Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01957/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01957-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kansas City Missouri School District
Appellee
Sondra L. Samuels
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1957

___________

Sondra L. Samuels, Dr., *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Western District of Missouri.

Kansas City Missouri School District, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: November 18, 2005

Filed: February 14, 2006

___________

Before ARNOLD, BEAM, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Dr. Sondra L. Samuels (Samuels) brought this action against the Kansas City,

Missouri, School District (School District), alleging the School District violated her

rights under both the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 12101-12213, and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-

2654. The district court1

 granted summary judgment in favor of the School District

on both of Samuels’s claims. Samuels appeals the district court’s adverse summary

judgment ruling. We affirm.

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I. BACKGROUND

Beginning in 1978, Samuels was employed full time by the School District,

where she taught mentally handicapped and learning disabled students. In 1999,

Samuels accepted the position of case manager within the School District’s

Exceptional Education Department (EED). This position required frequent travel to

several different schools, extensive walking and stair-climbing, and repetitive

handwriting. In October 2000, Samuels applied for and was offered the position of

Vocational Resource Educator (VRE) at the Manuel Career & Technical Center, a

position that appealed to Samuels because it involved very little handwriting, no

outside travel, limited walking, and no significant physical activity. On October 17,

2000, Samuels wrote to the coordinator of the EED, stating she had accepted the VRE

position and asking to be released from her position as case manager. Samuels’s

request was granted, and she was later released from her case manager position in

December 2000. 

Beginning in November 2000, Samuels experienced a series of unfortunate

mishaps. On November 6, 2000, Samuels slipped and fell while entering a high

school, sustaining injuries to her knees, neck, and back. A few weeks later, Samuels

was involved in a car accident, injuring her back and ribs and aggravating her fall

injuries. In January 2001, Samuels slipped and fell on ice outside a restaurant, again

aggravating her prior injuries. 

Following her first accident in November 2000, Samuels notified the VRE

program director of her injuries and told him she would be on medical leave.

However, on January 12, 2001, the VRE program director wrote Samuels, stating her

job offer was being withdrawn because he could not continue to wait for Samuels to

become available or to receive communication regarding her status. As a result of

these accidents and the injuries she sustained, Samuels was on short-term leave from

her position with the School District from November 2000 until approximately April

2001. While Samuels was on leave, the School District requested she complete the

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requisite FMLA paperwork. Samuels did not return the required documentation to be

placed on FMLA leave, although Samuels alleges she was never provided with the

paperwork. During Samuels’s leave period, the School District continued to

compensate Samuels at her normal rate of pay, using her sick leave, and held open her

case manager position until she returned. 

In April 2001, Samuels’s physician released her for return to work on a parttime basis with restrictions. During the remainder of the 2001 school year, Samuels

returned to her previous position as case manager but was unable to perform the

physical tasks required of her position. Thus, she was assigned to perform light duty

clerical work in the EED office on a reduced schedule of twenty hours per week.

When Samuels returned to work, she requested and received intermittent leave to

attend physical therapy and other medical appointments relating to her injuries.

On May 21, 2001, Samuels submitted to the School District a formal request

for job accommodations due to her disabilities and limitations, along with a Medical

Assessment of Functional Capability Report. In her formal request, Samuels asked

to be assigned to buildings with one floor or an elevator, accessible handicap parking

or minimal walking, and room to perform stretching exercises. She also requested

time for therapy and doctor’s appointments. 

In response to Samuels’s formal request for job accommodations, Samuels was

evaluated by two medical professionals to determine whether she needed any

accommodations to perform the essential functions of her position. Samuels’s

physician, Dr. S.R. Katta (Dr. Katta), determined: Samuels still was recovering from

injuries she sustained in November 2000; her capacity to lift or carry objects was

limited to less than five pounds; Samuels could stand or walk for a maximum of one

hour each day; she could not sit for more than one hour without interruptions for rest

and stretching; and she lacked capacity to climb, stoop, crouch, kneel, or crawl.

Pursuant to School District policy, Samuels also was examined by Dr. Robert Bruce

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(Dr. Bruce), a physician selected by the School District, who determined Samuels’s

impairments were resolved without any lasting effects, and she did not qualify for an

accommodation. School District policy also states the School District will pay for an

independent medical evaluation if the opinion of the School District’s doctor and the

employee’s doctor differ. Dr. Craig Lofgreen (Dr. Lofgreen) was hired for this

purpose, and after an examination, Dr. Lofgreen believed Samuels did not appear to

be disabled and did not qualify for an accommodation. On June 4, 2001, the School

District notified Samuels her request for a job accommodation was denied. 

On July 12, 2001, Samuels was transferred to Chester Anderson Middle School

(Anderson) to work as a learning disability teacher. Anderson is an alternative school

for students who have been diagnosed with mental and behavioral disorders and many

of whom have a history of violent and disruptive behavior toward others. Charlene

Luster (Luster), the director of the EED, decided to transfer Samuels based on her

understanding Samuels had requested and agreed to be transferred to Anderson, a

school that satisfied the majority of Samuels’s criteria. Samuels, however, alleges she

never spoke to anyone about a transfer to Anderson and she did not want to be

transferred to Anderson because she lacked the physical capacity to control the

students. Samuels also alleges during her time at Anderson her duties exceeded the

work restrictions prescribed by her doctor, she was not provided with a handicap

parking spot, and she had to walk one-half block to and from the school building.

On September 10, 2001, Samuels was injured at Anderson when a student

kicked a chair in which she was sitting, causing pain to her lower back, ribs, neck and

left leg. A physician with Employer Health Services, a medical service provider

retained by the School District, diagnosed Samuels with a vibratory injury to her left

lower extremity and back. Samuels was cleared to return to work on September 14,

2001; however, she requested, and was granted, an extended medical leave of absence

without pay from September 10, 2001, until August 31, 2002. In August 2002,

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Samuels returned to work as an elementary school counselor until December 2003,

when she again requested a long-term leave of absence due to hypertension. 

On March 3, 2004, Samuels brought suit against the School District, alleging

(1) the School District violated the ADA by discriminating against her and refusing

to provide her reasonable accommodations for her disabilities, and (2) the School

District violated the FMLA by refusing to restore her to the position she held or a

comparable position when she returned to work. The district court granted summary

judgment in favor of the School District, holding (1) Samuels was not disabled within

the meaning of the ADA, and (2) Samuels’s FMLA claim was barred by the two-year

statute of limitations, and the three-year extended limitations period did not apply

because Samuels failed to demonstrate a willful violation of the FMLA by the School

District. Samuels appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, applying the same standards

as the district court. Woodland v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 302 F.3d 839, 841-

42 (8th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment for the School District is proper if the

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Samuels and giving her the benefit of

all reasonable inferences, shows there are no genuine issues of material fact and the

School District is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);

Mayer v. Nextel W. Corp., 318 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir. 2003). 

B. ADA Claim

Under the ADA, employers are barred from discriminating “against a qualified

individual because of the disability of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To

establish a prima facie case under the ADA, Samuels must demonstrate (1) her

condition qualifies as a disability within the meaning of the ADA, (2) she is qualified

to perform the essential functions of her position with or without a reasonable

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accommodation, and (3) she has suffered an adverse employment action due to her

disability. Spangler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 278 F.3d 847, 850 (8th

Cir. 2002) (citing Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir.

1999)). 

The ADA defines a disability as “a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual.” 42

U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). “Whether an impairment substantially limits a major life

activity is a threshold question.” Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1206

(8th Cir. 1997). Evidence of a medical diagnosis of an impairment is insufficient.

Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). The impairment

must be substantial, that is, considerable or to a large degree. Id. at 196. An

individual’s major life activities are substantially limited if she is unable to perform

a basic function the average person in the general population can perform, or is

significantly restricted in the condition, manner, or duration under which she can

perform a major life activity as compared to an average person in the general

population. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii). “When the major life activity under

consideration is that of working, . . . ‘substantially limits’ requires, at a minimum,

[Samuels shows she is] unable to work in a broad class of jobs.” Sutton v. United Air

Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999); see also Snow, 128 F.3d at 1207. “The

inability to perform a single particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation

in the major life activity of working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). 

Furthermore, temporary impairments with little or no long-term impact are not

disabilities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii). “The impairment’s impact must . . . be

permanent or long term.” Toyota Motor, 534 U.S. at 198. In determining whether a

person is substantially limited in a major life activity, we consider (1) the nature and

severity of the impairment, (2) its duration or anticipated duration, and (3) its actual

or expected long-term impact. Snow, 128 F.3d at 1207 (citation omitted). 

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On appeal, Samuels contends she presented sufficient evidence to create a

genuine issue of material fact regarding whether she was disabled within the meaning

of the ADA. We disagree. The record reveals no evidence Samuels suffers from a

long-term or permanent disability. On March 28, 2001, Dr. Katta released Samuels

for return to work on a part-time basis beginning April 3, 2001. At that time, Dr.

Katta indicated Samuels’s need to work a reduced schedule would last about two

weeks and the restrictions regarding the overhead use of her arms and the repetitive

use of her upper extremities would last only about two months. Similarly, in

documentation submitted on April 18, 2001, in support of Samuels’s request for leave,

Dr. Katta indicated Samuels’s need to work a reduced schedule would be

approximately six months in duration and failed to describe any chronic conditions.

None of the other records prepared by Dr. Katta indicate Samuels’s physical

limitations would be long-term or permanent. Additionally, Dr. Bruce, the School

District’s physician, and Dr. Lofgreen, the independent physician, both concluded

Samuels did not suffer from a disability and therefore did not qualify for

accommodations. The medical records created before and contemporaneously with

Samuels’s request for accommodations in May 2001 simply are insufficient to create

a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Samuels is disabled within the meaning

of the ADA. 

Samuels relies heavily on medical evaluations performed by Dr. Daniel

Zimmerman (Dr. Zimmerman), who examined Samuels in April 2002 with regard to

her worker’s compensation claim for Samuels’s November 2000 fall and the student

assault at Anderson. Samuels contends Dr. Zimmerman’s conclusion that she suffers

a 60% permanent partial disability of her body as a whole demonstrates she is

disabled. Again, we disagree. Dr. Zimmerman did not examine Samuels until April

15, 2002, nearly one year after the School District denied Samuels’s request for

accommodations. Because the determination of whether an individual is entitled to

protection under the ADA should be made as of the time of the employment decision,

see Browning v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir. 1999), we do

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not find Dr. Zimmerman’s conclusions relevant. Furthermore, even assuming

arguendo his conclusions were relevant to Samuels’s ADA claim, Dr. Zimmerman,

in noting several actions Samuels should avoid, did not state Samuels was incapable

of working.

We further conclude Samuels failed to offer any evidence of limitations

imposed upon her that made her unable “to perform either a class of jobs or a broad

range of jobs in various classes.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Samuels directs our

attention to Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.,188 F.3d 944, 949-50 (8th Cir.

1999), in which this court held there was a triable issue on whether the plaintiff’s

medical restrictions substantially limited her employment opportunities under the

ADA. The plaintiff in Fjellestad presented evidence that, out of 28,000 available jobs

in South Dakota fitting her vocational profile, she was eligible for only 1,300 jobs due

to her functional limitations. Id. at 949. Additionally, the plaintiff’s doctors

diagnosed her with a permanent 30% impairment of her upper right arm and restricted

her to working no more than three consecutive days. Id. Samuels failed to present

evidence of analogous limitations imposed upon her employment opportunities

because of her alleged impairments and disabilities. We are unpersuaded by

Samuels’s reference to a case remarkably distinguishable from her own. Evidence of

general temporary work restrictions, without more, is insufficient to constitute a

disability within the meaning of the ADA. See Brunko v. Mercy Hosp., 260 F.3d 939,

941 (8th Cir. 2001). 

Because Samuels failed to satisfy the threshold requirement of her prima facie

case, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the School District

with regard to Samuels’s ADA claim. 

C. FMLA Claim

Under the FMLA, an individual asserting a violation must bring her claim

within two years of “the last event constituting the alleged violation.” 29 U.S.C.

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§ 2617(c)(1). If an employer has “willfully” violated the employee’s rights under the

FMLA, the statute of limitations is extended to three years. Id. § 2617(c)(2).

Samuels’s complaint alleges the School District’s FMLA violation occurred in August

2001. Samuels’s complaint was not filed until March 2004. In granting the School

District’s summary judgment motion, the district court held Samuels’s FMLA claim

was barred by the two-year statute of limitations because Samuels failed to prove the

School District willfully violated the FMLA. On appeal, Samuels contends her

FMLA claim is subject to the three-year statute of limitations because the School

District willfully violated her rights when (1) the School District did not return

Samuels to her former position as case manager upon return from her leave of

absence, and (2) the School District transferred Samuels to a teaching position at

Anderson knowing it was not an equivalent position. 

Arguing one “elementary principal [sic] of law” is “ everyone is presumed to

know the law and what the law requires of them to conform their actions accordingly,”

Samuels contends this court should presume School District officials knew their

actions violated the FMLA and therefore willfully violated the FMLA. Although the

term “willful” has not been defined expressly in the FMLA or by the Supreme Court,

we determined in Hanger v. Lake County, 390 F.3d 579, 583 (8th Cir. 2004), that the

Supreme Court’s definition for “willful” in the context of the Fair Labor Standards

Act also applies to the term “willful” under the FMLA. Under that definition, the

plaintiff must demonstrate the employer “either knew or showed reckless disregard

for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute.” Id. (quoting

McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988)). Such a standard

recognizes an employer’s general knowledge about the statute’s potential

applicability, by itself, fails to demonstrate willfulness. Id. at 584. 

With this standard in mind, we conclude Samuels failed to demonstrate the

School District knew or acted with reckless disregard as to whether its conduct

violated the FMLA. Upon Samuels’s return to work on April 15, 2001, Samuels

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performed light duty clerical work for the remainder of the school year in the EED in

the same position she held before her leave of absence. Samuels worked on a reduced

schedule and was granted intermittent leave to attend physical therapy. Following

Samuels’s request for a transfer to a school with handicap parking, room to perform

stretching exercises, and an elevator or only one floor, she was transferred to

Anderson, a school satisfying the majority of her criteria, based on Luster’s good faith

belief Samuels had requested and agreed to be transferred to Anderson. Our review

of the record reveals no evidence or reasonable inference that the School District knew

its actions were unlawful or showed reckless disregard for whether its conduct was

prohibited by the FMLA when granting Samuels’s request for a transfer. While the

School District presumably knew the FMLA was “in the picture,” such general

knowledge does not indicate a “willful” violation of the statute. See Hanger, 390 F.3d

at 584.

Because Samuels failed to demonstrate a willful violation by the School

District, her FMLA claim is barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

We therefore affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the

School District on Samuels’s FMLA claim. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s entry of summary

judgment in favor of the School District.

______________________________

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