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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Andre Welch
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued January 26, 2010

Decided April 19, 2010

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge    

No. 09‐2873

ANDRE WELCH,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent‐Appellee.

                     

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 1:07‐cv‐04333

Blanche M. Manning,

     Judge.

O R D E R

Andre Welch was found guilty by a jury of bank robbery, see 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and

sentenced to 160 months in prison.  After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct

appeal, Welch filed a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  He claimed that the federal

public defender who represented him at trial was ineffective because he either mishandled a

plea offerfrom the government or else failedeventopursueplea negotiations withprosecutors.

After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Welch’s motion.  The court found that

the government had never proposed, and defense counsel had never solicited, a plea

agreement, and that counsel forWelch had acted reasonably given Welch’s insistence on going

to trial and the relative weakness of the government’s case against him.    We affirm the

judgment.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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Although no eyewitness identified him and no physical evidence at the bank tied him

to the robbery, Welch was convicted in 2003 based on the testimony of his ex‐wife, a former

roommate, and a former coworker, all of whom identified Welch as the man in the grainy

photographs taken by surveillance cameras at the bank.  Welch’s direct appeal took a long time

to resolve because Booker was decided while the case was pending.  See United States v. Welch,

368 F.3d 970 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Welch, 429 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2005).  In 2007, after

the direct appeal had finally concluded, Welch filed a pro se § 2255 motion that included the

firstiteration of his ineffective‐assistance claim againsthispublicdefender,Imani Chiphe.  This

pro se motion, as well as the amended version filed after the district court had appointed

counsel, centered on a claim that Chiphe had misadvisedWelch about a plea proposal from the

government that would require him to serve only 48 months in prison.  Welch alleged that he

became aware of this offer only because Chiphe had discussed it with his wife.  He was not

interested, he explained, in the offer because Chiphe also communicated, first to his wife and

laterto him directly, that at most he could get 60 to 72 months in prison even if he went to trial.

But Welch added that he would have accepted the proposed deal if Chiphe had not

misrepresented the maximum prison exposure and also failed to anticipate upward

adjustments that would be applied for several uncharged robberies and obstruction of justice.

The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing to explore whether the 48‐month

plea deal had actually been offered and what, if any, discussions occurred between Chiphe and

Welch regarding potential sentencing issues and the decision to go to trial.  At the hearing,

Welch contradicted the allegations in his pro se and counseled § 2255 motions.    Now he

testified that he never talked to Chiphe at all about the possibility of pleading guilty, despite

his contrarydescriptions ofthe allegedly mishandled 48‐month plea deal.  According toWelch,

Chiphe never discussed with him potential sentencing scenarios, and, in particular, Chiphe

never explained the possibility of getting credit for acceptance of responsibility if he pleaded

guilty.  Welchdid concede, however,that he nevertold Chiphe he was interested in negotiating

a plea agreement.  And, despite his admission that he is familiar with plea negotiations after

having entered guilty pleas in three previous cases, Welch also conceded that he never asked

Chiphe about the possibility of pleading guilty nor did he tell Chiphe to contact the prosecutor

to find out about a plea deal.   

For his part, Chiphe testified that he and the prosecutor never discussed a possible plea

agreement—48 months or otherwise.  From the very beginning, Chiphe recounted, Welch had

vehemently maintained his innocence and had agreed with Chiphe that, given the weakness

ofthe government’s evidence,the case could be won attrial.  Chiphe explained that “Mr.Welch

was never seriously contemplating pleading guilty,” and that all along their plan was to go to

trial.  Chiphe did notremember whether Welch ever specifically told him not to engage in plea

discussions with the government, but he added that he “had a client who was telling me he was

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innocent, so, I mean, that’s kind ofthe same thing.”  When Welch “told me he was innocent and

told me he wanted to go to trial,” Chiphe continued, “I took that to mean that he did not want

to plea[d].”  Chiphe disputed Welch’s testimony that they did not discuss different sentencing

scenarios; although he could not remember the specific dates, Chiphe confirmed that he

engaged in extensive discussions with Welch about possible guidelines outcomes and their

consequences, including his eligibility for an acceptance reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.

Chiphe explained that Welch was “well aware” of the possibility of guidelines adjustments

based on obstruction and the uncharged robberies because he had been “very involved in the

litigation of [his] case.”  

The prosecutor corroborated Chiphe’s testimony.  He explained that he never made a

plea offer because it was his practice to wait for the defendant to approach him, which never

happened in this case.

After the evidentiary hearing, Welch’s lawyers abandoned his allegations about a

48‐month plea offer.  Instead, in post‐hearing submissions, Welch offered an entirely new legal

theory: Chiphe’s failing was notthat he mishandled a 48‐monthdeal, butthat he neverinitiated

plea negotiations in the first place.  The district court acknowledged this about‐face when the

judge rejected Welch’s claim of ineffective assistance and denied his § 2255 motion.  The judge

highlighted Welch’s shifting and contradictory assertions and determined, based on Chiphe’s

credible testimony corroborated by the prosecutor, that there never had been a plea offer.

Regarding Welch’s new theory that Chiphe should have initiated plea negotiations, the court

concluded that Chiphe’s decision not to approach the government did not constitute deficient

performance.  Welch had maintained his innocence and insisted on a trial, the court reasoned,

so there was no reason for Chiphe to have believed that he would agree to a plea bargain.  The

court noted the weakness of the government’s case and the reasonable chance of an acquittal

at trial, and also gauged as significant that Welch never asked Chiphe about the possibility of

a plea bargain despite his considerable experience with the criminal justice system, including

the three cases that had ended with guilty pleas.

Inthis courtWelchargues that Chiphe’sperformance wasdeficient because, saysWelch,

the lawyer unilaterally decided not to initiate plea negotiations.  In defining what he believes

to have been counsel’s unfulfilled obligation, Welch insists that Chiphe either should have

independently pursued a plea deal with the government or else conferred with him before

deciding against that plan of action.  On appeal from the denial of § 2255 relief, we review

issues of law de novo and issues of fact for clear error.  Bednarski v. United States, 481 F.3d 530,

534 (7th Cir. 2007).

Defendants have a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel during plea

negotiations.   Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58‐59 (1985).   To have prevailed on a claim of

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ineffective assistance of counsel, Welch was required to establish that counsel’s performance

“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and caused him prejudice.  Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).    We give great deference to counsel’s judgment,

recognizing that there is a wide range of reasonable defense strategies, id. at 689; United States

v. Recendiz, 557 F.3d 511, 531 (7th Cir. 2009), and we analyze the reasonableness of counsel’s

performance in the context of the facts of the particular case, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688‐89.

Under the circumstances, Chiphe’s decision not to initiate plea negotiations was

reasonable and in accordance with Welch’s own insistence on going to trial.    It is well‐

established, and Welch concedes, that counsel does not have an absolute obligation to pursue

plea negotiations in every case.  See United States v. Wells, 394 F.3d 725, 735 (9th Cir. 2005);

Armienti v. United States, 313 F.3d 807, 814‐15 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Boone, 62 F.3d 323,

327 (10th Cir. 1995); Beans v. Black, 757 F.2d 933, 936 (8th Cir. 1985); Dillon v. Duckworth, 751 F.2d

895, 901 (7th Cir. 1985).  Nonetheless, Welch maintains that in this case it was unreasonable for

Chiphe not to approach the government about a potential plea deal because Chiphe made that

decision without consulting him or even discussing the possibility of a plea.  Because the

prosecutor had a policy of waiting for defense counsel to initiate plea negotiations, Welch says,

the only way he could have found out about the benefits of a plea agreement is if his lawyer

had approached the government.   Welch implicitly argues that Chiphe failed to properly

inform Welch of his options and thus his decision to go to trial was ill‐advised.  

But there is no factual support for Welch’s contention.   The district court credited

Chiphe’s testimony and found that the lawyer had engaged in extensive conversations with

Welch abouttrial strategy, different sentencing scenarios (including the possibility ofreceiving

a reduction for acceptance ofresponsibility if Welch entered a plea), and the weaknesses of the

government’s case.  The court also found that, throughout these discussions, Welch adamantly

maintained his innocence and consistently expressed his desire to have a trial.  These findings

deserve great deference, see Bednardski, 481 F.3d at 534, and this evidence demonstrates that

Chiphe competently advised his client, see Davis v. Greiner, 428 F.3d 81, 88‐89 (2d Cir. 2005);

Moss v. United States, 323 F.3d 445, 475 (6th Cir. 2003); Purdy v. United States, 208 F.3d 41, 45 (2d

Cir. 2000).  Based on his conversations with Welch, Chiphe reasonably understood that his

client had no interest in entering a guilty plea.  Although in hindsight Welch may now regret

his choice, he received exactly the assistance he wanted at the time—an attorney who would

aggressively fight the bank‐robbery charge at trial.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. 689‐90; McAfee v.

Thurmer, 589 F.3d 353, 356 (7th Cir. 2009).

To the extent that Welch argues that Chiphe should have ignored his protestations of

innocence and independently approached the government about a potential plea deal, his

position is untenable.  We do not require counsel to do that which is futile, and thus we would

not mandate that counsel engage in the empty endeavor of negotiating a plea agreement for a

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client who has made it clearthat he has no interest in entering a guilty plea.  See Wells, 394 F.3d

at 735 (rejectingdefendant’s ineffective‐assistance claim when it was hisunwillingness toplead

guilty that prevented counsel from initiating plea negotiations); Armienti, 313 F.3d at 814‐15

(same).  More importantly, creating a rule that counsel should disregard his client’s wishes

would work the additional harm of jeopardizing the attorney‐client relationship and the trust

that counsel must establish to effectively represent his client.   We would not require that

counsel engage in such a betrayal, which necessarily would demonstrate a lack of faith in his

client’s position and have the unintended effect of preventing counsel from providing the type

of reasonable assistance that the Sixth Amendment requires.  

Because we agree with the district court that counsel’s performance was reasonable, the

prejudice prong of Strickland falls away.  We note, however, that even now Welch continues to

insist that he is innocent, which makes it difficult to believe his assertion that he would have

accepted a plea deal if Chiphe had negotiated one.  See,e.g., Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d

855, 859 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that defendant’s assertion of innocence undermined his

contention that he would have accepted a plea deal); Moss, 323 F.3d at 475 (rejecting

defendant’s ineffective‐assistance claim in part because defendant had maintained his

innocence and made clearthat he would not plead guilty under any circumstances); Sanders v.

United States, 341 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2003) (“A defendant who maintains his innocence at

all the stages of his criminal prosecution and shows no indication that he would be unwilling

to admit his guilt undermines his later § 2255 claim that he would have pleaded guilty if only

he had received better advice from his lawyer.”); United States v. Stevens, 149 F.3d 747, 748 (8th

Cir. 1998) (concluding that defendant could not establish prejudice when his post‐trial

assertions of innocence demonstrated that he would not have entered a guilty plea); United

States v. Stantini, 85 F.3d 9, 17 (2d Cir. 1996).  But see Griffin v. United States, 330 F.3d 733, 738

(6th Cir. 2003) (explaining that declarations of innocence were not dispositive of whether

defendant would have accepted plea agreement); Mask v. McGinnis, 233 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir.

2000) (upholding district court’s conclusion that overwhelming evidence against defendant

might have prompted him to accept plea agreement despite protestations of innocence).

Moreover,Welchdidnotpresent any evidence thatthe government wouldhave been amenable

to a plea deal or under what terms Welch would have accepted such an agreement.  See Gallo‐

Vasquez v.United States, 402 F.3d793, 798‐99 (7th Cir. 2005)(noting thatdefendant mustprovide

concrete evidence that a favorable plea offer would have been available to him); Prewitt v.

United States, 83 F.3d 812, 819 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that defendant must do more than

speculate about potential benefits that he was denied).  Thus, Welch’s claim also fails for lack

of prejudice.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  

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