Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01959/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01959-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pamela Golinveaux
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-1959

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

 v. * District Court for the 

* Northern District of Iowa.

Pamela Golinveaux, *

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 14, 2010

Filed: July 28, 2010

___________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Chief Judge.

Pamela Golinveaux pled guilty to being a felon in possession of seven rounds

of .22 caliber ammunition while having been previously convicted of three or more

violent felony offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1),

conditioned upon this court’s review of the district court’s1

 denial of her motion to

suppress. Golinveaux argues the ammunition should have been suppressed because

1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Northern District of Iowa, adopting the report and recommendations of the

Honorable Jon S. Scoles, United States Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of

Iowa.

Appellate Case: 09-1959 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/28/2010 Entry ID: 3687642
she did not voluntarily consent to the search of her vehicle. The district court found

the search was voluntary, and we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

On March 12, 2004, a loss prevention officer at the Cedar Falls, Iowa, Wal-Mart

observed Golinveaux take three boxes of Sudafed cold medicine, which contains

pseudoephedrine, a precursor for the manufacture of methamphetamine, from a store

shelf and leave without paying. The loss prevention officer brought Golinveaux and

her companion, Seth Caldwell, to the store’s loss prevention office, a 12-foot by 20-

foot unmarked windowless room, where they waited for the police. Two Cedar Falls

police officers eventually arrived and spoke with Golinveaux. One officer asked

Golinveaux for consent to search her car. Golinveaux refused and requested to speak

to a lawyer, stating she “wanted that lawyer thing.” 

The officer then called his commanding officer, Captain Craig Berte, who came

to the scene and was advised of the circumstances, including Golinveaux’s request for

counsel and refusal to consent to a vehicle search. After Captain Berte entered the loss

prevention office, the office contained six to seven people.2

 Golinveaux maintains she

felt physically intimidated in the room because she was the only woman present, and

although she was unrestrained and seated at a table before the officers, the officers

likely were standing. Captain Berte told Golinveaux he knew she had asked for an

attorney and he would not ask any questions about the theft. Captain Berte then gave

Golinveaux a “dangerous chemical speech,” explaining he was concerned about the

danger to “hundreds and hundreds” of people if Golinveaux’s car contained other

2

Golinveaux, Caldwell, Wal-Mart’s loss prevention officer, Captain Berte and

two other officers, and possibly the Wal-Mart store manager were in the office. 

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Appellate Case: 09-1959 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/28/2010 Entry ID: 3687642
precursors for the manufacture of methamphetamine.3

 Golinveaux repeatedly said

there was nothing illegal in her car. 

About thirty-eight minutes after the first officers arrived, and twenty-three

minutes after Captain Berte was dispatched,4

 Golinveaux, on the condition she could

be present during its execution, consented to the search of her car for chemicals. 

Golinveaux apparently led the officers to her vehicle and unlocked the car using a

remote control. The search revealed a black tin containing methamphetamine residue

in the center console, a gold pipe containing marijuana residue in a cup holder, a

loaded Harrington & Richardson .22 caliber rimfire seven shot revolver under the

driver’s seat, more drug paraphernalia behind the front seat, and a bloody syringe in

the trunk. After the search, Golinveaux was arrested and, for the first time, given a

warning pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Golinveaux was

eventually transported to jail and booked. None of the officers involved in

Golinveaux’s arrest or booking noticed any signs that she was impaired by alcohol or

drugs. 

On August 26, 2008, a grand jury indicted Golinveaux for being a felon in

possession of seven rounds of .22 caliber ammunition while having been previously

convicted of three or more violent felony offenses,5

 in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). Golinveaux moved to suppress the evidence seized during

3

Captain Berte denies the “dangerous chemical speech” was an impassioned

speech designed to be a plea to Golinveaux’s emotions. 

4

The record does not indicate when Captain Berte arrived at the loss prevention

room. However, one of the other officers arrived approximately ten minutes after

dispatch. 

5

Golinveaux’s prior felony convictions included breaking and entering, second

degree burglary, burglary, robbery and aggravated battery (including stabbing a police

officer), and second degree robbery. 

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Appellate Case: 09-1959 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/28/2010 Entry ID: 3687642
the search of her vehicle, arguing her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to

counsel were violated when Captain Berte continued to question her after she requested

a lawyer and Golinveaux’s consent to search her vehicle was not given voluntarily. 

Golinveaux then entered a conditional guilty plea, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.

11(a)(2), reserving her right to appeal all issues raised by the motion to suppress and

to withdraw her guilty plea if she prevailed. The district court accepted Golinveaux’s

guilty plea and denied her motion to suppress, concluding (1) Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d

1323, 1330 (8th Cir. 1985) (“[A] consent to search is not an incriminating statement.”),

foreclosed her right to counsel argument; (2) Golinveaux’s consent to the search was

voluntary; and (3) in any event the evidence was admissible because it would

inevitably have been discovered. Golinveaux appeals the district court’s judgment as

to the voluntariness of her consent and the inevitable discovery doctrine. Because we

conclude Golinveaux voluntarily consented to the search, we find it unnecessary to

reach the inevitable discovery issue.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

“[T]he question [of] whether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was

the product of duress or coercion, expressed or implied, is a question of fact to be

determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,

412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). “We review the factual findings of the district court as to

what the parties said or did for clear error; we review the district court’s finding that

the Fourth Amendment has not been violated de novo.” United States v. SerranoLopez, 366 F.3d 628, 639 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Bloomfield, 40

F.3d 910, 918 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc)) (internal marks omitted). 

B. Voluntariness of Consent

Although a warrantless search presumptively violates the Fourth Amendment,

voluntary consent to search is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. 

See United States v. Parker, 587 F.3d 871, 878 (8th Cir. 2009). “The government bears

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the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that consent to search was

freely given, but awareness of the right to refuse is not necessary for consent to be

voluntary.” United States v. Arciniega, 569 F.3d 394, 398 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting

United States v. Smith, 260 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2001)). 

Factors relevant to the analysis include (1) the individual’s age and

mental ability; (2) whether the individual was intoxicated or under the

influence of drugs; (3) whether the individual was informed of [her]

Miranda rights; and (4) whether the individual was aware, through prior

experience, of the protections that the legal system provides for suspected

criminals. It is also important to consider the environment in which an

individual’s consent is obtained, including (1) the length of the detention;

(2) whether the police used threats, physical intimidation, or punishment

to extract consent; (3) whether the police made promises or

misrepresentations; (4) whether the individual was in custody or under

arrest when consent was given; (5) whether the consent was given in

public or in a secluded location; and (6) whether the individual stood by

silently or objected to the search.

Arciniega, 569 F.3d at 398 (internal citations omitted). 

The magistrate judge learned Golinveaux’s age (50) and educational level

(thirteen years), and noted the absence of any evidence Golinveaux suffered from a

mental disability. After mentioning methamphetamine residue was found inside the

car, the court pointed to the officers’ testimony that Golinveaux showed no signs of

being under the influence and rejected Golinveaux’s argument that she was likely

under the influence at the time she gave consent to search. The court found

Golinveaux received no Miranda warnings until after the search, but also found

Golinveaux had a general understanding of her rights, as evidenced by her request for

counsel and lengthy criminal history. Golinveaux allows she “had the personal

wherewithal and background to make a voluntary decision about consent to search”

and we find no clear error in the district court’s findings regarding Golinveaux’s

personal characteristics. 

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Although Golinveaux concededly possessed the personal characteristics

necessary to make a voluntary choice, the environment in which she gave consent may

have been intimidating. Golinveaux states she was in Wal-Mart’s loss prevention

office for about an hour. She was not physically restrained. The officers made no

promises or misrepresentations to Golinveaux. The magistrate judge pointed out that

although there was no evidence Golinveaux was directly threatened, physically

intimidated, or punished, she may have been physically intimidated because the

officers and Wal-Mart employee or employees were all male and standing during the

interview, and Golinveaux was slight, seated, and female. While adopting the

magistrate judge’s finding that Golinveaux may have been physically intimidated, the

district court added that “the environment surrounding [Golinveaux] at the time she

gave her consent was not unduly coercive.” Our review of the record reveals no clear

error in these findings. 

Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude Golinveaux’s consent to the

search of her car was voluntary. At most, Golinveaux was in police custody for thirtyeight minutes before she gave consent to search, and was subject to the possible

physical intimidation described above and Captain Berte’s “dangerous chemical

speech” for less than twenty-three minutes. We do not believe, in such a short time,

an experienced criminal such as Golinveaux—particularly given her history of

assaulting law enforcement officers—was so overcome by police authority or by

Captain Berte’s persuasive powers as to make her consent involuntary. Golinveaux’s

motion to suppress was properly denied.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s judgment.

______________________________

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