Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-05761/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-05761-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Fortino De La Cruz
Defendant
Yolanda G. De La Cruz
Defendant
Carmen Garcia
Defendant
Jose Garcia
Defendant
Ana Ramos
Defendant
U.S. Bank National Association
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

Plaintiff appears to have mistakenly attached Plaintiff’s motion to quash in what appears to be

a different case involving the same parties (case no. PS09-1505) as Exhibit 2. However, the correct

motion to quash was attached to Mr. Garcia’s removal papers which are also attached as Exhibit 8.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOC.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

JOSE GARCIA, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C-09-5761-EDL

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE: MOTION FOR REMAND AND

MOTION FOR COSTS AND FEES

Plaintiff U.S. Bank National Association (“US Bank) has filed a motion to remand this

unlawful detainer complaint back to Contra Costa County Superior Court following Defendant Jose

Garcia’s procedurally and substantively improper removal. US Bank also seeks costs and fees for

its remand motion. Defendant has not opposed the remand motion or consented to this Court’s

jurisdiction, and all mail to him regarding consent has been returned to the court as undeliverable. 

For the following reasons, the Court issues this Report and Recommendation recommending

GRANTING the motion to remand and awarding costs in the amount of $700.00.

Background

This action began as a residential unlawful detainer action filed by Plaintiff US Bank in

Contra Costa County on October 16, 2009. See Request for Judicial Notice Ex. 1 (complaint in case

no. PS09-2108). The Complaint sought to recover possession of certain property and evict all

persons occupying the property, including Defendant Jose Garcia and a number of other named

individuals and DOE defendants. Id. On October 26, 2009, pro se Defendant Jose Garcia filed a

motion to quash service of summons. Id. Ex. 8 at p.26.1

 On November 2, 2009, the court denied

Case 3:09-cv-05761-CRB Document 17 Filed 02/16/10 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Mr. Garcia’s motion to quash. See Ex. 4. Neither the minute order or the order signed by the judge

state that Mr. Garcia must “answer only,” and instead appear to allow “5 days to respond.” See Ex.

4. However, the “Notice of Ruling on Motion to Quash” prepared by counsel for Plaintiff states that

the court allowed Mr. Garcia five days to “answer only.” Id. Ex. 4. Mr. Garcia did not answer

within five days, but instead filed a demurrer to the complaint on November 6, 2009. The demurrer

was denied by the state court on December 13, 2009, and according to the “Notice of Ruling”

prepared by counsel for Plaintiff, the court allowed Mr. Garcia five days to “answer only.” Id. Exs.

3, 5. Plaintiff’s counsel prepared a notice of the order and served it on November 17, 2009. On

November 19, 2009, Mr. Garcia filed an answer to the complaint. Ex. 6. 

On November 25, Plaintiff requested entry of default against “Fortino de la Cruz, Yolanda G.

de la Cruz, Carmen Garcia, Ana Ramos, and All Occupants pursuant to CCP 415.46.” Ex. 7. A

copy of the request for entry of default was sent to the individuals listed on the request, as well as to

Jose Garcia. Id. Plaintiff claims throughout its papers that “default judgment” was entered against

Mr. Garcia, but nothing indicates that this is true. It appears that default was “entered” against the

other named defendants, but not Mr. Garcia. Plaintiff does not appear to have moved for or obtained

“default judgment” against any defendants, including Mr. Garcia. See Motion at 4:15, 6:4-6, 7:20. 

On December 9, 2009, Mr. Garcia filed a notice of removal to this Court based on diversity of

citizenship. Ex. 8. On December 14, 2009, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the state court action

without prejudice, and on January 7, 2009 sought to remand the removed federal case back to state

court. Ex. 9. Mr. Garcia has not opposed the remand motion or consented to the jurisdiction of this

magistrate court, and US Bank did not file a reply.

Legal Standard

“Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a

State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be

removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district

and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “If at any

time before final judgment[, however,] it appears that the district court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

Case 3:09-cv-05761-CRB Document 17 Filed 02/16/10 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Additionally, the notice of removal does not indicate that Mr. Garcia obtained the consent of

any of the other defendants to remove. When there is more than one defendant in an action, all

defendants must unanimously agree to join in the removal. Hewitt v. City of Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230,

1232 (9th Cir. 1986). Failure to comply with the unanimity requirement renders the removal

procedurally defective. See Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1193, n. 1 (9th Cir. 1988).

Removal was improper on this procedural basis as well.

3

 The Ninth Circuit “strictly construe[s] the removal statute against removal jurisdiction.” Gaus v.

Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Thus, “[f]ederal jurisdiction must

be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Id. (citation

omitted). “The ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always

has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Id. Removal jurisdiction may be based on

diversity of citizenship or on the existence of a federal question. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b); id. at § 1331. 

Whether removal jurisdiction exists must be determined by reference to the well-pleaded complaint. 

Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332, this Court has diversity jurisdiction where the parties are diverse and “the matter in

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” 

Analysis

A. The Removal Was Untimely

Plaintiff moves to remand on the basis that Mr. Garcia’s removal of the action was untimely

under 28 U.S.C. § 1446, which requires that an action be removed within thirty days of service or

thirty days after it becomes ascertainable that the action could be removed. Mr. Garcia was served

with the summons and complaint on October 23, 2009, and did not remove until December 8, 2009. 

Ex. 8. Nothing in the interim changed the nature of the original complaint or made it any more or

less removable than it was on the date it was served. Therefore, even taking into consideration the

leniency afforded to pro se litigants, there is no excuse for Mr. Garcia’s failure to timely remove,

and remand is appropriate on this basis.2

 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (removed case may be remanded

to state court based on a “defect” in the removal procedure).

B. No Federal Court Jurisdiction

1. No Diversity Jurisdiction

Mr. Garcia removed on grounds of complete diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1),

Case 3:09-cv-05761-CRB Document 17 Filed 02/16/10 Page 3 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

claiming that he is domiciled in California while US Bank is domiciled in Ohio. Ex. 8 at 2. Plaintiff

does not challenge the citizenship allegations, but notes that Mr. Garcia’s removal papers make no

mention of the $75,000 statutory minimum amount in controversy. The burden of proving the

propriety of removal rests with the removing party. Abrego v. Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676,

685 (9th Cir. 2006). Mr. Garcia has not opposed the motion or made any other effort to show that

the statutory minimum has been met, and the face of the complaint shows that it has not been met. 

The cover page of the complaint states in the caption, “AMOUNT DEMANDED DOES NOT

EXCEED $10,000,”and the Civil Case Cover Sheet indicates that it is a “limited” action because the

amount demanded is $25,000 or less. Ex. 1. Therefore, the case was not removable as a diversity

action and remand is appropriate.

2. No Federal Question Jurisdiction

Although Mr. Garcia did not remove based on federal question jurisdiction, US Bank notes

that the case was not removable on this basis because the complaint alleges a single, state law

“unlawful detainer” claim. US Bank’s argument against federal question jurisdiction is likely in

response to certain statements in Mr. Garcia’s answer that refer to federal law, and intended as a

preemptive effort to defeat any argument that these statements create a federal question.

Specifically, Mr. Garcia’s answer states as an affirmative defense that, “I believe the bank wants to

sell this house so they are violating federal laws that protect me as a tenant. The [sic] refuse to obey

the law and is [sic] so doing are discriminating on me and retaliating against me because I wish to

continue renting.” Ex. 6 at p. 2. Mr. Garcia’s answer also states, “They are violating federal law

that protects me as a tenant, only to sell the house.” Id. 

These statements in the answer do not create a federal question over which this Court may

exercise jurisdiction. In Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002),

the Ninth Circuit held:

The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘wellpleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when

a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded

complaint. However, the existence of a defense based upon federal law is

insufficient to support jurisdiction. [A] case may not be removed to federal court

on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of pre-emption, even if the

defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint, and even if both parties concede

that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue. (internal citations and

Case 3:09-cv-05761-CRB Document 17 Filed 02/16/10 Page 4 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

The Court need not reach US Bank’s additional argument that Mr. Garcia’s attempt to remove

is also improper because it was filed after default judgment was entered. As noted above, US Bank has

not submitted any evidence of such a default judgment against Mr. Garcia.

5

footnote omitted)

Because the complaint alleges only a single state law cause of action, there is no federal question

jurisdiction and remand is appropriate on this basis as well.3

C. Remand After State Court Dismissal

Though it is clear that there was no basis for removal of the case to this Court and the Court

may not retain jurisdiction over the matter, the procedural history of this action raises another

question: Can the Court remand back to state court where the state court action has been voluntarily

dismissed after removal, or should it dismiss the case outright? As discussed above, Mr. Garcia

filed a notice of removal in federal court on December 9, 2009, and on December 14, 2009, Plaintiff

filed a voluntary “request for dismissal” of the state court action and shortly thereafter moved to

remand the federal case. See Exs. 8, 9.

Generally, a removing party is required to file a notice of removal with the clerk of the state

court, “which shall effect the removal and the State court shall proceed no further unless and until

the case is remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). Any subsequent action of the state court is void. See

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. App. 3d 670, 676 (1982). Thus, if Mr. Garcia properly

filed the notice of removal in state court on December 9, then the state court had no authority to

dismiss the previously-removed case on December 14 and the dismissal would be void. However,

there is no indication in the documents before this Court that Mr. Garcia notified the state court or

the Plaintiff of the removal on that date, and the removal notice does not bear the state court case

number. Plaintiff and the state court may have been unaware of the removal notice when the case

was dismissed. Therefore, this Court cannot say with certainty that the state court action was

properly dismissed, which would make remand futile. Given the uncertainty of the procedural

history, this case does not fall within the narrow line of cases recognizing an exception to § 1447(c)

and allowing a federal court to dismiss a case instead of remand it where there is “absolute certainty

that remand would prove futile.” See Bell v. City of Kellogg, 922 F.2d 1418, 1425 (9th Cir. 1991)

(quoting M.A.I.N. v. Commissioner, Maine Dept. of Human Servs., 876 F.2d 1051, 1054 (1st

Case 3:09-cv-05761-CRB Document 17 Filed 02/16/10 Page 5 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Cir.1989)).

For the foregoing reasons, remand to Superior Court for the County of Contra Costa is

appropriate.

D. Costs and Fees of Remand Motion

 US Bank seeks $2,100.00 in costs and fees allegedly incurred as a result of the improper

removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“An order remanding the case may require payment of just costs

and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.”). US Bank

contends that there was no legal basis for Mr. Garcia’s removal, it was procedurally improper, and

was done solely to harass Plaintiff by causing further litigation expenses, unnecessary delay, and to

impede its right to possession of its real property. 

An award of costs and fees is discretionary, but courts generally do not award them where

the removing party had an “objectively reasonable basis for removal.” See Martin v. Franklin

Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 136 (2005). In this case, and despite Mr. Garcia’s pro se status, there

was no objectively reasonable basis for believing removal was appropriate. Neither federal question

nor diversity jurisdiction are indicated on the face of the complaint, and instead the complaint makes

clear that it contains a single state law claim for less than $10,000. Therefore, an award of actual

costs and fees is appropriate.

The declaration of Donna La Porte filed concurrently with US Bank’s remand motion states

that attorneys for US Bank spent a total of four hours preparing the remand motion at a cost of

$175.00 per hour, for a total of $700.00. This amount of time and the rate spent appears to be

reasonable, and the Court recommends that $700.00 in costs and fees be awarded. Ms. La Porte’s

declaration also anticipates an additional eight hours to prepare a reply to Mr. Garcia’s opposition

and attend the motion hearing. Mr. Garcia did not file an opposition and thus US Bank did not file a

reply. Additionally, this matter was decided without oral argument and no appearance by counsel

was necessary. Therefore, no additional award of costs or fees is warranted.

Conclusion

Any party may serve and file specific written objections to this recommendation within ten

(10) working days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P.

Case 3:09-cv-05761-CRB Document 17 Filed 02/16/10 Page 6 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

72(b); Civil Local Rule 72-3. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right

to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Dated: February __, 2010 

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE

United States Magistrate Judge

16

Case 3:09-cv-05761-CRB Document 17 Filed 02/16/10 Page 7 of 7