Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01575/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01575-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Arthur Victor Leija
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTHUR VICTOR LEIJA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,1 Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security

Defendant.

1:13-cv-1575 GSA

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S 

SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT

 ̳

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Arthur Victor Leija (―Plaintiff‖) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (―Commissioner‖ or ―Defendant‖) denying his application for

Supplemental Security Income payments under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The matter 

is pending before the Court on the parties‘ briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, 

to the Honorable Gary S. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge.2

 

1

Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 14, 2013. Pursuant to Rule 

25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Carolyn W. Colvin is substituted for Michael J. Astrue as the 

defendant in this action.

2 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. See Docs. 8 & 9.

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SUMMARY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff filed a Title XVI application for Supplemental Security Income on September 21, 

2009, alleging disability beginning on August 1, 2007. AR 154-161. His claim was denied 

initially and upon reconsideration. AR 85-88, 93-99. Subsequently, on November 15, 2011, an 

administrative law judge (―ALJ‖) conducted a hearing on Plaintiff‘s claim. AR 29-76. Plaintiff 

was represented by an attorney and testified at the hearing; a vocational expert also appeared and 

testified. AR 29-76. In a decision dated November 23, 2011, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was 

not disabled because he could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 

economy. AR 15-24. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff‘s request for review, making the 

ALJ‘s decision the Commissioner‘s final decision. AR 10-12. Plaintiff then commenced this 

action in District Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine 

whether (1) it is supported by substantial evidence and (2) it applies the correct legal standards. 

See Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 

1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). 

―Substantial evidence means more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.‖ Thomas 

v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). It is ―relevant evidence which, considering the 

record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.‖ Id. 

Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports 

the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld.‖ Id. The ALJ's findings will be upheld 

―if supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.‖ Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004).

///

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DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts the following claims: (1) the ALJ failed to comply with the requirements 

of Social Security Ruling (―SSR‖) 00–4p; (2) the ALJ‘s step five determination that Plaintiff is 

able to perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy is not supported by 

substantial evidence; and (3) the ALJ improperly rejected plaintiff's subjective testimony.

A. The ALJ Complied With SSR 00-4p

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (―RFC‖) to perform 

sedentary work with certain limitations, including that he ―should be allowed to alternate 

positions every 30 minutes for brief breaks.‖ AR 20-21. The ALJ further determined that 

Plaintiff did not have any past relevant work. AR 23. Relying on testimony from a vocational 

expert (―VE‖), the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform alternative work activity, and 

accordingly determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. AR 23; 24; 

71-74. The VE testified that Plaintiff could perform leaf tier, ampoule sealer, and assembler jobs 

consistent with his RFC, as set forth in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (―DOT‖). In 

addition, because the DOT does not address the ability to frequently switch between sitting and 

standing positions in various jobs, the VE eroded by 50 percent the job numbers applicable to the 

three occupations. Thus, first the VE identified, with reference to the DOT, three occupations 

that were consistent with Plaintiff‘s RFC; next, the VE eroded by 50 percent the number of jobs 

within each occupation so as to account for the sit/stand restriction the ALJ had incorporated into 

Plaintiff‘s RFC. Plaintiff argues that the VE‘s testimony conflicted with the DOT because the 

DOT does not address the ability to frequently switch sitting and standing positions within each 

occupational classification. Plaintiff further argues that pursuant to SSR 00-4p, the ALJ could not 

rely on the VE‘s testimony unless she resolved the apparent conflict between the VE‘s testimony 

and the applicable job descriptions in the DOT by obtaining a reasonable explanation from the 

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VE for her deviation from the DOT.

SSR 00–4p states that ―[w]hen a [vocational expert] ... provides evidence about the 

requirements of a job or occupation, the adjudicator has an affirmative responsibility to ask about 

any possible conflict between that [vocational expert] ... evidence and information provided in the 

[Dictionary of Occupational Titles].‖ SSR 00–4p further provides that the adjudicator ―will ask‖ 

the vocational expert ―if the evidence he or she has provided‖ is consistent with the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles and obtain a reasonable explanation for any apparent conflict. Massachi v. 

Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152–53 (9th Cir. 2007) (alterations in original). Here the ALJ asked the 

VE if her testimony conflicted with the DOT, and the VE answered in the negative. Nonetheless, 

Plaintiff asserts that the VE's testimony did in fact conflict with the DOT because the VE testified 

that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform certain jobs that existed in significant numbers in the 

national economy while the DOT does not the address the availability of a sit/stand option within 

its occupational classifications. Defendant responds that the ALJ was not bound by SSR 00-4p 

here because there was no apparent conflict between the VE‘s testimony and the DOT. 

Defendants argue that because there was no conflict to resolve, the ALJ was not required to 

obtain an explanation from the VE for her testimony that sedentary jobs with a sit/stand option 

consistent with Plaintiff‘s RFC were available in significant numbers in California. For the 

reasons discussed below, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff‘s argument that the fact that the 

DOT is silent as to a sit/stand option in its occupational classifications creates an apparent conflict

with VE testimony regarding the availability of jobs incorporating a sit/stand option.

The DOT does not discuss the availability of a sit/stand option and ―the Ninth Circuit has 

not considered whether a sit/stand option creates a conflict with any of the occupations in the 

DOT.‖ Gilmour v. Colvin, No. 1:13–cv–0553 BAM, 2014 WL 3749458, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 

2014). A number of other courts, however, have found that there is no apparent conflict between 

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the DOT and a VE's testimony about the availability of jobs with a sit/stand option. Id.; see also 

Edwards v. Colvin, No. 2:13-CV-1461 DAD, 2015 WL 673441, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2015)

(collecting cases); Forrest v. Commissioner of Social Sec., No. 14–5421, 2014 WL 6185309, at 

*4 (6th Cir. Nov.17, 2014) (―But the DOT does not discuss whether jobs have a sit/stand option 

... and therefore the vocational expert's testimony supplemented, rather than conflicted with, DOT 

job descriptions.‖);

3

Zblewski v. Astrue, 302 Fed. Appx. 488, 494 (7th Cir. 2008) (―Because the 

DOT does not address the subject of sit/stand options, it is not apparent that the testimony 

conflicts with the DOT.‖);

4

Strain v. Colvin, No. CV 13–1973 SH, 2014 WL 2472312, at *2 

(C.D. Cal. June 2, 2014) (―Because the DOT does not address the subject of sit/stand option, it is 

not apparent that the testimony of the VE conflicts with the DOT.‖); McBride v. Commissioner of 

Social Sec., No. 2:12–cv–0948 CMK, 2014 WL 788685, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Feb.25, 2014) (―The 

DOT does not address the issue of a sit/stand option for these positions, but there does not appear 

to be any conflict with plaintiff's need to sit after an hour of standing, as the VE testified. 

Therefore, the undersigned sees no apparent conflict between the VE's testimony and the DOT.‖); 

Conn v. Astrue, 852 F.Supp.2d 517, 528 (D. Del. 2012) (―the VE's testimony and the DOT are not 

in conflict; the DOT simply does not address sit/stand options‖); Harvey v. Astrue, No. 09–2038 

CW, 2010 WL 2836817, at *14 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2010) (―Where the DOT does not include 

information about a particular aspect of a job—such as the existence of a sit/stand option—it is 

proper to consult with a VE, as SSR 83–12 instructs. Such testimony supplements the DOT, 

rather than conflicting with it.‖).

Moreover, in this case, to account for Plaintiff's need for a sit/stand option, the VE eroded 

50 percent of the available jobs in the sedentary occupations she had identified based on the DOT, 

finding that the remaining 50 percent of the jobs in those occupations would allow for the 

 

3 Citation to this unpublished Sixth Circuit opinion is appropriate pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 32.1.

4 Citation to this unpublished Seventh Circuit opinion is appropriate pursuant to Seventh Circuit Rule 32.1.

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sit/stand option included in Plaintiff‘s RFC by the ALJ. On cross examination, Plaintiff's counsel 

did object to or question the VE's testimony concerning the availability of jobs allowing for the

sit/stand option. Courts considering similar issues have declined to find a conflict between VE 

testimony and the DOT in these circumstances. Coleman v. Colvin, No. EDCV 13–1834 AGR, 

2014 WL 4080007, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug.18, 2014) (―This court agrees with the decisions that 

decline to find an  ̳apparent‘ conflict when the DOT is silent about a particular mental or physical 

requirement and the claimant's counsel failed to raise or identify any conflict to the ALJ.‖); 

Gilmour v. Colvin, No. 1:13–cv–0553 BAM, 2014 WL 3749458, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2014) 

(even if VE‘s testimony conflicted with the DOT, any error was harmless where VE considered 

the sit/stand option and eroded the number of jobs available as part of that consideration); Hirschy 

v. Comm‘r of Soc. Sec., 2012 WL 996527, * 11 (E.D. Cal. Mar.23, 2012) (ALJ's error in not 

questioning the VE on whether a conflict existed with the DOT deemed harmless since the VE 

addressed the sit/stand option and eroded available jobs accordingly); Herrera v. Colvin, No. 

EDCV 13–1734 SP, 2014 WL 3572227, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2014) (any deviation from the 

DOT was resolved because the VE ―rendered an expert opinion on the lack of occupational 

erosion caused by the sit/stand option‖ in the jobs under consideration, i.e., ―hand bander and 

table worker‖ jobs, and the VE was not required to detail any reasons for her determination‖). 

Other courts gone further, finding that where a VE could have addressed the issue of any conflict 

with the DOT, and a claimant‘s counsel fails to raise the issue at the hearing, the issue is waived. 

See Savasli v. Colvin, No. EDCV 13–1632 FFM, 2015 WL 263482, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 

2015). The Savasli court stated:

Particularly where, as here, it is not intuitive that elevating the legs would be 

precluded by the DOT definition, plaintiff should have raised the issue at the 

hearing if he wished to preserve it. The VE could have addressed the issue on the 

record avoiding the entire basis for plaintiff's complaint herein. Under these 

circumstances, the Court finds that plaintiff has waived the issue.

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Id. Here, the Court finds that the ALJ complied with the requirements of SSR 00-4p because the 

VE considered the sit/stand option included in Plaintiff‘s RFC, identified specific occupations 

that Plaintiff could perform, and eroded the job numbers for those occupations in order to account 

for his sit/stand limitation.

B. The ALJ Properly Relied on the VE’s Testimony Regarding Job Numbers

(i) Applicable Law

A claimant who can engage in work that exists in the national economy is not disabled.

The Commissioner must demonstrate that the claimant can perform jobs that exist ―in significant 

numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.‖ 42 

U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B); see also Gutierrez v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 

523–25 (9th Cir. 2014). ―The burden of establishing that there exists other work in significant 

numbers‖—either nationally or regionally—―lies with the Commissioner.‖ Beltran v. Astrue, 700 

F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012). If a reviewing court finds the number of jobs at either the regional 

or national level significant, the ALJ's decision must be upheld. Id. at 390. There is no ―brightline rule for what constitutes a significant number of jobs‖ in a region or in the national economy. 

Id. at 389.

An ALJ properly relies on a VE's ―testimony regarding the number of relevant jobs in the 

national economy.‖ Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (―An ALJ may take 

administrative notice of any reliable job information, including information provided by a VE.‖). 

―A VE's recognized expertise provides the necessary foundation for his or her testimony. Thus, 

no additional foundation is required.‖ Id. 

An ALJ's determination that work that a claimant can perform exists in significant 

numbers in the regional or national economy must be supported by substantial evidence. The 

―substantial evidence‖ standard involves a quantum of proof that is ―more than a mere scintilla 

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but less than a preponderance‖ of the evidence presented to the adjudicator. Orn v. Astrue, 495 

F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is such that ―a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.‖ Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). A 

reasonable mind need not accept obvious errors in a VE's testimony that lead to implausible 

results. See Farias v. Colvin, 519 F. App'x 439, 440 (9th Cir. 2013) (―A reasonable mind would 

not accept the VE's testimony that there are 3,600 head dance hall hostess positions in the local 

economy and 342,000 in the national economy.‖). Moreover, a reviewing court should ―weigh 

both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ's factual 

conclusions.‖ Gutierrez, 740 F.3d at 523.

(ii) Analysis

At the administrative hearing, the VE testified that a person with Plaintiff‘s RFC would be 

able to do hand packaging, material handler, and assembler jobs that were available in significant 

numbers in the California economy. AR 47-48. The VE testified that hand packaging jobs 

included ampoule sealer jobs (DOT No. 559.687.014), with 3000 jobs in the State of California. 

She also testified that material handling jobs included leaf tier jobs (DOT No. 529.687-138), with 

5000 jobs in California. Finally she testified that there were 3000 assembler jobs (DOT 700.684-

014) in California. The VE eroded all these jobs by 50 percent in order to account for the 

sit/stand limitation included in Plaintiff‘s RFC. AR 47-49.

Plaintiff challenges the VE‘s testimony regarding the number of jobs in California for 

each DOT job classification that she determined was compatible with Plaintiff‘s RFC. 

Specifically, with reference to employment numbers compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 

in May 2013, Plaintiff alleges that only 2,970 national jobs exist for the DOT‘s ampoule sealer 

job classification; 460 national jobs exist for DOT‘s leaf tier occupational classification; and 230 

jobs national jobs exist for the DOT‘s assembler job classification. Doc. 16 at 12-13. Plaintiff 

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alleges that collectively these job numbers do not constitute a significant number of jobs in the 

national economy and do not reflect an appropriate regional distribution. Doc. 16 at 14. Plaintiff 

also asserts that the ALJ erred in not asking the VE to describe her methodology for calculating 

the job numbers she cited. Doc. 16 at 16.

As discussed below in more detail, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in her step five 

determination by relying on the VE‘s testimony regarding the number of jobs available in 

California that Plaintiff could perform. As an initial matter, the Court notes that although 

Plaintiff was represented by counsel at his administrative hearing, counsel made no attempt to 

question the VE regarding her methodology or to challenge her testimony regarding the numbers 

of jobs available that Plaintiff could perform. Furthermore, Plaintiff cites no authority for his 

contention, raised for the first time in this appeal, that the VE was required to explain her 

methodology for calculating the number of jobs available for each occupational classification at 

issue. Contrary to Plaintiff‘s contention, applicable case law clarifies that no ―additional 

foundation‖ beyond a VE‘s ―recognized expertise‖ is required for the VE‘s testimony regarding 

the availability of jobs:

An ALJ may take administrative notice of any reliable job information, including 

information provided by a VE. A VE's recognized expertise provides the 

necessary foundation for his or her testimony. Thus, no additional foundation is 

required.

Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); also see Lang v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:13-cv-00590-SAB, 2014 WL 1383247, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2014).

Plaintiff further suggests that employment statistics compiled by the Bureau of Labor 

Statistics indicate that the VE‘s testimony in this case is unreliable. As discussed below, the 

Court finds Plaintiff‘s argument unpersuasive. The Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 

employment statistics for various occupations based on its Occupational Employment Statistics

(―OES‖) program. The OES program uses the Office and Management and Budget‘s Standard 

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Occupational Classification (―SOC‖) system for classifying ―workers and jobs into occupational 

categories for the purpose of collecting, calculating, analyzing, and disseminating data.‖

5

See

http://www.bls.gov/oes/oes_ques.htm#other; last visited March 17, 2015. The SOC classification 

system is different from the DOT‘s classification system. As a result the occupational 

classifications encompassed by the BLS‘s OES program do not overlap with or correspond to the 

DOT‘s occupational classifications. Thus, Plaintiff‘s challenge to the VE‘s testimony regarding 

the availability of jobs for each DOT category at issue is inherently problematic as it relies on 

statistics gleaned from a different classification system. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not 

adequately demonstrate the relevancy of the specific OES data he relies on. 

In order to identify potentially applicable OES employment data, Plaintiff translated the 

DOT job codes provided by the VE to SOC job codes by using code translation data on a website, 

http://onetonline.org/crosswalk/. However, Plaintiff does not provide any evidence or

information to establish the reliability or accuracy of this job-code conversion website.

Nonetheless, based on this ―crosswalk‖ website, Plaintiff argues that the DOT occupational

classification of ―leaf tier,‖ DOT No. 559.687-138, translates to SOC code 53-7062.00. See Doc. 

16 at 12-13; also see http:/ / www.onetonline.org/crosswalk/; last visited March 18, 2015. In the 

OES system, this SOC code, in turn, corresponds to the ―Laborers and Freight, Stock, and 

Material Movers, Hand‖ occupational subcategory, which itself falls within the broader 

―Transportation and Material Moving Occupations‖ classification. See

http://www/bls.gov/oes/current/oes_stru.htm; last visited March 18, 2015. Plaintiff argues that 

the VE‘s testimony that there are 5000 leaf tier jobs in the State of California is contradicted by 

the OES, which, for the ―Laborers and Freight, Stock, and Material Movers, Hand‖ occupational 

 

5

The 2010 SOC system, the system currently in use, contains 840 detailed occupations, aggregated into 461 broad 

occupations. In turn, the SOC combines these 461 broad occupations into 97 minor groups and 23 major groups. 

See http://www.bls.gov/oes/oes_ques.htm#other; last visited March 17, 2015

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sub-category of the ―Transportation and Material Moving Occupations‖ classification, lists only 

460 national jobs in the ―Tobacco Manufacturing‖ sector. Doc. 16 at 12-13; see also

http://data.bls.gov/oes/datatype.do; last visited March 18, 2015. However, based on its 

description in the DOT, the ―leaf tier‖ job could reasonably be included in other sectors in the 

OES system as well, such as the ―Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing‖ sector.

6

 

Moreover, based on the DOT‘s description, ―leaf tier‖ is not a transportation-related job, and 

could reasonably be included in other SOC categories and classifications, such as the ―Food and 

Tobacco Roasting, Baking, and Drying Machine Operators and Tenders‖ sub-category in the 

―Production Occupations‖ classification, among others.7 See

http://www/bls.gov/oes/current/oes_stru.htm. Plaintiff cites job numbers from one sector of the 

sub-category ―Laborers and Freight, Stock, and Material Movers, Hand‖ (SOC code 53-7062) 

within the ―Transportation and Material Moving Occupations‖ classification, on the basis of a 

crosswalk website, without providing any evidence or information regarding the reliability and 

accuracy of this website.8 The Court is not persuaded that the alternative job numbers cited by 

Plaintiff call into question the testimony of the VE regarding the availability of leaf tier and other 

material handler jobs compatible with Plaintiff‘s RFC.

Plaintiff also challenges the VE‘s testimony regarding the number of ―ampoule sealer‖ 

jobs (DOT No. 559.687-014) available in the State of California. Specifically, using the 

crosswalk website discussed above, Plaintiff alleges that the DOT‘s ―ampoule sealer‖ 

 

6

Indeed, the OES states that 9110 jobs exist nationally for the Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing Sector 

for SOC No. 53-7062. See http://data.bls.gov/oes/datatype.do; last visited March 18, 2015. It is likely that other SOC 

classifications would also similarly subsume the DOT‘s ―leaf tier‖ occupation classification. 

7 The DOT describes the leaf tier classification as follows: ―Ties tobacco leaves in hands (bundles) to facilitate 

processing. Selects loose leaves for hand and arranges leaves with butt ends together. Winds tie leaf around butts 

and pulls end of tie leaf into hand.‖ DOT, Fourth Edition, Revised 1991. The Industry Designation for this 

occupation in the DOT is ―Tobacco Industry.‖ Id.

8 The website cited by Plaintiff, www.onetonline.org/crosswalk/, indicates that occupations covered by the SOC code 

53-7062 include freight moving jobs, dock worker and warehouse worker jobs, and other manual labor jobs that are 

not classified within other SOC codes. See http://www.onetonline.org/link/summary/53-7062.00; last visited March 

18, 2015. 

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occupational classification corresponds to SOC code 53-7064, i.e., the occupational sub-category 

―Packers and Packagers, Hand,‖ within the broader occupational classification of ―Transportation 

and Material Moving Occupations.‖ Doc. 16 at 12-13; see also 

http://www/bls.gov/oes/current/oes_stru.htm; last visited March 18, 2015. Plaintiff asserts that

the VE‘s testimony that there are 5000 ―ampoule sealer‖ jobs in California is contradicted by the 

OES, which, for the ―Packers and Packagers, Hand‖ occupational sub-category within the 

―Transportation and Material Moving Occupations‖ classification, lists only 2,970 national jobs 

in the ―Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing‖ sector. However, based on the applicable 

DOT definition, the ampoule sealer job is not a transportation-related job, and it could also 

reasonably be included in other SOC sub-categories and classifications in the OES system. For 

example, there clearly are multiple potentially relevant subcategories within the ―Production 

Workers‖ classification, and perhaps more than one applicable industrial sector.9 Plaintiff cites 

job numbers from one sector of the sub-category ―Packers and Packagers, Hand‖ (SOC code 53-

7064) within the ―Transportation and Material Moving Occupations‖ classification, on the basis 

of a crosswalk website, without providing any evidence or information regarding the reliability 

and accuracy of this website. The Court is not persuaded that the alternative job numbers cited by 

Plaintiff call into question the testimony of the VE regarding the availability of ampoule sealer 

jobs and other hand-packaging jobs compatible with Plaintiff‘s RFC.

Finally, Plaintiff challenges the VE‘s testimony regarding the number of ―assembler‖ jobs 

(DOT No. 700.684-014) available in the State of California. Specifically, using the crosswalk 

website discussed above, Plaintiff alleges that the DOT‘s ―assembler‖ occupational classification 

 

9 The DOT defines the ―ampoule sealer‖ occupation as follows: ―Seals ampoules filled with liquid drug products, 

preparatory to packaging. Rotates neck of ampoule in flame of bunsen burner to melt glass. Grips tip of ampoule, 

using tweezers, and draws tip away from neck to seal ampoule as glass hardens. Places sealed ampoule in basket for 

sterilization and inspection. May hold unsealed ampoule against jet of inert gas to displace air. May immerse sealed 

ampoules in dye bath to test for leaks. May tend machines that steam-wash and fill ampoules. DOT, Fourth Edition, 

Revised 1991. The Industry Designation for this occupation in the DOT is: ―Pharmaceuticals and Related Products 

Industry.‖

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corresponds to SOC code 51-999, i.e., the occupational sub-category ―Production Workers, All 

Other,‖ within the broader occupational classification of ―Production Occupations.‖ See

http://www/bls.gov/oes/current/oes_stru.htm; last visited March 18, 2015. Plaintiff challenges the 

VE‘s testimony that 3000 assembler jobs exist in California based on the fact that the OES lists 

230 jobs nationally in the ―Jewelry and Silverware Manufacturing‖ sector of the ―Production 

Workers, All Other‖ occupational sub-category of ―Production Occupations.‖ However, the 

Court is not persuaded that all applicable assembler jobs included in the OES are contained in the 

―Production Worker, All Other‖ sub-category of the ―Production Occupations‖ classification.10 

Indeed, several sub-categories within the Production Occupations classification appear relevant at 

first glance and would merit further scrutiny: Assemblers and Fabricators (SOC code 51-2000); 

Assemblers and Fabricators, All Other (SOC code 51-2099); Team Assemblers (SOC. code 51-

2092); and Jewelers and Precious Stone and Metal Workers (SOC code 51-9071); among others. 

Plaintiff cites job numbers from one sector of the sub-category Production Workers, All Other 

(SOC code 51-9199) on the basis of a crosswalk website, without providing any evidence or 

information regarding the reliability and accuracy of this website. The Court is not persuaded 

that the alternative job numbers cited by Plaintiff call into question the testimony of the VE 

regarding the availability of assembler jobs compatible with Plaintiff‘s RFC. 

The Court declines to discredit the VE‘s testimony in light of the inadequacy and dubious 

relevance of the alternative job numbers cited by the Plaintiff. See Lang v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 

No. 1:13-CV-00590-SAB, 2014 WL 1383247, at *5-*7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2014); Alanis v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:13-CV-01306-SAB, 2014 WL 4960789, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 

2014). Accordingly, the Court will not disturb the ALJ‘s step five determination.

 

10 The DOT defines the ―assembler‖ occupation as follows: ―Assembles jewelry, such as rings, lockets, bracelets, 

brooches, and watchcases, using pliers, screwdriver, and jeweler‘s hammer. May use foot press.‖ DOT, Fourth 

Edition, Revised 1991. The Industry Designation for this occupation in the DOT is Jewelry, Silverware, and Plated 

Ware Industry. Id.

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C. The ALJ Properly Discounted Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptom Testimony

(i) Summary of Plaintiff‘s Testimony

On November 15, 2011, Plaintiff testified at a hearing before an ALJ and was represented 

by counsel. AR 31-51. Plaintiff testified that he completed high school and lived with his 

girlfriend and her family. AR 33-34. Plaintiff was 5‘4‖ tall and weighed approximately 490 

pounds. AR 33. Plaintiff did not drive. AR 34. Plaintiff could generally take care of his

personal needs. AR 35. He could attend social gatherings, but most of the time his family came

over to visit him. AR 35-36. Plaintiff could not stand long enough to cook but could microwave 

food; he could shop using a motor cart. AR 35. Plaintiff picked up around the house, but also 

needed to nap during the day. AR 36. Plaintiff‘s hobby was drawing, which he engaged in 

frequently. AR 36. Plaintiff had only had a few brief temporary jobs. AR 36. 

Plaintiff testified that he had constant ―excruciating‖ lower back pain, and would not be 

functional without medication. AR 37. Plaintiff also had pain in both knees, mostly when he 

walked; sometimes he felt his legs would ―come out from under‖ him because of his weight. AR

37-38. Walking and sitting were not comfortable for Plaintiff; standing up was the most 

comfortable position. AR 37. When Plaintiff sat for a long time he had trouble breathing. AR 

37. Plaintiff also had trouble sleeping at night because he gasped for air, but he slept during the 

day. AR 38. Plaintiff could not do much to lose weight because of his back pain. AR 39. 

Plaintiff usually used a cane when he went out, for support. AR 39-40. 

Plaintiff testified that he could sit for 15-20 minutes before he needed to stand up and that 

he could stand for 10 minutes at a time, before needing to sit down again. AR 40. Plaintiff could

walk half a block at a time. AR 40. He had bad cracks on the bottoms of his feet that hurt a great 

deal. AR 41-42. Plaintiff treated the cracks by putting Vaseline and lotion on his feet. AR 42. 

Plaintiff stated that his feet would also swell at least three times a day, so he lies down and 

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elevates his legs. AR 42. Plaintiff stated that he lies down to rest and nap during the day for at 

least 6 hours every day. AR

43. Plaintiff testified that he went to bed at 8:30 or 9:00 p.m. and woke up around 7:00 or 

8:00 a.m. AR 43. Plaintiff stated that during the day he could be up and about for 30 minutes at a 

time, but after each 30-minute period of activity he needed to lie down for an hour. AR 44. 

Plaintiff testified that he could watch television straight through without a break for one hour at a 

time, but after doing that he needed to stand for 30 to 45 minutes. AR 45. Plaintiff stated it was 

hard for him to climb and bend, and he could not kneel. AR 41. Plaintiff could lift no more than 

ten pounds. AR 42. Finally, Plaintiff testified that he tried to ―walk around a lot to lose weight‖ 

but that his pain interfered with his attempts. AR 46. Plaintiff stated that he walked around in his 

yard and to the mailbox, which is about a half a block away. AR 46, 40. Plaintiff stated that his 

pain medications, including Vicodin, Soma and ―some over the counter stuff‖ helped to control 

his pain. AR 39. 

(ii) Applicable Law

In evaluating the credibility of a claimant's testimony regarding subjective complaints of 

pain and other symptoms, an ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 

F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented 

objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to 

produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. Id. The claimant is not required to show that the

impairment ―could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged; 

she need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.‖ Id. If the 

claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only reject the 

claimant's testimony regarding the severity of the symptoms if she gives ―specific, clear and 

convincing reasons‖ for the rejection. Id. 

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Regarding credibility determinations by an ALJ, the Ninth Circuit has held as follows:

The ALJ may consider many factors in weighing a claimant's credibility, including 

(1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant's reputation 

for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other 

testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or 

inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of 

treatment; and (3) the claimant's daily activities. If the ALJ's finding is supported 

by substantial evidence, the court may not engage in second-guessing. 

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226–27 (9th Cir. 2009);

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; Social Security Ruling (―SSR‖) 96-7p, available at 1996 WL 

374186. Other factors the ALJ may consider include a claimant's work record and testimony 

from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of 

which he complains. Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). Finally, an 

ALJ‘s credibility finding must be properly supported by the record and sufficiently specific to 

assure a reviewing court that the ALJ did not ―arbitrarily discredit‖ a claimant‘s subjective 

testimony. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 

F.2d 341, 345-46 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). 

(iii) Analysis

In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to produce his alleged symptoms. AR 22. However, the ALJ further 

determined that Plaintiff‘s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those 

symptoms were not credible to the extent they were inconsistent with her assessment of Plaintiff‘s 

residual functional capacity. AR 22. Absent affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ was 

required to provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff‘s subjective symptom 

testimony. 

The ALJ discounted Plaintiff‘s subjective symptom testimony on the following grounds: 

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(1) Plaintiff‘s complaints about the severity of his symptoms was inconsistent with the objective 

evidence in the record; (2) Plaintiff has only received conservative treatment which was not 

commensurate with his complaints of totally disabling pain; (3) although Plaintiff has continually 

been advised to lose weight, his doctor noted that he was not motivated; (4) the medical record, 

though limited, reflects that Plaintiff reported that his pain was controlled with medications with 

no side effects; (5) and Plaintiff‘s daily activities were not as limited as would be expected given 

his complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations.

First the ALJ found that the objective medical evidence and the results of Plaintiff‘s 

physical examination contained in the record do not support Plaintiff‘s subjective complaints. 

AR 22. Specifically, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff ―had a waddling gait, but his balance was 

maintained with no assistive devices. The claimant had normal muscle bulk and tone without 

atrophy, strength was 5/5 without focal motor deficits, and sensation was intact with good hand 

coordination.‖ AR 22. Although Plaintiff had arthralgia in his knees and mildly diminished 

flexion range of motion, he had no effusion or crepitus. AR 22. Examinations show no 

cardiovascular, pulmonary, gastrointestinal, or genitourinary abnormalities. AR 22. The ALJ 

further noted that although Plaintiff complained of low back pain, his range of motion of the 

lumbar spine was not impaired and he showed no radicular signs or symptoms. AR 22. The ALJ 

observed that ―no doctor has imposed any limitations due to claimant‘s weight.‖ AR 22.

Although an ALJ may not rely solely on the inconsistency between objective findings and 

a claimant‘s subjective claims in order to reject the latter, Light, 119 F.3d at 792, an ALJ may 

properly consider such an inconsistency as one factor among others in making his credibility 

determination. Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). Here the ALJ gave multiple reasons for 

discounting Plaintiff‘s testimony; accordingly the ALJ‘s analysis of the inconsistency between 

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Plaintiff‘s subjective complaints and the objective medical evidence constitutes a specific, clear 

and convincing reason, supported by the record as a whole, for his adverse credibility 

determination. See AR 236-240; AR 270 (lumbosacral spine series revealed normal findings).

Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff‘s credibility was undermined by that fact that he has not 

received treatment for pain that was commensurate with his complaints of disabling pain. AR 22. 

Specifically, the ALJ stated, ―[t]he claimant has not received treatment consistent with a chronic 

pain syndrome such as biofeedback, acupuncture, use of a TENS unit, physical therapy, or 

attendance at a pain management clinic. Surgery has not been recommended.‖ AR 22. The ALJ

noted that although Plaintiff has continually been advised to lose weight, his treating doctor 

specifically noted that he was not motivated. AR 22. The ALJ properly relied on the fact that 

Plaintiff had not required pain management or surgery or other interventions to manage his pain 

in discounting his complaints of disabling symptoms. See, e.g., Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 

853, 856 (9th Cir.2001); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir.2007), citing Johnson v. 

Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir.1995) (―evidence of ―conservative treatment‖ is sufficient to 

discount a claimant's testimony regarding severity of an impairment‖); de Santacruz v. Astrue, 

2012 WL 2264270, *5 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2012) (in discrediting claimant's subjective symptom 

testimony, ALJ properly considered discrepancy between claimant's subjective complaints and 

the nature and extent of the treatment obtained). The ALJ's reasoning is specific, clear and 

convincing, and is supported by substantial evidence, as the medical record does not demonstrate 

that Plaintiff required aggressive treatment for his stated disabling symptoms. 

The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff‘s credibility was undermined by the fact that the medical 

record reflected that Plaintiff‘s pain was controlled with medication, with no side effects. AR 22. 

The consultative examiner noted in October 2009 that Plaintiff was not taking any medications 

except Motrin, which he took as needed and obtained partial relief. AR 36. Subsequently, 

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Plaintiff took additional pain medications such as Vicodin and Soma and reported that his pain 

was controlled with the medication, without any side effects. AR 279; 287; 289; 291; 293; 295; 

297; 299; 307; 309; 310. During a March 2011 doctor visit, Plaintiff was simply prescribed 

analgesics for his back pain. AR 290. In June 2011, Plaintiff reported that he was doing well 

with his pain medication. AR 283. The ALJ properly relied on the ample evidence in the record 

that Plaintiff‘s pain was well-controlled by medication to discount his subjective symptom 

testimony. 

Finally, in making her credibility determination, the ALJ relied on inconsistencies 

between Plaintiff‘s daily activities and his subjective complaints of disabling symptoms. The 

ALJ stated, ―[t]he claimant has described daily activities, which are not limited to the extent one 

would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations.‖ AR 21. The ALJ 

noted that the claimant largely took care of his personal needs, could shop using a motor cart, 

visit with his friends and family, draw, and watch television. AR 21. The ALJ further observed 

that Plaintiff picked up his living room (which usually took 30 minutes), took out the trash from 

his home to a dumpster using a wagon, picked up his yard (which usually took 1 hour), and 

watched his step daughter play but could not play with her. AR 21, 181-82. Although, the 

Plaintiff described limited daily activities, his testimony about his daily activities appears to 

contradict his subjective symptom testimony that he could sit for no more than 15-20 minutes at a 

time and could stand for no more than 10 minutes at a time, and that after every thirty minutes of 

activity he need to lie down for an hour. AR 40; 44. The ALJ‘s reliance on the inconsistency 

between Plaintiff‘s activities and his subjective complaints of totally disabling symptoms is 

supported by substantial evidence and the Court may not second-guess the ALJ‘s determination. 

See, e.g., Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (―[e]ven where [the daily] 

activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant‘s 

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testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment‖); Orn v. 

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (2007) (claimant‘s daily activities that contradict claimant‘s other 

testimony vitiate claimant‘s credibility). 

In sum, the ALJ cited specific, clear and convincing reasons, based on permissible 

grounds and supported by the record as a whole, for rejecting Plaintiff‘s subjective complaints. 

See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2004). As such, the 

ALJ‘s credibility determination is proper.

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the ALJ‘s decision is free of legal error and is supported by 

substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Accordingly, this Court DENIES Plaintiff‘s appeal 

from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. The Clerk of this Court 

is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Carolyn Colvin, the Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, and against Plaintiff Arthur Victor Leija.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 26, 2015 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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