Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03141/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03141-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tony Caonabo Cabrera-Sosa
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

TONY CAONABO CABRERA-SOSA, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

) 

) 

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No. 95-3141 

FILED 

UniteU StateS Court of A;;~::.::, 

Tf"!!t~ Circuit 

t:.Pi~ 1 G 1996 

PATRICK FiSH~G 

Cl~r!; 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 94-10118-01) 

Timothy J. Henry, Assistant Federal Public Defender (David J. 

Phillips, Federal. Public Defender, with him on the briefs), 

Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

D. Blair Watson, Assistant United States Attorney (Randall K. 

Rathbun, United States Attorney, and Michael Christensen, 

Assistant United States Attorney, with him on the brief), 

Wichita, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BRORBY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge. 

Appellate Case: 95-3141 Document: 01019279301 Date Filed: 04/16/1996 Page: 1 
Tony Caonabo Cabrera-Sosa pled guilty to reentering the 

United States after a previous deportation for a felony in 

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (1). The district court sentenced 

him to a term of sixty months. On appeal, Mr. Cabrera-Sosa 

contends the district court's application of the "aggravated 

felony" enhancement violates clear statutory language and the Ex 

Post Facto Clause. We affirm. 

I . 

In 1986, Mr. Cabrera-Sosa sold crack cocaine to an 

undercover officer of the New York City Police Department, which 

resulted in his conviction in July 1990 for felony possession of 

cocaine. 1 Mr. Cabrera-Sosa was deported in January 1992 to the 

Dominican Republi~ after his release from prison. In late 1994, 

DEA officers executed a search warrant at the Wichita residence 

of Wilfred Escribano, whom they had identifed as Mr. CabreraSosa. Under questioning by INS officials, Mr. Escribano admitted 

he was Mr. Cabrera~sosa. He further explained he had obtained a 

United States passport under the Escribano alias in 1989 and had 

1 The record indicates that Mr. Cabrera-Sosa's 1990 

conviction was either for possession of -cocaine or possession 

with intent to distribute. As we discuss infra, this distinction 

does not affect our holding. 

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Appellate Case: 95-3141 Document: 01019279301 Date Filed: 04/16/1996 Page: 2 
used it to reenter the United States one month after his 1992 

deportation. 

A grand jury indicted Mr. Cabrera-Sosa for reentering the 

country after having been deported for an aggravated felony. He 

pled guilty to the lesser charge of reentering after deportation 

for a felony. In computing Mr. Cabrera-Sosa's offense level, 

however, the district court added a sixteen-point enhancement 

because he had been npreviously . . deported after a conviction 

for an aggravated felony." U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b) {2). Mr. CabreraSosa contends that his drug trafficking conviction in 1990 was 

not an aggravated felony within the plain meaning of section 

2L1.2(b) (2), and that the aggravated felony enhancement violates 

the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. 

II. 

We first consider Mr. Cabrera-Sosa's argument that the 

district court misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines. We review 

the court's interpretation of the guidelines de novo. United 

States v. Agbai, 930 F.2d 1447, 1448 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

Section 2L1.2(b) (2) provides for a sixteen-level enhancement 

to the base offense level n[i]f the defendant previously was 

deported after a conviction for an aggravated felony." The 

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Appellate Case: 95-3141 Document: 01019279301 Date Filed: 04/16/1996 Page: 3 
Application Notes, which explicitly reflect the definition of 

aggravated felony set out in 18 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43) ,define 

uaggravated felony" in pertinent part as uany illicit trafficking 

in any controlled substance (as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802), 

including any drug trafficking crime as defined in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c) (2) ." 2 U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 comment. (n.7). 

Under section 924(c) (2), the relevant statute, uthe term 

'drug trafficking crime' means any felony punishable under the 

Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled 

Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or the 

2 The initial definition of aggravated felony enacted in 

1988 included uany drug trafficking crime as defined in section 

924(c) (2) of title 18, United States Code." Anti-Drug Abuse Act 

of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469 

(1988) . A November 1990 amendment, effective after the 

conviction here, added the emphasized language so the definition 

included uany illicit trafficking in any controlled substance (as 

defined in section 802 of Title 21) . including any drug 

trafficking crime as defined in section 924(c) (2) of Title 18) ." 

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43) {B); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 

101-649, § 501 (a) (2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (1990). 

Mr. Cabrera-Sosa and the government devote considerable 

effort to arguing whether the 1990 amendments applied to earlier 

convictions. Both parties apparently assume that Mr. CabreraSosa's July 1990 conviction was not a "drug trafficking crime" 

within the 1988 definition of aggravated felony then in effect, 

notwithstanding the district court's holding to the contrary. 

~ rec., vol. I, doc. 25 at 2. Because we agree with the 

district court, we do not reach the parties' arguments about the 

1990 amendments. 

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Appellate Case: 95-3141 Document: 01019279301 Date Filed: 04/16/1996 Page: 4 
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.)." 

18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) (2). "For a drug offense to come within this 

statute, and, in turn, to meet the definition of 'aggravated 

felony,' it must meet two criteria: first, the offense must be 

punishable under one of these three enumerated statutes; and 

second, the offense must be a felony." United States v. Forbes, 

16 F.3d 1294, 1301 (1st Cir. 1994). 

The 1990 conviction meets both criteria. First, possession 

of cocaine is clearly punishable under the Controlled Substances 

Act. See. e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Second, it is undisputed 

that Mr. Cabrera-Sosa's 1990 conviction was a felony within the 

meaning of section 924(c) (2) even though it was a state 

conviction. The Controlled Substances Act defines a felony as 

"any Federal or S~ate offense classified by applicable Federal or 

State Law as a felony." 21 U.s. C. § 802 (13) . 3 Under New York 

law any criminal offense punishable by more than one year is a 

felony. N.Y. Penal Law§ 10.00(5) (McKinney 1995). Since Mr. 

Cabrera-Sosa's sentence for his 1990 conviction was fifteen 

months, the offense was a felony under New York law. ~ Forbes, 

3 ~ ~ U.S.S.G. § 2Ll.2 comment. 

'aggravated felony' applies to offenses 

violation of federal or state law . 

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(n. 7) ("The term 

whether in 

• II ) • 

Appellate Case: 95-3141 Document: 01019279301 Date Filed: 04/16/1996 Page: 5 
16 F.3d at 1301 n.10; Jenkins v. INS, 32 F.3d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 

1994) . 

Mr. Cabrera-Sosa argues, however, that the definition of 

"aggravated felony" does not include offenses committed prior to 

the enactment of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (ADAA) , which 

introduced the definition. Section 7342 of the ADAA, which 

defined "aggravated felony," did not specify whether the term 

applied to offenses committed prior to the law's enactment. ~ 

Pub L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4470 (1988). "Instead, the 

temporal scope of the term is determined in the substantive 

sections that follow the definition--the sections providing for a 

variety of consequences that attach upon the conviction of an 

aggravated felony." Ayala-Chavez v. United States, 945 F.2d 288, 

291 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds, 

Pub. L. No. 102-232, § 306 (a) (11) (B), 105 Stat. 1733, 1751 

(1991) . Each of the substantive sections contained an 

applicability provison which specifically stated to whom the 

section applied. ~ The section criminalizing the conduct at 

issue here provided for enhanced penalties for reentry by aliens 

"whose deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commission 

of an aggravated felony." ADAA § 7345(a), 102 Stat. at 4471 

(emphasis added) . The applicability provision stated that this 

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Appellate Case: 95-3141 Document: 01019279301 Date Filed: 04/16/1996 Page: 6 
amendment applied to "any alien who enters . . . the United 

States on or after [November 18, 1988] ." Id. § 7345(b). 

Mr. Cabrera-Sosa was convicted in 1990 of a crime defined at 

that time as an aggravated felony, he was subsequently deported, 

and his later reentry was obviously after 1988. Accordingly, we 

reject his argument that the ADA~ definition does not apply to 

him. We hold that his 1990 conviction was an aggravated felony 

within the meaning of section 2L1.2(b) (2). 

III. 

Mr. Cabrera-Sosa also contends the "aggravated felony" 

enhancement violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the 

Constitution. We review this question de novo. United States v. 

Walker, 27 F.3d 417, 419 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 377 

(1994). 

The Constitution provides that "No Bill of Attainder or ex 

post facto Law shall be passed." U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 

The Supreme Court has "held that [this] Clause is aimed at laws 

that 'retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase 

the punishment for criminal acts.'" California Dep't of 

Corrections v .. Morales, 115 S. Ct. 1597, 1601 (1995) (quoting 

Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 44 (1990)). 

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Appellate Case: 95-3141 Document: 01019279301 Date Filed: 04/16/1996 Page: 7 
We recently addressed the Ex Post Facto Clause's 

implications for sentencing: 

"An ex post facto law is one that among other 

things (1) makes conduct criminal that was legal 

when done, or (2) inflicts greater punishment 

for an offense than the law existing when the 

offense was committed." To determine whether 

the application of a sentencing guidelines 

provision violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, the 

Supreme Court has articulated a two-prong test: 

first, did the sentencing court apply the 

guideline to "events occurring before its 

enactment," and second, did that guideline 

"disadvantage the offender affected by it." 

United States v. Gerber, 24 F.3d 93, 96 (lOth Cir. 1994) (quoting 

United States v. Patzer, 15 F.3d 934, 942-43 (lOth Cir. 1993), 

and Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430 (1987)). We have held 

the Ex Post Facto Clause prevents a court from applying an 

amended version of a sentencing guideline that was not yet in 

effect when the defendant committed the crime. United States v. 

Underwood, 938 F.2d 1086, 1090 (lOth Cir. 1991); see also United 

States v. Orr, 68 F.3d 1247, 1252-53 (lOth Cir. 1995) (remanding 

for resentencing under the guidelines in effect when the crime 

was committed), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 747 (1996). 

Mr. Cabrera-Sosa was clearly disadvantaged by the aggravated 

felony enhance~ent because the Sentencing Guidelines impose a 

sixteen-point increase in his base offense level. U.S.S.G. § 

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Appellate Case: 95-3141 Document: 01019279301 Date Filed: 04/16/1996 Page: 8 
2Ll.2. However, the relevant event was not the crime of drug 

trafficking. Mr. Cabrera-Sosa pled guilty to reentering the 

country without permission after deportation. The event for 

which he was sentenced was his reentry, not his drug offense. 

See United States v. Arzate-Nunez, 18 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 

1994). The penalties were unambiguous when he reentered the 

country in 1992, and subsequent changes in the law have not been 

applied to his detriment. ~Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30 

(1981) ("Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is not 

an individual's right to less punishment, but the lack of fair 

notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases 

punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was 

consummated."). 

Other courts.have held the Ex Post Facto Clause inapplicable 

when confronted with similar facts. ~United States v. SaenzForero, 27 F.3d 1016, 1018-21 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that 

enhancement of defendant's sentence under§ 1326(b) (2) and§ 

2Ll.2(b) (2) for 1985 conviction for conspiring to possess and 

distribute cocaine was not ex post facto violation) ; United 

States v. Troncoso, 23 F.3d 612, 615 (1st Cir. 1994) (rejecting 

ex post facto attack on conviction under§ 1326(b) (2) where 

defendant's aggravated felony convictions predated ADAA 

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Appellate Case: 95-3141 Document: 01019279301 Date Filed: 04/16/1996 Page: 9 
amendments), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 912 (1995); Arzate-Nunez, 

18 F.3d at 733-35 ("Since Arzate-Nunez reentered the country 

after both 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43) and U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 were in 

effect, the district court correctly rejected his ex post facto 

claims."); see also Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948) 

(holding that recidivist statute was not unconstitutional ex post 

facto law even though defendant's classification as habitual 

offender relied on offense occurring prior to effective date of 

recidivist statute). Mr. Cabrera-Sosa's sentencing did not 

violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

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