Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01560/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01560-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Timmey Dean Hale
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

04-1560

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Western District of Missouri.

Timmey Dean Hale, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: November 5, 2004

Filed: July 13, 2005 (Corrected: 07/19/05)

___________

Before BYE, MELLOY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to a plea agreement with the United States, Timmey Dean Hale pled

guilty to one count of unlawful possession of a firearm as an unlawful user of a

controlled substance, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). For purposes of the

United States Sentencing Guidelines, the parties stipulated to a base offense level of

14, with a two-level increase under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(4) for possession of a stolen

firearm, and a four-level increase under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) for possession of 8-

24 firearms. 

The United States Probation Office prepared a presentence report (“PSR”). In

addition to the adjustments addressed in the plea agreement, the PSR recommended

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The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

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a four-level increase under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5) for possession of a firearm in

connection with the offense of possession of methamphetamine. Hale objected to this

adjustment, arguing that he had not possessed the firearms “in connection with” the

other offense. At sentencing, the district court1

 overruled Hale’s objection and

arrived at a total offense level of 21, which resulted in a sentencing range of 37 to 46

months’ imprisonment. The court then sentenced Hale at the low end of that range.

On appeal, Hale renews his challenge to the enhancement under USSG

§ 2K2.1(b)(5), arguing that the district court clearly erred in finding that he possessed

a firearm “in connection with” another felony offense. He also moves for leave to file

a supplemental brief arguing that his sentence violates his Sixth Amendment rights

based on the reasoning of Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).

Hale’s argument regarding the district court’s application of USSG

§ 2K2.1(b)(5) is unpersuasive. In order to be possessed “in connection with” an

offense, a firearm need only have “some purpose or effect with respect to, and must

facilitate, or have the potential of facilitating, another felony offense” such that “its

presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or coincidence.” See United

States v. Regans, 125 F. 3d 685, 686 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation omitted).

Hale admitted that he had been using and selling methamphetamine, and that officers

found methamphetamine in his kitchen and bedroom, numerous methamphetamine

precursors in his kitchen, and several firearms, one of which was stolen, in his living

room. Hale also admitted that when he was stopped by police in October 2002, he

had with him a stolen shotgun and a user amount of methamphetamine. These

admitted facts are sufficient to justify the court’s imposition of the enhancement. See

United States v. Bell, 310 F.3d 604, 605-06 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (upholding

application of § 2K2.1(b)(5) where firearm was found under mattress and near

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cocaine base, because defendant potentially could have used firearm to protect

himself or his drugs); United States v. Letts, 264 F.3d 787, 791 (8th Cir. 2001)

(holding that §2K2.1(b)(5) properly applied where witness told officers that

methamphetamine lab on defendant’s property belonged to defendant, and defendant

had firearms and containers with user amounts of methamphetamine and percursors

in garage, because firearms “could have been used to protect the defendant’s

laboratory and were easily obtainable if necessary”); Regans, 125 F.3d at 686

(holding that § 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement was proper even where the defendant had

a firearm and only a quantity of drugs for personal use).

Hale’s motion for leave to file a brief in light of Blakely v. Washington

suggests that he also would argue that the district court’s application of mandatory

sentencing guidelines, combined with its factual findings concerning his possession

of a firearm, was contrary to the Sixth Amendment as applied in United States v.

Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005). We deny the motion for supplemental briefing,

because we conclude that Hale has waived any claim based on Booker. 

In his plea agreement, Hale agreed to the following provision in paragraph 10:

The defendant agrees not to appeal or otherwise challenge the

constitutionality or legality of the Sentencing Guidelines. The defendant

understands and acknowledges that his sentence will be determined and

imposed pursuant to those Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant is aware

that a sentence imposed under the Sentencing Guidelines does not

provide for parole. The defendant agrees that this Court has

jurisdiction and authority to impose any sentence up to the statutory

maximum established for the offense and expressly waives the right to

appeal his sentence, directly or collaterally, on any ground except for

an upward departure by the sentencing judge, a sentence in excess of

the statutory maximum, or a sentence in violation of law apart from the

Sentencing Guidelines. However, if the United States exercises its right

to appeal the sentence imposed as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b),

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the defendant is released from this waiver and may appeal his sentence

as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

The parties expressly waive the right to appeal or collaterally

attack by post-conviction motion any sentencing issue, including the

applicability of certain U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provisions, which

have been addressed and agreed upon in this Plea Agreement, and which

are set forth in paragraph 12. Each party retains the right to appeal only

sentencing issues which have not been agreed-upon or which have not

been specifically addressed in the Plea Agreement. The defendant

expressly waives the right to appeal or collaterally attack by postconviction motion all other issues.

Hale’s agreement “not to appeal or otherwise challenge the constitutionality or

legality of the Sentencing Guidelines” clearly encompasses his appeal based on

Booker, as there can be no doubt that a Booker claim is a challenge to the

constitutionality or legality of the sentencing guidelines as they existed at the time of

Hale’s sentencing. See United States v. Parker, No. 04-3793, 2005 WL 1513135, at

*2 (8th Cir. June 28, 2005); United States v. Amburn, No. 04-2999, 2005 WL

1412968, at *8 (8th Cir. June 17, 2005). In addition, we agree with the Eleventh

Circuit that the general appeal waiver language in the second and fourth sentences of

the provision quoted from Hale’s plea agreement “is broad enough to include an

Apprendi/Blakely/Booker claim.” United States v. Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d 1294,

1296-97 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (considering virtually identical language); see

also Parker, 2005 WL 1513135 at *2; cf. United States v. Lea, 400 F.3d 1115, 1116

(8th Cir. 2005) (rejecting government’s argument that defendant waived right to

appeal based on Booker, where plea agreement preserved the defendant’s statutory

right to appeal any issue not “specifically listed” or “specifically addressed,” and the

provision asserted to constitute waiver merely stated that certain sentencing guideline

provisions would apply, without specifically addressing the issue of mandatory or

advisory application of the guidelines).

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Hale’s waiver of his right to appeal was knowing and voluntary. The written

plea agreement describing the waiver was signed by Hale and his attorney. The

district court ensured that the waiver was knowing and voluntary by specifically

reviewing paragraph 10 of the plea agreement with Hale at his change of plea hearing,

and by gaining Hale’s acknowledgment that he understood the appeal waivers. (Plea

Tr. at 6-7). See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 891 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc)

(“One important way a district court can help ensure that a plea agreement and

corresponding waiver are entered into knowingly and voluntarily is to properly

question a defendant about his or her decision to enter that agreement and waive the

right to appeal.”).

Knowing and voluntary appeal waivers generally are enforceable, subject only

to an exception where enforcement would result in a “miscarriage of justice.” Id. at

891. Hale’s sentence was within the statutory range for the offense of conviction, and

it therefore does not constitute a “miscarriage of justice” within the meaning of Andis.

United States v. Burns, 409 F.3d 994, 996 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); see also

United States v. Parker, No. 04-3793, 2005 WL 1513135, at *3 (8th Cir. June 28,

2005); United States v. Fogg, 409 F.3d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 2005). Therefore, the

appeal waiver is enforceable.

Accordingly, we deny Hale’s motion for leave to file a supplemental brief, and

we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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