Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01080/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01080-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gino Snow
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

GINO SNOW, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

NOV 2 7 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-1080 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-303) 

Robert T. McAllister (Barry Boughman with him on the briefs) of 

Martin, McAllister & Murphy, Denver, Colorado, for defendantappellant. 

Thomas M. O'Rourke, Assistant U.S. Attorney (Michael J. Norton, 

United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Denver, Colorado, 

for plaintiff-appellee. 

Before LOGAN and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and GREENE, District 

Judge.* 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable J. Thomas Greene, United States District Judge 

r for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-1080 Document: 01019956418 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 1 
Defendant Gino Snow pleaded guilty to two counts of 

conspiracy to defraud 'the United States in violation of 18 u.s.c. 

§§ 371 and 1001, reserving, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(a)(2), 

a right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to 

suppress evidence. Following sentencing, defendant brought this 

appeal, arguing that (1) the affidavit used to procure the s~arch 

warrant failed to establish probable cause that evidence of a 

crime would be found at defendant's restaurant at the time it was 

to be executed, (2) the search warrant affidavit contained false 

statements, and (3) the search warrant and the subsequent search 

were overly broad. 

I 

Defendant makes two. arguments concerning the legal 

sufficiency of the affidavit used to support the application for 

the search warrant: that the affidavit (1) failed to establish 

probable cause because it ·was based on stale information, and 

(2) was deficient because it relied primarily on unreliable 

hearsay. We disagree. 

Probable cause to search cannot be based on stale information 

that no longer suggests that the items sought will be found in the 

place to be searched. United States v. Shomo, 786 F.2d 981, 983 

(10th Cir. 1986). The determination of timeliness, however, does 

not depend on simply the number of days that have elapsed between 

the facts relied on and the issuance of the warrant; instead, 

whether the information is too stale to establish probable cause 

depends on "the nature of the criminal activity, the length of the 

activity, and the nature of the property to be seized." Id. at 

984. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1080 Document: 01019956418 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 2 
In the instant case, we cannot conclude that the information 

contained in the affidavit was too stale to establish probable 

cause. The F.B.I. investigation into defendant's affairs took 

place over a five week period leading up to the application for 

the warrant. The information gathered was cumulative in nature, 

requiring the F.B.I. to delay going before the magistrate until 

sufficient evidence was obtained. Although it is true that the 

affidavit contained undated hearsay, this fact alone does not 

warrant suppression. Defendant was being investigated for running 

an ongoing, continuous operation to defraud the government. Such 

ongoing and continuous activity makes the passage of time less 

critical. Id. at 984. Further, the items sought, which included 

records of defendant's activities, were of the type that would be 

kept for some time given the nature of defendant's activities. 

See United States v. Williams, 897 F.2d 1034, 1039 (10th Cir. 

1990). 

Defendant's argument on the hearsay information in the 

affidavit is equally without merit. Hearsay evidence may be used 

to establish probable cause for a search warrant. Jones v. United 

States, 362 U.S. 257, 269 (1960). The basic inquiry is whether 

the magistrate, given all the circumstances set out in the 

affidavit, made a practical, common sense decision that there was 

· a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be 

found at the designated location. Illinois v: Gates, 462 U.S. 

213, 238 (1983). The affidavit here contained information taken 

from informants and other documentation connecting defendant and 

his restaurant to an illegal real estate business. Many of the 

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Appellate Case: 90-1080 Document: 01019956418 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 3 
hearsay statements came from other police officers or their 

informants, some of which were corroborated by documentation. 

Based on this evidence, the magistrate could have concluded that 

there was a fair probability that evidence of the real estate 

scheme would be found at defendant's restaurant. 

II 

Defendant next contends that the district court erred in not 

suppressing the evidence seized because the search warrant 

affidavit contained false statements. He argues that statements 

connecting him to a scheme to pay individuals for their assistance 

in falsifying real estate documents were admittedly false and 

should not have been considered in determining probable cause. If 

removed, defendant argues,- there would not have been probable 

cause to search. 

An affidavit containing erroneous or unconstitutionally 

obtained information invalidates a warrant if that information was 

critical to establishing probable cause. If, however, the 

affidavit contained sufficient accurate or untainted evidence, the 

warrant is nevertheless valid. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 

705, 719 (1984). 

In the instant case, even absent the inaccurate statements, 

the affidavit contained sufficient evidence to establish probable 

cause. Defendant's name and the names of several of his employees 

appeared on fraudulent real estate documents. The telephone 

number of defendant's restaurant was listed on one real estate 

contract, and other evidence indicated that defendant was running 

a real estate business out of the restaurant's basement. The 

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Appellate Case: 90-1080 Document: 01019956418 Date Filed: 11/27/1990 Page: 4 
affidavit contained statements from an individual that he rented 

his residence from defendant and paid his rent in the basement of 

defendant's restaurant. Based on this uncontroverted direct and 

circumstantial evidence, we conclude that the district court did 

not err in refusing to suppress the evidence seized. 

III 

Finally, defendant argues that the district court erred in 

refusing to suppress the evidence seized because the warrant 

authorized a "general exploratory rummaging" of the basement of 

his restaurant. Further, defendant argues that the F.B.I. agents 

went beyond the scope of the warrant when they seized defendant's 

personal financial statement and keys and opened a locked safe. 

Under the Fourth Amendment, a search warrant must describe 

the items to be seized with sufficient particularity to prevent a 

"general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings." 

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 ( 1971). "The 

particularity requirement ensures that a search is confined in 

scope to particularly described evidence relating to a specific 

crime for which there is demonstrated probable cause." Voss v. 

Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 404 (10th Cir. 1985). 

In the case at hand, the warrant identified the location of 

the search as the lower level of defendant's restaurant, where 

defendant's offices were located. It authorized seizure of 

typewriters and other printing material suspected of printing 

false documents and all documents relating to several properties 

involved in defendant's real estate scheme. This language does 

not authorize a "general, exploratory rummaging." 

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Further, the F.B.I. did not exceed the scope of the 

authorized search. When law enforcement officers grossly exceed 

the scope of a search warrant, suppression of all evidence seized 

under that warrant is required. United States v. Medlin, 842 F.2d 

1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 1988). Such is not the case here. 

Defendant's personal financial statement and keys were items 

bearing a reasonable relation to defendant's real estate scheme. 

See United States v. Gentry, 642 F.2d 385, 387 (10th Cir. 1981). 

The locked safe was a likely source for the specified documents 

and could therefore be opened. See United States v. Ross, 456 

U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982). Accordingly, we hold that the district 

court did not err in refusing to suppress the evidence seized from 

defendant's restaurant. 

AFFIRMED. 

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