Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03061/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03061-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of the Army
Respondent
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent
Dwight Wimper
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DWIGHT WIMPER,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3061

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DC-0752-14-0617-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: December 2, 2015

______________________ 

 KELLY LYNN BURCHELL, BGM Law PLLC, Washington, DC, for petitioner.

 STEPHEN FUNG, Office of the General Counsel, Merit 

Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G. POLISUK. 

______________________ 

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2 WIMPER v. MSPB

Before O’MALLEY, TARANTO, Circuit Judges, and STARK,

District Judge.*

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge.

Dwight Wimper (“Wimper”) seeks review of the Merit 

Systems Protection Board (“the Board”) decision dismissing his appeal for lack of jurisdiction without a hearing. 

Wimper v. Dep’t of the Army, No. DC-0752-14-0617-I-1, 

2014 MSPB LEXIS 7383 (M.S.P.B. Oct. 20, 2014). Specifically, the Board found that Wimper failed to nonfrivolously allege that his resignation was involuntary. For 

the reasons explained below, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Wimper was employed as a Human Resource Specialist with the Department of the Army (“the agency”) from 

February 22, 2005, until his resignation in April 2014. As 

a condition of his employment, Wimper was required to 

maintain a top-secret security clearance and pass random 

drug tests. 

On August 14, 2013, the agency randomly selected 

Wimper for a drug test. Pursuant to its regulations, the 

agency conducted urinalysis to test for drug use, using a 

split-specimen collection procedure, meaning one portion 

of the specimen was tested while the other was reserved 

for follow-up testing, if needed. On August 29, 2013, the 

medical review office reported that Wimper’s urine sample tested positive for cocaine. Given the initial positive 

result, the agency sent the second portion of the splitsample to an approved third-party laboratory for verification of the initial result. That test confirmed the positive 

result for cocaine.

* The Honorable Leonard P. Stark, Chief District 

Judge, United States District Court for the District of 

Delaware, sitting by designation.

 

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WIMPER v. MSPB 3

 On October 23, 2013, Wimper reported for a second 

drug test, which came back negative for cocaine. In 

December 2013, Wimper took a separate, independent 

drug test which tested his body hair instead of urine. 

That test showed that Wimper tested negative for cocaine 

for a time frame of “approximately 12 month[s].” Joint 

Appendix (“JA”) 10. 

By memorandum dated December 11, 2013, the agency issued a Notice of Proposed Removal for “unauthorized 

use of a controlled substance and failure to maintain a 

condition of employment.” JA 5. Wimper submitted a 

written response, through counsel, denying drug use and 

requesting “a full complete copy of all drug test materials 

from all laboratories and names and designations of all 

personnel who had [his] sample in their custody.” JA 12. 

Wimper also requested that he have access to the initial 

urine sample to conduct a DNA analysis. Wimper submitted a separate document requesting that the agency 

conduct a DNA test of his urine specimen and asking the 

agency to provide chain of custody documentation. 

On January 14, 2014, the deciding official—Colonel 

Twanda Young—completed a “Douglas Factor Checklist,” 

which included findings of fact and an assessment of the 

appropriate penalty. Therein, Colonel Young found that, 

based on the evidence of record and Wimper’s response, 

Wimper was guilty of drug use. She explained that 

Wimper’s “Body Hair Analysis” drug test was not credible, 

because it “is unknown if the 12 month span report included the period found positive.” JA 16. Based on her 

findings, and her analysis of the Douglas factors, Colonel 

Young decided to sustain the proposed removal. 

Colonel Young subsequently responded to Wimper’s 

request for additional information and explained how 

Wimper could have his August 14, 2013 urine sample 

retested at his expense at an approved laboratory. She 

explained that Wimper’s October 23, 2013 test was not a 

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4 WIMPER v. MSPB

“retest”—but rather a separate test—particularly given 

that cocaine generally “only persist[s] in urine at detectable concentrations for a period of 2-4 days.” JA 25-26. 

Colonel Young further indicated that, because urine was 

the “only approved specimen matrix to be collected in the 

drug testing program[,]” she was authorized to render a 

decision based solely on the results of Wimper’s urinalysis. JA 25. After additional correspondence between 

Wimper and Colonel Young, the agency issued its Notice 

of Decision to Remove Wimper from the federal service on 

April 8, 2014. The Notice informed Wimper that he had 

the right to appeal his removal to the Board and explained how to file that appeal. 

In a response to the agency’s Notice of Decision to 

Remove dated April 15, 2014, Wimper alleged that, while 

at the agency on April 8, 2014 for the sole purpose of 

entering sick time into the attendance system, Colonel 

Young tried to make him sign a document without consulting his lawyer and embarrassed and humiliated him 

when he declined to do so.1 Wimper asserted that this 

“despicable” behavior by Colonel Young was in retaliation 

for an earlier-filed equal employment opportunity (“EEO”) 

complaint and was, thus, retaliatory. JA 63. 

By letter dated April 14, 2014, Wimper resigned from 

his position, effective April 17, 2014. In that letter, 

Wimper did not provide any information regarding his 

reason for resigning. Nor did he assert that his resignation was involuntary. Accordingly, the agency processed 

his resignation with an adjusted effective date of April 17, 

2014.

Wimper timely appealed to the Board, arguing that he 

was forced to resign from his position to “keep from being 

1 It is unclear from the record when this response 

was delivered to the agency. 

 

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WIMPER v. MSPB 5

fired due to allegations that are not true.” Wimper, 2014 

MSPB LEXIS 7383, at *3. Wimper submitted a number 

of documents with his appeal, including correspondence 

regarding the removal decision and a copy of an EEO

complaint. Id. 

On May 14, 2014, the agency moved to dismiss 

Wimper’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that 

Wimper “does not and cannot refute that he voluntarily 

resigned effective April 17, 2014.” JA 75. The administrative judge (“AJ”) ordered Wimper to respond to the 

agency’s motion and directed him to “file a response to 

include nonfrivolous allegations of fact to support a finding that his resignation was somehow coerced or involuntary.” Wimper, 2014 MSPB LEXIS 7383, at *4. Wimper 

timely responded, citing cases explaining involuntary 

resignations, constructive removals, and coercion. 

Wimper asserted that, based on this authority, it was 

clear that his resignation was involuntary because he had 

already been informed he was being terminated. Wimper 

then concluded that he “made nonfrivolous allegations 

that, if proven, entitle him to a jurisdictional hearing.” 

JA 90. Notably, Wimper did not allege that his unpleasant encounter with Colonel Young on April 8, 2014 caused 

his resignation. 

On October 20, 2014, the AJ issued an initial decision 

dismissing Wimper’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Given 

the “unrefuted facts,” the AJ found Wimper’s resignation 

voluntary. Wimper, 2014 MSPB LEXIS 7383, at *8. 

Because Wimper “failed to nonfrivolously allege facts to 

support a finding that his resignation was coerced and/or 

otherwise involuntary,” the AJ dismissed his appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction without a hearing. Id. at *10.

The AJ’s initial decision became the final decision of 

the Board on November 24, 2014, when Wimper did not 

file a petition for review by the full Board. Wimper timely 

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6 WIMPER v. MSPB

appealed to this court, and we have jurisdiction pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

The scope of our review in an appeal from a decision 

of the Board is limited. We must affirm the Board’s 

decision unless it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; 

(2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or 

regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by 

substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); Fields v. Dep’t 

of Justice, 452 F.3d 1297, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Whether 

the Board has jurisdiction to adjudicate an appeal is a 

question of law, which we review de novo. Parrott v. 

Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 519 F.3d 1328, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 

We review findings of fact underlying the Board’s jurisdictional decision for substantial evidence. Id. 

The Board’s jurisdiction is not plenary, but is limited 

to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction 

by law, rule, or regulation. Johnston v. Merit Sys. Prot. 

Bd., 518 F.3d 905, 909 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Resignations are 

presumed voluntary, and an employee who voluntarily 

resigns has no right to appeal to the Board. Garcia v. 

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 437 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 

2006) (en banc). The Board has jurisdiction where the 

employee proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

his resignation was involuntary and thus “tantamount to 

forced removal.” Shoaf v. Dep’t of Agric., 260 F.3d 1336, 

1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We have recognized that “an 

involuntary resignation constitutes a constructive removal that is appealable to the [Board].” Id. 

We have also recognized that, in constructive removal 

cases, the Board’s “jurisdiction and the merits of an 

alleged involuntary separation are ‘inextricably intertwined.’” Id. (quoting Schultz v. United States Navy, 810 

F.2d 1133, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). “If it is established that 

a resignation . . . is involuntary, the [Board] not only has 

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WIMPER v. MSPB 7

jurisdiction, ‘but also the employee wins on the merits and 

is entitled to reinstatement.’” Id. (quoting Schultz, 810 

F.2d at 1136)). 

Employees typically seek to show that their resignations were involuntary on grounds that the agency: “proposed or threatened an adverse action against the 

employee,” “misinformed or deceived the employee,” or 

coerced the employee to retire by creating intolerable 

working conditions. Id. (internal citations omitted). To 

establish involuntariness on the basis of coercion, an 

employee must show that: “(1) the agency effectively 

imposed the terms of the employee’s resignation or retirement; (2) the employee had no realistic alternative but 

to resign or retire; and (3) the employee’s resignation or 

retirement was the result of improper acts by the agency.” 

Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1329 (quoting Shoaf, 260 F.3d at 

1341); see also Fruhauf Sw. Garment Co. v. United States, 

111 F. Supp. 945, 951 (Ct. Cl. 1953). The test for involuntariness is “an objective one” that “considers the totality of 

the circumstances.” Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1329 (internal 

citations omitted). In applying this test, we have stated 

that coercive involuntariness:

does not apply to a case in which an employee decides to resign or retire because he does not want 

to accept a new assignment, a transfer, or other 

measures that the agency is authorized to adopt, 

even if those measures make continuation in the 

job so unpleasant for the employee that he feels 

that he has no realistic option but to leave. As 

this court has explained, the fact that an employee is faced with an unpleasant situation or that 

his choice is limited to two unattractive options 

does not make the employee’s decision any less 

voluntary.

Id. (quoting Staats v. U.S. Postal Serv., 99 F.3d 1120, 

1124 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The Board will find an employee’s 

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8 WIMPER v. MSPB

resignation involuntary where the employee shows that 

he resigned to avoid an adverse action that the agency 

was not entitled to take. Terban v. Dep’t of Energy, 216 

F.3d 1021, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 2000). But where “an employee 

is faced merely with the unpleasant alternatives of resigning or being subject to removal for cause, such limited 

choices do not make the resulting resignation an involuntary act.” Schultz, 810 F.2d at 1136.2

When an employee makes a nonfrivolous allegation of 

Board jurisdiction, he is entitled to a hearing where he 

must prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1344; see also Kahn v. Dep’t of 

Justice, 528 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“If the 

employee successfully makes nonfrivolous allegations of 

jurisdiction, the Board then conducts a hearing on the 

merits.”). On appeal, Wimper argues that he made a 

sufficient showing that his resignation was involuntary 

and that this court should remand back to the AJ for an 

evidentiary hearing. Specifically, Wimper contends that 

the AJ failed to consider certain documents which showed 

that the agency: (1) engaged in improper conduct when it 

removed him without a reasonable basis; and

(2) “inappropriately used misinformation, deceit, and 

force throughout the administrative process.” Appellant’s 

Br. 10-11. According to Wimper, the agency left him with 

no choice but to resign. 

In response, the government argues that we should 

affirm the Board’s decision to dismiss Wimper’s appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction because he failed to make a nonfrivo2 While Wimper claims that this court has never 

addressed constructive discharge due to inevitable termination, we have stated that a resignation to avoid removal 

for cause is not involuntary. See Schultz, 810 F.2d at 

1136. The non-binding cases Wimper cites to the contrary 

do not alter that conclusion. 

 

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WIMPER v. MSPB 9

lous allegation that his resignation was involuntary. The 

government further argues that there is no factual or 

legal support to Wimper’s argument that his resignation 

was coerced. Finally, the government maintains that 

Wimper’s due process rights were not violated and his 

hostile work environment claims lack merit. For the 

reasons explained below, the government’s arguments are 

well-taken. 

A. The Reasonableness of the Agency’s Actions 

As the AJ indicated, “unless the appellant can demonstrate that the agency lacked ‘reasonable grounds for 

threatening to take the adverse action,’ the ‘resulting 

resignation cannot be considered . . . involuntary.’” 

Wimper, 2014 MSPB LEXIS 7383, at *6 (quoting Terban, 

216 F.3d at 1026). The AJ explained that Wimper “does 

not allege that his resignation was the product of intolerable working conditions, misinformation, misrepresentation, or deception, nor does he claim that the agency knew 

it would not prevail if the action was challenged or that it 

lacked reasonable grounds to support its decision to 

terminate his employment.” Id. at *9. Instead, Wimper’s 

allegations were simply that his resignation was involuntary because he was forced to resign “to keep from being 

fired.” Id. Because Wimper failed to nonfrivolously allege 

facts to support a finding that his resignation was coerced 

or otherwise involuntary, the AJ dismissed his appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction. 

Wimper argues that his resignation was based on the 

agency’s improper conduct in: (1) predetermining his guilt 

without addressing inconsistencies in the drug tests; 

(2) failing to consider exculpatory evidence; and 

(3) misleading him throughout the process. In particular, 

Wimper claims that he “raised the issues of the initial 

cutoff concentration level for cocaine in both the initial 

test and the split level test and the lack of evidence regarding the complete chain of custody for the August 14, 

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10 WIMPER v. MSPB

2013 drug test.” Appellant’s Br. 23-24. Wimper further 

alleges that the agency erred in refusing to consider his 

“Body Hair Analysis”—which indicated that he tested 

negative for cocaine. Finally, Wimper alleges that, when 

he sought DNA testing of his August 14, 2013 urine 

sample, the agency responded that it would render its 

decision without reviewing those results. 

Wimper’s allegations are unsupported in the record, 

and, in any event, do not establish that he resigned involuntarily. As to the initial cutoff concentration level for 

cocaine, the government explains that the agency provided Wimper with information as to where he could obtain 

more specific, scientific detail about the nature of the 

testing. And, “the agency’s failure to provide the petitioner with the cutoff concentration levels for his drug tests in 

no way shows that the agency could not reasonably believe in the accuracy of the drug test.” Respondent’s Br. 

20. Although Wimper alleges that the agency refused to 

consider his body hair drug test, the record reveals that 

Colonel Young did review that test, but “did not find the 

results creditable.” JA 16. Accordingly, Colonel Young 

relied solely on the agency’s own urine test results, which 

was permitted under the agency’s regulations. See Army 

Reg. 600-85 at ¶ 4-1 (2012) (“The Army’s drug testing 

policy is dependent on an aggressive and thorough urinalysis program . . . .”). 

Applying the Terban standard, the AJ correctly dismissed Wimper’s appeal because the record demonstrated 

that the agency had a reasonable basis to believe the 

removal would be sustained. 216 F.3d at 1026. Wimper 

violated the terms of his employment when he tested 

positive for cocaine during a random drug test administered pursuant to agency policy. Wimper, 2014 MSPB 

LEXIS 7383, at *1. The record reveals that the agency 

followed its procedures in obtaining the drug test results, 

including verification by a third-party laboratory. Accordingly, the record supports the AJ’s finding that Wimper 

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WIMPER v. MSPB 11

failed to show that the agency “lacked reasonable grounds 

to support its decision to terminate his employment.” Id. 

at *9.

Although Wimper argues that the AJ ignored certain 

documents in rendering his decision, the AJ recognized 

that Wimper “attached a number of other random documents relating to the agency’s removal action.” Wimper, 

2014 MSPB LEXIS 7383, at *3. After considering these 

submissions, the AJ found that Wimper “completely failed 

to respond with any allegations of fact to support a finding that his resignation was involuntary.” Id. at *8. In 

reaching this conclusion, the AJ noted that Wimper 

provided “a 15-page summary of the law relating to 

constructive removals and concluded, without any supporting allegations, that it ‘should be perfectly clear that 

[he] made nonfrivolous allegations that, if proven, entitle 

him to a jurisdictional hearing[].” Id. 

Based on the “unrefuted facts,” the AJ concluded that 

Wimper’s resignation was voluntary. Wimper, 2014 

MSPB LEXIS 7383, at *8. That the AJ did not mention 

all of the specific documents in reaching this conclusion 

does not mean that he did not consider them. See Charles 

G. Williams Constr., Inc. v. White, 326 F.3d 1376, 1380 

(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The Board’s failure to discuss the evidence upon which Williams relies does not mean that it 

did not consider it.”) This is especially true given that an 

administrative judge has broad discretion to decide the 

contents of his opinion, including what it should contain 

and in what detail. Lowder v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 504 

F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see Terban, 216 F.3d at 

1024 (recognizing that giving “little weight to” certain 

events is “well within the Board’s discretion”). And the 

fact that the AJ referred to the documents Wimper submitted as “random” indicates that he reviewed them, but 

found the documents were not relevant to demonstrating 

that Wimper’s resignation was involuntary. That decision 

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12 WIMPER v. MSPB

was within the AJ’s discretion, and we decline to disturb 

it on appeal. 

B. Deception 

Next, Wimper argues that the agency’s deceptive actions forced him to resign. We have recognized that a 

“resignation or retirement is involuntary if it is obtained 

by agency misinformation or deception.” Covington v. 

Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 750 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. 

Cir. 1984). In Covington, for example, the appellant was 

informed that his agency was being abolished, his position 

was therefore being abolished, and he had no right of 

assignment to another position. Id. at 939. It turned out 

that notice was incorrect, however, because certain employees had the right to compete for positions within the 

successor agency. Id. at 940. After receiving the notice, 

and relying on the incorrect information contained therein, the appellant elected to retire through a discontinued 

service retirement prior to the separation date dictated by

the reduction in force. Id. at 939. On appeal, we held 

that the appellant’s retirement was involuntary because 

the agency’s notice was “misleading and erroneous in 

material ways.” Id. at 942. We explained that, the “misleading information can be negligently or even innocently 

provided; if the employee materially relies on the misinformation to his detriment, his retirement is considered 

involuntary.” Id. 

Here, the record is devoid of any evidence that 

Wimper relied on any misrepresentation to his detriment. 

Wimper points to the following as evidence of deception: 

(1) the agency found him guilty and decided to remove 

him in January 2014, but he was not removed until April 

2014; (2) the agency led him to believe he could access his 

DNA sample for testing, but later denied him access; and 

(3) the agency required Wimper “to report to work to 

personally enter his sick leave, as a ruse to issue its 

removal decision.” Appellant’s Br. 25. None of these 

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WIMPER v. MSPB 13

allegations, even if true, provided incorrect information 

upon which Wimper relied or could have relied in deciding 

to resign. 

First, although Colonel Young did make an initial 

evaluation of the proposed removal in January 2014, she 

did not effectuate the removal at that time because she 

gave Wimper an opportunity to gather information and 

provide a supplemental response before issuing the removal in April 2014. Second, the record shows that 

Wimper requested access to his urine sample for DNA 

testing, and in March 2014, the agency gave him specific 

instructions as to how he could obtain the specimen for 

testing. There is no record evidence that the agency 

denied Wimper access. As to his claim of an elaborate 

ruse to issue the agency’s removal decision, there is no 

evidence that requiring Wimper to come to the office to 

enter his sick leave misled him into deciding to resign. 

Accordingly, Wimper failed to establish that the agency 

forced him to resign through deception or misinformation. 

C. Coercion 

As noted, to establish involuntariness on the basis of 

coercion, an employee must show that the agency “effectively imposed” the terms of the resignation, the employee 

had no realistic alternative but to resign, and the employee’s resignation “was the result of improper acts by the 

agency.” Staats, 99 F.3d at 1124. On appeal, Wimper 

argues that “the Agency effectively imposed the terms of 

[his] resignation through its unwillingness to address 

exculpatory evidence, acts of deception, and heavyhandiness [sic] when serving Appellant with his Notice of 

Removal.” Appellant’s Br. 26. According to Wimper, he 

had few, if any, options to contest his removal and that 

his “only option was resignation.” Id. Wimper also alleges that he was pushed to his breaking point by the agency’s “coercive actions on April 8, 2014,” which tricked him 

into “entering the building on false pretenses, and then 

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14 WIMPER v. MSPB

having him escorted out by police when he was medically 

unable to accept service of their removal.” Id. at 27-28. 

Shortly thereafter, Wimper “submitted his resignation in 

the face of his inevitable termination.” Id. at 28.

Each of Wimper’s claims lacks foundation in the record. First, there is no evidence that the agency imposed 

or suggested Wimper’s resignation. The mere fact that 

Wimper resigned to avoid his pending removal does not 

mean that his resignation was coerced. See Schultz, 810 

F.2d at 1136 (“[W]here an employee is faced merely with 

the unpleasant alternatives of resigning or being subject 

to removal for cause, such limited choices do not make the 

resulting resignation an involuntary act.”). Second, 

although Wimper claims he had no options to contest his 

removal, the agency gave him ample opportunity to do so. 

Wimper submitted a written response to the removal 

proposal as well as a supplemental response after he 

requested and obtained more information. And, although 

Wimper claims that he had no choice but to resign “to 

ensure a fair, impartial review of his disciplinary matter,” 

Appellant’s Br. 27, the agency informed Wimper that he 

had the right to appeal his removal to the Board. Accordingly, Wimper failed to show that his resignation was the 

product of coercion. 

D. Wimper’s Remaining Arguments 

Wimper also asserts that: (1) the agency violated his 

due process rights by denying him an opportunity to 

respond to its Douglas factor analysis; and (2) the agency 

created a hostile work environment, which forced him to 

resign. Neither argument has merit. 

As to the first issue, the “essential requirements of 

due process . . . are notice and an opportunity to respond.” 

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 

(1985). Here, Wimper was provided notice of the charges 

against him, and the agency gave him approximately four 

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WIMPER v. MSPB 15

es. During that time, the agency gave Wimper an opportunity to examine the evidence against him, and Colonel 

Young did not render her final decision until she reviewed 

and considered Wimper’s responses. Accordingly, there 

was no due process violation.

As to the second issue, there is no evidence that 

Wimper asserted a hostile work environment claim below. 

Indeed, the AJ specifically noted that Wimper “does not 

allege that his resignation was the product of intolerable 

working conditions.” Wimper, 2014 MSPB LEXIS 7383, 

at *9. In any event, Wimper’s hostile work environment 

claim “fails to recognize that a removal cannot create a 

hostile work environment that an employee feels forced to 

leave from, because it necessarily forces the employee 

from that environment.” Respondent’s Br. 11-12. 

CONCLUSION 

Wimper failed to establish, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that his resignation was involuntary. Because 

Wimper failed to raise a nonfrivolous allegation that, if 

proven, could establish the Board’s jurisdiction over his 

appeal, he was not entitled to a hearing before the Board. 

Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s decision that it lacked 

jurisdiction. 

AFFIRMED 

COSTS

No costs.

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