Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02041/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02041-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Neil Hamilton Adler
Defendant
John Michael Crim
Plaintiff
C. Logan
Defendant
Management & Training Corp.
Defendant
Cynthia Mann
Defendant
McBride
Defendant
Nickie McDonough
Defendant
Dale Patrick
Defendant
T. Stewart
Defendant
Kwonto Sy
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN MICHAEL CRIM, 

Plaintiff,

v.

MANAGEMENT TRAINING CORP.,

et al.,

Defendants.

 /

1:09-cv-02041-AWI-GSA-PC 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS

FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT AS PREMATURE

(Docs. 12, 15, 19, 21.)

I. BACKGROUND

 John Michael Crim (“Plaintiff”) is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights

action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 42 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff filed the complaint

commencing this action on November 20, 2009. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff names as defendants

Management & Training Corp. (“MTC”), Neil Hamilton Adler (Warden), T. Stewart (Staff

Member), Cynthia Mann (Staff Member), Nickie McDonough (Staff Member), Dale Patrick (Staff

Member), C. Logan (Discipline Hearing Officer), McBride (S.I.S. Officer), and Kwonto Sy (S.I.S.

Officer) (“Defendants”).

On December 22, 2009, Defendants filed a Notice of Appearance in this action through

counsel. (Doc. 9.) On January 28, 2010, February 5, 2010, May 24, 2010, and June 1, 2010,

Plaintiff filed motions for entry of default against Defendants. (Docs. 12, 15, 19, 21.) Defendants

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have filed opposition to Plaintiff’s motions, and Plaintiff has replied to the opposition. (Docs. 13,

14, 16, 17.) 

II. REQUESTS FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

Rules 12 & 55

Entry of default is appropriate as to any party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief

is sought that has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and where that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). 

Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, “[A] defendant must serve an answer

within 20 days after being served with the summons and complaint; or if it has timelywaived service

under Rule 4(d), within 60 days after the request for a waiver was sent.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a)(1)(A). 

Under Rule 4(d), a defendant may waive service of a summons by signing and returning a waiver

of service. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d).

Plaintiff requests entry of default against Defendants because they have not served Plaintiff

with an answer to his complaint. In opposition, Defendants argue that default should not be entered

against them because a responsive pleading is not yet due in this action. Defendants refer to the

court’s informational order of November 23, 2009, which informs the parties that the court is

required to screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A before a responsive pleading is due. 

Plaintiff replies that Defendants are mistaken in their belief that they must wait for direction from

the court, because this action was not brought against a governmental entity, and therefore the court’s

informational order is not applicable. 

Screening Requirement

Pursuant to the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, the court is required to screen complaints

brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof

if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim

upon which reliefmay be granted, or that seek monetaryrelieffrom a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof,

that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . .

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. the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

Discussion

Here, Plaintiff argues that the court is not required to screen the complaint because none of

the Defendants is “a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity” pursuant

to § 1915A. In the complaint, Plaintiff describes defendant Management & Training Corporation

as a “private business contracting with the Federal Bureau of Prisons to manage and train staff who

are employed [by] MTC” and “responsible for the operation and management of Taft Correctional

Institution,” where Plaintiff is currently incarcerated. (Cmp at 2 ¶ III.) All of the other defendants

named in the complaint are employees of MTC working as correctional staff at Taft Correctional

Institution (“TCI”). Cmp at 2-3 ¶ III.) 

The court routinely applies § 1915A's screening requirement to Bivens cases brought byTCI

prisoners against MTC and its employees. The Ninth Circuit permits Bivens actions against private 1

party defendants who contract with the federal government. Schowendgerdt v. General Dynamics

Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1337-38 (9th Cir. 1987) (allowing Bivens action against private corporation

and its employees where corporation contracted with government to provide security services to

Naval Industrial plant); Ginn v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding that private

corporation operating federal Headstart Program could be liable under Bivens for violation of

employees’ constitutional rights). Thus, for purposes of screening prisoner complaints, the court 

proceeds under the assumption that prisoners may bringBivens actions against a private corporation

and its employees who operate a correctional facility pursuant to a contract with the United States. 

See e.g. Hill v. Corrections Corporation of America, 14 F.Supp.2d 1235, 1238 (D. Kan., July 29,

1998). Accordingly, MTC and MTC’s employees are considered “a governmental entity” and

“officers or employees of a governmental entity” for purposes of screeningPlaintiff’s complaint, and

Plaintiff states in the complaint that he brings an action under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 by a federal prisoner.

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(Cmp at 1 ¶1.) Actions under § 1983 and those under Bivens are identical in most respects save for the replacement

of a state actor under § 1983 by a federal actor under Bivens. See Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir.

1991); also see Correctional Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66, 122 S.Ct. 515, 519 (2001) . Therefore, the

court treats Plaintiff’s complaint as a Bivens action.

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the court’s informational order applies to Plaintiff’s complaint with respect to the screening

requirement. The court’s informational order provides that “[T]he court is required to screen

complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee

of a government entity. . . [to determine] if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous

or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” (Doc. 3 at 2-3 ¶12.) Therefore, Defendants are

not required to file an answer or other pleading in response to Plaintiff’s complaint until after the

court has completed its mandatory screening process to determine whether Plaintiff states any

cognizable claims. For this reason, Plaintiff’s motions for entry of default are premature and shall

be denied as such.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Plaintiff’s motions for entry of default

against Defendants, filed on January 28, 2010, February 5, 2010, May 17, 2010, and June 1, 2010,

are DENIED as premature.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 8, 2010 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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