Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01876/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01876-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Martin Biter
Respondent
Donell Thomas Haynie
Petitioner

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONELL THOMAS HAYNIE,

Petitioner,

v.

MARTIN BITER, Warden

Respondent.

No. 2:13-cv-1876 TLN DAD P

ORDER AND

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Therein, petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction entered 

against him on August 30, 2010, in the Sacramento County Superior Court on one count of 

kidnapping.1 He seeks federal habeas relief on the grounds that: (1) his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance; and (2) the decision of the California Court of Appeal rejecting one of his 

appellate claims was “arbitrary,” in violation of his right to due process. Upon careful 

consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned will recommend that 

petitioner‟s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

 

1

 Petitioner was also convicted of simple assault as a lesser included offense to assault with a 

deadly weapon and possession of methamphetamine, along with kidnapping, and with a finding 

that he had suffered two prior “strike” convictions pursuant to California‟s Three Strikes Law. 

However, in his federal habeas petition before this court he challenges only his kidnapping 

conviction. (ECF No. 9 at 4, 5.) 

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I. Background

In its unpublished memorandum and opinion affirming petitioner‟s judgment of 

conviction on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the 

following factual summary:

A jury found defendant Donell Thomas Haynie guilty of false 

imprisonment (Penal Code,FN1 § 236; count 4), simple assault as a 

lesser included offense to assault with a deadly weapon by means 

likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 240; count 5), possession of 

methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 

6), and kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a); count 7). The jury found 

defendant not guilty of oral copulation by force (§ 288a, subd. 

(c)(2); count 1), two counts of rape by force (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); 

counts 2 and 3), and pandering (§ 266i, subd. (a)(1); count 8). In a 

bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true allegations 

defendant had two serious felony convictions within the meaning of 

section 667, subdivision (a), which also qualified as “strikes” under 

the three strikes law (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i); 1170.12). Defendant 

was sentenced to 85 years to life in prison, consisting of three terms 

of 25 years to life for counts 4, 6, and 7, plus 5 years for each of his 

serious felony convictions.FN2

FN1. Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal 

Code.

FN2. As for the assault (count 5), the trial court indicated that it 

was “not going to in light of the sentence order any additional time 

even though probation is suggesting otherwise.”

Defendant appeals, contending his kidnapping conviction must be 

reversed because the trial court did not instruct the jury on the 

lesser included offense of false imprisonment, and his conviction 

for false imprisonment must be reversed because the People cannot 

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the kidnapping and false 

imprisonment convictions are not based on the same act. We shall 

conclude that defendant is barred under the doctrine of invited error 

from challenging the trial court‟s failure to instruct the jury on false 

imprisonment as a lesser included offense to kidnapping, and that it 

is impossible to determine whether the same act forms the basis for 

both his kidnapping and false imprisonment convictions. 

Accordingly, we shall reverse defendant‟s conviction for false 

imprisonment (count 4), affirm the judgment in all other respects, 

and remand the cause with directions.FN3

FN3. Because we shall reverse his conviction on count 4, we need 

not consider defendant‟s claims of sentencing error as to that count.

/////

/////

/////

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. The Prosecution

At approximately 10:30 p.m. on August 12, 2009, G.A. met her 

cousin and some friends at a bar in Sacramento. Sometime later, 

the group was joined by a friend of G.‟s cousin and defendant. G. 

had never seen defendant before that night. After the bar closed, 

she left with her cousin‟s friend and defendant in defendant‟s car. 

After dropping off her cousin‟s friend, G. and defendant went to 

defendant‟s apartment for a swim. When they finished swimming, 

they returned to defendant‟s apartment, and defendant gave G. 

some dry clothes. G. asked defendant for a ride home. Defendant 

said he had lent his car to his cousin, and G. fell asleep on 

defendant‟s bed.

G. woke up around 6:00 a.m. and asked defendant if his cousin had 

returned. Defendant said “no,” and G. fell back to sleep. She woke 

up about 9:00 a.m. when she “felt” defendant come into the 

bedroom. Defendant lay down on the bed and tried to touch her. 

She told him to get his hand off her, and defendant responded that 

“he was going to fuck [her] up.” When G. reached for her cellular 

telephone, defendant attempted to take it by wrestling with and 

choking her. He then dragged her into the bathroom, told her take 

off all her clothes, and said that he was going to sell her to a pimp. 

Thereafter, defendant prevented her from leaving the bathroom.

Defendant eventually let G. out of the bathroom and told her to take 

some blue Ecstasy pills. When she refused, he told her she either 

had to take the pills or give him a “blow job.” When she refused to 

take the pills, defendant dragged her back into the bathroom and 

forced her to perform oral sex on him while he held a screwdriver 

to her body. Thereafter, he fondled her breasts and forced her to 

have sexual intercourse with him.

When defendant left the bathroom, G. ran out the front door and 

down the stairs leading to the apartment. Defendant followed her 

and dragged her back to his apartment by her hair while repeatedly 

threatening to kill her. A neighbor who observed the altercation 

called 911.

Once inside the apartment, defendant told G. to take a shower and 

said he would kill her if the police came. When she finished 

showering, defendant duct taped her hands, feet, and mouth. Five 

or ten minutes later, the police knocked at the door. Defendant 

removed the duct tape, flushed it down the toilet, and threw the roll 

of tape into a laundry basket. Defendant apologized and told G. to 

tell the police that it was his cousin and his cousin‟s girlfriend who 

had been fighting outside the apartment. When the police entered 

the apartment, G. initially told them defendant‟s cousin and his 

cousin‟s girlfriend had been fighting outside the apartment. After 

defendant was taken out of the room, G. told the police what 

actually had happened and pointed out the duct tape in the toilet and 

the laundry basket.

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G. was taken to the hospital. She had visible bruising and abrasions 

on her body and adhesive and sliver flecks consistent with duct tape 

on her body. She also had redness and an abrasion “in the area 

posterior to the vagina.”

II. The Defense

Christopher Reed was living with defendant at the time of the 

incident and sat in the Jacuzzi while defendant and G. swam in the

pool. Defendant and G. were talking, hugging, and kissing in the 

pool; and when they returned to the apartment, they appeared 

affectionate toward each other. Reed heard them talking and 

laughing in the bedroom before he fell asleep. At approximately 

6:00 a.m., defendant asked Reed to take his mother to work. When 

Reed returned, defendant asked him to take his brothers to school. 

Reed returned about 20 minutes later but left again to pick up some 

money from his estranged wife. Reed did not see G. that morning.

At approximately 9:30 a.m. on August 13, 2009, defendant‟s 

neighbor visited defendant‟s apartment for about five minutes. G. 

was lying on the couch and did not appear to be in any distress.

Defendant testified that on the night in question, G. left the bar with 

him and a couple of other men. Defendant invited her to go 

swimming, and she accepted. G. jumped into the pool wearing her 

dress, but later removed it and was wearing only her panties. He 

and G. kissed in the pool, and he penetrated her vagina with his 

finger. When they returned to defendant‟s apartment, defendant 

showed G. the bathroom and gave her a toothbrush and a dry shirt 

to put on. While defendant was talking to Reed in the living room, 

G. left the bathroom and went into defendant‟s bedroom. 

Defendant joined her there, and they had sexual intercourse. When 

they were finished, defendant left the bedroom and fell asleep on 

the couch. Around 6:00 a.m., he asked Reed to drive his mother to 

work. Reed agreed and returned about 20 minutes later. Defendant 

then asked Reed to drive his brothers to school, and Reed agreed. 

When Reed returned, Reed asked defendant if he could borrow his 

car. Defendant agreed and walked with Reed outside to the car. 

Defendant was gone about 15 minutes. When he returned, G. was 

laying on the couch. The two talked, and defendant began 

wondering where he had left his money. When he was unable to 

find it, he began questioning G. about the money. She did not 

appreciate being questioned and refused to show him her wallet. 

When defendant left the room, G. ran out the front door and down 

the stairs. Defendant chased after her, and the two scuffled as she 

screamed for help. Defendant may have pulled her hair a couple of 

times and choked her, but he denied dragging her by her hair or 

stomping on her. Eventually, he picked her up and carried her to 

the base of the stairs leading to his apartment. When two 

acquaintances walked by, defendant told them, “[T]his bitch stole 

my money,” and they helped him look for G.‟s wallet. Defendant 

followed G. to the apartment and suggested she take a shower 

because her feet were bleeding. While defendant was not going to 

let her go until he got his money, he denied duct taping her.

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When defendant told G. the police were there, she told him not to 

answer the door and maybe they would go away. At that point, 

defendant told her to tell the police that it was his cousin and his 

cousin‟s wife who were fighting.

People v. Haynie, No. C066352, 2013 WL 518616, at *1 -3 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. Feb. 13, 2013)

On March 3, 2013, petitioner filed a petition for rehearing in the California Supreme 

Court. (Resp‟t‟s Lod. Doc. 10.) On March 7, 2013, that petition was summarily denied. (Id.) 

On September 6, 2013, petitioner filed a motion to recall the remittitur. (Resp‟t‟s Lod. Doc. 10a.) 

The California Supreme Court summarily denied that motion on September 12, 2013. (Id.) On 

March 25, 2013, petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (Resp‟t‟s 

Lod. Doc. 11.) The Supreme Court denied that petition on May 1, 2013. (Id.) 

Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Sacramento 

County Superior Court, claiming that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in 

asking the trial court not to instruct the jury on false imprisonment as a lesser included offense to 

kidnapping, and that his appellate counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in failing to raise a 

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on appeal. (Resp‟t‟s Lod. Doc. 12.) On October 

21, 2013, the Sacramento County Superior Court denied that petition in a reasoned decision 

addressing the merits of petitioner‟s claims. (Id.) On November 18, 2013, petitioner filed a pro 

se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal. (Id.) Liberally construed, 

that petition raised the same two claims that petitioner raised in his habeas petition filed in the 

Sacramento County Superior Court. (Id.) On November 21, 2013, that petition was summarily 

denied by the California Court of Appeal. (Id.) 

On January 8, 2014, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, raising the same two claims. (Resp‟t‟s Lod. Doc. 13.) On March 25, 2014, the 

Supreme Court directed respondent to file an informal response to this petition and granted 

petitioner time to file a reply. (Id.) Respondent filed an informal response on April 15, 2014. 

(Resp‟t‟s Lod. Doc. 14.) Petitioner filed a reply on May 9, 2014. (Resp‟t‟s Lod. Doc. 15.) On 

June 25, 2014, the California Supreme Court summarily denied petitioner‟s application for a writ 

of habeas corpus. (Resp‟t‟s Lod. Doc. 13.) 

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II. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 

state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000).

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas 

corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not 

be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.

For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists of 

holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. 

Greene v. Fisher, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 

(9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Circuit court precedent 

“may be persuasive in determining what law is clearly established and whether a state court 

applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 

567 (9th Cir. 2010)). However, circuit precedent may not be “used to refine or sharpen a general 

principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] Court has 

not announced.” Marshall v. Rodgers, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (citing 

Parker v. Matthews, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012)). Nor may it be used to 

“determine whether a particular rule of law is so widely accepted among the Federal Circuits that 

it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, be accepted as correct. Id. Further, where courts 

of appeals have diverged in their treatment of an issue, it cannot be said that there is “clearly 

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established Federal law” governing that issue. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006).

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule 

contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court 

precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court‟s 

decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner‟s case.2 Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 

(9th Cir. 2004). A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that court 

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 

(2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent 

review of the legal question, is left with a „firm conviction‟ that the state court was „erroneous.‟”) 

“A state court‟s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

„fairminded jurists could disagree‟ on the correctness of the state court‟s decision.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner 

must show that the state court‟s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. 

If the state court‟s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing 

court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner‟s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 

527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of § 

 

2

 Under § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision based on a factual determination is not to be 

overturned on factual grounds unless it is “objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Davis v. Woodford, 

384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

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2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by considering 

de novo the constitutional issues raised.”). 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

If the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a 

previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of 

the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “When a 

federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication 

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. This presumption 

may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other explanation for the state 

court‟s decision is more likely.” Id. at 99-100 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 

(1991)). Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner‟s claims rejects some claims but 

does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to 

rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 

___, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013). 

Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo 

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether 

a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no 

reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. 

A summary denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner‟s claims. 

Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 957 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 2012). While the federal court cannot analyze 

just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must review the 

state court record to determine whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

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relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. This court “must determine what arguments or theories . . . could 

have supported, the state court‟s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded 

jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior 

decision of [the Supreme] Court.” 562 U.S. at 102. The petitioner bears “the burden to 

demonstrate that „there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.‟” Walker v. 

Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 98). 

When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner‟s 

claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal 

habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 

F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003).

III. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Exhaustion of State Remedies

In his first ground for federal habeas relief, petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance in failing to request that the trial court instruct the jury at his trial on false 

imprisonment as a lesser included offense to the kidnapping charge. (ECF No. 9 at 6.) In his 

second ground for relief, petitioner claims that the state appellate court‟s rejection of his argument 

on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on false imprisonment as a lesser 

included offense to the kidnapping charge was “arbitrary” and therefore violated his “liberty 

interest” protected by the Due Process Clause. (Id.) Respondent argues that neither of these two 

claims has been exhausted in state court and that they should be rejected on that basis. (ECF No. 

20 at 10-12.) 

The exhaustion of available state remedies is a prerequisite to a federal court's 

consideration of claims sought to be presented in habeas corpus proceedings. See Rose v. Lundy, 

455 U.S. 509 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by 

providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider all claims before 

presenting them to the federal court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Middleton v. 

Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1986). However, a federal court considering a habeas 

petition may deny an unexhausted claim on the merits when it is perfectly clear that the claim is 

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not “colorable.” Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005). See also 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, 

notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the 

State”). For the reasons explained below, the undersigned need not address the issue of 

exhaustion because it is perfectly clear that petitioner has not raised even colorable claims for 

federal habeas relief. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

As set forth above, petitioner‟s first claim for federal habeas relief is that his trial counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance in failing to request that the trial court instruct the jury on false 

imprisonment as a lesser included offense to the kidnapping charge. (ECF No. 9 at 6.) That 

claim is clearly not colorable and the undersigned recommends that it be rejected.

1. Background

On appeal in state court petitioner claimed that the trial court erred in failing to instruct his 

jury on false imprisonment as a lesser included offense to the kidnapping charged in count 7 of 

the information. The California Court of Appeal concluded that petitioner had waived this claim

pursuant to the doctrine of “invited error” by failing to request the jury instruction. The state 

appellate court reasoned as follows:

Defendant Is Barred Under the Doctrine of Invited Error From 

Challenging the Trial Court’s Failure to Instruct the Jury on 

False Imprisonment as a Lesser Included Offense to 

Kidnapping

Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error 

by honoring his request not to instruct the jury on false 

imprisonment as a lesser included offense of kidnapping. As we 

shall explain, he is barred from raising this claim on appeal.

After the parties and the trial court finished discussing the requested 

jury instructions, the trial court sought to confirm that the parties 

were not requesting the jury be instructed on any lesser included 

offenses except as to count 5, assault with a deadly weapon by 

means likely to produce great bodily injury. The parties responded 

in the affirmative.

The following court day, the trial court again raised the issue of 

lesser included offenses. In particular, the court indicated that it 

thought the jury should be instructed on false imprisonment as a 

lesser included offense to kidnapping (count 7).

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“THE COURT: . . . [¶] . . . [W]e have had some dialogue by e-mail 

back and forth about the instructions and my thinking about a lesser 

false imprisonment [instruction] as to Count 7, the kidnap charge. 

[¶] The reason I think that is because we already had a discussion 

about the different acts that potentially had constituted a 236 [false 

imprisonment] as charged.

“[PROSECUTOR]: Correct.

“THE COURT: And then the reason why I think that we need to 

give a lesser to 236 [false imprisonment] on the kidnap is the jury 

could find that [defendant] did not commit a kidnap for the conduct 

that occurred outside, and thus find him guilty of false 

imprisonment in the lesser-included offense.

“[PROSECUTOR]: Basically if they found it was not a substantial 

distance but the other element [sic] were satisfied.

“THE COURT: Yes. That he detained her against her will, so that 

they could find him guilty of that. And I think the People are - I 

still, unless the defense is going to demand that I not give a lesser -

[¶] I don't know if - I didn‟t ask [defense counsel] about this yet 

because we just got together this morning. [¶] Do you have any 

position about the giving of a lesser on Count 4. I'm sorry. On 

count 7, the kidnap?

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Submitted your Honor, No.

“THE COURT: You do or don‟ want to give one? If you don't 

want to give one then I won‟t give a lesser. But I‟ll have to give - I 

think it is wise to make the election.

“[¶] ... [¶]

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We are not requesting it, your Honor.

“THE COURT: Are you specifically asking me not to give the 

lesser then of false imprisonment?

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Are you indicating that he is still 

charged with the false imprisonment?

“THE COURT: He is charged with false imprisonment in Count 4. 

He is charged with the kidnap in Count 7, and so they could find 

him not guilty of a kidnap but find him guilty of a lesser false 

imprisonment to the kidnap.

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Can I explain to him what‟s happening?

“THE COURT: Yes.

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We are asking that it not be read.

“[¶] ... [¶]

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“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Unless my client is requesting if there is 

a lesser on Count 4 [false imprisonment], then you add the lesser on 

Count 7 [kidnap].

“THE COURT: I don‟t know what the lesser would be on a Count 4 

[false imprisonment]. What lesser are you asking for? 236?

“[PROSECUTOR]: I don‟t believe there is one.

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don‟t believe there is one either. I just

- [¶] . . . And my concern is the confusion if - this is a life case 

anyway, and if he is already charged with [false imprisonment] in 

Count 4, I don‟t think it would be necessary or useful to the defense 

to have the lesser in Count 7.”

Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error by 

failing to instruct the jury on false imprisonment as a lesser 

included offense to kidnapping because the jury was left with an 

“„unwarranted all-or-nothing choice‟ between a conviction for 

kidnapping and acquittal.” The People respond that under the 

invited error doctrine, defendant may not raise this issue on appeal 

because “[f]rom [defense counsel‟s] remarks, it is apparent that 

[she] was pursuing a deliberate all-or-nothing strategy in the hopes 

of securing an acquittal on the kidnapping charge.”

False imprisonment is a lesser included offense of the crime of 

kidnapping. (People v. Magana (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1117, 

1120–1121.) In criminal cases, the trial court must instruct on 

lesser included offenses “if there is substantial evidence the 

defendant is guilty of the lesser offense, but not the charged 

offense.” (People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 556.) “„“[A] 

defendant[, however,] may not invoke a trial court‟s failure to 

instruct on a lesser included offense as a basis on which to reverse a 

conviction when, for tactical reasons, the defendant persuades a 

trial court not to instruct on a lesser included offense supported by 

the evidence. [Citations.] In that situation, the doctrine of invited 

error bars the defendant from challenging on appeal the trial court's 

failure to give the instruction.”‟ [Citations.]” (People v. Beames

(2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 927.)

Here, the record clearly reflects that defendant and his counsel 

expressed a deliberate tactical purpose in resisting an instruction on 

false imprisonment as a lesser included offense of kidnapping, the 

very instruction he now complains should have been given. As the 

trial court mentioned, there were two potential false imprisonments 

in this case - one outside the apartment and one inside. Rather than 

run the risk of the jury finding defendant guilty of two counts of 

false imprisonment, defendant and his counsel elected to forego an 

instruction on the lesser included offense of false imprisonment as 

to the kidnapping offense, hoping the jury would find him not 

guilty of kidnapping and guilty of, at most, one count of false 

imprisonment. Unfortunately for them, things did not go as they 

had hoped, and the jury found defendant guilty of kidnapping and 

false imprisonment. Having made the tactical decision to take an 

all-or-nothing approach on count 7, the kidnapping offense, we find 

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that any error was invited, and that defendant therefore is barred 

from invoking such error as a basis for reversing his conviction.

Haynie, 2013 WL 518616, at **3 -4.

After the California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner‟s argument of trial court 

instructional error, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Sacramento County 

Superior Court. Therein, he claimed that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in 

refusing a jury instruction on the lesser included offense to the kidnapping charge, and claimed 

that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to raise the argument of the 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel on appeal. (Resp‟t‟s Lod. Doc. 12.) The Superior Court 

denied relief on both claims, reasoning as follows: 

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered him ineffective 

assistance of counsel in failing to request the court to give a lesser 

included instruction on kidnapping, and that appellate counsel was 

ineffective in failing to raise the issue on appeal.

Petitioner admits that the trial court had indicated that it thought the 

jury should be instructed on false imprisonment as a lesser included 

offense to kidnapping because the evidence was susceptible of a 

finding that the distance of asportation was not substantial enough 

to constitute kidnapping, and the prosecution agreed, but that it was 

petitioner‟s own defense counsel who did not want the instruction 

and told the court that counsel was not asking for the instruction. 

Petitioner claims that trial counsel erroneously advised petitioner to 

decline the lesser included offense instruction, which made it an allor-nothing choice on the count for the jury. He claims there was a 

substantial evidentiary basis for acquittal on kidnapping and guilt 

on the lesser included false imprisonment, due to the asportation 

issue, and that but for counsel‟s error it is reasonably probable that 

a different result would have ensued. He further claims that had he 

only been convicted of false imprisonment on the charge, he would 

now be eligible for Penal Code § 1170.126 recall of sentence and 

resentencing.

On appeal, appellate counsel did raise the issue of whether the trial 

court erred in honoring the defense‟s request to not instruct the jury 

on false imprisonment as a lesser-included offense to kidnapping, 

because that left the jury with an all-or-nothing choice between 

conviction for kidnapping and acquittal. The Third District Court 

of Appeal found that petitioner was estopped from raising this 

claim on appeal[.]

* * *

Petitioner‟s appellate counsel did not specifically raise an 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim on the appeal, but it 

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would appear that had the issue been raised it would have been 

rejected, as the Third District clearly found that trial counsel‟s 

choice had been a tactical one that counsel hoped would lead to an 

acquittal on the kidnapping charge. The Third District also quoted 

prior case that indicates that trial counsel may make a tactical 

choice not to want a lesser included instruction given, and that 

when counsel does so the defendant is barred from raising the claim 

on appeal. It would appear that this means such a tactical choice by 

counsel may be an informed tactical choice within the range of 

reasonable competence, which does not deprive a criminal 

defendant of effective assistance of counsel (see Strickland v. 

Washington, (1984) 466 U.S. 668; People v. Pope, (1979) 23 

Cal.3d 412). Nor would it appear in the instant case that the tactical 

choice of counsel was unreasonable. Petitioner was charged in 

Count 7 with kidnapping and in Count 4 with false imprisonment. 

There was one instance in which the evidence showed kidnapping, 

that had the asportation issue; there were different acts shown, 

however, by the evidence, that constituted only false imprisonment. 

The People had chosen not to elect which act it sought the 

conviction for, for Count 4. As such, the jury could have rejected 

false imprisonment on the different acts and then been faced with 

the issue of whether the kidnapping lacked asportation and thus 

should result in an acquittal of the kidnapping but a conviction on 

the false imprisonment. As such, Count 4 acted as a lesser included 

offense instruction for Count 7, and counsel saw no need to 

separately instruct on a lesser included offense for Count 7. That 

was not unreasonable, and in any event prejudice is not shown in 

this situation.

(Resp‟t‟s Lod. Doc. 13.)

2. Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel‟s waiver of the lesser included offense jury 

instruction was not based on a tactical decision because counsel failed to conduct sufficient 

investigation before making the decision to waive the instruction. (ECF No. 9 at 9.) Citing the 

decision in Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 949 (9th Cir. 2008), petitioner argues that “until a 

reasonable investigation is conducted, counsel is not in a position to make critical strategic 

decisions or settle on a trial strategy.”3 (Id.) Petitioner contends that trial counsel‟s decision to 

waive the instruction was made “on the spot.” (Id. at 10.) He also argues that because his trial 

counsel failed to conduct sufficient investigation, she “completely lack [sic] understanding to 

 

3

 In Correll the court held that trial counsel‟s decision not to put on a mitigation case could not be 

considered the product of a strategic choice where counsel had failed to make a reasonable 

investigation into potential mitigating evidence. 539 F.3d at 949. 

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what the court was trying to tell her.” (Id.)

Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel‟s “mistake” in declining the trial court‟s invitation 

to instruct his jury on the lesser included offense, which was made without conducting sufficient 

investigation, was not a tactical decision to proceed on an “all-or-nothing strategy” but was 

instead simply an uninformed error on the part of his counsel. (Id.) He states that counsel never 

advised him “that it would be her plan to pursue an all-or-nothing strategy on the kidnapping 

offense.” (Id. at 13.) In support of his arguments in this regard, petitioner cites the decision in

Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006), in which the court noted that 

“although trial counsel is typically afforded leeway in making tactical decisions regarding trial 

strategy, counsel cannot be said to have made a tactical decision without first procuring the 

information necessary to make such a decision.” (Id. at 11.) 

Petitioner also claims that he suffered prejudice as a result of his trial counsel‟s error in 

failing to request the lesser included offense jury instruction. (Id.) He argues that the lesser 

included offense instruction with regard to the kidnapping count against him was “very essential”

to his defense because it was possible the jury in his case could have found he committed false 

imprisonment, and not kidnap, with respect to the events that occurred outside his apartment. 

(Id.) Petitioner notes the jury acquitted him of “all crimes that depended solely on the victims 

testimony, which means that petitioner was acquitted of all crimes that allegedly took place inside 

the apartment before the victim fled.” (Id. at 12.) From this petitioner speculates that had they 

received the lesser included offense instruction, his jury probably would have found that the 

“asportation” required for a kidnapping conviction was not shown because there was no risk of 

harm to the victim in moving her from outside the apartment to inside the apartment. (Id.) 

Petitioner concludes that “there was a substantial evidentiary basis for an acquittal on the 

kidnapping charge in favor of a lesser included offense of false imprisonment.” (Id.) 

In support of his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, petitioner has filed his 

own declaration under penalty of perjury, in which he declares, in pertinent part, as follows: (1) 

prior to the jury instruction conference held in open court and described by the California Court 

of Appeal, his trial counsel had never spoken to him about lesser included offense jury 

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instructions with respect to count 7 of the information; (2) when his trial counsel finally did 

discuss the issue with petitioner during a recess, she told him that “she was not going to ask for 

the instruction to be read,” and then stated „I believe the court has to give it to us anyway;” (3) 

trial counsel did not ask petitioner whether or not he wanted a lesser included offense jury 

instruction given with respect to the charge against him in count 7; (4) trial counsel also did not 

ask him whether he wanted a lesser included offense jury instruction given on count 7 if the court 

gave a lesser included offense jury instruction with respect to the charge in count 4; (5) if 

petitioner had been asked, he would have requested “the lesser included offense instruction on 

any count the court was willing to give;” and (6) trial counsel did not advise him of the possible 

consequences of waiving the lesser included offense jury instruction on count 7. (Id. at 15.) 

Without further explanation, petitioner also declares that “this proposition was never the strategy 

for my defense.” (Id.) Finally, petitioner states that he contacted his appellate counsel to “notify 

him of (trial counsel‟s) ineffectiveness during jury instructions for the lesser included on count 

7,” but received no response. (Id. at 16.) 

3. Applicable Law

The clearly established federal law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is

that set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To 

succeed on a Strickland claim, a defendant must show that (1) his counsel‟s performance was 

deficient and that (2) the “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. Counsel is 

constitutionally deficient if his or her representation “fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness” such that it was outside “the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 

criminal cases.” Id. at 687–88 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Counsel‟s errors must be „so 

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.‟” Richter, 562 

U.S. at 114 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Reasonable tactical decisions, including 

decisions with regard to the presentation of the case, are “virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 687-90.

 A reviewing court is required to make every effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of 

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel‟s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the 

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conduct from counsel‟s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669. See also Richter, 

131 S. Ct. at 789 (same). Reviewing courts must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel‟s 

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 689. There is in addition a strong presumption that counsel “exercised acceptable professional 

judgment in all significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) 

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). This presumption of reasonableness means that the court 

must “give the attorneys the benefit of the doubt,” and must also “affirmatively entertain the 

range of possible reasons [defense] counsel may have had for proceeding as they did.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1407 (2011) (internal quotation marks and alterations 

omitted).

[AEDPA] limits our authority to grant a federal writ by establishing 

two “highly deferential” standards. Premo v. Moore, ––– U.S. –––

–, 131 S. Ct. 733, 740, 178 L.Ed.2d 649 (2011). “The pivotal 

question is whether the state court‟s application of the Strickland 

standard was unreasonable. This is different from asking whether 

defense counsel‟s performance fell below Strickland‟s standard.” 

Harrington v. Richter, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785, 178 

L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). Thus, a state court‟s determination that a 

claim lacks merit bars federal habeas relief so long as „fairminded 

jurists could disagree‟ on the state court‟s decision. Yarborough v. 

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 

(2004). Moreover, to grant a habeas petition under § 2254(d)(2), a 

state court's factual findings must be „clearly erroneous,‟ not just 

merely debatable. Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107–08 (9th 

Cir. 2000). These stringent standards „guard against extreme 

malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not as a 

substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.‟ Richter, ––

– U.S. ––––, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Griffin v. Harrington, 727 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 2013).

“The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both “highly deferential,” and 

when the two apply in tandem, review is „doubly‟ so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (citations 

omitted). Thus, in federal habeas proceedings involving “claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, . . . AEDPA review must be “„“doubly deferential”‟” in order to afford “both the state 

court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.” Woods v. Daniel, ___U.S.___, ___, 

2015 WL 1400852, at *3 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2105) (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. 

Ct. 10, 13 (2013)). As the Ninth Circuit has recently acknowledged:

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“The question,” therefore, “is whether there is any reasonable 

argument that counsel satisfied Strickland‟s deferential standard.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011). Even where this 

court believes the state court decision was “wrong,” that result must 

be upheld if “fairminded jurists could disagree on [its] correctness.” 

Id. at 786.

Camp v. Nevins, ___F.3d___, ___, 2015 WL 1347350, at * 4 (9th Cir. Mar. 26, 2015). 

With these standards in mind, the undersigned turns to address petitioner‟s claims.

4. Analysis

Petitioner took the witness stand at his trial and testified that G. went to his apartment 

voluntarily and had consensual sex with him. This testimony was supported by another witness 

who observed petitioner and G. “talking, hugging, and kissing” in the swimming pool prior to 

going into petitioner‟s apartment. This same witness testified that petitioner and G. appeared 

affectionate toward each other when they returned to the apartment, and that they were 

subsequently talking and laughing in the bedroom. Petitioner further testified at trial that G. later 

stole his wallet and left the apartment after they had an argument about it. Although he agreed 

there was a physical altercation outside the apartment related to his attempts to get his wallet back 

from G., he denied hitting, dragging, or kicking G, or forcing her back into his apartment. 

(Reporter‟s Transcript on Appeal at 452-58, 483-84.) Petitioner explained that he believed his 

behavior was justified because he thought G. had stolen his wallet and he didn‟t want her to leave 

with it. (Id. at 452-58, 479-80) 

In light of petitioner‟s extensive testimony at trial supporting his defense that no 

kidnapping occurred and the testimony of another witness that petitioner and G. appeared to be 

on very good terms before the fight outside the apartment, it is reasonable to conclude that 

petitioner‟s trial counsel made a tactical decision to give the jury an all-or-nothing choice on the 

kidnapping charge based on the expectation that petitioner would be acquitted of it. While some 

lawyers may have chosen to request the lesser included offense jury instruction, the decision by 

petitioner‟s trial counsel to employ a different tactic was not unreasonable under the facts of this 

case. Petitioner himself concedes that “there was a substantial evidentiary basis for an acquittal 

on the kidnapping charge.” (ECF No. 9 as 12.) Nor was it unreasonable for petitioner‟s trial 

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counsel to be concerned that giving the jury two instructions on false imprisonment might result 

in two convictions for false imprisonment instead of an acquittal on the kidnapping charge and a 

conviction on only one count of false imprisonment. 

The Ninth Circuit has opined that when trial counsel makes a “difficult but thoughtful 

tactical decision,” a reviewing court must presume that counsel‟s conduct was “within the range 

of competency.” Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1368 (9th Cir. 1988). Of course, a defense 

counsel “need not request instructions inconsistent with its trial theory.” Butcher v. Marquez, 758 

F.2d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1985) (concluding that counsel was not ineffective for choosing to forego 

a voluntary manslaughter jury instruction when the defense theory was that defendant did not 

commit the charged act, not that he committed it under provocation). As the Ninth Circuit stated

under somewhat similar circumstances as presented here:

It is true that counsel did not offer a negligent homicide instruction 

and that he objected to the mitigated deliberate homicide 

instruction. The record discloses that counsel did so not out of 

ignorance of the law but as the result of a tactical decision that the 

jury should be forced to the choice of finding Bashor guilty of 

deliberate homicide or acquitting him outright. With the benefit of 

hindsight we know that this strategy was incorrect; however, it did 

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. United States v. 

Stern, 519 F.2d 521, 524–25 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033, 

96 S. Ct. 565, 46 L.Ed.2d 407 (1975), (reasoned tactical decisions 

are not faulted, even if in retrospect better tactics were available).

Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 1984). See also Doucet v. Swarthout, No. 2:12-

cv-0031 GEB KJN P, 2014 WL 1884218, at *9-10 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2014) (no ineffective 

assistance where counsel specifically requested that the jury not be instructed on attempted 

voluntary manslaughter, and that despite facts in evidence to support the instruction on the lesser 

included offense, counsel stated in open court that he made this decision in consultation with 

petitioner in light of the chosen alternate theory of defense); Carrillo v. Hernandez, No. CV 08-

5616-ODW(CW), 2014 WL 103109, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014) (no ineffective assistance in

not requesting a lesser included instruction that was arguably inconsistent with the defense theory 

presented at trial). But cf. Griffin, 727 F.3d at 940 (trial counsel found to have rendered 

ineffective assistance in failing to object to unsworn testimony of government witness, thereby 

waiving issue on appeal, where the witness‟ testimony was the only direct testimony that 

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defendant was the shooter in an otherwise weak circumstantial case). Under these standards, the 

decision by petitioner‟s trial counsel not to request the lesser included offense jury instruction 

was “not outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 687-88.

As noted above, petitioner suggests that his trial counsel merely decided on the spur of the 

moment, and only after the trial judge brought up the subject, to decline the lesser included 

offense jury instruction. He argues this implies that his counsel had not conducted adequate 

“investigation” into this issue before making that decision. Petitioner offers no support for this 

conclusory allegation, and it is therefore insufficient to support this claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th 

Cir. 1994)) (“„[c]onclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do 

not warrant habeas relief‟”). 

Petitioner declares that he would have requested the lesser included offense instruction if 

he had been consulted. This argument does not support petitioner‟s claim for relief. His trial 

counsel did not render ineffective assistance in failing to obtain petitioner‟s permission to decline 

the lesser included offense instruction or to determine the overall defense strategy. “The

appointed counsel manages the lawsuit and has the final say in all but a few matters of trial 

strategy.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 812 (1975). Further, “a lawyer may properly 

make a tactical determination of how to run a trial in the face of his client‟s incomprehension or 

even explicit disapproval.” Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 8 (1966). See also Raley v. Ylst, 470 

F.3d 792, 799 (9th Cir.2006) (“A disagreement with counsel‟s tactical decisions does not provide 

the basis for declaring that the representation was constitutionally deficient.”), cert. denied, 552 

U.S. 833 (2007); United States v. Corona-Garcia, 210 F.3d 973, 977, n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Even 

if we were to conclude that the conflict with respect to trial tactics was severe, however, we 

would still be disinclined to reverse on that ground because trial tactics are clearly within the 

realm of powers committed to the discretion of defense counsel in any event.”); United States v. 

Wadsworth, 830 F. 2d 1500, 1509 (9th Cir. 1987) (“It is equally clear that appointed counsel, and 

not his client, is in charge of the choice of trial tactics and the theory of defense”); Rhay v. 

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Browder, 342 F.2d 345, 349 (9th Cir. 1965) (“[C]ounsel is the manager of the lawsuit; this is of 

the essence of the adversary system of which we are so proud. In the nature of things he must be, 

because he knows how to do the job and the defendant does not. That is why counsel must be 

there.”) Here, trial counsel‟s apparent belief that the evidence supporting an acquittal on the 

kidnapping charge against petitioner might lead to a not guilty verdict on that count was 

reasonable, regardless of whether she discussed this issue with petitioner. 

In rejecting petitioner‟s argument on appeal that the trial court had erred in failing to give 

the lesser included instruction, the California Court of Appeal determined that trial counsel‟s 

decision not to request a lesser-included offense instruction was based on a tactical decision to 

proceed with an all-or-nothing defense to the kidnapping charge. In rejecting petitioner‟s 

subsequent ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Sacramento County Superior Court agreed

with that conclusion, and further concluded that trial counsel‟s tactical choice was a reasonable

one under the circumstances of petitioner‟s case. The Superior Court‟s decision in this regard is 

clearly not “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended 

in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim that he received 

ineffective assistance from his trial counsel.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Although not entirely clear, it appears that petitioner may be attempting to raise a claim 

that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to argue on appeal that trial 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to request a jury instruction on false 

imprisonment as a lesser included offense to the kidnapping charge. (See ECF No. 9 at 7, 8, 13-

14.) In any event, such a contention does not present a colorable claim for relief.

The Strickland standards apply to appellate counsel as well as trial counsel. Smith v. 

Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989). 

However, an indigent defendant “does not have a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel 

to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional 

judgment, decides not to present those points.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). 

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Rather, counsel “must be allowed to decide what issues are to be pressed.” Id. Otherwise, the 

ability of counsel to present the client‟s case in accord with counsel‟s professional evaluation 

would be “seriously undermined.” Id. See also Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1274 n.4 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (Counsel is not required to file “kitchen-sink briefs” because it “is not necessary, and 

is not even particularly good appellate advocacy.”) There is also, of course, no obligation to raise 

meritless arguments on a client‟s behalf. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 (requiring a showing 

of deficient performance as well as prejudice). Thus, appellate counsel is certainly not deficient 

for failing to raise a weak issue. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. In order to establish prejudice in 

this context, petitioner must demonstrate that, but for appellate counsel‟s errors, he probably 

would have prevailed on appeal. Id. at 1434 n.9; see also Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 

840–42 (9th Cir. 2001). Finally, the failure of an attorney to raise a meritless claim is not 

prejudicial. See Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 

1227, 1239 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Above, the undersigned has concluded that petitioner‟s claim of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel lacks merit. Appellate counsel‟s decision not to include this argument in petitioner‟s 

direct appeal, but to instead focus on arguments which counsel believed were more meritorious, 

was certainly “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” 

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). See also Jones, 463 U.S. at 751–54 (an 

experienced attorney knows the importance of “winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and 

focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues”). The undersigned also 

notes that in California, “claims of ineffective assistance are often more appropriately litigated in 

a habeas corpus proceeding” and not on appeal. People v. Mendoza Tello, 15 Cal. 4th 264, 267 

(1997). Indeed, petitioner did raise his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in habeas 

proceedings he pursued in state court. His appellate counsel‟s decision to follow well-established 

authority as to the type of issues most appropriately raised on direct appeal was clearly “within 

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim, if any, that his 

appellate counsel provided him ineffective assistance. 

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D. Violation of Due Process

In his final ground for relief, petitioner claims that “the state court arbitrarily deprived 

petitioner due process of law guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the United States 

constitution.” (ECF No. 9 at 6.) He argues that the decision of the California Court of Appeal

rejecting his argument that the trial court erred in failing to give the lesser included offense jury 

instruction violated its own prior decision in People v. Golde, 163 Cal.App.4th 101 (2008). He 

contends that this erroneous ruling by the Court of Appeal also violated his Fourteenth 

Amendment “liberty interest” in being “protected from having the state arbitrarily deny him 

relief.” (Id.) Petitioner argues that, under state law, the trial court had a sua sponte duty to 

instruct the jury on all lesser included offenses supported by the evidence introduced at trial and 

that the trial court‟s failure to do so in this case violated state law. (Id. at 18-19.) Furthermore, 

petitioner argues that his state created right to a lesser included offense jury instruction was 

arbitrarily abrogated by the California Court of Appeal‟s erroneous holding that his claim of trial 

court error was waived by the doctrine of invited error.

4

 

In essence, although petitioner places a “due process violation” label on this claim, he is 

actually arguing that the decision of the California Court of Appeal was an erroneous application 

of California law. As noted above, the federal habeas relief is not available for alleged error in 

the application of state law, and habeas corpus cannot be utilized in federal court to try state 

issues de novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972); see also Wilson, 562 U.S. at 

16; Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 192 n.5 (2009) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that „it is 

 

4

 In People v. Breverman, 19 Cal.4th 142, 154-55 (1998), the California Supreme Court held 

that a trial court‟s obligation to instruct the jury sua sponte on lesser included offenses supported 

by the evidence exists even when as a matter of trial tactics a defendant not only fails to request 

the instruction but expressly objects to its being given. In Golde, the California Court of Appeal 

for the Third Appellate District, relying on the Breverman decision, found that the trial court in 

that case had a duty to instruct on all lesser included offenses supported by the evidence and erred 

in leaving it up to the defendant to make that decision. The court in Golde concluded, however, 

that the lesser included offense in that case was not supported by the evidence and, therefore, a 

jury instruction on that offense need not have been given. Golde, 163 Cal. App.4th at 115-16. 

The court also held that, in this context, the law concerning invited error is “inapposite.” Id. at 

116. In People v. Beames, 40 Cal.4th 907, 926 (2007), however, the California Supreme Court 

rejected the defendant‟s argument that the trial court‟s failure to instruct the jury on a lesser 

included offense violated his federal constitutional rights because any error by the trial court in 

this regard was “both invited and harmless.” See also Bortis v. Swarthout, No. 2:11-cv-3186-

KJM-EFB P, 2013 WL 4012833, at * 11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2013). 

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not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law 

questions.‟”); Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, questions of 

whether the trial court violated state law in failing to give the lesser-included offense jury 

instruction and/or whether the appellate court‟s decision addressing that issue was erroneous 

under state law are not properly presented to this federal habeas court. 

A habeas petitioner may not “transform a state-law issue into a federal one” merely by 

asserting a violation of the federal constitution. Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 

1997). Rather, petitioner must show that the decision of the state courts somehow “violated the 

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1083 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68). Petitioner has failed to make this showing. 

The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause applies when government action deprives 

a person of life, liberty or property. U.S. Const., Amend. IV. “The Supreme Court has 

„repeatedly held that state statutes may create liberty interests that are entitled to the procedural 

protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.‟” Carlo v. City of Chino, 

105 F.3d 493, 497 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980)). However,

here petitioner has not cited any case establishing that he has a state created liberty interest in 

having his jury in a state criminal prosecution instructed on a lesser included offense.

5

 It is 

correct that the United States Supreme Court has held that the failure to instruct on a lesser 

included offense in a capital case constitutes constitutional error if there was evidence to support 

the giving of the instruction. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980). The Supreme Court 

has not decided, however, whether this rationale extends to non-capital cases. The Ninth Circuit, 

like several other federal circuits, has declined to find constitutional error arising from the failure 

to instruct on a lesser included offense in a non-capital case. See Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 

929 (9th Cir. 2000); Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he failure of a 

state trial court to instruct on lesser included offenses in a non-capital case does not present a 

federal constitutional question”); Bashor, 730 F.2d at 1240 (“[T]he failure of a state court to 

 

5

 Let alone over his defense counsel‟s objection.

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instruct on a lesser offense [in a non-capital case] fails to present a federal constitutional question 

and will not be considered in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.”); James v. Reese, 546 F.2d 

325, 327 (9th Cir. 1976) (“Failure of a state court to instruct on a lesser offense fails to present a 

federal constitutional question and will not be considered in a federal habeas corpus proceeding”); 

see also United States v. Rivera-Alonzo, 584 F.3d 829, 834 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In the context of 

a habeas corpus review of a state court conviction, we have stated that there is no clearly 

established federal constitutional right to lesser included instructions in non-capital cases. . . . 

On direct review, we have not resolved whether there is a Constitutional right to a lesser-included 

instruction in noncapital cases.”) 

In the absence of a liberty interest, the fact that a state court decision may arguably appear 

to contravene state law does not make that decision “arbitrary,” in violation of the federal due 

process clause. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 

U.S. 1 (1979). Moreover, to find a constitutional right to a lesser-included offense instruction 

here would require the application of a new rule of law in the context of a habeas petition, 

something the court cannot do under the holding in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 28 (1989). See

Solis, 219 F.3d at 929 (habeas relief for failure to instruct on lesser included offense in noncapital case barred by Teague because it would require the application of a new constitutional 

rule); Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 819 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Tolbert 

v. Page, 182 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (same).

For these reasons, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief with respect to his 

claim that his right to due process was violated by the California Court of Appeal‟s rejection of 

his instructional error argument on appeal. 

IV. Motion for Default Judgment

On October 14, 2014, petitioner filed a motion entitled “Objection to the Delay in Time 

Constraints.” (ECF No. 22.) Therein, petitioner argues that this court should grant his habeas 

petition because of respondent‟s failure to file a timely answer to his petition. The court will 

construe petitioner‟s filing as a motion for default judgment.

/////

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A default judgment is unavailable in a habeas action. See Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 

612 (9th Cir. 1990). In any event, respondent was never in default nor was respondent‟s answer 

untimely. A review of the court docket reflects that on August 1, 2014, respondent was ordered 

to file a response to petitioner‟s February 21, 2014 amended petition for writ of habeas corpus

within sixty days. (ECF No. 14.) Respondent filed a timely answer on September 30, 2014, as 

ordered. (ECF No. 20.) Accordingly, petitioner‟s motion for default judgment will be denied.

V. Conclusion

For all of the reasons explained above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner‟s 

motion for default judgment (ECF No. 22) is denied.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner‟s application for a writ of habeas 

corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge‟s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court‟s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue 

in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Federal Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it 

enters a final order adverse to the applicant). 

Dated: April 9, 2015

DAD:8:

Haynie1876.hc

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