Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02076/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02076-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Civil Liberties Union of Colorado
Amicus Curiae
Donald M. Bjornsrud
Appellant
City of Colorado Springs
Appellee
William P. Flanagan
Appellant
Victor B. Morris
Appellant
James Munger
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

· °FOR ·THE·· TENTH CIRCUIT 

WILLIAM P. FLANAGAN, VICTOR B. ) 

MORRIS, and DONALD M. BJORNSRUD, ) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cirr:t)i·': 

DEC 8 1989 

ROBERT 1. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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No. 86-2076 

JAMES MUNGER and CITY OF 

COLORADO SPRINGS, 

Defendants-Appellees, 

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 

OF COLORADO, 

Amicus Curiae. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 86~Z-144) 

Craig M. Cornish, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for PlaintiffsAppellants. 

Gordon L. Vaughan of Hall & Evans, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for 

Defendants-Appellees. (Alan Epstein of Hall & Evans, Denver, 

Colorado, with him on the brief for Defendant-Appellee James 

Munger; Kathleen A. Carlson and Peter M. Susemihl of Susemihl, 

Lohman, Kent, Carlson & McDermott, P.C., Colorado Springs, 

Colorado, on the brief for Defendant-Appellee City of Colorado 

Springs.) 

(Robert L. Connelly, Jr. and Robert Douglas Clark of Isaacson, 

Rosenbaum, Spiegleman, Woods, Levy & Snow, P.C., Denver, Colorado, 

on the brief for Amicus Curiae.) 

Before McKAY and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and PARKER, District 

Judge*. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

*Honorable James A. Parker, United States District .;Tu-dge for the 

District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 86-2076 Document: 010110280935 Date Filed: 12/08/1989 Page: 1
When this lawsuit was filed, appellants were high-ranking 

police officers with the Colorado Springs Police Department. 1 

·Officer William Flanagan had'"be·en with ·the department for twenty 

years, ten of those as a deputy police chief. Officer Donald 

Bjornsrud had been with the department for twenty-two years and 

was serving as the Administrative Lieutenant of the patrol bureau. 

In the summer of 1985, the three original plaintiffs and Mr. 

Richard Paul, an investor with video rental experience, formed a 

corporation for the purpose of opening and operating a video 

rental store. Each participant held a twenty-five percent ownership interest in the corporation, although Mr. Paul was responsible for organizing and operating the video store. 

In September 1985, Mr. Paul purchased in bulk approximately 

2500 used video tapes for the corporation. Mr. Paul designated 

approximately 100, or less than four percent of the tapes, adult 

films. 2 These tapes were displayed sideways on a six-foot-high 

shelf labeled "Adult Films." Only the films' titles were visible 

1 Victor B. Morris, one of the three original plaintiffs, 

voluntarily dismissed his complaint after appellants filed their 

notice of appeal. 

2 "Adult films" included films rated "X" by the Motion Picture 

Association and films Mr. Paul considered inappropriate for rental 

to anyone under the age of 21. 

These adult films graphically depicted explicit sexual acts 

between men and women, but did not contain child pornography, bestiality or sadomasochism. The plaintiffs specifically requested 

that Mr. Paul ensure that none of the tapes were legally obscene 

under federal, state, or local law. 

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from the shelf in order not to expose the public to potentially 

sexually explicit film covers. Store policy prohibited renting 

adult films to- persons under·· the age of twenty-one. 

On or about November 13, 1985, James Munger, Colorado 

Springs' Chief of Police, received an anonymous letter alleging 

that Colorado Springs police officers "were co-owners of a Porno 

Video business." In response to the letter, Chief Munger ordered 

an internal affairs investigation conducted by a detective from 

the Denver Police Department. In late November 1985, the detective rented a total of four adult films from plaintiffs' video 

store and viewed the tapes with three members of the Colorado 

Springs Police Department Internal Affairs Unit. At Chief 

Munger's request, an FBI agent with expertise in obscenity law 

also viewed the tapes. 

On November 27, 1985, Chief Munger notified plaintiffs of the 

investigation. The Chief informed them that the investigators had 

determined that the adult films under investigation were not 

obscene under Colorado's criminal statutes. 3 He also informed 

them that the investigation was continuing with regard to possible 

violations of Colorado Springs Police Department regulations 

regarding approval for off-duty employment and conduct unbecoming 

an officer. Ultimately, the investigating officers found that 

3 The Chief admitted in pleadings that the films were not 

outside the protection of the first amendment nor in violation of 

any federal, state, or local laws. 

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each plaintiff had violated the off-duty employment regulation, 

but made no determination regarding a possible violation of the 

unbecoming"~conduct regulation. 

On December 9, 1985, Chief Munger asked plaintiffs to remove 

all sexually explicit films from their rental store inventory. 

Chief Munger told the plaintiffs that if they refused to voluntarily remove the tapes, he would order them to do so. He also 

informed plaintiffs that he would be issuing a reprimand against 

them for violations of departmental regulations. In response to 

the Chief's request, plaintiffs removed sexually explicit videos 

from the store's shelves. 

On December 16, 1985, a local reporter contacted one of the 

plaintiffs in order to verify information she had received that 

the plaintiffs ran a video store which rented X-rated films and 

that the plaintiffs would receive a written reprimand from the 

department for their activities. The plaintiff told the reporter 

that the video store had removed all adult films at Chief Munger's 

request. He also told her that plaintiffs had not been reprimanded, nor did he believe that they would be. 

After this conversation, the plaintiff immediately contacted 

the other plaintiffs and arranged a meeting with Chief Munger. 

Then Chief Munger, believing he had the consent of plaintiffs, 

responded to the local news reporter's earlier questions to him 

and communicated the charges against plaintiffs, the results of 

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( the internal affairs investigation, and the fact that the officers 

would receive written repri~ands. The local press ran several 

article~~egarding the- information released by-~hief· Munger. 

Chief Munger issued written reprimands for violations of sections C 1300 "Standards of Conduct," C 1301.25 "Conduct Unbecoming 

An Officer," and C 1360.01 "Obtaining Approval" for off-duty 

employment. Chief Munger admitted that plaintiffs would not have 

been reprimanded for failing to obtain approval for off-duty 

employment if they had not violated the conduct-unbecoming regulation by renting or selling sexually explicit videos. Thus, it is 

conceded that plaintiffs' "speech" activity, renting videos, was 

the substantial motivating factor of each of the reprimands. The 

reprimands were placed in each plaintiff's personnel file. 

In their or'iginal and amended complaints, plaintiffs alleged 

that defendants violated their first amendment rights, federal and 

state constitutionally-protected privacy rights, various federal 

and state procedural due process rights, federal and state due 

process rights based on the vagueness of the departmental regulations, and federal and state equal protection rights. Officer 

Flanagan also alleged that Chief Munger retaliated against him for 

participating in the video store and for filing suit by failing to 

reappoint him as deputy chief, a position he had held in the 

department for ten years. 

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-sAppellate Case: 86-2076 Document: 010110280935 Date Filed: 12/08/1989 Page: 5
Chief Munger denied liability, contending that he enjoyed 

qualified immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 

( 1982 )·. The City- of· ·color ado Springs a-lso 'denied liability, contending that it was not liable for Chief Munger's actions under 

the principles articulated in Monell v. New York City Department 

of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and Pembaur v. 

Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986). 

On defendants' motion, the trial court dismissed all of 

plaintiffs' state claims for relief. Plaintiffs moved for partial 

summary judgment on their first amendment and void for vagueness 

claims. The defendants moved to dismiss or in the alternative for 

summary judgment on all claims. The trial court granted summary 

judgment for the defendants on all causes of action. 

Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment 

to defendants and its denial ·of summary judgment to plaintiffs on 

the freedom of speech and void for vagueness claims. We review an 

order granting or denying summary judgment under the same standard 

applied by the trial court in determining whether summary judgment 

is proper. United States v. Gammache, 713 F.2d 588, 594 (10th 

Cir. 1983). Summary judgment is proper if the record before the 

court shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

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Appellate Case: 86-2076 Document: 010110280935 Date Filed: 12/08/1989 Page: 6
I. Free Speech Claim 

The facts of this appeal are essentially undisputed. Because 

there is no genuine-issue asto any- material fact regarding 

plaintiffs' free speech claim, we address whether Chief Munger and 

the City are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

A. The Pickering Test 

The Supreme Court test for determining whether an employee is 

entitled to first amendment protection for engaging in "speech" at 

work or related to work is found in Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 

U.S. 563 (1968), and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). Under 

the Pickering/Connick test, in order to assess whether a public 

employer has violated an employee's right to freedom of speech, a 

court is to "arrive at a balance between the interests of the 

[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 

concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 

employees. II Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. Thus, we normally 

analyze the issue in two steps: We first determine whether the 

employee's speech is upon a matter of public concern, and if so, 4 

we balance the employee's interest in free speech against the 

4 If an employee's speech "cannot be fairly characterized as 

constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for [the employer's 

adverse employment decision]. When employee expression cannot be 

fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, 

or other concern to the community, government officials should 

enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive 

oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment." 

Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. 

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"government's interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment 

of its responsibilities to the public." Connick, 461 U.S. at 150. 

Although this case involves public employer discipline for 

public employee speech, it is factually and conceptually different 

from the typical Pickering/Connick fact pattern. A typical 

Pickering/Connick case involves an employee who has been terminated or disciplined by a public employer for critical and allegedly disruptive comments made about work. 5 This case involves 

"speech" which is off the job and unrelated to any internal functioning of the department. 

However, the Supreme Court has extended the Pickering/Connick 

test to a case which does not fully replicate the original 

Pickering/Connick fact situation. In Rankin v. McPherson, 483 

U.S. 378 (1987), a-county constable fired a clerical employee in 

his office who, when referring to the attempted assassination of 

President Reagan, stated, "if they go for him again, I hope they 

get him. 11 · This statement did not address any aspect of the public 

employer's enterprise. For the first time, the Court did not 

address the usual Pickering problem, whether a statement about 

work is so publicly significant that it addresses concerns of the 

community rather than merely disrupting the public enterprise. By 

using Pickering to test Rankin's statements, the Court extended 

5 See,~, Pickering, 391 U.S. 563; Connick, 461 U.S. 138; 

and Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 

(1979). 

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Pickering's applicability to a class of cases in which a public 

employer takes adverse employment action against a public employee 

··for making a··statement which is unrelated· to- employment but is 

made at work. 

Although the Supreme Court has extended the Pickering/Connick 

test to a case which involves speech at work but not about work, 

we do not believe that the Pickering/Connick public concern test 

logically extends two more steps to this case in which a public 

employee (1) engages in nonverbal protected expression which is 

(2) neither at work nor about work. The public concern test 

requires that we first determine whether a plaintiff's speech may 

_ be "fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of 

public concern." Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. As we discuss below, 

it is nearly impossible to logically apply the public concern test 

to the present case in which an employee engages in nonverbal protected expression neither at work nor about work. However, the 

balancing prong of the Pickering/Connick test is still easy to 

apply in this situation. A court can still compare an employee's 

interest in free speech and his employer's interest in the 

efficient functioning of government even with nonverbal protected 

expression. 

Initially, we note that the language used by the Supreme 

Court in explaining the public concern test indicates its inapplicability to the present fact situation. The Supreme Court 

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requires that the employee's speech comment "upon matters of public concern." Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. It is difficult to 

· comprehend how eachof the officer's owning of a one-quarter 

interest in a video store which rents a small portion of sexually 

explicit videos is making a "comment" on any subject, especially a 

subject of public concern. Owning a store that rents movies isn't 

necessarily commentary about the desirability of these films. 

This is not debate or explicit verbal speech. If plaintiffs had 

made off-duty statements supporting sexually explicit films, those 

comments would almost surely relate to a matter of public concern. 

However, it is not clear that part ownership of a video store 

which rents a small portion of sexually explicit videos is commentary at all. 6 . Thus, the language in the Pickering/Connick 

cases requiring commentary on a matter of public concern is difficult to apply in this situation. 

The specificity of precedential language in our circuit further indicates that the public concern test was not intended to 

apply to situations of this type. In Wilson v. City of Littleton, 

6 An alternative analysis of this case would hold that by owning a percentage of a video store which rents sexually explicit 

videos, the plaintiffs are implicitly making a comment about the 

desirability of such videos. Since obscenity is a topic of general public interest, under this line of reasoning, the plaintiffs 

could be making a comment on a matter of public concern. However, 

we believe that such an analysis is stretching to artificially 

force this case into the existing framework of the Pickering test. 

We believe that the case is more accurately analyzed under the 

alternative framework explained below. Nevertheless, the result 

reached under either analysis may be the same. If the "speech" is 

of public concern, then the court is ultimately required to balance the employer's ability to protect the work environment and 

the employee's right to free speech. 

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Colo., 732 F.2d 765, 769 (10th Cir. 1984), we stated that "it is 

not always enough that '[the speech's] subject matter could in 

· [·certain] ·circumstances, [be] the· topic·of ·a communication to the 

public that might be of general interest.' [Connick, at 148) n.8 

(emphasis added). What is actually said on that topic mu~t itself 

be of public concern." The language of Koch v. City of 

Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1445 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. 

Ct. 262 (1988), is also troubling. "[T]his circuit has already 

indicated that what is of general interest to the public is not 

necessarily of public concern for First Amendment purposes." In 

Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 

479 U.S. 1085 (1987), we recognized that "it is not always enough 

that the subject matter of a communication be one in which there 

might be general interest, ••• but that what is actually said on 

the topic is the crux of the public concern content inquiry." Id. 

at 1317 n.l (emphasis in original; citations omitted). In these 

cases, we construe "public concern" very narrowly, limiting first 

amendment protection to statements made by public employees which 

"sufficiently inform [an] issue" of public concern. Wilson, 732 

F.2d at 768. 

The language of _these cases is very difficult to apply to the 

situation presented by this case. Again we note that it is difficult to understand how the plaintiffs are "actually [saying]" 

anything by part ownership of the store. Since the plaintiffs 

have made no statement about the films, it is difficult to understand how they are "sufficiently inform[ing an] issue" of public 

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concern. Our cases seem to require that something actually be 

said on the topic. However, even if we accept the proposition 

that.showing.the filmsis implicitly a statement that plaintiffs 

favor the films, such a statement is not easily covered by the 

existing cases. It is not clear how an implicit statement can 

sufficiently inform an issue of public concern or contribute to 

the debate over sexually explicit films. 

Another problem with Wilson, Koch, and Wren is that they 

involve speech that occurred at work or about a work-related subject. When a statement is made at or about work, use of the public concern test, indeed a narrow definition of public concern, 

makes sense. The test helps define public concern in an area in 

which the critical distinction should be whether the speech at 

issue takes on significance outside the workplace or whether it 

deals primarily with an employee's personal employment problem. 

However, in a case like this of nonverbal protected expression not 

at or about the workplace, the "speech" already takes place outside of the workplace and thus the purpose behind using the public 

concern test is simply irrelevant. 

The formulation of the public concern test in Connick and its 

progeny also implies that the test is not intended to apply to 

areas in which the employee does not speak at work or about work. 

"We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen 

upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon 

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matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to 

-review the.,w-isdom of a personnel·de·cision taken-by a" public agency 

allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior." Connick, 461 

U.S. at 147. Thus, the Connick public concern test is intended to 

weed out speech by an employee speaking as an employee upon 

matters only of personal interest. The speech of the plaintiffs 

in this case is clearly not speech as an employee, and thus does 

not fulfill the purpose of the public concern test. A Fourth 

Circuit case makes the point clear. "Pickering, its antecedents, 

and its progeny--particularly Connick--make it plain that the 

'public concern' •.•• inquiry is better designed • to identify a narrow spectrum of employee speech that is not entitled 

even to qualified protection than it is to set outer limits on all 

that is." Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998 (4th Cir. 

1985). 7 Clearly, plaintiffs are not speaking as employees and 

7 The only appellate court that has considered a case in which 

a police officer was disciplined for speech not at or about work 

is the Berger court. In Berger, a police officer performed blackface which was offensive to certain members of the public. The 

Berger court applied the Pickering test to the police officer's 

speech. However, since the court explained the factual differences and yet gave no reasoning for extending Pickering, it 

appears that the court applied the test because of the inertia of 

previous decisions applying Pickering in employment cases. 

'We do not find the Berger court's use of the Pickering test 

persuasive. However, we do agree with the result of the case. 

While it is true the Berger case and this case can be factually 

distinguished (the Ber~er case involved the actual performance of 

entertainment while this case involves only the distribution of 

"entertainment"), analytically the two cases are indistinguishable. Both cases involved off-duty entertainment "speech" by 

police officers which did not "add" to debate. Thus, the Berger 

case provides a persuasive prior resolution of very similar 

issues, although obviously we are not bound by Fourth Circuit 

precedent. The result of the Berger court is in line with the ,, 

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thus do not fit the narrow spectrum which the public concern test 

is meant to identify. 

Thus, we conclude that the public concern test does not apply 

when public employee nonverbal protected expression does not occur 

at work and is not about work. Nevertheless, we believe that an 

alternative test can be applied in these cases which can fulfill 

the same function as the public concern test. We hold that the 

_public concern prong of the Pickering/Connick test cannot be 

applied to a case of nonverbal expression that does not occur at 

work or is not about work. The alternative test should be whether 

the speech involved is "protected expression." If the speech 

involved is protected expression, then the second half of the 

existing Pickering test--the balancing between the employee's 

right to free speech and the employer's right to curtail activity 

which interferes with the efficient operation of the office--

should be applied. This approach is consistent with the underlying principles behind the Pickering and Connick decisions and 

result which we reach in this case, although we adopt a slightly 

different approach. 

There are also two appellate court cases that deal with offduty police officer activities under the freedom of association 

doctrine of the first amendment. Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539 

(11th Cir. 1984); Battle v. Mulholland, 439 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 

_1971). These cases are only marginally relevant, however, because 

they do not deal with speech and they do not apply the Pickering 

balancing test, although they both cite Pickering. Nevertheless, 

these cases also support the approach we adopt in this case. The 

central question addressed in each case is whether the activity 

involved is constitutionally protected. The cases do not even 

attempt to apply the public concern prong of Pickering. Indeed, 

we express some doubt whether the Pickering test, particularly the 

public concern prong, applies in freedom of association cases. 

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their application of the public concern test. Even the Fourth 

Circuit in the Berger case, which applied the public concern test, 

agreed ·that the ~r-inciples behind -the cases would support an 

approach of this type. 

The principle that emerges is that all public employee 

speech that by content is within the general protection 

of the first amendment is entitled to at least qualified 

protection against public employer chilling action 

except that which, realistically viewed, is of purely 

"personal concern" to the employee--most typically, a 

private personnel grievance. 

Berger, 779 F.2d at 998 (emphasis in original). 

The purpose of the public concern test is to avoid raising 

personal personnel grievances to constitutional cases. This 

purpose is also served by a test which requires cases involving 

employee nonverbal expression which is not at work nor about work 

to involve protected expression. In those cases the employee is 

not raising a personal personnel grievance, and it makes little 

sense to ask whether this speech is of public concern. 

Applying the above test to this ca~e, it is clear that plaintiffs' speech is protected expression. Sexually explicit films 

and the distribution of sexually explicit films have consistently 

been upheld as protected under the first amendment, whether under 

the free speech or free press clauses. See Erznoznik v. City of 

Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Times Film Corp. v. City of 

Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 

(1965); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 499-500 

(1952); Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); and 

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Neiderhiser v. Borough of Berwick, 840 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1988). 

Cf. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509 (1948). Since this 

-speech is off the job-and not related to the internal functroning 

of the department and is clearly protected expression under the 

first amendment, we then proceed to the balancing portion of the 

Pickering test. 

B. Balancing 

Under Pickering, we must balance plaintiffs' interest in 

engaging in this protected expression against the state's interest 

as an employer in "promoting the efficiency of the public services 

it performs through its employees." Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 

When balaricing, we consider the content, context, manner, time, 

and place of the employee's expression. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152-

53. Pertinent considerations include "whether the [expression] 

impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among coworkers, has a 

detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the regular 

operation of the enterprise." Rankin, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) 

(citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570-73). Essentially, the balance 

must tip in favor of protection "unless the employer shows that 

some restriction is necessary to prevent the disruption of official functions or to insure effective performance by the 

employee." Childers v. Independent School Dist. No. 1 of Bryan 

County, 676 F.2d 1338, 1341_ (10th Cir. 1982). 

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Under the formulation above, we hold that the Pickering balance tips in favor of plaintiffs, thereby protecting them from 

adverse employment action based upon their speech •. The Pickering 

test balances the plaintiff's interest in engaging in free speech, 

not the value of the speech itself. Plaintiffs have a substantial 

interest in engaging in this protected expression. Plaintiffs 

have an interest in exercising their constitutional rights, particularly their right to freedom of speech and press. Although 

plaintiffs' speech may not be as "valuable" as political or social 

comment, we think that this type of off-duty public employee 

speech must be 

accorded the same weight in absolute terms that would be 

accorded comparable ••• expression by citizens who do 

not work for the state •••• We do not ••• read the 

Pickering, Givhan and Connick Court's emphasis on the 

importance attached to speech on matters involving public affairs and the operations of government as implying 

that employee speech on other matters lying within the 

first amendment's general protection should be accorded 

little weight in the public employee speech balancing 

process. That emphasis in those cases we think simply 

reflected the fact that that was the type of speech 

involved in each, and that in content such speech does 

indeed embody core first amendment values. 

Berger, 779 F.2d at 999-1000. 

The defendants' interest in preventing plaintiffs' speech is 

much more attenuated. Chief Munger's articulated reason for prohibiting plaintiffs from renting sexually explicit films was that 

if members of the public knew that officers were renting them, 

negative public feelings about the distribution of sexually 

explicit films would erode the public's respect and confidence in 

the police department. This erosion of public confidence and 

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respect would discourage citizens from cooperating with the 

department, thereby inhibiting the efficiency and effectiveness of 

·it in the· community. 

We note first that Chief Munger did not argue that plaintiffs'_ speech "impair[ed] discipline by superiors or harmony among 

coworkers, ha[d] a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or 

impede[d] the performance of [plaintiffs'] duties or interfere[d] 

with the regular operation of the enterprise." RankJ.n, 107 s. Ct. 

at 2899. Rather, defendants argued that reaction by offended 

members of the public would adversely impact its external 

relationships and operations. 

Arguably, "the only public employer interest that can outweigh a public employee's recognized speech rights is the interest 

in avoiding direct disruption, by the speech itself, of the public 

employer's internal operations and employment relationships." 

Berger, 779 F.2d at 1000 (emphasis added); see also Connick, 461 

U.S. at 151; Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415 n.4; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 

570. The record is devoid of evidence of actual, or potential, 

disruption of the department's internal operations--no discipline 

problems, no disharmony, no impact on close working relationships, 

and no performance problems by plaintiffs. Defendants' case 

revolves solely around evidence of the potential disruption of the 

department's external relationships and operations. 8 Even if 

8 The Fourth Circuit has held that even the disruption of the 

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disruption of external operations could justify defendants' 

actions under Pickering and its progeny, their justification must 

fail under another theory. 

The department cannot justify disciplinary action against 

plaintiffs simply because some members of the public find plaintiffs' speech offensive and for that reason may not cooperate with 

law enforcement officers in the future. The Supreme Court has 

squarely rejected what it refers to as the "heckler's veto" as a 

justification for curtailing "offensive" speech in order to prevent public disorder. See,~, Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 

U.S. 229 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). See 

also Berger, 779 F.2d at 1001. The record is devoid of evidence 

of actual or potential internal disruption caused by plaintiffs' 

speech. 9 Defendants' evidence pointed only to potential problems 

police department's external relationships and operations to the 

extent of picketing and potential altercations between blacks and 

whites did not justify disciplinary action in faithfulness to 

first amendment principles. 

Here not only was the perceived threat of disruption 

only to external operations and relationships, it was 

caused not by the speech itself but by threatened 

reaction to it by offended segments of the public. 

Short of direct incitements to violence by the very 

content of public employee speech ••• , we think this 

sort of threatened disruption by others reacting to 

public employee speech simply may not be allowed to 

serve as justification for public employer disciplinary 

action directed at that speech. 

Berger, 779 F.2d at 1001. 

9 This case does not involve negative reactions or potential 

internal disruption by fellow police officers or others inside the 

polic.e ·department. . We express no opinion as to the outcome of---the 

"heckler's veto" argument in such a case. , .. 

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which might be caused by the public's reaction to plaintiffs' 

speech. "[A]pprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome 

the-right ·to freedom of expression." Battle v. Mulholland, 439 

F.2d 321, 324 (5th Cir. 1971) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines 

Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1969)). 

The Supreme Court's rejection of the heckler's veto lends support 

to our holding that the defendants have only an attenuated 

interest in preventing plaintiffs' speech. 

The final reason that we reject the police department's justification for disciplining the plaintiffs based on the public's 

reaction to the plaintiffs' speech is the possibility that such a 

justification could be extended to future cases in which even 

greater problems could result. For example, a citizen might find 

a police officer who rented sexually explicit films for his own 

personal use objectionable. If the public's reaction to an 

officer's off-duty "speech" that is not related to work justifies 

discipline for renting videos to others, that same justification 

may be used to prevent a police officer's personal use of sexually 

explicit videos. The citizen could argue that the public response 

could lead to a disruption of the police department. In addition, 

it is not inconceivable that plaintiffs and defendants might 

attempt to apply this_argument in cases of assembly or religion in 

which a police officer attends a meeting of a religious or other 

group to which some members of the public object. There are 

strong first amendment values in the free exercise of religion and 

,, 

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in the freedom of assembly which could be severely restricted if 

the external objectors' justification were allowed to be applied 

·in these cases. 

We conclude that plaintiffs' interest in engaging in the 

speech at issue outweighs defendants' interest in preventing it. 

Because the Pickering balance tips in favor of plaintiffs, we hold 

that Chief Munger violated their right to freedom of speech and 

press by prohibiting them from selling or renting sexually 

explicit video tapes and by reprimanding them for engaging in that 

activity. 

C. Liability of Chief Munger 

Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), "government 

officials performing discretionary functions, generally are 

shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 

818. The qualified immunity standard articulated above focuses on 

the objective legal reasonableness of an official's conduct measured against clearly established law at the time he acted. Id. 

In order to strip an official of qualified immunity for violating 

an individual's constitutional right, "[t]he contours of the right 

must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. 

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 

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Although Chief Munger is guilty of violating the plaintiffs' 

constitutional rights, he is still entitled to summary judgment on ., 

p·laintiffs' ·freedom of speech· claim because, as a· matter of law, 

he enjoys qualified immunity with respect to that issue. Qualified immunity insulates Chief Munger from liability with respect 

to this claim because, when he acted, the law regarding the regulation of police officers' off-duty speech in this context was not 

clearly established. The discussion above indicates the uncertainty of the issue under prior law. Chief Munger "could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, 

nor could he fairly be said to 'know' that the law forbade conduct 

not previously identified as unlawful." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 

Therefore, we affirm the trial court's award of summary judgment 

to Chief Munger and its denial of summary judgment to plaintiffs 

with respect to the damage claim against him on this issue. 

D. Liability of the City of Colorado Springs 

If an employee inflicts a constitutional injury when executing "a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, ••• the ·government as an entity is 

responsible under§ 1983." Monell v. New York City Dept. of 

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978} (rejecting respondeat 

superior as theory of municipal liability}. 10 Municipal liability 

10 "Official policy" under§ 1983 includes custom, Monell, 436 

U.S. at 690-91, and usage, Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 

481 n.10 (1986}~ 

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attaches only to "acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered," Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480, and only where "a 

•del0-ibe-I"-ate · choice to follow a course of action -is· made from among 

various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for 

establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in 

question." Id. at 483-84. 11 

The final policymaker determination is a question of state 

law. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483. We note at the outset that the 

City admitted that "[a]t all times pertinent hereto, the City of 

Colorado Springs has delegated to [Chief Munger] final authority 

to issue reprimands to Colorado Springs police officers." Complaint, ,49; and Answer of City of Colorado Springs, ,26 (admitting allegation of ,49 of Complaint); Response to Plaintiffs' 

Request for Admissions, ,12 (admitting City delegated to Chief 

authority to set policy regarding discipline imposed on officers 

for violations of departmental rules and regulations, although 

such authority was reviewable). This admission effectively disposes of the municipal liability issue because it all but flatly 

states that Chief Munger was the final policymaker with respect to 

issuing written reprimands in the department. 

11 The fact that Chief Munger is immune from liability for his 

actions is irrelevant to the liability of the City. We found that 

Chief Munger violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The 

City cannot claim immunity under Harlow because it is not a 

"government official." Therefore, the City is liable, and the 

only remaining question is whether it is immune from liability 

under another theory. 

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In spite of this admission, the City argues that it is not 

liable because Chief Munger's authority to set policy regarding 

-departmental discipline is-always-reviewable by-the City Manager 

and the City Council. See Response to Plaintiffs' Request for 

Admissions, 112. The City argues that it has not delegated final 

authority to the Chief because the City Manager has general management and supervision of all matters relating to the police 

department, its subordinate officers and employees. Mun. Code, 

Ch. 2, Art. 6, § 2-6-103. He also has "the power to set aside any 

action taken by the department head and ••• may supercede any 

department head in the functions of his position." Mun. Code, Ch. 

1, Art. 4, § 1-4-205. The City also argues that it has not delegated final authority to Chief Munger because "[t]he rules of the 

Civil Service Commission ••• govern disciplinary matters relative to uniformed personnel [~, review by City Council] except 

as otherwise provided by charter or ordinance." Mun. Code, Ch. 2, 

Art. 6, 5 2-6-105. 

Although it appears at -first blush that the Chief does not 

have final policymaking authority because the City Manager and 

City Council may r~view his decisions, we believe that he does 

have final authority for two reasons. First, we believe that specific.police department sections in the code truly govern the 

issue. Although the City Manager has general management and 

supervision over the department, § 2-6-103, the Chief of Police 

has direct management and supervision. Mun. Code, Ch. 2, Art. 6, 

§ 2-6-104. In addition, under§ 2-6-104 the Chief is "responsible 

,: 

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for the discipline, good order and proper conduct of the Department, [and] the enforcement of all laws, ordinances and 

regulations pertaining thereto." Mun. Code, Ch. 2, Art. 6, § 2-6-

104. 

Secondly, we find the City's review argument unpersuasive. 

Sections 1-4-205, 2-6-103 and 2-6-105, supra, certainly do not 

create mandatory or even any formal review of departmental 

actions. In fact, the City admitted that there is no provision 

for administrative review of written reprimands in the City's procedural manual. See Response to Plaintiffs' Request for Admissions, 114. Although the City argues that departmental decisions 

may ultimately be reviewed by the City Manager or City Council, 

for all intents and purposes the Chief's discipline decisions are 

final, and any meaningful administrative review is illusory. 

Thus, even if we based our analysis on Colorado Springs' municipal 

code, we would hold that Chief Munger has final authority to 

establish policy with respect to departmental reprimands. 

In our judgment, when Chief Munger issued the reprimands 

against plaintiffs, he acted as the official "responsible for 

establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in 

question." Pembaur, 475 UrS • at 483-84. Therefore, Chief 

Munger's unconstitutional reprimand may be imputed to the City for 

purposes of municipal liability. We reverse the trial court's 

grant of summary judgment to the City on this issue, grant summary 

,, 

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judgment to plaintiffs, and remand to the trial court for a determination of remedies on their free speech claim against the City 

and, to~he extent they seek·injunctive relief, against Chief 

Munger as well. 

II~ Void for Vagueness Claim 

Plaintiffs contend that departmental regulations C 130012 and 

C 1301.2513 are unconstitutionally vague. A regulation14 is vague 

on its face when it "either forbids or requires the doing of an 

act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." 

12 

13 

C 1300. STANDARDS OF CONDUCT -- GENERAL RULES: Members 

of a Police Department are highly visible representatives of government and are entrusted with the 

responsibility of ensuring the safety and well-being of 

the community as well as the delivery of police services. Since the functions of a Police Department have a 

major impact upon the community, standards of conduct 

for police personnel are higher than standards applied 

to the general public. In this regard Department Members will conduct themselves in a manner which does not 

bring discredit upon individuals, the Department, the 

City of Colorado Springs or the community. 

C 1301.25. CONDUCT UNBECOMING A POLICE OFFICER: Members 

of the Colorado Springs Police Department shall conduct 

themselves at all times, both on and off duty, in such a 

manner as to reflect most favorably on the Department. 

Conduct unbecoming a police officer shall include that 

which brings the Department into disrepute or reflects 

discredit upon the officer as a Member of the Department, or that which impairs the operation or efficiency 

of the Department or Member. 

14 See Verbeck v. Schnicker, 660 F.2d 1260, 1262 (8th Cir. 

1981)-;-cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982) (prohibition against 

vagueness applies to administrative regulations as well as 

statutes). 

,.· 

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Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). The 

rule should comport with a "rough idea of fairness ••• and pro-

.·. vide fai·r··warning tha·t certain· kinds -of· conduct are prohibited. 11 

Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972). 

We hold that regulations C 1300 and C 1301.25 are not vague 

on their face. For that purpose, we adopt the reasoning of the 

Colorado Court of Appeals in Puzick v. City of Colorado Springs, 

680 P.2d 1283 (Colo. App. 1983) (addressing constitutionality of 

Cl301.25). In Puzick, the court reasoned that: 

While it is true that this rule is not precise in 

delineating proscribed conduct or in positing a standard 

by which a police officer can evaluate the propriety of 

proposed conduct, broad rules such as ones condemning 

"conduct unbecoming an officer" or, as here, conduct 

impairing the operation or efficiency of the department 

or bringing the department into disrepute, have been 

generally upheld against challenges of facial vagueness. • • • 

Capacious phrases such as the one included in the 

Colorado Springs Manual are unavoidable. They nevertheless provide adequate notice to police officers that 

their conduct, both on and off duty, must meet a high 

standard of comportment •••• 

As Judge Leventhal of the District of Columbia Circuit 

noted in Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822, 835 (D.C. Cir. 

1968), modified, 425 F.2d 469, aff'd, 425 F.2d 472 

(1969): 

"[I]t is not feasible or necessary for the 

Government to spell out in detail all that 

conduct which will result in retaliation. The 

most conscientious of codes that define prohibited conduct of employees includes 'catchall' clauses prohibiting employee 'misconduct,' 'immorality,' or 'conduct unbecoming.'" 

Id. at 1286 (citations omitted). 

,, 

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Thus, we hold that the statutes are not vague on their face. 

The remaining vagueness issue is whether the statute is vague as 

applied; ~~The trial court's decision on vagueness appears to be 

based on its conclusion that plaintiffs' speech was not protected. 

In light of our reversal of this finding, we remand for consideration of whether the statute is vague as applied and the attendant issues of immunity. 

III. Right to Privacy Claim 

Plaintiffs contend that the Chief's disclosure to the media 

of the reprimands he issued against them violated their constitutional right to privacy. 15 The trial court granted summary 

judgment on this issue because it believed that the facts in the 

record did not support a claim for relief on this ground. We 

affirm. 

The Supreme Court has recognized that the constitutional 

right to privacy protects an individual's interest in preventing 

disclosure by the government of personal matters. See Whalen v. 

Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 & n.24 (1977). In Denver Policemen's Protective Ass'n v. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1981), we 

adopted the Colorado test for determining whether information contained in personnel files is of such a highly personal or sensitive nature that it falls within the zone of confidentiality. "In 

15 The federal constitutional right to privacy is protected by 

the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Roe v. 

Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 

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applying this test the court must consider, (1) if the party 

asserting the right has a legitimate expectation of privacy, (2) 

if- disclosure -ser-ves, a compelling state ~in-teres·t, -and ( 3) if disclosure can be made in the least intrusive manner." Id. at 435; 

see Martinelli v. District Court in and for the City and County of 

Denver, 612 P.2d 1083, 1091 (Colo. 1980). 

The plaintiffs' right to privacy claim can be disposed of 

under the first prong of the Martinelli test. Our cases provide 

no absolute right to privacy in the contents of personnel files. 

Only highly personal information is protected. In Lichtenstein 

this court held that police internal investigation files were not 

protected by the right to privacy when the "documents related 

simply to the officers' work as police officers." Lichtenstein, 

660 F.2d at 435. The court upheld the Martinelli definition of 

privacy rights which held that data in files "which is not of a 

highly personal or sensitive nature may not fall within the zone 

of confidentiality." Id. 

In this case Chief Munger revealed two facts from the internal investigation file to the news media. The Chief told the 

media (1) that the plaintiffs had been reprimanded, and (2) that 

the reason for the reprimand was their ownership of the video 

store. Clearly the reason for the reprimand, the part ownership 

of the video store, was public information. The plaintiffs often 

worked in the store themselves renting videos to the public. They 

were even observed telling some customers that they were police 

,, 

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officers. Thus, the plaintiffs could have no expectation that 

their ownership of the video store would be kept private. 

We also hold that the fact that the reprimands were issued 

was not information in which the plaintiffs had a legitimate 

expectation of confidentiality. Although the reprimands were 

based on off-duty conduct, we have already concluded that this 

conduct itself was public information. In addition, the reprimands were issued because the off-duty conduct was believed to 

reflect on the officers' fitness as officers and to undermine public confidence in the department. Thus, the fact that the reprimands were issued "related simply to the officers' work as police 

officers." Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d at 435. We are unwilling to 

hold that a reprimand of a public employee is of a highly personal 

nature and creates a constitutional expectation of privacy. 

Plaintiffs point to city policy, regulation, and custom which 

states that information in personnel files will be kept confidentiai.16 However, under our precedents these statutes and policies 

do not by themselves create a constitutional privacy right. In 

Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 1986), fire fighters 

16 See Personal Privacy policy adopted by City Council of 

Colorado Springs on July 9, 1985; City's Answer Brief at 3 n.l; 

Complaint, paragraph 40 (alleging personnel files of public 

employees are confidential and may not be disclosed to the public 

absent consent by the employee) and paragraph 41 (alleging that 

under municipal regulation and custom, internal affairs 

investigations and personnel files are confidential); City's 

Answer, paragraphs 20, 21 (admitting allegations of paragraphs 40, 

41 but stating regulations and customs were not violated); and 

Chief Munger's Answer at paragraphs 22, 23 (same). 

, .. 

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signed forms prior to making statements to police internal investigators which contained assurances of confidentiality. However, 

this court held that 

[a]ny limited assurances of confidentiality offered by 

Denver officials to the Mangels do not make a difference 

in this case. Rights of substantive due process are 

founded not upon state provisions but upon deeply rooted 

notions of fundamental personal interests derived from 

the Constitution. The legitimacy of individual expectations of confidentiality must arise from the personal 

quality of any materials which the state possesses. 

Allegations of a failure on the part of government 

officials to abide by their own assurances of confidentiality will not suffice to state a claim. Any disclosed information must itself warrant protection under 

constitutional standards. 

Id. at 839 (citations and footnotes omitted). The presence of 

privacy statutes and regulations may inform our judgment concerning the scope of the constitutional right to privacy. 

However, such local acts, standing alone, fall far short of the 

kind of proof necessary to establish a broadly recognized, 

reasonable expectation of privacy which has been identified by 

precedent. Thus, plaintiffs cannot rely on state statutes to 

create a federal constitutional claim. However, our holding does 

not affect the plaintiffs~ right to seek redress for a violation 

of the City's policies under any causes of action created on the 

state level. No claim of such a cause of action is before us. 

Since we hold that the information released by Chief Munger 

is not of a highly personal nature, we deny the plaintiffs' privacy claim. We affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment 

to defendants Munger and the City on this issue. 

,, 

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IV. Deprivation of Liberty Claim 

Plaintiffs contend that defendants deprived them of liberty 

·withou~ due process of law by•releasing informa~ion about th~ir 

reprimands to the media. A public employee enjoys two interests 

protected under the liberty prong of the fourteenth amendment's 

due process clause: (1) an interest in his good name, reputation, 

honor and integrity, and (2) an interest in other employment 

opportunities. Miller v. City of Mission, Kan., 705 F.2d 368, 373 

(10th Cir. 1983). In order to show deprivation of a liberty 

interest under section 1983, plaintiffs must first show that the 

government's action stigmatized or otherwise damaged their reputations. See McGhee v. Draper, 639 F.2d 639, 642-43 (10th Cir. 

1981). To do so, they must show that the government published 

false and stigmatizing information about them in connection with 

the adverse action taken against them. See Asbill v. Housing 

Auth. of Choctaw Nation, 726 F.2d 1499, 1503 (10th Cir. 1984). 

At this point, we can easily dispose of the liberty deprivation issue. None of the statements made by Chief Munger to the 

media about plaintiffs were false--plaintiffs subsequently 

received letters of reprimand for their involvement in a video 

tape business. 17 The Chief simply verified most of the underlying facts, many of which had already been verified by one of the 

plaintiffs. His comments which were not true facts were merely 

17 The fact that we have held that Chief Munger's reprimand of 

plaintiffs was unconstitutional does not alter the fact that he 

did so. Therefore, his statement that he would issue written 

reprimands to plaintiffs was true. 

,· 

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opinion and did not contain personal information. 18 Because 

plaintiffs did not show that any of Chief Munger's statements to 

the media were false, they-have failed to·support a claim for deprivation of liberty under section 1983. Therefore, defendants are 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and we affirm the trial 

court's grant of summary judgment to them. 

v. Retaliatory Demotion Claim 

Officer Flanagan alleges that he was demoted19 from the position of deputy chief as a result of his participation in plaintiffs' video rental business and in retaliation for filing this 

lawsuit. With respect to this claim, several genuine issues of 

material fact exist. First, a factual dispute exists with respect 

to the nature of a deputy chief's position, for instance, whether 

it is merely titular, or whether appointment to the position is a 

formal promotion. 

Secondly, a fundamental factual dispute exists with regard to 

Chief Munger's reason for demoting or failing to reappoint plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that he was demoted for engaging in protected activity. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that deputy 

chiefs ''serve at the will and pleasure of the Chief of Police," 

Mun. Code, Ch. 2, Art. 6, § 2-6-102B, and that Chief Munger 

18 For example, Chief Munger commented that plaintiffs' activity 

risked tarnishing the image of the Police Department. 

19 Defendants characterize this action as a failure to 

reappoint. 

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decided not to reappoint plaintiff based entirely on professional 

considerations. Because these genuine issues of fact exist, the 

· ·trial ·court ':·improper-ly granted·. summary judgment -0n plaintiff's 

claims. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings 

on these issues. 20 

VI. Conclusion 

On plaintiffs' first amendment claim, we hold that Chief 

Munger violated plaintiffs' right to freedom of speech. However, 

because of the Chief's immunity to liability under Harlow, we 

affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Chief Munger 

and its denial of summary judgment to plaintiffs with respect to 

him on the damage claim. We reverse the trial court's grant of 

summary judgment to the City on the free speech issue because a 

City employee violated plaintiffs' right to free speech, while 

conceding that the speech was the substantial motivating factor 

for the reprimand. The City lacked immunity under Monell, and 

thus we grant summary Judgment for plaintiffs against the City and 

remand for a determination of damages and consideration of the 

equitable relief requested. 

On plaintiffs' right to privacy claim, we affirm the trial 

court's grant of summary judgment to the City and to Chief Munger. 

20 We do not address the issue of Harlow immunity with respect 

to Chief Muriger or the City's liability under Monell with respect 

to these claims because neither defendant raised these defenses 

below or on appeal, and thus we lack the necessary facts. We 

leave these determinations to the trial court on remand. 

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We affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs' facial void for vagueness claim and remand on the void for 

vagueness as applied ·issue~ We also-affirm the trial court's 

grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiffs' deprivation 

of liberty claim. Finally, we reverse and remand on Officer 

Flanagan's retaliatory demotion claims. 

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. 

, .. 

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