Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-10064/USCOURTS-ca9-09-10064-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles A. Borowy
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  No. 09-10064

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.

v.  3:08-cr-00007-LRHVPC-1 CHARLES A. BOROWY,

Defendant-Appellant. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Larry R. Hicks, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 4, 2009—San Francisco, California

Filed February 17, 2010

Before: Betty B. Fletcher, William C. Canby, Jr., and

Susan P. Graber, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

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COUNSEL

Michael K. Powell, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Reno,

Nevada, for defendant/appellant Charles A. Borowy.

Elizabeth A. Olson, Assistant United States Attorney, Reno,

Nevada, for plaintiff-appellee United States of America.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Defendant Charles A. Borowy appeals the denial of his

motion to suppress and seeks to vacate his guilty plea because

of a violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. He argues that the evidence recovered by an FBI

agent who accessed his shared files on the peer-to-peer filesharing service LimeWire was unconstitutionally obtained

and that the district court should have suppressed this evidence. He argues further that, because he was misinformed as

to the term of supervised release to which he was subject, this

court should vacate his guilty plea. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

I. Background

On May 3, 2007, Special Agent Byron Mitchell logged

onto LimeWire, a publically available peer-to-peer filesharing computer program, to monitor trafficking in child pornography. Agent Mitchell conducted a keyword search in

LimeWire using the term “Lolitaguy,” a term known to be

associated with child pornography. From the list of results

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returned by this search, Agent Mitchell identified known

images of child pornography using a software program that

verifies the “hash marks” of files and displays a red flag next

to known images of child pornography. At least one of these

files was shared through what was later determined to be

Borowy’s IP address. Using the “browse host” feature of

LimeWire, Agent Mitchell viewed a list of the names of all

of the approximately 240 files being shared from Borowy’s IP

address, several of which were explicitly suggestive of child

pornography and two of which were red-flagged. Agent

Mitchell downloaded and viewed seven files from Borowy’s

IP address, four of which were child pornography. Prior to

downloading the files, Agent Mitchell did not have access to

the files’ contents. Execution of a search warrant resulting

from Agent Mitchell’s investigation led to the seizure of

Borowy’s laptop computer, CDs, and floppy disks. Forensic

examination of these items revealed more than six hundred

images of child pornography, including seventy-five videos.

Borowy moved to suppress this evidence, arguing that

Agent Mitchell’s activities in locating and downloading the

files from LimeWire constituted a warrantless search and seizure without probable cause that violated Borowy’s Fourth

Amendment rights. Borowy argued that because he had purchased and installed a version of LimeWire that allows the

user to prevent others from downloading or viewing the

names of files on his computer and because he attempted to

engage this feature, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the files. However, for whatever reason, this feature

was not engaged when Agent Mitchell downloaded the seven

files from Borowy’s computer, and there was no restriction on

Agent Mitchell’s accessing those files.1 The district court

refused to suppress the evidence, finding that Agent Mitchell’s conduct was not a search under the Fourth Amendment

1Borowy asserts that this feature was not engaged because rebooting the

computer caused it to reset to its default setting of sharing files. This

explanation is not supported by evidence in the record.

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and that Agent Mitchell had probable cause to download the

files.

Borowy conditionally pleaded guilty to possession of child

pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), reserving his

right to appeal the suppression decision. The plea memorandum, the district court, and counsel for both the government

and the defense initially informed Borowy that the maximum

term of supervised release for this crime was not more than

three years. However, at the beginning of Borowy’s sentencing hearing, the district court and Borowy’s attorney correctly

noted that the relevant statute calls for a period of supervised

release ranging from five years to life. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(k). Borowy concedes that he made no objection at

sentencing that he had been misinformed as to the supervised

release term. Borowy was sentenced to forty-five months of

imprisonment followed by lifetime supervised release.

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Suppress

We review motions to suppress de novo and a trial court’s

factual findings for clear error. United States v. Howard, 447

F.3d 1257, 1262 n.4 (9th Cir. 2006). We review de novo a

district court’s determination of probable cause to search.

United States v. Davis, 530 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2008).

[1] Under Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), government conduct qualifies as a search only if it violates a reasonable expectation of privacy. Whether Agent Mitchell

engaged in an unconstitutional search and seizure is largely

controlled by United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117, 1127

(9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 2037 (2009), which

held that the defendant’s expectation of privacy in his personal computer could not “survive [his] decision to install and

use file-sharing software, thereby opening his computer to

anyone else with the same freely available program.” This

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result is consistent with that of other circuits that have considered the issue. See United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 842-

43 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Ganoe), petition for cert. filed __

U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. Dec. 11, 2009) (No. 09-8153); United

States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2008).

[2] Borowy argues that his case is distinguishable from

Ganoe because of his ineffectual effort to prevent LimeWire

from sharing his files. However, as in Ganoe, “[t]he crux of

[Borowy’s] argument is that he simply did not know that others would be able to access files stored on his own computer”

and that, although Borowy intended to render the files private,

his “technical savvy” failed him. Ganoe, 538 F.3d at 1127.

Borowy, like Ganoe, was clearly aware that LimeWire was a

file-sharing program that would allow the public at large to

access files in his shared folder unless he took steps to avoid

it. See id.; see also United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d

1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007 ) (“[P]rivacy expectations may be

reduced if the user is advised that information transmitted

through the network is not confidential and that [others] may

monitor communications transmitted by the user.”). Despite

his efforts, Borowy’s files were still entirely exposed to public

view; anyone with access to LimeWire could download and

view his files without hindrance. Borowy’s subjective intention not to share his files did not create an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the face of such widespread

public access. See Ganoe, 538 F.3d at 1127; United States v.

King, 509 F.3d 1338, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).

Because Borowy lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy

in the shared files, Agent Mitchell’s use of a keyword search

to locate these files did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

[3] Borowy also argues that the use of a “forensic software

program” that is unavailable to the general public to confirm

that the files contained child pornography rendered Agent

Mitchell’s conduct an unlawful Fourth Amendment search.

We disagree. Borowy had already exposed the entirety of the

contents of his files to the public, negating any reasonable

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expectation of privacy in those files. Cf. California v. Ciraolo,

476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (finding the use of an aircraft to

observe marijuana plants was not a Fourth Amendment search

as it only revealed information accessible to any member of

the public flying in the airspace); cf. also Kyllo v. United

States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore

details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’

. . . .”) (emphasis added). Moreover, the hash-mark analysis

appears to disclose only whether the files in the list that Agent

Mitchell’s keyword search returned were known child pornography. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122-

26 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)

(“canine sniff” of luggage left in public place is not a Fourth

Amendment search). In this context, the hash-mark analysis

functioned simply as a sorting mechanism to prevent the government from having to sift, one by one, through Borowy’s

already publically exposed files.2

[4] Finally, Borowy argues, citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480

U.S. 321, 324-26 (1987), that by downloading the seven files

to examine their contents, Agent Mitchell seized the files

without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See also Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 68-69

(1992) (explaining that even in the absence of a search, seizures of property are subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny).

We need not resolve whether downloading a file constitutes

2Because we decide only the case in front of us, we reject Borowy’s

argument that our decision will allow unrestricted government access to

all internet communications. We do not rule on whether, if confronted

with different facts—for example, where the information was not already

exposed to the public at large, where the hash-mark analysis might reveal

more than whether a file is known child pornography, or where the government “vacuumed” vast quantities of data indiscriminately—we might

find a Fourth Amendment violation. Here we are presented only with the

limited case of a targeted search of publicly exposed information for

known items of contraband. 

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a seizure of that file because the district court properly concluded that Agent Mitchell had probable cause. Probable

cause “merely requires that the facts available to the officer

would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that

certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful

as evidence of a crime.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742

(1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the

district court noted, the file names for at least five of the files

were explicitly suggestive of child pornography.3 The list of

these file names was obtained by searching for a term known

to be associated with child pornography and two of the files

were red-flagged as known child pornography. In light of this

information, the district court correctly held that Agent Mitchell had probable cause to download the files.

B. Rule 11 Error

We conduct a plain error review of a Rule 11 violation to

which no objection has been made. See United States v. Benz,

472 F.3d 657, 658-59 (9th Cir. 2006). To establish plain error

the defendant must show “(1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that

affected substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affected the

fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id. at 659. The government concedes the first two elements of the plain error analysis. See also Fed. R. Crim. Proc.

11(b)(1)(H), (I). It disputes, however, that this error affected

Borowy’s substantial rights.

[5] To show that the error affected his substantial rights,

Borowy must prove that there is a “reasonable probability

that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.”

United States v. Monzon, 429 F.3d 1268, 1272 (9th Cir. 2005)

3Of the remaining two file names, it appears that the district court may

have been exceedingly charitable as to at least one of them, which

included the abbreviation “PTHC,” in determining that it was not suggestive of child pornography. See Stults, 575 F.3d at 838 (explaining that

“PTHC” is an abbreviation commonly associated with child pornography).

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(internal quotation marks omitted). The inquiry includes

“ ‘the overall strength of the Government’s case and any possible defenses that appear from the record,’ ” “ ‘evidence

tending to show that a misunderstanding was inconsequential

to the defendant’s decision, [and] evidence indicating the relative significance of other facts that may have borne on his

choice regardless of any Rule 11 error.’ ” Id. (quoting United

States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 84-85 (2004))

(internal quotations marks omitted). “A defendant must thus

satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the

entire record, that the probability of a different result is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding” but need not prove by a preponderance that the result

would have been different. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83

& n.9 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Our sister circuits have reached divergent results when considering plain error Rule 11 violations on the basis of the

same misinformation that was provided to Borowy. Compare

United States v. Rivera-Maldonado, 560 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir.

2009) (finding this error affected the defendant’s substantial

rights) with United States v. Luken, 560 F.3d 741, 745 (8th

Cir. 2009) (finding the error did not affect the defendant’s

substantial rights). While we are cognizant that the difference

between a maximum three-year term of supervised release

and a term of five years to life is substantial, we conclude

that, on the facts of this case, Borowy has not shown that the

error affected his substantial rights. 

Perhaps the most revealing evidence on this point is that,

at sentencing, Borowy cited the court’s authority to impose

lifetime supervised release as a factor the court should consider in reducing his prison term. Thus, rather than seeking to

rectify or minimize the effect of the Rule 11 error by objecting at sentencing, arguing for a lesser term of supervised

release, or seeking to withdraw his plea, see United States v.

Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 970-71 (9th Cir. 2000), Borowy

actually attempted to turn the error to his advantage. Further2526 UNITED STATES v. BOROWY

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more, because the district court correctly denied Borowy’s

suppression motion, the government had ample evidence of

Borowy’s possession of child pornography. See Dominguez

Benitez, 542 U.S. at 85 (“When the record made for a guilty

plea and sentencing reveals evidence, as this one does, showing both a controlled sale of drugs to an informant and a confession, one can fairly ask a defendant seeking to withdraw

his plea what he might ever have thought he could gain by

going to trial.”). Borowy also received a substantial benefit

from his guilty plea, which lowered the sentencing guideline

range to 51 to 63 months rather than 70 to 87 months and

resulted in the dismissal of Count One of the indictment, for

which there is a 60 month statutory minimum sentence, see 18

U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1); Littlejohn, 224 F.3d at 970-71. 

[6] Given the strength of the government’s case, the benefit that Borowy obtained by pleading guilty, and his focus on

negotiating a lesser prison term, we conclude that Borowy has

not demonstrated that the Rule 11 error affected his substantial rights.

AFFIRMED.

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