Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00019/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00019-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
A. Haddock
Defendant
H. Haro
Defendant
Hugo Lua
Plaintiff
R. Sherrill
Defendant
O. Smith
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HUGO LUA,

Plaintiff,

v.

O. SMITH, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:14-cv-00019-LJO-MJS

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF NO. 1)

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY (30) DAYS

SCREENING ORDER

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Hugo Lua, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed 

this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on January 6, 2014. (ECF No. 1.) 

His complaint is now before the Court for screening.

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

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such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

The Complaint identifies the following officials at Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP) 

as Defendants: (1) H. Haro, Correctional Counselor II; (2) R. Sherrill, Correctional 

Counselor I; (3) A. Haddock, LCSW Mental Health; and (4) O. Smith, Facility C Captain 

and Unit Classification Committee Chairperson.

Plaintiff alleges the following:

On July 18, 2013, Plaintiff transferred into KVSP from Pelican Bay State Prison. 

A Unit Classification Committee (UCC) hearing was convened on July 31, 2013 to 

determine Plaintiff‟s placement within KVSP. Plaintiff addressed the Defendants, each a 

committee member, and stated that he had contracted Valley Fever in 2005 at Pleasant 

Valley State Prison, that there is a chance the disease could be “reactivated” and 

threaten Plaintiff‟s health if he were to remain in an area where Valley Fever is endemic, 

and that KVSP is located within the endemic zone. Plaintiff requested a transfer to a 

prison outside the endemic zone. (Compl. at 4.) The Defendants reviewed Plaintiff‟s file 

and explained that Plaintiff was categorized a low medical risk and not restricted from 

prisons where Valley Fever is most prevalent. (Id. at 4 and 16.)

Plaintiff‟s health was stable when he first arrived at KVSP but it quickly 

deteriorated. On September 5, 2013 lab results revealed a high level of Valley Fever in 

Plaintiff‟s system. He was transferred to an outside hospital where it was determined 

that Valley Fever had disseminated beyond his lungs. Plaintiff was treated intravenously 

for a week at the hospital followed by six weeks of further treatment at a hospital within 

Corcoran State Prison. Plaintiff now suffers nightly chills and sweats and will require oral 

medication for the rest of his life. (Id. at 5.)

///

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IV. ANALYSIS

A. Section 1983

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the „deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws‟ of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass‟n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda 

Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 

1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.‟” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility 

that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as 

true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 1949-50.

B. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of 

punishment and from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 

F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Extreme deprivations are required to make out a 

conditions of confinement claim, and only those deprivations denying the minimal 

civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth 

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Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citations and 

quotations omitted). In order to state a claim for a violation of the Eighth Amendment, 

the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a claim that prison officials knew of and 

disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 

U.S. 825, 847 (1994).

A prisoner may state “a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment by alleging 

that [prison officials] have, with deliberate indifference, exposed him to [environmental 

conditions] that pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health." 

Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).

The Courts of this district have repeatedly found that confinement in a location 

where Valley Fever1is prevalent, in and of itself, fails to satisfy the first element of an 

Eighth Amendment claim, i.e. that the condition poses an excessive risk of harm. See, 

e.g., Smith v. Yates, 2012 WL 1498891, *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2012) (citing King v. 

Avenal State Prison, 2009 WL 546212, *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2009) ("[T]o the extent that 

Plaintiff is attempting to pursue an Eighth Amendment claim for the mere fact that he 

was confined in a location where Valley Fever spores existed which caused him to 

contract Valley Fever, he is advised that no courts have held that exposure to Valley 

Fever spores presents an excessive risk to inmate health."); see also Gilbert v. Yates, 

2010 WL 5113116, *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2010); Willis v. Yates, 2009 WL 3486674, *3 

(E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2009).

Thus, Plaintiff cannot state an Eighth Amendment claim based solely upon mere 

exposure to, or contraction of, Valley Fever. There are some circumstances however 

where exposure to Valley Fever could conceivably give rise to an Eighth Amendment 

claim. Smith v. Schwarzenegger, 393 F. App'x. 518 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Helling, the 

Court held that it was not inconceivable that the Plaintiff could allege a cognizable claim 

 

1

 Valley Fever, also known as coccidioidomycosis, is "'an infectious disease caused by inhalation of a 

fungus (Coccidioides) that lives in the soil of dry, low rainfall areas. It is spread through spores that 

become airborne when the dirt they reside in is disturbed by digging, construction, or strong winds. There 

is no direct person-to-person transmission of infection.'" Plata v. Brown, 2013 WL 3200587, *2 (N.D. Cal. 

June 24, 2013).

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based on Valley Fever exposure). Courts have deemed the first prong of an Eighth 

Amendment claim satisfied where the plaintiff has identified a factor responsible for 

either increasing the risk of contraction or the severity of infection. See, e.g., Stevens v. 

Yates, 2012 WL 2520464, *3 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) (nearby construction disturbed 

soil); Owens v. Trimble, 2012 WL 1910102, *2 (E.D. Cal. May 25, 2012) (asthma); 

Whitney v. Walker, 2012 WL 893783, *2-4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2012) (immune system 

compromised by cancer); Thurston v. Schwarzenegger, 2008 WL 2129767, *2 (E.D. Cal. 

May 21, 2008) (various medical conditions, including asthma, and race); see also Plata 

v. Brown, 2013 WL 3200587, *7 n. 10, *14 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2013) (finding that the 

following groups are at an increased risk of harm from Valley Fever infection and should 

therefore be excluded from Pleasant Valley State Prison and Avenal State Prison: 

inmates designated as medically high-risk; "'[p]atients with impaired cellular immunity, 

such as those with solid organ transplants, those with HIV infection, and those with 

chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, chronic renal failure, congestive heart failure, 

diabetes; patients receiving TNF inhibitors (medications used in the treatment of 

arthritis); Filipino and African-American men; and pregnant women in the 2nd or 3rd 

trimester.'").

In this case Plaintiff alleges that he was at an increased risk of harm from Valley 

Fever because he was previously diagnosed with the disease. Plaintiff asserts that his 

transfer from Pelican Bay State Prison to KVSP, where Valley Fever is endemic, created 

a risk that his condition would reactivate and spread beyond his lungs. The Defendants 

explained at the UCC hearing that Plaintiff was medically low risk and could safely be 

housed in the Valley Fever area. Shortly after being forced to remain at KVSP, Plaintiff‟s 

health deteriorated and tests revealed disseminated Valley Fever.

The facts alleged in the Complaint do not support the conclusion that Plaintiff‟s 

earlier diagnosis left him more vulnerable to the disease. A handout titled “Basic 

Information about Valley Fever”, produced by the Prison Law Office and attached to the 

Complaint, states that most people who contract Valley Fever gain a life-long immunity

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to further infection. (Compl. at 11.) Nothing in the Complaint other than Plaintiff‟s 

conjecture and the worsening of his symptoms after his arrival at KVSP supports the 

contrary conclusion. In Plata v. Brown the Ninth Circuit came to the conclusion that 

inmates who had previously been diagnosed with Valley Fever were not at an increased 

risk of harm. 2013 WL 3200587, *14 (“„Individuals with a prior history of cocci are 

immune to subsequent infection,‟ Expert Report at 2, so any such individuals need not 

be transferred or excluded from the affected institutions.”). Inmates who had previously 

been diagnosed with Valley Fever were exempted from the Plata order. Id.

Accordingly, the court feels compelled to conclude that the Complaint does not 

identify a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff‟s health from the re-exposure to Valley 

Fever spores. Accordingly, it fails to state a claim. Plaintiff will be granted leave to 

amend. To state a claim Plaintiff must clearly allege the basis for his conclusions that 

his previous exposure to Valley Fever created an increased risk of harm from reexposure and that Defendants knowingly disregarded that risk, and he must reconcile 

those conclusions with the findings in Plata. Plaintiff‟s theory must be supported by 

something more than his lay opinion or mere conjecture.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff‟s Complaint does not state a claim for relief. The Court will grant Plaintiff 

an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 

(9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff opts to amend, he must demonstrate that the alleged acts 

resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49. Plaintiff 

must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to „state a claim that is plausible on its face.‟” 

Id. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must also demonstrate 

that each named Defendant personally participated in a deprivation of his rights. Jones 

v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it 

is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th 

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Cir. 2007). Plaintiff should carefully read this Screening Order and focus his efforts on 

curing the deficiencies set forth above.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general 

rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint 

no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First 

Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed 

under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 

omitted).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk‟s Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights complaint form 

and (2) a copy of his Complaint, filed January 6, 2014;

2. Plaintiff‟s Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted;

3. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, 

the Court will recommend that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state 

a claim and failure to comply with a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 30, 2014 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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