Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06141/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06141-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Great American Life Insurance Co.
Appellee
Rodnie R. Hester
Appellant

Document Text:

FIL L.Jl 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Unitro St,h~r~tit Appea},p, 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT DEC 1 8 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

RODNIE R. HESTER, also known as Clerk 

Rodney R. Hester, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

GREAT AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE CO. , 

Defendant-Appellee. 

No. 92-6141 

(D.C . No. CIV-91-1474-A) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument . 

The case is therefore ordered 

Plaintiff Rodnie R. Hester appeals from an order of the 

district court granting defendant Great American Life Insurance 

Co .'s motion for summary judgment. We affirm. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the d octrine s of the law of 

the case , res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36. 3. 

Appellate Case: 92-6141 Document: 010110152741 Date Filed: 12/18/1992 Page: 1 
In 1981, defendant issued a ten-year renewable term life 

insurance policy to Kay M. Hester. Plaintiff, then married to Ms. 

Hester, was named as the primary beneficiary. The Hesters 

divorced in 1986. Ms. Hester, owner of the policy, retained the 

right to change beneficiaries. Plaintiff remained the primary 

beneficiary and paid all premiums until Ms. Hester's death in 

199 1. Plaintiff then notified defendant of the death and his 

intent to claim the policy proceeds. 

Five days after Ms. Hester's 

request, signed by Ms . Hester the day 

death, defendant received a 

prior to her death, to 

change the primary beneficiary from plaintiff to the trustee of a 

trust set up for the benefit of her daughters . Upon verification 

of the trust, defendant paid the policy proceeds to it. Plaintiff 

brought this diversity action claiming the right to the policy 

proceeds of $100,000.00, damages for emotional distress in the 

amount of $50,000 . 00, and punitive damages of $10,000,000 . 00. 

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the district court erred in 

granting defendant's motion for summary judgment because genuine 

issues of material fact exist . Plaintiff also argues that the 

district court erred as a matter of law. 

We do not address plaintiff's argument concerning disputed 

facts. In his brief, plaintiff states that he takes issue with 

twelve undisputed facts set forth by defendant in its brief in 

support of its motion for summary judgment. Not only does 

plaintiff not identify the facts he disputes, aside from 

references to numbered paragraphs in defendant's brief, but he did 

not include a copy of the brief in his appendix. Although 

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Appellate Case: 92-6141 Document: 010110152741 Date Filed: 12/18/1992 Page: 2 
defendant did include a copy in its appendix, this court will not 

'"sift through' the record in search of [pl aintiff's] contentions 

of error" to manufacture his arguments for him. SEC v . Thomas, 

965 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1992). We defer to the district 

court's holding that no genuine issues of material fact exist. 

Plaintiff argues he is entitled to the proceeds because, 

although Ms. Hester properly submitted the change of beneficiary, 

defendant did not endorse the change on the policy prior to Ms. 

Hester's death. The policy provided that to change beneficiaries, 

"[C]hanges must be in writing on our forms and must be received at 

our office. We may ask you to return this policy so we can 

endorse your change on it." Appellee's Supp. App. at 29. 

Plaintiff argues that because defendant did not require 

endorsement of the change on the policy, endorsement was a 

discretionary act and, as such, could not be performed after Ms. 

Hester's death. Plaintiff misunderstands the use of the word 

"discretionary" in this context . A discretionary act is an act, 

taken by a person with power to designate a beneficiary, which 

actually identifies that beneficiary. See Harjo v. Fox, 146 P.2d 

298, 302 (Okla. 1944). Defendant possessed no power to change the 

beneficiary. See. e.g., id. (Secretary of Interior's consent to 

insured's request for change of beneficiary required by statute; 

because consent not obtained prior 

discretionary act remained to be 

effective) While discretionary acts 

death of the insured, id., only 

to insured's death, a 

completed and change was not 

must occur prior to the 

Ms. Hester could perform the 

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Appellate Case: 92-6141 Document: 010110152741 Date Filed: 12/18/1992 Page: 3 
discretionary act of designating a beneficiary. Therefore, the 

beneficiary designation was completed prior to Ms. Hester's death. 

Ministerial acts are acts which are a matter of certainty and 

require only time for their completion. Id. Endorsement of the 

policy by defendant was a ministerial act. See American Nat'l 

Ins. Co. v. Reid, 108 F. Supp. 428, 430 (W.D. Okla. 1952). Here, 

defendant had discretion only as to whether or not it would 

require performance of that ministerial act. 

Further, an endorsement provision in a policy is for the 

protection of the insurer. See O'Neal v. O'Neal, 141 P.2d 593, 

597 (Okla. 1942); Bowser v. Bowser, 211 P.2d 517, 519 (Okla. 

1949). Therefore, that requirement can be waived. See Reid, 108 

F. Supp. at 429 (endorsement provision for insurer's benefit and 

may be waived where uncompleted act deemed "merely ministerial") . 

Defendant clearly waived the endorsement provision by depositing 

the proceeds in the trust. Cf. O'Neal, 141 P.2d at 598. 

Plaintiff argues that his right to the proceeds vested at the 

time of Ms. Hester's death. While the rights of the parties do 

vest at the time of the insured's death, this fact does "not 

change the legal aspects of this matter if the insured had done 

all reasonably within h[er] power to comply with the requirements 

of the policy" and change the beneficiary prior to her death. Id. 

at 597; see also Shaw v. Loeffler, 796 P.2d 633, 635 (Okla. 

1990) (change in beneficiary can only be effected by following 

procedure prescribed in policy except where insured has done all 

in his power to comply with procedures, but "failed to finalize 

the change due to the non-occurrence of some ministerial act"). 

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Appellate Case: 92-6141 Document: 010110152741 Date Filed: 12/18/1992 Page: 4 
Ms. Hester had done all she could to effec t the change . The 

district court correctly granted summary judgment f o r defendant. 

Finally, defendant argues that this court lacks jurisdiction 

to rule on plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment because 

the district court's order denying a similar motion is not 

appealable. We read plaintiff's brief as asking us to reverse the 

district court's judgment, enter judgment as a matter of law for 

plaintiff, and remand this case for determination of punitive 

damages. Based on our holding that the district court correctly 

entered summary judgment for defendant, this issue is moot. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 92-6141 Document: 010110152741 Date Filed: 12/18/1992 Page: 5