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Parties Involved:
Robert Lee Ripley
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-12613

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ROBERT LEE RIPLEY, 

a.k.a. Robert Ripley, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:21-cr-00154-PGB-DAB-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12613

Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Robert Ripley appeals his sentence for distribution of child 

pornography. He argues that (1) he is entitled to be resentenced in 

light of Amendment 821 to the Sentencing Guidelines because he 

may be eligible for a sentence reduction under the newly enacted, 

and retroactive, U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1, despite acknowledging that he 

does not meet all ten criteria;1 and (2) the district court plainly erred 

1 Amendment 821 added § 4C1.1 to the guidelines (adjustment for certain 

zero-point offenders), which provides for a two-point decrease in a defendant’s 

offense level if the defendant satisfies the following criteria: 

(1) the defendant did not receive any criminal history points 

from Chapter Four, Part A;

(2) the defendant did not receive an adjustment under § 3A1.4 

(Terrorism);

(3) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of 

violence in connection with the offense;

(4) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury;

(5) the instant offense of conviction is not a sex offense;

(6) the defendant did not personally cause substantial financial 

hardship;

(7) the defendant did not possess, receive, purchase, transport, 

transfer, sell, or otherwise dispose of a firearm or other 

dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in 

connection with the offense;

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22-12613 Opinion of the Court 3

in failing to pronounce each of the discretionary conditions of 

supervised release at sentencing and instead generally referencing 

that Ripley must “comply with the mandatory and standard 

conditions adopted by the court in the Middle District of Florida.” 

The government has moved to dismiss the appeal pursuant to the 

sentence-appeal waiver in Ripley’s plea agreement. Ripley did not 

file a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss.

After review, we conclude that the sentence-appeal waiver 

is valid and enforceable. Therefore, we grant the government’s 

motion to dismiss. 

“We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de 

novo.” United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). 

We enforce appeal waivers that are made knowingly and 

voluntarily. See United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th 

Cir. 2006); United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 

1993). To demonstrate that a waiver was made knowingly and 

(8) the instant offense of conviction is not covered by § 2H1.1 

(Offenses Involving Individual Rights);

(9) the defendant did not receive an adjustment under § 3A1.1 

(Hate Crime Motivation or Vulnerable Victim) or § 3A1.5 

(Serious Human Rights Offense); and

(10) the defendant did not receive an adjustment under § 3B1.1 

(Aggravating Role) and was not engaged in a continuing 

criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848; 

decrease the offense level determined under Chapters Two 

and Three by 2 levels.

U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a) (2023). 

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12613

voluntarily, the government must show that either (1) the district 

court specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver 

during the plea colloquy; or (2) the record makes clear that the 

defendant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver. 

Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351.

Ripley’s plea agreement contained the following sentenceappeal waiver: 

The defendant agrees that this Court has jurisdiction 

and authority to impose any sentence up to the 

statutory maximum and expressly waives the right to 

appeal [his] sentence on any ground, including the 

ground that the Court erred in determining the 

applicable guidelines range pursuant to the United 

States Sentencing Guidelines, except (a) the ground 

that the sentence exceeds the defendant’s applicable 

guidelines range as determined by the Court pursuant to 

the United States Sentencing Guidelines; (b) the 

ground that the sentence exceeds the statutory 

maximum penalty; or (c) the ground that the 

sentence violates the Eighth Amendment to the 

Constitution; provided, however, that if the 

government exercises its right to appeal the sentence 

imposed, as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b), then 

the defendant is released from his waiver and may 

appeal the sentence as authorized by 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3742(a).

Ripley initialed each page of the agreement and signed the plea 

agreement, including the certification that he read the entirety of 

the agreement and that he fully understood its terms. 

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22-12613 Opinion of the Court 5

At the change-of-plea hearing, the magistrate judge 

confirmed that Ripley signed and initialed the plea agreement, 

reviewed it with his attorney, understood it, and agreed to be 

bound by it.2 The magistrate judge explained that the plea 

agreement contained an appeal waiver under which Ripley, “for 

most purposes, [gave] up any right to appeal or challenge the 

sentence that’s actually imposed by the district judge,” and that this 

waiver applied to a challenge in a direct appeal or a collateral 

attack. The district court then explained the narrow circumstances 

under which Ripley had preserved his right to appeal. Ripley stated 

that he understood. After reviewing the charges against Ripley, the 

elements of the offenses, the factual basis for the plea, and asking 

questions to confirm that the plea was knowing and voluntary, the 

magistrate judge entered a report and recommendation 

recommending that the district court accept Ripley’s guilty plea, 

and the district court accepted the recommendation. 

At sentencing, Ripley did not object to the calculation of his 

guidelines range3 and moved for a downward variance. After 

denying Ripley’s request for a downward variance, the district 

court imposed a sentence of 168 months’ imprisonment followed 

by a term of 10 years’ supervised release. This appeal followed.

2 Ripley consented to the magistrate judge taking his plea. 

3 The district court determined that Ripley’s advisory Guideline range was 151 

to 188 months’ imprisonment. 

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12613

The record establishes that Ripley’s sentence-appeal waiver 

was knowingly and voluntarily made. Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351. 

Ripley initialed each page of the plea agreement, signed the 

agreement, and confirmed during the plea colloquy that he 

reviewed the agreement and that he understood it. The magistrate 

judge also orally reviewed the sentence-appeal waiver with Ripley 

during the plea colloquy, and Ripley stated that he understood. 

Thus, the appeal waiver is valid and enforceable and forecloses 

Ripley’s appeal because the issues he raises do not fall within the 

narrow exceptions to the waiver. See United States v. Weaver, 275 

F.3d 1320, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001) (enforcing an appeal waiver where 

“the waiver provision was referenced during [the defendant’s] . . . 

plea colloquy and [the defendant] agreed that she understood the 

provision and that she entered into it freely and voluntarily”). 

Accordingly, we GRANT the government’s motion to dismiss.

APPEAL DISMISSED. 

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