Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03204/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03204-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Datacard Corporation
Appellee
Xuelin Zhuang
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3204

___________

Xuelin Zhuang, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Datacard Corporation, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: March 18, 2005

Filed: July 12, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, GIBSON, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Xuelin Zhuang (Zhuang) appeals from the district court’s1

 grant of summary

judgment to Datacard Corporation (Datacard) on her employment discrimination

claims. These claims allege violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 629 et al,

and the Minnesota Human Rights Act, M.S.A. § 363.03. We affirm. 

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I. Background

Zhuang is female and was born in China in 1954. She worked for Datacard

from May 1997 until she was terminated in September 2002. Datacard manufactures

secure identification cards and credit cards, and its operations center on the work of

software developers (developers) and software test engineers (testers). Developers

write computer codes. Testers ensure that those codes operate as intended. Although

separate positions, each entails the same pay scale and the prerequisites for both are

identical—a bachelor of science degree and three to five years of experience. Zhuang

holds a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering and a masters degree in

software engineering, and her past experience included developing software test code

and designing and testing software. Initially hired by Datacard as a tester, Zhuang

applied for and received a transfer to a developer position in 1998. 

As a tester, Zhuang’s performance review stated that she “meets/exceeds”

expectations. Her supervisor noted that Zhuang “makes very good comments and

suggestions...[,] is good about requesting clarification when she doesn’t understand

something...[,] is soft-spoken and this often results in other team members

interrupting her or dominating the conversation...[and] needs to find a way to

minimize the occurrence of this which should also work to resolve the perception that

she is shy or quiet.” When she became a developer, Zhuang initially performed tester

functions. Her new supervisor, Jay Nelson (Nelson) in her March and April 1999

performance reviews concluded that she “meets/exceeds” expectations, although in

the first of these reviews he noted that he would like her to improve her written

communications and notify him earlier of her decisions on the job. 

In March 2000, Zhuang became part of the Graphical User Interface (GUI)

team developing software for the Zenith Project, a software program intended to

make Datacard’s products operate more efficiently. Three other Datacard employees

worked on the GUI team, along with five outside contractors. The contractors had

knowledge of the Java computer programming language and were considered costAppellate Case: 04-3204 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/12/2005 Entry ID: 1926778
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efficient to employ. Zhuang was the only non-Caucasian member of the GUI team.

In reviewing Zhuang’s work as a developer, Karen Kensok noted that she “meets”

expectations, and suggested that she improve her programming skills in specific

programs and participate more actively in meetings. 

In early 2001, Datacard implemented the Critical Chain Management System

(the System), a scheduling process that tracked the process of Datacard’s projects for

the purpose of ensuring their timely completion. Pursuant to System protocol,

Datacard gave stuffed toy monkeys to the employees who were furthest behind in

their tasks. Embodying the metaphorical “monkey on one’s back,” these toys served

as scarlet letters, singling out those who were disfavored within the workplace. For

a variety of reasons, many team members on the Zenith Project, including Zhuang,

fell behind the System’s schedule; however, Zhuang never received a monkey. 

 

Nonetheless, Steve Pothast (Pothast), the manager of the Zenith GUI team,

stated that Zhuang was having trouble completing her tasks on time and noted that

several team members had expressed concern regarding Zhuang’s ability to

understand work assignments. In Zhuang’s June 2001 review, Kensok noted that she

“meets” expectations, and commented that she has done an “excellent job” in certain

areas but needed opportunities for gaining communication and leadership skills. In

July of 2001, Pothast assigned a contractor with experience in the Java programming

language to work with Zhuang as a mentor. In August, Pothast sent Zhuang a letter

detailing areas in which she needed to improve, including troubleshooting skills,

confidence in asking questions, and understanding why things are done instead of

seeking “just the quick fix.” After six to eight weeks, Pothast determined that

Zhuang’s skills had not improved and that they did not meet the requirements of a

software developer position. Pothast informed Zhuang that she would receive

negative feedback on her upcoming performance review and that, but for her mentor,

she would get a monkey every week. According to Zhuang, Pothast told her that she

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“d[id] not have potential for improvement” and that he did not think technical training

would help her.

On October 5, 2001, Pothast presented Zhuang with two options: she could

remain a developer on the Zenith Project and be placed on a performance

improvement plan and a sixty-day probation if her performance did not improve; or,

she could become a tester on the Zenith GUI team. If she stayed in her current

position, he could not guarantee her employment. Zhuang noted that the suggestion

that she take a tester position hurt her feelings, and stated, “I was forced to leave my

developer job and [that] ma[de] me look very bad.” Pothast stated that he had

examined Zhuang’s skill set and past successes, and had “basically created a position

in the test group where there was a need.”

On October 9, 2001, Zhuang complained to Datacard’s human resource

department as follows: she had been asked to take on tester duties when she was first

hired as a developer; false information about her work history provided by Nelson

had led to higher expectations being placed upon her; and Pothast had humiliated her

by saying that she would not be a successful developer, that technical training would

not help her, that she should go to an English as a Second Language class, and that

she was “just different from other people.” Zhuang then took the tester position, in

which she received work assignments from Connie Johnson (Johnson), a woman with

less education than Zhuang. Zhuang’s salary, job rank, and benefits did not change.

In Pothast’s October 29, 2001, review, Zhuang received a “requires

development” rating. Pothast stated that Zhuang’s deficiencies related to maintaining

her schedule, depending on others, working independently, solving problems, and

waiting too long to seek help. Zhuang objected to Pothast’s comments on her work

and told him that the review was unfair. In April 2002, Pothast became the manager

of the software testers, the group to which Zhuang now belonged. 

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On April 8, 2002, Zhuang filed her first of two discrimination charges with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that she had been

discriminated against on the basis of her race, sex, national origin, and age. Her

factual basis for the charge alleged that she was “subjected to different terms and

conditions of employment than White, young, American employees,” “forced to

transfer into the position of Tester,” and told that “no amount of technical training

would help” her. She did not specify an adverse action. An EEOC mediation session

was carried out on June 20, 2002, with Zhuang and Datacard representatives as

parties. Among Datacard’s representatives was Karmen Nelson, a human resources

consultant and employee resources manager. At the conclusion of the mediation,

Zhuang tentatively agreed to settle her claims, but then rescinded the agreement one

week later. 

In mid-2002, Jim Goodland (Goodland), the Vice President of Software

Development, was instructed to reduce his staff. Financial concerns had led Datacard

to institute a series of lay-offs beginning in 1997 and a company-wide restructuring

effort had begun. Karmen Nelson explained that “many, many, many employees had

been let go in the preceding time frame” and noted that “the company was not doing

well.” In July or August, 2002, Goodland and Karmen Nelson considered which

employees to terminate, using a host of criteria—such as Datacard’s business needs,

employee performance, and what types of skills Datacard would require of its

employees as it moved forward—to aid their deliberations. Additional criteria was

supplied by a “skills matrix” that evaluated Datacard employees in nine areas:

performance trend, leadership, technical skills, specific knowledge, communications

and teamwork, productivity, work quality, meeting commitments, and knowledge of

how the customer works. Zhuang was ranked near the bottom of the skills matrix,

below Johnson. Pothast did not participate in the selection process, although his

performance evaluations informed Zhuang’s ranking within the skills matrix.

Goodland and Karmen Nelson discussed Zhuang’s EEOC complaint in addition to her

job performance and skill set. Forty employees, including Zhuang, were selected for

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termination. Several white males from within Zhuang’s group were also among the

forty employees. 

On July 11, 2002, Karmen Nelson initiated Datacard’s termination procedure

for Zhuang. On August 6, 2002, Zhuang was notified that she would be terminated

effective September 3, 2002, along with thirty-nine other Datacard employees.

Zhuang met with Goodland and recalled being told that “the company needs positive

high-energy people.” Although the discussions that led to Zhuang’s termination

occurred in July or August of 2002, Datacard produced during discovery a printout

of an e-mail dated May 2, 2002, from Mary Kohman (Kohman), Datacard’s Senior

Payroll Clerk, which contained Zhuang’s name and the subject heading,

“TERMINATION NOTIFICATION (CONFIDENTIAL).” After discovery, Datacard

submitted a printout of the same e-mail, albeit with a date of September 3, 2002.

Datacard claims that this was the e-mail actually sent to notify Zhuang of her

termination. According to Datacard, the first e-mail printout that it produced was a

copy of a template, not the e-mail received by Zhuang. Kohman testified that she

created the e-mail template on May 2 for notifying Datacard personnel about

departing employees and that she did not learn of Zhuang’s impending termination

until late August. Kohman further specified that it was not until September 3, 2002,

that she entered Zhuang’s name into the template e-mail, printed a copy for her file,

and sent the e-mail. 

Zhuang filed her second EEOC claim on November 5, 2002. She reasserted

her original claims and alleged further that Datacard retaliated against her. “My layoff was in reprisal for my Charge of Discrimination,” she wrote. Furthermore, she

alleged that being forced to work under Johnson adversely impacted her career

development, noted that Pothast, whom she had charged with discrimination in her

first EEOC complaint, had become her manager once again, and claimed that

although she had been informed that her position was to be eliminated due to business

reasons, young white male contractors were hired to take over her duties. 

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II. Discrimination

We review de novo the district’s court grant of summary judgment. Shanklin

v. Fitzgerald, 397 F.3d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 2005). We view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party and conclude that summary judgment was

proper only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “When a motion

for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse

party may not rest upon [] mere allegations or denials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

The district court correctly ruled that Zhuang did not establish a prima facie

case of discrimination. To establish a prima facie case of the various types of

discrimination she alleges, Zhuang must show the following: (1) she was a member

of a protected group, (2) she was meeting the legitimate expectations of her employer,

(3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) there are facts that permit an

inference of discrimination. Cherry v. Ritenour Sch. Dist., 361 F.3d 474, 478 (8th

Cir. 2004). The first element is uncontested with regard to each type of

discrimination alleged. 

Zhuang claims that she suffered three adverse employment actions. The first

is a series of events that included being assigned a mentor and receiving negative

performance reviews, the second is her transfer to the Zenith Test Group, and the

third is the termination of her employment. Her first argument on this matter

regarding her mentor and her performance reviews is unavailing. We do not believe

that Zhuang has provided any evidence, as opposed to mere allegations, that the

mentor and the reviews did not in fact constitute a benefit to her, an employer’s

method of giving her feedback and a chance to improve. 

Even assuming that Zhuang’s transfer to the tester position was involuntary,

Zhuang’s second argument fails as well. Because “[a] transfer involving only minor

changes in working conditions and no reduction in pay or benefits [does] not

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constitute an adverse employment action,” Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142,

1144 (8th Cir. 1997), we hold that Zhuang has failed to make the necessary showing

on the issue of whether she suffered an adverse employment action. It is uncontested

that her pay and benefits remained the same when she returned to a tester position.

She has failed to raise any genuine issue regarding working conditions that could alter

our conclusion in this regard. “Changes in duties or working conditions that cause

no materially significant disadvantage...are insufficient to establish the adverse

conduct required to make a prima facie case.” Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,

37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994). Zhuang’s arguments in this regard amount to a

personal preference for one position over the other. Additionally, we note that rather

than tending to show an adverse employment action, Zhuang’s option (whether forced

or voluntary) to transfer to a position she had performed well in the past constitutes

evidence that Datacard was attempting to provide Zhuang with a way to retain her

employment. 

 

With regard to Zhuang’s final argument on this claim, termination does

constitute an adverse action. Datacard has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for its actions, however, as required by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), and Zhuang has not presented probative evidence that

Datacard’s reasons are pretexts for unlawful discrimination. See id. (describing how

these various burdens of proof shift from one party to another). “There is nothing

inherently discriminatory” in Datacard’s reliance on Zhuang’s recent performance

evaluations, see Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 780 (8th Cir.

1995), and Zhuang has not shown that she was meeting the legitimate expectations

of her employer or that there are facts that permit an inference of discrimination. 

As to the second and fourth elements of the prima facie case, Zhuang presents

various pieces of circumstantial evidence that are insufficient to show that she was

meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations or to provide an inference of

discrimination. Although Zhuang received more positive performance evaluations

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during her initial tenure as a tester, this does not constitute evidence that those who

supervised her in her later role as a developer evinced discriminatory intent by giving

her less positive reviews, nor does it suggest that she was meeting her employer’s

legitimate expectations at the time she was terminated. See Miller v. Citizens Sec.

Group, Inc., 116 F.3d 343, 346 (8th Cir. 1997) (concluding that performance

evaluations from April 1990 to January 1991 were not evidence that an employee was

meeting his employer’s legitimate expectations because those evaluations were too

far removed in time from his March 1992 discharge). Similarly, much was made of

the fact that Zhuang never received the dreaded monkey. Although Zhuang may not

have been the person who was furthest behind in her work, she was reportedly behind

in her work, and we do not find the fact that she was not the furthest behind to be

probative of discriminatory intent or pretext. Those who executed the company-wide

layoff, of which Zhuang was a casualty, used many criteria in their decisional

processes. We, like the district court, refuse to “sit as super-personnel departments

reviewing the wisdom or fairness of the business judgments made by employers,

except to the extent that those judgment involve intentional discrimination.” Kiel v.

Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999). 

With regard to facts permitting an inference of discrimination, we find none.

An innocuous discussion about age at a contractor’s birthday party at work, for

example, is not evidence of discrimination. Such erroneous perceptions abound in

this case and are too numerous to address in their entirety. It is true, for example, that

problems with Zhuang’s communication skills were cited in performance evaluations

and that Zhuang may have been told that she was “different.” It would be

unreasonable, however, to equate decisions and comments based on this with

discrimination. No doubt many native English speakers could be cited for such

problems, and many employees besides Zhuang, including several white males from

Zhuang’s particular work group, were also terminated. We require probative

evidence of intentional discrimination, not mere allegations based upon facts that as

a matter of law are insufficient to establish discrimination. 

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We conclude that summary judgment was appropriate because Zhuang has

failed to establish the second and fourth elements of her prima facie case. Moreover,

even had she established a prima facie case, we could not conclude on the basis of the

evidence presented that her employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

terminating her were pretexts. 

To the extent that Zhuang sought to raise a hostile work environment claim on

appeal, we note that it has only been raised in her reply brief and that, in any event,

such a claim is without merit, as nothing in the record suggests that she was subjected

to harassment. See Elmahdi v. Marriott Hotel Services, Inc., 339 F.3d 645, 652 (8th

Cir. 2003) (discussing the elements of such a claim and the level to which harassment

must rise to be actionable). 

 

III. Retaliation

Zhuang alleges that Datacard retaliated against her for filing the EEOC claim.

In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Zhuang must show that (1) she

engaged in statutorily protected conduct; (2) suffered an adverse employment action;

and (3) there is a causal connection between her protected conduct and the adverse

employment action. EEOC v. Kohler Co., 335 F.3d 766, 772 (8th Cir. 2003). The

first and second elements are satisfied by virtue of Zhuang’s complaint to the EEOC

and her termination. There remains the question whether there is a disputed issue of

material fact as to the existence of a causal connection between her EEOC complaint

and her termination. 

Although Datacard’s employees have proffered persuasive explanations for

why the May 2, 2002, e-mail did not correspond to the date on which Zhuang was

identified for termination, it would be improper to credit the moving party’s version

of the facts on summary judgment. Zhuang points out that there are formatting

differences between the copy of the May 2 e-mail and the September 3, 2002, e-mail

produced by Datcard even though the employee who sent the e-mail claims the same

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template was in use until 2003. Therefore, there is a disputed issue of fact regarding

the e-mail. We conclude, however, that the date of the e-mail in the context of this

case is not a material fact. More than a temporal connection is generally required to

present a genuine factual issue of retaliation. Peterson v. Scott County, 406 F.3d 515,

524 (8th Cir. 2005). Although such close temporal proximity between the date of an

EEOC claim and a decision to fire an employee could conceivably support a finding

that a plaintiff had carried her burden on the third element, see, e.g., Clark County

School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (referencing cases that accept mere

temporal proximity as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case),

it does not do so here. A causal connection implies not just a relationship between

two events, but a certain type of relationship in which one event is generated by the

other. Temporal proximity can point to such a relationship, but the fact of two events

occurring close in time does not eliminate the possibility of a mere coincidence. The

closer in time two events are found to occur, however, the greater the odds become

that one is caused by the other or that both are caused by a separate, third event. By

showing that the date of the e-mail identifying her for termination is disputed, Zhuang

has focused upon the unlikelihood of a mere coincidence in the filing of her April 8,

2002, EEOC complaint and the May 2, 2002, termination e-mail. 

The only possible evidence of a causal relationship is Karmen Nelson’s

acknowledgment that when she met with Goodland to discuss who was being selected

for termination they “would discuss anything that [they] saw,” including Zhuang’s

EEOC claim. Dep. of Karmen M. Nelson, app. at 174. Nelson further acknowledged

that Goodland “would have known...that [Zhuang] had filed an EEOC charge.” Id.

Whatever evidentiary value the fact of an employer’s knowledge and discussion of

an employee’s EEOC claim might have in another case, the question here is whether

the fact of the complaint was a causal factor behind Datacard’s decision to terminate

Zhuang. We conclude that Nelson and Goodland’s discussion of Zhuang’s EEOC

claim is not probative of retaliation in this case. There is no evidence that their

discussion was marked by retaliatory animus, and thus any finding of retaliation

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would necessarily be based upon mere conjecture and would amount to a

determination that an employee can insulate herself from an otherwise valid

termination by filing an EEOC complaint. 

 

As did the district court, we conclude that even if Zhuang had established a

prima facie case of retaliation, her evidence was insufficient to show that Datacard’s

legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for terminating Zhuang was a pretext for retaliation.

See Peterson, 406 F.3d at 524 (discussing the applicable burden-shifting framework).

Datacard’s proffered explanation pointed out that the company was not economically

healthy and was reducing its staff. It also pointed out that Zhuang had been singled

out for negative job performance, was not performing well at the time, and had ranked

poorly on the skills matrix used to assess which employees should be terminated.

Given the absence of any retaliatory motive on Datacard’s part, that explanation is

valid, for it is a company’s prerogative to make business decisions in accordance with

economic need and employee job performance and Zhuang has failed to provide

evidence of pretext. It is this same paucity of evidence in Zhuang’s favor that not

only prevented her from making out her prima facie case, but would further prevent

her, had such a case been made out, from prevailing on the issue of pretext. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on

Zhuang’s retaliation claim. 

IV. Motion to Strike 

We review a district court’s denial of a motion to strike for abuse of discretion.

Dall v. United States, 957 F.2d 571, 572 (8th Cir. 1992). Zhuang argues that

Datacard should not have been permitted to introduce the September 3, 2002, e-mail

into evidence on the ground that Datacard failed to disclose the e-mail when Zhuang

requested all such documents during discovery. The district court credited Datacard’s

explanation that the May 2 e-mail produced in discovery was the product of a

technical error and admitted a copy of the new e-mail, bearing a September 3, 2002,

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date, along with additional affidavits on the issue. The district court postponed oral

argument, permitted Zhuang to conduct additional discovery, and allowed

supplemental briefing on the matter. It was not an abuse of discretion for the district

court to conclude that Datacard’s failure to produce the September 3 e-mail in a

timely fashion was harmless and that a substantial justification for this failure was

offered. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). 

V. Conclusion

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

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