Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-16-02016/USCOURTS-ca10-16-02016-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Matthew Maley
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

MATTHEW MALEY, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 16-2016 

(D.C. No. 2:13-CR-03696-RB-3) 

(D. N.M.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Matthew Maley was charged with conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of 

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; possession with intent to distribute 50 

grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), 

and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

922(g)(1) and § 924(a)(2). After receiving three trial continuances that extended the start 

of trial more than seven months, Mr. Maley filed a fourth motion to continue, claiming he 

had hired new counsel who was unavailable during the scheduled trial date. The district 

court denied his motion, Mr. Maley proceeded to trial, and he was convicted on all five 

 *

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

March 9, 2017

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 16-2016 Document: 01019776216 Date Filed: 03/09/2017 Page: 1 
 

2 

counts. He appeals the district court’s denial of his fourth motion for a continuance, and 

we affirm. 

I. 

Mr. Maley was arrested on December 4, 2013. Jared Abrams and Steven 

Almanaza entered their appearances on his behalf on December 6 and December 19, 

respectively. The district court scheduled the trial to begin on February 18, 2014, but Mr. 

Maley filed an unopposed motion on February 4 to continue trial for sixty days. The 

court granted the motion and reset trial for April 14. 

Due to a superseding indictment filed on March 19, the district court reset trial 

again, for May 19. On April 23, Mr. Maley joined one of his co-defendants’ unopposed 

motion to continue trial for sixty days, which the court granted, resetting trial for July 14. 

Leading up to this new trial date, three of Mr. Maley’s co-defendants pled guilty. Mr. 

Maley flirted with doing the same but instead on July 14 he filed yet another motion to 

continue. The next day, Mr. Almanza and Mr. Abrams filed motions to withdraw as 

counsel. The court allowed Mr. Maley seven days to retain a new attorney but denied the 

motion to withdraw after Mr. Maley’s efforts proved fruitless. Instead, the court granted 

Mr. Maley’s third motion to continue, resetting trial for September 15. In so doing, the 

court noted that “[t]he attorney client relationship between Matthew Maley and counsel 

has deteriorated” and that “Mr. Maley has expressed that he and his family are actively 

seeking new counsel to handle the instant case.” Rec., vol. I at 51. At a status 

conference on July 29, Mr. Almanza said that he had been contacted by Mark Resnick, an 

attorney based in Tucson, Arizona, who had expressed an intention to enter an 

Appellate Case: 16-2016 Document: 01019776216 Date Filed: 03/09/2017 Page: 2 
 

3 

appearance and was just trying to work things out. At that time, the court warned Mr. 

Maley that the trial would go forward in September in any event. 

On September 4, Mr. Abrams told the court that Mr. Maley had hired Mr. Resnick 

and that he and Mr. Almanza would remain as local counsel. The court commented that 

“[t]his matter has been pending since mid-July on this whole issue of new counsel. And 

even as of this morning, we’re just assuming that’s going to happen.” Rec., vol. IV at 4. 

Nevertheless, the court reset trial for September 22. 

On September 17, however, Mr. Maley filed his fourth motion to continue the 

trial, this time opposed by the government, stating that Mr. Resnick intended to represent 

him but he had a jury trial set in Tucson during Mr. Maley’s trial date in New Mexico. In 

an attached email, Mr. Resnick said he would need a ninety-day continuance. In this 

final motion to continue, Mr. Maley cited United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 458 U.S. 140, 

144 (2006), for the proposition that “a Defendant has a right to choose which counsel 

shall represent him and should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own 

choice.” Rec., vol. II at 20. 

In its order denying Mr. Maley’s most recent motion to continue, the district court 

explained how courts must balance a defendant’s right to retain counsel of choice against 

the need to maintain the integrity of the judicial process. Applying the factors we set out 

in United States v. Flanders, 491 F.3d 1197, 1216 (10th Cir. 2007), the court succinctly 

found the following: 

Consideration of these factors leads the Court to conclude that Mr. 

Maley’s motion should be denied. First, Mr. Maley waited until three 

business days before the trial to file his motion. Over thirty-five witnesses 

Appellate Case: 16-2016 Document: 01019776216 Date Filed: 03/09/2017 Page: 3 
 

4 

have been notified and the Court has cleared its calendar for the trial. 

Undoubtedly, a continuance would inconvenience the witnesses and the 

Court. Second, this is the fourth request for a continuance. The Court 

granted the defense’s three prior requests for trial continuances. Third, Mr. 

Maley has never explained any reason for his delay in obtaining new 

counsel and he has never suggested a legitimate reason that would warrant 

such a lengthy delay. Fourth, Mr. Resnick has been in contact with current 

counsel and the Government since July 2014, yet he has failed to enter an 

appearance. Fifth, Mr. Almanza and Mr. Abrams are competent attorneys 

who are prepared to try the case. Sixth, Mr. Maley has failed to make a 

case for any material prejudice or substantial harm that would result from 

the denial of his request for a continuance. Seventh, while the trial may be 

lengthy, the charges are not complex. Finally, the facts specific to the case 

are that for two months the Court allowed Mr. Maley free rein to obtain 

new counsel with the only requirement being that he notify the Court of his 

progress, yet to date, on the eve of trial, Mr. Resnick has not entered an 

appearance. All of the factors deemed relevant by the Tenth Circuit weigh 

against Mr. Maley’s request to continue the trial. Accordingly, Defendant’s 

Motion to Continue Trial Set for September 22, 2014 will be denied. 

Rec., vol. II at 29-30 (emphasis added). 

 Mr. Maley proceeded to trial with Mr. Abrams and Mr. Almanza, was convicted 

on all five counts, and now appeals. 

II. 

Mr. Maley’s sole argument on appeal is that the district court deprived him of his 

constitutional right to counsel of choice by denying his fourth request for a continuance. 

We review a district court’s denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. United States 

v. Trestyn, 646 F.3d 732, 739 (10th Cir. 2011). 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 

shall enjoy the right to . . . have Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. 

amend. VI. “[A]n element of this right is the right of a defendant who does not require 

appointed counsel to choose who will represent him.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 

Appellate Case: 16-2016 Document: 01019776216 Date Filed: 03/09/2017 Page: 4 
 

5 

548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006). “‘Attorneys are not fungible;’ often ‘the most important 

decision a defendant makes in shaping his defense is his selection of an attorney.’” 

United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 625 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. 

Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1502 

(10th Cir. 1988)). Not only is a deprivation of this right “complete” at the time of denial, 

“regardless of the quality of the representation [the defendant] received,” GonzalezLopez, 548 U.S. at 148, but it also qualifies as structural error, meaning it is not subject to 

harmless-error analysis, id. at 148-149, 152. Thus, “when [a] trial court unreasonably or 

arbitrarily interferes with a defendant’s right to counsel of choice . . . a conviction cannot 

stand.” United States v. Holloway, 826 F.3d 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting United 

States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1016 (10th Cir. 1992)). 

 This right, however, “is not absolute.” United States v. McKeighan, 685 F.3d 956, 

966 (10th Cir. 2012). Specifically, in the context of a court’s refusal to grant a 

continuance we must “balance[e] the defendant’s ‘constitutional right to retain counsel of 

. . . choice against the need to maintain the highest standards of professional 

responsibility, the public’s confidence in the integrity of the judicial process and the 

orderly administration of justice.’” United States v. Flanders, 491 F.3d 1197, 1216 (10th 

Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 

993, 1015 (10th Cir. 1992)). 

In striking that balance, we consider whether: 1) the continuance would 

inconvenience witnesses, the court, counsel, or the parties; 2) other 

continuances have been granted; 3) legitimate reasons warrant a delay; 4) 

the defendant's actions contributed to the delay; 5) other competent counsel 

is prepared to try the case; 6) rejecting the request would materially 

Appellate Case: 16-2016 Document: 01019776216 Date Filed: 03/09/2017 Page: 5 
 

6 

prejudice or substantially harm the defendant's case; 7) the case is complex; 

and 8) any other case-specific factors necessitate or weigh against further 

delay. 

Id. 

 As recounted above, the district court evaluated each factor we set out in Flanders

and cogently concluded that Mr. Maley’s motion for a continuance should be denied. 

The court clearly did not abuse its discretion in so doing. 

 We AFFIRM. 

Entered for the Court 

Stephanie K. Seymour 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 16-2016 Document: 01019776216 Date Filed: 03/09/2017 Page: 6