Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-03080/USCOURTS-caDC-11-03080-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives
Amicus Curiae for Appellee
United States of America
Appellee
Fraser Verrusio
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 12, 2013 Decided August 12, 2014

No. 11-3080

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

FRASER VERRUSIO,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cr-00064-1)

Richard P. Sobiecki argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs were A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender,

Rosanna M. Taormina, Assistant Federal Public Defender, and

Vernon A.A. Cassin III.

Kirby A. Heller, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Lanny

A. Breuer, then Assistant Attorney General, and John D.

Buretta, then Deputy Assistant Attorney General. Michael A.

Rotker, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, entered an appearance.

Kerry W. Kircher, General Counsel, U.S. House of

Representatives, William Pittard, Deputy General Counsel,

Christine M. Davenport, Senior Assistant Counsel, and Todd B.

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Tatelman, Mary Beth Walker, and Eleni M. Roumel, Assistant

Counsel, were on the brief for amicus curiae Bipartisan Legal

Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives

in support of appellee.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and ROGERS and

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Chief Judge: Fraser Verrusio, the former policy

director of the House Transportation Committee, was convicted

on three counts relating to his receipt of illegal gratuities from

Jack Abramoff’s lobbying group. On appeal, Verrusio argues

that his indictment omitted an essential element of the charges

against him, that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain

his convictions, and that the district court erred in excluding a

defense exhibit and quashing a defense subpoena. For the

reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the district

court.

I

Verrusio’s convictions arose out of his work as policy

director for the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

of the U.S. House of Representatives. As policy director, he

advised Chairman Don Young, as well as the Committee as a

whole, regarding legislative strategies and policy. See, e.g.,

Supp. App. 22 (Blackann Test.); id. at 46 (Harless Test.).1

 The

House Transportation Committee had jurisdiction over

legislation authorizing federal surface transportation funding,

which required renewal every six years. Because the federal

1

All citations to Supp. App. refer to the Government’s

Supplemental Appendix.

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highway act in force in 2003 -- known as the Transportation

Equity Act for the Twenty-First Century (TEA-21) -- was set to

lapse at the end of that year, the Committee was especially

focused on enacting the next federal highway bill.

A

Companies and their lobbyists were also focused on the new

highway bill. One of those companies was United Rentals, a

nationwide construction equipment company. United Rentals

hired lobbyists from Jack Abramoff’s group at the Greenberg

Traurig law firm to advance its legislative agenda.2

 The

lobbyists were Todd Boulanger and James Hirni.3

 Todd Ehrlich

was their primary contact at United Rentals. 

Because its business was renting construction equipment,

United Rentals wanted language in the federal highway bill that

would provide incentives for state transportation departments to

contract with builders that rented rather than bought such

equipment. It also wanted language that would require liability

insurance at a level that few companies other than United

Rentals had. In addition, it wanted language encouraging the

use of “intelligent” transportation systems like the ones United

Rentals had to offer. App. 187 (Boulanger Test.). Together,

Boulanger, Hirni, and Ehrlich devised a plan to insert three

2

For cases describing the FBI’s “corruption investigation into the

activities of former lobbyist Jack Abramoff,” Citizens for

Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 746 F.3d

1082, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2014), see id.; United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d

460 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United States v. Safavian, 649 F.3d 688 (D.C.

Cir. 2011).

3

Hirni worked for another law firm from February 2003 through

December 2003. He then moved to Greenberg Traurig.

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amendments into the highway bill, all of which were intended to

give United Rentals a competitive advantage. Id. Boulanger,

Hirni, and Ehrlich all testified at Verrusio’s trial. 

So, too, did Trevor Blackann. In 2003, Blackann was a

legislative assistant to Senator Kit Bond, who, at the time,

chaired the Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure

of the Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works. 

The Subcommittee had primary responsibility for drafting the

Senate version of the new federal highway bill. As a result,

Blackann was in a position to be helpful in adding United

Rentals’ desired amendments to the bill. See id. at 191, 196-97

(Boulanger Test.).

Boulanger and Hirni discussed United Rentals’ “package of

proposals” for legislation with Blackann. App. 220 (Blackann

Test.). That discussion included details of the three specific

amendments the company wanted. According to Blackann, the

amendments were aimed at “providing preferential treatment in

federal government contracting for renting or leasing equipment

as opposed to purchasing equipment”; a “minimum insurance

requirement”; and a “work zone safety piece,” including

intelligent transportation systems. Id.

After Blackann discussed United Rentals’ desired

legislative package with lobbyists Boulanger and Hirni, he then

discussed it with Verrusio. He did so, he testified, because he

knew from the lobbyists “that they were also working with Mr.

Verrusio on the same package of amendments.” Id. Blackann

said that he and Verrusio anticipated opposition to United

Rentals’ desired amendments from companies that sold

construction equipment, and that they “discussed the idea of

waiting till the last possible minute legislatively to insert the

provisions.” Id. at 221. Blackann termed this the “airmail

strategy.” Id. According to Blackann, Verrusio was adamant

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that this was the route that United Rentals should take. Id.

Blackann advised lobbyists Boulanger and Hirni that he and

Verrusio “were both in support of [the airmail] strategy.” Id.

In October 2003, after the above-described discussions had

taken place, United Rentals’ Ehrlich told lobbyist Boulanger that

he had tickets to the first game of the 2003 World Series, and he

asked “if there were any government officials that [United

Rentals] would be interested in taking that could be helpful” in

advancing its legislative agenda. App. 188 (Boulanger Test.). 

Ehrlich and Boulanger, in conjunction with Hirni, decided to

invite Blackann and Verrusio. According to Boulanger, they

decided to invite them because “they were in positions to be

helpful . . . [s]pecifically” with “[t]he United Rentals’

amendments that we were seeking to include in the highway

bill.” Supp. App. 19-20 (Boulanger Test.). Boulanger knew that

Verrusio “was close to the chairman” of the House

Transportation Committee, and he hoped “to influence”

Verrusio “to do some things for our clients.” App. 188

(Boulanger Test.); Supp. App. 21 (same). At trial, Hirni

similarly admitted that he had used the “tickets in [an] attempt

to influence the Congressional staff for legislation.” Supp. App.

85.

As planned, Hirni invited Blackann and Verrusio to the

World Series game and made clear that United Rentals would

cover the costs. App. 251-52 (Hirni Test.). Both men accepted

the invitation. Id. at 250-51. Hirni and Blackann flew to New

York together and met Ehrlich there. Over drinks, Blackann

described the airmail strategy that he, Verrusio, and the two

lobbyists had agreed was “the best course of action.” Supp.

App. 26 (Blackann Test.). Shortly thereafter, Verrusio joined

them for dinner. According to Hirni, the four men “talked a lot

about United Rentals” and “got into a conversation about

concepts and ideas United Rentals had for federal legislation.” 

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Id. at 64 (Hirni Test.). Verrusio was “the senior guy at the

table,” Blackann testified, and was “leading the conversation.” 

Id. at 27. Verrusio “walked them through” the airmail strategy,

indicating that it had “the best chance for ultimate success.” Id.

Ehrlich paid for the dinner and drinks. Id. at 65-66 (Hirni Test.).

On the way to Yankee Stadium, the chauffeured car

carrying the four men stopped at a convenience store, where

Hirni bought several small bottles of liquor for the group. The

men then went on to the game. On their way out of the stadium,

Verrusio signaled to Hirni that he and Blackann wanted souvenir

jerseys. Hirni paid for them with his corporate credit card. Id.

at 27, 29 (Blackann Test.); id. at 70 (Hirni Test.).

After leaving the stadium, the group went to a strip club

called Privilege. Hirni paid the cover charge and the cost of

drinks, while Ehrlich paid for several lap dances. Hirni also

bought Verrusio and Blackann t-shirts from the club. When the

group left, they stopped for pizza before returning to their hotel. 

The next morning, Hirni paid the hotel expenses, and Verrusio,

Blackann, and Hirni took a car to the airport and flew to

Washington, D.C. Id. at 71-74, 76-77 (Hirni Test.); see App.

225 (stipulated facts).

At trial, the parties stipulated to the value of what Verrusio

received during the New York trip: The round-trip plane ticket

cost $228.50; his hotel and room service costs were $301.27; the

face value of the World Series ticket was $110; the World Series

jersey cost $130; and Verrusio’s pro rata share of the costs for

other transportation, dinner, drinks, and the strip club was $490. 

The total cost of Verrusio’s trip, paid by United Rentals, was

$1,259.77. See App. 225; Verrusio Br. 53-54.

Three days after the trip, Hirni forwarded Verrusio an email

from Boulanger that “listed a series of legislative items and

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some legislative text that United Rentals was now pushing,” and

asked whether Verrusio had time to discuss it. Supp. App. 79-

80 (Hirni Test.). Verrusio responded that the language “needs

a lot more work for anyone to be able to help with progress.” 

App. 262-63 (Hirni Test.).

Because the Senate moved more quickly on the federal

highway bill than the House, Blackann began working on United

Rentals’ agenda before Verrusio did. Blackann notified

Verrusio that his office was not going to follow the airmail

strategy of waiting until the last moment, but was instead going

“to actually work to get something in the Senate version of the

bill.” Supp. App. 34 (Blackann Test.). Verrusio then gave

Blackann a “dressing-down,” “saying why don’t you just stick

with the plan,” and warning that “we’re going to get killed, you

know about all the opposition . . . don’t do it.” Id. Nonetheless,

United Rentals’ lobbyists succeeded in getting all three of its

desired amendments into the bill coming out of the Senate

Committee. According to Boulanger, Blackann “was integral”

to achieving that result. App. 198. “[H]e basically did a lot of

the heavy lifting behind the scenes, in getting objections taken

care of from other members of the committee and the staff that

worked on that committee.” Id.

As the bill worked its way through the Senate, Hirni kept

Verrusio “in the loop.” App. 265 (Hirni Test.). Verrusio in turn

helped Hirni understand “the likelihood of the Senate language

working in the House” and “when the House was going to act.” 

Id. Verrusio also suggested that United Rentals “get elected

members on [the House Transportation Committee] to weigh in

with the chairman in support of the provisions that we had

included in the Senate bill.” Supp. App. 8 (Boulanger Test.).

Hirni identified Representative John Boozman as someone

whose support United Rentals should cultivate. He emailed one

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of Boozman’s staff members, Vivian Moeglein, to say that he

had “spoken to [Verrusio] and he is good to go.” App. 413

(Hirni email to Moeglein). According to Hirni, “good to go”

meant that Verrusio was “going to be helpful with [United

Rentals’] legislative asks.” Id. at 271 (Hirni Test.). Hirni also

said that he was “resending [Verrusio] the language in the

Senate bill, with changes which would represent the 100%

victory for [United Rentals].” Id. at 413 (Hirni email to

Moeglein). Verrusio “asked us,” Hirni said, “to give him the

language plus what we would want in the perfect world.” Id.

As the House version of the federal highway bill advanced,

Boulanger asked Verrusio for updates. On January 20, 2004,

Verrusio emailed Boulanger that he was “[s]till hard at it. 

Dissenting views still loom with some in leadership. Stay

tuned.” Supp. App. 13 (Boulanger Test.). Boulanger then

emailed Verrusio to ask, “[i]n your gut, what are the odds?,”

noting that “[t]his seems like a total mess.” Id. at 13-14. 

Verrusio responded: “Far from a total mess. No question that

there are issues, but we still feel good.” Id. at 14.

Verrusio’s optimism proved misguided. Opposition to

United Rentals’ amendments remained substantial. Blackann

advised Boulanger and Hirni not to continue to pursue them in

the House version of the bill because “it would only make [the

opposition] more upset.” Id. Since the language was in the

Senate version, Blackann hoped to prevail at the Senate/House

conference. He testified that Verrusio was at the

“preconference” meeting of Senate and House staff in which

Blackann, as Senate designee, presented the United Rentals

provisions to the House. Id. at 36-37 (Blackann Test.). But the

opposition ultimately proved too strong, and United Rentals

eventually told its lobbyists that it was no longer interested in

pursuing the amendments. They did not make it into the final

law. Id. at 16 (Boulanger Test.).

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B

Each year, congressional officials are required to disclose

detailed information concerning their financial holdings and

transactions, as well as information concerning income, gifts,

and reimbursements from private sources. They must do so on

a Financial Disclosure Statement, which asks employees a series

of questions. If they answer “yes” to any of those questions,

they must attach additional forms disclosing particular types of

information. The form states that it “will be reviewed by the

Committee on Standards of Official Conduct or its designee”;

requires the reporting individual to certify that the statements on

the form “are true, complete and correct to the best of my

knowledge and belief”; and warns that “[a]ny individual who

knowingly and willfully falsifies . . . this report may be subject

to . . . criminal sanctions.” App. 404 (2003 Verrusio Financial

Disclosure Statement) (citing 5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 104; 5 U.S.C.

§ 1001).

Most relevant here, employees must report gifts from a

single source totaling more than $285 on an attachment called

“Schedule VI.” A “gift” is defined, with exclusions not relevant

here, as “a payment . . . or any thing of value.” App. 423

(Schedule VI Instructions). “All types of gifts, including travelrelated expenses provided for [the employee’s] personal benefit,

must be reported on Schedule VI.” Id. “[A]ny gift with a fair

market value of $114 or less need not be counted.” Id. Thus,

for example, if a government employee “received a $90 gift and

a $200 item from the same source, neither item would have to be

disclosed, since the $90 gift falls below the $114 aggregation

threshold and the remaining item is valued at less than $285.” 

Id. But a “group of items received from the same source at the

same time are considered one gift and the total value should be

added together.” Id.

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Employees must also report certain travel payments and

reimbursements valued at more than $285 and provided by a

private source on a different attachment, called “Schedule VII.” 

Schedule VII is for “travel (including food and lodging) in

connection with official duties.” Id.

When the time came for Verrusio to submit his financial

disclosure statement for 2003, he did not include information

about the World Series trip on either Schedule VI or VII. 

Although Verrusio answered “yes” to the question on the main

financial disclosure statement asking whether he had “receive[d]

any reportable gift in the reporting period,” App. 404, he left the

attached Schedule VI blank. Verrusio did fill out a Schedule

VII, but he did not include the World Series trip on that

schedule. Id. at 408, 409.

House Ethics Committee4

 staff attorney Paul Lewis

reviewed Verrusio’s financial disclosure statement for 2003. 

Lewis noted in an email to Verrusio that, although Verrusio had

checked “yes” in the box for gifts to be reported on Schedule VI,

“no[] information is reported.” Supp. App. 105-06 (Lewis

Test.). Verrusio responded that the “Schedule VI ‘gifts’ section

should be checked ‘no.’” Id. at 108. Although Lewis twice

asked Verrusio to so amend his disclosure statement, Verrusio

never responded. Id. at 109-12.

4

In 2003, the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct was

colloquially known as the Ethics Committee. The Committee

officially changed its name to the Committee on Ethics at the start of

the 112th Congress.

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C

In September 2008, FBI Special Agent James Harless

contacted Verrusio in connection with the FBI’s investigation

into Jack Abramoff’s lobbying activities. Verrusio initially

denied having been on a trip to New York with Jim Hirni. Supp.

App. 46 (Harless Test.). He also said he had never been offered

tickets to any sporting events by Todd Boulanger, Jim Hirni, or

anyone else lobbying on behalf of United Rentals. Id.

After the agent confronted him with the fact of the 2003

World Series trip, however, Verrusio admitted that “he was

asked to go because Ehrlich and Hirni wanted to get something

done on the United Rentals agenda.” Id. at 47. He also told the

agent that “the trip was not an official trip, that it served no

official purpose.” Id. The agent then asked Verrusio why he did

not disclose the trip on his financial disclosure form. He

initially said that “he had disclosed everything in accordance

with Congressional rules,” but then Verrusio told the agent that

“he knew he should have” disclosed the trip but had not done so. 

Id. at 48-49. He told the agent that, “for him to have included

the trip in the disclosure form, . . . he would have had to have

misrepresented what the trip actually was, meaning he would

have had to have said it was an official trip when, it fact, it

wasn’t an official trip.” Id. at 49. Verrusio “said it was not a

fact-finding trip,” and “that it would not have passed the

scrutiny of the Ethics Office.” Id.

A grand jury indicted Verrusio on March 6, 2009. Count

One alleged that Verrusio conspired to receive illegal gratuities

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Specifically, it charged that

Verrusio and Blackann “agreed to provide favorable official

action to aid [United Rentals] by, among other things, inserting,

or causing others to insert, and protecting from removal, the

three legislative amendments sought by” United Rentals. 

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Indictment ¶ 13(b). Count Two alleged that Verrusio violated

the gratuities statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c), by accepting items of

value “for and because of his official assistance provided and to

be provided to [United Rentals’] efforts to secure favorable

amendments to the Federal Highway Bill.” Id. ¶ 28. Count

Three alleged that Verrusio violated the false statement statute,

18 U.S.C. § 1001, by knowingly and willfully making a

materially false statement on his 2003 financial disclosure form. 

Id. ¶¶ 26-34.

Verrusio moved to dismiss the indictment on all counts for

lack of specificity and failure to state an offense. After the

district court denied the motion, Verrusio asked the court to

reconsider its ruling with respect to Count Two. In a hearing on

that motion, the district court ordered the government to submit

a supplemental brief identifying authorities supporting the

proposition that the alleged official acts were cognizable under

the gratuities statute. App. 165. Instead of submitting a brief,

on June 14, 2010 the government filed a superceding indictment,

which added information to Counts One and Two. As to Count

One, the government added that “Verrusio advised Blackann

that Verrusio and Blackann should wait to insert the

amendments sought by [United Rentals] until later in the

legislative process, and Blackann understood that Verrusio

would insert the amendments at the conference committee stage

of the Highway Bill.” Indictment ¶ 15. As to Count Two, the

government added a “to wit” clause, which detailed five forms

of “official assistance provided and to be provided to [United

Rentals’] efforts to secure favorable amendments to the Federal

Highway Bill,” including “influencing the language of the

Federal Highway Bill.” Id. ¶ 28.5

5

The other forms of official assistance specified in the “to wit”

clause were:

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Verrusio again moved to dismiss Counts One and Two for

failure to allege an “official act” within the meaning of 18

U.S.C. § 201(c). The district court denied the motion, and the

case proceeded to trial. At the close of the evidence, Verrusio

moved for judgment of acquittal. As to Counts One and Two,

he argued that the government had failed to prove the “official

act” element of the gratuities charges; as to Count Three, he

argued that the government had failed to prove the falsity, intent,

and materiality elements of the false statements charge. The

court denied the motion, and the jury subsequently convicted

Verrusio on all counts.

On this appeal, Verrusio contends that: (1) the district court

erred in denying his pretrial motion to dismiss Count Two

because the indictment failed to allege an “official act”; (2) the

b. advising Blackann that [United Rentals’]

amendments should be inserted at the Conference

Committee stage;

c. meeting with Blackann, Ehrlich, and Hirni, and

discussing the Federal Highway Bill during the trip to

New York City;

d. advising Hirni that [United Rentals’] amendments

needed improvement, and offering to discuss the issue

further; and

e. advising Boulanger and Hirni regarding how to

overcome opposition to [United Rentals’] amendments.

Indictment ¶ 28(b)-(e). Because we conclude that the first listed form

of assistance -- “influencing the language of the federal highway bill”

-- satisfies the “official act” requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) and

was supported by sufficient evidence to warrant conviction, we do not

address the other four listed items.

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evidence was insufficient to convict on Counts One and Two

because it failed to show that he conspired to perform or did

perform an official act; (3) the evidence failed to show that he

made a false statement on his financial disclosure form; and (4)

the district court committed reversible error in excluding a

defense exhibit and quashing a defense subpoena. We address

Verrusio’s first two challenges in Part II and his remaining two

challenges in Parts III and IV.

II

The gratuities statute provides, in relevant part, that any

“public official” who:

otherwise than as provided by law for the proper

discharge of official duty . . . directly or indirectly

demands, seeks, receives [or] accepts . . . anything of

value personally for or because of any official act

performed or to be performed by such official . . . shall

be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more

than two years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 201(c). The statute defines “official act” as:

any decision or action on any question, matter, cause,

suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time

be pending, or which may by law be brought before

any public official, in such official’s official capacity. 

Id. § 201(a)(3). The jury convicted Verrusio of violating the

statute (Count Two), and of conspiring with others to violate the

statute (Count One).

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The Supreme Court has explained the difference between

the gratuities offense of § 201(c) and the related bribery offense

of § 201(b) as follows:

The distinguishing feature of each crime is its intent

element. Bribery requires intent ‘to influence’ an

official act or ‘to be influenced’ in an official act, while

illegal gratuity requires only that the gratuity be given

or accepted ‘for or because of’ an official act. In other

words, for bribery there must be a quid pro quo -- a

specific intent to give or receive something of value in

exchange for an official act. An illegal gratuity, on the

other hand, may constitute merely a reward for some

future act that the public official will take (and may

already have determined to take), or for a past act that

he has already taken.

United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 404-05

(1999).

Not all acts that an official performs come within the scope

of the gratuities statute. Verrusio’s arguments on appeal focus

on two cases that have interpreted the meaning of § 201(c),

United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers and Valdes v. United

States, 475 F.3d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).

In Sun-Diamond, the Supreme Court reversed a trade

association’s conviction for giving former Agriculture Secretary

Michael Espy illegal gratuities (including sports tickets,

luggage, and meals) under the parallel subsection of the

gratuities section that is applicable to those who give (rather

than, as here, to those who receive) gratuities. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 201(c)(1)(A). The trial judge had charged the jury that it

could find the association guilty if it “provided Espy with

unauthorized compensation simply because he held public

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office,” and that the “government need not prove that the alleged

gratuity was linked to a specific or identifiable official act or any

act at all.” Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 403. The Supreme Court,

however, held that the prohibition of “gratuities given or

received ‘for or because of any official act performed or to be

performed’ . . . means ‘for or because of some particular official

act,’” and that “the Government must prove a link between a

thing of value conferred upon a public official and a specific

‘official act’ for or because of which it was given.” Id. at 406,

414. It is insufficient, the Court said, that the gift is merely

“given by reason of the donee’s office.” Id. at 408. It is also

insufficient that the gift is given merely “to build a reservoir of

goodwill that might ultimately affect one or more of a multitude

of unspecified acts.” Id. at 405.

In Valdes, this court reversed a police detective’s conviction

for accepting cash for searching police databases for information

requested by an undercover informant. Focusing on the

statutory definition of official act, the court held that the

detective’s actions were not on a “question [or] matter” that

could be described as “‘pending’ or capable of being ‘by

law . . . brought’” before him. 475 F.3d at 1324 (quoting 18

U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)). That definition, the court said, “refers to a

class of questions or matters whose answer or disposition is

determined by the government,” which would “include[] such

questions as ‘Should the Congress enact new legislation

regulating corporate directors?’” Id. “Except in limited

circumstances,” we said, a mere “release of information” does

not come within that class. Id. at 1329. 

In the following subparts, we apply this background to

Verrusio’s challenges to the validity of the indictment and the

sufficiency of the evidence.

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A

Verrusio contends that the district court should have

dismissed Count Two because it omitted an essential element of

the gratuities offense: the allegation of an “official act.” 

Verrusio Br. 37; Reply Br. 4. Because it presents a question of

law, we review this contention de novo. See United States v.

Yakou, 428 F.3d 241, 246 (D.C. Cir. 2005).6

It is certainly true that an indictment must “‘contain[] the

elements of the offense intended to be charged.’” United States

v. Pickett, 353 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Russell v.

United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763 (1962)). But the validity of an

indictment “is not a question of whether it could have been more

definite and certain.” United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374,

378 (1953). Rather, to be sufficient, an indictment need only

inform the defendant of the precise offense of which he is

accused so that he may prepare his defense and plead double

jeopardy in any further prosecution for the same offense. See

Russell, 369 U.S. at 763-64; United States v. Blackley, 167 F.3d

543, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1999).7

Verrusio’s indictment did in fact inform him of the precise

offense of which he was accused, including the “official act”

element. Count Two charged him with “demand[ing], seek[ing],

receiv[ing], [and] accept[ing] . . . a thing of value personally for

6

Although Verrusio’s briefs suggested that he also challenged the

sufficiency of the indictment’s allegations with respect to Count One,

he indicated at oral argument that he did not intend to do so. See Oral

Arg. Recording at 17:35 (Nov. 12, 2013).

7

Because Verrusio does not claim that the indictment was

insufficient to protect him from double jeopardy, we consider only

whether it adequately informed him of the offense alleged.

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18

and because of an official act performed and to be performed by

defendant Verrusio,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(B). 

Indictment ¶ 28 (emphasis added).

Nor was that all the indictment said. Count Two charged

that Verrusio, 

being a public official and otherwise than as provided

by law for the proper discharge of official duty, did

directly and indirectly demand, seek, receive, [and]

accept . . . a thing of value personally for and because

of an official act performed and to be performed by

[him], that is, defendant VERRUSIO did accept a trip

to Game One of the 2003 Baseball World Series in

New York City for and because of his official

assistance provided and to be provided to [United

Rentals’] efforts to secure favorable amendments to the

Federal Highway Bill, to wit: a. influencing the

language of the Federal Highway Bill . . . .

Indictment ¶ 28 (emphasis added). Indeed, the General

Allegations section of the indictment specified the particular

amendments that United Rentals sought:

In particular, Boulanger and Hirni sought three

amendments to the Federal Highway Bill. One

amendment would have encouraged public works

agencies to rent rather than purchase construction

equipment . . . . Another amendment would have

encouraged public works agencies to contract only

with those companies -- such as [United Rentals] --

which had large dollar amounts of liability insurance

coverage . . . . A third amendment would have

encouraged public works agencies to use work zone

USCA Case #11-3080 Document #1507150 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 18 of 39
19

safety systems such as those provided by [United

Rentals].

Id. ¶ 6; see id. ¶ 26 (incorporating General Allegations into

Count Two). Accordingly, not only did Verrusio’s indictment

allege an official act, it specified the particular act that SunDiamond requires.

Verrusio makes two further claims in connection with his

challenge to the indictment. First, he maintains that the only

argument in the government’s appellate brief on this point was

that Count Two sufficiently alleged an “official act” merely by

alleging that Verrusio would provide “official assistance”; that

in so doing the government waived any other argument it might

have had in support of the indictment; and that as a consequence

the indictment must fall because “official assistance” is

insufficiently “specific” under Sun-Diamond. Reply Br. 8-9, 10-

12. Verrusio’s syllogism fails because its premise is incorrect. 

The government did not rest its support of the indictment merely

on “official assistance,” but on a particular kind of assistance. 

The government argued that “the charging language in Count

2 . . . describes the official act as ‘official assistance provided

and to be provided to [United Rentals’] efforts to secure

favorable amendments to the Federal Highway Bill,’” and

pointed out that “Verrusio’s contention that Acts 1 and 3 lack

specificity is beside the point when the specific ‘official act’ is

assisting United Rentals win passage of the amendments.” 

Gov’t Br. 28 (quoting Indictment ¶ 28).

Second, Verrusio contends that Count Two of the

indictment failed to allege an official act because it failed to say

“how Mr. Verrusio was going to use his position” to help United

Rentals. Reply Br. 10. This is necessary, he says, because

Valdes requires that an official act “involved using his official

position to influence the decision-making process.” Id. at 9

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20

(citing Valdes, 475 F.3d at 1324). But whether or not such

specificity is required in an indictment, Verrusio’s indictment

supplied it. As we have noted, one of the official acts specified

in Count Two was assisting in United Rentals’ “efforts to secure

favorable amendments to the Federal Highway Bill,” by, among

other things, “influencing the language of the Federal Highway

Bill.” Indictment ¶ 28. That is certainly a “question[] or

matter[] whose answer or disposition is determined by the

government.” Valdes, 475 F.3d at 1324. Indeed, it is

indistinguishable from the “question or matter” that Valdes gave

as an example of one that plainly comes within the statute: 

“‘Should the Congress enact new legislation regulating

corporate directors?’” Id. Moreover, as the evidence at trial

showed, the question of whether the amendments should be

added to the bill was “pending” before and to be answered (at

least partly) by the committee for which Verrusio was the policy

director. See infra Part II.B.4.

Nothing more (and perhaps less) is sufficient to satisfy

Valdes. The indictment certainly need not allege precisely how

Verrusio contemplated influencing that language. Would he do

it by himself or ask someone else to do it? Would that someone

else be Colonel Mustard or Professor Plum? With a candlestick

or a rope, in the library or the study? Answering those questions

is not required at the indictment stage. Alleging that Verrusio

received gratuities for his official assistance in “securing

favorable amendments” to the federal highway bill by

“influencing [its] language” is sufficiently specific.

In sum, because the indictment alleged that Verrusio

accepted the World Series trip for or because of his official

assistance in influencing the language of the federal highway

bill, the charge contained the required element, and the district

court correctly denied Verrusio’s motion to dismiss.

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21

B

Verrusio also argues that the evidence admitted at trial was

insufficient to convict him on Counts One and Two. Evidence

is sufficient to sustain a verdict if, “viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979). In making that determination, we draw “no distinction

between direct and circumstantial evidence, and giv[e] full play

to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the

evidence and draw justifiable inferences of fact.” United States

v. Branham, 515 F.3d 1268, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Verrusio contends that the evidence

was insufficient in the following respects.8

1. Verrusio’s principal contention is that the evidence failed

to “connect the item of value received by the public official to

a specific official act.” Verrusio Br. 15. No violation of the

gratuities statute occurs, he notes, if “the item of value was

provided because of a public official’s position or for future,

unspecified acts.” Id.

This argument attempts to fit the square peg of this case into

Sun-Diamond’s round hole. As we noted above, the indictment

did not allege that the World Series trip was given merely on

account of Verrusio’s official position or for some unspecified

future action that he might take. See supra Part II.A. Rather, it

charged that Verrusio received the World Series trip “for” his

official assistance in “secur[ing] favorable amendments to the

Federal Highway Bill . . . to wit . . . influencing the language of

8

Because Verrusio does not present any sufficiency arguments

that he contends are unique as to either count, we do not address the

counts separately.

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22

the Federal Highway Bill . . . .” Indictment ¶ 28. And as we

explained above, that allegation is sufficient under Sun-Diamond

to satisfy the “official act” element of the gratuities offense -- if

the government establishes it at trial. See supra Part II.A. In

our view, the government did so.

As set out in Part I, the evidence showed that United

Rentals wanted specific amendments inserted into the thenpending federal highway bill. Lobbyists Boulanger and Hirni

discussed United Rentals’ desired amendments with Senate

staffer Trevor Blackann, who in turn discussed those

amendments with Verrusio. Because of their respective

positions in the Senate and House Committees responsible for

the bill, both Blackann and Verrusio were well situated to help

United Rentals advance its legislative agenda.

Blackann testified that he discussed United Rentals’

legislative agenda with Verrusio because he knew, from his

discussions with Boulanger and Hirni, “that they were also

working with Mr. Verrusio on the same package of

amendments.” App. 220. Blackann said that he and Verrusio

anticipated opposition to United Rentals’ desired amendments,

and that they “discussed the idea of waiting till the last possible

minute legislatively to insert the provisions,” which Blackann

termed the “airmail strategy.” Id. at 221. Verrusio was adamant

that this was the route that United Rentals should take, and

Blackann so advised United Rentals’ lobbyists. Id.

It was after these discussions that United Rentals employee

Ehrlich asked the lobbyists whether “there were any government

officials that [United Rentals] would be interested in taking [to

the World Series] that could be helpful” in advancing the

company’s legislative agenda. App. 188 (Boulanger Test.). 

Together they decided to invite Blackann and Verrusio because

“they were in positions to be helpful . . . [s]pecifically” with

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23

“[t]he United Rentals’ amendments that we were seeking to

include in the highway bill.” Supp. App. 19-20 (Boulanger

Test.). Boulanger knew that Verrusio was “close” to the

chairman of the House Committee and hoped to “influence

him . . . to do some things for our clients.” Id. at 21-22. 

Similarly, Hirni acknowledged that he had used the “tickets in

[an] attempt to influence the Congressional staff for legislation.” 

Id. at 85.

The emphasis on specific legislation continued while the

two lobbyists and the two congressional staffers were in New

York. Over drinks and dinner, the four men “talked a lot about

United Rentals” and “got into a conversation about concepts and

ideas United Rentals had for federal legislation.” Id. at 64

(Hirni Test.). Verrusio “walked them through” the airmail

strategy, indicating that it had “the best chance for ultimate

success.” Id. at 27 (Blackann Test.).

Although the relevant legal issue at trial was what the allexpenses-paid trip was “for” at the time it was given, the jury

was also free to look to post-trip events as circumstantial

confirmation of the parties’ original intentions. See United

States v. Mitchell, 49 F.3d 769, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that

“subsequent acts may sometimes be relevant to the intent

underlying an earlier act”); United States v. Gallo, 543 F.2d 361,

365 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (same). That evidence likewise indicated

that the World Series trip was given for Verrusio’s assistance in

inserting language into the highway bill. Just three days after

the trip, Hirni forwarded Verrusio an email from Boulanger that

“listed a series of legislative items and some legislative text that

United Rentals was now pushing.” Supp. App. 79 (Hirni Test.). 

Soon thereafter, Blackann told Verrusio that his office was

going “to actually work to get something in the Senate version

of the bill.” Id. at 34 (Blackann Test.). According to one of the

lobbyists, Blackann “was integral” to United Rentals’ success in

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24

getting all three of its amendments included in the bill coming

out of the relevant Senate committee. App. 198 (Boulanger

Test.). And while the company was unsuccessful on the House

side, there was nonetheless substantial evidence that Verrusio

also kept trying to help with the language until the very end. See

App. 413 (Hirni email to Moeglein) (stating that Verrusio had

asked him for the language of United Rentals’ amendments

“plus what [it] would want in the perfect world”); id. (stating

that Hirni had sent Verrusio “the language in the Senate bill,

with changes which would represent the 100% victory for”

United Rentals).9

In sum, after hearing all of the evidence, a reasonable juror

could readily have concluded that the World Series trip was

given and received “for or because of some particular official

act” -- that is, for influencing the language of the federal

highway bill -- and not merely “by reason of [Verrusio’s] office”

or merely “to build a reservoir of goodwill that might ultimately

affect one or more of a multitude of unspecified acts,” SunDiamond, 526 U.S. at 405-07 (emphasis added).

2. Verrusio further maintains that the government failed to

establish the intent element of the gratuities offense because

there was insufficient evidence that “the alleged official

acts . . . [were] contemplated when [he] accepted the illegal

gratuity.” Verrusio Br. 15. We conclude, to the contrary, that

the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Verrusio

9

See also Supp. App. 13 (Verrusio email to Boulanger) (“Still

hard at it. Dissenting views still loom with some in leadership. Stay

tuned.”); id. at 14 (Verrusio email to Boulanger) (“Far from a total

mess. No question there are issues, but we still feel good.”); id. at 36-

37 (Blackann Test.) (noting that Verrusio was at the “preconference”

staff meeting at which Blackann, as Senate designee, presented United

Rentals’ amendments to the House).

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25

accepted the gift knowing it was being given for the particular

act of influencing the language of the federal highway bill. 

Indeed, the evidence was also sufficient to find that Verrusio

intended to do so.10

As the evidence set forth above shows, when the

opportunity to give the World Series tickets arose, United

Rentals did so for and because of Verrusio’s anticipated help in

inserting its desired amendments into the bill. The testimony of

Ehrlich, Hirni, and Boulanger was more than sufficient to

10It is doubtful that proof of the latter, heightened level of intent

is required. See Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 404-05 (“The

distinguishing feature of each crime[, bribery and gratuity,] is its intent

element. . . . An illegal gratuity . . . may constitute merely a reward

for some future act that the public official will take (and may already

have determined to take), or for a past act that he has already taken.”

(emphasis added)); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 527

(1972) (“To sustain a [gratuities] conviction it is necessary to show

that appellee solicited, received, or agreed to receive, money with

knowledge that the donor was paying him compensation for an official

act.”); United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1522 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(“A central difference between accepting a bribe and accepting a

gratuity is the degree of culpable intent on the part of the

recipient; . . . to convict for accepting a gratuity the jury need only

find that the defendant acted ‘knowingly and willingly.’” (quoting

United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1982)));

Campbell, 684 F.2d at 150 (indicating that the intent element of the

gratuities offense is satisfied by showing that the defendant “accepted

gifts ‘with knowledge that the donor was paying him compensation for

an official act.’” (quoting Brewster, 408 U.S. at 527)); United States

v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that “[w]hat is

outlawed” by the gratuities offense “is only the knowing and

purposeful receipt by a public official of a payment, made in

consideration of an official act, for himself”).

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26

establish that point.11 Did Verrusio know that was why he was

being offered the tickets? In taking them, did he intend to help

the company in the way it hoped he would? Verrusio was the

policy director for the House Committee with jurisdiction over

the federal highway bill. Before he went on the trip, he had

already discussed, in detail, the amendments United Rentals

wanted with both the company’s lobbyists and with Blackann,

his counterpart in the Senate. See App. 220 (Blackann Test.). 

Together the two had already devised a strategy for how they

might achieve United Rentals’ goals. Surely a reasonable jury

could have concluded that, before getting on the airplane to New

York City, Verrusio knew what the company wanted, knew why

it had turned to him, and indicated that he planned to help. Once

in New York, Verrusio’s active participation in the discussion

of United Rentals’ “concepts and ideas . . . for federal

legislation,” Supp. App. 64 (Hirni Test.), provided further

evidence that he knew he was receiving an illegal gratuity. The

chauffeured car ride, the World Series game, the souvenir

jerseys, and the strip club all came afterwards.

Once again, post-trip events could have provided a

reasonable jury with further confirmation of the parties’ original

intentions. See supra Part II.B.1; see, e.g., Mitchell, 49 F.3d at

11See, e.g., App. 188 (Boulanger testimony that Ehrlich asked the

lobbyists if “there were any government officials that [United Rentals]

would be interested in taking [to the World Series] that could be

helpful” in advancing the company’s legislative agenda); Supp. App.

19-20 (Boulanger testimony that Ehrlich and Boulanger, in

conjunction with Hirni, decided to invite Blackann and Verrusio

because “they were in positions to be helpful . . . [s]pecifically” with

“[t]he United Rentals’ amendments that we were seeking to include in

the highway bill”); id. at 85 (Hirni testimony that he used the World

Series “tickets in [an] attempt to influence the Congressional staff for

legislation”).

USCA Case #11-3080 Document #1507150 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 26 of 39
27

776. That evidence ranged from Hirni forwarding Verrusio --

just three days after the trip -- an email that “listed a series of

legislative items and some legislative text that United Rentals

was now pushing,” Supp. App. 79 (Hirni Test.); to Verrusio

indicating to Hirni that he was “going to be helpful with our

legislative asks,” App. 271 (Hirni Test.); to Verrusio asking

Hirni, three months after the trip, to “give him the language plus

what [United Rentals] would want in the perfect world,” id. at

413 (Hirni email to Moeglein). That evidence also included

Verrusio’s failure to list the trip on his financial disclosure form,

Supp. App. 105-106 (Lewis Test.), and his initial failure to

disclose the nature of the trip to an FBI agent, id. at 46 (Harless

Test.). The jury could have inferred consciousness of guilt from

both of those false statements. See United States v. Shabban,

612 F.3d 693, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding that the defendant

“evidenced consciousness of guilt” by making false statements

about an event). And, of course, the jury heard Verrusio’s

admission to FBI Agent Harless that he was “asked to go” to the

World Series “because Ehrlich and Hirni wanted to get

something done on the United Rentals agenda.” Supp. App. 47

(Harless Test.) 

3. Verrusio’s third argument is that “the government

proved, at most, that Mr. Verrusio shared publicly available

information with lobbyists,” and that the “sharing of information

is not an official act because it does not implicate a public

official using his position to influence decision-making.” 

Verrusio Br. 15.

It is true, as we noted above, that this court has held that,

“[e]xcept in limited circumstances,” the mere “release of

information” does not come within the statutory definition of

“official act.” Valdes, 475 F.3d at 1329. But it does not matter

if, “during the [World Series] trip,” Verrusio’s only acts were to

“provide[] generic advice and publicly-available information

USCA Case #11-3080 Document #1507150 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 27 of 39
28

regarding how United Rentals could achieve its goals.” Reply

Br. 14. The gratuities statute proscribes payments “for or

because of any official act performed or to be performed by

such official.” 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Nor

does it matter whether Verrusio succeeded in influencing the

language -- or even tried to do so. As we explained in Valdes,

“the anti-gratuity provision has no requirement that the payment

actually influence the performance of an official act.” 475 F.3d

at 1322 (internal quotation marks omitted). What matters is

what the gift was contemplated for at the time it was given. And

for the reasons set forth above, a reasonable jury could readily

have concluded the World Series trip was contemplated for the

particular act of getting United Rentals’ language into the

federal highway bill.

4. Finally, Verrusio suggests that he could not have received

a payment for “influencing the language of the Federal Highway

Bill” because he was not responsible for drafting legislation or

deciding whether it would get into the bill. This is the same

argument we rejected in United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 460

(D.C. Cir. 2013), another case involving Jack Abramoff’s

lobbying team. Ring was charged with paying an illegal gratuity

when he gave Washington Wizards basketball tickets to a

Justice Department attorney as a reward for helping to expedite

review of a visa application. Ring’s defense was that the

attorney lacked decisionmaking authority with respect to visa

applications, and that all the attorney did (or could do) was to

call a secretary at the Immigration and Naturalization Service

(INS), who in turned passed on the request to various INS

officials, who ultimately agreed to expedite the application. Id.

at 469. In rejecting Ring’s defense, we held:

[T]he attorney acted in his official capacity to influence

the visa application process . . . . To be sure, the

attorney himself lacked independent authority to

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29

expedite visa applications. But Ring’s attempt to

import a requirement that the official in question have

ultimate decisionmaking authority into the definition of

“official act” has no statutory basis.

Id. at 470 (citations omitted).

As policy director of the House Committee with jurisdiction

over the federal highway bill, Verrusio was well-positioned to

influence its language. See App. 188-91 (Boulanger Test.);

Supp. App. 22 (Blackann Test.); id. at 46 (Harless Test.).

Blackann testified that “Mr. Verrusio, he’s the policy director

for the whole committee, so he’s kind of got the umbrella

authority overall of the subcommittees. . . . [Verrusio] is the

guy, based on his position, that could come in at the last minute

with Chairman Young’s last-minute priorities. . . . He had the

ability to come in at the last minute and do something different.” 

Supp. App. 43. Indeed, Blackann testified that Verrusio was

there at the “last minute” -- at the “preconference” staff meeting

at which Blackann presented the United Rentals provisions of

the Senate bill to the House. Id. at 37. All of this was sufficient

evidence of Verrusio’s ability to influence the content of the

highway bill, even if he did not have ultimate authority to

determine its final language. Cf. United States v. Carson, 464

F.2d 424, 433 (2d Cir. 1972) (“There is no doubt that federal

bribery statutes have been construed to cover any situation in

which the advice or recommendation of a Government employee

would be influential, irrespective of the employee’s specific

authority (or lack of same) to make a binding decision.”

(citations omitted)). 

Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence

to sustain Verrusio’s convictions on Counts One and Two.

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30

III

Verrusio also contends that the evidence was insufficient to

sustain his conviction on Count Three for making a false

statement on his 2003 financial disclosure statement. He makes

two arguments in support of that proposition.

A

At trial, Verrusio’s principal argument was that, although

the indictment charged that he made a false statement on

Schedule VI (gifts) of his financial disclosure form, the evidence

introduced at trial only showed that he should have reported

some of the World Series items on Schedule VII (official travel). 

The two premises of this argument were that the travel-related

expenses (transportation, meals, lodging) were reportable on

Schedule VII, and that the value of the remaining items (the strip

club, World Series tickets, jerseys) did not meet the reporting

threshold for Schedule VI. See Trial Tr. 112-16 (Feb. 7, 2011

p.m.). As a consequence, Verrusio contended, there was nothing

false about his failure to fill out Schedule VI. He repeats that

argument on appeal.

The government responds by challenging the first premise,

maintaining that all of the items should have been reported on

Schedule VI, not VII.12 To this, Verrusio replies that there was

no evidence upon which the jury could “differentiate between

reportable ‘gifts’ and ‘travel’” because “no witness -- expert or

otherwise -- testified with specific knowledge about what gifts

are reportable on Schedule VI.” Reply Br. 14-15. Verrusio is

wrong. The jury was presented with sufficient evidence

12Because the government does not challenge the second premise

on appeal, and because it is not necessary to our disposition, we do not

address it.

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31

regarding which information had to be reported on Schedule VI

and which on Schedule VII, as well as with sufficient evidence

to support the charge that he should have reported all of the

items from the World Series trip on Schedule VI.

 First, the court admitted the instructions for Schedule VI as

an exhibit. Those instructions explain the difference between

the two schedules. The instructions state that employees must

report gifts from a single source totaling more than $285 on

Schedule VI. “All types of gifts, including travel-related

expenses provided for [the employee’s] personal benefit, must

be reported on Schedule VI.” App. 423 (emphasis added). By

contrast, the instructions explain, Schedule VII is for privately

funded “travel (including food and lodging) in connection with

official duties.” Id. (emphasis added).

Second, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to

conclude that the trip and its related expenses were for

Verrusio’s “personal benefit,” and not “in connection with

official duties.” In particular, the jury heard Verrusio’s

statements to the FBI: Verrusio admitted “that he knew he

should have” disclosed the trip, and further admitted that it

“wasn’t an official trip.” Supp. App. 49 (Harless Test.). 

Blackann likewise testified that the trip was not for official

business. Id. at 44. So, too, did Hirni and Ehrlich. See App.

251 (Hirni Test.); id. at 287 (same); Supp. App. 88 (Ehrlich

Test.). And, of course, Verrusio did not report the trip on

Schedule VII either.

B

Verrusio also maintains that a reasonable juror could not

have found that the failure to disclose the trip and related

expenses was “material” because “[t]here was no testimony as

to how, if at all, the information disclosed in the [financial

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32

disclosure] statements could have influenced the action of the

Ethics Committee.” Verrusio Br. 51. An essential element of

the false statement offense of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) is that the

statement be “materially false.” United States v. Moore, 612

F.3d 698, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2010). A statement “need not actually

influence an agency in order to be material; it need only have ‘a

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing’ an

agency function or decision.” Id. at 701-02 (quoting United

States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)). Nor must the

government “present any testimony or other evidence

specifically for the purpose of establishing the materiality of [the

defendant’s] false statement.” Id. at 702. Rather, the jury can

infer from other evidence that the false statement “was capable

of affecting” the agency’s functions. Id.

In this case, the jury could reasonably have inferred that

Verrusio’s false statement on his 2003 financial disclosure form

was material. The form specifically stated that it “will be

reviewed by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct or

its designee.” App. 404. Committee attorney Paul Lewis

further testified that the Committee told its staff to determine

whether financial disclosure statements were “accurate,”

“complete,” and “complied with applicable laws and rules.” 

Supp. App. 95 (Lewis Test.). From this, the jury could

reasonably conclude that, by omitting items required to be listed

on the form and falsely certifying that it was nonetheless “true,

complete and correct,” App. 404, Verrusio interfered with the

Ethics Committee’s ability to perform its function of monitoring

compliance with relevant rules. Verrusio’s omissions plainly

affected the functions of staff attorney Lewis, who had to follow

up with Verrusio repeatedly regarding the inconsistencies in his

disclosure forms. See Supp. App. 105-12 (Lewis Test.). And

Verrusio himself admitted to the FBI that, had he listed the trip

on the form, it “would not have passed the scrutiny of the Ethics

Office.” Id. at 49 (Harless Test.). Cf. United States v. Stadd,

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636 F.3d 630, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding that the defendant’s

misrepresentation about a conflict of interest in an email to

agency counsel was material because, if the defendant “had

accurately reported the substance” of his conflict, he “would

have raised red flags that would have led [the agency lawyer] to

inquire further”); Moore, 612 F.3d at 702 (holding that the jury

could reasonably have inferred that the defendant’s signing of a

false name on a postal service delivery form “was capable of

affecting the Postal Service’s general function of tracking

packages and identifying the recipients of packages entrusted to

it”).

IV

In this Part, we address Verrusio’s contentions that the

district court committed reversible error by excluding a defense

exhibit and quashing a defense subpoena.

A

 Verrusio contends that the district court committed

reversible error when it excluded the instructions for Schedule

VII of the financial disclosure statement. As noted in Part III.A,

the theory of Verrusio’s defense was that several of the expenses

relating to the World Series trip were not personal gifts, which

must be disclosed on Schedule VI, but rather were travel

expenses related to his official duties, which instead belonged on

Schedule VII. On that theory, Schedule VI did not contain any

false statements. Accordingly, Verrusio sought to introduce the

instructions for Schedule VII into evidence.

Although the district court admitted Verrusio’s entire

financial disclosure statement, including Schedule VII, and also

admitted the instructions for Schedule VI, it excluded the

Schedule VII instructions on relevance grounds. See App. 316-

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34

17. In that respect, the court erred, because the instructions --

which discussed the difference between Schedules VI and VII --

were relevant to Verrusio’s defense. Nonetheless, that error

helps Verrusio only if it was not harmless. See FED.R.CRIM. P.

52(a). And because the alleged error “did not involve a

constitutional right,” it is harmless “as long as ‘it did not have

a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict.’” United States v. Stubblefield, 643 F.3d 291,

296-97 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States,

328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); see United States v. Powell, 334 F.3d

42, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2003). We conclude that the error was

harmless.

As we have noted, the Schedule VI instructions, which were

admitted into evidence, read: “All types of gifts, including

travel-related expenses provided for your personal benefit, must

be reported on Schedule VI. However, travel (including food

and lodging) in connection with official duties is reported

separately on Schedule VII.” App. 423. Given that instruction,

Verrusio was able to (and did) present to the jury his theory that

the expenses he failed to report on Schedule VI involved travel

in connection with his official duties and hence were not

reportable on Schedule VI. See Trial Tr. 84 (Feb. 7, 2011 p.m.). 

There was, however, more than enough evidence for the jury to

reject this theory. See supra Part III.A.

The remaining question is whether there was anything in the

Schedule VII instructions that was not in the Schedule VI

instructions and that harmed Verrusio’s defense by its absence. 

The non-admitted Schedule VII instructions state, in pertinent

part:

[Y]ou must disclose in this section travel for such

activities as speaking engagements, conferences, or

fact-finding events related to official duties. You must

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35

also disclose privately paid travel that, while not

related to your official duties, was not provided merely

for your personal benefit; for example, travel paid for

by corporations that you or your family own, travel that

is necessary in connection with your service as an

officer or board member of any organization, and

travel for job interviews must be disclosed here. . . . In

contrast, travel-related expenses provided merely for

your personal benefit (for example, a vacation paid for

by a personal friend) are subject to the reporting

requirements for Schedule VI.

App. 424. Of the specific items that the instruction lists as

reportable on Schedule VII, the only one that Verrusio might

have argued applied to the New York trip was that it was a

“fact-finding event[] related to official duties.” But nothing

precluded Verrusio from making that claim to the jury using the

admitted instruction, which stated that “travel (including food

and lodging) in connection with official duties is reported

separately on Schedule VII.”

The additional advantage of having an instruction stating

specifically that a “fact-finding event[] related to official duties”

was reportable on Schedule VII, when there was an admitted

instruction saying that “travel . . . in connection with official

duties” was reportable on that Schedule, was minimal. That is

particularly so considering that no witness testified the trip was

“related to official duties” at all. Three witnesses specifically

said it was not. See App. 222-23 (Blackann Test.); Supp. App.

44 (same); App. 251 (Hirni Test.); id. at 287 (same); Supp. App.

88 (Ehrlich Test.). Moreover, Verrusio himself told the FBI that

“it was not a fact-finding trip.” Supp. App. 49 (Harless Test.). 

And, of course, he did not report the trip on Schedule VII (or

VI).

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Verrusio also contends that he was prejudiced because the

non-admitted Schedule VII instructions state that pre-approval

of a trip by the Ethics Committee is not required. But the

government did not argue that pre-approval of the World Series

trip was required, and testimony and defense argument

underscored that point. See App. 222 (Blackann Test.); Supp.

App. 151-52 (defense closing argument). Accordingly, neither

this nor any of the preceding arguments persuades us that the

exclusion of the Schedule VII instructions had “a substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,”

Stubblefield, 643 F.3d at 296-97 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

B

Verrusio subpoenaed Vivian Moeglein, the former

legislative director for Congressman John Boozman, seeking her

testimony that Verrusio did not press her to act in United

Rentals’ favor. Moeglein moved to quash on the ground that her

testimony was privileged under the Speech or Debate Clause,

see U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6, and the district court agreed. 

Verrusio now contends that the protection of the Speech or

Debate Clause is not absolute, and that the court should have

balanced his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights against the

Speech or Debate Clause privilege and found that his rights

prevailed. Alternatively, Verrusio contends that the district

court should have granted his motion to dismiss the indictment

because the unavailability of the witness deprived him of his

ability to present a defense.

As Verrusio conceded at oral argument, he has waived the

first contention. Oral Arg. Recording at 38:58-41:01. At trial,

Verrusio’s counsel told the court that “the defense fully

recognizes the high hurdle that the Speech or Debate clause

imposes here, and we really don’t have many quibbles with

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House counsel’s brief,” which argued that the Speech or Debate

privilege was absolute. App. 336.

Because Verrusio waived this argument, any error was

extinguished. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733

(1993). But even if we were to regard the argument as merely

forfeited rather than waived, it would still fail under the plain

error standard of review. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S.

461, 467 (1997). Verrusio points to no case in which any court

has found that a defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights

trump the Speech or Debate Clause privilege, and he

acknowledges that this is “an issue that has apparently never

been directly confronted by any court.” Verrusio Br. 39. In

such circumstances, an error cannot be plain. See United States

v. Nwoye, 663 F.3d 460, 466 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Absent

controlling precedent on the issue or some other absolutely clear

legal norm, the district court committed no plain error.” (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly, we affirm

the district court’s decision to quash the subpoena for

Moeglein’s testimony without deciding whether it was

erroneous.

Although Verrusio did not waive his second contention, it

also fails. Repeating an argument that he raised before the case

went to the jury, App. 365, 369, Verrusio contends that the

district court should have dismissed the indictment because

quashing Moeglein’s subpoena deprived him of material

evidence, thereby violating his rights to compulsory process and

due process. To establish a compulsory process violation, a

defendant must show “more than the mere absence of

testimony.” United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858,

867 (1982). Rather, he must make “some showing that the

evidence lost would be both material and favorable to the

defense.” Id. at 873. A “witness’ testimony is material [only]

if its absence actually prejudiced the defendant’s ability to

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mount a defense.” United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640, 662

(D.C. Cir. 1995); see id. at 663 n.14; Valenzuela-Bernal, 458

U.S. at 867-69. And “at least the same materiality requirement

obtains with respect to a due process claim.” ValenzuelaBernal, 458 U.S. at 872.

Verrusio has not shown that Moeglein’s testimony was

material in the above sense. He contends that he could have

“elicit[ed] testimony from [her] about her interactions with

Hirni, including his offer to buy her lunch and his offer of

tickets to a sporting event.” Reply Br. 24 (citing trial proffer). 

But the fact that the lobbyist offered other staffers gifts hardly

exculpates Verrusio, whether or not those gifts constituted

illegal gratuities. Verrusio also proffers that Moeglein would

have said “that Mr. Verrusio was not in fact inserting himself in

the process, that he was not placing the pressure on her, that she

independently was communicating with Mr. Hirni, and that she

has no recollection of any pressure being put on her by Mr.

Verrusio.” Id. (quoting App. 342). But as we explained above,

see supra Part II.B.3, the government was not required to show

that Verrusio took any affirmative steps to add United Rentals’

amendments to the federal highway bill, let alone that he

pressured Moeglein to act in United Rentals’ favor. Moreover,

even if the proffer were accurate, the fact that Verrusio did not

pressure one staffer is no (or, at best, extraordinarily weak)

evidence that he did not try to influence others.

Finally, we note that, after the court quashed the subpoena,

it went on to consider whether to strike two previously admitted

email chains between Moeglein and Hirni. The issue was

resolved when the parties instead agreed to redact Moeglein’s

statements from the email chains, strike testimony discussing

those statements, and preclude argument about her conduct. 

App. 361-62, 366-68. Verrusio still argued that he needed

Moeglein as a witness to explain the statements that Hirni made

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39

to her in emails. But the redactions greatly, if not entirely,

mitigated the value of her testimony, given that the “speaker” in

the emails -- Hirni -- testified at trial and was subject to crossexamination. Verrusio has not suggested what kind of

admissible testimony Moeglein could have offered to explain

Hirni’s statements. And he has proffered nothing to suggest that

his inability to put Moeglein on the stand “actually prejudiced

[his] ability to mount a defense.” Dean, 55 F.3d at 662.

Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s denial of

Verrusio’s motion to dismiss the indictment.

V

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Verrusio’s

indictment did not omit an essential element of the charges

against him, that the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain

his convictions, and that Verrusio was not prejudiced by the

district court’s decisions to exclude a defense exhibit and quash

a defense subpoena. The judgment of the district court is

therefore

Affirmed.

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