Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-16-01951/USCOURTS-ca7-16-01951-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Megan J. Brennan
Appellee
Nancy Morrow
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 5, 2016*

Decided February 9, 2017

Before

          DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

         DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 15‐3593

NANCY MORROW,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

MEGAN J. BRENNAN,

POSTMASTER GENERAL,

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,

       Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 15 C 5846

Charles R. Norgle, Sr.,

Judge.

                                                 

* These appeals are successive to Morrow v. Donahoe, 564 F. App’x 859 (7th Cir.

2014), and have been submitted under Operating Procedure 6(b) to the original panel. We

have unanimously agreed to decide these cases without oral argument because the briefs

and records adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would

not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). Finally we have substituted

the current Postmaster General as the proper defendant in this suit. See FED. R. CIV. P.

25(d).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 16-1951 Document: 12 Filed: 02/09/2017 Pages: 5
Nos. 15‐3593, 16‐1945, & 16‐1951    Page 2

No. 16‐1945

NANCY MORROW,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

MEGAN J. BRENNAN,

POSTMASTER GENERAL,

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,

       Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 16 C 2342

Charles R. Norgle, Sr.,

Judge.

No. 16‐1951

NANCY MORROW,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

MEGAN J. BRENNAN,

POSTMASTER GENERAL,

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,

       Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 15 C 6906

Charles R. Norgle, Sr.,

Judge.

O R D E R

These consolidated appeals represent the latest in a series of efforts by plaintiff

Nancy Morrow to revive an employment‐discrimination suit that she lost more than four

years ago. The district court determined that claim preclusion barred her efforts.

We agree with that assessment and thus affirm the district court’s judgments. We add a

word of caution, that further frivolous efforts to continue to litigate these matters may

lead to sanctions against Morrow.

I. Prior Litigation

Over five years ago, when Morrow worked for the United States Postal Service,

she sued it for age discrimination and retaliation over a seven‐day suspension that she

received for working overtime without authorization. The district court dismissed her

complaint, but we reversed and allowed her to proceed on her claim of age

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Nos. 15‐3593, 16‐1945, & 16‐1951    Page 3

discrimination. See Morrow v. Donahoe, No. 12‐2666 (7th Cir. Nov. 2, 2012). On remand,

the uncontested evidence showed that, as part of a settlement, the suspension had been

reduced to an “official job discussion.” As a result, the district court entered summary

judgment against Morrow, reasoning that she had suffered no adverse employment

action. See Morrow v. Donahoe, No. 11 C 4349, 2013 WL 3776278 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 2013).

We affirmed. See Morrow v. Donahoe, 564 F. App’x 859 (7th Cir. 2014).

Morrow responded with two new lawsuits against the Postmaster General. In the

first she alleged that she had suffered age discrimination and retaliation when, among

other things, a supervisor wrote a “threatening” letter to her about her improper use of

sick time. See Morrow v. Donahoe, No. 14 C 3614, 2015 WL 3463554 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2015).

The district court granted summary judgment forthe Postmaster General, explaining that

Morrow had not pursued her administrative remedies for her age discrimination claim

and that the letter was not an adverse employment action. In the second suit Morrow

accused an attorney for the Postal Service of violating her constitutional rights by hacking

into an administrative law judge’s email account and forging an order dismissing her

complaint before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See Morrow v.

Donahoe, 15 C 761 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2015). The district court dismissed Morrow’s

complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction because Morrow did not properly serve the

attorney. In a consolidated decision we affirmed both judgments. See Morrow v. Brennan,

653 Fed. App’x 480 (7th Cir. 2016).

Between our first and second affirmances, Morrow filed six additional cases

against the Postmaster General. The district court ruled that, in light of her initial suit,

claim preclusion barred them all. See Morrow v. Donahoe, No. 15 C 6906 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14,

2016); Morrow v. Donahoe, No. 16 C 2342 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2016); Morrow v. Donahoe,

No. 15 C 5155 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2015); Morrow v. Donahoe, No. 15 C 5846 (N.D. Ill.

July 7, 2015); Morrow v. Donahoe, No. 15 C 5161 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 2015); Morrow v.

Donahoe, No. 15 C 760 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 2015 ). Morrow timely appealed three of those

judgments, and we have consolidated them for decision.

II. Cases Before the Court

In the first suit on appeal (15 C 5846), Morrow alleged that a supervisor violated

her right to due process by providing a false affidavit to the district court in Morrow’s

initial lawsuit (11 C 4349). Morrow raised this identical claim in 15 C 760, one of the cases

the district court dismissed on the basis of claim preclusion and that Morrow did not

appeal.

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Nos. 15‐3593, 16‐1945, & 16‐1951    Page 4

Morrow’s second suit (16 C 2342) is nearly incomprehensible. In the form

complaint, she provided no facts underlying her claim of employment discrimination.

In the portion of the form asking Morrow to state what relief she seeks, she wrote:   

Direct the defendant to (specify): unlawful and personal deprivation at the

hands of the postal serv. and I am a person aggrieved. At the US employee

credit union my zip code mail was changed to 60699. The Inspector office

which almost led to repossession of my car. A change of address was put in

and my mail was forward to Logan Square post office. Financial hardship

(Mistakes in original.) Without further elaboration, she attached to her complaint various

documents from her initial lawsuit (11 C 4349).

Finally, in the third suit (15 C 6906), Morrow accused another Postal Service

attorney of interfering with a different EEOC proceeding. Similar to her allegations in

case 15 C 761, she said that an attorney had hacked into a judge’s email account to

“fraudulently deny” her complaint. Her complaint in this third suit was virtually

identical to the one she filed in case number 15 C 5161, yet another case that the district

court dismissed on the basis of claim preclusion and that Morrow did not appeal.   

III. Analysis

Morrow appeals these three judgments, but she does not contend that the district

court erred in dismissing her suits. She has thus waived any appellate issue by failing to

develop any meaningful argument for our review. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8); Rahn v. Bd.

of Trustees of N. Ill. Univ., 803 F.3d 285, 295 (7th Cir. 2015).

In any case, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that claim preclusion bars

the three suits that Morrow has appealed. That doctrine prohibits “‘successive litigation

of the very same claim’ by the same parties,” Whole Womanʹs Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S.Ct.

2292, 2305 (2016) (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001)), as well as

litigation of claims that could have been raised during an earlier proceeding but were not.

See Bell v. Taylor, 827 F.3d 699, 706 (7th Cir. 2016). Although claim preclusion is an

affirmative defense, see FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1), a district court may raise the issue sua

sponte when preclusion clearly applies. See Turley v. Gaetz, 625 F.3d 1005, 1013 (7th Cir.

2010); Kratville v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 195, 198 (7th Cir. 1996).

The first suit—about the false affidavit in her initial suit—is identical to the claim

that she presented, and the district court resolved, in 15 C 760. It is therefore claim‐

precluded. The second suit, which to the extent it is coherent attacks how the Postal

Service treated Morrow during the time before her initial suit, raises claims that she did

raise or could have raised in that suit, 11 C 4349. It is thus also barred by claim preclusion.

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Nos. 15‐3593, 16‐1945, & 16‐1951    Page 5

The third suit, which concerns an attorney’s alleged hacking into a judge’s email account,

mirrors the same claim raised and decided in 15 C 5161. Consequently it too is claim‐

precluded. See Bell, 827 F.3d at 706.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment in each case. We end with

a warning. These three suits represent the sixth, seventh, and eighth times that Morrow

has sued the Postal Service or Postmaster General since 2014, when we affirmed the grant

of summary judgment against her on her initial claim of age discrimination. Morrow is

warned that further repetitious litigation arising from her Postal Service employment

would be frivolous and invite sanctions, including possible monetary sanctions that if

unpaid will lead to a circuit‐wide filing bar. See Support Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d

185, 186 (7th Cir. 1995).

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