Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-2_05-cv-00124/USCOURTS-ared-2_05-cv-00124-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Linda Sanders
Defendant
Dwayne White
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned Magistrate Judge (docket

entry #9).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EASTERN DIVISION

DWAYNE WHITE PETITIONER

REG. #02953-112

V. NO. 2:05CV00124 JWC

LINDA SANDERS, Warden, RESPONDENT

FCI, Forrest City, AR

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Dwayne White, an inmate in the Federal Correctional Institution in Forrest City,

Arkansas, brings this 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus (docket entry #1),

alleging that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is miscalculating his good conduct time credits.

Respondent contends that the petition is without merit (docket entry #5), and Petitioner has

replied (docket entry #7). For the reasons that follow, the petition must be dismissed.1

According to Petitioner, he is serving a 180-month sentence, imposed on April 3,

1995. He says the BOP has inaccurately calculated his projected good conduct time

credits at the rate of forty-seven days for each year of his sentence, when the applicable

statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), provides for fifty-four days of credit for each year of the

sentence. This is due to the BOP’s policy of awarding good conduct time based on the

time actually served on a sentence, rather than the sentence imposed. Petitioner says he

is entitled to earn up to 810 days of good conduct time, which would place his projected

release date in June 2007, and he asks the Court to direct the BOP to recalculate his good

conduct time accordingly.

Case 2:05-cv-00124-JWC Document 11 Filed 10/18/05 Page 1 of 4
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 Federal prisoners have a statutory right to receive credit toward their sentences for

good behavior. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(a) & (b). Section 3624(b)(1) provides in relevant part:

[A] prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year ...

may receive credit toward the service of the prisoner’s sentence, beyond the

time served, of up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner’s term

of imprisonment, beginning at the end of the first year of the term, subject to

determination by the Bureau of Prisons that, during that year, the prisoner

has displayed exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary

regulations. ... [C]redit for the last year or portion of a year of the term of

imprisonment shall be prorated and credited within the last six weeks of the

sentence. 

Once credit is awarded under this statute, the number of years that a prisoner

actually will serve will be less than the imposed sentence. The BOP has interpreted §

3624(b) as entitling a prisoner to be awarded good conduct time credits based only on the

time he has served, rather than on the full sentence that he received. 28 C.F.R. §

523.20(a)(1) (stating that the BOP “shall award ... 54 days credit for each year served

(prorated when the time served by the inmate for the sentence during the year is less than

a full year)”) (emphasis added); BOP Program Statement 5880.28, at 1-40 to 1-61 (Feb.

21, 1992), available at http://www.bop.gov (setting forth detailed calculation instructions).

The position advanced by Petitioner – that he should receive credit for each year

of the sentence imposed – was rejected by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in James

v. Outlaw, 126 Fed. Appx. 758 (8th Cir. 2005) (unpub. per curiam), as follows: 

We conclude that § 3624(b) is ambiguous because it does not clearly

indicate whether a prisoner’s good time credits are based on the time served

in prison or the sentence imposed. See White v. Scibana, 390 F.3d 997 (7th

Cir. 2004)[, cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2921 (2005)]; Pacheco-Camacho v.

Hood, 272 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001)[, cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1105 (2002)].

Since the BOP regulation was adopted through the notice and comment

procedure, it is entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and we conclude that it is a

reasonable interpretation of the statute. 

Case 2:05-cv-00124-JWC Document 11 Filed 10/18/05 Page 2 of 4
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Id. at 759. This ruling was reiterated in United States v. Wittman, 139 Fed. Appx. 759, 760

(8th Cir. 2005) (unpub. per curiam) (citing James and rejecting prisoner’s argument that

BOP’s calculation method is contrary to Congress’s intent and also finding rule of lenity

inapplicable to resolve ambiguity).

The Eighth Circuit’s decisions are in accord with rulings from every other Circuit

Court of Appeals that has addressed the issue. Perez-Olivo v. Chavez, 394 F.3d 45, 48-54

(1st Cir. 2005); O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2005); Yi v. Fed. Bureau

of Prisons, 412 F.3d 526, 530-35 (4th Cir. 2005); Sample v. Morrison, 406 F.3d 310, 312-

13 (5th Cir. 2005) (dicta); Petty v. Stine, No. 05-5379, 2005 WL 2258042 (6th Cir. Sept. 19,

2005); White, 390 F.3d at 1000-02; Pacheco-Camacho, 272 F.3d at 1270-71. But see

Moreland v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 363 F. Supp. 2d 882, 885-94 (S.D. Tex. 2005)

(agreeing with Petitioner’s position); Williams v. Dewalt, 351 F. Supp. 2d 412, 413-20 (D.

Md. 2004) (same). 

In O’Donald, the Third Circuit explained that the BOP’s interpretation of § 3624(b)’s

ambiguous language is reasonable because it “comports with the language of the statute,

effectuates the statutory design, establishes a ‘fair prorating scheme,’ enables inmates to

calculate the time they must serve with reasonable certainty, and prevents certain inmates

from earning [good conduct time] for time during which they were not incarcerated.”

O’Donald, 402 F.3d at 174 (citing Pacheco-Camacho, 272 F.3d at 1270-71). Accepting

Petitioner’s reading of the statute would “entitle an inmate to receive credit for good

conduct in prison for time – perhaps several years of time – that he was not in prison.”

White, 390 F.3d at 1002. 

Case 2:05-cv-00124-JWC Document 11 Filed 10/18/05 Page 3 of 4
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This Court will follow the Eighth Circuit’s unpublished decisions in James and

Wittman, which represent the clear majority view, and will, therefore, afford full deference

to the BOP’s interpretation of § 3624(b) and dismiss Petitioner’s claim that the BOP is

miscalculating his good conduct time credits. 

Petitioner asks the Court to hold his petition in abeyance pending the Eighth

Circuit’s decision in Patel v. Jeter, No. 05-2652. Patel, like James and Wittman, involves

the same issue as presented here regarding calculation of good conduct time. However,

the Eighth Circuit’s docket sheet for Patel, accessed electronically, shows that appointed

counsel for the petitioner there has recently moved for leave to withdraw and tendered a

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 366 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (where counsel finds a

case to be “wholly frivolous,” he must so advise the court, request permission to withdraw,

and tender a brief “referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the

appeal”). In light of the Eighth Circuit’s two unpublished per curiam opinions rejecting

Petitioner’s position, the Court does not find sufficient justification to hold this ruling in

abeyance pending the appellate ruling in Patel. 

Accordingly, this 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus is hereby

DISMISSED in its entirety with prejudice. Petitioner’s motion to hold a ruling in abeyance

(docket entry #8) is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 18th day of October, 2005. 

 

 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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