Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06168/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06168-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
County of Alameda
Defendant
Sarah Krause
Defendant
Justin Linn
Defendant
Erik McDermott
Defendant
Stephen Sarcos
Defendant
Fernando Miguel Soria
Plaintiff

Document Text:

ORDER – No. 18-cv-06168-LB

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

San Francisco Division 

FERNANDO MIGUEL SORIA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 18-cv-06168-LB 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT 

SARA KRAUSE'S MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

Re: ECF No. 25 

INTRODUCTION 

In his complaint, the plaintiff claims that four Alameda County deputy sheriffs violated his 

civil rights by causing another inmate to douse him with feces and urine, spraying him with mace, 

breaking his arm, and denying him medical attention, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution and (in one claim) the Eighth Amendment.1

 One 

defendant is former deputy Sarah Krause, who moves to dismiss the claims against her under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.2 The court can decide the 

motion without oral argument. See Civ. L. R. 7-1(b). The court denies the motion to dismiss 

 

1

 Compl. – ECF No. 1. Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint 

citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents. 

2

 Mot. – ECF No. 25. 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-06168-LB 2

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except that it grants the motion to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim because as a pretrial 

detainee, the plaintiff cannot bring a claim under the Eighth Amendment. 

 

STATEMENT

Mr. Soria has a “history of depression and other psychological disorders.”3 In August 2016, he 

went to John George Psychiatric Pavilion in San Leandro, California, to refill a prescription 

prescribed to treat depression.4 The staff there tried to sedate him by giving him a shot, and he 

objected and struggled with the staff.5 Alameda County Sheriff’s deputies responded and arrested 

Mr. Soria for resisting arrest in violation of California Penal Code § 148(a)(1), took him into 

custody, and booked him into Santa Rita (Alameda County) Jail.6 Mr. Soria was housed in an 

isolation cell for “at least two days” and then was taken to administrative segregation.7

“On several evenings between September and November of 2016,” four deputies — Justin 

Linn, Erik McDermott, Stephen Sarcos, and Sarah Krause — conspired to have another inmate 

known as “Preacher” “gas” (or douse) Mr. Soria with urine and feces from a shampoo bottle.8

They did this by opening the doors to the two inmates’ cells and convincing Preacher to gas Mr. 

Soria.9 Mr. Soria was not allowed to shower and had to clean himself and his clothes with water 

from the toilet in his cell.10 After one gassing incident, the four deputies did not provide Mr. Soria 

with clean clothes for two to three days.11 

 

3

 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 4 (¶ 11). 

4 Id.

5 Id. (¶ 12). 

6 Id. (¶ 13). 

7 Id. 

8 Id. (¶ 14). 

9 Id.

10 Id.

11 Id. at 5 (¶ 15). 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-06168-LB 3

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Another time, Mr. Soria tried to close his door after the deputies opened his handcuffing port 

“ostensibly to allow Preacher to gas” him.12 Deputies Lin, McDermott, Krause, “and/or” Sarcos 

kicked the port shut while Mr. Soria’s arm was extended through it, breaking his arm.13 Mr. Soria 

did not receive medical attention for a week, despite his several complaints of pain and injury.14

Another time, Deputy McDermott sprayed mace on Mr. Soria’s chest while he was lying 

down.15 Mr. Soria protested the treatment, was not allowed to wash the mace off, and could only 

“wash his clothes in the sink during ‘yard time.’”16 

Another time, after the deputies caused Mr. Soria “to be doused with feces and urine,” Deputy 

McDermott took Mr. Soria’s dirty clothes but refused to give him clean ones.17 On that occasion, 

there was no mat in his cell, so Mr. Soria slept on the concrete floor with no blanket.18 

On another occasion, the deputies caused a gassing of Mr. Soria, who was doused in urine and 

feces and not allowed to clean himself, and as a result, vomited and convulsed.19 

On “more than one but less than five occasions,” a civilian employee saw Deputy Linn 

“release Preacher from his cell while the handcuffing ports on [Mr. Soria’s] cell were left open.”20

The civilian employee saw Preacher gas Mr. Soria.21 Preacher was “known to spray urine and 

feces” into open handcuffing ports on days that Deputies Lin, McDermott, Krause, and Sarcos 

worked in the housing unit.22 

 

12 Id. (¶ 16). 

13 Id. 

14 Id.

15 Id. (¶ 17). 

16 Id.

17 Id. (¶ 18). 

18 Id. 

19 Id. (¶ 19). 

20 Id. (¶ 20). 

21 Id.

22 Id.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-06168-LB 4

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One time, Mr. Soria watched Deputy Linn lead Preacher out of his cell (unrestrained) to 

another cell door on the upper tier of the housing unit.23 Deputy Linn unlocked the handcuffing 

port of the door, and Preacher “dispense[d] something into the occupied cell through the 

handcuffing port.”24 Later, the inmate from that cell told investigators that Preacher gassed him 

with feces and urine.25 Preacher admitted to investigators that he doused the other prisoner with 

feces and urine and “later admitted that the gassing was planned with the help of Defendants 

Krause and Sarcos.”26 “Preacher also admitted the conspirators’ intent was that Preacher gas Soria, 

but mistakenly gassed the wrong inmate.”27 

“After the initial Investigation,” Deputy Lin spoke to an inmate worker and asked him to tell 

other inmates that Mr. Soria was “a snitch in an attempt to dissuade Soria from cooperating with 

law enforcement.28 However, the inmate worker declined to do so.”29

Deputies Krause and Sarcos “admitted to the conspiracy and were arrested for Assault and 

Battery” in August 2017.30 The Alameda County District Attorney is prosecuting Deputies Lin, 

McDermott, Krause, and Sarcos.31 The criminal complaint charges defendant Krause only in 

Count Seven, which charges the assault of Johnny Jerome Bowie (not Mr. Soria).32

Mr. Soria contracted Hepatitis C while in jail.33

 

23 Id. at 5–6 (¶ 21). 

24 Id. 

25 Id. 

26 Id.

27 Id. 

28 Id. at 6 (¶ 22). 

29 Id. 

30 Id. (¶ 23). 

31 Id.

32 Criminal Complaint – ECF No. 48; Req. for Judicial Notice – ECF No. 25-2. The court takes 

judicial notice of the complaint, which is a public record, and also can consider the complaint under 

the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001); 

Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2005). 

33 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 6 (¶ 24). 

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Mr. Soria brings five claims against the four deputies, including Ms. Krause, who moves to 

dismiss the claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) for failure to state a claim.34 The 

claims are as follows: (1) claim one: excessive force for breaking his arm, in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; (2) claim three: denial of medical attention in 

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) claim four: conspiracy to violate his civil rights 

based on all of the conduct; (4) claim five: deliberate indifference in violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment based on all of the conduct; and (5) claim six: deliberate indifference in violation of 

the Eighth Amendment based on all of the conduct.35

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief” to give the defendant “fair notice” of what the claims are and the grounds upon 

which they rest. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the 

‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to 

raise a claim for relief above the speculative level[.]” Id. (internal citations omitted). 

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, which 

when accepted as true, “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are 

 

34 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 7–13 (¶¶ 28–57); Mot. – ECF No. 25 at 2. Defendants Erik McDermott and 

Stephen Sarcos answered the complaint. Answers – ECF Nos. 24 and 35. On March 12, 2019, the 

court set aside the clerk’s entry of default against Justin Linn, who has not yet filed his responsive 

pleading. Order – ECF No. 51. 

35 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 7–13 (¶¶ 28–57). 

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merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and 

plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 557). 

If a court dismisses a complaint, it should give leave to amend unless the “the pleading could 

not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. 

Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). 

ANALYSIS 

The court denies the motion to dismiss claims one, three, four, and five and grants the motion 

to dismiss claim six. 

First, claim one charges excessive force. The Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee 

from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 

2466, 2473 (2015) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989)). Although protected 

by the Due Process Clause, the Fourth Amendment “sets the applicable constitutional limitations 

for considering claims of excessive force during pretrial detention.” Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 

290 F.3d 1175, 1197 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation omitted), overruled on other grounds by 

Castro v. Cnty, of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016).36 The defendant claims that the 

complaint does not allege sufficient facts about her use of excessive force. The court disagrees. 

Among other facts, Mr. Soria alleged that the four deputies opened the handcuffing port to allow 

Preacher to gas him and then kicked it shut, breaking his arm.37 The defendant nonetheless argues 

that it is not logical that all deputies kicked the port, thereby breaking his arm.38 But at the 

pleadings stage, the court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Mr. Soria necessarily saw which 

deputy kicked the door. The allegations give fair notice of the claim and the grounds for it. 

 

36 For this reason, the defendant’s argument — that the claim fails because it was brought under the 

Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment — fails. See Opp. – ECF No. 25-1 at 10. 

37 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 5 (¶ 16). 

38 Mot. – ECF No. 25-1 at 10–11. 

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Second, claim three charges that after the deputies kicked the port door and broke Mr. Soria’s 

arm, they failed to give him medical attention for over a week.39 Deliberate indifference to a 

pretrial detainee’s serious medical needs violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 

Clause. Id. at 1187 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). The defendant claims that 

the plaintiff has not pleaded facts specific to her showing a sufficiently culpable state of mind in 

denying medical care.40 At the pleadings stage, the allegations about causing a broken arm and 

leaving it untreated are sufficient to give notice of the claims. The fact issues surrounding 

responsibility and a sufficiently culpable mind are better addressed at summary judgment. (As the 

plaintiff points out, Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1988), is a summary-judgment case.41) 

Third, claim four charges conspiracy to violate Mr. Soria’s civil rights. The defendant moves 

to dismiss it in part on the ground that an element of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 is racial or 

class-based animus.42 See Griffin v. Brekenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1971). Technically, the 

caption references 42 U.S.C. § 1985.43 But the claim references § 1983.44 Conspiracy is not itself a 

constitutional tort under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 935 (9th Cir. 

2012) (en banc). It does not enlarge the nature of the claims asserted by the plaintiff, as there must 

always be an underlying constitutional violation. Id. Nonetheless, conspiracy may enlarge the pool 

of responsible defendants by demonstrating their causal connection to the violation; the fact of the 

conspiracy may make a party liable for the unconstitutional actions of the party with whom he has 

conspired. Id. Conspiracy in § 1983 actions is usually alleged by plaintiffs to draw in private 

parties who would otherwise not be susceptible to a § 1983 action because of the state action 

doctrine, or to aid in proving claims against otherwise tenuously connected parties in a complex 

 

39 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 5 (¶ 16). 

40 Mot. – ECF No. 25-1 at 11–12. 

41 Opp. – ECF No. 34 at 8. 

42 Mot. – ECF No. 25-1 at 14. 

43 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 11, line 12. 

44 Id. at 12, line 7. 

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case. Id. Here, the fact allegations are that the defendants acted in concert and, at the pleadings 

stage, give notice of the claims. 

Fourth, claim five charges deliberate indifference in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 

based on the deputies’ conduct. The Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due-process clause 

protects against the arbitrary or oppressive exercise of government power. Cnty. of Sacramento v. 

Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998). “Only official conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ is 

cognizable as a due process violation.” Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846). At the pleadings stage, the fact allegations meet this standard 

and give notice of the claims. 

Fifth, claim six charges deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment based on 

the deputies’ conduct. As a pretrial detainee, Mr. Soria’s claim for his injuries arises under the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment. Castro v. Cnty. of Los 

Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (citing Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535). The 

plaintiff does not address the issue in the opposition, instead addresses claims five and six 

together, references only the Fourteenth Amendment, and predicates both claims on the same 

facts.45 The plaintiff thus does not dispute that the claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

The court dismisses claim six, which in any event duplicates claim five (the Fourteenth 

Amendment claim) in that both are predicated on the same conduct.46 

CONCLUSION 

The court grants the motion to dismiss claim six, the Eighth Amendment claim, and otherwise 

denies the motion to dismiss. This disposes of ECF No. 25. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 16, 2019 ______________________________________ 

LAUREL BEELER 

United States Magistrate Judge 

 

45 Opp. – ECF No. 34 at 7–8. 

46 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 12–13 (¶¶ 49, 52–53, 55, 57). 

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