Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01036/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01036-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Peter James Smith
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Ralph R. Erickson, United States District Judge for the District

of North Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-1036

___________

United States of America, * 

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of North Dakota. 

Peter James Smith, *

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 22, 2009 

Filed: January 5, 2010

___________

Before RILEY, SMITH and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

After a jury trial, Peter James Smith was convicted of two counts of aggravated

sexual abuse of a child, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 2241(c). Smith appeals,

arguing that the district court1

 erred by admitting a 40-minute DVD recording of a

forensic interview of the child victim and by admitting the lay opinion testimony of

the forensic interviewer under Federal Rule of Evidence 701. For the following

reasons, we affirm. 

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I. BACKGROUND

In December 2006, Smith and his girlfriend, Priscilla Bear, babysat B.R., then

eight years old, at B.R.’s home. Immediately thereafter, B.R. began having

nightmares. During the nightmares, B.R. would yell not to touch her. Approximately

one month later, B.R. told her mother that Smith had touched her inappropriately

when he babysat her. On April 5, 2007, B.R.’s mother reported to Bureau of Indian

Affairs Criminal Investigator Donovan Wind that Smith had sexually abused B.R.

Investigator Wind contacted a Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agent who

arranged for B.R. to be interviewed by forensic examiner Karen Seviour of the Red

River Child Advocacy Center.

On April 10, 2007, Seviour conducted a forensic interview of B.R. B.R. told

Seviour that Smith placed his fingers in her vagina on one occasion and that he

touched her vaginal area over her clothing on an earlier occasion. Seviour recorded

the interview on a DVD.

On January 9, 2008, Investigator Wind and FBI Special Agent Michael

Thompson interviewed Smith about the allegations. Smith admitted that he knew B.R.

but denied any sexual contact with her. On January 24, 2008, Smith voluntarily met

with Special Agent Thompson and FBI Special Agent Kelly Kenser for a second

interview. Smith initially denied any sexual contact with B.R., but as the interview

progressed Smith admitted that there were two incidents in which his fingers

penetrated B.R.’s vagina. The first incident occurred at B.R.’s grandmother’s home

around Halloween of 2006. Smith claimed that he woke up and found that B.R. had

taken his hand and inserted one of his fingers, up to his first knuckle, into her vagina.

He did not report the incident to anyone because it “slipped his mind.” The second

incident occurred on December 26, 2006. Smith claimed that he fell asleep on the

toilet and woke up because B.R. had inserted two of his fingers, up to the first

knuckle, into her vagina. Smith did not report this incident either.

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The Government dismissed the abusive sexual contact charge at trial. 

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 Smith was charged with two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 2241(c) and 1153, and one count of abusive sexual contact,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 2244(a)(5) and 1153.2

 Prior to trial, Smith filed a motion

in limine seeking to prohibit the Government from introducing the DVD of B.R.’s

forensic interview on the basis that the DVD contained hearsay. The Government

responded, arguing that the DVD was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 807

and this court’s decision in United States v. Thunder Horse, 370 F.3d 745 (8th Cir.

2004). During the final pretrial conference, the district court decided to reserve ruling

on the admissibility of the DVD until trial.

At trial, B.R. testified that Smith touched her vagina underneath her clothes on

two occasions. The first incident occurred at B.R.’s grandmother’s home. While B.R.

sat on a bed in the basement, Smith touched her inside her vagina. The second incident

occurred when Smith entered B.R.’s bedroom while B.R. was sleeping. B.R. testified

that Smith again penetrated her vagina with his fingers. Smith left the room, and B.R.

placed suitcases in front of her door to keep Smith from entering again. 

Bear testified that she and Smith babysat B.R. at B.R.’s home in December

2006. When Bear saw Smith walking toward B.R.’s bedroom, she asked him what he

was doing. Smith then left the home, and Bear went to check on B.R. When Bear

reached B.R.’s room, she was unable to open the door because there was luggage in

front of the door. 

During the defense case, Smith’s counsel called Seviour as a witness for the

purpose of establishing an apparent inconsistency in B.R.’s testimony and advancing

Smith’s theory that B.R.’s account of the incidents was the product of influence from

her mother and Bear. Seviour testified that, during her forensic interview, B.R. said

that Smith touched her once inside her vagina and once in the vaginal area over her

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clothing. During the Government’s cross-examination of Seviour, it sought to

introduce the DVD recording of the entire forensic interview. Noting Smith’s

previous objections to the admission of the DVD, the district court overruled the

objections, stating, “I believe that in chambers there[] [was] an adequate discussion

of the constitutional issues, of the beyond-the-scope issues and of the Rule 807

issues.” The Government then played the DVD for the jury.

During the Government’s cross-examination of Seviour, it also sought to

question Seviour about the apparent inconsistency between B.R.’s forensic interview

and her testimony at trial. Smith objected on the basis that the question called for

expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The parties and the district

court discussed the permissible scope of Seviour’s testimony, and the district court

ruled that Seviour could give her lay opinion based on her experience but not based

on research and studies she might have performed for the case. The Government then

asked Seviour, “Yesterday [B.R.] testified that [Smith] inserted his finger inside her

vagina on two occasions, not just one occasion. In your experience is that an

inconsistent statement?” Seviour responded:

In my experience I would not consider it an inconsistent statement and

the reason that I wouldn’t is kids make disclosures over a period of time.

And so when a child comes in and does an interview with me and they

do not make a disclosure I may only get a tiny part of it. And then as

they are able to mature a little bit if they receive counseling in a

supportive environment more details of what occurred to them may come

out. And so it’s not a one-time thing. It’s a process for kids. 

Smith objected, and the district court overruled his objection. The jury found Smith

guilty of both counts of aggravated sexual abuse. The district court sentenced him to

360 months’ imprisonment. 

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II. DISCUSSION

Smith appeals, arguing that the district court’s admission of the DVD and

Seviour’s opinion testimony constitutes reversible error. In particular, Smith asserts

that the Government failed to properly authenticate the DVD as required by Federal

Rule of Evidence 901; that the district court did not properly discuss the requirements

for admitting the DVD under Rule 807 and Thunder Horse; and that the matters

discussed on the DVD went beyond the scope of Seviour’s direct examination, in

violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 611(b). Smith also argues that the district court

erred in admitting Seviour’s testimony regarding B.R.’s apparently inconsistent

statements as a lay opinion under Rule 701. 

 We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United

States v. Gustafson, 528 F.3d 587, 590 (8th Cir. 2008). “We will not reverse a

judgment on the basis of erroneous evidentiary rulings absent a showing that those

rulings had a substantial influence on the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Haskell,

468 F.3d 1064, 1074 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting McPheeters v. Black & Weatch Corp.,

427 F.3d 1095, 1101 (8th Cir. 2005)). 

A. The DVD recording of B.R.’s forensic interview

First, we consider Smith’s claim that the Government did not authenticate the

DVD. Smith asserts that the court should have considered the factors set out in United

States v. McMillan, 508 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1974), in determining if the Government

laid the proper foundation for Seviour to authenticate the DVD. He further argues that

Seviour could not authenticate the DVD because Seviour “had not marked the DVD

to be able to identify it.” 

Rule 901(a) allows parties to authenticate evidence in any way that presents

“evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its

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These factors include:

(1) That the recording device was capable of taking the conversation

now offered into evidence. (2) That the operator of the device was

competent to operate the device. (3) That the recording is authentic and

correct. (4) That changes, additions or deletions have not been made in

the recording. (5) That the recording has been preserved in a manner

that is shown to the court. (6) That the speakers are identified. (7) That

the conversation elicited was made voluntarily and in good faith, without

any kind of inducement.

McMillan, 508 F.2d at 104. 

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proponent claims.” Rule 901(b) provides that a party may authenticate evidence

through “[t]estimony [of a witness with knowledge] that a matter is what it is claimed

to be.” Seviour identified the DVD as a recording of her forensic interview with B.R.

and indicated that the DVD was an accurate recording of the interview. This was

sufficient to authenticate the DVD under Rule 901(b). See United States v. Two Elk,

536 F.3d 890, 905 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that photographs were properly

authenticated where witnesses with knowledge testified that they were accurate

depictions). There is no requirement that Seviour mark the DVD to identify it. 

McMillan is simply inapplicable to this case. McMillan involved an

electronically monitored telephone call between a government informant and

McMillan. 508 F.2d at 104. The Government sought to authenticate the telephone

recording through the testimony of a law enforcement agent who remotely recorded

the conversation but did not participate in it. Id. at 104-05. We adopted several

factors to be considered to determine if the law enforcement officer’s electronic

recording of the conversation was true and accurate, since the officer was not present

during the conversation and did not participate in it. See id. at 104-05.3

 Because

Seviour conducted and recorded the forensic interview and, therefore, was able to

attest to the accuracy of the DVD recording, none of the concerns in McMillan are

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present here. Thus, the district court did not err with respect to the authentication of

the DVD.

Second, we consider Smith’s argument that the district court failed to properly

discuss the requirements for admitting the DVD under Rule 807 and Thunder Horse.

Hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls within an established exception. Fed. R. Evid.

802. Rule 807 establishes a residual or “catch-all” exception to the ban on hearsay.

Hearsay statements can be admitted under Rule 807 if the court determines that the

statements have “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” to the

exceptions in Rule 803 and 804 and that:

(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the

statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any

other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable

efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of

justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.

Fed. R. Evid. 807. To determine if statements made by a child who was allegedly a

victim of sexual abuse to a forensic interviewer have sufficient circumstantial

guarantees of trustworthiness to be admissible under Rule 807, we consider “a wide

range” of nonexclusive factors, as outlined in Thunder Horse. Thunder Horse, 370

F.3d at 748. These factors include “the training and experience of the interviewer;

whether the child was interviewed using open-ended questions; the age of the child

and whether the child used age-appropriate language in discussing the abuse; the

length of time between the incident of abuse and the making of the hearsay statement;

and whether the child repeated the same facts consistently to adults.” Id. (citing

United States v. N.B., 59 F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 1995)). 

Smith argues that the district court “made no findings on the record” regarding

the Thunder Horse factors and that the district court “made no finding” that the DVD

was “more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence

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which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts.” Smith also argues that

the “only reason” the district court gave for admitting the DVD was that it “simply felt

it was fair to do so.”

The district court was not required to make a finding on the record as to each

of the Rule 807 requirements and the Thunder Horse factors as long as the record

demonstrates that the district court considered the relevant factors. See United States

v. Headbird, 461 F.3d 1074, 1078 (8th Cir. 2006); see also United States v.

Hawthorne, 235 F.3d 400, 404 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding no abuse of discretion where

the district court “might well have articulated more detailed findings in ruling on [the]

objection,” but it was clear that the district court considered the relevant factors).

Here, the record demonstrates that the district court considered the Rule 807

requirements and the Thunder Horse factors. Smith filed a motion in limine asserting

that the DVD was inadmissible hearsay, and the Government filed a response

outlining the requirements for admission of the DVD under Rule 807 and Thunder

Horse. During the pre-trial conference, the district court addressed the motion in

limine but ultimately reserved ruling on the motion, stating that it would “make the

necessary factual findings under Rule 807” and consider the “four or five

nonexclusive [Thunder Horse] factors” during the trial. At trial, the Government’s

cross-examination of Seviour established the foundational requirements for admission

of the DVD under Rule 807. When Smith objected to the Government’s foundational

questions, the district court overruled the objections, noting that the Government was

“laying the foundation to the offer of the interview.” As the cross-examination

proceeded, the district court stated that it was satisfied with the Government’s Rule

807 foundation and its inquiry into the Thunder Horse factors. The district court then

admitted the DVD, noting that it overruled Smith’s objection. Because the record

demonstrates that the district court considered the Rule 807 requirements and the 

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Smith does not make a substantive challenge to the district court’s application

of the Thunder Horse factors. Had he made such a challenge, we would have little

trouble rejecting it since we agree with the district court’s conclusion that the Thunder

Horse factors were met. We also reject Smith’s argument that the DVD should not

have been admitted under Rule 807 because it actually was not more probative on the

point for which it was offered than any other evidence. Smith called Seviour to

establish an apparent inconsistency between B.R.’s testimony at trial and the

statements she made during her forensic interview. The Government introduced the

DVD to show the exact statements B.R. made during the forensic interview. The

DVD recording of the forensic interview was the most probative evidence of the

statements B.R. made during the forensic interview. Because we conclude that the

DVD was admissible under Rule 807, we need not consider whether it satisfied any

other exception to the rule against hearsay or qualified for admission as non-hearsay

under Rule 801(d)(1). See Fed. R. Evid. 802. 

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Thunder Horse factors, it was not required to make a finding on the record as to each

requirement and factor. Accordingly, Smith’s second argument fails.4

 

Third, we consider Smith’s argument that admitting and playing the DVD

recording of the entire forensic interview violated Rule 611(b) because the matters

discussed in the forensic interview were beyond the scope of his direct examination

of Seviour. Rule 611(b) provides that “[c]ross-examination should be limited to the

subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the

witness.” However, “[t]he court may, in the exercise of [its] discretion, permit inquiry

into additional matters as if on direct examination.” Fed. R. Evid. 611(b). “The extent

of . . . cross-examination rests largely in the trial court’s discretion.” United States v.

Drake, 542 F.2d 1020, 1022 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 611(b), United States

v. Seeverts, 428 F.2d 467, 468 n.1 (8th Cir. 1970)). “Cross-examination may embrace

any matter germane to direct examination, qualifying or destroying it, or tending to

elucidate, modify, explain, contradict or rebut testimony given by the witness.”

United States v. Hiland, 909 F.2d 1114, 1132-33 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Roberts v.

Hollocher, 664 F.2d 200, 203 (8th Cir. 1981)). 

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The matters discussed in the forensic interview were not beyond the scope of

Smith’s direct examination of Seviour, and even if they were, the district court did not

commit reversible error. Throughout the trial, Smith placed the issue of B.R.’s

credibility in controversy. Smith called Seviour to establish an inconsistency between

B.R.’s statements to Seviour during the forensic interview and B.R.’s testimony at

trial. On direct examination, Seviour testified that during the forensic interview, B.R.

stated that Smith touched her inside her vagina on only one occasion and that he

touched her vagina over her clothes on the other occasion. This testimony put B.R.’s

credibility at issue by suggesting that B.R. did not tell the truth during her trial

testimony when she stated that Smith’s fingers penetrated her vagina during both

incidents of sexual abuse. Smith’s questioning of Seviour allowed the Government

to admit germane evidence to “explain, contradict or rebut” the impression left by

Seviour’s testimony. See Hiland, 909 F.2d at 1132-33; see also United States v.

Womochil, 778 F.2d 1311, 1315 (8th Cir. 1985) (allowing the Government to “clarify

or complete an issue opened up by defense counsel”). B.R.’s statements describing

how Smith touched her when he sexually abused her were certainly germane to the

testimony Smith elicited from Seviour. The other portions of the DVD recording were

also germane because B.R. provided other details of her sexual abuse that were

consistent with her testimony at trial. The district court acted within its broad

discretion in admitting and playing the entire DVD recording of B.R.’s forensic

interview to allow the jury to assess B.R.’s credibility. 

Even if the district court committed error in admitting the entire DVD

recording, it was not reversible error. The district court warned Smith that “you’re

going to []examine [Seviour] at your risk and that there’s a reasonable chance that the

whole interview’s going to come in if you put her on the stand and you []examine

[her] about inconsistent statements.” In light of the district court’s warning, Smith

knowingly opened the door to the admission of the entire DVD. “It is fundamental that

where the defendant ‘opened the door’ and ‘invited error’ there can be no reversible

error.” United States v. Beason, 220 F.3d 964, 968 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting United

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States v. Steele, 610 F.2d 504, 505 (8th Cir. 1979)). Moreover, Smith did not identify

any portion of the DVD recording that was unfairly prejudicial or that contained

evidence that had not already been admitted at trial. Thus, because Smith did not

show that playing the entire DVD recording of the forensic interview had a substantial

influence on the jury’s verdict, any error in admitting it was harmless.

B. Seviour’s opinion testimony

Smith argues that Seviour’s opinion regarding B.R.’s apparently inconsistent

statements was improper expert testimony and not admissible as lay opinion under

Rule 701 because Seviour’s testimony was based on her “expert body of knowledge,”

not her perception of B.R. Additionally, he argues that the admission of Seviour’s

statement was not harmless because it undermined Smith’s key defense theory that

B.R.’s testimony at trial was the result of influence by B.R.’s mother and Bear. 

“Rule 701 provides that if a witness is not testifying as an expert, then any

testimony by the witness expressing his or her opinion or inferences is limited to those

that are rationally based on the witness’s perception and helpful to understanding the

witness’s testimony or determining a fact in issue.” U.S. Salt, Inc. v. Broken Arrow,

Inc., 563 F.3d 687, 690 (8th Cir. 2009). “Personal knowledge or perceptions based

on experience” is sufficient foundation for lay testimony. In re Air Crash at Little

Rock Arkansas on June 1, 1999, 291 F.3d 503, 515-16 (8th Cir. 2002). “[P]erceptions

based on industry experience [are] a sufficient foundation for lay opinion testimony.”

U.S. Salt, Inc., 563 F.3d at 690 (emphasis added) (quoting Burlington N.R. Co. v.

Nebraska, 802 F.2d 994, 1004-05 (8th Cir. 1986)). However, a lay witnesses’s

opinion must not be based on “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge

within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. This inquiry requires a case-bycase analysis of both the witness and the witnesses’s opinion. See In re Air Crash,

291 F.3d at 515-16. 

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In In re Air Crash, we upheld that admission of the lay opinion testimony of Dr.

Charles Fuller, a college professor, regarding the chances that Anna Lloyd, a student

of Dr. Fuller, could become a music teacher. Id. at 515. Dr. Fuller was the supervisor

of aspiring music teachers at Lloyd’s college. Id. Dr. Fuller’s testimony was based

on his experience supervising and observing other aspiring music teachers and “his

personal knowledge and observations” of Lloyd. Id. We found that the district court

acted within its “considerable discretion” in admitting Dr. Fuller’s testimony that

Lloyd had a small chance of becoming a music teacher as a lay opinion under Rule

701. Id. at 516. Dr. Fuller was qualified to give the lay opinion “[b]ecause of [his]

personal knowledge of Lloyd and his experience as the supervising instructor” of

aspiring music teachers. Id.

As in In re Air Crash, here Seviour was qualified to give her lay opinion based

on her personal knowledge and perception of B.R. and her experience performing

forensic interviews of allegedly abused children. Seviour had performed hundreds of

forensic interviews where she observed allegedly abused children and discussed

allegations of sexual and physical abuse with the children. Seviour’s opinion in this

case was based exclusively on her experience observing other sexually abused

children and her personal perception of B.R. during the forensic interview. Seviour

did not refer to any “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” in stating

her opinion. Accordingly, the district court acted within its considerable discretion

in admitting Seviour’s statement as a lay opinion under Rule 701. 

Even if Seviour’s testimony did not qualify as a proper lay opinion under Rule

701, the error did not have a substantial influence on the jury’s verdict. The evidence

against Smith is strong. See United States v. Farish, 535 F.3d 815, 820-21 (8th Cir.

2008). After initially denying any sexual contact with B.R., Smith admitted that there

were two occasions on which his fingers penetrated B.R.’s vagina up to the first

knuckle. Incredibly, Smith claimed that he was unconscious on both occasions and

that B.R., then a child, instigated the contact. Smith failed to report either incident to

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anyone, and he claimed that he did not report the first incident because it “slipped his

mind.” A jury could easily disbelieve Smith’s initial denial in light of his subsequent

admission of sexual contact but entirely incredible denial of volition. B.R. recounted

two occasions on which Smith touched her inside her vagina. B.R. stated that these

incidents occurred at B.R.’s grandmother’s home and at B.R.’s home, just as Smith

admitted. Bear’s testimony and B.R.’s mother’s testimony corroborated B.R.’s

account of the sexual abuse. Bear saw Smith walking toward B.R.’s bedroom on the

night he sexually abused B.R. B.R.’s mother witnessed the nightmares B.R. had after

the sexual abuse. Furthermore, the jury had the opportunity to view both B.R.’s live

testimony and her forensic interview to evaluate the apparent inconsistency and

consistencies in B.R.’s statements. We conclude that even if Seviour’s testimony

were not admissible, the admission of Seviour’s lone answer did not substantially

influence the jury’s verdict. Therefore, any error would be harmless.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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