Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00683/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00683-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Amy Marie Butler
Petitioner
D. K. Johnson
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

AMY MARIE BUTLER, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

D. K. JOHNSON, Warden 

Respondent. 

No. 2:14-cv-0683-MCE-EFB P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel with a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. She challenges a judgment of conviction entered 

against her on May 2, 2011, in the Yuba County Superior Court on charges of robbery of an 

inhabited dwelling in concert with two or more persons, conspiracy to commit robbery, and 

principal armed with a firearm. She seeks federal habeas relief on the following grounds: (1) the 

trial court’s abuse of discretion in sentencing her to the upper term violated her rights under the 

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) and Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 

(2007); (2) the trial court’s abuse of discretion in imposing consecutive terms violated state law 

and her federal constitutional rights; and (3) her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 

Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned recommends 

that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied. 

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I. Background

 In its unpublished memorandum and opinion affirming petitioner’s judgment of 

conviction on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the 

following factual summary: 

Two people lost their lives as a result of a plan to steal marijuana 

originally hatched by defendant Amy Marie Butler. Defendant was 

given a break for her cooperation and then violated her probation by 

possessing a loaded firearm. Defendant now appeals the state 

prison sentence imposed by the trial court after revocation of her 

probation. The court imposed a term of 12 years for robbery of an 

inhabited dwelling in concert with two or more persons (Pen.Code, 

§§ 211, 213, subd. (a)(1)(A);1

 hereafter robbery), principal armed 

with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)), and conspiracy to commit 

robbery (§ 182; hereafter conspiracy). 

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in imposing 

the upper term of nine years for the robbery, asserting that the court 

relied upon only one aggravating factor – that she took advantage of 

a position of trust – and that factor does not outweigh factors in 

mitigation. She also contends the court abused its discretion in 

imposing a consecutive term of two years for conspiracy because it 

failed to cite any factor supporting imposition of a consecutive 

sentence, and that if we find the trial court did state a reason, which 

could only be that she took advantage of a position of trust, this was 

an impermissible dual use of facts. Finally, she contends if we find 

her trial counsel's failure to object to the trial court's imposition of a 

consecutive term for conspiracy was error, she received ineffective 

assistance of counsel. 

We reject defendant's contentions and affirm the judgment. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Procedural History 

On June 2, 2006, defendant pleaded no contest to robbery and 

conspiracy, admitted a principal armed with firearm allegation, and 

agreed to testify against her coconspirators. In exchange for 

defendant's pleas, admission and truthful testimony, the parties 

agreed that the two counts of murder would be dismissed, defendant 

would initially receive probation and she would be exposed to a 

maximum sentence of no more than 12 years. 

On May 20, 2009, following defendant's testimony against two of 

her coconspirators, the court suspended imposition of sentence and 

granted her probation for five years. Among the probation 

conditions were requirements that she obey all laws and not possess 

 1

 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 

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any firearms or ammunition. The court dismissed the two counts of 

murder. 

On January 20, 2011, defendant was charged with violating her 

probation by failing to obey all laws and possessing a firearm and 

ammunition. On February 22, 2011, defendant admitted violating 

the condition that she obey all laws and the prosecution moved to 

strike the duplicative possession allegations. 

On May 2, 2011, the court sentenced defendant to 12 years in 

prison, consisting of the upper term of nine years for the robbery, 

one year for the firearm enhancement, and a consecutive term of 

two years for the conspiracy.2

Facts Underlying the Charged Offenses 

In early September 2005, defendant was with Angelic Rampone, 

Michael Huggins, Matthew Griffin, Dustin Sparks, and Levill Hill. 

At some point during their conversation, Huggins said he wanted to 

buy some marijuana and resell it to make money. Defendant told 

the group that two of her friends from high school, Christopher 

Hance and Scott Davis, were growing a large quantity of marijuana 

for medicinal purposes at Hance's residence in Olivehurst. Aside 

from defendant, only her boyfriend, Matthew Griffin, knew Hance 

and Davis. Defendant told Huggins he could buy the marijuana 

from Hance and Davis, but at some point suggested that she could 

get Hance and Davis out of the house so the group could steal the 

marijuana. Defendant was to share in an even split of the money 

made from selling the marijuana. 

On September 13, 2005, defendant led some of the others to 

Hance's residence to steal the marijuana. The plan was for 

defendant to get Hance and Davis out of the residence on the ruse 

that they were arranging for the purchase of $700 worth of 

marijuana. However, the plan fell through when defendant was 

only able to get Davis to leave. 

About a week later, the plan to steal marijuana was again discussed. 

This time the plan was to tie up Hance and Davis and then steal the 

marijuana. Defendant said she did not want to have anything to do 

with the plan anymore and would not participate. However, 

defendant told the others that Hance and Davis were “good 

fighters” and that they had firearms in the trailer on the property 

where Davis stayed. 

Early in the morning of September 27, 2005, Rampone, Huggins, 

Griffin, Sparks, and Hill drove to Hance's residence. Huggins was 

armed with a .45–caliber handgun, supposedly to be used to subdue 

and tie up Hance and Davis. After walking around the property, 

Hill and Griffen changed their minds and returned to their vehicle. 

Huggins entered the front yard and headed toward the trailer in the 

 2

 As part of defendant's plea bargain she agreed to waive the section 654 prohibition 

against multiple punishment. 

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backyard while Sparks stayed at the front yard gate. Huggins called 

out, “Yuba County Sheriffs” and “I want Scott Davis” and walked 

toward the trailer. 

Initially thinking law enforcement was there, Hance's father, 

Michael, retrieved his medical marijuana recommendation. In the 

meantime, Huggins shot the family dog and went to the trailer, 

where he struggled with Davis, who was unarmed. Huggins shot 

Davis during the struggle. Davis collapsed and died on the scene. 

As Huggins and Hance fought, Michael came out of the house and 

retrieved a gun from the trailer. Huggins shot Hance in the pelvis 

and Hance fell to the ground. Michael pointed the shotgun at 

Huggins but lowered it when Huggins again yelled, “Yuba County 

Sheriff's Department.” Hance shouted, “Dad, he's not a cop, he's 

not a cop.” Michael asked for identification. Huggins ran from the 

scene, joined the rest of his group and they drove off. Hance was 

transported to a hospital where he died from his gunshot wound. 

The Initial Sentencing 

On May 20, 2009, finding that defendant had fulfilled her end of 

the bargain up to that point, the court imposed the agreed-upon 

sentence and placed defendant on five years' formal probation. The 

court made clear to defendant that possession of firearms or 

ammunition would be a violation of her probation and the basis for 

a new charge. Defendant signed the probation order containing the 

conditions that she obey all laws and not possess firearms or 

ammunition. 

Facts Underlying the Probation Violation 

While preparing for the trial of one of the coconspirators, an 

investigator for the district attorney's office found a photograph on 

defendant's Facebook site showing a male holding her arms as she 

held a handgun. A sheriff's detective was told by two people who 

were present when the photograph was taken that the male was 

defendant's boyfriend and he was showing defendant how to aim 

and shoot at a target while they were camping. 

The Probation Violation Sentencing 

The court announced its intent to sentence defendant to the upper 

term of nine years for the robbery, one year for the firearm 

enhancement and a consecutive term of two years for the 

conspiracy. The court then gave the following reasons for its 

intended sentence: 

“In arriving at this intended sentence, the Court has considered that 

Defendant took advantage of a position of trust. She was friends 

with the victims and introduced and set up the initial meeting to 

purchase marijuana. As a result of her involvement and the 

information she subsequently provided, the victims were shot to 

death with a .45–caliber handgun. The Court has considered that 

Defendant has no known prior criminal record; however, in 

considering the totality of the circumstances, I do believe that the 

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upper term is warranted.”3

 (Italics added.) Later, in responding to 

defense counsel's request to impose no more than the low term, the 

court further observed that not only had defendant taken advantage 

of a position of trust, but she also had admitted to a detective that 

she was also involved in the second plan (to tie up the victims). 

And the court reiterated that there had been the loss of two lives. 

People v. Butler, No. C068341, 2013 WL 1283866, at *1-3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2013), review 

denied (June 12, 2013). 

 After her judgment of conviction was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal, 

petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. Therein, she requested 

review of all of the claims she had raised on direct appeal. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. entitled 

“California Supreme Court, Petition for Review, May 1, 2013.” The petition for review was 

summarily denied. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. entitled “California Supreme Court Order Denying 

Petition for Review, June 12, 2013.” 

II. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims 

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 

state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1,5 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000). 

 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas 

corpus relief: 

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not 

be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 

claim - 

 

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 Prior to stating the reasons for its intended state prison sentence, the court cited several 

reasons for denying another grant of probation. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.414(a)(1), (a)(3), 

(a)(4), (a)(8); undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.) While the trial 

court could have used any of these reasons to impose the upper term (People v. Scott (1994) 9 

Cal.4th 331, 350, fn. 12; People v. Bowen (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 102, 106), it did not expressly 

state that it was doing so. 

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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

 For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists of 

holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. 

Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Greene v. Fisher, ___ U.S. 

___, 132 S.Ct. 38 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Circuit court precedent “may be persuasive in determining 

what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 

633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)). However, circuit 

precedent may not be “used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court 

jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] Court has not announced.” Marshall 

v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (citing Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 

(2012) (per curiam)). Nor may it be used to “determine whether a particular rule of law is so 

widely accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, 

be accepted as correct. Id. Further, where courts of appeals have diverged in their treatment of 

an issue, it cannot be said that there is “clearly established Federal law” governing that issue. 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006). 

 A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule 

contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court 

precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s 

decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. 4 Lockyer v. 

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 Under § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision based on a factual determination is not to be 

overturned on factual grounds unless it is “objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Davis v. Woodford, 

384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

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Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 

(9th Cir. 2004). In this regard, a federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 

(2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent 

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”). 

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner 

must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. 

 If the state court’s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing 

court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 

527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of § 

2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by considering 

de novo the constitutional issues raised.”). 

 The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). If 

the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a 

previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of 

the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “When 

a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication 

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. This presumption 

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may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other explanation for the state 

court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 785 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)). 

Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects some claims but does not 

expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to rebuttal, that 

the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 

S.Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013). 

 Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo 

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether 

a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no 

reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. 

 A summary denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner’s claims. 

Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 957 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 2012). While the federal court cannot analyze 

just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must review the 

state court record to determine whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. This court “must determine what arguments or theories ... could 

have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded 

jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior 

decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. at 102. The petitioner bears “the burden to demonstrate 

that ‘there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.’” Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 

925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 98). 

 When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s 

claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal 

habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 

F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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III. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Sentencing Claims

 1. Upper Term Sentence

 In her first ground for relief, petitioner claims that the trial court’s abuse of discretion in 

sentencing her to the upper term for the robbery violated her rights under the Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments. ECF No. 1 at 4.5 She also argues that the trial judge’s use of “the 

crime itself as an aggravating factor” violated the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) and Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 

(2007). Id. In support of these claims, and all of her federal habeas claims, petitioner has 

attached her opening brief on appeal filed in state court. Id. at 20-26. 

 a. State Court Decision

 On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the upper 

term of nine years for the robbery. The California Court of Appeal denied the claim on state law 

grounds, reasoning as follows: 

Defendant contends the court abused its discretion in imposing the 

upper term of nine years. She asserts that the trial court relied on a 

single factor – that defendant took advantage of a position of trust 

in that she was friends with the victims – and that this factor was 

outweighed by other circumstances. She asserts the court abused its 

discretion in imposing the upper term. We find no abuse of 

discretion. 

A trial court's sentencing decision is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) “In 

reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two 

fundamental precepts. First, ‘“[t]he burden is on the party attacking 

the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was 

irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, 

the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate 

sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose 

a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.”’ [Citation.] 

Second, a ‘“decision will not be reversed merely because 

reasonable people might disagree. ‘An appellate tribunal is neither 

authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the 

judgment of the trial judge.’”' [Citation.] Taken together, these 

precepts establish that a trial court does not abuse its discretion 

unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable 

 5

 Page number citations such as this one are to the page numbers reflected on the court’s 

CM/ECF system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties. 

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person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 

367, 376–377.) A single aggravating factor is sufficient to make a 

defendant eligible for an upper-term sentence. (People v. Black

(2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 813.) 

Defendant asserts that the trial court cited only one factor in 

aggravation in giving its reasons for imposing the upper term—that 

defendant took advantage of a position of trust. (Rule 4.421(a)(11).) 

Defendant does not assert that this factor has no application here, 

but she places little value on it, stating, “[t]here is nothing to 

suggest the relationships were more than casual friends,” they were 

not romantically involved and there was no fiduciary relationship. 

From this, defendant argues, “the violation of trust was not as great 

as it could have been.” 

The aggravating factor that a defendant violated a position of trust 

focuses on a defendant's special status vis-á-vis the victim and the 

exploitation of trust or confidence. (People v. Dancer (1996) 45 

Cal.App.4th 1677, 1694–1695, disapproved on other grounds in 

People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117, 1123.) As we have 

noted, the trial court observed that defendant “took advantage of a 

position of trust. She was friends with the victims and introduced 

and set up the initial meeting to purchase marijuana. As a result of 

her involvement and the information she subsequently provided, the 

victims were shot to death . . . .” As can be seen by the italicized 

portion of the trial court's statement of reasons, the trial court 

recognized it was defendant's friendship with the victims, and the 

information she provided about them, that led to their deaths. The 

information “subsequently provided” (after the initial meeting) was 

that the victims were “good fighters,” that they had firearms, and 

that the firearms would be in the trailer. 

In addition to finding defendant had taken advantage of a position 

of trust by providing information she obtained as a result of her 

relationship with the victims, the court also cited other factors in 

aggravation in the italicized portion of its reasons. The court cited 

the loss of life (an aggravating factor within rule 4.421(a)(1)), and 

that there were two lives lost (an aggravating factor within rule 

4.408(a), other criteria reasonably related to the sentencing 

decision). The court also cited defendant's involvement in the 

second plan. (Rule 4.421(a)(8).) Defendant's assertion that the 

court cited only one aggravating factor is belied by the record. 

In her reply brief, defendant asserts that the trial court's reference to 

the loss of two lives “applies to the court's reasoning for not 

selecting the low term. It has no bearing on why it chose the upper 

term.” Defendant lifts the court's comments out of context and 

ignores the court's reasons, which we italicized, ante, for imposing 

its intended sentence. 

Reading the court's comments in context, we note defense counsel 

suggested that defendant's possession of the firearm, the basis for 

the probation violation, was not as serious as finding a gun under 

the seat of a car or in a house. He argued, “. . . I don't think it rises 

to the level of sentencing this young lady to prison. I think she 

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should be reinstated. And, albeit, I don't believe that she should 

receive the upper term for this violation. I think the Court should 

consider [the] lower term.” To this the court responded that the 

probation violation was not a “technical violation.” The court 

stated, “There is no reason that you would try to learn how to shoot 

a gun if you didn't intend to shoot a gun. And when you think of the 

ultimate outcome, the loss of two lives, the lower term does not 

seem warranted.” (Italics added.) 

Thus, it is clear the court's comments were in response to defense 

counsel's alternative request of a low-term sentence. Having 

previously stated that its intended sentence, including selecting the 

upper term for robbery as the base term, was based in part on the 

fact that “[a]s a result of her involvement and the information she 

subsequently provided, the victims were shot to death,” it is equally 

clear that the court factored the loss of two lives into its upper-term 

sentencing choice. 

As to defendant's purported offsetting mitigating circumstances, in 

addition to her view that the probation violation was not serious, 

she cites the following: She had no prior criminal record; both the 

prosecutor and the court commented favorably at the initial 

sentencing hearing regarding her thorough cooperation with law 

enforcement; since nothing was taken, it appears the offense was 

attempted robbery rather than robbery; and she had been crime free 

for more than four years when the violation was discovered. Aside 

from defendant's having no prior convictions, for reasons we shall 

discuss, the other factors she cites either do not weigh into the 

calculus for determining the base term sentence or are entitled to 

little weight. 

While events and conduct occurring during probation may be 

considered in determining whether to reinstate a defendant on 

probation and whether to run state prison sentences consecutively 

or concurrently, such events or conduct may not be considered in 

determining the base term. (Rule 4.435;6 People v. Leroy (1984) 

155 Cal.App.3d 602, 605–606 [court may determine postprobation 

conduct in determining whether to impose consecutive or 

concurrent sentences]; People v. White (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 677, 

681 [court must consider postprobation events to determine whether 

the defendant should be reinstated on probation or incarcerated].) 

Thus, defendant's claim that her probation violation was not as 

serious “as it could have been” is not a mitigating factor to be 

considered in determining the base term. Even if it could be 

considered, it would be of little aid to her, because it still shows her 

willingness to violate a condition of her probation by committing 

another felony offense. And the felony offense she committed, 

which was blatantly displayed on the Internet, involved possession 

 6

 Rule 4.435 provides in pertinent part: “(b) On revocation and termination of probation 

under section 1203.2, when the sentencing judge determines that the defendant will be committed 

to prison: [¶] (1) . . . [¶] The length of the sentence must be based on circumstances existing at the 

time probation was granted, and subsequent events may not be considered in selecting the base 

term . . . .” 

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of a firearm – the same type of instrument that took the lives of the 

two victims here. Moreover, as the trial court noted, she had no 

legitimate reason to learn how to aim and shoot a firearm if she had 

no intent to possess one. 

Defendant sees mitigation in remaining crime free during the four 

years before the violation of probation. While the court was free to 

consider that defendant was crime free between the time she 

entered her plea on June 2, 2006 and the grant of probation on May 

20, 2009, rule 4.435 precludes consideration of her conduct after 

the grant of probation for purposes of determining the base term. 

However, that defendant remained crime free during her period of 

cooperation with the prosecution is entitled to little weight, as she 

was motivated during that time period to achieve the benefit of her 

bargain and avoid exposure to two life terms for murder. And even 

if the entire four years could be properly considered, we would 

likely view that period as a rather short lapse of time, constituting 

an aggravating factor. After all, it had only been four years since 

she hatched the idea to commit a theft that resulted in the death of 

two people, and only 16 months after she was formally placed on 

probation. 

As for defendant's cooperation prior to her grant of probation, 

defendant received the benefit of her agreement. Where, as here, a 

defendant's cooperation with law enforcement was the product of a 

plea bargain whereby she obtained the dismissal of two counts of 

murder, her cooperation is not a mitigating factor. (See People v. 

Burg (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 304, 306–307 [a guilty plea resulting 

from a plea bargain is not a sufficient acknowledgment of guilt to 

constitute a mitigating factor since the admission is only to receive 

a benefit from the prosecution].) 

That the offense may actually only have been attempted robbery 

because nothing in the record shows that anything was taken is a 

distinction with no difference. Not only is the claim contrary to 

defendant's plea, which admitted the offense was a robbery,7 but 

even if nothing was taken, that fact is in no way attributable to 

defendant. It was the resistance by the victims that prevented a 

completed robbery. 

In sum, the court cited multiple aggravating factors. Any one of 

those factors clearly outweighed the mitigating factors that could be 

considered, including the fact that defendant had no prior 

convictions. 

Finally, defendant contends if probation was granted initially, it 

does not follow that defendant should now receive the upper term 

of nine years. Defendant asserts that the imposition of the upper 

term, when her original sentence was probation “renders the 

sentence hugely disproportionate to the facts of the case” and was 

“grossly unfair under the circumstances.” In making this argument, 

 7

 A defendant may not challenge on appeal the factual basis for his or her entry of a plea. 

(People v. Voit (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1365–1366.) 

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defendant overlooks three circumstances. First, the bar was set low 

in this case by the plea agreement. Defendant was initially granted 

probation for her agreement to testify truthfully, and for no other 

reason. Second, defendant was originally exposed to indeterminate 

life sentences for the deaths of two people, and as part of her 

bargain, she agreed that her maximum exposure would be limited to 

12 years. Third, section 1203.2, subdivision (c) expressly provides 

that, “[u]pon any revocation and termination of probation the court 

may, if the sentence has been suspended, pronounce judgment for 

any time within the longest period for which the person might have 

been sentenced.” (Italics added.) Thus, the statutory scheme 

contemplates the potential for long sentences after revocation of 

probation. 

Given the totality of the circumstances, there was no abuse of 

discretion by the court in imposing the upper term for the robbery. 

Butler, 2013 WL 1283866, at *3-6. 

 b. Applicable Law and Analysis

 Petitioner’s challenge to her upper term sentence essentially involves an interpretation of 

state sentencing law. As explained above, “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to 

reexamine state court determinations on state law questions.” Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 

(2010) (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67). So long as a sentence imposed by a state court “is not 

based on any proscribed federal grounds such as being cruel and unusual, racially or ethnically 

motivated, or enhanced by indigency, the penalties for violation of state statutes are matters of 

state concern.” Makal v. State of Arizona, 544 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 1976). See also Miller 

v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 1989) (issue concerning only state sentencing law 

not suitable for federal habeas review). Thus, “[a]bsent a showing of fundamental unfairness, a 

state court’s misapplication of its own sentencing laws does not justify federal habeas relief.” 

Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994). Under the circumstances of this case, 

petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court’s imposition of the upper term sentence for 

a robbery in which two people were killed was fundamentally unfair. 

 Petitioner also claims that her upper term sentence violates the Sixth Amendment, as set 

forth in the Apprendi and Cunningham decisions. As respondent notes, these claims are 

unexhausted. Exhaustion of state court remedies is a prerequisite to the granting of a petition for 

a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b)(1). However, notwithstanding petitioner’s failure 

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to exhaust these claims, the court recommends that they be denied on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, 

notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the 

State”). 

 In Apprendi, Cunningham, and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the United 

States Supreme Court established that, for Sixth Amendment purposes, any fact that increases the 

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, except the fact of a prior 

conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Pursuant to 

California law at the time petitioner was sentenced, California’s Determinate Sentencing Law for 

a violation of a statute specifying three terms of imprisonment, such as a robbery, had been 

amended in response to the Cunningham decision to provide that the choice between the three 

terms “shall rest within the sound discretion of the court” without the need to find and weigh 

aggravating or mitigating factors. See Cal. Penal Code § 1170(b) (2009). See also People v. 

Sandoval, 41 Cal.4th 825, 836, n.2 (2007). In light of this amendment to California’s sentencing 

law, the trial judge’s exercise of discretion to sentence petitioner to the maximum term for the 

robbery did not violate the Sixth Amendment. See Chioino v. Kernan, 581 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (describing California’s amended Determinate Sentencing Law as “amending [the law] 

to comply with the constitutional requirements of Cunningham”); Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 

652 n. 20 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Following the decision in Cunningham, the California legislature 

amended its statutes such that imposition of the lower, middle or upper term is now discretionary 

and does not depend on the finding of any aggravating factors.”); Ochoa v. Uribe, No. ED CV 12-

586-RGK (PLA), 2013 WL 866118, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2013) (“Because the amendment to 

§1170(b) eliminated the middle term as the statutory maximum, petitioner has not shown that the 

imposition of the upper terms violated the rule formed in Apprendi, Blakely, and Cunningham.”); 

Lloyd v. Gonzalez, No. CV 11-3321 PJW, 2012 WL 84046 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2012) 

(“Under [the 2007 amendment to California Penal Code § 1170(b)] the trial judge was authorized 

in its (sic) discretion to sentence Petitioner to the upper term without any aggravating factors 

being proven to a jury or admitted by Petitioner.”); Jones v. Knipp, No. EDCV 09-1395-

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JSL(CW), 2012 WL 3839428 at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2012) (“At the outset, Petitioner’s claim 

fails because he was sentenced pursuant to the amended DSL, which accords with the rule 

announced in Apprendi as applied by Cunningham”); Juarez v. Allison, No. CV 10-10001-GE E, 

2011 WL 3654449, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2011) (upper term sentence pursuant to amended 

version of § 1170(b) did not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial). 

 Petitioner may also be claiming that that her upper term sentence of nine years on the 

robbery charge, or her overall sentence of twelve years, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 

in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. She is not entitled to 

habeas relief on any such claim. 

 The United States Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment includes a “narrow 

proportionality principle” that applies to terms of imprisonment. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 

U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also Taylor v. Lewis, 460 F.3d 1093, 1097 

(9th Cir. 2006). However, successful challenges in federal court to the proportionality of 

particular sentences are “exceedingly rare.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1983). See 

also Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 775 (9th Cir. 2004). “The Eighth Amendment does not 

require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme 

sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 

(Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 288, 303). In Lockyer v. Andrade, the United 

States Supreme Court held that it was not an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law for the California Court of Appeal to affirm a “Three Strikes” sentence of two 

consecutive 25 year-to-life imprisonment terms for a petty theft with a prior conviction involving 

theft of $150.00 worth of videotapes. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75. The Supreme Court has also held 

that a “Three Strikes” sentence of 25 years-to-life in prison imposed pursuant to a grand theft 

conviction involving the theft of three golf clubs from a pro shop was not grossly disproportionate 

and did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003). 

 Petitioner has failed to show that her sentence falls within the type of “exceedingly rare” 

circumstance that would justify habeas relief under the Eighth Amendment. Petitioner received a 

sentence of twelve years in prison for her plea of no contest to one count of robbery of an 

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inhabited dwelling in concert with two or more persons, one count of conspiracy to commit 

robbery, and an allegation that a principal was armed with a firearm. In Andrade and Ewing, the 

United States Supreme Court upheld much longer sentences for far less serious crimes than the 

crimes petitioner was convicted of. In Harmelin, the Supreme Court upheld a sentence of life 

without the possibility of parole for possessing a large quantity of cocaine. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 

996. In Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), the Supreme Court concluded that a sentence of 

life with the possibility of parole for obtaining money by false pretenses did not constitute cruel 

and unusual punishment. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 282. In light of these decisions of the United 

States Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the sentence imposed in petitioner’s case was grossly 

disproportionate. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on any claim that 

her sentence violates the Eight Amendment. 

 2. Consecutive Terms

 In her second ground for relief, petitioner claims that the trial court abused its discretion in 

imposing “consecutive terms.” ECF No. 1 at 4. She explains: 

Court did not identify any other reasons for imposing consecutive 

sentences for a two year term for the same act. Penal Code PC 654 

states in part, “An acquittal or conviction & sentence under anyone 

bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.” 

Thus violating 6th, 8th, 14th Amendment. 

Id. 

 Petitioner also challenged the trial court’s imposition of consecutive terms on appeal. The 

state appellate court found that her claim in this regard had been waived because of her trial 

counsel’s failure to object to the sentence on this ground at the sentencing proceedings. The court 

reasoned as follows: 

II. Imposition of Consecutive Sentences 

Defendant contends reversal of the consecutive term of two years 

for the conspiracy conviction is required for three reasons. First, 

the court failed to state any factor for imposing the consecutive 

term. Second, if this court finds the trial court did state such a 

factor, it must have been only that defendant had taken advantage 

of a position of trust, which constitutes a prohibited dual use of that 

factor. Third, if this court concludes defendant's failure to object to 

the foregoing errors forfeited the issue for appellate review, then 

she received ineffective assistance of counsel. 

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We conclude that defendant has forfeited the first two claims. In 

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 (Scott), our high court stated, 

“We conclude that the waiver doctrine should apply to claims 

involving the trial court's failure to properly make or articulate its 

discretionary sentencing choices. Included in this category are 

cases in which the stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the 

particular case, and cases in which the court purportedly erred 

because it double-counted a particular sentencing factor, 

misweighed the various factors, or failed to state any reasons or 

give a sufficient number of valid reasons.” (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th 

at p. 353.) Here, defendant did not object on the ground that the 

trial court failed to specifically state any reason for imposing a 

consecutive sentence, or on a dual use of fact ground. 

Consequently, the issue is forfeited. 

Defendant claims that defense counsel preserved these contentions. 

She points out that in her statement of mitigation, which the trial 

court stated it had read and considered, she argued that the 

probation officer's statement that consecutive sentencing was 

proper because the crimes were committed at different times and 

separate places (rule 4.425(a)(3)) was not factually accurate and 

should have alerted the court that it was required to state reasons for 

imposing a consecutive term. 

We disagree. “Although the court is required to impose sentence in 

a lawful manner, counsel is charged with understanding, 

advocating, and clarifying permissible sentencing choices at the 

hearing. Routine defects in the court's statement of reasons are 

easily prevented and corrected if called to the court's attention. As 

in other waiver cases, we hope to reduce the number of errors 

committed in the first instance and preserve the judicial resources 

otherwise used to correct them.” (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 353.) 

Thus, it was defendant's burden to point out to the court at the time 

of sentencing that it had not stated any reason for imposition of a 

consecutive term on the conspiracy sentence or that it had doublecounted factors. The court could have corrected the error then.8

 8

 On January 20, 2012, the People filed a motion to augment the record with the trial 

court's minute order denying defendant's petition for modification of sentence, which the trial 

court filed over a month after defendant filed her notice of appeal. Although not necessary for 

our disposition of this matter, we grant the People's motion to augment the record with the court's 

minute order. 

In its order, the court wrote, “[D]efendant seeks a concurrent sentence as to Count 4, a 

violation of Penal Code section 182. The Court continues to find that based upon California 

Rule[s] of Court, Rule 4.425(a)(3) [the crimes were committed at different times or separate 

places, rather than being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of 

aberrant behavior], the crime of robbery of an inhabited dwelling in concert with two or more 

persons (Count 3) and the crime of conspiracy to commit robbery of an inhabited dwelling in 

concert with two or more persons (Count 4) occurred at different times and locations. The 

robbery of an inhabited dwelling in concert with two or more person occurred at Olivehurst, 

California on or about September 27, 2005. The conspiracy to commit robbery of an inhabited 

dwelling in concert with two or more persons began in early September 2005 in the Sacramento, 

California area . . . . In view of the Court's sentencing objectives and Rule 4.425(a)(3), the Court 

continues to finds [sic ] that the consecutive sentence of one-third of the middle term of six years, 

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Therefore, defendant may not raise the issue for the first time on 

appeal. 

Butler, 2013 WL 1283866, at **6-7. 

 Respondent argues that petitioner’s second ground for relief is unexhausted and 

procedurally defaulted. ECF No. 14 at 24. It is true that “[a] federal habeas court will not review 

a claim rejected by a state court ‘if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state law ground that 

is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Martin, 131 S. Ct. 

at 1127. However, a reviewing court need not invariably resolve the question of procedural 

default prior to ruling on the merits of a claim. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 524-25 

(1997); see also Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Procedural bar issues 

are not infrequently more complex than the merits issues presented by the appeal, so it may well 

make sense in some instances to proceed to the merits if the result will be the same”); Busby v. 

Dretke, 359 F.3d 708, 720 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that although the question of procedural default 

should ordinarily be considered first, a reviewing court need not do so invariably, especially when 

the issue turns on difficult questions of state law). Thus, where deciding the merits of a claim 

proves to be less complicated and less time-consuming than adjudicating the issue of procedural 

default, a court may exercise discretion to reject the claim in its merits and forgo an analysis of 

procedural default. See Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1998); Batchelor v. 

Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1982). Under the circumstances presented here, the 

undersigned finds that petitioner’s claim can be resolved more easily by addressing it on the 

merits. Accordingly, this court will assume that petitioner’s second ground for relief is not 

procedurally defaulted. The court also concludes that this sentencing claim should be denied on 

the merits, notwithstanding petitioner’s failure to exhaust the claim in state court. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(2). 

 Although petitioner adds a citation to the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments in 

her description of this claim, her second claim for relief essentially involves the interpretation of 

 

namely 2 years is warranted for the subordinate term, a felony violation of Penal Code section 

182.” While the trial court indicates it “continues to” make the above findings, the court never 

articulated that finding on the record during the sentencing hearing. 

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state sentencing law. A habeas petitioner may not “transform a state-law issue into a federal one” 

merely by asserting a violation of the federal constitution. Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 

(9th Cir. 1997). Rather, as set forth above, petitioner must show that the decision of the 

California Court of Appeal somehow “violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States.” Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1083 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68). 

Petitioner’s claim, which essentially involves a challenge to state sentencing laws, is not 

cognizable in this federal habeas action. 

 Even if the claim were cognizable, petitioner has failed to show that her consecutive twoyear sentence for conspiracy violates the Sixth Amendment or any other provision of the federal 

constitution. In Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009), the United States Supreme Court held that 

judges have discretion to determine whether sentences are imposed consecutively or concurrently 

under the Sixth Amendment rules announced in Apprendi and Blakely. The Court found that 

“[t]he decision to impose sentences consecutively is not within the jury function that ‘extends 

down centuries into the common law.’” Id. at 168 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477). Instead, 

“specification of the regime for administering multiple sentences has long been considered the 

prerogative of state legislatures.” Id. The Sixth Amendment does not prohibit trial judges from 

finding facts necessary to support the imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, 

sentences. Id. at 167-71. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on any claim based on 

the Sixth Amendment. 

 As explained above, petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that her sentence violates the 

Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, or that it is fundamentally 

unfair, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief 

on her claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

 For all of the foregoing reasons, petitioner’s second ground for relief should be denied. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 In her final ground for relief, petitioner claims that her trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance. ECF No. 1 at 5. Her claim is stated, in full, as follows: 

///// 

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Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object. Violates 

Strickland vs. Washington. His failure to object to judge sentencing 

among his other duties fell below normal standards and in doing so 

it prejudice defendant at trial and post trial. 

Id.

 1. State Court Decision

 On direct appeal, petitioner claimed that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 

in failing to object at the sentencing hearing to the trial court’s imposition of a consecutive term 

for the conspiracy conviction. Id. at 34-37. She argued that “the objection would have been 

meritorious because the trial court clearly erred in failing to articulate reasons for the consecutive 

term or in its dual use of an aggravating factor.” Id. at 37. Petitioner also argued that trial 

counsel’s deficient performance resulted in prejudice because “there is a reasonable probability 

that without the trial court’s errors, a concurrent term would have been selected.” Id. 

 The California Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, reasoning as follows: 

As to defendant's claim that failure to object results in 

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, we disagree. To 

establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show 

(1) counsel's performance was below an objective standard of 

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) the 

deficient performance prejudiced defendant. (Strickland v. 

Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 691–692 [80 L.Ed.2d 674] 

(Strickland); People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216–217 

(Ledesma).) “‘Surmounting Strickland 's high bar is never an easy 

task.’ [Citation.]” (Harrington v. Richter (2011) U.S. [178 

L.Ed.2d 624, 642] (Richter), quoting Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 

599 U.S. , [176 L.Ed.2d 284, 297].) 

We follow our high court's direction, “‘If it is easier to dispose of 

an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 

prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.’” (In re Alvernaz

(1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 945.) To show prejudice, a defendant must 

show a reasonable probability that he would have received a more 

favorable result had counsel's performance not been deficient. 

(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 693–694; Ledesma, supra, 43 

Cal.3d at pp. 217–218.) “A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Strickland, 

supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694; accord, Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 

218.) 

Rule 4.425(b) provides that “[a]ny circumstances in aggravation or 

mitigation may be considered in deciding whether to impose 

consecutive rather than concurrent sentences,” except a fact used to 

impose the upper term, a fact used to otherwise enhance the 

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defendant's prison sentence, and a fact that is an element of the 

crime. As we have noted, any one of the aggravating factors 

identified by the trial court was sufficient to justify imposition of 

the upper term. For example, assuming that in selecting the upper 

term the court used the factor that defendant took advantage of a 

position of trust in the way it described when it gave its reasons for 

imposing the upper term, the following factors remain available for 

use in imposing a consecutive sentence. Not only did the robbery 

involve great violence (rule 4.421(a)(1)), but people were killed. 

Thus, the robbery was distinctly worse than the customary robbery. 

(People v. Castorena (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 558, 562 (Castorena) 

[where the facts surrounding the charged offense exceed the 

minimum necessary to establish the elements of the crime, the trial 

court can use such evidence to aggravate the sentence and the trial 

court is not precluded from using facts to aggravate a sentence 

when those facts establish elements not required for the underlying 

crime].) Moreover, the fact that there is more than one victim is a 

proper factor for imposition of upper term or consecutive sentences. 

(People v. Calhoun (2007) 40 Cal.4th 398, 405–408, citing rule 

4.408(a).) 

Defendant's participation in the way the crime was carried out 

shows planning and sophistication (rule 4.421(a)(8)). In addition, 

she induced others to participate in the commission of the crime and 

occupied a position of leadership in its commission (rule 

4.421(a)(4)). Defendant's contention that consideration of the use 

of the planning factor violates the dual use rule because planning is 

an element of the conspiracy unavailing. Even assuming planning 

is an element of conspiracy,9

 in making a sentencing choice the 

court may consider the totality of a defendant's involvement in the 

crime. (Rule 4.421(a)(4); Castorena, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 

562.) Defendant was more than a follower. She originated the idea 

of committing a theft of marijuana from the victims who were 

killed.10 Moreover, the object of the theft was a suspected large 

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conspiracy requires proof of four elements: (1) an agreement between two or more people, (2) 

who have the specific intent to agree or conspire to commit an offense, (3) the specific intent to 

commit that offense, and (4) an overt act committed by one or more of the parties to the 

agreement for the purpose of carrying out the object of the conspiracy. [Citations.]” (People v. 

Vu (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1024 (Vu).) Nor does the prosecution have to show 

sophistication as an element of conspiracy. Yet, the original plan conceived by defendant showed 

just that. 

10 While the trial court discussed defendant's involvement in the crime in the context of 

denying probation (see fn. 3, ante ) and in later describing how she took advantage of a position 

of trust, the court did not expressly mention as aggravating circumstances for imposing the upper 

term that defendant conceived the idea of stealing the marijuana from the victims, presented that 

idea to the coconspirators, and did nothing to stop the commission of the crimes. 

The other aspects of defendant's involvement the court expressly mentioned it considered 

in connection with the position of trust factor could have been considered under rule 4.421(a)(4) 

as circumstances showing her leadership in the crime or as separate factors relevant to the 

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quantity of contraband that was to be sold and defendant was to 

share in the proceeds. (Rule 4.408(a); see rule 4.421(a)(10).)11

Lastly, we observe that the victims' family dog was shot, a violation 

of section 597, subdivisions (a) and (d) and a fact that could be 

considered an aggravating factor under rule 4.421(a)(1), facts 

related to the crime, whether or not charged, that involved “a high 

degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness.” Because these 

factors would all be available to the court upon resentencing,12 there 

is no reasonable likelihood defendant would obtain a more 

favorable outcome. Hence, defendant cannot establish prejudice. 

Butler, 2013 WL 1283866, at **7-8. 

 2. Applicable Legal Standards

 The applicable legal standards for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are set forth 

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To succeed on a Strickland claim, a defendant 

must show that (1) his counsel's performance was deficient and that (2) the “deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. Counsel is constitutionally deficient if his or 

her representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” such that it was outside 

“the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. at 687–88 (internal 

 

sentencing decision under rule 4.408(a). These included the following: defendant took the other 

coconspirators to the location, actively participated in the first attempt to steal the marijuana by 

luring one of the victims away from the premises, and provided the coconspirators with 

information concerning the victims' ability to resist, including the fact that the victims had 

firearms and the location where they kept those firearms. As the court appears to have considered 

these facts under the position of trust factor, they cannot be used again as a reason for consecutive 

sentences. 

11 Under rule 4.421(a)(10), it is an aggravating factor when the crime involves a “large 

quantity of contraband.” The record is not clear on the size of the crop defendant and her crime 

partners sought to steal, but we must assume the conspirators thought it large enough that they 

could make money from selling it. Even assuming the crop did not qualify as particularly large, 

that defendant suggested stealing a controlled substance knowing that the purpose was to resell it 

and that she planned to personally share in the proceeds are facts reasonably related to the 

sentencing decision under rule 4.408(a). 

12 We need not decide whether the court was justified in determining that the robbery and 

conspiracy were committed at different times and places, because that reason was only stated by 

the trial court in its order denying defendant's motion to modify the sentence after defendant's 

notice of appeal was filed. We do note that conspiracy is an ongoing going crime (Vu, supra, 143 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1024), so a conspiracy may take place in locations other than where the 

agreement is reached. 

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quotation marks omitted). “Counsel’s errors must be ‘so serious as to deprive the defendant of a 

fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.’” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 787-88 (quoting Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687). 

 A reviewing court is required to make every effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of 

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the 

conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669; see Richter, 131 

S.Ct. at 789. Reviewing courts must also “indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct 

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

This presumption of reasonableness means that the court must “give the attorneys the benefit of 

the doubt,” and must also “affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons [defense] counsel 

may have had for proceeding as they did.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 196 (2011) 

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

 Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” 

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 792. A reviewing court “need not first determine whether counsel’s 

performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of 

the alleged deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of 

lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 

 3. Analysis

 The Strickland standards govern claims for ineffective assistance of counsel in noncapital 

sentencing proceedings. Daire v. Lattimore, 812 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 2016). After reviewing the 

record of the sentencing proceedings in petitioner’s case, this court does not find that petitioner’s 

trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to the trial court’s decision to 

impose a consecutive sentence for the conspiracy conviction. 

 As set forth above, the California Court of Appeal concluded that trial counsel’s failure to 

object to the trial court’s imposition of a consecutive sentence for the conspiracy conviction did 

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not result in prejudice because that sentence was fully supported by the trial record and was 

proper under California law. The state court’s decision that petitioner’s sentence complied with 

the requirements of California law is binding on this court. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 

76 (2005) (“We have repeatedly held that a state court’s interpretation of state law, including one 

announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas 

corpus”); Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 576 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 

U.S. 684, 691 (1975)) (“If a state law issue must be decided in order to decide a federal habeas 

claim, the state’s construction of its own law is binding on the federal court). 

 Further, the decision of the Court of Appeal is not based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts of this case. The facts of this case, as set forth in the record supports the court’s 

conclusion that the robbery in this case involved great violence, that there was more than one 

victim, that petitioner’s participation in the way the crime was carried out showed planning and 

sophistication, that petitioner induced others to participate in the robbery, that the object of the 

theft was a suspected large quantity of contraband that was to be sold, and that the victims’ family 

dog was shot. See Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal at 72-73, 151, 163-66, 168-70. According to the 

Court of Appeal, any of these factors would have supported the trial court’s imposition of a 

consecutive term for the conspiracy. Under these circumstances, petitioner cannot show deficient 

performance or prejudice from her trial counsel’s failure to object to the imposition of 

consecutive sentences. An objection on these grounds would not have been successful. Rupe v. 

Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996) (“the failure to take a futile action can never be 

deficient performance”). 

 For all of the foregoing reasons, petitioner is not entitled to relief on her claim of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

C. Traverse

 In the traverse, petitioner claims that prosecutorial misconduct induced her to enter into a 

plea agreement in which she waived potential sentencing issues arising under Cal. Penal Code 

654. ECF No. 15 at 5-7. She also asserts that her plea agreement somehow violated her right to 

“equal protection of constitutional law;” that her conviction for possession of a firearm was based 

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on insufficient evidence; and that the trial court’s use of the “crimes of murder, for which 

petitioner was never charged, as factors in aggravation,” violated her right to equal protection of 

the laws. Id. at 6-7, 13. Petitioner states that she “can not be forever held accountable for two 

murders.” Id. at 13. She also disagrees with some of the facts contained in respondent’s brief on 

appeal. Id. at 7-9. 

 To the extent petitioner is attempting to belatedly raise new claims in the traverse, relief 

should be denied. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (a traverse is 

not the proper pleading to raise additional grounds for relief); Greenwood v. Fed. Aviation 

Admin., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“we review only issues which are argued specifically 

and distinctly in a party’s opening brief”). Even if these claims had been properly raised, 

petitioner’s conclusory allegations fail to demonstrate that the prosecutor committed misconduct, 

that her plea agreement violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, or that her 

convictions are based on insufficient evidence. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 

1995) (quoting James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (“It is well-settled that ‘[c]onclusory 

allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas 

relief’”)). With regard to petitioner’s sentence, for the reasons set forth above petitioner has 

failed to show that the trial court’s imposition of the upper term for the robbery or a consecutive 

two year term for the conspiracy violates the federal constitution. 

IV. Conclusion 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for a writ of 

habeas corpus be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

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Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue 

in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a 

final order adverse to the applicant). 

DATED: October 20, 2016. 

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