Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02395/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02395-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Isidro Navarette-Zamora
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2395

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the Eastern 

* District of Arkansas.

Isidro Navarette-Zamora, *

* [PUBLISHED] 

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: 

 Filed: July 20, 2005 

___________

Before 

___________

PER CURIAM.

Isidro Navarette-Zamora pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than 500

grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.

The district court1

 found that his criminal history was Category I, he deserved a threelevel reduction for acceptance of responsibility, he was responsible for over 1700

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grams of methamphetamine, and his total offense level was thirty-one. The

Guidelines range was 108 to 135 months, but the statutory mandatory minimum was

120 months. On May 18, 2004, the district court imposed the minimum, 120 month

sentence. 

Shortly after sentencing, defense counsel recognized that Mr. NavaretteZamora was eligible for safety valve relief. On May 25, 2004, the district court

granted an unopposed motion to modify the presentence report and correct the

judgment. The district court found that Mr. Navarette-Zamora met all the criteria of

U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 such that the statutory mandatory minimum did not apply. Also,

as adjusted under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(7), his total offense level became 29. The

resultant Guidelines range was 87 to 101 months. The district court applied the

minimum sentence of 87 months.

Mr. Navarette-Zamora argues on appeal that his sentence involved error under

Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004). His appeal was pending when the

Supreme Court issued its opinion in Blakely. Because he raises this issue for the first

time on appeal, we review for plain error under United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543,

551-52 (8th Cir. 2005). The district court, in May 2004, understandably made a

factual finding by the preponderance of the evidence standard and applied the

Guidelines as mandatory. Accordingly, there was error. Under Pirani, Mr. NavaretteZamora must show that this error affected his substantial rights, i.e., that the error was

prejudicial. Id. In this context, prejudice means that there is a reasonable probability

that the district court would have granted a lesser sentence had the district court not

treated the Guidelines as mandatory. Id.

Here, the district court initially imposed the statutory minimum sentence, then

granted safety valve relief and imposed a bottom-of-the-range Guidelines sentence.

There is nothing else to suggest that the district court would have granted a lesser

sentence. 

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In Pirani, we held that a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range is

insufficient, standing alone, for a defendant to make the required showing of

prejudice. Id. at 553 (“But sentencing at the bottom of the range is the norm for many

judges, so it is insufficient, without more, to demonstrate a reasonable probability that

the court would have imposed a lesser sentence absent the Booker error.”). Here, it

is arguable that the district court’s repeated bottom-of-the-range sentences suggest

that the district court might have granted a lesser sentence had it not believed itself

to be constrained by a mandatory sentencing regime. We reject this argument

because, as we stated in Pirani, sentencing at the bottom of the range may be the

norm. If it is the norm, it is not unexpected that a district court would repeat this

action twice in the same case. Barring other indicia from the district court that a

lesser sentence would be appropriate, Pirani forecloses relief on the present facts.

This appeal involves no other claims that merit discussion, and having carefully

reviewed the record, we affirm the judgment of the district court. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

Counsel’s request to withdraw is granted.

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I dissent.

I would remand this case for resentencing. 

As the majority notes, the district court sentenced the defendant under

mandatory guidelines and thereby erred. The error is plain. The only question is

whether, under our decision in Pirani, there is a reasonable probability that the

sentencing judge would impose a lower sentence if we sent the case back.

In Pirani we said that a sentence at the bottom of the guideline range is not

enough to show a reasonable probability of a lower sentence on remand. Pirani did

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not contemplate or consider the unusual situation we have here: The sentencing

judge gives the lowest available sentence the first time around; then it is discovered

that the sentence can be even lower, and the judge gives the lowest available sentence

the second time, too.

I think it is reasonably clear that the judge thought the available sentences were

too high. I think it is reasonably probable that the judge would give a lower sentence

if she could.

Thus, here the sentence should be remanded.

______________________________

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