Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00007/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00007-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
USA
Plaintiff
Anthony West
Defendant

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

SHEA J. KENNY

Assistant United States Attorney

501 I Street, Suite 10-100

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 554-2700

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

ANTHONY WEST,

 Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:19-CR-00007 MCE

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

ORDER

DATE: April 2, 2020

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

COURT: Hon. Morrison C. England, Jr.

This case is set for status on April 2, 2020. On March 16, 2020, this Court issued General Order 

611, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California scheduled to commence before

May 1, 2020. This General Order was entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.

Although the General Order addresses the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id.

at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering and ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either 

orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

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and inexcusable—the General Order requires specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances 

are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of 

justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a 

speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets 

forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice 

served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in 

a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Order excludes delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial 

continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 2, 2020. Subsequently, the

Court on its own motion continued the April 2 status conference to May 7, 2020. Dkt. 31.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until May 7, 

2020, and to exclude time between April 2, 2020, and May 7, 2020, under Local Code T4 for the reasons 

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stated below. The parties further request that this Stipulation and Order vacate and supersede the 

Court’s minute order filed on March 18, 2020, Dkt. 31, continuing the status conference. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) On December 13, 2019, the defendant’s previous attorney was relieved as counsel 

following a hearing before the Honorable Garland E. Burrell, Jr. Dkt. 23.

b) On December 16, 2019, Todd Leras was appointed as counsel for the defendant. 

Dkt. 25. Mr. Leras received the case file from defendant’s previous counsel in January 2020.

c) On January 7, 2020, the Court set a status hearing for April 2, 2020, pursuant to 

the parties’ filed stipulation. Dkt. 29 & 30.

d) On March 18, 2020, the Court on its own motion reset the April 2, 2020 status 

conference to May 7, 2020, and excluded time through May 7, 2020 under General Order 611. 

Dkt. 31.

e) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

includes approximately 110 pages of investigative reports, search warrant applications and 

affidavits, and the defendant’s criminal history information. In addition to these documents, the 

discovery also includes approximately 138 photographs from the execution of the search warrant 

in relation to this case, as well as several hours of video footage of interviews with the defendant. 

All of this discovery has been produced, or will be produced shortly, directly to the defendant’s 

new counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

f) Due to the fact that counsel for the defendant has recently been appointed to the 

case, counsel for the defendant requires additional time to review the discovery that has been 

produced or made available, to review the case, to conduct investigation related to the charges, to 

conduct legal research regarding the charges and potential sentencing factors, to consult with his 

client regarding the case and potential resolutions, and to otherwise prepare for trial.

g) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking 

into account the exercise of due diligence.

h) The government does not object to the continuance.

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i) In addition to the public health concerns cited by General Order 611 and 

presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in 

this case because the defendant is detained pending trial, and defense counsel is currently unable 

to visit confer with his client in the jail as a result of COVID-19. Further, counsel for the 

government has been encouraged to telework and minimize personal contact to the greatest 

extent possible. It will be difficult to avoid personal contact should the hearing proceed. 

j) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

k) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 2, 2020 to May 7, 2020, 

inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] 

because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of 

the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest 

of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

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4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: March 19, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ SHEA J. KENNY

SHEA J. KENNY

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: March 19, 2020 /s/ TODD LERAS

TODD LERAS

Counsel for Defendant 

ANTHONY WEST

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 23, 2020 

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