Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-30219/USCOURTS-ca9-14-30219-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Andrew Franklin Kowalczyk
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v.

ANDREW FRANKLIN KOWALCZYK,

Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 14-30198 

 14-30219

D.C. No. 

3:08-cr-00095-

MO-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted 

July 6, 2015—Portland, Oregon

Filed November 4, 2015

Before: Harry Pregerson, N. Randy Smith, and 

John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Pregerson

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2 UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s order finding a

defendant incompetent to stand trial and referring him to a

federal medical center for further evaluation, and remanded. 

The panel held that 18 U.S.C. § 4247 creates a nonwaivable right to counsel during competency proceedings,

and that the defendant was entitled to be represented by an

attorney at his competency hearing. The panel held that the

“meaningful adversarial testing” standard applies to assessing

whether amicus counsel, appointed by the district court,

satisfied the requirement of the right to counsel, and

concluded that the defendant’s amicus counsel did provide

meaningful adversarial testing.

The panel rejected the defendant’s claim that he was

denied his constitutional right to testify in his competency

hearings, and held that any potential abuse of discretion in not

allowing the defendant to speak at a hearing on supplemental

briefing was harmless.

The panel held that because multiple competency

evaluations and determinations are permitted by 18 U.S.C.

§ 4241, the panel did not commit process error when, after

finding the defendant incompetent for the first time and

referring him for treatment, the district court held a second

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK 3

competency hearing and ordered him committed and treated

a second time.

The panel saw no reason to reassign the case to a different

district court judge on remand.

COUNSEL

Stephen R. Sady (argued), Chief Deputy, Federal Public

Defender, Portland, Oregon, for Defendant-Appellant.

Gary Y. Sussman (argued), Assistant United States Attorney,

Kelly A. Zusman, Appellate Chief, S. Amanda Marshall,

United States Attorney, United States Attorney’s Office,

Portland, Oregon, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

OPINION

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

During the long running course of Andrew Kowalczyk’s

prosecution for production of child pornography the district

court conducted two separate competency hearings to

determine whether Kowalczyk was competent to stand trial.

During the second competency hearing, the district court

appointed amicus counsel. After both competency hearings

the district court found Kowalczyk incompetent to stand trial

and referred Kowalczyk to a federal medical center for

further evaluation. Kowalczyk appeals the second

commitment order. Kowalczyk argues that the second

competencyhearing violated his constitutional rights because

it: (1) deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel;

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4 UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK

(2) deprived him of his right to testify; and (3) deprived him

of the procedural protections outlined under 18 U.S.C. § 4241

for finding an individual incompetent. We affirm the district

court’s commitment order and remand for further

proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 21, 2008, a federal grand jury in the District

of Oregon returned a one count indictment charging

Kowalczyk with production of child pornography in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e). On March 20, 2012 the grand

jury returned a superseding indictment charging Kowalczyk

with eight additional counts of producing child pornography.

On February 22, 2008, Kowalczyk’s case was assigned to

District Judge Garr M. King. Kowalczyk first appeared in

court on August 20, 2009, and pleaded not guilty. Federal

Public Defenders Francesca Freccero and Ellen Pitcher were

appointed to represent Kowalczyk.

On December 2, 2009, Freccero and Pitcher moved to

withdraw as Kowalczyk’s attorneys because of a conflict with

Kowalczyk. The district court granted the motion to withdraw

and appointed Matthew Schindler to represent Kowalczyk.

Priscilla Seaborg was subsequently appointed as co-counsel.

Schindler and Seaborg moved to withdraw ten months later

on October 15, 2010. The district court warned Kowalczyk

that if his actions caused another attorney to resign he would

have to represent himself. On October 22, 2010, the district

court granted Schindler’s and Seaborg’s motion to withdraw

and appointed Michael Levine and Matthew McHenry to

represent Kowalczyk.

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UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK 5

Soon after, Levine and McHenry filed a motion to

withdraw, explaining that a “mutual loss of trust ha[d] led to

an irreconcilable breakdown in the attorney–client

relationship.” Kowalczyk stated that he did not wish to

represent himself, and the district court denied the attorneys’

motion to withdraw. On May 5, 2011, Levine and McHenry

filed a second motion to withdraw, explaining that the

“attorney–client relationship [was] shattered and irreparably

broken.” The district court granted Levine and McHenry’s

motion to withdraw, and appointed the seventh attorney, Noel

Grefenson, to represent Kowalczyk.

On June 1, 2012, Kowalczyk filed a pro se motion

objecting to Grefenson’s representation and requesting new

or additional counsel. The district court denied the motion.

On October 29, 2012, defense counsel Grefenson filed an

ex parte motion requesting funds for a psychological

evaluation of Kowalczyk. Grefenson explained that

Kowalczyk insisted that he receive a competency evaluation,

though Grefenson, admitting he was not a mental health

professional, did not believe his client was incompetent. The

district court denied the request, finding that there was no

indication “Kowalczyk was mentally unstable to the point

where he could not understand the proceedings or consult

with his lawyer.”

The district court noted that this was not the first time

Kowalczyk requested medical attention shortly before trial

was scheduled to begin. On August 10, 2012, less than a

month before a scheduled trial date, Kowalczyk complained

of a hernia and said he needed surgery. A doctor determined

surgery was not necessary and that the symptoms were likely

due to obesity.

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6 UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK

In November 2012, Kowalczyk’s father hired a clinical

and forensic psychologist, Dr. Donald True, to evaluate

Kowalczyk. Dr. True concludedKowalczyk was not presently

competent to stand trial and was unable to work with

attorneys due to irrational paranoia.

On November 16, 2012, the district court held an ex parte

hearing to address Kowalczyk’s continued requests for a new

attorney. Grefenson informed the court that Kowalczyk had

filed a lawsuit against him. Kowalczyk maintained that he

wanted to be represented by an attorney.

The district court summarized the procedural history of

the case and opined that it appeared as if Kowalczyk was

looking for ways “to avoid going to trial.” Because of the

conflict of interest created by the lawsuit Kowalczyk filed

against Grefenson, the district court decided to appoint new

counsel. But the court warned Kowalczyk that this was the

final lawyer that would be appointed and if Kowalczyk did

“anything that causes the lawyer to have to resign, . . . [the

court would] assume [he was] doing it in order to avoid going

to trial and [would] assume that [he had] waived [his] right to

counsel.” Kowalczyk then submitted Dr. True’s report to the

court. During the November 16, 2012 hearing, Judge King

transferred the case to Judge Mosman because Judge King

was scheduled to undergo surgery.

On November 30, 2012, Judge Mosman appointed Mark

Cross, the eighth attorney to represent Kowalczyk. The

district court again reminded Kowalczyk that Cross was his

“last lawyer” and that it would “deem [Kowalczyk] to be

representing [himself]” if “anything [got] in the way of the

continued representation.”

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UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK 7

On March 11, 2013, the government moved for a

competency hearing, a psychological evaluation, and

discovery of prior psychological reports. The district court

granted the government’s motion and ordered Kowalczyk to

undergo psychological evaluation in preparation for the

competency hearing and asked that a report be prepared

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4247.1

In May 20, 2013, Kowalczyk, acting pro se, moved for

substitution of counsel. He complained that, among other

things, Cross had not spent much more than an hour of face-

 

1 Psychiatric or psychological reports.— A psychiatric or

psychological report ordered pursuant to this chapter shall be

prepared by the examiner designated to conduct the psychiatric

or psychological examination, shall be filed with the court with

copies provided to the counsel for the person examined and to

the attorney for the Government, and shall include—

(1) the person’s history and present symptoms;

(2) a description of the psychiatric, psychological, and

medical tests that were employed and their results;

(3) the examiner’s findings; and

(4) the examiner’s opinions as to diagnosis, prognosis,

and—

(A) if the examination is ordered under section

4241, whether the person is suffering from a

mental disease or defect rendering him mentally

incompetent to the extent that he is unable to

understand the nature and consequences of the

proceedings against him or to assist properly in his

defense.

18 U.S.C. § 4247(c).

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8 UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK

time with him. Cross moved to withdraw as counsel that same

day.

On May 29, 2013, the district court held a status

conference to discuss both motions. The court summarized

the case’s drawn out procedural history, including references

to the eight court-appointed attorneys whose representation

was withdrawn, with the court’s consent, because of serious

conflicts that arose with their client Kowalczyk. The court

asked Cross whether he believed Kowalczyk was “mentally

competent to proceed with pro se representation.” Cross

responded, “I don’t believe in good faith that I can represent

in my opinion that he is not competent.” The court then

stated:

I’m inclined to find that the defendant has

been acting in a manner that’s dilatory and

hinders the efficient administration of justice;

that as Judge King said . . . that the

defendant’s conduct seems calculated to

prevent the trial from happening now five and

a half years later and eight attorneys later, and

that therefore he should be deemed to have

waived his right to counsel and proceed pro

se.

The district court granted Cross’s motion to withdraw and

stated that Kowalczyk’s motion for substitute counsel would

be resolved on the date set for the competency proceeding:

June 10, 2013. The court also had government counsel

remind Kowalczyk of the elements of the charged offense and

the potential punishment. The court found Kowalczyk

“competent to represent himself though the competency

hearing,” finding “that defendant has a rational as well as

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UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK 9

factual understanding of the proceedings against him and that

he has the mental capacity to conduct basic defense and trial

tasks as well as other pro se defendants.”

Self-Representation and First Competency Hearing

On June 6, 2013, Kowalczyk filed an emergency petition

for writ of mandamus with our court, challenging the district

court’s authority to require him to represent himself at his

own competency hearing. Our court denied the emergency

petition on the ground that any harm would be “correctable

on appeal.” 

On June 10, 2013, the district court held the first hearing

during these proceedings to address Kowalczyk’s

competency. The district court denied Kowalczyk’s motions

for substitute or standby counsel, consistent with its earlier

finding that Kowalczyk was “competent to represent himself

through the competency hearing.”

Government psychologist Dr. Eric Johnson submitted his

report to the court. The report stated that there were “findings

both in support of and not in support of incompetency.” Dr.

Johnson recommended a finding of incompetence and referral

to a facility where Kowalczyk can be “closely observed,

treated, and evaluated.” Defense psychologist Dr. True

determined, based on his own assessment, that Kowalczyk

was not competent to stand trial.

The district court was concerned that Kowalczyk was

malingering, but in light of the defendant’s and government’s

psychological reports, the district court found Kowalczyk

incompetent to stand trial. The district court ordered

Kowalczyk committed to the custody of the Attorney General

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10 UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK

under 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(d) and 4247(d). Kowalczyk was

transferred to the United States Medical Center for Federal

Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri (“FMC Springfield”)

pursuant to the court’s order.

Bureau of Prisons forensic psychologist Dr. Richart

DeMier evaluated Kowalczyk during his commitment at

FMC Springfield from July 2013 until October 2013.

Return from FMC Springfield and Second Competency

Hearing

Dr. DeMier determined that Kowalczyk was competent to

proceed with the case, finding “no mental illness which

would preclude [defendant’s] ability to understand the nature

of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his

defense.” Kowalczyk returned to the district court for further

proceedings. 

On October 9, 2013, the district court set further

competency proceedings for November 26, 2013. Before the

hearing, the government moved the district court to appoint

counsel to represent Kowalczyk at the competency hearing.

The court granted the government’s motion, appointed Todd

Bofferding as Kowalczyk’s legal counsel, and rescheduled

the competency hearing for January 9, 2014. On January 7,

2014, Bofferding and Kowalczyk filed a joint motion to

withdraw, citing concerns that Kowalczyk would soon file a

lawsuit and state bar complaint against him.

On January 9, 2014, the district court found that

Kowalczyk had “waived by action his right to be fully

represented at the competency hearing.” The court granted

Bofferding’s motion to withdraw. The court decided to

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UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK 11

appoint amicus counsel, finding that “the law technically

requires representation at a competency hearing.” When

Kowalczyk asked the court to explain the role of amicus

counsel, the court provided the following:

[An attorney appointed by the court] to do his

best to present any views opposing the

Government’s views in court. He won’t be

representing you. So you won’t be able to fire

him, but he will be doing his level best to

represent the interests of justice that any

defendant would be wanting to advance in a

case like this. 

The court appointed Robert Reid as amicus counsel and

ordered him “to advocate, as an attorney independent of both

the prosecution and Mr. Kowalczyk, the position of

competency that Mr. Kowalczyk has advised the Court he

intends to pursue in his pro se capacity.” 

On February 4, 2014, Kowalczyk moved pro se for

appointment of counsel for the competency hearing, which

the government opposed. The court denied the motion and

stated:

By his own actions, defendant has made

appointing him a lawyer impossible and

repeatedly demonstrated his intention to use

such appointments as a tactical delay. For him

to now complain that he cannot proceed

without counsel is like Penelope complaining

that her tapestry is not finished.

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12 UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK

The district court began competencyproceedings on April

10 and 11, 2014. On April 10, the government called and

examined one witness, Dr. DeMier, who was subsequently

cross-examined by both Reid as amicus counsel and

Kowalczyk acting pro se. At the conclusion of testimony that

day, the court asked the parties which witnesses they would

be presenting the next day. Both Kowalczyk and amicus

counsel Reid separately offered the names of witnesses, but

neither Kowalczyk nor Reid asked to have Kowalczyk testify

on his own behalf. On April 11, Kowalczyk released his two

witnesses without questioning them and, upon his request,

was escorted out to a remote viewing room when Reid called

Kowalczyk’s mother as a witness. After Kowalczyk returned,

Reid called and examined Kowalczyk’s father and Dr. True,

both of whom Kowalczyk cross-examined. The court then

concluded taking of evidence in the case. In all respects,

Kowalczyk fully participated in both days of the competency

proceedings, often being allowed by the court to speak out of

turn. 

The district court also determined that Reid did a “truly

masterful job” representing Kowalczyk’s interests over the

two days, both by cross-examining the government expert,

Dr. DeMier, and by calling Kowalczyk’s parents and Dr. True

as friendly witnesses.

Dr. DeMier, the evaluating doctor from FMC Springfield,

testified that Kowalczyk seemed “veryinvested in convincing

me that he was mentally ill,” which is uncommon for people

who are actually mentally ill and is more common in those

who are malingering. Dr. DeMier did not administer any

psychological tests because he believed that they would not

be accurate due to Kowalczyk’s knowledge of the purpose of

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UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK 13

the tests. Dr. DeMier testified that he believed Kowalczyk

was malingering and that he was competent to stand trial.

Dr. True, the defense expert, testified that Kowalczyk

suffered from paranoid schizophrenia with a pattern of

delusional disorder, a diagnosis similar to his first assessment

of Kowalczyk where he found that Kowalczyk had

Delusional Disorder, paranoid type. Dr. True testified that

Kowalczyk’s mental illness affects his competency because

it impacts his ability to work with attorneys and may lead him

to fire them. Dr. True also emphasized the importance of

using objective tests during psychological examinations.

The court found that while Kowalczyk clearly understood

the proceedings against him and was therefore competent on

that factor, it was unclear whether Kowalczyk was

incompetent on the second competency factor—his ability to

work with attorneys—and requested supplemental briefing on

that issue from the parties. The district court specifically

asked for briefing on whether: (1) “Dr. DeMier’s

methodology [was] so flawed as to make his conclusion of

competence unreliable,” (2) there is “solid evidence” to

support a finding that Kowalczyk was suffering from

delusions and paranoia, and (3) there is evidence that the

trouble with Kowalczyk’s attorneys was caused by his

paranoia and delusions. Amicus counsel Reid filed a 69-page

supplemental brief in response to the district court’s request

for further briefing on the issue of whether Kowalczyk was

competent to work with his attorneys. The government and

Kowalczyk also filed supplemental briefs, arguing

respectively for competency and incompetency.

On July 23, 2014, the district court held a hearing after

the supplemental briefings. After the government and amicus

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14 UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK

counsel argued the issues, Kowalczyk requested to speak. The

court initially denied his request, instead ruling that it found

“a better-than-average chance” that Kowalczyk was “merely

malingering.” However, the court also found that Dr.

DeMier’s competency evaluation and finding of competence

was inadequate, as was the incompetency finding by Dr.

True. Thus, the court decided to send Kowalczyk for

“renewed evaluation” by someone other than Dr. DeMier and

directed that the evaluation include a “thorough review of the

record in this case.”

After ruling, the court allowed Kowalczyk to speak.

Kowalczyk informed the court that he did not wish to return

to FMC Springfield. The court granted his request and

suggested that he be sent to a different facility.

On September 2, 2014, the district court ordered that

Kowalczyk be committed to the custody of the Attorney

General “who shall hospitalize defendant for evaluation and

treatment” for not more than four months “to determine

whether there is a substantial probability that in the

foreseeable future defendant will attain the capacity to permit

the proceedings to go forward.” If the evaluator determined

Kowalczyk was malingering and was competent, the

evaluator is required to issue a report to the court. If the

evaluator determined Kowalczyk had regained competency

then he or she is ordered to file a certificate with the court.

Finally, the court determined that if, at the end of the four

month period, Kowalczyk remained incompetent, a hearing

would be held to address further proceedings under 18 U.S.C.

§§ 4246 and 4248.

Kowalczyk appealed the district court’s order. Kowalczyk

also sought the appointment of counsel. Our court appointed

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UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK 15

Chief Deputy Federal Public Defender Steve Sady to

represent Kowalczyk in his appeal. Kowalczyk filed an

emergency motion in this court to stay the district court’s

commitment and treatment order. That motion was granted

without prejudice; the order stated: 

All proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)

are stayed pending this appeal. This order is

without prejudice to the district court’s entry

of a new order for psychiatric or

psychological examination of appellant and

the preparation of a psychiatric or

psychological report to be filed with the court

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b). However, no

use of the transcripts or other records of

appellant’s prior competencyhearings shall be

made in any examination or evaluation of

appellant pending this appeal.

The district court has declined to order a new evaluation.

JURISDICTION

We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s

commitment order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because pretrial

commitment orders are final decisions under the collateral

order doctrine. United States v. Friedman, 366 F.3d 975,

979–80 (9th Cir. 2004).2

2 We do not address Kowalczyk’s argument that the district court

violated his Sixth Amendment rights and attorney–client privilege, by

questioning his attorneys regarding their opinion as to his competency and

opening sealed proceedings that allowed the prosecution access to

privileged information and trial strategy detrimental to his case. Because

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16 UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK

DISCUSSION

I. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 

Our court reviews Sixth Amendment claims and the

waiver of the right to counsel de novo. United States v.

Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003); United

States v. Gerritsen, 571 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2009). We

also review the interpretation of statutes de novo. United

States v. Thompson, 728 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2013).

A. Counsel is Required During CompetencyProceedings

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the waivable right to

counsel at all critical stages of criminal proceedings,

including during competency proceedings. United States v.

Hamilton, 391 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that

“court-ordered psychiatric examinations to determine

the extent of such harm will be sufficiently protected by post-judgment

appeals, our jurisdiction to hear this claimis limited by the collateral order

doctrine. See United States v. Guerrero, 693 F.3d 990, 997 (9thCir. 2012)

(noting that “decisions adverse to the attorney–client privilege, as a class,

are not effectively unreviewable on appeal of a final judgment, and

therefore not subject to collateral order review” (citing Mohawk Indus.,

Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 108–09 (2009))). Nonetheless, we note

that government intrusion into the attorney–client relationship is not per

se violative of the Sixth Amendment unless the defendant is substantially

prejudiced by such actions. United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182,

1186–87 (9th Cir. 1980). Substantial prejudice results, for example, from

“the prosecution’s use of confidential information pertaining to defense

plans and strategy, and fromother actions designed to give the prosecution

an unfair advantage at trial.” Id. at 1187; see also United States v.

Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the trial is yet

to begin. The prosecution has yet to use any such information at trial in a

prejudicial way. 

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UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK 17

competency to stand trial and future dangerousness”

constitute a critical stage). At a competency hearing to

determine whether an individual is competent to stand trial,

“the person whose mental condition is the subject of the

hearing shall be represented by counsel and, if he is

financially unable to obtain adequate representation, counsel

shall be appointed for him.” 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d) (emphasis

added). “The word ‘shall’ is ordinarily the language of

command.” Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 153 (2001)

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

Kowalczyk argues that § 4247 creates a non-waivable

right to counsel during competency proceedings and argues

that otherwise the statute would be superfluous because the

Sixth Amendment already guarantees the waivable right to

counsel. Kowalczyk notes that “courts should avoid

interpreting a statute in a way that renders a provision

meaningless.” Los Coyotes Band of Cahuilla & Cupeno

Indians v. Jewell, 729 F.3d 1025, 1036 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing

Gorospe v. C.I.R., 451 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2006)). While

our court has yet to decide whether § 4247 creates a nonwaivable right to counsel, several other circuits have held that

a defendant whose competence to stand trial is in question

cannot legally waive his or her right to counsel. See United

States v. Ross, 703 F.3d 856, 871 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he

Constitution requires a defendant to be represented by

counsel at his own competency hearing, even if he has

previously made a knowing and voluntary waiver of

counsel.”); United States v. Klat, 156 F.3d 1258, 1263 (D.C.

Cir. 1998) (“[W]here a defendant’s competence to stand trial

is reasonably in question, a court may not allow that

defendant to waive her right to counsel and proceed pro se

until the issue of competency has been resolved.”); United

States v. Purnett, 910 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he trial

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18 UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK

court cannot simultaneously question a defendant’s mental

competence to stand trial and at one and the same time be

convinced that the defendant has knowingly and intelligently

waived his right to counsel.”).

Reading § 4247 as creating a non-waivable right to

counsel during competencyproceedings is consistent with the

Supreme Court’s holding in Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375

(1966). There, the Court held that “it is contradictory to argue

that a defendant may be incompetent [to stand trial], and yet

knowingly or intelligently ‘waive’ his right to have the court

determine his capacity to stand trial.” Id. at 384. This same

reasoning applies to a potentially incompetent defendant’s

inability to knowingly or intelligently waive his right to

counsel. Thus, we hold that, as a person whose competence

to stand trial was in question, Kowalczyk could not legally

waive his right to counsel; thus he was entitled to be

represented by an attorney at his competency hearing.

Further, “the Constitution permits States to insist upon

representation by counsel for those competent enough to

stand trial under Dusky [v. United States, 362 U.S. 402

(1960),] but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the

point where they are not competent to conduct trial

proceedings by themselves.” Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S.

164, 178 (2008). Essentially, the standard of competence for

waiving counsel and invoking the right to self-representation

may be higher than the standard of competence required to

stand trial. See United States v. Thompson, 587 F.3d 1165,

1172 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that judges may “require a

higher level of competence for self-representation”). Thus, if

states can require a competent, but mentally ill, defendant to

have counsel, then surelyCongress through § 4247(d) has the

authority to require representation by counsel for a defendant

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UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK 19

whose competency is in question during competency

proceedings. 

The government argues that in limited circumstances a

judge may force a defendant to proceed pro se if his or her

conduct “hinders the efficient administration of justice.” In

United States v. Sutcliffe, our court determined “that the

district court did not err in finding that Defendant knowingly

and intelligently waived his right to counsel through his

conduct.” 505 F.3d 944, 956 (9th Cir. 2007). However, unlike

Kowalczyk, the competence of the defendant in Sutcliffe was

no longer in question; he was in a position where he could

knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel.3

Kowalczyk’s situation is more comparable to that of the

defendant in United States v. Meeks, 987 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.

1993). Similar to Kowalczyk, Meeks’s “attempts to change

attorneys delayed his trial several times” and our court noted

the district court’s understandable frustration. Id. at 579. Our

court found that Meeks’s history of mental illness precluded

a finding of a “knowing, intelligent waiver.” Id. Though

Meeks was actually found competent to stand trial following

competency proceedings, his history of mental illness alone

convinced our court that he was unable to impliedly waive his

right to counsel at trial through his conduct. Id. at 577–79.

Our court “indulge[s] every reasonable presumption against

waiver of fundamental constitutional rights, and doubts must

be resolved in favor of no waiver.” Id. at 579 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Here, Kowalczyk, who also had a

history of mental illness and was found incompetent to stand

3

See Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d at 952, 956 (competency proceedings must

have resulted in a finding of competence because Sutcliffe’s case

proceeded to trial).

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20 UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK

trial during his first competency hearing, was just as

incapable as Meeks of knowingly and intelligently waiving

his right to counsel through his conduct. 

Accordingly, the district court was required to provide

Kowalczyk with an attorney during his competency

proceedings. We thus must consider whether the district

court’s appointment of amicus counsel satisfied this

requirement of the right to counsel.

B. The Meaningful Adversarial Testing Standard is 

Applicable

“[A]ppointed counsel must function in the active role of

an advocate, as opposed to that of amicus curiae.” Entsminger

v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 751 (1967). The government argues

that the district court’s appointment of amicus counsel

fulfilled Kowalczyk’s right to counsel at his competency

hearing because amicus counsel acted as if he were defense

counsel. We agree. 

We follow the Sixth Circuit and apply the “meaningful

adversarial testing” standard of United States v. Cronic, 466

U.S. 648, 656 (1984). Ross, 703 F.3d at 872. Under Cronic,

counsel must “subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful

adversarial testing” in order to satisfy the Sixth Amendment’s

guarantee of the effective assistance of counsel. Cronic, 466

U.S. at 659. We agree with the Sixth Circuit that Cronic’s

“meaningful adversarial testing” standard “is the appropriate

standard for assessing whether [a defendant’s] standby

counsel provided representation that was adequate to

overcome [the defendant’s] claim that he was deprived of

counsel at his competency hearing.” Ross, 703 F.3d at 872.

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UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK 21

Without mentioning Cronic or the “meaningful

adversarial test” by name, the Eighth and Second Circuits

follow a similar approach to determine whether a defendant

was deprived of his right to counsel during competency

proceedings. See Wise v. Bowersox, 136 F.3d 1197, 1203 (8th

Cir. 1998) (finding no deprivation of due process, where

prosecution’s arguments for competency to stand trial were

challenged by standby counsel’s arguments for

incompetency); Purnett, 910 F.2d at 55–56 (2d Cir. 1990)

(holding that standby counsel was not an adequate

replacement for defense counsel during competency

proceedings, where the record showed that standby counsel

did not focus on his client’s competency and did not review

the client’s psychiatric report).

Here, Kowalczyk’s amicus counsel, Reid, provided

“meaningful adversarial testing.” Reid advocated for the same

incompetency position as Kowalczyk. Reid also filed a 69-

page supplemental brief, and thoroughly litigated

Kowalczyk’s interests, both by cross-examining the

government expert, Dr. DeMier, and by calling Kowalczyk’s

parents and Dr. True as friendly witnesses. The district court

determined that Reid did a “truly masterful job” representing

Kowalczyk’s interests.

Because amicus counsel provided “meaningful

adversarial testing,” we hold that Kowalczyk “was

sufficiently represented by counsel at the competency hearing

to overcome his denial of counsel claim.” Ross, 703 F.3d at

873.

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22 UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK

II. Right to Testify During Competency Hearing

We review “de novo a defendant’s claim that he was

deprived of his constitutional right to testify.” United States

v. Gillenwater, 717 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2013). 

“[A] defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the

witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense.” Id. at

1077 (internal quotation marks omitted). The same right

applies in a competency hearing, a “critical stage” in the

adversarial process. Id. at 1077 n.5. A defendant’s right to

testify is personal and therefore may be relinquished only by

the defendant. Id. at 1079. Additionally, the “relinquishment

of the right [to testify] must be knowing and intentional.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]aiver of the right to

testify may be inferred from the defendant’s conduct and is

presumed from the defendant’s failure to testify or notify the

court of his desire to do so.” United States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d

174, 177 (9th Cir. 1993).

The appellant argues that his right to testify during his

competency proceeding was violated when the court did not

allow him to speak during the July 23, 2014 hearing after

supplemental briefing. We disagree. The July 23 hearing after

supplemental briefing must be viewed in context of the twoday evidentiary hearing which preceded it on April 10 and 11,

2014. On both days of this earlier hearing, Kowalczyk was an

active participant in the calling and examining of witnesses

and had ample opportunity to testify himself.

In Gillenwater, our court found that the district court had

denied the defendant’s right to testify. 717 F.3d at 1073–75.

The defendant had expressed his desire to testify during his

competency hearing, against the advice of his attorney. Id.

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UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK 23

This led to the defendant’s disruptive outburst, removal from

the courtroom by the court, and denial of the defendant’s

right to testify. Id. On appeal, our court vacated and

remanded for a new competency hearing based on the district

court’s denial of the defendant’s right to testify. Id. at 1085. 

Unlike the defendant in Gillenwater, Kowalczyk actively

participated in his competency hearing as a pro se defendant

and was given the opportunity to testify. On April 10, 2014,

the first day of the evidentiary hearing, Kowalczyk crossexamined the government’s witness. At the conclusion of the

first day, the court asked all parties what evidence they

wanted to present the next day. At that time, Kowalczyk and

amicus counsel Reid named witnesses to be called the next

day, but neither asked to call Kowalczyk to testify. On April

11, 2014 Kowalczyk dismissed his two witnesses without

questioning but cross-examined witnesses called by Reid.

Initially, the court denied Kowalczyk’s request to speak

during the July 23 hearing. However, the record is not clear

that Kowalczyk was requesting to testify. Instead, he may

have been asking to argue, as other counsel had been

permitted to do. The record does show that the time to

provide testimony had passed. The court had concluded the

taking of evidence in the case on April 11 and called for

supplemental briefing to focus on key legal issues in another

hearing. Thus, we cannot agree with Kowalczyk that he was

denied his constitutional right to testify in his competency

hearings.

Nor do we believe the court abused its discretion by

initially refusing Kowalczyk’s request to speak during the

July 23 hearing. As the court in Gillenwater noted,

“[N]othing in our decision prevents the district court from

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24 UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK

exercising discretion to limit testimony, focus the scope of

the proceeding, or exclude irrelevant testimony.” Id. at 1079.

Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the July hearing,

Kowalczyk was given the opportunity to tell the court of his

wish not to return to FMC Springfield. Moreover, the district

court ultimately decided the competency proceedings in

Kowalczyk’s favor by finding him incompetent and ordering

that he be committed to another medical center. Thus, any

potential abuse of discretion, in not allowing Kowalczyk to

speak at the July 23 hearing on supplemental briefing, was

harmless.

III. No Clear Procedural Violations Under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 4241

Kowalczyk argues that the district court violated the

proper process for competency proceedings laid out in 18

U.S.C. § 4241, when, after finding Kowalczyk incompetent

for the first time and referring him for treatment, the district

court held a second competency hearing and ordered him

committed and treated a second time. We disagree. 

Section 4241 is “a comprehensive provision detailing the

standards and procedures for finding an individual mentally

incompetent.” United States v. White, 887 F.2d 705, 707 (6th

Cir. 1989). The Sixth Circuit has found that § 4241 “in no

way limits the court to a single inquiry into a defendant’s

competency.” Id. at 709. As the Seventh Circuit has noted,

the issue of a defendant’s competency “can hardly be

considered final when the very objective of competency

determinations is to discover whether or when a defendant

will be competent to stand trial.” United States v. Sherman,

912 F.2d 907, 909 (7th Cir. 1990). 

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UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK 25

Because multiple competency evaluations and

determinations are permitted by § 4241, there is no process

error that would invalidate Kowalczyk’s commitment order.

IV. Remand to the Same District Court Judge

Kowalczyk argues that reassignment to a different district

court judge is necessary. In deciding whether remand to a

new judge is appropriate, this court considers:

(1) whether the original judge would

reasonably be expected upon remand to have

substantial difficulty in putting out of his or

her mind previously-expressed views or

findings determined to be erroneous or based

on evidence that must be rejected, (2) whether

reassignment is advisable to preserve the

appearance of justice, and (3) whether

reassignment would entail waste and

duplication out of proportion to any gain in

preserving the appearance of fairness.

United States v. Atondo-Santos, 385 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir.

2004). Kowalczyk argues, relying on the second factor, that

remand to the same judge would lead to the appearance of

unfairness. We disagree.

We reserve reassignment for “rare and extraordinary

circumstances,” Krechman v. Cnty. of Riverside, 723 F.3d

1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2013), which we find absent in this

instance. The district court judge has taken extraordinary

measures across the lengthy duration of this case to treat

Kowalczyk fairly. In deciding Kowalczyk’s competency to

stand trial, for example, the district court judge took into

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26 UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK

careful consideration Kowalczyk’s own and the government’s

psychological reports. Based on this evidence—and despite

the district court’s concerns that Kowalczyk was

malingering—the judge ultimately found Kowalczyk

incompetent to stand trial and ordered him transferred to

FMC Springfield.

Considerations of judicial efficiency further counsel

against reassignment. Given the lengthy procedural history of

this case, remanding the case to a different judge would entail

waste and duplication disproportionate to any appearance of

unfairness that may exist in this case. Indeed, the record does

not indicate that this case constitutes one of those “rare

occasions [where] . . ., both for the judge’s sake and the

appearance of justice,” assignment to a different judge is

warranted. United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 785 F.2d

777, 780 (9th Cir. 1986).

We see no reason here to reassign this case to a different

district court judge on remand. 

CONCLUSION

First, Kowalczyk had a non-waivable right to have

counsel during his competency proceedings. Amicus counsel

masterfully fulfilled that role by providing “meaningful

adversarial testing” of the prosecution’s case. Second, given

our review of Kowalczyk’s competency proceedings, he was

not denied the right to testify. Any potential abuse of

discretion, in not allowing Kowalczyk to speak at the July 23

hearing on supplemental briefing, was harmless. The bottom

line is that Kowalczyk got what he wanted: the court found

him incompetent to stand trial and ordered that he be treated

at a federal medical facility. We remand to the district court

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UNITED STATES V. KOWALCZYK 27

for further proceedings consistent with the views herein

expressed.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

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