Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-92-03133/USCOURTS-caDC-92-03133-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rochelle Ardall Crowder
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued En Banc January 28, 1998 Decided May 1, 1998

No. 92-3133

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Rochelle Ardall Crowder,

Appellant

Consolidated with

No. 94-3108

No. 93-3059

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Horace L. Davis,

Appellant

_________

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Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(91cr00353-01 & 91cr00150-01)

Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant Horace Lee Davis, and Gerald I.

Fisher, appointed by the court, argued the cause for appellant

Rochelle Ardall Crowder. With them on the joint and supplemental briefs were A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender,

Santha Sonenberg and Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal

Public Defenders.

Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

causes for appellee. With him on the brief were Eric H.

Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney at the time the supplemental briefs

were filed, and John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Wald, Silberman,

Williams, Ginsburg, Sentelle, Henderson, Randolph,

Rogers, Tatel, and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Tatel, in which

Chief Judge Edwards and Circuit Judges Wald and

Silberman join.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Silberman.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: The principal question in these

cases is whether a criminal defendant may, over the government's objection, offer to concede an element of an offense

(such as knowledge or intent) and thereby (1) preclude the

government from introducing evidence under Rule 404(b),

Fed. R. Evid., to prove that element, and (2) obtain an

instruction that the jury need not consider or decide that

element. When we first heard these cases en banc, a divided

court answered the question this way: whenever there is "a

defendant's offer to concede knowledge and intent combined

with an explicit jury instruction that the Government no

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longer needs to prove either element," Rule 404(b) renders

the bad acts evidence inadmissible. United States v. Crowder

(Crowder I), 87 F.3d 1405, 1410 (1996). On the government's

petition for a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court granted

the writ, vacated our judgment and remanded the cases for

reconsideration in light of the intervening decision in Old

Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997). See United

States v. Crowder, 117 S. Ct. 760 (1997). We now hold that

despite a defendant's unequivocal offer to stipulate to an

element of an offense, Rule 404(b) does not preclude the

government from introducing evidence of other bad acts to

prove that element.

I

A

For ease of reference we will again recount the facts of

these cases. In separate jury trials, both defendants were

convicted of drug offenses, Crowder for possessing heroin and

crack cocaine with intent to distribute, Davis for distributing

crack cocaine and for possessing crack with intent to distribute.

Crowder. Police officers driving along the 1300 block of

Newton Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., saw Crowder engage

in what appeared to be a drug transaction, exchanging a small

object for cash. The officers stopped their car and gestured

for Crowder to approach. Crowder started to come closer

but then turned and ran. During the ensuing chase Crowder

discarded a brown paper bag containing 93 ziplock bags of

crack cocaine and 38 wax-paper packets of heroin. When the

officers caught up with him, they found that he was carrying

a beeper and $988 in small denominations.

Crowder's first trial ended in a mistrial. Before the retrial,

the government gave notice that it would seek to prove

Crowder's knowledge, intent and modus operandi by introducing evidence to show that Crowder sold crack cocaine to

an undercover officer on the same block on Newton Street

seven months after his arrest in this case. Crowder objected

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to the evidence, partly on the basis that he was willing to

stipulate that the amounts of drugs "seized [by the police in

this case] were consistent with distribution" so that "anybody

who possessed those drugs possessed them with the intent to

distribute." J.A. 178, 203.

The district court took the matter under advisement. After the government presented its case-in-chief, Crowder

mounted a defense based on the theory that the police had

framed him. Through nine witnesses, including his nephew,

his father, the mother of his child, and Newton Street neighbors, he tried to show that the officers came looking for him

to enlist his aid in a homicide investigation, that the transaction the officers observed consisted merely of the passing of a

cigarette, that he had the $988 to pay for repairs to his

family's house, and that his child's mother had loaned him the

beeper so that he could keep in touch with her.

At the close of the defense case, the government renewed

its effort to introduce the evidence of Crowder's other drug

offense. As to Crowder's pretrial offer to stipulate, the

government argued that Crowder had now contested his

intent to distribute, and that the evidence of his other drug

deal had legitimate probative value apart from its bearing on

intent, which is all the proposed stipulation addressed.

The district court first took up Rule 404(b):

It seems to the court that the first question is whether or

not this evidence is probative of anything in the case, and

it seems to the court that this evidence is probative,

because Mr. Crowder is trying to suggest in his defense

and I think, if we look at the evidence in the defense, not

just Mr. Crowder's testimony, that all of this was just a

coincidence, it was a coincidence that he had the $900 in

his possession, it's a coincidence that he had a beeper in

his possession, and that everything else took place, presumably, the running away and the officer chasing him,

and the officer finding a large quantity of drugs in the

alley, had nothing at all to do with Mr. Crowder. So, to

me, that raises an issue of intent, raises an issue of

knowledge, perhaps raises an issue, as was raised in the

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Watson case, of his knowledge of even the drug trade.

It seems to me, based upon that evidence, that the 404(b)

evidence is probative.

J.A. 242-43.

Having found the evidence probative for a proper purpose

under Rule 404(b), the court turned to Federal Rule of

Evidence 403 and concluded that the probative value of

Crowder's other drug crime was not substantially "outweighed by potential undue prejudice to Mr. Crowder." J.A.

248. The court noted the highly probative nature of the

evidence to prove intent and knowledge, particularly in view

of Crowder's defense that "he doesn't know anything about it

... [and] this is all a setup by the police." J.A. 249. When

the court admitted the evidence in the government's rebuttal

case, it gave a limiting instruction, which it repeated during

its jury charge.

Davis. An undercover officer purchased a rock of crack

cocaine from Horace Lee Davis on the 900 block of 5th

Street, N.W. Davis had obtained the crack from a man

sitting in a nearby car. After the transaction, the undercover

officer left the scene and broadcast a description of Davis and

the other man. Both were stopped a short time later and

positively identified by the undercover officer. The police

apprehended Davis as he was opening the door to the car

from which he had obtained the rock. A search of the car

uncovered more than 20 grams of crack as well as $40 in cash.

The cash included pre-recorded bills the officer had used to

buy the rock from Davis.

Davis put on a defense of misidentification. He explained

that he had purchased a beer from a nearby liquor store and

had simply walked out of the store just before his arrest.

Before trial, the government gave notice that it intended to

introduce evidence of three prior cocaine sales by Davis, all in

the vicinity of a shelter at 425 2nd Street, N.W., only a few

blocks from the site of the charged offense. The government

sought to introduce these prior acts to prove essential elements of Davis's crime--knowledge and intent. Davis objected, in part on the basis of his proposed stipulation "that the

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person who sold the undercover officer the drugs in this case

had the intent to distribute any and all drugs recovered by

the police, both through their purchase and through the

seizure from [the] car, and that that individual also knew of

the drugs recovered from [the] car." J.A. 79 n.1. The

district court ruled that the government did not have to

accept Davis's concession and could prove the required elements of knowledge and intent through evidence of Davis's

prior acts. When the court admitted evidence of the prior

acts, it gave a limiting instruction, and reiterated the instruction in its jury charge.

B

While the government's certiorari petition in these cases

was pending, the Supreme Court handed down Old Chief v.

United States. There the defendant had been charged with

violating federal assault and weapons statutes, including 18

U.S.C. s 922(g)(1), which prohibits persons previously convicted of certain felonies from possessing a firearm. The

defendant's prior conviction was for "assault causing serious

bodily injury." 117 S. Ct. at 647. Wanting to keep these

details from the jury, the defendant offered to stipulate that

he had an unspecified conviction of the sort described in

s 922(g)(1). The government refused the defense offer, the

trial court admitted the order of judgment and commitment

in the assault case, and the court of appeals affirmed.

Dividing five to four, the Supreme Court reversed. The

Court first rejected the defendant's argument that his offer to

stipulate rendered the evidence of his prior conviction irrelevant and reaffirmed "the accepted rule that the prosecution is

entitled to prove its case free from any defendant's option to

stipulate the evidence away," 117 S. Ct. at 654. The Court

then went on to carve out a narrow exception to that rule,

applicable only to "the element of felony-convict status," id. at

655. Concluding that there was "no cognizable difference

between" a judgment and conviction order proving felony

convict status and an admission or stipulation to that effect,

and that a description of the prior offense might unduly

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prejudice the defendant, the Court held that the Rule 403

balance of probative value versus unfair prejudice tilted in

favor of excluding the government's proof.

II

Rule 404(b) provides: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,

or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in

order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or

absence of mistake or accident...."

Our original en banc decision rested on the following

theory: "a defendant's offer to concede knowledge and intent

combined with an explicit jury instruction that the Government no longer needs to prove either element" results in the

other crimes evidence having, as "its only purpose," proof of

the defendant's propensity, which Rule 404(b) forbids. Crowder I, 87 F.3d at 1410. The idea was that the proposed

stipulation (and instruction) "completely removed" knowledge

and intent from the trial; that evidence of the defendant's

other crimes therefore could no longer be considered relevant

to those elements; and that if the evidence had no other nonpropensity purpose, its only function would be to prove what

Rule 404(b) barred. See id.1

Tested against the Supreme Court's Old Chief decision, the

theory of Crowder I fails. See 1 Stephen A. Saltzburg et al.,

Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 385-86 (7th ed. 1998).

Old Chief 's holding ultimately rested on Federal Rule of

Evidence 403, which authorizes trial courts to exclude evidence if its "probative value is substantially outweighed by

the danger of unfair prejudice...." But before getting to

__________

1 The en banc majority expressed agreement with United

States v. Mohel, 604 F.2d 748, 751 (2d Cir. 1979), that "under Rule

404(b) bad acts evidence must be relevant to an 'actual' issue and

that an offer to stipulate to an issue removes it from the case."

Crowder I, 87 F.3d at 1410. A clear majority of the other circuits

reject the Second Circuit's position. The cases are discussed in an

addendum to this opinion.

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Rule 403, the Court had to dispose of a preliminary question,

a question that bears directly on the Crowder I theory. The

defendant in Old Chief claimed, as Crowder I held, that a

defense stipulation to an element of a crime completely

removes the element from trial, thereby rendering other

evidence of the element irrelevant and thus inadmissible. See

Fed. R. Evid. 402 ("Evidence which is not relevant is not

admissible."). The Supreme Court rejected this argument.

A defendant's offer to stipulate or concede an element of an

offense, the Court concluded, does not deprive the government's evidence of relevance. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at

649. There does not have to be an "actual issue" about the

facts sought to be proven. As the Court put it, "evidentiary

relevance under Rule 401 [is not] affected by the availability

of alternative proofs of the element," such as a defendant's

concession or offer to stipulate. Id. In support, the Court

quoted the statement in the advisory committee notes to Rule

401 that the "fact to which the evidence is directed need not

be in dispute." Id.2 The Court then summed up: "If, then,

relevant evidence is inadmissible in the presence of other

evidence related to it, its exclusion must rest not on the

ground that the other evidence has rendered it 'irrelevant,'

but on its character as unfairly prejudicial, cumulative or the

like, its relevance notwithstanding," id. at 650--a thesis the

Court reiterated several times later in its opinion. Id. at 651,

651 n.7, 653-54, 655-56.

__________

2 Rule 401 is derived from a provision of the California Evidence Code defining "relevant evidence" as evidence of "any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action."

Cal. Evid. Code s 210 (West 1995). In drafting Rule 401, the

framers deleted the word "disputed," a deletion representing "a

significant change in the law." 22 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure s 5164, at 44

(1978). Professors Wright and Graham suggest that the framers'

decision to delete "disputed" was "sponsored" by the Justice Department to prevent courts from concluding, as we had in Crowder

I, "that the defense can bar the introduction of [other offense

evidence] by offering to stipulate to the fact it is supposed to

prove." Id.

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From this aspect of Old Chief, several propositions necessarily follow. First, if the government's other crimes evidence would have been relevant under Rule 401--if it would

have made it more likely with the evidence than without it

that the defendants had the requisite knowledge or intent--

the evidence remained relevant despite the defendants' offers

to stipulate. Second, the government therefore could offer

this evidence for the purpose of proving something Rule

404(b) expressly permits, namely, the defendants' knowledge

or intent. We have recognized before that although the first

sentence of Rule 404(b) is "framed restrictively," the rule

itself "is quite permissive," prohibiting the admission of other

crimes evidence "in but one circumstance"--for the purpose

of proving that a person's actions conformed to his character.

United States v. Jenkins, 928 F.2d 1175, 1180 (D.C. Cir.

1991). In other words, properly viewed, the first sentence of

Rule 404(b) bars not evidence as such, but a theory of

admissibility. Third, compliance with Rule 404(b) does not

assure admission of the other crimes evidence. Old Chief

stated that if "there were a justification for receiving evidence

of the [defendant's felony conviction] on some issue other

than status [such as knowledge or intent], Rule 404(b) guarantees the opportunity to seek its admission." 117 S. Ct. at

655. The "opportunity," not the "admission," is what Rule

404(b) "guarantees." 3 But if a trial court were to exclude the

government's evidence of bad acts, the court could not do so

"on the ground that the other evidence"--the proposed stipulation backed up by a jury instruction--"rendered it 'irrelevant,' " Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 650. Instead, as already

mentioned, exclusion would have to be on the basis that the

evidence is "unfairly prejudicial, cumulative or the like, its

relevance notwithstanding." Id.

In other important ways, Old Chief stands at odds with our

original decision in these cases. According to Crowder I, the

__________

3 The Supreme Court made a similar point in Huddleston v.

United States, 485 U.S. 681, 688 (1988): if evidence is offered for a

proper purpose under Rule 404(b), "the evidence is subject only to

general strictures limiting admissibility such as Rules 402 and 403."

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government may not introduce its bad acts evidence because

a "defendant's concession of intent and knowledge deprives

the evidence of any value ...." 87 F.3d at 1407 (italics

added). There are several problems lurking within this formulation. For one thing, it hands to criminal defendants the

ability to control the government's presentation of its case.

Yet all nine Justices in Old Chief agreed with "the familiar,

standard rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case

by evidence of its own choice, or, more exactly, that a criminal

defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full

evidentiary force of the case as the government chooses to

present it." 117 S. Ct. at 653; see id. at 658-60 (dissenting

opinion).

For another thing, every Justice disagreed with the notion

that a stipulation has the same evidentiary value as the

government's proof. Even when coupled with a jury instruction that the fact stipulated must be considered proven, a

stipulation cannot give "the Government everything the evidence could show," Crowder I, 87 F.3d at 1410. The "evidentiary account of what a defendant has thought and done can

accomplish what no abstract statements ever could" (Old

Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 653-54); "[i]f suddenly the prosecution

presents some occurrence in the series differently, as by

announcing a stipulation or admission, the effect may be like

saying, 'never mind what's behind the door,' and jurors may

well wonder what they are being kept from knowing" (id. at

654); a "syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a

courtroom may be no match for the robust evidence that

would be used to prove it" (id.); jurors "who hear a story

interrupted by gaps of abstraction may be puzzled at the

missing chapters" (id.); see also id. at 659 (dissenting opinion). There is, in short, a "need for evidence in all its

particularity to satisfy the jurors' expectations about what

proper proof should be," and so to prevent nullification or

unjustified acquittal. Id. at 654.

The Supreme Court made these points to distinguish between "stipulations to the status element of a crime, which

can be forced upon the prosecution, and stipulations to other

elements of a crime, which the prosecution should remain free

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to reject." 1 Saltzburg, supra, at 385. Proof of status, the

Court said, concerns an element that is "wholly independent[ ] of the concrete events" of the charged crime. Old

Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 654-55. In contrast, the elements of

intent and knowledge are at the core of the offenses charged

in the cases before us. Replacing proof of these elements

with stipulations creates "a gap in the story of a defendant's

subsequent criminality." Id. at 655. To be sure, other

crimes evidence will typically relate to events more or less

removed in time from the charged offense. But that is true

of many other kinds of evidence. A husband's prior physical

abuse of his wife while he was in a jealous rage may suggest

his motive for murdering her; an incriminating statement

made after the offense may reveal intent; tangible evidence

found later may suggest identity. Evidence about what the

defendant said or did at other times can be a critical part of

the story of a crime, and may be introduced to prove what the

defendant was thinking or doing at the time of the offense.

This is true regardless whether the defendant's actions on

those other occasions were in themselves criminal. Old Chief

establishes that the prosecution cannot be forced to stipulate

away the force of such evidence.

The Supreme Court also distinguished Old Chief's case on

the ground that there was "no cognizable difference" between

the proof the prosecution sought to present--a document

reflecting the prior conviction--and the stipulation the defendant offered. Id. As to the stipulation, Old Chief was willing

to concede that he personally had the requisite prior felony

conviction.

The stipulations Crowder and Davis proposed were of an

entirely different sort. Both were of uncertain and doubtful

significance. Crowder was willing to stipulate only that

"anybody who possessed those drugs possessed them with the

intent to distribute." But "anybody" was not on trial. Crowder was. And it was Crowder's intent, not "anybody's," that

the prosecution had to establish to the jury's satisfaction.

The stipulation Davis offered is of a piece. It mentioned only

some hypothetical drug dealer, some "person." Yet the prosecution's evidence of Davis's prior crack cocaine sales--sales

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close in time and place to those charged in the indictment--

was not meant to show that someone had intent and knowledge. The evidence was introduced to prove that Davis had

the intent to distribute the crack and that Davis knew what

he was possessing. Davis's proposed stipulation could not

possibly have substituted for such proof. It did not even

mention him by name. Far from a choice between "propositions of slightly varying abstraction," the choice in these cases

was between concrete evidence of the defendants' actions

giving rise to natural and sensible inferences, and abstract

stipulations about hypothetical persons not on trial.4

The government's proof of Crowder's other crime also had

legitimate probative force with respect to matters beyond

those encompassed in his proposed stipulation. A "piece of

evidence," the Court wrote in Old Chief, "may address any

number of separate elements, striking hard just because it

shows so much at once," 117 S. Ct. at 653. Rule 404(b)

evidence will often have such multiple utility, showing at once

intent, knowledge, motive, preparation and the like. Proof of

an individual's intent to commit an act may itself serve as

proof that the individual committed the act, as the Supreme

Court recognized more than a century ago. See Mutual Life

Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 296 (1892). In proving that

a defendant intended to distribute crack cocaine, for instance,

the government might simultaneously be showing the defendant's motive to possess the crack, which Rule 404(b) permits.

__________

4 Although neither Crowder nor Davis proposed a jury instruction to encompass their stipulations, Crowder I devised a model

charge in an effort to "ensure that the jury clearly understands that

the concession releases the Government from its burden of proof on

the conceded elements," 87 F.3d at 1411. The model charge

improved on the language of Crowder's and Davis's stipulations, but

as a substitute for evidence, it contradicted much of Old Chief. A

"syllogism," the Supreme Court wrote, is "not a story." 117 S. Ct.

at 654. The Court issued a firm warning against replacing a

narrative, which jurors are entitled to expect, with "abstract statements" in the form of jury instructions, which can only make jurors

"wonder what they are being kept from knowing." Id. at 653-54,

654.

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Intent would thereby serve as an intermediate fact from

which the jury could infer another intermediate fact--motive--from which it could in turn infer the element of possession. Thus, other-offense evidence of intent would have

probative value not just on the intent element, but also on the

possession element of the offense.

The multiple utility of Rule 404(b) evidence is illustrated in

Crowder's case. See also United States v. Latney, 108 F.3d

1446, 1448-50 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 355 (1997);

United States v. Harrison, 679 F.2d 942, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

The trial court permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence of Crowder's other crime to prove not only his intent to

distribute, but also his "knowledge of the substance within his

possession." 5 One of the charges against Crowder was possessing with intent to distribute crack cocaine.6 Crowder

threw away a brown paper bag as he ran from the police to

avoid arrest. The paper bag contained wax-paper packets of

heroin and ziplock bags of crack. Some of the ziplock bags

were clear; others were dark. The clear bags contained a

larger amount of crack than the dark bags. The government's other-offense evidence showed that several months

after his arrest in this case, the police caught Crowder selling

crack cocaine on the same block. Crowder held up two

ziplock bags to an undercover officer. One bag was clear; he

__________

5 A defendant's hands-on experience in the drug trade cannot

alone prove that he possessed drugs on any given occasion. But it

can show that he knew how to get drugs, what they looked like,

where to sell them, and so forth. Evidence of a defendant's

experience in dealing drugs--evidence, that is, of his "bad acts"--

thus may be a "brick" in the "wall" of evidence needed to prove

possession. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, advisory committee notes.

6 For a jury to find a defendant guilty of that offense, the

government must prove, among other things, that the defendant

possessed crack cocaine, that he did so knowingly and intentionally--that is, "consciously, voluntarily and on purpose, not mistakenly,

accidentally or inadvertently"--and that when the defendant possessed the crack, he had the specific intent to distribute it. See

Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, Instruction 4.29 (4th ed. 1993).

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offered it for $20. The other bag was dark; it contained a

smaller amount of crack of less purity; he offered it for $10.

As the government told the court, Crowder's other offense

was thus probative of several matters "of consequence" at

trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 401. In terms of Rule 401, it was

more probable with the evidence than without it that Crowder

intended to distribute the crack cocaine in the brown paper

bag. On the other occasion when he had crack cocaine in his

possession, he sold it. It was more probable with the evidence than without it that Crowder knew the material in the

ziplock bags was crack cocaine, just as he knew the substance

in the ziplock bag he sold to the undercover officer was crack

cocaine. And it was more probable with the evidence than

without it that Crowder knowingly possessed the crack cocaine recovered from the brown paper bag. Crowder's offer

to stipulate dealt only with someone's intent and therefore did

not even come close to covering everything the government's

Rule 404(b) evidence legitimately proved against him.

* * *

For all of these reasons, upon reconsideration of our earlier

decision in light of Old Chief we hold that a defendant's offer

to stipulate to an element of an offense does not render the

government's other crimes evidence inadmissible under Rule

404(b) to prove that element, even if the defendant's proposed

stipulation is unequivocal, and even if the defendant agrees to

a jury instruction of the sort mentioned in our earlier opinion.

See Crowder I, 87 F.3d at 1411. Other rules of evidence may

bear on the admissibility of evidence satisfying Rule 404(b)

and we will get to them next. For now it is enough to repeat

the words of the advisory committee on Rule 404(b): if

evidence is offered for a purpose Rule 404(b) permits, such as

proving knowledge or intent, Rule 404(b) "does not require

that the evidence be excluded."

III

While Rule 404(b) does not require the exclusion of bad

acts evidence offered for a purpose the rule recognizes as

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legitimate, other evidentiary rules might. For instance, offering the evidence for a proper purpose will satisfy Rule

404(b), but it will not in itself satisfy the relevancy standards

of Rules 401 and 402. As Professor James explained in a

highly-regarded article, to "determine the relevancy of an

offered item of evidence one must first discover to what

proposition it is supposed to be relevant." 7 The government

must identify which of the matters listed in Rule 404(b)--

"motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,

identity, or absence of mistake or accident"--it is intending to

prove by the other crimes evidence. If the defense objects,

the court must then satisfy itself that the evidence is relevant

to that matter. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S.

681, 691 (1988).8

In the cases before us, neither defendant contested the

relevancy of the other crimes evidence to his intent, except on

the basis that their proposed stipulations took intent out of

the case. Old Chief, as we have discussed, rejected that

argument. And so we move on to another hurdle, Rule 403.

The familiar language of Rule 403 is: "Although relevant,

evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice...." In

these cases, the concern about "prejudice" focused on the

danger of the jury using the other crimes evidence in a way

the rules do not permit--to conclude that because the defendant committed some other crime, he must have committed

the one charged in the indictment. This danger, of course,

will be present in every Rule 404(b) case. But that alone

cannot give rise to a per se rule of exclusion, as Crowder and

Davis argued when we first heard their cases en banc. In

__________

7 George F. James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29

Cal. L. Rev. 689, 696 n.15 (1941); see also 1 McCormick on

Evidence s 185 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). The

advisory committee notes cite and rely upon Professor James' work

and Rule 401 adopts the test of relevancy he proposed in 1941.

8 For instance, if a defendant were charged with distributing

heroin, the government would be hard pressed to demonstrate why

evidence of the defendant's earlier commission of a rape was

relevant to anything properly provable under Rule 404(b).

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adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress "was not

nearly so concerned with the potential prejudicial effect of

Rule 404(b) evidence as it was with ensuring that restrictions

would not be placed on the admission of such evidence."

Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 688-89; see also H.R. Rep. No.

93-650, at 7 (1973) (noting that Rule 404(b)'s second sentence

is intended to place emphasis on admissibility). As to Rule

403, each case will turn on the discretionary judgment of the

trial court and its assessment, not of relevance, but of the

evidentiary value of the government's Rule 404(b) evidence.

On the same side of the balance, the trial court will take into

account the effect of a limiting jury instruction to protect the

rights of the accused. See Fed. R. Evid. 403, advisory

committee notes.

Crowder and Davis maintained, however, that whenever a

defendant offers to stipulate to intent, as both purported to

do here, the Rule 403 balance will always tip in favor of

exclusion. See Joint Brief for Appellants In Banc at 25,

Crowder I. We agree that trial courts may take offers to

stipulate into account in making their Rule 403 determinations. See Fed. R. Evid. 403, advisory committee notes ("The

availability of other means of proof may also be an appropriate factor."). But we do not agree that the existence of the

offer will necessarily be decisive. Here the proposed stipulations were ambiguous, conditional and tentative. Neither

mentioned the defendant directly. At no point in their trials

did either defendant propose a jury instruction requiring the

jury to find the conceded element of intent. That such an

instruction might be needed if their proposed stipulations

were to have any force is something the defendants acknowledged for the first time during the oral argument in Crowder

I. The judges who presided at their trials could not possibly

have anticipated the model jury instruction that later developed (see Crowder I, 87 F.3d at 1411), and their failure to do

so was neither "plain" nor "error." Old Chief warns against

using Rule 403 to replace the prosecution's evidence with a

jury instruction of the sort devised in Crowder I. See note 4,

supra.

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In short, the Rule 403 inquiry in each case involving Rule

404(b) evidence will be case-specific. There can be no "mechanical solution," no per se rule of the sort Crowder and

Davis advocate.

We have considered the defendants' other arguments and

reject them. The convictions are affirmed.

So ordered.

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ADDENDUM

As we mentioned in footnote 1 of the opinion, United States

v. Mohel, 604 F.2d 748, 751 (2d Cir. 1979), held that "under

Rule 404(b) bad acts evidence must be relevant to an 'actual'

issue and that an offer to stipulate to an issue removes it

from the case." So far as we can tell, this is the general rule

in both the Second and the Eleventh Circuits, although the

Eleventh Circuit has never reversed a conviction on this basis

and appears to have embraced a contrary position in earlier

cases. See, e.g., United States v. Colon, 880 F.2d 650, 660 (2d

Cir. 1989); United States v. Ortiz, 857 F.2d 900, 903-04 (2d

Cir. 1988); United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 942 (2d

Cir. 1980); United States v. Manafzadeh, 592 F.2d 81, 87 (2d

Cir. 1979); United States v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520, 1537 (11th

Cir. 1996); United States v. Taylor, 17 F.3d 333, 338 (11th

Cir. 1994); United States v. Costa, 947 F.2d 919, 925 (11th

Cir. 1991); United States v. Hernandez, 896 F.2d 513, 522

(11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493,

1498 (11th Cir. 1985) ("This circuit has refused to adopt a per

se rule either for or against admission of evidence when that

evidence is relevant to an issue to which the defendant offers

to stipulate. Rather, we analyze the offer to stipulate as one

factor in making the Rule 403 determination."); United

States v. O'Shea, 724 F.2d 1514, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) ("As a

general rule, a party may not preclude his adversary's offer of

proof by admission or stipulation.").

Other circuits have rejected the position of the Second

Circuit, concluding that bad acts evidence may be admissible

to prove an element of a crime regardless whether that

element is "in dispute." These include the Fourth, Fifth,

Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. See, e.g., United

States v. Hernandez, 975 F.2d 1035, 1040 (4th Cir. 1992);

United States v. Wallace, 32 F.3d 921, 927-28 (5th Cir. 1994);

United States v. Ponce, 8 F.3d 989, 993-94 (5th Cir. 1993);

United States v. Davis, 792 F.2d 1299, 1305 (5th Cir. 1986);

United States v. Spletzer, 535 F.2d 950, 955 (5th Cir. 1976);

United States v. Myers, 123 F.3d 350, 363 (6th Cir.), cert.

denied, 118 S. Ct. 611 (1997); United States v. Mauldin, 109

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F.3d 1159, 1161 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Murphy, 107

F.3d 1199, 1206-07 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Johnson,

27 F.3d 1186, 1192-93 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v.

Hebeka, 25 F.3d 287, 291 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v.

Zalman, 870 F.2d 1047, 1056 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v.

Brown, 34 F.3d 569, 573 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v.

Monzon, 869 F.2d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v.

Allen, 798 F.2d 985, 1001 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v.

Liefer, 778 F.2d 1236, 1240-43 (7th Cir. 1985); United States

v. Chaimson, 760 F.2d 798, 805-06 (7th Cir. 1985); United

States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1182 (9th Cir. 1994); United

States v. Jones, 982 F.2d 380, 382-83 (9th Cir. 1992); United

States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1990);

United States v. Gano, 560 F.2d 990, 993 (10th Cir. 1977).

Still other circuits have been somewhat equivocal. The

First Circuit, while suggesting that a defendant's offer to

stipulate to an element renders evidence of other bad acts

inadmissible to prove that element, also has stated that "[i]n

the final analysis, ... whether such an offer is accepted

remains in the sound discretion of the district judge." United States v. Garcia, 983 F.2d 1160, 1175 (1st Cir. 1993); see

United States v. Williams, 985 F.2d 634, 637 (1st Cir. 1993);

United States v. Ferrer-Cruz, 899 F.2d 135, 138 (1st Cir.

1990). The Third Circuit has noted that "district courts

should generally deem prior bad acts evidence inadmissible to

prove an issue that the defendant makes clear he is not

contesting" but has refused to adopt a per se rule of exclusion. United States v. Jemal, 26 F.3d 1267, 1274 (3d Cir.

1994); see United States v. Sheeran, 699 F.2d 112, 118 n.12

(3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985,

1003-04 (3d Cir. 1980).

The Eighth Circuit seems to have taken inconsistent positions on the issue. Compare United States v. Sumner, 119

F.3d 658, 660-61 (8th Cir. 1997) (supporting per se rule of

exclusion), United States v. Moore, 98 F.3d 347, 349-50 (8th

Cir. 1996) (same), United States v. Thomas, 58 F.3d 1318,

1321-23 (8th Cir. 1995) (same), and United States v. Jenkins,

7 F.3d 803, 806-07 (8th Cir. 1993) (same), with United States

v. Crouch, 46 F.3d 871, 875 (8th Cir. 1995) (reading Jenkins

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narrowly), United States v. Barry, 133 F.3d 580, 582 (8th Cir.

1998) (acknowledging as general rule of circuit that "the

government is not bound by a defendant's offer to stipulate")

(quotation marks and citation omitted), United States v.

DeAngelo, 13 F.3d 1228, 1231 (8th Cir. 1994) (same), United

States v. Hiland, 909 F.2d 1114, 1134 (8th Cir. 1990) (same),

and United States v. Bass, 794 F.2d 1305, 1312 n.6 (8th Cir.

1986) (same). In a decision handed down after Old Chief, the

Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court's decision may have resolved the Rule 404(b)-stipulation question

once and for all. See United States v. Spence, 125 F.3d 1192,

1194 n.2 (8th Cir. 1997).

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Tatel, Circuit Judge, with whom Edwards, Chief Judge,

Wald, and Silberman, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting: Although Rule 404(b)'s first sentence--"[e]vidence of other

crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith"--restrains prosecutors and sometimes deprives juries

of relevant evidence, Congress determined that the Rule's

valuable protection against the prejudice of bad acts evidence

outweighs its costs. Substituting its own policy judgment for

Congress', this court now converts Rule 404(b) from a requirement that courts inquire into the purposes of character

evidence--"[t]he threshold inquiry a court must make before

admitting similar acts evidence under Rule 404(b) is whether

that evidence is probative of a material issue other than

character," Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686

(1988)--into a question of relevance. Since bad acts evidence

is almost always relevant, the court has effectively erased

Rule 404(b)'s first sentence, making all character evidence

admissible under Rule 404(b)'s second sentence, subject to

Rule 403 balancing. Nothing in Old Chief v. United States,

117 S. Ct. 644 (1997), requires this result, nor does Old Chief

call for abandoning our former en banc decision in these

cases. I respectfully dissent.

Over a century ago, the Supreme Court recognized that

evidence of defendants' prior bad acts "only tend[s] to prejudice the defendants with the jurors, to draw their minds away

from the real issue, and to produce the impression that [the

defendants] were wretches whose lives were of no value to

the community, and who were not entitled to the full benefit

of the rules prescribed by law for the trial of human beings."

Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 458 (1892). Eighty

years later, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence

likewise recognized the powerful and invidious tendency of

character evidence to shift jurors' focus from defendants'

actions to their character, noting that it " 'subtly permits the

trier of fact to reward the good man and to punish the bad

man because of their respective characters despite what the

evidence in the case shows actually happened.' " Fed. R.

Evid. 404(a) advisory committee's notes (1972 Proposed

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Rules) (quoting California Law Revision Commission, Report,

Record and Studies 615 (1964)).

Rule 404(b)'s first sentence excludes bad acts evidence

not for lack of relevance--to the contrary, bad acts evidence

is highly relevant--but because using the evidence causes

undue prejudice. "The overriding policy of excluding such

evidence, despite its admitted probative value," the Supreme

Court has explained, "is the practical experience that its

disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair

surprise and undue prejudice." Michelson v. United States,

335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948). Elaborating further in Old Chief,

the Court said that " '[a]lthough ... "propensity evidence" is

relevant, the risk that a jury will convict for crimes other

than those charged--or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict

anyway because a bad person deserves punishment--creates

a prejudicial effect that outweighs ordinary relevance.' " Old

Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 650 (quoting United States v. Moccia, 681

F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1982) (Breyer, J.)). Far from irrelevant,

propensity evidence tends to "overpersuade" the jury, Michelson, 335 U.S. at 476, powerfully aiding the prosecution

with its inexorable implication that a person who once committed a bad act probably also did the bad act for which he is

on trial. Rule 404(b)'s first sentence thus unambiguously

prohibits the government from using character evidence to

show propensity, excluding it to ensure that "[a] defendant

[is] tried for what he did, not for who he is." United States v.

Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting United

States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977)). Because " 'it reflects and gives meaning to the central precept of

our system of criminal justice, the presumption of innocence,' " United States v. Dockery, 955 F.2d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir.

1992) (quoting Daniels, 770 F.2d at 1118), prohibiting the use

of bad acts evidence to show propensity promotes fairer

trials.

Prejudicial though it is, bad acts evidence can be highly

probative of many things the government may legitimately

need to prove, such as knowledge, intent, or motive. Rule

404(b) strikes the balance between the prejudicial effect of

bad acts evidence and its probative value through a two-step

process. The court first determines whether the evidence's

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only purpose is to prove propensity. Is the putative issue for

which it is offered uncontested? United States v. Foskey, 636

F.2d 517, 524 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (prosecution could not offer

character evidence to prove identity where identity was not

an issue) (citing United States v. James, 555 F.2d 992, 1000 &

n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). Has the defendant, as in these cases,

conceded the non-propensity element for which the government offered the evidence? United States v. Mohel, 604 F.2d

748, 753 (2d Cir. 1979). Or has the government failed to

convince the court of the authenticity of its proffered nonpropensity reasons? If the answer to any of these questions

is yes, the court must exclude the evidence under Rule

404(b)'s first sentence. But if the government articulates a

material and legitimate non-propensity purpose for the evidence, it becomes admissible under Rule 404(b)'s second

sentence, subject to Rule 403 balancing. By its decision

today, this court essentially eliminates the first step of this

analysis.

Abandoning our original en banc decision in Crowder I, the

court reaches this result by relying on Old Chief and the

unremarkable proposition that propensity evidence remains

relevant under Rules 401 and 402 even after a defendant

completely removes its non-propensity purposes from the

case through concession and agreement to a "must convict"

jury instruction. But Crowder I never held that a defendant's concession renders bad acts evidence irrelevant under

Rule 402. Instead, it held that the concession makes the

evidence inadmissable under Rule 404(b)'s first sentence.

United States v. Crowder (Crowder I), 87 F.3d 1405, 1407

(D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 760 (1997). An unambiguous stipulation and jury instruction, Crowder I explained, so

thoroughly drains the evidence's non-propensity value for the

prosecution's case that to admit the evidence would unduly

prejudice the jury. Id. at 1410 (defendant's concession

"gives the Government everything the evidence could show

... without risk that the jury will use the evidence for impermissible propensity purposes"). As Crowder I put it, "the

defendant's concession of intent and knowledge deprives the

evidence of any value other than what Rule 404(b)'s first senUSCA Case #92-3133 Document #349748 Filed: 05/01/1998 Page 23 of 29
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tence unambiguously prohibits: 'to prove the character of a

person in order to show action in conformity therewith.' "

Id. at 1407. The evidence remains relevant, just as the

excluded evidence in Old Chief remained relevant. But after

a defendant has conceded the purpose for which the government seeks to introduce the evidence, that evidence no longer serves any function except to put character evidence

before the jury. Rule 404(b)'s first sentence therefore requires its exclusion.

Far from invalidating Crowder I, Old Chief supports its

result. In Old Chief, the Supreme Court confronted a scenario similar to the one we face here--a defendant trying to

stipulate away an element of his crime in order to preclude

the admission of prejudicial evidence--but the case arose

under a different rule, Rule 403. Unlike Rule 404(b)'s first

sentence's flat prohibition on using bad acts evidence to

demonstrate character, Rule 403 simply requires courts to

balance the prejudicial effect of bad acts evidence against its

probativeness. Notwithstanding the fact-sensitive nature of

Rule 403 balancing at which district court discretion "is at its

height," Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549,

555 (D.C. Cir. 1993), the Court ruled that when Old Chief

offered to remove his felon-status from the case by stipulation, "the only reasonable conclusion was that" evidence of his

status that revealed the name or nature of his prior felony

would be so prejudicial that a district court's admission of

such evidence would always constitute an abuse of discretion,

Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 655-56. Explaining that the name

and nature of the defendant's felony remained relevant, id. at

649, and reiterating the usual rule that a defendant's stipulation "generally cannot prevail over the Government's choice

to offer evidence showing guilt and all the circumstances

surrounding the offense," id. at 651, the Court nevertheless

found the risk of undue prejudice so great as to require a per

se exclusionary rule. If relevance was insufficient under Rule

403's relatively flexible standard, see id. at 652 (distinguishing

"probativeness" under Rule 403 from "relevance" under Rule

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401), it is certainly insufficient under Rule 404(b)'s absolute

bar.

As the court now interprets Rule 404(b), its first sentence

never comes into play unless the government is careless

enough to confess that its only motive for introducing the

evidence is to prove the defendant's bad character. The clear

implication of today's decision is that Rule 404(b) is satisfied if

propensity evidence is remotely relevant to any issue, even a

conceded issue that the government need never prove. See

Maj. Op. at 9. Rule 404(b) requires more. It imposes an

affirmative burden on prosecutors to articulate--and on

courts to approve--material, non-propensity purposes for admitting bad acts evidence. As the Supreme Court put it in

Huddleston, "[t]he threshold inquiry a court must make

before admitting similar acts evidence under Rule 404(b) is

whether that evidence is probative of a material issue other

than character." 485 U.S. at 686. This burden constitutes

the defendant's first and most important protection against

the harmful effects of character evidence. Once that threshhold is passed, the evidence's relevance will often tip Rule

403's scales in the government's favor, and once the evidence

is admitted the curative effects of limiting jury instructions

are an " 'unmitigated fiction.' " Daniels, 770 F.2d at 1118

(quoting Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949)

(Jackson, J., concurring)).

To be sure, a single piece of evidence can serve many

purposes, see Maj. Op. at 12-13, but that does not automatically satisfy Rule 404(b). The government must actually

articulate one of these multiple purposes as a basis for

introducing the evidence. If it does, the evidence can come in

under the second sentence of Rule 404(b), subject to Rule 403

balancing. This balancing is precisely what Crowder I held

should happen in Crowder's case on remand, see Crowder I,

87 F.3d at 1413-14. It also could have happened in Davis's

case if the government had articulated an unconceded material purpose for the evidence such as motive. By holding that

the mere relevance of character evidence satisfies Rule

404(b), this court relieves the government from even this

relatively light burden of articulation and persuasion.

The court quotes lengthy passages of Old Chief dicta

regarding prosecutorial narrative and the jury's expectations

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about proper proof, see Maj. Op. at 10-11, reiterating Old

Chief 's point that intrinsic evidence may be essential to

"creat[e] a coherent narrative of [a defendant's] thoughts and

actions in perpetrating the offense for which he is being

tried." Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 656. By their very nature,

however, "other bad acts" are separate from, not integral to,

"the offense ... being tried." Id. In Davis's case, the other

bad acts evidence concerned events that took place before the

offense with which he was charged occurred. The bad acts in

Crowder's case occurred after his first trial. In neither case,

therefore, did the evidence have any place in the government's narrative about what actually happened on the dates

of the alleged crimes for which the defendants were on trial,

unless, of course, the government were permitted to argue

based on propensity. But Rule 404(b) requires the prosecution to produce some reason other than propensity to connect

a defendant's prior or subsequent acts with the "narrative" of

the charged offense. Absent such a connection, excluding the

bad acts evidence does not detract from the prosecution's

story in any way, except by forbidding tales of defendants'

bad character. Indeed, Old Chief recognized that the government's authority to construct its narrative of the charged

crime is cabined by Rule 404(b). Id. at 651.

The court says that Crowder I would have permitted

defendants to control the prosecution's presentation of its

evidence, but most evidence never implicates Rule 404(b) at

all. Generally speaking, defendants' concessions cannot prevent the admission of non-bad acts evidence intrinsic to their

crimes, such as Crowder's beeper. Presumptively admissible,

such evidence is subject only to Rule 403 under which a

concession functions merely as one factor in the balance.

Only because Rule 404(b), a specialized rule of evidence,

disfavors character evidence and imposes special burdens on

the prosecution can an unambiguous concession block admission of such evidence.

According to the court, the similarity in the bags involved

in Crowder's two drug transactions made it more likely that

he knew the substances were cocaine. See Maj. Op. at 13-14.

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dence would have to show something more, such as modus

operandi. Although the prosecution offered the evidence for

that purpose, the district court excluded it, finding that the

government failed to establish any unique similarities between the past and present acts. See Crowder I, 87 F.3d at

1413.

The court worries that a confused jury may decline to

convict, but Crowder and Davis's willingness to accept a

"must convict" jury instruction removes this danger. The

instruction also answers the court's concern that the stipulations were unclear because they failed to refer to defendants

by name, see Maj. Op. at 11-12. The offered instruction

makes abundantly clear that possession, not knowledge or

intent, remains the only issue in dispute. See Appellants'

Supp. Br. at 9; Crowder I, 87 F.3d at 1412. As Crowder I

explained, both defense counsel made clear at trial that

possession was the only issue:

Davis's attorney ... told the district court that "[o]nce

the government has proved possession in this case, it's

our position they've proved knowledge and intent as

well." In both opening statement and closing argument,

Davis's attorney reiterated that knowledge and intent

were not at issue.... [Crowder's] attorney [likewise]

stated that "[t]he issue in this case is: Did he or did he

not possess those drugs? That's the threshold thing that

the Government has to be able to prove in this case. The

rest of it in terms of what the facts--what the evidence

will show, we concede."

Id. at 1411-12.

As Crowder I also explained, the instruction itself promotes

clarity. See id. at 1415. Unlike limiting jury instructions

that are used when character evidence is admitted and that

require juries to ignore the obvious implication of bad acts

evidence, a "must convict" instruction would not require the

jury to perform " 'mental gymnastic[s].' " Daniels, 770 F.2d

at 1118 (quoting Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007

(2d Cir. 1932)). Rather, the trial court simply instructs the

jury that to convict it need find only possession beyond a

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reasonable doubt. Hardly confusing, this approach protects

defendants from the prejudice of bad acts evidence while

preserving the government's ability to prove its case.

Aside from depriving the government of the ability to

introduce character evidence, Crowder and Davis's concessions and proposed jury instructions would have made the

government's task easier--in effect transforming these distribution cases into simple possession cases. Why, then, does

the government decline the offer? The answer is this: Bad

acts evidence is so prejudicial that by using it, the government is more likely to convict, even with the burden of

proving all three elements of the crime, than if it need prove

only possession but cannot use the evidence. "Let's not kid

ourselves," said then-Chief Judge Penn, the trial judge in

Crowder's case, "the reason the government seeks to introduce [404(b) evidence] is because it's prejudicial." United

States v. Crowder, Crim. No. 91-351, Trial Tr. at 603 (D.D.C.

March 3, 1992).

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Silberman, Circuit Judge, dissenting: I adhere to the

views I expressed in the first en banc case, see United States

v. Crowder, 87 F.3d 1405, 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1996). I would only

add that, with all due respect to the Supreme Court, I do not

understand why it thought that this case was affected by the

Court's opinion in Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644

(1997).

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