Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05247/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05247-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Bar Association
Appellee
Massachusetts School of Law
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 8, 1997 Decided July 15, 1997 

No. 96-5247

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,

APPELLEE

MASSACHUSETTS SCHOOL OF LAW AT ANDOVER, INC.,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 95cv01211)

Lawrence R. Velvel argued the cause and filed the brief for 

appellant.

David Seidman, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellee United States of America. 

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With him on the brief were Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General, A. Douglas Melamed, Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General, and Catherine G. O'Sullivan, Attorney.

Roger E. Warin argued the cause for appellee American 

Bar Association. With him on the brief were David L. Roll

and David R. Stewart.

Before: WALD, WILLIAMS and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.

Opinion concurring in the judgment filed by Circuit Judge

WALD.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge: On June 27, 1995 the Department 

of Justice filed a complaint in district court here against the 

American Bar Association, alleging that through its control of 

law school accreditation the ABA had violated § 1 of the 

Sherman Act by, among other things, fixing law school faculty 

salaries. Simultaneously, the Department filed a proposed 

consent decree prohibiting certain conduct and ordering 

structural changes in the ABA Section on Legal Education. 

Following the procedure for the entry of consent judgments 

prescribed by the Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(d)(1994), 

the Department filed a competitive impact statement with the 

district court and then published both the statement and the 

proposed consent judgment in the Federal Register for public 

comment. Nearly a year later, after several modifications 

had been made, the district court found the proposed settlement to be in the public interest, see id. § 16(e), and entered 

judgment.

The Massachusetts School of Law at Andover ("MSL" or 

the "School") is a state-accredited law school that has unsuccessfully sought ABA accreditation. In November 1993 it 

filed a private antitrust action against the ABA in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging many of the same 

anticompetitive practices that the Department later charged 

the ABA with here. It lost in the trial court and (after this 

case was argued) on appeal. See Massachusetts School of 

Law at Andover v. ABA, 107 F.3d 1026 (3d Cir. 1997).

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Before the district court here MSL objected to the proposed settlement agreement on the grounds that it should go 

further in remedying the alleged antitrust violations and 

should contain a more effective enforcement mechanism. 

MSL also claimed that the Department had failed to, and 

should be required to, file documents that were "determinative in formulating [the proposed consent judgment]," 15 

U.S.C. § 16(b), and that approval of the judgment should be 

conditioned upon disclosure of information acquired in the 

course of the Department's investigation.

MSL used a number of channels to advance its position. It 

submitted written comments in response to the Federal Register publication, as provided for by 15 U.S.C. § 16(d). It 

moved to intervene in the district court proceedings, and in 

the alternative to participate as amicus curiae. And on entry 

of judgment, it sought to intervene in the district court for 

purposes of appeal. The court granted amicus status but 

denied both intervention motions. MSL now appeals from 

the denial of its motion for intervention for purposes of appeal 

and from entry of the consent judgment. We affirm the 

denial of intervention for purposes of appeal, except with 

respect to the disclosure issue. On the merits of the latter, 

we find that the district court properly rejected the School's 

claim that evidentiary material from the Department's investigation should be made public. 

* * *

The Tunney Act provides that before a settlement agreement between the Department and a party charged with 

violating the antitrust laws can take effect, "the court shall 

determine that the entry of such judgment is in the public 

interest." 15 U.S.C. § 16(e). The court may employ a wide 

variety of techniques in gathering information about the 

proposed judgment and coming to a decision, one of which is 

to allow intervention by interested parties:

[T]he court may ... authorize full or limited participation in proceedings before the court by interested 

persons or agencies, including appearance amicus curiae, 

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1MSL cites United Airlines for its statement that "[t]he critical 

inquiry in every such case is whether in view of all the circumstances the intervenor acted promptly after the entry of final 

judgment." Id. at 395-96. As the sole objection raised before the 

Court was timeliness, the remark was obviously not intended to 

state the entirety of the rules governing intervention for purposes 

of appeal. MSL's reliance on United States v. LTV Corp., 746 F.2d 

51 (D.C. Cir. 1984), is equally wide of the mark, as it holds merely 

that in the absence of a motion to intervene, a non-party cannot 

appeal; it does not state the oppositethat one who has moved to 

intervene is automatically entitled to an appeal on the merits. 

intervention as a party pursuant to the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, examination of witnesses or documentary materials, or participation in any other manner and 

extent which serves the public interest as the court may 

deem appropriate.

Id. § 16(f)(3).

The Act directs us to look to the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure for the legal standard governing intervention. 

MSL suggests, however, that those rules have no application 

where intervention is sought solely for purposes of filing an 

appeal. It notes that 15 U.S.C. § 16(f)(3) speaks of "participation in proceedings before the court," but that, if the 

district court grants intervention solely for purposes of appeal, no participation whatsoever in the district court will 

result (disregarding, of course, whatever might occur in the 

event of a reversal). But even if MSL were right on the 

narrow issue of 15 U.S.C. § 16(f)(3), that would do no more 

than remove that provision from consideration, at which point 

we would go right back to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although those rules nominally apply only to "procedure in the United States district courts," Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, 

we apply themspecifically Rule 24to interventions solely 

for purposes of appeal. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 176-

82 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see also United Airlines v. McDonald, 

432 U.S. 385, 390 (1977) (upholding, against claim that attempted intervention was untimely, circuit court decision 

treating intervention for purposes of appeal as governed by 

Rule 24).1In addition, the Supreme Court has observed that 

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the Rules' "policies underlying intervention may be applicable 

in appellate courts," International Union v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 

205, 217 n.10 (1965), and we have held that intervention in the 

court of appeals is governed by the same standards as in the 

district court, Building & Construction Trades Dept. v. 

Reich, 40 F.3d 1275, 1282-83 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

The parties have assumed that we review the district 

court's application of Rule 24 for abuse of discretion. Indeed, 

that is what we said with respect to intervention in proceedings before the district court in Building & Construction 

Trades Dept., 40 F.3d at 1282. Although in this case the 

scope of review makes no difference because of our agreement with the district court, it deserves a brief detour to note 

some complications.

While in Building & Construction Trades Dept. we did not 

explicitly distinguish between intervention of right and permissive intervention, other courts and even this court have 

done so in the past. See Edwards v. Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 

995 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 

1319, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Hodgson v. United Mine Workers of America, 473 F.2d 118, 127 n.40 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Yet, 

except as intervention as of right may be likely to involve 

more pure issues of law, which would be reviewed de novo, cf. 

Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 863 

F.2d 891, 894-95 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (explaining that although 

formula for review of preliminary injunction is abuse of 

discretion, issues of law are reviewed de novo), it is not 

apparent that that distinction should be important. It would 

seem that it is only at the level of the particular issue (or subissue) that one can make sensible distinctions. Thus, in 

Hodgson v. United Mine Workers, 473 F.2d 118, 125 n.26 

(D.C. Cir. 1972), we noted the existence of district court 

discretion over the timeliness and adequacy of representation 

issues under Rule 24(a)(2), and over Rule 24(b)(2) determinations generally.

On the other hand, so far as intervention solely for purposes of appeal is concerned, we note that the effect of a 

decision on such intervention will often be indistinguishable 

from the effect of a decision on a motion to intervene in an 

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2Although the language of 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) has something in 

common with other statutory provisions thought to confer a "conditional right to intervene," under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1), see, e.g., 

appeal in the court of appeals, a decision that we necessarily 

make quite independently and that, as we said in Building &

Construction Trades Dept., is governed by the same standards as the district court's decision. It would be paradoxical 

for us to affirm a district court's denial of intervention for 

purposes of appeal on deference principles, and then turn 

around and grant intervention in this court. That paradox of 

course disappears where only the would-be intervenor seeks 

to appeal and we affirm the district court's denial of intervention, leaving no appeal in which to intervene; but that leaves 

a still greater paradoxthe court of appeals deferring to the 

district court on whether to hear an appeal from its judgment. And the paradox is heightened where it turns out that 

the intervention determination is tied to the merits, as proves 

the case here. See pp. 11-13 below. Further, for both 

(intervention for purposes of appeal, intervention in an appeal), the effects are feltat least initiallyin the court of 

appeals. Finally, we note that our decisions on district court 

intervention solely for purposes of appeal have by no means 

always indicated any particular deference, see, e.g., Smuck v. 

Hobson, 408 F.2d at 177-82, nor have those of other circuits, 

see, e.g., Romasanta v. United Airlines, 537 F.2d 915, 917-20 

(7th Cir. 1976), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. United 

Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977); Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 735-37 (9th Cir. 1991) (reviewing timeliness for abuse of discretion but showing no special deference 

on other criteria), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Arizonans 

for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997); Triax 

Co. v. TRW, Inc., 724 F.2d 1224, 1226-29 (6th Cir. 1984). In 

any event, as we agree with the district court, we need not 

worry longer about the scope of review.

Intervention as of Right

Anticipating the application of Rule 24, MSL claims that it 

was entitled to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) or 

permissively under Rule 24(b)(2).2 For purposes of Rule 

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28 U.S.C. § 2323; 7C Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice 

and Procedure § 1911, at 355 (1986), we do not need to resolve the 

question of whether it qualifies as such. The School does not make 

that argument and an affirmative finding would here yield a wholly 

circular exercise; the Tunney Act looks entirely to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

24 to supply the legal standard for intervention. 

3See Motion that the Court Either (A) Grant MSL the Status of 

Intervenor or, (b) in the Alternative, Grant MSL the Status of 

Amicus Curiae While Reserving Decision on a Later Grant of 

Intervenor Status if an Appeal is Sought at 3, United States v. 

ABA, Civil Action No. 95-1211 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 1995) (Bulky 

Pleading No. 10). 

24(a)(2), MSL alleges that it has an interest in the action 

because the ABA's anticompetitive practices have led to 

denial of accreditation and thus inflicted millions of dollars of 

injury.3 We have little doubtand the United States and 

ABA do not questionthat this is a substantial interest. 

Putting aside the disclosure aspects of Tunney Act proceedings, however, we are hard pressed to see how "the applicant 

is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a 

practical matter impair or impede [MSL's] ability to protect" 

the interest, as required under Rule 24(a)(2).

To be sure, we may assume arguendo that the more 

zealously the Department had pursued its antitrust claims, 

the greater the resulting advance in the School's interest in 

being free of anticompetitive behavior. But MSL points to no 

case equating failure to promote an interest with its impairment. At least if we may take the state of the world without 

the Department's lawsuit as the baseline, mere failure to 

secure better remedies for a third party (whether because of 

litigative sloth or some more sinister reason) is not a qualifying impairment. And indeed, our Tunney Act jurisprudence 

seems to make clear that that is the baseline for the Act's 

substantive purposesthe district court is not to reject an 

otherwise adequate remedy "simply because a third party 

claims it could be better treated." United States v. Microsoft 

Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1461 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Of course one can imagine an antitrust consent decree that 

would affirmatively set the School's interests back (i.e., "imUSCA Case #96-5247 Document #284520 Filed: 07/15/1997 Page 7 of 17
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4

Further, by facilitating advantageous exit from a stateaccredited school, the provision makes entry into such a school 

more appealing. This effect may well offset the adverse one. Cf. 

Shoreham-Wading River Central School District v. NRC, 931 F.2d 

102, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 

pair" them). A decree with res judicata, collateral estoppel, 

or stare decisis effect might very well affect MSL's ability to 

protect its interests, but as the district court correctly noted 

the consent decree has no such effect. See Memorandum 

Opinion, United States v. ABA, Civil Action No. 95-1211 

(D.D.C. Nov. 1, 1995). A judgment can also set a would-be 

intervenor back in more subtle ways. In Smuck v. Hobson, 

408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969), for example, we found impairment in a judgment that bound the school board defendantswho chose not to appealto adopt certain policies to 

which the intervenor parents objected. Thus, the judgment 

impaired their interest in being able to persuade the board to 

exercise its discretion in favor of policies they preferred. Id. 

at 180-81. At oral argument MSL asserted such an impairment for the first time, saying that because the decree 

requires the ABA to permit accredited schools to accept 

transfer students from institutions like MSL (presumably this 

is tied to the decree provision on transfer credits for courses 

completed at state-accredited law schools), it has led to an 

increase in transfers out of MSL. The briefs do not make 

this claim, however, so the United States and the ABA have 

had no real opportunity to respond. As our standard rule 

precludes consideration of a claim raised for the first time in 

a reply brief absent extraordinary circumstances, see, e.g., 

United States v. Whren, 111 F.3d 956, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1997), 

this newly asserted hazard cannot support a finding of a 

material risk of impairment.4

Even if we found an interest subject to impairment, we 

would have to consider whether that interest "is adequately 

represented by existing parties." Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). 

Certainly the interests of MSL and the United States appear 

closely aligned. We may assume that the Department 

brought the suit in order to benefit students who must pay 

the artificially high price of tuition at accredited law schools, 

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or who are disadvantaged because they attend law schools 

denied accreditation because of the alleged § 1 violation. 

MSL, a law school seeking to compete by offering a lower 

cost legal education but hindered in its efforts by the alleged 

wrongful denial of accreditation, is not in the class of consumer beneficiaries; but it would benefit, just as they would, from 

a greater ability to engage in voluntary, mutually advantageous transactions with them. The primaryperhaps only

divergence apparent between the United States and MSL is 

that while MSL would like the Department to invest resources in the lawsuit without limit, the Department has 

other claims on its resources. But we do not think representation is inadequate just because a would-be intervenor is 

unable to free-ride as far as it might wisha well-nigh 

universal complaint. Accordingly, we find no right to intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) for purposes of a general appeal.

MSL's claim of access to documents, based on its interpretation of the disclosure requirement of 15 U.S.C. § 16(b), 

poses a different question. That section says, among other 

things,

Copies of such proposal [for a consent judgment] and any 

other materials and documents which the United States 

considered determinative in formulating such proposal, 

shall also be made available to the public at the district 

court and in such other districts as the court may subsequently direct.

Id. On the broad view of this provision espoused by MSL, 

once the proposed consent decree was filed they acquired a 

legal entitlement to access to a wide range of documents in 

the government's files. The filing of the proposed consent 

decree, then, triggers a new baseline against which possible 

"impair[ment]" is to be measured. District court approval of 

the decree without insistence on such access would set the 

School back by denying it documents to which it was entitled. 

Although the School might be able to gain access through 

discovery in its own antitrust suit, it might well not, given the 

various privileges that attach to government documents. See, 

e.g., Tuite v. Henry, 98 F.3d 1411, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 

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(investigatory and deliberative process privileges). Moreover, the alignment of the Department's and MSL's interests 

falls completely apart on this issue. MSL hopes for the 

broadest access in the interest of its own antitrust suit, 

whereas the Department wants to keep such information 

confidential to facilitate its ability to investigate possible 

antitrust violations and negotiate settlements. Accordingly, 

we find that MSL's motion for intervention for purposes of 

appeal should have been granted with respect to its record 

disclosure claims. See United States v. Alex. Brown & Sons, 

169 F.R.D. 532, 539-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting intervention 

of right in Tunney Act proceeding to move to compel disclosure of settlement documents).

Permissive Intervention

MSL claims in the alternative that it should be allowed 

permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(2). First it argues 

that it sought to prove and remedy some of the very same 

anticompetitive conduct in its private antitrust suit that is at 

the heart of this lawsuit, thus satisfying Rule 24(b)(2)'s 

threshold requirement that the applicant's claim (or defense) 

have a question of fact or law in common with those of the 

"main action." The ABA argues that there is no such overlap, because the only substantive issue on appeal is whether 

the district court properly applied the Tunney Act, an issue 

that plays no role at all in MSL's independent antitrust claims 

against the ABA. Insofar as the ABA is saying simply that 

the search for overlap is a forward-looking exercise, we agree. 

Here that implies issues alive on appeal and that might be 

subject to a theoretical remand. But contrary to the ABA's 

assumption, the issue of Tunney Act compliance does overlap 

with the underlying merits of the two lawsuits. Although a 

pre-trial consent decree is necessarily entered without findings of illegal conduct, see Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1460-61, it is 

certainly possible that the discrepancy between the remedy 

and undisputed facts of antitrust violations could be such as 

to render the decree "a mockery of judicial power," id. at 

1462, and thus require its rejection. In such a case, the 

upshot would be a remand with at least some prospect of trial 

on the merits, and the overlap of legal and factual issues in 

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the two plaintiffs' substantive antitrust claims might produce 

efficiency gains that in turn might warrant intervention. In 

this case the overlap on those issues amply satisfies Rule 

23(b)(2). For example, the operation of the ABA's Section on 

Legal Education was the main target of the Department's 

complaint and is the source of MSL's alleged antitrust injury. 

See Massachusetts School of Law at Andover v. ABA, 107 

F.3d 1026, 1031-32.

Once a common question of fact or law is found, Rule 

24(b)(2) says that the district court, in exercising its discretion, "shall consider whether the intervention will unduly 

delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the 

original parties." The "delay or prejudice" standard presumably captures all the possible drawbacks of piling on parties; 

the concomitant issue proliferation and confusion will result in 

delay as parties and court expend resources trying to overcome the centrifugal forces springing from intervention, and 

prejudice will take the form not only of the extra cost but also 

of an increased risk of error. See generally Edward J. 

Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of Scarce Judicial Resources: The Efficiency of Federal Intervention Criteria, 12 

Ga. L. Rev. 701 (1978). The downside of intervention might 

therefore outweigh the hoped-for advantageslitigative economy, reduced risks of inconsistency, and increased information (which might reduce the risk of error). See id. And 

while intervention nominally for purposes of appeal may 

permit the court to correct any error made in the district 

court, it may not easily stop there but may ultimately entail 

participation in a remand, thereby implying the same drawbacks as intervention in the initial trial proceedings.

At least for intervention for purposes of appeal of a Tunney 

Act case, the "delay or prejudice" standard of Rule 24(b)(2) 

appears to force consideration of the merits of the would-be 

intervenor's claims. If the attempted intervenor shows adequate grounds for upsetting the consent judgment, then delay 

will be entailed (a remand for further proceedings, possibly 

including trial), but it would be hard to say that this delay is 

undue. On the other hand, if the would-be intervenor is 

unable to show grounds for upsetting the judgment, there 

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5Apart from any "undue delay" that intervention might bring 

about, untimeliness in seeking intervention may justify its denial 

without consideration of the merits. Unlike MSL, some would-be 

intervenors may inexcusably neglect to try to enter the proceedings 

before judgment, at a time when notice of their arguments would 

have enabled the district court to avert the alleged errors. Then, 

post-judgment intervention for the purpose of challenging those 

supposed defects on appeal would rightly be denied as untimely. 

See NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366-68 (1973). 

would be no fear of delaybut by the same token no prospect 

of any gain from intervention. Thus the intervention issue 

and the merits merge. The result is somewhat similar to 

National Mediation Board representation certification cases, 

where we take a "peek at the merits" to determine whether 

we have jurisdiction to review. See International Bhd. of 

Teamsters v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 402 

F.2d 196, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1968).5

Although this circuit has no holding on the standard for 

intervention for purposes of appeal in a Tunney Act case, our 

treatment of the subject in United States v. LTV Corp., 746 

F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1984), meshes well with our recent articulation of our (and the district court's) review of antitrust 

settlement agreements under the Act. In part because of the 

constitutional questions that would be raised if courts were to 

subject the government's exercise of its prosecutorial discretion to non-deferential review, see United States v. Microsoft 

Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1457-59 (D.C. Cir. 1995), we have 

construed the public interest inquiry narrowly. The district 

court must examine the decree in light of the violations 

charged in the complaint and should withhold approval only if 

any of the terms appear ambiguous, if the enforcement 

mechanism is inadequate, if third parties will be positively 

injured, or if the decree otherwise makes "a mockery of 

judicial power." See id. at 1462.

Similarly, when we discussed the standard for intervention 

in Tunney Act proceedings in United States v. LTV, we 

suggested that compliance with the public interest requirement would be determinative. In that case we made clear 

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that intervention was a prerequisite for challenging a district 

court's approval of a consent decree. We observed that the 

would-be intervenor must first establish that its participation 

would aid the court, 746 F.2d at 54, and went on to cite the 

language of the Sixth Circuit in United States v. HartfordEmpire Co., 573 F.2d 1, 2 (6th Cir. 1978), a case which 

occurred after the passage of the Tunney Act but did not 

discuss it:

A private party generally will not be permitted to intervene in government antitrust litigation absent some 

strong showing that the government is not vigorously 

and faithfully representing the public interest.

LTV, 746 F.2d at 54 n.7 (quoting 573 F.2d at 2); see also 

United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 534 F.2d 

113, 117 (8th Cir. 1976) (post-Tunney Act case adopting 

similar formula without explicit discussion of the Act and also 

cited in LTV). Thus only if the would-be intervenor can point 

to the specific defects identified by Microsoft, or some discrepancy between the remedy and substantially undisputed 

facts so broad as to render the decree a "mockery of judicial 

power," will intervention under Rule 24(b)(2) (and reversal) 

be warranted.

MSL points to nothing that meets this standard. It claims 

that the decree was deficient in four areas: it failed (1) to 

lower the high faculty-student ratio required for ABA accreditation, (2) to require the ABA to abandon its ban on forcredit or required bar preparation courses, (3) to ensure the 

end of secrecy in the accreditation process, and (4) to make 

the structural changes in the ABA's Section on Legal Education necessary to prevent recurrence of the Sherman Act 

conspiracy. Of course there is no finding that these practices 

were illegal, and Microsoft reminds us that it would accordingly be "inappropriate for the judge to measure the remedies 

in the decree as if they were fashioned after trial." 56 F.3d 

at 1461. Nonetheless, even as measured by the Department's 

complaint, the decree clearly represents a material accomplishment.

The complaint identified both the first two items as anticompetitive accreditation standards and practices. And the 

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consent decree was entered only after the ABA took action on 

each. A report prepared by the ABA Special Commission to 

Review the Substance and Process of the ABA's Accreditation 

of American Law Schools and filed with the court by the ABA 

Board of Governors altered the formula for calculating student-faculty ratio so as to permit part-time and adjunct 

faculty to count for up to 20% of the faculty component. See 

United States' Response to Supplemental Public Comments 

at 23, United States v. ABA, Civil Action No. 95-1211 (D.D.C. 

May 13, 1996). It also changed its practice to encourage law 

schools to sponsor bar review courses, particularly for students who may be at risk of failing the bar, although it did 

not alter the rule against required or for-credit bar review 

courses. Id. at 26. Given the entanglement of these issues 

with educational policy concerns, not to mention the ABA's 

other defenses, we cannot say that their resolution suggests 

malfeasance.

As to structural issues, a heading in the complaint asserts 

that legal educators "Captured the ABA's Law School Accreditation Process," Complaint at 4, United States v. ABA,

Civil Action No. 95-1211 (D.D.C. June 27, 1995), followed by 

descriptive details. In fact the decree limited the percentage 

of law school deans and faculty sitting on the numerous 

bodies that make up the Section on Legal Education, including the Council, the Accreditation Committee, the Standards 

Review Committee, and the site evaluation teams (which 

report to the Accreditation Committee). See Final Judgment 

at 5-7, United States v. ABA, Civil Action No. 95-1211 

(D.D.C. June 25, 1996). Finally, although one might logically 

presume secrecy to be a key tool in pursuit of the alleged 

conspiracy in restraint of trade, it is never mentioned in the 

complaint. MSL points out that the Department said in the 

proposed consent judgment that the accreditation process 

"was kept from public view." See Appellant's Br. at 13. But 

continuing secrecy, in an otherwise cleansed process, does not 

necessarily have anticompetitive implications. There is, in 

short, no reason to infer a sell-out by the Department. 

Accordingly, MSL does not satisfy the standards for intervention for purposes of appeal.

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* * *

We found earlier that MSL could intervene to secure 

review of the district court's rejection of the claim that the 

Tunney Act requires the government to disclose whatever 

documentary evidence it has collected in the course of its 

investigation. MSL relies first on 15 U.S.C. § 16(b), which 

provides, in relevant part:

Copies of such proposal [for a consent judgment] and any 

other materials and documents which the United States 

considered determinative in formulating such proposal, 

shall also be made available to the public at the district 

court and in such other districts as the court may subsequently direct.

15 U.S.C. § 16(b). According to MSL, documents "the United States considered determinative in formulating" the decree 

include evidentiary material on the defendant's alleged antitrust violations; the government sees the provision as referring only to documents, such as reports to the government, 

"that individually had a significant impact on the government's formulation of reliefi.e., on its decision to propose or 

accept a particular settlement." Appellee's Br. at 27. The 

reference to what "the United States considered determinative" seems to point toward the government's view; surely it 

rules out the claim to all the investigation and settlement 

material, and confines § 16(b) at the most to documents that 

are either "smoking guns" or the exculpatory opposite. The 

legislative history in fact supports the government's still 

narrower reading. Senator Tunney explained, "I am thinking 

here of the so-called Ramsden memorandum which was important in the ITT case." 119 Cong. Rec. 24,605 (1973). The 

Ramsden memorandum was a report prepared for the Antitrust Division by an outside consultant analyzing the economic consequences of requiring ITT to divest itself of the 

recently acquired Hartford Fire Insurance Corporation. The 

nature of the Tunney Act also cuts against MSL's proposed 

interpretation. The legislative history displays a firm intent 

to preserve the government's ability to negotiate settlement 

agreements, see Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1456, yet a broad 

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disclosure requirement would directly interfere with that 

ability. The advantages of settlement to a defendant would 

be seriously undermined if it were sure to result in a discovery bonanza for private claimants. Cf. United States v. Alex. 

Brown & Sons, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 532, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

MSL also invokes 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2), which authorizes 

the court, in determining whether entry of the proposed 

consent judgment would be in the public interest, to consider 

"the impact of entry of such judgment upon ... individuals 

alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the 

complaint." Appellant urges us to read into this provision a 

section in both the House and Senate Reports stating that:

The Committee believes that in the majority of instances 

the interests of private litigants can be accommodated 

without the risk, delay and expense of the government 

going to trial. For example, the court can condition 

approval of the consent decree on the Antitrust Division's 

making available information and evidence obtained by 

the government to potential, private plaintiffs which will 

assist in the effective prosecution of their claims.

S. Rep. No. 93-298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1973); H.R. 

Rep. No. 1463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974). This is a lot of 

weight to give a piece of legislative history that directly 

conflicts with the congressional intent to preserve the consent 

decree as a means of resolving government antitrust cases. 

As MSL's claim of entitlement to the Department's trove of 

evidence has no other basis, we affirm the trial court's refusal 

to order it turned over.

Accordingly we affirm the denial of intervention for purposes of appeal, except with regard to the question of whether the Tunney Act requires the government to make evidentiary material available to the public. On the merits of that 

claim, we find that the Tunney Act does not require that the 

government give access to evidentiary documents gathered in 

the course of an investigation culminating in settlement.

So ordered.

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WALD, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: I concur 

in the judgment and in most of the reasoning of the panel 

opinion. I do want to stress, however, that in my view, the 

application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(2) in this 

case responds to the unusual nature of proceedings under the 

Tunney Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974) (codified 

as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1994)), as well as to the 

fact that the would-be intervenor here appeals from the 

denial of a post-judgment intervention motion, and that the 

applicability of a similar analysis outside of this context 

should not be assumed. This court long ago observed that 

the language of Rule 24 required "other than literal application in atypical cases." Textile Workers Union v. Allendale 

Co., 226 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (en banc). I believe 

that this is such an atypical case, and that we have therefore 

properly allowed for a somewhat "non-literal" application of 

Rule 24(b)(2). Thus, I would not expect our opinion to stand 

for the proposition that the process of appellate review, or of 

remand for the correction of errors made by the district 

court, may generally be treated as factors that "delay or 

prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties" under Rule 24(b)(2). Cf. majority opinion at 11. We 

treat them as such here so that this court may reserve the 

discretion to review and correct a district court's "public 

interest" determination when the record indicates that the 

determination is contrary to the dictates of the Tunney Act 

and a non-party well-situated to demonstrate that this is so 

seeks to subject that determination to appellate review.

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