Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03191/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03191-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tina Marie Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

 No. 04-3191

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Tina Marie Johnson, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Appeals from the United States

 No. 04-3301 District Court for the

___________ Northern District of Iowa.

United States of America, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Jay Dee Kloppenburg, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 6, 2005

Filed: June 9, 2005 

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Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

Appellate Case: 04-3191 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/09/2005 Entry ID: 1913508
1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

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___________

PER CURIAM.

Tina Johnson and Jay Kloppenburg appeal their sentences (280 and 324 months

respectively) that the district court1

 imposed after they each pleaded guilty to

conspiring to manufacture and attempt to manufacture 5 grams or more of actual

(pure) methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 846.

Johnson and Kloppenburg argue that the district court violated their Sixth

Amendment rights by applying--over their objections under Blakely v. Washington,

124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536-43 (2004)--various federal Sentencing Guidelines

enhancements. 

The Supreme Court recently decided that the reasoning in Blakely applies to

the Guidelines, and therefore “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is

necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts

established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or

proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct.

738, 756 (2005). 

Although it is not entirely clear to us from the record what precisely defendants

were disputing below, we will liberally construe their arguments as objecting to the

district court deciding the facts underlying the sentencing enhancements at issue. The

resulting Sixth Amendment violations, however, were harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1999) (for all preserved

constitutional errors other than “very limited class” determined to be “structural,”

reviewing court must disregard all errors that are harmless beyond reasonable doubt;

error is harmful if it affects substantial rights). 

Appellate Case: 04-3191 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/09/2005 Entry ID: 1913508
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The court first determined the appropriate Guidelines ranges and U.S.S.G.

§ 5K1.1 departures. Considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the

court then crafted an alternative sentence in each case that would apply in the event

that the Guidelines were held unconstitutional; and in each case the alternative

discretionary sentence was the same as the sentence that was imposed within the

Guidelines-mandated sentencing range. See United States v. Dominguez-Benitez,

124 S. Ct. 2333, 2339 (2004) (error affects substantial rights if it has prejudicial effect

on outcome of judicial proceeding); United States v. Haack, No. 04-1594, 2005 WL

840124, at *5 (8th Cir. Apr. 13, 2005) (sentencing court must first determine

appropriate Guidelines sentencing range and whether departure is appropriate; court

must then consider § 3553(a) factors when determining whether to impose Guidelines

or non-Guidelines sentence); see also United States v. Marcussen, No. 04-2935, 2005

WL 820350, at *2 (8th Cir. Apr. 1, 2005) (applying harmless-error analysis where

there was no Sixth Amendment violation, but where sentencing under mandatory

Guidelines scheme was deemed erroneous in light of Booker; finding error to be

harmless because district court imposed alternative non-Guidelines sentence that was

same as sentence mandated by Guidelines and thus sentencing under mandatory

Guidelines scheme did not affect ultimate sentence). 

The sentences were enhanced considerably because of the substantial risk of

harm to the defendants' two-month old child, who was present in defendants'

anhydrous-ammonia and ether-filled residence. This fact resulted in the 6-level

enhancement for the creation of a substantial risk of harm to the life of a minor, which

supports our determination that Johnson’s and Kloppenburg’s sentences were not

unreasonable. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764-67.

Accordingly, we affirm.

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Appellate Case: 04-3191 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/09/2005 Entry ID: 1913508