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Parties Involved:
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 147, AFL-CIO
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 16, 2002 Decided July 9, 2002

No. 01-1301

International Union of Operating Engineers,

Local 147, AFL-CIO,

Petitioner

v.

National Labor Relations Board,

Respondent

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

Richard F. Griffin argued the cause for petitioner. With

him on the briefs was Helen L. Morgan. John M. Singleton

entered an appearance.

William M. Bernstein, Attorney, National Labor Relations

Board, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the

brief were Arthur F. Rosenfeld, General Counsel, John H.

Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong,

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Deputy Associate General Counsel, and Frederick Havard,

Supervisory Attorney. David A. Fleischer, Senior Attorney,

and Frederick L. Cornnell, Jr., Attorney, entered appearances.

Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, and Randolph and Tatel,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Ginsburg.

Ginsburg, Chief Judge: The International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 147, petitions for review of a Decision

and Order of the National Labor Relations Board dismissing

a complaint issued by the General Counsel against Tidewater

Construction Co. The complaint alleged that Tidewater violated ss 8(a)(1) & (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29

U.S.C. ss 158(a)(1) & (3), by refusing to consider for hire six

applicants, who Tidewater claims were lawfully locked out.

We hold that the Board failed adequately to explain why

evidence presented by the Union did not demonstrate that

Tidewater had unlawfully refused to consider the applicants

due to antiunion animus.

I. Background

Tidewater does heavy industrial and highway bridge construction in the southeastern United States. Until December, 1993 Tidewater was a member of the Virginia Association

of Contractors and was a party to successive collective bargaining agreements between the Union and the VAC. Pursuant to this arrangement, Tidewater hired heavy equipment

operating engineers from the Union's hiring hall, and from

January, 1992 to October, 1994 all of Tidewater's operating

engineers were members of the Union. After Tidewater

withdrew from the VAC, the Union filed a petition for a

representation election, as the result of which it was certified

as the representative of Tidewater's operating engineers in

March, 1994. In October, following months of unsuccessful

bargaining, the Union called a strike. In December the

strikers offered unconditionally to return to work but TideUSCA Case #01-1301 Document #688082 Filed: 07/09/2002 Page 2 of 9
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water informed the Union it was "locking out the bargaining

unit employees in support of [its] contract demand."

To aid in the process of hiring replacements, Tidewater

created a "lockout list" of: (1) the 25 striking employees; (2)

40 other individuals who had been on the Excelsior list of

those eligible to vote in the representation election in March,

see Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966); and

(3) 16 individuals who were neither strikers nor on the

Excelsior list. Ten of the individuals on the Excelsior list

would not have been on such a list compiled in December,

1994 rather than in February of that year.

Tidewater hired 40 replacement workers but refused to

consider for employment six applicants who were on the

lockout list because they had been eligible to vote in the

March election. Those applicants were falsely told they were

being denied employment because there was no work available. One of the six rejected applicants would not have been

on an updated Excelsior list.

The Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the

Board, and the General Counsel filed a complaint alleging

that Tidewater violated ss 8(a)(1) & (3) of the Act by failing

to consider for hire the six applicants. An Administrative

Law Judge dismissed the complaint, see Tidewater Constr.

Co. and Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs., Local 147, 33

N.L.R.B. No. 147 at 4-7 (2001), and the Board affirmed,

stating:

[W]e find that the lockout did not become unlawful

because [Tidewater] expanded the lockout beyond current employees who had participated in the strike and

refused to consider for hire six job applicants who, by

virtue of their prior history of employment in the bargaining unit, were eligible to vote in a Board election

held 9 months prior to the start of the lockout....

Id. at 1. The Board concluded that Tidewater's reliance upon

an outdated Excelsior list to determine the scope of the

lockout was reasonable. Id. at 1-2. In dissent, Member

Liebman pointed to evidence of antiunion animus and rejectUSCA Case #01-1301 Document #688082 Filed: 07/09/2002 Page 3 of 9
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ed Tidewater's argument that extension of the lockout to all

employees eligible to vote in the representation election

brought legitimate economic pressure to bear in support of its

bargaining position. Id. at 3.

II. Analysis

The court reviews the Board's decision deferentially. We

uphold its findings of fact if they are supported by substantial

evidence, see Pac. Micronesia Corp. v. NLRB, 219 F.3d 661,

665 (D.C. Cir. 2000), and accept its interpretation of the Act if

it is reasonable and consistent with controlling precedent, see

Tualatin Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 714, 717 (D.C. Cir.

2001). The Board has an obligation to engage in reasoned

decisionmaking, see Penrod v. NLRB, 203 F.3d 41, 46 (D.C.

Cir. 2000), which obligation requires it to give a reasoned

explanation when it departs from its own precedent, see

Chelsea Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 285 F.3d 1073, 1075-76 (D.C.

Cir. 2002).

The Union contends that the Board, in dismissing the

allegation that Tidewater unlawfully rejected the employment

applications of six of its members, "failed to consider overwhelming evidence of [Tidewater's] unlawful motivation."*

Tidewater argues that the Board properly upheld its action as

part of a legitimate lockout of bargaining unit employees.

The Board has recently set forth the elements of a refusalto-consider violation as follows:

To establish a discriminatory refusal to consider ... the

General Counsel bears the burden of showing ... (1)

that the respondent excluded applicants from a hiring

process; and (2) that antiunion animus contributed to the

decision not to consider the applicants for employment.

__________

* Insofar as the Union contends that Tidewater also violated the

Act by placing on its lockout list individuals who never sought

employment with Tidewater and never knew they were on the list,

the Board properly dismissed the complaint. Tidewater's actions

neither abridged the s 7 rights of these individuals nor discouraged

them from union activity.

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Once this is established, the burden will shift to the

respondent to show that it would not have considered the

applicants even in the absence of their union activity or

affiliation. If the respondent fails to meet its burden,

then a violation of Section 8(a)(3) is established.

FES (A Division of Thermo Power) and Plumbers and

Pipefitters Local 520 of the United Assoc., 331 N.L.R.B. No.

20, 2000 WL 627640 *10 (2000). It is also well established

that "an employer violates neither s 8(a)(1) nor s 8(a)(3)

when, after a bargaining impasse has been reached, he temporarily shuts down his plant and lays off his employees for

the sole purpose of bringing economic pressure to bear in

support of his legitimate bargaining position." Am. Ship

Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965). We have made

clear, however, that "a lockout is unlawful under the Labor

Act ... if [it is] motivated by antiunion animus." Int'l Bhd.

of Boilermakers, Local 88 v. NLRB, 858 F.2d 756, 760 (1988).

Thus, whether Tidewater "locked out the six applicant employees ... 'because of their union membership or affiliation' " became the "key contested issue in this case." Tidewater Constr. Co., 33 N.L.R.B. No. 147 at 1.

As the Union shows on review, the Board, having correctly

framed the dispositive question, failed reasonably to address

it. In particular, the Board failed adequately to consider

three indications that Tidewater was motivated by antiunion

animus.

First, the Union argues that the Board unreasonably disregarded Tidewater's inability to explain why 10 of the 16

individuals who were neither strikers nor on the Excelsior list

were included on the lockout list. See Southwest Merch.

Corp. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 1334, 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("[T]he

absence of any legitimate basis for an action--i.e., the absence of a credible explanation from the employer--may form

part of the proof of the General Counsel's case"). We agree.

The ALJ, whose reasoning the Board adopted, noted that

after "numerous shifts in position" Tidewater had still provided "no explanation for the inclusion of 10 of the 16 names" on

the list. 33 N.L.R.B. No. 147 at 6. The ALJ ultimately

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concluded that their being listed did not evidence antiunion

animus because the 10 individuals did not apply for employment and there was "no proof that the 10 were even union

members." Id. Whether the 10 applied for employment,

however, is irrelevant to whether their unexplained inclusion

on the list bespeaks antiunion animus. Indeed, it is also

irrelevant whether they were actually members of the Union,

so long as Tidewater thought they were. As the Union points

out, the "locator list" maintained by Tidewater described each

of the 10 as follows: "Operating Engineers Local 147 --

LOCKED OUT EMPLOYEE." The Board argues lamely

that "[t]his ambiguous notation does not prove union membership," Brief at 26 n.10 (emphasis deleted), but the list certainly seems to show that Tidewater thought the 10 individuals

were members of the Union, and this is what counts.

The Board also argues that Tidewater's inability to explain

why the 10 were on the list does not "alone ... sustain a

finding of unlawful motivation." Perhaps not. On the question of animus, however, as we shall see, the Board did not

have this evidence "alone" -- which may be why neither the

Board nor the ALJ gave this rationale in their respective

decisions.

Second, the Union argues that the Board failed to explain

why Tidewater's statements to the six applicants were not

also evidence of an antiunion animus, and how, in light of

these false statements, the Board's decision could be reconciled with Eads Transfer, Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 711 (1991).

Again, we agree.

Tidewater falsely told each of the applicants "there was no

work available" rather than telling them they were locked

out, as it now claims they were. Tidewater Constr. Co., 33

N.L.R.B. No. 147 at 6. From this misrepresentation the

Board could have inferred that Tidewater had an unlawful

motive. See Property Resources Corp. v. NLRB, 863 F.2d

964, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Instead, the ALJ merely observed

that Tidewater gave false reasons without explaining why

that did not tend to indicate an unlawful motive, and the

Board itself did not even mention this evidence. In its brief

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the Board argues (echoes?) that "standing alone" the giving

of false reasons is "insufficient to establish discriminatory

motivation." Again, this evidence did not stand alone, and

neither the Board nor the ALJ, unlike the General Counsel

on review, implied otherwise.

The Board's decision in this case also appears to be in some

tension with its decision in Eads Transfer, though perhaps

not in direct conflict, as the Union claims. There the Board

said:

[A]n employer can only justify its failure to reinstate

economic strikers "for legitimate and substantial business reasons" based on a "lockout" by its timely announcement to the strikers that it is locking them out in

support of its bargaining position. For only after the

employer has informed the strikers of the lockout can the

strikers knowingly reevaluate their position and decide

whether to accept the employer's terms and end the

strike or to take other appropriate action. In the absence of notification, we conclude that an employer's

failure to reinstate economic strikers based on a claimed

lockout on their unconditional offer to return to work is

inherently destructive of employee rights ... and is a

violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.

304 N.L.R.B. at 712-13. In this case the ALJ held, 33

N.L.R.B. No. 147 at 5-6, and the Board contends in its brief,

that Tidewater complied with the notice requirement of Eads

Transfer because it informed the Union by letter that it was

"locking out the bargaining unit employees in support of [its]

contract demand." We think this explanation incomplete.

The six applicants, who were members of the Union but not

striking employees, had no reason to believe that Tidewater

considered them part of the bargaining unit being locked out.

Therefore, when Tidewater falsely told the applicants there

was no work available rather than telling them they were

locked out, it deprived them of whatever ability they may

have had to "reevaluate their position" and act accordingly.

Eads Transfer, 304 N.L.R.B. at 712. Although the six applicants obviously could not have offered "to accept the employUSCA Case #01-1301 Document #688082 Filed: 07/09/2002 Page 7 of 9
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er's terms" and return to work, as members of the Union

they may have had some influence in the Union's decision

whether to accept Tidewater's last offer and end the lockout.

On the other hand, if the applicants were in no position to

influence the Union, the rationale of Eads Transfer may not

be implicated. We need not decide now, however, whether

Eads Transfer controls this case. Having found incomplete

the Board's explanation why Eads Transfer is inapplicable,

we must remand that question to the Board for further

consideration.

Third, the Union claims the Board gave an inadequate

explanation why Tidewater's lockout of the 10 individuals who

appeared only on the outdated Excelsior list was not evidence

of antiunion animus. Yet again, we agree.

The Supreme Court in American Ship Building held that

absent antiunion animus an employer may lawfully lockout its

employees. 380 U.S. at 318. Board precedent makes clear,

however, that a lockout that goes beyond excluding employees to refusing to hire union members as replacements is

indicative of antiunion animus. See Schenck Packing Co., 301

N.L.R.B. 487, 489 (1991). In this case, in addition to the

striking employees, Tidewater locked out everyone on the

outdated Excelsior list which, in keeping with Board practice

in the construction industry, see Steiny & Co., Inc., 308

N.L.R.B. 1323, 1326 (1992), included every operator of heavy

equipment who had worked for Tidewater 30 days or more in

the year prior to the compilation of the list, or for at least one

day in the previous year and 45 days in the previous two

years.

For the purpose of this case, the Union concedes that

Tidewater could have locked out anyone on an Excelsior list

compiled at the time of the lockout. The Union argues,

however, that because all of Tidewater's employees before the

March election were members of the Union -- as Tidewater

well knew -- Tidewater's use of a list that was 10 months old

was evidence of antiunion animus.

The Board held that Tidewater could lock out any employee

having a "reasonable employment nexus with the bargaining

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unit" and that, because there is no way to "define with

absolute accuracy the outer limits of a former employee's

reasonable expectation of reemployment in a bargaining unit

with a fluctuating work force," Tidewater could rely upon the

outdated Excelsior list. 33 N.L.R.B. No. 147 at 1-2. The

non-sequitur in this is apparent: Because an Excelsior list is

an approximation even when first made, the Board allows an

employer still to use it when it is further removed from being

accurate by the passage of ten months. The logical gap is

equally glaring: The Board has not said why it does not

require the use of an updated list. Would such a requirement

would be too burdensome? To be sure, Tidewater made this

and other claims in its brief to the ALJ, but neither he nor

the Board adopted Tidewater's argument or gave any other

reason for their complacency on this score.

III. Conclusion

Because the Board failed in three respects adequately to

explain why it did not find convincing evidence of Tidewater's

antiunion animus, the Decision and Order of the Board is

vacated and this matter is remanded to the Agency for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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