Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05055/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05055-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Emanuel Michael
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

EMANUEL MICHAEL,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-5055

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:14-cv-00757-CFL, Judge Charles F. 

Lettow. 

______________________ 

Decided: March 15, 2016

______________________ 

 EMANUEL MICHAEL, Decatur, GA, pro se.

 TAMARA N. ROUNTREE, Environment and Natural 

Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented 

by JOHN C. CRUDEN. 

______________________ 

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2 MICHAEL v. US

Before PROST, Chief Judge, DYK, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Emanuel Michael appeals a decision of the Court of 

Federal Claims (the “Claims Court”). The Claims Court

dismissed his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that he failed to timely file suit under 28 

U.S.C. § 2501. Because we agree that Mr. Michael’s suit 

is time-barred, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

On August 20, 2014, Mr. Michael brought this pro se 

action against the United States and other defendants in 

the Claims Court, based on a variety of legal theories. 

Mr. Michael’s complaint alleged various acts of interference by federal, state, and local officials with a parcel of 

land in Eatonton, Georgia, allegedly owned by a Native 

American tribe. Mr. Michael asserts that he has been 

authorized to represent the tribe in this suit. The interfering acts named in the complaint were alleged to have 

occurred between 1998 and 2000. The United States 

brought a civil forfeiture action against the property in 

2003 and received a judgment of forfeiture from the 

District Court for the Middle District of Georgia on September 25, 2007. Mr. Michael’s complaint sought “declaratory and injunctive relief freeing the property of local 

zoning and land use laws and prohibiting interference 

with” the property. Michael v. United States, No. 14-

757L, 2014 WL 7149569, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 15, 2014). 

After denying Mr. Michael’s motion for a preliminary 

injunction, the Claims Court granted the United States’ 

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Id. at *4. The Claims Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Michael’s case for numerous reasons, including a lack of standing, lack of jurisdiction over claims 

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MICHAEL v. US 3

against state and local officials, and failure to comply 

with the six-year statute of limitations. Id. at *3–4. Mr. 

Michael appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(3). We review de novo the Claims Court’s

dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Samish 

Indian Nation v. United States, 419 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005). 

DISCUSSION

The Claims Court lacks jurisdiction over claims 

against state and local governments and their officials. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see also United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941); Berdick v. United States, 

612 F.2d 533, 536 (Ct. Cl. 1979). As to claims against the 

United States, 28 U.S.C. § 2501 establishes a six-year 

statute of limitations for all suits brought at the Claims 

Court. “Every claim of which the United States Court of 

Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the 

petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim 

first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2501. The Supreme Court has

repeatedly held that the particular six-year statute of 

limitations of § 2501 is “jurisdictional and thus not subject to equitable tolling.” United States v. Kwai Fun 

Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1634 (2015); see also John R. Sand 

& Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 134, 135 

(2008). “A cause of action against the government has 

first accrued when all the events which fix the government’s alleged liability have occurred and the plaintiff 

was or should have been aware of their existence.” San 

Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1350

(Fed. Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). “The question whether the pertinent events 

have occurred is determined under an objective standard; 

a plaintiff does not have to possess actual knowledge of all 

the relevant facts in order for the cause of action to accrue.” Fallini v. United States, 56 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. 

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4 MICHAEL v. US

Cir. 1995); see also San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 

1350. 

Mr. Michael’s complaint does not allege any injury 

arising from any event that occurred after September 25, 

2007, the date on which the district court issued a judgment of forfeiture of the property in Eatonton, Georgia. 

While the accrual of a claim at the Claims Court can be 

suspended in rare circumstances where the government 

concealed its acts or the plaintiff’s injury was “inherently 

unknowable,” Ladd v. United States, 713 F.3d 648, 653 

(Fed. Cir. 2013), Mr. Michael has not sufficiently alleged

that such circumstances exist in this case. Thus, any 

cause of action Mr. Michael might have had accrued, at 

the latest, by September 25, 2007. Mr. Michael filed his 

complaint at the Claims Court on August 20, 2014, 

months after the six-year limitations period had run. 

The Claims Court was therefore correct that Mr. Michael’s claims against the United States are time-barred. 

We affirm the court’s dismissal. We need not reach other 

jurisdictional issues, including, inter alia, whether Mr. 

Michael has standing.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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