Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03886/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03886-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Youseph J.A. Idriss
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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 No. 04-3886

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Youseph J.A. Idriss, *

*

Appellant. *

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Appeals from the United States

 No. 04-3887 District Court for the

 ___________ District of Minnesota.

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Trokom Harris Moore, *

*

Appellant. *

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 No. 04-3888

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United States of America, *

*

Appellate Case: 04-3886 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/08/2006 Entry ID: 2007435
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Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Youseph J.A. Idriss, *

*

Appellee. *

 ___________

 No. 04-3889

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United States of America, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Trokom Harris Moore, *

*

Appellee. *

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Submitted: September 13, 2005

Filed: February 8, 2006 

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Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

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WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Youseph Idriss and Trokom Moore were convicted of possessing and aiding

and abetting each other in possessing altered U.S. currency with intent to defraud, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 472 and 2. Moore appeals his conviction on the ground that

there was insufficient evidence to convict him of possessing “altered” currency. 

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Idriss appeals his conviction on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to

convict him and that the district court’s imposition of a restitution order based on facts

not proven to the jury violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The

government cross-appeals on the ground that the district court erred in relying on

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), in declining to enhance the base offense

level on facts not admitted by the defendants nor proven to a jury. We affirm Idriss’s

and Moore’s convictions and remand for resentencing in light of United States v.

Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

I.

In 2003, Idriss and Moore participated in “black money” schemes to defraud

recent U.S. immigrants Fawaz Hamed, Won Kim, and Steve Rhee of thousands of

dollars. Idriss and Moore posed as refugees from war-torn Liberia and convinced

their victims that they possessed millions of dollars in U.S. currency that had been

blackened to remove it from Liberia. Idriss and Moore convinced their victims that

they were interested in purchasing the victims’ businesses, but that their only capital

was the blackened currency. They claimed the blackened currency could be restored

to its original condition only by using an expensive chemical to “clean” the bills.

Idriss and Moore proposed that if the victims would lend them money to purchase the

chemical, they would use the cleaned currency to purchase the victims’ businesses and

give them a one hundred percent return on their investment. Idriss and Moore gained

their victims’ trust by demonstrating the cleaning process on genuine U.S. currency

that they removed from safes that also contained worthless pieces of black paper and

by encouraging their victims to keep the genuine U.S. currency to verify its

authenticity. Idriss’s and Moore’s victims agreed to advance money for the chemical

in exchange for a portion of the cleaned U.S. currency. The victims never recovered

their initial investments, nor did they receive the promised returns.

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In total, Moore defrauded Hamed of $30,000 using the blackened money

scheme, and colluded with Idriss to defraud Kim and Rhee each of $15,000 using the

scheme. Finally, Idriss attempted to defraud Special Agent Samec, an undercover

agent, of $22,000 using the same scheme. Idriss and Moore were arrested. Moore

failed to appear for trial and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Moore surrendered

to the authorities nearly three months later. Idriss and Moore were convicted of three

counts each of possessing and aiding and abetting each other in possessing altered

U.S. currency with intent to defraud.

The district court sentenced Idriss to five years of probation and Moore to six

months of imprisonment. The district court declined to enhance these sentences from

the base offense level of six based on the amount of loss to the victims and the

obstruction of justice by Moore because these facts were neither found by the jury nor

admitted to by the defendants. In addition to the probation and imprisonment orders,

the district court ordered Idriss and Moore to pay, jointly and severally, restitution of

$30,000—the amount of loss to Kim and Rhee—and ordered Moore to pay an

additional $30,000 for the loss to Hamed.

II.

Moore argues that the evidence presented to the jury did not establish the

existence of “altered” U.S. currency. He asserts that the term “alter” means that some

change occurs in the object while the object retains its essential character and that this

is not the case here. Instead, Moore maintains that the black substance “obscured”

the currency so that it looked like worthless black paper, thus losing its essential

character. 

We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.

United States v. Hill, 410 F.3d 468, 471 (8th Cir. 2005). We must uphold the jury’s

verdict if, “based on all the evidence and all reasonable inferences in favor of the

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The district court instructed the jurors that the “alteration of an obligation of

the United States with intent to defraud need not be an alteration which destroys or

impairs the validity of the obligation.” Moore has

raised no challenge to this instruction.

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verdict, any reasonable juror could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Id. “We will reverse only if the jury must have had a reasonable doubt

concerning one of the essential elements of the crime.” United States v. Patten, 397

F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted).

A reasonable juror could have found Moore guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

of possessing altered U.S. currency. The plain meaning of the term “alter” is “to cause

to become different in some particular characteristic (as measure, dimension, course,

arrangement, or inclination) without changing into something else.” Webster’s Third

New International Dictionary 63 (1981); see also United States v. Hamilton, 332 F.3d

1144, 1149–50 (8th Cir. 2003) (applying a term’s plain meaning when a statutory

interpretation question was raised in the context of a sufficiency of the evidence

claim); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 359 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting a dictionary

definition of the term “alter”). Moore’s argument that this does not include blackened

currency is unpersuasive.1

 Blackening currency makes the currency different, yet it

does not change the currency into something else. The government presented

testimony that Moore possessed blackened currency that was used to defraud Hamed,

Kim, and Rhee. See, e.g., Tr. at 109–10, 434 (explaining how Moore possessed

blackened U.S. currency and removed the black coating with a special chemical). The

jury acted within reason in determining that Moore altered U.S. currency.

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III.

We turn next to Idriss’s claim that the government’s evidence was insufficient

to sustain his conviction. Idriss argues that the evidence presented to the jury did not

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the requisite intent to commit the

crime of possessing altered U.S. currency with intent to defraud Kim, Rhee, and

Samec. He argues that, to prove intent, the government had to prove knowledge that

the safes did not contain genuine U.S. currency, and he contends that the government

failed to do this.

We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict Idriss on all three

counts of the indictment. The government need not prove intent directly and can often

prove intent by circumstantial evidence. United States v. Londondio, 420 F.3d 777,

786 (8th Cir. 2005); Patten, 397 F.3d at 1102–03; United States v. Flynn, 196 F.3d

927, 929 (8th Cir. 1999). Intent “can be inferred from the facts and circumstances

surrounding a defendant’s actions.” Patten, 397 F.3d at 1102–03; Flynn, 196 F.3d at

929. For instance, a “jury could reasonably infer guilty knowledge and intent to

defraud from . . . inconsistent statements” and furtive conduct by the accused. United

States v. Berry, 599 F.2d 267, 269 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); United States v. Pitts,

508 F.2d 1237, 1240 (8th Cir. 1974). The government presented ample evidence of

Idriss’s furtive behavior. Idriss used a false name with his victims. Idriss refused to

present identification when Rhee asked him to do so, even though he possessed a valid

American driver’s license, a social security card, and an INS employment

authorization card. Idriss claimed he was a foreign visitor staying in a hotel room

with $1.5 million in blackened currency, but the government presented evidence that

Idriss had a local address and did not stay in a hotel room during the relevant period.

Idriss also claimed that he was flying to Chicago to buy the expensive chemical, but

the government presented evidence that Idriss never flew during that time. Finally,

Idriss carried the briefcase containing blackened currency and was able to pick out

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three bills that were genuine U.S. currency from among the worthless pieces of black

paper. From all of this evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude that Idriss had the

requisite intent to possess altered U.S. currency with intent to defraud.

IV.

Next, we turn to the government’s assertion that, based on Booker, the district

court erred in finding that the Sixth Amendment precludes enhancing Idriss’s and

Moore’s sentences based upon facts not proven to a jury. The government preserved

any Booker error by arguing that Blakely does not apply to the federal sentencing

guidelines. United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 549 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc).

Accordingly, we review de novo whether the district court properly applied the

guidelines. See United States v. Hadash, 408 F.3d 1080, 1082 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating

that the first inquiry under Booker is whether the district court properly applied the

guidelines); United States v. Mathijssen, 406 F.3d 496, 498 (8th Cir. 2005). 

In Blakely, the Supreme Court held that a court cannot enhance a sentence

beyond the statutory maximum based on judicial findings that were neither admitted

by the defendant nor found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 542 U.S. at 303–04;

cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that any fact that increases

a sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be proven beyond a

reasonable doubt to a jury). In Booker, the Supreme Court extended Blakely’s

holding to the federal guidelines, holding that they run “afoul of the Sixth Amendment

insofar as the scheme [is] based on certain facts found by the sentencing judge” and

requires the judge “to impose a more severe sentence than could have been imposed

based on facts found by the jury or admitted by the defendant.” United States v.

Marcussen, 403 F.3d 982, 983 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 750). A

district court may, however, enhance a defendant’s sentence based on its own fact

findings so long as the district court recognizes the guidelines scheme to be merely

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advisory and does not enhance the sentence beyond the statutory maximum. See

Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756–57, 764–68. 

In sentencing Idriss and Moore, the district court stated that, “given the

Supreme Court’s decision in the case of [Blakely],” it could not increase the base

offense level without a jury determination or a defendant’s admission. A six-month

sentence enhancement for the amount of money defrauded or a two-month

enhancement for obstruction of justice, however, would still be within the statutory

maximum for the crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 472. Thus, the district court erred in

viewing the Sixth Amendment’s limitation on the guidelines as excluding all sentence

enhancements based upon the district court’s own fact finding, even if they are

discretionary and within the statutory maximum. 

When the guidelines are incorrectly applied, we remand for resentencing unless

the error was harmless, such as when the district court would have imposed the same

sentence absent the error. Hadash, 408 F.3d at 1082. The burden of proving harmless

error falls upon the beneficiary of the error—here, Idriss and Moore. See United

States v. Bruce, 413 F.3d 784, 785 (8th Cir. 2005). Given that the error here was not

of constitutional magnitude, cf. United States v. Turnbough, 425 F.3d 1112 (8th Cir.

2005), Idriss and Moore must establish harmless error by showing that no “grave

doubt” exists as to whether the district court’s “error substantially influenced the

outcome of the [sentencing] proceedings.” United States v. Mendoza-Mesa, 421 F.3d

671, 673 (8th Cir. 2005). Because Idriss and Moore have not met this burden, we

remand for resentencing in light of Booker.

Finally, Idriss argues that the district court’s imposition of a $30,000 restitution

order based on judicially found facts violates his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.

This claim is without merit. In United States v. Carruth, we held that neither

Apprendi nor Blakely prohibits judicial fact finding for restitution orders, and Booker

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does not affect restitution orders. 418 F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2005). The district

court’s determination of a permissible restitution award is limited only by the scope

of the indictment. United States v. Ross, 279 F.3d 600, 609 (8th Cir. 2002) (Ross II);

United States v. Ramirez, 196 F.3d 895, 900 (8th Cir. 1999). The scheme to defraud

Kim and Rhee of $30,000 falls within the scope of the indictment, and thus the district

court did not err in ordering Idriss to pay restitution in this amount.

Idriss’s and Moore’s convictions are affirmed, but their cases are remanded for

resentencing in accordance with the views set forth in this opinion and the holding in

Booker.

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