Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_04-cr-01291/USCOURTS-azd-3_04-cr-01291-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Delyne Benally
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Delyne Benally, 

Defendant. 

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CR-04-1291-PCT-DGC

ORDER

Defendant has filed a motion for new trial based on alleged juror misconduct.

Doc. #57. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the motion.

Background

A jury trial was held in this matter on October 11-14, 2005, in Prescott, Arizona. The

jury found Defendant not guilty on Count 1, assault with a dangerous weapon, and guilty

on Count 2, assault resulting in serious bodily injury. The charges concerned Defendant’s

alleged assault on his infant son. 

During v oir dire on October 11, 2005, Juror 25 stated that she worked part-time

conducting background checks for a California company. The juror did not state that she

had any knowledge of Defendant or had conducted a background check concerning him.

Nor did the juror respond when asked if she knew Defendant on any basis. Juror 25

ultimately was placed on the jury and participated in rendering the verdict.

The jury returned its verdict on Friday, October 14, 2005. Doc. #64. On the

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afternoon of Monday, October 17, 2005, the Court’s Judicial Assistant received a

telephone call from a person identifying himself as Juror 25’s husband. The husband

explained that, after reflection, his wife thought she might have encountered Defendant’s

name during a background check performed as part of her part-time work before trial. T he

Court’s Judicial Assistant informed the caller that the juror should contact counsel for the

parties and provided the caller with the names and p hone numbers for the prosecutor and

defense attorney. The Court directed its staff to call counsel and inform them of this

contact and entered a text-only order reflecting the call to the Court’s chambers. Doc. #51.

On the basis of this information, Defendant filed the present motion for new trial.

Doc. #57. The Government has filed a response. Doc. #66. The Court held a st at us

conference with Government counsel, defense counsel, and Defendant on December 16,

2005, at which the Court concluded t hat a hearing should be held to question Juror 25

about these matters. Doc. #70. The Court and counsel initially intended to conduct the

hearing in Prescott on January 4, 2006 because the Court and one of the counsel were

scheduled to be in trial in Prescott that day. When the trial settled, counsel for the

Government and counsel for Defendant agreed that the hearing could be conducted in

Phoenix, with Juror 25 (who lives in Northern Arizona) participating by telephone.

Doc. #71.

The hearing was held on January 4, 2006 as scheduled. Doc. #72. Juror 25 appeared

by telephone, was placed under oath, and responded to questions from the Court. Id.

Counsel were given the opportunity at side-bar to suggest additional questions, and the

Court asked those questions. Id.

Juror 25 test ified as follows: She performs part-time background checks for a

California company. The company performs background checks for employers on

prospective employees. Following the trial, as she was driving home, Juror 25 recalled that

she might have conducted a background check on Defendant. She was not certain, but his

name sounded familiar. Juror 25 believes the background check might have revealed a prior

conviction for child abuse. Juror 25 was not certain she had performed a background

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1

 During questioning of Juror 25 the Court was mindful of Federal Rule of Evidence

606(b). As a result, the Court did not ask questions about the jury’s deliberat ions or about

Juror 25’s thoughts during deliberations.

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check on Defendant and could recall no information concerning the possible child abuse

conviction. Juror 25 did not remember the possible background check during voir dire,

trial, or the jury’s deliberation. When asked what triggered her memory while driving home,

she could not identify any particular factor. Juror 25 did not discuss this information with

any other juror at any time.1 

Discussion

The parties’ briefs and the Court’s legal research have identified three possible

grounds for a new trial: (1) the two-part test for dishonest voir dire responses set forth in

McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984); (2)

Defendant’s showing of actual bias; and (3) Defendant’s showing of inferred bias. The

Court will discuss each of these grounds in turn.

A. The McDonough Test.

In McDonough, the Sup reme Court held that to obtain a new trial a party must

demonstrate that (1) the juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire,

and (2) a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.

464 U.S. at 556. The Supreme Court explained that “[t]he motives for concealing

information may vary , but only those reasons that affect a juror’s impartiality can truly be

said to affect the fairness of a trial.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has made clear that simple

forgetfulness does not constitute “dishonesty” under the first prong of the McDonough

test. See United States v. Edmond, 43 F.3d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Evidence presented by Defendant and generated during the hearing demonstrates

that Juror 25 did not respond dishonestly during voir dire. The uncontradict ed evidence

shows that Juror 25 did not recall her possible background check of Defendant until after

the trial had been concluded. Because mere forgetfulness cannot satisfy the first prong

of McDonough, the Court concludes that a new trial is not warranted under t he

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McDonough test.

B. Actual Bias.

In a concurrence to McDonough, Justices Blackman, Stevens, and O’Connor

exp lained that “regardless of whether a juror’s answer is honest or dishonest, it remains

wit hin a trial court’s option, in determining whether a jury was biased, to order a post-trial

hearing at which the movant has the opportunit y t o demonstrate actual bias[.]” 464 U.S.

at 556. Assuming that this concurring opinion reflects current law, the Court cannot

conclude that Defendant has shown actual bias. The unrefuted evidence demonstrates

that Juror 25 did not recall her possible background check of Defendant before or during

trial. The evidence also establishes t hat Juror 25 did not discuss this possible background

check with other jurors. In addition to the fact that t his evidence is uncontroverted, the

Court finds it to be credible. Juror 25 and her husband promptly contacted the Court and

counsel after she recalled this information, she willingly made herself available for the

January 4, 2006 hearing, and the Court found her answers during the hearing to be

forthright and candid. Given this evidence, the Court cannot conclude that Defendant has

demonstrated actual bias on the part of Juror 25.

C. Inferred Bias.

The concurring opinion in McDonough also states that the trial court may afford the

movant an opportunity to demonstrate, “in exceptional circumstances, that the facts are

such that bias is to be inferred.” Id. at 556-57. The Ninth Circuit has identified four

circumstances where bias might be inferred. See Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 528-29

(9th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit has emphasized, however, that “[o]nly in ‘extreme’ or

‘extraordinary’ cases should bias be presumed.” Id. at 527 (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455

U.S. 209, 222, 223 n.* (1982)). 

Defendant argues that the first of the four Tinsley circumstances applies here:

“Courts have found implied bias where the juror is ap p rised of such prejudicial information

about the defendant that the court deems it highly unlikely that he can exercise

independent judgment even if the juror states he will.” Id. at 528. The Court concludes

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that such inferred bias has not been shown in this case.

Information about a prior child abuse conviction possessed by a juror in a child

abuse case would certainly be regarded as “prejudicial information” within the meaning of

Tinsley, but the Court cannot conclude that Juror 25 was “apprised of such prejudicial

information” during t rial, nor that it was “highly unlikely” that Juror 25 could exercise

independent judgment. Id. As noted above, the undisputed evidence shows that Juror

25 did not recall the possible background check or its results until aft er t he jury had

rendered its verdict and trial had been concluded. Even then, Juror 25 was not cert ain she

had conducted such a check on Defendant. As also noted above, the Court finds this

evidence to be credible.

Because Defendant has not shown that Juror 25 was apprised of p rejudicial

information during the course of trial or that it is highly unlikely Juror 25 could have

exercised independent judgment, the first Tinsley circumstance for inferred bias has not

been established. Defendant does not claim that any other Tinsley circumstances apply.

Conclusion

Defendant has not established that the McDonough test is satisfied, that Juror 25

possessed actual bias, or that t his is one of the “extreme” or “extraordinary” cases where

the Court should infer bias. Id. at 527. Defendant’s motion will therefore be denied.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for new trial (Doc. #57) is

denied.

DATED this 6th day of January, 2006.

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