Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01278/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01278-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rosanne Campbell
Respondent
William Ray Morgan
Petitioner

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM RAY MORGAN,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-1278 GEB GGH P

vs.

ROSANNE CAMPBELL, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a 2003 prison disciplinary conviction

for possession of inmate manufactured alcohol in violation of Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3016(a). 

Petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction.

In the answer, respondent argues that the petition is barred by the statute of

limitations. Respondent also argues that the petition should be denied on the merits. For the

following reasons, the court rejects respondent’s argument that the petition is time barred, but

recommends that it be denied on the merits.

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II. Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petitions is set forth in 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1):

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

The statute of limitations for a state prisoner to file a habeas corpus petition

challenging a prison disciplinary conviction runs from the day after he receives notice of the

denial of his administrative appeal. Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir.

2004)(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D)). 

Section 2244(d)(2) provides that the time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation.

The exhibits respondent has provided in support of her claim that the instant

petition is barred by the statute of limitations concern petitioner’s conviction for a different rules

violation, i.e. the introduction of narcotics for distribution and sales. See Answer, Exhibit C. 

Respondent’s argument regarding when petitioner’s administrative appeal was denied and when

he filed his state habeas petitions challenging his conviction for possession of alcohol are based

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on a different conviction. Accordingly, the court finds that respondent has not met her burden of

demonstrating that petitioner’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. See Day v.

McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 1675, 1681-82 (2006) (statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and is

akin to an affirmative defense). Accordingly, the court will consider the merits of petitioner’s

claim that his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. 

III. Insufficient Evidence

A. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies to this

petition for habeas corpus which was filed after the AEDPA became effective. Neelley v. Nagle,

138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir.), citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). The

AEDPA “worked substantial changes to the law of habeas corpus,” establishing more deferential

standards of review to be used by a federal habeas court in assessing a state court’s adjudication

of a criminal defendant’s claims of constitutional error. Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263

(9th Cir. 1997). 

In Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), the Supreme

Court defined the operative review standard set forth in § 2254(d). Justice O’Connor’s opinion

for Section II of the opinion constitutes the majority opinion of the court. There is a dichotomy

between “contrary to” clearly established law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, and an

“unreasonable application of” that law. Id. at 1519. “Contrary to” clearly established law applies

to two situations: (1) where the state court legal conclusion is opposite that of the Supreme

Court on a point of law, or (2) if the state court case is materially indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case, i.e., on point factually, yet the legal result is opposite.

“Unreasonable application” of established law, on the other hand, applies to

mixed questions of law and fact, that is, the application of law to fact where there are no factually

on point Supreme Court cases which mandate the result for the precise factual scenario at issue. 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 407-08, 120 S. Ct. at 1520-1521 (2000). It is this prong of the

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AEDPA standard of review which directs deference to be paid to state court decisions. While the

deference is not blindly automatic, “the most important point is that an unreasonable application

of federal law is different from an incorrect application of law....[A] federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,

that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S. Ct. at

1522 (emphasis in original). The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the

objectively unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court

authority. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002).

The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated

awareness of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.

Ct. 362 (2002). Nevertheless, the state decision cannot be rejected unless the decision itself is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court authority. Id. An

unreasonable error is one in excess of even a reviewing court’s perception that “clear error” has

occurred. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). Moreover, the

established Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional

principles, or other controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules

binding only on federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. at 9, 123 S. Ct. at 366.

However, where the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in

dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal court will independently review the record in

adjudication of that issue. “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the

constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state

court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003).

The Amador County Superior Court issued a reasoned decision denying

petitioner’s habeas petition challenging his conviction for possession of alcohol. See Exhibits

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attached to petition. The California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court issued

unexplained opinions denying petitioner’s habeas petitions. Id. When reviewing a state court’s

summary denial of a claim, the court “looks through” the summary disposition to the last

reasoned decision. Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000). 

B. Analysis

Due process requires that there be “some evidence” supporting a prison

disciplinary that deprives a prisoner of good time credits. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,

455, 105 S. Ct. 2768 (1985). This standard “does not require examination of the entire record,

independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence,” but instead

asks “where there is any evidence in the record that could support” the challenged finding. Id.

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3016(a) provides that inmates may not inhale, ingest,

inject, or otherwise introduce into their body; possess, manufacture, or have under their control

any controlled substance, controlled medication, or alcohol, except as specifically authorized by

the institution’s health care staff. 

The rules violation report contains the following statement by Correctional

Officer Kantack, the reporting employee, regarding the circumstances of the offense:

On January 18, 2003, at approximately 1805 hours, while on duty as Building # 5,

Floor # 2 Officer, conducting the evening meal release in Building # 4, I

conducted a search of cell A4-241, assigned to inmate Morgan, E-06775, A4-241-

L, and inmate Luna, D-53635, A4-241-U. I noticed, prior to entering the cell, a

strong odor of fermenting fruit. During my search, I discovered, secreted in the

upper bunk mattress, in a plastic bag, approximately three (3) gallons of what

appeared to be inmate manufactured alcohol (Pruno). The substance was orange

in color, warm to the touch, and had a strong odor of fermenting fruit. 

Correctional Sergeant J.P. White was notified and reported to Building # 4 and

verified the substance to be inmate manufactured alcohol, in its late stages of

fermentation. The alcohol was disposed of per institutional procedure by flushing

it down the toilet. 

Answer, Exhibit B. 

The rules violation report discusses the evidence presented at the hearing and the

hearing officer’s findings:

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SUBJECT’S STATEMENT:

Subject was read and acknowledged the charge filed against him.

Subject plead NOT GUILTY to the written charge.

Subject states, “I was out in the yard all day. I came in at 3:30 and laid down. I

went to chow and when I came back there was a cell search receipt saying they

found Pruno in my cellies’ mattress. I asked my cellie about it. Somebody paid

him to hold on to the wine until that night. I never seen it. He told the officer that

night it was his wine.”

WITNESSES/EVIDENCE:

Subject did request witnesses present at the hearing as is indicated on the CDC115A. Witness # 1 Inmate Luna, D-53635). Granted: The following questions

were asked of Inmate Luna by inmate Morgan through the SHO:

(Q#1) Did I have anything to do with the wine?

(A#1) No.

(Q#2) Did I know the wine was there?

(A#2) Nope.

The following questions were asked of Correctional Officer M. Kantack by the

SHO.

(Q#1) In what was the inmate manufactured alcohol contained?

(A#1) A state plastic bag.

(Q#2) Is is true that inmate Luna admitted to you that the inmate manufactured

alcohol was his?

(A#2) No, all I remember his saying was, “Fuck off.” He was mad because I took

his wine.

FINDINGS:

The Senior Hearing Officer finds subject GUILTY of the charge: CCR§ 3016(a)

POSSESSION OF INMATE MANUFACTURED ALCOHOL. The evidence that

supports the findings includes: The written RVR by Correctional Officer M.

Kantack specifically describes that on January 18, 2003, at approximately 1805

hours, while on duty as Building # 5, Floor # 2 Officer conducting the evening

meal release in Building # 4, I conducted a search of cell A4-241, assigned to

inmate Morgan, E-06775, A4-241-L, and inmate Luna, D-53635, A4-241-U. I

noticed, prior to entering the cell, a strong odor of fermenting fruit. During my

search, I discovered, secreted in the upper bunk mattress, in a plastic bag,

approximately three (3) gallons of what appeared to be inmate manufactured

alcohol (Pruno). The substance was orange in color, warm to the touch, and had a

strong odor of fermenting fruit. Correctional Sergeant J.P. White was notified and

reported to Building # 4 and verified the substance to be inmate manufactured

alcohol, in its late stages of fermentation. The alcohol was disposed of per

institutional procedure by flushing it down the toilet.

The fermentation or distillation of materials in a manner consistent with the

production of alcohol or the physical possession of alcohol in an

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institution/facility or contract health facility. Alcohol means anything containing

ethanol. Possession means it was found on the inmate’s person, within the

inmate’s area of responsibility or evidence shows that defendant retained

constructive possession. All inmates are assigned areas within their living space

for storage of personal property. Any contraband found within this area is

considered the responsibility of that inmate. If this area is shared with another

inmate, the inmates are jointly responsible with reasonable evidence both inmates

were aware of its presence. Constructive possession means one person retains

control or ownership while it is in the actual possession of another. Fermentation

or distillation means there is reasonable evidence that the substance had the

characteristics of this process such as characteristic smell or appearance. Per CCR

3290(h), identification of alcohol by laboratory testing is not required. 

Identification of alcohol based upon factors such as appearance or characteristic

odor can be accepted as sufficient. This finding is based upon the following

preponderance of the evidence: 1) Inmate Morgan had just left his cell where a

Correctional Officer could smell the presence of inmate manufactured alcohol

from outside the cell; 2) Inmate Morgan’s witness’s statement was placed in

question when the reporting employee contradicted the witness’s statement that he

informed the officer that the alcohol was his. The evidence, as indicated in the

RVR, and witness statement, revealed a preponderance of evidence which

demonstrated that S is guilty of POSSESSION OF INMATE MANUFACTURED

ALCOHOL.

Answer, Exhibit B. 

Petitioner argues that he did not possess the alcohol because it was found under

his cellmate’s mattress and his cellmate denied that petitioner was aware of it. 

In People v. Rushing, 209 Cal. App. 3d 618, 257 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1989), the

California Court of Appeal described the general principles of “possession” crimes:

The essential elements of the unlawful possession of a controlled substance are

actual or constructive possession in an amount sufficient to be used as a controlled

substance with knowledge of its presence and its nature as a controlled substance. 

The elements may be proven by circumstantial evidence. [Citation omitted.]

Actual of constructive possession is the right to exercise dominion or control over

the contraband or the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where

it is found. [Citation.] Exclusive possession is not necessary. A defendant does

not avoid conviction if his right to exercise dominion and control over the place

where the contraband was located is shared with others. [Citation omitted.] 

209 Cal. App. 3d at 621-622, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 288-89.

The fact that the alcohol emitted a strong odor was some evidence that petitioner

was aware of its presence. Because the area under the cellmate’s mattress was easily accessible

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to petitioner demonstrates that petitioner shared dominion and control of the area where the

alcohol was found. The alcohol was not found, for example, in a hiding place of which only

petitioner’s cellmate could have been aware. In addition, the hearing officer could have

reasonably disbelieved Luna’s testimony that petitioner was not aware of the alcohol, or found

that Luna’s willingness to take responsibility for it did not mean that petitioner was unaware of it. 

For these reasons, the court finds that there was some evidence to support the guilty finding. 

The denial of petitioner’s claim by the Amador County Superior Court was not an

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court authority. Accordingly, the

petition should be denied.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 3/12/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

morg1278.157

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