Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-73654/USCOURTS-ca9-12-73654-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Daniel Lemus
Petitioner
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE DANIEL LEMUS,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 12-73654

Agency No.

099-711-900

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted October 21, 2015

Pasadena, California

Filed November 16, 2016

Before: Johnnie B. Rawlinson and Jacqueline H. Nguyen,

Circuit Judges, and Michael A. Ponsor,* Senior District

Judge.

Opinion by Judge Ponsor

* The Honorable Michael A. Ponsor, Senior District Judge for the

U.S. District Court for Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

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SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel denied Jose Daniel Lemus’s petition for review

from the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision

retroactively applying to him the holding in Holder v.

Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012), that an applicant

for cancellation of removal must satisfy the years-ofresidence requirement on his own, without relying on a

parent’s residential history. 

Petitioner contended that Martinez Gutierrez announced

a new rule of law and that, under Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,

4040 U.S. 97 (1971), its holding should not be applied

retroactively to him. The panel held that because it was

deferring to the BIA’s decision in Matter of Escobar, 24 I. &

N. Dec. 231 (BIA 2007), as directed by the Supreme Court,

rather than adopting a new rule on its own, the retroactivity

analysis set forth in Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. FTC,

691 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1982), applied rather than that of

Chevron Oil. The panel held that the second Montgomery

Ward factor, which favors retroactivity if a party could

reasonably anticipate the change in law, and the third factor,

which examines the extent of reliance upon the former rule,

weighed heavily against Lemus. The panel further found that

the fifth factor favored the government’s strong interest in

uniform application of the immigration statutes.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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LEMUS V. LYNCH 3

COUNSEL

Florence Weinberg (argued) and Andrew K. Nietor, San

Diego, California, for Petitioner.

Carmel A. Morgan (argued) and Gray J. Newkirk, Trial

Attorneys; Luis E. Perez, Senior Litigation Counsel; Office

of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, Washington, D.C.;

for Respondent.

OPINION

PONSOR, Senior District Judge:

In Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012),

the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) permissibly construed section

240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(a), when it concluded that an alien seeking

cancellation of removal had to satisfy the years-of-residence

requirement on his own, without relying on a parent’s

residential history. Id. at 2014–15. Petitioner Lemus

contends that Martinez Gutierrez announced a new rule of

law and that, under Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97

(1971), its holding should not be applied retroactively to him.

We disagree. Lemus’s citation of Nunez-Reyes v. Holder,

646 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), in support of his

argument for prospective application of Martinez Gutierrez

is not persuasive. In Nunez-Reyes, we applied Chevron Oil’s

retroactivity analysis, because we ourselves were explicitly

adopting a new rule, setting aside our own longstanding

circuit precedent. Id. at 692. Where, as here, we are adopting

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4 LEMUS V. LYNCH

no new rule on our own, but merely (at the direction of the

Supreme Court) deferring to the BIA, Chevron Oil’s

retroactivity criteria are inapplicable.

Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504 (9th Cir.

2012) (en banc), offers a more compelling precedent on the

issue of retroactivity. In that case, we did not announce a

new rule on our own authority, as in Nunez-Reyes, but rather

deferred to a rule previously announced by the BIA, as

Martinez Gutierrez has instructed us to do here. GarfiasRodriguez held that in this situation the proper approach to

the issue of retroactivity is set forth in Montgomery Ward &

Co., Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1982). 702 F.3d at

520. Applying Montgomery Ward, we hold that Martinez

Gutierrez should be applied retroactively. Based on this, we

will deny the petition.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner Jose Daniel Lemus is aGuatemalan citizen who

entered the United States as a four-year-old in 1993 with his

mother. In 2006, after Lemus turned eighteen, he became a

legal permanent resident through his stepfather. On April 3,

2011, Lemus was crossing by car from Mexico to Calexico,

California when a routine sweep uncovered nearly fifty

pounds of marijuana in his vehicle’s rear panels. Lemus was

initially charged with importation of marijuana and held in

custody. On June 7, 2011, he pleaded guilty to one count of

making a materially false statement to a federal officer in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. On July 1, 2011, he was

sentenced to time served. Four days later, he was transferred

into the custody of the Department of Homeland Security and

was thereafter placed into removal proceedings, charged with

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LEMUS V. LYNCH 5

being inadmissible as an alien who was or had been a

trafficker in illicit controlled substances.

In proceedings before the IJ, Lemus admitted that he was

involved in drug trafficking and was to be paid $3,000 for his

thwarted attempt to bring marijuana into the United States. 

Nevertheless, he sought relief through an application for

cancellation of removal, a course available to certain

permanent residents. Section 240(A)(a) of the Immigration

and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), authorizes

the Attorney General to cancel the removal of a person who:

“(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent

residence for not less than 5 years; (2) has resided in the

United States continuously for 7 years after having been

admitted in any status; and (3) has not been convicted of any

aggravated felony.”

The government argued that Lemus was not eligible for

this relief because he had not fulfilled the seven-year

continuous residencyrequirement. Lemus acknowledged that

he could not independently satisfy this requirement, since he

had only been a legal resident for approximately five years

when he pleaded guilty to the false statement charge.1 He

argued, however, that by imputing his stepfather’s years of

residency to himself, he could satisfy the requisite number of

years needed to qualify.

At the time of the proceeding before the IJ, this

imputation was permitted—in the teeth of the BIA’s vigorous

1 The stop-time rule provides that an alien’s period of continuous

residence is deemed to end when he is served with a notice to appear or

is convicted of certain criminal offenses, including a controlled substance

violation. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1).

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disagreement—under the authority then prevailing in the

Ninth Circuit. See Mercado-Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d

1102 (9th Cir. 2009); Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d

1013 (9th Cir. 2005). A dispute nevertheless arose at the

hearing before the IJ, not about the principle of imputing a

parent’s residential history, but about whether Lemus’s

stepfather had actually acquired enough countable years to

allow Lemus to satisfy the residency requirement. The IJ’s

inquiry therefore necessarily focused on when the stepfather

had actually been admitted for purposes of this calculation.

Lemus argued before the IJ that his stepfather was

admitted as part of the family unity program, which would

have meant that, under Ninth Circuit authority, Lemus could

count his stepfather’s years in presenting his case for

cancellation. The government disagreed, contending that the

stepfather’s admission was based on a deferred action

decision, which would have precluded Lemus from imputing

his stepfather’s residential history. In order to clarify the

historical picture, Lemus’s lawyer asked the IJ to order the

government to produce the stepfather’s Alien Registration

File (“A-File”).2 The IJ continued the case in the hope that

the government would locate and turn over the A-File, but the

government ultimately failed to do this.

At the final hearing before the IJ, on April 17, 2012, the

principal issue was the date upon which Lemus’s stepfather

was admitted. The IJ sided with the government and found

Lemus ineligible for cancellation of removal. The IJ also

2 The A-File “contains the official record material about each

individual for whom DHS has created a record.” U.S. v. Lopez, 762 F.3d

852, 856 n.1 (9thCir. 2014) (quoting 76 Fed. Reg. 34233, 34236 (June 13,

2011)).

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LEMUS V. LYNCH 7

held that he had no authority to require the Department of

Homeland Security to produce the stepfather’s A-File, and he

ordered Lemus removed.

Lemus appealed the IJ’s ruling to the BIA where, again,

the central issue initially was whether Lemus could take

advantage of his stepfather’s residential history to satisfy the

eligibility requirements for his application for cancellation of

removal. Lemus conceded, as he did before the IJ, that he

could not independently meet the seven-year residency

requirement.

While the BIA appeal was pending, the Supreme Court

issued its decision in Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez. In its

unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the line of

Ninth Circuit decisions that allowed imputation of a parent’s

years of residency under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), instead holding

that the BIA’s contrary construction of the statute, as set forth

in Matter of Escobar, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 235, was reasonable

and therefore entitled to deference. Martinez Gutierrez,

132 S. Ct. at 2021. In Escobar, the BIA had interpreted the

statute as requiring that an alien satisfy the years of residency

requirement independently, without imputing a parent’s

residence period. 24 I. & N. Dec. at 234–35.

Lemus argued to the BIA, as he does here, that Martinez

Gutierrez should not apply retroactively to him in light of the

contrary Ninth Circuit precedent controlling on June 7, 2011,

when he pleaded guilty to making a materially false

statement. Lemus contended that he would have proceeded

differently in his criminal case if he had known that his plea

would render him ineligible for cancellation of removal. 

Lemus further argued before the BIA that, since (in his view)

Martinez Gutierrez should not apply retroactively, his

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stepfather’s residency ought to be imputed to him and that, if

there was any uncertainty regarding his stepfather’s

residency, the government should be required to produce his

stepfather’s A-File to clear up the confusion.

The BIA concluded that Martinez Gutierrez foreclosed

any argument for imputation, rejecting Lemus’s contention

that it should not be applied retroactively. The BIA reasoned

that because retroactivity is the default rule, and none of the

limited circumstances justifying departure from that rule was

present in Lemus’s case, Lemus could not avoid retroactive

application of Martinez Gutierrez. The BIA therefore

affirmed the IJ’s denial of relief. The BIA also ruled that,

without the right to impute his stepfather’s residency, Lemus

could not claim prejudice based on any denial of access to his

stepfather’s A-File.

Lemus has appealed the decision of the BIA to this court. 

He argues that Martinez Gutierrez should not apply to him

and that this court should remand this matter to the IJ for a

hearing on the question whether Lemus is eligible for

cancellation of removal. He also seeks a determination by

this court that the IJ’s refusal to require the government to

produce his stepfather’s A-File prejudiced him and that, on

remand, the government must produce the file.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our jurisdiction derives from 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1),

which authorizes judicial review of final orders of removal,

and § 1252(a)(2)(D), which authorizes review of questions of

law. The question now before us, regarding the retroactivity

of Martinez Gutierrez, raises a pure issue of law, which we

review de novo. Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 512 n.6.

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III. DISCUSSION

The issue here is straightforward. The parties agree that,

without relying on his stepfather’s residential history, Lemus

is ineligible for cancellation of removal. Martinez Gutierrez

held that the BIA’s construction of the underlying statute

barring such reliance was reasonable and that we are obliged

to defer to it. If Martinez Gutierrez is retroactive, then

Lemus is ineligible for cancellation of removal, and this

petition must be denied.

In Martinez Gutierrez, Justice Kagan recounted the

dialogue between the BIA and the Ninth Circuit Court on the

issue of imputation. 132 S. Ct. at 2015–18. As of 2011,

when Lemus was apprehended with the nearly fifty pounds of

marijuana and pleaded guilty to making a false statement, this

controversy had been going on for at least six years. In 2005,

in Cuevas-Gaspar, the Ninth Circuit declined to follow the

BIA’s restrictive construction of the statute on the issue of

imputation. 430 F.3d at 1026. In 2007, in In re Escobar, the

BIA expressly disagreed with Cuevas-Gaspar with respect to

allowing imputation to satisfy the seven-year residency

requirement under § 1229b(a)(2), declining to follow it

outside the Ninth Circuit, and also holding that imputation

was impermissible to satisfy the five-year lawful permanent

residencyrequirement under §1229b(a)(1) in all jurisdictions.

24 I. & N. Dec. at 235. In 2008, the BIA went a step further

in Matter of Ramirez-Vargas, 24 I. & N. Dec. 599 (BIA

2008), again rejecting Cuevas-Gaspar, but—relying on the

Supreme Court’s decision in National Cable &

Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,

545 U.S. 967 (2005)—adding that even in the Ninth Circuit,

the BIA would follow its decision in In re Escobar, disallow

imputation to satisfy §1229b(a)(2), and not apply contrary

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Ninth Circuit authority. Id. at 600–01. In 2009, the Ninth

Circuit, in Mercado-Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102 (9th

Cir. 2009), “doubled down” (as Justice Kagan put it) on its

Cuevas-Gaspar holding. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. at

2016. Mercado-Zazueta expressly held that the BIA’s

construction of the statute barring imputation was not

reasonable and therefore not entitled to deference. 580 F.3d

at 1112–13.

In sum, by 2011 when Lemus was taken into custody, the

imputation controversy between the BIA and the Ninth

Circuit was prominent in the landscape of immigration law. 

Along with the BIA, two other circuits had already parted

company with the Ninth Circuit and deemed the BIA’s

approach to imputation a reasonable construction of

§ 1229b(a). See Deus v. Holder, 591 F.3d 807 (5th Cir.

2009); Augustin v. Attorney Gen., 520 F.3d 264 (3d Cir.

2008).

Martinez Gutierrez addressed two consolidated cases

from the Ninth Circuit involving aliens seeking cancellation

of removal under circumstances essentially identical to those

before us now. As here, neither alien could meet the

eligibility requirements for cancellation without relying on a

parent’s residential history. 132 S. Ct. at 2016–17. The

Court held that the BIA’s interpretation of § 1229b(a) was in

accord with the statute’s text which “does not mention

imputation, much less require it.” Id. at 2017. Justice Kagan

noted that the hypothetical possibility of some other

reasonable construction of the statute was irrelevant because

the BIA’s construction “prevails if it is a reasonable

construction of the statute, whether or not it is the only

possible interpretation or even the one a court might think

best.” Id. Because the BIA’s interpretation was “based on a

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LEMUS V. LYNCH 11

permissible construction of the statute,” the Court reversed

the Ninth Circuit judgments. Id. at 2021 (quoting Chevron,

U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843

(1984)).

Significantly, on remand, this court in separate

dispositions applied Martinez Gutierrezto both aliens, ruling

that neither was eligible for cancellation of removal. See

Sawyers v. Holder, 684 F.3d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 2012) (per

curiam) (rejecting imputation because Cuevas-Gaspar and

Mercado-Zazueta were “no longer valid precedent”);

Martinez Gutierrez v. Holder, 474 Fed. App’x 587, 588 (9th

Cir. July 11, 2012) (unpublished decision) (citing Sawyers). 

Neither the Supreme Court, nor the Ninth Circuit in its two

decisions on remand, made any explicit mention of the issue

of retroactivity.

Lemus argues that he relied on the then-controlling

authority of this court in 2011 when he made the decision to

plead guilty and exposed himself to a risk of removal. He

now says that, had he known that he would be ineligible for

cancellation of removal, he might not have pleaded guilty and

might instead have opted to hold the government to its burden

to prove the charge against him beyond a reasonable doubt.

Lemus’s argument runs immediately afoul of the default

rule that “a court’s decisions apply retroactively to all cases

still pending before the courts.” Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at

690. While Chevron Oil suggested, forty-five years ago, that

in limited instances, departure from the default retroactivity

rule might be countenanced, 404 U.S. at 106–07, we have

noted that more recent Supreme Court authority “could

support a conclusion that the Chevron Oil test no longer

applies in any circumstances: all new rules of law must be

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applied retroactively.” Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 691 (citing,

among other cases, Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S.

86 (1993)).

Two recent, carefully articulated en banc decisions of this

court make it clear that the analysis of retroactivity set forth

in Chevron Oil is not applicable to this case.

In Nunez-Reyes, we set aside a well-established circuit

precedent, Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir.

2000), which had held that a state conviction for a simplepossession drug crime, later expunged by the state court, did

not constitute a “conviction” for federal immigration

purposes. Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 688. We concluded that

Lujan-Armendariz was wrongly decided, but determined,

based on Chevron Oil, to apply our decision only

prospectively, based on three considerations: (1) the court

was announcing a new rule of law, overruling clear past

circuit precedent; (2) retroactive application of the rule posed

a risk of substantial injustice; and (3) retroactive application

would not further the rule’s underlying purpose. Id. at

692–94. In reaching this conclusion, we took into

consideration undisputed evidence that “because of the clarity

and consistent application” of the prior precedent, aliens for

more than a decade had pleaded guilty to minor drug crimes,

finished drug programs, and gotten their convictions

expunged “in reliance on Lujan-Armendariz’s promise that

doing so would spare them from adverse immigration

consequences.” Id. at 692.

The case before us now is different from Nunez-Reyes in

at least two important respects. First, in this case we are not

overruling our own firmly rooted precedent. Second, though

we recognize the consequences for Lemus may be serious, the

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record offers no evidence that applying Martinez Gutierrez

retroactively will risk the sort of broad injustice that

concerned us in Nunez-Reyes. In that case, the record offered

evidence that, based on advice of counsel, substantial

numbers of individuals had waived their constitutional rights

in reliance on the prior precedent and would be at risk of

deportation by a retroactive application of the new rule. Id.

at 693–94. In addition, Nunez-Reyes made clear that the

Chevron Oil test may not be applied on a case-by-case

basis—courts “must decide between pure prospectivity and

full retroactivity.” 646 F.3d at 690. Chevron Oil thus is a

poor fit here and offers no help to Lemus because, as

discussed above, we have alreadyapplied the rule disallowing

imputation retroactively.

Garfias-Rodriguez offers a much closer analogy to this

case. The background of that case was our decision in Acosta

v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 550, 551–52 (9th Cir. 2006), in which

we held that aliens inadmissible under § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of

the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(A)(9)(c)(i)(I), might be eligible for

adjustment of status based on a marriage to an American

citizen. A year later, the BIA reached a contrary conclusion

in In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (BIA 2007). In GarfiasRodriguez, we held that in light of the BIA’s reasoned

opinion, Briones was entitled to deference. 702 F.3d at 514.

Having resolved the substantive issue against the

petitioner, Garfias-Rodriguez confronted the question of

retroactivity. The pivotal question on this issue was whether,

in those circumstances, “we, as a judicial decisionmaker,

have changed the law, or whether it is the agency that has

changed the law.” Id. Garfias-Rodriguez concluded that

where we defer to an agency rule, we will treat the new rule

“as we would if the agency had changed its own rules.” Id.

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at 516. In reaching this conclusion, we drew a bright line

between the situation where we defer to an agency and the

situation where, as in Nunez-Reyes, the circuit itself adopts a

new and different rule. Id. at 517–18. In addressing the issue

of retroactivityin a deferral situation, Garfias-Rodriguez held

that Chevron Oil was “not the appropriate framework.” Id. at

518. In these circumstances, the test to be applied was to be

found in Montgomery Ward. Id. at 520.

When applied to determine whether agencyrulings can be

applied retroactively, the Montgomery Ward test considers:

(1) whether the particular case is one of first

impression, (2) whether the new rule

represents an abrupt departure from well

established practice or merely attempts to fill

a void in an unsettled area of law, (3) the

extent to which the party against whom the

new rule is applied relied on the former rule,

(4) the degree of the burden which a

retroactive order imposes on a party, and

(5) the statutory interest in applying a new

rule despite the reliance of a party on the old

standard.

691 F.2d at 1333.

Applying these five factors, we find that the balance tips

against Lemus.

The first factor, whether this is a case of first impression,

is “not . . . well suited to the context of immigration law” and

favors neither party. Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 521.

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The second and third factors are intertwined. These “will

favor retroactivity if a party could reasonably have

anticipated the change in the law such that the new

‘requirement would not be a complete surprise.’” Id. at 521,

(quoting Montgomery Ward, 691 F.2d at 1333–34. GarfiasRodriguez emphasized that the “ambiguity in the law—which

resulted in a six-year dialogue between the BIA and

us—should have given Garfias no assurances of his eligibility

for adjustment of status.” Id. at 522. Given the virtually

identical facts here, Montgomery Ward’s second and third

factors must weigh heavily against Lemus. The fact that we

“doubled down” in Mercado-Zazueta afterGarfias-Rodriguez

does not dictate a different result in this case. Simply put,

although Mercado-Zazueta attempted to clarify this court’s

stance on imputation, it cannot be said that it settled the

debate with such finality that the subsequent contrary

decision in Martinez Gutierrez was a “complete surprise.” 

Lemus was on notice that our approach was vulnerable based

upon repeated contrary decisions, not only from the BIA but

from other circuits as well.

The fourth factor, as in Garfias-Rodriguez,favors Lemus,

given the increased risk of deportation he faces if Martinez

Gutierrez is applied retroactively. See 702 F.3d at 523.

Finally, the fifth factor favors the government, as it has a

strong interest in the uniform application of the statutory

immigration scheme. See id. Indeed, as noted, Martinez

Gutierrez applied retroactively to both aliens who were the

subject of that case. In fact, we have subsequently applied it

retroactively to nine other individuals as well. See SantosMartinez v. Lynch, 620 F. App’x 586 (9th Cir. 2015);

Sanchez-Cortes v. Holder, 579 App’x 550 (9th Cir. 2014);

Sanchez v. Holder, 567 F. App’x 553 (9th Cir. 2014);

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Martinez-Escalera v. Holder, 555 F. App’x 695 (9th Cir.

2014); Paez-Carrasco v. Holder, 544 F. App’x 789 (9th Cir.

2013); De Zavala v. Holder, 492 F. App’x 821 (9th Cir.

2012); Mojica v. Holder, 689 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2012) (per

curiam); Pimentel-Ornelas v. Holder, 475 F. App’x 223 (9th

Cir. 2012); Parra Camacho v. Holder, 478 F. App’x 431 (9th

Cir. 2012).

Having applied the Montgomery Ward factors and

concluded that they favor retroactive application of Martinez

Gutierrez, we should note that, even under Chevron Oil, the

argument favoring a prospective-only application would be

a very hard sell. Significantly, Judge Graber, who wrote the

majority opinion in Nunez-Reyes favoring prospective

application in that case, submitted a short, separate opinion in

Garfias-Rodriguez, taking the position in that case that

retroactive application would be appropriate under either

Chevron Oil or Montgomery Ward. Garfias-Rodriguez,

702 F.3d at 534. Moreover, as the majority in GarfiasRodriguez recognized, “In practice, we see very little

substantive difference between [the Chevron Oil] factors and

those of Montgomery Ward.” Id. at 517 n.10.

Lastly, given that Martinez Gutierrez bars Lemus from

imputing his stepfather’s years of residence to obtain

eligibility for cancellation of removal, his due process

argument regarding access to his stepfather’s A-File must

also fail. Even if he obtained the file, and it confirmed his

stepfather’s years of residency, they would be of no help to

him.

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IV. CONCLUSION

The BIA correctly determined that Jose Daniel Lemus is

not eligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(a). This Petition is therefore DENIED.

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