Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01225/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01225-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Intervenor for Respondent
Natural Resources Defense Council
Petitioner
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Respondent
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 17, 2015 Decided April 26, 2016

No. 14-1225

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL,

PETITIONER

v.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND UNITED STATES 

OF AMERICA,

RESPONDENTS

EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC,

INTERVENOR

On Petition for Review of An Order of the

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Howard M. Crystal argued the cause for petitioner. With 

him on the briefs were Eric R. Glitzenstein and Geoffrey H. 

Fettus.

James E. Adler, Senior Attorney, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, argued the cause for respondents. With him on 

the brief were John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General, 

U.S. Department of Justice, John E. Arbab, Attorney, and 

Andrew P. Averbach, Solicitor, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission.

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Brad Fagg argued the cause and filed the brief for 

intervenor Exelon Generation Company, LLC,

Before: ROGERS, BROWN and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN. 

BROWN, Circuit Judge: National Resources Defense 

Council (NRDC) challenges the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission’s (NRC’s) denial of NRDC’s request for a hearing 

and subsequent application for a waiver, asserting this process 

was inconsistent with the procedural rigor mandated by the 

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The denial 

thwarted NRDC’s attempt to intervene in the license renewal 

proceeding for Exelon’s Limerick nuclear power station in 

Pennsylvania. NRDC sought to present “new and significant” 

information regarding severe accident mitigation alternatives 

(SAMAs) relevant to Limerick. We find the Commission 

reasonably concluded NRDC’s request to intervene was a 

challenge to a general rule—10 C.F.R. §51.53(c)(3)(ii)(L) 

(Rule (L))—improperly raised in an individual adjudication; 

and, contrary to NRDC’s view, while NEPA requires agencies 

to take a hard look before approving a major federal action, it 

does not mandate adoption of a particular process for doing so. 

Having failed to show its contentions were unique to Limerick, 

NRDC also was not entitled to a waiver. We conclude the 

Commission’s actions were not arbitrary and capricious and 

deny the petition.

I.

The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) empowers the Commission 

to issue and renew nuclear power plant licenses. See 42 U.S.C. 

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§ 2133. The Act limits initial licenses to a forty-year term but 

otherwise grants the Commission wide authority to regulate the 

license issuance and renewal process. See id. at § 2133(c). In 

10 C.F.R. Part 54, the Commission laid out the general 

framework for renewal. The Commission also promulgated 10 

C.F.R. Part 51 to deal with its obligations under NEPA. NEPA 

requires preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement 

(EIS) before undertaking any “major Federal action[] 

significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 

42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); see also New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 

471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012). This requirement ensures each 

agency “consider[s] every significant aspect of the 

environmental impact of a proposed action” and “inform[s] the 

public that it has indeed considered environmental concerns in 

its decisionmaking process.” Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 

462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983). The issuance or renewal of a nuclear 

power plant license qualifies as a “major federal action” 

triggering the Commission’s obligations under NEPA. See 

New York, 681 F.3d at 476.

The AEA also provides that “the Commission shall grant a 

hearing upon the request of any person whose interest may be 

affected by the proceeding.” 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A). In 10 

C.F.R. § 2.309, the Commission laid out the specific 

procedures an intervening party must follow. The interested

party must file a written request listing the specific contentions 

the party seeks to litigate. See id. at § 2.309(a), (f)(1). If a 

party’s contentions do not meet the Commission’s specificity or

relevancy requirements, the agency may deny the hearing 

request. See id. Finally, the AEA subjects all final 

Commission orders to judicial review. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(b). 

“Any party aggrieved” by a final order of the Commission may

“file a petition to review the order in the court of appeals.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2344. This court has “routinely interpreted [the 

phrase ‘any party aggrieved’] to allow petitions by parties who 

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were intervenors before the Commission.” State of Alaska v. 

FERC, 980 F.2d 761, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1992). To challenge the 

Commission’s grant of a license renewal, then, a party must 

have successfully intervened in the proceeding by submitting

adequate contentions under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309. 

II.

NRDC here sought to intervene in the relicensing of 

Exelon’s Limerick power station. To understand how this

relicensing process works, a brief history of the power plant at 

issue is helpful. The Limerick Generating Station is a dual-unit 

nuclear power plant with two boiling water reactors located in 

Limerick Township, Pennsylvania, approximately 35 miles 

outside of Philadelphia. The Commission first licensed 

Limerick in 1984 after conducting ninety-five days of hearings 

and “generating a 20,000-page transcript.” Limerick Ecology 

Action, Inc. v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719, 728 (3d Cir. 1989). Various 

environmental petitioners challenged NRC’s grant of a full 

power license to Limerick, alleging the Commission failed to 

adequately consider several environmentally relevant factors in 

violation of NEPA. Specifically, petitioners contended the 

Commission improperly declined to consider severe accident 

mitigation design alternatives (SAMDAs)1 on the basis of the

Agency’s policy statement that read: “[NRC will] exclude 

consideration of design alternatives as a matter of Commission 

policy while research into design alternatives [is] ongoing.” Id.

at 734. SAMDAs are defined as “possible plant design 

modifications that are intended not to prevent an accident, but 

to lessen the severity of the impact of an accident should one 

occur.” Id. at 731. 

 1 The terms “severe accident mitigation alternatives” (SAMAs) and 

“severe accident mitigation design alternatives” (SAMDAs) have the 

same meaning and are used interchangeably throughout this opinion.

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 The Third Circuit held NRC’s policy statement—unlike a 

notice-and-comment rulemaking—was not entitled to 

deference. See id. at 729–31. Moreover, the court rejected 

NRC’s Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for 

Limerick as inadequate under NEPA because it did not include

“the requisite careful consideration of the environmental 

consequences [of SAMDAs].” Id. at 723. But the court did not 

foreclose the possibility that SAMDAs could be dealt with

“generically” through a subsequent rulemaking.2

 See id.

(“Although NEPA requires the Commission to undertake 

‘careful consideration’ of environmental consequences, . . . it 

may issue a rulemaking to address and evaluate environmental 

impacts that are ‘generic,’ i.e. not plant-specific.” (citation 

omitted)).

Prompted by Limerick Ecology, NRC staff conducted a 

site-specific severe accident mitigation analysis at Limerick 

and issued a supplemental environmental impact statement 

(SEIS) summarizing its findings. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Comm’n, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Final 

Environmental Statement Related to the Operation of Limerick 

Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, NUREG-0974 Supplement 

(Aug. 1989). NRC staff concluded “the risks and 

environmental impacts of severe accidents at Limerick are 

 2 The Third Circuit did conclude SAMDAs were “unlikely” to 

qualify for generic treatment based on the record presented. Id. at 

739. But, as discussed infra, NRC ultimately treated SAMDAs as 

“quasi-generic” (conducting a single site-specific SAMDA analysis 

for each plant when initially licensed but requiring no new analysis 

when re-licensed) and, regardless, the Third Circuit’s dicta did not 

eliminate the Commission’s ability to treat this issue generically if 

resolved through notice-and-comment rulemaking on a more 

extensive record. 

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acceptably low” and that “no new information” called into 

question the FEIS’s original severe accident findings. Id. at vi. 

A. The 1996 Rulemaking

The Commission subsequently accepted the Third Circuit’s

invitation to streamline its evaluation of environmental issues

during license renewal by resolving many issues generically. 

See Environmental Review for Renewal of Nuclear Power Plant 

Operating Licenses, 61 Fed. Reg. 28,467 (June 5, 1996). The 

Commission identified 92 issues material to environmental 

review of nuclear power plants; of these, it assessed that 68 

issues could be adequately addressed generically, whereas 24 

“were found to require additional assessment for at least some 

plants at the time of the license renewal review.” Id. at 28,468; 

see also 10 C.F.R. pt. 51 appx. B. The former were classified 

as “Category 1” issues and the latter as “Category 2.” See 10 

C.F.R. pt. 51 appx. B. The rulemaking also addressed two 

related concerns: that interested parties would be denied the 

opportunity to participate in the license renewal process with 

respect to “generically” resolved issues and that a generic EIS 

could not satisfy NEPA’s “hard look” requirement because it 

would necessarily rely on findings from 20 years prior. See 61 

Fed. Reg. at 28,470. NRC responded to these concerns by (i) 

committing to prepare a supplemental site-specific EIS (rather 

than simply an environmental assessment) for each renewal 

which would consider comments introducing “new and 

significant” information regardless of whether the comments

were directed to Category 1 or 2 issues; (ii) leaving cost-benefit 

conclusions and conclusions “relative to the overall 

environmental impacts including cumulative impacts” entirely 

to the site-specific supplemental EIS; and (iii) formally 

reviewing the rule and the generic EIS (GEIS) every 10 years 

to determine “what, if anything, in the rule requires revision.” 

Id. at 28,470-71. 

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The Commission formally classified SAMAs as a Category 

2 issue, although it included an exception for plants that had 

previously performed a SAMA analysis. See 10 C.F.R. pt. 51 

appx. B. (“[A]lternatives to mitigate severe accidents must be 

considered for all plants that have not considered such 

alternatives.”). The Commission explained its categorization of 

SAMAs at length. The GEIS analyzes SAMAs for “each site” 

using “site-specific estimates for parameters such as population 

distribution and meteorological conditions.” 61 Fed. Reg. at 

28,480. The information incorporated into the GEIS is

therefore based on an evaluation of each particular plant. See 

id. (“[T]he analyses performed for the GEIS represent 

adequate, plant-specific estimates of the impacts from severe 

accidents that would generally over-predict, rather than underpredict, environmental consequences.” (emphasis added)). But 

NRC concluded that SAMAs could not yet be categorized as a

“Category 1” issue because not all plants had conducted a 

SAMA analysis at the initial licensing stage: 

The Commission has determined that a sitespecific consideration of alternatives to mitigate 

severe accidents will be required at the time of 

license renewal unless a previous consideration of 

such alternatives regarding plant operation has 

been included in a final environmental impact 

statement or a related supplement. . . . Although 

the Commission has considered containment 

improvements for all plants . . . [and] has 

additional ongoing regulatory programs whereby 

licensees search for individual plant vulnerabilities 

to severe accidents and consider cost-beneficial 

improvements, these programs have not yet been 

completed. Therefore, a conclusion that severe 

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accident mitigation has been generically 

considered for license renewal is premature.

Id. at 28,480–81. In its rulemaking, NRC also specifically 

enumerated the plants, including Limerick, which had already 

completed an adequate SAMA analysis at licensing and so 

were not required to conduct further analysis at relicensing. 

See id. at 28,481 (“NRC staff considerations of [SAMAs] have 

already been completed and included in an EIS or supplemental 

EIS for Limerick, Comanche Peak, and Watts Bar. Therefore, 

[SAMAs] need not be reconsidered for these plants for license 

renewal.”).

 The Commission codified its treatment of SAMAs at 10 

C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(L) (Rule (L)), which states: “If the staff 

has not previously considered severe accident mitigation 

alternatives for the applicant’s plant in an environmental impact 

statement or related supplement or in an environmental 

assessment, a consideration of alternatives to mitigate severe 

accidents must be provided.” Rule (L) thus constitutes a 

generic determination, via rulemaking, that one SAMA per 

plant is sufficient to “uncover most cost-beneficial measures to 

mitigate both the risk and the effects of severe accidents, thus 

satisfying [the Commission’s] obligations under NEPA.” In 

the Matter of Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Limerick 

Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), 2013 WL 5872241, at *5 

(Oct. 31, 2013). For plants like Limerick where a SAMA 

analysis was performed when the plant was initially licensed,

reliance on that earlier site-specific analysis is sufficient: The 

Commission relies on both the site-specific SEIS and the GEIS 

to conduct its severe accident analysis under NEPA. So 

although SAMAs are a “mixed” general and site-specific issue,

the Commission has described Rule (L) as the functional 

equivalent of a Category 1 designation for severe accident 

impacts at plants such as Limerick. 

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B. The Relicensing Process

The categorization of SAMAs directly impacts a licensee’s 

obligations during relicensing. Under 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(1) –

(2), every applicant for renewal of a power plant license must 

submit an Environmental Report (ER), which describes “in 

detail the affected environment around the plant, the 

modifications directly affecting the environment . . . , and any 

planned refurbishment activities.” The applicant need only

submit plant-specific information for Category 2 issues, id.

§ 51.53(c)(3)(ii), as the Category 1 GEIS findings can generally

be incorporated wholesale, id. § 51.53(c)(3)(i). Although Rule 

(L) exempts an applicant from conducting another plantspecific SAMA analysis if one has previously been completed, 

that applicant is still required to report “any new and significant 

information regarding the environmental impacts of license 

renewal of which the applicant is aware,” including information

about SAMAs. 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)(iv); see Massachusetts

v. United States, 522 F.3d 115, 120 (1st Cir. 2008) (“The NRC 

concedes that this [requirement] applies even to ‘new and 

significant information’ concerning Category 1 issues.”). 

After an applicant has submitted its ER, the NRC staff 

produces a draft supplemental EIS for license renewal. 10 

C.F.R. § 51.95(c). “This plant-specific SEIS addresses 

Category 2 issues and complements the GEIS, which covers 

Category 1 issues. Id. § 51.71(d). When the GEIS and SEIS 

are combined, they cover all issues NEPA requires be 

addressed in an EIS for a nuclear power plant license renewal 

proceeding.” Massachusetts, 522 F.3d at 120. The public then 

has an opportunity to comment on the draft SEIS, and NRC 

staff prepare a final SEIS only after reviewing the comments. 

See 10 C.F.R. § 51.95(c)(3). 

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For parties seeking to challenge the staff’s findings, the 

process varies by issue category. Because Category 2 issues 

are site-specific, they can be challenged directly during the

relicensing proceeding. The Commission has established a

different mechanism for challenging generic Category 1 

findings during individual license renewal proceedings. If a

party submits comments on a Category 1 issue during the 

public comment period, the NRC staff has three potential 

avenues for response. If it deems the existing generic analysis 

adequate, it can provide an explanation of that view (including, 

if applicable, consideration of the significance of the new 

information). See 61 Fed. Reg. at 28,470. However, if a 

commenter provides new information that calls into question 

the validity of a generic Category 1 finding, “the NRC staff will 

seek Commission approval to either suspend the application of 

the rule on a generic basis . . . or delay granting the renewal

application” until the GEIS is updated and the rule amended. 

Id. If the commenter provides site-specific information 

indicating the rule is incorrect with respect to that particular 

plant, the NRC staff will petition the Commission to “waive the 

application of the rule with respect to that analysis in that 

specific renewal proceeding.” Id. 

A party who remains dissatisfied by the Commission’s 

response to its Category 1-related comment has two final 

alternatives: that party can (i) petition for a waiver of the NRC 

regulation (such as Rule L) with respect to that proceeding, see

10 C.F.R § 2.335(b); or (ii) petition the agency for a 

rulemaking to amend the GEIS, see 61 Fed. Reg. at 28,470. 

“This divergent treatment of generic and site-specific issues is 

reasonable and consistent with the purpose of promoting 

efficiency in handling license renewal decisions.” 

Massachusetts, 522 F.3d at 120. 

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III. 

This litigation spans many years and many volumes. In 

June 2011, Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) filed 

an application to renew its initial 40-year operating licenses for 

Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, for an additional 

20 years. Because of Rule (L)’s carve-out for plants that 

previously conducted a SAMA analysis, Exelon’s ER

supporting its license renewal application did not contain a new 

SAMA analysis but merely noted such an analysis had been 

completed for the initial operating licenses. See Exelon 

Generation Co., Environmental Report—Operating License 

Renewal Stage, Limerick Generation Station, Units 1 and 2, at 

4-49 (June 2011). Although Exelon relied on Rule (L) to 

conclude no updated site-specific analysis was legally required, 

it still included a detailed consideration of whether “new and 

significant” information had identified “a significant 

environmental issue not covered in the GEIS” or an issue

excluded from the GEIS that could lead to “an impact finding 

different from that codified in the regulation.” Id. at 5-2. 

Exelon concluded that it had discovered no such new or 

significant information. See id. at 5-4 to 5-9. 

After NRC staff published a Notice of Opportunity for 

Hearing on Exelon’s relicensing application, see 76 Fed. Reg. 

52,992 (Aug. 24, 2011), NRDC submitted a petition to 

intervene and a hearing request. Perhaps anticipating that its 

SAMA-related contentions would be precluded by Rule (L), 

NRDC framed its arguments in terms of NEPA, alleging that 

NEPA requires an EIS to contain “high quality” information 

and “accurate scientific analysis,” meaning an agency cannot

possibly comply with NEPA if it relies on “outdated, 

inaccurate, or incomplete” environmental analyses. See

Natural Resource Defense Council Petition to Intervene and 

Notice of Intention to Participate, Nos. 50-352-LR, 50-353-LR, 

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at 48 (Nov. 22, 2011). In its petition, NRDC specifically 

contended that Exelon’s ER “erroneously conclude[d] that new 

information related to its SAMDA analysis [was] not 

significant.” Id. at 16. The Atomic Safety and Licensing 

Board (“Board”) admitted only this contention. In the Matter 

of Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Limerick Generating Station, 

Units 1 and 2), 75 N.R.C. 539, 570–71 (2012). In doing so, the 

Board rejected Exelon’s argument that Rule (L) absolved it of 

any responsibility to conduct an updated SAMA analysis. See 

id. at 543.

Both NRC staff and Exelon appealed the Board’s 

admission of NRDC’s contention as an impermissible 

challenge to Rule (L) in the context of an individual 

adjudication. Exelon acknowledged its obligation to evaluate 

“new and significant” information related to SAMAs but 

argued no party could challenge the adequacy of its evaluation 

as it relates to the prior Limerick SAMA analysis, absent a 

waiver. See Exelon’s Brief in Support of the Appeal of LBP-12-

08, Nos. 50-352-LR, 50-353-LR, at 7 (Apr. 16, 2012). The 

Commission agreed and reversed the Board’s ruling, 

concluding that NRDC’s contention, “reduced to its simplest 

terms, amounts to a challenge to [Rule (L)].” See In the Matter 

of Exelon Generation, Co., 76 N.R.C. 377, 386 (Oct. 23, 2012) 

(“The assumption underlying [NRDC’s contention] is that 

Exelon’s 1989 SAMDA analysis is out-of-date, which Exelon 

then must remedy in its [ER], even though this is something 

[Rule (L)] otherwise exempts Exelon from having to do.”). 

However, because the Commission conceded it had not yet 

faced this precise factual scenario, it found NRDC could 

potentially challenge the adequacy of Exelon’s ER by seeking a 

waiver of Rule (L). See id. The Commission therefore 

remanded the case to the Board to afford NRDC an opportunity 

to file a petition for waiver. Id. at 388. The Commission also 

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noted NRDC could file a petition for rulemaking to rescind 

Rule (L)’s exception. Id. at 387. NRDC declined to do so. 

On remand, the Board concluded Rule (L) could not be 

waived but referred the decision back to the Commission for 

further review given the complex interplay between Rule (L)

and 10 C.F.R. §2.335(b).3 The Commission ultimately 

affirmed the Board’s decision to deny the waiver but did so on 

different grounds. In doing so, it justified its stringent waiver 

standard by explaining: 

When we engage in rulemaking, we are “carving 

out” issues from adjudication for generic resolution. 

Therefore, to challenge the generic application of a 

rule, a petitioner seeking waiver must show that 

there is something extraordinary about the subject 

matter of the proceeding such that the rule should 

not apply.

Exelon Generation Co., LLC, 2013 WL 5872241, at *3. To 

qualify for waiver, four factors must be met. See In the Matter 

of Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone), 62 N.R.C. 

551, 559–60 (2005). The Commission found NRDC failed to 

meet its burden since it could not demonstrate that its challenge 

rested on “issues that [were] legitimately unique to the 

proceeding” rather than issues of “broader concern[] about the 

rule’s general viability or appropriateness.” Exelon Generation 

Co., at *4. Because NRDC was not relying on information that 

set “Limerick apart from other plants undergoing license 

renewal whose previous SAMA analyses purportedly also 

 3 Under section 2.335(b), “[t]he sole ground for petition of waiver . . . 

is that special circumstances with respect to the subject matter of the 

particular proceeding are such that the application of the rule or 

regulation (or a provision of it) would not serve the purposes for 

which the rule or regulation was adopted.” Id. 

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would be in need of updating,” the Commission denied the 

waiver. Id. at *8. Nevertheless, the Commission directed the 

Staff to review the significance of any new SAMA-related 

information raised by NRDC. Id. at *9. 

IV. 

The Administrative Procedure Act governs our review of 

an agency’s rule or licensing decision. See 5 U.S.C. § 500 et 

seq. This court is authorized to set aside the Commission’s 

relicensing decision only if it was “arbitrary, capricious, an 

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 

Id. § 706(2)(A). Our general posture of deference toward 

agency decision-making is particularly marked with regards to 

NRC actions because “the [AEA] is hallmarked by the amount 

of discretion granted the Commission in working to achieve the 

statute’s ends.” Massachusetts v. NRC, 878 F.2d 1516, 1523 

(1st Cir. 1989) (quoting Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. NRC, 582 

F.2d 77, 82 (1st Cir. 1978) (alterations omitted)). 

Moreover, to the extent NRC’s technical judgment is 

before the court, we “must generally be at [our] most 

deferential.” Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 103. In the 

NEPA context “determining what constitutes significant new 

information” is “a factual question requiring technical 

expertise,” and so the agency’s determination is “owe[d] 

considerable deference.” Town of Winthrop v. FAA, 535 F.3d 

1, 8 (1st Cir. 2008). Still, we must ensure NRC “examine[d] 

the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for 

its action including a rational connection between the facts 

found and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., 

Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).

Finally, we evaluate the Commission’s interpretation of the 

AEA’s hearing requirement under the familiar two-step 

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Chevron analysis. This court is “obliged to defer to the 

operating procedures employed by an agency when the 

governing statute requires only that a ‘hearing’ be held,” as 

does the AEA. Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 920 

F.2d 50, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1990). And the Commission’s

interpretation of its own regulations is given “controlling 

weight” unless that interpretation is “plainly erroneous or 

inconsistent with the regulation.” City of Idaho Falls v. FERC, 

629 F.3d 222, 228 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

V. 

Before delving into the law, it is helpful to lay out in plain 

terms what is at stake in this case from both parties’ 

perspectives. For NRDC, the existence of Rule (L) ostensibly

creates a “regulatory blackhole” that prevents the organization 

from intervening in the relicensing adjudication to challenge 

the adequacy of Limerick’s 1989 SAMA analysis in light of 

advancements in technology. Because NRDC is barred from 

intervening, the organization is not entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing on its claims. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.310. Moreover, even 

though the Commission directed NRC staff to consider 

NRDC’s “new and significant” information, that consideration 

is shielded from substantive judicial review because NRDC 

was prevented from intervening in the adjudication. See State 

of Alaska, 980 F.2d at 763. 

NRDC alleges both alternative routes to a challenge—

seeking a waiver or submitting a petition for rulemaking—are 

merely illusory. As the Commission conceded at oral 

argument, it has rarely, if ever, granted a petition for waiver. 

And rulemaking is a lengthy process, often taking years. A 

party that has submitted a rulemaking petition can seek to 

suspend the relicensing process while its petition is considered. 

However, it is unclear under Commission regulations whether 

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NRDC would qualify to request suspension: a petitioner may 

request suspension of “any licensing proceeding to which the 

petitioner is a participant.” 10 C.F.R. § 2.802(e) (emphasis 

added). “Participant” is defined by the Commission as “an 

individual or organization . . . that has petitioned to intervene in 

a proceeding or requested a hearing but has not yet been 

granted party status by the [Board].” Id. § 2.4. Even if NRDC 

qualifies under this definition—having been definitively denied 

intervenor status—it would still have to satisfy the 

Commission’s three-pronged test for suspension of licensing 

proceeding. See In the Matter of Private Fuel Storage, LLC, 54 

N.R.C. 376 (2001). 

At first glance, NRDC’s predicament is worrisome given 

the decades that elapse between licensing and relicensing and 

the advances in mitigation technology that inevitably occur in 

the interim. Concern is especially understandable in light of

the Fukushima tragedy. In March 2011, the world watched in 

horror as, following a Magnitude 9 earthquake off the coast of 

Japan, the tsunami it generated crashed ashore—killing 

thousands, flooding cities, destroying homes, schools and 

factories, and overwhelming the ten meter seawalls protecting 

Fukushima’s Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant. All six of the 

boiling water reactors at the plant were damaged, and three 

experienced meltdowns. The profound human cost of this 

event is a powerful reminder that these issues demand our most 

careful attention. 

After closer inspection, however, we are persuaded that the 

issue is less problematic than it first appears. SAMAs represent

only a minor portion of the Commission’s overall regulatory 

regime—separate and apart from its safety requirements. A 

SAMA is simply “a cost-benefit analysis that addresses 

whether the expense of implementing a mitigation measure not 

mandated by the NRC is outweighed by the expected reduction 

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in environmental cost it would provide in a core damage 

event.” Massachusetts v. NRC, 708 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 2013). 

Potential benefits include “averted costs such as public 

exposure, offsite property damage, occupational exposure 

costs, cleanup and decontamination costs, and replacement 

power costs.” Id. at 68 n.5. Put simply, SAMAs are not meant 

to prevent an accident but rather to mitigate the severity should 

one occur. The Commission relies on a myriad of other safety 

mechanisms to prevent accidents. For example, plants are 

required to maintain “up-to-date” emergency plans that are 

evaluated on a site-specific basis during license renewal. See 

61 Fed. Reg. at 28,480. The Commission also uses ongoing 

programs to evaluate mitigation alternatives including the 

Containment Performance Improvement program, the 

Individual Plant Examination program, and the Individual Plant 

Examination for External Events programs. See id. at 28,481.

These site-specific programs have considered a range of 

potential mitigation measures, resulting in the adoption of

several “plant procedural or programmatic improvements”

apart from the relicensing process. Id. As plants like Limerick 

implement these changes, the relative benefits of adopting 

additional mitigation alternatives diminish.

4

The Commission—and the plants themselves—are thus 

constantly evaluating new mitigation alternatives through 

channels other than the relicensing process. Exelon has in fact

implemented several additional mitigation measures at 

 4 The ongoing nature of many mitigation measures reinforces this 

dynamic. One SAMA adopted by Exelon, for example, was the 

creation of an accident management program to develop “procedures 

that promote the most effective use of available plant equipment and 

staff in the event of an accident.” Limerick Environmental Report, at 

5-5. This management program continues to exist and so, 

presumably, continues to develop relevant procedures to mitigate 

damage in the event of an accident. 

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Limerick since its 1989 SAMA analysis. See Limerick 2014 

Supplemental EIS, supra, at 5-4 to 5-9. The Commission has 

also evaluated the safety of all plants in light of events at

Fukushima; immediately after the earthquake, the Commission 

convened a task force to consider its ramifications. The Task 

Force issued its preliminary findings only four months after the 

accident. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 

Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st 

Century: The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from 

the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident (July 12, 2011). It concluded 

“a sequence of events like the Fukushima accident is unlikely 

to occur in the United States and some appropriate mitigation 

measures have been implemented, reducing the likelihood of 

core damage and radiological releases.” Id. at vii. Notably, 

SAMA analyses had long assumed that a sequence of events 

similar to Fukushima “could yield devastating consequences” 

and so had accounted for such circumstances. See Limerick 

2014 Supplemental EIS, supra, at 5–8. The Task Force’s report 

thus confirmed the Commission’s “twin expectations” that 

“future SAMA analyses would not likely find major plant 

improvements cost-beneficial” and that risk reduction could be

adequately accomplished through “ongoing safety oversight.” 

Id. 

But the relicensing process also includes means for NRC 

to consider “new and significant” information related to 

Category 1 issues—even if it does not guarantee a hearing. As 

discussed previously, if a party raises relevant “new and 

significant” information regarding a generic finding, NRC staff 

have the option to suspend the rule and relicensing until the 

GEIS is updated or to waive application of the rule to that 

particular plant. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 28,470. And in this case, 

NRC staff actually considered and explained its treatment of 

NRDC’s “new and significant” information. See Limerick 

2014 Supplemental EIS, supra, at 5-25 to 5-26. 

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From the Commission’s perspective, then, it is both 

effective and efficient to resolve certain issues through generic 

findings. The relicensing process is already lengthy, as NRC 

staff must evaluate all relevant information, respond to public 

comment, and hold evidentiary hearings on challenges to sitespecific issues. If any party could also challenge every 

generically resolved issue, the number of hearings would 

increase dramatically—even though those hearings would be 

unlikely to identify measures not already considered by the 

Commission. The agency has therefore wisely chosen to focus 

its limited resources in other more availing areas, while still 

building in several safety valves to ensure that truly significant 

new information is not overlooked. 

Having explained the regulatory framework—and defined 

the issues at stake—we now turn to the legal questions. 

A.

This case’s complicated procedural background obscures 

the relatively straightforward legal issue at play. The key 

question is whether NRDC is seeking a hearing on an issue 

generically resolved through rulemaking via an individual 

adjudication. Commission regulations preclude such collateral 

attacks, absent a waiver. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.335(a) (“[N]o rule 

or regulation of the Commission, or any provision thereof, 

concerning the licensing of . . . facilities . . . is subject to attack 

by way of discovery, proof, argument, or other means in any 

adjudicatory proceeding subject to this part.”). Moreover, “it is 

‘hornbook administrative law that an agency need not—indeed 

should not—entertain a challenge to a regulation’ in an 

individual adjudication.” New Jersey Dep’t of Env’t Protection 

v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132, 143 (3rd Cir. 2009) (quoting Tribune 

Co. v. FCC, 133 F.3d 61, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). 

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From the outset, NRDC’s contentions have focused on the 

inadequacy of Limerick’s 1989 SAMA in light of changes over 

the past three decades. Rule (L) forecloses this approach.

NRDC is arguably correct in arguing that Rule (L)’s language, 

on its face, does not preclude the Commission from requiring 

plants that have already undergone a SAMA analysis to

conduct an additional analysis. But here, NRC has reasonably 

concluded that Rule (L) means SAMAs can be treated 

generically for plants like Limerick that have once completed a

SAMA analysis. Given how extensive the first SAMA analysis 

is, the Commission found a second analysis would not provide 

enough value to justify the resource expenditure. This 

determination is reasonable and so is entitled to deference. See

Ames Constr., Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review 

Comm’n, 676 F.3d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 

NRDC attempts to wriggle out from under this regulatory

bar by asserting that its right to a hearing on “new and 

significant” information derives from the AEA and NEPA’s 

hearing requirements. But neither statute does the work NRDC 

asks of it. The organization points, at times, to the AEA’s 

mandate that, “the Commission shall grant a hearing upon the 

request of any person whose interest may be affected by the 

proceeding.” 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a). Yet the AEA “does not 

confer the automatic right of intervention upon anyone.” Union 

of Concerned Scientists, 920 F.2d at 55. Because the AEA 

itself “nowhere describes the content of a hearing or prescribes 

the manner in which this ‘hearing’ is to be run,” id. at 53, we 

must defer to the operating procedures adopted by the agency, 

see id. at 54. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized “time 

and again” that “even where an agency’s enabling statute 

expressly requires it to hold a hearing, the agency may rely on 

its rulemaking authority to determine issues that do not require 

case-by-case consideration.” Nuclear Info. Res. Serv. v. NRC, 

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969 F.2d 1169, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc). Indeed, “a 

contrary holding would require the agency continually to 

relitigate issues that may be established fairly and efficiently in

a single rulemaking proceeding.” Id.

Similarly, with respect to NEPA, that statute “does not, by 

its own terms or its intent, alter the Commission’s hearing 

procedures . . . . The Supreme Court has been clear that ‘the 

only procedural requirements imposed by NEPA are those 

stated in the plain language of the Act.’ NEPA does not 

mandate particular hearing procedures and does not require 

hearings.” Beyond Nuclear v. NRC, 704 F.3d 12, 18–19 (1st 

Cir. 2013) (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. 

Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 548 (1978)). And 

though NEPA “does impose a requirement that the NRC 

consider any new and significant information regarding 

environmental impacts before renewing a nuclear power plant’s 

operating license,” it “does not require agencies to adopt any 

particular internal decisionmaking structure.” Massachusetts, 

522 F.3d at 127 (quoting Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 462 

U.S. at 100). Because neither the AEA nor NEPA guarantees

an absolute right to a hearing and neither dictates how the 

Commission should determine who receives a hearing, 

NRDC’s reliance is misplaced. If every party challenging a 

generically resolved issue on the basis of “new and significant 

information” were guaranteed a hearing, the Commission 

would have no ability to streamline its relicensing process via 

generic rulemaking. And “the Supreme Court has found 

agency reliance on prior [generic] determinations to be 

perfectly acceptable, even when the statute before it plainly 

calls for individualized hearings and findings.” Nuclear Info. 

Res. Serv., 969 F.2d at 1175 (listing Supreme Court cases).5

 5 NRDC’s reliance on Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC (USC I)

also fails. 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In that case, the 

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Existing precedent further bolsters the Commission’s 

position that generically resolved issues need not be fully

reconsidered at relicensing to comply with NEPA’s “hard look” 

requirement. For instance, in New Jersey Department of 

Environmental Protection v. NRC, the Third Circuit considered 

whether the NRC, when reviewing a relicensing application, 

had to examine the environmental impact of a hypothetical 

terrorist attack on a particular plant. The court concluded 

“[e]ven if NEPA required an assessment of the environmental 

effects of a hypothetical terrorist attack on a nuclear facility, 

the NRC has already made this assessment . . . . The NRC 

rules codify these generic findings, and by regulation, license 

renewal applications are excused from discussing generic 

issues in their environmental reports.” 561 F.3d at 143. The 

appellant in that case still attempted to argue that NRC’s 

generic findings did not properly account for the unique risks 

borne by that particular plant. But the Third Circuit rejected 

these arguments as “collateral attacks on the licensing renewal 

regulations” and concluded “the proper way to raise them 

would have been in a petition for rulemaking or a petition for a 

waiver based on ‘special circumstances.’” Id. 

 

Commission postponed its evaluation of emergency preparedness 

exercises to the post-adjudicatory phase of licensing and, in doing so, 

removed the public’s ability to seek a hearing on that issue. This 

court reversed, holding the Commission had lacked authority to 

eliminate hearings on issues it conceded were material to its licensing 

decision. See id. at 1447. But the regulation in that case prohibited 

hearings without resolving the underlying issue in a generic rule—a 

process which affords the public an opportunity to comment during 

the rulemaking. Because the USC I framework is inapt here, we rely 

instead on precedents that address the Commission’s authority to 

resolve material issues generically rather than on a case-by-case 

basis. See, e.g., Nuclear Info. Res. Serv., 969 F.2d at 1176; 

Massachusetts, 522 F.3d at 127. 

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For all practical purposes, this case cannot be 

distinguished. Here, an NRC regulation excludes plants like 

Limerick from conducting a subsequent SAMA analysis;

NRDC argues that this general regulation does not account for 

new circumstances. Such an argument similarly amounts to a 

collateral attack on the agency’s regulation—an attack which 

should properly have been brought through a rulemaking 

petition or via the waiver process. 

The Supreme Court in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.

considered a similar issue: there, NRC had chosen to 

generically evaluate the impact of fuel cycles and to inform 

licensing boards of its evaluation through a published table. 

This process was challenged as improperly forgoing any plantspecific analysis. But the Court upheld NRC’s determination: 

“The generic method chosen by the agency is clearly an 

appropriate method of conducting the hard look required by 

NEPA.” 462 U.S. at 101. The Court noted that generic

resolution furthers “[a]dministrative efficiency,” and cautioned 

“[i]t is not our task to determine what decision we, as 

Commissioners, would have reached. Our only task is to 

determine whether the Commission has considered the relevant 

factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts 

found and the choice made.” Id. at 105. Here, NRC considered 

whether additional site-specific SAMAs would be efficacious, 

concluding that they would not. This decision was rational, 

supported by facts, and similarly sufficient to satisfy the 

Commission’s “hard look” obligation under NEPA with respect 

to plants like Limerick.

Finally, in Massachusetts v. United States, the First Circuit 

confronted a challenge to NRC’s global findings regarding the 

storage of spent fuel on site at a nuclear plant. The 

Commonwealth contended, as NRDC does here, that “it may 

raise [this] issue in the re-licensing proceeding and that [the 

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company’s] report violated NEPA and 10 C.F.R. 

§ 51.53(c)(3)(iv) because it failed to address ‘new and 

significant information’ regarding the risk of on-site spent fuel 

storage.” 522 F.3d at 122. Because on-site storage was 

classified as a Category 1 issue under its regulations, NRC 

denied the Commonwealth intervener status and encouraged it 

to pursue the issue via a petition for rulemaking. The court 

held “the Commission’s decision to deny party status to the 

Commonwealth in the . . . license renewal proceedings [was] 

reasonable in context, and consistent with agency rules.” Id. at 

127. The court also emphasized that, as here, NRC regulations 

“provide channels through which the agency’s expert staff may 

receive new and significant information, namely from a license 

renewal applicant’s environmental report or from public 

comments on a draft SEIS.” Id. 

NRDC brushes aside these cases as distinguishable 

because the issues there fell squarely under a “Category 1” 

classification. But, at bottom, NRDC is challenging Rule (L)

itself as the organization has raised only issues precluded by 

this regulation. Whether the SAMA analysis is considered as a 

proper “Category 1” issue for plants like Limerick or rather as a 

“functional equivalent,” the principle remains the same: NRDC 

cannot challenge an agency’s rulemaking via collateral attack, 

absent a waiver. Moreover, NRDC has not been denied full 

access to litigate these issues; no party has an unequivocal right 

to a hearing on any terms before the Commission, and NRDC 

has been free all along to seek a waiver (as it did) or to pursue 

its contentions through rulemaking. The Commission has 

spoken to NRDC’s precise contentions through a notice-andcomment generic rule concerning a matter squarely within the 

agency’s expertise. We therefore uphold the Commission’s 

interpretation and invocation of Rule (L). 

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B.

Having concluded the Commission’s interpretation of Rule 

(L) is reasonable and NRDC can only proceed if it receives a 

waiver, we now consider whether NRDC’s petition for waiver

was properly denied. The Commission’s determination is 

entitled to deference as long as it was not arbitrary and 

capricious. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 462 U.S. 

at 98. Under 10 C.F.R. § 2.335(b), a party is entitled to waiver 

only if it can prove “special circumstances” justify suspension 

of the rule. The Commission has adopted a four-factor test for 

assessing special circumstances. A movant must show “that 

(i) the rule’s strict application would not serve the purposes for 

which [it] was adopted; (ii) the movant has alleged special 

circumstances that were not considered, either explicitly or by 

necessary implication, in the rulemaking proceeding leading to 

the rule sought to be waived; (iii) those circumstances are 

“unique” to the facility rather than common to a large class of 

facilities; and (iv) a waiver of the regulation is necessary to 

reach a significant safety problem. . . . For a waiver request to 

be granted, all four factors must be met.” Millstone, 62 N.R.C. 

at 559–60. 

Here, the Commission’s decision rested on the third factor 

of “uniqueness.” In Millstone, the Commission found that 

considerations such as proximity of the plant to an adjoining 

state and changes in demographics and roadways around the 

plant were “hardly unique” as these were “important but 

common problem[s] addressed by the NRC’s ongoing 

regulatory program.” Id. at 562. Other circuits have upheld the 

Commission’s denial of waivers on a similar basis. See, e.g., 

Massachusetts, 708 F.3d at 74 (holding that, because the 

concerns raised by spent fuel cell storage “applied to all nuclear 

power plants,” the claims were best handled through 

rulemaking). 

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In this case, NRDC raised claims of newer, more 

efficacious technology developed since 1989 for boiling water 

reactors like Limerick. It also pointed to demographic changes 

around the plant (such as increased population and changed 

economic circumstances). But—as in Millstone—these

concerns are applicable to many, if not all, other plants that 

would be seeking relicensing after a twenty-year period. The 

Commission therefore denied the petition for lack of “unique” 

application. That reasonable determination is entitled to 

deference from this court.

As a final note, NRDC’s aims are ultimately best served by 

pursuing a rulemaking to challenge Rule (L), as the 

Commission has urged. Although rulemaking is far from the 

fastest route, it has transparency, extensive public input, and 

broad application to recommend it. As it stands, however, we 

conclude the Commission’s interpretation and application of 

Rule (L) in the Limerick relicensing proceeding was reasonable 

and cannot be challenged through NRDC’s collateral attack. 

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is 

Denied. 

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