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Parties Involved:
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor
Respondent
Ruth Lucille Hotchkiss
Petitioner

Document Text:

F I ·.l.J .L:.J 1-{ n-rltJNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United Stat{'!; ~~rt<? • . p.,-.... ' - Tenth C!rcu1, 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

RUTH LUCILLE HOTCHKISS, widow of 

NEAL G. HOTCHKISS, 

Petitioner, 

v . 

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' 

COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 

Respondent. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

APR2 G i992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 91-9542 

(No. 88-BLA-647) 

(Petition for Review) 

Before EBEL, BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and KANE,** District Judge. 

**Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior District Judge, United 

States District Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by 

designation. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

* 

The case is therefore ordered 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-9542 Document: 010110246167 Date Filed: 04/28/1992 Page: 1
Petitioner Ruth Lucille Hotchkiss, widow of Neal G. Hotchkiss 

(the miner), petitions this court to review the decision of the 

Benefits Review Board upholding the administrative law judge 

(ALJ)'s denial of benefits to Petitioner under the Black Lung 

Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. Petitioner argues that the 

ALJ failed to afford her the applicable presumptions under the Act 

and failed to adequately interpret and weigh certain evidence in 

her favor. We reject Petitioner's contentions and affirm. 

The miner worked in coal mines from 1932 until 1954 . He 

applied for benefits under the Act on November 28, 1972, May 18, 

1978, and April 19, 1982. All three claims were denied. 

After the miner's death on July 4, 1982, Petitioner wrote to 

the Department of Labor requesting advice as 

documents would substantiate the miner's 

to whether certain 

third claim. The 

Department responded that the evidence failed to substantiate that 

the miner's disability was related to his coal mine employment. 

Petitioner took no further action on any of the miner's claims. 

She filed her own survivor' s claim in September 1986. 

Benefits under the Act are provided to "eligible survivors of 

a miner whose death was due to pneumoconiosis." 20 C. F.R. 

§ 718.205(a). For claims filed on or after January 1, 1982, death 

is considered to be due to pneumoconiosis if: 1) competent 

medical evidence establishes that death was due to pneumoconiosis; 

2) pneumoconiosis was a substantially contributing cause or factor 

leading to death or the death was caused by complications of 

pneumoconiosis; or 3) the presumption in 20 C.F.R. § 718.304 

applies. 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(c)(l)-(3). Survivors are not 

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Appellate Case: 91-9542 Document: 010110246167 Date Filed: 04/28/1992 Page: 2
entitled to benefits where the miner's death was caused by a 

medical condition unrelated to pneumoconiosis "unless the evidence 

establishes that pneumoconiosis was a substantially contributing 

cause of death. " 20 C.F.R. § 718 . 205(c)(4). 

Pneumoconiosis is defined as "a chronic dust disease of the 

lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and 

impairments, arising out of coal mine employment." 

pulmonary 

20 C.F . R. 

§718.201. A disease "arising out of coal mine employment " 

includes "any chronic pulmonary disease resulting in respiratory 

or pulmonary impairment significantly related to, or substantially 

aggravated by, dust exposure in coal mine employment." Id. 

The ALJ found that the miner died of respiratory failure due 

to carcinoma of the lung, and not from pneumoconiosis. He relied 

on a statement in the death certificate, signed by Dr. Howard 

Ward, that the cause of death was respiratory failure due to 

carcinoma of the lung; a discharge summary dated three days after 

the miner's death signed by Dr. Ward and containing the same 

diagnosis; and a report by Dr. Timothy Kennedy dated January 5, 

1987, that the miner's death was due to cancer, not coal miner's 

pneumoconiosis. The ALJ gave little weight to the opinion of Dr. 

Dwight Adams that pneumoconiosis was a significant factor in the 

miner' s death or to four affidavits submitted by individuals with 

no medical training. The ALJ further found that Petitioner had 

not established the irrebuttable presumption of death due to 

pneumoconiosis under 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.304(a), (b), or (c). He 

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Appellate Case: 91-9542 Document: 010110246167 Date Filed: 04/28/1992 Page: 3
refused to apply the presumption of pneumoconiosis under 20 C.F.R. 

§ 718.305 because the claim was filed after January 1, 1982. The 

Benefits Review Board affirmed. 

We review the ALJ's decision to determine whether it is 

supported by substantial evidence, is in accord with the law, and 

is rational. Zettler v . Director, OWCP, United States Dep't of 

Labor, 886 F.2d 831, 834 (7th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is 

"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion." Velasquez v. Director, OWCP, 

835 F.2d 262, 265 (10th Cir. 1987). 

Noting that the miner was diagnosed as having chronic 

obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), 1 Petitioner first contends 

that COPD is considered pneumoconiosis if the COPD arose out of 

coal mine employment, and that COPD is presumed to arise out of 

coal mine employment pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.203(b) and .302. 

These sections provide, "If a miner who is suffering or suffered 

from pneumoconiosis was employed for ten years or more in one or 

more coal mines, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the 

pneumoconiosis arose out of such employment." (Emphasis added.) 

Before the presumption in subsections .203(b) and .302 

applies, however, it must first be established that a miner is 

suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis. These subsections do 

not allow a presumption to be made that COPD is pneumoconiosis. 

Rather, once pneumoconiosis is shown, they allow a presumption to 

be made that the disease arose out of coal mine employment. 

1 Respondent concedes that the miner was 

form of chronic obstructive pulmonary 

Respondent at 22. 

4 

suffering 

disease. 

from some 

Brief of 

Appellate Case: 91-9542 Document: 010110246167 Date Filed: 04/28/1992 Page: 4
Competent medical evidence failed to establish that the 

miner's COPD was pneumoconiosis as defined in 20 C.F . R. § 718.201. 

COPD is included within the definition of pneumoconiosis if the 

COPD was "significantly related to, or substantially aggravated 

by, dust exposure in coal mine employment." Id. In Dr. Robert 

Hill's May, 1982, report he diagnosed the miner's condition as 

chronic obstructive lung disease and oat cell carcinoma of the 

lung but opined that the diagnosed condition was not related to 

dust exposure in the miner's coal mine employment. While Dr. Ward 

stated in an August 31, 1982, letter that the miner died of 

respiratory failure due to oat cell carcinoma of the lung and 

preexistent pulmonary disease probably of a chronic obstructive 

type, he did not give an opinion as to whether the condition was 

related to dust exposure in the miner's coal mine employment. 

Petitioner argues that the ALJ improperly weighed the 

evidence which did establish that the miner suffered from 

pneumoconiosis, specifically, Dr. Adams' July 27, 1988, letter in 

which the doctor states that COPD had a significant involvement in 

the miner's death "and was a result of pneumoconiosis." R. II, CX 

1. The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Adams' letter because the 

record did not indicate Dr. Adams' relationship to the miner, or 

whether Dr. Adams had merely reviewed the records regarding the 

miner's death or participated in the care of the miner. "The ALJ 

is not bound to accept the opinion or theory of any given 

physician, but may weigh the medical evidence and draw his own 

inferences. We may not set aside an inference because we find the 

opposite one more reasonable or because we question its factual 

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basis." American Coal Co. v. Benefits Review Bd., United States 

Dep't of Labor, 738 F.2d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1984). 

Petitioner asserts that the ALJ should have given more weight 

to Dr. Adams' opinion because Dr. Adams was the miner's local 

physician and because he performed extensive tests as far back as 

1973. However, the only basis for Dr. Adams' opinion appearing in 

the record is his interpretation of a June 19, 1973, x-ray as 

containing large opacities. Two other physicians read the same 

x-ray and concluded that it did not contain any large opacities. 

The ALJ concluded that more weight should be given to the negative 

interpretations because of the superior qualifications of those 

physicians, thereby discrediting the only basis for Dr. Adams' 

1988 opinion that appears in the record. We conclude that the ALJ 

did not err in giving little weight to Dr. Adams' opinion. 

Petitioner also argues that the ALJ erred in disregarding 

four lay affidavits concerning the miner's condition. The ALJ 

gave little weight to these affidavits because they contain 

conclusions by relatives and friends with no medical training. 

Lay affidavits may constitute evidence of death due to 

pneumoconiosis "[w]here there is no medical or other relevant 

evidence." 30 u.s.c. § 923(b). Because in this case there is 

medical evidence of the cause of death, the ALJ properly 

disregarded the lay affidavits. 

Petitioner cri ticizes the ALJ's reliance on the death 

certificate signed by Dr. Ward which listed the cause of death as 

respiratory failure due to carcinoma of the lung. She notes that 

Dr. Ward wrote a later letter stating that the cause of death was 

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Appellate Case: 91-9542 Document: 010110246167 Date Filed: 04/28/1992 Page: 6
both oat cell carcinoma of the lung and preexistent pulmonary 

disease probably of a chronic obstructive type. However, as 

previously noted, Dr. Ward did not give an opinion as to whether 

the pulmonary disease was significantly related to, or 

substantially aggravated 

employment. His opinion 

further opinion as to 

insufficient. 

by, dust exposure in coal mine 

that death was due to COPD, without a 

the etiology of this condition, is 

Petitioner also criticizes the ALJ's reliance on Dr. 

Kennedy's opinion that coal miner's pneumoconiosis did not 

substantially contribute to the miner's death because Dr. Kennedy 

never treated the miner and is a consultant exclusively for the 

Department of Labor. We reiterate that it is the ALJ's function, 

rather than this court's, to weigh the medical evidence. We 

conclude that the medical evidence does not establish that the ALJ 

was wrong in denying the claim. See American Coal Co., 738 F.2d 

at 391. 

Petitioner next contends that the ALJ erred by not affording 

her the presumption set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 718.304(a)-(c) that 

the miner's death was due to pneumoconiosis. This section creates 

an irrebuttable presumption that a miner's death was due to 

pneumoconiosis if he suffered from a chronic dust disease of the 

lung which: 1) when diagnosed by chest x-ray, yields one or more 

large opacities classified in Categories A, B, or C; or 2) when 

diagnosed by biopsy or autopsy, yields massive lesions in the 

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Appellate Case: 91-9542 Document: 010110246167 Date Filed: 04/28/1992 Page: 7
lung; or 3) when diagnosed by other means would be a condition 

which could reasonably be expected to yield the results described 

above. 

Petitioner contends that the ALJ erred by disregarding Dr. 

Adams' interpretation of the miner's 1973 x-ray as showing large 

opacities of size A. As discussed above, the ALJ gave little 

weight to Dr. Adams' interpretation in light of contrary 

interpretations of the same x-ray by Drs. Furnary and Moskowitz. 

Ors. Furnary and Moskowitz are both B readers. A "B reader " is a 

physician who has demonstrated proficiency in evaluating chest 

roentgenograms for pneumoconiosis by taking and passing a 

proficiency examination. 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a) (1) (ii) (E). "The 

ALJ is entitled to place more weight to B-Readers' conclusions due 

to their expertise in the area . " Johnson v . Island Creek Coal 

Co., 846 F . 2d 364, 366 (6th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ's determination that Petitioner did not establish 

entitlement to the irrebuttable presumption under subsection 

.304(a). Petitioner raises no arguments with respect to the ALJ's 

determination that she did not establish entitlement to the 

irrebuttable presumption under subsections .304(b) or (c). 

next contention is that the ALJ erred by not 

presumptions set forth in 20 C.F.R. 

Petitioner's 

affording her the 

SS 718.303(a) and .305(a). Subsection .303(a) creates a 

rebuttable presumption that if a deceased miner was employed for 

ten or more years in a coal mine and died from a respirable 

disease, the death was due to pneumoconiosis. Subsection .305(a) 

creates a rebuttable presumption that a miner's death was due to 

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Appellate Case: 91-9542 Document: 010110246167 Date Filed: 04/28/1992 Page: 8
pneumoconiosis if the miner was employed for fifteen or more years 

in underground coal mines and a chest x-ray is submitted which is 

interpreted as negative with respect to the requirements of 

subsection .304, but other evidence demonstrates the existence of 

a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment. 

These presumptions only apply to claims filed before 

January 1, 1982. 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.303(c), .305(e). Petitioner 

argues that because the miner had a claim pending at the time of 

his death, her claim merged with his claim for purposes of 

applying these presumptions. 

Merger of claims is provided for in 20 C.F.R. § 725.309. The 

Sixth Circuit has concluded that "[a] careful reading of the 

regulations indicate [sic] that they do not cover separate claims 

filed on behalf of the miner's estate and by an eligible survivor 

in her own right and on her own behalf." Earl Patton Coal Co. v. 

Patton, 848 F.2d 668, 672 (6th Cir. 1988). We agree. 

Petitioner's claim did not merge with the miner's, and she cannot 

rely on the presumptions in subsections .303(a) and .305(a). 

The Order of the Benefits Review Board is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

James E. Barrett 

Senior Circuit Judge 

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