Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00184/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00184-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Elaine Margreat Rosalia
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELAINE MARGREAT ROSALIA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-0184-CKD

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying applications for Disability Income Benefits (“DIB”) and

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act 

(“Act”), respectively. For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment and grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, born October 31, 1956, applied on November 18, 2011 for DIB and on 

November 23, 2011 for SSI, alleging disability beginning March 15, 2008. Administrative 

Transcript (“AT”) 10, 18, 172-88. Plaintiff alleged she was unable to work due to depression, 

anxiety, lower back pain, rheumatoid arthritis in both hands, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, and 

degenerative disc disease and arthritis in her lumbar spine. AT 217. In a decision dated July 29, 

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2013, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled.1 AT 10-20. The ALJ made the 

following findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. omitted):

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through December 31, 2013.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 

March 15, 2008, the alleged onset date.

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: carpal tunnel 

syndrome, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, major 

depressive disorder, panic disorder with agoraphobia, posttraumatic 

stress disorder, bipolar disorder, and borderline personality traits.

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

 

1 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to 

disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in 

part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A 

parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. See

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920, 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 

140-142 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to 

perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) and 

416.967(c) except: she could lift, carry, push, and/or pull 50 pounds 

and 25 pounds frequently; she could stand and/or walk for 6 hours 

in an 8-hour workday; she does not require the use of a hand-held 

assistive device; she could sit without restriction; she could 

frequently handle and finger bilaterally; and she could perform 

simple, unskilled work.

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work.

7. The claimant was born on October 31, 1956 and was 51 years 

old, which is defined as an individual closely approaching advanced 

age, on the alleged disability onset date. The claimant subsequently 

changed age category to advanced age.

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to 

communicate in English.

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination 

of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a 

framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” 

whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills.

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, 

and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can 

perform.

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from March 15, 2008, through the date of this 

decision.

AT 12-20. 

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the following errors in finding plaintiff not 

disabled: (1) improperly determined that the opinion of consultative psychologist Dr. Patty that 

plaintiff had social interaction difficulties was entitled to “little weight” when determining 

plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”); (2) improperly relied on the Medical Vocational 

Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 (the “Grids”) to find plaintiff not 

disabled at step five; and (3) failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for finding plaintiff’s 

testimony less than fully credible.

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III. LEGAL STANDARDS

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

“The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 

Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 

conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 

affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 

also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 

administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 

or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 

1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in 

weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The ALJ did not err in Considering the Medical Evidence

First, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by giving “little weight” to the opinion of Dr. 

Patty, a consultative examining psychologist, that plaintiff had “moderate” social interaction 

difficulties without providing sufficient reasons for doing so.2

 

2

The ALJ also gave “little weight” to the opinions of non-examining physicians Dr. Kang and 

Dr. Tashjian that plaintiff had “moderate” difficulties with social interaction for the same reasons 

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The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by 

treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 

1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a 

greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 

F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). 

To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to 

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record, 

and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 

F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be 

rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 

830. While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is 

contradicted by a supported examining professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different 

independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). In 

any event, the ALJ need not give weight to conclusory opinions supported by minimal clinical 

findings. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir.1999) (treating physician’s conclusory, 

minimally supported opinion rejected); see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The opinion of a 

non-examining professional, without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a 

treating or examining professional. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831.

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he expressed with regard to the similar opinion provided by Dr. Patty. AT 17. In her motion for 

summary judgment, plaintiff’s arguments regarding the ALJ’s consideration of the medical 

evidence primarily addresses only the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Patty’s opinion and only obliquely 

addresses the ALJ’s consideration of the opinions of Dr. Kang and Dr. Tashjian. See ECF No. 14 

at 10-17. Nevertheless, because the ALJ addressed the concurring opinions of Dr. Kang and Dr. 

Tashjian in the exact same manner he addressed Dr. Patty’s opinion, the court’s discussion below 

with regard to Dr. Patty’s opinion is equally applicable to the ALJ’s consideration of the opinions 

of Dr. Kang and Dr. Tashjian.

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Here, Dr. Patty performed a comprehensive psychological examination of plaintiff on 

February 24, 2012 and opined, inter alia, that plaintiff had “moderate restrictions” in her ability 

to do detailed and complex instructions; relate and interact with coworkers and the public; 

maintain concentration and attention, persistence, and pace; associate with day-to-day work 

activity, including attendance and safety; and maintain regular attendance in the workplace and 

perform work activities on a consistent basis. AT 326-31. She opined that plaintiff had “no 

restrictions” with regard to all other aspects of mental functioning. AT 330-31. The ALJ

generally gave Dr. Patty’s opinion “significant weight” because it was largely consistent with 

plaintiff’s treatment records demonstrating that plaintiff ‘s psychiatric conditions were well 

controlled. AT 17. However, he determined that Dr. Patty’s opinion that plaintiff had 

“moderate” social interaction difficulties was entitled to only “little weight” because: “Dr. Patty 

observed no attitude or behavioral issues upon mental status examination and the claimant has not 

sought any dedicated counseling to address any social interaction issues.” Id.

Plaintiff contends that these were insufficient reasons to discount this particular aspect of 

Dr. Patty’s opinion. Particularly, plaintiff asserts that Dr. Patty’s own mental examination notes 

in the record actually support the “moderate” social interaction limitations opined by Dr. Patty, 

rather than detract from them as the ALJ reasoned. Plaintiff points to Dr. Patty’s notes that 

plaintiff exhibited a restricted affect, reported feeling useless, and was tearful during the 

examination to support her argument. However, specifically with regard to plaintiff’s “social 

history,” Dr. Patty noted that plaintiff “got along fairly well with people at work,” was “liv[ing] 

with a friend,” and had “fair” relationships with her family and friends” despite indications that 

plaintiff tried to avoid them at times. AT 329-30. These examination findings provided the ALJ 

with substantial evidence to properly support his determination that Dr. Patty’s opinion that 

plaintiff had “moderate” limitations regarding social interaction was entitled to reduced weight 

because it conflicted with Dr. Patty’s own examination findings. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 

F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that incongruities between a treating physician’s 

objective medical findings and that physician’s opinion constitute specific and legitimate reasons 

for the ALJ to reject that physician’s opinion concerning the claimant’s functional limitations); 

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Rollins, 261 F.3d at 856 (holding that the ALJ properly discounted a treating physician’s 

functional recommendations that “were so extreme as to be implausible and were not supported 

by any findings made by any doctor,” including the treating physician’s own findings). 

Similarly, the ALJ also properly determined that Dr. Patty’s opinion regarding social 

interaction was entitled to lesser weight because it conflicted with the lack of evidence in the 

record showing that plaintiff had sought counseling in order to address social interaction issues. 

Indeed, Dr. Patty herself noted that plaintiff “has not received any psychiatric treatment.” AT 

327. Plaintiff speculatively argues that she could have been seeking psychiatric treatment from 

her primary care physician and that the ALJ’s failure to inquire into this possibility during the 

administrative hearing precludes him from using plaintiff’s apparent lack of psychiatric treatment 

as a reason for discounting Dr. Patty’s opinion. However, the record simply provides no support 

for such theorizing. Plaintiff carries the burden of proof in establishing the existence of such an 

arrangement, see Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5, and the record reflects that she has failed to do so 

here. 

Moreover, even had the ALJ erred in discounting Dr. Patty’s opinion concerning

plaintiff’s social restrictions, it would have been harmless error under the circumstances presented 

in this case. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“we may not reverse an 

ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless”). As noted above, Dr. Patty opined that 

plaintiff had, at worst, “moderate” limitations with regard to social functioning. AT 331. The 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that moderate mental limitations are not sufficiently 

severe so as to require vocational expert testimony. Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (involving an assessment that the claimant was moderately limited in “his ability to 

maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; his ability to perform activities within 

a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual with customary tolerance; and his ability 

to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruption from psychologically-based 

symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest 

periods.”); see also Martin v. Astrue, 2013 WL 552932, at *8-*9 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2013) (had 

the ALJ erred by failing to adopt or give greater weight to a consultative examining psychiatrist’s 

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opinion that the plaintiff had “moderate social functioning limitations,” such error would have 

been harmless). Accordingly, even had the ALJ fully adopted Dr. Patty’s opinion regarding this 

“moderate” mental limitation, the ALJ still could have relied on the Grids in the manner that he 

did to determine that plaintiff was not disabled. Therefore, even had the ALJ improperly 

discounted the opinion of Dr. Patty, such error would have been harmless.

B. The ALJ did not err in Relying on the Grids to Determine that Plaintiff was not 

Disabled

Next, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in relying on the Grids to determine that plaintiff 

was not disabled at step five of the analysis. In particular, she argues that the ALJ’s

determination that plaintiff’s RFC limited her to “simple, unskilled work” and frequent bilateral 

handling and fingering precluded the ALJ from solely utilizing the Grids to determine that 

plaintiff was not disabled because these non-exertional limitations were sufficiently severe so as 

to significantly limit the range of work permitted by the plaintiff’s exertional limitation to 

medium work. For the reasons discussed below, this argument is without merit.

The Grids take administrative notice of the numbers of unskilled jobs that exist throughout 

the national economy at various functional levels. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 

200.00(b). An ALJ may resort to the Grids at step five of the sequential analysis to determine 

whether there exists unskilled work within the national economy for which the claimant is 

capable of performing. “The ALJ can use the [G]rids without vocational expert testimony when a 

non-exertional limitation is alleged because the [G]rids provide for the evaluation of claimants

asserting both exertional and non-exertional limitations. But the [G]rids are inapplicable when a 

claimant’s non-exertional limitations are sufficiently severe so as to significantly limit the range 

of work permitted by the claimant’s exertional limitations.” Hoopai, 499 F.3d at 1075 (citations 

and quotation marks omitted). In such instances, the testimony of a vocational expert is required. 

Id. 

Here, plaintiff’s assertion that her limitation to “simple, unskilled work” precluded the 

ALJ from relying exclusively on the Grids is frivolous. The Grids specifically take into account 

limitations to unskilled work and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that the more

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severe restriction to “nonpublic, simple, repetitive work” does not constitute a non-exertional 

limitation sufficient to prevent an ALJ from relying solely on the Grids. Angulo v. Colvin, 577 F. 

App’x 686, 687 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the plaintiff’s “restriction to nonpublic, simple, 

repetitive work” did not preclude the ALJ from only using the Grids to determine that the plaintiff 

was not disabled); see also 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2. 

Similarly, plaintiff’s assertion that her non-exertional limitation to frequent bilateral 

handling and fingering precluded the ALJ from exclusively relying on the Grids at step five is 

without merit. With regard to fingering limitations, Social Security Ruling (“SSR”)385-15 notes 

that the “loss of fine manual dexterity narrows the sedentary and light ranges of work much more 

than it does the medium, heavy, and very heavy ranges of work.” 1985 WL 56857. It also notes 

with regard to handling impairments that “[v]arying degrees of limitations would have different 

effects, and the assistance of a [vocational specialist] may be needed to determine the effects of 

the limitations.” Id. The ALJ here properly determined that plaintiff generally had the ability to 

perform work at a “medium” exertional level. AT 15. He further determined that plaintiff was 

limited to “frequent” fingering and handling activities, thus indicating that she was only 

minimally limited in these abilities. Given plaintiff’s RFC to perform “medium work” and the

minor degree of limitation in her abilities to finger and handle, the court concludes that these 

limitations are not so severe so as to significantly limit the range of work plaintiff could have 

performed. Accordingly, the ALJ was not required to obtain the testimony of a vocational expert 

and did not err in relying on the Grids to find plaintiff not disabled at step five.

C. The ALJ did not err in Finding Plaintiff Less Than Fully Credible

Lastly, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by determining that plaintiff’s testimony 

regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms was not entirely

credible. This argument is not well taken.

 

3

Social Security Rulings “represent precedent final opinions and orders and statements of policy 

and interpretations that we have adopted.” 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1). Social Security Rulings are 

“binding on all components of the Social Security Administration.” Heckler v. Edwards, 465 

U.S. 870, 873 n.3 (1984); cf. Silveira v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 2000) (“This court 

defer[s] to Social Security Rulings ... unless they are plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 

Act or regulations”).

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The ALJ determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the court defers to the 

ALJ’s discretion if the ALJ used the proper process and provided proper reasons. See, e.g., 

Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1995). If credibility is critical, the ALJ must make an 

explicit credibility finding. Albalos v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 871, 873-74 (9th Cir. 1990); Rashad v. 

Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring explicit credibility finding to be 

supported by “a specific, cogent reason for the disbelief”). 

In evaluating whether subjective complaints are credible, the ALJ should first consider 

objective medical evidence and then consider other factors. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 

344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). If there is objective medical evidence of an impairment, the ALJ 

then may consider the nature of the symptoms alleged, including aggravating factors, medication, 

treatment and functional restrictions. See id. at 345-47. The ALJ also may consider: (1) the 

applicant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements or other inconsistent 

testimony, (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a 

prescribed course of treatment, and (3) the applicant’s daily activities. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 

1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); see generally SSR 96-7P, 61 FR 34483-01; SSR 95-5P, 60 FR 55406-

01; SSR 88-13. Work records, physician and third party testimony about nature, severity and 

effect of symptoms, and inconsistencies between testimony and conduct also may be relevant. 

Light v. Social Security Administration, 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). A failure to seek 

treatment for an allegedly debilitating medical problem may be a valid consideration by the ALJ 

in determining whether the alleged associated pain is not a significant non-exertional impairment. 

See Flaten v. Secretary of HHS, 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ may rely, in part, 

on his or her own observations, see Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir. 

1989), which cannot substitute for medical diagnosis. Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 177 n.6 

(9th Cir. 1990). “Without affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, the 

Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be clear and convincing.” 

Morgan v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999).

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Here, the ALJ provided the following reasons in support of his adverse credibility 

determination:

First, the claimant[’s] . . . . allegations are inconsistent with clinical indications 

that show that her condition is well controlled. For example, physical 

examinations of the back, wrists, and knees have often revealed few significant 

findings except for some tenderness and some decreased range of motion about the 

spine and wrists. The record documents no specialized care. Consistent with 

medium exertional-type work, the claimant reported that she performed a house 

cleaning job on March 14, 2011. As recently as March 23, 2013, claimant 

reported that she was performing yard work. By April 30, 2013, the claimant 

reported that she engages in a “[v]igorous activity level” and that she exercises 

“daily.”

When the claimant presented to emergency care on March 23, 2012 with 

complaints of back pain, physical examination again revealed few significant 

findings and radiographs revealed “[m]ild” to “[m]inimal” findings with only 

moderate narrowing at the L3-4 level. In fact, the claimant was discharged in a 

“[s]table” condition with a recommendation to merely avoid heavy lifting.

The claimant’s psychiatric condition similarly appears well controlled. The 

claimant has conservatively treated at primary care rather than counseling or 

therapy. Progress notes show few significant mental status examination findings. 

In fact, the claimant’s most serious complaints have occurred during periods of 

active alcohol abuse. When the claimant was hospitalized in August 2009 and 

April 2013, she was noted to have engaged in alcohol abuse. When sober, the 

claimant reported “feeling better” with improved sleep and that she “feels good 

about being alcohol free but admits it is difficult to stay sober.”

Second, the claimant[’s] . . . allegations are inconsistent with medical opinions that 

show that she has a considerable ability to work despite her impairments. 

Consultative physician Kristof Siciarz, M.D., examined the claimant on February 

24, 2012, and opined that even with her impairments, she could lift, carry, push, 

and/or pull 50 pounds and 25 pounds frequently; she could stand and/or walk for 6 

hours in an 8-hour workday; she does not require the use of a hand-held assistive 

device; she could sit without restriction; and she could perform manipulations 

without limitation.

. . . 

The claimant’s allegations are partially supported by her use of prescription 

medication; her use of assistive devices such as a cane, wrist braces, and a back 

brace; her previous requirement for carpal tunnel surgery; radiographic findings of 

spinal degeneration. The claimant has been placed on two psychiatric holds with 

suicidal ideation, wherein her global assessment of functioning score reached as 

low as 30.

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However, the weight of the evidence shows that while the claimant may 

experience some level of pain and psychiatric symptoms, it is so well controlled 

such that she could nonetheless perform a wide range of unskilled medium 

exertional work.

AT 17 (citations to the record omitted). These constituted clear and convincing reasons for 

discounting plaintiff’s testimony that were supported by substantial evidence from the record.

First, the ALJ determined that the evidence in the record that plaintiff’s impairments were

generally well controlled and that plaintiff’s treatment for those impairments was relatively 

conservative undermined her complaints of disabling symptoms. This was a proper 

consideration. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that 

a favorable response to conservative treatment undermines complaints of disabling symptoms); 

Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We have previously indicated that evidence 

of conservative treatment is sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony regarding severity of an 

impairment”); Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989); Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (a condition that can be controlled or corrected by 

medication is not disabling for purposes of determining eligibility for benefits under the Act). It 

was also supported by substantial evidence in the record. Plaintiff’s treatment records generally 

show that the only forms of treatment she received with regard to her complaints of back pain 

were pain medications and routine medical checkups. See e.g., AT 289-290, 314, 318, 335-40, 

403, 423, 426, 445. Similarly, while the record does show that plaintiff was briefly hospitalized 

twice, once in 2009 and once in 2013, for attempting suicide, it also shows that these were shortlived acute episodes brought on by traumatic events and plaintiff’s use of alcohol, that plaintiff’s 

mental state was largely stable throughout the relevant period, and that plaintiff received only 

treatment in the form of medication for her mental impairments. E.g., AT 326-31, 409, 437-40. 

This evidence constituted substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s reasoning that plaintiff’s 

conservative treatment and relative stability of her impairments undermined her credibility with 

regard to her allegations that her impairments rendered her totally disabled.

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Next, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s reported activities indicated that her impairments 

caused her far fewer limitations than she alleged. This too was a proper reason for discounting 

plaintiff’s testimony that was supported by substantial evidence. “While a claimant need not 

vegetate in a dark room in order to be eligible for benefits, the ALJ may discredit a claimant’s 

testimony when the claimant reports participation in everyday activities indicating capacities that 

are transferable to a work setting . . . Even where those activities suggest some difficulty 

functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they 

contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112-13 (citations 

and quotation marks omitted); see also Burch, 400 F.3d at 680 (ALJ properly considered 

claimant’s ability to care for her own needs, cook, clean, shop, interact with her nephew and 

boyfriend, and manage her finances and those of her nephew in the credibility analysis); Morgan 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (ALJ’s determination regarding 

claimant’s ability to “fix meals, do laundry, work in the yard, and occasionally care for his 

friend’s child” was a specific finding sufficient to discredit the claimant’s credibility). Here, the 

record indicates that plaintiff engaged in activities such as mowing her lawn and working as a 

house cleaner for houses her brother built, which entailed labor such as cleaning windows. AT 

48-49, 287, 408, 439, 444. These activities directly conflicted with plaintiff’s allegations that her 

impairments precluded her from all work. Accordingly, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s 

determination that plaintiff’s activities undermined the credibility of her subjective complaints.

Finally, the ALJ also determined that plaintiff’s testimony regarding the extent of her 

impairments conflicted with the medical evidence in the record. Although lack of medical 

evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, it is 

nevertheless a relevant factor for the ALJ to consider. Burch, 400 F.3d at 681. Substantial 

evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that the medical findings and opinions of plaintiff’s 

physicians indicated that plaintiff’s impairments caused symptoms less severe than those plaintiff 

alleged. Indeed, plaintiff’s examining physicians opined that neither her physical nor her mental 

impairments caused functional limitations that would have prevented plaintiff from working. AT 

319-31 (physical and mental examinations opining only mild to moderate physical and mental 

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limitations with regard to basic workplace functions). Furthermore, plaintiff’s treating notes in 

the record show that plaintiff had only mild-to-moderate symptoms with regard to her back 

impairments. E.g., AT 291, 309, 425, 430. These medical records indicate that the symptoms of 

plaintiff’s impairments were less severe than what plaintiff claimed through her testimony. The 

ALJ properly relied on this reasoning as an additional factor for finding plaintiff’s testimony less 

than fully credible.

In sum, the ALJ provided multiple clear and convincing reasons for finding plaintiff’s 

testimony regarding the extent of her impairments less than fully credible, all of which were 

supported by substantial evidence from the record. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in making 

his adverse credibility determination.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14) is denied;

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 21) is granted; 

and 

3. Judgment is entered for the Commissioner.

Dated: January 4, 2016

11 rosalia0184.ss

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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