Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00636/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00636-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nathan Cagle
Petitioner
Theresa Schwartz
Respondent

Document Text:

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NATHAN CAGLE,

Petitioner, No. CIV-S-04-0636 LKK KJM P 

vs.

THERESA SCHWARTZ, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges several convictions he sustained in

the Superior Court of Yolo County in 2002, on two separate grounds. Respondents filed an

answer on December 8, 2004. 

I. Background 

After plaintiff was convicted and sentenced in the Superior Court of Yolo County, 

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal. Answer, Ex. 1. In its decision affirming

petitioner’s convictions and sentence, the Court of Appeal summarized the trial court

proceedings and the evidence presented at trial as follows:

Defendant Nathan Cagle was convicted on various charges,

including embezzlement, grand theft, extortion, and stalking,

stemming from his association with two women with whom he had

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a romantic relationship. . .

Carol Weinmann owned a stained glass and upholstery shop (Kat’s

Custom Upholstery) in Woodland, California. She had been in

business approximately seven years when defendant entered her

shop to look around while he was having his car repaired. They

quickly began dating, and soon became intimate. 

Defendant told Weinmann he was active in the Native American

community. He referred to himself as Windwalker. He did Native

American artwork, and made Weinmann a ceremonial Native

American wedding dress. He told Weinmann they would grow old

together.

Defendant eventually began to do his artwork in Weinmann’s shop. 

Defendant offered to do things to help Weinmann around the shop. 

She taught defendant how to take bids for her. He did more and

more things for her around the shop, and she did things for him as

well. They helped each other out, but defendant was not

Weinmann’s employee.

Defendant was unemployed at the time, so Weinmann loaned

defendant money to purchase a car and car stereo. Defendant only

paid back $50 of the approximately $2,040 he owed her for the car

and stereo.

In January 1998 defendant opened a car detailing business next to

Weinmann’s shop. Weinmann purchased the business license and

the first stock of supplies for defendant. Defendant’s shop and

Weinmann’s were connected by a metal roll top door that could be

locked only from defendant’s side. Weinmann’s shop was

protected by an alarm. Weinmann gave defendant the access code

to the alarm.

After defendant opened his business he did not spend as much time

at Weinmann’s shop, although he continued to help her out. She

also helped him by detailing cars with him. 

Defendant started making significant business decisions for

Weinmann’s business, even though she did not give him

permission to do so. Around March 1998, defendant took an order

for an upholstering job from Willibaldo Rodriguez. Defendant

quoted Rodriguez $537.94 for the job, but only charged Rodriguez

$300. Weinmann and her employees did the upholstery work. 

Defendant gave Weinmann $200 and told her Rodriguez would pay

the rest later. Rodriguez paid the remaining $100, but Weinmann

never received it.

In another incident Weinmann prepared an estimate for work to be

done on a boat by James Canady. Defendant gave the bid to

Canady, but Weinmann did the work. The bid was for $2,970.93. 

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Canady paid $500 up front and tendered a gift certificate for $200. 

Weinmann only received $2,170.93 of the remaining $2,270.93,

even though Canady paid the full amount.

In another incident Polly Nelson came to Weinmann to repair the

broken stained glass on her front door. Nelson contracted

separately with defendant to remove and re-install the door. 

Weinmann quoted Nelson $1,435 to do the glass work, with the

understanding she would be paid by Nelson’s insurance company. 

Weinmann never received the money from the insurance company. 

The insurance company sent the checks for Weinmann’s work to

defendant and defendant cashed them. The checks were made out

to “Nathan Deon, Doing Business as Kat’s Custom Upholstery,”

and “Nathan Deon, Doing Business as Kat’s Stained Glass[.]” 

Defendant told the claims adjuster the drafts should be made out to

him because he owned the business.

On March 13, 1998, Weinmann discovered defendant had received

an e-mail from a woman named Caroline, indicating defendant had

spent the previous evening with Caroline. Weinmann confronted

defendant and “told him to pack up his beads and feathers and

leave.” Weinmann had the locks and the alarm code changed in

her shop. 

Weinmann felt she needed to get away so she went to Clear Lake

for the weekend. When she returned to her shop on Monday, she

found defendant in her shop. He bragged to her that he had

convinced the police and the alarm company he was supposed to be

there. Defendant told Weinmann if she wanted him out of her life,

“then I am going to sue you. I’m going to ruin you in this town. 

I’m going to see my attorney. . . . Oh, by the way, how much fire

insurance do you have on this place?” He then demanded she put

him on her payroll and paid [sic] him $400 per week until June 10,

1998. 

After this incident Weinmann started to notice money was missing

from the shop. To test defendant, she put a check in her desk

drawer, and when she came in the next morning the check was

gone. She stopped payment on the check. A few days later, on

June 10, defendant told her he could not work for her anymore.

On June 12, 1998, defendant sent Weinmann a letter demanding

$10,400. Weinmann turned the letter over to the police. 

Defendant called Weinmann twice demanding the money.

Defendant began following Weinmann around town. He gave her

“evil” looks and glared at her. She felt threatened by him and did

not believe her encounters with him occurred by chance. She also

began receiving hang-up phone calls. Finally, in September she

got a restraining order against defendant. 

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Weinmann’s property started disappearing during the time

defendant was in her life, and she stopped noticing property was

missing after he was gone. She made a list of items he took. The

total value of the missing items was $11,455.88.

Brenda Klein met defendant in June 1998. They soon began dating

and became intimate. On July 31, 1998, defendant called Klein

and told her he was being arrested for violation of probation. Klein

loaned defendant $3,200 to hire an attorney. She also allowed him

to stay with her to avoid going to jail. She accepted third party

custody of him, and he lived with her for a period of about nine

weeks.

Klein had her own business selling credit card equipment and debit

machines. Klein hired defendant as an independent contractor in

her business because he needed a job for probation. Defendant

charged Klein for some business cards without her permission. 

Klein also agreed to co-sign a contract for defendant to get a

cellular phone. She later found out the phone bill was in her name. 

Klein paid approximately $2,000 for defendant’s phone charges.

Klein noticed things like tools, jewelry, and coins turned up

missing while defendant was staying with her. Klein estimated the

missing items had a value of around $1,159.

The jury convicted defendant of embezzlement based on the money

defendant took from Weinmann on the Rodriguez, Canady, and

Nelson jobs. He was convicted of check fraud based on

possession of one of the checks from Nelson’s insurance company. 

He was convicted of two counts of grand theft based on the

personal property taken from Weinmann and Klein. He was found

guilty of diversion of construction funds based on the Nelson job. 

The jury found him guilty of one count of extortion based on his

demand to be on Weinmann’s payroll, and guilty of stalking

against Weinmann. He was found guilty of two counts of grand

theft by false pretenses, one against Weinmann and one against

Klein.

The jury found defendant not guilty of extortion of the $10,400

from Weinmann. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on one

count of check fraud and the burglary charge.

The trial court sentenced defendant to a total of nine years in

prison.

 

Answer, Ex. 4 at 1-6.

Petitioner filed a petition for review challenging the Court of Appeal’s order

affirming petitioner’s convictions and sentences. Answer, Ex. 5. The petition was denied. Id.,

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 In Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 1

held in a § 2254 action that “any independent opinions we offer on the merits of constitutional

claims will have no determinative effect in the case before us . . . At best, it is constitutional

dicta.” However, to the extent Bell stands for the proposition that a § 2254 petitioner may obtain

relief simply by showing that § 2254(d) does not preclude his claim, this court disagrees. Title

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) still requires that a habeas petitioner show that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution before he or she may obtain habeas relief. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71;

Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 773-75. 

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Ex. 6. Only the Court of Appeal issued a reasoned opinion with respect to any of the claims

brought before this court. Id., Ex. 4. 

II. Habeas Corpus Standard

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Also, federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any 

claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the

claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (referenced herein in as “§ 2254(d)” or “AEDPA). See Ramirez v. Castro,

365 F.3d 755, 773-75 (9th Cir. 2004) (Ninth Circuit affirmed lower court’s grant of habeas relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after determining that petitioner was in custody in violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights and that § 2254(d) does not preclude relief); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003) (Supreme Court found relief precluded under § 2254(d) and therefore did

not address the merits of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim). Courts are not required to 1

address the merits of a particular claim, but may simply deny a habeas application on the ground

that relief is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (overruling Van Tran v.

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2000) in which the Ninth Circuit required district

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courts to review state court decisions for error before determining whether relief is precluded by

§ 2254(d)). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show that he is not precluded from obtaining

relief by § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). 

The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1) are

different. As the Supreme Court has explained:

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to”

clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing

law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we

have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court

may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the

state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from

our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court does not apply a rule different from the

law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or unreasonably apply such law if the state court simply

fails to cite or fails to indicate an awareness of federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002). 

This court will look to the last reasoned state court decision in determining

whether the law applied to a particular claim by the state courts was contrary to the law set forth

in the cases of the United States Supreme Court or whether an unreasonable application of such

law has occurred. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. dismissed, 538 U.S.

919 (2003). Where the state court fails to give any reasoning whatsoever in support of the denial

of a claim arising under Constitutional or federal law, the Ninth Circuit has held that this court

must perform an “independent review of the record to ascertain whether the state court decision

was objectively unreasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). In other

words, the court assumes the state-court applied the correct law, and analyzes whether the

decision of the state court was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that law. 

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It is appropriate to look to lower federal court decisions to determine what law has

been "clearly established" by the Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular

application of that law. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 1999).

III. Arguments And Analysis

A. Peremptory Challenges 

Petitioner’s first claim is that the prosecution violated plaintiff’s constitutional

rights by exercising peremptory challenges on two jurors because of their race. Pet. at 24-27. 

Purposeful discrimination on the basis of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges violates

the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,

89 (1986); Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005). So-called Batson claims are evaluated

using a three-step test:

First, the movant must make a prima facie showing that the

prosecution has engaged in the discriminatory use of a peremptory

challenge by demonstrating that the circumstances raise “an

inference that the prosecutor used [the challenge] to exclude

veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.” [Citation

omitted.] Second, if the trial court determines a prima facie case

has been established, the burden shifts to the prosecution to

articulate a [gender]-neutral explanation for challenging the juror

in question. [Citation omitted.] Third, if the prosecution provides

such an explanation, the trial court must then rule whether the

movant has carried his or her burden of proving the existence of

purposeful discrimination.

Tolbert v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 985, 987-88 (9th Cir. 1999). The burden of persuasion regarding

discriminatory motivation “rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.’” Yee v.

Duncan, 463 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995)). 

The California Court of Appeal addressed petitioner’s Batson claims as follows: 

Two of the potential jurors claimed Native American Heritage. 

Another was Hispanic. One Native American, Lopez, was

dismissed after the prosecutor’s challenge for cause. The other

Native American, Vigil, and the Hispanic, Macias, were dismissed

after peremptory challenges.

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 Petitioner's counsel challenged the peremptory strikes pursuant to People v. Wheeler, 2

22 Cal.3d 258 (1978), which prohibits, under the California Constitution, the use of racially

motivated peremptory challenges. Id. at 276-77. A Wheeler motion serves as an implicit

objection under Batson. People v. Yeoman, 31 Cal.4th 93, 117 (2003). 

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Macias was excused before the jury was sworn, but Vigil was

excused after the jury had been sworn and before the alternate

jurors were sworn. After the peremptory challenge to Vigil,

defendant asked to reserve a motion pursuant to People v. Wheeler,

supra.

Defendant’s Wheeler motion, did not dispute the for cause

2

challenge of Lopez, noting Lopez stated he felt he would be biased

in favor of a Native American. The motion disputed the

peremptory challenges of Vigil and Macias.

a. Prospective Juror Vigil

The trial court found defendant had made a prima facie case of

discrimination as to Vigil, and asked the prosecutor for a

justification of his challenge to Vigil. 

The prosecutor stated he was concerned about Vigil because she

said at first she might be partial. When the court asked her if she

would be thinking about things similar to Lopez’s concern, she

responded that she would. In the prosecutor’s mind, Lopez was a

clear cut motion to excuse for cause. Vigil said she would not hold

the District Attorney to a higher standard than the defense, but the

prosecutor said he thought she seemed uncomfortable answering

the question.

In ruling on the motion the trial court stated Vigil had expressed

her feelings in such a way “that raised in my mind a question of her

ability to allow the People to start from a neutral point, that is,

taking into account the presumption of innocence, but letting the

People start from that point that the law allows them to. And her

responses to those questions at first, they way she stated it, really

came across like she was having some doubts about that.” The

trial court expressed it would have exercised a peremptory to

excuse Vigil, had it been prosecuting the case, even if Vigil had not

been Native American.

We review a trial court’s ruling on a Wheeler motion with

considerable deference because such motions call upon a trial

court’s personal observations. (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th

1132, 1155.) We affirm a denial of a Wheeler motion if the record

contains grounds that would have made a peremptory challenge of

a juror in question reasonable. (Ibid.)

/////

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In the present case, the trial court made a “sincere and reasoned

attempt” to evaluate the prosecutor’s reasons for challenging Vigil,

and the record contains reasonable grounds for the challenge. 

(People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 386.) The trial court did

not err in denying the Wheeler motion as to Vigil.

b. Prospective Juror Macias

Defendant asserts in his opening brief, without citation to the

record, that the trial court found the Wheeler motion untimely as to

Lopez, and that the trial court erred by failing to find a prima facie

case as to Lopez. The record does not bear out either of these

assertions. Defendant asserts in his reply brief that these are

arguments he meant to make with respect to prospective juror

Macias, not Lopez. We accept defendant’s claim he mistakenly

used Lopez’s name when making these arguments, since the

arguments are applicable to Macias and have no factual foundation

as to Lopez.

A Wheeler motion is timely if it is made before jury empanelment

is completed. (People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 969;

People v. Gore (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 692, 703.) Where the trial

is to be heard with alternate jurors, jury empanelment is not

complete until the alternates are selected and sworn. (People v.

McDermott, supra, at p. 969; In re Mendes (1979) 23 Cal.3d 847,

853; People v. Rodriguez (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1023.) The

trial court thus erred when it ruled the Wheeler motion was

untimely as to prospective juror Macias. (People v. Rodriguez,

supra, at p. 1023.)

We nevertheless find the error harmless because defendant failed

to make a prima facie showing of discrimination. There exists a

presumption “that a party exercising a peremptory challenge is

doing so on a constitutionally permissible ground.” (People v.

Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 278.) The presumption may be

rebutted by a prima facie showing of discrimination. (Id. at p.

280.)

To make a prima facie showing, a defendant must make a complete

record, establish that the excluded persons are members of a

cognizable group, and show from the circumstances of the case

that the person is being challenged because of his or her group

association. (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280.) A

sufficient prima facie showing is made where the defendant shows,

“that his opponent has struck most or all of the members of the

identified group from the venire, or has used a disproportionate

number of his peremptories against the group. He may also

demonstrate that the jurors in question share only this one

characteristic – their membership in the group – and that in all

other respects they are as heterogeneous as the community as a

whole. Next, the showing may be supplemented when appropriate

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by such circumstances as the failure of his opponent to engage

these same jurors in more than desultory voir dire, or indeed to ask

them any questions at all. Lastly, . . . the defendant need not be a

member of the excluded group in order to complain of a violation

of the representative cross-section rule; yet if he is, and especially

if in addition his alleged victim is a member of the group to which

the majority of the remaining jurors belong, these facts, may also

be called to the court’s attention.” (People v. Wheeler, supra, at

pp. 280-281, fn. omitted.)

Here, defendant’s sole showing with respect to Macias was that

Macias was “not Native American [but] was a minority whose

answers . . . did not seem to raise a[n] identifiable problem with the

People, other than being young and Hispanic. I don’t recall him

saying anything that would cause one concern.”

Additionally, unlike People v. Gore, supra, there was no “prima

facie pattern of systemic exclusion[.]” (People v. Gore, supra, 18

Cal.App.4th at p. 705.) In Gore, the prosecutor peremptorily

excused the only four prospective Hispanic jurors before the panel

of 12 jurors was sworn. (Id. at p. 697.) When the alternate jurors

were called for selection, the prosecutor immediately used the first

peremptory challenges to excuse the only three Hispanic

prospective alternate jurors. (Ibid.) Only then did it become

apparent that the prosecutor systemically had excluded every

Hispanic juror.

In the present case, the exclusion of one other person of an

identifiable group does not show a pattern of systematic exclusion. 

The defense counsel stated during the hearing on the motion that

he believed the jury was “primarily, if not entirely, Caucasian.” 

However, there was no evidence the prosecutor systematically

challenged all persons of color. 

The exclusion of one Hispanic, in addition to one Native

American, without more, is insufficient to show a prima facie

pattern of discrimination, and is not enough to overcome the

presumption that the prosecutor exercised his peremptory

challenges in a constitutional manner. (People v. Turner (1994) 8

Cal.4th 137, 165, 168 citing to People v. Rousseau (1982) 129

Cal.App.3d 526, 536-537 “[defense counsel’s statement that ‘there

were only two [B]lacks on the whole panel, and they were both

challenged by the district attorney” fails to establish a prima facie

case.]”.) 

Answer, Ex. 4 at 6-11.

As noted above, it is petitioner’s burden to establish that he is not precluded from

obtaining habeas relief by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner has not met this burden because he

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has not shown that the last state court opinion addressing his claim was flawed in the manner

required under § 2254(d). In fact, petitioner fails to make any argument concerning the Court of

Appeal’s opinion regarding petitioner’s Batson claim. See Pet. at 26-27. 

In any case, the record before this court does not suggest that the Court of

Appeal’s decision was flawed to the extent that this court could grant relief. The state appellate

court applied the standard found in Batson to petitioner’s claim of discrimination in the selection

of jurors and the court did not apply the standard in a manner that is inconsistent in any respect

with any Supreme Court precedent. Also, there is nothing in the record before this court

indicating that the Court of Appeal’s decision that petitioner did not state a prima facie case of

discrimination as to the use of a peremptory challenge against Macias, and that there were

reasonable grounds to challenge Vigil, was based upon an unreasonable determination of the

facts. Findings of fact made by state courts are presumed correct and petitioner has the burden of

rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner

here has not rebutted the presumption of correctness.

For all the foregoing reasons, petitioner’s claim that the prosecution exercised

peremptory challenges against two jurors in violation of the Constitution must be rejected.

B. Prior Convictions 

Petitioner’s second claim concerns evidence presented at trial indicating petitioner

had several prior convictions; he claims the evidence was “irrelevant” and cumulatively

prejudicial. Pet. at 28-35. The California Court of Appeal addressed this claim as follows:

Defendant did not testify at trial. However, he offered evidence of

several of his out of court statements that, if believed by the jury,

supported his theory of defense, i.e., that the complaining

witnesses were merely scorned women seeking to retaliate by their

complaints to police.

With the testimony of Kathleen Morrow defendant sought to cast

doubt on Weinmann’s testimony that their relationship was

primarily personal and intimate, and that defendant was not her

business partner and did not work for her as an employee. Morrow

testified defendant told her Weinmann wanted to have a sexual

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relationship with him, and defendant discussed with Morrow

whether Weinmann was sexually harassing him. Defendant told

Morrow he quit his job with Weinmann because Weinmann was

sexually harassing him and because she had called him in for a

business meeting and was waiting in the office naked.

Defendant also called James Willis to testify defendant told him he

owned the upholstery shop. Defendant called Richard Durrenberg

to testify defendant told him Weinmann wanted to have an affair

with defendant, but that Weinmann was a “skag” and he was not

attracted to her.

Defendant sought to cast doubt on Klein’s testimony by depicting

her as a drunk, angry woman who was out to get him. Durrenberg

testified defendant told him he was frustrated with his situation

with Klein, and that Klein was always drunk. He wanted out of the

relationship because Klein was drunk all the time. Kathy Morrow

testified defendant asked her to accompany him to Klein’s house

because he was concerned about Klein’s temper and wanted a

witness in case Klein attacked him or lied about him. 

[Fn1]

__________________________________

 Defendant asserts these hearsay statements were

[Fn1]

admitted for the purpose of showing his state of mind and

emotional attitude. As we expressed at oral argument, defendant’s

state of mind as it related to his conduct was not an issue. In any

event, the statements were admitted for all purposes, the

prosecution was entitled to impeach their credibility.

The prosecutor made a motion to impeach defendant’s hearsay

statements pursuant to People v. Jaccobs (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th

1444, hereinafter Jacobs. The trial court granted the motion and

read a stipulation to the jury that defendant had been convicted of

five felonies: “1975, transportation of a controlled substance; 1986,

theft; 1990 theft; 1996, forgery; 1996, sale of migratory bird parts.”

The trial court further instructed the information was not to be used

as evidence of defendant’s propensity to commit crimes, but for the

purpose of attempting to impeach defendant’s credibility regarding

his own statements.

____________________________________

The prosecutor made a motion to impeach defendant’s hearsay

statements pursuant to People v. Jaccobs (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th

1444, hereinafter Jacobs. The trial court granted the motion and

read a stipulation to the jury that defendant had been convicted of

five felonies: “1975, transportation of a controlled substance; 1986,

theft; 1990 theft; 1996, forgery; 1996, sale of migratory bird parts.”

The trial court further instructed the information was not to be used

as evidence of defendant’s propensity to commit crimes, but for the

purpose of attempting to impeach defendant’s credibility regarding

his own statements.

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In Jacobs, a prosecution for receiving stolen property, the

defendant sought to introduce his own statement to the

investigating officer that he had purchased the property in question

from an acquaintance. (78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1447.) The defendant

did not testify at trial. (Id. at p. 1446.) The trial court allowed the

prosecution to impeach the defendant’s hearsay statement with

evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions. (Id. at p. 1449.) 

The court of appeal agreed, holding Evidence Code sections 788

and 1202, taken together, provide that evidence of a prior felony

conviction is admissible to impeach a criminal defendant’s hearsay

declaration. (Id. at pp. 1449-1450.) [Fn2]

____________________________________

Evidence Code section 788 provides that with certain [Fn2] 

exceptions not relevant here, the credibility of a witness may be

attacked by showing the witness has been convicted of a felony.

Evidence Code section 1202 provides: “Evidence of a

statement or other conduct by a declarant that is inconsistent with a

statement by such declarant received in evidence as hearsay

evidence is not inadmissible for the purpose of attacking the

credibility of the declarant though he is not given and has not had

an opportunity to explain or deny such inconsistent statement or

other conduct. Any other evidence offered to attack or support the

credibility of the declarant is admissible if it would have been

admissible had the declarant been a witness at the hearing. For the

purposes of this section, the deponent of a deposition taken in the

action in which it is offered shall be deemed to be a hearsay

declarant.”

____________________________________

The purpose of allowing a hearsay declarant to be impeached by an

inconsistent statement, other conduct, or “[a]ny other evidence[,]”

is to be fair to the party against whom the hearsay was received,

since that party is denied the opportunity to impeach the statement

by cross-examination. (Am-Cal Investment Co. v. Sharlyn Estates,

Inc. (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 526, 542; Evid Code, § 1202.)

Defendant argues his credibility was not placed in issue, and that

the prior convictions were only related to defendant’s character and

to show defendant had a history of committing such crimes. 

Defendant attempts to distinguish Jacobs, because there the

hearsay declaration had the effect of exonerating Jacobs, whereas

here his hearsay declaration was merely an expression of his

“emotional attitude” toward Weinmann. Defendant claims his

hearsay statements that he was not in love with Weinmann went

only to his state of mind.

The record does not support defendant’s claim his statements were

admitted only for the purpose of showing state of mind. In fact, the

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statements were admitted for all purposes without objection from

the prosecution. The hearsay declarations were offered by

defendant at least in part to tell defendant’s version of the events,

and to thereby disprove the charges against him. As such, the

prosecution was entitled to impeach the hearsay statements with

evidence of defendant’s prior felony convictions.

Defendant also argues the prior convictions should have been

inadmissible under evidence code section 352 because of the

multiplicity of convictions and because of the remoteness of the

first three convictions.

Under Evidence Code section 352, the trial court has discretion to

exclude evidence “. . . if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate

undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of

undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.”

“‘When an objection to evidence is raised under Evidence Code

section 352, the trial court is required to weigh the evidence’s

probative value against the dangers of prejudice, confusion and

undue time consumption. Unless these dangers “substantially

outweigh” probative value, the objection must be overruled.

[Citation.] On appeal, the ruling is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. [Citation.]’” (People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546,

606, quoting People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 609.) We will

not disturb the trial court’s exercise of discretion “unless the court

acted in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that

resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. [Citations.]” (People

v. Yovanov (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 392, 406.)

The trial court should consider four factors when making a

determination under Evidence Code 352: “‘(1) whether the prior

conviction reflects adversely on an individual’s honesty or

veracity; (2) the nearness or remoteness in time of a prior

conviction; (3) whether the prior conviction is for the same or

substantially similar conduct to the charged offense; and (4) what

the effect will be if defendant does not testify out of fear of being

prejudiced because of impeachment by prior convictions.

[Citation.]’” (People v. Green (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165, 182,

quoting People v. Muldrow (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 636, 644.)

Alluding to the above factors, defendant argues the 1976 drug

conviction and the 1986 and 1990 theft convictions were too

remote in time. However, even remote convictions may be

admissible under Evidence Code section 352 where the defendant

has not led a subsequently blameless life. (People v. Green, supra,

at p. 183.) A systematic occurrence of convictions creates a pattern

that is relevant to a defendant’s credibility. (Ibid.) Here, defendant

was convicted of forgery six years after the nearest prior conviction

and only two years before the crimes at issue occurred. Taken

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together, the convictions show a systematic occurrence of

convictions indicating the trial court did not err in determining the

remote prior convictions were more probative than prejudicial.

Citing People v. Lewis (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1288, 1297,

Defendant argues the multiplicity of convictions weighed against

the introduction of those convictions. However, People v. Lewis,

supra, held it was not error to permit impeachment with more than

one felony conviction because a “series of crimes evidencing moral

turpitude is more probative of a defendant’s willingness to give

perjured testimony than a single such offense.” (Ibid.)

The People concede the prior conviction for sale of migratory bird

parts was not a crime of moral turpitude. Nevertheless we find the

admission of this evidence harmless. Evidence defendant had gone

to federal prison possessing eagle feathers was already before the

jury without objection from defendant. 

Answer, Ex. 4 at 11-17.

In his petition, petitioner argues that the decisions of the trial court and the Court

of Appeal concerning the admission of evidence indicating petitioner had sustained prior

convictions violate several provisions of California law. Pet. at 28-29, 32-34. However, as noted

above, habeas corpus relief is only available for violations of federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

Petitioner also asserts some violations of federal law. First, petitioner

claims, as he did before the Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court that the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the use of prior convictions that do not

involve moral turpitude for impeachment purposes. Pet. at 28:19-24; cf. Answer, Ex. 1 at 27 &

Ex. 5 at 1. However petitioner fails to cite any case law in support of this argument and it does

not appear that the United States Supreme Court has ever issued such a broad holding. 

Therefore, the court is barred from granting petitioner relief in this claim under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d).

Next, petitioner cryptically asserts, as he did before the California Supreme Court

that “[c]onviction of a criminal offense based on irrelevant evidence is a violation of federal due

process. (In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358.)” Pet. at 29:1-2; cf. Answer, Ex. 5 at 12. But

Winship is not a case concerning how prior convictions may be used against a criminal

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defendant, nor is it a case in which the Supreme Court addresses in any respect what kind of

evidence is admissible at a criminal proceeding and what kind is not. Rather, Winship held that

juveniles, when charged with a crime, are entitled to the benefit of the reasonable doubt standard. 

397 U.S. at 368. There is nothing in Winship indicating petitioner’s rights arising under federal

law were violated by the admission into evidence at petitioner’s trial of prior convictions. Again,

petitioner is precluded from obtaining relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Finally, petitioner claims, as he did before the California Supreme Court: 

To not permit the introduction of [petitioner’s] state-of-mind

evidence, at the cost of opening the floodgates of prior conviction

evidence, denied [petitioner] the fundamental rights to due process,

compulsory process, and confrontation. (Washington v. Texas

(1967) 388 U.S. 14, 22; Martin v. Ohio (1987) 480 U.S. 228, 233;

Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690.) 

 

Pet. at 33:1-5; cf. Answer, Ex. 5 at 16.

In addressing the gist of this claim, the Court of Appeal appropriately found that

the hearsay evidence presented by petitioner was not relevant simply with regard to petitioner’s

“state of mind,” but was admitted for all purposes; for example, it also indicated that Weinmann

and Klein had motive to lie, or did in fact lie to police about petitioner committing criminal acts. 

Answer, Ex. 4 at 15. It does not appear petitioner’s “state of mind” regarding the nature of his

relationships with Weinmann and Klein was relevant in this case in any respect because his

thoughts about Weinmann and Klein, considered in isolation, have no bearing on whether

petitioner was guilty of the crimes charged. In other words, petitioner’s thinking that Weinmann

and Klein harbored ill feelings against petitioner does not excuse or explain in any way

petitioner’s committing the crimes charged. 

The question remains whether the prosecution’s use of prior convictions as a

means to impeach the hearsay testimony identified in the Court of Appeal’s opinion violated

petitioner’s Constitutional right to due process as that right has been defined by the United States

Supreme Court.

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The Supreme Court has held that a defendant’s prior convictions may be used for

impeachment purposes if he or she testifies so long as jurors are instructed, as they were in this

case, that such evidence may not be considered for the purpose of determining guilt. See, e.g.,

Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 200 (1998); cf. CT 550-551; RT 1907. But the Supreme Court

has never addressed when a defendant’s out of court statements can be impeached with the use of

prior convictions, nor does Supreme Court precedent regarding the use of prior convictions make

it clear that a defendant’s out of court statements cannot be impeached by prior convictions. For

this reason as well, petitioner is precluded from obtaining habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d).

IV. Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, the court will recommend that petitioner’s

application for writ of habeas corpus be denied.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: September 4, 2007.

1

cagl0636.157

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