Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02845/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02845-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin Daly
Defendant
Bryan Donahoo
Defendant
Leon E. Morris
Plaintiff
Pereira
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LEON E. MORRIS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DALY, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:12-cv-2845 JAM AC P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

I. Introduction 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner who proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis with this civil rights 

action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on plaintiff’s verified Second 

Amended Complaint (SAC), filed November 13, 2013, on plaintiff’s First Amendment claims 

that defendants Daly, Pereira and Donahoo, all Appeals Coordinators, retaliated against plaintiff 

for utilizing the prison grievance system, by “arbitrarily cancelling and destroying his grievances 

and exhibits [and] threatening to bar plaintiff from filing grievances.” See ECF No. 19. 

Presently pending is defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the merits of plaintiff’s 

claims. Alternatively, defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity. See ECF 

No. 32. Defendants’ motion is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302(c). For the reasons that follow, this 

court recommends that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted. 

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II. Plaintiff’s SAC and the Parties’ Briefing 

 Plaintiff’s verified SAC makes the following allegations, for which plaintiff generally 

seeks “monetary relief,” ECF No. 19 at 4-5: 

Filing administrative grievances and initiating litigation are 

protected activities, and it is impermissible for prison officials to 

retaliate against prisoner for engaging in these activities. From 

2009 to this present date [November 9, 2013], guards/appeals 

coordinators Kevin Daly, Bryan Donahoo and Pereira have 

retaliated against this plaintiff by (1) arbitrarily cancelling and 

destroying his grievances and exhibits, threatening to bar plaintiff 

from filing grievances, (2) because he (3) exercised his First 

Amendment rights to file prison grievances and otherwise seek 

access to the legal process, and that (4) beyond imposing those 

tangible harms, the guards’ actions chilled [plaintiff’s] First 

Amendment rights and (5) were not undertaken in narrowly tailored 

furtherance of legitimate penological purposes. Guards/appeals 

coordinator Pereira has done this seven (7) times and both Kevin 

Daly and Bryan Donahoo more than five (5) times respectively. 

Upon screening the SAC pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A, this court found that it states a 

First Amendment claim against defendants Daly, Pereira and Donahoo “for retaliation against 

plaintiff for filing administrative grievances and initiating litigation.”1 See ECF No. 20 at 1. 

Defendants answered the SAC. ECF No. 27. Discovery proceeded through October 14, 2014. 

ECF No. 28. On April 6, 2015, defendants filed the pending motion for summary judgment, ECF 

No. 32, supported by their verified declarations and exhibits, see ECF Nos. 33-5. Plaintiff 

responded to defendants’ statement of undisputed facts and filed an unverified opposition with 

exhibits, ECF No. 42, but did not file a declaration. Defendants filed a reply. ECF No. 46. 

 III. Legal Standards 

A. Legal Standards for Sustaining a Retaliation Claim 

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five 

basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 

 

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 As has become clear in evaluating the merits of defendants’ motion for summary judgment, it 

would have been appropriate, alternatively, to dismiss plaintiff’s SAC with leave to file a further 

amended complaint that better substantiated his claims. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.”) (Citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); 

see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his 

‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do”). 

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because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (fn. and citations 

omitted). 

“Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials and to 

be free from retaliation for doing so.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(citing Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009)). Filing prison grievances and 

pursuing civil rights litigation are constitutionally protected activities, and it is impermissible for 

prison officials to retaliate against prisoners for engaging in those activities. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 

567. 

 A plaintiff need not prove that the alleged retaliatory action, in itself, violated a 

constitutional right. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (1995) (to prevail on a retaliation claim, 

plaintiff need not “establish an independent constitutional interest” was violated); see also Hines 

v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 268 (9th Cir.1997) (upholding jury determination of retaliation based on 

filing of a false rules violation report); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531(transfer of prisoner to 

a different prison constituted adverse action for purposes of retaliation claim). Rather, the interest 

asserted in a retaliation claim is the right to be free of conditions that would not have been 

imposed but for the alleged retaliatory motive. However, not every allegedly adverse action will 

support a retaliation claim. See e.g. Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 

2000) (retaliation claim cannot rest on the logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, literally, 

“after this, therefore because of this”). 

 To sustain a retaliation claim, plaintiff must plead facts that support a reasonable inference 

that plaintiff’s exercise of protected conduct was the “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind 

the defendant’s challenged conduct. See Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 

(9th Cir. 1989) (citing Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). 

Plaintiff must also plead facts which suggest an absence of legitimate correctional goals for the 

challenged conduct. Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806 (citing Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 532). Mere allegations of 

retaliatory motive or conduct will not suffice. A prisoner must “allege specific facts showing 

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retaliation because of the exercise of the prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Frazier v. Dubois, 922 

F.2d 560, 562 n.1 (10th Cir. 1990). 

 B. Legal Standards for Summary Judgment 

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party “initially bears the burden of 

proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 

v. Oracle Corp. (In re Oracle Corp. Securities Litigation), 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party may accomplish 

this by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, 

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for 

purposes of the motion only), admission, interrogatory answers, or other materials” or by showing 

that such materials “do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that the 

adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 

(c)(1)(A), (B). 

 When the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, “the moving party need 

only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Oracle 

Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). 

Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, 

against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a 

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district 

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment ... is satisfied.” Id. at 323. 

 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the 

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existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials 

of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or 

admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. Moreover, “[a] [p]laintiff’s verified complaint 

may be considered as an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment if it is based on personal 

knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1132 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).2

The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that 

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Assoc., 809 

F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, 

Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce 

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U .S. at 587 (citations omitted). 

 In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact,” the court 

draws “all reasonable inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving party.” 

 

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 In addition, in considering a dispositive motion or opposition thereto in the case of a pro se 

plaintiff, the court does not require formal authentication of the exhibits attached to plaintiff’s 

verified complaint or opposition. See Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(evidence which could be made admissible at trial may be considered on summary judgment); 

see also Aholelei v. Hawaii Dept. of Public Safety, 220 Fed. Appx. 670, 672 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(district court abused its discretion in not considering plaintiff’s evidence at summary judgment, 

“which consisted primarily of litigation and administrative documents involving another prison 

and letters from other prisoners” which evidence could be made admissible at trial through the 

other inmates’ testimony at trial); see Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 (unpublished Ninth Circuit 

decisions may be cited not for precedent but to indicate how the Court of Appeals may apply 

existing precedent). 

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Walls v. Central Costa County Transit Authority, 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 

It is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may 

be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244–45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), 

aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing 

party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material 

facts. ... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation 

omitted). 

 In applying these rules, district courts must “construe liberally motion papers and 

pleadings filed by pro se inmates and ... avoid applying summary judgment rules strictly.” 

Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). However, “[if] a party fails to properly 

support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact, as 

required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion 

. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). 

C. Legal Standards for Exhausting Administrative Remedies 

Defendants seek summary judgment on the merits of plaintiff’s retaliation claim, which 

involves the processing of prisoner grievances. Accordingly, the legal framework for the 

exhaustion of prisoners’ administrative remedies provides relevant context. 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires that prisoners exhaust “such 

administrative remedies as are available” before commencing a suit challenging prison 

conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Regardless of the relief sought, a prisoner must pursue an 

appeal through all levels of a prison’s grievance process as long as some remedy remains 

available. “The obligation to exhaust ‘available’ remedies persists as long as some remedy 

remains ‘available.’ Once that is no longer the case, then there are no ‘remedies . . . available,’ 

and the prisoner need not further pursue the grievance.” Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (original emphasis) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). Hence, “[a]n 

inmate has no obligation to appeal from a grant of relief, or a partial grant that satisfies him, in 

//// 

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order to exhaust his administrative remedies.” Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 

2010). 

The PLRA also requires that prisoners, when grieving their appeal, adhere to CDCR’s 

“critical procedural rules.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 91 (2006). “The level of detail 

necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to 

system and claim to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the 

boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). 

In California, CDCR regulations authorize prisoners to grieve or “appeal” any action or 

inaction by prison staff that has “a material adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or 

welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). A prisoner commences an appeal by submitting a 

CDCR Form 602 that “describe[s] the specific issue under appeal and the relief requested.” Id. § 

3084.2(a). The form limits the prisoner to “one issue or related set of issues” and “to the space 

provided.” Id. § 3084.2(a)(1), (2). The form directs that the prisoner “shall list all staff 

member(s) involved and describe their involvement in the issue.” Id. § 3084.2(a)(3). Currently, a 

prisoner must submit his appeal within 30 calendar days of “[t]he occurrence of the event or 

decision being appealed;” “[u]pon first having knowledge of the action or decision being 

appealed;” or “[u]pon receiving an unsatisfactory departmental response to an appeal filed.” Id. § 

3084.8(b). 

Each prison is required to have an “appeals coordinator” whose job it is to “screen all 

appeals prior to acceptance and assignment for review.” Id. § 3084.5(b). The appeals coordinator 

may refuse to accept an appeal, by “rejecting” or “cancelling” it. Id., § 3084.6(a) (“Appeals may 

be rejected pursuant to subsection 3084.6(b), or cancelled pursuant to subsection 3084.6(c), as 

determined by the appeals coordinator”). According to the regulations, “a cancellation or 

rejection decision does not exhaust administrative remedies.” Id., 3084.1(b). 

 An appeal may be “rejected” for several reasons, including “fail[ure] to demonstrate a 

material adverse effect on [the prisoner’s] welfare;” “[t]he appeal makes a general allegation, but 

fails to state facts or specify an act or decision consistent with the allegation;” “[t]he appeal 

involves multiple issues that do not derive from a single event, or are not directly related and 

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cannot be reasonably addressed in a single response due to this fact;” and failure to submit the 

appeal “on the departmentally approved appeal forms.” Id. § 3084.6(b). When an appeal is 

“rejected,” the appeals coordinator is required to “provide clear and sufficient instructions 

regarding further actions the inmate . . . must take to qualify the appeal for processing.” Id., 

§ 3084.6(a)(1). 

 An appeal may be “cancelled” for other reasons, including that the prisoner failed “to 

correct and return a rejected appeal within 30 calendar days of the rejection;” the appeal 

duplicates a “previous appeal upon which a decision has been rendered or is pending;” the 

prisoner “continues to submit a rejected appeal while disregarding appeal staff’s previous 

instructions to correct the appeal including failure to submit necessary supporting documents;” 

and “[t]ime limits for submitting the appeal are exceeded even though the [prisoner] had the 

opportunity to submit within the prescribed time constraints.” Id., § 3084.6(c). When an appeal 

is “cancelled,” the prisoner “shall be notified of the specific reason(s) for the . . . cancellation.” 

Id., § 3084.5(b)(3).3

 If the appeals coordinator allows an appeal to go forward, the inmate must pursue it 

through the third level of review before it is deemed “exhausted.” Id. § 3084.1(b) (“all appeals 

are subject to a third level of review, as described in section 3084.7, before administrative 

remedies are deemed exhausted”). 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) mandates that “[n]o action shall be 

brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . or any other Federal law, by a 

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Although “the PLRA’s 

exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life,” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 

 

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 There is no requirement to tell the prisoner how to correct the “cancelled” appeal because 

cancellations refer to defects that cannot be corrected. The only way for a prisoner to proceed 

with a cancelled appeal is to show that the cancellation was made in error (or that new 

information shows that the appeal may now be processed). Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 

3084.6(a)(3) (“a cancelled appeal may later be accepted if a determination is made that 

cancellation was made in error or new information is received which makes the appeal eligible for 

further review”). 

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516, 532 (2002), the requirement for exhaustion under the PLRA is not absolute. As explicitly 

stated in the statute, “[t]he PLRA requires that an inmate exhaust only those administrative 

remedies ‘as are available.’” Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 42 

U.S.C. § 1997e(a)) (administrative remedies plainly unavailable if grievance was screened out for 

improper reasons); see also Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Remedies 

that rational inmates cannot be expected to use are not capable of accomplishing their purposes 

and so are not available.”). “We have recognized that the PLRA therefore does not require 

exhaustion when circumstances render administrative remedies ‘effectively unavailable.’” Sapp, 

623 F.3d at 822 (citing Nunez, 591 F.3d at 1226); accord Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 

(9th Cir. 2005) (“The obligation to exhaust ‘available’ remedies persists as long as some remedy 

remains ‘available.’ Once that is no longer the case, then there are no ‘remedies . . . available,’ 

and the prisoner need not further pursue the grievance.”).4

Moreover, as recently held by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, if a prisoner fails to 

comply with procedural requirements in pursuing his appeal, but prison officials address the 

merits of the appeal nevertheless, then the prisoner is deemed to have exhausted his available 

administrative remedies. See Reyes v. Smith, 810 F. 3d 654 (9th Cir. Jan. 12, 2016). 

IV. Facts 

 The court has reviewed Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (DSUF), ECF No. 32-

 

4

 When a motion for summary judgment is premised on the prisoner’s alleged failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies, the Ninth Circuit has laid out the following analytical approach, as set 

forth in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Scott v. 

Albino, 135 S. Ct. 403 (2014) (citation and internal quotations omitted): 

[T]he defendant’s burden is to prove that there was an available 

administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that 

available remedy. . . . Once the defendant has carried that burden, 

the prisoner has the burden of production. That is, the burden shifts 

to the prisoner to come forward with evidence showing that there is 

something in his particular case that made the existing and 

generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable 

to him. However, . . . the ultimate burden of proof remains with the 

defendant. 

If a court concludes that a prisoner failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies, the 

proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice. See Jones v. Bock, supra, 549 U.S. at 223-24; Lira 

v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2005). 

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3; plaintiff’s response thereto, designated herein Plaintiff’s Disputed Facts (PDF), ECF No. 42 at 

11-42; defendants’ respective declarations, ECF Nos. 33-5; and the parties’ respective exhibits. 

The court finds that the following facts are undisputed by the parties or, following the court’s 

review, are deemed undisputed for purposes of the pending motion. Pertinent allegations are also 

noted. 

1. Plaintiff Leon Morris has, at all relevant times, been incarcerated under the authority of 

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) at California State Prison, 

Sacramento (CSP-SAC). 

 2. Defendants Daly, Pereira, and Donahoo worked as Appeals Coordinators at CSP-SAC 

during various time periods relevant to this lawsuit. 

 3. In late January 2011, CDCR headquarters began implementing regulations requiring 

the use of new inmate appeal documents, including Form 22 and amended Form 602. During this 

transition, appeals and correctional staff, as well as inmates, were learning the new process and 

changes. Prisons were directed to post posters and hand out pamphlets that notified and educated 

inmates about these changes to the appeals process, and to make the new forms available. 

4. The parties dispute whether inmates and staff in plaintiff’s housing unit, Psychiatric 

Services Unit II, Bldg. 4 (PSU-II-4), were so informed. Plaintiff contends that inmates and staff 

at PSU-II-4 were not informed of the changes or provided the new forms until “several months 

after January 2011.” See PDF Nos. 6, 8, 10. Plaintiff avers that “absolutely nothing was posted 

nor pamphlets handed out to the prisoners anywhere in PSU II. Not even the guards knew 

anything about the new forms nor handed out anything whatsoever.” PDF No. 8. 

5. The Form 22 is intended to function similarly to the “informal” level of review 

provided in prior Form 602. Inmates are required to use and exhaust a Form 22 to appeal minor 

issues that can be informally resolved, such as lack of showers, hygiene or stationery supplies, or 

inadequate food. Certain appeal issues/categories, such as serious inmate disciplinary, 

classification, transfers, or program, bypass the informal level and do not require the use of a 

Form 22. The Form 22 is in “triplicate” format, thus allowing the inmate to keep a copy for his 

own records to demonstrate that he submitted it to staff. 

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6. Plaintiff avers that, in practice, he “experienced serious problems getting guards to sign 

the new Form 22 and when plaintiff filed a 602 staff complaint against the guards for refusing to 

sign the Form 22, [defendant] appeals coordinators cancelled it. When plaintiff was fortunate 

enough to get a guard to sign the Form 22, the recipient refused to respond and return the form 

and that occurred 9 out of 10 times.” PDF No. 10. 

 7. Also during this time period, the CSP-SAC Appeals Office began to transition from 

using an “Inmate/Parolee Appeal Screening Form” (a single-page form with boxes to check 

providing instructions to inmates on how to cure their appeal deficiencies), to using a new CDC 

Form 695 (a computer-generated letter advising inmates of their appeal deficiencies and how to 

correct them). Typically, an Appeals Coordinator uses a Form 695 if he screens out an appeal, 

and returns both the Form 695 and the original Form 602 to the appropriate building officer to 

then return to the inmate; the Appeals Office does not typically keep copies of the Form 695 or 

the appeal. Until approximately mid-2012, appeals that were screened out were not assigned an 

appeal log number. 

 8. Plaintiff avers (in his opposition filed August 19, 2015) that “the process of giving the 

screened out 602 to the appropriate building officer (the Sgt.) to return to the inmate started only 

a few months ago, not mid-2012.” PDF No. 12. 

 9. Defendants aver that their work responsibilities as Appeals Coordinators “included, but 

were not limited to, reviewing inmate appeals, screening out or canceling appeals that did not 

meet the requirements under CDCR policy delineated in the California Code of Regulations, title 

15, sections 3084-3086, which govern inmate administrative appeals, and forwarding proper 

appeals to appropriate CDCR staff for responses, investigations, or interviews.” DSUF No. 3. 

10. Plaintiff contends generally that defendants misused their authority to screen out and 

cancel appeals as a means to retaliate against inmates and shield prison officials from 

wrongdoing, and did so in this case. Plaintiff contends that defendants failed to adhere to the new 

appeal procedures but instead opted “to do whatever they wanted.” PDF Nos. 3, 7. 

 11. Plaintiff submitted 104 appeals at CSP-SAC for the time period September 2007 

through January 2014, according to CDCR’s electronic database, the Inmate/Parolee Appeals 

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Tracking System – Level I & II (IATS). Plaintiff contends that “the true number is far less due to 

the fact that all of those are appeals [that plaintiff ] was forced to jump through the various hoops 

defendants imposed and forced plaintiff to climb through before cancelling plaintiff’s staff 

complaint[s], proving the filing is nothing more than an exercise of futility.” PDF No. 4. 

 12. Of these 104 appeals, defendants have identified twenty (20) appeals that one or more 

of them reviewed, if only in part. These include Forms 602, Forms 22, and Forms 695, and 

related matters produced by plaintiff at his deposition. Defendants have submitted copies of each 

of these twenty appeals, and described how each was processed pursuant to CDCR regulations. 

See ECF No. 32 (summarizing how each appeal was processed and why), and ECF Nos. 33-35 

(declarations and exhibits submitted by each defendant). 

13. None of the twenty identified appeals were exhausted. With the exception of the two 

appeals detailed below, the remaining eighteen appeals addressed a variety of matters, including 

plaintiff’s challenges to anticipated cellmates and double celling; allegedly inadequate security 

checks; the denial of notary services; failure to provide legal copies; missing property; denial of 

showers and use of clippers; request for a medical pillow; failure of kitchen staff to wear hair nets 

and properly cover food; ignoring plaintiff’s hunger strike; noise and cold from fans and blowers; 

failure to take plaintiff to his mental health appointments and to group sessions; and privacy 

during medical appointments. 

14. Only two of the twenty identified appeals can reasonably be construed as a direct 

challenge to the processing of plaintiff’s appeals by one or more of the defendants, and they are 

therefore described in detail: 

(1) First, in a Form 602 appeal, entitled “Appeals Coordinator Pereira,” and designated by 

staff “LEGAL, Processing of Appeals, 03/14/2011,” signed March 13, 2011, plaintiff 

alleged that defendant Pereira “makes it his policy to shield his corrupt cohorts from 602’s 

with constant screen-out[s]. For frivolous and non-existing reasons.” Plaintiff requested 

that defendant Pereira “stop shielding his corrupt cohorts with screen-out or step aside and 

give up the position of appeals coordinator to someone who will at least be impartial.” 

The appeal was screened out on March 23, 2011, with a Form 695 signed by defendant 

Daly, which informed plaintiff that his appeal failed to comply with Cal. Code Regs. tit. 

15, § 3084.6(b)(6), because it “makes a general allegation, but fails to state facts or 

specify an act or decision consistent with the allegation.” 

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Plaintiff wrote his disagreement on the Form 695 (stating that Pereira “did it against my 

602 against your Capt. Carter, 4 bldg. guards for retaliation, the tower guards for using the 

fan and blower to drown out my call for help and others, Now, that is specific”), and 

submitted it. 

The appeal was again screened out based on Section5

 3084.6(b)(6), with a Form 695 

signed by defendant Daly on April 26, 2011. 

Plaintiff wrote his disagreement on the form (stating that “this 602 was sent in March, you 

held it over a month. Why?”), and submitted it. 

The appeal was again screened out based on Section 3084.6(b)(6), with a Form 695 signed 

by defendant Donahoo on June 2, 2011. 

Plaintiff returned the form on June 14, 2011, with the notation, “That is not a general 

allegation. It’s clear as it can be. Let’s use you as an example. You’re doing just [] as he 

did, shielding.” 

The next day, June 15, 2011, defendant Donahoo notified plaintiff that his appeal was 

cancelled at the First Level Review pursuant to Section 3084.6(c)(3) (authorizing 

cancellation of appeal if the inmate “continues to submit a rejected appeal while 

disregarding appeal staff’s previous instructions to correct the appeal including failure to 

submit necessary supporting documents, unless the inmate . . . provides . . . a reasonable 

explanation of why the correction was not made or documents are not available”), with the 

notation, “You continue to submit a rejected appeal while disregarding appeal staff’s 

previous instructions to correct the appeal.” See Daly Decl., ¶ 46 and Ex. E (ECF No. 35-

2 at 3-9); see also Pl. Ex. D (ECF No. 42 at 89-93). 

(2) Second, in a Form 602 appeal, entitled “Donahoo Cancelling 602,” and designated by 

staff “LEGAL, Processing of Appeals, 08/27/2012,” signed August 27, 2012, plaintiff 

alleged that “Appeals Coordinator Donahoo compelled me to file repeated CDCR-22’s. 

Then when I finally file[d] the 602, he cancels it stating time restraints expired. Which 

was [his] fault, not mine.” Plaintiff requested that “My 602’s not [be] cancelled when 

compelled to file repeated CDCR-22’s. And Donahoo and Daly stop shielding their 

cohorts from 602’s against them.” 

The appeal was screened out on September 4, 2012, with a Form 695 signed by defendant 

Daly, on the following three grounds: 

a. Failure to comply with Section 3084.6(b)(2), because it “failed to demonstrate a 

material adverse effect upon [plaintiff’s] welfare” (with further explanation). 

b. Failure to comply with Section 3084.6(b)(6), because it “makes a general 

allegation, but fails to state facts or specify an act or decision consistent with the 

allegation.” 

 

5

 All further “Section” references are to Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. 

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c. Failure to comply with Section 3084.6(b)(7), because it “is missing necessary 

supporting documents as established in CCR 3084.3.” 

Plaintiff was further informed that, “[i]f you are challenging a specific 

cancellation, it is incumbent on you to support your claims and attach [the] 

cancellation to [the] new appeal, as CDC 695 describes,” which provides in part 

that “a separate appeal can be filed on the cancellation decision.” 

Plaintiff wrote his disagreement on the Form 695, and submitted it on September 28, 

2012, asserting: 

Again you held this for three weeks. Why[?] What kind of evil game or tactic are 

you deploying? The adverse effect is me not being afford[ed] redress and 

violation of my 1st Amendment right to file a complaint. This complaint states a 

clear fact as did your worthless CDCR 22, it’s no general allegation, you and Daly 

alway[s] cancel and shield 602 complaint against your libertine cohorts. It’s not 

missing [] documentation. You have copies use them. The statement on this 602 

complaint is quite clear. Here are the Log Nos. [two provided]. You cancelled 

them and a lot more all for fraudulent reasons in order to shield your libertine 

reprobate cohorts. 

The appeal was again screened out with a Form 695 signed by defendant Daly on October 

5, 2012, on the grounds that it failed to comply with Section 3084.6(b)(7) (missing 

necessary supporting documents); and Section 3084.6(b)(6) (general allegation without 

supporting facts); and because specific cancellation decisions that appeared to be 

challenged were inadequately identified and described. 

Plaintiff again wrote his disagreement on the form and submitted it on October 12, 2012, 

asserting: 

This is no general allegation, you, Donahoo and your predecessor Pereira are 

cancelling 602s against your libertine cohorts shielding them and violating my 1st 

Amendment right to file a 602 complaint. That fact is quite clear. The 602 

complaint was about your libertine cohorts destroying my personal prop. in 

retaliation for filing a 602 complaint the date was 8-21-2012. The other was filed 

7.28.2012 and two of your cohorts, left not left (sic) but intentionally took off the 

cover on my food leaving it open for flies and other insects to feast on it leaving 

me unable to [eat] any of it. You have the Log # and [there] are an untold # more, 

I’m just citing these two. 

On October 26, 2012, defendant Daly notified plaintiff that his appeal was cancelled at the 

First Level Review pursuant to Section 3084.6(c)(3), with the notation that “You continue 

to submit a rejected appeal while disregarding appeal staff’s previous instructions to 

correct the appeal. [¶] Refer to previous CDC 695s dated 9/4/12 and 10/5/12 for 

instructions which were not adhered to.” See Daly Decl., ¶ 46 and Ex. J (ECF No. 35-4 at 

9-15); see also Pl. Ex. D (ECF No. 42 at 89-93). 

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15. Plaintiff does not allege that any of his appeals reviewed by defendants during the 

relevant period, including his appeals filed against defendants herein, reflect an attempt to exhaust 

his administrative remedies on his retaliation claims pursued in this action. 

V. Analysis 

 In assessing the merits of a summary judgment motion, the court must examine the 

parties’ evidence supporting and refuting each element of plaintiff’s retaliation claim. Construing 

the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence demonstrates that, in response to 

plaintiff’s exercise of his right to grieve prison conditions, defendants routinely (or nearly so) 

rejected and eventually cancelled plaintiff’s appeals. This finding supports the first and third 

elements of plaintiff’s retaliation claim, specifically, that defendants responded adversely to 

grievances submitted by plaintiff in the exercise of his First Amendment rights. See Rhodes, 408 

F.3d at 567-68. Missing, however, is any evidence to support plaintiff’s allegations that 

defendants’ challenged conduct was motivated by retaliation against plaintiff because he 

exercised his First Amendment rights. This second element of a retaliation claim requires 

evidence of a causal connection between the first and third elements. See id. 

Defendants have each submitted a sworn declaration, with exhibits, explaining how their 

respective processing of each of the twenty appeals submitted by plaintiff during the relevant 

period was consistent with CDCR regulations. See Pereira Decl., ECF No. 33; Donahoo Decl., 

ECF No. 34; and Daly Decl., ECF No. 35. Defendants demonstrate that “their handling of 

Morris’s deficient appeals were in accordance with Title 15 provisions regarding inmate appeals 

and the introduction of new Form 22 and new CDCR 602, and promoted the legitimate 

penological interest of providing all inmates with an efficient and effective appeal process.” ECF 

No. 32-2 at 27. Thus, defendants, as the moving parties, have met their burden of submitting 

authenticated evidence showing that they properly processed plaintiff’s appeals in accordance 

with CDCR regulations, and that the rejection and/or cancellation of each matter was in 

furtherance of legitimate penological goals. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 

The burden therefore shifts to plaintiff, as the nonmoving party, to establish that there is a 

genuine issue for trial. Celotex, at 324. It is plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate “that there were no 

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legitimate correctional purposes motivating the actions he complains of,” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808, 

that is, “plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving the absence of legitimate correctional 

goals,” id. at 806 (citing Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 532). It is not plaintiff’s burden, on summary 

judgment, to conclusively demonstrate retaliation, only to “point to some facts in the record that 

demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact[.]” Reese v. Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 

F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). 

Plaintiff has not filed a sworn declaration or verified opposition; his only pertinent 

verified allegation, set forth in the SAC, is that defendants engaged in the challenged conduct 

“because” of plaintiff’s protected conduct, merely mirroring the elements of a retaliation claim. 

See ECF No. 19 at 4; see also Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68. See also n.1, supra. 

Plaintiff’s responses to defendants’ undisputed facts provides little more – plaintiff relies 

on most of the same exhibits submitted by defendants (copies of plaintiff’s appeals and official 

responses thereto) to generally assert that defendants shielded one another and coworkers from 

wrongdoing, “misused their authority,” did “whatever they wanted,” and forced plaintiff “to jump 

through various hoops,” resulting in “nothing more than an exercise in futility.” See generally 

ECF No. 42 at 11-42. Plaintiff alleges that he “did everything right” and “everything that was 

requested,” but maintains that he “didn’t need to follow instructions that were clearly wrong.” Id. 

Significantly, however, plaintiff has not identified any specific conduct that allegedly illustrates 

defendants’ retaliatory motive against plaintiff because he was utilizing the appeals process. 

Thus, plaintiff has failed to allege any “specific facts showing retaliation because of the exercise 

of [plaintiff’s] constitutional rights.” Frazier, supra, 922 F.2d at 562 n.1. 

Plaintiff’s unverified opposition also fails to support his claims. Plaintiff alleges therein 

that defendants’ screen-outs were “absurd,” “a ruse,” “a farce,” and consisted of “useless” and 

“worthless” “rhetoric” and “innuendos.” See generally ECF No. 42 at 1-10, 43-4. Plaintiff 

speculates, “Why if not retaliation?” Id. at 3. He concludes, ECF No. 42 at 10: 

Everything they’ve said is a lot of rhetoric, innuendos, and lies 

outright. They know everything done to me by those criminals was 

acts of retaliation. They’re just shocked and surprised that unlike 

other victims I’ve attempted to stand up and fight; look for some 

justice. . . . 

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Although defendants’ challenged conduct demonstrates a pattern of rejecting and 

ultimately cancelling plaintiff’s appeals, plaintiff has submitted no evidence supporting a 

reasonable inference that the exercise of his First Amendment rights was a “substantial” or 

“motivating” factor behind defendants’ challenged conduct. See Sorrano’s Gasco, supra, 874 

F.2d at 1314. The record before the court does not support such an inference. Nor has plaintiff 

submitted any evidence supporting a reasonable inference that defendants’ challenged conduct 

did not advance legitimate penological goals. Courts must “‘afford appropriate deference and 

flexibility’ to prison officials in the evaluation of proffered legitimate penological reasons for 

conduct alleged to be retaliatory.” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 

482 (1995)). Thus, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact 

concerning defendants’ motivation for their challenged conduct. For these reasons, this court is 

compelled to recommend that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted on the 

merits. 6 

In the absence of any evidence of retaliatory motive, this action appears to reflect only 

plaintiff’s frustrations in attempting to exhaust appeals on his several substantive claims. 

However, prison officials are not required under federal law to process inmate grievances in a 

specific way or to respond to them in a favorable manner. Prisoners do not have a “separate 

constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 

850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988)). Even the 

non-existence of, or the failure of prison officials to properly implement, an administrative 

appeals process within the prison system does not raise constitutional concerns. Mann, 855 F.2d 

at 640; see also Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993). At all times plaintiff 

retained the option of commencing a civil action on a specific substantive claim that he had 

attempted to exhaust through the prison’s grievance system but for which he contends 

administrative remedies were effectively unavailable. See Sapp, 623 F.3d at 822-24; Nunez, 591 

F.3d at 1224; Brown, 422 F.3d at 935. Instead, plaintiff decided to pursue this “shotgun” civil 

 

6

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rights action, broadly challenging defendants’ responses to all of his relevant appeals. This 

approach was miscalculated in the absence of any evidence to overcome defendants’ evidence 

that their challenged conduct advanced legitimate penological goals and was not motivated by 

retaliatory animus. 

VI. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment, ECF No. 32, be granted, and judgment be entered for defendants. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: March 1, 2016 

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