Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01509/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01509-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
JBLU, Inc.
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

JBLU, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1509

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:12-cv-00042-NT, Senior Judge Nicholas 

Tsoucalas.

______________________ 

Decided: March 2, 2016

______________________ 

 ELON ABRAM POLLACK, Stein Shostak Shostak Pollack 

& O’Hara, Los Angeles, CA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. 

Also represented by MANDY ANN EDWARDS, MATTHEW 

ROSS LEVITON. 

 ALEXANDER J. VANDERWEIDE, International Trade 

Field Office, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, New York, NY, 

argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, AMY M. RUBIN. 

______________________ 

Case: 15-1509 Document: 46-2 Page: 1 Filed: 03/02/2016
2 JBLU, INC. v. US

Before MOORE, TARANTO, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

JBLU, Inc. appeals from the United States Court of 

International Trade (“trial court”) decision on summary 

judgment that U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(“Customs”) correctly determined that JBLU violated 

section 304 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, by 

importing jeans that were not properly marked with their 

country of origin. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

JBLU is a California corporation registered to do 

business as C’est Toi Jeans USA. Between September 11 

and October 20, 2010, JBLU imported into the United 

States jeans manufactured in China, including over 

350,000 pairs in the eleven shipments at issue. The jeans 

were embroidered with “C’est Toi Jeans USA,” “CT Jeans 

USA,” or “C’est Toi Jeans Los Angeles” in various fonts on 

their backs, pocket linings, back waistbands, and hangtags. JBLU filed trademark applications with the United 

States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) for “C’est Toi 

Jeans USA” and “CT Jeans USA” on October 8, 2010. The 

applications indicated that the two marks had been used 

in commerce since 2005. JBLU did not file a trademark 

application for “C’est Toi Jeans Los Angeles.” It is unclear whether there was evidence of the use of that mark. 

The imported jeans also had labels on their front waistbands indicating they were “Made in China” in small font. 

The figure below depicts an example pair of the imported 

jeans. J.A. 39.

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JBLU, INC. v. US 3

When the shipments arrived, Customs inspected 

samples of the jeans and determined that JBLU violated 

section 304 of the Tariff Act because the jeans did not 

comport with the marking requirements of 19 C.F.R. 

§ 134.46. Section 304 of the Tariff Act, as amended, 

requires that imported articles be marked with their 

country of origin:

Except as hereinafter provided, every article of 

foreign origin (or its container . . . ) imported into 

the United States shall be marked in a conspicuous place as legibly, indelibly, and permanently as 

the nature of the article (or container) will permit 

in such manner as to indicate to an ultimate purchaser in the United States the English name of 

the country of origin of the article.

19 U.S.C. § 1304(a). Section 304 further provides that the 

Secretary of the Treasury may by regulation, inter alia, 

“[d]etermine the character of words and phrases or abbreviations thereof which shall be acceptable . . . and prescribe any reasonable method of marking, . . . and a 

conspicuous place on the article (or container) where the 

marking shall appear.” Id. § 1304(a)(1).

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4 JBLU, INC. v. US

Customs promulgated regulations under this authority in 1968, including the two regulations at issue that 

were renumbered in 1972 as 19 C.F.R. §§ 134.46 and 

134.47. See Country of Origin Marking, 37 Fed. Reg. 2509 

(Feb. 2, 1972) (renumbering the regulations as §§ 134.46 

and 134.47); Country of Origin Marking, 33 Fed. Reg. 

17,627-02 (Nov. 26, 1968) (adopting the regulations); 

Country of Origin Marking, 33 Fed. Reg. 12,332-01

(Aug. 31, 1968) (proposing the regulations). Under 

§ 134.46, when words, letters, or names referring to a 

geographical location (e.g., “United States,” “American,” 

“U.S.A.”) appear on an imported article or its container, 

and the words, letters, or names “may mislead or deceive 

the ultimate purchaser as to the actual country of origin 

of the article,” the article must also be marked with its

country of origin in a manner that is legible and permanent; “in close proximity to [the location] words, letters or 

name”; and “in at least a comparable size.” 19 C.F.R. 

§ 134.46.

Section 134.47 provides more lenient requirements for 

instances where the location words, letters, or name are 

“part of a trademark or trade name.” 19 C.F.R. § 134.47. 

In such a case, the country of origin marking must be 

legible and permanent; “conspicuous[]”; and either “in 

close proximity [to the location words, letters, or name] or 

in some other conspicuous location.” Id.

Customs determined that because JBLU’s jeans were 

marked with “USA” and “Los Angeles,” they must also be 

marked with their country of origin pursuant to § 134.46. 

It determined that JBLU’s “Made in China” labels did not 

meet the requirements of § 134.46 because the country of 

origin markings were not in close proximity to and of at 

least the same size as “USA” and “Los Angeles.” Customs

thus issued Notices to Mark and/or Redeliver to JBLU. 

JBLU filed protests against the Notices, arguing that 

“C’est Toi Jeans USA,” “CT Jeans USA,” and “C’est Toi 

Jeans Los Angeles” were trademarks such that Customs 

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JBLU, INC. v. US 5

should have applied the more lenient requirements of 

§ 134.47. JBLU argued that its “Made in China” labels

met the requirements of § 134.47. 

Customs agreed that JBLU’s “Made in China” labels 

met the more lenient requirements of § 134.47 but determined that § 134.47 only applied to the jeans that were 

marked with “C’est Toi Jeans USA” or “CT Jeans USA” 

that were imported after JBLU filed its trademark applications for those marks (“the post-application jeans”). It 

accepted JBLU’s protest as to those jeans. Customs 

determined, however, that § 134.46 applied to the jeans 

that were marked with “C’est Toi Jeans USA” or “CT 

Jeans USA” and were imported before JBLU filed its 

trademark applications (“the pre-application jeans”), and 

to jeans that were marked with “C’est Toi Jeans Los 

Angeles” (“the no-application jeans”). It determined that 

JBLU’s “Made in China” labels did not meet the more 

stringent requirements of § 134.46. It thus denied 

JBLU’s protest as to the pre-application and noapplication jeans. 

JBLU filed suit against the government at the trial 

court, contesting the denial of its protest with regard to 

the pre-application and no-application jeans. The parties 

cross-moved for summary judgment on whether Customs 

correctly determined that JBLU violated section 304 by 

not properly marking those jeans. The trial court granted 

the government’s motion, denied JBLU’s motion, and 

dismissed the case. JBLU appeals. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Ct. Int’l 

Trade R. 56. We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment “for correctness as a matter of law, decidCase: 15-1509 Document: 46-2 Page: 5 Filed: 03/02/2016
6 JBLU, INC. v. US

ing de novo the proper interpretation of the governing 

statute and regulations as well as whether genuine issues 

of material fact exist.” Guess? Inc. v. United States, 944 

F.2d 855, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

If a regulation is clear on its face, no deference is given to the promulgating agency’s interpretation, and we 

interpret the regulation in accordance with its unambiguous meaning. Viraj Grp. v. United States, 476 F.3d 1349, 

1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Doing otherwise would allow the 

agency, “under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to 

create de facto a new regulation.” Christensen v. Harris 

County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000). The fact that a term is 

not defined by a regulation does not make it ambiguous 

and entitled to deference. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. 

United States, 125 F.3d 1463, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“It is 

well settled that the legislature’s failure to define commonly-used terms does not create ambiguity, because the 

words in a statute are deemed to have their ordinarily 

understood meaning.” (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted)). If a regulation is ambiguous, we give 

the promulgating agency’s interpretation substantial 

deference “as long as [it] is neither plainly erroneous nor 

inconsistent with the regulation.” Gose v. U.S. Postal 

Serv., 451 F.3d 831, 836 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

The trial court decided on summary judgment that 

Customs correctly determined that JBLU violated section 304 of the Tariff Act with regard to the preapplication and no-application jeans. It reasoned that 

“C’est Toi Jeans USA,” “CT Jeans USA,” and “C’est Toi 

Los Angeles” were not “trademarks” under § 134.47 and 

that the more stringent requirements of § 134.46 thus 

applied. The trial court determined that because § 134.47 

did not expressly define “trademark,” Customs’ interpretation was entitled to substantial deference unless it was 

plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. 

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JBLU, INC. v. US 7

The trial court determined that various decisions by 

Customs showed that Customs had consistently interpreted “trademark” in § 134.47 as limited to trademarks 

that were registered with the PTO and trademarks subject to a pending registration application. It determined 

that such an interpretation was not plainly erroneous or 

inconsistent with the regulation’s purpose of preventing 

the ultimate purchaser from being misled or deceived

when the name of a location other than the country of 

origin appears on imported merchandise. 

JBLU argues that the trial court erred because an 

agency’s interpretation of a regulation is entitled to 

deference only if the regulation is ambiguous. It argues 

that “trademark” in § 134.47 unambiguously includes 

federally registered and common law trademarks. We 

agree. 

The record includes a dictionary definition of “trademark” from the time § 134.47 was promulgated as “the 

name, symbol, figure, letter, word, or mark adopted and 

used by a manufacturer or merchant in order to designate 

his goods and to distinguish them from any others.” THE 

RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

1501 (1966). The dictionary definition of record is not 

limited to registered trademarks or trademarks with a 

pending application. Indeed, the definition notes that “[a] 

trademark is usually registered with a governmental 

agency,” showing that it does not have to be. Id.

The version of the Lanham Act in effect at the time

§ 134.47 was promulgated similarly defines “trademark” 

as “any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination 

thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant 

to identify his goods and distinguish them from those 

manufactured or sold by others.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1946). 

This definition is echoed in the Lanham Act’s current 

definition of “trademark” as “any word, name, symbol, or 

any combination thereof—(1) used by a person, or 

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8 JBLU, INC. v. US

(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in 

commerce and applies to register on the principal register 

established by this chapter, to identify and distinguish his 

or her goods.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). Neither definition 

is limited to registered trademarks or trademarks subject 

to a pending application.

These definitions are consistent with the fact that 

trademark rights stem from use, not registration. See, 

e.g., In re ECCS Inc., 94 F.3d 1578, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996); 

San Juan Prods., Inc. v. San Juan Pools of Kan., Inc., 849 

F.2d 468, 474 (10th Cir. 1988) (“Nor is a trademark created by registration. . . . The Lanham Act protects unregistered marks as does the common law.”). See also

McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition

§ 19:1.75 (4th ed. 2014) (“U.S. trademark law is seen as 

recognizing an intellectual property created and acquired 

by use. Government registration in the U.S. is essentially 

recognition of a right already acquired by 

use. . . . [R]egistration in the U.S. does not create the 

trademark.”).

The government offers no competing dictionary or 

statutory definition of “trademark.” Cf. Viraj, 476 F.3d at 

1355 (finding that the term at issue was ambiguous 

based, in part, on the parties’ presentation of competing 

dictionary definitions). See also Oral Argument at 19:45–

20:04, available at

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20

15-1509.mp3. In fact, the government acknowledges 

“[t]here is no denying that the Lanham Act or a dictionary 

definition of the term ‘trademark’ provides for a broader 

array of marks than those for which recognition by the 

[PTO] has been formally requested.” Government Br. 11; 

see also Oral Argument at 17:35–18:45. The government 

instead argues that the use of the word “trademark” in 

the intellectual property context does not inform its 

meaning in the context of § 134.47. We are not persuaded.

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JBLU, INC. v. US 9

The word “trademark” in § 134.47 unambiguously includes trademarks without a pending application. This is 

consistent with the dictionary definition of record and the 

Lanham Act definitions from 1946 and today. We do not 

see a distinction between the clear meaning of the term in 

dictionaries and in the intellectual property context and 

the use of the term in § 134.47. There is nothing in the 

record indicating that the plain meaning of “trademark” is 

limited to registered trademarks and trademarks with 

pending applications. Nor is there anything in the record 

calling into question the unambiguousness of the term 

“trademark.” 

Like the dictionary definition, regulations in the same 

chapter as § 134.47 and regulations in a different chapter 

but the same title as § 134.47 use the word “trademark” to 

include registered and unregistered trademarks. See, e.g., 

19 C.F.R. §§ 133.11, 133.22, 148.55, 210.12.1 When 

determining the plain meaning of a regulation, a court 

may look to the language of related regulations. Roberto 

v. Dep’t of Navy, 440 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 

(citing Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1577–78 

(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). The regulations here show 

that when Customs intended to limit a regulation to 

“registered trademarks,” it expressly did so. Customs did 

not so limit “trademark” in § 134.47. We hold that the 

term “trademark” in § 134.47 is clear on its face. The trial 

court erred in deferring to Customs’ interpretation because “trademark” in § 134.47 unambiguously includes 

unregistered trademarks that are not subject to a pending 

application. 

Customs determined that the “Made in China” labels 

on JBLU’s jeans satisfied the requirements of § 134.47. 

 

1 The Tariff Act itself also distinguishes between 

“trademarks” and “registered trademarks.” See, e.g., 19 

U.S.C. §§ 1337, 1526, 1681a.

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10 JBLU, INC. v. US

We thus reverse the trial court’s decision on summary 

judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

COSTS

Costs to JBLU.

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