Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50086/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50086-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Fredy Oswaldo Gamez Reyes
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

FREDY OSWALDO GAMEZ REYES,

AKA Luis Enrique Aguirre, AKA

Douglas Omar Castillo, AKA

Chapo, AKA Freddy Oswaldo

Gamez, AKA Freddy Oswaldo

Gamez-Reyes, AKA Carlos Lopez,

AKA Carlos Ramirez,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-50086

D.C. No.

2:12-cr-00020-

SJO

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 3, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed November 21, 2014

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Raymond C. Fisher,

and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Murguia

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2 UNITED STATES V. GAMEZ REYES

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a sentence for harboring and

concealing illegal aliens for financial gain.

The panel held that the district court applied the proper

legal standard and did not clearly err in applying an

enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(4), for

harboring unaccompanied minor aliens, when the district

court looked at the particular circumstances of this alien

smuggling ring and the defendant’s role within it to conclude

that it was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that

unaccompanied minors would be present. Rejecting the

defendant’s contention that the district court’s finding did not

comport with due process, the panel held that the undisputed

facts upon which the district court relied bear sufficient

indicia of reliability.

Upholding the district court’s imposition of an

enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(8), the panel

held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that

this particular smuggling organization detained aliens both in

connection with a demand for payment and through coercion

or threat, and in finding that such detention was reasonably

foreseeable to the defendant.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. GAMEZ REYES 3

COUNSEL

Marisa Conroy (argued), Law Office of Marisa L. D. Conroy,

Encinitas, California; Michelle Anderson Barth, Burlington,

Vermont, for Defendant-Appellant.

Kerry C. O’Neill (argued) and David M. Herzog, Assistant

United States Attorneys; Robert E. Dugdale, Assistant United

States Attorney, Los Angeles, California, for PlaintiffAppellee.

OPINION

MURGUIA, Circuit Judge:

FredyOswaldo Gamez Reyes pleaded guilty to six counts

of harboring and concealing illegal aliens for financial gain,

in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (a)(1)(B)(i).1

The district court imposed a within-guidelines sentence of

ninety-six months’ imprisonment and a three-year term of

supervised release. On appeal, Gamez Reyes claims that the

district court erred in applying a two-level sentencing

enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(4), for

harboring unaccompanied minor aliens, and a two-level

sentencing enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.1(b)(8)(A), for involuntarily detaining aliens through

coercion or threat or in connection with a demand for

1

 We use the term “illegal aliens” because that is the terminology used

in the indictment, plea agreement, and judgment of conviction.

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4 UNITED STATES V. GAMEZ REYES

payment.2 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and

18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Between May 2008 and March 2011, Gamez Reyes

participated in a large-scale alien smuggling operation that

smuggled approximately 2,000 aliens annually into the

United States and harbored them in stash houses in southern

California until they paid a fee. Typically, the aliens paid a

portion of the smuggling fee in their country of origin, and

after they arrived in the United States their families paid the

remainder of the fee on the aliens’ behalf. Gamez Reyes was

in charge of obtaining and renting the stash houses,

overseeing the maintenance and operation of the stash houses,

and collecting smuggling fees from family members in

exchange for the release of the aliens. Gamez Reyes worked

directly with the leader of the smuggling ring, known as

“Honda.” Under Honda’s direction, Gamez Reyes retrieved

smuggling fees from Western Union or MoneyGram and

delivered the money to Honda in person; in exchange, Honda

gave Gamez Reyes between fifty and one-hundred dollars per

transaction. GamezReyes also personallycollected fees from

family members or directed other members of the smuggling

ring to pick up the fees.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents

began investigating the alien smuggling ring on July 27,

2009, after two female aliens inside one of the ring’s stash

houses in Compton, California, handed a note to children

standing outside the house’s barred window. Written in

2 We address Gamez Reyes’s other claims in an unpublished

memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this opinion.

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UNITED STATES V. GAMEZ REYES 5

Spanish on a piece of toilet paper, the note read, “Do me a

favor and call this number. Don’t call the police please! We

are immigrants and we cannot leave. May God grant you

blessings.” The women later explained to ICE agents that

they wrote the note because one of the smugglers acting as a

guard at the Compton house demanded an additional fee. 

When they were unable to come up with the extra money, the

smuggler, known as Pablo and later determined to be a close

associate of Gamez Reyes, threatened to kill them. The

children gave the note to a neighbor, who contacted the

Compton house owner’s daughter, who alerted the owner. 

Concerned, the owner called Gamez Reyes, who assured the

owner no one was being held captive. Nonetheless, the

owner notified Gamez Reyes that she had called the police

and that officers were on their way.

Later that day, ICE agents arrived at the Compton stash

house, followed by Los Angeles police officers and sheriff’s

deputies. Upon the agents’ arrival, numerous individuals ran

out of the house, and a dog charged at the officers. The

officers shot the dog and ultimately arrested eighteen aliens

from the stash house and one member of the alien smuggling

operation. Among the eighteen arrested aliens were two

young brothers from Ecuador, later determined to be thirteen

and fifteen years old. Local residents in the Compton

neighborhood discovered the two boys hiding in an

abandoned house shortly after the raid and brought them to

the ICE agents. During an interview with ICE agents the day

after the raid, one of the boys explained that their father

resided in Ecuador, that their undocumented mother lived in

New York, and that he and his brother traveled to the United

States with their cousin. An attempt to reach the boys’

mother by phone was unsuccessful.

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6 UNITED STATES V. GAMEZ REYES

Police later discovered that, after the raid on the Compton

stash house, Gamez Reyes signed a lease for a new stash

house in Lynwood, California. Between January 2010 and

March 2011, ICE agents executed search warrants on the

Lynwood stash house and two other houses in southern

California, after receiving phone calls from concerned

relatives that smuggled aliens were being held against their

will inside the houses. Agents found thirty-seven, thirty-five,

and seven smuggled aliens in stash houses located in

Lynwood, Baldwin Park, and Hesperia, California,

respectively. At each location, the agents arrested several

members of the smuggling ring acting as guards, and they

recovered smuggling ledgers, known as “pollo books,” with

several hundred names of smuggled aliens and payment

information. GamezReyes’s name, or his moniker, “Chapo,”

appeared in connection with 142 distinct entries in the

smuggling ledgers. His name was also mentioned in

MoneyGram records and interviews with the aliens. Gamez

Reyes was arrested at his home in Compton, California, on

March 18, 2011, pursuant to a federal arrest warrant for an

unrelated illegal reentry offense.

Gamez Reyes was charged in a seven-count indictment. 

Counts one through six charged Gamez Reyes with harboring

and concealing illegal aliens for financial gain, in violation of

8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (a)(1)(B)(i). Count seven

charged Gamez Reyes with concealing, harboring, and

shielding an alien from detection, during and in relation to

which he caused serious bodily injury to the alien.3 After

3 This count stemmed from allegations that Gamez Reyes sexually

assaulted two female aliens while they were held at the Compton stash

house. Gamez Reyes disputed these claims, and after an investigation, the

government was unable to conclude any sexual assaults took place. One

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UNITED STATES V. GAMEZ REYES 7

entering into plea negotiations with the government, Gamez

Reyes pleaded guilty to counts one through six, and the

government dismissed count seven. The government agreed

not to recommend a term of imprisonment higher than the

low end of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, and

the parties agreed not to seek any other specific offense

characteristics, adjustments, or departures. The plea

agreement acknowledged, however, that the district court was

not a party to the agreement, that it could determine the

appropriate sentencing range, and that it was not bound by

any of the parties’ recommendations.4

See Fed. R. Crim. P.

11(c)(1)(B). Gamez Reyes further confirmed at his changeof-plea hearing that he understood that the plea agreement did

not bind the district court and that the district court retained

discretion to impose a sentence it deemed appropriate.

After Gamez Reyes pleaded guilty, the United States

Probation Office prepared a presentence report (“PSR”). The

of the women was unable to identify Gamez Reyes in a photographic

lineup as her assailant. The other woman claimed that the alleged assault

took place inside the stash house but Gamez Reyes claimed it was

consensual sex at a hotel. Gamez Reyes passed a polygraph test, and the

government obtained a hotel registration consistent with Gamez Reyes’s

account. After lengthy discussion at sentencing, the district court

ultimately credited Gamez Reyes’s claim that he engaged in sexual

conduct with the alien at a hotel, but the court did not credit his claim that

the sexual conduct was a voluntary act on behalf of the alien. The district

court did not rely on the sexual assault allegations when it imposed the

enhancements discussed in this appeal.

4 By contrast, a plea agreement executed pursuant to Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) provides that where the parties “agree that

a specific sentence . . . is the appropriate disposition of the case . . . such

a recommendation or request binds the court once the court accepts the

plea agreement.”

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8 UNITED STATES V. GAMEZ REYES

PSR recommended a two-level enhancement for smuggling,

transporting, or harboring an unaccompanied minor. This

recommendation was based on evidence that agents had

apprehended the thirteen- and fifteen-year-old minors during

the raid of the Compton stash house and evidence that the

minors were unaccompanied by a parent or grandparent. The

PSR also recommended a two-level enhancement for

involuntarily detaining an alien through coercion or threat, or

in connection with a demand for payment. This

recommendation was based on (1) evidence that the two

women who threw the note out of the window at the Compton

stash house were detained in the stash house after smugglers

raised their fee; (2) indications in the note itself that

immigrants were being held against their will in the stash

house; and (3) the fact that Gamez Reyes admitted to

overseeing the stash houses and collecting fees. In

recommending these enhancements, the PSR applied the

“Relevant Conduct” guideline at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a), which

holds a defendant accountable for reasonably foreseeable

actions or omissions of others committed in furtherance of a

jointly undertaken criminal activity.

At sentencing, Gamez Reyes objected to the

enhancements, and, consistent with the plea agreement, the

government also argued against imposing the enhancements.5

With respect to the unaccompanied minor enhancement, the

5 The government argues on appeal that the district court did not clearly

err in applying the enhancements. In the plea agreement, the parties

agreed that they both maintained the right to “argue on appeal and

collateral review that the Court’s Sentencing Guidelines calculations and

the sentence it chooses to impose are not error.” See United States v.

Rodriguez-Castro, 641 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2011) (government did

not breach plea agreement by arguing on appeal in support of sentence

imposed by district court).

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UNITED STATES V. GAMEZ REYES 9

government argued that there was little evidence that the age

of the two minor boys or their relationship to the other aliens

in the house was reasonably foreseeable to GamezReyes, and

noted that this particular alien smuggling ring did not focus

on smuggling minors into the country. But the government

also conceded that none of the aliens recovered from the

Compton stash house shared a last name with the two boys,

and that the organization’s only requirement for smuggling an

alien was the alien’s ability to pay the fee. With respect to

the involuntary detention enhancement, the government

conceded that some aliens’ fees were increased once they

arrived in the United States, but argued that there was little

evidence Gamez Reyes knew or reasonably should have

known about the increased fees. The government also argued

that it is a normal incident of smuggling operations that the

aliens are held in custody until they pay the agreed-upon fee. 

After listening to arguments from both parties in two lengthy

hearings, and after reviewing the PSR, sentencing

memoranda, and ICE investigative reports on which the

probation officer relied, the district court denied Gamez

Reyes’s objections, imposed the two disputed enhancements

and a third enhancement for an aggravated role in the offense,

and sentenced Gamez Reyes to ninety-six months’

imprisonment, at the top of the Sentencing Guidelines range.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of the

Sentencing Guidelines, and we review for clear error its

factual findings. See United States v. Rivera-Alonzo,

584 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus, we review for clear

error the district court’s finding that it was reasonably

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10 UNITED STATES V. GAMEZ REYES

foreseeable to Gamez Reyes that the ring would smuggle

unaccompanied minors and involuntarily detain aliens in the

stash houses.6 Under the clearly erroneous standard, “[s]o

long as the district court’s view of the evidence is plausible

in light of the record viewed in its entirety, it cannot be

clearly erroneous, even if the reviewing court would have

weighed the evidence differently had it sat as the trier of

fact.” United States v. Gust, 405 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir.

2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We

have previously identified an intracircuit split on whether the

proper standard of review of the application of the Sentencing

Guidelines to the facts is de novo or abuse of discretion, see

United States v. Tanke, 743 F.3d 1296, 1306 (9th Cir. 2014),

but we need not resolve the issue here because our decision

would be the same under either standard of review. See id.

B. Unaccompanied Minor Enhancement

The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-level

enhancement “[i]f the defendant smuggled, transported, or

harbored a minor who was unaccompanied by the minor’s

parent or grandparent.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(4). A minor is

defined as “an individual who had not attained the age of 16

years.” Id., cmt. n.1. As in the PSR, when the district court

imposed this enhancement it relied on the “Relevant

 

6

 The government argues that the plain error standard of review should

apply with respect to Gamez Reyes’s challenge to the unaccompanied

minor enhancement, because Gamez Reyes raises a new legal argument

in his opening brief on appeal that he did not raise before the district court. 

We reject this contention. See Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1098

(9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e may consider new legal arguments raised by the

parties relating to claims previously raised in the litigation.”); see also

United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2004)

(“[I]t is claims that are deemed waived or forfeited, not arguments.”).

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UNITED STATES V. GAMEZ REYES 11

Conduct” guideline, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Section

1B1.3(a)(1)(B) provides that in the case of a jointly

undertaken criminal activity, whether or not it is charged as

conspiracy, a particular special offense characteristic should

be determined based on “all reasonably foreseeable acts and

omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken

criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the

offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the

course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for

that offense.” On appeal, Gamez Reyes does not dispute that

unaccompanied minors were found at the Compton stash

house. Instead, he disputes whether it was reasonably

foreseeable to him that the unaccompanied minors would be

there. In particular, he contends that, rather than applying the

“reasonably foreseeable” standard, the district court

effectively applied a “strict liability” standard, because it

relied chiefly upon the sheer volume of aliens smuggled

annually to conclude that it was reasonably foreseeable

unaccompanied minors would also be smuggled.

We conclude that the district court applied the proper

legal standard and did not clearly err in imposing the

unaccompanied minor enhancement, despite the

government’s argument at sentencing that it was not

reasonably foreseeable to Gamez Reyes that unaccompanied

minors would be smuggled. The district court relied in part

on the large size of this alien smuggling ring to find that “it

was reasonably foreseeable for [Gamez Reyes] to have

known that the minors were [at the Compton location].” But

the district court also relied on Gamez Reyes’s familiarity

with the circumstances of the Compton stash house: he

located and leased the house, he went to the house a number

of times, and there were fewer aliens held in that stash house

compared to the other houses. The district court also

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12 UNITED STATES V. GAMEZ REYES

considered that this particular smuggling organization had no

system in place to ensure that any minor aliens were

accompanied; instead, all that was required was payment of

the smuggling fee. Therefore, the district court did not apply

a “strict liability” standard. It properly looked at the

particular circumstances of this alien smuggling ring and

Gamez Reyes’s role within it to conclude that it was

reasonably foreseeable to Gamez Reyes that unaccompanied

minors would be present.

Nonetheless, Gamez Reyes insists that “it was not an

obvious fact” that the two minor brothers were traveling

unaccompanied. But it did not need to be “obvious” to

Gamez Reyes that unaccompanied minors were being held in

the Compton house, only “reasonably foreseeable.” See

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). The Guidelines provide an

instructive and analogous example of when a defendant can

be held accountable for the conduct of others:

Defendant P is a street-level drug dealer who

knows of other street-level drug dealers in the

same geographic area who sell the same type

of drug as he sells. Defendant P and the other

dealers share a common source of supply, but

otherwise operate independently. Defendant P

is not accountable for the quantities of drugs

sold by the other street-level drug dealers

because he is not engaged in a jointly

undertaken criminal activity with them. In

contrast, Defendant Q, another street-level

drug dealer, pools his resources and profits

with four other street-level drug dealers.

Defendant Q is engaged in a jointly

undertaken criminal activity and, therefore, he

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UNITED STATES V. GAMEZ REYES 13

is accountable under subsection (a)(1)(B) for

the quantities of drugs sold by the four other

dealers during the course of his joint

undertaking with them because those sales

were in furtherance of the jointly undertaken

criminal activity and reasonably foreseeable

in connection with that criminal activity.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2(c)(6); see also Stinson v. United

States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) (“[C]ommentary in the

Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is

authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal

statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading

of, that guideline.”). Gamez Reyes admitted that he collected

the smuggling fees, that he processed the fees through

MoneyGram and Western Union, and that he was paid in cash

“from the organization in exchange for his participation in the

smuggling organization.” As the district court noted, he was

a frequent visitor to the Compton stash house and he was in

frequent contact with the head of the organization and the

guards stationed at the stash houses. Like “Defendant Q” in

the example above, Gamez Reyes pooled his resources and

profits with the other members of the smuggling ring. 

Coupled with the size of this organization, Gamez Reyes’s

significant role within it, the lack of any screening

mechanism to prevent unaccompanied minors, and Gamez

Reyes’s intimate knowledge of the circumstances in the

Compton stash house, it was plausible for the district court to

conclude that Gamez Reyes could reasonably have foreseen

that other members of this smuggling ring might smuggle

unaccompanied minors, either by act or omission. 

Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err by imposing

this enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Dallman,

533 F.3d 755, 760 (9th Cir. 2008) (district court did not err in

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14 UNITED STATES V. GAMEZ REYES

holding defendant accountable for the aggregate amount of

marijuana carried by all coconspirators in attempt to import

marijuana into the United States because coconspirators

coordinated importation efforts, aided each other in crossing

a barbed wire fence at the border, and together attempted to

hide from Border Patrol agents); United States v. Lavender,

224 F.3d 939, 941–42 (9th Cir. 2000) (district court’s finding

that it was reasonably foreseeable coconspirator would carry

and use a dangerous weapon during a bank robbery was not

clearly erroneous); United States v. Willis, 899 F.2d 873, 875

(9th Cir. 1990) (district court properly held wife accountable

for husband’s possession of a firearm in a narcotics

trafficking organization because the husband’s gun was

plainly visible and coconspirators were few in number and

knew each other well, such that the court could infer that each

participant knew the others’ “methods of operation”); see also

United States v. Rodriguez, 525 F. App’x 268, 270 (5th Cir.

2013) (per curiam)(district court did not err in finding

reasonably foreseeable that a minor alien would be among

those harbored where smuggling organization was not

restricted by age).

Finally, and contrary to Gamez Reyes’s contention, the

district court’s finding comports with due process. To prevail

on a due process claim, Gamez Reyes must demonstrate that

his sentence was based on false or unreliable information. 

See United States v. Vanderwerfhorst, 576 F.3d 929, 935–36

(9th Cir. 2009). Challenged information is deemed false or

unreliable if it lacks “some minimal indicium of reliability

beyond mere allegation.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). Gamez Reyes has not met this burden. The district

court relied on Gamez Reyes’s own admissions that the

organization smuggled in approximately 2,000 aliens

annually, that he rented the Compton house where the two

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UNITED STATES V. GAMEZ REYES 15

minor boys were held, that he oversaw the maintenance and

operation of the stash houses, and that he personally collected

smuggling fees. The district court also fairly relied on both

the PSR and the underlying ICE investigative reports

submitted by the probation officer. See United States v.

Burns, 894 F.2d 334, 336–37 (9th Cir. 1990) (no error in

consideringSecretService investigative report at sentencing). 

In particular, the district court noted that those investigative

reports included information that Gamez Reyes came to the

Compton stash house on a regular basis and that, on the day

of the raid, Gamez Reyes arrived at the Compton house to

retrieve and drive away with a guard named Pablo

immediatelybefore officers arrived. Additionally, the district

court relied on the juvenile’s statement to the authorities that

he and his brother were not accompanied by their parents.7

These facts, which Gamez Reyes does not dispute, bear

sufficient indicia of reliability, and the district court did not

err in relying on them to impose the enhancement.

C. Involuntary Detention Enhancement

The Guidelines provide for a two-level enhancement “[i]f

an alien was involuntarily detained through coercion or

threat, or in connection with a demand for payment, (i) after

the alien was smuggled into the United States; or (ii) while

the alien was transported or harbored in the United States.” 

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(8)(A). The district court found that

aliens were involuntarily detained both in connection with a

7 Gamez Reyes does not challenge the credibility of that statement on

appeal. He did challenge the statement before the district court, but his

conclusory argument that “juveniles can easily lie for a wide variety of

reasons,” is not persuasive and does not demonstrate that this evidence

was false or unreliable.

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16 UNITED STATES V. GAMEZ REYES

demand for payment and through coercion or threat. As with

the unaccompanied minor enhancement, the district court

applied the “reasonably foreseeable” test articulated in

section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) to impose the involuntary detention

enhancement.

The district court did not clearly err in finding that this

particular smuggling organization detained aliens both in

connection with a demand for payment and through coercion

or threat. The investigation into this smuggling organization

began after two women threw a note out of a barred window

claiming they were being held captive. It is undisputed that

the Compton stash house had bars on the windows, guards on

watch, locks on the doors, an aggressive pitbull, and an

unloaded rifle in plain sight. In their interviews with ICE

agents, the aliens provided further information about the

Compton stash house conditions. One alien claimed that a

guard sat next to the door to prevent the aliens from leaving

and that he also controlled access to the bathroom. One of

the women who threw the note out of the window claimed

that men arriving at the house were instructed to remove their

shoes, shirts, and belts; when one man inquired why, a guard

beat him. She also described a guard restricting use of the

bathroom and shower, and she observed the guard named

Pablo walk around with a pistol. Both of the women who

threw out the note stated that Pablo doubled their smuggling

fee once they arrived and told them that if they tried to escape

they would be killed. An alien who was held for four months

at the Lynwood stash house told ICE agents that he witnessed

a guard threaten female aliens that if they wanted a shower,

blankets, or a jacket, they had to have sex with the guard. He

also witnessed guards carrying guns, and when he attempted

to escape, one of the guards caught him, threw him in a

closet, and punched him in the face.

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UNITED STATES V. GAMEZ REYES 17

As our sister circuits have recognized, these are coercive

and threatening conditions. See, e.g., United States v.

Alapizco-Valenzuela, 546 F.3d 1208, 1217–19 (10th Cir.

2008) (involuntary detention enhancement properly applied

where aliens forced at gunpoint to give up their personal

belongings and phone family members and friends for

additional money to pay the smugglers, had to remain hidden

in the stash houses without food or drink, were not free to

leave, and feared for their lives and physical safety); United

States v. DeLeon, 484 F. App’x 920, 934 (5th Cir. 2012) (per

curiam) (exits of stash house were boarded up and/or

padlocked from the outside to prevent escape); United States

v. Gonzalez-Mendoza, 401 F. App’x 997, 998 (5th Cir. 2010)

(per curiam) (aliens detained in stash houses under armed

guard, smugglers demanded additional payments, and

firearms located in stash houses).

Further, the district court did not clearly err, despite the

government’s recommendation against applying an

involuntary detention enhancement, in finding that it was

reasonably foreseeable to Gamez Reyes that the organization

would detain aliens through coercion or threat or in

connection with a demand for payment. Gamez Reyes was a

frequent visitor to the Compton house, where he would have

witnessed the aliens without shoes, the bars on the windows,

guards keeping watch, the aggressive dog, and a gun in plain

sight. He was directly responsible for securing the stash

houses, was in constant contact with the guards, and

significantly, was in charge of collecting the smuggling fees. 

The evidence shows that Gamez Reyes was in particularly

close contact with the guard named Pablo, who threateningly

demanded additional smuggling fees. Even if Gamez Reyes

did not personally threaten any aliens, demand additional

payments, or condone the guards’ demands of sexual favors

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18 UNITED STATES V. GAMEZ REYES

from female aliens in return for bathroom privileges, it was

reasonably foreseeable to him that others in the smuggling

ring would use these threatening tactics to detain the aliens. 

See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2(c)(6); see also AlapizcoValenzuela, 546 F.3d at 1219 (district court reasonably

inferred defendant knew aliens were being held against their

will when he arrived at a stash house and saw aliens without

shoes or personal belongings and armed guards keeping

watch over them). Therefore, the district court did not err in

imposing the involuntary detention enhancement. See, e.g.,

United States v. Miguel, 368 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2004)

(district court properly found it reasonably foreseeable that

child transported through desert in alien smuggling

organization would sustain bodily injury); United States v. Li,

206 F.3d 78, 86 (1st Cir. 2000) (district court did not err in

finding that “shoddy conditions, meager provisions, and

inadequate safety measures” on ship smuggling Chinese

nationals into United States were reasonably foreseeable to

defendants, even those defendants not present on the ship).

III. CONCLUSION

The district court did not clearly err in applying the

two-level unaccompaniedminor enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.1(b)(4) or the two-level involuntary detention

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(8)(A), because it

was not bound by the plea agreement to accept the parties’

recommendations, it conducted a careful, thorough review of

all the relevant information in the plea agreement, PSR, and

underlying ICE investigation reports, and it properly applied

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UNITED STATES V. GAMEZ REYES 19

the reasonably foreseeable standard dictated by U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) to those facts. There was no error, clear or

otherwise. Accordingly, we affirm the sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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