Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-04-02588/USCOURTS-ca7-04-02588-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Philip M. Sebolt
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 04-2588

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

PHILIP M. SEBOLT,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 02 CR 648—Ronald A. Guzman, Judge.

____________

ARGUED MARCH 29, 2006—DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2006

____________

Before BAUER, KANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. Philip Sebolt was charged with

using his computer to commit various federal crimes

involving child pornography. At trial, a host of “other acts”

evidence was admitted, some of which Sebolt contested, and

some of which he did not. After Sebolt was convicted on all

counts, he was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment.

Sebolt appeals his convictions and his sentence. We affirm

the convictions and order a limited remand of his sentence

pursuant to United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 481-84

(7th Cir. 2005).

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2 No. 04-2588

I. HISTORY

On March 14, 2002, FBI Special Agent Mark Miller of the

Baltimore field office was in the course of his investigation

into the online trading of child pornography. Miller logged

on to two suspicious chat rooms, one named, “preteen666,”

and the other, “preteen411.” In the “preteen666” chat room,

Miller noticed that a person using the screen name

“Blah35674” was running a file server and had pictures of

young boys and girls available.

Miller connected to Blah35674’s file server, which utilized

a ratio program of 1:3. Essentially, the server would give a

visitor three pictures for every one picture the visitor

contributed. Miller uploaded his own innocuous files, which

enabled him to download 53 images of child pornography

from Blah35674’s file server. Specifically, Miller uploaded

an encrypted photograph onto the server and in return, the

server sent him a picture of child pornography entitled

“Helgav 044.jpg.” To request this photograph, Miller had

typed the command “Get Helgav 044.jpg.” Before the server

sent Miller the picture, it sent a message that the picture

was “on its way.”

At another time, Miller requested a file entitled “baby

fuck 14.JPG” by typing “Get baby fuck14.JPG.” In response,

Miller received the message “Failed to send baby fuck

14.JPG.” Miller then requested a file named “Cbaby 2.MPG”

by typing “get Cbaby 2.MPG.” In response, Miller received

a message that the file was “on its way.”

Miller testified that the server displayed a banner

scrolling across an internet page, which stated:

Upload Boy Baby Pics! Upload Boy Baby Pics!

Upload Boy Baby Pics! Upload Boy Baby Pics!

Upload Boy Baby Pics! I’m also looking for a text

file for someone to msg me, on tips/tactics/advice on

how to molest kids. I am not out to hurt or kidnap

a kid. Just fun loving molesting. I have a web cam

Case: 04-2588 Document: 54 Filed: 08/21/2006 Pages: 16
No. 04-2588 3

and am willing to produce pics if I can successfully

molest a kid/baby. Any help would be nice. :)

Miller contacted his FBI counterparts in Chicago. They

determined that the internet protocol address associated

with the screen name Blah35674 was registered through an

internet service provider to Janet Sebolt in Bensenville, Illinois. The FBI, along with members of the Cook

County Sheriff’s Department and Bensenville Police

Department, executed a federal search warrant for Janet

Sebolt’s address on July 1, 2002. After gaining entry to the

residence, the officers found Janet’s son, Philip Sebolt, in

his bedroom deleting files on his computer. Officers unplugged the computer and began to search the residence.

Two officers interviewed Sebolt at his residence after

orally advising him of his Miranda rights. Sebolt indicated

that he understood his rights and would answer questions.

Sebolt admitted that he was running a file server from his

personal computer in his bedroom and that the server’s

purpose was to trade child pornography. Sebolt conceded

that he used the screen name “Blah” followed by numbers when he traded child pornography and that he

posted the aforementioned advertisement because he had a

sexual attraction to young boys. Sebolt then identified

specific items of child pornography, acknowledged that they

were of real children, and estimated the children’s ages.

When asked if he had ever molested young boys, Sebolt

stated that he had sexually assaulted a relative.

After the interview concluded, the officers took Sebolt

to an FBI field office for processing. At the field office,

Sebolt signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights and

provided a handwritten statement. In the statement, Sebolt

admitted to using his computer to possess child pornography and to distribute it over the internet. Sebolt confessed

to printing several of these images, which he kept under his

bed and used when masturbating. Sebolt also stated that he

engaged in sexual relations with a 16-year-old girl in

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4 No. 04-2588

Wisconsin whom he met on the internet, and that he had

molested a young male relative several times (the same

victim as Sebolt’s oral confession).

The search of Sebolt’s computer revealed more than

27,000 images of child pornography. Sebolt’s computer

also contained transcripts of online conversations Sebolt

had with respondents to his advertisement requesting

advice on molesting children. Five of these chats were found

in a file labeled “how to molest,” with one in a file labeled

“personal,” and another in a file labeled “kp.” The online

conversations centered on Sebolt’s attempts to molest

children without getting caught by law enforcement.

Officers also found on Sebolt’s computer logs the computer had generated detailing the server’s interactions with

online visitors. The logs showed guests’ requests for certain

files and the server’s responses. For instance, one of the

logs showed that on June 25, 2002, someone using the

screen name Gustave Premier (“Premier”) sent files to

Sebolt’s server and requested in exchange files containing

child pornography, including one entitled “hel-an09.jpg.”

After Premier requested “hel-an09.jpg,” Sebolt’s computer

responded that “hel-an09.jpg is on its way.” Officers also

recovered approximately 250 pictures containing child

pornography and a pair of boys’ Pokemon underwear from

beneath Sebolt’s bed.

On March 26, 2003, a federal grand jury returned a fourcount second superseding indictment charging Sebolt with

violating various federal child pornography laws. Count 1

charged Sebolt with knowingly possessing child pornography. Counts 2 and 3 alleged Sebolt transported child

pornography, namely computer images entitled

“helgave049.jpg” and “hel-an09.jpg,” for Counts 2 and 3,

respectively. Count 4 charged Sebolt with advertising

child pornography online.

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No. 04-2588 5

Sebolt filed a pretrial motion in limine objecting to the

introduction of evidence relating to his molestation of his

young male relative. The motion in limine was denied.

During the four-day jury trial, the government repeatedly

referred to Sebolt’s molestation of his relative. The government also made repeated reference to his trip to Wisconsin to have sex with a minor female, his failed attempts to

molest other children, and the underwear under his bed.

Sebolt made no objections at trial to the introduction into

evidence of any of these other acts that occurred in addition

to the acts of molestation that involved his relative.

Sebolt’s strategy at trial was to admit to collecting child

pornography but to deny distribution and advertisement.

Sebolt proclaimed that his role was passive and that the

logs were inaccurate. The jury disagreed and returned

guilty verdicts against Sebolt on all counts.

On March 3, 2004, the district court held a sentencing

hearing. The court applied the sentencing guidelines and

found that several enhancements applied. The court

calculated a criminal history category of I, and an offense

level of 40, resulting in a sentencing range of 292 to 365

months. The court sentenced Sebolt to the statutory

maximum prison term for each count: 60 months on Count

1, 120 months each on Counts 2 and 3, and 240 months on

Count 4. The sentences on Counts 2 and 3 were to run

concurrently with each other and consecutive to the sentence on Count 4. The sentence on Count 1 was to run

concurrently with the other counts. The result was a

sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment.

Sebolt appeals his convictions and sentence.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Sebolt argues there was insufficient evidence to support

his conviction on Count 3, which alleged Sebolt “knowingly

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6 No. 04-2588

transported and shipped child pornography, namely, a

computer image entitled ‘hel-an09.jpg,’ in interstate

commerce by means of a computer.”

In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Sebolt

“bears a heavy burden and faces a nearly insurmountable

hurdle.” United States v. Seawood, 172 F.3d 986, 988 (7th

Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). The jury verdict is entitled to

great deference, and we will uphold it if, viewing all facts

and making all inferences in the prosecution’s favor, “ ‘any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” United

States v. Hicks, 368 F.3d 801, 804-05 (7th Cir. 2004)

(quoting United States v. Gardner, 238 F.3d 878, 879 (7th

Cir. 2001)). We will overturn a conviction “only if the record

is devoid of evidence from which a reasonable jury could

find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.

Curtis, 324 F.3d 501, 505 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing United

States v. Menting, 166 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 1999)).

To prove Sebolt guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on

Count 3, the government was required to prove he transported the picture entitled “hel-an09.jpg” in interstate

commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1). Sebolt argues that

although his computer may have generated a message

that the image was “on its way” to Premier, there is no

evidence that the image was ever sent because there is no

evidence that the file was received.

Special Agent Miller testified that for every one of the 53

images he obtained from Sebolt’s file server, he previously

received a message that the file was “on its way.” The

reasonable inference, therefore, is that because the log

contained a message that “hel-an09.jpg” was on its way

to Premier, it was in fact transported to Premier.

Sebolt points to a failed transmission in which Miller

requested a file by typing “get Cbaby 2.MPG” and received

a message that the file was “on its way” but did not receive

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No. 04-2588 7

this file. Sebolt argues that the incomplete transmission

calls into question the accuracy of the log and negates the

inference. But Sebolt does not mention Miller’s testimony

that his computer was disconnected from the internet one

minute after receiving the message that “Cbaby 2.mpg” was

“on its way,” before which, a jury could reasonably conclude,

the file could have been received. Nor does Sebolt discuss

the 21-page log Sebolt’s server generated when Premier

visited, showing Premier exchanged numerous images with

Sebolt’s server. The message that the file “hel-an09.jpg” was

“on its way” appeared on page 14, and there was no subsequent indication in the log that the file was not received.

Because Miller testified that there were 53 instances

in which Sebolt’s server generated the message that a file

was “on its way” and sent the image, a jury could have

reasonably inferred that Sebolt’s server sent “hel-an09.jpg”

when the log said this file was “on its way.” The 54th

instance, in which the message was generated but the file

was not sent, was easily explained and sufficiently distinct so as not to turn a reasonable inference into an

unreasonable one. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to convict Sebolt on Count 3.

B. Relevance and Fairness of the Evidence

Next, Sebolt argues it violated Rules 403 and 404(b) of the

Federal Rules of Evidence for the jury to have heard

testimony that Sebolt (1) molested a young male relative;

(2) drove to Wisconsin intending to have sex with a minor

female; (3) kept a pair of boys’ Pokemon underwear under

his bed; and (4) discussed other thoughts and attempts to

molest children.

Rule 404(b) prohibits the use of other acts evidence which

tend to prove the defective character of a defendant “and

likely therefore to have committed the crime of which he is

accused in the present case, or perhaps some other, undeCase: 04-2588 Document: 54 Filed: 08/21/2006 Pages: 16
8 No. 04-2588

tected crime for which he should be punished.” Paladino,

401 F.3d at 474-75. However, Rule 404(b) does not exclude

such evidence if it is relevant to certain other issues,

specifically the defendant’s “motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of

mistake or accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); United States v.

Hale, 448 F.3d 971, 985 (7th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citing

United States v. Macedo, 406 F.3d 778, 792 (7th Cir. 2005)).

Even if relevant, however, this evidence may be excluded as

unduly prejudicial if it would cause the jury to ground its

verdict on a ground other than the evidence. Fed. R. Evid.

403; United States v. Whitlow, 381 F.3d 679, 686 (7th Cir.

2004).

The government admits Sebolt’s objection in his pretrial

motion in limine to the admission of the evidence that he

molested his relative, coupled with the district court’s

definitive denial, sufficiently preserved this issue for

appeal. See Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 566 (7th Cir.

1999). We review the admission of the molestations for

abuse of discretion. See United States v. Rangel, 350 F.3d

648, 650-51 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Owing special

deference to the district court’s decision, we will not overturn it unless no reasonable person could agree with it.

United States v. Toro, 359 F.3d 879, 884-85 (7th Cir. 2004)

(citing United States v. Thomas, 321 F.3d 627, 630 (7th Cir.

2003)).

However, Sebolt made no objection to the admission of

other evidence he now claims to have been wrongly admitted. We review the admission of that evidence for plain

error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Pree, 408 F.3d

855, 868 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). “Under this

standard of review, we must find that: (1) an error occurred;

(2) the error was ‘plain,’ that is, it was clear or obvious; and

(3) the error affected the outcome of the district court

proceedings.” United States v. Shearer, 379 F.3d 453, 456

(7th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,

Case: 04-2588 Document: 54 Filed: 08/21/2006 Pages: 16
No. 04-2588 9

731-35 (1993)). If so, then it is within our discretion to

rectify forfeited errors which seriously affect “the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings.” United

States v. Henningsen, 402 F.3d 748, 750 (7th Cir. 2005)

(citations omitted).

Under either standard of review, we employ a four-part

test to determine whether prior conduct is admissible under

Rule 404(b) and will find no error if:

(1) the evidence is directed toward establishing a

matter in issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged; (2) the evidence

shows that the other act is similar enough and close

enough in time to be relevant to the matter in

issue; (3) the evidence is sufficient to support a jury

finding that the defendant committed the similar

act; and (4) the probative value of the evidence is

not substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice.

United States v. Price, 418 F.3d 771, 783-84 (7th Cir. 2005)

(quoting United States v. Asher, 178 F.3d 486, 492 (7th Cir.

1999)).

The government made several references in all phases

of the trial to Sebolt’s admission that he had molested his

relative. One theory of the government’s case was that

Sebolt had molested this boy for some time until the

child had grown too old. Out of potential victims, the

government hypothesized, Sebolt sought to sharpen his

predatory skills so as to find new victims. The government

claimed this was Sebolt’s motive for posting his online

advertisement, i.e., the conduct alleged in Count 4.

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10 No. 04-2588

1 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1)(A). Count 4 actually alleged a violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The statute

was amended and re-codified shortly after the final charging

instrument was issued. See Pub. L. No. 108-21, §506(2) (2003).

Sebolt dissects the statutory elements of Count 41 and

argues the prior molestations do not tend to prove any of

them. We have rejected this rationale because Rule 404(b)

explicitly makes motive relevant, and establishing motive

tends to prove a crime was committed. See United States v.

Lloyd, 71 F.3d 1256, 1264 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Although the

defendant argues that motive was not one of the elements

the government was required to prove in order to gain a

conviction, motive to possess a firearm was ‘relevant to the

matter in issue.’ ” (quoting United States v. Wilson, 31 F.3d

510, 514 (7th Cir. 1994))). Prior instances of sexual misconduct with a child victim may establish a defendant’s sexual

interest in children and thereby serve as evidence of the

defendant’s motive to commit a charged offense involving

the sexual exploitation of children. See United States v.

Cunningham, 103 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1996). It also may

serve to identify the defendant to the crime. See id. We

accept the government’s argument that the evidence of

Sebolt’s prior molestation of his young male relative was

admissible for the permitted purposes of proving motive and

identity. Sebolt’s own words to that effect could not have

been more clear.

Nevertheless, the molestations must have “occur[red]

close enough in time to the crime[s] charged to be relevant

to [Sebolt’s motive].” See Lloyd, 71 F.3d at 1264 (citation

omitted). When Sebolt allegedly committed the charged

offenses, approximately two years had passed since he

last molested his relative. The two-year period is significant

to proving Sebolt’s motive because Sebolt considered his

inactivity to be a dry spell. The cessation of the molestations was the starting point.

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No. 04-2588 11

Sebolt does not dispute the third requirement of admissibility was met because his own admissions—his confession

and his chat records—were the source of the molestation

evidence. See United States v. Joseph, 310 F.3d 975, 978-79

(7th Cir. 2002).

The fourth consideration is whether the probative value

of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger

of unfair prejudice. As discussed, Sebolt’s history of molestation provided strong evidence of his motive to advertise

child pornography online. Sebolt correctly states that

evidence of child molestation is highly prejudicial. However

it is not unfairly prejudicial in Sebolt’s case. A limiting

instruction was given regarding other bad acts evidence,

and the government did not overstep its bounds in this

regard.

The motive to molest children does not completely overlap

with the propensity to possess, transport, or advertise child

pornography. See Cunningham, 103 F.3d at 556-57. If it did,

then there would be a greater chance that evidence of

molestations introduced in this case was used to prove

propensity. (Indeed, the motive to molest children would

completely overlap only with the propensity to molest

children.) And the conceptual gap between molestation and

child pornography is not so wide as to “induce the jury to

decide the case on an improper basis . . . rather than on the

evidence presented.” United States v. Thomas, 321 F.3d 627,

630 (7th Cir. 2004) (quotations and citations omitted). In

other words, the molestations and the evidence supporting

the statutory criminal elements were similar in character,

i.e., establishing Sebolt’s sexually deviant mental state, so

there is no reason to suspect the jury was inflamed by the

admission of the molestations. The prejudicial effect did not

substantially outweigh the probative value, and the molestations were appropriately admitted.

As noted, Sebolt did not object at trial to the admission of

other evidence which he now contests was inappropriately

admitted for the same reasons as the molestations. Sebolt

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12 No. 04-2588

2 We need not discuss the government’s theory of relevance

that because Sebolt knew the underwear was under his bed and it

was found there, it proves Sebolt’s knowledge that the child

pornography was under his bed. The evidentiary source of Sebolt’s

knowledge of the underwear was the statement he made to

officers during the search of his bedroom, at which point he also

admitted knowledge of the child pornography. So the underwear

had no independent probative value as to the presence of pornography.

takes issue with the admission of evidence from his handwritten confession that two weeks prior to his arrest, he

drove to Wisconsin to have sex with a 16-year-old girl whom

he first met online. Sebolt’s sexual misconduct resulting

from an online relationship is relevant to his motive

because it confirms he was indeed looking for “some fun

loving molesting.” Beyond alleging (incorrectly) this evidence is irrelevant, Sebolt makes no credible argument, and

we need not discuss what easily falls within the remaining

confines of Rule 404(b).

Nor was it error to admit other portions of Sebolt’s online

chats, in which he discussed his past experiences with other

molesters. All of the acts—the details of which are insignificant—involved Sebolt’s recent attempts, missed opportunities, and potential future opportunities to molest children.

These acts are relevant to his motive as well, and were

properly admitted without Sebolt’s objection.

On the other hand, the admission of the underwear gives

us pause. During the search, officers found a pair of young

boys’ Pokemon underwear under Sebolt’s bed. When

confronted with the underwear, Sebolt stated that he had

found it on a sidewalk near his residence and that he put it

on his face when masturbating. Similar to Sebolt’s molesting activities, Sebolt’s use of the underwear demonstrates

his sexual interest in young boys and therefore is relevant

to his motive.2

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No. 04-2588 13

But what is troubling is that, unlike the other evidence of

Sebolt’s motive which was gleaned from a computer log and

a written confession and was read into the record, the

actual physical underwear was introduced into evidence. In

his interview, Sebolt had confessed to his use of the underwear, and he did not later dispute it. Because this point was

well established and unrebutted; there was no probative

value for admitting the physical evidence of his motive.

Little imagination is necessary to conclude the underwear

was unfairly prejudicial.

Even if the underwear’s probative value was substantially

outweighed by its prejudicial effect, however, Sebolt does

not show that he “probably would have been acquitted but

for the erroneously admitted evidence.” United States v.

Wynn, 845 F.2d 1439, 1443 (7th Cir. 1988) (citations

omitted); United States v. Wilson, 966 F.2d 243, 246-47 (7th

Cir. 1992) (finding no plain error because “[t]he record is

replete with evidence from which the jury could convict [the

defendant]”). Nevertheless the reason why the underwear

had no probative value—the numerous other evidentiary

sources from which the jury could have convicted

Sebolt—also warrants against reversal. In particular,

Sebolt’s handwritten confession and file server log provided

overwhelming evidence of his guilt.

C. Testimony About Pornographer

A British detective testified about the real life events

depicted by “hel-an09.jpg” and “helgave049.jpg.” A British

man abused his stepchildren and one of their friends, and

the man posted pictures of the abuse on the internet. After

he was convicted, the detective visited him in prison. The

man verified the authenticity of several images, including

“hel-an09.jpg” and “helgave049.jpg,” and the identities of

the children in them. Sebolt argues the jury heard testimony that another individual who had possessed the

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14 No. 04-2588

same pictures at issue in Sebolt’s case had already been

convicted by a court. Again, Sebolt did not object, and, as

previously discussed, we review for plain error only.

Putting to one side the issue of plain error, Sebolt was

in no way prejudiced by the exposure of the jury to the other

man’s conviction. In order to obtain reversal, Sebolt must

show that the admission of the contested evidence affected

his substantial rights. See Pree, 408 F.3d at 868 (citations

omitted). The only prejudicial effect we can imagine (for

Sebolt has not mentioned any), would be for the jury to have

relied upon the conviction, rather than the evidence, to

conclude the images on the pictures constituted child

pornography within the meaning of the charged offenses.

There is no dispute about the lurid content of the photographs and images the jury viewed. The evidence proving

Sebolt possessed child pornography was so overwhelming,

at closing arguments, Sebolt practically admitted to the

possession charge.

D. Sebolt’s Sentence

Sebolt does not take issue with the district court’s legal

conclusions in calculating his sentence under the Guidelines. He makes a general objection to the factual basis of

these results, however. Realizing his Crawford claim was

doomed from the start, see United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d

614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005), Sebolt withdrew it. Now Sebolt

challenges the use of hearsay, on due process grounds, at

his sentencing hearing at which an FBI special agent

testified to the statements made by people he encountered

during his investigation, namely Sebolt’s girlfriend and

other alleged victims. The statements, to which Sebolt did

not object, asserted that Sebolt molested young neighbors

and a child in a public restroom. Even if this testimony

were stricken, however, the Guideline calculations would

have been no different. The trial record provides ample

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No. 04-2588 15

support for Sebolt’s sentencing enhancements. Without a

discernible deprivation, further discussion is unwarranted.

The district judge imposed Sebolt’s sentence prior to the

Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543

U.S. 220 (2005), and both sides agree it did so under the erroneous impression that the Guidelines were mandatory.

See United States v. Cunningham, 405 F.3d 497, 504-05 (7th

Cir. 2005). Although Sebolt did not object at the time, he

does now with the benefit of hindsight, and we review for

plain error. United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 429

(7th Cir. 2005) (citing Paladino, 401 F.3d at 481-84).

The district judge considered each enhancement offered

by the government and objected to by Sebolt. The judge

overruled most, but not all, of Sebolt’s objections to the

enhancements. The judge thoroughly discussed his reasons to ensure that the sentencing range reflected the

seriousness of Sebolt’s conduct and the sheer volume of

pornography he possessed, which almost doubled his

sentencing range. The judge sentenced Sebolt a mere five

months fewer than the top of that range. It is unlikely

the judge would impose a lesser sentence on Sebolt with the

understanding that the Guidelines are advisory, but these

circumstances are mere “indicators rather than assurances.” See United States v. Lee, 399 F.3d 864, 866-67 (7th

Cir. 2005). Because there is room to speculate, the better

course is to ask the district judge. We therefore will order a

limited remand pursuant to the procedure set forth in

Paladino, 401 F.3d at 481-84, to inquire of the sentencing

judge whether, if given the opportunity to resentence, he

would impose the original sentence.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Sebolt’s convictions

and order a LIMITED REMAND pursuant to the procedure set

forth in Paladino.

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16 No. 04-2588

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—8-21-06

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