Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_04-cv-00078/USCOURTS-ared-5_04-cv-00078-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Clifton Liggins
Plaintiff
Larry Norris
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

CLIFTON LIGGINS PETITIONER

vs. Civil Case No. 5:04CV00078 HLJ

LARRY NORRIS, Director, 

Arkansas Department of Correction RESPONDENT

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INSTRUCTIONS

The following recommended disposition has been sent to United

States District Court Judge James M. Moody. Any party may serve

and file written objections to this recommendation. Objections

should be specific and should include the factual or legal basis

for the objection. If the objection is to a factual finding,

specifically identify that finding and the evidence that supports

your objection. An original and one copy of your objections must

be received in the office of the United States District Court Clerk

no later than eleven (11) days from the date of the findings and

recommendations. The copy will be furnished to the opposing party.

Failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right

to appeal questions of fact.

If you are objecting to the recommendation and also desire to

submit new, different, or additional evidence, and to have a

hearing for this purpose before the District Judge, you must, at

the same time that you file your written objections, include the

following:

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1. Why the record made before the Magistrate Judge is

inadequate.

2. Why the evidence proffered at the hearing before

the District Judge (if such a hearing is granted)

was not offered at the hearing before the

Magistrate Judge. 

3. The detail of any testimony desired to be

introduced at the hearing before the District Judge

in the form of an offer of proof, and a copy, or

the original, of any documentary or other nontestimonial evidence desired to be introduced at

the hearing before the District Judge.

From this submission, the District Judge will determine the

necessity for an additional evidentiary hearing, either before the

Magistrate Judge or before the District Judge.

Mail your objections and “Statement of Necessity” to:

Clerk, United States District Court

Eastern District of Arkansas

600 West Capitol Avenue, Suite 402

Little Rock, AR 72201-3325

DISPOSITION

Now before the court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Clifton Liggins, an inmate of the

Arkansas Department of Correction. Petitioner was convicted by a

jury on March 4, 2003, of sixteen counts of breaking or entering

and one count of theft of property and received a sentence totaling

thirty years imprisonment. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed

his sentences on January 7, 2004 (Respondent’s Exhibit 2).

Petitioner did not seek post-conviction relief under Rule 37 of the

Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.

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In the present petition, he raises the following grounds for

relief:

1. Appellate counsel was ineffective because he would

not raise ineffective assistance of counsel on direct

appeal;

2. Trial counsel was ineffective in that he

A. failed to object on the basis of

insufficient evidence and/or lack of

specificity in the “BOLO” bulletin issued by

law enforcement authorities with regard to the

description of the vehicle and the

identification of the driver as “white” and

the passenger as a “black” female;

B. failed to attack the credibility or

impeach the testimony of the arresting

officer, Lance Blagg, who gave contradicting

testimony numerous times;

C. failed to object to a warrantless search

by the arresting officer, as he did not advise

Petitioner of his right to refuse consent for

a search of the vehicle and he did not have a

valid search warrant;

D. failed to impeach the testimony of Sgt.

Donaldson, the officer who transmitted the

faulty “BOLO,”(be on the lookout), the

complainant Ms. Nolan, or the criminal

investigator, Charles Blevins, who all gave

conflicting testimony throughout the trial;

E. failed to object to the fact that

Petitioner was stopped in Lincoln County and

ordered by the officer to drive the U-Haul

truck into Desha County, which is in another

jurisdiction, without being under arrest,

signing any extradition papers or being

informed of his constitutional rights; and

F. failed to raise the fact that the

arresting officer violated Rule 3.1 of the

Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure by

detaining Petitioner for more than forty-five

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1 Petitioner attempted to raise here the claim that he was

sentenced in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531

(2004), but in an Order entered on May 25, 2005, the court denied

permission for Petitioner to amend to add this allegation. In an

Order entered on June 15, 2005, the court mistakenly directed

Petitioner to amend to add specific allegations in support of his

Blakely claim and the Respondent to respond. Petitioner does not

refer to Blakely in the petition he filed on July 15, 2005. In any

event, Petitioner would not be entitled to relief under Blakely

because the Supreme Court has not made that case retroactive to

cases on collateral review. Never Misses a Shot, 413 F.3d 781 (8th

Cir. 2005).

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minutes on the side of the road and for an

hour in the parking lot of the police station

during a routine traffic stop;

3. The trial court abused its discretion by allowing the

prosecutor to impeach his testimony with his prior

criminal history; and

4. The trial court erred in denying his motion to

suppress evidence based on lack of probable cause for a

traffic stop, search and arrest because the “BOLO”

bulletin gave a generic description of the vehicle, the

driver and the passenger.1

I.

None of Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel are properly before this court, because he did not raise

them in state court. Abdullah v. Groose, 75 F.3d 408, 411 (8th

Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1215 (1996). If a petitioner has not

fairly presented his claims to the state courts, or has not

presented them in a procedurally correct manner, Wainwright v.

Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977), requires him to demonstrate adequate

cause for this default and actual prejudice resulting from the

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constitutional violation he asserts. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.

478, 488 (1986). In order to establish cause, a petitioner must

show "some objective factor external to the defense impeded

counsel's efforts to comply with a State's procedural rule," such

as "a showing that the factual or legal basis for the claim was not

reasonably available," or that "interference by officials made

compliance impracticable." Id. In Arkansas, a defendant must

present his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a motion

for post-conviction relief under Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of

Criminal Procedure. Petitioner asserts appellate counsel would not

assert the claims on direct appeal, but he does not explain why he

did not raise the claims himself in a Rule 37 motion. See Smittie

v. Lockhart, 843 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1988)(holding that petitioner's

pro se status in post-conviction proceedings is not sufficient

cause for a procedural default, even if he has a low educational

level); Vasquez v. Lockhart, 867 F.2d l056 (8th Cir. l988), cert.

denied, 490 U.S. 110 (1989)(holding that petitioner's pro se status

and lack of familiarity with the language and the court system is

not sufficient cause for a procedural default); Williams v.

Lockhart, 873 F.2d 1129, 1130 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.

942 (1989)(holding that ignorance of the law is not sufficient

cause to excuse a pro se petitioner's failure to file a postconviction motion under Rule 37). Thus, I find Petitioner has not

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established sufficient cause for his default and the claims are

procedurally defaulted. 

A claim of "actual innocence" may excuse a petitioner from

showing cause for his failure to raise an issue previously, and is

a "gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass" before the

court may consider procedurally defaulted claims. Schlup v. Delo,

513 U.S. 298 (1995). Schlup requires a petitioner to present "new

reliable evidence--whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence,

trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence" to

establish his innocence. Id. at 324. Petitioner has not asserted

any evidence to suggest his actual innocence and, thus, there is no

basis for allowing him to pass through the gateway. Grounds one

and two are procedurally barred and may not be considered by this

court.

II.

Ground three is the claim that the trial court abused its

discretion by allowing the prosecutor to impeach Petitioner’s

testimony with his prior criminal history. On direct appeal, the

Arkansas Court of Appeals made the following statement of the case:

On July 8, 2002, Sergeant Jamie Donaldson of the Dumas

Police Department was dispatched to a local mini-storage

building after Kerry Nolan reported that someone had

broken into her storage unit. When the officer arrived at

the storage building, Ms. Nolan informed him that when

she arrived at her storage unit she saw a "van type

U-Haul" blocking her unit and that a black male and a

black female were loading items into the U-Haul. She also

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said that she found the lock cut off her unit and that

several items were missing from inside. Ms. Nolan

indicated that she had last seen the U-Haul traveling

north on Highway 65. Sergeant Donaldson sent out a

"NCIC-ACIC BOLO" (BOLO) to the surrounding areas for the

vehicle and two suspects. He described the suspects as a

black male and black female driving a U-Haul. Following

the BOLO, Sergeant Donaldson called Officer Charles

Blevins for backup.

Officer Lance Blagg of the Grady Police Department

received the BOLO and while he was performing a traffic

stop, a U-Haul containing a black male and black female

passed him. Upon completing the traffic stop, Officer

Blagg pursued the U-Haul and initiated a traffic stop.

Officer Blagg informed the driver that the Dumas Police

Department was looking for the U-Haul. Officer Blagg said

that appellant gave him his name and driver's license.

Appellant then complied with Officer Blagg's request to

follow him to the police station. Officer Blagg detained

appellant and his passenger until Officer Blevins

arrived.

Officer Blevins was accompanied by Ms. Nolan. When they

arrived, appellant got out of the U-Haul and Ms. Nolan

identified him as the man she had seen at the

mini-storage building. Appellant consented to a search of

the U-Haul. Inside, Officer Blevins found a couch,

television, and other items. Ms. Nolan's items were found

in the front of the U-Haul. Officer Blevins took

appellant and the passenger into custody and had the

U-Haul towed back to Dumas. Appellant was subsequently

charged with sixteen counts of breaking or entering and

one count of theft of property. 

Liggins v. State, 2004 WL 33627, *1 (Ark.App. Jan.7,

2004)(Respondent’s Exhibit 2). 

Prior to Petitioner’s testimony in the guilt phase of the

trial, counsel objected to the prosecution’s planned use of prior

convictions to impeach him on cross-examination. The court

overruled his objection, Petitioner testified and the prosecutor

cross-examined him and presented the evidence of his prior

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convictions. Defense counsel requested, and the trial court gave,

the following instruction to the jury: 

Ladies and gentlemen, I’m going to give you instructions

now on previous conviction for impeachment purposes. The

instruction is that evidence that a witness has

previously been convicted of a crime or crimes may be

considered by you for the purpose of judging the

credibility of the witness but not as evidence of guilt

of the Defendant.

Respondent’s Exhibit 5, p. 377.

On appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals found as follows:

Rule 609(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence provides:

For the purpose of attacking the credibility

of a witness, evidence that he has been

convicted of a crime shall be admitted but

only if the crime (1) was punishable by death

or imprisonment in excess of one [1] year

under the law under which he was convicted,

and the court determines that the probative

value of admitting this evidence outweighs its

prejudicial effect to a party or a witness, or

(2) involved dishonesty or false statement,

regardless of the punishment. 

Rule 609 gives the State the right to impeach the

credibility of a witness. Turner v. State, 325 Ark. 237,

926 S.W.2d 843 (1996). However, the trial court has

considerable discretion in determining whether the

probative value of prior convictions outweighs their

prejudicial effect, and that decision will not be

reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id.

The admissibility of a prior conviction for impeachment

purposes is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.

Schalski v. State, 322 Ark. 63, 907 S.W.2d 693 (1995).

Factors to consider include the impeachment value of the

prior crime, the date of the conviction and the

defendant's subsequent history, the similarity between

the prior conviction and the crime charged, the

importance of the defendant's testimony, and the

centrality of the credibility issue. Id. This court has

consistently allowed prior convictions to be used for

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impeachment purposes, even when the convictions are for

similar crimes to those charged. Id.

Appellant had twelve prior felony convictions in the

State of Arkansas. These included ten convictions for

felony burglaries and thefts of property, one conviction

for possession of a firearm and one conviction for

possession of a controlled substance. The burglary and

theft-of-property convictions are substantially similar

to the crimes charged. Under these circumstances we

cannot conclude that the trail court abused its

discretion when it allowed the State to impeach appellant

with his prior felony convictions.

Liggins v. State, 2004 WL 33627, *3 (Ark.App.Jan.7,2004)

(Respondent’s Exhibit 2). The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act

provides that, when a habeas petitioner's claim has been

adjudicated on the merits in state-court proceedings, a

federal court may not grant relief unless the state

court's adjudication of the claim "resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A state-court decision is contrary

to this Court's clearly established precedents if it

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set

forth in our cases, or if it confronts a set of facts

that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of

this Court but reaches a different result. Williams v.

Taylor, supra, at 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495; Early v. Packer,

537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002)(per

curiam). A state-court decision involves an unreasonable

application of this Court's clearly established

precedents if the state court applies this Court's

precedents to the facts in an objectively unreasonable

manner. Williams v. Taylor, supra, at 405, 120 S.Ct.

1495; Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25, 123

S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (per curiam). 

Brown v. Payton, U.S. , 125 S.Ct. 1432, 1438 -1439 (2005).

The question of whether the admission of evidence violates

Arkansas’ rules of evidence is merely a matter of state law, and is

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2 Rule 609(a) provides: "For the purpose of attacking the

credibility of a witness, (1) evidence that a witness other than an

accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to

Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in

excess of one year under the law under which the witness was

convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such

a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the

probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its

prejudicial effect to the accused...."

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not subject to review in federal habeas corpus proceedings.

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). Moreover, the Eighth

Circuit has found the admission of prior convictions for purposes

of impeachment, in and of itself, does not raise a specific federal

constitutional question. Amos v. State of Minn., 849 F.2d 1070,

1073 (8th Cir. 1988). In addition, the Federal Rules of Evidence

contain an almost identical rule allowing impeachment in federal

courts with prior convictions.2 As the Supreme Court has

explained, 

both the Government and the defendant in a criminal trial

must make choices as the trial progresses. For example,

the defendant must decide whether or not to take the

stand in her own behalf. If she has an innocent or

mitigating explanation for evidence that might otherwise

incriminate, acquittal may be more likely if she takes

the stand. Here, for example, Ohler testified that she

had no knowledge of the marijuana discovered in the van,

that the van had been taken to Mexico without her

permission, and that she had gone there simply to

retrieve the van. But once the defendant testifies, she

is subject to cross-examination, including impeachment by

prior convictions, and the decision to take the stand may

prove damaging instead of helpful. A defendant has a

further choice to make if she decides to testify,

notwithstanding a prior conviction. The defendant must

choose whether to introduce the conviction on direct

examination and remove the sting or to take her chances

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with the prosecutor's possible elicitation of the

conviction on cross-examination.

* * *

[A]s we said in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,

215, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971): "It has long

been held that a defendant who takes the stand in his own

behalf cannot then claim the privilege against

cross-examination on matters reasonably related to the

subject matter of his direct examination.... It is not

thought overly harsh in such situations to require that

the determination whether to waive the privilege take

into account the matters which may be brought out on

cross-examination. It is also generally recognized that

a defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf may be

impeached by proof of prior convictions or the like....

Again, it is not thought inconsistent with the

enlightened administration of criminal justice to require

the defendant to weigh such pros and cons in deciding

whether to testify."

Ohler v. U.S., 529 U.S. 753, 757-758 (2000).

The state court’s ruling was not contrary to Supreme Court

precedent. The only question is whether the court’s denial of the

claim was objectively unreasonable. 

On cross-examination, Petitioner admitted to all of the prior

convictions, and he admitted he was present at the scene of the

crime on the night in question. When the police stopped him, he

was driving a U-haul containing furniture and other items that had

been stolen from storage units. Two witnesses identified him as

the person they saw removing some of the items from one of the

units. Petitioner denied any connection with the truck or with

removing the items from the units. After the prosecution’s crossexamination, the trial court instructed the jury that the prior

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convictions were only to be considered by them as evidence of

Petitioner’s credibility. It was not unreasonable for the Arkansas

Court of Appeals to find the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in allowing Petitioner’s impeachment with his prior

convictions. 

III.

Petitioner’s fourth claim is that the trial court erred in

denying his motion to suppress. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465

(1976), the Supreme Court held that "where the State has provided

an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment

claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus

relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional

search or seizure was introduced at trial." Id. at 482. 

It is the existence of state processes allowing an

opportunity for full and fair litigation of fourth

amendment claims, rather than a defendant's use of those

processes, that bars federal habeas corpus consideration

of claims under Stone. "[I]f state procedures afford the

defendant in a criminal case the opportunity to [fully

and fairly] litigate whether evidence obtained in

violation of the fourth amendment should be excluded ...

then Stone v. Powell precludes federal habeas corpus

consideration of those issues whether or not the

defendant avails himself of that opportunity."

Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804, 808 (8th Cir. 1981). "The Stone bar

applies despite a state court's error in deciding the merits of a

defendant's fourth amendment claim." Id. The only inquiry is

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whether the state has provided an opportunity for full and fair

hearing, or "the prisoner was foreclosed from using that procedure

because of an unconscionable breakdown in the system." Willet v.

Lockhart, 37 F.3d 1265, 1273 (8th Cir. 1994). Not only did

Arkansas provide a full and fair opportunity for Petitioner to

present his Fourth Amendment claims, but he availed himself of

those procedures. He merely disagrees with the outcome.

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on ground four.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this petition be, and it is

hereby, dismissed with prejudice. The relief prayed for is denied.

Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing (DE # 13) is

denied. 

SO ORDERED this 31st day of August, 2005.

 

United States Magistrate Judge

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