Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01151/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01151-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Albert George Curtis
Plaintiff
HD Development of Maryland, Inc
Defendant
HD Properties of Maryland
Defendant
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

This is a disability related lawsuit brought by Plaintiff Albert Curtis (“Curtis”) against 

Defendants Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. and HD Development of Maryland, Inc. (collectively 

“Home Depot”). Curtis alleges violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”), as well as violation of California law. Curtis initially identified 29 barriers at a Home 

Depot store, but through stipulation by the parties, only 10 barriers remain in dispute. See Doc. 

No. 52. Now before the Court are the parties‟ cross motions for summary judgment. For the 

reasons that follow, the motions will be granted in part and denied in part. 

BACKGROUND1

Curtis is a disabled individual. See JUMF 1. Curtis is paralyzed from his mid-section 

 

1

“JUMF” refers to Joint Undisputed Material Fact, “PUMF” refers to Plaintiff‟s Undisputed Material Fact, and 

“DUMF” refers to Defendant‟s Undisputed Material Fact. The parties have objected to some of the submitted 

evidence. If the Court relies on evidence to which objections have been made, the objections are deemed overruled.

ALBERT GEORGE CURTIS,

Plaintiff

v.

HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., a Delaware 

corporation, and HD DEVELOPMENT 

OF MARYLAND, INC., a Maryland 

corporation d.b.a. HD Properties of 

Maryland,

Defendants

CASE NO. 1:13-CV-1151 AWI GSA 

ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Doc. Nos. 43, 46)

Case 1:13-cv-01151-AWI-GSA Document 57 Filed 01/23/15 Page 1 of 20
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down to his feet and uses a manual wheelchair for mobility. See PUMF‟s 1, 3, 4. The Home 

Depot store located at 3500 Demaree St., Visalia, California (“the Store”) has areas that are open 

to the public, which are places of public accommodation. JUMF 2. The Store was built in 1995-

1996, and therefore the new construction guidelines identified in the 1991 Americans with 

Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”), found at 28 C.F.F. Part 36 App. A, apply 

to the Store for purposes of determining whether a violation of the ADA existed at the time of 

Curtis‟s visits to the Store and whether any violations of the ADA continue to exist. See JUMF 3. 

Curtis visited the Store on April 3, 2013, see JUMF 5, made two visits in March 2013, made two 

visits in May 2013, and made two visits in June 2013. See PUMF 7. In addition to these visits, 

Curtis has visited the Store on numerous occasions. See PUMF 8, 37. Curtis has been patronizing 

the Store prior to 2000, and plans to return and continue to patronize the Store. See PUMF 40, 41. 

Curtis generally has a need to shop at the Store about once a month. See Curtis Dec. ¶ 34.

The area in front of the Store marked with yellow hash marks is the accessible route from 

the accessible parking area to the Store‟s main entrance. PUMF 9. During each of Curtis‟s 

documented visits to the Store, Curtis found that the accessible route from the accessible parking 

area to the entrance to the Store, as well as the entrance to nursery, were obstructed by 

merchandise for sale placed in the accessible route. See PUMF‟s 3, 5, 7, 10. Home Depot 

obstructed the accessible route around Christmas 2013 by placing a Christmas Tree display within 

the route. See PUMF 13. The Store‟s accessible route was also obstructed by merchandise in 

August 2007. See PUMF 14. The accessible route from the accessible parking area was often 

reduced to zero width due to displays of merchandise. See PUMF 49. When the accessible route 

was blocked by merchandise during Curtis‟s visits, Curtis would have to move his manual 

wheelchair into the area used by vehicles in order to get into the Store. See PUMF 50; see also

PUMF 55. Curtis has complained to Store management for years about their placing merchandise 

in the accessible path, but nothing has been done. See PUMF 43. At some point, Curtis had a 

conversation with a Store manager named Brent about the lack of an accessible route. See PUMF 

44. Brent was rude and stated that Home Depot could do whatever it wanted to do and had no 

obligation to move the merchandise to provide Curtis with an accessible route of travel. See id.

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A written policy was provided to Store employees via e-mail prior to Store Manager 

Joseph Wall‟s April 2014 deposition. See PUMF 15. The written policy requires that the path of 

travel to the entrance be kept clear. See id. For at least 5 years, Home Depot has had a policy of 

keeping the accessible route clear of obstructions. See PUMF 16. 

 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Cross motions for summary judgment are evaluated separately under the same standards 

that apply to single summary judgment motions. See Pintos v. Pacific Creditors Ass‟n, 565 F.3d 

1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009); ACLU v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 790 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as to 

any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Fortyune v. American MultiCinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004). The party seeking summary judgment bears 

the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying the portions 

of the declarations (if any), pleadings, and discovery that demonstrate an absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Soremekun v. Thrifty 

Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). A fact is "material" if it might affect the outcome 

of the suit under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 

(1986); United States v. Kapp, 564 F.3d 1103, 1114 (9th Cir. 2009). A dispute is “genuine” as to 

a material fact if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Freecycle Sunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 

509, 514 (9th Cir. 2010).

Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant must 

affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the movant. 

Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. Where the non-moving party will have the burden of proof on an 

issue at trial, the movant may prevail by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of 

the non-moving party's claim or by merely pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to 

support an essential element of the non-moving party's claim. See James River Ins. Co. v. Herbert 

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Schenk, P.C., 523 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2008); Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. If a moving party 

fails to carry its burden of production, then “the non-moving party has no obligation to produce 

anything, even if the non-moving party would have the ultimate burden of persuasion.” Nissan 

Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party 

meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine 

issue as to any material fact actually exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103. The opposing party cannot “‟rest 

upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading‟ but must instead produce evidence that „sets 

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.‟” Estate of Tucker v. Interscope 

Records, 515 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008).

The opposing party‟s evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences that may be 

drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 899 

(9th Cir. 2010). While a “justifiable inference” need not be the most likely or the most persuasive 

inference, a “justifiable inference” must be rational or reasonable. See Narayan, 616 F.3d at 899. 

Inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party‟s obligation to produce a 

factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Sanders v. City of Fresno, 551 

F.Supp.2d 1149, 1163 (E.D. Cal. 2008); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott, 300 F.Supp.2d 993, 

997 (E.D. Cal. 2004). “A genuine issue of material fact does not spring into being simply because 

a litigant claims that one exists or promises to produce admissible evidence at trial.” Del Carmen 

Guadalupe v. Agosto, 299 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2002); see Bryant v. Adventist Health 

System/West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). Further, a “motion for summary judgment 

may not be defeated . . . by evidence that is „merely colorable‟ or „is not significantly probative.‟” 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Hardage v. CBS Broad. Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2006). 

If the nonmoving party fails to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material 

fact, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103.

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CROSS-MOTIONS

A. BARRIERS

Defendant’s Arguments

Home Depot argues that summary judgment is proper because the alleged remaining 

barriers are either not actually barriers or have been remedied. For those barriers which have been 

remedied, claims based on such barriers are now moot. Because there are no violations of the 

ADA, the Court should grant summary judgment on all of the ADA claims and decline to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over Curtis‟s state law claims. 

Plaintiff’s Arguments

Curtis argues that the evidence shows that ADA violations remain. Curtis argues that 

Home Depot does not address his contention that some barriers are reoccurring, despite policies to 

the contrary. Furthermore, measurements taken by Home Depot were not properly converted into 

percentages (as opposed to angles), and upon proper conversion, violations of the ADAAG are 

apparent. Because the evidence affirmatively establishes violations of the ADA and California 

law, Curtis argues that he should be awarded $4,000 in statutory damages, be granted declaratory 

relief, and be granted an injunction that remedies the identified barriers.

Legal Standard

Title III of the ADA (42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.) prohibits discrimination on the basis of 

disability in the “full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, 

or accommodations of any place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); Oliver v. 

Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 904 (9th Cir. 2011). The ADA requires that new business 

facilities be “readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities,” unless this would be 

“structurally impracticable.” 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1); Oliver, 654 F.3d at 905; see Chapman v. 

Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011). “In general, a facility is readily 

accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities if it meets the requirements . . . in the 

ADAAG, which is essentially an encyclopedia of design standards.” Oliver, 654 F.3d at 905. For 

businesses built after January 26, 1993, new construction and alterations must comply with the 

applicable ADAAG. See Antoninetti v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 614 F.3d 971, 976 (9th Cir. 

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2010). If a place of public accommodation is inconsistent with the applicable ADAAG standards, 

then a plaintiff may bring a civil action on the basis that the offending design feature constitutes a 

barrier that denies full and equal enjoyment of the premises. Oliver, 654 F.3d at 905; see Molski 

v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). As long as the plaintiff has encountered 

one barrier, he may seek relief for unencountered barriers as well. Chapman, 531 F.3d at 944. A 

private plaintiff can only obtain injunctive relief (i.e. removal of the barrier) under Title III of the 

ADA, and may not obtain monetary damages. Oliver, 654 F.3d at 905; Molski, 481 F.3d at 730. 

As such, “a defendant‟s voluntary removal of alleged barriers prior to trial can have the effect of 

mooting [an] ADA claim.” Oliver, 654 F.3d at 905; see Chapman v. Starbucks Corp., 2011 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 3570, *11 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2011); Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F.Supp.2d 1134, 

1145 (S.D. Cal. 2006); Parr v. L&L Drive-Inn Restaurant, 96 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1087 (D. Haw. 

2000); Independent Living Res. v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F.Supp. 698, 771 (D. Or. 1997). 

Courts often find that the voluntary cessation exception to mootness does not apply once an ADA 

barrier has been removed because of the expense and nature of the removal makes it highly 

unlikely that the barrier will reoccur. See Hickman v. Missouri, 144 F.3d 1141, 1143-44 (8th Cir. 

1998); Houston v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12209, *2-*3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2014); 

Independent Living, 982 F.Supp.2d at 774. 

Discussion2

In December 2013, Curtis‟s expert Michael Bluhm visited the Store and detected a number 

of alleged barriers. In August/September 2014, the Store‟s Manager Joseph Wall (“Wall”) 

declared that various corrective actions by Home Depot had been taken. Wall, and Home Depot‟s 

attorney Allison Kleaver (“Kleaver”), submitted declarations and new pictures of the alleged 

barriers identified by Bluhm during his December 2013 visit. In December 2014, Bluhm revisited the Store and took additional measurements. The essence of the parties‟ dispute is whether 

 

2 There is no dispute between the parties that the ADAAG applies in this case. JUMF 2. Curtis contends that an older 

version of the ADAAG, known as the 1991 ADAAG, applies to determine the existence of a barrier, but any 

injunctive relief would be governed by the standards adopted in 2012, known as the 2010 ADAAG. Home Depot, in 

both its motion and opposition, cites exclusively to the 2010 ADAAG, but does not dispute Curtis‟s assertions 

regarding the 1991 ADAAG. Given the parties‟ apparent agreement, unless the Court notes a distinction between the 

1991 ADAAG and 2010 ADAAG, a reference to the 2010 ADAAG should be understood as meaning that the 1991 

ADAAG imposed an essentially identical requirement. 

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ten alleged ADA barriers are now moot because of Home Depot‟s corrective actions. The Court 

will address the ten alleged barriers separately.3

1. Obstruction of Accessible Route – FAC ¶ 10(a)

Under the 2010 ADAAG, an accessible route must be at least 36” wide, although the route 

may be reduced to 32” wide for a length of no more than 2 feet. See 2010 ADAAG § 403.5.1.4 

Department of Justice regulations for Title III of the ADA require public accommodations to 

“maintain in operable working condition those features of facilities and equipment that are 

required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 

36.211(a); Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., 816 F.Supp.2d 831, 858 (N.D. Cal. 2012). It is not 

sufficient to provide an accessible route if that feature is not maintained in a manner that enables 

individuals with disabilities to use it. Moeller, 816 F.Supp.2d at 858. Failing to properly maintain 

an accessible route, including keeping the route free of obstructions, may violate the ADA. Id. 

However, there is no liability for “isolated or temporary” interruptions to accessibility. 28 C.F.R. 

§ 36.211(b); Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports, 870 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1008 (E.D. Cal. 2012). 

Here, there is no dispute that the accessible pathway in front of the Store is slightly wider 

than 48 inches wide. See Wall Dec. ¶ 5 & Ex. 1. There is also no dispute that the Store has a 

policy against obstructing accessible routes. See Wall Dec. Ex. 2. In pertinent part, the policy 

prohibits “the placement of merchandise, product displays, or shopping carts on the sidewalks or 

wheelchair accessible parking and the [Store] entrance and exit, or in the accessible areas of the 

parking lot.” Id. This evidence indicates that there are no current violations concerning the width 

of accessible routes to the Store. 

Nevertheless, the evidence does not show that Home Depot adequately maintains a 36”

 

3 Bluhm has submitted two declarations, and Wall has submitted three declarations. Bluhm‟s first declaration is Doc. 

No. 43-6, and it details his findings from the December 2013 visit. The Court will refer to this declaration as “Bluhm 

Dec.” Bluhm‟s second declaration is Doc. No. 53-3, and it details the results of the December 2014 visit. The Court 

will refer to this declaration as “Bluhm Opp. Dec.” Wall‟s first declaration is Doc. No. 46-5. The Court will refer to 

this declaration as “Wall Dec.” Wall‟s second declaration is Doc. No. 54-1, and it details the work that Home Depot 

completed in August/September 2014. The Court will refer to this declaration as “Wall Opp. Dec.” Wall‟s third 

declaration is Doc. No. 55-2, and it responds to several aspects of the second Bluhm declaration. The Court will refer 

to this declaration as “Wall Rep. Dec.”

4 The California Building Code (“CBC”) requires that the width of an accessible route be 48 inches. See CBC § 11B403.5.1. The CBC is codified at California Code of Regulations, Title 24, Part 2. 

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width. First, Curtis‟s declaration indicates that he has experienced an “obstructed route” (a route 

whose width is less than regulatory limits) on numerous occasions, including during 2012 and 

2013. See Curtis Dec. ¶¶ 13, 18, 22-28. Photographs taken by Curtis also affirmatively show 

obstructions in the form of merchandise (barbecue grills, lawn mowers, and large boxes) in the 

accessible route. See Curtis Dec. Exs B-G.

5

 Although there were no measurements taken with 

respect to the photographs, it is generally apparent that the width is considerably less than 32”. 

See id. Also, Curtis has been utilizing a wheelchair sufficiently long to opine whether an area is 

less than 32” wide, and he declares that he regularly encounters obstructions that narrow the width 

of the route to less than 32”. See id. at ¶¶ 16, 22-28; cf. Strong v. Valdez Fine Foods, 724 F.3d 

1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2013) (disabled person‟s experience was a sufficient basis to opine regarding 

measurements of possible barriers). Second, the photographic evidence and Curtis‟s declaration 

do not demonstrate a stray piece of merchandise that a customer may have left in the route, rather 

they demonstrate the deliberate placement of merchandise for sale by Home Depot. Such 

deliberate placement of merchandise by Store employees is not “temporary or isolated.” See

Chapman, 870 F.Supp.2d at 1009-10. Given these considerations, Curtis has shown that Home 

Depot violated 2010 ADAAG § 403.5.1 and 28 C.F.R. § 36.211(a) by not maintaining an 

unobstructed accessible route. 

Again, there is no evidence that Home Depot is currently violating 2010 ADAAG 403.5.1 

and 28 C.F.R. § 36.211(a). However, the Court cannot agree that Home Depot‟s voluntary 

cessation of the offending conduct has mooted the issue. Under the voluntary cessation exception 

to mootness, mere cessation of illegal activity in response to pending litigation does not moot a 

case unless it is shown that the “allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to 

recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000); 

Rosemere Neighborhood Ass‟n v. EPA, 581 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Here, Home Depot argues that its policy against obstruction combined with the acts of 

Wall in inspecting the route show that the route is maintained and the issue is moot. The Court 

 

5 One of the exhibits shows a car parked in the accessible route. However, the car is not a Home Depot car, and the 

car appears to have been improperly parked by a customer. This photograph appears to depict a temporary barrier that 

is not actionable under 28 C.F.R. § 36.211(b).

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disagrees. Wall testified at his deposition that Home Depot has had some policy against 

obstructing accessible routes for about 5 years. See Wall Depo. 165:24-166:8. However, Curtis 

declared that he has complained to Store management about obstructions in the accessible routes 

from merchandise and displays for the last 2 to 3 years, but the problem was not remedied. See

Curtis Dec. ¶¶ 18-19. In fact, one manager was extremely dismissive of Curtis and denied that 

there was even a problem with merchandise obstructing the accessible route. See id. at ¶ 20. 

These complaints would have been made at a time when a Home Depot policy against obstruction 

was in place. See Wall Depo. 165:24-166:8; Curtis Dec. ¶¶ 18-20. In other words, whatever 

policy was in force did not prevent Curtis from experiencing non-temporary obstructions on 

numerous occasions, nor did the existence of the policy change results when Curtis complained to 

store managers. Further, the policy that has been produced for the Court‟s review was apparently 

shown to Wall for the first time a few months before his April 2014 deposition. See Wall Depo. 

134:22-136:25. This suggests that the policy is not commonly known to Home Depot employees 

and managers, and that there is a new emphasis on keeping accessible routes free from 

obstruction. Finally, unlike other barriers, Home Depot could easily revert to obstructing the 

accessible routes through placement of merchandise or displays. The barrier involved is not so 

much structural in nature, as it is a maintenance issue. Redesign, new construction, renovation, or 

any type of structural modification is not necessary in order to keep the accessible route 

unobstructed with merchandise. Obstruction merely depends on Home Depot ordering an 

employee to place merchandise in or near the accessible route. Given the nature of the barrier, 

what appears to be a relatively new policy, and Curtis‟s experiences despite a 5-year old policy 

against obstruction, Home Depot‟s voluntary cessation of obstructing the accessible route does not 

moot the controversy. Cf. Hickman, 144 F.3d at 1144 (noting that the ADA compliance in that 

case was “far more than a mere voluntary cessation of an alleged illegal conduct, where we would 

leave the defendants free to return to their old ways,” and noting that the resumption of the 

challenged conduct “does not depend solely on the defendants‟ capricious actions.”). 

Because the issue is not moot, and Curtis has shown improper maintenance of the 

accessible route to the Store entrance, summary judgment in favor of Curtis is appropriate.

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2. Accessible Route From Accessible Parking Area – FAC ¶ 11(b)

Under the 2010 ADAAG, an accessible route of at least 36” in width must be provided 

from inter alia accessible parking to an accessible entrance. See 2010 ADAAG §§ 206.2.1, 

403.5.1. Like the previous barrier, there is no dispute that the actual route is at least 36” wide; the 

dispute is whether the route is maintained at a 36” width. 

Curtis relies on the same evidence to establish an obstruction in this route as he did with 

the previous accessible route. See Plaintiff‟s Motion (Doc. No. 43-1) at p.11. In the absence of 

clarification from the parties, the Court views the accessible Store entrance route to be part of the 

accessible route that leads from the parking area to the Store entrance. Again, the photographic 

evidence presented shows that merchandise has obstructed the accessible route that runs along the 

front of the Store, and Curtis‟s declaration shows that he has encountered this problem on 

numerous occasions despite complaints to management. Curtis‟s evidence shows that Home 

Depot has not adequately maintained the accessible route as required by 28 C.F.R. § 36.211(a). 

For the same reasons discussed above, the evidence shows that Home Depot has not 

adequately maintained the accessible route so as to keep it free of non-temporary obstructions that 

reduce it to less than 36”. Summary judgment in favor of Curtis on this claim is appropriate.

3. Caldwell Ave. Curb Ramp Slope – FAC ¶ 11(d)

Under the 2010 ADAAG, curb ramps may not have a running slope steeper than 1:12, or 

8.33%. See 2010 ADAAG § 405.2, 406.1. There is an accessible route with a curb ramp from the 

public sidewalk on Caldwell Ave. to the Store‟s entrance that is at least 36” wide. See DUMF 6. 

In December 2013, Bluhm measured the slope of the curb ramp to be 10.1%. See Blum 

Dec. ¶ 8 & Ex. B. In August 2014, the curb ramp was rebuilt and resloped. See Wall Opp. Dec. ¶ 

8. Wall measured the slope of the curb ramp to be 6.2%. See id. at Ex. 4. In September 2014, 

Kleaver measured the slope, and found that it was 4.8o. See Kleaver Dec. Ex. 4. Bluhm has 

declared that when 4.8o is converted to a percentage, the slope is actually 8.4%. See Blum Op. 

Dec. ¶ 11.

6

 Additionally, when Bluhm revisited the Store in December 2014, he re-measured the 

 

6 Additionally, the Court notes that Bluhm is critical of Kleaver giving measurements in degrees, using a Husky brand 

smart level, and taking some measurements while the level was on debris. See Bluhm Opp. Dec. ¶¶ 8-12.

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slope of the ramp curb and found that it measured 9.6%. See id. at ¶ 13 & Ex. B.

There is no doubt that 6.2% is within the regulatory limit, but a slope of 8.4% and a slope 

of 9.6% both exceed the maximum regulatory slope.7 The Court is faced with conflicting 

measurements. The Court cannot resolve the conflicting measurements through a summary 

judgment motion. Viewing the evidence through the prism of summary judgment, the Court must 

deny both motions for summary judgment.

4. Cross-Slope Along Accessible Entry Route – FAC ¶ 11(e)

Under the 1991 ADAAG, cross-slopes on an accessible route cannot exceed 1:50, or 2.0%. 

See 1991 ADAAG § 4.3.7. Under the 2010 ADAAG, cross-slopes on an accessible route cannot 

exceed 1:48, or 2.08%. See 2010 ADAAG § 403.3. 

During his December 2013 visit, Bluhm measured two cross-slopes of the Store entry 

walkway. See Bluhm Dec. ¶ 9. Bluhm obtained slope measurements of 2.4% and 3.1%. See id.

& Ex. C.8 In August 2014, the area of the walkway where Bluhm took his measurements was 

resurfaced. See Wall Dec. ¶ 10. Wall measured the two cross-slopes of the resurfaced entry 

walkway, and obtained measurements of 1.5% and 1.9%. See Wall Dec. ¶ 9 & Ex. 5. In 

September 2014, Kleaver measured the cross-slopes to be 1.6o and 1.7o. See Kleaver Dec. ¶ 9 & 

Ex. 4. Bluhm declares that converting 1.6o and 1.7o to percentages yields slopes of 2.79% and 

2.97%, respectively. See Bluhm Opp. Dec. ¶¶ 14, 15. There is no indication that Bluhm remeasured the cross-slope of the entry walk-way during his December 2014 re-visit. See Bluhm 

Opp. Dec.

The Court is again faced with conflicting measurements. The measurements taken by Wall 

show Home Depot is in compliance, as 1.5% and 1.9% are obviously less than 2.0%. However, 

Bluhm‟s December 2013 measurements, and Kleaver‟s measurements when converted from 

degrees to percentages, show cross-slopes greater than 2.0%. The Court cannot resolve the 

 

7 The Court notes that the slope measurements taken in this case appear to have been made to the nearest tenth, even 

though the 2010 ADAAG slope is measured in hundredths. Converting a 8.33% slope into degrees yields a figure of 

4.76o. Rounded to the nearest tenth, 4.76o becomes 4.8o. However, there has been no evidence regarding the settings 

of Kleaver‟s level, or that the level is designed to measure to the nearest tenth of a degree.

8 Exhibit C attempts to depict measurements, but the readings of the smart level are illegible.

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conflicting measurements through a summary judgment motion. Viewing the evidence through 

the prism of summary judgment, the Court must deny both motions for summary judgment.

5. Cross-Slope Of Parking Stall – FAC ¶ 11(g)

Under the 1991 ADAAG, accessible parking spaces and aisles cannot contain slopes that 

exceed 1:50, or 2.0%. See 1991 ADAAG 4.6.3. The 2010 ADAAG mandates that cross-slopes in 

parking spaces and accessible aisles cannot exceed 1:48, or 2.08%. See 2010 ADAAG § 502.4. 

In December 2013, Bluhm measured the cross-slopes of a parking stall and 

loading/unloading accessible aisle. See Bluhm Dec. ¶ 11. Bluhm obtained measurements for 

these cross-slopes ranging between 2.4% and 2.6%. See id. & Ex. E.9 In August 2014, the 

northwest parking stall was undesignated as an accessible parking area. See Wall Dec. ¶ 11. Wall 

measured the southwest accessible stall and obtained a slope measurement of 1.4%. See id. & Ex. 

7. In September 2014, Kleaver measured the cross-slope of the southwest accessible parking stall 

to be 1.4o.10 See Kleaver Dec. ¶ 11 & Ex. 7. Bluhm declares that converting 1.4o to percentages 

yields a figure of 2.44%. See Bluhm Opp. Dec. ¶ 16. There is no indication that Bluhm remeasured the cross-slope of the southwest parking stall during his December 2014 visit. 

The Court is again faced with conflicting measurements. The measurements taken by Wall 

show Home Depot to be in compliance, as 1.4% is obviously less than 2.0%. However, Bluhm‟s 

December 2013 measurements, and Kleaver‟s measurements when converted from degrees to 

percentages, show a cross-slope greater than 2.0% for the southwest accessible parking stall. The 

Court cannot resolve the conflicting measurements through a summary judgment motion. 

Viewing the evidence through the prism of summary judgment, the Court must deny both motions 

for summary judgment.

6. Exterior Food/Beverage Counter Height – FAC ¶ 11(i)

Under the 2010 ADAAG, a sales and service counter cannot exceed a height of 36”, for 

either a forward or parallel approach. See 2010 ADAAG §§ 904.4.1, 904.4.2.

 

9 Exhibit E only depicts a measurement of 2.6%. 

10 Exhibit 6 to Kleaver‟s declaration is not clear. A reading of 1.4 is apparent, but unlike other photos, it is not clear 

that the 1.4 reading is in degrees. Given Home Depot‟s failure to challenge Bluhm‟s assertion that the 1.4 reading is a 

measurement in degrees, the Court will read Exhibit 6 as showing 1.4o.

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During Bluhm‟s initial visit to the Store, there was one counter at the exterior food and 

beverage stand. See Bluhm Dec. ¶ 13. The counter‟s height is 57”. After Bluhm‟s initial visit, a 

second counter located on the left-side of the food stand was added. See Wall Opp. Dec. ¶ 13; 

Bluhm Opp. Dec. ¶ 18. The height of the second counter is slightly more than 33”. See Wall 

Opp. Dec. ¶ 13 & Ex. 8. 

Curtis argues that this second counter is not an “equivalent facilitation” because it is 

inferior to the first counter in every way. The first counter offers menus, impulse buy items, and 

product displays. The second counter has none of these amenities. Further, the second counter is 

around the corner and completely separates disabled individuals from non-disabled individuals. In 

reply, Wall declares that the first counter is located along the front walkway and the second

counter is located next to the dining seating area of the food stand. See Wall Rep. Dec. ¶ 6. Wall 

declares that both counters offer the same services, meaning that the customers can purchase and 

pay for food and beverages and receive their food orders at both counters. See id. The menu 

board for the food stand is located to the side of the first/front walkway counter, and not at one 

counter or the other. See id. In Wall‟s experience, customers typically view the menu board prior 

to approaching one of the counters to place an order. See id. Further, display signs that were 

present at the first counter during Bluhm‟s first visit are no longer present. See id.

The 1991 ADAAG § 2.2 states in part that “departures from particular technical and 

scoping requirements of the ADAAG by the use of other designs and technologies are permitted 

where the alternative designs and technologies used will provide substantially equivalent or 

greater access to and usability of a facility.” 1991 ADAAG § 2.2. The 2010 ADAAG § 103 states 

that nothing “prevents the use of designs, products, or technologies as alternatives to those 

prescribed, provided that they result in substantially equivalent or greater accessibility and 

usability.” See 2010 ADAAG § 103. The burden of establishing “equivalent facilitation” rests on 

the defendant. See Independent Living, 982 F.Supp. at 727. 

Contrary to Curtis‟s argument, it is not necessary for Home Depot to provide a wholly 

equivalent design to that mandated by 2010 ADAAG § 904.4.1. Home Depot must provide a 

design that is “substantially equivalent.” Wall‟s reply declaration describes a counter that 

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complies with the relevant height restrictions, and one that appears to provide equivalent services. 

Further, signs and displays that were present during Bluhm‟s initial visit have been removed, and 

the indication is that no signs and displays are part of any counter. Finally, the location of the 

second counter is not the same as the first, but Wall‟s declaration describes a location that appears 

to be desirable, since it is close to a seating area and the first counter. In other words, Wall‟s reply 

declaration indicates that the second counter is “substantially equivalent” to the first counter. 

Nevertheless, Wall‟s reply declaration contains no photographs of the second counter, and 

Curtis has not had an opportunity to respond to Wall‟s reply declaration. Because the Court does 

not feel that Curtis has had a sufficient opportunity to address the new evidence, the Court will 

deny summary judgment.

11

 

7. Cross-Slope of Exterior Food/Beverage Counter – FAC ¶ 11(j)

Under the 1991 ADAAG, accessible elements must be connected by accessible routes that 

have slopes of no more than 1:50, or 2.0%. See 1991 ADAAG 4.3.2(2), 4.3.7. Under the 2010 

ADAAG, accessible elements on a site must be connected by an accessible route and cannot have 

a slope greater than 1:48, or 2.08%. See 2010 ADAAG § 206.2.2, 403.3. 

In Home Depot‟s opposition, Wall declared that the slope in front of the second counter 

was less than 2.08%. See Wall Opp. Dec. ¶ 13 & Ex. 9. Bluhm‟s opposition declaration does not 

address this measurement, nor does Curtis. Instead, Curtis argues that because the second counter 

is not equivalent, the slope at the first counter must be less than 2.08%, and it is not. Bluhm 

measured the slope at the first counter to be 3.0%. See Bluhm Dec. ¶ 14 & Ex. H. 

Resolution of this claim depends on whether the second counter is substantially equivalent 

to the first counter. If the second counter is substantially equivalent, then there is no violation of 

§§ 206.2.2 and 403.3 because there is unrebutted evidence that the slope is less than 2.0%. If the 

second counter is not substantially equivalent to the first counter, then there is unrebutted evidence 

that the slope is greater than 2.0%. Because the Court is denying both summary judgment motions 

with respect to the height of the exterior food counter, summary judgment on this claim will also 

be denied.

 

11 Prior to the pre-trial conference, the parties are to meet and confer regarding whether this alleged barrier still exists. 

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8. Tool Rental Counter Height – FAC ¶ 11(n)

The 1991 ADAAG requires that, where counters have cash registers and are provided for 

sales or distribution of goods or services to the public,” a portion of the counter cannot exceed 36” 

in height. See 1991 ADAAG § 7.2(1). The 2010 ADAAG also mandates that sales and service 

counters cannot exceed a height of 36”. See 2010 ADAAG § 904.4.1. 

The Store has a tool rental area, and at the rental area there is a counter with several cash 

registers, telephones, and credit/debit card readers. See Bluhm Dec. Ex. K. It is undisputed that a 

portion of the counter has a height of less than 36”. See Bluhm Dec. ¶ 17; Wall Opp. Dec. ¶ 14. 

Home Depot argues that the counter is in compliance with 2010 ADAAG 904.4.1 because it is less 

than 36” tall. Curtis argues that the 2010 ADAAG requires that check writing surfaces in 

checkout aisles cannot exceed 34” in height. See 2010 ADAAG §§ 902.3, 904.3.3. Because the 

counter is greater than 34”, Curtis contends that there is a barrier. 

Curtis acknowledges that the 1991 ADAAG determines whether there is a barrier. See

Doc. No. 43-1 at pp. 5-6. The relevant 1991 ADAAG provision cited by Curtis for this alleged 

barrier is 1991 ADAAG § 7.2(1). See id. at p.15. That provision sets a height limit of 36”, it does 

not set a height limit of 34”. See 1991 ADAAG 7.2(1). Because the counter is less than 36”, 

there is no violation of 1991 ADAAG § 7.2(1). 

Furthermore, in terms of the 2010 ADAAG, the Court agrees with Home Depot‟s 

characterization of the counter. The tool rental counter does not appear to be a checkout aisle, as 

that term is commonly understood. See Bluhm Dec. Ex. K. Rather, the picture of the tool rental 

area depicts what would commonly be described as a sales or service counter. See id. Sales and 

service counters are governed by 2010 ADAAG § 904.4, while checkout aisles are governed by 

2010 ADAAG § 904.3. Curtis‟s reliance on 2010 ADAAG § 904.3.3 is misplaced.

Because the tool rental counter is less than 36” in height, there is no barrier. Summary 

judgment in favor of Home Depot on this claim is appropriate.

9. Maneuvering Clearance At Men‟s Restroom – FAC ¶ 11(q)

Under the 2010 ADAAG, for a latch-side push approach restroom door, a minimum of 42” 

of maneuvering space is required. See 2010 ADAAG § 404.2.4.1. However, if a door-closer is 

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attached to the door, then an additional 6” of maneuvering space is required. See id. at n.4. 

Bluhm declared that he measured 46” of clearance between a drinking fountain and the 

restroom door. See Bluhm Dec. ¶ 18. Because the Store‟s restroom door had a self-closing 

mechanism, Bluhm declares that an additional 6” of maneuvering space is necessary, meaning that 

48” of total clearance is required. See Bluhm Opp. Dec. ¶ 19. Home Depot does not dispute that 

48” inches of clearance is required due to the self-closing door mechanism. See 2010 ADAAG § 

404.2.4.1 n.4. However, as part of the reply, Wall declares that since Bluhm‟s 2014 re-visit, there 

is no longer a door closer on the men‟s restroom. See Wall Rep. Dec. ¶ 7.

Here, the dispute between the parties is due to the door closer. Without a door-closer, 

there is no dispute that more than 42” of maneuvering space is provided and that there would be

no barrier. Because the door closer has been removed, and there is nothing to indicate that Home 

Depot will put the door closer back on, there is no barrier and this claim is moot. Cf. Hickman, 

144 F.3d at 1143-44; Houston, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12209 at *2-*3; Independent Living, 982 

F.Supp.2d at 774. Summary judgment in favor of Home Depot on this claim is appropriate. 

10. Covered Restroom Pipes – FAC ¶ 11(u)

Under the 2010 ADAAG, water supply and drain pipes under lavatories and sinks must be 

insulated or otherwise configured to protect against contact. See 2010 ADAAG § 606.5. 

During his initial inspection, Bluhm noted that pipes under the men‟s restroom sinks were 

not fully insulated so as to avoid contact. See Bluhm Dec. ¶ 21 & Ex. N. As part of Home 

Depot‟s opposition, Wall declared that the pipes under the sinks are now wrapped to prevent 

costumers from coming into contact with them. See Wall Opp. Dec. ¶ 16 & Ex. 12. During 

Bluhm‟s December 2014 return inspection, Bluhm found that not all pipes were wrapped and that 

a person in a wheel chair could still come into contact with hot pipes. See Bluhm Opp. Dec. ¶ 21. 

In reply, Wall declares that the pipes have been re-wrapped since Bluhm‟s return visit, and that 

there are no exposed portions of piping that a customer could come into contact. See Wall Rep. 

Dec. ¶ 8 & Ex. 17. 

Wall‟s reply declaration includes pictures of the sinks in the men‟s restroom at the Store. 

See id. Additional insulation has been added over some of the previously exposed pipes. See id. 

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However, there are still some pipes that are exposed. See id. What the exposed pipes deliver or 

whether the pipes otherwise pose a danger to a disabled customer is unknown. Further, the 

exposed pipes appear to be blocked or “boxed in” by other insulated pipes. From the pictures, it 

does not appear to the Court that the legs or knees of a customer who is in a wheelchair would be 

in danger of touching the exposed pipe. Cf. Wall Rep. Dec. Ex. 17 with 1991 ADAAG § 4.19.3 

Fig. 31. The configuration of the sinks in conjunction with the insulation that has been added 

indicate that there is no longer a violation of 2010 ADAAG § 606.5. 

Nevertheless, the exact measurements of the sinks are unknown, and Curtis has not had a 

chance to respond to these pictures. Out of caution, the Court will not grant summary judgment.12

11. State Law Claims

Home Depot requests that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

Curtis‟s state law claims. The request is based on the premise that the there are no ADA 

violations. However, the Court has found two ADA violations, and summary judgment is being 

denied as to six other alleged ADA barriers. Because the Court has not resolved all of Curtis‟s 

ADA claims, it will retain supplemental jurisdiction over Curtis‟s state law claims.

B. PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTED RELIEF

1. Injunctive Relief

Curtis has requested injunctive relief so that the alleged barriers may be removed. Curtis 

will be entitled to injunctive relief with respect to maintaining accessible routes to the Store‟s 

entrances. However, the Court is denying all summary judgment with respect to six other alleged 

barriers. Because this case remains on-going, the Court declines to issue an injunction at this time. 

Once all alleged barriers have been finally determined, the Court will issue an injunction.

2. Monetary Relief

A violation of the ADA is an automatic violation of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act. 

See Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f); Jankey v. Lee, 55 Cal.4th 1038, 1044 (2012). Under the Unruh Act, a 

 

12 Prior to the pre-trial conference, the parties are to meet and confer regarding whether a barrier still exists with 

respect to the sink pipes.

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prevailing plaintiff may recover inter alia a minimum statutory damages award of $4,000 per 

violation. See Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a); Jankey, 55 Cal.4th at 1044. However, a plaintiff must 

demonstrate that each encounter he had with a particular barrier denied him full and equal access 

to a place of accommodation. See Cal. Civ. Code § 55.56(a); Garcia v. Brown, 2012 Cal.Unpub. 

LEXIS 4919, *4-*5 & n.2 (2012).

13

 A denial of full and equal access may be demonstrated if the 

plaintiff shows that he experienced difficulty, discomfort, or embarrassment because of the barrier. 

See Cal. Civ. Code § 55.56(c); Garcia, 2012 Cal.Unpub. LEXIS 4919 at *4-*5 & n.2.

Here, Curtis has declared without contradiction that each time he has encountered the 

accessible route being blocked, he has experienced either difficulty or discomfort.14 If the route to 

the nursery is blocked, Curtis must go to the main Store entrance and then wheel himself across 

the Store to get to the nursery, and then repeat the process to leave. See Curtis Dec. ¶ 31. This 

creates difficulty because Curtis has a manual wheelchair. See id. Further, when he needs to go to 

the main entrance of the Store and the accessible routes are obstructed, he has to travel outside the 

accessible route and into the path of travel for automobiles. See id. at ¶ 30. This causes Curtis 

anxiety, stress, and discomfort that he may be hit by a car. See id. Curtis requests only $4,000 in 

statutory damages. See Doc. No. 43-1 at 21:11-14.

Home Depot does not challenge Curtis‟s evidence or arguments regarding statutory 

damages, rather Home Depot focuses on the absence of barriers. 

In the absence of additional argument from Home Depot, Curtis has met his burden. On 

many occasions, Curtis has experienced obstructed/unmaintained accessible routes that have 

caused him discomfort and difficulty. See Curtis Dec. ¶¶ 18-28, 30-31. Summary judgment in 

favor of Curtis for $4,000 in statutory damages under the Unruh Act is appropriate. See Cal. Civ. 

Code §§ 51(f), 55.56(a), (c); Jankey, 55 Cal.4th at 1044.

 

13 Despite state rules, the Court may consider unpublished state cases as persuasive authority. See Employers Ins. of 

Wausau v. Granite State Ins. Co., 330 F.3d 1214, 1220 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003).

14 Home Depot objects to portions of Curtis‟s declaration as being contradicted by portions of Curtis‟s deposition. 

However, Home Depot failed to provide copies to the Court of either the cited deposition excerpts or Curtis‟s 

deposition as a whole. Parties who cite to depositions are required to submit courtesy copies of the deposition to the 

Court. See Local Rule 133(j). Without at least copies of the cited deposition pages, Home Depot‟s objections amount 

to unsupported assertions that material disputed facts exist. Unsupported assertions do not create genuine disputes. 

Agosto, 299 F.3d at 23; Angel v. Seattle-First Nat‟l Bank, 653 F.2d 1293, 1299 (9th Cir. 1982).

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 CONCLUSION

Both parties move for summary judgment. 

With respect to the ten alleged ADA barriers, summary judgment in favor of Curtis on the 

barriers alleged in Paragraphs 10(a) and 11(b) of the FAC is appropriate because the evidence 

shows that Home Depot has not adequately maintained unobstructed accessible routes with widths 

of 36”. Summary judgment in favor of Home Depot will be granted as to the barriers alleged in 

Paragraphs 11(n) and 11(q) because there never was a barrier as alleged in Paragraph 11(n) and 

the barrier in Paragraph 11(q) has been remedied. Because there are either conflicting 

measurements, or because Curtis has not had an adequate opportunity to respond, summary 

judgment on the remaining six alleged barriers will be denied.

With respect to Curtis‟s state law claims, there is an insufficient basis to decline 

supplemental jurisdiction. Further, the Court will decline to issue an injunction until a final 

determination has been made with respect to each alleged barrier. However, as to statutory

damages under California law, Curtis declares that he only seeks $4,000.00. Because Curtis has 

sufficiently met his burden, and Home Depot did not adequately refute Curtis‟s claim, summary 

judgment in favor of Curtis for a statutory damage award in the amount of $4,000.00 will be 

granted.

ORDER15

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Home Depot‟s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to the claims 

found in Paragraphs 11(n) and 11(q) of the FAC;

2. Home Depot‟s motion for summary judgment is otherwise DENIED;

 

15 The parties are to meet and confer regarding the barriers that remain at issue prior to filing the joint pre-trial 

statement (the Court will not accept separate pre-trial statements). Further, because there are conflicting 

measurements, the parties are to address whether an impartial expert should be appointed in order to take 

measurements of the disputed barriers. See Local Rule 281(19). The Court has not decided whether to appoint an 

impartial expert, but the Court expects the parties to discuss the advisability and logistics of such an appointment.

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3. Curtis‟s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to the claims found

in Paragraphs 10(a) and 11(b) of the FAC and as to Curtis‟s claim for $4,000 in 

statutory damages under the California Unruh Act; and

4. Curtis‟s motion for summary judgment is otherwise DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 23, 2015 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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