Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00559/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00559-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Otis A. Brown
Petitioner
Kenneth Jones
Respondent

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

OTIS A. BROWN, :

AIS 234410,

:

Petitioner,

:

vs. CA 06-0559-KD-C

:

KENNETH JONES,

:

Respondent.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Otis A. Brown, a state prisoner presently in the custody of the

respondent, has petitioned this Court for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is challenging the validity of his February 18,

2004 attempted murder conviction in the Circuit Court of Mobile County,

Alabama. On March 26, 2004, Brown was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal by the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals on January 7, 2005, Brown v. State, 925 So.2d 1009

(Ala.Crim.App. 2005) (table), and that court entered a certificate of final

judgment of affirmance on March 2, 2005 (Doc. 8, Exhibit G). Petitioner filed

a Rule 32 petition in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama collaterally

attacking his conviction and sentence on May 3, 2005. The trial court

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summarily dismissed the petition on September 16, 2005 and on January 27,

2006, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the dismissal of

Brown’s Rule 32 petition. Petitioner’s application for rehearing was overruled

by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on February 17, 2006 and, on May

12, 2006, the Alabama Supreme Court denied Brown’s petition for writ of

certiorari. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued the final judgment

of affirmance on May 15, 2006. 

In his petition before this Court, filed September 12, 2006 (Doc. 1, at

13), Brown raises the following grounds which he claims entitle him to relief:

(1) he was the object of unduly and impermissibly suggestive pretrial

and trial identification procedures which tainted his identification;

(2) trial counsel was ineffective (a) in interfering with his Fifth

Amendment right to testify at trial; (b) in failing to move for a mistrial after the

trial court granted a directed verdict on the robbery charge; and (c) in failing

to object to the material variance in the indictment alleging attempted murder

pursuant to Alabama Code § 13A-6-2(a)(1) and the proof at trial pursuant to

§ 13A-6-2(a)(3); 

(3) appellate counsel was ineffective (a) in failing to challenge the trial

court’s ruling which admitted collateral bad act evidence; (b) in failing to

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3

challenge the trial court’s denial of his motion for directed verdict on the

attempted murder charge; and (c) in failing to pursue his claim on direct appeal

to the Alabama Supreme Court pursuant to federal law; and

(4) the trial court was without jurisdiction to render a judgment or

impose sentence because of the material variance in the indictment alleging

attempted murder pursuant to Alabama Code § 13A-6-2(a)(1) and the proof at

trial pursuant to § 13A-6-2(a)(3). 

The respondent has admitted that petitioner has exhausted his state

court remedies. (Doc. 8, at 8) Respondent does claim, however, that this Court

is procedurally barred from reaching the merits of the first two grounds of the

petition and, with respect to grounds two through four, that Brown has failed

to establish that the state court’s decision regarding these issues was contrary

to federal law or an unreasonable application of the law to the facts of his case.

This case is ripe for a decision by this Court.

This cause is before the Court on the petition and respondent’s answer,

with attachments. A careful review of the record has been completed and it is

determined that it contains sufficient facts upon which the issues under

consideration may be properly resolved. Therefore, no evidentiary hearing is

required.

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FINDINGS OF FACT

1. During the November 2003 session of the Mobile County Grand

Jury, petitioner was charged, in separate indictments, with the attempted

murder and robbery of Ralph Houston. (See Doc. 9, Exhibit A, Attempted

Murder Indictment) The attempted murder indictment reads, in relevant part,

that “Otis Alonzo Brown . . . did, with the intent to cause the death of Ralph

Houston, a violation of § 13A-6-2 of the Code of Alabama, attempt to cause

the death of Ralph Houston, by shooting him with a gun, in violation of §

13A-4-2 of the Code of Alabama[.]” (Id. (emphasis in original)) 

2. During the trial, Therios Triplett testified that on June 15, 2003

three men in a car asked him if he had any drugs and when he replied in the

negative the men pulled guns on him and rifled through his pockets. (See T.T.

39-43) Triplett identified Brown as one of the three assailants. (See id. at 41-

42) Triplett then watched as the men drove up to Houston, who was on his

bicycle, and shot the victim. (Id. at 44-45) Houston identified Brown as the

person who shot him in the back on June 15, 2003. (T.T. 75-77) The wound

rendered Houston a paraplegic. (T.T. 30)

3. That same day, Demarkies Wiggins was told, at gunpoint, to

Case 1:06-cv-00559-KD-C Document 10 Filed 09/17/07 Page 4 of 36
1 Presumably because of a change in court reporters, the trial transcript restarts at

record page 1 at several different junctures. To maintain consistency for purposes of this report

and recommendation, the undersigned has manually renumbered the pages of trial testimony to

eliminate all breaks in the numbering. 

2 Chenoweth testified that Brown’s name came to his attention early in his

investigation of the crime and that he spoke with Houston in the hospital on June 17, 2003 and

verified that Brown was the assailant before he created the photo spread and showed it to the

victim on the eighteenth of June. (See T.T. 162-163)

3 Wiggins failed to pick out Brown’s picture when shown this same photo spread

on June 18, 2003. (T.T. 182)

5

empty his pockets by the same three men. (T.T. 110-111)1 According to

Wiggins, Brown remained in the car while he was held at gunpoint by Bernard

Rancher, Brown’s brother. (Id. at 111-112 & 116)

4. Officer David Evans spoke to Triplett on January 29, 2004 and

presented him with a photo spread; Triplett picked Brown’s photo from the

spread. (T.T. 143-146) Detective Richard Chenoweth showed Houston a photo

spread on June 18, 2003, three days after the shooting; the victim identified

Brown as his assailant. (T.T. 150 & 165)2

 Thomas Stiles, an investigator with

the District Attorney’s office, showed Wiggins a photo spread on February 2,

2004; Wiggins selected Brown’s picture from the photographs presented to

him. (T.T. 191-192)3

5. Several witnesses, including petitioner’s girlfriend, supplied

Brown with an alibi for the date in question. (T.T. 197-242) These witnesses

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testified that Brown never left the home of his girlfriend, Lakesha Nodd,

during the early and late evening of June 15, 2003. (See id.)

6. The trial court granted Brown’s motion for a directed verdict of

acquittal on the robbery charge (T.T. 249); however, it denied Brown’s motion

for a directed verdict of acquittal on the attempted murder charge (see, e.g.,

T.T. 268). 

7. The petit jury found Brown guilty of the attempted murder of

Ralph Houston. (T.T. 291; see also T.T. 291-292 (jury was polled regarding

its guilty verdict))

8. Brown was sentenced to life imprisonment on March 26, 2004.

(Doc. 9, Exhibit A, Sentencing Transcript, at 6; see id. (“I would just like to

say, Your Honor, that I’m falsely accused. It was righteously my brother and

I don’t know how I got involved in all of this . . . .”))

9. Petitioner filed a direct appeal from his conviction and sentence

in the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. (See Doc. 8, Exhibit B) That court

affirmed Brown’s conviction and sentence by memorandum opinion. (Doc. 8,

Exhibit D)

The evidence adduced at trial indicates that, on June 15,

2003, Brown, his brother, and a third man were riding around in

an automobile and approached Demarkies Wiggins. Wiggins

was riding his bicycle when the three men approached him, at

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first asking for drugs, then leaving him alone, only to return to

rob him at gunpoint. When the three left, Wiggins decided to go

warn some friends about the three men. On the way, someone

told him that his brother, Ralph Houston, had been shot, and

Wiggins went home to telephone his mother.

Shortly after the three men left Wiggins, they approached

Therios Triplett and his female friend. The men first asked

Triplett whether he had any drugs and, upon receiving a

negative response, the men robbed Triplett and his friend at

gunpoint. The men left the scene of that robbery and proceeded

down the street. Triplett saw that the men were approaching

Houston, who was riding his bicycle, and Triplett yelled to

Houston to be careful. The three men stopped close to Houston

and spoke to him. Houston tried to get off of his bicycle and run,

but one of the men in the car exited the car and shot Houston as

he attempted to run away. 

Houston testified that Brown was the man who pulled the

trigger and shot him in the back. As a result of the shooting,

Houston was left a paraplegic.

On appeal, Brown argues that the trial court erred by

denying his motion to suppress three photographic line-up

identifications and the subsequent in-court identifications.

Specifically, Brown argues that each of the witnesses identified

Brown from the photographic line-up only after having seen the

same photograph of Brown on television as a fugitive wanted in

the shooting. Brown’s argument is founded on the allegation

that each eyewitness’s account of the events in question was

unreliable. Specifically, he alleges that each witnesses’s account

is unreliable and, therefore, the only way they could have

recognized Brown in the photographic line-up was due to having

seen “the exact same photograph on television as was shown to

[them] in the photo array.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.) Brown

bases his claim of unreliability on the following facts: the victim

and one eyewitness saw Brown’s photograph on television; the

other eyewitness, the victim’s brother, did not see the

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photograph on television, but did not tell law enforcement

officers on the night of the shooting that he had recognized the

shooter; and two eyewitnesses, who were brothers, reviewed a

photographic line-up wherein the photographs were in the same

order. Brown made these same arguments in his motion to

suppress and the hearing thereon.

In Blackmon v. State, 487 So.2d 1022 (Ala. Crim. App.

1986), this Court stated:

[T]he required inquiry is two-pronged. The

first question is whether the initial identification

procedure was unnecessarily or impermissibly

suggestive. If it is found to have been so, the court

must then proceed to the question whether the

procedure found to be . . . unnecessarily or

impermissibly suggestive was so conducive to

irreparable mistaken identification or had such a

tendency to give rise to a very substantial

likelihood of irreparable misidentification that

allowing the witness to make an in-court

identification would be a denial of due process.

487 So.2d at 1025.

In Ex parte Johnson, 620 So.2d 709 (Ala. [1993]) . . ., the

Alabama Supreme Court stated:

Pretrial identifications are to be set aside

on grounds of prejudice only if the pretrial

identification procedure is so suggestive as to give

rise to a substantial likelihood of

misidentification. The totality of the

circumstances surrounding the out-of-court

identification need be analyzed only when the

pretrial procedures used appear to have been

unnecessarily or impermissibly suggestive.

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620 So.2d at 712.

...

Initially, we note that the fact that the victim and one of

the eyewitnesses saw a photograph of Brown on television prior

to their identifying him in a photographic line-up does not

necessarily affect the level of suggestiveness present in the lineup. The fact that the two saw a photograph of Brown on

television prior to the line-up and the fact that the victim’s

brother did not immediately tell law enforcement that he knew

the shooter are not relevant to the identification procedure

employed by law enforcement. Rather, those two occurrences

concern the totality of the circumstances surrounding the out-ofcourt identification, a factor we do not consider unless the

pretrial identification procedure itself is determined to have been

unnecessarily or impermissibly suggestive.

Additionally, to the extent that Brown takes issue with

the length of time between the crime and the photographic lineup, we note that this fact generally is not considered in the initial

determination of whether the initial identification procedure was

unnecessarily or impermissibly suggestive. Rather, if a pretrial

identification procedure has been held to be unnecessarily or

impermissibly suggestive, we must then evaluate whether the incourt identification of the defendant by the witness has a basis

independent of the pretrial identification. It is at that point that

we consider the length of time between the crime and the

photographic line-up.

Finally, the fact that two eyewitnesses, who were

brothers, viewed the same photographic array does not render

the array impermissibly suggestive. As Brown admits in his

brief, the two testified that they had never discussed the array or

the identity of the shooter with each other. Brown expresses a

clear disdain for the two eyewitnesses’ rendition of the facts;

however, any judgment as to their credibility was to be made by

the factfinder – the jury – not the court.

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The photographic array is not in the record before us.

Although Brown makes a vague reference in his motion to

suppress to an “unduly suggestive line-up, identification, showup or confrontation,” very little testimony during the hearing on

the motion to suppress concerned the actual presentation of the

photographic line-up to the witnesses. Brown did not argue that

the photographic line-up itself was suggestive; rather, he argued

that the photographic line-up was not timely presented to two of

the witnesses and that the televised photograph influenced two

of the witnesses. As stated above, before the timing of the lineups or the televised photograph can be relevant, Brown must

first have established that the photographic line-up was

suggestive. For the reasons stated below, we hold that he did not

and, as he did not make a threshold showing of suggestiveness,

we do not address the remainder of his contentions on appeal.

Detective Chenoweth testified that, three days after the

shooting, he approached the shooting victim, Houston, with the

same photographic line-up as had been used with Wiggins and

Triplett. Detective Chenoweth testified that he made the

photographic line-up. He testified that he found pictures of

people with similar facial hair, hair, height, and weight. The

backgrounds of the photographs were “match[ed] up . . . to be

the same.” (R. 35.) When Detective Chenoweth presented the

line-up to Houston, he told Houston that the person who shot

him may or may not have been in the line-up. Houston picked

Brown’s picture from the line-up “in a matter of seconds.” (R.

37.)

Therios Triplett, the first robbery victim, testified that,

some seven months after the robbery, he was shown a

photographic line-up consisting of six photographs. Sergeant

David Evans testified that the line-up consisted of six

photographs of people with similar characteristics, including

age, race, and gender. Sergeant Evans told Triplett that the

person who robbed him may or may not have been in the lineup. Triplett picked Brown’s photograph from the line-up after “a

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few seconds.” (R. 18.)

Demarkies Wiggins, the second robbery victim and

brother of the shooting victim, testified that he was shown a

photographic line-up some seven to eight months after the

robbery. He did not remember how many photographs were

present. Detective Richard Chenoweth testified that he showed

the same photographic line-up to Wiggins at the hospital on the

same night that he showed it to Houston. He also testified that

he “went through the same proper protocol” prior to showing the

line-up to Wiggins. However, Wiggins was “irritable [and]

agitated” over the state of his brother (C. 56) [and] did not select

a suspect from the line-up on that occasion. Seven to eight

months later, Detective (sic) Thomas Stiles showed the

photographic line-up to Wiggins, and Wiggins “looked at it for

approximately a couple of minutes” before picking Brown’s

photograph out of the line-up.

Nothing in the record before us indicates that the

photographic line-ups were unnecessarily or impermissibly

suggestive. Therefore, we do not reach a point where the

timeliness of the presentation of the line-ups, or Brown’s

photograph on television, becomes relevant.

Moreover, we note that, as for the three in-court

identifications of Brown as the perpetrator, although Houston

saw Brown’s picture on television prior to identifying him,

Houston also testified that he had known Brown for years from

the neighborhood. Additionally, Triplett testified that he “got a

good look at” Brown when he exited the car to rob his female

friend. He testified that there was no doubt in his mind that

Brown was the man who had robbed them and was the man in

the photographic line-up. Finally, although Wiggins was not

shown the line-up until several months after the robbery,

Wiggins, too, knew Brown from the neighborhood prior to the

robbery. When an in-court identification of the accused is shown

to have a basis independent of any pre-trial identification, then

it is correctly received into evidence. Because the in-court

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4 The record contains a March 9, 2005 letter to Brown from his appellate attorney,

Robert A. Ratliff, Esquire, advising him of the following: “You have 14 days from the denial of

the rehearing application to file a Writ of Certiori (sic). I see no grounds for a writ of Certiori

(sic) based upon these denials, but you can file a writ yourself, if you would like to take those

steps.” (Doc. 8, Exhibit H, March 9, 2005 Letter)

12

identifications in this case had bases independent of the pre-trial

identification, the in-court identifications were properly

admitted.

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed.

(Id. at 1-7 (most internal citations and quotation marks omitted; footnote

omitted)) Brown’s application for rehearing (Doc. 8, Exhibit E) was overruled

by the Alabama Court of Criminal appeals on February 11, 2005 (Doc. 8,

Exhibit F). On March 2, 2005, a certificate of final judgment of affirmance

was entered by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. (Doc. 8, Exhibit G)4

10. Brown filed a Rule 32 petition in the Circuit Court of Mobile

County, Alabama collaterally attacking his conviction and sentence on May

3, 2005. (Doc. 8, Exhibit K) In his brief in support of the Rule 32 petition,

Brown asserted that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective

assistance of trial and appellate counsel and that the trial court was without

jurisdiction to render judgment or impose sentence because of a material

variance in the indictment allegations and the proof offered at trial. (Doc. 8,

Exhibit H, MEMORANDUM AND ATTACHMENTS TO PETITION FOR

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POST-CONVICTION RELIEF PURSUANT TO RULE 32, A.R.CR.P.)

11. On September 16, 2005, the trial court entered the following

order denying Brown’s Rule 32 petition:

Petitioner seeks relief under Rule 32 alleging that the US

Constitution requires a new trial and that the court was without

jurisdiction to impose the sentence. 

Petitioner’s claim of constitutional violations are

precluded because those allegations could have been raised at

trial and on appeal. Rule 32.2(a)(3), (a)(5).

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial and

appellate counsel fail under both Strickland v. Washington and

Brooks v. State, 2005 Ala.Crim.App. Lexis 94. In order to

establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim the Petitioner

must show (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2)

that he was prejudiced as a result of the deficient performance.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 688 (1984). Moreover,

establishing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “requires

showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the

defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is unreliable. Id.,

694. “When a Defendant challenges a conviction, the question

is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the

errors, the fact-finder would have had reasonable doubt

respecting guilt. Id. 

In Brooks v. State, Petitioner alleged the ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel. Just as in this case where

appellate counsel was not called to testify, in Brooks appellate

counsel was not asked whey (sic) she declined to raise “specific

issues” in her appellate brief. Id. In that case, the evidence

before the court was that appellate counsel testified, “Based on

her experience she believed that it was best to raise only those

claims on appeal that were meritorious and not to use the

‘scattergun approach’ used by some attorneys.” Id., 21. The

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Brooks court did not find that the failure to raise every possible

issue amounted to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

“Where the record is unclear--either because an issue was not

addressed or because counsel could not recall--the Court will

presume that counsel acted in a manner consistent with the

requirements of the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Thus, Petitioner’s

claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel fails.

Petitioner’s claim of lack of jurisdiction fails because it

lacks specificity required under Rule 32.6. Petitioner does not

say what issue should have gone to the Supreme Court and also

due to the failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted

under Rule 32.7.

Accordingly, this Court is authorized summarily to

dismiss the petition without an evidentiary hearing or a response

from the State for having raised no issue of material fact or law,

Rule 32.7(d). The petition is dismissed under Rule 32.7.

(Doc. 8, Exhibit H, September 16, 2005 ORDER)

12. Petitioner appealed the trial court’s summary dismissal of his

Rule 32 petition to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. (Doc. 8, Exhibit

I) The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal

of Brown’s Rule 32 petition by memorandum opinion entered on January 27,

2005. (Doc. 8, Exhibit K)

I.

Brown argues that both his trial and appellate counsel

were ineffective.

[T]o prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,

a defendant must meet the two-pronged test set out by

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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80

L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

First, the defendant must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient. This requires showing

that counsel made errors so serious that counsel

was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the

defendant must show that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense. This requires

showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as

to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial

whose result is unreliable. Unless a defendant

makes both showings, it cannot be said that the

conviction or death sentence resulted from a

breakdown in the adversary process that renders

the result unreliable.

The performance component outlined in Strickland is an

objective one: that is, whether counsel’s assistance, judged

under prevailing professional norms was reasonable considering

all the circumstances. Once a defendant has identified the

specific acts or omissions that allegedly were not the result of

reasonable professional judgment on counsel’s part, the court

must determine whether those acts or omissions fall outside the

wide range of professionally competent assistance.

When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, we indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct

was appropriate and reasonable.

Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must

be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a

defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance

after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all

too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense

after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that

a particular act or omission of counsel was

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unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney

performance requires that every effort be made to

eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct

from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of

the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation,

a court must indulge a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance; that is, the

defendant must overcome the presumption that,

under the circumstances, the challenged action

might be considered sound trial strategy. There

are countless ways to provide effective assistance

in any given case. Even the best criminal defense

attorneys would not defend a particular client in

the same way.

And even if an attorney’s performance is determined to

be deficient, the petitioner is not entitled to relief unless it is also

established that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

In an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the burden

is on the claimant to show that his counsel’s assistance was

ineffective.

Here, Brown has failed to meet the two-pronged test

required by Strickland to prevail on an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim. Brown has failed to prove that his counsel’s

performance was deficient as well as failing to prove how that

alleged deficiency prejudiced his defense. Brown’s claims are

merely bare allegations that do not describe how his trial and

appellate counsel’s conduct was deficient nor do they describe

how he was prejudiced by such conduct. Moreover, claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel are non-jurisdictional. Because

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Brown had different counsel at trial and on appeal, his claims of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel should have been raised on

direct appeal, but were not. Thus, they are precluded from

appellate review.

Brown properly raises several claims of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel. As to his contention regarding

collateral-act evidence, this claim could not have properly raised

on appeal because, as Brown notes in his petition, it was not

raised at trial. (C. 19, 20). Therefore, because it was not properly

preserved for appellate review, it would have been futile for

counsel to raise this issue on appeal. Brown’s argument that his

appellate counsel was ineffective for allegedly failing to raise

the trial court’s error of denying his motion for a new trial must

also fail. An attorney’s decision not to raise a particular

argument regarding the evidence is not to raise a particular

argument regarding the evidence is not an indication that the

attorney’s performance fell below an acceptable professional

standard. Lastly, Brown argues that his appellate counsel was

ineffective for failing to petition the Alabama Supreme Court for

certiorari review. It is well settled that a criminal defendant is

not entitled to a discretionary appeal to the Alabama Supreme

Court. Therefore, appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for

failing to file a discretionary appeal.

II.

Brown claims that “there is a fatal variance in the

indictment’s allegation that Mr. Brown committed attempted

murder pursuant to 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala.Code (1975) and the

state’s proof offered at trial showing that Mr. Brown committed

attempted murder pursuant to § 13A-6-2(a)(3), Ala.Code.”

There is no merit to this claim. The record in Brown’s direct

appeal indicates that Brown shot the intended victim in the back

as he attempted to run away. Contrary to Brown’s contention,

the evidence at trial established the offense of attempted

intentional murder, as alleged in the indictment. Accordingly,

Brown is entitled to no relief as to this claim.

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III.

Rule 32.7(d), Ala.R.Crim.P., authorizes the trial court to

summarily dismiss a petitioner’s Rule 32 petition “[i]f the court

determines that the petition is not sufficiently specific, or is

precluded, or fails to state a claim, or that no material issue of

fact or law exists which would entitle the petitioner to relief

under this rule and that no purpose would be served by any

further proceedings, the court may either dismiss the petition or

grant leave to file an amended petition.” As discussed above,

Brown’s claims are precluded from appellate review. Thus,

summary disposition was appropriate.

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is

affirmed.

(Id. at 2-7 (most internal citations and quotation marks omitted; footnotes

omitted)) Petitioner’s application for rehearing was overruled on February 17,

2006 (Doc. 8, Exhibit M) and his petition for writ of certiorari to the Alabama

Supreme Court was denied on May 12, 2006 (Doc. 8, Exhibit O). A certificate

of final judgment of affirmance was issued by the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals on May 15, 2006. (Doc. 8, Exhibit P)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Procedural Default Doctrine.

1. In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115

L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), the Supreme Court stated that it would "not review a

question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court

Case 1:06-cv-00559-KD-C Document 10 Filed 09/17/07 Page 18 of 36
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rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and

adequate to support the judgment." Id. at 729, 111 S.Ct. at 2553-2554. This

rule applies whether the state law ground is procedural or substantive. Id. at

729, 111 S.Ct. at 2554. The doctrine applies to bar federal habeas review

when a state court declines to address a petitioner's federal claims because the

petitioner fails to meet a state procedural requirement. Id. at 729-730, 111

S.Ct. at 2554; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53

L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) (federal courts must honor legitimate state trial and

appellate procedural rules when enforced by state courts and must decline to

review on the merits claims that the state treats as barred absent a showing of

cause for non-compliance with such rules and resulting prejudice); Alderman

v. Zant, 22 F.3d 1541, 1549 (11th Cir.) ("Pursuant to the doctrine of procedural

default, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas corpus relief, who fails to raise

his federal constitution[al] claim in state court, or who attempts to raise it in

a manner not permitted by state procedural rules is barred from pursuing the

same claim in federal court absent a showing of cause for and actual prejudice

from the default."), cert. denied sub nom. Alderman v. Thomas, 513 U.S.1061,

115 S.Ct. 673, 130 L.Ed.2d 606 (1994). "In these cases, the state judgment

rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds." Coleman, 501

Case 1:06-cv-00559-KD-C Document 10 Filed 09/17/07 Page 19 of 36
20

U.S. at 730, 111 S.Ct. at 2554 (citations omitted).

2. The application of the independent and adequate state ground

doctrine in the habeas context is grounded in concerns of federalism and

comity. Id.

Without the rule, a federal district court would be able to do in

habeas what this Court could not do on direct review; habeas

would offer state prisoners whose custody was supported by

independent and adequate state grounds an end run around the

limits of this Court's jurisdiction and a means to undermine the

State's interest in enforcing its laws.

Id. at 730-731, 111 S.Ct. at 2554.

 3. An additional consideration comes to the fore when the

independent and adequate state ground supporting a petitioner's custody is a

state procedural default. Id. at 731, 111 S.Ct. at 2554. The Supreme Court has

long held

that a state prisoner's federal habeas petition

should be dismissed if the prisoner has not

exhausted available state remedies as to any of his

federal claims. (citations omitted) This

exhaustion requirement is also grounded in

principles of comity; in a federal system, the

States should have the opportunity to address and

correct alleged violations of state prisoners'

federal rights.

 . . .

[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the

Case 1:06-cv-00559-KD-C Document 10 Filed 09/17/07 Page 20 of 36
21

State's procedural requirements for presenting his

federal claims has deprived the state courts of an

opportunity to address those claims in the first

instance. A habeas petitioner who has defaulted

his federal claims in state court meets the

technical requirement for exhaustion; there are no

state remedies any longer "available" to him.

(citations omitted) In the absence of the

independent and adequate state ground doctrine in

federal habeas, habeas petitioners would be able

to avoid the exhaustion requirement by defaulting

their federal claims in state court. The

independent and adequate state ground doctrine

ensures that the States' interest in correcting their

own mistakes is respected in all federal habeas

cases.

Id. at 731, 732, 111 S.Ct. at 2554-2555, 2555.

4. In the habeas context, federal courts are to "presume that there

is no independent and adequate state ground for a state court decision when the

decision 'fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven

with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible

state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion.'" Id. at 735, 111

S.Ct. at 2557 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-1041, 103 S.Ct.

3469, 3476-3477, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983)); see Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255,

263, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 1043, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989) ("[A] procedural default

does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review

unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case 'clearly and

Case 1:06-cv-00559-KD-C Document 10 Filed 09/17/07 Page 21 of 36
22

expressly' states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar."). In all other

cases, the presumption is not applicable. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 739, 111

S.Ct. at 2559. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d

334 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the Harris v. Reed presumption is

inapplicable to a claim that is never presented to the state courts. Id. at 299,

109 S.Ct. at 1069 ("The rule announced in Harris v. Reed assumes that a state

court has had the opportunity to address a claim that is later raised in a federal

habeas proceeding."). Moreover, the presumption "looks through"

unexplained orders to the last reasoned decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 804, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 2595, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991).

Where there has been one reasoned state

judgment rejecting a federal claim, later

unexplained orders upholding that judgment or

rejecting the same claim rest upon the same

ground. If an earlier opinion "fairly appear[s] to

rest primarily upon federal law," Coleman, 501

U.S., at 740, 111 S.Ct., at 2559, we will presume

that no procedural default has been invoked by a

subsequent unexplained order that leaves the

judgment or its consequences in place. Similarly

where . . . the last reasoned opinion on the claim

explicitly imposes a procedural default, we will

presume that a later decision rejecting the claim

did not silently disregard that bar and consider the

merits.

501 U.S. at 803, 111 S.Ct. at 2594. Also, the presumption may not be applied

Case 1:06-cv-00559-KD-C Document 10 Filed 09/17/07 Page 22 of 36
23

in cases in which the state court opinion did not, at a minimum, discuss the

federal grounds at issue." Tower v. Phillips, 7 F.3d 206, 211 (11th Cir. 1993)

("Coleman and Ylst lead us to conclude that we may not assume that had the

state court issued an opinion, it would have ignored its own procedural rules

and reached the merits of this case. In fact, the most reasonable assumption is

that had the state court ruled, it would have enforced the procedural bar.").

Finally, "where a state court has ruled in the alternative, addressing both the

independent state procedural ground and the merits of the federal claim, the

federal court should apply the state procedural bar and decline to reach the

merits of the claim." Alderman v. Zant, supra, 22 F.3d at 1549.

5. When a petitioner has procedurally defaulted a claim, a federal

court is barred from reaching the merits of that claim unless the petitioner "can

demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged

violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claim[] will

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman, supra, 501 U.S. at

750, 111 S.Ct. at 2565. The cause and prejudice standard applies "uniformly

to all independent and adequate state procedural defaults." Id. at 750-751, 111

S.Ct. at 2565.

In procedural default cases, the cause

standard requires the petitioner to show that

Case 1:06-cv-00559-KD-C Document 10 Filed 09/17/07 Page 23 of 36
24

"some objective factor external to the defense

impeded counsel's efforts" to raise the claim in

state court. (citation omitted). Objective factors

that constitute cause include "'interference by

officials'" that makes compliance with the state's

procedural rule impracticable, and "a showing that

the factual or legal basis for a claim was not

reasonably available to counsel." (citation

omitted). In addition, constitutionally

"[i]neffective assistance of counsel . . . is cause."

(citation omitted). Attorney error short of

ineffective assistance of counsel, however, does

not constitute cause and will not excuse a

procedural default. (citation omitted). Once the

petitioner has established cause, he must show

"'actual prejudice' resulting from the errors of

which he complains." (citation omitted). 

 

 

Federal courts retain the authority to issue

the writ of habeas corpus in a further, narrow

class of cases despite a petitioner's failure to show

cause for a procedural default. These are

extraordinary instances when a constitutional

violation probably has caused the conviction of

one innocent of the crime. We have described

this class of cases as implicating a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. (citation omitted).

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493-494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d

517 (1991).

6. In his answer, respondent asserts that Brown’s identification

claim is procedurally defaulted under O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,

119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999) (“[I]n order to exhaust state remedies as

Case 1:06-cv-00559-KD-C Document 10 Filed 09/17/07 Page 24 of 36
5 See Ex parte Ingram, 675 So.2d 863, 865-866 (Ala. 1996) (“[I]n any cases in

which the defendant is convicted after the date this opinion is released, an ineffective-assistanceof-counsel claim must be presented in a new trial motion filed before the 30-day jurisdictional

time limit set by Rule 24.1(b), Ala.R.Crim.P., expires, in order for that claim to be properly

25

to a federal constitutional issue a prisoner is required to file a petition for

discretionary review in the state’s highest court raising that issue, if

discretionary review is part of the appellate procedure in the state.”) due to

petitioner’s failure to seek certiorari review in the Alabama Supreme Court

following the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmance of his conviction

and sentence and overruling of his application for rehearing (see Doc. 8, at 9

(“This issue was raised in the state court on direct appeal in the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals but was not raised in a petition for writ of certiorari to the

Alabama Supreme Court. This claim is due no review or relief on federal

habeas review because it is procedurally defaulted pursuant to O’Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999).”). In addition, respondent contends that this

Court is procedurally barred from reaching the merits of petitioner’s

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims because the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals found these claims defaulted since they could have been

raised at trial or on appeal but were not. (Id. at 11)

7. It is clear to the undersigned that Brown has procedurally

defaulted his identification and ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims5

Case 1:06-cv-00559-KD-C Document 10 Filed 09/17/07 Page 25 of 36
preserved for review upon direct appeal. When a defendant makes a claim of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel, and that claim cannot reasonably be presented in a new trial motion

filed within the 30 days allowed by Rule 24.1(b), Ala.R.Crim.P., the proper method for

presenting that claim for appellate review is to file a Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P., petition for postconviction relief.”); cf. Boyd v. State, 913 So.2d 113 (Ala. 2003) (ineffective assistance of trial

counsel claims raised on direct appeal). 

26

for the reasons previously identified. Certainly, Brown recognized his

O’Sullivan problem given his petition argument that “[a]ppellate counsel failed

to pursue [the identification] claim to [the] Alabama Supreme Court.” (Doc.

1, at 3) 

 8. Turning to the issue of cause and prejudice, this Court need find

that cause exists for the default of petitioner’s identification claim since

appellate counsel failed to petition the Alabama Supreme Court for writ of

certiorari and did not inform Brown of his right to do so until after the time for

filing such petition had passed, that is, after the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals had issued its final order of affirmance. Even assuming cause for the

petitioner’s procedural default of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel

claims, however, petitioner would not be entitled to a merits-review of these

claims by this Court because he cannot establish prejudice. Specifically,

Brown has not established, through citation to applicable case law, that the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals would have granted his certiorari

application and reversed his conviction and sentence on the basis that the trial

Case 1:06-cv-00559-KD-C Document 10 Filed 09/17/07 Page 26 of 36
6 In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner is

required to show (1) that his attorney’s representation fell below “an objective standard of

reasonableness” and (2) that a reasonable probability exits that but for counsel’s unprofessional

conduct, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 

In this case, Brown contends that trial counsel: (1) interfered with his Fifth Amendment

right to testify at trial; (2) failed to move for a mistrial after the trial court granted a directed

verdict of acquittal on the robbery charge; and (3) failed to object to the material variance in the

indictment alleging petitioner committed attempted murder pursuant to Alabama Code § 13A-6-

2(a)(1) and the proof at trial which was based on Alabama Code § 13A-6-2(a)(3).

Brown cannot establish that his trial attorney’s representation fell below “an objective

standard of reasonableness” with respect to his second and third claims of attorney error.

Petitioner’s trial attorney twice moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on the attempted murder

charge. This action constitutes a sufficient attack on the only remaining charge against petitioner,

particularly in absence of any suggestion by Brown of any basis for a motion for mistrial. In

addition, there was no material variance between the contents of the indictment and the proof

offered at trial; the indictment charged petitioner with intentional attempted murder which was

consistent with the proof offered at trial. Accordingly, there was nothing about the indictment

worthy of a challenge by trial counsel.

Turning to the remaining issue, even assuming trial counsel told Brown that he had no

constitutional right to testify, petitioner has not established that the result of his trial would have

been different had he testified. The jury did not believe Brown’s alibi witnesses and petitioner

has come forward with no reason why the jury would have credited his testimony more than that

of his alibi witnesses. 

27

court should have suppressed both the photographic line-ups and the in-court

identifications. In addition, Brown has not shown he was prejudiced by

appellate counsel’s failure to challenge trial counsel’s performance on appeal,

inasmuch as he has failed to establish that trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance.6

Case 1:06-cv-00559-KD-C Document 10 Filed 09/17/07 Page 27 of 36
28

9. The fundamental miscarriage of justice/actual innocence

exception does not apply in this case because petitioner has not satisfied the

Murray v. Carrier standard. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 106 S.Ct. 2639,

91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). That standard requires Brown to show that “a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is

actually innocent.” 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. at 2649-2650. To be credible,

a claim of actual innocence “requires petitioner to support his allegations of

constitutional error with new reliable evidence--whether it be exculpatory

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical

evidence--that was not presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324,

115 S.Ct. 851, 865, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995); see also id. at 327, 115 S.Ct. at

867 (“To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it is

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the

light of the new evidence.”). Brown has not come forward with any evidence

which establishes his actual innocence and thereby undermines his attempted

murder conviction. Accordingly, this case is not one of those rare cases in

which the actual innocence exception is applicable. 

B. Merits Discussion of Collateral Petition Claims.

Case 1:06-cv-00559-KD-C Document 10 Filed 09/17/07 Page 28 of 36
7 Based upon the facts as found by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals in its

decision, it is clear that no argument can be made that the decision of the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented to the state courts. More to the point, since this Court must presume as

correct the determinations of all factual issues made by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals,

petitioner simply cannot rebut that presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.

The appellate court’s findings are based upon what a reasonable jury could have found the

evidence to be. 

29

10. Brown filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief in this

Court on or about September 12, 2006, and therefore, his case is governed by

28 U.S.C. § 2254 as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (AEDPA). Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402, 120 S.Ct. 1495,

1518, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 530 (11th

Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 956, 122 S.Ct. 357, 151 L.Ed.2d 270 (2001).

As amended, § 2254 now provides:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim— 

 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.7

Case 1:06-cv-00559-KD-C Document 10 Filed 09/17/07 Page 29 of 36
30

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2) (footnote added). Moreover, the Act, as

amended, presumes as correct all determinations of factual issues made by a

State court and places the burden upon the petitioner of rebutting such a

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e).

11. In Williams v. Taylor, supra, the Supreme Court held that 

§ 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to

grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to

claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ

may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied— the statecourt adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) “was contrary to . . . clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States,” or (2) “involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Under

the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on

a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the

Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the

“unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

Case 1:06-cv-00559-KD-C Document 10 Filed 09/17/07 Page 30 of 36
31

if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the

Supreme Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts

of the prisoner’s case. Id. at 412-413, 120 S.Ct. at 1523; see Bottoson, supra,

234 F.3d at 531 (“In addition, a state court decision involves an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent ‘if the state court either unreasonably

extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to

a new context where it should apply.’”). 

12. In this case, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals effectively

reached the merits of two of the issues petitioner raised in his collateral attack

on his conviction and sentence, specifically, his ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claims and his material variance claim. Brown cannot

establish his entitlement to relief under § 2254(d)(1) & (d)(2) with respect to

either of these issues. In this regard the undersigned notes generally that

petitioner has not and cannot show, under the “contrary to” clause, that the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, arrived at any conclusions opposite to

those reached by the Supreme Court of the United States on any question of

law or decided the case differently than the Supreme Court did in a previous

case presenting a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Moreover, as

Case 1:06-cv-00559-KD-C Document 10 Filed 09/17/07 Page 31 of 36
32

indicated above, under the “unreasonable application” clause, petitioner has

not and cannot establish that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, though

recognizing the correct governing principles from the Supreme Court’s

decisions, unreasonably applied those principles to the facts in this case. Here,

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, in its decision on collateral review,

recognized the applicability of Strickland v. Washington, supra, to petitioner’s

claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and reasonably applied

the principles outlined in that case to the facts of petitioner’s case in finding

that counsel did not provided constitutionally ineffective assistance on appeal.

13. Turning to the remaining ground of the instant petition that was

addressed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on collateral review,

specifically his fatal variance claim, the undersigned would note that the

federal law applicable to this claim is that set forth by the Eleventh Circuit in

Thompson v. Nagle, 118 F.3d 1442 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.

1125, 118 S.Ct. 1071, 140 L.Ed.2d 130 (1998).

An accused has a constitutional right to an indictment

which puts him on notice of the case the prosecution will present

at trial. See Kotteakos vs. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct.

1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946); United States v. Peel, 837 F.2d

975, 976-77 (11th Cir. 1988); Ex parte Washington, 448 So.2d

404, 408 (Ala. 1984). The rationale behind the rule prohibiting

material variances between indictments and proof at trial is twofold. Most importantly, the rule insures “that the accused shall

Case 1:06-cv-00559-KD-C Document 10 Filed 09/17/07 Page 32 of 36
8 This analysis by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals comports with the first

step of the two-step inquiry set out in Thompson v. Nagle, supra. In other words, the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals found no material variance. As heretofore indicated, the undersigned

33

be definitely informed as to the charges against him, so that he

may be enabled to present his defense and not be taken by

surprise by the evidence offered at the trial.” Berger v. United

States, 295 U.S. 78, 82, 55 S.Ct. 629, 630, 79 L.Ed. 1314

(1935). Secondly, the rule protects the accused against

subsequent prosecutions for the same offense. Id. The Eleventh

Circuit has established a two-step inquiry when considering

allegations of variance between indictments and proof at trial.

“First, we must determine whether a material variance did

indeed occur; and second, whether [the defendant] suffered

substantial prejudice as a result of the variance.” United States

v. Starrett, 55 F.3d 1525, 1553 (11th Cir. 1995) (citations

omitted), cert. denied, Sears v. United States, 517 U.S. 1111,

116 S.Ct. 1335, 134 L.Ed.2d 485 (1996).

Id. at 1453. While the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals did not mention

Thompson v. Nagle, or any comparable case, in its analysis of Brown’s claim

that there was a material variance between the indictment and proof offered at

trial, recognition by the appellate court of the proper analysis is clear from the

entirety of its discussion of Brown’s fatal variance argument. (See Doc. 8,

Exhibit K, at 6 (“There is no merit to this claim. The record in Brown’s direct

appeal indicates that Brown shot the intended victim in the back as he

attempted to run away. Contrary to Brown’s contention, the evidence at trial

established the offense of attempted intentional murder, as alleged in the

indictment.”)8

) Therefore, the undersigned simply cannot find that the state

Case 1:06-cv-00559-KD-C Document 10 Filed 09/17/07 Page 33 of 36
can find no material variance. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals is absolutely correct that

the indictment charged Brown with attempted intentional murder (see Doc. 9, Exhibit A,

Attempted Murder Indictment (“Otis Alonzo Brown . . . did, with the intent to cause the death of

Ralph Houston, a violation of § 13A-6-2 of the Code of Alabama, attempt to cause the death of

Ralph Houston, by shooting him with a gun, in violation of § 13A-4-2 of the Code of

Alabama[.]”)); the proof offered at trial was consistent with this indictment (compare id. with

Trial Transcript).

34

court adjudication was contrary to such law nor can it be found that the state

court unreasonably applied relevant precedent. Moreover, it is not debatable

among reasonable jurists that the result of which petitioner complains is

incorrect. Stated differently, it is not debatable among reasonable jurists that

the appellate court’s rejection of petitioner’s fatal variance argument is

inherently incorrect. 

CONCLUSION

The Magistrate Judge is of the opinion that petitioner’s rights were not

violated in this cause and that his request for habeas corpus relief should be

denied.

The attached sheet contains important information regarding objections

Case 1:06-cv-00559-KD-C Document 10 Filed 09/17/07 Page 34 of 36
35

to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DONE this the 14th day of September, 2007.

 s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00559-KD-C Document 10 Filed 09/17/07 Page 35 of 36
36

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION, AND

FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

l. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must,

within ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with

the Clerk of this court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual

findings of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en

banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate

Judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in

a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),

by filing a ‘Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation’

within ten days after being served with a copy of the recommendation,

unless a different time is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to which objection is

made and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall submit to

the district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation should be

reviewed de novo and a different disposition made. It is insufficient to

submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate judge,

although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to submit a

brief in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection. 

A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals;

only the district judge's order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable Where Proceedings Tape Recorded). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 and FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge finds that the tapes and original

records in this case are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this

recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will pay the

cost of the transcript.

_s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY____________ 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00559-KD-C Document 10 Filed 09/17/07 Page 36 of 36