Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01417/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01417-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Veterans Affairs
Intervenor
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent
Donatus U. Unara
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DONATUS U. UNARA,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Intervenor

______________________ 

2016-1417

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. CH-3443-15-0404-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: August 4, 2016

______________________ 

 DONATUS U. UNARA, Ypsilanti, MI, pro se.

 KATRINA LEDERER, Office of the General Counsel, 

Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, for 

respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G. POLISUK. 

 REBECCA SARAH KRUSER, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

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2 UNARA v. MSPB

Justice, Washington, DC, for intervenor. Also represented by REGINALD T. BLADES, JR., ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN,

JR., BENJAMIN C. MIZER. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Donatus U. Unara (“Unara”) appeals from the final 

order of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“the Board”) 

dismissing his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Unara 

v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No. CH-3443-15-0404-I-1 

(M.S.P.B. Nov. 4, 2015) (“Final Order”); Unara v. Dep’t of 

Veterans Affairs, No. CH-3443-15-0404-I-1 (M.S.P.B. June 

30, 2015) (“Initial Decision”). Because the Board correctly 

concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Unara’s appeal, 

we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Unara was previously employed as a Medical Technologist, GS-9, at the Harry S. Truman Medical Center of 

the Department of Veterans Affairs (“the Agency”). 

Initial Decision at 1. After not being selected for a GS-10 

vacancy in April 2014, Unara filed a formal Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaint of age and race 

discrimination at the Agency’s Office of Resolution Management, alleging that a series of events created a hostile 

work environment beginning in July 2013. Id. at 1, 4–6. 

He detailed incidents of not being provided appropriate 

training; unequal treatment of his compensation request; 

a manager’s hostile response to his report of a workplace

problem; and his nonselection for the GS-10 position. 

Intervenor’s App. (“I.A.”) 50. 

In September 2014, Unara suffered a stroke at work

and was hospitalized. Initial Decision at 6. Unara subsequently amended his EEO complaint to assert allegations 

of harassing actions by the Agency after his complaint 

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UNARA v. MSPB 3

was filed, including scheduling meetings for times when 

he was scheduled to be off-duty; falsely accusing him of 

being unresponsive to managerial requests and disruptive 

in the workplace; issuing him a written counseling; assigning him additional job duties; taking no action to 

ensure that his assistant was helping him perform his job 

duties; and calling him while he was hospitalized to 

request that he return to work. I.A. 50–51.

While on medical leave, he received a letter from the 

Agency explaining his responsibility to submit medical 

documentation to support his continued leave of absence. 

I.A. 37. Instead of submitting such documentation, Unara 

resigned from his position on November 17, 2014. Final 

Order at 2. In January 2015, Unara again amended his 

EEO complaint, adding an allegation that the hostile 

work environment forced him to resign. Id. 

The Office of Resolution Management accepted his 

forced resignation claim for investigation as independently actionable, making it a “mixed case” appeal. Id.; I.A. 

51–52. As a result, the investigation and a final agency 

decision were required to be completed within 120 days of 

the amendment being accepted. Final Order at 2. Before 

that period ended, however, the Office sent Unara a notice 

with a copy of the investigative file to inform him of his 

available options for processing his complaint, including

requesting a final agency decision within 30 days. Id. at

3; I.A. 54–55. Instead, Unara appealed to the Board. 

Final Order at 2–3. The Agency ultimately did not issue 

a final decision. See id. at 4–5 & n.4.

The Board’s administrative judge (“AJ”) issued an acknowledgment order explaining to Unara that it lacks 

jurisdiction over presumptively voluntary actions such as 

resignations, and advised him that his appeal would be 

dismissed unless he amended his petition to allege that 

his resignation was the result of duress, coercion, or 

improper acts by the Agency. Final Order at 3–4; I.A. 28–

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29. In response, Unara filed a submission repeating his 

allegations of how the Agency forced him to resign by

verbally harassing him and creating a hostile work environment as set forth in his EEO complaint. Final Order

at 4; I.A. 33–35. 

The AJ subsequently issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction without a 

hearing, concluding that Unara failed to make any nonfrivolous allegation that his resignation was involuntary

and thus failed to establish the Board’s jurisdiction over 

his appeal. See Final Order at 5; Initial Decision at 8–9. 

Unara petitioned for review by the full Board, which

subsequently issued a final order denying the petition and

affirming the AJ’s initial decision to dismiss the appeal. 

Final Order at 2. 

Unara timely appealed from the Board’s final order. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). 

DISCUSSION

We must affirm the Board’s decision unless we find it 

to be “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 

otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having 

been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). We review a determination of 

the Board’s jurisdiction de novo as a question of law, and 

review underlying factual findings for substantial evidence. See Parrott v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 519 F.3d 1328, 

1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 

“A decision to resign or retire is presumed to be voluntary, and an employee who voluntarily retires has no 

right to appeal to the Board; the Board assumes jurisdiction over an appeal by an employee who has resigned or 

retired only if the employee shows that his resignation or 

retirement was involuntary and thus tantamount to 

forced removal.” Staats v. U.S. Postal Serv., 99 F.3d 1120, 

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UNARA v. MSPB 5

1123–24 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Garcia v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 437 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc); 

Cruz v. Dep’t of Navy, 934 F.2d 1240, 1248 (Fed. Cir.

1991) (en banc). The employee is only entitled to a hearing—at which point jurisdiction must be shown by a 

preponderance of the evidence, Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1344—

if nonfrivolous allegations are made that the resignation 

was “the product of coercion by the agency.” Conforto v. 

Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 713 F.3d 1111, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 

(citing Dumas v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 789 F.2d 892, 894 

(Fed. Cir. 1986).

“The test for involuntariness is objective,” id., and 

“the doctrine of coercive involuntariness is a narrow one,” 

Staats, 99 F.3d at 1124. To overcome the presumption 

that a resignation was voluntary, an employee must show 

that “the agency effectively imposed the terms of the 

employee’s resignation”; that the employee “had no realistic alternative but to resign”; and that the resignation was 

“the result of improper acts by the agency.” Garcia, 437 

F.3d at 1329 (quoting Shoaf v. Dep’t of Agric., 260 F.3d 

1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001)) (emphasis added). However, 

merely disliking “measures that the agency is authorized 

to adopt, even if those measures make continuation in the 

job so unpleasant . . . that he feels that he has no realistic 

option but to leave,” is insufficient. Conforto, 713 F.3d at 

1121–22.

Unara argues that the Board did not take into account the facts presented regarding the incidents of 

discrimination that he experienced, which made his 

working conditions so intolerable that the Agency’s actions constituted a constructive removal. Pet’r’s Br. 2. He

also asserts that the Board inadequately dealt with his 

motions to compel, in which he sought discovery for his 

EEO claims. Id. Unara further contends that the Board 

failed to consider the improper acts of the Agency in 

interfering with his medical leave by sending him a letter 

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6 UNARA v. MSPB

that demanded his resignation before the amount of leave 

that he was entitled to had ended. Id. 

The government responds that the Board properly 

considered all relevant facts and correctly concluded that 

it lacked jurisdiction over Unara’s appeal. Resp’t’s Br. 10. 

The government notes that because the Board only considered the jurisdictional allegation, it did not evaluate 

the merits of Unara’s appeal. Id. Specifically, the government asserts that the Board correctly considered, 

under the totality of the circumstances, whether Unara’s 

working conditions were objectively intolerable such that 

his resignation was involuntary. Id. at 12. The government argues that the Board found that even assuming his 

allegations of the hostile work environment were true, 

they would not have compelled a reasonable person to 

resign because several of the issues could have been 

resolved in other ways, they only existed for short periods 

of time, or they were actions that the Agency was authorized to undertake. Id. at 13–14. The government also

contends that Unara’s claim that the Agency improperly 

applied or calculated his medical leave time was not 

before the Board and is thus waived. Id. at 14.

The Agency, as intervenor in the present appeal, similarly asserts that the Board examined all of the facts 

presented and addressed whether they evidenced improper agency actions and how they would affect a reasonable 

person in Unara’s position. Intervenor’s Br. 15, 17–18. 

The Agency further responds that Unara did not identify 

any specific facts that the Board failed to consider. The 

Agency also contends that the Board properly treated 

Unara’s motions to compel because they did not comply 

with the Board’s regulations, and thus the AJ’s failure to 

rule on the first motion was not prejudicial. Id. at 15–16, 

23. The Agency further asserts that the full Board’s 

rejection of the second motion was also proper. Id. at 16–

17, 23. The Agency lastly agrees with the government

that Unara waived the argument that the letter that he 

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UNARA v. MSPB 7

received during his medical leave forced him to resign, 

and moreover asserts that the letter on its face did not 

demand his resignation. Id. at 24–25.

We agree that the Board did not err in dismissing 

Unara’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Board considered his assertions of harassment and discrimination and 

found that, although the described incidents showed “an 

unpleasant and inconvenient working environment,” none 

of the alleged actions were improper or would suffice to 

compel a reasonable person to resign. The Board analyzed the individual allegations and found them to be

legitimate Agency decisions that it is authorized to make, 

see Staats, 99 F.3d at 1124; or otherwise not so oppressive 

as to force Unara’s resignation. There were reasonable 

explanations for the Agency’s actions or realistic alternatives to resigning. See Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1329; Conforto, 

713 F.3d at 1122. The Board also considered Unara’s 

arguments concerning the motions to compel and found 

that any alleged errors were not prejudicial and would not 

have changed the outcome of the appeal. Final Order at 6 

n.7. Moreover, we do not find anything in the record 

indicating that Unara raised to the Board the issue of the 

letter received during his medical leave, as he instead 

focused on his manager’s statements to him shortly after 

his stroke; regardless, the letter does not support a nonfrivolous allegation of involuntary resignation. 

The Board thus properly considered the totality of the 

circumstances and found that Unara did not demonstrate 

that any Agency actions would have effected a constructive removal. Accordingly, Unara failed to meet his 

burden to nonfrivolously allege that his resignation was 

objectively coerced and thus involuntary. Without such 

allegations, the Board correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction over Unara’s appeal.

We have considered Unara’s remaining arguments, 

but find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, 

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8 UNARA v. MSPB

we affirm the Board’s decision dismissing Unara’s appeal 

for lack of jurisdiction.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs. 

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