Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02886/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02886-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Ruiz Singh
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2886

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

David Ruiz Singh, *

*

Defendant-Appellant. *

___________ 

Appeals from the United States

No. 06-3056 District Court for the Southern

___________ District of Iowa.

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Martin Ruiz Singh, *

*

Defendant-Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 10, 2007

Filed: July 13, 2007

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Before MELLOY, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

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MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Defendants David Ruiz Singh (“David”) and Martin Ruiz Singh (“Martin”)

were convicted by a jury of distributing methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1), and conspiring to distribute in excess of 500 grams of methamphetamine

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Martin was also convicted of being a felon in

possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Both defendants argue

that the district court permitted the introduction of inadmissible hearsay testimony

over their objections and in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth

Amendment. They also argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their

convictions. Because we find that the admission of hearsay testimony was harmless

and not in violation of the Confrontation Clause, and because there was sufficient

evidence to support the convictions, we affirm.

I. Background

Martin and David are brothers who were involved in the distribution of

methamphetamine in and around Marshalltown, Iowa, from 1998 through 2004.

Martin worked at a meat packing plant where he conducted a part of his drug trade

and cultivated contacts for buying and selling pound quantities of methamphetamine.

David served the role of enforcer and money collector for the conspiracy. David also

sold smaller, user-quantities of methamphetamine. The brothers were convicted

following a joint trial in which numerous co-conspirators and several police officers

testified. We describe the evidence and testimony introduced against the two men,

and objections to the evidence, as relevant to the present appeal.

The first prosecution witness was Todd Parrish, a deputy in the Marshall

County Sheriff’s Office. Deputy Parrish testified that he was involved in the

preparation, surveillance, and follow-up activities surrounding a number of controlled

buys, controlled deliveries, and contacts between Martin and a cooperating coAppellate Case: 06-2886 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/13/2007 Entry ID: 3329352
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conspirator, Mark Carnahan. Deputy Parrish did not physically observe the

interactions between Carnahan and Martin, but he listened to and/or recorded their

conversations from a nearby location. Through his testimony, Deputy Parrish

provided context that helped to corroborate subsequent testimony by Carnahan

regarding the encounters. The controlled encounters took place at David’s residence

and at the meat packing plant. 

The next witness, Detective Burt Tecklenburg of the Marshall County Sheriff’s

Office, was the lead detective on the case. Det. Tecklenburg testified three times

during the trial: he testified before and after cooperating co-conspirator Carnahan, and

he testified as a rebuttal witness after the defense rested its case. In his initial

testimony, Det. Tecklenburg explained his background and introduced a series of

recordings from controlled transactions and encounters involving Carnahan and

Martin.

Carnahan was the next government witness and the central witness to the

government’s case. Carnahan testified that he met Martin at the meat packing plant

where Martin was a supervisor. Carnahan learned that Martin was selling

methamphetamine, and Carnahan soon began receiving methamphetamine from

Martin on credit. Carnahan sold between seven and ten pounds of methamphetamine

for Martin between 1998 and 1999 or 2000. Martin stopped selling to Carnahan at

that time because Carnahan fell behind on payments to Martin. In 2002, after a

replacement seller for Martin lost his job at the meat packing plant, Martin returned

to using Carnahan to sell methamphetamine. In the 2002-2003 timeframe, Carnahan

sold an additional five to seven pounds of methamphetamine for Martin.

In addition, Carnahan testified that on at least two occasions, he arranged with

Martin to obtain ounce quantities of methamphetamine from David at David’s

residence and, in fact, met with and received the methamphetamine from David. In

addition, on at least one occasion, David came to Carnahan’s home to demand the

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payment of $900 that Carnahan owed to Martin. David pushed Carnahan down a

hallway and told Carnahan to come up with the $900 or he would take Carnahan’s car.

Also, over the objection of defense counsel, Carnahan testified that Martin told him

David was the money collector or “muscle” for the brothers’ drug-dealing activity.

Carnahan then explained his involvement in several controlled phone calls,

money deliveries, and drug transactions that Deputy Parrish and/or Det. Tecklenburg

had described. Carnahan described a first controlled purchase in which he called

Martin to arrange a buy, Martin instructed him to come to David’s residence, and

Carnahan went to David’s residence. At David’s residence, Martin gave Carnahan

two ounces of methamphetamine for $1800. Carnahan testified that David was

present for the transaction and that David told Carnahan to “stay a little bit longer

because a white person coming to a Mexican’s house, that doesn’t look good.”

Carnahan next described a controlled delivery of $900 to David to pay the debt

to Martin, as referenced above. Carnahan received $900 from Det. Tecklenburg and

paid the money to David at David’s residence. Carnahan testified that David told him

to stop delivering drugs to people on credit and to start demanding cash at the time of

delivery to avoid falling behind on his own payments.

Carnahan also testified about additional controlled encounters with Martin and

David at David’s residence. In one instance, Carnahan again purchased two ounces

of methamphetamine for $1800 and sought to introduce an undercover agent to

Martin. Martin refused to permit Carnahan to bring in the new person on that

occasion. David was present during that transaction but did not actively participate.

On another occasion, Carnahan was to receive methamphetamine from Martin at the

meat packing plant, but Martin pre-empted the workplace delivery by arriving

unannounced at Carnahan’s apartment and delivering the drugs. The final controlled

transaction involving Carnahan was a purchase of one ounce of methamphetamine

from Martin in the employees’ locker room at the meat packing plant.

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Officers had made audio tapes of the controlled transactions, and the tapes,

where audible, corroborated Carnahan’s descriptions of the encounters. The tapes

were played in court, and Carnahan identified David and Martin’s voices on the

recording from one of the controlled transactions. Carnahan then identified Martin’s

voice on tapes from three different transactions. In order to explain comments on one

of the tapes regarding transactions that preceded Carnahan’s cooperation with law

enforcement officials, Carnahan testified that he had been involved in pound-quantity

methamphetamine transactions with Martin. 

Regarding credibility issues, Carnahan stated that he had been convicted of

drug-related state felonies and that, at the time he commenced his cooperation with

Det. Tecklenburg, he faced the possibility of federal charges that would have carried

a twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence and possible life imprisonment. He

admitted that he used methamphetamine while assisting Det. Tecklenburg. He also

stated that he initially cooperated with Det. Tecklenburg for money rather than for

assistance in avoiding prosecution, but he later cooperated to avoid prosecution.

Det. Tecklenburg then returned to the stand and testified as to his own role in

the investigation. He provided context for much of Carnahan’s testimony. Over

objections, Det. Tecklenburg testified regarding out-of-court statements Carnahan had

made in which Carnahan described David’s statements implicating Martin in the

conspiracy and in which Carnahan described the encounter with David involving

intimidation related to the $900 debt to Martin. This testimony from Det. Tecklenburg

mirrored the testimony that Carnahan himself provided.

Diane Pieters testified next. Pieters was a methamphetamine user who obtained

user-quantities of methamphetamine directly from David and from David through

other people on approximately forty occasions. At one point in her testimony, she

stated that another methamphetamine user, Henry Segovia, obtained

methamphetamine for her from David. Defense counsel objected, and the district

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court overruled the objection based on the district court’s belief that Pieters had said

Segovia obtained the methamphetamine for David. Another methamphetamine user,

Christine Torres, testified that she purchased user quantities of methamphetamine

from David on over twenty occasions.

In addition, co-conspirators Jose Luis Delgado Benitez and Esequiel Gallardo

testified. Benitez testified that he met Martin when he and Martin worked together at

the meat packing plant. Benitez purchased pound quantities of methamphetamine

from Martin and, over objection, said that Martin described having a brother from

California who was in Marshalltown and who collected a debt for him. Gallardo also

met Martin when working at the meat packing plant. Gallardo sold approximately

twenty-five pounds of marijuana to Martin and approximately eight pounds of

methamphetamine. Gallardo testified over objection that Martin told him to deal with

David if he ever needed anything or needed to drop anything off. Gallardo did not

state that he ever actually bought methamphetamine from, or sold methamphetamine

to, David.

Additional officers testified as to their roles in the preparation and execution of

the controlled transactions and the execution of search warrants. At Martin’s

residence, officers found a digital scale in the kitchen and $472 in cash on Martin’s

person. One of the bills contained a white powdery substance consistent with

methamphetamine.

Finally, a Marshalltown police officer, Todd Tuttle, described a traffic stop

involving David that took place during the window of time that Carnahan was

cooperating with investigators. Officer Tuttle saw David driving a vehicle with overly

tinted windows, recognized David, and knew that David was driving in violation of

a suspended license. Officer Tuttle activated his lights, and David failed to stop.

Officer Tuttle then activated his siren and David stopped. When Officer Tuttle exited

his car to approach David’s vehicle, David drove away. Officer Tuttle returned to his

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car, pursued David, and David stopped his vehicle again. Officer Tuttle again

approached David’s vehicle and ordered David to exit the vehicle. David then

attempted to drive away and Officer Tuttle, who was hanging onto David’s door, was

dragged a short distance. David then exited his vehicle and refused to obey Officer

Tuttle’s commands. Officer Tuttle used mace on David, but David remained

uncooperative and physically resisted Officer Tuttle. Ultimately, Officer Tuttle

discharged his mace at David eight times and took him into custody. A search of

David’s vehicle revealed 2.2 grams of methamphetamine in the glove box.

II. Discussion

A. Confrontation Clause Challenges

Martin and David argue that it was error to admit testimony from Carnahan,

Gallardo, and Delgado-Benitez regarding incriminating statements that David made

about Martin and Martin made about David. They characterize the testimony from

these witnesses as describing out-of-court statements by non-testifying co-defendants

that should have been excluded under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137

(1968), and that were admitted in violation of each defendant’s right to cross-examine

witnesses as guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The

district court conditionally admitted the challenged testimony from these witnesses’

regarding Martin’s and David’s statements under Federal Rule of Evidence

801(d)(2)(E) as statements by co-conspirators made in the course of, and in

furtherance of, the conspiracy. In accordance with the procedure set forth in United

States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978), the district court subsequently

determined that the government established the existence of a conspiracy by a

preponderance of independent evidence. Based on this determination, the district

court allowed the challenged testimony to stand. 

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Bruton held generally that the admission of an incriminating statement by nontestifying co-defendant at a joint trial violates the defendant’s rights under the

Confrontation Clause. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137. Bruton, however, does not preclude

the admission of otherwise admissible statements by a co-conspirator under Rule

801(d)(2)(E). See United States v. Mickelson, 378 F.3d 810, 819 (8th Cir. 2004)

(“However, when the statements are those of a co-conspirator and are admissible

under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), the Sixth Amendment and Bruton are

not implicated.”). Further, our court has held that co-conspirators’ statements made

in furtherance of a conspiracy and admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are generally

non-testimonial and, therefore, do not violate the Confrontation Clause as interpreted

by the Supreme Court. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-54 (2004)

(providing examples of statements that are testimonial in nature); see also United

States v. Lee, 374 F.3d 637, 644 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying Crawford and stating, “In

contrast to these examples, casual statements to an acquaintance are not testimonial.

Nor are statements to a coconspirator or business records testimonial.”) (internal

citation omitted). In the circumstances of the present case, we believe that the district

court properly admitted the challenged testimony under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and that the

co-defendants’ out-of-courts statements were not testimonial. Accordingly, there was

no violation of the Confrontation Clause and no error in the admission of the

challenged testimony.

B. Other Hearsay Objections

Martin and David challenge as inadmissible hearsay the testimony from Det.

Tecklenburg in which Det. Tecklenburg relayed Carnahan’s prior, out-of-court

description of interactions with David. They also challenge the admission of the

statement by Pieters that Henry Segovia obtained methamphetamine “from” David.

We believe that these challenges have merit. 

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Carnahan’s statement to Det. Tecklenburg was an out-of-court statement

“offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” i.e. that David was

involved in the conspiracy and served in the role of money collector or “muscle” for

Martin. Fed. R Evid. 801(c). David made a timely objection to the admission of this

aspect of Det. Tecklenburg’s testimony, and we find no applicable exclusion to the

hearsay definition nor exception to the general rule of inadmissibility that would

permit Det. Tecklenburg’s testimony. Carnahan was a cooperating informant and his

statement to Det. Tecklenburg was made in that capacity, not in the capacity of coconspirator and not in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Alonzo, 991

F.2d 1422, 1425-26 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that statements by a cooperating coconspirator to known authorities, made after the commencement of cooperation, are

not admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) because such statements are not made “in

furtherance of the conspiracy”). 

Also, it is not clear that Pieters’s testimony regarding an incriminating, out-ofcourt statement by Henry Segovia identifying David as a supplier of

methamphetamine was admissible. While Segovia may have been a co-conspirator

within the meaning of Rule 801(d)(2)(E), Pieters’s testimony relaying Segovia’s

statement about David was not admitted under this rule. The district court overruled

defense counsel’s objection to Pieters’s testimony based on the understanding that

Pieters had said Segovia obtained methamphetamine for David. The transcript of the

trial indicates that Pieters actually testified that Segovia claimed to have obtained the

methamphetamine from David. This distinction, while subtle, arguably changes the

impact of the statement from one suggesting David was a user of methamphetamine

to one identifying David as a supplier. It is not entirely clear, however, that this

distinction impacts admissibility. Regardless, we need not dwell on this point further;

if there was error in the admission of Pieters’s testimony, any such error was harmless.

Error in the admission of evidence only provides a basis for relief if the error

affected the defendants’ “substantial rights.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); see United States

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v. Sanchez-Godinez, 444 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 2006) (“An evidentiary error is

harmless if the substantial rights of the defendant were unaffected and the error did

not influence or had only a slight influence on the verdict.”) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Det. Tecklenburg’s hearsay testimony was arguably

harmful because it buttressed Carnahan’s credibility by showing that Carnahan had

made an earlier, consistent out-of-court statement to Det. Tecklenburg that was

identical or similar to his trial testimony. David accurately characterizes Carnahan as

an important government witness at the center of the case and argues that the improper

buttressing of Carnahan’s credibility must have impacted the jury’s deliberations.

Although David presents a logical chain of reasoning that sets forth a cogent

theory to explain how the hearsay could have been prejudicial, we must view the

evidentiary error in light of the record as a whole. Here, a great deal of properly

admitted testimony and evidence buttressed Carnahan’s credibility and provided

context for the controlled transactions. The audio tapes played in court and the

testimony of other conspirators strongly corroborated Carnahan’s testimony. Properly

admitted testimony from officers provided context and explained the controlled

transactions. Against this backdrop, we do not find that the incremental buttressing

of Carnahan’s credibility by the admission of hearsay through Det. Tecklenburg

affected David’s “substantial rights.” Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 52(a). Also, given the ample

evidence demonstrating David’s involvement in the conspiracy and detailing his

repeated provision of user-quantities of methamphetamine to Pieters and Torres, the

challenged testimony describing a single incident involving Henry Segovia had, at

most, a de minimis impact.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In addition, we find the evidence and testimony, as set forth above, sufficient

to support the defendants’ convictions. Both defendants argue the evidence was

insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the amount of

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methamphetamine involved in the conspiracy and attributable to each defendant was

greater than 500 grams. Although the controlled transactions involving Carnahan did

not involve 500 or more grams of methamphetamine, multiple co-conspirators—

Carnahan, Benitez, and Gallardo—testified as to their own personal involvement in

the conspiracy. Each of these witnesses testified as to transactions with Martin

involving methamphetamine in amounts in excess of 500 grams. The evidence as

described herein is sufficient to support the jury’s determination that David, as well

as Martin, participated in the conspiracy to distribute in excess of 500 grams of

methamphetamine. To the extent the defendants base their challenges on the jury’s

credibility determinations, such determinations are “virtually unreviewable” on

appeal, and we will not disturb the jury’s assessment in this case. United States v.

Davis, 471 F.3d 938, 948 (8th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted).

The judgments of the district court are affirmed.

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