Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02808/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02808-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
St. Charles County
Appellant
State of Wisconsin
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Donald J. Stohr, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2808

___________

St. Charles County, State of Missouri, * 

* 

Appellant, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Eastern District of Missouri.

State of Wisconsin, * 

* 

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: February 15, 2006

Filed: May 16, 2006

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BOWMAN and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

St. Charles County, Missouri, ("the County") filed this action against the State

of Wisconsin to collect $5,421.86 in expenses that St. Charles County allegedly

incurred for jailing a Wisconsin fugitive pending extradition. Wisconsin subsequently

moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(c), and the district court1

 granted the motion. The County appeals, arguing that the

Federal Extradition Act , 18 U.S.C. § 3181 et seq., grants this court jurisdiction to

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Section 3195 provides that "[a]ll costs or expenses incurred in any extradition

proceeding in apprehending, securing, and transmitting a fugitive shall be paid by the

demanding authority."

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determine whether Wisconsin failed to comply with the Act and to order any available

remedy to the County for such failure. We affirm. 

I. Background

 Jill Knutowski fled from Wisconsin to Missouri in violation of her probation.

About a month later, she was arrested and incarcerated in the County. Wisconsin

sought to extradite Knutowski under the Act. The County detained Knutowski for 83

days pending extradition and then released her into the custody of an agent of

Wisconsin. The County requested $4,150.00—$50.00 per day—from Wisconsin for

housing Knutowski. Also, the County demanded $1,271.86 for Knutowski's medical

expenses while she was in custody. Wisconsin declined to pay the $5,421.86, and the

County brought suit to recover the expenses, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3195 for subject

matter jurisdiction. 

The district court granted Wisconsin's motion for judgment on the pleadings,

holding that the Act did not provide the County with a right of action and, even if it

did, the Eleventh Amendment would bar such a claim. 

II. Discussion

On appeal, the County argues that § 31952

 of the Act establishes a cause of

action for a county seeking to recover extradition costs and expenses from a

demanding jurisdiction, such as Wisconsin. Wisconsin responds that the Eleventh

Amendment is a jurisdictional bar to suits against states by counties in federal courts

because Congress did not expressly abrogate the states' sovereign immunity in the Act.

In the alternative, Wisconsin argues that even if Congress abrogated the states'

sovereign immunity, such abrogation is invalid because Congress lacks the power to

abrogate the states' sovereign immunity in the Act. 

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The Second Circuit held that the Act provides a cause of action in federal court

to a county against a state to recover extradition costs. County of Monroe v. Florida,

678 F.2d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1982). In contrast, the Tenth Circuit held that the Act

does not provide a cause of action to a county with a cause of action against a state to

recover extradition costs because only the executive authority of the state has the right

to recover extradition expenses. Colfax County Bd. of County Comm'r v. New

Hampshire, 16 F.3d 1107, 1109–10 (10th Cir. 1994). 

4

The United States Supreme Court recently carved out an exception to the

general rule that Congress must expressly abrogate states' sovereign immunity. In the

case of bankruptcy, it is "not necessary [for Congress] to authorize the Bankruptcy

Court's jurisdiction" because, in ratifying the Bankruptcy Clause, the states "agreed

in the plan of the Convention not to assert any sovereign immunity defense they might

have had in proceedings brought pursuant to 'Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies.'"

Cent. Va. Comm. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 995, 1004 (2006). The Court indicated

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Because we consider it dispositive of the appeal, we first address whether the

Eleventh Amendment bars this suit. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he

Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law

or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of

another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Thus, while the

Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits between states, a county is a "Citizen of

another State" for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406

U.S. 91, 97 (1972). 

We note that the Second and Tenth Circuits have come to conflicting

conclusions as to whether the Act establishes a cause of action by which a county may

recover its extradition costs.3

 However, because we find the Eleventh Amendment

bars such an action, we need not address the issue. 

When Congress exercises its power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment

without the states' consent, it must express its intention "in unmistakable language in

the statute itself." Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).4

 The

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that this exception for bankruptcy cases is a narrow one, stressing that "the

Bankruptcy Clause's unique history, combined with the singular nature of bankruptcy

courts' jurisdiction," persuaded the Court that "the ratification of the Bankruptcy

Clause does represent a surrender by the States of their sovereign immunity in certain

federal proceedings." Id. at 1000 n.9. Because this is not a bankruptcy case, this

narrow exception does not apply. 

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Second Circuit acknowledged that "the Federal Extradition Act does not expressly

abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity." County of Monroe, 678 F.2d at

1133. However, despite the lack of express abrogation, the Second Circuit found that

the "plain language of s 3195 and its legislative history reveal an intent by Congress

to require the demanding state to pay the expenses of extradition" and that the Act has

a history focusing directly on the issue of state liability. Id. It found that if the Act

does not authorize suits by counties against states, then it is "rendered virtually

meaningless." Id. at 1134. In addition, the court noted that "a somewhat lesser

quantum of congressional intent to abrogate the immunity" is necessary when the "the

financial consequences of abrogating states' immunity are not particularly severe." Id.

We read the Act, congressional intent, and Supreme Court precedent somewhat

differently. Regarding abrogation, the Court has stated: 

Our opinion in Atascadero should have left no doubt that we will

conclude Congress intended to abrogate sovereign immunity only if its

intention is "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." Lest

Atascadero be thought to contain any ambiguity, we reaffirm today that

in this area of the law, evidence of congressional intent must be both

unequivocal and textual. Respondent's evidence is neither. In particular,

we reject the approach of the Court of Appeals, according to which,

"[w]hile the text of the federal legislation must bear evidence of such an

intention, the legislative history may still be used as a resource in

determining whether Congress' intention to lift the bar has been made

sufficiently manifest." Legislative history generally will be irrelevant to

a judicial inquiry into whether Congress intended to abrogate the

Eleventh Amendment. If Congress' intention is "unmistakably clear in

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As noted in footnote 4, states' sovereign immunity is also abrogated in

"proceedings necessary to effectuate the in rem jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts."

Cent. Va. Comm. Coll., 126 S. Ct. at 1005.

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the language of the statute," recourse to legislative history will be

unnecessary; if Congress' intention is not unmistakably clear, recourse

to legislative history will be futile, because by definition the rule of

Atascadero will not be met.

Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) (internal citations omitted). Given this

guidance, we hold that the Eleventh Amendment bars the instant suit because

Congress did not expressly abrogate the states' sovereign immunity in the Act. 

Congress may not use its powers under Article I to abrogate the states'

sovereign immunity from suit in federal courts. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517

U.S. 44, 64–65 (1996). However, when it acts pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment,

Congress has the power to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. Fla. Prepaid

Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 637 (1999).

Therefore, "'appropriate' legislation pursuant to the Enforcement Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment could abrogate state sovereignty." Id. To determine whether

an Act may be viewed as "remedial or preventive legislation aimed at securing the

protections of the Fourteenth Amendment," a court must "first identify the Fourteenth

Amendment 'evil' or 'wrong' that Congress intended to remedy, guided by the principle

that the propriety of any § 5 legislation must be judged with reference to the historical

experience it reflects." Id. at 640 (internal quotations and citation omitted).5

Here, the County argues that "Section 3195 could be properly interpreted as a

mechanism by which the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment are extended to

[the County] to protect it from the unconstitutional deprivation of property occasioned

by the demand of Wisconsin to hold and extradite one of its fugitives." We do not so

interpret § 3195. Congress's 1793 enactment of the Extradition Act stated no intent to

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abrogate the states' sovereign immunity through the Fourteenth Amendment because

the Act's passage predated the Fourteenth Amendment by 75 years. 

Finally, we "turn [ ]to the question whether [Wisconsin's] sovereign immunity,

though not abrogated, was voluntarily waived." Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid

Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999). Sovereign immunity is

a privilege that the state holds, which it may voluntarily waive. Id. However, the "test

for determining whether a State has waived its immunity from federal-court

jurisdiction is a stringent one." Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). A state

only waives its sovereign immunity "if the State voluntarily invokes [federal]

jurisdiction, or else if the State makes a clear declaration that it intends to submit itself

to [federal] jurisdiction." Id. at 675–76 (internal quotations and internal citations

omitted). Therefore, "the State's consent [must] be unequivocally expressed."

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984). We hold that

Wisconsin never expressly consented to being sued in federal court and that

constructive waiver of sovereign immunity is not permitted. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.

at 680. 

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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