Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02180/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02180-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dennis Joseph Hadash
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

1

 The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2180

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Dennis Joseph Hadash, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: May 12, 2004

Filed: May 27, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, HEANEY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Dennis Hadash pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of six firearms in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). The district court1

 sentenced Hadash to four years of

probation, restitution ($834), and a fine ($3,000). The government appeals, asserting

that the district court erred in applying United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual

(U.S.S.G.) § 2K2.1(b)(2) and that the district court was not justified in stating that it

would alternatively depart downward to the same level. Although we agree that the

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district court incorrectly applied U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2), we affirm the downward

departure in light of recent changes to our sentencing laws.

I.

While working as a maintenance employee at the United States Postal Service’s

mail recovery center in St. Paul, Minnesota, Hadash stole six semi-automatic

handguns that were in storage at the facility because they had been rejected by the

addressee. Hadash used some of the guns for target practice, gave one to a neighbor,

and sold one to his girlfriend’s son. When questioned, Hadash quickly confessed.

He entered into a plea agreement, admitting that he possessed stolen firearms and

agreeing to forfeit all his interest in the guns.

The parties agreed that U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(7) established a base offense level

of 12. The district court applied two two-level increases because six firearms were

involved, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A), and because Hadash abused a position of trust

when he stole mail while working as a postal service employee. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3.

Because of his acceptance of responsibility, Hadash received a three-level reduction.

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. This calculation resulted in an offense level of 13, absent

additional departures, with a range of 12 to 18 months’ imprisonment for a defendant

with a criminal history category of I. The government argued that no other departures

were warranted.

The district court, however, applied a six-level downward guideline adjustment

for collection of firearms, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2), acknowledging that it was utilizing

“a broad definition to the term [‘collection’].” The district court stated in the

alternative, however, that if the collections provision could not be appropriately

applied, it would nevertheless depart to precisely the same range. It cited Koon v.

United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), implying that it would find that there were

mitigating circumstances that were not adequately taken into consideration by the

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guidelines calculation. Id. at 94; see also U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. The six-level reduction

resulted in an offense level of seven, with a range of 0 to 6 months’ imprisonment.

II.

Although the Supreme Court changed the applicability of the sentencing

guidelines from mandatory to advisory in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738

(2005), we continue to review de novo challenges to the applicability of the

guidelines. See United States v. Mathijssen, No. 04-1995, slip op. at 3 (8th Cir. May

2, 2005). We also continue to review factual findings made by the district court for

clear error. United States v. Mashek, No. 04-2560, slip op. at 7-8 (8th Cir. May 10,

1005). Although Booker provided that we will review the ultimate sentence for

unreasonableness, the correct guidelines range is still “the critical starting point for

the imposition of a sentence.” Id. at 6 n.4. We therefore utilize the following

approach to review. We first ask whether the district court correctly applied the

guidelines in determining a guidelines sentencing range. Id. at 7. If the guidelines

were correctly applied, we then consider whether the sentence chosen by the district

court was reasonable in light of all the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Haack,

403 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir. 2005). If, however, the guidelines were incorrectly

applied, “we will remand for resentencing as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1)

without reaching the reasonableness of the resulting sentence in light of § 3553(a).”

Mashek, slip op. at 8. Remand is unnecessary, however, if the error in application

was harmless, such as when the district court would have imposed the same sentence

absent the error. Id.

We conclude that it was clear error for the district court to conclude, in light

of contrary evidence, that Hadash possessed the six firearms at issue “solely for

lawful sporting purposes or collection” and to apply a six-level departure under

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2). That conclusion is contrary to our precedent and amounts

to an improper application of the plain meaning of the guideline. U.S.S.G. §

2K2.1(b)(2) states:

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2

 Sections 401(d)(1) and (2) of the PROTECT Act, Pub. L. 108-21 (2003),

amended 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) and altered the level of deference the court of appeals

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If the defendant . . . possessed all ammunition and firearms solely for

lawful sporting purposes or collection, and did not unlawfully discharge

or otherwise unlawfully use such firearms or ammunition, decrease the

offense level determined above to level 6.

For this section to apply, the defendant has the burden of proving that its terms have

been met. See United States v. Letts, 264 F.3d 787, 791 (8th Cir. 2001). The

defendant must prove that every firearm at issue was possessed solely for the purpose

of collection. See United States v. Ramirez-Rios, 270 F.3d 1185, 1187 (8th Cir.

2001).

Nothing in the record indicates that Hadash has met this burden. He did not

even keep all of the six firearms, but gave one away and sold another. Nor did

Hadash present any evidence that he stored or used the guns in a manner that reflected

the collection purpose. Indeed, Hadash’s counsel acknowledged during the

sentencing hearing that “the argument was never intended to be that this was a lawful

collection” and that Hadash very likely “had nothing like that in mind when he stole

the guns.” Sentencing Tr. at 5.

Although we conclude that the district court erred in its application of U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.1, we find that the error was harmless because the district court stated that it

alternatively would depart to the same level if the provision did not apply.

Sentencing Tr. at 8. We therefore ask whether the decision to depart from the

correctly determined guidelines range of 12 to 18 months’ imprisonment down to a

term of probation and a fine was reasonable.

We have stated that our reasonableness review is akin to the pre-PROTECT

Act2

 appellate practice for reviewing downward departures: abuse of discretion

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gave to the district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines to the facts; it

required de novo review of whether a departure was or was not justified by the facts

of the case. See United States v. Aguilar-Portillo, 334 F.3d 744, 749-50 (8th Cir.

2003). Booker, however, excised § 3742(e) and expressly rejected de novo review

of departures. 125 S. Ct. at 764.

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review. See United States v. Dalton, No. 04-1361, slip op. at 6 (8th Cir. Apr. 13,

2005); Mashek, slip op. at 8. If the district court departs, it must still “provide the

reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” Mashek, slip op. at 6 n.4; see

also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). Our review differs from pre-PROTECT Act review,

however, because our primary point of reference is now § 3553(a), see Booker, 125

S. Ct. at 765, instead of § 3553(b) as interpreted in Koon, 518 U.S. at 92-93

(elaborating the application of § 3742(e) before the PROTECT Act). Prior to the

PROTECT Act, departures not specifically enumerated in the guidelines were

allowed if they fell within the exception in § 3553(b), which stated that the district

court “shall impose a sentence” within the guidelines range unless “mitigating

circumstances” existed that were “not adequately taken into consideration by the

Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). The

district court could consider only the “sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and

official commentary of the Sentencing Commission” in its consideration of whether

the Commission adequately accounted for a particular circumstance. Id.; see also

U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(a)(1). It could depart without abusing its discretion if the case was

“unusual enough for it to fall outside the heartland of cases in the Guideline” at issue,

based on whether the Sentencing Commission had forbidden, encouraged, or

discouraged consideration of certain relevant facts. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 98-100.

In addition to excising the PROTECT Act provision, § 3742(e), however, Booker also

excised § 3553(b) and its narrow prescription for when departures are warranted. See

Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764. 

After Booker, therefore, we ask “whether the district court’s decision to grant

a § 3553(a) variance from the appropriate guidelines range is reasonable, and whether

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the extent of any § 3553(a) variance or guidelines departure is reasonable.” Mashek,

slip op. at 9. Because the guidelines are now advisory, a reasonable departure is not

limited solely to circumstances that the formerly mandatory guidelines framework

would have deemed permissible bases for departure. We must consider more broadly

whether the district court considered and weighed the § 3553(a) factors in addition

to the recommended guidelines range and stated its reasons for choosing the

particular sentence. We recognize that deference is often appropriate because the

district court is in a better position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to find

the relevant facts. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 97; United States v. Wells, 127 F.3d 739,

748 (8th Cir. 1997). Although the sentencing court has discretion to impose a

sentence once it has considered all the § 3553(a) factors, its ruling “may be

unreasonable if [it] fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received

significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or

considers only appropriate factors but nevertheless commits a clear error of judgment

by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the limited range of choice dictated by the

facts of the case.” Haack, 403 F.3d at 1004.

We conclude that the district court’s decision to depart downward was

reasonable based on the § 3553(a) factors. Although the district court was operating

under the mandatory guidelines framework, it listed several § 3553(a) factors to

justify the departure from the recommended guidelines range. For example, it

addressed “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and

characteristics of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), when it stated that Hadash

was simply “a law abiding citizen, who [did] an incredibly dumb thing.” In addition,

the district court’s statement that most gun cases involve “people that get themselves

guns to do very bad things” reflects that it considered “the need for the sentence

imposed” for purposes of just punishment, adequate deterrence, and correctional

treatment, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), and that it concluded that Hadash was not the

type of defendant the guidelines section was designed to punish. In a word, the

district court considered appropriate factors and reasonably concluded that Hadash’s

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circumstances were such that a lower sentence would not cause unwarranted

sentencing disparities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

The sentence is affirmed.

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