Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-55130/USCOURTS-ca9-13-55130-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stephen Robert Deck
Appellant
Mack Jenkins
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEPHEN ROBERT DECK,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

MACK JENKINS, Chief Probation

Officer,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 13-55130

D.C. No. 

8:11-cv-01767-

MWF-FFM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 8, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed September 29, 2014

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Milan D. Smith, Jr.,

and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Christen;

Dissent by Judge M. Smith

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2 DECK V. JENKINS

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of a 28

U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging a

conviction of an attempted lewd act upon a child under the

age of 14, and remanded for further proceedings.

The panel took as established that prosecutorial error

occurred, where the California Court of Appeal decided that

the prosecutor, in closing argument, negated an essential

element of intent under California law by “pushing

defendant’s intent to commit a lewd act on ‘Amy’ to,

potentially, ‘next week,’ or in ‘two weekends’ or to ‘just

some point in the future.’” The California Court of Appeal

concluded that the misstatements were not prejudicial.

The panel found itself in virtual equipoise as to the

harmlessness of the error, where the comments were not

inadvertent or isolated and went to the heart of the defense,

the lawyers’ diametrically opposed statements of the law in

closing arguments confused the jury, a corrective instruction

was not given, the jury’s request for clarification was not

answered, and the written jury instructions did not address the

subject of the jury’s confusion; and where the panel could not

say that there was overwhelming evidence that the defendant

intended to commit a lewd act on the specific night in

question.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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DECK V. JENKINS 3

The panel concluded that the prosecutor’s misstatements

amounted to constitutional trial error under clearly

established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court,

and had grave doubt as to whether the error had a substantial

and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.

Dissenting, Judge M. Smith wrote that the majority flouts

clear Supreme Court AEDPA precedent in order to justify its

holding that a state court’s decision is incorrect.

COUNSEL

Charles M. Sevilla (argued), Law Office of Charles Sevilla,

San Diego, California, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Julie L. Garland, Kevin Vienna (argued),

and David Delgado-Rucci, Office of the Attorney General of

California, San Diego, California, for Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge:

Stephen Deck was convicted in California of one count of

an attempted lewd act upon a child under the age of 14. After

exhausting review of his conviction in state court, he

petitioned the federal district court for habeas relief under

28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that prosecutorial misstatements

made during rebuttal closing argument deprived him of a fair

trial. The district court dismissed Deck’s petition. We

reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for further

proceedings.

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4 DECK V. JENKINS

BACKGROUND

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA), “state court findings of fact are presumed correct

unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.” Gonzales

v. Pliler, 341 F.3d 897, 903 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1)). Both Deck and the State agree that the

California Court of Appeal (CCA) correctly framed the

underlying facts of the case. Our opinion relies on, and

quotes at length from, the CCA’s opinion in People v. Deck,

No. G043434, 2011 WL 2001825 (Cal. Ct. App. May 24,

2011).

The Alleged Crime

In February 2006, the Laguna Beach Police Department

collaborated with volunteers from an organization called

Perverted Justice “on a sting operation to identify and arrest

adults using the Internet to meet minors for sex.” Id. at *1. 

“After online conversations confirmed the adult’s intent, . . .

decoys arranged a meeting between the adult and fictitious

minor at an apartment,” where the adult would be arrested. 

Id.

Deck, who was then a lieutenant with the California

Highway Patrol, began chatting online with a fictitious girl

named “Amy.”1

Id. Amy represented to Deck that she was

13 years old, and her online profile included a photograph of

an actual 13-year-old girl. Id. The two exchanged sexually

suggestive messages, and Deck expressed an interest in

taking photographs of Amy. Id. at *1–2. They arranged a

 

1

 We use “Amy” to refer to the Perverted Justice volunteer who played

this role.

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DECK V. JENKINS 5

meeting for an upcoming Saturday. Id. at *2. Amy asked

Deck to come to her apartment, but Deck said he was “not

comfortable meeting at your house” and proposed meeting in

public. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Deck also

suggested that after their first date, if their chemistry

remained as good as it seemed during their chats, they would

arrange another date and engage in some of the sexual

activity they discussed online.” Id. But he said: “‘I probably

won’t be able to keep my hands off of you.’” Id. On the day

of their planned meeting, Deck claimed not to be feeling well

but “promised to stop by [Amy’s] apartment for their first

meeting,” at a time when Amy’s mother was not around. Id.

at *3. In a subsequent online chat, he asked Amy to meet him

“in a public place close to her apartment.” Id. He said he

would be bringing her a piece of pie. Id. “Before signing off

his computer, Deck added, ‘Remember I am sick so no

kissing or nothing. Just bringing you your pie.’” Id.

The CCA opinion described what happened next:

Deck made the 45 mile drive from his

residence to “Amy’s” apartment, arriving

around 8:35 p.m. He parked in the apartment

complex’s parking lot and walked to the park

for his rendezvous with “Amy.” Spotting a

young female sitting at a picnic table in the

park, Deck approached and asked whether she

was “Amy.” The female responded by asking

whether he was “Steve.” When Deck

acknowledged his identity, the police arrested

him.

Investigators searched Deck and found a

digital camera and the piece of pie he

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6 DECK V. JENKINS

promised to bring “Amy.” They also searched

Deck’s car, where they found a MapQuest

printout with directions to “Amy’s” apartment

and six packaged condoms past the listed

expiration date.

Id.

Procedural History

Deck was charged with attempt to commit a lewd or

lascivious act (“lewd act”) upon a child. The CCA explained

that, under California law:

An attempt to commit a lewd act upon a

child requires both an intent to arouse, appeal

to, or gratify the lust, passions, or sexual

desires of [the defendant] or the child and . . .

a direct if possibly ineffectual step toward that

goal . . . .

For an attempt, the overt act must go

beyond mere preparation and show that the

[defendant] is putting his or her plan into

action; it need not be the last proximate or

ultimate step toward commission of the crime

or crimes, nor need it satisfy any element of

the crime. However, as we have explained,

[b]etween preparation for the attempt and the

attempt itself, there is a wide difference. The

preparation consists in devising or arranging

the means or measures necessary for the

commission of the offense; the attempt is the

direct movement toward the commission after

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DECK V. JENKINS 7

the preparations are made. [I]t is sufficient if

it is the first or some subsequent act directed

towards that end after the preparations are

made.

Id. at *7 (alterations in original) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). Deck was convicted after a jury

trial and sentenced to 365 days in county jail and five years

formal probation.

One of Deck’s arguments to the CCA was that the

prosecutor’s closing argument misstated the law of attempt. 

Id. at *11. The CCA agreed, but held that the prosecutor’s

“lone misstatement” of the law was rendered harmless by the

trial court’s correct jury instructions. Id. Because the issue

in this appeal is highly fact-specific, it is worth providing the

CCA’s description and analysis of the prosecutor’s error in

(close to) its entirety.

The CCA first summarized the prosecutor’s statements as

follows:

On rebuttal, the prosecutor agreed with

defense counsel that “I need to prove to you

that [Deck] took a direct, but ineffectual step

on or about February 18, 2006.” Deck

focuses on a handful of ensuing comments as

the basis for his misconduct claim that the

prosecutor misstated the law of attempt.

Specifically, Deck zeroes in on four

sentences, italicizing a few of the prosecutor’s

words in just two sentences of his closing

argument, as follows: “I don’t have to prove

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8 DECK V. JENKINS

to you that he was going to commit a lewd act

on or about February 18th, 2006 . . . . [¶] But

even if his intent was just to meet her, get to

know her, break the ice and follow the next

day, the next week, maybe [in] two weekends

when mom’s gone, again, as long as he took a

direct, but ineffectual step towards that goal,

that is all I need. [¶] I don’t need to prove to

you that he was going to commit a lewd act on

that day, just some point in the future direct

and ineffectual step that day [sic: garbled

diction] . . . . He was on that day going to

commit a lewd act with Amy.” (Italics

added.)

Id. at *11 (alterations in original) (citations and some internal

quotation marks omitted).

The CCA next discussed whether the prosecutor’s

statements were erroneous:

In this excerpt isolated by defendant, the

prosecutor’s first and final sentences present

no problem. First, the prosecutor did not have

to prove Deck “was going to commit” a lewd

act with “Amy” in the sense that he would be

successful; after all, lack of success defines an

attempt. As the prosecutor explained just a

few sentences later: “I don’t have to prove to

you that he was going to actually succeed in

committing the lewd act on that day.” And, in

defendant’s excerpt, the prosecutor’s final

sentence properly focused the jury’s attention

on the day he met with “Amy,” emphasizing,

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DECK V. JENKINS 9

“He was on that day going to commit a lewd

act with Amy.” (Italics added.) This was the

prosecutor’s repeated emphasis, arguing

several times, for example, that defendant was

“[d]efinitely going down there to engage in a

lewd act, lewd contact with Amy”; “If Amy

was a real 13–year–old girl, [in] the

defendant’s own[] words, he wouldn’t be able

to keep his hands off of her”; “He was on that

day going to commit a lewd act with Amy”;

and characterizing the idea that Deck would

“just see her that day” as “baloney.”

Id. (alterations in original).

The CCA concluded that the prosecutor misstated the law:

The prosecutor erred . . . by suggesting an

intent to engage in a lewd act at “just some

point in the future” or “the next week, maybe

[in] two weekends” sufficed. As our Supreme

Court has explained, to establish an attempt

the defendant’s overt act “must go beyond

mere preparation and show that the

[defendant] is putting his or her plan into

action.” Indeed, the acts of the defendant

must go so far that they would result in the

accomplishment of the crime unless frustrated

by extraneous circumstances.

. . . .

Here, pushing defendant’s intent to

commit a lewd act on “Amy” to, potentially,

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10 DECK V. JENKINS

“next week” or in “two weekends” or to “just

some point in the future” negates the essential

element necessary to constitute an attempt

. . . . The merely speculative possibility of a

potential future rendezvous is inconsistent

with the inevitable nature of an attempt, where

the offense will be accomplished unless

frustrated by extraneous circumstances or

absent an intervening force.

Id. at *12 (alterations in original) (citations and some internal

quotation marks omitted).

Having decided that the prosecutor’s misstatements of

California law negated an essential element of attempt, the

CCA concluded that the misstatements were not prejudicial

to Deck:

[T]he prosecutor’s errant gloss on the law of

attempt does not require reversal. First, it was

an isolated departure in a few stray words and

not the focus of the prosecutor’s argument,

which properly remained on Deck’s clear

intent, coupled with the steps he took, to

commit a lewd act with the victim on the

weekend he actually met with her.

More importantly, the trial court properly

instructed the jury on the relevant principles. 

The court instructed the jury the necessary

“direct step” to constitute an attempt “requires

more than merely planning or preparing to

commit” the target offense, but instead “goes

beyond planning or preparation” with a

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DECK V. JENKINS 11

“direct movement towards the commission of

the crime after preparations are made.”

Id. (citation omitted).

The CCA reasoned that, based solely on these jury

instructions:

[T]he jury knew it was not enough to plan or

prepare to commit a lewd act at a potential

later rendezvous. Rather, the attempt must

consist of “an immediate step that puts the

plan in motion so that the plan would have

been completed if some circumstance outside

the plan had not interrupted the attempt.” We

presume the jury followed these instructions.

Id.

The CCA recognized that Deck’s argument relied heavily

on the jury’s request for clarification of the law relating to the

prosecutor’s closing rebuttal argument:

[A]bout an hour into deliberations, the jury

sent the trial court a note asking it to

“‘[c]larify [the] law as it relates to whether

defendant did not have to do anything that

day, only attempted [sic] to put it into play.’” 

The trial court excused the jury an hour early

for the weekend recess to discuss the matter

with counsel, and then excused the jury after

only an hour of deliberation on Monday

because defense counsel became ill. At the

outset of deliberations on Tuesday, the trial

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12 DECK V. JENKINS

court seated an alternate juror to replace a

juror who had called in sick.

The trial court had discussed with counsel

how to respond to Friday’s jury note but,

given deliberations had to begin anew with

the substitute juror, the trial court instructed

the jury as follows: “I know that there was a

previous question sent out by the foreperson,

Juror # 9. In light of the fact I have just given

you this instruction that you have to start all

over again, disregard past deliberations, you

need to follow that instruction. If you have

any further questions that you want answered

once you start deliberating with the jury, send

that out in the question format and we will

answer it for you.”

Id. at *13 (some internal quotation marks omitted).

Finally, the CCA reasoned that the jury’s failure to

resubmit its question (or a similar one) after restarting

deliberations demonstrated that the jurywas not misled by the

prosecutor’s misstatements:

The jury, presumably having taken a fresh

look—or a first look in the case of the new

juror—at the trial court’s instructions, had no

further questions for the trial court and

reached a verdict. Deck does not dispute the

trial court’s instructions concerning attempt

correctly stated the law. We must presume

the jury understood and followed those

instructions. Consequently, there is no basis

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DECK V. JENKINS 13

to conclude the jury disregarded the trial

court’s instructions and instead fixated on an

isolated comment by the prosecutor.

Id.

The CCA’s version of events contains most of the details

relevant to this appeal, but two additional points are helpful. 

First, Deck’s trial defense was that he lacked the mental

intent to engage in a lewd act “on that date”; defense counsel

emphasized this point heavily during his closing argument. 

The prosecutor recognized the importance of this defense

argument and told the judge that the purpose of his rebuttal

was to dispute it. Second, though the CCA described the

prosecutor’s misstatements as an “isolated departure in a few

stray words,” there was another important misstatement by

the prosecutor during rebuttal: “Even if you buy this baloney

just see her that day, not touching her, stay five feet away

from her, follow up the next day if they got along, then

commit the lewd act, that is sufficient under the law for the

defendant to be guilty.”

Deck filed a petition for review to the California Supreme

Court, which denied review. Deck then filed a petition in

federal court for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. A federal magistrate judge recommended dismissal

of the petition with prejudice, and the district court adopted

the magistrate’s findings and recommendations. Deck

appeals.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s denial of a § 2254 habeas

corpus petition de novo. Gonzalez v. Duncan, 551 F.3d 875,

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14 DECK V. JENKINS

879 (9th Cir. 2008). Looking through the district court’s

decision, this court reviews the last reasoned state-court

decision, which in this case is the opinion of the CCA. See

Van Lynn v. Farmon, 347 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2003).

AEDPA allows for habeas relief only if the state court’s

decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1). An error that occurs during the presentation of

a case to the jury, including prosecutorial misconduct, is a

trial error. See Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir.

2012); Mach v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Whether trial error amounts to a constitutional violation

depends on the extent to which it renders the proceedings

unfair. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986).

A constitutional trial error will not warrant habeas relief

unless the violation “had substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Because it is more stringent, the Brecht

standard “obviously subsumes” the AEDPA standard for

review of a state court determination of the harmlessness of

a constitutional violation. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 120

(2007). The Court in Fry held that because it “makes no

sense to require formal application of both tests,” Brecht

alone should be applied. Id.

Here, the state appellate court decided that “pushing

defendant’s intent to commit a lewd act on ‘Amy’ to,

potentially, ‘next week’ or in ‘two weekends’ or ‘just some

point in the future’ negate[d] the essential element necessary

to constitute an attempt.” Deck, 2011 WL 2001825, at *12. 

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DECK V. JENKINS 15

In other words, the CCA established that a trial error occurred

through the prosecutor’s misstatement of California law. We

do not review this ruling, nor do we review the state court’s

interpretation of the California law of attempt as applied to

Deck’s case. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005)

(“[A] state court’s interpretation of state law, including one

announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction,

binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”).

Our first task is to determine whether the established trial

error amounts to a constitutional violation under clearly

established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. 

Because the state court has already established that a trial

error occurred and the constitutional dimension of the error

turns entirely on the issue of prejudice, we apply Brecht

“without regard for the state court’s harmlessness

determination.” See Pulido v. Chrones, 629 F.3d 1007, 1012

(9th Cir. 2010); see also Stouffer v. Trammell, 738 F.3d 1205,

1227–28 (10th Cir. 2013) (reviewing state court holding that

trial error occurred but was not prejudicial under the Brecht

standard). The relevant inquiry under Brecht is whether the

error substantially and injuriously influenced the jury’s

decision. See O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995). 

“While there is no burden of proof per se, ‘we look to the

State to instill in us a ‘fair assurance’ that there was no effect

on the verdict.’” Shaw v. Terhune, 380 F.3d 473, 478 (9th

Cir. 2004) (alteration and citation omitted). If the record is so

evenly balanced that a “conscientious judge is in grave doubt

as to the harmlessness of an error,” the petitioner must

prevail. O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 437; see also id. at 435 (defining

“grave doubt” as being in “virtual equipoise as to the

harmlessness of the error”).

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DISCUSSION

I. Clearly Established Federal Law on Prosecutorial

Misstatements

It is clearly established under Supreme Court precedent

that a prosecutor’s “misleading . . . arguments” to the jury

may rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation. 

Sechrest v. Ignacio, 549 F.3d 789, 807 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing

Darden, 477 U.S. at 181–82); see also Allen v. Woodford,

395 F.3d 979, 997 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Darden for

conclusion that improper prosecutorial argument may violate

federal constitutional rights). The Supreme Court recently

reaffirmed that Darden is the “clearly established Federal

law” relating to a “prosecutor’s improper comments” for

purposes of AEDPA review. Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct.

2148, 2153 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).2“[A]

prosecutor’s improper comments will be held to violate the

Constitution only if they ‘so infected the trial with unfairness

as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” 

Id. (quoting Darden, 477 U.S. at 181); see also Caldwell v.

Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340 (1985). The “clearly

established Federal law” from Darden is that prosecutorial

misconduct amounts to a constitutional violation if it “so

infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting

conviction a denial of due process.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181

(internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has

2 The dissent suggests that we treat Parker itself as “clearly established

federal law.” In fact, we cite Parker to illustrate that the rule from Darden

is clearly established—and was at the time of the state court’s decision. 

See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2000)

(recognizing that persuasive authority “may help us determine what

[Supreme Court] law is ‘clearly established’”).

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DECK V. JENKINS 17

acknowledged that “the Darden standard is a very general

one,” Parker, 132 S. Ct. at 2155, but AEDPA “recognizes . . .

that even a general standard may be applied in an

unreasonable manner,” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930,

953 (2007). A federal court may find “an application of a

principle unreasonable when it involves a set of facts

‘different from those of the case in which the principle was

announced.’” Id. (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

76 (2003)).

We recognize that “clearly established federal law” for

purposes of AEDPA review includes only “the holdings, as

opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions.” 

White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we do not construe the

reasoning used in prior Supreme Court decisions as an

“elaborate, multistep test.” Parker, 132 S. Ct. at 2155. No

single consideration should be treated as either necessary or

sufficient to reach a decision. See id. at 2155–56 (holding

that appellate court’s use of multistep test for

unconstitutionality of prosecutorial misconduct improperly

departed from the “highly generalized standard” in Darden).

Holding that a condemnatory closing argument did not

deprive the petitioner in Darden of a fair trial, the Supreme

Court reasoned that the prosecutor “did not manipulate or

misstate the evidence” and that the trial court properly

instructed the jury “that the arguments of counsel were not

evidence.” 477 U.S. at 181–82. The Court also considered

the “heavy” weight of the evidence against the petitioner,

which “reduced the likelihood that the jury’s decision was

influenced by argument.” Id. at 182.

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The Supreme Court elsewhere observed that:

arguments of counsel generally carry less

weight with a jury than do instructions from

the court. The former are usually billed in

advance to the jury as matters of argument,

not evidence, and are likely viewed as the

statements of advocates; the latter, we have

often recognized, are viewed as definitive and

binding statements of the law. Arguments of

counsel which misstate the law are subject to

objection and to correction by the court. This

is not to say that prosecutorial

misrepresentations may never have a decisive

effect on the jury, but only that they are not to

be judged as having the same force as an

instruction from the court. And the arguments

of counsel, like the instructions of the court,

must be judged in the context in which they

are made.

Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384–85 (1990) (emphasis

added) (citations omitted). We recognize that “[a] slight

misstatement of law by a prosecutor can be rendered harmless

by the court’s proper instruction to the jury.” United States

v. Mendoza, 244 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 2001). And under

Supreme Court precedent, a jury is presumed to follow the

court’s instructions. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234

(2000).

In the dissent’s view, the CCA decided that no federal

constitutional error occurred in this case, and the CCA’s

decision is entitled to AEDPA deference independent from

the deference already encompassed in the Brecht

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DECK V. JENKINS 19

harmlessness standard. Controlling authorityrequires that we

follow a different approach.

The heading of the relevant section of the CCA’s decision

was: “The Prosecutor’s Misstatement Concerning Attempt

Was Harmless.” The CCA agreed with Deck that the

prosecutor misstated the law of attempt but held that “this

lone misstatement—counteracted by the trial court’s correct

instructions—was harmless.”3 Deck, 2011 WL 2001825, at

*11. We accept the CCA’s interpretation of California law

and take as established that prosecutorial error occurred. The

CCA did not expressly reach the question whether this error

amounted to a violation of federal due process, so we must

consider whether the CCA’s harmlessness determination

amounted to an implied ruling that no federal constitutional

violation took place.

The Supreme Court has defined a “fair trial” as “a trial

resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles v.

Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). In Hein v. Sullivan,

601 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2010), our court summarized the

factors the Supreme Court evaluated in Darden to determine

whether the petitioner’s trial was “fair,” and then observed

that consideration of the Darden factors “appears to be

equivalent to evaluating whether there was a ‘reasonable

probability’ of a different result.” Id. at 914–15. California

courts use the “reasonable probability” standard to evaluate

whether prosecutorial misconduct renders a trial

fundamentally unfair under state law. See People v. Partida,

122 P.3d 765, 771 (Cal. 2005); People v. Espinoza, 838 P.2d

204, 212 (Cal. 1992). We therefore conclude that although

3 As explained below, the prosecutor’s error was more than a single

“lone misstatement,” but this point is not relevant here.

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the CCA did not independently evaluate the federal

constitutional question, its harmlessness analysis can be seen

as an implied ruling that no federal constitutional violation

occurred because the prosecutor’s error was harmless.

The dissent implies that we should apply AEDPA

deference to decide whether the type of prosecutorial

misconduct in Deck’s case rose to the level of a federal due

process violation, in addition to the deference due to the

CCA’s evaluation of prejudice. The dissent’s concern is

misplaced: the CCA did not hold that the type of misconduct

here—misstatements of the law in closing argument—may

not rise to the level of a due process violation. Instead, the

CCA impliedly held that no due process violation occurred

because the error was harmless. Under both California and

federal law, prosecutorial misconduct renders a trial

“fundamentally unfair” (i.e., a violation of due process) only

when it was not harmless because there was a reasonable

probability of a different result absent the error. The dissent’s

approach is inconsistent with Supreme Court directives. 

Beyond harmlessness, there is no additional state court

determination regarding the federal due process claim to

which we could defer here. AEDPA deference to the CCA’s

harmlessness determination is already subsumed within the

Brecht standard.4 See Fry, 551 U.S. at 120.

The dissent interprets our opinion as “rest[ing] on [the]

conclusion that a defendant’s right to due process of law is

4 For this reason, if we were to hold that the error in Deck’s trial was not

harmless under the Brecht standard, this would necessarily entail the

conclusion that the CCA’s ruling with regard to harmlessness was

unreasonable under the deferential AEDPA standard. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1); Fry, 551 U.S. at 120.

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DECK V. JENKINS 21

violated when the prosecutor misstates the law in his closing

argument, even when the judge correctly instructs the jury on

the relevant legal principles.” But nowhere do we suggest

that every misstatement of the law in closing argument rises

to the level of a due process violation. This fact-intensive

determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. Where

the state court has determined that prosecutorial misconduct

occurred, and where the constitutional dimension of the error

completely overlaps with the harmlessness determination,

there is nothing left to do but apply the Brecht standard.

AEDPA review and the Brecht standard are both highly

deferential, but this does not mean that we are to superimpose

new layers of deference when applying a general rule like the

one from Darden. To do so would needlessly complicate our

doctrine and contravene controlling authority. Where, as

here, our review is limited to assessing a state court’s

conclusion regarding prejudice, Supreme Court and circuit

precedents require us to apply Brecht “without regard for the

state court’s harmlessness determination.” Pulido, 629 F.3d

at 1012; see also Fry, 551 U.S. at 119–20.

II. Application of Federal Law to Deck’s Case

A. The prosecutor’s misstatements were not

inadvertent or isolated.

In its analysis of prejudice, the CCA reasoned that “the

prosecutor’s errant gloss on the law . . . . was an isolated

departure in a few stray words and not the focus of the

prosecutor’s argument.” Deck, 2011 WL 2001825, at *12;

see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). But it is clear the erroneous

assertions of law in the prosecutor’s closing rebuttal

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argument were not mere “stray words;” they were a direct

response to the central theory of Deck’s case.

The contention that Deck lacked the intent to commit a

lewd act on the night of the meeting was absolutely central to

his defense. In his closing argument, defense counsel told the

jury that, while Deck’s conduct may have been reprehensible,

it did not constitute attempt. He stressed that Deck’s defense

was a technical one, telling the jury that this was a case where

law and justice might not be “on the same side” and “don’t

necessarily meet.” Defense counsel expressly argued to the

jury that “Mr. Deck never had the intent in the first place to

engage in a lewd act” on the date of the meeting, and that

“Mr. Deck had a definite and unambiguous intent not to

engage in a lewd act on that date” (emphasis added). 

Leaving no doubt that the jury would be required to examine

the precise elements of the law of attempt in California,

defense counsel argued: “Like it or not[,] the law is on Mr.

Deck’s side in this case. Like it or not.” The temporal

requirement for Deck’s intent was not a side issue in his trial;

it went to the heart of Deck’s defense, and his counsel made

this abundantly clear to the jury.

There is no doubt the trial court recognized that the

defense and prosecution made directly conflicting statements

to the jury regarding the temporal component of intent as

relevant to attempt. In fact, the prosecutor’s own statements

about the purpose of his rebuttal closing argument contradict

the CCA’s suggestion that his misstatements were stray

words or inadvertent misstatements. In a discussion with trial

counsel after the jury sent its note requesting clarification on

the temporal requirement for attempt, the trial court

acknowledged that the lawyers gave irreconcilable statements

of the law to the jury, and the prosecutor claimed that his

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DECK V. JENKINS 23

rebuttal was necessary to convey the State’s position on what

the law required the State to prove:

The Court: You did not object at all to

[defense counsel’s] argument. He clearly

argued to the jury that he had to commit a

lewd act that day, that he had the intent to do

that.

[Prosecutor]: That is what my rebuttal was

for. I am arguing what the law is.

(emphasis added). The prosecutor’s view of what the law

required him to prove is precisely the one the CCA later

rejected. Recognizing that the temporal component of

attempt was pivotal to Deck’s defense, the trial judge stated

that he would “even entertain additional closing argument on

[the] issue based on the fact that there were two different

things argued to the jury,” and that it was “not surprising”

that the jury asked for clarification in light of this difference.

The CCA’s characterization of the prosecutor’s

misstatements as brief and errant departures from an

otherwise sound argument is contradicted by the record. The

State’s rebuttal unambiguously repeated several erroneous

statements regarding what California law required to convict

Deck. The misstatements were the counterpunch to Deck’s

“like it or not” closing argument. The prosecutor told the jury

that although the evidence showed that Deck intended to

engage in lewd conduct that day, they could convict Deck

even if they agreed with the defense that the evidence raised

reasonable doubt about whether Deck had this intent:

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But even if his intent was just to meet her, get

to know her, break the ice and follow up the

next day, the next week, maybe two weekends

when mom’s gone, again, as long as he took a

direct, but ineffectual step towards that goal,

that is all I need.

I don’t need to prove to you that he was

going to commit a lewd act on that day, just

some point in the future [sic] direct and

ineffectual step that day. So the best case

scenario for the defense is baloney. . . . Even

if you buy this baloney[,] just see her that day,

not touching her, stay five feet away from her,

follow up the next day if they got along, then

commit the lewd act, that is sufficient under

the law for the defendant to be guilty.

The prosecutor’s repetition of the phrase “even if”

unquestionably shows that he presented alternative theories

of the case on which the jury could rely to convict Deck,

rather than making a passing incorrect statement of his

primary argument. The prosecutor’s unequivocal

assertions—“that is all I need” and “that is sufficient under

the law for the defendant to be guilty”—leave no doubt that

he was arguing, incorrectly, that the jury could still convict

Deck even if it found doubt about whether Deck intended to

engage in a lewd act on the night of the meeting.

The manner in which the prosecutor presented his

alternative theory, using statements like “sufficient under the

law,” created a significant likelihood that the comments

would be “viewed as definitive and binding statements of the

law,” rather than merely as argument. See Boyde, 494 U.S.

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DECK V. JENKINS 25

at 384. We need not engage in speculative Monday morning

quarterbacking to know that the rebuttal argument may have

seriously misled the jury; the jury’s note to the trial court

after the start of deliberations went straight to this contested

point of law. It asked the court to “[c]larify law as it relates

to whether defendant did not have to do anything that day

only attempt to put it into play.” The significance of this

request is discussed further below.

B. The trial court did not correct the prosecutor’s 

misstatements.

“Arguments of counsel which misstate the law are subject

to objection and to correction by the court,” id., but here the

trial court did not correct the prosecutor’s misstatements. 

Nor did the court answer the question posed in the jury’s

note, because the jury was subsequently told to start

deliberations over after a juror became sick and had to be

excused. Notably, even the trial court did not expect the jury

to find the answer to its question in the written set of jury

instructions. The record shows the judge anticipated that the

jury would ask the same question, and the court was

diligently reviewing the applicable California case law and

working with counsel to draft a response when the jury

reached a verdict. That the trial court did not issue a

correction before the verdict was returned weighs in favor of

finding a constitutional violation, because, as we have

recognized, improper prosecutorial statements cannot be

neutralized by instructions that do not in any way address

“the specific statements of the prosecutor.” United States v.

Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

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The CCA emphasized that “the trial court properly

instructed the jury on the relevant principles” of the law of

attempt. Deck, 2011 WL 2001825, at *12. The written

instructions made it clear that the State needed to prove that

Deck: (1) “took a direct but ineffective step toward

committing” the crime, and (2) “intended to commit” the

crime. The CCA held that this instruction correctly stated the

law, and we do not review this holding.

5

See Bradshaw,

546 U.S. at 76.

But the CCA went on to conclude that, based on the

written instructions alone, “the jury knew it was not enough

to plan or prepare to commit a lewd act at a potential later

rendezvous.” Deck, 2011 WL 2001825, at *12. This

conclusion does not comport with the record. The

instructions entirely failed to address the specific

misstatements made by the prosecutor; they gave the jury no

direction at all regarding whether the law required the

prosecutor to show that Deck intended to commit a lewd act

on the night of the meeting. The jury could have concluded

 

5

 The instructions elaborated:

A direct step requires more than merely planning or

preparing to commit [the offense] or obtaining or

arranging for something needed to commit [the

offense]. A direct step is one that goes beyond

planning or preparation and shows that a person is

putting his plan into action. A direct step indicates a

definite and unambiguous intent to commit [the

offense]. It is a direct movement towards the

commission of the crime after preparations are made. 

It is an immediate step that puts the plan in motion so

that the plan would have been completed if some

circumstances outside the plan had not interrupted the

attempt.

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DECK V. JENKINS 27

that the instructions were perfectly compatible with the

prosecutor’s repeated assertions that Deck could be found

guilty even if the meeting was merely a step in a plan to

commit a lewd act with Amy in the near future. The jury was

told that, under the State’s alternative theory, the purpose of

the initial meeting would have been to confirm Amy’s

identity before arranging a future sexual encounter.

The CCA’s conclusion that the jury correctly understood

the law of attempt is further undermined by the differing

interpretations of the law adhered to by the trial court and

counsel. The prosecutor believed that the instructions

permitted his view of the law, but the CCA later held that the

prosecutor was incorrect. Defense counsel insisted the law

required more. Tellingly, the trial judge sided with the

prosecutor and not the defense. After going round and round

on the issue with counsel, the judge stated:

[M]y analysis of it after reading [California]

cases is that the People are correct in their

analysis of the law. I do not think it has to be,

the ultimate step, intend to commit it that day. 

He had to have the specific intent to commit

the lewd act at or about the time he took the

direct step. That doesn’t mean he had to have

the intent to commit child abuse that day, on

that particular day. I think that is accurate. 

But it’s very, very difficult to phrase that in an

instruction format that it’s clean and that’s

understandable. I mean if the lawyers can’t

even agree, how do we expect jurors or

layperson to grasp it[?]

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(emphases added). The italicized sentences in this statement

encapsulate a separate problem with the CCA’s analysis: it is

difficult to imagine that “the jury knew” something from the

jury instructions that even the trial judge who gave the

instructions did not know.

The trial judge and counsel plainly agreed that the jury’s

question was not addressed by the instructions, and they

expected the jury to come back with another version of its

initial question after it restarted deliberations with the new

juror. Working to craft an answer to the question when the

bailiff announced there was a verdict, the court seemed

surprised that the jury could have reached a verdict without

having its earlier question answered:

The Bailiff: There’s a verdict, your Honor.

The Court: There is a verdict?

The Bailiff: Yes.

The Court: Well, that solves that issue.

The dissent relies on the presumption that a jury

understands and follows the court’s instructions. We

recognize the existence of this well-established presumption,

but it is not dispositive here for a simple reason the dissent

fails to acknowledge: the jury instructions on attempt did not

address the temporal issue that was the gravamen of the

prosecutor’s misstatements. The instructions did say that to

be convicted of attempt, the defendant must put his “plan in

motion so that the plan would have been completed if some

circumstances outside the plan had not interrupted the

attempt.” But this provided no guidance as to whether, in

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DECK V. JENKINS 29

order to convict Deck, his plan would have to be completed

that night, or, as the prosecutor incorrectly told the jury, Deck

merely had to put in motion a plan to complete the act “the

next day, the next week, maybe two weekends [later].” The

trial judge’s interpretation of the instructions in a manner

inconsistent with the CCA’s determination of California law

vividly illustrates that, even if the jury read the instructions

carefully and made their best effort to follow them, they

could no more than guess at the correct rule of California law. 

To be clear, we do not believe the jury failed to follow the

trial court’s directions in the sense that it disregarded the

court’s instructions. Rather, the record shows that the most

diligent of juries would have had no way of divining whether

the prosecutor’s interpretation of the law of attempt was

incorrect from the instructions given to them.6

C. The evidence concerning the temporal aspect of

Deck’s intent was not overwhelming.

In Darden, the Supreme Court reasoned that

overwhelming evidence “reduced the likelihood that the

jury’s decision was influenced by” the prosecutor’s improper

argument in that case. 477 U.S. at 196. The weight of the

 

6 Deck’s case is analogous to cases where the jury has been “instructed

on multiple theories of guilt, one of which is improper.” Hedgpeth v.

Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 61 (2008). In such cases, the reviewing court applies

the Brecht analysis without presuming that the jury followed the correct

theory. See id. at 61–62. Here, the prosecutor and defense counsel gave

contradictory interpretations of the law of attempt, and the instructions

themselves did not resolve the contradiction. Under these circumstances,

we agree with what our dissenting colleague wrote in a previous decision:

“While we presume jurors follow the instructions they are given, we

cannot equally assume they can sort out legal contradictions.” Doe v.

Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1023 (9th Cir. 2011) (M. Smith, authoring judge).

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evidence against Deck is an important consideration, but it

does not change the outcome on the facts presented here.

On one hand, the jury could have found that Deck

intended to engage in lewd touching with Amy on the day of

the meeting: he had previously discussed performing sexual

acts with her in graphic detail, he knew that her mother was

not at home, and he had condoms in his car. “A rational juror

reasonably could conclude Deck’s comments [about feeling

sick, wanting to meet in public, and cautioning ‘no kissing or

nothing’ at the meeting] served merely as a ploy to convince

‘Amy’ to meet him or as a prudent precaution Deck took to

verify ‘Amy’s’ age and identity.” Deck, 2011 WL 2001825,

at *9. Furthermore, Deck’s background in law

enforcement—he was a lieutenant with the California

Highway Patrol at the time—makes it more likely that he was

playing it safe in his communications with Amy to avoid

exactly this type of sting. The prosecutor argued along these

lines in closing rebuttal that Deck “knew what the defense

was” to the charge and “tried to create his own defense.”

The CCA also emphasized that only minimal physical

contact was required to support conviction for committing a

lewd act. The intended touching need not have been overtly

sexualized to an outside observer. Id. at *10 (“[T]he jury

need only have found Deck intended to touch ‘Amy’ with the

intent to arouse himself or her.”). In an earlier chat

discussion, Deck conceded that although he wanted to meet

in public for their first date and not engage in sexual activity:

“I probably won’t be able to keep my hands off of you.” Id.

at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).

On the other hand, the jury could have believed that the

prosecutor only proved his alternative theory that Deck

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DECK V. JENKINS 31

intended to commit lewd acts with Amy at a later meeting. 

The jury could have believed Deck wanted to avoid contact

with Amy on the day he was arrested because he was

grooming Amy for future contacts and wanted to exercise

caution by having a more limited first meeting, in public, to

assess the situation. The jury might even have believed that

Deck did not intend contact or touching on that particular day

because he was ill, as he claimed. That Deck was carrying a

camera and had condoms in his car shows preparation, but

these facts do not establish when he planned to follow

through. The prosecutor’s assurance that the jury could

convict “even if” it believed the prosecution’s alternative

theory of the case could have influenced the jury to find

“attempt” based on an anticipated future rendezvous with

Amy. If the jury had not been on the fence on this question,

it is unlikely it would have sent its note to the court.

D. There is “grave doubt” about the harmlessness of

the error.

The jury’s request for clarification, above all, leaves us

with “grave doubt” about whether the prosecutor’s comments

had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the

verdict. The jury’s note asked the trial court to “clarify [the]

law as it relates to whether defendant did not have to do

anything that day[,] only attempt to put it into play.”7 Even

the State concedes on appeal that “on some level, [the

prosecutor’s] statements resonated with the jury in that they

provoked a question from the jury.” Rather than disputing

7 The jury’s request for clarification on the law of attempt also included

the following language, which was crossed out near the top of the blank

space: “In closing arguments, Prosecutor . . . [illegible] . . . we need it read

back.”

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that the prosecutor’s closing rebuttal argument perplexed the

jury, the State contends that the jury’s failure to resubmit its

question to the trial court after restarting its deliberations

suggests “the jury was satisfied with the original, correct

instructions on the crime of attempt when it rendered its

verdict.” But the judge’s oral direction in response to the

jury’s note was also confusing. The judge orally directed the

jury:

I know that there was a previous question sent

out by the foreperson, Juror # 9. In light of

the fact I have just given you this instruction

that you have to start all over again, disregard

past deliberations, you need to follow that

instruction. If you have any further questions

that you want answered once you start

deliberating with the jury, send that out in the

question format and we will answer it for you.

Id. at *13. The CCA accepted that the jury satisfied itself

about the temporal requirement for attempt by looking at the

trial court’s written instructions. Id. But as explained, the

written instructions provided no specific guidance on this

point. Worse, the jury may have understood the judge’s oral

direction to mean that the court was not going to provide an

answer to the jury’s earlier question, and that only if the jury

had any other (“further”) questions, could it submit them to

the court.

Without the benefit of a corrective instruction, the jury

may have arrived at the same erroneous legal conclusion that

the trial judge reached: that Deck could be convicted even if

the jury was not sure whether he intended to commit a lewd

act on the day he met Amy. After all, that is precisely what

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DECK V. JENKINS 33

the prosecutor told the jury in rebuttal. Unquestionably, this

scenario would constitute prejudice under the Brecht

standard.

Brecht requires that we determine whether the

prosecutor’s comments “had substantial and injurious effect

or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht,

507 U.S. at 637 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the

evidence is at least in “virtual equipoise” on this question,

such that we have grave doubt as to the harmlessness of the

constitutional trial error, the petition must be granted. See

O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 437–38. The state appellate court’s

decision established that the prosecutor gave incorrect

direction to the jury about an element of California law under

which Deck was convicted. The record establishes that the

comments were not inadvertent or isolated, and it cannot be

questioned they went to the heart of Deck’s defense. The

lawyers’ diametrically opposed statements of the law in

closing arguments confused the jury, but a corrective

instruction was not given. Nor was the jury’s request for

clarification answered, and the written jury instructions did

not address the subject of the jury’s confusion. Despite the

significant evidence presented by the State, we cannot say

there was overwhelming evidence that Deck intended to

commit a lewd act on the specific night in question. 

Therefore, considering the entire record and viewing it in

context, we find ourselves at least in “virtual equipoise as to

the harmlessness of the error” of federal law. See O’Neal,

513 U.S. at 435.

CONCLUSION

The prosecutor’s misstatements regarding an element of

the crime amounted to constitutional trial error under clearly

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established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. 

See Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. We have grave doubt as to

whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence on the jury’s verdict. See O’Neal, 513 U.S. at

437–38. In view of these conclusions, we REVERSE the

judgment of the district court and REMAND with

instructions to grant the petition unless the State agrees to

grant Deck a new trial within a reasonable period of time. 

See Stark v. Hickman, 455 F.3d 1070, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006).

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly—and often

unanimously—reversed our circuit’s decisions granting

§ 2254 relief. For example, in its four most recent terms, the

Supreme Court has reversed us thirteen times in cases

involving our application of AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, ten

of which reversals have been unanimous. In my view, this

case is yet another candidate for reversal because the majority

flouts clear Supreme Court AEDPA precedent in order to

justify its holding that a state court’s decision is incorrect. In

so doing, the majority commits the same error the Supreme

Court has criticized our court for making time after time by

“collapsing the distinction between ‘an unreasonable

application of federal law’ and what [the majority] believes

to be ‘an incorrect or erroneous application of federal law.’”

Nevada v. Jackson, — U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1990, 1994 (2013)

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DECK V. JENKINS 35

(per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412

(2000)) (unanimously reversing our grant of habeas relief).1

1

See also Marshall v. Rodgers, — U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450

(2013) (per curiam) (unanimously reversing our grant of habeas relief and

criticizing our court for “[our] mistaken belief that circuit precedent may

be used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court

jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that [the Supreme] Court has not

announced”); Cavazos v. Smith, — U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. 2, 6–8 (2011) (per

curiam) (reversing our grant of habeas relief and stating: “This Court

vacated and remanded this judgment twice before, calling the panel’s

attention to this Court’s opinions highlighting the necessity of deference

to state courts in § 2254(d) habeas cases. Each time the panel persisted in

its course, reinstating its judgment without seriously confronting the

significance of the cases called to its attention . . . . Its refusal to do so

necessitates this Court’s action today.”); Swarthout v. Cooke, — U.S. —,

131 S. Ct. 859, 862–63 (2011) (per curiam) (unanimously reversing our

grant of habeas relief and stating: “The short of the matter is that the

responsibility for assuring that the constitutionally adequate procedures

governing California’s parole system are properly applied rests with

California courts, and is no part of the Ninth Circuit’s business.”);

Harrington v. Richter, — U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011)

(unanimously reversing our grant of habeas relief and criticizing us for

“treat[ing] the unreasonableness question as a test of [our] confidence in

the result [we] would reach under de novo review”); Premo v. Moore, —

U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 733, 743–46 (2011) (unanimously reversing our grant

of habeas relief and criticizing us for “transpos[ing]” Supreme Court

precedent “into a novel context”); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111,

121–23 (2009) (unanimously reversing our grant of habeas relief and

reminding us that “it is not an unreasonable application of clearly

established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal

rule that has not been squarely established by [the Supreme] Court”

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 147

(2005) (reversing our grant of habeas relief and commenting that we had

“no basis for . . . concluding that the [state court’s] application of [the

Supreme Court’s] precedents was objectively unreasonable” (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

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I. Background

As the majority explains, Deck engaged in online

conversations with a fictitious thirteen-year-old named Amy.

The trial record shows that Deck and Amy exchanged

sexually suggestive messages and that they planned to meet

in person to “date” and to engage in sexual acts. Deck

indicated that he would not feel safe meeting for the first time

at Amy’s home, so they arranged to meet initially at a nearby

park.

The day of their planned meeting, Deck told Amy that he

was sick, and said: “so no kissing or nothing. [I’m] [j]ust

bringing you . . . pie.” During their prior online

conversations, Deck had repeatedly used the term “pie” as a

euphemism for performing oral sex on Amy. Moreover,

although Deck stated that he and Amy would not engage in

sexual conduct at their first meeting, he also told Amy “I

probably won’t be able to keep my hands off of you.”

On February 18, 2006, Deck drove forty-five minutes to

meet Amy at the park near her home. Deck arrived around

8:35 p.m, and when he identified himself to a teenage girl, the

police arrested him. A subsequent search of Deck’s car

revealed, among other things, MapQuest directions to Amy’s

apartment, six packaged condoms, and a digital camera. Deck

was charged with one count of an attempted lewd act on a

child under the age of fourteen and tried before a jury.

During his closing argument, the prosecutor argued that

Deck was guilty of an attempted lewd act on a child because:

(1) if Amy had been a real thirteen-year-old, Deck would

have touched her on February 18, 2006, and (2) in light of

Deck’s express intent to engage in sexual conduct with Amy,

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DECK V. JENKINS 37

“any touching” would have constituted a lewd act under

California law.

Throughout his closing argument, the prosecutor

discussed his understanding of attempt under California law.

The prosecutor’s explanation was not a model of clarity, nor

was it entirely accurate. The prosecutor first stated,

I need to prove to you that [Deck] took a

direct, but ineffectual step . . . First of all, his

intent was to commit a lewd act. Definitely

going down there to engage in a lewd act,

lewd contact with Amy. But for that sting

operation and Amy being fictitious . . . he

would have [engaged in a lewd act].

The prosecutor also stated: “But even if [Deck’s] intent was

to just meet her, get to know her, break the ice and follow up

the next day, the next week, maybe two weekends when

mom’s gone, again, as long as he took a direct, but ineffectual

step towards that goal, that is all I need.”

Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s closing

argument, but instead offered his own explanation of attempt

during his closing remarks. Before the jury started its

deliberations, the presiding judge correctly instructed the jury

concerning the law of attempt, as follows:

A direct step requires more than merely

planning or preparing to commit [the offense]

or obtaining or arranging for something

needed to commit [the offense]. A direct step

is one that goes beyond planning and

preparation and shows that a person is putting

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38 DECK V. JENKINS

his plan into action. A direct step indicates a

definite and unambiguous intent to commit

[the offense]. It is a direct movement towards

the commission of the crime after

preparations are made. It is an immediate step

that puts the plan in motion so that the plan

would have been completed if some

circumstances outside the plan had not

interrupted the attempt.

(Emphasis added).

On direct appeal, Deck argued, among other things, that

his conviction should be reversed because the prosecutor

misstated the law of attempt in his closing argument. The

California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District (Court of

Appeal) agreed that the prosecutor was incorrect when he

stated: “[E]ven if [Deck’s] intent was to just meet [Amy], get

to know her, break the ice and follow up the next day, the

next week, maybe two weekends when mom’s gone, again,

as long as he took a direct, but ineffectual step towards that

goal, that is all I need.” The Court of Appeal further

explained that to be guilty of attempt under California law,

“the acts of the defendant must go so far that they would

result in the accomplishment of the crime unless frustrated by

extraneous circumstances.”

While the Court of Appeal held that the prosecutor

misstated the law of attempt, the Court nevertheless affirmed

Deck’s conviction. In so doing, the Court of Appeal held that

the prosecutor’s legal error did not require reversal because

the judge correctly instructed the jury. The Court explained:

“[W]e presume the jury followed [the trial judge’s]

instructions . . . . [Thus], the jury knew it was not enough to

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DECK V. JENKINS 39

plan or prepare to commit a lewd act at a potential later

rendezvous[, and that] the attempt must consist of ‘an

immediate step that puts the plan in motion so that the plan

would have been completed if some circumstances outside

the plan had not interrupted the attempt.’” According to the

majority, the Court of Appeal’s holding is an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. I respectfully

disagree.

II. Clearly Established Law

The majority contends that Deck is entitled to habeas

relief, because (1) the prosecutor inadvertently misstated

California law in his closing argument, and (2) the majority

has “grave doubt” as to whether this misstatement affected

the outcome of Deck’s trial. But whether the majority has

“grave doubt” about whether a trial error was harmless is only

relevant if that error amounts to a constitutional violation. See

O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435–36 (1995). When a

state court has previously determined that no such

constitutional error occurred, a federal court “ha[s] no

authority” to disrupt the state court’s holding unless the state

court’s holding is “‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Parker v.

Mathews, — U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2012) (per

curiam) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).

The Supreme Court has also emphasized that “‘an

unreasonable application of federal law is different from an

incorrect application of federal law.’” See, e.g., Harrington

v. Richter, — U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (quoting

Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). “The critical point is that relief is

available under § 2254(d)(1)’s unreasonable-application

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40 DECK V. JENKINS

clause if, and only if, it is so obvious that a clearly established

rule applies to a given set of facts that there could be no

‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question.” White v.

Woodall, — U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1706–07 (2014)

(quoting Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 787).

Importantly, even if a federal court would grant relief to

a § 2254 petitioner under a de novo review, a state court’s

denial of relief is not necessarily unreasonable. Harrington,

131 S. Ct. at 786. This is so, because “[u]nder § 2254(d), a

habeas court must [first] determine what arguments or

theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state

court’s decision,” and then “‘[t]he only question that matters’

. . . [is] whether it is possible [that] fairminded jurists could

disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent

with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.”

Id. (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003))

(emphasis added).

The majority’s opinion rests on its conclusion that a

defendant’s right to due process of law is violated when the

prosecutor misstates the law in his closing argument, even

when the judge correctly instructs the jury on the relevant

legal principles. While the majority may believe that federal

law should protect a criminal defendant from prosecutorial

errors of this nature, the Supreme Court has never announced

such a rule.

The majority correctly observes that the Supreme Court

has stated that prosecutorial misconduct may deny a criminal

defendant due process of law. But the only Supreme Court

decisions the majority cites for this proposition are Parker v.

Mathews, 132 S. Ct. at 2154–55 (holding that § 2254 relief

was not proper because the alleged prosecutorial error was

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DECK V. JENKINS 41

not a clearly established constitutional violation),2 Darden v.

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179–83 (1986) (same), and

Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 339–40 (1985)

(holding that the Eighth Amendment is violated when the

prosecutor and the court erroneously instruct the jury that the

responsibility for determining whether a death sentence is

appropriate lies with the court of appeals and not with the

jury).

While Parker, Darden, and Caldwell all state that

prosecutorial misconduct could render a trial so unfair as to

deny a defendant due process of law, in none of these cases

did the Supreme Court actually hold that a prosecutor’s error

denied a criminal defendant due process, nor did the Court

establish what type of misconduct would cause a trial error of

constitutional magnitude.

Critically, the Supreme Court has never held, nor even

suggested, that a defendant’s constitutional rights are

violated where a prosecutor misstates the law in closing

argument, but the trial judge correctly instructs the jury. In

fact, the Supreme Court has indicated just the opposite.

The Supreme Court has long held that “[a] jury is

presumed to follow” a judge’s instructions. Weeks v.

Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000). This is true even when

a party provides contrary instructions. For example, in Brown

v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005), the prosecutor repeatedly and

incorrectly argued to the jury that it could not consider certain

2

I note that the majority improperly relies on Parker, as it was issued

after the Court of Appeal denied Deck’s appeal, and it could not therefore

have been clearly established federal law at the time of the Court of

Appeal’s decision.

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mitigating evidence in the penalty phase of the defendant’s

trial for capital murder. The court failed to provide a

corrective instruction, but correctly instructed the jury on the

applicable law before deliberations began. Id. at 146–47. In

so doing, the trial court did not instruct the jury that the

prosecutor’s statements were incorrect. Id. It merelyprovided

a correct explanation of the law, which was inconsistent with

the prosecutor’s erroneous statements. Id.

The Brown Court (reversing our court, sitting en banc)

held that the petitioner was not entitled to relief under § 2254.

Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that the trial

court “should have [explicitly] advised the jury that it could

consider [the mitigating] evidence,” it was not unreasonable

for the state court to conclude that the jury relied on the

judge’s correct instructions, rather than on the prosecutor’s

misstatements. Id. at 146–47. As in Brown, the state trial

court here did not explicitly instruct the jury that the

prosecutor was incorrect when he stated that the jury could

convict Deck even if it concluded that Deck did not intend to

touch Amy for several days or weeks after their initial

meeting. Nonetheless, the court offered an instruction that

directly contradicted the prosecutor’s erroneous explanation,

when it explained that a defendant is only guilty of attempt if

he “[makes a] direct movement towards the commission of

the crime after preparations are made[, by] putt[ing his] plan

in motion so that the plan would have been completed if some

circumstances outside the plan had not interrupted the

attempt.”

Despite Brown, the majority concludes that the Supreme

Court’s broad statements that a prosecutor’s comments can

render a trial constitutionally infirm grant this court authority

to set aside the Court of Appeal’s holding that no such error

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DECK V. JENKINS 43

occurred in this case. This conclusion flouts AEDPA’s

deferential standard.

The majority is correct that under § 2254 even a general

rule can be applied in an unreasonable manner. This is so,

because “‘[c]ertain principles are fundamental enough that

when new factual permutations arise, the necessity to apply

the earlier rule will be beyond doubt.’” White, 134 S. Ct. at

1706 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666

(2004)). But, even where a general rule is at issue, “relief is

available under § 2254(d)[] . . . if, and only if, it is so obvious

that [the] clearly established rule applies to a given set of

facts that there could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the

question.” White, 134 S. Ct. at 1706–07 (quoting Harrington,

131 S. Ct. at 787). “‘[I]f a habeas court must extend a

rationale before it can apply to the facts at hand,’ then by

definition the rationale was not ‘clearly established at the

time of the state court decision.’” White, 134 S. Ct. at 1706

(quoting Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 666).

Under the Supreme Court’s case law, it will rarely be “so

obvious” that a prosecutorial error violated a defendant’s due

process rights that there could be no “‘fairminded

disagreement’ on the question.” White, 134 S. Ct. at 1706–07

(quoting Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 787). In Parker, the

Supreme Court specifically addressed this issue and warned

that because the standard for determining whether

prosecutorial error amounts to a constitutional error “is a very

general one . . . [we must give state] courts more leeway . . .

in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations

[concerning prosecutorial conduct].” Parker, 132 S. Ct. at

2155 (internal quotationmarks omitted); see also Harrington,

131 S. Ct. at 786 (“The more general the rule, the more

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44 DECK V. JENKINS

leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case

determinations.”).

Here, there is simply no Supreme Court precedent

establishing “beyond fairminded disagreement” that Deck’s

due process rights were violated. The Supreme Court has

generally acknowledged that prosecutorial misconduct may,

under some circumstances, amount to a due process violation.

But the Court has never suggested that a prosecutor’s

inadvertent misstatement of state law creates such a

circumstance, particularly where the judge later provides the

jury with a correct explanation of the law. For this reason, the

Court of Appeal’s holding that the prosecutor’s erroneous

statements of law did not violate Deck’s constitutional rights

is not “an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

III. Prejudice

Not only does the majority grant habeas relief based on a

new constitutional rule that it announces today, but it

compounds its error by rejecting the Court of Appeal’s

reasonable conclusion that any prosecutorial error was not

prejudicial. This holding relies on an interpretation of the

facts that is tenuous at best.

It is well-settled law that “[a] jury is presumed to follow

. . . [and] is [also] presumed to understand” a judge’s

instructions. Weeks, 528 U.S. at 234. Here, it is undisputed

that the presiding judge correctly instructed the jury that a

defendant is only guilty of attempt if he “[makes a] direct

movement towards the commission of the crime after

preparations are made[, by] putt[ing his] plan in motion so

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DECK V. JENKINS 45

that the plan would have been completed if some

circumstances outside the plan had not interrupted the

attempt.” In order to overcome the presumption that the jury

understood and followed this instruction, and to show that the

prosecutor’s statements were prejudicial, the majority adopts

a strained interpretation of the record. With respect, the

majority’s interpretation is neither persuasive nor consistent

with the scope of AEDPA review.

The majority notes that during its deliberations, the jury

asked the court to “clarify [the] law as it relates to whether

defendant did not have to do anything that day only attempt

to put it in play.” After the jury submitted this question, the

jury adjourned for the day. When the jury reconvened, an

alternate juror was substituted for a sick juror. The judge

properly instructed the jury to begin its deliberations anew,

and to submit any outstanding questions to the court. The new

jury did not resubmit the original jury’s question, and it was

never answered.

Accordingto the majority, the jury’s unanswered question

proves that (1) despite the judge’s correct instruction, the jury

believed the prosecutor’s conflicting statement that it could

convict Deck even if it found that Deck did not intend to

touch Amy for several days or weeks after their initial

meeting, and (2) the jury convicted Deck on these grounds. In

my view, the majority’s reading is unfounded and does

nothing to overcome the presumption that a jury understands

and follows a judge’s instructions. Id.

Inchoate offenses are undoubtedly confusing to a lay jury.

Recognizing this potential for confusion, the fairest

interpretation of the jury’s question is a simple request for

confirmation that a defendant may be guilty under the law of

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attempt even if he does not complete a substantive

offensive—“only attempt[s] to put it in play.” Contrary to the

majority’s reading, nothing about the jury’s note indicates

that the jury believed that Deck could be guilty of attempt

even if he did not intend to touch Amy for several days or

weeks following their initialmeeting. Rather, the note focuses

on what actions one must take (i.e., what he must “do”) to be

guilty of attempt.

The majority points to no other record evidence indicating

that the jury relied on the prosecutor’s erroneous statements,

rather than on the judge’s correct explanation of the law.

Thus, I find no reason to believe that these statements were

prejudicial. Moreover, the record certainly does not show that

in reaching this same conclusion, the Court of Appeal acted

unreasonably or even erroneously.

IV. Conclusion

Relief under § 2254(d) is appropriate only where the state

court’s holding is “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). The Supreme Court has specifically warned our

court that, “[b]y framing [Supreme Court] precedents at [too]

high [a] level of generality, [we] could transform even the

most imaginative extension of existing case law into ‘clearly

established Federal law, as determined bythe Supreme Court’

. . .[, which] would defeat the substantial deference that

AEDPA requires [to state courts].” Jackson, 133 S. Ct. at

1994. The majority flouts the Supreme Court’s clear

directive, and in the absence of clearly applicable Supreme

Court precedent, concludes that Deck is entitled to § 2254

relief, merely because the majority believes that the Court of

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DECK V. JENKINS 47

Appeal’s decision is incorrect.3 For these reasons, I

respectfully dissent.

 

3 With regard to our treatment of petitions under § 2254, Justice Scalia

recently observed:

It is a regrettable reality that some federal judges like to

second-guess state courts. The only way this Court can

ensure observance of Congress’s abridgement of their

habeas power is to perform the unaccustomed task of

reviewing utterly fact-bound decisions that present no

disputed issues of law. We have often not shrunk from

that task, which we have found particularly needful

with regard to decisions of the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g.,

Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 132 S. Ct. 2, — L.Ed.2d

— (2011) (per curiam) (reinstating California

conviction for assault on a child resulting in death);

Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 1305, 179

L.Ed.2d 374 (2011) (per curiam) (reinstatingCalifornia

conviction for sexual attack on a 72–year–old woman);

Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 733, 178

L.Ed.2d 649 (2011) (reinstating Oregon conviction for

murder of a kidnapped victim); Knowles v. Mirzayance,

556 U.S. 111, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009)

(reinstating California first-degree murder conviction);

Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 126 S. Ct. 969, 163

L.Ed.2d 824 (2006) (reinstating California conviction

for cocaine possession); Kane v. Garcia Espitia,

546 U.S. 9, 126 S. Ct. 407, 163 L.Ed.2d 10 (2005) (per

curiam) (reinstating California conviction for

carjacking and other offenses); Yarborough v. Gentry,

540 U.S. 1, 124 S. Ct. 1, 157 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003) (per

curiam) (reinstating California conviction for assault

with a deadly weapon); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S.

19, 123 S. Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (per

curiam) (reinstating capital sentence for California

prisoner convicted of first-degree murder, attempted

murder, and armed robbery).

Cash v. Maxwell, — U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. 611, 616–17 (2012) (Scalia, J.,

dissenting from the denial of certiorari).

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