Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01376/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01376-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher Austad
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, United States District Judge for the

District of South Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-1376

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of South Dakota.

Christopher Austad, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: November 13, 2007 

Filed: March 5, 2008

___________

Before RILEY, BOWMAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Christopher Austad (Austad) pled guilty to mailing threatening communications

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). After calculating a sentencing Guidelines range

of 37 to 46 months imprisonment, the district court1

 sentenced Austad to 84 months

imprisonment. Austad appeals, arguing the sentence is unreasonable, and that the

district court failed to consider Austad’s history and circumstances. We affirm.

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A few days later, Austad wrote a letter to Senator Tim Johnson, threatening to

kill both Senator Johnson and President George W. Bush.

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I. BACKGROUND

In March of 2006, Austad sent a letter from his prison cell at the South Dakota

State Penitentiary.2

 The letter was addressed to United States District Court Judge

Richard Battey, and consisted of exceptionally graphic threats to Judge Battey.

Austad stated the letter was a response to Judge Battey’s sentencings of “a couple of

buddies of” Austad. Among other threats, Austad claimed he would bite off Judge

Battey’s fingers, shoot him in the knees and elbows to disable him, eat portions of his

nose and face, puncture his eyes with hot needles, and sodomize him using a metal rod

with a razor blade welded to it. Austad further threatened to shoot Judge Battey in the

back of the head “assassination style.” Finally, Austad threatened to “cut [Judge

Battey] up and eat what [Austad could] and burn the rest of [Judge Battey’s] body to

ashes.” Judge Battey and his wife felt threatened by the letter, and took steps to

improve their home security system.

When later confronted by federal agents, Austad confirmed he drafted the letter,

and expressed his intent and willingness to carry out the threat. Austad claimed he

could cause harm to Judge Battey even from prison, and stated he had a murder-forhire plan in place. The plan, according to Austad, consisted of making a phone call

to a person outside of prison, and making a pre-arranged coded noise. Austad said the

recipient of the phone call would then contact another person who would carry out the

attack for $2,000.

Austad entered a plea of guilty to a charge of mailing threatening

communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). In recommending the offense

level, the presentence report (PSR) calculated a base offense level of 12, and a number

of increases and reductions, for a total offense level of 21. The PSR assessed a

criminal history category of V. Combining the offense level of 21 and the criminal

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Austad was sentenced pursuant to the 2006 version of the manual. All

references to the Sentencing Guidelines thus refer to the 2006 edition. 

4

The application note provides, “In determining whether subsection[]

(b)(1) . . . appl[ies], the court shall consider both conduct that occurred prior to the

offense and conduct that occurred during the offense . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(1),

cmt. n.1. 

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history category of V, the PSR recommended a Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months

imprisonment. In arriving at the offense level of 21, the PSR included a 6 level

enhancement pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) §

2A6.1(b)(1) (2006),3

 for the specific offense characteristic of “conduct evidencing an

intent to carry out [threatening communications].” Austad objected to this

enhancement. 

At sentencing, the district court declined to impose the § 2A6.1(b)(1)

enhancement. The district court explained application note 1 of § 2A6.1(b)(1)

expressly states, for the enhancement to apply, only conduct that transpired before or

during the offense may be considered.4

 The district court noted Austad’s statement

to the federal agents, evidencing an intent to carry out the threat, was not made until

after Austad was caught. The district court recognized the Guidelines cannot envision

every manner in which offense characteristics may occur, and stated, “frankly I think

the sentencing commission is wrong on that limitation on [§ 2A6.1(b)(1)], but that’s

what it says, so I am applying the guidelines as what the guidelines say.” The district

court thus granted Austad’s objection to the application of § 2A6.1(b)(1), struck the

6 level § 2A6.1(b)(1) enhancement, and utilized an offense level of 15 and a

Guidelines range of 37 to 46 months imprisonment. However, the district court

announced it would still consider Austad’s post-offense conduct, evidencing the intent

to carry out the threat, under the court’s overall consideration of the purposes and

goals of sentencing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

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In imposing its sentence, the district court did consider Austad’s post-offense

statement in determining a § 3553(a) variance. The district court also acknowledged

Austad had “for the first time, shown repentance . . . .” The district court further

considered Austad’s significant disciplinary history while incarcerated, including

“twelve major write-ups in seven months, some of a violent nature in the

penitentiary.” The district court emphasized “a need to protect the public from future

crimes of [Austad],” and explained it was “rel[ying] heavily upon that [consideration]

in reaching what it believes to be an appropriate sentence.” Thus, the district court

“[wound] up looking at the same range as if the 6 points [for the § 2A6.1(b)(1)

enhancement] were not deducted.” The district court thus imposed a sentence of 84

months imprisonment.

Austad appeals, arguing the sentence is unreasonable, and the district court

failed to consider Austad’s history and circumstances. 

II. DISCUSSION

“Regardless of whether the sentence imposed is inside or outside the Guidelines

range, the appellate court must review the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion

standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). We “must

first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as

failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the

Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence

based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen

sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Id.

Next, if “the district court’s sentencing decision is procedurally sound, the appellate

court should then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed

under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. “When conducting this review, the

[appellate] court will, of course, take into account the totality of the circumstances,

including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” Id. “If the sentence

is within the Guidelines range, the appellate court may, but is not required to, apply

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We note, however, “[a] sentence is not unreasonable simply because it creates

some disparity between sentences,” Myers, 503 F.3d at 686 (citation omitted), and

Myers represented “an unusual case with an unusual defendant.” Id. at 687 (citation

omitted).

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a presumption of reasonableness.” Id. (citation omitted). On the other hand, “if the

sentence is outside the Guidelines range, the court may not apply a presumption of

unreasonableness.” Id. We “may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give

due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole,

justify the extent of the variance.” Id.

A. Reasonableness of the Sentence

Austad relies heavily on past Eighth Circuit cases holding extraordinary

variances from the Guidelines range require extraordinary circumstances. See, e.g.,

United States v. Kendall, 446 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v.

Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2005). Because the district court imposed an

extraordinary upward variance (84 months, after a calculated Guidelines range of 36

to 46 months), Austad argues his sentence can only be justified by extraordinary

circumstances. 

Before Gall, Austad’s sentence might have presented a closer issue, particularly

in light of cases in which relatively similar conduct received a lighter sentence than

that imposed on Austad. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 503 F.3d 676, 680 (8th Cir.

2007) (involving a sentence of 60 months imprisonment for mailing a death threat to

a federal judge).5

 However, Gall overruled our “extraordinary circumstances”

analysis. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 595-96. In light of Gall, we must recognize, although

it is “uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a more significant

justification than a minor one,” id. at 597 (emphasis added), the justification need not

be precisely proportionate. Id. at 594-95 (expressly rejecting this court’s requirement

of “extraordinary circumstances” as well as any mathematical proportionality

assessment). The Supreme Court in Gall does conclude that “a district judge must

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Austad also takes issue with the district court’s reliance on his likelihood to reoffend, arguing Austad had no ability to carry out his threats, because he had no

access to a telephone, and no money to be able to pay someone on the outside to

commit the threatened acts. First, this fails to recognize Austad was not convicted of

actually harming Judge Battey, but of threatening him. Second, the characteristics

noted by the district court indicate a significant likelihood that, given an opportunity

to do so, Austad will continue to make threats against members of society. Whether

or not Austad has any ability to carry out the threat, the threat itself causes emotional

turmoil in the lives of those threatened, including their families, and is, therefore, itself

a crime. As this case amply demonstrates, Austad committed this crime even while

incarcerated. It is not unreasonable to conclude such threats would occur, and

potentially with significantly greater frequency, if Austad were not in prison. The

district court, therefore, did not err in determining a harsher sentence would help

promote the goal of protecting society. 

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give serious consideration to the extent of any departure from the Guidelines and must

explain his conclusion . . . an unusually lenient or an unusually harsh sentence is

appropriate in a particular case with sufficient justifications.” Id. at 594. 

Comparing Austad’s sentence to the one imposed in Myers, it becomes clear

the district court, in sentencing Austad, supported the upward variance with sufficient

and proportionate justifications. The district court noted it could not ignore Austad’s

offense conduct. Austad’s threats were extreme. The district court further considered

Austad’s significant disciplinary record, including “twelve major write-ups in seven

months, some of a violent nature in the penitentiary.” Additionally, the district court

noted the likelihood Austad would continue to re-offend by threatening other

members of society, and the court announced it was “rel[ying] heavily” upon this

consideration.6

 The district court correctly recognized the Guidelines do not always

account for every factual circumstance which could arise in a given case. As the

Supreme Court recently re-explained in a different context, although the district court

must first properly calculate the Guidelines range, and consider this calculation in

determining an appropriate sentence, the district court may consider whether an inAppellate Case: 07-1376 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/05/2008 Entry ID: 3409418
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Austad’s contention that his mental illness demonstrates he is unlikely to ever

carry out his threats cuts both ways. On one hand, Austad’s mental illness may

evidence nothing more than an extreme impulsiveness and pattern of self-destructive

behavior. On the other hand, Austad’s mental illness may also evidence a kind of

impulsiveness which might compel him to act upon these threats at some point. In

any event, the district court is in a much better position to make such determinations,

and we are not free to substitute our judgment for that of the district court when the

district court’s determinations are not unreasonable. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. 

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Guidelines sentence fails appropriately to serve the objectives of sentencing. See

Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564, 574-75 (2007). 

In sentencing Austad, the district court calculated the sentencing range by

employing the language of the application note to § 2A6.1(b)(1). This resulted in a

shorter Guidelines range. However, had Austad expressed his intent to carry out the

threat contemporaneously with making the threat, Austad could have been subject to

the 6 level increase. See U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(1), cmt. n.1. The district court

determined a similar increase was warranted pursuant to § 3553(a) in order to promote

the goals of deterrence and “particularly to protect the public from further crimes of

Mr. Austad.” The district court’s conclusion that Austad’s conduct was just as bad as

that encompassed by § 2A6.1(b)(1), and thus deserving of a similar sentence, is

logical and reasonable. 

Finally, Austad argues the district court failed to consider properly the

§ 3553(a) factors by not considering Austad’s history and circumstances, including

Austad’s history of mental illness. First, we note the district court heard Austad’s

attorney explain Austad’s history and circumstances. “[W]e do not require a district

court to categorically rehearse each of the section 3553(a) factors on the record when

it imposes a sentence as long as it is clear that they were considered.” United States

v. Dieken, 432 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).7 Second, “[t]he fact

that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was

appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at

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597. As the Supreme Court reminds us, “[t]he sentencing judge is in a superior

position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case.

The judge sees and hears the evidence, makes credibility determinations, has full

knowledge of the facts and gains insights not conveyed by the record.” Id. (citation

omitted). Given these considerations, we cannot say the district court abused its

discretion in sentencing Austad. Even if Austad’s sentence were considered

“unusually harsh,” the district court explained the sentence with “sufficient

justifications.” See id. at 594.

III. CONCLUSION

Austad’s sentence is affirmed.

______________________________

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