Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01174/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01174-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Brenda G. Short
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BRENDA G. SHORT, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Defendant. 

No. 2:15-cv-1174-EFB 

ORDER 

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying her applications for a period of disability and Disability Insurance 

Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the 

Social Security Act. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For the 

reasons that follow, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted, the Commissioner’s 

motion is denied, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI, alleging that she had 

been disabled since April 15, 2009. Administrative Record (“AR”) 151-168. Plaintiff’s 

applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Id. at 94-103, 107-111. On October 

10, 2013, a hearing was held before administrative law judge (“ALJ”) David M. Blume. Id. at 

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23-43. Plaintiff was represented by a non-attorney at the hearing, at which she and a vocational 

expert testified. Id.

On December 20, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled 

under sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act.1 Id. at 9-18. The ALJ made the 

following specific findings: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through 

December 31, 2010. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 15, 2009, the 

alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.). 

* * * 

 1

 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) is paid 

to disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Under both provisions, 

disability is defined, in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to 

“a medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 

1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 423(d)(1)(a), 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The 

following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: cervical and lumbar degenerative disc 

disease, thoracic fracture, depression, anxiety, and social phobia (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 

416.920(c)). 

* * * 

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 

416.926). 

* * * 

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the residual 

functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 

416.967(b) except she can occasionally climb ramps/stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, 

or crawl. She cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She should not work around 

hazards. She can perform simple, repetitive tasks. She can occasionally interact with the 

public, co-workers, and supervisors. 

* * * 

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 

416.965). 

* * * 

7. The claimant was born on April 24, 1964 and was 44 years old, which is defined as a 

younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 

416.963). 

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English 

(20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964). 

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using 

the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not 

disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 

CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional 

capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the 

claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)). 

* * * 

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from 

April 15, 2009, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)). 

Id. at 11-18. 

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Plaintiff’s request for Appeals Council review was denied on April 1, 2015, leaving the 

ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. Id. at 1-4. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings 

of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards were 

applied. Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); 

Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel, 

180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are 

conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is 

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th 

Cir. 1996). “‘It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. 

N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 The sole issue before the court is whether the ALJ provided legally sufficient reasons for 

rejecting the opinion of plaintiff’s examining physician. ECF No. 12 at 5-9. The weight given to 

medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by treating, examining, or nonexamining professionals. Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion 

of a treating professional, who has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an 

individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). To evaluate whether an 

ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to considering its source, the court considers 

whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record; and (2) clinical findings support the 

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opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical 

professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. In contrast, a 

contradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical professional may be rejected for “specific 

and legitimate” reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 830. While a treating 

professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted by a supported 

examining professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different independent clinical findings), the 

ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). However, “[w]hen an examining 

physician relies on the same clinical findings as a treating physician, but differs only in his or her 

conclusions, the conclusions of the examining physician are not ‘substantial evidence.’” Orn v. 

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 Plaintiff underwent a comprehensive mental evaluation, which was performed by Dr. Sid 

Cormier, Ph.D., an examining physician. AR 291-295. Dr. Cormier diagnosed plaintiff with 

social phobia, generalized anxiety disorder, and major depressive disorder, recurrent, moderate. 

Id. at 294. Dr. Cormier opined that plaintiff was moderately to seriously limited in performing 

simple and repetitive tasks as well as complex and detailed tasks, maintaining regular attendance, 

performing simplistic work activities on a constant basis, completing a normal workday or work 

week work without interruptions, and interacting with coworkers and the general public. Id. at 

294. Dr. Cormier further opined that plaintiff was moderately impaired in her ability to deal with 

typical stress she may encounter in a competitive work situation. Id. 

 The record also contains opinions from two non-examining physicians, both expressing 

the opinion that plaintiff’s mental impairments were not severe. AR 59-60, 86-87. 

 In assessing plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ gave little weight to the opinion of 

Dr. Cormier. Because Dr. Cormier’s examining opinion was contradicted by other medical 

opinions, the ALJ was required to provide specific and legitimate reasons for according it reduced 

weight. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. 

 The ALJ provided a single reason for giving little weight to Cormier’s opinion: “it appears 

to be based primarily upon the claimant’s subjective allegations, which as discussed above are not 

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entirely credible.”2 AR 16. The opinion of a treating physician may be rejected where it is 

premised primarily on plaintiff’s subjective complaints and the ALJ properly discounted 

plaintiff’s credibility. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). However, an 

ALJ does not provide sufficient “reasons for rejecting [a] physician’s opinion by questioning the 

credibility of the [plaintiff’s] complaints where the doctor does not discredit those complaints and 

supports his ultimate opinion with his own observations.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin, 

528 F.3d 1194, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2008). 

 There is no dispute that Dr. Cormier relied, at least to some degree, on plaintiff’s 

subjective complaints. See generally AR 291-295. However, his report also establishes that he 

relied on objective findings to support his opinion. For example, during the evaluation Dr. 

Cormier observed that plaintiff “appeared to be in significant physical discomfort and 

demonstrated both verbal and nonverbal behavior consistent with her self-appraised pain rating 

. . . .” AR 291. He also noted that plaintiff appeared to be in significant psychological distress 

and exhibited behavior consistent with at least moderate anxiety. Id. at 292. Mental status 

examination revealed that plaintiff’s mood was moderately depressed and she was anxious with 

an appropriate quality of affect. Id. at 293. 

 Significantly, Dr. Cormier stated that his opinion and diagnosis of social phobia, major 

depressive disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder were based on structured diagnostic 

interviewing, historical information, behavioral observations, and plaintiff’s self-reports. Id. at 

292, 294-295. Furthermore, he “discerned no indications of malingering, symptom exaggeration, 

or symptom minimization.” Id. at 292. 

 Thus, Dr. Cormier supported his opinion with objective findings, and there is no basis for 

the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Cormier relied primarily upon claimant’s subjective allegations. 

For that reason the ALJ’s sole basis for rejecting this examining opinion was legally insufficient. 

///// 

///// 

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 Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s credibility finding. 

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Accordingly, this matter must be remanded for further consideration of plaintiff’s mental 

impairments. Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Unless the district court 

concludes that further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not 

remand with a direction to provide benefits.”). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted; 

 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is denied; 

 3. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order; and 

 4. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in plaintiff’s favor. 

DATED: September 27, 2016. 

Case 2:15-cv-01174-EFB Document 15 Filed 09/27/16 Page 7 of 7