Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01405/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01405-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marmon Dennis Record
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

· FILED 

United S,tates Co~rt of Appeals 

fenth C!rC11it 

APR 2 81989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Cierk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. No. 88-1405 

MARMON DENNIS RECORD, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 87-CR-140-03-B) 

David E. 0 1Meilia, Assistant United States Attorney (Tony M. 

Graham, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Tulsa, 

Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Jame~ L. Martin, Arlington, Texas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before MOORE, ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Marmon Dennis Record (Record) was convicted by a jury· of 

conspiring to import cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 21 

u.s.c. §§ 963, 960 & 952(a), and of conspiring to possess with 

intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine and marijuana, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 & 841. The trial court sentenced 

Record to twenty-five years in prison on each of the two counts, 

the sentences to be served concurrently. Record appeals his 

Appellate Case: 88-1405 Document: 01019589961 Date Filed: 04/28/1989 Page: 1 
convictions, invoking our jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1291. 

Background 

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government as we must, United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 581 

ClOth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 u·. S. 1188 ( 1985}, the relevant 

facts may be summarized as follows: 

From approximately summer 1980 until December 1982, indicted 

coconspirator Frank Palmero (Palmero), along with several others, 

imported three 500-700 pound loads of marijuana into Florida. The 

marijuana was obtained from Jamaican suppliers and flown into 

Florida. Palmero testified that this "smuggling network" was set 

up using the names of connections provided by defendant Record. 

Rec. vol. V at 323. Palmero also testified that the second load 

of marijuana brought into Florida was sold by Record. 

In 1982, Record and unindicted coconspirator Boris Olarte 

(Olarte) arranged to import marijuana into Florida from Colombia 

by way of the Bahamas. In this arrangement, Olarte would provide 

the marijuana and a landing strip in Colombia, while Record would 

furnish a plane, a Cessna 421, pilots, and pay $100 per pound for 

the marijuana. After being loaded with marijuana in Colombia, the 

plane would stop in the Bahamas, where Record would transfer the 

marijuana from the plane to a boat for transport to Florida. 

Record utilized connections with Bahamian authorities to maintain 

"security,. for the operation. Once the drugs arrived in Florida, 

Record had "clients" to whom he could sell the marijuana for $280-

$300 per pound. 

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In the summer of 1982, Olarte and Record imported 2000 pounds 

of marijuana into the United States, where Record sold it. Olarte 

and Record consummated a similar deal in fall 1982 involving 1500 

pounds of ·marijuana. Record, Palmero, and indicted coconspirator 

Bobby Jamieson (Jamieson) helped to unload marijuana from at least 

one of these plane deliveries to the Bahamas. On at least one 

occasion, the Jamieson transported the marijuana to Florida in his 

boat, a 30-foot Rybovich. 

Around December 1982, while using the same general method of 

operation, the activity of the participants expanded to include 

dealing in cocaine. Record, Palmero, and Olarte agreed to import 

100 kilograms (kilos) of cocaine in the next transact ion , but 

Olarte had difficulty with his cocaine source and instead 

substituted 1200 pounds of marijuana in this first intended 

cocaine deal. Apparently, this load of marijuana was dumped into 

the ocean and was never sold. The next transaction, in early 

1983, successfully brought 115 kilos of cocaine and 500 pounds of 

marijuana into the United States. In this deal, Record, Jamieson, 

and Palmero helped to offload the plane in the Bahamas, and 

Jamieson transported the drugs to Florida by boat. Planning for 

the next importation of drugs began soon thereafter, with the 

discussions involving Record, Palmero, Olarte, and Olarte's wife, 

Clara Lacle (Lacle). 

A few months later in 1983 or early in 1984, with Palmero 

taking a more active organizational role and piloting the plane, a 

Cessna 310, the operation smuggled into Florida 290 kilos of 

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cocaine and 400 pounds of marijuana. Record assisted in 

offloading the plane, and Jamieson transported the drugs to 

Florida by· boat. In the 290-kilo deal, Record held back 20 to 25 

kilos of Olarte•s cocaine, claiming that they were lost. Olarte 

absorbed the loss and· decided to exclude Record from ~he next 

planned deal, using Palmero and Jamieson instead to fill ·Record's 

former organizational and transportation roles. 

In early 1985, Olarte, Palmero, and Jamieson brought 390 

kilos of cocaine into Florida. Olarte, Palmero, and Jamieson met 

in Aruba around October 1986 to plan the importation of 400 to 500 

kilos of cocaine into the United States. Olarte was arrested in 

November 1986 regarding participation in a different drug 

operation, but continued from his place of incarceration in the 

Tulsa county jail to try to organize the deal originally planned 

in Aruba. 

After being imprisoned in Oklahoma, Olarte contacted Palmero 

by telephone in Florida, seeking money directly or through a drug 

deal. Palmero initially sent Olarte $4,000, and then Palmero met 

a second time in Aruba with, among others, Jamieson and Lacle. 

The parties agreed to pursue the cocaine importation deal , planned 

at the first meeting in Aruba, to raise funds for Olarte. In May 

1987, however, Olarte began to cooperate with the government, and 

this cooperation led to the indictment and arrest of Palmero, 

Jamieson, and the defendant Record. Jamieson, Palmero, and Olarte 

negotiated pleas and testified for the government in return for 

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consideration of such testimony at the time of their sentencing. 

Record was convicted by a jury and sentenced in January 1988. 

Record seeks reversal of his conviction, arguing that 1) the 

evidence was insufficient to prove one continuous conspiracy as 

charged in the indictment, 2) the trial court unduly emphasized 

evidence harmful to the defense by instructing the jury that 

"using a telephone .. could constitute an overt act underlying a 

conspiracy, 3) the trial court erred by advising the government 

before it rested that it had not proven venue, 4) the trial court 

failed to adequately define the term "broader conspiracy" in its 

instructions to the jury, 5) the trial court erroneously admitted 

evidence of a prior bad act by Record, and 6) the government•s 

closing argument unfairly implied that Record would commit future 

crimes if acquitted. We affirm. 

I. 

Record argues that the government's proof constituted a fatal 

variance in that the evidence at trial showed four distinct 

conspiracies rather than the single conspiracy charged in the 

indictment. Specifically, Record contends that the first 

conspiracy consisted of a July 1980 agreement between Palmero and 

several unindicted individuals to import cocaine and marijuana 

into Florida. The second conspiracy, according to Record, 

involved an April 1983 agreement between himself, Palmero, Olarte, 

and Jamieson to import cocaine and marijuana into Florida, 

resulting in the two deals which brought into Florida first 115 

kilos of cocaine and 500 pounds of marijuana, and then 290 kilos 

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of cocaine and 400 pounds of marijuana. Record claims that this 

was the only conspiracy in which he was actively involved and that 

the other conspirators chose to cut him out of future dealings at· 

that point due to the shortage of 20-25 kilos of cocaine. Record 

asserts that the third conspiracy surrounded the October 1985 

agreement between Olarte, Jamieson, and Palmero to import 390 

kilos of cocaine into Florida. Finally, according to Record, the 

fourth conspiracy was a May 1987 agreement between Olarte and 

Palmero for the purpose of accomplishing Olarte's escape from the 

Tulsa county jail. 

A variance occurs when the trial evidence establishes facts 

different from those charged in the indictment. United States v. 

Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 581 (lOth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 u.s. 

1188 (1985). Such a variance may be "fatal" or prejudicial if it 

''affects the substantial rights of the accused." United States v. 

Morris, 623 F.2d 145, 149 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 449 u.s. 1065 

(1980). Record claims two sources of prejudice. First, he cites 

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 u.s. 750 (1945), where the Supreme 

Court found a variance prejudicial in a thirteen-defendant "mass 

conspiracy" because ''[t]he dangers of fransference of guilt from 

one to another ~cross the line separating conspiracies . • • are 

so great that no one can really say prejudice to substantial right 

has not taken place." Id. at 773-74. 

Record's primary assertion of prejudice, however, is that the 

claimed variance prevented the government from properly 

establishi ng venue in that only the "fourth conspiracy'' touched-

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the Northern District of Oklahoma, and Record argues he was not a 

party to that conspiracy. Venue in federal criminal cases is an 

element of the prosecution's case which must be proved, unlike the 

other elements, by a preponderance of the evidence. United States 

v. Rinke, 778 F.2d 581, 584 (lOth Cir. 1985). In a conspiracy, 

venue "'lies either in the jurisdiction in which the 

conspiratorial agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction in 

which an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed 

by any of the conspirators.'" Id. at 584-85 (quoting United 

States v. Smith, 692 F.2d 693, 697 (lOth Cir. 1982)). Thus, if 

the conspiratorial agreements or overt acts touching the Northern 

District of Oklahoma were part of a separate conspiracy not 

involving Record, venue there would be inappropriate. See United 

States v. Durades, 607 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1979). 

Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish a single 

conspiracy is a question of fact for the jury to decide. 1 Dickey, 

1 The jury instruction entitled "Multiple Conspiracies," which 

included the entirety of Record's requested jury instruction 

regarding multiple conspiracies, instructed the jury in part: 

You are further instructed, with regard to the 

alleged conspiracy offense, that proof of several 

separate conspiracies is not proof of the single, overall conspiracy charged in the indictment unless one 

of the several conspiracies which is proved is the 

single conspiracy which the indictment charges. What 

you must do is determine whether the single conspiracy charged in the indictment existed between two or more 

conspirators. If you find that no such conspiracy 

existed, then you must acquit the defendant as to that 

charge. However, if you are satisfied that such a 

conspiracy existed, you must determine who were the 

members of that conspiracy. 

If you find that the defendant was a member of 

another conspiracy, not the one charged in the 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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736 F.2d at 581. We review the sufficiency of the evidence by 

considering all the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, in 

the light most favorable to the government, drawing reasonable 

inferences and making credibility choices in support of the jury's 

verdict. Id. In ord~r to find a single conspiracy, "the jury 

must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged 

coconspirators possessed a common, illicit goal." Id. at 582. 

Significantly,. this is not a case where the difficulty lies in 

inferring from circumstantial evidence such a common undertaking. 

The evidence is manifest and Record admits that he knowingly 

conspired with others to violate the drug laws, at least during 

his asserted "second conspiracy." Record argues instead that a 

variance is shown by differences in personnel, the passage of time 

between drug transactions, and his lack of participation in 

portions of the charged conspiracy. We disagree. 

The proof summarized at the outset reflects a significant 

overlap in personnel, method of operation, and purpose throughout 

the period of the indictment such that the single, ongoing illegal 

scheme to import and distribute cocaine and marijuana for profit 

charged in the indictment may be inferred. ~, United States v. 

· Gomez, 810 F.2d 947, 955 (lOth Cir.) (multiple drug transactions 

constituted single conspiracy), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2488 

(footnote continued from previous page) indictment, then you must acquit the defendant. In 

other words, to find the defendant guilty, you must find 

that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment and not some other separate conspiracy. 

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(1987); Dickey, 736 F.2d at 582 (numerous marijuana and cocaine 

transactions over five-year period with varying participants 

considered single conspiracy); United States v. Pilling, 721 F.2d 

286, 293 (lOth Cir. 1983) (numerous trips and changing personnel 

irrelevant when constant purpose to import drugs into the United 

States for profit); United States v. Bridwell, 583 F.2d 1135, 

1141-42 (lOth Cir. 1978) (seven different drug transactions over 

substantial period of time show continuous course of conduct 

representing a single conspiracy to sell drugs illegally); United 

States v. Champion, 813 F.2d 1154, 1166-67 (11th Cir. 1987) 

(eighteen drug transactions over three-year period with one common 

participant considered single conspiracy as purpose and basic 

means of implementation consistent throughout). 

Nevertheless, Record denies the existence of significant 

overlap in personnel, arguing that he did not participate in the 

"first conspiracy." Palmero testified, however, that prior to 

these first three marijuana transactions, Record provided him and 

another individual with names of others in order to "put together 

a smuggling network." Rec. vol. Vat 323. One of these 

individuals was a pilot named Dick Pinder (Pinder). Id. at 324. 

Barbara Fore, a former girlfriend of Pinder, testified that around 

1979 or 1980, Pinder told her that he was involved in the drug 

business with Record and Palmero, that he traveled often to 

Jamaica, and that Record, Palmero, and himself had lost a plane in 

Jamaica in the course of their drug dealings. Id. at 480-87. 

Finally, Palmero indicated that Record received and sold the 

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marijuana imp?rted in the second of these first three deals. Id. 

at 334-35. 

The heart of the conspiracy ~barged in the indictment 

consists of the transactions that Record calls the ttsecond 

conspiracy." From approximately mid-1982 until late 1983 or early 

1984, the key players were all heavily involved. Olarte provided 

marijuana and cocaine in Colombia, ~, rec. vol. IV at 97, and 

Record provided transportation and security for the intermediate 

stop in the ·Bahamas, as well as transportation to Florida and 

distribution once there, id. at 55-56. Palmero and Jamieson 

assisted in offloading the drugs from planes in the Bahamas, and 

Jamieson transported the drugs by boat from the Bahamas to 

Florida. ~, rec. vol. V at 347-50. Sometime during this 

period, Palmero began piloting the leg from Colombia to the 

Bahamas and began to take a more active organizational role. Id. 

at 362-367. At this juncture, evidence of a conspiracy involving 

these individuals is overwhelming. 

Record argues that the "third conspiracy" was separate in 

that Record was excluded by Olarte due to the loss of 20-25 kilos 

of cocaine. However, the purpose and method of operation remained 

the same. Jamieson, Palmero, and Olarte continued to participate. 

And despite Record's insistence on his subsequent lack of 

participation, a "turnover, 11 much less a change by one, in 

personnel does not terminate a conspiracy. United States v. 

Brewer, 630 F.2d 795, 800 (lOth Cir. 1980) (individual who 

participated in initial drug transaction remained part of single, 

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continuing conspiracy even after being excluded from·future 

dealings by coconspirators). "That •some of the participants 

remained with the enterprise from its inception until it was 

brought to an end, and others joined or left the scheme as it went 

along,• is of no consequence if each knew he was part of a larger 

ongoing conspiracy ... Id. (quoting United States v. Parnell, 581 

F.2d 1374, 1382 (lOth Cir. 1978), £!!!· denied, 439 u.s. 1076 

( 1979)). 

Finally, Record disagrees that the proof showed a common goal 

to import and distribute drugs for profit, as he claims that the 

purpose of the "fourth conspiracy" was to effect Olarte's escape 

from jail, not to make money from the importation and distribution 

of drugs as in the other transactions. Olarte testified, however, 

that in his discussions with Palmero regarding escape from the 

Tulsa county jail, he indicated that Palmero•s help would be 

rewarded by drugs or drug deals so that Palmero could make some 

more money. Rec. vol. IV at 152. During this time, Olarte had 

phoned his wife Lacle, asking her to put Palmero in contact with 

someone who could help Palmero consummate the deal originally 

planned in Aruba by Palmero, Olarte, and Jamieson. Rec. vol. IV 

at 149. Palmero testified that after he had spoken by phone to 

Olarte in Tulsa and after having sent Olarte the $4,000, he 

actually went to Aruba again and met with Lacle and Jamieson, 

among others, where they agreed to import cocaine to raise money 

for Olarte. Rec. vel. V at 392-94. From this, the jury could 

infer that the ... discussions between Palmero and Olarte were in 

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furtherance of the conspiracy's original purpose to import and 

distribute drugs for profit, the only change being that the fruits 

would be used foi Olarte's escape, rather than the boats and 

houses purchased by various participants with past drug proceeds. 

We take note of Judge Friendly's opinion in Uni t ed States v. 

Borelli, 336 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 u.s. 960 

(1965), which, while not cited by Record, perhaps best supports 

his position. There, a defendant was convicted for joining in an 

ongoing conspiracy to import and distribute heroin from 1950 to 

1959, although the defendant's participation was limited to two 

1951 heroin purchases. The defendant argued that the illegal 

agreements involving him did not reach into the five-year statute 

of limitations period preceeding the 1962 indictment. The court 

agreed, rejecting as a "considerable oversimplification" the "view 

that if the evidence warrants the finding that some defendants 

were parties to a single agreement to sell contraband for a nineyear period, it necessarily does so as to every defendant who has 

conspired with them at any time for any purpose." Id. at 384. 

According to the court, the two 1951 purchases were insufficient 

to warrant an inference that the defendant agreed to participate 

in significantly changed operations begun seven years later. Id. 

at 1353. 

We agree with the statement in Borelli that "it is ••• 

essential to determine what kind of agreement or understanding 

existed as to each defendant... Id. at 384; Dickey, 736 F.2d at 

583 (guilt individual and personal in conspiracy case) . The facts 

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of this case are distinguishable from Borelli, however, in that 

Record was a central conspirator rather than isolated purchaser 

like the defendant in Borelli. The Second Circuit has held since 

Borelli that an individual's understanding of an agreement may be 

inferred from the "nature of the criminal enterprise and' the 

defendant's role in it, since 'it would be unrealistic to assume 

that major producers, importers, wholesalers or retailers [of 

narcotics] do not know that their actions are inextricably linked 

to a large on-going plan or conspiracy.'" United States v. 

Taylor, 562 F. 2d 1345, 1352 (2d Cir.) (quoting United States v. 

Arroyo, 494 F.2d 1316, 1319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 419 u.s. 827 

(1974)), cert. denied, 432 u.s. 909 (1977). 2 

Here, Record clearly was a primary player responsible for 

transportation to the United States of the drugs obtained in 

Columbia by Olarte, and for the security of the smuggling effort. 

Record introduced Palmero to Olarte, rec. vol. V at 353, and this 

introduction permitted transactions to proceed virtually unchanged 

after Record was excluded, as Palmero assumed the organizational 

2 While the court in Borelli applied its reasoning regarding the 

isolated purchaser to other defendants! including one described as 

a "central" participant, Borelli, 336 F.2d at 386, we decline to 

accord this significant weight for two reasons. Firstf after the 

court discussed in detail why a peripheral conspirator's limited 

participation did not give rise to an inference that he made 

himself a part of whatever the core conspirators later did, it is 

difficult to understand why the court applied such reasoning, 

without discussion, to a central conspirator. More importantly, 

the Second Circuit has clearly indicated since Borelli that 

"centrality" does make a difference, as it held in Taylor that the 

extent of a conspirator's agreement regarding the ongoing nature 

of a conspiracy may be inferred in part from that conspirator's 

role in the criminal enterprise. Taylor, 562 F.2d at 1352. 

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and transportation roles previously filled by Record. Id. at 385; 

rec. vol. VII at 750. This contrasts with Borelli where the later 

t~ansactions were described by the court as a different "chapter" 

or "phase," involving changed operations and an altered core of 

conspirators. Borelli, 336 F.2d at 381-86. Record recruited 

Jamieson for the drug importation scheme in 1983. Rec. vol. VII 

at 658. Jamieson continued to participate with Palmero and Olarte 

after Record was excluded, and Jamieson testified that his goal in 

participating in drug smuggling with Record "[w]as to do one deal, 

make some money, and do another one." Id. at 717-18. These 

circumstances are sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to 

impute to Record an understanding of the ongoing nature of the 

illegal conspiracy. Thus, we hold that there was no variance as 

the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the "four 

conspiracies" argued by Record were indeed a single conspiracy as 

alleged in the indictment. 

That does not end our inquiry, however, because while Record, 

as a member of the single conspiracy charged in the indictment, is 

responsible for all overt acts committed in furtherance of that 

conspiracy, his connection to the conspiracy would terminate upon 

an effective withdrawal. See United States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 

1428, 1448 (lOth Cir. 1987). Record asserts that even assuming 

the proof reflected a single conspiracy, he did not participate in 

the conspiracy charged in the indictment after being excluded by 

Olarte from the 1985 390-kilo cocaine deal. Jamieson also 

testified that Record had indicated at about the same time that 

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"he wanted to cool it for a while, that things were hot, he felt 

like things were hot." Rec. vol. VII at 702. 

A defendant bears the burden of establishing withdrawal from 

a conspiracy. United States v. Parnell, 581 F.2d 1374, 1384 (lOth 

Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1076 '(1979). To withdraw, an 

individual must act affirmatively by "either making a clean breast 

to the authorities or communicating his withdrawal in a manner 

reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators." Id. While 

Record asserts that he did not participate in the activities of 

the conspiracy after the 1983 deal involving 290 kilos of cocaine 

and 400 pounds of marijuana, "mere cessation of activities alone 

is not enough" to constitute withdrawal. Id. 

Neither was Record's comment to Jamieson that he wanted to 

"cool it" for a while the type of affirmative act needed to 

support a withdrawal. Jamieson testified that Re~ord said "after 

things cooled off he would start doing something again at a later 

time or whatever." Rec. vol. VII at 702. That Record was cut out 

of subsequent drug deals by coconspirators is not dispositive of 

his criminal liability. See Brewer, 630 F.2d at 800 (no 

withdrawal when participant in initial drug transaction cut out of 

subsequent dealings part of same conspiracy). Record has not met 

his burden with regard to withdrawal and is therefore responsible 

for all acts done in furtherance of the single conspiracy charged 

in the indictment, including those touching the Northern District 

of Oklahoma. Thus, we hold that venue there was proper. See 

United States v. Behrens, 689 F.2d 154, 161 n.l (lOth Cir.), cert. 

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denied, 459 U.S. 1088 (1982); United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 

1313, 1333 (lOth Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 u.s. 905 (1980). 

II. 

Record next argues, without citation to authority, that the 

trial court erred by instructing the jury that "~sing a telephone" 

could constitute an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy, 

thereby unduly emphasizing to the jury telephone conversations 

between Palmero and Olarte, the government's main evidence used to 

establish venue in the Northern District of Oklahoma. The trial 

court instructed the jury that an overt act "may be as innocent as 

the act of a man walking across the street, or driving an 

automobile, or using a telephone." Rec. vol. I, doc. 121. This 

wording is identical to that found in the pattern instruction in 

the standard reference on jury instructions. See 2 Devitt & 

Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice & Instructions § 27.07 (3d ed. 

1977). As counsel for Record failed to object at trial to this 

instruction, we review for plain error. United States v. Newman, 

733 F.2d 1395, 1402 (lOth Cir. 1984); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 30. 

To analyze this claim, we must first put the consideration of 

venue in this case into perspective. While venue is a part of the 

prosecution's case which must be proved by a preponderance of the 

evidence, Rinke, 778 F.2d at 584, counsel for Record agreed with 

the trial court and the government that venue was an issue for the 

trial court to decide. Rec. vol. VII at 636-38. Record neither 

requested a jury instruction on venue nor objected to the lack of 

one. Instead, counsel for Record attacked -venue through the 

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multiple conspiracy defense, arguing that the overt acts touching 

the Northern District of Oklahoma were part of a separate 

conspiracy not involving Record. See rec. vel. VII at 824-25 

(motion for judgment of acquittal); id. at 843-45 (discussions 

with the trial court regarding jury instructions). The trial 

court instructed the jury regarding multiple conspiracies in the 

fashion requested by Record. 

The evidence at trial of the phone calls in question was 

uncontradicted, and counsel for Record even acknowledged to the 

trial court that some conspiracy touched the Northern District of 

Oklahoma, id. at 825-26. Thus framed by the parties and the trial 

court, therefore, the jury's task with respect to venue was the 

indirect one of considering whether the proof reflected the 

single, ongoing conspiracy charged in the indictment, thus 

connecting Record with the acts es~ablishing venue in the Northern 

District of Oklahoma. Given this context, we find no error, and 

certainly not plain error, in the giving of the overt acts 

instruction as worded. See United States v. Pringle, 576 F.2d 

1114, 1120 (5th Cir. 1978) (no prejudice, considering jury charge 

as a whole, when two examples in pattern overt acts jury 

instruction paralleled aspects of government 1 s case). 

Nevertheless, we consider the failure of the trial court to 

submit the venue issue specifically to the jury, as we have held 

that it is "fundamental error" to fail to instruct the jury as to 

the necessary elements of the offense charged. United States v. 

King, 521 F.2d 61, 63 (lOth Cir. 1975), overruled on other 

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grounds, United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 99 (1988). Other courts have developed 

rules examining the particular circumstances of a case rather than 

requiring automatic reversal for the failure to instruct the jury 

on venue. See, ~' United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 462 

(8th Cir. 1985) (denial of venue jury instruction harmless error 

when evidence establishing venue is uncontroverted and 

substantial), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 (1986); United States v. 

Winship, 724 F.2d 1116, 1124-25 (5th Cir. 1984) (failure to 

instruct on venue is reversible error when venue put into issue 

and defendant requests instruction). The instant case, however, 

does not involve either oversight by the trial court or its denial 

of a proper request to charge the jury regarding venue, as the 

parties agreed that the issue was within the province of the trial 

court. We find no error when the parties themselves submit the 

issue to the trial court and the transcript supports the 

determination by the trial court that venue was established. 

III. 

Record next contends, again without citation to authority, 

that the trial court erred by advising the prosecution before it 

had rested that it had not adequately proved venue. Record does 

not argue here that venue was improper, and we already have held 

to the contrary. Instead, Record argues that the comments of the 

trial court "let the prosecution know they needed to present 

additional evidence," thereby violating his rights to due process 

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and t-he effective assistance of counsel, guaranteed by the fifth 

and sixth amendments respectively. 

The statements complained of occurred following the testimony 

of Harry Bennett, a pilot who had picked up drugs from Olarte in 

Colombia' and flown them to Record in the Bahamas. Bennett 

testified that he traveled.to Oklahoma in July 1983 to purchase 

the plane he used to fly the drugs, and that he may have flown 

over the Northern District of Oklahoma on the return flight to 

Florida. After this testimony, the trial court made the following 

statement: 

While we're waiting for that witness, I just wanted 

to make the point to counsel outside the hearing of the 

jury that in view of the very equivocal testimony of 

this witness, Bennett, on whether or not from Santa Fe, 

New Mexico on the way to the vicinity of Memphis on the 

June, 1983 trip in the 421 Cessna where he was traveling 

with the pilot Bullock, the Court does not think that 

adequate for purposes of establishing venue in the 

Northern Dis~rict of Oklahoma because he in effect said, 

"I assume we crossed the Creek County area,'' and then on 

cross-examination says it's equally possible they 

didn't. 

So I just wanted to alert counsel and counsel for 

the government to the effect that I consider that will 

cause a problem area if that is going to be the basis 

for establishing venue here in the Northern District of 

Oklahoma. • • • I just wanted to alert counsel as to 

this witness while we were on that subject to point out 

that problem area. 

Rec. vol. V at 313. 

We need express no opinion on whether the statements 

complained of were error ~s we find from a review of the 

transcript that any error was harmless. At the time of the trial 

court's statement, the prosecution had already introduced 

testimony sufficient to establish venue in the Northern District 

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of Oklahoma by a preponderance of the evidence. Olarte had 

previously testified that he made phone calls from his jail cell 

in Tulsa directing his wife and Palmero to further the deal 

planned in Aruba, which the jury found to be part of the single, 

ongoing conspiracy. The trial court even acknowledged during its 

statement that Bennett's testimony was not the government's sole 

basis for establishing venue, but that "it would be something 

perhaps in the nature of cumulative testimony along that line." 

Rec. vol. Vat 313. The trial court's statement was thus harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

IV. 

Record contends that the jury was prejudicially confused by 

the failure of the trial court to define the term "broader 

conspiracy" in its instructions. The trial court instructed the 

jury as follows: 

If you find that the defendant was involved merely 

in a single transaction, that conduct may be treated as 

permitting the inference of knowledge of a broader 

conspiracy if the single act itself shows so much 

familiarity with or high-level participation in the 

overall conspiracy as to be in and of itself indicative 

of the broader conspiracy. 

Rec. vol. I, doc. 121. As Record neither objected to the 

submission of this instruction to the jury, nor requested a 

clarification of the term in question, we review the instruction 

for plain error. United States v. Newman, 733 F.2d 1395, 1402 

(lOth Cir. 1984); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 30. 

Record argues that use of the term "broader conspiracy" gave 

undue emphasis to the government's position that the proof 

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reflected the single conspiracy charged in the indictment. The 

trial court instructed the jury at length, however, regarding the 

significance of possible proof of multiple conspiracies differing 

from the single conspiracy for which Record was indicted. A 

portion of the instructions stated specifically that ''if you find 

that no such [single] conspiracy existed, then you must acquit the 

defendant." Rec. vol. I, doc. 121 . Given this context, and 

considering the plain meaning of "broader conspiracy," we find no 

error, let alone plain error. Record's contention that the term 

shifted the burden of proof to the defendant and denied him his 

sixth amendment right to be informed of the nature and cause of 

the accusation against him flirts with the frivolous. 

v. 

Record claims that the trial court erred by admitting 

te.stimony regarding the importation of marijuana by Record pr~or 

to the time period of the conspiracy charged in the indictment . 

Jamieson testified that during the period of the charged 

conspiracy, he and Record had discussions wherein Record sought 

Jamieson's participation in ''the drug business." Rec. vol. VII at 

658. Jamieson testified that during these discussions, Record 

told of his prior experience in smuggling, namely a 1978 

transaction where Record had brought 32,000 pounds of marijuana 

into Louisiana on a shrimp trawler. Id. at 660. 

Prior to introduction of the testimony, defense counsel made 

a motion in limine seeking to prevent the admission of Record's 

statement. While defense counsel initially objected to the 

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statement as inadmissible hearsay, the trial court properly 

focused on the Rule 404(b)3 implications of the testimony, which 

focus defense counsel then adopted. Rec. vol. VII at 646. The 

prosecution emphasized that the testimony was admissible contrary 

to the hearsay objection, but failed to recognize the Rule 404(b) 

aspect of the testimony, stating that "[t]hat evidence is not 

being offered by the government for any 404(b) purpose." Id. at 

647. The trial court then responded to both the hearsay and Rule 

404(b) contentions, ruling that the testimony was admissible as a 

nonhearsay statement under Fed. R. Evid. 80l(d)(2)(A) 4 and as 

tending to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

[or] knowledge." 5 Id. 

3 Rule 404(b) provides: 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 

admissible to prove the character of a person in order 

to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 

however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof 

of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 

4 Rule 80l(d)(2)(A) states that "[a] statement is not hearsay if 

[t]he statement is offered against a party and is the party's own 

statement in either an individual or a representative capacity." 

5 Rule 404(b) only applies to evidence of acts extrinsic to the 

charged crime. United States v. Orr, 864 F.2d 1505, 1510 (lOth 

Cir. 1988). An uncharged act may not be extrinsic if it was part 

of the scheme for which a defendant is being prosecuted, see Orr, 

864 F.2d at 1510, or if it was "inextricably intertwined" wittlthe 

charged crime such that a witness' testimony "would have been 

confusing and incomplete without mention of the prior act." 

United States v. Richardson, 764 F.2d 1514, 1521-22 (11th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 474 u.s. 952 (1985). Record's statement to 

Jamieson, although during the time of the charged conspiracy, fits 

into neither of these categories, so we will analyze its admission 

under Rule 404(b) as involving an extrinsic act. 

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Jamieson then testified, and the prosecution sought to 

introduce through Jamieson Record's statement regarding his prior 

misconduct. Defense counsel again objected, and pursuant to an 

earlier request, the trial court gave the jury a limiting 

in.struction regarding the Ru·le 404(b) purposes of the testimony._ 

!d. at 660-61. Defense counsel did not object to the limiting 

instruction or request that one be given during the general charge 

to the jury. The jury was not given a separate instr~ction at the 

close of the case. We review the trial court's decision to allow 

this testimony for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Neal, 

718 F.2d 1505, 1509-10 (lOth Cir. 1983}, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 

818 ( 1984). 

Our analysis of this issue requires us to briefly summarize 

the development of Rule 404(b) law in this circuit. In United 

States v. Nolan, 551 F.2d 266 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 434 u.s. 

904 (1977), we described the parameters of Rule 404(b) admission 

in an inclusive sense, holding that "it would allow admission of 

uncharged illegal acts unless the only purpose for their admission 

is to prove the criminal disposition of the defendant." rd. at 

271. Nevertheless, we have developed numerous requirements which 

must be met before 404(b} acts may be ·admitted. United States v. 

Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173, 1176 (lOth Cir. 1988). In fact, when faced 

with the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence, a trial court in this 

circuit is burdened with considering at least ten separate factors 

before ruling on the admissibility of the proffered evidence. 

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Nolan itself articulated five guidelines to be used in 

det.ermining the admissibility of uncharged illegal acts. There we 

said that 

(1) the evidence must tend to establish intent, 

knowledge, motive, identity, or absence of mistake or 

accident; 2) the evidence must be so related to the 

importation of contraband that it serves to establish 

intent, knowledge, motive, identity, or absence of 

mistake or accident; (3) the evidence must have real 

probative value, not just possible worth; (4) and the 

uncharged illegal act must be close in time to the crime 

charged. 

Nolan, 551 F.2d at 271 (citation omitted). We further held that 

"[t]he probative value of proof of the commission of the prior 

crime must outweigh the prejudice."6 Id. 

We have held that the government bears the burden of showing 

the proffered evidence to be relevant to an issue in the case, and 

that the government "must articulate precisely the evidential 

hypothesis by which a fact of consequence may be inferred from the 

evidence of other acts." United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 

1436 (lOth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 u.s. 1081 (1986). We 

have also required the trial court to "specifically identify the 

purpose for which such evidence is offered," further noting that 

"a broad statement merely invoking or restating Rule 404(b) will 

not suffice." Id. Further, we have held that there must be a 

clear and logical connection between the uncharged misconduct and 

6 "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 

considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 

presentation of cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

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the case being tried. United States v. Biswell, 700 F.2d 1310, 

1317-18 {lOth Cir. 1983). 

Our recent pronouncement on Rule 404{b) in United States v. 

Rivera, 837 F.2d 906, reh'g granted on other grounds, 847 F.2d 660 

(lOth Cir. 1988), shows a ~erspective toward Rule 404{b) much 

transformed since the inclusive approach reflected by Nolan. In 

Rivera, we stated that "'[t]he use of other crimes evidence is not 

looked on favorably and its use must pe narrowly circumscribed and 

limited.'" Id. at 911 {quoting United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 

1318, 1321 {9th Cir. 1986)). In furtherance of. this restrictive 

approach, we added to the growing list of requirements, holding 

that 

[i]f evidence is admitted solely under the authority of 

Rule 404{b), the court must give a limiting instruction 

both at the time the evidence is admitted and in the 

general charge to minimize the danger that the jury 

might use the evidence as proof that the defendant acted 

in conformity with his past acts on the occasion for 

which he is being tried. 

Id. at 913. 

We must now reevaluate the proper application of Rule 404{b) 

in light of the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in Huddleston 

v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1496 (1988). In Huddleston, the 

defendant had been convicted of possessing and selling stolen 

goods, 32,000 blank video cassette tapes, in interstate commerce. 

The defendant did not dispute that the tapes were stolen, but only 

that he was unaware of that stolen character. The trial court 

admitted evidence of "similar acts" pursuant to Rule 404(b) as 

tending to show the defendant's knowledge that the tapes were 

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indeed stolen. Specifically, evidence was admitted that the 

defendant had sold a number of 12" black-and-white televisions for 

$28 each. While the defendant did not question the relevance of 

the proffered testimony, he asserted that the government failed to 

prove to the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence, prior 

to admission of the testimony, that the televisions were in fact 

stolen. Id. at 1497-99. 

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist stated that 

requiring the trial court to make such a preliminary finding "is 

inconsistent with the structure of the Rules of Evidence and-with 

the plain language of Rule 404{b}." Id. at 1500. Briefly 

sketching that structure, the Court noted that Rules 401 and 402 

establish the basic principle that relevant evidence is admissible 

unless the Rules provide otherwise, while Rule 403 allows the 

trial court·to exclude evidence when its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by potential prejudice. Rules 404-412 

address problematic evidentiary matters, but seek only to limit 

the uses rather than to prohibit the introduction of such 

evidence. Id. 

The Court also examined the legislative history of Rule 

404(b), concluding that "Congress was not nearly so concerned with 

the potential prejudicial effect of Rule 404(b) evidence as it was 

with ensuring that restrictions would not be placed on the 

admission of such evidence." Id. at 1500-1501. Given this 

context, the Court stated that the defendant's reading of Rule 

404(b) "as mandating a preliminary finding by the trial court that 

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the act in questiqn occurred not only superimposes a level of 

judicial oversight that is nowhere apparent from the language of 

that provision, but it is simply inconsistent with the legislative 

history behind Rule 404(b)." Id. at 1500. 

The Court was not unconcer~ed that unduly prejudicial 

evidence might be admitted under Rule 404(b). According to the 

Court , however, 

the protection against such unfair prejudice emanates 

not from a requirement of a preliminary finding by the 

trial court, but rather from four other sources: first , from· the requirement of Rule 404(b) that the evidence be 

offered for a proper purpose; second, from the relevancy 

requirement of Rule 402--as enforced through Rule 

104(b}; third, from the assessment the trial court must 

make under Rule 403 to determine whether the probative 

value of the similar acts evidence is substantially 

outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice ; and 

fourth, from Federal Rule of Evidence 105, which 

provides that the trial court shall, upon request, 

instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to 

be considered only for the proper purpose for which it 

was admitted. 

Id. at 1502 (footnote and citations omitted). 

As an inferior federal court, we are necessarily guided by 

Huddleston in reviewing a trial court's decision to admit evidence 

under Rule 404(b). Generally, we note that the inclusive approach 

toward the admission of 404(~) evidence reflected in the Nolan 

decision is vindicated by the Court's comment that Congress was 

more concerned with avoiding restrictions on the admission of 

404 (b) evidence than with potential prejudice. Id. at 1501; Cuch, 

842 F.2d at 1176. Further, Huddleston provides a four-step 

framework for avoiding such prejudice, which will greatly simplify 

the task of a trial court in this circuit, as well as a reviewing 

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court, in analyzing the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence~ Thus, 

mindful of Huddleston's inclusive approach, we will apply to the 

facts of this. case the requirements articulated therein by the 

Supreme Court. 7 . 

The trial court's decision to admit in the instant case 

satisfies the first two requiremens of Huddleston, as we hold that 

the testimony regarding the prior marijuana transaction was both 

offered for and relevant to a proper purpose. We have previously 

recognized the probative value of uncharged acts evidence to 

demonstrate motive, intent, knowledge, or plan in the context of a 

conspiracy prosecution. ~, Orr, 864 F.2d at 1511; United 

States v. Mora, 845 F.2d 233, 237 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 109 

S. Ct. 562 (1988); United States v. Brown, 770 F.2d 912, 914 {lOth 

Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 479 u.s. 314 (1987); United 

States v. Bridwell, 583 F.2d 1135, 1140 (lOth Cir. 1978), United 

States v. Parnell, 581 F.2d 1374, 1384 (lOth Cir. 1978), cert. 

7 Of course, this does not mean, and we could not hold that our 

prior decisions consistent with Huddleston no longer have 

precedential value. For instance, the Kendall requirements that 

the government and trial court articulate precisely the basis for 

which evidence is offered and admitted is consistent with 

Huddleston's first two requirements that Rule 404(b) evidence be 

offered for and relevant to a proper purpose, and the Kendall 

requirements facilitate the third Huddleston requirement that the 

trial court weigh probative value against potential prejudice. In 

the instant case, the government and trial court failed to 

articulate precisely a basis for admission as required by Kendall. 

Since Huddleston, however, we have held that any error in failing 

to adhere to the Kendall requirements would be considered harmless 

if "the purpose for adm~tting the other acts testimony is apparent 

from the record, and the district court's decision to admit was 

correct." United States v. Orr, 864 F.2d 1505, 1511 (lOth Cir. 

1988). Thus, .if the transcript reflects that the "decision to 

admit" was proper under the requirements of Huddleston, any 

failure to adhere to Kendall will 'necessarily be harmless. 

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denied, 439 u.s. 1076 (1979). In Brown, where the defendant was 

charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 

marijuana and cocaine, we allowed under Rule 404(b) evidence of 

defendant's prior arrest for possession of marijuana, stating that 

"[t]he prior act at issue here ·was highly probative of defendant's 

scheme to possess and distribute marijuana. The Tenth Circuit has· 

long recognized the relevance of previous wrongs and crimes in the 

context of narcotics violations." Id. at 914. Such is ~specially 

true where, as in the case of Record, the uncharged misconduct is 

close in time and similar in method to the charged scheme. 

Bridwell, 583 F.2d at 1140. 

Our conclusion that the testimony was offered for a proper 

and relevant purpose is bolstered by comparison to United States 

v. Barbieri, 614 F.2d 715 (lOth Cir. 1980), where the defendant 

was tried on a charge that he conspired to organize a prostitution 

business in violation the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952. Testimony 

was admitted at trial showing that during discussions for this 

purpose, the defendant encouraged others by stating that he would 

set up an operation "just like we had in St. Louis." Id. at 717. 

Similarly, during the time of the charged conspiracy, Record 

. . sought to encourage Jamieson by boasting of a prior successful 

drug importation. We held in Barbieri that reference to this 

prior, uncharged act was relevant to show intent and plan and to 

show "the dimensions and continuing nature of [defendant's] 

scheme." Id. at 719. This holding applies to the instant 

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situation where Record's primary defense at trial consisted of 

denying the continuing nature of the charged conspiracy. 

Huddleston next requires that the trial court weigh under 

Rule 403 the probative value of the similar acts evidence against 

its potential for unfair prejudice. Huddleston, 108 So Ct. at 

1502. The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether 

or not prejudice inherent in otherwise relevant evidence outweighs 

its probative value. United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 535 

(lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 108 s. Ct. 1084, 1299 (1988). The 

trial court did not abuse that discretion here where the evidence 

was highly probative of the charged scheme, the use of the 

evidence was very limited in the context of the whole trial, and 

introduction of the evidence was followed by the trial court's 

limiting instruction to the jury. 

Finally, we must examine the trial court's failure to "give a 

limiting instruction both at the time the evidence is admitted and 

in the general charge" as required by Rivera, which was decided 

without the benefit of the recent Huddleston decision. Rivera, 

837 F.2d at 913. A ~imiting instruction was given, as requested, 

at the time of the admission of the testimony, but such an 

·instruction was neither requested nor given at the close of the 

case. The Court stated in Huddleston that a trial court may 

protect against potential prejudice in the admission of Rule 

404(b) evidence by, among other things, giving the jury a limiting 

instruction "upon request" as provided for by Fed. R. Evid. 105. 

Huddleston, 108 s. Ct. at 1502 (emphasis added}. While we 

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certainly recognize the salutary purpose and effect of such 

instructions, in the wake of Huddleston it is not error for a 

trial court to fail to instruct the jury at the close of the case 

in the absence of a proper request by counsel. See Cuch, 842 F.2d 

at 1177; Bridwell, 583 F.2d at 1140. Thus, con~idering the 

Huddleston guidelines, we hold that the trial court acted within 

its discretion under Rule 404(b) in admitting testimony regarding 

the prior marijuana importation. 

VI. 

Lastly, Record argues that he was unfairly prejudiced by the 

prosecution•s closing argument when counsel for the government, in 

concluding a fishing metaphor, said to the jury: "You've got him 

in the boat. What are you going to do? Are you going to throw 

him back into the sea of narcotics to grow up and be a world 

record bass?" Rec. vol. VIII at 993. In analyzing a claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct, we usually determine first whether the 

alleged misconduct was in fact error, and if so, whether such 

error requires reversal or instead whether it was harmless beyond 

a reasonable doubt. United States v. Martinez-Nava, 838 F.2d 411, 

416 (lOth Cir. 1988}. We need not examine in depth the existence 

of error, however, if we are convinced that the asserted error, 

whether or not actually error, was harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Id. In evaluating prosecutorial misconduct under the 

harmless error doctrine, "we must look to the curative acts of the 

district court, the extent of the misconduct, and the role of the 

misconduct within the case as~ whole." Id. 

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Here, the trial court did not caution the jury regarding the 

prosecutor's comment at that time because counsel for Record did 

not object to the comment until after the prosecutor's argument 

and after the trial court had discussed the future course of the 

trial with the jury (filling two pages of transcript) and 

dismissed them for lunch. Thus, the conduct of counsel for Record 

limited the trial court's ability to caution the jury regarding 

any possible error. However, immediately prior to the statement 

objected to, Record's counsel objected to ''improper argument," and 

the trial co~rt overruled the objection stating: "Remember ladies 

and gentlemen, you folks heard the evidence." Rec. vol. VIII at 

993. Further, prior to their deliberation, the trial court 

instructed the jury that "the statements and arguments of counsel 

are not evidence in the case." Rec. vol. I, doc. 121. 

The prosecutor's comment was brief and repeated nowhere else 

in the trial. Significantly, the reference to possible future 

narcotics violations was indirect and non-threatening to the jury, 

reducing the propensity of the comment to affect the jurors' 

decision. In that sense, the statement differs considerably from 

that found in the case cited by Record, where the prosecutor said: 

"Ladies and gentlemen, if he walks out of this courtroom, this a 

blank check, this is a blank check for this man to go out and 

commit a crime against you, against Judge O'Kelley, against your 

families, against your friends • • " See United States v. 

Williams, 523 F.2d 1203, 1208 (5th Cir. 1975). Finally, the 

evidence of ;guilt was not so scant as to render this comment 

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pivotal to the jury's decision . Given ~he trial court's 

instruction, the limited and indirect nature of the comment, and 

ample evidence of gui lt, we are convinced that the prosecutor's 

comment was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt . See Martinez-

~, 838 F.2d at 416- 17. 

AFFIRMED. 

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