Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02078/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02078-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Scott Johnson
Plaintiff
Damyanti A. Patel
Defendant
Amrat K. Patel
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SCOTT JOHNSON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

AMRAT K. PATEL, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-02078-WBS-AC 

ORDER AND FINDINGS & 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Pending before the court is plaintiff’s December 24, 2014, motion for default judgment 

against defendants Amrat K. Patel and Damyanti A. Patel, located at America’s Best Value Inn, 

3951 Budweiser Ct., Stockton, California 95215-2301. ECF No. 13 at 2. The court has 

determined that the matter shall be submitted upon the record and briefs on file and accordingly, 

the date for hearing of this matter shall be vacated. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g). Upon review of the 

docket, the motion for default judgment and all attached exhibits, THE COURT FINDS AS 

FOLLOWS: 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff initiated this action on September 5, 2014, alleging violations of the Americans 

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., the California Unruh Civil Rights 

Act, the California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. § 54–54.8, and negligence. ECF No. 1 at 1, 

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5–9. Certificates of service filed September 25, 2014, demonstrate that copies of the summons 

and complaint were served on defendants personally on September 18, 2014, at America’s Best 

Value Inn, 3951 Budweiser Ct., Stockton, California 95215-2301. ECF Nos. 4 & 5. On October 

30, 2014, at plaintiff’s request, the Clerk entered default as to both defendants. ECF No. 8. On 

December 24, 2014, plaintiff filed the instant motion for default judgment, and served a copy of 

the motion by mail on the defendant at America’s Best Value Inn, 3951 Budweiser Ct., Stockton, 

California 95215-2301. ECF No. 13. 

DISCUSSION 

 It is within the sound discretion of the district court to grant or deny an application for 

default judgment. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In making this 

determination, the court considers the following factors: 

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of 

plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, 

(4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a 

dispute concerning the material facts, (6) whether the default was 

due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). “In applying this discretionary 

standard, default judgments are more often granted than denied.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. 

Castworld Products, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting PepsiCo, Inc. v. 

Triunfo-Mex, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 431, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1999)). 

 As a general rule, once default is entered, the factual allegations of the complaint are taken 

as true, except for those allegations relating to damages. Tele Video Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal, 

826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). However, although well-pleaded 

allegations in the complaint are admitted by defendant’s failure to respond, “necessary facts not 

contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by 

default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992). 

A. The Americans with Disabilities Act 

 Title III of the ADA provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the 

basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 

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advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, 

leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 

Discrimination includes “a failure to remove architectural barriers . . . in existing facilities . . . 

where such removal is readily achievable.” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). Under the ADA, the term 

readily achievable means “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much 

difficulty or expense.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9). 

 “To prevail on a Title III discrimination claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is 

disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or 

operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public 

accommodations by the defendant because of her disability.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 

F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). Further, “[t]o succeed on a ADA claim of discrimination on 

account of one's disability due to an architectural barrier, the plaintiff must also prove that: (1) the 

existing facility at the defendant’s place of business presents an architectural barrier prohibited 

under the ADA, and (2) the removal of the barrier is readily achievable.” Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn 

Rest., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1085 (D. Haw. 2000). 

 Here, plaintiff alleges (1) that he is disabled, ECF No. 1 at 1; (2) that defendants’ 

business, America’s Best Value Inn, is a place of public accommodation, id. at 2–3; (3) that 

plaintiff was denied access to defendants’ business because of plaintiff’s disability, id. at 3–4; and 

(4) that defendant’s business has a number of architectural barriers (lack of properly configured 

disabled parking space(s), and accessible ramps, entrances, counters, and rooms), id. at 6–8.1

 

 

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 Plaintiff also asserts violations of the ADA based on defendants’ failure to adhere to the 

California Building Code. ECF No. 1 at 6. In support of his proposition that failure to adhere to 

the California Building Code can constitute a violation of the ADA, plaintiff points to the ADA 

Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”), 36 C.F.R., Part 1191, § 502.3.3, available at 

http://www.access-board.gov/guidelines-and-standards/buildings-and-sites/about-the-adastandards/ada-standards-single-file#about. Id. Section 502.3.3, which relates to the marking of 

disabled parking spaces, states that “[t]he method and color of marking are not specified by these 

requirements but may be addressed by State or local laws or regulations.” This does not, in and 

of itself, mean that violations of State and local building regulations related to disability also 

constitute violations of the ADA. See Eiden v. Home Depot USA, Inc., No. CIVS04-977 

LKK/CMK, 2006 WL 1490418, at *8 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2006) (holding that the ADAAG 

regulations do not create a cause of action based on failure to comply with the California Building 

(continued...) 

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Plaintiff argues that whether the removal of these barriers is readily achievable is an affirmative 

defense that is waived if not raised. ECF No. 13 at 6–7 (citing Wilson v. Haria and Gorgi Corp., 

479 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1133 & n.7 (E.D. Cal. 2007)). The court finds that it does not need to 

address the issue of whether the “ready achievability” of the barriers constitutes an affirmative 

defense. Regardless, 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b) specifically lists “[i]nstalling ramps[,] . . . 

[r]epositioning shelves[,] . . . [r]earranging . . . display racks, and other furniture[,] . . . [and] 

[c]reating designated accessible parking spaces[,]” as examples of typical “steps to remove 

barriers.” This means that the barriers cited by plaintiff are per se readily achievable and plaintiff 

has therefore met his burden. 

Because plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true on default, the court finds that plaintiff has 

made out a prima facie Title III discrimination claim. Additionally, the court finds that the 

majority of the Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment to plaintiff on that claim. 

Therefore, the court recommends that plaintiff be granted default judgment against defendant on 

his ADA claim and award plaintiff an injunction requiring defendant to provide the correct 

number and type of properly configured disabled parking space(s) including a van accessible 

disabled parking space, an accessible entrance, an accessible transaction counter, and accessible 

rooms in accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the Americans 

with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG) contained in 28 CFR Part 36. See 42 

U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) (authorizing injunctions under the ADA). 

B. Unruh Civil Rights Act 

 The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides: “All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are 

free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, 

disability, medical condition, marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and equal 

accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of 

every kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). To prevail on his disability discrimination 

 

Code). Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing that 

defendants’ building code violations necessarily create a cause of action for violation of the ADA. 

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claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, plaintiff must establish that (1) defendant denied plaintiff 

the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services; (2) a motivating 

reason for defendant’s conduct was plaintiff’s disability, (3) plaintiff was harmed; and (4) 

defendant’s wrongful conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s injury. California 

Civil Jury Instructions (CACI), No. 3020. A plaintiff who establishes a violation of the ADA 

need not prove intentional discrimination under the Unruh Act. See Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 46 

Cal. 4th 661 (Cal. 2009) (interpreting Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f), which provides “A violation of the 

right of any individual under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336) 

shall also constitute a violation of this section”). 

 Here, because plaintiff’s complaint properly sets out the necessary elements for his ADA 

claim, plaintiff has also properly set out the necessary elements for his Unruh Civil Rights Act 

claim. Therefore, and because there are no policy considerations which preclude the entry of 

default judgment on this claim, Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72, the court will recommend that 

plaintiff's motion for default judgment on his Unruh Civil Rights Act claim be granted. 

 The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides for a minimum statutory damage amount of $4,000 

per violation, and “any attorney’s fees that may be determined by the court in addition thereto.” 

Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). Plaintiffs are entitled to recover the statutory minimum for each time: (1) 

they are deterred from visiting a particular establishment due to defendant's noncompliance with 

the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for the Arts, 370 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 2004); 

and (2) they “actually visit[] the offending establishment,” Feezor v. Del Taco, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 

2d 1088, 1090 (S.D. Cal. 2005). Plaintiff’s motion seeks a damages award in the amount of 

$11,925 for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, including two instances of visiting 

defendants’ business for statutory violations totaling $8,000. ECF No. 13 at 5, 11–12. Plaintiff 

alleges that he visited defendants’ business and was denied equal access twice in April 2014, and 

“several [unspecified] times thereafter.” Id. at 5. Accordingly, the court will recommend that 

plaintiff be awarded the minimum $8,000 in statutory damages in accordance with his request for 

the two instances he visited defendants’ business during April of 2014. 

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Plaintiff also requests $3,925 in attorney’s fees and costs under Title III of the ADA and 

the Unruh Civil Rights Act. ECF No. 13 at 14–16; ECF No. 13-4 at 2–4. Attorney’s fee awards 

are calculated using the lodestar method whereby the hours reasonably spent in the litigation are 

multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1146–48 

(9th Cir. 2001). The hourly rate is generally calculated “according to the prevailing market rates 

in the relevant legal community.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). It is also the 

general rule that the court will use the rates of attorneys practicing in the forum district. Gates v. 

Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff requests attorney fees at an hourly 

rate of $425 for 8.2 hours of work, along with $440 in filing fees and service costs. ECF No. 13-

4 at 3. Plaintiff claims that this is a fair rate for attorneys with similar experience in the area of 

disability law, but does not address the prevailing market rates in the forum district. Id. at 3–4. 

The court has found that the prevailing rate is $250 per hour in the Sacramento division of the 

Eastern District of California for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, 

experience, and reputation. See, e.g., Loskot v. D & K Spirits, LLC, 2:10-CV -0684 WBS DAD, 

2011 WL 567364 at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2011) (citing numerous Eastern District ADA cases 

resolved on default judgment where $250 was determined to be the reasonable rate). 

Accordingly, the court will recommend that plaintiff be awarded $2,490 in attorney fees and 

costs, based on an hourly rate of $250 along with $440 in filing fees and service costs. 2

 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the January 28, 2015, hearing on 

plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is vacated; and 

 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment on plaintiff’s ADA claim and Unruh Civil 

Rights Act claim, ECF No. 13, be granted; 

 2. Plaintiff be awarded statutory damages in the amount of $4,000 and attorney’s fees and 

 

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 Although plaintiff’s Complaint contains claims for violation of the California Disabled Persons 

Act and negligence, plaintiff does not address those claims in his Motion for Default Judgment. 

Accordingly, the Court only reaches plaintiff’s claims for violation of the ADA and the Unruh 

Civil Rights Act. 

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costs in the amount of $2,490; and 

 3. Plaintiff be granted an injunction requiring defendant to provide the correct number 

and type of properly configured disabled parking space(s) including a van accessible disabled 

parking space, an accessible entrance, an accessible transaction counter, and accessible rooms in 

accordance with the ADA and the ADAAG. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: January 21, 2015 

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