Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca1-14-01963/USCOURTS-ca1-14-01963-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David E. Gorski
Appellant/Cross-Appellee
Legion Construction, Inc.
Appellant/Cross-Appellee
United States
Appellee/Cross-Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

Nos. 14-1963 

 14-1964 

 14-2074 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, Cross-Appellant, 

v. 

DAVID E. GORSKI, 

Defendant, Appellant, Cross-Appellee, 

LEGION CONSTUCTION, INC., 

Interested Party, Appellant, Cross-Appellee. 

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 

[Hon. F. Dennis Saylor, IV, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Lynch, Selya, and Kayatta, 

Circuit Judges. 

Tracy A. Miner, with whom Megan A. Siddall and Demeo LLP were 

on brief, for Gorski. 

Martin G. Weinberg, with whom Kimberly Homan was on brief, 

for Legion Construction, Inc. 

Jennifer Hay Zacks, Assistant United States Attorney, with 

whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for 

the United States. 

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251
December 9, 2015 

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251
- 3 - 

LYNCH, Circuit Judge. These interlocutory appeals 

are from a district court order that, among other things, compels 

the law firm of Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C. 

(Mintz Levin) to produce certain documents pertaining to a fraud 

allegedly committed by David Gorski in his operation of Legion 

Construction, Inc. (Legion). Gorski and Legion appeal the district 

court's order that attorney-client privileged documents be 

produced under the crime-fraud exception. The prosecution crossappeals the district court's decision to exclude communications 

between Gorski and his personal attorney, Elizabeth Schwartz, from 

the production order. We conclude that we have jurisdiction over 

Legion's appeal and the prosecution's cross-appeal, but not over 

Gorski's appeal. We dismiss Gorski's appeal for want of appellate 

jurisdiction. We affirm the production order as to Mintz Levin. 

We vacate the district court's decision to exclude Gorski's 

communications with Schwartz from the production order and remand 

that portion of its order. 

 I. 

The prosecution alleges that from about late 2005 to 

about November 2010, Gorski fraudulently represented to federal 

government agencies that Legion was a Service-Disabled Veteran 

Owned Small Business Entity (SDVOSB) in order to qualify for and 

obtain government contracts. 

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251
- 4 - 

By statute, at least three percent of all government 

contracts must go to SDVOSBs. 15 U.S.C. § 644(g)(1)(A)(ii). To 

qualify as an SDVOSB, an entity must be at least fifty-one percent 

owned by one or more service-disabled veterans. 13 C.F.R. § 125.9; 

38 C.F.R. § 74.3. The entity must also be controlled by one or 

more service-disabled veterans, meaning that both long-term 

decision-making and day-to-day management are conducted by 

service-disabled veterans. 13 C.F.R. § 125.10(a); 38 C.F.R. 

§ 74.4(a), (c)(1). Before February 8, 2010, the service-disabled 

veteran owners were not required to work full time but had to "show 

sustained and significant time invested in the business." 38 

C.F.R. § 74.4(c)(1) (2008). Effective February 8, 2010, the 

regulations were amended to require that a service-disabled 

veteran owner "work full-time in the business." 38 C.F.R. 

§ 74.4(c)(1) (2010). The February 8, 2010, amendment also 

eliminated the self-certification procedure that had been in 

effect for SDVOSBs, replacing it with a formal verification 

process. 38 C.F.R. § 74.2. The essence of the criminal case 

against Gorski is that Gorski, a non-veteran, made false statements 

about the ownership, operation, and control of Legion to appear to 

be in compliance with the SDVOSB eligibility requirements while 

retaining effective ownership and control of the company for 

himself.

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251
- 5 - 

The prosecution alleges the following facts. Around 

late 2005, Gorski approached Veteran A, a service-disabled 

veteran, to start a construction business targeting SDVOSB 

contracts. Gorski told Veteran A that he wanted Veteran A's 

involvement for his "veteran status." Gorski filed a certificate 

of incorporation for Legion in January 2006, with Veteran A listed 

as president and himself as vice president.

From January 2006 to August 2007, Veteran A was nominally 

the fifty-five percent owner of Legion. In August 2007, Gorski 

caused Legion to undergo a corporate restructuring in which Gorski 

became a nominal forty-nine percent owner, Veteran A became a 

nominal eleven percent owner, and Veteran B -- also a servicedisabled veteran -- became nominal owner of the remaining forty 

percent. However, Veteran A received no compensation for the stock 

that he relinquished. Meanwhile, Gorski retained effective 

control of Legion by having the veterans execute demand notes 

payable to Gorski and secured by their shares of Legion stock, as 

well as by having them sign employment agreements that allowed 

Gorski to terminate their employment with Legion for cause. Gorski 

also placed his wife on Legion's payroll even though she had fulltime employment elsewhere, as a disguised method to pay himself 

more money than he was paying the veterans. Throughout this time, 

Legion was awarded government contracts based on representations 

that it qualified as an SDVOSB.

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 5 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251
- 6 - 

In late 2009, Legion retained Mintz Levin in 

anticipation of the February 8, 2010, amendment in regulatory 

criteria for SDVOSBs. Mintz Levin effected a corporate 

restructuring under which Veteran B purchased Veteran A's 

remaining stock, resulting in Veteran B nominally owning fiftyone percent of Legion's shares and Gorski nominally owning fortynine percent. Although the purchase did not occur until March 23, 

2010, the documents were dated "as of" February 1, 2010 -- before 

the date of the regulatory amendments.

At some point, Gorski also engaged Elizabeth Schwartz, 

an attorney unaffiliated with Mintz Levin, for legal advice related 

to the 2010 restructuring. 

On March 8, 2010, one of Legion's competitors filed a 

bid protest with the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) 

challenging Legion's SDVOSB status. The protest related to a bid 

submitted by Legion on January 11, 2010. On April 5, 2010, Legion, 

with the assistance of Mintz Levin, filed a response to the SBA. 

The response included new corporate documents prepared by Mintz 

Levin purporting to show that Legion restructured on February 1, 

2010. The record supports the district court's finding that the 

new corporate documents were crafted so as to make it appear that 

they were signed before the date of the SBA regulatory amendments, 

when they were not, and that an affidavit that flatly swore under 

penalty of perjury that Veteran B purchased the stock on February 

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251
- 7 - 

1, 2010, was false. Further, it is plain that Gorski likely knew 

that his lawyers' handiwork could lead SBA to believe that which 

was false. 

Between July 29, 2010, and November 19, 2010, Gorski had 

discussions with Legion's accountant about circumventing the 

SDVOSB regulations that require the service-disabled veteran owner 

to be the company's highest paid officer. Gorski and Legion's 

accountant discussed a plan under which Gorski would receive 

additional, hidden compensation in a special bank account.

On October 23, 2012, Gorski was indicted for one count 

of conspiracy to defraud the United States and four counts of wire 

fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1343.

On July 21, 2014, the prosecution issued subpoenas to 

Legion and Mintz Levin under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

17(c). The subpoenas required the production of documents from 

November 2009 to December 2010 concerning Legion's ownership and 

SDVOSB eligibility; negotiations and transfers of Legion stock 

involving Gorski, Veteran A, and Veteran B; and the March 2010 bid 

protest filed against Legion. Mintz Levin and Legion withheld 

production of certain documents on the basis of attorney-client 

privilege.

On August 7, 2014, the district court granted the 

prosecution's motion that the court conduct an in camera 

examination to determine whether the crime-fraud exception to the 

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 7 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251
- 8 - 

attorney-client privilege applied. Mintz Levin and Legion 

submitted thousands of pages of documents for the district court's 

review. On September 4, 2014, the district court held an ex parte 

hearing with defense counsel and, upon concluding that the crimefraud exception to the attorney-client privilege applied, ordered 

that all of the contested documents be produced.

On September 8, 2014, Gorski filed an ex parte motion 

for reconsideration of the September 4 order as overbroad with 

respect to seven categories of documents. Also on September 8, 

2014, Legion, which is not a party to the criminal case, filed a 

motion to intervene and to stay the September 4 order, along with 

a motion to conduct a de novo hearing on the crime-fraud exception. 

The district court granted Legion's motion and, on September 11, 

2014, held an ex parte hearing with counsel for Legion and Gorski. 

On September 12, 2014, the district court issued an order 

granting in part and denying in part the motion for 

reconsideration. As an initial matter, the district court found 

that all of the documents at issue were relevant and facially 

privileged. The only issue was whether the crime-fraud exception 

applied. The district court began its analysis by stating that it 

considered the grand jury indictment of Gorski to be "conclusive 

evidence" of probable cause to believe that Gorski committed a 

crime or fraud. The district court then reasoned that "there is 

a reasonable basis to believe that Gorski intended to, and did, 

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 8 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251
- 9 - 

use the services of the lawyers" in furtherance of that crime or 

fraud. The district court found that it was reasonable to believe 

that Gorski intended to use Mintz Levin's services to "perpetuate 

[an] ongoing scheme" in which he "maintain[ed] effective ownership 

and control of Legion, while maintaining its apparent status as 

a[n] SDVOSB." 

However, the district court granted the motion to 

reconsider as to category three of the documents, which consisted 

of communications between Gorski and his personal attorney, 

Schwartz, in relation to the 2010 restructuring. The district 

court found that although "[t]he basic intent of those 

communications is arguably the same as his communications with 

Mintz Levin, . . . Ms. Schwartz apparently had no role in the 

submission to the SBA." The district court concluded that under 

the circumstances, it would "not make the necessary finding" as to 

the applicability of the crime-fraud exception. The district court 

also determined, without explaining its reasoning on the record, 

that the crime-fraud exception did not apply to documents in 

categories one, two, five, and six of the motion for 

reconsideration. The district court ordered Legion and Mintz Levin 

to produce all of the contested documents not encompassed by those 

categories. 

Legion and Gorski filed separate notices of appeal. 

Legion limited its appeal to the portion of the district court 

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 9 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251
- 10 - 

order requiring production of documents by Mintz Levin. The 

district court has stayed its production order as to Mintz Levin 

pending appeal. The district court has stayed and held in abeyance 

its independent production order as to Legion, pending resolution 

of this appeal as to the Mintz Levin order. 

II. 

"Ordinarily, litigants may not seek immediate appeal of 

discovery orders because they are not final decisions and orders 

of the district court." Gill v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, 

Inc., 399 F.3d 391, 397 (1st Cir. 2005); see also FDIC v. Ogden 

Corp., 202 F.3d 454, 458 (1st Cir. 2000). A target of a discovery 

order can gain an immediate right of appeal by refusing to comply 

with a discovery order, being held in contempt by the district 

court, and then appealing the contempt order. Gill, 399 F.3d at 

397. However, none of the parties to this appeal have been held 

in contempt. Examining the alternative bases upon which the 

parties claim appellate jurisdiction to challenge the discovery 

order, we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction over Gorski's 

appeal but that we do have jurisdiction over Legion's appeal and 

the prosecution's cross-appeal. 

Gorski relies solely on the collateral order doctrine as 

the basis for appellate jurisdiction.1 The collateral order 

 1 The prosecution points out an antecedent issue 

explicitly left open by the district court: whether Gorski can 

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 10 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251
- 11 - 

doctrine allows immediate appeal of a "small class" of decisions 

that do not end the litigation but are nonetheless considered 

"final" and thus immediately reviewable. Cohen v. Beneficial 

Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). "That small category 

includes only decisions that are conclusive, that resolve 

important questions separate from the merits, and that are 

effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the 

underlying action." Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 

42 (1995); see also United States v. Quintana–Aguayo, 235 F.3d 

682, 684 (1st Cir. 2000) (per curiam). Gorski argues that the 

collateral order doctrine gives us jurisdiction over his appeal 

because the district court's discovery order will be effectively 

unreviewable in an end-of-case appeal.

Gorski's argument is squarely at odds with the Supreme 

Court's decision in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 

100 (2009). In Mohawk, the Court held that "collateral order 

appeals are not necessary to ensure effective review of orders 

adverse to the attorney-client privilege," id. at 108, because 

"postjudgment appeals generally suffice to protect the rights of 

litigants and ensure the vitality of the attorney-client 

 

even assert attorney-client privilege over the documents the 

prosecution seeks from Mintz Levin, or whether the privilege is 

held by Legion alone. We do not resolve this issue because we 

lack jurisdiction over Gorski's appeal even if he is a privilegeholder. 

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 11 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251
- 12 - 

privilege," id. at 109. The Court reasoned that when disclosure 

orders are held to be erroneous on postjudgment appeal, 

"[a]ppellate courts can remedy the improper disclosure of 

privileged material in the same way they remedy a host of other 

erroneous evidentiary rulings: by vacating an adverse judgment and 

remanding for a new trial in which the protected material and its 

fruits are excluded from evidence." Id. Moreover, the Court 

noted, immediate review of serious errors is available through a 

writ of mandamus or by a contemptuous refusal to comply with the 

discovery order and an appeal of the subsequent contempt order. 

Id. at 111. 

Gorski attempts to distinguish Mohawk by pointing out 

that if we do not hear his appeal, our decision on Legion's appeal 

will become the law of the case and prevent Gorski from 

relitigating the issue on appeal from final judgment. This, Gorski 

claims, makes the discovery order effectively unreviewable on 

final judgment in a way that distinguishes Mohawk. But even if 

Gorski is correct about the applicability of the law of the case 

doctrine -- an issue we do not decide -- the Court made it clear 

in Mohawk that the availability of collateral order review is 

determined by examining "the class of claims, taken as a whole." 

Id. at 107. As such, Mohawk held that parties are categorically 

barred from appealing privilege-related disclosure orders under 

the collateral order doctrine, notwithstanding the fact "[t]hat a 

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 12 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251
- 13 - 

fraction of orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege may 

nevertheless harm individual litigants in ways that are 'only 

imperfectly reparable.'" Id. at 112 (quoting Dig. Equip. Corp. v. 

Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 872 (1994)). We do not have 

jurisdiction over Gorski's appeal. 

Legion, a non-party to the indictment, claims appellate 

jurisdiction under an exception to the final order doctrine 

deriving from Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918). Under 

Perlman, "a discovery order addressed to a non-party sometimes may 

be treated as an immediately appealable final order vis-à-vis a 

party who claims to hold an applicable privilege." Ogden Corp., 

202 F.3d at 459. The rationale for Perlman is that when the target 

of a discovery order is a non-party, a party claiming the privilege 

cannot gain the right of appeal by itself refusing to produce 

discovery and being held in contempt. See id. Nor will the target 

of the discovery order allow itself to be held in contempt to 

obtain appellate review on behalf of the privilege-holder because 

the non-party "presumably lacks a sufficient stake in the 

proceeding to risk contempt by refusing compliance." Id. (quoting 

Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 n.11 

(1992)). As such, "[c]ourts frequently have invoked Perlman when 

a client . . . seeks to appeal an order compelling her 

attorney . . . to produce allegedly privileged materials." Id. 

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 13 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251
- 14 - 

Legion's appeal presents a classic Perlman situation. 

The district court has ordered Mintz Levin, a non-party, to produce 

documents. Legion asserts attorney-client privilege over those 

documents, but it cannot bring an immediate challenge to that order 

by allowing itself to be held in contempt because it is not the 

target of the subpoena at issue.2 Nor does it seem that Mintz 

Levin has any intention of refusing to comply and therefore risking 

contempt. See id. Because Legion is a non-party, it cannot ensure 

that there would be any traditional final judgment from which to 

appeal, either. Legion is thus "powerless to avert the mischief 

of the order," Perlman, 247 U.S. at 13, unless we apply the Perlman 

exception and take appellate jurisdiction. 

We have jurisdiction over the prosecution's cross-appeal 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, which provides that "[a]n appeal by the 

United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or 

order of a district court suppressing or excluding evidence." 

III. 

In privilege cases, we review questions of law de novo, 

factual findings for clear error, and discretionary judgments for 

 2 Although there is also a subpoena against Legion, the 

district court's production order as to Legion has been stayed and 

held in abeyance pending our resolution of the appeals of the order 

as to Mintz Levin. Therefore, we have before us only the part of 

the district court's order compelling production from Mintz Levin. 

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 14 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251
- 15 - 

abuse of discretion. Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 

245 (1st Cir. 2002). 

The attorney-client privilege is "a privilege of a 

client to refuse to testify or to have his counsel testify as to 

confidential communications between the two made in connection 

with the rendering of legal representation." In re Grand Jury 

Proceedings, 417 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 2005). The crime-fraud 

exception "withdraws protection where the client sought or 

employed legal representation in order to commit or facilitate a 

crime or fraud." Id. at 22. The party invoking the crime-fraud 

exception "must make a prima facie showing: (1) that the client 

was engaged in (or was planning) criminal or fraudulent activity 

when the attorney-client communications took place; and (2) that 

the communications were intended by the client to facilitate or 

conceal the criminal or fraudulent activity." In re Grand Jury 

Proceedings (Gregory P. Violette), 183 F.3d 71, 75 (1st Cir. 1999); 

see also United States v. Albertelli, 687 F.3d 439, 450 (1st Cir. 

2012). By prima facie showing, we mean "a reasonable basis to 

believe that the lawyer's services were used by the client to 

foster a crime or fraud." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d 

at 23 & n.4. This standard may be met by "something less than a 

mathematical (more likely than not) probability that the client 

intended to use the attorney in furtherance of a crime or fraud." 

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 15 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251
- 16 - 

Id. at 23. However, it requires more than "speculation [or] 

evidence that shows only a distant likelihood of corruption." Id. 

Here, we are satisfied that the reasonable basis 

standard is met as to both parts of the crime-fraud exception 

test.3 As to the first part, the district court correctly noted 

 3 Two antecedent issues are raised by Gorski's brief but 

not by Legion's brief. Though we do not have jurisdiction over 

Gorski's appeal and Legion does not expressly adopt the arguments 

in Gorski's brief, we understand Gorski to make these arguments in 

opposition to the government's appeal, and so we address them. 

 The first issue is whether the district court erred in 

conducting an in camera review of the privileged documents at all. 

The Supreme Court has held that district courts may conduct an in 

camera review of privileged materials upon a "good faith belief by 

a reasonable person," United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 

(1989) (quoting Caldwell v. Dist. Court, 644 P.2d 26, 33 (Colo. 

1982)), that "in camera review of the materials may reveal evidence 

to establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies," 

id. The standard for in camera review is a "very relaxed test" 

that requires a lesser evidentiary showing than what is ultimately 

needed to pierce the privilege. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 

F.3d at 22. That standard was met by the prosecution's allegation 

that Mintz Levin's restructuring of Legion was part of a five-year 

ongoing scheme whose essence was that the outward structure of the 

company did not match its actual ownership and control. Gorski's 

argument that the use of an effective date on corporate documents 

was not illegal and so could not have formed the basis for the in 

camera review is too narrowly focused, because it is the entire 

five-year scheme alleged in the indictment that justifies in camera 

review. A jury could view the chronology as an attempt to convince 

the SBA that transactions took place before they did, and to dispel 

any reason for further SBA inquiry. 

 The second issue is whether the district court erred in 

not considering a January 2, 2014, decision by a magistrate judge 

not to conduct an in camera review under Zolin. It is uncontested 

that the prosecution did not file a timely appeal of the magistrate 

judge's order and thereby waived its right to review under Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 59(a). However, the advisory committee 

notes on Rule 59(a) specifically provides that "[d]espite the 

waiver provisions, the district judge retains the authority to 

review any magistrate judge's decision or recommendation whether 

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 16 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251
- 17 - 

that the indictment provides a reasonable basis to believe that 

Gorski and/or Legion was engaged in criminal or fraudulent 

activity. 

As to the second part, we too have reviewed the numerous 

and varied documents and agree with the district court's 

characterizations. There are many communications between Gorski 

and his attorneys on the "perceived need to revise [Legion's] 

corporate structure." The facts concerning the chronology of the 

events and the relevance of the dates to the regulatory structure 

are documented. There is considerable information about the bid 

protest, choices as to how to respond, and the preparation of 

affidavits for submission to the government. 

The district court correctly concluded that there was a 

reasonable basis to believe that the attorney-client 

communications "were intended by the client to facilitate or 

conceal the criminal or fraudulent activity." In re Grand Jury 

Proceedings, 183 F.3d at 75. Gorski allegedly orchestrated an 

ongoing scheme in which, for five years, he maintained the outward 

appearance that Legion was compliant with SDVOSB regulations while 

retaining actual control for himself. Mintz Levin was retained to 

 

or not objections are timely filed." See Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(a) 

advisory committee's note to 2005 adoption; see also Thomas v. 

Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154 (1985). It was well within the district 

court's discretion to decide the issue on its own, even after the 

time had passed for the prosecution to appeal the magistrate 

judge's order. 

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 17 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251
- 18 - 

restructure Legion to maintain that supposed compliance with 

changing SDVOSB regulations. The fact that Gorski intended to 

continue the fraudulent scheme even after achieving outward 

compliance with the new SDVOSB regulations in early 2010 may be 

inferred from the allegation that, between July and November 2010, 

Gorski was in discussions with Legion's accountant to provide him 

with hidden additional compensation. In short, there is a 

reasonable basis to believe that for a five-year period running 

both before and after the 2010 restructuring, Gorski exercised 

ownership and control over Legion in excess of that which was 

reported to the SBA. There is also a reasonable basis to believe 

that, with the intent of continuing this scheme, Gorski and/or 

Legion sought out the services of Mintz Levin to restructure Legion 

and maintain Legion's outward compliance with SDVOSB regulations. 

Legion argues that Gorski and/or Legion lacked the 

intent to use Mintz Levin's services to further or conceal criminal 

activity because they were merely seeking to ensure that Legion 

was in compliance with the new SDVOSB regulations. They contend 

that there is no evidence that Gorski lied to the lawyers or 

withheld material information from them. It is true that a 

reasonable inference may be drawn in favor of Gorski from the fact 

that he approached a reputable law firm to assist him in the 

restructuring and, as the district court noted, this inference may 

carry the day at trial. However, it is also reasonable to infer 

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 18 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251
- 19 - 

that Mintz Levin was retained with the intent of creating outward 

compliance with the amended regulations so that Gorski could 

continue his ongoing scheme to retain hidden ownership and control. 

That reasonable inference suffices to meet the "something less 

than a mathematical (more likely than not) probability" standard, 

In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d at 23, that the prosecution 

had to meet to defeat the attorney-client privilege. 

Legion argues that even if the above were true, the 

production order was overbroad because the district court did not 

conduct a document-by-document review to determine specifically 

which communications and documents were in furtherance of the 

criminal or fraudulent conduct. However, the district court made 

it clear in a status conference following the order that its 

decision was the result of "a document-by-document review." We 

too have reviewed the documents. The district court could have 

done a document-by-document analysis and still readily concluded 

that all of the documents from Mintz Levin fell within the crimefraud exception based on a reasonable inference that the entire 

scope of the representation was intended by Gorski to further the 

crime or fraud. Gorski's ongoing scheme required Legion to be 

structured to maintain the appearance of compliance with SDVOSB 

regulations, and the entire scope of Mintz Levin's representation 

was related to the 2010 restructuring. As such, there was a 

reasonable basis to conclude that there was a complete congruence 

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 19 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251
- 20 - 

between everything Mintz Levin did and the fraudulent purpose by 

Gorski that triggers the crime-fraud exception. 

Our decision that a prima facie case for the crime-fraud 

exception has been made does not reflect a finding on the ultimate 

question of whether Gorski acted wrongfully. See United States v. 

Schussel, 291 F. App'x 336, 346 (1st Cir. 2008). Nor does it bear 

on the conduct or intent of the lawyers involved, because the 

crime-fraud exception is triggered by the intent of the client. 

In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 183 F.3d at 79. 

IV. 

In its cross-appeal, the prosecution challenges the 

district court's quashing of the prosecution's subpoena as to the 

"category three" documents, which consisted of communications 

between Gorski and his personal attorney, Schwartz, in relation to 

the 2010 restructuring. The district court reasoned that even 

though "[t]he basic intent of those communications is arguably the 

same as his communications with Mintz Levin," the crime-fraud 

exception does not apply to those documents because "Ms. Schwartz 

apparently had no role in the submission to the SBA."

The prosecution argues that the district court erred 

because whether or not Schwartz was involved in the submissions to 

the SBA relating to the bid protest was legally irrelevant. We 

agree. As described above, the crime-fraud exception applies upon 

two prima facie showings: first, that the client was engaged in 

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 20 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251
- 21 - 

criminal or fraudulent activity; and second, that the attorneyclient communications were intended by the client to facilitate or 

conceal the criminal or fraudulent activity. See id. at 75. The 

district court found that the indictment provided a reasonable 

basis to believe that Gorski was engaged in criminal activity, 

meeting the first requirement. As for the second requirement, the 

district court recognized that Gorski's intent with regard to 

Schwartz was arguably the same as his intent with regard to Mintz 

Levin: to perpetuate an ongoing scheme to conceal the true 

ownership and control of Legion over a five-year time period. The 

fact that Schwartz was not actually involved in the submission of 

documents in the bid protest or otherwise has no necessary bearing 

on either of those two points. Further, Schwartz predated Mintz 

Levin as counsel advising Gorski on Legion. The government alleges 

there was an earlier part of an ongoing fraud. Gorski did indeed 

ask her for ideas on how to "financially benefit from [his] 

efforts" despite the nominal restructuring and his concerns about 

no longer being the "primary shareholder" despite shouldering the 

"balance of responsibilities" after the restructuring.

Because the district court appears to have employed 

incorrect legal reasoning with regard to the "category three" 

documents, we vacate and remand that portion of the district court 

order for application of the correct legal standard. 

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 21 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251
- 22 - 

V. 

We dismiss Gorski's appeal for want of appellate 

jurisdiction. We vacate the portion of the district court order 

quashing the prosecution's subpoena as to the "category three" 

documents, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. Otherwise, we affirm the district court's order of 

production as to Mintz Levin. Costs are taxed against David E. 

Gorski and Legion Construction, Inc. 

Case: 14-1963 Document: 00116929129 Page: 22 Date Filed: 12/09/2015 Entry ID: 5960251