Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01820/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01820-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
California Franchise Tax Board
Appellee
John Chiang
Appellee
Krista Dunzweiler
Appellee
Kamala Harris
Appellee
Nancy Paker
Appellee
Leslie Ann Peralta
Appellant
Selvi Stanislaus
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

LESLIE ANN PERALTA, DBA AMETHYST 

INNOVATIONS,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, A STATE 

AGENCY, SELVI STANISLAUS, DIRECTOR, 

NANCY PAKER, TAX COUNSEL, IN INDIVIDUAL 

AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES, JOHN CHIANG, 

CALIFORNIA STATE TREASURER, IN 

INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES, FKA 

CALIFORNIA STATE CONTROLLER, KAMALA

HARRIS, CALIFORNIA STATE ATTORNEY 

GENERAL, KRISTA DUNZWEILER, DEPUTY 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, IN INDIVIDUAL AND 

OFFICIAL CAPACITIES,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2016-1820

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of California in No. 3:15-cv-01595-

WHO, Judge William H. Orrick III.

______________________ 

Decided: December 9, 2016

______________________ 

Case: 16-1820 Document: 30-2 Page: 1 Filed: 12/09/2016
2 PERALTA v. CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD. 

LESLIE ANN PERALTA, Clearlake, CA, pro se. 

KENNY KHOA VU NGUYEN, California Office of the Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for defendantsappellees. Also represented by KAMALA D. HARRIS.

______________________ 

Before MOORE, WALLACH, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

WALLACH, Circuit Judge. 

Appellant Leslie Ann Peralta appeals the decision of 

the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (“District Court”) dismissing various federal and 

state law claims for failure to state a claim under Rule 

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 

Peralta v. Cal. Franchise Tax Bd., 124 F. Supp. 3d 993, 

995 (N.D. Cal. 2015). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Ms. Peralta is the inventor of U.S. Patent No. 

7,584,129 (“the ’129 patent”). The ’129 patent discloses a 

“new method for recovery of tax revenues in lien status” 

by “utiliz[ing] a new, non-title related and previously 

unperformed tax lien search to be performed during the 

real property escrow process on any lienholder.” ’129 

patent, Abstract. After unsuccessfully attempting to 

license her patented invention to the California Franchise 

Tax Board (“FTB”), Ms. Peralta sued the FTB, as well as 

its officers and their attorneys in both their official and 

individual capacities for patent infringement and related 

state law claims. See Peralta, 124 F. Supp. 3d at 996−98. 

The District Court dismissed the majority of Ms. Peralta’s claims with prejudice, finding that the FTB and its 

officers and attorneys had not waived their sovereign 

immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 999, 

1001–02. The District Court allowed Ms. Peralta thirty 

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PERALTA v. CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD. 3

days to amend her Complaint to plead valid patent infringement claims against the FTB officials in their 

individual capacities and to plead valid state law contract

claims. Id. at 998, 1000–01, 1003–04. The District Court 

noted that Ms. Peralta’s “only basis for federal jurisdiction” was her patent infringement claim, and that 

“[w]ithout a viable patent claim, there is no federal jurisdiction for [Ms.] Peralta’s state-law claims.” Id. at 998. 

Instead of amending her Complaint, Ms. Peralta appealed 

to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit before 

the District Court entered final judgment. Appellant’s 

App. 6 (Docket No. 36). The District Court later entered 

final judgment. Id. (Docket No. 39). After it received the 

appeal, the Ninth Circuit transferred the case to the U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit “because 

the . . . Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over 

appeals in cases arising under federal patent law.” Appellees’ Suppl. App. 97. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(1) (2012).

DISCUSSION

I. The Federal Circuit Has Jurisdiction to Hear This 

Appeal

“[A] federal court [must] satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the subject matter before it considers the merits 

of a case.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 

574, 583 (1999). We thus address Appellees’ argument 

that this court lacks jurisdiction over Ms. Peralta’s claim 

for an injunction barring the FTB and its employees from 

infringing the ’129 patent. See Appellees’ Br. 21. Ms. 

Peralta appealed to the Ninth Circuit following the District Court’s grant of leave to amend her Complaint to 

plead certain claims with greater specificity. At that 

time, the District Court had not entered a final judgment. 

Compare Appellant’s App. 6 (Docket No. 35 entered Aug. 

24, 2015, stating an “amended complaint shall be filed 

Case: 16-1820 Document: 30-2 Page: 3 Filed: 12/09/2016
4 PERALTA v. CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD. 

within 30 days of this Order”), with id. (Docket No. 36 

entered Sept. 2, 2015, entering a notice of appeal filed 

with the Ninth Circuit). Appellees allege that “[Ms.] 

Peralta’s refusal to amend before filing her Notice of 

Appeal deprives this [c]ourt of jurisdiction over her claim 

for injunctive relief.” Appellees’ Br. 21.1 

Rule 4(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure states that “[a] notice of appeal filed after the court 

announces a decision or order―but before the entry of the 

judgment or order―is treated as filed on the date of and 

after the entry.” The Supreme Court has interpreted that 

this rule “permits a notice of appeal filed from certain 

nonfinal decisions to serve as an effective notice from a 

subsequently entered final judgment,” FirsTier Mortg. Co. 

v. Inv’rs Mortg. Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 274 (1991) (footnote omitted), which establishes the requisite finality 

needed for general appellate review per 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 

id. at 275. We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the District Court’s entry of final judgment on 

October 5, 2015, following Ms. Peralta’s appeal, satisfies 

our circuit’s identical jurisdictional requirement to review 

appeals from “final decision[s] of a district court.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1); see Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. 

Prods., Inc., 320 F.3d 1354, 1362−63 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 

(observing for purposes of final judgment that “[w]hat 

essentially is required is some clear and unequivocal 

manifestation by the trial court of its belief that the 

 

1 Ms. Peralta was only granted leave to amend with 

respect to her infringement claims for injunctive relief 

and against the FTB officials in their individual capacities, and her contract claim against the FTB defendants 

in their individual capacities. See Peralta, 124 F. Supp. 

3d at 1004. Appellees only raise an argument on lack of 

jurisdiction with respect to the claims for injunctive relief.

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PERALTA v. CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD. 5

decision made . . . is the end of the case” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

II. The District Court Did Not Err in Dismissing the Case 

for Lack of Jurisdiction

We review grants of motions to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the 

law of the regional circuit in which the district court sits. 

K-Tech Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 

F.3d 1277, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The Ninth Circuit

“review[s] de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” WPP Lux. Gamma Three Sarl 

v. Spot Runner, Inc., 655 F.3d 1039, 1047 (9th Cir. 2011). 

“The court accept[s] the plaintiffs’ allegations as true and 

construe[s] them in the light most favorable to plaintiffs.” 

K-Tech Telecomms., 714 F.3d at 1282 (internal quotations 

and citation omitted). “The court will hold a dismissal 

inappropriate unless the complaint fails to ‘state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To 

plead with sufficient plausibility, a plaintiff must show 

“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

A. The District Court Properly Dismissed Ms. Peralta’s 

Claims

Ms. Peralta argues that the District Court erred in 

dismissing her case for failure to state a claim. Appellant’s Br. 20–21. We address each of her arguments in 

turn.

1. Patent Infringement Claims Against the FTB and Its 

Employees in Their Official Capacities for Damages

The District Court dismissed Ms. Peralta’s claims 

against the FTB and its employees in their official capaciCase: 16-1820 Document: 30-2 Page: 5 Filed: 12/09/2016
6 PERALTA v. CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD. 

ties because Ms. Peralta failed to present evidence that 

the FTB and its employees waived sovereign immunity. 

Peralta, 124 F. Supp. 3d at 999. 

Ms. Peralta claims that the California Attorney General’s acceptance of a federal grant of $200,000 to prosecute intellectual property crimes, “one of many” such 

grants, Appellant’s Br. 4, waived the state of California’s, 

and hence the FTB’s, immunity because the grant stated 

that the Attorney General would protect inventors and 

“bring those involved in intellectual property crimes to 

justice,” Appellant’s App. 28 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). She further argues that the FTB

waived immunity by (1) “provid[ing] no remedy, or an 

insufficient remedy” to an injured patent owner, Appellant’s Br. 12, and (2) generally “agreeing to comply with 

all federal statutes,” including patent statutes under Title 

35, the agency has waived immunity, id. at 21. 

The “test for determining whether a [s]tate has 

waived its immunity from federal-court jurisdiction is a 

stringent one.” College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Postsecondary 

Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A waiver of sovereign 

immunity ‘must be unequivocally expressed,’ . . . .” Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 374 F.3d 1123, 1127 (Fed. 

Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 

535, 538 (1980)) (additional citations omitted). A state 

does not “consent to suit in federal court merely by stating 

its intention to sue and be sued . . . or even by authorizing 

suits against it in any court of competent jurisdiction.” 

College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 676 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). Additionally, the “mere 

receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a [s]tate has 

consented to suit in federal court.” Atascadero State 

Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246−47 (1985) (citation 

omitted), abrogated on other grounds in Lane v. Pena, 518 

U.S. 187 (1996). 

Case: 16-1820 Document: 30-2 Page: 6 Filed: 12/09/2016
PERALTA v. CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD. 7

On review, we find no evidence that when accepting 

the grant, the State Attorney General, or the FTB and its 

employees in their official capacities, waived California’s 

sovereign immunity. The word waiver is not mentioned

in the grant and there is no language in the grant that 

could otherwise be construed as a waiver. See generally

Appellant’s App. 84 (Press Announcement of Grant Receipt). Furthermore, agreeing to follow federal law is not, 

as Ms. Peralta alleges, the test for waiver. We affirm the 

District Court’s determination that Appellees have not 

waived their sovereign immunity.

2. Patent Infringement Claims Against FTB Employees in 

Their Official Capacities for Injunctive Relief

Under Ex parte Young, claims against state officials 

for injunctive relief are not barred by the Eleventh 

Amendment. 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908). Ms. Peralta pled 

claims against the FTB employees in their official capacities for injunctive relief, and the District Court dismissed 

these infringement claims. The District Court found that 

Ms. Peralta had failed to plead sufficient facts and to put 

defendants on proper notice. Peralta, 124 F. Supp. 3d at 

1000−01. 

In her Complaint, Ms. Peralta did not allege claims 

against FTB employees with adequate sufficiency. On her 

infringement claims for injunctive relief, Ms. Peralta 

stated that defendants have continued to infringe the ’129 

patent through “practicing the method embodied in the 

’129 patent, directly and through third parties . . . via the 

internet, 24 hours per day, 7 days per week.” Appellant’s 

App. 32. She further claimed that she “discover[ed] clear 

evidence of unauthorized use” of the ’129 patent, id. at 26, 

and that certain named individuals were “in . . .position[s] 

to terminate and remedy the harm caused [to] Plaintiff by 

theft of her intellectual property, but failed and refused 

ever to do so,” id. at 18; see id. (referring to the third 

Case: 16-1820 Document: 30-2 Page: 7 Filed: 12/09/2016
8 PERALTA v. CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD. 

named FTB employee and stating that “all harm caused 

as described herein commenced with this Defendant”). 

The facts asserted in the infringement claim do not allege with requisite specificity the actual infringement 

claimed. See Pennington Seed, Inc. v. Produce Exch. No. 

299, 457 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“A nexus 

between the violation of federal law and the individual 

accused of violating that law requires more than simply a 

broad general obligation to prevent a violation.”). A 

complaint in federal court must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and 

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)–

(2). “All that is required are sufficient allegations to put 

defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them.” 

McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Because Ms. Peralta has not presented her Complaint 

against the named individuals with adequate specificity, 

she has not put the named individuals on notice of the 

alleged infringement. Ms. Peralta offers no reasonably 

cognizable arguments to contest the District Court’s 

finding on the sufficiency of her pleading. See Appellant’s 

Br. 12−13.

Finally, Ms. Peralta argues that the District Court’s 

Patent Local Rules do not mandate that she provide 

evidence of infringing material until “[n]ot later than 14 

days after the Initial Case Management Conference.” 

Appellant’s Br. 11 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). She further argues that her pleadings would 

have been sufficient had she opted to file a Form 18, 

which in patent infringement cases filed before December 

1, 2015, only required a form complaint whose “‘proper 

use . . . effectively immunizes a claimant from attack 

regarding the sufficiency of the pleading.’” Id. at 20 

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PERALTA v. CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD. 9

(quoting K-Tech Telecomms., 714 F.3d at 1277).2 As for 

Ms. Peralta’s contention relating to Form 18, we stated in 

K-Tech Telecommunications, “Form 18 in no way relaxes 

the clear principle of Rule 8, that a potential infringer be 

placed on notice of what activity or device is being accused 

of infringement.” 714 F.3d at 1284.3 The boilerplate 

allegation that defendants infringe by practicing “the 

method embodied in the ’129 patent, directly and through 

third parties . . . via the internet, 24 hours per day, 7 days 

per week,” Appellant’s App. 32, is not enough to comply 

with Form 18, which still requires “some allegation of 

specific services or products of the defendants which are 

being accused,” Addiction & Detoxification Inst. L.L.C. v. 

Carpenter, 620 F. App’x 934, 937 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

 

2 The revised Federal Rules of Civil Procedure entered into effect on December 1, 2015. The revised Rules 

eliminate Rule 84, which had allowed for patent infringement claims to be plead at a lower standard in form 

pleadings than that espoused in Twombly. See generally 

Fed. R. Civ. P. and advisory committee’s note to 2015 

amendment.

3 Nor are the Patent Local Rules’ requirements for 

disclosure of asserted claims and infringement in conflict 

with the underlying rules for sufficiency of pleading in 

federal court. See, e.g., Atlas IP LLC v. Pac. Gas & Elec. 

Co., No. 15-cv-05469-EDL, 2016 WL 1719545, at *5 (N.D. 

Cal. Mar. 9, 2016) (examining a 12(b)(6) motion in a 

patent infringement case under the Twombly and Iqbal

standards, and affirming defendant’s claim that the 

Patent Local Rules “cannot trump the pleading requirements of Iqbal and Twombly”).

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10 PERALTA v. CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD. 

3. Patent Infringement Claims Against FTB Employees in 

Their Individual Capacities for Damages

The District Court also dismissed Ms. Peralta’s claims 

against the FTB employees in their individual capacities 

for failure to show that the actions were taken as individuals, effectively finding that the claims were de facto 

against the employees in their official capacities and 

again barred by sovereign immunity. Peralta, 124 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1001−02.

We agree that Ms. Peralta has presented no allegation 

that the accused individuals acted in their individual 

capacities as required to assert claims for damages 

against state officials. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 

651, 663 (1974). Ms. Peralta’s Complaint, liberally construed, does not set forth any basis for a claim that the 

officials were acting in their individual capacities. See 

Appellant’s App. 10−92. The District Court judge even 

suggested that Ms. Peralta amend the Complaint in order 

to properly allege such claims, but she declined to do so. 

Peralta, 124 F. Supp. 3d at 1001.

4. State Law Claims 

Because Ms. Peralta has not pled a plausible factual 

basis to assert a patent infringement claim under federal 

law, we do not have jurisdiction over the supplemental 

state law claims. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. 

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (for pendent or supplemental jurisdiction to exist, “[t]he federal claim must have 

substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction 

on the court” (citation omitted)). Therefore, we decline to 

review the pleadings on Ms. Peralta’s state law claims. 

III. There Is No Evidence to Support a Finding of Judicial 

Bias 

Ms. Peralta argues that there was a “disqualifying 

conflict of interest,” Appellant’s Br. 2, in her case because 

the District Court judge’s “family[] firm [Orrick, HerringCase: 16-1820 Document: 30-2 Page: 10 Filed: 12/09/2016
PERALTA v. CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD. 11

ton and Sutcliffe] has represented . . . [the] defendants 

. . . .”4 Id. at 2−3. We disagree.

Ms. Peralta’s claims of judicial bias by the District 

Court and request for reassignment on remand “invoke[] a 

matter not within the exclusive jurisdiction of this court,” 

and will be assessed under the law of the Ninth Circuit. 

See Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119, 

1122 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit reviews claims 

of judicial bias not raised at the district court for “plain 

error,” United States v. Bosch, 951 F.2d 1546, 1548 (9th 

Cir. 1991), and will only reverse or vacate a district court 

opinion under this standard “when it appears necessary

to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the 

integrity and reputation of the judicial process,” id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To succeed 

on a judicial bias claim, an appellant must “overcome a 

presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as 

adjudicators.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). 

The Ninth Circuit will reassign a different judge on 

remand only under “rare and extraordinary circumstances.” Krechman v. Cty. of Riverside, 723 F.3d 1104, 1112 

(9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

 

4 Ms. Peralta also argues that the case “should have 

been transferred back to the San Jose Division” to grant 

her “a fair and impartial hearing.” Appellant’s Br. 3, see 

id. at 24−25 (making further arguments as to why the 

case should be transferred back to the San Jose Division). 

However, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) states that “[a] district court 

may transfer any civil action to any other district or 

division where it might have been brought.” San Jose and 

San Francisco are both in the Northern District of California; the decision to change venue within the district 

was entirely proper. 

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12 PERALTA v. CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD. 

Ms. Peralta has presented no evidence of judicial bias 

(in her words, “judicial conflict of interest,” Appellant’s 

Br. 9). There is no evidence that Judge Orrick has practiced at or is affiliated with Orrick, Herrington, and 

Sutcliffe. Nor is there any evidence presented that the

firm has any affiliation with the case at bar. Ms. Peralta 

has not only failed to overcome the “presumption of honesty” accorded to adjudicators, see Withrow, 421 U.S. at 

47, she has presented nothing but rank, baseless, and 

scandalous speculation to support her argument. 

CONCLUSION

We have considered Ms. Peralta’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we find 

that the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California is

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

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