Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00137/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00137-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Willard Santos
Petitioner
D. Smith
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLARD SANTOS,

Petitioner,

v.

D. SMITH,

Respondent.

 /

1:08-cv-00137 OWW DLB HC

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER OF

DISMISSAL

[Doc. 12]

The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, was

dismissed and judgment was entered on April 11, 2008. (Court Docs. 10, 11.) Now pending

before the Court is Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, filed on April 24, 2008. (Court Doc.

12.) 

In his motion for reconsideration, Petitioner states that the Court did not address the

points of jurisdiction that he raised. Petitioner’s continues to challenge the constitutional validity

of his underlying conviction arising from the United States District Court in Tampa, Florida on

January 25, 2000. (Petition, at 3.) 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) governs the reconsideration of final orders of the

district court. The rule permits a district court to relieve a party from a final order or judgment

on the grounds of: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly

discovered evidence . . . ; (3) fraud . . . of an adverse party; (4) the judgement is void; (5) the

judgment has been satisfied . . . ; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of

Case 1:08-cv-00137-OWW -DLB Document 13 Filed 06/03/08 Page 1 of 2
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the judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). The motion for reconsideration must be made within a

reasonable time, in any event, “not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding

was entered or taken.” Id.

Motions to reconsider are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Combs v. Nick Garin

Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9 Cir. 1983) th

(en banc). To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce

the court to reverse its prior decision. See e.g., Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634

F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514

(9 Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[c]lause

th

60(b)(6) is residual and ‘must be read as being exclusive of the preceding clauses.’” LaFarge

Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement, 791 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986), quoting Corex

Corp. v. United States, 638 F.2d 119 (9 Cir. 1981). Accordingly, “the clause is reserved for th

‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Id.

Petitioner fails to meet this standard. Petitioner does not set forth any arguments or evidence

that have not already been considered by this Court. Petitioner’s arguments present no basis for

relief. Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 2, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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