Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04198/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04198-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alberto Gonzales
Respondent
Olivia Chebet Kipkemboi
Petitioner
Wilfred Kipkemboi Sugut
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

Nos. 05-4198/06-1895

___________

Olivia Chebet Kipkemboi, et al., *

*

Petitioners, *

* Petitions for Review from the Board

v. * of Immigration Appeals. 

* 

Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General *

of the United States, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Respondent. * 

___________

Submitted: January 12, 2007

Filed: January 23, 2007

___________

Before COLLOTON, BRIGHT, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Olivia Kipkemboi petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) denying her claim for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). She also seeks review of the BIA’s

denial of her motion to reopen the administrative proceedings. Her husband, Wilfred

Kipkemboi Sugut, sought asylum based on his wife’s claim, and he also petitions for

review of the agency’s decisions. The petitioners are citizens of Kenya who entered

the United States in 1999, and they have two young children, both of whom are

citizens of the United States. 

Appellate Case: 05-4198 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/23/2007 Entry ID: 3270309
-2-

Before the agency, Kipkemboi argued, among other things, that she had a well

founded fear that upon removal to her native Kenya, she would be subjected to female

genital mutilation (“FGM”). She contended that FGM is widespread in the Rift

Valley area of Kenya where she and her husband were raised and married, and that the

government of Kenya is unable or unwilling to control the practice. Kipkemboi also

argued that her daughter would be subjected to FGM, and that the emotional trauma

associated with witnessing the pain and suffering of the child would constitute

persecution of Kipkemboi.

Kipkemboi testified before the immigration court that although her husband

does not approve of FGM, her husband’s family opposed his marriage to her because

she had not been circumcised. She averred that her husband’s family still wants her

to undergo FGM, and that she also fears that her young daughter would be subjected

to the procedure. Kipkemboi testified that she fears returning to Kenya, because

although she would live in Nairobi, which is a five-hour drive from the Rift Valley,

she would not be safe from her husband’s family. Kipkemboi also introduced the

State Department’s country report on Kenya from 2003, which reported that FGM is

still significantly practiced in the country, despite laws against it, and which recounted

the story of a 28 year-old woman who was seized by her in-laws and forcibly

subjected to FGM. 

The immigration judge noted the decision of the BIA in In re Kasinga, 21 I&N

Dec. 357 (BIA 1996), which held that female genital mutilation may, under certain

circumstances, constitute persecution based on membership in a “particular social

group,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), such that a well-founded fear of the practice

could qualify an individual for a grant of asylum. The immigration court harbored

“no doubt that FGM is a significant violation of human rights,” but found not credible

the testimony of the male petitioner that members of his family had traveled three

times to Nairobi in 1999 for the purpose of seizing Kipkemboi and subjecting her to

FGM. In stating his ultimate conclusion concerning Kipkemboi’s eligibility for

Appellate Case: 05-4198 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/23/2007 Entry ID: 3270309
-3-

asylum, the immigration judge opined that “[s]imply put, the Court does not believe

that the evidence in this case indicates that there is a significant likelihood that the

female respondent or any child of both respondents would face FGM upon returning

to Kenya.” (Addendum at 81; emphasis added). For similar reasons, the immigration

judge concluded that petitioners were not eligible for withholding of removal or relief

under the CAT. The BIA affirmed without opinion, and later denied a motion to

reopen the proceedings.

We conclude that this case must be remanded to the agency for further

consideration, because we cannot determine that the immigration judge applied the

correct legal standard in rejecting Kipkemboi’s claim for asylum. The Supreme Court

has explained that a fear of persecution may be “well-founded” even where there is

less than a 50% chance that the act of persecution will take place, and the Court

endorsed the view of a commentator that a well-founded fear of persecution would

exist where every tenth adult male person in an applicant’s country of origin is either

put to death or sent to some remote labor camp. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.

421, 431 (1987). While the immigration judge appeared to acknowledge this

framework at an early stage of his opinion, the critical conclusion of the opinion’s

analysis section applied a standard requiring a “significant likelihood” of persecution.

The phrase “significant likelihood” has no universal definition, but it has been equated

with “more likely than not” by adjudicators in the immigration context and elsewhere.

E.g., Tagaga v. INS, 228 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that petitioner met

the higher standard for withholding of deportation where he established a “substantial

likelihood” that he would be tried for treason if removed to country of origin); Rogers

v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 654 n.3 (1st Cir. 1980) (observing that “[t]he exact meaning

of the term ‘substantial likelihood’ is unclear on its face,” and then agreeing with

suggestion of the district court and the parties that it should be construed to mean

“more likely than not”), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Mills v.

Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); cf. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,

Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 75 n.20 (1978) (equating “substantial likelihood” with “likely”);

Appellate Case: 05-4198 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/23/2007 Entry ID: 3270309
-4-

G.A. Thompson & Co., Inc. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 955 (5th Cir. 1981)

(characterizing “substantial likelihood” as a standard of proof higher than “reasonable

likelihood”).

 For these reasons, we cannot be confident that the immigration judge and the

BIA applied the proper legal standard in this case. We therefore grant the petition for

review and remand for further proceedings. See Corado v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 945,

948 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). We express no view on whether the evidence

compels the conclusion that petitioners have a well-founded fear of persecution upon

return to Kenya, and we leave the determination of eligibility for asylum to the

Attorney General in the first instance.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 05-4198 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/23/2007 Entry ID: 3270309