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Parties Involved:
Board of Trustees of Metropolitan State University of Denver
Appellee
Angelia McGowan
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

ANGELIA MCGOWAN, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF 

METROPOLITAN STATE UNIVERSITY 

OF DENVER, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 15-1272 

(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-01716-WJM-NYW) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Angelia McGowan sued the Board of Trustees of Metropolitan State 

University of Denver (Metro State) claiming, among other things, racial 

discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

April 13, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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district court granted summary judgment in favor of Metro State. McGowan 

appeals,1

 and we affirm. 

I. Background 

McGowan, an African American, was Assistant Director of Communications 

at Metro State from 2007 to 2011. Her first supervisor, Catherine Lucas, recruited 

McGowan for the job and used the school’s affirmative action program to expedite 

the hiring process. McGowan was initially responsible for external communications, 

which involved significant interaction with the media. According to Lucas, 

McGowan struggled to “proactively pitch” stories to the media, R. at 197-98, and 

sometimes demonstrated poor “critical thinking skills,” id. at 201-02. This led Lucas 

to believe McGowan would be better suited for a job requiring less media interaction, 

so she assigned McGowan to an internal communications position without changing 

her title or salary. 

One of McGowan’s primary responsibilities in her internal communications 

position was serving as the editor of @Metro, an online publication for Metro State 

faculty and staff. But according to McGowan’s new supervisor, Donna Fowler, 

McGowan had an “ongoing problem” handling her editorial responsibilities. Id. at 

247-48. Specifically, McGowan had trouble meeting deadlines, wrote articles with 

inaccurate information, and missed submissions. 

 1

 McGowan appeals only the district court’s summary judgment on her Title 

VII discrimination and retaliation claims. 

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3 

In April 2010, McGowan was given a poor performance evaluation. Because 

McGowan’s move to internal communications occurred during the review period, 

both Lucas and Fowler were involved in her evaluation. McGowan earned an overall 

rating of “Achieves Performance Standards,” but her numerical performance score 

was relatively low (1 on a 0-3 scale). Id. at 343, 350. As part of the evaluation, 

McGowan was asked to submit a report documenting media placements in the first 

part of the review period, while she was still working in external communications. 

Lucas discovered several errors in the report and accused McGowan of “fudg[ing] or 

fib[bing].” Id. at 273-74. In her written comments, Fowler said the errors created a 

“serious trust issue” with McGowan. Id. at 346. McGowan acknowledged the report 

was inaccurate, but submitted a written rebuttal claiming the errors were inadvertent 

and that Lucas and Fowler had created “a hostile work environment” for various 

reasons unrelated to race, id. at 360. McGowan later appealed the performance 

evaluation to little avail. 

Shortly after her evaluation, McGowan complained about Lucas and Fowler to 

the director of Metro State’s Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) office, but she 

did not file a formal grievance and, at McGowan’s request, the director did not 

discuss the meeting with either supervisor. 

Over the next year, Fowler occasionally sent McGowan memos expressing 

concerns with her performance and asking McGowan to submit plans for 

improvement. When McGowan’s performance did not improve, Fowler hired a 

consultant who worked with McGowan for a month and helped train her how to 

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publish a weekly newsletter like @Metro. In McGowan’s next performance 

evaluation, in April 2011, Fowler gave McGowan a slightly higher performance score 

(1.36 on the 0-3 scale) and noted her proficiency in some areas, but concluded the 

quality of McGowan’s work and her skill in managing @Metro remained poor. 

The poor performance reviews and performance-related memos eventually led 

McGowan to believe she would be fired, so she resigned from Metro State in August 

2011 and later brought this suit. 

II. Standard of Review 

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo and apply the same 

standard as the district court. Hawkins v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 778 F.3d 877, 

882 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 690 (2015). 

Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the facts in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. 

(internal quotation marks omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” if 

there is sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to resolve the issue either way. 

Savant Homes, Inc. v. Collins, 809 F.3d 1133, 1137 (10th Cir. 2016). A fact is 

“material” if it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim. Id. 

III. Analysis 

 McGowan claims Lucas and Fowler discriminated against her by giving her 

poor performance reviews and criticizing her work, which led to her constructive 

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discharge.2

 Similarly, she claims some of the poor reviews and critiques were in 

retaliation for McGowan accusing Lucas and Fowler of creating a hostile work 

environment and complaining about them to the EEO director. But McGowan failed 

to produce sufficient evidence of either claim to survive summary judgment. 

Because McGowan’s claims are based on circumstantial evidence, the threestep McDonnell Douglas3

 burden-shifting framework applies. See Crowe v. ADT 

Sec. Servs., Inc., 649 F.3d 1189, 1194 (10th Cir. 2011). This requires McGowan to 

first establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation.4

 Id. at 1195. If she 

clears this hurdle, Metro State must articulate a “legitimate, non-discriminatory or 

non-retaliatory rationale” for any adverse employment actions. Id. The burden then 

shifts back to McGowan, “who must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 

 2

 McGowan claims she was constructively discharged because the criticism of 

her performance made working conditions so intolerable that she felt forced to 

resign. Proof of constructive discharge can satisfy the “adverse employment action” 

requirement of McGowan’s claims, see Fischer v. Forestwood Co., 525 F.3d 972, 

979 (10th Cir. 2008), but the district court found it unnecessary to determine whether 

McGowan presented sufficient evidence of constructive discharge because the court 

resolved her claims on other grounds. We do the same. 

3 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 

4

 To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, an employee must present 

evidence that (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse 

employment action, and (3) the “action took place under circumstances giving rise to 

an inference of discrimination.” E.E.O.C. v. PVNF, L.L.C., 487 F.3d 790, 800 

(10th Cir. 2007). A prima facie case of retaliation requires an employee to show that 

(1) she engaged in protected opposition to discrimination, (2) a reasonable employee 

would have found the challenged action materially adverse (meaning the action might 

dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination), 

and (3) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse 

action. Id. at 803. 

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[Metro State’s] reasons are a pretext for unlawful discrimination” or retaliation. 

Johnson v. Weld Cty., 594 F.3d 1202, 1211 (10th Cir. 2010). 

The district court held that McGowan failed to establish a prima facie case of 

discrimination or retaliation, but even if she had, Metro State offered a legitimate 

reason for any adverse actions—McGowan’s poor performance—which McGowan 

failed to show was pretextual.5

 We agree that McGowan failed to show pretext, so 

we affirm the district court’s decision on this ground without addressing whether 

McGowan made a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. 

 “[A] plaintiff can establish pretext by showing the defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory [or non-retaliatory] explanations for its actions are so incoherent, 

weak, inconsistent, or contradictory that a rational factfinder could conclude they are 

unworthy of belief.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). “To 

support an inference of pretext, . . . [a plaintiff] must come forward with evidence 

that the employer didn’t really believe its proffered reasons for action and thus may 

have been pursuing a hidden discriminatory [or retaliatory] agenda.” Id. 

 McGowan claims “the sequence of events leading up to her constructive 

discharge constituted . . . circumstances indicative of pretext.” Aplt. Opening Br. 

at 10. According to McGowan, this sequence began during the hiring process, when 

she “was advised . . . that Metro hired her only as a grudging concession to its prior 

 5

 The district court discussed McGowan’s failure to show pretext only in the 

context of her retaliation claim, but its analysis applies equally to her discrimination 

claim because McGowan relies on essentially the same adverse acts for both claims 

(poor reviews, criticism of her performance, and constructive discharge) for which 

Metro State offers the same justification (McGowan’s poor performance). 

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underrepresentation of African-Americans.” Id. The only evidence supporting this 

claim is McGowan’s deposition testimony that Lucas once told her Metro State 

wanted to increase its number of Hispanic students. McGowan did not recall Lucas’ 

exact words, but her comment left McGowan with the impression Lucas would have 

preferred to hire a Latino. Assuming Lucas made such a comment, McGowan 

acknowledged that Lucas actively recruited her for the position at Metro State, 

suggesting she was no “grudging concession.” And regardless, to establish pretext, a 

comment must be somehow tied to the employment actions in dispute. Johnson, 

594 F.3d at 1212-13. McGowan presented no evidence that Lucas made similar 

comments during her employment at Metro State, and nothing in the record connects 

Lucas’ comment to criticisms of McGowan’s performance more than two years later. 

 McGowan claims her April 2010 performance evaluation also reveals evidence 

of pretext. Specifically, she argues the accusations of dishonesty that followed her 

inaccurate media report were “false, inconsistent, contradictory and implausible” 

because the report related to her duties in her external communications position, 

which she no longer held, and because some of the purported errors were later found 

to be correct. Aplt. Opening Br. at 12. But McGowan admits the report contained 

numerous errors, and she makes little effort to explain why she should not have been 

asked to complete the report, which related to duties she held during the review 

period, or why her supervisors should have overlooked the report’s inaccuracies. Nor 

does McGowan offer evidence of any procedural irregularity in the evaluation 

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process. In short, nothing about the April 2010 evaluation gives rise to an inference 

of pretext. 

 Finally, the evidence suggests Lucas and Fowler had honest concerns about 

McGowan’s performance and tried to help her succeed. Lucas testified that when she 

saw McGowan having trouble pitching stories, Lucas “began to give her coaching 

and feedback.” R. at 197-98. And Fowler went so far as to hire a consultant who 

worked with McGowan for a month. McGowan admits Lucas and Fowler were 

concerned about her performance,6

 and aside from McGowan’s arguments regarding 

the April 2010 evaluation, she does not deny the particulars of their complaints. In 

short, the record reveals no evidence that Metro State did not actually believe its 

proffered reasons for any adverse employment actions. See Johnson, 594 F.3d at 

1211 (requiring evidence that an employer did not actually believe its proffered 

reasons for an action to support an inference of pretext). There is therefore nothing a 

rational factfinder could rely upon to find Metro State’s justification for giving 

McGowan poor reviews and criticizing her performance unworthy of belief. See id. 

 For these reasons, we conclude McGowan failed to show that Metro State’s 

proffered reason for any adverse employment actions—McGowan’s poor 

performance—was a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. 

 6

 This admission does not appear in McGowan’s appellate briefs, but in her 

response to Metro State’s motion for summary judgment. 

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We therefore affirm the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Metro 

State. 

Entered for the Court 

Carolyn B. McHugh 

Circuit Judge 

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