Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cr-00238/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cr-00238-19/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marion P. Fry
Defendant
Mollie P. Fry
Defendant
Dale C. Schafer
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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1 The court also held the trial confirmation hearing;

trial of this matter is set to commence August 1, 2007.

2 The court denied as moot defendants’ motion for

discovery compliance regarding any “informants” used by the

government (Docket #129); the court accepted the government’s

representation that it did not use any informants in the instant

investigation; however, the government conceded there are certain

cooperating witnesses who will testify in this action and as to

those witnesses, the government indicated it would disclose

pertinent information, including cooperation agreements. 

The court granted the government’s motions in limine

nos. 5, 6 and 7, to exclude any argument regarding jury

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

NO. CR. S-05-238 FCD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DALE C. SCHAFER and MARION

P. FRY, aka Mollie P. Fry,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

On July 13, 2007, the court heard oral argument on the

parties’ motions in limine.1 At the hearing, the court decided

on the record some motions,2 deferred ruling on others, pending

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nullification, to exclude evidence or argument regarding

potential punishments and to exclude evidence or argument

relating to any mental disease or defect of defendant Fry,

respectively. 

The court did not specifically discuss the government’s

notice of intent to introduce possible evidence under Federal

Rule of Evidence 404(b). The admissibility of any such evidence

will be considered by the court during trial, when, and if, it is

sought to be introduced.

3 The court deferred ruling on the government’s motions

in limine nos. 3 and 4, to exclude evidence regarding defenses of

entrapment by estoppel or public authority and to exclude

evidence regarding the execution of the search warrant,

respectively, pending factual proffers on the issues by

defendants, to be filed with the court, under seal, on or before

July 20, 2007. As set forth below, defendants filed a proffer

only with respect to the government’s motion in limine No. 3;

they did not file the proffer under seal.

4 The government filed its motions in a consolidated

document (Docket #131), to which defendants responded in a

consolidated opposition (Docket #136).

5 Defendants styled their motion as a motion in support

of various proposed jury instructions (Docket #128). However,

the court construes the motion, as did the government (Docket

#137), as a motion in limine in support of the assertion of

various defenses to the charged conduct, including defenses of

compliance with federal or state law, fair notice, mistake of

fact, mistake of law, advice of counsel, good faith and/or

entrapment or reliance on public authority. In some respects,

defendants’ motion overlaps with the government’s MIL Nos. 1, 2

2

factual proffers by defendants,3

 and submitted certain motions. 

By this order, the court issues its decision with respect to the

motions taken under submission, including the government’s motion

in limine4 no. 1 (“MIL No. 1"), to exclude any evidence or

argument pertaining to a medical necessity defense, and motion in

limine no. 2 (“MIL No. 2"), to exclude any evidence or argument

pertaining to a defense of erroneous belief that defendants’

conduct was legal, and defendants’ motion in limine in support of

certain jury instructions (hereinafter, “defendants’ MIL to

assert defenses”).5 The court also rules herein on the deferred

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and 3.

6 The Court based its holding on the premise that there

can be no necessity for a substance which has no medical value,

based on marijuana's Schedule I classification.

7 As set forth below, Judge Karlton’s decision in

“Mushroom Trail” is not to the contrary. There, Judge Karlton

considered the retroactive application of Gonzales v. Raich, 125

S.Ct. 2195 (2005), not OCBC.

3

motions (the government’s, “MIL No. 3" and “MIL No. 4").

Government’s MIL No. 1

The court GRANTS the government’s MIL No. 1 to exclude any

argument or evidence pertaining to a defense of medical

necessity. It is the law of this case that the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Oakland Cannabis

Buyers' Cooperative (“OCBC”), 532 U.S. 483 (2001), holding that

medical necessity cannot be a defense to a federal charge of

manufacturing and distributing marijuana in violation of the

Controlled Substances Act ("CSA"),6 may be retroactively applied

to defendants’ charged conduct here, occurring between 8/1/99 and

9/28/01. The court made this finding on the record at the

January 20, 2006 hearing wherein it denied defendants’ motion to

dismiss the indictment on the grounds that, at the time in

question, state and federal law permitted possession and

cultivation of marijuana for medicinal purposes. With respect to

OCBC, the court found that the Supreme Court’s decision was

foreseeable in light of a circuit split on the issue and thus,

under United States v. Qualls, 172 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 1999),

OCBC could be retroactively applied to defendants’ alleged

conduct.7

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4

Moreover, even if OCBC could not be applied retroactively,

defendants’ argument regarding the purported legality of their

charged conduct would only apply to the time frame of 7/17/00 to

8/29/00, the time between the OCBC-district court’s modification

of the injunction to include a medical necessity exemption and

the Supreme Court’s stay of the injunction. Preliminarily, the

court notes that defendants’ argument can be summarily dismissed

as it pertains to their alleged conduct occurring between

5/14/01, the date of the Supreme Court's decision in OCBC and

9/28/01, the last date of wrongdoing charged in the indictment;

as to that time frame, the law (as described in OCBC) clearly did

not support a medical necessity defense. 

With respect to defendants' alleged conduct occurring

between 8/1/99 and 5/14/01, defendants misapply the lower court

decisions in OCBC to their conduct. OCBC was a non-profit

cannabis club. In the district court, the government brought

suit, requesting a preliminary injunction to stop the

distribution of cannabis in the wake of California's initiative

supporting the medical use of marijuana. The district court

issued the injunction on May 13, 1998 (5 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D.

Cal. 1999)). OCBC appealed the district court's order denying

its motion to modify the injunction to permit distribution to

persons that have a medical necessity. On September 13, 1999,

the Ninth Circuit reversed the order denying the modification and

remanded the case to the district court to reconsider whether a

medical necessity exemption should be included in the injunction

(190 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1999)). The Ninth Circuit did not

vacate the injunction upon remand. Thus, the original injunction

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remained in effect. The district court modified the injunction

to include a medical necessity exemption on July 17, 2000 (2000

WL 1517166 (N.D. Cal. 2000)). That injunction was stayed by the

Supreme Court on August 29, 2000 (530 U.S. 1298 (2000)). Thus,

the only period in which defendants can argue that federal law

supported a medical necessity defense is from 7/17/00 to 8/29/00. 

Nevertheless, this court has determined that OCBC may be

retroactively applied to defendants’ charged conduct, and thus,

defendants cannot assert a medical necessity defense with respect

to any time frame relative to the indictment. 

Government’s MIL No. 2

The Court GRANTS the government’s MIL No. 2 to exclude any

evidence or argument pertaining to a defense that defendants

erroneously believed their alleged conduct was legal. Defendants

are not entitled to present evidence relating to their purported

erroneous belief that their alleged conduct was legal under

federal law because the charged offenses require a "knowing"

scienter, not a "willful" one. The government is required to

show only that defendants knew they were "in fact performing an

act," not that they knew the act was "criminalized by statute." 

See United States v. Lynch, 233 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The charged offenses here are general intent crimes to which it

is not a defense that defendants lacked the intent to violate the

law. See United States v. Fahey, 411 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1969);

United States v. Cain, 130 F.3d 381, 384 (9th Cir. 1997)

(district court properly gave instruction in possession of

cocaine with intent to distribute case that government need not

prove the defendant knew his conduct was illegal).

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6

Specifically as to the Count I conspiracy charge, defendants

argued, in their reply, that the defense is viable, citing a

California appellate court decision, People v. Urziceanu, 132

Cal. App. 4th 747 (2005), which permitted a mistake of law

defense to a conspiracy to sell marijuana charge under state law. 

In Urziceanu, the court was interpreting California's conspiracy

statute, Cal. Penal Code § 182. The court reasoned that such a

charge required the government to prove that the defendant knew

what he was doing violated the law; in other words, the

conspiracy charge was a specific intent crime to which mistake of

law could be a defense. Id. at 876.

Defendants’ reliance on Urziceanu is unavailing. The United

States Supreme Court has recognized in construing the federal,

general conspiracy statute (18 U.S.C. § 371), that a defendant

does not need to know his conduct violates federal law to be

guilty of a conspiracy. Section 371 makes it unlawful to

"conspire . . . to commit any offense against the United States."

The Supreme Court held in United States v. Feola that: 

A natural reading of these words would be that since 

one can violate a criminal statute simply by engaging 

in the forbidden conduct, a conspiracy to commit that

 offense is nothing more than an agreement to engage in 

the prohibited conduct. 

420 U.S. 671, 687 (1975). The drug conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C.

§ 846, is substantially the same as Section 371, and thus, the

court applies Feola here. United States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d

118, 128 (2nd Cir. 2004) (upholding district court's refusal to

give good faith instruction to § 846 conspiracy charge, stating

"knowledge of, or intent to violate the law is simply not an

element of this offense"). Section 846 reads: "any person who

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8 For the reasons set forth below regarding the

government’s MIL No. 3, the court also precludes defendants from

asserting a defense of entrapment by estoppel or public

authority.

7

attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined this

subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties . . . ." See

also United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1493 (9th Cir. 1995)

(recognizing in the context of a conspiracy charge under RICO and

the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act that "[e]stablishing a

defendant's guilt of conspiracy to commit a substantive crime

requires proof of mens rea essential for conviction of the

substantive offense itself . . . No greater or different intent

is necessary.")

Thus, the government is required only to prove that

defendants agreed to commit the acts which make up the objects of

the conspiracy, which here, are not specific intent crimes--i.e.,

they do not require proof of an intent to violate the law. 

Defendants' beliefs concerning the legality of the use of

“medicinal marijuana” are not a proper defense and evidence of

their beliefs, or their reasons for those beliefs, are irrelevant

to the charges. Fed. Rs. Evid. 401, 402. 

Defendants’ MIL to Assert Defenses

The court DENIES defendants’ MIL to assert certain defenses,

including defenses of compliance with federal or state law, fair

notice, mistake of fact, mistake of law, advice of counsel or

good faith.8

As to any defense of compliance with federal or state law,

the court’s discussion above regarding the government’s MIL No. 1

applies with equal force here and serves as a basis to deny

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9 Mushroom Trail involved a civil forfeiture action

involving real property on which the claimant allegedly grew

marijuana for “lawful, medicinal purposes.” Judge Karlton 

ultimately denied the government’s motion for summary judgment,

finding that triable issues of fact existed as to whether the

claimant’s conduct fell within the CUA. The case later settled.

8

defendant’s proffered defense. The court also finds that

defendants cannot assert a defense based on (1) reliance on Raich

v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), holding the CSA

unconstitutional as exceeding Congress’ powers under the Commerce

Clause and thus not preemptive of California’s Compassionate Use

Act (“CUA”), or (2) Judge Lawrence Karlton’s decision in United

States v. Real Property Located at 11550 Mushroom Trail, et al.,

Civ. 04-2470 LKK/KJM, Order, filed January 19, 2006 ("Mushroom

Trail"), holding that the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v.

Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005), reversing the Ninth Circuit’s

decision, could not be applied retroactively to a civil

forfeiture claimant's conduct, occurring between June 2004 and

September 2004, and permitting the claimant to argue that his

conduct was lawful pursuant to the Ninth Circuit's decision in

Raich.9 Both the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Raich and Mushroom

Trail are inapplicable to this case, as defendants could not have

relied on either decision at time of the charged conduct, which

occurred years before these decisions were issued; defendants’

charged conduct occurred between 8/1/99 and 9/28/01, but the

Ninth Circuit did not issue its decision until 2003 and Mushroom

Trail was decided in 2006.

As to a fair notice defense, such a defense is premised on

the principle that the government may not prosecute a person when

that person has been "required at peril of life, liberty or

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9

property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes."

Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). Fair notice is

about statutes, not erroneous or confusing judicial opinions. 

United States v. Larm, 824 F.2d 780, 784 (9th cir. 1987). Here,

21 U.S.C. § 841 meets the fair notice requirement as it

unambiguously publishes what conduct is prohibited and what

minimum sentences apply. See United States v. Taylor, 693 F.2d

919, 922 (9th Cir. 1982) (the Constitution requires only that the 

"wording of the statute is sufficient to give a person of

ordinary intelligence fair notice that his or her contemplated

conduct is forbidden"). Thus, defendants cannot assert a fair

notice defense.

As to a mistake of fact defense, defendants’ motion is

denied as they have failed to make a proffer as to any factual,

as opposed to legal, mistake at issue.

As to a mistake of law defense, defendants’ motion is denied

for the same reasons the court grants the government’s MIL No. 2. 

As to an advice of counsel defense, which defendant Schafer

seeks to assert based on his communications with an attorney

Nicks, defendants’ motion is denied as such a defense is also

unavailable for the same reasons the court granted the

government’s MIL No. 2. Advice of counsel is not, strictly

speaking, a defense to a criminal charge, but rather, is a

circumstance indicating good faith which may be considered by the

jury if relevant to negate a specific element of the offense with

which a defendant is charged. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510

U.S. 135, 138-39 (1994) (recognizing that good faith might be

relevant in cases where specific intent to violate the law is an

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10 As such, advice of counsel defenses arise largely in

tax and banking cases where the offenses require proof that a

defendant violated a known legal duty. See e.g. United States v.

Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 1980) (recognizing that

while reliance on counsel is not a complete defense in tax

evasion cases, it is a circumstance indicating good faith which

the trier of fact is allowed to consider on the issue of

"willfullness").

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element of the charged offense).10 Thus, because an advice of

counsel defense serves only to negate specific intent to violate

the law, it would clearly not be a viable defense to the Count II

charge of manufacturing. Indeed, defendant Schafer concedes this

point in his reply. As to the Count I conspiracy charge, the

defense is also unavailable, under Feola and Ansaldi, as set

forth above. See also United States v. Soares, 998 F.2d 671

(9th Cir. 1993) (affirming the defendant's conviction and finding

no error in the district court's preclusion of an advice of

counsel defense since the kickback statute at issue did not

require the government to prove the defendant knew he was

violating the law).

For the same reasons, defendants cannot assert a good faith

defense to the charged offenses.

Thus, defendants are precluded from asserting any of the

above defenses, and as such, they may not introduce evidence or

make argument relating to these defenses. Defendants’ motion

(Docket #128), construed as a motion in limine to assert

defenses, is DENIED as to the defenses discussed herein.

Government’s MIL No. 3

The court GRANTS the government’s MIL No. 3 to exclude

evidence regarding any defense of entrapment by estoppel or

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public authority. The court previously denied on January 20,

2006, defendants' pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment based

on the argument that federal agents lured defendants into

committing federal crimes by telling them they would not be

prosecuted by federal authorities for their federal crimes. The

government seeks to preclude assertion of any affirmative defense

based on the same argument. For the same reasons the court

denied defendants' motion to dismiss, it grants the government’s

instant motion in limine.

The court may preclude a proposed defense if the evidence

described in the offer of proof is insufficient as a matter of

law to support the proffered defense. United States v. Aguilar,

883 F.2d 662, 692 (9th Cir. 1989). In the earlier proceedings on

defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment, defendants could

not identify an authorized federal government official who

erroneously told them it was permissible to sell marijuana. 

United States v. Brebner, 951 F.2d 1017, 1024 (9th Cir. 1991) (to

assert the instant defense, defendants must proffer facts that an

authorized official of the federal government affirmatively told

defendants their charged conduct was permissible under federal

law and they reasonably relied upon that representation). At the

July 13, 2007 hearing, the court deferred ruling on this motion

to permit defendants to make a new offer of proof on this issue. 

Defendants filed their proffer on July 20, 2007 (Docket #146). 

However, again, defendants failed to make the requisite showing;

defendants’ proffer, if it shows anything at all, simply concerns

the underlying investigation, which involved federal and local

law enforcement agents; at times, federal agents appear to direct

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certain undercover operations performed by local agents. 

Significantly, the proffer does not establish, in any respect,

that federal agents, or any other law enforcement officials, told

defendants their alleged conduct was permissible under federal

law. Therefore, the court grants the government’s MIL No. 3.

Government’s MIL No. 4

The court GRANTS the government’s MIL No. 4 to exclude any

evidence pertaining to the manner in which the DEA agents

executed the search of defendants' residence, including evidence

pertaining to defendants’ son’s civil rights action, pending in

this court, arising out of events taking place during the

execution of the search warrant. At the hearing, the court

announced its tentative ruling to grant the motion on the ground

that any such evidence is irrelevant to the charged conduct of

growing and selling marijuana. Fed. Rs. Evid. 401, 402. It

deferred ruling, however, to permit defendants to make a factual

proffer. Said proffer was to be filed by July 20, 2007. 

Defendants did not file a proffer. As such, the court grants the

government’s motion for the above reason.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 DATED: July 24, 2007

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