Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01137/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01137-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Antonio Fabela
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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The Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the Western District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 07-1137

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Antonio Fabela,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

Western District of Arkansas

[UNPUBLISHED]

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Submitted: November 12, 2007

 Filed: November 27, 2007

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Before MURPHY, HANSEN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Antonio Fabela appeals from the final judgment entered by the district court1

after he pleaded guilty to controlling a storage unit for the purpose of storing cocaine

and methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. We

affirm.

Appellate Case: 07-1137 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/27/2007 Entry ID: 3375924
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On appeal, Fabela does not challenge the district court's compliance with Fed.

R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3) prior to its acceptance of the plea. In effect, Fabela concedes that

there was an adequate factual basis for his plea when the district court formally

accepted it. 

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Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Fabela agreed to plead guilty to

controlling a storage unit for the purpose of storing methamphetamine and cocaine.

See § 856(a)(2). In exchange, the government agreed to move to dismiss the four

remaining counts for drug conspiracy and drug possession with the intent to distribute.

At the subsequent change-of-plea hearing, the district court questioned Fabela and

determined that his plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by an adequate

factual basis. In open court, Fabela affirmed that he had, in fact, made the storage unit

available for use to others with the knowledge that one or more of these individuals

intended to use, or used, the storage unit for the purpose of storing a controlled

substance. At no point during the hearing did Fabela indicate that he was innocent or

that he desired to maintain his prior plea of not guilty. At the conclusion of the

change-of-plea hearing, the district court accepted Fabela's plea and adjudged him

guilty of count 5. A Presentence Investigation Report (PSIR) was ordered. 

At sentencing, the district court addressed several objections to the PSIR,

making two rulings (denial of "safety valve" relief and a mitigating-role reduction)

adverse to Fabela. The district court then formally approved the plea agreement,2

 and

proceeded to announce an advisory Guidelines range of 108 to 135 months.

Significantly, the district court utilized the drug quantity that the parties had agreed

to in the plea agreement in making its advisory Guidelines range determination.

When the district court offered Fabela a chance to make a statement immediately prior

to the imposition of his sentence, Fabela undermined the factual basis for his plea by

claiming that the drugs found in the storage unit were not his: "I swear to God that

what I'm being blamed for wasn't mine." (Sent. Tr. at 58.)

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 Fabela makes no attempt to set aside his plea on direct appeal pursuant to Fed.

R. Crim. P. 11(e).

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The district court discounted Fabela's comments and announced its intention to

sentence Fabela to 114 months' imprisonment. The district court then asked Fabela's

counsel whether she had any objections. Counsel consulted with Fabela off the record

and reported: "I've recommended to my client that we make no objection to what your

intentions are. My client has conceded in that and advised me that that was acceptable

to him. So we make no objections to your stated intentions." (Id. at 62.) The district

court then imposed a 114-month sentence.

Fabela's primary argument on appeal is that after he expressed his innocence,

the district court, on its own motion, was obligated to either advise Fabela that he

could make a motion to withdraw his plea or rehabilitate the factual basis for his plea.3

We respectfully disagree.

Rule 11 requires the district court to independently ensure, and document on the

record, that there is an adequate factual basis for a guilty plea before accepting that

plea. Fed. R. Crim P. 11(b)(3); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).

After the district court accepts the plea, the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate

"a fair and just reason" for withdrawing the plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B); U.S.

v. Mugan, 441 F.3d 622, 630-31 (8th Cir. 2006). It follows that, in most cases, the

defendant must make a motion in order to withdraw his plea after it has been accepted.

We review Fabela's claim that the district court should have sua sponte advised

him that he could make a motion to withdraw his already-accepted plea, or should

have sua sponte rehabilitated the already-established factual basis for Fabela's plea,

for an abuse of discretion. Cf. Mugan, 441 F.3d at 630 (reviewing the district court's

denial of a motion to withdraw for an abuse of discretion). 

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Here, there is no basis for concluding that the district court abused its

discretion. Before the district court accepted Fabela's plea, it had already ensured that

there was a sufficient factual basis for the plea. Fabela was represented by competent

counsel, presumed to know the procedure for withdrawing a plea after it has been

accepted. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). Yet Fabela made

no motion to withdraw his plea. In fact, after Fabela consulted with counsel following

his claim of innocence, Fabela's counsel assured the district court that its intended

sentence "was acceptable to [Fabela]." (Sent. Tr. at 62.) Implicit in this statement is

the representation that Fabela did not wish to withdraw his plea. 

Additionally, Fabela's comments were made immediately prior to the actual

imposition of his sentence, after the district court had denied two of his objections to

the PSIR and after the district court had announced the applicable advisory Guidelines

range. It is clear from the record that Fabela's belated claim of innocence was

motivated, at least in part, by his unhappiness with the district court's intended

sentence, an insufficient basis for withdrawing a plea. See United States v. Stuttley,

103 F.3d 684, 686 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Post-plea regrets by a defendant caused by

contemplation of the prison term he faces are not a fair and just reason for a district

court to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea, or for this court to reverse the

district court."). We also note that our rejection of Fabela's position is consistent with

the law of this circuit. See, e.g., Schone v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 1994)

("Schone's argument that the trial court sua sponte should have given him an

opportunity to withdraw his pleas is without merit."); Paulson v. Black, 728 F.2d

1164, 1167 (8th Cir. 1984) ("We also reject Paulson's argument that on its own motion

the trial court should have offered him the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.").

We also reject out of hand Fabela's pure policy claim that "District Courts

should require U.S. Attorneys to reasonably translate indictments and documents into

Spanish." (Fabela's Br. at 16.) The record indicates that Fabela was provided with a

court-appointed, certified translator for consultation with his counsel, at the changeAppellate Case: 07-1137 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/27/2007 Entry ID: 3375924
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of-plea hearing and at the sentencing hearing. Fabela affirmed that the plea agreement

was in fact translated into Spanish, and that after going over the plea agreement with

counsel several times, he understood the agreement. Because nothing more is

necessary, Fabela's claims are without merit. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

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Appellate Case: 07-1137 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/27/2007 Entry ID: 3375924