Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02841/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02841-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marmon Motor Company
Appellant
Gary T. Osterhoudt
Not Party
William J. Osterhoudt
Not Party
Oz-T Ltd.
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

WILLIAM J. OSTERHOUDT; GARY T. 

OSTERHOUDT, 

Plaintiffs, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

FI BD 

Uflited St~ v.Jfitt of Appeals 

Temh Ci:cuit 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

and ) No. 88-2841 

) (D.C. No. CIV-87-1096-A) 

OZ-T LTD., 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MARMON MOTOR COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

) ( W. D. Okla. ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, LOGAN, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

Defendant Marmon Motor Company appeals a judgment entered on 

a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff OZ-T, Ltd. Marmon 

manufactures tractors for use in over-the-road hauling. OZ-T 

ordered ten tractors -from Marmon in March of 1985. OZ-T used the 

tractors in its interstate trucking business until December of 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-2841 Document: 010110119396 Date Filed: 06/12/1991 Page: 1 
. ; 

1986 and returned the tractors to Marmon in April of 1987. OZ-T 

then sued Marmon for damages on claims for breach of contract, 

breach of express and implied warranties, and negligent design, 

or, in the alternative, for rescission of the contract and return 

of the purchase price. The jury returned a verdict for OZ-Ton 

its rescission claim and awarded it $275,089.00. 

Marmon's appeal raises four issues: (1) whether the trial 

court committed reversible error when it admitted evidence of 

warranty claims made by purchasers of Marmon tractors other than 

OZ-T; (2) whether the trial court committed reversible error when 

it instructed the jury on rescission pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 

15, § 233, rather than on revocation of acceptance pursuant to 

Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 2-608; (3) whether the jury's award should 

be set aside as excessive on its face; and (4) whether the jury's 

award should be set aside as unsupported by substantial evidence. 

We answer each question in the negative and affirm the judgment of 

the district court. 

Marmon first contends that the trial court should have 

excluded evidence of warranty claims by purchasers other than OZ-T 

under Fed. R. Evid. 403, which provides in pertinent part: 

"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice." We will not disturb a trial court's determination 

that the probative value of proffered evidence did or did not 

substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect absent an abuse of 

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discretion. Dow Chem. Corp. v. Weevil-Cide Co., 897 F.2d 481, 486 

(10th Cir. 1990). Based upon our review of the record on appeal, 1 

the parties' briefs, and the pertinent law, we conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 

evidence at issue. 

Before considering whether the trial court erred in 

instructing the jury on common law rescission, as codified in 

Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 233, rather than on revocation of 

acceptance under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), as adopted by 

Oklahoma in Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 2-608, we must first determine 

whether Marmon properly preserved this issue for appeal. Rule 51 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[n]o party 

may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an 

instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury 

retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter 

objected to and the grounds of the objection." 

Marmon concedes that it did not formally object to the court 

giving the rescission instruction. Marmon argues that it 

nonetheless preserved the issue for appeal by making its position 

that revocation of acceptance under the UCC had displaced common 

law rescission "abundantly clear" to the trial court before the 

court instructed the jury. Brief of Appellant at 32-33. See 

1 The court has supplemented the record on appeal, sua sponte, 

with Plaintiffs' Final Contentions, Plaintiffs' Trial Brief, 

Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions, Plaintiff's Brief in 

Opposition to Defendant's Motion for New Trial, and those portions 

of the transcript not previously designated by the parties. See 

10th Cir. R. 10.2.4 and 11.1.1. 

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Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 

1514 (10th Cir. 1984)("Rule 51 requires counsel 'to make 

abundantly clear to the trial court the objecting party's 

position.'" (quoting Rogers v. Northern Rio Arriba Elec. Coop., 

Inc., 580 F.2d 1039, 1042 (10th Cir. 1978))), aff'd, 472 U.S. 585 

(1985). We disagree. 

Although Marmon's pretrial filings, including its proposed 

jury instructions, clearly indicated Marmon's position that 

revocation of acceptance under the UCC applied to the facts of the 

case, the filings did not indicate, clearly or otherwise, that 

revocation of acceptance had replaced rescission in Oklahoma. "We 

long have held that the offering of a proposed instruction does 

not preserve a challenge to the court's instructions under Rule 

51, absent a specific objection." Id. at 1515. The only 

reference to the interaction of rescission and revocation of 

acceptance Marmon made in the record on appeal was the following 

statement by Marmon's counsel during his argument for a directed 

verdict: 

As to Plaintiffs' theory of relief on recision (sic) or 

revocation and acceptance, I think it's quite clear that 

the code, Uniform Commercial Code, provisions as to 

revocation of acceptance and cover, and that to apply 

the common-law principle of recision (sic) would be 

inconsistent with the UCC. 

Rec., supp. vol. III, Transcript at 654. The morning after the 

instruction conference, which was not recorded, Marmon objected to 

certain language in the court's proposed rescission instruction. 

This objection, contrary to indicating that Marmon opposed the 

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giving of an instruction on rescission at all, indicated that 

Marmon opposed only particular language in the instruction, which 

the court deleted at Marmon's request. 

Based on the record before us, we conclude that Marmon failed 

to preserve its present objection to the rescission instruction. 

We note that the trial court reached the same conclusion in its 

order denying Marmon's motion for a new trial. See Rec., vol. I, 

doc. 119, Order at 2. 

We have recognized a plain error exception to Rule Sl's 

requirements, but we have applied it sparingly and only in the 

interest of justice. See Lusby v. T. G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 796 

F.2d 1307, 1311-12 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 884 (1986); 

Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d at 

1516. Under the circumstances here, we conclude that the trial 

court did not commit plain error when it instructed the jury on 

rescission rather than on revocation of acceptance. 

The final two issues we must address concern the jury's award 

on OZ-T's rescission claim. The court instructed the jury that if 

it found OZ-T could rescind the purchase contract, then it should 

award OZ-T the purchase price minus certain monies (a payment 

Marmon made to the finance agency and any profit OZ-T made on the 

Marmon tractors while it used them), as well as damages for the 

profit OZ-T would have earned during the time reasonably required 

to replace the tractors. Marmon does not object to the court's 

instruction, but contends that the award the jury made based on 

that instruction was excessive on its face and was not supported 

by the evidence. 

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"The standard for determining whether an award of damages is 

excessive is whether the award shocks the judicial conscience." 

Miller v. United States ex rel. Dep't of Army, 901 F.2d 894, 897 

(10th Cir. 1990). The jury's award here does not meet this 

standard and, therefore, is not excessive on its face. Our review 

of the award is otherwise "limited to the inquiry as to whether 

the record contains substantial evidence to support the jury's 

. conclusion, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party." Kitchens v. Bryan County Nat'l Bank, 

825 F.2d 248, 251 (10th Cir. 1987). Based upon our careful review 

of the entire transcript, as well as the exhibits included in 

addenda to the parties' briefs, we conclude that the jury's award 

was supported by substantial evidence. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Stephanie K. Seymour 

Circuit Judge 

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