Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-24-01449/USCOURTS-ca3-24-01449-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General United States of America
Respondent
Johana Ojeda-Guaman
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

______________ 

No. 24-1449 

______________ 

JOHANA OJEDA-GUAMAN, 

 Petitioner 

v. 

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

______________ 

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF 

THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 

(Agency Nos. A220-197-123) 

Immigration Judge: Richard Bailey 

______________ 

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

December 2, 2024 

______________ 

 

Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and McKEE, Circuit Judges. 

(Filed: December 9, 2024) 

______________ 

OPINION*

______________ 

SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 

does not constitute binding precedent. 

Case: 24-1449 Document: 29 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/09/2024
2 

Petitioners Johana Ojeda-Guaman and her minor son seek review of a decision of 

the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing their appeal of the Immigration 

Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their application1

 for asylum and withholding of removal.

2

 

Because Petitioners fail to challenge the BIA’s conclusions on issues dispositive of their 

application, we will deny the petition. 

I 

Petitioners are natives and citizens of Ecuador who entered the United States 

without inspection in June 2021. A few months later, the Department of Homeland 

Security served both with Notices to Appear (“NTA”), informing them that they were 

removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Thereafter, they appeared before an 

IJ and admitted to the factual allegations in the NTA. Based on those admissions, the IJ 

1

 Ojeda-Guaman included her son as a derivative beneficiary on her application. 8 

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A) (“A spouse or child . . . of [a noncitizen] who is granted asylum 

under this subsection may, if not otherwise eligible for asylum under this section, be 

granted the same status as the [noncitizen] if accompanying, or following to join, such 

[noncitizen].”); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.3(a) (providing a process by which spouses and children 

of asylees may apply for derivative asylum status). Because the Immigration and 

Nationality Act only provides for derivative asylum relief, not derivative withholding of 

removal, asylum is Ojeda-Guaman’s son’s only viable claim. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) 

(defining eligibility for withholding of removal, and not providing for derivative 

withholding); Arif v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 677, 681-82 & nn.16-17 (5th Cir. 2007) 

(collecting cases). 

2

 Because the Petitioners do “not raise[] any argument regarding the denial of 

[their] CAT claim except by mentioning the Convention in [their] concluding paragraph,” 

we conclude “the CAT claim to have been waived.” Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 532 

n.1 (3d Cir. 2005). 

Case: 24-1449 Document: 29 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/09/2024
3 

sustained the charge of removability, and the Petitioners sought asylum and withholding 

of removal. 

At the merits hearing, Ojeda-Guaman testified that she had been sexually assaulted 

by a man in her community. After she reported the attack to the police, the man came to 

her house and threatened her and her son with a throat-cutting gesture. They then fled 

Ecuador. Based on these events, Petitioners sought, among other things, asylum and 

withholding of removal. The IJ denied Petitioners’ application based on a finding that 

they had not shown that the Ecuadorean government was unwilling or unable to protect 

them, but rather they showed only that the prosecution of the assailant “did not proceed 

as quickly as [they] would have liked.” AR 35.

Petitioners appealed to the BIA, but did not challenge the IJ’s conclusion that they 

had failed to establish that the Ecuadorean government was unwilling or unable to protect 

them. Accordingly, the BIA “deem[ed] the issue waived” and affirmed the IJ’s decision 

on this basis alone. AR 4.

Petitioners seek review. 

II3

3

 The IJ had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.2, the BIA had jurisdiction under 8 

C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3), and we have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). See Garcia 

v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 502 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011). When “the BIA issue[s] its own 

opinion, and did not simply adopt the opinion of the IJ, we review . . . the BIA’s decision 

as the final agency decision.” Nelson v. Att’y Gen., 685 F.3d 318, 320-21 (3d Cir. 2012) 

(citations omitted). “[T]o the extent the BIA deferred to or adopted the IJ’s reasoning, 

we also look to and consider the decision of the IJ on those points.” Id. at 321 (citation 

omitted). We review legal determinations de novo and “accept factual findings if 

Case: 24-1449 Document: 29 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/09/2024
4 

To obtain asylum, a noncitizen must show that (1) she “is unable or unwilling to 

avail . . . herself of the protection of [her] country because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 

particular social group, or political opinion,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); and (2) “the 

government in h[er] home country either committed the persecution or was unable or 

unwilling to control the persecutor,” Blanco v. Att’y Gen., 967 F.3d 304, 310 (3d Cir. 

2020) (citation omitted).4 Here, the IJ found, among other things, that Petitioners did not 

prove that the government was “unable or unwilling to control the persecutor.” Id. 

For our Court to review this ruling, Petitioners must have “exhausted all 

administrative remedies available to [them] as of right.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); see also 

Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 416-17, 419, 423 (2023) (holding that, as a 

claims-processing rule, § 1252(d)(1) permits courts to review final removal orders only 

after administrative exhaustion, subject to waiver and forfeiture). Under our “liberal 

exhaustion policy,” a noncitizen “need not do much to alert the B[IA] that [s]he is raising 

an issue,” “so long as . . . [she] makes some effort . . . to place the B[IA] on notice of a 

supported by substantial evidence.” Sesay v. Att’y Gen., 787 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 

2015). 

4

 The standard for establishing eligibility for withholding of removal is similar but 

more demanding as it requires the noncitizen to demonstrate a “clear probability,” 

Blanco, 967 F.3d at 310, that her “life or freedom would be threatened” in her home 

country because of a statutorily protected ground, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). If an 

asylum-seeker cannot show a “well-founded fear of persecution,” she also cannot show a 

“clear probability” of the same. Toure v. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2006). 

Case: 24-1449 Document: 29 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/09/2024
5 

straightforward issue being raised on appeal.” Joseph v. Att’y Gen., 465 F.3d 123, 126 

(3d Cir. 2006), as amended (Nov. 27, 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). However, when a noncitizen fails to raise any argument regarding a particular 

issue in either her notice of appeal or brief to the BIA, she fails to provide the BIA notice 

and therefore does not exhaust her administrative remedies. See Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 

F.3d 114, 120-22, 126 (3d Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Santos-Zacaria, 598 

U.S. 411. 

Here, the IJ found that Petitioners had not established that the Ecuadorean 

government was unwilling or unable to protect Ojeda-Guaman from any past or future 

persecution, which is a necessary showing to obtain both asylum and withholding of 

removal. See Blanco, 967 F.3d at 310. Petitioners failed to argue in their notice of 

appeal or brief to the BIA that the IJ erred in that determination and, as a result, the BIA

properly concluded that they had waived the issue. As a consequence of failing to raise 

the issue before the BIA, Petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.5

 

Accodingly, because Petitioners did not exhaust their administrative remedies, they may 

not seek our review. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). 

5

 Even if we were to disregard the administrative exhaustion requirement imposed 

by § 1252(d)(1), Petitioners’ failure to challenge the IJ’s conclusion before this Court that 

they did not show Ecuador’s unwillingness or inabililty to protect Ojeda-Guaman 

constitutes a waiver. See Travitz v. Ne. Dep’t ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund, 13 F.3d 

704, 711 (3d Cir. 1994) (“When an issue is not pursued in the argument section of the 

brief, the appellant has abandoned and waived that issue on appeal.”). 

Case: 24-1449 Document: 29 Page: 5 Date Filed: 12/09/2024
6

III

For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition.

Case: 24-1449 Document: 29 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/09/2024