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Parties Involved:
Rene Ramos Campos
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 20a0016n.06

Nos. 18-6055/6218/6242

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CIRO MACIAS MARTINEZ, SMIRNA ORTIZ, 

and RENE RAMOS CAMPOS,

Defendants-Appellants.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

Before: SUTTON, KETHLEDGE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Ciro Macias Martinez, Rene Ramos Campos, and Smirna 

Ortiz appeal their convictions and sentences in connection with a drug and money-laundering 

conspiracy. We reject all their arguments and affirm.

I.

In 2015, a farmhand named Ciro Macias Martinez began laundering Mexican drug-cartel 

money for a man known as “Jalisco,” whom Macias had met in prison. At first Macias wired 

small amounts of money to Mexico—$3,000 or less. He eventually gained the cartel’s trust and 

began laundering larger amounts. To do so, he enlisted the help of his wife, Brizeida Sosa, who 

in turn asked her sister, Arlenne, and a coworker, Laura, to participate. Laura then recruited her 

own sister, Smirna Ortiz. 

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To begin the laundering process, Jalisco would send account numbers and directions to 

Macias, who would pick up the drug money. Macias or Sosa would then divide the money 

(sometimes hundreds of thousands of dollars) into stacks that each totaled less than $10,000. Then

Sosa, Arlenne, Laura, and Ortiz (or some combination of that group) would travel to banks in 

Kentucky, Tennessee, or North Carolina to deposit each stack separately, using the account 

numbers provided by Macias. The women would make deposits at multiple banks per trip, and 

later sent photos of the deposit slips to Macias, who sent them on to Jalisco. For every $10,000 in 

structured deposits, the women received $200. 

Macias also shipped cash in bulk for the cartel. At Jalisco’s direction, Macias would 

contact a courier, specify a meeting time and place, and deliver money for the courier to smuggle 

into Mexico. To that end, in November 2016, Macias met Rene Ramos Campos at a gas station 

and handed him a duffel bag with $575,440. Campos then hid the money in two compartments in

the cab of his tractor trailer and drove off. Soon thereafter, an “interdiction team” stopped Campos

and seized the cash, which Campos admitted was drug money.

 Macias also distributed methamphetamine and other drugs for the cartel. Jalisco’s 

couriers would deliver drugs to Macias, who passed them on to street-level dealers. Macias would 

decide whether the dealers paid for the drugs up front or after they sold the drugs. Then Macias 

would launder the proceeds. Eventually Macias was distributing 40 kilograms of drugs per week.

In April 2017, DEA agents arrested Macias and Ortiz, among others. Their cases were 

later consolidated with Campos’s case. Macias thereafter pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute 

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and conspiracy to commit 

money laundering with the intent to promote a specified unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 1956(h). Campos also pled guilty to conspiracy to commit money 

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laundering to promote a specified unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) 

and 1956(h). Ortiz went to trial, where a jury convicted her of conspiracy to commit money 

laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) and 1956(h). 

Macias’s guidelines range was 324 to 405 months’ incarceration; the district court 

sentenced him to 372 months. Campos’s range was 121 to 151 months; the district court sentenced 

him to 136 months. Ortiz’s range was 97 months to 121 months; the district court sentenced her 

to 97 months. 

These appeals followed.

II.

A. 

Macias appeals only his sentence, specifically the district court’s application of a four-level 

enhancement for what the court found to be Macias’s leadership role in the conspiracy. See 

generally U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. We review that finding for clear error, and otherwise review 

deferentially the court’s legal conclusion that Macias was an organizer or leader. See United States 

v. Sexton, 894 F.3d 787, 794 (6th Cir. 2018).

As described above, Macias was the hub of conspiracies to sell drugs and to launder the 

proceeds of those sales. Macias received drugs from the cartel, passed the drugs on to street-level 

dealers, and dictated the terms on which the dealers paid for the drugs. Macias also recruited 

participants in the money-laundering conspiracy and directed the conspiracy’s operations, based 

in part on Jalisco’s instructions to Macias. Plainly he played a leadership role in the conspiracies 

here. 

Macias is mistaken, moreover, to argue that Jalisco’s instructions to him, or Sosa’s 

instructions to her co-conspirators, precluded a finding that Macias was a leader or organizer. A 

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conspiracy can have multiple leaders or organizers, see U.S.S.G. § 3B.1.1 cmt. n.4; and that Macias 

had participants above him (Jalisco) and beneath him (Sosa) does nothing to diminish the 

leadership role that he in fact played in these conspiracies. The district court had ample grounds 

for the enhancement.

B.

Campos likewise challenges only his sentence, specifically the district court’s refusal to 

reduce Campos’s offense level based on what Campos says was his acceptance of responsibility 

for his offense. See generally U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. The district court initially granted that reduction, 

but revoked it during Campos’s sentencing hearing. There, Campos’s attorney argued that Campos 

had laundered only $275,000—rather than the $575,440 that agents seized from his truck—

because, Campos asserted, he planned to steal about $300,000 of that amount rather than pass it 

on to the cartel. The district court thought that assertion was factually frivolous—stealing 

$300,000 from a drug cartel usually leads to consequences not worth the $300,000—and that the 

assertion amounted to a denial in substantial part of the money-laundering conduct to which 

Campos had pled. Hence the court revoked the reduction.

Whether we review the district court’s revocation of the § 3E1.1 reduction deferentially or 

de novo is less than clear. United States v. Thomas, 933 F.3d 605, 611 (6th Cir. 2019) (collecting 

cases). But that difference in the standard does not make any difference to the outcome here. “A 

defendant who falsely denies, or frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the court determines 

to be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility[.]” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 

cmt. n.1(A). Here, Campos pled guilty to conspiring to launder money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 1956(h). The value of the money he laundered is “relevant conduct” under 

the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, 2S1.1(a)(2)–(b)(1), 2B1.1(b). Campos 

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substantially denied that relevant conduct when he asserted at his sentencing hearing that he 

intended to launder only $275,000. To a significant extent, therefore, Campos sought to evade 

responsibility for the very conduct to which he pled guilty. And he did so on grounds that the 

district court emphatically found to be false. Admittedly, we have our doubts that Campos’s 

assertion that he intended to steal the $300,000 was “frivolous,” given that Campos had hidden 

that amount separately from the other $275,000 in the cab of his truck. But we see no basis to set 

aside the court’s more modest conclusion that Campos’s assertion was simply false. 

Moreover, Campos is mistaken to argue that the district court revoked the acceptance-ofresponsibility reduction solely on the basis of a “legal argument” made by his counsel. That legal 

argument, as shown above, was based upon a factual premise that itself amounted to a substantial 

denial (rather than acceptance) of responsibility. And Campos himself vouched for that factual 

premise when the district court pressed him on the point. Thus, in sum, the court did not err when 

it found that Campos was not entitled to an offense-level reduction under § 3E1.1.

Campos separately challenges the district court’s finding that Campos was engaged “in the 

business of money laundering.” See generally U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(C). We review that finding 

for clear error. See United States v. Anderson, 526 F.3d 319, 323 (6th Cir. 2008). There was none: 

Campos admitted that he typically received $10,000–$15,000 for transporting drug proceeds and 

that agents had seized $400,000 from him in similar circumstances in 2013; and Campos was a 

passenger in another vehicle stop during which officers seized $140,000. Campos’s argument is 

meritless.

C.

Ortiz appeals both her conviction and her sentence. She first argues that the government 

lacked sufficient evidence to convict her. We must affirm her conviction if, based on the evidence 

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at trial, any rational jury could find that she conspired to launder money in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii). See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Ortiz challenges the 

government’s proof as to two elements in particular: first, that she knew the money that she and 

her co-conspirators deposited was drug proceeds; and second, that she knew the deposits were 

structured (by keeping them below $10,000) “to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under 

State or Federal law.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii).

That the money that Ortiz and others deposited was the proceeds of unlawful activity

should have been obvious to any sentient member of the conspiracy. Macias was employed at a 

horse farm and his wife, Sosa, was a waitress; yet at Macias’s direction Ortiz and her coconspirators deposited more than a half-million dollars in cash (which typically smelled like 

marijuana) before they were arrested. Ortiz also saw Sosa count into separate piles as much as 

$250,000 in cash on a single occasion. Moreover, Sosa testified that she told Ortiz that Macias 

“got a nicer truck because he was dealing with the drugs, you know, he was taking [a] bigger risk 

than us with the money.” Trial Tr., R. 333 at PageID # 1928–29. And two of the women who 

deposited money along with Ortiz—including Ortiz’s sister, Laura—thought that it was “obvious” 

that the money came from drugs. (For the same reasons, we reject Ortiz’s argument that the district 

court erred when it enhanced her guidelines range on the ground that the cash she deposited was 

drug proceeds.) 

The government also presented sufficient evidence that Ortiz knew or was willfully blind 

to the fact that the deposits were structured to avoid a reporting requirement under state or federal 

law. Every one of the more than 50 deposits that Ortiz made (and every one of her co-conspirators’ 

deposits) was made in an amount less than $10,000, even though—as Ortiz well knew—every one 

of those deposits came from a pile of cash much greater than $10,000. Ortiz also knew that she 

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and her conspirators went to great lengths—by separating the cash into smaller amounts, and by 

making multiple deposits at multiple banks each trip—to keep each deposit under $10,000, even 

though the total amount deposited was often about ten times that amount. Ortiz was also told to 

use a cover story when making the deposits; she was often nervous about making them; and she 

did not want to use her own identification card when doing so. And Ortiz herself said that she 

“knew that something wasn’t right” with the deposits. Trial Tr., R. 334 at PageID # 2006. Thus, 

considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational jury could infer 

that Ortiz knew or chose to remain willfully blind to the fact that her deposits were structured to 

avoid a state or federal reporting requirement.

Ortiz responds that the testimony of her co-conspirators was not credible, but credibility 

was an issue for the jury to decide. See United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 449 (6th Cir. 

2010). Ortiz also says that she did not know what money laundering was until an agent explained 

it to her after her arrest; but § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) “does not require that the defendant know that 

structuring or money laundering is a crime.” United States v. Hill, 167 F.3d 1055, 1070 (6th Cir. 

1999). Sufficient evidence therefore supported her money-laundering conviction.

For the same reasons, we reject Ortiz’s argument that the district court abused its discretion

when it instructed the jury that it could find the knowledge requirements of § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) 

met if it was “convinced that [Ortiz] deliberately ignored a high probability” that the cash she 

deposited “represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity[,]” that the deposits were 

structured “to avoid a transaction requirement[,]” and that Ortiz had “deliberately closed her eyes 

to what was obvious.” Trial Tr., R. 468 at PageID # 3048. To the contrary, we agree with the 

district court that Ortiz’s case was “a prime example of when [the deliberate ignorance instruction] 

should be given.” Id. at 3030.

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Ortiz next argues that the district court erred in its determination of the amount of cash that 

Ortiz laundered (a determination that increased her offense level by 14 for purposes of computing 

her guidelines range). We review that determination for clear error. See United States v. Donadeo, 

910 F.3d 886, 893 (6th Cir. 2018). 

A DEA agent testified that Ortiz made deposits on seven money-laundering trips with her 

co-conspirators. Together, the group laundered between $70,000 and $100,000 on each trip. On 

each of the seven trips, the group coordinated their activities (e.g., no two women deposited money 

into the same account at the same bank branch) and used the same scheme (they made deposits at 

multiple banks into accounts identified by Sosa). Thus, the district court properly included the 

money laundered by Ortiz’s co-conspirators in the amount for which Ortiz was responsible. See 

Donadeo, 910 F.3d at 893–94. And the district court estimated that the group deposited $85,000 

for each of the seven laundering trips—the midpoint between $70,000 and $100,000. The resulting 

calculation, $595,000, is a reasonable estimate of the amount deposited by the group, and thus the 

amount for which Ortiz was responsible. Hence the court did not clearly err.

Finally, Ortiz argues that she was entitled to a four-level reduction because, she says, she 

was a minimal participant in the conspiracy. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a). Again, we review the 

district court’s determination only for clear error. United States v. Randolph, 794 F.3d 602, 616 

(6th Cir. 2015). A defendant is a minimal participant when she is “plainly among the least culpable 

of those involved in the conduct of a group.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.4. Moreover, the relevant 

comparison is not with members of the cartel, as Ortiz suggests, but with her money-laundering 

co-conspirators: Laura, Arlenne, and Sosa. See id. True, by that measure Sosa had a leadership 

role; but—as the district court correctly pointed out—that does not mean that “everyone else gets 

a minor role reduction.” Sentencing Tr., R. 447 at PageID # 2889. Moreover, Ortiz made seven 

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money-laundering trips in only five months before she was arrested; and at her suggestion the 

group expanded its deposits to banks in North Carolina. The district court therefore did not clearly 

err in finding that Ortiz was an average participant in the conspiracy rather than a minimal one. 

* * *

The district court’s judgments are affirmed.

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