Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-24-02412/USCOURTS-ca3-24-02412-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joseph Aruanno
Appellant
Internal Revenue Service
Not Party

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 24-2412

___________

JOSEPH ARUANNO,

Appellant

v.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-00786)

District Judge: Honorable Evelyn Padin

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

on December 26, 2024

Before: BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 31, 2024)

____________________________________

Case: 24-2412 Document: 14 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/31/2024
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___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

In 2022, Joseph Aruanno, a frequent pro se litigant, sought to file an in forma pauperis 

(“IFP”) complaint against the IRS in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California (“the California District Court”). Before ruling on Aruanno’s IFP motion, 

the California District Court transferred his case to the United States District Court for the 

District of New Jersey (“the District Court”). Upon the transfer, the District Court directed 

Aruanno to show cause why it should not deny his IFP application given his history of 

abusive litigation. After Aruanno responded to the show-cause order, the District Court 

denied Aruanno’s IFP application. Aruanno appealed, and we affirmed the District Court’s 

decision. 

After our ruling, the District Court provided Aruanno 30 days in which to submit the 

filing fee for his complaint and notified him that his case could be dismissed if he did not 

submit it. In response, Aruanno filed another IFP application. The District Court denied his 

application and provided him 30 more days in which he could pay the fee, warning him 

that the failure to pay the fee would result in the dismissal of his case. When Aruanno did 

not submit the required fee, the District Court dismissed his case. Aruanno appeals. 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

Case: 24-2412 Document: 14 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/31/2024
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We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s order 

dismissing Aruanno’s case for abuse of discretion. See Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 

1373–74 (3d Cir. 1992).

Dismissal is a harsh sanction, see id. at 1373, but, under the circumstances, the District 

Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case for Aruanno’s failure to pay the 

fee. Instead of paying the fee, Aruanno continued to seek IFP status despite the District 

Court’s earlier ruling and our affirmance of that ruling on appeal. Furthermore, in arguing 

in favor of the grant of IFP status, he essentially asked the District Court to do something 

it may not do, namely, to alter our mandate based on matters that he included (or could 

have included) in his earlier appeal. See Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 679 F.2d 336, 337 

(3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam). While we ordinarily require a district court to balance several 

factors before dismissing a case for lack of prosecution, see Poulis v. State Farm Fire & 

Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984), that balancing was not necessary in this case, 

see Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 455 (3d Cir. 1994); Guyer v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424, 

1429–30 (3d Cir. 1990).

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

Case: 24-2412 Document: 14 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/31/2024