Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-01061/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-01061-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Manpower Group
Defendant
Manpower US Inc.
Defendant
Virgil L. Strong
Plaintiff
The Hwashin America Corporation
Consol Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

VIRGIL L. STRONG, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Case No. 2:14-cv-1061-WKW-WC 

 ) LEAD CASE 

THE HWASHIN AMERICA ) 

CORPORATION, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Before the court is the Hwashin America Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss for 

Failure to Prosecute (Doc. 38), in which it seeks dismissal pursuant to Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure 37 and 41. On October 16, 2014, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed two 

Complaints alleging that his employment was terminated due to unlawful discrimination 

based upon his age, race, and criminal background. See Compl. (Doc. 1), Strong v. 

Manpower Group, Civ. Case No. 2:14-cv-1061-WKW-WC; Compl. (Doc. 1), Strong v. 

The Hwashin America Corp., Civ. Case No. 2:14-cv-1062-WKW-WC. One complaint 

was against the Hwashin America Corporation (“Defendant”) and the other named 

Manpower US Inc.1

 (“Manpower”) as defendant. The cases were consolidated into a 

single action, Order (Doc. 7) at 1, and the District Judge referred the consolidated case to 

the undersigned Magistrate Judge “for all pretrial proceedings and entry of any orders or 

recommendations as may be appropriate.” Order (Doc. 5). On June 30, 2015, the court 

 

1

 The complaint actually named Manpower Group as the defendant, but Plaintiff later sought and was 

granted leave to amend the name of the party to Manpower US Inc. See Mot. (Doc. 32); Order (Doc. 33). 

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was informed that Manpower and Plaintiff had reached a settlement agreement, (Doc. 

36), and thus Manpower was dismissed from the case. Order (Doc. 37) at 1. 

Accordingly, the only remaining claims are against Defendant, who seeks dismissal 

based on Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute. After a review of Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss, and for the reasons that follow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 38) be GRANTED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

In the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, Defendant informed the court 

that, to date, Plaintiff has failed to serve any initial disclosures, has not fully responded to 

Interrogatories, has failed to provide or make available documents which are responsive 

to Requests for Production, has moved to a new residence without notifying the court or 

Defendant, and has failed to attend two properly-noticed depositions. Def.’s Mot. (Doc. 

38) at 1-5. Plaintiff has also failed, on numerous occasions, to respond when Defendant 

has contacted Plaintiff regarding the deficiencies in the discovery materials. Id. at 3, 4. 

After reviewing the Motion to Dismiss, the undersigned ordered Plaintiff to show 

cause as to why the motion should not be granted. Order (Doc. 39) at 1. The time for 

Plaintiff to show cause expired on August 24, 2015. Plaintiff has yet to file any response 

to the undersigned’s order. Additionally, the undersigned set the matter for a hearing to 

be held on August 26, 2015. Order (Doc. 39) at 1. Although Plaintiff did not object to 

the date or time set for the hearing, Plaintiff failed to appear. 

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At the hearing on the matter, Defendant informed the court that the last confirmed 

communications between Defendant and Plaintiff occurred on June 30, 2015.2

 On that 

day, Plaintiff requested that the second attempt at his deposition be set for July 31, 

2015—yet, for the second time, as mentioned above, Plaintiff failed to appear at his 

properly-noticed deposition. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly “authorizes a district 

court to dismiss a complaint for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with a court 

order or the federal rules.” Gratton v. Great Am. Commc’ns, 178 F.3d 1373, 1374 (11th 

Cir. 1999). 

The district court possesses the inherent power to police its docket. Link v. 

Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30, 82 S. Ct. 1386, 1388, 8 L. Ed. 

2d 734 (1962). “The sanctions imposed can range from a simple reprimand 

to an order dismissing the action with or without prejudice.” Mingo v. 

Sugar Cane Growers Co-op. of Fla., 864 F.2d 101, 102 (11th Cir. 1989). 

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to 

dismiss a party’s complaint “[f]or failure . . . to prosecute or to comply with 

. . . any order of court.” But dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) is 

appropriate only if “(1) a party engages in a clear pattern of delay or willful 

contempt (contumacious conduct); and (2) the district court specifically 

finds that lesser sanctions would not suffice.” Betty K. Agencies Ltd., 432 

F.3d at 1339; Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985) 

(reciting two-pronged test for dismissal); Jones v. Graham, 709 F.2d 1457, 

1458 (11th Cir. 1983) (same); Hildebrand v. Honeywell, Inc., 622 F.2d 179, 

181 (5th Cir. 1980) (same). 

Collins v. Lake Helen, L.P., 249 F. App’x 116, 120 (11th Cir. 2007). 

 

2

 Notably, on June 30, the same day Defendant last heard from Plaintiff, the court was informed that 

Manpower had reached a settlement with Plaintiff and sought to be dismissed from the case. See

Stipulation of Dismissal (Doc. 36) at 1. 

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Additionally, Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the court 

to issue various sanctions, including dismissal, based on a party’s failure to make 

disclosures or cooperate in discovery. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) authorizes a district court to dismiss an action if 

a party “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.” Rule 37(d) 

authorizes the same if a party fails to appear for properly noticed 

deposition. 

While disfavored, “dismissal . . . may be appropriate when plaintiff’s 

recalcitrance is due to [willfulness], bad faith or fault.” Phipps v. Blakeney, 

8 F.3d 788, 790 (11th Cir. 1993). There is a “need for a strict adherence to 

Rule 37 so as to prevent parties from ‘flouting discovery orders.’” 

Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Watkins, 943 F.2d 1297, 1304 (11th 

Cir. 1991) (quoting National Hockey League, et al. v. Metropolitan Hockey 

Club, Inc., et al., 427 U.S. 639, 96 S. Ct. 2778, 49 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1976)). 

Reed v. Fulton Cnty. Gov’t, 170 F. App’x 674, 675 (11th Cir. 2006). 

The undersigned concludes this case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute 

and for failure to provide or permit discovery, as Plaintiff has been engaging in a clear 

pattern of willful contempt and lesser sanctions would not suffice. Plaintiff was 

previously warned that his failure to comply with court orders would result in the 

recommendation that his case be dismissed. Order (Doc. 8) (warning Plaintiff that failing 

to comply with the court’s order “will result in this court’s recommendation that this 

case be dismissed”); order (Doc. 10) (warning Plaintiff “that if he fails to respond, the 

court will have no choice but to recommend this case be dismissed for failure to 

prosecute and abandonment of claims”). Despite the prior warnings, Plaintiff has failed 

to cooperate in the discovery process—failing to turn over initial disclosures, failing to 

respond fully to interrogatories and requests for production, and twice failing to appear at 

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his own deposition—and has utterly ignored the court’s order (Doc. 39) to show cause 

and to appear for a hearing. 

The undersigned has reviewed the case to determine whether a measure less 

drastic than dismissal is appropriate. After such review, the undersigned finds dismissal 

is the proper course of action. Plaintiff is an indigent individual. The imposition of 

monetary or other punitive sanctions against him would be ineffectual. Plaintiff’s utter 

inaction in this case following the settlement received by Manpower suggests he does not 

seek to proceed with this case against Defendant. It therefore appears that any additional 

effort by this court to secure his compliance would be unavailing. 

Consequently, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff’s abandonment of his 

claims and his failure to comply, both with his discovery obligation and orders of the 

court, warrant dismissal. Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (As a 

general rule, where a litigant has been forewarned, dismissal for failure to obey a court 

order is not an abuse of discretion.); see also Tanner v. Neal, 232 F. App’x 924 (11th Cir. 

2007) (affirming sua sponte dismissal without prejudice of inmate’s § 1983 action for 

failure to file an amendment to complaint in compliance with court’s prior order directing 

amendment and warning of consequences for failure to comply). 

II. CONCLUSION

 For the reasons stated above, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate 

Judge that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute (Doc. 38) be 

GRANTED and this case be dismissed. 

 It is further

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ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said 

Recommendation on or before September 17, 2015. Any objections filed must 

specifically identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the 

party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by 

the District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order 

of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable. 

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in 

the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the 

District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on 

appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except 

upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 

(5th Cir. 1982); see Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see 

also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as 

binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to 

the close of business on September 30, 1981). 

Done this 3rd day of September, 2015. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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