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Parties Involved:
Canteen Food and Vending Service, Division of Canteen Corporation
Appellant
Wallace E. Torrence
Appellee

Document Text:

,. 

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

United St.at.es Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

MAR 1 41989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

WALLACE E. TORRENCE, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

CANTEEN FOOD AND VENDING SERVICE, 

Division of Canteen Corporation, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 87-1815 

) (D.C. No. 85-2241-S) 

) ( D. Kan.) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR and SETH, Circuit Judges, and SEAY, Chief Judge.** 

**Honorable Frank H. Seay, Chief Judge, United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellee Wallace E. Torrence (Torrence) brought this action 

against his employer, Canteen Food and Vending Service, Division 

of Canteen Corporation (Canteen), for back pay he claimed under 

the provisions of Canteen's collective bargaining agreements 

covering the years 1975 through 1985, with the International 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 87-1815 Document: 010110024610 Date Filed: 03/14/1989 Page: 1 
, ' 

Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement 

Workers of America and its Local No. 31 (UAW). He alleged breach 

of employment contract, misrepresentation, fraud, and outrageous 

conduct in the Kansas state district court. Torrence claimed that 

he should be paid double time for all his Sunday hours, pursuant 

to the collective bargaining agreement. Canteen responded that he 

should have been and indeed had been paid double time for the 

seventh day of the work week, which was Saturday for Torrence's 

work schedule. Canteen removed the action to the federal district 

court under diversity jurisdiction. After a jury trial, Torrence 

was awarded $10,538.15 plus interest. Canteen unsuccessfully 

moved for directed verdict at the close of Torrence's presentation 

of evidence and at the close of all evidence, and unsuccessfully 

moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, motion to alter or 

amend the judgment, and motion for new trial. Canteen appeals to 

this court claiming error in the trial court's denial of its 

motions for directed verdict. 

Torrence maintains that he exhausted the arbitration 

procedure available to him under the collective bargaining 

agreement. He claims that he submitted a written grievance 

pursuant to the procedure in the collective bargaining agreement 

and that the UAW refused to take the grievance to arbitration. He 

uses Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), for authority that the 

court has jurisdiction, rather than the National Labor Relations 

Board (NLRB), over disputes centered on a collective bargaining 

agreement if the union has breached its duty of fair 

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' 

representation, grounding federal court jurisdiction on the Labor 

Management Relations Act, § 301, found at 29 u.s.c. § 185. 

Canteen's position is that The National Labor Relations Act 

(NLRA) preempts federal and state court jurisdiction over suits 

involving unfair labor practices. See San Diego Building Trades 

Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959); A. Cox, Recent 

Developments in Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 Ohio State L.J. 

277, 277-78 n.6 (1980). Canteen asserts that since this case is 

plainly a charge of unfair labor practice, jurisdiction lies with 

the NLRB. Canteen asserts that Vaca does not provide authority 

for federal court jurisdiction in this case because the UAW's 

refusal to take Torrence's grievance to arbitration did not 

constitute a breach of its duty of fair representation. Canteen 

maintains that as a matter of law, the court should have granted 

Canteen's motion for directed verdict at the close of Torrence's 

case. 

In reviewing the propriety of a directed 

verdict pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50, we apply 

the same standard as the trial court should in 

the first instance. Viewing the evidence in a 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 

"a directed verdict is justified only if the 

proof is all one way or so overwhelmingly 

preponderant in favor of the movant as to 

permit no other rational conclusion." 

Wilson v. Al McCord Inc., 858 F.2d 1469, 1474 (10th Cir. 1988) 

(quoting J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. Crites, 851 F.2d 309, 311 (10th 

Cir. 1988)). 

The duty of fair representation does not require unions to 

take to arbitration every grievance with which they are presented. 

Representative unions have the capacity to refuse to pursue 

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Appellate Case: 87-1815 Document: 010110024610 Date Filed: 03/14/1989 Page: 3 
frivolous grievances. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191; Evangelista v. 

Inlandboatmen's Union of Pac., 777 F.2d 1390, 1395 (9th Cir. 

1985); Foust v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 572 F.2d 710, 

715 (10th Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court has written that the 

failure to pursue a grievance to arbitration must be "arbitrary, 

discriminatory, or in bad faith" to constitute breach of the duty 

of fair representation. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190. The probable 

success of the outcome is not a criterion for review. See Vaca, 

386 U.S. at 192-93; Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 609 F.2d 1123, 

1126 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980). The focus of 

the inquiry should be the manner in which the union handles the 

grievance. If the union refuses to pursue a grievance, it must at 

least postulate a reason for doing so. See R. Gorman, Labor Law 

at 714-15 (1976). "[P]roof of unfair representation must 

demonstrate 'substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or 

dishonest conduct."' Freeman, 609 F.2d at 1128 n.9 (quoting 

Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 

299 (1971)); cf. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 

554, 570-71 (1976)(burden of demonstrating breach of duty by union 

''involves more than demonstrating mere errors in judgment"). 

In the case before us, the UAW refused to process Torrence's 

grievance. It also gave Torrence a rational explanation for its 

refusal in a face-to-face meeting with him. Agreeing with Canteen 

management, the UAW reasoned that Sunday was the first day of 

Torrence's work week, rather than the seventh day, and that the 

collective bargaining agreement should be interpreted to call for 

double-time pay on the seventh work day. This reasoning is 

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Appellate Case: 87-1815 Document: 010110024610 Date Filed: 03/14/1989 Page: 4 
supported by the fact that Torrence had been paid and had accepted 

the double-time pay rate for his Saturday hours during the same 

period of time about which he was complaining. (Tr. at 49, 195.) 

The UAW representative who testified as to the UAW's intent with 

regard to the collective bargaining agreement was the union's 

representative in collective bargaining negotiations with Canteen 

for the period in question. (Tr. at 203-04). 

After a thorough review of the trial transcript, we conclude 

that Torrence failed to raise a triable issue of fact on whether 

the UAW breached its duty of fair representation. He presented no 

evidence of ''arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith" behavior on 

behalf of the UAW. In the absence of this required proof, the 

district court should have granted Canteen's motion for directed 

verdict. 

As to Torrence's remaining tort claims, "the inquiry in any 

section 301 case where state law tort actions are also alleged is 

whether evaluation of the tort claim is 'inextricably intertwined 

with consideration of the terms of the labor contract."' 

Evangelista, 777 F.2d at 1401 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. 

Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985)). 

In the case before us, 

inextricably intertwined with 

claim. Any analysis of whether 

Torrence's tort claims are 

his breach of employment contract 

Canteen acted fraudulently or 

outrageously, or misrepresented the terms of his contract to 

Torrence must begin with analysis of the contractual relationship 

between Torrence and Canteen, and must necessarily interpret the 

form and substance of that relationship. Once Torrence failed his 

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Appellate Case: 87-1815 Document: 010110024610 Date Filed: 03/14/1989 Page: 5 
burden of proof that the UAW breached its duty of fair 

representation, the district court had no jurisdiction to hear 

Torrence's tort claims against his employer. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for the 

entry of an order dismissing the case for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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