Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-05537/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-05537-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vance Edward Johnson
Petitioner
D. L. Runnels
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VANCE EDWARD JOHNSON,

Petitioner,

 v.

D. L. RUNNELS, Warden,

Respondent. ________________________________

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No. C 02-5537 CW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND

ADDRESSING PENDING MOTIONS

(Docket nos. 49, 52, 53)

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Vance Edward Johnson, a prisoner of the State of

California who is incarcerated at Folsom State Prison, filed this

pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. After denying Respondent's motion to dismiss the petition

as untimely, the Court ordered Respondent to show cause why the

petition should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer to

the petition and a memorandum of points and authorities and

exhibits in support thereof. Petitioner has filed a traverse to

the answer and exhibits in support thereof. The Court now

addresses the merits of the claims.

 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1999, Petitioner was tried and convicted in Santa Clara

County Superior Court. Under California's Three Strikes Law he was

sentenced on July 1, 1999, to a prison term of 150 years to life

for various counts of carjacking, second degree robbery, attempted

second degree robbery, being a felon in possession of a firearm,

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and enhancements for personal use of a firearm. The trial court

also imposed a restitution fine of $10,000. 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal of the conviction and

sentence and the State court of appeal affirmed the judgment in all

respects in a written opinion on September 14, 2000, except for the

trial court's imposition of the restitution fine, which was

vacated. Petitioner sought timely review of the appellate court's

decision affirming the judgment. The California Supreme Court

denied review on December 20, 2000. On December 20, 2001, 

Petitioner timely filed his first federal habeas corpus petition in

this Court, Johnson v. Runnels, C 01-4969 CW (PR). The petition

was dismissed without prejudice on March 4, 2002, for failure to

exhaust State remedies.

Petitioner then filed a State habeas corpus petition in the

California Supreme Court, which summarily denied the petition on

September 18, 2002, without citation or comment. On October 18,

2002, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial

of the habeas petition. On October 24, 2002, the clerk of the

California Supreme Court wrote to Petitioner explaining that the

denial of his habeas petition was final and no motion for

reconsideration would be entertained. 

The present petition was filed on November 21, 2002. 

Petitioner raises twenty-five claims for relief, all of which 

have been exhausted for the purpose of federal habeas corpus

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Originally, Petitioner raised twenty-six claims for relief, but he

has withdrawn voluntarily claim number seven.

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review.1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In its written opinion, the California Court of Appeal

summarized the factual background as follows:

On July 10, 1998, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Teresa

Cusick parked her 1988 Honda Accord in front of her house

in Mountain View. In the car with Cusick was her cousin,

Julie Lingenfelter, who was sitting in the front

passenger seat. As Cusick was removing the car keys from

the ignition, defendant approached the car from the

passenger side, leaned on the door, pointed a gun at

Cusick's face, and said: "Drop your purse, put your keys

in the ignition, and get out of the car." Although

defendant was wearing a black nylon mask, Cusick and

Lingenfelter were able to see "a good portion of his

face, his eyes, cheeks, and a little bit of the nose." 

Afraid that defendant would shoot her, Cusick put the

keys in the ignition and got out of the car. 

Lingenfelter also got out of the car. Defendant walked

around the rear of the car and got in the driver's seat.

After Cusick had walked a few feet away from the car, she

turned around and, addressing defendant, said: "Can I

just, please, have my purse?" Defendant replied he

needed the money. Cusick said: "I don't have any money

in my purse. Can I, please, have my purse?" Defendant

sarcastically responded: "No. Don't worry, I'll bring it

right back." Defendant then drove off with the lights

off. Inside Cusick's purse were her wallet with her

checkbook, driving license, Visa credit card, ATM card,

and some miscellaneous items.

Cusick and Lingenfelter identified defendant as the

carjacker both at the preliminary hearing and at trial. 

Cusick did not want to pick anyone at the photo lineup

because "in the photographs, it was really hard to tell,"

"the photographs just weren't lifelike," and Cusick, who

"couldn't say for sure that was the guy," did not "want

to convict an innocent person." Cusick explained that

what she was shown at the photo lineup were copies of

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photographs, "[a]nd a copy of a photograph is not as

lifelike as a photograph." Lingenfelter explained she

had a "really hard time" picking out one that looked like

defendant in the photo lineup because the people in the

lineup, unlike defendant during the carjacking, "were all

wearing glasses."

On July 27, 1998, Cusick's car was found abandoned in

Berkeley. Among the items retrieved from the car were a

can of pears and a black nylon mask that looked like the

mask worn by the carjacker during the carjacking. On the

label of the pear can was found a latent print from

defendant's left middle finger. A DNA analysis of the

cell material recovered from the black nylon mask

identified defendant as the donor. Cynthia Hall, who was

qualified as an expert in DNA analysis, testified that

the probability of finding the same pattern in

individuals selected at random from the ethnic group to

which defendant belonged, was "1 in 2 times 10 to the

11th" power.

On July 13, 1998, three days after the carjacking of

Cusick's car, defendant was arrested with Angela Grubbs

in another carjacked vehicle. When the police searched

defendant's pockets, they found Cusick's driver's license

and keys. The officers also found inside the console in

the front seat a 9mm Luger semiautomatic pistol. Cusick

and Lingenfelter identified the gun as "the gun that

[defendant] used that night." Defendant was wearing a

black baseball cap at the time of his arrest. Cusick

testified that at the time of the carjacking defendant

was wearing a black baseball cap.

People v. Johnson, B9841054, 2-3 (Sep. 14, 2000) (Opinion).

 STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court unless the State court's adjudication of the claims: 

"(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

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determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite

to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if

the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). "Under the 'unreasonable

application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. The

only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings of the Supreme Court as of the

time of the relevant State court decision. Id. at 412. 

In determining whether the State court's decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest

State court to address the merits of a petitioner's claim in a

reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2000). It also looks to any lower court decision examined or

adopted by the highest State court to address the merits. See

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Williams v. Rhoades, 354 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004) (because

State appellate court examined and adopted some of the trial

court's reasoning, the trial court's ruling is also relevant). 

Where the State court gives no reasoned explanation of its

decision on a petitioner's federal claim and there is no reasoned

lower court decision on the claim, a review of the record is the

only means of deciding whether the State court's decision was

objectively reasonable. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853

(9th Cir. 2003); Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir.

2002). When confronted with such a decision, a federal court

should conduct "an independent review of the record" to determine

whether the State court's decision was an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; accord

Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970 n.16 (9th Cir. 2004). 

If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted

only if the error had a "'substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Penry v. Johnson,

532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 638 (1993)).

DISCUSSION

I. WRONGFUL ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE

A. Background

Petitioner raises numerous claims based on the erroneous

admission of evidence at trial. In the first three claims he

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argues that the trial court erred when it qualified a prosecution

witness as an expert on DNA evidence and allowed her to testify

about the DNA evidence gathered in Petitioner's case. These claims

were raised on appeal and denied in a reasoned opinion by the

California Court of Appeal. The remainder of Petitioner's wrongful

admission of evidence claims address the trial court's admission of

certain physical evidence, of evidence of prior bad acts, and of

the victims' in-court identifications. These claims were not

raised on appeal and were presented only to the California Supreme

Court in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied

summarily without citation or comment. 

B. Applicable Federal Law

The erroneous admission of evidence is not grounds for federal

habeas relief unless a specific constitutional guarantee is

violated or the error is of such magnitude that the result is a

denial of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. 

See Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999); Colley v.

Summer, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.

839 (1986). Failure to comply with State rules of evidence is

neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for granting federal

habeas relief on due process grounds. See Henry, 197 F.3d at 1031;

Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). While

adherence to State evidentiary rules suggests that the trial was

conducted in a procedurally fair manner, it is certainly possible

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Before addressing the claims on the merits, the court of appeal

noted that at trial defense counsel had not objected to Hall's

qualification as an expert in DNA analysis or to the procedures she had

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to have a fair trial even when State standards are violated;

conversely, State procedural and evidentiary rules may countenance

processes that do not comport with fundamental fairness. See

Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919 (citing Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447,

1453 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984)).

In order to obtain habeas relief on the basis of an

evidentiary error, the petitioner must also show that the error was

prejudicial under Brecht v. Abrahamson: that the error had "'a

substantial and injurious effect' on the verdict." Dillard v. Roe,

244 F.3d 758, 767 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at

623).

C. Analysis

1. Qualification of Cynthia Hall as a DNA Expert

The Santa Clara County DNA unit prepared a DNA analysis of

samples of cell material that were taken from the black nylon mask

found inside Ms. Cusick's abandoned car. At trial the court

accepted Cynthia Hall, who analyzed the DNA, as an expert in DNA

analysis, and admitted her testimony regarding the method used to

analyze the DNA, and the results of the analysis. On appeal,

Petitioner did not challenge the admissibility of DNA evidence. 

Rather, he argued that Ms. Hall was unqualified and did not possess

the data needed to substantiate her assumptions.2 With respect to

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used in performing that analysis. The court wrote: "Defendant's failure

to object waived the objection. (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585,

622)." Opinion at 4. However, the court proceeded to address the

claims on the merits. Accordingly, this Court is not precluded from

considering the merits of the claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797, 801 (1991)(if the State court does not rely on a potential

procedural bar but instead considers the federal claim on the merits,

there is no procedural default, and the federal court may consider the

claim). 

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Ms. Hall's qualifications, the court wrote:

 [T]he trial court did not err, and did not abuse its

discretion, in qualifying Hall as an expert in DNA

analysis. Hall had been a criminalist for four years in

the DNA unit of the Santa Clara County crime laboratory,

where she received in-house training and attended

specialized training courses at the California

Criminalistics Institute in Sacramento. Hall also holds

a bachelor of science degree in biochemistry, which is a

requirement in performing DNA analysis, and had satisfied

the requirements for performing DNA analysis prescribed

by the Technical Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods. 

Most importantly, Hall had been qualified as an expert in

DNA analysis 25 times.

Based on these qualifications, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in qualifying Hall as a DNA analysis

expert. "'A person is qualified to testify as an expert

if he has special knowledge, skill, experience, training,

or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on

the subject to which his testimony relates.' [Citation.] 

The trial court is given considerable latitude in

determining the qualifications of an expert and its

ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless a manifest

abuse of discretion is shown. [Citations.]" (People v.

Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d [24,] 39 [(1976)].)

Opinion at 5. 

Here, Petitioner does not provide specific reasons why Ms.

Hall was not qualified as an expert. Rather, he maintains that

"the hearing on her expertise, experience and general knowledge, RT

303-04, was only perfunctory," and that "her lack of knowledge and

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the weakness of her statistical contentions were not explored." 

(Pet's Amended Supplemental Habeas Brief (Pet's Supp. Brief), Claim

2.) The latter reference is to the fact that Ms. Hall made a

mathematical error in calculating the likelihood that the DNA

profile in question would be found in an African-American in the

population, which, as discussed further below, actually was in

Petitioner's favor. 

A federal habeas court may grant the writ if it concludes that

the State court's adjudication of the claim "resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The State court's determination of the facts

is "dressed in a presumption of correctness," Taylor v. Maddox, 366

F.3d 992, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2004), which can be rebutted only by

clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Here, the State court's determination regarding Ms. Hall's

qualifications as an expert in DNA analysis was reasonable in light

of the evidence presented at trial. The fact that Ms. Hall made a

mathematical error (which accrued to Petitioner's benefit) is not

clear and convincing evidence which rebuts the presumption of

correctness of the court's factual findings. Moreover, Petitioner

had a full, fair and complete opportunity to challenge Ms. Hall's

qualifications at trial, even if counsel did not take advantage of

that opportunity. 

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The State court's determination that Ms. Hall was qualified as

an expert witness was not an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented at trial. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(2). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas

relief on this claim. 

2. Admission of DNA evidence

In his first and third claims for habeas relief, Petitioner

contends that the trial court erred in admitting the DNA evidence

because of insufficient evidence of its scientific reliability, in

violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Ms. Hall testified in general regarding the methodologies and

procedures used to gather and analyze DNA for comparative purposes

in criminal cases. She also testified about the specific

procedures used at the Santa Clara County DNA unit, and about the

steps she took when analyzing the DNA in Petitioner's case. Ms.

Hall concluded that the "nine allele profile" that had been found

both in Petitioner's DNA and on the cell sample taken from the

black nylon mask had a frequency of "one in two times ten to the

eleventh power (i.e., 200,000,000,000)," or "one in 200 million,"

in the African-American population.

On appeal, Petitioner argued that Ms. Hall had not shown that

the methods of DNA typing which she used met the requirements for

admissibility under California law. He also argued that the jury

should not have been allowed to rely on Ms. Hall's testimony

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because "[t]he finer points of DNA analysis . . . were not

mentioned." (Pet's Supp. Brief, Claim II.) Finally, he argued

that Ms. Hall's testimony was not reliable because she had erred in

her math regarding the frequency of the nine allele profile in the

population, in that two times ten to the eleventh power gives a

frequency of one in 200 billion, not one in 200 million. 

The Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner's claims, finding as

follows: 

As to the system and procedure used in analyzing the DNA

evidence in this case, Hall testified as follows: "[T]he

first step is to take either a blood sample, or an item

of evidence, and extract DNA from that item, which

consists of putting a small amount of sample in a tube

and adding different chemicals, which releases the DNA

from the cell. That's then separated, via a filter to

separate the DNA from the rest of the cellular material. 

[¶] At that point, the DNA sample is processed through

P.C.R. transaction. The process of amplification is to

take the small amount of DNA and basically just copy it

over and over again, basically like a zerox [sic]

machine, in order to obtain several copies of the small

portion of the DNA. This amplified, or copied DNA, is

then put through a process called electrophoresis, which

separates out different strands of DNA, based on its

size. And those different sizes of DNA can be assigned a

DNA type, which are the results which are produced in our

report."

Hall went on to explain the validation or quality control

that her DNA unit used to ensure that the procedure

employed was accurate, reliable, and conformed to the

scientific community's standards: "There's actually

several different criteria that have to be met. The

first is a validation of the procedure. And there's two

different types of validation; one is the developmental

validation, which is performed by the specific company

which produces the DNA type of kits; and the second

validation is an internal validation, which every lab is

required to perform before implementing the technology in

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case work. [¶] There are several different types of

samples that have to be tested. Adjudicated cases have

to be looked at, old proficiency samples have to be

looked at, specimens, different tissue types from the

same individual, repeated tests, both within a lab; for

example, more than one analyst types the same sample, to

ensure that they are obtaining the same results; it's

also looked at the accordance between labs. [¶] So a

sample is submitted to one lab, and also submitted to

another lab, to ensure that the same types are being

obtained for each. Each analyst, themselves, are

required to perform a series of proficiency tests, or

unknown samples. [¶] To ensure that analyst is able to

obtain the correct result, and is following the correct

procedure, our laboratory completed an internal

validation, along with the developmental validation done

by the company. So far as quality control procedures

within the procedure, itself, there are several different

control samples, or blanks, that are run with every case

sample. A contraction control, which consists of all the

agents used with DNA, without the DNA to make sure there

are no DNA within the reagents; two different

reamplification controls; one is a positive DNA

amplification control to make sure that DNA sample is

coming up with the correct DNA type; and a negative

amplification control to make sure that there is no DNA

type obtained, in the sample, in other reagents, or other

samples, or any other means."

Hall testified that in analyzing the samples in this case

and making her calculations, she followed the validation

and review procedures she had described. We are

persuaded that on this record Hall's qualifications and

the procedure of DNA analysis employed by her both met

the standard of admissibility for expert evidence. 

Consequently, the trial court did not err and did not

abuse its discretion in qualifying Hall as an expert

witness on DNA analysis and admitting into evidence her

testimony on the subject.

Defendant complains that, "[w]hen asked how frequently

the nine allele profile would be found for an AfricanAmerican in the population, Hall defined that as one in

two times ten to the eleventh power (i.e.,

200,000,000,000), which in her calculation was then

stated to be one in 200 million or one in 200 million

African-Americans."

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Hall erred in her math, because one in two times ten to

the eleventh power gives a frequency of one in 200

billion, not one in 200 million. However, the error

favored defendant's chances of having been misidentified,

and so was harmless. Hall did not err, and there is no

claim that she did, in stating that the chance that

someone other than defendant was the donor of the DNA

material on the black nylon mask was one in two times ten

to the eleventh power.

Opinion at 5-7. 

This Court need not decide whether the admission of Ms. Hall's

testimony was error under California law. See Dillard, 244 F.3d at

766. Even if it was, to obtain habeas relief Petitioner must show

that the admission of the DNA evidence "rendered the trial so

fundamentally unfair as to violate due process." Id. (citing

Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998)). Here, it

did not. The other evidence against Petitioner was abundant:

Petitioner's fingerprints were lifted from the can of pears found

in Ms. Cusick's car, Petitioner had Ms. Cusick's driver's license

and keys in his pockets when he was arrested, the gun found in the

car that Petitioner was driving when he was arrested was identified

by Ms. Cusick and Ms. Lingenfelter as the gun used in the

carjacking, Petitioner was wearing a black baseball cap at the time

of his arrest and Ms. Cusick testified that at the time of the

carjacking the perpetrator was wearing a black baseball cap, and

Ms. Cusick and Ms. Lingenfelter identified Petitioner as the

perpetrator at trial. Because no constitutional violation

occurred, the determination of the California Court of Appeal was

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not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. See id. at 767 (citing 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to

habeas relief on this claim.

3. Admission of Evidence of Uncharged Crimes

The prosecutor introduced evidence that two days after the

Mountain View carjacking Petitioner robbed Kady Cheung, an employee

at a restaurant in Berkeley, and carjacked a Ford Bronco from its

owner, Jose Torres, a few minutes later. The Mountain View car was

recovered in Berkeley about a block from the subsequent car theft. 

Petitioner and Ms. Grubbs were arrested in the Bronco the next day

in San Francisco. A gun identified by Ms. Cusick, Ms. Lingenfelter

and Ms. Cheung was found in the center console of the Bronco. No

charges were brought against Petitioner based on this evidence. 

Petitioner maintains that admission of the evidence of the

uncharged bad acts was unduly prejudicial and denied him the right

to a fair trial.

Permitting a jury to hear evidence of prior crimes or bad acts

may violate due process. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422,

438 n.6 (1983); Fritchie v. McCarthy, 664 F.2d 208, 212 n.1 (9th

Cir. 1981) (citing Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 561 (1967)). 

Again, however, a State court's procedural or evidentiary ruling is

not subject to federal habeas review unless the ruling violates

federal law, either by infringing upon a specific federal

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constitutional or statutory provision or by depriving the defendant

of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See

Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919-

20. 

The admission of other crimes evidence violates due process

where there are no permissible inferences the jury can draw from

the evidence, in other words, no inference other than one that the

defendant's conduct in the case at issue was in conformity with his

previous conduct. See McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th

Cir. 1993); Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. The relevance of the evidence

of other bad acts to motive or intent, the opportunity for the jury

to weigh the credibility of the witness's account of the other bad

acts, and the judge's use of cautionary jury instructions to limit

the jury's consideration of the other bad acts all are factors a

federal court may consider to determine whether a due process

violation occurred. See, e.g., Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d

1176, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1990) (admission of other bad act testimony

did not violate due process where trial court balanced probative

weight against prejudicial effect and gave jury cautionary

instruction), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 979 (1991); Gordon v. Duran,

895 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1990) (admission of uncharged crimes

did not violate due process where trial court gave limiting

instruction to jury, jury was able to weigh witness's credibility

and evidence was relevant to defendant's intent); Butcher v.

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Marquez, 758 F.2d 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1985) (admission of uncharged

offenses does not violate constitutional rights where jury had

opportunity to weigh credibility of complaining witness and judge

admonished jury to consider incident only as evidence of intent,

not as evidence of bad character). Accordingly, a federal court

cannot disturb on due process grounds a State court's decision to

admit evidence of prior crimes or bad acts unless the admission of

the evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the

trial fundamentally unfair. See Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355,

1357 (9th Cir. 1995); Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir.

1986).

At a pretrial in limine hearing, defense counsel moved to

exclude evidence of the uncharged bad acts. In response, the

prosecutor argued that the series of events beginning with the

robbery in Berkeley and ending with the taking of the Bronco by

force was highly probative of Petitioner's identity because it

would show that he was in possession of Ms. Cusick's car when he

dropped Ms. Grubbs off shortly before he committed the robbery, and

when he returned to pick her up shortly thereafter he was driving

the Bronco. 

With respect to the carjacking of the Bronco, the trial court

found that

the probative value of that information outweighs the

prejudicial affect [sic], because of the proximity and

time and place. And I think it explains some surrounding

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circumstances, and also corroborates Ms. Grubbs's

testimony, if it is true. [¶] So I am going to allow

it. But I don't think we need to go on at length about

it either, [Ms. Prosecutor]. You know, I don't expect

you to hammer it into the ground.

RT 41-2.

Then, turning to defense counsel, the court stated that if

requested she would give a limiting instruction to the jury at the

time the evidence came in. 

With respect to the evidence of the Berkeley restaurant

robbery, the court also found that its probative value outweighed

any prejudicial effect. In so doing, the court cautioned the

prosecutor that all that should come in was "just what happened. 

In other words, no great detail, except for the time, and the fact

that there was a robbery, and, you know, any identification." RT 

44-5. 

With respect to both uncharged acts, the court then summarized

that the purpose of admitting the evidence was to establish 

the identity of the person who did it, [more] than any

other factors. It establishes the defendant's need to,

if he, in fact, did this, to get out of there quickly,

and why he did. The need to take the car and why he

showed up in one car, rather than having had the other

car, et cetera, et cetera. 

Id. at 45. 

At trial Ms. Cheung and Mr. Torres testified. When

instructing the jury, the trial court expressly discussed the

limited purposes for which the testimony could be considered. RT

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510-12.

Thus, the trial court carefully weighed the probative value of

the evidence against its possible prejudicial impact, the jury was

able to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and the trial

court instructed the jury on the limited purposes for which the

evidence could be considered. Petitioner has not established the

existence of a due process violation, and the State court's

rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

Accordingly, this claim for habeas corpus relief is denied. 

4. Admission of Backpack, Fingerprints,

and Parking Citations

In claims thirteen through fifteen, Petitioner challenges the

trial court's admission into evidence of a backpack found in Ms.

Cusick's car, on which the name "Joshua Johnson" was written, of

fingerprint evidence lifted from the can of pears retrieved from

Ms. Cusick's car, and of computer copies of three parking citations

issued to Ms. Cusick's car in Berkeley. 

Petitioner argues that the backpack and the fingerprints

lifted from the can of pears should not have been admitted into

evidence because seventeen days passed from the time Ms. Cusick's

car was carjacked until it was recovered and delivered to the

police, and any evidence taken from the car therefore had been

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3 Quoting the California Court of Appeal's opinion, Respondent's

brief states that Ms. Cusick's car was reported abandoned by police and

towed on July 27, 1998. Resp.'s Br. 2. However, her car was actually

reported and towed on July 23, 1998, and recovered by Ms. Cusick on July

27, 1998. RT 168, 225. Counsel for the prosecution and the defense

stipulated that after Ms. Cusick was notified that her car had been

found and she went to retrieve it, neither she nor her father touched,

removed or added any item to the car or trunk, and only touched the

items necessary to operate and drive the car from Berkeley to Mountain

View.

4 California Evidence Code section 1500.5 was repealed and replaced

by section 1520 in 1998. At the time of Petitioner's trial, section

1520 provided, "The content of a writing may be proved by an otherwise

admissible original." Cal. Evid. Code § 1520.

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vulnerable to tampering during that period.3

 He also makes claims

of tampering by the police when they dusted the car and the items

therein for fingerprints, and removed the items from the car. 

(Pet.'s Trav., Ex. 10(B)-(C).) Petitioner provides no facts which

support his suspicions that this evidence was planted. His

speculation is not enough to substantiate his claim that the

evidence was unreliable and should not have been admitted. See

Walters, 45 F.3d at 1358 (mere suspicion and speculation cannot

support logical inferences). 

Petitioner challenges the reliability of the parking citations

admitted at trial because of discrepancies between those citations

and the citations which Petitioner had received during pretrial

discovery. Defense counsel objected to admission of the citations

at trial on the ground of "lack of authenticity" under California

Evidence Code section 1500.5 (Best Evidence Rule).4

 In response,

the prosecutor explained that the discrepancies had occurred due to

a computer error, and that all the copies presented in court were

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complete and accurate reflections of the tickets as originally

issued. The court allowed the citations into evidence. As with

the backpack and fingerprint evidence, Petitioner's claim that the

citation discrepancies indicated evidence-tampering is supported by

nothing more than speculation. 

Whether the backpack, fingerprint and citation evidence was

admitted properly under California law is not pertinent to this

Court's analysis. See Dillard, 244 F.3d at 766. A federal court

will interfere only if it appears that the admission of evidence

violated fundamental due process and the right to a fair trial. 

Henry, 197 F.3d at 1031. Here, other than speculation, Petitioner

provides no basis for questioning the integrity of the police

investigation and recovery of evidence, and he fails to demonstrate

that admission of the evidence rendered his trial fundamentally

unfair. The State court's denial of these claims for relief was

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, Petitioner is

denied habeas relief on claims thirteen, fourteen and fifteen. 

5. Witness identifications

Petitioner argues that the in-court identifications of him by

Ms. Cusick and Ms. Lingenfelter were impermissibly suggestive and

insufficiently reliable, in violation of due process. At trial,

both Ms. Cusick and Ms. Lingenfelter testified about their

difficulty seeing the face of the suspect at the time of the

carjacking because of the darkness and the fact that he was wearing

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Petitioner also argues improper identification by Mr. Torres, the

owner of the Bronco, but Mr. Torres failed to identify Petitioner at

trial, so there is no merit to this claim.

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a black nylon mask, but they also stated that they saw portions of

his face, that he had "dark" eyes, and that he was AfricanAmerican. When presented with a six-man photographic lineup

approximately a month after the carjacking, neither Ms. Cusick nor

Ms. Lingenfelter chose Petitioner as the suspect and instead

identified others. However, both identified Petitioner at the

preliminary hearing and at trial, where he was the only AfricanAmerican man. 

Petitioner also challenges his in-court identification by Ms.

Cheung, the victim of the Berkeley restaurant robbery.5

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after the robbery, police showed Ms. Cheung a single photograph of

a person other than Petitioner and she tentatively identified the

photograph as depicting the robber. A few days later, police

showed her a photographic lineup of several individuals and Ms.

Cheung identified Petitioner as the robber. Ms. Cheung did not

appear at the preliminary hearing and so did not identify

Petitioner at that time. On the day of her in-court appearance at

trial, she rode in the elevator with Petitioner, who was escorted

by two officers and in restraints. In court, Ms. Cheung made a

positive identification of Petitioner from the stand. On crossexamination defense counsel questioned Ms. Cheung regarding the

reliability of her identification of Petitioner. Ms. Cheung

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admitted that she had seen Petitioner in the elevator in

restraints, but testified that she had not based her in-court

identification of him on that encounter. RT 203-05. 

Due process protects against the admission of evidence derived

from suggestive pretrial identification procedures. Neil v.

Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196 (1972). Identification testimony is

inadmissible as a violation of due process only if (1) a pretrial

encounter is so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very

substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, and 

(2) the identification is not sufficiently reliable to outweigh the

corrupting effects of the suggestive procedure. See Van Pilon v.

Reed, 799 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). To prevail on habeas

review, a petitioner must show that the identification procedure

used in the case was "'so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to

irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due process

of law.'" Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 1995)

(quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967)).

At trial, Petitioner did not attack the identification

testimony of any witness as having resulted from a suggestive

pretrial identification procedure. Rather, defense counsel

examined the witnesses with respect to their opportunity to observe

and the conditions surrounding the events. At closing argument,

defense counsel generally discussed the problems inherent in

identifying someone under stressful circumstances, particularly

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when the identification is cross-racial. RT 557-60. He then

discussed each of the three eyewitnesses who had identified

Petitioner, and explored the discrepancies and difficulties with

their testimony. RT 560-63, 564-69. Counsel concluded that under

"close scrutiny" the identifications were "troublesome and,

basically, unreliable." RT 569. 

The State court's rejection of Petitioner's witness

identification claims was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor

was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented at trial. Accordingly these claims for

relief are denied.

II. WRONGFUL EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE

A. Background

Petitioner states that he normally wears eyeglasses, but the

carjacking and robbery suspect did not. Based on these facts, in

claims twenty-one and twenty-two Petitioner complains that he was

made to wear his eyeglasses for the photographic lineup but he was

not allowed to wear the eyeglasses or present evidence of his

prescription for eyeglasses at trial. Although his argument is not

easily deciphered, he appears to argue that jail officials allowed

him access to his eyeglasses so as to create a suggestive

photographic lineup, and then denied him access to them so as to

deny him a fair trial. 

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B. Applicable Federal Law

As discussed above, to prevail on habeas review, a petitioner

must show that the identification procedures used in the case were

"'so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken

identification that he was denied due process of law.'" Johnson,

63 F.3d at 929 (quoting Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301-02). In addition,

the exclusion of evidence does not violate the Due Process Clause

unless "it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the

traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as

fundamental." Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996). The

defendant must establish that his right to have the jury consider

the excluded evidence in the case was a "fundamental principle of

justice." See id.

C. Analysis

The Court finds no merit to Petitioner's claims. First, as

discussed above, Petitioner was not identified by either Ms. Cusick

or Ms. Lingenfelter from the photographic lineup. Thus, there can

be no prejudice attributed to the fact that he was wearing his

eyeglasses. Second, Petitioner provides no factual basis for the

proposition that the victims would not have been able to identify

him at trial if he had been wearing his glasses, nor does he cite

any legal precedent to the effect that the prosecution could not

have asked him to remove his eyeglasses in order for the victims to

attempt to identify him. The rejection of these claims by the

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State court was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, these

claims for habeas relief are denied. 

III. ADMISSION OF PRIOR TESTIMONY OF UNAVAILABLE WITNESS

A. Background

In claim ten, Petitioner claims that the trial court's

admission of the preliminary hearing testimony of Angela Grubbs

violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. Petitioner

argues that the prosecution failed to exercise due diligence in

attempting to locate Ms. Grubbs to testify at trial, and that the

trial court erred in finding her unavailable and allowing her

preliminary hearing testimony be read instead. 

In claim eleven, Petitioner urges that he was prejudiced by

the manner in which Ms. Grubbs's preliminary hearing testimony was

read to the jury. Petitioner claims that the Deputy District

Attorney who read Ms. Grubbs's testimony before the jury appeared

to be "a very all-american [sic], beautiful looking person, female

caucasian, professional, in a business suit, well groomed,

articulate Deputy D.A., who read these parts and turned and smiled

to the jury . . ." which projected an erroneous air of credibility

with respect to Ms. Grubbs. (Pet's Supp. Brief, Claim XI.) 

Petitioner also claims that providing a photograph of Ms. Grubbs

during jury deliberation, but not during the trial when her

testimony was read, was prejudicial.

B. Applicable Federal Law 

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The Confrontation Clause applies to all out-of-court

testimonial statements offered for the truth of the matter

asserted, i.e., "testimonial hearsay." Crawford v. Washington, 541

U.S. 36, 51 (2004). The Supreme Court has not articulated a

comprehensive definition of testimonial hearsay, but "[w]hatever

else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at

a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial;

and to police interrogations." Id. at 68. Out-of-court statements

by witnesses that are testimonial hearsay are barred under the

Confrontation Clause unless the witness is unavailable and the

defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 

Id. at 59. The government must prove that the witness is

unavailable. Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir.

1988). This requires that the prosecution make a good faith effort

to obtain the witness's presence. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719,

724-25 (1968).

C. Analysis

1. Witness unavailability

Ms. Grubbs testified at the preliminary hearing in March, 1999

and was subject to cross-examination by Petitioner. RT 399-425. 

The prosecution intended to call Ms. Grubbs at trial to testify

against Petitioner based on their arrest together in Berkeley on

July 13, 1998 and her preliminary hearing testimony. Upon being

contacted after the preliminary hearing, Ms. Grubbs was very

cooperative and stated she had no problem testifying at the jury

trial. RT 355. However, because Ms. Grubbs was a transient

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without a permanent address, the only way to locate her was through

her mother. Id. The prosecution claims there was no reason to

believe Ms. Grubbs would be unavailable because they had contacted

and successfully produced her for the preliminary hearing in the

same manner. RT 358.

A subpoena for Ms. Grubbs was issued on May 14, 1999. RT 343. 

Detective Tony Najarro attempted to locate her by calling the phone

number of the residence where Ms. Grubbs was picked up for the

preliminary hearing, but it was disconnected. RT 345, 347. 

Detective Najarro also called Ms. Grubbs's mother's house, but was

informed by another female resident that the mother was not at

home. RT 346. Over the next few days, Detective Najarro tried

calling the mother four or five more times, but she never returned

his calls. RT 346, 351. From May 18 to May 20, 1999, Detective

Najarro made several trips to Berkeley to visit Ms. Grubbs's

earlier apartment address and her mother's residence, but was

unable to locate Ms. Grubbs or her mother. RT 346.

On May 26, 1999, Detective Najarro called Officers Rego and

Broberg, of the Berkeley and San Francisco police departments

respectively, inquiring about Ms. Grubbs's whereabouts. RT 347-

348. He left a message with Officer Broberg who informed him that

he didn't think she would be in San Francisco, but if she was,

Detective Najarro should check the Tenderloin district. RT 348. 

Detective Najarro also ran State-wide and local checks through the

police system which determined that Ms. Grubbs was not in custody. 

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RT 348.

At trial, Petitioner's counsel argued that the prosecution's

attempts to locate Ms. Grubbs were insufficient to satisfy due

diligence because they failed to determine if she was on probation,

receiving welfare, or had minor children. RT 353. Petitioner also

raised the issue that, because the prosecution was aware of her

criminal record, drug abuse, and transient lifestyle, a few phone

calls and visits were inadequate. RT 356-57. The trial court

found that, under the circumstances surrounding this particular

witness, the People exercised due diligence in trying to procure

her. RT 359.

The issue of the due diligence of the prosecution's attempts

to procure a preliminary hearing witness for trial, in order to

determine the admissibility of his or her preliminary hearing

testimony, is a factual question to be determined according to the

circumstances of each case. See Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d

139, 142-43 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, the trial court's finding of

due diligence based on the specific facts and circumstances

surrounding Ms. Grubbs's lifestyle and the prosecution's good faith

reliance on previously successful means of serving and procuring

Ms. Grubbs was not unreasonable. Petitioner's argument that more

could have been done to locate her does not negate the fact that

the prosecution made a good faith effort to locate her, which is

all the Confrontation Clause requires. See Windham v. Merkle, 163

F.3d 1092, 1102 (9th Cir. 1998).

Moreover, Petitioner had an opportunity to cross-examine Ms.

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Grubbs at the preliminary hearing and effectively did so. Ms.

Grubbs's credibility based on her criminal history and drug abuse

was addressed by both sides, RT 399, 416-17, along with the

possibility of bias due to fear. RT 418, 421. Ms. Grubbs's

testimony at the preliminary hearing was given under circumstances

similar to a trial because she was under oath, Petitioner was

represented by counsel, the proceedings were conducted before the

court, and a judicial record of the hearings was produced. 

Thus, the State court's rejection of this claim was not based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the trial

record, and Petitioner's claim alleging wrongful admission of Ms.

Grubbs's preliminary hearing testimony is denied. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(2). 

2. Reading of Prior Testimony

Petitioner alleges that he was prejudiced by the manner in

which Ms. Grubbs's prior testimony was read to the jury, as well as

by the court’s failure to supply the jury with a photograph of Ms.

Grubbs until after her testimony was read. However, Petitioner

fails to cite any Supreme Court authority to support his claim. If

there is no Supreme Court precedent that controls on the legal

issue raised by a petitioner in State court, the State court's

decision cannot be contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly-established federal law. Stevenson v. Lewis, 384 F.3d

1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). Moreover, the court's decision to

permit the deputy district attorney to read the transcript had no

substantial or injurious effect on the jury's verdict because the

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jury was aware of Ms. Grubbs's prior convictions for theft

offenses, RT 399, was presented with a photograph of Ms. Grubbs, RT

570, and heard closing arguments that put her credibility in doubt. 

RT 570-75. Thus, the State court's rejection of this claim was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court precedent, and this claim for habeas relief is

denied. 

IV. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

A. Background

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor engaged in

constitutionally impermissible misconduct by failing to turn over

exculpatory evidence to the defense. First, he claims that the

prosecution failed to turn over a San Francisco booking sheet that

listed the items found by police on Petitioner's person when he was

arrested. Petitioner further claims that the loss of a portion of

his trial transcripts led to the suppression of Santa Clara booking

sheets that would have been favorable to his appeal. Finally, he

asserts that the prosecution failed to provide a photograph of a

person whom an eyewitness initially identified as the perpetrator. 

B. Applicable Federal Law

Prosecutorial misconduct is cognizable in federal habeas

corpus. The appropriate standard of review is the narrow one of

due process and not the broad exercise of supervisory power. See

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). The right to due

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process is violated when a prosecutor's misconduct renders a trial

"fundamentally unfair." See id.; Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,

219 (1982) ("the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of

alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not

the culpability of the prosecutor"). 

If a defendant so requests, the government has an obligation

to surrender favorable evidence that is "material either to guilt

or to punishment." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 

"[E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability

that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of

the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable

probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)

(plurality opinion); accord id. at 685 (White, J., concurring). 

If the defense does not request such information, the

prosecutor must nonetheless turn over any evidence that might

create a reasonable doubt that otherwise would not exist. See

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-13 (1976) (omission of

such evidence must be evaluated in the context of the whole case

and violation of due process occurs when a defendant is denied a

fair trial; thus, even minor violations may meet the reasonable

doubt requirement in a close case). However, where the government

discloses all the information necessary for the defense to discover

the alleged Brady material on its own, the government is not guilty

of suppressing evidence favorable to the defendant. See United

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States v. Bracy, 67 F.3d 1421, 1428-29 (9th Cir. 1995). The

government is likewise under no obligation to search for or turn

over exculpatory evidence not under its control or in its

possession. See United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 1028 (9th

Cir. 1998) (government does not "possess" or "control" exculpatory

information contained in federal public defender's files).

C. Analysis

1. Failure to disclose San Francisco

booking sheet

Petitioner's first claim of prosecutorial misconduct is that

the prosecutor failed to disclose the booking sheet from

Petitioner's arrest, which he alleges contained exculpatory

information. Officer Leonard Broberg testified that when he

arrested and searched Petitioner, he found a set of keys in

Petitioner's pocket that Ms. Cusick identified as the keys to her

stolen vehicle. RT 81; 130-32. However, the prosecution never

produced a booking sheet, which presumably would have listed the

items found on Petitioner by the arresting officer. Petitioner

claims, as defense counsel argued in closing, that the keys were

not actually found on Petitioner's person during his arrest. RT

584-85. Petitioner asserts that because production of the booking

sheet would have shown that the keys were not listed, it would have

proven this theory and tended to show he was not guilty.

Petitioner has not presented sufficient evidence to show that

the information in the booking sheet was exculpatory, nor that it

was material. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. He merely speculates

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that the booking sheet would not have listed the victim's keys. 

Moreover, even if the jury had concluded that Ms. Cusick's keys

were not found on Petitioner when he was arrested, it nevertheless

could have convicted him based on the eyewitness, DNA, and other

evidence implicating him. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show

that the booking sheet was exculpatory or material. The State

court's denial of this claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

Accordingly, this claim for habeas relief is denied.

2. Suppression of Santa Clara County

booking sheets due to the lost trial

transcripts

Petitioner asserts that the prosecution impermissibly

suppressed booking sheets from Santa Clara County that were

admitted during the testimony of Officer Ortiz. The transcript of

Officer Ortiz's testimony was lost by the court reporter. 

Petitioner argues that the loss of these transcripts was tantamount

to non-disclosure of the booking sheets and prejudicial to his

appeal.

Petitioner fails to show that the prosecutor engaged in any

misconduct. Petitioner concedes that the loss of the transcript

was caused by the court reporter, not the prosecution. Moreover,

the fact that the booking sheets were introduced by the prosecution

at trial negates an inference that the sheets were suppressed or

undisclosed. Accordingly, the State court's denial of this claim

was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

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established Supreme Court precedent, and this claim for habeas

relief is denied.

3. Failure to disclose the photograph

identified by Ms. Cheung

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by

suppressing a photograph, of someone other than Petitioner, that

eyewitness Kady Cheung tentatively identified as the perpetrator of

the robbery shortly after the robbery occurred. At the

photographic lineup several days later, Ms. Cheung identified

Petitioner. At trial, although defense counsel questioned Ms.

Cheung about her first identification, he did not introduce the

first photograph into evidence. RT 200-04. Petitioner argues that

the photograph constituted exculpatory evidence that was suppressed

by the prosecution.

Petitioner fails to prove a Brady violation on this claim. 

First, Petitioner has not provided any evidence that defense

counsel's failure to introduce the photograph resulted from its

non-disclosure by the prosecution. Further, because Ms. Cheung

testified that she had originally identified someone other than

Petitioner, the fact that the jury did not see the actual

photograph is immaterial. Accordingly, the State court's denial of

this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Supreme Court precedent, and this claim for

habeas relief is denied. 

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V. ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTIONS

A. Background

Petitioner raises three claims of instructional error. First,

he maintains that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury

on its responsibility to inform the court of potential instances of

juror misconduct. Next, he claims he was prejudiced by the court's

cautionary instruction to the jury not to consider the fact that

Petitioner had been seen in restraints. Finally, he objects to the

court's use of his name when instructing the jury on the offenses

charged in the information. 

B. Applicable Federal Law

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under

State law does not state a claim cognizable in federal habeas

corpus proceedings. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72

(1991). To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury

charge, a petitioner must show that the ailing instruction by

itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction

violates due process. See id. at 72; Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S.

141, 147 (1973); see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,

643 (1974) ("'[I]t must be established not merely that the

instruction is undesirable, erroneous or even "universally

condemned," but that it violated some [constitutional right].'"). 

The instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must

be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the

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trial record. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. In other words, the

court must evaluate jury instructions in the context of the overall

charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process. See

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) (citing Henderson

v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)).

C. Analysis

1. CALJIC No. 17.41.1

Petitioner's jury was instructed pursuant to CALJIC No.

17.41.1 as follows:

The integrity of a trial requires that jurors at all

times during their deliberations conduct themselves as

required by these instructions. Accordingly, should it

occur that any juror refuses to deliberate or expresses

any intention to disregard the law or to decide the case

based on penalty or punishment or any other improper

basis, it is the obligation of the other jurors to

immediately advise the court of the situation.

RT 603, 670.

On appeal, Petitioner complained that the instruction violated

various federal and State constitutional provisions by infringing

on the free speech rights of the jurors and undermining their

discretion to disagree and nullify. After a careful analysis of

relevant case law, the court concluded that both the federal and

State courts have rejected the principle that jurors are entitled

to information about possible punishments and must be instructed on

the right to jury nullification. Agreeing with this rationale, the

court addressed CALJIC No. 17.41.1:

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As to the portion of CALJIC No. 17.41.1 instructing the

jury that they should immediately advise the court of the

situation "should it occur that any juror refuses to

deliberate or expresses an intention to disregard the law

or to decide the case based on penalty or punishment, or

any other improper basis," that instruction no more than

instructs the jurors what their obligation is when any

juror engages in juror misconduct. Because jurors must

apply the law, as instructed by the court, it is

misconduct for a juror to refuse to obey the court's

instruction. Misconduct by a juror taints the integrity

of the judicial process, and should be prevented whenever

possible, and rectified when committed. Yet, because the

jurors deliberate by themselves, they alone would know

when jury misconduct is committed by one or more of them. 

It is thus essential that one or more of them report to

the court when one or more of them engage in jury

misconduct. Consequently, an instruction informing the

jurors of this duty and exhorting them to report any jury

misconduct so that the same may be corrected, and the

integrity of the judicial process preserved, is not only

proper, but necessary.

Defendant argues that CALJIC No. 17.41.1 compromises the

jury's privacy, inhibits jury deliberations, and "chills

speech in a forum where 'free and uninhibited discourse'

is most needed." The fear is unfounded. There is no

showing that the jury's privacy in this case was in fact

compromised, or their deliberations inhibited. Defendant

bears the burden of showing that the challenged

instruction in fact prejudiced him.

In any event, any claim of jury privacy must be balanced

against the need to protect the judicial process from

jury misconduct. We do not think the instruction in

question has disturbed that balance. Certainly,

defendant has made no attempt to show that the jury's

right to secrecy in this case outweighs the court's need

to be informed of any jury misconduct or of refusal by

any juror to follow the court's instructions. 

We conclude the trial court did not err in giving CALJIC

No. 17.41.1.

Opinion at 10-11.

In Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 543

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U.S. 1037 (2004), the Ninth Circuit rejected a State habeas

petitioner's constitutional challenge to CALJIC No. 17.41.1,

holding: "It is clear . . . that the California appellate court's

holding was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

clearly established Supreme Court precedent, because no Supreme

Court case establishes that an instruction such as CALCIC 17.41.1

violates an existing constitutional right." Id. at 955-56. Here,

as in Brewer, Petitioner "has pointed to no Supreme Court precedent

clearly establishing that CALJIC 17.41.1--either on its face or as

applied to the facts of his case–-violated his constitutional

rights." Id. at 957. As the Court of Appeal's rejection of

Petitioner's claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, this

claim for habeas corpus relief is denied. 

2. Cautionary instruction on

identification

As discussed above, Ms. Cheung identified Petitioner in court

as the man who robbed her at the Berkeley restaurant. She also had

selected him in a photographic lineup a few days after the

incident. On cross-examination Ms. Cheung admitted that she had

seen Petitioner in an elevator at the courthouse in the custody of

two officers and in restraints, but she testified that she did not

base her identification in court on that encounter. There was no

suggestion at trial that her sighting of Petitioner was other than

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accidental. 

In the instructions, the jury was admonished not to consider

the fact Petitioner may have been placed in restraints and not to

speculate about the reason for restraints. In determining the

issues the jury was told to "disregard this matter entirely." RT

504. Petitioner did not object to the instruction on appeal. The

instruction appears to have been a standard one, given in order to

prevent prejudice to Petitioner from any speculation by the jury as

to why he was in restraints. In claim twelve, however, Petitioner

appears to argue that the instruction also prevented the jury from

considering Ms. Cheung's observation of Petitioner in restraints

when assessing the credibility of her identification. 

Even if the jury instruction erroneously precluded the jury

from considering the fact that Ms. Cheung had seen Petitioner in

restraints, Petitioner has not shown that the instruction by itself

so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates

due process. Ms. Cheung identified Petitioner from a photographic

lineup a few days after the robbery and again in the courtroom. 

She was subjected to cross-examination at trial, and the jury was

able to assess her credibility as a witness. The record does not

support an inference that the jury's inability to consider that Ms.

Cheung saw Petitioner in restraints had any effect on the verdict. 

The State court's rejection of this claim was not contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

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Court precedent, nor was it an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented at trial. Accordingly,

this claim for habeas corpus relief is denied.

3. Use of Petitioner's name in jury

instruction

The offenses with which Petitioner was charged in the

information were read at the start of trial and again as part of

the final instructions. When reading the charges, the trial court

referred to Petitioner by name. During final instructions, the

jury was reminded that in count five Petitioner was charged with

possession of a firearm by a former felon, as follows:

Count five, that in the County of Santa Clara, State of

California, on or about July 10th, 1998, the said

defendant, Vance Edward Johnson, committed a felony, to

wit: a violation of California Penal Code section

12021(A)(1), possession of firearm by specified person,

in that the said defendant who having been convicted of a

felony, did own and have in his possession, and under his

custody and control, a firearm, to wit: handgun.

RT 519. 

The trial court later instructed on the elements of that

offense, stating that the fact that Petitioner was a former felon

had been established by stipulation:

Defendant is accused in count five of having violated

section 12021 subdivision (A)(1) of the Penal Code, a

crime.

Every person who having previously been convicted of a

felony, owns or has in his possession or under his

custody and control any pistol, revolver or other firearm

is guilty of a violation of section 12021 subdivision

(A)(1) of the Penal Code, a crime.

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In this case, the previous felony conviction has already

been established by stipulation so that no further proof

of that fact is required. You must accept as true the

existence of the previous felony conviction.

RT 523. In claim twenty-three, Petitioner appears to argue that

together the instructions were conflicting and prejudicial because

they allowed the jury to presume that he possessed a gun.

The Court finds no support in the record for Petitioner's

argument. First, to the extent Petitioner maintains that the use

of his name in the instructions was prejudicial, this claim is

without merit because the mention of his name was nothing more than

a verbatim reading of the charges the jury was to consider, and the

charges had been read previously to the jury at the start of trial.

Regarding Petitioner's argument that the instruction allowed the

jury to presume he had a gun, the jury was advised that Petitioner

had plead not guilty and that the prosecution had to prove the case

against him beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the instruction

indicated that his status as a former felon had been established

but did not assume that he did, in fact, possess the firearm. In

fact, defense counsel explicitly advised the jury that Petitioner's

admission to having a prior felony conviction was not an admission

that he ever possessed a firearm. RT 583-84. 

The Court must view the challenged instruction in the context

of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. See Estelle,

502 U.S. at 72. Having done so, this Court finds that the State

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court's denial of this claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent. Accordingly, this claim for habeas relief is denied. 

VI. SENTENCING ERRORS

A. Background

Petitioner raises two claims of sentencing error. First, he

claims that the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences

for each of the carjacking and robbery convictions violated

California's prohibition against double punishment. Second, he

argues that the trial court erred when it relied upon an invalid

prior conviction for purposes of California's Three Strikes Law. 

B. Applicable Federal Law

Criminal punishment must comply with due process. Gardner v.

Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). A federal court may vacate a

sentence if it is based on a conviction infected by constitutional

error, or exceeds the sentence allowable under State law. Walker

v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 476-477 (9th Cir. 1987). Generally, a

federal court may not review a State sentence that is within

statutory limits. Id. at 476. "Absent a showing of fundamental

unfairness," even a State court's "misapplication of its own

sentencing laws does not justify federal habeas relief." Christian

v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994). In evaluating a State

conviction, a federal court must defer to the State court's

interpretation of applicable State sentencing laws. Bueno v.

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Hallahan, 988 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir. 1993). 

C. Analysis

1. Imposition of Consecutive Sentences

Petitioner was convicted for the carjacking and robbery of Ms.

Cusick and the carjacking and attempted robbery of Ms.

Lingenfelter. The trial court imposed consecutive life terms for

each of these four offenses. On appeal, Petitioner argued that his

sentences for the robbery and the attempted robbery should not have

been consecutive to his sentences for the carjackings. He claimed

these sentences violated the prohibition against double punishment

in California Penal Code section 654, which provides:

An act or omission that is punishable in different ways

by different provisions of law shall be punished under

the provision that provides for the longest potential

term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or

omission be punished under more than one provision. An

acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one bars a

prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.

The Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner's claim, finding as

follows:

Here, the intent to carjack was clearly separate and

distinct from the intent to rob the victims of their

money. When defendant approached Cusick's vehicle in the

manner he did, he evidently had already formed his intent

to steal the vehicle. There is no evidence that

defendant already knew at that time that Cusick and

Lingenfelter had wallets in the car. Consequently, it

cannot be said that defendant's intent to carjack

included the intent to rob the victims of their wallets. 

Apparently, the intent to rob Cusick and Lingenfelter of

their wallets was formed only after defendant knew that

Cusick had a purse with her, and this was when defendant

leaned on the car's door, pointed a gun at Cusick's face,

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and told Cusick to "[d]rop your purse, put your keys in

the ignition, and get out of the car." This intent came

later, and thus was not one with the earlier intent to

steal the car, which caused defendant to approach the car

masked and armed. That the two intents were separate and

distinct is also shown by the fact that when Cusick asked

defendant for her purse, defendant replied he needed the

money. Money did not appear to be the purpose of the

carjacking since after the carjacking, defendant just

abandoned the car in Berkeley. Indeed defendant has not

argued that the robberies were incidental to the

carjacking, or that the carjacking was incidental to the

robberies. 

We conclude the trial court did not err in imposing four

consecutive life terms.

Opinion at 12.

To the extent that Petitioner claims that the State courts

erred in their interpretation of the applicability of section 654

he raises an issue of State law which is not cognizable on federal

habeas corpus. See Watts v. Bonneville, 879 F.2d 685, 687 (9th

Cir. 1989) (alleged violation of section 654 fails to state a basis

for federal relief). To the extent he argues a violation of due

process based on the prohibition against punishing a defendant for

multiple offenses if the offenses stem from the same act, see id.,

Petitioner has not shown that the State appellate court's finding

of separate criminal acts was an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the trial record. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

The State court's rejection of Petitioner's consecutive

sentencing claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application

of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor was it based on

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an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the trial

record. Accordingly, this claim for habeas corpus relief is

denied.

2. Three Strikes Allegation

The jury found that Petitioner had suffered two prior serious

felony convictions, one which was from the State of Florida. This

finding resulted in sentencing under California's Three Strikes Law

and also resulted in an additional ten-year term. Petitioner

appears to argue that reliance on the Florida prior was error

because Florida court records show that the sentence was reduced. 

This claim states no ground for relief because it does not call

into question the existence or validity of the prior conviction. 

Moreover, even if Petitioner is somehow attempting to challenge the

prior conviction's validity, a federal habeas corpus petitioner

generally may not attack the constitutionality of a prior

conviction used to enhance a later sentence. Lackawanna County

Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 403-04 (2001). "[O]nce a

state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack

on its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those

remedies while they were available . . . the conviction may be

regarded as conclusively valid." Id. at 403. "If that conviction

is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant

generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence through a

petition under 2254 on the ground that the prior conviction was

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unconstitutionally obtained." Id. at 403-4. An exception to this

rule exists where there was a failure to appoint counsel in

violation of the Sixth Amendment. Id. Here, Petitioner makes no

such allegation. Therefore, Petitioner cannot collaterally

challenge the validity of his Florida conviction in this

proceeding. 

The State court's rejection of this claim was not contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court precedent. Accordingly, this claim for habeas relief is

denied.

VII. IMPAIRMENT OF THE TRIAL JUDGE

A. Background

After the first day of evidence the jury was ordered to return

at 1:30 the next afternoon. RT 173. Following a 3:30 p.m. break

on the second day the judge recessed for the rest of the day. In

doing so she stated on the record that she had had "a little

surgery" the day before and believed she would have no difficulty

returning. However, the judge discovered that she was hemorrhaging

and had to return to the doctor to "get this taken care of." She

expressed her intent to return at 9:00 a.m. the next day. RT 215. 

Court resumed as scheduled the following morning and there were no

further delays. Based on this record evidence, Petitioner asserts

that the judge was physically unfit and mentally impaired,

resulting in denial of a fair trial.

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B. Applicable Federal Law

Petitioner cites no case law in support of the proposition

that a judge's failure to step down from presiding over a trial

because of temporary physical impairment amounts to a violation of

due process. Moreover, with respect to the broader category of

judicial misconduct, a claim of judicial misconduct by a State

judge in the context of federal habeas review does not simply

require that the federal court determine whether the State judge

committed judicial misconduct; rather, the question is whether the

State judge's behavior "rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair

as to violate federal due process under the United States

Constitution." Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.

1995) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1158 (1996). A

State judge's conduct must be significantly adverse to a defendant

before it violates constitutional requirements of due process and

warrants federal intervention. See Garcia v. Warden, Dannemora

Correctional Facility, 795 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1986). 

C. Analysis

Petitioner has alleged no facts to substantiate a claim that

the trial judge's ailment had any effect whatsoever on the fairness

of his trial, let alone that it rendered the trial fundamentally

unfair. The State court's rejection of this claim was not contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court precedent. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas

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corpus relief on this claim.

VIII. INACCURATE RECORD ON APPEAL

A. Background

Petitioner claims that inaccuracies and omissions in his trial

transcript violated his due process rights and prejudiced his

appeal. Respondent concedes that the witness index is inaccurate,

and that both sides' opening statements and the testimony of

Officer Arturo Ortiz were not recorded. 

B. Applicable Federal Law

Although there is no due process requirement that States allow

direct appeals of criminal convictions, if State law does permit

such appeals, due process and equal protection require that

indigent criminal defendants be provided with free transcripts for

use in the appeal, or other effective means of obtaining adequate

appellate review. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227

(1971); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-20 (1956) (per

curium). However, a court need only provide an indigent defendant

with "a record of sufficient completeness" to prepare an appeal;

irrelevant or extraneous portions of the transcript may be omitted. 

Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1971). 

A State's failure to provide a full record of a trial may

violate a defendant's due process rights and form the basis for

federal habeas corpus relief. See Madera v. Risley, 885 F.2d 646,

648 (9th Cir. 1989). Two criteria are relevant to this

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determination: (1) the value of the transcript to the defendant in

connection with the appeal or trial for which it is sought; and 

(2) the availability of alternative devices that would fulfill the

same functions as a transcript. See id. (citing Britt, 404 U.S. at

227 & n.2). A habeas petitioner must also establish prejudice from

the lack of a transcript to be entitled to habeas corpus relief.

See id. at 649. 

C. Analysis

Petitioner argues that his appeal was prejudiced by the

inaccuracies and omissions in the trial transcripts. However, he

fails to show what, if any, prejudicial effect they had. The

witness index, although inaccurate, is something that appellate

counsel could easily verify and correct. Although the failure to

record opening statements can violate due process, Petitioner fails

to show how their omission from the record prejudiced his appeal. 

With respect to the testimony of Officer Ortiz, during closing

argument the prosecutor referred to the testimony and argued that

it established that Officer Ortiz booked Petitioner in Santa Clara

County and observed that keys to the car stolen in Mountain View

were in his possession, RT 549-550; defense counsel did not contest

Officer Ortiz's observation but implied that the keys had not been

in Petitioner's possession when he was originally arrested in San

Francisco, RT 582-83. Thus, there was some alternative in the

appellate record to a transcript of Officer Ortiz's actual

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testimony. In any event, Petitioner does not establish that the

missing transcript denied him a fair appeal. 

Petitioner has not made a sufficient showing that the

omissions and inaccuracies in the trial record were prejudicial to

his appeal. Accordingly, the State court's rejection of this claim

was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. This claim for habeas relief

is therefore denied. 

IX. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL

A. Background

Petitioner raises myriad claims of ineffective assistance of

trial counsel, many of which rely upon counsel's failure to act or

to address errors discussed previously in this Order. For the most

part, however, he attacks counsel's representation in general. 

B. Applicable Federal Law

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as

a claim of denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which

guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The

benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether

counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having

produced a just result. Id.

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of

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counsel claim a petitioner must establish two things. First, he

must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, that is,

that it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under

prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-88. Second, he must

establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient

performance, that is, that "there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome. Id. 

The Strickland framework for analyzing ineffective assistance

of counsel claims is "clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" for the

purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis. See Williams, 529 U.S.

at 404-08. 

C. Analysis

A court need not address the question of counsel's deficient

performance if it finds that the petitioner was not prejudiced

thereby. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. To the extent

Petitioner argues the ineffective assistance of counsel in

conjunction with other claims already denied by the Court in this

Order, his argument is without merit because the Court has found

that no error or prejudice accrued to Petitioner with respect to

those claims. Moreover, with respect to allegations of misconduct

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not addressed in conjunction with other claims in this Order, he

has not shown that as a result of any of counsel's actions there is

"a reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding

would have been different." Id. at 694. 

The State court's rejection of Petitioner's ineffective

assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of Strickland. Accordingly, this claim for relief is

denied. 

X. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL

A. Background

Petitioner alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to obtain a complete and adequate record on appeal, failing

to file a State habeas corpus petition in conjunction with the

appeal, failing to "raise any crucial issues and assignments of

error that arguably might have resulted in reversal," and failing

to provide Petitioner with a copy of the California Supreme Court's

denial of the petition for review for purposes of Petitioner's

federal habeas corpus petition. 

B. Applicable Federal Law

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees

a criminal defendant the effective assistance of counsel on his

first appeal as of right. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-

405 (1985). Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

are reviewed according to the standard set out in Strickland. 

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Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989). Petitioner

therefore must show that counsel's performance fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, he would

have prevailed on appeal. Id. at 1434 & n.9 (citing Strickland,

466 U.S. at 688, 694).

Appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise

every non-frivolous issue requested by a defendant. See Jones v.

Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983); Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d

1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997); Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 n.10. The

weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the

hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy. See id. at 1434. 

Appellate counsel therefore frequently will remain above an

objective standard of competence and have caused his client no

prejudice for the same reason--because the issue he declined to

raise was weak. See id. 

C. Analysis

Petitioner has failed to show that appellate counsel's alleged

errors caused him prejudice. As discussed in this Order, the

incorrect and incomplete record on appeal did not prejudice

Petitioner. And his argument that appellate counsel failed to

raise crucial issues on appeal is devoid of any specificity. To

the extent he attempts to incorporate any of the issues addressed

in this Order, he is not entitled to relief for the reasons

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discussed. Finally, Petitioner's claim that appellate counsel

should have filed a State habeas corpus petition in conjunction

with his appeal does not present a claim for federal relief. See

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755-57 (1991) (no federal

constitutional right to counsel on State collateral review); accord

Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d. 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1996).

For these reasons, the State court's rejection of Petitioner's

claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, this claim for

habeas relief is denied. 

XI. PENDING MOTIONS

Petitioner has filed a motion for the appointment of counsel

(docket no. 52), a motion to engage in discovery (docket no. 49),

and a motion asking the Court to direct the United States Marshal

to serve third-party subpoenas duces tecum (docket no. 53). The

Court has reviewed the motions and finds no bases for exercising

its discretion to appoint counsel, see 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B)

(authorizing the district court to appoint counsel to represent a

habeas petitioner whenever "the court determines that the interests

of justice so require"), or to allow Petitioner to engage in

discovery and issue third-party subpoenas duces tecum, see Rule

6(a) of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C.

foll. § 2254 ("a party shall be entitled to invoke the processes of

discovery available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if,

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and to the extent that, the judge in the exercise of his discretion

and for good cause shown grants leave to do so, but not

otherwise."). Accordingly, these motions are denied. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus is DENIED, and all pending motions are DENIED (docket nos.

49, 52, 53). The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and close

the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 3/29/06

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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