Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-07001/USCOURTS-caDC-14-07001-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Berry Law PLLC
Appellant
Kraft Foods Group, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided January 30, 2015 

No. 14-7001 

BERRY LAW PLLC, 

APPELLANT

v. 

KRAFT FOODS GROUP, INC., 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:13-cv-00475) 

R. Stephen Berry was on the briefs for appellant. 

Daniel S. Blynn, Darrell J. Graham, and John E. Bucheit 

were on the brief for appellee. 

Before: GRIFFITH and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS. 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: Berry Law PLLC 

appeals from the district court’s dismissal of its implied-inUSCA Case #14-7001 Document #1535034 Filed: 01/30/2015 Page 1 of 5
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fact contract and quasi-contract claims against Kraft Foods 

Group, Inc. We affirm. 

* * * 

In August 2010, Stephen R. Berry of Berry Law advised 

Kraft that it might have an antitrust claim worth tens of 

millions of dollars against News Corporation, News America 

Marketing FSI LLC, and News America Marketing In-Store 

LLC (collectively “News Corp.” or “News”). (All referenced 

facts come from the complaint.) The claim related to possible 

monopolization and tying in the “sale of in-store promotion 

services and free-standing-insert coupons placed in 

newspapers.” Kraft’s chief litigation counsel, Douglas 

Cherry, asked Berry for further legal analysis of the possible 

claim. 

Berry Law then prepared a 42-page evaluation 

memorandum for Kraft’s top management analyzing liability 

and damages issues. Berry alleges that he completed that 

memo by November 10, 2010. At about the same time, 

Cherry noted that the matter was “moving pretty fast” and that 

he wished to brief Kraft’s general counsel about the matter. 

The complaint says that “upon information and belief, [the 

evaluation memorandum] was forwarded at the very least to 

Kraft’s General Counsel in early 2011.” It was presumably 

Cherry who did the forwarding. 

Meanwhile, on October 28, 2010, Berry sent a “retention 

email” to Cherry. Cherry replied, 

[Y]ou have asked about fees for work to create the 

proposal to share with management. FWIW [For 

what it’s worth], we have never paid for that work as 

far as I know for any outside counsel. We’ve viewed 

it as part of what we expect counsel to do in bringing 

USCA Case #14-7001 Document #1535034 Filed: 01/30/2015 Page 2 of 5
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to us a proposal to use their firm. I don’t think this 

will be a big issue for you in view of the size of the 

ultimate payout should this matter proceed 

favorably, but if it helps you to get comfortable 

proceeding as I suggest, I can tell you that 

presuming we move forward, you will be our counsel 

on this matter. That requires no further approvals. 

(Emphasis added in the complaint.) 

Berry Law claims that it persisted, “ask[ing] that it be 

able to carry its evaluation time and bill it later if the matter 

‘moved forward,’” but does not claim that Kraft reconsidered 

its earlier denial. Rather, the complaint alleges that, in 

January or February of 2012, Kraft “‘moved forward’ with 

pre-Complaint discussion or negotiation” with News Corp. 

According to Berry, on February 19, 2012, Kraft “terminated 

Berry Law’s representation, cryptically indicating that it did 

not believe that some of its purchases from News were 

overcharged and stating that its damages were uncertain.” 

Berry Law then sent Kraft a “quantum meruit fee 

statement” and other correspondence seeking $191,528.70 in 

legal fees and expenses that it believed it was owed. Kraft did 

not respond to Berry’s communications. Berry then filed this 

action seeking that amount—i.e., “the value of services which 

enabled and facilitated Kraft’s discussion or negotiation with 

News and its possible compensation by News”—based on an 

implied-in-fact contract or a quasi-contract theory. The 

district court dismissed the complaint. 

* * * 

To state a claim for breach of an implied-in-fact contract, 

Berry Law must plausibly allege that it rendered Kraft 

valuable services; that Kraft accepted, used, and enjoyed those 

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services; and that the circumstances “reasonably notified” 

Kraft that Berry “expected to be paid” by Kraft. Jordan Keys 

& Jessamy, LLP v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 870 A.2d 

58, 62 (D.C. 2005). Notice to the recipient that the provider 

expects to be paid is commonly the critical issue. See 

Bloomgarden v. Coyer, 479 F.2d 201, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 

In applying these principles we will assume arguendo that the 

alleged discussions or negotiations with News Corp. could 

qualify as “moving forward” as the term appeared in the 

context of the email exchange. 

Berry Law’s implied-in-fact contract claim fails because 

the complaint does not plausibly allege that Kraft was 

“reasonably notified” that Berry expected to be paid for any 

work completed before that point. The complaint alleges that 

Kraft told Berry that it had “never paid” “fees for work to 

create the proposal to share with management,” and “viewed 

it as part of what we expect counsel to do in bringing to us a 

proposal to use their firm.” Any expectation that Berry might 

have had that Kraft would pay for such work was thus 

unreasonable. See Jordan Keys & Jessamy, 870 A.2d at 62. 

Cherry’s statement that “presuming we move forward, 

you will be our counsel on this matter” might be read to 

support an implied-in-fact contract as to any work that Berry 

Law might complete after “moving forward.” Indeed, 

Cherry’s email language, “I can tell you that presuming we 

move forward, you will be our counsel on this matter,” recited 

and emphasized in the complaint, suggests just that. But the 

complaint seeks something completely different: 

compensation for work performed before Kraft’s “moving 

forward”—that is, “the value of services which enabled and 

facilitated Kraft’s discussion or negotiation with News and its 

possible compensation by News.” Indeed the complaint 

explicitly claims not to be “seeking contingent compensation 

from any value received by Kraft from News.” There is thus a 

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mismatch between Berry’s claim and the character of the 

relief he seeks (and thus, implicitly, the character of the injury 

inflicted).

Berry Law’s quasi-contract claim fares no better. To 

state such a claim, otherwise known as an unjust enrichment 

claim, Berry must plausibly allege that he conferred a benefit 

on Kraft, that Kraft retained the benefit, and that Kraft’s 

retention of the benefit is unjust under the circumstances. 

Peart v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 972 A.2d 810, 813 (D.C. 2009). 

Kraft told Berry that it would not compensate him for 

work completed prior to management approval. No 

compensation is due where the “plaintiff did not contemplate 

a personal fee, or the defendant could not reasonably have 

supposed that he did.” Bloomgarden, 479 F.2d at 212. 

Rather, in view of Kraft’s unequivocally expressed position 

on preliminary work, Berry cannot reasonably have 

contemplated a fee for work completed before Kraft moved 

forward, nor could Kraft reasonably have known Berry 

contemplated any such payment. Instead, Berry completed 

the memorandum and other legal work in the hope that Kraft 

would retain him as counsel in the event that Kraft “moved 

forward.” Because Berry Law’s “services were rendered 

simply in order to gain a business advantage,” its quasicontract claim fails. Id. at 211. 

* * * 

The judgment of the district court is 

 Affirmed. 

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