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Parties Involved:
Haitham Yousef Alhindi
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-10595

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

HAITHAM YOUSEF ALHINDI, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 9:22-cr-80085-AMC-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-10595

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JORDAN and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:

This appeal requires us to decide whether intervening orders that changed the statutory basis for a defendant’s custodial 

hospitalization and dismissed his underlying indictment render this 

appeal moot. After Haitham Alhindi was arrested for cyberstalking, 

18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A), the district court found him incompetent 

to stand trial and ordered him to undergo evaluative hospitalization for not more than four months, see id. § 4241(d)(1). Nearly 

eight months later, Alhindi challenged his confinement for exceeding the time limit under section 4241(d)(1) and for violating the 

Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V. The district court denied Alhindi’s motion and extended his confinement. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 4241(d)(2)(A). While this appeal of that order was pending, the 

government commenced a civil-commitment proceeding against

Alhindi in the Eastern District of North Carolina, id. § 4246. The 

district court in the criminal action then ruled that Alhindi’s capacity was unrestorable and dismissed his superseding indictment. Because Alhindi is now confined under a statutory authority different 

from the one he challenges on appeal and is no longer under indictment, we cannot provide him meaningful relief. We dismiss this 

appeal as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

In May 2022, Alhindi was arrested for cyberstalking after 

making violent threats to a former coworker. A magistrate judge 

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ordered that Alhindi be detained pretrial due to his “serious impulse control and anger management issues” and “strong indications of mental illness and delusion.” Seeid. § 3142. On June 7, 2022, 

a grand jury in the Southern District of Florida indicted Alhindi on 

one count of cyberstalking. See id. § 2261A(2)(A). A superseding indictment entered on December 13, 2022, extended the charges to 

five counts of cyberstalking.

On July 14, 2022, Alhindi’s counsel requested that the district 

court evaluate his competency because of concern that he “may be 

suffering from paranoid delusions rendering him unable to assist in 

his own defense.” The next day, the district court granted that request and instructed the Federal Bureau of Prisons to complete a 

psychological examination and to prepare a report on its findings 

by August 26, 2022. Capacity and quarantine issues in the prison 

system delayed the submission of this report.

On November 28, 2022, the district court held a hearing and 

found Alhindi incompetent to stand trial. It issued a commitment 

order under section 4241(d) for Alhindi to “undergo competencyrestoration treatment at a medical facility.” It ruled that Alhindi 

was to be “hospitalized for treatment in a suitable facility for such 

a reasonable time, not to exceed four months from the date of this 

Order.” And it directed that Alhindi “be placed into a Federal Medical Facility either in or as close to Florida as possible.”

On February 27, 2023, upon learning that a backlog at Federal Medical Center Butner in North Carolina had prevented the 

Bureau from hospitalizing Alhindi, the district court sua sponte

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ordered the Bureau to “forthwith hospitalize” Alhindi “for treatment at a suitable facility . . . , as it was ordered to do in the November 28, 2022 Competency Order.”

On April 13, 2023, Alhindi moved to dismiss his indictment. 

He argued that his continued detention violated section 4241(d) because that statute only allows hospitalization “for such a reasonable 

period of time, not to exceed four months” to determine whether he 

would attain competency soon. Id. § 4241(d)(1) (emphasis added). 

He also contended that his detention violated the Due Process 

Clause.

On April 21, 2023, the district court denied Alhindi’s motion 

to dismiss his indictment and directed the Bureau to commence 

evaluative hospitalization of Alhindi by July 1, 2023. It rejected 

Alhindi’s argument that his continued detention violated section 4241(d), explaining that the four-month time limit does not 

start until the hospitalization begins. And it rejected his argument 

that it violated his right to due process because “this is not a record 

of indefinite or unreasonably prolonged detention.” Alhindi timely 

filed an interlocutory appeal challenging that order.

On June 21, 2023, Alhindi arrived at Federal Medical Center 

Butner for his evaluative hospitalization. On July 19, 2023, the district court entered an order that the Bureau’s final report on 

whether Alhindi’s competency could be restored was due by October 11, 2023, and that, under section 4241(d)(1), Alhindi’s evaluative hospitalization would end on October 18, 2023.

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On October 4, 2023, the Bureau submitted the competency 

report. The report noted that Alhindi repeatedly declined offers to 

take medication and participate in psychological testing, which 

meant that some forms of the competency evaluation were “unable to be completed.” It diagnosed Alhindi with delusional disorder 

of a persecutory type and concluded that he was incompetent. But 

it opined that “there is likely a substantial probability that Mr. 

Alhindi’s competency to stand trial can be restored with appropriate treatment with antipsychotic medication.”

On October 13, 2023, the district court held a status hearing 

to address next steps in the light of the competency report. At this 

hearing, the government announced that it intended to seek involuntary medication of Alhindi as an attempt to restore his competency.

On February 15, 2024, almost eight months after his evaluative hospitalization began, Alhindi filed a motion arguing that his 

hospitalization was “unlawful and unconstitutional.” He argued 

that the four-month period for his evaluative hospitalization under 

section 4241(d)(1) expired on October 21, 2023, and that he could 

not be hospitalized under section 4241(d)(2)(A) either because the 

district court did not make a determination that “there is a substantial probability that within such additional period of time [Alhindi] 

will attain . . . capacity.” Id. § 4241(d)(2)(A). He also argued that his 

continued hospitalization violated the Due Process Clause.

On February 21, 2024, the district court denied Alhindi’s motion. It stated that “[t]o the extent there is a need on this record for 

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an additional Court finding, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4142(d)(2)(A), 

that there is a substantial probability that [Alhindi] will attain the 

capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward, the Court hereby 

makes that finding.” And it ordered the Bureau to hospitalize 

Alhindi “for treatment in a suitable facility for an additional reasonable period of time.” Alhindi timely filed an interlocutory appeal 

challenging this order.

On April 1, 2024, this Court resolved Alhindi’s first interlocutory appeal. See United States v. Alhindi, 97 F.4th 814 (11th Cir. 

2024). We affirmed the initial hospitalization order after concluding that the four-month time limit applies to the period of hospitalization, not the time of commitment. Id. at 824–26.

On May 9, 2024, the district court denied the government’s 

request to involuntarily medicate Alhindi. The next day, the government filed a Certificate of Mental Disease or Defect and Dangerousness in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. See 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). That district encompasses Federal Medical Center Butner, where Alhindi remains 

committed.

On May 16, 2024, the government requested that the district 

court in Florida enter an order finding Alhindi incompetent and unrestorable, which would trigger the start of civil-commitment proceedings under section 4246 in North Carolina. On May 20, 2024, 

the district court granted the government’s request. It found 

Alhindi “not competent to proceed in this instant matter and not 

restorable.”

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24-10595 Opinion of the Court 7

On July 22, 2024, Alhindi moved for immediate release and 

dismissal of the superseding indictment in the original district 

court. He argued that the district court had exhausted all options

under section 4241 and that his continued hospitalization violated 

the Due Process Clause. On July 30, 2024, the government responded that the district court should deny Alhindi’s motion. It also 

explained that “[a] dismissal of the Superseding Indictment would 

have no affect [sic] on his detention status in the [Eastern District 

of North Carolina] so long as the dismissal was ‘solely for reasons 

related to the mental condition of the person.’”

On August 23, 2024, the district court dismissed the superseding indictment without prejudice “for reasons related to 

[Alhindi]’s mental condition.” It stated that “[t]he dismissal of the 

Superseding Indictment precludes continued detention of [Alhindi]

pursuant to the Superseding Indictment in this case.” But it recognized that a stay of release remained in effect in the civil-commitment proceeding in North Carolina. It explained that dismissal was 

not statutorily required but that there was also “no realistic possibility” that Alhindi “will be restored to competency sufficient to 

stand trial on the pending charges.” And it directed the clerk to 

close the case and terminate all pending motions.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review jurisdictional questions, including the mootness

of an appeal, de novo. Vital Pharms., Inc. v. Alfieri, 23 F.4th 1282, 1288 

(11th Cir. 2022).

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8 Opinion of the Court 24-10595

III. DISCUSSION

Under Article III of the Constitution, our jurisdiction as a 

federal court is limited to “[c]ases” and “[c]ontroversies.” U.S.

CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. There are “three strands of justiciability 

doctrine—standing, ripeness, and mootness—that go to the heart 

of the Article III case or controversy requirement.” Harrell v. Fla. 

Bar, 608 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 2010) (alteration adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The third, mootness, 

bars us from adjudicating appeals that “no longer present[] a live 

controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful 

relief.” Christian Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. United States, 662 F.3d 1182, 

1189 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This jurisdictional bar applies “at all stages of the litigation.” 

BankWest, Inc. v. Baker, 446 F.3d 1358, 1364 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted).

This appeal turns on whether two intervening orders prevent us from remedying the violations that Alhindi alleges. As we 

have explained, “[i]f events that occur subsequent to the filing of a 

lawsuit or an appeal deprive the court of the ability to give the 

plaintiff or appellant meaningful relief, then the case is moot and 

must be dismissed.” Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th 

Cir. 2001). Alhindi was hospitalized under section 4241(d) when he 

commenced this appeal, but he is now hospitalized under section 4246 after the district court found that his competency was unrestorable. And the district court later dismissed the superseding 

indictment against Alhindi “for reasons related to [his] mental condition.” To determine whether we can offer Alhindi any 

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24-10595 Opinion of the Court 9

“meaningful relief” in the light of these developments, id., we must 

examine the interplay between a competency evaluation and restoration process under section 4241 and a civil-commitment proceeding under section 4246.

Section 4241(d) provides two authorities for involuntary 

hospitalization of a mentally incompetent defendant awaiting trial 

on a criminal charge. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). Section 4241(d)(1) establishes that a defendant can be hospitalized for “such a reasonable 

period of time, not to exceed four months” to evaluate whether 

there is a “substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he 

will attain . . . capacity.” Id. § 4241(d)(1). And section 4241(d)(2) 

permits further hospitalization for an “additional reasonable period 

of time” until “his mental condition is so improved that trial may 

proceed” if “the court finds that there is a substantial probability 

that within such additional period of time he will attain . . . capacity.” Id. § 4241(d)(2). Section 4241(d) directs that “[i]f, at the end of 

the time period specified, it is determined that the defendant’s mental condition has not so improved as to permit the proceedings to 

go forward, the defendant is subject to the provisions of sections 4246 and 4248.” Id. § 4241(d).

Section 4246 governs the process for how a hospitalized defendant can be civilly committed. See id. § 4246. A person in custodial hospitalization who suffers from a mental defect can qualify if 

his “sentence is about to expire,” he “has been committed to the 

custody of the Attorney General pursuant to section 4241(d),” or 

“all criminal charges [against him] have been dismissed solely for 

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reasons related to the mental condition of the person.” Id.

§ 4246(a). The person must also be “presently suffering from a 

mental disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious 

damage to property of another,” and “suitable arrangements for 

State custody and care of the person [must] not [be] available.” Id.

Upon the government’s filing of a certificate attesting that these 

requirements are met, the filing “shall stay the release of the person 

pending completion of procedures contained in this section.” Id.

Based on these provisions, two intervening orders have foreclosed our ability to grant Alhindi relief in this appeal. Alhindi 

ceased being subject to competency-restoration treatment under 

section 4241(d)(2)(A) when the district court issued the order finding Alhindi “not competent to proceed in this instant matter and 

not restorable.” Since then, Alhindi’s confinement has been based 

on a different statutory source: a civil-commitment certificate under section 4246. We cannot give Alhindi “meaningful relief” from 

that commitment because it is the subject of a separate civil proceeding in the Eastern District of North Carolina. Al Najjar, 273 

F.3d at 1336.

In other situations where new statutory bases superseded 

the original bases for orders challenged on appeal, we have held 

that the appeals of the original orders were moot. In Al Najjar v. 

Ashcroft, for example, we held that an appeal of an order releasing 

an alien on bond became moot when an intervening affirmance of 

a deportation order gave the Attorney General the “plain and 

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unmistakable power” to detain him under a different statutory provision. Id. at 1332, 1338–40. And in De La Teja v. United States, we 

held that an appeal of a pre-removal detention order became moot

when an intervening final removal order detained an alien “pursuant to a wholly different statute.” 321 F.3d 1357, 1361–63 (11th Cir. 

2003). Although these decisions did not involve section 4241(d), 

their logic applies with equal force in this appeal. Because Alhindi’s 

current commitment is authorized by section 4246, not section 4241(d), this appeal is moot.

The dismissal of the superseding indictment confirms that 

this appeal is moot. The district court made clear that “[t]he dismissal of the Superseding Indictment precludes continued detention of 

[Alhindi] pursuant to the Superseding Indictment in this case.” So 

the order that Alhindi challenges in this appeal lacks any remaining 

legal effect. The district court no longer has an action pending 

against Alhindi. And the only court with jurisdiction over a “live 

controversy” related to Alhindi’s current commitment is the district court in North Carolina. Christian Coal., 662 F.3d at 1189 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because courts “are 

not in the business of pronouncing that past actions which have no 

demonstrable continuing effect were right or wrong,” we must dismiss this appeal. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18 (1998).

IV. CONCLUSION

We DISMISS this appeal as moot.

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24-10595 JORDAN, J., Concurring 1

JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring in the Judgment:

I agree with the court that this appeal is moot, and for me 

mootness results from the combined effect of two intervening 

events. The first is that Mr. Alhindi is now the subject of a civil 

commitment proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 4246 and is no longer 

being held under 18 U.S.C. § 4241. The second is that the indictment against him in the criminal case—from which this appeal 

arises—has been dismissed due solely to his mental condition. 

Mr. Alhindi argues that his appeal is not moot under the reasoning of United States v. Carrington, 91 F.4th 252 (4th Cir. 2024). 

Because the court does not address Carrington, I write separately to 

explain why that case does not save this appeal from dismissal on 

mootness grounds.

In Carrington, the Fourth Circuit explained in part that in a 

case like this one—where there is a competency evaluation in a 

criminal case in one district pursuant to § 4241 and a simultaneous 

civil commitment proceeding in another district pursuant to 

§ 4246—“[a]ny challenges to delays in prior periods of custody, or 

to the criminal court’s authority to issue the operative custody order, must be raised in the criminal court itself.” Id. at 259. “In effect, this means that the civil-commitment court may only hear 

challenges to the period of custody that immediately precedes the 

civil-commitment proceeding.” Id. See also id. at 261 (explaining 

that if a defendant does not challenge § 4241 delays in the criminal 

court he cannot “revive them in a challenge to the civil-commitment certificate’s validity”) (emphasis removed).

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2 JORDAN, J., Concurring 24-10595

As Mr. Alhindi reads Carrington, his current appeal before us 

is not moot because his challenges to the additional period of time 

he was in § 4241 custody—without an appropriate order finding a 

substantial probability that he could be restored to competency—

can and should be resolved in this appeal. If we conclude, for example, that the district court did not have the authority to enter the 

February 21, 2024, order, he believes that he could present our decision to the civil commitment court in the Eastern District of 

North Carolina and ask it to rule that at the time the civil commitment proceeding was instituted he was not properly “in the custody of the Attorney General” pursuant to § 4241(a).

The Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Carrington—including its explanation of how §§ 4241 and 4246 work—makes sense to me. But 

Carrington does not prevent this appeal from being moot. First, as 

the court explains, we cannot order Mr. Alhindi released from custody under § 4241 because he is no longer being held under that 

statute; he is instead being held pursuant to § 4246 (which stays his 

release pending the resolution of the civil commitment proceeding). Second, we have no jurisdiction over anyone in North Carolina who currently has custody of him. Third, the criminal indictment against him in this case has been dismissed, so there is no 

longer an underlying matter in which we could give him effective 

relief. 

A person need not be in the custody of the Attorney General 

pursuant to § 4241 in order for the government (through the director of the facility holding the person) to file a civil commitment 

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24-10595 JORDAN, J., Concurring 3

certificate. The government can also file such a certificate if the 

person is one “against whom all criminal charges have been dismissed solely for reasons related to [his] mental condition[.]” 

§ 4246(a). And that is now Mr. Alhindi’s situation. 

The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have persuasively held that 

the eligibility conditions set out in § 4246(a) constitute an element 

of the civil commitment case and do not go to the subject-matter 

jurisdiction of the civil commitment court. See United States v. 

Curbow, 16 F.4th 92, 117 (4th Cir. 2021); United States v. Ryan, 52 

F.4th 719, 722 (8th Cir. 2022). It seems to me that if we were to 

hold—as Mr. Alhindi wants us to—that the district court in his 

criminal case did not have the authority to enter the February 21, 

2024, order, then the government (through the director of the facility holding Mr. Alhindi) could simply amend the civil commitment certificate (or file a new certificate) to allege that Mr. 

Alhindi—instead of being a person who was in the custody of the 

Attorney General pursuant to § 4241—is now a person against 

whom all criminal charges have been dismissed solely because of 

his mental condition. See § 4246(a). And that would leave Mr. 

Alhindi in the same position he is in today: in custody pursuant to 

§ 4246 pending resolution of the civil commitment proceeding in 

the Eastern District of North Carolina. This is, unfortunately, one 

of those cases where “it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 

U.S. 165, 172 (2013).

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