Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cr-00097/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cr-00097-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dean Ray McLaughlin
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

McGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

BRIAN W. ENOS

Assistant United States Attorney

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401

Fresno, Ca 93721

Telephone: (559) 497-4000

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEAN RAY McLAUGHLIN,

Defendant.

Case No: 1:19-cr-00097 DAD-BAM

STIPULATION TO CONTINUE APRIL 13, 2020 

STATUS CONFERENCE TO JULY 27, 2020; 

ORDER

Ctrm: 8

Hon. Barbara A. McAuliffe

This case is set for a status conference on April 13, 2020. On March 17, 2020, this Court issued 

General Order 611, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California scheduled to 

commence before May 1, 2020. This General Order was entered to address public health concerns 

related to COVID-19. 

Although the General Order addresses the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. Zedner 

v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

Case 1:19-cr-00097-DAD-BAM Document 25 Filed 04/06/20 Page 1 of 5
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id.

at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally

or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—the General Order requires specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances 

are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of 

justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a 

speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets 

forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice 

served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in 

a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Order excludes delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time.”

///

Case 1:19-cr-00097-DAD-BAM Document 25 Filed 04/06/20 Page 2 of 5
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

STIPULATION

THE PARTIES HEREBY STIPULATE, through their respective attorneys of record, Assistant 

United States Attorney Brian W. Enos, counsel for the government, and David A. Torres, counsel for 

defendant Dean Ray McLaughlin (“defendant”), that this action’s Monday, April 13, 2020 status 

conference be continued to Monday, July 27, 2020, at 1:00 p.m. The parties likewise ask the court to 

endorse this stipulation by way of formal order.

The parties base this stipulation on good cause. Specifically,

1. On or about December 30, 2019, the government sent a plea offer in the form of a written 

plea agreement to the defense. Since that time, counsel for defendant has been leveraged 

(among other matters) trying a murder case in state court, and then underwent surgery to 

address a medical issue. To date, he continues to recover but is not yet able to return to the 

office. In addition, and in light of the current (and spreading) COVID-19 pandemic, he will 

be unable to return until his recovery is complete.

2. Counsel for the parties will work to complete its negotiations regarding a potential resolution 

of this case by the requested continuance date of July 27, 2020. If they are able to reach a 

resolution prior to this date, they will notify the court and ask that a change of plea hearing 

be set.

3. The parties therefore stipulate that the period of time from April 13, 2020, through July 27, 

2020, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and 

(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the parties’ request on the 

basis of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the 

best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

///

///

///

///

///

Case 1:19-cr-00097-DAD-BAM Document 25 Filed 04/06/20 Page 3 of 5
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: April 3, 2020

By:

MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ BRIAN W. ENOS

BRIAN W. ENOS

Assistant United States Attorney

(As authorized 4/3/20)

Dated: April 3, 2020 By: /s/ David A. Torres

David A. Torres, Esq.

Attorney for Defendant

 Dean Ray McLaughlin

Case 1:19-cr-00097-DAD-BAM Document 25 Filed 04/06/20 Page 4 of 5
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

O R D E R

IT IS ORDERED that the status hearing currently set for April 13, 2020 at 1:00 pm is continued 

until July 27, 2020, at 1:00 pm before Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the period of time from April 13, 2020, through July 27, 

2020, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) 

because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the parties’ request on the basis of the 

Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the 

public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 6, 2020 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:19-cr-00097-DAD-BAM Document 25 Filed 04/06/20 Page 5 of 5