Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-01377/USCOURTS-caDC-06-01377-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Clark County, Nevada
Petitioner
Federal Aviation Administration
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 4, 2008 Decided April 18, 2008 

No. 06-1377 

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA,

A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

PETITIONER

v. 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of a Decision of the 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Lori Potter argued the cause for petitioner. On the briefs 

were John E. Putnam, Peter J. Kirsch, Catherine M. van 

Heuven, and M. Brooke McKinley. Daniel S. Reimer entered 

an appearance. 

Stephanie R. Marcus, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the 

brief were Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General, and Thomas M. Bondy, Attorney. Robert S. 

Greenspan, Attorney, entered an appearance. 

Before: GINSBURG, GRIFFITH, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges. 

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH. 

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: For several years, Clark 

County, Nevada, has been working with the Federal Aviation 

Administration on plans for a new airport southwest of Las 

Vegas. As that process unfolded, an alternative-energy 

company notified the FAA that it wanted to build a wind farm 

of 83 electricity-generating turbines on a mountain a few 

miles from the planned airport site. The FAA concluded that 

the 400-foot-tall turbines would not obstruct the airspace near 

the airport site or pose a hazard by interfering with radar 

systems at the new airport. Clark County disagrees with the 

FAA’s assessments and has petitioned for judicial review of 

the FAA’s determinations, arguing that the agency failed to 

provide a reasoned explanation for purposes of the 

Administrative Procedure Act. We agree with Clark County. 

We therefore grant its petition for review, vacate the FAA’s 

determinations, and remand to the FAA for further 

explanation. 

I 

Clark County, Nevada, includes Las Vegas and 

surrounding communities and is one of the fastest-growing 

areas in the United States. The county’s population recently 

topped 2 million residents – double its population in 1994 and 

triple its population in 1981. The county has grown so rapidly 

in large part because of Las Vegas’s popularity as a vacation 

destination. Perhaps attracted by the perception that what 

happens in Vegas stays in Vegas, more than 39 million people 

visited the city in 2007. 

The population and tourism booms are straining Clark 

County’s infrastructure, including McCarran International 

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Airport, the county’s only commercial airport. McCarran 

served a record 47.7 million passengers in 2007 and is 

projected to exceed its capacity of 53 million passengers 

within the next few years. 

In 2000, recognizing the need for additional airport 

capacity in the Las Vegas region, Congress passed and 

President Clinton signed the Ivanpah Valley Airport Public 

Lands Transfer Act. Pub L. No. 106-362, 114 Stat. 1404 

(2000). This law authorized the sale of roughly 6,000 acres of 

federal land to Clark County for a new commercial airport 30 

miles southwest of Las Vegas, near the Nevada-California 

border. Since the sale closed in 2004, Clark County has filed 

an airport layout plan with the FAA showing the proposed 

runway and radar-facility locations and the planned flight 

procedures. In cooperation with the county, the FAA and the 

federal Bureau of Land Management are preparing an 

environmental impact statement for the airport. See Notice of 

Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the 

Southern Nevada Supplemental Airport, 71 Fed. Reg. 52,367 

(Sept. 5, 2006). The county predicts that the new airport will 

open by 2017. 

As the county worked its way through the airportplanning process, an alternative-energy company proposed to 

build an electricity-generating wind farm on federal land atop 

Table Mountain, which overlooks the Ivanpah Valley and is 

about 10 miles from the airport site. The farm would include 

83 wind turbines, 80 of which would reach almost 400 feet 

into the air. 

Under federal regulations governing airspace, the 

company notified the FAA of the proposed wind-farm 

construction. See 14 C.F.R. § 77.13. The FAA initiated 

aeronautical studies to assess whether the turbines would 

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“result in an obstruction of the navigable airspace or an 

interference with air navigation facilities and equipment or the 

navigable airspace.” 49 U.S.C. § 44718(b)(1); see also 

§ 44718(b)(1)(C)-(D) (requiring FAA to study impact of 

proposed construction on “existing” and “planned” airports). 

The FAA conducted the aeronautical studies under its Part 77 

regulations governing “objects affecting navigable airspace” 

and its procedural handbook for Part 77 studies. See

Procedures for Handling Airspace Matters, FAA Order 

7400.2F (Feb. 16, 2006) (“Handbook”). The FAA sought to 

determine whether any turbine would exceed the obstruction 

standards in Subpart C of its Part 77 regulations or whether 

any turbine would otherwise pose a hazard to air navigation. 

The FAA ultimately issued 83 “Does Not Exceed” 

determinations – one for each turbine. It concluded that each 

turbine “does not exceed [the Subpart C] obstruction 

standards, does not have substantial adverse physical or 

electromagnetic interference effect upon navigable airspace or 

air navigation facilities, and would not be a hazard to air 

navigation.” Handbook ¶ 7-1-3(a); 14 C.F.R. § 77.19(c)(1) 

(aeronautical study results in determination that proposed 

construction “[w]ould not exceed any standard of subpart C 

and would not be a hazard to air navigation”); see also, e.g., 

Determination of No Hazard to Air Navigation, No. 2006-

AWP-2865-OE (Sept. 17, 2006), Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 97 

(issuing “Does Not Exceed” determination for one of the 

turbines after an “aeronautical study revealed that the 

structure does not exceed obstruction standards and would not 

be a hazard to air navigation”). 

Clark County has petitioned for review of the FAA’s 

“Does Not Exceed” determinations, which are reviewable 

orders under 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a). The county argues that 

the FAA’s determinations violated the arbitrary-andcapricious standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. In 

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response, the FAA first contends that Clark County’s petition 

is not justiciable because the county lacks standing and its 

petition is not ripe. If standing and ripeness requirements are 

satisfied, the FAA argues that its “Does Not Exceed” 

determinations are reasonable and reasonably explained. 

II 

We first consider the FAA’s contentions that Clark 

County lacks standing to challenge the determinations and 

that the county’s petition is not ripe for review. 

The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” 

requires a party to show injury in fact caused by the 

defendants’ conduct and redressable by judicial relief. Lujan 

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); see also

Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 900 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (party 

whose “standing is not self-evident . . . must supplement the 

record to the extent necessary to explain and substantiate its 

entitlement to judicial review”). Clark County has 

sufficiently demonstrated injury in fact: It has submitted 

affidavits, which the FAA does not persuasively rebut, that 

the proposed wind turbines would pose a hazard to planes 

flying near its planned airport and that the turbines would 

interfere with radar units at the airport. Cf. City of Dania 

Beach v. FAA, 485 F.3d 1181, 1186-87 (D.C. Cir. 2007). For 

standing purposes, the FAA’s determinations cause that injury 

because they allow construction of the wind turbines. 

Conversely, a hazard determination by the FAA would 

preclude construction. See CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE

§ 30.56.070(c); see also Renal Physicians Ass’n v. Dep’t of 

Health & Human Servs., 489 F.3d 1267, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 

2007) (“[S]tanding exists where the challenged government 

action authorized conduct that would otherwise have been 

illegal.”); BFI Waste Sys. of N. Am., Inc. v. FAA, 293 F.3d 

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527, 531-32 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The injury is redressable under 

standing precedents because, on remand, the FAA could issue 

hazard determinations that would prevent construction of the 

turbines. See Am.’s Cmty. Bankers v. FDIC, 200 F.3d 822, 

828-29 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Tel. & Data Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 19 

F.3d 42, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 

n.7 (“The person who has been accorded a procedural right to 

protect his concrete interests can assert that right without 

meeting all the normal standards for redressability and 

immediacy.”). In sum, the FAA’s standing argument is 

meritless – akin to arguing that homeowners have no standing 

to object to federal approval of a toxic dump or dam being 

built in their neighborhood. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. 

In addition to contesting Clark County’s standing, the 

FAA argues that the county’s petition is not ripe for review. 

We disagree. To be sure, the environmental impact statement 

for the airport is not yet complete, and the county may change 

the location of the radar units. And it is true that the FAA’s 

“Does Not Exceed” determinations are subject to periodic 

review and renewal (and have in fact been renewed). But 

Clark County’s challenge to the initial determinations is 

nonetheless fit for review at this time. See Nat’l Ass’n of 

Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 459, 

463 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The initial “Does Not Exceed” 

determinations represent the FAA’s only decision on the 

merits of whether the turbines exceed obstruction standards or 

otherwise pose a hazard to navigation. And as the FAA’s 

counsel candidly acknowledged at oral argument, a later 

challenge to any of the FAA’s renewal decisions likely could 

not include objections to the merits of the FAA’s “Does Not 

Exceed” determinations. The FAA’s now-is-too-early, lateris-too-late argument exposes the hole in its ripeness 

submission and demonstrates why this case is fit for judicial 

resolution. 

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The FAA also says that the turbines might never be built 

because the federal Bureau of Land Management has yet to 

approve the wind-farm project. That’s true but irrelevant. 

The county’s petition is still ripe because this is the only time 

the county may challenge the merits of the FAA’s “Does Not 

Exceed” determinations, and the FAA could stop the windfarm project entirely. Cf. Khodara Envt’l, Inc. v. Blakey, 376 

F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2004) (Alito, J.) (allowing party to 

challenge one of two “independent” regulatory obstacles). 

III 

We proceed to the merits of Clark County’s petition. 

In Administrative Procedure Act parlance, the FAA did 

not conduct formal, on-the-record hearings; rather, its “Does 

Not Exceed” determinations were the product of informal

adjudication. We review these informal adjudicatory 

determinations under the APA to determine whether they are 

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 

in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also

Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 

653-56 (1990). 

“‘The scope of review under the “arbitrary and 

capricious” standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute 

its judgment for that of the agency.’” Mount Royal Joint 

Venture v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 745, 753 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 

(quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 

Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). We must uphold the FAA’s 

determinations so long as the agency “engaged in reasoned 

decisionmaking and its decision is adequately explained and 

supported by the record.” N.Y. Cross Harbor R.R. v. STB, 

374 F.3d 1177, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation 

marks omitted); see also D&F Afonso Realty Trust v. Garvey, 

216 F.3d 1191, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 

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Here, each of the FAA’s determinations stated that the 

FAA had performed an aeronautical study on a particular 

turbine demonstrating “that the structure does not exceed 

obstruction standards and would not be a hazard to air 

navigation.” Determination of No Hazard to Air Navigation, 

No. 2006-AWP-2865-OE (Sept. 17, 2006), J.A. 97. Although 

such a brief explanation may suffice in typical informal 

agency adjudications, the FAA’s failure to further explain its 

conclusions here is problematic because the only evidence in 

the record available to this Court actually supports the 

opposite conclusions – that the turbines both would exceed 

the FAA’s obstruction standards and would interfere with 

radar systems at the new airport. 

As to obstruction standards, the record evidence contains 

“40:1 Reports” prepared by the FAA. The agency does not 

dispute that the reports measure whether a proposed 

construction project would penetrate an imaginary 40:1 slope 

climbing out and up from the end of an airport runway. In 

some cases, as the FAA’s procedural Handbook indicates, tall 

objects that penetrate the 40:1 slope exceed the Part 77 

obstruction standards and pose a hazard to aircraft. See 14 

C.F.R. § 77.23(a)(3); Handbook ¶ 6-3-9(e)(4) (requiring FAA 

to issue Notice of Presumed Hazard when structure penetrates 

40:1 departure slope by more than 35 feet). The 40:1 Reports 

in the record here indicate that the wind turbines would 

significantly penetrate the 40:1 slope for runways at the 

Ivanpah airport (and at the nearby Henderson airport, which 

serves general-aviation traffic). The only contrary indications 

in the record are two statements by the FAA official who 

ultimately issued the “Does Not Exceed” determinations; he 

asserted that there “are no Part 77 penetrations – clear as a 

bell” and that there “are NO Part 77 penetrations within this 

project area.” J.A. 27, 276. Those conclusory statements do 

not address the seemingly contrary findings in the 40:1 

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Reports. Nor do they offer any explanation for the FAA’s 

ultimate conclusion that the turbines would not exceed its Part 

77 obstruction standards. In short, the FAA’s determinations 

do not satisfy the APA’s reasoned decisionmaking 

requirement with respect to the agency’s Part 77 obstruction 

standards. 

The record evidence also suggests that the turbines would 

interfere with radar systems at the Ivanpah airport. Clark 

County submitted an aerospace consultant’s study to the 

FAA; the study concluded that the turbines “may impact 

aviation safety.” ASRC Aerospace Corp. Radar Impact 

Analysis, at 4 (Apr. 21, 2006), J.A. 5. Among other things, 

the study stated that the wind turbines “will likely show up on 

the display of air traffic control” radar at the Ivanpah airport. 

Id. at 3, J.A. 4. Because each wind turbine has a radar 

“signature approximately that of a jumbo jet,” the wind farm 

“could likely appear as a fleet of jumbo jets” on the radar 

screen and confuse air traffic controllers. Id. In addition, the 

turbines could intermittently disappear from the screen and 

reappear a few seconds later – hampering “the ability of the 

air traffic controller to successfully control aircraft in the 

area.” Id. Because of potential radar issues, two offices 

within the FAA raised concerns to the FAA’s Obstruction 

Evaluation Service, which was the office conducting the 

aeronautical study. The Airway Facilities Division objected 

to the turbines due to “the proximity of proposed sites to 

proposed air traffic radar facilities” at the Ivanpah airport. 

J.A. 90. The Flight Procedures Office similarly stated that the 

turbines “could very possibly impact some air navigation 

facilities” for the Ivanpah airport, “such as RADAR or other” 

navigational aids. Id. In a subsequent e-mail to the 

Obstruction Evaluation Service, an employee in the Flight 

Procedures Office elaborated: “History has borne out the fact 

that wind turbines can impact RADAR and other” 

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navigational aids, and the wind turbine project needs “to be 

brought to the attention of” the FAA’s Airports Division 

(which was in charge of the Ivanpah airport project) as well as 

Clark County. J.A. 23. 

In an e-mail to a colleague at the FAA, the official who 

ultimately issued the “Does Not Exceed” determinations 

dismissed the radar study and the internal staff objections as 

“a whole lot of IFs, Might’s and Maybe’s.” J.A. 27. He 

acknowledged that the FAA could have circulated the 

proposed determinations to interested parties – including 

Clark County – for comment, but he stated that notice and 

comment would have yielded only “a lot of responses citing 

the if’s, might’s and maybe’s.” Id. The official stated that he 

therefore was “inclined to let the whole project go,” id., 

notwithstanding the agency’s statutory duty to consider the 

impact of proposed structures on “planned” airports. 49 

U.S.C. § 44718(b)(1)(D). 

In light of the record evidence and the lack of any 

coherent explanation countering the concerns about radar 

interference, the FAA’s determinations do not satisfy the 

reasoned decisionmaking requirement for this reason as well.1

 1

 Seeking to prop up the agency’s determinations, the FAA’s 

counsel capably offered several new justifications to this Court. 

But we find nothing in the agency’s determinations that supports 

counsel’s post hoc explanations. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 

U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (“[A] reviewing court . . . must judge the 

propriety of [agency] action solely by the grounds invoked by the 

agency.”); PanAmSat Corp. v. FCC, 198 F.3d 890, 897 (D.C. Cir. 

1999) (“We do not ordinarily consider agency reasoning that 

appears nowhere in the [agency’s] order.”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted and alteration in original). 

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* * * 

In sum, the FAA failed to reasonably explain why the 

turbines would not exceed its Part 77 obstruction standards or 

cause hazardous interference with radar systems at the 

Ivanpah airport. We therefore grant Clark County’s petition 

for review, vacate the 83 “Does Not Exceed” determinations, 

and remand to the FAA.2

So ordered. 

 2

 At oral argument, the FAA’s counsel argued that it would be 

overly burdensome for the FAA to prepare a detailed explanation 

each time a “pre-decisional” 40:1 Report indicates that construction 

might exceed an obstruction standard but a “more detailed 

calculation” leads the agency to conclude otherwise. Oral Arg. Tr. 

at 29. But our narrow, fact-bound holding today will not require 

more explanation in most such cases. Instead, if the FAA performs 

a “more detailed calculation” that bears on its decision, the agency 

may simply include that calculation in the record. If the calculation 

in fact supports the agency’s ultimate conclusion, no further 

explanation may be needed in many cases. But here, the only 

record evidence actually undermines the agency’s ultimate 

conclusions. 

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