Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-03295/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-03295-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
AutoZone, Inc.
Defendant
Scott Canale
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT CANALE,

Plaintiff,

v.

AUTOZONE, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:24-cv-03295-CSK

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

(ECF No. 4)

Pending before the Court is Defendant AutoZone, Inc.’s motion to dismiss 

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which is fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 

4, 9, 10.)1 A hearing was held on January 14, 2025. For the reasons stated below, the 

Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint

with leave to amend. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

1 This case proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) for all 

purposes, including the entry of judgment, pursuant to the consent of all parties. (ECF 

Nos. 6, 7, 8.)

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background2

From July 5, 2023 to February 6, 2024, Plaintiff Scott Canale was employed by 

Defendant AutoZone, Inc. as a manager. Compl. ¶ 7 (ECF No. 1-1). Plaintiff was 

classified as a non-exempt employee and paid $18 an hour. Id. Plaintiff alleges that 

during his employment, he was discriminated against due to his gender, sex and 

disability. Id. ¶¶ 8, 45. 

From November 1, 2023 to May 1, 2024, Plaintiff was placed on a modified duty 

restriction by his medical provider, which restricted Plaintiff from working night shifts. Id.

¶ 9. Plaintiff alleges despite Defendant being aware of Plaintiff’s work restrictions, 

Plaintiff was forced to work late nights. Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff also alleges his “medical 

condition” was “broadcast[ed] to other employees who did not need to be informed,” 

which resulted in Plaintiff being the “subject of ridicule for his disability.” Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff 

alleges he was bullied “for not being ‘a real man’” and threatened with physical harm. Id. 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant permitted and ratified this behavior. Id. Plaintiff also alleges 

he was retaliated against for complaining of this behavior and was “picked on” by 

Defendant and its agents and employees and “knowingly promoted one of Plaintiff’s 

main tormentors.” Id. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant failed to compensate him for 

“several rest periods and meal breaks. Id. ¶ 12.

B. Procedural Background

On September 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in Sacramento County 

Superior Court. See Compl. Defendant was served with process on October 29, 2024. 

(ECF No. 1-2 at 5-6.) On November 26, 2024, Defendant removed the action to federal 

court on diversity jurisdiction grounds. (ECF No. 1 at 2-5.) 

2 These facts primarily derive from the Complaint (ECF No. 1-1), which are construed in 

the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party. Faulkner v. ADT Sec. 

Servs., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013). However, the Court does not assume the 

truth of any conclusory factual allegations or legal conclusions. Paulsen v. CNF Inc., 559 

F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009).

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Plaintiff alleges the following fifteen (15) state law causes of action: (1) violation of 

California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, California Government Code § 12900, et 

seq., (“FEHA”) for disability discrimination; (2) violation of FEHA for failure to provide 

reasonable accommodation; (3) violation of FEHA for sex and gender discrimination; 

(4) violation of FEHA for harassment and hostile work environment; (5) violation of FEHA 

for failure to prevent discrimination and harassment; (6) violation of FEHA for retaliation; 

(7) violation of California Labor Code § 2802 for failure to reimburse business expenses; 

(8) violation of California Labor Code § 512 for failure to provide meal breaks; 

(9) violation of California Labor Code § 226.7 for failure to provide rest periods; 

(10) violation of California Labor Code §§ 201-203 for waiting time penalties; (11) unjust 

enrichment; (12) breach of contract; (13) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing; (14) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 for unfair 

business practice; and (15) wrongful termination. Compl. ¶¶ 18-116.

On December 3, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 4.) 

Defendant moves to dismiss all claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Def. Mot. (ECF No. 4.)

Plaintiff filed his opposition on December 16, 2024 (ECF No. 9), and Defendant filed its

reply on December 23, 2024 (ECF No. 10). A hearing was held on January 14, 2025. 

Attorney Catherine Ann Allen appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. Attorney Michael Hoffman

appeared on behalf of Defendant. (ECF No. 11). 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint fails to state a claim if 

it either lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 

theory. Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). To state a claim on 

which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 

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the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678 (2009). When considering whether a claim has 

been stated, the court must accept the well-pleaded factual allegations as true and 

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. However, 

the court is not required to accept as true conclusory factual allegations contradicted by 

documents referenced in the complaint, or legal conclusions merely because they are 

cast in the form of factual allegations. Paulsen, 559 F.3d at 1071.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s entire Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The 

Court considers Defendant’s arguments with respect to each of Plaintiff’s claims below. 

A. First Cause of Action: Disability Discrimination 

FEHA prohibits employment discrimination against any person because of a 

physical or mental disability. Cal. Gov’t. Code § 12940(a). In order to establish a claim 

for disability discrimination under FEHA, a plaintiff must allege and show that: (1) plaintiff 

suffers from a disability; (2) plaintiff is otherwise qualified to do his job; and (3) plaintiff 

was subjected to an adverse employment action because of his disability. Faust v. 

California Portland Cement Co., 150 Cal. App. 4th 864, 886 (2007); Jaco v. Winco

Holdings, Inc., 2019 WL 1438069 at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2019). Under FEHA, a 

“physical disability” is any physiological disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic 

disfigurement or anatomical loss that both affects a specific bodily system and limits a 

major life activity. Cal. Gov't Code § 12926(m). Under FEHA, a “mental disability” is any 

mental or psychological disorder or condition, such as intellectual disability, organic brain 

syndrome, emotional or mental illness, or specific learning disabilities, that limits a major 

life activity. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(j). “A mental or psychological disorder or condition 

limits a major life activity if it makes the achievement of the major life activity difficult.” 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(j)(1)(B).

Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead factual allegations, beyond 

conclusory assertions, that Plaintiff is disabled under FEHA. Def. Mot. at 5-6. Plaintiff 

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argues the allegations in the Complaint alleging “he cannot work at night due to his 

disability and that this was substantiated by a doctor’s work restriction” is sufficient to 

plead a qualified disability under Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12926 and 12926.1. Pl. Opp’n at 4 

(citing Compl. ¶ 9). The Court finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a cognizable 

disability under FEHA or that he was subjected to an adverse employment action 

because of his disability.

The Complaint alleges in a conclusory manner that Plaintiff is disabled. See

Compl. ¶¶ 9 (“Among other things, Mr. Canale was placed by his medical provider on 

modified duty which included a restriction that he was not to work shifts from November 

1, 2023 to May 1, 2024.”); 10 (“Defendant was well aware of Plaintiff’s restrictions.”); 

10 (“Plaintiff’s condition was broadcast[ed],” employees were informed of Plaintiff’s “work 

restrictions and/or his medical condition.”); 10 (Plaintiff was the “subject of ridicule for his 

disability.”); 20 (Plaintiff “alleges that his physical and mental disabilities were a 

motivating factor in Defendant’s discrimination.”); 28 (“Plaintiff was an individual with a 

disability within the meaning of section 12926(i) and (k) of the government code”).

3 Legal 

conclusions are not allegations of fact. See Eclectic Properties East, LLC v. Marcus & 

Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). 

Additionally, the Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff’s disability made the 

achievement of a major life activity difficult. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12926(m), (j). 

Without sufficient factual allegations detailing Plaintiff’s medical condition, and whether 

such a condition makes achievement of a major life activity difficult, the Court is unable 

to determine whether Plaintiff’s medical condition constitutes a protected disability under 

FEHA. See Featherstone v. S. California Permanente Med. Grp., 10 Cal. App. 5th 1150, 

3 Plaintiff submitted a declaration in support of his opposition, which include some facts 

that were not pled in the Complaint. (ECF No. 9-1.) The Court notes, however, that its 

review of the Complaint’s pleading sufficiency is limited to the Complaint and does not 

include Plaintiff’s declaration submitted in support of his opposition. At the hearing, 

Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that Plaintiff’s declaration raised new factual allegations not 

pled in the Complaint and that the Court’s review for this motion was limited to the 

Complaint. 

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1167 (2017) (“not every illness qualifies as a disability” under FEHA.); Cenis v. Winco 

Holdings, Inc., 787 F. App'x 947, 948 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that vomiting and diarrhea 

did not constitute a disability under FEHA and that plaintiff therefore could not make a 

prima facie showing of disability discrimination in violation of FEHA). The Court therefore 

dismisses Plaintiff’s first cause of action for disability discrimination with leave to amend. 

B. Second Cause of Action: Failure to Provide Reasonable 

Accommodations 

Under FEHA, an employer must “make reasonable accommodation for the known 

physical or mental disability” of an employee. Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(m)(1). A 

reasonable accommodation is any “modification or adjustment to the workplace that 

enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the job held or desired.” 

Scotch v. Art Institute of California, 173 Cal. App. 4th 986, 994 (2009). In order to 

establish a claim for failure to accommodate under FEHA, a plaintiff must allege and 

show that: (1) plaintiff has a disability; (2) plaintiff is qualified to perform the essential 

functions of the position; and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate 

plaintiff's disability. Id. at 1009-10.

As set forth above, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that he has a disability is 

insufficient to establish Plaintiff has a disability within the meaning of FEHA. Without 

alleging additional facts supporting the existence of a qualifying disability under FEHA, 

Plaintiff has not adequately pled his claim for failure to provide reasonable 

accommodations under FEHA. See Jackson v. Kaplan Higher Educ., LLC, 106 F. Supp. 

3d 1118, 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that employer could not be held liable under 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(m)(1) where plaintiff failed to provide evidence that she had a 

disability under FEHA). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s second cause of action 

for failure to accommodate with leave to amend.

C. Third Cause of Action: Sex and Gender Discrimination 

FEHA prohibits employment discrimination against any person because of that 

person’s “sex, gender, gender identity, or gender expression.” Cal. Gov’t. Code 

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§ 12940(a). In order to establish a claim for discrimination under FEHA, a plaintiff must 

allege and show that: (1) plaintiff belongs to a protected class; (2) plaintiff was 

performing competently in the position he held; (3) plaintiff suffered an adverse 

employment action; and (4) some other circumstance suggests that the employer acted 

with a discriminatory motive. Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 355 (2000).

Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead facts showing he was 

subjected to discrimination based on his sex and gender. Def. Mot. at 8. Defendant 

contends Plaintiff fails to allege facts establishing Plaintiff suffered from an adverse 

employment action based on his sex and gender. Id. Plaintiff argues he was “made fun 

of ‘including bullying Plaintiff for not being ‘a real man’ and threatening Plaintiff 

physically”, which is sufficient to establish a claim for sex and gender discrimination. Pl. 

Opp’n at 6 (citing Compl. ¶ 10). The Court finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a 

cognizable sex and gender discrimination claim under FEHA.

The Complaint alleges Plaintiff’s “coworkers made numerous discriminatory 

remarks based on Plaintiff’s sex and gender” and that after a “significant period of 

satisfactory, competent, and diligent performance to the profit of Defendant, Plaintiff was 

constructively terminated as a result of Defendant’s intolerable and unbearable working 

conditions.” Compl. ¶¶ 37-38. Plaintiff further alleges Defendant “compelled, coerced, 

aided and abetted the discrimination...levied at Plaintiff.” Id ¶ 11. Even if the Court 

assumes without finding that constructive discharge has been alleged, the Complaint’s

allegations do not sufficiently assert a causal connection between the alleged adverse 

employment action and Defendant’s alleged discriminatory motive based on sex and 

gender. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a). Plaintiff’s allegations as to motive are cursory 

and conclusory. See Compl. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s third cause of 

action for sex and gender discrimination with leave to amend.

D. Fourth Cause of Action: Harassment and Hostile Work Environment 

FEHA prohibits harassment in the workplace. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(1). 

“’[H]arassment’ because of sex includes sexual harassment, gender harassment, and 

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harassment based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. Sexually 

harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire.” Cal. Gov't 

Code§ 12940(j)(4)(C). “Sexual harassment law in California requires an employee to 

prove ‘severe or pervasive’ harassment.” Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc., 97 

Cal. App. 5th 865, 878 (2023) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 12923). “A single incident of 

harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a 

hostile work environment if the harassing conduct has unreasonably interfered with the 

plaintiff's work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working 

environment.” Cal. Gov't Code § 12923(b); see also Beltran, 97 Cal. App. 5th at 878. “[A]

hostile work environment exists ‘when the harassing conduct sufficiently offends, 

humiliates, distresses, or intrudes upon its victim, so as to disrupt the victim's emotional 

tranquility in the workplace, affect the victim's ability to perform the job as usual, or 

otherwise interfere with and undermine the victim's personal sense of well-being.’ The 

plaintiff is not required to show a decline in productivity, only ‘that a reasonable person 

subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find, as the plaintiff did, that the 

harassment so altered working conditions as to ‘make it more difficult to do the job.’”

Beltran, 97 Cal. App. 5th at 878 (quoting Cal. Gov’t Code § 12923(a)). “The existence of 

a hostile work environment depends upon the totality of the circumstances and a 

discriminatory remark, even if not made directly in the context of an employment 

decision or uttered by a nondecisionmaker, may be relevant, circumstantial evidence of 

discrimination.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12923(c). 

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claim fails to sufficiently allege severe or pervasive 

harassment. Def. Mot. at 4-5. Plaintiff argues the Complaint sufficiently alleges an 

ongoing course of harassment due to his gender, sex and disability. Pl. Opp’n at 3. 

Plaintiff argues that the harassment created a hostile work environment because Plaintiff 

was “’forced to work late nights’” despite his work restrictions related to his disability,

Plaintiff’s “employer humiliated Plaintiff by broadcasting his condition to other 

employees,” Plaintiff was subjected to “ridicule for his disability including bullying Plaintiff 

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for not being a ‘real man,’ and even threatening Plaintiff with physical harm,” Defendant 

ratified this behavior, and Defendant “rewarded his main tormentor by promoting him 

over Plaintiff.” Id. (citing Compl. ¶¶ 10, 11, 45). 

The Court agrees that Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege a claim for harassment 

and hostile work environment. Plaintiff’s general allegations do not clearly articulate the 

incidents of harassment due to Plaintiff’s sex, gender and/or disability. The allegations 

are conclusory, and it is unclear whether the alleged harassment “consists of conduct 

outside the scope of necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for 

personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives.” 

Roby, 47 Cal. 4th at 707 (citation omitted). Moreover, the Complaint does not sufficiently 

allege how such harassment interfered with Plaintiff’s ability to fulfill his role as a 

manager. See Beltran, 97 Cal. App. 5th at 878. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s 

fourth cause of action for harassment and hostile work environment with leave to amend.

E. Fifth Cause of Action: Failure to Prevent Discrimination and 

Harassment

Under FEHA, employers must take “all reasonable steps necessary to prevent 

discrimination and harassment from occurring.” Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(k). A claim for 

relief for failure to prevent discrimination and harassment is “dependent on a claim of 

actual” discrimination and harassment. Dickson v. Burke Williams, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 

4th 1307, 1315 (2015). “Without actionable discrimination, harassment..., there can be 

no viable § 12940(k) claim.” Rubadeau v. M.A. Mortenson Co., 2013 WL 3356883, at 

*14 (E.D. Cal. July 3, 2013). Parties appear to agree that Plaintiff’s failure to prevent 

discrimination and harassment claim is derivative of Plaintiff’s harassment claim. See

Def. Mot. at 10; Pl. Opp’n at 7-8; Def. Reply at 6 (ECF No. 10). Because Plaintiff has not 

adequately pled his claims for discrimination and harassment, as set forth above, the 

Court dismisses Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination and 

harassment with leave to amend. 

/ / /

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F. Sixth Cause of Action: Retaliation

To assert a retaliation claim under FEHA, plaintiff must show that: (1) plaintiff 

engaged in a protected activity; (2) plaintiff’s employer subjected him to adverse 

employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and 

the employer’s action. Kumar v. Alameda Cnty. Med. Ctr., 2011 WL 13244636, at *13 

(N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2011). “Although an employee need not formally file a charge in 

order to qualify as being engaged in protected opposing activity, such activity must 

oppose activity the employee reasonably believes constitutes unlawful discrimination, 

and complaints about personal grievances or vague or conclusory remarks that fail to put 

an employer on notice as to what conduct it should investigate will not suffice to 

establish protected conduct.” Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1047 

(2005). 

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s allegations that he reported “harassing and 

discriminatory treatment” is too vague and conclusory to adequately plead a claim for 

retaliation. Def. Mot. at 8-10. Plaintiff argues the allegations that he was retaliated 

against “for complaining of the unlawful behavior” and was “picked on” and “knowingly 

promoted one of Plaintiff’s main tormentors over him” is sufficient to plead retaliation. Pl. 

Opp’n at 6-7 (citing Compl. ¶ 11). The Court finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently 

alleged a cognizable retaliation claim under FEHA. Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory 

allegation that he “reported the harassing and discriminatory treatment” does not 

sufficiently establish that Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity. See Compl. ¶ 57; see 

also Dokes v. Safeway, Inc., 2018 WL 1518562, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2018) (finding 

Plaintiff’s assertions that he was engaged in a protected activity “worth protecting” was 

insufficient to establish he was engaged in a “protected activity” as prescribed by FEHA.) 

Additionally, the Complaint, in its current form, fails to establish that Plaintiff’s action was 

in opposition to a policy or practice of Defendant. See Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th at 1047. 

Because the Complaint does not sufficiently allege whether Plaintiff engaged in a 

protected activity, the Court will therefore dismiss Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for 

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retaliation with leave to amend. 

G. Seventh Cause of Action: Failure to Reimburse Business Expenses

California Labor Code § 2802(a) requires an employer to “indemnify his or her 

employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct 

consequence of the discharge of his or her duties[.]” The statute defines “necessary 

expenditures or losses” to include “all reasonable costs.” Cal. Labor Code. § 2802(c). 

Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for expenses incurred during the performance of Plaintiff’s 

job duties. See Compl. ¶ 62. Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claim fails to identify the 

business-related expenses incurred, thereby precluding any finding that the expenses 

were reasonable and incurred in direct discharge of Plaintiff’s duties. Def. Mot. at 12. 

The Court agrees. Plaintiff merely alleges expenses were incurred (Compl. ¶¶ 62-64),

but does not identify a single specific cost that was not reimbursed or explain why such 

costs were required for his job. See Tavares v. Cargill Inc., 2019 WL 2918061, at *7 

(E.D. Cal. July 8, 2019) (dismissing claim for failure to reimburse business expenses 

because plaintiff only alleged general allegations that she was not reimbursed for 

uniforms and equipment and failed to allege “any single specific cost incurred”). Because 

Plaintiff’s allegations are general and without any supporting factual allegations, the 

Court dismisses Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for failure to reimburse business 

expenses with leave to amend.

H. Eighth & Ninth Cause of Action: Failure to Provide Meal Breaks & 

Failure to Provide Rest Periods

To establish a claim for failure to provide meal or rest breaks, plaintiff must show 

facts specifically identifying an instance where plaintiff was deprived of a meal or rest 

break. See Landers v. Quality Commc'ns, Inc., 771 F.3d 638, 646 (9th Cir. 2014); see 

also Boyack v. Regis Corp., 812 F. App'x 428, 431 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding rest break 

claim fell short of the requirements of Landers by failing to allege a single workweek 

where employee was impeded or discouraged from taking rest breaks). Defendant 

argues that Plaintiff’s meal and rest period claims are conclusory and do not plead a 

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single instance of any missed meal or rest break. Def. Mot. at 10-12. The Court agrees. 

Plaintiff’s allegations are a formulaic recitation of the governing statutory language. See

Compl. ¶¶ 12 (“[i]n further disregard for the law, Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiff 

for several missed rest periods and meal breaks”); 71 (“Defendant failed to relieve 

Plaintiff of all duty for timely uninterrupted 30 minute periods and, in fact, facilitated 

practices and procedures that impeded Plaintiff from taking interrupted meal breaks); 78 

(“Defendant directly and or indirectly authorized and permitted Plaintiff to take rest 

periods at all times suffered and, in fact, had practices and procedures that impeded 

Plaintiff from taking breaks. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was not allowed all rest 

breaks”). Because Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead claims for failure to provide meal 

breaks and rest periods, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action for failure 

to provide meal breaks and ninth cause of action for failure to provide rest periods with 

leave to amend. 

I. Tenth Cause of Action: Waiting Time Penalties 

The parties appear to agree that Plaintiff’s claim for waiting time penalties claim is 

derivative of Plaintiff’s meal break, rest period and reimbursement claims. See Def. Mot. 

at 12; Pl. Opp’n at 9; Def. Reply at 7. Because Plaintiff has not adequately pled his 

claims for meal breaks, rest periods and reimbursement as set forth above, the Court 

dismisses Plaintiff’s tenth cause of action for waiting time penalties as it relates to these 

claims with leave to amend. See Sousa v. Walmart, Inc., 2023 WL 5278662, at *12 (E.D. 

Cal. Aug. 16, 2023) (dismissing waiting time penalty claims due to dismissal of the 

underlying meal break and rest period violations). 

J. Eleventh Cause of Action: Unjust Enrichment 

“[I]n California, there is not a standalone cause of action for unjust enrichment, 

which is synonymous with restitution.” Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 

762 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff alleges a 

standalone claim for unjust enrichment which is not a valid claim. See Compl. ¶¶ 87-90. 

However, when a plaintiff alleges a standalone claim for unjust enrichment, a court “may 

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‘construe the cause of action as a quasi-contract claim seeking restitution.’” Astiana v. 

Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 762 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Rutherford Holdings,

LLC v. Plaza Del Rey, 223 Cal. App. 4th 221, 231 (2014)). Even if the Court construed 

this claim as a quasi-contract claim seeking restitution, the Complaint’s conclusory and 

vague allegations fail to sufficiently plead a claim for quasi-contract. See Compl. ¶¶ 88

(“[a]s a result of their breaches and wrongful acts, Defendant has been unjustly enriched 

at Plaintiff’s expense”); 89 (Defendant has derived a benefit from its actions including 

“withholding money that rightfully belongs to Plaintiff and failing to reimburse Plaintiff for 

amounts due, including waiting time penalties”). Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s 

eleventh cause of action for unjust enrichment with leave to amend to allege a quasicontract claim seeking restitution if Plaintiff can sufficiently plead such a claim. Plaintiff 

does not have leave to amend to allege an unjust enrichment claim.

K. Twelfth Cause of Action: Breach of Contract

To establish a claim for breach of contract, plaintiff must show: (1) the existence 

of a contract, (2) defendant's breach, (3) plaintiff's performance or excuse for 

nonperformance, and (4) the resulting damages to plaintiff. Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. 

Goldman, 51 Cal. 4th 811, 821 (2011). Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to plead the 

terms of the contract; the Court agrees. See Def. Mot. at 12. Plaintiff generally alleges 

the violation of a contract but does not sufficiently allege which specific employment 

agreement is at issue. Based on the specific provisions identified (Compl. ¶¶ 93-94), 

Plaintiff appears to allege violations of an employee handbook, policy or manual. See Pl. 

Opp’n at 9-10. Because the Court cannot identify which actions violated the terms of a 

specific contract, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. The Court also notes 

that “[u]nless the parties contract otherwise, employment relationships in California are 

ordinarily ‘at will,’ meaning that an employer can discharge an employee for any reason.”

See Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff may not 

bring a breach of contract claim predicated on the termination of at-will employment. 

Kasbarian v. Equinox Holdings, Inc., 739 F. App'x 397, 399 (9th Cir. 2018). For these 

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reasons, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s twelfth cause of action for breach of contract with 

leave to amend.

L. Thirteenth Cause of Action: Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith 

and Fair Dealing 

To establish a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, plaintiff must 

show that: (1) the parties entered into a contract; (2) plaintiff fulfilled his obligations under 

the contract; (3) any conditions precedent to defendant's performance occurred; 

(4) defendant unfairly interfered with plaintiff's rights to receive the benefits of the 

contract; and (5) plaintiff was harmed by defendant's conduct. Reinhardt v. Gemini Motor 

Transp., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1145 (E.D. Cal. 2012). “Importantly, to state a claim for 

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a plaintiff must identify the 

specific contractual provision that was frustrated.” Ahmadi v. United Cont'l Holdings, Inc., 

2014 WL 2565924, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 2014) (internal quotation and citation 

omitted). Here, the Complaint does not identify the specific contract Defendant’s conduct 

frustrates. Without reference to a contract, the Court cannot evaluate whether Plaintiff 

sufficiently pleads this claim. See Ahmadi, 2014 WL 2565924, at *6. Therefore, the Court 

dismisses Plaintiff’s thirteenth cause of action for breach of covenant of good faith and 

fair dealing with leave to amend.

M. Fourteenth Cause of Action: Unfair Business Practice

Parties appear to agree that Plaintiff’s claim for unfair business practice claim is 

derivative of Plaintiff’s other state law claims. See Def. Mot. at 13; Pl. Opp’n at 11; Def. 

Reply at 8. Because Plaintiff has not adequately pled his other state law claims, the 

Court dismisses Plaintiff’s fourteenth cause of action for unfair business practice with 

leave to amend. See Lefevre v. Pac. Bell Directory, 2014 WL 5810530, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 

Nov. 7, 2014) (dismissing unfair business practice claim due to dismissal of underlying 

wage and hour law claims). 

N. Fifteenth Cause of Action: Wrongful Termination 

“[W]hile an at-will employee may be terminated for no reason, or for an arbitrary 

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or irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate for an unlawful reason or a 

purpose that contravenes fundamental public policy.” Silo v. CHW Med. Found., 27 Cal. 

4th 1097, 1104 (2002). To establish a claim for wrongful termination, plaintiff must show: 

(1) plaintiff was terminated; and (2) plaintiff’s dismissal violated a policy that is 

fundamental, beneficial for the public and embodied in a statute or constitutional 

provision. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 1238, 1256 (1994). A constructive 

discharge may provide the basis for a wrongful termination claim in violation of public 

policy “when the employer's conduct effectively forces an employee to resign.” Id. at 

1244. The parties appear to agree that Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim is derivative 

of Plaintiff’s underlying FEHA claims. See Def. Mot. at 10; Pl. Opp’n at 7-8; Def. Reply at 

6. Because Plaintiff has not adequately pled his underlying FEHA claims as set forth 

above, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s fifteenth cause of action for wrongful termination 

with leave to amend.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons provided above, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 4) is GRANTED;

2. The Complaint (ECF No. 1-1) is DISMISSED;

3. Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE to file an amended complaint as provided 

above within thirty (30) days of this Order;

4. If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, it should be titled “First 

Amended Complaint” with reference to the appropriate case number. An 

amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any 

prior pleading. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967); E.D. Cal. 

Local Rule 220. If Plaintiff does not timely file an amended complaint, this 

will be interpreted as consent to dismissal of this action. 

Dated: January 15, 2025

4, cana3295.24

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