Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03570/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03570-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lamar Bertucci
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3570

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Lamar Bertucci

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Nebraska - Omaha

____________

 Submitted: May 14, 2015

 Filed: July 23, 2015

____________

Before WOLLMAN, SMITH, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Lamar Bertucci pleaded guilty to killing a bald eagle and a rough-legged hawk,

in violation of 16 U.S.C. §§ 668(a), 703, and 707. The district court sentenced

Bertucci to a total of eight months' imprisonment, imposed a $6,500 "financial

obligation," and additionally imposed a condition of supervised release that requires

Bertucci to participate in anger-management counseling. Bertucci appeals the district

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court's sentencing decisions, arguing that the district court procedurally erred in its

application of the Guidelines, lacked authority to issue the "financial obligation," and

abused its discretion by requiring anger-management counseling. For the reasons

stated herein, we vacate Bertucci's sentence and remand for resentencing. 

I. Background

In early 2014, a grand jury returned an indictment against Bertucci charging

him with shooting and killing a bald eagle and a rough-legged hawk, in violation of

16 U.S.C. §§ 668(a), 703, and 707. Bertucci pleaded guilty to the offenses, and the

district court ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSR).

The PSR concluded that Bertucci had a criminal history score of two and that

his total offense level wasten. The PSR incorporated a four-level enhancement under

Guidelines §§ 2Q2.1(b)(3)(A)(ii) and 2B1.1(b)(1)(C) on the basis that the total "loss"

amounts for the eagle and hawk exceeded $10,000 but did not exceed $30,000. The 1

PSR also incorporated a two-level enhancement under Guideline § 2Q2.1(b)(1)(B)

for a "pattern of similar violations" because Bertucci was convicted in 2009 for

possession of bald eagle feathers, in violation of § 668(a). In discussing Bertucci's

alleged prior criminal conduct, the PSR also included several paragraphsfocusing on

previous assaults that Bertucci had allegedly committed.

Bertucci objected to both enhancements, as well asto the allegations of assault.

Bertucci's objections focused on the PSR's allegedly erroneous $10,000 valuation of

the bald eagle. In that regard, Bertucci emphasized that both the government and the

district court had adopted a mere $2,000 valuation for bald eagles in the 2009

prosecutions of both him and his brother. Bertucci also focused on the PSR's

allegations of assault, which Bertucci asserted were factually baseless. As Bertucci

The PSR assessed the replacement cost for the bald eagle at $10,000 and the

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replacement cost for the hawk at $1,750. 

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noted in his objections, charges relating to the assault allegations were either

dismissed or never filed at all. 

The district court ultimately denied Bertucci's objections and sentenced him to

a total of eight months' imprisonment with one year of supervised release. The court

imposed a special condition of supervised release that requires Bertucci to "attend,

successfully complete, and pay for any diagnostic evaluations and treatment or

counseling programs for anger management [to include a domestic violence

component or a batterer's awareness programas deemed necessary] as directed by the

probation officer." (Emphasis omitted.) In addition, the court imposed a "financial

obligation" on Bertucci "in the amount of $5000.00 for the eagle and $1500.00 for

the hawk for a total amount of $6500.00."

II. Discussion

Bertucci argues on appeal that the district court committed multiple procedural

errors with respect to its application of the Guidelines. Bertucci also argues that the

$6,500 "financial obligation" was, in reality, an order for restitution, which the

district court lacked authority to order in this case. Finally, Bertucci argues that the

district court had an insufficient factual basis to require anger-management

counseling.

In reviewing Bertucci's sentence, we "must first ensure that the district court

committed no significant procedural error, such asfailing to calculate (or improperly

calculating) the Guidelines range." Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). If

the district court committed no procedural error, we then "consider the substantive

reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard." Id.

Similarly, "[w]e review the district court's imposition of the terms and conditions of

supervised release for an abuse of discretion." United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d 660,

667 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Heidebur, 417 F.3d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir.

2005)).

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A. Guidelines

Bertucci argues that the district court erred by adopting "a flawed valuation

process" to value the eagle at $10,000 and the hawk at $1,750. As a result of the

district court's valuations, it applied a four-level sentence enhancement under

§§ 2Q2.1(b)(3)(A)(ii) and 2B1.1(b)(1)(C), which jointly prescribe a four-level

enhancement for offenses involving wildlife with a "market value" exceeding

$10,000. 

Critically, with respect to the "market value" of the wildlife, Application Note

4 to § 2Q2.1 clarifies that:

When information is reasonably available, "market value" . . . shall be

based on the fair-market retail price. Where the fair-market retail price

is difficult to ascertain, the court may make a reasonable estimate using

any reliable information, such as the reasonable replacement or

restitution cost orthe acquisition and preservation (e.g., taxidermy) cost.

(Emphasis added.) Thus, even assuming there was no "reasonably available"

information to determine the "fair-market retail price" of the bald eagle and roughlegged hawk (which the district court implicitly found), substitute estimates must

nevertheless be "reasonable" and based on "reliable information." With this

procedural safeguard in mind, we now analyze the reliability of the valuation-related

evidence in the record before us. 

As Bertucci emphasizes on appeal, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service

has prepared a Fish, Wildlife & Plant Valuation Table ("Valuation Table") that

identifies the "replacement value" of eagles as $2,500 and the "replacement value"

2

of hawks as $350. Notably, the District of Nebraska (the district court in this case)

At the time Bertucci was prosecuted in 2009, the then-current version of the 2

Valuation Table identified the replacement value of eagles as $2,000.

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has specifically adopted the Valuation Table to establish the replacement values of

various types of birds—including eagles and hawks. See D. Neb. General Order 05-

01, Sched. D at 20. Furthermore, both the district court and the government have 3

relied on the Valuation Table to specifically value bald eagles; in 2009, for instance,

they used the Valuation Table to value bald eagles in prosecutions against Bertucci

and his brother.

The government has failed to explain how the value of eagles could have

quintupled between 2009 (when the government and court adopted the Valuation

Table's then-current valuation of $2,000) and 2014 (when the government initiated

this prosecution). To the contrary, Ellen Goeckler, a Special Agent with the United

States Fish and Wildlife Service who testified at the sentencing hearing,

acknowledged that bald eagles were recently "taken off the endangered species list"

and that we can properly "assume that their populations are growing."

Nevertheless, instead of once again relying on the Valuation Table, both the

PSR and court chose to rely on valuations found in an affidavit submitted by Edward

Clark, Jr., President of the Wildlife Center of Virginia. Clark's affidavit, in sum,

concludes that the "reasonable replacement costs" for bald eagles and rough-legged

hawks are $10,000 and $1,750, respectively. 

Clark's valuations, of course, differ drastically from both valuations in the

Valuation Table and valuations that the government and district court have adopted

in similar cases. But these wide discrepancies are not the only issues that cast doubt

We also note that various federal courts have adopted wildlife and plant

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valuation tables containing numberssimilar to those in the Valuation Table. See, e.g.,

E.D. Tex. General Order 01-02, Exh. B., App. A at 21 ($1,000 for eagles; $500 for

hawks); W.D. La. Standing Order 1.846 at 16 ($1,000 for eagles; $250 for hawks);

W.D. Tex. Rule CR-58(c), Exh. C, App. A at A-2 ($1,000 for eagles; $500 for

hawks).

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on the affidavit's reliability; indeed, a careful examination of the affidavit reveals

additional infirmities. For instance, the affidavit itself suggests that Clark may have

structured his analysis and inflated his valuations to comport with his own beliefs

that, as a legal policy matter, a bird's replacement value should be deemed to exceed

the bird's average rehabilitation costs. As Clark averred:

In considering replacement cost within the context of illegal activity, I

feel strongly that the ultimate determination of that cost should not

inadvertently create an incentive to kill the affected birds rather than to

simply displace or injure them. . . .

Therefore, even in the absence of a comparable market value or

propagation cost upon which to base the replacement value of dead

birds, a determination ofreasonable restitution payments can be reached

by beginning with the average cost to properly care for, rehabilitate and

release to the wild an individual bird of the affected species . . . . Then,

this cost basis can be adjusted to account for [other] factors . . . .

(Emphasis added.) Of course, Clark may be right that ensuring replacement costs

generally exceed average rehabilitation costs constitutes good policy. But his proper

role in submitting the affidavit waslimited to assessing the true valuation of the eagle

and hawk per the Guidelines—not assessing what valuations would constitute sound

legal policy. See § 2Q2.1(b)(3)(A).

We also note that, after making the above policy statement, Clark's affidavit

discusses assorted numbers ranging from a mere $475 (the purported market price of

a kestrel in Great Britain) all the way up to $50,000 (the estimated price to propagate

and release a CaliforniaCondor) before "subjectively factoring in" eagles' and hawks'

"scarcity" and "role[s] in the ecosystem" to arrive at his final estimated "replacement

costs." Critically, much of the information contained in his analysis is derived from

Clark's alleged conversations with third parties. Certain of these conversations

occurred more than two decades ago. We further note that the affidavit leaves unclear

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whether Clark was even present at certain of the exchanges, making it impossible to

discern, for instance, how Clark learned of the information or how reliable the

information is.4

In light of the foregoing considerations, Clark's valuations (adopted by the

government) do not constitute sufficiently reliable evidence to justify the new and

dramatically increased eagle and hawk valuations proffered in this case. See U.S.S.G. 5

§ 2Q2.1 cmt. n.4. 

B. Financial Obligation

Whether the district court erred in imposing the $6,500 "financial obligation"

depends on whether that obligation is properly understood as restitution or a fine.

Indeed, it is undisputed on appeal that the court had authority to issue a fine;

however, the court generally did not have authority to order restitution for Bertucci's

offenses. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A (authorizing restitution for various

6

crimes but not for violations of 16 U.S.C. §§ 668(a), 703, or 707); United States v.

Indeed, in contrast with the affidavit's description of a 1988 conversation in 4

which Clark specifies "I spoke" with the third party, Clark avoids making such

affirmative representations with respect to 2006 conversations and does not even

represent that he witnessed the conversations. 

Because we vacate Bertucci's sentence, we need not address his arguments 5

about a two-level pattern enhancement and the court's discussion of the Guidelines

during sentencing.

Of course, the district court had authority to order restitution either as a

6

condition of probation, see 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(2), or as a condition of supervised

release, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), but chose neither option in this case. We also note

that in United States v. Oliver, this court affirmed a district court's sentence of "two

years probation and $5,000 restitution" for the defendant's violations of 16 U.S.C. §

668(a). See 255 F.3d 588, 589 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Oliver is inapposite here,

however, given that the defendant in Oliver did not challenge the district court's

authority to order restitution and we therefore did not address the issue. 

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Love, 431 F.3d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 2005) ("A federal court cannot order restitution

'except when authorized by statute.'" (quoting United States v. Bok, 156 F.3d 157, 166

(2d Cir. 1998)).

In analyzing whether the "financial obligation" is tantamount to either

restitution or a fine, we note at the outset that:

"If the oral sentence is ambiguous, our task is to discern the court's

intent." [United States v. Olson, 716 F.3d 1052, 1056 (8th Cir. 2013)].

If we find such an ambiguity, then we look to "'the entire sentencing

pronouncement,' including the written record," to determine the district

court's intent. Id. [(quoting United States v. Buck, 661 F.3d 364, 374

(8th Cir. 2011)).] "There is no dispute that ambiguities in the sentence

pronouncement are to be construed in favor of the defendant." Buck, 661

F.3d at 374 (quotation omitted).

United States v. Thomas, 757 F.3d 806, 809 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), as corrected (July

8, 2014).

A close examination of the sentencing hearing transcript reveals that the court

intended to order restitution—not a fine. We note, for instance, that the government

specifically requested during the hearing that the court impose "some restitution in

this case." Shortly thereafter, when the court announcedBertucci's sentence, the court

specified that the "financial obligation" was "[i]n lieu of a fine." (Emphasis added.)

And, although the court later referred to the financial obligation in passing as a "fine,"

the court further characterized the financial obligation as an "assessment for the loss

of the eagle and the hawk"—"in the amount of $5,000 asfar asthe eagle is concerned

and $1500 as far as the hawk is concerned."

The government is correct that the court later characterized the financial

obligation as a "fine" in its written judgment. Nevertheless, as the government also

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concedes, "when an oralsentence and the written judgment conflict, the oralsentence

controls." United States v. Mayo, 642 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)

(citing United States v. Foster, 514 F.3d 821, 825 (8th Cir. 2008)).

Consequently, we hold that the "financial obligation" is, in fact, restitution,

which the court lacked authority to order in the context of the specific charges filed

in this case. We note, however, that "the district court may consider" on remand

7

whether to order "restitution as a condition of[Bertucci]'s supervised release." United

States v. Dean, 64 F.3d 660, 1995 WL 493006, at *4 (4th Cir. Aug. 18, 1995) (per

curiam).8

The government additionally contends that we should apply the deferential

7

plain-error standard of review to affirm the district court's decision. After all,

according to the government, Bertucci did not argue during the sentencing hearing

that the court lacked statutory authority to impose restitution in this case. Bertucci did

argue, among other things, that the court could not "provide restitution to nature."

Nevertheless, even if plain error review governed our analysis of thisissue, we would

find that the court committed plain error by issuing restitution without authority to do

so. See United States v. Poitra, 648 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2011) ("To obtain relief

under a plain-error standard of review, the party seeking relief must show that there

was an error, the error is clear or obvious under current law, the error affected the

party's substantial rights, and the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of judicial proceedings." (citing United States v. Curry, 627 F.3d

312, 314–15 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)); United States v. Clark, 274 F.3d 1325,

1328–29 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that a district court committed plain

error by imposing a sentence in contravention of statutory requirements); United

States v. Barajas-Nunez, 91 F.3d 826, 833 (6th Cir. 1996) ("Permitting sentencing

courts to disregard governing law would diminish the integrity and public reputation

of the judicial system."). 

We further note that, if the district court chooses to order restitution as a

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condition of supervised release, the court may rely on the Valuation Table to

determine the replacement values of the eagle and the hawk.

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C. Counseling

District courts have "broad discretion" in fashioning special conditions of

supervised release, provided those conditions "meet the requirements of 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(d)." United States v. Davis, 452 F.3d 991, 994 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing United

States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 893 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). 

Section 3583(d) first requires that the condition be "reasonably related"

to the nature and characteristics of the offense and the defendant, the

deterrence of criminal conduct, the protection of the public from any

further crimes of the defendant, and the defendant's correctional needs.

18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d)(1), 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D);

United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 732–33 (8th Cir. 2005). Second,

the condition must not involve any "greater deprivation of liberty than

is reasonably necessary" to advance deterrence, protect the public from

further crimes by the defendant, and promote the defendant's

correctional needs. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d)(2), 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C),

(a)(2)(D). Finally, the condition must be consistent with any pertinent

policy statements that the sentencing commission has issued. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(d)(3).

Id. at 994–95. 

On appeal, the government cites paragraphs 47 and 58 of the PSR, which,

according to the government, justify the court's imposition of anger-management

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counseling as a special condition of supervised release. Those paragraphs provide, 9

in full, the following:

47. The defendant has been arrested for the following offenses in

Lancaster and Burt Countiesin Nebraska and in the Omaha Tribal

Court, of which all charges were dismissed; theft [x2]; failure to

appear; DUI [x2]; false statement to police; DUS; escape; assault;

criminal mischief [x2]; aggravated assault; simple assault; flight

to avoid arrest; possession of a controlled substance; and

domestic abuse.

* * *

58. In 2009, the defendant completed the following courses in the

Douglas County Jail: Addiction Class; Boundaries; Cognitive

Life Choices; HIV Prevention; Reactive Behavior; and Recovery

Class.

These paragraphs fail to establish the factual or evidentiary basis necessary to

impose anger-management counseling. To be sure, paragraph 47 does contain

allegations that, if proven true, would support the district court's decision. But

paragraph 47 specifically notes that "all" these charges "were dismissed"—meaning

the entire paragraph consists of only bare and unproven accusations of misconduct

Multiple other paragraphs in the PSR referred to prior assaults that Bertucci 9

allegedly committed. Bertucci objected to the assault allegations, however, and, asthe

government concedes, "it made no effort to prove up" the allegations in those

paragraphs. Consequently, because the district court elected not to hold an evidentiary

hearing with respect to those disputed facts, the court could not consider them in

fashioning special conditions of supervised release. United States v. Morehead, 375

F.3d 677, 679 (8th Cir. 2004) ("When a defendant disputes material facts in his PSR,

the sentencing court must either refuse to take those facts into account or hold an

evidentiary hearing." (citing United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1154 (8th Cir.

1996))).

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from other cases. That alone cannot constitute a sufficient basis for requiring angermanagement counseling; after all, "an indictment is simply an accusation. It is not

evidence of anything." United States v. Gammage, 580 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir. 2009)

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

With respect to paragraph 58, Bertucci's participation in assorted behaviorrelated classes five years ago, without more, fails to show that anger-management

counseling is now reasonably necessary, or even appropriate. The record is

insufficient to support imposition of the condition. The district court neither heard

evidence nor made findings with respect to either the content of the classes or why

Bertucci attended them. Thus, the special condition is not reasonably related to

Bertucci's crime, nor does it address concerns of crime deterrence, public safety, or

Bertucci's correctional needs. The condition is therefore vacated.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we vacate the district court's sentence and remand for

resentencing consistent with this opinion. "Asfor remand, the government had notice

of [Bertucci's] factual objection to the PSR and had fair opportunity to present

evidence." United States v. Webster, 2015 WL 3634549, at *2 (8th Cir. June 12,

2015). Thus, "[f]ollowing 'the traditional path' of limiting the government to one bite

at the apple, the district court on remand may re-sentence . . . only based on the

existing record." Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 639 F.3d 489, 498 (8th Cir.

2011); United States v. Gammage, 580 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir. 2009)).

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