Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cr-00509/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cr-00509-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bernadette Dickerson
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

) CRIMINAL ACTION NO.

 v. ) 2:14cr509-MHT

) (WO)

BERNADETTE DICKERSON )

OPINION AND ORDER

This cause is before the court on defendant 

Bernadette Dickerson’s motions for revocation of United 

States Magistrate Judge Terry F. Moorer’s order that 

she be detained pending sentencing. Dickerson pled 

guilty to one count of knowingly attempting to bribe an 

individual not to testify against her son in a criminal 

prosecution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1512(b)(2)(A). A district court may revoke or amend 

a magistrate judge’s detention order under 18 U.S.C. § 

3145(b). The court reviews the magistrate judge’s 

detention order de novo. See United States v. King, 

849 F.2d 485, 489-490 (11th Cir. 1988). 

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Based on the court’s independent and de novo review 

of the transcript of the evidentiary hearing on 

detention, the arguments of the parties, and the 

motions, briefs, and attached evidentiary submissions,

the court will deny the Dickerson’s motions and adopt 

the magistrate judge’s detention order. See King, 849 

F.2d at 490-491 (setting forth procedures for district 

courts to follow on motions to revoke or amend 

detention orders entered by magistrate judges). 

I.

The magistrate judge found Dickerson’s detention 

required under 18 U.S.C. § 3143, which sets forth the 

conditions under which a court may order a convicted 

defendant released pending sentencing. “Unlike a 

defendant who has not yet been convicted and for whom 

the statute gives a presumption for [release] ...

except in certain circumstances, see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3142(b), once a defendant has been convicted, albeit 

not yet sentenced, the burden shifts to defendant.” 

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United States v. Strong, 775 F.2d 504, 505 (3d Cir. 

1985). Section 3143(a) creates a rebuttable presumption 

of detention for all defendants, with the exception of 

those defendants “for whom the applicable [sentencing] 

guideline ... does not recommend a term of 

imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a) (emphasis added). 

Here, Dickerson concedes that the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines recommend imprisonment for her 

conviction, and the court so finds.1 Therefore, the 

presumption of detention applies to this case.

Under § 3143(a), “[t]he court ‘shall order’

detention unless defendant shows by ‘clear and 

convincing evidence’ that (1) s/he is not likely to 

 

1. Under USSG § 2J1.2, the applicable base-offense 

level for Dickerson’s offense is 14. As the court does 

not have evidence before it that would allow it 

reliably to determine Dickerson’s criminal-history 

category, the court will assume for purposes of 

argument that Dickerson has the lowest criminal-history 

category of I. With a criminal-history category of I, 

Dickerson would be subject to a prison term of 15-to-21 

months. Even if she received a 3-point offense-level 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the 

Sentencing Guidelines would still recommend a sentence 

of imprisonment. 

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flee or (2) pose a danger to the safety of the 

community or any person therein if released.” United 

States v. Strong, 775 F.2d 504, 505 (3d Cir. 1985)

(quoting § 3143(a)). See also United States v. MansoPortes, 838 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) 

(same); cf. United States v. Giancola, 754 F.2d 898, 

900-01 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (release pending 

appeal).

The court will evaluate the evidence regarding 

risk of flight first and potential danger second. 

II.

Dickerson argues that she is not a flight risk 

because she has never before fled from legal problem. 

The evidence before the court on this issue is mixed. 

Dickerson has failed to appear for multiple traffic 

tickets over the years, but it is unclear how long ago 

these failures occurred, and the government conceded 

that she ultimately resolved the cases. Dickerson 

testified that she missed these traffic-court 

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appearances due to hospitalizations. However, 

Dickerson has a demonstrated history of lying to this 

court: she first wrote a letter to the court seeking to 

withdraw her guilty plea, then wrote another letter in 

which she attempted to convince the court that someone 

else had written the first letter. She later admitted 

to writing both letters. Therefore, because 

Dickerson’s word cannot be trusted and without proof in 

the form of medical records, the court does not accept 

her medical excuse, and there is no evidence that she 

failed to appear for any other cases. 

Dickerson further points out that she is a lifelong 

resident of Montgomery County, Alabama, and testified 

that she has a home, business, husband, and other 

family in the county. While Dickerson has not 

presented any evidence that she is a lifelong resident 

of Montgomery County, the court assumes for purposes of 

this discussion that she could prove this fact. The 

testimony of the probation officer confirmed that she 

lives in Montgomery in a home owned by a family member 

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with her husband and son. Dickerson also testified 

that she wants to get out of jail so that she can 

operate her tax-preparation business in advance of the 

April 15th IRS income-tax filing deadline. If she is 

unable to work during the coming month and a half, she

contends, she will lose much of her planned income for 

this year. However, as demonstrated above, Dickerson 

has a history of lying to this court. Given this 

history, the court is not inclined to accept her word

about her business as proof without some documentation. 

She has not provided the court with any documentary 

evidence or testimony from a third party confirming the 

existence of her tax business. 

Accordingly, while Dickerson has put forward some 

evidence that she is not likely to flee, it is not 

clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome 

the presumption of detention. In any case, the court 

has some concern that Dickerson might attempt to flee 

if released and that no conditions the court could 

impose would reduce that risk. 

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What causes the court the most concern is 

Dickerson’s willingness to resort to lying and 

manipulation to get out of jail, combined with her 

history of resisting arrest and recent volatile 

behavior. During her incarceration, Dickerson, who is 

represented by counsel, repeatedly has written directly 

to the court, making wild accusations in her letters 

against a variety of people. As mentioned above, in 

one letter, she attempted to mislead the court by 

claiming she had not written one of the letters. While 

her desperation to get out of jail is certainly 

understandable, her tactics create concern that she 

cannot be trusted. 

Furthermore, Dickerson has a recent history of 

extreme impulsivity and an oppositional attitude 

towards court personnel and law enforcement. She twice 

has been accused of physically resisting arrest, has 

been convicted of harassment; has antagonized and 

fought with other inmates in the jail; and has been 

hostile with court probation officers. Indeed, she 

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even had to be removed from the courtroom during a 

hearing about her son’s criminal case in this court. 

Conditions such as home confinement and electronic 

monitoring would not suffice to ensure her appearance 

in court given her lack of respect for court officials 

and out-of-control behavior. 

III.

Dickerson also has failed to show by clear and 

convincing evidence that she is not likely to pose a 

danger to others if released. Dickerson argues, in 

response to the government’s evidence that she has 

twice been accused of physically resisting arrest, that 

those prior incidents should not be held against her 

because she was under extreme stress at the time. 

However, Dickerson is under extreme stress now, so the 

court sees no reason to distinguish Dickerson’s current 

predicament from the ones underlying her previous 

episodes with police. 

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Dickerson also points out that there is no evidence

in the record that she threatened violence or used 

violence against the witnesses she sought to bribe.

While this is true, the record contains other evidence 

suggesting her willingness to resort to violence. Jail 

records establish that Dickerson recently engaged in a 

physical altercation with another inmate in the jail, 

and that she and the other inmate had to be pulled 

apart to stop the fight. Additionally, as mentioned 

earlier, Dickerson recently was ordered removed from 

court during her son’s case and engaged in oppositional 

behavior with the probation officers, who would have to 

supervise her were she released. While verbally 

oppositional behavior in itself is not necessarily 

dangerous, it reflects that Dickerson lacks both 

respect for officials and emotional control, two traits 

which could easily lead to dangerous behavior. 

In support of her request for release, Dickerson 

also mentions that she suffers from a number of serious 

medical conditions. However, she has presented no 

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medical records or other evidence to support her health 

claims, and here again the court is not inclined to 

accept her claims without additional proof.

2 

Finally, Dickerson has not suggested any conditions 

that would reduce the risk of danger to others that she

would pose if released. Nor can the court conceive of 

any, given her recent volatility. 

In sum, Dickerson has failed to overcome the 

presumption in favor of detention pending sentencing 

with clear and convincing evidence that she is unlikely 

to flee or pose a danger to others if released under 

any conditions. 

***

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

(1) The motions for revocation or amendment of the 

detention order (doc. nos. 33 and 39) are denied. 

 

2. The court further notes that these medical 

conditions were not disabling enough to prevent her 

from fighting in the jail. 

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(2) The detention order of the United States 

Magistrate Judge (doc. no. 25) is adopted.

 DONE, this the 11th day of March, 2015.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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