Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01232/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01232-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Howmedica Osteonics Corp.
Appellant
Smith & Nephew, Inc.
Appellee
Stryker Ireland Ltd.
Appellant
Wright Medical Technology, Inc.
Appellee
Zimmer, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP., STRYKER 

IRELAND LTD.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

ZIMMER, INC., WRIGHT MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, 

INC., SMITH & NEPHEW, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2015-1232, -1234, -1239

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

District of New Jersey in No. 2:11-cv-06511-SDW-MCA, 

Judge Susan D. Wigenton.

______________________ 

Decided: May 12, 2016

______________________ 

GEORGE C. LOMBARDI, Winston & Strawn LLP, Chicago, IL, for plaintiffs-appellants Howmedica Osteonics 

Corp., Stryker Ireland Ltd. Also represented by KARL

LEONARD; MICHELLE C. REPLOGLE, Houston, TX; SCOTT R.

SAMAY, New York, NY; JOVIAL WONG, Washington, DC; 

WILLIAM L. MENTLIK, ROY H. WEPNER, Lerner, David,

Littenberg, Krumholz & Mentlik LLP, Westfield, NJ. 

J. MICHAEL JAKES, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, 

Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Washington, DC, for defendantCase: 15-1232 Document: 74-2 Page: 1 Filed: 05/12/2016
2 HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. v. ZIMMER, INC. 

appellee Zimmer, Inc. Also represented by AMANDA K.

MURPHY. Defendant-Appellee Wright Medical Technology, 

Inc., represented by ANTHONY J. FITZPATRICK, 

CHRISTOPHER S. KROON, Duane Morris, LLP, Boston, MA; 

SAMUEL W. APICELLI, Philadelphia, PA. DefendantAppellee Smith & Nephew, Inc., represented by BRADLEY 

T. LENNIE, Hunton & Williams, LLP, Washington, DC;

DAVID A. KELLY, Atlanta, GA; ARNOLD B. CALMANN, 

Saiber, LLC, Newark, NJ.

______________________ 

Before O’MALLEY, PLAGER, and WALLACH, Circuit 

Judges.

PLAGER, Circuit Judge. 

This is a patent case. Plaintiffs-Appellants Howmedica Osteonics Corp. and Stryker Ireland Ltd. (collectively, 

“Stryker”) appeal the district court’s final judgment.1 The 

district court held that Defendants-Appellees Smith & 

Nephew, Inc. (“Smith”); Wright Medical Technology, Inc.

(“Wright”); and Zimmer, Inc. (“Zimmer”) (collectively 

“Zimmer et al.”) did not infringe the asserted claims of 

U.S. Patent No. 6,475,243 (“’243 patent”).2 

The district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement following claim construction. On appeal, 

Stryker contends that the district court erred in its claim 

construction and abused its discretion by forbidding 

 

1 We refer to the final judgment for ease of reference. The district court granted a separate final judgment in favor of each defendant-appellee. 

2 As explained in more detail later, the ’243 patent 

at issue is a reexamination patent; several of the asserted 

claims were added in reexamination. 

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HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. v. ZIMMER, INC. 3

Stryker from asserting infringement under the doctrine of 

equivalents. 

BACKGROUND

I. Technology and Prosecution History

The ’243 patent concerns a socket assembly used in 

prosthetic hip implants. The patent addresses three 

major components involved: a shell member and a bearing 

member, which together replace the socket (technically 

the acetabulum) part of the pelvis bone, and the femoral 

component, the ball-shaped end of the thigh bone that 

marries with the socket. In a prosthetic hip replacement, 

a shell device is implanted into a patient’s pelvic bone; a 

bearing device is then secured into that shell; and that 

bearing then receives the ball-shaped end of a patient’s 

femur (which end may be replaced with an artificial ball 

device). 

According to the patent, securing the bearing to the 

shell is particularly important. The securement mechanism depends upon the type of bearing chosen by the 

physician. In some instances, a bearing may be secured 

by means of a rib-recess securement. The bearing’s 

exterior surface, which comes into contact with the shell’s 

interior surface, contains a protruding rib. That rib fits 

into a recess within the shell’s interior surface. This 

attachment mechanism works when the bearing is of a 

flexible type, such as a polyurethane substance.

In other instances, a bearing may be secured by 

means of complementary tapered surfaces. A portion of 

the bearing’s exterior surface, which comes into contact 

with the shell’s interior surface, is tapered in a manner 

complementary to a tapered portion of a shell’s interior 

surface. This may be used when the bearing is of a ceramic or metal type. 

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4 HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. v. ZIMMER, INC. 

In at least some instances, a fourth component may be 

involved—a metallic securing device or sleeve, which fits 

in between the shell and the bearing.

Regardless of whether a sleeve is necessary, the patented shell can accommodate either type of securement

since the shell may contain both a recess and a tapered 

surface. However, the location of the recess relative to the 

taper within the shell is important. The patent claims 

specify that the recess and the taper (or the first and 

second securing “structures” or “elements”) are to be 

“juxtaposed” or in “juxtaposition” with one another and 

“placed at relative locations such that the effectiveness” of 

each is “maintained while in the presence of the other.”3 

Examples: 

Claim 20: “the first and second securing structures being juxtaposed with one another and 

placed at relative locations such that the effectiveness of each of the first and second securing 

elements is maintained while in the presence of 

the other of the first and second securing elements”;

Claim 27: “the first and second securing elements 

being juxtaposed with one another and placed at 

relative locations such that the effectiveness of 

each of the first and second securing elements is 

maintained while in the presence of the other of 

the first and second securing elements”;

Claim 41: “the securement recess and the internal 

securement taper being juxtaposed with one another and placed at relative locations such that 

the effectiveness of each of the securement recess 

 

3 For ease of reference, we refer to the recess and 

taper—not the “structures” or “elements”—unless otherwise noted.

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and the internal securement taper is maintained 

while in the presence of the other of the securement recess and the internal securement taper”; 

and

Claim 53: “the securement recess and the internal 

securement taper are in juxtaposition with one 

another and placed at relative locations such that 

the effectiveness of each of the securement recess 

and the internal securement taper is maintained 

while in the presence of the other of the securement recess and the internal securement taper.”

’243 Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate at 1:47–55 

(claim 20), 3:11–17 (claim 41), 5:48–6:5 (claim 53); 

’243 patent at 17:3–8 (claim 27). 

In two separate passages, the written description explains that the recess is to be placed “essentially midway” 

along the taper. First, in discussing shell member 22, the 

patent states:

Seating surface 110 includes an upper end 112 

and a lower end 114 and is divided by the recess 

62 into an upper segment 116 and a lower segment 118 (see FIG. 4). By placing the recess 62 

essentially midway between the upper end 112 

and the lower end 114, engagement of the seating 

surfaces 106 and 110, and the locking of the seating surfaces 106 and 110 in response to such engagement, is facilitated by virtue of the locking 

being accomplished along segments 116 and 118 

having generally the same, and therefore maximized, axial length. In this manner, the effectiveness of the seating surface 110 in assuring 

appropriate alignment between the sleeve 100 and 

the shell member 22 as the sleeve 100 is inserted 

into the shell member 22 and in subsequently attaining the desired locking engagement with seatCase: 15-1232 Document: 74-2 Page: 5 Filed: 05/12/2016
6 HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. v. ZIMMER, INC. 

ing surface 106 is not compromised by the presence of the recess 62.

’243 patent at 7:8–23 (emphasis added). 

The patent explains that seating surface 110, located 

in the shell’s interior surface, is provided with a tapered 

configuration for mating with another tapered surface. 

Id. at 6:20–7:5. These components are pictured: 

Second, in discussing shell member 212, the patent 

states:

Seating surface 354 includes an upper end 360 

and a lower end 362 and is divided by the recess 

262 into an upper segment 364 and a lower segment 366. By placing the recess 262 essentially 

midway between the upper end 360 and the lower 

end 362, engagement of the seating surfaces 350 

and 354, and the locking of the seating surfaces 

350 and 354 in response to such engagement is facilitated, by virtue of the locking being accomplished along segments 364 and 366 having 

generally the same, and therefore maximized, axial length. In this manner, the effectiveness of the 

seating surface 354 in assuring appropriate 

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8 HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. v. ZIMMER, INC. 

and subsequent (on the right) versions of Figure 4 are 

reproduced below:

Fourth, Stryker added dependent claims 25 and 32 which 

explicitly state that the recess is located “essentially 

midway between the upper and lower ends of the internal 

securing surface.” ’243 Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate at 2:7–9 (claim 25); ’243 patent at 18:4–6 (claim 32).

II. Procedural History

On November 4, 2011, Stryker sued Zimmer et al. in 

the United States District Court for the District of New 

Jersey for infringing the ’243 patent. On May 17, 2012, 

Stryker served its initial infringement contentions asserting literal infringement of several claims—without asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents 

(“DOE”). However, Stryker also stated: 

To the extent that any of the limitations of the asserted claims are not deemed to be literally infringed in the manner set forth in Exhibit A, 

Stryker contends that they are infringed under 

the doctrine of equivalents. In the event that a 

claim limitation is deemed to be missing under a 

literal infringement analysis (e.g., due to claim 

construction), Stryker reserves the right to 

demonstrate the presence of a substantial equivaCase: 15-1232 Document: 74-2 Page: 8 Filed: 05/12/2016
HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. v. ZIMMER, INC. 9

lent of such an element and pursue infringement 

claims under the doctrine of equivalents.

J.A. 5409–10, 5463, 5758–59. 

On July 9, 2013, the district court issued its Markman 

opinion and order. The court construed the relative 

location claim language quoted above in claims 20, 27, 41, 

and 53, to require that “the recess is essentially midway 

along the taper such that the effectiveness of each is not 

compromised.” J.A. 39. The court also construed claim 

language in the same claims to require that “the internal 

taper of the shell mates with the external taper of a 

metallic securing member (i.e. sleeve) secured to and 

separate from the bearing member.” J.A. 46. In other 

words, the court required the presence of a sleeve in 

between the shell and the bearing, for the taper type of 

securement. 

As a result of the “sleeve” construction, Stryker could 

no longer prove infringement by Wright or Zimmer—

neither of their products contained a sleeve. Appellants’ 

Br. at 17. As a result of the “essentially midway” construction, Stryker could no longer prove literal infringement by any of the Appellees. Id. at 18–19.

Even after the adverse claim constructions, Stryker 

did not move to amend its infringement contentions to 

include the DOE.

Stryker offered Wright and Zimmer a stipulated 

judgment of non-infringement under the “sleeve” construction. Stryker offered Smith a stipulated judgment of 

non-infringement under the “essentially midway” construction. No consent judgment was reached because 

Wright and Zimmer sought a judgment that they did not 

infringe under the “essentially midway” construction. 

Despite the lack of agreement, Stryker moved for entry of final judgment or entry of partial final judgment 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)—based on the “sleeve” conCase: 15-1232 Document: 74-2 Page: 9 Filed: 05/12/2016
10 HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. v. ZIMMER, INC. 

struction as to Zimmer and Wright and the “essentially 

midway” construction as to Smith. In its briefing, Stryker 

stated it had infringement arguments against Wright and 

Zimmer regarding the “essentially midway” construction 

under the DOE. The district court denied Stryker’s 

motion and ordered summary judgment briefing. Zimmer 

et al. moved for summary judgment. The parties agreed 

that only claims 20, 27, 41, and 53 were relevant for

summary judgment.

On November 24, 2014, the court issued an opinion 

and order granting Zimmer et al.’s motions for summary 

judgment of non-infringement. The court determined that 

Stryker’s failure to amend its infringement contentions to 

include a DOE infringement theory precluded Stryker 

from asserting that theory in opposition to Zimmer et al.’s 

motions for summary judgment. The court noted that 

Stryker could not assert infringement under the DOE 

generally and also stated Stryker was specifically precluded from asserting the DOE theory of infringement 

with respect to the “essentially midway” construction. 

Stryker did not argue for literal infringement under the 

court’s “essentially midway” construction. As a result, the 

court granted Zimmer et al.’s motions for summary judgment based on the “essentially midway” construction. 

The court also granted Zimmer’s and Wright’s motions for 

summary judgment of non-infringement based on the 

court’s “sleeve” construction. The court expressed no 

opinion as to whether Smith would be entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the “sleeve” construction.

The court entered final judgments based upon its 

granting Appellees’ motions for summary judgment. 

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Stryker appealed to this court, and we have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).4

DISCUSSION

Resolution of this appeal turns on two issues: did the 

district court err in its claim constructions, and did the 

district court err in precluding Stryker from pursuing a 

DOE theory of infringement.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment according to the law of the regional circuit. Teva

Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 661 F.3d 

1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The Third Circuit reviews 

grants of summary judgment without deference, applying 

the same standard used by the district court. Azur v. 

Chase Bank, USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 

2010). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

247–48 (1986).

We review claim construction without deference to the 

trial court’s view of the matter, but we review underlying 

factual findings by the district court for clear error. Teva 

Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841–42

(2015).

We review a district court’s application of its local 

rules for abuse of discretion. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 

2006).

 

4 This appeal is a consolidation of appeal nos. 2015-

1232, 2015-1234, and 2015-1239. 

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12 HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. v. ZIMMER, INC. 

I. Claim Construction

First, we examine the district court’s claim construction. Stryker contests both the “essentially midway” and 

“sleeve” constructions. However, we need only address 

the “essentially midway” construction because it is dispositive. 

Generally, a claim term is given its ordinary and customary meaning—the meaning that a “term would have 

to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the 

time of the invention.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 

1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). However, a 

skilled artisan reads a claim term not only in the context 

of the claim at issue, but also in the context of the entire 

patent, including the written description and prosecution 

history, as well as relevant extrinsic evidence. Id. at 

1313–17. Indeed, “the [written description] ‘is always 

highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Id. at 1315 (citation omitted). 

Nevertheless, we have observed that there is a fine line 

between reading a claim in light of the written description 

and reading a limitation into the claim from the written 

description. Id. at 1323.

As discussed in the background section above, each 

claim at issue specifies that the recess and taper of the 

shell be “juxtaposed” or in “juxtaposition” with one another and “placed at relative locations such that the effectiveness” of each is “maintained while in the presence of 

the other.” The claims themselves do not describe how to 

achieve this outcome. 

As noted earlier, the written description contains two 

passages—set out above—describing how to place the 

recess and taper relative to one another to maintain 

effective alignment and securement. Both passages were 

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added in conjunction with the claim language at issue.5 

Both passages place the recess “essentially midway” along 

the taper, dividing the taper into two roughly equal

segments whose lengths are thereby maximized. ’243 

patent at 7:8–23, 11:28–42. The written description 

explains that, as a result, the effectiveness of the taper is 

not compromised by the presence of the recess. Id. These 

explanations are the only instances in which the patent 

specifies how to achieve the goals of relative recess and 

taper placement and what effectiveness of the taper 

means in the context of the claims. Indeed, the written 

description offers no other suggestion as to how the recess 

and taper should be located to satisfy the claim language. 

Thus, every description and every figure in the patent 

that discusses the issue places the recess “essentially 

midway” along the taper.

Stryker asks that we focus on the plain language of 

the claims and offers a number of dictionary definitions 

for the terms “juxtaposed with” and “in juxtaposition 

with” to mean that the recess and taper are “positioned 

nearby” one another. But focusing on a particular term’s 

plain and ordinary meaning may be inadequate, when 

relying on that meaning does not resolve the parties’ 

dispute. See O2 Micro Int’l, Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation 

Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008). That is 

the case here. By focusing on the specific juxtaposition 

terms, Stryker ignores the other claim language at issue 

(e.g., effectiveness) and fails to resolve the parties’ dispute 

as to how the recess and taper are to be located relative to 

 

5 More accurately, the written description passages 

were added in conjunction with only some of the claims at 

issue—claims 20 and 27. Claims 41 and 53 were added 

during reexamination. Claim 20 was amended during 

reexamination. 

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14 HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. v. ZIMMER, INC. 

each other to satisfy the entirety of the claim language at 

issue. 

This problem is only resolved by examining the written description—i.e., reading the claims in context. 

Construing the claims in this manner is not only consistent with our precedent, but also necessary in light of 

the claim language at issue. We have previously construed such relative location terms in a similar manner by 

relying upon the written description. See, e.g., Hologic, 

Inc. v. SenoRx, Inc., 639 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Here, 

we must understand how the recess and taper are to be 

“juxtaposed” or in “juxtaposition” with one another, and 

“placed at relative locations such that the effectiveness” of 

each is “maintained while in the presence of the other.” 

The meaning of these terms is not facially clear, and a 

skilled artisan would naturally look to the written description for a full understanding of the claims. We do the 

same and adopt the district court’s construction.

We noted earlier the fine line between reading claims 

in light of the written description, and importing limitations from the written description. We also note that not 

all commentators are in agreement that we religiously 

adhere to the distinction. See, e.g., Robert L. Harmon et 

al., Patents and the Federal Circuit 453–56 (12th ed. 

2015). The statute requires that claims “particularly 

point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter” of the 

invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b); see also Nautilus, Inc. v. 

Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014). 

When the claims leave little doubt as to what is intended, 

re-shaping the claims with material from the written 

description is clearly unwarranted. 

On the other hand, the parties have not raised the 

question of whether the juxtaposition language could 

make the claims fatally indefinite. Under the circumstances, construing the unclear claim terms at issue in 

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light of the written description explanation is the proper 

claim construction technique. 

Stryker argues that the district court’s construction is 

improper for at least two additional reasons, neither of 

which is persuasive.

A. Preferred Embodiments

Stryker contends that the “essentially midway” language in the written description concerns a preferred 

embodiment or preferred embodiments and that we 

cannot so limit the claims. Stryker labels this as the 

“cardinal sin” of claim construction, based upon Phillips, 

415 F.3d at 1320, and DSW, Inc. v. Shoe Pavilion, Inc., 

537 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 

First, Stryker focuses on the sentences preceding each 

of the two written description passages set out above: “In 

the preferred embodiment, the shell member 22 and the 

sleeve 100 are constructed of commercially pure titanium 

and the angle A is about 6o.” ’243 patent at 7:5–8. “In the 

preferred embodiment, the shell member 212 and the 

sleeve 340 are constructed of commercially pure titanium 

and the angle 356 is about 60.” Id. at 11:25–27.6 Stryker 

notes that each sentence starts with the phrase “In the 

preferred embodiment.” Stryker reasons that introductory clauses apply not only to the sentences in which they 

are located, but also to the entirety of the quoted passages. 

Stryker is mistaken. Both sentences discuss preferred embodiments only with respect to the angle of the 

taper—not the relative locations of the recess and the 

taper. In other words, context reveals that such introduc-

 

6 It appears that the language may have been mistakenly drafted as “angle 356 is about 60” instead of 

“angle 356 is about 6o.”

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16 HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. v. ZIMMER, INC. 

tory clauses limit only the sentences in which they are 

located in this case. 

Second, Stryker argues that the “essentially midway” 

language in the written description concerns a preferred 

embodiment because of language near the beginning and 

end of the written description. Before the figures are 

described, the patent states: “The invention will be understood more fully . . . in the following detailed description 

of preferred embodiments of the invention.” Id. at 3:42–

45. Similarly, before reciting the claims: “It is to be 

understood that the above detailed description of preferred embodiments of the invention is provided by way of 

example only.” Id. at 12:54–56.

However, if the general rule against limiting claims in 

this manner held, then Stryker’s proposed understanding 

would quite severely limit any understanding of the 

claims in light of the written description. Indeed, there 

would be some question as to whether there was the 

statutorily required written description—“[t]he specification shall contain a written description of the invention . . 

. in . . . full, clear, concise, and exact terms.” 35 U.S.C. 

§ 112(a).

We decline to read this written description in such a 

crabbed manner as Stryker suggests. Reading the patent 

in its entirety, it is clear that such generalized language 

concerning preferred embodiments, near the start and 

end of the written description, does not limit the entirety 

of the intervening section—3:42 to 12:54. In this case, 

such language merely reflects that this wide swath of the 

written description may contain descriptions of preferred 

embodiments, and this is true.

Finally, Stryker argues that, even if we were to rely 

on the written description, it merely teaches that the 

length of the taper zone should be maximized—and that 

this can be accomplished by placing the groove midway 

along the taper, at an edge of the taper, or not in the 

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taper. However, this misconstrues the language of the 

written description, which clearly discusses maximizing 

each of the two separate segments of the taper created by 

placing the groove in the middle of the taper and thereby 

bisecting the taper. See ’243 patent at 7:8–23, 11:28–42.

B. Claim Differentiation

Stryker also argues that the district court’s construction violates the doctrine of claim differentiation, since 

dependent claims are presumed to be of narrower scope 

than the independent claims from which they depend. 

Stryker cites claims 25 and 32, which include the additional, explicit requirement that the “recess is located 

essentially midway” between the taper. Claim 25 ultimately depends from independent claim 20. Claim 32 

ultimately depends from independent claim 27. 

However, claim differentiation is a rebuttable presumption that may be overcome by a contrary construction dictated by the written description or prosecution 

history. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & 

Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In this instance, that presumption has been rebutted. The written 

description reveals only instances in which the claim 

language is satisfied by the placement of the recess “essentially midway” along the taper. The prosecution 

history reveals that the same language from the written 

description was added in conjunction with the similar 

claim language at issue—as well as the “essentially 

midway” language in dependent claims 25 and 32. The 

natural and correct result of reviewing the intrinsic 

evidence was the district court’s construction. Claim 

differentiation is not conclusive; it is a guide, not a rigid 

rule. See ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., Inc., 558 

F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Although it is a useful 

tool, claim differentiation does not require that the “dependent claim tail . . . wag the independent claim dog” in 

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18 HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. v. ZIMMER, INC. 

this case. See N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 

7 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district 

court’s “essentially midway” construction.

II. Local Patent Rules

Second, we examine whether the district court abused 

its discretion in applying its local rules to preclude 

Stryker from arguing infringement under the DOE. We 

affirm decisions in which the district court enforced its 

own local rules, unless it is “clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; based on erroneous conclusions of law; 

clearly erroneous; or unsupported by any evidence.” 

Monolithic, 467 F.3d at 1366–67; see also Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 

1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (same). In light of this highly 

deferential review standard, we are not able to conclude 

that the district court abused its discretion.

The district court determined that Stryker could not 

assert any DOE theory of infringement because Stryker 

failed to comply with the court’s Local Patent Rules 

(“LPR”). LPR 3.1(e) requires that a patentee’s infringement contentions state “whether each limitation of each 

asserted claim is alleged to be literally present or present 

under the doctrine of equivalents in the Accused Instrumentality,” unless a design patent is at issue. The district 

court noted that Stryker failed to set forth specifically any 

DOE theory in its original infringement contentions nor 

did it allege DOE in later amended contentions. Indeed, 

Stryker never sought to amend its infringement contentions to include the DOE. And the court also determined 

that Stryker’s reserving its right to assert the DOE did 

not satisfy LPR 3.1(e). 

We defer to the district court “when interpreting and 

enforcing local rules so as not to frustrate local attempts 

to manage patent cases according to prescribed guideCase: 15-1232 Document: 74-2 Page: 18 Filed: 05/12/2016
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lines.” Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 289 F.3d 761, 774 

(Fed. Cir. 2002). The local rules clearly required Stryker, 

as the party asserting infringement, to state whether it 

asserted infringement under the DOE in its infringement 

contentions. The local rules also clearly envisioned that 

Stryker could seek to amend its infringement contentions. 

LPR 3.7 allows for amendment by court order upon a 

timely application and showing of good cause. LPR 3.7(a) 

specifically notes that “a claim construction by the [c]ourt 

different from that proposed by the party seeking 

amendment” may, absent undue prejudice to the adverse 

party, support a finding of good cause. 

Stryker never sought to amend its infringement contentions to include the DOE, so it cannot demonstrate 

that it satisfied the LPR requirements. Although the 

result may seem harsh, we find no abuse of discretion in 

the district court applying its rather clearly stated rule. 

Indeed, we have failed to find an abuse of discretion in 

similar circumstances. In Genentech, 289 F.3d at 773–74, 

we affirmed the district court’s ruling that Genentech 

failed to comply with a local rule requiring that a DOE 

theory be included in its claim chart. As a result, Genentech was barred from proceeding with a DOE theory of 

infringement. Id.

Stryker’s arguments on this point are not persuasive. 

Stryker first attempts to shift the focus from the LPR by 

arguing that the district court abused its discretion in 

permitting Zimmer et al. to move for summary judgment. 

Stryker reasons that the district court should have granted it final judgment on the same terms as its proposed

consent judgment—although not all Appellees agreed to 

those terms. We observe that this argument ignores the 

district court’s actual decision and does not address 

Stryker’s failure to abide by the local rules. Moreover, 

Stryker did not appeal the denial of its motion for entry of 

final judgment. 

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20 HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. v. ZIMMER, INC. 

Stryker next argues that it had no need to allege a 

DOE theory of infringement until after claim construction. This may have been true, but it still does not excuse 

Stryker’s failure to follow the local rules. Even if Stryker 

had no reason to amend until after claim construction, 

Stryker could have sought amendment after the Markman order. Stryker asserts that a litigant cannot be 

forced to foresee and incorporate all possible claim constructions into its initial infringement contentions. This 

may be true, but the local rules provide for opportunity to 

seek amendment of its contentions for this very reason. 

See LPR 3.7(a) (discussing claim construction). 

Stryker focuses on language in Monolithic, 467 F.3d 

at 1366, that “[i]f a local patent rule required the final 

identification of infringement and invalidity contentions 

to occur at the outset of the case, shortly after the pleadings were filed and well before the end of discovery, it 

might well conflict with the spirit, if not the letter, of the 

notice pleading and broad discovery regime created by the 

Federal Rules.” Of course, we agree, but we highlight the 

very next sentence from the same opinion: “But we see 

nothing in the Federal Rules that is inconsistent with 

local rules requiring the early disclosure of infringement 

and invalidity contentions and requiring amendments to 

contentions to be filed with diligence.” Id. (emphasis 

added).

With respect to amendment, Stryker argues there was 

no opportunity or reason to amend after the Markman

order, because discovery had been stayed. Zimmer et al. 

note a number of discrepancies with this argument, which 

Stryker does not contest. Zimmer et al. note that Stryker 

engaged in discovery after the Markman order by requesting samples of the accused products—and that Zimmer et 

al. provided such samples. Zimmer et al. note that the 

district court then entered an order ending discovery two 

months after the Markman order, because Stryker conCase: 15-1232 Document: 74-2 Page: 20 Filed: 05/12/2016
HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. v. ZIMMER, INC. 21

ceded at a status conference that it could not prove infringement.

Moreover, when seeking entry of a final judgment, 

Stryker contended it had a DOE argument, but Stryker 

refused to disclose the basis for that argument. Stryker 

does not appear to contest any of these points. Even if 

Stryker did contest these points, the record reflects that 

Stryker had time to seek amendment of its infringement 

contentions but failed to do so. In light of the record we 

cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in applying its local rules to prevent Stryker from 

asserting the DOE when it did. 

III. Summary Judgment

The district court granted Zimmer et al.’s motions for 

summary judgment on the basis of the “essentially midway” construction. The court reasoned that, in light of the 

accused devices, Stryker could not prevail on a literal 

infringement theory, and could not argue for DOE infringement given its failure to comply with the local rules. 

Stryker has not identified any genuine dispute as to any 

material fact or any indication why Zimmer et al. would 

not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on 

our affirming the “essentially midway” construction and 

affirming the district court’s application of its local rules 

to bar Stryker’s DOE argument. We affirm on this 

ground, but we express no opinion as to the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment in favor of Wright and Zimmer on the basis of the “sleeve” construction. On the 

basis of our disposition, we need not and do not reach that 

issue.

As a result of the consolidation of the three cases here 

on appeal, identifying the exact “asserted claims” in this 

case is not a straightforward exercise. For the record, 

here is our understanding. Although neither the parties 

nor the district court identified for the record on appeal 

all of the actual “asserted claims,” the parties and the 

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22 HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. v. ZIMMER, INC. 

district court appear to have agreed that claims 20, 27, 

41, and 53 were dispositive for the purposes of summary 

judgment.

In their briefing of summary judgment before the district court, the Appellees identified the asserted claims in 

each of their cases. Zimmer stated that Stryker asserted 

Zimmer infringed claims 20, 27–30, 35–37, 39, 41–48, and 

53–55. Motion for Summary Judgment by Zimmer, Inc. 

at 2, Howmedica v. DePuy, No. 11-6498 (D.N.J. June 6, 

2014), ECF No. 225-2. All of these claims are either the 

independent claims at issue on appeal (claims 20, 27, 41, 

and 53) or are dependent claims ultimately depending 

from those independent claims. Each of those independent claims contains language affected by the “essentially 

midway” construction. Stryker could not prevail on a 

literal infringement theory under the district court’s 

construction.

Wright stated that Stryker asserted Wright infringed 

claims 20, 27–30, 36, 37, 39, 41–44, 47, 48, and 53. Motion for Summary Judgment of Noninfringement by 

Wright Med. Tech., Inc. at 2, Howmedica v. DePuy, No. 

11-6498 (D.N.J. June 6, 2014), ECF No. 224-2. All of 

these claims are either the independent claims at issue on 

appeal (claims 20, 27, 41, and 53) or are dependent claims 

ultimately depending from those independent claims. 

Each of those independent claims contains language 

affected by the “essentially midway” construction. 

Stryker could not prevail on a literal infringement theory 

under the district court’s construction.

Smith stated that Stryker asserted Smith infringed 

claims 20, 27–30, 35–37, 39, and 41–55. Motion for 

Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement by Smith & 

Nephew Inc. at 1, Howmedica v. DePuy, No. 11-6498 

(D.N.J. June 6, 2014), ECF No. 220-2. All of these 

claims—except for claims 49–51—are either the independent claims at issue on appeal (claims 20, 27, 41, and 

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HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. v. ZIMMER, INC. 23

53) or are dependent claims ultimately depending from 

those independent claims. Claims 49–51 each include the 

identical relative location terms found in claim 20—which 

is at issue on appeal. It is unclear why the district court 

or the parties did not construe the identical claim language in claims 49–51. However, the parties and the 

district court appear to be in agreement that the construction of these terms in the claims at issue on appeal—

claims 20, 27, 41, and 53—is dispositive. With this understanding, we affirm.

CONCLUSION

We have considered the parties’ other arguments but 

found them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, the 

final judgments of the district court are affirmed.

AFFIRMED

Case: 15-1232 Document: 74-2 Page: 23 Filed: 05/12/2016