Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05288/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05288-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commission on Presidential Debates
Appellee
Federal Election Commission
Appellee
John Hagelin
Appellant
The Natural Law Party of the United States of America
Appellant
Mike Tompkins
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 3, 1996

Decided October 4, 1996

Issued October 11, 1996

No. 96-5287

ROSS PEROT, PAT CHOATE, AND

PEROT '96, INC.,

APPELLANTS

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

AND THE COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES,

APPELLEES

-

No. 96-5288

DR. JOHN HAGELIN, DR. MIKE TOMPKINS, AND

THE NATURAL LAW PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLANTS

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

AND THE COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES,

APPELLEES

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(96cv2196 & 96cv2132)

Thomas O. Gorman argued the cause for appellants Ross Perot, et al., with whom Samuel W.

Lanham, Jr., Jamin B. Raskin, and Thomas O. Sargentich, pro hac vice, and Robert E. Steinberg

were on the briefs.

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Thomas M. Newmark argued the cause (pro hac vice) for appellants Dr. Hagelin, et al., and was on

the brief.

Richard B. Bader, Associate General Counsel, argued the cause for appellee Federal Election

Commission, with whom Lawrence M. Noble, General Counsel, was on the brief.

Lewis K. Loss, Attorney, argued the cause for appellee Commission on Presidential Debates, with

whom William H. Briggs, Jr., was on the brief.

Before: SILBERMAN, RANDOLPH, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM: Two days hence a series of debates between candidates nominated by the

Democratic Party and the Republican Party for President and Vice President of the United States is

scheduled to begin. One day ago this court heard argument concerning those debates. The case was

argued before the district court on October 1, 1996. In view of the importance of the issues and the

short time remaining before the debates begin, this court granted the motions for expedited review.

Appellants in these consolidated appeals are Ross Perot and Pat Choate, the presidential and

vice-presidential nominees of the Reform Party, and their campaign organization, Perot '96, Inc.

(collectively "Perot"); and Dr. John Hagelin and Dr. Mike Tompkins, the nominees of the Natural

Law Party of the United States, and their party (collectively "Dr. Hagelin"). They appeal from the

denial of injunctive relief and the grant of summary judgment to the Federal Election Commission

("FEC") and the Commission on Presidential Debates ("CPD"). Appellants now raise only two

contentions. Perot contends that the FEC has unlawfully delegated legislative authority to a private,

non-profit corporation, in violation of Article I of the Constitution. Dr. Hagelin contends that the

district court erred in granting summary judgment on the groundsthat it lacked jurisdiction to enjoin

a violation of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA"), 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (1994),

despite the inability of the FEC to address the violation prior to the 1996 presidential debates

scheduled by the CPD to begin on October 6, 1996. Hence, we do not address the merits of

appellants' other claims, presented to the district court, that they were wrongfully excluded from the

debates. On the issues before this court, we find no merit in Perot's constitutional challenge or in Dr.

Hagelin's contentions. As to the validity of the FEC regulation at the center of this controversy, we

conclude that the grant of summary judgment sustaining it was premature. Accordingly, we affirm

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the denial of injunctive relief, vacate the grant of summary judgment relating to the claim that the

regulation is inconsistent with the statute, and remand with instructions to dismiss the regulatory

claim without prejudice.

I.

The CPD is a private, non-profit corporation formed in 1987 for the purpose of sponsoring

presidential debates. In prior years, that task had been performed by another non- profit entity, the

League of Women Voters. Beginning with the 1988 presidential election, the CPD assumed that

function. The members of the CPD include a former chairman of the Democratic National

Committee, a former chairman of the Republican National Committee, and other representatives of

the Democratic and Republican parties. In connection with the 1996 presidential election, the CPD

hasscheduled a series oftwo presidential and one vice-presidential debates, with the first presidential

debate scheduled to take place on October 6, 1996. The only candidates invited to participate are

President William Jefferson Clinton and former Senator Robert J. Dole, the respective nominees of

the Democratic and Republican Parties, and their vice-presidentialrunning mates. The CPD, relying

on its preannounced criteria, and the recommendation of an advisory committee consisting primarily

of political scientists, based its decision to exclude other candidates on the grounds that no other

candidates have a "realistic chance of winning" the 1996 election.

To understand the nature of appellants' claims, we set forth the underlying statutory and

regulatory framework. The FECA prohibits "any corporation" from making "a contribution or

expenditure in connection with" any federal election. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a). Both a "contribution" and

an "expenditure" are defined to include, inter alia, any advance of "anything of value ... for the

purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." Id. § 431(8)(A)(I); id. § 431(9)(A)(I). An

"expenditure" does not, however, include "nonpartisan activity designed to encourage individualsto

vote or to register to vote." Id. § 431(9)(B)(ii).

As early as 1976, the FEC recognized that § 441b could be construed to bar the use of

corporate funds to stage debates. See 44 Fed. Reg. 59,162 (1979). To remove doubt about the

legalityof corporate sponsorship of debates, the FECpromulgated a regulation incorporating its view

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1 The regulation reads in relevant part:

§ 110.13 Candidate debates.

(a) Staging organizations. (1) Nonprofit organizations described in 26

U.S.C. 501(c)(3) or (c)(4) and which do not endorse, support, or oppose political

candidates or political parties may stage candidate debates in accordance with this

section and 11 C.F.R. 114.1(f).

* * * *

(b) Debate Structure. The structure of debates staged in accordance with

this section and 11 C.F.R. 114.4(f) is left to the discretion of the staging

organization(s), provided that:

(1) Such debates include at least two candidates; and

(2) The staging organization(s) does not structure the debates to promote

or advance one candidate over another.

(c) Criteria for candidate selection. For all debates, staging

organization(s) must use pre-established objective criteria to determine which

candidates may participate in a debate. For general election debates, staging

organization(s) shall not use nomination by a particular political party as the sole

objective criterion to determine whether to include a candidate in a debate....

11 C.F.R. § 110.13. 

that "nonpartisan debates are designed to educate and inform voters rather than to influence the

nomination or election of a particular candidate," and thus "funds expended ... to defray costs

incurred in staging nonpartisan debates" ought not run afoul of § 441b. 44 Fed. Reg. 76,734 (1979).

The current version of this regulation, to be codified at 11 C.F.R. § 110.13, was transmitted to

Congress in December 1995, and became effective March 13, 1996. It provides that eligible

non-profit organizations may stage candidate debates, so long asthey "use pre-established objective

criteria to determine which candidates may participate in a debate."1

On September 19, 1995, approximately six months before the effective date of § 110.13, the

CPD announced its selection criteria for participants in the 1996 presidential debates. The CPD had

concluded that the historical prominence of Democratic and Republican nominees warranted an

invitation to the respective nominees of the two major parties in 1996. With respect to "non-major

party candidates," the CPD announced criteria by which it could identify those who had "a realistic

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(i.e., more than theoretical) chance of being elected." These criteria included evidence of national

organization (such as placement on the ballot in enough states to have a mathematical chance of

obtaining an electoral collegemajority),signs of national newsworthiness(as evidenced, for example,

by the professional opinions of the Washington bureau chiefs of major newspapers, news magazines,

and broadcast networks), and indicators of public enthusiasm (as, for instance, reflected in public

opinion polls). On September 17, 1996, the CPD issued a press release indicating its conclusion that

no candidate other than President Clinton or Senator Dole had a realistic chance of being elected, and

that, therefore, only those candidates and their vice-presidential running mates, would be invited to

participate in the debates.

On September 6, 1996, Dr. Hagelin filed an administrative complaint against the CPD with

the FEC, asserting that the CPD violated 11 C.F.R. § 110.13(c) by using subjective criteria to choose

whomto invite as participantsin its debates and by inviting President Clinton and Senator Dole based

solelyon their nominations by the Democratic andRepublican parties. On September 13, Dr. Hagelin

filed a verified complaint against the FEC and the CPD in the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia seeking to enjoin the CPD from using unlawful debate selection criteria or, in

the alternative, to order the FEC to take immediate action on his complaint as well as authorize it to

take expedited action against the CPD's alleged violations of the FECA.

Meanwhile, on September 20, 1996, Perot filed an administrative complaint against the CPD

with the FEC. He too challenged the CPD's application of its selection criteria. On September 23,

1996, Perot filed a verified complaint in the district court, requesting that the court enjoin the FEC

and the CPD from violating the FEC regulations, the FECA, and various constitutional provisions.

The FEC and the CPD filed motions to dismiss the complaints. The district court

consolidated the cases for argument, and, after expedited briefing, heard oral argument and ruled

from the bench on October 1, 1996. The district court denied appellants' requests for preliminary

injunctive relief. Applying the factors set forth in Washington Metropolitan Area Transit

Commission v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the court determined first

that neither Dr. Hagelin nor Perot could show a likelihood ofsuccess on the merits. The court noted

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that Congress had granted the FEC exclusive primary jurisdiction to adjudicate civil claims under the

FECA, and it emphasized that the FECA precluded its exercise of jurisdiction over the instant claims

until the FEC acted on the claims or until 120 days after those claims had been filed. The district

court then looked to the balance of equities presented in appellants' claims for injunctive relief. This

factor also weighed against Dr. Hagelin and Perot, as the damage they would suffer if the debates

were to be held without their participation could at least be partially remedied in subsequent

proceedings, and in any event it did not outweigh the public interest in allowing the debates to go

forward without interference.

In addition to denying both appellants' claims for injunctive relief, the district court rejected

Perot's claim that the CPD threatened a violation of his First Amendment right to freedom ofspeech.

Relying on San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522

(1987), the court held that no such claim could lie against the CPD since it was not a state actor. The

court summarily rejected Perot's equal protection, due process, and nondelegation claims. Finally,

the court, treating the motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment, granted summary

judgment for appellees on the claim that § 110.113 was beyond the scope of its statutory authority.

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b), 56. Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837 (1984), the court found the regulation a permissible interpretation of the FECA's

exemptionfromthe definition of "expenditure" nonpartisanactivitydesigned to encourage individuals

to vote.

II.

We agree with the district court that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of the

complaints filed with the FEC or to order the FEC to do so before the CPD-sponsored debate on

October 6, 1996. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of these claims on jurisdictional

grounds.

Congress could not have spoken more plainly in limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts to

adjudicate claims under the FECA. The statute explicitly states that "[e]xcept as provided in section

437g(a)(8) of this title, the power of the [FEC] to initiate civil actions under subsection (a)(6) shall

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be the exclusive civil remedy for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act." 2 U.S.C. § 437d(e);

accord 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b)(1) ("The [FEC] shall administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and

formulate policy with respect to, this Act.... The [FEC] shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect

to the civil enforcement of such provisions.").

Section 437g requires the FEC to proceed with due deliberation after it receives a complaint

alleging violations of the Act. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1). Dr. Hagelin filed his complaint with the FEC

on September 6, 1996; Perot filed his complaint on September 20, 1996. CPD, which is alleged to

have violated the Act, had to be notified within five days. Id. § 437g(a)(1). We presume this was

done. The next step is for the FEC to vote to determine whether there is reason to believe the subject

of the complaint has violated the Act. Id. § 437g(a)(2). If the complaint is not dismissed at that

stage, the FEC conducts an investigation. Id. If the FEC's general counsel recommends that the FEC

proceed to the next statutory stepa vote on whether there is probable cause to believe the

respondent violated the Actthe respondent is notified and is given fifteen days to submit a brief

stating its legal and factual position and replying to the general counsel's brief. Id. § 437g(a)(3). If

the FEC then decides there is probable cause, it "shall attempt, for a period of at least 30 days," or

at least 15 days if an election is imminent, to have the respondent correct or prevent the violation.

Id. § 437g(a)(4)(A)(i) & (ii). The FEC may skip this step and refer the matter to the Attorney

Generalfor enforcement action only ifit determinesthat the violation is knowing and willful and only

if the violation is of a type included in § 437g(d). Id. § 437g(a)(5)(C).

Other procedural requirements, unnecessary to mention, also bind the FEC's deliberations

about, and investigation of, complaints. The end of the administrative road is a civil complaint filed

by the FEC in the district court or an action by the complaining party. Section 437g(a)(8)(A) states:

"[a]ny party aggrieved by an order of the [FEC] dismissing a complaint filed by such party under

paragraph (1), or by failure of the [FEC] to act on such complaint during the 120-day period

beginning on the date the complaint is filed, may file a petition with the United States District Court

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2 Apart from § 437g(a)(8)(C), there is no private right of action to enforce the FECA against

an alleged violator. See Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S.

527, 533 (1989); see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82-85 (1975). 

for the District of Columbia." Id. § 437g(a)(8)(A).2 The district court's decision may be appealed

to this court. Id. § 437g(a)(9).

Dr. Hagelin claims that we may ignore these elaborate statutory requirements and force the

FEC to act immediately because otherwise he would suffer irreparable harm. To do so, however,

would place usin conflict with our decision in In re Carter-Mondale Reelection Committee, Inc., 642

F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Carter-Mondale is, as the FEC argues, directly on point. The plaintiffs

in that case asked the court to find a violation of the federal election laws, and requested alternatively

"that the FEC be directed to conduct an immediate investigation of the [plaintiffs'] charges." Id. at

542. The court held that "the exclusive jurisdiction of the FEC extends to assure that the [FEC's]

initial investigation is completed, or the statutory time limit allowed for an investigation has expired,

before any judicial review is invoked." Id. It therefore declined to hear the case because "the entire

matter at this time is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Election Commission." Id.

It is true, as Dr. Hagelin points out, that the Carter-Mondale opinion said there might be

extraordinary circumstances allowing a party to "hurdle the explicit time restraints of the [Federal

Election Campaign] Act." 642 F.2d at 543. But the opinion never specified what these

circumstances might be. It did not indicate on what basis, short of holding § 437g unconstitutional

(which no one urges), a court could disregard the statutory commands. And the statement inCarterMondale was made before the Supreme Court instructed us that if "Congress specifically mandates,

exhaustion is required." McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992). Section 437g is as

specific a mandate as one can imagine; as such, the procedures it sets forthprocedures purposely

designed to ensure fairness not only to complainants but also to respondentsmust be followed

before a court may intervene. We assume that in formulating those procedures Congress, whose

members are elected every two or six years, knew full well that complaints filed shortly before

elections, or debates, might not be investigated and prosecuted until after the event. Congress could

have chosen to allow judicial intervention in the face of such exigencies, but it did not do so. And

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as we have said, a court is not free to disregard that congressional judgment.

Even if we could somehow ignore the jurisdictional requirements of § 437g(a), but see

Carter-Mondale, 642 F.2d at 542, Dr. Hagelin could not achieve the result he seeks. This court

could not compel the FEC to enforce its regulation in accordance with the FECA. When the FEC's

failure to act is contrary to law, we have interpreted § 437g(a)(8)(C) to allow nothing more than an

order requiring FEC action. See FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Since the FEC

is given 120 days to act on a submitted complaint, § 437g(a)(8)(A), its delay in this case is neither

unlawful nor unreasonable. See Rose, 806 F.2d at 1084-85. Second, if this court were to enjoin the

CPD from staging the debates or from choosing debate participants, there would be a substantial

argument that the court would itself violate the CPD's First Amendment rights. See Nebraska Press

Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (prior restraint); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian &

Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995) (speaker's choice of content).

III.

In addition to the statutory arguments, Perot also raises a novel constitutional claim. As we

understand it, he contends that the FEC's "candidate debates" regulation unlawfully delegates

legislative authority to a private, non-profit corporation, in violation of Article I of the Constitution.

In fact, this attack on the regulation rests on what might be termed a subdelegation of authority

theory, since the claim is that Congress has delegated authority to the FEC, which in turn has

delegated some portion of that authority to the CPD. The FEC acknowledges that we have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to decide this issue, although it questions whether Perot is

entitled to any relief. We agree that we have jurisdiction over the claim, but we are unpersuaded that

the regulation delegates legislative authority to the CPD.

It is well established that Congress may, by a legislative act, grant authority to an executive

agency such as the FEC to adopt rules and regulations, so long as it provides some "intelligible

principle" bywhich the agency isto exercise that authority. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,

372 (1989) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928)). We

agree with the general proposition that when Congress has specifically vested an agency with the

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authority to administer a statute, it may not shift that responsibility to a private actor such as the

CPD. Cf. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935).

In the cases before us, however, the FEC has not delegated any authority to the CPD. It has

issued a regulation permitting eligible non-profit organizations to stage candidate debates, provided

that they employ "pre-established objective criteria" to determine who may participate. Rather than

mandating a single set of "objective criteria" allstaging organizations must follow, the FEC gave the

individual organizations leeway to decide what specific criteria to use. 60 Fed. Reg. 64,262 (1995).

One might view this as a "delegation," because the organizations must use their discretion to

formulate objective criteria they think will conform with the agency's definition of that term. But in

that respect, virtually any regulation of a private party could be described as a "delegation" of

authority, since the party must normally exercise some discretion in interpreting what actionsit must

take to comply.

The contention that the regulation delegates authority to the CPD because it does not spell

out preciselywhat the phrase "objective criteria" means goesfar beyond the normal usage of the term

"delegation." This position would go further than the position of Justice Scalia, who dissented from

the Supreme Court's decision in Mistretta that a congressional grant of rulemaking authority to the

United States Sentencing Commission was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power,

but acknowledged that "no statute can be entirely precise, and ... some judgments, even some

judgments involving policy considerations, must be left to the officers executing the law and to the

judges applying it...." 488 U.S. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting). So too, a regulation's use of a term

that may be susceptible to differing interpretations does not automatically result in a delegation of

authority to the entities that it governs.

Here, the FEC has chosen to give the CPD and any other organizations that wish to sponsor

debates the latitude to choose their own "objective criteria." In adopting such standards, a staging

organization acts at its peril, unless it first secures an FEC advisory opinion pursuant to 2 U.S.C. §

437f. Without such an opinion, the organization runs the risk that the FEC will subsequently

determine that its criteria are not objective, and that its sponsorship of the debate violated § 441b.

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If that happens, the staging organization may be subject to the penalties provided in the FECA. The

authority to determine what the term "objective criteria" means rests with the agency, however, and

to a lesser extent with the courts that review agency action.

Insum, we are unpersuaded that theFEChas unconstitutionallydelegated legislative authority

to the CPD. At oral argument counsel suggested that this court should order the FEC, either through

mandamus orsome other extraordinary remedy, to "take back" the authority it has "delegated" to the

CPD. As we understand this argument, Perot seeks to have the FEC either withdraw its regulation

or revise it to define in detail what are "objective criteria." It is unclear how the FEC could

accomplish this goal in time to have any effect on the presidential debates. Before prescribing new

regulations, the FEC must transmit a statement ofits proposed action to Congress, and the regulation

may not take effect until thirty legislative days have passed. 2 U.S.C. § 438(d). Nor may the FEC

render an advisory opinion concerning the legality of the CPD's preannounced criteria upon request

of a third party. Id. § 437f(a)(1). As noted in Part II, a complaint is subject to the statutory timetable

that also would preclude relief prior to the debates.

IV.

Before the district court, Perot also argued as an appendage to the request for a preliminary

injunction that the FEC lacked authority to promulgate 11 C.F.R. §§ 110.13 and 114.4(f), and that

the regulations carve out an illegal exception to the corporate contribution and expenditure limits of

2 U.S.C. § 441b. On appeal Perot mentions this argumentthat the FEC's debate regulation, 11

C.F.R. § 110.13, is ultra viresonly in a footnote of his brief, and counsel did not address it at oral

argument.

The district court granted summaryjudgment on this claim, finding the regulations permissible

under 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(ii), which exempts from the definition of "expenditure" "nonpartisan

activity designed to encourage individualsto vote or to register to vote." Perot's footnote claims that

the CPD'ssponsorship of debates does not fall within this exemption, primarily because it is not truly

nonpartisan. We need not reach the merits of this contention.

TheFECAhas no provisions governing judicialreviewofregulations,so an actionchallenging

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its implementing regulations should be brought under the judicial review provisions of the

Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Among other things, the APA directs

courts to consider the administrative record in determining the legality of agency action. Id. § 706.

Perot has not invoked the APA, and no party has produced the administrative record. See FED. R.

APP. P. 15, 17. Consequently, the district court did not have the opportunity to consider the

regulations' legality in terms of that record or the APA and the case law under it. Especially since we

do not have the administrative record before us, and this issue was not fully briefed, we will refrain

from reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment. The case is simply not in a posture

to permit an important question of this sort to be properly adjudicated.

Accordingly, we remand this part to the district court with instructions to dismiss without

prejudice only Count IV of Perot's complaint, which raises this claim. Perot will then be free to file

a new suit properly challenging the FEC's authority to promulgate the regulations. He will not suffer

unduly from any delay in resolving thisissue, as even an immediate order invalidating the regulations

would not provide him with any meaningful relief from the alleged harms. In all other respects, the

district court's order is affirmed.

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