Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_13-cv-02163/USCOURTS-alnd-1_13-cv-02163-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donna Andersen
Plaintiff
Omni Insurance Company
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

DONNA ANDERSEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

OMNI INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:13-CV-2163-VEH

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Donna Andersen (“Ms. Andersen”) initiated this insurance coverage

dispute with her insurer, Defendant Omni Insurance Company (“Omni”), in the

Circuit Court of Calhoun County, Alabama, on October 25, 2013. (Doc. 1-1 at 3).

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Omni removed the lawsuit to federal court on November 27, 2013. (Doc. 1 at 1). 

Pending before the court is Omni’s Motion To Dismiss Count Two of the

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 6) (the “Motion”) filed on December 4, 2013. Although

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the caption indicates that it is opposed (id. at 1), Ms. Andersen never has filed any

opposition to the Motion, which under Appendix III to the court’s uniform initial

All page references to Doc. 1-1 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system. 1

 All page references to Doc. 6 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system. 2

FILED

 2014 Mar-04 PM 04:09

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:13-cv-02163-VEH Document 14 Filed 03/04/14 Page 1 of 8
order was due on December 18, 2013. (See Doc. 4 at 23 ¶ B.2 (“The opponent’s

responsive brief shall be filed no later than fourteen (14) calendar days thereafter.”)).

Accordingly, the Motion is now ready for disposition, and, for the reasons explained

below, is GRANTED. 

II. Standards

A. Rule 12(b)(1)3

As the Eleventh Circuit has explained the standard on motions to dismiss for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction:

Attacks on subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(1) come in two forms. “Facial attacks” on the complaint

“require[] the court merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has

sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the

allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the

motion.” Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953, 101 S. Ct. 358, 66 L. Ed. 2d 217

(1980) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. &Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884,

891 (3d Cir. 1977)). “Factual attacks,” on the other hand, challenge “the

existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the

pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and

affidavits, are considered.” Id.

These two forms of attack differ substantially. On a facial attack,

a plaintiff is afforded safeguards similar to those provided in opposing

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion-the court must consider the allegations of the

complaint to be true. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir.),

Omni indicates that its Motion is filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and (c). (Doc. 6 at 1). 3

Because the Motion is jurisdictional in nature and seeks a without prejudice dismissal of Count Two

on lack of ripeness grounds, the Motion is appropriately considered pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

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Case 1:13-cv-02163-VEH Document 14 Filed 03/04/14 Page 2 of 8
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S. Ct. 396, 70 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1981). But

when the attack is factual, 

the trial court may proceed asit never could under 12(b)(6)

or Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1)

motion is the trial court’s jurisdiction-its very power to

hear the case-there is substantial authority that the trial

court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to

the existence of its power to hear the case. In short, no

presumptive truthfulness attachesto plaintiff's allegations,

and the existence of disputed material facts will not

preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits

of jurisdictional claims.

Id. at 412-13 (quoting Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).

Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1990). 

B. Ms. Andersen’s Failure to Oppose

Ms. Andersen’s failure to file any opposition does not automatically mean that

the Motion is due to be granted. As explained by Judge Steele in Branch Banking and

Trust Co. v. Howard, No. 12–0175–WS–N, 2013 WL 172903, *1 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 16,

2013):

As noted, Churchill and Howard elected not to be heard in

response to BB & T’s Amended Motion to Dismiss. Notwithstanding

that omission, BB & T (as Rule 12(b)(6) movant) bears the initial

burden of demonstrating that it is entitled to dismissal of the

counterclaims. Churchill’s and Howard’s lack of response to the Rule

12(b)(6) Motion does not trigger the kneejerk granting of such Motion

on an abandonment theory. See Gailes v. Marengo County Sheriff’s

Dep’t, 2013 WL 81227, *5 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 4, 2013) (“the Court will not

treat a claimas abandoned merely because the plaintiff has not defended

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Case 1:13-cv-02163-VEH Document 14 Filed 03/04/14 Page 3 of 8
it in opposition to a motion to dismiss”). Rather, it remains BB & T’s

burden as movant to establish its entitlement to relief under Rule

12(b)(6). In light of these circumstances, the Court scrutinizes BB & T’s

Motion to Dismiss in accordance with the following legal standard: “the

Court will review the merits of the [movant]’s position and, if it is

clearly incorrect or inadequate to satisfy the [movant]’s initial burden,

will deny the motion despite the [nonmovant]’s failure to respond. If,

however, the [movant]’s presentation is adequate to satisfy its initial

burden, the Court will not deny the motion based on arguments the

[nonmovant] could have made but by silence elected not to raise.” Id.

Branch Banking, 2013 WL 172903, *1 (footnotes omitted).

III. Analysis

Count Two of Ms. Andersen’s complaint asserts a claim of bad faith against

Omni for failing to investigate or pay her claim for underinsured motorist benefits.

(Doc. 1-1 at 8-10 ¶¶ 14-21). In its Motion, Omni contendsthat “because both liability

and damages have not been fixed, the Plaintiff’s bad faith claim is premature and not

ripe for adjudication.” (Doc. 6 at 2 ¶ 2 (citing Pontius v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., 915 So. 2d 557 (Ala. 2006); Ex parte Safeway Ins. Co., 990 So. 2d 344 (Ala.

2008) (hereinafter (“Safeway I”))). 

Here, Omni launches both a facial and factual jurisdictional attack on Count

Two of Ms. Andersen’s complaint. Initially, Omni contends that the second count of

Ms. Andersen’s complaint is facially deficient because she “makes an open-ended

prayer for relief with respect to [her] claim for underinsured motorist benefits” in the

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Case 1:13-cv-02163-VEH Document 14 Filed 03/04/14 Page 4 of 8
first count of her complaint. Cf. Safeway I, 990 So. 2d at 352 (“In this case, Galvin’s

complaint appears facially sufficient to show that the trial court has subject-matter

jurisdiction over Galvin’s bad-faith claim against Safeway.”); id. (“She avers that

liability for the accident is uncontested and that the damages are undisputed.”). 

Alternatively, Omni relies upon the affidavit of Bryan Tansill (“Mr. Tansill”) 

(Doc. 6-1) in a factual jurisdictional attack: “To date, the Plaintiff has not scheduled

a cervical discectomy surgery. . . . At this point, damages are not fixed. Plaintiff has

not incurred the costs associated with [performing surgery].” (Doc. 6-1 at 3 ¶¶ 7, 8).

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Ms. Andersen has not contested these statements.

The court has studied the cases relied upon by Omni and agrees that, even

though Ms. Andersen has already settled with the tortfeasor who caused the collision, 

the undisputed fluidity and still speculative nature of Ms. Andersen’s medical

damages means that her bad faith claim is due to be dismissed without prejudice

consistent with Pontius and Safeway I.

We agree with State Farm that Pontius’s breach-of-contract and

bad-faith claims were not ripe for adjudication. Without a determination

of whether liability exists on the part of the underinsured motorist and

the extent of the plaintiff’s damages, a claim of bad-faith failure to pay

or breach of contract is premature. The trial court properly dismissed the

claims because the claims were not ripe for adjudication. However, as

discussed earlier, State Farm’s motion challenges the subject-matter

All page references to Doc. 6-1 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system. 4

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Case 1:13-cv-02163-VEH Document 14 Filed 03/04/14 Page 5 of 8
jurisdiction of the court. A dismissal for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction does not operate as an adjudication on the merits. See Ex

parte Capstone Dev. Corp., 779 So. 2d 1216 (Ala. 2000) (a dismissal for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is treated as a dismissal without

prejudice to the plaintiff's right to reinstitute the action). Therefore, the

trial court should have dismissed Pontius’s breach-of-contract and

bad-faith claims without prejudice. See also Stringfellow v. State Farm

Life Ins. Co., 743 So. 2d 439 (Ala.1999) (insured’s unripe fraud action

should properly have been dismissed without prejudice in order to allow

the insured to bring the action when it presented a justiciable

controversy). Therefore, the judgment of dismissal is modified to

provide that the dismissal of Pontius’s breach-of-contract and bad-faith

claims is without prejudice to Pontius’s right to refile those claims.

We recognize that Pontius has now resolved her underlying

lawsuit against the Martins. Based on LeFevre, there can be no bad-faith

action based on conduct arising before the uninsured motorist’s liability

is established and damages are fixed; therefore, “there can be no action

based on the tort of bad faith based on conduct arising prior to that time,

only for subsequent bad faith conduct.” 590 So. 2d at 159. Accordingly,

any claims alleging bad-faith failure to pay an insurance claim or breach

of contract based on State Farm’s failure to pay UIM benefits must be

based on conduct arising after the Martins[’] liability was established

and damages fixed.

Pontius, 915 So. 2d at 564-65 (emphasis added); see also Safeway I, 990 So. 2d at

352 (“Safeway has established a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus because

Safeway presented unrefuted evidence indicating that the damages are in dispute and,

in accordance with Pontius, Galvin’s bad-faith claim, as a matter of law, is not ripe;

consequently, the trial court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the

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Case 1:13-cv-02163-VEH Document 14 Filed 03/04/14 Page 6 of 8
claim.”). But see Ex parte Safeway Ins. Co., No. 1120439, ___ So. 3d ___, 2013 WL

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5506557, at *4 (Ala. Oct. 4, 2013) (Moore, C.J.) (hereinafter “Safeway II”) (denying

petition for writ of mandamus filed by insurer and questioning, declining to apply,

and distinguishing, but not expressly overruling, holding in Pontius with respect to

insured’s uninsured motorist benefits claiminvolving phantomdriver); id.(“Because

I am unable to distinguish the facts of the present case from this Court’s controlling

decisions in [Safeway I], and [Pontius], and because no party to the present appeal

requests that we overrule either decision, I respectfully dissent from the main

opinion’s conclusion that mandamus relief is not warranted.”) (Shaw, J., dissenting)

(footnote omitted).

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IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein the Motion is GRANTED, and Count Two of Ms.

The court notes that neither Pontius nor Safeway I expressly addresses whether the 5

ripeness doctrine applies when the claim at issue is one for bad faith failure to investigate. Further,

the court has not been able to locate an Alabama Supreme Court decision which clarifies whether

the type of bad faith claim asserted alters the jurisdictional analysis. In the absence of controlling

countervailing authority and because the dismissal is a without prejudice one, the court is persuaded

that a bad faith investigation claim falls within the scope of the Supreme Court of Alabama holdings

in Pontius and Safeway I.

Safeway II expressly distinguishes itself factually from Pontius (and those following 6

Pontius, like Safeway I) because the latter two decisions “involved known uninsured drivers, not

phantom drivers.” Safeway II, 2013 WL 5506557, at *3 n.2; see id. (“Safeway has not cited, and we

have not found, any controlling decisions that apply Pontius to cases involving phantom drivers.”). 

Despite this distinction drawn in Safeway II, three justices (Justices Stuart, Shaw, and Bolin)

dissented from the majority opinion in Safeway II. As of the entry date of this court’s order, Safeway

II has not been released yet for publication. 

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Case 1:13-cv-02163-VEH Document 14 Filed 03/04/14 Page 7 of 8
Andersen’s complaint is HEREBY DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of March, 2014.

 

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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