Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02576/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02576-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Erma J. Alaniz
Plaintiff
Robert M. Peppercorn
Defendant
Robert M. Peppercorn, M.D., Inc.
Defendant

Document Text:

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERMA J. ALANIZ,

2:05-CV-2576-MCE-DAD

Plaintiff,

v. AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROBERT M. PEPPERCORN, M.D.,

INC.; ROBERT M. PEPPERCORN,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiff Erma J. Alaniz

(“Plaintiff”) is seeking redress from Robert M. Peppercorn, M.D.,

Inc. (“Employer”) and Robert M. Peppercorn, individually (“Dr.

Peppercorn”) (collectively “Defendants”) for alleged

discrimination based on sex, sexual harassment and retaliation in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e, et seq. and California’s Fair Employment and Housing

Act (“FEHA”), Government Code section 12940 et seq. Plaintiff

also alleges a cause of action for failure to prevent

discrimination and harassment in violation of FEHA, Government

Code Section 12940(k).

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Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h).

2

Lastly, Plaintiff alleges a common law cause of action for

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Defendants seek 1

summary judgment on all Plaintiff’s claims. For the reasons set

forth below, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted

in part and denied in part. 

BACKGROUND

Robert M. Peppercorn, M.D., Inc. is a medical practice that

provides dermatological services, skin surgery, cosmetic medical

services and skin spa services to members of the public. Dr.

Robert M. Peppercorn, M.D. is the founder and sole shareholder of

Robert M. Peppercorn, M.D., Inc. At all times relevant,

Defendant was a 53 year old married man. Plaintiff in this

action, Erma Alaniz, was employed as the office manager of Robert

M. Peppercorn, M.D., Inc., from 1993 through her termination in

2005.

The salient facts of this case surround Dr. Peppercorn’s

relationship with his 26 year old medical office assistant,

Tiffany Rasberry (“Rasberry”). Rasberry first submitted an

application to work for Dr. Peppercorn in late 2004. She was

interviewed by both Plaintiff and Dr. Peppercorn and promptly

received an offer of employment which she accepted. Rasberry

began working for Dr. Peppercorn in December, 2004.

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3

Shortly after Rasberry’s hire, she and Dr. Peppercorn began

exhibiting flirtatious conduct in the office. In particular, Dr.

Peppercorn and Rasberry repeatedly touched one another on the

hand and arm. The two were seen standing shoulder to shoulder in

the office and had occasional private lunches. Similarly, Dr.

Peppercorn and Rasberry were overheard giggling in an examination

room with the door closed. 

Almost immediately, rumors regarding the relationship

between Dr. Peppercorn and Rasberry began to surface. A number

of the employees in the office began to discuss among themselves

their perceptions of the nature of the relationship. Plaintiff,

who had worked at Dr. Peppercorn’s office for more than a decade,

complained to Dr. Peppercorn that several employees believed his

relationship with Rasberry was inappropriate given his marriage

to Judy Peppercorn (“Mrs. Peppercorn”) and their 13 year old

daughter. Dr. Peppercorn responded to the complaints and the

workplace discussions by calling meetings and demanding that the

employees, including Plaintiff, cease their discussions of his

relationship with Rasberry.

The cycle of complaints followed by demands that the

workplace discussions cease existed unabated for a period of

months. Simultaneously with the foregoing, Mrs. Peppercorn was

seeking information from Plaintiff regarding the relationship

between Dr. Peppercorn and Rasberry. Specifically, Mrs.

Peppercorn sought and obtained from Plaintiff a security code

which allowed access to the office after hours.

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4

Plaintiff provided Mrs. Peppercorn with Rasberry’s personnel file

and current address which Mrs. Peppercorn used to personally

confront Dr. Peppercorn and Rasberry at Rasberry’s apartment. In

addition, Plaintiff provided Mrs. Peppercorn a key to the

financial files of the business as well as other sensitive

information. That information was disclosed by Plaintiff without

the permission of Defendants.

Near the end of her employment, Plaintiff disclosed to other

employees that she had written a letter of resignation and had

job interviews. Upon learning from Lori Barnette (“Barnette”)

that Plaintiff had circulated her plans to resign to other

employees, Dr. Peppercorn warned Plaintiff her disclosure was

unprofessional. Plaintiff, in turn, confronted Barnette about

disclosing Plaintiff’s planned resignation to Dr. Peppercorn. 

Barnette then alerted Dr. Peppercorn to the confrontation. 

Ultimately, Dr. Peppercorn, Barnette and Plaintiff met to discuss

the issues. Dr. Peppercorn first indicated his dissatisfaction

with Plaintiff’s unprofessionalism. He then pressed Plaintiff

regarding which employees had complained to her regarding his

relationship with Rasberry. Plaintiff refused to identify those

employees that had confided in her. Dr. Peppercorn became

increasingly angry over her refusal to answer his questions and,

ultimately, terminated Plaintiff’s employment.

It is undisputed that Dr. Peppercorn bestowed gifts on

Rasberry including flowers, cash, a computer, furniture, a credit

card, meals and entertainment. In addition, Dr. Peppercorn paid

Rasberry her full salary and medical benefits for a period of

seven months subsequent to her resignation.

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5

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

seeking to recover upon a claim ... may ... move ... for a

summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part

thereof.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp.

374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter

Twp. of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting Rule 56(c)).

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6

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that

the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of W. Pulp and Paper

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Stated another way,

“before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary

question for the judge, not whether there is literally no

evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could

properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it,

upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448, 20

L.Ed. 867 (1872)). As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the

moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its

opponent must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.

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Both Federal courts as well as California courts have 2

adopted similar standards for discrimination claims, hostile work

environment sexual harassment claims and retaliation claims under

FEHA. (See, e.g., Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal.

App. 3d 590, 608 (1989); Lyle v. Warner Bros. TV Prods., 38 Cal.

4th 264, 279 (2006). 

7

Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier

of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine

issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the

opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences

that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

While Plaintiff’s Complaint is not entirely clear, the Court

finds that Plaintiff presents three theories upon which she

contends relief is warranted: (1) disparate treatment

discrimination in the form of favoritism; (2) harassment in the

form of a hostile work environment; and (3) retaliation.2

Plaintiff has made the foregoing allegations based on both Title

VII as well as California’s FEHA.

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8

Discrimination on the basis of sex is prohibited under both

Title VII and California’s FEHA. Specifically, Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act makes it illegal for an employer “to

discriminate against any individual with respect to his

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

because of such individual’s ... sex.” 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-2(a)(1). A plaintiff may show a violation of this statute

by proving disparate treatment, disparate impact or the existence

of a hostile work environment. Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Comm.

Coll. Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Under the McDonnell Douglas test for Title VII and FEHA

discrimination claims, the plaintiff can establish a prima facie

case by showing: (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she

was performing according to her employer’s legitimate

expectations, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and

(4) some other circumstance indicates a discriminatory motive,

such as similarly qualified individuals being treated more

favorably. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-

803, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973); see also Godwin v.

Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998). Once

plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the

burden shifts to defendant to articulate a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 802-803. If defendant meets this burden of

production, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to establish that

defendant’s proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination. 

See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

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9

“The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the

defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff

remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Id. Moreover, “the

amount that must be produced in order to create a prima facie

case is very little.” Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1111.

I. Discrimination

Plaintiff argues she suffered discrimination on the basis of

her sex. Her theory is that Dr. Peppercorn’s romantic

relationship with Rasberry resulted in Rasberry receiving

numerous gifts and benefits of employment not accorded Plaintiff. 

The viability of this claim depends on the so-called “paramour”

theory of gender discrimination. More precisely, this claim

advances the theory that a supervisor’s relationship with a coworker coupled with favoritism can constitute discrimination.

There is an uneven split in the circuits regarding the

validity of this theory. One District of Columbia Court tacitly

endorsed this theory in dicta. See King v. Palmer, (D.C. Cir.

1985) (stating that “unlawful sexual discrimination occurs

whenever sex is for no legitimate reason a substantial factor in

the discrimination.”) Aside from this one decision, however,

“every other federal court which has considered the propriety of

the ‘paramour’ theory has rejected it as a Title VII cause of

action.” Alberto v. Bank of Am., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13520,

1995 WL 562170, *4 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing DeCinto v.

Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986));

Becerra v. Dalton, 94 F.3d 145, 149-50 (4th Cir. 1996);

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10

Ackel v. Nat'l Communs., Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 382 (5th Cir. 2003);

Schobert v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 733 (7th

Cir. 2002) (Title VII does not prevent employers from favoring

employees because of personal relationships); Tenge v. Phillips

Modern Ag. Co., 446 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2006) (Termination of an

employee based on the employee’s consensual sexual conduct with a

supervisor is not a violation of Title VII); Taken v. Oklahoma

Corp. Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1370 (10th Cir. 1997); Womack v.

Runyon, 147 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Candelore

v. Clark County Sanitation Dist., 975 F.2d 588, 590 (9th Cir.

1992) (“A co-worker’s romantic involvement with a supervisor does

not by itself create a hostile work environment”). Each of these

courts reason that “[w]hen an employer discriminates in favor of

a paramour, such an action is not sex-based discrimination, as

the favoritism, while unfair, disadvantages both sexes alike for

reasons other than gender.” Ackel, 335 F.3d at 382 (citing Green

v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 656 n.6 (5th

Cir. 2002)).

Here, like in the foregoing cases, Plaintiff was not treated

disparately based on her gender. Rather, any advantages given

Rasberry were solely based on the relationship between she and

Dr. Peppercorn. Plaintiff does not claim she suffered any other

type of gender based discrimination. Given these facts as well

as the overwhelming weight of authority cited above, the Court

finds Plaintiff’s claims of disparate treatment based on

favoritism under Title VII and FEHA fail as a matter of law.

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11

II. Hostile Work Environment

Plaintiff further argues she was subjected to a hostile work

environment because of Dr. Peppercorn’s romantic relationship

with Rasberry. To prevail on this claim of sexual harassment,

Plaintiff must show that (1) she was subjected to verbal or

physical conduct because of her gender; (2) that the conduct was

unwelcome; and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of Plaintiff’s employment and

create an abusive work environment. Fuller v. City of Oakland,

47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995). The analysis here is both

objective and subjective: “[c]onduct that is not severe or

pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work

environment -- an environment that a reasonable person would find

hostile or abusive -- is beyond Title VII’s purview.” Harris v.

Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993). “Likewise, if

the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be

abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of

the victim’s employment, and there is no Title VII violation.” 

Id.

As discussed supra, almost every circuit to decide whether a

workplace affair creates a harassing environment has declined to

so find. Nonetheless, Plaintiff claims that the California

Supreme Court’s recent decision in Miller v. Dep’t of

Corrections, is to the contrary. 36 Cal.4th 446 (2005). In

support of her position, Plaintiff points to the Miller court’s

conclusion that:

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[A]lthough an isolated instance of favoritism on the

part of a supervisor toward a female employee with whom

the supervisor is conducting a consensual sexual affair

ordinarily would not constitute sexual harassment, when

such sexual favoritism in a workplace is sufficiently

widespread it may create an actionable hostile work

environment in which the demeaning message is conveyed

to female employees that they are viewed by management

as sexual playthings’ or that the way required for

women to get ahead in the workplace is by engaging in

sexual conduct with their supervisors or the

management.

Id. at 451.

While the foregoing holding clearly permits a claim under

California law for hostile work environment based on favoritism,

that holding requires more than the mere existence of an

interoffice romance. Specifically, in Miller, there was

“widespread” sexual conduct in the form of three simultaneous and

open affairs with significant favoritism that permeated the

working environment. That favoritism involved unfettered abuse

and harassment against both plaintiffs by one of her supervisor’s

paramours, flagrant boasting by the favored women, eyewitness

accounts of public fondling, admissions by the supervisor that he

could not control his paramours based on the sexual relationship

between them, and repeated promotions based on sexual favors

rather than on qualifications. Id. at 471.

In stark contrast, aside from the evidence showing Dr.

Peppercorn showered Rasberry with gifts, none of the types of

favoritism shown in Miller is evidenced here. More specifically,

Plaintiff does not allege she was denied promotions or suffered

other losses of employment benefits.

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13

There is no allegation in the record that Rasberry abused

Plaintiff or any other employee nor is there any evidence that

Rasberry flaunted her relationship with Dr. Peppercorn. In

addition, while there were incidents of Dr. Peppercorn and

Rasberry behaving flirtatiously, there is no allegation the two

engaged in public fondling of the sort that existed in Miller. 

Dr. Peppercorn did not accede he could not control Rasberry based

on the alleged affair and, in fact, Rasberry resigned her

position in an effort to abate the rising tide of rumors. 

In sum, Miller explicitly distinguished a case like the one

here in which there is an isolated workplace sexual affair

coupled with the presence of mere office gossip. Id. at 470-71. 

The Court finds the record lacking in evidence that would lead a

reasonable trier of fact to conclude the commonplace office

romance between Dr. Peppercorn and Rasberry sent the message that

women were “sexual playthings,” or that engaging in sexual

conduct with supervisors was the only vehicle for advancement. 

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Title VII and FEHA hostile work

environment claims.

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14

III. Retaliation

A. Prima Facie Case

Plaintiff claims her termination was retaliatory in

violation of Title VII as well as FEHA. In order to establish a

claim of retaliation thereunder, the plaintiff must demonstrate

(1) that she engaged in a protected activity; (2) that her

employer was aware of the activity; (3) that she suffered an

adverse employment action; and (4) that there was a causal

connection between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action. Raad v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch.

Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1197 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Yanowitz v.

L'Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1042 (2005).

Plaintiff alleges her termination was retaliatory. In order

to proceed on this claim, she must first allege she engaged in a

protected activity of which her employer was aware. Plaintiff

avers, and the Court agrees, her complaints to Dr. Peppercorn

himself regarding the alleged affair were a protected activity

for purposes of her retaliation claim.

 An employee’s conduct may constitute protected activity

for purposes of a retaliation claim not only when the employee

opposes conduct that ultimately is determined to be unlawful, but

also when the employee opposes conduct that the employee

reasonably and in good faith believes is unlawful, whether or not

that belief is ultimately borne out. Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th 1043

(internal citations omitted).

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While the Court has found Plaintiff cannot proceed on her claims

of discrimination nor hostile work environment, that fact alone

does not defeat her claim that she reasonably believed she was

opposing unlawful conduct. In fact, taking all inferences in

favor of Plaintiff, the Court finds she was engaged in protected

activity for purposes of this retaliation claim.

Neither party contends, nor could they, that Plaintiff did

not suffer an adverse employment action. To be sure, Plaintiff’s

termination constitutes adverse employment action. See e.g.

Thomas v. City of Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The salient inquiry, however, is whether Plaintiff’s termination

is causally related to her protected activity. “The causal link

between a protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action

‘can be inferred from timing alone’ when there is a close

proximity between the two.” Id. (citing Villiarimo v. Aloha

Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Plaintiff alleges she was terminated as a result of her

protected activity of complaining regarding the alleged affair. 

Neither Plaintiff nor Defendants proffer specific evidence

regarding the delay between Plaintiff’s protected activity and

her termination. Nonetheless, the Court must view the facts

before it and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Applying that standard, the Court finds a

reasonable inference of causal effect between Plaintiff’s

termination and her protected activity.

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16

B. Pretext

Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the

employer is required to offer a legitimate, non-retaliatory

reason for the adverse employment action. Brooks v. City of San

Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000); Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th

1028 (citing Morgan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 88 Cal. App. 4th

52, 68 (2000)). If the employer produces a legitimate reason for

the adverse employment action, the presumption of retaliation is

removed, and the burden shifts back to the employee to prove

intentional retaliation. Brooks, 229 F.3d at 928; Yanowitz, 36

Cal. 4th at 1042 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Defendants allege Plaintiff was fired for divulging

sensitive employment data to Dr. Peppercorn’s estranged wife as

well as for insubordination. Indeed, Plaintiff admittedly

obtained a security code for Mrs. Peppercorn that allowed access

to the office after hours. Plaintiff provided Rasberry’s

personnel file and current address to Mrs. Peppercorn which Mrs.

Peppercorn used to personally confront Dr. Peppercorn and

Rasberry at Rasberry’s apartment.

In addition, Plaintiff disclosed to other employees that she

had written a letter of resignation and had job interviews. Upon

learning from Barnette that Plaintiff was circulating her

imminent resignation, Dr. Peppercorn told Plaintiff such a

disclosure was unprofessional. Plaintiff, in turn, confronted

Barnette about disclosing her plans to Dr. Peppercorn. Barnette

then alerted Dr. Peppercorn to the confrontation.

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Ultimately, Dr. Peppercorn, Barnette and Plaintiff met to discuss

the issues. Dr. Peppercorn first indicated his dissatisfaction

with Plaintiff’s unprofessionalism. He then pressed Plaintiff

regarding which employees had complained to her regarding the

alleged affair with Rasberry. Plaintiff refused to identify

those employees that had confided in her. Dr. Peppercorn became

increasingly angry over her steadfast refusal to answer his

questions and, finally, terminated Plaintiff’s employment.

The foregoing legitimate explanations for Plaintiff’s

termination satisfy Defendants’ burden that it’s employment

decision was lawful. Accordingly, the presumption of retaliation

drops from the case and the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to

introduce evidence from which the Court could conclude that

Defendants’ proffered explanation was pretextual. See Texas

Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 n. 10

(1981). 

Plaintiff has provided uncontroverted evidence that she

complained of the alleged affair and its vexing effect on her

working environment. She further provided evidence that her

termination was proximately related to those complaints. 

Analyzed as either a straightforward “pretext” case or a mixed

motives case, the record reveals that it is probable that

Plaintiff’s protected activity motivated, at least in part,

Defendants’ decision to terminate her. Whether or not one

accepts Defendants’ explanations for terminating Plaintiff, one

cannot ignore the evidence, albeit circumstantial, that

Plaintiff’s complaints about the alleged affair played some role

in her termination.

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Given this finding, Plaintiff is entitled to a trial on these

claims for retaliatory discharge in violation of Title VII and

FEHA. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on

this claim is denied.

IV. Failure to Prevent Harassment

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action prays for relief for her

employer’s “failure to take reasonable steps to prevent

discrimination and harassment from occurring in violation of

FEHA” under section 12900, et seq. FEHA makes it unlawful “for

an employer ... to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to

prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring.” Cal.

Gov’t Code § 12940(k).

The California Supreme Court has stated that FEHA “makes it

a separate unlawful employment practice” for an employer to

violate section 12940(k). State Dept. of Health Servs. v. Super.

Ct., 31 Cal. 4th 1026, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 441 (2003). Numerous

other California courts have recognized a separate cause of

action against an employer for failure to investigate or take

reasonable steps to prevent harassment or discrimination under

section 12940(k). See, e.g., Tritchler v. County of Lake, 358

F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding the district court did

not abuse its discretion in requiring a finding of actual

discrimination before a violation of section 12940(k) becomes

actionable) (citing Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist., 63

Cal. App. 4th 280, 283-84, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596 (1998));

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Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 103 Cal.

App. 4th 1021, 1035, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 285 (2002) (“Prompt

investigation of a discrimination claim is a necessary step by

which an employer meets its obligation [under section

12940(k)]”).

While Defendants did not argue their rationale for why this

claim should be summarily adjudicated, the Court finds that

Trujillo “does not provide for a right of action in a tort claim

in absence of a showing that the plaintiff has, in fact, been the

victim of discrimination.” In fact, both Trujillo and Tritchler

require findings of actual discrimination or harassment before a

plaintiff has a successful claim for failure to take reasonable

steps to prevent the same under section 12940(k). Tritchler, 358

F.3d at 1155; Trujillo, 63 Cal. App. 4th at 284. Given that the

Court has dismissed both these claims, no claim under Section

12940(k) for either discrimination or harassment can survive.

Despite the foregoing conclusion, the Court finds

Plaintiff’s section 12940(k) claim based on a failure to prevent

retaliation may proceed. Specifically, the two courts that have

analyzed the question of whether section 12940(k) permits a claim

for failure to prevent or investigate discrimination, when only a

retaliation claim survives, have found in the affirmative. See

Giovannetti v. Trs. of the Cal. State Univ., 2006 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 41750 *28-29 (2006); Taylor v. City of L.A. Dept. of Water

& Power, 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216 (2006).

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In Taylor the Court found it more reasonable to conclude that the

Legislature intended to extend “a comparable degree of protection

both to employees who are subject to the types of basic forms of

discrimination at which the FEHA is directed--that is, for

example, discrimination on the basis of race or sex--and to

employees who are discriminated against in retaliation for

opposing such discrimination, rather than to interpret the

statutory scheme as affording a greater degree of protection

against improper retaliation than is afforded against direct

discrimination.” Taylor, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 1240. This Court

agrees. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s

section 12940(k) claim based on failure to prevent retaliation is

denied. 

V. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Under California law, the elements of intentional infliction

of emotional distress are as follows: (1) extreme and outrageous

conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or

reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional

distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme

emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the

emotional distress by defendant’s outrageous conduct. 

Christensen v. Super. Ct., 54 Cal. 3d 868, 903, 820 P.2d 181,

202, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79, 81 (1991). “Conduct is deemed

outrageous if it is ‘so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that

usually tolerated in a civilized community.’” Saridakis v.

United Airlines, 166 F.3d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir. 1999).

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Plaintiff’s opposition to the present Motion states merely

that she “presents a substantial amount of evidence establishing

each of these elements.” However, a thorough review of the

record by this Court fails to reveal such evidence. In fact, the

Court finds no evidence that the conduct on the part of Dr.

Peppercorn vis-a-vis Plaintiff could be characterized as so

extreme it exceeds all bounds of human decency. See Schneider v.

TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming summary

judgment when incidents in which supervisor made threatening

gestures and screamed at employee while criticizing her showed

rudeness and insensitivity, but did not amount to outrageous

conduct); Yurick v. Super. Ct., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1116, 257 Cal.

Rptr. 665, 671 (Ct. App. 1989) (summary judgment appropriate when

employer’s alleged conduct and discriminatory remarks, while

offensive and in breach of the common standards of civility, were

not so egregious as to give rise to an actionable claim); Trerice

v. Blue Cross of Cal., 209 Cal. App. 3d 878, 257 Cal. Rptr. 338,

340 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding employer’s poor handling of

plaintiff’s termination did not qualify, as a matter of law, as

outrageous conduct).

Here, while there is no question Dr. Peppercorn could have

used better judgment in the course of dealing with his employees,

he cannot be said to have acted beyond all bounds tolerated in

society with respect to his treatment of Plaintiff. Accordingly,

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim

for intentional infliction of emotional distress is granted.

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VI. Punitive Damages

In California, a plaintiff can recover punitive damages only

if he proffers, by clear and convincing evidence, that the

defendant “has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” 

Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a).

Defendants contend Plaintiff may not seek punitive damages

because there is no evidence in the record of oppression or

malice towards Plaintiff. Whether Defendants’ conduct was

oppressive or malicious is not an issue of law, but rather an

issue of fact inappropriate for disposition on a Motion for

Summary Judgment. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment as to punitive damages is denied. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claims for

discrimination, hostile work environment and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s claims for retaliation,

failure to prevent retaliation and punitive damages.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 4, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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