Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01333/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01333-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Fort Collins, Colorado
Not Party
Fort Collins Police Department
Not Party
Thomas Streufert
Appellee
Ernie Tellez
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I L ....... J.,) 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Unit.ed States ~rtofi AppealP Tenth Crrcu t 

THOMAS STREUFERT, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

CITY OF FORT COLLINS, COLORADO; FORT 

COLLINS POLICE DEPARTMENT, sued as: 

Police Department of the City of Fort 

Collins, Colorado; ERNIE TELLEZ, as an 

officer of the City of Fort Collins 

Police Department, 

Defendants, 

and 

ERNIE TELLEZ, in his individual 

capacity, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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DECO 9 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

) No. 91-1333 

) (D.C. No. 91-C-184) 

) (D. Colo.) 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and SAFFELS,** Senior 

District Judge. 

**Honorable Dale E. Saffels, Senior District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-1333 Document: 010110151465 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Defendant Ernie Tellez appeals from the district court's 

denial of his summary judgment motion, in which he claimed 

qualified immunity from suit. The district court refused to grant 

defendant's motion because it found that there were material 

issues of fact regarding defendant's entitlement to qualified 

immunity which remained in dispute. 

This action arises out of events occurring on the evening of 

February 11, 1989. The defendant was at a Fort Collins bar in his 

official capacity as a Fort Collins, Colorado, police officer. 

The plaintiff and his wife were at the same bar on the same 

evening. At closing time, the defendant arrested the plaintiff 

for harassment after witnessing a series of events in which the 

plaintiff was involved. The plaintiff claims that the defendant 

is not entitled to qualified immunity because there are material 

questions of fact as to whether the defendant had probable cause 

to arrest the plaintiff. 

When a district court's denial of a qualified immunity 

summary judgment motion is '"grounded upon a finding that disputed 

material facts exist in the case,'" an interlocutory appeal may be 

taken. Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 579 (10th Cir. 1990) 

(quoting Devargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714, 

719 (10th Cir. 1988)). When a defendant asserts the defense of 

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Appellate Case: 91-1333 Document: 010110151465 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 2 
qualified immunity, the plaintiff must establish that the 

defendant "violated 'clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known.'" Id. at 579-80 (quoting Powell v. Mikulecky. 891 F.2d 

1454, 1456 (10th Cir. 1989)). Further, the defendant bears the 

normal summary judgment burden of showing that no material facts 

exist which would defeat the claim of qualified immunity only 

after the plaintiff has shown violation of a clearly established 

right. Id. at 580. In this case, there is no question that 

plaintiff had a clearly established right not to be the subject of 

a warrantless arrest without probable cause, Karr v. Smith, 774 

F.2d 1029, 1031 (10th Cir. 1985), and, in denying summary 

judgment, the district court must have implicitly determined that 

the "plaintiff had carried his initial burden of alleging conduct 

in violation of clearly established law." Stewart, 915 F.2d at 

580. Consequently, the defendant, as summary judgment movant, 

must "demonstrate that no material issues of fact remain as to 

whether the defendant's actions were objectively reasonable in 

light of the law and the information the defendant possessed at 

the time of his actions." Salmon v. Schwarz, 948 F.2d 1131, 1136 

(10th Cir. 1991). 

The defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if a 

reasonable police officer could have believed, in light of clearly 

established law and the information possessed by him at the time, 

that probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff. Hunter v. 

Bryant, 112 S. Ct. 534, 536-37 (1991). Further, even if the 

defendant erred in concluding that he had probable cause to make 

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Appellate Case: 91-1333 Document: 010110151465 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 3 
the warrantless arrest, he would be entitled to immunity if his 

belief was reasonable. Id. at 537. Margin for reasonable error 

by the officer exists because '"officials should not err always on 

the side of caution' because they fear being sued." Id. (quoting 

Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 196 (1984)). 

Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, we hold that the defendant's actions were objectively 

reasonable in light of the law and the information he possessed at 

the time of his actions. Consequently, the defendant is entitled 

to qualified immunity. At the very least, the undisputed facts 

show that the defendant observed the plaintiff holding onto a 

woman's hand as they left the bar at closing time. The woman was 

very intoxicated, she was falling and stumbling as they walked, 

and the plaintiff did not stop to allow the intoxicated woman to 

regain her balance or composure. Further, the defendant got the 

impression, from all that he observed, that the plaintiff was not 

happy with the woman. They reached two steps and the woman, while 

still in the half falling-half walking state, lunged down the 

stairs. She twisted during the fall, landing on her back. At 

that point, the defendant approached the fallen woman and the 

plaintiff, who was now at the bottom of the steps, and arrested 

the plaintiff for harassment. 1 We also hold that the defendant's 

1 Pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-111(1), an individual 

guilty of harassment if he: 

.. with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another 

person, he: 

(a) strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise 

person or subjects him to physical contact; . 

4 

touches a 

is 

Appellate Case: 91-1333 Document: 010110151465 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 4 
actions were objectively reasonable in charging the plaintiff with 

resisting arrest, especially in light of the fact that the 

plaintiff himself admitted that he was jostling and wriggling when 

the defendant and another officer were attempting to arrest him 

for harassment. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado is REVERSED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 91-1333 Document: 010110151465 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 5