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Parties Involved:
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Amicus Curiae
Vital Signs, Inc.
Appellee
Beverly A. Whitbeck
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 2, 1997 Decided June 20, 1997 

No. 96-7193

BEVERLY A. WHITBECK,

APPELLANT

v.

VITAL SIGNS, INC.,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 95cv01011)

Michael G. Kane argued the cause for appellant. With him 

on the briefs were Vicki G. Golden and David R. Cashdan.

Lisa S. Grosskreutz argued the cause for appellee. With 

her on the briefs were Pamela J. Moore and Joseph P. 

Harkins.

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Robert J. Gregory, Attorney, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, argued the cause for amicus curiae Equal 

Opportunity Employment Commission. With him on the 

brief were C. Gregory Stewart, General Counsel, J. Ray 

Terry, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, and Vincent J. Blackwood, Assistant General Counsel.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD and TATEL, Circuit 

Judges.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: In this suit under the District of 

Columbia Human Rights Act, appellant alleges that her employer denied her reasonable accommodation and discharged 

her because of her disability. Finding her claim barred by 

her receipt of disability benefits and her requested reasonable 

accommodation not required by the Act, the magistrate judge 

entered summary judgment for her employer. We reverse. 

The receipt of disability benefits does not bar a Human 

Rights Act suit, and appellant raises genuine issues of material fact with respect to her reasonable accommodation claim.

I

In 1992, appellee Vital Signs, Inc., a medical equipment 

manufacturing company, took over Biomedical Dynamics for 

whom appellant Beverly Whitbeck was working as a sales 

representative. During her final year at Biomedical, Whitbeck sold approximately $900,000 of medical equipment, accounting for over ten percent of the company's eight million 

dollar annual sales. Vital Signs offered Whitbeck a job, 

guaranteeing her $84,000 for her first year. Whitbeck began 

working for Vital Signs on September 7, 1992.

In February of 1993, Whitbeck began feeling weakness in 

her legs. Within a few days she could barely walk. Diagnosed with a tumor on her spinal cord, she had surgery on 

March 8. Following several weeks of hospitalization and 

rehabilitation and able to move around only with the help of a 

walker or wheelchair, Whitbeck returned home on May 7.

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Almost immediately, Whitbeck began working from her 

home office, increasing her work load as she grew stronger. 

In July, with the aid of a driver she hired and paid (Vital 

Signs subsequently reimbursed her), Whitbeck again began 

calling on customers. With her car outfitted with hand 

controls and a wheelchair rack, Whitbeck was making sales 

calls on her own by September of 1993. Dispensing with her 

wheelchair in early 1994, Whitbeck was able to visit her 

customers with the aid of a cane and a sample bag on wheels.

Maintaining regular customer contacts by phone, fax, and 

mail, Whitbeck made field calls only two or three days a 

weekfewer than her pre-disability four-and-a-half-day-aweek average. Despite the decrease in sales calls, Whitbeck 

ranked in the forties out of more than one hundred salespeople, performing better than other sales representatives from 

her region.

Sometime in early 1994 and no longer receiving her guaranteed first-year salary, Whitbeck applied for and began 

receiving "residual disability" benefits from her private insurer, Royal Maccabees. Maccabees provides residual disability 

benefits to insured persons who, though working, have had 

their income reduced by more than 20% as a result of 

accident or sickness.

On April 15, 1994, Whitbeck visited her neurologist, Dr. 

Jorge Kattah, telling him that she was having difficulty doing 

her job because she had trouble walking long distances. 

Explaining that her condition was unlikely to improve, Kattah 

suggested she use a motorized cart to move around at work. 

As a result, in an event central to this case, Whitbeck raised 

the issue of a motorized cart during a conversation with her 

supervisor, Sherry Henricks, on April 28, 1994. Whitbeck's 

and Henricks's versions of this conversation differ significantly. According to Whitbeck, over lunch she told Henricks that 

she would like to use a motorized cart to get around at work, 

to which Henricks responded "it would not work; it was not a 

good idea.... It wouldn't look right." Whitbeck Dep. at 121 

(Feb. 8, 1996). Henricks then asked Whitbeck if Vital Signs 

could begin advertising for Whitbeck's replacement. HenUSCA Case #96-7193 Document #280358 Filed: 06/20/1997 Page 3 of 9
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ricks recalls the conversation differently. According to her, 

at some point during that day, she and Whitbeck did discuss 

whether Whitbeck "wanted to continue working for Vital 

Signs," with Whitbeck indicating that although her doctor 

recommended a "scooter, ... it was something that she just 

couldn't see herself doing" and would instead like to resign. 

Henricks Dep. at 68-71 (Feb. 7, 1996).

Some time after this meeting but before May 16, 1994, 

Whitbeck stopped working and Vital Signs removed her from 

the payroll. To maintain health benefits, Whitbeck went on 

Family and Medical Leave. In May she applied for and 

began receiving total disability benefits from Maccabees. At 

the suggestion of Henricks, she applied for long-term disability benefits from Vital Signs' insurer, Mutual of Omaha, but 

because her condition was "pre-existing," benefits were denied. On August 11, 1994, Whitbeck applied for Social Security disability benefits, which were awarded on January 13, 

1995.

Although receiving no pay, Whitbeck continued checking 

her voice mail and responding to customers. She also proposed, first to Henricks and then in a letter dated August 25, 

1994, to Vital Signs Chief Executive Officer Terry Wall, that 

she work part-time preparing promotional materials for Vital 

Signs. Vital Signs never responded. Whitbeck was officially 

terminated on November 21, 1994.

Charging Vital Signs with failure to reasonably accommodate her disability and discriminatory discharge in violation of 

the District of Columbia Human Rights Act ("DCHRA"), D.C. 

Code Ann. § 1-2501 et seq. (1992), Whitbeck filed suit in the 

Superior Court for the District of Columbia. Citing diversity 

jurisdiction, Vital Signs removed the case to the United 

States District Court for the District of Columbia where, with 

the parties' consent, it was referred to a magistrate judge for 

all further proceedings.

Vital Signs moved for summary judgment, arguing that 

Whitbeck's application for and receipt of disability benefits 

barred her disability discrimination claims. Agreeing, the 

magistrate judge entered summary judgment for Vital Signs, 

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reasoning that because Whitbeck "ha[d] not established that 

she was able to perform the essential functions of her position 

since she applied for and [was] receiving both monthly Social 

Security and Maccabees disability payments effective six 

months before her termination date" she did not fit the 

statutory definition of disability. Whitbeck v. Vital Signs, 

Inc., 934 F. Supp. 9, 16 (D.D.C. 1996). In the alternative, the 

magistrate judge concluded that "the reasonable accommodation that Ms. Whitbeck sought is not required under the law." 

Id.

In this appeal by Whitbeck, we review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 

(D.C. Cir. 1994). As the agency charged with enforcing the 

Americans with Disabilities Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sought and received leave to file a brief 

as amicus curiae. Pursuant to Rule 28(j) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure, the EEOC notified this panel 

of the Social Security Administration's amicus curiae brief in 

Swanks v. WMATA, --- F.3d ---, No. 96-7078 (D.C. Cir. 

June 20, 1997), a case we also decide today.

II

Intended to "secure an end in the District of Columbia to 

discrimination for any reason other than that of individual 

merit," the DCHRA prohibits discrimination on several 

grounds, including "discrimination by reason of ... physical 

handicap." D.C. Code Ann. § 1-2501 (1992). At the time of 

the critical events in this case, the DCHRA defined "physical 

handicap" as "a bodily or mental disablement which may be 

the result of injury, illness or congenital condition for which 

reasonable accommodation can be made." Id. § 1-2502(23) 

(repealed June 28, 1994); see D.C. Code Ann. § 49-304(a) 

(Supp. 1996) ("[T]he repeal of any act of the Council shall not 

release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred pursuant to the act...."). The Act makes it unlawful 

for an employer to:

discharge ... or otherwise to discriminate against any 

individual, with respect to his compensation, terms, conUSCA Case #96-7193 Document #280358 Filed: 06/20/1997 Page 5 of 9
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ditions, or privileges of employment[;] ... or to limit, 

segregate, or classify his employees in any way which 

would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or otherwise adversely affect his 

status as an employee.

Id. § 1-2512(a)(1) (1992). District of Columbia courts interpreting the DCHRA "have generally looked [for guidance] to 

cases from the federal courts" arising under federal civil 

rights statutes. Benefits Communication Corp. v. Klieforth,

642 A.2d 1299, 1301-02 (D.C. 1994). In particular, when 

determining the elements of a prima facie case and the 

allocation of burdens and order of proof in a disability discrimination case under the DCHRA, District of Columbia 

courts rely on cases decided under analogous federal antidiscrimination laws. American Univ. v. District of Columbia 

Comm'n on Human Rights, 598 A.2d 416, 422 (D.C. 1991); 

Miller v. American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities, 

Inc., 485 A.2d 186, 189-90 (D.C. 1984).

We begin with the magistrate judge's holding that Whitbeck may not maintain this action because she applied for and 

received public and private disability benefits. As we explain 

in Swanks, the Social Security Administration's inquiry into 

an individual's eligibility for disability benefits focuses on the 

individual's ability to do work generally available in the 

national economy and does not address the possible effect of 

accommodation on ability to work. Swanks, slip op. at 4-5. 

According to Whitbeck, she was found disabled at step three 

of the Social Security Administration's evaluation process. 

See Swanks, slip op. at 5-6 (describing five-step evaluation 

process). At this step the agency determines whether the 

individual's disability is "listed" at 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart 

P, App. 1 (1996). If so, the claimant is found disabled and 

awarded benefits without any further inquiry. 20 CFR 

§ 404.1520(d). Whitbeck's receipt of disability benefits is 

thus not at all inconsistent with her claim that she could 

perform her job with reasonable accommodation. See 

Swanks, slip op. at 8.

We reach the same conclusion with respect to private 

disability benefits. Where, as here, an insurer makes disability determinations without regard to whether the insured can 

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work with reasonable accommodation, an award of benefits 

does not preclude a later claim that the insured can work with 

accommodation. See, e.g., EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON 

THE EFFECT OF REPRESENTATIONS MADE IN APPLICATIONS FOR 

BENEFITS ON THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A PERSON IS A 

"QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL WITH A DISABILITY" UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 at 17 (Feb. 12, 1997) 

(noting that because private disability insurance contracts 

"[f]requently ... make[ ] no allowance for an individual's 

ability to work with reasonable accommodation .... an individual receiving disability insurance benefits still may be 

entitled to protection under the ADA"). The residual disability benefits Whitbeck received from Maccabees while still 

working at Vital Signs are available when the insured is 

"engaged in [his or her] Regular Occupation and [has his or 

her] income reduced, due to Accident or Sickness, by at least 

20% percent of [his or her] Prior Income." Maccabees Life 

Ins. Co., Regular Occupation Amendment. Her receipt of 

these benefitsbenefits available to working disabled personsis thus not at all inconsistent with her claim that she 

could work with accommodation. The same is true with 

respect to Maccabees' total disability insurance policy; its 

definition of total disability"due to Accident or Sickness, 

[the insured] cannot perform the substantial and material 

duties of [his or her] regular occupation," id.likewise does 

not consider the insured's ability to work with reasonable 

accommodation.

The magistrate judge's alternative conclusionthat "Vital 

Signs was not required ... to create a new part-time position 

..." for Whitbeck, Whitbeck, 934 F. Supp. at 16cannot 

support summary judgment for a very simple reason: Whitbeck has never argued that Vital Signs denied her reasonable 

accommodation by refusing to give her a new part-time job. 

Appellant's Br. at 17 n.15; see Pl.'s Opp. to Def.'s Mot. for 

Summ. J. at 1. Instead, Whitbeck claims Vital Signs rejected 

her request for a motorized cart on April 28, 1994, Pl.'s 

Compl. at 3-5; Whitbeck Dep. at 120-22; Whitbeck Aff. at 3-

4 (Apr. 25, 1996), an allegation that we must credit at this 

stage of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

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U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (At summary judgment, "[t]he evidence 

of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor."). From this, together 

with evidence in the record that her doctor believed she could 

do her job with a motorized cart and that Vital Signs had 

allowed her to work with a wheelchair, a reasonable jury 

could find that Whitbeck proposed a reasonable accommodation which would allow her to work again as a Vital Signs 

sales representative. See, e.g., Reil v. Electronic Data Sys. 

Corp., 99 F.3d 678, 683 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding evidence of 

two proposed accommodations and of company's having provided similar adjustments in the past sufficient to meet 

summary judgment burden). Whitbeck's August 25 letter to 

Vital Signs, relied on by the magistrate judge, does not 

support summary judgment, as a reasonable jury could also 

conclude that because this letter came after the April 28 

conversation with Henricks, Whitbeck asked for a part-time 

position only because her employer had previously rejected 

her request for a motorized cart.

Relying on a decision of the District of Columbia Court of 

Appeals, Vital Signs argues that Whitbeck failed to make out 

even a prima facie case of discrimination because "she presented herself to Vital Signs, and to her insurance carriers 

and the Social Security Administration, in a manner which 

demonstrated that she either was unable or unwilling to 

perform the responsibilities of her position." Appellee's Br. 

at 13-14; see Miller, 485 F.2d at 190 (quoting Prewitt v. 

United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 309-10 (5th Cir. 

Unit A Nov. 1981)) (" 'To sustain [a] prima facie case, there 

should ... be a facial showing or at least plausible reasons to 

believe that the handicap can be accommodated....' [S]uch 

a showing would require, at a minimum, that an employee 

present herself to the employer as someone willing and able 

to work, but for a surmountable handicap."). In support of 

this argument, Vital Signs points to Whitbeck's applications 

for disability benefits, to her failure to make any further 

requests for a motorized cart after her conversation with 

Henricks, to the statement in her August 25 letter to Vital 

Signs that she was no longer physically able to work as a 

sales representative, and to her failure to respond to an 

August 2 letter inquiring into her ability to work and need for 

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accommodation. Again, all of these actions occurred after the 

April 28 conversation with Henricks. A reasonable jury could 

therefore find, not only that Whitbeck presented herself on 

April 28 as willing and able to work with a motorized cart, but 

also that her post-April 28 actions were understandable, i.e., 

because Vital Signs had previously denied her request for a 

motorized cart, she applied for disability benefits, told Vital 

Signs she could no longer work, and believed she had no 

obligation to make a subsequent request for a motorized cart 

or to respond to Vital Signs' letter. Cf. Hunt-Golliday v. 

Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist., 104 F.3d 1004, 1012 

(7th Cir. 1997) ("After an employee's request [for reasonable 

accommodation], both parties bear responsibility for determining what accommodation is necessary.") (citing Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th 

Cir. 1996)).

Vital Signs also relies on an undated letter from Whitbeck 

to Dr. Kattah which states "I am not physically able, after 

months of trying, to perform the functions [of] my job," as 

well as Kattah's indication on a Maccabees form dated April 

14, 1994, that Whitbeck was totally disabled. To a reasonable 

jury, however, Whitbeck's statement that she was no longer 

able to perform her job might be nothing more than an 

accurate description of her conditionwithout accommodation, she was unable to work. As to the April 14 form, three 

days later Kattah wrote another of Whitbeck's physicians, 

stating that Whitbeck was performing her job with assistance 

and would probably need "some form of transportation such 

as [a motorized] cart." Because the April 14 form does not 

address Whitbeck's ability to work with accommodation, and 

because the record contains evidence that Kattah believed 

Whitbeck could work with assistance, a jury could reasonably 

find that Whitbeck would have been able to work with her 

requested accommodationa motorized cart.

We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

So ordered.

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