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Parties Involved:
Longleaf in Vinings Homeowners Association, Inc.
Appellant
QBE Insurance Corporation
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-11528

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-03132-AT

LONGLEAF IN VININGS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

QBE INSURANCE CORPORATION,

 Defendant - Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(March 29, 2016)

Before WILSON, WILLIAM PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Longleaf in Vinings Homeowners Association (Longleaf) appeals the 

district court’s dismissal of its bad faith failure to pay and breach of contract

claims against its insurer, QBE Insurance (QBE). In May 2012, a hailstorm 

damaged property covered by Longleaf’s insurance policy with QBE. Longleaf 

notified QBE of the damage in February 2013, but QBE refused to indemnify

Longleaf. Longleaf then filed this diversity action in district court, asserting that 

QBE’s refusal violated Longleaf’s policy and constituted bad faith failure to pay. 

The district court granted summary judgment to QBE on both Longleaf’s claims. 

The court found that QBE was not obligated to indemnify Longleaf because

Longleaf’s policy required Longleaf to promptly notify QBE of the storm-related 

damage, Longleaf failed to do so, and Longleaf did not establish a justification for 

the delay. On appeal, Longleaf argues that a triable issue exists as to whether its 

delay in providing notice to QBE was justified and, as a result, summary judgment

was improper.

1

 We affirm.

I

Summary judgment may be granted only if “there is no genuine issue as to 

any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 

 1 Longleaf also appears to disagree with the district court’s findings that (1) under 

Longleaf’s policy with QBE, prompt notice was a condition precedent for coverage and (2) 

Longleaf’s notice to QBE was actually delayed. However, Longleaf makes only vague, passing 

references to these determinations. Therefore, it has abandoned any challenges to them. See 

United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1186

(2015).

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law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 

(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Genuine disputes are those in which 

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1325–26 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “For factual issues to be considered genuine, 

they must have a real basis in the record.” Id. at 1326 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Relatedly, affidavits that are not based on personal knowledge “cannot 

raise genuine issues of fact, and thus . . . cannot defeat a motion for summary 

judgment.” Id. at 1326–27.

II

As a threshold matter, we must identify the state law governing Longleaf’s 

claims. Because the forum state is Georgia, we apply Georgia’s choice-of-law 

rules. See Boardman Petroleum, Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 750, 

752 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Federal courts sitting in diversity apply the forum state’s 

choice-of-law rules.”). In Georgia, contract-based claims, like Longleaf’s, are 

governed “by the law of the place where [the contract] w[as] made” unless the 

contract was drafted to be performed in a different state. See id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Longleaf’s policy was issued in Georgia and its terms concerned 

property in Georgia. Thus, Georgia law controls Longleaf’s claims. See id.

III

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Under Georgia law, “when an insurance policy includes a notice 

requirement” and “the insured unreasonably fails to timely comply with the . . . 

requirement, the insurer is not obligated to provide a defense or coverage.” See 

Forshee v. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 711 S.E.2d 28, 31 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). As 

noted above, Longleaf’s policy required it to provide “prompt notice” to QBE in 

the event of loss or damage. “Prompt notice” is notice that is given with 

“reasonable diligence and within a reasonable length of time in view of the 

attending circumstances of each particular case.” See Advocate Networks, LLC v. 

Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 674 S.E.2d 617, 619 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).2

 Hence, “unexcused significant delay” violates a 

policy’s “prompt notice” requirement, but a delay in notice does not contravene 

such a requirement if the insured offers a valid justification for the delay. See id.

(“Because [the insured] provides no other reasonable explanation for the fourmonth delay at issue, the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, that it violated 

the provision of the policies requiring that . . . [notice] be immediately [given] to 

[the insurer].”). An insured bears the burden of establishing a justification for the 

delay. See Kay-Lex Co. v. Essex Ins. Co., 649 S.E.2d 602, 606 (Ga. Ct. App. 

2007).

 2 In Advocate Networks, the court addressed a policy requiring “immediate” notice, but 

the court equated that requirement with a “duty to provide [the insurer] prompt notice.” See 674 

S.E.2d at 619.

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Here, Longleaf did not notify QBE of the damage caused by the hailstorm 

until nine months after the storm. Absent a reasonable explanation, this delay

clearly violated the “prompt notice” requirement in Longleaf’s policy. See 

Advocate Networks, 674 S.E.2d at 619 (holding that a four-month delay without 

justification violated the policy’s notice requirement); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. 

J.B. Forrest & Sons, Inc., 209 S.E.2d 6, 8–11 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (same); 

Richmond v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 231 S.E.2d 245, 249 (Ga. Ct. App. 

1976) (“[T]he eight months delay in notifying the insurer was unreasonable as a 

matter of law.”). As such, Longleaf focuses its appeal on its excuse for the delay. 

Longleaf contends that the delay was justified because it did not become aware of 

the damage at issue until more than six months after the hailstorm. 

However, the only evidence Longleaf offers in support of this assertion is an 

affidavit from its current president, and that affidavit is insufficient to create a 

triable issue as to whether the delay was justified. Specifically, the affidavit cannot 

establish a triable issue because it was not based on personal knowledge. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (An affidavit used to oppose a motion for summary judgment 

“must be made on personal knowledge.”); Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1326–27. The district 

court held that the president’s affidavit does not meet this threshold requirement, 

explaining:

Although [the president] states that he is Longleaf’s 

president, it is undisputed that [he] was not Longleaf’s 

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president either when the loss purportedly occurred or 

when the loss was reported to QBE some nine months 

later. . . . [Furthermore,] [t]he Affidavit does not indicate 

. . . the nature of [the president’s] association with 

Longleaf during the relevant timeframe or provide any 

basis for his knowledge of the events discussed in the 

Affidavit.

See Longleaf in Vinings Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. QBE Ins. Corp., No. 13-3132, 

slip. op. at 14 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 12, 2015). 

We must defer to the district court’s “lack of personal knowledge”

determination unless the court abused its discretion by making a “clear error of 

judgment” or applying “the wrong legal standard.” See Corwin v. Walt Disney 

Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1249 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); id.

at 1249–52 (reviewing for abuse of discretion whether the district court erred in 

determining that two affidavits were inadmissible because they were not supported 

by personal knowledge). Based on our review of the record, we cannot conclude 

that the court committed such error. Therefore, the affidavit is inadequate to 

satisfy Longleaf’s burden of establishing a triable issue as to whether the delayed 

notice was justified, see Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1326–27, and the district court properly 

granted summary judgment to QBE, see Advocate Networks, 674 S.E.2d at 619.

AFFIRMED.

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