Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-05-07709/USCOURTS-ca4-05-07709-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ian Ralph Blackstock
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 05-7709

IAN RALPH BLACKSTOCK, a/k/a Ian R.

Blackstock, a/k/a Black,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

James C. Cacheris, Senior District Judge.

(CR-93-350)

Argued: September 28, 2007

Decided: January 9, 2008

Before TRAXLER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges,

and Norman K. MOON, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Traxler wrote the

opinion, in which Judge Shedd and Judge Moon joined. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Neal Lawrence Walters, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

SCHOOL OF LAW, Appellate Litigation Clinic, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Richard Daniel Cooke, Special Assistant United

States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,

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Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Mitchell A. Mosvick,

Third Year Law Student, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL

OF LAW, Appellate Litigation Clinic, Charlottesville, Virginia, for

Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, United States Attorney, James Strawley, Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

OPINION

TRAXLER, Circuit Judge: 

We granted a certificate of appealability to permit Ian Ralph Blackstock to challenge the district court’s dismissal of Blackstock’s

motion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 as successive. We conclude that the

motion was not successive because the district court recharacterized

a previous motion filed by Blackstock as a § 2255 motion without

giving Blackstock the notice required by United States v. Castro, 540

U.S. 375 (2003). Although no notice of the recharacterization would

have been required under the rules we set out in United States v.

Emmanuel, 288 F.3d 644 (4th Cir. 2002), the portion of Emmanuel

that sanctions the district court’s action is inconsistent with the

Supreme Court’s approach to the issue in Castro. Accordingly, we

vacate the district court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Blackstock pleaded guilty to federal weapons charges in 1993. In

2001, he filed a motion seeking to require the government to produce

all documents associated with his case. Although the only relief

requested in the motion was the production of the requested information, Blackstock noted in the motion that his conviction had been

invalidated by the Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in Apprendi

v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The district court recharacterized

Blackstock’s discovery motion as a petition under 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2255, and, because Apprendi had not been applied retroactively, the

court denied the petition on the merits. Blackstock unsuccessfully

moved for reconsideration of the order, but he did not appeal. 

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In 2005, Blackstock filed a motion under Rule 60(b) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to set aside the district court’s 2001

ruling. Blackstock argued that the district court had improperly converted his 2001 discovery motion into a § 2255 petition. Blackstock

attached a new § 2255 petition to his Rule 60 motion. 

The district court denied Blackstock’s Rule 60 motion. Looking to

this court’s pre-Castro decision in Emmanuel, the district court concluded that no notice of the conversion of the discovery motion into

a § 2255 petition was required. The district court then dismissed the

§ 2255 petition filed with the motion, because Blackstock had not

received permission from this court to pursue a second or successive

§ 2255 petition. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(b) (West 2006). 

II.

As we explained in Emmanuel, pre-AEDPA1 courts "received various and sundry post-conviction motions from prisoners, examined

their substance and the relief sought, and, when appropriate, routinely

treated certain of them as having been made pursuant to § 2255,

regardless of the label the prisoner gave the motion." Emmanuel, 288

F.3d at 647. AEDPA, however, imposed significant limitations on a

prisoner’s ability to file successive § 2255 motions. See 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2255 (West 2006). Because of these limitations, a decision to

recharacterize a prisoner’s motion as arising under § 2255 can have

adverse consequences:

If a district court receiving a motion under some other provision of law elects to treat it as a motion under § 2255 and

then denies it, that may cause the movant’s subsequent filing

of a motion under § 2255 to be barred as a "second" § 2255.

Thus a conversion, initially justified because it harmlessly

assisted the prisoner-movant in dealing with legal technicalities, may result in a disastrous deprivation of a future

opportunity to have a well-justified grievance adjudicated.

The court’s act of conversion which we approved under preAEDPA law because it was useful and harmless might,

1The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L.

No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 

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under AEDPA’s new law, become extraordinarily harmful

to a prisoner’s rights. A prisoner convicted pursuant to

unconstitutional proceedings might lose the right to have a

single petition for habeas corpus adjudicated, solely by reason of a district court’s having incorrectly recharacterized

some prior motion as one brought under § 2255. 

Emmanuel, 288 F.3d at 647-48 (quoting Adams v. United States, 155

F.3d 582, 583-84 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam)). 

Given the post-AEDPA problems that could be caused by recharacterizing a prisoner’s post-conviction pleading, this court in Emmanuel

imposed certain limitations on a district court’s exercise of its discretion to recharacterize a filing. We held that a district court may not

recharacterize a prisoner’s filing as a § 2255 petition without notifying the prisoner of its intent to recharacterize the motion, warning the

prisoner of the effects of recharacterization, and giving the prisoner

an opportunity to withdraw or amend his motion. See id. at 649-50.

We explained, however, that "the notice requirements imposed in this

opinion are based on the assumption that the recharacterization will

have some adverse consequence on the movant." Id. at 650. Therefore, "[i]n cases where no adverse consequences will ensue, the district court need not give the movant any notice prior to proceeding

with the recharacterization." Id.

The district court relied on Emmanuel’s exception to the notice

requirement when considering Blackstock’s 2005 Rule 60 motion and

§ 2255 petition. The court determined that no adverse consequences

flowed from the recharacterization of Blackstock’s 2001 discovery

motion because any subsequent § 2255 petition would have been

untimely, given that Blackstock was convicted in 1993. See, e.g.,

Brown v. Angelone, 150 F.3d 370, 375 (4th Cir. 1998) (concluding

that prisoners whose convictions became final before the enactment

of AEDPA had until April 24, 1997, one year after AEDPA’s effective date, to file a federal habeas petition). Because the recharacterization did not adversely affect Blackstock, the district court concluded

that no notice was required under Emmanuel. And because no notice

was required, the 2001 discovery motion was properly characterized

as a § 2255 petition. The district court therefore denied Blackstock’s

Rule 60 motion and dismissed the 2005 § 2255 petition as successive.

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On appeal, Blackstock contends that while the district court’s analysis might be consistent with the rules set forth in Emmanuel, it is not

consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach to the issue in Castro,

which was decided after we issued our opinion in Emmanuel. We

agree. 

In Castro, the Supreme Court agreed with the circuit courts to have

considered the issue that with the advent of AEDPA and its restrictions on successive petitions, limitations on a district court’s power

to recharacterize a prisoner’s motion were needed. The Court held

that if a district court recharacterizes a prisoner’s motion as his first

§ 2255 motion,

the district court must notify the pro se litigant that it

intends to recharacterize the pleading, warn the litigant that

this recharacterization means that any subsequent § 2255

motion will be subject to the restrictions on "second or successive" motions, and provide the litigant an opportunity to

withdraw the motion or to amend it so that it contains all the

§ 2255 claims he believes he has. 

Castro, 540 U.S. at 383. If the district court fails to give the required

notice, "the motion cannot be considered to have become a § 2255

motion for purposes of applying to later motions the law’s ‘second or

successive’ restrictions." Id.

Castro’s requirement that notice be given before a filing is

recharacterized as a § 2255 petition would appear to be inconsistent

with the exception to the notice requirement that we recognized in

Emmanuel. The government, however, contends that because Castro

involved a recharacterization that in fact worked to the detriment of

the prisoner, the Supreme Court had no opportunity to consider

whether the notice requirement should be applied in cases where the

recharacterization does not negatively affect the prisoner. The government therefore contends that Castro should not be understood as

rejecting Emmanuel’s exception to the notice requirement and that it

was proper for the district court to apply the Emmanuel exception. We

disagree. 

In Emmanuel, we did not hold that a district court’s failure to give

the required notice amounted to harmless error if the recharacterizaUNITED STATES v. BLACKSTOCK 5

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tion did not adversely affect the prisoner; we held that notice of the

recharacterization was not required if the recharacterization had no

adverse effect. See Emmanuel, 288 F.3d at 650. The Supreme Court,

however, made it clear that notice is required in all cases where the

district court treats a pro se filing as a § 2255 petition, stating that a

district court "cannot . . . recharacterize a pro se litigant’s motion as

the litigant’s first § 2255 motion unless the court" provides the

required notice. Castro, 540 U.S. at 377 (first emphasis added). Given

the clarity of this language, it would be improper for us to read into

the Court’s flat prohibition against recharacterization absent proper

notice an unstated Emmanuel-like exception to the notice requirement, as the government urges us to do. 

Moreover, as evidenced by this case, the Emmanuel exception

when applied can produce a result directly contrary to the result compelled by Castro. In Castro, the Supreme Court held that when the

required notice is not provided, the unwarned recharacterized motion

"cannot be considered to have become a § 2255 motion for purposes

of applying to later motions the law’s ‘second or successive’ restrictions." Id. at 383. But that is precisely what happened in this case —

the district court, applying the Emmanuel exception, treated the

unwarned recharacterized motion as the first § 2255 petition and then

dismissed Blackstock’s 2005 § 2255 petition as successive. If a

proper application of the Emmanuel exception (that is, an application

consistent with the rules set forth in Emmanuel) can lead to a result

that is in direct conflict with the remedy dictated by Castro, then it

is apparent that Castro and the Emmanuel exception cannot co-exist.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Supreme Court’s decision in

Castro effectively overruled Emmanuel’s exception to the notice

requirement. Under Castro, notice was required before the recharacterization of Blackstock’s 2001 discovery motion; because no notice

of the recharacterization was given, the 2001 motion cannot be

counted as Blackstock’s first § 2255 petition. And while we recognize

the difficultly faced by the district court when attempting to follow

the dictates of Castro and Emmanuel, it nonetheless follows from

these conclusions that the district court erred by dismissing Blackstock’s 2005 § 2255 petition as successive.

The government contends that even if the Emmanuel exception did

not survive Castro, the district court’s decision should still be

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affirmed. The government argues that a § 2255 petition would have

been time-barred in 2005, when Blackstock filed his Rule 60(b)

motion, and would also have been time-barred in 2001, when Blackstock filed the discovery motion that was recharacterized as a § 2255

petition. Because Blackstock’s § 2255 claims are untimely, the government contends that the district court properly dismissed the petition. Again we disagree. 

It does appear from the information before us that AEDPA’s oneyear limitations period would prevent Blackstock from obtaining

relief under § 2255 — Blackstock’s convictions became final in 1993,

AEDPA was enacted in 1996, and the motions at issue here were filed

in 2001 and 2005. Nonetheless, AEDPA’s limitations period is an

affirmative defense, and Blackstock was not required to allege in his

petition facts that could refute the defense. See Hill v. Braxton, 277

F.3d 701, 706 (4th Cir. 2002). Although the government asserts in its

brief that Blackstock’s claims are untimely, the government did not

respond to Blackstock’s 2005 filings with the district court. Blackstock therefore has had no opportunity to come forward with evidence

that might justify the application of equitable tolling or otherwise

establish that his claims are not time-barred. Under these circumstances, it would be improper for us affirm the dismissal of Blackstock’s petition on timeliness grounds. See id. at 707 (concluding that

district court may not sua sponte dismiss habeas petition on limitation

grounds without giving the prisoner notice and an opportunity to

respond). Instead, we must remand to the district court so that Blackstock may present whatever evidence he might have and the district

court can determine in the first instance whether Blackstock’s § 2255

petition was timely filed. 

The government also contends that we should affirm the district

court’s dismissal because Blackstock has not shown that he is entitled

to relief under Rule 60. Motions seeking relief from judgment under

Rule 60(b)(6), the provision relied upon by Blackstock, must be made

within a reasonable time. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) ("A motion

under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time—and for

reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the

judgment or order or the date of the proceeding."). The government

argues that Blackstock’s motion, which was filed more than four

years after his discovery motion was recharacterized by the district

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court and more than two years after the Supreme Court decided Castro, was not filed within a reasonable time. While we are inclined to

agree with the government about Blackstock’s entitlement to relief

under Rule 60(b), we believe that, under Castro, any deficiencies in

Blackstock’s Rule 60 motion do not foreclose his right to seek relief

on his § 2255 petition.

In Castro, the district court recharacterized a prisoner’s filing as a

§ 2255 petition and then denied the petition. The prisoner appealed,

but he did not challenge the district court’s recharacterization of his

motion. Questions about the propriety of the recharacterization did

not arise until nearly three years later, when the prisoner filed a

§ 2255 petition that the district court rejected as successive. See Castro, 540 U.S. at 378. Before the Supreme Court, the government

argued that the later § 2255 petition was properly viewed as successive because the prisoner failed to appeal the recharacterization of the

first filing. According to the government, the failure to appeal the

recharacterization made the "recharacterization valid as a matter of

‘law of the case,’" and the valid recharacterization made the later petition successive. Id. at 383-84. The Supreme Court rejected that argument:

No Circuit that has considered whether to treat a § 2255

motion as successive (based on a prior unwarned recharacterization) has found that the litigant’s failure to challenge

that recharacterization makes a difference. That is not surprising, for the very point of the warning is to help the pro

se litigant understand not only (1) whether he should withdraw or amend his motion, but also (2) whether he should

contest the recharacterization, say, on appeal. The "lack of

warning" prevents his making an informed judgment in

respect to the latter just as it does in respect to the former.

Indeed, an unwarned pro se litigant’s failure to appeal a

recharacterization simply underscores the practical importance of providing the warning. Hence, an unwarned

recharacterization cannot count as a § 2255 motion for purposes of the "second or successive" provision, whether the

unwarned pro se litigant does, or does not, take an appeal.

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Id. at 384 (citations omitted). 

Castro thus establishes that a prisoner need not directly challenge

the recharacterization of his filing; whether a later § 2255 petition is

properly viewed as successive can be resolved when the later petition

is filed. In this case, Blackstock filed a new § 2255 petition, and that

filing was sufficient, as it was in Castro, to permit Blackstock to challenge the district court’s recharacterization of his 2001 discovery

motion. While Blackstock also filed a Rule 60(b) motion challenging

the 2001 recharacterization, that motion was no more necessary in

this case than an appeal of the recharacterization was necessary in

Castro. And because the motion was unnecessary, it simply does not

matter whether the Rule 60(b) motion, in and of itself, was meritorious.2

III.

To summarize, we conclude that the exception to the notice

requirement recognized by this court in Emmanuel did not survive the

Supreme Court’s opinion in Castro. Under Castro, Blackstock’s 2001

pro se motion cannot be counted as his first § 2255 petition, because

the required warnings were not given before the motion was recharacterized as a § 2255 petition. The district court therefore erred by dismissing Blackstock’s 2005 § 2255 petition as successive.

Accordingly, we hereby vacate the district court’s judgment and

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

VACATED AND REMANDED

2Although the government does not develop the argument, it contends

that to treat the 2005 § 2255 petition as not successive is to improperly

give retroactive effect to Castro. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 247

F.3d 139, 146 (4th Cir. 2001) ("New rules of constitutional criminal procedure are generally not applied retroactively on collateral review."

(internal quotation marks omitted)). We do not believe that granting

Blackstock relief in this case amounts to a retroactive application of Castro. Castro does not invalidate prior unwarned recharacterizations of pro

se filings, but instead establishes a rule governing the effect that will be

given those unwarned recharacterizations in the future, when a subsequent § 2255 petition is filed. Castro was decided in 2002, and Blackstock filed the motions at issue in this appeal in 2005. Our conclusion that

Blackstock’s 2005 § 2255 petition was not successive is simply the result

of applying the law in existence in 2005, when that petition was filed. 

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