Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02253/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02253-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robbin Faliuy
Defendant
Alfonso Johnson
Plaintiff
Tammy Owens
Defendant
Ed Prieto
Defendant
Yolo County Jail
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALFONSO JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

YOLO COUNTY JAIL et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-2253 DAD P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a county jail inmate proceeding pro se. Plaintiff and a fellow inmate 

previously commenced a civil rights action by filing a complaint, primarily complaining about 

not receiving adequate medical and mental health care. See Case No. 2:14-cv-01915 DAD P. 

The undersigned severed plaintiff‟s claims, directed the Clerk of the Court to open this separate 

civil action for plaintiff, dismissed his original complaint and granted him leave to file an 

amended complaint and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 3) Plaintiff has 

complied with the court‟s order.

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 

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the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff‟s county jail trust

account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for 

monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month‟s income credited to plaintiff‟s 

county jail account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of 

the Court each time the amount in plaintiff‟s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in 

full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims 

that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only „a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,‟ in order to „give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.‟” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more 

than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual 

allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 

U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the 

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allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 

738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all 

doubts in the plaintiff‟s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 

(1976). “A person „subjects‟ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or 

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of 

their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 

holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); 

Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 

concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT

In his amended complaint plaintiff has identified as defendants the Yolo County Jail, 

Tammy Owens (the Director of Medical), Yolo County Sheriff Ed Prieto, Commander Robbin

Faliuy, and Lieutenant Radamaker. The allegations of plaintiff‟s amended complaint are 

somewhat difficult to decipher, but he appears to allege that since April 2014, he has not received 

adequate treatment for his mental illness and has not received pain medication for head trauma he 

suffered in 2011. In his amended complaint plaintiff also alleges that he suffers from bipolar 

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depression and headaches. In terms of relief, plaintiff requests the award of damages. (Compl. at 

3.)

DISCUSSION

The allegations in plaintiff‟s amended complaint are so vague and conclusory that the

court is unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for 

relief. The amended complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required by Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must 

give fair notice to the defendants and must allege facts that support the elements of the claim 

plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants 

engaged in that support his claims. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the 

requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the amended complaint must be dismissed. The court 

will grant plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint.

If plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, he must allege facts 

demonstrating how the conditions complained of resulted in a deprivation of his federal 

constitutional or statutory rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The second 

amended complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant was involved in the 

deprivation of plaintiff‟s rights. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is 

some affirmative link or connection between a defendant‟s actions and the claimed deprivation. 

Rizzo, 423 U.S. 362; May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson, 588 F.2d at 

743. Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not 

sufficient. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268.

Plaintiff‟s amended complaint suffers from a number of additional deficiencies. As an 

initial matter, the court notes that plaintiff has named a number of supervisory officials, including 

jail medical director Tammy Owens and Yolo County Sheriff Ed Prieto as defendants in this 

action. As noted above, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the 

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. The Ninth Circuit has made 

clear that a supervisory defendant may be held liable under § 1983 only “„if there exists either (1) 

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his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal 

connection between the supervisor‟s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.‟” Starr v. 

Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th 

Cir.1989)). In this case, it does not appear from the allegations of plaintiff‟s amended complaint 

that the supervisory defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of his

constitutional rights. If plaintiff wishes to proceed against any supervisory defendants, he will 

need to allege facts in his second amended complaint clarifying the causal connection between 

the defendants and his alleged constitutional deprivations.

In addition, if plaintiff wishes to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate 

medical and/or mental health care, he is advised that inadequate medical and mental health care 

do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment cognizable under § 1983 unless the mistreatment 

rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 

U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994) (“deliberate 

indifference” standard also applies in cases involving the adequacy of mental health care in 

prisons). In general, deliberate indifference may be shown when prison officials deny, delay, or 

intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or may be shown by the way in which prison 

officials provide medical care. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 393-94 (9th Cir.

1988).

If plaintiff wishes to proceed on a claim that he was provided constitutionally inadequate 

medical and/or mental health care, he must allege facts demonstrating how each named 

defendant‟s actions rose to the level of “deliberate indifference.” Plaintiff is also advised that 

mere differences of opinion between a prisoner and prison medical staff as to the proper course of 

treatment for a medical condition do not give rise to a § 1983 claim. See Toguchi v. Soon Hwang 

Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004); Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 

1996); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 

1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Moreover, before it can be said that a prisoner‟s civil rights have been abridged, “the 

indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere „indifference,‟ „negligence,‟ or 

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„medical malpractice‟ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Lab., 622 F.2d 

458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). See also Wood v. Housewright, 900 

F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990) (“In determining deliberate indifference, we scrutinize the 

particular facts and look for substantial indifference in the individual case, indicating more than 

mere negligence or isolated occurrences of neglect.”). 

Delays in providing medical care may manifest deliberate indifference. Estelle, 429 U.S. 

at 104-05. To establish a claim of deliberate indifference arising from delay in providing care, 

however, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the delay was harmful. See Berry v. Bunnell, 

39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994); Hunt v. Dental Dep‟t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989); 

Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm‟rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). In this 

regard, “[a] prisoner need not show his harm was substantial; however, such would provide 

additional support for the inmate‟s claim that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to his 

needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Finally, insofar as plaintiff wishes to proceed in this action against Yolo County, he is 

advised that will need to satisfy four conditions in order to establish municipal liability: “(1) that 

[the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that the municipality 

had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff‟s constitutional 

right and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Van Ort v. 

Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). In any 

second amended complaint plaintiff elects to file, he should identify any policy (or policies)

pertinent to his claims. He must also allege therein facts that show he received inadequate 

medical and/or mental health care pursuant to the policy and that the policy was the “moving 

force” or cause of his injury. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to prior pleadings in order to make his 

second amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th 

Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a second amended complaint, the prior pleading no longer serves 

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any function in the case. Therefore, in any second amended complaint plaintiff elects to file, as in 

an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 

alleged. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff‟s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 5) is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. The fee 

shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court‟s order to the Sheriff of Yolo County

filed concurrently herewith.

3. Plaintiff‟s amended complaint is dismissed.

4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a second

amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the second amended complaint must bear the 

docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Second Amended Complaint”; failure 

to file a second amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in dismissal of this 

action without prejudice.

5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff the court‟s form for filing a civil 

rights action.

Dated: April 21, 2015

DAD:9

john2253.14a

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