Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03091/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03091-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wayne Byfield
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 15, 2004 Decided December 10, 2004

No. 03-3091

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

WAYNE BYFIELD,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 89cr00322-01)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant Wayne Byfield. With her on

the briefs was A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H.

Jaffee, Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an

appearance for appellant Wayne Byfield.

Patricia A. Heffernan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued

the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Roy W. McLeese,

III, John P. Gidez and Robert D. Okun, Assistant U.S.

Attorneys.

Before: EDWARDS, RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS.

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellant Wayne

Byfield proposes that a person cannot smoke a mixture of

roughly equal parts sugar and cocaine base. Accordingly, he

says, for sentencing purposes the sugar should be subtracted

from the total weight of the material he was convicted of

possessing. Because the government provided virtually no

evidence contradicting his factual claim, we reverse and

remand.

* * *

Byfield is serving a 292-month prison term under a

1992 conviction for possession of more than 50 grams of

cocaine base with intent to distribute, in violation of 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). In earlier passes at

the case, we reversed a district court’s mistaken grant of

Byfield’s motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding

the verdict, United States v. Byfield, 928 F.2d 1163 (D.C. Cir.

1991), and affirmed his ensuing conviction, United States v.

Byfield, 1 F.3d 45 (Table) (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam). In

2002 Byfield moved pro se for modification of his sentence

under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The district court denied

Byfield’s motion, and he filed a timely notice of appeal. 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) permits a court to “reduce the

term of imprisonment” of a properly filing defendant whose

“term . . . [was] based on a sentencing range that has

subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(o).” Section 1B1.10 of the

Guidelines enumerates retroactive amendments that qualify a

defendant for § 3582(c)(2) relief. Those named include the

amendment invoked by Byfield, Amendment 484 to U.S.S.G.

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§ 2D1.1, which says that, for sentencing purposes, a drug

“[m]ixture or substance” under § 2D1.1 “does not include

materials that must be separated from the controlled substance

before the controlled substance can be used.” Byfield was

sentenced under § 2D1.1 before Amendment 484 took effect

in 1993. 

Byfield was convicted for possessing a mixture of

cocaine base (commonly known as crack) and mannitol

(sugar) that weighed 607.8 grams. Applying the preAmendment 484 version of § 2D1.1 to that weight, the

sentencing court sentenced Byfield to the minimum within the

Level 38 sentencing range (292-365 months). The mixture,

however, comprised about 340 grams (56%) cocaine base and

about 267 grams (44%) mannitol. If the mannitol “must be

separated from the [cocaine base] before the [cocaine base]

can be used,” as Byfield claims, he would qualify for the

Level 36 sentencing range (235-93 months). 

Byfield also noted that the initial sentencing and trial

record included no expert testimony that a mixture of sugar

and cocaine base could be smoked. He therefore sought a

hearing, offering to “produce expert testimony that sugar isn’t

a usable substance in cocaine base.” 

The district court denied Byfield’s requests for a

modification and for a hearing. “Sugar,” the court held, “is

simply a cutting agent, which . . . may be properly included in

the weight of drugs . . . for sentencing purposes,” citing

Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 458-59 (1991). We

review the court’s decision not to conduct a hearing for an

abuse of discretion. United States v. Tidwell, 178 F.3d 946,

949 (7th Cir. 1999). 

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* * *

We begin by clarifying Byfield’s evidentiary burden.

Section 6A1.3 of the Guidelines allows hearings “[w]hen any

factor important to the sentencing determination is reasonably

in dispute.” U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3. The government conflates

Byfield’s burden of proof for an Amendment 484

modification with his burden for securing a hearing under

§ 6A1.3. Relying on United States v. Sprague, 135 F.3d 1301

(9th Cir. 1998), it argues that Byfield must show “by a

preponderance of evidence that the mixture or substance . . .

contained materials that must be separated to render the

controlled substance usable.” Id. at 1306-07. Once Byfield

made that showing, the burden would shift to the government

“to establish the . . . weight of the controlled substance.” Id.

at 1307. 

Whether Sprague is correct, it is inapposite. Sprague

purports only to describe the defendant’s burden of proof

regarding whether a retroactive amendment is applicable. See

id. But § 6A1.3 sets a far lower threshold for a hearing,

requiring only that an important factor be “reasonably in

dispute.” See United States v. Sisti, 91 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir.

1996) (reasonable dispute if movant has a relevant “colorable

claim”). The government’s extension of Sprague from

Amendment 484 to § 6A1.3, by contrast, would force a party

to prove, before a hearing, that which he needs a hearing to

prove. 

The government also suggests that § 6A1.3 may not

even apply to sentence modifications under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2), but gives no reason why it should not. We can

see no material distinction, for these purposes, between initial

sentencings and § 3582(c)(2) revisions. 

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The record in fact pits some evidence against nothing;

as we’ve said in another context, “something . . . outweighs

nothing every time.” Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Employees

v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Byfield

asserted below that, when burned, the mannitol in the disputed

mixture would melt and prevent the cocaine base from

vaporizing to induce a high. On appeal, he also observes that

neither the Sentencing Commission nor the federal courts

have contradicted his assertion. See U.S. SENTENCING

COMM’N, COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 91

(1995) (not including sugar in a list of common cutting agents

for crack cocaine).

The government’s response in the district court and

here is that sugar is a cutting agent—that is, an added

substance that dilutes drugs to increase distributor

profits—that counts toward the weight of drugs for sentencing

purposes. It cites Chapman, which upheld the inclusion of

blotter paper in the weight of LSD for sentencing under

§ 841(b)(1)(B). 500 U.S. at 455. 

Chapman does not really advance the government’s

case. After it was decided, Amendment 484 for the first time

made usability essential for calculating the weight of a drug

quantity for § 2D1.1 sentencing purposes. True, en route to

its conclusion under the prior law, Chapman made a rhetorical

point about ingestion: “Like cutting agents used with other

drugs that are ingested, the blotter paper . . . carrying LSD can

be and often is ingested with the drug.” 500 U.S. at 462. But

ingestibility was not the crux of the decision, which in any

event never mentioned the ingestibility of mannitol as a

cutting agent for cocaine base. 

In fact, no decided case reaches the issue. While

Byfield overstated the relevance of some cited authorities, the

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government’s effort to make affirmative use of appellate

decisions is equally amiss. For instance, while United States

v. Jackson, 115 F.3d 843 (11th Cir. 1997), referred to sugar as

a cutting agent that would be consumed, id. at 845, the drug in

question was cocaine, not cocaine base. Byfield’s assertion,

which the government at oral argument conceded was

perfectly plausible, is thus uncontradicted by any pertinent

holding or responsive evidence. And while Byfield did not

qualify as an expert, he was, as counsel observed, convicted

of knowingly possessing cocaine base with intent to

distribute, a conviction at least suggesting some familiarity

with drug buyers’ interests. Against the vacuum presented by

the government, this is enough of a smidgeon to put the

matter “reasonably in dispute.” 

The government seeks to undercut Byfield’s request

for a hearing on the ground that he failed to ask explicitly for

a court-appointed expert or invoke 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. We

are at a loss to understand how that differs materially from

what Byfield did. To be sure, Byfield cited neither § 6A1.3

nor § 3006A. He instead simply requested a “re-sentencing

hearing” at which he and the government could “produce

expert testimony.” But statutory and Guidelines section

numbers are not talismans, and a pro se prisoner’s failure to

recite them doesn’t obviate the need for a hearing when the

record meets the threshold condition. See, e.g.,

Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 286 F.3d 576, 583 (D.C.

Cir. 2002) (court has an “obligation to construe pro se filings

liberally”).

Given that Byfield’s proposition therefore remains

unrefuted, we hold that the district court abused its discretion

in denying Byfield a § 6A1.3 hearing. Compare United States

v. Small, 74 F.3d 1276, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding

refusal to postpone sentencing to reweigh implicated drugs

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because “[t]he district court made a reasoned factual

determination that the government had proved the weight of

the drugs”). 

The hearing may in fact prove quite simple. The

government’s appellate brief points to scholarly authorities

for the proposition that cocaine base vaporizes when heated to

about the temperature of boiling water (100 degrees Celsius),

whereas mannitol melts at about 166-68 degrees Celsius. But

chemists we are not, and the government doesn’t claim that

these points meet the standards for judicial notice. The cited

items do suggest, however, that on remand, once Byfield is

given an opportunity to present expert evidence in support of

his contention, expert affidavits from the government may be

enough to refute his claims. The Commentary to § 6A1.3

says that the district court is to “determine the appropriate

procedure in light of the nature of the dispute,” and observes

that “lengthy sentencing hearings seldom should be

necessary,” and that “affidavits of witnesses may be adequate

under many circumstances.” See U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3

Commentary. 

Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions

that the district court should allow the parties to present

evidence regarding whether Byfield is entitled to a reduced

sentence under Amendment 484 to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.

So ordered. 

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