Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01126/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01126-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Blue Gacnik
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

BLUE GACNIK, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

STEVEN CARROLL GADE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

ANTONIO ESTEVAN SANDOVAL, 

Defendant-Appellant 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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FILED UdeCI States Ccnut of AppealS 

Tenth Circuit 

MAR 13 1995 

PATRICK FISHER - Clerk 

No. 94-1126 

No. 94-1135 

No. 94-1140 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 93-CR-337) 

Philip W. Ogden, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for DefendantAppellant Blue Gacnik (submitted on the briefs) . 

Donald G. Paulson, Paulson & Paulson, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 

for Defendant-Appellant Steven Carroll Gade. 

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Janine Yunker, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Michael G. Katz, 

Federal Public Defender, with her on the brief), Denver, Colorado, 

for Defendant-Appellant Antonio Estevan Sandoval (submitted on the 

briefs) . 

Gregory C. Graf, Assistant United States Attorney, Denver, 

Colorado, (Henry L. Solano, United States Attorney, with him on 

the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before KELLY and HENRY, Circuit Judges, and BURCIAGA, District 

Judge.t 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

Defendants-appellants Blue Gacnik, Steven Carroll Gade, and 

Antonio Estevan Sandoval appeal the district court's application 

of the Sentencing Guidelines after each, in accordance with Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 11(a) (2), entered a plea to conspiracy to manufacture 

explosive materials without a license, 18 U.S.C. § 371. Our 

jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 

3742(a). We affirm Messrs. Gade's and Sandoval's sentences, but 

remand Ms. Gacnik's case for resentencing. 

Background 

In May 1993, Mr. Gade acquired a copy of a book entitled 11 The 

Anarchist's Cookbook, 11 which details, inter alia, how to 

manufacture explosives. Among the many inviting recipes contained 

therein appeared one for aluminum flash powder, a highly explosive 

material considerably more dangerous and volatile than either 

t The Honorable Juan G. Burciaga, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

After these appeals were submitted, Judge Burciaga passed away. 

Judge Burciaga did not participate in this opinion. In this 

regard, see 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). 

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dynamite or plastic explosives. Necessary ingredients were 

ordered, and sizable batches of highly explosive aluminum flash 

powder were mixed and packaged for distribution. Messrs. Gade and 

Sandoval then sold devices containing the explosives at parties, 

and included juveniles among their satisfied customers. 

On June 26, 1993, Pueblo police responded to a call reporting 

that Mr. Gade had fired shots outside his apartment during an 

altercation with members of a group known as 11 Skinheads Against 

Racial Prejudice 11 (SHARPS). Ms. Gacnik, who was dating Mr. Gade 

at the time, called the police. When the police arrived, they 

took Mr. Gade into custody. Upon returning to the station, 

officers received an anonymous phone call informing them that Mr. 

Gade was manufacturing explosive devices. With Mr. Gade's 

consent, the police returned to the apartment, accompanied by him, 

to search for explosives. 

Between the time that Mr. Gade was taken into custody and the 

police returned to search, Mr. Sandoval and Ms. Gacnik gathered up 

the explosive materials in the apartment and hid them in the 

basement of the building behind the stairs. At the time of their 

actions, the two were aware only of the police investigation into 

the shooting incident, and not of any investigation in connection 

with the manufacture of the explosives. Not surprisingly, upon 

their arrival at Mr. Gade's, the police initially failed to find 

any explosive materials. When Ms. Gacnik was questioned regarding 

the whereabouts of these materials, she denied any knowledge, 

until prompted by Mr. Gade to admit their location. 

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Police ultimately recovered 2.2 pounds of aluminum flash 

powder stored in a jar, 60 explosive devices containing a total of 

1.7 pounds of flash powder, and two pipe bombs from the basement. 

On appeal, the Defendants challenge the sentences meted out 

to them as a result of these activities. 

Discussion 

A. Obstruction of Justice 

Ms. Gacnik contends that the district court erred in 

assessing her a two-level upward sentence adjustment for 

obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (Nov. 1994). 

This Sentencing Guideline provision mandates a two-level offense 

increase "[i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or 

attempted to obstruct or impede the administration of justice 

during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the 

instant offense." She raises two legal arguments. First, she 

contends that § 3C1.1 should not be read to encompass conduct that 

is itself part of the crime. Next, Ms. Gacnik argues that this 

Guideline adjustment should not apply to obstructive conduct 

occurring prior to the commencement of an official investigation 

into the ultimate offense of conviction. 

In support of her first argument, Ms. Gacnik contends that 

her concealment of the explosive materials was an element of the 

conspiracy to manufacture these materials without a license, the 

crime of which she was convicted. She raises this challenge for 

the first time on appeal. Her failure to raise this matter below 

severely limits the scope of our review. "Normally, failure to 

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alert the trial court to an error precludes review of that same 

issue by this court." United States v. Frederick, 897 F.2d 490, 

494 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 863· (1990). However, 

"[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be 

noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the 

court." United States v. Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1511 (lOth Cir. 

1991) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 

1343 (1993). Therefore, unless the district court's findings in 

this regard constitute plain error, we may not consider the merits 

of Ms. Gacnik's claim. Id. 

The plain-error exception is not a tool to be routinely 

employed, but rather "is to be 'used sparingly, solely in those 

circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise 

result.'" United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (quoting 

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.l4 (1982)). To invoke 

this exception, the district court's error must be "'particularly 

egregious,'" id. (quoting Frady, 456 U.S. at 163) as well as 

"'obvious and substantial.'" Saucedo, 950 F.2d at 1511 (quoting 

United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1254 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 112 S. Ct. 239 (1991)). 

We find that no such error was committed in regard to Ms. 

Gacnik's first legal challenge. Her claim that an act of 

concealment is an element of the crime of conspiracy to 

manufacture explosive materials without a license is incorrect. 

For purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 371, the crime of conspiracy consists 

of (1) an agreement; (2) to break the law; (3) accompanied by an 

overt act; (4) furthering the conspiracy's object; (5) and that 

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the defendant willfully entered the conspiracy. United States v. 

Hanson, 41 F.3d 580, 582 (lOth Cir. 1994). This crime does not 

encompass any element of fraud, deceit, or concealment. While the 

act of concealment may be taken as evidence of a conspiracy, it is 

not by itself an element of the crime as defined under the law. 

Moreover, the act of concealment is not incorporated in U.S.S.G. § 

2Kl.3, the guideline provision applied to the offense to which 

Ms. Gacnik pleaded, and so there is no danger of punishing her 

twice for the same conduct. See United States v. Flinn, 18 F.3d 

826, 829 (lOth Cir. 1994) ("impermissible cumulative sentencing 

occurs when the same conduct on the part of the defendant is 

used to support separate increases under separate enhancement 

provisions ... "). 

Ms. Gacnik did raise her second legal argument with the 

district court, that the reach of § 3Cl.l does not include 

obstructive conduct occurring prior to the commencement of an 

official investigation into the offense of conviction. Given 

that, resolution of this question mandates an examination of the 

district court's interpretation and application of the Sentencing 

Guidelines; our review is de novo. See United States v. 

Hershberger, 962 F.2d 1548, 1550 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

We find Ms. Gacnik's argument persuasive. A plain reading of 

U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.l compels the conclusion that this provision should 

be read only to cover willful conduct that obstructs or attempts 

to obstruct "the ip.vestigation ... of the instant offense." 

(emphasis added) . 

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The Sentencing Guidelines are to be interpreted as if they 

were a statute, meaning that we must follow the "clear, 

unambiguous language if there is no manifestation of contrary 

intent[,]" United States v. Goldbaum, 879 F.2d 811, 813 (lOth 

Cir. 1989) (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 391 

(1989)), "giving the words used their ordinary meaning." Moskal 

v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (internal citation and 

quotations omitted). To our mind, the clear language of § 3Cl.l 

enunciates a nexus requirement that must be met to warrant an 

adjustment. This requirement is that the obstructive conduct, 

which must relate to the offense of conviction, must be undertaken 

during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing. Obstructive 

conduct undertaken prior to an investigation, prosecution, or 

sentencing; prior to any indication of an impending investigation, 

prosecution, or sentencing; or as regards a completely unrelated 

offense, does not fulfill this nexus requirement. See United 

States v. Leyy, 992 F.2d 1081, 1083 (lOth Cir. 1993) (finding 

nexus requirement between obstructive conduct and offense of 

conviction) . 

In so holding, we must respectfully disagree with the Eighth 

Circuit, which has read § 3Cl.l in broader terms regarding the 

precise issue before us. In United States v. Dortch, 923 F.2d 629 

(8th Cir. 1991), the Eighth Circuit reasoned quite properly that 

the offense of conviction may not be what initially attracts 

police attention, but then, in our opinion, wrongly assumed that 

this truism had been incorporated into § 3Cl.l, such that a 

defendant obstructing justice with knowledge of an investigation 

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wholly unrelated to the offense of conviction could be found 

deserving of an adjustment. 923 F.2d at 632. In our view, this 

reasoning contradicts the plain language of the provision, which 

speaks only of adjustment for obstruction of "the investigation 

... of the instant offense." U.S.S.G. §3C1.1 (emphasis added). 

Although we reject this reasoning in Dortch, we continue to agree 

with its alternative holding (not at issue here) that "[t]he 

conduct relied upon to support an obstruction of justice 

enhancement must relate to the crime of conviction." See l!§yy, 

992 F.2d at 1084 (citing Dortch, 923 F.2d at 632). 

Another case relied upon by the government, United States v. 

Barry, 938 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1991), is not contrary to our 

ruling. In that case, a defendant, obviously aware of an 

investigation, lied to a grand jury investigating the very crimes 

for which he was ultimately convicted. Id. at 1332. The D.C. 

Circuit correctly noted that "the significant factor is not the 

mere timing of the obstruction but rather whether the defendant 

attempted to obstruct the administration of justice with respect 

to the investigation ... of the offense of conviction." Id. at 

1334 (emphasis in original) . 

Under our reading of § 3C1.1, we find that the government 

failed to establish this nexus. There is simply no evidence that 

Ms. Gacnik undertook to hide the explosive materials with any 

knowledge of an impending investigation or during any 

investigation of the conspiracy for which she was ultimately 

convicted. We disagree with the district court that the very act 

of concealment, standing alone, is sufficient evidence of Ms. 

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Gacnik's awareness of an investigation pointed at her offense of 

conviction. The record reveals only that Ms. Gacnik was aware 

that the police had taken Mr. Gade into custody for having 

discharged a gun, but this knowledge of police interest in a 

completely unrelated offense, not involving her, simply does not 

.meet the requirements of § 3Cl.l. We therefore reverse the 

district court's finding that an obstruction of justice adjustment 

was proper in Ms. Gacnik's case, and remand for resentencing. See 

18 u.s.c. § 3742(f). 

B. Acceptance of Responsibility 

Ms. Gacnik and Mr. Gade contend that the district court 

erred by refusing to award either of them a two-level downward 

adjustment for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to § 3El.l of 

the Sentencing Guidelines. This section provides in relevant 

part, 11 [i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of 

responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 

levels. 11 U.S.S.G. § 3El.l (a). Whether a defendant has accepted 

responsibility for purposes of § 3El.l, is a factual question that 

we review under a clearly erroneous standard. United States v. 

McCollum, 12 F.3d 968, 972 (lOth Cir. 1993). We recogni·ze that 

11 [t]he sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a 

defendant's acceptance of responsibility. For this reason, the 

determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great 

deference on review. 11 U.S.S.G. § 3El.l, comment. (n.S). 

The district court did not commit clear error in ruling that 

Ms. Gacnik had failed to accept responsibility for her criminal 

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conduct. The record supports this conclusion. Ms. Gacnik 

attempted to minimize her role in the conspiracy in the face of 

evidence to the contrary about her involvement in the manufacture 

of the explosive devices and her knowledge of the sales of these 

devices to third parties. Additionally, the district ·court found 

that Ms. Gacnik's denial of knowledge of the dangerousness of the 

explosive devices lacked credibility. 

Neither does Mr. Gade's behavior warrant a downward 

adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. A defendant who 

enters a guilty plea is not entitled to a downward adjustment for 

acceptance of responsibility as a matter of right. U.S.S.G. § 

3E1.1, comment. (n.3). Rather, the defendant bears the burden to 

prove his acceptance of responsibility. McCollum, 12 F.3d at 972. 

It is clear, as the district court found, that Mr. Gade did not 

meet this burden. Mr. Gade was far from truthful in admitting 

conduct comprising the offense. Moreover, he did not voluntarily 

terminate his criminal conduct; indeed, after his arrest, Mr. Gade 

sought to revive his business by ordering additional materials for 

the manufacture of explosives. 

Mr. Gade argues that § 3E1.1 should be liberally construed to 

take into account a defendant's subjective characteristics, such 

as his age, experience, and physical and mental abilities. This 

contention is akin to the argument for individualized sentencing 

rejected by the Supreme Court in Mistretta v. United States, 488 

U.S. 361, 395 (1989). As the Court recognized, the Sentencing 

Guidelines replaced the entirely individuated determinations of 

the past with a standardized evaluation and weighing that could 

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then be applied to individual cases. Id. To do as Mr. Gade asks 

would be to undermine this entire scheme. 

C. Upward Departure Under U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3 

All three defendants challenge the upward departures assessed 

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3, comment. (n.10). The Tenth Circuit 

has enunciated a three-step analysis for review of upward 

departures: (1) a de novo review of whether the circumstances 

cited by the district court warrant departure; (2) a clearly 

erroneous review of the factual determinations supporting the 

decision to depart; and (3) a reasonableness review of the degree 

of departure. Flinn, 18 F.3d at 828. 

Application Note 10 of § 2K1.3 provides: 

An upward departure may be warranted in any of the 

following circumstances: (1) the quantity of explosive 

materials significantly exceeded 1000 pounds; (2) the 

explosive materials were of a nature more volatile or 

dangerous than dynamite or conventional powder explosives 

(~, plastic explosives); (3) the defendant knowingly 

distributed explosive materials to a person under twentyone years of age; or (4) the offense posed a substantial 

risk of death or bodily injury to multiple individuals. 

At sentencing, the district court deemed two of these factors to 

be present with respect to all three Defendants: the explosive 

materials were more volatile than dynamite, and the offense posed 

a substantial risk of death or injury to multiple individuals. 

Additionally, the court found that Messrs. Gade and Sandoval had 

knowingly distributed the explosive materials to persons under the 

age of twenty-one. As a result of these findings, the court 

imposed a two-level upward departure on Ms. Gacnik, while Messrs. 

Gade and Sandoval received three-level upward departures. 

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The district court relied upon appropriate circumstances 

warranting a departure. It followed the specific criteria listed 

in U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3, comment. (n.10). As the Supreme Court has 

noted, Sentencing Guideline Commentary is to be given controlling 

weight, so long as it is neither plainly erroneous nor 

inconsistent with the Guidelines themselves. Stinson v. United 

States, 113 s. Ct. 1913, 1919 (1993). 

Messrs. Gade and Sandoval, however, question whether the four 

factors listed under Application Note 10 may be cumulated to award 

multiple departure increases, or whether these factors are 

alternative criteria, the presence of one or more of which allows 

the awarding of only one departure increase. This is a question 

of first impression. Our reading of the Sentencing Guidelines 

indicates that Application Note 10 provides for the awarding of 

cumulative departure increases when more than one of the listed 

factors are present. 

In addressing "general application principles," the 

Sentencing Guidelines note that the "commentary may suggest 

circumstances which, in the view of the Commission, may warrant 

departure from the guidelines. " U.S. S. G. § 1Bl. 7 (emphasis 

added) . We think that each of the four factors listed in 

Application Note 10 constitutes a separate circumstance. Each.of 

the fou~ factors may be present by itself or in combination with 

the other three; they are independent variables, and as such, 

ought to be considered independently in awarding an adjustment 

under § 2Kl. 3. 

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As the next step in our analysis, we find that the district 

court did not commit any error, much less clear error, in its 

factual determinations underlying its decisions to depart. The 

unrebutted testimony of Agent Thomasson of the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, and Firearms establishes that the explosive materials 

manufactured by the Defendants were more volatile than dynamite or 

conventional powder explosives. 

Ms. Gacnik, however, urges that such a finding is not enough 

to warrant departure under Application Note 10, and contends that 

a defendant must have knowledge of the materials' volatility 

during the course of the conspiracy. We disagree. 

Application Note 10 is silent regarding the existence of a 

mens rea requirement for this volatility/dangerousness factor; 

however, when the drafters of the Guidelines have wished to impose 

a mens rea requirement, they have been explicit in doing so. See 

United States v. Sanders, 990 F.2d 582, 584 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 114 S. Ct. 216 (1993); United States v. Singleton, 946 

F.2d 23, 25 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1231 (1992); 

United States v. Taylor, 937 F.2d 676, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1991). That 

the drafters can and do deem bad intent necessary for certain 

crimes is illustrated by the inclusion of a scienter requirement 

in the very next factor listed under Application Note 10, 

11 knowingly distribut[ing] explosive materials to a person under 

twenty-one years of age. 11 See Singleton, 946 F.2d at 25 (emphasis 

in original) . 

We may readily dispose of the remaining challenges to the 

district court's factual determinations pertaining to upward 

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departure under § 2Kl.3. Mr. Sandoval argues that insufficient 

evidence was presented to implicate him in the knowing 

distribution to persons under twenty-one. Agent Thomasson, 

however, testified that he interviewed juveniles to whom Messrs. 

Gade and Sandoval had attempted to sell the explosive devices. 

Ms. Gacnik and Mr. Gade object to the finding that their offense 

posed a substantial risk of death or bodily injury to multiple 

individuals. The record supports the opposite conclusion. 

The last step in examining an upward departure requires a 

reasonableness review of the degree of the departure. We do not 

lightly overturn determinations of the appropriate departure 

degree. United States v. Williams, 922 F.2d 578, 582 (lOth Cir. 

1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 982 (1991). Only Mr. Sandoval has 

appealed on this last factor. Certainly these departures 

increased Mr. Sandoval's sentence, but this three-level increase 

was well within the range of reasonableness given the seriousness 

of the conduct and the potential for harm. See Flinn, 18 F.3d at 

828-29 (six-level adjustment deemed reasonable). 

D. Criminally Negligent Homicide as a Crime of Violence 

Lastly, Mr. Sandoval contends that the district court erred 

in finding that conduct underlying a predicate conviction for 

criminally negligent homicide presented a serious risk of physical 

injury to others, and assigning him a base offense level of twenty 

as one who had been convicted for a "crime of violence." 

Because resolution of this issue demands that we examine the 

district court's interpretation and application of the Sentencing 

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Guidelines, our review is de novo. See Hershberger, 962 F.2d at 

1550. 

U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3(a) (2) provides that a district court must 

assign a base offense level of twenty "if the defendant had one 

prior felony conviction of either a crime of violence ·or a 

controlled substance offense .. II Application Note 2 to § 

2K1.3-refers to§ 4B1.2 for the definition of "crime of violence." 

This section defines the term as follows: 

(1) The term "crime of violence" means any offense under 

federal or state law punishable by imprisonment for a 

term exceeding one year that (i) has as an element the 

use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 

against the person of another, or (ii) is burglary of a 

dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves the use of 

explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents 

a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1) (emphasis added). 

Mr. Sandoval argues that in determining the applicability of 

§ 4B1.2(1) (ii), the district court should have limited its inquiry 

into the conduct set forth in the predicate count of conviction. 

If the lower court had so limited its analysis, Mr. Sandoval 

contends, it would have had to conclude that the criminally 

negligent homicide at issue did not constitute a "crime of 

violence." We disagree with this argument. Rather, we find that 

the district court correctly looked to the statutory count of 

conviction, the indictment, and specific, unchallenged facts set 

forth in the presentence report to conclude that Mr. Sandoval 

indeed had committed a "crime of violence" for purposes of § 

4B1.2 (1) (ii). 

Under Colorado law, "criminally negligent homicide" occurs 

when "[a]ny person ... causes the death of another person by 

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conduct amounting to criminal negligence .... 11 Colo. Rev. 

Stat. § 18-3-105 (1986). 11A person acts with criminal negligence 

when, through a gross deviation from the standard of care that a 

reasonable person would exercise, he fails to perceive a 

substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will ·occur or 

.that a circumstance exists. 11 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-501. 

Read together, these statutes clearly delineate 11 Conduct that 

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, 11 

thus placing criminally negligent homicide squarely within the 

ambit of a 11 crime of violence 11 under § 4B1.2 (1) (ii). 

To label any and all conduct resulting in a charge of 

criminally negligent homicide as a 11 crime of violence, 11 however, 

may sweep too broadly. Because it encompasses such a wide range 

of behaviors, Colorado's criminally negligent homicide statute is 

ambiguous. Thus, a court 11 'can look beyond the statutory count of 

conviction in order to resolve a patent ambiguity caused by a 

broad state statute.' 11 United States v. Garcia, 42 F.3d 573, 576 

(lOth Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Smith, 10 F.3d 724, 733 

(lOth Cir. 1993) (per curiam)). The range of this extra-statutory 

examination is, however, limited to the charging papers, judgment 

of conviction, plea agreement or other statement by the ·defendant 

for the record, presentence report adopted by the court, and 

finding$ by the sentencing judge. Smith, 10 F.3d at 734. Relying 

upon information contained in his prior indictment, Mr. Sandoval's 

presentence report reveals that he pleaded guilty to criminally 

negligent homicide in connection with the fatal child abuse of his 

two infant children. To our mind, it is beyond cavil to argue 

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that child abuse is not conduct presenting a "serious potential 

risk of physical injury to another." Mr. Sandoval clearly has 

committed a "crime of violence" under § 4B1.2 (1) (ii). 

The judgments are AFFIRMED as to Messrs. Gade and Sandoval. 

The judgment against Ms. Gacnik is REMANDED for resent-encing. 

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