Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05156/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05156-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Albert Otis Davis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

.. 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

. FILED 

TENTH CIRCUIT Vn•ted States Court or Appeals Tenth Circuit 

SEP 3 - 1996 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

v. No. 95-5156 

ALBERT OTIS DAVIS, 

De fen dan t-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for theN orthern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-179-K) 

Stephen J. Greubel, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Tulsa, Oklahoma 

(Stephen J. Knorr, Federal Public Defender, with him on the brief), for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Lucy 0. Creekmore, Assistant United States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma 

(Stephen C. Lewis, United States Attorney, with her on the brief), for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before EBEL, HOLLOWAY and HENRY, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 95-5156 Document: 01019277465 Date Filed: 09/03/1996 Page: 1 
Defendant-Appellant Albert Otis Davis was convicted of one count of 

being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S .C. § 922(g)( 1 ), after he was 

stopped by police and found to be carrying a gun. Davis contends the 

district court should have suppressed the gun and his subsequent statements 

as the fruits of an unlawful detention because there was no reasonable 

suspicion to justify the investigative stop pursuant to which the gun was 

found. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse. 

I. 

The following are the facts in this case as found by the district 

court: On December 20, 1993 at approximately 10:00 p.m., Tulsa police 

officers Yelton, Spitler and Staats were patrolling the area of 1900 North 

Madison in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The Tulsa Police Department on prior 

occasions had received complaints regarding gunshots being fired in that 

area. One building in the area was known to the Tulsa Police Department 

as a "juice joint," ~. a business that sells liquor without a license. 

Officer Yelton testified at the suppression hearing that the building had 

been known as a "juice joint" for the ten years he had served as a police 

officer, but that legal activities such as dominoes and pool also take place 

there. Officer Yelton testified that in the past he had investigated two 

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Appellate Case: 95-5156 Document: 01019277465 Date Filed: 09/03/1996 Page: 2 
shootings in the area and had been involved in eight arrests in the area 

relating to drug sales and/or gun use. Officer Yelton also testified that 

gangs, such as the Crips and the Bloods, "hang out" and sell drugs at this 

location and that it had been the scene of gang disputes. 

On the night and at the time in question, the three officers arrived in 

a marked police car and observed a brown Monte Carlo with four 

occupants parked just north of the "juice joint." Upon the officers' 

arrival, one of the occupants, Defendant Albert Otis Davis, exited the 

Monte Carlo. As he did so, he made eye contact with Officer Yelton, 

then broke eye contact and began walking toward the establishment with 

his hands in his pockets. Officer Yelton knew Davis was an ex-convict 

who had been acquitted of a gang-related homicide. Officer Yelton also 

knew Davis was associated with a gang, and had received information that 

Davis had been selling narcotics. However, none of Officer Yelton's 

prior contact with criminal activity in the 1900 North Madison area had 

involved Davis. 

The officers told Davis to stop and to take his hands out of his 

pockets, but Davis continued walking in the same direction and same 

manner. Officer Yelton testified that he was concerned at that point with 

officer safety and believed defendant might be hiding a firearm. Officer 

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Yelton further testified that he believed defendant was about to enter the 

"juice joint." Officer Yelton and Officer Staats approached Davis and 

each officer grabbed one of Davis' arms. The officers escorted Davis to 

the Monte Carlo and told him to place his hands on top of the vehicle. 

Instead, Davis entered the front seat of the vehicle, removed a firearm 

from his coat pocket, and threw the firearm into the back seat of the 

vehicle. The officers recovered the firearm from the back seat and 

arrested Davis. Davis was taken to the police station, where he was read 

his Miranda rights, signed a waiver of those rights, and made a written 

statement. 

II. 

On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we 

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and we 

review the district court's findings of fact only for clear error. United 

States v. Lambert, 46 F.3d 1064, 1067 (lOth Cir. 1995). We review~ 

ll.Q.Y.Q., however, the district court's conclusion as to whether the officers 

had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity at the time of 

the seizure. l.d....; Ornelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996). 

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Appellate Case: 95-5156 Document: 01019277465 Date Filed: 09/03/1996 Page: 4 
A. 

According to the Supreme Court, there are three types of policecitizen encounters: 

(1) consensual encounters which do not implicate the Fourth 

Amendment, see. e.~., Michi~an v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 57 4-

76 (1988); INS v. Del~ado, 466 U.S. 210, 218-21 (1984); (2) 

investigative detentions which are Fourth Amendment seizures of 

limited scope and duration and must be supported by a reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity, see. e. i., United States v. Sokolow, 

490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); and (3) 

arrests, the most intrusive of Fourth Amendment seizures and 

reasonable only if supported by probable cause. See. e.i., Hayes v. 

Florida, 470 U.S. 811,815-16 (1985); Dunaway v. New York, 442 

u.s. 200, 212-16 (1979). 

United States v. Bloom, 975 F.2d 1447, 1450-51 (lOth Cir. 1992), 

overruled in part on other grounds, United States v. Little, 18 F. 3d 1499, 

1504 n. 5 (1Oth Cir. 1994). The government argues that the encounter 

between the Tulsa police officers and Davis was a lawful investigative 

detention. "A seizure by means of an investigative detention 'is 

constitutional only if supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion 

that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity I'" Lambert, 46 F r 3d 

at 1069 (quoting United States v. Ward, 961 F.2d 1526, 1529 (lOth Cir. 

1992) (quoting Reid vI Georiia, 448 u Is r 438' 440 (1980) (per curiam))) I 

An officer who "stops" and briefly detains a person for questioning "must 

be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together 

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with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 

intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). While an investigative 

detention does not require probable cause, it does demand "something 

more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.'" United 

States v. Melendez-Garda, 28 F.3d 1046, 1051 (lOth Cir. 1994) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). In the course of a valid investigative detention, 

an officer may conduct a limited protective search ("frisk") if the officer 

harbors an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the person is armed 

and dangerous. United States v. Kin~, 990 F. 2d 1552, 1557 (1Oth Cir. 

1993); United States v. Santillanes, 848 F. 2d 1103, 1108 (1Oth Cir. 

1988). 

According to the government, the officers in this case possessed 

reasonable and articulable suspicion that Davis was engaging in criminal 

activity based on the following four factors: (1) Davis' car being parked 

outside a known criminal establishment; (2) Davis' actions in exiting the 

car when he saw the officers, making and then breaking eye contact, and 

refusing to stop when directed; (3) Davis' keeping his hands in his 

pockets; and ( 4) the officers' knowledge of Davis' prior criminal record. 

None of these factors, standing alone, provides a lawful basis for an 

investigative detention. First, "[t]he fact that [Davis] was in a 

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Appellate Case: 95-5156 Document: 01019277465 Date Filed: 09/03/1996 Page: 6 
neighborhood frequented by [criminals], standing alone, is not a basis for 

concluding that [Davis] himself was engaged in criminal conduct." Brown 

vI Texas, 443 U IS. 4 7, 52 (1979). Similarly, the fact that Davis was 

approaching a "juice joint" does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion 

that criminal activity was afoot, especially since the record shows that the 

establishment also offered legitimate activities to its patrons. 

Davis' actions in exiting the car, making and then breaking eye 

contact with the officers, and then walking away from the officers also do 

not furnish the basis for a valid Terry stop. Looking at a police officer 

and then looking away does not provide the officer with "a particularized 

and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal 

activity," Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1661(internal quotation marks omitted). 

See. e.~., Santillanes, 848 F. 2d at 1105-08 (no reasonable suspicion when 

defendant, who had prior criminal record, spotted detective, veered away, 

and walked at an increased pace). Moreover, while an officer does not 

violate the Fourth Amendment simply by approaching an individual in a 

public place and asking him questions, the individual "need not answer 

any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions 

at all and may go on his way." Florida v, Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 

(1983) (plurality opinion) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., 

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concurring); liL.. at 34 (White, J., concurring)). Thus, Davis' refusal to 

stop when asked by the officer cannot justify his detention. ~Royer, 

460 U.S. at 498 ("[A person] may not be detained even momentarily 

without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and [the person's] 

refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those 

grounds. "). 1 

The fact that Davis had his hands in his coat pockets on a December 

night in Tulsa also does not justify an investigative detention. There was 

no evidence presented at the suppression hearing indicating that the 

officers possessed any particularized basis for suspecting that Davis was 

armed. Rather, Officer Yelton testified at the suppression hearing that 

his suspicion of Davis was based simply on his "perception" after ten 

1 There is some debate as to whether the officers' instruction to 

"stop" was an order which began the detention, or whether the officers' 

request was merely precatory. This issue would turn on whether the 

officers' telling Davis to stop "constituted a show of authority sufficient to 

make a reasonable person believe that he or she was not free to leave." 

United States v. Laboy, 979 F .2d 795, 798 (1Oth Cir. 1992). The district 

court did not address this issue, nor do we find it determinative of the 

question whether Davis' refusing to stop would provide the officers with 

reasonable suspicion. As stated in the text, if the officers' "request" was 

merely precatory, Davis' refusal to stop could not create reasonable 

suspicion for a Terry stop. Royer, 460 U.S. at 498. On the other hand, if 

the officers' request would have made a reasonable person feel that he or 

she was not free to leave, then the investigative detention began at exactly 

that point, and thus Davis' subsequent refusal to comply with the officers' 

order to stop could not furnish the basis for the earlier detention. 

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Appellate Case: 95-5156 Document: 01019277465 Date Filed: 09/03/1996 Page: 8 
years on the police force. Officer Yelton elaborated on what he meant by 

his "perception": 

Well, again, the training by the Tulsa Police Department and what we 

teach is that we look at individuals and you size them up, basically 

looking at them. And your perception is basically 90 percent what 

you feel. 

R.O.A., Vol. III at 41 (emphasis added). Officer Yelton acknowledged the 

lack of any particularized basis reasonably to suspect that Davis was in 

the process of committing a crime: 

Q. On that evening, you had no information to indicate that Mr. 

Davis was in possession of a firearm; is that correct? 

A. That's correct. 

Q. And you had no information indicating that he was about to 

distribute narcotics of any kind? 

A. No. 

Q. And you had no suspicion of any law violation? 

A. No. 

liL.. at 37-38. Absent a specific and articulable factual basis, an officer's 

"perception" is nothing more than "an inchoate and unparticularized 

suspicion or 'hunch,'" Melendez-Garcia, 28 F. 3d at 1051 (internal 

quotation marks omitted), which cannot furnish the basis for an 

involuntry detention. 

Finally, the fact that the officers were aware of Davis' criminal 

record does not justify the stop: Knowledge of a person's prior criminal 

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involvement is not, standing alone, sufficient to create reasonable 

suspicion. United States v. Sandoval, 29 F. 3d 537, 542 (1Oth Cir. 1994). 

Even if these factors standing alone would not justify a Terry stop, 

the government urges us to uphold the detention because it argues that 

these four factors, when taken together, created a reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity. lli United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1989) 

(reasonable suspicion depends on II the totality of circumstances--the 

whole picture II; even if any one factor alone is insufficient to justify a 

stop, taken together they may suffice). The district court agreed with this 

argument, concluding that Davis' evasive attitude (walking away from 

police, dropping eye contact and keeping his hands in his pockets) in the 

context of his criminal history and the high crime area gave rise to 

reasonable suspicion. We disagree. An investigative detention will be 

countenanced only if the officers have a specific, articulable and objective 

factual basis to believe that the person stopped is engaged in criminal 

activity. Even considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, 

the government fails to show any specific factual basis for suspecting that 

a particular crime was being committed by Davis at the time he was 

detained. The government argues that the officers reasonably suspected 

that Davis was unlawfully carrying a firearm. However, there is no 

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evidence whatsoever to support such a suspicion. There was no evidence 

that the officers spotted a suspicious bulge in Davis I coat pockets, that 

Davis appeared to be hiding anything in his pockets, that a tipster 

informed police that Davis was armed or carrying drugs, or that Davis 

made any threatening move towards the officers. Here, the factual 

findings of the district court indicate that when Davis was instructed by 

the officers to stop, "he continued walking in the same direction and same 

manner." (Emphasis added.) There was a similar lack of any evidence 

that Davis was in the process of engaging in an illegal drug or alcohol 

transaction. On the present record, therefore, we hold that the officers 

lacked the necessary "reasonable, articulable suspicion" to justify their 

detention of Davis. 

B. 

The district court also concluded that because Davis himself 

removed the gun from his pocket and threw it onto the back seat of the 

vehicle, the weapon was in "plain view" and thus the officers I seizure of 

the gun did not violate the Fourth Amendment. ill United States v. 

Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985) (upholding seizure of evidence in 

plain view of officers during a Terry stop). However, "[t]he first and 

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most fundamental prerequisite to reliance upon plain view as a basis for a 

warrantless seizure ... is that 'the initial intrusion which brings the 

police within plain view of such an article' is itself lawful." 3 Wayne R. 

LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 

7.5(a), at 575 (1996) (quoting Coolid2e v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 

465 (1971)). "The [plain view] doctrine serves to supplement the prior 

justification--whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, 

search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being 

present unconnected with a search directed against the accused." 

Coolid2e, 403 U.S. at 466. Here, Davis' act of removing the firearm 

from his coat and placing it in plain view was a direct result of his 

unlawful detention. Compare Hensley, 469 U.S. at 235 ("[The] police 

were entitled to seize evidence revealed in plain view in the course of the 

lawful stop .... ") (emphasis added). Because Davis' detention was 

unlawful, and because this illegality caused the evidence to be placed in 

plain view, the government cannot rely on the plain view doctrine to 

justify the seizure of the firearm. 

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III. 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is 

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

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