Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03090/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03090-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Defense
Respondent
Kenneth M. Pedeleose
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

KENNETH M. PEDELEOSE,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3090

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. AT-1221-14-0260-W-1.

______________________ 

Decided: August 10, 2015

______________________ 

KENNETH M. PEDELEOSE, Acworth, GA, pro se.

JOSHUA E. KURLAND, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

ELIZABETH M. HOSFORD. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, and TARANTO,

Circuit Judges.

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2 PEDELEOSE v. DEFENSE

TARANTO, Circuit Judge. 

The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), 

a component of the United States Department of Defense, 

suspended Kenneth Pedeleose from his job for fourteen 

days. Mr. Pedeleose appealed to the Merit Systems 

Protection Board, alleging that the suspension was issued 

in retaliation for his whistleblowing. The Board denied 

him relief, concluding that the DCMA had shown, by clear 

and convincing evidence, that it would have suspended

him for inappropriate behavior even if he had not made 

protected disclosures. Mr. Pedeleose appeals that decision. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Mr. Pedeleose is a DCMA industrial engineer with 27 

years of federal service. He works, and has worked at all 

times relevant to this appeal, at the DCMA contract 

management office located at a Lockheed Martin facility 

in Marietta, Georgia. Mr. Pedeleose’s duties include 

reviewing Lockheed Martin’s “Cost Performance Reports” 

and “provid[ing] technical support for negotiations . . . [by] 

perform[ing] . . . comprehensive, complete, and accurate 

technical evaluation with detailed analysis of cost proposals” that serve as the “foundation” for contract negotiation. Gov’t App. 163.

On February 16, 2010, Mr. Pedeleose received notice 

that his supervisor, Ms. Nelson, proposed to suspend him 

for fourteen days on the ground that he engaged in 

“[i]nsolent and [i]ntimidating [b]ehavior [t]oward 

[m]anagement [o]fficials.” Id. at 117. The proposal 

pointed to three incidents. First, on November 17, 2009,

his second-line supervisor, Mr. Tessier, directed Mr. 

Pedelose to attend a meeting, and after the meeting Mr. 

Tessier asked him how it had gone. According to Mr. 

Tessier, Mr. Pedeleose became “very upset” and “point[ed]

at [his] clipboard and slamm[ed] [his] pen 

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PEDELEOSE v. DEFENSE 3

ing.” Id. at 118. Second, the following morning,1 Mr. 

Pedeleose allegedly became “agitated” when the Contracts 

Operations Supervisor, Mr. Gentile, asked him which 

afternoon meetings he would be attending. Id. Mr. 

Gentile reported that he and Mr. Pedeleose moved into 

the hallway, where Mr. Pedeleose “raised [his] voice and 

pointed [his] finger” and “yell[ed] and threatened to file a 

complaint against [Mr. Gentile and others].” Id. “Mr. 

Gentile described [Mr. Pedeleose’s] behavior as ‘totally 

unprofessional and out of control,’” “felt very threatened 

by [Mr. Pedeleose’s] actions,” and “actually thought [Mr. 

Pedeleose] w[as] going to hit him.” Id. Third, Mr. Tessier

reported that Mr. Pedeleose left the confrontation with 

Mr. Gentile and came immediately to Mr. Tessier’s office, 

where he “stated very loudly, more than once, that [he] 

wanted to go home.” Id. Mr. Pedeleose “loudly stated 

that Mr. Gentile had disrespected and embarrassed [him], 

and . . . complained about taking [another employee’s] 

workload.” Id. Mr. Tessier described Mr. Pedeleose as 

“red faced and full of rage” and his conduct as “explosive” 

and a “display of aggression.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). Both Mr. Tessier and Mr. Gentile wrote 

memoranda recounting the incidents. 

On April 21, 2010, the relevant deciding official, Ms. 

Snow, sustained the proposed suspension. The suspension took effect April 25th, and Mr. Pedeleose returned to 

duty on May 9th. 

Just under two years later, in 2012, Mr. Pedeleose 

filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel making a whistleblower allegation: he charged that he had 

been suspended in retaliation for reporting what he 

believed to be a violation of the Truth in Negotiations Act, 

1 The Notice of Proposed Suspension misstates the 

second specification as having occurred on the morning of 

November 17, 2009. 

 

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4 PEDELEOSE v. DEFENSE

see 10 U.S.C. § 2306a, to his supervisors and to the DCMA 

Office of Special Investigations. (His disclosures alleged 

that Lockheed Martin used two sets of data for contract 

proposals—one set for internal analysis, the other for 

external submissions.) The Office of Special Counsel 

closed its inquiry into Mr. Pedeleose’s claim of whistleblower retaliation in December 2013 after concluding that 

the DCMA could prove, by clear and convincing evidence, 

that it would have suspended Mr. Pedeleose even if he 

had not made disclosures of potential wrongdoing. Mr. 

Pedeleose then sought redress from the Board under 5 

U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3) and 1221. 

A Board administrative judge determined that Mr. 

Pedeleose’s claim of whistleblower retaliation failed for 

two reasons. The first was that Mr. Pedeleose could not 

establish that the alleged whistleblower disclosures at 

issue were a contributing factor to his suspension.2 The 

second was that the DCMA had shown, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that it would have suspended him

even if he had not made the disclosures. Pedeleose v. 

Dep’t of Defense (Initial Decision), No. AT-1221-14-0260-

W-1, slip. op. at 7–8 (M.S.P.B. July 28, 2014). 

When Mr. Pedeleose petitioned for review of the initial decision, the Board affirmed the denial of relief. The 

Board first concluded, contrary to the conclusion of the 

administrative judge, that Mr. Pedeleose had shown that 

some of his disclosures were a contributing factor to his 

suspension under the “‘knowledge/timing test.’” Pedeleose v. Dep’t of Defense (Final Decision), No. AT-1221-14-

0260-W-1, slip. op. at 6, 9 (M.S.P.B. Jan. 22, 2015) (quot2 The administrative judge outlined seven relevant 

disclosures in his initial decision. Those disclosures range 

in date from October 2009 to March 2010. Mr. Pedeleose 

does not appear to dispute the administrative judge’s list 

of the disclosures relevant to this appeal.

 

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PEDELEOSE v. DEFENSE 5

ing Wadhwa v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 110 M.S.P.R. 

615, ¶ 12, aff’d, 353 F. App’x 435 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). “Under that test,” the Board has ruled, a whistleblower “can 

prove the contributing factor element through evidence 

that the official taking the personnel action knew of the 

. . . disclosure and took the personnel action within a 

period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the 

personnel action.” Wadhwa, 110 M.S.P.R. at ¶ 12. Here, 

the Board concluded, Mr. Pedeleose had satisfied the 

knowledge/timing standard by showing that his supervisor issued the February 16, 2010 notice of proposed suspension only thirteen days after the February 3rd 

meeting in which, the parties agree, she first learned of 

six of Mr. Pedeleose’s disclosures.3 

The Board nevertheless rejected Mr. Pedeleose’s 

claim. Like the Office of Special Counsel and the administrative judge, it concluded that the DCMA had proven, 

by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have 

suspended Mr. Pedeleose even if he had not made protected disclosures. It relied on evidence that his supervisor 

made the decision to discipline him—and contacted a 

DCMA employee-relations specialist in that regard—well 

before learning of the protected disclosures. 

Mr. Pedeleose appeals the Board’s decision. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). 

3 The Board, like the administrative judge, concluded that a March 10, 2010 disclosure could not have been a 

contributing factor to Mr. Pedeleose’s suspension because 

it “postdates the proposed suspension” and “there is no 

evidence that the deciding official was aware of [the 

March 10th disclosure] at the time she rendered her 

decision.” Final Decision, slip op. at 7. 

 

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6 PEDELEOSE v. DEFENSE

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Mr. Pedeleose alleges that the proceedings 

against him were biased. He also attacks the evidence 

underlying his suspension. He argues that the DCMA, 

anticipating a complaint against Mr. Gentile, Ms. Nelson, 

and Mr. Tessier, prepared documents containing false 

statements regarding his conduct, and it then used those 

documents to discredit his whistleblowing. He recites 

numerous evidentiary or other criticisms of the agency’s 

case.

But it is not this court’s function to re-weigh the evidence. See Bieber v. Dep’t of the Army, 287 F.3d 1358, 

1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Schab v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 

142 F. App’x 449, 450 (Fed. Cir. 2005). We must affirm 

the Board’s decision unless it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, 

an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 

with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by 

law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); 

see also Terban v. Dep’t of Energy, 216 F.3d 1021, 1024 

(Fed. Cir. 2000). Applying our restricted standard of 

review, we cannot disturb the Board’s decision here. 

Mr. Pedeleose’s claim for relief from the Board in this 

appeal under 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1) depends on his establishing whistleblower retaliation under the Whistleblower 

Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). To do so, an employee “must establish four elements: (1) the acting official has the authority to take, recommend, or approve any 

personnel action; (2) the aggrieved employee made a 

protected disclosure; (3) the acting official used his authority to take, or refuse to take, a personnel action 

against the aggrieved employee; and (4) the protected 

disclosure was a contributing factor in the agency's personnel action.” Chambers v. Dep’t of Interior, 602 F.3d 

1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Even if an aggrieved employee establishes those elements, however, “there is still no 

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PEDELEOSE v. DEFENSE 7

violation of the [Whistleblower Protection Act] if the 

agency can prove by clear and convincing evidence that it 

would have taken the same personnel action(s) in the 

absence of the protected disclosure.” Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. 

§ 1221(e)(2)).

In Mr. Pedeleose’s case, the government never disputed that the deciding official had authority to take, and did 

take, a personnel action against him. Initial Decision, slip 

op. at 4. The parties likewise agree that Mr. Pedeleose 

made protected disclosures. Id. at 5. And the government 

does not challenge the Board’s conclusion that six of Mr. 

Pedeleose’s disclosures were a contributing factor to his 

suspension. See Br. of Appellee 19–21. The only issue 

before us, therefore, is whether the Board appropriately 

ruled that the DCMA established by clear and convincing 

evidence that it would have suspended Mr. Pedeleose 

even if he had not made the protected disclosures in 

question. 

When evaluating whether an agency would have taken a personnel action against a whistleblower had the 

whistleblowing not occurred, we have focused on three 

factors: “the strength of the agency’s evidence in support 

of its personnel action; the existence and strength of any 

motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials who 

were involved in the decision; and any evidence that the 

agency takes similar actions against employees who are 

not whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly situated.” Carr v. Social Sec. Admin., 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 

(Fed. Cir. 1999); see, e.g., Chambers, 602 F.3d at 1382 

(noting that the Carr factors “should be considered”). 

Here, substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings 

on the Carr factors and its ultimate determination that 

the DCMA would have suspended Mr. Pedeleose even if 

he had not made the protected disclosures at issue. 

With respect to the first factor, the agency’s evidence 

includes the written accounts from the two supervisors 

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8 PEDELEOSE v. DEFENSE

who observed Mr. Pedeleose’s offensive conduct. Gov’t 

App. 125–27. Those “memoranda contain[ ] detailed 

descriptions of the incidents” that led to Mr. Pedeleose’s 

suspension, and were written “while the incidents . . . 

were still fresh in [the supervisors’] minds.” Final Decision, slip op. at 10. Further, sufficient evidence shows 

that the suspension process was initiated before Mr. 

Pedeleose’s supervisor learned of his disclosures—Ms. 

Nelson and the DCMA’s Director of Labor and Employee 

Relations both submitted declarations to that effect. 

Moreover, Mr. Pedeleose’s disciplinary record in the year 

leading up to the suspension was far from clean. The

suspension itself was based on three separate incidents 

occurring within a 24-hour period. In addition, Mr. 

Pedeleose received a one-day suspension in June 2009 for 

rude and disrespectful statements, a suspension this court 

affirmed in Pedeleose v. Dep’t of Defense, 479 F. App’x 341 

(Fed. Cir. 2012). He also received a letter of warning and 

instruction in September 2009 “directing him to carry out 

his job duties without threats and defiance.” Final Decision, slip op. at 11; Gov’t App. 129–30. And he received 

another letter of instruction in January 2010 “based on a 

complaint by another employee who alleged that [Mr. 

Pedeleose] had repeatedly made disparaging and unprofessional statements directed at management.” Final 

Decision, slip op. at 11; Gov’t App. 121–22. The DCMA’s 

“Table of Penalties” provides that appropriate discipline 

for a second instance of “[d]isrespectful conduct, use of 

insulting, abusive, or obscene language” ranges from a 

ten-day suspension to removal. Gov’t App. 175–76. The 

fourteen-day suspension here, based on more than two 

incidents, falls well within this range.4 

4 Mr. Pedeleose asserts that the January 20 letter 

of warning contained false allegations. Br. of Appellant at 

Cont’n pp. 21–24; Gov’t App. 205. Even if Mr. Pedeleose 

 

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PEDELEOSE v. DEFENSE 9

With respect to the second Carr factor, there is evidence that Mr. Pedeleose’s supervisor, Ms. Nelson, was 

“arguably implicated” by Mr. Pedeleose’s assertion that 

management was “rewriting his reports to conceal negative information about [the contractor].” Final Decision, 

slip op. at 12. The Board properly acknowledged that 

these allegations might provide motivation for Ms. Nelson 

to retaliate. Id. 

Finally, after noting that the third Carr factor does 

not apply to Mr. Pedeleose’s case, because the parties 

agree that no similarly situated, non-whistleblower

employees exist, the Board concluded that “any evidence 

of motive to retaliate on the part of the relevant agency 

officials does not outweigh the strength of the evidence in 

support of the agency’s suspension decision.” Id. at 12–

13. We see no reversible error in this weighing of the 

evidence, and we may not re-weigh it ourselves. See 

Bieber, 287 F.3d at 1364. We therefore cannot say that 

the Board’s decision denying corrective action based on 

Mr. Pedeleose’s claim of whistleblower retaliation was 

arbitrary or capricious, contrary to law, or unsupported by 

substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). 

We have considered Mr. Pedeleose’s additional arguments and concluded that they do not justify reversal. In 

particular, Mr. Pedeleose’s claims of bias are conclusory 

and point to no action by the Board or administrative 

judge that rises to the level of “evidencing ‘a deep-seated 

favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment 

impossible.’” Bieber, 287 F. 3d at 1363 (quoting Liteky v. 

United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). 

were right in that assertion, our limited standard of 

review and the other evidence would require affirmance of 

the Board’s findings on the first Carr factor and its ultimate determination that the DCMA would have suspended him even if he had not engaged in whistleblowing. 

 

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10 PEDELEOSE v. DEFENSE

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Board is 

affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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