Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00158/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00158-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
The City of Montgomery
Defendant
Roosevelt Watkins
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

 

 )

ROOSEVELT WATKINS )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:11-cv-158-MEF

 ) (WO - do not publish)

THE CITY OF MONTGOMERY, )

Defendant. )

ORDER

This cause is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Facilitate Class Notice

Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Doc. #47), filed on December 5, 2011. For the most part,

Defendant does not oppose facilitation of class notice at this point in the litigation (Doc.

#50). The only contested issue is whether the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (“FLSA’s”) threeyear statute of limitations should be tolled to allow for publication of notice to those who

have worked as Fire Lieutenants in the Fire Suppression Division since February 22, 2005,

as Plaintiff argues, or notice should only be published to those who have worked in that

capacity since March 7, 2008, per the FLSA’s statute of limitations. 

Under the “fairly lenient standard” prescribed by the Eleventh Circuit, Plaintiff’s

motion is due to be GRANTED as to those individuals who have worked as Fire Lieutenants

in the Fire Suppression Division since February 22, 2005.

I. Factual Background

Plaintiff Roosevelt Watkins is employed by Defendant City of Montgomery as a Fire

Lieutenant in the Division of Fire Suppression. On March 7, 2011, Plaintiff filed this action

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against Defendant under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 

In his complaint (Doc. #1) Plaintiff alleges that “the [Defendant] does and has not paid him

and other similarly situated ‘Fire Suppression Lieutenants’ proper overtime wages as

required by 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).” Plaintiff seeks conditional collective action certification

under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) so that he may represent all current and former similarly situated

Fire Suppression Lieutenants who were subjected toDefendant’s alleged policyof not paying

proper overtime compensation.

II. Standard of Review

Title 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) provides that 

“an action to recover [unpaid overtime compensation under the FLSA] may

be maintained . . . by any one or more employees for and in [sic] behalf of

himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. No employee

shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in

writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which

such action is brought.”

29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

Thus, § 216(b) clearly provides for a collective action, but does not adequately 1

describe the procedures a district court should use to administer the certification of a

collective action or the requisite opt in procedures. For this, we turn to the Eleventh Circuit. 

In Hipp v. Liberty National Life Insurance Co., 252 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2001), the

 Plaintiff is seeking to maintain a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) 1

rather than a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. See LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois,

Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 288-89 (5th Cir.1975) (recognizing the “fundamental” differences

between Rule 23 class actions and § 216(b) collective actions).

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Eleventh Circuit suggested that district courts adopt a two-tiered approach for determining

whether 216(b)’s “similarly situated” requirement is satisfied. Id. at 1217-18 (citing Mooney

v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207 (5th Cir. 1995).

The first stage in the two-tiered process is a “notice stage,” wherein “the district court

makes a decision—usually based on the pleadings and any affidavits which have been

submitted—whether notice of the action should be given to potential class members.” Id. at

1218. Using a “fairly lenient standard,” if the court is satisfied that there may be a group of

similarly situated plaintiffs, the court may conditionally certify the class at this point. From

here, potential class members are given notice and the opportunity to opt-in. Id.

“The second stage is typically precipitated by a motion for ‘decertification’ by the

defendant usually filed after discovery is complete and the matter is ready for trial.” Id. At

this point, the court has much more information and can make an informed factual

determination as to whether there is a “similarly situated” group of plaintiffs. “If the

claimants are not similarly situated, the district court decertifies the class, and the opt-in

plaintiffs are dismissed without prejudice. The class representatives—i.e. the original

plaintiffs—proceed to trial on their individual claims.” Id.

The Eleventh Circuit concludes this portion ofits opinion noting that “[n]othing in our

circuit precedent . . . requires district courts to utilize this approach. The decision to create

an opt-in class under §216(b) . . . remains soundly within the discretion of the district court.” 

Id. at 1219. However, the court also notes that the “two-tiered approach to

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certification . . . appears to be an effective tool for district courts to use in managing these

often complex cases, and we suggest that district courts in this circuit adopt it in future

cases.” Id.

This Court will follow the certification process suggested by the Eleventh Circuit in

Hipp. 

III. Discussion

The one contested issue in Defendant’s motion is whether, at this first stage of the

certification process, notice should be provided to individuals who worked as Fire

Lieutenants in the Fire Suppression Division since February 22, 2005, or only to those who

have worked as Fire Lieutenants in the Fire Suppression Division since March 8, 2008. 

Plaintiff’s statute of limitations defense is dependent on many questions of fact (see

generally Doc. #50 (raising, inter alia, issues of with whom “discussions” may or may not

have been had before Fire Lieutenants were classified as exempt, and whether the Mayor had

to approve of this classification in writing or was only required to give oral approval)). 

These questions aremore appropriatelyresolved at either the summaryjudgment stage

or on a motion for decertification after discovery is complete or nearly complete. The Court

expresses no opinion as to the merits of the statute of limitations defense at this time, except

to say that, under the facts pled by Plaintiffs, the court is satisfied that there may be a group

of similarly situated plaintiffs dating back to February 22, 2005. This is all that is required

for conditional certification under Hipp. 

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For the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Facilitate Class Notice Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)

(Doc. #47) is GRANTED and this matter is CONDITIONALLY CERTIFIED as a

collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b); 

(2) Defendant, the City of Montgomery, IDENTIFY TO PLAINTIFF all current

and former Fire Suppression Lieutenants who have worked for the Montgomery

Fire Department in that capacity since February 22, 2005; 

(3) The Proposed “Notice of Lawsuit and Consent To Become A Party Plaintiff”

(Doc. #48, Ex. A) is APPROVED with the requirement that, on page two, section

III, line six, the word “were” be removed where it appears before the word

“worked;” and 

(4) Plaintiff is AUTHORIZED to issue notice of this lawsuit to all present and

former Fire Suppression Lieutenants who have worked for the City of

Montgomery in that capacity at any time between February 22, 2005 and the

present.

DONE this the 19 day of January, 2012. th

 /s/ Mark E. Fuller 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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