Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cr-00285/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cr-00285-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin Gifford
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

NO. CR. S-06-285 LKK

Plaintiff,

v.

KEVIN GIFFORD O R D E R

Defendant.

 /

The United States has brought a motion in limine relative to

what it has characterized as the defendant’s “alleged vigilante

defense”. There appears to be three potential avenues by which

evidence concerning defendant’s defense might be admitted: 1)

justification, 2) public authority, and 3) the statutory exception

in 18 U.S.C. § 2252(c).

Defendant has stated he is not presenting a statutory defense

under 2252(c)(which is hardly surprising given that he would not

be able to satisfy the required elements). Furthermore, the public

authority defense should probably not be available to him for the

simple reason that there has been no direct communication from law

Case 2:06-cr-00285-LKK Document 50 Filed 09/06/07 Page 1 of 4
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1

 The case cited by defendant, United States v. Jumah , 2007

WL 2231164 (4th Cir. 2007), recognized public authority as an

affirmative defense to possession of controlled substances, but

there, the defendant was formerly a confidential source for the DEA

and he had communicated with a DEA officer. Accordingly, it was

at least arguable that he was acting in reliance on the statements

of a law enforcement officer.

Here, defendant seems to argue that there were, in fact,

governmental statements supporting citizens’ efforts to catch

online predators, but obviously none of these were specifically

directed at the defendant individually. Rather, defendant argues

that there were general statements by FBI officials endorsing the

efforts of private citizens to go “under cover” to catch

pedophiles. It would not appear to this court that a general call

for cooperation would be sufficient, although the court must

confess it is unable to find a case either way.

2

 The case law is not clear on the terminology and sometimes

uses “necessity”, “self-defense”, “justification”, “duress”,

“coercion”, and “choice of evils” interchangeably.

2

enforcement to the defendant.1

Accordingly, defendant’s option, if any, is to characterize

the evidence as part of a “justification” or “choice of evils”

defense.2

As an initial matter, defendant is correct when he states that

there is a presumption that Congress legislates with an

understanding of common law affirmative defenses. Thus, for

example, all circuits to have considered the issue have found that

there is a common law defense of justification available to felonin-possession charges, even though the relevant statute is silent

on the issue. See United States v. Mooney, 2007 WL 2231164 *5-*6

(4th Cir. 2007) (“It is well recognized Congress enacts criminal

law against the preexistence of the common law. And it is equally

clear that firmly entrenched in the common law is the justification

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3

 It appears to this court that the Fifth Circuit may have

confused motive with intent, Be that as it may, it appears to be

the only case the parties have found dealing with the particular

issue.

3

defense.”).

I thus conclude that the mere fact that a statute does not

expressly provide for the defense of justification does not prevent

its use. Here, the statute is somewhat different, however, because

it is not actually silent with respect to all defenses: 2252(c)

expressly sets forth a statutory defense. Nonetheless, it appears

to this court that the specific enumeration of one defense has not

eliminated reliance upon the other common law defenses, at least

to the extent that a particular common law defense deals with a

different situation than the statutory defense (e.g., vigilantism

as opposed to public authority).

The question remains as to what constitutes a “justification”

or “choice of evils” defense and if vigilantism should fall under

that category. The only case cited by defendant is United States

v. Roberts, 887 F.2d 534, 536 (5th Cir. 1989) There, the Fifth

Circuit held that the district court erroneously excluded

psychiatric evidence offered to support a vigilante defense to

cocaine possession and importation. The court said that the

testimony “would have corroborated [defendant’s] claim that he did

not intend to violate the law and that he was working alone to

apprehend drug dealers.” Id. At 536. The court concluded that

this testimony might have negated an essential element of the crime

charged, intent to distribute.3

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4

Significantly, the court concluded that a vigilante defense

would negate an essential element of the crime and, thus, would be

a true affirmative defense. Intent in that sense is equally

significant in the case of possession with intent to distribute as

charged by the government in the instant case. 

In the Ninth Circuit, a necessity defense must permit the jury

to conclude: “(1) that [the defendant] was faced with a choice of

evils and chose the lesser evil; (2) that he acted to prevent

imminent harm; (3) that he reasonably anticipated a causal

relationship between his conduct and the harm to be avoided, and

(4) that there were no other legal alternatives to violating the

law.” United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825 (9th Cir.

2005).

Here, assuming that the necessity standard applies at all, it

is, to say the least, a close call whether defendant could make a

prima facie showing. There are serious questions about whether

defendant acted to prevent harm, whether that harm was imminent,

whether it was reasonable for him to believe that his conduct would

thwart the criminal conduct of others, and whether there were other

alternatives to violating the law.

Nevertheless, in perhaps an over-abundance of caution, the

court will allow the evidence in, and will give an appropriate

instruction on the defense.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 6, 2007.

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