Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-07-04170/USCOURTS-ca10-07-04170-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Colleen Lasater
Appellee
Shirley Morrison
Appellee
Connie Roska
Appellant
James Roska
Appellant
Melinda Sneddon
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

CONNIE ROSKA; JAMES ROSKA, on 

behalf of minor children Rusty 

and Jessica Roska, and Maria Stewart, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants/Cross-

 Appellees, 

v. 

MELINDA SNEDDON; SHIRLEY 

MORRISON; COLLEEN LASATER, 

 Defendants - Appellees/Cross-

 Appellants. 

CONNIE ROSKA, on behalf of minor 

children Rusty and Jessica Roska, and 

Maria Stewart; JAMES ROSKA, on behalf 

of minor children Rusty and Jessica Roska, 

and Maria Stewart, 

 Plaintiffs – Appellants/Cross-

 Appellees, 

v. 

MELINDA SNEDDON; SHIRLEY 

MORRISON; COLLEEN LASATER; 

CRAIG T. PETERSON; DAN CHOATE; 

DARLA RAMPTON, 

 Defendants – Appellees/Cross-

 Appellants. 

No. 07-4170 

(D. Utah) 

(D.C. No. 2:99-CV-112-DAK) 

07-4288 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

February 23, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT1

Before HARTZ, EBEL, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel concludes that oral 

argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. 

P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This case is submitted for decision without oral 

argument. 

This case is burdened with an extensive procedural history. The Roska family2

(the Roskas) brought suit against various social workers from the Utah Division of Child 

and Family Services (Social Workers) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the removal 

of twelve-year-old Rusty Roska from the family home. Numerous district court hearings 

and several appeals culminated in a trial to determine the parents’ damages on their 

procedural due process claims. At issue here is whether the Roskas waived their 

substantive due process claims and the Roskas children’s procedural due process claims 

in their first appeal. They also challenge the validity of the Social Workers’ offer of 

judgment. We affirm. 

 1

 This order and judgment is an unpublished decision, not binding precedent. 10th 

Cir. R. 32.1(A). Citation to unpublished decisions is not prohibited. Fed. R. App. 32.1. 

It is appropriate as it relates to law of the case, issue preclusion and claim preclusion. 

Unpublished decisions may also be cited for their persuasive value. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 

Citation to an order and judgment must be accompanied by an appropriate parenthetical 

notation B (unpublished). Id. 

2

 The plaintiffs are parents Connie and James Roska and their children, Rusty 

Roska, Jessica Roska, and Maria Stewart. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

The Roskas initiated their suit over ten years ago in October 1999. A detailed 

rendition of the facts are found in Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2003) 

(Roska I), and Roska v. Sneddon, 437 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 2006) (Roska II). Suffice it to 

say the Roskas claimed the Social Workers violated numerous constitutional rights when 

they removed Rusty from the family home without providing notice or a pre-removal 

hearing. 

The Social Workers submitted their first offer of judgment on June 26, 2000. It 

stated in relevant part: 

Pursuant to Rule 68(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants, 

offer judgment to be taken against them jointly by plaintiffs in the amount 

of Five Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($5,000) and offer judgment to be 

taken against them jointly for an additional sum for accrued costs and 

reasonable attorney fees recoverable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, to be 

determined by the Court. This offer is made in consideration for a 

dismissal of the above captioned lawsuit. 

(Appellants’ Appx. at 203.) They made similar offers in March 2006 for $100,000 and 

May 2006 for $200,000. 

In February 2001, the district court granted summary judgment to the Social 

Workers on all claims, concluding they were entitled to qualified immunity. The Roskas 

appealed. We affirmed the dismissal of a majority of the claims but held the “plaintiffs . . 

. sufficiently alleged a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process 

rights” and “clearly established law plainly put defendants on notice that their conduct 

violated the Constitution.” Roska I, 328 F.3d at 1246, 1250. We based our holding on 

Malik v. Arapahoe County Dep’t. of Social Servs., 191 F.3d 1306, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999) 

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(“[I]t [is] clearly established law that, except in extraordinary circumstances, a parent has 

a liberty interest in familial association and privacy that cannot be violated without 

adequate pre-deprivation procedures.” (emphasis added)). We remanded the case to the 

district court, however, to consider an additional issue—whether the Social Workers’ 

reliance on certain Utah statutes or the advice of counsel rendered their actions 

objectively reasonable and thus entitled them to qualified immunity. Id. at 1252-53. 

On remand, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district 

court held neither the Social Workers’ reliance on the Utah statutes nor their reliance on 

the advice of counsel rendered their conduct objectively reasonable and therefore, they 

were not entitled to qualified immunity on the parents’ claims. Roska v. Sneddon, 311 F. 

Supp. 2d 1307, 1316-17 (D. Utah 2004). However, it held they were entitled to qualified 

immunity on the children’s claims because “even if . . . children have liberty interests in 

their familial associations, that right would not have been clearly established at the time 

of the conduct in question. Accordingly, [the Social Workers] are entitled to qualified 

immunity from liability to the children.” Id. at 1317. All parties appealed. On May 13, 

2005, we dismissed the children’s appeal for lack of a final order. On February 9, 2006, 

we affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to the Social Workers on the parents’ 

claims. See Roska II, 437 F.3d at 967. 

The case again returned to the district court for a trial to determine damages. Prior 

to trial, the parties disputed which theories of liability remained and which damages 

could be assessed. The court rejected the Roskas’ contention that all plaintiffs had 

preserved both their substantive and procedural due process claims for trial. It 

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determined only the parents’ procedural due process claims had survived the appeal in 

Roska I. Roska v. Sneddon, No. 1:99CV112DAK, 2007 WL 1557418, at *2 (D. Utah 

May 25, 2007). 

At the completion of the trial, the jury found the parents had suffered no actual 

damages and awarded them a total of $2.00 in nominal damages. The Roskas moved for 

costs and attorney’s fees as the prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The district 

court granted the motion but determined the June 25, 2000 offer of judgment cut off their 

entitlement to fees and costs as of that date. It also determined the Roskas should 

reimburse the Social Workers for the costs they incurred after June 25, 2000, based on 

the offer of judgment on that date. Roska v. Sneddon, No. 1:99CV112DAK, 2007 WL 

4165750, at *4 (D. Utah Nov. 20, 2007). 

On appeal, the Roskas raise three issues: (1) their substantive due process claims 

were not waived in Roska I, (2) the district court erred in dismissing the children’s 

procedural due process claims on the basis of qualified immunity because the children’s 

protected interest was clearly established at the time of the constitutional violation, and 

(3) the Social Workers’ June 25, 2000 offer of judgment was insufficient to limit their 

award of attorney’s fees and costs and to require them to pay the Social Workers’ costs 

after that date. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Preservation of Claims

Claims not briefed and argued on appeal are waived. See Tran v. Trs. of State 

Colls. in Colo., 355 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Issues not raised in the opening 

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brief are deemed abandoned or waived.”). In Roska I, we considered the district court’s 

dismissal of all of the Roskas’ claims. Therefore, the only claims which remained were 

those the Roskas presented and argued on appeal in Roska I. 

On appeal in Roska I, the Roskas’ argument in support of their due process claims 

is repeated here in its entirety: 

II. THE LAW RESPECTING PLAINTIFFS’ FOURTEENTH 

AMENDMENT RIGHT TO FAMILIAL ASSOCIATION AND PRIVACY 

WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED ON MAY 29TH, 1999, SUCH THAT 

DEFENDANTS MORRISON, SNEDDON, PETERSON AND LASATER 

SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT PREDEPRIVATION PROCEDURES, 

OR EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES, WERE REQUIRED 

PRIOR TO REMOVING PLAINTIFF RUSTY ROSKA FROM HIS 

HOME AND FROM THE CUSTODY OF HIS PARENTS. 

According to the Court, Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim for 

violation of familial association and privacy depend upon establishing a 

Fourth Amendment violation. And since the Court concluded that 

Defendants relied upon the state statute, the Court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ 

claims. However, the Fourteenth amendment claim was well established on 

the date of the seizure, and is a separate claim from the Fourth Amendment. 

In Malik, the mother of a child who had been taken by state officials sued 

under § 1983 for, among other things, violation of her Fourteenth 

Amendment liberty interest in familial association and privacy. The 

defendants moved for summary judgment, and the trial court denied the 

motion. This Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty interest 

in familial association was: “clearly established law that, except in 

extraordinary circumstances, a parent has a liberty interest in familial 

association and privacy that cannot be violated without adequate predeprivation procedures.” Malik, 191 F.3d at 1315. In the case of Rusty 

Roska, there were no pre-deprivation procedures; Defendants didn’t even 

bother to get an ex parte order. Nor were there any “extraordinary 

circumstances.” Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ right to familial 

association, and the District Court dismissal of this claim should be 

reversed. 

(Appellees’ Supp. Appx. at 492-93 (record citation omitted).). 

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The question presented is whether the Roskas waived all but the parents’ 

procedural due process claims in Roska I because their argument referred only to the 

parents’ procedural due process rights. 

1. Substantive Due Process Claims 

A procedural due process claim is separate from a substantive due process claim. 

“In contrast to substantive due process claims, in procedural due process claims, the 

deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in ‘life, liberty, or 

property’ is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of 

such an interest without due process of law.” Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 

1020 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted). “To assess whether an individual was denied 

procedural due process, courts must engage in a two-step inquiry: (1) did the individual 

possess a protected interest such that the due process protections were applicable; and, if 

so, then (2) was the individual afforded an appropriate level of process.” BrammerHoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1209 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotations 

omitted). Substantive due process, however, “protects certain ‘fundamental liberty 

interests’ from deprivation by the government, regardless of the procedures provided, 

unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Chavez 

v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775 (2003) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has long 

recognized the right to familial relations as a component of substantive due process;3

 it is 

 3 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982) (“[U]ntil the state proves 

parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous 

termination of the natural relationship.”). 

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“the rubric under which the Supreme Court has addressed unenumerated rights under the 

Fourteenth Amendment.” Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1202 n.3 (10th Cir. 

2003). 

The Roskas’ argument in Roska I made no attempt to distinguish between these 

different claims, declining to mention substantive due process or cite to a case discussing 

such claims. Neither do the Roskas’ appellate briefs attempt to show how these claims 

were argued on appeal from the dismissal of their case. Rather, they argue substantive 

due process “was never at issue, until now.” (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 21.) This 

statement completely ignores the fact that all claims were at issue in Roska I. Therefore, 

while it may be possible to conjure Roskas’ substantive due process claim from the 

cavalier reference to “family association,” it is not our responsibility to write their 

argument for them. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 

(10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he court cannot take on the responsibility of serving as the litigant’s 

attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.”). The Roskas failed to 

specifically raise or argue substantive due process in Roska I and any claims thereunder 

were waived. 

2. The Children’s Procedural Due Process Claims 

The Roskas only citation in their brief in Roska I was to Malik, which does not 

address the children’s procedural due process rights expressly or by implication. The 

Roskas’ argument did not specifically address the children’s interest or argue in favor of 

extending our holding in Malik. Further, they cited no cases in which children were held 

to have a constitutionally protected procedural due process right under these 

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circumstances. Rather, the cases cited discussed only the parents’ rights to pre-removal 

process. Accordingly, Roska I addressed only the parents’ procedural due process rights. 

Following our decision in Roska I, the district court considered the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment on March 26, 2004. In considering the parties’ 

arguments on the children’s standing to bring a due process claim, raised by the Social 

Workers, the district court held: 

The cases cited by Defendants speak only of a parent’s right to familial 

association. However, they do not expressly limit such rights to only 

parents. Nonetheless, both parties agree that they can find no case law 

recognizing a child’s liberty interest in familial association. Therefore, 

even if this court were to hold that the children have liberty interests in their 

familial associations, that right would not have been clearly established at 

the time of the conduct in question. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to 

qualified immunity from liability to the children. 

Roska I, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 1317. On May 13, 2005, we dismissed the Roskas’ appeal 

from this decision, concluding the order granting immunity to the Social Workers on the 

children’s claims was not immediately appealable while claims remained pending in the 

district court. Therefore, the issue was not addressed in Roska II and was not waived by 

that appeal. 

On remand from our decision in Roska II, the Roskas filed a motion with the 

district court to set aside its order dismissing the children’s claims, arguing our 2006 

unpublished decision in Suasnavas v. Stover, 196 Fed. Appx. 647 (10th Cir. 2006) 

(unpublished), which relied on Trujillo v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 768 F.2d 1186 (10th 

Cir. 1985), held the children’s right to familial association had been clearly established 

since 1985. The motion did not distinguish the children’s procedural and substantive due 

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process claims. The Social Workers argued the court’s ruling granting qualified 

immunity on the children’s procedural due process claim should stand because the 

Roskas failed to cite any case law which clearly established such right and Suasnavas and 

Trujillo dealt only with substantive due process, not the children’s right to predeprivation procedure. In reply, the Roskas argued they were not required to argue the 

substantive and procedural claims separately to maintain both. Not surprisingly, they 

cited no case for this proposition. 

The district court held: 

[Social Workers] . . . contend that the children’s claims are foreclosed by 

the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in the first appeal. The first appeal was brought 

after Judge Benson had dismissed all of the claims in this case. Therefore, 

in the first appeal, the Tenth Circuit addressed each of Plaintiffs’ claims. 

The court’s discussion of Plaintiffs’ claim regarding a right to maintain a 

family relationship, which is the claim Plaintiffs now assert involves the 

children’s liberty interest in familial association, focused only on the 

procedural due process rights to notice and a hearing before the removal of 

a child. First, in finding that Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged a violation 

of their due process rights, the Tenth Circuit discussed only the right to a 

parent’s right to notice and hearing before a temporary removal of a child. 

Next, in determining that the law on this claim was clearly established, the 

court relied on Malik v. Arapahoe County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., in which the 

court held that it was “clearly established that, except in extraordinary 

circumstances, a parent has a liberty interest in familial association and 

privacy that cannot be violated without adequate pre-deprivation 

procedures.” The court did not address the claim as a substantive due 

process liberty interest or as a claim by the siblings. It also did not 

recognize whether the siblings would have a similar right to procedural due 

process before the removal of a sibling. The court agrees with Defendants 

that the only claim surviving the Tenth Circuit’s first decision was the 

parents’ procedural due process rights to notice and a hearing. 

Roska, 2007 WL 1557418, at *2. The district court also noted: 

The Tenth Circuit’s ruling is consistent with this court’s previous ruling 

that the children’s claims were not clearly established. Suasnavas involved 

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a substantive due process claim under Section 1983 whereas this case 

involves only a procedural due process claim. The Tenth Circuit clearly 

construed Plaintiffs’ claim to maintain a familial relationship as only a 

procedural due process claim. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Set Aside 

Order Dismissing Claims is denied. 

Id. at *3. 

On appeal, the Roskas’ opening brief again argued Suasnavas and Trujillo clearly 

established the children’s right to procedural due process. They maintained the existence 

of a substantive right automatically gives rise to a procedural right. They cited no law for 

this proposition and they did not address the district court’s holding this claim was 

waived because it was not raised in Roska I. Similarly, the Social Workers’ response did 

not argue the court’s determination should be affirmed because the children’s procedural 

argument was waived but because Suasnavas, an unpublished opinion, discussed 

substantive, not procedural, due process rights. Therefore, the Social Workers argued the 

court correctly held the children’s right to procedural due process was not clearly 

established. 

The district court correctly held that the Trujillo and Suasnavas4

 opinions did not 

clearly establish the law regarding a procedural due process claim because both cases 

dealt only with substantive due process. Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1187 (plaintiffs, mother and 

adult daughter, alleged the wrongful death of their adult son and brother while in prison 

 4

 “In determining whether the law was clearly established, . . . we may not rely 

upon unpublished decisions.” Green v. Post, 574 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2009). It appears, 

however, that we recently retreated from this rule as a definitive statement and may 

consider unpublished decisions to the extent they are “uncontroversial and establish no 

new precedent” and are given the persuasive effect of authority from another circuit. Id. 

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deprived them of their constitutional right of familial association); Suasnavas, 196 Fed. 

Appx. at 654 (recognizing the substantive due process right to familial association 

extended to a parent with respect to her child, a child with respect to her parents, and a 

grandparent with respect to his or her grandchildren.) Neither case discusses procedural 

rights or the adequacy of procedures because these issues are irrelevant to establish a 

substantive due process claim. The distinction between procedural due process and 

substantive due process claims may be best illustrated in footnote 5 of the Trujillo

decision where we noted: 

[T]he familial relationships in this case do not form the outer limits of 

protected intimate relationships. As the Court in [Roberts v. United States 

Jaycees] further explained, “a broad range of human relationships . . . may 

make greater or lesser claims to constitutional protection . . .,” requiring “a 

careful assessment of where a particular relationship’s objective 

characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the most 

attenuated of personal attachments.” 104 S. Ct. at 3251. Those 

characteristics which would indicate a protected association include 

smallness, selectivity, and seclusion. Id. at 3250. We need not make such 

an assessment here, since the relationships at issue clearly fall within the 

protected range. 

768 F.2d at 1189 n.5. Thus, difference between a substantive and procedural due process 

claim is distinguished by the scope of the parties who retain the requisite interest. All 

those with a recognized right to familial association do not necessarily have a protected 

interest in procedure. For example, merely because Suasnavas recognized a grandparent 

has a substantive right to familial association with a grandchild does not mean the same 

grandparent would have a separate and distinct procedural due process right apart from 

that of the parents prior to removal of the grandchild from the parents’ home. 

In their reply brief, the Roskas abandon their reliance on Suasnavas and, for the 

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first time, direct our attention to another unpublished decision, Burgess v. Houseman, 

where we stated: “A minor child ‘enjoys a liberty interest requiring that procedural due 

process accompany her confinement.’” 268 Fed. Appx. 780, 784 (10th Cir. 2008) 

(unpublished) (quoting J.B. v. Washington County, 127 F.3d 919, 925 (10th Cir. 1997)). 

Burgess concluded this right has been clearly established since 1997. Id. The Roskas

argue this case law requires us to reinstate the children’s procedural claims and remand 

for a new trial. In a sur-reply brief, the Social Workers urge us to ignore Burgess because 

it was wrongly decided and determine J.B. stated only an “abstract right” without 

discussing what procedures were required. (Appellees’ Sur-Reply Br. at 5.) Thus, J.B.

did not clearly establish a constitutional violation for the purposes of denying qualified 

immunity. We decline to engage in either analysis. 

The Roskas presentation of the case law supporting their argument is too little, too 

late. Even if the children’s procedural due process claims survived Roska I, the Roskas 

were required to give the district court an opportunity to determine whether the right was 

clearly established. Once the Social Workers raised the qualified immunity defense, the 

Roskas “carried the burden of showing both that a constitutional violation occurred and 

that the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” 

Green, 574 F.3d at 1300 (quotations omitted). Our discussion in J.B. was available to the 

Roskas throughout these proceedings which span over a ten-year period. They did not 

choose to apprise the district court of arguably relevant precedent nor did they cite to J.B.

in their previous appeals. Indeed, they waited until their reply brief to do so here and 

give no reason for their failure to address the matter in district court. We will not 

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consider what is tantamount to an entirely new argument submitted in a reply brief. 

United States v. Wayne, 591 F.3d 1326, 1332 (10th Cir. 2010) (an argument raised for the 

first time in a reply brief is waived). The district court did not err in concluding the 

Roskas failed to meet their burden to show the children’s procedural due process rights 

were clearly established, a prerequisite to the denial of qualified immunity. 

B. Rule 68 Offer of Judgment

At the time Defendants made their offer,5

 Rule 68 provided: 

At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending 

against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow 

judgment to be taken against the defending party for the money . . . 

specified in the offer, with costs then accrued . . . . If the judgment finally 

obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree 

must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer. 

“Under this scheme, the defendant can protect itself from the costs associated with 

protracted litigation by making a formal offer of judgment. If the final judgment is less 

than the settlement offer, the otherwise ‘prevailing’ plaintiff is precluded from recovering 

his post-offer costs.” Knight v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 3 F.3d 1398, 1404 (10th Cir. 

1993). “The plain purpose of Rule 68 is to encourage settlement and avoid litigation.” 

Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985). 

The language of an offer of judgment is construed according to ordinary contract 

principles. See Stubblefield v. Windsor Capital Grp., 74 F.3d 990, 992-92 (10th Cir. 

1996); Guerrero v. Cummings, 70 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1996); Goodheart Clothing 

 5

 Rule 68 was amended in 2007 and again in 2009. The changes are irrelevant for 

our purposes. See Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 68 advisory committee’s notes. 

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Co. v. Laura Goodman Enters., Inc., 962 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1992). The district 

court’s determination whether to grant costs under Rule 68 is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion and “its underlying factual findings for clear error.” First Nat’l Bank of Turley 

v. Fidelity & Deposit Ins. Co. of Md., 196 F.3d 1186, 1189 (10th Cir. 1999). 

The Roskas moved for an award of costs and attorney’s fees. Because 42 U.S.C. § 

1988(b) allows a prevailing plaintiff to recover attorney’s fees and costs from a defendant 

in a § 1983 action, the district court granted the Roskas’ request, but capped their 

recovery as of the date the Social Workers made their first Rule 68 offer of judgment. 

See Marek, 473 U.S. at 9 (“Since Congress expressly included attorney’s fees as ‘costs’ 

available to a plaintiff in a § 1983 suit, such fees are subject to the cost-shifting provision 

of Rule 68.”). The court determined the Roskas were liable for the Social Workers’ costs 

from that date. The Roskas contend the court erred because the Social Workers’ offer 

was not valid under Rule 68 for two reasons: (1) it was not an unconditional offer and (2) 

the failure to apportion the amount being offered to each individual plaintiff created an 

unacceptable ambiguity. 

1. Unconditional Offer 

The Roskas argue a Rule 68 offer of judgment “must specify a definite sum for 

which judgment may be entered, which plaintiff can either accept or reject. It must be 

unconditional and must include ‘costs then accrued.’” (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 27 

(quoting 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, 

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 3002 (1973)). They contend the 

June 25, 2000 offer was invalid because it conditioned the offer on dismissal of the case. 

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In response, the Social Workers claim it was not a “condition” but merely an affirmation 

the case would be over if the Roskas accepted the offer. The district court concluded the 

offer was valid, stating: 

Plaintiffs’ contention . . . has no specific support from case law . . . . A 

judgment essentially dismisses a case. The offer in this case allowed for 

judgment to be entered against Defendants and the case to be dismissed. 

The court typically enters judgment and closes the case. The court finds no 

appreciable difference between the dismissal of a case and the closing of a 

case. 

Roska, 2007 WL 4165750, at *2. 

On appeal, the Roskas maintain any condition in an offer of judgment renders the 

offer invalid for the purposes of Rule 68. This is simply not the law. See Lang v. Gates, 

36 F.3d 73, 75 (9th Cir. 1994) (a defense offer conditioned upon joint acceptance by both 

plaintiffs qualifies for Rule 68 treatment); see also Mite v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 106 

F.R.D. 434, 435 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (offer not defective on account of “no admission of 

liability” condition). The Roskas cite no case holding the inclusion of language 

conditioning an offer of judgment on dismissal invalidates an otherwise unambiguous 

offer. 

We must keep in mind the ultimate purpose of Rule 68—to promote the swift and 

effective resolution of a lawsuit. In this context, an unconditional offer means a definite 

and certain offer to pay for the plaintiff’s damages and accrued costs with the defendant’s 

clear agreement to allow judgment to enter against him or her. See Marek, 473 U.S. at 6 

(“[T]he offer [must] be one that allows judgment to be taken against the defendant for 

both the damages caused by the challenged conduct and the costs then accrued. In other 

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words, the drafters’ concern was not so much with the particular components of offers, 

but with the judgments to be allowed against defendants.”). In this case, the language of 

the offer stating it was made “in consideration for a dismissal” of the lawsuit, i.e., ending 

the entire litigation, serves to promote Rule 68’s purpose and does not impose a condition 

which would compromise a judgment being entered against the Social Workers or 

otherwise invalidate the offer. (Appellants’ Appx. at 203.) Applying general contract 

principles, the offer was clear and unconditional.6

2. Apportionment/Ambiguity 

The Roskas also claim the offer was ambiguous because it did not allocate the 

amounts intended to compensate each plaintiff. Several courts have held an offer of 

judgment which fails to apportion the offer among various plaintiffs creates an 

unacceptable ambiguity in the offer. See, e.g., Thomas v. Nat’l Football League Players 

Ass’n, 273 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 2001) (lump sum offer of judgment to multiple 

plaintiffs did not trigger Rule 68’s cost-shifting provision); Gavoni v. Dobbs House, Inc., 

164 F.3d 1071, 1075 (7th Cir. 1999) (unapportioned offer of judgment to multiple 

plaintiffs is not effective under Rule 68). 

These holdings are based on two considerations. The first relates to the position of 

 6

 Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. County of Albany, is an 

example of the type of condition which would invalidate a Rule 68 offer. 369 F.3d 91 

(2d Cir. 2004). There, the court held the offer of judgment was invalid because it was 

conditioned upon the approval of a proposed redistricting plan by the local legislative 

body. Id. at 95. It was therefore not an offer within normal contract principles because 

the plaintiff’s acceptance would not have created a contract without further action by the 

legislative body. Id.

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the plaintiff in evaluating a Rule 68 offer. Unlike other contracts, consequences flow 

from the rejection as well as the acceptance of a Rule 68 offer of judgment. See Gavoni, 

164 F.3d at 1076. Because “[a] judgment less favorable than the offer requires that a 

plaintiff pay the defendant’s usually substantial post-offer costs[,] [t]here must . . . be a 

clear baseline from which plaintiffs may evaluate the merits of their case relative to the 

value of the offer.” Id. When there are multiple plaintiffs, it may be difficult for an 

individual plaintiff to determine whether an unallocated offer is reasonable as to his or 

her individual claim. 

The second consideration concerns the court’s ability to determine whether the 

plaintiff receives a judgment less favorable than the Rule 68 offer. An unapportioned 

offer may cause uncertainty as to whether the actual judgment received by an individual 

plaintiff is less than plaintiff’s share of the offer. A court needs two easily comparable 

figures and should not attempt to apportion an offer in the first instance. See id. 

The district court recognized the Social Workers’ offer of judgment did not 

apportion the offer to each Roska family member but provided a lump sum for their 

claims. Nonetheless, the court concluded: 

This case finds no basis for determining that the Plaintiffs could not 

measure the value of the Defendants’ offer in relation to the merits of their 

individual claims. Plaintiffs were represented by the same attorney. If each 

Plaintiff had been represented by a different attorney then there may have 

been a problem with measuring the value of the offer as to each Plaintiff. 

But Plaintiffs’ attorney was in a better position than even the Defendants to 

evaluate the value of each of their claims 

. . . . 

Plaintiffs cannot escape the requirements of Rule 68 merely because they 

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gambled and lost. Rule 68 requires part[ies] to critically consider the value 

of their cases. If Rule 68 is interpreted too strictly or technically, it 

decreases its effectiveness of promoting settlement. 

Roska, 2007 WL 4165750, at *3. 

When determining whether an offer of judgment is valid, our primary concern is 

that “the offeree must know what is being offered in order to be responsible for refusing 

the offer.”7

 Arkla Energy Res. v. Roye Realty & Developing, Inc., 9 F.3d 855, 867 (10th 

Cir. 1993). In Arkla Energy, the parties disputed the non-delivery of gas under an 

installment contract. The defendant submitted an offer of judgment for 100,000 Mcf of 

gas. The plaintiff responded with a Motion to Clarify Offer of Judgment, citing the 

ambiguity and incompleteness of the offer, “due primarily to the uncertain value of the 

gas.” Id. Because the defendant never satisfactorily clarified the offer and “the 

ambiguity was critical,” we determined the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

refusing to award attorney’s fees under Rule 68. Id. 

Case law, however, does not go so far as to say a defendant must always apportion 

an offer between each plaintiff. See Harbor Motor Co. v. Arnell Chevrolet-Geo Inc., 265 

F.3d 638, 649 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e need not go so far as to conclude . . . that Rule 68 

 7

 The Kansas district court has stated it “believes that the Tenth Circuit would 

conclude that a Rule 68 offer made to multiple plaintiffs is not valid unless it provides 

individualized offers to each plaintiff.” Lintz v. Am. Gen. Finance, Inc., 76 F.Supp.2d 

1200, 1213 (D. Kan. 1999). Lintz involved two unrelated plaintiffs suing for workplace 

sexual harassment. Following trial, the jury found that both plaintiffs had been subjected 

to sexual harassment and further found defendants were liable. The jury awarded no 

damages to plaintiff Lintz, but awarded the second plaintiff $25,000 in compensatory 

damages. Under these circumstances, we agree the unallocated offer to the plaintiffs was 

not valid because the two plaintiffs were unable to evaluate the offer as it related to their 

individual claims. 

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always requires an exact delineation of the manner in which damages are to be 

apportioned among multiple parties.”). While the practice of allocating the offer as to 

each plaintiff may increase clarity and ensure the offer is valid, such requirement in every 

instance would place form over substance. 

Thus, the district court was not required, as a matter of law, to consider the Social 

Workers’ unallocated offer of judgment ineffective. Instead, it found as a matter of fact 

that the June 35, 2000 offer of judgment provided the Roskas sufficient specificity to 

intelligently evaluate the value of their individual claims against the amount offered. The 

court did not clearly err in so finding. 

The facts of this case are readily distinguished from those cases in which 

apportionment was necessary. For example, in Gavoni, three individual plaintiffs, 

Gavoni, Rosendale and Jordan, sued for injuries resulting from an elevator malfunction. 

174 F.3d at 1073. The plaintiffs sought $825,000 in damages: $230,000 for Gavoni, 

$320,000 for Rosendale and $275,000 for Jordan. Id. at 1074. The defendant offered a 

lump sum to the plaintiffs of $10,000. Id. The jury awarded Gavoni and Rosendale 

$2,000 each and Jordan $2,500. Id. The court held the defendant’s offer of judgment 

was invalid because, inter alia, “[t]he plaintiffs simply could not have evaluated the 

individualized values of the offer.” Id. at 1076. 

Unlike the plaintiffs in Gavoni (and other cases), the Roskas were not individuals 

with competing claims suing for separate physical injuries. This was a single family 

represented by one attorney, claiming mental and emotional damages arising from the 

same set of facts. Under these circumstances, the failure to apportion the offer does not 

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create a “potential [for] derivative litigation” over its division or the associated costs and 

attorney’s fees. Id. at 1077. Moreover, unlike the plaintiffs in Arkla Energy Resources, 

the Roskas did not notify the Social Workers that the offer appeared ambiguous nor did 

they request clarification. 

We are also mindful that the Roskas did not disclose their assessment of individual 

damages to the Social Workers at any point in this protracted litigation. Their Amended 

Complaint sought a collective judgment on their due process claim “in the amount of 

$5,000,000.00 for emotional and mental suffering, and $15,000,000.00 for punitive 

damages.” (Appellants’ Appx. at 51.) No further factual support or computation as to 

individual damages was provided, even though the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

require such disclosure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) (“[A] party must, without 

awaiting a discovery request, provide to the other parties: . . . a computation of each 

category of damages claimed by the disclosing party—who must also make available . . . 

documents or other evidentiary material . . . on which each computation is based, 

including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered.”). 

Finally, we note the Roskas did not state the offer made on June 25, 2000, was 

rejected because they could not assess its applicability to the individual claims. Rather, 

in their own words, “[the] offer of judgment was a token offer conditional upon dismissal 

of the Roska case. Had the Roskas accepted the offer, it is possible that the Court would 

have denied their request for attorney’s fees altogether, even though the offer agreed to 

pay them.” (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 34 (citing Fisher v. Kelly, 105 F.3d 350 (7th Cir. 

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1997).)8

 Thus, according to the Roskas, “[i]t would have been folly for [them] to have 

accepted the offer.” (Id.) This argument makes clear the Roskas were not interested in 

accepting the offer even if it allocated amounts to individuals. 

Under the facts of this case, the purposes of Rule 68 were fully and fairly met by 

the Social Workers’ offer of judgment. The Roskas were in a position to determine the 

value of each family member’s claim and intelligently assess the risks associated with 

rejecting the $5,000 offer. If there was any confusion, the Roskas could have asked for 

clarification. The $5,000 offer as compared to the $2.00 judgment provided precise 

figures for the district court to compare. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did 

not clearly err in finding the Roskas and their attorney were able to intelligently assess 

the offer and did not abuse its discretion in determining the Social Workers’ June 25, 

2000 offer of judgment was valid under Rule 68. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered by the Court: 

Terrence L. O’Brien 

United States Circuit Judge 

 8

 In Fisher, the plaintiff accepted a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment for “$7,500 plus 

costs accrued to date.” 105 F.3d at 352 (quotations omitted). The Court of Appeals 

upheld the district court’s denial of pre-offer attorney’s fees, holding the plaintiff was not 

entitled to fees because the defendant had acted gratuitously in the face of a “frivolous, 

unreasonable, or groundless” lawsuit. Id. at 353 (quotations omitted). We do not 

comment on the Fisher court’s holding but observe that unless the Roskas feared their 

lawsuit would be considered “frivolous, unreasonable or groundless,” they had no reason 

to fear their attorney’s fees and costs would be forfeited by their acceptance of the offer. 

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