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Parties Involved:
Donna June Rouse
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 3, 1998 Decided March 23, 1999

No. 97-3134

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Donna June Rouse,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cr00271-03)

Howard B. Katzoff, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the brief for appellant.

Barbara A. Grewe, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher and Katherine Winfree,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant

U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

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Before: Randolph, Rogers and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: Following her conviction on nine

counts of fraud and 11 counts of money laundering, appellant

moved for a new trial based on what she claimed to be "newly

discovered" evidence that her co-defendant had abused her

physically, sexually, and emotionally. She argued that she

became able to admit the abuse only after undergoing posttrial counseling and that the abuse precluded her from having

the requisite criminal intent. Relying on this history of

abuse, appellant also requested a downward departure in

sentencing on grounds of diminished mental capacity, duress,

and coercion. Mindful of the deferential standard of review

applicable to district court credibility determinations, we affirm the district court's rejection of these and other claims.

I

A federal grand jury indicted appellant Donna Rouse, as

well as Pamela Glascoe and Richard Gartmon, on charges of

interstate transportation of securities obtained by fraud, 18

U.S.C. s 2314 (1994), and money laundering, id. s 1956(a)(1).

Rouse and Gartmon proceeded to trial, while Glascoe pled

guilty and testified for the government. Rouse and Gartmon

were convicted and sentenced to prison for 57 months and 120

months, respectively. In a separate appeal, we affirmed

Gartmon's conviction and sentence. See United States v.

Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

The indictments arose from a scheme to defraud the

George Washington University Health Plan of over $450,000.

Glascoe, a secretary in the Health Plan's marketing and sales

department, prepared check requests authorizing sponsorships of local events and programs as well as payments to

vendors for services purchased by the Health Plan. Upon

approval by Health Plan executives, checks were issued by

the finance department. Glascoe had no authority to approve

or sign check requests.

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Glascoe and Gartmon began dating in November 1994. At

Gartmon's request, Glascoe soon began submitting check

requests for fictitious sponsorships. She gave the issued

checks to Gartmon. Because Health Plan employees knew

that Glascoe was dating Gartmon, she never requested checks

in his name. Instead, Gartmon gave her the names of three

women to use on the checks. One was Donna Rouse, another

Gartmon girlfriend.

On January 11, 1995, Glascoe created a request for a $5,500

check to Rouse for sponsorship of a fictitious "clean air

challenge." The Health Plan issued the check, Glascoe gave

it to Gartmon, and Rouse endorsed it, deposited it in her

personal bank account, and received $1,000 cash back from

the teller. Glascoe never met or spoke to Rouse. Rouse

never organized any events featuring the Health Plan as a

sponsor.

Glascoe also submitted fraudulent invoices for services

from a printing company owned by one of Gartmon's friends.

Eight times between January and March 1995, Glascoe typed

up invoices and corresponding check requests, each time

naming Rouse as payee. Glascoe also drafted phony contracts to support the invoices. Ranging from $16,800 to

$84,600, the eight checks totaled $438,000. Rouse personally

endorsed and deposited six of the eight checks into her

checking account. Using a deposit slip for Rouse's account,

Gartmon's cousin deposited the seventh. It was unclear who

deposited the eighth. During this time, Rouse opened a

money market account, depositing large sums there as well.

Rouse never performed any printing services, nor was she

ever employed by the printing company. Searching Rouse's

home, the police found a phony civil complaint signed by

Rouse, which alleged that the Health Plan had failed to fulfill

a contract for printing services. The complaint falsely

claimed that Rouse was vice-president of the printing company and that the company had printed materials for the Health

Plan.

Rouse gave Gartmon most of the money from the fraudulently obtained checks, although she never wrote checks from

her accounts in his name. Instead, knowing that the money

was for Gartmon, she wrote checks and obtained cashier's

checks payable to Gartmon's other girlfriends, his friends,

and various businesses. Gartmon used the money to make

and repay loans and to buy three sports cars, a hair salon,

and a jacuzzi and gazebo for his house. In all, Rouse gave

Gartmon's surrogates 11 checks ranging from $3,000 to

$23,000. These checks totaled $140,000.

After a jury convicted Rouse on nine counts of criminal

fraud and 11 counts of money laundering, she filed three posttrial motions that are now at issue in this appeal. First, she

moved for acquittal notwithstanding the verdict, claiming that

the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. The

district court denied the motion. Second, eight months after

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her conviction, she moved for a new trial based on "newly

discovered" evidence that she had suffered "battered woman's

syndrome" during her 14-year relationship with Gartmon.

According to Rouse, that syndrome precluded her from having the requisite criminal intent under the fraud and money

laundering statutes. Despite a psychiatrist's testimony that

Rouse had endured severe sexual, physical, and emotional

abuse by Gartmon during the time of her criminal conduct,

the district court determined that the abuse was not "newly

discovered" and refused to order a new trial. Finally, Rouse

requested a downward departure from the applicable sentencing guidelines based on diminished mental capacity and coercion or duress. Following an evidentiary hearing in which

Rouse testified for the first time, the district court found her

claims not credible and sentenced her to a 57-month prison

term, the maximum sentence under the guidelines. We consider each of the district court's rulings in turn.

II

We begin with Rouse's claim of evidence insufficiency.

Challenging the fraud counts, Rouse argues that the government failed to prove that she knew the checks she endorsed

or deposited were obtained by fraud. According to Rouse,

while the evidence showed that Glascoe and Gartmon colluded

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in the fraud, it failed to show that either Glascoe or Gartmon

told Rouse the source of the checks. Rouse further argues

that even if the evidence showed that she had the requisite

knowledge by the end of the scheme, it failed to show that

she knew of the fraud at the time each check was transferred

to her, as the fraud statute requires. See 18 U.S.C. s 2314.

With respect to the money laundering counts, Rouse argues

that the government failed to prove that she knew that the

money she gave Gartmon was obtained illegally or that her

purpose in writing the checks was to conceal Gartmon's

ownership or control of the money. See id. s 1956(a)(1).

Overall, Rouse's theory is that she was an unknowing victim

of Gartmon's schemes and deceits.

In assessing claims of evidence insufficiency, we view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the government,

drawing all reasonable inferences in the government's favor.

Our inquiry is "limited to the question of whether 'any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' " United States v.

Dingle, 114 F.3d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). We must affirm the

conviction unless we conclude that "a reasonable juror must

necessarily have had a reasonable doubt as to the defendant['s] guilt." United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d 413, 437

(D.C. Cir. 1983).

Applying this standard, we find no basis for setting aside

the jury's verdict. As to the fraud counts, the evidence shows

that Rouse never applied for any sponsorships from the

Health Plan, that she performed no services for the Health

Plan, and that she had no contact with any Health Plan

employee responsible for submitting or approving check requests. The evidence also shows that, during the four

months prior to the deposit into her accounts of nine checks

ranging from $5,500 to $84,600, Rouse carefully monitored

her bank accounts, made no deposits larger than $944, and

kept an average balance no greater than $235. Acting on the

sensible assumption that Rouse knew that organizations do

not hand out large checks for no reason, a rational jury could

conclude from this evidence that Rouse knew that each check

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issued to her was illegitimate. The physical evidence recovered from Rouse's home--the phony civil complaint signed by

Rouse falsely claiming that she was vice-president of a printing company and that the company had provided printing

services for the Health Plan--further supports the finding

that Rouse knew the checks were obtained by fraud.

With respect to the money laundering counts, the evidence

shows that Rouse knew that the large checks she wrote were

used to buy goods and services for Gartmon's benefit, even

though none of the checks bore Gartmon's name. The evidence also shows that when Rouse wrote small checks on

Gartmon's behalf in the past, she consistently noted the

check's purpose on the memo line of the check; the large

checks she wrote for Gartmon carried no such notation.

Along with the evidence that Rouse knew that the money she

was spending for Gartmon's benefit was obtained illegally,

these facts provide sufficient grounds for a rational jury to

infer that Rouse knew that the checks she wrote for Gartmon

served to conceal his ownership or control of the illegally

obtained funds.

III

We turn next to Rouse's challenge to the district court's

denial of her motion for a new trial. Arguing that she

became able to reveal Gartmon's physical, sexual, and emotional abuse only after undergoing post-trial psychotherapy,

Rouse claimed that this "newly discovered" evidence could

lead a new jury to find that she participated in the fraud only

to avoid Gartmon's abuse and that she therefore lacked the

requisite criminal intent.

The facts leading up to Rouse's claim of "newly discovered"

evidence are as follows: Before trial began, the government

alerted Rouse's lawyer to the possibility that Gartmon had

abused Rouse, referring the lawyer to entries in Rouse's

diary mentioning acts of violence, forced sex, and threats by

Gartmon during the three-month period of the charged conduct. The government also gave Rouse's lawyer a tape

recording of a pre-indictment interview in which Rouse told a

prosecutor that although she loved Gartmon, she was afraid

of him. During the interview, Rouse also said that Gartmon

had been verbally and physically abusive, and that not wanting to upset Gartmon, she asked no questions when he told

her to deposit or write checks. Asked by her lawyer about

her diary entries and the tape recording, Rouse denied having

been abused and rejected his suggestion that she see a

psychologist with experience working with battered women.

Rouse never testified at trial, and her lawyer presented no

claim or evidence of abuse to the jury.

Between conviction and sentencing, Rouse underwent 11

months of psychotherapy with a clinical social worker, during

which she admitted that her relationship with Gartmon had

been abusive for many years. The social worker referred

Rouse to a psychiatrist. Examining Rouse for seven hours

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over two days, the psychiatrist prepared a report finding that

on numerous occasions over a 10-year period, Gartmon hit

her, raped her, and forced her to have sex with another man.

See Letter from Dr. Susan J. Fiester to Howard Katzoff of

12/2/96, at 6-8. Through this constant abuse, the report

stated, "Mr. Gartmon was able to terrorize Ms. Rouse and to

virtually control her life." Id. at 15. According to the

psychiatrist, Rouse's "compliant, even servile behavior" in

response to Gartmon's requests that she open accounts, deposit checks, and provide him money "is typical of a woman

who has been severely battered." Id. Concluding that "Ms.

Rouse is clearly suffering from the Battered Woman Syndrome," the report explained:

[A]s a battered woman, she came under [Gartmon's]

control, and, as a result of coercion and duress, experienced a diminished ability to make appropriate decisions

regarding her behavior.... [Her] criminal activity was

directly related to her abusive relationship with Mr.

Gartmon, specifically: 1) her chronic fear of being beaten

and sexually abused; 2) the depression and anxiety

which occurred as a consequence, and 3) her need to

deny reality in the interest of minimizing any type of

conflict with Mr. Gartmon because that conflict would

likely lead to serious physical abuse.

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Id. at 17. The report further stated that "[i]t is an essential

part of the battering relationship for the victim to conceal the

fact of the abuse from others for a variety of reasons including denial and fear of physical harm...." Id. at 18. "Ultimately," according to the report, "Ms. Rouse's ability to

recognize and accept the tragic reality of her abuse by Mr.

Gartmon evolved from an internal process fostered by her

psychotherapeutic treatment and could not have emerged

even with aggressive external probing [by] the Government

or her attorney." Id.

Relying on the psychiatrist's report, Rouse moved for a

new trial, claiming that the "newly discovered" evidence of

abuse, "unlocked" by post-trial psychotherapy, could lead a

jury to conclude that she was merely a passive participant in

the fraud and thus lacked criminal intent. Summarizing her

report at the hearing on the motion, the psychiatrist testified

that Rouse's fear of Gartmon's abuse made her susceptible to

doing or believing whatever he told her during the period of

the charged conduct, and that her state of severe denial

prevented her from reporting the abuse. Rouse chose not to

testify.

The government never disputed that Rouse had suffered

physical, sexual, and psychological abuse by Gartmon. Instead, it argued that she and her lawyer knew of the abuse

and that she had the capacity to introduce it at trial but

simply chose not to. The district court agreed, ruling that

the evidence of abuse was not "newly discovered." As long as

the district court did not misapply the law or abuse its

discretion, we must affirm. See United States v. Kelly, 790

F.2d 130, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

In reaching its conclusion, the district court relied on the

following findings: (1) Rouse's entries in her diary and her

statements in the pre-indictment interview showed that she

was capable of acknowledging the abuse before trial; (2)

aware that Rouse had been abused, her lawyer advised her to

seek counseling, but she refused; (3) because Gartmon was

incarcerated before trial, he was unable to harm Rouse

physically; (4) because Rouse did not live with Gartmon, had

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no children with him, and did not depend on him financially,

she had little reason to fear reprisal for reporting the abuse;

and (5) having been convicted, Rouse had a strong motive for

feigning an inability to discuss the abuse at the time of trial.

We think these findings are less probative than they might

first appear. That Rouse mentioned the abuse in her personal diary says little about her ability to report the abuse to

others. Her admission of abuse in the pre-indictment interview, moreover, consisted of nothing more than the following

dialogue:

Prosecutor: You must have a specific reason for feeling

... that you had no choice [but to continue in the fraud

scheme]. There must be more than a vague feeling that

you didn't know what his reaction would be.

Rouse: I mean, I didn't want any verbal, mental, physical abuse, like, towards me.

Prosecutor: Is he verbally abusive towards you?

Rouse: Sometimes.

Prosecutor: Physically?

Rouse: Sometimes.

7/12/95 Interview Tr. at 44. We likewise suspect that the

district court may have relied too heavily on the fact that

Rouse was not under Gartmon's physical control. According

to the psychiatrist, Rouse was unable to report the abuse

because she was psychologically debilitated by denial and

fear:

[T]he simple physical factors of having a place to go

already, [having] a job or resources, is [sic] only a piece

of the situation. One can't ignore the very powerful

psychological aspect of the attachment....

...

[I]f a woman doesn't have kids and may have a place to

go, the psychological factors may play a much more

powerful role in why they're essentially stuck and incapacitated and staying in that relationship.

2/6/97 Mot. Hearing Tr. at 76-77. Indeed, an entry in

Rouse's diary reveals that Rouse went to Gartmon's house to

cook him breakfast and wash his clothes just two days after

he hit her in the eye and forced her to have sex with another

man. In the context of this and other self-defeating behavior

detailed in the psychiatrist's report, Rouse's refusal to seek

psychotherapy before trial, viewed by the district court as a

free and rational choice to "stand by [her] man," id. at 61,

could just as easily be evidence of her chronic state of denial

and fear.

In the end, however, because the burden of proof was on

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tion. The court did not reject the existence of battered

woman's syndrome as a general matter, nor did it summarily

reject Rouse's claim of "newly discovered" evidence. Instead,

the court reviewed the psychiatrist's report, carefully questioned the psychiatrist during the hearing on Rouse's motion,

and gave Rouse's lawyer ample opportunity to explicate her

claim. Aware of the incentives facing Rouse after being

convicted, the district court asked the psychiatrist whether

"avoid[ing] punishment [could have been] a motivation" for

Rouse to allege an inability to report the abuse earlier. Id. at

84. The psychiatrist responded: "[I]t's not really my professional expertise to determine if somebody is lying or telling

the truth" and that "opportunism" could have been a motive

for Rouse's claim. Id. at 84. Unconvinced that the psychiatrist had adequately verified Rouse's truthfulness, the district

court said: "We're on the eve of sentencing. So, why didn't

the doctor focus on that? Why didn't she attach any significance to these revelations being made at the eleventh hour?

That's very significant, in my view." Id. at 130. The court

concluded that Rouse "knew what was going on in her life"

and chose not to bring it forward at trial. Id. at 133.

Since the district court had legitimate concerns about

Rouse's credibility given the timing of her claim, and since

the court had understandable doubts about the psychiatrist's

report and testimony, we see no grounds for withholding the

deference we ordinarily give to a district court's credibility

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determinations. See Carter v. Bennett, 840 F.2d 63, 67 (D.C.

Cir. 1988) ("The district court's credibility determinations are

entitled to the greatest deference from this court on appeal.").

Although the evidence in this case might support a different

conclusion, that possibility does not warrant a finding that the

district court abused its discretion. We thus affirm the denial

of Rouse's motion for a new trial.

IV

After the district court denied her new trial motion, Rouse

sought a downward departure on the grounds of diminished

mental capacity and coercion or duress. See U.S.S.G.

ss 5K2.12-.13. At her sentencing hearing, Rouse testified

for the first time, claiming that Gartmon's abuse effectively

compelled her to participate in the fraud and money laundering scheme or, alternatively, weakened her ability to resist

such participation. Observing that Rouse was "very articulate, sophisticated, [and] very intelligent," the district court

found "absolutely incredible" and "preposterous" her testimony that she simply did whatever Gartmon told her to do and

that she knew nothing about the source or amount of money

going into and out of her bank account during the period of

the charged conduct. 9/19/97 Sentencing Hearing Tr. at 7-8,

10. Struck by Rouse's "total lack of candor," id. at 64, the

court rejected her claim that Gartmon's abuse had debilitated

her to such an extent that she was unable to control her own

actions. Deferring again to the district court's credibility

determination, we see no grounds for disturbing its decision

to deny Rouse a downward departure. See United States v.

Leandre, 132 F.3d 796, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (district court's

downward departure decision must be upheld on appeal in the

absence of "a mistake of law or an incorrect application of the

Guidelines").

V

We affirm Rouse's conviction and sentence.

So ordered.

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