Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cr-00010/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cr-00010-19/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ursula Choice
Defendant
Monica Cobbins
Defendant
Josiah Larkin
Defendant
Krishell Robinson
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff
Thomalyn Virden
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

KRISHELL ROBINSON,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cr-00010-SI-3 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR A WRIT OF AUDITA 

QUERELA

Re: Dkt. No. 496

Now before the Court is defendant Krishell Robinson’s motion for writ of audita querela or 

coram nobis. Dkt. No. 496. This motion came on for hearing on April 5, 2019. Defendant asks 

that the Court vacate her sentence and “re-sentence her with a restitution order that reflects her level

of contribution to the IRS’s loss and her individual economic circumstances[,]” pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3664(h). Id. at 13. The government opposes, and defendant has filed a reply brief. Dkt. 

Nos. 500, 501. For the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS defendant’s motion for 

a writ of audita querela and VACATES the sentence imposed on February 17, 2017. 

BACKGROUND

On January 6, 2015, defendant Krishell Robinson (“defendant”) was charged with one count 

of conspiracy to file false claims against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 286, and 

seventeen counts of making false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims against the United States, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287, based on her role in the filing of federal income tax returns that falsely 

claimed education expenses under the American Opportunity Tax Credit (AOTC). Dkt. No. 1. 

Defendant was indicted with co-defendants Josiah Larkin, Ursula Choice, Monica Cobbins, 

and Thomalyn Virden. Count One of the indictment charged that the defendants, at Larkin’s tax 

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preparation firm, from November 2012 through August 2013, “agreed, combined, and conspired to 

defraud the United States by obtaining, and aiding others to obtain, the payment and allowance of 

false, fictitious, and fraudulent claims.” Id. ¶ 8. The indictment further charged that, “[a]s part of 

the scheme, the defendants filed with the IRS, or assisted in filing, federal income tax returns falsely 

claiming that education expenses ranging from $3,816 to $4,000 had been paid and the taxpayers 

were therefore eligible for the AOTC and a corresponding tax refund.” Id. ¶ 9.1 

On March 18, 2016, defendant pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to file false claims. 

Dkt. Nos. 139, 141. Defendant’s plea stated, in part: 

I agree to pay full restitution for all the losses caused by all the schemes or offenses 

with which I was charged in this case, and I agree that the amount of restitution will 

not be limited to the loss attributable to the count to which I am pleading guilty, 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3). I agree to pay restitution in an amount to be set 

by the Court . . . .

Dkt. No. 139 ¶ 9. Co-defendants Choice, Virden, and Cobbins also pled guilty before trial. Dkt. 

Nos. 82, 175, 228.

On January 25, 2017, following his conviction by jury, Larkin was sentenced to 37 months 

of custody, three years of supervised release, and restitution of $184,798. Dkt. No. 321. On 

February 17, 2017, the Court sentenced Cobbins, defendant, and Virden. As to Cobbins and 

defendant, the government sought restitution of $184,798, joint and several, which it stated “is the 

tax loss to the government from the conspiracy of the tax loss remaining from the 280 false returns 

involved in the conspiracy . . . .” See Dkt. Nos. 335 at 4; see also Dkt. No. 337 at 5. As to Virden, 

the government sought $6,838 of restitution, which it stated was the tax loss agreed to by the parties, 

“which includes relevant conduct.”2 Dkt. No. 338 at 3. Cobbins was sentenced to five years of 

 

1 Due to the lengthy history of this case, the Court recites only those facts necessary to 

resolve the present motion. A more fulsome summary of the background of the case may be found 

in the Court’s prior orders. See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 304, 453, 472.

2 Virden pled guilty to one count of filing false claims but not to the conspiracy charge. Dkt. 

Nos. 174, 175. The plea agreements that Virden and defendant entered contained similar language. 

Virden’s plea agreement stated, in relevant part: 

I agree to pay full restitution for all losses caused by all the schemes or offenses with 

which I was charged in this case, and I understand that the amount of restitution will 

not be limited to the loss attributable to the counts to which I am pleading guilty, 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3). I understand that the Court will not consider my 

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probation and restitution of $184,798. Dkt. No. 351. Defendant was sentenced to three years of 

probation and restitution of $184,798. Dkt. No. 353. Virden was sentenced to two years of 

probation and restitution of $6,838. Dkt. No. 349. 

On June 9, 2017, the Court sentenced Choice. The government sought restitution of 

$184,798, but Choice argued that her restitution should be apportioned and her financial 

circumstances considered under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(h). See Dkt. Nos. 392 at 11-12, 393 at 4-5. The 

Court agreed and sentenced Choice to one year of probation and restitution of $18,500. See Dkt. 

No. 400. 

The following year, Cobbins petitioned for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming she was 

denied her Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because at her plea hearing 

counsel for the government and counsel for the defense represented to the Court that her restitution 

would be apportioned, but the plea agreement she signed stated otherwise.3 Dkt. No. 427. On 

 

economic circumstances in determining the restitution amount. I agree to pay 

restitution in an amount to be set by the Court at the time of sentencing, but in no 

event less than $6,838.

See Dkt. No. 174 ¶ 9.

3 At Cobbins’s plea hearing, the following colloquy regarding restitution took place:

The Court: Will there be restitution, Ms. Stier?

Ms. Stier [AUSA]: Yes, Your Honor. That will be determined by the Court.

The Court: Do you have any idea how much?

Ms. Stier: Well, Your Honor, the -- the restitution will not be less than $2000. But 

we have to determine her role in the conspiracy to determine how much it is for all 

of the tax returns in which she had a role in [sic] within the conspiracy. We have not 

made that determination yet. 

The Court: Is that right, Mr. Lowenstein?

Mr. Lowenstein [Cobbins’s counsel]: Yes, that is exactly correct. There were 

several tax preparers who prepared taxes that’s [sic] alleged to have been fraudulent. 

Ms. Cobbins’ role in that was very limited, to only a certain amount of tax returns 

that she helped prepare. And so the restitution will be limited to the amount of loss, 

based on those returns. 

Dkt. No. 408 at 5:23-6:15. 

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November 5, 2018, the Court vacated Cobbins’s sentence and re-sentenced Cobbins to five years of 

probation and restitution of $18,500. Dkt. Nos. 470, 472, 473. In doing so, the Court found it 

reasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(h) to resentence Cobbins “to the same sentence but with reduced 

restitution based on her limited role in the conspiracy and her ability to pay” and ordered that she 

pay restitution of approximately ten percent of the total loss to the IRS, or $18,500. Dkt. No. 472 

at 13. 

Now before the Court is defendant’s motion for writ of audita querela or coram nobis, 

seeking a reduction of her restitution award on the basis of a legal defense arising after the entry of 

judgment. Dkt. No. 496. 

LEGAL STANDARD

The writ of error coram nobis affords a remedy to attack a conviction when the petitioner 

has served his sentence and is no longer in custody. Telink, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 45 

(9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Walgren, 885 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th Cir. 1989). Specifically, the 

“writ provides a remedy for those suffering from the ‘lingering collateral consequences of an 

unconstitutional or unlawful conviction based on errors of fact’ and ‘egregious legal errors.’” 

Walgren ̧ 885 F.2d at 1420 (quoting Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496, 1498, 1499 & n.2 (9th 

Cir. 1985)). 

Coram nobis relief is a “highly unusual remedy.” United States v. Riedl, 496 F.3d 1003, 

1004 (9th Cir. 2007). To qualify for coram nobis relief, four requirements must be satisfied: (1) a 

more usual remedy is not available; (2) valid reasons exist for not attacking the conviction earlier; 

(3) adverse consequences exist from the conviction sufficient to satisfy the case and controversy 

requirement of Article III; and (4) the error is of the most fundamental character. United States v. 

Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1011 (9th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky, 

559 U.S. 356 (2010); Matus-Leva v. United States, 287 F.3d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2002); Estate of 

McKinney v. United States, 71 F.3d 779, 781-82 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The writ of audita querela, a common law writ to afford relief to a judgment debtor against 

a judgment or execution because of some defense or discharge arising subsequent to the rendition 

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of the judgment or the issue of the execution, may not be the vehicle for vacating a properly obtained 

conviction on purely equitable grounds. Doe v. INS, 120 F.3d 200, 204 (9th Cir. 1997). The writ, 

if it survives at all, is available only if a defendant has a legal defense or discharge arising subsequent 

to the underlying judgment. Id.

The difference between coram nobis and audita querela is one of timing, not substance. Id. 

at 203 n.4. Coram nobis is used to attack a judgment that was infirm at the time it was rendered for 

reasons that later come to light. Audita querela is used to attack a judgment that was correct when 

rendered, but later is rendered infirm by matters arising after its rendition. See id.

Like other common law writs, a writ of audita querela is available to fill the gaps of available 

postconviction remedies. United States v. Valdez-Pacheco, 237 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(per curiam). A petition for a writ of audita querela is not available if the claims are cognizable in 

a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, even if filing such a motion would be barred as successive. Id. at 

1080; Carrington v. United States, 503 F.3d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding writ of audita querela 

could not be used to challenge sentence under federal sentencing guidelines based on new Supreme 

Court case even though § 2255 motion was no longer available because of statutory bar to second 

and successive § 2255 motions).

DISCUSSION

I. Writ of Audita Querela

Defendant argues that the Court should grant a writ of audita querela because her judgment 

has become legally infirm since it was rendered. Defendant argues that the Court’s use of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3664(h) to apportion the restitution of her co-defendants, after she herself was sentenced to the 

full restitution amount, constitutes legal error that the Court must now correct by lowering her

restitution. The government asserts that the judgment was lawful when entered, that defendant is 

wrongly asking the Court to reconsider its decision to deny her request for apportionment that she 

made at sentencing,4and that defendant has waived her right to bring this motion. 

 

4 At defendant’s sentencing, the following exchange occurred: 

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The Court agrees with the parties that judgment was correct when entered but finds 

defendant is correct that the judgment has been made infirm due to the judgments subsequently 

entered against her co-defendants. A writ of audita querela will therefore issue.

18 U.S.C. § 3664(h) states:

If the court finds that more than 1 defendant has contributed to the loss of a victim, 

the court may make each defendant liable for payment of the full amount of 

restitution or may apportion liability among the defendants to reflect the level of 

contribution to the victim’s loss and economic circumstances of each defendant.

18 U.S.C. § 3664(h). Defendant asserts that the Court erred because “[b]y its plain terms, Section 

3664(h) provides the Court with a choice: it may impose full restitution on every co-defendant or it 

may apportion liability. The Court here erred by doing some of both . . . .” Dkt. No. 496 at 8. 

The Court agrees with defendant’s reading of the statute. The Court did not consider the 

application of Section 3664(h) to this case until the sentencing of Choice, who was sentenced last 

of all the defendants and several months after defendant had already received a judgment to pay full 

restitution. When the Court apportioned Choice’s restitution according to Section 3664(h), it 

rendered infirm the restitution order as to defendant, for whom it had not considered apportionment 

under Section 3664(h).5 This error was further compounded by the Court’s resentencing Cobbins 

to a lower restitution amount in November 2018. While “[e]quities or gross injustice” alone do not 

 

Mr. Blank [counsel for defendant]: On the restitution, I raise just sort of glancingly, 

your Honor could apportion to her particular - - the clients that she helped, rather 

than having her be jointly and severally responsible for everyone. I don’t have that 

number. I can provide it to you.

The Court: I don’t agree with you, so . . .

Mr. Blank: I won’t press it.

Dkt. No. 371 at 7:5-11. In addition, defendant’s sentencing memorandum contained the following 

footnote: “. . . A more equitable restitution order might be limited to those clients personally assisted 

by Ms. Robinson. The Court may defer ruling on restitution until after imposing the rest of the 

sentence. . . .” See Dkt. No. 334 at 4 n.1.

5 The Court expressed this concern at the time of Choice’s sentencing: “I’m still concerned 

about equity in sentencing because of what we’ve done with the other folks in this case . . . .” See

Dkt. No. 465 at 10:24-11:1.

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provide a basis for granting a writ of audita querela, see Doe, 120 F.3d at 203, the Court finds the 

remedy appropriate in the unique circumstances of this case, in order to correct the Court’s judgment 

that was later rendered infirm by the ordering of substantially different restitution amounts for 

Choice, Cobbins, and Virden.

The Court further finds that, considering the similar level of contribution to the victim’s loss, 

and the economic circumstances of defendant, Cobbins, and Choice, defendant meets the 

requirements for apportionment pursuant to Section 3664(h). According to the figures in the 

Probation Presentence Reports, defendant filed 289 tax returns, similar to Choice’s 236 returns. See

Dkt. 331 at 8, 10. Defendant and Choice received similar training and directions from Larkin on 

tax preparation. Id. at 8-9. The Court has previously expressed that the extent of criminal activities 

committed by defendant, Choice, Cobbins, and Virden are not equivalent to Larkin’s involvement 

and benefit. Dkt. No. 465 at 10:3-5 (“The thing that moves me, though, is that it was certainly 

wrong but it’s not anything that these women made any real money off of.”). Both defendant and 

Choice testified as government witnesses at Larkin’s trial, and there was evidence that defendant 

and Choice did not initially know that the scheme was illegal. 

Defendant’s economic circumstances are also similar to those of Choice and Cobbins. At 

the time of sentencing, defendant had assets totaling $167, monthly income of $1,597, and total 

monthly cash flow of $447. Dkt. No. 331 at 17-18. By contrast, Cobbins had monthly cash flow of 

$1,040 and Choice of $1,722.26. Dkt. Nos. 359 at 30, 360 at 19. At the April 5, 2019 hearing, 

defendant represented that she currently lives in San Francisco and earns $1,360 every two weeks 

before taxes. 

For both Choice and Cobbins, the Court ordered $18,500 of restitution, after applying 

Section 3664(h), finding that ten percent of the total loss was reasonable under the circumstances of 

this case, given their respective roles in the conspiracy and economic circumstsances. See Dkt. No. 

392 at 11-12 (Choice Sent. Memo); Dkt. No. 472 at 13. For those same reasons, the Court finds 

restitution of $18,500, to be paid jointly and severally, is reasonable as to defendant here.

Because the Court will grant the writ of audita querela, the Court will not reach defendant’s 

alternative argument regarding whether the Court should grant coram nobis relief.

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II. Waiver 

The government argues that defendant waived her right to bring this motion “when she 

agreed to give up her right to appeal her conviction, the judgment, and any orders of the Court, as 

well as any aspect of her sentencing, including any orders relating to forfeiture and/or restitution 

. . .,” as outlined in her plea agreement. Dkt. No. 500 at 10. Defendant disagrees, arguing, inter 

alia, that any waiver of her “right to challenge her restitution order is invalid because her plea 

agreement did not include an estimate of the amount of restitution she faced.” Dkt. No. 501 at 3.

Generally, “[a] waiver of appellate rights ‘is enforceable if (1) the language of the waiver 

encompasses [the defendant’s] right to appeal on the grounds raised, and (2) the waiver is knowingly 

and voluntarily made.’” United States v. Medina-Carrasco, 815 F.3d 457, 461 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has “developed a special notice requirement for appeal 

waivers relating to restitution orders, holding that in order for that waiver to be valid a defendant 

must be ‘given a reasonably accurate estimate of the amount of the restitution order to which he is 

exposed’ at the time the defendant agrees to waive the appeal.” United States v. Lo, 839 F.3d 777, 

785 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Tsosie, 639 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2011)). 

In Tsosie, the Ninth Circuit found a defendant had not waived his right to appeal the 

restitution that the district court imposed, despite the fact that in his plea agreement he waived his 

right to appeal the imposition of sentence, which the parties agreed included the restitution order, 

and where the plea agreement stated that restitution would be determined by the court. 639 F.3d at 

1216-17. Critically, the defendant’s “plea agreement did not set forth any specific amount of 

restitution that Tsosie could be required to pay, or even any estimate of that amount.” Id. at 1218. 

Accordingly, the appellate court found that “Tsosie ‘lacked sufficient notice to waive his right to 

appeal the restitution award.’” Id. (citing United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 

2004)). The Tsosie court explained that, “[u]nlike terms of imprisonment, which have statutory 

maximums and are meted out by judges aided by the Sentencing Guidelines, there is neither a 

statutory limit nor any guidelines covering the amount of restitution orders . . . .” Id. 

Here, defendant entered into a plea agreement containing the following language:

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4. I agree to give up my right to appeal my conviction, the judgment, and any 

orders of the Court, as well as any aspect of my sentence, including any orders 

relating to forfeiture and/or restitution, except that I reserve my right to claim my 

counsel was ineffective.

5. I agree not to file any collateral attack on my conviction or sentence, 

including a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or 28 U.S.C. § 2241, except that I reserve 

the right to claim my counsel was ineffective. I also agree not to seek relief under 

18 U.S.C. § 3582. 

. . .

9. I agree to pay restitution for all the losses caused by all the schemes or 

offenses with which I was charged in this case, and I agree that the amount of 

restitution will not be limited to the loss attributable to the count to which I am 

pleading guilty, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3). I agree to pay restitution in an 

amount to be set by the Court. . . .

Dkt. No. 139 ¶¶ 4-5, 9.

As in Tsosie, defendant’s plea agreement did not set forth any specific amount of restitution 

she would be required to pay, or even estimate that amount. Nor is this a case where the factual 

detail found elsewhere in the plea agreement specified the total amount of the loss. See Lo, 839 

F.3d at 782, 787 (finding the plea agreement gave a reasonably accurate estimate of the restitution 

order to which Lo was exposed where Lo agreed to the truth of the fact that he defrauded entities of 

at least $2.3 million and where the plea stated he would “pay restitution in an amount to be set by 

the Court, but in no event less than $1,700,000 to ANI and $46,189.54 to A.W. . .”). For this reason, 

the Court finds that defendant did not waive her right to appeal her restitution order. 

Nor is the Court persuaded by the government’s argument that “Robinson may also have 

waived her restitution claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal.” See Dkt. No. 500 at 10. The 

government cites to an unpublished Ninth Circuit memorandum in which the appellate court stated 

in dicta that even assuming the pro se defendant’s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 challenging his 

restitution order could be construed as a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, “O’Neill waived 

any objection to the validity of [the] restitution order by failing to raise the issue on direct appeal.” 

See O’Neill v. United States, 369 Fed. App’x 854 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Gianelli,

543 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2008)). The logic of O’Neill cannot be extended to a motion for a 

writ of audita querela, because the grounds for a writ of audita querela necessarily arise through 

error after the judgment has been rendered. In many instances, this presumably will occur after the 

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time to appeal has passed.6

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS defendant’s

motion for a writ of audita querela and VACATES the sentence imposed on February 17, 2017. The 

Court RE-SENTENCES defendant Krishell Robinson to the same sentence as previously imposed, 

with the exception of the amount of restitution. Defendant shall pay restitution of $18,500.00, 

jointly and severally. The U.S. Probation Office shall prepare an amended judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 10, 2019

______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

 

6 The Court also does not find persuasive the government’s reliance on another unpublished 

Ninth Circuit case, Evans v. United States, 270 Fed. App’x 579 (9th Cir. 2008). See Dkt. No. 500 

at 10. While there the appellate court affirmed the denial of a petition for writ of error coram nobis 

as a collateral attack that the defendant had waived, the unpublished memorandum disposition does 

not provide enough factual detail for the Court to discern its applicability to the facts of this case. 

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