Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-03264/USCOURTS-ca8-15-03264-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Rapid City
Appellant
Rushmore Plaza Civic Center
Appellant
Kyle Soltesz
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-3264

___________________________

Kyle Soltesz, doing business as Top Dog Enterprises

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Rushmore Plaza Civic Center, a political subdivision of the City of Rapid City;

City of Rapid City, a political subdivision of the State of South Dakota

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellants

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of South Dakota - Rapid City

____________

 Submitted: October 20, 2016

 Filed: February 7, 2017 

____________

Before MURPHY, GRUENDER, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Kyle Soltesz ran a concession stand in the Rushmore Plaza Civic Center in

Rapid City, South Dakota. He sued the Civic Center and the City after his lease was

terminated—supposedly without due process—and his property seized. At trial, 

Soltesz alleged municipal liability premised on the decision of a final policymaker. 

See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 482-83 (1986). The district court

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failed to identify the final policymaker as a matter ofstate law. Because the Supreme

Court demands a district court make such an identification, we reverse and remand.

I. Background

Kyle Soltesz operated as a food vendor in the Rushmore Plaza Civic Center

under a five-year lease agreement. The Civic Center could terminate the agreement

at any time with 45 days notice. Soltesz ran his concession stand—Top Dog

Pizza—for two years until a video surveillance camera captured him assaulting one

of his employees. The video was later viewed by the Civic Center’s General

Manager, Brian Maliske.

Maliske then took a series of steps to end the business relationship between

Soltesz and the Civic Center. Maliske first called Soltesz into a meeting and

confronted him with the video. Maliske next issued Soltesz a “no trespass” warning

and then had security escort him out of the building. Soltesz understood the warning

to mean that he would be arrested if he returned to the Civic Center. Several days

later, the Civic Center’s Board of Directors met. The record reveals no evidence

whatsoever of what the Board did or did not discuss at its meeting. But shortly after

the meeting ended, Soltesz’s attorney received a letter signed by Maliske terminating 

the lease agreement immediately.

Over the next few months, Soltesz unsuccessfully sought to retrieve his

property from the Civic Center and transfer his lease to another food vendor. But the

“no trespass” warning remained in effect—he could not return to his concession stand

to retrieve any of his property. Eventually two employees were allowed into the Civic

Center; by that time, much of the food had spoiled. Soltesz also arranged to sell his

businessto another pizza vendor, so long asthe Civic Center would transfer the lease

from Soltesz to the new vendor. The Board rejected this request and shortly

thereafter leased out Soltesz’s old space.

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Soltesz sued the Civic Center and the City of Rapid City—a municipality and

a political subdivision of the State of South Dakota that owns and operates the Civic

Center—under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The suit alleged violations of federal and state law. 

Under federal law, Soltesz claimed a deprivation of his constitutional rights by the

municipality. Specifically, he alleged that terminating the lease without the mandated

45 days notice violated the due process protections ofthe Fourteenth Amendment and

that keeping his property locked in the concession stand was an unreasonable seizure

under the Fourth Amendment. Under state law, Soltesz claimed breach of the lease,

conversion, and tortious interference with business relationships. The Civic Center

counter-claimed for breach of contract, failure to restore premises, fraud and deceit,

and rescission.

Soltesz brought his federal claims under the Pembaur theory of municipal

liability: a decision of an official responsible for establishing final policy attaches

liability to the municipality. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483. The case was tried to a

jury. After Soltesz presented his case, the Civic Center moved for judgment as a

matter of law (“JMOL”), arguing that Soltesz had failed to establish the identity of

the final policymaker for the municipality in regards to his lease. The district court

denied the motion and allowed the case to proceed. At the close of the Civic Center’s

case, the Civic Center again moved for JMOL, asserting that “the issue of who the

final policy decision-maker is is a legal issue for the Court [to determine].” The

district court again denied the motion, stating, “It’s a fact issue, not a legal one. And

I am not going to instruct the jury on who the person acting under color of law is.” 

Indeed, the district court did not instruct the jury as to the identity of the official

responsible for establishing final policy for the municipality. The jury ultimately

found in favor of Soltesz on all of his claims.

The Civic Center raised the final-policymaker issue a third time in its renewed

motion for JMOL following entry of judgment. The Center argued that state law

designated the Board as the final policymaker and that Soltesz had failed to present

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evidence showing the Board had violated his constitutional rights. The district court

once again denied the motion. In its order, the court ruled that sufficient evidence

was presented at “trial from which the jury could conclude that Mr. Maliske was the

final policymaker for the Rushmore Civic Center.” The court also suggested that the

Civic Center’s Board of Directors both ratified Maliske’s decisions and delegated

authority to him. In a footnote, the court alternatively held that, as a matter of law,

“Maliske was the final decision-maker for the Rushmore Plaza Civic Center and the

City of Rapid City with regard to their relationship with Mr. Soltesz.” In a separate

order, the district court granted Soltesz’s motion for attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988(b). The Civic Center appeals the district court’s denial of its renewed motion

for JMOL and the award of attorneys’ fees.

II. Discussion

“We review the denial of a motion for a judgment as a matter of law de novo,

and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.” 

Bonenberger v. St. Louis Metro. Police Dep’t, 810 F.3d 1103, 1107 (8th Cir. 2016)

(internal quotation marks omitted). JMOL “is appropriate when ‘a party has been

fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury

would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that

issue.’” Duban v. Waverly Sales Co., 760 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1)). “[I]n reviewing a jury verdict, we draw every reasonable

inference in favor of the verdict and may not make credibility determinations or

weigh the evidence.” Chen v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 2007). 

“[M]unicipal liability under § 1983 attaches where . . . a deliberate choice to

follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or

officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in

question.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483. Thus a single decision by a municipal official

can constitute official policy. Bolderson v. City of Wentzville, 840 F.3d 982, 985

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(8th Cir. 2016). But “liability attaches only where the decision-maker possesses final

authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.” Pembaur,

475 U.S. at 481.

“[T]he identification of those officials whose decisions represent the official

policy of the local government unit isitself a legal question to be resolved by the trial

judge before the case is submitted to the jury.” Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491

U.S. 701, 737 (1989). The need for the trial judge to identify a final

policymaker—and not submit the issue to the jury—is beyond debate. See, e.g., Dean

v. Cnty. of Gage, 807 F.3d 931, 940 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing Jett, 491 U.S. at 737);

Walden v. City of Providence, 596 F.3d 38, 55 (1st Cir. 2010) (“Whether an official

is a final policymaker is . . . a question of law for the trial judge to decide.”);

Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan Cnty. Sch. Dist., 523 F.3d 1219, 1224 (10th

Cir. 2008) (“The judge, not the jury, should determine who exercises final

policymaking authority in a municipality.”). “Only after the judge identifies an

official as a final policymaker is it appropriate for the jury to determine whether [that

official’s] decisions have caused the deprivation of rights at issue by policies which

affirmatively command that it occur.” Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, 709 F.3d

1201, 1215 (8th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

District courts should consult two sources to identify the final policymaker:

“(1) ‘state and local positive law’ and (2) state and local ‘custom or usage having the

force of law.’” Id. (quoting Jett, 491 U.S. at 737). State law, including valid local

ordinances and regulations, will always direct the courts to some official or body of

officials that has policymaking authority in a given area of the municipality’s

business. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 125 (1988). Federal courts

are not justified “in assuming that municipal policymaking authority lies somewhere

other than where the applicable law purports to put it.” Id. at 126. 

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In addition to creating municipal liability for their own actions, final

policymakers can also create thisliability by either delegating policymaking authority

to a subordinate or ratifying the actions of a subordinate. See id. at 124-27.

A subordinate official possesses delegated final policymaking authority when

that official acts (1) free of review and (2) without any constraints imposed as a

matter of policy by the original policymaker. Id. at 127. “If the board retains the

authority to review, even though it may not exercise such review or investigate the

basis ofthe decision, delegation offinal authority does not occur.” Milligan-Hitt, 523

F.3d at 1229 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e are interested only in

delegations of legal power, not in whether the board’s actual exercise of its power of

review was sufficiently aggressive.” Id. at 1227. “Simply going along with

discretionary decisions made by one’s subordinates . . . is not a delegation to them

of the authority to make policy.” Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 130. Even if an official has

the final say on an issue, his decisions may not be final policy. “That a particular

agent is the apex of a bureaucracy makes the decision final but does not forge a link

between finality and policy.” Gelin v. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, 456 F.3d 525,

530 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397, 400 (7th Cir. 1992))

(internal quotation marks omitted).

A final policymaker ratifies the decision of a subordinate when he or she takes

an affirmative act to approve both the decision and the basis for the decision. 

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127. “Accordingly, ratification requires both knowledge of

the alleged constitutional violation, and proof that the policymaker specifically

approved of the subordinate’s act.” Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 988 n.2 (9th Cir.

2004). The issue of whether a final policymaker ratified a subordinate’s decision is

a question of fact for the jury to decide. See Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1238-39

(9th Cir. 1999).

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The Supreme Court has set a high bar for establishing municipal liability under

§ 1983, and demands careful analysis from district courts, to avoid any risk that

liability could be imposed under a theory of respondeat superior. See Pembaur, 475

U.S. at 479. A municipality bears responsibility for its own torts, not the torts of its

employees. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). “[I]t

is when execution of a government’s policy[,] . . . by those whose edicts or acts may

fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an

entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. 

Turning to the claims in this case, the Civic Center contends that no legally

sufficient evidentiary basis exists to support the jury verdict. Whether an official

possessed final policymaking authority, the Center continues, is a question of law. 

The district court thus erred in submitting the question to the jury. The Civic Center

raised this very issue three times to the district court; the court denied the motion

every time. The Civic Center, therefore, has preserved the issue for appellate review. 

See Walden, 596 F.3d at 55 (holding that a motion for JMOL preserved the issue of

whether a municipal official is a final policymaker).

We agree with the Civic Center: no legally sufficient evidentiary basis exists

to impose liability on a municipality for the decisions of a final policymaker when the

district court fails to identify that policymaker. The district court must identify the

final policymaker as a matter of law before the claims reach the jury. See, e.g.,

Atkinson, 709 F.3d at 1215. Even if the plaintiff proceeds on a theory of delegation

or ratification, the court must identify the final policymaker. See Jett, 491 U.S. at

736-37 (holding that jury instructions regarding delegated policymaking are

inappropriate because it isfor the court to “identify those officials” whose wrongs can

create municipal liability); Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127 (“If the authorized

policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it, their ratification

would be chargeable to the municipality because their decision is final.”). Failing

to do so raises the risk of respondeatsuperior liability—a risk we cannot tolerate. For

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§ 1983 liability to attach, the jury must find the decision of a final policymaker

caused the constitutional deprivation. See Jett, 491 U.S. at 737. If the jury is not

instructed as to who the final policymaker is, it cannot find that the decision of a final

policymaker caused any constitutional deprivation. A verdict imposing municipal

liability on the decision of a final policymaker, when the jury receives no instruction

on the final policymaker’s identity, cannot be affirmed. See Speer v. City of Wynne,

276 F.3d 980, 987 (8th Cir. 2002) (remanding the case to the district court, in part,

because municipal liability had been imposed without the district court identifying

a final policymaker). We must therefore vacate the jury verdict.

Soltesz and the district court each attempt to explain that factual evidence

presented at trial supports the jury’s verdict. Soltesz presents an argument that trial

testimony showed Maliske had final policymaking authority in dealing with food

vendors and their leases. In the alternative, Soltesz argues that the record implies the

Board of Directors had delegated policymaking authority to Maliske because the

Board did nothing after receiving notice of the lease termination. Again in the

alternative, Soltesz argues that the record indicates the Board ratified Maliske’s

decisions when it failed to protest or stop termination of the lease. The district court,

in its post-trial order denying the Civic Center’s renewed motion for JMOL, held: “as

a matter of law, . . . by the greater convincing weight of the evidence presented at

trial[,] Maliske wasthe final decisionmaker for the Rushmore Plaza Civic Center and

the City of Rapid City with regard to their relationship with Mr. Soltesz.”

The explanations offered by Soltesz miss the clear import of Supreme Court

precedent: the identity of the final policymaker is a question ofstate law for the court,

not the jury, to decide. Thus an argument about the sufficiency of evidence

supporting the jury’s determination of the identity of the final policymaker “entirely

misses the mark.” Atkinson, 709 F.3d at 1216. The district court’s post-trial order

fares no better. The court repeats Soltesz’s mistaken logic by basing its decision on

evidence presented at trial suggesting Maliske was the de facto final policymaker. 

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But there are no de facto final policymakers—only de jure. See Gelin, 456 F.3d at

530. Further, the district court’s post-trial identification of Maliske as the final

policymaker cannot remedy the error already made. The jury can find liability on the

part of the municipality only through the decisions of a final policymaker. Given no

final policymaker whose decisions it could analyze, the jury rendered a verdict

against the defendants that lacked a legally sufficient basis.

III. Conclusion

A final policymaker may have deprived Soltesz of his constitutional rights in

this case. But if Soltesz wishes to bring his claims to a jury, the district court must

identify the final policymaker in accordance with South Dakota state law and local

Rapid City ordinances. We therefore reverse the district court’s ruling on the Civic

Center’s renewed motion for JMOL, vacate the jury’s verdict, and remand for a new

trial.

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