Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03152/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03152-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Matt Cahill
Petitioner
Department of Health and Human Services
Respondent
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MATT CAHILL,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3152

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. AT-1221-14-0906-W-1.

______________________ 

Decided: May 10, 2016

______________________ 

JASON LEE ROMRELL, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, 

Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Washington, DC, argued for 

petitioner. Also represented by JAMES R. BARNEY; J.

DEREK MCCORQUINDALE, DANIEL CRAIG COOLEY, Reston, 

VA.

KATRINA LEDERER, Office of the General Counsel, 

Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, argued 

for respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G. POLISUK. 

______________________ 

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2 CAHILL v. MSPB

Before PROST, Chief Judge, LOURIE and TARANTO, Circuit 

Judges.

TARANTO, Circuit Judge. 

Matt Cahill was an employee of the United States 

Department of Health and Human Services in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention from March 2011 

until July 2014. In February 2014, he complained that

agency officials had taken personnel actions against him 

in retaliation for his having raised concerns, at a March 

2012 meeting, about his agency’s data-gathering equipment and procedures. When he brought that complaint to

the Merit Systems Protection Board, the Board concluded 

that it lacked jurisdiction to hear it because Mr. Cahill 

had not presented nonfrivolous allegations that his March 

2012 disclosure was known to at least one of the agency 

officials he charged with taking the challenged personnel 

actions. We conclude otherwise, and we therefore reverse 

and remand. 

BACKGROUND

From December 2003 until March 2008, Mr. Cahill 

did information-technology work for the Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention as an independent contractor. In March 2011, the agency hired him as an 

employee within a division having the prevention of 

HIV/AIDS as its mission. His job was within the Quantitative Science and Data Management Branch (or group) 

within that division (QSDM or QSDMB), but his assignment was “to support Data Management activities” of 

another part of the same division, i.e., the Behavioral and 

Clinical Surveillance Branch (BCSB), which, among other 

things, conducts studies for which its field workers use

hand-held devices called “Pocket PCs” to collect data. J.A. 

90–91, 144.

On February 27, 2014, Mr. Cahill filed a complaint 

with the Office of Special Counsel, 5 U.S.C. 

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CAHILL v. MSPB 3

§ 1214(a)(1)(A), alleging that agency officials had violated 

the whistleblower protections of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) 

by taking personnel actions against him as a result of a 

disclosure about agency practices that he had made at a 

March 2012 meeting.1 In his complaint, Mr. Cahill alleged: 

On March 22, 2012, there was a group meeting 

with BCSB management, team leads, project 

leads, and QSDM management. 

J.A. 145. At that meeting, Mr. Cahill alleged, he voiced 

his concerns about some of the agency’s data-collection 

instruments and procedures, including that the Pocket 

PCs were outdated, had bad batteries, lost data, presented data-entry problems, and generally did not work 

properly. Mr. Cahill contended that his supervisors began 

treating him differently after that meeting; that he was 

not invited to BCSB meetings, was discouraged from 

participating in projects to which he was assigned, and 

was eventually placed on a Performance Action Plan; that

he “had problems with Assistant Branch Chief, Dawn 

Gnesda,” J.A. 145, who purportedly retaliated against 

him by changing his telework agreement and providing

him with negative feedback; that he received a September 

2012 email asking him not to participate in certain BCSB 

activities; that he received a negative Performance Management Appraisal Program review; and that Kim Crenshaw, his supervisor as of June 13, 2013, treated him 

poorly. 

 

1 Mr. Cahill also alleged that the agency had improperly reduced his pay in 2008 as a result of a disclosure he had made in 2004 when he served as an 

independent contractor. The Board found no jurisdiction 

over that allegation, and Mr. Cahill does not challenge 

that ruling here.

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4 CAHILL v. MSPB

The Office of Special Counsel found an insufficient 

basis to pursue detailed investigation of Mr. Cahill’s claim

and so closed its file on the matter. Mr. Cahill then filed 

an individual-right-of-action appeal with the Board under 

5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3)(A), 1221(a). After receiving Mr. 

Cahill’s brief, which largely reiterated his allegations to 

the Office of Special Counsel, an administrative judge 

ordered Mr. Cahill to show why his appeal should not be 

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In response, Mr. Cahill

repeated much of his complaint to the Office of Special 

Counsel, including the above-quoted passage. He also 

added several exhibits, including a Performance Management Appraisal Program document reviewed by Timothy Green and a Performance Assistance Plan 

memorandum written by Mr. Green (identified by the 

memorandum as chief of QSDMB), as well as an email 

from Dr. Jacek Skarbinski (identified in the signature 

block as team lead of the BCSB Clinical Outcomes Team) 

informing Mr. Cahill that his support would not be needed for certain agency projects. The administrative judge 

concluded that Mr. Cahill had not presented enough to 

constitute nonfrivolous allegations of various elements of 

a whistleblower claim under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A), and 

the judge therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of Board 

jurisdiction. 

On review under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(c), the Board 

modified but ultimately affirmed the administrative 

judge’s decision. Disagreeing with the administrative 

judge, the Board concluded that Mr. Cahill had nonfrivolously contended that his March 2012 disclosure was 

protected: his disclosure was of information he reasonably 

believed evinced gross mismanagement and presented a 

substantial and specific danger to public health and 

safety. The Board also determined that Mr. Cahill had 

alleged at least one statutorily covered personnel action

(placement on a performance plan) and that more such 

actions may exist, including the alleged performance 

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CAHILL v. MSPB 5

evaluation and a significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions. See 5 U.S.C. 

§ 2302(a)(2)(A)(viii), (xii). According to the Board, however, where Mr. Cahill failed was in adequately connecting 

those allegations. Specifically, the Board concluded that 

Mr. Cahill had failed nonfrivolously to allege that “his 

2012 disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel 

action” for one reason: he lacked a nonfrivolous allegation 

that any of the officials involved in the personnel actions 

knew of his March 2012 disclosure. J.A. 2, 11. On that 

sole basis, the Board determined that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1).

Mr. Cahill appealed to this court. Id. § 7703(b)(1). 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). 

DISCUSSION

We review de novo the Board’s determinations as to 

its jurisdiction. Kahn v. Dep’t of Justice, 528 F.3d 1336, 

1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 

To establish the Board’s jurisdiction in an individualright-of-action appeal, it suffices that an appellant exhaust his remedies before the Office of Special Counsel

and present “non-frivolous allegations” that (1) he made a 

protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(b)(8) or 

2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) and that (2) the disclosure 

was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take 

or fail to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. 

§ 2302(a). See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); Kahn, 528 F.3d at 

1341; Spruill v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 978 F.2d 679 (Fed. 

Cir. 1992). And the court has long treated “a nonfrivolous allegation” of an element required for Board 

jurisdiction as one that, “if proven, can establish the 

Board’s jurisdiction” insofar as that element is concerned. 

Garcia v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 437 F.3d 1322, 1330

(Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc) (constructive discharge context); 

id. at 1344; Dumas v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 789 F.2d 892, 

894 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“non-frivolous allegation” of jurisdicCase: 15-3152 Document: 37-2 Page: 5 Filed: 05/10/2016
6 CAHILL v. MSPB

tional element is one that “if proven could make a prima 

facie case” on that element).

In this case, there is no dispute about exhaustion, 

about the protected character of the March 2012 disclosure, or about the existence of one or more personnel 

actions taken against Mr. Cahill. The dispute is limited 

to the “contributing factor” element. Accordingly, we need 

only analyze whether Mr. Cahill has nonfrivolously 

alleged that his March 2012 disclosure was a contributing 

factor in at least one such personnel action.

The statute expressly addresses how the “contributing 

factor” element of the whistleblower claim can be established. It can be established “through circumstantial 

evidence, such as evidence that (A) the official taking the 

personnel action knew of the disclosure . . . ; and (B) the 

personnel action occurred within a period of time such 

that a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure . . . was a contributing factor in the personnel action.” 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1). And as this case comes to us, 

the only disputed issue is whether any of the agency 

officials taking the challenged personnel actions knew of 

the March 2012 disclosure. 

Accordingly, the question at this stage is whether Mr. 

Cahill has nonfrivolously alleged such knowledge. On 

that question, we reach a conclusion different from that of 

the Board. Reading Mr. Cahill’s assertions in light of the 

entire “written record,” Kahn, 528 F.3d at 1341, we conclude that Mr. Cahill has sufficiently alleged that such an 

agency official did have such knowledge.

In the key sentence set out above, Mr. Cahill alleged 

that “[o]n March 22, 2012, there was a group meeting 

with BCSB management, team leads, project leads, and 

QSDM management.” J.A. 145. He did not give the 

names of the meeting’s attendees; elaborate on how many 

people fit each of the descriptions “BCSB management,” 

“team leads,” “project leads,” and “QSDM management”; 

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CAHILL v. MSPB 7

or expressly state that the particular officials he alleged 

to have committed the personnel actions at issue knew of 

the March 2012 disclosure. Nevertheless, when read with 

an eye on likely inferences appropriate to the context, Mr. 

Cahill’s allegations are sufficiently specific and plausible 

to constitute nonfrivolous assertions that at least one, and 

perhaps three, of the officials charged with the personnel 

actions at issue attended the March 2012 meeting or at 

least knew what Mr. Cahill disclosed there.

One such official is Ms. Gnesda, who, the Board’s brief 

to us indicates, served as Assistant Branch Chief of the 

BCSB, MSPB Br. 24, and hence was “BCSB management,” J.A. 145. The written record before the Board 

included Mr. Cahill’s identification of Ms. Gnesda as 

“Assistant Branch Chief,” id., along with his explanation 

that, though his job was in the QSDMB, his assignment 

in that job was to provide data-management support for 

BCSB, id.; J.A. 90–91, ¶¶ 25–27. That Ms. Gnesda’s 

position was in BCSB in particular (not QSDMB) is 

consistent with Mr. Cahill’s description of the alleged 

personnel actions that she took after the March 2012 

meeting: changing his telework agreement, providing him 

with negative feedback, and instructing him to stop 

participating in the BCSB’s Medical Monitoring Project. 

And the record before the Board also included notes made 

by Ms. Gnesda, recording: “March 22, 2012—Meeting 

with all BCSB team leaders, BCSB Branch Chief, BCSB 

Associate Chief for Science, Matt [Cahill], and Thom 

Sukalac.” J.A. 322. 

A second pertinent official is Mr. Green, whom Mr. 

Cahill accused of taking personnel actions against him 

after the March 2012 meeting. The record makes clear 

that Mr. Green was “Chief, Quantitative Sciences and 

Data Management Branch (QSDMB), Division of 

HIV/AIDS Prevention.” J.A. 125. That is, Mr. Green was 

“QSDM management,” J.A. 145; he was the head of the 

branch for which Mr. Cahill formally worked. Ms. 

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8 CAHILL v. MSPB

Gnesda’s notes also indicate that Mr. Green was the 

Branch Chief for QSDM. J.A. 323.

The third pertinent official is Dr. Skarbinski. Mr. 

Cahill charged that, after the March 2012 meeting, Dr. 

Skarbinski newly excluded him from various BCSB 

meetings and activities. The record indicates that Dr. 

Skarbinski was “Team Lead, Clinical Outcomes Team, 

Behavioral and Clinical Surveillance Branch.” J.A. 117. 

“Team leads” is one of the categories of asserted participants in the March 2012 meeting. J.A. 145.

Whether Mr. Cahill has nonfrivolously alleged facts 

sufficient to establish the Board’s jurisdiction depends on 

how his allegations would be understood in context, 

especially by the responding agency. See Middleton v. 

Dep’t of Def., 185 F.3d 1374, 1379–81 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 

Here, it is notable that in the proceedings before the 

administrative judge and the Board, the agency, while

challenging Mr. Cahill’s allegations regarding several 

elements of the whistleblower claim, did not contend that 

Mr. Cahill had inadequately alleged that any of the 

officials charged with the personnel actions knew of Mr. 

Cahill’s disclosures at the March 2012 meeting. See Oral 

Arg. at 11:55–12:45, 13:15–16:10; J.A. 442–49. The 

agency’s silence on that issue is significant to our assessment of the adequacy of Mr. Cahill’s allegations. 

The silence suggests that, read in context, Mr. Cahill’s 

allegations adequately communicated that Ms. Gnesda, 

Mr. Green, Dr. Skarbinski, or all three attended the 

March 2012 meeting or knew what was said there. In 

particular, it suggests that there were so few leaders of 

the branches and teams identified by Mr. Cahill that his 

allegations about “a group meeting with BCSB management, team leads, project leads, and QSDM management,” J.A. 145, adequately conveyed a contention that at 

least Ms. Gnesda, Mr. Green, or Dr. Skarbinski, or all 

three, either attended or would have learned of what 

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CAHILL v. MSPB 9

transpired at that meeting. Moreover, the agency would 

have known, or been able readily to check, both the organizational facts and the roles and knowledge of the three 

individuals. Indeed, nothing in the record indicates that 

there is more than one branch chief or assistant chief, see, 

e.g., J.A. 421 (identifying Sam Costa as “[t]he QSDM 

assistant branch chief”) (emphasis added), and the Board 

at oral argument before us confirmed its belief that each 

team has only one team lead, Oral Arg. at 19:08–18.

The agency’s silence on the point is significant in a 

second way: it deprived Mr. Cahill of notice that his 

allegations might require greater specificity—which he 

might well have provided if the need had been identified. 

The importance of notice of deficiencies before a claim is 

finally dismissed is reflected in district courts’ common 

practice of providing an opportunity to amend an insufficiently specific complaint after the deficiencies have been 

identified.2 The Board itself has permitted an agency to 

 

2 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court 

should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.”); 5 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice 

and Procedure § 1216 (3rd ed. 2004) (“The pleader is 

entitled to considerable latitude regarding the mode of 

stating a claim for relief, provided the pleading gives 

reasonable notice of the claims that are being asserted. 

. . . [I]f the requisite allegations are not in the complaint 

and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted is made . . . the pleader 

should be given the opportunity to amend the complaint, 

if she can, to show the existence of the missing elements.”); 10A Wright et al., supra, § 2722 (“[W]hen plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint and defendant’s 

motion for summary judgment are presented together, the 

court may consider the latter as addressed to the complaint in the form in which it is sought to be amended. . . . 

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10 CAHILL v. MSPB

seek a more definite statement where necessary, Zimmerman v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 61 M.S.P.R. 75, 

77 (1994), and permitted claimants in other contexts to 

amend their pleadings, Shelton v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 

38 M.S.P.R. 280, 283 (1988) (citing as guidance Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)); see also Balagot v. Dep’t of 

Def., 102 M.S.P.R. 96, 98–99 (2006). But without an 

objection from the agency as to the specificity of his allegations concerning agency officials’ knowledge, Mr. Cahill 

was not on notice that his allegations should be made 

more specific, such as by giving the names of the March 

2012 meeting participants or the number of individuals 

who could fit the categories of participants (e.g., “BCSB 

management”) or by otherwise indicating why Ms. 

Gnesda, Mr. Green, or Dr. Skarbinski would likely have 

known of his March 2012 disclosure. Thus, this is not a 

case in which the absence of readily available details 

highlights the inadequacy of what is alleged; here, given 

the lack of notice of a problem and an opportunity to cure, 

the absence of greater detail provides no support for 

judging the allegations Mr. Cahill did make to be inadequate. 

We conclude that Mr. Cahill nonfrivolously alleged 

that at least one of Ms. Gnesda, Mr. Green, and Dr. 

Skarbinski knew of his March 2012 disclosure. We need 

not consider the sufficiency of Mr. Cahill’s allegations as 

to other agency officials. We hold that the Board erred in 

dismissing his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

 

[I]f an amendment would change the result on the [summary judgment] motion, it should be permitted and 

summary judgment denied.”). 

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CAHILL v. MSPB 11

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Board’s 

dismissal of Mr. Cahill’s petition and remand for further 

appropriate proceedings. 

Costs awarded to Mr. Cahill.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

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