Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01886/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01886-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pedro Garza
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 10, 2016

Decided March 11, 2016

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 15-1886

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

PEDRO GARZA,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Indiana, 

Fort Wayne Division

No. 1:12CR88-001

Theresa L. Springmann,

Judge.

O R D E R

In late 2012, police in Fort Wayne, Indiana, conducted a series of controlled buys 

from Pedro Garza, and he was arrested after attempting to sell to an undercover 

detective almost $40,000 worth of cocaine. Garza was charged with five counts of 

distributing controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)(A), and, in exchange for the 

government’s agreement to dismiss four of those counts, Garza agreed to plead guilty to 

the remaining count and waive his right to appeal. Under the appeal waiver, Garza 

consented to “expressly waive [his] right to appeal or to contest [his] conviction and all 

components of [his] sentence.” A magistrate judge conducted a plea colloquy and 

recommended that the district court accept Garza’s guilty plea. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2014). The district court adopted that 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15-1886 Page 2

recommendation and sentenced Garza to 188 months’ imprisonment—the low end of 

the guidelines range.

Garza appealed, and his appointed counsel, arguing that the appeal is frivolous,

seeks to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief 

explains the nature of this case and considers the issues that an appeal like this one 

might be expected to involve. We invited Garza to respond to counsel’s submission, 

see CIR. R. 51(b), but he has not done so. Because the analysis in counsel’s brief appears 

thorough, we discuss only the issues identified in that brief. See United States v. Bey, 

748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

Counsel first considers whether Garza could challenge the voluntariness of his 

guilty plea. After consulting with his client, see United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 

(7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002), counsel tells us 

that Garza wishes to withdraw his guilty plea but lacks a nonfrivolous basis for doing so. 

We agree. Garza did not move to withdraw his plea in the district court, so we would 

review the adequacy of the plea colloquy for plain error. See United States v. Vonn, 

535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002). And the transcript of that colloquy shows that the district court 

complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11: The court, through an interpreter, 

advised Garza of the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty; it ensured 

that Garza understood the charges against him, the minimum and maximum penalties, 

and the potential immigration consequences; and it informed him of the effect of his 

appeal waiver. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1). The government also proffered a factual 

basis for the plea, which Garza admitted to. Id. 11(b)(3). This compliance with Rule 11 

shields the guilty plea from challenge on direct appeal. See United States v. Blalock, 321 

F.3d 686, 688–89 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Akinsola, 105 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1997); 

United States v. Lovett, 844 F.2d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1988). We thus agree with counsel that a 

challenge to Garza’s plea would be pointless.

Counsel next correctly concludes that any challenge to Garza’s sentence would be 

frivolous since in his appeal waiver Garza relinquished his “right to appeal or to contest 

[his] conviction and all components of [his] sentence.” Because an appeal waiver stands 

if the guilty plea that produced the waiver is intact (and we have just said that his guilty 

plea cannot reasonably be challenged), see United States v. Gonzalez, 765 F.3d 732, 741 

(7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Zitt, 714 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013), we would enforce 

Garza’s waiver of an attack on his sentence. No exception to an appeal waiver (such as a 

sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum, is based on an impermissible factor like 

race, or is the result of an incompetent lawyer) is suggested in the record. See Dowell v. 

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No. 15-1886 Page 3

United States, 694 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 637 

(7th Cir. 2005). Thus a sentencing challenge would be frivolous.

Accordingly we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the 

appeal.

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