Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-08-10147/USCOURTS-ca9-08-10147-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kurt F. Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 08-10147

v.  D.C. No.

KURT F. JOHNSON, 3:05-cr-00611-WHA

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  No. 08-10258

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.

v.  3:05-cr-00611-

WHA-1 DALE SCOTT HEINEMAN,

Defendant-Appellant. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

William H. Alsup, United States District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 10, 2010—San Francisco, California

Filed July 6, 2010

Before: Barry G. Silverman, Raymond C. Fisher and

Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Silverman

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COUNSEL

Maitrey A. Badami, Badami & Leonida, San Francisco, California; and Kari E. Hong, Law Offices of Kari E. Hong, Oakland, California, for the defendants-appellants. 

Laurie Kloster Gray (argued), Joseph P. Russoniello, Barbara

J. Valliere, Brigid S. Martin, and C. David Hall, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California, San Francisco, California, for the Government-appellee. 

OPINION

SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge:

Defendants Kurt F. Johnson and Dale Scott Heineman were

indicted for conspiracy and multiple counts of mail fraud

related to their illegitimate debt-elimination business. They

were adamant in their desire to represent themselves and

assert an absurd legal theory wrapped up in Uniform Commercial Code gibberish. Both defendants were examined by a

psychiatrist and found to have no diagnosable mental disorder. Thereafter, the district court conducted Faretta1

 hearings

spanning several days in which the defendants were extensively advised of their right to counsel and the disadvantages

1Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (establishing that a defendant has the constitutional right to represent himself when he voluntarily

and intelligently elects to do so). 

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of self-representation. The judge practically begged them to

accept counsel but they refused. The district court found that

the defendants were competent to represent themselves and

that such was their constitutional right. Defendants now contend that Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), decided

by the Supreme Court after their trial concluded, required the

district court to terminate their self-representation because of

what they describe as their “nonsensical” legal “antics” after

the trial began. They say they may have been competent to

stand trial but not to represent themselves. 

The record clearly shows that the defendants are fools, but

that is not the same as being incompetent. Under both Faretta

and Edwards, they had the right to represent themselves and

go down in flames if they wished, a right the district court

was required to respect. There was no legal or medical basis

to foist a lawyer on them against their will. We also hold

today that there was no basis for the recusal of the district

judge nor error in any of the jury instructions.

I. Background

In 2004-2005, Kurt F. Johnson and Dale Scott Heineman

started a debt-elimination program. The premise of their program was that banks had an unfair advantage over borrowers;

the program purportedly provided a mechanism for borrowers

to eliminate their mortgage debt. The program was entitled

the “Dorean Process” and consisted of several steps. Homeowners first transferred their interest in their properties to a

trust, naming the defendants as trustees. The defendants then

sent demand notices to the lenders questioning the validity of

their lending practices. When banks failed to respond or

“prove” that their lending practices were valid, the defendants

recorded bogus documents with county clerks’ offices ostensibly establishing that the homes were no longer subject to a

mortgage. The homeowners then refinanced with a different

bank using their supposedly unencumbered homes as collateral. In addition to up front fees, Heineman and Johnson also

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took as a fee a significant portion of the proceeds of the new

loans the homeowners thus obtained. By their own admission,

the defendants made over three million dollars in this scheme.

Because the homeowners stopped making their mortgage

payments, the initial lenders started sending notices of default

and eventually foreclosure notices. In response, Johnson and

Heineman sued the banks that were initiating foreclosures.

Johnson and Heineman filed fifteen such lawsuits against different banks/lenders, all in the Northern District of California.

Judge Alsup dismissed the defendants’ first case under Rule

8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Frances Kenny

Family Trust v. World Sav. Bank FSB, No. C 04-03724, 2005

WL 106792, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2005). Judge Alsup also

entered an order for Johnson and Heineman’s lawyer to show

cause why he should not be sanctioned for filing multiple frivolous cases. The lawyer filed a response and also filed a

motion to withdraw as counsel and a declaration under seal in

support of his motion. He explained in his sealed declaration

that some of Johnson’s and Heineman’s statements to customers were false. He expressed concern that he had been

employed in an effort to supply credibility to the possibly illegitimate Dorean Process. Judge Alsup sanctioned the attorney

and referred the matter to the United States Attorney’s Office.

Johnson and Heineman were indicted on September 22,

2005, and the case was assigned to Judge Alsup because it

related to the defendants’ prior civil case. The defendants

filed a “Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition” in which they

moved to recuse Judge Alsup. The motion was referred to

Judge Susan Illston. Judge Illston found that the rulings made

by Judge Alsup during the prior civil proceedings regarding

the defendants’ debt elimination scheme were, in effect, all in

a day’s work, nothing out of the ordinary, contained nothing

uncalled for, and did not evince a design to hurt the defendants. She also found that Judge Alsup’s referral of the matter

to the U.S. Attorney’s Office only demonstrated his belief that

the law may have been broken, not that he harbored a deepUNITED STATES v. JOHNSON 9571

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seated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair

judgment impossible. The recusal motion was thus denied. 

Judge Alsup then held a series of Faretta hearings in which

he patiently and thoroughly addressed the issue of selfrepresentation with the defendants. At the first hearing, Judge

Alsup addressed Defendant Johnson first:

THE COURT: Now, Mr. Johnson, you’re entitled to

a lawyer and if you can’t afford one we will appoint

one at no expense to you. Do you understand that?

JOHNSON: I understand your offer, yes.

THE COURT: And . . . do you want a lawyer?

JOHNSON: Absolutely not. 

Judge Alsup then explained the significance of the right to

counsel: 

You’re entitled to a lawyer here to help you get

through this and to help you identify all the issues

and to make the best arguments possible on your

behalf, that’s important. . . . And it’s a right you have

under the Constitution. You don’t want to give that

up without thinking very hard about it. . . . 

My job is to try my best get you a fair trial and a fair

procedure and right off the bat we need to get you

a lawyer and you need — you should have a lawyer.

You do have a right to represent yourself if you

really want to, but [a part] of my job is to help you

understand why you should not do that and you

should have a lawyer, but if at the end of all that you

insist on it you can represent yourself if you want[ ]

to. 

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The defendants requested a continuance to allow them to

research whether they should accept outside representation

and the court granted the continuance. 

At the defendants’ next hearing the court had an assistant

federal public defender present to demonstrate to the defendants that they could in fact have counsel appointed for them.

The court explained the advantages of having a lawyer and

the disadvantages of not having one: 

If you don’t have a lawyer then you have to conduct

the case yourself. By that, I mean, you have to make

your motions, do legal research, respond to motions

made by the Government and to come in and argue

them. And it’s conceivable someone who’s not a

lawyer can do an okay job at that, but it’s very

unlikely because it helps to have the experience of

being a lawyer. . . . 

So you must abide by the same rules of the Court as

the lawyers do. And if you make mistakes, I can’t

give you special privileges or benefits, and the judge

can’t help you. The Government is represented by a

trained, skilled prosecutor experienced in criminal

law in the court procedures and . . . the procedures

you face in this case. 

Judge Alsup again asked the defendants if they wanted a lawyer:

THE COURT: Now, do you want to give up your

right to have a lawyer represent you in this case?

HEINEMAN: Sir, I’m not looking to be represented

by anybody. 

The court then asked Heineman if he would like to consult

with the assistant public defender regarding representation: 

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THE COURT: Before you make it clear to me you

understand in making that decision — do you want

to talk to Mr. Cohen back there from the public

defender’s office? 

HEINEMAN: I don’t have anything to say to him at

this time.

The court then addressed Johnson who requested another continuance so that he could look into whether he would have

access to a law library prior to deciding whether he wanted

counsel appointed. The court granted the request and continued the hearing. 

Because the defendants were considering representing

themselves and because they had made some strange comments in court, the district judge ordered that the defendants

undergo mental examinations. James R. Missett, M.D., Ph.D.,

evaluated the defendants separately at the Federal Corrections

Institute in Dublin, California. Both defendants were less than

cooperative during their evaluations, but Dr. Missett engaged

them for approximately one hour each and filed written

reports in which he opined that neither defendant was suffering from any mental disorder. The court held a competency

hearing at which Dr. Missett testified in person. The court

found the defendants competent to represent themselves based

on Dr. Missett’s reports and testimony and based on the

court’s own observations. 

The court held one final Faretta hearing, advising the

defendants once again of the implications of proceeding without an attorney: 

THE COURT: I want to now turn to the two paths

that you can go down here. One path is you have a

lawyer at no expense to you. We will appoint a lawyer. Each of you will have a separate lawyer, a lawyer who will be yours; not representing the Public

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Defender or whatever it would be, representing you

and your interest in the case. That would be effective

immediately and going all the way through the end

of trial. That’s one road we can go down. 

Another road we can go down is you say, No, I don’t

want a lawyer and that you want to appear in court

and conduct your own defense. You have the right

under the Constitution to do that, but I need to make

sure that you — before you exercise that right, that

you understand you have the right to the lawyer and,

also, what some of the advantages and disadvantages

are for each of these courses. . . . 

That lawyer would help conduct the investigation.

That lawyer would review the discovery that’s been

provided to you, but, also, would follow up on leads.

That lawyer would make possible motions to compel

further information from the government. The lawyer would have an investigator working with him to

go out and ask questions, dig up evidence, try to

poke holes in the government’s case, and do investigations into some of the witnesses the government

may want to bring at trial so that the crossexaminations by the lawyer would be the best possible examinations. . . . 

All right. I want to give you another opportunity. I

am suggesting very strongly to you that you both

should have a lawyer to make out the case here in

court in your defense and to poke holes in the government’s [case] and to make motions and so forth.

. . . It can only help you and it can’t hurt you and I

suggest that you should do that. Will you let me

appoint a lawyer?

JOHNSON: Like I say, your Honor, if you want to

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appoint one for the defendant, you are more than

welcome to.2 I do not want one. 

THE COURT: Mr. Heineman?

HEINEMAN: That is correct, I do not want one.

Appoint one [sic] the defendant. 

Despite the defendants’ refusal to accept appointed counsel,

the district judge did appoint advisory counsel to assist the

defendants solely on issues of procedure and courtroom protocol. 

On the first day of trial, the court yet again asked the defendants to consider appointment of counsel despite the additional delay that would result; again, both defendants refused.

After a month-long jury trial, the defendants were convicted

of one count each of conspiracy and thirty-four counts each

of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.

II. Self-Representation

Johnson and Heineman argue that the district court should

not have permitted them to represent themselves. First, they

argue under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46

(1975), and Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970), that

their self-representation should have been terminated because

their own courtroom behavior rendered their trial unfair. Second, they argue that under Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164,

128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008), regardless of whether their behavior

required termination under Faretta, they were in fact not competent to continue representing themselves. As evidence in

2One of the defendants’ recurring themes in their colloquies with the

court was their peculiar theory that they were “sentient human beings” distinct from the abstract titles “Defendants KURT F. JOHNSON and DALE

SCOTT HEINEMAN” as they were referred to in the indictment and court

documents. 

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support of these two similar, but distinct, claims that the district court should have forced counsel upon them, they cite

their reluctance to provide the court with their names or dates

of birth, their campaign of filing meaningless and nonsensical

documents, their insistence on wearing their prison garb in

front of the jury, and their off-the-wall comments such as

Johnson’s statement in his opening that he wanted the jury to

“enter a guilty plea for us,” which he subsequently apologized

for, explaining that he “was trying to make a very quick remedy to this procedurally.” We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1291. 

[1] A defendant’s right to self-representation is clearly

established. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821. But before electing to

represent himself a defendant must be advised of his right to

counsel and the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation. Id. at 835. Further, a defendant’s waiver of the

right to counsel must be knowing and voluntary. Id. If a

defendant persists in his choice to represent himself, that

choice must be honored even if it is to his own detriment. Id.

at 834. Here, there is no question but that the court more than

adequately ensured that Faretta was satisfied. It is hard to

imagine what else the court could or should have said to have

explained the hazards of self-representation. 

[2] Nonetheless, the right to self-representation is not absolute; the constitutional guarantee to a fair trial permits “the

trial judge [to] terminate self-representation by a defendant

who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.” Id. at 834 n.46 (citing Allen, 397 U.S. at 343). It is

an open question what standard of review this court should

apply to a district court’s decision to permit an obstreperous

defendant to represent himself under Faretta when there is a

risk the trial will violate due process, but we need not decide

the applicable standard here because these defendants’ claims

fail under any of the possible standards of review. It is clear

that Johnson and Heineman did not engage in such serious

obstructionist conduct that the fairness of their trial was jeopUNITED STATES v. JOHNSON 9577

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ardized, requiring the district court to terminate their selfrepresentation. Defendants argue that termination of selfrepresentation is required when defendants engage in serious

misconduct, are unwilling to abide by courtroom protocol, or

are extremely disruptive and defiant. But the behavior of the

defendants during the trial in this case, while occasionally

wacky, was not disruptive or defiant. The defendants filed

numerous nonsensical pleadings, were uncooperative at times,

and chose to wear their prison garb during trial, but they did

not exhibit a blatant disregard for courtroom rules or protocol

and did not make it impossible for the court to administer fair

proceedings. In fact, they made opening statements, closing

arguments, cross-examined witnesses, argued jury instructions, and testified on their own behalf. They did not disrupt

the proceedings or have to be gagged, shackled, or removed

from the courtroom. See United States v. Mack, 362 F.3d 597,

600-03 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding self-representation should

have been terminated where defendant’s behavior led to the

trial court’s exclusion of the defendant from the courtroom

and the denial of the defendant’s right to call witnesses and

conduct closing argument). The defendants’ courtroom

behavior, although eccentric at times, would not have justified, let alone required, the involuntary deprivation of their

constitutional right to represent themselves. 

[3] Defendants next argue that they were not competent to

represent themselves, Faretta notwithstanding, under the

Supreme Court’s decision in Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S.

164, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008). Until recently, if a defendant was

determined to be competent to stand trial he was also deemed

competent to represent himself. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S.

389, 399 (1993). The Supreme Court clarified in Edwards,

however, that a trial court may insist on representation for a

defendant who is competent to stand trial but who is suffering

from severe mental illness to the point where he is not competent to perform the more arduous task of representing himself.

Edwards, 554 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 2388. The Court concluded that the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial permits

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a district court to override a Faretta request for defendants

whose mental disorder prevented them from presenting any

meaningful defense. Id. 

As an initial matter, we have not yet articulated the applicable standard of review to be applied to Edwards challenges.

See United States v. Thompson, 587 F.3d 1165, 1171 & n.2

(9th Cir. 2009) (assuming abuse of discretion); United States

v. Ferguson, 560 F.3d 1060, 1070 n.6 (9th Cir. 2009).

Because Edwards holds that the Constitution “permits” interfering with a Faretta request for “gray area” defendants, it

suggests an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v.

Berry, 565 F.3d 385, 391 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v.

DeShazer, 554 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 2009). However,

that does not directly affect the question raised by the defendant here, which is when, if ever, the Constitution requires a

court to impose counsel on a “gray area” defendant despite a

voluntary and knowing waiver. Given the nature of the distinction between that which is constitutionally required and

that which is merely constitutionally permitted, see Edwards,

554 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct at 2385 (noting relevance of that

distinction), the standard of review to be applied to Edwards

challenges in which a Faretta request was granted may

require different analysis than provided by Edwards itself, in

which the Faretta request was denied. We have no need to

reach these difficult questions here, however, because the

defendants in this case fail to get through the door to making

an Edwards claim at all, because they were clearly fully competent, albeit foolish, to represent themselves. We review the

district court’s factual finding that the defendants were competent to represent themselves for clear error. See United

States v. Friedman, 366 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 2004); see

also Edwards, 554 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 2387 (“[T]he

trial judge, particularly one such as the trial judge in this case,

who presided over one of [the defendant’s] competency hearings and his two trials, will often prove best able to make

more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the

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individualized circumstances of a particular defendant.”);

DeShazer, 554 F.3d at 1286. 

We recently applied Edwards in United States v. Ferguson,

560 F.3d at 1069, and United States v. Thompson, 587 F.3d

at 1171-73. In Ferguson, the district court acquiesced in a

defendant’s request for self-representation despite his bizarre

courtroom behavior because the court felt it could not force

representation upon Ferguson under the law. After the trial,

but while the appeal was still pending, the Supreme Court

decided Edwards. On appeal, we remanded to the district

court to allow it to decide whether the opinion in Edwards

would have affected its decision to allow Ferguson to represent himself. Ferguson, 560 F.3d at 1070. 

In concluding that remand was appropriate we relied on the

fact that the psychiatric reports regarding Ferguson focused

on whether he was competent to assist counsel at trial, not

whether he was competent to represent himself. Id. at 1068.

We also focused on Ferguson’s failure to do anything at his

trial: he conducted no voir dire, gave no opening, gave no

closing, conducted no cross-examination, and called no witnesses. Id. at 1069. We noted that this absence of a defense

seriously jeopardized the fairness of his trial or at least the

appearance of fairness. Id. We found most important the

implication in the record that the district court might have

forced counsel upon Ferguson had the district court had the

benefit of the decision in Edwards. Id. 

Subsequently, in Thompson, we determined that no remand

was necessary under Edwards where a defendant’s selfreported mental problems and vacillations regarding selfrepresentation appeared manufactured as a tactic to delay

trial. Thompson, 587 F.3d at 1173. On the morning of trial,

after multiple continuances and a competency hearing,

Thompson advised the court that he wished to represent himself and would need additional time to prepare for trial. Id. at

1168. The court conducted a Faretta hearing and strongly

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urged Thompson to reconsider self-representation but finally

relented and granted Thompson’s request to represent himself.

Id. at 1168-70. 

In Thompson, we contrasted the factual circumstances there

with those in Ferguson. Thompson, 587 F.3d at 1172-73. Specifically, we relied on evidence in the record indicating that

the district court properly evaluated Thompson’s ability to

represent himself rather than merely his competence to stand

trial. Id. We also noted the difference between Ferguson’s

total lack of activity at trial and Thompson’s lengthy colloquies with the court in which he seemed “acutely aware of

what was occurring.” Id. at 1173. We held that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Thompson was competent to represent himself. Id. 

[4] In this case, the district court did not err in concluding

that Johnson and Heineman were competent to represent

themselves. The district court had the defendants psychiatrically evaluated and held a competency hearing in which it

properly considered both their competence to represent themselves as well as their competence to stand trial. The doctor

who evaluated the defendants concluded that there was no

evidence that either was suffering from any mental disorder.

And the district court found that “both defendants are able to

comprehend information as it is received by them in a normal

manner without any mental defect whatsoever; that they are

able to express themselves coherently and appropriately,

sometimes even with great articulation.” Most importantly,

the district court concluded, “[t]hey are able to assist in their

own defense . . . if they had counsel. Or if they don’t have

counsel, to assist themselves in conducting the defense.” The

district court, even without the benefit of Edwards, presciently contemplated whether the defendants had the mental

capacity to represent themselves, not just the competence to

stand trial, and it found that they did. 

[5] The record amply supports the district judge’s determination. The defendants gave opening statements, testified,

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examined and cross-examined witnesses, challenged jury

instructions, and delivered closing arguments of significant

length. The district court was in the best position to observe

the defendants’ behavior and to make the determination that

the defendants had the mental capacity to represent themselves. Edwards, 554 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 2387; Ferguson, 560 F.3d at 1070. The concerns present in Ferguson over

the defendant’s total failure to present any defense are not

implicated by the record in this case. Nor is there any evidence of any mental illness whatsoever on the part of either

defendant in this case, unlike the defendant in Edwards. See

Edwards, 554 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 2382-83 (discussing

the defendant’s schizophrenia). 

[6] In sum, the district judge conducted three Faretta hearings spanning several days in which he repeatedly and thoroughly advised the defendants of their right to counsel, the

pitfalls of self-representation, and their right to change their

minds. The defendants unequivocally demonstrated their

understanding of the situation and their adamant desire to represent themselves, as was their right. They were examined by

a psychiatrist and found to be fine. In the absence of any mental illness or uncontrollable behavior, they had the right to

present their unorthodox defenses and argue their theories to

the bitter end.

III. Recusal

[7] We review the denial of a recusal motion for an abuse

of discretion. Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th

Cir. 2008). Johnson and Heineman argue that Judge Alsup

should have been recused because he presided over their prior

civil case and they say he received extrajudicial information

that biased him against them. Title 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) provides “[a]ny . . . judge . . . of the United States shall disqualify

himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Section 455(b)(1) further provides

that the judge shall disqualify himself “[w]here he has a per9582 UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON

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sonal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). 

[8] The Supreme Court analyzed the evolution of these

sections and the scope of their application in Liteky v. United

States, 510 U.S. 540, 543-56 (1994). Liteky addressed both

courtroom bias and the extrajudicial source doctrine, the situation in which a judge is allegedly biased based on information acquired outside of judicial proceedings. Id. at 554-55.

The Court held that judicial rulings or information acquired

by the court in its judicial capacity will rarely support recusal.

Id. at 555. The Court explained that if information is acquired

during court proceedings, only exceptionally inflammatory

information will provide grounds for recusal based on bias or

prejudice: 

[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts

introduced or events occurring in the course of the

current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not

constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion

unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or

antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. 

Id. The Court also held that extrajudicial sources are neither

necessary nor sufficient alone to warrant recusal on bias or

prejudice grounds. Id. at 554. 

We have described the extrajudicial source factor as involving “something other than rulings, opinions formed or statements made by the judge during the course of trial.” United

States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008). We have

provided an objective test for determining whether recusal is

required: “whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all

the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might

reasonably be questioned.” Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Court for

the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 428 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2005).

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We have also noted several factors that are ordinarily insufficient to require recusal including the following: 

[T]he mere fact that a judge has previously

expressed . . . a dedication to upholding the law or

a determination to impose severe punishment within

the limits of the law upon those found guilty of a

particular offense; [ ] prior rulings in the proceeding,

or another proceeding, solely because they were

adverse; [ ] mere familiarity with the defendant(s), or

the type of charge, or kind of defense presented.

Id. at 1178-79. 

[9] Judge Illston did not abuse her discretion in denying

the defendants’ motion to recuse Judge Alsup. Judge Alsup’s

dismissal of the defendants’ prior civil case, his order of sanctions against their attorney, his award of costs and fees to the

civil defendants, and his referral of the matter to the U.S.

Attorney’s Office were judicial actions that will not serve as

bases for recusal absent unusual circumstances not present

here. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Adverse findings do not equate

to bias. Nothing Judge Alsup did was outside of his official

duties or even shown to be erroneous in any way. Further, the

defendants’ civil attorney’s declaration filed under seal in

their civil case did not constitute an extrajudicial source

potentially prejudicing Judge Alsup; it was an event occurring

in the course of prior proceedings. Id. It was not an abuse of

discretion for Judge Ilston to conclude that Judge Alsup’s

prior rulings did not display a “deep-seated favoritism or

antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible,” id.,

or suggest that “his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).

IV. Jury Instructions

When a defendant has objected to a jury instruction at trial,

we review for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Harri9584 UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON

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son, 585 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2009). In formulating jury

instructions, the trial court is afforded “substantial latitude so

long as its instructions fairly and adequately cover the issues

presented.” United States v. Hicks, 217 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th

Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Johnson and

Heineman argue that Jury Instructions Eighteen and Nineteen

constituted findings of fact that were forced upon the jury and

consequently reduced the government’s burden of proof. Jury

Instruction Eighteen defined terms such as “note,” “deed of

trust,” “family trust,” and “mortgage.” It also explained the

legal obligations of lenders and borrowers when a loan is

made. Jury Instruction Nineteen stated that nothing in the

Uniform Commercial Code or other banking or accounting

laws would alter the legal principles contained in the other

instructions. 

[10] The court’s instructions were not findings of fact, as

the defendants now claim. The instructions were simply correct statements of the law and did not invade the province of

the jury or reduce the government’s burden of proof. See

Hicks, 217 F.3d at 1045-46.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ convictions are

AFFIRMED.

UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON 9585

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