Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03109/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03109-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Talon G. Wright
Appellant

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-3109

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TALON G. WRIGHT,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 14-cr-69 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 18, 2016 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 23, 2016

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and 

ADELMAN, District Judge.*

SYKES, Circuit Judge. A day after police responded to a 

domestic dispute between Talon Wright and Leslie 

Hamilton, an investigator returned to the couple’s apartment 

to follow up on suspicions that Wright was in possession of

child pornography. With Hamilton’s consent, the investiga-

 * Of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.

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tor searched the apartment and conducted a forensic preview of a desktop computer found in the living room. The 

preview revealed images of child pornography on the hard 

drive. Wright was indicted on child-pornography and childexploitation charges. He moved to suppress the evidence 

recovered from the warrantless search of his computer, 

arguing that Hamilton lacked authority to consent. The

district judge denied the motion. Wright pleaded guilty but 

reserved his right to appeal the denial of suppression and 

now does so. 

We affirm. Although Wright owned the desktop computer, Hamilton was a joint user who enjoyed virtually unlimited access to and control over it. The computer was located

in the living room of the couple’s apartment, and everyone in 

the family, including Hamilton and her children, used it 

freely. These facts, which were conveyed to the investigator 

prior to the search and later confirmed through further

investigation, establish Hamilton’s common authority over 

the computer. 

I. Background

On July 31, 2014, police officers in Urbana, Illinois, responded to a domestic dispute between Wright and Hamilton. In their incident report, the responding officers noted 

that Hamilton called Wright a “pedophile” during the 

altercation. Apparently no arrests were made that day.

The following morning Urbana Police Investigator Tim 

McNaught, who specializes in handling crimes against 

children, reviewed the officers’ report as a matter of course. 

Concerned about Hamilton’s use of the word “pedophile,” 

Investigator McNaught contacted her and requested a 

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meeting. Hamilton arrived at the police station that same 

morning. In this initial interview, Investigator McNaught

sought Hamilton’s permission to search the couple’s apartment and computers for evidence of child pornography.

Hamilton agreed and took McNaught to the apartment. 

During the search, McNaught seized a desktop computer

he found in the living room; forensic analysis revealed 

images of child pornography on the hard drive. Wright was

charged with one count of possessing child pornography,

18 U.S.C. § 2252A, and two counts of sexually exploiting a 

minor, id. § 2251. He moved to suppress the evidence recovered from the desktop computer, arguing that Hamilton 

lacked authority to consent to the warrantless search.

At the evidentiary hearing that followed, Investigator 

McNaught testified about three different encounters with 

Hamilton on the day of the search: (1) the initial interview 

conducted prior to the search; (2) a discussion that occurred 

during the search itself; and (3) a lengthier post-search 

interview.

First, Investigator McNaught described the brief interview with Hamilton that took place at the Urbana police 

station before the search of the apartment and computer. In

that interview McNaught asked Hamilton why she called

Wright a pedophile. Hamilton responded that Wright had 

used his cellphone to visit a website called “Jailbait.” Investigator McNaught recognized “Jailbait” as a site that features 

pornographic images of underage girls. Hamilton also

mentioned seeing a video with a disturbing title on the 

family’s home computer. Based on this information, 

McNaught asked Hamilton for permission to search the 

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couple’s apartment and computers for evidence of child 

pornography, and Hamilton agreed.

Next, Investigator McNaught testified about the search 

itself. He explained that Hamilton took him to the apartment

that she shared with Wright and let him in using her key. 

Once inside McNaught spotted a desktop computer on the 

living-room floor. The computer wasn’t attached to a keyboard or traditional monitor, but it was connected to a flatscreen TV. According to Investigator McNaught, Hamilton 

described the computer as “kind of a family computer” and 

said that “[a]nytime she or her kids wanted to use it, they 

did.” She explained that they used the computer to watch 

movies, play games, check the children’s grades, and store 

work-related documents. However, since the apartment’s 

wireless Internet service had been discontinued about a 

month earlier, they could only access the Internet when 

Wright was around to use his cellphone as a wireless 

hotspot. Hamilton also pointed out her own laptop computer; she told the investigator that with the exception of her

personal laptop, Wright owned the rest of the computer 

equipment in the apartment. 

Investigator McNaught then “previewed” the desktop 

computer’s hard drive by connecting it to his own laptop, a 

standard forensic procedure that allows investigators to 

view the drive’s contents without altering it. This preview 

revealed images of child pornography, so McNaught asked 

Hamilton for permission to seize the computer along with 

the rest of the electronic devices in the apartment for further 

investigation. She agreed. Off-site forensic analysis of the 

computer revealed additional pornographic images as well 

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No. 15-3109 5

as video and still images of Wright engaging in sexually

explicit conduct with a minor.

Finally, Investigator McNaught testified about a second

interview that he conducted with Hamilton after he completed his search of the apartment. During this longer follow-up 

interview, Hamilton described the living arrangements at 

the apartment, which was leased in her name. She explained 

that she and Wright had been in a tumultuous, “on-and-off” 

relationship for the last two years and had broken up several 

days earlier. Prior to the breakup, the couple had been living 

together in the apartment along with their six-month old 

son, three of Hamilton’s children from another relationship, 

and two of Wright’s children from another relationship. 

Since the breakup Wright and his two daughters were 

temporarily staying with his mother while Hamilton and her 

children prepared to move out of the apartment permanently.

Hamilton also talked about the desktop computer during 

the second interview. She mentioned a long password that

her children knew but she did not. She suggested that the 

password was somehow associated with the computer but

was unable to say if it was required to gain access to the 

computer itself or only to access the Internet via the apartment’s wireless connection. Hamilton also reiterated that she 

and her children regularly used the computer to watch 

movies, play games, and access the Internet. The forensic 

analysis of the computer did not reveal any sign of password 

protection, but it did confirm that Hamilton and her children 

had used the computer recently: The browser history revealed frequent visits to kid-friendly websites, online videos

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relating to women’s and mothers’ issues, and the homepage

for the children’s school.

Based on Investigator McNaught’s testimony, the judge 

concluded that Hamilton exercised common authority over 

the desktop computer and could give valid consent to the 

warrantless search. Accordingly, the judge denied Wright’s 

motion to suppress. Wright pleaded guilty to one count of 

sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of possessing 

child pornography but reserved his right to appeal the 

ruling on his suppression motion.

II. Discussion

Wright challenges the district court’s denial of suppression. We review the judge’s legal conclusions de novo and 

factual findings for clear error. United States v. James, 

571 F.3d 707, 713 (7th Cir. 2009). Wright’s challenge is limited to the search of the desktop computer, which was 

conducted without a warrant but with Hamilton’s consent.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the 

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A warrantless search of property is 

per se unreasonable unless an established exception applies. 

United States v. Henderson, 536 F.3d 776, 779 (7th Cir. 2008) 

(citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). Searches conducted with consent are one such exception. Fernandez 

v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1132 (2014); see also James, 

571 F.3d at 713 (“Because a person may voluntarily waive his 

Fourth Amendment rights, no warrant is required where the 

defendant consents to a search.”). 

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Consent may be obtained either from the defendant or 

from a third party who exercises common authority over the 

property to be searched. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 

164, 170–71 (1974). Common authority does not require the 

existence of an ownership interest in the property; it “rests 

rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally 

having joint access or control for most purposes.” Id. at 171

n.7. The premise of this rule is that a defendant who permits 

another person to use his property assumes the risk that that 

person will allow others to access the property in his absence. Id.; see also United States v. Jackson, 598 F.3d 340, 347 

(7th Cir. 2010). And because “the ultimate touchstone of the 

Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,” Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. 

at 1132 (quotation marks omitted), either actual authority or

apparent authority is enough to support third-party consent.

Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188–89 (1990); see also James, 

571 F.3d at 714. The government bears the burden of proving

authority to consent, whether actual or apparent, by a 

preponderance of evidence. James, 571 F.3d at 714.

A. Actual Authority

Wright concedes that Hamilton exercised common authority over the couple’s apartment, but it doesn’t necessarily follow that her authority extended to the desktop computer found inside. “The key to consent is actual or apparent 

authority over the area to be searched.” United States v. Basinski, 

226 F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). As several of our sister circuits have observed, in this context computers are akin to closed containers: The information that 

they “contain” is usually not readily observable without 

some further investigation. See United States v. Andrus, 

483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Buckner, 

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473 F.3d 551, 554 (4th Cir. 2007); cf. United States v. Rodriguez, 

888 F.2d 519, 523 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Many a closed container is 

accessible; opening it requires justification ... .”). So 

Hamilton’s authority over the computer turns on whether 

she enjoyed mutual use of, access to, and control over the

computer itself. 

It’s clear that she did. The desktop computer belonged to 

Wright, not Hamilton, but it functioned as a family computer. According to Hamilton, she and her children freely used 

it to watch movies, play games, check the children’s grades, 

and store work-related documents. Forensic analysis bolstered this claim: Investigator McNaught testified that he 

found “a lot of Internet history” showing recently viewed 

children’s movies and games as well as the login page for 

Urbana Middle School’s website. Moreover, Wright left the 

computer in the apartment when he went to stay with his 

mother, leaving Hamilton with unrestricted access to and 

control over it in his absence. These facts easily establish that 

Hamilton exercised common authority over the computer. 

Cf. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (holding that the 

defendant’s cousin had common authority over a duffel bag 

that the cousin was allowed to keep at his house and use to 

store his belongings).1

 

1 Wright notes that the only way to access the Internet from the desktop 

computer was to use his cellphone as a wireless hotspot. This, he claims, 

demonstrates that Hamilton’s use of the computer was restricted because 

she could only get online in his presence and with his permission. His 

claim is only half true. The apartment’s wireless Internet service was 

discontinued about a month before the search because the couple had 

failed to pay their bill. However, forensic analysis uncovered an Internet 

history consistent with Hamilton’s testimony dating back more than two

months before the search occurred. So Hamilton had at least one month 

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Wright’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.

First, he makes much of the fact that he and Hamilton had 

ended their relationship shortly before the search occurred. 

He emphasizes that Hamilton was in the process of moving 

out of the apartment and that she was not planning to take 

the desktop computer with her when she left. He argues that 

any authority over the computer Hamilton once had was

revoked when she started packing up her things to move 

out. But the end of a romantic relationship doesn’t automatically mean that common authority over shared property has 

been revoked. See United States v. Ryerson, 545 F.3d 483, 488

(7th Cir. 2008). If the ex-partner “continue[s] to access, use, 

or control the property,” as Hamilton did, she continues to 

exercise authority regardless of the relationship’s status. Id.

Second, Wright points out that the desktop computer had

a password associated with it—one that Hamilton admitted 

she didn’t know. He argues that this admission necessarily 

means that Hamilton lacked common authority over the 

computer. It’s true that ignorance of a computer password

may demonstrate a lack of authority under some circumstances. Like a lock on a briefcase or storage trunk, password

protection on a computer demonstrates the owner’s affirmative intent to limit access to its contents. See, e.g., Andrus, 

483 F.3d at 718; Buckner, 473 F.3d at 554; Trulock v. Freeh, 

275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir. 2001). In other words, a defendant

who password-protects his computer does not assume the 

 

of unlimited Internet access before the search. Moreover, online browsing is just one of several ways in which Hamilton claimed that she used 

the desktop computer. The other uses that she described—watching 

downloaded movies and storing work-related documents—only required access to the computer itself, not the Internet.

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risk that third parties not privy to the password will permit 

others to access the computer’s contents in his absence. See 

Buckner, 473 F.3d at 554. Accordingly, third parties from 

whom a password has been withheld lack common authority over a computer.

But Hamilton is not in that situation. As an initial matter,

there’s some ambiguity about whether the desktop computer was actually password-protected. Hamilton was unable to 

specify whether the long password she mentioned was 

required to access the computer itself or simply to connect to 

the apartment’s wireless network. Investigator McNaught, 

on the other hand, testified unequivocally that forensic 

analysis of the computer revealed no sign of password 

protection. Given these facts, we think it unlikely that the 

computer itself was password-protected.

That said, we agree with the district judge that Hamilton 

exercised common authority over the computer even assuming it was password-protected. Hamilton didn’t know the 

password but her children did, which strongly suggests that 

Wright made no attempt to keep it from her. Cf. United States

v. Richards, 741 F.3d 843, 850 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[The defendant] had an expectation of privacy in the west bedroom 

because ... he alone had access to the room if it was locked.”) 

(emphasis added). Indeed, there’s no indication that Wright 

made any effort to prevent Hamilton from using the computer despite knowing that she and her children did so

frequently. In contrast Wright did take steps to prevent 

Hamilton from accessing his cellphone: Hamilton told 

Investigator McNaught that she rarely even got a look at the 

phone because Wright was constantly changing its passcode.

In this context Hamilton’s ignorance of whatever password

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may have been associated with the desktop computer

doesn’t undercut the common authority that she exercised 

by virtue of being able to use the computer whenever she 

wanted. See James, 571 F.3d at 714 (holding that the defendant’s mother exercised common authority over a safe left in 

her possession absent “evidence that [the defendant] attempted to limit or restrict her control over the safe”). Her 

consent to the warrantless search of the computer’s hard 

drive was therefore valid, and the judge properly denied

Wright’s motion to suppress on this basis.

B. Apparent Authority 

Although the district judge considered only Hamilton’s 

actual authority over the desktop computer, the record 

establishes that Hamilton also exercised apparent authority, 

which provides an alternative basis for denying Wright’s 

suppression motion. See United States v. Reaves, 796 F.3d 738, 

741–42 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e may affirm the judgment of the 

district court on any ground supported in the record.”). 

Apparent authority exists if “the facts available to an officer 

at the time of a search would allow a person of reasonable 

caution to believe that the consenting party had authority”

over the property to be searched. Ryerson, 545 F.3d at 489 

(citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188); see also United States v. 

Groves, 470 F.3d 311, 319 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Facts that came to 

light after the search began cannot reasonably have influenced the officers’ beliefs regarding whether [a third party] 

possessed apparent authority.”). 

Of course “mere possession of [a closed] container by a 

third party does not necessarily give rise to a reasonable 

belief that the third party has authority to consent to a search 

of its contents.” Basinski, 226 F.3d at 834. Rather “one must 

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look for indicia of actual authority” over the container

known to the officer at the time of the search. United States v. 

Rosario, 962 F.2d 733, 737 (7th Cir. 1992) (quotation marks 

omitted); see also Basinski, 226 F.3d at 834 (“[A]pparent 

authority turns on the government’s knowledge of the third 

party’s use of, control over, and access to the container to be 

searched, because these characteristics are particularly 

probative of whether the individual has authority over the 

property.”). Typically this analysis entails considering the 

nature of the container and its outward appearance, including the presence of any sort of locking mechanism. Basinski, 

226 F.3d at 835. When the container at issue is a computer, a 

key consideration is “whether law enforcement knows or 

should reasonably suspect because of surrounding circumstances that the computer is password protected.” Andrus, 

483 F.3d at 719. 

The judge found that before Investigator McNaught 

searched the desktop computer, Hamilton informed him that

it was a family computer that she and her children could use 

any time. What McNaught observed at the apartment was 

consistent with this claim. The computer was located on the 

living-room floor, which was scattered with women’s 

clothes and children’s toys, and was also apparently where 

Hamilton and Wright slept. Although the computer had no 

keyboard attached to it, it was connected to a flat-screen TV, 

consistent with Hamilton’s earlier claim that she and her 

children used the computer to watch family movies. Moreover, Hamilton made no mention that the computer might be 

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No. 15-3109 13

password-protected until her second interview with Investigator McNaught, which took place after the search.2

Given this information, it would have been entirely reasonable for Investigator McNaught to conclude that 

Hamilton exercised common authority over the desktop 

computer. See, e.g., Andrus, 483 F.3d at 719 (“Third party 

apparent authority to consent to a search has generally been 

upheld when the computer is located in a common area of 

the home that is accessible to other family members under 

circumstances indicating the other family members were not 

excluded from using the computer.”); cf. Basinski, 226 F.3d at 

835 (holding that the defendant’s friend lacked apparent 

authority over a briefcase because the officers “knew that 

[the defendant] never gave [his friend] the combination to 

the lock”). Hamilton’s apparent authority provides an 

additional basis for concluding that her consent was valid

and that Wright’s suppression motion was properly denied. 

AFFIRMED.

 

2 At oral argument Wright’s counsel suggested that Hamilton first told 

Investigator McNaught about her use of the desktop computer during 

the second interview, which occurred after the search. The judge’s factual 

findings, which he set forth chronologically in the order denying the 

motion to suppress, are to the contrary. The judge found that Hamilton 

told McNaught the entire family used the computer to download and 

watch family movies during the first, pre-search interview. The judge 

also found that while Investigator McNaught was searching the apartment, Hamilton again indicated that any time she or her children wanted 

to use the computer, they did. Wright points to nothing in the record that 

contradicts these findings, and we see no basis to conclude that they are 

clearly erroneous.

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