Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-07-04380/USCOURTS-ca4-07-04380-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Edward Lee Watkins
Appellant

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-4380

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

EDWARD LEE WATKINS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,

District Judge. (5:05-cr-00258-D)

Submitted: November 6, 2007 Decided: November 21, 2007

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for

Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M.

Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys,

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Edward Lee Watkins appeals the district court’s

revocation of his supervised release and imposition of a

twenty-four month prison term. On appeal, Watkins contends his

revocation sentence was plainly unreasonable because it exceeded

his policy statement range of four to ten months. We affirm. 

This court will affirm a sentence imposed after

revocation of supervised release if it is within the prescribed

statutory range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v.

Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.

1813 (2007). In making this determination, the court first

considers whether the sentence is unreasonable. Id. at 438. This

initial inquiry takes a more deferential appellate posture

concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion than

reasonableness review for guidelines sentences. United States v.

Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007)(citations omitted). 

While the district court must consider the policy

statements contained in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines

as “helpful assistance,” and the statutory requirements and factors

applicable to revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a),

3583, the court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke the

previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the

statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39. The court must

provide a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed, as with

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*

The probation officer alleged: (1) Watkins used a controlled

substance on February 12, 2007; (2) Watkins failed to participate

as directed in a substance abuse treatment program by failing to

attend counseling sessions on ten occasions between October 2006

and February 2007; (3) Watkins failed to perform community service

and had only completed 28.45 of the 200 hours ordered; (4) Watkins

used cocaine on March 15, 2007; (5) Watkins consumed alcohol on

March 14, 2007; and (6) Watkins failed to follow the probation

officer’s instructions not to leave the probation office after

testing positive for cocaine use on March 15.

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the typical sentencing procedure, but this statement need not be as

specific as has been required for departing from a traditional

guidelines range. Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657. Only if this modified

“reasonableness” analysis leads us to conclude that the sentence

was unreasonable, do we ask whether it is “plainly” so. Id. 

Watkins began serving his term of supervised release on

July 27, 2005. On October 6, 2005, his term of supervised release

was modified to include halfway house placement and mental health

treatment because Watkins had been charged with second degree

trespass. On August 4, 2006, Watkins tested positive for cocaine

use. On March 19, 2007, a probation officer filed a second amended

motion for revocation of Watkins’ supervised release, citing six

violations, including three that occurred after Watkins was

released from custody pending his revocation hearing.* 

 Watkins admitted the violations and asked the court to

consider a six-month halfway house placement. The district court

acknowledged that Watkins’ policy statement range was four to ten

months, but concluded that a sentence of twenty-four months, the

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statutory maximum, was appropriate. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual § 7B1.4; 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2)(2000). 

Watkins contends the increase in his sentence above the

policy statement range was plainly unreasonable. We disagree. The

district court considered the policy range under Chapter Seven, but

sentenced Watkins to the statutory maximum based on his need for

mental health and substance abuse treatment and on his pattern of

repeated violations. It was reasonable for the court to take into

account not only the severity of Watkins’ most severe violation,

but also the number of violations. See Moulden, 478 F.3d at 658.

We therefore affirm Watkins’ sentence. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

 

AFFIRMED

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