Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-01704/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-01704-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joe McGrath
Respondent
Felix Solorio Valdovinos
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FELIX SOLORIO VALDOVINOS,

Petitioner,

v.

JOE McGRATH,

Respondent.

 /

No. C02-1704 CW

ORDER DENYING

RESPONDENT'S

MOTIONS TO

AUTHORIZE

INTERLOCUTORY

APPEAL AND FOR

STAY

Respondent has filed a motion to authorize an interlocutory

appeal of the Court's March 20, 2007 Order granting Petitioner

Felix Solorio Valdovinos's motion to lift the stay on his petition

for a writ of habeas corpus and to amend his petition to add newly

exhausted allegations. Respondent also seeks a stay of the

proceedings pending resolution of the appeal. Petitioner opposes

this motion. The matter was taken under submission on the papers. 

Having considered all of the papers on the motion, the Court DENIES

Respondent's motion to authorize interlocutory appeal and DENIES as

moot Respondent's motion to stay.

Respondent asks the Court to certify the following issues: 

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(1) whether this Court erred in allowing Petitioner to add his

newly exhausted claims to his petition without requiring him to

show good cause for his delay in exhausting them, and (2) whether

this Court erred in concluding that Petitioner's newly exhausted

claims relate back to his original claims. 

BACKGROUND

On December 1, 1998, a jury convicted Petitioner of the first

degree murder of Nelson Caballero. A state appellate court

affirmed the judgment on August 23, 2000. Petitioner filed a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme

Court on June 29, 2001 that was denied on December 19, 2001. 

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA) imposes a one-year period of limitation on an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1). On April 10, 2002, Petitioner filed a timely pro se

federal habeas petition in this Court.

On May 24, 2004, more than two years after the expiration of

AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations (Dec. 3, 2004 Order at 14-

15, Docket #38, dismissing unexhausted claims and staying

petition), Petitioner's counsel filed a traverse introducing four

pieces of newly discovered evidence that had not been submitted

with his state habeas petition. On July 27, 2004, Respondent moved

to dismiss on the ground that the traverse added facts and legal

theories that made Petitioner's claims unexhausted, and that the

revised claims were untimely and did not "relate back" to the

original ones. The Court found that three of Petitioner's claims

were, as revised, unexhausted, stayed the petition in light of the

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new evidence, and ordered Petitioner to proceed diligently to

exhaust his remedies in State court. (Dec. 3, 2004 Order at 35,

Docket #38)

More than nine months later, on September 9, 2005, Petitioner

filed in the California Supreme Court a state habeas corpus

petition, containing his unexhausted claims, which was denied on

July 26, 2006. Petitioner returned to this Court on September 14,

2006 by filing a motion to lift the Court's stay and to amend the

stayed petition to add the newly exhausted claims. Respondent

opposed this motion, arguing (1) that Petitioner did not act within

a reasonable time to exhaust his unexhausted claims, and (2) that

the newly exhausted claims were untimely because they did not

relate back to the original claims. 

On May 20, 2007, the Court granted Petitioner's motion to lift

the stay and to amend the petition to add the newly exhausted

claims. Respondent then filed this motion to authorize an

interlocutory appeal and a motion to stay proceedings pending

resolution of the appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard for Authorization of Interlocutory Appeal

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), this Court may certify an

appeal of an interlocutory order if three factors are present. 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b). 

First, the issue to be certified must involve a controlling

question of law. Id. Establishing that a question of law is

controlling requires a showing that the "resolution of the issue on

appeal could materially affect the outcome of litigation in the

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district court." In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020,

1026 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing United States Rubber Co. v. Wright,

359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 1966)). The term "controlling" has

been construed broadly and may, in limited circumstances, reach

such issues as "needless expense and delay." Batt v. City of

Oakland, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77087, at *7 (N.D. Cal.) (citing

Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316, 319 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

Second, there must be substantial ground for difference of

opinion on the issue. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). A substantial ground

for difference of opinion is not established by a party's strong

disagreement with the court's ruling; the party seeking an appeal

must make some greater showing. Mateo v. M/S Kiso, 805 F. Supp.

792, 800 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 

Third, an interlocutory appeal must be likely materially to

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1292(b); Mateo, 805 F. Supp. at 800. Whether an appeal may

materially advance termination of the litigation is linked to

whether an issue of law is "controlling" in that the court should

consider the effect of a reversal by the Ninth Circuit on the

management of the case. Id. In light of the legislative policy

that interlocutory appeals be certified only in exceptional

circumstances, the court should consider whether litigation in

reliance on its order permitting such an appeal would be

"protracted and expensive." In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673

F.2d at 1026; Mateo, 805 F. Supp. at 800. If an interlocutory

appeal would delay resolution of the litigation, an appeal should

not be certified. Shurance v. Planning Control Int'l, Inc., 839

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F.2d 1347, 1348 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to hear certified appeal

in part because decision of Ninth Circuit might come after

scheduled trial date). 

The court should construe the requirements for certification

strictly, and grant a motion for certification only when

exceptional circumstances warrant such action. Coopers & Lybrand

v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978). The party seeking

certification of an interlocutory order has the burden of

establishing the existence of such exceptional circumstances. Id.

A court has substantial discretion in deciding whether to grant a

party's motion for certification. Brown v. Oneonta, 916 F. Supp.

176, 180 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) rev'd in part on other grounds, 106 F.3d

1125 (2nd Cir. 1997). 

II. Interlocutory Appeal of Delay Issue 

Respondent argues that the first issue that is appropriate for

interlocutory appeal is whether this Court erred in allowing

Petitioner to add his newly exhausted claims to his petition

without requiring him to show good cause for his delay in

exhausting them.

a. Controlling Question of Law

Respondent cites APCC Services, Inc. v. Sprint Communications

Co. L.P., 297 F. Supp. 2d. 90, 95-96 (D.D.C. 2003) and Oxygenated

Fuels Association, Inc. v. Pataki, 304 F. Supp. 2d 337, 340

(N.D.N.Y. 2002) for the proposition that under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),

a controlling question of law is one that could significantly

affect or impact the action. Respondent argues that the issues he

seeks to appeal meet that criterion because reversal of the Court's

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order would reduce Petitioner's claims to what they were in the

original petition, thereby avoiding the additional briefing and

other preparation Petitioner's expanded claims would require.

The resolution of this issue on appeal could materially affect

the outcome of litigation by saving time and expense for the

litigants and the Court if the Court's order were reversed. The

issue of whether this Court erred in not requiring Petitioner to

show good cause for his delay in exhausting his state court

remedies is therefore a controlling question of law in this case,

at least as to the newly exhausted issues. Batt, 2006 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 77087, at *7 (citing Kuehner, 84 F.3d at 319). Petitioner

does not argue otherwise.

b. Substantial Ground for Difference of Opinion

Although Respondent vehemently argues that the March 20, 2007

Order is incorrect and did not address Respondent's legal

arguments, Respondent must make a greater showing that a

substantial ground for difference of opinion exists. See Mateo,

805 F. Supp. at 800. 

Citing APCC Services, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d. at 97-98,

Respondent asserts that a substantial ground for difference of

opinion exists where there is a dearth of precedent within the

controlling jurisdiction and conflicting decisions in other

circuits, and where a court's challenged decision conflicts with

decisions of several other courts. Respondent argues that the lack

of case law applying Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 278 (2005),

establishes a substantial ground for difference of opinion as to

whether this Court was correct in allowing Petitioner to add his

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newly exhausted claims to his petition without requiring him to

show good cause for his delay. However, Respondent does not

establish that there are conflicting decisions on this issue in

other circuits or that this Court's order conflicts with decisions

of other courts.

In Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278, the Supreme Court instructed

courts to "place reasonable time limits on a petitioner's trip to

state court and back." The Supreme Court also instructed that a

district court should stay rather than dismiss a petition with both

exhausted and unexhausted claims if the petitioner had good cause

for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims were potentially

meritorious, and there was no indication that the petitioner

engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. Id.

Rhines does not present a substantial ground for difference of

opinion on whether nine months is a reasonable time for Petitioner

to file his unexhausted claims in state court because Rhines did 

not set an outer limit of what is a reasonable time period. 

Although the Court in Rhines cited a Second Circuit opinion,

Zarvela v. Artuz, 254 F. 3d 374, 381 (2nd Cir. 2001), which

suggested that district courts condition stays on petitioners

pursuing their state court remedies within thirty days, the Court

did not adopt any specific time limit. Moreover, Rhines was

decided after this Court issued its order staying the petition and

instructing Petitioner to proceed diligently to exhaust his state

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1 Although several Ninth Circuit cases have held Zarvela's

thirty-day suggested time limit to be reasonable, the Ninth Circuit

has not required district courts to impose a thirty-day time limit

on petitioners filing their dismissed claims while the proceeding

is stayed. See Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1071 (9th Cir. 2002)

(holding that a district court "may require" petitioners to file

their new state petition within thirty days) overruled in part by

Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007); Ford v.

Hubbard, 330 F.3d 1086, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002); Brambles v. Duncan, 342 F.3d 898, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that taking eighty-five

days to exhaust state remedies did not demonstrate the petitioner's

lack of diligence).

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court remedies. Because neither the Ninth Circuit1 nor the Supreme

Court has adopted a specific time limit for petitioners to file

their unexhausted claims in state courts while the district court

stays their petitions, it would have been inappropriate for this

Court in its March 20, 2007 Order to impose retroactively and

without notice a specific time limit on Petitioner. 

Further, the limits the Supreme Court established in Rhines

were primarily directed towards capital defendants who might delay

filing an amended petition in state court in an attempt to delay

the execution of their sentences. Id. at 277-78. That policy does

not apply to Petitioner because he is not a capital defendant who

has an interest in delay; there is no evidence that Petitioner

intentionally engaged in dilatory litigation tactics. As the Court

noted in its March 20, 2007 Order, Petitioner did not control his

counsel's schedule or have the ability to communicate with his

counsel in English. (Dec. 3, 2004 Order at 14.) The Court also

found that Petitioner is not responsible for not listing in his

original petition exculpatory information that he had no knowledge

of due to the alleged misconduct of the prosecutor. (Dec. 3, 2004

Order at 16.) To dismiss Petitioner's petition under these

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circumstances because he took nine months to file his state habeas

petition would be unjustified and would not support Rhine's primary

goal of preventing intentional delays by capital defendants. In

this case, the strength of the ground for difference of opinion

does not support an interlocutory appeal. 

c. Materially Advance Termination of Litigation

Respondent argues that if this Court authorizes an

interlocutory appeal and its March 20, 2007 Order is reversed, the

subsequent reduction in Petitioner's claims and the Court's

workload would materially advance the termination of the

litigation. 

A court should grant a motion for certification only when

exceptional circumstances warrant such action. Coopers, 437 U.S.

at 475. Respondent has not demonstrated that such extraordinary

circumstances are present here. If an interlocutory appeal were

granted and the Ninth Circuit reversed this Court's March 20, 2007

Order, it would simplify the resolution of this case but would not

end the litigation of Petitioner's remaining claims. If the Ninth

Circuit affirmed the Order, the interlocutory appeal would have

delayed the ultimate termination of this case rather than advanced

it. Moreover, whatever the outcome of an interlocutory appeal, the

other claims will go forward and one party may take a second

appeal, thus burdening the court of appeals with two appeals in the

same case.

III. Interlocutory Appeal of Relation-Back Issue 

The second issue that Respondent argues is appropriate for

interlocutory appeal is whether this Court erred in concluding that

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Petitioner's newly exhausted claims relate back to his original

claims. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), new claims

relate back to the date of the original pleading if they arose out

of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the

original pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2). 

a. Controlling Question of Law

Respondent cites APCC Services, 297 F. Supp. 2d. at 95-96, and

Oxygenated Fuels, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 340, for the proposition that,

in determining whether a question of law is controlling, the court

should consider the precedential impact the appeal will have on

other cases. Respondent argues that the present issue has

precedential value and is therefore controlling because the case

law on the "common core of operative facts" in the habeas context

is sparse and because this case presents an opportunity for the

Ninth Circuit to simplify AEDPA by holding that an untimely,

factually unexhausted claim ordinarily does not relate back to the

original, timely claim.

Because a successful interlocutory appeal of this issue would

have precedential value as well as materially affect the

litigation's outcome by saving time and expense for the litigants

and the Court, this question is controlling, at least as to the

newly exhausted issues. See In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673

F.2d at 1026 (citing United States Rubber Co., 359 F.2d at 785);

Batt, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77087, at *7 (citing Kuehner, 84 F.3d

at 319).

 

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b. Substantial Ground for Difference of Opinion

As stated above, a substantial ground for difference of

opinion is not established by a party's strong disagreement with

the court's ruling. Mateo, 805 F. Supp. at 800. Respondent argues

that the March 20, 2007 Order is incorrect but does not make the

requisite greater showing that a substantial ground for difference

of opinion exists.

Respondent argues that the lack of case law applying Mayle v.

Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 657-664 (2005), establishes a substantial

ground for difference of opinion as to whether this Court was

correct in allowing Petitioner to amend his petition. Mayle held

that amendments to a habeas petition do not "relate back" when they

are based on facts that differ in time and type from those in the

original pleading. Because Mayle did not address cases such as

this one involving amendments based on facts with no readily

discernible time of occurrence, Respondent argues that the lack of

case law leaves substantial ground for difference of opinion. 

As with his argument based on Rhines, however, Respondent only

establishes that there is a dearth of case law in this area, not

that there are conflicting decisions on this issue in other

circuits or that this Court's March 20, 2007 Order conflicts with

decisions of other courts. Thus, Respondent has not shown a

substantial ground for difference of opinion on the relation-back

issue sufficient to justify an interlocutory appeal. 

c. Materially Advance Termination of Litigation

Respondent does not separately discuss how an appeal of the

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relation-back issue would materially advance termination of the

litigation. For the reasons stated above in regard to the issue of

delay, even if the appellate court found that the new amendment did

not relate back, the termination of the litigation would not be

materially advanced.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondent's motion to authorize an

interlocutory appeal (Docket #49) is DENIED and Respondent's motion

to stay (Docket #49) is DENIED as moot. Respondent's answer to the

petition is due thirty days from the date of this order. 

Petitioner's traverse is due thirty days thereafter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 7/12/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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