Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00585/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00585-11/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brame
Defendant
California Highway Patrol
Defendant
Harrison Orr
Plaintiff
Plumb
Defendant
State of California
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

HARRISON ORR, Individually,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, a 

public entity; STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA, a public entity; 

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL

OFFICERS BRAME, PLUMB, and 

DOES 1-10 individually,

 Defendants.

CIV. NO. 2:14-585 WBS EFB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: CROSSMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Harrison Orr brought this civil rights action 

against defendants California Highway Patrol (CHP), the State of 

California, and Officers Brame and Plumb, alleging that his 

arrest on August 6, 2013 violated state and federal law. (See

First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (Docket No. 5).) Presently before the 

court are plaintiff and defendants’ cross-motions for summary 

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff is a resident of Citrus Heights, California. 

(Orr Dep. at 12:15-13:2, 21:1-5 (Docket No. 54-1).) In September 

of 2006, plaintiff suffered a brain-stem stroke that forced him 

to retire from his job at a money-management firm. (Id. at 

21:18-22:10.) Later, in June 2013, plaintiff suffered transient 

ischemic attacks or “mini strokes.” (Orr Dep. at 39:19-22; Helm 

Decl. Ex. 6 (“June 2006 Discharge Summary”) (Docket No. 54-6).) 

The strokes left plaintiff with facial droop, slurred speech, and 

balancing problems that require him to use a cane. (Orr Dep. at 

26:11-25; Helm Decl. Exs. 11, 14 (Docket Nos. 54-10, 54-13).) At 

the time of his arrest in August 2013, plaintiff was 76 years 

old.

On August 6, 2013, plaintiff was driving his grey 2005 

Toyota southbound on the Interstate 80 Business Loop (“I-80 

Business”) to his former home in South Sacramento. (Orr Dep. at 

44:10-45:7; Helm Supp. Decl. Ex. 45.) At that time, Officer 

Brame was driving a marked patrol car southbound on I-80 Business 

to transport an arrestee to the Sacramento County Jail. (Brame 

Dep. at 63:13-64:5, 65:9-67:9.) Brame pulled up directly behind 

plaintiff in the left lane and noticed that plaintiff appeared to 

be driving too slowly. (Id. at 67:17-19; Orr Dep. at 62:11-

63:23.) After observing plaintiff make what he believed were 

several erratic moves, Brame pulled plaintiff over. (See id. at 

87:13-14.)

Brame collected plaintiff’s license and registration 

and asked plaintiff to get out of the car. (Orr Dep. at 53:19-

22.) When plaintiff asked what the matter was, Brame asked 

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plaintiff if he had been drinking, and plaintiff replied that he 

had not. (Id. at 53:22-54:1.) Brame also asked plaintiff if he 

had taken any drugs or medications that day, and plaintiff 

responded that he had taken medication for his heart before he 

left home. (Orr Dep. at 56:15-21.) It is disputed whether 

plaintiff also informed Brame that he had suffered a stroke. 

While plaintiff states he repeatedly informed Brame about the 

stroke, (Orr Dep. at 56:18-57:6), Brame states plaintiff informed 

him that he had a neurological condition but does not recall 

whether plaintiff actually used the word “stroke,” (Brame Dep. at 

103:15-21). 

Brame became increasingly suspicious of plaintiff after

performing two sobriety tests, both of which plaintiff failed.1

(See Brame Dep. at 91:20-24, 101:3-102:18.) Brame also noticed 

that plaintiff’s speech was slurred and his pupils were 

constricted. (Id. at 119:15-19.) Brame called CHP to request 

that they send someone with a breathalyzer test, and Officer 

Plumb soon arrived with the equipment at the scene. (Id. at 

132:25-133:5.) The result of plaintiff’s test was zero, ruling 

out alcohol. (Brame Dep. at 107:21-22, 108:1-4.) 

 

1 Brame performed a horizontal gaze nystagmus test where 

he asked plaintiff to follow the tip of his finger with his 

eyes.1 (Brame Dep. at 91:20-24.) Plaintiff’s eyes did not 

smoothly track Brame’s finger, making Brame suspicious that 

plaintiff was intoxicated. (Id. at 92:9-12, 96:21-23.)

Brame also performed the Rhomberg test, which assists 

in determining a subject’s balance and ability to assess the 

passage of time. (Brame Dep. at 101:3-102:18.) The test 

involves asking a subject to stand with his feet together, arms 

by his side, close his eyes, and estimate the passage of thirty 

seconds. (Id.) Because plaintiff was unable to maintain his 

balance, Brame discontinued the test. (Id.)

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Still suspicious that plaintiff could be under the 

influence of drugs, Brame and Plumb decided to place plaintiff 

under arrest for driving under the influence. (Id. at 118:23-

119:1.) Brame made arrangements for a certified drug recognition 

expert to conduct a further evaluation of plaintiff at the CHP 

office to rule out whether or not drugs were the cause of his 

appearance and behavior. (Id. at 116:19-22.) 

Plaintiff initially cooperated with the arrest. 

However, when Brame informed plaintiff that he would have to be 

handcuffed, plaintiff states he told the officers that he could 

not be handcuffed because he had problems balancing. (Orr Dep. 

at 63:3-4.) After some discussion, plaintiff and the officers 

reached an impasse. Plumb communicated to Brame that they would 

need to take plaintiff down, and in a matter of seconds Plumb 

punched plaintiff in his right ribs and knocked him to the 

ground. (Orr Dep. at 65:12-20; Plumb Dep. at 30:23-25.) The 

officers handcuffed plaintiff behind his back and lifted 

plaintiff off the ground. (Orr Dep. at 70:18-23; Brame Dep. at 

152:22-153:2.)

Sargeant Kelly, who had arrived at the scene, 

transported plaintiff to the CHP office. (Kelly Dep. at 14:8-10

(Docket No. 54-4).) There, Officer Hannem performed an hour-long 

drug-recognition evaluation on plaintiff and ultimately 

determinaed plaintiff was a “medical rule-out,” meaning that in 

his opinion, plaintiff’s condition was due to a medical condition 

as opposed to drug use or alcohol. (Id. at 54:14-17, 58:6-12.)

At 4:40 p.m. plaintiff was booked at the Sacramento 

County jail for willfully resisting an officer in violation of 

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California Penal Code section 148(a). (Helm Decl. Ex. 19 at 8 

(Docket No. 54-18) (noting plaintiff was transported to 

Sacramento County Jail and booked for a “148(a) PC at 1640 

hours”).) Plaintiff was released sometime between 12:30 and 1 

a.m. (Orr Dep. at 89:18-21.) 

As a result of his arrest, plaintiff asserts he 

sustained substantial bruising to his body, endured pain, and 

took six to seven weeks to heal. (Orr Dep. at 32:25-33:2, 92:23-

102:4; Helm Decl. Ex. 33.) Plaintiff brought claims against 

Officers Brame and Plumb for (1) unreasonable search and seizure 

and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 42 

U.S.C. § 1983; (2) interference with plaintiff’s enjoyment of his 

rights, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1; (3) interference with plaintiff’s 

right to be free from violence or intimidation, Cal. Civ. Code § 

51.7; (4) assault and battery; (5) negligence; (6) Elder Abuse, 

Cal Welfare & Insts. Code § 15610.07; and (7) false arrest. (See

First Am. Compl. (Docket No. 5).) Plaintiff also brought claims 

against the California Highway Patrol and the State of California 

under the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and 

Rehabilitation Act (“RA”). Both parties both move for summary 

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.2

Because plaintiff does not contest summary judgment on his claim 

under section 51.7, the court need not discuss it and will enter 

judgment in favor of defendants on that claim accordingly. 

 

2 Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on all claims 

except his claim under California Civil Code section 51.7. (See

Pl.’s Mot. at 1 (Docket No. 50).) In his opposition, plaintiff 

states that to simplify and streamline this case, he does not 

contest summary judgment on his section 51.7 claim. 

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II. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice

Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits the court to take 

judicial notice of a fact not subject to reasonable dispute 

because either it “(1) is generally known within the [] court’s 

territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily 

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 

Defendants request that the court take judicial notice 

of the “fact” that expert Roger Clark’s opinions as a Police 

Procedures Consultant have been found to be ipse dixit in a 

number of cases decided in various federal district and appellate 

courts. (See Defs.’ Req. for Judicial Notice at 1-3 (Docket No. 

58).) Other courts’ discussions of Clarks’ opinions in other 

cases are not a proper subject for judicial notice. While a 

court may take judicial notice of another court’s opinion, it may 

do so for the existence of the opinion only, and not for the 

truth of the facts recited therein. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 

250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001), impliedly overruled on other 

grounds as discussed in Gallardo v. Dicarlo, 203 F.Supp.2d 1160, 

1162 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Furthermore, whether in other cases 

courts have found Clark’s opinion to be ipse dixit has no bearing 

on the instant case with its particularized facts and 

circumstances. 

III. Analysis

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

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P. 56(a). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome 

of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a 

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s 

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial 

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that 

negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the moving party can demonstrate that the nonmoving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential 

element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. 

Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the 

burden shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 

324 (quoting then-Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). To carry this burden, 

the non-moving party must “do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be 

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could 

reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 252.

In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 

255. “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, 

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and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury 

functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for 

summary judgment . . . .” Id. On cross-motions for summary 

judgment, the court “must review the evidence submitted in 

support of each cross-motion [in a light most favorable to the 

non-moving party] and consider each party’s motions on their own 

merits.” Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 

1097 (W.D. Wash. 2004). 

Both parties filed formulaic and conclusory objections 

to evidence submitted by the other party. “Objections to 

evidence on the ground that the evidence is irrelevant, 

speculative, argumentative, vague and ambiguous, or constitutes 

an improper legal conclusion are all duplicative of the summary 

judgment standard itself.” Century 21 Real Estate LLC v. All 

Prof’l Realty, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1215 (E.D. Cal. 2012) 

(citing Burch v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 433 F. Supp. 2d 

1110, 1119–20 (E. D. Cal. 2006)). “Similarly, statements based 

on speculation, improper legal conclusions, personal knowledge, 

or argumentative statements are not facts and can only be 

considered as arguments, not as facts, on a motion for summary 

judgment.” Id.

In the interest of brevity, the court will not review 

the substance or grounds of the individual objections here. The 

parties’ objections are all overruled. 

B. Section 1983 Claims for Violation of the Fourth Amendment

Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive 

rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred by . . . the United States Constitution and federal 

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statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 

144 n.3 (1979). Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Brame and 

Plumb are based on their alleged unlawful arrest of plaintiff and 

their use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. (See FAC ¶ 35.) 

1. Unlawful Arrest

a. The Violation

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 

applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 

prohibits searches and arrests without probable cause. Beck v. 

Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 90-91 (1964); McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 

1007-08 (9th Cir. 1984). “The long-prevailing standard of 

probable cause protects ‘citizens from rash and unreasonable 

interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime.’” 

Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (quoting Brinegar 

v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). 

“Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the 

circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person 

would have concluded that there was a fair probability that [the 

suspect] had committed a crime.” United States v. Ortiz, 427 

F.3d 567, 573 (9th Cir. 2004). “While conclusive evidence of 

guilt is of course not necessary under this standard to establish 

probable cause, ‘[m]ere suspicion, common rumor, or even strong 

reason to suspect are not enough.’” United States v. Lopez, 482 

F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 

F.2d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1984)). “The probable cause inquiry is 

an objective one, focusing on the facts known to the officer at 

the scene.” Fowler v. Cal. Highway Patrol, Civ. No. 3:13-1026, 

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2014 WL 1665046, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2014) (citing 

Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004)). “The arresting 

officers’ subjective intention . . . is immaterial in judging 

whether their actions were reasonable for Fourth Amendment 

purposes.” Lopez, 482 F.3d at 1072. 

Once there is probable cause for an arrest, it can 

dissipate:

If probable cause is established at any early stage of 

the investigation, it may be dissipated if the 

investigating officer later learns additional 

information that decreases the likelihood that the 

defendant has engaged, or is engaging, in criminal 

activity. A person may not be arrested, or must be 

released from arrest, if previously established 

probable cause has dissipated. “As a corollary . . . 

of the rule that the police may rely on the totality 

of facts available to them in establishing probable 

cause, they also may not disregard facts tending to 

dissipate probable cause.”

Ortiz, 427 F.3d at 574 (quoting Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 

1218 (5th Cir. 1988)).

The Ninth Circuit has distinguished between litigating 

probable cause in the criminal and civil contexts. See McKenzie, 

738 F.2d at 1008. “[I]n a § 1983 action the factual matters 

underlying the judgment of reasonableness generally mean that 

probable cause is a question for the jury, and summary judgment 

is appropriate only if no reasonable jury could find that the 

officers did or did not have probable cause to arrest.” Id.

Plumb and Brame arrested plaintiff for driving under 

the influence, which is a misdemeanor.

3 (Brame Dep. at 118:20-

 

3 Defendants argue that Brame and Plumb had probable 

cause for arresting plaintiff for resisting arrest, (see Defs.’ 

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119:3.) Brame’s suspicion of plaintiff arose from a number of 

known facts. Plaintiff was driving below the speed limit in the 

far left lane of traffic and was at one point straddling the lane 

divider as he attempted to move to the shoulder. (See Orr Dep. 

at 48:2-5; MVARS video; Brame Dep. 87:13-14.) Based on Brame’s 

experience, driving at a slow speed is a key indicator that a 

driver is intoxicated. (Brame Dep. at 70:18-23.) Brame also 

states he observed plaintiff cutting off a vehicle while changing 

lanes. (Id. at 75:21-76:2.) 

Plaintiff’s appearance and behavior also led Brame to 

believe plaintiff had ingested a narcotic. The way plaintiff’s 

eyes failed to track Brame’s finger, plaintiff’s slurred speech, 

and his poor balance could indicate drug use. (Id. at 109:4-24, 

119:11-22.) Plaintiff’s constricted pupils was also potentially

a sign that plaintiff was under the influence of drugs; 

defendants’ expert Kevin Craig, an instructor in the Impaired 

Driving Unit at the CHP Academy, states that most non-narcotic 

causes of abnormal pupil constriction such as eye injury or old 

age will cause only one eye to constrict. (Craig Decl. ¶ 12.) 

According to Brame, both of plaintiff’s eyes were constricted. 

 

Mem. at 21-22), but this begs the question, because plaintiff 

could not have resisted arrest prior to the time he was arrested. 

For that initial arrest to be lawful, the officers must have had 

probable cause to believe plaintiff had driven under the 

influence. See Fowler, 2014 WL 1665046, at *6 (holding that 

arrest for resisting arrest was supported by probable cause if 

there was probable cause to believe plaintiff had committed 

another arrestable offense).

 

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(See Brame Dep. at 119:16-19.) 

Plaintiff’s constricted pupils, however, were an 

equivocal sign that plaintiff had ingested drugs. The CHP manual 

states that a head injury could cause constricted pupils. (See

Helm Decl. Ex. 36 at 2-13, 3-7.) It states, vaguely, that “most” 

non-narcotic analgesic conditions, including eye injury or old 

age, will cause only one eye to constrict. Id. Neither Craig’s 

statement nor the manual indicate that a neurological condition 

such as a stroke should only result in unilateral, rather than 

bilateral constriction. (See id. at 3-7.) In discussing his 

examination of plaintiff at the CHP office, Officer Hannem stated 

that he had been trained that the kind of constriction plaintiff 

exhibited could be the result of either a stroke or drug use. 

(See Hannem Dep. at 56:4-11.) 

In addition to these facts, there were a number of 

signs--some disputed--that plaintiff’s condition resulted from a 

medical condition. It is disputed whether plaintiff told Brame 

he had previously suffered from a stroke.4 (Orr Dep. at 56:15-

21, 69:13-18.). At the time of the accident, plaintiff’s stroke

had left him with a facial droop. (See Helm Decl. Ex. 8 

(“Plaintiff’s Booking Photo”); Hannem Dep. at 42:23-24.) The 

Peace Officer Standards and Training (“POST”) Academy teaches

officers that indicators of stroke include “sagging facial 

muscles,” “poor balance, clumsiness,” and “impaired, slurred 

speech.” (Helm Decl. Ex. 22 (“POST Manual on First Aid and 

 

4 Brame states plaintiff told him he suffered from a 

“neurological condition” but could not recall whether plaintiff 

actually used the word “stroke.” (Brame Dep. at 112:8-10, 11:1-

3.) 

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CPR”).) A jury could therefore conclude that a reasonable 

officer would know that plaintiff’s “droopy” face, poor balance, 

and clumsiness could indicate that plaintiff had suffered a 

stroke. If it is true that plaintiff asserted that he informed 

the officers on multiple occasions about his stroke, then his 

physical symptoms would have corroborated his representations.

There were several other indicators beyond plaintiff’s 

physical condition suggesting that plaintiff had disabilities. 

Plaintiff’s car had a license plate for people with disabilities, 

(see Helm Decl. Ex. 4), and Brame saw the plate when he ran it

with the dispatcher.5 (Brame Dep. at 106:23-25) Brame found 

plaintiff’s cane in the trunk of his car while he was looking for 

drugs. (See id. at 180:3-9.) Although Brame states that found 

the cane after his arrest of plaintiff, where probable cause has 

dissipated after an arrest due to newly discovered facts, the 

arrestee must be released, see Ortiz, 427 F.3d at 574. 

Despite these additional facts that a jury could find 

would have suggested to a reasonable officer that several of 

plaintiff’s symptoms were attributable to a medical condition, 

Brame states he believed he could not take plaintiff’s word about 

his neurological issues. When asked if he doubted plaintiff when 

plaintiff told him he had a previous neurological condition, 

Brame testified, “I couldn’t take [plaintiff’s] word as gospel; I 

had to obviously do my investigation to figure that out.” (Brame 

Dep. at 113:2-5.) Brame, however, failed to do any investigation 

 

5 Defendants assert that plaintiff was not the registered 

owner of his car, but plaintiff’s DMV registration indicates that 

plaintiff is a registered co-owner, along with Demetra Thomason. 

(See Helm Decl. Ex. 46.)

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to determine whether plaintiff had a medical condition, including 

asking plaintiff any questions about his neurological condition. 

Instead Brame merely “[went] through the field sobriety test,” 

(see Brame Dep. at 113:6-20), the purpose of which was to detect 

drug use. 

“Probable cause means ‘fair probability,” but it does 

not mean “‘certainty or even a preponderance of the evidence.’” 

United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983)). “Once a 

police officer has a reasonable basis for believing there is 

probable cause, he is not required to explore and eliminate every 

theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an 

arrest.” See Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 128 

(9th Cir. 1997) (holding that where there was evidence that 

plaintiff had attacked a police officer, the arresting officer 

was not required to believe plaintiff, rather than the officer, 

that plaintiff had acted in self-defense); see also Fowler, 2014 

WL 1665046, at *9 (holding that officer was not required to take 

into account plaintiff’s representation that her stroke-related 

disabilities made it difficult for her to comply with his 

instructions, where those disabilities “were not readily 

verifiable” at the moment she resisted arrest). 

Here, however, a reasonable jury could conclude that 

plaintiff’s medical condition was not a “theoretical” claim of 

innocence. There were facts known to Brame at the time of 

plaintiff’s arrest that made plaintiff’s stroke readily 

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verifiable. Plaintiff’s facial droop, his cane,6 his license 

plate for disabled persons could have “overcome” or “chipped 

away” at the fair probability that plaintiff’s condition was the 

result of disabilities associated with stroke, and not drug use. 

See Ortiz, 427 F.3d at 574; Fowler, 2014 WL 1665046, at *9. 

Under Ortiz, a reasonable jury could find that Brame was not 

entitled to disregard these facts which dissipated probable cause 

that plaintiff was under the influence of drugs. See Ortiz, 427 

F.3d at 574.

Moreover, it is telling that Officer Hannem, after 

conducting a nearly identical investigation to Brame’s at the CHP 

office, with the same known facts available to him, concluded 

that under the totality of the circumstances plaintiff’s symptoms 

were consistent with plaintiff’s reported history of having been 

a stroke victim. (Hannem Dep. at 57:24-58:12.) Plaintiff, 

Hannem concluded, was a “medical rule-out.” (Id.) On the other 

hand, Hannem was a certified drug recognition expert, (Hannem 

Dep. at 64:7-19), and although Brame had also been certified in 

that role, he permitted his certification to lapse, (Brame Dep. 

at 121:1-16). CHP policy also provides that DRE evaluations 

should be conducted in a controlled environment with minimal 

distractions and controllable lighting conditions. (See Craig 

Decl. ¶ 12.) A reasonable jury could find that Hannem’s current 

certification and the controlled environment of the CHP office 

either did or did not make a difference in Hannem’s 

 

6 As previously discussed, although Brame discovered 

plaintiff’s cane after plaintiff was placed in handcuffs, a 

reasonable jury could find the cane further dissipated probable 

cause. See Ortiz, 427 F.3d at 574.

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classification of plaintiff as a medical rule-out. 

From the totality of the known facts, a reasonable jury 

could find that probable cause was lacking when the officers 

informed plaintiff he was being placed under arrest.7 See

McKenzie, 738 F.2d at 1008 (noting that in § 1983 cases the 

judgment of reasonableness generally means that a probable cause 

is a question for the jury). Because a number of material facts 

are in dispute, granting summary judgment to either party on 

plaintiff’s unlawful arrest claim against the officers is 

inappropriate at this time. See id. 

b. Qualified Immunity

Defendants raise the defense of qualified immunity. 

(See Defs.’ Mot. at 27.) In suits under § 1983, “qualified 

immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil 

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person should have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 

U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 

818, (1982)). “In resolving the claim of qualified immunity, the 

 

7 “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a 

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he 

does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative 

acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to 

do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Officer 

Plumb participated in the arrest of plaintiff with the same facts 

available to him that were available to Officer Brame. (See

Plumb Dep. at 25:23-24 (describing that both officers flanked 

plaintiff upon his arrest; Plumb Dep. at 19:11-20:25 (describing 

facts known to him at the time of plaintiff’s arrest).) Because 

there exists a reasonable dispute of material fact as to whether 

plaintiff’s arrest was lawful, plaintiff also has a viable 

unlawful arrest claim against Plumb. 

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court must determine whether, taken in the light most favorable 

to plaintiff, defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional 

right, and if so, whether the right was clearly established.” 

Kinnamon v. Latia, Civ. No. 1:12-1325 AWI DLB, 2015 WL 590617, at 

*6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2015) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 

194, 201 (2001)). Defendants bear the burden of establishing 

qualified immunity. See Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633, 638 (9th 

Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has held that a court may assume 

the existence of a constitutional violation under the first 

inquiry for purposes of the qualified immunity analysis.

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. The court has already found that 

disputed issues of fact exist regarding whether defendants Brame 

and Plumb arrested plaintiff without probable cause in violation 

of the Fourth Amendment. 

Assuming there was a Fourth Amendment violation, the 

court proceeds to the clearly established inquiry. This inquiry 

“serves the aim of refining the legal standard and is solely a 

question of law for the judge.” Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro. Police 

Dep’t, 556 F.3d 1075, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009). As the Supreme Court 

has recognized, whether the unlawfulness of certain conduct is 

clearly established “depends largely ‘upon the level of 

generality at which the relevant legal rule is to be 

identified.’” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999) (quoting 

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)). The right must 

be defined in a “particularized, and hence more relevant, sense,” 

requiring a court to strike a balance between defining a right 

too generally so that the definition necessarily leads to the 

conclusion that the right is clearly established and defining the 

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right too narrowly so that prior precedent must mirror the facts 

of the case in order to conclude that the right has been clearly 

established. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202–03. If the court 

concludes a right is not clearly established, the officer is 

entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 202.

Here, the issue is whether it is clearly established 

that an officer lacks probable cause to arrest someone for 

driving under the influence where there is a readily verifiable 

innocent explanation for symptoms of drug use. It is well 

established that “[t]he effect of evidence which may support, or 

incline toward, a finding of probable cause can, of course, be 

vitiated by countervailing evidence.” Lopez, 482 F.3d at 1074 

(citing Ortiz, 427 F.3d at 527). It was thus clearly established 

that even if the officers believed plaintiff was driving under 

the influence, they were not entitled to ignore countervailing

facts that overcame this belief, including plaintiff’s assertion 

that he had suffered from a stroke, was on medication, and the 

aforementioned facts suggesting plaintiff was disabled. 

In addition to circuit precedent, a court may also 

consider police policy to determine whether a police officer was 

on notice that his behavior violated the constitution. See

Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 

2003) (holding that officers were not entitled to qualified 

immunity even absent Ninth Circuit precedent squarely on point 

where “the officers received training from their own police 

department explaining specifically” that the force they applied 

could cause death). 

The California Highway Patrol training manual 

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anticipates the danger that certain medical conditions could risk 

subjecting an innocent person to arrest. The training manual 

states,

(f) Many times a subject may appear obviously 

impaired. There are other circumstances, such as 

medical conditions, that may cause a person to show 

signs and symptoms that are consistent with alcohol 

and/or drug impairment. Some of these conditions 

include . . . (3) Injuries or diseases of the nervous 

system; (4) head injuries. . . .

(g) It is imperative that the possibilities of such 

conditions be explored and ruled out to prevent the 

arrest of innocent, sober persons, and to prevent a 

person who is injured from being subjected to further 

aggravation and/or lack of medical attention.

(h) While the presence, or alleged presence, of any of 

the above conditions does not negate the giving of a 

further and more complete examination by the officer, 

the subject’s condition may require immediate medical 

attention. If the officer suspects a medical 

condition exists and treatment may be needed, the 

officer should immediately arrange for medical 

treatment.

(Helm Decl. Ex. 24 at 2-7 (“CHP Training Manual”).) This policy 

places officers on notice that some medical conditions could put 

individuals at risk of being arrested for driving under the 

influence of drugs when there was an entirely innocent 

explanation for his appearance and behavior. It is unclear 

whether plaintiff’s stroke constitutes an “injur[y] to the 

nervous system” or a “head injury,” both of which the manual 

single out as conditions needing immediate assistance. In any 

case, the policy teaches the importance of being perceptive to 

countervailing facts indicating a medical condition, and not drug 

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use, is the cause of a person’s behavior and appearance. As 

previously discussed, a jury could find that, once aware that 

plaintiff’s symptoms could be stroke-, and not drug-induced, the 

officers asked no further questions and even ignored other 

evidence that plaintiff was disabled. (See Brame Dep. at 113:6-

20, 156:14-15; 180:5-9.) 

Together, Lopez and CHP policy clearly establish that 

an officer lacks probable cause to arrest someone for driving 

under the influence where there is a readily verifiable innocent 

explanation for symptoms of drug use. Because it remains a 

disputed issue of fact whether plaintiff’s medical condition was 

readily verifiable, defendants are not entitled to qualified 

immunity at this stage. See Lopez, 482 F.3d at 1074.

Defendants rely on Fowler, a case also involving the 

arrest of a stroke victim, to argue that because there a district 

court judge ruled the officers did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment, then it is not clearly established that a claim of a 

previous stroke immunizes a plaintiff from an arrest. (See Defs.’ 

Reply at 12); 2014 WL 1665046. Fowler applied Ortiz to facts 

similar to those here. See id. 

Fowler is distinguishable in key respects. In Fowler, 

police attempted to arrest plaintiff for public intoxication, but 

she refused to stay in her vehicle when the officers asked her to 

do so. Id. at *1-*2. Plaintiff states she yelled at the 

officers that her disability stemming from a stroke made it 

difficult for her to understand directions and her surroundings. 

Id. at *9. No other facts suggested the plaintiff had a 

disability. The court found that this was not an Ortiz

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“dissipation” situation because plaintiff’s statements alone 

could not overcome the fair probability that plaintiff had 

willingly refused to comply with the instructions. See id. 

Here, however, a reasonable jury could find that the 

officers had facts in addition to plaintiff’s statement that he 

had had a stroke--his physical appearance, including his facial 

droop, his disabled persons license plate, and his cane, which 

Brame discovered post-arrest while searching plaintiff’s car on 

the scene for drugs. A reasonable jury could find that 

plaintiff’s condition, unlike Fowler’s, was “readily verifiable” 

and facts indicating plaintiff’s medical condition should have 

overcome the fair probability that plaintiff was acting under the 

influence of drugs. There are thus factual disputes that prevent 

the court from deciding qualified immunity at this stage. 

2. Excessive Force

a. The Violation

The Fourth Amendment also governs plaintiff’s excessive 

force claim, but unlawful arrest and excessive force claims 

require different inquiries. Beier v. City of Lewiston, 354 F.3d 

1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004); see also id. (“Because the excessive 

force and false arrest factual inquiries are distinct, 

establishing a lack of probable cause to make an arrest does not 

establish an excessive force claim, and vice-versa.”). A court 

must determine whether “the officers’ actions are ‘objectively 

unreasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting 

them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” 

Id. at 397. In Graham the Supreme Court articulated three 

factors that courts should typically consider in an excessive 

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force analysis: “(1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) 

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of 

the officers or others; and (3) whether the suspect is actively 

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” 

Cameron v. Craig, 713 F.3d 1012, 1021 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). In addition to these factors, “a court 

(or jury) may ‘look to whatever specific factors may be 

appropriate in a particular case.’” (Id.) (quoting Franklin v. 

Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

Ultimately, “[d]etermining whether a police officer’s 

use of force was reasonable or excessive therefore requires 

careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each 

particular case and a careful balancing of an individual’s 

liberty with the government’s interest in the application of 

force.” Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Whether an 

officer used excessive force under the Fourth Amendment is a 

question for the jury, which “almost always turn[s] on a jury’s 

credibility determinations.” See id. “Because [the excessive 

force balancing test] requires a jury to sift through disputed 

factual contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom, we have 

held on many occasions that summary judgment . . . in excessive 

force cases should be granted sparingly.” Id.

Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against the officers 

centers on Plumb’s punch of plaintiff in his right rib--what 

defendants call a “distraction punch,” (see Defs.’ Mot. at 34)--

and the officers’ forceful takedown of plaintiff to the ground. 

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The occurrence of both actions is undisputed.

8 (See Orr Dep. at 

65:12; Plumb Dep. at 30:23-25, 148:24-147:4.)

However, the parties characterize differently the 

degree of force used. Plumb states that he “struck” plaintiff in 

the lower ribs with a closed fist but not in a forceful manner, 

choosing not to hit plaintiff harshly because of his age. (Plumb 

Dep. at 32:13-33:18.) During the takedown, Plumb says the 

officers “placed” plaintiff on the ground in order to lessen the 

impact. (Id. at 36:6-16.) Plaintiff, on the other hand, 

describes the officers’ acts much more violently, testifying that 

Plumb punched him in the ribs, and Brame kicked his feet out from 

under him and forced him to the ground in a matter of seconds, 

such that he had trouble breathing. (Orr Dep. at 69:3-18.) The 

officers called the fire department, and paramedics found 

plaintiff’s condition to be stable, (Pass Decl. Ex. Q at 1 

 

8 Plumb delivered the punch to plaintiff’s ribs, and 

Brame initiated the takedown by kicking plaintiff’s shin. (See

Brame Dep. at 148:25-149:4, 163:18-164:7.) Each officer is 

liable, however, where his acts amount to “integral 

participation” in the constitutional violation. See, e.g., James 

by James v. Sadler, 909 F.2d 834, 837 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding 

that while officers did not physically perform the pat-down of 

plaintiff, because they provided back-up by remaining armed on 

the premises throughout the search, their activities rendered 

them integral participants). A reasonable jury could find that 

Brame was an integral participant in Plumb’s punch of plaintiff 

because Brame was simultaneously grabbing at plaintiff in an 

attempt to “use more of [his] strength to try to get--get control 

of [plaintiff].” (Brame Dep. at 146:10-147:3.) A reasonable 

jury could also find that Plumb was an integral participant in 

the takedown. Brame states, “We lowered [plaintiff] to the 

ground . . . . We had control of his upper body as far as 

grabbing that, and once I was able to keep his lower body from 

moving with his upper body, we were able to take him down to the 

ground.” (Brame Dep. at 149:9-15 (emphasis added).) 

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(Docket No. 57-4)), although photos taken of plaintiff at booking 

show substantial bruising on his legs and buttocks, (Helm Decl. 

Ex. 33). Based on this equivocal evidence, the degree of force 

used on plaintiff is genuinely in dispute. 

The officers used force in the course of arresting 

plaintiff for driving under the influence, and the severity of 

that crime, a misdemeanor, is generally low. See Bowman v. 

Reilly, Civ. No. 2:09-1322, 2010 WL 831412, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 

4, 2010) (concluding the severity of a DUI was low in an 

excessive force analysis); Walker v. City of Post Falls, Civ. No. 

1:07-264, 2008 WL 4997056, at *8 (D. Idaho May 21, 2008) (noting 

under Graham the severity of a DUI and the threat arrestee posed 

were not overwhelming although ultimately concluding officers’ 

use of force was reasonable where arrestee had not cooperated). 

Although driving under the influence poses a risk to public 

safety, that risk, at least in this situation, was not immediate. 

In examining the second two Graham factors, the court 

notes a number of material facts in dispute, including whether 

plaintiff actively resisted arrest. Plaintiff admits that when 

Officer Brame grabbed him to handcuff him, he struggled a bit, 

but he states he did so while saying, “I am going to cooperate 

with you. I will go. Just you cannot handcuff me.” (Orr Dep. 

at 67.) When the officers continued to grab him, plaintiff also

continued to struggle, repeating, “You can’t do that. You can’t 

do that.” (Id. at 67:11-14.) From plaintiff’s version of the 

facts, a reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff’s conduct 

did not amount to resistance to arrest, instead concluding that 

plaintiff was avoiding complying with the officers’ attempt to 

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handcuff him.

Even if plaintiff failed to immediately submit to the 

handcuffs, a jury could find that that alone is insufficient to 

justify the use of force. “[A] statement that a suspect is 

physically unable to comply with a request does not, by itself, 

justify the use of force. Instead, the police may use force only 

when the intrusion on the individual’s liberty interest is 

outweighed by the governmental interests at stake.” Winterrowd 

v. Nelson, 480 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 2007). In Winterrowd, 

the Ninth Circuit concluded that even when plaintiff was 

“adamant” that he was not required to hand over his registration 

to the officers, a mistake of law, “that attitude would not 

justify the deliberate infliction of pain.” Id. 

Defendants tell a different story, stating plaintiff 

was shouting and even used expletives to communicate to the 

officers that he would not submit to handcuffs. (See Plumb Dep. 

at 29.) Defendants assert that plaintiff was “physically 

fighting” the officers when they attempted to handcuff him. (See

Defs.’ Mot. at 26; Brame Dep. at 140:1-3, 143:23.) As these 

disputes demonstrate, whether plaintiff was actively resisting 

arrest is the kind of factual inquiry that almost always turns on 

a jury’s credibility determination. See Santos, 287 F.3d at 853.

Whether there was an immediate threat to the officers’ 

safety is also disputed. Plaintiff had been cooperative up to

the point at which the officers attempted to handcuff him, which 

is undisputed, (see Brame Dep. at 137:3-12 (describing plaintiff 

as a “model citizen” up until the handcuffing)). The officers

stated that plaintiff clenched his fists like a boxer, (Brame 

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Dep. at 140:1-3, 143:23), and Plumb stated that it “appeared to 

[him] that [plaintiff] was going to strike either [him] or 

Officer Brame,” (Plumb Dep. at 31:24-32:4). Plaintiff, however,

insists that he never assumed this menacing position with his 

fists clenched. (See Orr Dep. at 66:22-67:14.) Additionally, 

plaintiff was at the time a 76-year-old man with poor balance.

9 

Plaintiff is not of slight build--his weight at the time was 

somewhere between 190 to 210 pounds, (see Pass Decl. Ex. M-1 

(Docket No. 57-3); Helm Opp’n Decl. Ex 42 (Docket No. 66-8)--but 

he was matched by two officers, each of whom weighed 200 pounds 

or over, (see Brame Dep. at 34:19-21; Plumb Dep. at 11:21-23). A 

jury could reasonably infer that plaintiff might have come around 

and agreed to the handcuffs had the officers spent more time 

conversing with him. 

On the other hand, a threat to the officers could be 

inferred from several other facts. This event took place on the 

side of the highway, which arguably exposed the officers to a 

risk of being hit by a car. If the officers reasonably believed

plaintiff was under the influence of drugs, which is contested,

then a jury could also conclude it was reasonable for them to 

believe plaintiff posed a greater threat to them than if he was 

sober. See Paramo v. City of Morgan Hill, Civ. No. 3:01-825, 

2002 WL 1497521, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 9, 2002) (“It was 

 

9 Defendants point out that plaintiff used to box in 

Golden Gloves competitions, (see Defs.’ Mot. at 13; Orr Dep. at 

65:14-15), but there is no evidence in the record that this was a 

known fact on the day of the incident. This fact is therefore

immaterial. For this reason, defendants’ request that the court 

take judicial notice that the Golden Gloves is the name given to 

annual competitions for amateur boxing is moot. 

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reasonable for an uncooperative suspect in custody and under the 

influence of alcohol could pose a threat to the safety of medical 

personnel.”). Altogether, a determination on whether plaintiff 

reasonably posed a threat to the officers requires a jury to sift 

through a number of disputed factual contentions and draw 

inferences therefrom. See Santos, 287 F.3d at 853. 

Ultimately, although the government generally may have 

a substantial interest in reducing DUI violations, see Killian v. 

City of Monterey, Civ. No. 5:12-5418, 2013 WL 6577064, at *9 

(N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2013), and ensuring officer safety during 

investigations, a reasonable jury could find either way that both 

of those interests did or did not compel the kind of force used 

here. Because plaintiff’s behavior leading up to the use of 

force, and thus the risk to the officer’s safety, is in dispute, 

summary judgment is appropriate for neither party at this time. 

b. Qualified Immunity

Assuming Brame and Plumb’s conduct constituted 

excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the 

officers cannot be held liable unless at the time of the arrest 

it was clearly established that their use of force was 

unreasonable.

“The Supreme Court has made clear that ‘officials can 

still be on notice that their conduct violates established law 

even in novel factual circumstances.” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 

F.3d 433, 442 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 

730, 741 (2002)). The Ninth Circuit has noted the importance of 

that principle “in the context of Fourth Amendment cases, where 

the constitutional standard--reasonableness--is always a very 

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fact-specific inquiry.” Id. On the other hand, courts must 

“apply the ‘clearly established’ rule in such a way that 

faithfully guards ‘the need to protect officials who are required 

to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in 

encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.’” Id.

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982)).

In Winterrowd, police pulled over the plaintiff 

suspecting that his license plates were invalid. See Winterrowd, 

480 F.3d 1182. When plaintiff did not produce a valid 

registration, police ordered him to get out of the car and put 

his hands behind his back. Id. The plaintiff explained to the 

officers that he could not put his hands behind his back because 

he had a shoulder injury. Id. The officers responded by forcing 

plaintiff onto the hood of the car, grabbing plaintiff’s right 

arm, and forcing it up, until the plaintiff screamed in pain. 

Id. The Ninth Circuit held that absent a threat to officer 

safety, officers are not entitled to use force just because an 

arrestee refuses to comply with an officer’s request. Similar to 

the facts here, there was a dispute over whether the plaintiff 

was threatening. The officers stated the plaintiff was 

“belligerent” but the plaintiff stated he was neither threatening 

nor physically abusive. Id. at 1184.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to 

plaintiff, in Winterrowd the Ninth Circuit held that no 

reasonable officer would believe he could constitutionally force 

a harmless motorist against the hood of a car and cause him 

unnecessary pain. Id. at 1186. The court found that even where 

the plaintiff was “verbally abusive” to the officers, “[a]n 

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officer may not use force solely because a suspect tells him he 

is incapable of complying with a request during the course of an 

ordinary pat-down.” Id. 

According to plaintiff, he calmly stated to the 

officers he could not wear handcuffs because of his balance. 

(See Orr Dep. at 63:3-4.) Based on plaintiff’s version of the 

facts, which are disputed, the only factual difference between 

Winterrowd and the instant case is that here plaintiff’s 

underlying alleged crime, a D.U.I., was arguably more severe than 

driving with an invalid license. While not a case on all fours, 

Winterrowd sufficiently placed Brame and Plumb on notice that 

their actions constituted unreasonable force. Because there 

remains a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether 

plaintiff behaved in a non-threatening manner in informing the 

officers that he could not comply with their instructions that he 

needed to be handcuffed, the court may not grant qualified 

immunity to the officers at this stage. 

C. State law claims

a. California Civil Code Section 52.1

Section 52.1, the “Bane Act,” permits “any individual 

whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution 

or laws of the United States . . . has been interfered with, or 

attempted to be interfered with, as described in subsection (a) . 

. . may institute . . . a civil action for damages . . . .” Cal. 

Civ. Code § 52.1(b). Subsection (a) permits the Attorney General 

to bring a civil action when “a person . . . whether or not 

acting under the color of law, interferes by threat, 

intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, 

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intimidation, or coercion” with a right secured by federal or 

state law. Id. § 52.1(a). Section 52.1 was originally adopted 

in response to a rise in hate crimes, but it is not limited to 

such crimes, nor does it require plaintiffs to demonstrate 

discriminatory intent. Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. 

4th 820, 843 (2004) (holding that “plaintiffs need not allege 

that defendants acted with discriminatory animus or intent, so 

long as those acts were accompanied by the requisite threats, 

intimidation, or coercion.”).

Generally, establishing an excessive force claim under 

the Fourth Amendment also satisfies the elements of section 52.1. 

See Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (“The City defendants concede in their briefs to us 

that a successful claim for excessive force under the Fourth 

Amendment provides the basis for a successful claim under Section 

52.1.”); Cameron v. Craig, 713 F.3d 1012, 1022 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(“Cameron asserts no California right different from the rights 

guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment, so the elements of the 

excessive force claim under Section 52.1 are the same as under § 

1983.”); Bender v. County of Los Angeles, 217 Cal. App. 4th 968, 

978 (2d Dist. 2013) (holding that where an arrest is unlawful and 

excessive force is applied in making the arrest, there has been 

coercion in violation of the Bane Act); cf. Venegas, 32 Cal. 4th 

at 843 (“We need not decide here whether section 52.1 affords 

protections to every tort claimant, for plaintiffs in this case 

have alleged unconstitutional search and seizure violations 

extending far beyond ordinary tort claims.”). Accordingly, 

because granting summary judgment to either party is 

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inappropriate with respect to plaintiff’s unlawful arrest and 

excessive force claims, so too will the court deny those motions 

with respect to plaintiff’s section 52.1 claim. 

Defendants contend that even if the officers used 

excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, they are 

immune from a Bane Act claim because their use of force was 

privileged pursuant to California Penal Code sections 835 and 

835a. Section 835 provides that “[t]he person arrested may be 

subjected to such restraint as is reasonable for his arrest and 

detention.” Cal. Pen. Code § 835. Section 835a provides that an 

officer may use reasonable force to effect an arrest, to prevent 

escape, or to overcome resistance. Id. § 835a. The court has 

already determined that genuine issues of material fact remain as 

to the reasonableness of force used by the officers. Therefore, 

at this stage the officers are not entitled to immunity under 

sections 835 and 835a. 

b. Assault, Battery, False Arrest, and Negligence 

Claims

For his assault and battery claims under California 

law, plaintiff must prove that the force used by the police 

officers was unreasonable. See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 

1116, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Under California law, a plaintiff 

bringing a battery claim against a law enforcement official has 

the burden of proving the officer used unreasonable force.”). 

The court finds no difference between this reasonable analysis 

and that which it previously performed in the Fourth Amendment 

context. See Hayes v. County of San Diego, 57 Cal. 4th 622, 632 

(2013) (holding reasonableness must be determined under the 

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totality of the circumstances and quoting the § 1983 case Graham, 

490 U.S. at 396, for the proposition that the use of force must 

be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the 

scene). 

Similarly, plaintiff’s false arrest10 and negligence 

claims11 turn on the reasonableness of the officers’ decision to 

arrest plaintiff for driving under the influence. Because 

genuine issues of material fact remain as to the reasonableness 

of the arrest, the court will deny both parties’ motions for 

summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s state-law claims for 

assault, battery, false arrest, and negligence. 

 

10 “In California, false arrest is a species of the tort 

of false imprisonment.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 

463, 486 n.15 (9th Cir. 2007). It is the “nonconsensual, 

intentional confinement of a person, without lawful privilege, 

for an appreciable length of time, however short.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). An officer is not liable 

for false arrest where he “had reasonable cause to believe the 

arrest was lawful.” Id. at 469 (quoting Cal. Pen. Code § 

847(b)). As discussed, there is a genuine dispute as to whether 

Officers Plumb and Brame had reasonable cause to believe 

arresting plaintiff for a DUI was supported by probable cause.

11 For his negligence claim, plaintiff must show the 

officers used unreasonable force under the circumstances. See

Atkinson v. County of Tulare, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1211 (E.D. 

Cal. 2011) (Wanger, J.) (“Plaintiff’s claim for negligence and 

battery flow from the same facts as the alleged Fourth Amendment 

Violation for excessive force and are measured by the same 

reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment.”) (citing Edson 

v. City of Anaheim, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1272-73 (4th Dist. 

1998)); Munoz v. City of Union City, 120 Cal. App. 4th 1077, 1102 

n.6 (1st Dist. 2004), disapproved of on other grounds by Hayes v. 

County of San Diego, 57 Cal. 4th 622, 627-28 (2013); Carter v. 

City of Carlsbad, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1164 (S.D. Cal. 2011) 

(“Negligence claims stemming from allegations of excessive force 

by a police officer are also analyzed under the Fourth 

Amendment’s reasonableness standard.”). 

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c. Elder Abuse

The Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act

(“EDACPA”) proscribes “[p]hysical abuse, neglect, financial 

abuse, abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment with 

resulting physical harm or pain or mental suffering” of an 

individual over the age of 65. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§

15610.07, 15610.27. The California legislature’s express intent 

in enacting the EDACPA was to protect elders and dependent adults 

from abuse, because it recognized that the vulnerability of that 

segment of the population places it at great risk of abuse by 

families and caretakers. See id. § 15600.

Neither the Ninth Circuit nor the California courts 

have ruled on the issue of whether the EDACPA applies to law 

enforcement taking custody of individuals over the age of 65. 

Courts in this district have held that EDACPA does not apply to 

law enforcement’s conduct toward an arrestee, reasoning that 

EDACPA was intended for deliberate, consistent caretakers, not 

for limited encounters with law enforcement. See Berman v. Sink, 

Civ. No. 2:13-597 LJO SAB, 2013 WL 2360899, at *17 (E.D. Cal. May 

29, 2013) (“This Court is unconvinced that an elderly person’s 

contact with law enforcement equates to actionable abuse under 

the Elder Abuse Act given the [Act’s] emphasis to remedy wrongs 

by ‘deliberate consistent caretakers.’”); Pirritano v. City of 

Redding, Civ. No. 2:08-1488 MCE KJM, 2010 WL 716235, at *4 (E.D. 

Cal. Mar. 1, 2010). The court finds this reasoning persuasive, 

particularly because law enforcement personnel are not among the 

“care custodians” listed in the Act. See id. § 15610.17. The 

court will therefore grant defendants’ motion for summary 

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judgment on this claim. 

D. ADA/Rehabilitation Act against defendants CHP and State 

of California

Plaintiff brings claims under Title II of the American 

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) 

against the California Highway Patrol and the State of 

California. (See FAC ¶¶ 63-74.) Both Title II of the ADA and 

the RA proscribe discrimination on the basis of disability by 

state or local governments or their instrumentalities, although 

the RA applies specifically to programs receiving federal 

funding.

12 See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 794(b). 

Public entities are vicariously liable for the acts of their 

employees under both acts. See Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 

F.3d 1124, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001). “There is no significant 

difference in analysis of the rights and obligations created by 

the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.” Zukle v. Regents of Univ. 

of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n.11 (9th Cir. 1999). Therefore, 

the court will apply the same analysis to claims under both 

statutes. 

Under Title II of the ADA, “no qualified individual 

with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be 

excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the 

services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be 

 

12 Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply to claims 

under Title II of the ADA or the RA. See Phiffer v. Columbia 

River Corr. Inst., 384 F.3d 791, 792 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Dare 

v. California, 191 F.3d 1167 (holding Congress abrogated states’ 

immunity under Title II of the ADA)); Clark v. State of Cal., 123 

F.3d 1267, 1271 (1997) (holding that by accepting federal funds a 

state waives immunity under the RA). 

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subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 

12132. “Discrimination includes a failure to reasonably 

accommodate a person’s disability.” Sheehan v. City & County of 

San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2014).

Recently, the Ninth Circuit held that the ADA applies 

to arrests, siding with the majority of circuits. See id. at 

1232. The Supreme Court granted the Sheehan defendants’ petition 

of certiorari and will hear the case in March of this year. See

City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, ___U.S.___,___, 135 

S. Ct. 702 (2014). However, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is still 

binding on this court. See Sanders County Republican Cent. Comm.

v. Fox (recognizing a published Ninth Circuit decision 

constitutes binding authority which must be followed until it is 

overruled by a body that is competent to do so (citing Gonzalez 

v. Ariz., 677 F.3d 383, 389 n.4 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc))); see 

also Wicker v. McCotter, 798 F.2d 155, 158 (5th Cir. 1986) 

(holding that the fact that the Supreme Court grants certiorari 

does not alter authority of the circuit’s prior decisions).

The Ninth Circuit identified at least two types of 

Title II claims applicable to arrests: 

(1) wrongful arrest, where police wrongly arrest 

someone with a disability because they misperceive the 

effects of that disability as criminal activity; and 

(2) reasonable accommodation, where, although police 

properly investigate and arrest a person with a 

disability for a crime unrelated to that disability, 

they fail to reasonably accommodate the person’s 

disability in the course of investigation or arrest, 

causing the person to suffer greater injury or 

indignity in that process than other arrestees.

 

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Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232. Plaintiff proceeds under both 

theories.

1. Wrongful Arrest

To prevail on his wrongful arrest theory under the ADA, 

plaintiff must prove that (1) he was disabled; (2) the officers 

knew or should have known he was disabled; and (3) the officers 

arrested him because of legal conduct relating to his disability. 

See Holocomb v. Ramar, Civ. No. 1:13-1102 AWI SKO, 2013 WL 

5947621, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2013) (citing Gohier v. 

Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 1999)); Lewis v. Truitt, 

960 F. Supp. 175, 178 (S.D. Ind. 1997). Defendants do not 

dispute that plaintiff is disabled. (See Defs.’ Mot. at 41-42.) 

The court’s analysis will therefore focus on the second two 

elements.

In its § 1983 analysis, the court already found there 

is a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether Officers 

Brame and Plumb should have known plaintiff has disabilities

based on plaintiff’s statements regarding his stroke, his 

physical symptoms, including lack of balance, and his disabled 

license plate. Brame also saw plaintiff’s cane in the back of 

plaintiff’s car. (See id. at 180:3-9.) Although he made that 

discovery after plaintiff was handcuffed, this was still before 

plaintiff was taken to the CHP office. A reasonable jury could 

find these were sufficient clues for providing defendants with 

notice that plaintiff had a disability. 

Defendants argue that because the officers observed 

plaintiff driving dangerously and erratically, then their arrest 

of plaintiff was due to illegal conduct, and not legal conduct 

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related to his disability. (Defs.’ Mot. at 41-42.) However, a 

reasonable jury could conclude that defendants arrested plaintiff 

and continued to detain him at the highway patrol office not for 

driving erratically, but for driving under the influence. (See

Brame Dep. at 118:23-119:1.) The officers stated that several of 

plaintiff’s stroke-related disabilities played into their 

decision to arrest plaintiff for a D.U.I.--his lack of balance, 

slurred speech, constricted pupils, and his difficulty following 

Brame’s finger. (See id. at 109:14-110:3.) None of these 

physical characteristics constitute illegal conduct. It can 

therefore reasonably be concluded that defendants arrested 

plaintiff because of legal conduct related to his disability. 

See Jackson v. Inhabitants of Town of Sanford, Civ. No. 94-12, 

1994 WL 589617, at *6 (D. Me. Sept. 23, 1994) (denying 

defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim that 

he was unjustifiably arrested for driving under the influence due 

to stroke-related disabilities in violation of the ADA, reasoning 

that the “legislative history of the ADA demonstrates that 

Congress was concerned with unjustified arrests of disabled 

persons such as the plaintiff there”). Because it also remains 

disputed whether the officers reasonably should have known that 

plaintiff is disabled, summary judgment is appropriate for 

neither party on plaintiff’s wrongful arrest claim at this time.

2. Reasonable Accommodation Theory

Title II also subjects the officers to liability if 

they “fail[ed] to reasonably accommodate the [plaintiff’s]

disability in the course of investigation or arrest, causing the 

person to suffer greater injury or indignity in that process than 

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other arrestees.” Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232. “[The] plaintiff 

bears the initial burden of producing evidence of the existence 

of a reasonable accommodation,” and “[a] public entity may defeat 

a reasonable accommodation claim by showing ‘that making the 

modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the 

service, program, or activity.’” Id. at 1233. Plaintiff asserts 

defendants denied him the accommodation of permitting him to (1) 

remain unhandcuffed and (2) use his cane over the course of his 

arrest. (Pl.’s Mot. at 38-40.) 

“[A] public entity is on notice that an individual 

needs an accommodation when it knows that an individual requires 

one, either because that need is obvious or because the 

individual requests an accommodation.” Robertson v. Las Animas 

County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 500 F.3d 1185, 1198 (10th Cir. 2007). 

The parties dispute whether the officers were on notice that 

plaintiff required an accommodation. Plaintiff states he 

informed Brame that the reason he could not be handcuffed was 

because he “ha[d] no balance.” (Id. at 63:4-5.) Brame admits 

plaintiff asked for his cane as they were leaving to head to the 

CHP office, (Brame Dep. at 180:16-18), but plaintiff testified 

that Brame did not return the cane to plaintiff until much later, 

after they left the CHP office to book plaintiff at the jail, 

(Orr Dep. at 91:11-20). Brame, however, testified that plaintiff 

never mentioned that he could not balance without handcuffs and

instead stated that he did not want to be seen putting on 

handcuffs by his neighbors and friends driving down the freeway. 

(See Brame Dep. at 130.) Whether the officers were on notice 

that plaintiff required an accommodation is thus in dispute. 

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Assuming defendants were on notice of plaintiff’s need 

for an accommodation, the question becomes whether a jury could 

find that permitting plaintiff to stay out of handcuffs is 

reasonable. “[T]the question of what constitutes a reasonable 

accommodation under the ADA requires a fact-specific, 

individualized analysis of the disabled individual’s 

circumstances and the accommodations that might allow him to meet 

the program’s standards.” McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 

1259, 1270 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

Defendants argue that it is unreasonable to ask a law 

enforcement officer to place himself in danger by permitting an 

arrestee to be unrestrained during an arrest. (Defs.’ Mot. at 48-

49.) Because plaintiff was suspected of narcotic use and was 

physically combative, defendants argue it was especially 

unreasonable to expect the officers to permit plaintiff to travel 

with the officers without handcuffs. (Id.) From defendants’ 

characterizations of plaintiff’s threatening behavior, a 

reasonable jury could conclude that it would be unreasonable for 

the officers to permit plaintiff to not wear handcuffs while he 

was in custody. 

Other evidence suggests it would have been reasonable 

for the officers to permit plaintiff not to be restrained by 

handcuffs and use his cane. If what plaintiff states is true, 

and he requested that he not be handcuffed prior to becoming 

combative, (see Orr Dep. at 63:4-5), then a reasonable jury could 

conclude that his request may have been more reasonable. 

Furthermore, there is evidence that Officer Kelly later took off 

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plaintiff’s handcuffs without trouble. (Kelly Dep. at 16:9-14 

(Docket No. 54-4).) When they arrived at the CHP office, Kelly 

took plaintiff’s handcuffs off because plaintiff was having 

problems walking up the stairs. (Id.) She assisted plaintiff by 

holding onto his arm and during this time did not perceive 

plaintiff as a threat. (Id. at 17:13-23.) Kelly testified that 

she felt it was within her discretion to remove the handcuffs in 

this situation even though plaintiff was in custody. (Id. at 

19:3-7.) From these disputed facts--including whether or not 

plaintiff was combative with the officers--the court cannot 

conclude that a reasonable jury could not find one way or the 

other that permitting plaintiff to proceed in custody

unhandcuffed with the use of his cane was reasonable. 

Whether plaintiff suffered injury or indignity from the 

officers’ alleged failure to accommodate is also in dispute. 

Plaintiff testified, “I can walk without a cane, but a cane is my

best friend,” and “without the cane, I stagger. With the cane, I 

don’t stagger as much, but I still stagger a little.” (Orr Dep. 

at 26:23-24, 27:12-14.) Plaintiff also testified that while 

handcuffs would not impair his ability to walk, he would be 

unable to get into the patrol car without use of his hands. (Id.

at 64:6-13.) Although there is no evidence of how plaintiff 

fared entering and exiting the police car, a genuine dispute of 

fact remains as to whether plaintiff suffered “greater injury or

indignity than other arrestees” while in handcuffs without the 

use of his cane. See Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232.

With so many facts in dispute, from which a reasonable 

jury could or could not conclude that CHP and the State of 

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California violated Title II by not offering plaintiff a 

reasonable accommodation, summary judgment is inappropriate on 

plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation claim. 

It is THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED with respect 

to plaintiff’s Section 51.7 and Elder Abuse claims and DENIED 

with respect to all other claims.

It is FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, DENIED in all 

respects.

Dated: February 25, 2015

 

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