Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01484/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01484-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Scott Johnson
Plaintiff
Chiu Lin
Defendant
Kuo Lin
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

KUO LIN, in his individual 

and representative capacity 

as Trustee, Kuo & Chiu Lin 

Family Trust; and CHIU LIN, 

in his individual and 

representative capacity as 

Trustee, Kuo & Chiu Lin 

Family Trust,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-01484-GEB-DAD

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Scott Johnson moves for partial summary 

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56 on his 

claims alleged under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”) and the California Unruh Civil Rights Act (“UCRA”).

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Plaintiff seeks an injunction under the ADA and damages under the 

 

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Plaintiff states he “stipulates to dismiss his Disabled Persons 

[Act] and [n]egligence [claims] . . . to ensure that this motion 

disposes of the entire case.” (Mot. 3:10-12.)

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UCRA concerning the following barriers he encountered at 

Defendants‟ restaurant, which he evinces violated the ADA 

Standards for Accessible Design: “[in]accessible parking, paths 

of travel, transaction counters, and restrooms.” (Pl.‟s Mot. 

Summ. J. (“Mot.”) 1:5-6, ECF No. 17-1.) Defendants counter the 

motion, arguing Plaintiff‟s “calculation of damages [under the 

UCRA] . . . raise[s] [a] genuine [dispute] of material fact.” 

(Defs.‟ Opp‟n to Pl.‟s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Opp‟n”) 2:1-2, ECF No. 

18.)

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A party is entitled to summary judgment if 

“the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” . . . . The moving party has the burden 

of establishing the absence of a genuine 

dispute of material fact. 

City of Pomona v. SQM North Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th

Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)) (citing Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “A fact is „material‟ when 

. . . it could affect the outcome of the case.” Thrifty Oil Co. 

v. Bank of Am. Nat‟l Trust & Sav. Ass‟n, 322 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248 (1986)). “A[] [dispute] of material fact is “genuine” 

when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is 

genuinely disputed must support the assertion 

by . . . citing to particular parts of 

materials in the record . . . or . . . 

showing that the materials cited do not 

establish the absence or presence of a 

genuine dispute, or that an adverse party 

cannot produce admissible evidence to support 

the fact.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B). 

Summary judgment “evidence must be viewed in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all reasonable 

inferences must be drawn in favor of that party.” Sec. & Exch. 

Comm‟n v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 

Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 

1227 (9th Cir. 2001)).

II. UNCONTROVERTED FACTS

The following averments in Plaintiff‟s declaration

submitted in support of his motion are uncontroverted. Plaintiff 

ate 

at [Defendants‟ restaurant] on . . . February 

15, 2013, February 21, 2013, February 22, 

2013, March 4, 2013, April 2, 2013, June 4 

2013, and June 5, 2013. On each of these 

occasions, [Plaintiff] faced . . . 

difficulties and discomforts due to . . . 

[the referenced] barriers [that hindered his

full and equal access to the restaurant.]

(Decl. Scott Johnson ¶ 8; see also Defs.‟ Response & Objections 

to Pl.‟s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, 

(“Defs.‟ SUF”) Nos. 3, 5, 1-2, 5-8, 10-11 12-14, 15-16, ECF No. 

18-1.) It is uncontroverted that “[s]ometime [after] . . . 

[Plaintiff last ate at Defendants‟ restaurant], Defendants made 

alterations to the parking, ramp, transaction counter and 

restroom . . . .” (Defs.‟ SUF No. 16.)

III. DISCUSSION

a. Plaintiff’s ADA Claims

i) Barriers Alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on his ADA injunctive 

relief claims alleged in his Complaint; however, there is a 

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genuine dispute of material fact as to whether those barriers 

still exist since it is uncontroverted that Defendants made 

“alterations” to the barriers since Plaintiff last ate at 

Defendants‟ restaurant. (Defs.‟ SUF No. 16.) Therefore, 

Plaintiff‟s summary judgment motion on his ADA claims alleged in 

his Complaint is denied.

ii) The Newly Installed Curb Ramp

Plaintiff also argues in his motion that “[a] newly 

installed ramp from the sidewalk to the . . . restaurant . . . 

[violates the cross slope requirements prescribed in the ADA 

Standards for Accessible Design].” (Mot. 2:17-22.) Defendants 

rejoin that this is the “first time” Plaintiff has made this 

claim. (Opp‟n 1:26-2:1.) 

Plaintiff did not allege the existence of this barrier 

in his Complaint, nor has he sought leave to amend his Complaint 

to allege its existence. This pleading issue is governed by what 

is prescribed as follows in the November 19, 2013 Status 

(Pretrial Scheduling) Order: “No further . . . amendments to 

pleadings is permitted, except with leave of Court for good cause 

shown.” (Status Order 2:4-6, ECF No. 9.) “The [status] order 

„control[s] the subsequent course of the action‟ unless modified 

by the court.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 

604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992) (alteration in original). Status orders

“may be modified upon a showing of „good cause.‟” Id.

Since Plaintiff has not satisfied the good cause 

standard, this portion of his motion is disregarded.

ii. Plaintiff’s UCRA Claim

Plaintiff argues since Defendants violated the ADA 

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standards referenced in his Complaint “there has been a per-se 

violation of [the UCRA]”, and he is therefore entitled to

“damages in the amount of $8,000 . . . for one visit and one 

deterrence.” (Mot. 10:22-23, 1:8, 11:16-18.)

The UCRA prescribes: “a violation of the right of any 

individual under the [ADA] shall also constitute a violation of 

[the UCRA].” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f). A plaintiff may recover 

“actual damages . . . in no case less than four thousand dollars 

($4,000)” for “each offense” under the UCRA. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 

52(a), 55.56(a). 

[Further, the UCRA] provides that statutory 

damages . . . are available under two 

circumstances: (1) if a plaintiff encountered 

the violation on a particular occasion or (2) 

if a plaintiff was deterred from accessing a 

place of public accommodation on a particular 

occasion. As to the first circumstance, a 

violation may be sufficient to give rise to 

damages if the plaintiff experienced 

difficulty, discomfort, or embarrassment as a 

result of the violation. As to the second 

circumstance, a deterrence will only give 

rise to damages if (a) the plaintiff had 

actual knowledge of a violation and (b) the 

violation would have actually denied the 

plaintiff full and equal access if he 

attempted to access the place on a particular 

occasion. 

Yates v. Vishal Corp., No. 11-CV-00643-JCS, 2013 WL 6073516, at 

*3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013) (emphasis added) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 55.56(b)-

(d) (describing the circumstances under which a plaintiff may 

recover statutory damages).

Plaintiff has not provided facts evincing that he was 

deterred from visiting Defendants‟ restaurant on a “particular 

occasion.” Therefore, this portion of his motion is denied.

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V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff‟s partial motion 

for summary judgment is denied.

Dated: April 28, 2015

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