Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35866/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35866-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alaska Wilderness League
Appellant
Center for Biological Diversity
Appellant
Mark Fesmire
Appellee
Greenpeace, Inc.
Appellant
Sally Jewell
Appellee
National Audobon Society, Inc.
Appellant
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
Appellant
Ocean Conservancy, Inc.
Appellant
Oceana, Inc.
Appellant
Pacific Environment and Resources Center
Appellant
Redoil, Inc.
Appellant
Brian Salerno
Appellee
Shell Gulf of Mexico Inc.
Appellee
Shell Offshore Inc.
Appellee
Sierra Club
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE;

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL

DIVERSITY, INC.; GREENPEACE, INC.;

NATIONAL AUDOBON SOCIETY, INC.;

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE

COUNCIL, INC.; OCEAN

CONSERVANCY, INC.; OCEANA, INC.;

PACIFIC ENVIRONMENT AND

RESOURCES CENTER; REDOIL, INC.;

SIERRA CLUB,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary of the

Interior; BRIAN SALERNO, Director

of Bureau of Safety and

Environmental Enforcement; MARK

FESMIRE, Regional Director of

Bureau of Safety and Environmental

Enforcement, Alaska Region,

Defendants-Appellees,

SHELL GULF OF MEXICO INC.; SHELL

OFFSHORE INC.,

Intervenor-Defendants–Appellees.

No. 13-35866

D.C. Nos.

3:12-cv-00048-

RRB

1:12-cv-00010-

RRB

ORDER

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2 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL

Filed December 29, 2015

Before: Jerome Farris, Dorothy W. Nelson,

and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.

Order;

Dissent by Judge Gould

SUMMARY*

Environmental Law

The panel denied the petition for panel rehearing, and

denied the petition for rehearing en banc on behalf of the

court, concerning decisions by the Bureau of Safety and

Environmental Enforcement not to engage in consultation

pursuant to the Endangered Species Act, and not to prepare

an environmental impact statement pursuant to the National

Environmental Policy Act, before approving Shell Gulf of

Mexico Inc.’s oil spill response plan for offshore drilling in

the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas on Alaska’s Arctic coast. 

Judge Nelson voted to grant the petition for panel

rehearing, and recommended granting the petition for

rehearing en banc.

Judge Gould, joined by Judges W. Fletcher and Callahan,

dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc. Judge Gould

wrote that the majority wrongly interpreted the statute that

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL 3

governs oil spill response plans, the 1990 amendments to the

Clean Water Act, as imposing nondiscretionary duties based

on a perceived statutory ambiguity; and in granting the

Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement Chevron

deference on the issue. Judge Gould wrote that this resulted

in the majority wrongly narrowing the application of both the

Endangered Species Act and the National Environmental

Policy Act.

ORDER

Judges Farris and Nguyen voted to deny the petition for

rehearing. Judge Nelson voted to grant the petition for

rehearing. Judge Nguyen voted to deny the petition for

rehearing en banc, and Judge Farris so recommended. Judge

Nelson recommended granting the petition for rehearing en

banc.

The full court was advised of the petition for rehearing en

banc. A judge requested a vote on whether to rehear the

matter en banc, and the matter failed to receive a majority of

the votes of the nonrecused active judges in favor of en banc

consideration. Fed. R. App. P. 35.

The petition for panel rehearing and the petition for

rehearing en banc are DENIED. No future petitions for

rehearing or petitions for rehearing en banc will be

entertained.

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4 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL

GOULD, Circuit Judge, with whom W. FLETCHER and

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting from the denial

of rehearing en banc:

I respectfully dissent from denial of rehearing en banc in

this case, which concerns decisions by the Bureau of Safety

and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) not to engage in

consultation pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA),

and not to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS)

pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),

before approving Shell’s oil spill response plans for offshore

drilling in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. The majority’s

ESA analysis rests first on an erroneous decision to grant

BSEE Chevron deference, based on the majority’s finding an

ambiguity in the statute where none exists, and second on an

incorrect analogy to National Association of Home Builders

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007). The majority

incorrectly interpreted the statute that governs oil spill

response plans, the 1990 amendments to the Clean Water Act

(CWA), as imposing nondiscretionary duties; it granted

Chevron deference to BSEE on this issue based on a

perceived statutory ambiguity. But the statute’s clear

language demonstrates without ambiguity that BSEE

exercises discretion in reviewing and approving oil spill

response plans. Both parts of the majority opinion lead to an

unprecedented and unwise constraining of the powers of the

ESA and NEPA.

The majority’s decision in this case encourages federal

agencies to abrogate their oversight by deciding that a

statute’s requirements limit their discretion to the point of

taking the ESA and NEPA off the table. The majority invites

federal agencies to ignore their ESA and NEPA obligations,

await a challenge, and then defend their inaction under the

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ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL 5

guise of Chevron deference. However, the federal courts

should not be so eager to accept, under the guise of Chevron,

an agency decision that violates existing case law interpreting

the ESA and NEPA, as well as the very logic of those

statutes. Chevron was meant to prevent courts from imposing

their own construction of a statute where Congress has not

“directly addressed the precise question at issue.” Chevron,

U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843

(1984). Instead, courts should defer to an agency’s

“permissible interpretation of a statute.” Id. Chevron was not

meant to force courts into deferring to an agency’s contention

that it lacks discretion over statutorily mandated

requirements. Such a ruling invites abrogation of statutory

responsibilities.

I.

A central flaw in the majority’s decision is that it finds an

ambiguity in 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5) where none exists. 

According to this statute, part of the 1990 amendments to the

CWA passed after the Exxon Valdez disaster, an oil

company’s oil spill response plan must show that the

company is capable of “responding, to the maximum extent

practicable, to a worst case discharge, and to a substantial

threat of such a discharge, of oil or a hazardous substance.” 

33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i). To comply, the proposed plans

must meet six specific requirements. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1321(j)(5)(D). The statute then directs that the President

“shall” take several actions after an oil company submits its

plan: “promptly review” it, “require amendments” to a plan

that does not meet the statutory requirements, and “approve

any plan” that does meet the requirements. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1321(j)(5)(E). According to the majority, the “shall”

language suggests that BSEE “must approve” anyconforming

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plan, and thus has no discretion over the adequacy of the

plans. Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell, 788 F.3d 1212,

1220 (9th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original). This led the

majority to find an ambiguity in the statute: “It is unclear how

the broad language of section 1321(j)(5)(A)(i), with its

reference to the ‘maximum extent practicable,’ interacts with

the finite statutory criteria of section 1321(j)(5)(D).” Id. 

“And that means we . . . face a statute whose halves do not

correspond to each other—giving rise to an ambiguity that

calls for Chevron deference.” Id. (quoting Scialabba v.

Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2210 (2014)).

However, there is no ambiguity in the statute that

warrants Chevron deference. The CWA amendments

unambiguously give BSEE discretion over oil spill response

plan approval. Section 1321(j)(5)(A)(i) requires an oil spill

response plan to respond “to the maximum extent practicable

to a worst case discharge, and to a substantial threat of such

a discharge, of oil or a hazardous substance.” According to

the majority, “the open-ended nature of [this] phrase . . .

suggests agency discretion.” Alaska Wilderness, 788 F.3d at

1220. The majority agreed with Judge Nelson, who

dissented, that this portion of the statute could be read to

“serve[] as an independent ‘standard’ that must be met in

addition to the list of enumerated requirements at

§ 1321(j)(5)(D).” Id. at 1222, 1229 (Nelson, J., dissenting)

(“[T]he phrase ‘maximum extent practicable’ . . . has a

superlative quality and therefore must refer to the greatest

option in a range of possibilities.”).

The majority is wrong that the statute’s “halves do not

correspond to each other.” Id. at 1220. Like the broad

language in § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i), one of the six explicit criteria

requires removal of a worst case discharge “to the maximum

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ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL 7

extent practicable.” 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D)(iii). 

Accepting the majority’s conclusion that this phrase

“suggests agency discretion,” there is no ambiguity entitling

BSEE to Chevron deference on the issue of its discretion,

because the phrase appears in both parts of the statute. See

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (“If the intent of Congress is clear,

that is the end of the matter . . . .”). The majority ignored that

the statute’s specific requirements include the same phrase as

the statute’s introduction, which the majority and dissent

agreed suggests agency discretion over response plan

approval.

As explained more fully below, this case is unlike Home

Builders because the statutory duty at issue does not restrict

BSEE’s discretion over approval of oil spill response plans. 

The majority makes much of the statute’s requirement that

BSEE “shall” approve any plan that “meets the requirements

of this paragraph,” but it ignores the substance of those

requirements. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(j)(5)(E)(i) & (iii). The

requirements do not constitute mere “triggering events,” as in

Home Builders; they require a thorough evaluation of a

response plan. Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 669.

First, one of statute’s explicit requirements is that

response plans must “be consistent with the requirements of

the National Contingency Plan [NCP] and Area Contingency

Plans.” 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D)(i). The NCP contains

numerous phases of operational responses to a spill, including

a special response to worst case discharges, see 40 C.F.R.

§§ 300.300–300.335, and includes several protections for

endangered species. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 300.135(k). The

NCP also requires that environmental evaluations “be

performed to assess threats to the environment, especially

sensitive habitats and critical habitats of species protected

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8 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL

under the [ESA].” 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(2)(i)(G). 

However, the majority does not explain how BSEE could

determine whether a response plan meets the NCP’s

numerous independent requirements if BSEE’s oversight role

is truly just to check the boxes in a “checklist.” Alaska

Wilderness, 788 F.3d at 1220. Whether an oil company’s oil

spill response plan is “consistent with the requirements of the

[NCP] and Area Contingency Plans” is far from a mechanical

determination or “triggering event[].” Home Builders, 551

U.S. at 669.

Second, the CWA amendments require that a company’s

response plan “remove . . . a worst case discharge,”

specifically defining the term “remove” to mean

“containment and removal of the oil . . . from the water and

shorelines or . . . such other actions as may be necessary to

prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or

welfare, including . . . fish, shellfish, wildlife, and public and

private property, shorelines, and beaches.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1321(a)(8). Whether an oil spill response plan provides the

means to “remove” a worst case discharge is also a question

that requires evaluation of the plan—it is not simply a

“triggering event[].” Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 669.

Third, other sections of the CWA governing the federal

government’s spill plans, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(d)(1)–(2) &

(j)(4)(B)–(D), contain the same “shall” language as the

sections governing oil spill response plans, yet are

undisputedly subject to ESA consultation. The majority

asserts that “[t]hese provisions . . . are different,” but does not

say why. Alaska Wilderness, 788 F.3d at 1224. The majority

tries to distinguish § 1321(d)(1), which requires the President

to prepare and publish an NCP, by claiming that “[n]othing

in the text prohibits such a plan from being prepared in light

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ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL 9

of concerns that an ESA consultation might raise.” Id. But

the majority does not explain why its analysis of the statute

at issue here looks for explicit mention of ESA consultation

whereas its analysis of a parallel provision looks for an

explicit prohibition on ESA consultation. It is the majority’s

inconsistent textual analysis, not any meaningful distinction

in CWA provisions, that produces these contrary results.

Fourth, the majority attempts to distinguish response plan

approval from the NCP, which according to the statute should

“include, but not be limited to” a number of factors “that

might be deemed necessary after an ESA consultation

occurs,” including “water pollution control and conservation

and trusteeship of natural resources (including conservation

of fish and wildlife).” 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2); Alaska

Wilderness, 788 F.3d at 1224. This argument by the majority

apparently is intended to bolster its conclusion that unlike the

NCP, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(E) “leaves no room for the

inclusion of additional factors.” Alaska Wilderness, 788 F.3d

at 1224. But the majority does not mention that, as explained

above, one of the very requirements BSEE must consider

before approving an oil spill response plan is its

“consisten[cy] with the requirements of the [NCP].” 

33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D)(i); Alaska Wilderness, 788 F.3d at

1224. It is unavailing to distinguish response plan approval

from the supposedly more broad-based NCP, when

consistency with the NCP is one of the factors to be

considered in approving an oil spill response plan.

Fifth, as the dissent explained, BSEE’s implementing

regulations make clear that the agency can exercise its

discretion to benefit protected species. Alaska Wilderness,

788 F.3d at 1228 (Nelson, J., dissenting). For example, the

regulations require operators to identify resources of

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10 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL

“environmental importance” that could be harmed by a

“worst case discharge scenario,” and to provide strategies to

protect them. 30 C.F.R. §§ 254.26(a), (c). The regulations

also require operators to identify procedures to “protect

beaches, waterfowl, other marine and shoreline resources, and

areas of special . . . environmental importance.” 30 C.F.R.

§ 254.23(g)(4). The majority does not explain how BSEE’s

cursory review of an oil spill response plan could be

consistent with the agency’s own regulations. These

regulations underscore that § 1321(j)(5)(D) is not just a

“checklist statute.” Alaska Wilderness, 788 F.3d at 1220.

BSEE reasoned that its implementing regulations define

“maximum extent practicable” as “within the limitations of

available technology, as well as the physical limitations of

personnel, when responding to a worst case discharge in

adverse weather conditions.” 30 C.F.R. § 254.6; Federal

Defendants’ Opposition to Rehearing En Banc at 12–13. 

According to BSEE, nothing in this language gives it the

discretion to consider a wide range of factors consistent with

the general meaning of the word “maximum.” Id. at 12. That

argument persuaded the majority. But Judge Nelson’s dissent

persuasively explains the unreasonableness of this reasoning.

See Alaska Wilderness, 788 F.3d at 1229 (Nelson, J.,

dissenting). Even under BSEE’s definition of “maximum

extent practicable,” BSEE must determine whether Shell’s

response plans met the standard. And, as even the majority

reasoned, the term “maximum extent practicable” “suggests

agency discretion because of [its] open-ended nature . . . .” 

Id. at 1220.

Finally, further evidence that the CWA amendments

contemplated active review comes from 33 U.S.C.

§§ 1321(j)(5)(E)(ii) & (iii), which direct BSEE to “require

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ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL 11

amendments to any plan that does not meet the requirements

of this paragraph,” or to approve a plan that does meet them. 

That Congress has given BSEE the responsibility to decide

whether an oil spill response plan meets the statutory criteria,

and has directed the agency to require amendments to

nonconforming plans, is further evidence that the statute

imparts discretion. Nowhere does the majority explain why

Congress would task BSEE with requiring amendments to a

nonconforming plan if it truly sought to cabin the agency’s

discretion or to make the requirements of the CWA

amendments mere “triggering events.” Home Builders,

551 U.S. at 669.

The approval process for oil spill response plans requires

agency discretion. It was wrong to grant BSEE Chevron

deference on this issue.

II.

Two flawed holdings flow from the majority’s erroneous

Chevron determination. Specifically, the majority narrowed

the application of both the ESA and NEPA. First, the

majority’s approach sets a dangerous precedent for ignoring

ESA § 7. Undisputedly, ESA consultation is only required

when an agency takes a “discretionary” action. 50 C.F.R.

§ 402.03. As explained above, however, response plan

approval pursuant to the requirements of 33 U.S.C.

§ 1321(j)(5)(D) is discretionary because it requires BSEE to

analyze whether the requirements have been met. BSEE

should therefore be required to consult under the ESA. The

majority concluded otherwise based on its incorrect analogy

to Home Builders. At issue in Home Builders was a

requirement in CWA § 402(b) that the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) “shall approve” a transfer of CWA

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12 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL

permitting authority from the federal government to a state

upon a showing that the state had met nine specified criteria.1

Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 650–51. The Supreme Court

described the “shall approve” language in CWA § 402(b) as

“mandatory” and held that EPA did not have discretion to

deny a transfer application. Id. at 661. Because the ESA

required consultation for all discretionary agency actions, the

Court’s majorityconcluded that application ofthe ESA would

impermissibly “engraft[] a tenth criterion onto the CWA.” Id.

at 663. Here, the majority claims that, like CWA § 402(b),

the six requirements for response plan approval in 33 U.S.C.

§ 1321(j)(5)(D) are mandatory, and the ESA is not applicable.

However, this case differs from Home Buildersfor at least

three reasons. First, Home Builders hinged partially on the

fact that the ESA was passed after the CWA, and did not

explicitly overrule CWA § 402(b). Home Builders, 551 U.S.

1 To become the permitting authority, the state must demonstrate that it

has the ability: (1) to issue fixed-term permits that apply and ensure

compliance with the CWA’s substantive requirements and which are

revocable for cause; (2) to inspect, monitor, and enter facilities and to

require reports to the extent required by the CWA; (3) to provide for

public notice and public hearings; (4) to ensure that the EPA receives

notice of each permit application; (5) to ensure that any other State whose

waters may be affected by the issuance of a permit may submit written

recommendations and that written reasons be provided if such

recommendations are not accepted; (6) to ensure that no permit is issued

if the Army Corps of Engineers concludes that it would substantially

impair the anchoring and navigation of navigable waters; (7) to abate

violations of permits or the permit program, including through civil and

criminal penalties; (8) to ensure that any permit for a discharge from a

publicly owned treatment works includes conditions requiring the

identification of the type and volume of certain pollutants; and (9) to

ensure that any industrial user of any publicly owned treatment works will

comply with certain of the CWA’s substantive provisions. 33 U.S.C.

§§ 1342(b)(1)–(9).

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at 662. But here, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5) postdates the ESA

by seventeen years. There is no concern here, as there was in

Home Builders, that ESA consultation would implicitly

amend a prior statute.

The second distinction is that in Home Builders, the

parties appeared to agree that the state had authority to

perform each of the nine enumerated functions in CWA

§ 402(b). Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 672 (“[T]here is no

dispute that Arizona has satisfied each of those statutory

criteria”); see also Alaska Wilderness, 788 F.3d at 1229

(Nelson, J., dissenting). The parties’ disagreement was

instead about whether ESA consultation added an extra step

to transfer of permitting authority. Here, the question is not

whether the ESA adds an extra step to the approval process,

but how much discretion there is in the existing steps of

33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D). On this the parties do not agree. 

This distinction means that although Home Builders is

controlling precedent, its particular outcome does not bind

this case.

Third, the conditions in § 1321(j)(5)(D) that must be met

for response plan approval are substantively different than the

conditions for state permitting authority in Home Builders. 

There, the Supreme Court characterized the conditions as

“triggering events” with a mechanical cause and effect. 

Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 669. Arizona had to show that it

had the ability to perform nine specific tasks. Once it had

done so, the agency had no choice but to transfer CWA

permitting authority. Id. at 669. This reading is consistent

with the Supreme Court’s conclusion that CWA § 402(b)

imposed nondiscretionary requirements on EPA. Id. at 661. 

Here, as explained above, the requirements are not simple

enough to be considered mere “triggering events.” Id. at 669. 

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They require evaluation of whether an oil spill response plan

actually meets, for example, the requirement that it be

consistent with the NCP, or the requirement that it ensure the

availability of personnel and equipment necessary to remove

a worst case discharge to the “maximum extent practicable.” 

33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(j)(5)(D)(i), (iii).

By not correcting the majority’s holding through en banc

rehearing, we have permitted a gross alteration of Supreme

Court precedent and given federal agencies unwarranted and

unprecedented authority over whether their statutory duties

are discretionary or not, which directly impacts whether ESA

consultation is required. ESA consultation is required for

“any action authorized, funded, or carried out by” a federal

agency—with the rare exception for cases such as Home

Builders, where a statute’s requirements are clearly

“triggering events” rather than independent requirements, and

where there is no dispute that the requirements have been

met. Neither is true of the statute at issue here, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1321(j)(5). This is clear from the statute itself, and the

majority was wrong to adopt the agency’s contrary

interpretation under the guise of Chevron.

The majority’s decision also misapplies NEPA precedent. 

NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an EIS for all

“major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of

the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). In a

narrow exception, NEPA does not apply where an agency

lacks the discretion to consider environmental values in its

decision making process. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Public

Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767–69 (2004). Here, the majority

held that BSEE reasonably concluded that it “must approve

any [response plan] that meets the statutory requirements.”

Alaska Wilderness, 788 F.3d at 1225. “Thus, even assuming,

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without deciding, that BSEE’s approval of Shell’s [response

plans] constitutes a ‘major Federal action,’ its approval is not

subject to NEPA’s requirements.” Id. The majority

analogized this case to Public Citizen, where the governing

statute required the Federal Motor Carrier Safety

Administration (FMCSA) to register a person to provide

transportation as a motor carrier if it found the person willing

and able to comply with the statute’s requirements. Public

Citizen, 541 U.S. at 766. NEPA review was not required in

Public Citizen because the agency lacked the power to

consider environmental consequences outside its statutory

obligation. Id. at 768–70.

The majority’s analogy to Public Citizen is

unsupported. As explained above, § 1321(j)(5)(D) imposes

a discretionary duty on BSEE. In Public Citizen, the

Supreme Court held that FMCSA did not have to account for

certain environmental effects in its environmental assessment

because it had “no ability to countermand” executive action

by the President, so its action did not have a “reasonably

close causal relationship” to any negative environmental

impacts. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 766–67. That is not the

case here, because BSEE does have the authority to consider

environmental values in its decision-making process. BSEE’s

approval of response plans is discretionary, and it would

provide a “reasonably close causal relationship” between the

agency action and environmental effects, including a “worst

case discharge,” stemming from a potential spill. See Public

Citizen, 541 U.S. at 767; 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i).2

2 Deference to BSEE’s views may also be tempered here because we are

assessing whether BSEE’s review and approval of an oil spill response

plan under the CWA is non-discretionary within the meaning of NEPA. 

As the D.C. Circuit has explained, “the court owes no deference to the

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16 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL

In sum, the impact of the majority’s decision is to take the

ESA and NEPA off the table when considering oil spill

response plans, which are a required component of offshore

drilling proposals. This violates the language of 33 U.S.C.

§ 1321(j)(5), which by its terms requires discretionary

evaluation of oil spill response plans. The statute calls on

BSEE to assess whether response plans give protection to the

“maximum extent practicable.” 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i). 

A federal agency cannot determine if protection is to the

“maximum extent practicable” without exercising some

discretion in judgment. If discretion is needed, then

claimants with standing, and the federal courts, must be part

of the approval process until decisions are made in litigation.

III.

I agree with the majority that the ESA and NEPA do not

require an agency to provide redundant analysis. NEPA and

its implementing regulations accommodate this concern by

allowing agencies to take a “tiered” approach to

environmental review. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (encouraging

tiering of NEPA review). We have also allowed for tiering of

ESA review. See Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish &

Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Thus, BSEE’s NEPA and ESA review of the proposed

[agency’s] interpretation of NEPA . . . because NEPA is addressed to all

federal agencies and Congress did not entrust administration of NEPA to

[BSEE] alone.” Grand Canyon Trust v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 290 F.3d

339, 342 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Moreover, Congress demonstrated in the CWA

that it knows how to exempt agency approvals from environmental

review. See 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c) (exempting certain actions by EPA from

NEPA review). That Congress did not similarly exempt BSEE’s oil spill

response plan approval, pursuant to the CWA, from NEPA or ESA review

strongly suggests that Congress intended the statutes to apply.

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ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL 17

approval of Shell’s oil spill response plans need not be

burdensome or redundant if the foreseeable impacts of

approving the plans, and reasonable alternatives, were already

addressed in an EIS and biological opinion completed at an

earlier stage of development. If this were the case, BSEE

could, for example, prepare a shorter environmental

assessment tiered to the earlier EIS to satisfy NEPA. See 40

C.F.R. § 1508.9 (describing an environmental assessment). 

Here, the majority does not address whether BSEE satisfied

NEPA and the ESA through tiered environmental review. 

Rather, the majority rules that oil spill response plan approval

is exempt from the ESA and NEPA altogether.

It is true that BSEE reviewed Shell’s oil spill response

plans only after other higher-level planning activities,

including preparing an EIS for each of its five-year leasing

programs and preparing a biological opinion evaluating the

likelihood that drilling will jeopardize species protected by

the ESA. See, e.g., NMFS, Beaufort and Chukchi Seas

Biological Opinion, http://goo.gl/YECHFu. But an oil spill

response plan may raise significant environmental risks

beyond those analyzed at a granular level at a previous stage

of development. For example, alternative means of

containing an oil spill, such as the controversial use of

dispersants, may themselves significantly impact listed

species, other environmental resources, and the safety of first

responders and the public to varying degrees. Review of

these risks and of alternative response actions would not be

redundant or duplicative if they were not considered in a

previous EIS and biological opinion. Indeed, the higher

planning levels govern the whole gamut of offshore drilling

operations. Oil spill response plans—while nominally a

“lower,” implementation-level action—are the first

component to be deployed when a spill actually happens. It

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18 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL

is ill-advised for the court to accept, under the guise of

Chevron, BSEE’s refusal to complete NEPA and ESA review

of these plans, especially since these plans may not be as

effective in redressing spills and preserving the environment

as they could be with environmental review of alternatives

and input from federal wildlife agencies.

I also emphasize this case’s importance notwithstanding

Shell’s recent suspension of its Arctic drilling program. 

Although the program is on hold, and the administration has

recently canceled existing Arctic lease sales, oil markets are

cyclical and it is all but certain that higher future oil prices, a

warming Arctic, or both will once again make drilling in the

Arctic cost-effective. The Department of the Interior’s latest

five-year drilling plan still includes offshore lease sales in

Alaska. Whenever Shell begins its Arctic drilling permitting

process again, BSEE will give Shell’s oil spill response plans

the same cursory review it did here. If this case is not

corrected by Supreme Court review, it will have two severe

consequences. First, it will preclude judicial review of oil

spill response plans when Shell’s Arctic drilling plans

resume. In light of BSEE’s obvious reluctance to give the

term “maximum extent practicable” its natural meaning in

33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(j)(5)(A)(i) &(j)(5)(D)(iii), it is undeniable

that Shell’s oil spill response plans will not be as responsive

to the needs of endangered and threatened species as they

would be with ESA consultation. And it is all but certain that

BSEE’s review of the response plans—the first line of

defense in the event of a major oil spill—will be far more

cursory than it would be if the public process, review of

foreseeable impacts, and consideration of alternatives

necessary under NEPA were provided.

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Second, and equally important, our court now has chosen

to accept an agency’s own opinion about the scope of its

discretion in order to make this case fit into the narrow

exceptions of Home Builders and Public Citizen. By ignoring

our proper role in this litigation, we have enabled BSEE’s

abrogation of its oversight role over response plan approval,

and we have invited other federal agencies to do the same any

time a statutory duty could arguably be cast as “mandatory”

or “nondiscretionary.” The message we send to agencies, and

to oil companies, is “we trust you and will rely on your

judgment without review by federal agency experts and

public input.” This is not the role envisioned by Congress

when it passed the 1990 CWA amendments, which require an

oil spill response plan to demonstrate its ability to respond,

“to the maximum extent practicable, to a worst case

discharge,” or when it passed the ESA, which requires

“[e]ach Federal agency” to consult with federal wildlife

agencies to “insure that any action authorized, funded, or

carried out by such agency” is not likely to jeopardize

protected species or adversely modify their critical habitat. 

33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). It is

not the role envisioned by NEPA, which mandated that “all

agencies” shall utilize a “systematic, interdisciplinary

approach” in planning and decision making, and shall prepare

an EIS for all major federal actions significantly affecting the

human environment, which include “any irreversible and

irretrievable commitments of resources which would be

involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.” 

42 U.S.C. § 4332. It is not the role for the courts Chevron

envisioned by approving deference to an agency’s

“permissible construction of the statute” only in response to

statutory ambiguity. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.

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20 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL

Although this case deals with a complicated regulatory

framework, at bottom it turns on simple answers to simple

questions: If an oil company submits an oil spill response

plan to BSEE, does the federal government have discretion to

consider alternative response actions in order to ensure that

any approved plan responds to a worst case spill to the

maximum extent practicable? Could alternative methods of

responding to a spill themselves have varying impacts on

listed species that now thrive in the Beaufort and Chukchi

Seas, such as the bowhead whale, the humpback whale, the

bearded seal, and the Steller sea lion, as well as other aspects

of the human environment? See BOEM Biological Opinion,

Lease Sale 193, http://goo.gl/YECHFu. If such dangers and

alternative courses of action are present, is it the aim of

Congress to have the agency that oversees drilling perform

public environmental review of the proposed plan and consult

with federal agencies that oversee listed species? If Congress

has required that an oil spill response plan must respond to

the spill to the maximum extent practicable, will that not

require a discretionary judgment of the regulating agency,

here the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement?

The answers to these questions are “yes.” Only if BSEE

scrutinizes whether an oil spill response plan gives protection

to the maximum extent practicable will our treasured public

trust resources be protected to the maximum extent

practicable.

By not correcting the majority’s holding through en banc

review, we have let stand a decision that misapplies core

principles of administrative and environmental law, and have

set a dangerous precedent of deferring to a federal agency’s

view of its own discretion, even when a statute is not

ambiguous. I respectfully dissent.

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