Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-03764/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-03764-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alex T. Owen
Petitioner
Marion Spearman
Respondent

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEX T. OWEN,

Petitioner,

v.

MARION SPEARMAN,

Respondent.

Case No. 13-cv-03764-VC (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

DENYING PETITIONERS’ MOTIONS

AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Re: Dkt. Nos. 29, 30

INTRODUCTION

Alex T. Owen has filed a federal habeas petition challenging the validity of his conviction, 

following a jury trial, of two counts of second degree robbery. He claims he was denied the right 

to effective assistance of trial counsel because his lawyer failed to challenge a “tainted 

identification” based on a witness’s “pre-trial encounter” with him, and failed to investigate an 

allegedly fabricated police report. He also claims his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 

to raise the allegedly tainted identification in his appeal. Because neither counsel provided 

ineffective assistance, the petition is denied. 

BACKGROUND

On March 22, 2010, a San Mateo County jury convicted Owen of two counts of second 

degree robbery. Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) 127, 130-31. On April 19, 2010, the court sentenced

Owen to eleven years in prison. CT 294-95, 307.

On May 23, 2011, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in a written, 

unpublished decision. Exh. D, People v. Owen, A128572 (Cal. Ct. App. May 23, 2011). On 

August 10, 2011, the California Supreme Court summarily denied review. Dkt. No. 1-1 at 9.

Owen timely filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the San Mateo County Superior 

Court, which was denied in a written, unpublished opinion on March 18, 2013. Doc. 1-1 at 11, In 

re Owen on Habeas Corpus, HC-2360 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 8, 2013). Owen filed petitions for a 

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writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, A138318, and the California Supreme 

Court, S210806, which were summarily denied. Exh. F.

On August 13, 2013, Owen filed this federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which is 

now fully briefed on the merits. Owen has also filed motions to appoint counsel and for an 

evidentiary hearing, which will be denied.

The state court of appeal summarized the facts as follows:

On November 25, 2009, Owen robbed a Wells Fargo Bank branch and, on December 23, 

2009, Owen robbed a Citibank branch. At each robbery, Owen gave a bank teller a note indicating 

that he was robbing the bank. 

Owen robbed the Wells Fargo Bank at approximately 3:30 p.m. After receiving Owen’s 

note, the Wells Fargo Bank teller, Wendy Rojas, gave Owen $3,800, which he placed in a black 

plastic bag and then left the bank. Rojas identified Owen at a photographic lineup and in court. 

Employees at the Lucky Brand Store directly across the street from the Wells Fargo Bank 

recognized Owen from the video stills taken during the robbery. Daryn Hon, a Lucky store 

employee, testified that, between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m on November 25, 2009, Owen came into the 

store, purchased a black thermal shirt and a pair of jeans, and wanted to wear the clothing out of 

the store. Hon removed the sensor tag on the jeans and helped Owen remove the tags from the 

other clothing. Owen was sweating profusely and had a roll of $100 bills in his pockets. Owen 

paid for the clothing with three $100 bills. In a photographic lineup, Hon identified two 

photographs as resembling the customer he helped; one of the photographs was of Owen. 

Chris Canotal also was working at the Lucky store the day of the Wells Fargo robbery. He 

saw Owen enter the store with a black plastic bag and assisted him in purchasing the black thermal 

top, a black shirt and black jeans. Owen changed into the new clothes and wore them out of the 

store, leaving the clothing tags in the fitting room. Two of Owen’s fingerprints were found on a 

Lucky clothing tag. Canotal identified Owen in a photographic lineup and at trial.

On December 23, 2009, at approximately 4:30 p.m., Owen robbed the Citibank branch 

located in the same building as the Wells Fargo Bank branch that was robbed in November. 

Ramon Andrada, the teller, gave Owen approximately $1,900, including money that contained a 

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United States District Court

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tracking device. Andrada identified Owen in a photo lineup and in court. 

Owen was arrested on the day of the Citibank robbery. Malinda Ladson, Owen’s 

girlfriend, was with Owen when he was arrested. She had a $20 bill in her purse with an 

electronic tracking serial number matching an electronic tracking number from the Citibank 

robbery. A pair of Lucky brand jeans, a long-sleeve black Lucky brand thermal shirt and a black 

baseball cap was found in Owen’s car. The baseball cap appeared to be the same type as the cap 

worn by the robber in the Wells Fargo and Citibank surveillance footage. Exh. D, People v. 

Owen, A 128572 at 2-4.

LEGAL STANDARD

A federal court may entertain a habeas petition from a state prisoner “only on the ground 

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 

a district court may not grant habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: 

“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted 

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 

412 (2000). 

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the petitioner’s 

claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion of the highest court to analyze whether the 

state judgment was erroneous under the standard of § 2254(d). Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

801-06 (1991). In this case, the highest court to issue a reasoned decision on Owen’s petition is 

the San Mateo County Superior Court.

DISCUSSION

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

To prevail on a Sixth Amendment claim for ineffectiveness of counsel, a petitioner must 

establish two things. First, he must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that it 

fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. 

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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). Second, he must establish that he was 

prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 

694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome

of the proceedings. Id.

A “doubly” deferential judicial review is appropriate in analyzing ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims under § 2254. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1410-11 (2011); Premo v. 

Moore, 131 S.Ct. 733, 740 (2011). The general rule of Strickland, i.e., to review a defense 

counsel’s effectiveness with great deference, gives the state courts greater leeway in applying that 

rule, which in turn “translates to a narrower range of decisions that are objectively unreasonable 

under AEDPA.” Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Yarborough v. 

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). When § 2254(d) applies, “the question is not whether 

counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that 

counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788

(2011). In addition, “the absence of evidence cannot overcome the strong presumption that 

counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Burt v. 

Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013) (internal citations omitted). 

A. Failure to Challenge Tainted Identification

This claim is based on a letter that Wells Fargo Bank teller and victim Wendy Rojas sent to 

the trial court after the jury delivered its verdict and before Owen was sentenced. Rojas identified 

Owen at a January 4, 2010 pretrial photo line-up and in court. Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) 111-

12; 120; 128-32. 

The letter, in pertinent part, states the following:

After the incident I felt like I had failed my job because with the 

right state of mind I could have done things differently. . . . When 

I found out that the authorities had someone in custody and then saw 

that it was the person who robbed me on November 25, 2009, I felt 

relieved. The fact that I would then have to appear in court and see 

him again scared me. It made me feel like I was putting myself at 

risk because he already knew where I worked, but he could be

finding out my name and would have a chance to remember my 

appearance. There was a chance that he could not be convicted, and 

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that he could come after me. I did my own research and found out 

that he had been a sex offender to young women like me and that 

terrified me even more. It could be someone’s daughter, or little 

sister, niece, a loved one, and I am glad to say that I helped pull a 

dangerous man off the streets and into the hands of the authorities to 

help keep the streets safe. That is all I would really like to state, and 

thank you for your time.1

Sincerely,

Wendy Rojas

Dkt. 1-2 at 5 (letter); RT at 475 (at sentencing hearing, court mentioned receiving a witness letter).

Owen argues that this letter shows that Rojas conducted a “secret investigation” of him 

between December 29, 2009, when she learned of the Citibank robbery, and January 4, 2010, 

when she identified him at the photo lineup. But Owen fails to cite any evidence showing that 

Rojas’s “research” was done before she identified him in the photo lineup. To the contrary, Rojas 

testified at the trial that, at the time she was shown the photo lineup, she did not know the names 

of any of the six individuals depicted in it. RT at 131. The photo lineup itself did not bear any 

names. Id. Owen fails to explain how Rojas could have learned his name, with which to research 

him, before the photo lineup. As pointed out by the state court, the letter therefore provides no 

support for Owen’s theory that Rojas’s identification of him resulted from her research. In re 

Owen, HC-2360 at 2. Given the doubly deferential standard of review afforded counsel’s 

performance in a habeas proceeding, Owen has failed to show that trial counsel was deficient in 

failing to submit a motion for a new trial based upon Rojas’s letter. 

Even assuming counsel was deficient in failing to move for a new trial, the state court 

reasonably concluded there was no reasonable likelihood of a different result had the letter 

impeached Rojas. Rojas’s identification of Owen was corroborated by the two clerks who worked 

in the Lucky store directly across the street from the Wells Fargo bank. They testified that, 

minutes after the Wells Fargo robbery, Owen entered the Lucky store carrying a black plastic bag, 

like black bag the Wells Fargo robber used for the stolen money. Ex. D at 2; RT at 116, 121, 177, 

211. They testified that Owen purchased clothing by paying for it with three $100 bills, changed 

 

1 Owen is identified online as a California registered sex offender. See 

http://www.meganslaw.ca.gov/index.htm

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into some of the clothing and wore it out of the store. Ex. D at 2; RT at 169-80. This evidence

was inculpatory because the bank robber received hundred dollar bills, Lucky Brand items were 

found in Owen’s trunk at the time of his arrest, and Owen’s fingerprints were found on a clothing 

tag from the Lucky store. Exh. D at 2-3; RT at 321. A plain, adjustable black baseball cap like 

that worn by the Wells Fargo robber was also found in Owen’s car when he was arrested. RT at 

321-26. And the jury viewed the video surveillance footage of the robbery, thereby allowing it to

make its own determination whether the person on the video tape matched Owen’s description. 

RT at 125-27. Finally, evidence showed that Owen robbed the Citibank branch in the same 

building, at around the same time of day and in a similar fashion as the Wells Fargo robbery. Ex. 

D at 3. On this record, the state court was not unreasonable in concluding there was no prejudice. 

In re Owen, HC-2360 at 2. 

Because Owen’s claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel fails, his claim of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on the failure to submit this claim on appeal also 

fails. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983) (appellate counsel does not have a 

constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by defendant); Miller v. Keeney, 

882 F.2d 1428, 1434 n.10 (9th Cir. 1989) (weeding out weaker issues is widely recognized as one 

of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy). 

In his petition, Owen also asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to request a “Wade 

Hearing” based on the alleged invalid identification. But a hearing under United States v. Wade, 

388 U.S. 218 (1967), to determine if Owen was deprived of his right to counsel at the pretrial 

photo lineup, was not required. Rojas viewed the photo lineup before Owen was arrested and, 

thus, before his Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 

452, 456-57 (1994). Further, Wade’s requirement of counsel at an in-person lineup does not apply 

to photographic lineups. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973). 

B. Failure to Investigate

A defense attorney has a general duty to conduct reasonable investigations or to give 

reasonable consideration before deciding an investigation is unnecessary. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

691; Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1088 (2014) (per curiam); Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. 

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Ct. 1388, 1407 (2011). Strickland directs that “‘a particular decision not to investigate must be 

directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of 

deference to counsel’s judgments.’” Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 836 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). Counsel need not pursue an investigation that would be 

fruitless or might be harmful to the defense. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 789-90.

 Owen argues that counsel should have investigated the report of Belmont police officer 

Klyde Hussey because it “was fabricated.” Dkt. No. 1-1 at 25. He contends that, if counsel had 

investigated, he would have uncovered dashboard camera footage depicting Hussey’s observations 

on the day he arrested Owen. However, there is no evidence of a dashboard camera and, even if 

there was one, Owen does not describe what exculpatory evidence it would have revealed. 

Owen also contends that an investigation of Hussey’s report would have yielded favorable 

evidence of a tracking device that was embedded in the bills given to the Citibank robber. 

Contrary to Owen’s assertion, counsel did investigate the tracking device, as demonstrated by his 

motion to exclude evidence about it, which the court denied. See CT 97-98; RT 19-24; 44-45. 

Furthermore, Owen provides no basis to support his contention that an investigation of the 

tracking device or the report concerning the movement of the device would have produced 

evidence helpful to his defense. 

Accordingly, Owen has failed to show deficient performance or prejudice based on 

counsel’s alleged failure to investigate.

II. Motions for Evidentiary Hearing and Appointment of Counsel

Owen moves for an evidentiary hearing regarding Rojas’s letter to the court, a dashboard 

camera in Hussey’s police car, and the tracking device. Owen would be entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing on disputed facts if his allegations, if proven, would entitle him to relief. Perez v. 

Rosario, 459 F.3d 943, 954 n.5 (9th Cir. 2006); Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1484 (9th 

Cir. 1995). He is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in light of the fact that he has failed to 

present any allegations which, if proven, would entitle him to relief, because none of his claims 

have survived review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Owen also moves for appointment of counsel. The Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel 

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does not apply in habeas corpus actions. Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 

1986). Appointment is mandatory only when the circumstances of a particular case indicate that 

appointed counsel is necessary to prevent due process violations. Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 

1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986). As discussed above, Owen’s claims have no merit; therefore,

appointment of counsel is denied. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

1. Owen’s motions for an evidentiary hearing and appointment of counsel are denied. Dkt. 

Nos. 29 and 30.

2. Owen’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. A certificate of appealability will 

not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). This is not a case in which “reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

3. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

VINCE CHHABRIA

United States District Judge

March 4, 2015

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