Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03138/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03138-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Thomas Fields
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 2, 2001 Decided March 13, 2001

No. 99-3138

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Thomas Fields, a/k/a Woozie,

Appellant

Consolidated with

No. 99-3139

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00071-01) (No. 98cr00071-06)

William Jackson Garber, appointed by the court, argued

the cause and filed the briefs for appellant Thomas Fields.

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Thomas G. Corcoran, Jr. and Mary-Ellen Noone, appointed by the court, argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant Bernard Johnson.

Barbara J. Valliere, Assistant United States Attorney,

argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were

Wilma A. Lewis, United States Attorney, John R. Fisher and

James H. Dinan, Assistant United States Attorneys.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Ginsburg and Tatel,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: Thomas "Woozie" Fields and Bernard "Tadpole" Johnson appeal from judgments of convictions

following a jury trial in the District Court. We affirm the

convictions of both defendants. However, because we find

that plain errors in sentencing affected defendants' substantial rights and undermined the fairness of the sentencing

proceedings, we vacate the sentences and remand the case to

the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

I. Background

This case involves the prosecution and conviction of two

members of a coterie known to the Government as the "L

Street Crew." In March 1998, a Federal Grand Jury in the

District of Columbia returned a 70-count Indictment charging

Fields, Johnson, and nine other individuals with Continuing

Criminal Enterprise, Conspiracy to Participate in a Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization ("RICO Conspiracy"),

and various drug trafficking, firearm, and violent offenses.

In October 1998, Fields, Johnson, and two other defendants

were named in a Superseding 74-count Indictment charging

virtually the same offenses. In May 1999, a 64-count Superseding Re-typed Indictment named Fields and Johnson

alone.

The May 1999 Indictment charged Fields and Johnson with

narcotics conspiracy (Count 1), RICO conspiracy (Count 3),

the kidnaping, gang rape, and attempted murder of a young

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woman referred to herein as K.D. (Counts 12-18), firearms

offenses in connection with that rape (Counts 37-38, and 49-

53), the attempted murder of an unknown individual in January 1997 (Counts 32, 33), and firearms offenses related thereto (Counts 45 and 61). Fields was charged, in addition to the

above offenses, with continuing criminal enterprise (Count 2),

assaults with a dangerous weapon (Counts 4 and 5), assaults

with intent to kill, kidnaping, and attempted murder in aid of

racketeering activity (Counts 6-11, 19-31), related firearms

offenses (Counts 34-36, 39-44, 46-48, 54-60), and money

laundering (Counts 62-64).

During the trial, the Government presented evidence of

attempted murders, assaults, a kidnaping, and a gang rape.

According to the Government's theory of the case, these

alleged crimes were motivated by the L Street Crew's desire

to protect or expand the area in which the group sold and

distributed drugs. Fields took the stand during the trial and

admitted to selling drugs to certain individuals, but denied

that he held any leadership role with respect to the L Street

Crew. Johnson did not testify.

The jury convicted Fields on 40 counts and Johnson on 16

counts. Both Fields' and Johnson's convictions included

those for the rape and attempted murder of K.D. At the

sentencing hearing, the trial judge adopted the calculations in

the Presentence Investigation Report ("PIR"), as well as the

Government's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of

law, and sentenced Fields to life plus 120 years, and Johnson

to life plus 25 years.

II. Analysis

In this appeal, Fields and Johnson seek review of myriad

issues relating to their convictions and sentencing. They

assert challenges to venue, sufficiency of the evidence, admission of evidence, joinder of defendants, failure to sever certain

counts, the firearms and other sentence enhancements, and

calculation of their sentences in light of the Supreme Court's

holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).

We have considered carefully all of appellants' arguments;

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most of appellants' claims require no discussion, because they

are meritless. There are two challenges, however, that have

merit. We address these claims below.

A. Determinations of drug quantity

Appellants contend that the sentences they received on

Counts 1 (Narcotics Conspiracy) and 3 (RICO Conspiracy)

were improperly enhanced beyond the statutory maximum,

because the finding as to drug quantity was not made by a

jury. The PIR, prepared after the jury trial, divided Fields'

40 counts of conviction into six groups involving substantially

the same harm, and Johnson's 16 counts of conviction into two

such groups. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

s 3D1.2 (1998) (rules for grouping closely related counts).

Counts 1 and 3 were included in Group 1, along with Counts

62-64 (Money Laundering). The PIR listed the base offense

level for both defendants at 38; this determination was

derived from an assumption that the offenses involved more

than the equivalent of 30,000 kilograms of marijuana. The

PIR attributed 173,570 kilograms to Fields and 148,862 kilograms to Johnson. In reaching these estimates, the PIR

purported to rely on testimony provided by members of the L

Street Crew at the trial.

In Apprendi, the Court held that, "[o]ther than the fact of a

prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a

crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."

120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. It therefore follows that drug quantity

is an element of the offense where a factual determination of

the amount of drugs at issue may result in a sentence that

exceeds a maximum sentence prescribed in the applicable

statute. See, e.g., United States v. Pratt, No. 99-4424, 2001

WL 101457, at *6 (4th Cir. Feb. 7, 2001); United States v.

Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 933 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,

121 S. Ct. 600 (2000); United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160,

164-65 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3555 (U.S.

Feb. 20, 2001) (No. 00-7819). This court's ruling to the

contrary in United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 966 F.2d 682,

685-86 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 901 (1992), is no

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longer good law. In light of Apprendi, it is now clear that, in

drug cases under 21 U.S.C. ss 841 and 846, before a defendant can be sentenced to any of the progressively higher

statutory maximums that are based on progressively higher

quantities of drugs specified in subsections 841(b)(1)(A) or

(B), the Government must state the drug type and quantity in

the indictment, submit the required evidence to the jury, and

prove the relevant drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt.

In the instant case, the Government did not come close to

satisfying the requirements of Apprendi. The Indictment

specified quantities of drugs alleged to be involved in Counts

1 and 3, but the verdict form asked only that the jury find

"detectable amount[s]" of marijuana, crack cocaine, and phencyclidine ("PCP") in order to find the defendants guilty.

Therefore, it cannot be found that the jury's convictions on

those counts were based on any specific factual findings as to

drug quantity. It was only in connection with Count 2

(Continuing Criminal Enterprise) that the verdict form required specific findings that defendants distributed 1.5 kilograms or more of crack cocaine and 3,000 kilograms or more

of marijuana, and the jury deadlocked on these issues.

It is undisputed that the quantity of controlled substances

involved was a decisive factor in the defendants' sentences.

The sentencing range for violations of 21 U.S.C. s 841 (1994

& Supp. IV 1998) is determined by drug quantities. Section

841(b)(1)(A) of Title 21 provides for a maximum penalty of life

where the offense involves 1,000 kilograms or more of a

mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana, and 21 U.S.C. s 841(b)(1)(B) provides for a maximum

sentence of 40 years where the offense involves 100 kilograms

or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable

amount of marijuana. Default statutory maximums of five to

30 years are provided in ss 841(b)(1)(C) and (D).

In this case, there were no substantive controlled substance

act offenses charged under 21 U.S.C. s 841. However, the

Narcotics Conspiracy Count was charged under 21 U.S.C.

s 846, and alleged a conspiracy to unlawfully possess with

intent to distribute and to distribute controlled substances in

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excess of 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana, 50 grams or

more of cocaine base, and 100 grams or more of PCP, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. s 841 (a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(ii)-(iv), (vii).

The RICO Conspiracy charged under Count 3 also alleged 21

U.S.C. s 841(a) violations.

At the sentencing hearing, the District Court adopted the

calculations in the PIR, as well as the Government's proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law, and found "well above"

the preponderance standard that 1,670 grams of crack cocaine, 11,388 grams of PCP, and 3,490 kilograms of marijuana

were "directly attributable to defendant Thomas Fields" during the course of the charged conspiracy. With respect to

Johnson, the District Court found that 1,670 grams of crack,

11,328 grams of PCP, and 2,182 kilograms of marijuana were

"reasonably foreseeable and part of jointly undertaken activity by defendant Johnson, and therefore are appropriately

attributable to him." The life sentences imposed on appellants were predicated in part on these calculations.

The District Court's sentence enhancements contravene

Apprendi. However, neither defendant objected at trial to

the District Court's determination of drug quantities, so our

review is for plain error. See United States v. Wolff, 195

F.3d 37, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). And we

may exercise our discretion to correct an error pursuant to

Rule 52(b) only when an "error" is "plain" or "obvious" under

current law, affects substantial rights, and seriously affects

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67

(1997).

The Government concedes that the imposition of life sentences based on drug quantities determined by the trial judge

at sentencing was plain error. The Government argues,

however, that appellants are not entitled to relief, because

they cannot show that the error affected their substantial

rights. We disagree.

The Government first asserts that substantial rights were

not affected, because the District Court correctly determined

that the quantity of drugs far exceeded the amount required

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under the applicable provision of s 841(b)(1). However, in

calculating the quantities at issue, the PIR relied heavily on

the imprecise testimony of various cooperating witnesses, and

the District Court simply adopted the PIR estimates. The

only concrete evidence of drug quantity offered at the trial

was from the seizures in this case and the testimony of Mr.

Joseph Bono, a forensic chemist with the Drug Enforcement

Administration. Government counsel acknowledged that this

evidence did not establish that either defendant possessed

more than 30,000 kilograms of marijuana. The Government

nevertheless urges us to extrapolate from the concrete evidence and attribute a higher quantity of drugs to each

defendant. Obviously, under Apprendi, we have no authority

to do this. The Government was required to convince the

jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants possessed enough of a controlled substance for the District Court

to adjust the base offense level to 38. They failed to do that

in this case.

The Government next suggests that we should ignore drug

quantity altogether and rely instead on the s 1963(a) RICO

penalty provision. Section 1963 states that "[w]hoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be ...

imprisoned not more than 20 years (or for life if the violation

is based on a racketeering activity for which the maximum

penalty includes life imprisonment)." 18 U.S.C. s 1963

(1994). The Government maintains that appellants were

charged with, and convicted of, Racketeering Act 21, the

kidnaping of K.D. Kidnaping, under the D.C. Code, carries a

maximum sentence of life imprisonment. D.C. Code Ann.

s 22-2101 (1996). Because the jury specifically found that

appellants committed Racketeering Act 21, the Government

asserts, the jury found facts justifying imposition of the

statutory maximum sentence of life totally apart from drug

quantity. The error in this reasoning is that neither the PIR

nor the trial judge relied on this rationale in imposing the life

sentences. Rather, the District Court, in raising the base

offense level to 38 for the Group 1 offenses, relied on the

PIR's findings on the marijuana equivalency amounts. We

therefore reject the Government's arguments.

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The District Court's failure to rely on concrete evidence to

determine the base offense level for the Group 1 Counts

undermined the fairness of the sentencing proceedings, because the error clearly affected the outcome of the case by

substantially increasing defendants' sentences. We cannot

ignore this plain error.

B. The leadership enhancement

Appellant Fields argues that the four-level increase that he

received for his leadership role in various offenses was improper in light of Apprendi. He further maintains that the

testimony of the various cooperating witnesses showed that

they had their own businesses, kept their own money, and

that Fields was not their boss. As noted above, the PIR

divided the counts of conviction into six groups. In each of

these groups, the report recommended a four-level increase in

the guideline range based on U.S.S.G. s 3B1.1(a), because

Fields was an organizer or leader of criminal activity that

involved five or more participants.

Count 1 (Narcotics Conspiracy) of the Indictment alleged

that the conspiracy operated as an organization controlled

and directed by Fields. Count 3 (RICO Conspiracy) alleged

that Fields was the leader of the organization. The issue of

leadership role, however, was not submitted to the jury with

respect to Counts 1 and 3. Instead, it was submitted in

conjunction with Count 2 (Continuing Criminal Enterprise)

and the jury was deadlocked as to this count.

Because the fact of leadership role may increase a defendant's sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum,

Apprendi applies. Accordingly, the issue of leadership must

be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt. Because Fields did not argue at

trial that leadership should have been submitted to the jury,

however, we review the record for plain error.

Though we have exercised our discretion to notice plain

error with regard to the issue of drug quantity, we decline to

do so with regard to leadership enhancement. On the issue

of leadership, the record evidence overwhelmingly demonUSCA Case #99-3138 Document #582057 Filed: 03/13/2001 Page 8 of 10
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strates that Fields managed and masterminded various offenses committed by the L Street Crew. Fields enlisted

members of the L Street Crew to assist him in distributing

controlled substances, including marijuana, crack cocaine, and

PCP, directed, procured, and participated in acts of violence

against rival drug groups, and orchestrated the kidnaping,

sexual assault, and shooting of K.D. Based on the sheer

volume of largely uncontested evidence offered at trial, there

is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Fields held a leadership role in the criminal activities for which he was convicted.

C. The sentence enhancements for the Group 2 offenses

Appellants contend that the sentence enhancement for

their Group 2 offenses was improper. We agree. The Group

2 offenses related to the kidnaping and attempted murder of

K.D. The applicable sentencing guideline for Count 12,

armed kidnaping, is U.S.S.G. s 2A4.1(a), which provides for a

base offense level of 24. The PIR computed an adjusted

offense level of 43, pursuant to U.S.S.G. s 2A4.1(b)(7)(B) and

Application Note 5, with the rationale that the object of the

kidnaping was to commit first degree murder, and the District Court adopted the finding that the attempted murder of

K.D. would have constituted first degree murder had she

died. The offense of first degree murder was not submitted

to the jury, however, and the jury made no finding beyond a

reasonable doubt that the object of the kidnaping was to

commit first degree murder.

Application Note 5 to s 2A4.1 of the U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines suggests that if an offense involved conspiracy to

kidnap for the purpose of committing murder, or if an offense

involved a kidnaping during which a participant attempted to

murder the victim under circumstances that would have

constituted first degree murder, subsection (b)(7) would reference first degree murder and result in an offense level of 43.

We reject this commentary, and the District Court's reliance

on it, because it is flatly at odds with the controlling Sentencing Guideline. As the Fifth Circuit correctly noted in United

States v. Smith, 184 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 1999), Application

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Note 5 "violate[s] the dictates of s 2A4.1(b)(7)(B)." Id. at

418.

Section 2A4.1(b)(7)(B) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

explicitly directs the court to cross-reference the guideline

applicable to the crime actually committed. In this case, that

crime was attempted murder. In Stinson v. United States,

508 U.S. 36 (1993), the Supreme Court held that, if the

"commentary and the guideline it interprets are inconsistent

in that following one will result in violating the dictates of the

other, the Sentencing Reform Act itself commands compliance with the guideline." Id. at 43. Because the Guideline

and not the commentary controls, we find that the District

Court erred in enhancing appellants' Group 2 offenses by

cross-referencing the guideline applicable to first degree murder.

III. Conclusion

In light of the above determinations, we vacate appellants'

sentences, and remand the case to the District Court. With

respect to the drug calculations, we instruct the District

Court to re-sentence the defendants based on the amount of

drugs as to which there can be no doubt, i.e., where drug

quantity is established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

On the kidnaping charge, we reverse and remand with instructions to sentence with reference to the Guideline, not

Application Note 5.

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