Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-01935/USCOURTS-ca7-09-01935-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sherman A. Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 3, 2010*

Decided February 4, 2010

Before

     KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

     TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

     DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐1935

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

SHERMAN A. JOHNSON,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 1:08‐cr‐10025‐001

Michael M. Mihm,

Judge.

O R D E R

Sherman Johnson pleaded guilty to possessing crack with intent to distribute and

was sentenced as a career offender to a term of 170 months.  In the plea agreement Johnson

waived his right to appeal all issues except whether his prior Illinois conviction for

aggravated battery qualified as a crime of violence under the career‐offender guideline.  As

the government concedes, circuit precedent controls the outcome here, and so we vacate the

sentence and remand.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09‐1935 Page 2

1

The guidelines define “crime of violence” as any offense under federal or state law

punishable by imprisonment of more than one year that “has as an element the use,

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.2(a)(1), or “is a burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives,

or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to

another,” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2).

In the presentence investigation report, the probation officer classified Johnson as a

career offender under § 4B1.1 of the sentencing guidelines because of two prior convictions

for crimes of violence.  Johnson objected that one of the convictions—for aggravated

battery—was not a crime of violence under the residual, “otherwise involves” clause of

§ 4B1.2(a)(2).1

  An aggravated battery under Illinois law is committed either by causing

great bodily harm, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12‐4(a), or by performing a simple battery in the

presence of a listed aggravating factor, such as being in a public place of accommodation, id.

5/12‐4(b)(8).  A simple battery can occur either by causing bodily harm, id. 5/12‐3(a)(1), or by

making contact “of an insulting or provoking nature,” id. 5/12‐3(a)(2).  See People v. Ojeda,

No. 2‐08‐0155, 2009 WL 5196590, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).  According to the charging

document here, Johnson “knowingly made contact of an insulting or provoking nature with

[the victim], in that the defendant struck [the victim] in the face with his fist” while in Club

Tequila, a public place of accommodation.  Johnson noted that he was charged with the part

of the statute criminalizing insulting or provoking contact in a public place, not the section

prohibiting causing bodily harm.  See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12‐4(b)(8).  He argued that the

offense should not be categorized as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause

because insulting or provoking contact did not encompass the kind of violent and

aggressive conduct required by the Supreme Court in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137

(2008).

After a hearing, the district court concluded that the aggravated‐battery

conviction—and specifically Johnson’s act of striking a woman in the face—qualified as a

crime of violence.  As a career offender, Johnson had an advisory guidelines range of 262‐

327 months.  The court’s 170‐month sentence was far below the low end of the

recommended range.  Had Johnson not qualified as a career offender, the guidelines range

would have fallen below the statutory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment, making the

statutory minimum the recommended sentence.

After Johnson filed a notice of appeal, we decided United States v. Evans, 576 F.3d

766, 767, 769 (7th Cir. 2009), concluding that the defendant’s prior Illinois conviction for

aggravated battery—charged as making physical contact of an insulting or provoking

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No. 09‐1935 Page 3

nature against a woman known to be pregnant—was not a crime of violence for purposes of

the career offender guideline.  See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12‐4(b)(11).  In Evans, we noted that

the terms “insulting” or “provoking” derived from the common law tort of battery.  Battery

can be offensive (such as spitting on a person) or forcible (such as pushing a person to the

floor)—and only the latter is a crime of violence.  576 F.3d at 768‐69.  But the statute is not

divisible—that is, the same words, “insulting or provoking,” describe both a violent and

nonviolent way of committing the crime.  Thus, we could examine only which crime the

defendant committed, not how he committed that crime.  Id. at 769 (citing United States v.

Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 407‐08 (7th Cir. 2009)).  And because most insulting or provoking

contact with a pregnant woman is not violent, the defendant’s conviction for aggravated

battery was not a crime of violence.  Evans, 576 F.3d at 769.

Johnson argues that Evans is dispositive because if insulting or provoking contact

with a pregnant woman is not a crime of violence, making insulting or provoking contact in

a public place also cannot be.  He asserts that the district court impermissibly considered

how he committed the crime for more than determining which part of the statute he

violated.  The government concedes that Evans is indistinguishable from this case.  We

agree.  The presence of a different aggravating factor—a public place rather than a pregnant

victim—does not change Evans’s conclusion that insulting or provoking contact, in the

ordinary case, is not violent.  See Woods, 576 F.3d at 403‐06.  The kind of insulting or

provoking contact Johnson made is irrelevant, and so the district court erred by considering

Johnson’s specific acts beyond the extent necessary to determine that Johnson was convicted

of making insulting or provoking contact, not causing bodily harm.  Johnson’s prior

conviction for aggravated battery is not a crime of violence.

Accordingly, the sentence is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for

resentencing.

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