Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-30225/USCOURTS-ca9-15-30225-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Daniel James Strycharske
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JESSE D. KAPLAN; DANIEL

JAMES STRYCHARSKE,

Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 15-30213

15-30225

D.C. Nos.

2:14-cr-00232-JLR-3

2:14-cr-00232-JLR-2

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington,

James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 29, 2016

Seattle, Washington

Filed October 7, 2016

Before: Michael Daly Hawkins and M. Margaret

McKeown, Circuit Judges, and David A. Ezra,* District

Judge.

Opinion by Judge Ezra

*The Honorable DavidAlanEzra, Senior United States District Judge

for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. KAPLAN

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed Jesse Kaplan’s and Daniel

Strycharske’s sentences of imprisonment and the district

court’s award of restitution in a case in which an explosion

during hash oil manufacturing engulfed an apartment building

complex in flames and caused severe injuries and one death.

The panel held that district courts have discretion in

calculating restitution, and that while fair market value

generally provides the best measure to ensure restitution in

the full amount of the victim’s loss, replacement value is an

appropriate measure of destroyed property under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3663A(b)(1)(B), where the fair market value is either

difficult to determine or would otherwise be an inadequate or

inferior measure of the value. The panel held that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in using replacement value

to calculate the value of destroyed personal belongings like

clothes, furniture, and home appliances.

The panel held that the district court was not required to

give additional notice of an upward departure, where the

presentence report specifically put the defendants on notice

that an upward departure may apply, and that the district

court did not commit plain error where it upwardly departed

only on grounds stated in the PSR. The panel held that

Kaplan’s 36-month sentence is substantively reasonable. The

panel rejected Strycharske’s contentions that the district court

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. KAPLAN 3

made clearly erroneous factual findings, made an

inflammatory analogy that prejudiced his sentencing, and

that his 36-month sentence is substantively unreasonable.

COUNSEL

Ralph Hurvitz (argued), Seattle, Washington, for DefendantAppellant Jesse D. Kaplan.

Scott J. Engelhard (argued), Seattle, Washington, for

Defendant-Appellant Daniel James Strycharske.

Charlene Koski (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Annette L. Hayes, United States Attorney; United States

Attorney’s Office; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

EZRA, Senior District Judge:

Appellants Jesse Kaplan (“Kaplan”) and Daniel

Strycharske (“Strycharske”) appeal their 36-month sentence

of imprisonment and final judgment of restitution in the

amount of $2,771,929 on the ground that the district court

erred by calculating the restitution award using replacement

value instead of fair market value. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We hold that district courts have discretion in calculating

restitution, and that while fair market value generally

provides the best measure to ensure restitution in the full

amount of the victim’s loss, “replacement value” is an

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4 UNITED STATES V. KAPLAN

appropriate measure of destroyed property under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3663A(b)(1)(B) where the fair market value is either

difficult to determine or would otherwise be an inadequate or

inferior measure of the value. We affirm the sentences on all

other grounds.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of Appellants’ quest to manufacture

homemade hash oil and the tragic consequences of that quest. 

In the summer of 2013, Kaplan and Strycharske met David

Shultz (“Shultz”) at a marijuana festival where Shultz held

himself out as knowledgeable about the hash oil

manufacturing process. Appellants expressed interest in

producing their own hash oil, so they invited Schultz to move

into their apartment. Subsequently, Schultz and Appellants

started making hash oil in the apartment. On November 5,

2013, butane fumes given off during the hash oil

manufacturing process ignited and exploded. The blast blew

out the apartment’s exterior wall and engulfed significant

portions of the building complex in flames. As a result of the

explosion, six victims suffered severe injuries, and one victim

later died due to complications arising out of her injuries.

On July 30, 2014, a grand jury returned a three-count

indictment against the Appellants. Count 1 charged

Endangering Human Life While Manufacturing Controlled

Substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 858 and 18 U.S.C.

§ 2; Count 2 charged Maintaining a Drug Involved Premises,

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) and (b), and 18 U.S.C.

§ 2; and Count 3 charged Manufacturing Hash Oil and

Marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

841(b)(1)(D), 846, and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The Appellants pled

guilty and signed materially identical plea agreements.

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UNITED STATES V. KAPLAN 5

At Kaplan’s sentencing, the district court calculated his

total offense level to be 17 and his criminal history category

to be I . The resulting Guidelines range called for a sentence

between 24 to 30 months’ imprisonment. After calculating

Kaplan’s Guidelines range, the district court considered the

§ 3553(a) factors, but found that “an upward departure . . . is

warranted under sentencing guideline [“USSG”] 5K2.0

[rather than a variance under the § 3553(a) factors], as the

aggravating circumstances of the crime are not fully

contemplated by the guidelines.” Accordingly, the district

court sentenced Kaplan to 36 months’ imprisonment. 

Likewise, at Strycharske’s sentencing the district court

calculated his Guidelines range to be 24 to 30 months’

imprisonment but sentenced him to 36 months’ imprisonment

by way of an upward departure pursuant to USSG

§ 5K2.0(a)(1)(A).

On October 15, 2015, the district court awarded

restitution in the amount of $2,771,929. On appeal, Kaplan

and Strycharke argue that the proper restitution amount is

$2,731,929. They argue that the $40,000 difference reflects

the district court’s improper use of replacement value in

calculating the value of certain items including clothing,

furniture, and household appliances.

DISCUSSION

A. The Restitution Award

How to measure the value of destroyed property when

calculating a restitution award is a matter of first impression

in this circuit.

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6 UNITED STATES V. KAPLAN

We review de novo the legality of a restitution order and

review for clear error the factual findings that support the

order. United States v. Luis, 765 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir.

2014). If the restitution order “is within the bounds of the

statutory framework, a restitution order is reviewed for abuse

of discretion.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Whether the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act

(“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, authorizes a district court to

measure property “value” using its replacement value goes to

the legality of the restitution order itself and is a question of

law; thus the standard of review is de novo.

“Fair market value” refers to “the price that a seller is

willing to accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the open

market.” Fair Market Value, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th

ed. 2014); United States v. Simmonds, 235 F.3d 826, 830 (3d

Cir. 2000) (“‘Market value’ refers to the actual price that the

[property] in question would have commanded on the open

market on the date of destruction.”). “‘Replacement value,’

in contrast, refers to the amount of money necessary to

replace the [property].” Simmonds, 235 F.3d at 830. In most

cases, the replacement value is greater than the fair market

value due to depreciation in value over time of many types of

property. Id. at 830–31.

The MVRA requires a district court to order a defendant

to make restitution to the victim of certain offenses. 

18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1). In situations where the return of

property is “impossible,” a district court shall order a

defendant to “pay an amount equal to the greater of the

value of the property on the date of the damage, loss,

or destruction[,] or the value of the property on the date

of sentencing, less [any offsets].” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3663A(b)(1)(B)(i)(I)–(II). However, the statute is silent

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UNITED STATES V. KAPLAN 7

about how to value property. United States v. Boccagna,

450 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2006). What is clear, however, is

that legislative history and case law demonstrates that the

purpose of the MVRA is to fully compensate victims for their

losses, and to restore victims to their original state prior to the

criminal act. S. Rep. No. 104–179, at 12–13 (1996)reprinted

in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924; United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d

1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e are presented with a

statute[,] the primary goal and overarching goal of which is

to make victims of crime whole, to fully compensate these

victims.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated “that the ordinary

meaning of ‘restitution’ is restoring someone to a position he

occupied before a particular event.” Hughey v. United States,

495 U.S. 411, 416 (1990). Guided by the remedial purposes

underlying the MVRA, other circuits which have addressed

this question have granted district courts a degree of

flexibility in calculating the value of property when

constructing an appropriate restitution award.

For example, the Third Circuit concluded that a district

court did not abuse its discretion in calculating the value of

the victims’ furniture destroyed by a fire under § 3663A using

“replacement value” rather than its “actual value.” 

Simmonds, 235 F.3d at 832. The Simmonds court explained

that “[w]hile there is no indication that the destroyed furniture

in this case was ‘unique,’ furniture often has a personal value

to its owners that cannot be captured or accurately estimated

by simply determining the market value of the furniture.” Id.

The Third Circuit held that “when evaluating personal items

of furniture in one’s residence, we find that replacement value

may be an appropriate measure of ‘value’ under

§ 3663A(b)(1). In these circumstances, the market value or

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8 UNITED STATES V. KAPLAN

cash value is an inadequate or inferior measure of ‘value.’” 

Id.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s use of

replacement value in determining the value of a burned-down

church. United States v. Shugart, 176 F.3d 1373, 1376 (11th

Cir. 1999). The Shugart court held that “‘value,’ as § 3663A

uses that term, contemplates a restitution order based on

replacement cost where actual cash value is unavailable or

unreliable. Whether actual cash value is unavailable or

unreliable is an issue of fact, and a district court’s decision to

use replacement cost is a matter of discretion.” Id. at 1375. 

The Eleventh Circuit explained that “[f]or fungible

commodities, value is easy to determine: it’s the actual cash

value, or fair market value, of the item.” Id. However,

“[a]lthough fair market value will often be an accurate

measure of the value of property, it will not always be so. 

Where actual cash value is difficult to ascertain—because an

item is unique, or because there is not a broad and active

market for it—replacement cost may be a better measure of

value.” Id.

Two other circuit courts have explicitly adopted this

approach. The Eighth Circuit held that

in certain situations replacement value is the

best measure of a victim’s actual loss,

particularly where the lost property is difficult

to value. Conversely, in situations where the

lost or damaged property is a fungible

commoditywith a viable market, we conclude

replacement value is likely not appropriate

because ‘fair market value will . . . provide[]

the most reliable measure of . . . the full loss.

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UNITED STATES V. KAPLAN 9

United States v. Frazier, 651 F.3d 899, 908 (8th Cir. 2011)

(remanding because district court did not make a factual

finding as to whether the destroyed home was a unique asset

with intangible value or whether it lacked a viable market

(quoting Boccagna, 450 F.3d at 115) (alteration in original)). 

The Second Circuit has chosen to “decline to hold that, as a

matter of law, district courts may only use fair market value

in making the property calculations contemplated by

18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B).” Boccagna, 450 F.3d at 117. 

Two additional circuits have implicitly noted, but not directly

held, that the MVRA permits multiple methods of calculating

restitution. United States v. Wilfong, 551 F.3d 1182, 1184 n.2

(10th Cir. 2008) (“We do not hold that the cost to the victim

is the only reasonable form of valuation. In some cases,

replacement cost may be more appropriate.”); United States

v. Gunselman, 643 F. App’x 348, 356 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting

that “other circuits have sanctioned the use of replacement

cost when that measure appears best suited to make victims

whole”). No circuit court has held differently.

This Court now joins our sister circuits in concluding that

fair market value generally provides the best measure to

ensure restitution in the “full amount” of the victim’s loss, but

that “replacement value” is an appropriate measure of

destroyed property under § 3663A(b)(1)(B) where the fair

market value is either difficult to determine or would

otherwise be an inadequate or inferior measure of the value

necessary to make the victim whole. Fair market value will

almost always be an accurate measure of the value of a

fungible commodity with a viable market, like precious

metals, coffee, lumber, currency, wheat, or even marijuana. 

See Fungible Goods, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)

(using coffee and grain as examples); Gonzales v. Raich,

545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005) (explaining that marijuana is “a

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10 UNITED STATES V. KAPLAN

fungible commodity for which there is an established, albeit

illegal, interstate market”); Fungible, Webster’s II New

Riverside Univ. Dictionary (1984) (using money and grain as

examples). It is within the district court’s discretion to

determine the proper method of calculating the value of such

property when ordering restitution pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3663A. However, the method chosen must comport with

the congressional intent to make the victim whole.

Accordingly, it would be an abuse of discretion for a district

court to issue a restitution award that makes a victim more

than whole, such as by awarding a windfall. Finally, the

district court’s determination of the actual value is a question

of fact and should be reviewed for clear error. See Shugart,

176 F.3d at 1375.

This holding comports with the position on an analogous

legal question: how district courts are to measure “loss” for

calculating total offense levels at sentencing. United States

v. Pemberton, 904 F.2d 515, 516–17 (9th Cir. 1990). While

“calculating loss under the guidelines is not necessarily

identical to loss calculation for purposes of restitution,”

United States v. Hunter, 618 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2010),

the two calculations are often based on similar figures. The

application notes to USSG § 2B1.1, which dictates offense

level enhancements for financial loss, states “[t]he sentencing

judge is in a unique position to assess the evidence and

estimate the loss based upon that evidence.” USSG § 2B1.1

cmt. n.3(C). The application note further explains that in

estimating loss, the sentencing court should use “the fair

market value of the property unlawfully taken, copied, or

destroyed; or if the fair market value is impracticable to

determine or inadequately measures the harm, the cost to the

victim of replacing that property.” Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C)(i). 

For example, in Pemberton, this court affirmed a district

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UNITED STATES V. KAPLAN 11

court’s valuation of a drawing based on a “contract price”

instead of its fair market value in calculating “loss” at

sentencing. 904 F.2d at 517. The court explained,

[t]he district court acted within its discretion

by valuing the drawings as it did. Being

unique, the drawings were not fungible items

for which there was a broad and active

market. In the absence of such a market,

which would have supplied a readily

ascertainable price, the court acted reasonably

in relying upon the [contract].

Id. Similarly, the sentencing judge is in the unique position

to assess the evidence and determine the nature and value of

the property for which restitution will be paid. Where

property is personal or unique, or neither fungible nor easily

sold on a viable market, district courts should be permitted

the discretion to make victims whole by determining an

appropriate measure of value under the circumstances of the

case before them.

Applying the holding to this case, it is clear that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in using replacement

value to calculate the value of destroyed personal belongings

like clothes, furniture, and home appliances. The district

court correctly focused its attention at the restitution hearing

on making the victims whole, in furtherance of the

congressional purpose of the MVRA. The district court

found that the various pieces of property at issue were “very

personal types of items,” and that awarding the fair market

value to purchase someone else’s used personal items would

not make the victim whole. Accordingly, the district court

entered restitution in the amount of $2,771,929, which

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12 UNITED STATES V. KAPLAN

reflected the use of replacement value.1 The district court’s

decision reflects this court’s view that replacement value is

preferred where fair market value would provide an

“inadequate or inferior measure of the value necessary to

make the victim whole.” Since the destroyed items were

personal in nature, fair market value would not have

adequately captured the destroyed items’ intangible, and

perhaps sentimental, value to the victims.2 Accordingly, the

district court did not abuse its discretion in using replacement

value to calculate restitution.

B. The Individual Sentences of Imprisonment

Both Appellants contend the district court committed a

procedural error by failing to comply with Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 32(h). Because Kaplan and Strycharske

failed to object at sentencing to the adequacy of notice, the

standard of review is plain error. See United States v. EvansMartinez, 530 F.3d 1164, 1167 (9th Cir. 2008).

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h) states:

Before the court may depart from the

applicable sentencing range on a ground not

identified for departure either in the

1 Only a small portion, approximately $40,000, of the restitution

award involved the personal property items at issue on appeal.

2 The Court notes that in addition to the difficulty in capturing the

intangible and sentimental value of these types of possessions, that even

if there is some type of Internet-based market for used property, the value

varies widely depending on the seller, and it can be simply impracticable

for the district court to ascertain which used piece of property most closely

approximates the item lost by the victim.

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UNITED STATES V. KAPLAN 13

presentence report or in a party’s prehearing

submission, the court must give the parties

reasonable notice that it is contemplating such

a departure. The notice must specify any

ground on which the court is contemplating a

departure.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h). “Under the plain language of the

Rule 32(h) . . . [t]he district court itself is required to give

notice of its intent to depart only when the PSR and the

parties’ prehearing submissions fail to identify the ground for

departure.” United States v. Cruz-Perez, 567 F.3d 1142, 1147

(9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

In this case, the PSRs filed for Kaplan and Strycharske

expressly indicated that factors may warrant a departure

pursuant to USSG § 5K2.0(a)(1)(A). Specifically, the PSRs

state that “death, serious bodily injury, and property

destruction was not contemplated in the advisory guideline

range.” Accordingly, the district court was not required to

give additional notice because the PSR specifically put

Kaplan and Strycharske on notice that the court may apply an

upward departure. Their contention that the district court

upwardly departed on alternative grounds is without merit. 

The record reflects that the district court articulated reasons

to upward vary pursuant to the § 3553(a) factors, but these

reasons did not form the basis for its upward departure. 

Accordingly, since the district court upwardly departed only

on grounds stated in the PSR, the district court did not

commit plain error.

Kaplan further argues that the district court erred by

applying an upward departure pursuant to USSG § 5K2.0. In

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14 UNITED STATES V. KAPLAN

this circuit, post-Booker departures may not form the basis of

a procedural error. United States v. Mohamed, 459 F.3d 979,

987 (9th Cir. 2006). Instead, “[t]o the extent that a district

court has framed its analysis in terms of a . . . departure, we

will treat such so-called departures as an exercise of postBooker discretion to sentence a defendant outside of the

applicable guidelines range[, and that sentence] is subject to

a unitary review for reasonableness.” Id. The substantive

reasonableness of a criminal sentence is reviewed for abuse

of discretion. United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th

Cir. 2008) (en banc).

Here, Kaplan’s sentence of 36 months imprisonment is

substantively reasonable. The district court noted that the

criminal conduct resulted “in several million dollars in

property damage, a fatality, permanent and disabling and

significant injuries, and interruption in the lives of a number

of people who did nothing wrong other than to live in an

apartment building that three individuals were misusing.” As

noted above, 21 U.S.C. § 858, the statute under which Kaplan

pled guilty, includes as an element of the offense the

“creat[ion of] a substantial risk of harm to human life.” The

creation of a risk is not the same thing as actual harm. 

Consequently, the sentence of 36 months is reasonable

because Kaplan’s criminal conduct resulted in significantly

more than just the “creat[ion of] a substantial risk of harm to

human life.” 21 U.S.C. § 858. Instead, his conduct resulted

in actual harm in the form of death and permanent injuries to

a class of victims, and a sentence above the applicable range

was necessary to account for behavior not considered by the

statute or the Guidelines.

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UNITED STATES V. KAPLAN 15

C. Strycharske’s Individual Issues

Strycharske argues that the district court made clearly

erroneous findings of fact when it stated the apartment

contained 64 cans of butane and that an open flame was

involved. Strycharske also argues that the district court made

a highly inflammatory analogy that prejudiced his sentencing. 

Finally, Strycharske argues that his sentence is substantively

unreasonable. This Court reviews findings of fact for clear

error and the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Flores, 802 F.3d 1028, 1047 (9th

Cir. 2015); United States v. Autery, 555 F.3d 864, 871 (9th

Cir. 2009).

It is undisputed that the apartment did not contain 64 cans

of butane; yet, the district court did not make a factual finding

to the contrary, nor rely on the quantity of butane containers

when imposing the sentence. Instead, the district court made

the statement in the phrase of a question, one that Strycharske

ultimately answered and corrected. Nor did the district court

commit clear error in finding that Strycharske acted with

“wanton recklessness [by] having butane canisters actively

involved around open flames.” While the factual basis of the

plea agreement does not describe the existence of an “open

flame,” the fact that the butane gas was “ignited” strongly

implies that a spark or a flame caused the explosion. 

Therefore, the district court did not commit clear error

because it was not illogical, implausible, or without support

in inferences drawn from the record that an “open flame”

existed near the butane canisters at the moment of explosion.

Further, the district judge’s “Bering Sea” analogy was

neither extraneous nor inflammatory. At sentencing,

Strycharske argued that his sentence should reflect an

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16 UNITED STATES V. KAPLAN

imprisonment range analogous to a drunk driving conviction. 

In response, the district court stated:

I would suggest to you that closer analogy is

when you’ve got a boat that you send up to

the Bering Sea, and you weld the doors shut

because it’s going to increase the profitability

of your voyage, and people die because it

sinks. That’s what I think this compares to.

The analogy’s reflection of an individual’s prioritization of

profit at the expense of the safety of others finds support in

the record; Strycharske admitted in his sentencing

memorandum filed with the district court that he, Schultz, and

Kaplan “discussed going into business together” to make hash

oil. It was ultimately the pursuit of that business interest that

led to the explosion. Finally, the “Bering Sea” analogy did

not infect Strycharske’s sentencing to the extent that it

resulted in an unfair process or undermined the district

court’s application of the § 3553(a) factors. To the contrary,

the district court’s articulation of the § 3553(a) factors and

ultimate upward departure pursuant to USSG § 5K2.0

demonstrates that the judge made “an individualized

assessment,” Carty, 520 F.3d at 994, that led the district court

to impose a sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment.

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

sentencing Strycharske to an unreasonable imprisonment. 

The district court correctly calculated the applicable range,

which called for imprisonment between 24 to 30 months. 

The district court fully articulated its reasons for an upward

variance using the § 3553(a) factors. Specifically, the court

noted that “what moves the court is the loss of life, the

permanently-disabling and significant injuries that people

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UNITED STATES V. KAPLAN 17

received . . . therefore, I take the nature and circumstances of

the offense to be highly significant and serious.” Despite

giving detailed reasons to justify an above the guideline range

sentence pursuant to the § 3553(a) factors, the district

ultimately applied an upward departure “based upon the fact

that the applicable sentencing guidelines did not consider the

extreme harm done to the victims, including the total

destruction of property, the permanent debilitating injuries,

and the loss of life as a result of injuries received in the

incident.” Given these circumstances, the district court did

not abuse its discretion in sentencing Strycharske to 36

months’ imprisonment, six months above the applicable

range.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s sentences

of imprisonment and award of restitution.

AFFIRMED.

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