Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04695/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04695-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Daniel J. Paramo
Respondent
Andrew B. Sharkey
Petitioner

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW B. SHARKEY,

Petitioner,

v.

DANIEL J. PARAMO,

Respondent.

Case No. 14-cv-04695-VC (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Andrew B. Sharkey has filed a pro se habeas petition challenging the validity of his 

conviction following a plea of no contest to murder, elder abuse, burglary and attempting to 

procure a person to commit perjury. Sharkey asserts that the trial court violated his constitutional 

right to conflict-free counsel, deprived him of effective assistance of counsel and deprived him of 

his right to counsel on his motion to withdraw his plea. Pet. at 5. The petition is denied.

BACKGROUND

On November 10, 2011, Sharkey pled no contest to the claims described above. In 

exchange, the prosecution dismissed a special circumstance allegation. 3 Clerk’s Transcript 

(“CT”) 436. On January 20, 2012, Sharkey filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea, which the 

trial court denied. 8 Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) 817. On February 24, 2012, the court sentenced 

Sharkey to 32 1/2 years to life in prison. 3 CT 497. 

On August 12, 2013, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in a written 

opinion. See People v. Sharkey, 2013 WL 4086990 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2013) (unpublished). 

Sharkey filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which was summarily denied 

on November 13, 2013. Exs. 8, 9. Sharkey did not file any state petitions for a writ of habeas 

corpus. On October 22, 2014, Sharkey filed this timely federal petition. 

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LEGAL STANDARD

A federal court may entertain a habeas petition from a state prisoner “only on the ground 

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 

a district court may not grant habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: 

“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted 

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 

412 (2000). State court factual determinations are presumed correct absent clear and convincing 

evidence to the contrary. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1)). If the state court only considered state law, the federal habeas court must ask 

whether the state law, as explained by the state court, is “contrary to” clearly established federal 

law. Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2001).

DISCUSSION

I. Background

Sharkey was initially represented by lead counsel Geoffrey Dunham and co-counsel Bruce 

Enos. 3 CT 330. After the preliminary hearing, Dunham became ill and Enos took over as lead 

counsel. 3 CT 330, 390. Sharkey filed a Marsden motion regarding Enos’ representation based 

on the fact that Enos had served as a prosecutor in one or more drug cases in which Sharkey was 

the defendant. 4-A RT 368-70. Enos stated that he had no recollection of Sharkey’s prior cases. 

4-A RT 369-70. The court granted the motion on the ground that there was a conflict of interest. 

Id. Subsequently, Dunham hired Erik Bruce as lead counsel. 3 CT 391. The trial court rescinded 

all its past rulings on motions in limine and allowed the parties to file new motions. 3 CT 400. 

Bruce filed motions in limine, 3 CT 416-22, filed a motion to suppress Sharkey’s statements, 3 CT 

425-30, prepared for trial, 5 RT 457, proposed a juror questionnaire, 5 RT 474, and negotiated the 

plea agreement, 5 RT 454-56. 

On November 10, 2011, Sharkey entered his no contest plea. 3 CT 440. The trial court 

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scheduled the sentencing hearing for January 20, 2012. 3 CT 465. Three days before the hearing, 

the trial court received Sharkey’s pro se motion to withdraw his plea based on ineffective 

assistance of counsel. 3 CT 476. The court construed this to be a Marsden motion to substitute 

counsel as well as a motion to withdraw the plea, and first held an in camera hearing on the

Marsden motion. 8 RT 755. At this hearing, Sharkey moved for substitution of both Bruce and 

Dunham on the ground that they had failed to confer with him, failed to subpoena witnesses that 

Sharkey had identified, failed to investigate and failed to offer a defense at the preliminary 

hearing. 8 RT 756-57; 4-A RT 762-63. In regard to plea negotiations, Sharkey stated that he had 

agreed to the plea under time pressure and the influence of medication, that he thought he could 

maintain his innocence to the murder charge even while pleading no contest, that the plea 

agreement did not allow him to serve his time in England, that counsel failed to inform him of the 

sentence he could face if convicted of all charges, and that counsel had told him that no viable 

defense could be provided at trial. 4-A RT 786-87, 790-94. He also argued that, when Enos was 

relieved as counsel, Dunham should have been relieved also and that, with Dunham’s office 

excluded, Bruce would not have been brought in under Dunham. 4-A RT 795. 

Dunham stated that he had discussed “every part of his case with [Sharkey] over repeated 

visits” and “disclosed to him what I believed to be every single piece of evidence against him, and 

discussed them at length.” 4-A RT 764. Dunham also stated that he was prepared for the 

preliminary examination, which was exhaustive, and that he did not offer an alibi defense at that 

time because it was not supported by the evidence. 4-A RT 775. Bruce explained the efforts of 

the defense investigator to obtain exculpatory evidence, including going to Arizona to find 

impeachable evidence on the prosecution’s primary witness. 4-A RT 770. With respect to plea 

negotiations, Bruce stated that he met with Sharkey weekly, that Sharkey was lucid during their 

discussions, “at all times [] appeared to understand what we were talking about,” that he explained 

the options to Sharkey, told him he “was under no obligation to take the deal” and that Sharkey 

decided to accept it after weighing all the factors. 4-A RT 788-89. Bruce also stated that he had 

not told Sharkey that no defense would be offered at trial. 4-A RT 794.

The trial court supplemented the record with its observations that, during the plea hearing, 

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Bruce took special care to ensure that Sharkey understood the terms of the agreement and had 

stopped the court several times to have a private conversation with Sharkey. 4-A RT 765. The 

court noted that, during the preliminary hearing, Dunham was exhaustive and thorough in his 

cross-examinations of witnesses and that it was rare for a defense attorney to call defense 

witnesses or offer a defense at that stage in the proceedings. 4-A RT 776-77. 

In ruling on the Marsden motion, the trial court cited California cases for the proposition 

that new defense counsel should be appointed if counsel being challenged was not providing 

adequate representation of the defendant, or if the defendant and counsel had such an 

irreconcilable conflict in their relationship that ineffective assistance was likely to result. 4-A RT 

797. The court denied the motion on the ground that it found neither an irreconcilable conflict nor 

any deficiency in defense counsels’ representation. 4-A RT 798. 

The trial court then conducted a hearing in open court on Sharkey’s motion to withdraw his 

plea. Bruce stated that he did not consent to the filing of this motion and that, though he would 

advise Sharkey on the motion, he thought Sharkey should proceed by himself and asked to 

withdraw for purposes of this motion. 8 RT 800. The trial court acknowledged the awkwardness 

of a represented defendant proceeding on his own motion, but denied Bruce’s request to withdraw 

and allowed Sharkey to proceed on his own. 8 RT 800-01. Sharkey asked the court if he should 

make a Faretta motion to represent himself, but the court told him it would not advise him in the 

matter. 8 RT 801. Sharkey did not make a Faretta motion and argued his motion to withdraw. 

Sharkey’s reasons to withdraw his plea were the same he offered in support of his Marsden

motion: he was medicated during one part of the plea negotiations; he was innocent of the murder 

charge; Bruce told him he had no defense; and he would not be able to serve his sentence in 

England. 8 RT 806-15. The prosecution rebutted the allegations that Sharkey was medicated 

during plea negotiations, noting that the negotiations took place over a period of time and that 

Sharkey had played an active role in them and had requested certain changes, some of which were 

made. 8 RT 809. The court asked Bruce to respond to Sharkey’s contention that Bruce had told 

him that the plea agreement would allow him to serve his sentence in England. 8 RT 816. Bruce 

replied that he told Sharkey this was a possibility, but that no promises were made. Id. The 

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prosecutor added that Bruce asked her if she would agree to this condition and she opposed it. Id.

When Sharkey insisted that this promise had been made to him, the court responded that it 

“couldn’t imagine that a promise would be made in that regard, since none of the attorneys would 

have the ability to enforce such a situation. It was never brought up during the entry of the plea, 

and certainly not in my experience on the court that in fact would be the case.” 8 RT 817.

The trial court stated it had presided over the change of plea hearing, had reviewed the 

entire record, including the preliminary hearing and had “a rather vivid recollection of the 

proceedings in question, and of handling Mr. Sharkey’s case.” 8 RT 802. The court concluded 

that Sharkey had entered his plea knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently and that there had been 

no deficiency in representation. 8 RT 814. Accordingly, it denied Sharkey’s motion to withdraw 

his plea. 8 RT 817.

II. Right to Conflict-Free Counsel

A. Conflict Based on Enos’ Past Prosecution of Sharkey for Drug Offenses

Sharkey argues that Enos’ conflict extended to Dunham, his employer, and thus to Bruce, 

Dunham’s new employee. Citing California cases such as Adams v. Aeroject-General Corp., 86 

Cal. App. 4th 1324, 1333 (2001), Sharkey contends that, “once the attorney is shown to have had 

probable access to former client confidences, the court will impute such knowledge to the entire 

firm, prohibiting all members of the firm from participating in the case.” Citing Pound v. DeMera 

Cameron, 135 Cal. App. 4th 70, 78 (2005), Sharkey argues that “this rule extends to attorneys who 

are not part of the same firm, but who associate together as counsel to represent the same party 

when one of the associated attorneys previously represented an adverse party in a substantially 

related matter.” 

The Court of Appeal distinguished those cases because they involved conflict claims by 

prior clients who were concerned that confidential information obtained in the prior representation 

could be used adversely to that client, whereas Sharkey brought a claim as the current client. See 

Sharkey, 2013 WL 4086990, at *2. The court noted that Sharkey did not claim that Enos obtained 

confidential information during his prosecution of Sharkey that he could have shared with 

Dunham or Bruce, but only claimed that he was uncomfortable being represented by a former 

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district attorney. Id. at *2-3. The Court of Appeal held that the substitution of Bruce for Enos at 

the first Marsden hearing addressed Sharkey’s claim of a potential conflict by being represented 

by a former district attorney. Id. at *3. 

 To establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment based on ineffective assistance of 

counsel, a petitioner ordinarily must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that 

it was prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984). The Supreme Court 

has created “an exception” to this “general rule” where the petitioner can show “an actual conflict 

of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance;” in such circumstances prejudice is 

presumed. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-50 (1980); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 

166-72 (2002). The Supreme Court “limited” this exception “to joint representation,” however, 

and any extension of the exception “‘outside of the joint representation context remain[s],’” as far 

as the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court is concerned, “‘an open question.’” Earp v. Ornoski, 

431 F.3d 1158, 1184 (9th Cir. 2005). In the absence of an actual conflict, a claim based on a mere 

potential or theoretical conflict must satisfy the two Strickland requirements—that counsel’s 

performance was objectively unreasonable and that the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result. 

Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 827 (9th Cir. 1995). 

When a trial court is made aware of defense counsel’s potential conflict of interest, it must 

“either appoint separate counsel or . . . take reasonable steps to ascertain whether the risk [is] too 

remote to warrant separate counsel.” Holloway v. Arkansas, 435, U.S. 475, 484 (1978). Where 

the state court makes factual findings, they are presumed to be correct and the petitioner has the 

burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. Bragg v. 

Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001) (addressing trial court hearing on conflict of 

interest).

The record shows that, as soon as the trial court learned of Sharkey’s claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel and his pro se motion to withdraw his plea, it held a hearing on these issues. 

At the Marsden hearing, the trial court conducted a substantial inquiry into whether there was a 

conflict necessitating substitution of counsel in connection with the motion to withdraw. The 

court allowed Sharkey to air all of his grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel and allowed 

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Dunham and Bruce to respond. Sharkey also claimed that the initial conflict with Enos should 

have been imputed to Dunham and to Bruce. After this extensive hearing, the court found no 

irreconcilable conflict existed, and that Enos' conflict should not be imputed. This finding was 

upheld by the Court of Appeal which found that any conflict based on Enos’ initial representation 

was addressed by the substitution of Bruce for Enos. This finding of fact is presumed correct 

unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Sharkey submits no such evidence. And, as 

discussed below, Sharkey has not established ineffective assistance of Dunham or Bruce.

Therefore, the state court’s denial of the claim of a conflict based on Enos’ previous 

representation was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal 

law. See Lockhart, 250 F.3d at 1230. Accordingly, habeas relief on this claim is denied.

B. Conflict Based on Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Sharkey also argues that his motion to withdraw his plea, which was based on ineffective 

assistance of counsel, created a conflict of interest with counsel. However, an attorney’s 

representation of a defendant on a motion based on that attorney’s asserted incompetence does not, 

in and of itself, require appointment of new counsel. Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 887-88 (9th 

Cir. 1990) (addressing motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel); Gray v. 

Gomez, 84 Fed Appx. 756, 760 (9th Cir. 2003); Freeman v. Lindsey, 242 F.3d 381, 381 (9th Cir. 

2000) (no Supreme Court decision clearly holds that state court must appoint substitute counsel 

whenever motion for new trial rests on alleged incompetence of counsel). And as discussed 

below, it was not unreasonable for the state courts to conclude that Sharkey's lawyers were not

ineffective in connection with the motion to withdraw the plea (or in connection with any other 

portion of the proceedings).

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, a petitioner must 

establish two things. First, he must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that it 

fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. A “doubly” deferential judicial review is appropriate in analyzing 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims under § 2254. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 202 

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(2011); Harrington, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011); Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 122-23 (2011). The 

general rule of Strickland, i.e., to review a defense counsel’s effectiveness with great deference, 

gives the state courts greater leeway in reasonably applying that rule, which in turn “translates to a 

narrower range of decisions that are objectively unreasonable under AEDPA.” Cheney v. 

Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir. 2010). When § 2254(d) applies, “the question is not 

whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable 

argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. 

Second, a petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient 

performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. 

Either prong under Strickland may be addressed first. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 286 n.14 

(2000). 

As discussed above, the trial court made a thorough inquiry into the reasons for Sharkey’s 

dissatisfaction with his counsel. Sharkey’s allegations regarding counsel’s ineffective assistance

were contradicted by counsel’s statements at the Marsden hearing, by the trial court’s own 

observations of counsel’s representation of Sharkey during court proceedings and by the transcript 

of the plea hearing. 4-A RT 760-99 (transcript of in camera Marsden hearing); 6 RT 603-622 

(transcript of plea hearing). As the Court of Appeal noted, “Although Sharkey and his counsel 

disagreed on the facts underlying many of his allegations, the court was entitled to accept 

counsel’s explanations.” Sharkey, 2013 WL 4086990, at *3. 

Given the evidence presented at the Marsden hearing, it was not unreasonable for the 

Court of Appeal to uphold the trial court’s denial of the Marsden motion based on the finding that 

counsel’s performance had not been deficient. 

IV. Failure to Appoint Counsel on Motion to Withdraw Plea

Sharkey argues that he was denied the right to counsel and due process because the trial 

court required him to argue the motion to withdraw his plea without the assistance of counsel. 

The Court of Appeal denied this claim as follows:

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During the Marsden hearing, the trial court heard in great detail 

appellant’s arguments that his trial counsel had been ineffective with 

respect to his plea agreement. At the conclusion of that hearing, the 

trial court rejected appellant’s allegations that his counsel was 

ineffective with respect to his no contest plea, finding that there had 

been no “deficiency in [counsel’s] representation whatsoever.” 

Each basis argued by appellant in his motion to withdraw had been 

raised as a basis for his Marsden motion, considered by the court, 

and found insufficient. In effect, the trial court determined during 

the Marsden hearing that the motion to withdraw the plea was 

meritless, and therefore that appellant’s counsel had properly 

refused to file it. We find no error in this determination, and affirm 

the denial of appellant’s Marsden motion.

Sharkey, 2013 WL 4086990, at *4. Because counsel could not be compelled to file a meritless 

motion to withdraw the no contest plea, the Court of Appeal held that any error, if any, was the 

trial court’s permitting Sharkey to pursue a frivolous motion despite counsel’s refusal to file or 

argue it and any such error was harmless. Id. at *5. In a footnote, the Court of Appeal denied 

Sharkey’s claim that he did not have counsel at the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea 

because the trial court denied Bruce’s request to withdraw. Id. at *5 n.2.

Counsel need not file frivolous motions. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 

2005); see also Santana v. Foulk, 2015 WL 4661539, *36 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2015) (state court’s 

determination that counsel’s decision not to present a meritless motion to withdraw guilty plea not 

an unreasonable determination of federal law governing ineffective assistance of counsel); 

Ruvalcaba v. Lewis, 2012 WL 467848, *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2012) (California Court of Appeal 

reasonably determined that petitioner was not deprived of his right to counsel because trial counsel 

may decline to bring a frivolous motion to withdraw a plea); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 

371 (2010) (to obtain relief on claim of ineffective assistance at plea stage, petitioner must show 

that decision to reject the plea would have been rational under the circumstances). 

At the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea, Sharkey made the same arguments he 

made at the Marsden hearing. His main argument was that, at the time of the plea agreement, he 

was under heavy depression medication and that, when Bruce first presented him with the plea 

agreement, it was at an unannounced appointment after Sharkey had awakened from a deep sleep 

from the medication. 6 RT 806-07. The district attorney responded that the plea negotiations had 

gone on over a period of time , that the final agreement was not the original one that was presented 

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to Sharkey and that, based on Sharkey’s requests for certain additions or deletions, the plea 

agreement was changed. Id. at 809. 

Sharkey also was adamant that he thought his no contest plea meant he was not pleading 

guilty to the murder charge but, based on a newspaper article stating that he pled guilty to all 

charges, he would not have accepted the plea. Id. at 804; 811-13. The court upheld the district 

attorney’s objection to the newspaper article as extrinsic and irrelevant evidence that occurred 

after Sharkey entered a plea. Id. at 804-05. In regard to his claim that he was not pleading guilty 

to murder, the court reminded Sharkey that, during the plea proceedings, Bruce requested a recess 

to talk to Sharkey about this and that Bruce added an allegation in the record to that effect. Id. at 

805. The court also pointed out that, at the plea hearing and with Sharkey’s agreement, it had 

crossed out the word “guilty” on the plea agreement and replaced it with the phrase, “no contest.” 

Id. at 806. 

The record shows that, at both the Marsden hearing and the hearing on the motion to 

withdraw, the trial court listened to all of Sharkey’s arguments about wanting to withdraw his plea 

and explained why they were not credible. The Court of Appeal’s finding that the trial court had 

determined at the Marsden hearing that Sharkey’s motion to withdraw his plea was frivolous was 

not an unreasonable finding of fact and must be deferred to on habeas review. And, the Court of 

Appeal’s determination that counsel was not required to file a frivolous motion to withdraw the 

plea is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of established federal authority. As the 

Court of Appeal noted, although it might have been prudent for the trial court to have denied

Sharkey the opportunity to argue on his own the motion to withdraw after it had denied his

Marsden motion and had determined the motion was frivolous, it was harmless to allow Sharkey 

to do so. 

Accordingly, this claim does not warrant habeas relief. 

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. A certificate of appealability will not 

issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). This is not a case in which “reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 

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529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

VINCE CHHABRIA

United States District Judge

January 28, 2016

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