Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03089/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03089-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paul Silvers
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

MAY 2 9 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

V. 

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No. 95-3089 

PAUL SILVERS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 91-CR-40045-02) 

Robert S. Streepy (Randall K Rathbun, United States Attorney, and Gregory G. Hough, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Topeka, Kansas, with him on the brief), Assistant United States Attorney, 

Kansas City, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Thomas M. Dawson, Leavenworth, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before BRORBY, BARRETT and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant Paul Silvers pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to distnoute 

marijuana in violation of21 U.S.C. § 841(a). He now appeals his sentence. We exercise jurisdiction 

pursuant to 18 U.S. C. § 3742(a) and affirm. 

Appellate Case: 95-3089 Document: 01019279333 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 1 
I 

A grand july returned a two-count indictment against Mr. Silvers and four other individuals 

in September 1991. The district court later dismissed Count 1 of the indictment, alleging Mr. Silvers 

and his codefendants conspired to possess marijuana with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) 

& 846), on double jeopardy grounds, United States v. Mintz, 804 F. Supp. 229 (D. Kan. 1992), and 

we affirmed the dismissal. United States v. Mintz, 16 F. 3d 1101 (1Oth Cir. ), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 

2723 & 2760 (1994). After we issued our mandate, Mr. Silvers pled guilty to Count 2 of the 

indictment, which alleged he and his codefendants "knowingly and intentionally possess[ ed] with the 

intent to distribute or dispense more than 1000 marijuana plants ... in violation of Title 21, United 

States Code, Section 841( a)( 1 ); with reference to Title 21, United States Code, Sections 812 and 

841(b )( 1 )(A)." In the plea agreement, the government agreed to allow Mr. Silvers "to present 

evidence at his sentencing regarding the number of marijuana plants that he possessed with intent to 

distribute," and Mr. Silvers "acknowledge[d] and underst[ood] that the Government takes the 

position that defendant possessed, with the intent to distribute, over 1000 marijuana plants, and will 

advocate this position at his sentencing." In the section of the preprinted petition to enter a plea of 

guilty in which the defendant is to indicate whether the government has made any promises or 

concessions, Mr. Silvers wrote, "possessed amount of marijuana is left open until sentencing." 

Similarly, in the section in which the defendant is to state the tenns of his plea agreement, Mr. Silvers 

wrote, "plea to possession & will be allowed to argue about amount of marijuana in defendant's 

possession." Finally, defense counsel averred that he had informed Mr. Silvers that the guilty plea 

"left open marijuana amount for trial." 

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At the change of plea hearing, defense counsel stated he 

just want[ ed] to make sure the Court knew and that my client also knows, the issue 

of the amount of the marijuana in his possession is left open specifically for 

sentencing, and the government contends he had a thousand plants and he contends 

he had substantially less than that, and that issue is reserved, to my understanding, to 

the sentencing. 

The government conceded defense counsel was correct, and that the matter was "spelled out in the 

written plea agreement." Later during the change of plea hearing, the government outlined the 

penalties for the offense to which Mr. Silvers was pleading guilty and explained the penalties would 

differ depending on the amount of marijuana attributable to him. The district court also stated the 

sentence would depend on "the finding of the court as to the quantity of marijuana." The government 

then summarized the evidence against Mr. Silvers, which, according to the government, included 

evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Silvers possessed with intent to 

distribute "a thousand or more marijuana plants." The district court asked defense counsel whether 

he believed the evidence was sufficient to prove Mr. Silvers' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 

"keeping in mind the difference of opinion on the quantity of marijuana." Defense counsel responded, 

"[y]es, resetving the fact of the amount of possession of Mr. Silvers." After an interruption, defense 

counsel continued: 

Resetving the amount of pounds, which we believe to be somewhere between 150 and 

potentially 400 pounds, we would agree with the government's assertions that there 

was possession of marijuana here, and the other issue is the amount of marijuana that 

was destroyed while in the possession of the government. 

At the close of the hearing, the district court accepted Mr. Silvers' guilty plea. 

Mr. Silvers' presentence report attributed 1, 000 marijuana plants to him for sentencing 

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purposes, thereby triggering the mandatory nnrumum sentence prescribed in 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(bX1XAXvii), which includes imprisonment for not less that ten years nor more than life. Using 

the version ofthe guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, see U.S.S.G. §1B1.11(a); United 

States v. Owens, 10 F.3d 1118, 1130 (lOth Cir. 1995), the presentence report assigned Mr. Silvers 

a base offense level of32, the level for offenses involving "[a]t least 1,000 KG but less than 3,000 KG 

of Marihuana." U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(c)(4). In converting the 1,000 marijuana plants into 1,000 

kilograms of marijuana, the presentence report relied on a footnote to the Drug Quantity Table, 

U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(c), which provides: 

In the case of an offense involving marihuana plants, if the offense involved (A) 50 or 

more marihuana plants, treat each plant as equivalent to 1 KG of marihuana; (B) 

fewer than 50 marihuana plants, treat each plant as equivalent to 100 G of marihuana. 

Provided, however, that if the actual weight of the marijuana is greater, use the actual 

weight of the marihuana. 

(Emphasis in the original). With a three-point downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, 

U.S.S.G. §3E1.1(a, b), Mr. Silvers' total offense level was 29, yielding a sentencing range of97-121 

months in criminal history category II. U.S.S.G. Chapter 5, Part A. However, because of the tenyear statutory mandatory minimum sentence, 21 U.S. C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii), Mr. Silvers' effective 

guideline sentencing range was 120-121 months. U.S.S.G. §5G1.1(c)(2). 

Now represented by a different attorney, Mr. Silvers objected to the presentence report on 

the ground that "use of any quantity of plants in this case to establish the Guideline would be legally 

incorrect, [because] the equivalency provisions of the United States Sentencing Guidelines with 

respect to marijuana can only apply to live marijuana plants actually found." Mr. Silvers also 

contended "there is no evidence to support 1,000 plants." At the sentencing hearing, the district court 

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rejected Mr. Silvers' first contention, stating "you've made an amenable argument ... to convert this 

sentencing into a proceeding on pounds rather than on number of plants of marijuana. However, the 

Court is ofthe opinion that ... [Mr. Silvers] should be sentenced on the basis of plants." As for the 

second objection, the district court found that "the presentence investigation report correctly uses 

1,000 or more marijuana plants to calculate the defendant's guideline range." At the close of the 

hearing, the district court sentenced Mr. Silvers to 120 months imprisonment, the statutory 

mandatory minimum in light of the finding at least 1,000 marijuana plants were attnoutable to him 

for sentencing purposes. 21 U.S. C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(vii). This appeal followed. 

n 

Before we address Mr. Silvers' challenge to his sentence, we will attempt to eliminate the 

apparent confusion surrounding the nature ofhis guilty plea. As noted above, Mr. Silvers pled guilty 

to Count 2 of the indictment, which alleged he and his codefendants "knowingly and intentionally 

possess[ ed] with the intent to distribute or dispense more than 1000 marijuana plants ... in violation 

ofTitle 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(l); with reference to Title 21, United States Code, 

Sections 812 and 841(b )( 1 )(A)." The only substantive charge in Count 2 was that Mr. Silvers 

possessed marijuana with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S. C. § 841(a). The other 

statutes cited are not substantive offenses: 21 U.S. C. § 812 is the schedule of controlled substances, 

and 21 U.S. C. § 84l(b)(l)(A) prescribes certain mandatory minimum penalties for violations of21 

U.S. C.§ 841(a). Our cases make clear not only that the mandatory minima prescnoed in 21 U.S. C. 

§ 841(b)(1)(A) are not substantive offenses in themselves, but further that "[t]he quantity of the 

marijuana possessed by [the] defendant is not an element of the substantive offense as defined in 21 

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U.S.C. § 84l(a)." United States v. Cox, 934 F.2d 1114, 1121 (lOth Cir. 1991); see also United 

States v. Underwood, 982 F.2d 426, 429-30 (lOth Cir. 1992) (because drug quantity is not an element 

of21 U.S. C. § 84l(a), defendant is not entitled to have the issue decided by a jury), cert. denied, 113 

S. Ct. 3043 ( 1993 ). We have also held it is unnecessary for the government to allege drug quantity 

in the indictment, and that even when the government does so, the quantity alleged "does not dictate 

the mandatory minimum that the court is required to impose" under 21 U.S.C. § 84l(b). United 

States v. Reyes, 40 F.3d 1148, 1151 (lOth Cir. 1994); see also Underwood, 982 F.2d at 429 (district 

court may rely on drug quantities not alleged in the indictment in calculating base offense level under 

U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(c)). Because drug quantity is not an element ofthe offense, "the government [is] 

not bound to prove the quantity [of drugs] seized beyond a reasonable doubt," Cox, 934 F.2d at 

1121, in order to obtain a conviction under 21 U.S. C. § 84l(a); rather, the government is required 

only to prove the quantity of drugs attributable to the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence 

at sentencing in order to trigger the mandatory minimum sentences prescnoed in 21 U.S. C. § 84l(b ), 

Underwood, 982 F.2d at 429, just as the government is required to prove such quantities by a 

preponderance of the evidence to establish the defendant's base offense level under the Drug Quantity 

Table, U.S.S.G. §2Dl.l(c), United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1529 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 116 S. Ct. 218 (1995), and the evidence need only possess "sufficient indicia of reliability to 

support its probable accuracy," U.S.S.G. §6Al.3, comment.; see United States v. Edwards, 69 F. 3d 

419,438 (lOth Cir. 1995),petitionsfor cert.jiled, (U.S. Feb. 23, Feb. 29 & Mar. 4, 1996) (Nos. 95-

1355, 95-8147 & 95-8134); United States v. Cody, 7 F.3d 1523, 1527 (lOth Cir. 1993). Placed in 

this context, Mr. Silvers' guilty plea amounted to an unconditional plea to the charge he possessed 

marijuana with the intent to distnbute in violation of21 U.S. C. § 84l(a), with an express caveat that 

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he did not wish to stipulate to the amount of marijuana attributable to him for sentencing purposes. 

With that said, we tum to Mr. Silvers' contentions on appeal. 

ill. Mandatory Minimum Penalties under 21 U.S. C.§ 84J(b){l){A) 

A. Supposed Requirement that the Government Prove Mr. Silvers Grew Marijuana 

Mr. Silvers contends the district court erred when it calculated his mandatory minimum 

sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii) on the basis of the number of marijuana plants 

attnoutable to him, rather than the actual weight of that marijuana. According to Mr. Silvers, the one 

plant/one kilogram equivalency does not apply in his case because he did not actually "grow" the 

marijuana in question, but instead discovered it growing wild in Kansas. In effect, Mr. Silvers would 

have us hold that, in order to obtain a sentence based on the number of plants, the government must 

prove by a preponderance ofthe evidence that the defendant was a "grower" of marijuana. Mr. 

Silvers' contention stands or falls on how we construe the relevant statute, 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b )( 1 )(A)(vii). 

"In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language." United States v. 

Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981). The statute itself says nothing about a requirement that the 

government prove by a preponderance that the defendant was a grower of marijuana. Instead, the 

statute provides as follows: 

(b) Penalties 

Except as otherwise provided .. , any person who violates [21 U.S.C. § 841(a)] 

shall be sentenced as follows: 

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(1)(A) In the case of a violation of[21 U.S.C. § 841(a)] involving--

(vii) 1000 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a 

detectable amount of marijuana, or 1,000 or more marijuana plants regardless 

ofweight; ... 

such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 

10 years or more than life .... 

21 U.S. C. 841(b ). By its plain and unambiguous language, the statute requires the government to 

prove only that either 1,000 marijuana plants or 1,000 kilograms of marijuana are attributable to the 

defendant for sentencing purposes in order to trigger the mandatory minimum. To accept Mr. Silvers' 

construction, we would in effect be required to rewrite the statute to read "1,000 kilograms or more 

of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana, or, if and only if the 

defendant is a grower of marijuana, 1,000 or more plants regardless of weight." For the reasons 

stated below, we cannot and will not do so. 

When, as in this case, "the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of a clearly 

expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." 

United States v. Floyd,_ F. 3d__,_ (lOth Cir. Apr. 18, 1996), 1996 WL 189800, *4 (quoting 

Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). There is no "clearly 

expressed legislative intention to the contrary" in this case. Before 1986, possession with the intent 

to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S. C. § 841( a) was not punished based on the number of 

plants atttibutable to the defendant. Congress did so for the first time with the enactment of the Anti8 

Appellate Case: 95-3089 Document: 01019279333 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 8 
Drug Abuse Act of1986, Pub. L. 99-570, § 1003(a)(1)(C), 100 Stat. 3207-5. No House or Senate 

Report was submitted with this legislation, see 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5393, and the discussion ofthe 

statute reported in the Congressional Record sheds no light on Congress' intent. Congress enacted 

the amendments changing the relevant sections of21 U.S.C. § 841(b) into their present form as part 

of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-690, §§ 6470(g)(2), 6470(h)(2), & 6479, 102 Stat. 

4181, 4378, 4381-82. Again, no House or Senate Report was submitted with this legislation. See 

1988 U.S.C.C.AN. 5937. The only discussion of the relevant parts of the statute on the either the 

House or Senate floor was a section-by-section analysis read into the Congressional Record by 

Senator Biden, then chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Regarding § 64 79, Senator Biden 

stated: 

Section 841(bX1XA) provides for a mandatory minimum 10 year penalty for 

distribution, or possession with intent to distribute, of"1,000 kilograms or more of 

a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana." Defendants 

charged with possessing large quantities of marijuana plants have argued that the 

statutory definition of marijuana specifically excludes the seeds and stems of the plant, 

and that therefore these items may not be counted toward the 1, 000 kilogram 

requirement. 

The government has argued in response that the term "mixture or substance" 

encompasses all parts of the plants as harvested, notwithstanding the statutory 

definition of "marijuana," but defendants contend that the "mixture or substance" 

language applies only to marijuana after it has been prepared for illegal distribution. 

The defendants' position has been adopted by at least one court. United States v. 

Miller, 680 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1988). 

The amendment is intended to curtail this unnecessary debate by providing 

that the minimum penalty is triggered either by the weight of the "mixture or 

substance" or by the number of plants regardless of weight. The bill uses 1,000 plants 

as the equivalent of 1,000 kilograms. 

134 Cong. Rec. 32,700 (1988). Nothing in Senator Biden's discussion of§ 6479 can be interpreted 

as expressing an intent that the one plant/one kilogram equivalency applies only if the government 

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first proves the defendant was a grower of marijuana. 

We are aware of a line of cases holding, despite the dearth of legislative history, that courts 

can infer that one of the purposes of the one plant/one kilogram equivalency is to punish marijuana 

growers more severely than other defendants. This line of cases began with United States v. Fitol, 

733 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1990), in which the district court stated: 

It seems clear . . . that ·by changing the determining factor from weight to 

number of "plants regardless of weight," Congress intended to punish growers of 

marihuana by the scale or potential of their operation and not just by the weight of the 

plants seized at a given moment. Congress must have found a defendant who is 

growing 100 newly planted marihuana plants to be as culpable as one who has 

successfully grown 100 kilograms of marijuana. 

ld at 1315 (emphasis in the original). The Fifo/ court's interpretation of Congress's intent has gained 

a wide following, both in this Circuit and in others. See United States v. Jackson, 11 F.3d 953, 956 

(lOth Cir. 1993) ("Congress intended to punish growers of marijuana by the scale or potential of their 

operation and not just by the weight of the plants seized at a given moment." (Citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted); Cody, 7 F.3d at 1528 ("This sentencing elevation is ... a reflection of 

Congress's belief that growing a large number of plants (capable of large scale distribution) is an 

exponentially more severe offense than growing a small number." (Citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted.)); United States v. Occhipinti, 998 F.2d 791, 802 (lOth Cir. 1993) ("[W]e rejected 

a challenge to the constitutionality of the minimum sentencing provisions found at 21 U.S. C. 

§ 84l(bXIXBXvii), holding that Congress rationally intended to punish growers of marijuana by the 

scale or potential of their operation and not just the weight of the plants seized at a given moment." 

(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)); United States v. Lee, 951 F.2d 778, 784 (lOth 

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Cir.) ("Congress intended to punish growers of marijuana by the scale or potential of their operation 

and not just the weight of the plants seized at a given moment. In our view, the cultivation of 

marijuana plants creates a greater potential for abuse than possession ofhaiVested marijuana."), cert. 

denied, 506 U.S. 978 (1992); United States v. Eves, 932 F.2d 856, 859 (lOth Cir.) (same), cert 

denied, 502 U.S. 884 (1991); see also United States v. Carvell, 74 F.3d 8, 9 n. 1 (1st Cir. 1996) 

("'Congress intended to punish growers of marihuana by the scale or potential of their operation and 

not just by the weight [or size] of the plants seized at a given moment."' (Quoting United States v. 

McMahon, 935 F.2d 397, 401 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 897 (1991))); United States v. 

Proyect, 989 F.2d 84, 88 (2d Cir.) ("[I]n enacting a mandatory minimum sentence based solely on 

the number of plants a grower possesses, Congress intended to punish growers of marijuana by the 

scale or potential of their operation and not just by the weight of the plants seized at a given 

moment.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 80 (1993); 

United States v. Murphy, 979 F.2d 287, 290 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Congress wanted to penalize large scale 

growers more harshly than small time offenders.... After all, if there were no large scale growers of 

marijuana it is unlikely that there could be large scale sellers of marijuana."); United States v. 

Fletcher, 74 F.3d 49, 55 (4th Cir. 1996) ("By providing that processed marijuana be measured by 

weight but live plants be counted by number and then treated as the equivalent of an amount of dry 

marijuana as set by statute, Congress has established a system of stepped-up ptmisbment for 

growers.") (footnotes omitted); United States v. Holmes, 961 F.2d 599, 601 (6th Cir.) ("Congress 

and the Sentencing Commission [have] adopted a view that a person who grows over 1,000 

marijuana plants is equally culpable as a person who harvests over 1000 kilograms of marijuana"), 

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 881 (1992); United States v. Young, 34 F.3d 500, 506 (7th Cir. 1994) 

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(equivalency provision "'reflects Congress' judgment that an individual who grows 150 plants is just 

as culpable as one who has distributed 150 kilograms of marijuana.'" (Quoting United States v. 

Haynes, 969 F.2d 569, 571 (7th Cir. 1992))); United States v. Smith, 961 F.2d 1389, 1390 (8th Cir. 

1992) ("The cases suggest Congress intended to account for the heightened culpability of growers 

because of their primacy in the distribution chain, rather than to punish them based on predictable 

yield of their plants."); United States v. Wegner, 46 F.3d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Our precedent 

unambiguously endorses the view that the one kilogram conversion ratio represents congressional 

intent to punish growers of 50 or more marijuana plants to a greater extent than smaller producers 

or mere possessors."); United States v. Foree, 43 F.3d 1572, 1581 (11th Cir. 1995) (21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b) "punishes marijuana growers by relying in sentencing on the number of live plants recovered 

rather than marijuana weight"). 

We are in substantial agreement with the conclusion in the Fitolline of cases that at least one 

of the reasons, and perhaps the main reason, Congress enacted the one plant/one kilogram 

equivalency was to punish growers more severely that others. We do not believe, however, that this 

line of cases supports Mr. Silvers' position. First, none of the above cases holds the government must 

prove the defendant was a grower in order to obtain a sentence under the one plant/one ldlogram 

equivalency. Second, the mere fact one of the legislative purposes of the one plant/one kilogram 

equivalency was to punish growers more severely does not mandate the conclusion that the 

government must prove the defendant was a grower before that equivalency can be applied. Had 

Congress intended to focus the impact of this statute so narrowly and limit its application in this way, 

Congress would have demonstrated its intent in the text of the statute or in some other clear and 

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unambiguous fashion. 

Third, we believe it is equally plausible that Congress' purpose was broader than Mr. Silvers 

suggests. The marijuana industry is very much like any other agricultural business, and the people 

involved in it have the same basic roles as their counterparts in the legitimate agricultural trade: some 

plant the seeds, some tend and water the plants, some harvest the plants when they are mature, some 

dry the plants, some cut and package them, some ship them, and some distribute them to the 

wholesale and retail markets. One could easily conclude that when Congress enacted 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b )( 1 )(A)(vii), it intended only to distinguish between individuals involved in production and 

individuals involved only in shipping, distribution, and sales, and to impose a harsher penalty on those 

involved in production, regardless of whether those individuals are growers, hatvesters, driers, etc. 

One could also conclude Congress sought to achieve this goal merely by punishing those who possess 

plants more harshly than those who possess processed marijuana, reasoning that those who possess 

plants are involved in the early stages of the production process, whereas those who possess 

processed marijuana are involved only in shipping, distribution, or sales. To effectuate this broader 

legislative pwpose, we conclude it is necessary for the government to prove only that the defendant 

possessed plants, and it is not be necessary for the government to prove the defendant's individual role 

in the production of marijuana, i.e., that he was a grower. 

Furthermore, contrary to Mr. Silvers' contention, there is nothing in the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines that conflicts with our conclusion. The footnote to the Drug Quantity Table, 

on which the probation department and the district court relied in this case, states merely: 

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In the case of an offense involving marihuana plants, if the offense involved (A) 50 or 

more marihuana plants, treat each plant as equivalent to 1 KG of marihuana; (B) 

fewer than 50 marihuana plants, treat each plant as equivalent to 100 G of marihuana. 

Provided, however, that if the actual weight of the marihuana is greater, use the actual 

weight of the marihuana. 

U.S.S.G. §2Dl.1(c) (n.*) (emphasis in the original). In the commentary to this guideline, the 

Commission explains: 

In cases involving fifty or more marihuana plants, an equivalency of one plant 

to one kilogram of marihuana is derived from the statutory penalty provisions of21 

U.S. C. § 841(b)(1)(A), (B), and (D). In cases involving fewer than fifty plants, the 

statute is silent as to the equivalency. For cases involving fewer than fifty plants, the 

Commission has adopted an equivalency of 100 grams per plant, or the actual weight 

of the usable marihuana, whichever is greater. The decision to treat each plant as 

equal to 100 grams is premised on the fact that the average yield from a mature 

marihuana plant equals 100 grams of marihuana. 

U.S.S.G. §201.1, comment. (backg'd). Neither provision suggests the government must prove the 

defendant was a grower in order to obtain a sentence using the one plant/one kilogram equivalency. 

Mr. Silvers makes much of the fact that the Sentencing Commission amended the above 

provisions effective November 1, 1995. U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 516. The amendment rewrote the 

footnote to the Drug Quantity Table, quoted above, to read as follo\vs: 

In the case of an offense involving marihuana plants, treat each plant, regardless of 

sex, as equivalent to 100 G of marihuana. Provided, however, that if the actual 

weight of the marihuana is greater, use the actual weight of the marihuana. 

(Emphasis in the original.) The amendment also rewrote the above-quoted portion of U.S.S.G. 

§ 201.1, comment. (backg'd): 

For marihuana plants, the Commission has adopted an equivalency of 100 

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grams per plant, or the actual weight of the usable marihuana, whichever is greater. 

The decision to treat each plant as equal to 100 grams is premised on the fact that the 

average yield from a mature marihuana plant equals 100 grams of marihuana. 

The Commission gave the following justification for the amendment: 

For offenses involving 50 or more marihuana plants, the existing§ 201.1 (Unlawful 

. Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking; Attempt or Conspiracy) uses 

an equivalency of one plant = one kilogram of marihuana, reflecting the quantities 

associated with the five- and ten-year mandatory minimum penalties in 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841. For offenses involving fewer than 50 marihuana plants, the guidelines use an 

equivalency of one plant = 100 grams of marihuana, unless the weight of the actual 

marihuana is greater. In actuality, a marihuana plant does not produce a yield of one 

kilogram of marihuana. The one plant = 100 grams of marihuana equivalency used 

by the Commission for offenses involving fewer than 50 marihuana plants was 

selected as a reasonable approximation of the actual average yield of marihuana plants 

taking into account (1) studies reporting the actual yield of marihuana plants (37.5 to 

412 grams depending on growing conditions); (2) that all plants regardless of size are 

counted for guideline purposes while, in actuality, not all plants will produce useable 

marihuana (~, some plants may die of disease before maturity, and when plants are 

grown outdoors some plants may be consumed by animals); and (3) that male plants, 

which are counted for guideline purposes, are frequently culled because they do not 

produce the same quality of marihuana as do female plants. To enhance fairness and 

consistency, this amendment adopts the equivalency of 100 grams per marihuana plant 

for all guideline determinations. 

U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 516. 

We see nothing in U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 516, that impacts our conclusion in this case. 

First, U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 516, neither states nor implies that the government must prove the 

defendant was a grower in order to obtain a sentence under the revised one plant/100 gram 

equivalency. Second, although our resolution of the issue must await another day, it should be noted 

thatitisfarfromclearwhetherU.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 516, is a valid exercise ofthe Commission's 

rulemaking authority, see United States v. Novey, 78 F. 3d 1483, 1486 (lOth Cir. 1996) (Sentencing 

15 

Appellate Case: 95-3089 Document: 01019279333 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 15 
Commission does not have authority to override or amend statute), given that it conflicts with 

Congress' intent to treat one plant as equivalent to one kilogram of marijuana, as reflected in 21 

U.S. C.§ 84l{bX1XAXvii). Third, it is true that the Commission has issued a policy statement stating 

this amendment may be applied retroactively, U.S.S.G. §1B1.10(a, c), and therefore the district 

courts have discretion to reduce existing sentences in light of this amendment under appropriate 

circumstances, assuming of course that the amendment is valid. See United States v. Telman, 28 F.3d 

94, 96 (lOth Cir. 1994). Mr. Silvers is not entitled to such a reduction, however, because he received 

the statutory mandatory minimum sentence, and U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 516, cannot be 

retroactively applied to bring his sentence below that statutory mandatory minimum. U.S. S. G. 

§5Gl.l(c)(2). 

In light of the above, we reject Mr. Silvers' contention the one plant/one kilogram equivalency 

prescribed in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(vii) applies only if the government proves the defendant 

actually grew the marijuana in question. 

B. The Meaning of the Word "Plants" in 21 U.S. C.§ 84J(b)(J)(A)(vii) 

Mr. Silvers contends that in order for the government to obtain a sentence on the basis of the 

one plant/one kilogram equivalency in 21 U.S. C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii), the government must prove it 

actually seized "plants" from the defendant's possession, and that plants are not "plants" for 

sentencing purposes unless they are alive. We reject Mr. Silvers' contention. Again, first and 

foremost, there is nothing in the language or legislative history of21 U.S. C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(vii) to 

support Mr. Silvers' position. See Fletcher, 74 F.3d at 55 ("Congress has not further subdivided live 

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Appellate Case: 95-3089 Document: 01019279333 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 16 
marijuana plants into growing plants and cut plants."). The statute states merely the one plant/one 

kilogram equivalency applies if the government proves 1,000 "plants" are attnl>utable to the 

defendant. There is nothing in the statute requiring the government to prove the additional elements 

Mr. Silvers urges us to embrace. Were we to so hold, our decision would be based on nothing more 

than judicial fiat. 

Second, in Eves, 932 F.2d at 860, we concluded there was not "any aspect of legislative 

history that supports [the] theory that Congress intended 'plant' to be construed other than by its plain 

and ordinary dictionary meaning." See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 461-62 (1991) (if 

a word in a statute or the Sentencing Guidelines is not defined therein, and does not have an 

"established common law meaning," the word "must be given [its] ordinary meaning"); Floyd,_ 

F.3d at~ 1996 WL 189800 at *4. We did note, however, that "the congressional intent was to 

simplify, not to complicate, the method of determining the high end or low end mandatory sentences," 

and that ifwe were to require the government to prove the plants were alive at the time of seizure, 

our conclusion would, in effect, "require police officers to possess infrared gas analyzers to determine 

whether gas exchange is occurring in marijuana growth [and] to undergo botanical training in order 

to obsetVe marijuana ... over a period of time to see whether increments of new tissue appear." Eves, 

932 F.2d at 860. To create such a requirement, we held, "would be to turn our face on the legislative 

purpose." ld With these concerns in mind, we concluded 

the definition intended by Congress is the one accepted by the district court here: a 

marijuana "plant" includes those cuttings accompanied by root balls. Whether the 

plant could survive on its own would not be an issue; if it looks like a "plant" -- that 

is, if it has a reasonable root system-- it will be considered a "plant." No expert need 

testify, no experiments with instrumentation to monitor whether gaseous exchange is 

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Appellate Case: 95-3089 Document: 01019279333 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 17 
occurring need be conducted, no elaborate trimester or viability system need be 

established. If a cutting has a root ball attached it will be considered a plant. 

ld Although the marijuana in Eves was in "plant" form at the time of seizure, there is nothing in our 

opinion to suggest the government must prove that the marijuana was in plant form at the time of 

seizure in every case to obtain a sentence under the one plant/one kilogram equivalency prescn'bed 

in either 21 U.S.C. § 841(b}(1}(A) or U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(c). Furthermore, Eves makes it clear a 

marijuana plant can be considered a "plant" for sentencing purposes even if the government cannot 

prove it was alive. 

Third, effective November 1, 1995, the Sentencing Commission embraced our definition of 

the word "plant" as used in U.S.S.G. §2Dl.l by adding application note 18, which provides: 

For purposes of the guidelines, a "plant" is an organism having leaves and a readily 

obseiVable root formation (~, a marihuana cutting having roots, a rootball, or root 

hairs is a marihuana plant). 

U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(c}, comment. (n.18). The Commission explained the amendment as follows: 

[T]his amendment addresses the issue of what constitutes a marihuana plant. Several 

circuits have confronted the issue of when a cutting from a marihuana plant becomes 

a "plant." The appellate courts generally have held that the term "plant" should be 

defined by its plain and ordinary dictionary meaning.... [A] marihuana 'plant' includes 

those cuttings accompanied by root balls .... Because this issue arises frequently, this 

amendment adds an application note to the Commentary of §2D 1.1 setting forth the 

definition of a plant for guidelines purposes. 

U.S. S. G. App. C, amend. 518 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Of course, U.S. S. G. 

§2D1.1, comment. (n.18), has no direct application to this case. This is so because it did not become 

effective until November 1, 1995, some eight months after Mr. Silvers was sentenced, and it is not 

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Appellate Case: 95-3089 Document: 01019279333 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 18 
retroactive. U.S.S.G. § lB l.lO(a, c). Furthermore, Mr. Silvers' sentence stands or falls depending 

on the applicability of the statutory mandatory minimum in 21 U.S. C. § 84l(b){l){A)(vii), and it is 

irrelevant what his base offense level is under U.S.S.G. §2Dl.l{c), given that the district court 

sentenced Mr. Silvers to the statutory mandatory minimum term of 120 months. Nevertheless, we 

believe the Commission's decision to embrace our definition of the word "plants" is noteworthy 

because it underscores the correctness of our definition in Eves. More importantly, it should be noted 

the definition of the word "plant" in U.S.S.G. §2Dl.l, comment. (n.l8), like our definition in Eves, 

does not require the government to prove the plants were in plant form at the time of seizure or that 

they were alive. 

Finally, we find none of the cases from our sister circuits holding the marijuana must be in 

"plant" form at the time of seizure, see United States v. Blume, 967 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1992), or 

that a plant is not a "plant" unless it is alive, see United States v. Stevens, 25 F.3d 318, 320-23 (6th 

Cir. 1994), and United States v. Osburn, 955 F.2d 1500, 1509 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 878 

(1992), to be persuasive. First, as noted above, neither the statute, the guidelines, nor our case law 

impose such requirements. Second, were we to embrace the holdings in Blume, Osburn, and Stevens, 

we would be adopting a special, heightened standard of proof in cases involving marijuana plants, 

which would conflict strikingly with the standard of proof in cases involving all other drugs. We have 

held countless times that if no drugs are actually seized, the government can nevertheless prove the 

t}pe and quantity of drugs attributable to the defendant through other evidence, and may also rely on 

estimates to approximate quantity provided there are sufficient indicia of reliability to support the 

estimate's probable accuracy. See, e.g., Owens, 70 F.3d at 1130; United States v. Hooks, 65 F. 3d 

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Appellate Case: 95-3089 Document: 01019279333 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 19 
850, 854 (lOth Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 797 (1996); United States v. Ortiz, 993 F.2d 204, 

207 (lOth Cir. 1993); U.S.S.G. §6A1.3(a). We see no basis for such a special rule in either the 

statute, the guidelines, or our case law. We therefore embrace the holdings of the Fourth, Seventh, 

and Ninth Circuits. See Fletcher, 74 F.3d at 55 (marijuana plant can be a plant even if it is not 

"alive"); Haynes, 969 F.2d at 572-73 (marijuana need not be in plant form at the time of seizure); 

Wegner, 46 F.3d at 926-27 (same). In light of our conclusion, the government is required to prove 

by a preponderance of either direct or circumstantial evidence only that the defendant possessed with 

the intent to distribute or distributed marijuana plants as defined in Eves, 932 F.2d at 860, at some 

point in time in order to obtain a sentence under the one plant/one kilogram equivalency in 21 U.S. C. 

§ 84l(b)(l)(A)(vii). 

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the District Court's Finding 1, 000 Marijuana 

Plants Were Attributable to Mr. Silvers 

Mr. Silvers' presentence report states "an excess of 1,000 plants" were attributable to him. 

The probation department based its conclusion primarily on information provided by one of Mr. 

Silvers' codefendants, Sandra Wolfe. Specifically, the presentence report states, "Wolfe ... advised 

the plants numbered more than 1,000" and "Wolfe indicated over 1,000 plants were harvested by 

Mintz and his associates. 11 Mr. Silvers objected to the probation department's reliance on Ms. Wolfe's 

statements because the district court had stated in its earlier order denying the government's second 

motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing Count 1 of the superseding indictment that "there 

are serious credibility problems with defendant Wolfe. 11 In that order, however, the district court did 

not expressly find Ms. Wolfe had lied. Instead, the district court stated it could not "find solely by 

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Appellate Case: 95-3089 Document: 01019279333 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 20 
virtue of the affidavit of Sandra Wolfe, who is seeking leniency in treatment by the government, that 

she was not in fact truthful in her testimony before this court and in a previous meeting with counsel 

for several of the defendants." 

In response to Mr. Silvers' objections, the government stated: 

The trial Court relied on affidavits from Mintz and Silvers in making its determination 

that the conspiracies alleged separately in Florida and Kansas were one and the same. 

The Court chose not to believe Ms. Wolfe in that regard. In hindsight, had the Court 

known then what is readily apparent now, that Mintz was a pathological liar and 

manipulator, the results likely would have been different. Also, bear in mind Ms. 

Wolfe's emotional state and her conflict with counsel at the time of that hearing .... 

Ms. Wolfe is adamant in her assertions that this matter involved over 1,000 marijuana 

plants. She took Special Agent Myers to an area where several acres of marijuana 

plants were growing, and later haiVested by Mintz, Silvers, et al. This is just one of 

many areas haiVested by Silvers, et al. Recall that they haiVested everything they 

could. 

The government also relied on a statement by Louis Charles Sheptin, one of codefendant Michael 

Mintz's fellow inmates, that Mr. Mintz told him he, Mr. Silvers, and others had cultivated and 

processed over 2,500 marijuana plants. 

At the sentencing hearing, the district court apparently changed its opinion regarding Ms. 

Wolfe's credibility, at least with respect to her statements regarding the number of marijuana plants 

attnoutable to Mr. Silvers. In overruling Mr. Silvers' objection, the district court stated: 

[T]he Court finds that the presentence investigation report correctly uses 1, 000 or 

more marijuana plants to calculate the defendant's guideline range .... 

The Court finds there is credible and sufficient evidence to find the defendant 

was accountable for this quantity of drugs. It was within the scope of this jointly 

undertaken criminal activity and was reasonable foreseeable .... 

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Mr. Silvers now contends the district court erred in relying on Ms. Wolfe's statements given 

that the district court had previously found her credibility doubtful, and on Mr. Mintz o:ut~of-court 

statements to Mr. Sheptin, given the government's admission Mr. Mintz is a pathological liar. Mr. 

Silvers further notes Ms. Wolfe's and Mr. Mintz's statements are inconsistent with other statements 

they made in the past. We agree that both Ms. Wolfe's and Mr. Mintz's credibility is, to say the least, 

uncertain. However, it is well established that "credibility determinations are for the district court ... 

and we will therefore not reexamine the credibility of a witness' testimony on appeal." Hooks, 65 

F.3d at 854 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The district court has made a finding 

regarding credibility, and we will not now second-guess that finding. Because Ms. Wolfe's and Mr. 

Mintz's statements support the district court's factual determination 1,000 marijuana plants are 

attributable to Mr. Silvers, we conclude its determination was not clear error. 

IV 

For the reasons stated, we find no fault with the district court's conclusion Mr. Silvers is 

subject to the mandatory minimum penalties prescribed in 21 U.S. C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii). Because 

the district court imposed the minimum term of imprisonment allowed under that statute, Mr. Silvers' 

contentions regarding the district court's application of the Se~tencing Guidelines are unavailing, 

because any errors the district court might have committed were harmless. Mr. Silvers' sentence is 

therefore AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 95-3089 Document: 01019279333 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 22 
No. 95-3089, United States v. Paul Silvers 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

I respectfully dissent. My review of the case law leads me to 

conclude that in order to be sentenced based on the number of 

plants rather than the weight of marijuana, the defendant must be 

a grower of marijuana. 

The circuits which have considered this issue, including this 

circuit, are unanimous that in amending 21 u.s.c. § 

84l(b) (1) (A) (ii) and U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l to specifically include 

plants separately from the weight of the marijuana, Congress 

intended to punish growers of marijuana differently than those 

defendants who merely possess marijuana. 

In United States v. Eves, 932 F. 2d 856 (lOth Cir.), ~. 

denied, 502 U.S. 884 (1991), we observed that in United States v. 

Fitol, 733 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1990), Judge Devitt "thoroughly 

reviewed the legislative history of the Sentencing Guidelines and 

concluded that: 

by changing the determining factor from weight to number 

of "plants regardless of weight" Congress intended to 

punish growers of marijuana by the scale or potential of 

their operation and not just by the weight of the plants 

seized at a given moment. Congress must have found a 

defendant who is growing 100 newly planted marijuana 

plants to be just as culpable as one who has successfully 

grown 100 kilograms of marijuana." 

Appellate Case: 95-3089 Document: 01019279333 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 23 
~, 932 F.2d at 859 (quoting Fitol, 733 F. Supp. at 1315). 

In United States v. Lee, 957 F.2d 778, 784 (lOth Cir.), ~-

denied, 506 U.S. 978 (1992), we stated that: 

We must hold that the district court erred in 

finding/concluding that because a single marijuana plant 

could not produce a kilogram of marijuana substance, the 

statute punished defendants who grow marijuana plants 

more severely than those who possess harvested marijuana 

and is, accordingly, violative of equal protection 

guarantees. We agree with Judge Devitt's 

observation in Fitol, supra, that Congress intended to 

punish growers of marijuana by the scale or potential of 

their operation and not just the weight of the plants 

seized at a given moment. In our view, the cultivation 

of marijuana plants creates a greater potential for abuse 

than possession of harvested marijuana. 

£e..e. al...s.Q United States v. Jackson, 11 F. 3d 953, 956 (lOth Cir. 

1993) ("Rather, as we recognized in [~] , 'Congress intended to 

punish growers of marijuana by the scale or potential of their 

operation and not just by the weight of the plants seized at a 

given moment.'"); United States v. Cody, 7 F.3d 1523, 1528 (lOth 

Cir. 1993) (The equivalency provision "is a reflection of Congress' 

belief that growing a large number of plants (capable of large 

scale distribution) is an exponentially more severe offense than 

growing a small number.") (quoting United States v. Osburn, 955 

F.2d 1500, 1508 (11th Cir.), ~- denied, 506 U.S. 878 & 901 

(1992)); United States v. Occhipinti, 998 F.2d 791, 802 (lOth Cir. 

1993) ("[W]e rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of the 

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Appellate Case: 95-3089 Document: 01019279333 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 24 
minimum sentencing provisions found at 21 u.s.c. § 

841(b) (1) (B) (vii), holding that Congress rationally 'intended to 

punish growers of marijuana by the scale or potential of their 

operation and not just the weight of the plants seized at a given 

moment."') (quoting ~' 957 F. 2d at 784) . 

Based on ~' ~' Jackson, ~' and Occhipinti from this 

circuit and the decisions of the eight other circuits cited by the 

majority1 , I would hold that a defendant cannot be sentenced based 

on the number of marijuana plants as opposed to the actual weight 

of the marijuana under the equivalency provision of U.S. S. G. § 

2D1.1 unless he or she is grower of marijuana. 

Unlike the majority, I do not view these cases as simply 

stating one reason for Congress' enactment of the one plant/one 

kilogram equivalency. In holding that Congress intended to punish 

growers with this "stepped-up punishment," the courts have 

1 ~united States v. Carvell, 74 F.3d 8, 9 n.1 (1st 

Cir. 1996); United States v. Proyect, 989 F.2d 84, 88 (2d Cir.); 

United States v. Murphy, 979 F.2d 287, 290 (2nd Cir. 1992); 

United States v. Fletcher, 74 F.3d 49, 55 (4th Cir. 1996); United 

States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 322 (4th Cir. 1995); United States 

v. Stevens, 25 F.3d 318, 320-23 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. 

Holmes, 961 F.2d 599, 601 (6th Cir.); United States v. Young, 34 

F.3d 500, 506 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Smith, 961 F.2d 

1389, 1390 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Wegner, 46 F.3d 924, 

926 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Foree, 43 F.3d 1572, 1581 

(11th Cir. 1995). 

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Appellate Case: 95-3089 Document: 01019279333 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 25 
recognized the anomaly created where individuals at different 

stages in production are treated much differently, evidencing that 

the harsher sentencing provision was not intended to extend further 

down the chain of production. ~ United States v. Osburn, 955 

F.2d 1500, 1509 (11th Cir.) (the market-oriented approach "mandates 

different treatment for individuals involved in different aspects 

of the distribution of a drug."), ~- denied, 506 U.S. 878 & 901 

(1992). ~ alaQ United States v. Rogers, 1993 WL 12672 (lOth Cir. 

1993) ("It is true that a marijuana grower, arrested prior to 

harvesting, is sentenced on a one kilogram-per-plant basis. On the 

other hand, a marijuana grower, arrested immediately after 

harvesting, is sentenced according to the actual weight of the 

marijuana, .. "). 

Significantly, there is no evidence that Silvers engaged in 

the process of "growing" marijuana in Kansas. To the contrary, the 

evidence relating to the marijuana in question was limited to 

Wolfe's testimony summarizing the manner in which she located the 

fields of wild marijuana, (Appendix of Appellant at 120-22, 123-25, 

126-27), and Mintz's testimony summarizing his travels to Kansas to 

set up a base operation for harvesting and processing the wild 

marijuana. ld. at 128-32, 133-35. The government's case against 

Silvers was predicated upon his participation in harvesting wild 

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Appellate Case: 95-3089 Document: 01019279333 Date Filed: 05/29/1996 Page: 26 
.. 

marijuana and his possession of harvested wild marijuana with the 

intent to distribute it. The government did not present any 

evidence that Silvers had engaged in growing marijuana in Kansas 

nor that Silvers had ever possessed any marijuana plants. 

Therefore, I would vacate the sentence imposed on Silvers and 

remand for resentencing on the basis of the weight of the marijuana 

involved. 

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