Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02117/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02117-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
ESPN CLASSIC EUROPE, Inc.
Appellee
ESPN CLASSIC, Inc.
Appellee
ESPN, Inc.
Appellee
Steve Ray
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2117

___________________________

Steve Ray

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

ESPN, Inc.; ESPN CLASSIC, Inc.; ESPN CLASSIC EUROPE, Inc.

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

____________

 Submitted: January 14, 2015

 Filed: April 22, 2015

[Published]

____________

Before SMITH, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM. 

Steve "Wild Thing" Ray brought suit against ESPN, Inc.; ESPN Classic, Inc.;

and ESPN Classic Europe, Inc. (collectively, "ESPN"), asserting state-law tort claims

Appellate Case: 14-2117 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/22/2015 Entry ID: 4267493 
related to ESPN's re-telecast of his wrestling performances. The district court1

 held

that the Copyright Act preempts Ray's claims and therefore dismissed Ray's suit for

failure to state a claim. We affirm.

I. Background

Ray wrestled professionally in the Universal Wrestling Federation (UWF) from

1990 to 1994. He alleges that he wrestled in the UWF for pecuniary gain and that

"[e]ach [of his] match[es] was filmed for future use to generate revenue." Ray

specifically agreed with a representative of the UWF that the films would be "sold and

used." Since his retirement from the UWF in 1994, Ray has, among other things,

promoted healthcare products and weightlifting supplements. 

According to Ray, ESPN has obtained certain films of his wrestling matches

and re-telecast them throughout North America and Europe without first obtaining his

"consent to use [his] identity, likeness, name, nick name, or personality to depict him

in any way." Ray does not allege, however, that ESPN obtained the films unlawfully.

Because of ESPN's alleged actions, Ray filed suit against ESPN in the Circuit Court

of Jackson County, Missouri, asserting four claims under Missouri state law: (1)

invasion of privacy, (2) misappropriation of name, (3) infringement of the right of

publicity, and (4) interference with prospective economic advantage. 

ESPN removed the case to federal court. ESPN then moved to dismiss the entire

case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds that the Copyright

Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., preempts Ray's claims. In analyzing ESPN's motion to

dismiss, the district court correctly noted at the outset of its opinion that Ray's first

two claims—invasion of privacy and misappropriation of name—allege the same tort

under Missouri law. See Nemani v. St. Louis Univ., 33 S.W.3d 184, 185 (Mo. 2000)

1

The Honorable Scott O. Wright, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

-2-

Appellate Case: 14-2117 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/22/2015 Entry ID: 4267493 
(en banc) (citation omitted). The court also noted that Ray did not challenge ESPN's

contention that the Copyright Act preempts Ray's claims for invasion of privacy and

interference with prospective advantage; therefore, the court assumed these claims

were waived. See Crossett Paper Mills Emps. Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y,

Inc., 476 F.3d 578, 580 n.2 (8th Cir. 2007). 

The court ultimately held that the Copyright Act preempts Ray's claims. In so

holding, the court noted that: 

[Ray's] wrestling performances were part of the copyrighted material,

and his likenesses could not be detached from the copyrighted

performances that were contained in the films. . . . [Ray] has not alleged

that his name and likeness were used to promote or endorse any type of

commercial product. Rather, [Ray] complains about ESPN airing

wrestling performances that have been captured on video. Thus, [Ray's]

complaints are based solely on ESPN airing video recordings depicting

him in a "work of authorship," which is plainly encompassed by

copyright law.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Ray argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claims as

preempted under the Copyright Act. We review de novo the district court's dismissal

for failure to state a claim. Rochling v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 725 F.3d 927, 930

(8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). In so doing, we assume "all facts in the complaint

to be true and construe[] all reasonable inferences from those facts most favorably to

the complainant." Id. (quotation and citations omitted).

The Copyright Act will preempt Ray's state-law claims if the following two

conditions are satisfied:

(1) the work at issue is within the subject matter of copyright as defined

in § 102 and 103 of the Copyright Act, and (2) the state law created right

-3-

Appellate Case: 14-2117 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/22/2015 Entry ID: 4267493 
is equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of

copyright as specified in § 106 [of the Copyright Act].

Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 428 (8th Cir.

1993) (citation and footnote omitted); see also 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). We analyze each

of these two conditions in turn.

A. Subject Matter of Copyright

The Copyright Act defines the subject matter of copyright generally as "original

works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . from which they

can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the

aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). "Works of authorship" include

"motion pictures and other audiovisual works." Id. at § 102(a)(6). "A work is 'fixed'

in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord

. . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or

otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration." Id. at § 101.

The filming of Ray's wrestling performances clearly generated an "original

work[] of authorship," id. at § 102(a), that was "'fixed' in a tangible medium of

expression" and could be "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated," id. at

§ 101. The films, therefore, are within the subject matter of copyright law. Id.; see

also Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848 (2d. Cir. 1997) ("We

hold that where the challenged . . . misappropriation relates in part to the copyrighted

broadcasts of [basketball] games, the subject matter requirement is met as to both the

broadcasts and the [basketball] games."); Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball

Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 674 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[T]elecasts [of baseball games] are

. . . within the subject matter of copyright."); Somerson v. McMahon, 956 F. Supp. 2d

1345, 1353–54 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (holding that "the video recordings of plaintiff's

wrestling activities fall within the subject matter of copyright" and that "the broadcast

or recording of the wrestling match is the subject of copyright protection"); Blood v.

-4-

Appellate Case: 14-2117 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/22/2015 Entry ID: 4267493 
Titan Sports, Inc., No. 3:94-CV-307-P, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24485, at *33–*34

(W.D.N.C. May 13, 1997) (holding that the Copyright Act preempted wrestler's statelaw claims for damages arising from the reproduction and distribution of films of his

wrestling performances).

Ray nevertheless argues that his claims are not within the subject matter or

ambit of the Copyright Act because ESPN's alleged use of his "likeness" is the true

"focal point of this case." In support of his argument, he cites factually distinguishable

or inapposite authority, including Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994 (9th

Cir. 2001), and Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654 (5th Cir. 2000), in which courts found

that the Copyright Act did not preempt certain state-law misappropriation or

right-of-publicity claims. In Downing, the defendant-retailer published a photograph

of the surfer-plaintiffs without their permission in the defendant's catalog to promote

the defendant's products as part of its surf-themed advertising campaign. 265 F.3d at

1000. The defendant also created and sold t-shirts exactly like those the plaintiffs wore

in the photograph. Id. As the court noted, "it [was] not the publication of the

photograph itself . . . that [was] the basis for [the plaintiffs'] claims, but rather, it [was]

the use of the [the plaintiffs'] likenesses and their names pictured in the published

photograph." Id. at 1003. Indeed, as the court later added, the defendant "went well

beyond mere republication of the photograph" and, among other things, "suggested

that the surfers had endorsed" the defendant's products. Laws v. Sony Music Entm't,

Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir. 2006) (referring to Downing). Similarly, the

defendants in Brown used the musician-plaintiffs' names and likenesses to sell

"cassettes and CD's," "music catalogs," "posters," and "videotapes," 201 F.3d at

656–57, even though the defendants "lacked copyrights" and had received no

authorization from the plaintiffs. Id. at 656. Notably, the court in Brown specifically

distinguished Baltimore Orioles—and in so doing, distinguished this case as well—on

the grounds that "the right of publicity claimed" by the plaintiffs in Baltimore Orioles

"was essentially a right to prevent rebroadcast of games whose broadcast rights were

already owned by" other parties. Id. at 659. 

-5-

Appellate Case: 14-2117 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/22/2015 Entry ID: 4267493 
Neither Downing nor Brown involved an attempt to merely "prevent

rebroadcast" of a copyrighted film—unlike this case. ESPN did not use Ray's likeness

or name in an advertisement without his permission to promote its commercial

products, and, as the district court correctly noted, Ray's "likenesses could not be

detached from the copyrighted performances that were contained in the films."

Consequently, Ray's attempts on appeal to recast his claims to evade copyright

preemption are unavailing. See also No Doubt v. Activision Publ'g, Inc., 702 F. Supp.

2d 1139, 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2010) ("A claim asserted to prevent nothing more than the

reproduction, performance, distribution, or display of a dramatic performance

captured on film is subsumed by copyright law and preempted." (quotation and

citation omitted)); Fleet v. CBS, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 651 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) ("[I]t

was not merely appellants' likenesses which were captured on film—it was their

dramatic performances which are . . . copyrightable. An actor who wishes to protect

the use of the image contained in a single, fixed dramatic performance need simply

retain the copyright."); 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on

Copyright § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][II] (2014) (noting that when a performer collaborates

in creating a copyrighted work, the performer is barred from "using the right of

publicity to squelch exploitation of that copyrighted work for its intended purpose").

B. Equivalence of State Rights

The Copyright Act gives copyright owners "exclusive rights to do and to

authorize," among other things, the reproduction of "the copyrighted work in copies

or phonorecords"; the preparation of "derivative works based upon the copyrighted

work"; the distribution of "copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the

public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending"; and the

display of certain "copyrighted work publicly." 17 U.S.C. § 106.

As discussed above, the crux of Ray's case is that ESPN re-telecast Ray's filmed

performances. Thus, because Ray's state-law rights have been "'infringed by the mere

act of reproduction, performance, distribution or display'" of his performances, his

-6-

Appellate Case: 14-2117 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/22/2015 Entry ID: 4267493 
state-law rights are equivalent to the exclusive rights "'within the general scope of

copyright.'" Nat'l Car Rental Sys., at 431 (quoting 1 Nimmer on Copyright §

1.01[B][1]); see also Laws, 448 F.3d at 1143 (holding that the Copyright Act

preempted a plaintiff's right-of-publicity claim based on the reproduction of a voice

recording); Balt. Orioles, 805 F.2d at 677 ("[A] right in a work that is conferred by

state law is equivalent to the right to perform a telecast of that work if the state-law

right is infringed merely by broadcasting the work.").2

III. Conclusion

After having thoroughly reviewed all of Ray's arguments on appeal, we affirm

the district court's dismissal of Ray's state-law claims as preempted under the

Copyright Act. 

______________________________

2

In light of this analysis, we reject Ray's contention that his claim for

interference with prospective economic advantage is uniquely beyond the preemptive

scope of the Copyright Act or otherwise requires an analysis separate from that of his

other state-law claims. See, e.g., Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 306

(6th Cir. 2004) ("Generally, tortious interference claims . . . are held to be preempted

because the rights asserted in such claims are not qualitatively different from the rights

protected by copyright."); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d

195, 201 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the Copyright Act preempted a tortious

interference claim), rev’d on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).

-7-

Appellate Case: 14-2117 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/22/2015 Entry ID: 4267493