Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02436/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02436-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher L. Grant
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2436

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Nebraska. 

Christopher L. Grant, also known as *

Lil Nut, also known as Little Nuts, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: December 14, 2005

Filed: January 31, 2006

___________

Before MELLOY, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

After a jury trial, Christopher L. Grant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute

cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, and was sentenced to 170

months’ imprisonment. Grant appeals, and we affirm.

The government at trial presented the testimony of ten witnesses, eight of whom

testified that he or she either had participated in or witnessed a cocaine base

transaction involving Grant. Many of the witnesses also testified to their own criminal

histories, and six indicated some hope that their testimony against Grant might result

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The Honorable Thomas M. Shanahan, United States District Judge for the

District of Nebraska.

2

The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, United States District Judge for the

District of Nebraska.

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in leniency in their own cases. Six witnesses also admitted to prior convictions for

giving false information to the police. 

After considering this evidence, including the impeachment material, the district

court1

 denied Grant’s motion for judgment of acquittal and the jury returned a guilty

verdict. The jury was further asked to determine, unanimously and beyond a

reasonable doubt, the quantity of drugs attributable to Grant. On this question, the

jury found that Grant had conspired to distribute “[a]t least 5 grams, but less than 50

grams” of a substance containing detectable amounts of cocaine. Based on this

finding, the United States Probation Office recommended a base offense level of 30

in its presentence report (“PSR”). See USSG § 2D1.1(a)(3), (c)(5). The PSR further

recommended a two-level adjustment for obstruction of justice, resulting in a total

offense level of 32. With his criminal history category of V, Grant was subject to an

advisory guidelines range of 188-235 months.

At sentencing, the district court2

 rejected the PSR’s recommended adjustment

for obstruction of justice, finding that the government had not met its burden of proof.

The court also considered but rejected the government’s argument that the jury’s drug

quantity finding was not binding on the district court, given the lower standard of

proof applicable to calculations under the advisory guidelines. Cf. United States v.

Vaughn, 410 F.3d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 2006 WL 37911 (Jan. 9,

2006). The court did find that Grant’s drug quantity fell at the high end of the range

determined by the jury, and held him responsible for more than 35 but less than 50

grams of cocaine base. Based on these findings, Grant’s advisory guideline range was

151-188 months, and the statutory range was ten years to life imprisonment. The

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court determined that a sentence at the middle of the advisory range was appropriate

and reasonable, and imposed a sentence of 170 months.

Grant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and will overturn a

verdict only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. United States v. McKay, 431 F.3d 1085, 1094 (8th Cir. 2005).

“Attacks on the sufficiency of the evidence that call on this court to scrutinize the

credibility of witnesses are generally not an appropriate grounds for reversal,” for “[i]t

is the task of the jury to evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” Id. (internal quotations

omitted). 

To prove Grant’s participation in a conspiracy, the government was required

to demonstrate that there was an agreement to achieve an illegal purpose, and that

Grant knew of the agreement and intentionally associated with it. Id. There need not

be an express agreement, and circumstantial evidence may suffice to prove the

necessary tacit understanding. United States v. Adams, 401 F.3d 886, 893-94 (8th

Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 492 (2005). 

Grant argues that the government failed to prove that he was aware of or

involved in any drug conspiracy. But the government adduced over a half-dozen

witnesses who testified that they observed Grant buying and selling crack cocaine at

various houses in the area, often in quantities indicative of an intent to redistribute.

If believed, this testimony was sufficient to show that Grant was a knowing participant

in an agreement to distribute cocaine base. See United States v. Oleson, 310 F.3d

1085, 1089 (8th Cir. 2002). The determination whether to believe those witnesses was

within the province of the jury.

Grant also argues that the district court erred in calculating the advisory

guideline range by finding him responsible for a greater quantity of drugs than was

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supported by the evidence. This argument is without merit. The drug quantity, like

the conspiracy in general, was amply supported by the testimony of multiple witnesses

if believed, and there is no clear error in the district court’s reliance on that testimony.

See United States v. Johnston, 353 F.3d 617, 625 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).

Finally, Grant asserts that the sentencing resulted in a violation of his Sixth

Amendment rights because the district court made factual determinations “better left

for the jury.” (Appellant’s Br. at 13). Grant was sentenced under the advisory

guidelines scheme announced in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 757 (2005),

and judicial fact-finding does not violate the Sixth Amendment when done in the

context of an advisory guidelines scheme. United States v. Winters, 416 F.3d 856,

858 (8th Cir. 2005). 

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

____________________________

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