Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03145/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03145-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Tristan Wolff
Appellant

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 11, 1997 Decided October 21, 1997 

No. 96-3145

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

TRISTAN WOLFF, A/K/A ASHLEY GABRIEL CAINE,

A/K/A STANLEY JAMES OSMAN,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 96cr00098-01)

William J. Garber, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause and filed the brief for appellant.

Barbara E. Kittay, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr.,

United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, John 

USCA Case #96-3145 Document #303873 Filed: 10/21/1997 Page 1 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

R. Fisher, and Thomas C. Black, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, were on the brief.

Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and RANDOLPH, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by 

Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Appellant, seeking review of the 

district court's judgment imposing a sentence of 84 months, 

alleges errors in enhancement, and in the denial of a threelevel reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Appellant 

also argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the 

government breached its plea agreement with him. The 

government concedes the breach, but differs with the defendant as to its effect. Because we agree with the appellant 

that he is entitled to resentencing based on the government's 

breach of the plea agreement, we do not reach the other 

allegations of error but vacate the district court's judgment 

and remand for resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND

An indictment of March 29, 1996, charged appellant Tristan 

Wolff with three counts of bank robbery in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 2113(a). On May 2, 1996, he entered into a written 

plea agreement with the government to plead guilty to two 

counts of bank robbery, in return for which the prosecution 

agreed, inter alia, that "the government will ... ask that 

[Tristan Wolff] receive full credit for acceptance of responsibility." On that date, he entered a plea of guilty in district 

court. The district court accepted the plea and continued the 

matter for sentencing. After the preparation of the Presentence Investigation Report, the case returned to court for 

sentencing on October 17, 1996. The court entered a sentence of 84 months incarceration, followed by 3 years of 

supervised release, reflecting an adjusted offense level of 28, 

computed from: (1) a base offense level of 20 (U.S.S.G. 

USCA Case #96-3145 Document #303873 Filed: 10/21/1997 Page 2 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

§ 2B3.1); (2) 2 levels for the specific offense characteristic of 

taking the property of a financial institution (U.S.S.G. 

§ 2B3.1(b)(1)); (3) 2 levels for "an express threat of death" 

(U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F)); (4) 2 levels for the second count 

of bank robbery (U.S.S.G. § 3Dl.4); and (5) 2 levels for 

"obstruction of justice" (U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1). The defendant 

requested a three-level decrease for "acceptance of responsibility" (U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1), which the sentencing judge denied.

Contrary to the plea bargain, the government not only did 

not join the defendant's request for full credit for acceptance 

of responsibility, but also specifically requested that the defendant be denied the three-point reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility and be given the upward adjustment for obstruction of justice that the district court ultimately awarded. 

Following sentencing, the defendant filed the present appeal, 

arguing that the district court erred: in enhancing the sentence for obstruction of justice without making sufficient 

findings on an adequate record to support that enhancement; 

in assessing an enhancement for threat of death; and in 

denying the three-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility. Anterior to his argument that the court erred in 

denying him credit for acceptance of responsibility, appellant 

argues that the government violated its plea agreement by 

arguing for that denial. On appeal, the government admits 

its breach of the plea agreement but argues that all other 

findings of the district courtthat is, as to the enhancementsshould be sustained and the case remanded solely for 

consideration of the effect of the breach. Appellant contends 

that the sentence should be vacated along with all antecedent 

findings and conclusions, and the case remanded for resentencing.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, the United States, with commendable candor, 

confesses its failure to comply with the provision of its plea 

agreement with appellant to the effect that it would ask the 

sentencing judge to award him "full credit for acceptance of 

responsibility." The government's original willingness to join 

USCA Case #96-3145 Document #303873 Filed: 10/21/1997 Page 3 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

in that petition was no doubt occasioned by defendant's own 

commendable candor in admitting that he robbed the banks 

in question.1 Unfortunately, as the presentence investigation 

unfolded, the government realized that Tristan Wolff had not 

evidenced similar candor as to much of anything elsefor 

example, as to whether he was in fact Tristan Wolff.

Among other difficulties on this score, the fingerprints of 

Tristan Wolff matched those of one Lee James Anthony 

Kincaid, who had an "extensive criminal record" in the United 

Kingdom, with 9 criminal entries between 1976 and 1981. It 

further appears that at other times, the individual appearing 

before the court as Tristan Wolff wearing the fingerprints of 

Lee James Anthony Kincaid had used the names of Stanley 

James Osman and Ashley Gabriel Caine. He also supplied the 

probation officer conducting the presentence investigation 

with a radically different life history than he had supplied at 

other times to other authoritiesand none of these histories 

found much support in public records. Apparently it was this 

deceptiveness, particularly the concealment of prior criminal 

history, that prompted the trial Assistant United States Attorney to argue against credit for acceptance of responsibility. 

Unfortunately, the United States made no attempt to set 

aside the plea agreement and begin again, but simply breached the agreement, as the government now admits.

The parties agree that appellant is entitled to relief. As 

the Supreme Court has long held, "when a plea rests in any 

significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or 

consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Santobello v. 

New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). This leaves only the 

dispute as to what relief is appropriate. The government 

contends that we should leave all findings and rulings of the 

__________

1 The commendability of his candor may be tempered a bit by the 

circumstances of his admission. It occurred immediately after he 

ran from the bank and asked directions from a nearby patrolman. 

The teller he had just robbed ran after him yelling that the bank 

had been robbed, and Wolff fled with stolen bank notes falling from 

his coat. Gov't App., tab C at 24.

USCA Case #96-3145 Document #303873 Filed: 10/21/1997 Page 4 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

district court intact save the denial of credit for acceptance of 

responsibility and remand for further proceedings on that 

single subject. We disagree.

The defendant bargained for a sentencing proceeding in 

which the trial judge would consider the government's recommendation for the downward adjustment in conjunction with 

all other factors in the case, not a proceeding in which all 

other factors are foreclosed against him before consideration 

of the government's recommendation. It may well be, as the 

government hypothesizes, that this factor would not change 

the trial court's decision on any other subject, but that is 

something we had best leave to the trial court. In Santobello,

the leading case on this subject, the Supreme Court noted 

that it did not need to "reach the question whether the 

sentencing judge would or would not have been influenced" 

by the terms of the plea bargain had the government fulfilled 

its obligation. Id. Rather, the high court determined that 

the ultimate disposition of the case was best left "to the 

discretion of the [trial] court, which is in a better position to 

decide whether the circumstances of [the] case require ... 

specific performance of the agreement" or withdrawal of the 

plea. Id. at 263. The same is true here. Consistent with 

Santobello we must vacate the sentence and remand the 

matter for further proceedings in the trial court.

We must still consider one more question regarding the 

breadth of the relief. Appellant assumes that we must direct 

the reassignment of the case to a different judge upon 

remand. He bases this position on language of the Supreme 

Court in Santobello:

The ultimate relief to which petitioner is entitled we 

leave to the discretion of the state court, which is in a 

better position to decide whether the circumstances of 

this case require only that there be specific performance 

of the agreement on the plea, in which case petitioner 

should be resentenced by a different judge, or whether, in 

the view of the state court, the circumstances require 

USCA Case #96-3145 Document #303873 Filed: 10/21/1997 Page 5 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

granting the relief sought by petitioner, i.e., the opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty.

Id. at 263 (emphasis added).

Appellant, like many others, assumes this to create a 

general rule that when a plea agreement is breached, resentencing must automatically be assigned to a different judge. 

See, e.g., United States v. McCray, 849 F.2d 304, 306 (8th Cir. 

1988) (per curiam) ("The Supreme Court [in Santobello] 

instructs us that "when the government breaches a plea 

agreement, the defendant is entitled to be resentenced by a 

different judge."); United States v. Hayes, 946 F.2d 230, 236 

(3rd Cir. 1991) ("If specific performance is elected, [defendant] 

must be resentenced by a different judge as dictated by the 

Supreme Court in Santobello."). Indeed, we have previously 

expressed that same assumption. In United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915 

(1992), we stated:

Any breach of a promise that induced the guilty plea 

ordinarily entitles the defendant on direct review either 

to specific performance and resentencing before a different judge or to withdrawal of the guilty plea, as the court 

deems appropriate.

Id. at 1028 (citing Santobello).

However, that language in Pollard was plainly dicta. In 

Pollard, a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, we denied 

relief altogether, so that any discussion of the available relief 

obviously did not constitute a dispositive holding in that case. 

Neither have we in any other decision ever passed on the 

question of whether Santobello requires resentencing before a 

different judge in every case, nor has the Supreme Court. 

Therefore, unless Santobello constitutes such a binding precedent, no precedent requires us to command such a reassignment. We hold that Santobello does not. Rather than 

expressing a holding, the language quoted above in its entirety mandates nothing. It merely sets forth the two options

specific performance or setting aside of the pleaavailable to 

the district judge. It then observes without accompanying 

USCA Case #96-3145 Document #303873 Filed: 10/21/1997 Page 6 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

reasoning that in the event of specific performance the petitioner in that case "should be sentenced by a different judge." 

That hardly amounts to the reasoned proclamation of a rule 

of general application.

At least two other Circuits have already reached the conclusion that a remand for resentencing based upon the breach 

of a plea agreement by the government does not require 

judicial reassignment. The Seventh Circuit in United States 

v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 1978), another case 

involving a breached plea agreement, concluded that "it is 

[not] necessary to have the resentencing before a different 

judge," without setting forth its reasoning for that conclusion. 

The Ninth Circuit has noted that "[w]here the government 

violates a plea agreement at sentencing, the usual remedy is a 

remand for resentencing." United States v. Travis, 735 F.2d 

1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1984). But the Travis Court went on to 

observe, "[r]emand to a different judge is not the usual 

remedy, it is one reserved for 'unusual circumstances.' " Id.

For this latter proposition, the Ninth Circuit relied on its 

earlier decision in United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162 (9th

Cir. 1979). In Arnett, the Ninth Circuit considering the same 

question, that is whether remand upon plea agreement breach 

need be to a different judge, concluded it did not.2

The Arnett court treated the remand the same as any other 

remand "when error is found in district court proceedings." 

Id. at 1165. We find that comparison apt. No one supposes 

that remands for resentencing after misapplication of the 

Guidelines, remands for rehearing after admission of improperly admitted evidence, or any of the other remands that can 

occur in the universe of criminal cases automatically require 

reassignment of the case. Indeed, in United States v. Robin,

__________

2 The Ninth Circuit cases are not uniform on this subject. In 

United States v. Camper, 66 F.3d 229, 232 (9th Cir. 1995), that court 

recognized an "apparent conflict" between Travis and United States 

v. Benchimol, 738 F.2d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 1984), which held, citing 

Santobello, that a defendant with whom the government had 

breached its plea agreement "is entitled to be resentenced before a 

different judge."

USCA Case #96-3145 Document #303873 Filed: 10/21/1997 Page 7 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

553 F.2d 8 (2nd Cir. 1977) (en banc) (per curiam), a case 

asserting allegations of error not involving breach of plea 

agreement but relied upon by the Ninth Circuit in Arnett, the 

en banc Second Circuit observed that such an unusual remedy is reserved for "unusual circumstances." Id. at 10. We 

are persuaded that the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in 

Arnett, borrowed from the Second Circuit's reasoning in 

Robin, is sound and hold that Santobello does not require 

remand upon a breached plea agreement to be reassigned to 

a different judge.

Our conclusion that Santobello requires reassignment to a 

different district judge only in the unusual case, does not of 

course answer the question whether we should require it in 

this case. However, the reasoning of the Second Circuit in 

Robin assists us in discerning standards to apply.

As that court viewed the question, except in the obvious 

and limited category of cases in which personal bias requires 

recusal, see 28 U.S.C. § 144, the "principal factors" to be 

considered by a court of appeals in determining whether to 

direct reassignment to a different judge are:

(1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected upon remand to have substantial difficulty in 

putting out of his or her mind the previously-expressed 

views or findings determined to be erroneous or based on 

evidence that must be rejected,

(2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the 

appearance of justice, and

(3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any gain in preserving the 

appearance of fairness.

Id.

We conclude that these factors are appropriate ones. As 

applied to this case, they do not require reassignment to a 

different judge. We are not remanding because of any error 

or misconduct on the part of the original trial judge. Indeed, 

the allegations of error by her, which we do not reach because 

of our disposition, are directed to rather technical application 

USCA Case #96-3145 Document #303873 Filed: 10/21/1997 Page 8 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

of the Guidelines and not to any "erroneous" factfinding, in a 

pejorative sense. Cf. Robin, at 10 ("Where the judge sits as 

the fact-finder, reassignment is the preferable course, since it 

avoids any rub-off of earlier error."). In fact, we do not lay 

the fault for this remand at her feet at all. Of course, she 

had been made advertent to the existence of the plea agreement at the time of the entry of the plea on May 2, 1996, but 

at the sentencing hearing, 5 and 1/2 months and an unknown 

number of other cases later, no one called the breach of the 

agreement to her attention. Had the trial defense attorney

who, we note, was not the able counsel who represented Wolff 

before ussought relief at that time, we have every reason to 

believe that the judge would have acted upon that request.

We therefore conclude that, on the record before us, we 

have no reason to believe that the sentencing judge would 

have "substantial difficulty" in putting out of her mind any 

previously expressed erroneous findings since she made no 

findings that we have held erroneous and we certainly do not 

conclude that she made any findings on evidence now rejected. Further, we see no reason to conclude that reassignment 

is "advisable to preserve the appearance of justice." On the 

other hand, there is reason to believe that reassignment 

would entail at least some waste and duplication, possibly out 

of proportion to whatever molecular gain there might be in 

preserving the appearance of fairness. We therefore conclude that none of the principal factors identified above 

warrants reassignment by this court in this case.

We caution that we do not intend to bind the hands of the 

trial judge. If she should conclude that reassignment is in 

order, obviously she retains the discretion to act upon that 

conclusion. We will not review the alleged errors set forth by 

appellant with regard to enhancements as we have no reason 

to do so at this time. We have already set aside the sentence. 

While it may be that the trial court will reach the same 

conclusions on remand, it may not. It may even be that 

appellant will be sufficiently satisfied with the new sentence 

to come before us no more. It may be that the plea agreement will be voided and the plea set aside. In any event, 

USCA Case #96-3145 Document #303873 Filed: 10/21/1997 Page 9 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

today's disposition is determined by the breached plea agreement without regard to the other matters and we need not 

decide those issues which will not affect the outcome.

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above we conclude that we must 

set aside appellant's sentence and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We leave to the district court the question of reassignment and such other 

matters not foreclosed above.

USCA Case #96-3145 Document #303873 Filed: 10/21/1997 Page 10 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I would send the case back for resentencing 

before a different district judge.

The defendant did not come clean with the probation 

officer, but that was of no moment under this strange plea 

agreement. By its terms, the government's promise to speak 

in favor of a downward adjustment for the defendant's acceptance of responsibility did not depend on the defendant's 

telling the truth to the probation officer, or to the district 

court. The government did not uphold its end of the bargain 

and so my colleagues rightly conclude that the defendant 

must have another sentencing in which the government fulfills its obligation. The defendant is entitled to specific 

performance of the government's end of the plea bargain. 

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). The only 

serious question is who should do the resentencing, the 

original district judge or a new one.

Like my colleagues, I cannot gather much guidance on the 

remedial question from Santobello. The first prosecutor 

promised Santobello not to recommend any particular sentence; a substitute prosecutor then urged the state judge to 

imprison Santobello for the maximum term. The judge ordered the maximum sentence in light of Santobello's long 

criminal history and said that the prosecutor's recommendation played no role whatever in his sentencing judgment. See

404 U.S. at 259. If one took the judge at his word, sending 

the case back to him for resentencing would have been 

senseless.* And so the Supreme Court ordered any resentencing of Santobello to be done by a different judge. I 

suppose this avoided making the prosecutor's breach a clear 

harmless error and preserved the possibility that Santobello 

__________

* The Court did say that it "need not reach the question whether 

the sentencing judge would or would not have been influenced had 

he known all the details of the negotiations for the plea." 404 U.S. 

at 262. This seems to me a red herring. So far as I can tell, 

nothing in the plea agreement required either party to inform the 

judge of "the details of the negotiations." See 404 U.S. at 258.

USCA Case #96-3145 Document #303873 Filed: 10/21/1997 Page 11 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

might receive some benefit from the prosecutor's promised 

silence.

What carries the day for me is not the reasoning given for 

the Santobello remedythere was noneor the remedy itself, which may have been prompted by the state judge's 

remarks, but the desirability of having a fixed rule in these 

cases, one easy to understand and easy to administer. Sending every defendant back to the original judge would, of 

course, be such a rule. But no one has urged it because there 

are some cases deserving of assignment to a new sentencing 

judge, a point on which all of us agree. I therefore come to 

the following position: in all cases in which the government 

breaches a plea agreement by doing something to influence 

the judge against the defendant in sentencing, the case should 

be remanded to a different judge for resentencing. (I would 

reserve an exception for breaches so harmless that we would 

not vacate the sentence, see Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a).)

The majority has a different approach. It wants to winnow 

out those cases not warranting reassignment on remand. 

This is to be done by applying another one of these multipronged "tests" in which the court of appeals balances imponderablesin other words, by applying no real test at all. The 

alternative I favoralways remanding to another judge

may not be a perfect solution. The new sentencing judge will 

probably learn of what the government said (but should not 

have said) at the initial sentencing and may have as much 

trouble keeping that information out of mind as would the 

original sentencing judge. The status quo thus may be 

impossible to restore fully. But at least we can make the 

attempt without trying to apply some standardless "standard."

USCA Case #96-3145 Document #303873 Filed: 10/21/1997 Page 12 of 12