Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01814/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01814-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gloria Y. Clayton
Defendant
Community Fund LLC
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

COMMUNITY FUND LLC,

Plaintiff,

 v.

GLORIA Y. CLAYTON,

Defendant. /

No. C 15-01814 JSW

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION AND

REMANDING ACTION

On April 22, 2015, Defendant Gloria Y. Clayton, proceeding pro se, filed a notice of

removal and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Without consent, on April 28, 2015,

this matter was reassigned to the undersigned from Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley

with a Report and Recommendation to remand this action. Defendant, as the party seeking

removal, bears the burden of demonstrating subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant was given an

opportunity to demonstrate the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, but has failed to do so. 

For the reasons set forth in the remainder of this Order, the Court HEREBY REMANDS this

action to the Contra Costa County Superior Court.

On February 26, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in Contra Costa

County Superior Court against Defendant (the “State Court action”). (See Notice of Removal.) 

Defendant removed the State Court action on the basis that jurisdiction is premised upon a

federal question. (See Notice of Removal.) “[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of

which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the 

Case 4:15-cv-01814-JSW Document 12 Filed 05/27/15 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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defendant ... to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the

place where such action is pending.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust,

463 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1983) (citation omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441. 

However, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kokkonen v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Accordingly, the burden of 

establishing federal jurisdiction for purposes of removal is on the party seeking removal, and

the removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.

1992). “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in

the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566.

“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘wellpleaded complaint rule.’” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 382, 392 (1987). The wellpleaded complaint rule recognizes that the plaintiff is the master of his or her claim. “[H]e or

she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Id. Thus, under the

well-pleaded complaint rule, federal-question jurisdiction arises where the “complaint

establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief

necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd.,

463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983). 

The State Court action is an unlawful detainer action which is purely a creature of

California law. Thus, federal law does not create the cause of action. Wells Fargo Bank v.

Lapeen, 2011 WL 2194117, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2011); Wescom Credit Union v. Dudley,

2010 WL 4916578, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2010). Moreover, the Court concludes that the

claim will not necessarily depend upon the resolution of a substantial question of federal law,

because Plaintiff need not prove compliance with the federal law relied upon by Defendant to

establish its claim. See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng. & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308,

314-15 (2005). 

Furthermore, a court cannot exercise removal jurisdiction on the ground that the

complaint gives rise to a potential or an anticipated defense that might raise a federal question,

Case 4:15-cv-01814-JSW Document 12 Filed 05/27/15 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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even if the defense is the only question truly at issue in the case. Franchise Tax Board, 463

U.S. at 10, 14; see also Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 (“[I]t is now settled law that a case may not

be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of preemption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties

concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue.”) (emphasis in original). 

Therefore, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this matter and must

remand to the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Maniar v. FDIC, 979 F.2d 782,

785 (9th Cir. 1992).

Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation and REMANDS this

case to Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Contra Costa. The Clerk

shall transfer the file forthwith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 27, 2015 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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