Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02189/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02189-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Claro Gonzales
Appellee
Tomasa R. Gonzales
Appellee
Millers Casualty Insurance Company of Texas
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

CLARO GONZALES and TOMASA R. 

GONZALES, by personal 

representative, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

Fi LED 

United Sw.k-g Co'..trt of. Appeals 

TM-,1:h ~ir<'•1il; 

JAN 2 3 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKFR 

Clerk 

vs. 

) 

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) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

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No. 87-2189 

MILLERS CASUALTY INSURANCE 

COMPANY OF TEXAS, a Delaware 

corporation, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CV-86-564 M) 

Shane A. English, Anthony, New Mexico (John E. Keithly, Anthony, 

New Mexico, on the brief-), for Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Michael J. Condon, Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., 

Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, BARRETT and LOGAN, Circuit Judges. 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge. 

Appellate Case: 87-2189 Document: 010110016335 Date Filed: 01/23/1991 Page: 1 
( 

Plaintiffs-appellees, Claro Gonzales and the Estate of his 

deceased wife Tomasa Gonzales, brought this action against Millers 

Casualty Insurance Company of Texas (Millers) seeking a 

declaration that they were entitled to underinsured motorist 

coverage under a Millers automobile insurance policy issued to 

Claro Gonzales. The district court granted summary judgment on 

the coverage issue to plaintiffs-appellees in an unpublished 

Memorandum Opinion and Order and Millers filed a timely appeal. 

For the reasons stated below, we affirm. 

I 

The claim of plaintiffs-appellees for underinsured motorist 

benefits arises from a head-on collision in Luna County, New 

Mexico, between an automobile driven by Claro Gonzales and one 

driven by Michael Woehrl. There were three passengers in the 

Gonzales vehicle: Tomasa Gonzales, Angelina Gonzales, and 

Christina Miranda. As a result of the collision, Tomasa Gonzales 

died, and Claro Gonzales and the two other occupants of the 

vehicle were injured. The district court's opinion says that 

Woehrl's negligence was the proximate cause of the accident, and 

this is undisputed. 

At the time of the accident the vehicle driven by Claro 

Gonzales was insured by Millers. Generally, under the Millers 

policy, Claro and Tomasa Gonzales were each insured for $75,000 

against bodily injury or death caused by an underinsured 

motorist. 1 Woehrl had automobile liability coverage with Mountain 

1 

The Millers policy covered three automobiles owned by Claro 

Gonzales, including the accident vehicle, and provided for 

underinsured motorist coverage of $25,000 per vehicle. Claro 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

2 

Appellate Case: 87-2189 Document: 010110016335 Date Filed: 01/23/1991 Page: 2 
( 

States Mutual Casualty Company (Mountain States) totalling 

$100,000 per occurrence. 

Mountain States disbursed the $100,000 proceeds of Woehrl's 

liability coverage evenly among Claro Gonzales, the Estate of 

Tomasa Gonzales, and the two other occupants of the vehicle, 

receiving releases of their claims against Woehrl. The four thus 

received $25,000 apiece from Mountain States. Alleging damages in 

excess of $25,000, plaintiffs-appellees sought compensation under 

the underinsured motorist provisions of the Millers policy. 

Millers denied further liability under these policy provisions. 

Plaintiffs-appellees commenced this declaratory judgment 

action against Millers in the District Court for Grant County, New 

Mexico. Millers removed the action to the United States District 

Court for the District of ·New Mexico, where jurisdiction was 

founded on diversity of citizenship. Plaintiffs-appellees and 

Millers both moved for summary judgment on the underinsured 

motorist coverage question. In particular, the parties contested 

whether Woehrl was an underinsured motorist under New Mexico law. 2 

The district court ruled in favor of plaintiffs-appellees on 

the summary judgment issues now before us. Generally the court 

(Footnote continued): 

Gonzales paid a separate premium for each vehicle to secure this 

underinsured motorist coverage. There is no dispute that under 

New Mexico law Claro and Tomasa Gonzales can individually stack 

the underinsured motorist coverage on the three vehicles to reach 

a total maximum coverage amount of $75,000 apiece. See generally 

Konnick v. Farmers Ins. Co., 703 P.2d 889, 891 (N.M. 1985). 

2 

As noted below in text, the precise question before the 

district court relative to the underinsured motorist determination 

is one of first impression in New Mexico. The question was 

certified to the New Mexico Supreme Court for resolution, but that 

court declined to answer the certified question. IR., Doc. 35, 

at 3. 

3 

Appellate Case: 87-2189 Document: 010110016335 Date Filed: 01/23/1991 Page: 3 
concluded that where there are multiple claimants to the proceeds 

of a tortfeasor's liability coverage as here, in determining 

whether the tortfeasor is an underinsured motorist the court must 

look to the liability proceeds actually available to the injured 

insureds, not merely the express policy limits of the tortfeasor's 

liability coverage. 

Thus the district court's construction of New Mexico law held 

Woehrl an underinsured motorist. The court had previously found 

that the liability coverage available to Claro Gonzales and the 

Estate of Tomasa Gonzales under Woehrl's insurance ($25,000 

apiece) was less than their respective underinsured motorist 

coverage ($75,000 apiece). The district court's ruling permitted 

plaintiffs-appellees to look to Millers to compensate them under 

the underinsured motorist policy provisions for any additional 

loss, subject to the coverage limits. 3 

II 

We review summary judgment determinations de novo, applying 

the same legal standard as the district court. ~, Osgood v. 

State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 

3 

Plaintiffs-appellees advanced a distinct argument for summary 

judgment relative to the underinsured motorist determination. 

Specifically, they argued that the compensation concerns of N.M. 

Stat. Ann. § 66-5-301(B) mandated that their underinsured coverage 

totalling $75,000 apiece be aggregated to equal $150,000 for 

purposes of determining whether Woehrl was an underinsured 

motorist. Under this argument, plaintiffs-appellees underinsured 

motorist coverage would be $50,000 more than Woerhl's liability 

coverage, and accordingly, he would be an underinsured motorist. 

In view of its ruling in favor of plaintiffs-appellees on the 

coverage issue, the district court declined to reach this distinct 

argument, concluding that it was immaterial. We similarly find no 

necessity for reaching that issue. 

4 

Appellate Case: 87-2189 Document: 010110016335 Date Filed: 01/23/1991 Page: 4 
( 

1988). Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, 

depos :~ions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 

see Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 561 F.2d 

202, 204 (10th Cir. 1977). When the moving party has carried its 

initial burden of alerting the court to the purported absence of a 

genuine issue for trial, the opposing party may not rest on the 

averments or denials of its pleadings but, rather, must establish 

specific triable issues of fact to avoid summary judgment. See 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986); Lake 

Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. San Luis Obispo County, 841 F.2d 872, 875-

76 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 827 (1988). 

Here there is no argument that summary judgment was 

procedurally incorrect due to the presence of a genuine issue as 

to a material fact. Instead, Millers challenges only the legal 

determination that the plaintiffs Claro and Tomasa Gonzales are 

entitled to further recovery on their underinsured motorist claim. 

III 

At the heart of this case is the definition of the term 

"underinsured motorist" under New Mexico law. 

statute provides: 

The relevant 

"underinsured motorist" means an operator of a motor 

vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance or 

use of which the sum of the limits of liability under 

all bodily injury liability insurance applicable at the 

time of the accident is less than the limits of 

liability under the insured's uninsured [/underinsured] 

motorist coverage. 

5 

Appellate Case: 87-2189 Document: 010110016335 Date Filed: 01/23/1991 Page: 5 
N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 66-5-301(B). 4 The district court commenced its 

analysis of the coverage issue with the language of the statute. 

It found§ 66-5-301(B) to be "potentially ambiguous" as to whether 

in the multiple claimant context the measure of the tortfeasor's 

liability coverage that is, "the sum of the limits of . 

liability insurance applicable at the time of the accident" -- was 

the amount of the liability proceeds actually available to an 

injured insured, or the express policy limits of the tortfeasor's 

liability coverage. 

The court turned for guidance to the objectives underlying 

§ 66-5-30l(B) and noted that the statute was designed to 

compensate victims of inadequately insured motorists, and more 

specifically, to put the injured insured in the same position the 

insured would have occupied had the tortfeasor had liability 

coverage equal to the insured's underinsured motorist coverage. 

According to the district court, in practical terms these 

objectives of § 66-5-301(B) were furthered in the multiple 

claimant context by construing the statute so that the measure of 

liability coverage for purposes of the underinsured motorist 

determination was the amount of liability proceeds actually 

available to an injured insured. 

4 

Under§ 66-5-301(B), the term "uninsured motorist coverage" 

is read to include underinsured motorist coverage. The Millers 

insurance policy also provides guidelines for determining who is 

an underinsured motorist. Specifically, the policy utilizes the 

term "underinsured highway vehicle" and defines it in language 

somewhat similar to the language used in defining the term 

"underinsured motorist" under§ 66-5-301(B). See IR., Doc. 24, 

Ex. A. The focus of the litigants' analysis, however, is on New 

Mexico's uninsured/underinsured motorist statute, for it is 

undisputed that the language of the statute is ultimately 

controlling. See generally Jimenez v. Foundation Reserve Ins. 

Co., 757 P.2d 792, 794 (N.M. 1988). 

6 

Appellate Case: 87-2189 Document: 010110016335 Date Filed: 01/23/1991 Page: 6 
Rejecting this construction, said the court, would mean that 

the Gonzales plaintiffs would have been better off if Woehrl had 

possessed no liability insurance at all -- a result that could not 

be accepted as logical. 5 Accordingly, purporting to read the 

language of the statute with reference to the objectives sought to 

be achieved, the district court concluded that, as to Claro and 

Tomasa Gonzales, Woehrl was an underinsured motorist. 

The question resolved by the district court relative to 

underinsured motorist coverage in the multiple claimant context is 

a question of first impression in New Mexico. The New Mexico 

courts have not spoken authoritatively on the subject. 6 

5 

Like many states, New Mexico generally mandates that 

automobiles operated on the state's roads carry minimum amounts of 

liability coverage. See generally N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 66-5.-201.1, 

66-5-205. 

6 

In its ruling on the question of underinsured motorist 

coverage, the district court relied in part on "actual receipt" or 

"availability" language in Schmick v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. 

Co., 704 P.2d 1092 (N.M. 1985). In particular, the district court 

quoted the following passage from Schmick: "[T]he most an insured 

can receive is the amount of underinsurance purchased for his 

benefit [which] ... amount must be offset by available liability 

proceeds." 704 P.2d at 1100. According to the district court, 

the quoted passage and other language in Schmick "indicates that 

the proper comparison is to the amount available to an injured 

person, not the tortfeasor's policy limits." IR., Doc. 35, at 5 

(emphasis in original). 

The Schmick decision, however, is not dispositive here. 

There was no multiple claimant situation in Schmick; the 

tortfeasor was found to be underinsured, and the single injured 

insured received the full limits of the tortfeasor's liability 

coverage. The major question in Schmick was whether the insured 

could collect both the liability proceeds and the full limits of 

her underinsured motorist coverage. 704 P.2d at 1093-94. Cf. 

Appellant's Reply Brief, at 5 (noting that "the Schmick analysis 

relied upon by the insureds was applied because the tortfeasor was 

underinsured, not to establish the tortfeasor's status as 

underinsured") (emphasis in original). The New Mexico Supreme 

Court in Schmick made use of "actual receipt" or "availability" 

language in answering this question in the negative. Generally, 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

7 

Appellate Case: 87-2189 Document: 010110016335 Date Filed: 01/23/1991 Page: 7 
Generally, we must accord at least some deference to the district 

court's construction of the substantive law of the state in which 

it sits. 7 See American Coleman Co. v. Intrawest Bank of 

Southglenn, 887 F.2d 1382, 1385 (10th Cir. 1989); Corbitt v. 

Andersen, 778 F.2d 1471, 1475 (10th Cir. 1985). 

Upon careful consideration, we conclude that the district 

court's reading (or, more specifically, prediction) of New Mexico 

law on the underinsured motorist question is correct, and its 

summary judgment determination should be upheld. There is no 

majority view evident in the case law construing similar state 

(Footnote 

the court 

liability 

insured's 

7 

continued): 

construed the statute to require the insured 

proceeds collected from the tortfeasor 

underinsured motorist coverage. 

to offset 

from the 

Recently, we have recognized that our decisions are not 

entirely consistent as to the proper level of deference to be 

accorded to a district judge's interpretation of the substantive 

law of his or her state of residence. Huffman v. Caterpillar 

Tractor Company, 908 F.2d 1470, 1477 n.19 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting 

the "variety of standards" that have been applied); see American 

Coleman Co. v. Intrawest Bank of Southglenn, 887 F.2d 1382, 1385 

(10th Cir. 1989). Compare Rhody v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 

771 F.2d 1416, 1419 (10th Cir. 1985) ("great deference" standard) 

with Corbitt v. Andersen, 778 F.2d 1471, 1475 (10th Cir. 1985) 

("some deference" standard) and Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 

896 F.2d 1228, 1232 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990) (acknowledging "some 

deference" standard, but noting that in cases of "pure statutory 

construction" perhaps less deference is in order). The 

divergencies in our decisions is exhaustively treated in 

Goodnight, Chaos on Appeal: The Tenth Circuit's Local Judge Rule, 

67 Den. U. L. Rev. 515 (1990). As noted there, we will likely 

have authoritative guidance soon in Russell v. Salve Regina 

College, 890 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 s.ct. 

3269 (1990) (certiorari granted to determine whether a party is 

entitled on appeal to a de novo review of a local judge's reading 

of unclear state law), argued before the United States Supreme 

Court on November 27, 1990. However, we do not find the 

variations in standards to be of decisional significance here. 

Whether viewed with deference or entirely de novo, we agree with 

the district court's views. 

8 

Appellate Case: 87-2189 Document: 010110016335 Date Filed: 01/23/1991 Page: 8 
statutes. 8 The district court's reading of New Mexico law, 

however, finds support in a respectable body of authority. 9 

For example, in Butler v. MFA Mutual Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1129 

(La. Ct. App. 1978), the Louisiana Court of Appeals found 

uninsured motorist coverage to exist in a multiple claimant 

situation where the amount of the tortfeasors' liability coverage 

actually available to the injured insured (as opposed to the face 

value of the coverage) was less than the limits of the insured's 

uninsured motorist coverage.

10 The court held that the statute at 

8 

Millers and plaintiffs-appellees suggest that their 

respective position with regard to underinsured motorist coverage 

constitutes the majority view. See Appellant's Brief-in-Chief, at 

14; Appellee's Answer Brief, at 7. In neither case, however, do 

the cited authorities support the suggestions. 

9 

American States Ins. Co. v. Estate of Tollari, 362 N.W.2d 

519, 520-22 (Iowa 1985); Butler v. MFA Mutual Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 

1129, 1132-33 (La. Ct. App. 1978); see Knudson v. Grange Mutual 

Companies, 507 N.E.2d 1155, 1156-58 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986); J. 

Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice §§ 5071.45, 

5108 (1981). See also Brown v. Erie Ins. Co., 519 N.E.2d 408, 

409-10 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986); State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. 

Diem, 358 So.2d 39, 40-41 (Fla. Ct. App. 1978). 

10 

In Butler, the statutory definition of "uninsured motor 

vehicle" embodied the concept of underinsurance; in effect, 

providing that an underinsured motor vehicle was "an insured 

vehicle when the liability insurance on it was less than uninsured 

[/underinsured] motorist coverage carried by an insured." 356 

So.2d at 1132. The stated liability coverage of each of the two 

tortfeasors in Butler was equal to or greater than the insured's 

underinsured motorist coverage. In finding nevertheless that 

underinsured motorist benefits were available, the Butler court 

looked to the purpose of the uninsured/underinsured statute, 

observing that: 

It is apparent that the legislature intended the insured 

should be reimbursed by his own insurer in these 

instances in the amount at least equal to the uninsured 

[/underinsured] motorist coverage carried by him. Where 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

9 

Appellate Case: 87-2189 Document: 010110016335 Date Filed: 01/23/1991 Page: 9 
issue "should be construed to mean the effective liability 

coverage," rather than the liability coverage appearing on the 

face of the tortfeasor's policy. Butler, 356 So.2d at 1133 

(emphasis in original). 

Also, in Knudson v. Grange Mutual Companies, 507 N.E.2d 1155 

(Ohio Ct. App. 1986), the court noted that the statutory 

requirement that insurance companies offer underinsured motorist 

coverage grew out of legislators' desire to avoid a situation 

where injured insureds would be better off if they were harmed by 

a motorist with no insurance coverage at all, than one with some 

coverage. Id. at 1157. Like the district court in the case at 

bar, the Knudson court concluded that adopting a view in multiple 

claimant situations that focused on the stated policy limits of a 

tortfeasor's liability coverage, rather than the liability 

proceeds actually available to a given insured, would tend to 

produce the illogical, undesirable situation the legislators 

sought to avoid. Id. at 1157-58. 

In addition, the district court's construction here of 

§ 66-5-301(B) squares with the underlying objectives of the 

statute. The district court correctly observed that the drafters 

of § 66-5-301(B) sought to ensure that innocent victims of 

inadequately insured motorists were compensated, and that they 

were put in the same position they would have occupied had the 

(Footnote continued): 

the liability insurance on the automobile is ineffective 

for any reason [e.g., multiple claimants] to pay to the 

insured this required amount, then the vehicle should be 

deemed "uninsured" [/underinsured] for the purpose of 

resolving recovery of uninsured [/underinsured] 

protection. 

Id. at 1133 (emphasis added). 

10 

Appellate Case: 87-2189 Document: 010110016335 Date Filed: 01/23/1991 Page: 10 
tortfeasor had liability coverage equal to the insured's 

underinsured motorist coverage. See Foundation Reserve Ins. Co. 

v. Marin, 787 P.2d 452, 454 (N.M. 1990); Morro v. Farmers Ins. 

Group, 748 P.2d 512, 513 (N.M. 1988). 

In a multiple claimant situation like this one, a 

tortfeasor's liability coverage may well be inadequate to 

compensate each injured insured up to the limits of the insured's 

underinsured motorist coverage and yet, on paper, still equal or 

exceed the insured's underinsured motorist coverage. With the 

statute's compensation concern in mind, it was not unreasonable 

for the district court to construe § 66-5-301(B) so that the 

measure of a tortfeasor's liability coverage was the amount of 

liability proceeds actually available to an injured insured, 

rather than the face amount·of the tortfeasor's policy. See Brown 

v. Erie Ins. Co., 519 N.E.2d 408, 409-10 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986); 

Butler, 356 So.2d at 1133. 

Millers advances two principal 

First, Millers contends that the 

arguments to the contrary. 

language of§ 66-5-30l(B) is 

unambiguous: 

amount of 

it allegedly directs courts to compare the face 

the tortfeasor's liability coverage against the face 

amount of the insured's underinsured motorist coverage. The 

district court allegedly erred by failing to give effect to this 

unambiguous language. In particular, Millers contends that the 

district court arrived at its conclusion as to New Mexico's view 

of the underinsured motorist question by (in effect) rewriting the 

statute to align it with its underlying objectives -- an allegedly 

misguided and improper approach. Second, Millers argues that the 

district court's reading of New Mexico law runs counter to our 

11 

Appellate Case: 87-2189 Document: 010110016335 Date Filed: 01/23/1991 Page: 11 
decision in Chafin v. Aetna Ins. Co., 550 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 

1976). 

We conclude, however, that Millers' arguments are without 

merit. The meaning of§ 66-5-301(B) is not self-evident in the 

multiple claimant situation. More specifically, the meaning of 

the phrase "the sum of the limits of. liability insurance 

applicable at the time of the accident" is not self-evident. In 

the instant case, the district court did not rewrite the statute. 

Rather, in accordance with New Mexico precedent, the court simply 

construed§ 66-5-301(B) liberally in light of the objectives it 

was designed to accomplish. See,~, Foundation Reserve, 787 

P.2d at 454; Chavez v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 533 P.2d 

100, 102-03 (N.M. 1975). See also 2A N. Singer, Sutherland 

Statutory Construction§ 58.06 (4th ed. 1984) (noting the "ancient 

wisdom" that a statute should be interpreted so as to effectuate 

its purpose) [hereinafter Statutory Construction]. 

Furthermore, even if the district court's statutory analysis 

is dubbed a rewriting of § 66-5-30l(B), such analysis is not 

per se improper under New Mexico law. New Mexico courts have held 

that during the process of statutory interpretation words may be 

added to a statute or statutory language may be disregarded "if it 

is necessary to do so to carry out the legislative intent." 

National Council of Compensation Ins. v. N.M. State Corp. Comm'n, 

712 P.2d 1369, 1370-71 (N.M. 1986); see Montoya v. McManus, 362 

P.2d 771, 776 (N.M. 1961). See also Statutory Construction, 

supra, § 47.38. Here, there is no dispute that a principal 

objective of the New Mexico legislature in enacting § 66-5-301(B) 

was compensation of innocent victims of inadequately insured 

12 

Appellate Case: 87-2189 Document: 010110016335 Date Filed: 01/23/1991 Page: 12 
motorists. In practical terms, where there are multiple 

claimants, the district court's purported rewriting of the statute 

may be reasonably viewed as necessary to further this objective. 

Millers' first argument, then, is without merit. 

We also reject Millers' second argument because, although 

Chafin is similar to this case in some respects, we find that it 

is ultimately distinguishable. At issue in Chafin was a question 

of first impression under New Mexico law: namely, whether a 

tortfeasor should be considered uninsured where the amount of his 

or her liability coverage satisfies the requirements of the 

state's financial responsibility law but the amount of liability 

proceeds actually available to each injured insured is less than 

the minimum amount of liability coverage required under the 

financial responsibility law. Chafin, 550 P.2d at 576. The 

district court found that under such circumstances a tortfeasor 

should not be deemed to be an uninsured motorist, rejecting a 

contrary argument by injured insureds which was based on the 

compensation objectives of New Mexico's uninsured/underinsured 

motorist statute. We affirmed. 

In arriving at our affirmance in Chafin, however, we found it 

significant that the rule advanced by the injured insureds, which 

would have resulted in the tortfeasor in question being treated as 

an uninsured motorist, appeared to be the minority view. We found 

"no indication" there that New Mexico would go against the weight 

of authority (in other words, the majority view) on the uninsured 

motorist issue and, accordingly, sustained the district court's 

reading of New Mexico law. Id. at 577. In contrast, there is no 

majority view on the question of underinsured motorist cove1:3ge 

13 

Appellate Case: 87-2189 Document: 010110016335 Date Filed: 01/23/1991 Page: 13 
presented here. 

supported by a 

The diBtrict court's reading of New Mexico law is 

respectable body of authority and guided by the 

underlying objectives of the statute. ~, Schmick v. State Farm 

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 704 P.2d 1092, 1095 (N.M. 1985) (uninsured/ 

underinsured motorist statute to be liberally construed to 

implement purpose of compensation). Thus, we do not find that 

Chafin controls the disposition of the instant case. In sum, we 

are convinced that the district court's determination of the 

underinsured motorist question was correct and accordingly, we 

AFFIRM. 

14 

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