Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03995/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03995-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dave Dormire
Appellee
Al Luebbers
Appellee
Jeremiah (Jay) W. Nixon
Appellee
James Purkett
Appellee
Melvin Leroy Tyler
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3995

___________

Melvin Leroy Tyler, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

James Purkett, Superintendent at FCC; * Western District of Missouri.

Al Luebbers; Jeremiah (Jay) W. Nixon; *

Dave Dormire, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: April 12, 2005

Filed: July 5, 2005

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Melvin Leroy Tyler appeals from the district court’s1

 decision finding that no

testable physical evidence in his case currently exists and that the evidence was lost

under negligent or otherwise inadvertent circumstances. We affirm.

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2

Tyler later made a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to vacate the district court’s

denial of his second petition. The district court denied the motion. We declined to

grant a certificate of probable cause and dismissed Tyler’s appeal. Tyler v. Purkett,

No. 96-1016 (8th Cir. Jan. 18, 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1031 (1997).

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I.

A.

In 1977, Tyler was convicted of one count each of robbery in the first degree,

rape, kidnaping, and armed criminal action for a December 27, 1976, attack on a

housewife in Columbia, Missouri. After denying a motion for new trial, the state

court judge presiding at Tyler’s trial sentenced him to a total of 185 years’

imprisonment. Tyler promptly appealed, and his conviction was upheld by the

Missouri Court of Appeals. State v. Tyler, 587 S.W.2d 918 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).

Tyler then filed his first petition for federal habeas corpus relief, which we dismissed

for failure to exhaust certain claims. Tyler v. Wyrick, 730 F.2d 1209 (8th Cir. 1984).

In 1989, Tyler filed his first motion for state postconviction relief. Following

a lengthy evidentiary hearing, the state court denied Tyler’s motion, and its decision

was affirmed on appeal. Tyler v. State, 794 S.W.2d 252 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). Tyler

subsequently filed two more motions for state postconviction relief, but both were

denied as untimely or successive. Tyler v. State, 941 S.W.2d 856 (Mo. Ct. App.

1997) (untimely); Tyler v. State, 994 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (untimely and

successive).

After failing to secure postconviction relief in Missouri state court, Tyler filed

a second petition for federal habeas corpus relief in 1990. The district court denied

Tyler’s petition, and we denied his subsequent motion for a certificate of probable

cause. Tyler v. Purkett, No. 93-2757 (8th Cir. Sept. 7, 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S.

1008 (1993).2

 Tyler next filed a third petition in federal court, which was again

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3

Both Tyler’s second and third federal habeas petitions were adjudicated by the

Honorable Joseph E. Stevens, Jr., United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri. After Judge Stevens’s death, Tyler’s cases were transferred to

Judge Gaitan.

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denied by the district court.3

 We denied Tyler’s motion for a certificate of

appealability. Tyler v. Purkett, No. 97-1327 (8th Cir. Mar. 17, 1997).

In 1998, Tyler sought to reopen both his 1990 (second) and 1994 (third)

petitions by making another Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to the district court. In

substance, the Rule 60(b) motion contended that various physical

evidence—including the victim’s undergarments and semen and hair samples taken

therefrom—was currently possessed by the State; that the State had misled and

defrauded both the Missouri state courts and the federal courts in representing that

it no longer had such evidence or that such evidence never existed; that such evidence

should be tested immediately in order to prove Tyler’s innocence; and that newly

discovered evidence existed mandating the reopening of his case. The district court

treated the motion as a second or successive habeas petition, and thus held that it

could not consider the motion absent authorization from this court. See, e.g., 28

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). The motion was therefore denied, as was Tyler’s subsequent

motion for reconsideration. 

On appeal, a panel of this court initially denied Tyler’s motion for a certificate

of appealability. After Tyler petitioned for rehearing, however, the en banc court

granted a certificate of appealability “on the question whether there exists evidence,

such as semen, hair, items of clothing, and related materials, that could be subjected

to DNA testing.” Tyler v. Purkett, No. 00-1432 (8th Cir. June 20, 2000). The en

banc court’s order further instructed the district court to conduct an evidentiary

hearing on Tyler’s argument that testable evidence existed, to order the evidence

tested if the district court found that such evidence did exist, and to enter findings

regarding the circumstances of the evidence’s destruction or loss if the district court

found that the evidence existed at one time but could no longer be found. Id.

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In addition, prior to his hearing in the district court, Tyler filed a motion for

DNA testing in Missouri state court. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 547.035. After an

evidentiary hearing, the state court similarly found that the victim’s undergarments,

as well as any hair and semen samples, were lost between 1977 and 1989.

Furthermore, the state court found that the circumstances of the evidence’s loss did

not constitute bad faith resulting in a denial of due process. See Arizona v.

Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57 (1988). The state court accordingly denied Tyler’s

motion, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Tyler, 142 S.W.3d 785

(Mo. Ct. App. 2004).

5

Tyler apparently does not dispute that the semen discarded by Dr. See no

longer exists or that the hair samples taken from himself, the victim’s couch, and the

victim were destroyed in a neutron activation test, the results of which were

inconclusive. See Tyler D. Ct. Exhibit A at items 6-8.

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Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court ultimately found that the

evidence cited by Tyler (semen, hair, items of clothing, and related materials) no

longer existed and could not be found, and thus could not be subjected to DNA

testing. D. Ct. Order of September 5, 2003, at 6. The district court further found that,

although such evidence had existed at one time, the evidence was accidentally,

negligently, or otherwise unintentionally lost or destroyed at some time after Tyler’s

1977 trial but before his first state postconviction motion in 1989.4

 Id. at 7.

B.

Tyler’s claims on appeal center on the fate of three items collected from the

victim of his crimes: her panties, pantaloons, and a piece of tissue paper taken from

the panties. It is undisputed that the items were collected from the victim shortly after

the commission of the crimes. Other items collected in connection with the Columbia

Police Department’s investigation included a pubic hair from the couch on which the

rape took place, a blood-covered shirt, and pubic hairs from both the victim and

Tyler. Additionally, Dr. William See, the victim’s gynecologist, collected a specimen

of fluid from the victim’s vagina, observed a number of active sperm when observing

the specimen under a microscope, and discarded the specimen.5

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6

The evidence in question was not offered at trial.

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Prior to trial, Tyler and his appointed counsel each made a motion for

appointment of experts. Tyler’s counsel requested an order appointing an expert “to

analyze certain fingerprints and hair and blood samples taken and collected at the

scene” of the crime. Trial Tr. at 50-51. Tyler himself (acting pro se) requested that

experts be appointed “because of the fact that the State of Missouri [would] introduce

certain evidence of fingerprints, sperm, and possibly hair,” “because the failure of the

state to provide a neutron activation test on the sperm and hair” necessitated the

appointment of an expert to conduct such tests, and because “any traces of sperm,

hair, blood, etc., [could not] be used wherein defendant cannot show the same does

not belong to him.” Id. at 142-44. In denying both motions, the trial court found that

no evidence involving fingerprints, hair, blood, or seminal fluid existed, had been

collected, would be offered at trial, or was in the possession of anyone.6

 Id. at 412.

The state prosecutor noted that Dr. See had found some seminal fluid during his

examination of the victim, but that it had not been collected. Id. Tyler later asserted

in his motion for new trial that the state had “failed to disclose the blood typing of the

sperm found on panties, tissue, and pantaloons” taken from the victim, id. at 1156,

but the trial court either refused to consider the issue—raised in a pro se amended

pleading—or rejected the argument without comment.

On direct appeal, Tyler apparently did not argue that experts should have been

appointed for him or that the State had failed to disclose certain evidence or test

results. Instead, he argued that Dr. See’s testimony should not have been admitted

because Dr. See had not attempted to determine the blood type of the sperm’s source.

In his first motion for state postconviction relief, Tyler renewed this claim. In

addition, Tyler asserted that the State had failed to conduct the proper tests on the

semen found by Dr. See and had failed to disclose that testing had been done on the

victim’s clothing and the results of such tests. He further alleged that he was denied

due process through the erroneous denial of his motion to appoint experts. Shortly

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after Tyler filed interrogatories in connection with his postconviction motion, the

State asserted that the evidence Tyler referenced—the victim’s panties and

pantaloons, as well as the tissue—could no longer be found and thus could no longer

be tested. Tyler subsequently argued that, as a result of the loss, he was entitled to

an immediate vacation of his sentence and a discharge from incarceration. 

Tyler’s postconviction arguments focused on a report compiled by Susan Land,

who in 1977 was a forensic chemist at the Missouri State Highway Patrol Laboratory.

The report, which Tyler utilized in his postconviction pleadings, showed that Land

had examined the items of clothing in question. The report stated that tests conducted

on the clothing had detected the presence of acid phosphatase—a component of

seminal fluid—on the panties, pantaloons, and tissue and had indicated the presence

of sperm on the panties. The report further showed that certain hairs had been

separated from the panties. Tyler claimed that the report clearly proved that the

evidence was, at the very least, available to be tested at the time of his trial. 

Although the state court agreed that the evidence had once been available, it

disagreed that the fact that the evidence was no longer available mandated Tyler’s

release. Specifically, the state court held that the circumstances surrounding the loss

of the evidence demonstrated a lack of intent to destroy or dispose of the evidence

and that Tyler had thus failed to show the requisite bad faith to make out a denial of

due process under Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57 (1988). See Tyler Exhibit

F-4 at 766-67.

In his subsequent second and third federal habeas petitions, Tyler again

asserted error in the denial of his motion for appointment of experts. In his federal

petitions, however, Tyler specifically attributed the error to the State’s failure to

disclose that Land had collected semen, hair, and phosphates from the victim’s

undergarments and that such evidence was available to test. After both petitions were

denied, Tyler brought the instant Rule 60(b) motion.

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In the district court, Tyler attempted to avoid the treatment of his Rule 60(b)

motion as a second or successive habeas petition in two ways. Neither is availing in

this case. First, Tyler claimed that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Thompson v.

Calderon, 151 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 1998), differentiates his motion from a second or

successive habeas petition. In Thompson, the Ninth Circuit stated in dicta that, “if

the State’s misconduct prevented the defendant from testing potentially exculpatory

evidence which might provide the information necessary to assert a factual predicate

for a successive petition, an independent Rule 60(b)(3) motion might be appropriate.”

Id. at 921 n.3 (emphasis added). We decline to utilize this dictum as a basis for

modifying our settled practice of construing Rule 60(b) motions to reopen habeas

cases as second or successive petitions when such motions “effectively or ultimately”

seek habeas relief. See United States v. Lambros, 404 F.3d 1034, 1036 (8th Cir.

2005) (per curiam). Accord Gonzalez v. Crosby, No. 04-6432, slip op. at 13 (U.S.

June 23, 2005). Furthermore, it is notable that the Ninth Circuit opined that its

distinction was justified by the fact that, in such a case, an application for

authorization to file a successive habeas corpus petition would provide no relief

because a state might have an incentive to conceal evidence. Thompson, 151 F.3d

at 921 n.3. In this case, however, the State of Missouri has no such incentive because

it is undisputed that the evidence complained of was lost prior to Tyler’s second

habeas petition.

Second, Tyler suggests that the State’s failure to disclose the existence of the

evidence tested by Land constituted fraud on both the state and federal courts

sufficient to bypass the procedural bar established by 28 U.S.C. § 2244. See

generally Fierro v. Johnson, 197 F.3d 147, 153-54 (5th Cir. 1999). Claims that a

party did not disclose to a court certain facts allegedly pertinent to the matter before

it, however, do not normally constitute fraud on the court. Id. at 154. Furthermore,

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II.

As an initial matter, we must determine the framework under which we will

consider Tyler’s claims on appeal. The Rule 60(b) motion on which we granted a

certificate of appealability arose from habeas petitions filed in 1990 and 1994.

Because the Rule 60(b) motion “sought ultimately to resurrect the denial” of Tyler’s

earlier habeas petitions by asserting new claims of error in his state conviction and

reasserting prior claims, however, it was properly construed as second or successive.7

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for reasons stated below, we do not believe that the actions complained of in this case

are sufficiently egregious to establish the “corrupt conduct” required to avoid § 2244.

Id. at 155.

-8-

Gonzalez v. Crosby, No. 04-6432, slip op. at 6, 7 n.4, 13 (U.S. June 23, 2005); United

States v. Lambros, 404 F.3d 1034, 1036 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Furthermore,

because the Rule 60(b) motion was filed after April 26, 1996—the effective date of

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)—and because

Tyler’s prior petitions for habeas corpus relief were no longer pending on their merits

at the time that the motion was filed, the motion is subject to AEDPA’s strictures.

See, e.g., Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204, 206-07 (2003).

When addressing habeas corpus petitions subject to AEDPA, we review the

district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.

Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 2004). In addition, we accord a

presumption of correctness to state court determinations of factual issues. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e). Furthermore, we may grant habeas relief with respect to a claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in a state court proceeding only if the state court decision

(1) was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state

court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Ryan v. Clarke, 387 F.3d 785, 790-91 (8th

Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3694 (May 31, 2005).

A.

Tyler first argues that because the State cannot show exactly how or when the

disputed evidence was lost, and because the State allegedly failed to disclose the

existence of the evidence, the district court’s factual findings that the loss was

accidental, negligent, or otherwise unintentional were clearly erroneous. We

disagree.

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8

The items listed as received by the prosecutor’s office included one

miscellaneous lot of underclothes and one hair sample. Tyler D. Ct. Exhibit A at item

1. This is consistent with the evidence listed in Land’s report. Id. at item 5.

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Pursuant to our 2000 order, the district court received live testimony and

deposition transcripts from a variety of individuals involved in the retention and

movement of evidence in this case, as well as various exhibits. Evidence routing slips

show that a bag containing the victim’s undergarments was originally taken to the

Missouri State Highway Patrol Laboratory on January 21, 1977. Tyler’s D. Ct.

Exhibit A at item 5. After examination by Land, the items were returned to the

Columbia Police Department on March 3, 1977, id. at item 21, and were forwarded

to the Boone County prosecutor’s office on March 16, 1977.8

 Id. at item 1. Milt

Harper, the prosecutor in Tyler’s case, testified that trial evidence in a specific case

would normally stay in the prosecutor’s office until the appellate process was

complete, that he instructed his employees to be “very careful” in handling the

evidence in Tyler’s case, that his policy of directing employees not to destroy

evidence in Tyler’s case applied regardless of whether the evidence was actually

utilized at trial, and that the evidence in Tyler’s case was still in the prosecutor’s

office when he stepped down in 1978. Tyler D. Ct. Exhibit E at 28, 30, 47-52, 66.

Joe Moseley, who succeeded Harper and held the office until 1992, similarly testified

that the prosecutor’s office could not destroy evidence without a court order, that he

did not instruct anyone to destroy evidence, and that nobody on his staff would have

destroyed evidence. Tyler D. Ct. Exhibit D at 12, 16-17. Moseley further stated that

some of the evidence was moved out of the prosecutor’s office due to remodeling.

Id. at 13-14.

In that regard, Ruby Marsden, an investigator with the Boone County

prosecutor’s office, testified that in 1980 she moved a box of evidence marked with

Tyler’s name and case number to the Columbia Police Department in anticipation of

a remodeling project at the prosecutor’s office. D. Ct. Hr’g Tr. at 8-10. Although she

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stated that she physically transferred the box to Lester Wright, the evidence

technician at the Columbia Police Department, id. at 11-14, no evidence routing

forms were signed by Wright or by any other employee of the Columbia Police

Department. Id. at 21-23. Wright testified that he remembered receiving a large

amount of evidence from the prosecutor’s office in 1980, but that he had no specific

recollection of receiving any evidence in Tyler’s case. Id. at 36-37. He further stated

that, to the best of his knowledge, he had never received instructions to destroy or

dispose of evidence he received from Marsden in 1980, including any evidence from

Tyler’s case. Id. at 37. Yvonne Dittmer, Wright’s successor until 1992, testified that

she had no recollection of the presence of evidence in Tyler’s case during her tenure

and that she would not have destroyed it without permission from the prosecutor’s

office. Id. at 49-51. Searches of both the prosecutor’s office and the Columbia Police

Department conducted since prior to 1989 have failed to uncover any of the evidence

that Tyler asserts exists. Id. at 5-8, 57-58.

Although the discrepancy between Marsden’s records and her recollection may

signal the presence of negligence or lax record keeping, the testimony considered by

the district court contains no facts that even hint at the intentional destruction of the

disputed evidence in this case. Furthermore, we do not believe that Tyler’s allegation

regarding the state’s failure to disclose the disputed evidence has any bearing on the

issue of whether the evidence was intentionally lost or destroyed. Finally, the mere

fact that a set of fingerprints connected to the crime were analyzed in 1988, see id. at

77-78, sheds no light on the whereabouts of the specific evidence at issue here:

semen, hair, items of clothing, and related materials. Accordingly, the district court’s

factual findings are not clearly erroneous.

B.

Tyler next claims that the actions of the state in first failing to disclose the

existence of the disputed evidence and then “mysteriously” losing or destroying such

evidence constituted bad faith sufficient to deprive him of due process. The district

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court did not make specific conclusions of law on this issue (nor can it be faulted for

doing so, given the direction in our June 20, 2000, order to enter factual findings

only), but our review of the legal ramifications of the loss of the disputed evidence

flows from the terms of that order. Although Tyler does not identify a specific legal

framework for his argument, his claim is most properly viewed under the Supreme

Court’s decision in Arizona v. Youngblood. 488 U.S. at 57-58 (bad faith analysis is

appropriate where the Court considered “the failure of the State to preserve

evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it could have been

subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant”).

Furthermore, because two Missouri state courts have previously considered the

Youngblood issue in this case and found an absence of bad faith, see Tyler Exhibit

F-4 at 766-67 (denial of first state postconviction motion), aff’d, 794 S.W.2d 252;

Appellee’s App. at 64-69 (denial of state motion for DNA testing), aff’d, 142 S.W.3d

785, we must give those decisions the deference mandated by AEDPA. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Considering the record and the legal arguments raised by Tyler, we do not

believe that the state courts’ findings of an absence of bad faith resulted in decisions

that were contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Similarly, we do not believe that such decisions were

based upon unreasonable determinations of facts in light of the evidence before each

court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

Tyler contends that the State failed to disclose the existence of the disputed

evidence prior to his state postconviction motion. His contention is belied, however,

by numerous instances in the record. In a second supplemental motion for new trial,

filed in the trial court shortly after his conviction, Tyler claimed as error the State’s

failure to disclose the “blood typing of the sperm found on panties, tissue and

pantaloons taken from the alleged victim.” Trial Tr. at 1156. It is difficult to imagine

how Tyler could have known of the presence of sperm on any of the victim’s

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9

Such a claim, even if made in the alternative in this case, would similarly be

insufficient to show bad faith because “the police do not have a constitutional duty

to perform any particular tests.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 59.

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clothing, let alone used the specific names of the items of clothing identified in

Land’s report, see Tyler D. Ct. Exhibit A at item 5, if such information had not been

disclosed to him. In addition, Tyler repeatedly stated in his pro se pleadings in his

first state postconviction motion that the State had disclosed Land’s report, but had

not disclosed the results of her tests for semen and acid phosphatase or the manner

in which she conducted the tests.9

 See Tyler Exhibit F-2 at 204-05 (while February

28, 1977, report of Land was tendered, State did not offer to test Tyler and did not

disclose whether secreter testing was done on seminal fluid sample from victim’s

undergarments), 220 (State did not disclose results of tests performed by State

Highway Patrol concerning, inter alia, sperm and acid phosphatase), 237 (State

disclosed that acid phosphatase was found on victim’s clothing, but did not disclose

the type and manner of test done), 314 (State made report of Susan Land available

following the February 28, 1977, finding that semen, phosphatase, and hair were

found, but did not make such items available for testing). Furthermore, Tyler’s

assisting counsel at the trial testified in Tyler’s first state postconviction motion that,

in his view, everything had been disclosed to Tyler prior to the commencement of the

trial. Tyler Exhibit E-2 at 216 (“I think we got everything there was to get”), 261

(assisting counsel examined some clothing of victim). Although Tyler may not have

received Land’s laboratory notes until some later date, such notes provided no

information that was not disclosed by the report. See Tyler D. Ct. Exhibit A at item

24.

Given these facts, we believe that Tyler’s case is controlled by our recent

decision in Ferguson v. Roper, 400 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2005), in which we held that

Youngblood does not apply to claims that evidence was lost or destroyed after trial.

Id. at 638. Notably, we held in Ferguson that Youngblood is inapplicable even in the

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face of an allegation that the prosecutor may not have disclosed the evidence prior to

trial. Id. If Youngblood is inapplicable in such a case, it is equally inapplicable in

a case—like Tyler’s—in which the existence of the evidence was disclosed prior to

trial. Although we find it puzzling that the State persisted in claiming that no samples

other than that discarded by Dr. See and those destroyed by neutron activation testing

had been “collected,” we do not believe that such conduct places this case outside of

Ferguson’s holding, especially in light of the fact that Tyler—who was, according to

the record, in possession of Land’s report—could have brought the report and its

findings to the attention of the trial court. Accordingly, we hold that Tyler’s

Youngblood claim is without merit.

C.

Tyler makes two additional arguments in favor of reversal. First, he contends

that the district court failed to follow the en banc court’s mandate by failing to order

the State to produce the results of tests conducted on the hairs recovered from the

victim’s undergarments. This claim fails, however, because there is no evidence in

the record tending to show that any tests were conducted on those hairs.

Two groups of hairs were collected in the course of the police investigation.

The first group, consisting of hairs taken from the victim’s couch, the victim herself,

and Tyler, were consumed in neutron activation testing as stated ante, note 4. The

second group were separated from the victim’s undergarments by Land and placed

in a small box. D. Ct. Hr’g Tr. at 72. Neither Land nor anyone else at the Missouri

State Highway Patrol Laboratory tested the hairs, as the laboratory did not have the

capability to do such testing. Tyler D. Ct. Exhibit A at item 27. The hairs were then

transferred to the Columbia Police Department, and eventually to the Boone County

prosecutor’s office, where their trail ends. In short, there is no indication in the

record that the second group of hairs was tested.

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Tyler’s second additional argument for reversal is that the district court should

have recused itself from conducting the evidentiary hearing. Specifically, he asserts

that because Judge Gaitan was a member of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western

District, at the time that Tyler made a motion for rehearing or transfer (to the Supreme

Court of Missouri) of the appeal of his first state postconviction motion, Judge Gaitan

was not permitted to conduct the evidentiary hearing. Because Tyler did not make

a motion for recusal in the district court, his only argument is that Judge Gaitan

should have recused himself sua sponte.

“Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify

himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”

28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The test for disqualification or recusal is an objective one and

asks whether, from the perspective of “the average person on the street,” a reasonable

man knowing all of the circumstances “would harbor doubts about the judge’s

impartiality.” United States v. Poludniak, 657 F.2d 948, 954 (8th Cir. 1981) (citation

omitted). Missouri Supreme Court Rule 83.02 states that a case may be transferred

to the Supreme Court of Missouri by order of a majority of the participating judges

of the Missouri Court of Appeals on account of “the general interest or importance

of a question involved in the case or for the purpose of reexamining existing law.”

Even accepting Tyler’s submission that all judges then sitting on the Missouri Court

of Appeals, Western District, ruled on his motion, we do not believe that Judge

Gaitan’s vote on such a motion would lead a reasonable person to harbor doubts

about his impartiality because neither an opinion on the general interest or importance

of an issue in a given case nor an opinion as to whether then-existing Missouri law

should have been reexamined provides any basis to question a jurist’s impartiality as

to the merits of the case. Accordingly, we do not believe that even the “appearance

of impartiality” is threatened in this case, thus requiring disqualification or recusal.

Poludniak, 657 F.2d at 954. Accord Dyas v. Lockhart, 705 F.2d 993, 997-98 (8th Cir.

1983) (remanding to a different district judge where judge who rendered opinion had

participated in a state court ruling on the merits of a case).

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10Tyler does not argue that his claim relies upon any new rule of constitutional

law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A).

-15-

III.

Finally, we hold that the grounds for relief presented in Tyler’s pro se reply

brief in this action are not subject to review. Tyler claims that, based upon newly

discovered deposition testimony that Land could have tested the disputed evidence

at the time of his trial, he is entitled to relief on his claim that the prosecution violated

its duty under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), to disclose the existence of the

disputed evidence. Because such a claim was presented, at the very least, in his

second federal habeas petition, it must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (“A

claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section

2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.”). Furthermore,

even if Tyler’s Brady claim was not presented in a prior habeas petition, it must be

dismissed unless he shows that: (1) “the factual predicate for the claim could not have

been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence”; and (2) “the facts

underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would

be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional

error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying

offense.”10 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B).

Tyler’s claim is not cognizable on successive habeas review because, even

assuming that the evidence could have been tested, Tyler cannot show that no

reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty, for we simply do not know what

the results of such tests would have been. Even if correctly and successfully

conducted, the tests may have excluded Tyler as the assailant or completely

inculpated him. A resort to speculation regarding what, if anything, the tests would

have shown, however, does not meet the requisite standard for considering claims

presented in a successive habeas petition.

Appellate Case: 03-3995 Page: 15 Date Filed: 07/05/2005 Entry ID: 1923726
11We express our appreciation to Tyler’s appointed counsel for her zealous

efforts on her client’s behalf.

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We affirm the findings entered by the district court pursuant to our June 20,

2000, order as not clearly erroneous. Furthermore, because there exists no basis upon

which to grant habeas relief, we fully and finally dismiss Tyler’s claims to the extent

that they present a habeas petition.11

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Appellate Case: 03-3995 Page: 16 Date Filed: 07/05/2005 Entry ID: 1923726