Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-08-03822/USCOURTS-ca8-08-03822-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Andrew King
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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The Honorable Roberto A. Lange, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 08-3822

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

James Andrew King, 

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the 

Eastern District of Arkansas.

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Submitted: January 15, 2010

 Filed: March 26, 2010

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Before GRUENDER and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges, and LANGE,1

 District

Judge.

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

James Andrew King pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The district court found that King had three previous

convictions for violent felony offenses and was therefore subject to a minimum term

of 180 months’ imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The

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court sentenced King to the statutory minimum. The question presented in this appeal

is whether King’s adjudication of juvenile delinquency in 1995 qualifies as a

conviction for a violent felony. Because we find that question cannot be answered

without resorting to conjecture, we vacate King’s sentence and remand for

resentencing. 

I. BACKGROUND

The ACCA provides that a defendant who violates § 922(g) is subject to a

mandatory minimum term of 180 months’ imprisonment if he has “three previous

convictions . . . for a violent felony.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). A “previous conviction”

for purposes of § 924(e)(1) “includes a finding that a person has committed an act of

juvenile delinquency involving a violent felony.” § 924(e)(2)(C). The statute defines

the term “violent felony” as 

any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or

any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of a

firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by

imprisonment for such term if committed by an adult that—

(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of

physical force against the person of another; or

(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or

otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of

physical injury to another . . . .

§ 924(e)(2)(B). Under this definition, an act of juvenile delinquency involving the use

or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device may qualify as a violent felony,

but only if the act of delinquency meets the other statutory criteria. Id. 

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King admits that he has two adult convictions for violent felony offenses. And

King does not contest the fact that he was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent in 1995

for violating section 5-73-104 of the Arkansas Code, which at that time provided that

[a] person commits the offense of criminal use of prohibited weapons

if . . . he uses, possesses, makes, repairs, sells, or otherwise deals in any

bomb, machine gun, sawed-off shotgun or rifle, firearm specially made

or specially adapted for silent discharge, metal knuckles, or other

implement for the infliction of serious physical injury or death which

serves no common lawful purpose. 

The disputed issue concerns the nature of the underlying act of juvenile delinquency;

more precisely, which part of section 5-73-104 did King violate?

The Government produced two documents to prove the fact of King’s juvenile

adjudication and the nature of the underlying act of delinquency: the delinquent

conduct adjudication order (a fill-in-the-blanks form used by the county chancery

court) and the predisposition report (a one-page report prepared by a juvenile intake

officer). The adjudication order says that King was charged with “criminal use of a

weapon,” in violation of section 5-73-104, but the order does not identify the weapon

or the way that King allegedly used it. The label “criminal use of a weapon” is

ambiguous; for while the title of section 5-73-104 is “criminal use of prohibited

weapons,” the statute criminalizes using, possessing, making, repairing, selling, or

otherwise dealing in prohibited weapons. Effectively, “criminal use” is defined to

include simple possession of certain weapons and various other acts that might not

constitute actual use of such weapons. 

The predisposition report does not resolve the ambiguity regarding the weapons

charge, though it does recite some of the relevant facts (“Andy” is the defendant):

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We have normalized the capitalization and corrected obvious punctuation

errors.

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On 4-9-95, 911 received a disturbance call that Andy was involved

in. As the deputy was on his way to the call he saw Andy walking

carrying a rifle. Statements were made to the officers that shots had been

fired. Also, at one point Andy had a knife and was told to drop the knife,

which he did. (These actions took place at the King’s home after the

fight at [a] relative’s home.) Andy and his brother Tim had been fighting

at his relative’s home, upsetting family members enough that they called

911 asking for help. The boys were physically fighting and calling each

other names.2

King conceded at sentencing that the predisposition report shows that he possessed

a rifle. Nevertheless, King argued that his juvenile adjudication could not be counted

as a conviction for a violent felony because neither the predisposition report nor the

adjudication order establish that the rifle he possessed was sawed off (sawed-off rifles

are prohibited under section 5-73-104, but the statute says nothing about typical fulllength rifles).

The district court accepted the premise that the records of King’s juvenile

adjudication do not conclusively establish that he possessed a sawed-off rifle. But the

court suggested that it need not determine what weapon King was charged with

“using” (i.e., using, possessing, making, repairing, selling, or otherwise dealing in)

because the fact of King’s juvenile adjudication proved that King possessed either a

sawed-off rifle or some “other implement for the infliction of serious physical injury

or death which serves no common lawful purpose.” As the court put it,

to be legitimately convicted under the statute [section 5-73-104], he

would have to be in possession of a sawed-off rifle, or, you know, I

mean, that’s the way it’s charged, “or other implement for the infliction

of serious physical injury or death which serves no common lawful

purpose.” The knife is not described, but the knife could meet that

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definition, depending on what it was. I mean, an ordinary pocketknife

has lots of lawful purposes, but there may be some kinds of knives that

have no purpose other than inflicting injury on a human being. But he

was convicted of possessing one of these kinds of implements that has

no purpose other than infliction of physical injury or death and which

can serve no common lawful purpose.

The court went on to find that this case “is directly on point with Vincent,” referring

to a decision in which we held that the defendant’s previous conviction under section

5-73-104 was for a violent felony. United States v. Vincent (Vincent I), 519 F.3d 732,

733-34 (8th Cir. 2008), vacated, 555 U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 996 (2009). Based on these

considerations, the court found that King’s juvenile adjudication qualifies as a

conviction for a violent felony and sentenced him to the mandatory minimum term

prescribed by § 924(e)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

As we said at the outset, the question presented in this appeal is whether King’s

adjudication of juvenile delinquency in 1995 qualifies as a conviction for a violent

felony. We begin our analysis by winnowing that general question down to more

manageable size. We can state with confidence that the underlying act of juvenile

delinquency satisfies one of the criteria for classification as a violent felony, since it

would be punishable by imprisonment for more than one year if committed by an

adult. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-73-104(c) (1995)

(providing that a violation of the statute is at least a Class D felony), 5-4-401(a)(5)

(1995) (providing that the maximum sentence for a Class D felony is six years’

imprisonment). And King has never challenged the notion that his act of juvenile

delinquency involved the use or carrying of a firearm or knife, so we will assume for

purposes of this appeal that the use-or-carry provision of § 924(e)(2)(B) is satisfied

as well. The Government does not argue that the underlying act of juvenile

delinquency “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical

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force against the person of another.” § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Nor does the Government

argue that the act of juvenile delinquency “is burglary, arson, or extortion, [or]

involves use of explosives.” § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The dispositive question thus

becomes whether King’s juvenile adjudication was for an act of delinquency that

“otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury

to another.” Id.

After Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008), a prior

offense fits within the ACCA’s “otherwise” clause only if it “pose[s] a similar degree

of risk of physical injury as the example crimes and [is] similar in kind to the example

crimes.” United States v. Williams, 537 F.3d 969, 972 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Begay,

128 S. Ct. at 1585-86). An offense is considered “similar in kind” to burglary, arson,

extortion, and crimes involving use of explosives if the offense “typically involve[s]

purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.” United States v. Gordon, 557 F.3d 623,

626 (8th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1586). 

To decide whether an adult conviction meets the two-part test set out in Begay,

courts must apply the “categorical approach” adopted by the Supreme Court in Taylor

v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. ---, 129 S.

Ct. 2294, 2299 (2009). That approach calls for considering the relevant offense

“generically, that is to say, . . . in terms of how the law defines the offense and not in

terms of how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular

occasion.” Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1584. We have joined several other circuits in

holding that “the categorical approach should also be used in examining . . . a prior

juvenile conviction.” United States v. Kirkland, 450 F.3d 804, 807 (8th Cir. 2006)

(citing United States v. Richardson, 313 F.3d 121, 126, 128 (3d Cir. 2002)); accord

United States v. Nevels, 490 F.3d 800, 808-09 (10th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases).

Although Kirkland examined a juvenile adjudication under the ACCA’s “has as an

element” clause, we are convinced that the categorical approach must also be applied

in considering a juvenile adjudication under the ACCA’s “otherwise” clause. We

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Throughout this opinion, we use the ACCA term “act of juvenile delinquency”

in a generic sense, analogous to how we use the terms “offense” or “crime” when

applying the categorical approach in cases involving contested adult convictions. See

Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1584; Williams, 537 F.3d at 972 n.1. 

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apply the categorical approach in considering adult convictions under either clause,

and we see no reason why juvenile adjudications should be treated any differently.

See, e.g., United States v. Salean, 583 F.3d 1059, 1061 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying the

categorical approach in considering an adult conviction under the “has as an element”

clause), cert. denied, 559 U.S. ---, 2010 WL 198049 (Feb. 22, 2010); Gordon, 557

F.3d at 625 (applying the categorical approach in considering an adult conviction

under the “otherwise” clause). Thus, we are concerned with how the law defines

King’s act of juvenile delinquency, rather than with ascertaining his actual conduct

on April 9, 1995.3

 See Nevels, 490 F.3d at 808-09; Richardson, 313 F.3d at 127-28.

The Supreme Court has said that “[the] categorical approach requires courts to

choose the right category. And sometimes the choice is not obvious.” Chambers v.

United States, 555 U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 687, 690 (2009). Here, the “right category”

cannot be determined solely from the fact of King’s juvenile adjudication, for section

5-73-104 “places together in a single numbered . . . section several different kinds of

behavior,” see id. at 691. Moreover, section 5-73-104 criminalizes behavior involving

several different kinds of weapons, including a catch-all class of weapons that

includes every conceivable “implement for the infliction of serious physical injury or

death which serves no common lawful purpose.” Under these circumstances, the

district court was permitted to “look beyond the complete statutory definition” to

sources such as “the charging document . . . [or] some comparable judicial record” to

determine which part of section 5-73-104 King violated (i.e., “the right category”).

See Williams, 537 F.3d at 973 (second quotation from Shepard v. United States, 544

U.S. 13, 26 (2005)); see also Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2299. The court was aware of

the adjudication order and the predisposition report, but the court did not determine

which part of section 5-73-104 King violated. Instead, the court found that the

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Again, we are assuming for purposes of this appeal that King’s juvenile

adjudication satisfies the use-or-carry provision of § 924(e)(2)(B), even though that

requirement apparently was overlooked by the parties and the district court. Indeed,

the Government’s position at sentencing and on appeal appears to be that King was

charged with simple possession of a prohibited weapon. See Government’s Br. at 6

(“[T]hough King argues that he was not in possession of a sawed-off rifle, his

conviction serves as conclusive proof that he possessed a weapon which could have

inflicted serious physical injury or death on another.” (emphasis added)); id. at 14

(“King’s [juvenile] conviction conclusively establishes that he was in possession of

a weapon which had the capacity to inflict serious physical injury or death . . . .”

(emphasis added)). Obviously, a person can possess a weapon without using or

carrying it, but we are willing to assume that the underlying act of juvenile

delinquency in this case involved carrying a firearm or knife rather than possession

simpliciter. We will go no further than that, however, since the Government has not

proved that King was charged with using a weapon, in the sense of actual use (e.g.,

brandishing or firing the weapon). For the sake of concision, we will continue to refer

to the crime of “possessing” a weapon rather than “possessing by carrying.” 

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underlying act of juvenile delinquency necessarily involved possessing either a

sawed-off rifle or some “other implement for the infliction of serious physical injury

or death,” such as a type of knife that “serves no common lawful purpose.”

We hold that the district court misapplied the categorical approach by failing

to “choose the right category” in which to place the underlying act of juvenile

delinquency; indeed, the court failed to choose a category at all. On the present

record, we cannot determine in the first instance whether King’s juvenile adjudication

involved possessing a sawed-off rifle as opposed to possessing some “other

implement,” such as a knife. If we put the Government’s proof in its best light, the

most we can say is that King was likely charged with possession of a prohibited

weapon.4

 Although the narrative in the predisposition report indicates that King

possessed a rifle and a knife, it does not identify which weapon King was charged

with possessing. In the end, we cannot choose one of these categories without

resorting to conjecture. Thus, we cannot affirm King’s sentence, for it should go

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without saying that a sentence enhancement may not be applied on the basis of

guesswork. See United States v. Chambers, 473 F.3d 724, 726 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[I]t

is an embarrassment to the law when judges base decisions of consequence on

conjectures . . . .”), rev’d on other grounds, 555 U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009). 

The Government suggested at sentencing that the uncertainty concerning the

underlying act of juvenile delinquency did not matter because this court had held that

any conviction under section 5-73-104 “necessarily is going to be a crime of violence

[i.e., violent felony] as 924(e) would define it.” The district court adopted the

Government’s suggestion, finding that our decision in Vincent I was controlling. The

Government’s and the district court’s interpretation of Vincent I was too broad. 

To be sure, we held in Vincent I that the defendant’s previous conviction under

section 5-73-104 was for a violent felony. 519 F.3d at 733-34. But the underlying

crime at issue in Vincent I involved the use or possession of a sawed-off shotgun.

Having decided that use or possession of a sawed-off shotgun fit within the ACCA’s

“otherwise” clause, we had no occasion to consider whether the crime of possessing

some “other implement for the infliction of serious physical injury or death,” such as

a type of knife that “serves no common lawful purpose,” would also qualify as a

violent felony. And we certainly did not decide, once and for all, that every

conviction for violating section 5-73-104 qualifies as a conviction for a violent felony.

In any event, after King had been sentenced, the Supreme Court granted

Vincent’s petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated our decision in Vincent I, and

remanded for further consideration in light of Begay and Chambers. Vincent v. United

States, 555 U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 996 (2009). On remand, we made clear that Vincent’s

previous conviction under section 5-73-104 involved simple possession of a sawed-off

shotgun. United States v. Vincent (Vincent II), 575 F.3d 820, 824-25 (8th Cir. 2009),

petition for cert. filed, --- U.S.L.W. --- (U.S. Dec. 28, 2009) (No. 09-8320). Applying

the “two-part test” set out in Begay and applied in Chambers, id. at 825, we held that

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We noted in Vincent II that “the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that a

conviction for use of each prohibited weapon listed in [section 5-73-104]—including

a sawed-off shotgun—has the element that the weapon ‘will inflict serious physical

injury or death and serves no lawful purpose.’” 575 F.3d at 823 (quoting Bridges v.

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“possession of a sawed-off shotgun is similar, in kind as well as degree of risk posed,

to the offenses listed in § 924(e),” id. at 827. Hence, we again concluded that

Vincent’s previous conviction was for “an ACCA-qualifying felony.” Id. But we

again had no occasion to address the crime of possessing some “other implement,”

such as a particularly dangerous knife, and we again did not purport to decide whether

every conviction for violating section 5-73-104 qualifies as a conviction for a violent

felony.

We acknowledge that Vincent II sometimes refers to “possession of a dangerous

weapon” rather than “possession of a sawed-off shotgun.” See 575 F.3d at 825

(“Possession of a dangerous weapon that has no lawful purpose creates a serious

potential risk of physical injury to others.”); id. at 826 (“Possession of a weapon that

has only unlawful purposes makes it ‘more likely that an offender, later possessing a

gun, will use that gun deliberately to harm a victim.’” (quoting Begay, 128 S. Ct. at

1586)). But there is no doubt that the actual question presented was whether

Vincent’s previous conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun qualified as a

conviction for a violent felony. Id. at 824-25, 827. Likewise, it is plain that our

holding relates to the crime of possessing a sawed-off shotgun, since key parts of our

analysis identify attributes of sawed-off shotguns that are not necessarily shared by

other dangerous weapons, such as knives. See, e.g., id. at 825 (“Sawed-off shotguns

‘are inherently dangerous and lack usefulness except for violent and criminal

purposes.’” (quoting United States v. Childs, 403 F.3d 970, 971 (8th Cir. 2005))); id.

at 826 (“Like explosives, a sawed-off shotgun can inflict indiscriminate carnage.”).

Thus, while simple possession of a sawed-off shotgun meets the two-part test, it does

not necessarily follow that possession of every other weapon that Arkansas sees fit to

criminalize will also meet the test.5

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Arkansas, 938 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Ark. 1997)). We gave at least some weight to the

Arkansas Supreme Court’s narrowing interpretation in finding thatsimple possession

of a sawed-off shotgun poses a similar degree of risk of physical injury as the § 924(e)

example crimes (burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving use of explosives).

See Vincent II, 575 F.3d at 825. After Begay, however, “the degree of risk of physical

injury is only half of the analysis.” Williams, 537 F.3d at 972. We went on to hold

in Vincent II that possession of a sawed-off shotgun is similar in kind to the example

crimes. 575 F.3d at 825-27. But it does not necessarily follow that possession of

every other weapon prohibited by section 5-73-104 (e.g., metal knuckles) is similar

in kind to burglary, arson, etc. 

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If it is possible to determine on remand that King’s juvenile adjudication

involved possessing a sawed-off rifle, then Vincent II will control, even though

Vincent II addressed the crime of possessing a sawed-off shotgun. In our view, the

crimes of possessing a sawed-off shotgun and possessing a sawed-off rifle “amount

to variations on a single theme,” so the district court may “consider them as together

constituting a single category.” See Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 691. If, on the other

hand, it is not possible to determine whether King’s juvenile adjudication involved

possessing a sawed-off rifle as opposed to possessing some “other implement,” such

as a knife, then Vincent II is not on all fours with this case. 

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At present, we decline to decide in the abstract whether the crime of possessing

a generic “implement for the infliction of serious physical injury or death which serves

no common lawful purpose” (or a knife with those characteristics) qualifies as a

violent felony under the ACCA’s “otherwise” clause. The Government did not brief

that question because it simply assumed that Vincent II was controlling. In the

absence of a threshold finding about the underlying act of juvenile delinquency,

addressing all of the various ways that King might have violated section 5-73-104

would be unwise; in fact, it would almost certainly produce a partially advisory

opinion. Accordingly, we remand to the district court for further proceedings

consistent with our description of the categorical approach and our explanation of the

holding in Vincent II.

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We do not impose any limitations on the evidence that the district court may

consider on remand, so the court “can hear any relevant evidence . . . that it could have

heard at the first hearing,” United States v. Dunlap, 452 F.3d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 2006)

(quoting United States v. Cornelius, 968 F.2d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 1992)). We note that

this marks a departure from what we have described as “the traditional path” of

limiting the Government to one bite at the apple. United States v. Gammage, 580 F.3d

777, 779-80 (8th Cir. 2009). We are convinced, however, that the circumstances in

this case permit us to remand without limitations. See Dunlap, 452 F.3d at 750. In

particular, both the Government and the district court mistakenly relied on an

excessively broad interpretation of Vincent I, which might have impeded full

development of the record. Perhaps more importantly, defense counsel did not clearly

explain his objection to the sentence enhancement, either in his presentence

memorandum or at the sentencing hearing. We are convinced that this objection was

sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review, but counsel’s convoluted

explanation seemingly added to the confusion about how to apply the categorical

approach. Now that the issue is properly framed, we see no good reason to foreclose

further development of the record. 

Finally, we wish to make clear that nothing in this opinion should be read as

casting doubt on the validity of King’s juvenile adjudication. To the extent King

makes a collateral attack on the validity of the 1995 adjudication, we summarily reject

his argument. See Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 382 (2001) (“[I]f, by the

time of sentencing under the ACCA, a prior conviction has not been set aside on direct

or collateral review, that conviction is presumptively valid and may be used to

enhance the federal sentence.”); United States v. Reyes-Solano, 543 F.3d 474, 478 (8th

Cir. 2008) (“Deprivation of the constitutional right to counsel is the only ground upon

which a prior conviction used to enhance a federal sentence may be collaterally

attacked.” (citing Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994))). We presume

that King’s juvenile adjudication is valid; in other words, we presume that King

violated section 5-73-104. But the categorical approach still required the district court

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to “choose the right category” in which to place the underlying act of juvenile

delinquency, see Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 690, and the presumption of validity does

not justify resorting to conjecture about which part of section 5-73-104 King violated.

Deciding whether the right category is so uncertain that the § 924(e)(1) enhancement

cannot be applied is distinct from the question whether the adjudication is valid—in

this instance, one has nothing to do with the other.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate King’s sentence and remand for

resentencing.

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