Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-10175/USCOURTS-ca9-12-10175-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Melissa R. Beecroft
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MELISSA R. BEECROFT,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-10175

D.C. No.

2:08-cr-00064-

RLH-GWF-3

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Roger L. Hunt, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 16, 2015

San Francisco, California

Filed June 13, 2016

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain and Milan D. Smith, Jr.,

Circuit Judges, and Brian M. Morris, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain

* The Honorable Brian M. Morris, District Judge for the U.S. District

Court for the District of Montana, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. BEECROFT

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed an order of restitution and the

amounts of forfeiture on the defendant’s convictions for

Counts 10, 11, 13, and 14; vacated $107 million in forfeiture

ordered on her conviction on Count 1; and remanded for

reconsideration of the appropriate amount of such forfeiture,

in a case in which the defendant was convicted for

participating in an extensive mortgage-fraud conspiracy. 

The panel held that the defendant’s bare speculation that

the process employed by the district court in calculating the

losses incurred by the victim banks was somehow deficient

does not approach her burden of demonstrating clear or

obvious error in the district court’s restitution calculations. 

Rejecting the defendant’s Eighth Amendment challenge to

the restitution order, the panel wrote that without error in the

loss calculation, the defendant cannot show that requiring

her to pay that amount back to the victims was somehow

excessive or grossly disproportional to her crimes. The panel

noted that the district court required the defendant to pay

slightly more than $2 million of the more-than-$50 million in

losses caused by the conspiracy in which she participated.

The panel held that the district court did not err in

calculating the proceeds of her criminal activity when

imposing the order of money forfeiture. The panel rejected

the defendant’s contention that the district court needed to

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. BEECROFT 3

take additional evidence to determine the “accurate” amount

of loan proceeds obtained by the conspiracy, where the

defendant has not argued, let alone demonstrated, what “good

reason” the court had to believe that the government’s

proposed forfeiture amount exceeded the proceeds of her

crimes. The panel wrote that this court has previously

rejected the argument that a defendant should not be ordered

to forfeit the total loan proceeds, where the defendant never

personally received the money but instead made only a small

commission on each transaction.

The panel held that the order of forfeiture imposed against

the defendant personally at sentencing is punitive and

therefore subject toEighth Amendment excessiveness review. 

The panel held that the amounts of forfeiture ordered on the

defendant’s four subsidiary counts of conviction ($330,000;

$305,000; $325,000; and $460,000) are not excessive, given

the gravity of the offenses, and that the amounts are

substantially less than the $1 million maximum fine

authorized by statute and the Sentencing Guidelines range. 

The panel held that the $107 million forfeiture order on the

conspiracy count, which is 100 times greater than the

maximum fine allowable and 5,000 times greater than the

lower end of the Guidelines range, runs afoul of the

Excessive Fines Clause. The panel remanded for the district

court to reconsider that amount.

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4 UNITED STATES V. BEECROFT

COUNSEL

Angela H. Dows (argued), Premier Legal Group, Las Vegas,

Nevada, for Defendant-Appellant.

Peter S. Levitt (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Daniel G. Bogden, United States Attorney; Elizabeth O.

White, Appellate Chief; United States Attorney’s Office, Las

Vegas, Nevada, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

Following her convictions for participating in an

extensive mortgage-fraud conspiracy, a defendant was

ordered to pay more than $2 million in restitution and

to forfeit more than $100 million. We must decide

whether either amount was erroneously calculated or

unconstitutionally excessive.

I

A

From roughly 2003 through 2008, Melissa Beecroft took

part in a multi-million dollar residential mortgage-fraud

scheme in the Las Vegas area. Led by Steven Grimm and

Eve Mazzarella, the conspirators recruited and paid straw

purchasers1to buy homes at substantially inflated prices,

1 Straw purchasers buy homes on behalf of other, undisclosed

individuals, with no intention to keep the properties themselves.

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UNITED STATES V. BEECROFT 5

sometimes with 100% mortgage financing. Once the

mortgage loans were funded, Grimm and Mazzarella caused

title and escrow companies to disburse excess funds to

various shell corporations they owned, under the pretense of

using the money to make repairs and improvements to the

homes, though such repairs were never made. Grimm and

Mazzarella also arranged to have participating mortgage

brokers and loan officers remit a portion of their commissions

and fees to Grimm. After each sale, the straw buyers would

then transfer ownership in the properties themselves to

Grimm and Mazzarella’s shell corporations.

Altogether, the scheme involved more than 400 strawbuyer transactions and 227 properties purchased for more

than $100 million. The vast majority of the loans involved

went into default, causing the lenders to lose tens of millions

of dollars.

B

Beecroft’s role in the scheme began sometime after

September 2002, when she was hired as an administrative

assistant at Grimm’s company, Desert Funding. In April

2003, Beecroft began working as an independent loan

processor for Select Equities, another company Grimm

owned, and she later became the owner and manager of a

third company, Secured Mortgage Services, in which the

majority of her business consisted of mortgages she prepared

for Grimm. In these positions, Beecroft participated

extensively in Grimm’s mortgage-fraud scheme, completing

loans for Grimm, handling false information that was given

to banks on behalf of straw buyers (including inflating

income information and even completing some of the

fraudulent loan applications herself), and directing to whom

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6 UNITED STATES V. BEECROFT

fraudulent third-party disbursements would be made. 

Beecroft participated in the scheme for years—joining

Grimm even before Mazzarella did—and was described by at

least one witness as Grimm’s “right hand.” According to the

government, Beecroft’s participation caused 143 of the 227

properties to go into default. The government believes she

made in excess of $400,000 from commissions and fees

generated during the scheme.

C

For her role in the scheme, Beecroft was charged with

conspiracy to commit bank, mail, and wire fraud, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, along with multiple subsidiary counts of

both mail and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341,

1343. After a lengthy jury trial, Beecroft was convicted of

the conspiracy count (Count 1), along with four subsidiary

counts—two counts each of mail and wire fraud (Counts 10,

11, 13, and 14).

Prior to sentencing, the probation office filed a

presentence investigation report (PSR) calculatingBeecroft’s

offense level at 37.2 The Guidelines range for imprisonment

was 210 to 262 months per count, and the PSR recommended

210 months for each count (to run concurrently). The PSR

also recommended that Beecroft be ordered to pay full

restitution to the victims for the losses caused by the

conspiracy, calculated at more than $52 million in total, as

supported in exhibits provided by the government. The

Guidelines authorized a fine between $20,000 and $1 million

2 Originally, the PSR calculated Beecroft’s offense level at 39, but an

amended PSR later removed a 2-level enhancement for personally

receiving $1 million.

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UNITED STATES V. BEECROFT 7

per count, but the PSR recommended no fine, given the large

amount of restitution recommended.

At sentencing, the district court concluded that, although

Beecroft was in some sense “the hub” of the scheme, she was

“not anywhere near as culpable as Mr. Grimm or Miss

Mazzarella,” and did not orchestrate the conspiracy or

perhaps even fully understand it. Accordingly, the court

sentenced Beecroft significantly below the Guidelines range

and the PSR’s recommendation: only three years in prison

and five years under supervised release. Regarding

restitution, the court again bristled at ordering the full amount

recommended in the PSR. Instead, the court limited the loss

calculation to certain properties proven at trial—a total of

$2,275,025—rather than the more than $52 million for all

properties involved in the conspiracy. The district court also

entered a criminal monetary forfeiture order against Beecroft

in the sum of $107 million for the conspiracy count, and

forfeiture of an additional $1,420,000 for the remaining four

counts. Beecroft’s counsel stated that he had no objection to

the sentence, including the orders of restitution and criminal

forfeiture.

II

Beecroft timely appealed and now argues that the

amounts of restitution and forfeiture ordered against her were

not properly calculated and otherwise violated the Eighth

Amendment. Because Beecroft did not raise these objections

to the district court, we review Beecroft’s claims only for

plain error. See United States v. Kuo, 620 F.3d 1158, 1162

(9th Cir. 2010) (reviewing method of calculating restitution

for plain error); United States v. Kearns, 61 F.3d 1422, 1428

(9th Cir. 1995) (reviewing constitutionality of forfeiture order

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8 UNITED STATES V. BEECROFT

for plain error). Under such review, we “may, in [our]

discretion, correct an error not raised at trial only where the

appellant demonstrates that (1) there is an error; (2) the error

is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute;

(3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights . . . ;

and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v.

Lopez, 762 F.3d 852, 863 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

III

We first consider Beecroft’s challenges to her $2,275,025

order of restitution. Beecroft contends that such amount was

not supported by adequate evidence and that it violated the

Eighth Amendment. We address each argument in turn.

A

Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA),

“a court must order a defendant to make restitution to a

victim of certain specified offenses.” United States v.

Anderson, 741 F.3d 938, 951 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see generally 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. 

Because the goal of restitution is to make the victim whole,

“any award is limited to the victim’s actual losses.” 

Anderson, 741 F.3d at 951 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The victims of the fraudulent scheme in which Beecroft

participated were the banks from which loans were

wrongfully obtained. Their losses are calculated as the total

amount of unpaid principal still owed on the relevant loans,

less whatever money the banks recovered from sale of the

collateral properties themselves. See Robers v. United States,

134 S. Ct. 1854, 1856 (2014).

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UNITED STATES V. BEECROFT 9

Beecroft agrees, but she contends that the record does not

contain adequate evidence to demonstrate that the court

indeed determined the amount of her restitution through such

method. Specifically, Beecroft suggests that the court did not

receive evidence that would have allowed it to account for the

value of the collateral properties when calculating the banks’

losses, and asks that the case be remanded to ensure that the

district court does so.

But, aside from her own skepticism, Beecroft gives no

reason to doubt that the district court did exactly what she

now requests. Indeed, the district court explicitly stated that

it would calculate loss through the method Beecroft

advocates: “[T]his court is of the opinion that except where

it is impossible to do so, the correct loss calculation is the

amount of the loan, less whatever was recovered in the sale,

including the foreclosure sale, or the value at sentencing, if

there has been no sale.”

Beecroft rightlynotes that it was the government’s burden

to provide reliable evidence to support loss calculation,

Anderson, 741 F.3d at 951–52, and the government did

precisely that. It, too, argued for the method of calculation

that Beecroft now advocates, and it provided the district court

with exhibits detailing the difference between the properties’

loan amounts and the value recovered through foreclosure

sales, as reported in public records. Those exhibits calculated

the banks’ total losses to be more than $50 million, an amount

the probation office agreed with in its PSR. In her sentencing

memorandum, Beecroft did not question the accuracyof these

figures or suggest that the government failed to offset the

value of the collateral properties, but instead she argued that

restitution should be based on her personal gain rather than

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10 UNITED STATES V. BEECROFT

the victims’ losses.3 Now on appeal, Beecroft still does not

argue, let alone demonstrate, that the figures presented by the

government were unreliable, and she fails even to allude to

other figures that might reflect a more accurate calculation.

Morever, although the district court acknowledged the

government’s and PSR’s calculations—and did not question

their accuracy—it ultimately elected to impose a substantially

lower restitution amount, to account only for the $2,275,025

in losses attached to certain properties which were alleged

and proven at trial. Beecroft not only failed to object to this

amount at sentencing, but indeed her sentencing

memorandum asked the court to set restitution in an amount

similar to this lower figure.

Beecroft’s bare speculation on appeal that this process

was somehow deficient does not approach her burden of

demonstrating clear or obvious error in the court’s restitution

calculations.4

B

Even though the loss amount was properly calculated,

Beecroft argues that the order of restitution nevertheless

violates the Eighth Amendment. Beecroft suggests that the

3 Beecroft no longer presses this argument—which is clearly out of step

with controlling law—on appeal.

4 To the extent Beecroft argues that the court erred by failing to consider

other factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2)—such as her financial

resources—before setting the restitution amount, such argument also fails. 

The factors Beecroft references are to be considered only afterthe amount

of restitution has already been determined, when crafting the defendant’s

payment schedule.

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UNITED STATES V. BEECROFT 11

amount of restitution was unconstitutionally excessive,

because it is “grossly disproportionate” to the gravity of her

offenses.

We have previously recognized that “proportionality is

inherent in a MVRA restitution order.” United States v.

Dubose, 146 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1998). Indeed,

because restitution under the MVRA is “inherently linked to

the culpability of the offender, restitution orders that require

full compensation in the amount of the loss are not

excessive.” Id. at 1146. For this same reason, we cautioned

that it “would be difficult to find any mandatory restitution

imposed under the MVRA cruel and unusual,” as well. Id. at

1147.

As noted, Beecroft has not demonstrated error in the

district court’s calculation of the amount of losses suffered by

the banks injured by Beecroft’s actions. Without error in the

loss calculation, Beecroft cannot show that requiring her to

pay that amount back to the victims was somehow excessive

or grossly disproportional to her crimes, which caused the

loss in the first place. And we reiterate that Beecroft was not

ordered to pay anything approaching the full amount of the

banks’ losses. Uncontroverted evidence was presented to the

district court showing that the scheme in which Beecroft

participated caused losses in excess of $50 million; requiring

her to pay slightly more than $2 million of that back is not an

unconstitutional and excessive punishment.5

5 Beecroft’s contention that she will never be able to pay the full amount

of her restitution is likewise unavailing. See Dubose, 146 F.3d at 1146

(“[A]n Eighth Amendment gross disproportionality analysis does not

require an inquiry into the hardship the sanction may work on the

offender.”).

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12 UNITED STATES V. BEECROFT

IV

We next consider Beecroft’s challenges to the order of

monetaryforfeiture imposed at sentencing. Again, she argues

that the amount of such order was both improperly calculated

and unconstitutionally excessive.

A

A person convicted of Beecroft’s crimes must be ordered

to “forfeit to the United States any property constituting, or

derived from, proceeds the person obtained directly or

indirectly, as the result of” the crime. 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2). 

Unlike restitution, such forfeiture is ordered not to restore the

victim, but instead to pay back the proceeds of the

defendant’s criminal activity. See United States v. Newman,

659 F.3d 1235, 1241–43 (9th Cir. 2011). For these purposes,

“the ‘proceeds’ of a fraudulently obtained loan equal the

amount of the loan.” Id. at 1244. And where the defendant

entered into a conspiracy, “the ‘proceeds’ of his crime equal

the total amount of the loans obtained by the conspiracy as a

whole.” Id. Curiously, “forfeiture” may extend to property

no longer in existence and sometimes even to property the

defendant never actually possessed, a counter-intuitive

interpretation compelled by prior precedent. See id. at

1241–45.

In line with this formulation, the district court ordered

Beecroft to forfeit the total amount of money obtained from

the fraudulent loans: $107 million for the conspiracy count,

and a total of $1,420,000 for the four subsidiary counts. 

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UNITED STATES V. BEECROFT 13

1

Beecroft first argues that the district court’s proceeds

calculation—based on information presented by the

government and the calculations presented in the PSR—was

somehow insufficient. She contends that the court needed to

take additional evidence to determine the “accurate” amount

of loan proceeds obtained by the conspiracy.

The court had no such obligation. Where a court “has

good reason to believe that the proposed forfeiture order

exceeds the amount authorized by statute (here, ‘proceeds’),

then the court, in its discretion, may inquire into the factual

basis for the proceeds.” Newman, 659 F.3d at 1245

(emphasis added). Beecroft has not argued, let alone

demonstrated, what “good reason” the court had to believe

that the government’s proposed forfeiture amount exceeded

the proceeds of her crimes. Beecroft does not even argue that

the figures adopted by the district court were indeed wrong,

nor does she suggest other evidence that might show a

different loan total. And, despite being given the opportunity

at sentencing, Beecroft did not seek to present any such

evidence before the district court, and she failed to indicate in

any way that she believed the forfeiture amount to be

inaccurate.

Once again, Beecroft’s bare assertion that the district

court needed more evidence to make an accurate accounting

of the loan proceeds falls far short of her burden of

demonstrating clear or obvious error in the court’s

calculation.

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14 UNITED STATES V. BEECROFT

2

Beecroft also argues that she should not be ordered to

forfeit the total loan proceeds, because she never personally

received that money, but instead made only a small

commission on each transaction. We previously rejected

such an argument in United States v. Newman. There, we

held that an individual participant in a mortgage-fraud

conspiracy may be ordered to forfeit the total loan proceeds

obtained by the conspiracy as a whole, notwithstanding the

sum of money the individual himself received. We explained

that “[i]t does not matter that [the defendant] personally

profited very little,” because he “entered into a conspiracy,

[and] the ‘proceeds’ of [such] crime equal the total amount of

the loans obtained by the conspiracy as a whole.” Newman,

659 F.3d at 1244. So too here. Beecroft was convicted of

participating in a conspiracy that earned over $107 million;

the law requires her to forfeit the full proceeds of that crime,

not simply what portion of those proceeds she may personally

have received. See id.; United States v. Spano, 421 F.3d 599,

603 (7th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Quassani,

593 F. App’x 627, 629 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2015) (mem.)

(rejecting argument that the government must link forfeiture

to individual defendant’s share of mortgage-fraud proceeds);

United States v. Bilyeu, 473 F. App’x 753, 754 (9th Cir. May

30, 2012) (mem.) (upholding order requiring individual

participant in mortgage-fraud scheme to forfeit full proceeds

of conspiracy).6

6 Although it may seem unusual to order a defendant to “forfeit” money

she may never have personally received, in the context of a conspiracy,

our inquiry looks to what the conspiratorial enterprise—not the

individual—gained. A conspiracy is “a partnership in crime”—an

“enterprise” or a “confederation” in which “the partners act for each other

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UNITED STATES V. BEECROFT 15

Beecroft suggests that Newman’s holding is somehow

undermined by a later concurring opinion which raised the

question whether a money launderer “who essentially is paid

a commission on other people’s money he handles as part of

an illegal scheme can be made to ‘forfeit’ funds that passed

through his hands but, it appears, were never his.” United

States v. Davis, 706 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 2013) (Berzon,

J., concurring). Aside from carrying no precedential

value—let alone any ability to overrule the standard set forth

in Newman—such concurring opinion offers little support to

Beecroft’s argument in this case. In Davis, the defendant

laundered money (for a fee) which undercover FBI agents

presented to him as having been stolen. Id. at 1082.

Critically, the defendant was not involved in the conduct that

originally acquired that money. Nevertheless, the defendant

was required to forfeit nearly the full sum of money that he

laundered for the agents. Id. at 1082–83. The defendant

appealed, arguing that this forfeiture amount should have

been offset by an additional order of restitution against

him—an argument the court rejected. Id. at 1084. Judge

Berzon concurred, and raised a question the defendant

himself had not asked: whether it was fair in the first place to

characterize the money the defendant laundered for others as

the “proceeds” of his illegal laundering operation. Id. at 1085

(Berzon, J., concurring). In that case, Judge Berzon’s

skepticism makes sense; while the proceeds of the

defendant’s illegal laundering operation clearly include the

in carrying it forward.” Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646–47

(1946). “Accordingly, the law treats a conspiracy, at least in some ways,

as an entity distinct from its individual members.” Ocasio v. United

States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1441 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Thus,

much like in a lawful partnership, “the proceeds of a conspiracy are a debt

owed by each of the conspirators,” regardless of the portion of those

proceeds that each member received. Spano, 421 F.3d at 603.

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fee he was paid to perform the laundering, it is quite another

thing to suggest that the “proceeds” of that laundering also

include the very money that he was asked to launder.

By contrast, regardless of her personal profit, Beecroft

was integral to a conspiracy that fraudulently acquired over

$107 million. It is not anomalous to order her jointly and

severally liable, along with the other participants in that

conspiracy, for the total amount of money that was illegally

gained by the conspiratorial enterprise.7 The district court did

not err in doing so.

B

Finally, Beecroft argues that the order of forfeiture

imposed against her violates the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against “excessive fines.” U.S. Const. amend.

VIII.

1

First, we agree with Beecroft that the order of forfeiture

in this case is subject to Eighth Amendment excessiveness

review. A monetary forfeiture order is constrained by the

Excessive Fines Clause only when it is imposed as

“punishment” for some offense. See United States v.

Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327–28 (1998). We have

previously explained that a general hallmark of criminal

7 We recognize that some circuits limit forfeiture in these circumstances

to “only so much of the proceeds (not received by [the defendant]) of the

fraud as were foreseeable to him.” Spano, 421 F.3d at 603 (emphasis

added) (collecting cases). We do not consider whether to adopt such a

foreseeability limit as well, because Beecroft has not argued for one.

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UNITED STATES V. BEECROFT 17

forfeiture orders—distinguishing them from orders of

restitution—is that they indeed serve to punish the defendant. 

See Davis, 706 F.3d at 1083–84; Newman, 659 F.3d at 1241.

The government correctly notes that there is some tension

in our cases regarding when an in rem forfeiture of criminal

proceeds is punitive.8 But we need not resolve that tension

here, because Beecroft’s forfeiture order was imposed against

her personally “upon conviction” for her crimes. See Kaley

v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1094 (2014). Such in

personam forfeitures of criminal proceeds serve, at least in

part, to punish; they “help to ensure that crime does not pay,”

by “punish[ing] wrongdoing, deter[ring] future illegality, and

lessen[ing] the economic power of criminal enterprises.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). This has long been the

case. “[In personam criminal] forfeitures have historically

been treated as punitive, being part of the punishment

8

In United States v. 3814 NW Thurman Street, 164 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir.

1999), we held that a civil in rem forfeiture of the proceeds of a

fraudulently obtained loan indeed constituted punishment, subjecting it to

excessive-fines constraints. See id. at 1194, 1197–98. In so concluding,

the majority rejected an argument raised in dissent that “forfeiture of

[criminal] proceeds can basically never be excessive,” as it simply makes

the defendant give up his illegal gains. Id. at 1199 (Rymer, J., dissenting).

Little over two years later, however, we held in a different case that

a civil in rem forfeiture of the proceeds of an illegal drug transaction was

not subject to an excessiveness review. United States v. Real Property

Located at 22 SantaBarbaraDrive, 264 F.3d 860, 874–75 (9thCir. 2001). 

There, we wrote broadly that, because “criminal proceeds represent the

paradigmatic example of ‘guilty property,’ the forfeiture of which has

been traditionally regarded as non-punitive, we . . . hold that the excessive

fines clause of the Eighth Amendment does not apply to a forfeiture action

brought under” the relevant statute. Id. That opinion made no effort to

distinguish the prior decision in Thurman Street.

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18 UNITED STATES V. BEECROFT

imposed for felonies and treason in the Middle Ages and at

common law.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 332; see also id. at

332 & n.7 (discussing historical use of criminal forfeitures as

punishment in England and United States). Indeed, while the

Supreme Court has at times analyzed whether a particular in

rem forfeiture is punitive, see id. at 330–34, the Court has

noted that there is no need for such an assessment when the

forfeiture was ordered against the criminal defendant himself. 

See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 559 n.4 (1993)

(“[T]his case involves in personam criminal forfeiture not in

rem civil forfeiture, so there was no threshold question

concerning the applicability of the Eighth Amendment.”); see

also Dubose, 146 F.3d at 1145 (“Unlike the legal fiction that

civil in rem forfeiture is a proceeding against the ‘guilty’

property, criminal in personam forfeiture is a proceeding

against the wrongdoer personally and therefore constitutes

punishment and a ‘fine’ within the meaning of the Excessive

Fines Clause.”).

Accordingly, the order of forfeiture imposed against

Beecroft personally at sentencing is punitive and therefore

subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.

2

“[A] punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines

Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a

defendant’s offense.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334. We

generally consider four factors when weighing the gravity of

an offense: “(1) the nature and extent of the crime,

(2) whether the violation was related to other illegal

activities, (3) the other penalties that may be imposed for the

violation, and (4) the extent of the harm caused.” United

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UNITED STATES V. BEECROFT 19

States v. $100,348.00 in U.S. Currency, 354 F.3d 1110, 1122

(9th Cir. 2004).

In large part, these considerations underscore the severity

of Beecroft’s crimes. Beecroft participated for years in a

massive conspiracy that included more than 400 fraudulent

transactions and more than 200 residential properties. As the

district court explained, these were “very serious crimes . . .

[that] had a tremendously damaging effect on our economy

and particularly on those who have been harmed by the

fraud.” The PSR described it as a scheme of

“incomprehensible” magnitude to “pillage financial

institutions and the Las Vegas community.” The crimes cost

banks tens of millions of dollars, and the PSR opined that

their consequences would last for years to come. Although

Beecroft did not orchestrate the scheme or share the same

level of culpability as Grimm or Mazzarella, both the district

court and PSR agreed that she was central to the fraud’s

success.

The penalties that may be imposed for Beecroft’s crimes

confirm their significance. For each count of conviction,

Beecroft could be sentenced to serve up to 30 years in prison. 

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1349. And the Guidelines

calculations—especially instructive as they reflect the

particular circumstances of Beecroft’s crimes, $100,348.00 in

U.S. Currency, 354 F.3d at 1122—provide a range of

imprisonment from 210 to 262 months per count. Beecroft

could be ordered to pay a fine of up to $1 million per count,

with a Guidelines range of $20,000 to $1 million. In short,

both in effect and in Congress’s judgment as expressed

through the applicable statutory penalties, Beecroft’s crimes

were extensive and grave.

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20 UNITED STATES V. BEECROFT

Comparing the gravity of these offenses to the forfeiture

order, id. at 1123, we have little trouble concluding that the

amounts of forfeiture ordered on Beecroft’s four subsidiary

counts of conviction (Counts 10, 11, 13, and 14) are not

excessive. For those counts, Beecroft was ordered to forfeit

$330,000; $305,000; $325,000; and $460,000, respectively. 

Each amount is substantially less than the $1 million

maximum fine authorized both by statute and by Beecroft’s

Guidelines range, before even considering the prison time

available for each conviction as well. To be clear, these sums

of money are not trivial. But neither were Beecroft’s crimes. 

The district court did not err, let alone clearly err, in setting

these amounts of forfeiture at less than half the otherwise

available fines. See, e.g., United States v. $132,245.00 in

U.S. Currency, 764 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2014)

(upholding forfeiture order that fell “far below the maximum

statutory fine” and was “only 2.6 times the maximum”

Guidelines fine); United States v. Mackby, 339 F.3d 1013,

1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding forfeiture order ten times

greater than maximum Guidelines fine).

The $107 million Beecroft was ordered to forfeit for the

conspiracy (Count 1) stands apart. As with the other counts

of conviction, for Count 1 Beecroft could be fined no more

than $1 million (with a Guidelines range beginning as low as

$20,000). In other words, for Count 1, Beecroft was ordered

to forfeit a sum more than 100 times greater than the

maximum fine allowable and more than 5,000 times greater

than the lower-end of the Guidelines range. Even accounting

for the fact that Beecroft faced potentially significant prison

time as well, see Mackby, 339 F.3d at 1018, this is a

tremendous disconnect between the forfeiture amount and

Beecroft’s legally available fine. Indeed, such a disconnect

stands out even among forfeiture orders which have

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UNITED STATES V. BEECROFT 21

previously been held grossly disproportional. For example,

in Bajakajian, the Supreme Court held a $357,144 forfeiture

order to be unconstitutionally excessive, observing that the

order was “many orders of magnitude” larger (roughly 70

times larger, to be more specific) than the $5,000 maximum

fine authorized for the defendant’s offense. 524 U.S. at

339–40. We have rejected forfeiture orders with far less

disparity. See, e.g., $100,348.00 in U.S. Currency, 354 F.3d

at 1123 (holding that a forfeiture amount between 3 and 20

times greater than maximum fine would be unconstitutionally

excessive); Thurman Street, 164 F.3d at 1198 (rejecting

forfeiture amount “more than 40 times the maximum fine

permitted under the Guidelines”).

The government cites no case upholding a forfeiture order

with a disparity similar to the one here, and it has not

attempted to argue that the $107 million otherwise

corresponds to injuries sustained by the government or the

banks.9 Cf. Mackby, 339 F.3d at 1018–19 (discussing

governmental harms caused bydefendant’s crimes); Thurman

Street, 164 F.3d at 1198 (“[T]his amount bears no reasonable

correlation to any injury suffered by the government or any

9

Indeed, the government wholly ignores the Eighth Amendment

excessiveness analysis and instead argues that, because $107 million was

a factually accurate accounting of the crime’s proceeds, the district court

had no discretion to reduce the mandatory forfeiture amount. The

government’s argument conflates discretionary reductions with

constitutionally required ones. It is correct that, in this case, forfeiture is

statutorily required and a district court cannot simply elect to reduce it as

a discretionary matter. But the court can—and must—make such a

reduction where the order would otherwise be unconstitutional. Cf.

Newman, 659 F.3d at 1240–41 (contrasting constitutional limitations on

forfeiture with discretionary reductions). To hold otherwise would be

tantamount to concluding that the Eighth Amendment simply does not

apply to statutorily mandated forfeitures.

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22 UNITED STATES V. BEECROFT

other party, as the fraudulently-obtained loan will be fully

repaid.”). And, because the propriety of the forfeiture amount

was not even discussed at sentencing, no such justification is

apparent on the record before us.

We have little doubt that the Eighth Amendment allows

Beecroft to be ordered to forfeit a substantial sum of money

for her participation in such an extensive and damaging

conspiracy. But difficulty remains with the exceptional

amount of forfeiture the court did impose. Without even an

argument supporting the propriety of the $107 million

forfeiture, we have no choice but to conclude that an order

which so vastly outpaces the otherwise available penalties for

Beecroft’s criminal activity runs afoul of the Excessive Fines

Clause. Even on plain-error review, we must vacate the

forfeiture order with respect to Count 1 and remand to the

district court for reconsideration of that amount in light of the

Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. See United

States v. Ferro, 681 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012)

(remanding for excessiveness analysis); Thurman Street,

164 F.3d at 1198 (same).

V

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the order of

restitution and the amounts of forfeiture ordered on

Beecroft’s convictions for Counts 10, 11, 13, and 14. We

VACATE the $107 million in forfeiture ordered on

Beecroft’s conviction for Count 1, and we REMAND for

reconsideration of the appropriate amount of such forfeiture.

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