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Parties Involved:
Tommy Berryhill
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 

) 

TOMMY BERRYHILL, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

OPINION ON REHEARING 

FI LED 

United States Courr of Appeals 

Temh Cirrnit 

.JUL 2 0 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

88-1699 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES.DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 87-42-CR) 

Paul G. Hess, Assistant United States Attorney (Roger Hilfiger, 

United States Attorney with him on the brief), Muskogee, Oklahoma, 

attorney for plaintiff-appellee. 

Stephen J. Greubel, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Tulsa, 

Oklahoma, attorney for defendant-appellant. 

Before SEYMOUR, BARRETT and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-1699 Document: 01019742580 Date Filed: 07/20/1989 Page: 1 
Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing of 

plaintiff-appellee United States of America requesting that the 

court revise its opinion with regard to our remand to the district 

court to correct its reliance on a repealed statute, the petition 

is granted. The United States argues that our remand in United 

_S_t_a_t_e_s~_v_.~_B_e_r_r~y_h_i_l_l, 872 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1989), authored by 

Barrett, Senior Circuit Judge, was based upon a misconception of 

the repeal date of 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b}(l}. We agree. In our 

order granting rehearing, we directed that· that opinion be 

withdrawn. 

Tommy Berryhill (Berryhill} appeals from a 

sentence entered after a jury trial and an order of 

court denying his motion for a new trial. 

judgment and 

the district 

Berryhill was indicted and charged with violations of 18 

U.S.C. § 1201, kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c}(l}, use of a firearm 

in the commission of a felony, and 18 u.s.c. § 2312, interstate 

transportation of a stolen motor vehicle relative to acts which 

occurred between July 7-11, 1987. Prior to trial, Berryhill moved 

for a change of venue due to frequent pre-trial prejudicial 

publicity and to suppress his identification based on 

prejudicially suggestive photographic lineups. Both motions were 

denied and the case proceeded to trial. 

At the close of the first day of trial, one of the jurors 

related that he knew or thought he knew Mrs. Swearingen, the 

victim, or 

remembered 

newspaper. 

her husband. Another juror acknowledged 

reading about the Swearingen kidnapping in 

The court, in the presence of counsel 

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that he 

a local 

and the 

Appellate Case: 88-1699 Document: 01019742580 Date Filed: 07/20/1989 Page: 2 
defendant, conferred with the two jurors in chambers and 

subsequently excused the juror who had related that he knew or 

thought he knew the victim. The court's examination of the juror 

who had read about the kidnapping showed that there was no 

significant possibility that the juror would be prejudiced 

thereby. The court properly found that this juror was qualified. 

See Rule 24, Fed. R. Crim. P. 

Following a four-day trial, the jury returned a guilty 

verdict as charged on all three counts. Thereafter, Berryhill 

moved for a new trial, alleging that the court erred in: denying 

his motion for change of venue; failing to conduct an in-depth 

voir dire of prospective jurors; and in denying his motion for a 

mistrial at the close of the first day of trial. The court 

denied this motion via a minute order. Berryhill's request for 

new counsel was similarly denied. Berryhill was sentenced to 300 

years with eligibility for parole after a minimum term of 99 years 

on Count I, and sentenced to five years on each of Counts II and 

III, said sentences to run consecutively. 

On appeal, Berryhill contends that: (1) we should reverse our 

United States v. O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. 

denied, 475 U.S. 1020 (1986); ( 2) the district court erred in 

failing to conduct adequate voir dire; ( 3) the court erred in 

denying his motion for a mistrial; and ( 4) the court erred in 

failing to grant his motion to suppress in-court identification 

evidence of himself which was the fruit of out-of-court, overly 

suggestive and unfair photographic displays. 

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Berryhill argues that we should reverse our decision in 

O'Driscoll and correct the illegal sentence given him pursuant to 

that decision. 

In O'Driscoll, we held that, inasmuch as 18 U.S.C. § 1201 

provided the penalty for kidnapping to be "imprisonment for any 

term of years or life," a sentence for a term of 300 years with 

eligibility for parole after a minimum term of 99 years was legal 

under § 1201 and 18 u.s.c. § 4205(b)(l). 1 Berryhill argues that 

O'Driscoll was incorrect and that his sentence in reliance on 

O'Driscoll is illegal. Berryhill requests that we reverse our 

holding in O'Driscoll and order that his sentence be corrected by 

deleting therefrom the language requiring a minimum 99 years 

incarceration prior to parole consideration. 

In response, the government argues that since the sentence 

was within§ 1201, i.e., an "imprisonment for any term of years or 

for life," it was legal, and that a legal sentence is not cruel, 

ex9essive, or unusual punishment. The government also argues that 

O'Driscoll is the law of this circuit and that "[a] court of 

appeals panel may not disregard binding precedent absent an 

intervening Supreme Court or en bane circuit decision. Flowers v. 

1 § 4205(b), repealed effective November 1, 1987, 

part: 

provided in 

Upon entering a judgment of conviction, the court having 

jurisdiction to impose sentence, when in its opinion the ends of 

justice and best interest of the public require that the defendant 

be sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, may 

(1) designate in the sentence of imprisonment imposed a minimum 

term at the expiration of which the prisoner shall become eligible 

for parole, which term may be less than but shall not be more than 

one-third of the maximum sentence imposed by the court •... 

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Appellate Case: 88-1699 Document: 01019742580 Date Filed: 07/20/1989 Page: 4 
United States, 764 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985). At present, the 

O'Driscoll case is the law of the Tenth Circuit and should be 

overruled only by concurrence of the court en bane." (Brief of 

Appellee at p. 4). We agree. See United States v. Taylor, 828 

F.2d 630, 633 (10th Cir. 1987) (a panel is not authorized to 

overrule a prior decision of a court of appeals); Fed. R. App. P. 

35, 28 u.s.c.; 10th Cir. R. 35. 

Berryhill was sentenced on April 22., 1988, and during 

sentencing, the court stated: 

Tommy Berryhill it is adjudged that on Count 1 you 

are hereby committed to the custody of the Attorney 

General of the United States, or his authorized 

representative, for imprisonment for a term of three 

hundred years. 

It is further ordered that under the provisions of 

Title 18, United States Code, Section 4205(b)(l), the 

Court is hereby designating that the defendant shall 

only .become eligible for parole after a minimum term of 

99 years incarceration. 

(R., Vol. IV, p. 599). 

A reviewing court is to grant substantial deference to the 

discretion of the trial court in sentencing criminals. Solem v. 

Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983). Although no penalty is ~ se 

constitutional, id., successful challenges to the proportionality 

of particular sentences, outside the context of capital 

punishment, have been exceedingly rare. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 

U.S. 263, 268 (1980). Thus, if a sentence is imposed within the 

prescribed statutory limits, the appellate court will generally 

not regard it as cruel and unusual. United States v. Gourley, 835 

F.2d, 249, 253 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, U.S. ' 108 

S. Ct. 1741, 100 L. Ed. 2d 204 (1988). Berryhill's sentence of 

imprisonment for a term of three hundred years with 

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eligibility for parole after 

incarceration was within the 

a minimum term of 99 years 

prescribed statutory limits of §§ 

1201 and 4205(b)(l). Furthermore, an identical sentence was 

upheld in O'Driscoll. Inasmuch as O'Driscoll is the law of the 

Tenth Circuit, we decline to hold that Berryhill's sentence was 

illegal. 

II. 

Berryhill contends that the court erred in failing to 

adequately voir dire prospective jurors. 

Berryhill argues that the traditional method of eliciting 

information from potential jurors, and the method utilized in this 

case, i.e., a series of questions requiring a "yes" or "no" 

answer, gives rise to a perfunctory examination of prospective 

jurors which does not provide sufficient information to 

intelligently exercise peremptory challenges. Berryhill argues 

that it is essential to supplement the court's examination with 

"at least some attorney questioning - for the intelligent exercise 

of jury challenges." While acknowledging that his counsel did 

not request attorney-conducted voir dire, Berryhill nonetheless 

contends that he was forced to rely on the court's voir dire. 

The government responds that the court did not err in its 

voir dire and that Berryhill's arguments in this regard are 

frivolous. The government cites to United States v. Hall 536 F.2d 

313, 324 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976) for the 

rule that it is the practice in this circuit for the court to ask 

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the voir dire questions; that conduct of voir dire is within the 

discretion of the district court; and that the court's exercise of 

that discretion will not be disturbed unless there is a clear 

showing of abuse. The government also argues that, inasmuch as 

defense counsel did not request attorney conducted voir dire 

during trial, Berryhill cannot raise this issue for the first time 

on appeal. 

The conduct of voir dire is within the sound discretion of 

the trial judge, United States v. Sutton, 732 F.2d 1483, 1493 

(10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1157 (1985), and this 

discretion will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of abuse. 

United States v. Lambinus, 747 F.2d 592, 598 (10th Cir. 1984), 

cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1067 (1985). We have carefully reviewed 

the trial court's voir dire. Nothing in the record before us 

indicates that the trial court was anything other than meticulous, 

conscientious and fair in its voir dire. The trial court's voir 

dire insured that the jurors were competent to serve and that they 

were impartial. United States v. Hall, supra, at 324. 

Furthermore, following its voir dire, the trial court 

solicited the aid and suggestions of counsel. (R., Vol. II, pp. 

30-31). Neither side expressed specific concern vis a vis the 

adequacy of the voir dire. Id. Under these circumstances, we 

shall not attribute error to the trial qourt's voir dire. See 

United States v. Lawson, 670 F.2d 923, 926 (10th Cir. 1982). 

III. 

Berryhill makes a brief one-half page argument that the trial 

court erred in failing to grant his motion for a mistrial when, 

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after the first day of trial, it became apparent that the court's 

inadequate voir dire had led to the impaneling of two jurors who 

had not earlier disclosed their prior knowledge of the parties and 

the facts. Specifically, Berryhill contends: 

Mr. Berryhill was denied his right to intelligently 

exercise the peremptory challenges provided him. That 

denial resulted in the retention of a juror who had been 

exposed to earlier (possibly inaccurate) newspaper 

accounts of the abduction and rape of a local woman. 

When this fact became apparent, not only to the 

judge and attorneys, but to all the other jurors, a 

mistrial was the proper remedy. 

(Principal Brief of Defendant/Appellant at page 35). 

A ruling on a motion for a mistrial is within the sound 

discretion of the trial judge. United States v. Behrens, 689 F.2d 

154, 162 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1088 (1982). 

Moreover, the trial court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Gibbons, 607 

F.2d 1320, 1330 (10th Cir. 1979). 

As set forth, supra, at the close of the first day of trial, 

one of the jurors related for the first time that "I know this 

lady. I met her one time. I know someone in her family." (R., 

Vol. II, p. 142). A second juror then stated "Your Honor, I read 

about the case, or heard about it, but I didn't know what they 

were talking about until they brought up about the little boy." 

Id. The court, in the presence of the defendant and counsel, 

subsequently conferred with the two jurors in chambers. 

Thereafter, out of an abundance of caution, the court discharged 

the juror who had related that he knew or thought he knew the 

victim. The juror stated that he had met the. victim briefly some 

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( eight or more years ago. Id. at 145-49. The court determined 

that the juror who had read about the kidnapping in a newspaper 

was qualified to serve. This juror stated that he recalled 

reading about a grandmother who had been kidnapped and taken outof-state, but he could not recall any names or details. Id. at 

156. The juror related that nothing he had read in the newspaper 

would influence him from being a fair and impartial juror. Id. at 

157-58. 

Thereafter, counsel for Berryhill moved for a mistrial: 

THE COURT: Okay. Let me hear what you have to 

say, Mr. Pyle, about both of them, actually. 

MR. PYLE: The case appears to be one of those 

occasional ones that all the things keep going wrong in 

it. And based upon the first juror's admission of 

knowing or believing he knows Mrs. Swearingen or her 

husband or whoever, I would move for a mistrial based 

upon the statement he made while in the juror box of 

having knowledge on it, and perhaps whatever influence 

it might have on the jury at that time. 

THE COURT: I don't think there was much said then, 

Dick, and I'll overrule that motion. 

* * * 

MR. PYLE: [N]ow we have a jury in the box and I'm 

sitting here and having waived peremptory challenges 

with a man now who said he's read something about it, 

and I didn't have a chance to inquire into that, and a 

man who says he knows the victim, or thinks he knows 

her, and doesn't know what he can do about that, and I 

don't have any chance to challenge him now. Based upon 

the fact I'm sitting here now after having waived that, 

with that not being disclosed by either of them at that 

point in time, I want to move for a mistrial. 

(R., Vol. II at pp. 158, 161). 

After the trial court denied the motion for mistrial, 

Berryhill personally related to the court, in chambers: 

THE DEFENDANT: Well, I ain't got nothing against 

that other guy sitting on the jury. 

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THE COURT: Sir? 

THE DEFENDANT: I ain't got nothing against that 

other one sitting on the jury. 

THE COURT: The other gentleman who had read 

something in the paper or something? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. There's nothing wrong with 

that, I don't think, but the other guy, you know, what 

he said and everything. I don't -- · 

(R., Vol. III at pp. 171-72). 

After the court excused the first juror questioned, he 

announced that the alternate juror would serve in his place. Id. 

at 165. No objections to the qualifications of this juror were 

made. Berryhill, as previously observed, stated that he had no 

objection to continued service of the second juror. The trial 

court, with the approval of both defense counsel and the 

defendant, Berryhill, thereafter informed the jury that after 

juror· Latimer had stated that he was acquainted with a witness, 

the court talked with him at length and determined that it was 

best that he not participate any further as a juror. Id. at 174-

75. 

The competency of a juror to sit is a matter within the wide 

discretion of the trial court and the trial judge's decision will 

not be interfered with except for an abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Porth, 426 F.2d 519 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 

824 (1970). The court did not err in denying Berryhill's motion 

for a mistrial. 

IV. 

Berryhill contends that the trial court erred in failing to 

grant his motion to suppress the in-court identifications of him. 

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( Berryhill argues, citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 

(1968), that it is proper for a court to suppress in-court 

identification evidence which is the fruit of out-of-court preaccusatory displays if such displays were overly suggestive and 

unfair. Berryhill argues. that: reliability is pivotal in 

determining the admissibility of identification testimony; 

reliability was entirely absent here because neither witness had 

~n opportunity to view him for more than a few moments and both 

were attending to employment duties when they saw him; it was only 

during the second, and suggestive, photographic lineup that he was 

identified; and, under the totality of the circumstances, the outof-court identifications were unreliable, the result of unfair and 

overly suggestive lineup procedures. 

In response, the government contends that: the photographic 

lineups were not suggestive; Berryhill was identified by three 

witnesses; each of the witnesses had previously given descriptions 

of a suspect which were similar to Berryhill's appearance; and, 

under the totality of the circumstances, the court properly denied 

Berryhill's motion to suppress. We agree. 

"The standard of review on an appeal of the denial of a 

motion to suppress evidence is that the reviewing court must 

accept the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous 

and must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government." United States v. Soto-Ornelas 863 F.2d 1487, 1490 

(10th Cir. 1988). See also United States v. Skowronski, 827 F.2d 

1414, 1417 (10th Cir. 1987) (trial judge's determinations in 

suppression hearing which rest upon credibility and reasonable 

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Appellate Case: 88-1699 Document: 01019742580 Date Filed: 07/20/1989 Page: 11 
inferences will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous). A 

photographic identification procedure is not unconstitutionally 

suggestive, if, when viewed "in light of the totality of 

surrounding circumstances," it does not give rise to a 

"photographic identification procedure so impermissibly 

suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of 

irreparable misidentification." Simmons v. United States, 390 

U.S. at pp. 383-84. Furthermore, even when we do accept a 

defendant's contention that a photographic procedure was 

unnecessarily suggestive, "the degree of suggestiveness ..• [can 

be] easily outweighed by sufficient evidence of 

reliability." Baca v. Sullivan, 821 F.2d 1480, 1482 (10th Cir. 

1987). See also Johnston v. Makowski, 823 F.2d 387, 391 (10th 

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, U.S. , 108 S. Ct. 750, 98 L. Ed. 

2d 763 (1988). 

In the instant case, the trial court, mindful of Simmons v. 

United States and after a suppression hearing which included the 

testimony of the three witnesses who identified Berryhill, entered 

a detailed order finding: 

The evidence established that three prospective 

witnesses had viewed photographic lineups on different 

occasions. Two of the prospective witnesses, Head and 

Singleton, each viewed two different photographic 

lineups on two different occasions. Plaintiff's 

Exhibits 1 and 2. In the first photo lineup, both Head 

and Singleton picked a picture of a man, other than the 

defendant, who they said most closely resembled the man 

they had seen. In the second photo lineup, which 

contained a more recent picture of the defendant, both 

picked the defendant's picture as the one which most 

closely resembled the man they had seen. 

The witness Posey, viewing a different photo 

lineup, picked the defendant's picture as the man she 

had seen. Plaintiff's Exhibit 4. Witness Posey had 

previously compiled a composite drawing of the suspect, 

plaintiff's Exhibit 3. All three witnesses had seen the 

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suspect only seven to ten days before the photo lineups, 

and all had ample opportunity to view the defendant at 

that time. All of the witnesses were shown the photo 

lineups separately at different times and places. All 

the witnesses had previously given physical descriptions 

of the suspect, which were similar to the defendant's 

appearance. 

* * * 

The court finds that the photographic lineups were 

not suggestive or conducive to a mistaken 

identification. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 

(1968). Considering the totality of the circumstances, 

the court finds that neither the evidence of the 

photographic lineups themselves nor any in-court 

identification of the defendant by these witnesses 

should be suppressed. Allen v. Johnston, 413 F. Supp. 1 

(W.D. Okl. 1975); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 1972). 

Accordingly, the· defendant's Motion to Suppress is 

denied. 

(R., Vol. I, Tab 27, pp. 1-2). 

Having carefully reviewed the suppression hearing transcript, 

we have found nothing supporting Berryhill's allegations that the 

photographic displays were impermissibly suggestive. We hold 

that the trial court did not err in denying Berryhill's motion to 

suppress all in-court identification of him by witnesses who had 

previously viewed photographic displays. 

AFFIRMED. 

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88-1699 -- United States of America v. Tommy Berryhill 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, concurring. 

I fully agree with parts II, III, and IV of the majority 

opinion. I concur in part I only because I am bound by this 

court's prio~ opinion in United States v. O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d 589 

(10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1020 (1986), which can be 

overturned only by the court en bane. In my view, the better 

interpretation of 18 u.s.c. § 4205(b)(l) (repealed Nov. 1, 1987) 

is set out in United States v. DiPasquale, 859 F.2d 9 (3rd Cir. 

1988); United States v. Castonguay, 843 F.2d 51 (1st Cir. 1988), 

and United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.), cert. 

denied 109 S.Ct. 533 (1988). But see United States v. Berry, 839 

F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 863 (1989); 

Rothgeb v. United States, 789 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1986); United 

States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986) cert. denied 479 

U.S. 1104 (1987). 

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