Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-03037/USCOURTS-caDC-14-03037-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hiachor Kpodi
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 16, 2016 Decided May 31, 2016

No. 14–3037

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

HIACHOR KPODI,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cr-00214-1)

Sandra G. Roland, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for the appellant. A.J. Kramer, Federal 

Public Defender, was with her on brief. Tony Axam Jr., 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Daniel J. Lenerz, Assistant United States Attorney, argued 

the cause for the appellee. Vincent H. Cohen Jr., Acting 

United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, Elizabeth 

Trosman and Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, were with him on brief.

Before: HENDERSON, SRINIVASAN and MILLETT, Circuit 

Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: After his 

May 9, 2013 arrest, Hiachor Kpodi was convicted of 

possessing with intent to distribute twenty-eight grams or more 

of cocaine base and possession of a firearm by a felon. During 

sentencing, the district court considered, as an aggravating 

factor, evidence that Kpodi was involved in an unrelated 

gunfight even though it had prohibited the Government from 

introducing the same evidence during Kpodi’s trial. The court 

sentenced Kpodi to 151 months’ imprisonment on the cocaine 

possession count and 120 months’ imprisonment on the gun 

possession count, to run concurrently. For the reasons that 

follow, we vacate and remand for resentencing in light of the 

district court’s erroneous reliance on the evidence of the 

gunfight.

I. BACKGROUND

A.

On May 9, 2013,1 officers of the District of Columbia 

Metropolitan Police Department and the Maryland State Police 

searched a residence that Kpodi shared with a roommate. 

During the search, police found, inter alia, cocaine base on 

Kpodi, cocaine base and Percocet in his bedroom and a loaded 

.45 caliber Glock semi-automatic handgun in a kitchen cabinet. 

On December 3, a grand jury indicted Kpodi on one count of 

possessing with intent to distribute twenty-eight grams or more 

of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(B)(iii) (Count I); one count of possessing with intent to 

distribute a detectable amount of oxycodone, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (Count II); one count of 

 1

 All events occurred in 2013 unless otherwise indicated.

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possession of a firearm by a felon,2 in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1) (Count III); and one count of using and carrying a 

firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Count IV). 

Before trial, in its December 6 Motion to Admit Other 

Crimes Evidence (Motion), the Government proffered 

evidence of four related events: (1) a July 24, 1997 search of 

Kpodi’s then-apartment that produced multiple handguns and 

twenty ounces of cocaine; (2) an April 4 report of gun shots 

being fired near Kpodi’s house; (3) an April 27 traffic stop and 

search of Kpodi’s vehicle that uncovered a loaded .45 caliber 

Glock handgun; and (4) an October 30 search of a Silver 

Spring, Maryland residence where Kpodi often transacted 

business that led to the seizure of ammunition and 280 grams 

of crack cocaine. The April 4 shooting forms the factual 

gravamen of Kpodi’s appeal. 

On the evening of April 4, Kpodi’s neighbors reported gun 

shots near Kpodi’s house. The next day, two residents 

reported that bullets had struck their vehicles. During the 

ensuing investigation, crime-scene investigators recovered 

twenty-nine shell casings near Kpodi’s residence, fourteen of 

which were from a .45 caliber handgun—the same caliber as 

the handgun subsequently seized in Kpodi’s residence on May 

9.3

 On April 24, the police interviewed two witnesses who 

saw Kpodi fleeing to his residence and ducking behind 

 2 The parties stipulated that Kpodi had previously been 

convicted of a felony. 1/9/14 Trial Tr. 220.

3

 The shell casings collected during the April 4 shooting, along 

with the evidence from the April 27 traffic stop, initiated the 

investigation that led to the search warrant executed at Kpodi’s 

residence on May 9. 

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vehicles while the shootings occurred. In its Motion, the 

Government summarized the witnesses’ testimony as follows:

[O]ne witness reported seeing men running up 

and down the 2200 block of Perry Street while 

the shots were being fired. This witness 

indicated that the witness saw . . . [Kpodi] 

running. A second witness indicated that after 

hearing the gun shots the witness 

observed . . . [Kpodi] running from between 

2220 & 2222’s pathway. This witness also 

stated [Kpodi] . . . ducked close to the vehicles 

parked on the odd side of the street as if he was 

retrieving items, then ran inside his home.

Appellant’s App’x (A.A.) 19. The Government argued that 

the .45 caliber shell casings collected near Kpodi’s residence 

further established his constructive possession of the .45 

caliber handgun recovered during the May 9 search, especially 

in view of the witnesses’ reports of seeing Kpodi duck behind 

the vehicles purportedly to retrieve the shell casings. 

According to the Government’s Motion, the eyewitness 

testimony and recovered shell casings showed that Kpodi 

possessed a firearm knowingly and intentionally around the 

time of his arrest and, accordingly, were admissible under 

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) as evidence that “bears on 

the identity and the intent of the possessor of the firearm as 

well as the absence of any mistake or accident regarding its 

whereabouts.” A.A. 20. Kpodi disputed the relevance of this 

evidence, arguing that neither witness identified any person 

(including Kpodi) who fired shots or was holding a gun at the 

time the shots were fired but merely observed him on the 

neighborhood streets fleeing from the shootings. 

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During a December 18 hearing, the district court 

expressed concern regarding the alleged extent of Kpodi’s 

involvement in the events of April 4, stating that it was “quite 

vague” and that the evidence merely showed that, “[y]ou have 

clarity that Mr. Kpodi . . . [was] on the street”; “that Mr. Kpodi 

ran into his house” and that “Mr. Kpodi was ducking behind 

cars.” 12/18/2013 Hr’g Tr. 41. The court further explained 

that the evidence did not establish whether Kpodi had any 

active role in the shootings or was merely fleeing from the gun 

shots. 

The court eventually denied the Government’s 404(b)(2) 

Motion with respect to the April 4 gunfight,4 finding that the 

“logical leaps” required to establish that Kpodi fired a 

later-seized Glock on April 4 were “simply too far,” especially 

“since eyewitnesses sufficiently observant to identify the 

defendant running on the street failed to see him holding a 

gun.” A.A. 55. The court explained that:

other inferences are just as, if not more, clear: 

that the defendant’s presence in the area was 

due to the fact that he lived there; that the 

defendant was running for shelter in his own 

home to avoid the gunfire; that the defendant 

was ducking behind cars for cover; and 

finally,—and most significantly—that the 

defendant had no gun . . . .

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because of the 

“limited and vague eyewitness testimony” that failed to 

identify Kpodi as a shooter that night, the district court 

reasoned that the “probative value of the April 4, 2013 

 4

 The court admitted the evidence of the April 27 traffic stop 

and October 30 search but excluded the evidence of the July 1997 

search. 

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evidence [was] questionable” and its potential prejudicial 

effect was “severe” because “[t]he prejudicial effect of having 

the jury hear the [G]overnment’s speculation that the defendant 

engaged in a gunfight on neighborhood streets in this city, with 

all of the attendant risk to the safety of innocent bystanders and 

residents, including children, is significant.” Id. at 57–58 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Trial began on January 7 

and ended on January 10, 2014, with guilty verdicts on Counts 

I and III and acquittals on Counts II and IV. 

B.

The district court sentenced Kpodi on June 3, 2014. 

Kpodi’s Presentence Report (PSR) included the April 4 

evidence even though the trial court had excluded it before 

trial. Kpodi objected to the district court’s consideration of 

that evidence for sentencing, arguing that it was no more 

relevant for sentencing than it was for Rule 404(b)(2). 

The court disagreed, reasoning that: (1) the PSR

“describes the shooting incident on the residential streets 

around the defendant’s residence on April 4”; (2) “two 

eyewitnesses identify the defendant as being involved”; and 

(3) “police found bullet casings that matched the same caliber 

gun found in the defendant’s residence during the execution of 

the search warrant a couple of weeks later.” 6/3/14 Hr’g Tr. 

11–12. After acknowledging that it had denied the 

Government’s December 6 Motion, the district court saw “no 

reason for exclusion from the PSR of this evidence for 

description of the circumstances that led to the investigation 

and ultimately to the execution of the search warrant at Mr. 

Kpodi’s home.” Id. at 12.

Later in the hearing, during the court’s discussion of the 18 

U.S.C. § 3553 factors, the court addressed the other-crimes 

evidence, including the April 4 gunfight:

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The events leading to the execution of the 

search warrant at the defendant’s house on May 

9th, 2013, while not admitted at trial as being 

too prejudicial, are chilling. We read all too 

frequently in the newspapers when we wake up 

in the morning about innocent bystanders, 

including children, inside their homes being 

accidentally shot by gunfire occurring on the 

streets, and in this case two eyewitnesses 

identified Mr. Kpodi as participating in such a

gunfight outside his home in D.C. a short time 

before the search warrant was obtained. 

While we don’t know the precise reason for the 

gunfight or the defendant’s precise role in the 

gunfight, what is clear from the defendant’s 

involvement and participation in the gunfight

combined with the loaded guns found in his 

possession during the [April 27] car-stop in the 

same month as the street gunfight and in his 

D.C. home where he stored his drugs is that he 

was clearly prepared to use a gun as part of his 

illegal drug business. 

To me this is a very important circumstance that 

the association of the defendant’s drug 

conviction with guns that is a very important 

consideration in the Court’s determination of 

which sentence recommendation is appropriate 

in this case.

Id. at 47–48 (emphases added). 

The PSR calculated Kpodi’s base offense level as 32, with 

an additional two-level enhancement for possession of a 

dangerous weapon, and calculated his criminal history as III. 

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The court reduced the total offense level by two due to 

mitigating circumstances, resulting in a Guidelines range of 

151 to 180 months on Count I and 120 months, the statutory 

maximum, on Count III. The court sentenced Kpodi to 

concurrent terms of 151 months’ imprisonment on Count I and 

120 months’ imprisonment on Count III. Kpodi timely 

appealed his sentence. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291.

II. ANALYSIS

Kpodi argues that the district court erred by considering 

the April 4 evidence when it sentenced him. The Government 

responds that the court did not abuse its discretion in relying on 

that evidence during sentencing, notwithstanding it had 

excluded the same evidence before trial as unduly prejudicial. 

Alternatively, the Government argues that any error was 

harmless. 

A.

We review Kpodi’s challenge to his sentence for abuse of 

discretion, applying the two-step approach from Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). First, we “ensure that the district 

court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing 

to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, 

treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the 

§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly 

erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen 

sentence . . . .” Id. at 51. Second, “[a]ssuming that the 

district court’s sentencing decision is procedurally sound,” we 

“then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence 

imposed . . . tak[ing] into account the totality of the 

circumstances.” Id.

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Because a sentence must “not be based on improper or 

inaccurate information,” United States v. Lemon, 723 F.2d 922, 

933 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted), we 

must determine whether the court relied on “clearly erroneous 

facts” in reaching the ultimate sentence, Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 

It is not per se error, however, for the sentencing judge to 

consider facts beyond those found by the jury. See United 

States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (“[A] jury’s verdict 

of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from 

considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long 

as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the 

evidence.”); accord United States v. Settles, 530 F.3d 920, 

923–24 (D.C. Cir. 2008). “[The clearly erroneous] standard 

applies to the inferences drawn from findings of fact as well as 

to the findings themselves.” Overby v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter 

Carriers, 595 F.3d 1290, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting 

Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).

According to Kpodi, the district court abused its discretion 

when it changed tack between trial and sentencing, reasoning 

pre-trial that the witness testimony and shell casings were not 

sufficiently probative that Kpodi had fired a weapon or 

participated in the April 4 shootings but concluding at 

sentencing that Kpodi was prepared to use guns in furtherance 

of his illegal drug business in light of the April 4 evidence. 

We agree. We have not previously determined whether a 

district court may consider Rule 404(b)(2) evidence during 

sentencing if it excluded the same evidence as unduly 

prejudicial before trial and we need not decide whether a 

categorical bar is warranted. Instead, we believe the district 

court abused its discretion by relying on a clearly erroneous 

inference in sentencing Kpodi.

During the pre-trial proceedings, the Government 

proffered two pieces of evidence to demonstrate that Kpodi 

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participated in the April 4 shootings: (1) the .45 caliber shell 

casings collected near Kpodi’s house that matched the caliber 

of the gun police later found when they searched his residence; 

and (2) the testimony of the two witnesses interviewed by the 

police. But as the district court explained before trial, this 

evidence, standing alone, did not support the Government’s 

inference that Kpodi fired a gun during the shootings or held a 

weapon while fleeing. According to the court, the eyewitness 

testimony was vague—it established only that Kpodi was 

nearby when the shooting occurred, ran from the gunshots and 

ducked behind a car. The .45 caliber shell casings also did not 

advance the Government’s argument—they were not linked 

specifically to Kpodi’s gun and therefore had little probative 

value with respect to the court’s eventual conclusion that 

Kpodi was prepared to use guns in the furtherance of his drug 

trade. At best, one witness stated that Kpodi ducked behind 

vehicles “as if he was retrieving items,” A.A. 19, but such an 

ambiguous statement inadequately supports an inference that 

Kpodi in fact picked up shell casings similar to those later 

found at the scene, much less that he used or was carrying a 

weapon at the time of the shootings. The district court 

therefore correctly concluded that “other inferences are just as, 

if not more, ‘clear,’ ” A.A. 55; that is, it was just as likely that 

Kpodi fled from gunfire and took shelter behind a car.

The district court’s pre-trial analysis was eminently 

reasonable. The court, however, switched course during 

sentencing. The court stated that the April 4 incident “shows 

that . . . there’s no surprise that he also used [guns],” and “as 

[disturbing] as it is, that he would engage in a shootout on the 

residential streets of the city.” 6/3/14 Hr’g Tr. 12. During its 

section 3553 analysis, the court referred to this evidence as 

“chilling,” tying it to “children, inside their homes being 

accidentally shot by gunfire occurring on the streets.” Id. at 

47–48. Critically, the court claimed that the eyewitnesses 

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“identified Mr. Kpodi as participating in such a gunfight,” id.

at 48 (emphasis added), even though the witnesses merely 

observed Kpodi fleeing, ducking and appearing to pick up 

something from the ground. The court recognized the 

uncertainty of Kpodi’s role in the April 4 shootings, stating that 

“we don’t know the precise reason for the gunfight or the 

defendant’s precise role in the gunfight” but it nevertheless 

believed that this evidence, in combination with the admitted 

evidence of the April 27 traffic stop and October 30 search, 

showed that Kpodi “was clearly prepared to use a gun as part of 

his illegal drug business.” Id. at 48. The court noted that the 

April 4 evidence was “a very important circumstance” and “a 

very important consideration in the Court’s determination of 

which sentence recommendation is appropriate.” Id. 

Nevertheless, in view of the vagueness of the evidence of 

Kpodi’s actions on April 4, the district court’s inference that 

Kpodi either fired a weapon, was holding a gun while fleeing 

or even participated in the April 4 shooting was clearly 

erroneous. The district court therefore abused its discretion 

by relying on that clearly erroneous inference during 

sentencing.

The Government, however, argues that the district court 

did not act inconsistently in its pre-trial analysis and in its 

subsequent sentencing. According to the Government, the 

district court excluded the April 4 evidence before trial because 

the Government failed to adequately support its argument that 

Kpodi used a gun during the shooting. The Government 

claims that the court’s earlier analysis, however, differs from 

its conclusion reached during sentencing that Kpodi 

participated in the April 4 shooting, which, in its view, is well 

supported by the witness testimony and the recovered shell 

casings. See Appellee’s Br. 21 (“Nowhere in its order 

addressing the [G]overnment’s motion did the district court 

find that appellant had not been involved with or participated in 

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the April 4, 2013, shooting incident (by, for example, picking 

up spent shell casings off the ground, or aiding other 

individuals who were shooting and/or being shot at).” 

(emphasis in original)).5

Again, the Government’s argument runs contrary to the 

district court’s statements during sentencing. The court did 

not conclude that Kpodi “would engage in a shootout” based 

solely on the fact he might have bent over to pick up shell 

casings; the court plainly viewed him as a shooter based on the 

statements it made during sentencing. 6/3/14 Hr’g Tr. 12. 

For example, the court discussed the frequency of shootings 

that could harm “innocent bystanders, including children.” 

Id. at 47. Although it did not “know . . . the defendant’s 

precise role in the gunfight,” the court’s discussion of the April 

4 event and of Kpodi’s role therein makes clear that Kpodi’s 

“participation” did not refer to his cleaning up evidence. Id. at 

48. More to the point, the court stated that Kpodi’s 

“involvement and participation in the gunfight” supported its 

conclusion that he “was clearly prepared to use a gun as part of 

his illegal drug business.” Id. (emphasis added). That 

inference is supported by neither the witness testimony nor by 

the fact that shell casings were recovered near Kpodi’s 

residence. The April 4 evidence does not support the 

conclusion that Kpodi used a gun in his illegal drug business; at 

most it shows that Kpodi lived near the area where the shooting 

occurred and might have retrieved evidence. Although the 

evidence from the April 27 traffic stop and October 30 search 

may ultimately support the district court’s conclusion that 

Kpodi had a propensity to use firearms in connection with his 

 5

 See also Oral Arg. Recording at 18:20–19:20 (Government 

iterating that, even if the evidence did not show that Kpodi fired a 

weapon on April 4, it demonstrated Kpodi’s participation in the 

shootings by, for example, his picking up shell casings at the scene).

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drug dealings, the inference that the April 4 evidence 

demonstrated that propensity was clearly erroneous.6

 

B.

The Government further argues that any error by the 

district court in its consideration of the April 4 evidence was 

harmless because the court’s reliance on that evidence did not 

affect Kpodi’s sentence. We disagree.

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a), “[a]ny 

error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect 

substantial rights must be disregarded.” FED. R. CRIM. P.

52(a). If the error affects no constitutional rights, it is 

harmless unless it had a “substantial and injurious effect or 

influence.”7 United States v. Powell, 334 F.3d 42, 45 (D.C. 

 6

 Even were we to adopt the Government’s argument that the 

district court was consistent in its pre-trial conclusion and its 

consideration of the April 4 evidence during sentencing, the 

evidence would nonetheless fail to support the inference that Kpodi 

was prepared to use a gun in furtherance of his drug trade. The only

evidence potentially showing that Kpodi picked up shell casings that 

evening was a single witness statement that Kpodi, while fleeing, 

“ducked close to the vehicles parked on the odd side of the street as if 

he was retrieving items.” A.A. 19. No witness identified him 

picking up any item, including shell casings. And the fact that the 

shell casings match the type of gun later seized from Kpodi’s 

residence is largely irrelevant—the Government did not connect 

those recovered shell casings to the gun later seized from Kpodi’s 

residence. 

7

 In contrast, “[a] constitutional error is harmless” only “if it 

appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did 

not contribute to the [sentence] obtained.’ ” United States v. 

Simpson, 430 F.3d 1177, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (second alteration in 

original) (emphasis added) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 

U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Because the Government fails under both the 

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Cir. 2003) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 

776 (1946)). “[I]n most cases, [this] means that the error must 

have been prejudicial: [i]t must have affected the outcome of 

the district court proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 

U.S. 725, 734 (1993); see also United States v. Williams, 503 

U.S. 193, 203 (1992) (“[O]nce the court of appeals has decided 

that the district court misapplied the Guidelines, a remand is 

appropriate unless the reviewing court concludes, on the record 

as a whole, that the error was harmless, i.e., that the error did 

not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence 

imposed.”). However, “[i]f we ha[ve] any doubt as to whether 

the erroneous understanding the District Court 

expressed . . . affected the District Court’s sentencing decision, 

we [will] not hold the error to be harmless.” United States v. 

Ayers, 795 F.3d 168, 176 (D.C. Cir. 2015). “The government 

bears the burden of proving the absence of such an effect.” 

United States v. Linares, 367 F.3d 941, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 

We have not previously addressed harmless error in the 

context of a sentencing court’s reliance on a clearly erroneous 

inference. 8 The Government has nevertheless failed to 

 

more stringent constitutional error and the less stringent 

non-constitutional error analysis, we need not determine the 

appropriate standard here.

8

 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 

discussed an analogous situation in United States v. Wright, 24 F.3d 

732 (5th Cir. 1994). The district court in Wright granted an upward 

departure on the basis of a factual finding—that Wright 

constructively possessed a gun—which the court of appeals found to 

be clearly erroneous. Id. at 734–35. The court explained that, 

“[s]ubtracting that incident from the quantum of facts the court used 

in deciding to depart upward, we cannot conclude whether the 

sentencing court still would have decided to depart upward and, if so, 

by how much. In other words, we cannot conclude that the court’s 

error was harmless.” Id. at 736. Wright demonstrates that at least 

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establish that the district court’s discussion of the April 4 

shooting did not affect its sentencing decision. The 

Government first argues that the error was harmless because 

Kpodi was given a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines 

range. Kpodi requested a below-Guideline sentence because 

of, inter alia, his continuing efforts to remain part of his 

children’s lives. The district court recognized this 

consideration during its balancing of the section 3553 factors9

and could have granted a downward departure in its discretion. 

The court declined to grant the departure, instead imposing a 

sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range. On 

resentencing, the court remains free to grant a downward 

departure as requested in light of Kpodi’s interest in his family 

when rebalancing the section 3553 factors once the April 4 

evidence is removed from consideration. But the fact that 

Kpodi was sentenced to the bottom of the Guidelines range is 

 

one of our sister circuits has remanded for resentencing on the basis 

of the district court’s reliance on a clearly erroneous factual finding. 

See also United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en 

banc) (“A sentence imposed as a result of a clearly erroneous factual 

conclusion will generally be deemed ‘unreasonable’ and, subject to 

the doctrines of plain and harmless error, will result in remand to the 

district court for resentencing.”). The Government claims that 

Wright is distinguishable because the district court in Wright heavily 

relied on the erroneous factual finding in granting the upward 

departure but the April 4 shooting evidence was only one of multiple 

considerations the district court reviewed in reaching the 151–month 

sentence. We remain unconvinced that the April 4 evidence played 

as minor a role in sentencing as the Government contends.

9 See 6/3/14 Hr’g Tr. 49 (“And it is because . . . he has 

indicated his concern about playing a role in his kids’ lives, which is 

not a newfound calling but one that seems to have been part of his 

history so far, that I feel that rather than sentence at the midpoint of 

the appropriate Guideline range, I’m going to impose a sentence at 

the low end of the Guideline range.”)

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itself insufficient to render the court’s consideration of the 

April 4 evidence harmless.

The Government also argues that the district court’s error 

was harmless because the April 4 shooting was one of multiple 

incidents that led the court to conclude that Kpodi was likely to

use guns in furtherance of his drug transactions. The 

Government’s argument, however, again mischaracterizes the 

tone of the sentencing hearing. As discussed, the court stated 

that “there’s no surprise that [Kpodi] also used” guns and “that 

he would engage in a shootout on the residential streets of the 

city.” 6/3/14 Hr’g Tr. 12. The court called the April 4 

incident “chilling,” referenced it specifically in discussing the 

harm to “innocent bystanders, including children,” and 

explained that it was a “very important circumstance” and 

“very important consideration” in determining “which 

sentence recommendation is appropriate.” Id. at 47–48. The 

district court considered the other Rule 404(b)(2) evidence as 

well as the April 4 evidence during its balancing of the section 

3553 factors but it is a stretch for the Government to claim that 

the court’s reference to the April 4 gunfight had no effect on its 

“selection of the sentence imposed.” Williams, 503 U.S. at 

203. On the basis of the sentencing transcript, we cannot 

conclude that the consideration of the April 4 evidence did not 

have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on 

Kpodi’s sentence. Powell, 334 F.3d at 45. 

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Kpodi’s sentence and 

remand for resentencing.

So ordered.

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