Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02462/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02462-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tennant Company
Defendant
Edward Watson
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

EDWARD WATSON, an individual, 

individually and on behalf of 

all others similarly situated 

and the general public,

Plaintiff,

v.

TENNANT COMPANY, a Minnesota 

Corporation, and DOES 1 through 

50, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:18-cv-02462 WBS DB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 

APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION 

SETTLEMENT AND PROVISIONAL 

CERTIFICATION OF CLASS

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Edward Watson filed this action against 

defendants Tennant Company (“Tennant” or “defendant”), and Does 1 

through 50, alleging various claims related to defendants’ 

failure to properly pay and reimburse service technician staff. 

Plaintiff and defendant Tennant reached a settlement in September 

2019. (Decl. of Alireza Alivandivafa ¶ 7 (Docket No. 25-1).) 

Before the court is plaintiff’s unopposed motion for preliminary 

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approval of the class action settlement and provisional 

certification of the class. (Docket No. 25.)

I. Summary of the Proposed Settlement

Under the proposed settlement, defendant will pay a 

gross amount of $1,100,000, with the entirely of the net 

settlement amount, after fees and costs, to be paid to the class, 

without reversion. (Mot. Prelim. Approval of Settlement, Ex. A, 

“Settlement Agreement,” ¶ 24 (Docket No. 25).) This represents a 

recovery of approximately 50 percent of the claimed overtime 

lost, if calculated for the entire class period. (Alivadivafa 

Decl. ¶ 9(A).) Plaintiff’s counsel seek attorneys’ fees in the 

amount of $366,666.66, one-third of the gross settlement. 

(Settlement Agreement at ¶ 26.) The settlement administration 

costs shall not exceed $20,000. (Id. at ¶ 9(C); Settlement 

Agreement at ¶30.) Plaintiff seeks a service award of $25,000. 

(Id. at ¶ 9(D).) The net settlement amount will be, at least, 

$658,333.33, after all attorneys’ fees, costs, and the service 

award. (Id. at ¶ 9(E).) The average award would be $8,777.77 

per class member, although each recovery will depend on the 

number of qualifying workweeks worked by each class member, 

determined as those workweeks which each putative class member 

actively worked as a service technician in California. (Id.; 

Settlement Agreement at ¶ 12, 30.)

The release covers all claims in the complaint as 

currently constituted. (Alivandivafa Decl. ¶ 8.) The Notice of 

Class Action Settlement and Workweek Dispute Form will be mailed 

to all class members via first class mail. Class members shall 

have 30 days to either opt out or to submit an objection to the 

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proposed settlement. (Id. at ¶ 9.) If 10 percent or more of the 

class members opt out, defendant can, at its option, withdraw 

from the settlement. (Settlement Agreement at ¶30(j).) 

Settlement checks will be valid and negotiable for 180 days, 

after which time any unclaimed checks will be paid to the State 

of California Controller’s Office of Unclaimed Property. (Id. at 

¶ 30(i).) 

II. Discussion

Where the parties reach a settlement agreement prior to 

class certification, the court must first assess whether a class 

exists. Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003). 

“Such attention is of vital importance, for a court asked to 

certify a settlement class will lack the opportunity, present 

when a case is litigated, to adjust the class, informed by the 

proceedings as they unfold.” Id. (quoting Amchem Prods. Inc. v. 

Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997)). “Second, the district court 

must carefully consider ‘whether a proposed settlement is 

fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable,’ recognizing that 

‘[i]t is the settlement taken as a whole, rather than the 

individual component parts, that must be examined for overall 

fairness....’” Id. (quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 

1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

A. Class Certification

The proposed class is defined as all persons who are or 

were employed by defendant as non-exempt Service Technicians 

(including those who performed the same duties as Service 

Technicians but with a different job title) in the State of 

California at any time during the Class Period, and who were not 

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covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement. 

(Alivandivafa Decl. ¶ 8.) To be certified, the putative class 

must satisfy both the requirements of Federal rule of Civil 

Procedure 23(a) and (b). Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 

510, 512 (9th Cir. 2013).

1. Rule 23(a) Requirements

Rule 23(a) establishes four prerequisites for class 

action litigation: (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) 

typicality, and (4) adequacy of representation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(a). The court examines each of these requirements in turn. 

a. Numerosity

A proposed class must be “so numerous that joinder of 

all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The 

numerosity requirement “requires examination of the specific 

facts of each case and imposes no absolute limitations.” Gen. 

Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980)). 

“Courts have routinely found the numerosity requirement satisfied 

when the class comprises 40 or more members.” Vasquez v. Coast 

Valley Roofing, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1121 (E.D. Cal. 2009) 

(citing Ansari v. New York Univ., 179 F.R.D. 112, 114 (S.D.N.Y.

1998)). Here, the parties satisfy the numerosity requirement 

because the settlement class is comprised of approximately 75 

members. (Alivandivafa Decl. ¶ 3.; see Vasquez, 670 F. Supp. at 

1121.) 

Under this Rule 23(a) requirement, “[p]laintiffs also 

must establish impracticability of joinder.” Vasquez, 670 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1121. “A court should consider ‘not only the class 

size but other factors as well, including the geographic 

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diversity of class members, the ability of individual members to 

institute separate suits, and the nature of the underlying action 

and the relief sought.’” Id. (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation 

Survivors v. Walters, 111 F.R.D. 595, 599 (N.D. Cal. 1986)). 

“The limited size of any individual plaintiff's recovery is also 

relevant.” Id. (citing Edmondson v. Simon, 86 F.R.D. 375, 379 

(N.D. Ill. 1980)). Here, individual members of the class may be 

unwilling or unable to bring separate suits “where the potential 

recovery by any individual plaintiff is relatively small.” See

id. Further, filing of individual suits by 75 separate 

plaintiffs could potentially clog the court’s docket and “create 

unnecessary burden on judicial resources.” Vasquez, 670 F. Supp. 

2d at 1121. Accordingly, joinder here would be impracticable.

b. Commonality

Rule 23(a) demands that “questions of law or fact [be]

common to the class.” “It does not require that all questions of 

law or fact be common to every single member of the class.” 

Vasquez, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 1121. Commonality is generally 

satisfied where “the lawsuit challenges a system-wide practice or 

policy that affects all of the putative class members.” 

Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 868 (9th Cir. 2001). 

“Differences in the ways in which these practices affect 

individual members of the class do not undermine the finding of 

commonality.” Vasquez, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 1121-1122 (citing 

Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 868). Here, the parties agree the 

predominant question for the settlement class is whether the 

defendant was obligated to pay minimum and/or overtime wages when 

service technicians worked from home, drove company vehicles to 

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and from work, traveled to calls from their homes after starting 

work at home, and traveled back home from their last calls. 

(Mot. at 15.) These common questions suffice to satisfy the 

commonality requirement.

c. Typicality

Under Rule 23(a), “the claims or defenses of the 

representative parties [must be] typical of the claims or 

defenses of the class.” Vasquez, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (citing 

Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 868). The typicality requirement is 

satisfied where “each class member's claim arises from the same 

course of events, and each class member makes similar legal 

arguments to prove the defendant's liability.” Id. (quoting 

Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 868.) “Under the rule's ‘permissive 

standards,’ representative claims are typical if they are 

‘reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members; they 

need to be substantially identical.’” Id. (citing Hanlon,150 

F.3d at 1020. Here, the conduct that gives rise to the class 

representative’s injuries -- namely defendant’s travel time pay 

practices –- is the same conduct that gives rise to the injuries 

of other class members. Accordingly, the typicality requirement 

is satisfied.

d. Adequacy of Representation

The final Rule 23(a) prerequisite is satisfied if “the 

representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 

interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). In resolving 

this issue, the court must address the following questions: “(a) 

do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of 

interest with other class members and (b) will the named 

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plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on 

behalf of the class?” In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 

F.3d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The court finds that the adequacy requirement is 

satisfied here. First, no conflict of interest exists here. The 

named plaintiff has an interest in proving liability against 

defendant for each of the claims alleged in the complaint, and 

this interest is identical to the interest of each absent class 

member. Cf. Vasquez, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (finding no 

conflict where all members had an interest in “obtaining payment 

for wages unlawfully withheld”). Second, class counsel is 

competent and has experience representing classes of employees in 

wage and hour litigation. (Alivandivafa Decl. ¶ 21, 24.; see

also id.)

2. Rule 23(b) Requirement

Having satisfied the prerequisites set forth in Rule 

23(a), plaintiffs must also satisfy one of the three provisions 

of Rule 23(b). The Rule 23(b)(3) provision is satisfied if “the 

questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over 

any questions affecting only individual members.” See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The predominant question in this litigation is 

whether defendant was obligated to pay minimum and/or overtime 

wages when technicians traveled to and from work. Accordingly, 

the class satisfies the Rule 23(b)(3) provision and the Rule 

23(b) requirement. The court thus finds that a class exists and 

will therefore certify the class. 

3. Rule 23(c)(2) Notice Requirements

If the court certifies a class under Rule 23(b)(3), it 

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“must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable 

under the circumstances, including individual notice to all 

members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Actual notice is not required, but the 

notice provided must be “reasonably certain to inform the absent 

members of the plaintiff class.” Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 

1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).

The parties have jointly selected Analytics Consulting 

to serve as the Settlement Administrator. (Settlement Agreement ¶ 

30.) The defendants will provide Analytics Consulting with the 

information necessary to contact members of the class within 14 

business days of the order granting preliminary approval. 

(Settlement Agreement ¶ 30(a).) All class members will be 

notified of the suit by first class mail within twenty calendar 

days following the court’s order of preliminary approval. 

(Settlement Agreement ¶ 30(b).) The notice summarizes the 

lawsuit, including the definition of the settlement class; a 

description of the substantive issues and proceedings to date; a 

neutral description of the proposed settlement; the amount of 

attorneys’ fees and costs sought; information regarding the right 

to opt out of the settlement; information regarding the right to 

challenge one’s number of work weeks; information regarding the 

right to file an objection regarding the settlement; the 

consequences of remaining a member of the settlement class,

including the fact that one will be bound by the judgment; the 

date, time, and place of the final approval hearing; the identity 

of plaintiff, plaintiff’s counsel, and defendant’s counsel; and 

contact information for plaintiff’s counsel, defendant’s counsel, 

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and the settlement administrator. (Settlement Agreement ¶ 30(b); 

(Mot. Preliminary Approval of Settlement, Ex. B, “Proposed Notice 

of Settlement” (Docket No. 25).) 

The court finds that the process set forth in the

Settlement Agreement is reasonably calculated to provide notice 

to class members and inform class members of their options under 

the agreement. Accordingly, the manner of notice and the content 

of notice satisfies Rule 23(c)(2)(B). Cf. Churchill Vill., LLC 

v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Notice is 

satisfactory if it ‘generally describes the terms of the 

settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with adverse 

viewpoints to investigate and to come forward and be heard.’”).

B. Preliminary Approval of Settlement

“The court must approve any settlement . . . of the 

claims . . . of a certified class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A). 

“The primary concern of [Rule 23(e)] is the protection of th[e] 

class members, including the named plaintiffs, whose rights may 

not have been given due regard by the negotiating parties.” 

Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Comm’n of the City & Cty. 

of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 624 (9th Cir. 1982).

Accordingly, a district court must determine whether a proposed 

class action settlement is “fundamentally fair, adequate, and 

reasonable.” Staton, 327 F.3d at 959. In determining whether a 

settlement agreement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, a 

district court may consider some or all of the following factors: 

“(1) the strength of the Plaintiff's case (2) the risk, expense, 

complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the 

risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (4) 

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the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery 

completed; (6) the stage of the proceedings; (7) the views and 

experience of counsel; (8) any opposition by class members; (9) 

the presence of a governmental participant.” Linney v. Cellular 

Alaska P’ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1242 (9th Cir. 1998). “This list 

of factors is not exclusive, and the court may balance and weigh 

different factors depending on the circumstances of each case.” 

Vasquez, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 (citing Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. 

Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1376 (9th Cir. 1993)). In addition, 

where the payment of attorney’s fees is also part of the 

negotiated settlement, the fee must be evaluated for fairness in 

the context of the overall settlement. Knisley v. Network 

Assocs., 312 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002).

Approval of a class action settlement requires a 

preliminary approval followed by a final approval. West v. 

Circle K Stores, Inc., No. CIV. S-04-0438, 2006 WL 1652598, *2 

(E.D. Cal. June 13, 2006) (“[A]pproval of a class action 

settlement takes place in two stages.”). At the preliminary 

approval stage, the court “evaluate[s] the terms of the 

settlement to determine whether they are within a range of 

possible judicial approval.” Wright v. Linkus Enters., Inc., 259 

F.R.D. 468, 472 (E.D. Cal.2009). At this stage, the court may 

grant preliminary approval of a settlement and direct notice to 

the class if the settlement: “(1) appears to be the product of 

serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations; (2) has no obvious 

deficiencies; (3) does not improperly grant preferential 

treatment to class representatives or segments of the class; and 

(4) falls within the range of possible approval.” Alvarado v. 

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Nederend, No. 1:08–cv–01099, 2011 WL 90228, *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 

11, 2011). 

1. Fairness, Adequacy and Reasonability of Settlement

For the following reasons, the court finds that the 

settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. Here, the 

settlement reflects the strength of the claims and defenses 

asserted. Class counsel believes that plaintiffs have viable 

claims that defendant implemented and engaged in unlawful wage 

and hour policies and practices. (Alivandivafa Decl. at ¶ 9.) 

Class counsel also believes that the claims asserted in this case 

are of a type typically subject to class certification, raising 

common questions as to the legality of defendant’s wage and hour 

policies and practices. (Id.) In defendant’s view, however, 

there is no guarantee that class certification would be granted. 

Defendant further contends that its employment policies and 

practices did not violate applicable wage and hour laws or the 

California Labor Code, arguing that its practices were optional 

and not required, and employees did not miss breaks or earn 

compensation for which they were not paid. (Id.) Defendant also 

maintains that the amount of damages and penalties available is 

far less than plaintiffs claim, such that a more favorable 

outcome at trial is not guaranteed. (Id.) This settlement 

therefore reflects the claims and defenses asserted by the 

parties. 

Further, the amount offered in settlement is generous 

compared to similar cases. The net recovery per class member 

will equate to, at least, $8,777.77. (See Alivandivafa Decl. at 

¶ 9.) The average recovery here exceeds that in other cases of 

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this nature. See, e.g., Vasquez, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 1125 

(average recovery of $1,000.00); Barbosa v. Cargill Meat 

Solutions Corp., 297 F.R.D. 431, 440 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (average 

recovery of $601.91).

Moreover, the discovery and investigation were 

extensive. Specifically, defendant produced thousands of pages 

of documents, in addition to voluminous electronic data, 

including the time and payroll records for all putative class 

members. (See Alivandivafa Decl. ¶¶ 14, 15.) Defendant also 

provided important information about the class and the claims. 

(Id.) Based on this and other information obtained directly from 

defendant’s service technicians, class counsel completed an 

extensive and detailed analysis of the plaintiff’s claims and the 

defendant’s potential liabilities. (Id.) In addition, 

plaintiff’s counsel performed a substantial amount of other work 

in preparation for mediation. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Counsel conducted 

extensive research, interviews, and engaged in law and motion, 

prior to obtaining the settlement at issue for plaintiffs. (See

Alivandivafa Decl. ¶ 6, 7, 14, 15). 

Indeed, counsel in this matter is experienced in these 

kinds of cases. Ms. Alivandivafa has been lead counsel or cocounsel in at least 15 wage-and-hour class actions in California 

state and federal courts and has been found to be qualified class 

counsel in all such cases. (Id. at ¶ 20.) The court thus finds 

that these factors weigh in favor of a finding of a fair, 

adequate, and reasonable settlement. 

2. Attorney’s Fees

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h), the 

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Court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees “authorized by law or 

by agreement of the parties.” A district court must “carefully 

assess the reasonableness of a fee amount spelled out in a class 

action settlement agreement.” Staton, 327 F.3d at 963. In 

diversity actions such as this one, the Ninth Circuit applies 

state law to evaluating fees and the method for calculating them. 

See Mangold v. Cal. Public Util. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1478 (9th 

Cir. 1995).

In general, courts use the percentage method to 

calculate attorney’s fees in cases where a common fund is 

created. Spann v. J.C. Penney Corp., 211 F. Supp. 3d 1244, 1262 

(C.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 1 

Cal. 5th 480, 489 (2016) (approving 27 percent share in 

$50,000,000 settlement)). “Given that the percentage method is 

particularly appropriate in common fund cases where ‘the benefit 

to the class is easily quantified,’” this court will use the 

percentage method to evaluate the requested attorneys’ fees. 

Cooley v. Indian River Transp. Co., No. 1:18-CV-00491, 2019 WL 

2077029, at *7 (E.D. Cal. May 10, 2019) (citing In re Bluetooth 

Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011)). 

“In evaluating whether a percentage fee award is reasonable, the 

court may consider factors such as, inter alia, the results 

secured for the class, awards in similar cases, and the degree of 

risk assumed by counsel.” Id. (citing Romero v. Producers Dairy 

Foods, Inc., No. 1:05-CV00484 DLB, 2007 WL 3492841, at *3 (E.D. 

Cal. Nov. 14, 2007)). 

Plaintiff’s counsel requests one-third of the common 

fund ($366,666.66) in attorneys’ fees. The court preliminarily

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finds the request to be reasonable. First, plaintiff’s counsel 

secured a favorable settlement for the class: an average recovery 

of $8777.77. In addition to the monetary award, class counsel’s 

efforts resulted in defendant changing its pay and scheduling 

practices to ensure that minimum and overtime wages be paid. 

(Alivandivafa Decl. at ¶ 7; cf. Spann, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 1263

(considering “non-monetary relief in the form of changed pricing 

policies, a compliance program, and training for defendant’s 

employees”).) Second, counsel litigated this matter on a 

contingency basis and therefore “assumed a significant risk that 

they would not be compensated for this work.” See Cooley, No. 

1:18-CV-00491, 2019 WL 2077029, at *8. Third, plaintiff’s 

counsel’s request is in line with awards in similar cases. In 

cases where recovery is less than $10,000,000, as here, 

California district courts tend to award between 30 and 40 

percent in class actions. See, e.g., Miller v. CEVA Logistics 

USA, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-01321-TLN, 2015 WL 4730176, at *8 (E.D. 

Cal. Aug. 10, 2015) (citing Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, 

Inc., 266 F.R.D. 482, 491–92 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (approving award of 

33 percent); Singer v. Becton Dickinson & Co., No. 08-CV-821-IEG 

(BLM), 2010 WL 2196104, at *9 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2010) (same); 

Romero v. Producers Dairy Foods, Inc., 2007 WL 3492841, at *1–4 

(E.D. Cal. 2007) (same)).

In light of the result plaintiffs’ counsel obtained, 

the risks counsel incurred, and the fees usually awarded in these 

types of cases, the court finds that one third of the common fund 

is a reasonable award. Accordingly, the court will preliminarily 

allow the award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $366,666.66

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on the understanding that class counsel must demonstrate, on or 

before the date of the final fairness hearing, that the proposed 

award is reasonable in light of the circumstances of the case.

3. Preliminary Approval

a. The settlement is the product of noncollusive, good-faith negotiations.

Here, it appears that the proposed settlement is the 

result of extensive investigation, informal discovery, litigation 

and negotiations between the parties. The prospect of settlement 

of these cases was discussed over a period of many months and 

negotiations were, at all times, adversarial, non-collusive, in 

good faith, and at arm’s length. (Alivandivafa Decl. at ¶¶ 3, 

16.) Further, the parties used a mediator highly regarded by 

both sides in resolving employment cases. (Id. at ¶¶ 3, 7, 16.) 

Overall, the settlement agreement is the product of extensive and 

informed negotiations between counsel with substantial litigation 

experience. (Id. at ¶ 20.) 

b. The proposed settlement has no obvious 

deficiencies.

The settlement provides for a payment of $1,100,000.00 

by defendant, a substantial recovery given the relatively small 

size of the class (75 members). The average settlement share is 

approximately $8,777.77. All settlement shares to be paid under 

the settlement agreement are determined by the number of weeks 

each class member worked in a service technician job. Unclaimed 

funds are to be sent to the State of California Controller’s 

Office of Unclaimed Property. (Agreement ¶ 30(i).) 

The class representative payment of $25,000.00 and the 

attorneys’ fees payment, as discussed above, are appropriate 

given the efforts and work by the attorneys. Further, the 

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expected settlement administrator’s fees and costs of no more 

than $20,000 seem “consistent with wage-and-hour settlements of 

this type and size.” See Vasquez, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 1125

(approving settlement administrator cost of no more than 

$20,000). All payments will nevertheless be subject to court 

approval at a later stage.

c. The proposed settlement does not give 

preferential treatment to the class 

representative.

All class members, including the class representative, 

will be paid based on the number of “Qualifying Workweeks,” which 

are the workweeks during which each putative class member 

actively worked as a service technician in California during the 

relevant time period. The settlement agreement therefore does 

not treat the class representative, or any other subsection of 

the class, differently from other class members. 

d. The settlement agreement falls within the 

range of possible approval.

The “range of possible approval” criterion focuses on 

“substantive fairness and adequacy.” In re Tableware Antitrust 

Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1080. “Courts primarily consider 

plaintiffs’ expected recovery balanced against the value of the 

settlement offer.” Id. Here, the settlement adequately 

represents plaintiff’s expected recovery. The gross settlement 

amount of $1,100,000 represents approximately 50 percent of the 

total alleged travel time violations. The settlement amount 

takes into account the significant risks plaintiffs would 

undertake if they proceeded with litigation. Specifically, 

defendant has vigorously contested, and would continue to 

contest, liability. (See Docket Nos. 6, 7; Mot. at 9.) 

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Moreover, even if plaintiff was to prevail, he would be required 

to expend considerable additional time and resources in further 

discovery, and to file a motion for class certification, 

potentially outweighing additional recovery obtained through 

successful litigation. (Mot. at 8.) Further, if plaintiff is

successful, defendant’s potential appeal could delay the outcome 

of this action for several years. (Id. at 9). Continued 

litigation will therefore delay payment to the class and does not 

guarantee a more favorable outcome for plaintiffs. Accordingly, 

given that the settlement confers a substantial benefit on the 

class members, and that proceeding with litigation imposes risks, 

the settlement adequately represents plaintiff’s expected 

recovery, and is therefore within the range of possible approval.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for

provisional certification of the class and for preliminary 

approval of class action settlement (Docket No. 25) be, and the 

same hereby is, GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT:

(1) the following class be conditionally certified for 

the purpose of settlement: “All persons (or their estate if 

deceased) who are or were actively working for defendant or any 

of defendant’s subsidiaries as non-exempt Service Technicians 

(including those who performed the same duties as Service 

Technicians but with a different job title) in the State of 

California, and who were not covered by a collective bargaining

agreement located in the State of California during the time 

period from August 7, 2014 through Preliminary Approval”;

(2) the proposed settlement is preliminarily approved 

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as fair, just, reasonable, and adequate to the members of the 

settlement class, subject to further consideration at the final 

fairness hearing after distribution of notice to members of the 

settlement class;

(3) for purposes of carrying out the terms of the 

settlement only:

(a) Edward Watson is appointed as Class Representative

and is provisionally found to be an adequate representative 

within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23;

(b) Alireza Alivandivafa, Esq. and Azad M. Marvazy, 

Esq. are provisionally found to be a fair and adequate 

representatives of the settlement class and are appointed as 

class counsel for the purposes of representing the settlement 

class conditionally certified in this Order;

(4) Analytics Consulting, LLC, is appointed as the 

settlement administrator;

(5) the form and content of the proposed Class Notice 

and the method is approved;

(6) no later than fourteen (14) days from the date this 

order is signed, defendant’s counsel shall provide the names and 

contact information of all settlement class members to Analytics 

Consulting;

(7) no later than twenty (20) days from the date 

defendant submits the contact information to Analytics 

Consulting, Analytics Consulting shall mail a Notice of Class 

Action Settlement to all members of the settlement class;

(8) no later than thirty (30) days from the date this 

order is signed, any member of the settlement class who intends 

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to object to, comment upon, or opt out of the settlement shall 

mail written notice of that intent to Analytics Consulting

pursuant to the instructions in the Notice of Class Action 

Settlement;

(9) a final fairness hearing shall be held before this 

court on Monday, September 21, 2020, at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom 5 

to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, 

and adequate and should be approved by this court; to determine 

whether the settlement class’s claims should be dismissed with 

prejudice and judgment entered upon final approval of the 

settlement; to determine whether final class certification is 

appropriate; and to consider class counsel’s applications for 

attorney’s fees, costs, and an incentive award to plaintiff. The 

court may continue the final fairness hearing without further 

notice to the members of the class;

(10) no later than twenty-one (21) days before the 

final fairness hearing, class counsel shall file with this court 

a petition for an award of attorney’s fees and costs. Any 

objections or responses to the petition shall be filed no later 

than fourteen (14) days before the final fairness hearing;

(11) no later than twenty-one (21) days before the 

final fairness hearing, class counsel shall file and serve upon 

the court and defendant’s counsel all papers in support of the 

settlement, the incentive award for the class representative, and 

any award for attorney’s fees and costs;

(12) no later than twenty-one (21) days before the 

final fairness hearing, Analytics Consulting shall prepare, and 

class counsel shall file and serve upon the court and defendants’ 

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counsel, a declaration setting forth the services rendered, proof 

of mailing, a list of all class members who have opted out of the 

settlement, a list of all class members who have commented upon 

or objected to the settlement;

(13) any person who has standing to object to the terms 

of the proposed settlement may appear at the final fairness 

hearing in person or by counsel and be heard to the extent 

allowed by the court in support of, or in opposition to, (a) the 

fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the proposed 

settlement, (b) the requested award of attorney’s fees, 

reimbursement of costs, and incentive award to the class 

representative, and/or (c) the propriety of class certification. 

To be heard in opposition at the final fairness hearing, a person 

must, no later than ninety (90) days from the date this order is 

signed, (a) serve by hand or through the mails written notice of 

his or her intention to appear, stating the name and case number 

of this action and each objection and the basis therefore, 

together with copies of any papers and briefs, upon class counsel 

and counsel for defendants, and (b) file said appearance, 

objections, papers, and briefs with the court, together with 

proof of service of all such documents upon counsel for the 

parties.

Responses to any such objections shall be served by 

hand or through the mails on the objectors, or on the objector’s 

counsel if there is any, and filed with the court no later than 

fourteen (14) calendar days before the final fairness hearing. 

Objectors may file optional replies no later than seven (7) 

calendar days before the final fairness hearing in the same 

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manner described above. Any settlement class member who does not 

make his or her objection in the manner provided herein shall be 

deemed to have waived such objection and shall forever be 

foreclosed from objecting to the fairness or adequacy of the 

proposed settlement, the judgment entered, and the award of 

attorneys’ fees, costs, and an incentive award to the class 

representative unless otherwise ordered by the court;

(14) pending final determination of whether the 

settlement should be ultimately approved, the court preliminarily 

enjoins all class members (unless and until the class member has 

submitted a timely and valid request for exclusion) from filing 

or prosecuting any claims, suits, or administrative proceedings 

regarding claims to be released by the settlement.

Dated: March 19, 2020

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