Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00090/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00090-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark Shawn Feathers
Plaintiff
S. Marsh
Defendant
A. Miranda
Defendant
B. Peterson
Defendant
Stu Sherman
Defendant
J. Silva
Defendant
Y. Welch
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK SHAWN FEATHERS,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. MIRANDA, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:15-cv-00090-DAD-SKO (PC)

FIRST SCREENING ORDER DENYING 

REQUEST FOR COUNSEL AND 

DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT, 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 11)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff Mark Shawn Feathers, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 

filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Americans with 

Disabilities Act), 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Rehabilitation Act), and state law on January 20, 2015. On 

March 5, 2015, pursuant to the order filed on January 22, 2015, Plaintiff filed a signed complaint. 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that 

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 

(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court 

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shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and 

courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 

F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated 

in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This 

requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Prisoners 

proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and 

to have any doubt resolved in their favor, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citations omitted), but nevertheless, the mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting the 

plausibility standard, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

II. Discussion

A. Summary of Allegations

Plaintiff, an inmate at California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison 

(“SATF”), has Schizoaffective Disorder, is morbidly obese, and has edema. Plaintiff alleges that 

he has qualifying disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the 

Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), and that Defendants A. Miranda, Y. Welch, B. Peterson, S. Marsh, and 

J. Silva discriminated against him on the basis of his disability when they precluded him from 

eligibility for an IDA job (assistance-giver). Plaintiff alleges that the job position was created as 

part of the Clark Remedial Plan and it entails providing assistance to inmates with physical 

impairments affecting their daily living routine. Plaintiff alleges that he is qualified for the 

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position based on his job history and his obtainment of a GED while in prison, but Defendants 

refused to place him on the waiting list for the position solely because of his disabilities. In 

addition to violating the ADA and the RA, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions violated his 

rights to equal protection and due process, constituted deliberate indifference, and violated his 

rights under state law.

B. Claims

1. ADA and RA Claims

Title II of the ADA and section 504 of the RA prohibit discrimination on the basis of 

disability. Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). “To establish a violation of 

Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is a qualified individual with a disability; 

(2) [he] was excluded from participation in or otherwise discriminated against with regard to a 

public entity’s services, programs, or activities; and (3) such exclusion or discrimination was by 

reason of [his] disability,” and “[t]o establish a violation of § 504 of the RA, a plaintiff must show 

that (1) [he] is handicapped within the meaning of the RA; (2) [he] is otherwise qualified for the 

benefit or services sought; (3) [he] was denied the benefit or services solely by reason of [his] 

handicap; and (4) the program providing the benefit or services receives federal financial 

assistance.” Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1052. 

At the pleading stage, Plaintiff’s allegation that he was excluded from a job position he 

was otherwise qualified for solely because of his disability supports cognizable claims under the 

ADA and the RA. However, ADA and RA claims are brought against a public entity or the 

appropriate state official in his or her official capacity rather than against individuals in their 

personal capacities. A.W. v. Jersey City Public Schools, 486 F.3d 791, 804 (3d Cir. 2007); Green 

v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 78-9 (2d Cir. 2006); Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Servs. Ctr. of 

Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2001); Abbott v. Rosenthal, 2 F.Supp.3d 1139, 1144 (D.Idaho 

2014); Roundtree v. Adams, No. 1:01-CV-06502 OWW LJO, 2005 WL 3284405, at *8 (E.D.Cal. 

Dec. 1, 2005). Under the circumstances alleged, it appears that Stu Sherman, the warden of 

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SATF, is the appropriate defendant to be named in his official capacity.1 See Castle v. Eurofresh, 

Inc., 731 F.3d 901, 910-11 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Determining whether a modification is reasonable (or 

even required) is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry, requiring analysis of the disabled individual’s 

circumstances and the accommodations that might allow him to meet the program’s standards.”) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend to name 

the warden in his official capacity.

2. Equal Protection Claim

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated 

alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (1985);

Hartmann v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013); Furnace v. 

Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 

2008). To state a claim, Plaintiff must show that Defendants intentionally discriminated against 

him based on his membership in a protected class. Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123; Furnace, 705 

F.3d at 1030; Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 

250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts demonstrating that 

Defendants intentionally discriminated against him by treating him differently than other similarly 

situated individuals.

3. Due Process Claim

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of 

life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that 

one of these interests is at stake. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). To state a 

claim, Plaintiff must first identify the interest at stake. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221. Liberty 

interests may arise from the Due Process Clause or from state law. Id. The Due Process Clause 

itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding more adverse conditions of 

 

1 The individual defendants are three correctional officers, a facility captain, and an education employee. Official 

capacity claims cannot be brought against former state officials and permitting Plaintiff to proceed against the present 

five defendants in an official capacity will result in delay and confusion should any substitution of parties need to be 

made in the future. Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1036 n.2 (9th Cir. 1999). Given that 

the ADA and RA preclude discrimination by public entities and Plaintiff’s claims involve decisions made at the 

institutional level, the institution’s warden is the most appropriate official for purposes of this suit.

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confinement, id. at 221-22 (citations and quotation marks omitted), and under state law, the 

existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature 

of the condition of confinement at issue, id. at 222-23 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 

481-84, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995)) (quotation marks omitted). Liberty interests created by prison 

regulations are generally limited to freedom from restraint which imposes atypical and significant 

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 

221(citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484) (quotation marks omitted); Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 

718 (9th Cir. 2007). 

The basis for Plaintiff’s due process claim is unclear, and his complaint sets forth no 

allegations supporting a cognizable claim for denial of due process. Plaintiff does not have a 

protected liberty interest at stake with respect to the processing of his inmate appeals or to any

particular substantive determination on his appeals, Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th 

Cir. 2003), and he does not have a protected property or liberty interest in a prison job, to the 

extent either of those theories underlies his claim, Sandin, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); Vignolo v. 

Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1997); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531 (9th Cir. 1995).

4. “Deliberate Indifference” Claim

Plaintiff alleges deliberate indifference toward his rights. However, deliberate indifference 

is a legal standard applicable to conditions of confinement claims brought under the Eighth 

Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. It is unclear if Plaintiff is attempting to 

pursue a separate Eighth Amendment claim but to the extent he is, he fails to state a claim. 

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and 

from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 

2006). Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of confinement claim, and only 

those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently 

grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 

112 S.Ct. 995 (1992) (citations and quotations omitted). In order to state a claim for violation of 

the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a claim that prison 

officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. E.g., Farmer 

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v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994); Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150-51 

(9th Cir. 2010); Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812-14 (9th Cir. 2009); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 

1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Here, there are no facts supporting a viable claim against Defendants for acting with 

deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. Any allegation that 

denying Plaintiff the particular job position he sought violates the Eighth Amendment is frivolous. 

See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Idleness and the lack of programs 

are not Eighth Amendment violations.”), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-

84.

5. State Law Claims

Finally, Plaintiff alleges negligence, and perhaps additional unspecified tort claims under 

California law. However, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate compliance with the Government Claims 

Act, which requires that a tort claim against a public entity or its employees be presented to the 

California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board no more than six months after the 

cause of action accrues.2 Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950, 950.2 (West 2011). 

Presentation of a written claim and action on or rejection of the claim are conditions precedent to 

suit. Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal.4th 201, 208-09 (Cal. 2007); State v. Superior Court 

of Kings Cnty. (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239 (Cal. 2004); Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty. Dep’t 

of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2001); Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. 

Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). To state a tort claim against a public employee, a 

plaintiff must allege compliance with the Government Claims Act. Shirk, 42 Cal.4th at 209; 

Bodde, 32 Cal.4th at 1239; Mangold, 67 F.3d at 1477; Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 

839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988).

C. Request for Appointment of Counsel

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff requests the appointment of counsel. Plaintiff does not 

have a constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in this action. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 

 

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Formerly known as the California Tort Claims Act. City of Stockton v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th 730, 741-42 (Cal. 

2007) (adopting the practice of using Government Claims Act rather than California Tort Claims Act).

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F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009); Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981). While 

the Court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), it 

will do so only if exceptional circumstances exist. Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970; Wilborn v. 

Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). In making this determination, the Court must 

evaluate the likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of Plaintiff to articulate his claims 

pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970 (citation 

and quotation marks omitted); Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331. Neither consideration is dispositive and 

they must be viewed together. Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970 (citation and quotation marks omitted); 

Wilborn 789 F.2d at 1331. 

In the present case, the Court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Even 

if it is assumed that Plaintiff is not well versed in the law and that he has made serious allegations 

which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, his case is not exceptional. The Court is faced with 

similar cases almost daily. Further, at this early stage in the proceedings, the Court cannot make a 

determination that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits, and based on a review of the record 

in this case, the Court does not find that Plaintiff cannot adequately articulate his claims. Palmer, 

560 F.3d at 970.

III. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff has stated cognizable ADA and RA claims, but he must amend to name the 

appropriate state official in his official capacity. Plaintiff’s other claims for denial of equal 

protection and due process, “deliberate indifference,” and violation of state law are not cognizable 

for the reasons set forth herein. The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to file a

second amended complaint curing the deficiencies he believes, in good faith, are curable. Akhtar,

698 F.3d at 1212-13; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130; Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 

1987). However, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims 

in his second amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but under 

section 1983, it must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights and liability may not be imposed under the theory of mere respondeat

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superior, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205-07. Although accepted as true, the 

“[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 

Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa 

County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be “complete in itself without 

reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel is denied;

2. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

3. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

4. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a

second amended complaint; and

5. If Plaintiff fails to file a second amended complaint in compliance with this order, 

this action will be dismissed, without prejudice as to the ADA and RA claims and

with prejudice as to the other claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 28, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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