Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cr-00910/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cr-00910-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Francis Martinez
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Respondent

vs.

Francis Martinez, 

Defendant-Movant. 

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CR 99-910-PHX-RGS

CV 04-1646-PHX-RGS (ECV)

AMENDED

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROGER G. STRAND, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

Pending before the court is Movant's pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct

Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. #38). On June

2, 2000, pursuant to a plea agreement, Movant pleaded guilty to three counts of Assault with

a Dangerous Weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3) and one count of Brandishing a

Firearm During a Crime of Violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Doc. #29.

On September 12, 2000, Movant was sentenced to 60 months for each of the three assault

convictions, with the terms to run concurrent to each other. Id. He was also sentenced to 84

months for the firearm conviction, that term to run consecutive to the terms imposed in the

other three counts. Id. Movant was also sentenced to 36 months of supervised release

following his release from prison. Id. 

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On August 9, 2004, Movant filed the instant Motion to Vacate (Doc. #38). Movant

alleges in the motion that his sentence was imposed in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). On October 6, 2004,

Movant filed a Motion to Amend and Supplement (Doc. #44) which raises ineffective

assistance of counsel as an additional ground for relief. In lieu of an answer, Respondent

United States filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #46) on April 8, 2005. Movant did not file a

response to the motion to dismiss or a reply in support of his motion to vacate.

On August 5, 2005, this court issued a Report and Recommendation (Doc. #48)

recommending that the motion to vacate be denied. On September 6, 2005, Movant filed an

Objection to Magistrate's Report and Recommendation (Doc. #50) in which he claimed that

he never received Respondent's motion to dismiss and therefore did not know what the

government was arguing. Judge Strand then granted Movant an additional 30 days to

respond to the government's motion to dismiss. The original Report and Recommendation

was withdrawn and this court was directed to prepare either the same or a new Report and

Recommendation depending on what, if any, new evidence was presented. Movant's

deadline to file a response to the motion to dismiss was December 19, 2005, but he has filed

nothing. Accordingly, this Report and Recommendation contains the same discussion and

recommendation as the previous one. 

DISCUSSION

Respondent contends in its motion to dismiss that Movant's motion and supplement

are barred by the one year limitation period in 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The limitation provision

of the statute states:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of – 

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by

governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such

governmental action;

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1

 Even if the limitation provision did not preclude consideration of this claim, the

claim would fail on the merits in light of Movant's plea agreement. Movant contends that

the facts supporting his sentencing enhancements "were neither admitted by the petitioner

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(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court

and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

Here, the judgment of conviction was filed on September 25, 2000. Doc. #29. Under

Rule 4(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, a notice of appeal by a

defendant must be filed within ten days of the judgment. Movant's judgment of conviction

became final after the tenth day passed without a notice of appeal, on or about October 7,

2000. Thus, Movant's § 2255 motion had to be filed no more than one year later, by October

7, 2001. Movant filed his motion on August 9, 2004, nearly three years after his judgment

of conviction became final. Accordingly, unless the time to file was extended based on one

of the above provisions, Movant's § 2255 motion is untimely.

Movant does not allege that governmental action caused an impediment that prevented

him from filing his motion. Nor does Movant contend that the facts on which his claims

were based could not have been discovered earlier. The only provision that could arguably

apply here is a right newly recognized by the Supreme Court.

Movant contends that his sentence was imposed in violation of Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), which held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction,

any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, however, was decided

on June 26, 2000, more than two months before Movant was sentenced and three months

before his conviction became final. Because the limitation period runs from the latest of the

date the judgment of conviction becomes final or the date of a newly recognized right by the

Supreme Court, the new rule announced in Apprendi does not extend the limitation period

here.1

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nor found by the jury." Doc. #38 at 2. While the latter part of this statement is true since

there was no jury, Movant's claim that he did not admit these facts is simply false. The

factual basis that Movant admitted to in the plea agreement provides the necessary basis to

impose the sentence enhancements. Doc. #25 at 6-8.

2

 Like the Apprendi claim, Movant's admissions in his plea agreement render his

Blakely claim meritless.

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Movant also contends that his sentence was imposed in violation of the rule

announced in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004). In Blakely, the

Supreme Court explained that "the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the

maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury

verdict or admitted by the defendant." Blakely, 124 S.Ct at 2537 (citations omitted)

(emphasis in original). Thus, a judge may not impose a sentence in excess of what the jury's

factual findings or the defendant's own admissions allow. See id.

 Movant's Blakely claim may not be raised on collateral review. The Ninth Circuit

recently held that the new rule announced in Blakely "does not apply retroactively to a

conviction that was final before that decision was announced." Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d

1025, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005). The same court had previously recognized that the Supreme

Court has not made Blakely retroactive to cases on collateral review. Cook v. United States,

386 F.3d 949, 950 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit's decision is consistent with other

federal circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 400 F.3d 844, 849 (10th Cir. 2005) ("[W]e

hold that Blakely does not apply retroactively to convictions that were already final at the

time the Court decided Blakely, June 24, 2004."); United States v. Green, 397 F.3d 101, 103

(2nd Cir. 2005) (neither Booker nor Blakely apply retroactively on collateral review).

Because the new rule in Blakely is not retroactive to cases on collateral review, the limitation

period in § 2255 is not extended here.2

Finally, Movant contends in his motion to amend and supplement (Doc. #44) that his

attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.

Movant filed this motion on October 6, 2004, four years after his judgment of conviction

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became final and three years after the limitation period expired. He presents no basis for the

limitation period to be extended to encompass his ineffective assistance claim and the court

finds no such basis. As a result, granting Movant permission to supplement his original

motion to raise such a claim would be futile. 

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the claims raised by Movant in his

motion to vacate and motion to supplement are precluded by the limitation period in 28

U.S.C. § 2255. Accordingly, the court will recommend that both motions be denied. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal

Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. #38) be DENIED; 

That the Motion to Amend and Supplement (Doc. #44) be DENIED; and

That Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #46) be GRANTED; 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

DATED this 11th day of January, 2006.

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