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Parties Involved:
Attorney General
Appellee
Dennis Lee Glidewell
Appellant
Stephen Kaiser
Appellee

Document Text:

PI L tt Tr-· . ~ t) uuned Stllfti Court of Appea.ls 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

JUN 2 0 1990 

_________ ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

DENNIS LEE GLIDEWELL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs. 

STEPHEN KAISER and, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, State of 

Oklahoma, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 89-6138 

) (D.C. No. Civ-89-0080-W) 

) (W.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK and EBEL, Circuit Judges.** 

Plaintiff-appellant Dennis Glidewell, prose, seeks to appeal 

from the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Glidewell is presently 

incarcerated in the Oklahoma state penitentiary serving a life 

sentence for first degree murder. According to Glidewell, his 

state trial encompassed four errors of constitutional magnitude: 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 89-6138 Document: 010110036862 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 1 
(1) ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) improper prosecutorial 

comments, (3) denial of the right to confront witnesses and (4) an 

involuntarily obtained confession. The district court allegedly 

erred when it failed to grant Glidewell an evidentiary hearing on 

his claims. See Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases 

Under Section 2254. Because Glidewell has exhausted his state 

court remedies as required by§ 2254(b), he properly invokes 

federal court jurisdiction. 

Now before the court is Glidewell's motion for a certificate 

of probable cause so that he may proceed with his appeal. 1 28 

U.S.C. 2253; Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). The district court denied 

Glidewell a certificate. In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 

893 (1983), the Supreme Court established the standard for the 

issuance of a certificate of probable cause: "[P]robable cause 

requires something more than the absence of frivolity. . [A] 

certificate of probable cause requires petitioner to make a 

substantial showing of the denial of a federal right." Having 

carefully reviewed both the state and federal court record in this 

matter, we conclude that Glidewell has not made the required 

showing for the issuance of a certificate. In a thorough 

memorandum opinion, the district court analyzed and rejected each 

of Glidewell's claims as meritless. We agree substantially with 

the reasons set forth in that opinion, a copy of which is attached 

1 Glidewell's motion of January 12, 1990 to amend his motion for 

a certifcate of probable cause which has been deferred to this 

merits panel is allowed. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 89-6138 Document: 010110036862 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 2 
hereto, that Glidewell fails to "make a substantial showing of the 

denial of a federal right." 

The motion for a certificate of probable cause is DENIED. 2 

APPEAL DISMISSED. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

2 Glidewell's pending motion to proceed in forma pauperis on 

appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is denied as moot. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 89-6138 Document: 010110036862 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 3 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FI t::J ED 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA }{~:( 5 1; 89 

DENNIS LEE GLIDEWELL, ) 

ROBERT 0. DENNIS 

r 1.i:::RK, U.S. DISTRIO:T C -- ~ 

\',' :.w I C:iiN DISTJ-\, ) 

Petitioner ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

No. CIV-89-80-W 

STEPHEN KAISER, ) 

) 

Respondent ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

The petitioner, a state prisoner~ brings this action 

pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus. The 

respondent has filed a response, and the petition is at issue. 

The Court has determined that an evidentiary hearing is not 

necessary in this matter, inasmuch as it can be resolved on the 

basis of the record. See Edgemon v. Lockhart, 768 F.2d 252 (8th 

Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1085 (1986); Hill v. Lockhart, 

731 F.2d 568 (8th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 

Moreover, the granting of such a hearing is within the discretion 

of the Court, and the Court finds that such a hearing is not 

necessary. See Brafford v. Marshall, 7 51 F. 2d 845 ( 6th Cir. 

1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 872 (1985). 

In this habeas corpus action the petitioner is attacking a 

state court judgment imposing a sentence for which he is 

presently in custody. The proper respondent in such a case is 

the person who has custody over the petitioner. 28 U.S.C. §2254; 

Rule 2(a), Rules Governing §2254 Cases. In the instant case, the 

person having custody of the petitioner is the warden of the 

,\ 

Appellate Case: 89-6138 Document: 010110036862 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 4 
facility in which the petitioner is incarcerated, Stephen Kaiser. 

Petitioner has properly named the warden as the respondent. 

However, he has also named the state Attorney General. The 

Attorney General is only a proper respondent in a federal habeas 

action when the petitioner is not presently in custody pursuant 

to the judgment he is attacking but may be subject to such 

custody in the future. Rule 2(b), Rules Governing §2254 Cases. 

Since the petitioner is attacking a judgment for which he is 

currently in custody, the warden is the only proper party 

respondent. Therefore, the state Attorney Generai is dismissed 

as a respondent. 

Fol lowing a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted of 

first degree murder in Oklahoma County District Court, Case No. 

CRF-78-521. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. Petitioner 

thereafter filed a direct appeal in the Oklahoma Court of 

Criminal Appeals, Case No. F-79-169. On April 13, 1981, the 

Court affirmed his conviction. Glidewell v. State, 626 P.2d 1351 

(Okla. Crim. App. 1981). On July 8, 1988, the petitioner filed 

an application for post-conviction relief in the District Court 

of Oklahoma County, Case No. CRF-78-521. In his application for 

post-conviction relief, the petitioner raised two grounds for 

relief that had not previously been raised on appeal. The 

petitioner for the first time argued he was denied adequate 

assistance of counsel and that he was denied the right to 

confront the witnesses against him. On August 4, 1988, the 

district court denied any post-conviction relief. The petitioner 

appealed that decision to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-6138 Document: 010110036862 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 5 
Case No. PC-88-710. The court affirmed the lower court on 

October 14, 1988, holding that he had not raised any issues in 

his application for post-conviction relief that he did not or 

could not have raised in his direct appeal. 

On January 18, 1989, petitioner filed the instant 

application for habeas corpus. The petitioner raises four 

grounds for relief: (1) illegally-obtained confession; (2) 

ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) denial of . the right to 

confront witnesses against him; (4) improper conm1ents by the 

prosecutor. 

Petitioner's first claim is that a statement taken from him 

the afternoon of his arrest was obtained unlawfully. Petitioner 

claims he had invoked his right to counsel and that he was tired, 

hungry, and worried about his girlfriend at the time his 

statement was taken. In Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985), 

the Supreme Court set forth the standard for reviewing claims of 

an unlawfully-obtained confession. The standard is whether under 

the totality of the circumstances the challenged confession was 

obtained in a manner compatible with the requirements of the 

Constitution. The Court held that this is a matter for 

independent federal determination. Id. at 112. It is therefore 

the duty of this Court to examine the entire record and make an 

independent determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness. 

United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1307 (10th Cir. 1987). 

However, the trial court's rulings with regard to subsidiary 

factual questions such as whether the police intimidated or 

I 

threatened a suspect or whether the suspect was susceptible to 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-6138 Document: 010110036862 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 6 
police coercion are subject to review under the clearly erroneous 

standard. Id. at 1307-1308; United States v. Fountain, 776 F.2d 

878, 885 (10th Cir. 1985). Based on an independent evaluation of 

the record with appropriate deference to the trial court's 

findings of fact the Court finds that petitioner's statement was 

voluntary. Several facts, including but not limited to the 

following, support this conclusion: (1) petitioner admits that 

he was given Miranda warnings several times (Tr. 198, 199, 205); 

(2) the interview was not exceedingly long, 45 minutes or less 

(Tr. 192, 193); (3) the petitioner appeared to · be sober and 

although tired able 

191, 196) ; ( 4) the 

threatened (Tr. 189, 

to read and understand his statement (Tr. 

petitioner was not physically abused or 

190, 194); and (5) the police officer who 

took the statement testified that the petitioner did not ask to 

see an attorney (Tr. 188, 189, 194). Finally, it does not appear 

that the petitioner was unusually susceptible to coercion because 

of his age or lack of education or intelligence. In sum, the 

Court finds that the confession was voluntarily and freely given. 

Petitioner's second claim is that he was denied effective 

assistance of counsel. Petitioner bases his claim on the fact 

that his attorney also represented his brother (a co-defendant) 

and that the attorney's conduct of the trial was incompetent. 

The standard of review applicable to ineffective assistance of 

counsel is now well established. Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668 (1984). The petitioner must first establish that 

counsel was deficient by showing that he connnitted errors so 

serious that he was not functioning as counsel guaranteed by the 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-6138 Document: 010110036862 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 7 
Sixth Amendment. Secondly, the petitioner must show that 

counsel's errors prejudiced the defense and were so serious that 

they deprived him of a fair trial. Moreover, the Court must 

indulge a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate 

assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 

reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 

The petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the results of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability 

is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The burden is on the 

petitioner to demonstrate how he was actually prejudiced by 

counsel's representation. United States v. Andrews, 790 F. 2d 

803, 815 (10th Cir. 1986); cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1018. While 

multiple representation is not a per se violation of the Sixth 

Amendment, it raises a limited presumption of prejudice. Mosier 

v. Murphy, 790 F.2d 62, 66 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 

U.S. 988 (1986). However, such prejudice is presumed only if the 

defendant demonstrates that counsel was in fact deficient in that 

he "actively represented conflicting interests." Mosier, 790 

F.2d at 66. Moreover, where the petitioner fails to raise the 

objection at trial, he must not only show a possible conflict but 

an actual conflict that adversely affected his lawyer's 

performance. Mosier, 790 F.2d at 66; see Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 

U.S. 335, 350 (1980). Review of the trial transcript reveals 

that petitioner did not raise this objection at trial. 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-6138 Document: 010110036862 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 8 
•. 

The Court's review of the transcript also does not indicate 

that there was an actual conflict or that multiple representation 

adversely affected the performance of petitioner's lawyer. 

Petitioner's brother was not tried with him and there is nothing 

in the record to indicate and petitioner has not alleged that 

their defenses were inconsistent. Although the petitioner states 

that a conflict of interest existed, he cites no evidence to 

support this contention, and absent a showing of conflict, the 

Court cannot find the petitioner was harmed. Mosier, 790 F.2d at 

66 . The Court's review of the record does not · indicate that 

petitioner's counsel was ineffective. In fact, the trial judge 

even commented on petitioner's attorney's excellent handling of 

the case (Tr. 279). The Court finds that petitioner had 

effective assistance of counsel and that petitioner was not 

prejudiced by counsel's representation. 

Petitioner's third claim is that he was denied his Sixth 

Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him when the 

testimony of one witness who had testified at a co-defendant's 

trial was read into the record. The record indicates that there 

was no showing of unavailability or attempt to produce the 

witness at trial. However, petitioner's counsel did not object 

to this form of testimony, but instead informed the court that he 

was present when the testimony was taken (Tr. 65, 66). On direct 

appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, petitioner did 

not raise this issue. Therefore, as the state court applied its 

procedural bar to the issue, 

prejudice before this Court 

the petitioner must show cause and 

can grant relief. Wainwright v. 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-6138 Document: 010110036862 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 9 
•. 

r-' 

·•-:··, 

Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). Even if this Court should find that 

the petitioner has shown cause for failing to raise this issue on 

direct appeal, petitioner has failed to show prejudice. The 

testimony of the witness did not in any way suggest the guilt or 

innocence of the petitioner. His testimony was simply that he 

found the body, determined there was no sign of life, determined 

that no one else was in the building, and then proceeded to call 

the police and an ambulance (Tr. 70, 72, 73, 74). A federal 

court in a habeas corpus proceeding will not review a state 

court's action in admitting evidence unless the petitioner 

establishes that the errors deprived him of a fundamentally fair 

trial. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974); Lisenba 

v . Ca 1 if o rn i a , 3 14 U . S . 21 9 (19 41 ) . The petitioner has been 

deprived of a fundamentally fair trial if there is a reasonable 

probability that in the absence of the erroneous evidentiary 

ruling, the outcome of the trial would have been different. 

Tucker v. Kemp, 802 F.2d 1293, 1295-1296 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. 

denied, 480 U.S. 911 (1987). Defendant has failed to establish 

that the introduction of this evidence would have made the 

outcome of the trial different, and its admission therefore does 

not raise a constitutional issue. 

In support of his final reason for habeas corpus relief, the 

petitioner argues that the prosecutor's corrrrnents in closing 

deprived him of a fair trial. The portion of the closing 

objected to by the petitioner was the prosecutor's statements 

that the petitioner had actually masterminded the entire robbery 

and homicide episode. Improper prosecutorial comments are 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-6138 Document: 010110036862 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 10