Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05171/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05171-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Central Intelligence Agency
Appellee
National Security Counselors
Appellant
United States Department of Defense
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 15, 2015 Decided January 15, 2016

No. 14-5171

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNSELORS,

APPELLANT

v.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-00442)

Bradley P. Moss argued the cause for appellant. With 

him on the briefs was Kelly B. McClanahan.

Mark W. Pennak, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were 

Benjamin C. Mizer, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and 

Leonard Schaitman, Attorney. 

Before: TATEL and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge PILLARD.

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PILLARD, Circuit Judge: An individual who litigates pro 

se is ineligible for attorney’s fees under the Freedom of 

Information Act (FOIA); the same is not ordinarily true of an 

organization that represents itself. This appeal asks whether a 

particularly small nonprofit corporation that represented itself 

is barred from recovering attorney’s fees under FOIA for the 

same reasons that render a pro se individual ineligible.

Congress sought to encourage meritorious FOIA 

litigation by making any “complainant” who substantially 

prevails eligible to recover reasonable attorney’s fees. 5 

U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i). Courts have recognized an 

exception from FOIA fee eligibility—which we have

described as “narrow”—barring attorney’s fees for legal work 

by any individual who successfully represents himself pro se. 

See Baker & Hostetler LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 473 

F.3d 312, 324-25 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Kay v. Ehrler, 499 

U.S. 432, 437-38 (1991)); Burka v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 

Human Servs., 142 F.3d 1286, 1288-89 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 

That exception is consistent with the broad statutory text of 

FOIA’s fee provision because the statutory reference to 

“attorney” fees contemplates an agency relationship that no 

individual can have with her- or himself. See Burka, 142 F.3d 

at 1288 (citing Kay, 499 U.S. at 435-36). It is the agency 

relationship between a lawyer and client that serves feeshifting’s goal of enlarging access to independent, objective 

legal advice. Id. Thus, although pro se individuals 

sometimes prevail, they are ineligible for attorney’s fees.

The district court held National Security Counselors, Inc. 

(NSC), a small, nonprofit corporation registered in Virginia, 

ineligible for fees. A lawyer who was one of the firm’s three 

co-founders and serves as its Executive Director represented 

NSC in litigation to obtain, under FOIA, documents that the 

government initially withheld. The court emphasized that the 

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attorney does virtually all of NSC’s work, including the legal 

work for which it seeks fees in this case. It therefore treated 

NSC as “a one-man operation” ineligible for fees under the 

pro se litigant exception. Nat’l Sec. Counselors v. CIA, 15 F. 

Supp. 3d 88, 93 (D.D.C. 2014). 

The district court failed to account correctly for NSC’s

status as a nonprofit corporation. The Supreme Court has 

drawn a clear distinction between an “organization, which is

always represented by counsel,” and a pro se individual. Kay, 

499 U.S. at 436 n.7. We have drawn the same line between 

organizations and individuals and held that “an organization 

remains eligible for attorney’s fees even when it represents 

itself in litigation.” Baker, 473 F.3d at 315 (fees under 

FOIA); accord Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 399-400 (4th Cir. 

2003) (fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505); Gold, Weems, Bruser, 

Sues & Rundell v. Metal Sales Mfg. Corp. (Gold), 236 F.3d 

214, 218-19 (5th Cir. 2000) (fees under the Louisiana Open 

Account Statute). In keeping with Kay, Baker, and the 

decisions of our sister circuits, we hold that a corporation with 

a legal identity distinct from the attorney who represents it in 

litigation is eligible to recover attorney’s fees under FOIA. 

Because NSC is such a corporation, it is not barred by the pro 

se litigant exception.

I.

NSC is a tax-exempt, nonprofit Virginia corporation. In 

2009, Kelly B. McClanahan co-founded NSC with Bradley P. 

Moss and Sean Heare. The record sheds light on the firm’s 

leadership and organizational structure. NSC operated 

initially as a tax-exempt, public-interest nonprofit association. 

It was established to serve four primary objectives: 

[1] to lawfully acquire from the government material 

related to national security matters and distribute it to 

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the public, [2] to use this material in the creation of 

original publications discussing the respective 

subjects, [3] to advocate for intelligent reform in the 

national security and information and privacy arenas, 

and [4] to provide a low-cost alternative to certain 

deserving clients involved in security law or 

information and privacy law-related proceedings. 

J.A. 26 (quoting http://nationalsecuritylaw.org). 

In January 2011, the organization took the further step of 

incorporating under Virginia law. Since then, it has 

conducted its activities as a nonprofit corporation under the 

name National Security Counselors, Inc. Virginia law 

imposes governance obligations on nonprofit corporations

like NSC. Anyone acting as a director to such a corporation 

owes a duty of loyalty to the interests of the corporation and 

must guard against conflicts of interest. See Byelick v. 

Vivadelli, 79 F. Supp. 2d 610, 623 (E.D. Va. 1999); see also 

Dodge v. Trs. of Randolph-Macon Woman’s Coll., 661 S.E.2d 

805, 809 (Va. 2008) (applying corporate directors’ duties to 

directors of nonstock charitable corporation). A director must 

discharge all directorial duties “in accordance with his [or 

her] good faith business judgment of the best interests of the 

corporation.” Va. Code § 13.1-870(A); see also Lake 

Monticello Owners’ Ass’n v. Lake, 463 S.E.2d 652, 656 (Va. 

1995). Virginia law subjects a nonprofit corporation like 

NSC to corporate recordkeeping requirements related to 

meetings, accounting, membership, articles of incorporation,

and bylaws. See Va. Code § 13.1-932(A)-(C), (E).

Record evidence identifies three NSC board members—

Kelly McClanahan, Bradley Moss, and Sean Heare—each of 

whom wears multiple hats in working part time for NSC. 

McClanahan, who specializes in national security and 

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information privacy law, is NSC’s CEO and Executive 

Director. He is an experienced litigator of whistleblower and 

FOIA matters who has dedicated much of his legal career to 

advocating for government transparency in the national 

security arena. McClanahan serves as the organization’s lead 

counsel in all cases before federal agencies and courts. He 

signs and submits all FOIA requests on NSC’s behalf and acts 

as the principal liaison between NSC and federal agencies. 

He is often the sole attorney of record on NSC’s cases, with 

“Of Counsel” attorneys and a “rotating class of legal interns”

sometimes supporting those litigation efforts. J.A. 105.

Moss is NSC’s Deputy Executive Director and the 

corporation’s registered agent. According to McClanahan’s

declaration, Moss “occasionally” “serves in an attorney 

capacity” for NSC and has appeared on the organization’s 

behalf in at least one FOIA case. J.A. 105; see also Docket,

Nat’l Sec. Counselors v. CIA, No. 12-284 (D.D.C.). Heare is

NSC’s Information Director and serves as the organization’s 

information security expert.

In pursuit of its stated public-interest goal to increase the 

transparency of the national security activities of the United 

States government, NSC frequently requests documents from 

federal agencies under FOIA. NSC also litigates cases, both 

in pursuit of its own FOIA requests, see, e.g., J.A. 18; Nat’l 

Sec. Counselors v. DOJ, No. 15-5117 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Nat’l 

Sec. Counselors v. CIA, No. 12-284 (D.D.C.); Nat’l Sec. 

Counselors v. CIA, No. 11-443 (D.D.C.), and on behalf of 

other clients with national-security-related claims, see, e.g., 

Mobley v. CIA, 806 F.3d 568 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

Between April and December 2010, NSC submitted four 

FOIA requests for disclosure of specified records of the 

Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence 

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Agency. Each of the requests stated that NSC was “a nonprofit organization under Virginia law.” J.A. 65, 71, 76, 82. 

Unsatisfied with the agencies’ responses to those requests, 

NSC filed this lawsuit, accompanied by NSC’s corporate 

disclosure statement as required under Local Civil Rule 7.1.

1

McClanahan was lead counsel for NSC. He was the only 

lawyer who entered an appearance in the district court. After 

a couple years of dueling motions and settlement negotiations, 

NSC was satisfied with the agencies’ identification and 

disclosures of responsive documents and so voluntarily 

dismissed the suit.2

NSC petitioned under FOIA for $14,794.90 in costs and 

attorney’s fees for McClanahan’s work between January 27, 

2011, and June 17, 2013. See NSC Fee Petition at 1, Nat’l 

Sec. Counselors v. CIA, No. 11-442 (D.D.C.), ECF No. 55. 

Without taking a position as to whether it might have been 

eligible for them, NSC did not seek fees for work in the

underlying agency proceedings during the period when it was 

operating as a tax-exempt association prior to its 

incorporation. Nor did it request fees for work performed for 

NSC by legal professionals other than McClanahan.

 1 Local Civil Rule 7.1 applies only to corporations and requires 

their counsel of record to file a “certificate listing any parent, 

subsidiary or affiliate of [the corporation] which, to the knowledge 

of counsel, has any outstanding securities in the hands of the 

public.” D.D.C. Local Civ. R. 7.1. 2 For purposes of this appeal, we give no consideration to NSC’s 

references to statements purportedly made by the parties during the 

course of settlement negotiations. As NSC concedes, those alleged 

statements were “not part of the record below,” Appellant’s Reply 

6, and therefore fall outside the appellate record. See Fed. R. App. 

P. 10; Swanson Grp. Mfg. LLC v. Jewell, 790 F.3d 235, 240 (D.C. 

Cir. 2015).

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On February 2, 2014, the district court denied NSC’s fee 

petition. The court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Kay to hold NSC ineligible for attorney’s fees. The court 

correctly observed that “this Circuit permits an ‘organization’ 

to recover attorney’s fees for its ‘in-house counsel’ where the 

attorney acts as an agent on behalf of the corporation.” Nat’l 

Sec. Counselors, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 92. But NSC was not an 

eligible organization, in the court’s view, because 

McClanahan does the lion’s share of NSC’s work and plays a 

leadership role in the nonprofit corporation and NSC was the 

only client in the case. The judge saw “little, if any, 

distinction” between NSC and McClanahan, id., and so cast 

NSC as essentially McClanahan’s “one-man operation,” id. at 

93. Although she acknowledged NSC’s corporate status and 

website, and mentioned unrefuted evidence that people other 

than McClanahan act as officers and part-time staff of NSC, 

the judge nonetheless demanded further evidence that NSC 

“publicly identifies itself as an incorporated entity, or in any 

other way distinct from Mr. McClanahan.” Id. She noted that 

McClanahan’s colleague Bradley Moss appeared at least once 

as NSC’s attorney in a different FOIA case, but discounted 

that as “too slim a reed” to overcome other evidence showing

that NSC is nothing more than “Mr. McClanahan as a sole 

practitioner.” Id. She emphasized McClanahan’s 

statement—made in another case in which NSC sought

discovery of information subject to a protective order—that, 

as NSC’s counsel and Executive Director, he was “in effect 

both the counsel and the party.” Id. The court thus treated

NSC in this case not as a “client separate from Mr. 

McClanahan,” but equivalent to a pro se individual “ineligible 

for an award of attorney’s fees” under Kay and Burka. Id. at 

93-94.

NSC timely sought reconsideration of the fee-denial 

order under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60. The 

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district court denied the motion in relevant part, reaffirming 

its determination that NSC is ineligible for attorney’s fees 

under FOIA because “McClanahan is National Security 

Counselors.” Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part 

Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. at 3, Nat’l Sec. Counselors v. CIA, No. 

11-442 (D.D.C.), ECF No. 73.3 This appeal followed.

II.

We review de novo questions of law, including the legal 

standards governing fee eligibility under FOIA. See Edmonds 

v. FBI, 417 F.3d 1319, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also 

Pietrangelo v. U.S. Army, 568 F.3d 341, 343 (2d Cir. 2009);

cf. Gold, 236 F.3d at 216 (concluding that “[t]he district 

court’s resolution of whether an attorney representing himself 

could collect fees under the open account statute is a 

conclusion of law we review de novo”).

A.

The question in this appeal is whether NSC is ineligible 

for attorney’s fees under FOIA’s fee-shifting provision. The 

government invokes the judicially created exception that bars 

individuals who represent themselves from recovering fees. 

Under that exception, individuals who successfully pursue 

their own cases pro se, whether they are lawyers or not, are 

ineligible to recover attorney’s fees. Kay, 499 U.S. at 433-36; 

Baker, 473 F.3d at 324; Burka, 142 F.3d at 1289-90. NSC is 

ineligible by the same token, the government contends, 

because “McClanahan acted as a pro se attorney in this 

matter.” Appellees’ Br. 15. NSC, for its part, contends that it 

 3 On reconsideration, the District Court correctly determined that 

NSC was entitled to the $350 in litigation costs irrespective of 

whether NSC is, in effect, a pro se individual litigant ineligible for 

attorney’s fees.

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has a legal status distinct from its in-house counsel,

McClanahan, and is therefore not ineligible for fees under 

Kay and Burka. We agree with NSC. 

While individuals who represent themselves may not 

recover fees, organizations that represent themselves may so 

recover. Baker, 473 F.3d at 324. The question here is 

whether NSC’s characteristics, including its small size and

McClanahan’s large role within it, warrant treating NSC like 

an individual rather than an organization. We think they do 

not. In reaching this conclusion, we are influenced by the 

statutory text, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kay, the 

ensuing decisions of our court, and those of other circuits.

FOIA authorizes district courts to “assess against the 

United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation 

costs reasonably incurred in any case . . . in which the 

complainant has substantially prevailed.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(a)(4)(E)(i). The statute contains no express limitation 

on who counts as an eligible “complainant” or whose work is 

compensable by payment of “attorney fees.” See Baker, 473 

F.3d at 324. We have interpreted section 552(a)(4)(E)(i) to 

require a prevailing plaintiff to show that it is both eligible for 

and entitled to fees. McKinley v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 739 

F.3d 707, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Once eligibility is 

established, a plaintiff must further demonstrate entitlement to 

fees “under the four criteria that the court weighs in 

determining whether attorney’s fees are appropriate.” Burka, 

142 F.3d at 1288 (listing the criteria as “(1) the public benefit 

derived from the case; (2) the commercial benefit to the 

plaintiff; (3) the nature of the plaintiff’s interest in the 

records; and (4) the reasonableness of the agency’s 

withholding of the requested documents” (quotation marks 

omitted)). This appeal addresses only the threshold question 

whether, assuming NSC substantially prevailed, it is eligible 

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for fees; we do not reach the further questions whether NSC 

substantially prevailed or whether, if eligible, NSC is entitled 

to fees.4

 

The Supreme Court in Kay held that an individual who 

represented himself and prevailed in his civil rights case was 

ineligible for attorney’s fees under the civil rights fee-shifting 

statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 499 U.S. at 435-37. The Court

concluded that “[n]either the text of the statute [n]or its 

legislative history provides a clear answer” to whether pro se

litigants are eligible for fees, but noted that section 1988’s 

provision for “attorney” fees makes it likely that Congress

“contemplated an attorney-client relationship as the predicate 

for an award under § 1988.” Id. at 435-36. Congress enacted 

section 1988 to ensure “the effective prosecution of 

meritorious claims,” id. at 437, by enabling victims of civil 

rights violations to vindicate their rights with the assistance of 

competent and independent counsel, id. at 436. The Court 

reasoned that authorizing fee awards for pro se plaintiffs

would not serve the goal of promoting “the benefit of the 

advice and advocacy of an independent attorney,” id. at 435, 

but instead might encourage self-representation by any 

plaintiff who “considered himself competent to litigate on his 

own behalf,” id. at 438. The Court identified the “overriding 

statutory concern” as “obtaining independent counsel for 

victims of civil rights violations,” id. at 437, and concluded 

that “[t]he statutory policy of furthering the successful 

prosecution of meritorious claims is better served by a rule 

that creates an incentive to retain counsel in every such case,” 

id. at 438.

Kay distinguishes individuals who represent themselves 

from organizations that do the same. Id. at 436 n.7. The 

 4 Because the district court denied NSC’s fee petition solely on 

eligibility grounds, it did not consider the four entitlement factors.

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Court recognized that “an organization is not comparable to a

pro se litigant because the organization is always represented 

by counsel, whether in-house or pro bono, and thus, there is 

always an attorney-client relationship.” Id. The statutory 

focus on “an attorney-client relationship as the predicate for 

an award,” id. at 436, therefore supports fees for selfrepresenting organizations even while it weighs against them 

for pro se individuals.

For many years before Kay, “it was settled law in this 

circuit that attorneys who prevailed in FOIA actions brought 

on their own behalf were eligible to obtain attorney’s fees.” 

Burka, 142 F.3d at 1288. Indeed, before Kay, we had held 

that even non-attorneys who prevailed could recover FOIA 

fees. See Cox v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 601 F.2d 1, 5-6 (D.C.

Cir. 1979). Kay, however, constrained us to change our 

position. In Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons, 993 F.2d 257 

(D.C. Cir. 1993), we applied to a pro se non-attorney under 

FOIA the fee eligibility exception for pro se individuals that 

Kay had recognized under section 1988. Id. at 259-60. Five 

years later in Burka, we again applied Kay in the FOIA 

context and held that attorneys who proceed pro se are 

equally ineligible for FOIA fees. 142 F.3d at 1289-90. 

We then had occasion in Baker to consider how Kay and 

its narrow pro se exception might apply to a law firm

partnership seeking fees for having represented itself in 

litigation. Noting that FOIA’s fee provision contains “no 

exception for a law firm that represents itself,” we held that 

the firm qualified under FOIA’s plain language as a 

“complainant” eligible for fees. See 473 F.3d at 324-26 

(citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i)). Kay did not instruct 

otherwise, in our view, for it only removed “individual

plaintiffs who represent themselves” from the universe of fee 

eligibility. Id. at 325.

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Baker is consistent with the law of other circuits, which 

have concluded that, for fee-eligibility purposes, an 

organization is different from an individual litigant. We are 

not aware of any federal court of appeals that has relied on 

Kay’s pro se litigant exception to deny attorney’s fees to any 

kind of self-representing organization, much less a bona fide

corporation represented by in-house counsel. For example, 

the Fourth Circuit in Bond held that a law firm’s 

representation by its own lawyers did not render the firm 

ineligible for fees, recognizing that there can be the requisite

agency relationship even where there is a close alignment and 

institutional connection between attorney and client, as is the 

case when “a State’s own attorney represent[s] the State” or 

“in-house counsel represent[s] the corporation.” 317 F.3d at 

400. That court concluded that “the principles of Kay” simply 

“do not apply where entities represent themselves through inhouse or pro bono counsel.” Id. at 399. The Fifth Circuit 

understood Kay in a similar manner and held that, “when an 

organization is represented by an attorney employed by the 

organization, the attorney has a status separate from the 

client.” Gold, 236 F.3d at 219-20. Relying on the same 

distinction between organizations and individuals, the Eighth 

Circuit saw “no meaningful distinction between a law firm 

and any other organization on the issue of whether there 

exists an attorney-client relationship between the organization 

and its attorney” and so held that, “where an attorney 

represents his or her own firm, Kay does not forbid the award 

of attorneys’ fees.” Treasurer, Trs. of Drury Indus., Inc. 

Health Care Plan & Trust v. Goding, 692 F.3d 888, 898 (8th 

Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).

Consistent with that line of precedent, we hold that a 

bona fide corporation with a legally recognized, distinct 

identity from the natural person who acts as its lawyer is 

eligible for attorney’s fees under FOIA provided it 

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substantially prevails. Even a small corporation like NSC is 

generally eligible for fees under FOIA. The existence of an 

entity, formally separate from the natural person acting as its 

lawyer, makes the difference. That conclusion is strongly 

presaged by Baker, which speaks in categorical terms: Kay

“made crystal clear” that the “exception for individual 

plaintiffs who represent themselves does not apply to 

organizations.” Baker, 473 F.3d at 325 (emphasis in 

original). “An attorney who works for a law firm is certainly 

no less independent than an attorney who works for a 

corporation.” Id. Lawyers represent many different kinds of 

organizations, but there is always an attorney-client 

relationship between an organization and its lawyer. We thus 

declined “to slice and dice Kay’s conclusion regarding 

‘organizations’ and apply footnote 7 to some organizations 

but not others.” Id.

The relevant doctrinal line is between a natural person 

going it alone, who is ineligible, and a person or organization 

who is represented by counsel and thus eligible for attorney’s 

fees. As the Supreme Court explained in Kay, an organization

“is always represented by counsel,” but an individual is not. 

499 U.S. at 436 n.7. The attorney-client relationship between 

an organization and its counsel requires the lawyer to step into 

a role, distinct from his personal capacity, in which he is 

legally and ethically constrained as an independent, zealous,

and loyal representative of the organization. See A.B.A. 

Model R. Prof’l Conduct 1.3 cmt. 1 (2013); A.B.A. Model R. 

Prof’l Conduct 1.13(b) (2013); cf. Kay, 499 U.S. at 436 n.7; 

Baker, 473 F.3d at 325. Even a lawyer for an organization he 

founded and runs must fulfill his professional lawyering 

responsibilities to that organization. He may not merely serve 

his own preferences, moods, or tastes. He is legally and 

ethically required to be loyal to client interests, as distinct 

from his own. See, e.g., In re Gonzalez, 773 A.2d 1026, 1031 

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(D.C. 2001) (“[T]he attorney owes a fiduciary duty to his 

client and must serve the client’s interests with the utmost 

loyalty and devotion.”). An attorney who works in an 

organization has a legally recognized, distinct identity from 

that of the organization, putting the lawyer in an agency 

relationship “sufficiently independent to ensure effective 

prosecution of claims, thus justifying fees.” Baker, 473 F.3d 

at 325 (citing Kay, 499 U.S. at 436 n.7). 

The distinction between organizations and individuals is 

all the more pronounced in the context of a corporation: 

indeed, it is well settled that “a corporation may appear in the 

federal courts only through licensed counsel.” Rowland v. 

Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1993) (emphasis 

added); see also Embassy of Fed. Rep. of Nigeria v. 

Ugwuonye, 901 F. Supp. 2d 92, 97 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting that 

even though individual could appear pro se in his personal 

capacity, he cannot do so as the trustee on behalf of a 

company). The law treats corporations—even small ones—as 

distinct from the natural persons that create or work for them. 

A corporation is “viewed as a distinct entity, even when it is 

wholly owned by a single individual.” Quinn v. Butz, 510 

F.2d 743, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted). 

In various contexts, the law takes seriously the formal 

line between a corporation and a natural person, even when 

the corporation is, in effect, a one-person firm. See, e.g., 

Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161-

65 (2001) (holding that closely held corporation and its sole 

shareholder are distinct for purposes of federal Racketeer 

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act). Individuals 

experience burdens as well as benefits associated with the 

separation between a company’s rights and their own. See, 

e.g., United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944) 

(holding that Fifth Amendment privilege against selfUSCA Case #14-5171 Document #1593790 Filed: 01/15/2016 Page 14 of 22
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incrimination “is a purely personal one” that “cannot be 

utilized by or on behalf of any organization, such as a 

corporation”); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Issued June 18, 

2009, 593 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that “a oneperson corporation cannot avail itself of the Fifth Amendment 

privilege” to resist grand jury subpoena of corporate records); 

Williams v. Mordkofsky, 901 F.2d 158, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 

(holding that individual owners lacked standing to assert the 

loss of a business opportunity that belonged to their firm and 

not to them individually, noting that, “[h]ad [the corporation] 

declared bankruptcy, it is certain that the [owners] would not 

be so quick to request that we disregard the corporate form”).

“One-person corporations are authorized by law and should 

not lightly be labeled sham.” Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 

U.S. 460, 471 (2000).

It makes sense to respect the corporate form and the 

distinctness of the lawyer from the organization, and to hold 

Kay’s pro se litigant exception inapplicable in cases of 

corporate self-representation. To incorporate NSC as a 

Virginia “nonstock corporation,” its founders were required to 

expend time and resources drafting articles of incorporation, 

filing those articles with the Office of the Clerk and paying 

the filing fee, obtaining a certificate of incorporation, 

delineating a process for the selection of directors, and 

appointing a registered agent, among other requirements. See, 

e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-804 (enumerating the filing 

requirements for Virginia nonstock corporations); id. § 13.1-

819 (listing requirements for articles of incorporation); id. 

§ 13.1-829 (setting forth restrictions on names); cf. Wagner v. 

Fed. Election Comm’n, 793 F.3d 1, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (en 

banc) (recognizing “the not insignificant costs involved in 

both establishing and operating as an LLC”).

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In addition, NSC’s section 501(c)(3) status places 

operational limits on the firm’s activities and further 

constrains its interests, as distinct from those of its board or 

staff. To qualify for tax-exempt status under section 

501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, a corporation must 

serve defined public interests and operate under certain 

constraints. A corporation like NSC must be “organized and 

operated exclusively for . . . charitable . . . or educational 

purposes . . . ,” 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), and it must “engage[] 

primarily in activities which accomplish” such purposes, 26 

C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). Because a tax-exempt 

organization must “serve[] a public rather than a private 

interest,” it may not be “organized or operated for the benefit 

of private interests such as designated individuals, the creator 

or his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons 

controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests.” 

Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(ii).

The government downplays the legally established

distinction between NSC and its attorney and contends that 

NSC has failed to “demonstrate a sufficiently independent 

arms-length relationship between the client and the attorney to 

offer ‘independent third party’ legal advice and assistance.”

Appellees’ Br. 31. But that argument confuses the rule’s 

rationale with the rule itself. Precedent does not call on courts 

to evaluate the objectivity and independence of each 

particular attorney-client relationship, or of counsel’s legal 

advice in the individual case. Instead, the cases make 

structural judgments at a higher level of generality, 

distinguishing self-representing individuals, who are not 

eligible for FOIA fees, from organizational litigants like 

corporations, that are. See Baker, 473 F.3d at 325 (relying on 

Kay, 499 U.S. at 436 n.7). No doubt, sometimes an individual 

gives himself objective and highly effective advice, and 

attorney advice to organizational clients may at times lack 

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17

independent, arms-length judgment. As we understand the 

binding precedent, however, such facts would neither render 

eligible the pro se individual whose legal decisions are 

objectively sound, nor defeat the eligibility of a prevailing 

corporation whose lawyer’s advice lacked independence. See 

id. Our precedent instead looks to an entity’s status as a 

proxy, however rough, for the independence and objectivity 

of the advice; it does not require an organization-byorganization, attorney-by-attorney, or case-by-case inquiry 

into either of those attributes.

For example, even as the Supreme Court in Kay held pro 

se litigants ineligible for fees because of the risk that they 

would lack “the judgment of an independent third party” and 

be governed by “emotion” rather than “reason,” 499 U.S. at 

437, the Court acknowledged the reality that the plaintiff 

before it “obviously handled his professional responsibilities 

. . . in a competent manner,” 499 U.S. at 435. Conversely, 

when the Fourth Circuit in Bond held that a law firm partner

was eligible for fees for representing his firm, it 

acknowledged the “increased risk of emotional involvement 

and loss of independence” when a firm’s own lawyers 

represent it. 317 F.3d at 399. But that was not dispositive 

because the firm “still remain[ed] a business and professional 

entity distinct from its members” with “distinct interests.” Id. 

at 400.5

 The Bond court thus categorically distinguished 

 5 We implicitly recognized in Burka the importance of the formal 

identification of the party in interest. The plaintiff there claimed he 

had clients apart from himself, but he was ineligible for attorney’s 

fees because he “chose to bring the case in his own name and to 

maintain the case in his own name throughout the litigation.” 142 

F.3d at 1290; see also Pub. Emps. For Envtl. Responsibility v. U.S. 

Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n, 968 F. Supp. 2d 85, 87 (D.D.C. 

2013) (observing that “it is only the party-in-interest—in other 

words, the party in whose name the action was brought by or 

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precedent denying fees to parents representing their own 

children under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 

Act, who had been deemed “generally incapable of 

exercising sufficient independent judgment on behalf of their 

children to ensure that ‘reason, rather than emotion,’ will 

dictate the conduct of the litigation.” Bond, 317 F.3d at 399 

(quoting Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Balt. Cty., 165 F.3d 260, 263 

(4th Cir. 1998)). Bond, by contrast, addressed a distinct type 

of circumstances “where entities represent themselves through 

in-house or pro bono counsel.” Id. 

To be sure, Kay teaches that the purpose of the pro se

litigant exception to fee eligibility is to avoid creating a 

disincentive to hire independent and objective counsel. 499 

U.S. at 438. The exception serves that purpose because it 

takes away the plaintiff’s temptation to represent himself and

keep the fees as reimbursement for his own time if he 

prevails. Removing that temptation encourages the individual 

to hire a lawyer and thereby gain the benefit of dispassionate 

legal advice. But we need not worry that a corporation will 

miss out on independent advice when, as happened here, it

opts for in-house over outside counsel. As Kay highlighted, 

there is an attorney-client relationship between in-house 

counsel and a corporation, id., and, as we have explained, that 

relationship is not an empty formalism. Even if in-house 

counsel plays a major operational role within the corporation, 

as McClanahan did here, and is personally committed to the 

objectives of a corporation, as many lawyers are, a lawyer 

wearing two professional hats is legally required to maintain 

the distinction between his roles as a lawyer and a director or 

member of the corporation. Here, for example, McClanahan, 

in his capacity as the corporation’s lawyer, was constrained to 

 

against—that concerns the court; no one else is considered a pro se 

litigant for attorneys’-fees purposes”).

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act to further NSC’s public-regarding, nonprofit objectives, 

and to respect its board-governed, corporate interests as 

independent of his own. See, e.g., A.B.A. Model R. Prof’l 

Conduct 1.13 (identifying ethical constraints when client is an 

organization).

The government nevertheless suggests that we conduct a 

case-specific, fact-intensive inquiry into the nature of the 

specific organization and its relationship to its in-house 

attorney. That approach strikes us as anomalous and 

untenable for at least two reasons. First, it likely would result 

in differing treatment among and within categories of 

organizational plaintiffs—the very result we sought to avoid 

in Baker by cautioning against allowing fees to some selfrepresenting organizations and not others. 473 F.3d at 325. 

Second, even as it would have us disregard the familiar legal 

distinction between organizations and individuals, the 

government has not proposed a readily administrable and 

clear test for determining whether an organization is 

independent enough to be eligible for fees under Baker. Proof 

that a putative organization lacks a legal identity distinct from 

that of the natural person(s) that comprise it might suffice to 

render it ineligible for FOIA fees, but the government has not 

persuasively made that case here.

B.

The district court applied the wrong legal standard and 

thus erred in concluding that NSC is ineligible for fees as a 

pro se individual litigant under Kay and Burka. 

There is no question that NSC is a bona fide corporation, 

and that it has been during the entirety of this litigation and 

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the underlying work for which NSC seeks fees.6 In support of 

its fee petition, NSC established that it was a bona fide

nonprofit corporation with its own legal identity. The 

government, by contrast, made no showing that could have 

supported the district court’s decision to disregard NSC’s 

corporate status. It failed to present evidence that, although 

duly incorporated, NSC is “simply the alter ego” of 

McClanahan. Quinn, 510 F.2d at 758. The government did 

not demonstrate that McClanahan dominates NSC in such a 

way that “negate[s] [the corporation’s] separate personality.” 

Id.; see also Founding Church of Scientology of Wash., D.C., 

Inc. v. Webster, 802 F.2d 1448, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 

(“Under the alter ego theory, the court may ignore the 

existence of the corporate form . . . .”). Neither the small size 

of a corporation nor the “deliberate adoption and use of a 

corporate form in order to secure its legitimate advantages” 

are reasons to apply the pro se exception. Quinn, 510 F.2d at 

758. McClanahan’s pervasive involvement in the 

corporation’s operations and litigation efforts does not negate 

NSC’s separate corporate status.

Finally, the government contends that the district court’s 

holding is “[m]ost tellingly” supported by NSC’s statement 

regarding civil discovery in a different case before a different 

judge, Appellees’ Br. 33, but that statement cannot bear the 

weight the government assigns it. The government quotes 

McClanahan, as NSC’s Executive Director and counsel of

record in that other case, saying that he was “in effect both the 

counsel and the party.” Id. (quoting J.A. 101 n.1 (Plaintiff’s 

Reply In Support of its Motion to Compel Compliance With 

 6

 NSC does not seek fees for the administrative FOIA work it did

before it filed the complaint in this case, when NSC was an 

unincorporated nonprofit association. We therefore need not decide 

in this appeal which other kinds of organizations might be eligible 

for FOIA fees.

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The Court’s 15 August 2012 Order, Nat’l Sec. Counselors v. 

CIA, No. 11-00443 (D.D.C.))). NSC’s assertion of identity 

between attorney and client was made in the materially 

distinct context of eligibility to receive in discovery 

information that the government asserted would be exempt 

from general public disclosure under FOIA. NSC proposed a 

protective order to keep the information confidential, and 

noted that, “[w]ith respect to the general rule that it is not 

good practice to provide information to a party’s counsel that 

cannot be shared with the party itself, such is not the case 

here, since the undersigned is both NSC’s counsel and the 

Executive Director of NSC, in effect both the counsel and the 

party.” J.A. 101 n.1. The asserted functional identity of NSC 

and its counsel for purposes of maintaining confidentiality 

does not in any way nullify NSC’s status as an independent

corporate entity or negate the attorney-client relationship

between the corporation and McClanahan, who presumptively 

provides his client firm with objective and independent legal 

advice.

Because the government did not challenge NSC’s 

corporate status, the district court should have concluded that 

NSC was not ineligible for fees under the pro se litigant 

exception. In the absence of grounds in the record on which a 

reasonable factfinder could conclude that NSC was not a 

corporation legally distinct from McClanahan, NSC remained 

eligible for fees, for it did not fall into the “narrow exception” 

to fee eligibility for pro se litigants. Baker, 473 F.3d at 324. 

By holding otherwise, the court effectively disregarded the 

corporate form without a legal or factual basis for doing so.

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We therefore reverse the district court’s holding that NSC 

is ineligible for fees under FOIA, and remand to the district 

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.7 

So ordered.

 7 In light of our disposition of NSC’s appeal of the initial fee-denial 

order, we need not reach the government’s claim that NSC failed to 

give sufficient notice of its intent to appeal the order denying 

reconsideration.

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