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Parties Involved:
International Transportation Service, Inc.
Respondent
National Labor Relations Board
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 27, 2006 Decided June 2, 2006

No. 05-1063

INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, INC.,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with

05-1126

On Petitions for Review and Cross-Application for

Enforcement 

of an Order of the National Labor Relations Board

Scott J. Witlin argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioner. Stanley R. Strauss and Brian W. Steinbach entered

appearances.

Ruth E. Burdick, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board,

argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were

Arthur F. Rosenfeld, Acting General Counsel, John H.

Ferguson, Assistant General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong,

Deputy Associate General Counsel, and Julie B. Broido, Senior

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Attorney.

Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and RANDOLPH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: International Transportation

Service, Inc. (“ITS”) petitions for review of a National Labor

Relations Board (“the Board” or “NLRB”) order finding it in

violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor

Relations Act (“NLRA” or “the Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)

and (1). The Board concluded that ITS committed an unfair

labor practice when it fired employee Deanna Tartaglia after she

picketed for recognition of a union as her personal bargaining

representative. Because we conclude that Tartaglia did not

engage in protected activity, and ITS therefore did not

unlawfully discharge her, we grant the petition for review.

I.

ITS operates a container terminal at the port of Long Beach

through which imports and exports pass continuously. Through

its membership in the Pacific Maritime Association (“PMA”),

the company indirectly employs longshoremen represented by

local unions affiliated with the International Longshore and

Warehouse Union (“ILWU”). ITS directly employs its office

clerical workers, a bargaining unit represented by the Office

Clerical Unit (“the Union”) of ILWU. The company also

employs a single “Payroll and Billing Representative” whose

union representation is the subject of this case.

During past bargaining with ITS on behalf of the office

clerical bargaining unit, the Union also attempted to negotiate on

behalf of the Payroll and Billing Representative. Each time,

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however, the Union ultimately agreed to leave the position out

of the unit. Accordingly, when ITS hired Deanna Tartaglia in

June 1999 as the Payroll and Billing Representative, the Union

was not authorized to bargain on her behalf. Not dissuaded by

prior failures, the Union asserted itself once more: On February

4, 2002, it presented ITS with a letter demanding recognition as

the bargaining representative of a single-employee unit

consisting of Tartaglia. The letter imposed a one-hour deadline,

which the Union extended until the next morning. On February

5, ITS rejected the demand and refused to recognize the Union

as Tartaglia’s bargaining representative.

Two Union representatives and Tartaglia immediately

responded by picketing. No other ITS employees joined the

picket line, but many ILWU-affiliated employees ceased

working. The work stoppage, having brought the terminal to a

halt, prompted ITS to request expedited arbitration with ILWU

through the PMA. Within a few hours, the arbitrator concluded

that the picket line was not bona fide and ruled in the company’s

favor, allowing ITS to refuse to pay employees who honored the

picket line. Although not subject to the arbitration, the Union

and Tartaglia ended the picket line following the ruling. 

The short work stoppage cost ITS a significant amount of

money and goodwill with its customers. It caused a mile-long

truck backup, delayed several shipments, and cost upwards of

$90,000. In addition, despite the arbitrator’s award, many

workers who honored the picket line did not return until the next

day. Because her actions triggered the events, ITS fired

Tartaglia on February 8.

The Union filed an unfair labor practice charge against ITS

for Tartaglia’s termination. The NLRB’s Regional Director

issued a complaint based on that charge, alleging that ITS

violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the NLRA by discharging

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Tartaglia for participating in the picket line. After a hearing, an

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that ITS had

committed an unfair labor practice by discharging Tartaglia for

picketing.

ITS filed exceptions, arguing that it committed no violation

because Tartaglia did not engage in activity protected by the

Act. Specifically, ITS argued that the Union’s recognitional

picketing violated Section 8(b)(7)(C) because the Board could

not certify Tartaglia as a single-employee bargaining unit. By

assisting the Union’s unlawful actions, therefore, Tartaglia could

not receive the Act’s protection under ITS’s theory. ITS also

argued that Tartaglia was either a managerial or supervisory

employee not subject to the protections of the Act. 

The NLRB rejected ITS’s exceptions and adopted the ALJ’s

ruling, which held on two alternative grounds that Tartaglia had

engaged in protected activity. First, relying on Teamsters Local

Union No. 115 (Vila-Barr Co.), 157 NLRB 588 (1966), it

concluded that a union does not violate Section 8(b)(7)(C) when

it pickets for recognition of a single-employee unit. ITS pressed

the Board to abandon Vila-Barr in light of a Seventh Circuit

case that questioned its correctness, see Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters

v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 12, 18 (7th Cir. l977) (“Purolator Security”),

but the Board declined. It therefore concluded that neither the

Union nor Tartaglia unlawfully picketed for recognition.

 

Second, the Board alternatively held that Tartaglia’s

picketing was protected even if the Union’s was prohibited.

Concluding that Tartaglia did not act as the Union’s

representative or agent, the Board refused to impute any

wrongdoing by the Union to Tartaglia. The Board also found

that the Act protected Tartaglia’s individual picketing because

it was “union activity.” Even though she did not act in concert

with other employees, it considered the union activity inherently

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concerted.

ITS timely petitions for review of the Board’s order, and the

Board cross-applies for enforcement. The company raises

three challenges to the Board’s order. First, it argues that

Tartaglia did not engage in protected, concerted activity when

she joined the Union’s picket line. It therefore urges this court

to reject Vila-Barr and find that Section 8(b)(7)(C) prohibits

recognitional picketing for single-employee bargaining units.

Second, ITS argues that Tartaglia was either a managerial or

supervisory employee not subject to the Act’s protections.

Third, ITS argues that the Board improperly refused to hear

evidence of Tartaglia’s misconduct prior to fashioning a remedy.

Because we agree that Tartaglia did not engage in protected

activity, we do not address the other arguments.

II.

We review the NLRB’s orders under a deferential standard.

If supported by substantial evidence, the Board’s findings of fact

are conclusive. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). Unless arbitrary or

capricious, we will uphold the agency’s policy judgments.

Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB, 113 F.3d 1259, 1266

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc). This level of deference, though

high, has limits, and we will not “rubberstamp NLRB

decisions.” Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. NLRB, 44 F.3d 1010,

1014 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The Board must provide “a reasoned

explanation” for its decisions. Petroleum Comm. v. FCC, 22

F.3d 1164, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

In this case, the Board held that ITS violated Section 8(a)(3)

and (1) of the Act by firing Tartaglia after she picketed for

recognition of herself as a single-employee bargaining unit.

Under Section 8(a)(1), an employer may not “interfere with,

restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights

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Section 9(b)(3) defines “guard” as a term of art for employees

who “enforce against employees and other persons rules to protect

guaranteed in” Section 7 of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).

Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer

to terminate an employee to “discourage membership in any

labor organization.” Id. § 158(a)(3). ITS argues that it could

not have violated either of these provisions because Tartaglia’s

recognitional picketing was not protected by Section 7, which

grants employees “the right to self-organization, to form, join,

or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through

representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other

concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or

other mutual aid or protection.” Id. § 157.

The Section 7 right to collective bargaining has never

extended to single-employee bargaining units. As the Board has

recognized since 1936, “the principle of collective bargaining

presupposes that there is more than one eligible person who

desires to bargain.” Luckenbach Steamship Co., 2 NLRB 181,

193 (1936). A single-employee bargaining unit by definition

excludes all other eligible persons from the bargaining process.

Accordingly, the Board will not certify single-employee

bargaining units because the Act does not empower it to do so.

The Board’s inability to certify a bargaining unit has ripples

in other areas of labor law, including Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the

Act, which forbids unions from picketing “where such picketing

has been conducted without a petition [for election] being filed

within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days from

the commencement of such picketing.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 158(b)(7)(C). In other words, Section 8(b)(7)(C) prohibits

picketing for recognition of a bargaining unit where the Board

will not certify the unit. This principle holds true for mixedguard units,1

 which the Act outlaws. Id. § 159(b)(3). Because

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property of the employer or to protect the safety of persons on the

employer’s premises.” 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3). A mixed-guard unit

includes both guards and nonguards.

the Board may not certify mixed-guard units, longstanding law

holds that Section 8(b)(7)(C) prohibits recognitional picketing

on their behalf. See Drivers, Chauffers, Warehousemen v.

NLRB, 553 F.2d 1368, 1376-77 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Purolator

Security, 568 F.2d at 18.

In Vila-Barr, the Board exempted single-employee units

from this general rule, thus creating conflict with the mixedguard cases. Although the Board will not certify singleemployee units, it held in Vila-Barr that Section 8(b)(7)(C) does

not prohibit unions from picketing for recognition of such a unit.

157 NLRB 588. The Board reasoned that it would be

“inequitable” to deny the right to picket for recognition of such

units because “[t]here is no statutory or other policy against

representation of an individual employee in a stable one-man

unit by an authorized representative.” Id. at 589-91.

The Seventh Circuit has called Vila-Barr into question.

Upholding the Board’s rule on mixed-guard units, it broadly

stated that Section 8(b)(7)(C) “bars recognitional picketing after

it is determined that no Board-conducted election will be held.”

Purolator Security, 568 F.2d at 18. In dictum, the court further

stated that Vila-Barr “was incorrect.” Id. at 18 n.12. The court

disagreed with the Board’s distinguishing of Vila-Barr from the

mixed-guard cases and concluded the same policy—“to stop

unions from imposing their will on employers and

employees”—applies to preclude recognitional picketing for

single-employee units. Id.

We too have held that Section 8(b)(7)(C) “appears to

contemplate picketing by way of prelude to an election.”

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Two Members of the Board noted “the absence of a threemember Board majority to overrule Vila-Barr” and therefore applied

it as Board precedent. Int’l Transp. Serv., Inc., 344 NLRB No. 22, at

1 n.2 (2005).

Drivers, Chauffers, Warehousemen, 553 F.2d at 1377. In other

words, a union violates Section 8(b)(7)(C) by picketing for

recognition when there is no “reasonable prospect of a Boardconducted election.” Id. at 1376-77. We agreed with the Board

that picketing for recognition of a mixed-guard unit did not

satisfy that condition. Although we noted the tension between

our reasoning and Vila-Barr, the issue was not before us, and we

did not reject the case at the time. Id. at 1377 n.31. We do so

now.

The Board understandably followed Vila-Barr as

precedent,2

 but we are not so bound. See Alabama Mun.

Distribs. Group v. FERC, 312 F.3d 470, 473-74 (D.C. Cir.

2002). No rational distinction supports the Board’s different

treatment of single-employee units and mixed-guard units for

purposes of recognitional picketing. The fact that the Act

prohibits the certification of mixed-guard units, see 29 U.S.C.

§ 159(b)(3), does not help the Board because the Act does not

permit it to certify one-person units either. As the Board held in

1936, the very nature of collective bargaining is incompatible

with single-employee bargaining units. Luckenbach, 2 NLRB

at 193. It is a distinction without a difference that the Act

expressly prohibits the Board from certifying mixed-guard units

and implicitly prohibits the certification of single-employee

units. The Act does not empower the Board to certify either

type of unit. Therefore, picketing for recognition of either type

of unit in no way serves as a “prelude to an election.” We

therefore reject Vila-Barr and hold that Section 8(b)(7)(C)

prohibits a union from petitioning for recognition of a oneperson unit, as the Union did here.

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Yet the Board held that Tartaglia did not need Vila-Barr to

receive Section 7’s protections because Section 8(b)(7)(C) only

prohibits union activity. The Board did not impute the Union’s

wrongdoing to Tartaglia because it found she was neither an

agent nor representative of the Union. This conclusion makes

little sense. Tartaglia authorized, joined, and was the subject

matter of the picket line. The Union had no other agenda than

to seek recognition as her personal bargaining representative.

Were it not for her, the Union would not have picketed in

violation of Section 8(b)(7)(C). Accordingly, Tartaglia made

possible and participated in all of the Union’s wrongdoing.

Thus, the unlawful endeavor was hers as much as the Union’s.

The Board’s error runs deeper. Even if Tartaglia did not

personally engage in prohibited activity by joining the picket

line, the Board did not explain why her assistance of prohibited

activity would otherwise be protected. The Act does not protect

all nonprohibited activities: Rather, it protects some activities,

prohibits some, and leaves others in a suspended state, neither

authorized nor punishable. The Board’s decision not to impute

wrongdoing to Tartaglia means only that she did not violate the

Act. It does not thereby usher her into the safety of Section 7.

Furthermore, the Board’s ruling creates perverse protections

for employees. It immunizes from employer discipline those

employees who aid a union’s unlawful activities. Presumably,

the ruling would also protect an employee who helps a union

vandalize his employer’s property simply because he assisted a

union. We decline to adopt this “Union made me do it” defense

for employee misconduct. The Act does not protect an

employee for assisting a union’s unlawful acts.

We also reject the Board’s alternative holding that

Tartaglia’s so-called “union activity” was the kind of concerted

activity protected by Section 7. To be sure, the Supreme Court

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has accepted that in some circumstances employees who act

alone may also be engaged in concerted activity. NLRB v. City

Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984). Specifically, the Court

approved of the NLRB’s so-called “Interboro doctrine,” which

held that an employee who individually asserted a collective

bargaining right had engaged in concerted activity. Id. at 829-30

(citing Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 NLRB 1295 (1966)).

The Court embraced the Board’s justifications for the Interboro

doctrine as well: (1) that assertion of a collective-bargaining

right was an extension of the concerted action that resulted in

the agreement; and (2) that the individual, by asserting the right,

had affected the rights of all other employees under the

agreement. Id. at 829. The Court also recognized the Board’s

counterpart to Interboro, which held that a nonunionized

employee asserting a noncollective-bargaining right had not

engaged in concerted activity. Id. at 829 n.6 (citing Meyers

Indus., Inc., 268 NLRB 493 (1984)). 

This court has also approved of the Board’s rule in Meyers:

Concerted activity “encompasses [only] those circumstances

where individual employees seek to initiate or to induce or to

prepare for group action, as well as individual employees

bringing truly group complaints to the attention of

management.” Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481, 1484 (D.C. Cir.

1987) (alteration in original). Accordingly, “concerted activity

includes circumstances where individual employees work to

initiate, induce or prepare for group action.” Citizens Inv. Servs.

Corp. v. NLRB, 430 F.3d 1195, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2005). To that

end, employees engage in concerted activity when bringing

group complaints to management’s attention. Id. at 1199. The

touchstone for concerted activity, then, must be some

relationship between the individual employee’s actions and

fellow employees.

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The facts do not support the Board’s conclusion that

Tartaglia engaged in concerted activity by assisting the Union.

If anything, the Board had it backwards: The Union assisted

Tartaglia. It formed a picket line for the sole purpose of

securing recognition as Tartaglia’s personal bargaining

representative. It did not assert the interest of any other party.

In other words, the Union had the sole goal of aiding Tartaglia,

and she had the sole aim of aiding the Union in helping herself.

Likewise, Tartaglia only aided the Union in its attempt to help

her personally. She did not assist the Union on behalf of her

fellow employees; neither did she “engage in behavior that

supported union employers and employees.” Tradesmen Int’l,

Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1137, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (emphasis

in original). Under the Board’s reasoning, Tartaglia, by latching

onto a union, could seek individual ends that she could not seek

otherwise.

Tartaglia’s personal picketing did not involve collective

action for “achiev[ing] common goals” any more than the

Union’s picketing. City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 830. She did not

assert a right obtained under a collective bargaining agreement

through prior group action, as had the employee in City

Disposal. Indeed, she had been repeatedly excluded from the

office bargaining unit and therefore had no rights to assert from

prior collective action. Neither did she act on behalf of other

employees. She instead requested recognition of the Union as

her personal bargaining representative. Even upon a successful

picketing campaign, she had no interest in spurring group action;

rather, any resulting agreement would have been a personal

agreement with ITS not applicable to any other employee. Her

picketing therefore did not raise the “truly group complaints”

necessary for a finding of concerted activity.

Consequently, the Board has demonstrated no relationship

between Tartaglia’s individual action and any effect on, or

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authority from, fellow employees. Tartaglia did not engage in

concerted activity and therefore does not receive Section 7

protection for her picketing. Neither does Section 7 protect her

for assisting the Union’s wrongdoing. Accordingly, we

conclude that ITS did not violate Section 8(a)(3) and (1) when

it discharged Tartaglia.

III.

For the above reasons, we grant the petition for review.

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