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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Allen Young
Appellant

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 18-3679

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ALLEN YOUNG,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:17-cr-82 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 26, 2020 — DECIDED APRIL 7, 2020

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.

BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Allen Young was indicted for the 

sex trafficking of four minors and the attempted sex trafficking of a fifth. Three weeks before his trial was scheduled to 

start, Young fired his attorney and invoked his right to represent himself. The result was predictable. The government presented compelling evidence—including the testimony of each 

victim—that Young knowingly facilitated the prostitution of 

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vulnerable minors and profited from their exploitation. 

Young, appearing pro se, failed to mount a serious defense to 

the government’s case, and the jury convicted him on all 

counts. He now appeals eight issues from the trial. None of 

his arguments has merit, and we affirm the judgment across 

the board. 

I.

Between 2014 and 2016, Allen Young promoted the prostitution of high-school-aged minors and took a cut of the 

money that they were paid for sex. He was indicted under 18 

U.S.C. § 1591 for sex trafficking four minor victims—Jyanna, 

Kiwana, Jackie, and Destiny—and attempting to do the same 

with a fifth—Alexus. Young followed the same general pattern with each victim. After meeting the victims, Young

showed them the classified ads website Backpage.com and 

taught them how to post advertisements for “escort services.”

Young sometimes took revealing photos of the victims for 

their ads and posted them himself from his own computer, 

paying the advertising fees out of pocket. Young then facilitated the victims’ “calls,” or appointments, with the men who 

responded to the Backpage ads. He set the hourly rates that 

his victims would charge for sex; he reserved the hotels where 

the sexual acts would take place; and he provided the victims 

with condoms to use during sex, as well as cell phones that 

they could use to contact him during their appointments. He 

provided housing for one victim, Kiwana, in his basement. 

Young also drove the victims to and from their calls, at least 

once picking up a victim from high school to take her to a call. 

Young usually took half of the money that his victims were 

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paid for sex. Sometimes he personally demanded sex from 

them—either in addition to or instead of the money. 

A few weeks before Young’s trial was set to begin, Young

fired his counsel and elected to represent himself. At trial, the 

government presented substantial evidence of Young’s guilt. 

It elicited testimony from each of the five victims, the FBI special agent who investigated the case, and a witness who had 

seen Young transport the victims. It introduced phone records showing extensive contact between Young’s phone and 

the victims’, which consistently matched the times and locations of their appointments. It put Young’s former employer

on the stand, who testified that he had fired Young after discovering that Young had used the workplace to photograph 

and advertise young women on Backpage. It introduced 

Young’s personal notebook, which contained the email address that he had used to post at least one of the victims’ Backpage ads and tips on how to avoid getting caught by the police as an escort. And it furnished the jury with Young’s postarrest statement, during which he admitted that he knew

about Backpage and that he knew Jyanna and knew that she 

was a minor.

Young testified in his own defense, questioned by his 

standby counsel. On the stand, Young admitted that he had 

been trying to start an adult escort business, that he knew 

some of the victims, and that he helped them by giving them

rides. He denied facilitating their prostitution and posting 

their ads on Backpage, and he said that he did not know that 

they were all minors.

The jury convicted Young on all counts, and the court sentenced him to 21 years’ imprisonment. Now represented by 

counsel, Young appeals eight issues from trial.

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II.

Young first argues that he never stood a chance at trial because the district court did not give him adequate time to prepare. The court denied the motion for a continuance that 

Young filed on May 3, 2018, eleven days before trial was set 

to begin. 

Young’s May 3 motion for a continuance was not his first. 

The court had originally scheduled the trial to begin on January 22, 2018. Still represented by counsel at the time, Young 

moved in January 2018 for a continuance to respond to a government request to narrow the indictment and to address new 

facts that the government had recently learned and disclosed. 

The court granted that continuance and reset the trial for February 20, 2018. In February, Young moved for a second continuance because his counsel had a family medical issue. The 

court granted that motion and rescheduled the trial for May 

14, 2018. In early April, the grand jury returned a narrowed 

superseding indictment. Two weeks later, Young elected to 

waive his right to counsel. The district court thoroughly advised Young about the consequences of invoking his right to 

self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 

(1975). The court explained that proceeding pro se could restrict Young’s ability to conduct research and to prepare for 

the trial. Young waived his right to counsel anyway. On May 

3, he orally moved for a third continuance to help prepare for 

the trial. The district court denied the motion and proceeded 

with the May 14 schedule.

A district court has great discretion in scheduling trials 

and may adhere to a trial date unless there are strong reasons 

to grant a continuance. United States v. Cosby, 924 F.3d 329, 334 

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(7th Cir. 2019). To determine whether such strong reasons exist, a district court must consider several factors, including the 

amount of time available for preparation, the risk of prejudice 

from denying the continuance, the defendant’s role in shortening the effective preparation time, the complexity of the 

case, the availability of discovery from the prosecution, the 

likelihood that a continuance would have helped the defendant, and the inconvenience to the district court. United States 

v. Schwensow, 151 F.3d 650, 656 (7th Cir. 1998). We will reverse 

the district court’s denial of a motion for a continuance only 

for abuse of discretion and upon a showing of actual prejudice. Id.

Reviewing the relevant factors, we conclude that the court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying the third motion for a 

continuance. Young has failed to explain what he would have 

done differently with the benefit of more time. He had 15 

months from the initial indictment to trial to prepare; for most 

of that time, he had the help of a lawyer, and after he took 

over his own defense, he had almost three weeks to get up to 

speed. Id. (affirming the district court’s denial of a continuance where the defendant had months with counsel to prepare for trial before electing to proceed pro se). His desire for 

more time arose from his own knowing and voluntary choice 

to proceed pro se—a change that he initiated three weeks before a trial date that had already been pushed back twice. Cf.

United States v. Volpentesta, 727 F.3d 666, 678 (7th Cir. 2013) 

(“We are particularly reluctant to find an abuse of discretion 

where, as in this case, a court denies a continuance to a defendant who decides to proceed pro se but then complains of 

not being prepared for trial.”). Further, Young did not lack 

access to the prosecution’s discovery: in detention, he was allowed to review all of the prosecution’s materials except for 

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certain phone records, which he was later permitted to access. 

As for the complexity of Young’s case, the trial transcript reveals that Young had a fairly strong grasp of the relevant 

facts. Young may have lacked a sophisticated understanding 

of the law, but he has not explained why that was the result 

of the timeline rather than his choice to proceed pro se. 

When Young elected to represent himself, he was warned 

that one of the consequences would be the difficulty of preparing for trial. A defendant has a right to self-representation, 

but “[d]efending pro se will almost always be foolish ....” 

Imani v. Pollard, 826 F.3d 939, 944 (7th Cir. 2016). Young proceeded pro se anyway, and he now faces the consequences. 

The court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a third 

continuance.

III.

Young also argues that the district court erroneously instructed the jury on the interstate commerce element of the 

offense. Young was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, which requires that the offense occur “in or affecting interstate commerce.” The district court instructed the jury that this element 

would be satisfied if the defendant did or knowingly caused 

another to do one or more of the following actions as part of 

in or in furtherance of the offense: “(1) used hotels that serve 

interstate travelers; or (2) used condoms manufactured outside of the State of Illinois; or (3) used the Internet to place 

advertisements.” Young asserts that these connections to interstate commerce are too flimsy to support a conviction.

We reject Young’s narrow theory. The statute sweeps 

broadly: again, the defendant’s actions need only be “in or affecting” interstate commerce. The Seventh Circuit’s pattern 

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jury instructions clarify that commerce “includes, among 

other things, travel, trade, transportation and communication.” PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH 

CIRCUIT 470 (2012 ed., rev. 2019). An advertisement for sex 

placed on the internet is plainly a communication delivered 

through an interstate infrastructure. See United States v. Horne, 

474 F.3d 1004, 1006 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining that a website 

“is an avenue of interstate commerce” and that the internet 

“crosses state and indeed international boundaries”). Hotels 

catering to interstate travelers have a close connection to interstate travel. Cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 

379 U.S. 241, 248 (1964) (holding that the local operations of a 

motel affect interstate commerce). And condoms manufactured out of state affect interstate trade. See United States v. 

Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1179–80 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining that 

condoms, along with hotels, affect interstate commerce); see 

also United States v. Walls, 784 F.3d 543, 548–49 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(holding that because Congress found that sex trafficking has 

a substantial effect on interstate commerce in the aggregate, 

each individual action need only have a de minimis effect on 

interstate commerce).

The jury instructions thus comported with the broad language of § 1591. Other circuits have taken the same approach 

to the interstate commerce element in this very statute. See, 

e.g., United States v. Phea, 755 F.3d 255, 263 (5th Cir. 2014) (element satisfied by use of cell phone, out-of-state customer, 

and online ads); United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 331–33 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (Craigslist and newspaper ads); Evans, 476 F.3d at 

1179–80 (condoms and hotels). And we have interpreted the 

interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act, another statute with a broadly defined interstate commerce element, in a 

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similarly expansive way. See Horne, 474 F.3d at 1006; United 

States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558–59 (7th Cir. 1995).

Young next argues that even if the court properly instructed the jury on the interstate commerce element, the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove that element. 

Young moved for a directed verdict on this basis at the district 

court and now argues that it warrants a reversal of his conviction. We will overturn a conviction based on insufficiency of 

the evidence only if the record is “devoid of evidence from 

which a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” United States v. Durham, 645 F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir. 

2011). 

Young has a compelling argument with respect to two of 

the three grounds on which the jury could have found the “interstate commerce” element satisfied: hotels and condoms. 

The government presented little to no credible evidence of the 

interstate nature of the hotels that Young used or that the condoms that he provided to the victims were manufactured out 

of state. That was unfortunate. Such information is no doubt 

readily available, and the government could have averted litigation on this issue by presenting it. 

Fortunately for the government, it had enough evidence 

of the third ground—internet advertising—to prove the interstate commerce element for each count of conviction. The 

court instructed the jury that they could find that the government proved the interstate commerce element if Young used 

or caused someone else to use the internet to place advertisements “as part of or in furtherance of the offense.” Jyanna, Kiwana, Destiny, and Jackie all testified at trial that Young used 

Backpage to advertise their escort services. They explained

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that sometimes Young posted their advertisements on Backpage himself and sometimes he took photos for the website 

and instructed one of the victims to post them on his behalf. 

They further testified that Young sometimes paid money to 

Backpage to promote their ads on the website. Their testimony was supported by examples of the advertisements, 

which were linked to Young’s phone number, email address, 

and IP address. That evidence is sufficient for a reasonable 

jury to find that Young used the internet in furtherance of his 

offenses against all four victims of sex trafficking.

With respect to Alexus, the victim of attempted sex trafficking, the evidence was slightly weaker. Jyanna testified 

that Young had posted an advertisement on Backpage for escort services, but not for Alexus directly. Two men responded 

to the Backpage ad, requesting two escorts. Jyanna persuaded

her friend Alexus to be the second, and Young picked up both 

Jyanna and Alexus to take them to the call. 

Even though Young did not advertise Alexus by name or 

by photograph, Jyanna’s testimony supports the jury’s finding on the “interstate commerce” element with respect to 

Alexus. Young’s Backpage advertisement attracted customers 

seeking two escorts, and he used Alexus to fulfill their request. Based on that evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that Young used the internet “as part of or in furtherance of” his attempt to provide Alexus for sex. The record

therefore was not “devoid” of proof that Young acted in interstate commerce with respect to every offense for which the 

jury convicted him. 

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IV.

Young challenges the district court’s decision to exclude 

evidence of his minor victims’ past sexual conduct. Before 

trial, Young moved to introduce evidence that Jyanna, Kiwana, and Alexus had been engaged as prostitutes “on their 

own” before they ever met him. The district court denied 

Young’s motion under Federal Rule of Evidence 412. We review the exclusion for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Groce, 891 F.3d 260, 266 (7th Cir. 2018). 

Evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other 

sexual behavior is generally inadmissible in proceedings involving allegations of sexual misconduct. FED. R.

EVID. 412(a)(1). The rule serves two purposes: it is meant to 

protect victims against “the invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associated with 

public disclosure of intimate sexual details” and to encourage 

victims to participate in legal proceedings without fear of 

those consequences. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s 

note to 1994 amendments. But the general rule has a few narrow textual exceptions, and Young argues that his proposed 

evidence falls under one of them. A court may admit sexualhistory evidence in a criminal case if excluding the evidence 

would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. FED. R.

EVID. 412(b)(1)(C). Young argues that the exclusion violated 

his Sixth Amendment right to prove his defense. The federal 

sex-trafficking statute makes it a crime to knowingly or with 

reckless disregard recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide, 

obtain, advertise, maintain, patronize, or solicit a minor to engage in a commercial sex act. 18 U.S.C. § 1591. Young posits 

that the evidence would tend to show that he lacked the mens 

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rea to knowingly or with reckless disregard “coerce,” “recruit,” or “harbor” the victims because he believed from their 

prior sexual acts that they were “acting of their own volition.”

The district court properly rejected this argument. Disproving that he knowingly “coerced” his victims would not 

have helped Young because coercion is not an element of the 

federal crime of sex trafficking when the victim is a minor. Id.

§ 1591(a), (c). Nor would it have helped Young to disprove 

that he knowingly “recruited” the victims to prostitution. Although recruitment is one possible means of completing the 

federal crime of sex trafficking, Young was not indicted for

recruitment. Finally, the prior sexual conduct of Young’s minor victims has no bearing whatsoever on whether Young 

knowingly “harbored” any of them for prostitution—that is, 

whether he knowingly provided his victims with a place to 

live. Nor, for that matter, could Young argue that his victims’ 

prior sexual acts bore on whether he “transported,” “provided,” “obtained,” or “maintained” them—the other charges 

in his indictment. See Groce, 891 F.3d at 266–67 (rejecting evidence of prior prostitution as irrelevant to the present 

charges); United States v. Carson, 870 F.3d 584, 593–94 (7th Cir. 

2017) (same); United States v. Cephus, 684 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 

2012) (same). The district court did not infringe on Young’s 

constitutional rights by denying him the opportunity to present evidence of his minor victims’ sexual history. 

V.

Young next argues that his personal notebook should have 

been excluded from evidence as the fruit of an illegal search. 

He contends that the person who consented to the search did 

not have the apparent authority to do so. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188–89 (1990).

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Whatever the merits of Young’s Fourth Amendment argument, he made it too late. A party moving to suppress evidence must do so before trial; the court may consider an untimely motion only if the moving party shows good cause.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(C); 12(c)(3). Young did not file a pretrial suppression motion; instead, he moved to suppress the 

notebook during the trial after the prosecution introduced the 

evidence. Young asserts that his election to proceed pro se 

during the weeks before trial amounted to good cause for his 

untimeliness. But Young discussed this issue with his attorney months before his decision to proceed pro se, and he was 

able to file several other pretrial motions after he fired his 

counsel. The district court’s conclusion that Young failed to 

demonstrate good cause for his untimeliness was not an 

abuse of discretion.

VI.

Young presents a spate of other arguments, all of which 

we reject. Young contends that the district court erroneously 

instructed the jury on the definition of “reckless disregard.” 

But the court’s instruction comported with our definition of

the term in Carson, 870 F.3d at 601. Young also challenges the 

admission of testimony by government’s expert FBI Special 

Agent Carrie Landau. The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Landau’s expert testimony, which 

defined key terms and explained common sex-trafficking dynamics, was reliable and helpful for the jury. See FED. R.

EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 

(1993). Young’s motion for a new trial on the basis of supposed perjury by two government witnesses, Special Agent 

Dana McNeal and victim Destiny, fares no better. The district 

court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that 

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McNeal had not perjured herself but rather had failed to understand Young’s convoluted cross-examination. As to Destiny’s testimony, Young never raised the argument below. It 

was not plain error to deny Young’s motion for a retrial notwithstanding inconsistencies in Destiny’s testimony on a minor issue collateral to Young’s guilt. Finally, because Young 

has failed to point to any errors at all in his trial, he has necessarily failed to demonstrate that his trial was tainted by cumulative error. 

* * *

Young has pointed to no reversible error. On the contrary, 

the record reveals that the district court ably presided over 

the many challenges of this particular trial. The court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. 

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