Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00887/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00887-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Manuel Andrade
Defendant
County of San Joaquin
Defendant
Jonathan Earl Danner
Plaintiff

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JONATHAN EARL DANNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN and 

MANUEL ANDRADE,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-0887-MCE-EFB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jonathan Earl Danner (“Plaintiff”) alleges several causes of action against

Defendants San Joaquin County and Manuel Andrade (collectively, “Defendants”) 

stemming from Plaintiff’s alleged unlawful arrest on April 11, 2014. Defendants have 

filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF 

No. 13. Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion (ECF No. 15), and Defendants filed a 

Reply (ECF No. 16). For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in 

part and DENIED in part.

1

///

///

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 Because oral argument would not have been of material assistance, the Court ordered this 

matter submitted on the briefs. See E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g).

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BACKGROUND2

From March 2013 to December 2013, Plaintiff employed Jonathan Jackson at 

Plaintiff’s hauling and handyman business. The employment relationship ended when 

Plaintiff terminated Jackson because of his work performance. In January 2014, 

Jackson started a physical altercation with Plaintiff and deliberately broke the window of 

Plaintiff’s vehicle. Another altercation between Jackson and Plaintiff occurred on 

April 11, 2014. The Complaint makes clear that Plaintiff and Jackson provided law 

enforcement with conflicting accounts of what transpired that morning.3

A. Plaintiff’s Account

At approximately 5:30 a.m. on April 11, 2014, Plaintiff awoke in his home to the 

sound of a revving car engine. Plaintiff looked out his bedroom window and saw 

Jackson’s friend Jorge Burns sitting in a vehicle; Plaintiff also heard Jackson shouting 

obscenities from the vehicle. Plaintiff walked outside, grabbed his dog, put the dog in his 

truck, and went back inside his house. Plaintiff was about to return outside when he 

heard glass shatter. Plaintiff observed Burns running away from Plaintiff’s truck and 

observed a brick in the passenger cabin of the truck. Plaintiff’s dog suffered severe 

injuries as a result of Burns throwing the brick through the windshield of Plaintiff’s truck. 

Plaintiff called 911 and pursued Burns and Jackson in his truck. San Joaquin 

County Sheriff Deputy Manuel Andrade (“Deputy Andrade”) reported to Plaintiff’s 

residence and took Plaintiff’s statement. Deputy Andrade observed Plaintiff’s dog 

bleeding profusely from its forehead and further noted the damage to Plaintiff’s truck. 

B. Jackson’s Account, According to Plaintiff’s Complaint

Deputy Andrade subsequently located and interviewed Jackson. Jackson 

admitted that he had broken Plaintiff’s window during a prior confrontation with Plaintiff

 2

 The following statement of facts is based entirely on the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF 

No. 1).

3

 The Complaint describes in detail both Plaintiff’s and Jackson’s version of events. 

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and stated he was paying Plaintiff for that damage. Jackson also admitted that he had 

encountered Plaintiff earlier in the morning of April 11, 2014. However, Jackson 

incorrectly stated that the encounter occurred at the Tower Mart at 147 East Lathrop 

Road and that Plaintiff instigated the confrontation. 

Jackson further stated that after the confrontation at Tower Mart, he took Burns to 

work and returned home. Ten minutes after that, Plaintiff appeared in front of Jackson’s 

residence and brandished a small gun. Plaintiff allegedly told Jackson to meet him 

around the corner. When Plaintiff drove around the corner, Jackson threw a rock at 

Plaintiff’s truck and shattered its window. Plaintiff then exited his truck with the gun, and 

Jackson threw another rock at Plaintiff. Plaintiff responded by throwing the rock back at 

Jackson, retrieving a brick from the back of his truck, and throwing the brick at Jackson. 

Plaintiff drove away in his truck, only to return in a different vehicle. Jackson did not 

offer Deputy Andrade an explanation regarding the dog’s injuries. 

C. Plaintiff’s Arrest

After hearing Jackson’s account, Deputy Andrade arrested Plaintiff for making 

criminal threats, brandishing a firearm, and making a false police report. Plaintiff 

suggests Deputy Andrade’s decision to arrest him and not Jackson was based on the 

fact that Plaintiff was convicted of battery on a police officer more than twenty years ago, 

a conviction for which he has since encountered “constant harassment from the police.” 

Compl. at 9. 

 Plaintiff spent six days in the San Joaquin County Jail before posting bail. 

Although the San Joaquin County District Attorney initially charged Plaintiff with the three 

offenses for which he was arrested, the District Attorney dismissed the charges on 

September 25, 2014. 

D. Plaintiff’s Complaint and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint identifies five causes of action: (1) false arrest under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) false arrest in violation of the California Constitution; (3) malicious 

prosecution; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5) a vicarious liability 

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claim against Defendant San Joaquin County under California Government Code section 

815.2(a).

4

 Defendants seek dismissal of all five causes of action. 

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6),5 all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and 

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 

Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 

47 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require 

detailed factual allegations. However, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of 

his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion 

couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles 

Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) 

(stating that the pleading must contain something more than “a statement of facts that 

merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.”)).

Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket 

assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Id. at 556 n.3 (internal citations and quotations 

 4

 Contrary to Plaintiff’s Opposition, there are no “allegations of excessive force” in the Complaint. 

Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 15, at 6. 

5 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise noted.

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omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how 

a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature 

of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 Charles Alan 

Wright & Arthur R. Miller, supra, at § 1202). A pleading must contain “only enough facts 

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . have 

not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint 

must be dismissed.” Id. However, “[a] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it 

strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery 

is very remote and unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 

(1974)).

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to 

grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no 

“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice 

to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the 

amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to 

be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors 

merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . 

carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 

185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that 

“the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Group, 

Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 

1013 (9th Cir. 2005); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 

1989) (“Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . 

constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .”)).

///

///

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ANALYSIS

Defendants advance several arguments in their Motion to Dismiss. The Court will 

address each in turn.

A. California Government Code Section 945.6(a)

Defendants argue that the second, fourth, and fifth causes of action should be 

dismissed on the ground that Plaintiff failed to file this action within six months of 

receiving notice that San Joaquin County had rejected his tort claim against the County. 

See generally Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.6(a) (“any suit brought against a public entity . . . 

must be commenced . . . not later than six months after the date [a letter rejecting a tort 

claim against the entity] is personally delivered or deposited in the mail”). Defendant

argues that the County rejected Plaintiff’s claim on October 23, 2014, that Plaintiff 

therefore should have commenced this action no later than April 23, 2015, and that 

Plaintiff’s state law claims are untimely because he did not file his Complaint until 

April 24, 2015. 

However, Plaintiff filed a civil cover sheet and a motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis on April 23, 2015. See ECF Nos. 2, 3. Although “[a] civil action is commenced 

by filing a complaint with the court,” see Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 (emphasis 

added), Plaintiff’s Opposition to the pending Motion explains that the Complaint was 

inadvertently separated from the documents filed on April 23, 2015, ECF No. 15 at 4. 

The Court, although skeptical of Plaintiff’s explanation, will not dismiss the second, 

fourth, and fifth causes of action on the ground that Plaintiff has failed to comply with 

section 945.6(a). Defendants’ Motion is therefore DENIED to the extent it seeks 

dismissal of those causes of action pursuant to section 945.6(a).6

///

///

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 Defendants’ Requests for Judicial Notice (ECF Nos. 13-2), which relate to Defendants’ section 

945.6(a) argument, are DENIED as moot. 

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A. First Cause of Action

Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges that Deputy Andrade’s arrest of Plaintiff was 

an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. Deputy Andrade seeks dismissal of the claim on the grounds that he is 

entitled to qualified immunity. 

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil 

liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known. A clearly established 

right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable 

official would have understood that what he is doing violates 

that right. . . . 

The dispositive question is whether the violative nature of 

particular conduct is clearly established. This inquiry must be 

undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as 

a broad general proposition. 

Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

In the context of an unlawful arrest, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity “if 

he reasonably believed there to have been probable cause.” Rosenbaum v. Washoe 

Cnty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). “Framing the reasonableness 

question somewhat differently, the question in determining whether qualified immunity 

applies is whether all reasonable officers would agree that there was no probable cause 

in this instance.” Id. at 1078. 

Probable cause to arrest exists when officers have 

knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to 

lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an 

offense has been or is being committed by the person being 

arrested. Alternatively, this court has defined probable cause 

as follows: when under the totality of circumstances known 

to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have 

concluded that there was a fair probability that [the 

defendant] had committed a crime.

United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

///

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At this stage of the litigation, the Court cannot find that Deputy Andrade is entitled 

to qualified immunity on the unlawful arrest claim. As noted above, on Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss, the Court must construe all allegations in the Complaint in the light 

most favorable to Plaintiff. The Complaint suggests that Deputy Andrade arrested 

Plaintiff solely on Jackson’s account (i.e., that Plaintiff brandished a gun and threw a 

brick at Jackson). While Jackson’s account, in isolation, could arguably lead a prudent 

person to conclude that there was a fair probability that Plaintiff had committed a crime, 

the probable cause analysis requires that the Court examine the totality of the 

circumstances known to Deputy Andrade. 

There are several allegations in the Complaint that indicate the account Jackson 

provided Deputy Andrade was less than credible. Of particular relevance is the 

absurdity of Jackson’s account—that is, that Jackson’s response to Plaintiff’s alleged 

brandishing of a gun was to throw a rock at Plaintiff’s truck and that Jackson threw 

another a rock at Plaintiff when Plaintiff exited his truck with the gun—and that Jackson 

admitted having shattered the window of Plaintiff’s vehicle during a prior confrontation. 

See also Compl. at 5 (“Deputy Andrade arrested plaintiff even though the deputy never 

found the gun plaintiff supposedly brandished.”). Construing the allegations in the 

Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Jackson’s statement—the only evidence 

of Plaintiff’s alleged criminal activity—was not believable. Deputy Andrade therefore did 

not have “knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of 

reasonable caution to believe” that Plaintiff had committed an offense, and it was not 

reasonable for him to believe that he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.7 Deputy 

Andrade is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the litigation.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED to the extent it seeks 

dismissal of the first cause of action.

///

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 This finding renders unnecessary any discussion of Deputy Andrade’s argument that the first 

and second causes of action should also be dismissed because Plaintiff has “fail[ed] to plead the required

‘lack of probable cause’ element.” Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 13-1, at 12. 

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B. Second Cause of Action

Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges that Deputy Andrade’s arrest of Plaintiff 

was an unreasonable seizure in violation of the California Constitution. Deputy Andrade

seeks dismissal of the second cause of action on the grounds that it is untimely under 

the applicable statute of limitations and that he is entitled to statutory immunity. The 

Court will address each of these arguments.

1. Statute of Limitations

Deputy Andrade correctly notes that (1) under California Code of Civil Procedure 

section 340(c), “[a]n action for . . . false imprisonment”8 shall be brought within one year, 

(2) according to the Complaint, Deputy Andrade arrested Plaintiff on April 11, 2014, and 

(3) Plaintiff did not file this action until April 24, 2015. Defendants argue that because 

Plaintiff did not commence this suit within one year of the arrest, section 340(c) bars and 

the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause of action.

Plaintiff did not even acknowledge Deputy Andrade’s section 340(c) argument in 

his Opposition. Nevertheless, both Plaintiff and Deputy Andrade have overlooked

California Government Code sections 945.3 and 352.1(a). Section 945.3 provides:

No person charged by indictment, information, complaint, or 

other accusatory pleading charging a criminal offense may 

bring a civil action for money or damages against a peace 

officer or the public entity employing a peace officer based 

upon conduct of the peace officer relating to the offense for 

which the accused is charged, including an act or omission in 

investigating or reporting the offense or arresting or detaining 

the accused, while the charges against the accused are 

pending before a superior court.

Any applicable statute of limitations for filing and prosecuting 

these actions shall be tolled during the period that the 

charges are pending before a superior court.

Applied here, section 945.3 tolled the limitations period from the date the District 

Attorney filed the information against Plaintiff (April 15, 2014) to the date the District 

Attorney dropped the charges against Plaintiff (September 25, 2014). Moreover, under 

 8

 “In California, false arrest and false imprisonment are not separate torts.” George v. City of 

Long Beach, 973 F.2d 706, 710 (9th Cir. 1992).

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California Code of Civil Procedure section 352.1(a), the limitations period was also tolled 

while Plaintiff was incarcerated at the San Joaquin County Jail. See generally Elliott v. 

City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing the district court because the 

statute of limitations was tolled “commencing at the [plaintiff’s] arrest and continuing 

through his custody”). The Complaint indicates that Plaintiff was incarcerated for six 

days beginning on April 11, 2014. 

Thus, applying sections 845.3 and 352.1(a), the limitations period was tolled from 

the date that Deputy Andrade arrested Plaintiff (April 11, 2014) to the date the District 

Attorney dropped the charges against Plaintiff (September 25, 2014). Plaintiff therefore 

had until September 26, 2015 to file a complaint containing his second cause of action. 

Because Plaintiff filed his Complaint in April 2015—months before the expiration of the 

one-year limitations period—the claim is not untimely under section 340(c).

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED to the extent that it seeks dismissal 

of the second cause of action on the ground it is untimely under section 340(c). 

2. Statutory Immunity

Deputy Andrade also argues he is entitled to statutory immunity under California 

Penal Code section 847(b), which provides that “[t]here shall be no civil liability” for false 

arrest if the arresting officer “had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful.” As 

explained above, construing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Deputy 

Andrade did not have reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful. Accordingly, 

Defendants’ Motion is DENIED to the extent that it seeks dismissal of the second cause 

of action on the ground that Deputy Andrade is entitled to immunity under section 

847(b).

C. Third Cause of Action

Plaintiff’s third cause of action is a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against 

Deputy Andrade. Deputy Andrade seeks dismissal of the claim on the ground that it is 

inadequately pled.

///

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“In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must 

show that the defendants prosecuted him with malice and without probable cause, and 

that they did so for the purpose of denying him equal protection or another specific 

constitutional right.” Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004)

(internal bracketing and quotation marks omitted). Deputy Andrade argues that Plaintiff 

has failed to adequately plead a malicious prosecution claim because (1) the Complaint 

makes clear that there was probable cause to prosecute Plaintiff and (2) Plaintiff has not 

alleged that Deputy Andrade improperly influenced the District Attorney to file criminal 

charges. The Court will address each of these arguments.

1. Probable Cause 

For the same reasons the Court found that, construing the allegations in the 

Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it was not reasonable for Deputy 

Andrade to believe that he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, the Court finds that 

there was not probable cause to prosecute Plaintiff (i.e., the charges were based entirely 

on Jackson’s less than credible account). 

2. Presumption of Prosecutorial Independence

Although malicious prosecution actions are not limited to suits against 

prosecutors, there is a “presumption of prosecutorial independence” that ordinarily 

precludes liability for individuals that participated in the investigation or filed a report that 

resulted in the initiation of proceedings. Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1066, 1067. But that 

presumption does not bar a subsequent § 1983 claim against an individual “who 

improperly exerted pressure on the prosecutor, knowingly provided misinformation to 

him, concealed exculpatory evidence, or otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad faith 

conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the initiation of legal proceedings.” Id.

at 1067. Applied here, Plaintiff’s Complaint sufficiently alleges that Deputy Andrade 

engaged in wrongful or bad faith conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the 

District Attorney to file charges against Plaintiff. Specifically, the Complaint states: 

“Deputy Andrade knew he did not have probable cause to arrest plaintiff, but that Deputy 

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Andrade’s arrest of plaintiff was done maliciously, with the intent to harm plaintiff . . . .” 

Compl. at 9. Plaintiff further alleges that “Deputy Andrade’s conduct was a substantial 

factor in causing plaintiff’s harm.” Id. Plaintiff also suggests that the real motivation 

behind Deputy Andrade’s decision to arrest Plaintiff and file the inaccurate police report 

was his knowledge of Plaintiff’s prior conviction for battery on a police officer. 

Because Plaintiff has alleged that Deputy Andrade engaged in wrongful or bad 

faith conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the District Attorney to file charges 

against Plaintiff, the presumption of prosecutorial independence does not bar Plaintiff’s 

malicious prosecution claim against Deputy Andrade. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss is DENIED to the extent that it seeks dismissal of the third cause of action on 

the ground that Plaintiff has inadequately pled a malicious prosecution claim. 

D. Fourth Cause of Action

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is an intentional infliction of emotional distress 

(“IIED”) claim against Deputy Andrade. An IIED claim consists of the following elements:

(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with 

the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the 

probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s 

suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual 

and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the 

defendant’s outrageous conduct.

Doe v. Gangland Prods., Inc., 730 F.3d 946, 960 (9th Cir. 2013). Deputy Andrade seeks 

dismissal of Plaintiff’s IIED claim on the ground that Plaintiff has not alleged extreme or 

outrageous conduct or that he suffered severe emotional distress. 

The Court finds that Deputy Andrade’s decision to arrest Plaintiff solely on the 

less than credible account of Jackson, which resulted in Plaintiff’s incarceration at the 

San Joaquin County Jail for six days and a criminal prosecution, may amount to extreme 

and outrageous conduct for purposes of IIED. See Hamre v. City of Bothell, 81 F. App’x 

260, 263 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he district court erred in dismissing Hamre’s intentional 

infliction of emotional distress claim by failing to recognize that being prosecuted on 

///

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trumped up charges amounts to more than ‘mere annoyance, inconvenience, or normal 

embarrassment.’”). 

However, the Complaint is deficient with respect to the “severe or extreme 

emotional distress” element. “Severe emotional distress means emotional distress of 

such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized 

society should be expected to endure it.” Kiseskey v. Carpenters’ Trust for So. Cal., 

144 Cal. App. 3d 222, 231 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the 

Complaint alleges that “Plaintiff actually suffered emotional distress,” Compl. at 9, the 

Court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion couched as a factual 

allegation,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). Plaintiff has not otherwise 

pled emotional distress of substantial and enduring quality. Accordingly, Defendants’ 

Motion is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s IIED claim. 

Because Plaintiff may be able to cure the defect, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the 

claim. 

E. Fifth Cause of Action

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action asserts that Defendant San Joaquin County is 

vicariously liable for Deputy Andrade’s acts under California Government Code section 

815.2(a). Section 812.2 imposes upon public entities vicarious liability for the tortious 

acts of their employees. See generally Robinson v. Solano Cnty., 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 

(9th Cir. 2002) (“California . . . has rejected the Monell rule and imposes liability on 

counties under the doctrine of respondeat superior for acts of county employees”).

In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants note that the Complaint does not specify 

which causes of action trigger the County’s vicarious liability. Defendant argues, and the 

Court agrees, that the County cannot be held vicariously liable for the federal causes of 

action (i.e., the first and third causes of action) in Plaintiff’s Complaint. See generally

Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 797 F.3d 654, 670-71 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that “a 

municipality is not liable under § 1983 based on the common-law tort theory of 

respondeat superior.”). Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is therefore GRANTED to the 

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extent it requests that the Court dismiss the County as a defendant from the first and 

third causes of action.

As to the state law causes of action, Defendants argue that the County cannot be 

held vicariously liable for claims that Defendants believe should otherwise be dismissed. 

As noted above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not adequately pled an IIED claim 

against Deputy Andrade; accordingly, that claim is DISMISSED as to both Defendants. 

However, the Complaint adequately states a false arrest claim under California law

against Deputy Andrade, and the County can be held vicariously liable on that claim 

under section 812.2. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED to the extent that it 

seeks to have the County dismissed as a defendant from the second cause of action.

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13) is 

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically: 

A. Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED to the extent it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s 

fourth of cause action. That claim is DISMISSED, with leave to amend, as to both 

Defendant Deputy Andrade and Defendant San Joaquin County. 

B. Defendants’ Motion is also GRANTED to the extent it seeks the dismissal of

Defendant San Joaquin County as a defendant to the first and third causes of action. 

Defendant San Joaquin County is DISMISSED, without leave to amend, as a defendant 

to the first and third causes of action.9

C. Defendants’ Motion is DENIED to the extent it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s 

remaining causes of action.

Not later than twenty (20) days following the date this Memorandum and Order is 

electronically filed, Plaintiff may, but is not required to, file a First Amended Complaint. If 

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 Because Defendant San Joaquin County may be held vicariously liable on the second cause of 

action, it is not outright dismissed as a party to this action. 

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Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, this action will proceed on the first, second, 

third, and fifth causes of action in the original Complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 1, 2015

Case 2:15-cv-00887-JAM-JDP Document 18 Filed 12/02/15 Page 15 of 15