Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02167/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02167-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carmen Cesar Rios-Ramirez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Ca~rt ~f Appeals Tenth Ctrcutt 

APR 2 1991 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL&OBERT L. HOECKER 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 89-2167 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

CARMEN CESAR RIOS-RAMIREZ, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Clerk 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. CR 89-0085-JC-01) 

Submitted on the Briefs:* 

William L. Lutz, United States Attorney, and Mary L. Higgins, Assistant u.s. Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for PlaintiffAppellee. 

William D. Fry, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Las Cruces, New 

Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. 

* The parties to this appeal have indicated that oral argument 

is not desired. After ~xamining the briefs and the appellate 

record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that 

oral argument would not materially assist the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 89-2167 Document: 01019292084 Date Filed: 04/02/1991 Page: 1 
Before BRORBY and McWILLIAMS, C~rcu~t . · J u d ges, and SPARR,** 

District Judge. 

McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. 

** Honorable Daniel B. Sparr, United States District Judge for 

the District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2167 Document: 01019292084 Date Filed: 04/02/1991 Page: 2 
Carmen Cesar Rios-Ramirez, the driver and sole occupant of a 

1974 Ford Cougar, entered the United States from the Republic of 

Mexico at the Port of Entry at Columbus, New Mexico, on February 

3, 1989, at approximately 4:30 p.m. Because Rios-Ramirez appeared 

"nervous," the Customs agents asked him to step out of the 

vehicle. A "sniffer dog" was placed near the vehicle and the dog 

"alerted" to the side panels of the vehicle. A subsequent search 

of the vehicle disclosed 22.68 kilograms of marijuana concealed in 

the door panels. Rios-Ramirez advised the agents that he did not 

know there was marijuana hidden in the door panels of the vehicle 

he was driving. In this connection, Rios-Ramirez stated that he 

had recently purchased the vehicle from one Raul Jose Contreras in 

Texas and that he was at the time of his arrest en route from 

Mexico to California 

counsel, Rios-Ramirez 

vehicle. 

to 

was 

meet 

going 

Contreras, 

to obtain 

where, according to 

the title to the 

Based on the foregoing chronology, Rios-Ramirez was charged 

in Count one of a two-count indictment with importing less than 

fifty kilograms of marijuana into the United States from the 

Republic of Mexico in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 952(a), 21 u.s.c. § 

960(a)(1) and (b)(4). In a second count Rios-Ramirez was charged 

with possession of less than fifty kilograms of marijuana with an 

intent to distribute, in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 841(a)(1), and 

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D). 

The government and Rios-Ramirez later entered into a plea 

agreement whereby Rios-Ramirez agreed to plead guilty to Count one 

and the government agreed to dismiss Count two. In that same 

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Appellate Case: 89-2167 Document: 01019292084 Date Filed: 04/02/1991 Page: 3 
agreement the government and Rios-Ramirez agreed that under the 

provisions of the United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines 

Manual (hereinafter referred to as "Sentencing Guidelines"), RiosRamirez was entitled to a two-level reduction in his base offense 

level for acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal 

conduct and a further reduction of two levels because he was only 

a minor participant in the criminal conduct alleged in the indictment. A further provision in the agreement provided that the parties understood that the district court was not bound by their 

stipulations concerning acceptance of responsibility and minor 

participation. 

Pursuant to the plea agreement, Rios-Ramirez pled guilty to 

Count one of the indictment. At sentencing, the government 

dismissed Count two. During the hearing at which Rios-Ramirez 

entered his plea of guilty, the district judge advised him that 

the court was not bound by the stipulations contained in the plea 

agreement and Rios-Ramirez stated that he understood such to be 

the case. 

The presentence report fixed Rios-Ramirez' base offense level 

at 18 and his criminal history category at I, resulting in a 

guideline range of 27 to 33 months imprisonment. In so doing, the 

pre-sentence report recommended no reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility or minor participation. 

At sentencing, defense counsel did not ask for any reduction 

for acceptance of responsibility. Indeed, it was Rios-Ramirez' 

contention throughout the proceedings that he did not know that 

there was marijuana hidden in the door panels of the vehicle he 

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Appellate Case: 89-2167 Document: 01019292084 Date Filed: 04/02/1991 Page: 4 
was driving at the time of his arrest. It was in this setting 

that defense counsel advised the district court that Rios-Ramirez' 

plea of guilty was being entered on the basis of North Carolina v. 

Alford, 400 u.s. 25 (1970). 1 

However, defense counsel at sentencing did request that under 

Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.2(b), Rios-Ramirez was entitled to 

have his base offense level reduced by two levels because he was 

only a minor participant in the drug importation. Such a reduction would have set Rios-Ramirez' base offense level at 16, 

resulting in a guideline range of only 21 to 27 months imprisonment. 

Although the district court made no specific reference to 

counsel's request for a reduction in Rios-Ramirez' base offense 

level for his claimed minor participation in the drug importation, 

the district judge obviously rejected the request when he 

sentenced Rios-Ramirez to 33 months imprisonment, the maximum allowed by the Sentencing Guidelines for a defendant with a base offense level of 18 and a criminal history category of I. 

On appeal, counsel presents one issue for review: "Whether 

the court committed error by failing to accord a two-level reduction to the base offense level as a result of appellant's minor 

participation in the offense." We find no error. 

1 In Alford, 400 u.s. at 37, the Supreme Court stated that an 

accused may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to 

the imposition of a prison sentence even though he is unwilling to 

admit participation in the crime, or even if his guilty plea 

contains a protestation of innocence where he intelligently 

concludes that his best interest requires a guilty plea and the 

record strongly evidences guilt. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2167 Document: 01019292084 Date Filed: 04/02/1991 Page: 5 
United States v. Pelayo-Munoz, 905 F.2d 1429 (lOth Cir. 1990) 

is almost a carbon copy of the instant case. There the defendant 

was charged in a one-count indictment with the possession with an 

intent to distribute more than fifty kilograms of marijuana. The 

defendant eventually pleaded guilty, and as a part of the plea 

agreement, the government and the defendant agreed that the 

defendant was entitled to a two-level reduction in his base offense level for acceptance of responsibility and another two-level 

reduction because he was only a minor participant in the criminal 

activity alleged in the indictment. Another provision in the plea 

agreement provided that these stipulations were not binding on the 

court. Later, the district court did not accept the stipulations 

in the plea agreement and, inter alia, refused to reduce the 

defendant's base offense level by two levels based on his claimed 

minor participation in the criminal activity. 

The defendant in Pelayo-Munoz was stopped by United States 

Border Patrol Agents while traveling northward on Interstate 25 

near Hatch, New Mexico. A search of his vehicle revealed 128 

pounds of marijuana. The defendant's contention was that he was a 

"mere courier" and therefore entitled to a two-level reduction in 

his base offense level for being a minor participant in the 

criminal activity. As indicated, the district court refused to 

classify the defendant as a minor participant and on appeal we 

affirmed. In so doing, we held that "[t]he fact that a defendant 

is a courier does not necessarily mean that he is a minor 

participant under section 3B1.2 of the Guidelines" and that the 

defendant there had failed to prove by a preponderance of the 

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Appellate Case: 89-2167 Document: 01019292084 Date Filed: 04/02/1991 Page: 6 
evidence that he was only a minor participant. Pelayo-Munoz, 905 

F.2d at 1430-31. To this same effect, see United States v. 

Maldonado-Campos, 920 F.2d 714, 717 (lOth Cir. 1990); United 

States v. Donaldson, 915 F.2d 612, 615 (lOth Cir. 1990); United 

States v. Calderon-Porras, 911 F.2d 421, 423-24 (lOth Cir. 1990); 

and United States v. Arredondo-Santos, 911 F.2d 424, 426 (lOth 

Cir. 1990). 

In the instant case, the record was not such as to require 

the district court to find that Rios-Ramirez was but a minor 

participant in the criminal activity alleged in the indictment. 

The inescapable fact is, of course, that Rios-Ramirez was the 

driver and sole occupant of a vehicle which was stopped at the 

border, and which, after a search, was found to contain a quantity 

of marijuana secreted in its door panels. Rios-Ramirez told the 

agents that he didn't know the marijuana was hidden in his 

vehicle, but, had he gone to trial, the question of whether he had 

guilty knowledge would have been an issue to be resolved by the 

jury notwithstanding his protestation that he did not know there 

was marijuana in his car. In like fashion, the district court was 

not bound to accept Rios-Ramirez' self-serving suggestion that the 

prior owner of the vehicle had probably placed the marijuana in 

the car. And even if he was a mere courier, we said in ArredondoSantos, that "couriers are indispensable to any drug-dealing 

network." 911 F.2d at 426. See also Calderon-Porras, 911 F.2d at 

423. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2167 Document: 01019292084 Date Filed: 04/02/1991 Page: 7 
We reject the suggestion that the district court was somehow 

compelled to hold that under Sentencing Guidelines § 3Bl.2, RiosRamirez was "less culpable" than, for example, the party who, according to Rios-Ramirez, had recently sold him the vehicle. So 

far as the record is concerned, the "other party" in this case was 

a figment of Rios-Ramirez' imagination. That is to say, there is 

nothing in the record to corroborate Rios-Ramirez' story. 2 

2 In his reply brief counsel for the first time raises the issue of non-compliance with Sentencing Guidelines § 6Al.3. That 

guideline provides that a district court shall resolve sentencing 

factors in dispute, notify the parties of its tentative findings, 

and provide a reasonable opportunity for submission of oral or 

written objections before sentencing. From the record before us, 

it would appear that the district court did not comply with § 

6Al.3. However, that guideline was not drawn to the attention of 

the district court. In such circumstance, we find a waiver. Cf. 

United States v. Fortenbury, 917 F.2d 477, 480 (lOth Cir. 1990) 

(where, in rejecting defendant's argument that he was denied an 

evidentiary hearing on disputed matters in the presentence report 

pursuant to § 6Al.3, we noted that defendant's counsel never 

requested such a hearing); and United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 

1558, 1566 (lOth Cir. 1990) (stating that although defendant's 

failure to ask for an evidentiary hearing upon disputed facts, as 

allowed by § 6Al.3, is not dispositive on appeal, it is a factor 

which we consider because the defendant is in the best position to 

inform the district court of the value of an evidentiary hearing). 

In any event, Rios-Ramirez and his counsel had ample opportunity 

to comment on and object both orally and in writing to disputed 

factors in the presentence report before the imposition of the 

sentence, in compliance with the thrust of § 6Al.3. See 

Fortenbury, 917 F.2d at 480; and Rutter, 897 F.2d at 1566. Hence, 

any possible error in this regard was harmless. 

In the context of asserting non-compliance with § 6Al.3, 

counsel also claims in his reply brief that the district court 

erred by failing to make specific findings of fact with respect to 

his argument that Rios-Ramirez was entitled to a reduction in his 

base offense level because he was a minor participant in the 

criminal activity. The record is clear that the district court 

rejected counsel's request for a reduction in Rios-Ramirez' base 

offense level for his claimed minor participant status when it 

imposed the highest sentence allowed by the Sentencing Guidelines 

for a defendant with a base offense level of 18 and a criminal 

history category of I. In our view, the district court did not 

err. See United States v. Hand, 913 F.2d 854, 857 (lOth Cir. 

1990) (defendant's disagreement over the presentence report's 

legal conclusion that he was not entitled to a reduction in his 

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Appellate Case: 89-2167 Document: 01019292084 Date Filed: 04/02/1991 Page: 8 
Judgment affirmed. 

base offense level for his claimed minor participation in the offense did not allege factual inaccuracies in the presentence 

report requiring specific findings by the sentencing court); see 

also United States v. Hart, 922 F.2d 613, 615-16 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

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Appellate Case: 89-2167 Document: 01019292084 Date Filed: 04/02/1991 Page: 9