Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-10459/USCOURTS-ca9-11-10459-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jordon Simmons
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JORDON SIMMONS,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-10459

DC No.

1:10 cr-0789

JMS

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

J. Michael Seabright, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 8, 2014—University of Hawaii William S.

Richardson School of Law

Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed April 3, 2015

Before: A. Wallace Tashima, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tashima

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2 UNITED STATES V. SIMMONS

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

Vacating a sentence for drug and firearm offenses, the

panel held that the defendant’s prior conviction for second

degree escape in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes § 710-

1021 was not a “crime of violence” under the career offender

guideline U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).

The panel held that because § 710-1021 includes both

active and passive forms of escape, the district court properly

concluded that a conviction under that statute is not a

categorical crime of violence.

The panel applied Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct.

2276 (2013), which was decided after sentencing in this case,

to address whether the modified categorical approach can be

applied to determine whether the defendant’s conviction

qualifies as a crime of violence. The panel assumed, without

deciding, that § 710-1021 is, as agreed by the parties,

divisible into three separate crimes. The panel also accepted,

as the parties agreed, that application of the modified

categorical approach demonstrates that the defendant was

convicted of the “escape from custody” version of the crime.

The panel rejected the government’s argument that escape

from custodymay be further subdivided into three additional,

distinct offenses. Comparing the elements of the crime of

conviction with the elements of the generic crime, the panel

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. SIMMONS 3

held that the crime of escape from custody is not a crime of

violence under § 4B1.1(a) because it does not have as an

element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force; it

is not burglary, arson, or extortion; it does not involve the use

of explosives; it does not present a serious potential risk of

physical injury to another; and the risk involved in the offense

is not roughly similar, in kind or in degree of risk posed, to

any of the enumerated offenses set forth in U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.2(a).

COUNSEL

Peter C. Wolff, Jr. (argued), Federal Public Defender,

Honolulu, Hawaii, for defendant-appellant.

Florence T. Nakakuni, United States Attorney, Jonathan M.

F. Loo (argued), Assistant U.S. Attorney, Honolulu, Hawaii,

for plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Jordan Simmons (“Simmons”) appealsfromthe

judgment of the district court sentencing him to 168 months’

imprisonment. He contends that the district court erred in

sentencing him as a career offender because it erroneously

concluded that his prior conviction for second degree escape

in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes § 710-1021 was a

“crime of violence” as that term is defined by U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines (“Sentencing Guidelines” or

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4 UNITED STATES V. SIMMONS

“U.S.S.G.”) § 4B1.1(a). We agree. We therefore vacate

Simmons’ sentence and remand for resentencing.

I.

Simmons pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to six

drug and firearm offenses. He was sentenced to 204 months’

imprisonment, followed by four years of supervised release.1

Simmons’ sentence was based, in part, on the district court’s

determination that Simmons was a “career offender” under

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). Application of the career offender

guidelines raised Simmons’ criminal history category from

category III to category VI, which increased his advisory

Guidelines sentencing range from 135–168 months’

imprisonment to 188–235 months’ imprisonment.

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 provides, in relevant part, that “[a]

defendant is a career offender if . . . the defendant has at least

two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or

a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).

Simmons had previously been convicted in Hawaii state court

of one count of second degree assault, in violation of Hawaii

Revised Statutes § 707-711, and one count of second degree

escape, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes § 710-1021. 

The district court concluded that both prior convictions were

“crimes of violence” under § 4B1.1(a). Simmons timely

1 This sentence was subsequently reduced to 168 months’ imprisonment

pursuant to the government’s motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b), based

on Simmons’ substantial assistance in the prosecution of another. This

sentence reduction does not affect our analysis of the issue before us.

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UNITED STATES V. SIMMONS 5

appealed, asserting that his second degree escape conviction

is not a “crime of violence.”2

II.

We review de novo a district court’s determinations under

the Sentencing Guidelines, including the district court’s

assessment of whether a prior conviction qualifies as a “crime

of violence.” See United States v. Gomez, 757 F.3d 885,

891–92 (9th Cir. 2014).

III.

28 U.S.C. § 994(h) “directs the [Sentencing] Commission

to ‘assure’ that the guidelines specify a sentence ‘at or near’

the statutory maximum” for career offenders. United States

v. Stewart, 761 F.3d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting

28 U.S.C. § 994(h)). “Carrying out this mandate, the

Commission promulgated the career offender guidelines,

which categorize an adult defendant as a ‘career offender’

when the defendant (1) is convicted of ‘a felony that is either

a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense’ and

(2) ‘has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime

of violence or a controlled substance offense.’” Id. at 996–97

(quoting U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a)).

To determine whether a “prior felony conviction”

qualifies as a crime of violence under § 4B1.1(a), we apply

“the ‘categorical approach’ and ‘modified categorical

approach’ set forth in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575

(1990).” United States v. Lee, 704 F.3d 785, 788 (9th Cir.

2 Simmons does not dispute that his second degree assault conviction is

a crime of violence.

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6 UNITED STATES V. SIMMONS

2012). Under this approach, “we look only to the statute of

conviction,” and “compare the elements of the statutory

definition of the crime of conviction with a federal definition

of the crime to determine whether conduct proscribed by the

statute is broader than the generic federal definition.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “If the

statute of conviction ‘sweeps more broadly than the generic

crime, a conviction under that law cannot count as a

qualifying predicate, even if the defendant actually

committed the offense in its generic form.’” United States v.

Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting

Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013)

(brackets omitted)). If the statute of conviction is not a

categorical crime of violence, sentencing courts may, in a

“narrow range of cases,” apply the “modified categorical

approach,” and “look beyond the statutory elements to the

charging paper and jury instructions to determine whether the

defendant’s conviction necessarily involved facts

corresponding to the generic federal offense.” Id. at 1054 n.2

(quoting Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283–84) (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

A.

Because § 710-1021 includes both active and passive

forms of escape, the district court properly concluded that a

conviction under that statute is not a categorical crime of

violence. See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122,

126–27 (2009).3It then proceeded to apply the modified

 

3

 Although Chambers considered whether a defendant’s prior crime of

conviction was a “violent felony” for purposes of the Armed Career

Criminal Act (“ACCA”), we make no distinction between the terms

“violent felony,” as that term is defined in the ACCA, and “crime of

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UNITED STATES V. SIMMONS 7

categorical approach and, after reviewing Simmons’ state

court plea colloquy (among other documents), concluded that

Simmons’ crime, as committed, constituted a crime of

violence. Specifically, the district court relied upon

Simmons’ admission that he “ran away from a police car” to

conclude that this prior offense created a serious risk of

injury; therefore, that it was a crime of violence under the

modified categorical approach.

At the time of Simmons’ sentencing, the district court’s

application of the modified categorical approach was correct

under our then-controlling decision, United States v. AguilaMontes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc),

abrogated by Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2286–91. In AguilaMontes de Oca, we held that, in applying the modified

categorical approach, sentencing courts may“look beyond the

statute of conviction to determine whether the facts proven at

trial or admitted by the defendant as part of his guilty plea

establish that the defendant was convicted of all of the

elements of the relevant federal generic offense.” SanchezAvalos v. Holder, 693 F.3d 1011, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2012)

(citing Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d at 921). If the prior

conviction “necessarily rested” on certain facts, and those

facts “satisf[ied] the elements of the generic offense,” then

the prior conviction was a qualifying offense. Aguila-Montes

de Oca, 655 F.3d at 936. The district court applied this

methodology here because Simmons’ prior conviction

“necessarily rested” on his escape from a police car, and

violence,” as that term is defined in the Sentencing Guidelines. See

United States v. Crews, 621 F.3d 849, 852 n.4 (9th Cir. 2010). Cases

addressing the ACCA’s violent felony provision are, therefore, relevant

to assessing whether a crime qualifies as a crime of violence under the

Sentencing Guidelines. See id.

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8 UNITED STATES V. SIMMONS

because the act of escaping from a police car satisfied the

generic definition of a “crime of violence” under AguilaMontes de Oca, the district court held that Simmons’ second

degree escape conviction was a crime of violence under

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).

As part of our decision in Aguila-Montes de Oca, we

concluded that the modified categorical approach applied not

only to “divisible” statutes – that is, statutes that “list[]

multiple, alternative elements, and so effectively create[]

several different . . . crimes,” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) – but also to

“indivisible” statutes – that is, statutes that set forth “a single,

indivisible set of elements,” id. at 2286. Aguila-Montes de

Oca, 655 F.3d at 926. We reasoned that “[t]he only

conceptual difference between a divisible statute and a nondivisible statute is that the former creates an explicitly finite

list of possible means of commission, while the latter creates

an implied list of every means of commission that otherwise

fits the definition of a given crime.” Aguila-Montes de Oca,

655 F.3d at 927. To illustrate our point, we provided the

following example: “[A] statute that requires use of a

‘weapon’ is not meaningfully different from a statute that

simply lists every kind of weapon in existence. Using the

word ‘weapon’ as an element is not analytically different

from creating a list of all conceivable weapons (‘gun, axe,

sword, baton, slingshot, knife, machete, bat,’ and so on).” Id.

After Simmons was sentenced, however, the Supreme

Court abrogated this approach in Descamps. There, the Court

clarified that the modified categorical approach could only be

employed if the statute of conviction was divisible, and that

the modified categorical approach had “no role to play” for

indivisible statutes. 133 S. Ct. at 2285. The modified

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UNITED STATES V. SIMMONS 9

categorical approach could only be applied to divisible

statutes, the Court held, because it was an “elements-based

inquiry.” Id. at 2287. As the Court explained, “when a state

statute punishes a broader range of conduct than a federal,

generic crime, ‘only divisible statutes enable a sentencing

court to conclude that a jury (or judge at a plea hearing) has

convicted the defendant of every element of the generic

crime.’” Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077, 1085 (9th Cir.

2014) (quoting Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2290). “That is

because ‘a prosecutor charging a violation of a divisible

statute must generally select the relevant element from its list

of alternatives. And the jury, as instructions in the case will

make clear, must then find that element, unanimously and

beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Descamps, 133 S.

Ct. at 2290 (brackets omitted)).

By contrast, a conviction of an indivisible statute carries

no such requirement of jury unanimity. See id. (“While the

jury faced with a divisible statute must unanimously agree on

the particular offense of which the petitioner has been

convicted (and thus, the alternative element), the opposite is

true of indivisible statutes; the jury need not so agree.”). 

Thus, our conclusion that “a statute that requires use of a

‘weapon’ is not meaningfully different from a statute that

simply lists every kind of weapon in existence,” AguilaMontes de Oca, 655 F.3d at 927, was incorrect. As the

Supreme Court explained: “As long as the statute itself

requires only an indeterminate ‘weapon,’ that is all the

indictment must (or is likely to) allege and all the jury

instructions must (or are likely to) mention. And, most

important, that is all the jury must find to convict the

defendant.” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2290. Moreover, “even

if in many cases, the jury could have readily reached

consensus on the weapon used, a later sentencing court

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10 UNITED STATES V. SIMMONS

cannot supply the missing judgment.” Id. As we have

subsequently observed:

Descamps held that indivisible statutes are

indivisible precisely because the jury need not

agree on anything past the fact that the statute

was violated. As long as the defendant’s

conduct violates the statute, the jury can

disagree as to how, and a later sentencing

court cannot conclude that the jury in fact

agreed on the particular means of

commission.

Rendon, 764 F.3d at 1085.

Properly understood, then, the purpose of the modified

categorical approach is not to determine – as the district court

did here – whether a crime as committed constitutes a crime

of violence, but rather “to identify, from among several

alternatives, the crime of conviction so that the court can

compare it to the generic offense.” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at

2285. If the statute under which the defendant is convicted is

divisible, the modified categorical approach permits

sentencing courts to consult a limited set of documents

(including the charging documents and jury instructions) to

determine which alternative form of the offense the defendant

committed. Id. at 2281. Once this analysis is complete, the

sentencing court “can then do what the categorical approach

demands: compare the elements of the crime of conviction

(including the alternative element used in the case) with the

elements of the generic crime.” Id. “If the elements of the

statutoryalternative under which the defendant was convicted

are broader than the generic crime, the prior conviction

‘cannot count as a qualifying predicate.’” United States v.

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UNITED STATES V. SIMMONS 11

Quintero-Junco, 754 F.3d 746, 751 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283 (brackets omitted)).

B.

The parties agree that the district court’s approach was

erroneous in light of Descamps. They disagree, however,

whether, after Descamps, Simmons’ second degree escape

conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under the modified

categorical approach. Because we may “affirm the district

court’s sentencing decision on any basis supported by the

record,” United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 566 (9th Cir.

1996), we must address whether, after Descamps, the

modified categorical approach can be applied to Hawaii

Revised Statutes § 710-1021 in order to determine whether it

qualifies as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).

1.

Section 710-1021 provides, in relevant part, that “[a]

person commits the offense of escape in the second degree if

the person intentionally escapes from a correctional or

detention facility or from custody.” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-

1021(1). The parties agree that the statute is divisible into

three distinct offenses: (1) escape from a correctional

facility; (2) escape from a detention facility; and, (3) escape

from custody. The parties further agree that, when the statute

is so subdivided, Simmons was convicted of the third version: 

escape from custody. Because, as we discuss below, the

crime of escape from custody is not a crime of violence under

§ 4B1.1(a), we assume, without deciding, that § 710-1021 is

divisible into the three crimes agreed upon by the parties.

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12 UNITED STATES V. SIMMONS

Perhaps anticipating our conclusion that the crime of

escape from custody does not qualify as a crime of violence

under § 4B1.1(a), the government argues that escape from

custody may be further subdivided into three additional,

distinct offenses. The government points to Hawaii Revised

Statutes § 710-1000(3), which defines “custody” as “restraint

by a public servant pursuant to arrest, detention, or order of

a court.” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1000(3) (emphasis added). 

Relying on this definition, the government argues that the

crime of escape from custody can be further subdivided into

three separate crimes: (1) escape from restraint by a public

servant pursuant to arrest; (2) escape from detention; and

(3) escape from order of a court.

We find this argument unavailing. Indeed, we recently

rejected an almost identical argument in United States v.

Cabrera-Gutierrez, 756 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2014) as

amended. In Cabrera-Gutierrez, we considered whether an

Oregon sexual abuse statute was divisible. Id. at 1135. The

statute at issue provided that a person commits sexual abuse

in the second degree “when that person subjects another

person to [certain sexual acts] and the victim does not consent

thereto.” Id. at 1133 (quoting Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.425). The

government there asserted that the statute was divisible

because another section of the state’s criminal code listed

four types of legal incapacity to consent. See id. at 1135

(citing Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.315). According to the

government, “the listing of several alternative modes of nonconsent in Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.315 render[ed] Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 163.425 divisible.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

We rejected this contention “for the simple reason that

[the defendant] was convicted of violating § 163.425, not

§ 163.315.” Id. We explained that, “under Descamps, what

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UNITED STATES V. SIMMONS 13

must be divisible are the elements of the crime, not the mode

or means of proving an element,” id. at 1137 n.16, and that,

“[t]o constitute an element of a crime, the particular factor in

question needs to be a constituent part of the offense that

must be proved by the prosecution in every case to sustain a

conviction under a given statute.” Id. at 1135 (quoting United

States v. Beltran-Munguia, 489 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir.

2007) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). 

Because, under Oregon law, none of the four modes set forth

in § 163.315 needed to be proven in order to sustain a

conviction under § 163.425, none was an element of the

crime of sexual assault. Id. Accordingly, we concluded that

§ 163.425 was not divisible. Id.

Here, as in Cabrera-Gutierrez, we reject the

government’s argument for the simple reason that Simmons

was convicted for violating § 710-1021, not § 710-1000(3). 

There is no support for the government’s argument that

§ 710-1000(3) sets forth “elements” that the prosecution must

prove in order to sustain a conviction under § 710-1021: 

Hawaii law makes clear that none of the three “modes” of

custody set forth in § 710-1000(3) needs to be proven in order

to convict a defendant of second degree escape. See, e.g.,

State v. Smith, 583 P.2d 337, 343 (Haw. 1978) (concluding

that the custody element of escape was satisfied when the

defendant was released on furlough and legally bound by the

restrictions of the furlough). Accordingly, none of the modes

of custody set forth in § 710-1000(3) is an element of the

crime of escape from custody. See Cabrera-Gutierrez,

756 F.3d at 1135.

Moreover, the government’s position is directly contrary

to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Descamps. Under

Hawaii law, the only thing that a “jury must find to convict

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14 UNITED STATES V. SIMMONS

the defendant” of second degree escape is that the defendant

was in custody. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2290. Hawaii

“juries are not instructed that they must agree unanimously

and beyond a reasonable doubt on whether the defendant”

escaped from restraint by a public servant pursuant to arrest,

detention, or order of a court; “rather, it is enough that each

juror agree only that one of the [three] occurred, without

settling on which.” Rendon, 764 F.3d at 1087 (quoting

United States v. Royal, 731 F.3d 333, 341 (4th Cir. 2013)

(internal quotation marks omitted)); see State v. Nakoa,

817 P.2d 1060, 1065 (Haw. 1991) (affirming a trial court’s

use of a jury instruction that read, “[u]nder our law ‘custody’

means restraint by a public servant pursuant to arrest or

detention.” (emphasis added)). Because § 710-1021 “requires

the jury to find only” that the defendant was in custody, the

“jurors need not all agree on whether the defendant” was

being restrained pursuant to arrest, detention, order of a court,

or some other form of custody. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at

2290. And, because the jury need not find “unanimously and

beyond a reasonable doubt” which mode of custody a

defendant escaped in order to sustain a conviction under

§ 710-1021, under Descamps, the crime of “escape from

custody” is not divisible. Id.

In sum, while we accept the parties’ agreement that

§ 710-1021 is divisible into three separate crimes, we reject

the government’s entreaty further to subdivide the crime of

“escape from custody.” To do so would violate both the

holding and reasoning of Descamps.

2.

Although we reject the government’s argument that the

crime of “escape from custody” is divisible, our inquiry is not

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UNITED STATES V. SIMMONS 15

at its end. As we noted above, the parties agree, and we

accept, that § 710-1021 is divisible into three distinct offenses

(escape from a correctional facility, escape from a detention

facility, and escape from custody). Moreover, the parties

agree, and we accept, that application of the modified

categorical approach demonstrates that Simmons was

convicted of the “escape from custody” version of the crime. 

In order to determine whether the crime of “escape from

custody” is a “crime of violence” as that term is defined in

§ 4B1.1(a), we must now “do what the categorical approach

demands: compare the elements of the crime of conviction

(including the alternative element used in the case) with the

elements of the generic crime.” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at

2281.

An offense is a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing

Guidelines if it is “punishable by imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year” and is an offense that

(1) has as an element the use, attempted use,

or threatened use of physical force against the

person of another, or

(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or

extortion, involves use of explosives, or

otherwise involves conduct that presents a

serious potential risk of physical injury to

another.

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). The offense of escape from custody

does not have as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of force; it is not burglary, arson, or extortion;

and it does not involve the use of explosives. See Haw. Rev.

Stat. § 710-1021. Thus, the crime of escape from custody can

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16 UNITED STATES V. SIMMONS

qualify as a crime of violence only if it falls into the last

clause – the so-called “residual” or “catchall” provision – of

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). See United States v. Piccolo,

441 F.3d 1084, 1086 (9th Cir. 2006).

To qualify as a crime of violence under the residual clause

of § 4B1.2(a), two criteria must be satisfied. “First, the

‘conduct encompassed by the elements of the offense, in the

ordinary case,’ must ‘present[] a serious potential risk of

physical injury to another.’” United States v. Park, 649 F.3d

1175, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting James v. United

States, 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007)) (alteration in original). 

Second, the prior offense must be “‘roughly similar, in kind

as well as in degree of risk posed’ to those offenses

enumerated at the beginning of the residual clause – burglary

of a dwelling, arson, extortion, and crimes involving

explosives.” Id. at 1178 (quoting Begay v. United States,

553 U.S. 137, 143 (2008)). The crime of escape from

custody satisfies neither criterion.

First, the crime of escape from custody does not “present

a serious potential risk of [physical] injury to another.” 

James, 550 U.S. at 208. In order to sustain an escape from

custody conviction, the prosecution must prove two elements

beyond a reasonable doubt: first, that the defendant escaped

from custody; and second, that he or she did so intentionally. 

Haw. Crim. Jury Instr. § 12.04; see also Haw. Rev. Stat.

§ 710-1021; Smith, 583 P.2d at 342. Proving that a defendant

“escape[d] from custody” “does not require proof of any

actual or potential risk of harm to others for a conviction.”

United States v. Jennings, 515 F.3d 980, 992 (9th Cir. 2008). 

State law makes clear that a defendant may violate § 710-

1021 in a way that poses no risk of physical injury to others. 

See Smith, 583 P.2d at 342. For example, a defendant may be

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UNITED STATES V. SIMMONS 17

convicted of escape from custody based on his “intentional

failure to return to physical confinement.” Id.; see also id. at

340 (affirming a defendant’s conviction for escape from

custody when he left the youth correctional facility at which

he was confined on a pass that allowed him to remain off the

facility from 8 a.m. to 7 p.m. and did not return until 3:30

a.m.). Because Simmons “could have been convicted on the

basis of conduct that did not present a serious potential risk

of physical injury to another,” his offense cannot be classified

as a “crime of violence.” United States v. Kelly, 422 F.3d

889, 893 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Chambers, 555 U.S. at

127–30 (noting that failure to report is not a violent felony

under the ACCA because it does not involve the risk of

physical harm inherent in active escapes); Piccolo, 441 F.3d

at 1089–90 (holding that escape is not categorically a crime

of violence because it can be effectuated in ways that do not

pose a danger to others, such as failure-to-report).

Moreover, the risk involved in the offense of escape from

custody is not roughly similar, in kind or in degree of risk

posed, to any of the enumerated offenses set forth in U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.2(a). See Park, 649 F.3d at 1178. First, the risk

involved in the crime of escape from custody is not similar in

kind to burglary, arson, extortion, or the use of explosives. 

Unlike arson or the use of explosives, the crime of escape

from custody does not necessarily involve the “intentional

release of a destructive force dangerous to others.” Sykes v.

United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2273 (2011). Unlike burglary,

the crime of escape from custody does not involve the

“invasion of victims’ homes or workplaces” and the attendant

risks of confrontation that inhere in those invasions. See

James, 550 U.S. at 225–26 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581);

see also United States v. Chandler, 743 F.3d 648, 654 (9th

Cir. 2014) (“The real danger of burglary, like robbery, is ‘the

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18 UNITED STATES V. SIMMONS

possibility of a face-to-face confrontation’ with the victim or

an intervener.” (quoting James, 660 U.S. at 203)). Finally,

unlike extortion, the crime of escape from custody does not

include “the wrongful use of force, fear, or threats.”

Chandler, 743 F.3d at 654 (quoting Scheidler v. Nat’l Org.

for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 409 (2003)). Accordingly,

the crime of escape from custody is not similar in kind to any

of the enumerated offenses.

Nor does the crime of escape from custody pose a similar

degree of risk as those crimes enumerated in § 4B1.2(a). As

noted above, escape from custody can be completed in a

manner that poses no risk of physical injury to others. See

Smith, 583 P.2d at 342. Escaping from custody does not

inherently involve risk to another or, in the ordinary course,

present such a risk. See Piccolo, 441 F.3d at 1089–90. The

same cannot be said of the enumerated offenses. See United

States v. Spencer, 724 F.3d 1133, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2013)

(recognizing that the enumerated offenses involve a

substantial risk of causing physical injury to another); United

States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 960 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting

that “Congress singled out the enumerated offenses because

. . . they often created a significant risk of bodily injury”). 

Because the risk involved in committing the crime of escape

from custody is less than the risk involved in any of the

offenses enumerated in § 4B1.2, it is not a crime of violence. 

See James, 550 U.S. at 203 (noting that the enumerated

offenses serve as a baseline for assessing whether a crime

presents a serious risk of physical injury to another).

IV.

We conclude that the district court erred in holding that

Simmons’ conviction under Hawaii Revised Statutes § 710-

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UNITED STATES V. SIMMONS 19

1021 is a “crime of violence” for purposes of U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.1(a). Accordingly, we vacate Simmons’ sentence and

remand for resentencing.

VACATED and REMANDED.

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