Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06556/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06556-18/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City Of Fresno
Defendant
Holly Louen
Plaintiff
Brian Twedt
Defendant

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOLLY LOUEN, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

FRESNO CITY POLICE OFFICER )

BRIAN TWEDT, et al., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-04-6556 OWW/SMS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

AND CORRECTION OF ORDER

DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

ACTION WITH PREJUDICE (Doc.

149) AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT

PREJUDICE (Doc. 158)

Plaintiff Holly Louen seeks reconsideration of the “Order

Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Action with Prejudice”

filed on August 10, 2006 (hereinafter the August 10 Order). 

Subsequent to the filing of Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration of the August 10 Order, Defendants filed a second

motion to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 41(b), Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, because of Plaintiff’s continued

failure to comply with the court orders discussed herein,

contending that Plaintiff’s failure to obtain a stay of the

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August 10 Order before filing the motion for reconsideration

negated any argument excusing Plaintiff’s compliance with the

August 10 Order.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.

1. Background.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Brian Twedt, an officer

with the Fresno Police Department, engaged in a series of

threatening and intimidating acts against her. Plaintiff alleges

claims for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California

Civil Code § 52.1, for intentional infliction of emotional

distress, and for declaratory judgment regarding violations of

her constitutional rights under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 

On November 4, 2005, at a hearing on Defendant City of

Fresno’s motion to compel (Doc. 27), the Magistrate Judge orally

ordered Plaintiff to undergo a mental examination. The oral

order was memorialized in a written order filed on December 22,

2005. (Doc. 57). Although Plaintiff’s request that the mental

examination be tape-recorded was granted, Plaintiff did not

request that her counsel, Kevin Little, be present during the

mental examination.

On December 2, 2005, the date for which the mental

examination was scheduled to be conducted by Dr. Harold L.

Seymour, Mr. Little arrived with Plaintiff at least 15 minutes

after the agreed-upon starting time. Mr. Little asked Dr.

Seymour to attempt to complete the examination anyway. Dr.

Seymour discovered that Mr. Little intended to be present for the

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examination. Dr. Seymour refused to proceed with Mr. Little

present because doing so would violate standards and practices of

clinical interviewing. Mr. Little refused to allow Plaintiff to

undergo the mental examination without his being present. 

The City moved the Magistrate Judge for sanctions because of

Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the December 2, 2005 Order. 

(Doc. 56). At the hearing on this motion on January 20, 2006,

the Magistrate Judge orally imposed sanctions in the amount of

$2,500 because of Plaintiff’s failure to undergo the mental

examination, but stayed payment of the monetary sanction until

the conclusion of this action at which time the Magistrate Judge

would determine if the monetary sanction would be enforced. The

Magistrate Judge also orally ordered that a full-day Independent

Mental Examination (IME) was proper under Rule 35, Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, that the IME could be tape-recorded, but that

Mr. Little’s presence at the IME was not permitted. (Doc. 66).

Plaintiff moved for reconsideration by District Court Judge

Robert E. Coyle of the Magistrate Judge’s January 20, 2006

orders, contending that the imposition of monetary sanctions was

contrary to law because the Magistrate Judge had not issued an

order prohibiting Mr. Little from attending the mental

examination and contending that the scope of the mental

examination was not before the Magistrate Judge, making the order

that Plaintiff undergo an IME a discovery sanction that exceeded

her powers under Rule 37 and constituted a denial of due process. 

Judge Coyle denied the motion for reconsideration by Order filed

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on April 19, 2006. (Doc. 95). Judge Coyle ruled that the

sanction ordered by the Magistrate Judge was proper and that she

had not erred in determining that a full-day IME was appropriate. 

Judge Coyle ordered in pertinent part:

3. As soon as is practicable, Plaintiff

shall appear for an Independent Mental

Examination with Dr. Harold L. Seymour.

4. The parties shall either stipulate to a

date and time for the examination or arrange

a scheduling conference with Magistrate Judge

Snyder to do so.

Plaintiff did not stipulate to a date for the IME or

cooperate in scheduling one.

The City moved the Magistrate Judge for an order enforcing

Judge Coyle’s April 19, 2006 Order and for sanctions because of

Plaintiff’s failure to comply. (Doc. 100). By Order filed on

June 6, 2006, (Doc. 107), the Magistrate Judge ordered that

Plaintiff attend a mental examination by Dr. Seymour on June 9,

2006 at 8:00 a.m. and that Plaintiff pay forthwith to counsel for

the City $768.00 in reasonable expenses and attorneys’ fees

caused by Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Judge Coyle’s April

19, 2006 Order.

On June 7, 2006, this action was reassigned to the

undersigned for all further proceedings because of the senior

status of Judge Coyle. 

Plaintiff did not attend the mental examination as ordered

by the Magistrate Judge. Nor did Plaintiff notify Dr. Seymour or

the City’s counsel that she would not be attending. (Doc. 116,

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Seymour Decl., filed June 12, 2006, ¶ 2; Doc. 116, Camerena

Decl., filed June 12, 2006, ¶ 1). At 12:27 p.m. on June 9, 2006,

four hours after she failed to attend the mental examination,

Plaintiff filed a document captioned “Notice of Interlocutory

Appeal”, (Doc. 111), giving notice that she intended to file an

appeal with the Ninth Circuit, appealing inter alia, Judge

Coyle’s April 19, 2006 Order and the Magistrate Judge’s June 6,

2006 Order requiring Plaintiff to submit to a mental examination,

because Plaintiff’s rights to due process, privacy and liberty

will be compromised if Plaintiff is required to submit to a more

extensive mental examination that was ordered “at least in part

as a discovery sanction”. 

By motion filed on June 12, 2006 (Doc. 116), Defendants

moved to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 41(b), Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with

court orders and for additional sanctions for the costs incurred

by Dr. Seymour in reserving his calendar for June 6, 2006, for

the IME and for attorneys’ fees incurring in preparing the motion

to dismiss. 

By Order filed on August 10, 2006, (Doc. 137), Defendants’

motion to dismiss the action was denied but other monetary

sanctions were imposed. The August 10, 2006 Order rejected

Plaintiff’s arguments that her conduct did not present a basis

for any sanctions whatsoever:

Plaintiff presents a series of arguments to

mitigate or excuse the conduct on which the

court’s prior sanctions have been based. For

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instance, Plaintiff argues once again that

she did not violate the court’s order that

she attend the mental examination of December

2, 2005. (Doc. 126 at 4:3-13). Judge

Coyle’s order of April 19, 2006, has already

conclusively resolved that issue. (See Doc.

95.) Plaintiff also attempts to excuse her

failure to cooperate in arranging a

scheduling conference or scheduling an

examination following the April 19 order. 

(Doc. 126 at 4:13-23.) The Magistrate Judge

found that Plaintiff’s conduct was

inexcusable. (See Doc. 107.)

Plaintiff also attempts to excuse her failure

to attend the mental examination on June 9,

2006. Plaintiff argues that her counsel had

already indicated at the hearing of June 2,

2006, that she was going to seek an

interlocutory appeal of the June 9 order. 

(Doc. 126 at 4:22-5:3.) Plaintiff also

attempts to excuse her failure to attend the

IME by pointing out that, on June 9, she

submitted a notice of interlocutory appeal,

which was filed a few hours after she failed

to attend the court-ordered mental

examination. (Id. at 5:2-6.) Finally,

Plaintiff’s counsel argues that Plaintiff had

no knowledge of the court’s order requiring

her to attend the mental examination on June

9 because counsel had not informed her of

that order until July 6, 2006. (Id. at 5:5-

5:9.)

Plaintiff’s oral statement at the June 2

hearing, that she intended to file an

interlocutory appeal, does not excuse her

failure to comply with the court’s order. 

Nor did Plaintiff’s filing of a notice of

appeal after the time set for her to attend

her IME passed excuse her failure. The rule

in well established that a party cannot

ignore a court order and seek relief after

the court-ordered deadline. Counsel cannot

ignore court orders and negate the opposing

party’s right to bring the matter to trial. 

Nonetheless, after examining the relevant factors for dismissal

under Rule 41(b), the August 10, 2006 Order ruled:

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It appears that Plaintiff’s failures to

comply with the court orders are attributable

to her counsel. The examination of December

2, 2005, did not go forward, even though

Plaintiff was present, because Plaintiff’s

counsel insisted on attending. Plaintiff’s

counsel further admits that he did not

communicate the court’s order of April 19,

2006, to Plaintiff until after the hearing

regarding sanctions on June 2, 2006. 

Finally, Plaintiff’s counsel did not inform

Plaintiff that the court had ordered her to

attend an examination on June 6, 2006, until

one month after the examination date.

Because Plaintiff’s counsel is to blame for

her failures to comply with the orders, the

sanction of dismissal in this case falls too

heavily on Plaintiff. Moreover, the court is

hopeful that this litigation can now proceed

to its conclusion in an expedient fashion. 

Plaintiff and her counsel are advised,

however, that the court will not tolerate any

further failures to comply with the orders of

this court. Any such failure will result in

dismissal of this action.

Defendants have incurred attorney fees in the

amount of $980.00 preparing this motion. 

(Doc. 116, Camerena Decl. ¶ 4.) Dr. Seymour

incurred $200.00 of costs in reserving his

calendar of June 9, 2006, for the IME that

Plaintiff failed to attend. (Doc. 116,

Seymour Decl. ¶ 4.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

counsel is sanctioned in the amount of

$1,180.00 for causing Plaintiff to fail to

attend the IME on June 9, 2006. Counsel

shall pay this sum from his personal funds

and shall not seek contribution from

Plaintiff. See FDIC v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376,

1382 (5 Cir.1994)(requiring attorney to pay th

monetary sanction where he was responsible

for the party’s failure to comply with a

discovery order).

Plaintiff is also directed to pay within 20

days the other sanctions that have been

ordered in this case: the $768.00 awarded in

the order of June 6, 2006 and the $2,500.00

ordered on February 23, 2006. As the court

finds that Plaintiff’s counsel is responsible

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for incurring these sanctions, he shall pay

these sums solely from his personal funds. 

See FDIC, 20 F.3d at 1382.

...

For the reasons set forth above:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED;

2. Plaintiff’s counsel is assessed sanctions

in the amount of $1,180.00 for causing

Plaintiff to fail to attend the IME on June

9, 2006;

3. Within 20 days of the issuance of this

order, Plaintiff’s counsel is directed to pay

Defendants $4,448.00, representing all

sanctions ordered against him in this action

to date;

4. Plaintiff is directed to attend a fullday IME with Dr. Seymour on August 23, 2006,

or on August 25, 2006;

5. Within 48 hours of the issuance of this

order, Plaintiff shall notify Defendants and

Dr. Seymour as to which of those days she

will attend the IME;

6. The IME will be audio-recorded;

7. No third party, including counsel, may

attend the IME; 

8. Plaintiff’s counsel shall cause a copy of

this order to be delivered to Plaintiff Holly

Louen within seven (7) days of the issuance

of this order; and

9. ANY FURTHER FAILURE OF PLAINTIFF OR

PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL TO COMPLY WITH AN ORDER

OF THIS COURT WILL RESULT IN DISMISSAL OF THE

ACTION.

On August 29, 2006, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of

the August 10 Order. (Doc. 149)

2. Standard of Review.

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Because the August 10 Order is an interlocutory order, see

Stanley v. Woodford, 449 F.3d 1060 (9 Cir.2006), discretion th

exists to reconsider. Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of

Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal.1986), aff’d in part

and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9 Cir.1987), th

cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988). “[T]his Court’s opinions are

not intended as mere first drafts, subject to revision and

reconsideration at a litigant’s pleasure.” Quaker Alloy Casting

Co. v. Gulfco Indus., Inc., 123 F.R.D. 282, 288 (N.D.Ill.1988). 

“Courts have distilled various grounds for reconsideration of

prior rulings into three major grounds for justifying

reconsideration: (1) an intervening change in controlling law;

(2) the availability of new evidence or an expanded factual

record; and (3) need to correct a clear error or to prevent

manifest injustice.” Kern-Tulare Water Dist., id.. Pursuant to

Rule 78-230(k)(3), Local Rules of Practice, the party seeking

reconsideration has the duty to indicate “what new or different

facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist

or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds

exist for the motion,’ and “why facts or circumstances were not

shown at the time of the prior motion.”

3. Legal Analysis.

a. Magistrate Judge’s Initial Examination Order.

Plaintiff seeks correction of the August 10 Order to the

extent that it stated:

On November 4, 2005, at a hearing on

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Defendant City of Fresno’s motion to compel

(Doc. 27), the Magistrate Judge ordered

Plaintiff to undergo a mental examination. 

This order was memorialized in a written

order on December 22, 2005.

Order 2:4-7.

Plaintiff points to portions of the transcript of the

November 4, 2005 hearing that indicate the Magistrate Judge did

not at that time order a particular examination, but rather

merely decided that “ medical exam is warranted.” (Doc. 134,

Transcript of Proceedings, November 4, 2005, at 13:5-7.) 

Plaintiff contends that it was only at the teleconference of

November 30, 2005, that the Magistrate Judge addressed the

specific mental examination that Defendant sought.

Plaintiff does not contend that the Magistrate Judge did not

order a mental examination at the November 30, 2005

teleconference. In Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the

Magistrate Judge’s sanctions order (Doc. 69), Plaintiff focused

her objection to the requirement of such an order, contending

that the Magistrate Judge’s order did not direct that her counsel

not be present at such an exam. (Doc. 69, at 1:26-2:1) (arguing

that “it was undisputed by the Court and the parties that there

was no order prohibiting counsel from attending the plaintiff’s

December 2, 2005 mental exam”).) Plaintiff did state that “there

was no indication prior to January 20, 2006 that the Court would

entertain expanding the scope of plaintiff’s previously ordered

mental exam, since that issue was not properly before it.” (Doc.

69, at 5:2-4) (emphasis added).) In a letter copied to the

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Mr. Little’s November 30, 2005 letter was filed in this 1

action on January 9, 2006 as Doc. 61.

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Magistrate Judge on November 30, 2005, Mr. Little states that

Plaintiff “is available for the limited mental examination

ordered today by Judge Snyder ....” In any event, it does not 1

matter whether the Magistrate Judge’s order was issued at the

November 4, 2005 hearing, as the August 10 Order indicated, or

later during the November 30, 2005 teleconference. It is

undisputed that the Magistrate Judge had ordered a mental

examination for December 2, 2005. 

Plaintiff also takes issue with the conclusion in the August

10, 2006 Order that the Magistrate Judge’s December 22, 2005

Order “memorialized” prior proceedings. See August 10, 2006

Order 2:6-7. Plaintiff claims that this characterization is

particularly momentous because the December 22, 2005 Order

indicates the examination was to be “one-on-one”, even though the

Court had not explicitly ordered that Plaintiff’s counsel not

attend. As Judge Coyle’s Order of April 10, 2006 made clear, the

Magistrate Judge’s sanctions were not upheld on the basis of the

“one-on-one” language of the December 22, 2005 Order. (Doc. 95)

Rather, Judge Coyle determined that the Magistrate Judge properly

concluded that Plaintiff’s failure to ask the Court’s permission

for her counsel to attend meant that refusing to proceed with the

examination on that basis violated the order. (Doc. 95, at 8:26-

9:16.). Thus, it is of no consequence whether the December 22,

2005 Order can properly be said to have “memorialized” any

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earlier order. 

b. Magistrate Judge’s January 20, 2006 Order.

Plaintiff directly attempts to reargue the extent to which

Rule 35, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, authorizes a party to

have counsel present during a mental examination. 

Plaintiff does not point to anything new before this Court

that merits reconsideration of Judge Coyle’s acceptance of the

Magistrate Judge’s finding made at the hearing on January 20,

2006, that Plaintiff’s counsel should have known that he had a

responsibility to inform the court of his intent to attend,

regardless of whether attendance was permissible under Rule 35. 

In her application for reconsideration of the August 10, 2006

Order, Plaintiff simply cites more authority in favor of a

position that the Court has already twice rejected.

Plaintiff also takes issue with the Court’s description of

the events of December 2, 2005. Plaintiff points to the

following language of the August 10, 2006 Order:

Dr. Seymour refused to proceed with

Plaintiff’s counsel present because doing so

would violate standards and practices of

clinical interviewing. Plaintiff’s counsel

refused to allow Plaintiff to undergo the

examination without being present.

August 10, 2006 Order at 2:17-21. Plaintiff argues that this

language is incorrect in light of Mr. Little’s November 30, 2005

letter to Defendant’s counsel. 

Mr. Little’s November 30, 2005 letter does not compel

reconsideration of the August 10, 2006 Order. Mr. Little, as

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Plaintiff’s reference to the purported silence of “Chapter 7 2

of the American Psychological Association’s Ethical Principles”,

made for the first time in this motion, does not justify Mr.

Little’s insistence that he attend Plaintiff’s mental examination

or compel reconsideration of the August 10, 2006 Order.

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author of the letter, was familiar with its contents and could

have raised this argument at any earlier stage in opposition to

the sanctions. In fact, this letter was already before the Court

at the time the August 10, 2006 Order was filed. Dr. Seymour’s

letter recounting the events of December 2, 2005 has been part of

the record since December 20, 2005. (Doc. 56-3, at 34-35.) It

includes his opinion that counsel’s presence at a mental exam

“clearly violates standards of practice in clinical

interviewing.” (Doc. 56-3, at 34.) Even if the Court were to

reconsider the ruling in light of Mr. Little’s November 30, 2005

letter, there is no reason to question Dr. Seymour’s opinion

about clinical interviewing practice. Nor does the November 30, 2

2005 letter, by indicating that Mr. Little attempted to contact

Defendant’s counsel, mitigate his refusal to allow the mental

examination to go forward. As the Magistrate Judge concluded,

any discussion of Mr. Little’s attendance should have occurred

prior to the examination date so as not to prevent the

examination from going forward. 

Mr. Little also reiterates his arguments, previously made to

the Magistrate Judge and to Judge Coyle, that it has been his

practice to attend Rule 35 examinations. Reconsideration of the

August 10, 2006 Order is not the appropriate vehicle for

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attacking the conclusions of the Magistrate Judge and Judge Coyle

that Plaintiff’s failure to attend the December 2, 2005

examination violated a court order.

At the hearing, Mr. Little cited cases supporting his

contention that counsel may attend an IME. This belated citation

of authority does not justify reconsideration of the rulings by

Magistrate Judge Snyder and Judge Coyle. Furthermore, it does

not excuse Mr. Little’s repeated failures to comply with court

orders. 

Plaintiff contends that the August 10, 2006 Order

erroneously concludes that the transcript of the hearing of

January 20, 2006 shows that the Magistrate Judge ordered the

expanded IME as a discovery sanction. The transcript of the

January 20, 2006 hearing has been available to the parties since

March 3, 2006. In fact, Plaintiff thoroughly argued this

position before Judge Coyle. (See Doc. 95, at 9:18-11:26.) 

Plaintiff provides no reason for reconsideration of the August

10, 2006 Order based on this previously rejected argument. The

IME was for up to one day, it does not require the doctor to

spend more time than is needed.

Plaintiff also takes issue with language in the August 10,

2006 Order that, after the April 19, 2006 Order, “Plaintiff did

not stipulate to a date for the examination nor cooperate in

scheduling one.” Order 3:14-15. Plaintiff contends that this

could not be the case because the City of Fresno did not attempt

to have Magistrate Judge Snyder set a date for a mental

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examination. The Magistrate Judge has already found that

sanctions were appropriate on the basis “that Plaintiff and her

counsel have failed to comply with the Court’s order because they

neither stipulated to a date and time for the exam or cooperated

in the arrangement of a scheduling conference to schedule the

exam [and that n]o excuse appears for this failure, which was not

substantially justified.” (Doc. 107, filed June 6, 2006, at

11:21-27.) A motion for reconsideration of the August 10, 2006

Order is not an appropriate vehicle to belatedly challenge the

Magistrate Judge’s June 6, 2006 Order. Furthermore,

reconsideration of the June 6, 2006 Order, based on argument

previously available to Plaintiff, is inappropriate.

Plaintiff again argues, as she did in opposition to the

City’s motion to dismiss (See Doc. 126, at 4:22-5:3), that she

informed Defendants at the hearing on June 2, 2006 she would not

be attending the mental examination scheduled for June 9, 2006. 

The August 10, 2006 Order rejected Plaintiff’s contention, ruling

that a notice of appeal filed after the time set to attend the

IME did not excuse her failure to attend the examination. 

Furthermore, the transcript of the June 2, 2006 hearing before

the Magistrate Judge, not previously filed in this action, does

not substantiate Plaintiff’s contention:

MR. CAMARENA: [¶] I just contacted Dr.

Harold Seymour this morning, and he has two

dates that he can make himself available, and

he prefers the first date, which is June 9th

at 8:00 o’clock a.m. If the Court is going

to grant this motion, then I would request

that Ms. Louen be ordered to appear at her

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independent mental examination at that time

in his office, as well as the sanctions

requested therein, in the amount of $768.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Little.

...

MR. LITTLE: [¶] ... I guess the only thing I

can say is that the docket reflects that we

have twice reflected clarification of [Judge

Coyle’s April 19, 2006 Order], because

essentially, we believe that his order is a

collateral order that is subject to

interlocutory appeal under the Cohen

doctrine. And we intend on filing an

interlocutory appeal based on that order, at

least with respect to the abstention issue.

THE COURT: You mean the abstention of the

case?

MR. LITTLE: Right.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay.

MR. LITTLE: So that’s been the reason for

the holding pattern regarding that.

...

THE COURT: ... The Court will put out a

ruling ... for all three matters in written

form, and I think you know the general

direction of all of them. ... [¶] And until

there is an interlocutory appeal, Mr. Little,

I’m going to go ahead and order that the exam

take place. And then just - you have to lead

me to where you are, okay?

MR. LITTLE: Thank you, Your Honor.

(CT 11:10-18; 16:5-17; 17:12-16). This transcript establishes

that Plaintiff expressed a general intent to appeal, but took not

action to put Defendants on notice that Plaintiff did not intend

to attend the ordered IME. Even if she had expressed such an

intent, that would not allow her to escape sanctions for failing

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to attend the IME as ordered. Plaintiff’s belated notice of

appeal after the time for the IME had come and gone. Plaintiff

has not established a basis for reconsideration of the August 10,

2006 Order.

c. The Court’s Jurisdiction.

Plaintiff contends that the August 10, 2006 Order ignored

the authorities she cited in support of staying the proceedings

pending a collateral order appeal.

The court has already considered the relevant authorities

and concluded that the requirements of a collateral order appeal

do not apply because Plaintiff is free to refuse to undergo the

mental examination and appeal any sanctions after final judgment

is entered. Order 5:20-6:20; see Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d

698, 709 (2 Cir.1987). Plaintiff’s disagreement with the nd

court’s interpretation of the relevant law does not present

grounds for reconsideration of the August 10 Order. 

Furthermore, on September 21, 2006, the Ninth Circuit, after

Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the August 10 Order was

filed, dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal for failure to prosecute. 

(Doc. 153). Although the Ninth Circuit subsequently granted

Plaintiff’s motion to reinstate the appeal, the Ninth Circuit

dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on December 5,

2006. Now that Plaintiff’s appeal has been dismissed, the issue

whether the court had jurisdiction at the time of the August 10

Order is no longer relevant. In any event, the August 10 Order

found jurisdiction and Plaintiff gives no basis to reconsider

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that decision. Finally, none of this changes the fact that

Plaintiff’s appeal, undisputedly filed after the IME was

scheduled to begin, does not excuse Plaintiff’s failure to attend

the IME.

d. Alleged Procedural Defects.

Plaintiff argues that the August 10 Order erred in holding

that sanctions are payable to both Defendants. As noted, the

August 10 Order stated that “Plaintiff’s counsel is directed to

pay Defendants $4,448.00, representing all sanctions ordered

against him in this action to date.” 

This language is at worst imprecise. It is implicit in the

August 10 Order that the sanctions are payable to the party

moving for them; i.e., the party that has incurred the expenses,

the Defendant City of Fresno.

Plaintiff also contends that the August 10 Order erred in

failing to recognize that “at minimum, plaintiff’s counsel’s acts

were partially well-founded, in good faith and legally

supported.” 

Such a holding is inconsistent with the court’s

interpretation of the facts in this case. Mr. Little’s behavior

in connection with his client’s mental examination has been

“reckless and irresponsible.” Order 9:26-27. Mr. Little has

ignored court orders, resulting in Plaintiff’s having “taken the

law into her own hands.” Order 9:7-10, 10:16. Counsel’s conduct

has been obstructive and succeeded in grinding the lawsuit to a

halt. Where good faith has not been established, it is not error

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to fail to make that finding. In any event, no showing of

willfulness is required for an award of reasonable expenses,

including attorney fees. Lew v. Kona Hosp., 754 F.2d 1420, 1427

(9 Cir.1988)(“Even a negligent failure to allow reasonable th

discovery may be punished.”). 

Plaintiff now complains about the amount of the stayed

sanctions the Magistrate Judge imposed on January 10, 2006,

contending that the sanctions “reflected an arbitrary amount.” 

Plaintiff did not challenge the amount of the sanctions or the 

method of determination of sanctions at the January 20, 2006

before the Magistrate Judge; nor in moving for reconsideration of

the January 20, 2006 hearing before Judge Coyle; nor in opposing

Defendant City of Fresno’s June 12, 2006 motion to dismiss,

wherein the City asked the court to award it $2,500 in sanctions. 

Mr Little argued at the hearing that there was no need to

challenge the amount of the sanctions because payment of the

sanctions was stayed. He further argued that he was entitled to

seek reconsideration because the sanctions were previously

imposed on his client, not him. 

These arguments for reconsideration are persuasive. The

court now eliminates the $2500.00 amount of the sanctions which

is not tied to the City’s incurred attorneys’ fees and costs. 

Plaintiff claims that the August 10 Order erred in imposing

sanctions against Mr. Little personally. Plaintiff argues that

this is improper because Defendant City of Fresno never requested

this and because Mr. Little was not given notice that sanctions

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against him personally were being considered. Plaintiff cites to

the transcript of the July 28, 2006 hearing on the motion to

dismiss:

THE COURT: All right. Well, what I’m saying

is this. That there are - you know, maybe

there’s another test or two that would

normally be administered in two, three hours,

half day session, whatever it would be, that

is reasonable. That’s what needs to be done. 

We need to get that examination. Then we

need to bring on the dispositive motions with

the trial date backing that up. That’s what

needs to happen in this case.

MR. WEAKLEY: Okay.

THE COURT: And now, I’m going to give you

the choice, Mr. Little, because if you don’t

want to do that, of course, I’m going to have

to consider alternative sanctions here. (CT

26:22-27:9).

Plaintiff claims that these statements foreclose the possibility

of sanctions being imposed on Mr. Little personally.

The portion of the transcript relied upon by Plaintiff does

not foreclose the imposition of monetary sanctions. The motion

to dismiss being argued on July 28, 2006 specifically prayed for

monetary sanctions as well as dismissal.

With regard to the $786 monetary sanction previously ordered

by the Magistrate Judge and affirmed by Judge Coyle, Rule

37(b)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that the

court may require “the party failing to obey the order or the

attorney advising that party or both” to pay expenses caused by

failure to comply with a court order. See also FDIC v. Conner,

20 F.3d 1376, 1382 (5 Cir.1994). Thus: th

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Because the apportionment of fault between an

attorney and client is the court’s

responsibility, a party listing only its

opponent in a motion for sanctions does not

absolve the opponent’s attorney of potential

liability. Instead, the movant merely

provides the court with the double option of

holding responsible either the opponent or

the attorney either under the motion or sua

sponte. Accordingly, a motion for sanctions

under Rule 37, even one which names only a

party, places both on notice that the court

may assess sanctions against either or both

unless they provide the court with a

substantial justification for their conduct.

DeVaney v. Cont’l Am. Ins. Co., 989 F.2d 1154, 1160 (11th

Cir.1993). The same is true with respect to the sanctions in the

amount of $1,180 ($980 in attorneys’ fees incurred in preparing

the motion to dismiss and $200 in costs incurred by Dr. Seymour

because of Plaintiff’s failure to attend the IME scheduled for

June 9, 2006). The court, on the City of Fresno’s motion to

dismiss, carefully considered the conduct of Plaintiff and Mr.

Little. Rather than imposing the sanction of dismissal because

of Plaintiff’s repeated intentional failures to comply with court

orders, failures directly attributable to the conduct of Mr.

Little, a lesser sanction was imposed. Based on the record, the

court determined that because “Plaintiff’s counsel is responsible

for incurring these sanctions, he shall pay these sums solely

from his personal funds.” Order 14:2-4. Mr. Little had notice

by virtue of the motion and the applicable Rules of Civil

Procedure.

Plaintiff also contends that sua sponte sanctions require a

finding by the court that Mr. Little “acted in bad faith,

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vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons”, citing

Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991). Chambers discusses

the imposition of sanctions based on a court’s inherent powers. 

Id. at 43. Inherent powers come into play when a court is

acting, not pursuant to rule or statute, but pursuant to “the

control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs

so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of

cases.” Id. 

The $768 sanction initially ordered by the Magistrate Judge,

was ordered pursuant to Rule 37. A motion under Rule 37

“provides the court with the double option of holding responsible

either the opponent or the attorney either under the motion or

sua sponte.” DeVaney, id., 989 F.2d at 1160. Such sanctions may

be assessed without a finding of willfulness. See Lew, id., 754

F.2d at 1427. As Rule 37(b)(2) requires, the court found that

Mr. Little’s actions were not justified and that an award of such

expenses is not unjust. Furthermore, one of the factors reviewed

in deciding whether to dismiss an action for failure to comply

with court orders is the availability of lesser sanctions. 

Again, Mr. Little is directly responsible for his client’s

failure to comply with these orders. Dismissing the action

because of Mr. Little’s conduct seemed unfair as would imposition

of monetary sanctions on Ms. Louen, who relied on her attorney. 

Plaintiff further seeks reconsideration of the August 10

Order because “although it seems to impose quasi-criminal type

sanctions on Plaintiff’s counsel, it fails to explicitly so

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indicate or make any explicit factual findings beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Plaintiff asserts:

If the sanction is intended to punish past

conduct and is imposed for a definite amount

or period without regard for the contemnor’s

future conduct, it is criminal and must be

proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Alternatively, if the sanction is intended to

coerce the contemnor to comply with the

court’s orders in the future, and the

sanction is conditioned upon continued

noncompliance, it is civil and need be proven

by a preponderance of the evidence.

This contention and the cases cited in support of it all

involve contempt proceedings. No contempt proceedings were or

are at issue in this case. Defendants moved to dismiss this

action pursuant to Rule 41(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

because of Plaintiff’s failure to comply with court orders for

discovery. In the context of reviewing the factors underlying

such a decision, the fifth factor, the availability of lesser

sanctions, led the court to conclude that monetary sanctions

imposed on Mr. Little would be more appropriate than dismissing

the action. Consequently, reconsideration of the August 10 Order

on the ground that an improper burden of proof was used is not

well-taken.

Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the monetary sanction

imposed in connection with the City of Fresno’s attorneys’ fees

incurred in drafting the motion to dismiss, pointing out that she

was successful in persuading the court that dismissal under Rule

41(b) was not an appropriate sanction for the failure to comply

with the court’s orders.

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Plaintiff is not entitled to reconsideration of the August

10 Order on this ground. Although Plaintiff avoided dismissal of

the action, the August 10 Order imposed these attorneys’ fees as

a lesser sanction to dismissal because of the failure to comply.

B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Defendants’ second motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(b)

is DENIED without prejudice. At this juncture, Plaintiff will

not be sanctioned by dismissal merely because a stay of the

August 10 Order did not precede the filing of the motion for

reconsideration. Furthermore, because the motion for

reconsideration is granted in part, dismissal is inappropriate. 

ACCORDINGLY, as set forth above:

1. Plaintiff’s Application for Reconsideration and

Correction of Order Denying Motion to Dismiss Action with

Prejudice is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

a. Plaintiff’s counsel is assessed sanctions in the

amount of $1,180.00 for causing Plaintiff to fail to attend the

IME on June 9, 2006.

b. Within 20 days of the filing date of this Order,

Plaintiff’s counsel is directed to pay defendant City of Fresno

$1,948.00.

c. Plaintiff is directed to attend an IME with Dr.

Seymour. The IME need not last a full day if Dr. Seymour is able

to complete the IME in less time. Plaintiff’s counsel shall

schedule the IME with Dr. Seymour within 20 days of the filing

date of this Order, giving written notice of the IME date and

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time to Defendants.

d. The IME shall be audio-recorded.

e. No third party, including Plaintiff’s counsel, may

attend the IME.

f. Plaintiff’s counsel shall serve a copy of this

Order on Plaintiff Holly Louen within seven days of the filing

date of this Order.

g. No further motions for reconsideration of the

issues or rulings discussed in this Order will be considered.

e. ANY FURTHER FAILURE OF PLAINTIFF OR PLAINTIFF’S

COUNSEL TO TIMELY COMPLY WITH AN ORDER OF THIS COURT WILL RESULT

IN DISMISSAL OF THIS ACTION.

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(b),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 22, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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