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Parties Involved:
Daniel J. Bowker
Appellant
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company
Appellee
State Farm General Insurance Company
Appellee

Document Text:

FJLE D 

Uni!M States Court or Ap;,-oafa 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT OCT O 3 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

DANIEL J. BOWKER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellee, 

and 

STATE FARM GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Defendant. 

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Clerk . 

) No. 90-2122 

) (D. C. No. CV-86-0272 JP) 

) (D. N.M.) 

) 

) 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

* 

The case is therefore ordered 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-2122 Document: 010110090780 Date Filed: 10/08/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiff Daniel J. Bowker appeals from an order of the 

district court denying his motion for a new trial in this 

diversity action. We affirm. 

Bowker, a recognized fire causation and origin expert who was 

hired as a consultant by various insurance companies and law 

enforcement agencies, commenced this action in district court 

alleging that defendant, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company 

(State Farm), 1 had in effect "blacklisted" him because he had 

investigated and provided a report for a State Farm policyholder 

(Suggs) after his home was destroyed by fire. State Farm denied 

Suggs' claim for coverage on the ground that the fire was caused 

by arson. Suggs was charged in state court with arson and 

insurance fraud. Apparently, based at least in part on Bowker's 

report that the fire originated in the electrical wiring, the 

charges were dropped. State Farm, however, continued to refuse to 

pay on the policy and Suggs sued in state court. Bowker agreed to 

testify for Suggs in that suit if necessary. 

In his complaint, Bowker alleged that because of his 

employment by Suggs, State Farm successfully "took affirmative 

action" to discourage others from using his services such that his 

annual income dropped from over $80,000 to less than $10,000. 

After a two week trial, the jury entered a verdict in favor of 

State Farm. Bowker then filed a timely motion for a new trial 

raising the issues he argues on appeal. 

1 Defendant State Farm General Insurance 

with prejudice after trial. Only State 

Company is a party to this appeal. 

2 

Company was dismissed 

Farm Fire and Casualty 

Appellate Case: 90-2122 Document: 010110090780 Date Filed: 10/08/1991 Page: 2 
Bowker argues that his right to an impartial jury was 

violated because the district court did not grant his request to 

excuse State Farm policyholders for cause and did not ask the jury 

during voir dire whether they believed their rates might go up if 

they returned a verdict against State Farm. Bowker also argues 

the district court erred in not granting his motion for a new 

trial2 because of two statements made during State Farm's opening 

statement and in not allowing him to present expert witness 

testimony to counteract those statements. 

"The scope of voir dire is a matter within the sound 

discretion of the trial court and, absent a clear abuse of 

discretion, the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal." 

Kloepfer v. Honda Motor Co., 898 F.2d 1452, 1460 (10th Cir. 

1990)(citing United States v. Espinosa, 771 F.2d 1382, 1405 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1023 (1985)). 

After voir dire, Bowker's counsel asked that all State Farm 

policyholders be dismissed for cause because "[o]bviously, their 

experience has been good or they wouldn't be insured by State 

Farm." Tr. at 66. The court agreed it had not asked about 

potential biases or whether those jurors who were-- State Farm 

policyholders believed their rates might go up if they returned a 

2 State Farm erroneously argues that this court does not have 

jurisdiction over this appeal because Bowker cannot take an appeal 

from an order denying a motion for a new trial. Bowker can take 

such an appeal. See generally McHargue v. Stokes Div. of Pennwalt 

Corp., 912 F.2d 394, 396 (10th Cir. 1990); Patty Precision Prods. 

Co. v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 846 F.2d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 

1988); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). Further, we will treat Bowker's 

notice of appeal as intending to bring issues arising from both 

the jury's verdict and the court's denial of his motion for a new 

trial up for review, see Grubb v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 1151, 1154 n.4 

(10th Cir. 1989). 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-2122 Document: 010110090780 Date Filed: 10/08/1991 Page: 3 
verdict against State Farm. The court noted, however, that no 

such request had been made and nothing stated during voir dire 

indicated any bias. 

The court's "refusal to ask the [requested] question [on voir 

dire] does not amount to an abuse of discretion when the trial 

judge adequately covers the issue in other questions and in his 

charge to the jury." United States v. Espinosa, 771 F.2d at 1405 

(footnote omitted). Here counsel for State Farm had asked: "Do 

all of you feel like you can give the same consideration to the 

testimony of both sides equal--rate both sides equal in this 

case?" Tr. at 64. The court also instructed the jury: "Further, 

sympathy or prejudice for or against any party should not affect 

your verdict and is not a proper basis for determining damages." 

R. 313 at 18. We find no abuse of the court's discretion either 

in its failure to ask a question not requested by counsel or in 

its refusal to excuse all State Farm policyholders from the jury. 

A blanket prejudice against Bowker solely for the reason that a 

jury member is a State Farm policyholder cannot be assumed. 

Bowker argues the district court erred in not granting his 

motion for a new trial based on two statements made by counsel in 

State Farm's opening statement. 

In ruling on a motion for a new trial, the trial judge 

has broad discretion. He has the obligation or duty to 

ensure that justice is done, and, when justice so 

requires, he has the authority to set aside the jury's 

verdict. He may do so when he believes the verdict to 

be against the weight of the evidence or when 

prejudicial error has entered the record. 

McHarque, 912 F.2d at 396 (citations omitted). 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-2122 Document: 010110090780 Date Filed: 10/08/1991 Page: 4 
• 

I 

~ 

In State Farm's opening statement, counsel stated: 

State Farm is a mutual company, which means that 

everyone who owns a State Farm policy owns a part of 

State Farm Insurance Company, and that's different from 

a stock company like something like the New York Stock 

Exchange or something like that. They don't have 

stockholders. It's a mutual company and the policy 

holders, in effect, own the company and then the 

insurance, as you know, is sold through neighborhood 

agents. 

Tr. at 136. 

Bowker argues that this erroneous statement3 could have 

influenced the jury by raising concerns in those jury members who 

were State Farm policyholders that their rates would increase if 

they were to return a verdict for Bowker. "State courts have 

uniformly set aside a verdict when counsel's comments suggest that 

insurance premiums will rise if a verdict is rendered against the 

insurance carrier." See Allstate Ins. Co. v. James, 845 F.2d 315, 

319 n.5 (11th Cir. 1988). 

Bowker argues that because of counsel's remarks in opening 

statement, he should have been permitted to present expert 

testimony in order to explain both underwriting procedures, and 

that any judgment for Bowker would not affect policyholder 

premiums, thus counteracting the effect of State Farm's opening 

statement. The district court refused to permit such expert 

3 The defendant State Farm company is not a mutual company. It 

is owned by the stockholders and, therefore, policyholders have no 

ownership interest in the company and their rates are unaffected 

by judgments awarded in suits such as this. 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-2122 Document: 010110090780 Date Filed: 10/08/1991 Page: 5 
testimony in light of the curative instruction requested by 

Bowker's counsel: 

A mutual insurance company is one owned by the 

policy holders. 

This case is against State Farm Fire and Casualty 

Company, which is not a mutual company. It is owned by 

stockholders and no policyholders own any interest in 

the company. 

Any judgment you may award Mr. Bowker will not be a 

loss under any policy and therefore will not increase 

any insurance premiums or rates of any State Farm 

company. 

R. 313 at 26. 

This special instruction was sufficient to afford Bowker 

adequate protection against any prejudice. See United States v. 

Joe, 831 F.2d 218, 221 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 

1072 (1988). We review the district court's determination 

regarding the admission of expert testimony under an abuse of 

discretion standard. Quinton v. Farmlands Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 

335, 336 (10th Cir. 1991). No abuse of discretion occurred here. 

Finally, Bowker argues that State Farm's introduction of its 

corporate representative as: "[H]e's the one that, when there's a 

hailstorm in southeastern New Mexico, makes sure there's enough 

people that come to southeastern New Mexico to take care of 

problems like that," tr. at 133, could be construed as appealing 

to the interests of the one juror who had suffered hail damage in 

a recent storm. We disagree. This statement does not imply that 

the representative was in charge of the amount of claims paid and 

would reduce the amount paid on the juror's claims were Bowker to 

prevail at trial. 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-2122 Document: 010110090780 Date Filed: 10/08/1991 Page: 6 
• 

\ 

t 

The district court did not abuse its discretion either as to 

the scope of voir dire or by its denial of Bowker's motion for a 

new trial. The judgment of the United States District Court for 

the District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

James E. Barrett 

Senior Circuit Judge 

7 

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