Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05169/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05169-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
County Line Investment Company and Wagco Land Development, Inc.
Appellant
Calvin L. Tinney
Appellee
Wagco Land Development, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

... FI LED 

Uoited States Court of Appeals 

T~nth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JUN 2 7 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

COUNTY LINE INVESTMENT COMPANY 

and WAGCO LAND DEVELOPMENT, INC., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

CALVIN L. TINNEY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 90-5169 

) (D.C. No. 88-C-550-E) 

) (N.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before TACHA, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

The single issue presented in this appeal is whether the 

district court erred in granting $46,390.00 in attorney's fees to 

defendant Calvin Tinney in this action to recover costs incurred 

in closing a sanitary landfill in Wagoner County, Oklahoma. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-5169 Document: 010110128227 Date Filed: 06/27/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiffs County Line Investment Company (County Line) and Wagco 

Land Development, Inc. (Wagco), brought three claims against 

Tinney, two under CERCLA1 and one for unjust enrichment under 

Oklahoma law. The district court granted summary judgment on all 

claims, which we affirmed. See County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 

Nos. 89-5118, 89-5119 (10th Cir. May 24, 1991). We now likewise 

affirm the award of attorney's fees. 

BACKGROUHD 

The factual background of this case is set forth in some 

detail in our opinion affirming the grant of summary judgment. 

See County Line Inv. Co., slip op. at 2-5. In this order and 

judgment, we recite only those facts necessary to our disposition. 

In March 1982, County Line purchased the property in issue, 

which was being used as a sanitary landfill. The property was 

transferred to Wagco, a subsidiary of County Line's parent 

company, in June 1985. Defendant Tinney was the previous owner of 

the landfill site. From 1978 through November 1983, the property 

was leased to third parties who allowed waste containing hazardous 

substances to be placed in the landfill. 

In late 1986, plaintiffs initiated proceedings to undertake 

formal closure of the landfill pursuant to Environmental 

Protection Agency standards. Wagco contacted Tinney to request he 

participate, both financially and in developing a closure plan. 

Tinney declined. County Line and Wagco ultimately completed the 

closure themselves at a cost of approximately $360,000.00. 

1 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, 

Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 9601-9675. 

2 

Compensation, and 

Appellate Case: 90-5169 Document: 010110128227 Date Filed: 06/27/1991 Page: 2 
In June 1988, plaintiffs filed suit against Tinney seeking 

reimbursement of those monies spent in securing the landfill. The 

district court granted Tinney's summary judgment motion on all 

claims. He subsequently filed a motion for attorney's fees 

pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 936 (1981), which the district 

court granted upon the recommendation of the magistrate judge. 

On appeal, plaintiffs assert that section 936 does not allow 

attorney's fees under the circumstances of this case. In the 

alternative, they contend the district court erred in failing to 

apportion the fees between the unjust enrichment claim and the two 

CERCLA claims, for which fees are not allowed. We review these 

issues in turn. 

A. Attorney's fees under Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 936 (1981) 

Oklahoma adheres to the American rule, which provides that 

attorney's fees are not recoverable absent some express statutory 

or contractual provision. Wieland v. Danner Auto Supply, Inc., 

695 P.2d 1332, 1333 (Okla. 1984). Of plaintiffs' three claims, 

only the unjust enrichment claim allows for the potential recovery 

of attorney's fees. The statutory authority for those fees is 

found in section 936, which states: 

In any civil action to recover on an open account, 

a statement of account, account stated, note, bill, 

negotiable instrument, or contract relating to the 

purchase or sale of goods, wares or merchandise, or for 

labor or services, unless otherwise provided by law or 

the contract which is the subject [of] the action, the 

prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney 

fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as 

costs. 

Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 936 (1981)(footnote omitted). 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-5169 Document: 010110128227 Date Filed: 06/27/1991 Page: 3 
The district court held plaintiffs' unjust enrichment cause 

of action constituted a claim for "labor or services" under this 

provision. On appeal, plaintiffs argue this ruling is erroneous 

because the claim was actually for the value of the benefit 

conferred in closing the landfill, rather than strictly for monies 

expended in that effort. We disagree. 

Oklahoma courts have had many opportunities to interpret the 

" labor or services" language of section 936. 

this section, 

In cases invoking 

it is the underlying nature of the suit itself which 

determines the applicability of the labor or services 

provisions of § 936. The question is whether the 

damages arose directly from the providing of labor or 

services, such as the failure to pay for those services, 

or from an aspect collaterally relating to labor or 

services. 

ABC Coating Co. v. J. Harris & Sons, Ltd., 747 P.2d 271, 272 

(Okla. 1987)(citing Burrows Constr. Co. v. Independent School 

Dist. No. 2, 704 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Okla. 1985)). 

In order to recover under this section, the prevailing party 

must show "that the claim is for labor or services rendered, not 

just that the claim relates to the performance of labor or 

services." Merrick v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 911 F.2d 426, 434 

(10th Cir. 1990). Thus, in order to recover fees, plaintiffs' 

unjust enrichment claim must be for "labor or services" rendered 

in closing the landfill. 

Although plaintiffs now contend that their unjust enrichment 

claim was never premised on recovery for labor or services, their 

complaint reveals otherwise. Paragraph fifteen of that complaint 

states, in part, "[d]efendant is liable to [plaintiffs] under 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-5169 Document: 010110128227 Date Filed: 06/27/1991 Page: 4 
.... 

CERCLA (relating to private cost recovery actions) in an amount 

not less than $250,000.00 to repay [plaintiffs) the costs expended 

by them. . .. " Rec. Vol. I, doc. 1 at 4. (Emphasis added.) 

Likewise, paragraph twenty-two provides, "[p)laintiffs conferred a 

benefit on Tinney and Tinney has been unjustly enriched thereby in 

the amount of these costs." Id. at 5. (Emphasis added.) 

The plain language of the complaint, particularly of the 

unjust enrichment claim, shows plaintiffs were seeking recovery of 

the monies they necessarily expended in cleaning up the landfill. 

We agree with the magistrate judge that it would require putting 

form over substance to rule otherwise. Despite their current 

arguments to the contrary, plaintiffs' original complaint reveals 

this claim as a direct attempt to recover the costs they expended 

in having the landfill closed. Consequently, we affirm the 

district court on this issue. 

B. Apportionment of attorney's fees 

In the alternative, plaintiffs contend the district court 

should have apportioned the fees between the CERCLA claims and the 

unjust enrichment claim because fees are generally not allowed on 

the former. The magistrate judge's recommendation, which the 

district court adopted, ruled that the three claims were 

indivisible, thereby justifying recovery of all reasonable fees 

expended in defending the litigation. We agree. 

An award of attorney's fees falls within the sound discretion 

of the trial court, and cannot be disturbed absent a showing of 

abuse of that discretion. See Allen v. Denver Pub. School Bd., 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-5169 Document: 010110128227 Date Filed: 06/27/1991 Page: 5 
928 F.2d 978, 986 (10th Cir. 1991); Wise v. Johnson Controls, 

Inc., 784 P.2d 86, 87 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989). Here, the district 

court made a discretionary finding that the claims presented were 

so intertwined factually as to make it impossible to apportion the 

fees involved. This finding was well within the discretionary 

power of the court. See generally Sisney v. Smalley, 690 P.2d 

1048, 1051-52 (Okla. 1984)(court allowing, but not requiring, that 

fees be apportioned where the court was able to do so); see also 

Concorde Limousines, Inc. v. Moloney Coachbuilders, Inc., 835 F.2d 

541, 546 (5th Cir. 1987)(award of entire fee is appropriate where 

there was overlapping effort). 

Consequently, the judgment of the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. In light 

of our disposition, plaintiffs' motion to reconsider this court's 

order allowing supplementation of the record and defendant's 

motion to file a reply brief are DENIED. 

Entered for the Court 

James E. Barrett 

Senior Circuit Judge 

6 

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