Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-01067/USCOURTS-caDC-15-01067-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Comcast Cable Communications, LLC
Intervenor for Respondent
Federal Communications Commission
Respondent
The Tennis Channel, Inc.
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 18, 2016 Decided July 5, 2016

No. 15-1067

THE TENNIS CHANNEL, INC.,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA,

RESPONDENTS

COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,

INTERVENOR

On Petition for Review of an Order of

 the Federal Communications Commission

Stephen A. Weiswasser argued the cause for petitioner. 

With him on the briefs was Daniel E. Matro.

Scott M. Noveck, Counsel, Federal Communications

Commission, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the

briefs were William J. Baer, Assistant Attorney General, U.S.

Department of Justice, Kristen C. Limarzi and Robert J.

Wiggers, Attorneys, Jonathan B. Sallet, General Counsel,

Federal Communications Commission, David M. Gossett,

Deputy General Counsel, and Jacob M. Lewis, Associate

General Counsel. Richard K. Welch, Deputy Associate General

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Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, and Maureen

K. Flood, Counsel, entered appearances.

Jonathan C. Bond argued the cause for intervenor Comcast

Cable Communications, LLC. With him on the brief were

Miguel A. Estrada and Lynn R. Charytan.

Before: ROGERS, BROWN and PILLARD, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, J., Circuit Judge: This petition for review stems

from a complaint filed by the Tennis Channel, Inc., alleging that

Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, violated Section 616 of

the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 536, by giving

preferential treatment to its affiliated networks in programming

tier placement. Tennis Channel prevailed before the Federal

Communications Commission, but its fortunes faltered when the

court held that the Commission and Tennis Channel had failed

to identify substantial evidence of unlawful discrimination based

on affiliation. Comcast Cable Commc’ns v. FCC (“Tennis I”),

717 F.3d 982 (D.C. Cir. 2013). On remand, the Commission

resolved the entirety of Tennis Channel’s complaint in

Comcast’s favor and denied Tennis Channel’s petition for

further proceedings. For the following reasons, we deny the

petition for review of the order on remand.

I.

Section 616 of the Communications Act bars multichannel

video programming distributors (“MVPD”) like Comcast from

discriminating against unaffiliated programming networks like

Tennis Channel, a sports programming network, in making

decisions about content distribution. 47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(3). 

Such discrimination is unlawful where the effect is to

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“unreasonably restrain the ability of an unaffiliated video

programming vendor to compete fairly.” 47 C.F.R.

§ 76.1301(c).

The administrative law judge ruling on Tennis Channel’s

complaint found that Comcast had violated Section 616, and the

Commission affirmed. Tennis Channel, Inc. (“Initial Order”),

27 FCC Rcd. 8508, 8509 (2012). The court granted Comcast’s

petition for review, concluding that the record did not support

the finding that Comcast had violated Section 616. See Tennis I,

717 F.3d at 987. Assuming the correctness of the Commission’s

interpretation of Section 616, id. at 984–85, the court held there

was not substantial evidence to show that Comcast had not

based its tiering decision on business considerations, id. at

985–87.1

 Tennis Channel petitioned for rehearing and rehearing

en banc, arguing that Tennis I represented a departure from antidiscrimination precedent, Pet. for Reh’g 4–11, Tennis I, 717

F.3d 982 (2013) (No. 12-1337), and seeking an express remand

for further proceedings because Tennis I might be understood to

preclude further record review by the Commission, id. at 11–15. 

The court denied the petition. 

On remand before the Commission, Tennis Channel filed a

petition for further proceedings and reaffirmation of the Initial

Order. Specifically, Tennis Channel requested the Commission

reevaluate its complaint against Comcast in view of what it

1

 In separate concurrences, Judge Kavanaugh opined that the

Commission’s interpretation of Section 616 violated the First

Amendment, because it did not require a showing of MVPD market

power, Tennis I, 717 F.3d at 994 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring), and

Judge Edwards opined that Tennis Channel’s complaint was untimely

under 47 C.F.R. § 76.1302(f) (2010), noting concerns about the lack

of fair notice under the Commission’s interpretation of when Section

616 complaints must be filed. Id. at 994–95 (Edwards, J., concurring).

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characterized as the “new” evidentiary test established in Tennis

I, Pet. 11–12, and argued there was sufficient evidence in the

administrative record for the Commission to find Comcast had

violated Section 616. Alternatively, Tennis Channel requested

that the record be reopened to allow Tennis Channel to submit

additional evidence if the Commission concluded the existing

record was lacking.

The Commission denied Tennis Channel’s petition. It

declined, in view of Tennis I, to search the record for evidence

that might sustain the discrimination complaint and denied

Tennis Channel’s complaint in its entirety. Tennis Channel, Inc.

(“Remand Order”), 30 FCC Rcd. 849, 851–52 ¶ 7 (2015). The

Commission concluded that the evidentiary test emphasized in

Tennis I was not novel, but could be viewed as “simply

provid[ing] examples of the types of evidence that might have

been adequate to prove that broader carriage would have yielded

net benefits to Comcast.” Id. at 852 ¶ 7. It further concluded

that in Tennis I the court had considered the evidence in the 

administrative record and consequently there was no room left

for the Commission to reconsider the discrimination question as

the court had “neither invited nor directed the Commission to

address on remand the evidentiary shortcomings identified in its

decision.” Id. The Commission also denied Tennis Channel’s

requests for further proceedings. Because Tennis I had already

analyzed the administrative record, additional briefing was

unnecessary, id., and because Tennis Channel had had a “full

and fair opportunity to litigate its complaint,” the benefit of

reopening the record was outweighed by “the interest in

bringing the proceeding to a close,” id. at 852 ¶ 8.

II.

Petitioning the court for review of the Remand Order,

Tennis Channel challenges both the Commission’s decision to

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deny its complaint and the determination that no further

proceedings are warranted. First, Tennis Channel contends that

the Commission ignored its obligation to make findings

following remand and erred in determining that the

discrimination complaint was fully resolved by Tennis I’s

analysis of the record. Had the Commission reexamined the

record, Tennis Channel maintains that it would have found

evidence of discrimination sufficient to satisfy Tennis I’s “new”

evidentiary test and to reaffirm its conclusion in the Initial

Order that Comcast had unlawfully discriminated on the basis

of affiliation. In particular, it would have found evidence that

Comcast’s asserted business decision was a pretext for affiliate

discrimination and that Comcast would have received a net

benefit or at least incurred no greater incremental loss from

moving Tennis Channel to a more favorable tier. The

Commission’s decision to reverse the Initial Order and deny

Tennis Channel’s discrimination complaint was therefore, it

maintains, “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706; see also

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Second,

Tennis Channel contends that this was a situation where the

Commission should have allowed further briefing and evidence

in view of Tennis I’s “new” evidentiary test for proving Section

616 discrimination. 

A. 

Although Tennis Channel’s petition for review might be

understood as focusing only on the denial on remand of its

requests for the Commission to reconsider the findings in the

Initial Order and make additional factual findings, it is clear that

Tennis Channel also objects to the Commission’s denial of its

complaint. Because that part of the Remand Order is a “new

and final order setting forth the rights and obligations of the

parties,” see ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270,

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278 (1987), there is little question that the court has jurisdiction

to determine whether the Commission adequately supported its

decision to deny the complaint, see id.; see also Schoenbohm v.

FCC, 204 F.3d 243, 245–46 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 

Tennis Channel’s contention that the Commission acted

arbitrarily and capriciously in denying its complaint is premised

on the view that the Commission misread Tennis I as having

determined that there was no evidence in the administrative

record that might have supported Tennis Channel’s

discrimination complaint against Comcast. The better reading

of Tennis I, it maintains, is that the court held only that the

findings made by the Commission in the Initial Order were

insufficient to sustain its discrimination claim. This reading

follows, it states, from the traditional administrative law

principle that judicial review is limited to analyzing whether the

findings and reasoning supplied by the agency adequately

support its decision, see, e.g., Sprint Nextel Corp. v. FCC, 508

F.3d 1129, 1132–33 (D.C. Cir. 2007), and Tennis I’s focus on

the deficiencies in the Commission’s presentation of the

evidence, not the record as a whole. Understanding Tennis I to

have gone further was all the more remarkable, Tennis Channel

suggests, in view of Tennis I’s “new” evidentiary test for

showing under Section 616 that an MVPD did not make its

decision based on a business justification. Had the Commission

understood Tennis I to have rejected only the approach in the

Initial Order, then the Commission could not have denied

Tennis Channel’s complaint without conducting additional factfinding on whether there was record evidence that Comcast had

not based its tiering decision on business considerations. 

The Commission’s view that Tennis I had concluded that

the administrative record lacked substantial evidence on which

the Commission could find discrimination is consistent with

administrative law principles. As Tennis Channel seems to

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recognize, see Pet’r’s Br. 30–31, the court did not decide factual

issues that the Commission never considered. See Sprint Nextel,

508 F.3d at 1132–33; SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88

(1943). Instead, the court explained that there was not

substantial evidence to support the Initial Order’s finding of

affiliate discrimination. See Tennis I, 717 F.3d at 984–87. Even

assuming that a court would usually review only the record

associated with the reasons given by the agency, and remand

upon finding those reasons unsupported by substantial evidence,

see Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006); INS v.

Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16–17 (2002), there is nothing to prevent

a reviewing court from examining the entire record to determine

whether additional fact-finding would be necessary on remand. 

As here, where there was a fully developed administrative

record devoid of evidence that might have supported the

Commission’s Section 616 determination, the court could

explain that no further analysis was required on remand. See,

e.g., George A. Hormel & Co. v. NLRB, 962 F.2d 1061, 1066

(D.C. Cir. 1992); Guardian Moving & Storage Co. v. ICC, 952

F.2d 1428, 1433–34 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Vance v. Heckler, 757

F.2d 1324, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Of course, no such express

determination can be found in Tennis I. Cf. George A. Hormel,

962 F.2d at 1066; Guardian Moving, 952 F.2d at 1433–34. 

Nonetheless, Tennis Channel fails to show that the Commission

acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it interpreted Tennis I

consistently with that administrative law precedent. 

For the Commission to have understood Tennis I as

requiring additional record analysis on remand, the Commission

would have had to ignore the court’s statements that it had

reviewed the administrative record and determined neither

Tennis Channel nor the Commission in its Initial Order had

pointed to substantial evidence to support finding Section 616

discrimination. See Tennis I, 717 F.3d at 984–87. Although

Tennis Channel suggests full review of the administrative record

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would have been unlikely, because Tennis I adopted a “new”

evidentiary test for establishing discrimination such that it was

obvious a remand was required, the Commission rejected the

view that Tennis I had established a new test and explained why

it reached that conclusion. See Remand Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at

851–52 ¶¶ 7–8. Not only had the court assumed the correctness

of the Commission’s interpretation of Section 616, see id. at

851–52 ¶ 7 (citing Tennis I, 717 F.3d at 984), the court’s

analysis reflected Commission precedent that an MVPD’s

decision is not discriminatory if based on a legitimate and nondiscriminatory business purpose, see Tennis I, 717 F.3d at 985

(citing Mid-Atlantic Sports Network, 25 FCC Rcd. 18,099,

18,115 ¶ 22 (2010)); see also TCR Sports Broad. Holding LLP

v. FCC, 679 F.3d 269, 274–77 (4th Cir. 2012). As the

Commission explained, the court was “simply provid[ing]

examples of the types of evidence” that might have sufficed to

undermine the legitimacy of Comcast’s claimed business

justification. Remand Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 852 ¶ 7. 

At best, Tennis Channel has established that in Tennis I the

court had the option of remanding the case for further

Commission review of the record to determine if there was

sufficient evidence to support the conclusion in the Initial

Order. But the court did not exercise that option. Under the

circumstances, the Commission correctly concluded that Tennis

I left no room for it to find discrimination on the existing

administrative record. 

Tennis Channel’s reliance on Section 402(h) is misplaced. 

That section provides that “[i]n the event that the court shall

render a decision and enter an order reversing the order of the

Commission, it shall remand the case to the Commission to

carry out the judgment of the court and it shall be the duty of the

Commission . . . to forthwith give effect thereto.” 47 U.S.C.

§ 402(h). All this means is that even if section 402(h) applied,

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see E. Carolinas Broad. Co. v. FCC, 762 F.2d 95, 100 n.6 (D.C.

Cir. 1985), the Commission was required to carry out the

judgment of the court, whatever it may be. It does not suggest

that the court, upon finding an agency’s reasons deficient, must

always remand for further record review and factfinding. By

conducting proceedings consistent with the court’s grant of

Comcast’s petition for review and vacatur of the Initial Order,

the Commission satisfied the requirements of Section 402(h). 

It is unnecessary for the court to address intervenor Comcast’s

suggestion that 28 U.S.C. § 2347, and not 47 U.S.C. § 402(h),

governs the scope of remand.

B.

When the Commission reopens a proceeding and issues a

new and final order, that decision is reviewable by the court. 

See Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. at 278. But when the

Commission exercises its discretion to deny reopening, “a

petition seeking review of an agency’s decision not to reopen a

proceeding is not reviewable unless the petition is based upon

new evidence or changed circumstances.” Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v.

FCC, 180 F.3d 307, 311 (D.C. Cir. 1999), abrogated on other

grounds by Entravision Holdings, LLC v. FCC, 202 F.3d 311,

313 n.** (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs,

482 U.S. at 278–79; Transp. Intelligence, Inc. v. FCC, 336 F.3d

1058, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Schoenbohm, 204 F.3d at 245,

250; Entravision, 202 F.3d at 313. The petitioner must have

presented such evidence or circumstances to the Commission. 

AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 363 F.3d 504, 509 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

Tennis Channel does not maintain that it presented “new

evidence” to the Commission on remand, see id.; indeed, it did

not identify what new evidence it would have introduced had the

Commission reopened the record. Much less has Tennis Channel

shown that there are “facts which, through no fault of [its own],

the original proceeding did not contain.” Sw. Bell., 180 F.3d at

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312 (quoting Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. at 279). 

Instead, the court has jurisdiction because Tennis Channel based

its requests for further proceedings on “non-pretextual grounds”

of “changed circumstances.” Vill. of Barrington, Ill. v. Surface

Transp. Bd., 758 F.3d 326, 329 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation

omitted); Jost v. Surface Transp. Bd., 194 F.3d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir.

1999); Fritsch v. ICC, 59 F.3d 248, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In

Tennis I, 717 F.3d at 985–87, the court focused on aspects of the

alleged discrimination not addressed in the Initial Order. Even

if these newly considered aspects did not amount to a “new”

evidentiary test, see supra Part II.A., the evidentiary focus of the

inquiry had shifted from whether the MVPD offered preferential

treatment to its affiliates with similar programming and costs to

whether petitioner had shown that the MVPD could have

recouped the costs of broadening coverage of the non-affiliate

such that failing to do so could not have been a legitimate

business decision. See Tennis I, 717 F.3d at 985–86. 

Consequently, in petitioning the Commission for further

proceedings, Tennis Channel was not merely explaining material

errors of law or reasoning in the Initial Order or Tennis I, but

was also seeking to “bring new material to [the Commission’s]

attention.” See Jost, 194 F.3d at 85; Fritsch, 59 F.3d at 252; see

also Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. at 278–79. It sought

to do this by having the Commission reexamine the

administrative record in light of Tennis I or reopen the record to

allow Tennis Channel to submit evidence addressing the

evidentiary deficiencies identified in Tennis I. Neither ground

was mere pretext by Tennis Channel to snatch victory from the

jaws of defeat. See Jost, 194 F.3d at 84–85.

On the merits, review of the Commission’s denial of further

proceedings is highly deferential: to overturn such a decision

“requires ‘a showing of the clearest abuse of discretion.’” Bhd.

of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. at 278 (citation omitted);

Schoenbohm, 204 F.3d at 250 n.4; Sw. Bell, 180 F.3d at 311; E.

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Carolinas Broad., 762 F.2d at 100–03. Tennis Channel fails to

show such abuse. 

Regarding the request for further briefing, because the

Commission correctly determined that Tennis I concluded the

administrative record contained insufficient evidence to support

a finding of Section 616 discrimination by Comcast, see supra

Part II.A, the Commission’s rejection of Tennis Channel’s

request for further briefing was hardly a clear abuse of

discretion. The Commission already had the opportunity to

review the record evidence that Tennis Channel claimed in its

petition for further proceedings was critical to showing affiliate

discrimination.

Regarding the request to reopen the record to allow

submission of additional evidence, although the Commission’s

explanation for denying Tennis Channel’s request was brief, it

was sufficient. Remand Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 852 ¶ 8. The

Commission explained that it was exercising its discretion not to

reopen the record because “the interest in bringing the

proceeding to a close outweigh[ed] any interest in allowing

Tennis Channel a second opportunity to prosecute its program

carriage complaint.” Id. “Tennis Channel has had a full and fair

opportunity to litigate its complaint.” Id. On remand, Tennis

Channel did not identify the critical evidence it intended to

present if the Commission reopened the record. During the oral

argument before the court, counsel for Tennis Channel suggested

the possibility of introducing expert testimony that carrying

Tennis Channel more broadly had the potential of increasing

Comcast’s advertising revenues and was supported by audience

interest in the channel. See Oral Arg. Tr. 9–10. Putting aside

that Tennis Channel had neither identified nor presented that

evidence in support of its reopening request, the failure to

develop evidence to rebut Comcast’s asserted business decision

appears to be a problem of its own making. Tennis Channel’s

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incentive to develop rebuttal evidence preceded Tennis I. See

Tennis I, 717 F.3d at 985–86; Mid-Atlantic Sports Network, 25

FCC Rcd. at 18,115 ¶ 22. With the benefit of extensive

discovery and evidentiary hearings, Tennis Channel had the

opportunity to put such evidence in the record. Having chosen

how to litigate its complaint, Tennis Channel fails to show the

Commission clearly abused its discretion in declining to extend

the proceedings. See E. Carolinas, 762 F.2d at 103; cf. Nw. Ind.

Tel. Co. v. FCC, 872 F.2d 465, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1989);

Carter/Mondale Presidential Comm. v. FEC, 775 F.2d 1182,

1187 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Because the Commission rested its

decision not to reopen on its discretion, and not the possible

statutory bar to reopening the record under 47 U.S.C. § 402(h),

see Remand Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 852 ¶ 8 n.30, the court has

no occasion to address whether the Commission could have

relied on Section 402(h)’s statutory bar, see E. Carolinas, 762

F.2d at 100–01.

Accordingly, the court denies the petition for review.

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