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Parties Involved:
Adam H. Smith
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-10044

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ADAM H. SMITH, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cr-00026-LGW-BWC-55

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-10044

Before JILL PRYOR, BRASHER, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

After pleading guilty, Adam H. Smith appeals his 48-month 

sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to 

distribute fentanyl. 

Smith and the government entered into a negotiated plea 

agreement. After a plea colloquy, the district court accepted 

Smith’s guilty plea. His plea agreementstated that the government 

and the defendant agreed that a “specific sentence not to exceed 

forty-eight (48) months would be appropriate in this case.” At 

sentencing, the district court imposed a 48-month prison term, 

followed by the mandatory minimum three years of supervised 

release required by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). At the sentencing, 

Smith did not object to the three years of supervised release in his 

sentence or contend that the district court breached the plea 

agreement.

For the first time on appeal, Smith argues that the district 

court plainly erred when it imposed a 48-month prison term plus 

the mandatory minimum 36-month term of supervised release. 

Smith claims the plea agreement mandated a total sentence of 48 

months, split as 36 months of supervised release and only 12 

months in prison. After careful review of the record and the 

parties’ briefs, we disagree and conclude that Smith has not shown 

the district court plainly erred when it sentenced him to 48 months 

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24-10044 Opinion of the Court 3

of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release and 

affirm Smith’s sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Indictment and Plea Agreement

In a multi-defendant indictment, Smith was charged with 

one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to 

distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, a detectable 

amount of fentanyl and heroin, and a quantity of alprazolam, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 

Pursuant to his negotiated plea agreement, Smith agreed to 

plead guilty to the lesser included offense of conspiracy to possess 

with intent to distribute and to distribute a quantity of fentanyl. 

The plea agreement listed the maximum possible sentence, as 

follows:

Defendant’s guilty plea will subject the 

Defendant to the following maximum possible 

sentence:

-Not more than 20 years of imprisonment;

-Not less than 3 years of supervised release, not 

more than life;

-Not more than a $1,000,000 fine; and

-$100 mandatory special assessment.

The plea agreement also contained a provision entitled “Agreed 

Sentence,” which stated:

The government and the defendant agree that 

a specific sentence not to exceed forty-eight (48) 

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-10044

months would be appropriate in this case. 

Consequently, this plea agreement is being offered to 

the Court pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal 

Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The plea agreement did not separately specify an agreed-upon term 

of supervised release. 

B. Plea Hearing

At Smith’s plea hearing, the district court, inter alia, 

reviewed the maximum possible penalties for his offense under his 

plea agreement as “not more than 20 years, a fine of not more than 

a million dollars, supervised release of at least three years and a 

$100.00 special assessment.” Smith responded that he understood. 

The district court also addressed the agreement about the 

48-month sentence. The district court explained that because the 

agreement was subject to Rule 11(c)(1)(C), if the court accepted the 

agreement, it would “not sentence [Smith] to more than 48 months 

in prison.” (Emphasis added.) The district court continued that the 

prison term “could be less than that” based on the factors that the 

court had previously detailed, but it would “not be more than 48 

months” to which Smith indicated he understood and had no 

questions. 

The district court also explained supervised release to Smith, 

stating that once Smith is released from prison, he would be subject 

to “rules” that the court set forth and could go back to prison if he 

did not follow those rules. Again Smith indicated he understood. 

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At this plea time, Smith made no claim that the 48 months 

in his plea agreement meant, and limited his sentence to, three 

years of supervised release and only 12 months of imprisonment.

Ultimately, the district court found that Smith’s guilty plea 

was knowing and voluntary and accepted the plea agreement. 

C. Presentence Investigation Report

The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) recommended 

an advisory guidelines range of 57 to 71 months. Relevant to this 

appeal, the PSI noted that “the plea agreement contains an 

agreement between the Government and the defendant that a 

sentence of 48 months of imprisonment is appropriate in this case.” 

(Emphasis added.) 

The PSI also noted that pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C),

the district court was required to impose a three-year term of 

supervised release. 

Smith raised several objections to the PSI, but he did not

object to the PSI’s description of his plea agreement as an 

agreement to a 48-month prison term, separate from the

mandatory minimum three-year supervised release term. Smith 

also submitted a sentencing memorandum that requested that the 

district court “sentence him to a period of incarceration within the 

range of 24-30 months.” 

The probation officer subsequently prepared a sentencing 

recommendation that “Smith be sentenced to 48 months of 

imprisonment,” as “consistent with the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea 

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-10044

agreement” and that after his release from confinement, Smith “be 

placed on supervised release for three years.” 

D. Sentencing

At his sentencing hearing, Smith reasserted his objections to 

the PSI, but he raised no objection to the probation officer’s 

recommendation of a 48-month prison term and three years of 

supervised release. 

After sustaining one of Smith’s guidelines objections, the 

district court found that the “advisory guideline range for 

imprisonment [wa]s 41 to 51 months of imprisonment, [followed by] 

3 years of supervised release. (Emphasis added.) Noting the 48-

month “cap on the sentence” in the plea agreement, Smith asked 

for a sentence of “24 to 30 months,” consistent with his sentencing 

memorandum. The government asked for a prison sentence of 48 

months. 

The district court pointed out that it had “accepted the 

[Rule] 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement” and “agreed to sentence Mr. 

Smith to no more than 48 months.” The district court then 

imposed a 48-month term of imprisonment, finding it was “within 

the confines of the [Rule] 11(c)(1)(C) agreement that [it] accepted.” 

The district court also imposed the mandatory minimum 

term of “supervised release for a period of 3 years once he’s 

released from this term of prison,” which is required by 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b)(1)(C). The district court also imposed a $100 special 

assessment but found Smith did not have the ability to pay a fine. 

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24-10044 Opinion of the Court 7

After pronouncing the sentence, the district court asked 

Smith if he had any objections to the court’s findings of fact or 

conclusions of law or the manner in which the sentence was 

imposed. Smith indicated that he did not have any objections to 

his sentence as imposed. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We generally construe a plea agreement de novo and review 

the district court’s factual findings regarding the scope of the 

agreement for clear error. United States v. Al-Arian, 514 F.3d 1184, 

1191 (11th Cir. 2008).1 

However, our review here is for plain error because the 

alleged Rule 11 error was not objected to in the district court. See

United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003). 

Establishing plain error requires showing (1) an error (2) that was 

plain, (3) affected one’s substantial rights, and (4) seriously affected 

the fairness of the judicial proceedings. Id. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. General Principles

Rule 11(c)(1)(C) permits the defendant and the government 

to enter a plea agreement that provides that “the government will 

1 We deny the government’s request to dismiss Smith’s appeal based on the 

direct-appeal waiver in his plea agreement. Because Smith claims a breach of 

the plea agreement that purports to bar his appeal, the appeal waiver does not 

preclude appellate review. See United States v. Tripodis, 94 F.4th 1257, 1261 n.2 

(11th Cir. 2024). 

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8 Opinion of the Court 24-10044

agree that a specific sentence . . . is the appropriate disposition of 

the case. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C). A district court presented 

with a plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) may either 

accept or reject it. Fed. R. Crim P. 11(c)(3)(A). If the district court 

accepts the plea agreement, it is bound by the agreed-upon 

sentence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(4). 

In determining the scope of the agreement, we apply an 

objective standard, asking whether the breaching party’s actions 

“were inconsistent with what the defendant reasonably 

understood when he entered his guilty plea.” Al-Arian, 514 F.3d at 

1191. “In interpreting a plea agreement, we do not accept a hypertechnical reading of the written agreement or a rigidly literal 

approach to the construction of the language.” United States v. 

Copeland, 381 F.3d 1101, 1106 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks 

omitted).

For plain error review of an alleged breach, “the ‘error must 

be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.’” 

United States v. Sosa, 782 F.3d 630, 637 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting 

Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). “In the context of 

plea agreement breaches, the Supreme Court has advised that 

‘[n]ot all breaches will be clear or obvious,’ such as when the 

drafting of an agreement leaves the scope of the government’s 

commitments open to doubt.” Id. (quoting Puckett, 556 U.S. at 143) 

(alteration in original). 

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B. Smith’s Claim on Appeal

For the first time on appeal, Smith claims that: (1) under his 

plea agreement, the district court could not impose more than a 

48-month total sentence; (2) there is a mandatory three-year 

supervised release requirement in § 841(b)(1)(C) for his drug 

conviction; and (3) thus the district court was required to impose 

only a 12-month prison sentence, followed by 36 months of 

supervised release, for a total 48-month sentence. Smith asks this 

Court to: (1) vacate his sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment and 

three years’ supervised release as a breach of the plea agreement; 

(2) remand for specific performance of the plea agreement; and 

(3) require the district court to sentence him to only 12 months’ 

imprisonment followed by the mandatory minimum three years’ 

supervised release. 

After review, we conclude that Smith has not carried his 

burden to show plain error in the district court’s imposition of a 

48-month sentence of imprisonment followed by three years of 

supervised release. First, Smith’s alleged understanding of the plea 

agreement is belied by the terms of his plea agreement and his 

affirmations at the Rule 11 plea colloquy. For starters, there was 

no promise in the plea agreement that the 48-month sentence 

would be split between incarceration and supervised release. It 

was never agreed upon at all, let alone with any specificity. Smith 

concedes that he “only agreed to a specific sentence not to exceed 

48 months” and that “[n]o additional consideration was given 

within the agreement as to how the sentence would be imposed or 

split between incarceration and supervised release.” 

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Further, there was an integration clause in Smith’s plea 

agreement, providing that it reflected all of the promises and 

agreements between Smith and the government. See Al-Arian, 514 

F.3d at 1192-93. The plea agreement clearly contained no promise 

from the government to recommend a split sentence consisting of 

a minimum of three years of supervised release and a maximum of 

12 months of imprisonment. Concomitantly, the district court was 

not bound to impose such a split.

Second, we reject Smith’s claim that the term “specific 

sentence not to exceed 48 months” necessarily meant that the 

district court was required to split the 48 months into the 

mandatory 36 months of supervised release, leaving only a 

maximum 12-month prison sentence. Nothing in those terms 

specified such a split sentence.

Third, Smith’s plea colloquy also refutes Smith’s claim that 

he allegedly understood the 48 months sentence term to 

encompass a split sentence of 36 months of supervised release and 

only 12 months of imprisonment. 

At the plea hearing, the district court explained to Smith 

that: (1) because the agreement was subject to Rule 11(c)(1)(C), it 

“would not sentence [Smith] to more than 48 months in prison”;

and (2) after Smith was released from prison, he would be subject to 

a supervised release term of at least three years. (Emphasis added.) 

In response to the district court’s statements, Smith did not object, 

but rather agreed. Given this exchange, Smith could not have 

reasonably understood at the time of his plea that the binding plea 

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24-10044 Opinion of the Court 11

agreement barred the district court from imposing a prison term of 

more than 12 months (as he now claims on appeal) because 36 

months of the “sentence” contemplated by the agreement was the 

mandatory minimum three-year term of supervised release. See id.

at 1191. 

Further evidence at sentencing confirms that Smith 

understood the term “specific sentence not to exceed 48 months” 

in the plea agreement to refer only to the prison sentence imposed. 

For example, Smith did not object to the PSI, which stated that the 

binding plea agreement was for “a sentence of 48 months of 

imprisonment.” Additionally, Smith’s sentencing memorandum 

specifically requested 24 to 30 months “of incarceration,” which 

would not have been possible if, as he now contends, the word 

“sentence” as used in this binding plea agreement included the 

mandatory minimum three-year supervised release term. 

Finally, at the sentencing hearing, Smith did not raise any 

objection to the probation officer’s recommendation of a 48-month 

prison sentence, followed by three years of supervised release, 

much less argue that the district would breach the binding plea 

agreement by following that recommendation. Instead, Smith 

acknowledged the binding plea agreement “not to exceed 48 

months” and reiterated his “request from [his] sentencing 

memorandum for 24 to 30 months,” which was a request for a term 

of incarceration. 

We recognize that the government cites our recent decision 

in United States v. Tripodis, in which the defendant challenged his 

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12 Opinion of the Court 24-10044

sentence on similar grounds and this Court affirmed the sentence. 

94 F.4th 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2024) (concluding the district court 

did not breach a binding plea agreement by imposing a term of 

supervised release in addition to a 60-month prison sentence). 

Certain facts in Tripodis are different, including that the defendant 

argued at sentencing that the supervised-release term breached the 

plea agreement. Id. at 1260-61. We need not address Tripodis

because it applied de novo review, whereas our review is for plain 

error only. And Tripodis does not suggest the district court here 

plainly erred.

In any event, we need not decide whether the district court’s 

sentence breached the binding plea agreement because any alleged 

error was not plain. Given the terms of the plea agreement and the 

specific factual circumstances discussed above, we cannot say that 

the district court’s alleged breach was “clear or obvious, rather than 

subject to reasonable dispute,” which is required to prevail on

plain-error review. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135; Sosa, 782 F.3d at 

637. Because the district court did not plainly breach the plea 

agreement, we affirm Smith’s sentence of 48 months of 

imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release.2

AFFIRMED.

2 To the extent Smith also raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

we decline to address it on direct appeal because the record is not sufficiently 

developed. See United States v. Curbelo, 726 F.3d 1260, 1267 (11th Cir. 2013).

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