Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-04-05016/USCOURTS-ca10-04-05016-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Morgan Earl Windrix
Appellant

Document Text:

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

PUBLISH MAY 3 2005 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED ST A TES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

V. 

MORGAN EARL WINDRIX, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee 

V. 

DAVID ALAN WESTCOTT, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

V. 

CHARLES ARNOLD MOOK, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 04-5016 

No. 04-5020 

No. 04-5021 

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APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. NO. 02-CR-120-EA) 

Case No. 04-5016: 

Michael G. McGuire, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant - Appellant Windrix. 

Kevin Danielson, Assistant United States Attorney (David E. O'Meilia, 

United States Attorney, with him on the briefs), Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff -

Appellee. 

Case No. 04-5020: 

Art Fleak, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant - Appellant Westcott. 

Shannon L. Henson, Assistant United States Attorney (David E. O'Meilia, 

United States Attorney, and Kevin Danielson, Assistant United States Attorney, 

on the briefs), Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff - Appellee. 

Case No. 04-5021: 

Stanley D. Monroe, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant - Appellant Mook. 

Shannon L. Henson, Assistant United States Attorney (David E. O'Meilia, 

United States Attorney, and Kevin Danielson, Assistant United States Attorney, 

on the briefs), Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff - Appellee. 

Before BRISCOE, HOLLOWAY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges. 

HARTZ, Circuit Judge. 

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These consolidated cases arise from the trial of three participants in a 

conspiracy to manufacture and sell methamphetamine. Defendants Morgan Earl 

Windrix, Charles Arnold Mook, and David Alan Westcott were each convicted of 

conspiring to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 846, and 

possessing equipment and chemicals for methamphetamine manufacturing, 21 

U.S.C. § 843(a)(6). Windrix, the conspiracy's leader, was further convicted on 

two counts of possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute, 21 

U.S.C. § 843, and maintaining a drug house, 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(l), (b); Mook 

was further convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, 

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(l), 924(a)(2). 

Each Defendant appeals the judgment on a number of grounds. We 

exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm the convictions but 

remand for resentencing in light of United States v. Booker,_ U.S._, 125 

S. Ct. 738 (2005). 

I. Background 

In July 1999 Windrix bought a fenced 10-acre hill property in Osage 

County, Oklahoma, on which he resided in a double-wide mobile home. Westcott, 

with his former wife Karen Heim, moved onto the property at Windrix's 

invitation, living in a single-wide mobile home. Mook, Windrix's nephew, 

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occasionally lived on the hill, but also maintained houses on South Xanthus and 

North Garrison Place in Tulsa. 

Between 1999 and 2002 Windrix, Westcott, Mook, and others manufactured 

and distributed methamphetamine using Windrix's hill as their base. Windrix 

arranged methamphetamine-manufacturing sessions (cooks) at least twice a week 

and supervised the procurement of ingredients for these cooks. Westcott assisted 

during the cooks, purchased and produced ingredients, and destroyed evidence of 

the cooks. Mook assisted during the cooks and kept methamphetamine, business 

records, firearms, and ammunition in his South Xanthus and North Garrison Place 

houses. 

On appeal Windrix contends that ( 1) the district court incorrectly failed to 

suppress evidence discovered during a May 10, 2002, traffic stop; (2) the 

Government proved multiple conspiracies rather than the single conspiracy with 

which he was charged; and (3) the district court incorrectly applied the 

Sentencing Guidelines by miscalculating drug quantities and imposing upward 

adjustments for firearm possession and for leading a criminal group of five or 

more. 

Vv estcott contends that ( 1) the district court incorrectly failed to suppress 

evidence discovered during a February 6, 2001, search of his mobile home on the 

hill; (2) the government proved multiple conspiracies rather than the charged 

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conspiracy; (3) the district court abused its discretion by refusing to sever his trial 

from that of the other defendants; ( 4) the jury pool was not a fair cross-section of 

the community; (5) the district court misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines by 

attributing to him quantities of methamphetamine that flowed through the 

conspiracy but that he could not have reasonably been expected to foresee; and 

(6) the Government failed to prove for sentencing purposes that the quantities of 

methamphetamine attributed to him were pure methamphetamine rather than a 

mixture. 

Mook contends that ( 1) the district court incorrectly failed to suppress 

evidence discovered in the February 6, 2001, search of the hill, the two 

September 23 searches of his residence, and the September 24 search of his 

storage lockers; (2) the Government proved multiple conspiracies rather than the 

single conspiracy with which it charged him; and (3) the district court incorrectly 

applied the Sentencing Guidelines by attributing to him quantities of 

methamphetamine that flowed through the conspiracy but that he could not have 

reasonably been expected to foresee. 

All three also challenge their sentences under Booker. 

II. Contested Searches and Seizures 

Police officers conducted a number of searches during their investigation of 

the conspiracy. Defendants challenge several of them on appeal. 

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On February 6, 2001, officers executed a search warrant of the Windrix 

property. The search included both trailers (Windrix's and Westcott's) on the 

hill. Officers discovered methamphetamine, ingredients and equipment for 

preparing methamphetamine, marijuana, several firearms, video surveillance 

equipment, a ballistic vest, night-vision scopes, walkie-talkies, a radio scanner, 

and large amounts of currency. 

On May 15, 2001, another warrant was executed, this time for Mook's 

South Xanthus house. Officers discovered marijuana, a firearm, scales, syringes, 

gloves, methamphetamine pipes, receipts for methamphetamine-manufacturing 

ingredients and equipment, and large amounts of currency. A year later officers 

obtained further evidence-methamphetamine, ingredients, and a videotape of 

Windnix at a cook-in a May 10, 2002, search of Windrix's car after a traffic 

stop. 

This prolonged investigation resulted in a September 6, 2002, indictment 

charging Defendants with conspiracy. On September 23, relying in part on the 

indictment, officers obtained and executed a warrant to search Mook's North 

Garrison house for documentary evidence of the conspiracy, and, after a fruitful 

search, a second warrant to search the house for methamphetamine-manufacturing 

equipment and other nondocumentary evidence. The North Garrison searches 

yielded financial records, bottles, filters, scales, smoking devices, marijuana, 

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firearms, ammunition, and large amounts of currency. During the first search, 

officers discovered a storage-locker receipt; they then obtained a warrant to 

search the storage locker, which they executed the following day. They found 

firearms, ammunition, paperwork, scales, glassware, plastic tubing, and a 

chemistry textbook. 

We proceed to address the challenges to these searches. In reviewing the 

denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Government and accept the district court's factual findings unless they are 

clearly erroneous, but review the ultimate question of Fourth Amendment 

reasonableness de novo. See United States v. Kimoana, 383 F.3d 1215, 1220 

(10th Cir. 2004). 

A. February 6, 2001, Search of Westcott's Home 

In January 2001 police officers obtained a search warrant for the hill. The 

warrant authorized the search to encompass "the dwelling, all outbuildings, 

vehicles and persons which may be found thereat." After providing directions to 

the property and stating that one enters the property on a road passing "through 

two rock pillars and [a]cross a cattle guard," the warrant described the property as 

follows: 

There is a white with brown trim mobile home setting in a 

north/south direction on the East Side of the entrance road. There is 

a white colored mobile home setting in an east/west direction, south 

of that location. There are numerous outbuildings on the property, 

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and there are numerous junk vehicles lined up on the west side of the 

entrance road. 

On February 6, 2001, police officers executed the warrant, searching both 

mobile homes. Between the time the warrant was obtained and the time of the 

search, officers had been informed that Westcott occupied the second trailer. 

Westcott contends that the search was overbroad because officers did not have 

probable cause to search his home. We disagree. 

In the affidavit supporting the warrant, investigator Mark Shea described 

the structures on the hill as including "a white with brown trim mobile home 

setting in a north/south direction on the East Side of the entrance road[,] ... a 

white colored mobile home setting in an east/west direction, south of that 

location[,] ... numerous outbuildings ... , and ... numerous junk vehicles .... " 

Search Warrant Affidavit at 1. The affidavit recounted Osage Nation police 

officer Dave Hinman' s interview with criminal-turned-informant Ricky Devon 

McDoulett on December 19, 2000. In the interview McDoulett told Hinman that 

Windrix, whom he identified by a photograph, lived in one of the two mobile 

homes, had provided methamphetamine to him in exchange for work on cars, had 

a methamphetamine laboratory in the back bedroom of his residence, had cooked 

mcthamphetamine many times in McDoulett' s presence, and had cooked 

methamphetamine with two unidentified males and an unidentified female all 

night on the day before the interview. McDoulett said that he had known Windrix 

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for 15 to 20 years and that Windrix had been dealing large amounts of 

methamphetamine for 10 years. McDoulett also said that Windrix had traded 

guns for methamphetamine, used wire detectors to scan people for transmitters or 

recorders, and used other persons to provide security during cooks. The same day 

as the Hinman interview McDoulett provided Tulsa police officers with 

information leading to two arrests for possession of methamphetamine with intent 

to distribute. 

Shea added that on January 6, 2001, Osage County deputy Shannon 

Bradford and Osage Nation police chief Ron Teel conducted surveillance of the 

hill. As they were walking up the road to the property, they saw several cars 

parked on the roadway. A woman stepped out of one of the cars and said into a 

cell phone, "I think someone is here," after which a light began scanning the area 

and an ATV four wheeler began patrolling the road. Shea further reported that a 

concerned citizen said that he had seen much traffic and heard frequent gunfire on 

the hill. Shea noted that property records showed that Windrix owns the hill. 

In addition, the affidavit stated that in October 2000 informant Wendy 

Chaalan had taken officer Brian Comfort to the hill and told him that Windrix 

conducts weekly multiple-pound cooks, that she had seen large amounts of 

methamphetamine and ingredients at Windrix's residence, that Windrix 

surrounded the hill with armed guards during cooks, and that Windrix used both 

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trailers and a barn to manufacture and sell methamphetamine. Two other 

informants had also told officers in December 2000 and January 2001 that 

Windrix was cooking methamphetamine at his trailer and had armed guards 

around the hill during cooks. 

Recognizing that informant Chaalan specifically tied his trailer to the 

methamphetamine operation, Westcott contends that Chaalan' s report was "vague, 

ambiguous, and unsubstantiated and uncorroborated." Westcott Aplt. Br. at 33. 

In particular, Westcott contends the report was vague and ambiguous because 

there were other "trailers"-"a large Graco travel trailer with a bed in it, and a 

dump trailer"-on the hill. Westcott Aplt. Br. at 34 (internal quotation marks and 

emphasis omitted). But in context the affidavit is clearly referring to the mobile 

homes when it mentions "trailers." 

Chaalan' s statement was sufficiently corroborated by other evidence 

indicating that the entire hill was used for a methamphetamine enterprise. We 

hold that the affidavit provided probable cause to search Westcott's mobile home. 

JB. May 15, 2001, Search of the South Xanthus House 

On May 15, 2001, police officers received a report of a possible 

methamphetamine lab at the South Xanthus house. Two officers investigated and 

detected "a strong chemical odor ... only associated with the manufacturing of 

methamphetamine." Affidavit for Search Warrant (5/15/2001). A few hours 

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later, on the basis of an affidavit by one of the officers, an Oklahoma state judge 

issued a warrant to search the house. The officer-affiant had been certified by 

the federal Drug Enforcement Administration in the recognition of 

methamphetamine odors. Police officers executed the warrant the same day, 

discovering methamphetamine-manufacturing materials and other evidence of the 

conspiracy. 

Mook contends that this search was not supported by probable cause, 

because humans cannot reliably identify odors. But we have repeatedly held in 

vehicle-search cases that "[a]n officer's detection of the smell of drugs, such as 

methamphetamine ... can be an independently sufficient basis for probable 

cause." United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir. 2000) (collecting 

cases). We see no reason to limit these cases to vehicle searches: the scent of 

methamphetamine, wherever detected, gives qualified officers probable cause to 

search for methamphetamine and evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing. 

Mook also complains that the affidavit for the warrant falsely states that 

Mary Gaye Fox, named as the defendant in the affidavit, had prior drug-related 

convictions. Even if the statement was false, however, the odor evidence clearly 

established probable cause, so the warrant was nevertheless valid. See Mason v. 

United States, 719 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1983). 

C. May 10, 2002, Vehicle Search 

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On May 10, 2002, Windrix was pulled over for a traffic violation. A drugdetection dog sniffed his car and alerted. A police officer asked for Windrix's 

consent to search the car, but Windrix refused. Officers then took Windrix into 

custody and detained him at headquarters for four hours while they applied for 

and received a search warrant for the car. When officers eventually searched the 

car, they discovered methamphetamine and methamphetamine-manufacturing 

materials. 

Windrix contends that his four-hour detention at police headquarters was 

unconstitutional and that the evidence discovered in the search of his car must 

therefore be suppressed. But we suppress evidence because of an unconstitutional 

arrest only when the evidence was discovered by exploitation of the arrest. Wong 

Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). 

Windrix rightly concedes that "the arresting officers had probable cause to 

search [his] vehicle right ... after the dog alert." Windrix' s Aplt. Br. at 19. It 

was the dog alert, not the arrest or anything Windrix said or did during the arrest, 

that justified the search. The evidence was not discovered by exploitation of the 

arrest. Consequently, it was proper not to suppress the evidence, regardless of the 

constitutionality of the arrest. See United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1508 

(10th Cir. 1996) (seizure of vehicle was not fruit of unlawful detention of 

occupants); United States v. Eylicio-Montoya, 70 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (10th Cir. 

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1995) (burlap bags containing marijuana would not have been any less visible had 

car's occupants not been unlawfully arrested). 

D. September 23, 2002, Search of the North Garrison House 

Mook challenges the September 23, 2002, search of his house on North 

Garrison, claiming that the affidavit for the search warrant failed to provide 

probable cause. We disagree. 

The search warrant authorized a search of the premises for documentary 

evidence as well as contraband. The affidavit incorporates the allegation in the 

original indictment against Defendants that they had conspired to manufacture 

and distribute methamphetamine from June 1999 until September 6, 2002, the 

date of the indictment. Officer Matthew Abowd's affidavit in support of the 

warrant added that in his experience investigating drug traffickers, they ( 1) use 

multiple cell phones, phone cards, and other telecommunications devices; (2) put 

property, bills, and other records in the names of others; (3) maintain business 

ledgers and bank and credit card statements; ( 4) keep recipes and receipts from 

ingredient purchases; and (5) possess pictures and videos of themselves and 

associates. He further stated that records of the conspiracy are often kept on 

traffickers' premises. 

Here, the grand-jury indictment provided probable cause to believe that 

Defendants were drug traffickers, see United States v. Killip, 819 F.2d 1542, 1550 

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(10th Cir. 1987), and Abowd's experience, together with common sense, provided 

probable cause to believe that records of their crime could be found in their 

homes. See United States v. One Hundred Forty-Nine Thousand Four Hundred 

Forty-Two and 43/100 Dollars ($149,442.43) in United States Currency, 965 F.2d 

868, 874 (10th Cir. 1992). Thus, there was probable cause to search Mook's 

house on North Garrison. 

E. Second Search of the North Garrison House and September 24, 

2002, Search of Mook's Storage Lockers 

Mook also challenges search warrants for ( 1) a second search of the house 

on September 23 and (2) the search of a storage locker on September 24. Mook's 

sole challenge to these searches is that the warrants were based on evidence 

discovered during the first September 23 search, which he contends was 

unconstitutional. Because we hold that search constitutional, we reject this 

challenge. 

III. The Conspiracy Charge 

The grand jury indictment charged that each defendant had participated in a 

conspiracy with at least nine named members. Defendants contend that there was 

a fatal variance between the conspiracy charged and the proof at trial of multiple, 

smaller conspiracies among subsets of the persons named in the indictment. "A 

variance arises when the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts different from 

those alleged in an indictment." United States v. Ailsworth, 138 F.3d 843, 848 

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( 10th Cir. 1998) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). But not every 

variance requires reversal. A "variance is reversible error only if it affects the 

substantial rights of the accused." Id. 

There are thus two questions: First, was there sufficient evidence to 

support a finding of the single conspiracy charged, or was there a variance? 

Second, if there was a variance, was that variance substantially prejudicial to 

Defendants? We need not decide the first question here because we answer the 

second in the Government's favor. Whether a variance was substantially 

prejudicial is a question of law that we review de novo. See United States v. 

Bryant, 349 F.3d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir. 2003). Even if there was a variance in this 

case, it was not substantially prejudicial to Defendants and consequently it is not 

a ground for reversing their convictions. 

"A defendant's substantial rights are not prejudiced merely because the 

defendant is convicted upon evidence which tends to show a narrower scheme 

than that contained in the indictment, provided that the narrower scheme is fully 

included within the indictment." United States v. Harrison, 942 F .2d 751, 758 

(10th Cir. 1991) ( internal quotation marks omitted). As we explained in 

United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1512-13 (10th Cir. 1995), this 

proposition "follows from the fact that the prohibition against variances is 

designed to insure notice of the charges; thus, a variance, without more, will not 

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warrant relief as long as the proof corresponds to an offense clearly charged in 

the indictment because the defendant will have had notice of that charge and 

cannoit claim prejudice." Id. at 1513. 

Here, even if the evidence did not establish a single conspiracy including 

all nine alleged coconspirators, it clearly supported finding a conspiracy including 

the three Defendants to manufacture methamphetamine on the hill. In addition to 

the tangible evidence seized during various searches-including 

methamphetamine, ingredients and equipment for preparing methamphetamine, 

and records of the conspiracy-the prosecution offered direct testimony from 

several witnesses. Westcott's former wife Karen Heim, who lived on the hill with 

Westcott, testified that she repeatedly observed Windrix cooking 

methamphetamine with Mook, Westcott, and others in the back room of Windrix's 

trailer; she and Westcott purchased ingredients with money from Windrix; cooks 

took place two to five times per week; and Mook participated in cooks and 

purchased ingredients while living on the hill. Amanda Jean Pedone, a charged 

coconspirator, testified that she bought methamphetamine from the hill for 

distribution; she saw Windrix, Westcott, and Mook bury ingredients and Windrix 

bury cash-as much as $20,000-on the hill; she saw Mook and Westcott assist 

Windrix with cooks on the hill; and she saw Westcott destroy evidence such as 

empty bottles and run errands to procure ingredients. Ryan Brandy Langston, a 

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charged coconspirator, testified that he procured ingredients for cooks; 

participated in cooks with Windrix, Westcott, and Mook; distributed 

methamphetamine from the hill; and saw Westcott prepare for cooks and destroy 

evidence. Coni Johnson testified that she procured ingredients for Windrix and 

distributed methamphetamine from the hill. This conspiracy including at least the 

three Defendants but not necessarily all the persons named in the indictment is a 

"narrower scheme ... fully included within the indictment." Harrison, 942 F.2d 

at 758. The conspiracy charge adequately notified Defendants of the nature of the 

crime alleged. 

In Harrison we also said, however, that a variance may be substantially 

prejudicial "if the evidence adduced against co-[ conspirators] involved in separate 

conspiracies was more likely than not imputed to the defendant by the jury in its 

determination of the defendant's guilt." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(brackets in original). Defendants allege such prejudice, pointing principally to 

the testimony of government witnesses Amanda Pedone, Coni Johnson, and Ryan 

Langston. Johnson, by her own testimony and Langston's, conspired separately 

with Ronnie Maynard to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine in Creek 

County. And Pedone testified to buying and selling methamphetamine from 

persons not associated with the hill conspiracy. 

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Windrix contends that (1) this testimony confused the jury, (2) the jury 

might have relied on it in convicting Defendants, and (3) the judge relied on 

evidence of non-hill-conspiracy manufacturing activities in making drug-quantity 

findings. Westcott raises the additional contentions that (1) although Windrix 

may have been connected with Johnson's non-hill-conspiracy manufacturing 

activities, Westcott was not; (2) the evidence established not only the hill 

conspiracy but separate uncharged drug activity by Westcott; and (3) Westcott 

was not involved, although others were, in using a minor to sell 

methamphetamine. And Mook further contends that there was not enough 

evidence to tie him even to the hill conspiracy, but only to a conspiracy "with 

respect to the alleged lab located on Mr. Mook's residence on North Garrison." 

Mook Aplt. Br. at 38. 

These contentions are unpersuasive. As in Harrison, the evidence 

concerning any criminal activity outside the hill conspiracy "was sufficiently 

narrow and insignificant compared to the overwhelming evidence offered with 

respect to the [hill] conspiracy ... that it is unlikely that any prejudicial spillover 

occurred at all." Harrison, 942 F.2d at 758. Indeed the jury was specifically 

instructed not to convict on the basis of conspiracies not charged, see 

United States v. Wright, 932 F.2d 868, 874-75 (10th Cir. 1991) (such an 

instruction safeguards against this type of prejudice), and the jury's capacity to 

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distinguish among the codefendants is demonstrated by its acquittal of 

codefendant Jimmy Ritz on all counts at the very trial at which Defendants were 

convicted. As we remand this case for resentencing in light of Booker, claims of 

prejudice stemming from the district court's drug-quantity findings are premature. 

Because Defendants have shown neither that the indictment failed to give 

them proper notice of the crimes charged, nor that there was any significantly 

prejudicial spillover of evidence from conspiracies of which they were not 

members, we hold that even if there was a variance in this case, Defendants were 

not substantially prejudiced by it. 

IV. Westcott's Motion to Sever 

The district court refused to sever Westcott's trial from that of the other 

defendants. We review the district court's refusal to sever for abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 1997). Westcott 

contends that his trial should have been severed because he was prejudiced by 

evidence relevant only to the activities of the other defendants-in particular, 

evidence of the same off-hill drug-related activities noted in the above discussion 

of Defendants' variance contention. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to 

sever. As we have already stated, Westcott's involvement with the conspiracy 

was sufficiently great that the evidence of other drug-related activities in which 

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coconspirators may have been involved was not unduly prejudicial. And the 

evidence of Windrix's and Mook's hill-conspiracy-related activities was not 

unduly prejudicial because it could have been introduced in a separate trial of 

Westcott on a charge of participating in the hill conspiracy. See, e.g., 

United States v. Yazzie, 188 F.3d 1178, I 193-94 (10th Cir. 1999) (aider and 

abettor not entitled to severance on the ground that evidence against murderer was 

particularly gruesome because same evidence could have been introduced in 

separate trial); United States v. Youngpeter, 986 F.2d 349, 353 (10th Cir. 1993) 

(lesser culpability of one defendant relative to others is not ground for reversing 

denial of request for severance) ( collecting cases). 

V. Jury-Wheel Composition 

Westcott contends that the Northern District of Oklahoma's jury-selection 

scheme, see N.D. Okla. Civ. R. 4 7 .1, which includes in the jury pool nonvoter 

licensed drivers in only one (the most urban) of the district's 11 counties, violated 

his right to trial by a jury chosen from a fair cross-section of the community. 

This right, Westcott contends, is guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment and the 

Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 (FJA), 28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq. 

The district court ruled that Westcott's motion asserting his fair-cross-section 

right was time-barred by 28 U .S.C. § 1867(a), which provides: 

fo criminal cases, before the voir dire examination begins, or within 

seven days after the defendant discovered or could have discovered, 

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by the exercise of diligence, the grounds therefor, whichever is 

earlier, the defendant may move to dismiss the indictment or stay the 

proceedings against him on the ground of substantial failure to 

comply with the provisions of this title in selecting the grand or petit 

Jury. 

The motion was filed on July 30, 2003, four days before trial. The Government 

says it should have been filed within seven days of appointment of counsel, the 

previous January I 0. 

Westcott has presented two arguments why his motion was timely. First, in 

response to a suggestion from the bench at oral argument, Westcott contended 

that his motion asserting a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section right was not 

subject to the statutory time bar, which, in his view, applies only to statutory 

challenges. Perhaps § 1867(e) 1 should be so read. Compare United States v. 

Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1366 (10th Cir. 1984) ("It has been held that 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1867(e) provides the exclusive means for a party charged with a federal crime 

to challenge a jury."), and United States v. Green, 742 F.2d 609,612 (11th Cir. 

1 28 U.S.C. § 1867( e) states: 

The procedures prescribed by this section shall be the exclusive means by 

which a person accused of a Federal crime ... may challenge any jury on 

the ground that such jury was not selected in conformity with the provisions 

of this title. Nothing in this section shall preclude any person ... from 

pursuing any other remedy, civil or criminal, which may be available for 

the vindication or enforcement of any law prohibiting discrimination on 

account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or economic status in 

the selection of persons for service on grand or petit juries. 

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1984) ( applying prerequisites of§ 1867 to constitutional claim) with 

United States v. Alba-Conrado, 481 F.2d 1266, 1270 n.5 (5th Cir. 1973) (§ 1867 

does not apply to constitutional challenge), and United States v. Jones, 687 F.2d 

1265, 1269 (8th Cir. 1982) (same). See also United States v. Pion, 25 F .3d 18, 22 

n.3 (1st Cir. 1994) ( discussing but not resolving the issue). But we need not 

decide the matter, because Westcott did not argue in district court, or even in his 

briefs on appeal, that § 1867 does not govern his Sixth Amendment challenge, see 

In re Walker, 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992) (in general we will not consider 

an argument not raised below), and he does not argue on appeal that any special 

circumstance requires us to address this contention despite lack of preservation 

below. 

Westcott's second response to the Government's time-bar contention is that 

his fair-cross-section motion was timely under the statute. The statute permits 

filing "within seven days after the defendant discovered or could have discovered 

[the factual basis for his motion] by the exercise of diligence." 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1867(a). He claims that his attorney discovered the local rule concerning jury 

selection only the day before he filed the motion. We are not persuaded. 

The allegedly illegal jury-selection procedures appear in a local civil rule 

referenced by a local criminal rule. Westcott points out that his attorney was a 

criminal-law specialist and hence not familiar with the jury-selection procedures 

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in the local civil rules. The district court, however, found that Westcott's 

attorney should have known about the jury-selection procedures because they 

apply to all criminal cases and are referenced by the local criminal rules, and that 

consequently Westcott had seven days from the appointment of his attorney to 

make his motion. 

We are basically in agreement with the district court. Westcott's attorney 

was charged with knowledge of the local criminal rules in their entirety, including 

those parts of the local civil rules incorporated by reference. See United States v. 

Rourke, 984 F.2d 1063, 1066 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992) (charging criminal defendant 

with knowledge that illegal sentence can be corrected under Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 

35); Jetton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 121 F.3d 423, 426 (8th Cir. 1997) 

(charging party with knowledge of local rules). That a party may be harmed by its 

attorney's neglect of a local rule is an accepted consequence of our system of 

representative litigation. See United States v. Torres, 372 F.3d 1159, 1163 (10th 

Cir. 2004) ( criminal defendant lost opportunity to appeal because counsel 

confused civil and criminal appeal deadlines). We hold that Westcott "could have 

discovered, by the exercise of diligence" the ground of his fair-cross-section 

claim long before his motion was filed. Accordingly, it was time-barred. 

Westcott also contends that he was entitled to certain jury-pool records. 

His pretrial motion sought the records "to determine the number of potential 

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jurors taken from voter lists and/or Driver's license lists." R. vol. IV, doc. 371 at 

1 0. But because his motion on the merits was time-barred, any error in denying 

him access to the records that might have supported his motion was harmless. 

VI. Sentencing Issues 

Each Defendant had his sentence enhanced under the Sentencing Guidelines 

on the basis of judge-found facts. The indictment charged a conspiracy involving 

50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine or 500 grams or more of a mixture. 

That amount of methamphetamine results in a guidelines base offense level of 32. 

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual§ 2Dl.l(c)(4) (2004). (Mook contends that 

the appropriate level was 30 because a level of 32 requires more than 50 grams of 

actual methamphetamine or more than 500 grams of mixture. But he is incorrect. 

The guidelines result in a base offense level of 32 for "[a]t least 500 G but less 

than 1.5 KG of Methamphetamine, or at least 50 G but less than 150 G of 

Methamphetamine (actual)." Id.) 

Windrix was in criminal-history category I. The indictment drug quantities 

and this criminal history lead to a guidelines range of 121-151 months' 

imprisonment. Id., ch. 5, pt. A, Sentencing Table. But the district court found 

\Vindrix responsible for 1.927 kilograms of actual methamphetamine, resulting in 

a base offense level of 38. Id.§ 2Dl.l(c)(l). The court also applied a 2-level 

enhancement for possession of a firearm, id. § 2D 1.1 (b )( 1 ), and a 4-level 

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enhancement for leading a criminal group of five or more, id.§ 3Bl.l(a). The 

total offense level was thus the guidelines maximum of 43, for which the 

guidelines prescribe life imprisonment. Id., ch. 5, pt. A, Sentencing Table. 

Mook was in criminal-history category III. The indictment drug quantities 

and this criminal history lead to a guidelines range of 151-188 months' 

imprisonment. Id. But the district court found Mook responsible for 1.84 

kilograms of actual methamphetamine, resulting in a base offense level of 38. Id. 

§ 2D 1.1 ( c )(1 ). The court also applied a 2-level enhancement for possession of a 

firearm. Id. § 2D 1.1 (b )( 1 ). The total offense level was thus 40, for which the 

guidelines prescribe 360 months' to life imprisonment. Id., ch. 5, pt. A, 

Sentencing Table. 

Westcott was in criminal-history category V. The indictment drug 

quantities and his criminal history lead to a guidelines range of 188-23 5 months' 

imprisonment. Id. But the district court found Westcott responsible for 1.927 

kilograms of actual methamphetamine, resulting in a base offense level of 3 8. Id. 

§ 2D1.l(c)(l). For this the guidelines prescribe 360 months to life imprisonment. 

Id. ch. 5, pt. A, Sentencing Table. 

Defendants objected to the enhancements to their offense levels as based on 

facts not found by the jury, contending that they were contrary to the rule 

announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Mook's counsel 

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made the objection during a joint presentation of objections by all defense 

counsel. The objection was adequately preserved below. 

United States v. Booker,_ U.S._, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), teaches that 

Defendants were correct. The district court violated the Sixth Amendment by 

making findings of fact that increased the mandatory sentencing ranges. Id. at 

748-49 (Op. of Stevens, J.). Thus, reversal is required unless the error was 

harmless. See United States v. Riccardi, 2005 WL 896430 at * 19-20 (10th Cir. 

Apr. 19, 2005) . 

Harmless-error review stems from Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

52(a), which provides that "[a]ny error ... that does not affect substantial rights 

must be disregarded." The Government concedes that to prevail on harmlesserror review in this case it "must prove the error is harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt." Gov't Supp. Br. at 15 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 

(1999)). The Government, which takes the position that Defendants did not 

preserve their Booker objection, spends most of its brief addressing plain error. 

The whole of its one-paragraph argument on harmless error is that Defendants' 

guidelines offense level was supported by the evidence and resulted in a sentence 

less than the statutory maximum. The Government has failed to present evidence 

to convince us beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court would have 

imposed just as harsh a sentence in the absence of a mandatory guideline regime. 

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Thus, we must set aside the Defendants' sentences and remand for 

resentencing. We need not resolve their challenges to the district court's 

application of the Sentencing Guidelines. We do, however, think it may be useful 

to the district court to note a concern regarding the determination of the purity of 

the methamphetamine prepared by Defendants. No chemical analysis of purity 

was performed on any sample. Because the conspiracy's methamphetamine was 

uncut, the district court apparently inferred that the methamphetamine was pure. 

This inference may be incorrect. See United States v. Mesner, 377 F.3d 849, 850 

(8th Cir. 2004) (methamphetamine found at laboratory was 15-19% pure); 

United States v. Houston, 338 F.3d 876, 881-83 (8th Cir. 2003). 

VII. Conclusion 

We AFFIRM Defendants' convictions but REMAND for resentencing in 

light of Booker. 

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