Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01502/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01502-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Huhtamaki
Defendant
Ray Anthony Stevens
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAY ANTHONY STEVENS,

Plaintiff, No. 2:09-cv-01502 JAM KJN PS

v.

HUHTAMAKI,

Defendant. ORDER

 /

Presently before the court is plaintiff’s motion to extend the July 2, 2010

discovery completion deadline (Dkt. No. 19), which is set forth in the court’s Status (Pretrial

Scheduling) Order (Dkt. No. 17 at 3). Plaintiff is proceeding without counsel, or pro se, and in

forma pauperis. Plaintiff’s motion, filed on July 2, 2010, seeks an extension of this deadline by

20 days. The court previously construed plaintiff’s motion as an ex parte application to extend

the discovery completion date, and permitted defendant to file a written opposition or statement

of non-opposition to plaintiff’s application. (Dkt. No. 20.) Defendant filed its timely opposition

on July 13, 2010. (Dkt. No. 21.)

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4), “[a] schedule may be

modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” See also Zivkovic v. So. Cal.

Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In general, the pretrial scheduling order can

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 In considering whether to modify a scheduling order pursuant to Rule 16(b), some 1

courts have considered the following factors set forth in U.S. ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft

Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1526 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted), judgment vacated on other grounds,

520 U.S. 939 (1997), which involved whether to reopen discovery:

1) whether trial is imminent, 2) whether the request is opposed, 3) whether

the non-moving party would be prejudiced, 4) whether the moving party

was diligent in obtaining discovery within the guidelines established by

the court, 5) the foreseeability of the need for additional discovery in light

of the time allowed for discovery by the district court, and 6) the

likelihood that the discovery will lead to relevant evidence.

See e.g., Tyco Thermal Controls LLC v. Redwood Indus., No. C 06-07164 JF (PVT), 2010 WL

2353533, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2010) (unpublished); United States v. Thompson, No. Civ. S

03-1532 FCD, GGH, 2005 WL 1303324, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2005) (unpublished); Bleek v.

Supervalu, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1120 (D. Mont. 2000). However, other courts have

expressed doubt as to whether the Hughes Aircraft Co. factors govern Rule 16(b)’s good cause

standard because that case did not involve modification of a scheduling order pursuant to Rule

16(b)(4). See, e.g,. Porter v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrections, No. Civ.S00-978 FCD/JFM, 2006 WL

467980, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2006) (unpublished); Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Kawamura, Nos.

CIV-S-97-1179GEBJFM, CIV-S-97-1185GEBJFM, 2003 WL 24288226, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec.

18, 2003) (unpublished). As is evident below, whether Hughes Aircraft Co. sets the applicable

standard is not material to the resolution of plaintiff’s application here. 

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only be modified ‘upon a showing of good cause.’”) (citing Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations,

Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1992)). A district court may modify the pretrial schedule “if it

cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Johnson, 975

F.2d at 609 (citations and quotation marks omitted). If the party seeking the modification “was

not diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id. In summarizing this good cause standard, a district

judge of the Northern District of California recently stated: “Generally, in determining whether

there is good cause to permit an extension the court will primarily look to the (1) diligence of the

party seeking the extension, but may also consider (2) the explanation for the failure to complete

discovery in a timely fashion; and (3) potential prejudice in allowing the extension.” Missing

Link, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., No. C-07-04487 RMW, 2010 WL 34268, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2010)

(unpublished).1

Here, plaintiff has provided no information about his efforts to conduct discovery

during the pendency of this action, or his diligence in that regard. Defendant asserts that plaintiff

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 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized the substantive and procedural

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leeway afforded pro se parties, albeit within limits, as compared to represented parties. See, e.g.,

Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that a pro se

petition for writ of habeas corpus should be read with more leniency insofar as exhaustion of

remedies is concerned); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“We

have noted frequently that the ‘rule favoring liberality in amendments to pleadings is particularly

important for the pro se litigant’” (citation omitted)); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261-63

(9th Cir. 1992); Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 1986) (“We recognize that the

plaintiff represented himself and therefore, in evaluating his compliance with the technical rules

of civil procedure, we treat him with great leniency.”). 

 Plaintiff should review Local Rule 183(a), which states, in part: “Any individual 3

representing himself or herself without an attorney is bound by the Federal Rules of Civil or

Criminal Procedure, these Rules, and all other applicable law. All obligations placed on

‘counsel’ by these Rules apply to individuals appearing in propria persona.” See also King v.

Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Pro se litigants must follow the same rules of

procedure that govern other litigants.”). Plaintiff is further admonished that his failure to follow

this court’s Local Rules, its orders, or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is grounds for

dismissal of his case and/or the imposition of sanctions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Local Rules

110, 183(a); see Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th

Cir. 2005) (recognizing that courts may dismiss an action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 41(b) sua sponte for a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute or comply with the rules of civil

procedure or the court’s orders); Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)

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has propounded no discovery, but that plaintiff has responded to defendant’s discovery requests. 

Plaintiff explains in his application that he has not been able to conduct discovery within the time

allotted because his efforts have been delayed: (1) “due to illness and hospitalization of his

teenage son,” and (2) because “Plaintiff has been busily engaged [sic] other family matters such

as Funerals [sic] and caring for his elderly mother.” (Dkt. No. 19 at 1.) Defendant does not

argue that it would be prejudiced by a brief extension of the discovery completion deadline. 

The undersigned has significant concerns regarding plaintiff’s lack of

demonstrated diligence in this case. However, in an abundance of caution in light of plaintiff’s

pro se status, and given no assertion of prejudice by defendant, the undersigned will grant 2

plaintiff a limited extension of time to conduct discovery. Plaintiff will be permitted 20 days

from the date of this order in which to “complete” discovery as that term is defined in the Status

(Pretrial Scheduling) Order. (Dkt. No. 17 at 3.) No further requests by plaintiff for extensions of

the discovery completion deadline will be entertained.3

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(“Failure to follow a district court’s local rules is a proper ground for dismissal.”). 

 To the extent that defendant requires relief from the new law and motion completion 4

deadline as a result of the court’s extension of the discovery completion deadline, the court will

entertain a reasonable request for modification of the scheduling order by defendant. 

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Because of this extension of the discovery completion deadline, the undersigned

must also extend the non-discovery law and motion completion deadline, which is presently set

for August 20, 2010. (Dkt. No. 17 at 2.) The new law and motion completion deadline will be

September 9, 2010. All other dates set forth in the Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order will 4

remain in effect. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. All discovery shall be conducted as to be “completed,” as that term is

defined in the Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order, within 20 days of the date of this order. No

further requests for extensions by plaintiff will be considered.

2. All law and motion, except as to discovery, shall be conducted so as to be

“completed,” as that term is defined in the Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order, by September 9,

2010. 

3. All other dates in the Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order shall remain in

effect.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 14, 2010

_____________________________________

KENDALL J. NEWMAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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