Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00388/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00388-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
California Highway Patrol
Movant
County of Yuba
Defendant
Steven L. Durfor
Defendant
Joseph Farrow
Defendant
Billy J. Saukkola
Defendant
Shelby F. Stewart
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SHELBY F. STEWART, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

California Highway Patrol Officer BILLY 

J. SAUKKOLA (Badge #18291), 

California Highway Patrol Commissioner 

JOSEPH FARROW, COUNTY OF 

YUBA, a municipal corporation duly 

organized under the laws of the State of 

California, Yuba County Sheriff STEVEN 

L. DURFOR, and Does 1-20,1

Defendants. 

No. 2:16-cv-00388-KJM-EFB 

ORDER 

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 The Ninth Circuit provides, “‘[Plaintiffs] should be given an opportunity through 

discovery to identify [] unknown defendants’” “in circumstances . . . ‘where the identity of the 

alleged defendant[] [is] not [] known prior to the filing of a complaint.’” Wakefield v. Thompson, 

177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 

1980)) (modifications in original). Plaintiff is cautioned that such defendants will be dismissed 

where “it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, or that the complaint would be 

dismissed on other grounds.” Id. (quoting Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642). Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 4(m), as recently amended, provides for dismissal of defendants not served within 

ninety days of filing of the complaint unless the plaintiff shows good cause. See Glass v. Fields, 

No. 1:09-00098, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97604 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011); Hard Drive Prods. v. 

Does, No. 11-01567, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109837, at *2–4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2011). 

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This action arises from the arrest and alleged assault of plaintiff Shelby Stewart by 

defendant California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) Officer Billy Saukkola and an unnamed Yuba 

County Sheriff Deputy on January 4, 2015, after plaintiff and his five-year-old daughter went to 

investigate the aftermath of a solo car accident that occurred down their street. This matter is 

before the court on motions to dismiss filed by defendants Saukkola and CHP Commissioner 

Joseph Farrow (collectively, “the CHP defendants”), ECF No. 5, and by defendants Yuba County 

Sheriff Steven Durfor and the County of Yuba (collectively, “the County defendants”), ECF 

No. 4. Plaintiff opposes the motions, in part, ECF Nos. 8 & 9, and defendants replied, ECF 

Nos. 10 & 11. The court held a hearing and initial scheduling conference on May 18, 2016, at 

which Beau Weiner appeared for plaintiff, William Cummings appeared for the CHP defendants, 

and Derek Haynes appeared for the County defendants. Having reviewed the allegations of the 

complaint and the parties’ briefing, the court orders as follows:2

I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983: UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND EXCESSIVE 

 FORCE 

The complaint asserts a claim for violation of plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and excessive force under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Saukkola, Farrow, and Durfor. See Compl. ¶¶ 50–55, ECF 

No. 1. The court finds the complaint fails to plead sufficient factual allegations to support a claim 

against Durfor and Farrow. 

At hearing, plaintiff conceded this claim should be dismissed as to Durfor and 

Farrow without leave to amend. See ECF No. 8 at 3–4; ECF No. 9 at 3. Accordingly, the court 

DISMISSES plaintiff’s first claim for relief with respect to Farrow and Durfor without leave to 

amend, leaving Saukkola as the sole named defendant in this claim. 

///// 

///// 

 2

 In an effort to streamline resolution of first motions to dismiss in cases where the parties 

have counsel and the court is granting leave to amend, the court is adopting a shortened form of 

order consistent with the order issued here. 

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II. 42 U.S.C. § 1983: MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR UNCONSTITUTIONAL CUSTOM, 

 PRACTICE, OR POLICY 

The complaint next asserts a claim for municipal liability based on an 

unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Durfor and the 

County of Yuba. See Compl. ¶¶ 56–65. 

“A municipality or other local government may be liable under [§ 1983] if the 

governmental body itself subjects a person to a deprivation of rights or causes a person to be 

subjected to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). To succeed on a § 1983 claim against a municipality for an 

unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy, a plaintiff must show “(1) that [the plaintiff] 

possessed a constitutional right of which [he or she] was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a 

policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; 

and, (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Plumeau v. Sch. 

Dist. No. 40 Cty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted); see Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900–01 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(affirming dismissal where plaintiff failed to allege “any facts demonstrating that his 

constitutional depravation was the result of a custom or practice of the [defendant city] or that the 

custom or practice was the ‘moving force’ behind his constitutional deprivation”). 

A plaintiff may prove the existence of a custom or informal policy by showing a 

pattern of similar incidents that demonstrate the alleged informal policy was “so permanent and 

well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 

F.2d 1342, 1349 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 

(1988)) (quotation marks omitted). To establish the existence of an informal policy, the plaintiff 

ordinarily must show more than a single constitutional deprivation, random act, or isolated event. 

Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999). In addition, to withstand a motion to 

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a case cannot rest on the bare allegation of unlawful policies, 

customs, or practices. AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012). 

///// 

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Here, the court finds the complaint’s conclusory allegations and allegations of a 

single incident of excessive force are insufficient to establish the existence of a county policy that 

was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations. See Christie, 176 F.3d at 1235; 

Johnson v. Cate, No. 10-00803, 2012 WL 1076209, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012) (“Plaintiff 

must allege facts, not conclusions, to support his municipality claim.” (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009))). 

At hearing, plaintiff conceded his claim for municipal liability against Durfor and 

the County of Yuba should be dismissed without leave to amend. See ECF No. 8 at 3, 7 n.1. 

Accordingly, the court DISMISSES plaintiff’s municipal liability claim against Durfor and the 

County without leave to amend. 

III. 42 U.S.C. § 1985: CONSPIRACY TO INTERFERE WITH CIVIL RIGHTS 

The complaint asserts a claim for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights under 

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) against Saukkola and unnamed officers. Compl. ¶¶ 66–70. The court finds 

the complaint fails to plead facts establishing that plaintiff is a member of a suspect or quasisuspect class or that the defendants conspired to violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights, as 

required to state a claim under § 1985(3). See Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 

(9th Cir. 1992); Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) (“A mere 

allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient.”). 

At hearing, plaintiff conceded this claim should be dismissed in its entirety without 

leave to amend. See ECF No. 8 at 3; ECF No. 9 at 3. Accordingly, the court DISMISSES 

plaintiff’s § 1985 claim without leave to amend.

IV. 42 U.S.C. § 1983: SUPERVISORY LIABILITY 

The complaint asserts another § 1983 claim against Farrow and Durfor for 

supervisory liability. Compl. ¶¶ 71–81. “A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under 

§ 1983 ‘if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, 

or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the 

constitutional violation.’” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. 

Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). “The requisite causal connection can be 

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established . . . by setting in motion a series of acts by others, or by knowingly refus[ing] to 

terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably should have 

known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Id. at 1207–08 (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted; alterations in Starr). “A supervisor can be liable in his individual 

capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his 

subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a 

reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Id. at 1208 (quoting Watkins v. City of 

Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

Here, apart from conclusory allegations as to the conduct of “Defendants” as a 

whole, the complaint makes no particular allegations regarding Durfor’s involvement. See Ivey v. 

Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a 

motion to dismiss.”). Accordingly, the court DISMISSES the supervisory liability claim against 

Durfor. At hearing, plaintiff requested leave to amend this claim. In light of the Federal Rules’ 

policy of favoring amendments, the court GRANTS plaintiff leave to amend his supervisory 

liability claim against Durfor if he can do so consonant with Rule 11. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a)(2); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989). 

With respect to the supervisory claim against Farrow, the complaint alleges 

Saukkola had a history of engaging in acts of excessive force, and Farrow was aware of at least 

one prior incident, where a CHP video shows Saukkola “delivering multiple brutal knee strikes to 

an unarmed suspect’s head while the suspect was restrained on the ground.” Compl. ¶¶ 78–79. 

The complaint alleges that despite this knowledge, Farrow failed to properly train, supervise, or 

discipline Saukkola for his repeated misconduct. Id. ¶ 80. The court finds these factual 

allegations sufficiently plead Farrow’s involvement and a causal connection between that 

involvement and Saukkola’s alleged constitutional violation. The court DENIES the CHP 

defendants’ motion to dismiss the supervisory liability claims against Farrow. 

///// 

///// 

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V. CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 52.1 (BANE ACT) 

The complaint asserts a claim against Saukkola and Farrow for violation of the 

California Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. Compl. ¶¶ 82–85. The California Bane Act prohibits 

any person from interfering by “threats, intimidation, or coercion . . . with the exercise or 

enjoyment by any individual . . . of rights secured by the Constitution . . . or of the rights secured 

by the Constitution or laws of this state . . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a). While a Bane Act claim 

is in certain respects the functional equivalent of a section 1983 claim, such a claim, to succeed, 

requires more than evidence of a violation of rights. Davis v. City of San Jose, 69 F. Supp. 3d 

1001, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2014). A plaintiff bringing a Bane Act claim “must introduce . . . evidence 

showing threats, intimidation, or coercion” that is independent from the coercion inherent in the 

unlawful arrest itself. Malott v. Placer Cty., No. 14-1040, 2016 WL 538462, at *7 (E.D. Cal. 

Feb. 11, 2016) (discussing Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 807 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2015)). 

California courts have held that “a wrongful arrest or detention, without more, does not satisfy 

both elements of section 52.1.” Allen v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 69 (2015); 

Shoyoye v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 203 Cal. App. 4th 947, 959 (2012). However, a plaintiff may 

state a claim under section 52.1 where an unlawful arrest is accompanied by “the deliberate and 

spiteful use of excessive force,” such that the force constitutes coercion separate and apart from 

the coercion inherent in an unlawful arrest. Bender v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 217 Cal. App. 4th 968, 

979 (2013). 

Here, the complaint alleges Saukkola and Farrow violated plaintiff’s rights to be 

free from unreasonable searches and seizures and excessive force under the California 

Constitution, California Civil Code, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. 

Constitution. Compl. ¶ 83. It alleges Saukkola interfered with these rights when he detained and 

arrested plaintiff without probable cause and then, from a standing position, “dropped his entire 

body weight down on [plaintiff],” “slammed his knee into [plaintiff’s] lower back,” and sat on top 

of plaintiff’s back. Id. ¶¶ 33–35, 84. Saukkola allegedly applied this force after plaintiff was 

already handcuffed on the ground and had told the officers he had had reconstructive surgery on 

his lower back. Id. ¶¶ 33–35. 

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The CHP defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s Bane Act claim because they say 

the complaint does not allege any actions by Farrow, and the force allegedly applied by Saukkola 

was force “inherent” in the arrest under Allen, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 67–68. ECF No. 5 at 5, 8–12. 

The court agrees that the complaint fails to plead facts establishing any threats, intimidation, or 

coercion by Farrow. At hearing, plaintiff conceded this claim should be dismissed as to Farrow 

without leave to amend. Accordingly, the court DISMISSES plaintiff’s Bane Act claim against 

Farrow without leave to amend. 

However, the court finds the complaint satisfies both elements of section 52.1 with 

respect to Saukkola, because the force allegedly applied by Saukkola constitutes coercion 

separate and apart from the coercion inherent in an arrest. Significantly, Saukkola allegedly 

dropped his weight on plaintiff, slammed his knee into plaintiff’s lower back, and sat on 

plaintiff’s back after plaintiff had already been handcuffed and was lying on the ground. Compl. 

¶¶ 33–35. Such force applied to an unresisting, handcuffed plaintiff cannot be said to constitute 

force inherent in an arrest. See Bender, 217 Cal. App. 4th at 979 (finding a clear showing of 

independent coercion where officer “deliberately and unnecessarily beat and pepper-sprayed [an] 

unresisting, already handcuffed plaintiff”). The court DENIES the CHP defendants’ motion to 

dismiss plaintiff’s Bane Act claim against Saukkola. 

VI. CLAIMS SIX THROUGH NINE: ASSAULT AND BATTERY, NEGLIGENCE, FALSE 

ARREST, AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 

Finally, the complaint asserts claims against Saukkola and Farrow for assault and 

battery, negligence, false arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Compl. ¶¶ 86–

106. The CHP defendants move to dismiss each of these claims against Farrow and to dismiss 

plaintiff’s false arrest claim against both Saukkola and Farrow. ECF No. 5 at 4–8, 12–13. 

The court finds the complaint fails to plead sufficient factual allegations regarding 

Farrow’s actions to state a claim against Farrow for any of these causes of action. At hearing, 

plaintiff conceded these claims against Farrow should be dismissed without leave to amend. 

Accordingly, the court DISMISSES plaintiff’s claims against Farrow for assault and battery, 

negligence, false arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional distress without leave to amend. 

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However, the court DENIES the CHP defendants’ motion to dismiss the false 

arrest claim against Saukkola. Contrary to defendants’ assertion, construing the allegations in the 

light most favorable to plaintiff, Saukkola did not have probable cause to suspect that plaintiff 

had committed or was about to commit a violation of California Penal Code section 148(a)(1)3 or 

some other crime. The complaint alleges Saukkola arbitrarily singled plaintiff out from the group 

of neighbors and told him to move back, despite the fact that numerous individuals were closer to 

the accident scene than plaintiff was, and then told the unnamed Sheriff Deputy, “We’re taking 

him,” and grabbed plaintiff’s arm. Compl. ¶¶ 30–32. Although the complaint alleges that before 

Saukkola arrived at the scene, plaintiff had called the paramedic an “ambulance driver,” which 

apparently offended her, id. ¶ 26, the court does not find this fact alone establishes at this stage 

that Saukkola had probable cause for the arrest. 

VII. PUNITIVE DAMAGES 

The complaint prays for punitive damages, among other relief. Id. ¶¶ 54, 64, 103, 

106; id. at 19. The County and Durfor move to dismiss plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages, 

arguing punitive damages are not available as a matter of law. ECF No. 4-1 at 8. In his 

opposition and at hearing, plaintiff clarified he seeks punitive damages against only the individual 

defendants, including Durfor, rather than the County or any defendant in his official capacity. 

See ECF No. 8 at 8. Punitive damages are available against supervisory officials in their 

individual capacity, but not in their official capacity. Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 

646–49 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 527 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The court DENIES the County defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s demand 

for punitive damages. If the amended complaint seeks punitive damages, plaintiff is ORDERED 

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 Section 148(a)(1) states, 

Every person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public 

officer, peace officer, or an emergency medical technician . . . in the 

discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office or 

employment, when no other punishment is prescribed, shall be 

punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or 

by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or by both 

that fine and imprisonment. 

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to clarify he seeks punitive damages against only the individual defendants in their individual 

capacity, as allowed by law. 

VIII. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED IN 

PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: 

The court DISMISSES plaintiff’s first claim for unreasonable search and seizure 

and excessive under § 1983 against Farrow and Durfor WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. This 

leaves Saukkola as the sole named defendant in this claim. 

The court DISMISSES plaintiff’s second claim for municipal liability under 

§ 1983 in its entirety WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

The court DISMISSES plaintiff’s third claim for conspiracy to interfere with civil 

rights under § 1985 in its entirety WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

The court DISMISSES plaintiff’s fourth claim for supervisory liability under 

§ 1983 against Durfor WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. The court DENIES the CHP defendants’ 

motion to dismiss this claim against Farrow. This leaves Farrow as the sole named defendant in 

this claim. 

The court DISMISSES plaintiff’s fifth claim for violation of the Bane Act against 

Farrow WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. The court DENIES the CHP defendants’ motion to 

dismiss this claim against Saukkola. This leaves Saukkola the sole named defendant in this 

claim. 

The court DISMISSES plaintiff’s sixth through ninth claims against Farrow for 

assault and battery, negligence, false arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional distress 

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. The court DENIES the CHP defendants’ motion to dismiss 

the false arrest claim against Saukkola. This leaves Saukkola as the sole named defendant in 

plaintiff’s sixth through ninth claims. 

The court DENIES the County defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s demand 

for punitive damages. If the amended complaint seeks punitive damages, plaintiff is ORDERED 

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to clarify he seeks punitive damages only against the individual defendants in their individual 

capacity, as allowed by law. 

An amended complaint consistent with this order shall be filed within fourteen 

(14) days of the date this order is filed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: June 21, 2016. 

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