Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03085/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03085-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marlin Moore
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 20, 2010 Decided July 27, 2010 

No. 06-3085 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

MARLIN MOORE, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 05cr00078-01) 

Sandra G. Roland, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. 

J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Lisa B. Wright, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance. 

Sarah T. Chasson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III and 

Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

Before: GINSBURG, TATEL and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges. 

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG. 

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH. 

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: Marlin Moore was convicted 

of making a materially false statement, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), because he signed a false name on a 

Postal Service delivery form. Moore admits he willfully 

signed a false name but argues his conviction must be 

reversed because no rational jury could have found the false 

name was “material” to any matter within the jurisdiction of 

the federal Government. We disagree and affirm his 

conviction. 

I. Background 

Inspectors from the United States Postal Service 

intercepted a package containing powder cocaine and 

addressed to Karen White, whom the Postal Service believed 

was a “fictitious person,” at 1315 Shepherd Street N.W. in 

Washington, D.C. The Postal Service and the Metropolitan 

Police Department (MPD) organized a “controlled delivery” 

in order to apprehend the recipient of the package. The MPD 

got a warrant authorizing them to replace most of the cocaine 

inside the package with flour, to place a tracking device inside 

the box, and to monitor the delivery of the package. Neither 

the MPD nor the Postal Service knew who would accept the 

package, but they were prepared to arrest anyone who, after 

delivery, attempted to open the package or to remove it from 

the premises. 

Postal Inspector Alicia Bumpas, posing as a letter carrier, 

attempted to hand deliver the package to the indicated 

address. When no one answered her knock on the door, 

Bumpas prepared to fill out a Postal Service form notifying 

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the addressee a parcel was waiting and could be obtained by 

picking it up or by arranging for another delivery. Before 

Bumpas could complete the form, Moore arrived at the house 

and used a key to open the front door. 

Bumpas told Moore she had an Express Mail package for 

Karen White, and asked whether White lived there and 

whether she was home. Moore said White was not home and 

he would sign for the package. When asked his relationship 

to White, Moore said he was her boyfriend. Bumpas asked 

Moore to sign the delivery form and the Express Mail label 

and Moore signed the name “Kevin Jones” on each. Moore 

then took the package, placed it inside the house, shut the 

door, and left the premises. Soon thereafter he returned to the 

house and retrieved the package. He was arrested when he 

attempted to leave with it. 

Moore was charged with various drug-related crimes not 

relevant to this appeal. He was also charged with making a 

materially false statement about a matter within the 

jurisdiction of the United States Postal Service, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). Moore admitted at trial that he 

signed the delivery form and the Express Mail label using a 

false name. On appeal Moore challenges the sufficiency of 

the evidence supporting his conviction for making a 

materially false statement in violation of § 1001. 

II. Analysis 

Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

the judgment of the district court is limited; we must affirm 

the jury’s verdict of guilty if “any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” United States v. Dykes, 406 F.3d 717, 721 

(D.C. Cir. 2005). In making this determination, we view the 

prosecution’s evidence in the light most favorable to the 

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Government and “giv[e] full play to the right of the jury to ... 

draw justifiable inferences of fact.” Id. 

To prove Moore made a statement in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), the Government must show he (1) 

“knowingly and willfully” (2) “[made] any materially false, 

fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation” (3) in a 

“matter within the jurisdiction of the executive ... branch of 

the Government of the United States.” Moore argues only 

that the Government’s evidence was insufficient to support a 

finding that his admittedly false statement was “materially 

false.” 

Section 1001 does not define “materially false.” The 

Supreme Court has said a statement is materially false if it has 

“a natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of 

influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which 

it was addressed.” United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 

509 (1995). Many of our sister circuits have adopted a 

somewhat broader approach to determining materiality, 

asking not only whether a statement might influence a 

discrete decision, but also whether a statement might affect in 

any way the functioning of the government agency to which it 

was addressed. See, e.g., United States v. Alemany Rivera, 

781 F.2d 229, 235 (1st Cir. 1985) (“test for materiality under 

18 U.S.C. § 1001 is ... whether [the statement] had the 

capacity to influence a government function”); United States 

v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir. 1980) (“false 

statement must simply have the capacity to impair or pervert 

the functioning of a government agency”); United States v. 

White, 270 F.3d 356, 365 (6th Cir. 2001) (“‘materiality’ is a 

fairly low bar .... [T]he government must present at least 

some evidence showing how the false statement in question 

was capable of influencing federal functioning.”); United 

States v. Moore, 446 F.3d 671, 681 (7th Cir. 2006) (statement 

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is material if it “has a natural tendency to influence, or ... is 

capable of affecting, a government function”); United States 

v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 530 (11th Cir. 1996) (“it is enough if 

the statements had a natural tendency to influence[] or [were] 

capable of affecting or influencing a government function”) 

(internal quotation marks deleted); see also Brogan v. United 

States, 522 U.S. 398, 403 (1998) (§ 1001 at least “protect[s] 

the authorized functions of governmental ... agencies from the 

perversion which might result” from relying upon a false 

statement); United States v. Sarihifard, 155 F.3d 301, 307 

(4th Cir. 1998) (stating distinction between discrete decision 

and general investigation by grand jury is “irrelevant” to 

materiality). 

In determining whether a false statement is material this 

court has consistently asked whether the statement has a 

tendency to influence a discrete decision of the body to which 

it was addressed. See, e.g., United States v. Winstead, 74 F.3d 

1313, 1320–21 (1996); United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 

940, 949 (1985). We have, however, suggested a “lie 

distorting an investigation already in progress” also would run 

afoul of § 1001. Hansen, 772 F.2d at 949. We now join the 

other circuits in holding a statement is material if it has a 

natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, 

either a discrete decision or any other function of the agency 

to which it was addressed. 

Moore argues that even with this understanding of 

materiality we must reverse his conviction because his false 

statement was “not capable of influencing the Postal Service” 

in any way. He notes that when Inspector Bumpas gave him 

the package and asked him to sign for it, “she did not know 

his name, she did not ask his name, and she did not ask him 

for identification.” 

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We agree the evidence shows the name that Moore 

signed was immaterial to Inspector Bumpas’s decision to 

deliver the package to him. In keeping with the reasoning 

above and in Gaudin, however, the question of materiality is 

not to be answered by reference only to the specific 

circumstances of the case at hand. As the Supreme Court 

explained in Gaudin, a statement need not actually influence 

an agency in order to be material; it need only have “a natural 

tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing” an 

agency function or decision. 515 U.S. at 509; accord Hansen, 

772 F.2d at 949 (“Proof of actual reliance on the statement is 

not required; the Government need only make a reasonable 

showing of its potential effects”); United States v. McBane, 

433 F.3d 344, 351 (3d Cir. 2005) (“the phrase ‘natural 

tendency’ connotes qualities of the statement ... that transcend 

the immediate circumstances in which it is offered and inhere 

in the statement itself”). 

Moore points out that at trial the Government failed to 

present any testimony or other evidence specifically for the 

purpose of establishing the materiality of Moore’s false 

statement. Nonetheless, we hold the evidence that was 

presented more than sufficed for a reasonable jury to 

conclude, as the Government argued at trial, that Moore’s 

false statement was capable of affecting the Postal Service’s 

general function of tracking packages and identifying the 

recipients of packages entrusted to it. Moore’s use of a false 

name also could have impeded the ability of the Postal 

Service to investigate the trafficking of narcotics through the 

mails. See United States v. Baker, 200 F.3d 558, 561 (8th Cir. 

2000) (fictitious home address provided by subject of Postal 

Service investigation was material because it could have 

inhibited the Postal Service’s ability “to carry out its core 

function of delivering the mail” and furthered the defendant’s 

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attempt to “[make] herself hard to find during the 

investigation”). 

What was that evidence? First, Inspector Bumpas 

testified she would not have delivered the package unless she 

received a signature identifying the recipient. From this the 

jury could reasonably infer one function of the Postal Service 

is to track certain types of packages and to identify the 

recipients thereof. Clearly, signing a false name on a delivery 

form may adversely affect the ability of the Postal Service to 

perform this function. 

Second, Postal Inspector Mark Mancuso testified to 

having used, in the course of a narcotics investigation, a 

Postal Service “database that will track who signed for a 

package.” In this case the Postal Service did not need to rely 

upon the name signed on the delivery form in order to identify 

Moore but only because, soon after leaving the premises, he 

returned and was arrested by the police staked out there. Had 

Moore not returned, his having given a false name could have 

prevented the Postal Service from identifying and locating 

him in pursuit of its investigation. 

III. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is 

Affirmed. 

 

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 KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, concurring: 

This case is novel: The Government has obtained a false 

statements conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 against an 

individual who signed the wrong name on a postal delivery 

form. I join the Court’s opinion. I add these brief concurring 

comments because this case highlights one of the difficult 

issues that can arise in prosecutions under the evermetastasizing § 1001 – namely, the mens rea requirements for 

the statute, which by its text proscribes only those false 

statements that are “knowingly and willfully” made. 

* * * 

Federal prosecutors tried Moore twice for various drug 

offenses, but both times the jury hung. In the second trial, 

prosecutors tacked on a false statements charge under § 1001. 

The charged false statement? Moore signed the wrong name 

on a Postal Service delivery form, PS Form 3849. Unlike 

many government forms, PS Form 3849 contained no 

warning that an inaccurate statement might be a crime. And it 

is not otherwise clear that Moore (or most people) would 

know that signing the wrong name on a postal delivery form 

is a crime. But the defense did not request a knowledge-oflaw instruction, and the District Court did not require the 

Government to prove that the defendant knew his conduct 

was unlawful. Moore was convicted of the false statements 

count and sentenced on that charge alone to five years in 

prison. 

As many others have noted, § 1001 prosecutions can pose 

a risk of abuse and injustice. In part, that’s because § 1001 

applies to virtually any statement an individual makes to 

virtually any federal government official – even when the 

individual making the statement is not under oath (unlike in 

perjury cases) or otherwise aware that criminal punishment 

can result from a false statement. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & 

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Misha Tseytlin, You’re (Probably) a Federal Criminal, in IN 

THE NAME OF JUSTICE 43, 47 (2009) (“Your mom taught you 

not to lie, but she probably didn’t tell you that making a false 

statement to any federal official dealing with any matter in his 

jurisdiction will make you a federal criminal.”); cf. United 

States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 82 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., 

dissenting) (§ 1001 can be used to punish “the most casual 

false statements so long as they turned out, unbeknownst to 

their maker, to be material to some federal agency function . . 

. . [making] a surprisingly broad range of unremarkable 

conduct a violation of federal law”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Proper application of statutory mens rea requirements and 

background mens rea principles can mitigate the risk of abuse 

and unfair lack of notice in prosecutions under § 1001 and 

other regulatory statutes. In § 1001 cases, that means proof 

that the defendant knew that making the false statement 

would be a crime. To be sure, “ignorance of law is no 

defense” is a hoary maxim. But it does not automatically 

apply to today’s phalanx of federal regulatory crimes. See 

WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.6, at 298-311 (5th ed. 

2010). For some regulatory offenses – particularly statutes 

like § 1001 that proscribe only “willful” conduct – the 

Supreme Court has recognized an ignorance-of-law or 

mistake-of-law defense, or has required affirmative proof of 

the defendant’s knowledge that his or her conduct was 

unlawful. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191-92 

(1998); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141-49 (1994);

Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199-201 (1991); 

Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1957); cf. 

Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1985); Dan 

M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse – But Only for the 

Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 150 (1997) (noting that 

“courts permit mistake of law as a defense [] selectively 

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across malum prohibitum crimes”). For criminal statutes 

prohibiting “willful” violators, those cases together require 

proof that the defendant was aware that the conduct was 

unlawful. 

In Bryan, the Supreme Court summarized the rule quite 

clearly: “[I]n order to establish a willful violation of a statute, 

the Government must prove that the defendant acted with 

knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.” 524 U.S. at 191-

92 (internal quotation marks omitted). Since Bryan, the Court 

has reiterated this formulation on several occasions. See also 

Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 n.9 (2007) 

(“we have consistently held that a defendant cannot harbor 

such criminal intent unless he acted with knowledge that his 

conduct was unlawful”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 

Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (the term 

“willfully” “requires a defendant to have acted with 

knowledge that his conduct was unlawful”) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).*

It is true that our Court many years ago seemed to assume 

(in addressing a mens rea issue under a different statute) that 

proving the defendant’s knowledge of the law may not be 

required in § 1001 cases. See United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 

517, 522 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1999). In so doing, Hsia referenced a 

1994 Third Circuit opinion that pre-dated the Supreme 

Court’s clarifying decisions in Bryan and later cases. That 

assumption may not endure in light of those subsequent 

 *

 To say that the Government must prove the defendant knew 

the conduct was a crime is not necessarily to say that the 

Government must prove the defendant knew the specific code 

provision proscribing the conduct, except with respect to certain 

highly technical statutes. See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 194; cf. Ratzlaf, 

510 U.S. at 141 (anti-structuring statute); Cheek, 498 U.S. at 200 

(tax statute). 

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Supreme Court precedents. In a future case, we therefore may 

need to consider the appropriate mens rea requirements and 

defenses for § 1001 prosecutions under those Supreme Court 

decisions. 

Here, however, there is no legal obstacle to our affirming 

Moore’s § 1001 conviction: Moore did not contend that the 

term “willfully” in § 1001 requires proof of the defendant’s 

knowledge of the law, and he did not challenge the jury 

instructions on that basis. But in a case where the issue is 

raised, the Supreme Court’s precedents arguably require 

district courts in § 1001 cases to give a willfulness instruction 

that requires proof that the defendant knew his conduct was a 

crime. To be sure, in many false statements cases the 

Government will be able to easily prove that the defendant 

knew his conduct was unlawful. But in some cases, it will not 

be able to do so – and those of course are precisely the cases 

where it would seem inappropriate and contrary to § 1001’s 

statutory text to impose criminal punishment. 

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