Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-03028/USCOURTS-caDC-13-03028-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles F. Daum
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 4, 2015 Decided August 14, 2015

No. 13-3024

No. 13-3025

No. 13-3028

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DAAIYAH PASHA, ALSO KNOWN AS MS. DEE,

IMAN PASHA, ALSO KNOWN AS KK,

CHARLES F. DAUM,

APPELLANTS

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cr-00102-2)

(No. 1:11-cr-00102-3)

(No. 1:11-cr-00102-1)

Megan L. Rodgers argued the cause for appellant Charles 

F. Daum. With her on the briefs were Seth A. Tucker, 

appointed by the court, and Christopher P. Nofal.

Brian P. Morrissey, Jr. argued the cause for appellant 

Iman Pasha. With him on the briefs were Jeffrey T. Green, 

appointed by the court, and Benjamin B. Glerum.

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2

K. Winn Allen argued the cause for appellant Daaiyah 

Pasha. With him on the briefs was Susan M. Davies, 

appointed by the court.

Kirby A. Heller, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause and filed the brief for appellee.

Before: ROGERS, GRIFFITH and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

WILKINS, Circuit Judge: In multiple respects, these

appeals concern the duties owed to the court by lawyers and 

their legal teams.

Appellants are a criminal defense attorney and two legal 

investigators who were convicted in 2012 of breaching those 

duties by fabricating evidence and suborning perjury during a 

2008 trial in which they represented another individual as 

defendant. Such conduct tears at the fabric of our system of 

laws.

But these appeals challenge prosecutorial misconduct that 

is likewise inimical to justice. Specifically, two Appellants

argue for reversal of their convictions based on the 

Government’s undisputed breach of its obligation to timely 

turn over exculpatory evidence. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 

U.S. 83 (1963). We agree with Appellant Daaiyah Pasha that 

but for the Brady deficiency, there is a reasonable probability 

of a different outcome in her case. We therefore direct a new 

trial for Daaiyah Pasha, with appropriate remedies to cure the 

damage caused by the Government’s delayed disclosure.

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We do not, however, agree with Appellants Charles 

Daum and Iman Pasha on the challenges they raise, and so we 

affirm their convictions.

I.

In April 2008, Appellant Charles Daum was retained as 

defense counsel by Delante White, who had been indicted on 

cocaine distribution charges. In September 2008, Daum 

represented White at a trial in the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia that resulted in a hung jury. 

Daum was assisted in this representation by Appellants Iman 

Pasha and Daaiyah Pasha as non-attorney investigators.

1

 

Daaiyah, a woman now in her early sixties, is Iman’s mother. 

In January 2009, the district court hearing the case 

against White granted Daum’s motion to withdraw as counsel 

based on threats made by White against Daum. A 

superseding indictment added new defendants and new 

charges, and White and others subsequently pled guilty to the 

cocaine-related charges and to witness tampering and 

obstruction of an official proceeding in connection with the 

original trial. 

Following a two-year investigation, the Government 

charged Daum, Iman, and Daaiyah with conspiracy to 

obstruct justice; Daum alone was also charged with witness 

tampering, fabricating evidence, and suborning perjury in the 

2008 trial. The factual crux of the allegation was that 

Appellants had staged a photo shoot a few weeks before the 

trial to support a defense that key evidence attributed to 

Delante White actually belonged to his brother Jerome White. 

 1 We will refer to Iman and Daaiyah Pasha by their first names in 

this opinion in order to distinguish them from each other.

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The Government alleged that Daum had masterminded the 

scheme and that Iman and Daaiyah had carried out the photo 

shoot on September 12, 2008, in the home of Cheryl White,

who is the mother of Delante White and his siblings Jerome

and Christopher. In its findings of fact, the District Court 

explained the photo shoot scheme as follows:

In preparation for Delante’s trial, Daum developed a plan 

to prove to a jury Delante’s claim that the drugs found at 

his grandmother’s – Evelyn Clowney’s – house belonged 

to his younger brother Jerome. In order to carry out this 

plan, Daum entered into a conspiracy in which he 

directed, in various ways, Daaiyah and Iman Pasha and 

Jerome and [Delante White’s girlfriend] Candice to set 

up a photo shoot to take pictures that showed Jerome 

cutting up what appeared to be crack cocaine with what 

appeared to be the items recovered from Evelyn 

Clowney’s apartment in plain view. The purpose of 

these staged photographs was to introduce them as 

evidence at Delante’s trial in an effort to make the jury 

think that all of the items found at Evelyn Clowney’s 

apartment, including the cocaine, actually belonged to 

Jerome. Daum assured Jerome, Christopher, and 

Candice, that they would not get in trouble for this plan, 

and were protected under a legal theory called “double 

jeopardy.”

Both of the substantial legal issues raised in these appeals 

arise from a pretrial motions hearing that took place on April 

19, 2012, and was attended by all Defendants and their 

counsel. At the outset of that hearing, the District Judge

announced that she would address two motions and discuss 

trial procedures for an expected trial start a week and a half 

later. 

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Before the Judge began to speak to those points, 

however, Daaiyah’s lawyer informed the District Court that 

the three Defendants were waiving their rights to jury trial and 

requesting the Government’s consent to try the case to the 

District Court. He explained that Defendants were only 

telling the District Court at such a late juncture because “this 

was a decision that was back and forth from last month.” 

Daum’s counsel added a similar statement, saying that “the 

decision was made recently with very fulsome discussions 

between the defense lawyers and their clients.” He also 

represented that the Government had not previously been 

informed of the waiver offer and that “obviously we would 

expect that they might need some time before they can 

respond.” The Judge noted that the Government was likely as 

surprised by the offer as she was, telling the prosecutor: “It 

took me back. It will take you back I assume.” And the 

Judge allowed the Government some time to decide whether 

to accept the offer of jury trial waiver. The Judge then 

proceeded to describe jury selection plans in case the waiver 

offer was not accepted.

On April 24, 2012, the Government filed a written 

acceptance of Defendants’ offer to waive jury trial. On April 

25, Defendants filed three waivers of trial by jury, one 

executed by each Defendant.

The April 19 hearing also addressed a motion by 

Daaiyah’s lawyer to compel production of Brady material. 

More than eight months earlier, on July 11, 2011, the 

Government had interviewed Everett Montgomery, the 

boyfriend of Cheryl White (at whose home the photo shoot 

was staged). Montgomery said that on the day of the photo 

shoot, he was present and saw a man and a woman in her midthirties enter the apartment carrying balloons, which were a 

key prop featured in the fabricated photos taken that evening. 

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The Government did not disclose Montgomery’s statements 

to the defense until April 5, 2012, over eight months after the 

interview and just a few weeks before the trial. The 

prosecutor trying the case, who had been present personally at 

the 2011 interview, acknowledged to the District Court that he 

had violated Department of Justice policy to provide Brady

information as soon as he became aware of it. He also 

reported that the Government had recently re-interviewed 

Montgomery, who had changed his story and now said that 

instead of one man and one woman, he had observed two 

women come into his apartment on the relevant evening. 

To clarify the critical timeline: The Government’s original 

interview with Montgomery took place on July 11, 2011. On 

April 5, 2012, the Government disclosed Montgomery’s 

exculpatory statement to defense counsel. Daaiyah’s lawyer

told the District Court that this caused him to “stop[] trial 

preparation and spen[d] the next five days trying to locate Mr. 

Montgomery,” at which time (that is, on April 10, 2012) 

Montgomery told the defense team that he had seen a man 

and a woman enter his apartment on September 12, 2008, the 

night of the photo shoot. On April 11, 2012, the day after 

defense counsel had first interviewed Montgomery, the 

prosecutors met with Montgomery at their office. They 

reported that at that meeting Montgomery said he saw “two 

women enter his apartment, both of whom were in their 

thirties or forties.” On April 16, 2012 – three days before the 

key pretrial hearing described above – defense counsel again 

met with Montgomery, who “reaffirmed that he saw a man 

and a woman enter his apartment on September 12, 2008.” 

After hearing argument at the pretrial hearing, the District 

Court announced that “there is not the slightest doubt that the 

Government committed a Brady violation.” It also concluded 

that there was “very real prejudice” because memories fade in 

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eight months and the defense had lost the opportunity to get a 

fresher recollection on the record. And it invited Defendants 

to submit requests for sanctions. 

On April 30, 2012, Defendants filed a written motion to 

dismiss the indictment or, in the alternative, to preclude the 

Government from introducing any testimony regarding events 

at the photo shoot. The District Court held an on-the-record 

phone conference the next morning, on May 1, 2012, and told 

the parties that “a final decision on these motions can occur 

certainly after trial, given what the defense is requesting in 

terms of its motion.” The Court accordingly reserved 

judgment on sanctions, ordering the Government to respond

in writing within 15 days after rendering of a verdict. 

A month-long bench trial began on May 7, 2012. The 

principal evidence presented regarding the participation of 

Iman and Daaiyah in the photo shoot included:

• Testimony by Delante White’s girlfriend, Candice 

Robertson, that both Iman and Daaiyah were 

present. She testified that Iman “took [most] of 

the pictures and [Daaiyah] staged the scene.” She 

also testified that both Iman and Daaiyah had been

present at a meeting in Daum’s office earlier in the 

day to plan the photo shoot. And she testified that 

she had paid Iman $200 for the photo shoot and 

$50 to have the photos developed without date 

stamps. 

• Testimony by Delante White’s brother, Jerome 

White, that both Iman and Daaiyah were present at 

the photo shoot. 

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• Testimony by Jerome White’s girlfriend, Brittany 

McDaniels, that she had witnessed two female 

investigators arriving at the photo shoot, but that 

Daaiyah was not one of those women. 

Defendants subpoenaed Montgomery to testify at trial,

and he complied and appeared in the courthouse ready to be 

called. Defendants asked the District Court mid-trial to 

preclude the Government from cross-examining Montgomery 

as a Brady sanction, and the District Court denied the request. 

Indeed, the District Court rejected the proposal out of hand, 

stating: “[T]here’s absolutely no case law supporting such a 

drastic, draconian way of dealing with the problem in 

mitigating any prejudice.” 

After this ruling, the defense did not call Montgomery. 

The trial concluded, and on June 22, 2012, the District Court 

announced and filed its verdict, finding Defendants guilty on 

all counts except one (Daum was found not guilty of Count V, 

tampering with a witness).

Pursuant to the District Court’s pretrial order, the 

Government responded post-verdict to the Pasha Defendants’ 

written motion to dismiss the indictment as a Brady sanction. 

In an Order dated August 20, 2012, the District Court denied 

the motion as a result of finding no prejudice caused by the 

Government’s Brady failure. The District Court explained:

“Having heard all the evidence in this case, the Court now 

concludes that the Defendants cannot meet their burden of 

showing a reasonable probability of a different outcome.” 

The District Court sentenced Defendants on March 12, 

2013, to 63 months imprisonment (Daum), three years of 

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probation (Iman), and three months of imprisonment 

(Daaiyah).

2

 Each Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

II.

We first analyze challenges raised by each Appellant to 

the validity of his or her waiver of right to trial by jury. Then, 

we turn to challenges raised by Daum to the District Court’s 

construction of the offenses. Finally, we examine the Brady

failures that create the most difficult issues in this appeal.

A.

Appellants contend – for different reasons – that their 

waivers of right to jury trial were ineffective. Our precedents 

clearly identify the test – sufficient basis – for determining 

whether a district court’s acceptance of a jury trial waiver in 

the first instance was in error. United States v. David, 511 

F.2d 355, 362-63 (D.C. Cir. 1975). That is, we ask whether 

or not the district court had sufficient basis for determining 

the validity of each waiver, id., and we think this District 

Court had sufficient basis in each instance here. As to 

challenges to the validity of jury trial waivers based on laterraised evidence, none of the Appellants has alleged or 

presented adequate evidence of harm.

3

 2 The Government notes that Iman’s probation was subsequently 

revoked, and the District Court remanded her to one year 

imprisonment.

3 The parties sharply dispute whether a jury trial waiver challenge 

not raised in the district court is subject to de novo or plain error 

review. We need not resolve that issue here because Defendants’ 

challenges are so plainly lacking in merit that they would fail no 

matter the standard we apply. We also note that the key cases cited 

by the Government for the proposition that challenges to the 

validity of a jury trial waiver should be reviewed for plain error 

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As a starting point on the proceedings in this case, we 

observe there is no dispute that each waiver complied with all 

requirements of Rule 23(a), that is: (1) the Defendants waived 

jury trial in writing; (2) the Government consented; and (3) 

the court approved. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a). Appellants 

can claim no violation of the rules, and they argue instead that 

their Due Process rights have been violated.

To support their claims, Appellants point to the 

Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges, which 

recommends that judges always conduct an oral colloquy and 

provides suggested questions for use in doing so. See 

FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT 

COURT JUDGES 33-35 (6th ed. 2013). But the Benchbook is 

merely a training manual and compendium of advice, and it is 

neither binding nor itself a statement of judicial policy. Id. at 

ii; see also United States v. Jones, 421 F.3d 359, 363 (5th Cir. 

2005) (explaining that although the Benchbook provides a

guide to questions at a colloquy, it is not a “sacrosanct 

litany”). To be sure, the Benchbook captures the best practice 

on this issue. As we said in David, “many courts – including 

our own – have indicated that trial judges would be welladvised to directly question the defendant in all cases to 

determine the validity of any proffered waiver of jury trial.” 

511 F.2d at 361.

Best practice notwithstanding, this District Court had the 

sufficient basis we must look for under David in reviewing 

 

deal with claims that Rule 23(a) was violated, not that a defendant’s 

underlying constitutional right was violated. See United States v. 

Williams, 559 F.3d 607, 610 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that “lack of a 

written waiver by Williams was a violation of Rule 23(a)”); United 

States v. Carmenate, 544 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he 

defendant failed to sign a written waiver pursuant to Rule 23(a)(1) 

of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”).

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each determination that a waiver was valid. See id. at 362. 

With all attorneys and Defendants present, experienced

defense counsel represented that the waiver decisions had 

been reached after “very fulsome discussions between the 

defense lawyers and their clients” that had been “back and 

forth from last month.” The written waivers were substantive

and addressed most of the issues recommended by the 

Benchbook, well beyond what is required by Rule 23(a)(1).

4

 

 4 Daum’s jury waiver stated:

Defendant Charles Daum, through counsel, respectfully 

informs this Court that pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 23 he 

wishes to waive his right to a trial by jury in this matter and 

wishes to have this case tried to the Court.

Mr. Daum understands that he has by Court Rule and by 

the United States Constitution the right to have the case 

decided by 12 jurors. He further understands that he would be 

permitted to participate in the jury selection process with his 

counsel. He further understands that for good cause his 

counsel could argue that prospective jurors who do not 

demonstrate impartiality after questioning by the Court could 

be excused by the Court. Additionally, Mr. Daum understands 

that based on FED. R. CRIM. P. 24 he would be able to exercise 

through his own counsel and counsel for the co-defendants ten 

peremptory challenges, which is his right, to strike any juror 

for any reason other than those not permitted by the court. Mr. 

Daum further understands that after the jury is selected the 

jurors would be instructed by the court to base their decision 

on the evidence in the case with regard to only his culpability. 

Additionally, the jury would be instructed that any verdict on 

any count with regards to any defendant must be unanimous.

Knowing all this and after full discussion with his counsel 

he knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to a jury trial in 

the above captioned case and desires to be tried by the court. 

I have read and consent to the above, [signed] Charles 

Daum.

Daaiyah and Iman simultaneously submitted materially identical 

waivers.

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Although we reaffirm that conducting a colloquy on jury trial 

waiver is always well advised, a colloquy was not necessary

to comply with Rule 23(a) in these circumstances.

To satisfy Due Process, a defendant waiving the right to 

trial by jury must do so knowingly and intelligently. David, 

511 F.2d at 361; see also Carmenate, 544 F.3d at 108 (stating 

that what “the Constitution requires is that a waiver of the 

right to a jury trial be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent”). 

Although a Rule 23(a)(1) written waiver is not conclusive 

proof that this requirement has been satisfied, we have treated 

it as at least a rebuttable presumption. Compare United States 

v. Lawson, 682 F.2d 1012, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (dismissing 

attack on the validity of jury trial waiver based on 

conformance with Rule 23(a)(1)), with David, 511 F.2d at 361 

(holding that Rule 23(a) written waiver is inadequate “where 

circumstances cast doubt on the validity of a given waiver”). 

None of the Appellants successfully rebuts the presumption.

Daum contends that medical issues contained in his

presentence report, a document prepared only after the trial,

create the same kind of special circumstance defeating the 

presumption as we found in David, where the defendant’s 

counsel expressed serious misgivings at the outset about his 

client’s competency to stand trial and the district court had

before it conflicting reports from psychiatrists on that point. 

See 511 F.2d at 358. But as Daum’s counsel repeatedly 

acknowledged at argument before us, there was nothing in the 

record indicating any issue at the time the District Court 

accepted his waiver. Here, Daum himself was an experienced 

defense lawyer, represented by another experienced defense 

lawyer, who submitted a detailed waiver statement well 

beyond that required by the rule. Under these circumstances, 

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we cannot find that the District Court lacked “sufficient basis” 

to accept the waiver.5

Iman and Daaiyah have somewhat better arguments, 

contending that the multi-defendant context creates a David

circumstance that requires a colloquy.6 They tell us that the 

District Court had an obligation to assess whether each 

Defendant understood that she could not be outvoted by her 

co-Defendants. And they would have us decide that the 

multi-defendant context always requires an oral colloquy. Cf. 

United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th 

Cir. 1997) (requiring oral colloquy on jury trial waiver for any 

defendant who has used a language interpreter yet submits a 

written waiver only in English).

Although we agree that the multi-defendant context calls 

for yet stronger urging that district courts conduct an oral 

colloquy on jury waivers in every case, we disagree that a per 

se rule is required. Neither Iman nor Daaiyah has asserted

 5 Daum seeks to draw on medical issues discussed in his 

presentence report and on a prescription medication label submitted 

as a sealed attachment to his reply brief in this appeal. Even 

assuming there is a circumstance in which later-created records 

could vitiate a jury waiver that a district court had substantial basis 

for accepting at the time of submission, we need not decide the 

question in this case because Daum has not alleged that his waiver 

was not in fact knowing and voluntary, nor has he pointed to 

enough evidence to overcome the presumption created by his 

written waiver that it was. 

6 Iman raises the additional arguments that her attorney, although 

present, did not speak at the hearing in which counsel for coDefendants made representations on her behalf, and also that her 

written waiver was electronically filed by counsel for a coDefendant. Where, as here, there has been no suggestion that a 

defendant’s lawyer was deficient in any way, we decline to read 

anything into either of these facts of the proceeding.

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that an oral colloquy would have made a difference to her 

waiver decision. Neither Iman nor Daaiyah has even argued 

that she in fact lacked understanding of her right to jury trial 

or that but for the trial court’s failure to ensure she had that 

understanding there is a reasonable probability she would not 

have waived the right.

In sum, Appellants have not submitted persuasive

evidence that any of them lacked ability to consent, lacked 

actual consent, or would have made a different decision on 

whether to waive the right to jury trial if there had been an 

oral colloquy. Absent such evidence or allegations and given 

that the procedure used by the District Court complied with 

Rule 23(a), it is an inescapable conclusion that Appellants are 

merely seeking a second bite at the trial apple. We see no 

basis in this issue for granting one.

B.

Daum next asks us to reverse certain convictions based 

on what he claims were two legal errors by the District Court 

in construing the scienter requirements of the charges against 

him. He hinges these challenges on a statement by the 

District Court that “we do not know what Defendant Daum’s 

motive could have been.” In the context of the opinion, this is 

a comment on the expressly-asked rhetorical question of “why 

in the world would an experienced, long-time defense 

attorney engage in such nefarious conduct?” The District 

Court explained that the question applied with even greater 

force because this was a representation for which Daum had 

charged a “paltry $12,000” for trial and retrial. Daum now 

argues this reflects a failure by the District Court to find: (1) 

corrupt motive required on the obstruction of justice charge, 

and (2) willfulness required on the subornation of perjury 

charge. These arguments conflate the abstract question of 

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“why the defendant did it” with the specific intent 

requirements of the charges in this case.

Given that Daum did not object on these issues below, we 

examine them only for plain error. See United States v. 

Purvis, 706 F.3d 520, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Daum has failed 

to identify any plain error here. 

First, Daum challenges his conviction for obstruction of 

justice on the basis that the District Court erred in concluding 

that motive is not an element of the crime.

7

 The statute 

prohibits “corruptly . . . endeavor[ing] to influence, obstruct, 

or impede, the due administration of justice.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 1503. Daum contends that “corruptly” means having a 

“corrupt motive,” and that as a factual matter he lacked one 

because he was motivated by fear of his client. Daum points 

to United States v. Haldeman to support his theory, but that 

case simply explained that “corruptly” meant having an evil 

purpose or intent. 559 F.2d 31, 115 n.229 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 

(en banc) (per curiam). In Haldeman, we upheld a ruling that 

the jury had to be convinced the relevant defendant “made 

some effort to impede or obstruct” the Watergate 

investigation or the resulting trial. Id. Haldeman does not, 

however, support the notion that special consideration is due a 

defendant “whose hope is to avoid obstructing justice while 

the natural consequence of success in his endeavor would be 

to achieve precisely the opposite result.” United States v. 

Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269, 1273 (4th Cir. 1979). Instead, 

“the defendant need only have had knowledge or notice that 

success in his fraud would have likely resulted in an 

obstruction of justice.” Id.; see also United States v. North, 

910 F.2d 843, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1990), opinion withdrawn and 

superseded in other part on reh’g, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 

 7 Iman joined this argument without elaboration in her brief. 

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1990) (explaining that a person acts “corruptly” when taking 

action with “‘the intent to obtain an improper advantage for 

[one]self or someone else, inconsistent with official duty and 

the rights of others’”) (quoting BALLENTINE’S LAW 

DICTIONARY 276 (3d ed. 1969) (alteration in original). The 

District Court found that Daum developed and directed a 

scheme to defraud a federal criminal trial. It was not plain 

error to conclude that this satisfied the statutory requirement 

that he acted “corruptly.”

Daum also challenges his two subornation of perjury 

convictions on the basis that the District Court omitted a 

required element of “willfulness.” The statute defining the 

crime states: “Whoever procures another to commit any 

perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury, and shall be fined 

under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or 

both.” 18 U.S.C. § 1622. Daum argues that the statute 

incorporates a willfulness requirement and that “willfulness” 

in this context should mean “voluntary, intentional violation 

of a known legal duty.” See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 

192, 200 (1991) (quoting United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 

346, 360 (1973)). The Government responds that Cheek

applies only to “highly technical statutes that present[] the 

danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently 

innocent conduct,” Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 194 

(1998), and so Daum’s reliance on it is misplaced. As the 

Government notes, however, the District Court made findings 

of fact that would satisfy even the Cheek standard of requisite 

intent. Among findings relevant to this Count (Count VI) was

that Daum “instructed Christopher White to perjure himself 

and say that he took the photos.” Given Daum’s experience 

and role as a criminal defense attorney, this finding suffices –

particularly under the plain error standard – to support a 

conclusion that Daum meant for White to break the law.

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Daum tells us reversal of his convictions is further 

warranted because “there is substantial evidence that [he] was 

under duress, or in fear for his safety, because on at least one 

occasion before the trial began, Delante White threatened 

[Daum’s] life if he did not win an acquittal.” As we 

understand it, Daum would have us read this into his elementof-the-offense arguments in a manner that puts the burden of 

proof on the Government to show that Daum was not acting 

under duress. But duress is an affirmative defense, and it is a 

defendant’s burden to demonstrate it at trial. See Dixon v. 

United States, 548 U.S. 1, 17 (2006); United States v. Nwoye, 

663 F.3d 460, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Model Penal Code 

§ 2.09. Daum did not attempt to present a duress claim before 

the District Court and now has cited nothing in the record 

showing that he drew the District Court’s attention to Delante 

White’s alleged threat. There was therefore no plain error in 

the lack of consideration the District Court gave to such 

evidence.

C.

Finally, we turn to Iman’s and Daaiyah’s contentions that 

they were prejudiced by the Government’s failure to timely 

turn over exculpatory evidence. A Brady violation has three 

components: “[1] The evidence at issue must be favorable to 

the accused . . . ; [2] that evidence must have been suppressed 

by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and 

[3] prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 

U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); see also United States v. Johnson, 

519 F.3d 478, 488 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

The first two components of a Brady violation are 

certainly present here. A prosecutor in this case was 

personally present at an interview in which a witness gave a 

scene-of-the-crime account that, if credited, would contradict 

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the identity of at least one of the Pasha Defendants in this 

case. The prosecutor waited over eight months until the eve 

of trial to reveal this information. As the District Court 

explained, this delay was inexcusable: At the moment the 

eyewitness said the two individuals who arrived at the photo 

shoot were a man and a woman (rather than two women), 

“counsel for the Government should have understood that as 

soon as they were finished talking with that gentleman, they 

had an obligation to give that information to the defense.”8

 

So the question we must resolve regards the third 

component of a Brady violation: that is, whether any 

Defendant was prejudiced by the Government’s failure to 

comply with its duty. We must answer in the affirmative if

we find “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280 (internal 

quotation mark omitted). “The defendant bears the burden of 

showing a reasonable probability of a different outcome.” 

Johnson, 519 U.S. at 488. But a reasonable probability does 

not require a showing that it is more likely than not that the 

defendant would have been acquitted had the evidence been 

disclosed. United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 164, 170 (D.C. 

Cir. 2010). Instead, “[a] ‘probability’ reaches the level of 

‘reasonable’ when it is high enough to ‘undermine confidence 

 8 The District Court denied as moot a separate sanctions motion 

related to a would-be Brady violation in connection with the count 

on which Daum was found not guilty. J.A. 98. Referencing that 

failure to comply with Brady obligations had more than once been a 

problem in this case, the District Court chastised the prosecutors

with respect to the failure to turn over the exculpatory evidence at 

issue in this appeal: “What is particularly troubling is that this is the 

second time in this case that the Government has withheld 

significant Brady information for an extended period of time. 

When is the Government going to learn?” 

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in the verdict.’” Id. (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 

435 (1995)).

1.

We review de novo the prejudice determination made by 

the District Court, considering directly “any adverse effect 

that the prosecutor’s failure . . . might have had on the 

preparation or presentation of the defendant’s case.” United 

States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683 (1985); see also In re 

Sealed Case No. 99-3096, 185 F.3d 887, 892 (D.C. Cir. 

1999). This remains true even where, as here, the factfinder 

was the judge who made the original prejudice determination. 

See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 672 (noting that the original 

proceeding was bench trial).

Not surprisingly, the Government urges deference to the 

District Court’s finding of non-prejudice. It cites our

observation in a prior case that “[t]he district judge is, of 

course, best suited to evaluate the significance of the 

undisclosed material.” United States v. Jenrette, 744 F.2d 

817, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Government reasons that this 

analysis applies with even greater force in a bench trial where 

the District Court is uniquely positioned to determine the 

effect of particular evidence on its own verdict. To the extent 

Jenrette’s observation survives the Supreme Court’s decision

in Bagley, however, it does not factor in our analysis here. 

The District Court noted that it would have reached a guilty 

verdict as to each of Iman and Daaiyah based on “all the other 

evidence upon which the Court relied in its final verdict.” But 

our role is not to conduct “a sufficiency of the evidence test,” 

asking whether the District Court’s conclusion about a 

hypothetical trial absent the Government’s Brady omission 

was supportable. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (“Bagley

materiality . . . is not a sufficiency of evidence test.”). 

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Instead, we ask whether “there is a reasonable probability 

that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different” for a generic 

factfinder who has not already reached a determination of 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, accounting for how the 

defense may have changed its preparation or presentation if 

the exculpatory material had been disclosed in a timely 

manner. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.

2.

It is uncontested here that the photo shoot to fabricate 

evidence for Delante White’s trial took place on September 

12, 2008, at the home of Delante White’s mother, Cheryl

White. The direct evidence of Iman’s and Daaiyah’s

involvement in the criminal events that evening is, however, 

limited. In short, two participants in the photo shoot placed 

both Iman and Daaiyah at the scene while a third said that 

although two women working as investigators for Daum had 

been present, Daaiyah was not one of them. All of the 

eyewitnesses had grave credibility problems.

Candice Robertson, Delante White’s girlfriend, testified 

that Iman “took [most] of the pictures and [Daaiyah] staged 

the scene.” The District Court found, however, that 

Robertson “was a total disaster as a witness” who “could not 

give a straight answer to any question; . . . could not give the 

same answer to any question when that question was asked 

more than once; . . . [and] changed her testimony so many 

times about so many things that it was almost sad to watch 

her.” She also received a favorable plea bargain for her 

testimony in this case.

Jerome White, Delante White’s brother, testified that 

both Iman and Daaiyah were present at the photo shoot. The 

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District Court found, however, that Jerome White “was a 

hesitant, reluctant witness, who was not at all forthcoming in 

his responses to questions” and that “[t]here were times he 

seemed barely awake on the stand and . . . could not keep his 

eyes open.” He testified that “he lived his life in order to stay 

high 24 hours a day” on drugs and alcohol and that “because 

of the enormous amount of marijuana he had smoked, his 

long-term memory was not good.” He, too, received a 

favorable plea bargain for his testimony in this case. 

Brittany McDaniels, Jerome White’s girlfriend, testified 

that although she had seen two women arrive at the photo 

shoot whom she took to be Daum’s investigators, Daaiyah 

was not one of those women. McDaniels was given a noprosecution agreement in exchange for her testimony. 

This is not much in the way of direct evidence.9 Had 

Everett Montgomery testified along the lines of his initial 

 9 Although the evidence was not overwhelming, particularly against 

Daaiyah, it was still well clear of the bar for the sufficiency of 

evidence challenge that Iman and Daaiyah raise as an alternative 

basis for vacating their convictions. The standard for such 

challenges is very high. See United States v. Mellen, 393 F.3d 175, 

180-81 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating that on appeal for sufficiency of 

the evidence, all evidence is reviewed in light most favorable to the 

Government and the conviction must be affirmed if any rational 

trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). 

“[F]ull play” is due the factfinder in determining credibility, 

weighing evidence, and drawing justifiable inferences. United 

States v. Hall, 613 F.3d 249, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Iman and 

Daaiyah have “not establish[ed] that it was implausible for the 

district court to credit particular . . . testimony,” United States v. 

Jones, 744 F.3d 1362, 1367 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 8 

(2014), given that other evidence supported their convictions. To 

the extent Daaiyah distinguishes Jones on the ground that the 

inability of Jerome and Candice “to tell a consistent story about 

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interview, the scorecard would have been two eyewitnesses 

who placed Daaiyah at the scene and two eyewitnesses whose 

testimony excluded her. The math would be less favorable 

for Iman, because Brittany McDaniels did not rule out her 

participation and because it is more likely that a factfinder 

could think Montgomery’s original description of a man and a 

woman in her mid-thirties to mid-forties might include 

Iman.

10 The District Court did note that had Montgomery 

testified, he likely would have had credibility problems, as “a 

number of witnesses testified to the fact that Mr. Montgomery 

was very inebriated at the time of the photo staging, . . . that 

he stayed in his bedroom most of the time, and that he slept 

during much of the time.” But even assuming that we may 

consider those factors without knowing what Montgomery 

himself would have said about them, it takes no stretch of the 

imagination to think Montgomery might have been at least as 

credible to a reasonable factfinder as the District Court found 

Candice Robertson to be – that is, barely credible at all.

The Government also argues that Montgomery’s memory 

was not fresh when the prosecution originally interviewed 

him in July 2011, nearly three years after the night of the 

photo shoot, and that the additional eight-month delay before 

the defense was notified of his initial statement could not have 

 

Daaiyah’s supposed participation in the photo shoot goes directly to 

Daaiyah’s conviction, not to their general credibility,” Reply Br. 5, 

this ignores other evidence on which the District Court properly 

relied, which, as noted, did not need to be overwhelming.

10 Although the parties did not clearly indicate the age of either 

Iman or Daaiyah, the district court records indicate that Iman was 

29 years old and Daaiyah was 58 years old at the time of the photo 

shoot in September 2008. We note also the District Court’s 

apparent conclusion at the April 19 pretrial conference that 

whatever Montgomery’s original description was, it was not 

categorically inconsistent with Iman’s appearance. 

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made much difference. It contends that the best framework 

for thinking about possible prejudice is whether the difference 

between an interview thirty-six months after the photo shoot 

and forty-five months after the photo shoot could have 

mattered. 

We disagree with the Government’s proposed analysis 

for two reasons. First, because Montgomery himself said the 

additional time lapse made a difference. Defendants 

submitted a declaration from him stating: “If you talked to me 

last year I would have been able to tell you more.” Second, 

both Daaiyah’s trial counsel and the District Court explained 

just what a difference the delay might have made. Daaiyah’s 

counsel told the District Court:

Had I known [at the time the Government initially 

interviewed Montgomery], I would have [gone] to this 

person. I wouldn’t have taken a statement from him. I 

would have gotten a Court Reporter and got it under oath. 

That’s how critical this person is to my case. So when 

this person comes to testify and the Government crossexamines him and says, didn’t you say X, I can 

rehabilitate him with sworn testimony which goes to the 

jury, as the Court knows, under the rules not as a prior 

consistent statement that we rehabilitated him for 

impeachment purposes, but it goes to the jury as 

substantive evidence for the truth because I had it under 

oath and it is the truth of it . . . .

The District Court evidently agreed:

[T]he prejudice here was very substantial. If defense 

counsel had been able [] to get to Mr. Montgomery, and I 

have a feeling with that kind of an exculpatory statement 

they would have done their best to get to him as fast as 

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24

possible, then at that point, they could have followed up 

with Mr. Montgomery. They could certainly have gotten 

a written statement from him, and they certainly if they 

wanted to could have gotten a statement under oath from 

him and if that statement was not favorable, too bad for 

the defense.

The great difficulty, as the District Court noted, is that 

“[w]e will never know whether that statement would have 

been favorable or unfavorable.” But because it was the 

Government that failed to comply with its Brady obligations, 

this uncertainty must be charged to the Government’s case.

All this plays out differently as to the two Appellants 

raising the Brady claim.

First, as to Iman: It is doubtful just how exculpatory 

Montgomery’s hypothetical testimony could have been for 

her (that is, the testimony Montgomery would have given 

absent the time lapse caused by the Brady failure). If 

credited, Montgomery’s original statement about seeing a 

man and a woman in her mid-thirties arrive at the photo shoot 

would defeat the Government’s narrative that Iman arrived 

with her mother, Daaiyah, but it does not clearly exclude 

Iman as being the woman Montgomery saw. Even treating 

Montgomery’s original statement as somewhat exculpatory of 

Iman, there was no other evidence that she did not participate 

in the photo shoot (unlike for Daaiyah, whom Brittany 

McDaniels testified was not there). Beyond the eyewitness 

testimony from the night of the photo shoot, the 

Government’s case included substantial other inculpatory 

evidence against Iman. Credible witnesses testified that Iman 

was Daum’s investigator working on Delante White’s case at 

the time of the photo shoot, and phone calls between Delante 

White and co-conspirators discussed Daum’s investigators 

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being at the shoot. Tiffany Archer, another investigator who 

worked with the Pashas, testified that she and Iman went to 

Candice Robertson’s apartment on April 14, 2009 –

ostensibly to search for perishables, but actually to give Iman 

time to search the apartment. Candice Robertson’s mother 

testified that on the same date (April 14, 2009), Iman called 

her and said she was “looking for Candice’s black bag.” She 

also testified that sometime later, Iman brought her a money 

order for $300 “to help Candice out” and that Iman visited a 

third time and told her she had sent Candice a $200 money 

order. The District Court noted that this testimony was 

“confirmed by documentary evidence of checks and money 

orders” and Iman’s actions “cannot be explained by any 

reason other than that they were a cover-up.” All this is 

enough to show that Iman Pasha was actively involved in 

Delante White’s case and to provide a good deal of 

evidentiary support for her involvement in the obstruction of 

justice conspiracy.

But the calculus is different as to Daaiyah because there 

is more exculpatory evidence and substantially less 

inculpatory evidence than for Iman. Defendants themselves 

seem to have collectively recognized this, submitting in their 

joint brief to the District Court that the prejudice “is 

particularly damning to defendant Daaiyah Pasha.” Indeed, 

we agree that Daaiyah has made out a Brady claim. Two 

witnesses with credibility issues (Candice Robertson and 

Jerome White) testified that she was at the photo shoot, but a 

third (Brittany McDaniels) testified that she definitely was 

not. Testimony from Montgomery along the lines of his 

initial statement would have made the eyewitness scorecard 

two against two as to whether Daaiyah participated in the 

photo shoot – even as we note that while the accounts of both 

McDaniels and Montgomery exclude Daaiyah’s participation, 

they are in tension with each other. Moreover, although 

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26

Daaiyah frequently worked as an investigator for Daum, it is 

not even clearly established in the record that she had a 

substantial role as his investigator on this case, much less that 

her participation was anywhere near as extensive as Iman’s.

There is some testimony about Daaiyah having been 

present at certain meetings. Candice Robertson and Jerome 

White placed Daaiyah at a planning meeting in Daum’s office 

the morning of the photo shoot. But their recollections of that 

meeting were inconsistent, and Jerome did not remember if 

Daaiyah was actually in the room during the meeting or 

elsewhere in Daum’s office. Christopher White, who was

involved in the broader obstruction of justice but was not 

present at the photo shoot, placed Daaiyah at a different 

meeting in which Daum instructed him to perjure his 

testimony. The District Court found Christopher White the 

most credible of the four core witnesses. Importantly, 

however, the District Court’s verdict did not make any 

explicit findings regarding Daaiyah’s presence at these two 

meetings, and so we cannot be sure whether it credited the 

relevant claims. But evidence regarding Daaiyah’s presence 

at meetings, even if such meetings were proven to have taken 

place, does not meaningfully corroborate the testimony that 

she participated in the photo shoot. Nor does this weak 

evidence counter the reasonable probability that, in light of 

Montgomery’s statement, a factfinder could have reasonable 

doubt as to her knowing participation in the conspiracy. See, 

e.g., United States v. Gomez-Pabon, 911 F.2d 847, 853-54 

(1st Cir. 1990) (“[M]ere association with other conspirators is 

not enough to support a conspiracy conviction.”). 

We do know that Daaiyah performed at least some work 

on Delante White’s case. On September 15, 2008 – three 

days after the photo shoot – she accompanied Daum to 

examine the evidence police had seized. Daum’s paralegal 

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27

testified that she was in a room with Daaiyah looking at 

photos in connection with Delante White’s trial preparation. 

Daum’s secretary testified that Iman and Daaiyah were the 

only investigators working for Daum at the relevant time, 

even as she could not say if Daaiyah had been working on the 

case. True, recorded jailhouse calls to Delante White reflect 

that both Candice Robertson and Brittany McDaniels reported 

that more than one of Daum’s investigators facilitated the 

photo shoot – McDaniels, for example, referred to Daum’s 

“squad.” But Robertson and McDaniels disagreed as to 

whether Daaiyah, present in the courtroom during trial, was 

among Daum’s employees at the photo shoot.

There is, undoubtedly, evidence suggesting that Daaiyah 

could have been involved in the photo shoot. But the 

eyewitness testimony regarding her participation was a crucial 

part of the Government’s case against her. Whereas for Iman, 

there was other evidence supporting a theory of her 

involvement in the conspiracy and no witness – including 

Montgomery, based on his initial statement – who would rule 

out her participation, the evidence is much weaker for 

Daaiyah. Even accepting that she was “around” some other 

players in and events related to the conspiracy, the photo

shoot testimony is the most meaningful evidence that she 

shared the conspiracy’s objective and participated in it. That 

testimony was from witnesses, Candice Robertson and Jerome 

White, with grave credibility problems who received 

favorable plea agreements.

In this context, we conclude that Montgomery’s 

testimony, if delivered in the form of his original statement 

and credited by the factfinder, would have created a 

reasonable probability of a different outcome as to Daaiyah’s 

guilt. See, e.g., United States v. Tavera, 719 F.3d 705, 713-14 

(6th Cir. 2013) (remanding for new trial because “[w]e cannot 

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28

be confident how [a jury] would have” weighed competing 

evidence “in light of the entire record” under the “reasonable 

doubt” standard); see also Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 

(2012) (“[T]he State’s argument offers a reason that the jury 

could have disbelieved Boatner’s undisclosed statements, but 

gives us no confidence that it would have done so.”). Our 

“confidence in the outcome” is undermined because, absent 

the Government’s failure to comply with its Brady 

obligations, a reasonable factfinder might – or might not –

have found Daaiyah’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678.

3.

That brings us to the question of what to do with 

Daaiyah’s conviction. We previously have said: “[O]nce a 

court finds a Brady violation, a new trial follows as the 

prescribed remedy, not as a matter of discretion.” United 

States v. Oruche, 484 F.3d 590, 595 (D.C. Cir. 2007). So our 

precedent dictates the remedy for the Brady violation here.

But when a new trial alone does not cure the prejudice, 

more is required. In California v. Trombetta, the Supreme 

Court observed that “fashioning remedies for the illegal 

destruction of evidence can pose troubling choices.” 467 U.S. 

479, 486 (1984). It continued: “In nondisclosure cases, a 

court can grant the defendant a new trial at which the 

previously suppressed evidence may be introduced. But when 

evidence has been destroyed in violation of the Constitution, 

the court must choose between barring further prosecution or 

suppressing . . . the State’s most probative evidence.” Id. at 

486-87. 

We think helpful authority is to be found in United States 

v. Bohl, in which the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 

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held that dismissal was appropriate where “the disposition of 

evidence that is central to the case [has] permanently 

deprive[d] the defendant of due process.” 25 F.3d 904, 914 

(10th Cir. 1994). The case against Bohl turned on whether 

non-conforming steel had been used to build FAA towers

under a Government contract, but the Government removed 

the towers while the defendant’s request to test them was 

pending. Even though the court said “the exculpatory value 

was latent, rather than patent” because it became impossible 

to know what the tests would have shown, the destruction was 

charged against the Government, which had produced no 

explanation for spoliation of the relevant evidence. Id. at 910. 

The court therefore directed dismissal of the case.

As these cases involving the destruction of evidence 

show by analogy, courts must sometimes fashion remedies to 

address persistent prejudice arising from the prosecution’s 

failure to timely disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense. 

See United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 n.2 (1981) 

(noting the possible necessity of more drastic remedies in 

cases where “there [is] continuing prejudice which . . . could 

not be remedied by a new trial”).

Putting all this together, we think that following 

conviction, the applicable remedy analysis for a Brady 

violation is as follows: (1) a Brady violation requires a 

remedy of a new trial; (2) such new trial may require striking 

evidence, a special jury instruction, or other additional 

curative measures tailored to address persistent prejudice; and 

(3) if the lingering prejudice of a Brady violation has removed 

all possibility that the defendant could receive a new trial that 

is fair, the indictment must be dismissed. To be sure, 

dismissal is appropriate only as a last resort, where no other 

remedy would cure prejudice against a defendant. See Bank 

of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 263 (1988)

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(holding that district court had no authority to dismiss where 

lesser remedy was available); Morrison, 449 U.S. at 365; see 

also Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Fahie, 419 F.3d 249, 254 (3d 

Cir. 2005) (joining Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Tenth 

Circuits in concluding that dismissal may be appropriate 

remedy for Brady violation even as it will be a “rare 

sanction”).

We now must apply the remedy analysis to the particular 

circumstances of delayed disclosure at issue here, where the 

Brady violation has caused prejudice in two respects: first, in 

trial preparation; and second, in the potential disappearance of 

memory and the availability of evidence.

On the first point, Daaiyah’s counsel told the District 

Court just how late disclosure impeded his trial preparation:

[B]esides the prejudice of trying to still continue to listen 

to phone calls until three in the morning and putting CDs 

in my car on the way in, on the way home, I now stop 

every day. I am not talking to my client. I am not 

preparing jury instructions. I am not meeting with 

[counsel for co-Defendants]. I am running around town 

trying to find this witness.

Indeed, “[i]t is not hard to imagine the many circumstances in 

which the belated revelation of Brady material might 

meaningfully alter a defendant’s choices before and during 

trial: how to apportion time and resources to various theories 

when investigating the case, whether the defendant should 

testify, whether to focus the jury’s attention on this or that 

defense, and so on.” United States v. Burke, 571 F.3d 1048, 

1054 (10th Cir. 2009). 

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Daaiyah’s counsel never asked for a continuance, 

however, raising questions about any claim that additional 

trial preparation time would have made a difference to her

case. See United States v. Wilson, 160 F.3d 732, 741 (D.C. 

Cir. 1998) (suggesting that failure to request a continuance 

undermines defendants’ claim that they would have prepared 

for trial differently). Still, failing to recognize the costs of 

delayed disclosure would “create dangerous incentives for 

prosecutors to withhold impeachment or exculpatory 

information until after the defense has committed itself to a 

particular strategy during opening statements or until it is too 

late for the defense to effectively use the disclosed 

information.” Burke, 571 F.3d at 1054. A new trial without 

more would, at least, address any remaining trial preparation

issue for this particular Defendant.

The more challenging circumstance is that there is no 

way to determine what Montgomery would have said in 

sworn testimony timely obtained by Daaiyah’s counsel. As 

the District Court noted: “We will never know whether that 

statement would have been favorable or 

unfavorable . . . . [W]hen credibility and memory are 

significant, not to say essential as they are in this trial, the 

eight-month passage of time can indeed detract from the 

ability to make sufficient use of the testimony.” In other 

words, this case is less like one in which physical evidence 

has been turned over late and more like one in which physical 

evidence has been destroyed.

Still, the Government tells us we should do nothing. It 

cites United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640, 664 (D.C. Cir. 

1995), for the proposition that failure to call a witness may 

undermine a claim that testimony would have affected the 

outcome of the trial. But Dean’s conclusion was premised on 

the fact that the defendant had “effectively used, or had an 

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opportunity to use, all the late-disclosed or unsegregated 

exculpatory evidence at trial.” Id. Our case is different 

because we must assume the witness’s memory did not hold 

through the delay. Montgomery himself told defense counsel 

that, had they interviewed him at the time of his original 

statement, he “would have been able to tell [them] more.” 

Moreover, defense counsel contended that Government agents

“impeded and frustrated” Montgomery’s willingness to 

cooperate with them. Defendants’ decision not to call 

Montgomery in these circumstances does nothing to show 

they would not have called him had they timely learned of his 

original statement. Daaiyah’s counsel told the District Court 

in his trial opening that Montgomery would testify that the 

investigators were a man and a woman in her thirties who 

could not have been Daaiyah. But at the time of that opening 

statement, the District Court had deferred ruling on the 

defense motions for sanctions. Given that he had no curative 

remedy to rely on, the decision by Daaiyah’s counsel not to 

call Montgomery is understandable on account of concern that 

the Government would cross-examine him with the 

inconsistent statements he recently had made.

Thus, something more than a new trial is required to 

avoid prejudice to Daaiyah. The Government’s actions have 

resulted in a situation in which, absent additional remedy “[a] 

new trial would be simply a repetition of the first trial, 

similarly infected by non-disclosure of discoverable 

evidence.” United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 653 (D.C. 

Cir. 1971), abrogated in part on other grounds by Arizona v. 

Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 67-71 (1988).

Defendants presented the District Court with multiple

suggestions for appropriate remedies. In their written pretrial 

motion, they proposed an order precluding the Government 

from introducing any testimony regarding the photo shoot. 

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During the trial they asked the District Court to preclude the 

Government from cross-examining Montgomery, and the 

District Court denied that request. We appreciate that the first 

proposed remedy would be extreme and the second proposed 

remedy unusual. It appears that the District Court may have 

thought it lacked authority to impose such remedies. See Tr. 

June 5, 2012 (p.m.) at 4 (“[T]here’s absolutely no case law 

supporting such a drastic, draconian way of dealing with the 

problem and mitigating any prejudice.”). To the contrary, 

however, if a remedy is available that gives the defendant a 

fair trial – such as precluding cross-examination completely 

or precluding impeachment with a prior statement – that

remedy is preferable to dismissal of the indictment. See, e.g., 

United States v. Makarita, 576 F. App’x 252, 262 (4th Cir. 

2014) (approving district court’s curative instruction telling 

the jury to disregard certain testimony related to withheld 

evidence); see also Dean, 55 F.3d at 664 (discussing 

approvingly a district court giving defense counsel the choice 

of remedy for a Brady violation to strike documents, give 

cautionary instructions to the jury, or simply cross-examine 

and seek to discredit testimony). “Where the district court 

concludes that the government was dilatory in its compliance 

with Brady, to the prejudice of the defendant, the district court 

has discretion to determine an appropriate remedy, whether it 

be exclusion of the witness, limitations on the scope of 

permitted testimony, instructions to the jury, or even 

mistrial.” Burke, 571 F.3d at 1054. Indeed, “[t]he choice of 

remedy is in the sound discretion of the district court.” Id.;

see also United States v. Miranda, 526 F.2d 1319, 1325 n.4 

(2d Cir. 1975) (stating that where Government has failed to 

carry out its Brady obligations, appropriate sanctions may 

include “the exclusion or suppression of other evidence 

concerning the subject matter of the undisclosed material”).

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It is important to our conclusion that Daaiyah’s counsel 

engaged in a good faith effort to craft a sanction that would fit 

the Government’s violation. Almost invariably, it will not do 

for a defendant to tell a district court that the only cure is 

dismissal of the indictment, and then to settle for something 

less on appeal that would be a basis for a second trial. Here, 

we think the defense gave the District Court some reasonable 

options. And the motivation concern works the other way, 

too, in that a prosecutor who learns of a Brady failure must 

have incentive to work with the court to remedy the violation

rather than, as was done here, to ask only that the failure be 

forgiven and forgotten. The effectiveness of our system 

requires more: As an inscription in the alcove outside the 

Attorney General’s Office reads, “The United States wins its 

point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.” 

Quoted in David W. Ogden, Memorandum for Department 

Prosecutors, Jan. 4, 2010, at http://www.justice.gov/dag/

memorandum-department-prosecutors-0.

We do not reach our new trial conclusion lightly, not 

least because the charges in this case relate to the integrity of 

process in our courts. There is, however, no way around the 

fact that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 

favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 

where the evidence is material either to guilt or to

punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 

prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. “By now government 

prosecutors should know: ‘Betray Brady, give short shrift to 

Giglio, and you will lose your ill-gotten conviction.’” 

Vaughn v. United States, 93 A.3d 1237, 1267 (D.C. 2014) 

(quoting United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 

2013) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of petition for 

rehearing en banc)). The application of that rule is the bottom 

line here.

USCA Case #13-3028 Document #1567860 Filed: 08/14/2015 Page 34 of 35
35

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm all convictions of 

Appellants Daum and Iman Pasha, and we vacate the 

conviction of Appellant Daaiyah Pasha and remand to the 

District Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It 

is

So ordered.

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