Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01202/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01202-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent
Vincent Industrial Plastics, Inc.
Petitioner

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 23, 2000 Decided April 14, 2000

No. 99-1202

Vincent Industrial Plastics, Inc.,

Petitioner

v.

National Labor Relations Board,

Respondent

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application for

Enforcement of an Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

Ronald I. Tisch argued the cause for petitioner. With him

on the briefs were Paul J. Kennedy and Alan D. Cohn.

Anne Marie Lofaso, Attorney, National Labor Relations

Board, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the

brief were Leonard R. Page, General Counsel, Linda R. Sher,

Associate General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy

USCA Case #99-1202 Document #510650 Filed: 04/14/2000 Page 1 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Associate General Counsel, and David Habenstreit, Supervisory Attorney.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Tatel and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: Vincent Industrial Plastics, Inc.

("Vincent" or "the Company") operates a plastics manufacturing plant in Henderson, Kentucky. On February 19, 1993, a

majority of Vincent's full- and part-time production and maintenance employees (designated a bargaining unit by the National Labor Relations Board ("the Board")) selected the

International Chemical Workers Union, AFL-CIO, Local

1032 ("the Union") as the employees' bargaining representative. The Board certified the Union on September 29, 1993,

and Company and Union officials commenced collective bargaining negotiations in January 1994. The negotiations continued for more than a year, but the parties were unable to

reach a final agreement. On February 16, 1995, after receiving a decertification petition from unit employees, the Company withdrew its recognition of the Union and declined to

participate in any further collective bargaining negotiations.

Between July 5, 1994 and April 20, 1995, the Union filed

several unfair labor practice charges ("ULPs") alleging that

Vincent violated the National Labor Relations Act ("the

Act"), 29 U.S.C. s 158(a)(1), (3), (5) ("s 8"), by unilaterally

implementing material changes in working conditions, coercively interrogating an employee, disciplining and terminating

employees on account of their support for the Union, and

unlawfully withdrawing its recognition of the Union. The

Board issued complaints on all of the charges.

Following a hearing on the complaints, an Administrative

Law Judge ("ALJ") concluded that the Company was guilty

of ULPs on all but one charge. See Vincent Indus. Plastics,

Inc., 328 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 1999 WL 282397, at *9 (1999). The

National Labor Relations Board ("Board") subsequently held

that Vincent was guilty of ULPs on all charges. The Board

specifically rejected the ALJ's finding that Vincent had not

violated the Act in unilaterally changing the Company's attendance policy. See id. at *1. The Board found that the

USCA Case #99-1202 Document #510650 Filed: 04/14/2000 Page 2 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

attendance policy was a material working condition, and that

Vincent was not legally justified in changing the policy without the Union's agreement. The Board issued a cease-anddesist order (including a remedy of reinstatement and back

pay for the employees who were unlawfully fired) and a

"Gissel" bargaining order, see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,

395 U.S. 575 (1969), requiring the Company to recognize the

Union and to resume collective bargaining negotiations.

Vincent petitions for review of the Board's order, and the

Board cross-petitions for enforcement. We grant the Board's

petition for enforcement, with one significant exception. The

Board, inexplicably, has once again defied the law of this

circuit and failed to offer an adequate justification for the

bargaining order sanction imposed against Vincent. We

therefore find ourselves in the all-too-familiar position of

having to remand this case to the Board for adequate justification of the proposed affirmative bargaining order, thus

further delaying relief for the employees the Board purports

to protect.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The facts of this case are laid out in detail in the ALJ's

decision, so we need only summarize here. The Company's

conduct that was found to be unlawful by the Board began

during the last half of 1994, after Vincent and the Union had

been negotiating for five months. Between July and December, 1994, Vincent unilaterally promulgated four policy

changes relating to attendance, work duties, working hours,

and time-keeping. We review each of these briefly.

On July 1, 1994, Vincent changed the policy by which it

disciplined employees for attendance problems. Prior to that

time, Vincent used a bifurcated system to tally employees'

excess attendance "occurrences" (unexcused absences, tardiness, and early exits). For pre-August 1992 hires, occurrences cleared from an employee's personnel file at the end of

every fiscal year. For employees hired after August 1992,

occurrences cleared on a rolling 360-day basis. All employUSCA Case #99-1202 Document #510650 Filed: 04/14/2000 Page 3 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

ees were subject to discipline if they incurred a certain

number of attendance occurrences during the applicable period.

Vincent believed that, among pre-August 1992 hires, the

end of each fiscal year occasioned a rash of attendance

occurrences as employees took advantage of the impending

slate-cleaning to maximize their attendance occurrences for

the year. Vincent proposed that pre-August 1992 hires operate under the rolling system. The Union stated that it

wanted to negotiate the entire contract rather than agree to

provisions piecemeal. In the face of the Union's insistence on

negotiating the entire agreement prior to agreeing to a

revised attendance policy, the Company unilaterally imposed

its policy change on July 1, 1994, at the beginning of the new

fiscal year.

Between October and December 1994, Vincent instituted

three additional policy changes without first proposing them

to the Union during ongoing collective bargaining sessions.

First, in October, Vincent relieved quality control employees

of their weighing and labeling duties, which comprised 25% of

their workday, and transferred the duties to press operators.

Then, in mid-November, Vincent instituted a shift extension

requiring quality control employees to work an extra 15

minutes at the end of each shift. Finally, on December 9,

1994, Vincent eliminated the use of time cards and instituted

a team system in which employees check in at the beginning

of their shift with their "team leader," and the team leader

then keeps track of the hours worked by each team member.

Vincent alleged that the new system was precipitated by its

observation that time cards were often lost or stolen, that

employees clocked in without reporting immediately to work,

and that employees clocked in for one another.

In addition to the foregoing changes in working conditions,

the Union also filed ULP charges related to Vincent's treatment of four Union members. First, in December 1994,

Mark Coomes, a supervisor, called Robert Ferguson away

from his machine and asked him whether he had heard

anything about the Union going on strike. This inquiry was

USCA Case #99-1202 Document #510650 Filed: 04/14/2000 Page 4 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

apparently prompted by an earlier conversation that day

between Mr. Coomes and Michael Early, president of the

Union, in which Mr. Early raised the possibility of a strike

vote. In response to Mr. Coomes' questioning, Mr. Ferguson

responded that he did not know anything about a possible

strike. Mr. Ferguson testified that Mr. Coomes inquired as

to a possible strike a second time that day, in the break room.

The Union alleged that Mr. Coomes' conduct constituted

coercive interrogation in violation of the Act.

In January 1995, Vincent disciplined Gloria Chester, the

Union's designated observer at the 1993 election and its plant

steward until October 1993, for alleged insubordination and

disrespectful actions toward a supervisor. On the day when

she was disciplined, Ms. Chester, while returning to her press

after bringing some material to the quality control office,

stopped to speak with Sue Scott, another press operator.

During the conversation, Ms. Scott complained to Ms. Chester about a clean-up job that Supervisor Rebecca Basham had

assigned to Ms. Scott. Ms. Chester said, "I would tell Becky

to kiss my ass." At this time, Ms. Basham was standing

behind Ms. Chester and overheard the remark. Ms. Chester,

apparently unaware of Ms. Basham's presence, returned to

her press area. Later that day, Tina Bradford, Vincent's

personnel manager, issued Ms. Chester a written warning.

The Union claimed that Vincent disciplined Ms. Chester on

account of her Union affiliation.

The third ULP related to Vincent's treatment of Union

members involves the allegedly discriminatory termination of

Mr. Early, Union President, in February 1995. Mr. Early

was arrested in September 1994 for driving while intoxicated.

He was to be sentenced either to 32 days jail time or to five

months of jail time in coordination with a work release

program with his employer. In February 1995, Mr. Early

approached John Domsic, plant manager, and requested that

Vincent participate in the work release program. On February 7, Mr. Domsic informed Mr. Early that Vincent would not

participate in the work release program. Mr. Early then

inquired abut the possibility of taking personal leave, and Mr.

Domsic replied that he would get back to Mr. Early.

USCA Case #99-1202 Document #510650 Filed: 04/14/2000 Page 5 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

On February 13, Mr. Early was sentenced to 32 days in jail

and 28 days in a rehabilitation center, to begin February 17.

On February 14, Mr. Early called Ms. Bradford, informed her

that he would be starting a jail sentence and therefore would

not be able to report to work, and asked about COBRA

benefits. When Ms. Bradford said she was not aware that he

had been terminated, he replied that he felt that the Company's refusal to participate in the work release program was

tantamount to termination. When Mr. Early failed to report

to work on February 15, he was effectively terminated.

The day Mr. Early was terminated, employees circulated a

petition to decertify the Union. Over two days, on February

15 and 16, 1995, a majority (82 out of 128) of the maintenance

and production employees signed the petition. Management

at Vincent verified the signatures and informed the Union

that the Company would no longer engage in bargaining.

After withdrawing its recognition of the Union, Vincent

granted wage increases, implemented a 401(k) plan, and

denied the Union's request for information regarding bargaining unit employees.

About a month later, on March 20, Vincent terminated

Wanda Nantz, a press operator and Union supporter (she

was, in fact, among those who did not sign the petition to

decertify the Union). Vincent alleges that it fired Ms. Nantz

because she failed, for the first two hours of her March 20

shift, to record hourly "shot" counts (i.e., the number of parts

produced for that hour) in the machine's production log.

After the omission was brought to Ms. Nantz's attention, she

recorded the counts until she was relieved of her duties and

given a disciplinary notice. The discipline would not have

resulted in Ms. Nantz's discharge except that she earlier had

been suspended for three days for smoking near her press.

B. Board Proceedings

The ALJ found that Vincent violated the Act by unilaterally

implementing all of the policy changes except for the attendance policy. The ALJ termed the attendance problem "sufficiently urgent to warrant unilateral implementation" of the

employer's policy. Vincent Indus., 1999 WL 282397 at *9.

USCA Case #99-1202 Document #510650 Filed: 04/14/2000 Page 6 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

According to the ALJ, the Union had the opportunity to

bargain but chose to insist on an overall agreement. See id.

As for the other policy changes, the ALJ found both that, in

each case, Vincent failed to present the proposed changes to

the Union during contract negotiations, thereby giving the

Union no opportunity to bargain over the issues, and that

none of the changes was necessitated by economic hardship.

See id. at *8, *10.

In addition, the ALJ found the questioning of Mr. Ferguson, the termination of Mr. Early and Ms. Nantz, and the

disciplining of Ms. Chester to constitute violations of s 8(a)(1)

and (3) of the Act. The interrogation of Mr. Ferguson,

according to the ALJ, interfered with Mr. Ferguson's right

"to keep private his sentiments as to the Union and his

knowledge of its affairs." Id. at *10. The ALJ found that

Gloria Chester's discipline was motivated by her Union affiliation, given the "ample credible evidence" that the language

she used generally was tolerated at Vincent, that no documentation supported Vincent's assertions that other employees had been disciplined for similar behavior, and that no

management representative ever questioned Ms. Chester

about the reason she left her press area, which was ostensibly

the reason she was disciplined. Id. at *11-12. The ALJ

termed Vincent's explanation for why it refused to accommodate Mr. Early's work release or leave request "inartful

pretext," and found that, but for Mr. Early's Union affiliation,

Vincent would not have both declined to participate in the

work release program and denied him personal leave. See id.

at *13. With respect to Ms. Nantz, the ALJ found that,

during the five-month period that the requirement of an

hourly "shot" count had been in effect, no one was cited for

omissions from the production log although omissions did

occur. See id. at *15. The ALJ accordingly concluded that,

given Ms. Nantz's public pro-Union stance, the issuance of

the citation to Ms. Nantz followed by her discharge was

discriminatory and a violation of s 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.

On review of the ALJ's decision, the Board affirmed all of

the ALJ's ULP findings save one. The Board reversed the

ALJ on the attendance policy issue, finding that Vincent had

USCA Case #99-1202 Document #510650 Filed: 04/14/2000 Page 7 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

"failed to prove that its attendance problem constituted an

economic exigency." Id. at *2. Therefore, the Board found

that the change in attendance policy violated s 8(a)(1) and (5)

of the Act.

On its own analysis, the Board found that Vincent's withdrawal of recognition was a violation of s 8(a)(1) and (5) of

the Act, applying the so-called "Master Slack" factors, see

Master Slack Corp., 271 N.L.R.B. 78 (1984), to evaluate the

causal connection between the unremedied ULPs and subsequent employee expression of dissatisfaction with a union.

The Board cited the following factors in finding a causal

connection between the ULPs and the decertification movement: (1) the unremedied ULPs continued until the day

before the employees began signing the decertification petition; (2) the unilateral changes and disciplining of Union

supporters were "likely to have a long lasting effect on the

bargaining unit and to discourage employees from supporting

the Union"; and (3) the disciplining and termination of Union

supporters "convey to employees the notion that any support

for the Union may jeopardize their employment." Vincent

Indus., 1999 WL 282397, at *3. The Board also imposed an

affirmative bargaining order as a remedy for the Company's

violations of the Act. No justification was offered to support

the bargaining order.

Vincent petitions for review of all of the above findings. In

addition, Vincent argues that the Board has failed to adequately justify imposing an affirmative bargaining order as a

remedy for the violations of the Act. The Board crosspetitions for enforcement of its order.

II. ANALYSIS

Under the Act,

[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer--

(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in

the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of

this title; ...

(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of

employment or any term or condition of employment

to encourage or discourage membership in any labor

organization ...

(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of

section 159(a) of this title.

29 U.S.C. s 158(a). We review Board ULP findings under a

deferential standard. This court will uphold the Board's

decision upon substantial evidence even if we would reach a

different result upon de novo review. See Perdue Farms,

Inc., Cookin' Good Div. v. NLRB, 144 F.3d 830, 834-35 (D.C.

Cir. 1998). We are even more deferential when reviewing the

Board's conclusions regarding discriminatory motive, because

most evidence of motive is circumstantial. See LCF, Inc. v.

NLRB, 129 F.3d 1276, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

USCA Case #99-1202 Document #510650 Filed: 04/14/2000 Page 8 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Furthermore, when the Board, as it did here, concludes

that unremedied ULPs tainted a decertification petition, this

court requires it to offer a reasoned explanation, based on

substantial evidence, in support of its finding. See Quazite

Div. v. NLRB, 87 F.3d 493, 496-97 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Finally,

to justify the imposition of an affirmative bargaining order,

we require the Board to explicitly balance three considerations: (1) the employees' s 7 rights; (2) whether other

purposes of the Act override the rights of employees to

choose their bargaining representatives; and (3) whether

alternative remedies are adequate to remedy the violations of

the Act. See Skyline Distribs. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 403, 410

(D.C. Cir. 1996).

A. The Board's ULP Findings

The Board's holding that Vincent's unilateral actions changing established working conditions constituted ULPs is easily

upheld. An employer may not unilaterally impose material

changes in terms or conditions of employment that are mandatory subjects of bargaining without first negotiating to

impasse. See Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S.

190, 198 (1991); Grondorf, Field, Black & Co. v. NLRB, 107

F.3d 882, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1997). There are two exceptions to

this general rule: An employer may impose unilateral terms

if the union engages in dilatory tactics to delay bargaining.

USCA Case #99-1202 Document #510650 Filed: 04/14/2000 Page 9 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

See Serramonte Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 86 F.3d 227, 235

(D.C. Cir. 1996). And an employer may act unilaterally if

faced with an economic exigency justifying the change. See

Visiting Nurse Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 177 F.3d 52, 56 (1st Cir.

1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 787 (2000); RBE Elecs. of S.D.,

Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 80, 81 (1995). An economic exigency must

be a "heavy burden" and must require prompt implementation. See RBE Elecs., 320 N.L.R.B. at 81. The employer

must additionally demonstrate that "the exigency was caused

by external events, was beyond the employer's control, or was

not reasonably foreseeable." Id. at 82 (footnote omitted).

Vincent imposed all of the changes save one without presenting a proposal to the Union during bargaining sessions.

Vincent can mount no argument that any of the disputed

changes were made due to an economic exigency, although it

tries to argue that the changes were not material or that they

were waived by the Union. These arguments hold no water:

All of the changes involved mandatory subjects of bargaining,

they raised material issues, and the Union cannot be held to

have waived the right to bargain over an issue that was never

proposed during bargaining sessions. There is one change

that Vincent did propose before imposing: the change in

attendance policy. Vincent urges that the Board's decision on

the attendance policy issue should be reversed, first, because

the Union waived its right to bargain over this issue, and,

second, because the Company had to make the changes in

order to meet an economic exigency. Vincent's arguments

are meritless.

There was no waiver by the Union here. The Union

desired to bargain over the attendance policy; it made clear

to Vincent that it wanted to negotiate the entire contract,

including the attendance policy, as a whole. See Visiting

Nurse Servs., 177 F.3d at 59 (rejecting employer's suggestion

that a union cannot insist on negotiating an entire contract

rather than piecemeal negotiation). In addition, the Union

offered counter-proposals to the Company's attendance policy

prior to Vincent's imposition of the policy change. See

Eighth Negotiation Session Meeting Notes, May 18, 1994, at

3-5, reprinted in Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 795-97; Ninth

USCA Case #99-1202 Document #510650 Filed: 04/14/2000 Page 10 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Negotiation Session Meeting Notes, May 24, 1994, at 3-4,

reprinted in J.A. 802-03. The Union did not precipitate an

impasse by insisting on negotiating a contract as a whole

rather than piecemeal. Such a view is mischievous, because it

would both "permit the employer to remove, one by one,

issues from the table and impair the ability to reach an

overall agreement through compromise on particular items"

and "undercut the role of the Union as the collective bargaining representative." Visiting Nurse Servs., 177 F.3d at 59.

Nor did the Board err in finding a lack of evidence to

support Vincent's claim of economic necessity. The Board

correctly noted that the "exigency" asserted by Vincent was

hardly extraordinary: The Company could point only to the

impending possibility of attendance problems. The Board

reasonably found that the Company's alleged problem did not

pose a "heavy burden" necessary to show an economic exigency. See RBE Elecs., 320 N.L.R.B. at 81. In addition, the

Board reasonably concluded that Vincent failed to show that

the attendance problem was unforeseen, caused by external

events outside its control, or that it was new. See id. at 82.

The Board's findings that Vincent fired two employees and

disciplined another in violation of the Act are also supported

by substantial evidence in the record. To establish a causal

nexus between adverse employment decisions and an employee's union affiliation, the complaining party must first show

that protected activity "was a 'motivating factor' " in the

adverse employment decision, and then the employer may

show that it would have made the adverse decision even had

the employee not engaged in protected activity. Wright

Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980); see also NLRB v.

Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983)

(approving of Wright Line approach). To establish an employer's discriminatory motive, the NLRB may "consider[ ]

such factors as the employer's knowledge of the employee's

union activities, the employer's hostility toward the union, and

the timing of the employer's action." Power Inc. v. NLRB,

40 F.3d 409, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Evidence that an employer

has violated s 8(a)(1) of the Act can support an inference of

USCA Case #99-1202 Document #510650 Filed: 04/14/2000 Page 11 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

anti-union animus. See Parsippany Hotel Management Co.

v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 413, 423-24 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

The ALJ found, and the Board affirmed, that Vincent

violated the Act in three instances when it took adverse

employment actions against its employees on account of their

Union affiliation: (1) when Vincent disciplined Gloria Chester;

(2) when Vincent terminated Michael Early; and (3) when

Vincent terminated Wanda Nantz. With respect to all three

findings, there is substantial evidence to support the Board's

determination.

The ALJ, with whom the Board agreed, relied on Ms.

Chester's position as a Union supporter, the fact that she

received discipline at a time when Vincent had taken several

unlawful unilateral actions, and the "significant aberrant circumstances surrounding issuance of the warning" to conclude

that the discipline would not have occurred but for Ms.

Chester's Union involvement. Vincent Indus., 1999 WL

282397, at *11. There is substantial evidence to support this

conclusion, especially given our deference to the Board's

findings regarding discriminatory motive. See Laro Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 56 F.3d 224, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Vincent cites to testimony in which the employer asserted

that other employees had been disciplined for similar behavior, but the ALJ and Board rejected this testimony for lack of

documentary or other corroborating evidence. The Board's

judgment on this point was reasonable. Cf. Synergy Gas

Corp. v. NLRB, 19 F.3d 649, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (reversing

finding of discrimination where company introduced personnel records to demonstrate that other employees had been

terminated for actions similar to that of the complaining

employee).

The ALJ and the Board relied on similar factors to conclude that the Company discharged Mr. Early in violation of

the Act. First, the ALJ found that a prima facie case of

discrimination was established in light of the other unlawful

conduct engaged in by Vincent and the Company's response

to Mr. Early's request for accommodation. See Vincent

Indus., 1999 WL 282397, at *13. The ALJ found Vincent's

USCA Case #99-1202 Document #510650 Filed: 04/14/2000 Page 12 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

explanation for refusing to participate in the work release

program to be "cryptic" and nothing "other than inartful

pretext." Id. (noting that Mr. Domsic stated both that

Vincent did not want to take responsibility for Mr. Early's

program and that Vincent did not know what it would have

been required to do). The Board agreed and we cannot

second-guess that judgment. In upholding the Board on this

point, we do not suggest that all employers must grant all

requests similar to Mr. Early's lest they be accused of

discriminating against bargaining unit employees. A company that consistently applies neutral policies, for example,

usually is on safe ground. See TIC-The Indus. Co. Southeast, Inc. v. NLRB, 126 F.3d 334, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In

this case, there is no evidence that the Company had any

policy at all to apply to Mr. Early. Therefore, it cannot be

said that the ALJ was unreasonable in finding that Mr.

Early's status as Union President influenced Vincent's decision to refuse to accommodate his particular needs as a result

of his arrest, especially considering the ALJ's conclusion,

supported by substantial evidence, that Mr. Early "was a

long-term skilled press operator and that there is not a

scintilla of evidence that alcohol ever affected his job performance or that he posed any threat to others at the plant."

Vincent Indus., 1999 WL 282397, at *13.

Vincent argues that the ALJ erroneously found violations

of the Act for the discharge of Ms. Nantz on two grounds: (1)

the ALJ erroneously concluded that Vincent knew of Ms.

Nantz's Union affiliation; and (2) the discipline meted out to

Ms. Nantz was consistent with Vincent's past practice. The

first challenge is easily dismissed. Ms. Nantz had been a

pro-Union advocate during the election, the shop steward, and

the Treasurer of the Local, and she had refused to sign the

decertification petition. Under these circumstances, there

was substantial evidence for the ALJ to conclude that Vincent

was aware of Ms. Nantz's affiliation with the Union.

With respect to Vincent's justification for disciplining Ms.

Nantz, the ALJ found that, for the five months that the

hourly "shot count" requirement was in place, there was no

evidence that any employees were disciplined even though

USCA Case #99-1202 Document #510650 Filed: 04/14/2000 Page 13 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

employees other than Ms. Nantz had made mistakes. Vincent proffered evidence that prior to the institution of the

new policy, employees were warned for failure to fill out

production logs correctly; but there are no such warnings in

evidence (apart from Ms. Nantz's discharge) for the period

during which the new policy was in place. Under these

circumstances, there was substantial evidence for the ALJ

and Board to conclude that Vincent's purported reason for

disciplining Ms. Nantz was pretextual.

The Board's finding that Vincent supervisor Mark Coomes

violated the Act by coercively interrogating Robert Ferguson

is less easily upheld. The interrogation of employees by an

employer is evaluated under a five-factor totality of the

circumstances test in order to determine whether the questioning is coercive and therefore violates s 8(a)(1). These

factors are: (1) the history of the employer's hostility and

discrimination against unions; (2) whether the information

sought is of a type that could be used to take action against

individual employees; (3) the rank of the questioner; (4)

where the questioning occurred; and (5) the truthfulness of

the reply. See Perdue Farms, Inc., 144 F.3d at 835. Here

the ALJ relied on the following facts to conclude that Mr.

Coomes compromised Mr. Ferguson's right to "keep private

his sentiments as to the Union and his knowledge of its

affairs": Mr. Coomes pulled Mr. Ferguson away from his

work area to initiate questioning; and Mr. Ferguson had not

previously identified with the Union. Vincent Indus., 1999

WL 282397, at *10. The ALJ inferred that Mr. Coomes'

purpose, to test the strength of the Union, was clear. Given

the substantial evidence in the record, we cannot say that this

conclusion is unreasonable.

Vincent relies on Certainteed Corp., 282 N.L.R.B. 1101

(1987), for the proposition that there is nothing coercive about

an employer inquiring about the possibility of a strike. In

Certainteed, the ALJ found that the employer did not violate

the Act by asking an employee about the possibility of a

strike, because the employer had a reasonable basis to fear an

"imminent strike" and had an interest in determining whether

it would be able to keep its business open. 282 N.L.R.B. at

USCA Case #99-1202 Document #510650 Filed: 04/14/2000 Page 14 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

1107. Here, while Mr. Coomes had just heard from Mr.

Early about the possibility of a strike vote, Mr. Coomes had

no legitimate reason for inquiring of Mr. Ferguson; Mr.

Early's offhand comment about the possibility of a strike vote

sometime in the future could hardly be relied upon to support

a reasonable basis to fear an "imminent strike." Certainteed

does not compel reversal of the Board.

The Board's findings that several unremedied ULPs tainted the decertification petition is unassailable. For the first

year after a successful certification election, a union enjoys an

irrebuttable presumption of majority support, after which the

employer may withdraw recognition if it has a good faith,

reasonable basis to doubt majority support for the union. See

Peoples Gas Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35, 37-38 (D.C. Cir.

1980). When a majority of unit employees signs a petition in

support of decertification, an employer may reasonably doubt

that there exists majority support for the union. See Sullivan Indus. v. NLRB, 957 F.2d 890, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

Nonetheless, if the Board determines that unremedied ULPs

contributed to the erosion of support for the union, the

employer may commit an unfair labor practice by withdrawing its recognition of the union. See, e.g., Lee Lumber &

Bldg. Material Corp. v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 1454, 1458-60 (D.C.

Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (examining whether ULPs contributed

to lack of support for union).

The Board's traditional four-factor test for determining

whether there is a causal connection between unremedied

ULPs and a petition for decertification consists of the following elements: "(1) [t]he length of time between the unfair

labor practices and the withdrawal of recognition; (2) the

nature of the illegal acts, including the possibility of their

detrimental or lasting effect on employees; (3) any possible

tendency to cause employee disaffection from the union; and

(4) the effect of the unlawful conduct on employee morale,

organizational activities, and membership in the union."

Master Slack Corp., 271 N.L.R.B. at 84. Vincent argues that

the explanation offered by the Board does not satisfy the

Master Slack requirements. We reject this contention.

USCA Case #99-1202 Document #510650 Filed: 04/14/2000 Page 15 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

The Board adequately explained its decision on the basis of

all four Master Slack factors, in more than conclusory language. The Board noted the close temporal link between the

unremedied ULPs and the decertification petition. See Vincent Indus., 1999 WL 282397, at *3. The Board additionally

explained that the unilateral implementation of changes in

working conditions has the tendency to undermine confidence

in the employees' chosen collective-bargaining agent. See id.

The Board finally reasonably concluded that the discipline

and termination of public supporters of the Union "convey to

employees the notion that any support for the Union may

jeopardize their employment." Id. The Board's conclusion

that Vincent's practices contributed to the decertification

petition are reasonably justified and supported by substantial

evidence. See NLRB v. Williams Enters., Inc., 50 F.3d 1280,

1288-89 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding finding of causation where

four months passed between company's anti-union statements

and decertification petition); Columbia Portland Cement Co.,

303 N.L.R.B. 880, 882 (1991), enf'd, 979 F.2d 460, 464-65 (6th

Cir. 1992) (upholding Board's finding of causation where

justification offered by Board was simply that the unremedied

ULPs "are likely to have undermined the Union's authority

generally and influenced [the Union's] employees to reject the

Union as their bargaining representative") (internal quotation

marks omitted) (alteration in original).

B. The Board's Remedies

The Board's remedies on behalf of the Union and the unit

employees who were adversely affected by Vincent's ULPs

included a cease-and-desist order, reinstatement and back

pay for the employees who were unlawfully terminated, and

an affirmative bargaining order. The Company challenges all

of the remedies imposed by the Board on the grounds that

the employer did not commit any ULPs. As noted above, we

reject this contention as meritless. The Company argues

further, however, that even if the Board did not err in finding

the aforecited ULPs, there was no basis for the Board to

issue an affirmative bargaining order against Vincent. The

Company's argument on this point is well taken.

USCA Case #99-1202 Document #510650 Filed: 04/14/2000 Page 16 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

The Board approved the ALJ's recommended remedy of an

affirmative bargaining order with little explanation. The

closest the ALJ came to justifying the order was to observe

that the "serious and egregious misconduct shown here[ ]

demonstrates a general disregard for fundamental rights

guaranteed employees by Section 7 of the Act." Vincent

Indus., 1999 WL 282397, at *15. This will not do. This court

repeatedly has reminded the Board that an affirmative bargaining order is an extreme remedy that must be justified by

a reasoned analysis that includes an explicit balancing of

three considerations: (1) the employees' s 7 rights; (2)

whether other purposes of the Act override the rights of

employees to choose their bargaining representatives; and (3)

whether alternative remedies are adequate to remedy the

violations of the Act. See Skyline Distribs., 99 F.3d at 410.

There is no such reasoned analysis in the instant case.

Instead, the Board's counsel was forced to conjure up an

argument in an effort to bolster the Board's unsupported

position. According to counsel, the Board need not justify

the imposition of a bargaining order in two types of cases:

where the employer has unlawfully withdrawn recognition

from the Union; and, as a subset of the first class, where

there are explicit Master Slack findings demonstrating a

causal connection between unremedied ULPs and a withdrawal of recognition. See Br. for NLRB at 47-55. Counsel's argument in defense of this position was inspired and

thoughtful, albeit in vain. The problem here is that counsel's

argument is nowhere to be found in the orders under review,

so we cannot ascribe it to the Board. The argument therefore constitutes a post hoc rationalization, which carries no

weight on review. See International Union of Petroleum &

Indus. Workers v. NLRB, 980 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

The Board's stubborn refusal to accept this circuit's position on affirmative bargaining orders is perplexing, for it

merely undermines the Board's purported goal of protecting

workers against employer violations of the Act. Board decisions, like those from other administrative agencies, are

entitled to deference. However, once a court has issued a

legal ruling on a disputed issue, the Board is bound to follow

USCA Case #99-1202 Document #510650 Filed: 04/14/2000 Page 17 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the court's judgment unless and until it is reversed by the

Supreme Court. The Board, no doubt, will plead innocence,

claiming that circuit courts often take different positions on

certain legal issues, so the Board is free to adopt a course

most to its liking within a maze of disparate courts of appeals

judgments. In addition, as counsel pointed out during oral

argument in this case, the Board sometimes has no clear idea

where a petition for review will be filed, so it cannot always

guess right in deciding what circuit law to follow. This latter

point is a fair rebuttal, but it is shortsighted in a case such as

the instant one. What is so troubling about this case, and

others like it, is that the Board could easily follow the law of

the D.C. Circuit--i.e., give a reasoned analysis to support an

affirmative bargaining order--without ever transgressing the

law of any other circuit. Some other circuits may not require

as much as does the D.C. Circuit with respect to what is

required to justify an affirmative bargaining order, but no

circuit will reject a bargaining order if the Board justifies it

as this court requires.

What is ultimately dissatisfying about this familiar dance is

not a sense that this court's institutional integrity is undermined by the Board's refusal to modify its behavior in response to operant conditioning, but that those left in the lurch

are precisely those who, in this case, sought protection from

the Board. As a result of the Board's failure to justify the

imposition of an affirmative bargaining order, relief for the

employees represented by the Union will be that much further delayed. Three years passed between the ALJ's decision and the Board's decision upholding the ALJ. Another

year has passed since the issuance of the Board decision here

on review. We now remand to the Board for an undetermined amount of time. As the Board well knows, in the

context of employee representation and collective bargaining,

relief delayed under the Act may be relief denied. This

makes little sense where, as here, the Board can easily satisfy

the commands of this circuit's law without running amok

because of a split in the law of the circuits.

The Board may persist in its stubbornness, but that will not

dissuade this court from fulfilling its role on behalf of parties

USCA Case #99-1202 Document #510650 Filed: 04/14/2000 Page 18 of 19
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

seeking judicial review. As we have said before when remanding to the Board to justify an affirmative bargaining

order, "[w]e persist not out of pique but from a sense that it

is our duty to ensure that the Board adheres to its statutory

mandate." Caterair Int'l v. NLRB, 22 F.3d 1114, 1123 (D.C.

Cir. 1994).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons articulated herein, we deny in part and

grant in part the petition for review and we grant in part and

deny in part the cross-application for enforcement. We remand the case to the Board with instructions to justify the

imposition of an affirmative bargaining order as required by

the law of this circuit or, in the absence of such justification,

to vacate that portion of the remedy.

USCA Case #99-1202 Document #510650 Filed: 04/14/2000 Page 19 of 19