Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01221/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01221-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Siamak S. Fard
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-1221

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SIAMAK S. FARD,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:09-cr-00247-1 — John F. Grady, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 2, 2014 — DECIDED JANUARY 7, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and WILLIAMS and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Siamak S. Fard pled guilty to one 

count of wire fraud pursuant to a blind plea. He later sought 

to withdraw his plea, alleging that it was not knowingly and 

voluntarily entered. The district judge conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Fard’s plea was based 

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2 No. 14-1221

upon a representation by Fard’s original defense counsel

that the government had promised to dismiss the indictment 

if Fard pled guilty and cooperated. At the hearing, counsel

denied having made such a statement. Rejecting Fard’s testimony, the district judge credited counsel’s testimony and 

denied Fard’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. At sentencing, the judge increased Fard’s guideline sentence, finding that he had obstructed justice by lying at the evidentiary 

hearing. He also denied Fard’s motion for an acceptance of 

responsibility reduction, because Fard falsely denied his 

leadership role in the scheme. Now, Fard seeks to withdraw 

his guilty plea and challenges certain aspects of his sentence. 

We find that Fard’s guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary, vacate his plea, and remand the case. Because we vacate Fard’s plea, we will not address the arguments regarding his sentence. 

I. BACKGROUND

On March 17, 2009, a federal grand jury in the Northern 

District of Illinois returned a three-count indictment charging Fard and two co-defendants with wire fraud in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Fard entered a plea of not guilty, and the 

government filed a superseding indictment on May 19, 2009, 

charging two additional co-defendants and three additional 

counts of wire fraud. In total, Fard was charged in four of 

the counts and again entered a plea of not guilty. A second 

superseding indictment was filed on May 25, 2010, after the 

district court granted a co-defendant’s motion to dismiss for 

vagueness, but the new counts did not pertain to Fard.

The indictments were based upon an alleged mortgage 

fraud scheme where the defendants obtained money and 

property from mortgage lenders by means of false represenCase: 14-1221 Document: 56 Filed: 01/07/2015 Pages: 17
No. 14-1221 3

tations. Fard and his co-defendants allegedly obtained nearly thirty loans in the names of nominees by submitting false 

and fraudulent documents to the lenders. The nominees 

would not have qualified for the loans if their applications 

had been truthful. They usually did not live in the houses 

which were purchased in their names and funds acquired by 

the defendants were at times used to pay for improvements 

on different properties from the ones for which they were 

disbursed. 

Over the course of two and a half years, the trial date was

continued several times. In April 2011, Fard’s original counsel filed a motion requesting that the district court appoint 

him to continue representing Fard under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, since Fard could no longer afford 

to pay him. The district court denied the motion, but we 

could find no record of why the motion was denied.

Trial was eventually set for October 18, 2011, but on October 17, defense counsel asked the court to continue the trial 

for sixty days, because both the defense and the government 

thought that Fard could provide significant cooperation and 

were hoping to reach an agreement. The judge refused to 

continue the trial beyond November 7, his next available 

date. After giving counsel that date, the judge called for a 

recess to allow the government, defense counsel, and Fard to 

confer. 

After the break, defense counsel stated, “We are going to 

change our plea to Count 3 with no agreement with the government at this time. We are entering, I guess we would call 

it a blind plea to Count 3 of the indictment, Judge.” The 

judge proceeded to read portions of the second superseding 

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indictment and primary allegations. Then the following exchange occurred:

Court: Do you follow me so far?

Fard: Yes, I do.

Court: And so far do you agree that you did all this?

Defense Counsel: Judge, he agrees that he participated in the scheme and he had knowledge of the 

scheme.

The judge pressed Fard about the extent of his

“knowledge” by questioning defense counsel, to which 

counsel responded, “[Fard] had knowledge of Nationwide 

submitting these, permitting and submitting these phony 

applications, and he knew it was going on, but he did nothing about it, he just participated in the scheme as it went 

along.” Nationwide was the lender Fard allegedly defrauded.

The judge then read from a draft, but unexecuted, plea 

agreement, which spelled out the way in which the defendants obtained mortgage loans in the names of nominees and 

used the money for other projects. Whenever Fard spoke, he 

resisted the allegations, at one point saying, “I mean, I did 

not plan any scheme. We just tried to build typical American 

dream to build and fix and sell and, you know, bring the 

dream true, and just got involved with the wrong people.”

Defense counsel repeatedly said that Fard “participated” 

and “had knowledge,” but that Fard did not want the court 

to think he was the planner. Another break was held after

Fard stated that the lender, Nationwide, put together the 

loan applications and knew about the misrepresentations. 

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No. 14-1221 5

The elements of wire fraud were never explicitly stated at 

the plea hearing. Fard insisted throughout the hearing—

relevant portions of which we will quote in our later discussion—that his intentions were honest and businesslike. Despite finding that it was “like pulling teeth” to get Fard to 

admit guilt, the district judge accepted Fard’s plea. 

After entering his guilty plea, Fard met with the government without his attorney to discuss cooperation. At the 

meeting, government agents asked Fard to talk about his involvement in the wire fraud scheme. Fard became agitated, 

arguing that he did not do anything wrong. The meeting 

ended without Fard providing any cooperation and he did 

not meet with the government again. Instead he asked his 

attorney to file a motion withdrawing his guilty plea. 

On November 10, 2011, Fard’s original counsel filed a 

motion to withdraw as counsel and to withdraw Fard’s 

guilty plea. The lawyer’s motion to withdraw as counsel was 

granted and new counsel was appointed.

New counsel filed a more detailed motion to withdraw 

Fard’s plea, arguing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because Fard did not understand the nature of the 

charge. The motion also alleged that Fard only entered into 

the guilty plea because his original counsel told him that the 

cooperation agreement with the government was conditional 

on his willingness to enter a guilty plea that day and that if 

he pled guilty, the government would provide Fard a meaningful opportunity to provide anticipated cooperation by 

working undercover. In an attached affidavit, Fard stated 

that his original counsel had told him on the morning of his 

change of plea hearing that the plea was just a formality and 

the case would be dismissed after he cooperated with the 

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6 No. 14-1221

government. The district judge decided that an evidentiary 

hearing was needed to determine the nature of the alleged 

conversations between Fard and original counsel on the day 

of the change of plea hearing.

On June 5, 2012, the evidentiary hearing was held. Original counsel, Fard, and the case agent testified. Counsel denied telling Fard on the day of the plea hearing that the government promised to dismiss the case if he pled guilty and 

cooperated, but he did admit to jokingly telling Fard that the 

indictment might be dismissed if Fard became a spy in Iran.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district judge made a 

credibility determination that counsel was telling the truth 

and Fard was not. The judge denied Fard’s motion to withdraw his plea and set a date for sentencing.

Sentencing was continued many times, during which 

Fard retained a third lawyer. He filed a third motion to 

withdraw Fard’s guilty plea, which raised similar issues as

the previous motions, along with an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim. The motion was denied. On January 22, 2014, 

Fard’s sentencing hearing was held. His pre-sentence report 

calculated an offense level of 29. But the district judge found 

Fard’s offense level to be 31 because he included a two-level 

increase for obstruction of justice, based upon his finding 

that Fard lied during the evidentiary hearing. Fard was also 

denied an acceptance of responsibility reduction. With a 

criminal history category of I, Fard’s Guideline range was

108–135 months. The judge ultimately sentenced Fard to 84 

months in prison.

On appeal, Fard once again seeks to withdraw his guilty 

plea as unknowingly and involuntarily entered. He also 

challenges the district judge’s sentencing decisions regarding 

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No. 14-1221 7

the obstruction of justice enhancement and the denial of an 

acceptance of responsibility reduction. 

II. ANALYSIS

Fard argues that his guilty plea was not knowing and 

voluntary. He asserts that his plea fell short of the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in two respects. First, his plea colloquy did not comply with Rule 11 

because he never understood the nature of the charge 

against him, and second, the district judge did not ensure 

that the plea was not based upon any undisclosed promises.

With respect to the first claim, Fard asserts that the district 

judge failed to make sure that Fard understood the nature of 

wire fraud and particularly that a wire fraud conviction required a specific intent to defraud.

We review the district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Chavers, 515 F.3d 722, 724 (7th Cir. 2008). After a 

guilty plea is accepted, a defendant may withdraw it if he 

presents a “fair and just reason” for doing so. Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 11(d)(2)(B). In reviewing the decision of the district court, 

factual findings as to whether the defendant has presented a 

“fair and just reason” are reviewed for clear error. Chavers, 

515 F.3d at 724. 

“By pleading guilty to a criminal charge, a defendant 

waives several fundamental constitutional guarantees. Because a defendant sacrifices these critical rights, both due 

process and Rule 11 require that a defendant’s guilty plea be 

made voluntarily and knowingly.” United States v. Fernandez, 

205 F.3d 1020, 1024 (7th Cir. 2000). Rule 11 sets up many requirements that are intended to assure that a defendant’s 

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guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. One requirement is 

that “before the court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo contendere ... the court must address the defendant personally 

in open court ... [and] the court must inform the defendant 

of, and determine that the defendant understands, the nature of each charge to which the defendant is pleading.” Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G). “Unless the defendant fully comprehends the elements of the crime to which he is confessing, 

his plea cannot be said to have been knowingly and voluntarily entered.” Fernandez, 205 F.3d at 1025 (quotation and 

citation omitted). A defendant does not have an absolute 

right to withdraw a plea before sentencing, but the court 

may allow him to do so if he has a “fair and just reason” for 

doing so. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B); Chavers, 515 F.3d at 

724. “A guilty plea taken without attention being given to the 

matters set forth in Rule 11 could constitute a ‘fair and just’

reason justifying the request for withdrawal of a plea, and 

the denial of a motion to withdraw under such a circumstance would be an abuse of discretion.” United States v. LeDonne, 21 F.3d 1418, 1423 (7th Cir. 1994).

To determine whether the defendant fully understands 

the nature of the charge to which he is admitting guilt, we 

have adopted a totality of the circumstances approach. United States v. Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.3d 761, 770 (7th Cir. 

2010). Under this approach, we consider “(1) the complexity 

of the charge; (2) the defendant’s level of intelligence, age, 

and education; (3) whether the defendant was represented 

by counsel; (4) the district judge’s inquiry during the plea 

hearing and the defendant’s own statements; and (5) the evidence proffered by the government.” Id. (citing Fernandez, 

205 F.3d at 1025). 

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No. 14-1221 9

Reviewing the record here in light of the relevant factors,

we cannot conclude that Fard was fully aware of the nature 

of the crime to which he pled guilty. The guilty plea was

“enveloped in confusion and misunderstanding,” Fernandez, 

205 F.3d at 1026, such that we cannot say with confidence 

that Fard truly understood that a wire fraud conviction required intent to defraud. 

The first factor, complexity of the charge, “mitigate[s] 

against a finding that [Fard] understood exactly what he was 

pleading to.” Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.3d at 771. Fard pled 

guilty to one count of wire fraud. A wire fraud conviction

under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 requires (1) a scheme to defraud; (2) 

intent to defraud; and (3) use of wires in furtherance of the 

scheme. United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 786 (7th Cir. 

2006). It is a specific intent crime. Id. To show the intent to 

defraud, we have said that we require a “willful act by the 

defendant with the specific intent to deceive or cheat, usually for the purposes of getting financial gain for one’s self or 

causing financial loss to another.” Id. (quotation and citation 

omitted). 

To a lay person, fraud may seem like theft. Laypeople, 

including defendants, often think fraudulent intent requires 

intent to take something from another person and not return 

it, for one’s own benefit. See In re Katsman, 771 F.3d 1048 (7th 

Cir. 2014) (noting defendant argued that she lacked fraudulent intent because she did not seek to obtain any monetary 

benefit). But fraud does not require that a defendant “contemplate[] harm to the victim or any loss.” Leahy, 464 F.3d at 

787. In fact, “a defendant’s honest belief that his actions will 

ultimately result in a profit and not a loss is [legally] irrelevant.” Id. As the government stated at oral argument, a perCase: 14-1221 Document: 56 Filed: 01/07/2015 Pages: 17
10 No. 14-1221

son can commit fraud even when he intends to repay the 

money obtained by the fraud. We believe that the illegal nature of many fraudulent schemes, like many conspiracies, 

will not be “immediately understandable to a layperson.” 

Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.3d at 771. Fraudulent intent and a 

fraudulent scheme are not terms with a simple and common 

meaning. Cf. United States v. Wetterlin, 583 F.2d 346, 350 (7th 

Cir. 1978) (conspiracy “is not a self-explanatory legal term or 

so simple in meaning that it can be expected or assumed that 

a lay person understands it”).

With respect to Fard’s intelligence, age, and education,

Fard was an experienced businessman in the construction 

industry. However, English was not his native language and 

he is not a lawyer. He should be no more expected to understand the meaning of “fraudulent intent” or a “fraudulent 

scheme” than an average juryperson. 

The fact that Fard was represented by counsel “d[oes] not 

alleviate the problems we perceive here,” PinedaBuenaventura, 622 F.3d at 771, particularly in light of Fard’s 

second challenge to his plea, namely that his lawyer told him 

that the government promised to dismiss his case if he pled 

guilty. Fard and his original counsel clearly had a difficult 

relationship and we cannot be assured that counsel explained the legal meaning of fraudulent intent to his client. 

In fact, counsel’s own statements at the plea hearing suggest 

that counsel knew Fard did not think he acted with fraudulent intent. Counsel said “his intentions he still feels were 

honorable and businesslike” and “[t]he intentions of what to 

do with the money, and that’s where he’s confused, was 

good.” By counsel’s own words then, Fard was confused 

about the nature of the charges. At certain points, counsel

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No. 14-1221 11

attempted to clarify matters for the court, but his clarification was couched in the words of “knowledge” and “participation”, not intent to defraud, and, regardless, “those attempts are not a substitute for [Fard] himself actually indicating an understanding of the charge to which he was 

pleading.” Id.

The fourth factor—the judge’s inquiry and the defendant’s own statements during the plea hearing—is where this 

plea runs into its biggest challenges. The court never explained what “intent to defraud” means or what a fraudulent scheme is, and Fard never admitted to acting with intent 

to defraud. A careful review of Fard’s colloquy demonstrates 

that Fard was indeed confused about the concept of fraudulent intent and was equivocal in many of his answers to the 

court regarding his actions. For example, when the judge

asked Fard if the government’s proffer regarding how the 

scheme worked was accurate, Fard responded “partial true.” 

Cf. Fernandez, 205 F.3d at 1027 (vacating defendant’s guilty 

plea and using defendant’s response “[n]ot all of the acts, 

partially” to the question of whether he had done the things 

set forth in the government’s proffer as evidence that defendant was confused over the crime to which he was admitting guilt). The court continued:

Court: So you were using these nominees to avoid the 

appearance that you were the applicant—

Fard: No, no, no. It was a partnership. The attorney 

recommended if we have partners, it will share the 

expenses, it will share the labor, and it will be also 

easier to obtain financing if you have multiple partners.

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12 No. 14-1221

Fard was unequivocal, both in his own statements and in

counsel’s statements on his behalf, in professing his good intentions. In his exchanges with the court, Fard firmly resisted admitting any intent to defraud. That is because, as counsel stated, “it was more the lenders here that were letting this 

stuff go for people who just wanted to run a business.” The 

lenders were aware of and involved in setting up the 

scheme. For example:

Court: Now, did you participate in that scheme to defraud the lenders by submitting to them and causing 

them to rely upon these false loan applications which 

were false in the respects which are recited in the 

draft that I read?

Fard: Your Honor, the lender was Nationwide Mortgage Financial, which they put the whole thing together. But I had acknowledgment, but I did not say 

anything against the lender. Lender is the one introduce these people to me to bring them as a partner. 

Lender was Nationwide Financial Mortgage, which 

they brought these people. 

It was at this point that the judge called for a break, recognizing that he was going to have to conclude that he did 

not have a plea. He told defense counsel that in order for the 

plea to be accepted, “you’ve got to get him to admit that he 

at least participated in this scheme knowing that it was a

fraudulent scheme.”1 In Pineda-Buenaventura, we suggested 

that when a district judge faces a defendant resisting taking 

responsibility at a plea hearing, the judge might want to take

1 Despite using the phrase “fraudulent scheme,” the judge did not 

explain the meaning of a fraudulent scheme. 

 

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No. 14-1221 13

a brief recess in the plea colloquy in order for defense counsel and the defendant to confer and address a defendant’s 

confusion. 622 F.3d at 772. At Fard’s hearing, the judge took 

such a break. But the confusion continued. After returning 

from the break, Fard explained in his own words what he 

was pleading to, in a statement which was, at best, “noncommittal, vague, and evasive,” id.:

Court: Mr. Fard, what do you plead guilty to?

Fard: I participate and I had the acknowledgment of 

the partners probably their stuff was not kosher, the 

document was not kosher.

Court: What do you mean probably? 

Fard: Like [defense counsel] said, the partner did not 

reside in the property.

Court: You say “partner.” Do you mean these nominees?

Fard: Yes, Your Honor.

Court: You knew that they were not qualified for 

these loans, if they told the truth about themselves?

Fard: Yes.

Court: Not what they intended to do. Did you know 

that?

Fard: Yes, Your Honor.

Court: All right. Now, did you know that the mortgage proceeds were going to be used by you and perhaps others to acquire and make improvements on 

properties other than this Oakley Avenue property?

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14 No. 14-1221

Fard: The mortgage, we did lots of improvement on 

that subject property, and we might use some of the 

money for another property, but we spent a lot of 

money on that particular property. 

And so it went on. The judge became so exasperated with 

Fard’s unwillingness to admit fault that he said “It’s like 

pulling teeth. I feel I ought to have a dental license this afternoon.” Nonetheless the judge felt he had elicited enough 

information for a plea on the intent and scheme to defraud, 

without ever explaining fraudulent intent. We find that

“[b]ased on this record, it is impossible to ascertain precisely 

what [intent] Fard admits.” Fernandez, 205 F.3d at 1027. 

The final consideration in our totality of the circumstances approach examines the government’s proffered evidence.

Examining this factor in Fernandez, we said that “[w]hile 

there was nothing wrong with the AUSA’s factual proffer on 

its face, the surrounding chaos at this change of plea hearing 

significantly negated any confidence in Fernandez’ understanding of and admission to those facts.” Id.; see also PinedaBuenaventura, 622 F.3d at 772. Similarly here, the government’s explanation of its evidence would probably be sufficient to secure a normal guilty plea, but “this was anything 

but an ordinary change of plea hearing.” Fernandez, 205 F.3d 

at 1027. Before the hearing, Fard’s attorney had sought to be 

appointed under the CJA because Fard could not afford to 

pay him to go to trial, but the court, without any explanation 

in the order, rejected the request. If Fard did not plead guilty, 

trial was set to begin in a couple weeks. Neither the district 

court nor the government ever explained the nature of 

fraudulent intent on the record. Breaks were taken, but confusion continued. And throughout the hearing, the words 

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No. 14-1221 15

“knowledge” and “participation” were used, rather than “intent” or “fraudulent.”

“A defendant’s clear understanding of the nature of the 

charge to which he is pleading guilty relates to the very 

heart of the protections afforded by the Constitution and 

Rule 11.” United States v. Bradley, 381 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 

2004) (quoting Fernandez, 205 F.3d at 1027). So we cannot 

conclude that the error in this case was harmless. Id.

Fard also argues that his plea was not voluntary because 

it was based on undisclosed promises. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(b)(2) (“Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open 

court and determine that the plea is voluntary and did not 

result from any force, threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea agreement).”). Because we vacate Fard’s plea on 

other grounds, we do not need to reach this argument. However, we note in passing that the district judge never asked 

Fard whether his plea was based upon any undisclosed 

promises. Fard’s claim is that his original attorney told him

that if he pled guilty, the government promised to dismiss 

the indictment. While the district judge credited the lawyer’s 

statements at the evidentiary hearing that he never told Fard 

the case would be dismissed if he pled guilty, statements on 

the record at the plea hearing indicate that such negotiations 

may have been taking place. The plea hearing began with 

defense counsel asking for a continuance because “we’ve entered into some pretty serious negotiations with the government that involve extensive cooperation between my client ... involving undercover operations .... And basically 

what we would like to see my client do is begin his cooperation.” The government agreed that Fard could be in a posiCase: 14-1221 Document: 56 Filed: 01/07/2015 Pages: 17
16 No. 14-1221

tion to “give historical cooperation” and “some active goingforward type cooperation.” Counsel then stated, “Judge, if I 

may, we were hoping that, depending how extensive this involvement is and the cooperation is, that maybe one hope is 

that we may b[e] able to avoid a plea altogether.” After the 

judge refused the continuance and a break was given, counsel stated that Fard was entering a blind plea to Count 3. 

When the judge asked about the other counts in the indictment, the government responded that “[t]his is a blind plea 

with no promises in either direction.” It was at this point 

that the judge could have asked Fard if he had been promised anything, but he did not. The government could have 

also stated that, while negotiations were ongoing, the government had made no promise to continue negotiating. And 

the government or the defense could have spoken up to alert

the judge after the factual basis was established that Fard 

had not been asked about all the areas required by Rule 11. 

See United States v. Polak, 573 F.3d 428, 432–33 (7th Cir. 2009)

(stating that it is the responsibility of the judge, prosecutor, 

and defense counsel to ensure that a plea meets the requirements of Rule 11 and that district judges may want to utilize 

a checklist to ensure that the requirements are satisfied at a 

plea colloquy). We do not need to make a determination as 

to whether Fard’s plea was based upon undisclosed promises, but the record here suggests that Fard’s claim is not farfetched. 

Because we vacate Fard’s conviction, we do not address

the challenges that Fard raises to his sentence. 

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No. 14-1221 17

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE Fard’s conviction

and REMAND this case for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

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