Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00371/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00371-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cigna Healthcare
Defendant
Connecticut General Life Insurance Company
Defendant
Grantrina A. Davis
Plaintiff

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and F.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties consented to proceed before a United States

Magistrate Judge, and by a June 20, 2005 order, this action was assigned to United States Magistrate Judge Lawrence J.

O’Neill for all further proceedings.

2 Although plaintiff’s complaint names CIGNA Healthcare as defendant, plaintiff was employed by

Connecticut General, a subsidiary of CIGNA Corporation (“CIGNA”). Plaintiff erroneously sues Connecticut General as

CIGNA Healthcare.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GRANTRINA A. DAVIS, CASE NO. CV-F-05-00371 LJO

Plaintiff, ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

COMPEL ARBITRATION AND TO STAY

vs. ACTION

(Docs. 21-23, 26, 33, 34.) 

CIGNA HEALTHCARE,

Defendant.

 /

INTRODUCTION1

Defendant Connecticut General Life Insurance Company (“Connecticut General”)2 seeks to

compel pro se plaintiff Grantrina Davis (“Ms. Davis”) to arbitrate her sexual harassment claims and to

stay this action. This Court considered Connecticut General’s motions to compel arbitration and to stay

this action on the record and without oral argument and vacates the July 29, 2005 hearing, pursuant to

this Court’s Local Rule 78-230(h). For the reasons discussed below, this Court GRANTS Connecticut

General’s motions to compel and to stay arbitration and SETS a status conference for February 9, 2006

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at 8:30 a.m. in Department 6 (LJO). 

BACKGROUND

Arbitration Policy

During December 11, 2000 to April 8, 2005, Ms. Davis worked as a Connecticut General claims

processor. In 1995, CIGNA, for it and Connecticut General, implemented a national arbitration policy

(“arbitration policy”) to require binding arbitration as the exclusive remedy for employment disputes.

The arbitration policy, as described in the “You and CIGNA” employee handbook, provides in pertinent

part:

Arbitration – If an employee is not satisfied with the result of either the Speak Easy

Process or the Peer Review Process, and the issue falls under the scope of the Arbitration

Policy, he or she may request arbitration, which is the last step of the Employment

Dispute Resolution Program. The Arbitration Policy was designed as a faster, less

expensive substitute for going to court. Mutual promises by both the employee and the

employer to arbitrate employment related legal claims is a term and condition of an

employee’s employment and arbitration must be used rather than going to court to

enforce legal rights and claims (or going to a government agency which in some states

acts like a court in judging claims).

The agreement to arbitrate applies to serious employment-related disagreements and

problems, which are those that concern a right, privilege, or interest recognized by

applicable law. Such serious disputes include claims, demands, or actions under Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Civil Rights Act of

1991, the Equal Pay Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Employee

Retirement Security Act of 1974, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Rehabilitation Act of

1973, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and any

other federal, state, or local statute, regulation, or common law doctrine, regarding

employment discrimination, conditions of employment, or termination of employment.

If the law in the state in which an employee works provides for a government agency

hearing to decide questions of law related employment discrimination claims, then the

agreement of the employee and the employer is that arbitration must be used instead of

a government agency hearing to decide the claim or going to court and having a jury. 

. . .

The employee and the Company agree to be bound by the decision made by the external,

neutral arbitrator. The arbitrator chosen by the employee and employer in accordance

with the employer’s arbitration rules and procedures will be sole and exclusive judge of

the proper interpretation of the agreement of the parties as well as the rules and procedures

of the arbitration process. The arbitrator will have all of the power a judge hearing the

dispute would have so that the significant differences between going to arbitration and

going to court are that the process will be much faster, less expensive and there will be no

jury. (Bold and italics in original.)

Ms. Davis’ Employment Application

Ms. Davis completed a December 8, 2000 employment application which states in pertinent part:

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I AGREE THAT IN RETURN FOR BEING CONSIDERED FOR EMPLOYMENT

AND/OR RECEIVING AN OFFER OF EMPLOYMENT, I WILL RESOLVE ANY

DISPUTE ABOUT MY CANDIDACY FOR EMPLOYMENT, EMPLOYMENT OR

CESSATIONOFEMPLOYMENTEXCLUSIVELY THROUGHTHEINTERNALAND

EXTERNAL EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS OF MY

EMPLOYER, WHICH INCLUDES FINAL AND BINDING ARBITRATION WITH A

NEUTRAL EVALUATOR. I UNDERSTAND THAT MY EMPLOYER ALSO

AGREES TO FOLLOW THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES AND THAT

COPIES OF THE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES DESCRIBING THE DISPUTE

RESOLUTION PROCESSES ARE AVAILABLE TO ME.

I agree to fulfill all of the requirements listed above . . . (Uppercase and underlining in

original.)

Ms. Davis signed a December 6, 2000 Employee Handbook Receipt to acknowledge she received

a copy of the “You and CIGNA” employee handbook and reviewed “the material, which includes

information on policies, programs, and services for employees of the CIGNA companies.” 

Ms. Davis’ Claims

Plaintiff proceeds on her first amended complaint to allege that a coworker imposed a “Sexual

Harassment misconduct” on Ms. Davis, that Ms. Davis addressed her complaint with her supervisor, that

“a hostile environment arose,” and that the coworker “continued making sexual advances.” Ms. Davis

refused Connecticut General’s May 13, 2005 letter request to arbitrate Ms. Davis’ claims, and

Connecticut General responded with its motions to compel arbitration and to stay this action. 

DISCUSSION

Federal Law

Connecticut General contends that Ms. Davis was a party to a binding arbitration agreement that

applies to her claims here. According to Connecticut General, Ms. Davis’ employment was subject to the

arbitration policy. In her opposition papers, Ms. Davis appears to claim she was unaware of arbitration

requirements.

Arbitration is a way to resolve disputes “that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.”

First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943, 115 S.Ct. 1920 (1995). Arbitration clauses

limit a court’s power: “Our role is strictly limited to determining arbitrability and enforcing agreements

to arbitrate, leaving the merits of the claim and any defenses to the arbitrator.” Republic of Nicaragua

v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469, 479 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 919, 112 S.Ct. 1294

(1992); see Muh v. Newberger, Loeb & Co., Inc., 540 F.2d 970, 972 (9th Cir. 1976) (If the parties have

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agreed to arbitrate, “the entire controversy must be referred to the arbitrator, including the validity of the

contract.”) A contractually based arbitration “can be brought to conclusion entirely extrajudicially, and

. . . the judiciary’s supervision is limited to confirming, vacating, or correcting any resultant award.”

Brock v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 10 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1806, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 678 (1992); JordanLyon Productions, Ltd. v. Cineplex Odeon Corp., 29 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1468, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 205

(1994). “[A] court can properly stay a suit before it if any issue in the suit is arbitrable, even if some

issues are not.” Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 361 (7th Cir.) (italics in original), cert.

denied, 522 U.S. 912, 118 S.Ct. 294 (1997).

Connecticut General notes that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq.,

applies to written arbitration agreements in employment cases and mandates that plaintiff’s claims are

subject to arbitration. Written agreements to arbitrate controversies arising out of an existing contract

“shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the

revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. “In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a

national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for

the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.” Southland Corp.

v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10, 104 S.Ct. 852, 858 (1984). “The enactment establishes a strong federal policy

in favor of the resolution of disputes through arbitration.” Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256,

263 (3rd Cir. 2003). “[F]ederal law presumptively favors the enforcement of arbitration agreements.”

Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 178 (3rd Cir. 1999). The FAA “establishes that, as a

matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor

of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is construction of the contract language itself or an allegation

of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Moses H. Cone Hospital v. Mercury Construction,

460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927 (1983).

In the employment context, the United States Supreme Court has explained that “for parties to

employment contracts . . . there are real benefits to the enforcement of arbitration provisions”:

We have been clear in rejecting the supposition that the advantages of the arbitration

process somehow disappear when transferred to the employment context. See Gilmer,

500 U.S., at 30-32, 111 S.Ct. 1647. Arbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the

costs of litigation, a benefit that may be of particular importance in employment litigation,

which often involves smaller sums of money than disputes concerning commercial

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contracts. . . . The Court has been quite specific in holding that arbitration agreements can

be enforced under the FAA without contravening the policies of congressional enactments

giving employees specific protection against discrimination prohibited by federal law; as

we noted in Gilmer, “‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo

the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an

arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.’” 

Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 1313 (2001).

A federal court is bound to enforce agreements to arbitrate:

By it terms, the Act [FAA] leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district

court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to

arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed. [9 U.S.C.] §§

3, 4. Thus, insofar as the language of the Act guides our disposition of this case, we

would conclude that agreements to arbitrate must be enforced, absent a ground for

revocation of the contractual agreement.

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 1241 (1985) (italics in original).

California Law

Connecticut General further points out that California law favors arbitration. The California

Arbitration Act (“CAA”), Cal. Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1280, et seq.,, like the FAA, provides a

comprehensive scheme to enforce arbitration. The California Supreme Court has explained:

California law, like federal law, favors enforcement of valid arbitration agreements. . . .

Thus, under both federal and California law, arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable,

and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of

any contract. . . . In other words, under California law, as under federal law, an arbitration

agreement may only be invalidated for the same reasons as other contracts.

Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 83, 98, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745 (2000).

The CAA defines “agreement” to include “agreements between employers and employees.” Cal.

Code Civ. Proc., § 1280(a). Like the FAA, the CAA seeks to enforce arbitration agreements: “A written

agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid,

enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.” Cal.

Code Civ. Proc., § 1281. 

California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 provides a procedure to enforce an arbitration

provision:

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a

written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate

such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the

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controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists . . .

“Thus, under section 1281.2, it is the trial court that determines if there is a duty to arbitrate the particular

controversy which has arisen between the parties. . . . Doubts as to whether an arbitration clause applies

to a particular dispute are to be resolved in favor of sending the parties to arbitration.” United

Transportation Union v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 7 Cal.App.4th 804, 808, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 702,

704 (1992). Broad contractual provisions for arbitration are liberally construed. Posner v. GrunwaldMarx, Inc., 56 Cal.2d 169, 175, 14 Cal.Rptr. 297 (1961).

Statutory Claims

Connecticut General argues that Ms. Davis agreed to arbitrate based on her employment

application and acknowledgment of receipt and review of the employee handbook, including its

description of the arbitration policy. Connecticut General contends that even federal and California

statutorily-based claims are subject to arbitration.

The United States Supreme Court has held that “federal statutory claims may be the subject of

arbitration agreements that are enforceable pursuant to the FAA because the agreement only determines

the choice of forum.” EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295, n. 10, 122 S.Ct. 754 (2002). “In

these cases we recognized that ‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the

substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than

judicial, form.’” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, 111 S.Ct. 1647 (1991)

(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S.Ct. 1647

(1985)).

Nothing in the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov. Code, §§

12900, et seq., “suggests it was intended to prohibit arbitration.” Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at 98, 99

Cal.Rptr.2d at 757. FEHA claims “are in fact arbitrable if the arbitration permits an employee to

vindicate his or her statutory rights.” Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at 91, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d at 751 (italics in

original). 

The California Supreme Court imposes five minimum requirements to arbitrate statutory civil

rights pursuant to a mandatory employment arbitration agreement:

Such an arbitration agreement is lawful if it “(1) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2)

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provides for more than minimal discovery, (3) requires a written award, (4) provides for

all of the types of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not

require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators’ fees or expenses as

a condition of access to the arbitration forum. Thus, an employee who is made to use the

arbitration as a condition of employment ‘effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory

cause of action in the arbitral forum.’” 

Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at 103, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d at 760 (quoting Cole v. Burns International Security

Services, 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. 1997)).

Connecticut General notes that its arbitration rules call for selection of a neutral evaluator in that

the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), which conducts arbitrations, “will send to the employee

and CIGNA an identical list of all arbitrators who are members of the regional Employment Dispute

Resolution Roster of AAA.” The arbitration rules permit an employee and CIGNA to object to names

on the list and sets forth further criteria for selection of an impartial arbitrator.

The arbitration rules set forth discovery procedures, including exchange of witnesses and

documents and up to two days of depositions. The arbitration rules require the arbitrator to submit a

written, signed decision to “include an opinion giving the reasons for the decision. The decision will be

implemented in the manner required by law.” The arbitration rules empower the arbitrator “to award any

remedy that either party would have been entitled to had the employee taken the dispute to a government

agency or to a court.” The arbitration rules limit an employee’s administrative costs to $100: “Unless the

employee chooses in his/her demand for arbitration to share equally in such expenses, CIGNA will pay

100% of any mediation/arbitration administrative fees required by the AAA in excess of the one hundred

dollars ($100) paid by the employee.” The $100 limit is $150 less than this Court’s filing fee.

Ms. Davis does not meaningfully challenge arbitration. Ms. Davis appears to claim she was

unaware of arbitration as the next step in the process to address her claims. Ms. Davis does not deny that

she signed and read her employment application to commit to arbitration and signed a receipt to

acknowledge she received the employee handbook describing arbitration. Plaintiff was “bound by the

provisions of the [arbitration] agreement regardless of whether [she] read it or [was] aware of the

arbitration clause when [she] signed the document.” Brookwood v. Bank of America, 45 Cal.App.4th

1667, 1674, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 515, 520 (1996). Moreover, “a party who signs a written agreement generally

is bound by its terms, even though he neither reads it nor considers the legal consequences of signing it.”

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Operating Engineers Pension Trust v. Gilliam, 737 F.2d 1501, 1504 (9th Cir. 1984). To relieve a party

of contractual responsibilities on grounds he/she did not read an arbitration clause would unreasonably

permit the party to “choose alternatively to seek arbitration or, should he prefer, to perform and receive

the benefits of the contract.” Parr v. Superior Court, 139 Cal.App.3d 440, 445-446, 188 Cal.Rptr. 801,

805 (1983). 

Ms. Davis raises no substantive dispute as to a valid agreement to arbitrate her employment claims

or as to the scope of claims subject to arbitration. Plaintiff’s employment application subjects to

arbitration “ANY DISPUTE ABOUT MY CANDIDACY FOR EMPLOYMENT, EMPLOYMENT OR

CESSATION OF EMPLOYMENT EXCLUSIVELY.” (Uppercase and underlining in original.) A broad

clause subjecting to arbitration disputes arising under or in connection with employment presumptively

covers all employment-related controversies. See Oldroyd v. Elmira Savings Bank, FSB, 134 F.3d 72,

76 (2nd Cir. 1998). Ms. Davis’ arguments regarding an agreement to arbitrate are subject to arbitration

and are not within this Court’s purview. As outlined above, Connecticut General has demonstrated

substantial federal and state authority to arbitrate Ms. Davis’ claims. Ms. Davis’ notion that arbitration

infringes First Amendment rights makes no sense in that Connecticut General is not a state actor subject

to First Amendment claims. Arbitration is the proper forum to address Ms. Davis’ claims at issue here.

Stay Of Action

9 U.S.C. § 3 addresses stay of proceedings referable to arbitration:

If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon

any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the

court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such

suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application

of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in

accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in

default in proceeding with such arbitration.

“A party to a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement is entitled to a stay of federal court proceedings

pending arbitration as well as an order compelling arbitration.” Alexander v. Anthony Int’l., L.P., 341

F.3d 256, 263 (3rd Cir. 2003).

Since Ms. Davis’ claims are subject to arbitration, this Court must stay this action.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed below, this Court:

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1. GRANTS Connecticut General’s motion to compel Ms. Davis’ to arbitrate her claims

before AAA pursuant to Connecticut General’s arbitration policy and rules; 

2. STAYS this action pending arbitration; and

3. SETS a status conference for February 9, 2006 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 6 (LJO). The

parties are encouraged to appear at the status conference by telephone by arranging a oneline conference call and adding the Court at (559) 498-7322. At the conference, the

parties shall be prepared to discuss the status of arbitration of plaintiff’s claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 25, 2005 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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