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Parties Involved:
Attorney General, State of Florida
Appellee
Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
Appellee
Richard Sierra
Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-10218

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 6:13-cv-00402-GKS-GJK

RICHARD SIERRA, 

 Petitioner-Appellant,

 versus

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, 

 Respondents-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(July 26, 2016)

Before CARNES, Chief Judge, WILLIAM PRYOR, and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Richard Sierra, a Florida prisoner, appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254

petition. He contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for advising him that, if 

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he went to trial and was found guilty, the court would have no option but to 

sentence him to life imprisonment. He argues that nothing was said during his plea 

colloquy to correct the incorrect advice he received about the consequences of 

going to trial. He asserts that if counsel had not given him the incorrect advice, he 

would have gone to trial instead of pleading guilty. 

In 2009 Sierra entered a written, open plea agreement. He pleaded no 

contest to one count of kidnapping with the intent to commit a felony with a 

firearm and one count of robbery with a firearm, and the State entered a nolle

prosequi on two counts of aggravated assault with a firearm. Sierra was also 

charged with violating his probation, which he admitted. He was sentenced to a 

total term of twenty-five years imprisonment. 

Sierra sought post-conviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 3.850, which the state court denied. The court also denied his motion 

for rehearing, finding that he could not demonstrate prejudice because he could not 

have reasonably relied on advice about facing a mandatory life sentence at trial 

based on what the court told him at the plea colloquy regarding the possible 

sentences for his crimes. The state appellate court affirmed the denial of relief. 

Sierra later filed a § 2254 petition in the district court, raising four claims. 

On the claim at issue here, the court found that Sierra had failed to show that his 

counsel acted unreasonably or that he was prejudiced. It dismissed his petition and 

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denied a certificate of appealability. We granted a certificate of appealability on 

this issue:

Whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for advising Mr. 

Sierra that if he did not plead guilty and was convicted at trial, the 

trial court had no other option but to sentence him to life 

imprisonment. 

When a state court has adjudicated a claim on the merits, AEDPA precludes 

federal habeas relief unless the state court’s decision was (1) “contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) . . . was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). To establish entitlement to relief, 

Sierra “must show that no fairminded jurist could agree with the state court’s 

decision on an issue of federal law or on an issue of fact.” Lynch v. Sec’y, Fla. 

Dep’t of Corr., 776 F.3d 1209, 1217 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). 

In the “rare case in which the petitioner has met the requirement of § 2254(d)(2) by 

showing the state courts made an unreasonable factual determination, we review 

[the] claim de novo, without deference to the [state court’s] decision.” Jones v. 

Walker, 540 F.3d 1277, 1288 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

To succeed on his claim, Sierra also “must prove that: (1) counsel’s advice 

was deficient; and (2) ‘but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 

and would have insisted on going to trial.’” Lynch, 776 F.3d at 1218 (quoting Hill 

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v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58–59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985)). “Moreover, to 

obtain relief on this type of claim, [he] must convince the court that a decision to 

reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.” Padilla 

v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). 

In its order denying Sierra’s motion to reconsider, the state collateral court 

noted that during Sierra’s plea colloquy he was informed that the crimes he was 

charged with committing were punishable by sentences of “up to life 

imprisonment.” Based on that, the court concluded that Sierra could not have 

reasonably relied on any incorrect advice that a life sentence was mandatory. The 

court pointed to the following exchange in the plea transcript:

THE COURT: Okay. The kidnapping charge is a life felony, which 

is punishable by up to life imprisonment, probation for up to life, 

and/or a fine of up to $15,000. Your charge of robbery with a firearm 

is a first-degree felony punishable by up to life imprisonment, 

probation for up to life, and/or a fine of up to $10,000. Do you 

understand that, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

THE COURT: Ok. [Defense counsel] has handed me an admission 

form in [the probation violation case]. In that case, you were placed 

on probation for possession of alprazolam, which is a third-degree 

felony punishable by up to five years in state prison, five years 

probation, and/or a fine of up to $5000. Do you understand?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

* * *

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THE COURT: Do you understand that if you enter this plea and this 

admission, the sentence to be imposed is entirely up to the court, and 

the court could impose any sentence which could be up to life 

imprisonment?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

The record establishes that Sierra was informed about the range of possible 

sentences for the crimes he had committed. He argues, however, that the state 

court unreasonably determined that the information provided during the plea 

colloquy cured the incorrect advice he received from his lawyer. Sierra asserts that 

because the court’s statements were made in the context of a guilty plea, they did 

nothing to dispel his misconception about facing a mandatory life sentence if he 

went to trial. He argues that counsel’s advice gave him the impression that guilty 

pleas and guilty verdicts result in separate sentencing schemes and because of that, 

he could not accurately weigh the consequences of going to trial instead of entering 

a guilty plea. 

Even assuming that is correct, and even assuming that the state court’s 

decision involved an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented, see Jones, 540 F.3d at 1288, under any standard of review

Sierra’s claim fails because he cannot show prejudice. A petitioner who has no 

viable trial defenses cannot establish prejudice from counsel’s advice to plead 

guilty. See Lynch, 776 F.3d at 1218–19. Sierra does not dispute the State’s 

assertion that there was overwhelming evidence of his guilt, including a video 

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recording of Sierra and a codefendant robbing a pawnshop, holding two employees 

at gunpoint, and binding their hands. There was also evidence that Sierra 

possessed some of the recently stolen property. Sierra asserts that he had some 

valid defenses, but he does not say what they are. He also asserts that a jury might

have convicted him of lesser included offenses warranting a lower sentence, 

particularly because his codefendant was indisputably the one who carried the 

firearm during the robbery. Sierra did not carry a firearm. 

Under Florida law, a person who participates in a common criminal scheme 

with another is guilty of all crimes committed in furtherance of that scheme, 

regardless of physical participation. See Lovette v. State, 636 So. 2d 1304, 1306 

(Fla. 1994); Jacobs v. State, 396 So. 2d 713, 716 (Fla. 1981). The fact that Sierra 

was not the robber who carried the firearm does not diminish his guilt for the 

charged crimes. See Freeny v. State, 621 So. 2d 505, 506 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)

(holding that “possession of a firearm by a codefendant is sufficient to convict a 

defendant of armed robbery, pursuant to the principal theory”). 

With a video recording of the crime and no valid defenses, it would not have 

been rational for Sierra to have rejected the plea agreement and proceeded to trial. 

See Diveroli v. United States, 803 F.3d 1258, 1265 (11th Cir. 2015) (explaining 

that it would not have been rational for the defendant to have rejected his plea 

agreement because of the evidence of his guilt and the lack of any valid defenses). 

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And if Sierra had decided to proceed to trial instead of pleading guilty, the State 

might well have chosen not to enter a nolle prosequi on the two counts of 

aggravated assault with a firearm as it had promised to do in the plea agreement. 

See Taylor v. State, 608 So. 2d 804, 805 (Fla. 1992) (holding that “aggravated 

assault is not a category-one necessarily lesser included offense of armed 

robbery”). Because he has failed to show he was prejudiced by counsel’s advice to 

plead guilty, he is not entitled to relief.

1

 

AFFIRMED. 

 1 Sierra has requested an evidentiary hearing. Because he has not sufficiently alleged facts that, 

if true, would entitle him to relief, an evidentiary hearing is not required. See Schriro v. 

Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474, 127 S. Ct. 1933, 1940 (2007) (holding that, where “the record 

refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is 

not required to hold an evidentiary hearing”). 

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