Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01930/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01930-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Barry J. Jewell
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-1930

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Barry J. Jewell, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 11, 2010

Filed: July 30, 2010

___________

Before BYE, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Barry Jewell of aiding and abetting tax evasion in violation

of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The district court1

 sentenced him to thirty

months in prison and three years of supervised release, and imposed a $25,000 fine.

Jewell appeals his conviction on a number of grounds. We affirm.

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I

Jewell practiced tax law in Little Rock, Arkansas. Carl and Patricia Evans were

two of his clients. In 2000, Carl Evans and his corporation, Press Promotions, settled

a copyright infringement case for $3,000,000. Carl Evans personally received

$2,062,500 of the settlement and Press Promotions received $937,500. After

receiving the settlement offer but prior to accepting it, Carl Evans consulted Jewell

about the tax consequences of the settlement.

In order to reduce the couple's 2000 year tax liability, Jewell suggested a

scheme whereby Carl Evans purportedly arranged for a venture capital group – prior

to the settlement – to fund the copyright infringement suit in exchange for $250,000.

Evans would receive $250,000 even if he lost the suit, but if the suit was successful

the venture capital group would receive any amount above $250,000 in exchange for

funding the litigation and bearing the risk of an unsuccessful outcome. Jewell

suggested the transaction so that the Evanses would only have to report $250,000 in

income from the settlement on their 2000 tax return instead of the full amount actually

received. In truth, however, Carl Evans funded the lawsuit himself and the agreement

with the venture capital group never occurred.

To carry out the scheme, Jewell wrote a letter to Carl Evans describing the

fictitious agreement with the venture capitalists. Evans then gave a copy of the letter

to his accountant, who relied upon it when preparing the couple's 2000 tax return. To

hide the additional settlement money, Jewell created a corporation called MIN

Enterprises, Inc., and placed the money in a retirement account for MIN Enterprises.

Jewell forged and backdated documents to carry out the scheme. For example, Jewell

made it appear as if MIN had been created in February 1998, before the $3 million

settlement, even though MIN was actually created after the settlement in July 2000.

One document, backdated to February 1998, contained an Employer Identification

Number the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) did not issue until July 2000. The money

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Moser pleaded guilty to the mail fraud conspiracy, as well as to money

laundering charges originally brought against him in Michigan, and received a

sentence of 188 months in prison. Moser's case gained some notoriety when he fled

the country prior to his first scheduled plea hearing and was later captured in

Madagascar. 

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placed in the MIN retirement account was eventually transferred back to Carl Evans

in May 2002. As payment for his services, Jewell asked for an amount equal to

exactly 10% of the estimated "tax savings" which would result from the scheme, or

$102,565. Carl Evans negotiated a reduced fee of $62,000 and paid Jewell that

amount for his services.

On April 4, 2007, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Jewell

with aiding and abetting tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 and 18 U.S.C.

§ 2, for causing the filing of a false return for the tax year 2000 in the name of Carl

and Patricia Evans. The indictment also charged one count of conspiracy to commit

mail fraud and three counts of money laundering. These four additional counts arose

from the government's allegation that Jewell and his law partner, Bobby Keith Moser,

conspired from 1996 through August 2002 to use client trust funds to pay for the

general operating expenses of their law firm and Jewell's child support, and to invest

over $1 million in a technology firm called Scanning Technologies, Inc., without the

knowledge or approval of their clients.2

 The alleged mail fraud arose from Jewell and

Moser using the mails to solicit new and existing clients in order to keep client trust

accounts funded. The money laundering counts alleged Jewell engaged in monetary

transactions with property derived from client trust accounts. The government

dismissed the three money laundering charges during trial; the jury decided the mail

fraud conspiracy and tax evasion charges.

Carl Evans testified at trial, giving an account of the advice Jewell gave him

with respect to the fictitious venture capital agreement. The government also

introduced evidence regarding the forged and backdated documents Jewell created to

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carry out the scheme. In addition, the government called an IRS agent who explained

the difference between the taxes the Evanses actually paid and the amount they should

have paid resulted in a tax deficiency of $737,436 in the 2000 tax year.

The jury acquitted Jewell on the mail fraud conspiracy charge, but convicted

him of aiding and abetting tax evasion. This timely appeal followed in which Jewell

raises a number of issues challenging his conviction. Additional facts relevant to the

disposition of the issues Jewell raises on appeal will be discussed below.

II

A

First, Jewell claims the district court erred in admitting into evidence a video

deposition Jewell gave in a lawsuit between Piedmont Technologies and Scanning

Technologies, the company in which the government alleged Jewell invested using

funds from clients' trust accounts. At trial, Jewell objected to the introduction of the

videotape as unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

"We give deference to a district court's decision under the Rule 403 balancing test and

reverse only for a clear abuse of discretion." United States v. Guerrero-Cortez, 110

F.3d 647, 652 (8th Cir. 1997). On appeal, Jewell additionally contends the

introduction of the deposition violated his right to a fair trial, his right to remain silent,

and amounted to prosecutorial misconduct in violation of his due process rights.

Because these additional claims were not raised in the district court, we review them

for plain error only. United States v. Lomeli, 596 F.3d 496, 504 (8th Cir. 2010).

"Under the plain error standard, we will reverse the district court only if the error

prejudices the substantial rights of the defendant, and would result in a miscarriage of

justice." United States v. Jones, 266 F.3d 804, 814 (8th Cir. 2001).

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The government's introduction of the Piedmont videotape was not relevant to

the tax evasion charge; instead, the videotape related only to the mail fraud conspiracy

charge. During the deposition, Piedmont's attorney repeatedly asked Jewell for the

names of the clients whose money was used to invest in Scanning Technologies, and

Jewell repeatedly asserted the attorney-client privilege as the reason for refusing to

answer the question. The government introduced the videotape to attempt to prove

Jewell was inappropriately asserting the attorney-client privilege to avoid disclosing

his use of client trust account funds without his clients' knowledge.

As noted above, the jury acquitted Jewell of the mail fraud conspiracy charge

to which the videotape deposition related. In United States v. Apodaca, 666 F.2d 89

(5th Cir. 1982), the Fifth Circuit addressed a similar situation in which a defendant

alleged evidentiary error relating to the introduction of an exhibit relevant to acquitted

conduct. In Apodaca, the defendant was charged with both corporate income tax

evasion and personal income tax fraud. The jury convicted him of corporate income

tax evasion, but returned verdicts of not guilty on the three counts of personal income

tax fraud. Id. at 91. On appeal, he challenged the introduction of Exhibit 121, a

summary of his personal expenses. The Fifth Circuit found no error in the

introduction of the exhibit, stating "the defendant was acquitted on all charges related

to his personal income tax returns, and . . . we are convinced that there was no

reasonable possibility that any error in admitting Exhibit 121 contributed to Apodaca's

conviction [for corporate tax evasion]." Id. at 95-96.

Similarly, we fail to see how any alleged error in admitting the videotape

deposition contributed to Jewell's conviction for aiding and abetting tax evasion. The

videotape related only to the government's failed attempt to secure a conviction for

conspiracy to commit mail fraud, and the jury was instructed to consider each charge

separately. Cf. United States v. Lawson, 173 F.3d 666, 671 (8th Cir. 1999)

(concluding the defendant was not prejudiced by joinder of separate counts where the

"district court also specifically instructed the jury to consider each count and the

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Without Standard's knowledge, Jewell identified Standard as the administrator

for the MIN Enterprises retirement account in which he placed some of the copyright

infringement settlement funds. Fletcher was familiar with Standard's handwriting and

signature because the two were best friends.

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relating evidence separately" and "[n]othing in the record suggests that the jury could

not keep separate the relevant evidence to each count"). We conclude the district

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the videotape under Rule 403's

balancing test. In addition, we conclude the admission of the videotape did not

prejudice Jewell's substantial rights.

B

Jewell next claims the district court should have granted his request to strike the

testimony of witness Scott Fletcher. We review a district court's decision to admit or

exclude testimony for an abuse of discretion. Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 946

(8th Cir. 2010).

Fletcher was an attorney who practiced law with Jewell and Moser. He also

oversaw the firm's computer system. Fletcher testified regarding several documents

Jewell generated as part of the fictitious venture capital agreement, including the dates

the documents were created. Fletcher also gave his opinion that Jewell had forged the

signature of a man named Robert Standard on some documents,3

 and also testified that

Jewell admitted to forging Standard's signature on one occasion. Finally, Fletcher

testified regarding a conversation he had with Jewell after Fletcher met with

government agents from Michigan who were investigating Moser. Fletcher said he

encouraged Jewell to speak to the agents as well, and Jewell said he could not because

of what he had done with three clients, one of whom was Evans. The government

introduced this last conversation to show guilty knowledge on Jewell's part regarding

the tax advice he gave the Evanses.

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Fletcher's proffer letter provided that statements Fletcher made in a series of

meetings with the government could not be used against him in a subsequent

proceeding. The letter did not, however, provide Fletcher with formal statutory

immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6002.

5

The district court instructed the jury as follows:

Ladies and gentleman, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States provides a privilege against self-incrimination. A person

is entitled to invoke that privilege under certain circumstances if that

person has some concern that there might be a prosecution. The

invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination is not a confession,

it's not an admission of guilt, and should not be treated by you as such.

Trial Tr. at 997.

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Prior to trial, the government had given Fletcher informal limited immunity

pursuant to a proffer letter.4

 When defense counsel cross-examined Fletcher about

certain conduct, he invoked his Fifth Amendment right because the proffer letter did

not give him immunity from prosecution for conduct to which he might admit. Upon

Fletcher's first invocation of the Fifth Amendment, the district court excused the jury

and directed defense counsel to ask Fletcher all questions he intended to ask him that

might invoke the Fifth Amendment, to determine whether it would be appropriate to

allow the questions in front of the jury. After that occurred, defense counsel wanted

Fletcher to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights in the presence of the jury, and the

district court allowed that to happen, while at the same time giving the jury an

explanatory instruction.5

During Fletcher's redirect examination, defense counsel asked the district court

to strike all of Fletcher's testimony. He argued Fletcher's invocation of the Fifth

Amendment would lead the jury to infer Jewell was guilty because the questions

posed to Fletcher pertained in part to Jewell’s same alleged wrongful conduct.

Defense counsel also contended Fletcher's invocation of the Fifth Amendment unduly

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restricted his ability to cross-examine Fletcher on motive and bias. Finally, defense

counsel asked the district court to strike Fletcher's testimony on the grounds Fletcher

had volunteered non-responsive and prejudicial testimony during the crossexamination.

The district court refused to strike Fletcher's testimony. Instead, the district

court referred to the cautionary instruction it had given to protect Jewell from any

alleged guilt-by-association the jury may infer due to Fletcher's invocation of the Fifth

Amendment. The district court specifically noted Fletcher's invocation of the Fifth

Amendment was "done by agreement. And if that was the wrong way to do it, it was

done by error, but it was done by agreement." Trial Tr. at 1064. With respect to the

claim that Fletcher's testimony should be stricken because it was non-responsive and

prejudicial, the district court had sustained counsel's objections to non-responsive

answers at the time they were made, and instructed the jury to disregard the

statements.

We need not decide whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing

to strike Fletcher's testimony based on Fletcher's invocation of the Fifth Amendment

in front of the jury, because Jewell is estopped from making that argument. Under the

invited error doctrine, "[a]n erroneous ruling generally does not constitute reversible

error when it is invited by the same party who seeks on appeal to have the ruling

overturned." United States v. Wisecarver, 598 F.3d 982, 988 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Roth v. Homestake Mining Co., 74 F.3d 843, 845 (8th Cir. 1996)). "The doctrine of

invited error applies when 'the trial court announces its intention to embark on a

specific course of action and defense counsel specifically approves of that course of

action.'" United States v. Mahler, 141 F.3d 811, 815 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting United

States v. Ahmad, 974 F.2d 1163, 1165 (9th Cir. 1992)). Here, the district court

announced its intention to allow Jewell to have Fletcher invoke his Fifth Amendment

right in the presence of the jury, followed by the court's cautionary instruction. Jewell

agreed with that course of action. Having specifically requested that the district court

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permit Fletcher to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights in the presence of the jury,

Jewell may not now complain about Fletcher doing so.

In addition, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision not to

strike Fletcher's testimony based on Jewell's claim that some of Fletcher's crossexamination answers were non-responsive and allegedly prejudicial. Having

examined the transcript, we conclude the district court's course of action – sustaining

Jewell's objections and instructing the jury to disregard the non-responsive statements

– adequately cured any claimed prejudice arising from the non-responsive statements.

C

Jewell contends the district court improperly limited his ability to crossexamine Bobby Keith Moser. We review evidentiary rulings regarding the scope of

cross-examination for an abuse of discretion, except where the Sixth Amendment

confrontation clause is implicated, and then our review is de novo. United States v.

Ragland, 555 F.3d 706, 712 (8th Cir. 2009).

Moser was Jewell's law partner. He was charged with and convicted of three

separate criminal schemes, one of which involved the same mail fraud conspiracy

conduct for which Jewell was acquitted. At Jewell's trial, Moser testified for the

government primarily with respect to the mail fraud conspiracy charge. As relevant

to the tax evasion charge, Jewell claims his ability to cross-examine Moser was

unfairly limited in three respects.

First, defense counsel wanted, but was not allowed, to admit into evidence

Moser's plea agreement and some documents Moser gave to a grand jury in Michigan.

The documents were promissory notes Moser had prepared in the law firm that were

fraudulent. In the plea agreement, Moser admitted to having prepared the notes, but

the footers on the bottom showed the initials of other attorneys in the firm. The

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purported purpose of admitting the promissory notes and plea agreement was to show

that sometimes Moser used other attorneys' initials on fraudulent documents he

prepared. Jewell wanted to suggest the fraudulent documents used in the Evans tax

scheme were prepared by Moser using Jewell's initials, rather than by Jewell.

Carl Evans testified regarding Jewell's specific involvement in the scheme

regarding the fictitious venture capital agreement. He also testified that his knowledge

of Moser was limited to having met him once in the law firm's lobby. Thus, there was

no colorable factual basis for the theory that Moser, rather than Jewell, was

responsible for the creation of the letter explaining the fictitious venture capital

agreement. The district court did not err in limiting this line of cross-examination.

Next, defense counsel wanted to introduce the list of tax evasion crimes Moser

acknowledged committing while in the firm. The Evans tax evasion crime was not on

the list. Defense counsel claims he should have been allowed to admit the list to

demonstrate the magnitude of Moser's criminal activity to attack his credibility, and

to suggest to the jury that it was Moser, not Jewell, who handled the Evans

transaction.

Defense counsel thoroughly attacked Moser's credibility on many levels,

including his guilty pleas to numerous felonies (one of which was perjury), his lies to

law enforcement, and his flight to Madagascar to avoid jail. The district court did not

err in excluding the list from evidence, because admission of the list would only have

been cumulative evidence attacking Moser's credibility. See Ragland, 555 F.3d at 712

(affirming a district court's limitations on cumulative cross-examination which "would

have added only marginally to any impeachment of [a witness's] credibility"). In

addition, as noted above, there was no colorable factual basis for Jewell's theory that

Moser committed the Evans tax fraud scheme rather than Jewell, because Carl Evans

testified it was Jewell, not Moser, with whom he consulted on the Press Promotions

settlement and its tax consequences.

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Finally, Jewell claims his cross of Moser was unfairly limited regarding a

particular statement Moser made to law enforcement indicating the funds invested in

Scanning Technologies were law firm fees rather than stolen client trust fund money.

This statement pertains to the mail fraud conspiracy, and Jewell was acquitted of that

conduct. Thus, the only relevance of this line of questioning as it pertains to the tax

evasion charge would have been how the jury evaluated Moser's overall credibility.

Because defense counsel was able to thoroughly attack Moser's credibility, the district

court did not abuse its discretion or violate the Confrontation Clause by limiting cross

on this issue.

D

Jewell also contends the district court erred when it failed to order the

government to disclose the presentence report (PSR) and financial statement from

Bobby Keith Moser's criminal case. Jewell argues he was entitled to Moser's PSR and

financial statement in order to challenge Moser's credibility. We review a district

court's decision to provide or deny a criminal defendant access to another person's

PSR for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641, 672 (8th

Cir. 2008).

In the district court, Jewell brought a motion to require the government to

disclose Moser's PSR, or in the alternative, asking the district court to conduct an in

camera review of the PSR to determine whether it contained material which should

be disclosed. The district court denied the motion, relying in part upon United States

v. Molina, 356 F.3d 269 (2d Cir. 2004), which held "no in camera review of a

co-defendant's PSR is required without a threshold showing of a good faith belief that

a co-defendant's PSR contains exculpatory evidence not available elsewhere." Id. at

275. Our circuit has expressed a similar threshold "showing of special need" a

defendant must make to obtain another person's PSR. Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d at 672.

In Spotted Elk, "the district court found that [the defendant] . . . could obtain the

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necessary information about co-conspirators' offense characteristics, criminal history,

and sentences from publicly available sources." Id. In affirming the district court, we

found it was not an abuse of discretion to require a third party desiring information

about a defendant's sentencing proceedings to attend the sentencing hearing, nor was

it an abuse of discretion to require the third party to show that the publicly available

sources of information were not adequate for his purposes. Id. Jewell did not make

a showing of special need for Moser's PSR, and thus the district court did not abuse

its discretion in refusing to disclose the PSR or financial statement (or in declining to

conduct an in camera review of the documents).

E

Jewell claims the district court erred in admitting evidence we will refer to as

the Christian Missionary Fund (CMF) evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Federal

Rules of Evidence. We view Rule 404(b) as a rule of inclusion, United States v.

Wiley, 29 F.3d 345, 350 (8th Cir. 1994), and thus recognize the district court's broad

discretion in determining admissibility under the rule. United States v. Wagoner, 713

F.2d 1371, 1375 (8th Cir. 1983).

The district court allowed the government to introduce evidence of a separate

tax evasion scheme in which Jewell participated to establish his intent to engage in the

Evans tax evasion scheme. Moser created a nonprofit corporation called the Christian

Missionary Fund (CMF), to which both he and Jewell made contributions, claiming

the contributions were charitable for tax purposes. In reality, the payments made to

CMF were tuition payments for the two men's children, who attended private schools.

After the so-called charitable contributions were made to CMF, CMF would in turn

award "scholarships" for donors' children at the schools they attended. The

government argued this tax evasion scheme, which occurred during the same time

Jewell engaged in the Evans tax evasion scheme, was admissible as evidence of

Jewell's criminal intent to evade taxes.

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Other acts evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) if it is 1) relevant to

a material issue raised at trial, 2) similar in kind and close in time to the

crime charged, 3) supported by sufficient evidence to support a jury

finding the defendant committed the other act, and 4) its probative value

is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial value.

United States v. Johnson, 439 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2006).

The CMF evidence was relevant to Jewell's intent to engage in a tax evasion

scheme, was arguably similar to the Evans tax evasion scheme, and occurred during

the same time. Finally, there was sufficient evidence to show Jewell engaged in this

separate tax scheme, and the district court was within its discretion to determine the

probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect under

Rule 403. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to

admit evidence of the CMF tax evasion scheme.

Relatedly, Jewell contends the district court's admission of the CMF evidence

required the district court to grant his motion to sever the trial of the mail fraud

conspiracy count from the trial of the tax evasion count, because the CMF evidence

was only relevant to the tax evasion count. Jewell argues the CMF evidence

improperly spilled over to the jury's consideration of the mail fraud conspiracy. A

district court's denial of a severance motion will be reversed only if the denial resulted

in severe or compelling prejudice. United States v. Boyd, 180 F.3d 967, 981 (8th Cir.

1999). Jewell cannot show he was prejudiced by any alleged spillover, because the

jury acquitted him of the mail fraud conspiracy count. We therefore find no reversible

error arising from the district court's denial of Jewell's motion to sever.

F

Jewell next argues the district court erred when it denied his motion for a

judgment of acquittal on the tax evasion charge. We review this claim de novo.

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United States v. Street, 531 F.3d 703, 710 (8th Cir. 2008). "When judgment of

acquittal is sought on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence we view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the verdict and give the government the benefit of all

reasonable inferences that can logically be drawn from the evidence." Id. (citing

United States v. James, 172 F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir.1999)). "The standard of review

is very strict, and we will reverse a conviction only if we conclude that no reasonable

jury could have found the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States

v. Garcia, 521 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Beck, 496 F.3d

876, 879 (8th Cir. 2007)).

Jewell argues there was insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude there was

a tax deficiency involving the Evanses and thus no evidence Jewell intended to aid or

abet them in evading or defeating their taxes. We disagree. "The elements of tax

evasion are willfulness, the existence of a tax deficiency, and an affirmative act

constituting evasion or attempted evasion of the tax." United States v. Marston, 517

F.3d 996, 999 n.2 (8th Cir.2008). Evans testified at trial that Jewell concocted the

venture capital agreement as a means of significantly reducing the amount of personal

income tax reported by Carl and Patricia Evans in the tax year 2000. An IRS agent

testified the difference between the tax liability the Evanses actually paid in 2000 and

the amount they should have paid resulted in a tax deficiency of $737,436. This

evidence was clearly sufficient for a reasonable jury to have found the government

presented evidence to satisfy all three elements of aiding and abetting tax evasion.

See, e.g., United States v. Abodeely, 801 F.2d 1020, 1023 (8th Cir. 1986) (generally

outlining what the government has to prove to show a tax deficiency).

Jewell argues the evidence was insufficient because the IRS never made an

assessment of the tax deficiency for the Evanses for the tax year 2000. He relies on

a statement from United States v. Schoppert, 362 F.3d 451 (8th Cir. 2004), which says

"the taxes evaded must have been imposed by the Internal Revenue Code and owed

by the taxpayer." Id. at 456. Jewell wrongly equates a tax assessment with a tax

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Jewell also claims the evidence was insufficient because the admission of the

Evanses' 2000 tax return violated Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

Jewell contends a tax return is "testimonial" because it is signed by taxpayers under

penalty of perjury. The government offered the tax returns prior to trial as business

records, and Jewell did not object to them except as to relevancy, so we review this

claim for plain error only. We find no plain error. Because Carl Evans testified,

Jewell had an opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the tax returns. In addition, in

United States v. Garth, 540 F.3d 766 (8th Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds,

United States v. Villareal-Amarillas, 562 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 2009), we rejected the

argument that admission of tax returns, even as to non-testifying witnesses, violated

Crawford. Id. at 778 (noting Crawford did not consider business records to be

testimonial, and that the defendant stipulated the tax returns were business records).

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deficiency. "A tax deficiency exists from the date a return is due to be filed; that

deficiency arises by operation of law." United States v. Voorhies, 658 F.2d 710, 714

(9th Cir. 1981). Thus, there can be a tax deficiency without an assessment. United

States v. Bennett, 330 Fed. Appx. 686, 687 (9th Cir. 2009).

Jewell also claims he cannot be guilty of tax evasion because the Evanses

eventually paid their taxes. Jewell relies upon a case from the Ninth Circuit for the

proposition a defendant must intend a permanent escape from paying a tax and not

merely a postponement. See Edwards v. United States, 375 F.2d 862, 867 (9th Cir.

1967) ("[E]vasion and defeat . . . contemplate an escape from tax and not merely a

postponement of disclosure or payment."). The Eighth Circuit has not adopted such

a position, however, and the Ninth Circuit itself has limited Edwards to the unique

facts involved in that case, where there was no evidence at all of an intent to avoid

payment of taxes, but merely to delay. See United States v. Huebner, 48 F.3d 376,

380 (9th Cir. 1994) (indicating the escape not postponement "statement in Edwards

must be read in the light of the facts of that case."). The fact that the Evanses

eventually reconciled their tax deficiency with the IRS does not exonerate Jewell

where a reasonable jury could determine he had the intent to assist the Evanses with

evading taxes in the tax year 2000.6

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G

Jewell contends the jury instruction on the elements of aiding and abetting tax

evasion constructively amended the indictment from a charge of tax evasion (in

violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201) into a charge of filing a false tax return (in violation

of 26 U.S.C. § 7206). "In reviewing an appeal based on a claim of constructive

amendment, we consider whether . . . the jury instructions created a substantial

likelihood that the defendant was convicted of an uncharged offense." United States

v. Whirlwind Soldier, 499 F.3d 862, 870 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Final Instruction No. 16 contained the elements of aiding and abetting tax

evasion, which referred to the filing of a false tax return by the Evans as an act done

willfully by Jewell to evade or defeat a tax. The instruction listed the second element

of aiding and abetting tax evasion as follows: "Second, Barry Jewell voluntarily and

intentionally caused to be prepared, signed, and filed a false and fraudulent income

tax return for Carl Evans in an attempt to evade and defeat that additional tax." Jewell

claims the reference to a false tax return constructively amended the tax evasion

charge into a charge of filing a false tax return.

Jewell was charged with aiding and abetting tax evasion under 18 U.S.C. § 2.

As Final Instruction No. 16 indicated, one way Jewell could aid and abet tax evasion

was by causing the Evanses to file a false tax return in an attempt to evade or defeat

taxes. Consequently, the jury instruction did not create a substantial likelihood that

Jewell was convicted of an uncharged offense.

H

Next, Jewell contends the district court erred when it refused to order the

disclosure of certain interview memoranda and notes prepared by IRS agent Dan

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Elliott pursuant to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500. We review the district court's

ruling under the Jencks Act for clear error. United States v. Wright, 540 F.3d 833,

842 (8th Cir. 2008).

As relevant to the tax evasion charge, Elliott testified about the backdated

documents Jewell created to carry out the tax evasion scheme. Elliott also discussed

how he traced the $62,000 legal fee Evans paid Jewell for his services. After Elliott's

direct examination, the district court ordered the government to provide the court with

a list of all materials prepared by Elliott that had been disclosed pursuant to the Jencks

Act, as well as a list of all materials that had been withheld as non-Jencks Act

materials. Items on the second list included memoranda of witness interviews, one

memorandum of activity regarding a topic Elliott did not discuss during his direct

examination, and Elliott's handwritten notes of meetings with witnesses. The district

court concluded Elliott "did not, on direct examination, testify about what any of these

[witnesses] told him during the interviews. And so, I’m going to make this [list] a part

of the record, but under the cases that I've looked at, I don't think that it's Jencks Act

material. I think the Jencks Act material has been provided based on these two lists."

Trial Tr. at 1285-86.

Jewell relies upon Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959), and United

States v. New, 491 F.3d 369 (8th Cir. 2007), to argue Elliott's undisclosed memoranda

and field notes constitute statements under the Jencks Act. In Palermo, the Supreme

Court stated a purpose of the Jencks Act was to prevent "the undiscriminating

production of agent's summaries of interviews regardless of their character or

completeness." Palermo, 360 U.S. at 350. To allow the defense to use statements to

impeach a witness which could not fairly be said to be the witness's own statement

rather than the product of the investigator's selections, interpretations and

interpolations would be unfair. Once a witness has testified on direct examination, the

Jencks Act requires the production of "statements" which are in the government's

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7

Jewell also challenged the district court's exclusion of the testimony of several

defenses witnesses, purportedly offered to show Agent Elliott's bias as well as the bias

of the IRS auditors. This purported claim of bias was not developed on appeal,

however, and we therefore deem the argument waived. See Cubillos v. Holder, 565

F.3d 1054, 1058 n.7 (8th Cir. 2009) (deeming an argument not developed on appeal

to be waived).

-18-

possession "which relate to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified."

18 U.S.C. § 3500(b).

New is consistent with Palermo's application of the Jencks Act. New was

prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter after he lost control of a vehicle he was

driving while intoxicated, and his two passengers later died as a result of the crash.

The Bureau of Indian Affairs agent, Agent Bennett, conducted his investigation of the

incident and wrote a five-page case report "that sets forth actions that Bennett took on

the date of the accident and observations that he made at the scene of the accident."

New, 491 F.3d at 376. Bennett's report describing what he saw and what he did at the

crime scene related to his testimony on direct examination and therefore should have

been produced. See id.

Neither New nor Palermo compelled the government to hand over its entire case

file of interviews and notes or other materials as Jencks Act material. In New, the

entire contents of Bennett's case report constituted a "statement" which related to his

own testimony on direct examination about a discrete traffic accident. In contrast,

Elliott's notes and memoranda related to a number of witness interviews unrelated to

his testimony. Because Elliott's testimony focused on selected aspects of his

investigation, the government was only obligated to provide any "statement" made by

Elliott which "relate[d] to the subject matter" to which he testified. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3500(b), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3); Wright, 540 F.3d at 842. Because the information on

the government's list of non-Jencks Act material did not pertain to the subject matter

of Elliott's testimony, the trial court did not clearly err in refusing to order the

production of the material.7

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I

Jewell next argues the district court failed to conduct an in camera review of

certain interview and field notes prepared by government agents to determine whether

the material should have been disclosed pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963). We review the district court's decision not to conduct an in camera review of

alleged Brady material for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Price, 542 F.3d

617, 621 (8th Cir. 2008). Jewell's contention on this point fails because he did not

present anything other than speculation that the documents he wanted the district court

to inspect contained Brady material. See United States v. Pou, 953 F.2d 363, 366-67

(8th Cir. 1992) ("Mere speculation that a government file may contain Brady material

is not sufficient to require a remand for in camera inspection, much less reversal for

a new trial.") (citation omitted).

J

Jewell contends the district court erred when it refused to allow witness Ralph

Hamner to give an opinion about the truthfulness of another witness, Debra Duree,

pursuant to Rule 608(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. We review the district

court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under Rule 608(a) for an abuse of

discretion. United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 341 (8th Cir. 1986).

Duree was Jewell's ex-wife. She testified she had a meeting with Jewell in the

summer of 2002 when he admitted he might go to prison because of something he did

in his law firm, and she may receive some checks from him in the mail. Shortly after

the meeting, Duree said she received a check for almost $25,000 from Jewell with the

words "child support" written on the memo line of the check. Jewell called Ralph

Hamner, the attorney in Jewell's divorce, to ask him his opinion regarding Duree's

truthfulness (more specifically, her character for untruthfulness) under Rule 608(a).

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The government objected arguing Rule 608(a) only pertains to introduction of

evidence concerning the defendant's truthfulness or untruthfulness. The district court

sustained the objection.

Rule 608(a) states:

The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in

the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the

evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness,

and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the

character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or

reputation evidence or otherwise.

Rule 608(a) applies to all witnesses, not just a defendant. See, e.g., United

States v. Turning Bear, 357 F.3d 730, 734 (8th Cir. 2004). Jewell laid the proper

foundation for Hamner's knowledge of Duree's character for truthfulness or

untruthfulness. The district court therefore abused its discretion when it refused to

allow Hamner to give his opinion.

Given the strength of the government's case against Jewell for aiding and

abetting tax evasion, however, we conclude the error was harmless and does not

warrant a reversal of the conviction. See United States v. Langley, 549 F.3d 726, 729

(8th Cir. 2008) (indicating improper evidentiary rulings require a conviction to be

reversed only when they affect a defendant's substantial rights or have more than a

slight effect on the verdict). Carl Evans testified about the fictitious venture capital

scheme Jewell created to reduce the Evanses' tax liability in the year 2000, other

government witnesses explained how Jewell created backdated and forged documents

to carry out the scheme, and an IRS agent testified the scheme resulted in a tax

deficiency of $737,436. After reviewing the record, we are confident the district

court's refusal to allow Hamner to give an opinion about Duree's untruthfulness was

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harmless because it "did not influence or had only a slight influence on the verdict."

United States v. Carroll, 207 F.3d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 2000).

K

Jewell claims the district court erred in denying his request for certain jury

instructions. We review the district court's refusal to give a defendant's proposed

instructions for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Meads, 479 F.3d 598, 601

(8th Cir. 2007).

Jewell requested several instructions which the district court declined to give,

namely, (1) a jury instruction augmenting the definition of "intent to evade and defeat

a tax," (2) a jury instruction relating to the level of intent required under 26 U.S.C.

§ 7201, (3) an instruction concerning a taxpayer's right to decrease or avoid taxes, (4)

a jury instruction on good faith, and (5) a jury instruction regarding the testimony of

witnesses who had committed perjury. Jewell's claim of instructional error fails

because, even assuming Jewell's requested instructions were accurate statements of

the law (a point disputed by the government), the jury instructions given by the district

court correctly and adequately stated the applicable law. See United States v.

Anderson, 533 F.3d 623, 632 (8th Cir. 2008) (indicating a defendant is not entitled to

a particularly worded instruction as long as the instructions as a whole correctly state

the law).

L

Jewell next argues certain remarks during the prosecutor's closing arguments

were improper and so prejudicial they deprived him of his right to a fair trial.

Significantly, Jewell made no contemporaneous objections to the remarks to allow the

district court to take curative action it might have deemed appropriate. As a result, our

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review is limited to plain error review. United States v. Aleman, 548 F.3d 1158, 1167

(8th Cir. 2008).

During the closing argument, the prosecutor suggested the jury could infer

Jewell's consciousness of guilt from the fact that Jewell's defense attorney contacted

Carl Evans about the 2000 tax return over a year before any law enforcement officers

contacted Evans. The prosecutor's complete remark was as follows:

You heard Mr. Evans testify, I asked Mr. Evans, When is the first time

you thought there was a problem, any problem at all with the tax

planning Mr. Jewell did for you? And he said, Well, I got a call from [the

defense attorney]. And how far before any contact with law enforcement

was that? It was over a year. Over a year before any investigator, any

law enforcement officer calls Carl Evans because there might be a

problem, [the defense attorney] contacts Carl Evans.

Trial Tr. at 1941. Jewell argues the prosecutor improperly suggested Jewell conspired

with his attorney to influence Evans's cooperation with authorities. We disagree. The

prosecutor never suggested defense counsel did anything improper by contacting

Evans. Nor did the prosecutor ever suggest Jewell and his attorney conspired to

influence Evans's testimony. The prosecutor's comment did not prejudice Jewell's

right to a fair trial.

Jewell further contends the prosecutor made several allegedly disparaging

comments about defense counsel during rebuttal that were so prejudicial Jewell's

conviction must be overturned. At one point, the prosecutor said "I heard [defense

counsel] talking out of both sides of his mouth." Trial Tr. at 2022. This comment

referred to the fact that Jewell presented two alternative theories of defense to the mail

fraud conspiracy charge – the first theory was that all the client trust account funds

invested in Scanning Technologies were legitimate; the alternative theory was that if

the investments were not legitimate, Moser was the person responsible for the

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wrongdoing, not Jewell. At another point, in referring to the first of those alternative

theories of defense (i.e., the investments were legitimate), the prosecutor said "[s]ome

people call it the classic smoke and mirrors defense[.]" Id. at 2023. The prosecutor

made two other "smoke and mirror" comments, both in reference to aspects of the mail

fraud conspiracy charge rather than the tax evasion charge. Id. at 2023, 2026. Finally,

at one point, the prosecutor said:

Now, I submit that [defense counsel] misstated one piece of evidence.

And you are the triers of fact. You decide at the end of the day what is

the reality and what are the facts, absolutely. So if anything I say is not

consistent with your memory, your memory goes. But let me just

suggest to you that perhaps you were misled on a few issues.

Id. at 2023-24. The prosecutor then discussed three of defense counsel's arguments,

all of which related to the charge for mail fraud conspiracy rather than the tax evasion

charge, and expressed her disagreement with defense counsel's view of the evidence.

Id. at 2024-26.

Jewell argues these remarks are "nearly identical" to an argument held improper

in United States v. Holmes, 413 F.3d 770 (8th Cir. 2005). The remarks in Holmes

were summarized as follows: 

"Mr. Moss is a good defense attorney, tries to get you to focus your

attention over here when what really is important is right in front of you.

It's all smoke and mirrors." (Mr. Moss was Mr. Holmes's trial counsel.)

The district court overruled Mr. Holmes's objection that this comment

was "improper." The government continued to make similar comments

about Mr. Moss later in its rebuttal argument, stating that "Mr. Moss

wants to distract you and tell you about all this other evidence that's not

important," and that issues that Mr. Moss had raised about who had

owned the gun in question were a "red herring." The government also

commented that "Mr. Moss needs to make sure that they get their stories

straight" ("they" presumably referred to Mr. Moss and Mr. Holmes), and

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that the jury should "look at Mr. Moss's story. That's why I said he's got

to get his stories straight."

Id. at 775. The court found the argument improper because the "various comments

referring personally to Mr. Moss and the necessity for Mr. Moss to 'get his stories

straight,' taken as a whole and in the context of the rebuttal argument, show that the

government attorney was accusing defense counsel of conspiring with the defendant

to fabricate testimony." Id.

We disagree the comments in this case were similar to those found prejudicial

in Holmes. First, there is no indication the prosecutor was accusing defense counsel

of conspiring with Jewell to fabricate testimony. Here the "smoke and mirror"

comments referred to the prosecutor's view of the strength of the theory of defense,

and did not suggest fabrication of testimony. Similarly, the comments about

misstating evidence and the jury being misled did not accuse defense counsel of

fabricating evidence, but rather expressed the prosecutor's disagreement with defense

counsel's view of certain items of evidence. It is not improper for the government to

comment on its interpretation of the evidence. United States v. Woods, 696 F.2d 566,

571 (8th Cir. 1982). In addition, the prosecutor contemporaneously reminded the

jurors "[y]ou decide at the end of the day what is the reality and what are the facts,

absolutely. So if anything I say is not consistent with your memory, your memory

goes." Second, the prosecutor's allegedly prejudicial comments all related to the mail

fraud conspiracy charge. We fail to see how comments relating solely to the mail

fraud evidence, even if improper, caused Jewell any prejudice when the jury acquitted

him of that conduct.

In addition, our review in Holmes was not limited to plain error review because

the improper comments were objected to at trial, and the Holmes court found the

prosecutor's remarks warranted a reversal only after determining the jury's verdict

could have been affected by "the exclusion of admissible testimony and the relative

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weakness of the government's case[.]" Holmes, 413 F.3d at 775. Here, the

government's case against Jewell was relatively strong, and we have not identified any

improperly excluded testimony that may have affected the jury's verdict. Reviewing

for plain error, we do not find any basis for reversing Jewell's conviction due to the

prosecutor's closing arguments.

M

Jewell next contends the cumulative effect of trial errors denied him a fair trial.

We will not overturn a conviction based upon the cumulative effect of trial errors

unless there is substantial prejudice to the defendant. United States v. Anwar, 428

F.3d 1102, 1115 (8th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Steffen, 641 F.2d 591,598

(8th Cir. 1981). Jewell, however, has not shown any prejudice resulted from trial

errors, let alone substantial prejudice. The only trial error we have identified was the

district court's failure to allow witness Hamner to give an opinion regarding witness

Duree's character for untruthfulness, and we held the error was harmless because our

review of the record as a whole indicated it did not affect the jury's verdict. Thus,

there is no basis for overturning Jewell's conviction due to the cumulative effect of

trial errors.

N

Finally, Jewell contends the district court erred when it denied his motion for

a new trial. We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of

discretion. United States v. Dittrich, 204 F.3d 819, 821 (8th Cir. 2000).

Jewell's new trial motion rested on two grounds. First, Jewell claimed the

government committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence.

The allegedly exculpatory evidence was a government interview with Dr. Edwin Bird,

a client of both Jewell's and Moser's, who along with both men participated in the

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CMF fund (whereby participants paid for their children's private tuition under the

guise of scholarships and claimed tax deductions for charitable contributions). In

support of the new trial motion, Bird submitted an affidavit about a phone

conversation he had with "an individual claiming to be an FBI agent" sometime in

2008. During the phone call, Bird was asked "whether my involvement with the fund

involved Keith Moser or Barry Jewell" and he stated the fund "was Moser's deal and

not Jewell's." Jewell contends this evidence was exculpatory as to the government's

claim Jewell had the intent to evade taxes.

Second, Jewell argued he was entitled to a new trial because of newly

discovered evidence. After the verdict against Jewell, a former client of Fletcher's

came forward with a tape-recorded conversation he had with Fletcher on October 27,

2006, which shows Fletcher had animosity towards Jewell. Jewell claimed this new

evidence of Fletcher's animosity probably would result in an acquittal upon retrial.

See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 479 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 2007) (setting forth the

four factors a defendant must prove in order to receive a new trial based on newly

discovered evidence, which includes showing the new evidence probably will result

in an acquittal upon retrial).

We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion

for a new trial. With respect to the alleged Brady violation, the government's CMF

evidence showed Jewell, like Bird, participated in the CMF fund, and thus evidence

suggesting the fund "was Moser's deal and not Jewell's" (i.e., that Moser incorporated

and controlled CMF) would not have negated the government's claim that Jewell

participated in the fund. The district court observed that disclosure of Bird's statement

would not have changed the outcome of the trial, and we agree. See United States v.

Parker, 267 F.3d 839, 846 (8th Cir. 2001) (setting forth the factors a defendant must

establish to prove a Brady violation, which includes showing "a reasonable probability

that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding

would have been different"). With respect to the new evidence of Fletcher's

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animosity, we agree with the district court's observation that such evidence would

only confirm what was already proven at trial, i.e., that Fletcher had animosity

towards Jewell, but would add nothing new. See Baker, 479 F.3d at 579 (generally

indicating newly discovered evidence offered merely to impeach a witness's testimony

is insufficient to warrant a new trial); United States v. Johnson, 450 F.3d 366, 373 (8th

Cir. 2006) (same).

III

We affirm the judgment of conviction.

______________________________

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