once, while Valerie had gone to the store to buy groceries for

[Petitioner]. During this visit, [Petitioner] showed them “nasty pictures” on his

computer and repeatedly told them he was “horny.” He was playing with his

penis and wanted her and Destinee to touch it. They did so; he had his clothes on

at the time. He took pictures of the vaginas of all three girls, but did not touch any

of them. They watched a video in which two girls were doing “nasty stuff.”

Destinee told her not to tell anybody about what happened during this visit

because she thought she would “get in trouble.” Sara knew that Felicia thought

they were alone with him twice.

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On November 26, 2002, District Attorney Investigator Tim Kiely interviewed

Felicia and Sara. A deputy district attorney, a representative from the victim

witness program, and the sisters’ mother were present during the interview.

Felicia repeated what she had told Detective DeVries in July, and added more

details of what occurred when the three girls were left alone with [Petitioner]. She

stated that [Petitioner], who was in his hospital bed, instructed Sara to stand on the

bed. While she stood up he licked her exposed vagina. He did the same thing

with Destinee. While lying on the bed, he instructed Felicia to put her vagina on

his penis. She pulled her slacks and underpants halfway down and sat on his

visible penis. She told him she could not “do it” any more and got off the bed.

She forgot to tell Detective DeVries during her July interview about this act of

sitting on [Petitioner].

During her interview Sara stated: One of the “nasty” videos [Petitioner] showed

the three girls depicted a naked girl and boy and a tied-up goat, and the boy put

the goat’s penis in the girl’s vagina. Sara was sitting on the floor and [Petitioner]

was sitting in his wheelchair when he asked her to touch his penis. Later he lay

on his bed and instructed her to get on top of him so he could lick her vagina. She

did so after taking off her pants. He then licked Felicia’s vagina, but she did not

like it and got off him. Destinee did not get on top of him. The visit during which

these incidents occurred was different from the visit during which [Petitioner]

took pictures of the girls’ naked vaginas. Sara had not told Detective DeVries

about [Petitioner] licking her vagina because she was too embarrassed.

1983 Offenses

In 1983 Naomi M. was seven or eight years old and lived in Leggett, Mendocino

County, with her sister Amy, then nine or ten years old, their mother, and mother’s

boyfriend, Ron. [Petitioner] was a friend of Ron and stayed with them for a while.

He frequently babysat Naomi and Amy. While babysitting them, he put his hands

on their vaginas, and made them touch his penis. On one occasion he was seated

between the girls on the living room floor and put one hand on Naomi’s vagina

inside her underpants. He did the same thing to Amy with his other hand.

Several months later Naomi, Amy, their mother, a different boyfriend, Jim, and

Grandpa, an older man whom her mother took care of, moved to South Leggett.

[Petitioner] also stayed at this house for a while. On one occasion at the South

Leggett house Naomi and [Petitioner] were in the bathroom, and he put his hand

on the back of her head and forced her mouth onto his exposed penis. Naomi did

not tell her mother immediately because she feared [Petitioner] would harm her

mother. After [Petitioner] went away from their house, Naomi and Amy decided

to inform their mother about his behavior. Her mother subsequently confronted

[Petitioner] in Naomi’s presence, and he admitted his acts. Naomi also talked to

a child protective services worker and the police about his conduct, and testified

in court proceedings about it. During this proceeding she testified that she and

Amy were always together when [Petitioner] touched them, but her testimony was

false because there were occasions when Naomi was alone with [Petitioner].

(Ans., Ex. 6 at 2–6) (footnote removed). 

Petitioner testified at trial. He denied that he had had any sexual contact with the victims.

He also denied that he showed them any videos, computer images, or photographs having sexual

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contact. According to his testimony, Maria on her own started playing a pornographic video

Petitioner had in his house. (Id. at 9–10.) Petitioner testified that he shut off the video as soon

as he realized what was playing. (Id., Ex. 2, Vol. 9 at 857.) Petitioner also testified that “he

cannot see or reach his penis due to his large stomach.” (Id., Ex. 6 at 9–10.) The Court notes

that Destinee testified in support of Petitioner at trial. (Id. at 6.) 

As grounds for federal habeas relief, Petitioner alleges that (1) defense counsel rendered

ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment, (2) the trial court’s admission of

prior bad acts evidence under California Evidence Code § 1108 violated his right to due process,

and (3) the trial court’s evidentiary rulings had the effect of denying Petitioner his due process

rights to present a defense and confront witnesses. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or

if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decision but

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4 Petitioner also alleged that defense counsel had a conflict of interest. (Pet. at 5(a).)

Because this claim was unexhausted, Petitioner moved to dismiss such claim. (See Docket No.

18.) The Court granted this motion. (See Docket No. 20.) 

6

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal

habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id.

at 409. 

DISCUSSION

1. Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner claims that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (A) failing to

cross-examine prosecution witnesses regarding a specific incident; and (B) failing to prepare

certain defense witnesses to testify.4

 (Pet. 5–5(a).) 

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are examined under Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, a petitioner

must establish two things. First, he must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e.,

that it fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms.

Id. at 687–68. Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome. Id. Where the defendant is challenging his conviction, the

appropriate question is “whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the

factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Id. at 695. 

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5 Petitioner was assigned three defense attorneys over the course of his prosecution.

Petitioner appears to contend that the trial court violated his right to the effective assistance of

counsel by allowing such substitutions of counsel. (Pet. at 5.) Petitioner has not shown with

any specificity, however, how such substitutions adversely effected the quality of his legal

representation. 

7

A. Cross-Examining Witnesses

Petitioner contends that he told defense counsel that he caught two of the alleged victims,

Sara and Felicia, in his shower, naked and masturbating with his bath oils. (Pet. at 5.) He

allegedly urged defense counsel to cross-examine Sara and Felicia regarding this incident.

Defense counsel, according to Petitioner, refused on grounds that he did not want to upset the

witnesses.5

 (Id.) Petitioner did not testify as to this alleged incident. (Ans., Ex. 2, Vol. 9 at

809–945.) 

A difference of opinion as to trial tactics does not constitute denial of effective assistance,

see U.S. v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir. 1981), and tactical decisions are not ineffective

assistance simply because in retrospect better tactics are known to have been available. See

Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Tactical decisions of trial counsel deserve deference when: (1) counsel in fact bases trial

conduct on strategic considerations; (2) counsel makes an informed decision based upon

investigation; and (3) the decision appears reasonable under the circumstances. See Sanders v.

Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to habeas relief on this claim. As to the first

Strickland prong, Petitioner has not shown that defense counsel’s performance was deficient.

Assuming that defense counsel was aware of the alleged shower incident, his tactical decision

not to question the witnesses regarding it was reasonable under the circumstances. First, there

was no evidence other than Petitioner’s assertion that such an event occurred. Defense counsel’s

decision not to present a set of unsupported facts appears reasonable. Second, had questioning

on such a topic upset the witnesses, it is not unreasonable to assume that the jury may have pitied

the witnesses, and formed a dislike to defense counsel. Furthermore, the prosecutor well may

have tried to use such evidence to support the charges against Petitioner, that is, that Plaintiff

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inspired their sexual activity. On this record, Petitioner has not shown that defense counsel’s

performance was deficient. 

As to the second Strickland prong, Petitioner has not shown prejudice. The alleged

shower incident indicates only that the girls were behaving in a sexual manner. The incident

does not support Petitioner’s innocence, nor undermine in any significant way, the evidence

adduced against Petitioner. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is DENIED.

B. Preparing Witnesses

Petitioner contends that defense counsel failed to interview witnesses Petitioner asked

counsel to call on his behalf. (Pet. at 5(a).) Petitioner asserts that although defense counsel did

subpoena these witnesses, he “made no attempt to prepare them for trial.” (Id.) “Because my

counsel failed to meet and interview my Spanish speaking neighbors with a translator about what

would be expected of them, being Mexican [n]ationals[,] they arrived in court confused and

intimidated.” (Petitioner’s Mem. of P. & A. in Support of Order to Show Cause at 7.) 

Whatever its merits, Petitioner’s claim is insufficiently detailed. He has not explained

in any detail how such allegedly deficient performance adversely affected his defense. For

instance, Petitioner has neither named the witnesses, nor pointed to specific examples of

testimony demonstrative of a lack of preparedness. Without a reasonably detailed articulation

of his contentions, this Court must deny Petitioner’s claim. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is

DENIED. 

///

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2. Prior Bad Act Evidence

Petitioner claims that the trial court’s admission of the 1983 incidents as prior bad act

evidence under California Evidence Code § 1108 violated his right to due process. (Pet. at 5.)

The state appellate court summarized the facts as follows: 

Prior to trial, the prosecutor moved for admission of the 1983 Naomi/Amy

incidents under Evidence Code section 1108. The prosecutor’s motion states that

[Petitioner] was held to answer on numerous sexual assault charges in 1984, but

[Petitioner] left California before the scheduled trial occurred and was absent until

1992. The parties agreed the case was tried twice, both trials ending in a mistrial.

The trial court concluded the 1983 incidents were admissible under Evidence

Code section 1108. It found there was “commonality” between the 1983 and the

present incidents, insofar as they both involved pairs of sisters, each of whom was

present during some or all of the alleged assaultive acts; the pairs of sisters were

of similar ages; both sets of incidents took place in [Petitioner]’s residence or

living quarters; [Petitioner] occupied a position of trust or control; and some of the

specific acts were similar. It also found that, notwithstanding the 19 year time

span, there was a “propensity” that could reasonably be drawn from the

circumstances of the 1983 incident that was relevant to the present charges.

Making a Evidence Code section 352 analysis, the court found that presenting

evidence of the 1983 incident would not have a serious impact on the length of

trial; the jury instructions adequately explained the use of the prior bad acts; and

the probative value of the prior acts outweighed their prejudice.

(Ans., Ex. 6 at 28–29.) 

At a trial in which a defendant is charged with committing a sexual offense, California

Evidence Code section 1108 allows the introduction of evidence that the defendant committed

other, uncharged sexual offenses. Such evidence is admissible under section 1108 provided that

the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 

The Due Process Clause has limited operation “beyond the specific guarantees

enumerated in the Bill of Rights.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990). State

law violates the Due Process Clause only if “it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the

traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Montana v. Egelhoff,

518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996). The Supreme Court has not found that the introduction of propensity

evidence offends the Due Process Clause. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly left open

that very question. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n. 5 (1991). Because it is an open

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question, it is not clearly established federal law that the admission of propensity evidence —

such as evidence that Petitioner committed sexual offenses in 1983 similar to those he was

accused of committing in the instant matter — violates due process. 

Furthermore, courts have “routinely allowed propensity evidence in sex-offense cases,

even while disallowing it in other criminal prosecutions.” United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d

1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001). In fact, “California’s Rule 1108 was modeled after the Federal 

Rules, and contains an express requirement that courts balance the probative value of the

evidence against its prejudicial effect.” Wolff v. Newland, 67 Fed. Appx. 398 (9th Cir.

2003).

With respect to the instant matter, because the Supreme Court has left open the

question of the admission of propensity evidence, Petitioner’s claim that the trial court’s

admission of propensity evidence under section 1108 violated his constitutional rights is without

merit. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is DENIED.

3. The Trial Court’s Evidentiary Rulings

Petitioner claims that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings regarding admission of two

videotaped interviews violated his due process right to present a defense and confront witnesses.

(Pet. at 6.) The first interview was of Sara’s and Felicia’s mother, and the second was of

Destinee. 

A. Videotaped Interview of Sara’s and Felicia’s Mother 

The state appellate court summarized the relevant facts and its decision on the claim as

follows:

Defense counsel asked the court to play the videotape of the mother’s interview

during his cross-examination of [Detective] DeVries. He noted that in her

interview with DeVries the mother was very angry and was basically making a

threat against [Petitioner]. He also noted that her statements during her July 2002

interview with DeVries contrasted with her December 2002 trial testimony in

which she stated she was not upset and only cried a little bit. He argued her

“angry” interview demeanor was relevant to his defense theory that, given the

change in the daughters’ statements between July and December, their mother

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influenced them during that period. As he argued, her demeanor would help

demonstrate that her trial testimony that she never spoke to her daughters about

[Petitioner]’s conduct after the July interview was “simply not credible.”

After viewing the videotape, the court denied [Petitioner]’s request under

Evidence Code section 352. It concluded the evidence’s marginal relevance

regarding the mother’s attitude during the interview was outweighed by the undue

consumption of time and potential for jury confusion on the collateral information

in the videotape.

....

[W]e find no error. Through [Petitioner’s] cross-examination of Felicia and Sara,

their mother, and Detective DeVries, and his direct examination of Valerie

[Destinee’s mother], [Petitioner] had ample opportunity to test Felicia and Sara’s

mother’s credibility. The court could reasonably conclude the videotape showing

the mother’s demeanor during her July interview with Detective DeVries was

cumulative on that issue and thus unduly time-consuming.

(Ans., Ex. 6 at 25–26, 28) (footnote removed). 

“State and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules

excluding evidence from criminal trials.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006)

(quotations and citations omitted). The exclusion of evidence does not violate the Due Process

Clause unless “it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of

our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996).

“While the Constitution prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no

legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote,

well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value

is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or

potential to mislead the jury.” Holmes, 547 U.S. at 325–26. 

The state’s latitude is limited, however, by a defendant’s constitutional rights to due

process and to present a defense, rights originating in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments,

which include the right to confront the witnesses and evidence adduced against the accused. See

Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324. To this end, the Confrontation Clause serves purposes of ensuring

that witnesses will testify under oath, forcing witnesses to undergo cross- examination, and

permitting the jury to observe the demeanor of witnesses. U.S. v. Medjuck, 156 F.3d 916, 919

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n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Applying these legal principles to the instant matter, the Court cannot say that the state

appellate court’s ruling resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. First, the ruling did indeed avoid an undue

consumption of time. As the state appellate court noted, Petitioner already had had an

opportunity to call the mother’s credibility into question. Second, and related to this first point,

because Petitioner had an opportunity to examine this witness, his rights to present a defense and

confront witnesses were not violated. On this record, the Court must deny Petitioner’s claim.

B. Videotaped Interview of Destinee

The state appellate court summarized the relevant facts and its decision on the matter as

follows:

[Petitioner] asked to play the 20 minute videotaped police interview of Destinee

[who testified in support of Petitioner at trial]. During the interview Detective

DeVries told Destinee that he could give her a lie detector if she was not telling

the truth and then asked if she knew what a lie detector test was. [Petitioner]

argued the videotape bolstered Destinee’s credibility because, even after this

quasi-threat, she continued during the interview to deny to the officer that

[Petitioner] harmed her. It would also show that the interview technique DeVries

used with her differed from the technique he used with Sara, Felicia, and Maria,

where he made no reference to a lie detector. He argued this difference was

relevant to the bias of the investigation and would explain the inconsistent

testimony between Destinee and the other three girls. The court denied the request

under Evidence Code section 352, on the grounds the undue consumption of time

to show it outweighed its probative value.

Detective DeVries was subsequently recalled as a witness for the defense. He

testified that while interviewing Destinee he picked up cues from her body

language and statements that suggested she was not being truthful, and he could

“possibly” point out these cues on the videotape. [Petitioner] reiterated his request

to show the videotape to demonstrate what DeVries observed that led to his

concern about Destinee’s veracity. The court noted that the videotape was

relevant for this purpose, but also noted the videotape was not admissible under

any hearsay exception, nor could DeVries testify as to his opinion about

Destinee’s credibility. Under Evidence Code section 352, it denied the request out

of concern the jury would have too much difficulty distinguishing the purposes for

which the tape could and could not be used.

....

[T]he court could conclude that the videotape of Destinee’s interview with

DeVries would have created a real danger of confusing and misleading the jury,

given the limited use to which the questions and answers in the interview could

Case 3:07-cv-00347-SI Document 43 Filed 01/19/10 Page 12 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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be put. It could also have concluded that any limiting instruction would have been

unsuccessful at adequately explaining the allowed and unallowed uses of the

interview statements. [Citation removed.] Additionally, the court could have

concluded that showing the videotape was cumulative to evidence from which the

jury could evaluate DeVries’s bias: his own cross-examination testimony, the

testimony of Dr. Fraser regarding the effect of interview techniques on possible

child abuse victims, and Destinee’s testimony describing her interview with

DeVries.

(Ans., Ex. 6 at 26–27, 28.) 

Applying these legal principles to the instant matter, the Court cannot say that the state

appellate court’s ruling was resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. First, as with the above claim, the

ruling did indeed avoid an undue consumption of time, and a confusion of issues. As the state

appellate court noted, Petitioner had had an opportunity to examine Destinee and establish her

credibility. Second, and related to this first point, because Petitioner had an opportunity to

examine DeVries and Destinee, his right to present a defense and confront witnesses were not

violated. On this record, the Court must deny Petitioner’s claim.

PENDING MOTIONS

There are two pending motions. In both, Petitioner asks the Court to grant his petition

on grounds that Respondent has not responded to Petitioner’s response to Respondent’s answer.

(See Docket Nos. 41 & 42.) Respondent is not obligated to respond to such a filing, and

Petitioner has not cited any binding legal authority to the contrary. Accordingly, Petitioner’s

motions (Docket Nos. 41 & 42) are DENIED. 

///

Case 3:07-cv-00347-SI Document 43 Filed 01/19/10 Page 13 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

Petitioner’s pending motions (Docket Nos. 41 & 42) are DENIED. 

This order terminates Docket Nos. 41 & 42. 

A certificate of appealability will not issue. Reasonable jurists would not “find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel,

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may seek a certificate of appealability from the Court of

Appeals. 

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent, and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 19, 2010 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-00347-SI Document 43 Filed 01/19/10 Page 14 of 14