Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01817/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01817-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Danyel Duckett
Defendant
Vimala Patel
Plaintiff
Chantail Shoots
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VIMALA PATEL,

Plaintiff,

v.

DANYEL DUCKETT, CHANTAIL 

SHOOTS, AND DOES 1 TO 10,

Defendant.

No. 2:16-cv-1817-TLN 

SUA SPONTE REMAND ORDER

This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendants Danyel Duckett and Chantail 

Shoots’ (“Defendants”) Notice of Removal and Motions to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (ECF 

Nos. 1–3.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motions to Proceed in Forma Pauperis 

are GRANTED. The Court hereby remands the action to the Superior Court of California, 

County of Sacramento, due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On or about July 13, 2016, Plaintiff Vimala Patel brought an action against Defendants in 

the Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento for possession of the real property known 

as 4331 Stockton Boulevard, Unit 45, Sacramento, CA (“the Property”). (Notice of Removal, 

ECF No. 1 at 11.) The Complaint alleges that Defendants entered into a lease with Plaintiff on or 

about October 3, 2015 to pay rent in the amount of $1,000.00 per month. (ECF No. 1 at 11.) 

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Plaintiff asserts that Defendants were provided 3-day notice to pay rent or quit possession of the 

property, but Defendants failed to do so. (ECF No. 1 at 12.) On August 2, 2016, Defendants

filed a Notice of Removal, removing this unlawful detainer action from the Sacramento County 

Superior Court. (ECF No. 1.) 

II. STANDARD OF LAW

28 U.S.C. § 1441 permits the removal to federal court of any civil action over which “the 

district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “Removal is

proper only if the court could have exercised jurisdiction over the action had it originally been 

filed in federal court.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 

Courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “the 

defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 

F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Furthermore, “[i]f the district court at any time 

determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action, it must remedy the 

improvident grant of removal by remanding the action to state court.” California ex rel. Lockyer 

v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838, as amended, 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 544 

U.S. 974 (2005).

The “presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded 

complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 

presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 386. 

Removal cannot be based on a defense, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim raising a 

federal question, whether filed in state court or federal court. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 

U.S. 49 (2009); Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2009). 

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants removed this case to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. 

Defendants argue that the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 (“PTFA”) gives rise to a

federal question by identifying two ways in which the statute is drawn into controversy in the 

instant case. 

Defendants state that Plaintiff’s claim is based upon a notice which, by nature of the 

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action, incorporates the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5220. (ECF 

No. 1 at ¶ 8.) However, the Complaint itself contains only a single claim for unlawful detainer. 

(ECF No. 1 at 9–10.) Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, “federal [question] jurisdiction 

exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded 

complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 386. The instant Complaint relies solely on California state 

law and does not mention expressly or impliedly 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201, et. seq. The Complaint does 

not state claims under the PTFA or any other federal law. The well-pleaded complaint rule makes 

the plaintiff the master of his claim, so he may avoid federal jurisdiction by basing his claim 

exclusively on state law, as is the case here. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392.

It seems Defendants mean to assert subject matter jurisdiction by alleging Plaintiff 

violated the PTFA.

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 However, removal cannot be based on a defense, counterclaim, cross-claim, 

or third party claim raising a federal question, whether filed in state court or federal court. See 

Vaden, 556 U.S. at 49; Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d at 1042–43. While Defendants

contend in the notice of removal that Plaintiff has violated a federal law, this assertion relates 

only to an affirmative defense or potential counterclaim, which is not considered in evaluating 

whether a federal question appears on the face of a plaintiff’s complaint. See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 

60-62. “[A] counterclaim – which appears as part of the defendant’s answer, not as part of the 

plaintiff’s complaint – cannot serve as the basis for ‘arising under’ jurisdiction.” Holmes Group, 

Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002).

In summary, the state court Complaint indicates that the only cause of action is one for 

unlawful detainer, which arises solely under state law and not under federal law. Thus, this action 

does not arise under federal law and no other grounds for federal jurisdiction are apparent. 

Therefore, it is appropriate to remand this case, sua sponte, for lack of federal jurisdiction. See 

United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (“the 

district court ha[s] a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action sua 

 

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In any event, the Ninth Circuit has held that no private right of action exists under the 

PTFA. Logan v. U.S. Nat. Assoc., 722 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th Cir. 2013). Further, “the PTFA is 

framed in terms of ‘protections’ for tenants, suggesting that it was intended to provide a defense 

in state eviction proceedings rather than a basis for offensive suits in federal courts.” Id. at 1173.

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sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

Thus for the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motions to proceed in forma pauperis 

(ECF Nos. 2–3) is GRANTED, and the Court hereby remands this action to the Superior Court of 

California, County of Sacramento.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 3, 2016

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