Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00512/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00512-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric Adams
Plaintiff
Goldman Sachs Specialty Lending Holdings, Inc.
Defendant
Litton Loan Servicing LP
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC ADAMS, CASE NO. CV F 10-0512 LJO DLB

Plaintiff, ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ F.R.Civ.P. 12

MOTION TO DISMISS

vs. (Doc. 7.)

LITTON LOAN, et al,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

Defendants Litton Loan Servicing LP (“Litton”) and Goldman Sachs Specialty Lending

Holdings, Inc. (“Goldman”) seek to dismiss as meritless and lacking necessary facts and elements pro

se plaintiff Eric Adams (“Mr. Adams’”) claims arising from Litton’s denial to modifyMr. Adams’ home

loan. This Court considered Litton and Goldman’s (collectively “defendants’”) F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss on the record and VACATES the May 4, 2010 hearing, pursuant to this Court’s sua

sponte dismissal of this action.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Adams’ Home Loan

On January 6, 2004, Mr. Adams obtained a $269,600 loan from Fremont Investment & Loan for

the purchase of his Los Banos home (“property”). The loan was secured by a deed of trust (“DOT”)

1

Case 1:10-cv-00512-LJO-DLB Document 9 Filed 04/09/10 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

recorded against the property. Litton is the loan servicer.

1

By October 2009, Mr. Adams had defaulted on his loan. On October 13, 2009, a notice of

default and election to sell under deed of trust was recorded to reflect that Mr. Adams owed $18,651.07

in delinquent loan payments.

Litton denied Mr. Adams’ request for loan modification.

Mr. Adams’ Claims

Mr. Adams proceeds on his complaint (“complaint”) filed on February9, 2010 in Merced County

Superior Court prior to removal to this Court. The complaint includes four claims entitled successively

“Deseption [sic] and Misrepresentation Wrongful Mortgage Practices,” “Fraud and Extortion,”

“Misconduct,” and “Defamation and Slander.” The complaint takes issue with Litton’s denial of loan

modification. The complaint makes reference to “bait-and-switch schemes,” “extortion,” and “blatant

form of misconduct.” The complaint notes: “It is evident that the defendants have broken a civil action

and committed Fraud.” For relief, the complaint seeks “damages” and orders to “Cease and Desist on

any actions of default, foreclosure and/or sale,” “for mortgage payment to be $559.21 fixed,” and to

“Stop predatory modification practices.”

DISCUSSION

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss Standards

Defendants fault the complaint as an improper attempt “to halt legitimate foreclosure” and seek

to dismiss its claims for failure to satisfy federal pleading requirements.

“A trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). . . . Such dismissal

may be made without notice where the claimant cannot possibly win relief.” Omar v. Sea-Land Service,

Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9 Cir. 1987); see Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361-362 (9 Cir. 1981). Sua th th

sponte dismissal may be made before process is served on defendants. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 324 (1989) (dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) are often made sua sponte); Franklin v. Murphy,

745 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9 Cir. 1984) (court may dismiss frivolous in forma pauperis action sua sponte th

prior to service of process on defendants).

Documents pertaining to Mr. Adams’ loan and foreclosure of the property were recorded with the Merced

1

County Recorder.

2

Case 1:10-cv-00512-LJO-DLB Document 9 Filed 04/09/10 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings set

forth in the complaint. “When a federal court reviews the sufficiencyof a complaint, before the reception

of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not

whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to

support the claims.” Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco

Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9 Cir. 1997). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where

th

there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

cognizable legal theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990); Graehling th

v. Village of Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7 Cir. 1995). th

In resolving a F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion, a court must: (1) construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine

whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996). Nonetheless, a court is not required “to accept as

true allegations that aremerelyconclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.”

In re Gilead Sciences Securities Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9 Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A court th

“need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations,” U.S. ex rel.

Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643, n. 2 (9 Cir.1986), and a court must not “assume that the th

[plaintiff] can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated . . . laws in ways

that have not been alleged.” Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State

Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897 (1983). A court need not permit an attempt

to amend if “it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by an amendment.” Livid Holdings Ltd.

v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9 Cir. 2005). th

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554,127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal citations omitted). 

Moreover, a court “will dismiss any claim that, even when construed in the light most favorable to

plaintiff, fails to plead sufficiently all required elements of a cause of action.” Student Loan Marketing

3

Case 1:10-cv-00512-LJO-DLB Document 9 Filed 04/09/10 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Ass'n v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629, 634 (S.D. Cal. 1998). In practice, “a complaint . . . must contain either

direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under

some viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562, 127 S.Ct. at 1969 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v.

Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7 Cir. 1984)). th

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937,1949 (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court recently

explained:

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” . . . A

claim has facial plausibilitywhen the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

. . . The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. (Citations omitted.) 

After discussing Iqbal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized: “In sum, for a complaint

to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that

content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret

Service, 572 F.3d 962, 989 (9 Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949). th

The U.S. Supreme Court applies a “two-prong approach” to address a motion to dismiss:

First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in

a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. . . . Second,

only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. . .

. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense. . . . But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not

“show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can

choose to begin byidentifying pleadings that, because theyare no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the

framework of a complaint, theymust be supported by factual allegations. When there are

well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-1950.

With these standards in mind, this Court turns to defendants’ challenges to the complaint.

Failure To Satisfy F.R.Civ.P. 8

The complaint references four “causes of action,” but as defendants note, each cause of action

4

Case 1:10-cv-00512-LJO-DLB Document 9 Filed 04/09/10 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim. F.R.Civ.P. 8 requires a plaintiff to “plead a short and plain

statement of the elements of his or her claim, identifying the transaction or occurrence giving rise to the

claim and the elements of the prima facie case.” Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 840 (9th

Cir. 2000). 

F.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(1) requires each allegation to be “simple, concise, and direct.” This requirement

“applies to good claims as well as bad, and is the basis for dismissal independent of Rule 12(b)(6).” 

McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9 Cir. 1996). “Something labeled a complaint but written th

more as a press release, prolix in evidentiary detail, yet without simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to

whom plaintiffs are suing for what wrongs, fails to perform the essential functions of a complaint.” 

McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1180. “Prolix, confusing complaints . . . impose unfair burdens on litigants and

judges.” McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179.

Moreover, a pleading may not simply allege a wrong has been committed and demand relief.

The underlying requirement is that a pleading give “fair notice” of the claim being asserted and the

“grounds upon which it rests.” Yamaguchi v. United States Department of Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475,

1481 (9 Cir. 1997). Despite the flexible pleading policy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a

th

complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v.

Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9 Cir. 1984). A plaintiff must allege with at least some th

degree of particularity overt facts which defendant engaged in to support plaintiff’s claim. Jones, 733

F.2d at 649. A complaint does not suffice “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual

enhancement.’” Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct.

1955). The U.S. Supreme Court has explained:

While, for most types of cases, the Federal Rules eliminated the cumbersome

requirement that a claimant “set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim,”

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (emphasis added),

Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a “showing,” rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to

relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant

could satisfy the requirement of providing not only “fair notice” of the nature of the

claim, but also “grounds” on which the claim rests.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, n. 3, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

The complaint fails to satisfy F.R.Civ.P. 8. The complaint makes mere references to “bait-andswitch schemes,” “extortion,” and “blatant form of misconduct” and notes: “It is evident that the

5

Case 1:10-cv-00512-LJO-DLB Document 9 Filed 04/09/10 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

defendants have broken a civil action and committed Fraud.” The complaint lacks facts to support

claims or valid, cognizable legal theories as to defendants. The complaint lacks specific allegations as

to Goldman. The complaint fails to give defendants fair notice of claims plainly and succinctly to

warrant dismissal of the complaint.

Fraud Claims

The complaint’s first two claims are entitled “Deseption [sic] and Misrepresentation Wrongful

Mortgage Practices” and “Fraud and Extortion.” The first claim alleges that based upon Litton’s request

for documents to consider Mr. Adams’ loan modification request, “the plaintiff can clearly state that the

defendants’ actions makes this also a cause of fraud.”

Defendants fault the claims’ failure to satisfyF.R.Civ.P. 9(b) particularityrequirements and fraud

elements.

The elements of a California fraud claim are: (1) misrepresentation (false representation,

concealment or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of the falsity (or “scienter”); (3) intent to defraud, i.e.,

to induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage. Lazar v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.4th

631, 638, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 (1996). The same elements comprise a cause of action for negligent

misrepresentation, except there is no requirement of intent to induce reliance. Caldo v. Owens-Illinois,

Inc., 125 Cal.App.4th 513, 519, 23 Cal.Rtpr.3d 1 (2004).

“[T]o establish a cause of action for fraud a plaintiff must plead and prove in full, factually and

specifically, all of the elements of the cause of action.” Conrad v. Bank of America, 45 Cal.App.4th 133,

156, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 336 (1996). Theremust be a showing “that the defendant therebyintended to induce

the plaintiff to act to his detriment in reliance upon the false representation” and “that the plaintiff

actually and justifiably relied upon the defendant’s misrepresentation in acting to his detriment.” 

Conrad, 45 Cal.App.4th at 157, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 336. “The absence of any one of these required elements

will preclude recovery.” Wilhelm v. Pray, Price, Williams & Russell, 186 Cal.App.3d 1324, 1332, 231

Cal.Rptr. 355 (1986).

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

6

Case 1:10-cv-00512-LJO-DLB Document 9 Filed 04/09/10 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

F.R.Civ.P. 9(b)requires a partyto “state with particularitythe circumstances constituting fraud.”

2

In the Ninth Circuit, “claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation must meet Rule 9(b)'s

particularityrequirements.” Neilson v. Union Bank of California, N.A., 290 F.Supp.2d 1101, 1141 (C.D.

Cal. 2003). A court may dismiss a claim grounded in fraud when its allegations fail to satisfyF.R.Civ.P.

9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements. Vess, 317 F.3d at 1107. A motion to dismiss a claim 3

“grounded in fraud” under F.R.Civ.P. 9(b) for failure to plead with particularity is the “functional

equivalent” of a F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Vess, 317 F.3d at

1107. As a counter-balance, F.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) requires from a pleading “a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

F.R.Civ.P. 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard “is not an invitation to disregard Rule 8's

requirement of simplicity, directness, and clarity” and “has among its purposes the avoidance of

unnecessarydiscovery.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9 Cir. 1996). F.R.Civ.P 9(b) requires th

“specific” allegations of fraud “to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged

to constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have

done anything wrong.” Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9 Cir. 1985). “A pleading is sufficient th

under Rule 9(b) if it identifies the circumstances constituting fraud so that the defendant can prepare an

adequate answer from the allegations.” Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 671-672 (9 Cir. 1993) th

(internal quotations omitted; citing Gottreich v. San Francisco Investment Corp., 552 F.2d 866, 866 (9th

Cir. 1997)). The Ninth Circuit has explained:

Rule 9(b) requires particularized allegations of the circumstances constituting fraud. The

time, place and content of an alleged misrepresentation may identify the statement or the

omission complained of, but these circumstances do not “constitute” fraud. The

statement in question must be false to be fraudulent. Accordingly, our cases have

consistently required that circumstances indicating falseness be set forth. . . . [W]e [have]

observed that plaintiff must include statements regarding the time, place, and nature of

F.R.Civ.P. 9(b)’s particularity requirement applies to state law causes of action: “[W]hile a federal court

2

will examine state law to determine whether the elements of fraud have been pled sufficiently to state a cause of action, the

Rule 9(b) requirement that the circumstances of the fraud must be stated with particularity is a federally imposed rule.” Vess

v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9 Cir. 2003) (quoting Hayduk v. Lanna, 775 F.2d 441, 443 (1 Cir.

th st

1995)(italics in original)).

“In some cases, the plaintiff may allege a unified course of fraudulent conduct and rely entirely on that

3

course of conduct as the basis of a claim. In that event, the claim is said to be ‘grounded in fraud’ or to ‘sound in fraud,’ and

the pleading of that claim as a whole must satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b).” Vess, 317 F.3d at 1103-1104.

7

Case 1:10-cv-00512-LJO-DLB Document 9 Filed 04/09/10 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the alleged fraudulent activities, and that “mere conclusory allegations of fraud are

insufficient.” . . . The plaintiff must set forth what is false or misleading about a

statement, and why it is false. In other words, the plaintiff must set forth an explanation

as to why the statement or omission complained of was false or misleading. . . .

In certain cases, to be sure, the requisite particularitymight be supplied with great

simplicity.

In Re Glenfed, Inc. Securities Litigation, 42 F.3d 1541, 1547-1548 (9 Cir. 1994) (en banc) (italics in th

original) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal

Pharm. Corp., 927 F.Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996); see Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9 Cir.

th

1997) (fraud allegations must be accompanied by “the who, what, when, where, and how” of the

misconduct charged); Neubronner, 6 F.3d at 672 (“The complaint must specify facts as the times, dates,

places, benefits received and other details of the alleged fraudulent activity.”) 

As to multiple fraud defendants, a plaintiff “must provide each and everydefendant with enough

information to enable them ‘to know what misrepresentations are attributable to them and what

fraudulent conduct they are charged with.’” Pegasus Holdings v. Veterinary Centers of America, Inc.,

38 F.Supp.2d 1158, 1163 (C.D. Ca. 1998) (quoting In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 694 F.Supp.

1427, 1433 (N.D. Ca. 1988)). “Rule 9(b) does not allow a complaint to merely lump multiple defendants

together but ‘require[s] plaintiffs to differentiate their allegations when suing more than one defendant

. . . and inform each defendant separately of the allegations surrounding his alleged participation in the

fraud.’” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764-765 (9 Cir. 2007) (quoting Haskin v. R.J. Reynolds th

Tobacco Co., 995 F.Supp. 1437, 1439 (M.D. Fla. 1998)). “In the context of a fraud suit involving

multiple defendants, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, ‘identif[y] the role of [each] defendant[] in the

alleged fraudulent scheme.” Swartz, 476 F.3d at 765 (quoting Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc.,

885 F.2d 531, 541 (9 Cir. 1989)). th

Moreover, in a fraud action against a corporation, a plaintiff must “allege the names of the

persons who made the allegedlyfraudulent representations, their authorityto speak, to whom theyspoke,

what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written.” Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 861 (1991).

Defendants correctly note that the complaint lacks facts to allege or support elements of a claim

grounded or sounding in fraud, including “extortion.” The complaint is severely lacking and fails to

8

Case 1:10-cv-00512-LJO-DLB Document 9 Filed 04/09/10 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

satisfy F.R.Civ.P. 9(b) “who, what, when, where and how” requirements. The complaint makes bare

reference to general “misrepresentation” and “fraud” with no required details and merely articulates

displeasure with Litton’s denial of Mr. Adams’ loan modification. The complaint makes no effort to

allege names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak,

to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written. The complaint fails to

substantiate the circumstances alleging falseness attributable to defendants. The complaint lacks facts

to support each fraud element or any elements grounded or sounding in fraud. The first and second

claims’ deficiencies are so severe to suggest no potential improvement from an attempt to amend.

Misconduct Claim

The complaint’s third claim is entitled “Misconduct,” and like defendants, this Court construes

it as a flawed negligence claim.

Defendants fault the claim’s failure to satisfy necessary elements of a negligence, especially

given limited lender duties.

“The elements of a cause of action for negligence are (1) a legal duty to use reasonable care, (2)

breach of that duty, and (3) proximate [or legal] cause between the breach and (4) the plaintiff's injury.”

Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles, 66 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1339, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 (1998) (citation

omitted). “The existence of a duty of care owed by a defendant to a plaintiff is a prerequisite to

establishing a claim for negligence.” Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings & Loan Assn., 231 Cal.App.3d

1089, 1095, 283 Cal.Rptr. 53 (1991). “The existence of a legal duty to use reasonable care in a particular

factual situation is a question of law for the court to decide.” Vasquez v. Residential Investments, Inc.,

118 Cal.App.4th 269, 278, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 (2004) (citation omitted).

“The 'legal duty' of care may be of two general types: (a) the duty of a person to use ordinary care

in activities from which harm might reasonably be anticipated [, or] (b) [a]n affirmative duty where the

person occupies a particular relationship to others. . . . In the first situation, he is not liable unless he is

actively careless; in the second, he may be liable for failure to act affirmatively to prevent harm.”

McGettigan v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 57 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1016-1017, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 516

(1997).

There is no actionable duty between a lender and borrower in that loan transactions are arms9

Case 1:10-cv-00512-LJO-DLB Document 9 Filed 04/09/10 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

length. A lender “owes no duty of care to the [borrowers] in approving their loan. Liability to a

borrower for negligence arises only when the lender ‘actively participates’ in the financed enterprise

‘beyond the domain of the usual money lender.’” Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal.App.3d 27, 35, 161

Cal.Rptr. 516 (1980) (citing several cases). “[A]s a general rule, a financial institution owes no duty of

care to a borrower when the institution's involvement in the loan transaction does not exceed the scope

of its conventional role as a mere lender of money.” Nymark, 231 Cal.App.3d at 1096, 283 Cal.Rptr.

53; see Myers v. Guarantee Sav. & Loan Assn., 79 Cal.App.3d 307, 312, 144 Cal. Rptr. 616 (1978) (no

lender liability when lender did not engage “in any activity outside the scope of the normal activities of

a lender of construction monies”). 

“Public policy does not impose upon the Bank absolute liability for the hardships which may

befall the [borrower] it finances.” Wagner, 101 Cal.App.3d at 34, 161 Cal.Rptr. 516. The success of

a borrower’s investment “is not a benefit of the loan agreement which the Bank is under a duty to

protect.” Wagner, 101 Cal.App.3d at 34, 161 Cal.Rptr. 516 (lender lacked duty to disclose “any

information it may have had”).

Defendants note the complaint’s failure “to allege facts showing defendants owed him a duty of

care.” Defendants are correct that the complaint lacks facts to support an actionable duty to impose on

defendants. “No such duty exists” for a lender “to determine the borrower's ability to repay the loan. .

. . The lender's efforts to determine the creditworthiness and ability to repay by a borrower are for the

lender's protection, not the borrower's.” Renteria v. United States, 452 F.Supp.2d 910, 922-923 (D. Ariz.

2006) (borrowers “had to rely on their own judgment and risk assessment to determine whether or not

to accept the loan”). Defendants are correct that they “owed no duty of care to Adams.” The complaint

lacks facts of special circumstances to impose duties on defendants in that the complaint depicts an

arms-length loan transaction, nothing more. The complaint fails to substantiate a special lending

relationship or an actionable breach of duty to substantiate a negligence claim. The “misconduct” claim

fails.

Defamation And Slander Claim

The complaint’s fourth claim is entitled “Defamation and Slander.” 

Defendants challenge the claim’s failure to satisfy elements of defamation or slander.

10

Case 1:10-cv-00512-LJO-DLB Document 9 Filed 04/09/10 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

To state a claim for either libel or slander a plaintiff must establish “the intentional publication

of a statement of fact that is false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure or which causes

special damage.” Arikat v. JP Morgan Chase &Co., 430 F.Supp.2d 1013, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing

Smith v. Maldonado, 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 397 (1999); Cal. Civ.Code §§ 45-46).

Publication means “communication to a third person who understands the defamatory meaning of the

statement and its application to the person to whom reference is made.” Arikat, 430 F.Supp.2d at 1020.

Defendants correctly note the complaint’s absence of allegations of a publication of a false

statement concerning Mr. Adams, injury by publication of a false statement, or a false statement’s

tendency to cause injury. The complaint lacks facts to support a defamation or slander claim.

Attempt At Amendment And Malice

Mr. Adams’ claims are insufficiently pled and barred as a matter of law. Mr. Adams is unable

to cure his claims by allegation of other facts and thus is not granted an attempt to amend.

Moreover, this Court is concerned that Mr. Adams has brought this action in absence of good

faith and that Mr. Adams exploits the court system solely for delay or to vex defendants. The test for

maliciousness is a subjective one and requires the court to “determine the . . . good faith of the

applicant.” Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46 (1915); see Wright v. Newsome, 795

F.2d 964, 968, n. 1 (11 Cir. 1986); cf. Glick v. Gutbrod, 782 F.2d 754, 757 (7 Cir. 1986) (court has th th

inherent power to dismiss case demonstrating “clear pattern of abuse of judicial process”). A lack of

good faith or malice also can be inferred from a complaint containing untrue material allegations of fact

or false statements made with intent to deceive the court. See Horsey v. Asher, 741 F.2d 209, 212 (8

th

Cir. 1984). An attempt to vex or delay provides further grounds to dismiss this action against

defendants.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court:

1. DISMISSES with prejudice this action against defendants; and 

2. DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment against plaintiff Eric Adams and in favor of

defendants Litton Loan Servicing LP and Goldman Sachs Specialty Lending Holdings,

/ / /

11

Case 1:10-cv-00512-LJO-DLB Document 9 Filed 04/09/10 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Inc. and to close this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 8, 2010 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

12

Case 1:10-cv-00512-LJO-DLB Document 9 Filed 04/09/10 Page 12 of 12