Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02322/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02322-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kimberly Tara Cockerham
Plaintiff
Carrey Snyder Hyatt
Defendant

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kimberly Tara Cockerham, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Carrey Snyder Hyatt, individually and in

her official capacity as Justice of the

Superior Court of Maricopa County, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-09-2322-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant Carry Snyder Hyatt’s (“Judge Hyatt”) Motion

to Dismiss (Dkt. # 7). For the following reasons, the Court grants the Motion.

Plaintiff Kimberly Tara Cockerham (“Plaintiff”) was a party before Judge Hyatt in

Maricopa County family court, during which Judge Hyatt issued rulings adverse to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff now brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution resulting from Judge Hyatt’s orders and

courtroom demeanor. Judge Hyatt moved to dismiss based on, among other grounds, judicial

immunity.

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

The task in a motion to dismiss “is to evaluate whether the claims alleged can be [plausibly]

Case 2:09-cv-02322-GMS Document 11 Filed 03/09/10 Page 1 of 2
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asserted as a matter of law.” See Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004); see

also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). When analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, all plausible “allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir.

1996). However, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not

sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).

A judge who is sued under Section 1983 has absolute immunity from suit for actions

taken in her official capacity. Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922–23 (9th

Cir. 916). A judge’s immunity applies no matter how “erroneous the act may have been,”

regardless of how “injurious in its consequences it may have proved[,]” and notwithstanding

“the motives with which . . . judicial acts are performed.” Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S.

193, 199–200 (1985). “As long as the judge’s ultimate acts are judicial actions taken within

the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, immunity applies.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072,

1078 (9th Cir. 1986). 

In this case, Plaintiff alleges wrongdoing only in the context of a case heard before

Judge Hyatt. Plaintiff makes no attempt to explain why any of Judge Hyatt’s rulings or

statements in courtroom proceedings were not within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Judge Hyatt is therefore entitled to absolute judicial immunity, and dismissal is appropriate.

Furthermore, because it appears that Plaintiff could not, in good faith, allege any facts to

overcome judicial immunity, dismissal is with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. # 7) is

granted with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court terminate this action.

DATED this 8th day of March, 2010.

Case 2:09-cv-02322-GMS Document 11 Filed 03/09/10 Page 2 of 2