Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-01171/USCOURTS-caDC-12-01171-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Suburban Air Freight, Inc.
Petitioner
Transportation Security Administration
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 19, 2013 Decided June 7, 2013

Reissued June 14, 2013

No. 12-1171

SUBURBAN AIR FREIGHT, INC.,

PETITIONER

v.

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of an Order 

of the Transportation Security Administration

Robert E. O'Connor Jr. argued the cause and filed the 

briefs for petitioner. 

Sharon Swingle, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were 

Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and 

Mark B. Stern and Dana L. Kaersvang, Attorneys.

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS, and TATEL, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

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TATEL, Circuit Judge: Petitioner Suburban Air Freight, a 

Federal Aviation Administration–certified air carrier, operates 

pursuant to a Transportation Security Administration–

approved security plan. After observing the loading of a 

Suburban aircraft, TSA inspectors determined that Suburban 

had failed to adequately implement security measures 

mandated by its plan. An administrative law judge agreed and 

imposed an $18,000 fine, which the TSA Administrator 

upheld. Finding no error, we deny Suburban’s petition for 

review.

I.

Congress endowed TSA with authority to promulgate 

regulations to promote transportation security. See 49 U.S.C. 

§ 114(l)(1). With respect to aviation security, TSA has 

established different sets of rules for different kinds of aircraft 

operators. This case involves the rules that govern “twelvefive” operations—that is, operations that (1) are not regulated 

under another TSA program, (2) utilize an airplane weighing

more than 12,500 pounds, (3) run scheduled or charter 

service, and (4) carry passengers and/or cargo. See 49 C.F.R. 

§ 1544.101(d). TSA requires twelve-five operators to “ensure 

that cargo is screened and inspected for any unauthorized 

person, and any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, and other 

destructive substance or item.” Id. § 1544.205(b). Although 

operators are given some flexibility to determine precisely 

how they will meet their security obligations, they must 

submit a proposed security program—known as a “TwelveFive Standard Security Program” or a “TFSSP”—to TSA for 

approval. Id. § 1544.105(a). TSA offers a standard-form 

TFSSP that operators may modify with TSA’s consent. See 

Aviation Security: Private Charter Security Rules, 67 Fed. 

Reg. 79,881, 79,884 (Dec. 31, 2002) (explaining that “TSA 

developed a standard security program and forwarded it to 

affected entities” and that “TSA may approve [proposed] 

changes” thereto). Operators must abide by their approved 

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TFSSP until and unless TSA approves an amendment. See id.

§ 1544.105(b).

Petitioner Suburban Air Freight operates pursuant to an 

approved TFSSP. Two provisions of that document are 

relevant here: Section 6.2, which provides that “[b]efore any 

crewmember is authorized to board his or her assigned 

aircraft, a direct twelve-five aircraft operator employee or 

authorized representative must request and verify a 

government-issued photo ID of each crewmember and his or 

her assignment on that flight,” and Section 8.1, which states 

that operators of all-cargo flights “must maintain direct 

custody and control of cargo.” Prior to the events at issue in 

this case, TSA had been in contact with Suburban about its 

compliance with these requirements.

On October 6, 2009, a TSA inspector visited Richmond 

International Airport and observed the loading of a Suburban 

flight transporting packages for DHL International Express, 

an “Indirect Air Carrier” with its own TSA-approved security 

plan. The flight was a “single pilot” operation, meaning that

the pilot was the only crew member. The cargo-loading area 

at the Richmond Airport is inside the airport’s secured area, 

which only individuals with airport-issued IDs and their 

guests may enter. Because the DHL employees delivering 

packages to Suburban had airport-issued badges but the 

Suburban pilot did not, DHL employees escorted the pilot into 

the secured area. In the pilot’s presence, the DHL employees

then proceeded to load the packages onto the plane.

The TSA inspector was not satisfied. He observed that no 

Suburban employee or authorized representative ever checked 

the pilot’s identification. Instead, the pilot indicated that he 

had “verified his own ID.” The inspector also noted that the 

pilot failed to keep a constant watch on the loading process—

at times even standing with his back to the aircraft—and then 

failed to inspect the cargo after loading was complete.

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As a result, TSA charged Suburban with violating the IDcheck and custody-and-control provisions of its TFSSP. 

Suburban disputed both alleged violations. Alternatively, it

argued that the October 6 flight did not qualify as a twelvefive operation and was therefore not subject to the TFSSP’s 

requirements because the flight carried no “cargo” within the 

meaning of the regulations. After a hearing, an administrative 

law judge found that the TFSSP applied and that Suburban 

had in fact committed both alleged violations. Accordingly, 

he imposed an $18,000 fine. Suburban filed an intra-agency 

appeal, and a TSA Administrator affirmed the ALJ’s decision

in all respects.

In its petition for review, Suburban raises three 

arguments. First, Suburban challenges the Administrator’s 

determination that the October 6 flight was carrying “cargo” 

and, as a result, that the TFSSP applied. Second, even if the 

TFSSP were applicable, Suburban argues that the 

Administrator erroneously interpreted and applied the two 

sections of the TFSSP the company was charged with 

violating. And third, even if the Administrator’s interpretation 

of the TFSSP would otherwise have been reasonable, 

Suburban maintains that it lacked fair notice that its TFSSP 

would be so interpreted.

II.

Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, we must 

uphold TSA’s decisions unless they are “arbitrary, capricious, 

an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 

law,” or unsupported by “substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706(2); 49 U.S.C. § 46110(c); see Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. 

TSA, 588 F.3d 1116, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In addition, “[w]e 

must give substantial deference to [the] agency’s 

interpretation of its own regulations.” Thomas Jefferson 

University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994). Both parties 

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appear to assume that we should afford similar deference to 

TSA’s interpretation of the TFSSP, and we agree. Although 

this seems to be the first time the question of deference has 

arisen in the TFSSP context, we believe TFSSPs are 

analogous to other formal, standardized, agency-approved 

documents with respect to which we afford agencies 

deference. Just as we defer to the Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission’s and the Federal Communications 

Commission’s interpretations of tariffs, see e.g., FPL Energy 

Marcus Hook, L.P. v. FERC, 430 F.3d 441, 446 (D.C. Cir. 

2005) (FERC); Global NAPs, Inc. v. FCC, 247 F.3d 252, 258 

(D.C. Cir. 2001) (FCC), for example, so too must we defer to 

TSA’s reasonable interpretation of a TFSSP.

A.

Suburban’s first argument—that the TFSSP did not apply 

to the October 6 flight—hinges on the proposition that the 

DHL packages Suburban was transporting were 

unaccompanied by an air waybill. Suburban’s logic is 

straightforward. The TFSSP governs only twelve-five 

operations; to qualify as a twelve-five operation, an aircraft 

must carry “passengers or cargo or both,” 49 C.F.R 

§ 1544.101(d); and “cargo” is defined as “property tendered 

for air transportation accounted for on an air waybill,” id.

§ 1540.5. Working backwards through the links in this chain, 

Suburban maintains that if there was no air waybill for the 

DHL packages, then those packages did not qualify as cargo, 

the October 6 flight was not a twelve-five operation, and the 

TFSSP did not apply. As Suburban repeatedly puts it, “no air 

waybill, no cargo, no TFSSP violation.” Petitioner’s Br. 37. 

TSA accepted Suburban’s reasoning but rejected its 

premise, concluding that the DHL packages were in fact 

“accounted for on an air waybill.” 49 C.F.R. § 1540.5. This 

conclusion was supported by substantial evidence: TSA 

inspectors testified that the packages DHL ships with 

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Suburban are accounted for on air waybills, a DHL email 

explained that “DHL uses air waybills for every shipment,” 

and TSA introduced one of DHL’s “master” air waybills into 

evidence. This evidence makes clear that DHL’s shipments, 

including its shipments with Suburban, are always accounted 

for on air waybills, and Suburban made no showing that it 

deviated from this practice on the October 6 flight. 

Accordingly, although Suburban is right that TSA never 

produced the specific air waybill for that flight, the absence of 

this document from the record fails to negate the substantial 

evidence showing that such a document existed. This is 

especially true given that Suburban failed to raise its “no air 

waybill” defense until shortly before the hearing. Suburban 

also attempts to undermine the Administrator’s conclusion by

pointing to her mischaracterization of a bit of testimony as 

coming from a DHL representative rather than a TSA 

inspector, but any such mistake was plainly harmless given

the clear import of the evidence. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 

(providing that “rule of prejudicial error” applies to review of 

agency decisions).

B.

Suburban next argues that even if the TFSSP governed

the October 6 flight, TSA arbitrarily and capriciously 

interpreted and applied the two TFSSP provisions it claims 

Suburban violated. Recall that the first of these, Section 6.2, 

provides that, “[b]efore any crewmember is authorized to 

board his or her assigned aircraft, a direct twelve-five aircraft 

operator employee or authorized representative must request 

and verify a government-issued photo ID of each 

crewmember and his or her assignment on that flight.” Flying

into the headwinds of this broad language, Suburban argues

that the ID-check requirement simply does not extend to 

single-pilot operations. Relying on the TFSSP’s repeated 

references to “crewmember,” Suburban insists that “crew” 

cannot refer to a single person. Moreover, it maintains that 

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TSA’s could not have intended the ID-check requirement to 

cover single-pilot operations because compliance is

effectively impossible where, as in this case, there is no other 

crewmember present to perform the check. 

This argument won’t fly. TSA’s interpretation of “crew” 

to include crews of one is reasonable. Indeed, Suburban’s 

own TFSSP defines “crewmember” as “[a] person assigned to 

perform duty in an aircraft during flight time,” and pilots, 

whose duty it is to fly the plane, certainly meet that definition 

regardless of whether they are flying solo. And far from 

impossible, compliance with the ID-check requirement on 

single-pilot operations, as TSA points out, could be achieved 

at Richmond Airport through designation of an authorized 

representative. Here, as TSA again points out, Suburban could 

have designated DHL as its representative, and DHL 

employees could then have checked the pilot’s ID and flight 

assignment before he boarded the plane. To the extent 

Suburban maintains this requirement would be impractical at 

other, more remote airports, it may submit a request to TSA to 

amend its TFSSP. See 49 C.F.R. § 1544.105(b). Although 

permitting a pilot to “verif[y] his own ID,” as this one 

purported to do, would doubtless be more convenient, to 

repeat that suggestion is in essence to refute it. It is TSA’s 

job—not Suburban’s or ours—to strike a balance between 

convenience and security, and a meaningful ID check, as 

opposed to a self-administered one, serves as an important 

element of the security regime TSA has devised.

The second TFSSP provision TSA found Suburban to 

have violated, Section 8.1, requires an “all-cargo twelve-five 

aircraft operator [to] maintain direct custody and control of 

cargo . . . from the time of acceptance until transferred to,” 

among other entities, an Indirect Air Carrier like DHL. 

Section 8.1 further specifies that “twelve-five aircraft operator 

employees and authorized representatives are the only 

individuals authorized to maintain custody and control of 

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cargo.” Despite this language, Suburban maintains that it 

should have sufficed that DHL employees maintained custody 

of the cargo while loading it on the plane, regardless of 

whether the pilot adequately supervised them. 

Acknowledging that the DHL employees were neither 

Suburban employees nor its authorized representatives, 

Suburban emphasizes that they were bound by DHL’s own 

security agreement with TSA and had extensively screened 

the packages prior to delivering them.

Again, the standard of review disposes of this argument. 

The TFSSP could hardly have been more clear—Suburban 

“employees and authorized representatives are the only

individuals authorized to maintain custody and control of 

cargo” (emphasis added)—and the pilot was the only such 

individual on hand while the DHL packages were loaded onto 

the plane. Because the evidence shows that the pilot failed to 

watch the DHL employees at all times or inspect the cargo 

after it was loaded, the Administrator reasonably concluded 

that Suburban violated Section 8.1. True, requiring the pilot to 

supervise the DHL employees may be somewhat redundant 

given that DHL had already screened the cargo. But TSA 

emphasizes that redundancy plays an important role in

aviation security. Suburban has no authority to deviate from

the obligations set out in its TFSSP merely because it believes

them superfluous. 

C. 

Finally, Suburban contends that even if the TFSSP 

applied and even if the Administrator’s interpretations of 

Sections 6.2 and 8.1 were reasonable, Suburban’s due process 

rights were violated because it lacked fair notice of those 

interpretations. The “fair notice doctrine,” which began as a 

principle of due process in the criminal context and “has now 

been thoroughly ‘incorporated into administrative law,’ ” 

General Electric Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 

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1995) (quoting Satellite Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1, 

3 (D.C. Cir. 1987)), “prevents . . . deference from validating 

the application of a regulation that fails to give fair warning of 

the conduct it prohibits or requires,” Gates & Fox Co. v. 

OSHRC, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

This case, however, has nothing in common with the very 

limited set of cases in which we have upheld an agency 

interpretation but nevertheless vacated an enforcement action 

on notice grounds. For one thing, the TFSSP made clear that 

Suburban was required to have someone other than the pilot 

check the pilot’s ID and to have an employee or authorized 

representative maintain custody and control of the cargo. Cf. 

General Electric, 53 F.3d at 1330 (lack of fair notice where 

agency’s “interpretation [was] so far from a reasonable 

person’s understanding of the regulations that they could not 

have fairly informed [regulated parties] of the agency’s 

perspective”). Moreover, Suburban makes no argument that 

TSA previously interpreted those provisions differently, let 

alone that the company relied on any such interpretation. Cf. 

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317–

18 (2012) (lack of fair notice where agency “changed course” 

with respect to its interpretation of a governing statute); 

Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 

2167–68 (2012) (“potential for unfair surprise is acute” where 

agency failed to “suggest[ ] that it thought the industry was 

acting unlawfully”). Indeed, Suburban signed on to the 

TFSSP, discussed the issues that arose in this case with TSA 

inspectors prior to the October 6 inspection, and had an

opportunity to press its position in an adversarial hearing. 

Neither the Constitution nor administrative law fair-notice 

principles require anything more. 

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III.

For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for 

review.

So ordered.

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