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Parties Involved:
Alfred James Clark
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

 The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

2

 Clark filed a pro se brief, making several allegations related to the arguments

set forth by his counsel. It is not our practice to consider pro se briefs filed by a party

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1882

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Alfred James Clark, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: December 15, 2004

Filed: May 26, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, LAY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Alfred James Clark appeals from his conviction on charges of being a felon in

possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He

also appeals from the 180-month sentence imposed by the district court,1

 contending

that he should be resentenced in light of Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531

(2004). We affirm.2

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who is represented by counsel. United States v. Cole, 262 F.3d 704, 707 n.3 (8th Cir.

2001). In any event, there is no merit in any of the issues Clark raises, and thus we

need not discuss them further.

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I.

The St. Paul police responded to a series of 911 calls made from Clark’s

apartment. In December 2001, the first call was made by Loretha Cager, the daughter

of Sherry Clark (Sherry), Clark’s wife. Clark had severely beaten Sherry, had pointed

a gun at her head and threatened her, and had fired a round at the floor. Ms. Cager

reported the domestic violence and stated that the man involved might still be armed.

Clark was arrested and held on state charges, but was released on bond when Sherry

bailed him out and signed an affidavit denying that he had assaulted her. In March

2002, Sherry called 911, stating that Clark was again threatening her, despite the nocontact order in place against him. When the police arrived, they noticed that the

apartment was in disarray but that nobody was home. An hour later, Sherry called

again from the apartment, stating that Clark had destroyed the apartment and

threatened her, and relating that he had fired a gun at her several months prior. Upon

their arrival, Sherry admitted the responding officers and gave them consent to search

the apartment. She also searched for the gun Clark had used to threaten her in

December, which she had previously hidden in the entertainment center. When she

was unable to find it, she led the officers into the master bedroom and directed them

to the attic closet, stating that Clark often hid things in the closet. One of the officers

searched the closet and found a sawed off shotgun and a handgun in a closed duffle

bag. Noticing that neither was the gun she was looking for, Sherry resumed her

search of the entertainment center and found a handgun, which she gave to the

officers.

Clark was charged in a four-count indictment. Counts one and two charged

him with being a felon in possession of ammunition and a handgun in violation of 18

U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Counts three and four involved his possession of the sawed-off

shotgun. Clark filed several pretrial motions, including a motion to suppress the

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3

 The Honorable Jonathan Lebedoff, Chief United States Magistrate Judge for

the District of Minnesota.

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evidence found in the attic closet because, he argued, Sherry did not have the

authority to consent to the search. A magistrate judge3

 recommended that the motion

to suppress be denied because he found “no indication that [Clark] had exclusive use

of the closet or that Ms. Clark did not have access to, or control over, the space.”

Report and Recommendation of July 1, 2002, at 9. The district court adopted the

recommendation and entered an order denying the motion. D.Ct. Order of Aug. 1,

2002.

On the first day of trial, jury selection proceeded in usual course, with each

party exercising peremptory strikes. The government struck six men and one woman;

the defendant struck nine women and two men. The empaneled jury was composed

of six men and six women, with a seventh man as the alternate. After the selected

jurors’ names had been read into the record, the remaining members of the jury pool

excused, and the jury given preliminary instructions, defense counsel raised a genderbased Batson challenge. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The following

morning, the district court solicited comments from both sides related to the Batson

challenge. It did not require the government to attempt to justify its strikes. Rather,

the court noted the “practical problem” that the issue had not been raised until the

remaining jurors had been dismissed, commented that the jury was in fact balanced,

and proceeded to trial with the then-empaneled jury.

The jury returned a guilty verdict on counts 1 and 2, but could not reach a

verdict on counts 3 and 4. After a series of communications between the court and

the jurors, the district court dismissed counts 3 and 4 without prejudice and accepted

the partial verdict.

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Following numerous delays and several changes of counsel, Clark was

sentenced on April 7, 2004. Applying the United States Sentencing Guidelines

Manual (U.S.S.G.), the district court established Clark’s base offense level as 24 in

light of his prior convictions. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) (2001). It applied a four-level

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) for possession of a firearm “in connection

with another felony offense,” in this case the assault on Sherry Clark. The district

court also applied a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice. U.S.S.G.

§ 3C1.1(a). In light of Clark’s criminal history category of V, the resulting guidelines

range was 151 to 188 months. The district court sentenced Clark to 180 months’

imprisonment (120 months on count 1 and 60 months on count 2, to be served

consecutively), three years of supervised release, and a special assessment of $200.

II.

A.

Clark first argues that the district court improperly rejected his gender-based

Batson challenge to the prosecution’s peremptory strikes. A gender-based

peremptory strike resting on impermissible stereotypes constitutes a violation of the

Constitution’s equal protection clause. J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140

n.11 (1994). A timely raised challenge contending that a strike was based on race or

gender requires the district court to apply a three-part burden-shifting test to

determine if the strike violates the equal protection clause. U.S. Xpress Enters., Inc.

v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 320 F.3d 809, 812 (8th Cir. 2003). Such a challenge is

untimely, however, if it is not “made at the latest before the venire is dismissed and

before the trial commences.” United States v. Parham, 16 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir.

1994).

Clark’s counsel did not raise the Batson challenge until after the venire had

been dismissed, as noted by the district court’s statement that it “didn’t hear about the

issue until [it] had already let the other jurors go.” Accordingly, the motion in this

case was untimely and Clark has waived the challenge.

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B.

Clark next contends that he was denied his right to be present at all stages of

his trial, a right that is grounded in the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment,

Blackwell v. Brewer, 562 F.2d 596, 599 (8th Cir. 1977), in the due process clause of

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, United States v. Gunter, 631 F.2d 583, 589

(8th Cir. 1980), and in Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The

defendant bears the burden to show that he was absent during a particular stage of the

trial. United States v. Leisure, 377 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated and

remanded, 125 S. Ct. 1065 (2005) (remanded for reconsideration of an unrelated

sentencing issue in light of United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005)). Clark

was absent during two meetings between the judge and trial counsel in which jury

notes were read and discussed and during an in-chambers conference and brief

hearing regarding a note from an individual juror. Although Clark’s brief implies that

he may also have been absent when the jury reported that it had not reached a

unanimous verdict and when an Allen charge was given, see Allen v. United States,

164 U.S. 492 (1896), the government counters that because Clark was present earlier

the same afternoon in the courtroom and the transcript did not indicate that he had

departed, he was very likely present and had at the very least failed to prove absence.

Govt. Brief at 44. 

Rule 43 provides that the defendant’s presence is required at:

(1) the initial appearance, the initial arraignment, and the plea;

(2) every trial stage, including jury impanelment and the return of the

verdict; and

(3) sentencing.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a). The defendant’s presence is not required, however, when the

“proceeding involves only a conference or hearing on a question of law.” Fed. R.

Crim. P. 43(b)(3). We have held that Rule 43(b)(3) does not require the defendant’s

presence at a chambers conference held to determine a jury’s request for more

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instructions. United States v. Parker, 836 F.2d 1080, 1087 (8th Cir. 1987); see also

Gunter, 631 F.2d at 589 (characterizing an in-chambers meeting “about the additional

identification evidence which the prosecution sought to introduce” as “a conference

upon a question of law.”); Leisure, 377 F.3d at 915 (finding that discussions of

certain jury questions presented only questions of law). Accordingly, we conclude

that no violation of Rule 43 occurred when Clark was absent from the discussions

concerning the district court’s response to the questions from the jury. Each of these

discussions involved legal questions regarding the manner in which the jury was to

be instructed, and the defendant was ably represented therein by his attorney. See

Parker, 836 F.2d at 1084.

C.

Clark also appeals from the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress the

firearms that officers retrieved from their search of the attic closet. He argues that his

wife did not have authority to consent to a search of the closet. We review the facts

supporting the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress for clear error and

review its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Oates, 173 F.3d 651, 656 (8th

Cir. 1999).

The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit entry into a person’s home when

voluntary consent has been obtained, either from the person whose property is

searched or from someone with common authority over the premises. Illinois v.

Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990). In assessing the reasonableness of a search

based on consent, we ask “whether the facts available would have justified a

reasonable officer in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the

premises.” United States v. Czeck, 105 F.3d 1235, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997). The

officer’s conclusion that the consenting individual had authority to consent need not

always be correct, but must always be reasonable. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185-86.

It was reasonable for the officers to believe that Sherry had authority to consent

to the search of the attic closet. The house belonged to Sherry and Clark, and the

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unlocked closet was attached to the bedroom they shared. See United States v.

Moran, 214 F.3d 950, 951-52 (8th Cir. 2000). The items inside the closet were not

clearly labeled or specifically identified as belonging only to Clark. See id.; Czeck,

105 F.3d at 1239 (noting that everything in the room except the toolbox, which the

officers obtained a warrant to search, appeared to belong to the person consenting).

We agree with the magistrate judge that Sherry’s statement that Clark hid things in

the closet did not establish that she lacked access to the space or that Clark had

exclusive access to it. See Report and Recommendation of July 1, 2002, at 9.

D.

Finally, Clark argues that the sentencing enhancements that the district court

applied under the sentencing guidelines for obstruction of justice, U.S.S.G.

§ 3C1.1(A), and possession of a firearm while committing a felony assault, U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(A), were based on facts found by the district court in violation of the

Sixth Amendment.

United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), decided in the wake of Blakely,

124 S. Ct. 2531, established that it is unconstitutional for the district court to impose

enhancements under a mandatory federal sentencing guidelines scheme based on facts

not established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 750, 756.

As a remedy for the constitutional error, the Court replaced the mandatory scheme

with an advisory one by excising two statutory provisions. Id. at 764. Because Clark

first raised a Sixth Amendment Booker-related claim on appeal, we review for plain

error. Id. at 769. We examine the error using the four-part test of United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993), as described in United States v. Pirani, No. 03-2871

(8th Cir. Apr. 29, 2005) (en banc). We ask whether there is (1) error (2) that is plain

and (3) that affects substantial rights such that (4) “the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings” is affected. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732. We have

determined that the constitutional error, in light of Booker, “arose from the

combination of the enhancement and a mandatory Guidelines regime.” Pirani, slip

op. at 9 (emphasis in original). Such error is clearly present here, but it is a closer

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4

 The district court applied a two-level enhancement because it found that Clark

had obstructed justice by urging his wife to sign a false affidavit while he was in

federal custody prior to trial. It also applied a four-level enhancement because it

found that Clark possessed and used the firearm while committing terroristic threats

and second degree assault. The total offense level was therefore 30, with a criminal

history category of V, resulting in a sentencing range of 151 to 188 months.

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question whether the error affected Clark’s substantial rights. Because the Supreme

Court chose to excise the error by “retaining enhancements based upon judge-found

facts but applying them in an advisory guidelines regime,” id., we will find that a

defendant’s substantial rights are affected if he can “show a ‘reasonable probability,’

based on the appellate record as a whole, that but for the error he would have received

a more favorable sentence.” Id. at 11.

Clark was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment, which falls within the

applicable range of 151 to 188 months. The district court stated that it agreed with

the calculation in the presentence investigation report,4

 and it did not indicate a desire

to further reduce the sentence below the applicable guidelines range. Sentencing Tr.

at 37. The district court instead stated that Clark “represents a substantial danger to

the community” and concluded that “a sentence toward the bottom end of this

guideline range is just not going to adequately take into account the punishment that

is necessary for him, and the protection of the community when he gets out.” Id. at

40. Accordingly, because the record as a whole does not establish a reasonable

probability that Clark would have received a more favorable sentence under an

advisory guidelines scheme, he has not met his burden of demonstrating prejudicial

error under Olano, and thus he is not entitled to be resentenced. See Pirani, slip op.

at 13.

The conviction and sentence are affirmed.

______________________________

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