Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10452/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10452-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joe Arviso Benally
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOE ARVISO BENALLY,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-10452

D.C. No.

3:13-cr-08095-GMS-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 11, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed August 1, 2016

Before: Dorothy W. Nelson, John T. Noonan,

and Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Noonan

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2 UNITED STATES V. BENALLY

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

Reversing a conviction for using a firearm in connection

with a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the

panel held that involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1112, which requires a mental state of only gross

negligence, prohibits conduct that cannot be considered a

“crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3), and

therefore cannot qualify under the categorical approach.

The panel explained that after Leocal v. Ashcroft,

543 U.S. 1 (2004) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) and (b)),

and Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir.

2006) (en banc) (taking up the question of reckless conduct

under § 16(a)), a “crime of violence” requires a mental state

higher than recklessness—it requires intentional conduct. The

panel wrote that United States v. Springfield, 829 F.2d 860

(9th Cir. 1987) (holding that involuntary manslaughter under

§ 1112 is a “crime of violence” for purposes of § 924(c)(3)),

is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning and results of

Leocal and Fernandez-Ruiz and is no longer good law.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. BENALLY 3

COUNSEL

Daniel L. Kaplan (argued), Assistant Federal Public

Defender; Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender; Office of

the Federal Public Defender, Phoenix, Arizona; for

Defendant-Appellant.

Karla Delord (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Krissa M. Lanham, Deputy Appellate Chief; John S.

Leonardo, United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s

Office, Phoenix, Arizona; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

NOONAN, Circuit Judge:

Joe Arviso Benally appeals a jury conviction for

involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1112 and 1153

and for using a firearm in connection with a “crime of

violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). In a separate

unpublished memorandum disposition, we address Benally’s

challenge to the trial proceedings and sentence. In this

opinion, we address whether involuntary manslaughter can be

considered a “crime of violence” under § 924(c). We hold

that involuntary manslaughter is not a “crime of violence”

and reverse the § 924(c) count of conviction.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On January 17, 2013, Carlos Harvey was shot in the chest

with Benally’s rifle, killing Harvey. Both Benally and

Harvey lived on the same multi-house compound in a rural

part of the Navajo Nation Indian Reservation in Oak Springs,

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4 UNITED STATES V. BENALLY

Arizona. On April 30, 2013, a federal grand jury returned an

indictment against Benally for the second-degree murder of

Carlos Harvey and for using a firearm in connection with a

“crime of violence.”

At trial, the government presented evidence that, after a

day of drinking, Benally shot Harvey intentionally after an

argument. Other government evidence indicated that the

shooting was accidental and part of a drunken game. The

jury did not convict Benally of second-degree murder, but of

the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter. The

jury, instructed to find involuntary manslaughter to be a

“crime of violence,” also convicted Benally of using a firearm

in connection with a “crime of violence” under § 924(c). 

Benally appeals his conviction on both counts.

JURISDICTION

An “Indian” who commits murder or manslaughter in

“Indian country” is subject to applicable federal criminal

laws. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). The location of the shooting here,

the Navajo Nation Indian Reservation, is “Indian country” for

the purposes of § 1153. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (defining “Indian

country” to include “all land within the limits of any Indian

reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States

Government”). We have appellate jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291.

DISCUSSION

Benally’s conviction under § 924(c) for use of a firearm

requires a predicate “crime of violence.” To determine

whether Benally’s conviction for involuntary manslaughter is

a “crime of violence” we apply the “categorical approach”

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UNITED STATES V. BENALLY 5

laid out in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). 

United States v. Amparo, 68 F.3d 1222, 1224–26 (9th Cir.

1995); see also United States v. Piccolo, 441 F.3d 1084,

1086–87 (9th Cir. 2006) (as amended) (applying the

categorical approach to the definition of a “crime of violence”

found in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2). Under this approach, we do not

look to the particular facts underlying the conviction, but

“compare the elements of the statute forming the basis of the

defendant’s conviction with the elements of” a “crime of

violence.” See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276,

2281 (2013) (describing this approach under 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)). The defendant’s crime cannot categorically be a

“crime of violence” if the statute of conviction punishes any

conduct not encompassed by the statutory definition of a

“crime of violence.” See id.; Piccolo, 441 F.3d at 1086–87;

United States v. Castillo-Marin, 684 F.3d 914, 919 (9th Cir.

2012) (“If the statute of conviction is overbroad . . . it does

not categorically constitute a crime of violence.”).

If the statute of conviction does not qualify as a

categorical “crime of violence,” we sometimes then apply the

modified categorical approach, which allows us to look to a

narrow set of documents that are part of the record of

conviction. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281; Piccolo,

441 F.3d at 1090. Here, the government did not argue that

the modified categorical approach applies and we need not

address it. Latu v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.

2008) (“[W]here, as here, the government has not asked us to

apply the modified categorical approach, we ‘consider only

whether the categorical approach is satisfied.’” (quoting

Mandujano-Real v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 585, 589 (9th Cir.

2008)).

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Accordingly, we compare the elements of § 1112, the

involuntary manslaughter statute, to the definition of a “crime

of violence” found in § 924(c)(3). We review de novo

whether a criminal conviction is a “crime of violence” and

whether a jury instruction misstated the elements of an

offense. Covarrubias Teposte v. Holder, 632 F.3d 1049,

1052 (9th Cir. 2011) (as amended); Amparo, 68 F.3d at 1224.

A “crime of violence” is an offense that “(A) has as an

element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical

force against the person or property of another, or (B) that by

its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force

against the person or property of another may be used in the

course of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3).

Involuntary manslaughter is the “unlawful killing of a

human being without malice . . . [i]n the commission of an

unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or in the commission

in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and

circumspection, of a lawful act which might produce death.” 

18 U.S.C. § 1112(a). A conviction for involuntary

manslaughter requires, at a minimum, a mental state of

“‘gross negligence,’ defined as a ‘wanton or reckless

disregard for human life.’” United States v. Pineda-Doval,

614 F.3d 1019, 1038–39 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United

States v. Crowe, 563 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation

omitted)).

In United States v. Springfield, 829 F.2d 860 (9th Cir.

1987), we held that involuntary manslaughter under § 1112

is a “crime of violence” for the purposes of § 924(c)(3). Id.

at 862–63. Although involuntary manslaughter does not

contain a use-of-physical-force element under § 924(c)(3)(A),

we held that it inherently involves a substantial risk that such

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UNITED STATES V. BENALLY 7

force will be used under § 924(c)(3)(B) because death by

involuntary manslaughter is “highly likely to be the result of

violence.” Id. at 863. Therefore, we held that involuntary

manslaughter “comes within the intent, if not the precise

wording, of section 924(c)(3).” Id. Additionally, we noted

that involuntary manslaughter’s requisite mental state of

“gross negligence” does not exclude it from being a “crime of

violence” because “Congress did not intend to limit ‘crimes

of violence’ to crimes of specific intent.” Id. at 863 n.1

(citing S. Rep. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 890–91

(1982)). But see Park v. INS, 252 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir.

2001), overruled on other grounds by Fernandez-Ruiz v.

Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)

(noting that the legislative history quoted did not correspond

to § 924(c), but a separate provision that never became law).

Intervening Supreme Court and en banc Ninth Circuit

decisions, namely, Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004), and

Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d at 1124–32, bring

Springfield’s result into question. A three-judge panel’s

holding is deemed “effectively overruled” if intervening

higher authority has “undercut the theory or reasoning

underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the

cases are clearly irreconcilable.” Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d

889, 893, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

Leocal and Fernandez-Ruiz discuss the mental state

necessary to commit a “crime of violence.” These cases do

not specifically address § 924(c)(3), but instead interpret the

“crime of violence” definition found in a different statutory

provision, 18 U.S.C. § 16. Regardless, because the wording

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8 UNITED STATES V. BENALLY

of the two statutes is virtually identical,1 we interpret their

plain language in the same manner. Cf. Park, 252 F.3d at

1022 (applying Springfield’s interpretation of § 924(c)(3) to

a case involving § 16).

In Leocal, the Supreme Court parsed the phrase “use of

force against the person or property of another” found in

§ 16(a) and (b). Leocal, 543 U.S. at 8–13. The Court, giving

the language its “‘ordinary or natural’ meaning,” determined

that it “most naturally suggests a higher degree of intent than

negligent or merely accidental conduct.” Id. at 9 (citations

omitted). While theoretically one can use force accidentally,

“it is much less natural to say that a person actively [uses]

physical force against another person by accident.” Id.

The Court acknowledged that § 16(b) “sweeps more

broadly than § 16(a)” by expanding the definition of “crime

of violence” to include an offense carrying a “substantial risk

that physical force against the person or property of another

may be used in the course of committing the offense.” Id. at

10 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)). But because § 16(b) involves

the same use-of-force-against-another formulation, the

predicate crime must carry a risk of behavior involving more

volition than “merely accidental or negligent conduct.” Id. at

10–11 (“The reckless disregard in § 16 relates not to the

1 Under § 16, the term “crime of violence” means “(a) an offense that

has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force

against the person or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is

a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical

force against the person or property of another may be used in the course

of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16 (emphasis added). The only

substantive change is the addition of the felony requirement in subsection

(b), underlined above; it does not affect the operative language used to

interpret the statute’s requisite mental state.

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UNITED STATES V. BENALLY 9

general conduct or to the possibility that harm will result

from a person’s conduct, but to the risk that the use of

physical force against another might be required in

committing a crime.”).

Leocal explicitly leaves open the question whether a

reckless mental state satisfies the requirements of § 16. Id. at

13. In Lara-Cazares v. Gonzales, we extended Leocal’s

reasoning to California’s vehicular manslaughter statute, a

crime requiring a mental state of gross negligence. 408 F.3d

1217, 1221–22 (9th Cir. 2005). That decision partly

abrogated pre-Leocal precedent finding criminally negligent

conduct to fall within the meaning of a “crime of violence.” 

See id. at 1222 (citing Park, 252 F.3d at 1024–25). The exact

effect of Leocal on reckless conduct, however, remained

unclear. United States v. Hermoso-Garcia, 413 F.3d 1085,

1089 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding reckless conduct to satisfy the

“crime of violence” standard under U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) without distinguishing Leocal).

In Fernandez-Ruiz, an en banc panel took up the question

of reckless conduct under § 16(a). It noted that, in Leocal,

the Supreme Court “not only endorsed the position that

crimes of violence must be volitional but also repeatedly

emphasized that such crimes cannot be ‘accidental.’” 

Fernandez-Ruiz, 466 F.3d at 1129 (citing Leocal, 543 U.S. at

8–10 and Lara-Cazares, 408 F.3d at 1221). Because

“accidental” means “[n]ot having occurred as a result of

anyone’s purposeful act” and reckless conduct is not

purposeful, “crimes of recklessness cannot be crimes of

violence.” Id. at 1129–30 (alteration in original) (citing

Black’s Law Dictionary 16, 1272, 1298 (8th ed. 2004)). 

Although not explicitly addressed in Fernandez-Ruiz, Leocal

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10 UNITED STATES V. BENALLY

made clear that, for the purposes of intent, § 16(b) should be

interpreted identically to § 16(a). Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10–11.

After Leocal and Fernandez-Ruiz, a “crime of violence”

requires a mental state higher than recklessness—it requires

intentional conduct. See Covarrubias Teposte, 632 F.3d at

1053 (“The effect of our holdings is that in order to be a

predicate offense under either 18 U.S.C. § 16 approach, the

underlying offense must require proof of an intentional use of

force or a substantial risk that force will be intentionally used

during its commission.” (quoting United States v. GomezLeon, 545 F.3d 777, 787 (9th Cir. 2008)). Involuntary

manslaughter under § 1112, requiring a lesser mental state of

“gross negligence,” prohibits conduct that cannot be

considered a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3). Under

the categorical approach, therefore,involuntarymanslaughter

cannot be a “crime of violence.” Springfield’s opposing rule

is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning and results of

Leocal and Fernandez-Ruiz and is no longer good law.

Benally’s § 924(c) count of conviction for using a firearm

in connection with a “crime of violence” is

REVERSED.

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