Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-20-01006/USCOURTS-ca13-20-01006-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent
Office of Special Counsel
Respondent
Mitchell Wine
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

MITCHELL WINE,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________

2020-1006

______________________

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DA-1221-19-0363-W-1.

______________________

Decided: May 21, 2020

______________________

MITCHELL WINE, Mountain View, AR, pro se. 

 JEFFREY GAUGER, Office of the General Counsel, 

United States Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by KATHERINE 

MICHELLE SMITH. 

 ______________________

Before PROST, Chief Judge, REYNA and HUGHES, Circuit 

Judges.

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2 WINE v. MSPB

PER CURIAM.

Mitch Wine petitions for review of the Merit Systems 

Protection Board’s dismissal of his individual right of action appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Because Mr. Wine did 

not make non-frivolous allegations of a “personnel action” 

taken against him, we affirm the Board’s decision.

I

The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) employed Mr. Wine from 2003 to 2018. In February 2016, Mr. 

Wine filed a complaint (MA-16-2281) with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), alleging that FWS supervisors retaliated against him for making certain protected disclosures. 

In July 2016, OSC informed Mr. Wine that it had terminated its investigation of these allegations, and Mr. Wine 

filed an individual right of action (IRA) appeal with the 

Board. See Wine v. Dep’t of the Interior, No. DA-1221-16-

0513-W-2, 2017 MSPB LEXIS 5121 at *13 (M.S.P.B. December 5, 2017) (2017 IRA Decision).

In the fall of 2016, Mr. Wine filed a second OSC complaint (MA-17-0509, “Fall 2016 complaint”) detailing additional disclosures. See id. at *14. Mr. Wine’s designated 

representative requested those claims be added to the 

pending IRA appeal, so OSC terminated its investigation

in March 2017. See Wine v. Dep’t of the Interior, No. DA0752-18-0116-S-7, 2019 MSPB LEXIS 1869 at *3–4 

(M.S.P.B. May 31, 2019) (finding that OSC had closed the 

2016 complaint, exhausting those issues, and that an IRA 

appeal based on that complaint would be untimely). The 

Board appears to have partly considered that second complaint in Mr. Wine’s IRA appeal, but found certain allegations not exhausted before OSC. 2017 IRA Decision

at *18–19, *20 n.2, *43 n.6, *51 n.9, *92 n.12. Ultimately,

the Board denied Mr. Wine’s request for corrective action 

because it found that FWS would have taken the same actions absent his whistleblowing. Id. at *97.

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WINE v. MSPB 3

In December 2017, FWS removed Mr. Wine and he appealed the removal. Mr. Wine eventually entered into a 

settlement agreement with FWS, which the Board approved as the final resolution of the appeal in April 2018. 

Wine v. Dep’t of the Interior, No. DA-0752-18-0116-I-1, 2018

MSPB LEXIS 1541 (M.S.P.B. April 30, 2018). 

In January 2018, while that appeal was pending, Mr. 

Wine contacted OSC seeking “reconsideration” of his Fall

2016 (MA-17-0509) complaint. S.A. 44.1 Mr. Wine believed 

this was necessary to cure his failure to exhaust allegations 

in his original IRA appeal. Id. OSC purportedly agreed to 

reevaluate the complaint, but Mr. Wine, dissatisfied with 

a perceived lack of follow-up or action, in June 2019, filed 

the IRA appeal petitioned here. Id. See Wine v. Office of 

Special Counsel, No. DA-1221-19-0363-W-1, 2019 MSPB 

LEXIS 2747 (M.S.P.B. July 29, 2019) (Decision). He alleges 

that OSC retaliated against him in violation of 5 U.S.C. 

§ 2302 by failing to complete an investigation of the Fall 

2016 complaint and by failing to “reconsider” that complaint in 2018. S.A. 44. 

II

In the petitioned IRA appeal, OSC moved for a jurisdictional determination, arguing that the Board lacked jurisdiction because Mr. Wine “failed to nonfrivolously allege: 

(1) that OSC subjected him to an appealable action; or 

(2) that OSC subjected him to a covered personnel action in 

retaliation for his protected whistleblowing activity.” Decision at *2–3. The Administrative Judge ordered Mr. 

Wine to show cause why the IRA appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, directing Mr. Wine to explain in particular how “OSC’s investigations or 

1 “S.A.” refers to the pages of the respondent’s supplemental appendix attached to the respondent’s brief.

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4 WINE v. MSPB

prosecutorial decisions were personnel actions within the 

meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A).” Decision at *3. 

Mr. Wine argued that OSC’s failure to investigate qualified as a personnel action under § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii) because it “effectuated a ‘significant change in working 

conditions’ for [Mr. Wine] by allowing FWS managers to 

dismiss harassment grievances against themselves and interfere with [Mr. Wine’s] Workers’ Compensation claim to 

have it denied unlawfully.” Decision at *4 (quoting S.A. 45, 

itself quoting § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii)). Mr. Wine argued that 

OSC’s actions were a prohibited personnel practice in violation of § 2302(b)(12) because, in his view, OSC had an obligation to investigate his claims under 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a),

and not doing so would violate his due process rights. Decision at *4–5. 

The Administrative Judge rejected these arguments, 

holding that the Board has no authority to enforce OSC’s 

statutory requirements to investigate allegations of whistleblower reprisal. Decision at *5–6 (citing Wren v. Merit 

Sys. Prot. Bd., 681 F.2d 867, 871–72, (D.C. Cir. 1982); Miller v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 111 M.S.P.R. 325, 332–33 

(2009)). The Administrative Judge explained that “[OSC’s] 

investigations and decisions are not personnel actions 

within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A), even 

though they may be of interest to [Mr. Wine] and to his career with FWS.” Decision at *6. 

Mr. Wine did not petition for appeal to the full Board.

The Administrative Judge’s initial decision became the 

Board’s final decision and Mr. Wine timely petitioned this 

Court for review. We have jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(b)(1)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

III

We set aside a final Board decision only if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 

in accordance with law; obtained without procedures 

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WINE v. MSPB 5

required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; 

or unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); 

Forest v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 47 F.3d 409, 410 (Fed. Cir. 

1995). We review the Board’s determination that it lacks 

jurisdiction without deference. Id. However, we review the 

underlying factual findings on which a jurisdictional determination is based for substantial evidence. Bolton v. Merit 

Sys. Prot. Bd., 154 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The 

petitioner, Mr. Wine, bears the burden of establishing the 

Board’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Stoyanov v. Dep’t of Navy, 474 F.3d 1377, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 

2007). 

We find no error in the Board’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. “The Board’s jurisdiction is not plenary, but is 

limited to those matters over which it has been granted jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation.” Id. To establish the 

Board’s jurisdiction over an IRA appeal, petitioners must 

identify non-frivolous allegations that (1) they engaged in 

whistleblowing activity by making a protected disclosure 

under 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(b)(8), (b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); 

and (2) the protected disclosure was a contributing factor 

in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel 

action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). Id. at 1379–80; see 

5 U.S.C. § 1221(a). “[N]ot every agency action is a ‘personnel action’ under the WPA.” King v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 133 F.3d 1450, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1998). We agree 

with the Board that Mr. Wine has not sufficiently alleged 

a “personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a).” 

Stoyanov, 474 F.3d at 1380. 

Mr. Wine alleged that OSC took a personnel action under the “catch-all” provision, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii), 

by failing to investigate his complaint. See S.A. 45. To establish a personnel action under this provision, Mr. Wine 

would have to identify a “significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions” caused by OSC’s allegedly improper inaction. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii). The 

circumstances here preclude any reasonable allegation 

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6 WINE v. MSPB

that OSC’s failure to investigate created a “significant 

change” in Mr. Wine’s working conditions. Because Mr. 

Wine did not work for OSC, OSC had no direct authority to 

change Mr. Wine’s working conditions. Claims that OSC’s 

actions can cause a “significant change” in Mr. Wine’s

working conditions—when he was employed by FWS, not 

OSC—rest on a dubious foundation. 

Moreover, OSC’s alleged failure to investigate logically

cannot have changed Mr. Wine’s working conditions. Any 

hostile working conditions Mr. Wine experienced at FWS 

must have existed before he even complained to OSC, else 

he would have had no grounds for a complaint. Thus, either OSC has not yet been given adequate notice of 

Mr. Wine’s allegations, or any failure to act by OSC only 

maintained the status quo. OSC’s hypothetical ability to 

improve the status quo by investigating Mr. Wine’s allegations and recommending corrective action does not give the 

Board jurisdiction over an IRA appeal involving OSC. Cf. 

Wren v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 681 F.2d 867, 871–72 (D.C. 

Cir. 1982) (holding that the Board has no authority to enforce OSC’s statutory requirement to investigate whistleblower reprisals).

The Whistleblower Protection Act offers Mr. Wine the 

opportunity to resolve any allegations he believes were not 

adequately investigated by OSC through filing an IRA appeal directed to FWS’s actions. Mr. Wine invoked that 

right for the Fall 2016 complaint already, as discussed in 

the 2017 IRA Decision. See Section I, supra. If any allegations were not exhausted before that IRA appeal—thereby 

depriving the Board of jurisdiction over those allegations 

in that appeal—the lack of jurisdiction was not for OSC’s 

failure to investigate or take action, but for Mr. Wine’s failure to make those allegations to OSC with adequate 

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WINE v. MSPB 7

specificity.2 After all, the OSC need not act for aggrieved 

persons to have exhausted their remedies before OSC. See

Ellison v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 7 F.3d 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 

1993) (“[I]f no action has been taken by the OSC within 120 

days . . . [an] employee [may] seek corrective action from 

the Board.”) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3)(B)). Any IRA appeal Mr. Wine may still have lies against FWS, not OSC. 

Establishing Board jurisdiction in such an appeal may require a new OSC complaint specifically making the unexhausted allegations, if Mr. Wine has a basis for such a 

complaint despite having already been separated from 

FWS.

Because the Board did not err in finding that Mr. Wine 

failed to identify a qualifying personnel action that OSC 

had taken against him, we affirm the Board’s dismissal of 

his appeal.

AFFIRMED

No costs. 

2 In that appeal, the Administrative Judge also 

found that—assuming Mr. Wine had exhausted the allegations made here—those allegations were “discrete, unrelated events, which taken together, do not constitute 

impermissible alterations in the terms and conditions of 

his employment.” Wine, 2017 MSPB LEXIS 5121 at *51. 

So, even if Mr. Wine’s allegations were properly raised

against OSC, they would still not yield non-frivolous allegations of a personnel action under § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii).

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