Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05067/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05067-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John C. Brisbin
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

JOHN C. BRISBIN, DBA CONSTRUCTION 

DEVELOPMENT SYSTEMS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES, 

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-5067

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:14-cv-00389-JFM, Senior Judge James F. 

Merow.

______________________ 

Decided: December 10, 2015

______________________ 

JOHN C. BRISBIN, Fresno, CA, pro se.

LAUREN MOORE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. With her on the brief 

were BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

DONALD E. KINNER. 

______________________ 

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2 BRISBIN v. US

Before MOORE, CLEVENGER, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Pro se appellant John C. Brisbin brought claims 

against the United States for breach of contract relating 

to his road work in Sequoia and Kings Canyon National 

Parks. He now appeals from a judgment of the Court of 

Federal Claims dismissing his contract claims for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. See Brisbin v. United States, 

119 Fed. Cl. 701 (2015). 

For the reasons stated below, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

In March of 2009, Plaintiff John C. Brisbin (individually and DBA as Construction Development Systems) 

entered into a contract with the United States (“U.S.” or 

“the Government”) relating to road construction and 

repair on the Generals Highway in Sequoia and Kings 

Canyon National Parks. During the course of the Plaintiff’s road work, Plaintiff submitted five claims for additional payments to the Government contracting officer 

(“CO”) relating to modifications and changes to the contract. The total amount of each claim exceeded $10,000 

per claim.

The CO denied each of the respective claims on May 

5, 2010, March 10, 2010, June 3, 2010, May 3, 2012, and 

November 29, 2012. In accordance with 41 U.S.C. § 

7103(d) (2011),1 each of the CO’s decisions denying each

claim was in writing and was mailed to Plaintiff. The 

contents of each written denial included a statement of 

the reason for the decision. See 41 U.S.C. § 7103(e). Additionally, each decision “inform[ed] the contractor of the 

1 41 U.S.C. § 7103 was formerly cited as 41 U.S.C. 

§ 604 and 41 U.S.C. § 605. 

 

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BRISBIN v. US 3

contractor’s rights” as those rights are defined in Chapter 

71 of Title 41 of the U.S. Code. See id. Specifically, each of 

the CO’s letters identified the proper forums in which 

Plaintiff could seek judicial review of the CO’s decision, 

and identified the deadlines for filing appeals in each 

forum. For example, the CO’s letter of May 5, 2010 (denying Plaintiff’s February 8, 2010 claim) stated:

You may appeal this decision to the Civilian 

Board of Contract Appeals. If you decide to appeal, you must, within 90 days from the date you 

receive this decision, mail or otherwise furnish 

written notice to the Civilian Board of Contract 

Appeals . . . . 

See Defendant-Appellee’s Appendix at A33.

Importantly, each letter also notified Plaintiff that 

“[a]s an alternative to the Board of Contract Appeals, you 

may bring an action directly to the United States Court of 

Federal Claims within 12 months of the date you receive 

this decision.” See id. The letters did not state that an 

appeal could or should be brought in a U.S. District Court.

Notwithstanding the advice in each of the five letters, 

Plaintiff filed a complaint for breach of contract against 

the U.S. in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 

of California on May 13, 2013 (more than 12 months after 

four of the five denials were issued). Plaintiff’s complaint 

sought damages of $823,548.83 for alleged breach of 

contract arising from the claims denied by the CO. On 

March 12, 2014, ruling on a motion by the Government to 

dismiss the complaint, the district court held that the 

Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2013), limits to 

district courts claims against the Government not exceeding $10,000. Because Plaintiff’s claims alleged damages in 

excess of $10,000, the district court held that it lacked 

jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s complaint, and that exclusive jurisdiction lay with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (2011). The district court thereCase: 15-5067 Document: 21-2 Page: 3 Filed: 12/10/2015
4 BRISBIN v. US

fore dismissed the case. The district court did not consider 

whether to transfer the case to the Court of Federal 

Claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1982). 

Shortly after the district court’s dismissal, on May 6, 

2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of Federal 

Claims asserting substantially the same claims as in the 

district court complaint. On motion from the Government, 

the Court of Federal Claims dismissed the complaint for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. While acknowledging 

that Plaintiff was seeking relief in the proper forum, the 

Court of Federal Claims held that Plaintiff had not filed 

his claims within the 12-month period mandated by 41 

U.S.C. § 7104(b)(3) (2011). 

Plaintiff now appeals the Court of Federal Claim’s 

dismissal of his complaint.

DISCUSSION

This court reviews the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. 

Brandt v. United States, 710 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 

2013). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing 

jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.

A 

We agree with the Court of Federal Claims that 

Plaintiff’s contract claims are time barred. A contractor 

displeased with a CO’s decision is given twelve months 

within which to appeal that decision to the Court of 

Federal Claims. 41 U.S.C. § 7104(b)(3). If this time deadline is not met, the CO’s decision becomes final, conclusive, and not subject to review. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(g). 

The most recent rejection of Plaintiff’s claims occurred 

on November 29, 2012. However, Plaintiff did not file a 

complaint with the Court of Federal Claims until May 6, 

2014, approximately one year and five months after the 

most recent rejection (and even longer after the older 

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BRISBIN v. US 5

rejections). Thus, the Court of Federal Claims correctly 

held that because Plaintiff did not file his complaint 

within twelve months of the rejection of any his claims, 

the court lacked jurisdiction to hear his complaint.

On appeal to this court, Plaintiff’s primary argument 

appears to be that the letters sent to the CO were not 

“claims” as the term is used in 41 U.S.C. § 7103, but were 

rather “potential claims” or “unresolved issues.” Plaintiff 

argues that “potential claims” do not become “claims” 

until the execution of a “Release of Claims” form, which 

Plaintiff alleges the Government never provided.2 Plaintiff argues that his “potential claims” did not become 

“claims” until the filing of his complaint with the Court of 

Federal Claims, and thus, were timely. We reject this 

argument.

The Contract Disputes Act (“CDA”) grants the Court 

of Federal Claims jurisdiction over actions brought on 

claims within twelve months of a contracting officer’s final 

decision. K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 778 F.3d 

1000, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also 41 U.S.C. § 7104(b). 

“Jurisdiction requires both that a claim meeting certain 

requirements have been submitted to the relevant contracting officer and that the contracting officer have 

issued a final decision on that claim.” K-Con, 778 F.3d at

at 1005. 

A “claim,” as that term is used in the CDA, is “a written demand or written assertion by one of the contracting 

parties seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of 

money in a sum certain, the adjustment or interpretation 

of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating 

2 The Government disputes this allegation in their 

brief, and asserts that “final voucher and release of claims 

forms” were sent to Plaintiff on July 3, 2013.

 

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to the contract.” Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 

1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting regulation then codified at 

48 C.F.R. § 33.201; current version at 48 C.F.R. § 52.233-

1). 

A claim need not be submitted in any particular form 

or use any particular wording, but it must provide a clear 

and unequivocal statement that gives the contracting 

officer adequate notice of the basis and amount of the 

claim. K-Con, 778 F.3d at 1005. The contracting officer 

“shall issue a decision in writing” that is mailed or otherwise provided to the contractor. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(d). The 

decision must “state the reasons for the decision reached 

and shall inform the contractor of the contractor’s rights 

as provided in this chapter.” Id. at § 7103(e).

In the present case, each of Plaintiff’s letters to the 

Government were written demands by Plaintiff seeking, 

as a matter of right under the contract, payment of money 

in a sum certain by the Government. Indeed, each of 

Plaintiff’s letters contained a certification stating, inter 

alia, “I certify that the claim is made in good faith.”

Plaintiff’s letters were thus clearly “claims” as that term 

is used by the CDA.

Further, in denying Plaintiff’s claims, the CO’s letters 

stated unequivocally that “[t]his is the Contracting Officer’s final decision on the matter and is being issued 

pursuant to FAR 52.233-1, Disputes, of the contract.” The 

CO’s letters similarly informed Plaintiff that he had a 

right to appeal the decision to the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals, or bring an action directly to the Court of 

Federal Claims. Thus, the CO’s letters were clearly the 

decisions of the CO under the statute. See 41 U.S.C. § 

7104(b)(3) (contractor must file an appeal within 12 

months of “the date of receipt of a contracting officer’s 

decision under section 7103 of this title”).

Assuming for the sake of argument that Plaintiff never received a “Release of Claims” form, we do not see how 

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that changes the analysis above. The Government generally requires a release of claims from contractors prior to 

making final payment under a contract. See e.g. 48 C.F.R. 

§ 52.232-5(h)(3) (2014). Whether a release form is provided to a contractor, or the contractor signs the release 

form, is irrelevant to whether a claim existed in the first 

place. Indeed, 48 C.F.R. § 52.232-5(h)(3) clearly contemplates that “claims,” to the extent there are any, exist 

prior to the execution of the release, else there would be 

no reason for a release in the first place. Cf. Augustine 

Med., Inc. v. Progressive Dynamics, Inc., 194 F.3d 1367, 

1372 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that general release 

language in a contract usually constitutes a waiver of all 

claims and causes of action arising under or by virtue of 

the contract). The Plaintiff’s letters to the CO demanded 

monetary payments under his contract with the Government. Those demands were each denied in writing by the 

CO, which started the 41 U.S.C. § 7104(b)(3) clock ticking. 

B 

For similar reasons, we also reject Plaintiff’s argument that the relevant statute of limitations for filing 

with the Court of Federal Claims is the six year limitation 

set out in 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(A). The relevant statutory language referred to by Plaintiff is as follows:

Each claim by a contractor against the Federal 

Government relating to a contract and each claim 

by the Federal Government against a contractor 

relating to a contract shall be submitted within 6 

years after the accrual of the claim.

41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(A). 

The six year time limit in § 7103(a)(4)(A) pertains to 

the statute of limitations for submitting a claim to the 

Government after the claim accrues. A claim accrues as of

“the date when all events, that fix the alleged liability of 

either the Government or the contractor and permit 

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8 BRISBIN v. US

assertion of the claim, were known or should have been 

known.” Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 773 F.3d 

1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 33.201).

Plaintiff’s claims were timely submitted to the CO after 

accrual per 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(A). However, each final 

decision of the CO denying Plaintiff’s respective claims 

started a new 12-month clock running on the time to file 

an appeal with the Court of Federal Claims under 41 

U.S.C. § 7104(b)(3). It is this latter deadline that Plaintiff 

missed, and which deprives the Court of Federal Claims 

of jurisdiction to hear his complaint.

C 

In the court below, Plaintiff appears to have argued 

that he relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1631 in his decision to file in 

the district court (rather than in the Court of Federal 

Claims), presumably believing that if his selection of 

forum was wrong the district court would transfer his 

case to the correct forum, rather than dismissing it outright. As the court below noted, in the Ninth Circuit § 

1631 is mandatory in nature, i.e. a district court must 

consider whether to transfer a case pursuant to § 1631 

once it has determined that it lacks jurisdiction even if no 

party moved the court for such a transfer. See Hays v. 

Postmaster General, 868 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Under Hays, after determining that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s complaint, the district court was 

required to determine whether to transfer Plaintiff’s 

complaint to another court with jurisdiction to hear his 

case. The district court made clear that it understood that 

“exclusive jurisdiction” over Plaintiff’s claims was with 

the Court of Federal Claims. See Defendant-Appellee’s 

Appendix at A126. Despite this, the district court failed to 

examine whether “in the interest of justice,” it should 

transfer Plaintiff’s claims to the Court of Federal Claims. 

See Hays, 868 F.2d at 331. At least one of Plaintiff’s 

claims would not have been time barred had the district 

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BRISBIN v. US 9

court transferred the case instead of dismissing it and 

forcing Plaintiff to file a new complaint. But because the 

deadline for filing with the Court of Federal Claims had 

passed by the time the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s 

claims, the district court’s error effectively denied Plaintiff of his statutory right to judicial review of the CO’s 

denial of at least one of his claims. Indeed, the district 

court’s error frustrated the very purpose of § 1631, which 

is to cure the prejudice to litigants (such as the Plaintiff) 

who mistakenly file in the wrong forum. See Dalton v. Sw. 

Marine, Inc., 120 F.3d 1249, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 

(“[S]ection 1631 is a remedial statute designed to eliminate any prejudice that results from filing in an improper 

forum”); Rodriguez-Roman v. I.N.S., 98 F.3d 416, 422 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (“The purpose of the statute is to aid litigants 

who were confused about the proper forum for review . . . .” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

While recognizing the prejudice to Plaintiff that has 

resulted from the district court’s error, we agree with the 

court below that it lacked authority to determine whether 

or not the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s 

earlier case. 

Without expressing any opinion on the merits of such 

a motion, we note (as did the court below) that a litigant 

may move under FED. R. CIV. P. 60 for relief from a court’s 

final judgment or order such as the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim.3 

3 We also note that the Plaintiff did not ask the

court below or this court to consider whether equitable 

tolling might allow Plaintiff to file his complaint out of 

time. We decline to address that issue in the first instance.

 

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10 BRISBIN v. US

CONCLUSION

Because Plaintiff’s contract claims were untimely 

filed, we affirm the decision of the Court of Federal 

Claims.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No Costs. 

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