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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Joshua A. Waldman
Appellant

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐1756

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

JOSHUA A. WALDMAN,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division.

No. 2:13‐cr‐00039 — Jane E. Magnus‐Stinson, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 16, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 30, 2016

____________________

Before POSNER, WILLIAMS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Inmate Joshua Waldman was con‐

victed of forcibly assaulting a correctional officer after head‐

butting him during an argument about a pat‐down search. He

advanced a self‐defense argument at trial, but was unsuccess‐

ful. On appeal, he argues that the district court erred in hold‐

ing that there needed to be an imminent threat of death or se‐

rious bodily harm before he could justifiably use force in self‐

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defense. We agree. Requiring that an inmate fear serious bod‐

ily harm or death before using force to protect himself is in‐

consistent with both the Eighth Amendment and common

law principles justifying the use of self‐defense. But we find

no clear error in the district court’s finding that Waldman had

a legal alternative to force in complying with the pat‐down.

So we affirm Waldman’s conviction because he failed to prove

at least one of the required components of his defense.

I.  BACKGROUND

On June 30, 2013, correctional officer Jason Buescher and

two of his fellow officers conducted random pat‐down

searches while inmates walked to the cafeteria in the Terre

Haute Federal Correctional Complex. Waldman grabbed his

winter coat before heading outside for lunch, even though it

was warm out. Noticing Waldman wearing the winter coat,

Buescher called Waldman for his pat‐down search. Con‐

cerned that Waldman could be hiding contraband under the

coat, Buescher ordered Waldman to take off his coat. The two

began arguing and Waldman took the coat off, wadded it up,

and threw it down next to Buescher. The testimony at trial

conflicted as to how the argument turned physical.  

A. Waldman’s Account of the Incident

Waldman testified that Buescher grabbed his left arm in a

very hard grip and ordered Waldman to stand against a

nearby wall. In his pretrial statement, Waldman stated that

Buescher grabbed and threw him against the wall. But this

was inconsistent with Waldman’s trial testimony that some‐

one he could not see had grabbed him and he walked to the

wall on his own. He further testified that Buescher told him

that he would “punk him out” in front of everyone. Multiple

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defense witnesses testified that the men raised their voices

and may have used profanity during the argument.  

Waldman testified that Buescher then advanced toward

him in a threatening manner, causing Waldman to fear harm.  

As Buescher completed his approach, Waldman reacted by

head‐butting him. Waldman testified that when Buescher

stuck his fingers in Waldman’s mouth and pushed his fingers

into Waldman’s eye socket, he bit Buescher’s finger to get it

out of his mouth and to stop the attack. Waldman admitted

that it took two other officers to help Buescher to restrain him.

Waldman suffered bruises to his face, head, and arms.  

B.  Buescher’s Account of the Incident

Buescher testified that after Waldman threw his jacket on

the ground, he ordered him to stand against the wall for a pat‐

down search. Waldman initially followed his order and

walked toward the wall, but as Buescher approached him,

Waldman turned around quickly and head‐butted him in the

face, causing him to fall backwards. The other two officers

conducting pat‐down searches testified that they saw Wald‐

man head‐butt Buescher. Buescher testified that while he and

the other two officers tried to restrain Waldman, Waldman

flailed his legs around, tucked his arms under his chest, and

bit Buescher’s finger. Buescher said his hand dug into Wald‐

man’s eye socket as he tried to stop Waldman’s biting.

Buescher suffered a fractured nose, head injury, and a bite

wound on his left index finger.  

C.  Prior Proceedings

Waldman was indicted for forcibly assaulting, resisting,

impeding, intimidating, or interfering with a corrections of‐

ficer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a) and (b). Following his

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indictment, Waldman appeared before the district court for a

one‐day bench trial. At the close of evidence, the judge re‐

quested further briefing from the parties regarding Wald‐

man’s theory of self‐defense, and specifically what constitutes

unlawful force by a federal correctional officer acting in pur‐

suit of his official duties.  

After hearing arguments on what should be considered

unlawful force, the district court held that in a prison setting,

for an inmate to establish self‐defense, he must face the immi‐

nent threat of death or serious bodily injury. Because

Buescher’s actions did not expose Waldman to a threat of im‐

minent serious bodily injury or death, and Waldman could

have complied with Buescher’s orders to avoid escalation of

the situation, the court found Waldman guilty and sentenced

him to 60 months in prison.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Waldman challenges his conviction on two

grounds: first, that the district court legally erred when it con‐

ditioned a prisoner’s right of self‐defense on the presence of

an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, and sec‐

ond, that the district court factually erred when it found that

Buescher did not expose Waldman to an imminent threat of

harm and that Waldman had a reasonable legal alternative to

head‐butting Buescher. We review Waldman’s challenge to

the district court’s legal conclusions de novo, and its factual

findings for clear error. United States v. P.H. Glatfelter Co., 768

F.3d 662, 676 (7th Cir. 2014).  

A. Self‐Defense under 18 U.S.C. § 111   

While 18 U.S.C. § 111 does not explicitly address self‐de‐

fense, when a statute is silent on the question of affirmative

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defenses, we are to effectuate the defense as “Congress may

have contemplated it,” looking to the common law as a guide.

See United States v. Dixon, 548 U.S. 1, 13‐14 (2006). At common

law, self‐defense is the use of force necessary to defend

against the imminent use of unlawful force. See United States

v. Haynes, 143 F.3d 1089, 1090 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Model Pe‐

nal Code 3.04(1) (1962)). But what is unlawful force in a prison

setting? Obviously correctional officers will sometimes need

to use force to maintain order inside prison walls. The gov‐

ernment urges that we adopt the definition of unlawful force

used by the Fourth Circuit, and hold that an inmate is only

permitted to use force in self‐defense against a correctional

officer if the inmate faces an “unlawful and present threat of

serious bodily injury or death.” United States v. Gore, 592 F.3d

489, 494 (4th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Jones, 254 Fed.

Appx. 711, 722 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished). But unlike the

defenses of duress or necessity, fearing death or serious bodily

harm is not required to make out a claim of self‐defense.

While using lethal force to defend oneself may require such a

serious threat, under our own Pattern Instructions, non‐lethal

force (like head‐butting, for example) does not contain such a

requirement. See Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions of the

Seventh Circuit 6.01 at 85 (2012).

Rather than fashioning our own definition of unlawful

force in a prison setting, we look to the Eighth Amendment,

which already sets the legal limits on prison officials’ acts to‐

wards inmates.1 Sometimes, it is within the bounds of the

                                                 

1 Three of our sister circuits have adopted a similar approach to analyzing

what type of unlawful force justifies self‐defense under Section 111 out‐

side of prison walls. The Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits have suggested

that self‐defense might be available under Section 111 when a defendant

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Eighth Amendment for correctional officers to use force that

would be unlawful outside of prison walls. That is because

“lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal

or limitation of many privileges or rights, a retraction justified

by the considerations of our penal system.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441

U.S. 520, 545‐46 (1979). And corrections officers face the diffi‐

cult task of balancing the need to maintain or restore disci‐

pline through force against the risk of injury to inmates. Hud‐

son v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 999 (1992). So whether a prison

security measure violates the Eighth Amendment turns on

whether “force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain

or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the

very purpose of causing harm.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,

320‐21 (1986). We think this test is as useful in determining if

an inmate is justified in using self‐defense as it is in determin‐

ing if a prisoner has an Eighth Amendment claim against his

jailers.  

The government argues that if self‐defense is not contin‐

gent upon fearing serious bodily injury or death, inmates will

be allowed to use force against guards any time they believe

the officer might be using slightly more force than necessary

against them. But such a danger is overblown. Prisoners will

still need to prove their fear was reasonable, meaning that there

was an objective reason to believe that officers intended to

cause sadistic and malicious harm. That is not an easy burden.

                                                 

uses force against a law enforcement agent who engages in excessive force

against him first. See United States v. Acosta‐Sierra, 690 F.3d 1111, 1126 (9th

Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Span, 970 F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1992));

United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699, 715 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v.

Weekes, 517 Fed. Appx. 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2013) (unpublished).

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A prisoner cannot prevail under the Eighth Amendment be‐

cause he “reasonably believed his handcuffs were too tight

causing momentary interruption of his circulation.” Gore, 592

F.3d at 495 (citing Jones, 254 F.App’x at 722). Indeed, under the

Eighth Amendment, “not every push or shove by a prison

guard violates a prisoner’s constitutionalrights.” United States

v. DeWalt, 224 F.3d 607, 620 (7th Cir. 2000). Similarly, the fear

that “guards would second‐guess every use of force to ascer‐

tain whether the force used exceeded, even by a bit, what was

necessary” is no different than the fear that guards already

have that they will be sued for using excessive force. Gore, 592

F.3d at 495 (internal citation omitted). So we hold that an in‐

mate may act in self‐defense if he reasonably fears imminent

use of sadistic and malicious force by a prison official for the

very purpose of causing him harm.  

The opposite holding would prevent inmates from pro‐

tecting themselves from sadistic and malicious acts which do

not cause serious bodily harm, but which everyone can agree

are egregious violations of the Eighth Amendment. For exam‐

ple, what about cases of sexual abuse of inmates? We have

previously held that forcing a prisoner to perform sexually

provocative acts in front of spectators is a viable Eighth

Amendment claim. Calhoun v. Detella, 319 F.3d 935, 940 (7th

Cir. 2003). Prisoners should not endure such abuse when they

could easily act to stop it because they would risk being con‐

victed of assaulting an officer. Under the federal definition of

“serious bodily harm,” without a substantial risk of death, ex‐

treme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement,

or protracted loss of the function of a bodily member, organ

or mental faculty, inmates would risk further incarceration if

they tried to resist such abuse. See 18 U.S.C. § 1365 (h)(3) (de‐

fining “serious bodily harm”). In the midst of enduring abuse

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by officials, prisoners should not be expected to calculate

whether the requisite disfigurement or loss of bodily function

will come to pass before acting to protect themselves. Such a

result is not consistent with the Eighth Amendment, and

would “give prison officials free reign to maliciously and sa‐

distically inflict psychological torture on prisoners, so long as

they take care not to inflict any physical injury in the process.”

Calhoun, 319 F.3d at 940. Under common law principles, re‐

quiring the threat of serious bodily injury or death certainly

might be appropriate for use of lethal force in self‐defense, see,

e.g., United States v. White Feather, 768 F.3d 735, 740 (7th Cir.

2013). But in a case where a prisoner is simply acting to stop

abuse completely untethered to official discipline, which can

only be interpreted as sadistic, malicious, and intended to

cause harm, she is entitled to act in self‐defense. And while

Congress clearly intended to protect correctional officers from

harm in passing 28 U.S.C. § 111, that purpose must be harmo‐

nized with Eighth Amendment protections, not supersede

them.

B. No Error in Finding Waldman Had Reasonable Legal

Alternative to Using Force

In addition to showing that the force threatened against

them violated the Eighth Amendment, inmate‐defendants

have other hurdles to mount. They must prove that the un‐

lawful use of force against them was imminent, and that they

had no reasonable legal alternatives to using force in self‐de‐

fense. United States v. Haynes, 143 F.3d 1089, 1092 (7th Cir.

1998).2 The district court correctly evaluated whether Wald‐

man had reasonable legal alternatives to striking Buescher,

                                                 

2 The district court appeared to place the burden of disproving self‐de‐

fense on the government, which may have been an error. See Dixon, 548

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which was a required element of his defense. While we are

very dubious that Buescher used or threatened any force

which violated the Eighth Amendment, we can affirm Wald‐

man’s conviction solely based on the district court’s finding

that he did not avail himself of legal alternatives to assaulting

Buescher.

Waldman could have simply submitted to Buescher’s

search—which no one is arguing was itself a violation of

Waldman’s constitutional rights—instead of escalating the sit‐

uation into a physical fight. Waldman insists that he did sub‐

mit to the search and only used force after Buescher need‐

lessly grabbed his arm and advanced toward him as if to

strike him in the throat. But the district court was entitled to

credit Buescher’s version of the facts—that Waldman was the

first aggressor, and used force before Buescher even touched

him. We will not disturb the court’s factual findings unless we

are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has

been made, and if two permissible views of the facts exist, the

fact‐finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly errone‐

ous. United States v. Breland, 356 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2004). There

was no clear error here. We see no basis for reversing the dis‐

trict court’s factual findings, and agree with its conclusion that

Waldman had reasonable alternatives to striking Buescher.  

                                                 

U.S. at 1 (no Constitutional requirement that government negates ele‐

ments of a defense that does not negate an element of the charged offense;

rather the allocation of proof depends on statute, or, in absence of clear

guidance, common law). Because the government did not raise this issue

on cross‐appeal, and Waldman cannot prevail regardless of which party

bears the burden of proof, we decline to rule on the burden of proof allo‐

cation for self‐defense claims under Section 111.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Waldman’s convic‐

tion.

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