Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03274/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03274-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Clayton Gaggero
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

AUG 2 ·1 1990 

I.OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

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No. 89-3274 

v. 

DAVID CLAYTON GAGGERO, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

(D.C. No. 89-10008-02) 

(Dist. of Kansas) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, SETH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

David Gaggero challenges his sentence, imposed after his plea 

of guilty to one count of manufacturing methamphetamine in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 841(a)(l) and 18 u.s.c. § 2. The district 

court sentenced Gaggero to a term of 210 months imprisonment based 

upon its determination that he is properly classified under the 

Sentencing Guidelines as a career offender. Gaggero challenges 

that determination and classification as erroneously based on a 

prior felony conviction which was more than ten years old at the 

time of his arrest on the present offense. He also contends that 

his two prior felony convictions relating to controlled substances 

were for simple possession of illegal drugs and could not be used 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36. 3 . . 

Appellate Case: 89-3274 Document: 010110041587 Date Filed: 08/27/1990 Page: 1 
as a basis for career offender status. 1 The government does not 

contest Gaggero's legal arguments, but rather represents to this 

court that the record on appeal is inadequate to resolve these 

issues relating to the timing of the present offense and the exact 

nature of the prior convictions. The government requests that the 

case be remanded to the district court. We agree that the record 

before us is insufficient on important factual issues. 

In sentencing Gaggero under the guidelines, the district 

court could only "count" prior convictions other than those actually resulting in imprisonment if the sentence relating to the 

conviction was imposed within ten years of Gaggero's "commencement 

of the instant offense." u.s.s.G. §4Al.2(e)(2). In this case, 

Gaggero was sentenced on January 2, 1979 for a drug related 

offense in Ravalli County, Montana. The presentence report in the 

instant case states that the manufacture of methamphetamine to 

which Gaggero pled guilty "occurred on or about January 14, 1989." 

Thus Gaggero contends that the 1979 offense predated the current 

offense by ten years and twelve days, and could not be considered 

in determining his offense category. 

We do not accept Gaggero's analysis. The guidelines measure 

the time between imposition of sentence for a prior conviction and 

the "commencement of the instant offense." The commentary to the 

guidelines provides that "the term 'commencement of the instant 

offense' includes any relevant conduct." u.s.s.G. §4Al.2, 

1 From the record before us, it appears that Gaggero did not 

raise these arguments to the district court prior to this appeal. 

However, the government does not assert waiver and we elect not to 

pursue the issue. 

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Appellate Case: 89-3274 Document: 010110041587 Date Filed: 08/27/1990 Page: 2 
comment. (n.8). The presentence report states that on January 13, 

1989, a codefendant purchased $5,600 of chemicals and glassware. 

Thus, although the actual manufacture may have occurred on January 

14, some relevant preparations were underway prior to that time. 

Neither the presentence report nor the district court's findings 

specify precisely when Gaggero first engaged in relevant conduct 

and thus "commenced" this offense. We therefore remand to the 

district court to address this factual question. 

Gaggero's other contention relates to the exact nature of his 

prior drug-related convictions. The career offender provision 

applies only if the current conviction is a felony crime of 

violence or controlled substance offense, and the defendant has at 

least two felony convictions for a crime of violence or a 

controlled substance offense. u.s.s.G. §4Bl.1. At the time of 

Gaggero's sentencing, a "controlled substance offense" was defined 

to include convictions under state statutes which were substantially similar to certain listed federal offenses such as manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to distribute, 

but not simple possession of illegal substances. U.S.S.G. 

§4Bl.2(2) (amended effective November 1, 1989, u.s.s.G. App. c, 

amend. 268). The presentence report describes Gaggero's 1979 

Montana conviction as "Possession of Dangerous Drugs." Another 

conviction in 1986 occurred in Portland, Oregon and is listed in 

the presentence report as "Possession Controlled Substance, False 

Information to Police Officer." Gaggero contends that these 

descriptions from the presentence report conclusively preclude 

classifying him as a career offender because they both indicate 

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Appellate Case: 89-3274 Document: 010110041587 Date Filed: 08/27/1990 Page: 3 
convictions for simple possession of drugs equivalent to 21 U.S.C. 

§ 844, a statute which is absent from the list of precursor 

offenses warranting career offender status. 

We cannot say that the mere descriptions of Gaggero's prior 

convictions contained in the presentence report definitively 

preclude his qualifying for career offender status. The report 

contains brief discussions of the facts pertaining to each of 

these convictions. The 1979 conviction involved a quantity of at 

least 35 pounds of marijuana and information concerning ongoing 

sales from a residence in which Gaggero was arrested. Likewise, 

the 1986 Oregon incident involved four "plastic bags" containing 

methamphetamine. These quantities alone indicate that the offenses possibly went beyond mere possession, and included some 

intent to distribute the substances. Although this circuit has 

not addressed the appropriate standard for determining whether a 

"controlled substance" conviction under state law is 

"substantially equivalent" to an offense under a qualifying 

federal statute, we cannot properly engage in any analysis in this 

case without a more precise finding as to the relevant state 

statute involved in each of these prior convictions. See generally United States v. Brown, 903 F.2d 540 (8th Cir. 1990); United 

States v. Cruz, 882 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1989) (comparing offense as 

defined under state statute to listed federal offense to determine 

whether prior conviction qualified). 

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Appellate Case: 89-3274 Document: 010110041587 Date Filed: 08/27/1990 Page: 4 
Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court for 

further proceedings, including resentencing if the facts as fully 

developed warrant such action. 

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Entered for the Court 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-3274 Document: 010110041587 Date Filed: 08/27/1990 Page: 5