Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01768/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01768-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Serar Ahmed Abdullahi
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

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Judge John A. Jarvey, United States District Judge for the Southern District of

Iowa, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 07-1768

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Serar Ahmed Abdullahi,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Western

District of Missouri

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Submitted: January 15, 2008

 Filed: March 28, 2008

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Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, MURPHY, Circuit Judge, and JARVEY, District Judge1

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JARVEY, District Judge.

Appellant Serar Ahmed Abdullahi, a naturalized Somali refugee, sent money

to individuals in his native country through an informal money transfer practice

known as a “hawala.” Abdullahi operated a hawala in Kansas City, Missouri, without

a state or federal license. After pleading guilty to one count of operating an

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 Unless otherwise noted, the facts contained in this section are based on the

Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSR) prepared by the United States Probation

Office for the district court prior to sentencing of Abdullahi on March 28, 2007.

Abdullahi originally made objections to the PSR, but withdrew those objections at the

time of sentencing.

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unlicensed money transmitting business, Abdullahi was sentenced to forty-one months

of incarceration followed by a two year term of supervised release. Abdullahi appeals

his sentence. We affirm.

Abdullahi was charged in a twenty-five-count indictment on September 29,

2005. Count Two alleged that Abdullahi operated an unlicensed money transmitting

business between approximately October 26, 2001, and January 14, 2003, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(A) and (B), and (b)(2). On August 24, 2006, Abdullahi

pleaded guilty to that charge. All remaining counts of the Indictment were dismissed

at sentencing. The district court denied downward adjustments to his base offense

level for acceptance of responsibility because it found that Abdullahi had not been

truthful about the nature of his business or the income he derived from the business.

The district court sentenced Abdullahi to a term of forty-one months of incarceration

followed by a two year term of supervised release.

Abdullahi appeals his sentence, alleging the district court (1) failed to calculate

an appropriate sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); (2) unconstitutionally denied him

a recording of the sentencing proceeding; and (3) violated the Ex Post Facto Clause

of the Constitution by applying the amended version of 18 U.S.C. § 1960 to conduct

that occurred prior to the enactment date of the amendment. 

Factual and Procedural Background.2

 Abdullahi came with family members

to the United States from Somalia as a political refugee in 1992. Abdullahi and his

family settled in the Kansas City, Missouri, area. Abdullahi’s employment history

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since 1992 includes jobs as a laborer, an operator of a Somali grocery store, and a taxi

cab driver.

From approximately January 5, 2000, to at least January 14, 2003, Abdullahi

operated a money transmitting business in Kansas City. Abdullahi did not have a state

or federal license to operate a money transmitting business. Abdullahi claimed that

he did not personally use the money that he collected, and that he did not profit from

his money transmitting business. Abdullahi stated that he charged a one-percent fee

for each monetary transaction to cover expenses. Abdullahi’s business was located

inside the Somali grocery store that he had previously operated. 

Abdullahi claimed that he collected money from Somalis living in the United

States and sent it to Somalia and other African countries to assist individuals with

basic living expenses. Abdullahi maintained six bank accounts in his name and

address in the Kansas City area for the purpose of operating the money transmitting

business. Abdullahi deposited a total of $1,648,589.87 into the accounts, with

$1,165,639.88 of those deposits being made in cash. Abdullahi transferred

$1,383,545.69 in interstate and foreign commerce to locations outside the state of

Missouri. Abdullahi did not send money directly to Africa. Instead, he transferred

the money to Jubba Financial Services, Inc., a money transmitting business located

in Minneapolis, Minnesota, who then transferred the money to Africa. Abdullahi

transferred $670,707.77 to Jubba Financial Services. In January of 2002, Jubba

Financial Services was renamed Kaah Express, F.S., Inc., and Abdullahi transmitted

another $365,792.58 to Kaah Express. Abdullahi also transmitted $347,045.34 to a

bank account located in Geneva, Switzerland under the name B.P. Shah. 

Guilty Plea and Sentencing. The Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSR)

established Abdullahi’s base offense level under the Guidelines at 22. The probation

office recommended a two-level reduction in the base offense level for acceptance of

responsibility pursuant to Guideline 3E1.1(a), as well as a one-level reduction for

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 The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri, Western Division. 

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timely notification of his intent to plead guilty pursuant to Guideline 3E1.1(b).

Abdullahi’s total offense level, therefore, was 19. 

On March 28, 2007, Abdullahi appeared before the district court3

 for

sentencing. Although he speaks English, a Somali interpreter was provided for him

during the proceeding. Abdullahi used the Somali interpreter when he testified and

for allocution prior to the imposition of sentence. Abdullahi made no objections to

the quality of the interpreter or the translation during the proceeding. Because the

district court found that Abdullahi had not been truthful about the nature of his

business or the income he derived from his business, the district court denied the

recommended adjustments to his base offense level for acceptance of responsibility.

Accordingly, the district court established Abdullahi’s total offense level at 22, which

yielded an advisory sentencing range from forty-one to fifty-one months of

incarceration.

 Abdullahi later filed a motion to produce a recording of the sentencing

proceeding. Abdullahi contended that the Somali interpreter made errors in

translation that affected the accuracy and responsiveness of Abdullahi’s testimony

before the district court. The district court denied Abdullahi’s motion to produce. 

Abdullahi filed a motion for reconsideration of that decision. In support of his motion

for reconsideration, Abdullahi included sworn affidavits from two observers of the

sentencing proceeding. The two affiants, both American citizens originally from

Somalia, alleged that the Somali interpreter made errors in translation during

Abdullahi’s sentencing proceeding. The district court denied Abdullahi’s motion for

reconsideration. 

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 United States v. Nur, Case No. 04-00370-01-CR-W-ODS (unpublished). The

Honorable Ortrie D. Smith, United States District Judge, Western District of Missouri

served as the presiding judge in Nur. 

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Reasonableness of Sentence. Abdullahi argues that his sentence resulted from

an unreasonable application of the factors contained in 18 U.S.C § 3553(a), and is

unreasonably disparate when compared to the sentence of probation that another

defendant received in 2006 in the Western District of Missouri.4

 The government

argues that the district court properly considered the factors contained in Section

3553(a), and that Abdullahi’s sentence is reasonable. The government argues that

Abdullahi’s sentence is not unreasonably disparate when compared to the sentence of

probation imposed on another defendant because of distinct factual differences

between the two cases. 

“If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, the appellate court may, but is

not required to, apply a presumption of reasonableness.” Gall v. United States, 128

S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007) (internal citation omitted); See also United States v. Garcia, 512

F.3d 1004, 1006 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted). In reviewing a sentence,

the appellate court “must first ensure that the district court committed no significant

procedural error . . . ” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. “[T]he appellate court should then

consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard.” Id. As a part of this review, the appellate court must take into

account the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. “A court abuses its discretion and

imposes an unreasonable sentence when it ‘fails to consider a relevant factor that

should have received significant weight; ... gives significant weight to an improper or

irrelevant factor; or ... considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those

factors commits a clear error of judgment.’” United States v. Mousseau, No. 07-1332,

2008 WL 539235, at *3 (8th Cir. February 29, 2008) (internal quotations omitted).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the factors

contained in Section 3553(a). Because Abdullahi’s sentence of forty-one months is

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within the Guideline range, it carries a presumption of reasonableness on appeal.

Garcia, 512 F.3d at 1006. The transcript of the sentencing proceeding reflects that the

district court considered the factors contained in Section 3553(a). At sentencing, the

district court stated:

Even though the defendant does not have a criminal history

he certainly does have a history of defrauding the

government in relation to non-payment of taxable income,

food stamp violations, his subsidized housing arrangement

that he was receiving, payment of rent and the

circumstances in relation to his obtaining a commercial

drivers license.

At any rate, I believe that a sentence within the range

recommended by the guidelines is reasonable and

appropriate. In that case, it does reflect the seriousness of

defendant’s conduct, that it would serve to promote respect

for the law and provide just punishment for the offense as

well as deter future criminal conduct. And given the

defendant’s history of defrauding the government, it would

additionally serve to protect the public from future criminal

conduct of the defendant. 

For that reason and taking into consideration the defendant

does not have a previous criminal history, I believe that a

sentence at the low end of the guidelines ranges is a

reasonable and appropriate sentence and I am going to

sentence the defendant to a term of 41 months in the

custody of the Bureau of Prisons on Count Two of the

Indictment.

Although the district court did not explicitly mention the factor of unwarranted

sentencing disparities between defendants with similar records guilty of similar

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5 Abdullahi argues that his sentence is unreasonable because in 2006, another

judge of the same district court sentenced defendant Ahmed Abdi Nur to probation

after he pleaded guilty to one count of operating an unlawful money transmitting

business in connection with another hawalah. While the cases of Nur and Abdullahi

share some factual similarities, Nur qualified for application of U.S.S.G. §

2S1.3(b)(3), which capped his total offense level at 6. After additional adjustments,

the district court established Nur’s total offense level at 4. The difference between the

total offense levels for Nur and Abdullahi adequately accounts for the disparity

between their sentences. 

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conduct, we find that the district court properly considered it.5

 The district court took

judicial notice of a pending sentencing order in United States v. Nur, No. 04-00370-

01-CR-W-ODS at Abdullahi’s request. “The relevant inquiry is not whether the

district court quoted or cited § 3553(a); it is whether the district court actually

considered the § 3553(a) factors and whether ‘our review of these statutory factors

leads us to conclude that they support the reasonableness of the district court’s

sentencing decision.’” United States v. Long Soldier, 431 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir.

2005) (internal quotation omitted). After reviewing the statutory factors, we find that

they support the reasonableness of the district court’s sentencing decision.

Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion. 

Denial of Motion for a Recording of the Sentencing Proceeding. Abdullahi

next contends that the district court violated his right to be meaningfully present at

his own trial by refusing to provide him with a recording of the Somali interpreter

used at sentencing. In support of this argument, Abdullahi submits affidavits from

Abdikarim Hassan Kassim and Mohammed Abdullahi, two American citizens

originally from Somalia, who claim to have attended Abdullahi’s sentencing. These

affidavits indicate that the interpreter improperly translated four questions and

answers.

First, the affiants contend that the following question and answer were given

at sentencing:

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Q. What percentage of the money were you receiving?

A. I'm getting paid.

The court has examined the transcript of the defendant's testimony and cannot find

this question or this answer. The affiants claim that the correct translation would

have been, "I'm not getting paid." However, the transcript reveals that on no fewer

than five occasions Abdullahi denied getting paid for his services or implied the same

by indicating that he was only reimbursed for his expenses. (Tr. 44, 49, 50, 53, 54).

Second, the affiants claim the following question and answer were given:

Q. Did you charge a fee?

A. Yes, I charged rent. 

They claim that the proper translation of the answer would have been, "Yes, I

charged a fee." Again, this question and answer do not appear in the sentencing

transcript. That transcript reveals that the prosecutor inquired as to whether

Abdullahi was using his subsidized housing to operate the unlawful business or claim

the subsidy as one of the expenses for which he was reimbursed. Abdullahi denied

charging rent as an expense and stated, "I paid rent." Although the affiants claim that

the Abdullahi's answer should have been translated as, "Yes, I charged a fee," such

an answer would be inconsistent with the five or more occasions noted above where

the Abdullahi denied charging a fee.

The affiants further claim that the following question and answer were given:

Q. Do you know what is going on in south Somalia – Do you have

any contacts there?

A. Yes, I have contacts there.

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The affiants claim that a proper translation should have been as follows, "A: I am

aware of what is going on there, but only through what I have seen on TV." Again,

the court cannot find that question or that answer in the defendant's testimony. The

transcript reveals that Abdullahi was examined about his knowledge of United States

warships that had launched attacks into southern Somalia, Al Qaeda's presence in

Somalia, and Al Qaeda's receipt of shelter and cover from the Union of Islamic

Courts in Somalia. Abdullahi generally denied any knowledge of any of these

activities. 

Finally, the affiants claim that the following question and answer were given:

Q. Who are the people who used your services?

A. The people who used my services are everywhere.

The affiants do not actually contend that there was a mistranslation here. Rather, one

of them claims that he could "see" that Abdullahi misunderstood the question. As

with the other alleged questions and answers, these cannot be found in the transcript

of the sentencing. Rather, Abdullahi testified that he knew the majority of his

customers and was impeached with his prior inconsistent statement in which he told

the FBI that he only knew five percent of them. 

For the reasons set forth above, this court finds that the factual premise for this

portion of the appeal does not exist as claimed. The affiants are simply wrong about

questions and answers that they claim to have observed. Abdullahi is entitled to no

relief in this regard. 

D. Ex Post Facto Application of 18 U.S.C. § 1960. Abdullahi argues that the

district court violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by applying the amended version of

18 U.S.C. § 1960 to conduct he committed prior to the enactment date of the

amended statute. On October 26, 2001, 18 U.S.C. § 1960 was amended when the

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 In his brief, Abdullahi makes several erroneous assertions regarding the date

that 18 U.S.C. § 1960 was amended. On page 44 of his brief, Abdullahi asserts that

18 U.S.C. § 1960 was amended on November 20, 2001. On pages 45 and 46 of his

brief, Abdullahi asserts three times that 18 U.S.C. § 1960 was amended on November

1, 2001. These erroneous assertions appear to provide the basis for Abdullahi’s

argument that the district court unconstitutionally applied the amended version of the

statute to Abdullahi’s conduct between the dates of October 26, 2001, and November

1, 2001 or November 20, 2001. 

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President signed into law the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub.L. 107-56, Title III,

§ 373(a), 115 Stat. 339 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2001)). The

amended version of the statute went into effect on October 26, 2001.6

 See President’s

Remarks on Signing of the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.

DOC. 1550-52 (Oct. 26, 2001) (“The changes, effective today, will help counter a

threat like no other our Nation has ever faced.”). Abdullahi pleaded guilty to

violating 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(A) and (B), and (b)(2), between approximately

October 26, 2001, and January 14, 2003. At sentencing, the district court found that

Abdullahi’s offense conduct spanned from approximately January 5, 2000, to January

14, 2003.

 Abdullahi argues that prior to the amendment, the statute required the

government to prove that the defendant knew that the operation of an unlicensed

money transmitting business was illegal. The amendment, Abdullahi argues,

removed from the statute the knowledge of illegality requirement. Thus, Abdullahi

argues that 1) his guilty plea should be set aside as unknowing and involuntary

because Count Two of the Indictment did not allege that Abdullahi knew the

operation of unlicensed money transmitting business was illegal; and 2) the district

court erred when it included in its sentencing calculations monetary amounts from

transactions that Abdullahi made prior to the amendment of the statute. The

government argues that the conduct to which Abdullahi pled guilty in Count Two of

the Indictment occurred on and after the effective date of the amendment. Thus, the

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government argues, the district court did not apply the amended 18 U.S.C. § 1960 in

violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 

Abdullahi did not raise this issue in the district court. This Court reviews

issues that are not raised in the district court for plain error. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).

While this Court has discretion to correct a forfeited error, the Court should not

exercise such discretion unless the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732

(1993) (internal quotations omitted). “To show that he is entitled to plain error relief,

[the defendant] bears the burden of showing prejudice - that is, he must show ‘a

reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different absent the alleged

error.’” United States v. Smith, 508 F.3d 861, 865 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations

omitted). 

Abdullahi’s guilty plea to Count Two of the Indictment does not violate the Ex

Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. The Ex Post Facto clause is violated when a

law defining a crime or increasing punishment for a crime 1) is applied to events that

occurred before its enactment, and 2) disadvantages the affected offender. United

States v. Carter, 490 F.3d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 2007). Count Two of the indictment

alleged a violation of the statute after the effective date of its amendment. Amounts

transmitted prior to that amendment were appropriately considered as relevant

conduct under the Guidelines. No Ex Post Facto Clause violation occurred. 

Abdullahi also failed to meet his burden to show that he was prejudiced by the

district court’s inclusion in sentencing calculations of monetary amounts from

transmissions that Abdullahi made prior to October 26, 2001. The district court

adopted the PSR’s uncontradicted allegation that $1,648,589.87 was illegally

transferred by the defendant and used it to determine Abdullahi’s sentencing range

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 Guideline 2S1.3(a)(2) contains a formula for determining the base offense

level of a defendant convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 1960. Under Guideline

2S1.3(a)(2) a defendant’s base offense level is 6 plus the number of offense levels set

out in a table in Guideline § 2B1.1. The offense levels set out in the Guideline 2B1.1

table are based on the amount of funds involved in the offense. The district court

determined that between approximately January 5, 2000 to January 14, 2003,

Abdullahi transferred $1.648,589.87 through his unlicensed money transmitting

business. Because Abdullahi’s offense involved more than $1 million but less than

$2.5 million, 16 offense levels were added pursuant to Guideline 2B1.1(b)(1)(I).

Thus, Abdullahi’s base offense level was 22. 

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pursuant to Guideline 2S1.3(a)(2).7

 Abdullahi does not attempt to identify the

amount of money that was transmitted prior to October 21, 2006. He does not claim

or provide proof that his sentencing range would have been different if the district

court excluded transmissions of money prior to October 26, 2001. When reviewed

for plain error, the Court of Appeals will not disturb the decision of a district court

unless the defendant shows that the alleged error is prejudicial. See, e.g., United

States v. Bailey, 206 Fed Appx. 650, 652-53 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding sentence on

plain error review when defendant failed to show that district court’s error affected

the Guidelines range). 

Abdullahi’s sentence is affirmed. 

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