Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-02-03196/USCOURTS-ca8-02-03196-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Lee Norman
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 02-3196

___________

United States of America, *

*

 Appellee, *

*

v. * Appeals From the United States

* District Court for the

Robert Lee Norman, also known as * Southern District of Iowa.

Skunk, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

No. 02-3223/3362

___________

United States of America, *

*

 Appellee/Cross Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Russell J. Schoenauer, *

*

Appellant/Cross-Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: October 23, 2003

Filed: January 22, 2005

 Vacated: May 27, 2005

 Reinstated: October 31, 2005

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Appellate Case: 02-3196 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/31/2005 Entry ID: 1969069
1

This procedure is commonly known as the Supreme Court’s “GVR”

mechanism. In Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163 (1996) (per curiam), the Supreme

Court explained the process and its basis. Essentially, a GVR disposition is

appropriate where intervening developments, such as a new decision of the Court or

a new agency interpretation of a rule, call into question the lower court’s ruling. Id.

at 167-68. The GVR is not the equivalent of a reversal on the merits, however.

Rather, the Court remands for the sake of judicial economy–so that the lower court

can more fully consider the issue with the wisdom of the intervening development.

Id.; see also id. at 174 (“Indeed, it is precisely because we are uncertain, without

undertaking plenary analysis, of the legal impact of a new development, especially

one, such as the present, which the lower court has had no opportunity to consider,

that we GVR.”).

2

The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa.

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Before RILEY, HEANEY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

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HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

These cases have returned to our panel following the Supreme Court’s grant of

certiorari, vacation of the judgment, and remand for reconsideration in light of United

States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).1 We requested supplemental briefing from

the parties regarding the applicability of Booker and United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d

543 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc), to their respective cases. With respect to all matters

other than our reconsideration of the defendants’ sentences in light of Booker, we

adhere to our prior opinion. See United States v. Cuervo, 354 F.3d 969 (8th Cir.

2004). As to the Booker issues, we affirm for the reasons stated below.

Robert Lee Norman and Russell J. Schoenauer were sentenced pursuant to the

district court’s2

 application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Norman

received a 352-month sentence, consisting of a 292-month guidelines sentence for his

drug trafficking convictions and a consecutive 60-month sentence for using a firearm

Appellate Case: 02-3196 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/31/2005 Entry ID: 1969069
3

The author of this opinion dissented in Pirani on the issue of what type of

objection is sufficient to preserve a Booker issue for review, and stands by that

dissent. See Pirani, 406 F.3d at 555-62 (Heaney, J., dissenting). Under that view,

each of these defendants would have preserved their Booker claims through their

objections to the district court’s drug quantity determinations. A majority of our court

en banc has held to the contrary, however, and this panel is not at liberty to overrule

that decision.

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in furtherance of drug trafficking. Schoenauer received a 210-month guidelines

sentence. 

At the time of sentencing, the court understood the guidelines to be mandatory.

Although both Norman and Schoenauer were subject to a number of required sentence

enhancements under the guidelines regime, neither of them challenged either the

enhancements or the guidelines system in a manner that would preserve the Booker

issue for our review.3 Pirani, 406 F.3d at 549-50 (holding that a claim of Booker error

is preserved if the defendant below argued that his sentence violated Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), or that the

guidelines were unconstitutional). Thus, we review for plain error. United States v.

Ryder, 414 F.3d 908, 917 (8th Cir. 2005). Plain error relief is warranted if the

defendant can show that the district court committed an error that is plain, which

affected his substantial rights, and which, if left uncorrected, would seriously affect

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Johnson v. United

States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997); Pirani, 406 F.3d at 550.

The first two factors are satisfied in these cases because the district court

sentenced the defendants under the mandatory guidelines regime, “and we have

previously determined that error to be plain.” United States v. Backer, 419 F.3d 882,

884 (8th Cir. 2005). In this circuit, our next task is to determine whether there is a

reasonable probability, based on the appellate record as a whole, that the defendants

would have received a more favorable sentence absent the Booker error. Pirani, 406

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F.3d at 551-52. If so, we consider whether we must correct the error to preserve the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 550.

Having carefully reviewed the entire record in Schoenauer’s case, we conclude

that he cannot establish a reasonable probability that he would have received a more

favorable sentence absent the Booker error. Although Schoenauer received a twolevel sentence departure, this was not indicative of the district court’s desire to further

deviate from the guidelines. The departure was specifically designed to counter a

two-level enhancement Schoenauer had received for possessing a dangerous weapon

during the commission of his drug crimes. Cuervo, 354 F.3d at 999. The district

court believed that enhancement was required, but further believed that the

circumstances of the enhancement took Schoenauer’s case out of the “heartland,”

justifying a departure. Id. Thus, the departure in this case does not establish a

reasonable probability of a more favorable sentence under the advisory guidelines.

We note that Schoenauer received a sentence in the middle of his adjusted guidelines

range, cf. United States v. Perez-Ramirez, 415 F.3d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding

persuasive the fact that a district court sentenced a defendant in the middle of his

guidelines range, leaving “unused some of its discretion to sentence Perez-Ramirez

to a more favorable sentence under the mandatory, pre-Booker guidelines”), and we

have found no other indication in the record supportive of Schoenauer’s contention

that he would have received a more lenient sentence under the advisory guidelines.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s sentence with respect to Schoenauer.

We now turn to Norman’s case. At the time of his sentencing, Norman

presented evidence that he suffered from Type 2 diabetes, retinopathy, hypertension,

and arthritis. His conditions require the administration of a regimen of medication,

including several shots of insulin, daily. Norman moved for a downward departure

based on his physical condition. The district court made the following statement

regarding the downward departure:

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Mr. Lowe [Norman’s attorney], I think your client has a serious

condition. Whether or not it is an extreme physical impairment isn’t

supported, in my view, by the medical records that I’ve read. Here’s

what I would urge you to do–there must be a way to do this. I’m not an

appellate lawyer anymore–but you should get some updated medical.

Based on what I got from Springfield . . . . I don’t think it qualifies under

[United States Sentencing Guidelines section] 5H1.4. Do you have any

cases or argument? Because all the cases I’ve found, as well as the

guideline, tell me the quality of this medical evidence–that the evidence

simply is not there.

. . . . 

And, you know, as a layperson, I think that diabetes 1 or 2 with

retinopathy is a condition that would fit into [United States Sentencing

Guidelines section] 5H1.4. But I’m not a doctor. If you get a doctor to

tell me, I think I’d have a basis to depart. But based on this record, and

specifically I’m referring to the medical evidence that I have from

Springfield as of 5-31-02, I think it would be reversible error to find a

departure based on 5H1.4.

(Sent. Tr. at 45-46.) 

Norman would have us interpret this statement as suggestive that the district

court would have granted a lower sentence had it been aware the guidelines were not

mandatory. We read it differently. The report referenced by the district court in the

above passage is from the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield,

Illinois, a report we have independently reviewed. As the district court noted, the

report stated that Norman’s “physical activities are not restricted,” and that Norman’s

treatment regimen could be followed “at any institution.” (Id. at 32.) Thus, this is not

a situation where the district court would have liked to have given a lower sentence

but found no avenue available, Ryder, 414 F.3d at 919-20 (granting plain error Booker

Appellate Case: 02-3196 Page: 5 Date Filed: 10/31/2005 Entry ID: 1969069
4

The district court was well aware that Norman’s convictions for maintaining

a continuing criminal enterprise, 21 U.S.C. § 848, and using a firearm in furtherance

of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), mandated a minimum sentence of at

least 300 months.

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relief where the record clearly indicated the district court disapproved of the

guidelines sentence it imposed, although it found the defendants did not qualify for

sentence departures), or where the record reflects serious concerns about the

defendant’s ability to receive needed medical care while incarcerated, United States

v. Spigner, 416 F.3d 708, 712-13 (8th Cir. 2005). Rather, the district court in this case

sought some evidence from Norman disputing the Springfield report’s conclusion that

his health would not be adversely affected by his incarceration–evidence which

Norman failed to present. Although the district court couched its sentence in terms

of Norman’s failure to qualify for a physical-condition departure under the mandatory

guidelines,4

 we see no basis in the record suggesting the reasonable possibility of a

different result under the now-advisory guidelines.

Because neither defendant has established a reasonable probability of a more

lenient sentence if they were sentenced under the advisory guidelines regime, we need

not consider whether they established the fourth prong necessary to warrant plain error

relief. We affirm the sentences imposed by the district court.

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Appellate Case: 02-3196 Page: 6 Date Filed: 10/31/2005 Entry ID: 1969069