Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00424/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00424-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Patricia L. LePage
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PATRICIA L. LePAGE,, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Defendant. 

No. 2:14-cv-424-EFB 

ORDER 

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying her applications for a period of disability and Disability Insurance 

Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the 

Social Security Act. The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment are pending. For the 

reasons discussed below, plaintiff’s motion is granted, the Commissioner’s motion is denied, and 

the matter is remanded for further proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, DIB and SSI, alleging that she had 

been disabled since November 1, 2007. Administrative Record (“AR”) 153-168. Her 

applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Id. at 65-74, 78-89. On August 2, 

2012, a hearing was held before administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Timothy Snelling. Id. at 33-

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57. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing, at which she and a vocational expert 

(“VE”) testified. Id. 

On September 14, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled 

under sections 216(i), 223(d) and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act.1 Id. at 19-28. The ALJ made the 

following specific findings: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through 

December 31, 2007. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 1, 2007, the 

alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., 416.971 et seq.). 

* * * 

 1

 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) is paid 

to disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Under both provisions, 

disability is defined, in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to 

“a medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 

1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 423(d)(1)(a), 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The 

following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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3. The claimant has the following severe combination of impairments: a history of 

congestive heart failure, atrial fibrillation, acute renal failure, myocardial infarction, deep 

venous thrombosis prophylaxis, a history of methamphetamine use, hypertension, diabetes 

mellitus, a history of cellulitis, idiopathic cardiomyopathy, and morbid obesity (20 CFR 

404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)). 

* * * 

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 

416.926). 

* * * 

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the residual 

functional capacity to perform a wide range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except that she can stand for only 2 hours in an 8-hour day 

and walk for only 2 hours in an 8-hour day. She can never climb ladders, ropes, and 

scaffolds. She is limited to occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, 

and climbing ramps and stairs. She should be allowed to alternate between standing and 

sitting every 2 hours. She should avoid concentrated exposure, i.e., intense, continuous, 

intractable, unremitting exposure, to hazards, such as dangerous machinery and 

unprotected heights 

* * * 

6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as an office clerk (DOT 

219.362-010; light exertional level; SVP 4). This work does not require the performance 

of work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s residual functional capacity (20 

CFR 404.1565 and 416.965). 

* * * 

7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from 

November 1, 2007, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(f) and 

416.920(f)). 

Id. at 21-28. 

Plaintiff’s request for Appeals Council’s review was denied on December 9, 2013, leaving 

the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. Id. at 1-6. 

///// 

///// 

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II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings 

of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards were 

applied. Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); 

Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel, 

180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are 

conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is 

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th 

Cir. 1996). “‘It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. 

N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s finding that she can perform her past relevant work is not 

supported by substantial evidence. ECF No. 17. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred 

by relying on testimony from a VE without inquiring as to whether the testimony deviated from 

the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”). Id. at 7-9. Plaintiff contends that because the 

ALJ failed to make this inquiry, the record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding that 

plaintiff can perform her past relevant work as it was actually or generally performed. Id. at 9-13. 

 At the fourth step of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ must determine whether 

plaintiff can perform any of his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). “Past 

relevant work” is work that a claimant has “done within the past 15 years, that was substantial 

gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for [the claimant] to learn to do it.” 20 C.F.R. 

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§§ 404.1520(b), 416.960(b). Although the claimant has the burden of showing that he cannot 

perform his past relevant work, the ALJ is still required to make the requisite factual finding to 

support his step-four conclusion. Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 2001). To 

determine whether a claimant can perform his past relevant work the ALJ must assess the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity, determine the physical and mental demands of the 

claimant’s past relevant work, and then make a finding as to whether the individual’s RFC would 

permit the claimant to return to his prior job or occupation. SSR 82-62. 

 The ALJ should first assess whether the claimant can perform his past relevant work as it 

was actually performed. SSR 96-8p; Pinto, 249 F.3d at 845. The claimant’s testimony and 

vocational reports are important sources of information regarding how the prior work was 

actually performed. Id. An ALJ may also seek information from a VE or the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles (“DOT”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b)(2),416.960(b)(2); SSR 82-61. 

 If the claimant cannot perform the job as it was actually performed, the ALJ then assesses 

whether the claimant can perform the occupation as it is generally performed. SSR 96–8p. The 

best source for determining whether the claimant can perform his past relevant work as it was 

generally performed is the DOT. Pinto, 249 F.3d at 845. The ALJ may also rely on VE 

testimony. Id. However, “[i]n order for an ALJ to accept vocational expert testimony that 

contradicts the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, the record must contain ‘persuasive evidence to 

support the deviation.’” Id. at 846. Furthermore, and of particular significance here, “[w]hen a 

job is a ‘composite’—that is, it has significant elements of two or more occupations and therefore 

has no counterpart in the DOT—the ALJ considers only whether the claimant can perform his 

past relevant work as actually performed.” Cook v. Colvin, 2015 WL 162953, at *7 (C.D. Cal. 

Jan. 13, 2015) (citing Program Operations Manual System (POMS) DI 25005.020(B), available at 

http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/ lnx/0425005020). 

 At step four the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled because she could perform 

her past relevant work as an office clerk as the position was actually performed by plaintiff and 

generally performed in the regional and national economy. AR 28. In making this finding, the 

ALJ relied on the testimony from the December 9, 2013 hearing. Id. Testimony from the hearing 

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indicated that plaintiff’s prior work included a position as a bookkeeper and a “combination job” 

that required plaintiff to dispatch tow trucks and perform secretarial duties. AR 51-52. The VE 

concluded that the first part of plaintiff’s combination job could be categorized as “dispatcher, 2 

49.167-014, sedentary, SVP-5,” and the second part of the job categorized as an “office clerk, 

219.362-010, light, SVP-4.” Id. at 52. 

 The ALJ asked the VE whether an individual with plaintiff’s RFC could perform 

plaintiff’s past relevant work. The VE testified as follows: 

Bookkeeper, no. Dispatcher, no. Office clerk, yes. There would 

be some erosion. It’s a light job so there would be some office 

environments where they’re on their feet greater than 50 percent of 

the time. That would be the exception rather than the rule. Most 

office people are sitting most of the day. 

AR 53. 

 Based on this testimony, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not disabled because she 

could perform her past relevant work as an office clerk “as actually performed by the claimant 

and generally performed in the national economy.” Id. at 28. 

 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to ask the VE whether his testimony 

conflicted with the DOT. ECF No. 17 at 9; see Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 

2007) (explaining that when a VE “provides evidence about the requirements of a job or 

occupation, the adjudicator has an affirmative responsibility to ask about any possible conflict 

between the [VE] evidence and information in the [DOT].”) (emphasis in original). The ALJ did 

not specifically ask the VE whether his testimony deviated from the DOT. However, it is clear 

from the VE’s testimony that he deviated from the DOT’s description for the office clerk 

position. The VE testified that an office clerk is categorized as light work, which would require 

workers to be on their feet greater than 50 percent of the time. AR 53. He went on to state that 

this “would be the exception rather than the rule,” because most people in an office setting are 

sitting most of the day. Id. He then concluded that plaintiff could perform the office clerk 

position, but that there would be some erosion to the occupational base. Id. Because it was clear 

from this testimony that the VE deviated from the DOT, any failure by the ALJ to affirmatively 

inquire about the conflict was harmless. 

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 Nevertheless, the court finds that the ALJ’s step-four finding in not supported by 

substantial evidence. First, the testimony does not support the finding that plaintiff could perform 

her past work as it was actually performed. The evidence does not indicate that plaintiff 

previously worked as an office clerk. Instead, the job at issue was described by the ALJ as a 

“combination job,” which included the duties for both a dispatcher and an office clerk. AR 52. 

The VE specifically testified that an individual with plaintiff’s RFC could not perform the work 

as a dispatcher. Thus, plaintiff could not perform that “combination job.” Her prior work 

included the performance of dispatch duties, and plaintiff’s RFC precluded her from performing 

such duties. The evidence conclusively shows that plaintiff could not perform this composite or 

“combination job” as it was actually performed. See Valencia v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 1081, 1087 

(explaining that jobs are comprised of a number of tasks and to “classify an applicant’s ‘past 

relevant work’ according to the least demanding function of the claimant’s past occupation is 

contrary to the letter and spirit of the Social Security Act.”). Accordingly, the ALJ’s finding that 

plaintiff could perform her prior work as an office clerk as actually performed is not supported by 

substantial evidence. 

 Furthermore, there is no basis for the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff could perform her prior 

work as it is generally performed in the national economy. While it may be the case that plaintiff 

can perform the work of an office clerk, she did not have a prior job as an office clerk. Instead, 

the job at issue was a composite job that included duties that would fall under an office clerk. 

“When a job is a ‘composite’—that is, it has significant elements of two or more occupations and 

therefore has no counterpart in the DOT—the ALJ considers only whether the claimant can 

perform his past relevant work as actually performed.” Cook, 2015 WL 162953 at *7. Thus, the 

ALJ was not permitted to dissect plaintiff’s job duties and find that plaintiff could perform her 

past relevant work because she could perform some of the tasks required of her prior job. See 

Valencia, 751 F.2d at 1086. 

 The Commissioner, relying on Druckerman v. Colvin, 2014 WL 5089398 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 

9, 2014), argues that the ALJ was permitted to dissect plaintiff’s prior work into two occupations 

and conclude that she was not disabled based on her ability perform one of the occupations. ECF 

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No. 20 at 11-20 (citing to Druckerman and arguing that “in the current economy, composite jobs 

are not unheard of, and it is acceptable for an ALJ to find that a claimant can perform a subset of 

that composite.”). Druckerman does not support this proposition. 

 In that case, the ALJ assessed the claimant with a light RFC with a limitation to 

keyboarding 30 minutes at a time up to 4 hours in an 8-hour day. Druckerman, 2014 WL 

5089398, at * 6. The VE testified that plaintiff had prior relevant work as a bookkeeper and an 

office manager. The VE testified that plaintiff could not perform the bookkeeper job as generally 

performed, but could perform the office manager job. Id. at 7. The VE “distinguished the two 

occupations on the basis that the keyboarding required for the office manager position was ‘more 

sporadic’ than it is for the bookkeeping function.” Id. The plaintiff testified that for both the 

bookkeeping and office manager jobs he was required to perform tasks required by both jobs. Id. 

Accordingly, the plaintiff argued that both positions were composite jobs and that the VE, in 

finding that he could perform the office manager position, improperly excluded the least 

demanding tasks from that job. Id. 

 The district court rejected the argument, noting that plaintiff “had two different 

occupational designations, bookkeeping and officer manager.” Id. The court observed that the 

VE specifically “testified that the office manager occupation had a wider variety of duties than 

the bookkeeping job and that, while it required some bookkeeping keyboarding functions, they 

were ‘more sporadic than with the bookkeeper.’” Id. The VE did not find that plaintiff could not 

perform any bookkeeping or keyboarding work, but simply found that plaintiff could still perform 

the office manager job because it required more sporadic typing than the bookkeeping job. Id. 

 Thus, unlike the instant case, the ALJ in Druckerman did not find that plaintiff’s prior 

work as an office manager was composite job. Instead, the ALJ found that plaintiff had past 

relevant work as an office manager, and that while this job included duties performed by a 

bookkeeper, a position precluded by the plaintiff’s RFC, the plaintiff could still perform the office 

manager position because it only required sporadic keyboarding. 

 This case does not involve two different past relevant jobs. Here, there was one job in 

question, dispatcher/secretary (see AR 192), but the VE characterized it as a combination job and 

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segregated it into two separate occupations, a dispatcher and an office clerk. He then testified 

that plaintiff’s RFC precluded the performance of former, but not the latter and failed to account 

for the fact the job as actually performed did not fit the work functions for which plaintiff is able 

to perform. Accordingly, the instant case is distinguishable from Druckerman. 

 Accordingly, the VE’s testimony does not support the finding that plaintiff could perform 

her past relevant work as it was actually performed by plaintiff or generally performed in the 

regional and national economy. Accordingly, this matter must be remanded for further 

proceedings. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 The ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, it is hereby 

ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted; 

 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is denied; 

 3. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order; and 

 4. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in plaintiff’s favor. 

DATED: September 29, 2015. 

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