Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00707/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00707-31/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
El Rancho Farms
Defendant
Garza Contracting, Inc.
Neutral
Angelica Rosales
Plaintiff
Margarita Rosales
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiffs Margarita Rosales and Angelica Rosales1seek final preliminary approval of a class 

settlement reached with El Rancho Farms and Garza Contracting Inc. (Doc. 184) In addition, Plaintiffs 

seek an award of attorneys’ fees and costs, claims administration costs, and class representative 

enhancement payments from the settlement fund. (Doc. 185) 

Because Plaintiffs carry their burden to demonstrate certification of the Settlement Class is 

 

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The true and correct name of “Angelica Rosales” is “Maria Lorena Corza Alvarado,” though she is known as 

“Lorena Corza.” Ms. Corza reports she used the name of her daughter, “Angelica Rosales,” while working at El Rancho. 

(Doc. 35-7 at 3). Therefore, the Court will refer to plaintiff “Angelica Rosales” as “Lorena Corza.”

MARGARITA ROSALES, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

v.

EL RANCHO FARMS, et al.,

Defendants.

ANGEL LOPEZ CRUZ, et al., 

 Plaintiffs,

v.

EL RANCHO FARMS, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case Nos.: 1:09-cv-00707-AWI-JLT

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS 

SETTLEMENT (Doc. 184) 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

FOR ATTORNEY FEES (Doc. 185)

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appropriate under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that the settlement terms are fair, 

reasonable, and adequate, the Court recommends that Plaintiffs’ request for final approval of the 

Settlement be GRANTED. In addition, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s request for attorney fees 

be GRANTED in the modified amount of $690,089.65; costs be awarded in the amount of $36,620.54;

and Plaintiffs’ request for enhancement payments be GRANTED in the modified amount of $7,500 for 

Margarita Rosales and Lorena Corza, and $4,000 for Angel Lopez Cruz and Angelica Alvarez.

BACKGROUND

On March 5, 2004, Arnaldo Lara, Mario Laveaga, Mirna Diaz, Paula Leon, and Raul Diaz, 

individually and acting for the interests of the general public, (“Lara Plaintiffs”) initiated an action in 

the Kern County Superior Court against Rogelio Casimiro, doing business as Golden Grain Farm 

Labor.2 On September 12, 2005, the Lara Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint and identified 

other employers of agricultural farm workers as defendants, including El Rancho Farms; Stevco, Inc.; 

Lucich Family Farms; and Castlerock Farming and Transport, Inc. 

On November 9, 2005, Plaintiffs’ counsel initiated an action against table grape growers based 

in Kern County, including D.M. Camp & Sons; Marko Zaninovich, Inc.; Sunview Vineyards of 

California, Inc.; and Giumarra Vineyards Corporation.3 (Doe v. D.M. Camp & Sons, Case No. 1:05-

cv-1417-AWI-SMS, Doc. 2) At the time the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs were unnamed former 

and current employees of the defendants. (See id.) On December 6, 2005, the plaintiffs filed a First 

Amended Complaint, identifying additional defendants, including El Rancho Farms. (Doe, Doc. 9) 

The Court acknowledged the Doe matter was related to several other cases initiated against grape 

growers. See Doe v. D.M. Camp & Sons, 624 F.Supp.2d 1153 (E.D. Cal. 2008). 

Defendants in Doe, including El Rancho Farms, filed motions to dismiss, which were granted 

 

2 The Court may take notice of facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources 

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 

(9th Cir. 1993). The record of a court proceeding is a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, and judicial 

notice may be taken of court records. Mullis v. United States Bank. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987); Valerio v. 

Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Colonial Penn 

Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236m 1239 (4th Cir. 1989); Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 615 F.2d 736, 738 (6th Cir. 

1980). Therefore, judicial notice is taken of the original Complaint and the Second Amended Complaint filed in Lara v. 

Casimiro, case number S-1500-CV-252445-SPC. In addition, judicial notice is taken of the state court’s docket of the 

Lara action, available at http://www.kern.courts.ca/gov.

3

For the reasons set forth above in Footnote 2, judicial notice is taken of the Court’s docket in Doe v. D.M. Camp 

& Sons, Case No. 1:05-cv-01417-AWI-SMS.

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by the Court on March 31, 2008. (Doe, Docs. 81, 168) In addition, the Court granted motions to sever 

the action, and the Court ordered the plaintiffs to file amended pleadings against each defendant. (Id.)

On May 29, 2008, “Angelica Rosales” and Margarita Rosales were identified as plaintiffs in the Third 

Amended Complaint against El Rancho Farms. (Doe, Doc. 173) On March 31, 2009, the Court 

ordered Plaintiffs to re-file in a new action within twenty days to finalize severance. (Doe, Doc. 241)

On April 20, 2009, Plaintiffs filed their complaint against El Rancho Farms, alleging: violations

of the Agricultural Workers Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1801; failure to pay wages; failure to pay 

reporting time wages; failure to provide meal and rest periods; failure to pay wages of terminated or 

resigned employees; knowing and intentional failure to comply with itemized employee wage statement 

provisions; penalties under Labor Code § 2699, et seq.; breach of contract; and violation of unfair 

competition law. (Doc. 1) Plaintiffs brought the action “on behalf of Plaintiffs and members of the 

Plaintiff Class comprising all non-exempt agricultural, packing shed, and storage cooler employees 

employed, or formerly employed, by each of the Defendants within the State of California.” (Id. at 4)

In compliance with the Court’s deadline for seeking class certification, Rosales and Corza filed 

a motion on September 9, 2011. (Doc. 33) Rosales and Corza sought certification of classes for unpaid 

rest breaks, untimely rest and meal breaks, off-the-clock work, and tool reimbursement. Each class

included “fieldworkers employed or jointly employed by El Rancho.” (Id.) However, Rosales and 

Corza failed to show El Rancho was a joint employer of the fieldworkers, as required by the class 

definitions. Further, they failed to demonstrate they worked a pure piece rate basis, and the Court 

found Rosales and Corza lacked standing to represent the unpaid rest break class. Finally, conflicting 

evidence defeated certification of the remaining classes. The recommendations were adopted in full on 

January 31, 2012, and the motion for class certification was denied. (Doc. 56)

Rosales and Corza filed a motion for reconsideration based upon additional evidence, seeking to 

demonstrate El Rancho and Garza Contracting were joint employers. (Doc. 60) Plaintiffs “abandoned 

the allegations of rest break violations to focus on the meal schedule” and abandoned claims of workers 

employed at El Rancho by farm labor contractors other than Garza. (Doc. 95 at 5) On July 6, 2012, the 

Court found the evidence presented by Plaintiffs was not new, and “[r]econsideration of the issues 

based upon new evidence is not warranted.” (Doc. 95 at 4) Further, the Court affirmed its prior order 

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denying certification of classes based unpaid rest breaks, untimely rest and meal breaks, off-the-clock 

work, and tool reimbursement. (Id. at 9) However, the Court granted Plaintiffs leave “to file a second 

motion for class certification with respect to meal periods of Garza employees who worked at El 

Rancho facilities.” (Id.) Accordingly, Rosales and Corza filed a second motion for class certification on 

July 26, 2012. (Doc. 96)

The Court found the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were 

satisfied, and recommended a class be certified for only for the meal break claim. (Doc. 106) These 

recommendations were adopted in full, and the class defined as: “All employees of Garza Contracting, 

Inc. who worked at El Rancho Farms facilities from 11/9/2001 through 12/31/2008 and who were 

provided a 12:00 noon meal break on shifts starting before 7:00 a.m.” (Doc. 112) Rosales and Corza 

were appointed as class representatives, and the law firm of Mallison & Martinez was appointed as 

Class Counsel. (Id. at 6) 

Following the Court’s determination that Rosales and Corza lacked standing to represent a class 

for rest break violations, Angel Lopez Cruz and Angelica Alvarez initiated an action against El Rancho 

Farms and Garza for failure to provide rest periods on November 28, 2012. (Case No. 1:12-cv-1934-

AWI-JLT (“Cruz”) Doc. 1) In addition, Cruz and Alvarez asserted El Rancho and Garza were liable 

for violations of the Agricultural Workers Protection Act, failure to pay wages, failure to pay wages of 

terminated or resigned employees, knowing and intentional failure to comply with itemized employee 

wage statement provisions; penalties under Labor Code § 2699, and violation of unfair competition 

law—similar to the claims presented by Rosales and Corza. (See id.) El Rancho and Garza filed 

motions to dismiss, arguing the action was duplicative in nature and “an attempt by plaintiffs to certify 

a subclass that was previously denied certification.” (See Cruz, Doc. 13 at 2) Although the motions 

were taken under submission, the Court did not have the opportunity to issue a ruling.

On June 20, 2014, the parties filed a Notice of Settlement, reporting they “participated in a 

private mediation session on June 11, 2014 with a private mediator, David Rudy,” and were “in the 

final stages of negotiating a Proposed Settlement Agreement.” (Doc. 159 at 1-2) Given the similarities 

between the claims presented in Rosales v. El Rancho Farms (Case No. 1:09-cv-00707-AWI-JLT) and 

Cruz v. El Rancho Farms (Case No. 1:12-cv-1934-AWI-JLT), the parties mediated the actions together. 

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(Doc. 161 at 4) 

The Court granted preliminary approval of the proposed settlement on November 26, 2014. 

(Doc. 173) The Settlement Class was defined as: “all persons who have been employed or jointly 

employed by Garza Contracting at El Rancho Farms facilities between November 9, 2001 and June 11, 

2014.” (Doc. 165 at 16; Settlement § I.D) In addition, Margarita Rosales, Lorena Corza, Angel Lopez 

Cruz, and Angelica Alvarez were appointed the Class Representatives, and authorized to seek 

enhancement payments up to $10,000 for their representation of the class. (Doc. 173 at 22) Stan 

Mallison and Hector Martinez were appointed as Class Counsel, and authorized to seek fees that did

not “exceed 33 1/3% of the gross settlement amount” and “costs up to $50,000.” (Id.) Gilardi and Co., 

LLC was appointed the Settlement Administrator. (Id.) On December 8, 2014, the Court approved the 

Class Notice Packet that conveyed this information to class members. (Doc. 177)

On January 9, 2015, the parties requested a sixty-day extension of time to prepare the class data 

and provide it to the Settlement Administrator. (Doc. 178) The Court approved an extension of time, 

and directed Plaintiff to prepare and file an amended notice to the class. (Doc. 179) However, in April 

2015, the parties informed the Court that the estimated number of class members increased from 3,000 

to approximately 6,900. (Doc. 182 at 3) Therefore, the parties requested a further extension of the 

deadlines related to the class notice, which was granted. (Doc. 183)

On April 20, 2015, the Settlement Administrator mailed the Class Notice Packet to class 

members. (Doc. 184-3 at 2, McGill Decl. ¶ 3) The Postal Service returned 1,224 of the packets to the 

Settlement Administrator. (Id., ¶ 5) Gilardi sought new addresses and re-served 552 of the Notice 

Packets, of which 70 were again retuned as undeliverable. (Id.) As of July 10, 2015, the Settlement 

Administrator “received 992 timely claim forms and 48 late claim forms.” (Doc. 198-1 at 2, McGill 

Supp. Decl. ¶ 3) No objections were filed with the Court or mailed to the Settlement Administrator. 

(Doc. 184-3 at 4, McGill Decl. ¶ 14)

Plaintiffs filed the motion for final approval of the class settlement terms on June 19, 2015. 

(Doc. 184) In addition, Plaintiffs filed their motion for attorneys’ fees costs, and class representative 

enhancement payments on June 26, 2015. (Doc. 185) Defendants filed an opposition to the Settlement 

on July 2, 2015, asserting uncashed checks should be distributed to cy pres beneficiaries of Defendants’ 

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choosing, rather than Plaintiff’s choice. (Doc. 195) Plaintiffs filed a brief in reply on July 13, 2015.4

(Doc. 199)

THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT

Pursuant to the proposed settlement (“the Settlement”), the parties agree to a gross settlement 

totaling $2,300,000. (Doc. 184-1 at 7; Doc. 166-1 at 3, Settlement § I.S) El Rancho and Garza agree to 

fund the Settlement for a class including “all persons who have been employed or jointly employed by 

Garza Contracting at El Rancho Farms facilities between November 9, 2001 and June 11, 2014.” (Doc. 

166-1 at 1; Settlement § I.D) Defendants agreed to fund the Settlement no later than January 31, 2015. 

(Doc. 166-1 at 13, Settlement § III.I.6)

I. Payment Terms

The gross settlement fund will cover payments to class members with additional compensation 

to the Class Representatives. (Doc. 166-1 at 5-6, Settlement § III.B) Further, the Settlement provides 

for payments to Class Counsel for attorneys’ fees and expenses, to the Settlement Administrator, and 

the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency. (Id.) Specifically, the Settlement provides 

for the following payments from the gross settlement amount:

• The Class Representatives will receive up to $10,000 each;

• Class counsel will receive no more than $766,667 for attorneys’ fees, which equals

33.33% of the gross settlement amount, and $50,000 for expenses;

• The California Labor and Workforce Development Agency shall receive $30,000

from the award pursuant to PAGA; and

• The Settlement Administrator will receive compensation for its fees and expenses.

(Doc. 166-1 at 5-6, Settlement § III.B) After these payments have been made, the remaining money 

(“Net Settlement Amount”) will be distributed as settlement shares to Class Members. (Id.)

To receive a settlement share from the Net Settlement Amount, a class member must submit a 

 

4

Plaintiffs’ reply brief was untimely. Pursuant to Local Rule 203(d), a party may file a reply “[n]ot less than 

seven (7) days preceding the date of hearing.” Seemingly, counsel is unaware of the lateness of Plaintiffs’ response given 

they offer absolutely no explanation for the late filing, do not seek leave for the filing of the late reply and do not, even, 

argue that the late filing should be considered.

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timely and valid claim form.5 According to Plaintiff’s preferred methodology, settlement shares will 

be calculated based upon: 

(a) that Claimant’s total pay periods (or if necessary, the number of Months of 

Employment) during the Class Period (b) divided by the aggregate number of pay 

periods (or if necessary, the number of Months of Employment) of all Participating 

Class Members (all class member claims) during the Class Period (with the division 

rounded to four decimal places) (c) multiplied by the value of the Net Settlement 

Amount.

(Doc. 166-1 at 7, Settlement § III.F.1) Under Defendant’s proposal, a claimant’s total pay period is 

divided by the total number of pay periods placed at issue in the complaint and then multiplied by the 

Net Settlement Amount. (Doc. 166-1 at 7, Settlement § III.G.1) Consequently, under Plaintiff’s 

methodology the exact amount each Class Member would receive depends upon the aggregate number 

of pay periods worked by all of those who submitted timely and valid claim forms. Under 

Defendants’ proposal, the amount each claimant would receive depends entirely on the number of pay 

periods the member worked. For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s 

methodology be adopted.

II. Releases

The Settlement provides that Rosales, Corza, Cruz, and Alvarez (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) and 

Class Members, other than those who elect not to participate in the Settlement, at the time final 

judgment is entered, shall release Defendants El Rancho and Garza from the claims arising in the class 

period. Specifically, the release for class members provides:

As of the date of the Judgment, all Participating Class Members hereby fully and 

finally release Defendants, and their partners, owners, subsidiaries, employees, 

officers, directors, agents, attorneys, stockholders, fiduciaries, other service providers, 

and assigns, from any and all claims, known and unknown, for or related to all claims 

based on or arising from the allegations that they were or are improperly compensated 

under federal, California, or local law (the “Class’s Released Claims”). The Class’s 

Released Claims are limited to the time period November 9, 2001 to June 11, 2014 for 

claims for alleged unpaid wages, overtime compensation, missed meal-period and restbreak wages or penalties, and interest; related penalties, recordkeeping penalties, paystub penalties, minimum-wage penalties, missed meal-period and rest-break penalties, 

and waiting-time penalties; and costs and attorneys’ fees and expenses. The Class 

Member’s Released Claims include all claims arising from or related to the matters 

alleged in the Actions, or that could have been alleged in the Actions.

 

5

Although Plaintiffs reported Defendants did not agree upon the proposed claim procedure, El Rancho reported it 

did “not prefer the direct delivery of checks over a claims procedure, or vice versa.” (Doc. 171-1 at 4)

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(Doc. 166-1 at 15, Settlement § III.J.2) The release for Plaintiffs encompasses more claims than the 

release of Class Members, because Plaintiffs release any claims that could have arisen during the 

course of their employment with Defendants. (Id., Settlement § III.J.1) Specifically, Plaintiffs’

release provides:

As of the date of the Judgment, Plaintiffs and their Counsel hereby fully and finally 

release Defendants, and their partners, owners, subsidiaries, employees, officers, 

directors, agents, attorneys, stockholders, fiduciaries, other service providers, and 

assigns, from any and all claims, known and unknown, including but not limited to 

claims arising from or related to their employment or claimed employment with 

Defendants, their compensation while employed as Defendants’ employee, under 

federal, state and/or local law, statute, ordinance, regulation, common law, or other 

source of law (the “Plaintiffs’ Released Claims”). The Plaintiffs’ Released Claims 

include, but are not limited to, all claims arising from or related to the matters alleged, 

or that could have been alleged in the Actions. The Plaintiffs’ Released Claims include 

all such claims covering the time period November 9, 2001 to June 11, 2014 for 

unpaid wages, including overtime compensation, missed meal-period and rest-break 

wages, and interest; penalties, including but not limited to, recordkeeping penalties, 

pay-stub penalties, minimum-wage penalties, missed meal-period and rest-break 

penalties, and waiting-time penalties; and attorneys’ fees and expenses. The Plaintiffs’ 

Released Claims include all claims arising from or related to the matters alleged in the 

Actions, or that could have been alleged in the Actions.

(Id., emphasis added) Thus, claims released by Plaintiffs, but not Class Members, include any claims 

arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. 

III. Service of the Notice Packets and Responses Received

The Court ordered the Settlement Administrator to mail the Class Notice Packet to the class 

members no later than April 20, 2015. (See Doc. 183 at 3) The Class Notice Packet—including the 

Class Notice, Claim Form and Exclusion Request Form—explained the nature of the action, the class 

definition approved by the Court, the claims and issues to be resolved, the deadlines applicable to Class 

Members, and the binding effect of a class judgment. Each class member received an estimate of his or 

her settlement based upon the months of employment. (See generally Doc. 180) In addition, the Class 

Notice Packet explained individuals may object to the settlement or elect to be excluded from the class, 

and the time and method to file objections or return the Exclusion Request Form to the Settlement 

Administrator. (See id. at 8-9) 

According to Maggie McGill, an employee of Gilardi & Co. LLC, the Class Notice Packets 

were “printed in both English and Spanish and mailed to the 6,692” Class Members on April 20, 2015. 

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(Doc. 184-3 at 2, McGill Decl. ¶ 3) Ms. McGill reports that the United States Postal Service returned 

1,224 Notice Packets as “undeliverable” to the Settlement Administrator. (Id., ¶ 5) Gilardi performed 

address searches and found updated mailing addresses for 552 class members, who were re-served with 

the Notice Packet. (Id.) However, “70 were returned once again as undeliverable.” (Id.)

Following service of the Class Notice Packet, the Settlement Administrator “received 992 

timely claim forms and 50 late claim forms.”6 (Doc. 200 at 2, McGill Supp. Decl. ¶ 3) Although the 

Settlement Administrator received 70 requests for exclusion, “37 Class Members concurrently 

submitted a Claim Form.” (Doc. 184-3 at 4, McGill Decl. ¶ 13) Ms. McGill reports Gilardi contacted 

the class members who returned both a claim form and a request for exclusion “to determine their 

intent,” and counsel agreed that these would be considered valid claims. (Doc. 200 at 3, ¶ 8) No 

objections were received by the Settlement Administrator. (Doc. 184-3 at 4, McGill Decl. ¶ 14)

IV. Method of Settlement Share Distribution and the Cy Pres Beneficiary

Generally, parties should have a plan for distributing unclaimed funds because many class

action settlements result in unclaimed funds. Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 

1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1990). The options for such distribution include cy pres distribution, escheat to 

the government, and reversion to the defendants. Id., 904 F.2d at 1307. Here, Plaintiffs and 

Defendants have agreed that a cy pres recipient should be designated for funds under the Settlement, 

but again seek the Court’s intervention related to their disputes concerning the identity of the 

beneficiary, and what funds should be directed to the cy pres beneficiary. Previously, the Court 

determined it would be appropriate for both uncashed and unclaimed funds to go to the cy pres 

beneficiary. (Doc. 173 at 10) The Court opined a pro rata distribution, as proposed by Plaintiffs, was 

impractical because the described method would require the Settlement Administrator “to calculate 

each claimant’s share of the unclaimed funds and uncashed checks, and send a second payment to each 

of the class members.” (Id.)

In seeking final approval of the Settlement, Plaintiffs renew their request that the funds be 

distributed on a pro rata basis to the class members who have made valid claims. (Doc. 184-1 at 12) 

 

6

The parties have agreed to deem the untimely Claim Forms that were postmarked after the deadline as valid. 

(Doc. 198)

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Plaintiffs explain the entire net settlement would be distributed to Class Members, which would require 

“only one distribution with all funds added in one check.” (Id. at 13) Plaintiffs contend this method 

“ensures that a high percentage of net settlement funds actually go to the Class.” (Id.) Finally, 

Plaintiffs contend that the funds from uncashed checks should go to the California Rural Legal 

Assistance. (Id. at 15-18)

On the other hand, Defendants oppose distribution on a pro rata basis, asserting that method of 

distribution is not preferable to the cy pres beneficiary receiving all unclaimed funds. (Doc. 195 at 4-6) 

According to Defendants, distribution of the funds to the Class Members on a pro rata basis “would 

result in a windfall to the relatively low number of members making claims in this action.” (Id. at 6) 

Defendants explain, “The participating class members comprise just less than 15% of the total class. If 

the settlement covers nearly all of the wage claims, then participating class members have been made 

nearly whole by receiving their calculated distribution.” (Id.) Further, Defendants assert that “a pro 

rata distribution is not the ‘next best thing’ for the approximately 5,700 silent class members,” either 

directly or indirectly.” (Id.) Finally, Defendants argue they should be permitted to select the cy pres 

beneficiary, subject to the Court’s approval, because “it is the recollection of counsel for both El 

Rancho Farms and for Garza Contracting that plaintiffs agreed to permit defendants to select the cy 

pres beneficiary, just as plaintiffs did in Rodriguez and Morales,” where the plaintiffs were represented 

by the same class counsel. (Id. at 7) Therefore, Defendants urge the Court to find both unclaimed and 

uncashed funds should go to the Boys and Girls Club of Kern County. (Id. at 8)

A. Distribution Method

The Ninth Circuit has determined a cy pres award must qualify as “the next best distribution” to 

giving the funds directly to class members. Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(citing Six Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1308). The designation of a cy pres beneficiary is appropriate 

to ensure class members do not receive a windfall while silent class members do not receive any 

compensation. Hartless v. Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D 630, 642 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (“distribution to claimants 

on a pro rata basis is inappropriate if it would result in a windfall to those claimants”); see also State of 

California v. Levi-Strauss, 41 Cal.3d 460, 474-78 (1986) (noting direct distribution may be a problem 

because non-claiming class members receive no compensation at all, while other class members can 

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receive a windfall, and the failure to allocate funds to a cy pres beneficiary would “cripple” the 

compensatory function of the private class action).

Here, Defendants assert: “If the settlement covers nearly all of the wage claims, then 

participating class members have been made nearly whole by receiving their calculated distribution. 

Redistribution of 85 % of the silent members’ shares would result in a windfall to the relatively low 

number of members making claims in this action.” (Doc. 195 at 6) On the other hand, it is not clear 

that the proposed settlement, in fact, covers all of the wage and hour violations raised by the Rosales 

and Cruz plaintiffs, such that the claimants have been made nearly whole. Mr. Mallison reported that at 

the time the parties engaged in mediation, Class Counsel estimated the value of the claims to be 

“between 3,000,000 and 5,000,000 [dollars],” excluding attorneys’ fees.7 (Doc. 184-2 at 14, Mallison 

Decl. ¶ 36) The net settlement to be distributed to Class Members has been estimated to be $1,356,633. 

(Doc. 199-5 at 2, McGill Decl. ¶ 2) Thus, there is no real evidence of a windfall.

Notably, it was only after this Court granted preliminary approval of the Settlement that the 

parties determined there were approximately 3,000 more class members than previously identified. 

(Doc. 182 at 3) As a result, the case-value estimates made by the parties for mediation purposes were 

likely to be a significant underestimate—and potentially only half the value of the claims presented in 

both Rosales and Cruz. Because there is insufficient evidence to support a determination that Class 

Members who submitted claim forms will receive a windfall, the proposed pro rata distribution is 

appropriate for unclaimed funds. Thus, the Court recommends the pro rata distribution occur as 

recommended by Plaintiffs.

B. Propriety of the Proposed Cy Pres Beneficiaries

Defendants assert, “The identity of the cy pres recipient was an important term to El Rancho 

Farms.” (Doc. 195 at 4) Previously, Defendants’ counsel reported it was “the reason that El Rancho 

agreed to such a large settlement amount. (Doc. 171-1 at 2, Estrada Decl. ¶ 6) Plaintiffs dispute this 

and argue that the execution of the settlement agreement which excludes this provision belies this 

claim. Indeed, the willingness of both sides to proceed in the settlement process without assurance that 

 

7

According to Ms. Estrada, counsel for El Rancho, she estimated the value of Plaintiffs’ claims to be 

approximately$1.2 million. (Doc. 195 at 7) However, she acknowledged at the hearing that this estimate did not include 

the value of the claims against Garza Contracting.

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their proposed beneficiary would be selected, undercuts that this determination was material to 

settlement. In any event, the parties agree that the Court should select the beneficiary.

The Ninth Circuit has determined any proposed cy pres recipient should be “tethered to the 

nature of the lawsuit and the interest of the silent class members.” Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 

1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011). In other words, the Ninth Circuit “require[s] that there be a driving nexus 

between the plaintiff class and the cy pres beneficiaries.” Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 865 

(9th Cir. 2012) (citing Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1038). The Court explained that without such tethering, 

the distribution of funds “may create the appearance of impropriety” by catering “to the whims and self 

interests of the parties, their counsel, or the court.” Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1038. Therefore, a cy pres 

award should not benefit a group that is “too remote from the plaintiff class.” Six Mexican Workers, 

904 F.2d at 1308.

The Ninth Circuit directs courts to consider whether awards to the proposed cy pres beneficiary 

would “(1) address the objectives of the underlying statutes, (2) target the plaintiff class, or (3) provide 

reasonable certainty that any member will be benefitted.” Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1040. Further, the 

Court must consider whether the cy pres distribution is appropriate given the “size and geographic 

diversity” of the class members. Id. at 1040-41 (citing, e.g., In re Airline Ticket Comm'n Antitrust 

Litig., 307 F.3d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 2002); Houck on Behalf of U.S. v. Folding Carton Admin. Comm., 

881 F.2d 494, 502 (7th Cir. 1989)). 

Notably, the Ninth Circuit has determined also that issues related to the identity of a cy pres 

beneficiary are not generally ripe until there are funds that remain undistributed. See Rodriguez v. West 

Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 966 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding cy pres distribution “becomes ripe only if 

entire settlement fund is not distributed to class members” and declining to determine propriety of cy 

pres at that time). The Court explained that where a cy pres distribution is contingent on the outcome 

of the claims process for a cash distribution, issues regarding the identification of recipients “will not 

be ripe until it is determined that available cash remains in th[e] fund after the claims process has 

concluded.” Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2012). If the pro rata distribution 

recommended above is adopted by the Court, it is unlikely there will be any remaining funds once the 

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distribution occurs. Therefore, the matter continues not to be ripe for decision.8

APPROVAL OF A CLASS SETTLEMENT

When parties settle the action prior to class certification, the Court has an obligation to “peruse 

the proposed compromise to ratify both the propriety of the certification and the fairness of the 

settlement.” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003). Approval of a class settlement is 

generally a two-step process. First, the Court must assess whether a class exists. Id. (citing Amchem 

Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997)). Second, the Court must “determine whether the 

proposed settlement is fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable.” Id. (citing Hanlon v. Chrysler 

Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 2998)). The decision to approve or reject a settlement is within 

the Court’s discretion. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026.

I. Certification of a Settlement Class9

Class certification is governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 

provides that “[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf 

of all.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Parties seeking class certification bear the burden of demonstrating the 

 

8

Though not deciding the issue, the Court is concerned that designating the CRLA as the cy pres beneficiary 

could create the appearance of impropriety because time sheets submitted by Plaintiff’s counsel indicate that the CRLA 

attorneys actually worked on this case. (Doc. 188-1 at 33, 36, 37) Such a designation could raise the specter of a quid pro 

quo arrangement and Class Counsel has cited no legal authority to the contrary. 

In addition, Class Counsel has an ongoing relationship with the CRLA. Mr. Mallison, Hector Martinez and 

Marco Palau, all were employed by the CRLA in the past. (Doc. 188 at 2, 7-8, Mallison Decl. ¶¶ 4, 11-12) Further, the 

CRLA and the Mallison & Martinez firm continue to act as co-counsel on other litigation (See id. at 4, Mallison Decl. ¶ 

6(h)) and, as described above, continue to work in tandem as demonstrated by this litigation. This ongoing entanglement is 

further demonstrated by the fact that Class Counsel has solicited the involvement of the CRLA in the cy pres beneficiary 

selection process. (Doc 199-1 at 3-4, ¶ 10) Indeed, Class Counsel represents that the CRLA claims that if the group is not 

designated as the beneficiary, the CRLA will appeal. Class Counsel fails to explain how such an appeal—which risks 

delay of the payment to the class (Doc. 166-1 at 13-14, Settlement § III.I.7)—furthers the interest of the class members. 

Likewise, given this threat, seemingly the CRLA’s interests conflict with the Class Members’ interest in a timely 

completion of the settlement.

Notably, the Court errs in designating a cy pres beneficiary which raise the concerns outlined here. See, e.g.,

Weeks v. Kellogg, Co., 2011 WL 6531116 at *19-20, n.102 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2011) (observing that “[c]ourts are wary of 

distributing cy pres funds to organizations that have a close relationship with class counsel given the appearance of a 

conflict of interest,” and finding a proposed beneficiary was improper due to “its preexisting relationship with certain of 

plaintiffs’ counsel”); In re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation, 2008 WL 4542669, *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2008) (“The Court 

agrees that PILCOP is a well respected public legal services organization in the Philadelphia area and, in general, is a 

deserving recipient of cy pres funds. However, because an attorney formerly associated with this case currently serves in a 

lead role at PILCOP, the Court does not deem it appropriate to direct any of the cy pres distribution to PILCOP”); see also

American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 3.07 (“A cy pres remedy should not be ordered if 

the court or any party has any significant prior affiliation with the intended recipient that would raise substantial questions 

about whether the selection of the recipient was made on the merits”).

9

Because the class was only conditionally certified upon preliminary approval of the Settlement, final 

certification of the Settlement Class is required.

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elements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, and “must affirmatively demonstrate . . . compliance with the 

Rule.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011); Doninger v. Pacific Northwest 

Bell, Inc., 563 F.2d 1304, 1308 (9th Cir. 1977). If an action meets the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), the 

Court must consider whether the class is maintainable under one or more of the three alternatives set 

forth in Rule 23(b). Narouz v. Charter Communs., LLC, 591 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 2010).

Here, Plaintiffs assert the Court should certify a settlement class that includes “all persons who 

have been employed or jointly employed by farm labor contractor Garza Contracting Inc. at El Rancho 

Farms facilities between November 9, 2001 and June 11, 2014.” (Doc. 166-1 at 1, Settlement § I.D) 

According to Plaintiffs, “Every requirement of Rule 23 is satisfied with respect to this proposed 

settlement class.” (Doc. 184-1 at 28)

A. Rule 23(a) Requirements

The prerequisites of Rule 23(a) “effectively limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed 

by the named plaintiff’s claims.” General Telephone Co. of the Southwest. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 

155-56 (1982). Certification of a class is proper if:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are 

questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the 

representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the 

representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). These prerequisites are generally referred to as numerosity, commonality, 

typicality, and adequacy of representation. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 156.

1. Numerosity

A class must be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(a)(1). This requires the Court to consider “specific facts of each case and imposes no absolute 

limitations.” General Telephone Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980). Although there is not a

specific numerical threshold, joining more than one hundred plaintiffs is impracticable. See Immigrant 

Assistance Project of Los Angeles Cnt. Fed’n of Labor v. INS, 306 F.3d 842, 869 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(“find[ing] the numerosity requirement . . . satisfied solely on the basis of the number of ascertained 

class members . . . and listing thirteen cases in which courts certified classes with fewer than 100 

members”). Here, the parties have identified more than 6,000 Class Members. (Doc. 184-1 at 28) 

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Therefore, the numerosity requirement is satisfied.

2. Commonality

Rule 23(a) requires “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).

Commonality “does not mean merely that [class members] have all suffered a violation of the same

pro-vision of law,” but “claims must depend upon a common contention.” Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. 

Ct. at 2551. In this case, Plaintiffs assert common issues include “minimum wage, overtime, and rest 

and meal period violations.” (See Doc. 184-1 at 29) Defendants do not dispute that the requirements 

of Rule 23 are satisfied. Accordingly, the Court finds the commonality requirement is satisfied for 

purposes of settlement.

3. Typicality

This requirement demands that the “claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical 

of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). The standards under this rule are 

permissive, and a claim or defense is not required to be identical, but rather “reasonably coextensive” 

with those of the absent class members. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. “The test of typicality is whether 

other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not 

unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course 

of conduct.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted); see also Kayes v. Pac. Lumber Co., 51 F.3d 1449, 1463 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(the typicality requirement is satisfied when the named plaintiffs have the same claims as other 

members of the class and are not subject to unique defenses). 

Here, Plaintiffs report that “[e]ach of the Class Representatives has claims similar and typical of 

the rest of the Class since they suffered similar injuries and have the same interest in redressing them.” 

(Doc. 184-1 at 29) Because Plaintiffs and the putative class members were subject to the same policies 

and practices at El Rancho Farms, the typicality requirement is satisfied. 

4. Fair and Adequate Representation

Absentee class members must be adequately represented for judgment to be binding upon them. 

Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940). Accordingly, representative parties must “fairly and 

adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). “[R]esolution of this issue 

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requires that two questions be addressed: (a) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any 

conflicts of interest with other class members and (b) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel 

prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?” In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 

454, 462 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020). 

a. Class counsel

As the Court noted previously, Stan Mallison and Hector Martinez have experience litigating

wage and hour class action cases and serving as class counsel. (See Doc. 173 at 13, citing Doc. 166 at 

5-7) Further, Mr. Mallison reports there are no known “personal affiliation[s] or family relationship[s] 

with the Plaintiffs and proposed Class Representatives.” (Doc. 184-2 at 9, Mallison Decl. ¶ 17) Thus, 

Class Counsel satisfy the adequacy requirement. 

b. Class representatives

All named plaintiffs seek appointment as class representatives of the Settlement Class. (Doc. 

184 at 2) Further, the parties have not identified any conflicts between Plaintiffs and Class Members. 

Because it appears the interests of the named plaintiffs are aligned with those of the class—to maximize 

their recovery— Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Settlement Class. 

B. Certification of a Class under Rule 23(b)(3)

As noted above, once the requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, a class may only be certified 

if it is maintainable under Rule 23(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b); see also Narouz, 591 F.3d at 1266. 

Plaintiffs assert class certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires a finding that (1) 

“the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only 

individual members,” and (2) “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and 

efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” These requirements are generally called the “predominance” 

and “superiority” requirements. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022-23; see also Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. 

at 2559 (“(b)(3) requires the judge to make findings about predominance and superiority before 

allowing the class”).

1. Predominance

The predominance inquiry focuses on “the relationship between the common and individual 

issues” and “tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by 

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representation.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022 (citing Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 623). The Ninth Circuit 

explained, “[A] central concern of the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance test is whether ‘adjudication of 

common issues will help achieve judicial economy.’” Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 

F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th 

Cir. 2001)). In this case, Plaintiffs argue the predominance requirement is satisfied because “the issues 

of Defendant’s [sic] alleged failure to pay Class Members minimum wage, overtime, and rest and meal 

period violations create common issues that predominate over individual questions.” (Doc. 184-1 at 

29) Accordingly, for settlement purposes only, the Court finds the predominance factor is satisfied.

2. Superiority

The superiority inquiry requires a determination of “whether objectives of the particular class 

action procedure will be achieved in the particular case.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1023 (citation omitted). 

This tests whether “class litigation of common issues will reduce litigation costs and promote greater 

efficiency.” Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996). Pursuant to Rule 

23(b)(3), the Court must consider four non-exclusive factors to determine whether a class is a superior 

method of adjudication, including (1) the class members’ interest in individual litigation, (2) other 

pending litigation, (3) the desirability of concentrating the litigation in one forum, and (4) difficulties 

with the management of the class action.

a. Class members’ interest in individual litigation

This factor is relevant when class members have suffered sizeable damages or have an 

emotional stake in the litigation. See In re N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield, Etc., 693 F.2d 847, 856 (9th 

Cir. 1982)). Here, the Settlement Administrator received 70 requests for exclusion.

10

 (Doc. 184-3 at 4, 

McGill Decl. ¶ 13) Importantly, there is no evidence that the class members who seek exclusion from 

the class are interested in pursuing their own actions. Therefore, this factor does not weigh against 

class certification.

b. Other pending litigation

The parties have not identified any other pending litigation for wage and hour violations 

 

10 As noted above, 37 Class Members who returned a request to be excluded from the Settlement Class also 

submitted a Claim Form. (Doc. 184-3 at 4, McGill Decl. ¶ 13)

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against El Rancho Farms and Garza Contracting. As a result, this factor weighs in favor of certifying

the Settlement Class.

c. Desirability of concentrating litigation in one forum

Because common issues predominate on Plaintiffs’ class claims, “presentation of the evidence 

in one consolidated action will reduce unnecessarily duplicative litigation and promote judicial 

economy.” Galvan v. KDI Distrib., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127602, at *37 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2011). 

Moreover, because the parties have resolved the claims presented in both cases through the settlement, 

this factor does not weigh against class certification. 

d. Difficulties in managing a class action

The Supreme Court explained that, in general, this factor “encompasses the whole range of 

practical problems that may render the class format inappropriate for a particular suit.” Eisen v.

Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 164 (1974). However, because the parties have reached a 

settlement agreement and the class has received notice of the claims in issue, it does not appear there 

are any problems with managing the action. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of class certification. 

Because the factors set forth in Rule 23(b) weigh in favor of certification, the Settlement Class 

is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(3). Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiffs’ request to certify 

the Settlement Class be GRANTED.

II. Evaluation of the Settlement Terms

Settlement of a class action requires approval of the Court, which may be granted “only after a 

hearing and on finding that [the settlement] is fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). 

Approval is required to ensure settlement is consistent with Plaintiffs’ fiduciary obligations to the class. 

See Ficalora v. Lockheed Cal. Co., 751 F.2d 995, 996 (9th Cir. 1985). The Ninth Circuit has identified

several factors to determine whether a settlement meets these standards, including:

the strength of plaintiff’s case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of 

further litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the 

amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed, and the stage of the 

proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the presence of a governmental 

participant;11 and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.

 

11 Because there is not a government participant in this action—only a government beneficiary of the settlement—

this factor does not weigh in the Court’s analysis.

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Staton, 327 F.3d at 959 (citation omitted). Further, a court should consider whether settlement is “the 

product of collusion among the negotiating parties.” In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d at 458 

(citing Class Plaintiffs v. Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1290 (9th Cir. 1992)). Reviewing the settlement 

terms, “[t]he court need not reach any ultimate conclusions on the contested issues of fact and law 

which underlie the merits of the dispute.” Class Plaintiffs, 955 F.2d at 1291(internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted).

A. Strength of Plaintiffs’ Cases

When evaluating the strength of a case, the Court should “evaluate objectively the strengths and 

weaknesses inherent in the litigation and the impact of those considerations on the parties’ decisions to

reach these agreements.” Adoma v. Univ. of Phoenix, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 964, 975 (E.D. Cal. 2012) 

(quoting In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 720 F.Supp 1379, 1388 (D. Az. 1989)). 

However, the Court does not “reach any ultimate conclusions on the merits of the dispute.” Officers for 

Justice v. Civil Serv. Commission, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982).

In this action, there are several disputed claims the fact-finder would be required to determine. 

Plaintiffs would face a significant risk of success if both actions were to proceed, and assert:

Although Plaintiffs believe strongly in the underlying merits of their case, wage and 

hour cases on behalf of low wage agricultural workers can difficult to prove on a class 

basis especially given the changing and uncertain legal environment. Further, there are 

clear uncertainties surrounding Plaintiffs’ ability to prove their claims given the 

unpredictability of a lengthy and complex jury trial.

(Doc. 184-1 at 23) Further, although the Court did not rule on the motions to dismiss filed in Cruz, 

Defendants argued the claims presented by Cruz and Alvarez were duplicative in nature. (See Cruz, 

Doc. 13 at 2) Given the uncertainties of the merits of both actions, this factor weighs in favor of 

approving of the Settlement.

B. Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

Approval of settlement is “preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation with uncertain 

results.” Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 529 (C.D. Cal. 2004). If 

the Settlement were to be rejected, the parties would have to engage in further litigation, including 

discovery and seeking class certification in Cruz. The time and expense of continued litigation could 

outweigh any additional recovery. In addition, as Plaintiffs previously acknowledged, “legal 

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developments could seriously diminish the value of [their] claims.” (Doc. 165 at 15) On the other 

hand, the proposed settlement provides for immediate recovery for the class, which includes 

individuals who may have been excluded in the class previously certified by the Court. Thus, this 

factor weighs in favor of approval of the Settlement.

C. Maintenance of Class Status throughout the Trial

There is a substantial risk a class may not have been certified in Cruz, particularly if the Court 

were to determine, as Defendants argued, that the action was merely “an attempt by plaintiffs to certify 

a subclass that was previously denied certification.” (See Cruz, Doc. 13 at 2) Due to the risk to the 

claims of class members, this factor supports preliminary approval of the Settlement.

D. Amount Offered in Settlement

The Ninth Circuit observed “the very essence of a settlement is compromise, ‘a yielding of 

absolutes and an abandoning of highest hopes.’” Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 624 (citation 

omitted). Thus, when analyzing the amount offered in settlement, the Court should examine “the 

complete package taken as a whole,” and the amount is “not to be judged against a hypothetical or 

speculative measure of what might have been achieved by the negotiators.” Id., 688 F.2d at 625, 628. 

Here, the proposed gross settlement amount is $2,300,000, of which an estimated $1,356,633 

would be available to Class Members.

12 (Doc. 166-1 at 3, Settlement § I.S; Doc. 199-5 at 2, McGill 

Decl. ¶ 2) Mr. Mallison reports that “Plaintiffs estimate[d] the value of class wage claims to be 

between 3,000,000 and 5,000,000 [dollars] excluding substantial attorneys’ fees, should Plaintiffs 

prevail completely on a class-wide basis at trial.” (Doc. 184-2 at 14, Mallison Decl. ¶ 36) 

Notably, however, “[t]he fact that a proposed settlement may only amount to a fraction of the 

potential recovery does not, in and of itself, mean that the proposed settlement is grossly inadequate 

and should be disapproved.” Linney v. Cellular Alaska Partnership, 151 F.3d 1234, 1242 (9th Cir. 

1998). Rather, as noted by the Ninth Circuit, “parties, counsel, mediators, and district judges naturally 

arrive at a reasonable range for settlement by considering the likelihood of a plaintiffs’ or defense 

verdict, the potential recovery, and the chances of obtaining it, discounted to present value.” Rodriguez 

 

12 This assumes the maximum award of attorney fees and class representative enhancements under the Settlement. 

(Doc. 199-5 at 2, McGill Decl. re Distribution ¶ 2)

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v. West Publishing Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir. 2009). Based upon the parties’ agreement that 

this amount provides adequate compensation for the class claims against El Rancho Farms and Garza 

Contracting, Inc., the Court finds the amount offered supports approval of the class settlement.

E. Extent of Discovery Completed and Stage of the Proceedings

The Court is “more likely to approve a settlement if most of the discovery is completed because 

it suggests that the parties arrived at a compromise based on a full understanding of the legal and 

factual issues surrounding the case.” Adoma, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 977 (quoting DIRECTV, Inc., 221 

F.R.D. at 528). 

Here, El Rancho began litigating the claims presented by “Doe” plaintiffs in 2005, and 

“Angelica Rosales” and Margarita Rosales were identified as plaintiffs in 2008. Garza and its 

employees were involved in discovery from the Rosales action prior to the filing of Cruz. In the course 

of litigation, the parties have produced and reviewed “thousands of documents including payroll and 

timekeeping information.” (Doc. 184-1 at 25) Given the amount of discovery conducted by the parties 

and the number of years that have passed since Plaintiffs’ counsel filed the First Amended Complaint in 

Doe identifying El Rancho Farms as a defendant, it appears that the parties made informed decisions

regarding the merits of their claims and defenses. Thus, the settlement agreement “is presumed fair,” 

and this factor supports final approval of the settlement. See Adoma, 913 F. Supp.2d at 977.

F. Experience and Views of Counsel

According to Mr. Mallison, “the class settlement with Defendants for $2,300,000, is reasonable 

and adequate and is in the best interest of the putative class members, including Defendants’ current 

and former workers, in light of all known facts and circumstances...” (Doc. 184-2 at 17, Mallison 

Decl. ¶ 46) Similarly, Defendants agree that the Settlement “reflects a fair, reasonable, and adequate 

settlement of the Actions.” (Doc. 166-1 at 18, Settlement § III.L.10) Given counsels’ experience and 

familiarity with the facts, their recommendation that the settlement be approved is entitled to significant 

weight. Nat’l Rural Telecomms., 221 F.R.D. at 528 (“Great weight is accorded to the recommendation 

of counsel, who are most closely acquainted with the facts of the underlying litigation”); see also 

Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., 297 F.R.D. 431, 447 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“In considering the 

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adequacy of the terms of a settlement, the trial court is entitled to, and should, rely upon the judgment 

of experienced counsel for the parties.”) Consequently, this factor supports approval of the Settlement.

G. Reaction of Class Members to the Proposed Settlement

The reaction of the class has been primarily positive. The Class Representatives report they 

“are strongly in support of the settlement.” (Doc. 184-1 at 27; see also Doc. 190 at 3, Cruz Decl. ¶ 7; 

Doc. 191 at 3, Corza Decl. ¶ 8; Doc. 198 at 3, Alvarez Decl. ¶ 7; Doc. 193 at 3, Rosales Decl. ¶ 8) 

Further, the Settlement Administrator received only 70 requests for exclusion (Doc. 184-3 at 4, McGill 

Decl. ¶ 13), and no objections were received by either the Settlement Administrator or the Court. 

Significantly, “the absence of a large number of objections to a proposed class action settlement 

raises a strong presumption that the terms of a proposed class action settlement are favorable to the 

class members.” Nat’l Rural Telecomms., 221 F.R.D. at 529. Because the number of requests for 

exclusion and objections received are vastly outweighed by the remaining class members who have 

indicated their consent to the terms of settlement, this factor weighs in favor the settlement. 

H. Collusion between Negotiating Parties

The inquiry of collusion addresses the possibility that the settlement agreement is the result of 

either “overt misconduct by the negotiators” or improper incentives of class members at the expense of 

others. Staton, 327 F.3d at 960. Plaintiffs assert, “[T]he Settlement was reached after extensive 

discovery, certification of late meal period class, years of motion practice, and extensive arms-length 

negotiations during numerous mediation sessions with Robert Coviello and Dave Rudy.” (Doc. 184-1 

at 27) Because the parties utilized private mediators, Plaintiffs conclude “the procedure by which the 

Settlement was arrived” supports approval of the Settlement. (Id.) Notably, the Ninth Circuit has 

determined the “presence of a neutral mediator [is] a factor weighing in favor of a finding of noncollusiveness.” In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Because there is no indication the agreement was the product of collusive conduct, this factor weighs 

in favor of approval of the Settlement. 

///

III. Conclusion

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The factors set forth by the Ninth Circuit weigh in favor of final approval of the Settlement, 

which appears to be is fair, reasonable, and adequate as required by Rule 23. Therefore, the Court 

recommends that Plaintiffs’ motion for final approval of the Settlement Agreement be GRANTED.

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

Attorneys’ fees and nontaxable costs “authorized by law or by agreement of the parties” may be 

awarded pursuant to Rule 23(h). Under the settlement, Class counsel may request attorneys’ fees that 

total “no[] more than 33.33% ($766,667) of the Gross Settlement Amount. (Doc. 166-1 at 5, Settlement 

§ III.A.2) Class Counsel are also authorized under the Settlement to seek litigation expenses that are 

“not more than $50,000.” (Id.) Here, Class Counsel requests the maximum of fees and costs permitted 

under the Settlement. (Doc. 185 at 1) In support of these requests, a representative from each law firm

representing Plaintiffs filed a declaration setting forth the hours worked and hourly rates sought, as well 

as the firm’s expenses. (Docs. 186-188) 

I. Legal Standards

“[A] district court must carefully assess the reasonableness of a fee amount spelled out in a class 

action settlement agreement” to determine whether it is “’fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable’

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 963 (9th Cir. 2003)). To do so, the Court 

must “carefully assess the reasonableness of a fee amount spelled out in a class action settlement 

agreement.” Id.

A court “may not uncritically accept a fee request,” but must review the time billed and assess 

whether it is reasonable in light of the work performed and the context of the case. See Common Cause 

v. Jones, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1079 (C.D. Cal. 2002); see also McGrath v. County of Nevada, 67 F.3d 

248, 254 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting a court may not adopt representations regarding the reasonableness 

of time expended without independently reviewing the record); Sealy, Inc. v. Easy Living, Inc., 743 

F.2d 1378, 1385 (9th Cir. 1984) (remanding an action for a thorough inquiry on the fee request where 

“the district court engaged in the ‘regrettable practice’ of adopting the findings drafted by the prevailing 

party wholesale” and explaining a court should not “accept[] uncritically [the] representations 

concerning the time expended”).

The party seeking fees bears the burden of establishing that the fees and costs were reasonably 

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necessary to achieve the results obtained. See Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th 

2000). Therefore, a fee applicant must provide time records documenting the tasks completed and the 

amount of time spent. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 424 (1983); Welch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 

Co., 480 F.3d 942, 945-46 (9th Cir. 2007). “Where the documentation of hours in inadequate, the 

district court may reduce hours accordingly.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.

Significantly, when fees are to be paid from a common fund, as here, the relationship between 

the class members and class counsel “turns adversarial.” In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. 

Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994). The Ninth Circuit observed: 

[A]t the fee-setting stage, plaintiff’s counsel, otherwise a fiduciary for the class, has 

become a claimant against the fund created for the benefit of the class. It is obligatory, 

therefore, for the trial judge to act with a jealous regard to the rights of those who are 

interested in the fund in determining what a proper fee award is.

Id. at 1302 (internal quotation marks, citation omitted). As a result the district court must assume a 

fiduciary role for the class members in evaluating a request for an award of attorney fees from the 

common fund. Id.; Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 968 (9th Cir. 2009) (“when fees are 

to come out of the settlement fund, the district court has a fiduciary role for the class”).

The Ninth Circuit determined both a lodestar and percentage of the common fund calculation

“have [a] place in determining what would be reasonable compensation for creating a common fund.” 

Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1989). Whether the Court 

applies the lodestar or percentage method, the Ninth Circuit requires “fee awards in common fund 

cases be reasonable under the circumstances.” Florida v. Dunne, 915 F.2d 542, 545 (9th Cir. 1990); 

see also Staton, 327 F.3d at 964 (fees must be “fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable”).

A. Lodestar Method

The lodestar method calculates attorney fees by “by multiplying the number of hours reasonably 

expended by counsel on the particular matter times a reasonable hourly rate.” Florida , 915 F.2d at 545 

n. 3 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). The product of this computation, the “lodestar” amount, yields a 

presumptively reasonable fee. Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013); 

Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008). Next, the court may adjust the 

lodestar upward or downward using a “multiplier” considering the following factors adopted by the 

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Ninth Circuit in a determination of the reasonable fees:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, 

(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other 

employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) 

whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the 

circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, 

reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the case, (11) the 

nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in 

similar cases.

Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975). However, the Court has since 

determined that the fixed or contingent nature of a fee and the “desirability” of a case are no longer 

relevant factors. Resurrection Bay Conservation Alliance v. City of Seward, 640 F.3d 1087, 1095, n.5 

(9th Cir. 2011) (citing Davis v. City of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1546 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992)).

B. Percentage from the common fund

As the name suggests, under the “common fund” method, attorneys who create a common fund 

for a class may be awarded their fees and costs from the fund. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1029; Boeing Co. v. 

Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) (“a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of 

persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from the fund as a 

whole”). An award from the common fund “rests on the perception that persons who obtain the benefit 

of a lawsuit without contributing to its cost are unjustly enriched at the successful litigant’s expense,” 

and as such application of the doctrine is appropriate “when each member of a certified class has an 

undisputed and mathematically ascertainable claim to part of a lump-sum judgment recovered on his 

behalf.” Boeing Co., 444 U.S. at 478. 

In the Ninth Circuit, the typical range of acceptable attorneys’ fees is 20% to 30% of the total 

settlement value, with 25% considered the benchmark. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 

1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002); Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1029 (observing “[t]his circuit has established 25 % 

of the common fund as a benchmark award for attorney fees”); In re Pacific Enterprises Securities 

Litigation, 47 F.3d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Twenty-five percent is the ‘benchmark’ that district 

courts should award in common fund cases”). The percentage may be adjusted below or above the 

benchmark, but the Court’s reasons for adjustment must be clear. Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. 

Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1989).

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To assess whether the percentage requested is reasonable, courts may consider a number of 

factors, including “the extent to which class counsel achieved exceptional results for the class, whether 

the case was risky for class counsel, whether counsel’s performance generated benefits beyond the 

cash settlement fund, the market rate for the particular field of law (in some circumstances), the 

burdens class counsel experienced while litigating the case (e.g., cost, duration, foregoing other work), 

and whether the case was handled on a contingency basis.” In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust 

Litigation, 779 F.3d 934, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

II. Evaluation of the Fees Requested

“The district court has discretion to use the lodestar method or the percentage of the fund 

method in common fund cases.” Powers v. Eichen, 229 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting In re 

Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 109 F.3d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 

1997)). Notably, the Court must consider similar factors under either method. See Kerr, 526 F.2d at 

70; In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litigation, 779 F.3d at 954-55. Further, the Court may “appl[y] 

the lodestar method as a crosscheck” to determine whether the percentage requested is reasonable. 

Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1050, n.5. 

A. Results obtained for the class

Courts have recognized consistently that the result achieved is a major factor to be considered in 

making a fee award. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436; Wilcox v. City of Reno, 42 F.3d 550, 554 (9th Cir. 

1994). Class Counsel assert they “recovered $2,300,000.00 on behalf of the class, that the class 

members would likely not have recovered independent of this action.” (Doc. 189 at 11) Of this, the 

claims administrator estimates that $1,356,633 from the common fund will be distributed to Class 

Members. (Doc. 199-5 at 2, McGill Decl. ¶ 2) As noted above, Mr. Mallison reports that “Plaintiffs 

estimate[d] the value of class wage claims to be between 3,000,000 and 5,000,000 [dollars] excluding 

substantial attorneys’ fees, should Plaintiffs prevail completely on a class-wide basis at trial.” (Doc. 

184-2 at 14, Mallison Decl. ¶ 36) While the settlement amount when compared to the lower value is an 

exceptional result, if the case value was closer to the upper end, the result is merely average. On the 

other hand, at the hearing, Class Counsel admitted that the case value was determined at the time of the 

mediation at which time Counsel believed that there were only 3,000 potential claimants. (Doc. 182 at 

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3) During the claims process, this number doubled to about 6,000. This suggests that the case value 

was significantly underestimated.13 Thus, the Court has been provided insufficient information for it to 

determine that an exceptional recovery for the class has occurred and, therefore, cannot recommend an 

upward departure from the benchmark. See Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1048 (observing “[e]xceptional 

results are a relevant circumstance” to an adjustment from the benchmark). 

B. Risk undertaken by counsel

The risk of costly litigation and trial is an important factor in determining the fee award. 

Chemical Bank v. City of Seattle, 19 F.3d 1297, 1299-1301 (9th Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court 

explained, “the risk of loss in a particular case is a product of two factors: (1) the legal and factual 

merits of the claim, and (2) the difficulty of establishing those merits.” City of Burlington v. Dague, 

505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992). As a result, the Ninth Circuit approved an award slightly above the 

benchmark in Vizcaino where the case was “extremely risky for class counsel” and the “plaintiffs lost in 

the district court – once on the merits, once on the class definition – and twice counsel succeeded in 

reviving their case on appeal.” Id., 290 F.3d at 1048.

Class Counsel assert the request of 33 1/3 % is justified, in part, because the case was taken 

“without any guarantee that they would ever obtain any compensation at all, as the representation [was] 

being handled solely on a contingency fee basis.” (Doc. 189 at 12) In addition, Class Counsel contend 

they faced risks related to the merits of the case, because the action was filed when “wage and

hour law in California was uncertain.” (Id., citing Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 

1004 (2012)). Further, Class Counsel assert:

[U]ntil recently (See Bluford v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 216 Cal. App. 4th 864 (2013)) the 

legal theory that employers are required to pay piece rate workers a separate payment 

for the rest breaks was largely untested. Plaintiffs [sic] counsel was on the vanguard of 

this legal theory (See Ontiveros v. Zamora, 2009 WL 425962 at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2009)). 

This legal theory is a critical part of the Cruz allegations. Thus, the risk associated with 

litigating class actions during the uncertainty of wage and hour law prior to Brinker, 

plus the presence of still novel legal claims in Cruz, weigh in favor of a departure from 

the Ninth Circuit 25% bench in awarding attorneys’ fees.

(Doc. 189 at 12)

 

13At the hearing Class Counsel argued there would be no windfall to the claimants if a pro rata distribution method 

was adopted despite that this nearly tripled the average recovery. In doing so, implicitly, Counsel admitted this amount did 

not exceed that which would make each claimant whole. Notably, had a larger number of claims been submitted—only

about 15% of those eligible to make claims did so (Doc. 184-1 at 7)—the average recovery could have been dismal.

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Significantly the Ninth Circuit has suggested the distinction between a contingency arrangement 

and a fixed fee arrangement alone does not merit an enhancement from the benchmark. See In re 

Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 942 n.7. (9th Cir. 2011) (observing “whether the 

fee was fixed or contingent” is “no longer valid” as a factor in evaluating reasonable fees); but see In re 

Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litigation, 779 F.3d at 954-55 (finding the contingent nature of litigation 

remains a relevant factor to evaluate a request from the common fund). Further, although Mr. Mallison 

asserts his firm “would not have agreed to represent plaintiffs in this case other than on a contingency 

fee basis unless it would have been confident that it would be awarded a contingency fee approximately 

1/3rd of the potential recovery if we were successful in our efforts” (Doc. 188 at 20-21, Mallison Decl. 

¶55), Mr. Martinez previously admitted that “[t]he firm chose the proposed class representatives” in 

this action. (Doc. 35 at 7, Martinez Decl. ¶19) Moreover, he fails to explain why he presumed at the 

onset of this case that a one-third award would be likely made by the Court or to detail upon what 

authorities he relied when deciding to pursue this case—notably, doing so without clients.

On the other hand, as Class Counsel observes, the California Supreme Court clarified the labor 

laws related to rest and meal periods in Brinker. In a related action, where the plaintiffs also raised 

meal and rest break violations, the Court observed the facts were straightforward, but “Plaintiffs’ 

counsel faced significant risk on the legal merits.” Morales v. Stevco, 2013 WL 1222058 at *3 (E.D. 

Cal. Mar. 25, 2013). Accordingly, this factor weighs slightly in favor of a departure from the 

benchmark fee award. See id. (awarding 30% of the common fund as attorney fees).

C. Skills of counsel and quality of work

The complexity of issues and skills required may weigh in favor of a departure from the 

benchmark fee award. See, e.g., Lopez v. Youngblood, 2011 WL 10483569 at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 

2011) (in determining whether to award the requested fees totaling 28% of the class fund, the Court 

observed the case involved “complex issues of constitutional law in an area where considerable 

deference is given to jail officials,” and the action “encompassed two categories of class members”); 

see also In re Heritage Bond Litig., 2005 WL 1594403 at *14 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005) (“Some courts 

have recognized that the novelty, difficulty and complexity of the issues involved are significant factors 

in determining a fee award”). 

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Here, Class Counsel assert their skills and the quality of work support an award greater than the 

benchmark in this action. (Doc. 189 at 12) According to Class Counsel, they “showed great skill, 

thoroughness, and conscientiousness in investigating and developing the claims, liability theories, and 

estimated possible recoveries in the Litigation.” (Id.) Specifically, they report:

Class Counsel and their staff interview dozens of workers and collected twenty-three (23) 

declarations from El Rancho and Garza fieldworkers in support of the Motion for Class 

Certification. [Citation.] Plaintiffs’ counsel also took three depositions and defended two 

depositions in this case. [Citation.] Plaintiffs’ counsel reviewed thousands of pages of 

time keeping records.

(Doc. 189 at 13) 

On the other hand, a review of the record indicates that the effectiveness of Class Counsel’s 

work was not stellar. Initially, Plaintiffs sought certification of four classes: (1) the unpaid rest break 

class, (2) the untimely rest and meal break class, (3) the off-the-clock work class, and (4) the tools 

reimbursement class. (Doc. 37 at 2, 6-11) Despite the fact that Class Counsel selected the plaintiffs in 

this action, the Court determined Lorena Corza and Margarita Rosales lacked standing to represent 

claims for unpaid rest breaks. (Doc. 52 at 29-31; Doc. 56 at 12-13) The Court denied Plaintiffs’ 

request to add a named plaintiff who could represent such claims given the fact that the litigation had 

been pending for more than five years and there was no right to substitute a proper class 

representative.14 (Doc. 56 at 31, citing Moreno v. Autozone, Inc. 410 Fed. Appx. 24, 25 (9th Cir. 2010); 

Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003)) Further, the Court declined 

to certify the other proposed classes due to evidentiary failures, including the failure to show common 

policies among the farm labor contractors (such as Garza) who employed laborers at El Rancho. (Doc. 

52 at 31-39; Doc. 56 at 13-16)

Class Counsel filed a motion for reconsideration “based [upon] clear error and manifest 

injustice” and proposed narrowing the definitions of the classes to individuals employed only by Garza 

rather than all farm labor contractors. (Doc. 189 at 13) Class Counsel requested reconsideration, in 

part, “based on new evidence.” (Doc. 95 at 3) However, the Court found the evidence to which 

 

14 Class Counsel has not explained how the fact that two named plaintiffs lacked standing escaped their notice 

until after the Court raised the issue when considering the initial motion for class certification. Indeed, the Cruz matter 

was filed only after the Court ruled that Plaintiffs would not be permitted to add another class representative who had 

standing to represent the unpaid rest break claims.

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Plaintiffs referred was not new, and should have been presented in support of the motion to file class 

certification. (Id. at 4) Further, the Court upheld its prior ruling denying the motion for class 

certification, but granted Plaintiffs leave to file a second motion for class certification with a narrowed 

class definition. (Doc. 95 at 9) Clearly, a more thorough review of the evidence should have occurred 

before Plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification such that a proper class definition could have 

been proposed and the lack of standing by Ms. Corza and Ms. Rosales could have been determined.

Moreover, when this action was initiated in 2005, many of the lead attorneys had been 

practicing for less than 10 years, demonstrating that exceptional skill and experience was not needed to 

pursue this litigation. Because the Court does not find this matter required exceptional skills and Class 

Counsel displayed skills and work quality consistent with those of attorneys with comparable 

experience, this factor supports an award equal to the Ninth Circuit benchmark. 

D. Length of professional relationship

Class Counsel do not address the length of the professional relationships with their clients as a 

factor supporting the fees requested. (See Doc. 189 at 10-16) “Angelica Rosales” was identified in the 

Lara action as a plaintiff in the Second Amended Complaint filed on September 12, 2005. Margarita 

Rosales was not identified as a plaintiff until on May 29, 2008, with the filling of a Third Amended 

Complaint against El Rancho Farms. (Doe, Doc. 173) Despite the fact that Class Counsel have 

expended nearly ten years representing these plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit has determined the 25 percent 

standard award” where “the litigation lasted more than 13 years.” See Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. 

Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (finding “the 25 percent standard award” was appropriate 

although “the litigation lasted more than 13 years”). Therefore, this factor does not weigh in favor of 

departure from the benchmark.

E. Awards in similar cases

Notably, as discussed above, 25% of a common fund is “benchmark award for attorney fees” in 

the Ninth Circuit. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1029; see also Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1047 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Previously, this Court observed that “[t]he typical range of acceptable attorneys’ fees in the Ninth 

Circuit is 20 percent to 33.3 percent of the total settlement value.” Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions 

Corp., 297 F.R.D. 431, 448 (E.D. Cal. 2013). Thus, the amount requested by Class Counsel is at the 

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highest end of the award spectrum. See id. 

Class Counsel assert that “courts within this District have awarded Class Counsel fee awards of 

33.3% to Class Counsel Mallison & Martinez in similar wage and hour class actions, including: Benitez

v. Wilbur, E.D. Cal. Case No. 08-1122 LJO GSA (331/3% award). Alvarado et al. v. Rex Nederend,

E.D. Cal. Case No. 1:08-cv-01099 OWW DLB (331/3% award); Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, Inc., 

E.D. Cal. Case No. 1:07-cv-00227 (331/3% award); Chavez et al. v. Petrissans et al., E.D. Cal., 1:08-cv00122 (331/3% award).” (Doc. 189 at 14-15) However, Class Counsel failed to provide any analysis 

regarding how they believe these cases are similar to the matter pending; indeed, they are not.

For example, in Benitez, the Court did not conduct an analysis regarding the reasonableness of 

the attorney fees or address the number of hours expended by counsel to represent the class of 

approximately 100 workers. (See Benitez, Case No. 1:08-1122-LJO-GSA, Docs. 39, 49 and 52) The

Court approved a settlement of $400,000 and awarded class counsel $133,333 in fees. (See Benitez, 

Doc. 52) Notably, class counsel had reported that 70 class members presented claim forms, and the 

estimated average payment to class members was nearly $3,000 per claimant. (Benitez, Doc. 49 at 9) 

Similarly, in Alvarado, there were “approximately 150 class members,” and the estimated average 

settlement share was $2,000. (Alvarado, Case No. 1:08-1099-OWW-MJS, Doc. 73 at 6, 10) In 

Chavez, counsel reported the average settlement share was $3,750 (Chavez, Case. No. 1:08-00122-

LJO-GSA, Doc. 83 at 10) and in Vasquez the average share was “approximately $2600 per claimant.” 

(Vasquez, Case. No. 1:07-cv-00227-OWW-GSA, Doc. 72 at 16) These settlement shares are 

significantly greater than the results achieved in the matter now before the Court.

Class Counsel acknowledge they have not received 331/3% in similar cases and the Court 

“awarded Class Counsel attorneys’ fees of 30% of the net settlements in class action cases on behalf of 

fieldworkers employed in the table-grape industry.”15 (Doc. 189 at 14, citing Rodriguez v. D.M. Camp 

& Sons, Case No. 1:09-cv-00700 and Morales v. Stevco, Case No. 1:09-cv-00704) However, Class 

Counsel argue Rodriguez and Morales “are distinguishable in a number of ways” that support a higher 

fee award. (Id. at 15) For example, Class Counsel assert, “neither Rodriguez nor Morales persuaded 

 

15 Presumably, Class Counsel refers to the gross settlement amounts as the fees were deducted from the common 

fund prior to distribution of the remaining funds to the class members.

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the Court to certify a class,” and neither case entailed “extensive law and motion practice.”16 (Id.) 

On the other hand, the results obtained in the Rodriguez and Morales settlements were much 

more beneficial to the class members than the estimated awards for class members in this action. In 

Morales, the average award for class members was “over $4,300” for each class member. Morales, 

2013 WL 1222058 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2013). The Court found this was “a significant recovery” 

that weighed in favor of a higher award. Id. Similarly, in Rodriguez, the average award was 

approximately $2,200 award per worker, and “the highest award [was] estimated to be approximately 

$17,300.” Rodriguez, 2013 WL 2146927 at *13 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2013). The Court determined such 

results were significant and weighed in favor of an award higher than the benchmark. See Morales, 

2013 WL 1222058 at *2; Rodriguez, 2013 WL 2146927 at *13. In contrast, here, the estimated average 

settlement share with a pro rata distribution is $1,336.58. (Doc. 199-5 at 2, McGill Decl. ¶ 3) Given 

the disparity in the results achieved, the Court does not find this compares favorably to Morales and 

Rodriguez to support the reward requested.

F. Lodestar Crosscheck and Market Rate

Class Counsel provided a list of each legal professional who worked on Rosales and Cruz, and 

report they worked at total of 2,617.89 hours. (Doc. 188 at 21-24) According to Class Counsel, this

results in a lodestar calculation of $1,414,414.31. (See id. at 24) Generally, when the lodestar is used as 

a cross-check for a fee award, the Court is not required to perform an “exhaustive cataloguing and 

review of counsel’s hours.” See Schiller, 2012 WL 2117001 at *20 (citing In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. 

Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 306 (3d Cir. 2005); In re Immune Response Sec. Litig., 497 F.Supp.2d 1166 (S.D.

Cal. 2007)). However, because a cursory review of the records revealed significant flaws related to the

lodestar calculation—including hours not related to this litigation, overbilling and clerical tasks— the 

Court has performed a detailed review of the records.

1. Hourly rate

As an initial matter, the Supreme Court has determined that attorneys’ fees should be calculated 

according to the “prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 

 

16 Although Class Counsel may imply otherwise, the plaintiffs did not file motions for class certification in 

Rodriguez and Morales.

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895 (1984). In general, the “relevant community” for purposes of determining the prevailing market 

rate, is the “forum in which the district court sits.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 

979 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, when a case is filed in the Fresno Division of the Eastern District of 

California, “[t]he Eastern District of California, Fresno Division, is the appropriate forum to establish 

the lodestar hourly rate.” See Jadwin v. County of Kern, 767 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1129 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 

However, “rates, other than those of the forum, may be employed if local counsel was unavailable, 

either because they are unwilling or unable to perform because they lack the degree of experience, 

expertise, or specialization required to handle properly the case.” Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 

1405 (9th Cir. 1992).

Here, Class Counsel argues that the out-of-district hourly rates from the San Francisco Bay area 

and Central District, which they used to calculate the lodestar, should be applied in this action. (Doc. 

189 at 16) According to Class Counsel, “the fact that Class Counsel has been involved in 16 of the 18 

Agricultural Workers Protection Act (29 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.) cases filed within the last ten years 

highly suggests that counsel located within the district is incapable or unwilling to take these contingent 

farm worker class actions because they do not have the requisite experience.” (Id.) Significantly, 

however, several of attorneys who represented plaintiffs in related action are employed in Bakersfield, 

California, which lies within the Fresno Division of the Eastern District. See Rojas v. Sunview, Case 

No. 1:09-cv-00705-AWI-JLT.17 Further, Class Counsel report the California Rural Legal Assistance 

has “filed lawsuits on behalf of 250 Central Valley farmworkers in matters involving AWPA and/or 

California wage and hour matters and filed administrative complaints or otherwise privately negotiated 

matters for 1,250 Central Valley farmworkers.” (Doc. 184-1 at 17) Because other lawyers are clearly 

available and willing to represent farmworkers and prosecute wage and hour class actions, Class 

Counsel have not met their burden to show hourly rates other than those of the Fresno Division should 

have been used for purposes of calculating the lodestar. See Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979; Gates, 987 

F.2d at 1405. Accordingly, the hourly rates must be adjusted to be consistent with attorneys in the 

Fresno Division of the Eastern District.

 

17 For the reasons set forth in Footnote 2, the Court takes judicial notice of the Court’s docket in Rojas v. Sunview, 

Case No. 1:09-cv-00705-AWI-JLT.

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a. Attorneys

 The hourly rates sought by counsel range from $295 to $825. (See Doc. 188 at 21-23) For 

example, Stan Mallison and Hector Martinez seek hourly rates of $650. (Id.) Previously, this Court 

has declined to calculate the lodestar with the requested hourly rate of $650 for Mr. Mallison and Mr. 

Martinez. Ontiveros v. Zamora, 303 F.R.D. at 356, 373-74 (E.D. Cal. 2014). The Court noted that the 

hourly rates were “high for even the most experienced attorneys in the Eastern District.” Id. at 374 

(citing Johnson v. Allied Trailer Supply, 2014 WL 1334006, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2014); Joe Hand 

Prom., Inc. v. Albright, 2013 WL 4094403, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013). Consequently, the Court 

calculated the lodestar with using $400 as the hourly rate for partners at Mallison & Martinez and $175 

as the rate for associates. Id. Although Ontiveros was filed in the Sacramento Division of the Eastern 

District, it demonstrates the hourly rates requested here do not align with those in the Eastern District.

More recently, this Court has reviewed the billing rates for the Fresno Division and concluded 

that “hourly rates generally accepted in the Fresno Division for competent experienced attorneys [are]

between $250 and $380, with the highest rates generally reserved for those attorneys who are regarded 

as competent and reputable and who possess in excess of 20 years of experience.” Silvester v. Harris, 

2014 WL 7239371 at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2014). For attorneys with “less than ten years of experience 

... the accepted range is between $175 and $300 per hour.” Id. (citing Willis v. City of Fresno, 2014 

WL 3563310 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2014); Gordillo v. Ford Motor Co., 2014 WL 2801243 (E.D. Cal. June 

19, 2014)). With these parameters in mind, the hourly rates for counsel must be adjusted to calculate 

the lodestar. 

Hours for each of the attorneys who have been in practice 20 years or more—including David 

Rosenfeld, William Sokol, Chris Raisner, Emily Rich, Suzanne Murphy, Jeff Westerman, and Elizabeth 

Lin—will be calculated at the rate of $380 per hour. For attorneys who have been in practice between 

15 and 20 years—including Stan Mallison, Hector Martinez, Sabrina Kim, and Nicole Duckett—the 

hourly rate is adjusted to $350 per hour. Further, for attorneys who have been in practice between 10 

and 15 years—including Alegria de la Cruz, Linelle Mogado, and Manjari Chawla—the rate is adjusted 

to $300 per hour. The hours worked by attorneys who have been admitted to practice between 5 and 10 

years—including Joseph Sutton, Jessica Juarez, Kerianne Steele, and Marco Palau —the lodestar will 

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be calculated at a rate of $225 per hour. Finally, for attorneys who have been in practice for less than 

five years, the rate is adjusted to $175 per hour. Based upon the prior survey of the attorney fees in the 

Fresno Division and the Court’s own knowledge, these hourly rates are reasonable. See Silvester, 2014 

WL 7239371 at *4; see also Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding “the 

district court did not abuse its discretion either by relying, in part, on its own knowledge and

experience” to determine reasonable hourly rates).

b. Non-attorney staff

 Class Counsel calculated their lodestar using hourly rates ranging from $95 to $325 for nonattorney staff. (See Doc. 188 at 21-23) Generally, paralegal rates within the Fresno Division of the 

Eastern District range between $75 to approximately $150.00. See Moreau v. Daily Independent, 2013 

WL 796621 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2013) (observing that “$75 for paralegals [is] reasonable for 

litigation performed in this district”); Spence v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2012 WL 844713 at *5 (E.D. 

Cal., Mar. 12, 2012) (approving “paralegal or other support rates” of $125.00, $145.00 and $155.00); 

Silvester 2014 WL 7239371 at *4 (“The current reasonable hourly rate for paralegal work in the Fresno 

Division ranges from $75 to $150, depending on experience.”)

Here, Class Counsel request hourly rates of $95 per hour for Joel Salas, Mirella Lopez, and 

Dyvienne Martinez. (See Doc. 188 at 22) Because these rates are within the range generally awarded 

in the Fresno Division, no adjustment is required. The hourly rate of $150 is appropriate for Eleanor 

Natwick, Judy Castillo, Teresa Oviedo, and Aaron Nathan, who have all been working as legal 

assistants or paralegals for more than twelve years. (Doc. 186 at 6-7, Rich Decl. ¶¶ 15-18) Because 

Michelle Grisat was a paralegal for only one year (see id., ¶ 14), her hourly rate will be adjusted to $75. 

Finally, Class Counsel offer no support that higher hourly rates are appropriate for Hector Hernandez, 

Jan Spring, or Deborah Vanore. Given the lack of information regarding their experience, the Court 

adjusts their hourly rates to $100 per hour. See Willis, 2014 WL 3563310 at *14 (setting the hourly rate 

for a paralegal at $100 where the plaintiffs did “not offer[] any reason” to support a rate “set at the 

highest level in this district”). Accordingly, the hourly rate for these individuals is adjusted to $100 to 

be in line with the rates in the Fresno Division. 

2. Hours expended

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A representative from each of the law firms designated as Plaintiffs’ counsel has provided a 

declaration including the hours worked in support of the request for attorney fees. Accordingly, the 

Court has reviewed the hours reported by each firm to determine whether they are reasonable.

a. Mallison & Martinez

Stan Mallison reports that his law firm worked 2,049.80 hours in the course of this action since 

2005. (Doc. 188 at 21-22, Mallison Decl. ¶ 57) However, this total includes work related to several 

other cases and claims against other grape growers.

i. Work related to other claims

The total hours reported by Mallison & Martinez includes work performed on the Lara action in 

the state court action. Significantly, the Lara plaintiffs did not identify El Rancho as a defendant until 

the filing of their Second Amended Complaint on September 12, 2005, and El Rancho did not respond 

to the allegations in the state court. Despite this, Mallison & Martinez seeks an award for a fraction of 

the hours for work completed in Lara beginning in April 2005, including preparing for and attending 

case management conferences; investigating claims against other defendants in Lara such as Golden 

Grain, Giumarra, Lucich Farms, and Castlerock; reviewing responses to discovery; and settlement 

discussions with Castlerock. (See, e.g., Doc. 188-1 at 2, 15, 24, 37, 86-88) In addition, Mallison & 

Martinez include work related to responding to demurrers in Lara, performing legal research, and 

preparing responses to the demurrers by the defendants. (Doc. 188-1 at 25, 77, 80) Because these tasks 

did not relate to the claims against El Rancho and Garza, the time related thereto should not be awarded 

from the class settlement fund. See Gauchat-Hargis v. Forest River, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

128508 at *11 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2013) (“Time spent on tasks that are not relevant to the case at issue 

should be eliminated from the lodestar analysis.”) This results in a deduction of 38.44 hours.

18

Mallison & Martinez also report time related to work on the bankruptcy proceeding filed by 

Rogelio Casimiro, doing business as Golden Grain, and the related adversary proceedings initiated by 

 

18 This total includes 3.59 hours for Hector Martinez, 33.35 hours for Stan Mallison, and 1.5 hours for Alegria De 

La Cruz.

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the Lara plaintiffs in the bankruptcy court.19 For example, several individuals report contacting 

Casimiro/Golden Grain employees and conducting interviews:

4/19/2006 Martinez, H. Telephone Calls to Lara, Paula, Mario re Casimiro Facts 0.42

5/30/2006 Mallison Preparation and attendance at Bnkruptcy [sic] deposition; 

meeting with investigator and co-counsel; defendanse [sic] 

counsel; trustee and deponents

2.00

6/6/2006 Hernandez Case discussion about declaration of workers that work for 

Rogelio Casimiro; Revise and comment on declaration

0.17

7/15/2006 Martinez, D. Telephone Call to former Golden Grain workers to schedule 

appointments

0.67

7/15/2006 Martinez, H. Contact Former workers from Employee list provided by 

Casimiro

0.67

7/16/2006 Martinez, D. Telephone Call to former Golden Grain workers re case update 

and scheduling for appointment

1.38

7/17/2006 Martinez, D. Telephone Call to former Golden Grain workers to make 

initial contact and schedule appointments

1.37

7/17/2006 Martinez, H. Telephone Call to Golden Grain former employer; explained 

status of case; scheduled appoitments [sic]; discussions...

1.00

7/18/2006 Martinez, D. Telephone Call to former GG workers to conduct initial 

contact and schedule interviews

0.95

7/18/2006 Martinez, H. Contacting class members re GG violations; explaination [sic] 

of case status’ scheduled appointments.

0.67

7/19/2006 Martinez, D. Telephone Call to former GG workers to provide[] update and 

schedule appts in Bakersfield

0.65

7/19/2006 Martinez, H. Contact former GG workers and explaining status of case; 

scheduled appointments

0.50

7/20/2006 Martinez, D. Telephone Call to former GG workers to update and schedule 

appts in Bakersfield

0.65

7/20/2006 Martinez, D. Prepare for trip to Bakersfield; Travel 0.85

7/20/2006 Mallison Factual investigation and Preparation for [travel] to 

Bakersfield; database work

0.71

7/20/2006 Martinez, H. Supervise DM and advise regarding calls to GG former 

workers

0.33

7/20/2006 Martinez, H. Prepare for trip to Bakersfield; Travel time 0.83

7/21/2006 Mallison Prep; travel to’ attendance at witness interviews 1.83

7/21/2006 Martinez, H. Meeting with witnesses and clients to obtain declarations 1.83

7/22/2006 Mallison Preparation for; attendance at interviews of witnesses in 

[Bakersfield]

2.00

7/22/2006 Martinez, H. Meeting with former Casimiro workers; Telephone Call to 

witnesses; review documents from Sara. Travel

1.83

8/2/2006 Martinez, H. Telephone Call to Golden Grain [w]itnesses regarding meeting 

in Arvin to obtain declarations

0.50

8/3/2006 Martinez, H. T/Cs to Golden Grain former workers to advise of meeting in 

Arvin on Sunday

0.33

12/13/2006 Mallison Review of settlement documents for GG case; declaration of 

Hector Martinez for appointment as lead counsel

0.29

 

19 On October 12, 2005, Casimiro filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern 

District of California, Case No. 05-19558-B-13. In January 2006, the Lara Plaintiffs initiated Adversary Proceeding No. 

05-01401 in the Bankruptcy Court, and sought withdrawal of reference from the Bankruptcy Court. (Case No. 1:06-cv0028-AWI, Doc. 1-4 at 2.) Plaintiffs again sought withdrawal of reference in August 2007, In re Rogelio A. Casimiro, et 

al., Case No. 1:07-cv-01218-AWI.

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(Doc. 188-1 at 12-13, 65, 68) Significantly, there is no evidence that the claims against Golden Grain 

were intertwined with the claims against El Rancho Farms or Garza Contracting. Because Class 

Counsel fail to explain how the discovery related to the bankruptcy proceedings was relevant here, or 

how the evidence gathered against Golden Grain was used to support Plaintiffs’ claims in Rosales and 

Cruz, the tasks related to the adversarial proceedings and class certification in the Bankruptcy Court 

should not be compensated here. This results in a total deduction of 22.43 hours.

ii. Work related to Valenzuela, Case No. 1:05-cv-01600-AWI-SMS

On December 16, 2005, Santos Valenzuela, Trinidad Ruiz, Marta Rincon De Diaz, Ramon 

Cervantes Perales, and Hugo Perez Rios filed a class action complaint against Giumarra Vineyards.20 

On December 21, 2005, Plaintiffs’ counsel filed a motion to consolidate the action with Doe. (See 

Valenzuela, Doc. 5) Stan Mallison and Hector Martinez report they had conferences related to 

Valenzuela and prepared documents related to consolidation of the claims with Doe. (Doc. 188-1 at 22-

23, 75-77) Because the claims brought by the Valenzuela plaintiffs related only to their employment by 

Giumarra Vineyards (see Valenzuela, Doc. 1), the work completed in that action was not related to the 

class claims here and should not be compensated. Thus, the lodestar is reduced by 9.63 hours.

21

b. Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld

Emily Rich, a shareholder with the law firm of Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld, reports that “the 

firm expended 1557.23 hours in attorney and paralegal time” prior to the severance of Doe, and seek 

1/6 of this time, or 259.54 hours. (Doc. 186 at 8, Rich Decl. ¶ 21) In addition, Ms. Rich reports they 

spent 62.15 hours on Rosales after the Doe action was severed into six separate actions. (Id., ¶ 22)

i. Work related to claims against other grape growers

Importantly, it is clear that many tasks reported prior to the severance of Doe into six separate 

cases relate to the claims of individuals who were not employed at El Rancho Farms. For example,

Chris Raisner recorded having several telephone conferences with attorneys who represented Giumarra 

 

20 Because the accuracy of the court’s docket cannot reasonably be questioned, the Court takes judicial notice of 

the docket and documents filed in Valenzuela v. Giumarra Vineyards Corporation, Case No. 1:05-cv-1600-AWI-SMS. 

See Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1388 n.9.

21 This includes 6.72 hours for Stan Mallison and 2.91 for Hector Martinez.

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Vineyards, Stevco, and DM Camp & Sons. (See, e.g., Doc. 186-2 at 8-9) Mr. Raisner also noted he 

drafted three letters to the Workforce Development Agency “re DM Camp & Sons, Marko Zaninovich, 

Inc.; and Sunview Vineyards of California.” (Id. at 11) Mr. Raisner and Ms. Rich worked on the 

proposed consolidation and appointment as lead counsel in Valenzuela—which, as discussed above, 

only raised claims against Giumarra Vineyards—with Doe. (Id. at 6-7) Further, the timesheets include 

investigations regarding other grape growers: Linelle Mogado interviewed Sunview and DM Camp 

workers while Kerianne Steele “[i]nterviewed putative class members and collected declarations from 

them re Casimiro’s violations of labor code.” (See id. at 12, 15, 22) 

In total, the attorneys at Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld worked 236 hours on actions that clearly 

did not relate to claims of individuals who were not employed at El Rancho Farms. As such, even 1/6 

the time for these tasks should not be included in the lodestar calculation. See Gauchat-Hargis, 2013 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128508 at *11 (“Time spent on tasks that are not relevant to the case at issue should 

be eliminated from the lodestar analysis.”) Thus, the lodestar will be reduced by 39.2 hours.

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ii. Clerical tasks

Notably, Class Counsel’s lodestar calculation included time for clerical tasks performed by 

Eleanor Natwick such as filing; “[d]ocument organization;” and downloading, printing, and saving 

documents from PACER. (See, e.g., Doc. 186-2 at 20-21, 23-25) Similarly, Linelle Mogado reported 

she assisted with “filing, preparation and scanning exhibits,” and showed an assistant “how to compile

information and enter data.” (Id. at 23, 25) Given the clerical nature of these tasks, the time expended 

should be deducted from the lodestar calculation. See Missouri, 491 U.S. at 288 n. 10; Nadarajah, 569 

F.3d at 921. Because Class Counsel seeks 1/6 of the time and Ms. Natwick and Ms. Mogado recorded 

31.75 hours in clerical tasks, this results in a deduction of 5.29 hours.

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c. Milberg, LLP

Milberg, LLP also represented the plaintiffs in the Doe action and seeks an award of 1/6 of the 

time related to that phase of the litigation. David Azar submitted a declaration on behalf of Milberg 

LLP, reporting: “The total number of hours expended on this litigation by [the] firm is 222.95 hours. 

 

22 This total includes deductions of 22.58 hours for Chris Raiser, 12.33 hours for Emily Rich, 2.96 hours for 

Linelle Mogado, and 1.33 hours for Kerianne Steele.

23 This total includes deductions of 1.58 hours for Linelle Mogado and 3.71 hours for Eleanor Natwick.

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The total lodestar for [the] firm is $113,015.68 consisting of $89,310.43 for attorneys’ time and

$23,705.25 for professional time.” (Doc. 187 at 2, ¶ 6)

i. Work related to claims against other grape growers

Milberg LLP also erroneously included several tasks related to other defendants from Lara and 

Doe, such as Castlerock. For example, Nicole Duckett reports time for preparing a joint status report 

related to the claims against Stevco. (Doc. 187-1 at 8) In addition, Ms. Duckett noted she spent time 

related to: “CastleRock: Email Hector Gonzalez; Call to Hector Gonzales; research mediators.” (Id. at 

9) Similarly, Sabrina Kim reports time for a conference with Ms. Duckett regarding “Castlerock 

mediation and status and next steps in litigation; tele/conf. with J. Westerman re: same.” (Id.) Ms. Kim 

also indicates she spent time reviewing a stipulation regarding “lead structure in Giumarra and 

SunView.” (Id. at 7) In total, the attorneys report 23.75 on tasks that clearly relate to claims against 

other defendants in Doe and Lara, which should not be included in the lodestar calculation. See 

Gauchat-Hargis, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128508 at *11. Because Milberg LLP seeks 1/6 of the time 

related to these actions, the lodestar will be reduced by 3.96 hours.

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ii. Clerical tasks

The lodestar calculation by Mr. Azar includes 50.62 hours of work by document clerks, Jessica 

Ortiz and Ray Velazquez. (Doc. 187-1 at 1) Ms. Ortiz and Mr. Valazquez were responsible for 

docketing documents, copying, printing and “monitoring” the case. (See id. at 9-14) Given the 

clerical nature of these tasks, the time attributed to a “document clerk” should not be included in the 

lodestar calculation. See Missouri, 491 U.S. at 288 n. 10; Nadarajah, 569 F.3d at 921. This results in 

the deduction of 50.62 hours.

In addition, many of the tasks performed by Cecille Chaffins were clerical in nature. For 

example, Ms. Chaffins reported prepared courtesy copies of documents, retrieved documents from 

PACER, calendared deadlines, and “organize[d] working files.” (See Doc. 187-1 at 3-9) In total, Ms. 

Chaffins spent 31.2 hours on tasks that are clerical in nature. Because Milberg seeks 1/6 of the time, 

this results in a deduction of 5.2 hours.

 

24 This includes deductions of 1.21 hours for Sabrina Kim, 0.08 hours for Jeff Westerman, and 2.67 hours for 

Nicole Duckett. 

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iii. Quarter-hour billing

Notably, the minimum time recorded at Milberg LLP was 0.25 hours, which is a practice that 

has been criticized because it inflates the time billed. Welch v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 949 

(9th Cir. 2007) (affirming a reduction after finding the billing practice inflated the time recorded); 

Robinson v. Plourde, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1100-01 (D. Haw. 2010) (applying a 20% reduction for 

billing in quarter-hour increments); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Am. v. Remington, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

9209 at *9 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2014) (also applying a 20% reduction where counsel billed in 15 minuteincrements).

In Welch, the district court “imposed a 20 percent across-the-board reduction on [the] requested 

hours” because the law firm “billed in quarter-hour increments.” Id., 480 F.3d at 948. The district 

concluded the “practice of billing by the quarter-hour resulted in a request for excessive hours . . . 

because counsel billed a minimum of 15 minutes for numerous phone calls and e-mails that likely took 

a fraction of the time.” Id. The Ninth Circuit also reviewed the time sheets, and noted: “Our own 

review of the time sheet confirms that it is replete with quarter-hour or half-hour charges for the 

drafting of letters, telephone calls and intraoffice conferences.” Id. Therefore, the reduction for 

quarter-hour billing was affirmed. Id.

Here, counsel and their staff billed 15 minutes on several occasions for reading brief minute 

orders from the Court, reviewing emails, and checking deadlines (See, e.g., Doc. 187-1 at 2, 9, 5 11) In 

Remington, this Court noted that “15-minute billing for reading the three-sentence Minute Order, which 

should have been read in 30 seconds or less time, obviously inflated the time spent performing that 

task, and causes concern that other unverifiable tasks likely took a fraction of the time billed to 

complete.” Prudential Ins. Co. v. Am. v. Remington, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9209 at *9. Similarly, Mr. 

Westerman’s billing 15 minutes for reading a minute order suggests that the reported time was inflated 

significantly by the quarter-hour billing minimum on other tasks such as reviewing emails, leaving a 

telephone message, and conferences with co-counsel. See id; Welch, 480 F.3d at 948-49. Therefore, 

the remaining time reported by counsel is reduced by 20% for purposes of the lodestar calculation. 

3. Lodestar Calculation

With the rates and time adjustments set forth above, the lodestar in this action is $690,089.65:

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LAW FIRM LEGAL 

PROFESSIONAL

ADJUSTED

HOURS

RATE LODESTAR

Mallison & Martinez

($556,891.85)

Stan Mallison 553.61 $350 193,763.50

Hector Martinez 357.45 $350 125,107.50

Marco Palau 337.62 $225 75,964.50

Joseph Sutton 670.40 $225 150,840.00

Alegria de la Cruz 13.00 $300 3,900.00

Eric Trabucco 14.20 $175 2,485.00

Hector Hernandez 0.85 $100 85.00

Jan Spring 10.25 $100 1,025.00

Jessica Juarez 12.60 $225 2,835.00

Joel Salas 0.50 $95 47.50

Mirella Lopez 6.50 $95 617.50

Deborah Vanore 2.33 $95 221.35

Dyvienne Martinez 0.00 n/a 0.00

Weinburg, Roger & 

Rosenfeld

($91,092.60)

David Rosenfeld 3.28 $380 1,246.40

Bill Sokol 1.29 $380 490.20

Chris Raisner 71.6 $380 27,208.00

Emily Rich 83.9 $380 31,882.00

Linelle Mogado 71.54 $300 21,462.00

Majari Chawla 5.17 $300 1,551.00

Kerianne Steele 16.88 $225 3,798.00

Suzanne Murphy 1.75 $380 665.00

Michelle Grisat 6.38 $75 478.50

Eleanor Natwick 10.58 $150 1,587.00

Teresa Oviedo 3.08 $150 462.00

Judy Castillo 1.50 $150 225.00

Aaron Nathan 0.25 $150 37.50

Milberg, LLP

($42,105.20)

Sabrina Kim 22.71 $350 7,948.50

Jeff Westerman 2.97 $380 1,128.60

Nicole Duckett 75.73 $350 26,505.50

Elizabeth Lin 12.77 $380 4,852.60

Cecille Chaffins 16.7 $100 1,670.00

“Document Clerks” 0.00 n/a 0.00

TOTAL $690,089.65

Significantly, there is a strong presumption that the lodestar is a reasonable fee. Gonzalez, 729 

F.3d at 1202; Camacho, 523 F.3d at 978. The benchmark award of 25% of the common fund amounts 

to $575,000—which is less than the lodestar as calculated above. However, the lodestar above is

significantly less than the fees requested by Class Counsel. As a result, the lodestar cross-check 

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supports a request slightly above the benchmark, but not the amount sought by class counsel. 

III. Fees to be Awarded

Weighing the factors set forth by the Ninth Circuit in In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust 

Litigation, a slight upward departure from the benchmark appears appropriate in this action. Despite 

the fact that Class Counsel displayed less than exemplary work and exerted dozens of hours relitigating issues related to class certification, Class Counsel succeeded on the second motion to certify a 

class and defeated motion for decertification. Further, the lodestar-cross check supports an upward 

departure from the benchmark. See Vizcaino 290 F.3d at 1048; Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1202. 

Accordingly, it is recommended that Class Counsel’s request for attorney fees be GRANTED in the 

modified $690,089.65, which is approximately 30% of the gross settlement fund.

REQUESTS FOR COSTS

I. Litigation Expenses

Reimbursement of taxable costs is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 54. Attorneys may recover reasonable expenses that would typically be billed to paying 

clients in non-contingency matters. See Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, the 

Settlement authorized Class Counsel to seek up to $50,000 for expenses. (Doc. 166-1 at 5, § III.B) 

Plaintiffs’ counsel report their actual costs totaled $36,620.54, and seek reimbursement of these funds. 

(Doc. 189 at 11) Class Counsel assert:

Here, the costs incurred are reasonable for a document-intensive wage and hour case 

and as such Class Counsel should be reimbursed. Mallison Decl. ¶¶58, 59. Plaintiffs 

propounded document requests demanding all of the critical payroll and timekeeping 

information at issue in this case and the names and contact information for 

Defendant’s former and current employees. Mallison Decl. ¶¶34-36. Defendants’ 

timekeeping system is paper-based consisting of a database for payroll and paper time 

records. Id. This required Class Counsel to meticulously review a vast quantity of 

paper time keeping and payroll records in order to properly analyze and negotiate a 

settlement in this case. Id. In addition, Class Counsel necessarily incurred significant 

costs related to taking depositions in this litigation. Id. Class counsel also incurred 

significant costs related to the production, duplication, and photocopying of the 

extensive paper record. Id. at ¶40.

(Doc. 189 at 19) 

Previously, this Court noted cost “including filing fees, mediator fees ..., ground transportation, 

copy charges, computer research, and database expert fees ... are routinely reimbursed in these types of 

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cases.” Alvarado, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52793, at *27-28. A review of the cost lists provided by 

Class Counsel demonstrates the costs incurred are reasonable. Accordingly, the Court recommends the

request for costs in the amount of $36,620.54 be GRANTED.

II. Costs of Settlement Administration

The Settlement authorizes the reimbursement of “reasonable fees and expenses” for the 

Settlement Administrator (Doc. 166-1 at 6, Settlement § III.B) Originally, Gilardi estimated the cost 

of administration would be approximately $30,000. (Doc. 165 at 5) Now, Gilardi seeks an award of 

$57,500 for performing the duties required under the terms of the Settlement. (Doc. 200 at 3)

Notably, when Gilardi made an estimate for its fees and expenses related to this action, the 

estimate was based upon a class size of 3,000. (Doc. 166-5 at 1) It was only after the Court granted 

preliminary approval of the Settlement and appoint Gilardi as the Settlement Administrator, that the 

class expanded from “approximately 3,000 Class Members” to more than 6,000 Class Members. (See 

Doc. 184-1 at 28.) Due to the additional time spent on the class data and significant increase in the 

number of Class Members, as well as the work related to processing late claims that the parties 

stipulated will be deemed timely, Gilardi seeks an award of fees greater than previously requested. 

(See Doc. 184-3 at 4, ¶ 16; Doc. 198-1 at 2, ¶ 4) Specifically, Ms. McGill reports that the costs for 

administration have increased to $75,054. (Doc. 200 at 6) Despite the actual costs of the settlement 

administration, Gilardi requests an award of $57,500. (Id. at 3, McGill Decl. ¶ 10)

Previously, this Court has awarded $25,000 for settlement administration in a wage and hour 

case involving approximately 170 potential class members. See Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, 266 

F.R.D. 482, 483-84 (E.D. Cal. 2010). Given that this class involves more than thirty times the number 

of class members in Vasquez, the Court finds the increased administrative expenses are reasonable, 

and recommends an award of $57,500 for the settlement administration be GRANTED.

25

PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST FOR AN INCENTIVE AWARD

The settlement provides that Plaintiffs may apply to the District Court for a class representative 

 

25 Class Counsel indicated that they were neutral on the amount of the award to the Claims Administrator but 

argued that Gilardi should be given the opportunity to file a declaration that would explain its higher costs. However, 

Gilardi had already done so. Ms. McGill’s declaration details that the actual cost for the services rendered was $75,000 but

Gilardi offered a discount in the amount of $17,554.07 reducing the total to $57,500. (Doc. 200 at 3, 5-6.)

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enhancement up to $10,000, to be paid from the gross settlement amount. (Doc. 166-1 at 5, Settlement 

§ III.B) Here, Plaintiffs request awards of $10,000 for the Rosales plaintiffs and $7,500 for the Cruz 

plaintiffs. (Doc. 189 at 20)

In the Ninth Circuit, a court has discretion to award class representatives reasonable incentive 

payments. Staton, 327 F.3d at 977; In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d at 463. Incentive 

payments for class representatives are not to be given routinely. In Staton, the Ninth Circuit observed,

Indeed, ‘[i]f class representatives expect routinely to receive special awards in addition 

to their share of the recovery, they may be tempted to accept suboptimal settlements at 

the expense of the class members whose interests they are appointed to guard.” 

Weseley v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 711 F. Supp. 713, 720 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); see also 

Women’s Comm. for Equal Employment Opportunity v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 76 F.R.D. 

173, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“[W]hen representative plaintiffs make what amounts to a 

separate peace with defendants, grave problems of collusion are raised.”). 

Id. at 975. In evaluating a request for an enhanced award to a class representative, the Court should 

consider all “relevant factors including the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the 

class, the degree to which the class has benefitted from those actions, . . . the amount of time and effort 

the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation . . . and reasonable fears of workplace retaliation.” Id. 

at 977. Further, incentive awards may recognize a plaintiff’s “willingness to act as a private attorney 

general.” Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2009).

A. Actions taken to benefit the class

The class representatives report they assisted counsel with a wide-range of tasks. Both Ms. 

Corza and Ms. Rosales had their depositions taken. (Doc. 191 at 3, Corza Decl. ¶ 6; Doc. 193 at 3, 

Rosales Decl. ¶ 6) Angel Lopez Cruz and Angelica Alvarez became involved in the litigation when 

they gave declarations in support of class certification in Rosales. (Doc. 190 at 2, Cruz Decl. ¶ 3; Doc. 

192 at 2, Alavarez Decl. ¶ 3) Further, each of the plaintiffs report they assisted with discovery, 

provided documents to the attorneys, and reviewed documents produced by El Rancho and Garza. 

(Doc. 190 at 3, Cruz Decl. ¶ 5; Doc. 191 at 3, Corza Decl. ¶5; Doc. 192 at 3, Alvarez Decl. ¶ 5; Doc. 

193 at 3, Rosales Decl. ¶ 5). 

Notably, Plaintiffs would have likely submitted to depositions and assisted with discovery 

whether the action was brought on behalf of the class. On the other hand, Plaintiffs sacrificed any 

additional claims that they may have had against the Defendants whether they were related to the 

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claims raised in the case or not as a condition of the settlement. Thus, the actions taken by Plaintiffs 

weigh in favor of an incentive payment.

B. Time expended by Plaintiffs

The Rosales plaintiffs estimate they spent between 91 and 96 hours related to this action by 

providing assistance with discovery, submitting to depositions, attending two of the mediation sessions 

in person, and being available by phone for the third mediation. (Doc. 191 at 3, Corza Decl. ¶¶5-7; 

Doc. 193 at 3, Rosales Decl. ¶¶ 5-7) In contrast, Mr. Cruz estimates he spent 12 hours on actions 

related to the litigation, including reviewing documents and being available by phone for the final 

mediation session. (Doc. 190 at 3, Cruz Decl. ¶¶ 5-6) Ms. Alvarez attended the final mediation 

session in person, and estimates she spent 31 hours on tasks related to this litigation. (Doc. 192 at 3, 

Alvarez Decl. ¶¶ 5-6) Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of incentive payments to both the Rosales 

and Cruz plaintiffs. 

 C. Fears of workplace retaliation

Ms. Rosales reports that when the “Doe” action was filed, she was “afraid that if [she] 

participated in the lawsuit [she] might be blacklisted and never get another agricultural job.” (Doc. 193 

at 2, ¶ 3) Similarly, Ms. Corza and Ms. Alvarez report they feared being unable to find work if they 

participated in the lawsuit. (Doc. 191 at 2, Corza Decl. ¶ 3; Doc. 192 at 2, Alvarez Decl. ¶ 3) Mr. Cruz 

asserts that after he became a named plaintiff, he was “harassed by [his] supervisor at El Rancho . . . 

and chose to quit rather than keep working.” (Doc. 190 at 2, Cruz Decl. ¶ 3) Thus, this factor supports

incentive payments to Plaintiffs.

D. Reasonableness of Plaintiff’s request

Considering the actions taken by Plaintiffs, an incentive award is appropriate. In determining 

the amount to be awarded, the Court may consider the time expended by the class representative, the 

fairness of the hourly rate, and how large the incentive award is compared to the average award class 

members expect to receive. See, e.g., Ontiveros, 303 F.R.D. at 366 (evaluating the hourly rate the 

plaintiff would receive to determine whether the award was appropriate); Rankin v. Am. Greetings, Inc., 

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72250, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 6, 2011) (observing that the incentive award 

requested was “reasonably close to the average per class member amount to be received); Alvarado, 

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2011 WL 1883188 at *10-11 (considering the time and financial risk undertaken by the plaintiff). 

1. Time expended

In Alvarado, the Court noted the class representatives “(1) travelled from Bakersfield to 

Sacramento for mediation sessions (2) assisted Counsel in investigating and substantiating the claims 

alleged in this action; (3) assisted in the preparation of the complaint in this action; (4) produced 

evidentiary documents to Counsel; and (5) assisted in the settlement of this litigation.” Id., 2011 WL 

1883188 at *11. Further, the Court noted the plaintiffs “undertook the financial risk that, in the event 

of a judgment in favor of Defendant in this action, they could have been personally responsible for the 

costs awarded in favor of the Defendant.” Id. In light of these facts, the Court found an award of 

$7,500 for each plaintiff was appropriate for the time, efforts, and risks undertaken. 

Here, the Rosales plaintiffs seek an award equal exceeding the incentive awards approved in 

Alvarado. However, because the actions taken by the Rosales are similar to those by the plaintiff in 

Alvarado, this factor supports authorizing an enhancement of $7,500 to the Rosales plaintiffs. 

2. Fairness of the hourly rate

Recently, this Court criticized a requested award of $20,000 where the plaintiff estimated “he 

spent 271 hours on his duties as class representative over a period of six years,” because the award 

would have compensated the class representative “at a rate of $73.80 per hour.” Ontiveros, 303 F.R.D. 

at 366. The Court explained that “[i]ncentive awards should be sufficient to compensate class 

representatives to make up for financial risk . . . for example, for time they could have spent at their 

jobs.” Id. at (citing Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Here, the Rosales Plaintiffs estimate they spent between 91 hours and 96 hours on this action. 

Thus, the requested award of $10,000 would compensate the plaintiffs at rates ranging from $104.17 to 

$109.89 per hour. The Cruz plaintiffs estimate they spent between 12 and 31 hours on this action, 

which would provide compensation to Angel Cruz at the rate of $625 per hour and Anglica Alvarez 

would receive a rate of $208 per hour. Because these rates are excessive, this factor supports an 

enhancement lower than that requested. See Ontiveros, 303 F.R.D. at 366.

3. Comparison of the award to those of the Class Members 

In Rankin, the Court approved an incentive award of $5,000, where the “[p]laintiff retained 

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counsel, assisted in the litigation, and was an active participant in the full-day mediation.” Id., 2011

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72250, at *5. The Court found the amount reasonable, in part because “the sum is 

reasonably close to the average per class member amount to be received.” Id. 

Here, the estimated average settlement share is $1,336.58. (Doc. 199-5 at 2, McGill Decl. ¶ 3) 

Thus, the Rosales plaintiffs request enhancement payments that are nearly $8,300 more than the 

average, while the Cruz plaintiffs request enhancements more than $6,000 than the average. Thus, this 

factor favors lower enhancements for both the Rosales and Cruz plaintiffs. 

E. Amount to be awarded

Given that the hourly rates sought by the class representatives are excessive, and that the 

enhancements sought are significantly out of proportion to the average awards anticipated by class 

members, the Court finds the requested incentives are inappropriate. However, Plaintiffs clearly 

expended efforts on behalf of the class. As such, the Court finds an incentive award is appropriate, and 

recommends the request be GRANTED in the modified amount of $7,500 for the Rosales plaintiffs 

and $4,000 for the Cruz plaintiffs. 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds the proposed class settlement is fair, adequate, and 

reasonable, and the factors set forth by the Ninth Circuit weigh in favor of final approval of the 

settlement agreement. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2); Staton, 327 F.3d at 959. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of the Settlement Agreement be GRANTED;

2. Plaintiffs’ request for certification of the Settlement Class be GRANTED and defined 

as follows:

All persons who have been employed or jointly employed by Garza 

Contracting at El Rancho Farms facilities between November 9, 2001 

and June 11, 2014.

3. The unclaimed fund be distributed on a pro rata basis to Class Members who filed 

claims on or before July 17, 2015 as follows:

The Settlement Share for each Claimant will be based on (a) that 

Claimant's total pay periods (or if necessary, the number of Months of 

Employment) during the Class Period (b) divided by the aggregate 

number of pay periods (or if necessary, the number of Months of 

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Employment) of all Participating Class Members (all class member 

claims) during the Class Period (with the division rounded to four 

decimal places) (c) multiplied by the value of the Net Settlement 

Amount;

4. Plaintiffs’ request for class representative incentive payments be GRANTED in the 

amount of $7,500 for the Rosales plaintiffs and $4,000 for the Cruz plaintiffs

5. Class Counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees is GRANTED in the modified amount of 

$690,089.65, which is approximately 30% of the gross settlement amount;

6. Class Counsel’s request for costs of $36,620.54 be GRANTED;

7. The request for fees for the Settlement Administrator in the amount of $57,500 be 

GRANTED; and

8. The California Labor Code Private Attorney General Act payment to the State of 

California in the amount of $30,000 be APPROVED;

9. The action be dismissed with prejudice, with each side to bear its own costs and 

attorneys’ fees except as otherwise provided by the Settlement and ordered by the 

Court; and

10. The Court retain jurisdiction to consider any further applications arising out of or in 

connection win the Settlement.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 14 days 

after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written objections 

with the Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” 

///

///

///

///

///

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The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991); Wilkerson v. 

Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 834 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 21, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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