Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02440/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02440-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nebeyou Kone
Plaintiff
Hirut Million Tadesse
Plaintiff
Tungland Corporation
Defendant

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Hirut Million Tadesse, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Tungland Corporation, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-02440-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

 Before the Court are Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Nebeyou Kone’s 

Title VII Claim (Doc. 28), Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 29) and Defendant’s Reply (Doc. 

31). Defendant argues Kone’s May 2, 2014, First Amended Complaint for 

Compensatory and Punitive Damages and Injunctive Relief (Doc. 23), which for the first 

time asserts a Title VII retaliation claim on Kone’s behalf, is untimely because it was 

filed more than 90 days after Kone received a “Right to Sue Letter” from the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission. Kone responds that his claim is not barred by 

Title VII’s statute of limitations because it relates back to the original Complaint for 

Compensatory and Punitive Damages and Injunctive Relief (Doc. 1) filed on November 

27, 2013, only five days after Kone received notice that the E.E.O.C. would not be 

proceeding with his charge. 

 Defendant’s Motion does not make clear pursuant to which rule it asks the Court 

to dismiss Kone’s claim. Because the “requirement for filing a Title VII civil action 

within 90 days from the date EEOC dismisses a claim constitutes a statute of limitations,” 

rather than a “jurisdictional prerequisite,” see Scholar v. Pac. Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 267 & 

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n.3 (9th Cir. 1992), the Motion cannot be brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(1). The Court therefore construes Defendant’s Motion as one requesting dismissal 

for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

 “An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading 

when ... the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, 

transaction, or occurrence set out--or attempted to be set out--in the original pleading.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). Where this conduct-transaction-occurrence test is satisfied, 

the party amending its pleading may “change[] the party or the naming of the party 

against whom a claim is asserted” as long as the new party, within the time limits of Rule 

4(m), “received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the 

merits” and “knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against 

it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C). 

“The Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 Amendment to Rule 15(c) observes that ‘the 

relation back of amendments changing plaintiffs is not expressly treated in revised Rule 

15(c)’” but “goes on to comment that ‘the attitude taken in revised Rule 15(c) toward 

change of defendants extends by analogy to amendments changing plaintiffs.’” 

Immigrant Assistance Project of the L.A. Cnty. Fed’n of Labor v. INS, 306 F.3d 842, 857 

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee’s note). Interpreting 

this commentary, the Ninth Circuit has held that an “amendment adding a party plaintiff 

relates back to the date of the original pleading only when: 1) the original complaint gave 

the defendant adequate notice of the claims of the newly proposed plaintiff; 2) the 

relation back does not unfairly prejudice the defendant; and 3) there is an identity of 

interests between the original and newly proposed plaintiff.” Id. (citing Rosenbaum v. 

Syntex Corp., 95 F.3d 922, 935 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

 Here, the events surrounding Kone’s termination by Defendant undoubtedly 

“arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence” described in the original 

Complaint. Indeed, the paragraphs in the First Amended Complaint describing Kone’s 

termination are copied almost verbatim from the original Complaint. Doc. 1 at 8-9; Doc. 

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23 at 8-9. Kone’s First Amended Complaint also easily meets the requirements of 

Immigrant Assistance Project. First, the original Complaint expressly put Defendant on 

notice that Kone might later “seek leave of this Court to amend this Complaint to assert 

an additional cause of action on behalf of Mr. Kone.” Doc. 1 at 3. Second, where the 

original and new plaintiffs are “similarly situated,” the defendant suffers no prejudice 

from the addition of that new plaintiff. See Immigrant Assistance Project, 306 F.3d at 

858. Given the common factual allegations underlying their claims, Kone and Tadesse, 

as husband and wife, are similarly situated. See also True Health Chiropractic Inc. v. 

McKesson Corp., No. 13-cv-02219-JST, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85961, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 

June 23, 2014) (finding no prejudice to defendant because “the relief [the additional 

plaintiff] seeks is the same as that sought by [the original plaintiff],” with the result that 

defendant “will not be required to change its litigation strategy or conduct”). Third, since 

Kone and Tadesse are “similarly situated,” they also share an “identity of interests.” See

Immigrant Assistance Project, 306 F.3d at 858 (finding “the identity-of-interest 

requirement of Rule 15(c) [i]s met because ‘the circumstances giving rise to the claim 

remained the same [under the amended complaint] as under the original complaint’” 

(second brackets in original) (citing Raynor Bros. v. Am. Cyanimid Co., 695 F.2d 382, 

384 (9th Cir. 1982))). 

 Kone therefore satisfies the requirements for amending a pleading to add a 

plaintiff under Rule 15(c). It is true that the caption to the original Complaint, as well as 

its first sentence, list both Tadesse and Kone as plaintiffs. Doc. 1 at 1. But the 

Complaint, read as a whole, clearly states a claim that only Tadesse, not Kone, could 

bring. The substance of the Complaint is concerned exclusively with alleged violations 

of Tadesse’s rights and with establishing the legal predicates required to justify awarding 

her relief. Indeed, Paragraph 4 of the Complaint declares that “this action is brought to 

remedy Tungland’s religious discrimination against Ms. Tadesse.” Id. at 2 (emphasis 

added). But when ruling on motions to dismiss, such as this one, courts “must liberally 

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” See Baughman v. 

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Roadrunner Commc’ns, LLC, No. CV-12-565-PHX-SMM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

114865, at *4 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2013) (citing Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Parsons, 

758 F. Supp. 1368, 1371 n.4 (D. Mont. 1990)). It would frustrate this rule of construction 

to hold that Kone is precluded from bringing his claim against Defendant merely because 

the original Complaint twice refers to him as a plaintiff in a cursory manner. Cf.

Williams v. Bradshaw, 459 F.3d 846, 849 (8th Cir. 2006) (observing that “a caption is not 

determinative as to who is a party to a suit”) (citing Greenwood v. Ross, 778 F.2d 448, 

452 (8th Cir. 1985)). As a result, Kone will be permitted to use Rule 15(c) to relate back 

to the original Complaint. Because the original Complaint was filed fewer than 90 days 

after Kone received his “Right to Sue Letter” from the E.E.O.C., his Title VII cause of 

action is timely. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff 

Nebeyou Kone’s Title VII Claim (Doc. 28) is denied. 

 Dated this 24th day of September, 2014. 

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