Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50549/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50549-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Lustig
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL LUSTIG, AKA

George,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-50549

D.C. No.

3:13-cr-03921-BEN-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted January 8, 2016

Pasadena, California

Filed July 29, 2016

Before: Paul J. Watford and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit

Judges and J. Frederick Motz,* Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Friedland;

Concurrence by Judge Watford

* The Honorable J. Frederick Motz, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed the district court in part, reversed in

part, and remanded, in a case in which an officer conducted

warrantless searches, incident to arrest, of cell phones found

in the defendant’s pockets two years before the Supreme

Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires law

enforcement officers to obtain a warrant before they may

search an arrestee’s cell phone.

The panel held that binding precedent at the time of the

searches provided a reasonable basis to believe the searches

were constitutional, and that the good-faith exception to the

exclusionary rule therefore applies to the evidence obtained

from those searches. The panel disagreed with the

defendant’s contention that the delay between the initial

searches and more comprehensive stationhouse searches

undertaken four days later rendered the stationhouse searches

unconstitutional.

Rejecting the defendant’s contention that harmless error

review does not apply in the context of a Fed. R. Crim. P.

11(a)(2) conditional guilty plea, the panel held that harmless

error review applies to the district court’s concededly

erroneous failure to suppress the fruit of searches of other cell

phones found in the defendant’s car. The panel held that the

standard that governs harmless error review in Rule 11(a)(2)

appeals is whether the government has proved beyond a

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG 3

reasonable doubt that the erroneously denied suppression

motion did not contribute to the defendant’s decision to plead

guilty. The panel concluded that the government did not

meet its burden of establishing harmless error, and remanded

to allow the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his guilty

plea.

Concurring, Judge Watford wrote that he does not think

Rule 11(a)(2)—or basic principles of contract law governing

plea agreements—permits any harmless error inquiry in this

context. He wrote that if this court does anything other than

affirm in full the denial of the defendant’s suppression

motion, he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea without

more.

COUNSEL

Timothy A. Scott (argued) and Nicolas O. Jimenez, Coleman,

Balogh & Scott LLP, San Diego, California, for DefendantAppellant.

Helen H. Hong (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Peter Ko, Chief, Appellate Section, Criminal Division; Laura

E. Duffy, United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s

Office, San Diego, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

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4 UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG

OPINION

FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge:

The United States Supreme Court held in Riley v.

California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), that the Fourth

Amendment requires law enforcement officers to obtain a

warrant before they may search an arrestee’s cell phone. 

Approximately two years before that decision, an officer

arresting Michael Lustig conducted warrantless searches,

incident to the arrest, of cell phones found in Lustig’s

pockets. We must determine whether pre-Riley precedent

provided a reasonable basis to believe such searches were

constitutional. Because we hold that binding appellate

precedent at the time of the searches did provide a reasonable

basis to believe the searches were constitutional, the goodfaith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to the

evidence obtained from those searches. In addition, we must

determine the effect of a concededly erroneous denial of a

motion to suppress evidence obtained from separate searches

of other cell phones found in Lustig’s car. To do so, we first

adopt our sister circuits’ test for evaluating harmlessness in

the context of a conditional guilty plea. Because the

Government has not met its burden of establishing

harmlessness under that test, Lustig must be given an

opportunity to vacate his guilty plea if he so wishes. We thus

affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.1

1

In a concurrently filed memorandum disposition, we address and reject

several secondary arguments Lustig raises in his briefing.

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UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG 5

I

In June 2012, a task force consisting of local and federal

law enforcement agencies conducted a sting operation to

obtain evidence of prostitution offenses. To effectuate the

operation, an undercover officer posed as a prostitute and

placed listings on a classified advertisements website. 

Defendant-Appellant Michael Lustig responded to the

advertisements and agreed to meet the undercover officer at

a hotel in Encinitas, California. Lustig was arrested at the

hotel for soliciting prostitution in violation of California law. 

Upon the arrest, Deputy Sheriff Chase Chiappino seized and

searched cell phones found on Lustig’s person and in his car.

Two cell phones were seized from Lustig’s pockets

incident to his arrest (the “Pocket Phones”). One was an

Apple iPhone, which Chiappino, upon its seizure, unlocked

by swiping across the screen. Chiappino observed that the

phone opened to the website where the fake advertisement

was posted, and he located the phone’s number on its settings

page. The other Pocket Phone was a Kyocera flip phone. 

Chiappino searched the Kyocera phone by viewing its call

history and text messages and identifying its phone number. 

The search revealed text messages suggesting further

involvement with prostitution.

Officers seized additional cell phones from Lustig’s car,

which was in the parking lot of the hotel (the “Car Phones”). 

At the scene, Chiappino searched those phones and found

additional text messages regarding prostitution.

Four days later, Chiappino returned to searching the

phones. He downloaded content from the phones and

searched the phones’ contacts in law enforcement databases. 

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The parties dispute whether Chiappino searched the Car

Phones or the Pocket Phones first, and whether evidence

discovered in one set of phones motivated searches of the

other.

In one of the Car Phones, Chiappino found text message

exchanges suggesting prostitution activity with a contact

named “Dominick.” He searched that contact’s phone

number in law enforcement databases but found no match. 

He also found a contact named “Dominick” in one of the

Pocket Phones (the iPhone), searched that phone number, and

discovered a match to a twelve-year-old minor female, whom

the officers thereafter referred to as “MF1.”

In his investigation of the Kyocera Pocket Phone,

Chiappino found a series of messages discussing libraries and

bookstores with a contact named “Andrew.” He searched for

that contact’s phone number in law enforcement databases

and matched it to a fourteen-year-old minor female, “MF2.”

Officers then located and interviewed MF1 and MF2

separately, and both confirmed that they had engaged in

commercial sex activity with Lustig. According to a

declaration filed by Chiappino but disputed by Lustig, MF2

also directed officers to a motel, where the officers eventually

obtained video surveillance of Lustig entering and leaving a

room with a female whom officers identified as MF1.

No warrants were obtained prior to any of these cell

phone searches. Sixteen months later, however, the officers

did obtain warrants to search two of the already searched Car

Phones.

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UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG 7

Lustig was indicted in the United States District Court for

the Southern District of California on two counts of child sex

trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a) and (b), based

on his conduct with MF1 and MF2. During pretrial

proceedings, Lustig moved to suppress the evidence found

through the searches of the phones. He argued that the

seizure of the Car Phones, and the searches of both the Car

Phones and Pocket Phones, violated the Fourth Amendment.2

The district court, after declining to hold a hearing, denied the

motion approximately three months before the Supreme

Court issued its decision in Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct.

2473 (2014).

Regarding the Pocket Phones, the district court held that

the searches were unconstitutional. It reasoned that

“searching an arrestee’s phone [without a warrant], beyond

what is in plain view, is an unreasonable search under the

Fourth Amendment . . . where the crime charged is a

misdemeanor,” as Lustig’s charge was at the time of arrest.3

Nevertheless, the district court went on to conclude that the

evidence found in the searches was admissible pursuant to the

good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The court

explained that at the time of the searches, the California

Supreme Court in People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011),

had held that warrantless searches of cell phones seized from

an arrestee’s person incident to arrest did not violate the

Fourth Amendment. The district court also noted that there

2 Lustig conceded that the Pocket Phones were properly seized incident

to arrest.

3 Lustig was initially arrested for soliciting prostitution in violation of

California Penal Code § 647(b). The state charge against Lustig was

eventually dismissed.

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8 UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG

were “no binding decisions to the contrary from the federal

courts.”

As to the Car Phones, the district court held that they were

constitutionally seized, but that the warrantless searches of

the phones’ content were unconstitutional. The district court

nevertheless declined to suppress evidence obtained from the

Car Phones. Because the Government eventually

attained—16 months later—a search warrant for the Car

Phones, the district court reasoned that the evidence would

inevitably have been discovered.

Lustig filed two motions to reconsider these suppression

rulings, each of which the district court denied. Lustig

subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2). Under the plea

agreement, Lustig pled guilty to three counts of violating

18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) by using a cell phone to facilitate a

prostitution offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, involving only

MF2, rather than the original indictment’s two counts for

child sex trafficking involving both MF1 and MF2. The

conditional guilty plea preserved Lustig’s right to appeal the

Fourth Amendment issues related to his motions to suppress.

After the plea was entered, the Government filed as part

of its sentencing submissions the aforementioned declaration

from Chiappino, which asserted that evidence concerning

MF2 “was wholly untainted by” evidence from the Car

Phones, and that officers “would have inevitably discovered”

MF1 even if not for the Car Phone searches.

Lustig now appeals the denial of his suppression motions.

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UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG 9

II

We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress

evidence de novo. United States v. Fowlkes, 804 F.3d 954,

960 (9th Cir. 2015). We review a district court’s factual

findings for clear error and its application of the good-faith

exception de novo. United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932,

937 (9th Cir. 2014).

III

Lustig advances two primary contentions on appeal. 

First, he argues that pre-Riley authority provided no

reasonable basis for Chiappino to search without a warrant

the contents of the Pocket Phones, and that the district court

therefore erred in holding that the fruit of those searches was

admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary

rule. Second, Lustig argues that the district court erred in

declining to suppress the Car Phone evidence. On appeal, the

Government concedes that the district court erred as to the

Car Phone evidence, but argues that the error was harmless

because it did not affect Lustig’s counts of conviction. We

address each issue in turn.

A

In Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), the

Supreme Court unanimously held that warrantless searches of

cell phones seized incident to arrest violate the Fourth

Amendment. Id. at 2495. There is thus no question that the

searches of Lustig’s Pocket Phones were unconstitutional. 

The question on appeal is instead whether the good-faith

exception to the exclusionary rule nevertheless makes

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10 UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG

admissible the evidence found in the Pocket Phone searches. 

We hold that it does.

The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.

amend. IV. To deter Fourth Amendment violations, courts

apply the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence that has been

unconstitutionally obtained. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S.

229, 236–37 (2011). In circumstances in which “suppression

fails to yield ‘appreciable deterrence,’” however,the Supreme

Court has held that “exclusion is ‘clearly . . . unwarranted.’” 

Id. at 237 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.

Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)). “[W]hen the police act

with an objectively ‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their

conduct is lawful . . . the ‘deterrence rationale loses much of

its force,’” and therefore the exclusionary rule does not apply. 

Id. at 238 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909,

919 (1984)). In Davis, the Supreme Court held that such a

“reasonable good-faith belief” exists when searches are

conducted “in objectively reasonable reliance on binding

appellate precedent.” Id. at 238, 249–50.

Davis involved a vehicle search during which the arrestee,

Davis, was out of reaching distance of the car. Davis moved

to suppress a revolver found inside the vehicle. Id. at 223–36. 

The Eleventh Circuit had long approved of such searches,

understanding the Supreme Court’s decision in New York v.

Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), “to establish a bright-line rule

authorizing substantially contemporaneous” automobile

searches incident to arrest. Davis, 564 U.S. at 235 (citing

United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 822, 824–27 (11th

Cir. 1996)). The district court denied Davis’s motion,

consistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s law at the time. While

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UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG 11

Davis’s appeal was pending, however, the Supreme Court

held in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), that vehicle

searches pursuant to arrest are generally forbidden when the

arrestee is out of reaching distance of the vehicle. Davis,

564 U.S. at 234. The Supreme Court in Davis held that,

although Gant made the search of Davis’s car

unconstitutional, the good-faith exception applied because the

search had been “in strict compliance with” “binding

appellate precedent.” Id. at 240–41.

Here, the Government argues that, like the officers in

Davis, Chiappino reasonably relied on then-binding appellate

precedent authorizing his search of Lustig’s Pocket Phones. 

The Government specifically points to United States v.

Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), in which the Supreme Court

held, seemingly as a categorical matter, that “in the case of a

lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only

an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth

Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that

Amendment.” Id. at 235. The Supreme Court emphasized

that “[t]he authority to search the person incident to a lawful

custodial arrest . . . does not depend on . . . the probability in

a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would

in fact be found upon the person of the suspect,” because

once there is probable cause to arrest, “a search incident to

the arrest requires no additional justification.” Id. Applying

this broad principle, the Supreme Court held that an officer

had not violated the Fourth Amendment by searching a

crumpled package of cigarettes in the arrestee’s pocket

without a warrant, or by seizing the heroin capsules hidden

therein. Id. at 236.

We agree with the Government that, before Riley, it was

objectively reasonable to have interpreted Robinson to

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12 UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG

announce a bright-line rule authorizing any search incident to

arrest of any item found in an arrestee’s pocket.

1

As a threshold matter, we recognize the obvious fact that

Robinson did not involve searches of cell phones, and indeed

could not have, given the state of technology at the time. 

Lustig argues that Robinson’s lack of factual equivalence to

his case is alone sufficient to preclude application of the

good-faith exception under Davis. But, as the Third Circuit

has accurately observed, “[n]o two cases will be factually

identical.” United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 176 (3d

Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1448 (2015). 

The Third Circuit has explained that the Davisinquiry “is not

answered simply by mechanically comparing the facts of

cases and tallying their similarities and differences. Rather,

[it] involves a holistic examination of whether a reasonable

officer would believe in good faith that binding appellate

precedent authorized certain conduct.” Id. The relevant

determination is thus whether “the rationale underpinning the

[binding appellate precedent] . . . clearly authorized the

[officers’] conduct.” Id. at 173–74 (emphasis added); see

also United States v. Burston, 806 F.3d 1123, 1129 (8th Cir.

2015) (considering whether the purported binding precedent

“provide[s] a rationale to justify [the officer’s] search”);

United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 337–38 (4th Cir.

2014) (“[I]t is the legal principle of [the precedent], rather

than the precise factual circumstances, that matters.”), cert.

denied, 136 S. Ct. 43 (2015); United States v. Aguiar,

737 F.3d 251, 260–62 (2d Cir. 2013) (rejecting the contention

that binding appellate precedent must be “specific to the facts

at hand”).

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UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG 13

Our own case law is consistent with this approach to

applying the good-faith exception. In United States v.

Thomas, 726 F.3d 1086, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 2013), we held

that the good-faith exception applied when officers relied on

Supreme Court precedent that was silent on the key fact

motivating the suppression motion. There, the defendant

challenged as unconstitutional a drug-detection dog’s

touching of his vehicle during a dog-sniff inspection of the

vehicle—an inspection that resulted in the discovery and

seizure of marijuana. Id. at 1092. The defendant relied on

two Supreme Court cases decided after the seizure in question

for the proposition that the dog’s physically touching his

vehicle was an unconstitutional trespass prohibited by the

Fourth Amendment.4Id. at 1092–93. We held that, whether

or not the dog’s physical contact with the car violated the

Fourth Amendment under these later cases, Supreme Court

precedent at the time of the incident categorically authorizing

dog-sniff inspections at vehicle stops made the evidence

admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary

rule. Id. at 1094–95 (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,

410 (2005) (“A dog sniff conducted during a . . . lawful

traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location

of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does

not violate the Fourth Amendment”) (alteration in original),

and City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000)

(“[A]n exterior sniff of an automobile” is permissible because

it “does not require entry into the car.”)). Although Caballes

and Edmond did not address physical contact with a vehicle,

4 Specifically, the defendant relied on United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.

945 (2012) (holding that attaching a GPS device to a car constituted a

Fourth Amendment search), and Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409

(2013) (holding that a dog-sniff conducted in the curtilage of the

defendant’s home was a Fourth Amendment search).

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14 UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG

we nevertheless held that the good-faith exception applied

because neither case “so much as hinted that officers were to

avoid contact” between the dog and the vehicle’s exterior. 

Thomas, 726 F.3d at 1095. Because the binding case law at

the time of the inspection “specifically authorize[d] a

particular police practice”—exterior dog-sniffs at vehicle

stops—“the absence of a previously expressed limit” on the

categorical rule, rather than a prior endorsement of a

particular subset of factual circumstances, was dispositive of

the good-faith analysis. Id. (quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at 241).

Following this approach, we reject Lustig’s contention

that the good-faith exception cannot apply here because, at

the time of his arrest, there had not been any decision by this

Circuit or the Supreme Court directly authorizing warrantless

cell phone searches incident to arrest. If precedent had to

constitute a factual match with the circumstances of the

search in question for the good-faith exception to apply, it

would make the good-faith exception a nullity because the

exception would only apply when the search was necessarily

constitutional under existing precedent.

Considering, then, the legal principles established by

Robinson and not merely its specific facts, we conclude that

Robinson was binding appellate authority that made it

reasonable to search Lustig’s Pocket Phones. Even the

Supreme Court in Riley, which “decline[d] to extend

Robinson” from physical objects to cell phone data,

acknowledged that Robinson had established a “categorical

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UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG 15

rule,” and that “a mechanical application of Robinson might

well support” cell phone searches. 134 S. Ct. at 2484–85.5

Lustig argues, however, that the law governing

warrantless searches of cell phones was unsettled at the time

of the search, thus precluding objectively reasonable reliance

on Robinson. In support, Lustig cites a handful of federal

district court decisions and an Ohio Supreme Court decision

pre-dating the searches here, which had held that cell phone

searches incident to arrest were unconstitutional. See, e.g.,

United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375SI, 2007 WL 1521573,

at *6–9 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d

949, 954 (Ohio 2009).

The Davis inquiry, however, is focused on binding

appellate authority, which Lustig’s cases are not. See United

States v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 1087, 1090–91 (9th Cir.

2012) (looking to Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent

5 The Fifth Circuit—before Riley and before the Pocket Phone searches

at issue here—similarly understood Robinson to authorize searches of cell

phones incident to arrest. See United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250,

259–60 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that, under Robinson, a valid custodial

arrest permits a warrantless search of an individual’s cell phone, including

its call records and text messages). In United States v. Flores-Lopez,

670 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 2012), also decided before the Pocket Phone

searches here, the Seventh Circuit likewise held that looking in a cell

phone for the cell phone’s number did not exceed what Robinson allows. 

Lustig is correct that the Seventh Circuit went on to discuss the unique

features of cell phones, but it explicitly left “for another day” the

constitutionality of a “more extensive search of a cell phone without a

warrant.” Id. The First Circuit eventually held that a search incident to

arrest does not authorize the warrantless search of data on a cell phone

seized from an arrestee’s person, but it did so after the searches at issue

here. See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2013), aff’d sub

nom. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).

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in applying Davis);see also United States v. Taylor, 776 F.3d

513, 517 n.1 (7th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (noting that courts

applying Davis look to “circuit-level binding appellate

precedent,” but that “[c]ircuits without local precedent . . .

rel[y] on . . . Supreme Court” precedent); United States v.

Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d 865, 867–68 (8th Cir. 2013)

(for the Davis good-faith exception to apply, “officers

performing a particular investigatory action . . . must strictly

comply with binding appellate precedent governing the

jurisdiction in which they are acting”); United States v.

Aguiar, 737 F.3d 251, 261 (2d Cir. 2013) (“binding

precedent” under Davis “refers to the precedent of this Circuit

and the Supreme Court”). Even if state appellate court

decisions could serve as “binding appellate precedent”—a

question we do not decide, see infra n.10—an Ohio state

court appellate decision had no “binding” effect on the

officers’ searches of Lustig’s phones in California. Lustig’s

contrary argument would suggest that police could not rely on

Supreme Court precedent that seems to authorize the search

in question if any district court or state court anywhere in the

country disagreed about the breadth of that precedent. We

decline to impose on law enforcement an obligation to

constantly search for non-binding authority across all

jurisdictions and to curtail their otherwise authorized

activities as soon as any court casts existing precedent into

doubt.6

6 A sufficient body of district court or state appellate court decisions

could perhaps create enough uncertainty about the scope of prior appellate

precedent to make it unreasonable to rely on that precedent. See Davis,

564 U.S. at 250–51 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing

that when the “law in the area” is “unsettled,” law enforcement officials

should “err on the side of constitutional behavior”) (quoting United States

v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982)). We need not determine here

whether that is so or precisely what would be required to create enough

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UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG 17

Lustig contends that application of the good-faith

exception here is precluded by our decision in United States

v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2014), which he argues has

already held that the good-faith exception does not apply to

pre-Riley warrantless cell phone searches. Lustig

misconstrues Camou, which dealt only with the timing of

searches following an arrest. In Camou, United States Border

Patrol agents had stopped the defendant’s truck at an

inspection checkpoint and discovered an undocumented

immigrant hiding in the truck. Id. at 935. The defendant was

placed under arrest and agents seized his truck as well as a

cell phone found in the cab of the truck. Id. One hour and

twenty minutes after the defendant’s arrest, an agent searched

the cell phone and found photographic images of child

pornography. Id. at 936. The defendant was indicted on

child pornography charges and moved to suppress the images

found on his cell phone. Id. The district court denied the

motion and we reversed. Id. at 936–37. We held, inter alia,

that the search of the phone was not incident to arrest because

it was conducted at a time too remote from the arrest, and that

the good-faith exception did not apply because the

“governing law at the time of the search made clear that a

search incident to arrest had to be contemporaneous with the

arrest.” Id. at 944–45 (citing United States v. Hudson,

100 F.3d 1409, 1419 (9th Cir. 1996)).

Although Camou, in its broadest outlines, is a post-Riley

case holding that the good-faith exception did not apply to a

pre-Riley cell phone search, it did not address the central

issue here—whether, when a cell phone is found during an

uncertainty because it is clear that, in light of Robinson’s seemingly broad

and categorical holding, the handful of decisions that Lustig cites were not

enough to make reliance on Robinson unreasonable.

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otherwise unquestionably valid search incident to arrest, it

may be searched during the arrest without a warrant.7

Because Camou said nothing about the question we face

here—and indeed never mentioned Robinson at all, let alone

its relationship to Riley—it does not foreclose application of

the good-faith exception to the searches of Lustig’s Pocket

Phones.

Lustig’s reliance on our recent decision in United States

v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 2016)—another post-Riley

case that declined to apply the good-faith exception to a preRiley search of a cell phone—is similarly unavailing. Lara

concerned a warrantless search of a probationer’s cell phone

pursuant to a probation agreement that included a “Fourth

Amendment waiver.” Id. at 607. The Fourth Amendment

waiver provided that the probationer would submit his

“person and property, including any residence, premises,

container or vehicle . . . to search and seizure at any time” by

any officer, “with or without a warrant, probable cause, or

reasonable suspicion.” Id. The probationer was ultimately

charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and

ammunition based on evidence discovered from a search of

his cell phone. Id. at 608. The probationer moved to

suppress that evidence. Id. On appeal, we held that the

waiver language did not clearly authorize the search in that

case, and that the search was not otherwise a reasonable

probation search. Id. at 610, 612.

7 Lustig also challenges the resumption of that initial search four days

later, which we address below.

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In addition, although we rejected the government’s

reliance on the Davis good-faith exception,8 we specifically

distinguished cases involving searches of cell phones incident

to arrest: “It hardly needs saying that a search incident to

arrest is not the same thing as a warrantless, suspicionless,

probation search. Nor is a case dealing with an incidental

search on all fours with a probation search.” Id. at 614. 

Given this language in Lara making clear that the questions

it addressed were distinct from the questions posed by

searches incident to arrest, Lara does not help Lustig resist

application of the good-faith exception here.

Finally, Lustig suggests that Riley tacitly rejected

applying the good-faith exception to cell phone searches. He

points to the fact that the Supreme Court in Riley

unanimously rejected the argument that Robinson extended

to cell phone searches as evidence that it was never

reasonable to think that Robinson authorized such searches. 

But the Supreme Court suggested exactly the opposite when

it observed, as noted above, that “mechanical application of

Robinson might well support the warrantless searches at issue

here.” Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484.9

8 Because in Lara the government had not sought application of the

good-faith exception in the district court, we held that the argument had

not been preserved on appeal. Id. at 613. We nevertheless proceeded to

explain that we would have rejected the argument on the merits even if not

waived. Id.

9 Lustig also argues that because Riley affirmed the First Circuit’s

decision in Wurie, which rejected the government’s good-faith exception

arguments, Riley must have done so as well. But Wurie concluded that the

government had waived the good-faith exception, not that the exception

was inapplicable on the merits. See Wurie, 728 F.3d at 13–14 (holding

that because the government “did not invoke the exception before the

district court,” it “entirely failed to carry [its] burden”).

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Because Robinson, by its terms, “specifically

authorize[d]” the search incident to arrest of an object found

on the arrestee’s person, the good-faith exception makes

admissible the evidence obtained during the searches of the

Pocket Phones incident to Lustig’s arrest.10 Davis, 564 U.S.

at 241 (emphasis omitted). As the First Circuit observed in

discussing another line of precedent, even though this brightline rule “turned out not to be as categorical as [it] seemed,

. . . that is not a reason to penalize the police for applying [it]

faithfully before [that] clarification[] occurred.” United

States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 67 (1st Cir. 2013).

2

Lustig contends that even if the good-faith exception

saves the searches of the Pocket Phones conducted at the

hotel, the delay between those initial searches and the more

comprehensive stationhouse searches undertaken four days

later rendered the stationhouse searches unconstitutional. We

disagree.

10 The Government argues that the California Supreme Court’s decision

in People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011), supports the conclusion that

Chiappino could reasonably believe that Robinson authorized the Pocket

Phone searches. Diaz held that, under Robinson, searches of cell phones

discovered directly from an arrestee’s person comported with the Fourth

Amendment. Id. at 505–06. Lustig responds that Diaz is irrelevant

because it is not binding federal appellate authority, and the searches of

his phones were conducted by officers cross-designated as federal agents. 

Because we hold that Robinson provides the applicable binding appellate

authority creating a reasonable basis for the Pocket Phone searches here,

and because we may affirmon any ground supported by the record, United

States v. Albers, 136 F.3d 670, 672 (9th Cir. 1998), we need not decide

whether state court decisions such as Diaz have any relevance to the goodfaith analysis here.

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UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG 21

In United States v. Burnette, 698 F.2d 1038 (9th Cir.

1983), we held that once an item “has been lawfully seized

and searched, subsequent searches of that item, so long as it

remains in the legitimate uninterrupted possession of the

police, may be conducted without a warrant.” Id. at 1049. In

specifically holding that a brief search of a purse incident to

arrest and a more detailed warrantless search of the same

purse later at the stationhouse were both constitutional, we

emphasized the “necessarily reduced expectation of privacy

one holds in his person after being placed under arrest” and

the “necessarily reduced” expectation of privacy in an item

already validly searched incident to arrest. Id. “Requiring

police to procure a warrant for subsequent searches of an item

already lawfully searched would in no way provide additional

protection for an individual’s legitimate privacy interests.” 

Id. This reasoning applies to the searches here, whether

delayed by four hours or four days. Because the Pocket

Phones were lawfully seized from Lustig’s person and

immediately searched incident to arrest, Burnette fully

authorizes the later searches. At the very least, it was

reasonable for Chiappino to believe that four days was a

permissible delay.

Lustig argues to the contrary, contending that the four-day

delay is “far more egregious” than the one hour and twenty

minute delay at issue in Camou. See Camou, 773 F.3d at

944–45. Camou, however, did not consider how a

preliminary search at the time of arrest might affect a later

search of the same item. In Camou, there was no search of

the cell phone incident to arrest, so the delayed warrantless

search was the initial search. Camou thus has no bearing

here.

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In sum, Robinson made it objectively reasonable to

believe that the searches of the Pocket Phones were

constitutional. We further conclude that Burnette authorized

the subsequent stationhouse searches of the Pocket Phones,

or at least provided a basis for a good-faith belief that those

searches were lawful. We therefore affirm the denial of

Lustig’s suppression motion as to the Pocket Phones.

B

Lustig also challenges the denial of the motion to

suppress evidence obtained through the Car Phone searches. 

In its Answering Brief, the Government concedes, citing

United States v. Sullivan, 753 F.3d 845, 855–56 (9th Cir.

2014),11that it did not present sufficient evidence to show

that the 16-month delay between the seizure of the Car

Phones and the officers’ obtaining a warrant to search them

was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and that the

district court therefore erred in denying Lustig’s motion. The

Government argues, however, that the error was harmless. It

contends that because Lustig pled guilty only to charges

involving MF2, whom the Government asserts was identified

exclusively through information obtained from the Pocket

Phones, any evidence derived from the Car Phones was

“immaterial to Lustig’s conviction.” We are not persuaded

that this is the relevant harmlessness inquiry. Rather, as our

sister circuits have held, the relevant question in the

conditional plea context is whether the erroneous suppression

ruling could have affected Lustig’s decision to plead guilty. 

11 This version of the Sullivan opinion cited by the Government was

subsequently withdrawn and superseded by a revised opinion. See United

States v. Sullivan, 797 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2015). The relevant portion

remained substantively unchanged.

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Because it could have, we reverse the suppression ruling on

the Car Phones.

1

As an initial matter, we agree with the Government’s

contention that harmless error review applies here. The

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically provide,

under the heading “[h]armless [e]rror,” that “[a]ny error,

defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial

rights must be disregarded.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). And the

Supreme Court has held that, generally, constitutional errors

in criminal proceedings must be disregarded if the

government can prove that they are harmless “beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7

(1999) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24

(1967)).

Consistent with these general principles, our prior

decisions have applied harmless error review in the Rule

11(a)(2) conditional plea context.12In United States v.

Richard Davis, 530 F.3d 1069, 1083 (9th Cir. 2008), for

instance, we held that a frisk of the defendant violated his

Fourth Amendment rights and that the district court erred by

failing to suppress the hashish oil discovered as a result of

that frisk. Nevertheless, we held that the error did not

 

12 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2) provides:

With the consent of the court and the government, a

defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo

contendere, reserving in writing the right to have an

appellate court review an adverse determination of a

specified pretrial motion. A defendant who prevails on

appeal may then withdraw the plea.

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mandate reversal because, even without the hashish oil, the

officers had “sufficient [evidence] to establish probable cause

to search [the defendant’s] truck”—a search that ultimately

led to discovery of the marijuana plants that formed the basis

of the defendant’s conviction. Id. at 1076, 1083–84. 

Therefore, “[a]ny error by the district court in failing to

suppress the hashish oil was harmless.” Id. at 1084; see also,

e.g., United States v. DiCesare, 765 F.2d 890, 896–99 (9th

Cir.), amended, 777 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985) (reviewing

district court errors for harmless error on appeal from a

conditional plea).

Lustig’s contention that harmless error review does not

apply in the Rule 11(a)(2) context, and that any error,

however slight or tangential, requires reversal with the

opportunity to withdraw the plea, is incorrect in light of this

precedent. Lustig rests his argument entirely on a statement

in a footnote in our decision in United States v. Mejia,

69 F.3d 309 (9th Cir. 1995), that “[i]f any ruling that forms a

basis for the conditional plea is found to be erroneous, we are

required to permit the defendant to withdraw his plea.” Id. at

316 n.8. In context, it is clear that this sentence was not

stating a general proposition but responded instead to the

particular facts of that case.

Mejia concerned two motions to suppress, relating to a

confession and consent to search a home, respectively. Both

the confession and the consent to search arose out of an

allegedly unconstitutional interrogation. The error we held

the district court to have made related to a continuance denial

that prevented the defendant from presenting testimony

needed to resolve material fact disputes about the

interrogation. We explained in the same footnote that:

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given the fact that the [two] motions [to

suppress] were heard together, that they

related to the same interrogation and involved

overlapping issues, that the failure to give a

Mirandawarning can be a consideration when

determining questions of consent, and that the

court’s error as to both motions was identical,

we would conclude that, under all the

circumstances, a showing of prejudice as to

either would be sufficient to require a finding

of error and a new hearing as to both.

Id. This factual context shows that the statement Lustig relies

upon cannot be interpreted to broadly foreclose harmless

error review in all instances. Instead, it refers to the

interrelated nature of the two motions and the conditional

plea at issue in that case. Indeed, the need to show that an

error was prejudicial in order for that error to trigger the right

to vacate a plea was clarified in the same footnote by the

phrase “a showing of prejudice as to either [motion] would be

sufficient to require a finding of error and a new hearing as to

both.” Id. (emphasis added).

This understanding of Rule 11(a)(2) is consistent with the

approaches of other circuits, which likewise have applied

harmless error type principles in the conditional plea context. 

See, e.g., United States v. Benard, 680 F.3d 1206, 1212–15

(10th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d

546, 557 (D.C. Cir. 2014); United States v. Leake, 95 F.3d

409, 420 n.21 (6th Cir. 1996).13 We thus agree with the

13 Peyton and Leake framed the issue as whether the defendant had

“prevail[ed] on appeal” for purposes of Rule 11(a)(2), rather than whether

the district court error was “harmless.” See Peyton, 745 F. 3d at 557;

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Government that harmless error review applies to the district

court’s failure to suppress the fruit of the Car Phone searches.

2

Having established that harmless error review applies in

Rule 11(a)(2) appeals, we must now determine the standards

that govern that review. The Government urges us to adopt

a standard that defines an error as harmless when we can

conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the evidence

erroneously admitted was “immaterial to [the defendant’s]

conviction.” Our cases have not directly addressed this issue,

but Rule 11(a)(2) itself and authority from our sister circuits

cause us to believe that the correct standard is instead whether

the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that

the erroneously denied suppression motion did not contribute

to the defendant’s decision to plead guilty.

The critical event for a defendant in a conditional plea

context is the decision to plead guilty after considering what

a trial would entail in light of the failed pretrial motions. 

Rule 11(a)(2) allows a defendant, having lost certain pretrial

motions, to plead guilty while reserving the right to appeal

those pretrial rulings. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, advisory

committee’s note to 1983 amendment (stating that the

purpose of subsection (a)(2) is to avoid forcing “a defendant

who has lost one or more pretrial motions” to “go through an

entire trial simply to preserve the pretrial issues for later

appellate review”). As the Tenth Circuit has held, unlike in

Leake, 95 F.3d at 419–20 & n.21. However framed, the ultimate question

is the same: when is a defendant entitled to withdraw his plea due to the

district court’s error? If an error is deemed harmless, then the defendant

will not have “prevail[ed] on appeal,” and vice versa.

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UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG 27

cases decided by a jury, in which constitutional error will be

harmless if the court concludes “beyond a reasonable doubt

that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict

obtained,” United States v. Benard, 680 F.3d 1206, 1213

(10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24), for

convictions based on conditional guilty pleas, the test must be

“reformulated to determine whether there is a reasonable

possibility that the error contributed to the plea,” id.

(emphasis added) (quoting People v. Grant, 380 N.E.2d 257,

264 (N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Molina-Gomez,

781 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir. 2015) (considering whether

suppression of the contested evidence “would have affected

[the defendant’s] decision to plead guilty”). It is thus whether

the evidence at issue in an erroneously denied suppression

motion could have affected the defendant’s decision to plead

guilty, not whether the evidence was material to a charge to

which the defendant pled, that determines whether the

suppression error was harmless in a conditional plea context.

The relevant inquiry in this case is thus whether there is

a “reasonable possibility”14that the erroneously admitted Car

Phone evidence contributed to Lustig’s decision to plead

guilty. Benard, 680 F.3d at 1213. This “reasonable

possibility” standard is necessarily hard for the government

to meet. This is because, as the Tenth Circuit has explained,

 

14 In the Tenth Circuit’s formulation, which we adopt here, concluding

that there is a “reasonable possibility” that the error contributed to the plea

decision is the opposite of concluding “beyond a reasonable doubt that the

. . . error did not contribute” to the plea decision. Benard, 680 F.3d at

1214 (emphasis added). In other words, an error will be harmless for Rule

11(a)(2) purposes if an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable

doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendant’s decision to plead

guilty, but will not be harmless if there is a reasonable possibility that the

error did contribute to the decision to plead guilty.

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“in the context of a plea, the record will be unlikely to contain

enough information for an appellate court” to conclude

beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence did or did not

contribute to the defendant’s plea decision. Id. A

“defendant’s decision to plead guilty may be based on any

factor inside or outside the record,” id. (quoting Grant,

380 N.E.2d at 264), and “only the defendant is in a position

to evaluate the impact of a particular erroneous refusal to

suppress evidence,” id. (citation omitted) (quoting Jones v.

Wisconsin, 562 F.2d 440, 445 (7th Cir. 1977)). 

“Accordingly, ‘an appellate court will rarely, if ever, be able

to determine whether an erroneous denial of a motion to

suppress contributed to the defendant’s decision [to plead

guilty], unless at the time of the plea he states or reveals his

reason for pleading guilty.’” Id. (alteration in original)

(quoting Grant, 380 N.E.2d at 265)).

Applying these principles, the Tenth Circuit in Benard

rejectedthe government’s argument that the suppression error

there was harmless because the key firearm evidence

supporting the firearm conviction that determined the

defendant’s ultimate sentence was not affected by the error. 

Id. Instead, the Tenth Circuit held that it was unable to

“conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court’s

error did not contribute to [the defendant’s] decision to plead

guilty. The record does not indicate why [the defendant]

decided to plead guilty, what other defenses or evidence he

might have produced on his behalf, or how the altered

bargaining positions of the parties might have affected his

decision if his post-arrest statements had been properly

suppressed.” Id. at 1214.

Further, the Tenth Circuit rejected the government’s

contention in Benard that, on remand, the case should be

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UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG 29

limited to the defendant’s firearm conviction because the

suppression error implicated only the defendant’s drug

conviction. Id. The Tenth Circuit explained that a reviewing

court should consider the error’s effect on the “bargaining

positions of the parties” in light of “the aggregate strength of

all the incriminating evidence accumulated by the

government,” including evidence on other counts. Id.

(alteration omitted) (quoting People v. Miller, 658 P.2d 1320,

1325–26 (Cal. 1983) (in bank)). “[F]inding the suppression

error to affect only some counts of a multi-count indictment

would interfere with the defendant’s ‘prerogative to

personally decide whether to stand trial or to waive his rights

by pleading guilty’ to the various counts of the indictment.” 

Id. (quoting People v. Hill, 528 P.2d 1, 29 (Cal. 1974),

overruled on other grounds by People v. Devaughn, 558 P.2d

889 (Cal. 1977) (in bank)). Because the Tenth Circuit could

not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

“would still have agreed to waive his right to a jury trial as to

either or both of the counts of conviction absent the district

court’s error,” it remanded “both counts of conviction under

Rule 11(a)(2).” Id. at 1214–15.

Other circuits are in accord with these principles. The

Sixth Circuit in United States v. Leake, 95 F.3d 409 (6th Cir.

1996), for example, articulated a standard substantially

similar to the Tenth Circuit’s for determining when a

defendant would be entitled to withdraw his plea, requiring

consideration of “the probability that the excluded evidence

would have had a material effect on the defendant’s decision

to plead guilty.” Id. at 420 n.21 (emphasis added). The D.C.

Circuit has adopted a similar test. See United States v.

Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 557 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Leake to

conclude that the defendant was entitled to withdraw his

plea); see also United States v. Burns, 684 F.2d 1066, 1076

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(2d Cir. 1982) (addressing conditional pleas prior to Rule

11(a)(2) and holding that failure to suppress evidence was

harmless error because suppression “would not have altered

appellant’s decision to plead guilty”).

Recently, the First Circuit arguably applied a

harmlessness standard even harder (or impossible) for the

government to satisfy when it remanded a case to allow the

defendant to withdraw his guilty plea despite noting that “it

is highly unlikely that the suppression of [the statements in

question] regarding drug trafficking activity . . . would have

affected [the defendant’s] decision to plead guilty.” United

States v. Molina-Gomez, 781 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir. 2015). The

First Circuit explained that determining whether the

defendant would have pled guilty absent the error was “not

our decision to make. . . . ‘[A] court has no right to decide for

a defendant that his decision [to plead guilty] would have

been the same had the evidence the court considers harmless

not been present.’” Id. (second alteration in original)

(quoting United States v. Weber, 668 F.2d 552, 562 (1st Cir.

1981)). The defendant “is entitled to determine for himself

whether he still wishes to plead guilty given the suppression

of the drug-trafficking-related statements.” Id.

Insofar as Molina-Gomez may be read to mandate remand

on any error without considering harmlessness,15our

15

It is unclear to what extent, if any, the First Circuit intended to adopt

a different standard than that articulated in Benard, given that it relied in

Molina-Gomez on the same authority as Benard to establish an appellate

court’s limited role in determining harmless error under Rule 11(a)(2). 

See Molina-Gomez, 781 F.3d at 25 (quoting Weber, 668 F.2d at 562, and

noting that Weber “adopt[ed] the rationale of the Seventh Circuit and

numerous state courts,” namely Jones v. Wisconsin, 562 F.2d 440 (7th Cir.

1977), People v. Grant, 380 N.E.2d 257 (N.Y. 1978), and People v. Hill,

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precedents applying harmless error review, described above,

foreclose adopting such a blanket rule. See, e.g., Richard

Davis, 530 F.3d at 1083; see also Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d

889, 892–93 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that a threejudge panel is bound by prior circuit precedent unless “clearly

irreconcilable . . . intervening higher authority” “effectively

overrule[s]” the precedent). We instead adopt the rule

articulated by a plurality of the circuit courts, under which we

must consider whether an erroneous denial of a motion to

suppress contributed to the defendant’s decision to plead

guilty, and under which it is only the “rare[]” case in which

we may definitively make the harmlessness determination

necessary to preclude remand. Benard, 680 F.3d at 1213; see

also United States v. Mikolon, 719 F.3d 1184, 1188–89 (10th

Cir. 2013) (recognizing Benard’s standard for allowing the

defendant to vacate the plea but concluding beyond a

reasonable doubt that any error did not contribute to the

defendant’s decision to plead guilty because “[t]he

government unequivocally represented to [the defendant] and

the court that it would not seek to admit [the defendant’s]

statements at trial” and thereby took the contested statements

“off the table”).

Contrary to the Government’s arguments, our precedent

is not inconsistent with a Rule 11(a)(2) inquiry that looks to

the decision to plead guilty rather than the relationship of the

wrongfully admitted evidence to the conviction. Although

we noted in United States v. Sines, 761 F.2d 1434, 1442 (9th

Cir. 1985), that the evidence wrongfully admitted was

“immaterial to [the defendant’s] conviction,” that case did not

mention,much less consider, the essential distinction between

evidence of underlying guilt and evidence that could

528 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1974), all of which Benard also relied upon).

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contribute to a plea decision in the Rule 11(a)(2) context. 

Moreover, even if it had, it is unlikely that that distinction

would have made a difference to the outcome of that

particular case. Sines was an example of the “rare” case in

which it was clear that the wrongfully admitted evidence

made no difference either to the decision to plead guilty or to

the conviction. The evidence at issue in Sines was the

defendant’s passport, which the prosecution could have used

to corroborate a witness’s testimony that the defendant was

in Thailand at the relevant time. Id. We determined,

however, that the passport was entirely unnecessary for that

purpose because other ample and admissible evidence served

the same function. Id. Furthermore, the prosecution did not

even mention the passport as part of the evidence against the

defendant during the defendant’s nolo contendere plea

colloquy, despite mentioning all of the other evidence that

proved his presence in Thailand. Id. The passport was thus

unambiguously not a factor in the case.16

In sum, in light of the purpose and effect of Rule 11(a)(2)

and our existing case law, we agree with the approach taken

by at least the plurality of our sister circuits for analyzing

whether an error is harmless under Rule 11(a)(2). If it is

beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to

the decision to plead guilty, it will be considered harmless. 

Otherwise, the error will require a remand to provide an

opportunity for the defendant to vacate the guilty plea.

16 The Government also relies on United States v. Richard Davis,

530 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2008), to argue for a harmlessness standard that

looks solely at the relationship between the evidence in question and the

charges of conviction. But nowhere in Richard Davis did we discuss the

import of the suppression error on either the defendant’s ultimate

conviction or his decision to plead guilty.

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3

Applying this framework to the present case, we conclude

that the Government has not met its burden of establishing

harmless error. See United States v. Velarde-Gomez,

269 F.3d 1023, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“The burden

of proving a constitutional error harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt rests upon the government.”). The

Government asks and answers the wrong question when it

argues that admission of the Car Phone evidence was

harmless because it was “immaterial to Lustig’s conviction.” 

The relevant inquiry is whether the erroneous admission of

the Car Phone evidence was immaterial to Lustig’s decision

to enter a guilty plea. Given the dearth of factual clarity in

the record as to Lustig’s plea considerations, and indeed as to

what evidence, exactly, was derived from the Car Phones, we

cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the Car

Phone evidence did not contribute to Lustig’s decision to

plead guilty.

The Government centers its argument on its assertion that

all of the evidence pertaining to MF2—which formed the

basis for the only charges to which Lustig ultimately pled

guilty—was obtained solely from the Kyocera pocket phone

rather than from the Car Phones. But this argument “ignores

the fact that the guilty plea was entered as part of an

agreement involving all of the counts of the [indictment],”

Benard, 680 F.3d at 1214 (alteration in original) (quoting

People v. Miller, 658 P.2d 1320, 1326 (Cal. 1983) (in

bank))—an indictment that initially included not just counts

related to MF2, but also counts related to MF1, about whom

some evidence was found in the Car Phones. The express

terms of Lustig’s conditional plea make explicit that “[i]n

exchange for Defendant’s guilty plea . . . the United States

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agrees to dismiss the Indictment without prejudice at the time

of sentencing.” Thus, Lustig’s “decision to plead guilty to

[the MF2-related counts in the superseding information] was

not made in a vacuum independent of the evidence on [the

MF1-related counts].” Benard, 680 F.3d at 1214. 

Considering the “bargaining positions of the parties” in light

of the “aggregate strength of all the incriminating evidence

accumulated by the [government],” id. (alteration in original)

(quoting Miller, 658 P.2d at 1325–26), the Car Phone

evidence could have had some effect on Lustig’s decision to

plead guilty even if that evidence may not have supported the

MF2-related counts of conviction.

An additional and independent reason to reject the

Government’s harmlessness argument is that it is unclear

what evidence may have constituted the fruit of the Car

Phone searches. The Government relies entirely on a single

declaration by Deputy Chiappino for its assertion that none of

the Car Phone evidence was used to locate the evidence

needed to support the MF2-related charges. But this

declaration was submitted at sentencing, long after the

suppression motions were litigated, and Lustig never had an

opportunity to challenge Chiappino’s statements through

cross-examination. Indeed, at oral argument before this

court, the Government conceded that Chiappino’s statements

were not “tested below.” Lustig, for his part, raises factual

questions as to the order of the searches of the various phones

and had asked the district court to hold a hearing to identify

the fruit of the searches. Because the district court denied

Lustig’s motion to suppress the Car Phones, it never had

occasion to hold such a hearing or to make a determination as

to the exact fruit of the searches.

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UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG 35

For these reasons, we simply cannot know “how the

altered bargaining positions of the parties might have affected

[Lustig’s] decision [to plead guilty] if [the Car Phone

evidence and any fruit thereof] had been properly

suppressed.” Benard, 680 F.3d at 1214. We certainly cannot

conclude, as the Government urges, that the Car Phone

evidence was analogous to the redundant, essentially useless

passport that the prosecution disclaimed as evidence in Sines. 

See Sines, 761 F.2d at 1442.17

In light of the Government’s

failure to satisfy its burden of proving beyond a reasonable

doubt that the district court’s suppression error was harmless,

we remand to allow Lustig the opportunity to withdraw his

guilty plea.18

IV.

The district court’s denial of the motion to suppress

evidence from the Pocket Phones is AFFIRMED. We

REVERSE the district court’s denial of the motion to

suppress evidence from the Car Phones and REMAND for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

17 Although the district court indicated that Lustig’s motion to reconsider

the Car Phone suppression ruling was “moot” due to the Government’s

self-suppression of the Car Phone evidence, the Government never

actually stated that it would refrain from using the Car Phone evidence to

prosecute its case. Instead, it stated that “to some extent we don’t intend

to use the evidence from the cell phones seized in the car.” This is a far

cry from disavowing the Car Phone evidence altogether.

 

18 On remand, before Lustig is required to make a decision on whether

to vacate his plea, Lustig should be given an opportunity to renew his

motion to exclude any fruit of the Car Phone searches. See United States

v. Allard, 600 F.2d 1301, 1305–06 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Because the question

of taint was not fully explored below, we must remand for resolution of

the remaining factual questions.”).

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36 UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG

WATFORD, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I join the court’s opinion but write separately to highlight

one aspect of the court’s reasoning that I cannot fully

embrace. The court holds that, even though we are reversing

in part the district court’s denial of Lustig’s motion to

suppress, he’s not automatically entitled to withdraw his

guilty plea. Instead, the court concludes that we must engage

in “harmless error review” to determine whether the district

court’s partially erroneous denial of the motion “contributed

to [Lustig’s] decision to plead guilty.” Maj. op. at 26, 31.

I do not think Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

11(a)(2)—or basic principles of contract law, which govern

plea agreements—permit any such inquiry. In my view, if

our court does anything other than affirm in full the district

court’s denial of Lustig’s suppression motion, he is entitled

to withdraw his guilty plea without more. The harmless error

analysis the court engages in has no place in this context.

That conclusion is dictated by the plain language of Rule

11(a)(2), a short, two-sentence provision added in 1983. The

first sentence authorizes a new type of guilty plea—the

“conditional” plea—that had not previously been sanctioned

by rule or statute: “With the consent of the court and the

government, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of

guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right to

have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a

specified pretrial motion.” Adding this provision was

necessary because a number of courts had held, prior to the

Rule’s amendment in 1983, that conditional pleas were not

permissible. A defendant either had to plead guilty

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UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG 37

unconditionally and waive appellate review of adverse pretrial rulings, or, if the defendant sought to preserve such

review, he had to plead not guilty and proceed through trial,

an often wasteful exercise with a foregone conclusion. See

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a) advisory committee’s note to 1983

amendments. Rule 11(a)(2) avoids that undesirable state of

affairs by allowing a defendant, with the government’s and

the court’s consent, to plead guilty on the condition that a

specified adverse ruling is ultimately affirmed on appeal. 

United States v. Carrasco, 786 F.2d 1452, 1454 (9th Cir.

1986), overruled on other grounds by United States v.

Castillo, 496 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2007). The second sentence

of the Rule states what happens if the condition does not

hold: “A defendant who prevails on appeal may then

withdraw the plea.”

In a case in which the defendant reserves the right to

challenge a single adverse ruling and that ruling ultimately

gets reversed in full on appeal, the application of Rule

11(a)(2)’s second sentence is simple. The defendant has

obviously “prevail[ed] on appeal” and as a result must be

afforded an opportunity to withdraw his plea. United States

v. Botello-Rosales, 728 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir. 2013) (per

curiam). I think the application of the Rule is just as simple

when, as in this case, the defendant prevails in part on appeal. 

As we said in Carrasco, a Rule 11(a)(2) plea is “conditioned

on the appellate court’s affirmance of the adverse pretrial

ruling.” 786 F.2d at 1454. If the appellate court does

anything other than affirm the specified ruling (or rulings) in

full, then the condition is not satisfied. That means, under

basic contract law principles, that the defendant is entitled to

withdraw from his end of the bargain. See United States v.

Bundy, 392 F.3d 641, 649 (4th Cir. 2004). There is no place

for an appellate court to decide that the partial victory the

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38 UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG

defendant won on appeal is too insignificant to warrant the

defendant’s backing out of the deal. See United States v.

Molina-Gomez, 781 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir. 2015).

Here, Lustig agreed to plead guilty on the condition that

the ruling denying his motion to suppress would be affirmed

on appeal. It didn’t get affirmed; it got reversed in part with

respect to the car phones. Thus, the one condition Lustig

placed on his agreement to plead guilty wasn’t satisfied, and

only he gets to decide whether the partial victory he won on

appeal is too inconsequential to justify backing out of the

deal.

The parties, of course, could have struck a different deal. 

Nothing in the language of Rule 11(a)(2) precludes a

defendant and the government from agreeing that the

defendant’s guilty plea will stand unless he wins reversal in

full of a particular adverse ruling. Or, in cases in which the

defendant challenges several distinct adverse rulings, that his

guilty plea will stand unless he wins reversal of all of them. 

That’s why the drafters of Rule 11(a)(2) inserted the

requirement that a conditional plea may be entered only with

the government’s consent—to ensure that the defendant could

not insist upon reserving the right to appeal some

inconsequential pre-trial ruling, the reversal of which would

not have any appreciable impact on the outcome of the case. 

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a) advisory committee’s note to 1983

amendments (“As for consent by the government, it will

ensure that conditional pleas will be allowed only when the

decision of the court of appeals will dispose of the case either

by allowing the plea to stand or by such action as compelling

dismissal of the indictment or suppressing essential

evidence.”). But the key point here is that if the parties do

not qualify the condition that a particular adverse ruling must

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UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG 39

be affirmed on appeal in order for the plea to stand, then a

defendant who wins even partial reversal will be entitled

under the terms of the agreement to withdraw his plea. See

United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309, 316–17 n.8 (9th Cir.

1995).

There is a place for harmless error review in the context

of conditional pleas, but it differs from the kind of harmless

error review the court engages in here. Appellate courts

always have the authority to determine that, even though the

district court’s reasoning was flawed in some respect, the

district court’s bottom-line ruling is nonetheless correct and

should be affirmed. Or, in like fashion, that the district

court’s ruling on a subsidiary issue was erroneous, but that

the court’s bottom-line decision to deny a suppression motion

is still correct, albeit for reasons that differ from those given

by the district court. See, e.g., United States v. Davis,

530 F.3d 1069, 1083–85 (9th Cir. 2008). In those

circumstances we say the district court’s errors are

“harmless” in the sense that they do not affect the ultimate

disposition of the appeal—the district court’s bottom-line

ruling still gets affirmed.

That kind of harmless error review is perfectly proper in

the context of Rule 11(a)(2) pleas. See United States v.

Rivera-Nevarez, 418 F.3d 1104, 1111–12 (10th Cir. 2005). 

It allows the court to determine, as the court did in Davis, that

the defendant ultimately won no victory on appeal—not even

a partial one—and thus that he cannot be said, in the language

of Rule 11(a)(2), to have “prevail[ed] on appeal.” In such

cases, the court uses harmless error review to affirm in full

the ruling that the defendant reserved the right to challenge on

appeal. See, e.g., Davis, 530 F.3d at 1083–85. The

defendants in cases like Davis are not entitled to withdraw

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40 UNITED STATES V. LUSTIG

their conditional guilty pleas because the condition attached

to their pleas is satisfied. This case has to come out

differently because the condition attached to Lustig’s plea

was not satisfied. We did not affirm in full the district court’s

ruling on Lustig’s motion to suppress.

In short, I agree with the court that Lustig’s convictions

must be vacated, and on remand he must be afforded an

opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. In my view, though,

that result follows from an application of the plain language

of Rule 11(a)(2) and basic contract law principles, not from

an application of harmless error review.

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