Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-05003/USCOURTS-ca10-94-05003-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Albert John Blair Jr.
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH -"FILED·, United States Court of Appeau 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 011995 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 94-5003 

ALBERT JOHN BLAIR, Jr. , 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR-92-025-B} 

Charles M. McLoughlin, Assistant United States Attorney (Stephen 

C. Lewis, United States Attorney for the Northern District of 

Oklahoma, with him on the brief), Tulsa, Oklahoma, for PlaintiffAppellee. 

Vicki Mandell-King, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Michael G. 

Katz, Federal Public Defender, with her on the briefs), Denver, 

Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before BALDOCK and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and BROWN,* District 

Judge. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

The defendant, Albert John Blair Jr., brings this appeal 

challenging the district court's acceptance of his guilty plea and 

* The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior United States District 

Judge, District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

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calculation of sentence. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

The relevant facts are essentially undisputed. Mr. Blair 

accepted wagers on professional and college basketball games from 

residents of the Northern District of Oklahoma over the phone via 

a toll-free number he had established. At the time, Mr. Blair was 

residing in the Dominican Republic. As part of his gambling 

operation, Mr. Blair employed a number of people who answered the 

phones, who used his information and capital, who paid a 

percentage of the profits from their own customers to him, and 

whose losses he covered. Mary J. Meyer played an active role in 

the enterprise. She would take and collect bets and place and lay 

off bets with other bookmakers for Mr. Blair. 

On February 10, 1993, the government filed a two count 

information against Mr. Blair. Count one charged him with 

knowingly using a wire communication facility for the transmission 

of bets or wagers, contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 1084. Count two 

charged Mr. Blair with knowingly and willfully conspiring to 

commit the offense of illegal gambling against the United States, 

contrary to both 18 U.S.C § 1084 and § 1955. Mr. Blair entered a 

plea agreement with the United States. On February 11, 1993, Mr. 

Blair appeared before the district court for the purpose of 

entering his guilty pleas. In addition to discussing the plea 

agreement and advising Mr. Blair of his rights, the court inquired 

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as to the factual basis for the plea. Satisfied that there was a 

factual basis for the pleas, the district court accepted the plea 

agreement. 

A presentence investigation report was prepared, and Mr. 

Blair filed several objections to it. Of those objections, only 

one is relevant to this appeal: Mr. Blair should not be assessed 

a two point increase in his base offense level for obstruction of 

justice. The factual basis for this increase, which the district 

court accepted, was Mr. Blair's "sham" marriage to Mary Meyer, 

intended to enable Ms. Meyer to invoke the marital privilege and 

thereby avoid testifying against Mr. Blair before the grand jury. 

Mr. Blair brings this appeal arguing the district court erred 

(1) in accepting his guilty pleas as no factual basis was 

established showing he was guilty of the crimes charged, and {2) 

in imposing a two point enhancement for obstruction of justice. 

DISCUSSION 

I. 

Mr. Blair argues the district court committed reversible 

error in accepting his guilty plea. This argument is premised on 

the contention that 18 U.S.C. § 1084 and § 371 are "specific 

intent" crimes and, further, that a specific intent crime requires 

a showing the defendant was cognizant of the illegality of his 

actions. In short, Mr. Blair argues ignorance of the law is a 

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defense to specific intent crimes generally and to the crimes he 

plead guilty to specifically. We are not persuaded. 

A 

Section 1084 provides, in pertinent part: 

(a) Whoever being engaged in the business of 

betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication 

facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign 

commerce of bets or wagers which entitles the 

recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets 

or wagers ... shall be fined not more than $10,000 or 

imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 

18 U.S.C. § 1084 (emphasis added). 

The term ''knowledge" as used in the criminal law has long had 

a very distinct and definite meaning. It specifies that the mens 

rea needed to establish the crime be that of general intent. E.g., 

United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980) (the term 

knowledge corresponds with the concept of general intent); United 

States v. Hall, 805 F.2d 1410, 1420 (lOth Cir. 1986) (same); 

Edward J. Devitt et al., Federal Jury Practice and Instructions 

§ 17.04 (4th ed. 1992). Because § 1084 proscribes the knowing use 

. . of wire communication facilities to take bets, the plain language 

of the statute clearly evinces Congress's judgment that general 

intent is the mens rea needed to establish a violation of § 1084. 

In arguing to the contrary, Mr. Blair relies exclusively on 

Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751, 756-57 (9th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 389 U.S. 897 (1967). While the court in Cohen did not 

conclude that § 1084 was a specific intent crime, the court did 

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hold that "Congress intended knowledge of the statutory 

prohibition to be an element of the offense under section 

1084(a) ." Id. at 757. We do not find the analysis of Cohen 

compelling and thus, decline to adopt it. 

First, the Cohen case contains no discussion of the plain 

meaning of § 1084 or the clearly established import of the term 

"knowledge." The language of the statute is, in our judgment, 

dispositive on the question of the mens rea needed to establish 

the crime. Second, we disagree with the Cohen court's conclusion 

Congress intended the statute to require knowledge of the 

statutory prohibition to support a conviction for its violation. 

The court reached this conclusion simply by observing that 

wagering is legal in the state of Nevada and thus, were the court 

to read the statute as requiring knowledge of its prohibition, 

"those innocent of intentional wrongdoing are afforded a defense." 

Id. at 756. While this undoubtedly is true, Congress nowhere 

manifested its intent to provide such a defense. Our duty is to 

apply the law as written, not rewrite it as we see fit. We 

decline to adopt the rule laid out in Cohen, and hold that the 

mens rea required to establish a violation of § 1084 is that of 

general intent. Accordingly, we reject Mr. Blair's allegation 

that reversible error was committed in accepting his plea to count 

one because no factual basis existed to establish he acted with 

specific intent. 

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B 

Mr. Blair argues there was no factual basis to support his 

guilty plea with respect to the conspiracy charged in count two. 

Again, he asserts conspiracy is a specific intent crime that 

requires proof the defendant acted with knowledge his conduct was 

prohibited by law. 

A specific intent crime is one in which an "act was committed 

voluntarily and purposely with the specific intent to do something 

the law forbids." Hall, 805 F.2d at 1420, see also Apodaca v. 

United States, 188 F.2d 932, 937 (lOth Cir. 1951) (specific intent 

requires "a conscious purpose to do wrong ... not only [with] 

knowledge of the thing done, but a determination to do it with bad 

intent or with an evil purpose or motive"). In contrast, a 

general intent crime is one in which an "act was done voluntarily 

and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident." Hall, 

805 F.2d at 1420; accord Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404 (discussing the 

Model Penal Code's distinction between acting "purposely" as 

opposed to "knowingly" and noting the two concepts correspond 

loosely to the common law concepts of general and specific 

intent). In short, a specific intent crime is one in which the 

defendant acts not only with knowledge of what he is doing, but 

does so with the objective of completing some unlawful act. 

There can be no doubt, therefore, that conspiracy is a 

specific intent crime. The general federal conspiracy statute 

provides, "[i)f two or more persons conspire to commit any 

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offense against the United States ... each shall be fined not more 

than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18 

U.S.C. § 371. "[T]he specific intent required for the crime of 

conspiracy is in fact the intent to advance or further the 

unlawful object of the conspiracy." United States v. Haldeman, 

559 F.2d 31, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 

(1977); see also, United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 688 (1975) 

(§ 371 requires "the conspirators agree to participate in the 

prohibited conduct") (citing Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 

211, 226 (1974)); United States v. Nall, 949 F.2d 301, 305 (lOth 

Cir. 1991) (elements of the crime of conspiracy include "an 

agreement[,] the purpose of [which] must be to break the law"). 

While we agree with Mr. Blair that the crime of conspiracy 

outlawed by § 371 is a specific intent crime, we do not accept the 

significance he and the government place on this fact. Specific 

intent crimes do not, as a rule, necessitate a showing the 

defendant intentionally violated a known legal duty. While it is 

true that such a requirement has been imposed in the context of 

income tax crimes and violations of the Bank Secrecy Act, see, 

e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) (applying the 

Internal Revenue Code); Ratzlaf v. United States, U.S. 

114 S. Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994) (applying the Bank Secrecy 

Act), such a requirement has been imposed only in those 

circumstances where there was a clear directive from Congress. 

E.g., United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976) (per curiam); 

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Ratzlaf, u.s. at , 114 S. Ct. at , 126 L.Ed.2d at 622-

23. Absent such an intent, the general rule, "deeply rooted in 

the American legal system," is "that ignorance of the law or a 

mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution [and is one 

that] has been applied by the [United States Supreme] Court in 

numerous cases construing criminal statutes." Cheek, 498 U.S. at 

199 (citations omitted) . Thus, a specific intent crime "normally 

does not necessitate proof that the defendant was specifically 

aware of the law penalizing his conduct." United States v. 

Scanio, 900 F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir. 1990); accord United States v. 

Shirk, 981 F.2d 1382, 1390 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. 

Ct. 873 (1994). 

The question of whether § 371 evinces the intent of Congress 

to require a defendant to have intentionally violated a known 

legal duty in order to sustain a conviction has been squarely 

rejected by the Supreme Court: 

The general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, 

offers no textual support for the proposition that to be 

guilty of conspiracy a defendant in effect must have 

known that his conduct violated federal law. The 

statute makes it unlawful simply to "conspire ... to 

commit any offense against the United States." A 

natural reading of these words would be that since one 

can violate a criminal statute simply by engaging in the 

forbidden conduct, a conspiracy to commit that offense 

is nothing more than an agreement to engage in the 

prohibited conduct. 

Feola, 420 U.S. at 687 (footnote omitted). Mr. Blair has made no 

effort to distinguish Feola from the present case and, indeed, 

nowhere mentions it in his brief. Accordingly, we hold that Feola 

is controlling and the prosecution need not prove a defendant 

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intentionally violates a known legal duty in order to sustain a 

conviction under § 371 in cases where the underlying substantive 

offense does not impose such a requirement. 

We turn next to the question whether a sufficienc factual 

basis existed to permit the district court to accept Mr. Blair's 

guilty plea as to count two given that § 371 is a specific intent 

crime. 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(f) requires a court to satisfy itself 

that there is a factual basis for a guilty plea before entering 

judgment on such a plea. "The acceptance of a guilty plea is 

deemed a factual finding that there is an adequate factual basis 

for the plea [and] review [is] under the clearly erroneous 

standard." United States v. Adams, 961 F.2d 505, 509 (5th Cir. 

1992) (citations omitted). Cf. United States v. Keiswetter, 860 

F.2d 992, 996 (lOth Cir. 1988) ("Although Rule 1l(f) establishes a 

subjective standard, the trial judge's exercise of ... discretion 

can only be judged by reference to the record"), rev'd en bane on 

other grounds, 866 F.2d 1301 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

Mr. Blair's petition to enter a plea of guilty as to count 

two stated: 

From approximately October 1990 through May 1991 I 

agreed with Richard Lowe to assist him and others in 

accepting wagers from individuals who resided in the 

Northern District of Oklahoma and elsewhere on sporting 

events. I also prepared the "line" for use in the 

operation. At one time we had six people including 

myself taking bets and placing bets. The volume per day 

was over $2,000. 

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At the hearing held to enter his guilty pleas, the district court 

inquired as follows: 

THE COURT: Count Two states: "From on or about 

January 28, 1991, and continuing thereafter until on or 

about March 23, 1991, in the Northern District of 

Oklahoma and elsewhere, the defendant knowingly and 

willfully conspired and agreed together with other 

persons to commit offenses against the United States, to 

wit: 

"1. being in the business of betting and wagering, 

to knowingly use a wire communication facility, that is, 

a telephone, for the transmission in foreign commerce, 

of bets and wagers 

"It was a part of the conspiracy that the defendant 

and his five or more co-conspirators would operate an 

illegal gambling/bookmaking operation from the 

Dominican Republic. 

Did you 

information? 

follow the reading, 

[MR. BLAIR]: I did, Your Honor. 

sir, of the 

THE COURT: Do you have any questions about it at 

all? 

[MR. BLAIR]: None whatsoever. 

THE COURT: Have you had ample time to talk to your 

lawyer, Mr. Carnes, about it? 

[MR. BLAIR]: Much time, sir. 

THE COURT: More particularly, on or about the date 

of February 2, 1991, or from January 28, 1991, 

continuing thereafter until about March 23rd, 1991, 

throughout that entire period of time, sir, were you 

mentally alert and did you know what you were doing? 

[MR. BLAIR]: I did, Your Honor. 

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In our judgment, this colloquy clearly establishes a factual 

basis for Mr. Blair's guilty plea. The district court expressly 

inquired as to whether Mr. Blair knowingly and willfully entered 

into a conspiracy to establish a bookmaking operation in the 

Dominican Republic. Mr. Blair agreed that he had. Mr. Blair 

further stated he knew what he was doing at all times relevant to 

count two. Finally, he stated he had no questions or 

uncertainties regarding the charge against him, and he informed 

the court he had ample time to discuss the charges with his 

attorney. 

Ignoring all of this, Mr. Blair focuses exclusively on his 

response to the district court's inquiry as to whether he knew his 

conduct was illegal. He stated: "I didn't really look into it. 

I wish I had." Because knowledge that one's conduct is illegal is 

not necessary to establish the crime that Mr. Blair pled guilty 

to, this statement casts no doubt on the factual basis for his 

plea. Based on the relevant statements and information before the 

district court, we conclude it was not clearly erroneous to accept 

Mr. Blair's guilty plea with respect to count two. 

II. 

Mr. Blair next argues the district court erred in imposing a 

two point sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant 

to U.S.S.G. §3C1.1. The enhanc~ment was premised on the court's 

; 

finding, which has not been chall:enged, that Mr. Blair's marriage 

to Mary Meyer was a "sham" intended to permit her to invoke the 

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marital privilege and thereby avoid testifying against Mr. Blair 

before the grand jury. Mr. Blair's allegation of error is 

premised on the contention §3Cl.l has no application under these 

facts. When application of the guidelines to the facts involves 

contested issues of law, our review is de novo. United States v. 

Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1560 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 

829 (1990). 

Section 

obstructed or 

3Cl. 1 provides, "If 

impeded, or attempted 

the defendant willfully 

to obstruct or impede the 

administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, 

or sentencing of the instant offense, increase the offense level 

by 2 levels." Following Mr. Blair's sentencing, however, the 

commentary to this section was amended to include Application Note 

7: "Under this section, the defendant is accountable for his own 

conduct and for conduct that he aided or abetted, counseled, 

commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused.• While the 

guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing apply, United 

States v. Underwood, 938 F.2d 1086, 1090 (lOth Cir. 1991), there 

is no constitutional or other bar to the retroactive application 

of a mere clarification of the guidelines. United States v. 

Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1514 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

At the time of Mr. Blair's sentencing, §3Cl.l. encompassed 

" [o] bstructive conduct vary [ing] widely in nature, degree of 

planning, and seriousness." U.S. S. G. §3Cl.l, comment. (n. 2) . The 

addition of Note 7 was intended only to "clarif[y] the scope of 

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the conduct for which the defendant is accountable under §§3Cl.l 

and 3C1.2." U.S.S.G. Appendix C, Amendment 457. While not 

conclusive, the Sentencing Commission's characterization of an 

amendment to the guidelines as a clarification, rather than a 

substantive change, is entitled to deference. United States v. 

Frederick, 897 F.2d 490, 494 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 

863 (1990). We agree with the Commission that Application Note 7 

is nothing more than a clarification of §3Cl.l as it existed at 

the time of Mr. Blair's sentencing. Section 3Cl.l encompasses 

conduct intended to "impede the administration of justice." In 

our judgment, stating a defendant can be held accountable for 

conduct he aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured 

or caused does nothing more than clarifies what it means to 

"impede." As such, Application Note 7 is relevant in determining 

whether the district court erred in enhancing Mr. Blair's sentence 

for obstruction of justice. 

Mary Meyer had decided on her own not to testify against Mr. 

Blair after she was indicted. However, Mr. Blair consulted an 

attorney to learn of the nature and operation of the marital 

privilege following Ms. Meyer's grand jury subpoena. He informed 

her that if they were married, her desire not to testify against 

him could be accomplished. In short, Mr. Blair was attempting to 

cloak Ms. Meyer's otherwise unlawful refusal to testify against 

him before the grand jury in legitimacy. There is no question 

that such a scheme amounts to aiding and abetting the obstruction 

of justice for purposes of §3Cl.l. Accordingly, we conclude the 

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district court did not err in enhancing Mr. Blair's sentence for 

obstruction of justice. 

The judgment of the district court is, therefore, AFFIRMED. 

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