Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02276/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02276-19/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Chapman
Plaintiff
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Defendant
Steve Rabin
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVE RABIN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-02276-JST 

ORDER DENYING COLLECTIVE

CERTIFICATION

Re: ECF No. 198

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Steve Rabin and John Chapman’s motion for conditional

certification of their proposed collective action. ECF No. 198. They seek to certify a class of 

older applicants for employment at Defendant PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLC (“PwC”), alleging 

that such applicants were subject to age discrimination. As set forth below, the Court concludes 

that Rabin and Chapman are not substantially similar either to unqualified applicants or to deterred 

applicants, both of which categories are part of the larger collective action they seek to certify. 

Accordingly, the Court denies the motion.1 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed this putative collective action on April 27, 2016. ECF No. 1. They allege 

that PwC “engag[es] in an intentional, companywide, and systemic policy, pattern, and/or practice 

of discrimination against [older] applicants” and “maintain[s] discriminatory policies, patterns, 

and/or practices that have an adverse impact on [older] applicants and prospective applicants.” 

 

1 The Court has filed this order under seal because it contains material subject to sealing orders. 

Within seven days of the filing date of this order, the parties’ shall provide the Court a stipulated 

redacted version of this order, redacting only those portions of the order containing or referring to 

material for which the Court has granted a motion to seal and for which the parties’ still request 

the material be sealed. The Court will then issue a redacted version of the order.

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ECF No. 42 ¶ 115. Plaintiffs claim that PwC “maintains hiring policies and practices for giving 

preference to younger employees that result in the disproportionate employment of younger 

applicants.” Id. ¶ 6. According to the complaint, these practices also deter older applicants from 

applying for positions at PwC in the first place. Id. ¶ 11. 

Defendant PwC is a global accounting and auditing firm that employs more than 70,000 

employees in the Americas. ECF No. 198-6 at 19-20, 44. By PwC’s own account, its “workforce 

is strikingly young.” ECF No. 198 at 13 n.25. Two-thirds of its employees are in their 20s and 

early 30s. ECF No. 198-4 at 115. Within that group, most are unmarried (75 percent) and without 

children (92 percent). Id. “[F]or three out of four of them, PwC is their first job out of college.” 

Id. In 2013, PwC predicted that “almost 80 percent of PwC’s workforce will be comprised of 

Millennials.” Id. PwC’s chairman Bob Moritz explains that PwC has historically had a young 

workforce, in part because “most hires will eventually move on to other firms or other careers.”2 

In 2011-2012 PwC, along with the University of Southern California and London School of 

Business, studied millennials in the workforce.3 

PwC utilizes a central hiring system, with companywide policies and procedures for each 

step of the hiring process, including job postings, interviewing, and hiring. Ex. 25. PwC also 

maintains a central recruiting database. Ex. 58. Interview processes are governed by uniform 

guidelines, and interviewers are trained centrally. Exs. 13, 25. Plaintiffs provide evidence about 

PwC recruitment and human resources strategies which suggest that the company favors younger 

employees and disfavors older applicants. For example, PwC emails refer to applicants over forty 

as “too old,” “matur[e],” or “non-traditional,” and PwC interviewers utilized questions suggesting 

that older applicants may not thrive with long hours or new technology. ECF No. 198-5 at 79

(describing some candidates as “too old” and some as “a bit young”); id. at 26 (referring to a 

candidate as “mature”); id. at 35 (rating non-traditional candidate as highly as possible); ECF No. 

 

2 Bob Moritz, The U.S. Chairman of PwC on Keeping Millennials Engaged, https://hbr.org/2014

/11/the-us-chairman-of-pwc-on-keeping-millennials-engaged (Nov. 2014), cited in ECF No. 198 

at 13 n.25. 

3

Id.

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198-4 at 28; ECF No. 198-8 at 55. Plaintiffs also explain that recruiters appear disinterested in 

older applicants at recruiting events. ECF No. 198-8 at 32; id. at 92; id. at 248. PwC features 

predominantly young people on its website. ECF No. 198-6 at 1.4 

Plaintiffs also allege that PwC steers older applicants into less desirable seasonal positions, 

referred to as the Flexibility Talent Network (“FTN”), which have lesser benefits and fewer 

opportunities for training and career advancement. ECF No. 198 at 16. Moreover, PwC recruits 

along two separate tracks, “campus” and “experienced,” and much of PwC’s associate hiring is on 

the campus track. PwC interns come exclusively from campus hiring and 85-90% of interns 

convert into full-time associates. Exs. 45, 90. Moreover, PwC spends far more money on campus 

recruiting than it does on experienced track recruiting. Ex. 42. 

Plaintiffs now seek to certify a collective action of “all individuals aged 40 and older who, 

from October 18, 2013 forward, applied or attempted to apply but were not hired for a full-time 

Covered Position (Associate, Experienced Associate, and Senior Associate) in the Tax or 

Assurance lines of service.” ECF No. 198 at 26-27. Putative collective action members who 

“attempted to apply” are also called “deterred applicants.” See, e.g., ECF No. 211 at 28; ECF No. 

218 at 20.5 To qualify for one of these covered positions, applicants must have a bachelor’s or 

master’s degree in a particular field (for example, accounting or taxation), a minimum grade point 

average (“GPA”), a commitment to obtain a certified public accountant (“CPA”) license, and 

between zero and four years of experience. ECF No. 198-7 at 1-16. 

Plaintiff declares that he Steve Rabin applied for a position as a Seasonal Experienced 

Associate at the age of 50. ECF No. 198-8 at 208-09. At his interview, a senior manager asked, 

 

4 For example, the declaration of Kelli King states, “the pictures on PwC’s website depicted only 

younger people, and its promotional quotes include statements like, ‘I went to PwC out of 

college.’” ECF No. 198-8 at 159. Cynthia Woolbright declares that “when I visited PwC’s 

website in 2014 and 2017 to look at job postings and apply for jobs, I noticed that the website 

featured mostly young people.” Id. at 251. Joycelyn Wooten states that “PwC’s website, which 

features college campus career fairs and on-campus interviewing, also illustrates that PwC’s 

recruitment efforts are mainly focused on young, college-aged individuals.” Id. at 260. 

5 This group is not every “deterred applicant,” but only that subset “who applied to FTN (i.e., nonCovered) positions and those who expressed interest in applying to the Covered Positions but 

whom PwC screened out or steered away before they could apply.” ECF No. 218 at 20. 

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“The people in the cubicles are much younger than you. How would you fit in? Would you be 

able to work for a younger manager or director?” Id. at 209. Rabin answered the question

satisfactorily, but was not hired for the position. He states that he could tell from the question and 

the manager’s tone of voice that he “viewed [Rabin’s] age as a disadvantage.” Id. Rabin also 

states that he attempted to apply on a separate occasion for an Associate position posted on PwC’s 

“campus” website, but was unable to do so because he did not have a school email or mailing 

address. Id. at 210. 

Plaintiff John Chapman declares that he was qualified for a position at PwC, and applied

“numerous” times while he was between the ages of 45 and 48, but never received a position. Id.

at 61. In a 2014 interview, a PwC manager asked Chapman whether he would be comfortable 

working with young people. Id. at 61-62. The manager “admitted that this was likely an 

inappropriate question to ask a candidate.” Id. at 62. Chapman did not get the job. During his 

three-year job application period, Chapman “attended several PwC ‘meet and greet’ and preinterview events where [he] met approximately twenty to thirty PwC Associates, Experienced 

Associates, and Senior Associates. None of them appeared to be over the age of 30.” Id. While 

PwC employees described Chapman in internal emails as “very smart” and thought “highly of 

him,” ECF No. 198-5 at 73, they also described him as “non-traditional,” “matur[e],” and “not the 

right fit.” Id.; ECF No. 197-5 at 27. 

Both Rabin and Chapman state that their inability to obtain employment at PwC has hurt 

their larger career prospects. According to Rabin, “a significant portion (probably the vast 

majority) of accounting opportunities that [he is] interested in require ‘Big Four’ accounting 

experience.6 In other words, PwC (in tandem with its three main competitors) functions as a 

gateway employer in the accounting industry. [His] inability to secure a job with PwC has 

negatively affected [his] efforts to secure other accounting employment.” ECF No. 198-8 at 62. 

Similarly, Chapman states that “as a ‘Big 4’ firm, [PwC] functions as a gateway employer for the 

accounting industry.” Id. When Chapman has interviewed at other employers, they have asked 

 

6 The Big Four firms are the four largest accounting firms: PwC, Deloitte, KPMG, and Ernst & 

Young. 

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why he did not have Big 4 experience or why he was not currently working at a Big 4 firm. 

Plaintiffs also offer the written testimony of Dr. David Neumark, a labor economist. Dr. 

Neumark studied preliminary hiring data from PwC and found “very strong statistical deviations 

from age-neutrality in hiring . . . strongly consistent with discrimination in favor of younger 

applicants.” ECF No. 198-3 ¶¶ 5, 14, 21. Neumark concluded that over a three-and-a-half year 

period, PwC hired younger applicants six times more often than older applicants. Id. ¶¶ 5, 14, 

Table 1. In his deposition, Neumark explained that he did not assess whether older applicants 

were discouraged from applying to PwC. ECF No. 211-4 at 9. Likewise, Neumark did not assess 

whether any other variables which correlate with age played a role in the statistical disparity. Id.

at 13-14. 

23 individuals have already opted into the collective action, and 28 collective members and 

potential members, who applied to covered positions and were qualified but rejected, submitted 

declarations in support of Plaintiffs’ motion. ECF No. 198-1 at ¶¶ 127-155.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Plaintiffs seek collective certification of their Age Discrimination in Employment Act 

(“ADEA”) case under the standards set forth under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 

U.S.C. § 216(b). The ADEA incorporates the collective action procedures of FLSA, set forth in 

29 U.S.C. § 216(b). See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); Lewis v. Wells Fargo & Co., 669 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 

1130 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“[B]ecause ADEA incorporates § 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act 

into its enforcement scheme, the same rules govern judicial management of collective actions 

under both statutes. . . .”).

29 U.S.C. § 216(b) provides that actions against employers may be brought “in any Federal 

or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself 

or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” A suit brought on behalf of other 

employees is known as a “collective action,” a type of suit that is “fundamentally different” from 

class actions. Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 74 (2013) (citing Hoffmann–La 

Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169–70 (1989)). For example, unlike in class actions, 

members of a collective action must file a “consent to sue” letter with the court in which the action 

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is brought creating an opt-in class. 29 U.S.C. 216(b). Also different is that “‘conditional 

certification’ does not produce a class with an independent legal status, or join additional parties to 

the action.” Genesis, 569 U.S. at 75. Collective actions allow aggrieved employees “the 

advantage of lower individual costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of resources.” Hoffman–

LaRoche, 493 U.S. at 170.

Certification requires a showing that the potential class members are “similarly situated.” 

Lewis, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 1127 (citation omitted). A majority of courts, including district courts 

in this circuit, follow a two-step process for determining whether a class is “similarly situated.” 

See Harris v. Vector Marketing Corp., 753 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1003 (2010); Lewis, 669 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1127.

At the first step, alternatively called “the notice stage” and “conditional certification,” the 

court considers whether the plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence to justify the conditional 

certification of the class and the sending of notice of the action to potential class members. Lewis, 

669 F. Supp. 2d at 1127. In making this determination, “the court requires little more than 

substantial allegations, supported by declarations or discovery, that the putative class members 

were together the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). In other words, “[b]ecause the court generally has a limited amount of evidence before 

it, the initial determination is usually made under a fairly lenient standard and typically results in 

conditional class certification.” Leuthold v. Destination Am., Inc., 224 F.R.D. 462, 467 (N.D. Cal. 

2004); see also Lewis, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 1127. “The fact that a defendant submits competing 

declarations will not as a general rule preclude conditional certification.” Harris v. Vector Mktg. 

Corp., 716 F. Supp. 2d 835, 838 (N.D. Cal. 2010); see also Ramirez v. Ghilotti Bros. Inc., 941 F. 

Supp. 2d 1197, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“[C]ourts need not even consider evidence provided by 

defendants at this stage[.]”). 

“At the second step of the two-step inquiry, ‘the party opposing the certification may 

move to decertify the class once discovery is complete.’” Heath v. Google Inc., 215 F. Supp. 3d 

844, 852 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (quoting Adams v. Inter–Con Sec. Sys., Inc., 242 F.R.D. 530, 536

(N.D. Cal. 2007)). At that stage, the court evaluates the collective action under a stricter standard

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for “similarly situated.” Lewis, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 1127. At that point, the court considers several 

factors, “including the disparate factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; the 

various defenses available to the defendant which appear to be individual to each plaintiff; fairness 

and procedural considerations; and whether the plaintiffs made any required filings before 

instituting suit.” Id. “Considerations involving the merits of claims are more appropriately 

addressed at the second stage of the analysis when [fewer] facts are in dispute.” Kellgren v. Petco 

Animal Supplies, Inc., No. 13CV644 L KSC, 2015 WL 5167144, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2015).

III. DISCUSSION

To show that certification is appropriate, Plaintiffs “must provide substantial allegations, 

supported by declarations or discovery, that the putative class members were together the victims 

of a single decision, policy, or plan.” Saleh v. Valbin Corp., 297 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1033 (N.D. 

Cal. 2017) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Stated differently, Plaintiffs must show that 

there is “some identifiable factual or legal nexus [that] binds together the various claims of the 

class members in a way that hearing the claims together promotes judicial efficiency and comports 

with the broad remedial policies underlying the FLSA.” Russell v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 07-

CV-3993-CW, 2008 WL 4104212, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008). Plaintiffs argue that they have 

offered more than sufficient evidence to show that PwC deliberately recruits and hires younger 

workers to the detriment of older workers, and that these documents, witness declarations, and 

statistical analyses “bind[] together” the class members’ claims and make collective adjudication 

appropriate. ECF No. 198 at 28. 

PwC argues that this evidence does not show a company-wide policy or practice. The

company describes ageist comments by PwC personnel as “anomalous.” ECF No. 211 at 13-14. 

PwC focuses on minor differences between the experiences of the declarants, for example that

“some applied through their colleges despite being over 40, while others applied to Associate-level 

positions online rather than on campus,” or that “some declarants attended PwC recruiting events 

and felt ignored or unwelcome, while others attended similar events and were encouraged to 

apply.” Id. at 10-11. Finally, PwC notes that Dr. Neumark’s statistical evidence is subject to 

alternative interpretations that are inconsistent with liability. Id. at 16-18. 

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These differences, while perhaps significant at a later stage of the case, are insufficient to 

defeat conditional certification. In Heath v. Google, an ADEA case alleging age discrimination in 

hiring computer engineers, the defendant made similar arguments in opposing conditional 

certification. 215 F. Supp. 3d at 854 (arguing that the only uniform policy is an antidiscrimination 

policy, and that age-related comments by recruiters and interviews were mere “stray remarks”). 

That court concluded that the defendant’s arguments went to the merits and should be addressed at 

a future stage. Id.; see also c.f. Deatrick v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., No. 13-CV-05016-

JST, 2014 WL 5358723, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2014) (reserving the consideration of “disparate 

factual and employment settings” and “various defenses available to the defendant with respect to 

each plaintiff” for the second stage of the certification process). Here, the Court likewise 

concludes that Plaintiffs have adequately shown a uniform decision, policy, or plan on the basis of 

PwC’s centralized and uniform hiring policies, and the substantial evidence of age disparities in 

hiring. ECF No. 198 at 13-25 (including declarations, PwC human resources policy documents, 

and statistical analyses showing a central uniform hiring policy which results in age disparities in 

hiring). PwC’s arguments to the contrary would be better addressed to the second stage of the 

proceedings. 

The Court’s inquiry does not end there, however. In addition to a showing that “the putative 

class members were together the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan,” Plaintiffs must 

show at this stage that they are “generally comparable to those they seek to represent.” Villa v. 

United Site Servs. of Cal., No. 5:12-CV-00318-LHK, 2012 WL 5503550, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 

13, 2012). Plaintiffs seek to certify a collective of “all individuals aged 40 and older who, from 

October 18, 2013 forward, applied or attempted to apply but were not hired for a full-time 

Covered Position (Associate, Experienced Associate, and Senior Associate) in the Tax or 

Assurance lines of service.” ECF No. 198 at 26-27. PwC argues that under Plaintiffs’ broad 

proposed class, “unqualified applicants . . . are not similarly situated to Chapman and Rabin, who 

allege they were qualified for the positions to which they applied,” and received an interview. 

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ECF No. 211 at 18.7 Plaintiffs do not dispute that their proposed collective includes unqualified 

applicants. 

As to this point, PwC’s arguments are more persuasive. The difference between Rabin and 

Chapman on the one hand, and facially unqualified applicants on the other, prevents the Court 

from conditionally certifying the class. “Although the standard for conditional certification at the 

notice-stage is lenient, there is a standard.” Heath, 215 F. Supp. 3d at 850 (emphasis added). A

plaintiff “need not show that his position is or was identical to the putative class members’ 

positions; a class may be certified . . . if the named plaintiff can show that his position was or is 

similar to those of the absent class members.” Labrie v. UPS Supply Chain Sols., Inc., No. C-08-

3182 PJH, 2009 WL 723599, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2009) (citing Edwards v. City of Long 

Beach, 467 F. Supp. 2d 986, 990 (C.D. Cal. 2006)) (emphasis added). Chapman and Rabin cannot 

make this showing, because they are not similarly situated to facially unqualified applicants. 

PwC requires applicants to have a degree in a relevant field, have earned a minimum 

undergraduate GPA, and, for Experienced and Senior Associate positions, relevant work 

experience. ECF No. 198-7 at 1-41. PwC does an initial screen for basic qualifications, and only 

interviews candidates who pass the initial screen. ECF No. 212-3 at 24-25. This initial screen 

significantly narrows the pool of applicants. ECF No. 211 at 21. Chapman and Rabin were 

facially qualified: they possessed a college degree in a relevant major, had attained the required 

GPA, and had passed the CPA examination. ECF No. 198-8 at 61, 208. As such, they passed the 

initial screen and received interviews. Id. Not only will the inquiry as to their claims be different 

from the one as to unqualified applicants’ claims, but it is hard to imagine how unqualified 

applicants could ever be part of the class, given that an ADEA plaintiff “must show, among other 

things, that he was qualified for the position.” Heath, 215 F. Supp. 3d at 857. 

This case is like Heath. In that case, the court considered a motion to conditionally certify an 

 

7 PwC makes additional arguments against certification including: (1) that campus recruiting is 

lawful, ECF No. 211 at 10; (2) that many recruiters do not know applicants’ age when they reject 

them, Id. at 24-25; and (3) that it is legal to conduct a generation focused workforce study, ECF 

No. 212-3 at 11. The Court declines to address these arguments because a discussion of the merits 

is not appropriate at this stage. Heath, 215 F. Supp. 3d at 855.

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age discrimination collective action against Google. Named plaintiff Cheryl Fillekes sought to 

certify a class under the FLSA consisting of persons over 40 who interviewed in-person for certain 

positions at Google. Id. at 853. The district court conditionally certified that class. Another 

plaintiff, Robert Heath, sought to conditionally certify a different class consisting of “all 

applicants” for certain specified jobs from 2010 to the present “who were 40 years of age or older 

at the time of their application[,] and who were rejected for the position.” Id. at 855. For that 

proposed class, there was no requirement that class members have been invited for an in-person 

interview or passed any kind of screening. The district court declined to certify that class because 

although Heath was facially qualified, the “proposed class would include an unknown number of 

applicants who demonstrate no plausible qualifications for the job.” Id.; see also Trinh v. JP 

Morgan Chase & Co., No. 07-CV-1666, 2008 WL 1860161 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2008) (declining 

to certify collective for failure to show Plaintiffs were similarly situated to class members). The 

court noted that “there are likely to be wide disparities in the class members’ qualifications and/or 

experiences” such that certification was inappropriate. Heath, 215 F. Supp. 3d at 857-58.

8

Similarly here, it is clear that facially unqualified applicants are included in Plaintiffs’ 

proposed class. “[Rabin’s] vast class would include every individual applicant over the age of 40 

without regard to their qualifications, including, for example, a lawyer applying for [an 

Experienced Associate].” Id. at 857. Because Plaintiffs Rabin and Chapman were facially 

qualified when they applied, ECF No 198-8 at 61, 208, the Court concludes they are not 

substantially similar to facially unqualified applicants. 

Plaintiffs argue on reply that limiting the class to qualified applicants prevents them from 

attacking discrimination in the initial screening process itself. ECF No. 218 at 19-20. They note 

that PwC recruiters are permitted to exercise discretion in the application of the screening criteria, 

such that “an offer can be extended to a candidate with any GPA,” and that while “[m]ajors should 

 

8 The collective action the court declined to certify in Heath was narrower than Plaintiffs’ 

proposed collective. The plaintiff in that case sought to certify a collective of all rejected 

applicants for particular positions within Google who were over 40. Heath, 215 F. Supp. 3d at 

855. In addition to all rejected applicants over 40, the proposed class in this case includes deterred 

non-applicants over 40. ECF No. 198 at 26-27.

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be relevant to the specific [line of service] desired,” and that “[t]ypical majors are Accounting, 

Finance, Business, and MIS/Computer Science,” no particular undergraduate major is actually 

required. Id. (quoting Exs. 153, 154) (emphasis added by Plaintiffs). They allege that the 

screening process itself is another mechanism by which PwC discriminates against older 

applicants, given that pre-interview rejection rates are higher for older applicants than younger 

ones. Id. at 19. While there may be merit to Plaintiffs’ claims about the screening process – a 

question the Court does not decide – the fact remains that neither Rabin nor Chapman is typical of 

a facially unqualified applicant. Plaintiffs must find another way to challenge discrimination in 

the initial screen, either through its existing named plaintiffs – who were rejected at the initial 

screening stage for some jobs, although they were facially qualified – or through a different named 

plaintiff, if they wish to do so.9

Likewise, Rabin and Chapman are not similarly situated to potential class members who 

were deterred from applying, because they did apply. ECF No. 212-3 at 28. In fact, Plaintiffs do 

not identify any individual deterred from applying who was over forty. ECF No. 198-8 at 171

(declarant Salvador Maciel explaining he was deterred from applying just before his 40th birthday; 

all other declarants applied). Other courts in this circuit have concluded that plaintiffs who 

applied could not represent those deterred from applying in an ADEA collective certification case

because they were not similarly situated. Pines v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., No. SACV89-

631AHS(RWRX), 1992 WL 92398, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 1992). 

In their reply brief and at the hearing on this motion, Plaintiffs attempted to recast “deterred” 

applicants as those who actually applied, but were steered away from covered positions into 

seasonal positions, and those who expressed interest in applying, but whom PwC steered away. 

ECF No. 218 at 20; ECF No. 231 at 36 (arguing that plaintiff Rabin should be considered a 

“deterred applicant” because “[a] recruiter reached out to him and steered him towards one of 

these FTN roles as opposed to inviting him to a full-time covered position”). As an initial matter, 

 

9 While Rabin and Chapman did not pass the initial screen or receive an interview for some 

applications, ECF No. 198-8 at 61, 208, they were facially qualified on each occasion they applied 

because they possessed the requisite GPA, degree, and other qualifications. 

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this new definition is not consistent with either the complaint or the dictionary. The complaint 

states that “PwC’s policies and practices have the effect of deterring prospective applicants ages 

40 and older from applying and denying job opportunities to those individuals ages 40 and older 

who do apply.” ECF No. 42 ¶ 11; see also id. ¶ 13 (same). And Merriam-Webster defines “deter” 

to mean “to turn aside, discourage, or prevent from acting.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 

Dictionary 340 (11th ed. 2012). More importantly, Rabin and Chapman are not similarly situated

to the class they seek to represent because they did in fact apply to covered positions. ECF No. 

198-8 at 61, 208.

10

Because Plaintiffs are not similarly situated to the class they seek to represent, the Court 

denies the motion to certify the proposed collective. The Court will not attempt to narrow the 

Plaintiffs’ proposed class to cure the defects the Court identifies in this order. Rather, the Court 

denies the motion without prejudice so that Plaintiffs can propose a class to which they are 

similarly situated, and Defendants can defend against that proposed class. See Rivera v. Saul 

Chevrolet, Inc., No. 16-CV-05966-LHK, 2017 WL 3267540, at *11 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2017); see 

also Heath, 215 F. Supp. 3d at 858 (rejecting Plaintiff’s request to narrow a class if the court 

concluded Plaintiff was not substantially similar to that class because to “do so would improperly 

prevent [Defendant] from identifying infirmities in such an alternative definition and deprive the 

Court of sufficient evidence and argument on which to base such a determination”). 

/ / /

 

10 The Court need not address the merits at this stage but notes that little case law supports the 

proposition that deterred applicants can maintain an ADEA collective action. Wynn v. Nat’l 

Broad. Co., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1102 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (dismissing without prejudice because 

the court was “highly skeptical” of plaintiffs’ ability to plead an ADEA collective on the basis of 

deterred applicants but allowing plaintiffs to amend so individual applicants could attempt to plead 

futility of applying); Pines, 1992 WL 92398, at *12 (declining to certify deterred applicants). But 

see Hyman v. First Union Corp., 982 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1997) (concluding that an employee 

who expressed interest in applying to a position but was told he was overqualified could be added 

to an ADEA collective action). 

As Plaintiffs admit, “identifying some types of deterred applicants could [also] pose 

ascertainability challenges.” ECF No. 218 at 20. Plaintiffs argue their class is ascertainable 

nonetheless because PwC maintains a list of potential applicants in its “Smashfly” database, which 

tracks individuals interested in working at PwC. Id. at 21-22. But the Court need not address the

question now because it concludes the class cannot be conditionally certified for other reasons. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the motion without prejudice. Plaintiffs may 

file an amended motion for collective certification within thirty (30) days. Failure to cure the 

deficiencies identified in this order or failure to file a subsequent motion within 30 days will result 

in a denial with prejudice of conditional certification of FLSA collective action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 26, 2018

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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