Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02394/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02394-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nancy Cochrane
Defendant
Bruce Charles Davis
Plaintiff
Jan Scully
Defendant

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRUCE CHARLES DAVIS,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-2394 LKK DAD P

vs.

NANCY COCHRANE, et al., ORDER AND

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a breach of contract action

seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. This proceeding was referred to the

undersigned magistrate judge in accordance with Local Rule 72-302 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

By order filed December 16, 2005, plaintiff was granted thirty days to pay the

filing fee or submit an application to proceed in forma pauperis. On January 9, 2006, plaintiff

filed an in forma pauperis application that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). Pursuant to the screening requirement, the court must dismiss claims that are legally

frivolous or malicious, claims that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and

claims that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(b)(1) and (2). Similarly, when a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court is

required to dismiss the case if the court determines at any time that the action is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably

meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at

327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an

arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989);

Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim

that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the allegations of the complaint. See

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). The court also construes

the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolves all doubts in the plaintiff’s

favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Section

1981 provides as follows:

(a) Statement of equal rights

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have

the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce

contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal

benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and

property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like

punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of

every kind, and no other.

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(b) “Make and enforce contracts” defined

For purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce contracts”

includes the making, performance, modification, and termination

of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms,

and conditions of the contractual relationship.

(c) Protection against impairment

The rights protected by this section are protected against

impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment

under color of State law.

42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Section 1983 provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person

within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires an actual connection or link between the actions of each

defendant and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v.

Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).

In the present case, plaintiff has sued Nancy Cochrane, a deputy district attorney,

and Jan Scully, Sacramento County District Attorney. Plaintiff alleges as follows: he entered

into plea agreements with the Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office in 1990 and in 1993;

in 1990, with the assistance of appointed counsel, plaintiff agreed to plead guilty to three counts

of second degree robbery in return for a promise of a 2 to 5 year sentence, with 5 years to be

added to the 2 to 5 years if he ever came back to court on the same type of crime; in 1993, with

the assistance of appointed counsel, plaintiff agreed to plead guilty to two counts of second

degree robbery and one count of receiving stolen property in return for a promise of a 2 to 5 year

sentence, with 5 years to be added to the 2 to 5 years if he ever came back to court on the same

type of crime; in 1998, plaintiff was charged with second degree robbery and an allegation of

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 Section 10 of Article 1 provides in part that no state shall pass any law “impairing the 1

Obligation of Contracts.”

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having suffered five prior serious felony convictions; a jury found plaintiff guilty of the robbery

charge and, after a separate trial, found that the prior felony allegations were true; plaintiff

received a sentence of 50 years plus ten years to life in prison.

Plaintiff claims that the 1998 judgment was imposed in violation of his federal

constitutional rights under article I, § 10 and the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 1

Plaintiff alleges no facts against the two named defendants but argues that both of them violated

the terms and conditions of plaintiff’s plea agreements in 1990 and 1993 by increasing the term

to be imposed for enhancement purposes. Plaintiff alleges that he was not advised by the district

attorney or the presiding judge in 1990 or 1993 that pleading guilty to second degree robbery

could result in a doubling of his sentence or even life imprisonment for future offenses. Plaintiff

describes the 1998 sentence as a breach of contract based on a change of terms and failure to act

in accordance with his plea agreements. Plaintiff asserts that his “only reason for pleading guilty

to the prior charges, is due to the main statement of; If petitioner return on the same type of crime

he could only face additional 5 years added on to the 2-5 years.” (Compl. at 5.)

By way of relief, plaintiff seeks a declaration that a breach of contract occurred

pursuant to the acts, policies, and practices of the defendants in violation of plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Plaintiff also seeks an order voiding the 1990 and 1993 plea agreements or

an order requiring specific performance of those agreements. (Id.) 

Plaintiff seeks to reduce the sentence imposed on him in 1998, either by voiding

the 1990 and 1993 plea agreements and thereby eliminating the five felony priors used to

enhance his sentence, or by requiring that his 1998 sentence be computed without applying any

enhancements except the additional five years contemplated by the plea agreements.

The court finds that plaintiff is seeking relief that will entitle him to an earlier

release from prison. When a state prisoner challenges the legality of his custody and the relief he

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 A court may take judicial notice of court records. See MGIC Indem. Co. v. Weisman, 2

803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980).

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seeks is the determination of his entitlement to an earlier or immediate release, his sole federal

remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Because

plaintiff seeks to reduce his 1998 sentence, he must seek relief in habeas proceedings rather than

in a civil rights action.

The court’s records reveal that plaintiff has filed a federal habeas petition

challenging his 1998 conviction. See Davis v. Butler, case No. CIV S-03-0426 GEB GGH P. 2

Counsel was appointed for plaintiff. The amended petition filed by counsel did not challenge the

sentence imposed in 1993. (See Findings and Recommendations filed in case No. CIV S-03-

0426 on June 20, 2005, at 1.) The magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations were

adopted in full, and the petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied on August 22, 2005. The

case is currently on appeal.

If plaintiff were to file a new habeas petition attacking his sentence on the grounds

alleged in this civil rights action, the petition would be a second or successive application. A

claim presented in a second or successive petition that was not presented in a prior petition must

be dismissed, unless

 (A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of

constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review

by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

 (B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been

discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and

 (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light

of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear

and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no

reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the

underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). It does not appear that plaintiff’s claims make the showing described in

§ 2244(b)(2)(A) or (B). Moreover, even a second or successive application that makes the

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 Plaintiff’s claims also appear to lack merit. Plea bargains are subject to the general 3

principles of contract by way of analogy in order to support either specific performance or

vacation of a plea as a remedy for breach of a plea agreement. See Santobello v. New York, 404

U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971); People v. McClellan, 6 Cal. 4th 367, 379-81, 24 Cal. Rptr. 739, 862

P.2d 739 (1993). Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that his plea agreements included

promises by the prosecutor that the convictions could not be used as a basis for an enhancement

allegation in future criminal proceedings. See United States v. Brownlie, 915 F.2d 527, 528 (9th

Cir. 1990) (a defendant pleading guilty need not be advised by the court of the possibility of a

future sentence enhancement based on the plea); Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 235-36 (9th Cir.

1988) (the possibility of future enhancements is a collateral consequence of a plea and the

criminal defendant has no right to be advised about such consequences on entering a guilty plea);

Davis v. Castro, No. C99-4351 WHA (PR), 2003 WL 1129882, at *3-4 & n.1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3,

2003) (rejecting state habeas petitioner’s challenge to application of California’s three-strikes

provisions where the state court taking his guilty pleas had warned him of a possible five-year

enhancement in the future based on existing law but did not promise that state law would not

change or, if it did change, would not be enforced against the petitioner). Sentences imposed

under three-strikes provisions are not additional punishment for prior convictions but rather a

stiffened penalty for the latest crime. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 728 (1998). 

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required showing under § 2244(b)(2) cannot be filed in the district court until the applicant

obtains an order from the court of appeals authorizing the district court to consider the

application. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).

Due to the habeas nature of plaintiff’s claims, the court finds that plaintiff cannot

amend his civil rights complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 42

U.S.C. § 1981 or § 1983. The action should be dismissed without granting leave to file an

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amended complaint. See Coakley v. Murphy, 884 F.2d 1218, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff has filed several documents concerning his attempts to obtain discovery

from the defendants. Plaintiff’s efforts to conduct discovery were premature, and all documents

of a discovery nature will be disregarded.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s documents filed March 3, 2006

(docketed as #8), June 23, 2006 (docketed at #9), and July 12, 2006 (docketed as #10) will be

disregarded; and

IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s January 9, 2006 application to proceed in forma pauperis be denied;

and

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2. This action be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. A document containing objections should be titled “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive the right to appeal

the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: November 9, 2006.

DAD:13

davi2394.56

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