Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03049/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03049-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tyrone W. Gloster
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 18, 1999 Decided August 10, 1999

No. 98-3049

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Tyrone W. Gloster,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cr00375-01)

Damien J. Marshall, Student Counsel, argued the cause

for appellant. With him on the briefs were Steven H. Goldblatt, appointed by the court, Catherine E. Lhamon, Supervisory Attorney, and Alexis W. Martin, Student Counsel.

Barton S. Aronson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Wilma A.

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Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., and Sima Sarrafan, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Williams, Sentelle and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland:

Garland, Circuit Judge: On the night of September 18,

1996, Tyrone Gloster was sitting on the steps of a residential

building, drinking with a number of other men. Police officers on routine patrol, having previously received complaints

regarding loitering and narcotics activity from the owner of a

nearby building, stopped to investigate. The officers asked

Gloster to stand. When he did, they discovered a loaded

semi-automatic handgun on the spot where he had been

sitting. Gloster was immediately arrested, and was subsequently convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon in

violation of 18 U.S.C. s 922(g)(1).

Gloster appeals his conviction on two grounds. First, he

contends that the district court improperly denied his motion

to exclude evidence of the ammunition found in the gun.

Second, he contends that the district court improperly denied

his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Finding no abuse of discretion by the trial judge, we

affirm Gloster's conviction.

I

Gloster was initially charged with two violations of 18

U.S.C. s 922(g)(1): one for possessing the firearm and one

for possessing its ammunition. Before trial, the district court

ordered the government to proceed on one count only. See

generally United States v. Clark, No. 97-3168, slip op. at 19

(D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 1999) (holding that possession of loaded

firearm constitutes single offense), available at 1999 WL

561973 at *11. The government elected to proceed on the

gun charge, and the ammunition count was dismissed. Defense counsel then sought to exclude from trial any evidence

that the gun was loaded, arguing that it was irrelevant and

unduly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The

district court denied the motion.

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At trial, the police officers testified that when they arrived

at the building, four men were on the steps. All were

standing except Gloster, who was sitting on the top step.

Officer Ernest Grant asked the four to show their hands "for

safety reasons." 10/24/97 Tr. at 25. All complied, but Gloster remained seated. Grant then asked Gloster to stand.

Gloster, said Officer Grant, "seemed to hesitate[,] as if he

didn't want to stand up." Id. at 98. When he finally did

stand, the officers saw that Gloster had been sitting "on top

of" the gun. Id. at 100; see id. at 98 ("The gun was directly

underneath his buttocks."); see also id. at 52-53, 69, 72.

Both the gun and the ammunition were entered into evidence,

the ammunition over defense counsel's objection that it was

"cumulative." Id. at 42-43.

Prior to the presentation of defendant's case, Gloster obtained a written statement from a witness, Gary Riddick, who

was the registered owner of the gun. Riddick said that he

had been with Gloster and the others before the police

arrived, but had left to go to the bathroom, placing the gun

"near Mr. Gloster on the top stair." 10/27/97 Tr. at 97. At

trial, however, Riddick refused to testify, asserting his Fifth

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The district

court appointed an attorney for Riddick, held a hearing, and

concluded that Riddick had a good faith basis for asserting

the privilege. The court then admitted Riddick's written

statement into evidence as a statement against his penal

interest, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3).

Gloster did not testify.

The jury found Gloster guilty as charged. Two months

later he moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 33, on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

The motion advised the court that Riddick was now willing to

testify, and attached a letter from Riddick discussing the

events of the night of September 18, 1996. Following a

hearing, the district court denied the motion, finding that

Riddick's proposed testimony was not newly discovered evidence, that it was "not significantly different from the statement" admitted at trial and therefore cumulative, and that

the evidence was not "of such a nature, given what the jury

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did have before it," that it would "probably produce an

acquittal." 3/6/98 Tr. at 39-40.

II

Gloster contends that the admission of the ammunition and

of the testimony that the gun was loaded was error because

the evidence was more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.1 We review such claims solely to

determine whether the district court abused its discretion.

United States v. Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir.

1998). We find no such abuse here.

Gloster's first argument is that the fact that the gun was

loaded was "not relevant to any matter properly provable to

the court." Def. Br. at 24. We disagree. Under the Federal

Rules, " '[r]elevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence

to the determination of the action more probable or less

probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed. R.

Evid. 401; see United States v. Latney, 108 F.3d 1446, 1449

(D.C. Cir. 1997). Gloster's defense was that the gun was

Riddick's, that Riddick had left it unattended on the steps of

the building while he went to the bathroom, and hence that it

was not within Gloster's possession. The fact that the gun

was loaded and therefore dangerous made it substantially less

probable that Riddick had simply left it unattended, and more

probable either that he left it in the possession of Gloster or

that Gloster had it in the first place. These were facts "of

consequence to the determination of the action," and the

evidence was therefore relevant within the meaning of Rule

401.

But, Gloster argues, the district court admitted evidence of

the ammunition before Riddick's statement was read to the

jury, and hence before it became relevant. The fact that the

__________

1 "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideration

of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403.

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gun was loaded, however, was relevant regardless whether

there was a statement from Riddick. At a minimum, it was

relevant to support the government's claim that Gloster possessed the gun--by negating speculation that it may have

belonged to someone else, whether that "someone" was Riddick or not. Indeed, while the defendant's opening statement

did not mention Riddick by name, it set forth the defense's

theory that someone other than Gloster put the gun on the

steps. 10/24/97 Tr. at 20 ("[T]he gun that the government is

now charging Mr. Gloster with having possessed that night

belonged to someone else. He was the one who put that gun

on the steps, not Mr. Gloster."). The Federal Rules of

Evidence give a trial court the authority to "exercise reasonable control over the ... order of ... presenting evidence so

as to (1) make the ... presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, [and] (2) avoid needless consumption of

time." Fed. R. Evid. 611(a). The court did not abuse that

authority by permitting the government to introduce evidence

that the gun was loaded as part of its case-in-chief.

Gloster's second argument is that as physical evidence, the

ammunition was merely cumulative of the officers' testimony

that the gun was loaded, particularly since Gloster did not

contest the point. There is no question, however, that physical evidence is an important part of an effective trial presentation and that the "persuasive power of the concrete and

particular is often essential to the capacity of jurors to satisfy

the obligations that the law places on them." Old Chief v.

United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997). Indeed, as the

Supreme Court noted in Old Chief, even a defendant's willingness to stipulate to a fact (which Gloster did not offer to do)

does not generally deprive the prosecutor of the discretion to

prove it: "[T]he familiar, standard rule [is] that ... a criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the

full evidentiary force of the case as the government chooses

to present it." Id. at 186-87; see Gartmon, 146 F.3d at 1021

(holding that Rule 403 "does not generally require the government to sanitize its case ... or to tell its story in a

monotone").

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Defendant also contends that the government's repeated

references to the ammunition during its witnesses' testimony

were cumulative. But whether testimony should be truncated

on the ground that it constitutes "needless presentation of

cumulative evidence," Fed. R. Evid. 403, is quintessentially a

question we leave to the discretion of the trial court. Nor

were the prosecutor's references to the ammunition, either in

direct examination or closing argument, any more than were

permissible to rebut defendant's theory of the case. See

Clark, 1999 WL 561973 at *6.

Third, Gloster contends that the evidence the gun was

loaded was prejudicial, and that the potential for prejudice

outweighed its probative value. It is true, as defendant

suggests, that a loaded gun may suggest a "different threat of

danger" than an unloaded one. Def. Reply Br. at 15. But it

is that very dangerousness that makes it less likely someone

simply left the gun unattended on a step. Rule 403 focuses

not on "prejudice" but "on the 'danger of unfair prejudice,'

and gives the court discretion to exclude evidence only if that

danger 'substantially outweigh[s]' the evidence's probative

value." Gartmon, 146 F.3d at 1021 (quoting Fed. R. Evid.

403). The standard the Rule sets for exclusion of evidence

has not been met here.

Finally, defendant claims that the district court failed to

conduct the Rule 403 balancing on the record. Although the

court's analysis was terse, stressing the relevance issue rather than the question of prejudice, so too was the defense

counsel's argument, which had the same emphasis. See

10/23/97 Tr. at 9-11; 10/24/97 Tr. at 43-44. In any event, in a

case like this, where "the considerations germane to balancing probative value versus prejudicial effect are readily apparent from the record," we will not reverse a conviction

merely for a failure to conduct an on-the-record balancing.

United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1135 (D.C. Cir.

1994) (quoting United States v. Manner, 887 F.2d 317, 322

(D.C. Cir. 1989)); see United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346,

1362 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

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III

Gloster also contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 33, which permits such motions on, inter alia, "the

ground of newly discovered evidence."2 Gloster argues that

the proffered testimony of Gary Riddick qualifies as newly

discovered evidence under the Rule.

This circuit follows a five-part test for granting a motion

for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. As we

said in United States v. Lafayette, a district court should

grant a new trial "only when the following five conditions are

met:

(1) the evidence [has] been discovered since trial; (2) the

party seeking the new trial [has] show[n] diligence in the

attempt to procure the newly discovered evidence; (3)

the evidence relied on [is] not ... merely cumulative or

impeaching; (4) [the evidence is] material to the issues

involved; and (5) [the evidence is] of such nature that in

a new trial it would probably produce an acquittal.

983 F.2d 1102, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Thompson v.

United States, 188 F.2d 652, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1951)). We will

reverse a district court's decision whether to grant such a

motion "only if the court abused its discretion or misapplied

the law." Id. The court did neither here.

The district judge found Gloster's motion to founder upon

the first requirement of the Lafayette test, that the evidence

truly be newly discovered, because Gloster was aware of its

substance at the time of trial. 3/6/98 Tr. at 39-40. Citing

United States v. Ortiz, 136 F.3d 161, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1998),

defendant concedes that "the general rule in this Circuit has

been that evidence known to the defendant at the time of trial

does not qualify as newly discovered." Def. Br. at 10; see

Ortiz, 136 F.3d at 168 ("The traditional definition of newly

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2 "The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to

that defendant if required in the interest of justice.... A motion

for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence

may be made only before or within two years after final judgment...." Fed. R. Crim. P. 33.

discovered evidence is evidence 'discovered since trial.' ").

He also concedes that we have applied this rule to post-trial

proffers of testimony from witnesses who refused to testify at

trial. He contends, however, that most of these cases involved witnesses who had been codefendants, and whose

changes-of-heart did not occur until after they were convicted

and no longer had anything left to lose. Gloster urges us to

take a different view of a case like his, where the witness is a

nonparty whose testimony only became available post-trial.

Although it is true that some of the cases in which we have

applied the general rule involved codefendants, see, e.g., United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1993), that was

not the situation in Ortiz itself, where the witness who

initially refused to testify was a nonparty. Ortiz strongly

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suggested that even a nonparty witness' post-trial offer to

testify would fail to qualify as newly discovered evidence

where the substance of the testimony was known to defendant at the time of trial. Ortiz, 136 F.3d at 168; see id. at

167 & n.12. As in Ortiz, however, Gloster's claim fails so

many parts of the Lafayette test that we need not tarry over

the first.

The district court found the substance of Riddick's proffered testimony to fail the third element of Lafayette as well

as the first, concluding that the new evidence was cumulative

because it was "not significantly different from the statement

that was offered and received at trial." 3/6/98 Tr. at 43. In

reply, Gloster contends that Riddick's testimony "could provide more details" about the night of the arrest than the

statement read at trial. Def. Br. at 19.3 But to the extent

Riddick's proffered testimony was not cumulative, it fails the

second prong of Lafayette because it was not "diligen[tly]"

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3 At a later point, Gloster also suggests that the testimony would

include more details of Riddick's personal history, including the fact

that he is a "married father of three children with a very steady

employment history," which would assertedly enhance his credibility with the jury. Def. Br. at 20. As noted below, there was no

reason this information could not have been included in the original

written statement.

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discovered. The original Riddick statement was the product

of an interview conducted by Gloster's defense counsel and

her investigator. Riddick initiated the contact; he called the

defense, volunteered to talk, and said he wanted to make a

statement. 12/27/97 Tr. at 104. Defense counsel typed the

statement herself, id. at 99, and the court admitted the

statement in its entirety. See 3/6/98 Tr. at 35-36. If the

newly proffered details truly were important, they could and

should have been included in the original statement.4

Defendant further contests the district court's conclusion

that the testimony was cumulative by arguing that the opportunity to observe Riddick's demeanor would permit the jury

"to assess more accurately the credibility of Riddick's testimony" than did the mere antiseptic reading of his written

statement. Although we agree that live testimony can convey

considerably more than a cold record, in this case Riddick's

presence would represent the proverbial two-edged sword.

While it is possible Riddick's demeanor would make him more

credible to the jury, it is also possible it would make him less.

Moreover, unlike the unchallenged and unedited written

statement, live testimony would subject Riddick to crossexamination on a host of issues, ranging from his relationship

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4 Defendant does not dispute that he had a full opportunity to

question Riddick before trial and to include whatever information

he wanted in the written statement admitted into evidence. Indeed,

he does not even dispute that he was aware of the details about

which Riddick now offers to testify. Instead, at oral argument

defendant suggested that his counsel may have intentionally failed

to include greater detail in Riddick's statement as a matter of trial

strategy: she expected him to testify, and may not have wanted to

subject him to cross-examination based on any inconsistencies that

might develop between the written and oral testimony. But if that

is true, Riddick's additional details are neither newly discovered nor

newly available. Rather, they are simply newly proffered, having

been intentionally withheld as a result of the defense's tactical

calculations. Events may have turned those calculations into miscalculations, but that is insufficient to save the proffered evidence

from failing the first prong of the Lafayette test.

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with Gloster to the credibility of his claim that he left a

loaded gun on the steps while he disappeared to use the

bathroom. Because we have no way to know whether Riddick's live testimony would put Gloster in a better or worse

position, we have no basis to conclude that the fifth element

of Lafayette is satisfied--that in a new trial the evidence

"would probably produce an acquittal." Lafayette, 983 F.2d

at 1105; see United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 342-43

(D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc).

IV

Finding no error on the part of the district court, we affirm

the judgment below.

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