Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-02-03584/USCOURTS-ca7-02-03584-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pedro L. Castillo
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1 Barrera pleaded guilty and has not appealed.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

PEDRO L. CASTILLO and

FRANK RODRIGUEZ,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________

Appeals from the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 01 CR 567—James F. Holderman, Judge.

____________

ARGUED MARCH 30, 2004—DECIDED MAY 3, 2005

____________

Before POSNER, RIPPLE and MANION, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. In October of 2001, a federal grand

jury returned an indictment charging Pedro Castillo, Frank

Rodriguez and Alfredo Barrera1

 with violations of various

federal narcotics and firearms statutes. Mr. Rodriguez

pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to distribute more

than 50 grams of crack cocaine from May of 2001 to June 20,

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
2 Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

2001. See 21 U.S.C. § 846; 18 U.S.C. § 2. Mr. Castillo was tried

by jury and found guilty of the same count as

Mr. Rodriguez plus four additional counts, including one

count of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). On appeal,

Mr. Castillo challenges his conviction. Mr. Castillo and

Mr. Rodriguez challenge the portion of their respective

written judgments ordering them to repay $3,000 in “buy

money” as restitution. They also challenge their respective

sentences. We held this case in abeyance pending the

Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 125

S. Ct. 738 (2005). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we

now affirm Mr. Castillo’s conviction. We reverse and

remand the orders regarding repayment. In light of Booker,

125 S. Ct. 738, while retaining jurisdiction, we remand this

case to the district court in accordance with our court’s decision in United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 2005

WL 435430 (7th Cir. Feb. 25, 2005).

I

BACKGROUND

A. Facts

1. June 4, 2001 Transaction

In March or April of 2001, a confidential informant (“CI”)

contacted Mr. Rodriguez, who had been introduced to the

CI as a drug supplier. The two met, and Mr. Rodriguez

agreed to supply the CI with samples of illegal drugs. On

June 4, 2001, the CI ran into Mr. Rodriguez at a restaurant;

Mr. Rodriguez agreed to give the CI samples of powder

cocaine and marijuana that night. The two met later, and

their meeting was recorded by the Federal Bureau of

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344 3

Investigation (“FBI”). At this meeting, Mr. Rodriguez gave

the CI two small bags containing samples of cocaine and

marijuana.

2. June 7, 2001 Transaction

Subsequently, Mr. Rodriguez agreed to provide the CI

with three ounces of crack cocaine in exchange for a payment of $3,000. Mr. Rodriguez arranged to obtain the three

ounces of crack cocaine requested by the CI from

Mr. Castillo. On June 7, 2001, the CI met Mr. Rodriguez, and

the two drove to a basement apartment to obtain the crack.

This transaction also was monitored and recorded by the

FBI.

When they arrived and pulled into the garage adjacent to

the basement apartment, Mr. Castillo was there. After introductions and small talk, Mr. Castillo told Mr. Rodriguez

to search the CI. Mr. Castillo then “stood right by the workbench[,] opened up a drawer” and pulled out three baggies

containing “three ounces of powder form cocaine.” Tr. at

131. Mr. Castillo informed the CI that he had been preoccupied and unable to cook the cocaine to make crack ahead of

time, but he invited the CI to stay while he cooked it.

Mr. Castillo, Mr. Rodriguez and the CI walked from the

garage to the kitchen of the basement apartment. Over the

next several hours, Mr. Castillo cooked the cocaine into

crack, explaining the cooking process to the CI. Except for

using the bathroom, which was a “short way down the hallway,” Tr. at 251, and maybe “going out to receive a phone

call,” Tr. at 149, the CI remained in the kitchen with Mr.

Castillo. Mr. Rodriguez and Barrera were in and out of the

kitchen during this time.

During the cooking, which was done in different batches,

Mr. Castillo and the CI discussed the CI’s buying more

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4 Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

crack cocaine from Mr. Castillo in the near future. Also

during this time period, an unknown individual came to the

door. The CI observed Mr. Castillo walk down the hallway,

return with “[d]ime bags of cocaine” and hand them to the

individual at the door. Tr. at 155. When Mr. Castillo returned to the kitchen to continue cooking, he told the CI:

“Yeah, but you easy, you got three. The man that’s coming

though, he just bought six,” apparently referring to ounces.

Tr. at 165. Mr. Castillo also told the CI about other customers: “I got, I got four people waiting next to you. You know

what I’m saying? So once I’m done with you, I gotta make

a phone call. They’ll come through . . . .” Tr. at 164-65. After

Mr. Castillo was finished cooking, he gave the CI a total of

approximately 72.3 grams of crack cocaine; the CI, in return,

gave Castillo $3,000 in government funds, which Castillo

put in the freezer.

3. June 20, 2001 Transaction and Arrest

On June 18, 2001, the CI spoke to Mr. Castillo by phone.

In this recorded conversation, Mr. Castillo agreed to provide

the CI with seven ounces of crack cocaine in exchange for

$7,000. The CI received $7,000 in government funds and a

recording device. Then, on or about June 20, 2001,

Mr. Castillo, Barrera and the CI met at a local restaurant.

They discussed “the deal and future deals as well.” Tr. at

184. Mr. Castillo then told the CI to come to his (Castillo’s)

car; Castillo got in the driver’s seat, the CI got in the front

passenger’s seat and Barrera got in the back seat.

Mr. Castillo pointed to a McDonald’s bag, which the CI

opened. The bag contained approximately 162.3 grams of

crack cocaine. The CI told Mr. Castillo that the money for

the crack was in his car, and, while the CI was getting out to

go to his car, Castillo instructed the CI to follow him. After

the CI, in his car, followed Mr. Castillo for some time,

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Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344 5

Castillo waved for the CI to pull over, and they had a discussion regarding counting the money. At that point, the

government agents converged, and Mr. Castillo and Barrera

were arrested. The 162.3 grams of crack were recovered, and,

as Barrera exited the car, agents observed and recovered a

handgun near Barrera’s feet.

4. June 20, 2001 Search of the Basement Apartment

Later that day, agents searched the basement apartment

where the June 7, 2001 transaction had taken place. In the

ceiling area of a rear storage closet off a bedroom down the

hallway, agents recovered “3.8 grams of a mixture containing

cocaine base, commonly known as crack,” and “18.7 grams

of mixtures containing cocaine” on a ceiling joist. Tr. at 315-

16. The Government’s drug trafficking expert testified that

“3.8 grams would border either user or distribution quantity,” Tr. at 417, and 18.7 grams of cocaine “would be in the

neighborhood of a distribution quantity of cocaine,” Tr. at

401. In that same storage area, approximately four to five

feet from the drugs, the agents recovered a Mossburg shotgun with a sawed-off barrel. The shotgun had been modified to accommodate a pistol grip, and a pistol grip was

recovered next to the shotgun. Agent Walker explained:

“The pistol grip has been made to fit onto that gun. The bolt

that you see coming out of the end of the shotgun does not

appear to be adequate to secure that pistol grip on the

shotgun.” Tr. at 358. He further testified that he and some

other agents “briefly looked at it, and it seemed like . . . you

would need maybe a different type of bolt.” Tr. at 359.

Also recovered near the shotgun was a white sock that

contained four shotgun shells. Mr. Castillo’s fingerprints

were not recovered on the shotgun shells or the shotgun,

but the Government’s fingerprint expert testified that guns

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6 Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

and ammunition are not very receptive surfaces for leaving

fingerprints. Tr. at 368. A drug trafficking expert explained

that it was not unusual for somebody involved in drug

trafficking to have an unloaded or loaded weapon “because

drug traffickers commonly utilize firearms or weapons to

protect their drugs and protect their drug proceeds, the

amount of money that they have at their location where

they’re selling drugs from, from other drug traffickers or

gang members who may want to rob them or break in and

steal their drugs or drug money. So it’s basically used as

protection.” Tr. at 415-16.

“Up towards the door area of this back closet area,” the

agents also recovered a box. Tr. at 291-92. This box contained a variety of drug paraphernalia, including weights

and scales, razors, plastic baggies, a “type of cutting agent

that would be used to put into drugs to make it greater in

quantity,” Tr. at 292, and a “drug ledger,” Tr. at 412. The

drug trafficking expert testified that these are tools of the

drug trade. The agents also recovered from the apartment

a number of pieces of mail, documents and photographs indicating that the apartment was in fact Mr. Castillo’s home.

For example, the address label on one piece of mail read:

“Pedro Castillo, 3328 West 65th Place, house basement,

Chicago, Illinois 60629.” Tr. at 324.

B. District Court Proceedings

In October of 2001, a grand jury charged Mr. Castillo and

Mr. Rodriguez (and Barrera) with a number of violations

of federal narcotics and firearms statutes. Specifically,

Mr. Castillo and Mr. Rodriguez both were charged with conspiring to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine

from May 2001 to June 20, 2001 (Count I), see 21 U.S.C.

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344 7

§ 846; 18 U.S.C. § 2, and distributing more than 50 grams of

crack cocaine on June 7, 2001 (Count II), see 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 2.

Mr. Castillo also was charged individually with four more

counts. Counts III and IV were based on the crack cocaine

and the handgun recovered in Mr. Castillo’s car during the

June 20, 2001 transaction and arrest. These counts charged

Mr. Castillo with possessing in excess of 50 grams of cocaine

base with the intent to distribute, see 21 U.S.C. § 846; 18

U.S.C. § 2 (Count III), and carrying a firearm during and in

relation to, and knowingly possessing a firearm in furtherance of, the drug trafficking offense set forth in Count III, see

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) & 924(c)(2) (Count IV). Counts V and

VI were based on the cocaine base and cocaine mixture and

the shotgun found in the basement apartment during the

June 20, 2001 search. These counts charged him with

possessing 3.8 grams of cocaine base and 18.7 grams of mixtures containing cocaine with the intent to distribute, see 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count V), and possessing a firearm in

furtherance of the drug trafficking offense set forth in Count

V, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) & 924(c)(1)(B)(i) (Count VI).

Mr. Rodriguez pleaded guilty to Count I. He was sentenced to 180 months in prison and five years of supervised

release, and he was ordered to pay a $500 fine and a $100

special assessment. The district court also orally ordered Mr.

Rodriguez to repay the $3,000 “buy money” as a condition

of supervised release. However, the written judgment

against Mr. Rodriguez asserted that the $3,000 repayment

was restitution and not a condition of supervised release.

On appeal, Mr. Rodriguez contends that the written judgment’s characterization of the $3,000 repayment as restitution was incorrect. In this court, the Government concedes

that this was a clerical error and that the $3,000 repayment

appropriately is considered a condition of supervised release.

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8 Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

The same error of deeming the $3,000 repayment as restitution occurred in Mr. Castillo’s sentencing. We agree with

the defendants and the Government that a remand is

appropriate as to both defendants to clarify that the $3,000

repayment is a condition of supervised release.

Mr. Castillo was convicted on Counts I, II, III, V and VI,

but not Count IV. He was ordered to serve a concurrent

sentence of 210 months for Counts I, II, III and V, and he

was ordered to serve a consecutive sentence of 120 months

for Count VI. He also was sentenced to five years of supervised release on each count of conviction and ordered to pay

a fine of $3,000 and a special assessment of $500. Finally, as

noted previously, he also was ordered to repay $3,000 buy

money under the faulty label of restitution.

II

DISCUSSION

A. Mr. Castillo’s Conviction under § 924(c)(1)(A)

Mr. Castillo challenges his conviction under Count VI that

charged him with “possess[ing]” a firearm “in furtherance

of” the drug trafficking offense charged in Count V. The

relevant portion of § 924(c)(1)(A) provides certain mandatory penalties for “any person who, during and in relation

to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or

carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime,

possesses a firearm.” The Government’s theory for Count VI

was that Mr. Castillo “possess[ed]” the shotgun “in furtherance of” the crime of possessing, with the intent to distribute,

3.8 grams of cocaine base and 18.7 grams of cocaine mixtures

on June 20, 2001, the date on which the agents searched the

basement apartment and recovered these goods in the

storage area. Mr. Castillo raises two objections to his

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344 9

conviction under Count VI. First, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he “possess[ed]” the

shotgun “in furtherance of” the underlying drug trafficking

offense. Second, he argues that the jury instructions on this

count were insufficient and caused him prejudice.

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

By way of background, § 924(c)(1)(A)’s criminalizing

“possess[ion]” of a gun “in furtherance of” certain crimes of

violence and drug trafficking offenses was added by

Congress in 1998 in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). Bailey

concerned the prior version of the statute, which did not explicitly mention “possession” but criminalized “using” and

“carrying” a firearm “during and in relation to” these

crimes. In the specific case under consideration, the court of

appeals had affirmed two convictions for “use” of a weapon

“during and in relation to” a drug crime based on an

“ ‘accessibility and proximity’ test,” which held that “ ‘one

uses a gun, i.e., avails oneself of a gun, and therefore

violates [§ 924(c)(1)], whenever one puts or keeps the gun in

a particular place from which one (or one’s agent) can gain

access to it if and when needed to facilitate a drug crime.’ ”

Id. at 141 (quoting United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 115

(D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc)). The Supreme Court rejected this

broad interpretation of “use” and held that “use” required

some type of “active employment.” Id. at 144. The Court

noted: “Had Congress intended possession alone to trigger

liability under § 924(c)(1), it easily could have so provided.”

Id. at 143. In 1998, Congress accepted the invitation and

broadened § 924(c) to sweep in the mere possession of

weapons, but only when the weapons were possessed “in

furtherance of” the underlying crime.

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
10 Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

In this case, Mr. Castillo challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence as to both the “possess[ion]” and “in furtherance

of” elements of § 924(c)(1)(A). In adjudicating a sufficiency

of the evidence challenge, this court “consider[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, defer[s]

to the credibility determination of the jury, and overturn[s]

a verdict only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could

find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.

Jackson, 177 F.3d 628, 630 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

a. Possession

Possession for purposes of § 924(c) can be either “actual”

or “constructive.” United States v. Rawlings, 341 F.3d 657, 659

(7th Cir. 2003). “Constructive possession” is defined as

“one’s having (and knowing one has) ‘the power and the

intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control

over the firearm, either directly or through others.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). If a person exercises exclusive control over

a premises, then constructive possession of a weapon found

therein can be inferred. See, e.g., United States v. Wahl, 290

F.3d 370, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2002). However, if the defendant

jointly occupies the premises, the Government must present

some evidence that supports a nexus between the weapon

and the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Heckard, 238 F.3d

1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2001).

In this case, Mr. Castillo submits that there is “no evidence

of exclusive ownership or possession of the apartment,”

Reply Br. at 1, but that contention is without merit. The

Government introduced into evidence pieces of mail,

documents and photographs that they recovered from the

basement apartment that strongly support the conclusion

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Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344 11

that the apartment was Mr. Castillo’s. For example, as we

noted above, the address label on one piece of mail read:

“Pedro Castillo, 3328 West 65th Place, house basement,

Chicago, Illinois 60629.” Tr. at 324. Also, an “AT&T Cable

Services” “work order,” under a box marked “Service Name

and Address,” read: “Castillo[,] Pedro, 3328 West 65th Place,

Chicago, Illinois 60629-3420.” Id.

Furthermore, Mr. Castillo’s actions and commentary on

June 7, 2001—cooking crack cocaine in the kitchen, dealing

drugs from the apartment, suggesting more people would

be coming by the apartment to buy drugs from him—were

consistent with the idea that he exercised dominion over the

apartment. See United States v. Finley, 245 F.3d 199, 203 (2d

Cir. 2001) (“Finley also argues that the evidence did not

show that he had control of the house. However, a reasonable jury could also have found the requisite control based

on the evidence that Finley was conducting a drug dealing

business by himself from inside the house.”); see also

United States v. Hishaw, 235 F.3d 565, 571 (10th Cir. 2000)

(“Circumstantial evidence may establish constructive possession.”). There was little, if any, evidence that suggested

that any other person rented the apartment or utilized the

apartment as his or her abode. The jury was more than entitled to find Mr. Castillo’s exclusive possession of the basement apartment and constructive possession of the shotgun.

b. In Furtherance Of

Mr. Castillo next argues that the evidence was insufficient

to establish that he possessed the shotgun “in furtherance of”

the underlying drug crime: the possession of, with the intent

to distribute, cocaine base and a cocaine mixture on June 20,

2001.

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12 Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

This argument invites us for the first time to consider

in detail the “in furtherance of” language in 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A), which, as we noted above, was added by

Congress in 1998 in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey, 516 U.S. 137. Our task is made easier by the

fact that our sister circuits have reviewed this language and

have come to fundamentally the same conclusion. See United

States v. Sparrow, 371 F.3d 851, 852-54 (3d Cir. 2004); United

States v. Hamilton, 332 F.3d 1144, 1149 (8th Cir. 2003); United

States v. Luciano, 329 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v.

Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v.

Wahl, 290 F.3d 370, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2002); United States v.

Timmons, 283 F.3d 1246, 1252-53 (11th Cir. 2002); United States

v. Basham, 268 F.3d 1199, 1207-08 (10th Cir. 2001); United

States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 462 (6th Cir. 2001); United

States v. Finley, 245 F.3d 199, 203 (2d Cir. 2001); United States

v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir.), modified on

denial of rehearing, 226 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 2000); see also United

States v. Krouse, 370 F.3d 965, 967-68 (9th Cir. 2004) (agreeing

with the core of the other circuits’ analyses but questioning

the utility of some of the “Ceballos-Torres factors”). After carefully studying these opinions and their rationales, we join

the core of their analyses and add some further elaboration

on the meaning of “in furtherance of” where relevant to this

case.

As the circuits note, the natural meaning of “in furtherance of” is “furthering, advancing or helping forward.” See,

e.g., Hamilton, 332 F.3d at 1149. The negative implication of

this definition is that the mere presence of a weapon at the

scene of a drug crime, without more, is insufficient to prove

that the gun was possessed “in furtherance of” the drug

crime. See Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462 (“[T]he possession of a

firearm on the same premises as a drug transaction would

not, without a showing of a connection between the two,

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Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344 13

sustain a § 924(c) conviction.”). Understanding “in furtherance of” in this manner fits not only the phrase’s natural

meaning, the starting point of all inquiries into statutory

construction, but it also is supported by the statute’s legislative history, and, more importantly, its purpose. See Bailey,

516 U.S. at 145 (beginning with the “ordinary and natural”

meaning of “use” in § 924(c) and then moving on to “consider not only the bare meaning of the word but also its

placement and purpose in the statutory scheme”).

The report by the House Committee on the Judiciary that

addressed the bill to amend § 924 explained “in furtherance

of” in these terms:

The government must clearly show that a firearm was

possessed to advance or promote the commission of the

underlying offense. The mere presence of a firearm in

an area where a criminal act occurs is not a sufficient

basis for imposing this particular mandatory sentence.

Rather, the government must illustrate through specific

facts, which tie the defendant to the firearm, that the

firearm was possessed to advance or promote the criminal activity.

The facts of the Bailey decision . . . provide a good

example. The Committee believes that the evidence

presented by the government in that case may not have

been sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession of

a firearm “in furtherance of” the commission of a drug

trafficking offense. In that case, a prosecution expert testified at Mr. Bailey’s trial that drug dealers frequently

carry a firearm to protect themselves, as well as their

drugs and money. Standing on its own, this evidence

may be insufficient to meet the “in furtherance of” test.

The government would have to show that the firearm

located in the trunk of the car advanced or promoted

Mr. Bailey’s drug dealing activity. The Committee beCase: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
14 Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

lieves that one way to clearly satisfy the “in furtherance

of” test would be additional witness testimony connecting Mr. Bailey more specifically with the firearm.

H.R. Rep. No. 105-344, 1997 WL 668339, at *11-12. The idea

underlying this report—that § 924(c)(1)(A) was intended to

reach weapons that actually facilitate crimes and not those

innocently possessed in the vicinity—also accords with the

very purpose of § 924(c). Quite simply, the portion of

§ 924(c) upon which we focus was intended to “combat the

dangerous combination of drugs and guns.” Muscarello v.

United States, 524 U.S. 125, 132 (1998) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). If the gun at issue did not

advance or further the underlying drug crime, the critical

drug/gun nexus is lacking, and the very purpose of the

statute is not implicated; if the gun at issue did advance the

drug crime, the very purpose of the statute, as well as its

language and legislative history, suggests that the gun was

intended to be within § 924(c)(1)(A)’s ambit.

In a case such as the one before us, when the charge is

possession with the intent to distribute narcotics, a gun which

is possessed (but not held, pulled, brandished or fired)

plausibly could advance the possession and future distribution of narcotics in a variety of ways. In this context, the

weapon can protect or be available to protect the possession

and future distribution of the drugs or the drug dealer. The

presence of a weapon serves as a potent warning to those

who might contemplate stealing the drugs and a potent tool

to defend against those who actually undertake to steal the

contraband. See United States v. Gaston, 357 F.3d 77, 83 (D.C.

Cir. 2004) (finding weapons possessed “in furtherance of”

when they were “strategically located so that [they were]

quickly and easily available for use” (internal quotations

marks and citations omitted)). The presence of the firearm

is a stark signal to other drug dealers that this turf is taken.

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344 15

See Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d at 412. No doubt, as in this case,

these valid “in furtherance of” theories often will be

outlined by a drug-trafficking expert who will testify

broadly about how drug dealers generally use weapons as

“tools of the trade” in these various ways. The Government,

however, cannot stop there; for a § 924(c)(1)(A) conviction

based on possession to have merit, the evidence must

establish a specific nexus between the particular weapon and

the particular drug crime at issue. Put slightly differently,

the Government must offer evidence to validate the notion

that the specific weapon at issue in fact furthered the drug

crime by, for example, being available for the protection of

the drug dealer or his drugs. See id. at 414. That specific

factual nexus is essential to distinguish between a gun on

the premises which has no reasonable relationship to the

drug possession and future distribution and a weapon that

is present to further that possession.

Often, the evidence regarding the underlying drug crime

and the weapon will be so intertwined that establishing the

link will be easy, at least at the sufficiency of the evidence

stage. See Lomax, 293 F.3d at 706 (“[A] fact finder is certainly

entitled to come to the common-sense conclusion that when

someone has both drugs and a firearm on their person, the

gun is present to further drug trafficking.”). Other cases will

be more difficult. For example, if police search a house and

uncover drugs and a “wall-mounted antique” or “an

unloaded hunting rifle locked in a cupboard,” Mackey, 265

F.3d at 462, the necessary link between the possession and

intent to distribute the drugs and the antique or hunting

rifle would be much more difficult to establish.

In short, “in furtherance of” means what it says: The

Government must present a viable theory as to how the gun

furthered the drug possession or distribution (e.g., being

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
16 Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

available to protect the drugs or drug dealer), and it must

present specific, non-theoretical evidence to tie that gun and

the drug crime together under that theory. The Fifth Circuit

has developed a non-exclusive list of factors to help in

determining whether a gun was, in fact, possessed “in

furtherance of” the drug crime: “the type of drug activity

that is being conducted, accessibility of the firearm, the type

of the weapon, whether the weapon is stolen, the status of

the possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the gun is

loaded, proximity to drugs or drug profits, and the time and

circumstances under which the gun is found.” CeballosTorres, 218 F.3d at 414-15. These factors are useful, but,

given the fact-intensive nature of the “in furtherance of”

inquiry, the weight, if any, these and other factors should be

accorded necessarily will vary from case to case.

Returning to the case before us, the Government submitted that Mr. Castillo possessed the shotgun “in furtherance

of” his possession and intent to distribute the cocaine base

and cocaine mixture on June 20, 2001. The Government

succinctly explained in its brief to this court its “in furtherance of” theories and supporting evidence:

[Castillo] strategically placed the shotgun near his cache

of drugs in the ceiling storage space, for the purpose of

protecting himself, his drugs, and his ongoing drug

trafficking business. The proximity of the shotgun to

Castillo’s cache of drugs afforded Castillo the opportunity to conceal the gun, while at the same time making

it readily accessible anytime Castillo was retrieving

drugs from his cache. The June 7, 2001, transaction

witnessed by the CI demonstrates that Castillo’s practice was to retrieve drugs from the cache whenever a

customer came to pick up drugs. Keeping the gun and

the drugs in the same area also ensured that anyone

poking around Castillo’s apartment might think twice

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344 17

about taking his stash of drugs, knowing he was armed,

ready and able to protect them from theft. Based on this

evidence, the jury was entitled to draw the reasonable

inferences that Castillo possessed the short-barrel

shotgun for the purpose of protecting himself, his drugs,

and his business.

Appellee’s Br. at 13-14. As we explained above, these “in

furtherance of” theories are consistent with the statutory

scheme. Moreover, the evidence propounded in support of

them was ample.

Mr. Castillo’s theory of the case is that the shotgun was

“merely present” at the apartment and did not further the

underlying drug trafficking offense. However, his argument,

and many of the “facts” he cites in support of his argument,

arise from a misconception of the underlying offense. He

consistently argues that there is no evidence that any drug

transaction took place at the basement apartment on June 20,

2001—the date on which the drugs and shotgun at issue

were recovered—and that there is no evidence that a drug

transaction took place in the bedroom where the storeroom

that contained the drugs and shotgun was located. From

this faulty premise, Mr. Castillo argues that the shotgun was

not in “proximity to . . . drugs or profit” involved in any

transactions that took place at the apartment and that he (Mr.

Castillo) did not have “access[ ] to the firearm” during any

drug transaction. Appellant’s Br. at 24-25 (referring to

Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d at 415 (explaining proximity and

accessibility as two factors)). However, the underlying offense in this case is possession of, with the intent to distribute,

the narcotics discovered on June 20, 2001, in the storage

area. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (stating that it is “unlawful for

any person knowingly or intentionally” to “possess . . . with

intent to . . . distribute” certain types of narcotics (emphasis

added)). Thus, the question in this case is whether the

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18 Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

2 Of course, the dealings in the basement apartment on June 7,

2001, certainly were relevant evidence that supported the

Government’s theory under Count VI. For example, the prior

transactions (along with the taped conversations and the drugdealing equipment found at his apartment) helped to establish

Mr. Castillo was a drug trafficker with an ongoing business. This,

in turn, laid the foundation for the Government’s expert to testify

that drug dealers keep guns near drugs to help protect themselves and their drugs. Also, Mr. Castillo’s actions and admissions during the June 7, 2001 transaction at his apartment

provided evidence from which the jury could conclude that he

sold drugs out of his apartment and that his modus operandi was

to retrieve the drugs from the storage area where the drugs (and

shotgun) were located and deliver them to patrons who came to

the door. For these reasons, and the reasons stated in the text, Mr.

Castillo simply has confused the importance of the June 7, 2001

transaction for purposes of Count VI when he suggests that the

June 7, 2001 events were irrelevant to Count VI because the

Government did not charge Mr. Castillo with possession of the

shotgun “in furtherance of” the June 7, 2001 transaction. See

Reply Br. at 1.

shotgun helped further the possession and future distribution of those drugs on June 20, 2001; it is not whether the

shotgun helped to further or facilitate some specific transaction, such as the June 7, 2001 sale of crack from Mr. Castillo

to the CI in Castillo’s basement apartment.2

The other “facts” or evidence Mr. Castillo cites that are not

based on this faulty premise include: (1) Mr. Castillo’s

fingerprints were not found on the gun and no evidence

“conclusively” linked Mr. Castillo to the gun (although, as

noted supra, there was plenty of evidence to establish that

the gun was Mr. Castillo’s); (2) there was no evidence the

gun was stolen or that it was illegally possessed by

Mr. Castillo, see Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d at 415 (noting these

as two factors); (3) the gun was not loaded when found

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344 19

3 The actual testimony was that there was some question as to

whether the pistol grip found next to the shotgun would fit on

the gun with the existing bolt. See Tr. at 358-59 (testimony of

Agent Walker) (“The pistol grip has been made to fit onto that

gun. The bolt that you see coming out of the end of the shotgun

does not appear to be adequate to secure the pistol grip on that

shotgun . . . . We briefly looked at it, and it seemed like . . . you

would need maybe a different type of bolt.”). There was no

evidence, however, that the shotgun needed the pistol grip to fire,

i.e., to be “operable.” Indeed, at the sentencing hearing, a

firearms expert testified and demonstrated that the gun could fire

even without the pistol grip being attached, and it would be

“uncomfortable” but not cause “substantial harm.” Sent. Tr. at 10-

11. Given that, at this stage, we are required to “consider the

evidence in the light most favorable to the Government,” we

cannot conclude that the evidence established that the gun was

inoperable. United States v. Jackson, 177 F.3d 628, 630 (7th Cir.

1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Even assuming the jury was required to conclude that the gun

was in fact inoperable, it would not change our holding. There is

no prerequisite that the gun be operable to be a “firearm” under

18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See United States v. Buggs, 904 F.2d 1070, 1075

(7th Cir. 1990) (“We cannot accept [the] claim that the government is required to prove that the gun was operable.”). Moreover,

even possessed weapons that do not fire can be used to advance

the possession and future distribution of drugs. A reasonable jury

could conclude on this record, for example, that someone

threatening Mr. Castillo or his drugs would be deterred by a

sawed-off shotgun pointed at him or even perched next to the

drugs, even if that person was not completely sure if the gun was

able to be fired.

(although ammunition was found in a sock next to the shotgun), see id. (noting “whether the gun is loaded” is a factor);

and (4) the gun was not “operable.”3 These and the other

facts Mr. Castillo notes make some headway into the

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
20 Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

Government’s theory and counter some of the Government’s

evidence, but they are far from enough to overturn a jury’s

verdict. Based on the evidence, the jury could have concluded that Mr. Castillo was a drug dealer, he sold drugs

out of his basement apartment by retrieving them from the

back storage area where the narcotics and shotgun (and

drug paraphernalia) were recovered in close proximity, and

that the shotgun was possessed to further the possession and

future distribution of those narcotics by being available to

protect Mr. Castillo, his drugs and his drug trafficking

business. See Jackson, 177 F.3d at 630 (explaining that, in

adjudicating a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, the

appellate court must “consider the evidence in the light

most favorable to the Government, defer to the credibility

determination of the jury, and overturn a verdict only when

the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is

weighed, from which a jury could find guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt” (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)).

Our conclusion in this regard is supported by a number of

cases. For example, in Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, immigration agents, after being invited into Ceballos-Torres’

home, “noticed a 9mm Glock handgun lying in plain view

on top of the bed” in his bedroom. Id. at 411. Later, after

obtaining a search warrant, the agents uncovered in closets

cocaine, money with traces of cocaine and other drug paraphernalia. Id. Like Mr. Castillo, Ceballos-Torres was charged

with possession with intent to distribute the cocaine discovered during the search, see 21 U.S.C. § 841, and knowing

possession of a firearm in furtherance of that drug trafficking

offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The only issue before

the Fifth Circuit on appeal was whether the Government

had presented sufficient evidence to convict him of possession of the 9mm “in furtherance of” the drug trafficking

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344 21

offense.

The Fifth Circuit did not look for a connection between

the gun and any prior drug transaction, as Mr. Castillo suggests that we do. Instead, it concluded, with relative ease,

that the evidence was sufficient to prove the handgun found

on the bed furthered the possession and future distribution

of the cocaine. See Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d at 415. The court

explained:

The weapon was loaded and easily accessible in

Ceballos’s apartment, and he confessed to ownership of

the firearm. It was possessed illegally. And it was possessed in the apartment along with a substantial amount

of drugs and money. Together, these factors reasonably

support a finding that Ceballos’s gun protected his

drugs and money against robbery.

Id.

Similarly, in United States v. Luciano, 329 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.

2003), the police arrested Luciano near his apartment when

he handed a parcel of heroin to a CI. The police then went

to his apartment and recovered more heroin and two handguns in a crawlspace in the ceiling. Id. at 3-4. Luciano was

indicted for possession with intent to distribute over

100 grams of heroin, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B), and

possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking

crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The First Circuit held that

the evidence was more than sufficient to establish that these

handguns were “possessed” “in furtherance of” the possession and future distribution of both the heroin in the parcel

and the heroin found in the crawlspace:

The government offered uncontradicted testimony that

the heroin in the crawlspace had a retail street value of

over $200,000, and that firearms are often used by drug

dealers to protect drug stockpiles, to preempt encroachCase: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
22 Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

ment into a dealer’s “territory” by rival dealers, and for

retaliation. Presented with this evidence, the jury found

that Luciano had possessed a firearm in furtherance of

a drug trafficking crime. Given the close proximity of

the firearms and loaded magazines to the significant

stockpile of heroin, we have no difficultly concluding

that there was a sufficient nexus between the drug trafficking crime and the firearms to sustain a conviction

under § 924.

Luciano, 329 F.3d at 6.

In United States v. Timmons, 283 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2002),

undercover agents conducted a controlled buy of a weapon

and 2.3 grams of crack cocaine in 1998 “in the quad area of

Lakewood Apartments.” Id. at 1249. Then, in late 1999, the

agents obtained a warrant to arrest Timmons and search his

apartment:

In the living room was a stove top oven. On top of

the oven were two fully loaded firearms, an Intratec

Model A B10 9mm luger and a Lorcin model 380. Inside

the oven was an empty ammunition box of 9mm

cartridges. In a closet next to the living room, agents

found a bullet-proof vest. In addition, agents found crack

cocaine and $350 inside a drawer under the stove. A

clear plastic baggy with individual hits of crack cocaine

was found under the cushions of the couch. Six individually packaged rocks of crack cocaine were recovered

from a shoe of Timmons’ size located in the bedroom of

the apartment. In total, agents found 35.67 grams of

crack cocaine in Timmons’ apartment.

Id. at 1249. Timmons pleaded guilty to possessing the drugs

with the intent to distribute them but contested the sufficiency of the evidence as to whether the one of the firearms

found on the stove furthered or advanced the possession

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344 23

and future distribution of the narcotics found in the apartment. Id. The court concluded:

[A]fter considering the evidence in light of the relevant

factors, we find that the evidence against Timmons (bullet proof vest, crack cocaine on the stove and under the

cushions of the couch, two fully loaded firearms on top

of the oven and ammunition inside the oven in the living room of his apartment) was sufficient for the jury to

have concluded that Timmons was guilty of possessing

the firearms “in furtherance of” drug trafficking.

Id. at 1253.

As the parties note in their briefs, some facts from these

cases make them easier “in furtherance of” cases and some

make them more difficult. The point, however, is that when

faced with identical charges, identical “in furtherance of”

theories and analogous facts, these courts concluded with

relative ease that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the

jury’s verdict. We agree and hold that the jury’s verdict in

this case, as it relates to the “in furtherance of” element, is

within the sufficiency of the evidence purview.

2. Jury Instructions

The jury instructions on Count VI stated, in relevant part,

that the Government must prove “[f]irst, that the defendant

committed the crime of possession with intent to distribute

a controlled substance as charged in Count 5 [and] second,

that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm in

furtherance of the crime.” Tr. at 545. Mr. Castillo claims that

the Count VI instructions were insufficient for three reasons:

(1) they did not define “in furtherance of”; (2) they did not

include an admonition that the “mere presence of a firearm

alone is insufficient to find possession,” Appellant’s Br. at 29;

and (3) the instructions did not include the factors set out in

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
24 Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

4 Mr. Castillo argues that, at the charge conference, he adequately preserved his objection to the issues he now raises with

regard to the instructions on Count VI. However, the transcript

from the charge conference only contains an objection by

Mr. Castillo’s counsel to the instructions for Count IV. Count IV

was also an 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) count, but it related to a different weapon, the one found in the car that Mr. Castillo emerged

from on June 20, 2001, right before he was arrested. Furthermore,

the objections made at the charge conference are quite far from

his current contentions regarding the “in furtherance of” element

in the instructions. See Tr. at 451; see also United States v. Trennell,

290 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2002) (“To assign error to any portion

of the charge to the jury or omission therefrom a party must state

‘distinctly the matter to which that party objects and the grounds

of the objection’ before the jury retires to consider its verdict.”

(quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 30)).

Ceballos-Torres, which help distinguish when a gun is

actually possessed “in furtherance of” the drug crime,

as opposed to being “merely present” at the crime scene.

Mr. Castillo’s attorney did not object to the jury instructions

on Count VI, nor did he offer an alternative to the Count VI

instructions.4

 Therefore, we must review the instructions for

plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v.

Trennell, 290 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2002). The Supreme

Court has explained that a plain error occurs when there

is (1) an error, (2) which is plain, (3) which affects the

defendant’s substantial rights, and (4) the error “seriously

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-35

(1993). In this case, we are unable to hold that the instructions for Count VI amount to plain error.

First, Mr. Castillo’s argument that no definition of “in

furtherance of” was given in the jury instructions is only

half true. It is true that the instructions for Count VI did not

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344 25

define “in furtherance of.” See Tr. at 545. However, just one

page earlier in the transcript, the judge explained as to

Count IV, another § 924(c)(1)(A) count, that “[p]ossession of

a firearm is in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime if the

possession furthers, advances, or helps forward the drug

activity that is being conducted.” Tr. at 544. The omission of

the definition of “in furtherance of” the second time around

as to Count VI is not even an error according to some courts.

See United States v. Contreras, 950 F.2d 232, 240 (5th Cir.

1991) (“Contreras also contends that the district court

should have defined the term ‘willfully’ in its attempt

instruction. The district court did so in its instruction on

count two. Once the court properly gave the instruction

with regard to count two, it did not need to repeat that

instruction on count five.”). This approach makes sense of

the rule that jury instructions should be reviewed as a whole

and not in artificially subdivided pieces. See Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). It is also hard to believe, as

a practical matter, that the jury somehow forgot that

definition when the judge read the instructions for Count VI

a minute or so later or when they got to the jury room with

the instructions.

Furthermore, the Count VI instructions were not given in

a vacuum. The Government defined the proper meaning of

“in furtherance of” in its closing argument:

So how did that shotgun further a drug crime? That’s

the question. Did it further—simply did it help the drug

crime? Did it aid a drug crime in some way? How did

that shotgun help this defendant possess with intent to

distribute narcotics?

Tr. at 475. Also in closing arguments, both the Government

and defense emphasized § 924(c)(1)(A)’s critical nexus

between the particular gun at issue and the drug trafficking

offense; a nexus that, as discussed above, serves to eliminate

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
26 Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

5 Indeed, some of the language used in the closing arguments

reflects that used by courts in distinguishing between a gun possessed “in furtherance of” a drug trafficking offense and guns

innocently possessed. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 245 F.3d 199,

203 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he requirement in § 924(c)(1) that the gun

be possessed in furtherance of a drug crime may be satisfied by

a showing of some nexus between the firearm and the drug

selling operation.”); United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 462 (6th

Cir. 2001) (noting that the factors employed by the circuits are

intended to “distinguish possession in furtherance of a crime

from innocent possession of a wall-mounted antique or an unloaded hunting rifle locked in a cupboard”).

the possibility of a conviction for innocent possession of a

gun, such as when a gun is merely present at a crime scene.

See Tr. at 498 (defense closing) (“The law on finding weapons

in a house deals with how close they were to each other,

what the proximity to each other was. It deals with the relationship that that particular weapon had to the drugs.”); Tr.

at 528-29 (government rebuttal at closing) (“And this is not

a gun you just keep around the house. It’s not a hunting

rifle. This is a sawed-off shotgun. And it’s kept four to five

feet away from where you keep your stash of drugs hidden

in the ceiling area.”); Tr. at 529 (“Drug dealing is going on

in that house. That’s where he’s cooking his crack. People

are coming to the front door. You want something there. It’s

[the shotgun] furthering his business. Because it gives him

the sense of security he needs to keep doing business.”).5

These admonitions, which were given close in time to the

jury instructions, substantially mitigate any danger flowing

from the lack of elaboration in the Count VI instructions. See

United States v. Santos, 932 F.2d 244, 252 (3d Cir. 1991)

(holding that the “possibility of a mistaken understanding

of the phrase [preponderance of the evidence] on the part of

the jury” is “too remote to constitute plain error” when

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344 27

6 The courts have held that the following terms do not connote

such technical or unfamiliar meaning, and failure to define them

in jury instructions does not constitute plain error. See United

States v. Blasini-Lluberas, 169 F.3d 57, 67 (1st Cir. 1999) (failure to

define “materiality” not plain error); United States v. Fulmer, 108

F.3d 1486, 1495 (1st Cir. 1997) (failure to define “intimidate” not

plain error); United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 910 (9th

Cir. 1993) (failure to define “possession” not plain error);

United States v. Chambers, 918 F.2d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir. 1990) (failure to define “knowingly” not plain error). Cf. Miller v. Neathery,

52 F.3d 634, 638-39 (7th Cir. 1995) (failure to define “recklessly”

(continued...)

counsel “gave the jury an accurate explanation of the legal

meaning of the phrase [in his closing argument], and that

meaning is consistent with the common understanding of

the words in the phrase”).

Finally, an instructive line of cases holds that it is not

error—plain or otherwise—to fail to give a definition of a

statutory term or phrase that carries its natural meaning and

that meaning is accessible to lay jurors. See id.; United States

v. Sherwood, 770 F.2d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 1985) (“In view of the

ordinary meaning the term ‘willfully’ has under section

3150 we do not think it likely that the failure to define the

term confused the jury.”). For example, a number of cases

have held that failure to define “carries” in § 924(c)(1)(A) is

not error because it is a commonly understood term. See,

e.g., United States v. Rhodenizer, 106 F.3d 222, 225 (8th Cir.

1997); United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383, 387 (8th Cir.

1991), overruled on other grounds as stated in United States v.

Beaman, 361 F.3d 1061, 1064 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Even reviewing

this issue under the plain error standard, there was simply

no error in the district court’s failure to give an instruction

on the meaning of ‘carries.’ ”).6

 Similarly, as we discussed in

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
28 Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

6 (...continued)

in the instructions was error (not necessarily plain error) because

it is an enigmatic term that lawyers and lay persons have difficulty describing).

detail above, “in furtherance of” naturally and necessarily

connotes more than mere presence or innocent possession; as

its natural meaning suggests (and as the instructions on

Count IV and the parties in their closing arguments explained), it requires that the gun be possessed to further,

advance or help forward the drug crime.

Given these factors, although it certainly would have been

helpful to explain “in furtherance of” specifically with

respect to Count VI, it is a stretch to deem that omission an

error which is “plain” under Rule 52(b). See United States v.

Sumner, 265 F.3d 532, 539 (7th Cir. 2001) (“ ‘Plain’ in this context is synonymous with clear or obvious. At a minimum,

this means the error must be clear under current law.”). Even

if it were a plain error, we cannot hold that Mr. Castillo has

carried his burden of proving an effect on his “substantial

rights,” i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the district

court proceedings. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734; United States v.

Westmoreland, 240 F.3d 618, 634 (7th Cir. 2001). Nor are we

able to conclude this alleged error “seriously affect[s] the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Kibler, 279 F.3d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 2002)

(“If the defendants can [show the first three elements are

met], the court of appeals has the discretion to correct the

forfeited error under Rule 52(b), but ‘the court should not

exercise that discretion unless the error “seriously affect[s]

the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” ’ ” (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732)). This is

especially true given the overwhelming nature of the

evidence establishing that the shotgun was possessed “in

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344 29

7 This opinion was circulated to the entire court with respect to

the application of United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), to

Mr. Castillo’s and Mr. Rodriguez’s sentence. All but one member

of the court in regular active service voted not to hear this case en

banc. Judge Easterbrook voted to hear it en banc.

furtherance of” the underlying drug trafficking crime in this

case. See United States v. Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635, 658 (7th Cir.

2002) (finding the error did not affect the fairness, integrity,

or public reputation of judicial proceedings because, “[h]aving reviewed the record, we are convinced that upon a

properly worded indictment, a properly instructed jury

would have found the defendants guilty of distributing the

requisite threshold quantities of narcotics”); Westmoreland,

240 F.3d at 635 (“We will find that an error [seriously affects

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation] of judicial

proceedings when an issue is closely contested and supported by conflicting evidence.”).

“It is well-established that the plain error standard allows

appellate courts to correct only particularly egregious errors

for the purpose of preventing a miscarriage of justice.”

United States v. Conley, 291 F.3d 464, 470 (7th Cir. 2002).

Because this is not such a case, we must reject Mr. Castillo’s

contention that the instructions on Count VI amounted to

plain error warranting a new trial.

C. Sentencing Errors7

Mr. Castillo and Mr. Rodriguez each argue that his

respective sentence violated the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).

Because neither defendant raised any challenge invoking

the Sixth Amendment before the district court, we review

for plain error. See United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471,

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
30 Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

2005 WL 435430, at *7 (7th Cir. Feb. 25, 2005).

Under the plain error test, “before an appellate court can

correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) ‘error,’

(2) that is ‘plain,’ and (3) that ‘affect[s] substantial rights.’ ”

United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002) (quoting

Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997)). “ ‘If all

three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4)

the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” Id. (quoting Johnson,

520 U.S. at 467).

1. Mr. Rodriguez’s Sentence

Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the base

offense level assigned to Mr. Rodriguez’s offense was 32. See

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3) & (c)(4) (at least 50 grams but less

than 150 grams of cocaine base). In his plea agreement,

Mr. Rodriguez waived his right to a jury trial, and he admitted, in the factual resume supporting his plea, that the

offense involved about 72.3 grams of crack cocaine. He

further agreed that the total amount of cocaine base attributable to him, for purposes of sentencing, was between 50

and 150 grams.

The pre-sentence report (“PSR”) recommended a 2-level

enhancement to Mr. Rodriguez’s offense level for obstruction

of justice based on a threatening letter that Mr. Rodriguez

had written and sent that was intended to reach a potential

witness in his case. A copy of the letter was attached to the

PSR. In his plea agreement, Mr. Rodriguez agreed:

The government’s evidence would show that on about

April 10, 2002, the defendant wrote and sent a letter from

the Stephenson County Jail addressed to Individual B,

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344 31

that contained information that was intended to be

given to Witness A in this case. Witness A had introduced the defendant to the CI in this case. In the letter,

the defendant asked Witness A to visit him at the

Stephenson County Jail. In the letter, the defendant said

that if Witness A did not contact him by a certain date,

“i will call my 3 brothers and my 6 cousins from their it

will get very ugly once they find out im going to prison

i cant control unless [Witness A] helps me. believe me

its no joke these guy don’t play and theirs nothing you

or the FBI, or cops, or even god can do about it.”

R.68 at 4. Mr. Rodriguez confirmed the accuracy of that

statement at his plea colloquy. The district court accordingly

imposed the obstruction enhancement. A final adjusted offense level of 34, combined with a criminal history category

of II, resulted in a sentencing range of 168 to 210 months.

The district court sentenced Mr. Rodriguez to 180 months in

prison and three years of supervised release.

With respect to the first and second prongs of our plain

error analysis, because Mr. Rodriguez’s sentence relies solely

upon facts admitted by him, the Sixth Amendment was not

violated. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756 (“[a]ny fact (other than

a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence

exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established

by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the

defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt”).

However, as our court has determined, the “mere mandatory application of the Guidelines—the district court’s belief

that it was required to impose a Guidelines sentence—

constitutes error.” United States v. White, No. 03-2875, slip op.

at 14 (7th Cir. May 3, 2005) (citing in part Booker, 125 S. Ct. at

769 (remanding respondent Fanfan’s sentence to allow

parties to seek resentencing in light of Booker even though

Fanfan’s sentence did not violate the Sixth Amendment),

and Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 2005 WL 435430, at *7 (finding

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32 Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

8 The other courts of appeals to have addressed this issue have

reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. ValenzuelaQuevedo, No. 03-41754, 2005 WL 941353, at *4 (5th Cir. Apr. 25,

2005) (stating that after Booker the mandatory application of the

guidelines is error that satisfies the first two prongs of plain error);

United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 2005 WL 807008, at

*2 (10th Cir. Apr. 8, 2005) (en banc) (“a sentencing court could err

by applying the Guidelines in a mandatory fashion, as opposed

to a discretionary fashion, even though the resulting sentence was

calculated solely upon facts that were admitted by the defendant,

found by the jury, or based upon the fact of a prior conviction”);

United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 2005 WL 628224, at *4 (4th Cir.

Mar. 16, 2005) (stating that Booker indicates the remedial scheme

should apply “to those defendants, like Fanfan, who had been

sentenced under the mandatory regime without suffering a

constitutional violation”); United States v. Hamm, 400 F.3d 336,

2005 WL 525232, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 8, 2005) (finding plain error

although defendant’s sentence was based upon facts admitted in

his guilty plea “[g]iven that the Supreme Court has held that the

Guidelines are now discretionary”); United States v. Shelton, 400

F.3d 1325, 2005 WL 435120, at *5 (11th Cir. Feb. 25, 2005) (“it was

Booker error for the district court to sentence Shelton under a

mandatory guidelines scheme, even in the absence of a Sixth

Amendment enhancement violation”); United States v. Williams,

399 F.3d 450, 2005 WL 425212, at *2 (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 2005) (deciding that the Supreme Court implicitly ruled, by its remand of the

sentence imposed on Fanfan, that a sentencing judge commits

error by mandatorily imposing the Guidelines even though it was

based only on facts found by the jury); United States v.

Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 2005 WL 407365 (1st Cir. Feb. 22,

(continued...)

Booker error where part of defendant Vellef’s sentence “was

based on mandatory provisions of the sentencing guidelines”)); United States v. Schlifer, 2005 WL 774914, at *3 (7th

Cir. Apr. 8, 2005).8

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344 33

8 (...continued)

2005) (determining that in light of Booker the first two plain error

requirements—an error exists and that error is clear at the time

of appeal—are satisfied whenever district court has treated the

Guidelines as mandatory at the time of sentencing).

Turning to the third prong of the plain error analysis,

the Government argues that Mr. Rodriguez cannot prevail

because he cannot show that the district court would have

imposed a lighter sentence had it realized the advisory nature of the Guidelines. On this record, we simply cannot

know what the district court would have done with the

additional sentencing discretion now afforded by Booker. For

that reason, we believe it appropriate, while retaining

jurisdiction, to direct a limited remand in Mr. Rodriguez’s

case for proceedings consistent with our circuit’s recent

decision in Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 2005 WL 435430, at *10.

See White, slip op. at 13-15 (applying Paladino-limited remand

due to mandatory application of the Guidelines and noting

that, with regard to the fourth prong of plain error, “we

can and have predetermined that if the defendant has been

prejudiced by an illegal sentence, then allowing that illegal

sentence to stand would constitute a miscarriage of justice.”

(citing Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 2005 WL 435430, at *9;

United States v. Pawlinski, 374 F.3d 536, 541 (7th Cir. 2004)).

But see United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 2005

WL 807008, at *7-9 (10th Cir. Apr. 8, 2005) (en banc) (affirming sentence for failure to satisfy fourth prong of plain error

because mandatory application of the Guidelines, absent

constitutional error, was not a “particularly egregious” error

“that would result in miscarriage of justice or otherwise call

the judiciary into disrepute”).

2. Mr. Castillo’s Sentence

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
34 Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

Mr. Castillo was tried and convicted by a jury on various

federal drug trafficking charges. The jury’s verdict included

a finding that Counts I, II and III together involved more

than 100 grams of a substance containing cocaine base, which

required a base offense level of 32. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4).

The district court, however, attributed 238.4 grams of cocaine base and 18 grams of powder cocaine to Mr. Castillo’s

offenses, which increased the base offense level to 34. See

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3). The enhanced offense level, combined

with Mr. Castillo’s criminal history category of IV, yielded

a sentencing range of 210 to 262 months. The district court

sentenced Mr. Castillo to serve concurrent sentences of

210 months’ for Counts I, II, III and V, and a consecutive

sentence of 120 months for Count VI. In announcing that

sentence, the district court stated: “I’m going to accept the

recommendation of defense counsel to sentence Mr. Castillo

to the lowest end of the guideline range, which is a substantial amount of time.” Sent. Tr. at 41.

The Government concedes, and we have no doubt, that

under the holding in Booker, the district court’s decision to

increase Mr. Castillo’s sentence absent jury fact-finding, in

a mandatory Guidelines system, was error and that the error

is obvious. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 2005 WL 435430, at *7.

The Government argues, however, that Mr. Castillo has

failed to establish plain error because he cannot prove that

the district court would have imposed a lesser sentence had

it understood the Guidelines to be advisory. Mr. Castillo

contends that the district court’s statement that the lowest

end of the Guidelines range is “a substantial amount of

time” demonstrates that, with more freedom, the district

court would impose a lighter sentence.

On this record, we cannot be certain of what the district

court would have done with the additional sentencing discretion now afforded by Booker. For that reason, we believe

it appropriate, while retaining jurisdiction, to direct a limited

Case: 02-3584 Document: 63 Filed: 05/03/2005 Pages: 40
Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344 35

remand in Mr. Castillo’s case for proceedings consistent

with our circuit’s recent decision in Paladino, 401 F.3d 471,

2005 WL 435430, at *10.

3. Restitution Order

As a final matter, for the sake of clarity, we note, as we

did in the first part of our opinion, that a remand is appropriate as to both Mr. Rodriguez and Mr. Castillo to clarify

that the $3,000 “buy money” ordered to be repaid as part of

their respective sentences is appropriately considered a

condition of supervised release. See, e.g., United States v.

Daddato, 996 F.2d 903, 905 (7th Cir. 1993).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Castillo’s conviction. We reverse the restitution orders and remand to the

district court to clarify that repayment of the $3,000 “buy

money” is a condition of supervised release. While retaining

jurisdiction, we remand this matter to the district court for

proceedings consistent with Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 2005 WL

435430, at *10.

IT IS SO ORDERED

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge, dissenting from the decision

not to hear these appeals rehearing en banc. These cases pose

one of the transition problems in implementing United States

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36 Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). What happens when there

has not been a violation of the sixth amendment—because,

for example, the only consideration that raised the sentence

is a prior conviction, see Almendarez-Torres v. United States,

523 U.S. 224 (1998), or the defendant has waived his right to

submit any dispute to the jury, see Shepard v. United States,

125 S. Ct. 1254, 1263 n.5 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.

Ct. 2531, 2541 (2004)—but the district judge treated the

Guidelines as conclusive? Booker knocks out 18 U.S.C.

§3553(b)(1), which makes the system mandatory, for all

prosecutions, not just those in which there is a constitutional

problem. See 125 S. Ct. at 768-69. This holding applies to all

cases on direct appeal. The opinions in Castillo and White

put these propositions together and hold that cases in which

there is no sixth amendment problem (and no misapplication of the Guidelines either) should be treated just like

those in which the Constitution has been violated.

Yet one element of plain-error analysis is whether the

shortcoming seriously impairs the fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-37 (1993); Johnson v. United States, 520

U.S. 461, 468-69 (1997); Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373,

394-95 (1999); United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 62-63 (2002);

United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631-33 (2002); United States

v. Dominguez Benitez, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 2339-40 (2004). This

condition is not satisfied when the district judge complied

with all requirements of the Constitution, statutes, and rules.

See United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS

5705 *21-32 (10th Cir. Apr. 8, 2005) (en banc).

United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2005), says

that a sentence lengthened because of a constitutional violation meets the plain-error standard; more time in prison,

caused by a constitutional wrong, is unjust. One cannot

say the same when there has been no violation of the

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Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344 37

Constitution (or, indeed, of any other legal norm). The

Sentencing Guidelines are not themselves an engine of

wrong. They emphasize candor and consistency in sentencing and have been applied about a million times since 1987.

Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004), holds that sentences imposed in violation of another rule derived from

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), are not so likely

to be unjust that the new rule must apply retroactively on

collateral review, and we held in McReynolds v. United States,

397 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2005), that Booker likewise does not

govern on collateral review. If this is so when the sixth

amendment has been violated, what can be the source of

injustice when it has been obeyed?

Although the plain-error standard differs from the standard for retroactive application, whether an error gravely

undermines the reliability of the outcome is common to the

two inquiries. Given Schriro and opinions such as Edwards

v. United States, 523 U.S. 511 (1998), and United States v.

Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997), it would be unsound to assert

that applying the Guidelines is so problematic that relief is

apt under the plain-error standard. When every statute has

been enforced accurately and constitutionally, the fairness,

integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings are

unimpaired.

The disposition of United States v. Fanfan, which was consolidated with Booker, does not bear on this issue. The remedial majority’s penultimate paragraph says, in part:

In respondent Fanfan’s case, the District Court held

Blakely applicable to the Guidelines. It then imposed

a sentence that was authorized by the jury’s

verdict—a sentence lower than the sentence authorized by the Guidelines as written. Thus, Fanfan’s

sentence does not violate the Sixth Amendment.

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38 Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

Nonetheless, the Government (and the defendant

should he so choose) may seek resentencing under

the system set forth in today’s opinions.

125 S. Ct. at 769. This does not mean that applying the

Guidelines is wrongful even when the judge does not resolve any factual dispute. Quite the contrary. The reason

that Fanfan’s sentence did not violate the sixth amendment

was precisely that it did violate the Sentencing Reform Act

of 1984 and the Sentencing Guidelines. The jury found that

Fanfan had distributed 500 or more grams of cocaine. How

much more? The judge concluded (on a preponderance of

the evidence) that Fanfan was culpable for 2.5 kilograms of

powder cocaine plus 262 grams of crack. The top of the

Guideline range for 500 grams was 78 months; the range for

Fanfan’s relevant conduct (including his role as a leader of

a criminal organization) was 188 to 235 months. To avoid

any constitutional problem, the judge sentenced Fanfan to

78 months’ imprisonment. The United States appealed to the

first circuit and filed a petition for certiorari before judgment,

which the Court granted. So the case was before the Court

on the prosecutor’s complaint, not Fanfan’s; the remand

occurred because the sentence was too low, not because it

might have been too high; plain-error review played no role

in the decision.

Applying Paladino to no-constitutional-error situations is

inconsistent with the reason the remedial opinion in Booker

made the Guidelines advisory across the board. The alternative was asymmetric: defendants would have been free to

argue for less time in every case, but when the top of

the Guideline range was favorable defendants could have

waived their sixth amendment rights and preserved that

benefit. The Court stated that Congress would have been

unlikely to adopt a one-sided approach. 125 S. Ct. at 768. Yet

the approach taken in Castillo and White implements only

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Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344 39

the defendant-favoring portion of the Court’s remedy. No

defendant is placed at risk of a higher sentence by a limited

Paladino remand. (It would be anachronistic to reply that the

prosecutor, too, could have appealed. Recall that this is

plain-error review, which is to say that neither side noticed

this issue until after the time for filing a notice of appeal had

expired. Until Booker a prosecutor would have had no

reason—and no statutory authority—to appeal from a

sentence that fell within a properly calculated Guideline

range. See 18 U.S.C. §3742(b).) That both sides have enjoyed

the even-handed application of a symmetric Guidelines system is still another reason to say that no injustice has

occurred.

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40 Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

A true Copy:

Teste:

 _____________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—5-3-05

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