Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-10137/USCOURTS-ca9-15-10137-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Khamphou Khouthong
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

STEVE MCINTOSH,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-10117

D.C. No.

3:14-cr-00016-

MMC-3

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Maxine M. Chesney, Senior District Judge, Presiding

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

IANE LOVAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-10122

D.C. No.

1:13-cr-00294-

LJO-SKO-1

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2 UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SOMPHANE MALATHONG,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-10127

D.C. No.

1:13-cr-00294-

LJO-SKO-3

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

VONG SOUTHY,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-10132

D.C. No.

1:13-cr-00294-

LJO-SKO-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KHAMPHOU KHOUTHONG,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-10137

D.C. No.

1:13-cr-00294-

LJO-SKO-4

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding

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UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH 3

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JERAD JOHN KYNASTON, AKA Jared

J. Kynaston, AKA Jerad J.

Kynaston; SAMUEL MICHAEL

DOYLE, AKA Samuel M. Doyle;

BRICE CHRISTIAN DAVIS, AKA Brice

C. Davis; JAYDE DILLON EVANS,

AKA Jayde D. Evans; TYLER SCOTT

MCKINLEY, AKA Tyler S.

McKinley,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 15-30098

D.C. No.

2:12-cr-00016-

WFN-1

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Wm. Fremming Nielsen, Senior District Judge, Presiding

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4 UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH

IN RE IANE LOVAN,

IANE LOVAN,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF

CALIFORNIA, FRESNO,

Respondent,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Real Party in Interest.

No. 15-71158

D.C. No.

1:13-cr-00294-

LJO-SKO-1

IN RE SOMPHANE MALATHONG,

SOMPHANE MALATHONG,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF

CALIFORNIA, FRESNO,

Respondent,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Real Party in Interest.

No. 15-71174

D.C. No.

1:13-cr-00294-

LJO-SKO-3

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UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH 5

IN RE VONG SOUTHY,

VONG SOUTHY,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF

CALIFORNIA, FRESNO,

Respondent,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Real Party in Interest.

No. 15-71179

D.C. No.

1:13-cr-00294-

LJO-SKO-2

IN RE KHAMPHOU KHOUTHONG,

KHAMPHOU KHOUTHONG,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF

CALIFORNIA, FRESNO,

Respondent,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Real Party in Interest.

No. 15-71225

D.C. No.

1:13-cr-00294-

LJO-SKO-4

OPINION

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6 UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH

Petitions for Writ of Mandamus

Argued and Submitted December 7, 2015

San Francisco, California

Filed August 16, 2016

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Barry G. Silverman,

and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

In ten consolidated interlocutory appeals and petitions for

writs of mandamus arising from three district courts in two

states, the panel vacated the district court’s orders denying

relief to the appellants, who have been indicted for violating

the Controlled Substances Act, and who sought dismissal

of their indictments or to enjoin their prosecutions on the

basis of a congressional appropriations rider, Consolidated

Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 542, 129

Stat. 2242, 2332-33 (2015), that prohibits the Department of

Justice fromspending funds to prevent states’ implementation

of their medical marijuana laws.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH 7

The panel held that it has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a)(1) to consider the interlocutory appeals from these

direct denials of requests for injunctions, and that the

appellants have standing to invoke separation-of-powers

provisions of the Constitution to challenge their criminal

prosecutions.

The panel held that § 542 prohibits DOJ from spending

funds from relevant appropriations acts for the prosecution of

individuals who engaged in conduct permitted by state

medical marijuana laws and who fully complied with such

laws. The panel wrote that individuals who do not strictly

comply with all state-law conditions regarding the use,

distribution, possession, and cultivation of medical marijuana

have engaged in conduct that is unauthorized, and that

prosecuting such individuals does not violate § 542.

Remanding to the district courts, the panel instructed that

if DOJ wishes to continue these prosecutions, the appellants

are entitled to evidentiary hearings to determine whether their

conduct was completely authorized by state law. The panel

wrote that in determining the appropriate remedy for any

violation of § 542, the district courts should consider the

temporal nature of the lack of funds along with the

appellants’ rights to a speedy trial.

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8 UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH

COUNSEL

Marc J. Zilversmit (argued), San Francisco, California, for

Defendant-Appellant Steve McIntosh.

Robert R. Fischer (argued), Federal Defenders of Eastern

Washington & Idaho, Spokane, Washington, for DefendantAppellant Jerad John Kynaston.

Richard D. Wall, Spokane, Washington, for DefendantAppellant Tyler Scott McKinley.

Douglas Hiatt, Seattle, Washington; Douglas Dwight Phelps,

Spokane, Washington; for Defendant-Appellant Samuel

Michael Doyle.

David Matthew Miller, Spokane, Washington, for DefendantAppellant Brice Christian Davis.

Nicholas V. Vieth, Spokane, Washington, for DefendantAppellant Jayde Dillion Evans.

Andras Farkas (argued), Assistant Federal Defender; Heather

E. Williams, Federal Defender; Federal Defenders of the

Eastern District of California, Fresno, California; for

Defendant-Appellant/Petitioner Iane Lovan.

Daniel L. Harralson, Daniel L. Harralson Law Corp., Fresno,

California, for Defendant-Appellant/Petitioner Somphane

Malathong.

Harry M. Drandell, Law Offices of Harry M. Drandell,

Fresno, California, for Defendant-Appellant/Petitioner Vong

Southy.

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UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH 9

Peter M. Jones, Wanger Jones Helsley, P.C., Fresno,

California, for Defendant-Appellant/Petitioner Khamphou

Khouthong.

Owen P.Martikan (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Barbara J. Valliere, Chief, Appellate Division; Brian Stretch,

United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office, San

Francisco, California, and ; Russell E. Smoot and Timothy J.

Ohms, Assistant United States Attorneys; Michael C.

Ormsby, United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s

Office, Spokane, Washington; Camil A. Skipper, Assistant

United States Attorney; Benjamin B. Wagner, United States

Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office, Sacramento,

California; for Plaintiff-Appellee/Real Party in Interest

United States.

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We are asked to decide whether criminal defendants may

avoid prosecution for various federal marijuana offenses on

the basis of a congressional appropriations rider that

prohibits the United States Department of Justice from

spending funds to prevent states’ implementation of their own

medical marijuana laws.

I

A

These ten cases are consolidated interlocutoryappeals and

petitions for writs of mandamus arising out of orders entered

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10 UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH

by three district courts in two states within our circuit.1 All

Appellants have been indicted for various infractions of the

Controlled Substances Act (CSA). They have moved to

dismiss their indictments or to enjoin their prosecutions on

the grounds that the Department of Justice (DOJ) is

prohibited from spending funds to prosecute them.

In McIntosh, five codefendants allegedly ran four

marijuana stores in the Los Angeles area known as

Hollywood Compassionate Care (HCC) andHappyDays, and

nine indoor marijuana grow sites in the San Francisco and

Los Angeles areas. These codefendants were indicted for

conspiracy to manufacture, to possess with intent to

distribute, and to distribute more than 1000 marijuana plants

in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(l)(A). 

The government sought forfeiture derived from such

violations under 21 U.S.C. § 853.

In Lovan, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and Fresno

County Sheriff’s Office executed a federal search warrant on

60 acres of land located on North Zedicker Road in Sanger,

California. Officials allegedly located more than 30,000

marijuana plants on this property. Four codefendants were

indicted for manufacturing 1000 or more marijuana plants

and for conspiracy to manufacture 1000 or more marijuana

plants in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846.

1 Appellants filed one appeal in United States v. McIntosh, No. 15-

10117, arising out of the Northern District of California; one appeal in

United States v. Kynaston, No. 15-30098, arising out of the Eastern

District ofWashington; and four appeals with four corresponding petitions

for mandamus—Nos. 15-10122, 15-10127, 15-10132, 15-10137, 15-

71158, 15-71174, 15-71179, 15-71225, which we shall address as United

States v. Lovan—arising out of the Eastern District of California.

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UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH 11

In Kynaston, five codefendants face charges that arose out

of the execution of a Washington State search warrant related

to an investigation into violations of Washington’s Controlled

Substances Act. Allegedly, a total of 562 “growing

marijuana plants,” along with another 677 pots, some of

which appeared to have the root structures of suspected

harvested marijuana plants, were found. The codefendants

were indicted for conspiring to manufacture 1000 or more

marijuana plants, manufacturing 1000 or more marijuana

plants, possessing with intent to distribute 100 or more

marijuana plants, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a

Title 21 offense, maintaining a drug-involved premise, and

being felons in possession of a firearm in violation of

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841, 856(a)(1).

B

In December 2014, Congress enacted the following rider

in an omnibus appropriations bill funding the government

through September 30, 2015:

None of the funds made available in this Act

to the Department of Justice may be used,

with respect to the States of Alabama, Alaska,

Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,

Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,

Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine,

Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,

Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,

Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New

Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, South

Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,

Washington, and Wisconsin, to prevent such

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12 UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH

States from implementing their own State

laws that authorize the use, distribution,

possession, or cultivation of medical

marijuana.

Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act,

2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217

(2014). Various short-term measures extended the

appropriations and the rider through December 22, 2015. On

December 18, 2015, Congress enacted a new appropriations

act, which appropriates funds through the fiscal year ending

September 30, 2016, and includes essentially the same rider

in § 542. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L.

No. 114-113, § 542, 129 Stat. 2242, 2332–33 (2015) (adding

Guam and Puerto Rico and changing “prevent such States

from implementing their own State laws” to “prevent any of

them from implementing their own laws”).

Appellants in McIntosh, Lovan, and Kynaston filed

motions to dismiss or to enjoin on the basis of the rider. The

motions were denied from the bench in hearings in McIntosh

and Lovan, while the court in Kynaston filed a short written

order denying the motion after a hearing. In McIntosh and

Kynaston, the court concluded that defendants had failed to

carry their burden to demonstrate their compliance with state

medical marijuana laws. In Lovan, the court concluded that

the determination of compliance with state law would depend

on facts found by the jury in a federal prosecution, and thus

it would revisit the defendants’ motion after the trial.

Appellants in all three cases filed interlocutory appeals,

and Appellants in McIntosh and Lovan ask us to consider

issuing writs of mandamus if we do not assume jurisdiction

over the appeals.

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UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH 13

II

Federal courts are courts of limited subject-matter

jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized both by

the Constitution and by Congress. See Gunn v. Minton,

133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064 (2013). Before proceeding to the

merits of this dispute, we must assure ourselves that we have

jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,

523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998).

A

The parties dispute whether Congress has authorized us

to exercise jurisdiction over these interlocutoryappeals. “Our

jurisdiction is typically limited to final decisions of the

district court.” United States v. Romero-Ochoa, 554 F.3d

833, 835 (9th Cir. 2009). “In criminal cases, this prohibits

appellate review until after conviction and imposition of

sentence.” Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S.

794, 798 (1989). In the cases before us, no Appellants have

been convicted or sentenced. Therefore, unless some

exception to the general rule applies, we should not reach the

merits of this dispute. Appellants invoke three possible

avenues for reaching the merits: jurisdiction over an order

refusing an injunction, jurisdiction under the collateral order

doctrine, and the writ of mandamus. We address the first of

these three avenues.

1

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a), “the courts of appeals shall

have jurisdiction of appeals from: (1) Interlocutory orders of

the district courts of the United States . . . granting,

continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, . . .

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14 UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH

except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme

Court.” (emphasis added). By its terms, § 1292(a)(1)

requires only an interlocutory order refusing an injunction. 

Nonetheless, relying on Carson v. American Brands, Inc.,

450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981), the government argues that

§ 1292(a)(1) requires Appellants to show that the

interlocutory order (1) has the effect of refusing an

injunction; (2) has a serious, perhaps irreparable,

consequence; and (3) can be effectually challenged only by

immediate appeal.

The government’s reliance on Carson is misplaced in

light of our precedent interpreting that case. In Shee Atika v.

Sealaska Corp., we explained:

In Carson, the Supreme Court considered

whether section 1292(a)(1) permitted appeal

from an order denying the parties’ joint

motion for approval of a consent decree that

contained an injunction as one of its

provisions. Because the order did not, on its

face, deny an injunction, an appeal from the

order did not fall precisely within the

language of section 1292(a)(1). The Court

nevertheless permitted the appeal. The Court

stated that, while section 1292(a)(1) must be

narrowly construed in order to avoid

piecemeal litigation, it does permit appeals

from orders that have the “practical effect” of

denying an injunction, provided that the

would-be appellant shows that the order

“might have a serious, perhaps irreparable,

consequence.”

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UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH 15

We find nothing in Carson to suggest that the

requirement of irreparable injury applies to

appeals from orders specifically denying

injunctions. Carson merely expanded the

scope of appeals that do not fall within the

meaning of the statute. Sealaska appeals from

the direct denial of a request for an injunction. 

Carson, therefore, is simply irrelevant.

39 F.3d 247, 249 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); accord

Paige v. California, 102 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 1996); see

also Shee Atika, 39 F.3d at 249 n.2 (noting that its conclusion

was consistent with “the overwhelming majority of courts of

appeals that have considered the issue” and collecting cases). 

Thus, Carson’s requirements do not apply to appeals from the

“direct denial of a request for an injunction.” Shee Atika,

39 F.3d at 249.

2

In the cases before us, the district courts issued direct

denials of requests for injunctions. Lovan, for instance,

requested injunctive relief in the conclusion of his opening

brief: “Therefore, the Court should dismiss all counts against

Mr. Lovan based upon alleged violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841

and/or enjoin the Department of Justice from taking any

further action against the defendants in this case unless and

until the Department can show such action does not involve

the expenditure of any funds in violation of the

Appropriations Act.” At the hearing, Lovan’s counsel made

exceptionally clear that his motion sought injunctive relief in

the alternative:

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16 UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH

THE COURT: But remember, your remedy is

not because you are upset that the Department

of Justice is spending taxpayer money. Your

remedy is a dismissal, which is what you are

seeking now, is it not?

MR. FARKAS: And your Honor, as an

alternative in our motion, we ask for a stay of

these proceedings, asked this Court to enjoin

the Department of Justice from spending any

funds to prosecute Mr. Lovan if this Court

finds he is in conformity with the California

Compassionate Use Act. So it is a motion to

dismiss or, alternatively, a motion to enjoin

until Congress designates funds for that

purpose.

Shortly thereafter, Lovan’s counsel reiterated: “[W]e would

ask either for a dismissal or to enjoin the government from

spending any funds that were not appropriated under the

Appropriations Act.” At the close of the hearing, Lovan’s

counsel even explicitly argued that the district court’s denial

of injunctive relief would be appealable immediately: “I

believe this might be the type of collateral order that is

appealable to the Ninth Circuit immediately. As I said, we

are asking for an injunction.” The district court denied

Lovan’s motion, which clearly requested injunctive relief.

Similarly, in Kynaston, the opening brief in support of the

motion began and ended with explicit requests for injunctive

relief. Subsequent filings by other defendants in that case

referenced the injunctive relief sought, and one discussed at

length how courts of equity should exercise their jurisdiction. 

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UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH 17

The district court denied the motion, which clearly sought

injunctive relief.

In McIntosh, the defendant requested injunctive relief in

his moving papers, and he mentioned his request for

injunctive relief three times in his reply brief. At the hearing,

the question of injunctive relief did not arise, and the district

court said simply that it was denying the motion. Although

McIntosh could have emphasized the equitable component of

his request more, we conclude that he raised the issue

sufficiently for the denial of his motion to constitute a direct

denial of a request for an injunction.

Therefore, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a)(1) to consider the interlocutory appeals from these

direct denials of requests for injunctions.

3

We note the unusual circumstances presented by these

cases. In almost all federal criminal prosecutions, injunctive

relief and interlocutory appeals will not be appropriate. 

Federal courts traditionally have refused, except in rare

instances, to enjoin federal criminal prosecutions. See

Ackerman v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Union, 187 F.2d 860, 868

(9th Cir. 1951); Argonaut Mining Co. v. McPike, 78 F.2d 584,

586 (9th Cir. 1935); Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States,

442 F.3d 177, 185 (3d Cir. 2006); Deaver v. Seymour,

822 F.2d 66, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1987). “An order by a federal

court that relates only to the conduct or progress of litigation

before that court ordinarily is not considered an injunction

and therefore is not appealable under § 1292(a)(1).” 

Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S.

271, 279 (1988). Thus, in almost all circumstances, federal

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18 UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH

criminal defendants cannot obtain injunctions of their

ongoing prosecutions, and orders by district courts relating

solely to requests to stay ongoing federal prosecutions will

not constitute appealable orders under § 1292(a)(1).

Here, however, Congress has enacted an appropriations

rider that specifically restricts DOJ from spending money to

pursue certain activities. It is “emphatically . . . the exclusive

province of the Congress not only to formulate legislative

policies and mandate programs and projects, but also to

establish their relative priority for the Nation. Once

Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided the

order of priorities in a given area, it is for . . . the courts to

enforce them when enforcement is sought.” Tenn. Valley

Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978); accord United States

v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Co-op., 532 U.S. 483, 497

(2001). A “court sitting in equity cannot ‘ignore the

judgment ofCongress, deliberatelyexpressed in legislation.’”

Oakland Cannabis, 532 U.S. at 497 (quoting Virginian Ry.

Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 551 (1937)). Even if

Appellants cannot obtain injunctions of their prosecutions

themselves, they can seek—and have sought—to enjoin DOJ

from spending fundsfrom the relevant appropriations acts on

such prosecutions.2 When Congress has enacted a legislative

2 We need not decide in the first instance exactly how the district courts

should resolve claims that DOJ is spending money to prosecute a

defendant in violation of an appropriations rider. We therefore take no

view on the precise relief required and leave that issue to the district courts

in the first instance. We note that district courts in criminal cases have

ancillary jurisdiction, which “is the power of a court to adjudicate and

determine matters incidental to the exercise ofits primary jurisdiction over

a cause under review.” United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1013–15

(9th Cir. 2000); see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.

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UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH 19

restriction like § 542 that expressly prohibits DOJ from

spending funds on certain actions,federal criminal defendants

may seek to enjoin the expenditure of those funds, and we

may exercise jurisdiction over a district court’s direct denial

of a request for such injunctive relief.

B

1

As part of our jurisdictional inquiry, we must consider

whether Appellants have standing to complain that DOJ is

spending money that has not been appropriated by Congress. 

“The doctrine of standing asks whether a litigant is entitled to

have a federal court resolve his grievance.” Kowalski v.

Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128 (2004). Although the government

concedes that Appellants have standing, we have an

“independent obligation to examine [our] own jurisdiction,

and standing is perhaps the most important of the

jurisdictional doctrines.” United States v. Hays, 515 U.S.

737, 742 (1995) (internal quotation marks and alterations

omitted).

Constitutional limits on our jurisdiction are established by

Article III, which limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to

“Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. It

“demands that an ‘actual controversy’ persist throughout all

stages of litigation. That means that standing ‘must be met

by persons seeking appellate review . . . .’” Hollingsworth v.

Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (citations omitted). To

have Article III standing, a litigant “must have suffered or be

375, 378–80 (1994); Garcia v. Teitler, 443 F.3d 202, 206–10 (2d Cir.

2006).

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20 UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH

imminently threatened with a concrete and particularized

‘injury in fact’ that is fairly traceable to the challenged action

. . . and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial

decision.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,

Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014).

In Bond v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed a

situation similar to the cases before us. 564 U.S. 211 (2011). 

There, the Third Circuit had concluded that the criminal

defendant lacked “standing to challenge a federal statute on

grounds that the measure interferes with the powers reserved

to States,” and the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 216, 226.

The Court explained that “[o]ne who seeks to initiate or

continue proceedings in federal court must demonstrate,

among other requirements, both standing to obtain the relief

requested, and, in addition, an ‘ongoing interest in the

dispute’ on the part of the opposing party that is sufficient to

establish ‘concrete adverseness.’” Id. at 217 (citations

omitted). “When those conditions are met, Article III does

not restrict the opposing party’s ability to object to relief

being sought at its expense.” Id. “The requirement of Article

III standing thus had no bearing upon [the defendant’s]

capacity to assert defenses in the District Court.” Id.

Applying those principles to the defendant’s standing to

appeal, the Court concluded that it was “clear Article III’s

prerequisites are met. Bond’s challenge to her conviction and

sentence ‘satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement,

because the incarceration . . . constitutes a concrete injury,

caused by the conviction and redressable by invalidation of

the conviction.’” Id. Here, Appellants have not yet been

deprived of liberty via a conviction, but their indictments

imminently threaten such a deprivation. Cf. Susan B.

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UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH 21

Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2342–47 (2014)

(threatened prosecution may give rise to standing). They

clearly had Article III standing to pursue their challenges

below because they were merely objecting to relief sought at

their expense. And they have standing on appeal because

their potential convictions constitute concrete, particularized,

and imminent injuries, which are caused by their prosecutions

and redressable by injunction or dismissal of such

prosecutions. See Bond, 564 U.S. at 217.

After addressing Article III standing, the Bond Court

concluded that, “[i]f the constitutional structure of our

Government that protects individual liberty is compromised,

individuals who suffer otherwise justiciable injury may

object.” Id. at 223. The Court explained that both federalism

and separation-of-powers constraintsin theConstitution serve

to protect individual liberty, and a litigant in a proper case

can invoke such constraints “[w]hen government acts in

excess of its lawful powers.” Id. at 220–24. The Court gave

numerous examples of cases in which private parties, rather

than government departments, were able to rely on

separation-of-powers principles in otherwise jusiticiable cases

or controversies. See id. at 223 (citing Free Enter. Fund v.

Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010); 

Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 433–36 (1998); 

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995);

Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chadha,

462 U.S. 919 (1983); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon

Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); Youngstown Sheet &Tube

Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry

Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).

The Court reiterated this principle in NLRB v. Noel

Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). There, the Court granted

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22 UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH

relief to a private party challenging an order against it on the

basis that certain members of the National Labor Relations

Board had been appointed in excess of presidential authority

under the Recess Appointments Clause, another separationof-powers constraint. Id. at 2557. The Court “recognize[d],

of course, that the separation of powers can serve to

safeguard individual liberty and that it is the ‘duty of the

judicial department’—in a separation-of-powers case as in

any other—‘to say what the law is.’” Id. at 2559–60 (citing

Clinton, 524 U.S. at 449–50 (Kennedy, J., concurring), and

quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177

(1803)); see also id. at 2592–94 (Scalia, J., concurring in the

judgment) (discussing at great length how the separation of

powers protects individual liberty).

Thus, Appellants have standing to invoke separation-ofpowers provisions of the Constitution to challenge their

criminal prosecutions.

2

Here, Appellants complain that DOJ is spending funds

that have not been appropriated by Congress in violation of

the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution. See U.S.

Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the

Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by

Law . . . .”). This “straightforward and explicit command . . .

means simply that no money can be paid out of the Treasury

unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress.” Office

of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424 (1990)

(citation omitted). “Money may be paid out only through an

appropriation made by law; in other words, the payment of

money from the Treasury must be authorized by a statute.” 

Id.

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UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH 23

The Appropriations Clause plays a critical role in the

Constitution’s separation of powers among the three branches

of government and the checks and balances between them. 

“Any exercise of a power granted by the Constitution to one

of the other branches of Government is limited by a valid

reservation of congressional control over funds in the

Treasury.” Id. at 425. The Clause has a “fundamental and

comprehensive purpose . . . to assure that public funds will be

spent according to the letter of the difficult judgments

reached by Congress as to the common good and not

according to the individual favor of Government agents.” Id.

at 427–28. Without it, Justice Storyexplained, “the executive

would possess an unbounded power over the public purse of

the nation; and might apply all its moneyed resources at his

pleasure.” Id. at 427 (quoting 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries

on the Constitution of the United States § 1348 (3d ed.

1858)).

Thus, if DOJ were spending money in violation of § 542,

it would be drawing funds from the Treasury without

authorization by statute and thus violating the Appropriations

Clause. That Clause constitutes a separation-of-powers

limitation that Appellants can invoke to challenge their

prosecutions.

III

The parties dispute whether the government’s spending

money on their prosecutions violates § 542.

A

We focus, as we must, on the statutory text. Section 542

provides that “[n]one of the funds made available in this Act

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24 UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH

to the Department of Justice may be used, with respect to

[Medical Marijuana States3] to prevent any of them from

implementing their own laws that authorize the use,

distribution, possession, or cultivation of medicalmarijuana.” 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113,

§ 542, 129 Stat. 2242, 2332–33 (2015). Unfortunately, the

rider is not a model of clarity.

1

“It is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction’ that,

‘unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking

their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.’” Sandifer

v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 876 (2014) (quoting

Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). Thus, in

order to decide whether the prosecutions of Appellants violate

§ 542, we must determine the plain meaning of “prevent any

of [the Medical Marijuana States] from implementing their

own laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or

cultivation of medical marijuana.” The pronoun “them”

refers back to the Medical Marijuana States, and “their own

3 To avoid repeating the names of all 43 jurisdictions listed, we refer to

Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,

Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,

Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,

Montana, Nevada, NewHampshire, NewJersey, NewMexico, NewYork,

North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina,

Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin,

Wyoming, the District of Columbia, Guam, and Puerto Rico as the

“Medical Marijuana States” and their laws authorizing “the use,

distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana” as the “State

Medical Marijuana Laws.” While recognizing that the list includes three

non-states, we will refer to the listed jurisdictions as states and their laws

as state laws without further qualification.

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UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH 25

laws” refers to the state laws of the Medical Marijuana States. 

And “implement” means:

To “carry out, accomplish; esp.: to give

practical effect to and ensure of actual

fulfillment by concrete measure.” Implement,

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary

(11th ed. 2003);

“To put into practical effect; carry out.” 

Implement, American Heritage Dictionary of

the English Language (5th ed. 2011); and

“To complete, perform, carry into effect (a

contract, agreement, etc.); to fulfil (an

engagement or promise).” Implement, Oxford

English Dictionary, www.oed.com.

See Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 559 (9th

Cir. 2010) (We “may follow the common practice of

consulting dictionaries to determine” ordinary meaning.);

Sandifer, 134 S. Ct. at 876. In sum, § 542 prohibits DOJ

from spending money on actions that prevent the Medical

Marijuana States’ giving practical effect to their state laws

that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation

of medical marijuana.

2

DOJ argues that it does not prevent the Medical

Marijuana States from giving practical effect to their medical

marijuana laws byprosecuting private individuals, rather than

taking legal action against the state. We are not persuaded.

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26 UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH

Importantly, the “[s]tatutory language cannot be

construed in a vacuum. It is [another] fundamental canon of

statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read

in their context and with a view to their place in the overall

statutory scheme.” Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1070

(2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, we must

read § 542 with a view to its place in the overall statutory

scheme for marijuana regulation, namely the CSA and the

State Medical Marijuana Laws. The CSA prohibits the use,

distribution, possession, or cultivation of any marijuana. See

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 844(a).

4 The State Medical Marijuana

Laws are those state laws that authorize the use, distribution,

possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana. Thus, the

CSA prohibits what the State Medical Marijuana Laws

permit.

In light of the ordinary meaning of the terms of § 542 and

the relationship between the relevant federal and state laws,

we consider whether a superior authority, which prohibits

certain conduct, can prevent a subordinate authority from

implementing a rule that officially permits such conduct by

punishing individuals who are engaged in the conduct

officially permitted by the lower authority. We conclude that

it can.

4 This requires a slight caveat. Under the CSA, “the manufacture,

distribution, or possession of marijuana [is] a criminal offense, with the

sole exception being use of the drug as part of a Food and Drug

Administration preapproved research study.” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S.

1, 14 (2005); see 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(c), 823(f), 841(a)(1), 844(a). Thus,

except as part of “a strictly controlled research project,” federal law

“designates marijuana as contraband for any purpose.” Raich, 545 U.S.

at 24, 27.

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UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH 27

DOJ, without taking any legal action against the Medical

Marijuana States, prevents them from implementing their

laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or

cultivation of medical marijuana by prosecuting individuals

for use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical

marijuana that is authorized by such laws. By officially

permitting certain conduct, state law provides for nonprosecution of individuals who engage in such conduct. If

the federal government prosecutes such individuals, it has

prevented the state from giving practical effect to its law

providing for non-prosecution of individuals who engage in

the permitted conduct.

We therefore conclude that, at a minimum, § 542

prohibits DOJ from spending funds from relevant

appropriations acts for the prosecution of individuals who

engaged in conduct permitted by the State Medical Marijuana

Laws and who fully complied with such laws.

3

Appellants in McIntosh and Kynaston argue for a more

expansive interpretation of § 542. They contend that the rider

prohibits DOJ from bringing federal marijuana charges

against anyone licensed or authorized under a state medical

marijuana law for activity occurring within that state,

including licensees who had failed to comply fully with state

law.

For instance, Appellants in Kynaston argue that

“implementation of laws necessarily involves all aspects of

putting the law into practical effect, including interpretation

of the law, means of application and enforcement, and

procedures and processes for determining the outcome of

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28 UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH

individual cases.” Under this view, if the federal government

prosecutes individuals who are not strictly compliant with

state law, it will prevent the states from implementing the

entirety of their laws that authorize medical marijuana by

preventing them from giving practical effect to the penalties

and enforcement mechanisms for engaging in unauthorized

conduct. Thus, argue the Kynaston Appellants, the

Department of Justice must refrain from prosecuting “unless

a person’s activities are so clearly outside the scope of a

state’s medical marijuana laws that reasonable debate is not

possible.”

To determine whether such construction is correct, we

must decide whether the phrase “laws that authorize” includes

not only the rules authorizing certain conduct but also the

rules delineating penalties and enforcement mechanisms for

engaging in unauthorized conduct. In answering that

question, we consider the ordinary meaning of “laws that

authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of

medical marijuana.” “Law” has many different meanings,

including the following definitions that appear most relevant

to § 542:

“The aggregate of legislation, judicial

precedents, and accepted legal principles; the

body of authoritative grounds of judicial and

administrative action; esp., the body of rules,

standards, and principles that the courts of a

particular jurisdiction apply in deciding

controversies brought before them.”

“The set of rules or principles dealing with a

specific area of a legal system <copyright

law>.”

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UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH 29

Law, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); and:

“1. a. The body of rules, whether proceeding

from formal enactment or from custom, which

a particular state or community recognizes as

binding on its members or subjects. (In this

sense usually the law.).”

“One of the individual rules which constitute

the ‘law’ (sense 1) of a state or polity. . . . The

plural has often a collective sense . . .

approaching sense 1.”

Law, Oxford English Dictionary, www.oed.com. The relative

pronoun “that” restricts “laws” to those laws authorizing the

use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical

marijuana. See Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of

Legal Usage 887–89 (3d ed. 2011). In sum, the ordinary

meaning of § 542 prohibits the Department of Justice from

preventing the implementation of the Medical Marijuana

States’ laws or sets of rules and only those rules that

authorize medical marijuana use.

We also consider the context of § 542. The rider prohibits

DOJ from preventing forty states, the District of Columbia,

and two territories from implementing their medical

marijuana laws. Not only are such laws varied in

composition but they also are changing as new statutes are

enacted, new regulations are promulgated, and new

administrative and judicial decisions interpret such statutes

and regulations. Thus, § 542 applies to a wide variety of laws

that are in flux.

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30 UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH

Given this context and the restriction of the relevant laws

to those that authorize conduct, we conclude that § 542

prohibits the federal government only from preventing the

implementation of those specific rules of state law that

authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of

medical marijuana. DOJ does not prevent the implementation

of rules authorizing conduct when it prosecutes individuals

who engage in conduct unauthorized under state medical

marijuana laws. Individuals who do not strictly comply with

all state-law conditions regarding the use, distribution,

possession, and cultivation of medical marijuana have

engaged in conduct that is unauthorized, and prosecuting such

individuals does not violate § 542. Congress could easily

have drafted § 542 to prohibit interference with laws that

address medical marijuana or those that regulate medical

marijuana, but it did not. Instead, it chose to proscribe

preventing states from implementing laws that authorize the

use, distribution, possession, and cultivation of medical

marijuana.

B

The parties cite various pieces of legislative history to

support their arguments regarding the meaning of § 542.

We cannot consider such sources. It is a fundamental

principle of appropriations law that we may only consider the

text of an appropriations rider, not expressions of intent in

legislative history. “An agency’s discretion to spend

appropriated funds is cabined only by the ‘text of the

appropriation,’ not by Congress’ expectations of how the

funds will be spent, as might be reflected by legislative

history.” Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181,

2194–95 (2012) (quoting Int’l Union, UAW v. Donovan,

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UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH 31

746 F.2d 855, 860–61 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.)). In

International Union, then-Judge Scalia explained:

As the Supreme Court has said (in a case

involving precisely the issue of Executive

compliance with appropriation laws, although

the principle is one of general applicability):

“legislative intention, without more, is not

legislation.” The issue here is not how

Congress expected or intended the Secretary

to behave, but how it required him to behave,

through the only means by which it can (as far

as the courts are concerned, at least) require

anything—the enactment of legislation. Our

focus, in other words, must be upon the text of

the appropriation.

746 F.2d at 860–61 (quoting Train v. City of New York,

420 U.S. 35, 45 (1975)); see also Cherokee Nation of Okla.

v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 646 (2005) (“The relevant case law

makes clear that restrictive language contained in Committee

Reports is not legally binding.”); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S.

182, 192 (1993) (“‘[I]ndicia in committee reports and other

legislative history as to how the funds should or are expected

to be spent do not establish any legal requirements on’ the

agency.” (citation omitted)).

We recognize that some members of Congress may have

desired a more expansive construction of the rider, while

others may have preferred a more limited interpretation. 

However, we must consider only the text of the rider. If

Congress intends to prohibit a wider or narrower range of

DOJ actions, it certainly may express such intention,

hopefully with greater clarity, in the text of any future rider.

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32 UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH

IV

We therefore must remand to the district courts. If DOJ

wishes to continue these prosecutions, Appellants are entitled

to evidentiary hearings to determine whether their conduct

was completely authorized by state law, by which we mean

that they strictly complied with all relevant conditions

imposed by state law on the use, distribution, possession, and

cultivation of medical marijuana. We leave to the district

courts to determine, in the first instance and in each case, the

precise remedy that would be appropriate.

We note the temporal nature of the problem with these

prosecutions. The government had authority to initiate

criminal proceedings, and it merely lost funds to continue

them. DOJ is currently prohibited from spending funds from

specific appropriations acts for prosecutions of those who

complied with state law. But Congress could appropriate

funds for such prosecutions tomorrow. Conversely, this

temporary lack of funds could become a more permanent lack

of funds if Congress continues to include the same rider in

future appropriations bills. In determining the appropriate

remedy for any violation of § 542, the district courts should

consider the temporal nature of the lack of funds along with

Appellants’ rights to a speedy trial under the Sixth

Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161.5

5 The prior observation should also serve as a warning. To be clear,

§ 542 does not provide immunity from prosecution for federal marijuana

offenses. The CSAprohibits the manufacture, distribution, and possession

of marijuana. Anyone in any state who possesses, distributes, or

manufactures marijuana for medical or recreational purposes (or attempts

or conspires to do so) is committing a federal crime. The federal

government can prosecute such offenses for up to five years after they

occur. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282. Congress currently restricts the government

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UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH 33

V

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the orders of the

district courts and remand with instructions to conduct an

evidentiary hearing to determine whether Appellants have

complied with state law.6

VACATED AND REMANDED WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.

from spending certain funds to prosecute certain individuals. But

Congress could restore funding tomorrow, a year from now, or four years

from now, and the government could then prosecute individuals who

committed offenses while the government lacked funding. Moreover, a

new president will be elected soon, and a new administration could shift

enforcement priorities to place greater emphasis on prosecuting marijuana

offenses.

Nor does any state law “legalize” possession, distribution, or

manufacture of marijuana. Under the Supremacy Clause of the

Constitution, state laws cannot permit what federal law prohibits. U.S.

Const. art VI, cl. 2. Thus, while the CSA remains in effect, states cannot

actually authorize the manufacture, distribution, or possession of

marijuana. Such activity remains prohibited by federal law.

6 We have jurisdiction under the All Writs Act to “issue all writs

necessary or appropriate in aid of [our] jurisdiction[] and agreeable to the

usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651. The writ of mandamus

“is a drastic and extraordinary remedy reserved for really extraordinary

causes.” United States v. Guerrero, 693 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004)). We

DENY the petitions for the writ of mandamus because the petitioners have

other means to obtain their desired relief and because the district courts’

orders were not clearly erroneous as a matter of law. See id. (citing

Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 557 F.2d 650, 654–55 (9th Cir. 2010)). In

addition, we GRANT the motion for leave to file an oversize reply brief,

ECF No. 47-2; DENY the motion to strike, ECF No. 52; and DENY the

motion for judicial notice, ECF No. 53.

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