Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01210/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01210-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darrel G. Adams
Respondent
Freddie J. Grayson
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FREDDIE J. GRAYSON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

DARREL G. ADAMS, )

)

Respondent. )

)

____________________________________)

1:09-cv-01210-JLT HC

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR VIOLATION

OF THE ONE-YEAR STATUTE OF

LIMITATIONS (Doc. 1)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO ENTER JUDGMENT AND CLOSE FILE

ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant petition was filed on July 8, 2009. (Doc. 1). On January 1

6, 2010, after a preliminary review of the Petition revealed that the petition may be untimely and

In Houston v. Lack, the United States Supreme Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner's notice of appeal is

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deemed filed on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court

clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 166, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The rule is premised on the pro se prisoner's

mailing of legal documents through the conduit of "prison authorities whom he cannot control and whose interests might be

adverse to his." Miller v. Sumner, 921 F.2d 202, 203 (9 Cir. 1990); see, Houston, 487 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. at 2382. The

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Ninth Circuit has applied the “mailbox rule” to state and federal petitions in order to calculate the tolling provisions of the

AEDPA. Saffold v. Neland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268-1269 (9 Cir. 2000), amended May 23, 2001, vacated and remanded on

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other grounds sub nom. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002). The date the petition is signed may be considered the

earliest possible date an inmate could submit his petition to prison authorities for filing under the mailbox rule. Jenkins v.

Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (9 cir. 2003). Accordingly, for all of Petitioner’s state petitions and for the instant federal

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petition, the Court will consider the date of signing of the petition (or the date of signing of the proof of service if no signature

appears on the petition) as the earliest possible filing date and the operative date of filing under the mailbox rule for

calculating the running of the statute of limitation. Petitioner signed the instant petition on July 8, 2009. (Doc. 1, p. 7).

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should therefore be dismissed, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause requiring Petitioner to file a

response within thirty days explaining why the petition should not be dismissed as untimely. (Doc.

7). On January 27, 2010, Petitioner filed his response and a supporting affidavit. (Docs. 8 & 9). 

After reviewing Petitioner’s response, the Court concludes that the petition is untimely. 

On July 23, 2009, Petitioner filed his written consent to the jurisdiction of the United States

Magistrate Judge for all purposes. (Doc. 4). 

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to

dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th

Cir.2001).

The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner adequate

notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-42. By issuing the

January 6, 2010 Order to Show Cause, the Court provided Petitioner with the opportunity to respond

required by the Ninth Circuit.

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 th

(1997). As mentioned, the instant petition was filed on July 8, 2009, and thus, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

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petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins to run on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, the Petitioner was convicted on October 13, 1997, in the Superior Court

for the County of Stanislaus. (Doc. 1, p. 1). Subsequently, Petitioner appealed his conviction, which

included filing a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court that was denied by that court

on March 9, 1999, in case no. S076219. (Id., p. 2). Thus, direct review would have concluded on

June 7, 1999, when the ninety-day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court

expired. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th

Cir.1999); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347 (8 Cir.1998). Petitioner would then have one th

year from the following day, June 8, 1999, or until June 7, 2000, absent applicable tolling, within

which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. As discussed above, Petitioner did not

file the instant petition until July 8, 2009, over nine years after the one-year period would have

expired. Accordingly, unless Petitioner is entitled to some for of statutory or equitable tolling, the

petition is untimely and should be dismissed. 

Although Petitioner did not expressly address the issue of timeliness in his petition, he

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directly addresses it in his response to the Order to Show Cause. In the response, Petitioner

maintains that he was unaware of the fact that the two 1993 convictions used to enhance his sentence

were first degree robbery and attempted first degree robbery convictions. Petitioner maintains that

he was convicted only of second degree robbery and attempted second degree robbery. Petitioner

further maintains, through his “jailhouse lawyer,” that he did not discover this discrepancy until

2008, when the jailhouse lawyer reviewed Petitioner’s files. (Doc. 9, p. 1). 

As indicated above, the one-year limitation period commences on the latest of one of the four

dates set forth in § 2244(d)(1). Normally, that date would be the date the petitioner’s conviction

became final. § 2244(d)(1)(A). However, the statute of limitations may also commence upon the

removal of an “impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States.” § 2244(d)(1)(B). The record does not suggest, and

Petitioner does not contend, that any such impediment ever existed or that it was subsequently

removed. Accordingly, that date is inapplicable.

Nor does § 2244(d)(1)(D) provide a later accrual date for the commencement of the statute of

limitations. Under § 2244(d)(1)(D), “[t]ime begins when the prisoner knows (or through diligence

could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance” or

appreciates the legal theories available to him. Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154, n. 3 (9 Cir. th

2001)(quoting Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000); see United States v. Pollard, 416

F.3d 48, 55 (D.D.C. 2005)(habeas petitioner’s alleged “ignorance of the law until an illuminating

conversation with an attorney or fellow prisoner” does not satisfy the requirements of section

2244(d)(1)(D)). Put simply, it is not necessary for a petitioner to understand the legal significance of

the facts; rather, the clock starts when a petitioner understands the facts themselves. Hasan, 254 F.3d

at 1154 fn. 3; Owens, 235 F.3d at 359 (“Time begins when the prisoner knows (or through diligence

could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner recognized their legal significance.”) Due

diligence does not require “the maximum feasible diligence,” but it does require reasonable diligence

in the circumstances. Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 74 (3d Cir. 2004)(quoting Moore v. Knight,

368 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2004); see Wims v. United States, 225 F.3d 186, 190, fn. 4 (2d Cir.

2000). 

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Here, Petitioner plainly knew, or should have known, through the exercise of reasonable

diligence, at the time of his original sentencing by the trial court, the “important fact[s]” on which he

would later seek to base his claim, i.e., that the 1993 convictions used as enhancements by the trial

court in 1997 were for first degree robbery despite the fact that Petitioner claims he was actually

convicted in 1993 of second degree robbery and attempted second degree robbery. 

Petitioner was present and represented by counsel at both the 1993 and 1997 proceedings. 

The Court presumes Petitioner had actual knowledge at those sentencing hearings of the crimes for

which he was being convicted as well as his own prior convictions that might be used as

enhancements. Reasonable diligence would require no less. Any reasonably diligent criminal

defendant would have inquired into the nature of any charges on which he was being convicted. 

Similarly, reasonable diligence would require that the criminal defendant be aware of or inquire into

the nature and date of any alleged prior convictions used to enhance his sentence. If Petitioner did

not have actual knowledge of the nature and dates of the prior convictions used at sentencing,

nevertheless he knew or should have known such information. Petitioner cannot now take advantage

of his own lack of curiosity, or simple indifference, about the serious convictions used at his own

trial, by waiting nine years and then raise such claims in a federal petition. The running of the statute

of limitations does not await illuminating advice, legal research, or the issuance of judicial decisions

that help would-be petitioners to recognize the legal significance of particular predicate facts. See 

Pollard, 416 F.3d at 55.

To the extent that Petitioner believes his petition to be timely because his fourth claim for

relief is premised upon Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 127 S.Ct. 856 (2007), again

Petitioner would be mistaken. Section 2244(d)(1)(C) provides that the one-year period may

commence from “the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review....” Presumably, Petitioner would implicitly contend that this

date applies by virtue of the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Cunningham that California’s

Determinate Sentencing Law (“DSL”) was unconstitutional.

Section 2244(d)(1)(C), however, is inapplicable to Cunningham because the United States

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Supreme Court has not held that Cunningham constitutes both (1) a new rule and (2) a rule

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. To the contrary, the Ninth Circuit, in Butler v.

Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 633-639 (9 Cir. 2008), held that Cunningham did not announce a new rule. In

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Butler, the Ninth Circuit clarified that the Cunningham decision, striking down California's

determinate sentencing law, was compelled by Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), such

that the decision as to whether a petitioner's constitutional rights herein were violated rests, as a

threshold matter, on whether or not his conviction became final before Blakely, not Cunningham,

was decided. Citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (1989), the Ninth Circuit

panel stated as follows:

Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker made "courts throughout the land" aware that sentencing 2 3 4

schemes that raise the maximum possible term based on facts not found by a jury violate the

constitutional rights of defendants. [Cunningham, supra,] at 306. No principles of comity or

federalism would be served by refusing to apply this rule to functionally indistinguishable

state sentencing schemes on collateral review. Cunningham thus did not announce a new rule

of constitutional law and may be applied retroactively on collateral review.

Butler, supra, at 639. (Emphasis supplied).

Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker have been determined to be new rules, but not retroactive on

collateral review, thereby not satisfying he second requirement. Cunningham has now been

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determined by the Ninth Circuit to apply retroactively to cases on collateral review, but is not a new

rule, thereby not satisfying the first requirement. Butler, 528 F.3d at 639. Hence, contrary to

Petitioner’s implicit contention, the alternative start date contained in subsection (C) for the one-year

limitation period in Petitioner’s case is not implicated by any of the applicable federal case law. 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000), held that other than the fact of a prior conviction,

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any fact increasing the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond

a reasonable doubt.

Blakely held that the relevant statutory sentencing maximum is the maximum sentence a judge may impose soley

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based on the facts reflected in the jury’s verdict or admitted by defendant.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), in addressing the constitutionality of the federal

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sentencing guidelines, held that if a fact necessarily results in a mandated higher sentence, the fact must be admitted by the

defendant or found by the jury.

See Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1246 (9 Cir. 2005)(Apprendi not retroactive); U.S. v. Sanchez5 th

Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 671 (9 Cir. 2002)(same); Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1033-1038 (9 Cir. 2005)(Blakely not

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retroactive); U.S. v. Cruz, 423 F.3d 1119 (9 Cir. 2005)(Booker not retroactive).

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Accordingly, the commencement of the statute of limitations here is governed by the “usual”

starting date contained in subsection (A). This conclusion is consistent with the great majority of

federal district courts in this circuit who have addressed this issue. E.g., Martinez v. Hedgepeth,

2008 WL 3154689, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2008)(because Cunningham was not a new rule,

subsection C is inapplicable); Thomas v. Yates, 2008 WL 4177608, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 4,

2008)(same); Bell v. Adams, 2008 WL 4722564, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2008)(same); Collett v.

Salazar, 2008 WL 4601463, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2008)(same); Taylor v. Vasquez, 2008 WL

23022, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2008)(same); Schuller v. Horel, 2008 WL 3914171, at *1 n.2

(C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2008)(same); Pimental v. Almager, 2008 WL 2757075, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 14,

2008)(same).6

As discussed above, using subsection (A) as the starting date inexorably leads to a conclusion

that the instant petition was filed nine years after the one-year period expired. Thus, unless

Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling sufficient to account for the nine-year delay, the petition is

untimely and should be dismissed.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2). A properly filed application is one that complies with the applicable laws and rules

governing filings, including the form of the application and time limitations. Artuz v. Bennett, 531

U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361 (2000). An application is pending during the time that ‘a California

petitioner completes a full round of [state] collateral review,” so long as there is no unreasonable

delay in the intervals between a lower court decision and the filing of a petition in a higher court. 

Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F. 3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds as recognized

by Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F. 3d 729 (9th Cir. 2008)(per curium)(internal quotation marks and citations

omitted); see Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193-194, 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006); see Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 220, 222-226, 122 S. Ct. 2134 (2002); see also, Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006

(9th Cir. 1999). 

The Court has been unable to find a district court case that reaches a different conclusion than those cited herein.

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Nevertheless, there are circumstances and periods of time when no statutory tolling is

allowed. For example, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period of time between finality of an

appeal and the filing of an application for post-conviction or other collateral review in state court,

because no state court application is “pending” during that time. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006-1007. 

Similarly, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period between finality of an appeal and the filing of

a federal petition. Id. at 1007. In addition, the limitation period is not tolled during the time that a

federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 563 U.S. 167, 181-182, 121 S.Ct. 2120

(2001); see also, Fail v. Hubbard, 315 F. 3d 1059, 1060 (9th Cir. 2001)(as amended on December 16,

2002). Further, a petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling where the limitation period has already

run prior to filing a state habeas petition. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the

state petition was filed.”); Jiminez v. White, 276 F. 3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Finally, a petitioner

is not entitled to continuous tolling when the petitioner’s later petition raises unrelated claims. See

Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165, 1166 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, Petitioner alleges that in July 2008 he filed a state habeas petition challenging the

legality of his sentence under Cunningham, that was denied on September 2, 2008. (Doc. 1, pp. 13;

34). Thereafter, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate

District, on September 23, 2008, that was denied on October 3, 2008. (Id., p. 36). Finally, Petitioner

filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court on November 12, 2008, that was denied on

May 13, 2009. (Id., pp. 14; 39). 

Even assuming, without deciding, that these three state habeas petitions were “properly filed”

within the meaning of the AEDPA, thus entitling Petitioner to statutory tolling of the one-year period

during the pendency of those proceedings, a petitioner is not entitled to tolling where, as here, the

limitations period has already run prior to filing the state habeas petition. Green v. White, 223 F.3d

1001, 1003 (9 Cir. 2000); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478 (9 Cir. 2001); see Webster v. Moore, 199 th th

F.3d 1256, 1259 (11 Cir. 2000)(same); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820 (9 Cir. 2003)(“section th th

2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state

petition was filed.”); Jackson v. Dormire, 180 F.3d 919, 920 (8 Cir. 1999) (petitioner fails to th

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exhaust claims raised in state habeas corpus filed after expiration of the one-year limitations period). 

As mentioned, the limitations period expired on June 7, 2000, more than eight years before Petitioner

filed his first state habeas petition. Accordingly, he cannot avail himself of the statutory tolling

provisions of the AEDPA. 

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitation period is subject to equitable tolling when “extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file the petition on time.” Shannon v. Newland,

410 F. 3d 1083, 1089-1090 (9th Cir. 2005)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “When 

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely

claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). “Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of

establishing two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct.

1807 (2005). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest

the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F. 3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)(citation

omitted). As a consequence, “equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases.” Miles, 187 F. 3d at

1107. 

Here, Petitioner implicitly alleges entitlement to equitable tolling based on his claim that he

did not realize the true nature and legal significance of the 1993 convictions until 2008. A

petitioner’s ignorance of the law is not grounds for equitable tolling. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d

1150, 1154 (9 Cir. 2006); see, e.g., Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 th

(9 Cir.1986) (pro se prisoner's illiteracy and lack of knowledge of law unfortunate but insufficient th

to establish cause); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710 (5 Cir. 1999); Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, th

1335 (6th Cir.1991). Petitioner’s indigent status and limited legal knowledge is no different than the

majority of incarcerated prisoners attempting to file petitions for writ of habeas corpus. Such

circumstances are not extraordinary and do not justify equitable tolling. If limited resources and

legal knowledge were an excuse for not complying with the limitations period Congress would have

never enacted the AEDPA since most incarcerated prisoners have these same problems. Thus, the

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limitations period will not be equitably tolled. 

To the extent that Petitioner is claiming that his trial counsel’s negligence at sentencing

entitled him to equitable tolling, such a claim also fails. The Ninth Circuit has held that the

miscalculation of the limitations period by a petitioner’s counsel, or his negligence in general, do not

constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. Frye v. Hickman, 273

F.3d 1144, 1146 (9 Cir. 2001). th

Ultimately, the issue here is Petitioner’s lack of diligence. Equitable tolling applies only

where prisoner has diligently pursued claims, but has in some "extraordinary way" been prevented

from asserting his rights. Thus, the Court must consider Petitioner’s diligence in pursuing his

claims. If Petitioner’s claims are to be believed, he asks for relief from the AEDPA’s statute of

limitation because he was incarcerated for nine years before taking it upon himself, through his

jailhouse lawyer, to look at the prior convictions used to enhance his sentence and, in the process,

discovered that his sentence had been enhanced by convictions he claims not to have suffered. The

Court finds Petitioner’s allegations wholly incredible. He was at sentencing, represented by counsel,

he had a direct appeal and appointed appellate counsel, he would have received, in the normal course

of events after direct review was concluded, the full appellate file, including transcripts of the trial,

sentencing, and relevant documents such as the abstract of judgment that contained the crimes for

which he was convicted and sentenced. Moreover, Petitioner was also present and represented by

counsel at the 1993 convictions and thus presumably was aware of the charges for which he was

being convicted. 

Petitioner had all of this information available to him for many years, but apparently did not

bother to inspect his court documents, review them for potential problems, or appreciate the legal

significance of the facts of which he had actual knowledge. The Court sees no way that such conduct

can be construed as reasonable diligence in pursuing one’s claims, nor does the Court find any

“extraordinary” factors that prevented Petitioner from discovering these facts at least at the time of

1997 sentencing, or at the very latest, by the conclusion of his direct review in that case on June 7,

1999. Had Petitioner exercised even minimal diligence during that time period, he would

undoubtedly have discovered the legal significance of the discrepancies he now alleges and could

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easily have exhausted such a claim in state court and timely filed his federal petition. A petitioner

who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse his lack of diligence. See 

Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984); see, also, Miles, 187 F.3d at

1107. Accordingly, the Court finds no basis to accord Petitioner any equitable tolling. Since the

Petition is untimely after consideration of all available tolling provisions, the Court must dismiss the

petition.

Moreover, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. The requirement that a

petitioner seek a certificate of appealability is a gate-keeping mechanism that protects the Court of

Appeals from having to devote resources to frivolous issues, while at the same time affording

petitioners an opportunity to persuade the Court that, through full briefing and argument, the

potential merit of claims may appear. Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a

district court’s denial of his petition, and an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-336 (2003). The controlling statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2253, provides as

follows:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge,

the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in

which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the validity of a

warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a person charged with a

criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of such person's detention

pending removal proceedings.

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not

be taken to the court of appeals from--

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention

complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or

issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

Accordingly, final orders issued by a federal district court in habeas corpus proceedings are

reviewable by the circuit court of appeals, and, in order to have final orders reviewed, a petitioner

must obtain a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253. This Court will issue a certificate of

appealability when a petitioner makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

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28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make a substantial showing, the petitioner must establish that

“reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been

resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement

to proceed further’.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463

U.S. 880, 893 (1983)).

In the present case, the Court finds that Petitioner has not made the required substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right to justify the issuance of a certificate of appealability. 

Reasonable jurists would not find it debatable that Petitioner has not shown an entitlement to federal

habeas corpus relief. Therefore, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. 

 ORDER

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS as follows: 

1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), is DISMISSED as untimely;

2. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the file.

3. The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 1, 2010 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

9j7khi UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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