Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02800/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02800-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joan Butler
Defendant
Chalene David
Defendant
Joseph A. George
Plaintiff
Victor Girospis
Defendant
James Holmes
Defendant
Bhawna Jain
Defendant
A. Jones
Defendant
Joan Lazore
Defendant
Rick Marino
Defendant
Maureen McLean
Defendant
Gus Reallon
Defendant
E. Rios
Defendant
Linda Rowe
Defendant
Michael Sayre
Defendant
Sutter Coast Hospital
Defendant
Acel Thacker
Defendant
James E. Tilton
Defendant
Wahidullah
Defendant
Dwight Winslow
Defendant
Candice Worch
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH A. GEORGE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

A. JONES, ET AL.,

Defendants. ______________________________

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No. C 06-2800 CW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT, DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

DENYING PENDING MOTIONS

(Docket nos. 18, 29, 33,

35, 46)

Plaintiff Joseph A. George, a state prisoner who was

incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison (PBSP) until at least

October 25, 2007, filed this pro se civil rights action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that several defendants, including

Defendants A. Jones, Chalene David, Maureen McLean and Linda Rowe,

were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs,

including his stomach and vision problems. Plaintiff also alleges

state law negligence claims against Defendants. 

In an Order dated February 1, 2007, the Court found that

Plaintiff’s allegations stated cognizable claims against Defendants

David, Rowe, Jones and McLean. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s

claims against the other Defendants.

Defendants Jones, McLean, David and Rowe filed a motion for

summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary

judgment. Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion. For the reasons

discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment and DENIES all other pending motions.

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 25, 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint naming the

following Defendants: PBSP Medical Technical Assistants (MTAs) A.

Jones and Gus Reallon; PBSP nurse practitioner Maureen McLean; PBSP

physicians Chalene David, Joan Lazore, Rick Marino and Linda Rowe;

PBSP Medical Appeal Analyst Candice Worch; PBSP Correctional Health

Service Administrator Acel Thacker; PBSP Health Care Manager Dwight

Winslow; and PBSP Chief Medical Officer Michael Sayre, M.D. 

On February 1, 2007, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s

deliberate indifference claims against Defendant Marino for failure

to disclose x-ray results, and those against Defendants Worch and

Thacker concerning the handling of his appeals. The Court also

dismissed all state law claims against Defendants Reallon, Lazore

and Marino. The Court dismissed with leave to amend Plaintiff’s

deliberate indifference claims against Defendants Reallon, Lazore,

Winslow and Sayre, related to treatment of his fractured thumb and

exposure to a cell used to quarantine inmates with staph

infections, specifying, the failure to do so would result in

dismissal of the claim without prejudice.

The Court found that Plaintiff’s allegations stated cognizable

Eighth Amendment claims for deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs against Defendants David and Rowe for failing to

provide treatment for his stomach ulcers, and against Defendants

Jones, McLean and David, for failing to contact PBSP’s optical

department to provide him with a replacement pair of eyeglasses and

to treat him for his vision headaches. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367, the Court retained supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s state law negligence claims against Defendants Jones,

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Plaintiff entitled the motion, “leave to file a supplemental

complaint and second amended complaint.” However, in the text,

Plaintiff clarified that it was “for leave to file a supplemental

complaint pursuant to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 15(d).”

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McLean, David and Rowe. The Court served Defendants with a copy of

the original complaint. 

On March 9, 2007, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint

(FAC) (docket no. 17), which he did not serve on Defendants. In

his FAC, Plaintiff added the following Defendants: PBSP

Correctional Officer E. Rios; PBSP MTA Victor Girospis; PBSP

physicians Wahidullah and Bhawna Jain; Secretary of California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation James E. Tilton;

Sutter Coast Hospital (SCH); SCH Hospital Director John Doe; SCH

physician James Holmes; and SCH nurse practitioner Joan Butler.

On March 9, 2007, Plaintiff also filed a motion for a

preliminary injunction to “order Defendants to provide Plaintiff a

special diet and to be examined by a qualified gastroenterologist

specialist for an endoscopy and biopsy test, provide Plaintiff a

copy of the results and to carry out a planned course of treatment

recommended by the specialist” (docket no. 18).

On April 23, 2007, Defendants Jones, McLean, David and Rowe

filed an answer to Plaintiff’s original complaint (docket no. 28).

On May 10, 2007, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a

supplemental complaint (docket no. 29).1

On June 4, 2007, Plaintiff filed a document entitled “notice

of lawsuit” against SCH (docket no. 32).

On July 9, 2007, Plaintiff filed a request for subpoenas duces

tecum (docket no. 33) to obtain appeal logs; a rules violation

report; a lock up order; a log of outgoing legal mail; a copy of a

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Defendants took note of the docket reference to Plaintiff’s FAC,

filed in March, 2007, but stated that they had not been served with

the FAC, nor had they been able to download it from Pacer. Further,

because the Court had only screened the original complaint, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), Defendants explained that they would refer

to the original complaint in their motion.

Because the allegations related to Plaintiff’s claims against

Defendants Jones, McLean, David and Rowe are not materially different

from the allegations in his original complaint, and because Defendants

based their motion on the original complaint, the Court will refer to

Plaintiff’s original complaint in the discussion of facts.

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questionnaire; all medical records from February 2, 2003, onward;

and all “policies, directives, and memoranda” on how to diagnose

and treat stomach ulcers, acid reflux, hand fractures and vision

ailments, and how to provide chronic care.

On July 23, 2007, Defendants Jones, McLean, David and Rowe

filed a motion for summary judgment2 (docket no. 35). Defendants’

motion was accompanied by Plaintiff’s complete medical record (MR)

and Declarations from Dr. Sayre, PBSP optometrist Steve Inouye,

O.D., and Deputy Attorney General Neah Huynh.

On October 15, 2007, Plaintiff also filed a motion for summary

judgment (docket no. 46). In a notice, filed the same day,

Plaintiff indicated that he was to be released from PBSP, on

parole, on October 25, 2007 (docket no. 45).

On November 14, 2007, Defendants filed an opposition to

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (docket no. 48).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

While incarcerated at PBSP, Plaintiff received medical

treatment for, among other things, stomach pain and vision

problems. He received treatment from several PBSP medical staff

members, including Defendants David and Rowe for stomach pains, and

Defendants Jones, McLean and David, for vision problems.

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A peptic ulcer is an erosion or sore in the wall of the stomach

or duodenum, the area of the small intestine connected to the stomach.

Stedman’s Medical Dictionary, 2061-62 (28th ed. 2006) (Stedman’s).

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Although Maalox and Mylanta are both non-prescription antacids,

it appears from the record that PBSP does not make Maalox available

and medical staff must special order, or “prescribe,” Mylanta. 

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Prilosec OTC® Tablets, generic name omeprazole, are prescription

drugs, used for the long-term treatment of heartburn. Physician’s

Desk Reference 2652 (62nd ed. 2008).

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I. Treatment for Stomach Pain

On February 18, 2004, upon arriving at PBSP, Plaintiff was

screened by medical staff; he reported that he had a stomach

ulcer,3 high blood pressure and an enlarged heart, and he listed a

variety of prescription medications that he was currently taking. 

(MR 003.) Medical staff referred Plaintiff to a chronic care

program, through which he would receive regular care for his

chronic health problems, including his mental health issues and

heart problems. (Id.) On February 19, 2004, Plaintiff complained

of stomach ache and indigestion, reported being depressed and

hearing voices, and requested appointments with medical and

psychiatric doctors; he was examined by a PBSP nurse, who referred

Plaintiff to the next available medical and psychiatric doctors. 

(MR 005.) On February 23, 2004, Plaintiff informed a nurse of

chest and stomach pains; on February 24, 2004, he continued to

complain of pain and was escorted to the medical clinic where he

requested Maalox from Defendant David. (Compl. ¶¶ 18-20.) 

Defendant David told Plaintiff that there was no Maalox available. 

(Id. ¶ 20.) Defendant David then ordered eight medications for

Plaintiff, including chewable Mylanta,4

 Prilosec,5 and prescription

high blood pressure medicine. (MR 010.) On February 25, 2004,

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Both Plaintiff’s complaint and FAC erroneously report this date

as April 25, 2004. During his deposition, Plaintiff clarified that

he meant February 25, 2004. (Pl.’s Depo. 33-34.)

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Plaintiff received these medications.6 (Compl. ¶ 22.)

From 2004 to 2005, except for a period from June to July,

2005, Plaintiff received monthly prescriptions for Prilosec and

chewable Mylanta. (MR 010, 031-37, 049.) On several occasions,

when Plaintiff ran out of Prilosec or Mylanta prior to his next

scheduled refill, PBSP medical staff placed pharmacy requests and

Plaintiff received refills within one day. (Id. at 022, 026, 038,

043-44, 383, 387.) In addition to heartburn medications, while at

PBSP, Plaintiff took high blood pressure medicine for his heart

problems and a variety of antidepressant and antipsychotic drugs. 

(Id. at 073-77.)

On February 25, 2005, Plaintiff saw Defendant McLean to

request a replacement of his heart medication and Defendant McLean

ordered the medication, but noted that it was the second time that

month that Plaintiff had requested a replacement prescription. 

(Compl. Ex. 42.)

On June 2, 2005, at Plaintiff’s chronic care appointment,

Defendant Rowe examined Plaintiff for hypertension, prescribed

heart medication, and informed Plaintiff that she did not yet have

the results of a recent echocardiogram test. (MR 027.) Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Rowe refused to prescribe Prilosec or

Mylanta tablets during this appointment. (Compl. ¶ 25.) 

On June 12, July 11 and July 22, 2005, Plaintiff attempted to

refill his Prilosec and Mylanta prescriptions, but the pharmacy had

no records of those prescriptions. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27, 31.) For two

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months, Plaintiff received Mylanta tablets from other inmates. (Id.

¶ 34.) On August 1, 2005, Dr. Sayre ordered Prilosec for

Plaintiff. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that he does not have a

stomach ulcer. On March 10, 2004, Plaintiff tested negative for H.

pylori, the type of bacteria responsible for most stomach ulcers. 

(MR 011, 419-20.) On November 28, 2006, a radiological examination

of Plaintiff’s upper-gastrointestinal tract showed no evidence of

an ulcer. (Id. at 438.)

In his Declaration, Dr. Sayre, who oversees all medical

records and prisoner medical care at PBSP, reviewed Plaintiff’s

medical records to comment on his stomach problems. (Sayre Decl. 

¶ 8.) Dr. Sayre noted that the November 28, 2006 test of

Plaintiff’s upper-gastrointestinal tract showed a minimal amount of

acid indigestion and, along with Plaintiff’s medical records as a

whole, indicated that Plaintiff suffers from mild heartburn, a

“digestive problem that occurs when stomach acid comes into contact

with the lining of the esophagus, causing irritation.” (Id. ¶ 9.) 

Dr. Sayre explained that heartburn, or acid indigestion, is common

among Americans, usually occurs after eating a meal, and is

typically treated over the long term with prescription Prilosec. 

(Id.) Prilosec does not provide immediate relief, whereas nonprescription antacids, such as Mylanta, Maalox and Rolaids, provide

short-term relief by neutralizing the stomach acids that cause

heartburn. (Id.) Dr. Sayre noted that inmates at PBSP may

purchase Rolaids, without a prescription, at the prison canteen. 

(Id.) He also explained that heartburn symptoms can be prevented

or curbed by maintaining a healthy weight, avoiding coffee and

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In his original complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant

Jones “discarded the glasses” after receiving them. (Compl. ¶ 60.)

In his FAC, Plaintiff only alleged that he handed Defendant Jones the

eyeglasses with a request that they be repaired. (FAC ¶ 82.) In his

deposition, Plaintiff retracted the statement that Defendant Jones

discarded his eyeglasses, stated that he did not think that she

intentionally withheld them from him, and explained that his only

allegation against Defendant Jones was that she received his broken

eyeglasses. (Pl.’s Depo. 69-72.)

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greasy foods, exercising regularly and avoiding eating meals just

prior to lying down. (Id.) Dr. Sayre listed the side effects,

such as stomach and vision problems, produced by several of

Plaintiff’s prescription medications. (Id. ¶¶ 13d-13e, 13l.)

II. Treatment for Vision Problems

On March 10, 2004, Plaintiff was seen by Defendant McLean

after complaining of several minor ailments, including vision

related headaches, because he was “reading a lot.” (MR 012-13.) 

Defendant McLean prescribed Tylenol for Plaintiff’s vision

headaches, scheduled an appointment for him to see an optometrist

and advised him to cut down on reading to reduce headaches. (Id.) 

On May 11, 2004, Dr. Inouye, PBSP’s optometrist, examined

Plaintiff’s eyes and determined that he was nearsighted with 20/80

vision in both eyes--meaning Plaintiff could see at twenty feet

what a person with 20/20 vision could see at eighty feet. (Inouye

Decl. ¶ 3; MR 051.) Dr. Inouye ordered prescription eyeglasses for

Plaintiff. (MR 052.) More than three months later, on August 16,

2004, Plaintiff received his prescription eyeglasses. (Compl. Ex.

37.) Before he received this pair of eyeglasses at PBSP, Plaintiff

had never worn prescription eyeglasses. (MR 012; Pl.’s Depo. 111.)

On October 15, 2004, Plaintiff gave Defendant Jones his

eyeglasses, requesting that the hinges be repaired.7 (Compl. 

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¶ 58.) On November 4, 2004, Plaintiff asked Barbara Fellows, a

PBSP nurse, to inquire about his broken eyeglasses; she called the

MTA clinic, as well as two other PBSP medical staff members, all of

whom reported that they were unable to find Plaintiff’s eyeglasses. 

(Compl. Ex. 38.) 

On November 9, 2004, Plaintiff saw Defendant McLean for weight

management counseling and told her that he had broken his

eyeglasses but that they were being repaired. (MR 020.) Plaintiff

also complained of headaches and requested Tylenol, which Defendant

McLean prescribed. (Id.) On January 5, 2005, Plaintiff saw

Defendant McLean regarding his hypertension, and she again

prescribed Tylenol. (MR 108.) Plaintiff also asked Defendant

McLean to call the optical department about his eyeglasses, but she

was taking notes and did not respond. (Pl.’s Depo. 75.) On

February 8, 2005, Plaintiff saw Defendant McLean regarding his

heartburn, and when he asked about his eyeglasses, Defendant McLean

said that she would ask the MTA to call. (Id. at 82.) On February

25, 2005, Plaintiff alleges that he asked Defendant McLean to call

the optical department about his eyeglasses, but she said it was

not her job. (Pl.’s Depo. 84-85.) 

On March 17, 2005, Plaintiff submitted a request for an

interview with the MTA regarding his broken eyeglasses. (Compl.

Ex. 43.) On April 21, 2005, in response to Plaintiff’s request, an

MTA determined that Plaintiff’s eyeglasses were lost and placed him

on the list for an optical consultation for a new pair of

eyeglasses. (Id.)

In early April, 2005, Plaintiff alleges that he also asked

Defendant David to contact the optical department about the missing

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eyeglasses and she said it was not her job. (Pl.’s Depo. 91-92.) 

On April 26, 2005, Plaintiff saw Defendant David regarding the

results of his echocardiogram and, at Plaintiff’s request, she

prescribed Tylenol for headaches caused by “reading or watching

television too long.” (MR 098; Compl. Ex. 50.) Plaintiff asked

Defendant David to schedule another appointment with the

optometrist regarding his broken eyeglasses, and she informed

Plaintiff that if his eyeglasses were not returned by the time of

his next chronic care appointment, she would schedule the

appointment. (Pl.’s Depo. 92.) On June 2, 2005, Defendant Rowe

referred Plaintiff to the optometry department regarding his broken

eyeglasses. (MR 027.)

On September 9, 2005, Dr. Inouye examined Plaintiff’s eyes

again, and determined that Plaintiff’s vision had improved to

20/60. (Inouye Decl. ¶ 4; MR 054.) Dr. Inouye ordered another

pair of prescription eyeglasses for Plaintiff. (MR 055.) Three

months later, on December 8, 2005, Plaintiff received the

eyeglasses. (Compl. Ex. 47.)

Dr. Inouye’s professional opinion of Plaintiff’s vision

problems is that, without corrective eyeglasses, Plaintiff would

experience a decrease in long range visual sharpness, but this

would not be serious and would only cause minor discomfort. 

(Inouye Decl. ¶ 5.) Dr. Inouye found that Plaintiff’s visual

sharpness at close range was “very good, even without eyeglasses.” 

(Id. ¶ 6.) Dr. Inouye explained that only those with highly

sensitive vision needs would be likely to experience vision-related

headaches. (Id. ¶ 5.) Dr. Inouye determined that Plaintiff did

not have sensitive vision needs. (Id.)

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In his declaration, Dr. Sayre explained PBSP’s policy

regarding inmate vision problems and repair of prescription

eyeglasses:

If an inmate complains of vision problems, then a

physician or nurse practitioner will refer him to the

optometry department. But if the inmate’s glasses need

repair (e.g. new frame or hinges) or if the prisoner

inquires about the status of his glasses, then the

attending physician or nurse practitioner would refer him

to the MTA (medical technical assistant) clinic. The

designated MTA clinic coordinator has the responsibility

of coordinating all medical appliances, which includes

eyeglasses, and would follow up upon request. . . . The

inmate may also inquire about the status of his

eyeglasses by submitting a request for an interview to

the MTA clinic.

(Sayre Decl. ¶ 7.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The

moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no material

factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true the

opposing party’s evidence if it is supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Id. at 324. The court must draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary

judgment is sought. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden by either

of two methods. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Fritz

Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000). The party may

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produce evidence negating an essential element of the non-moving

party’s case, or, after suitable discovery, the party may show that

the non-moving party does not have enough evidence of an essential

element of its claim or defense to carry its ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial. Id. If the moving party discharges its

burden by showing an absence of evidence to support an essential

element of a claim or defense, it is not required to produce

evidence showing the absence of a material fact on such issues. 

Id. After the moving party shows an absence of evidence to support

the non-moving party’s case, the burden then shifts to the

non-moving party to produce “specific evidence, through affidavits

or admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists.” 

Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). The

moving party may also discharge its burden by negating an essential

element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense by producing

affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210 F.3d at 1105. 

If the moving party produces such evidence, the burden then shifts

to the non-moving party to produce specific evidence to show that a

dispute of material fact exists. Id.

Where the moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue

at trial, it must, in order to discharge its burden of showing that

no genuine issue of material fact remains, make a prima facie

showing in support of its position on that issue. UA Local 343 v.

Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). That

is, the moving party must present evidence that, if uncontroverted

at trial, would entitle it to prevail on that issue. Id. Once it

has done so, the non-moving party must set forth specific facts

controverting the moving party’s prima facie case. Id. The

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non-moving party’s “burden of contradicting [the moving party’s]

evidence is not negligible” and does not change merely because

resolution of the issue is “highly fact specific.” Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

On July 23, 2007, Defendants filed a motion for summary

judgment on all of Plaintiff’s remaining claims; his deliberate

indifference claims and his supplemental state law claims related

to the treatment of his stomach and vision problems (docket no.

35). Plaintiff responded by filing a cross-motion for summary

judgment, which the Court will also consider as his opposition to

Defendants’ motion.

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the

Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). The

analysis of a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs involves an examination of two elements: (1) a prisoner’s

serious medical needs and (2) a deliberately indifferent response

by the defendants to those needs. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX

Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997)

(en banc). A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a

prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or

the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury that a

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that

significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the

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existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

indications that a prisoner has a serious need for medical

treatment. Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)).

A prison employee is deliberately indifferent if he or she

knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate

it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The prison

official must not only “be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but

“must also draw the inference.” Id. If a prison official should

have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not

violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. 

Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002).

In order for deliberate indifference to be established,

therefore, there must be a purposeful act or failure to act on the

part of the defendant and resulting harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at

1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404,

407 (9th Cir. 1985). A finding that the defendant’s activities

resulted in “substantial” harm to the prisoner is not necessary,

however. Neither a finding that a defendant’s actions are

egregious nor that they resulted in significant injury to a

prisoner is required to establish a violation of the prisoner’s

federal constitutional rights, McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060-61, but

the existence of serious harm tends to support an inmate’s

deliberate indifference claims, Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096

(9th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “[a] difference of opinion

between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding

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treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.” Franklin v.

Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).

A. Plaintiff’s Stomach Ulcer

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he has a stomach

ulcer, which is a serious medical need, and that Defendants David

and Rowe were deliberately indifferent to that need.

Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from a “peptic ulcer.” 

Aside from his statement that his mother has stomach ulcers,

Plaintiff produces no evidence that he suffers from ulcers. 

Plaintiff’s conclusory statement, without more, is not sufficient

to carry his burden of proof at the summary judgment stage. See

Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005)

(in equal protection case, conclusory statement not sufficient to

carry non-moving party’s burden in a motion for summary judgment). 

In contrast, Defendants provided Plaintiff’s complete medical

record for all of the treatment that Plaintiff received while

incarcerated at PBSP, and this evidence shows that Plaintiff does

not have an ulcer. On March 10, 2004, Plaintiff tested negative

for the bacteria that commonly causes ulcers. On November 28,

2006, another test of Plaintiff’s gastrointestinal system indicated

that he suffered from mild acid reflux, but that he did not suffer

from an ulcer. 

The evidence indicates that Plaintiff suffers from heartburn,

which is not a serious medical need within the meaning of the

Eighth Amendment. See O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 617 (9th

Cir. 1990) (finding that failure to satisfy a plaintiff’s repeated

requests for aspirins and antacids does not amount to a

constitutional violation). Heartburn is common among the American

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population and can be managed through diet, exercise, and

medication. However, even if Plaintiff’s stomach pain amounted to

a serious medical need, Plaintiff must produce evidence that

Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his need.

Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant David rests solely on her

inability to give him Maalox on February 24, 2004. (Pl’s Depo. at

28-29.) Plaintiff does not dispute Defendants’ evidence that

Defendant David did not have Maalox available at Plaintiff’s

February 24, 2004 appointment, or that Defendant David ordered two

heartburn medications for Plaintiff that he received the next day. 

Further, Plaintiff does not dispute the availability of an overthe-counter antacid, Rolaids, that treats the same symptoms as

Maalox and Mylanta and that he could have purchased at the prison

canteen. Although Plaintiff waited one day to receive his

medications, in the interim, he received Mylanta from other

inmates. Defendant David did not deny, delay, or intentionally

interfere with Plaintiff’s treatment, but rather, took reasonable

steps to address Plaintiff’s medical need by ordering both an

antacid, for short-term relief of his symptoms, and a prescription

medication for the long-term treatment of his heartburn.

Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant Rowe was deliberately

indifferent for failing to order Prilosec or Mylanta on June 2,

2005. Defendant Rowe moves for summary judgment on this claim. In

his cross-motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff does not make any

specific argument pertaining to this claim. Plaintiff’s medical

record indicates that he did not receive Mylanta or Prilosec from

June through July, 2005. However, the record contains no evidence

that Defendant Rowe deliberately disregarded Plaintiff’s medical

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needs. During a June, 2005 chronic care appointment, Defendant

Rowe addressed Plaintiff’s chronic care issues of hypertension and

cardiac problems, by prescribing medications, ordering tests, and

offering medical advice regarding the management of Plaintiff’s

symptoms. In his deposition, Plaintiff clarifies that he and

Defendant Rowe had a disagreement about an unrelated matter, and

when she later said “no” to his request for prescription antacids,

he got up and walked out without saying another word. (Pl.’s Depo.

at 36-41.) Plaintiff provides no argument or evidence that

Defendant Rowe purposely denied or delayed Plaintiff’s access to

treatment; that Plaintiff suffered from a serious unmet medical

need; or that he suffered any harm from not receiving a

prescription for antacids for two months.

For the duration of Plaintiff’s confinement at PBSP,

Defendants David and Rowe, and other medical staff, provided timely

treatment, consistent medical care and prescription medications for

Plaintiff’s heartburn, as well as for his more serious chronic

physical and mental health conditions. The two specific incidents,

on February 4, 2004 and June 2, 2005, which give rise to

Plaintiff’s claims, evince reasonable provision of medical care,

rather than purposeful attempts to deny or obstruct Plaintiff’s

access to treatment. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1061

(9th Cir. 2004) (finding summary judgment appropriate where

physician provided consistent, responsive care to inmate and did

not deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with treatment). 

In sum, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy an essential element

of his claim--that he suffers from ulcers; no reasonable jury could

find that Plaintiff’s mild heartburn is a serious medical need

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within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; and neither Defendant

David nor Defendant Rowe was deliberately indifferent to

Plaintiff’s medical need.

B. Plaintiff’s Vision Problems

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Jones, McLean and David were

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by failing to

contact PBSP’s optical department to provide him with a replacement

pair of eyeglasses and to treat him for his vision headaches.

On March 10, 2004, less than one month after Plaintiff arrived

at PBSP, Defendant McLean assessed Plaintiff’s complaint of visionrelated problems, ordered Tylenol to relieve his headaches, advised

him to cut down on his reading, and scheduled an appointment for

him to see an optometrist. One month later, on May 11, 2004,

Plaintiff’s eyes were examined by the PBSP optometrist, who found

that Plaintiff was nearsighted and, thus, ordered corrective

lenses. More than three months later, on August 16, 2004,

Plaintiff received his first pair of corrective eyeglasses. 

Plaintiff’s medical record and Dr. Inouye’s declaration

indicate that Plaintiff’s specific vision problems are not a

serious medical need within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. 

Plaintiff’s nearsightedness may cause some discomfort, because

objects that are far away might appear blurry. However, Dr. Inouye

noted that Plaintiff’s close-range vision, without corrective

lenses, is “very good” and that the types of activities he could

potentially engage in as a prisoner at PBSP, including reading,

drawing, watching television and conversing with other inmates,

would not be visually or physically difficult for someone with

Plaintiff’s visual acuity and lack of special visual sensitivity. 

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(Inouye Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.) Further, in the time period that Plaintiff

did not have eyeglasses, his vision actually improved. 

Plaintiff also asserts that his headaches were “migraines.” 

Plaintiff’s conclusory statement, without more, is insufficient to

withstand summary judgment. Plaintiff’s medical record makes

reference to Tylenol prescriptions for tension headaches. 

Plaintiff provides no evidence that he was diagnosed with migraines

or suffered from migraine symptoms while at PBSP. Dr. Inouye

commented that Plaintiff’s headaches could have been caused by a

myriad of things, such as medications, excessive reading, and poor

lighting. The evidence indicates that several of Plaintiff’s

prescription medications could have produced headaches as a side

effect. Plaintiff’s medical record also shows that, on several

occasions, Plaintiff stated that he developed headaches after

spending too much time reading or watching television.

Neither Plaintiff’s vision impairment nor his headaches

constitute a serious medical need under the Eighth Amendment. Even

if they did, Plaintiff must establish that Defendants were

deliberately indifferent in treating those needs. 

Plaintiff’s sole allegation against Defendant Jones is that

she was the last person to see his eyeglasses. On October 15,

2004, only two months after receiving his first pair of eyeglasses,

the hinges became damaged and Plaintiff gave the glasses to

Defendant Jones, requesting that they be repaired. The evidence

shows that, if Plaintiff’s allegation is true, Defendant Jones did

no more than receive Plaintiff’s broken eyeglasses. Plaintiff

presents no evidence to suggest Defendant Jones intentionally or

deliberately misplaced his eyeglasses.

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Plaintiff argues that PBSP staff, specifically Defendants

McLean and David, must have purposefully delayed the process of

finding his eyeglasses and, alternatively, referring him to the

optometry department for a new pair. On November 4, 2004, a nurse

contacted the optical department at Plaintiff’s request, but no one

she spoke to could locate Plaintiff’s eyeglasses. On February 8,

2005, Defendant McLean told Plaintiff that she would ask an MTA to

call the optical department regarding his broken eyeglasses. On

April 21, 2005, after Plaintiff submitted a request to the MTA

clinic, a medical appliances coordinator conducted a search,

determined that Plaintiff’s eyeglasses were lost, and placed him on

the waiting list for an optometry appointment. Although Plaintiff

does not remember the exact date or provide evidence of the

encounter, he alleges that he saw Defendant David in early April,

2005, and Defendant David told Plaintiff that it was not his job to

contact the optometry department. However, on April 26, 2005,

Defendant David offered to schedule an optometry appointment if the

eyeglasses had not been located by the time of Plaintiff’s next

chronic care appointment. On June 2, 2005, at Plaintiff’s next

chronic care appointment, Dr. Rowe, filling in for Defendant David,

referred Plaintiff to the optometry department, as promised. At

his deposition, Plaintiff admitted that it would be reasonable for

PBSP staff to attempt to locate his missing pair of eyeglasses

prior to scheduling an appointment for a new pair, because of the

length of time it took to receive a new pair after they were

ordered. (Pl.’s Depo. 93.) It is clear that PBSP staff, including

Defendants McLean and David, attempted to help, rather than hinder,

Plaintiff’s efforts to locate his eyeglasses. 

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After his referral to the optometry department on April 21,

2005, Plaintiff argues that Defendants somehow contributed to the

remaining eight month delay in receiving his eyeglasses. Although

Plaintiff was not able to see the optometrist until September 9,

2005, the evidence indicates that the scheduling process within the

optometry department was outside the control of Defendants Jones,

McLean and David. Further, although Plaintiff did not receive his

new pair of eyeglasses until December, 2005, this was the same

three-month delay that he had encountered in receiving his first

pair. Plaintiff provides no evidence that the delay between his

referral to the optometrist and his receipt of a new pair of

eyeglasses was due to any action or inaction on the part of

Defendants.

Likewise, nothing in the record suggests that Defendants

McLean or David refused to treat Plaintiff’s medical needs related

to his purported vision headaches. Defendant McLean consistently

ordered Tylenol at Plaintiff’s request, and counseled Plaintiff to

cut down on reading and other activities that appeared to cause his

headaches. In his deposition, Plaintiff conceded that he was

satisfied with the care that he received from Defendant McLean. 

Defendant David also ordered Tylenol for Plaintiff’s headaches, at

his request. 

Plaintiff fails to show that his vision problems were a

serious medical need within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, or

that Defendants Jones, McLean or David acted with deliberate

indifference in responding to his medical needs.

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C. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue, in the alternative, that they are entitled

to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

The defense of qualified immunity protects “government

officials ... from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule

of qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.

335, 341 (1986). When qualified immunity is asserted in a motion

for summary judgment, the district court must carefully examine the

specific factual allegations against each individual defendant. 

Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1287 (9th Cir. 2000). 

To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity, the court must engage in a two step analysis. In the

first step, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has

alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right. Conn v.

Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). If so, this right must be

“clearly established,” in light of the specific context of the

case. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001). The plaintiff

bears the burden of proving the existence of a clearly established

right at the time of the allegedly impermissible conduct. Maraziti

v. First Interstate Bank, 953 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1992). 

However, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable

to the party asserting injury. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If the

law is determined to be clearly established in step one, at step

two of the inquiry, a court must determine whether a reasonable

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official could have believed his or her conduct was lawful in the

situation confronted. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868,

871-72 (9th Cir. 1993).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,

the Court has found that Defendants’ actions did not amount to

wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. Even if Plaintiff’s rights had been violated,

though, Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity because

they have produced sufficient evidence that they could have

believed that their actions were reasonable under the circumstances

of each claim as outlined below.

First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant David exhibited

deliberate indifference, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, by

not giving Plaintiff Maalox on February 24, 2004. Defendant David

was unable to fulfill Plaintiff’s immediate request for Maalox

because the antacid was not available. However, in light of

Plaintiff’s complaint of acid indigestion, Defendant David acted

reasonably by ordering prescription antacids, which were available

to Plaintiff the next day. In the interim, Defendant David could

have reasonably surmised that Plaintiff would purchase Rolaids from

the prison canteen. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant David

purposely delayed scheduling an optometry appointment for

Plaintiff. Because of the long wait for a new pair of eyeglasses,

Defendant David’s decision to help Plaintiff search for his missing

glasses prior to scheduling a new appointment was reasonable.

Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rowe was deliberately

indifferent for failing to prescribe Prilosec or Mylanta on June 2,

2005. During an argument about an unrelated issue, Plaintiff asked

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if Defendant Rowe would prescribe antacids and Defendant Rowe

purportedly said “no.” Without saying another word, Plaintiff got

up and left the room, after which Defendant Rowe placed

prescription orders for all of Plaintiff’s necessary heart

medications. Given the context, a reasonable prison official in

Defendant Rowe’s position could have thought it was unnecessary to

grant Plaintiff’s request for prescription antacids.

Third, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Jones was deliberately

indifferent to Plaintiff’s vision needs, because Plaintiff gave her

his broken eyeglasses on October 15, 2004. Plaintiff has not

alleged that Defendant Jones deprived him of an actual

constitutional right.

Fourth, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant McLean violated his

Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment

because she did not schedule an optometry appointment for a new

pair of eyeglasses. Defendant McLean acted reasonably by following

PBSP’s policy of asking an MTA to call the optical department

regarding Plaintiff’s broken eyeglasses.

Therefore, Defendants Jones, Rowe, McLean and David are

entitled to qualified immunity.

D. Supplemental State Law Claims

Plaintiff’s complaint includes supplemental state law claims

against Defendants Jones, McLean, David and Rowe for medical

malpractice under California law.

The federal supplemental jurisdiction statute provides that

“district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all

other claims that are so related to claims in the action within

such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or

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controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The elements of a claim for professional

negligence, also referred to as medical malpractice, under

California law, are “(1) the duty of the professional to use such

skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession

commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a

proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the

resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the

professional’s negligence.” Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 200

(1971), superseded in part by Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.6. 

Although prison employees often enjoy immunity from state tort

liability, California law expressly provides: “Nothing in this

section exonerates a public employee who is lawfully engaged in the

practice of one of the healing arts under any law of this state

from liability for injury proximately caused by malpractice.” Cal.

Gov’t Code § 845.6. 

Defendants argue that they exercised reasonable prudence and

diligence in providing medical care, and therefore did not breach

their duty of care to Plaintiff. The evidence in the record,

described in detail above, supports the conclusion that Defendants

David and Rowe were not negligent in treating Plaintiff’s

heartburn, and Defendants McLean and David were not negligent in

treating Plaintiff’s vision problems or headaches. Plaintiff’s

claim against Defendant Jones, that she merely received Plaintiff’s

eyeglasses, is insufficient to constitute negligence. 

Alternatively, even if Defendants had been negligent, Plaintiff

suffered no cognizable injury, loss or damage related to either his

heartburn or vision problems. 

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8

Plaintiff did not raise these specific allegations in his FAC

and the Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's original claims

against Defendants Worch and Thacker concerning the handling of his

§ 602 appeals. In general, it is not proper for Plaintiff to advance

new claims during summary judgment, but Plaintiff’s arguments will be

liberally construed and the Court will screen them as claims. See

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (a pro se plaintiff's

pleadings are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers”).

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Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference and supplemental

state law claims.

II. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

On October 15, 2007, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary

judgment (docket no. 46), in which he raised arguments about

retaliation, fraud and exhaustion.8 Defendants oppose this motion.

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a

state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because

of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action 

(4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights,

and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th

Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). To prove retaliation, a plaintiff

must show that the defendants took adverse action against him or

her that "would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from

future First Amendment activities." White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214,

1228 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino

County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against

him for filing inmate grievances and for initiating a lawsuit. 

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To establish a claim for fraud, Plaintiff must show: (1) a

misrepresentation of fact; (2) contemporaneous knowledge that the

representation is false; (3) intent to defraud and to induce reliance;

(4) justifiable reliance; and (5) damages. Hobart v. Hobart Co., 26

Cal. 2d 412, 422 (1945).

10For example, Plaintiff changed “when” to “would,” “sly” to

“slight,” “peer” to “appeal” and “beef” to “belief” (Pl.’s Depo. 73,

86, 104, 115.)

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Specifically, Plaintiff argues that a retaliatory motive can be

inferred against Defendants Jones, McLean and David for allegedly

refusing to help Plaintiff find his missing eyeglasses, and against

Defendant Rowe for allegedly refusing to order necessary

medications. As discussed above, Defendants did not refuse to help

Plaintiff; they assisted Plaintiff by trying to find his missing

eyeglasses and consistently provided necessary prescription

medications. Even if Plaintiff experienced delays in care that he

attributed to Defendants, these delays would not dissuade a person

of reasonable firmness from exercising his or her right to free

speech. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim.

Second, Plaintiff contends that, by omitting reference to the

court reporter and two correctional officers present at his

deposition and allegedly changing words in his deposition

transcript, Defendants’ counsel and the court reporter committed

fraud.9 The minor errors alleged in the eight corrections to the

transcript that Plaintiff filed on August 20, 2007 (docket no. 43)

can be attributed to reasonable mistake on the part of the court

reporter, and have not induced reliance.10 None of the changes that

Plaintiff submitted affect his claims, Defendants’ arguments, or

the Court’s disposition. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a

cognizable claim.

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Third, Plaintiff argues that he has exhausted his

administrative remedies. See Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378,

2387 (2006) (PLRA requires “proper exhaustion” of available

administrative remedies). However, Defendants do not raise this as

an affirmative defense. See Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 919

(2007) (failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the

PLRA). Thus, Plaintiff’s argument is moot because exhaustion is

not at issue here.

To the extent that Plaintiff has raised claims of fraud or

retaliation on the part of Defendants Jones, McLean, David or Rowe,

these claims are DISMISSED. For the reasons discussed in the

previous section, Plaintiff has not established that Defendants

acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. 

Therefore, his motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint

and Screening of First Amended Complaint

On May 10, 2007, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a

supplemental complaint (docket no. 29). The Court must also screen

Plaintiff’s FAC, submitted on March 9, 2007 (docket no. 17).

A. Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) permits “supplemental

pleadings setting forth transactions or occurrences or events that

have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be

supplemented.” The purpose of Rule 15(d) is to promote as complete

an adjudication of the dispute between the parties as is possible. 

LaSalvia v. United Dairymen of Ariz., 804 F.2d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir.

1986). “Rule 15(d) is intended to give district courts broad

discretion in allowing supplemental pleadings. The rule is a tool

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of judicial economy and convenience.” Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d

467, 473 (9th Cir. 1988). However, “a supplemental complaint

should have some relation to the claim set forth in the original

pleading,” and a court may deny leave to supplement a complaint on

grounds of undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, or

futility. Id. at 474. Futility exists where no set of facts can

be proved which would state a valid claim, or where the claim would

be subject to dismissal. Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d

209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Plaintiff’s motion describes the following course of events,

which happened after the date of his original pleading: On March

19, 2007, Plaintiff set a fire in his cell in order to be placed in

administrative segregation. On April 13, 2007, Plaintiff was

forced out of administrative segregation and housed in the general

population, “after revealing who was trying to assassinate” him. 

On May 2, 2007, Plaintiff was “cell extracted by block gun after

plaintiff staged this event” in order to return to administrative

segregation. On May 3, 2007, Plaintiff was placed in

administrative segregation, after twenty-two hours without food. 

Although it is not explicit, it appears that Plaintiff’s primary

concern was a desire to be placed in administrative segregation. 

The events described by Plaintiff are unrelated to the claims and

Defendants addressed in his original pleadings.

Even if the events were related, however, allowing Plaintiff

to file a supplemental pleading would be futile because he has

failed to state a valid claim. Plaintiff alleges a “staff

conspiracy to aid and abet inmates to stab plaintiff to death,” but

no specific staff members or constitutional violations are

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mentioned. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of a conspiracy are

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. See Woodrum v.

Woodword County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989) (conspiracy,

even if established, does not give rise to liability under § 1983

unless a plaintiff specifically alleges that a constitutional right

was violated).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to file a supplemental complaint

is DENIED.

B. First Amended Complaint

On March 9, 2007, Plaintiff submitted a FAC, restating his

previous allegations against Defendants Reallon, Lazore, Winslow

and Sayre; and alleging new claims against Defendants Rios,

Girospis, Wahidullah, Tilton, Jain, Sutter Coast Hospital and SCH

staff members Doe, Holmes and Butler (docket no. 17). Plaintiff

did not serve the FAC on Defendants.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that pleadings

may be amended once, without leave, if no answer has been filed. 

Nevertheless, a federal court must conduct a preliminary screening

in any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental

entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable

claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.

§ 1915A(b)(1), (2).

1. Defendants Reallon, Lazore, Winslow and Sayre

In an Order dated February 1, 2007, the Court gave Plaintiff

leave to amend his claims against Defendants Reallon, Lazore,

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Winslow and Sayre related to their treatment of his fractured thumb

and to Plaintiff’s exposure to a cell used to quarantine inmates

with staph infections. The Court instructed Plaintiff that, in

amending his claims, he must “allege in good faith, and by citing

actual examples which are subject to proof, that the named

Defendants denied his specific requests for pain medication after

he refused orthopedic surgery during the time-frame alleged above

or that he suffered any illness from being exposed to a cell used

to quarantine inmates with staph infections.” Plaintiff’s FAC does

not refer to being exposed to staph infection and simply reiterates

the remaining allegations against these Defendants that were stated

in Plaintiff’s original complaint.

Plaintiff’s FAC does not cure the pleading deficiency

identified in the Court’s Order dismissing these claims against

Defendants Reallon, Lazore, Winslow and Sayre related to their

treatment of his fractured thumb. These claims are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

2. Defendants Rios, Girospis, Wahidullah, Jain and

Tilton

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Rios, Girospis, Wahidullah

and Jain “failed to refer” him to a specialist for his stomach

problems and delayed his receipt of an upper GI test, and that

Defendant Tilton is liable in his supervisory capacity.

The claims asserted against these Defendants are frivolous

because the Court has already ruled on these issues and Plaintiff

cannot prevail on his claims. The Court has found that Plaintiff

failed to show that his stomach problems are a serious medical need

within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Further, although

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11On June 4, 2007, Plaintiff also filed a document entitled,

“notice of lawsuit” against SCH Defendants. This document fails to

state a valid cause of action. Construing the document liberally, as

a request for leave to amend, the request is futile and, thus, denied.

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Plaintiff alleges some delay in access to tests and specialists,

the evidence shows that PBSP medical staff provided sufficient and

timely medical care and consistently addressed Plaintiff’s medical

needs in a reasonable fashion. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Rios,

Girospis, Wahidullah, Jain and Tilton are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

3. Sutter Coast Hospital Defendants

In his FAC, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants SCH, and staff

members Doe, Holmes and Butler were deliberately indifferent in

treating his fractured left thumb.11

On March 5, 2005, Plaintiff fractured his thumb in an

altercation with another inmate. (FAC Ex. 9.) On the same day, a

PBSP physician ordered Tylenol for Plaintiff and sent him to the

SCH emergency room, where Defendant Butler took Plaintiff’s vital

signs, prescribed medication, administered a tetanus shot, and

escorted Plaintiff to the x-ray unit. (Id. ¶ 70, Ex. 11.) 

Defendant Holmes wrapped Plaintiff’s fractured left thumb in a

splint but did not prescribe pain medication. (Id. ¶ 71.) 

Plaintiff was then discharged from SCH and transferred back to

PBSP. (Id. Ex. 12.) 

Even if SCH Defendants were acting under color of state law,

Plaintiff fails to state cognizable claims against them. SCH

Defendants provided reasonable outpatient care. Plaintiff’s

allegations that SHC Defendants did not provide appropriate followup treatment after Plaintiff returned to PBSP are without merit. 

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Plaintiff’s follow-up treatment was the purview of PBSP medical

staff, and these related claims against PBSP Defendants Reallon,

Lazore, Winslow and Sayre have been dismissed.

For the reasons described above, Plaintiff’s claims against

SCH Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IV. Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Plaintiff moves for a preliminary injunction “compelling

Defendants to perform their pre existing duties” (docket no. 18). 

To establish entitlement to a preliminary injunction, a moving

party must demonstrate either: (1) a combination of probable

success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm; or

(2) that there exist serious questions regarding the merits and the

balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor. Rodeo Collection,

Ltd. v. West Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 1987). The

test is a “continuum in which the required showing of harm varies

inversely with the required showing of meritoriousness.” Id.

(quoting San Diego Comm. Against Registration & the Draft v.

Governing Bd. of Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 790 F.2d 1471,

1473 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Because Plaintiff’s claims did not succeed on their merits,

and because Plaintiff failed to show the possibility of irreparable

harm, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

V. Plaintiff’s Request for Subpoenas Duces Tecum

Plaintiff asks this Court to serve subpoenas duces tecum on

the PBSP custodians of property records, mail logs, medical

records, rules violation reports, and all “policies, directives,

and memoranda” on a variety of medical topics (docket no. 33). 

Plaintiff may compel a person who is not a party to this

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action to appear before the court and produce documents for

inspection and copying, pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(c), 45(a). In order to do so, Plaintiff must

fill out subpoena forms and ensure that each person is served with

the subpoena by a non-party. Plaintiff must tender to each person

“the fees for one day’s attendance and the mileage allowed by law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1). The fee for each person is forty dollars

per day, see 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b), and cannot be waived for a

plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis. See Dixon v. Ylst, 990

F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1993).

Plaintiff argues that on two occasions his requests for

medical records were denied. (Plaintiff’s request for subpoenas

duces tecum at 1.) However, the documents attached to Plaintiff’s

request for medical records reveal that Plaintiff completed the

request on the wrong administrative form, after which PBSP

personnel informed him in a timely fashion that he must complete

his request on a different form. Then, when PBSP fulfilled

Plaintiff’s request, he refused to pick up the records. (Id. Exs.

1-3.) 

Regardless, Defendants attached Plaintiff’s entire medical

record to their motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff refers to

this evidence to support his cross motion for summary judgment. 

Defendants also summarized the PBSP vision and prescription

eyeglasses policy. Consequently, Plaintiff had access to the only

records that he requested that were relevant to his cognizable

claims in this action. 

 Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for subpoenas duces tecum is

DENIED.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (docket no. 35)

is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment (docket no.

46) is DENIED.

3. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a supplemental

complaint (docket no. 29) is DENIED.

4. The Court has screened Plaintiff’s FAC as follows:

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Reallon, Lazore, Winslow and

Sayre related to the treatment of his fractured thumb are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and all remaining claims against Defendants

Rios, Girospis, Wahidullah, Tilton, Jain, Doe, Butler, Holmes and

SCH are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

5. Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction (docket no.

18) is DENIED.

6. Plaintiff’s request for subpoenas duces tecum (docket no.

33) is DENIED.

7. This Order terminates Docket nos. 18, 29, 33, 35 and 46.

8. The Court shall enter judgment and close the file. Each 

party shall bear his or her own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 3/28/08 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH A. GEORGE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

A. JONES et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV06-02800 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on March 28, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Joseph A. George T-79867

3065 Webster Ave.

San Diego, CA 92113

Neah Huynh

Attorney General’s Office

Correctional Law Section

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102

Dated: March 28, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:06-cv-02800-CW Document 49 Filed 03/28/08 Page 36 of 36