Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-15010/USCOURTS-ca11-14-15010-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Deon D. Jones
Appellant
Lockheed Martin Corporation
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-15010

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-01591-CAP

DEON D. JONES,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION,

 Defendant-Appellee,

LOCKHEED MARTIN AERONAUTICS COMPANY, et al.,

 Defendants.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(January 7, 2016)

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Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Deon Jones filed this pro se appeal of the district court’s dismissal of his 

discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and 

state law against his former employer, Lockheed Martin Corporation 

(“Lockheed”). The district court dismissed Jones’s claims with prejudice for 

repeated failure to obey a court order requiring him to properly file an amended

complaint. Jones argues on appeal that the district court erred because his 

amended complaint presented a prima facie claim of discrimination under the 

ADA. Upon careful consideration, we affirm.

“We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss.” Shotz 

v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1079 (11th Cir. 2001). To survive a motion to dismiss 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) the complaint must provide 

sufficient factual allegations to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A court may 

draw reasonable factual inferences in favor of the plaintiff, but need not accept any 

legal conclusions in the complaint. Id.

To state an ADA discrimination claim, a plaintiff must allege that he was 

disabled, qualified to perform the job, and discriminated against because of his 

disability. Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th 

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Cir. 2004). A district court has discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over state-law claims that relate to a federal claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). If a 

district court dismisses all of a plaintiff’s federal claims, we encourage it to also 

dismiss any remaining state claims. Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 

1089 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).

We review for abuse of discretion a dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 41(b), which allows a district court to dismiss an action for failure 

to comply with local rules. Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 192 (11th Cir. 1993). 

Local Rule 41.3 for the Northern District of Georgia authorizes a court to dismiss a 

civil case if the plaintiff “fail[s] or refuse[s] to obey a lawful order of the court.” 

N.D. Ga. Civ. R. 41.3(A)(2). A dismissal under this rule operates as a dismissal 

with prejudice unless the court specifies otherwise. Id. R. 41.3(B).

Because dismissal with prejudice is a drastic remedy, it is appropriate only 

where there is a clear record of delay or willful contempt and lesser sanctions 

would be insufficient. Kilgo, 983 F.2d at 192. Dismissal with prejudice is 

appropriate “where a party, as distinct from counsel, is culpable” for the failure to 

comply. Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 

2005). It is generally not an abuse of discretion for a district court to dismiss a suit 

for disregard of an order if the litigant was warned and still failed to comply. 

Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989).

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The district court did not err in finding that Jones failed to state a 

discrimination claim under the ADA. Jones properly identified his disability in his 

amended complaint. However, he never alleged with sufficient facts that 

Lockheed discriminated against him because of this disability. See Cleveland, 369 

F.3d at 1193. Jones only alleged with sufficient facts that Lockheed terminated 

him for reasons unrelated to his disability.

Because Jones failed to state a claim as necessary to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing his 

ADA and state-law claims with prejudice under Rule 41(b). After Jones failed to 

state a claim in his initial complaint, the district court noted the deficiencies in 

Jones’s complaint and dismissed his ADA claim without prejudice to allow him to 

file an amended complaint. The court warned Jones after he filed several 

extraneous exhibits instead of an amended complaint that it would dismiss his 

claims if he failed to adhere to the court’s orders regarding how to file his amended 

complaint.

Jones then amended his complaint, but he again failed to state a claim or

follow the district court’s orders regarding which claims to include in the 

complaint. The court allowed Jones yet another opportunity to file his amended 

complaint, and again warned that it would dismiss his claims if Jones failed to 

follow the court’s orders. Instead of filing a second amended complaint, Jones 

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moved for the district court judges involved in his case to recuse themselves and he 

filed an improper appeal to this Court of the district court’s non-final order.

Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

dismissing Jones’s claims under Rule 41(b) based on his failure to obey a lawful 

court order in accordance with Local Rule 41.3. See N.D. Ga. Civ. R. 41.3(A)(2). 

The district court properly warned Jones twice that his failure to comply with its 

orders would result in dismissal of his claims. See Moon, 863 F.2d at 837, 839. 

Also, the district court determined that no lesser sanction would suffice, because it 

had already attempted the lesser sanction of dismissal without prejudice to no 

avail. See Kilgo, 983 F.2d at 192. The district court also properly dismissed 

Jones’s remaining state-law claims when it dismissed his ADA claim. See Raney, 

370 F.3d at 1089.

After careful review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we 

affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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