Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03045/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03045-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Defense
Respondent
Antonio White Landell
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ANTONIO WHITE LANDELL, Ph.D.,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3045

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. PH-0752-13-5854-I-1. 

______________________ 

Decided: October 5, 2015

______________________ 

ANTONIO WHITE LANDELL, Bristow, VA, pro se.

CHRISTOPHER L. HARLOW, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by FRANKLIN E. WHITE, JR., ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

JOYCE R. BRANDA. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, CLEVENGER, and O’MALLEY, Circuit 

Judges.

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2 LANDELL v. DEPT. OF DEFENSE

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge. 

Dr. Antonio W. Landell seeks judicial review of the 

Merit System Protection Board’s (MSPB) decision affirming the Defense Intelligence Agency’s (the Agency) termination of his employment after the Agency revoked his

security clearance. Landell v. Dept. of Defense, No. PH0752-13-5854-I-1 (M.S.P.B. Sept. 12, 2014). We affirm the 

MSPB’s decision.

BACKGROUND

Dr. Landell was employed as an Intelligence Officer in 

a position that required eligibility for access to Sensitive 

Compartmented Information, and he had been given the 

appropriate security clearance. On November 16, 2011, 

the Defense Intelligence Central Adjudication Facility 

(DICAF) advised Dr. Landell that the Agency intended to 

revoke his security clearance because of security concerns 

that were inconsistent with the Agency’s eligibility criteria. The DICAF provided Dr. Landell with a Statement of 

Reasons for the intended action. On June 20, 2012, the 

Agency suspended him from his duties, and on August 1, 

2012, the DICAF notified Dr. Landell that his security 

clearance had been revoked and that he was entitled to 

appeal the revocation to the Defense Intelligence Security 

Appeals Board (DISAB). Dr. Landell appealed, and, after 

receiving submissions and argument, the DISAB affirmed 

the decision to revoke his security clearance. The Agency

then terminated his employment for failure to maintain a 

security clearance, a stated condition of employment for 

all positions with this agency. 

On appeal to the MSPB, the Administrative Judge 

and then the full Board affirmed, ruling that Dr. Landell 

had received procedural due process, and that the MSPB 

had no authority to review an agency’s decision to revoke 

a security clearance, other than to ascertain that the 

requirements of due process had been met. 

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LANDELL v. DEPT. OF DEFENSE 3

On appeal to this court, Dr. Landell states that the 

Agency’s action was unjust and unfair, that he had done 

no wrong, that the alleged infraction had occurred years 

earlier in military service, that he was the victim of 

favoritism and discrimination, and that the MSPB erred 

in declining to review the merits of the revocation. 

DISCUSSION

The MSPB held that it does not have authority to review an agency’s revocation of security clearance, other 

than to ascertain whether the employee received due 

notice of the proposed action and had an opportunity to be 

heard as required by Dept. of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 

518, 530–31 (1988). Precedent has elaborated that the 

MSPB’s review is limited to “whether a security clearance 

was denied, whether the security clearance was a requirement of the appellant’s position, and whether the 

procedures set forth in Section 7513 were followed.” 

Hesse v. Dept. of State, 217 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 

2000). In conducting this limited review, the MSPB may 

consider whether an agency committed harmful error by 

failing to follow its own regulations in denying or revoking 

the security clearance. Romero v. Dept. of Defense, 527 

F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

The MSPB reviews removals only to the extent of ascertaining whether an agency’s formal policy requires 

reassignment under such conditions and, if so, whether a 

position existed to which the appellant could be reassigned. Blagaich v. DOT, 90 M.S.P.R. 619 ¶ 16 (2001), 

aff’d, 63 F. App’x 476 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Dr. Landell states that the Agency violated unspecified procedures, regulations, and laws; violated Title VII 

of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Pendleton Act, and the 

Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 

Rights Act of 1994; did not provide any factual evidence in 

support of its action; and conspired to remove him from 

his position in order to hire a more favored candidate. In 

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4 LANDELL v. DEPT. OF DEFENSE

accordance with Egan, the MSPB did not review these 

issues and arguments, but limited its review to the procedural requirements. 

The MSPB found that Dr. Landell was provided with 

a Statement of Reasons for the proposed revocation, and 

that the procedural protections of Section 7513 were 

followed, including the opportunity to respond. With 

respect to reassignment, it is not disputed that security 

clearance is a requirement of all positions at this agency. 

We do not discern reversible error in the MSPB’s application of its limited review authority with respect to 

employment actions based on security clearance requirements. Although Dr. Landell’s appeal brief is directed to 

the merits of the revocation of his security clearance, the

MSPB correctly determined that the Agency provided the 

requisite procedural due process, and that the merits of 

the revocation are not reviewable by the MSPB. Similarly, review of that issue is not within the authority of this 

Court on appeal from the MSPB ruling. The MSPB 

decision is affirmed.

Each party shall bear its costs.

AFFIRMED

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