Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01090/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01090-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Autry
Defendant
Sundar Bains
Defendant
Collins
Defendant
S. Garcia
Defendant
Basant Sidhu
Plaintiff
Sanjesh Singh
Plaintiff
Stacey Singh
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BASANT SIDHU, SANJESH

SINGH,

NO. CIV. S-09-1090 LKK/DAD

Plaintiffs,

v.

O R D E R

SHERIFF'S DEPUTY S. GARCIA,

SHERIFF'S DEPUTY AUTRY,

SHERIFF'S DEPUTY COLLINS,

STACEY SINGH, aka STACEY KAUR,

SUNDAR BAINS,

Defendants.

 /

This case concerns the search of plaintiffs’ home by sheriff

deputies following a welfare check. For the reasons described

below, the court grants summary judgment in favor of the sheriff

deputies and denies plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background.

Plaintiff Sanjesh Singh (“Singh”) and defendant Stacey Kaur

(“Kaur”) met and married in Fiji in a arranged marriage in April

2007. Dep. of Sanjesh Singh (“Singh Dep.”) at 8:13-21. Kaur

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Plaintiffs move to strike this declaration because Kaur did 1

not appear for her deposition. The Sheriff Deputy defendants argue

that plaintiffs did not move to compel or to amend the scheduling

order to obtain Kaur’s testimony. Further, Kaur is not represented

by counsel, including counsel for the Sheriff Deputy defendants.

The Sheriff Deputy defendants state that they merely contacted her

to obtain a declaration. The court finds that the declaration may

be considered in these motions because plaintiffs did not

diligently pursue Kaur’s testimony and because Kaur is not a party

to these motions.

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remained in Fiji until April 2008, when she moved to Vacaville,

California to live with Singh and his family, including his mother

plaintiff Basant Sidhu (“Sidhu”). Singh Dep. at 18:22-19:02, 38:08-

14. Plaintiffs’ home is in a rural area with no nearby bus stops

or grocery stores. Singh Dep. at 57:03, 57:17-23. Kaur was not

licensed to drive. Decl. of Stacey Kaur (“Kaur Decl.”) ¶ 5.1

Sidhu then contacted Sheriff Deputy defendant Seth Garcia

(“Garcia”) of the Solano County Sheriff’s Department on June 22,

2008 to report that she was receiving harassing calls from Kaur’s

uncle, defendant Sundhar Bains (“Bains”). Dep. of Seth Garcia

(“Garcia Dep.”) at 23:17-24:03. Sidhu had actually only received

one concerned call from defendant Bains regarding Kaur’s wellbeing. Dep. of Basant Sidhu (“Sidhu Dep.”) at 106:05-111:05. Garcia

asked to speak with Kaur during the June 22 call for Sidhu, and did

hear Kaur say that she was fine and that she wanted to be left

alone. Garcia Dep. at 40:17-41:13, 44:02-23. 

Bains was concerned with Kaur’s safety and well-being, and

wanted to see Kaur at plaintiffs’ house. Sidhu Dep. at 106:05-

109:06. Bains informed Sheriff Deputy Garcia stating that he was

concerned about Kaur, and had a large number of worrisome emails

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from Kaur. Garcia Dep. at 49:19-51:13, 52:07-53:03, 58:19-59:15,

60:13-61:25. Bains never mentioned that there was an exigency or

emergency when speaking to Garcia. Garcia Dep. at 46:10-25, 47:01-

13. In the emails Garcia received from Bains, Kaur wrote that she

was contemplating suicide and needed help. Garcia Dep. at 12:08-

14:12, 66:01-24. In addition, Kaur stated in these emails that she

was not allowed to contact anyone by email and that her calls were

being monitored. Garcia Dep. at 12:08-13:20. Further, Kaur wrote

that she was in fear of physical violence from Sidhu. Garcia Dep.

at 12:08-13:20. In the emails, Kaur also indicated that she

believed it was the right time for her to call the police for help.

Garcia Dep. at 12:08-13:20.

On the morning of June 24, 2008 Sheriff Deputy defendants

Garcia and Denton Autry (“Autry”) visited plaintiffs’ and Kaur’s

house to conduct a “knock and talk” welfare check on Kaur. Garcia

Dep. at 84:06-18, 98:03-16; Dep. of Denton Autry (“Autry Dep.”) at

35:03-17, 63:04-10. Autry saw someone look out the window and

movement in the house as he and Garcia arrived at the home. Autry

Dep. at 63:22-64:17. Garcia knocked at the door and rang the

doorbell for several minutes but received no response. Garcia Dep.

at 101:5-12; Kaur Decl. ¶ 7. At Garcia and Autry’s request, the

sheriff dispatcher placed a phone call to home. They heard the

phone ring, but there was no answer. Garcia Dep. at 103:18-105:06;

Kaur Decl. ¶ 7. Kaur and an elderly woman called “Grandma” or

“Granny” were inside the home but did not answer the door or the

call. Garcia Dep. at 101:05-12, 126:19-21, 127:11-23; Kaur Decl.

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¶ 7. Kaur was told by Granny that they should hide and not answer

the door. Kaur Decl. ¶ 7. Defendants Garcia and Autry checked the

perimeter of the residence but could not gain any information

because the windows were all covered. Garcia Dep. at 107:04-06,

108:13-16, Autry Dep. at 64:02-03. 

Garcia and Autry testified that they believed the Kaur’s

safety might be at risk because someone was obviously in the home

but not responding and because of Kaur’s emails discussing suicidal

thoughts and threats of physical violence. Garcia Dep. at 113:17-

24, 114:05-115:10; Autry Dep. at 71:21-73:03. Thus, they concluded

that emergency circumstances existed for a search. Sheriff Deputy

Autry located an open door in the rear of the house. Autry Dep. p.

113:13-14. The parties dispute who left this door open. The Sheriff

Deputy defendants contend that Kaur, seeing the officers arrive and

wanting their help, made sure to leave this door open so that they

could enter the home. Kaur Decl. ¶ 7; Decl. of Seth Garcia (“Garcia

Decl.”) at 117:09-13, 162:09-163:01. Plaintiffs, however, offer

evidence that Kaur did not know how the door was opened and

testimony that it was Singh who left thr door open. Decl. of

Sanjesh Singh (“Singh Decl.”) ¶ 19; Ex. H at 105-08, 120-23. 

Sheriff Deputy defendant Craig Collins (“Collins”) arrived at

the home after Garcia and Autry and upon his arrival provided

backup to Garcia and Autry while they searched the house. Dep. of

Craig Collins (“Collins Dep.”) at 28:05-29, 54:17-25. Autry and

Garcia then entered through the open door and repeatedly identified

themselves as from the Sheriff’s Department. Autry Dep. at 113:13-

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14; Garcia Dep. at 117:18-118:04. Autry and Garcia conducted a

search of the home limited to looking anywhere where there could

have been a body. Autry Dep. at 98:05-17, 125:05-126:20; Garcia

Dep. at 123:04-18, 124:05-125:24. Sheriff Deputies Autry, Collins,

and Garcia testified that they did not enter the home to search for

evidence of a crime. Autry Dep. at 78:21-79:01; Collins Dep. at

69:17-70:18; and Garcia Dep. at 102:18-103:03. The Sheriff Deputies

located the only occupants of the home, Kaur and Grandma, crouched

on the floor in an upstairs bedroom. Autry Dep. at 123:17-124:04;

Garcia Dep. at 126:19-23, 127:06-128:21, 131:01-05. Singh arrived

after the search had concluded and while Garcia was speaking with

Kaur. Garcia Dep. at 134:16-21; Singh Dep. at 84:23-85:13, 86:21-

25; Kaur Decl. ¶ 9. 

B. Procedural History

On June 9, 2010, plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary

judgment as to all claims brought against the Sheriff Deputy

defendants. On June 28, 2010, the Sheriff Deputy defendants moved

for summary judgment on all claims brought against them. On July

12, 2010, plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for partial summary

judgment along with their opposition to the Sheriff Deputy

defendants motion. This cross-motion only address the issue of

whether Kaur impliedly consented to the search of the house. All

motions are set to be heard on July 26, 2010.

II. STANDARD FOR A FED. R. CIV. P. 56 MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists no genuine

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issue as to any material fact. Such circumstances entitle the

moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);

see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970);

Secor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1995). Under

summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c)).

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish the existence

of a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986); see also First

Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89

(1968); Secor Ltd., 51 F.3d at 853. In doing so, the opposing party

may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but must tender

evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits and/or other

admissible materials in support of its contention that the dispute

exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S.

at 289. In evaluating the evidence, the court draws all reasonable

inferences from the facts before it in favor of the opposing party.

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88 (citing United States v. Diebold,

Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)); County of Tuolumme

v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001).

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Both parties have also moved for summary judgment on the 2

issue of implied consent. Because the court grants the defendants’

motion pursuant the emergency doctrine, the court does not consider

the issue of implied consent.

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Nevertheless, it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a

factual predicate as a basis for such inferences. See Richards v.

Nielsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). The

opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to

find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87 (citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure.

Plaintiffs contend that the Sheriff Deputy defendants, Garcia,

Autry, and Collins, have violated their Fourth Amendment rights to

be free from unreasonable search and seizure by entering their

residence without a search warrant and without a valid exception

to the search warrant requirement.2

1. The Emergency Exception to the Warrant Requirement.

One well-established exception to the search warrant

requirement of the Fourth Amendment is the case of an emergency.

In Brigham City v. Stuart, The United States Supreme Court held,

“One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need

to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such

injury.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)(internal

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citations omitted). The Court reasoned that “‘the need to protect

or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what

would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.’” Id.

(quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978)); see also

U.S. v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947, 950-51 (9th Cir. 2008). In Brigham,

the Court held that it was objectively reasonable for a police

officer to enter a home without a warrant to render aid to the

injured, and to protect against further harm, when he witnessed a

fight taking place in the home through the back window. Id. at 406.

While the Supreme Court precedent could suggest that exigent

circumstances and the emergency doctrine are part of a single

exception, the Ninth Circuit has held otherwise. Hopkins v.

Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 763 (9th Cir. 2009). Specifically, the

court held that, “the ‘emergency’ exception stems from the police

officers’ ‘community caretaking function’ . . . . [T]his exception

does ‘not [derive from] police officers’ function as criminal

investigators,” and therefore probable cause is irrelevant. Id.

(quoting U.S. v. Cervantes, 219 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 2000)); see

also U.S. v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, in

Hopkins, the Circuit held that exigent circumstances and the

emergency doctrine were two separate exceptions to the warrant

requirement with different tests.

The emergency doctrine applies when “(1) law enforcement had

an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there was

immediate need to protect others or themselves from serious harm;

and (2) the search’s scope and manner were reasonable to meet the

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need.” Snipe, 515 F.3d at 952; see also Brighamm City, 547 U.S. at

404; Hopkins, 573 F.3d at 764. In Snipe, the Court of Appeals held

that officers were objectively reasonable in believing there was

an emergency where they received a call from a hysterical man

saying “[g]et the police over here now.” Id. at 953. In addition,

Snipe held that the officers’ manner of entry was reasonable

because they knocked and announced themselves and only conducted

a search of areas where people were likely to be injured. Id. This

objective reasonableness test is determined from the totality of

the circumstances. Hopkins, 573 F.3d at 764 (quoting U.S. v.

Stafford, 416 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

2. Application of the Emergency Doctrine to the

Instant Case.

The Sheriff Deputy defendants move for summary judgment on

plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim. They argue that the evidence

shows that it was objectively reasonable for them to believe there

was an emergency. Further, defendants claim that their method of

entry and scope of search of the home were reasonable, and thus

they had a valid exception to the warrant requirement. In support

of this contention, defendants provide the following evidence:

(1) Df. Sep. SUF 6

Testimony of Garcia that Sidhu initiated contact with the

Sheriff Department to report she was receiving harassing calls from

Bains about Kaur. Garcia Dep. at 23:17-24:03. 

(2) Df. Sep. SUF 6

Testimony of Sidhu that she had actually only received one

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concerned call from Bains regarding Kaur’s well-being. Sidhu Dep.

at 106:05-111:05.

(3) Df. Sep. SUF 7

Testimony of Sidhu that Bains was concerned with Kaur’s safety

and well-being, and wanted to come to Sidhu’s home to check on

Kaur. Sidhu Dep. at 106:05-109:06.

(4) Df. Sep. SUF 13

Testimony of Garcia that Bains contacted him stating that he

was concerned about Kaur and had a large amount of emails from Kaur

that concerned him. Garcia Dep. at 49:19-51:13, 52:07-53:03, 58:19-

59:15, 60:13-61:25.

(5) Df. Sep. SUF 14

Testimony of Garcia that in the emails he received from Bains,

Kaur mentioned contemplating suicide and needing help. Garcia Dep.

at 1208-14:12, 66:01-24, Ex. 5 at 1, 7, 18, 24, 26, 14.

(6) Df. Sep. SUF 15

Garcia received emails from Bains written by Kaur stating that

she was not allowed to contact anyone by email and that her calls

were being monitored. Garcia Dep. at 12:08-13:20, and Ex. 5 at 5,

6, and 18. 

(7) Df. Sep. SUF 16

Kaur stated in one of her emails that she feared physical

violence from Sidhu. Garcia Dep. at 12:08-13:20, and Ex. 5 at 12.

(8) Df. Sep. SUF 17

In the emails received by Garcia, Kaur states that she needs

help and that now is the right time to call the police for help.

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Garcia Dep. at 12:08-13:20, and Ex. 5 at 7. 

(9) Df. Sep. SUF 23

Testimony of Autry that as he and Garcia arrived at the home,

he saw someone look at the window and saw movement in the house.

Autry Dep. at 63:22-64:17. 

(10) Df. Sep. SUF 24

Testimony of Garcia that when he knocked on the door and rang

the doorbell for several minutes, there was no response. Garcia

Dep. at 101:5-12. 

(11) Df. Sep. SUF 25

Testimony of Garcia that, the sheriff dispatch placed a phone

call to the residence at the request of the officers. The officers

heard the phone ring, but no one answered the call. Garcia Dep. at

103:18-105:06. 

(12) Df. Sep. SUF 30

Testimony of Garcia and Autry that they checked the perimeter

of the residence, but could not gain any information because the

windows were all covered. Garcia Dep. at 107:04-06, 108:13-16, and

Autry Dep. at 64:02-03. 

(13) Df. Sep. SUF 31

Testimony of Autry that he located an open door in the rear

of the house. Autry Dep. at 113:13-14.

(14) Df. Sep. SUF 32

Testimony of Autry and Garcia that they entered through the

open door and repeatedly identified themselves as present and from

the sheriff’s department. Autry Dep. at 113:13-14, and Garcia Dep.

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at 117:18-118:04. 

(15) Df. Sep. SUF 33

Testimony of Autry and Garcia that they conducted a search of

the home that was limited to looking anywhere they could find a

body. Autry Dep. at 98:05-17, 125:05-126:20, Garcia Dep. at 123:04-

18, 124:05-125:24.

(16) Df. Sep. SUF 48

Testimony of Autry, Collins, and Garcia that they did not

enter the home to search for evidence of a crime. Autry Dep. at

78:21-79:01, Collins Dep. at 69:17-70:18, and Garcia Dep. at

102:18-103:03.

Plaintiffs oppose this motion, based largely on defendants’

own testimony. Plaintiffs argue that the defendants’ testimony does

not create a circumstance under which it would be objectively

reasonable for them to believe there was an emergency, and

therefore an exception to the warrant requirement. In addition to

the facts stated above, plaintiffs support this contention with the

following evidence:

(1) Decl. of Herman Franck (“Franck Decl.”), Ex. C.

Testimony of Garcia that the officers waited an entire day

after receiving the emails to do their welfare check on Kaur.

Garcia Dep. at 88:18-25, 89:01-05. 

(2) Franck Decl., Ex. C.

Testimony of Garcia that Bains never at any time mentioned

there was an exigency or emergency when speaking to the officers.

Garcia Dep. at 46:10-25, 47:01-13.

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The court finds that no reasonable jury could conclude that

the defendants’ determination of an emergency, as that term is

understood under Fourth Amendment caselaw, was objectively

unreasonable. The Sheriff Deputies had received evidence that Kaur

may have been held against her will and in danger of harm from

herself or others at any moment. The emails, coupled with Sidhu’s

overzealous claim of harassing phone calls and insistence that Kaur

was well to Garcia, created a reasonable concern to the officers

that might warrant a welfare check, within their “community

caretaking function.” 

Moreover, the Sheriff Deputies only contend that the emergency

arose when they reached the home, not before. Specifically, the

emergency arose only after they were aware (1) that there was at

least one person in the home when they arrived (2) that a person

in the house saw the officers, and (3) that there was no response

to either their knocks at the door or the call placed by dispatch.

This, in conjunction with the fact that Kaur may have been in

danger from herself or others and that she may have been held

against her will, makes it objectively reasonable for the Sheriff

Deputies to believe that Kaur was in imminent danger. Thus, the

emergency exception to the warrant requirement applied. The Sheriff

Deputies did not enter the home seeking evidence of a crime, but

rather entered pursuant their community caretaking function under

objectively reasonable belief of a need to protect Kaur from harm.

The additional facts and disputes that plaintiffs raise are

immaterial. Because the Sheriff Deputies do not claim that the

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emergency arose prior to their visit to the home, it is of no

effect that they waited an entire day to conduct the welfare check

or that Bains did not previously characterize the situation as an

emergency. 

Further, a reasonable jury could not find the manner in which

the Sheriff Deputies entered the home to be unreasonable, as that

term is understood in Fourth Amendment case law. The Sheriff

Deputies entered through an open door in the rear of the home. Upon

entry, they repeatedly called into the home to identify themselves.

Moreover, the only evidence submitted by the parties indicates that

the Sheriff Deputies’ search was limited only to places where a

body might have been found, which is reasonablely within the scope

of the purpose for the search: to locate Kaur and verify her wellbeing. Thus, defendants motion for summary judgment is granted as

to plaintiffs’ first claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment.

B. Trespass.

Plaintiffs allege that the defendants’ entry into their home

constitutes the common law tort of trespass. It is well established

that the “essence of the cause of action for trespass is an

‘unauthorized entry’ onto the land of another.” Miller v. Nat’l

Broadcasting Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1480 (1986). 

However, the California Supreme Court has recognized that

“necessity often justifies an action which would otherwise

constitute a trespass, as where the act is prompted by the motive

of preserving life . . . and reasonably appears to the actor to be

necessary for that purpose.” People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 378

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(1956); see People v. Ammons, 103 Cal. App. 3d 20, 31 (1980).

Roberts upheld the trial court’s conclusion that police officers

did not trespass when they entered an apartment without a warrant

because they reasonably believed someone was in distress, having

heard moans coming from the apartment. Id. at 378. 

As noted above, it was objectively reasonable for the

Sheriff Deputies to believe that there was an emergency and that

they needed to enter the home to protect Kaur from serious harm.

Since it is well-established in California that such an entry

does not constitute a trespass, the Sheriff Deputies’ motion for

summary judgment is granted as to plaintiffs’ trespass claim.

C. Right to Privacy.

Plaintiffs allege that defendant officers’ entry into their

home constitutes a violation of the Right to Privacy under

California Constitution Art. I Section 1. In California, the

violation of the right to privacy is an actionable tort.

Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tabacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 823-

24 (9th Cir. 1974). Art. I § 1 creates a right of action against

private as well as government entities. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate

Athletic Assn., 7 Cal. 4th 1, 20 (1994). In California, to

sustain an action for common law invasion of privacy, plaintiffs

must prove: “(1) intrusion into a private place, conversation or

matter, (2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable

person.” Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200,

231 (1998); see Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1482. Further, “in

determining the ‘offensiveness’ of an invasion of a privacy

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interest, common law courts consider, among other things: ‘the

degree of the intrusion, the context, conduct and the

circumstances surrounding the intrusion as well as the

intruders’ motives and objectives.” Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 26

(quoting Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1483-84). In Shulman, the

California Supreme Court reversed an award of summary for the

defendant television producers, holding that there were triable

issues of fact as to whether defendants invaded plaintiff’s

privacy when they accompanied her in a medical rescue helicopter

after an accident and videotaped plaintiff and her care without

consent. Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th at 242. 

 In this case, plaintiffs base their invasion of privacy

claim on the Sheriff Deputies’ entry into plaintiffs’ home

without a warrant and their ensuing search for Kaur. Further,

plaintiffs rely primarily on the Sheriff Deputies’ own testimony

to support their claim. However, plaintiffs have alleged no

facts to support the allegation that this entry and search

occurred in a manner which is highly offensive to a reasonable

person. As described above, this court finds that Sheriff

Deputies were objectively reasonable in believing that there was

an emergency exception to the warrant requirement when they

entered the home. In addition, it appears to the court that

defendant officers’ search was reasonable and limited to the

purpose of finding Kaur and verifying her safety. While

plaintiffs claim that there was a “full scale search,” they have

not presented any evidence to support this conclusion. Rather,

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the evidence supports the contention that the degree of

intrusion of the search was limited only to places in the house

where a body could have been located and not a “full scale

search.” Further, the Sheriff Deputies testified that they

entered the home through an open door in the rear of the home

and repeatedly identified and announced themselves upon entry.

Again, plaintiffs were not present when the entry occurred and

are therefore unable to dispute this testimony. As already

noted, the court holds that the Sheriff Deputies were

objectively reasonable in concluding that there was an

emergency, and the Sheriff Deputies testify that their

motivation for entering the home was to ascertain and protect

the well-being of Kaur. There was no damage to property

reported, no seizures, and no arrests made. Therefore, in light

of the emergency circumstances surrounding the entry, it cannot

be shown that defendant officers’ conduct amounted to anything

near what would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.

Thus, defendant officers’ motion for summary judgment as to

plaintiffs’ invasion of privacy claim is granted. 

 D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. 

 Plaintiffs allege that the defendant officers’ entry into

their home constitutes the tort of intentional infliction of

emotional distress. To succeed on this claim, plaintiffs must

prove: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with

the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the

probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s

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suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual

and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the

defendant’s outrageous conduct.” (Internal quotations omitted)

Christensen v. Super. Ct., 54 Cal. 3d 868, 903 (1991).

Furthermore, to prove that a defendant’s conduct is

“outrageous[, it] must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of

that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Id. at 903. 

 In this case, as with their claim for invasion of privacy,

plaintiffs base their intentional infliction of emotional

distress claim on the Sheriff Deputies’ entry into their home

without a warrant. Moreover, plaintiffs essentially predicate

their allegations of outrageousness on the Sheriff Deputies’

lack of warrant. As described above, Sheriff Deputies possessed

a valid emergency exception to the warrant requirement. It was

objectively reasonable for the Sheriff Deputies to believe there

was an emergency. Pursuant to that emergency, Sheriff Deputies

entered the home to confirm Kaur’s safety and render aid if

necessary. Further, the Sheriff Deputies entered the home

through an open door and repeatedly announced and identified

themselves upon entry. In addition, there is no evidence to show

that the scope of the search conducted was anything other than

reasonable and limited to the purpose of the entry: to verify

Kaur’s safety. Furthermore, plaintiffs were not present when

this search took place, and defendant officers’ undisputed

testimony states that their conduct was not directed at

plaintiffs, but rather at protecting Kaur. The Sheriff Deputies’

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conduct simply does not rise to a level so extreme as to exceed

all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.

Therefore, the Sheriff Deputies’ motion for summary judgment as

to plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional distress

claim is granted. 

 IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the court ORDERS as follows: 

 (1) Plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment, ECF Nos. 44, 

 66, are DENIED. 

 (2) The Sheriff Deputy defendants' motion for summary 

 judgment, ECF No. 58, is GRANTED. 

 (3) The court notes that claims of aiding and abetting the 

 Sheriff Deputy defendants' violations of Section 1983 

 and state law remain against non-moving defendants 

 Bains and Kaur. It appears to the court that because 

 it enters judgment for the Sheriff Deputies as to the 

 claims Bains and Kaur allegedly aided and abetted, 

 that Bains and Kaur are also entitled to judgment. 

 For this reason, the court orders plaintiffs to show 

 cause as to why judgment should not be entered as to 

 Bains and Kaur within fourteen (14) days of the 

 issuance of this order. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 DATED: August 12, 2010.

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