Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-01256/USCOURTS-caDC-11-01256-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Road & Transportation Builders Association
Petitioner
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent
Lisa Perez Jackson
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 12, 2012 Decided January 15, 2013

No. 11-1256

AMERICAN ROAD & TRANSPORTATION BUILDERS 

ASSOCIATION,

PETITIONER

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND LISA PEREZ 

JACKSON,

RESPONDENTS

On Petition for Review of Final Agency Action

of the Environmental Protection Agency

Lawrence J. Joseph argued the cause for petitioner. 

With him on the briefs was Nick Goldstein.

Kim Smaczniak, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for respondent. With her on the briefs was 

Michael Horowitz, Attorney, U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency.

Before: ROGERS, BROWN, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH.

USCA Case #11-1256 Document #1415179 Filed: 01/15/2013 Page 1 of 10
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KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: The American Road & 

Transportation Builders Association has repeatedly sought 

judicial review of Environmental Protection Agency 

regulations relating to nonroad engines and vehicles. But 

ARTBA began bringing those challenges several years after 

the regulations were promulgated. As we have explained 

before, ARTBA’s challenge to EPA’s regulations is timebarred under the Clean Air Act’s 60-day filing period. See 

American Road & Transportation Builders Association v. 

EPA, 588 F.3d 1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In this case, 

ARTBA is also challenging EPA’s approval of California’s 

State Implementation Plan, but that challenge must be brought 

in the Ninth Circuit. We therefore dismiss the petition for 

review.

I

Section 209(e) of the Clean Air Act preempts certain 

state regulation of nonroad engines. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e). 

The term “nonroad engine” covers a wide variety of internal 

combustion engines, including those found in tractors, 

construction equipment, lawnmowers, locomotives, and 

marine craft. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 89.1, 1068.30. In 1994, EPA 

promulgated regulations interpreting the preemptive scope of 

Section 209(e). See 59 Fed. Reg. 36,969, 36,986-87 (July 20,

1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 31,306, 31,339 (June 17, 1994). Those 

regulations were largely upheld by this Court in Engine 

Manufacturers Association v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 

1996). In 2002, ARTBA petitioned EPA to amend its

Section 209(e) regulations to broaden their preemptive effect. 

In 2008, EPA rejected that petition. See 73 Fed. Reg. 59,034, 

59,130 (Oct. 8, 2008). Shortly thereafter, ARTBA brought 

suit in this Court to challenge the denial of its petition. See 

American Road & Transportation Builders Association v. 

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EPA, 588 F.3d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2009). We dismissed that suit 

for lack of jurisdiction, holding that ARTBA’s claims were 

time-barred under the Clean Air Act. Id. at 1110.

The Clean Air Act requires that each state submit to EPA

a State Implementation Plan and any later revisions thereof. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 7410. The SIP specifies the state’s chosen 

methods of complying with national ambient air quality 

standards set by EPA. Id. In 2010, EPA proposed to approve 

revisions to the California SIP. See 75 Fed. Reg. 28,509 

(May 21, 2010). Those revisions required emissions 

reductions from development projects, and arguably required 

some emissions reductions from nonroad vehicles such as

construction equipment. Id. at 28,510. ARTBA submitted 

comments to EPA requesting that EPA deny the proposed 

revisions and again petitioned EPA to amend its 

Section 209(e) regulations.

Notwithstanding ARTBA’s comments, EPA approved 

the revisions to the California SIP. See 76 Fed. Reg. 26,609 

(May 9, 2011). In doing so, EPA declined to revisit its 

Section 209(e) regulations, characterizing ARTBA’s petition 

for amendment as “little more than a renewal of its earlier 

request.” Id. at 26,611. Sixty days later, ARTBA filed suit in 

the Ninth and D.C. Circuits. The Ninth Circuit proceedings 

have been stayed pending the outcome of this case. See 

Order, American Road & Transportation Builders Association

v. EPA, No. 11-71897 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 2012).

II

This appeal challenges two agency actions: (i) EPA’s 

approval of revisions to the California SIP; and (ii) EPA’s 

denial of ARTBA’s petition to amend the Section 209(e) 

preemption regulations.

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A

ARTBA challenges EPA’s approval of a 2011 California 

SIP revision. EPA argues that, under Section 307(b)(1) of the 

Clean Air Act, that challenge must be brought in the Ninth 

Circuit. Section 307(b)(1) states, in relevant part:

A petition for review of action of the Administrator in 

promulgating any national primary or secondary ambient 

air quality standard . . . or any other nationally applicable 

regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the 

Administrator under this chapter may be filed only in the 

United States Court of Appeals for the District of 

Columbia. A petition for review of the Administrator’s 

action in approving or promulgating any implementation 

plan . . . or any other final action of the Administrator 

under this chapter . . . which is locally or regionally 

applicable may be filed only in the United States Court of 

Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Notwithstanding the 

preceding sentence a petition for review of any action 

referred to in such sentence may be filed only in the 

United States Court of Appeals for the District of 

Columbia if such action is based on a determination of 

nationwide scope or effect and if in taking such action the 

Administrator finds and publishes that such action is 

based on such a determination.

42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (emphases added).

This statutory language establishes two routes by which 

venue may be appropriate in this Court. First, EPA’s 

regulations may themselves be nationally applicable. Second, 

and alternatively, EPA may determine that the otherwise 

locally or regionally applicable regulations have a nationwide 

scope or effect. Here, ARTBA has failed to demonstrate that 

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EPA’s approval of the California SIP revision meets either 

test for obtaining review in this Court. Venue is therefore 

proper in the Ninth Circuit.

First, the California SIP rulemaking was not nationally 

applicable. Under Section 307(b)(1), EPA’s “action in 

approving or promulgating any implementation plan” is the 

prototypical “locally or regionally applicable” action that may 

be challenged only in the appropriate regional court of 

appeals. See Texas Municipal Power Agency v. EPA, 89 F.3d 

858, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also ATK Launch Systems, Inc. 

v. EPA, 651 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 2011) (describing 

SIPs as “purely local action” and “undisputably regional 

action”). And in determining that a SIP approval is a “locally 

or regionally applicable” action, this Court need look only to

the face of the rulemaking, rather than to its practical effects. 

See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Thomas, 838 

F.2d 1224, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

Second, EPA declined to find that this otherwise locally 

or regionally applicable action has “nationwide scope or 

effect.” As an initial matter, EPA asserts that its decision 

whether to make such a finding is not judicially reviewable. 

Given the statutory text, EPA argues that a court cannot 

review EPA’s decision to decline to make a nationwide scope 

or effect determination. But we need not cross that bridge in 

this case. Even assuming that we can review EPA’s refusal 

under the deferential Administrative Procedure Act arbitrary 

and capricious standard, see 5 U.S.C. § 706, it was not 

unreasonable for EPA to decline to make a “determination of 

nationwide scope or effect” in this case. Nothing in the 

California SIP approval contemplated nationwide scope or 

effect, and EPA emphasized in its response to ARTBA’s 

comments that the SIP revisions could be lawfully applied 

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“only to certain development projects within the geographic 

jurisdiction covered.” 76 Fed. Reg. 26,609, 26,612 (May 9, 

2011). ARTBA counters that the SIP approval applies a 

broad regulation to a specific context and that it may set a

precedent for future SIP proceedings. Although both of those

statements may be factually accurate, neither characterization 

distinguishes this action from most other approvals of SIPs or

SIP revisions – which, again, unequivocally fall in the 

“locally or regionally applicable” category. EPA’s decision 

not to make a “determination of nationwide scope or effect” 

thus was not unreasonable.

 In this case, then, a challenge to the California SIP 

revision must be – and, notably, already has been – filed in 

the Ninth Circuit. See Petition for Review, American Road 

& Transportation Builders Association v. EPA, No. 11-71897 

(9th Cir. July 8, 2011). Because venue is proper in the Ninth 

Circuit and not in this Court, we dismiss ARTBA’s challenge 

to EPA’s approval of the California SIP revision.

B

ARTBA’s primary objective in this Court is to obtain a 

fresh round of judicial review of EPA’s Section 209(e) 

preemption regulations. See 40 C.F.R. § 1074.10; id. Part 89, 

Subpart A, Appendix A. ARTBA most recently petitioned 

EPA to amend those regulations in conjunction with 

ARTBA’s comments on a 2011 California SIP revision. EPA 

rejected the petition as duplicative of arguments the agency 

had already rejected in 2008, and as inappropriate in light of 

the limited scope of the California SIP proceedings. See 76 

Fed. Reg. 26,609, 26,611-12 (May 9, 2011). ARTBA seeks 

review of the denial of its petition, but its claims are timebarred under the Clean Air Act for many of the same reasons 

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this Court explained in 2009 in dismissing a similar challenge. 

See American Road & Transportation Builders Association v. 

EPA, 588 F.3d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (ARTBA I). 

Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act sets a 60-day 

period for challenges to EPA regulations, with a renewed 60-

day period available based on the occurrence of after-arising 

grounds.

1

 EPA promulgated the Section 209(e) regulations in 

their current form in 1997. See 62 Fed. Reg. 67,733, 67,736 

(Dec. 30, 1997). The question is whether there is an afterarising ground here that permits ARTBA now to challenge 

EPA’s Section 209(e) regulations.

ARTBA argues that it petitioned for amendment of the 

regulations as part of its comments on the California SIP 

revision and that the denial of its petition qualified as an afterarising ground. With most agency regulations, we apply the 

general rule that, after a statute of limitations period has run, a 

party who seeks judicial review of the regulations may choose 

“to petition the agency for amendment or rescission of the 

regulations and then to appeal the agency’s decision.” NLRB 

Union v. FLRA, 834 F.2d 191, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1987). But 

there is an exception to that general rule for statutory schemes 

in which Congress “specifically address[ed] the consequences 

of failure to bring a challenge within the statutory period.” 

National Mining Association v. Department of the Interior, 70 

F.3d 1345, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In ARTBA I, we held that 

 1 “Any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed 

within sixty days from the date notice of such promulgation, 

approval, or action appears in the Federal Register, except that if 

such petition is based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth 

day, then any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed 

within sixty days after such grounds arise.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 7607(b)(1).

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the Clean Air Act is one such statutory scheme. See 588 F.3d 

at 1113; see also National Mining, 70 F.3d at 1350 n.2. Thus, 

the denial of a petition for amendment does not constitute an 

after-arising ground that permits the petitioning party to seek 

review in this Court outside the original 60-day window for 

challenging the promulgation of Clean Air Act regulations. 

See ARTBA I, 588 F.3d at 1113.

In ARTBA I, the Court did, however, also discuss two 

specific exceptions to the Clean Air Act’s stringent limitations 

period: ripeness and reopening. See id. at 1113-16. Neither is 

applicable here, for the same reasons we discussed in 2009. 

First, as explained in ARTBA I, the occurrence of an event that 

ripens a claim constitutes an after-arising ground. See id. at 

1113-14. None of the grounds for ARTBA’s petition – a 

1998 rulemaking about the scope of locomotive preemption, a 

2004 statutory amendment, or several Supreme Court 

opinions through 2009 – can make ARTBA’s claim newly 

ripe years after those developments took place. See id. at 

1114. ARTBA does not assert that the approval of the 

California SIP ripened its claim. Nor could it: ARTBA’s 

claims about the Section 209(e) regulations have been ripe at 

least since 2009. Second, an agency may reexamine its 

regulations and thereby initiate a new 60-day period of 

judicial review. As this Court held in ARTBA I, however, an 

agency’s response to a petitioner’s comments cannot provide 

the sole basis for reopening. See id. at 1114-15. EPA here 

replied to ARTBA’s comments on the California SIP revision 

only to recognize the comments and, in doing so, expressly 

stated that it was not reopening its Section 209(e) regulations. 

See 76 Fed. Reg. at 26,612.

ARTBA contends that ARTBA I does not control this case 

because ARTBA I involved a bare petition for amendment, 

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while this case involves a petition for amendment of the 

Section 209(e) regulations coupled with an application of 

those regulations to the California SIP approval. That is a 

distinction without a difference.

ARTBA I noted that the restrictive National Mining

scheme did not imply “any sort of limitation on the 

recognized ability of a party against whom a regulation is 

enforced to contest its validity in the enforcement context.” 

ARTBA I, 588 F.3d at 1113. But the Section 209(e) 

regulations were not applied in an enforcement proceeding in 

this case, as ARTBA recognized at oral argument, and we 

therefore need not address the possibility of a challenge in the

enforcement context.

2

Moreover, if the mere application of a regulation in a SIP 

approval were sufficient to constitute an after-arising ground 

and trigger a new 60-day statute of limitations period, ARTBA 

I’s concerns about preserving “the consequences” of failing to 

bring a challenge within 60 days of a regulation’s 

promulgation would be meaningless. See ARTBA I, 588 F.3d 

 2 Section 307(b)(2) of the Clean Air Act states that EPA action 

that could have been reviewed within the 60-day window “shall not 

be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for 

enforcement.” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(2). The Supreme Court has 

fielded claims about the due process implications of that provision, 

although it has not yet definitively ruled on its constitutionality. 

See, e.g., Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 592 n.9 

(1980); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 289-

91 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Chrysler Corp. v. EPA, 

600 F.2d 904, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting the “nagging presence 

of a substantial due process question”). Because the contested 

regulations were not applied here in an enforcement proceeding, we 

need not confront the relevance of Section 307(b)(2).

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at 1113; see also National Mining, 70 F.3d at 1351 (“Such an 

interpretation would make a mockery of Congress’ careful 

effort to force potential litigants to bring challenges to a rule 

issued under this statute at the outset . . . .”). There would be 

no pressure to challenge regulations within the 60-day period 

after their promulgation if any petitioner could simply wait to 

test the substance of those regulations once EPA applies them, 

for example, in an approval of a state SIP revision – as 

ARTBA has attempted to do here.

Therefore, as we did in ARTBA I, we hold that ARTBA’s 

challenge to EPA’s Section 209(e) regulations is time-barred.

* * *

The petition for review is dismissed.

3

So ordered.

 3 We deny EPA’s request for attorney’s fees under Fed. R. 

App. P. 38.

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