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Parties Involved:
Armando Nelson Pelliere
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

. FILED 

UDJted States Court of App~b Tenth Circ:uit 

JUN 1 3 i99S 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk ' 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 94-3061 

ARMANDO NELSON PELLIERE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 93-40003-03-SAC) 

F.G. Manzanares of Topeka, Kansas for Defendant-Appellant. 

T.G. Luedke, Assistant U.S. Attorney (Randall K. Rathbun, United 

States Attorney, with him on the brief), Topeka, Kansas, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BALDOCK and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge. 

Appellate Case: 94-3061 Document: 01019279286 Date Filed: 06/13/1995 Page: 1 
Armando Pelliere was charged in two counts of a multi-count 

indictment with conspiracy to possess crack cocaine with intent to 

distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and with possession of 

cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 

841(a) (1). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Pelliere pled guilty 

to the possession charge, and the government dismissed the 

conspiracy charge. In sentencing Mr. Pelliere, the district court 

imposed a three-level enhancement for Mr. Pelliere's role in the 

offense and a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice. 

On appeal, Mr. Pelliere asserts that both enhancements are 

erroneous. We reverse and remand for resentencing. 

I. 

Mr. Pelliere was charged with participating in a wide-ranging 

drug conspiracy involving numerous coconspirators who imported 

cocaine from Panama and distributed it in Junction City, Kansas. 

When authorities arrested the leader of the organization in 1990, 

alleged coconspirator Marcos Torres took his place. Mr. Torres 

subsequently left the country for several months in late 1991 

during which time Mr. Pelliere alleg~dly remained involved in the 

conspiracy. The count to which Mr. Pelliere pled guilty charged 

that he, along with Mr. Torres and others, possessed with intent 

to distribute one kilo of cocaine on June 18, 1992. 

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Appellate Case: 94-3061 Document: 01019279286 Date Filed: 06/13/1995 Page: 2 
Mr. Pelliere was arrested on February 8, 1993. In a 

detention hearing before a federal magistrate judge, Mr. Pelliere, 

through his attor~ey, denied any involvement in the conspiracy. 

Shortly after the plea, customs special agent Jim Kanatzar 

interviewed Mr. Pelliere. Mr. Pelliere again denied any 

involvement with "the organization before 1992, although he 

admitted committing some drug transactions in March of 1992. In 

1993 during an interview with a probation officer, Mr. Pelliere 

likewise denied being a party to any conspiracy. 

Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court accepted 

the presentence report's recommendation that Mr. Pelliere's 

sentence be enhanced two levels under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for 

obstruction of justice and three levels under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) 

for his role in the offense as a manager or supervisor. These 

enhancements resulted in an offense level of 31 which, together 

with Mr. Pelliere's criminal history category of I, resulted in a 

sentencing range of 108-135 months. The court sentenced Mr. 

Pelliere to 108 months. 

II. 

The government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 

any sentence enhancement it asserts the court should grant. See 

United States v. Torres, Nos. 94-6128, 94-6140, 94-6152, 1995 WL 

242649, at *12 (lOth Cir. April 25, 1995). The presentence report 

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Appellate Case: 94-3061 Document: 01019279286 Date Filed: 06/13/1995 Page: 3 
originally recommended a two-level enhancement for obstruction of 

justice under section 3Cl.l on the basis of Mr. Pelliere's alleged 

involvement in an attempt to threaten a grand jury witness who was 

also involved in the conspiracy. When Mr. Pelliere objected to 

the evidence of this incident as a fabrication by the witness, the 

government responded that although no evidence directly linked Mr. 

Pelliere to the threat, the witness' assumption that Mr. Pelliere 

was involved was well-founded. In addition, the government 

asserted for the first time that the enhancement was also 

warranted on the basis of statements Mr. Pelliere made to Agent 

Kanatzar and to the magistrate judge denying his involvement in 

the conspiracy. 

Section 3Cl.l provides: 

If the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or 

attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of 

justice during the investigation, prosecution, or 

sentencing of the instant offense, increase the offense 

level by 2 levels. 

The commentary makes clear that the guideline is applicable where 

a defendant provides "materially false information to a judge or 

magistrate," Commentary, Application note 3(f), U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.l, 

and/or provides "a materially false statement to a law enforcement 

officer that significantly obstructed or impeded the official 

investigation or prosecution of the instant offense," id. at 

Application note 3(g). After hearing evidence from a probation 

officer and from Agent Kanatzar, the district court determined 

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Appellate Case: 94-3061 Document: 01019279286 Date Filed: 06/13/1995 Page: 4 
that an enhancement for obstruction of justice was proper. In so 

doing, the court specifically declined to base the enhancement on 

Mr. Pelliere's alleged involvement in witness-tampering, stating 

that 

the court will not be basing the enhancement on this 

factor. The court finds sufficient additional evidence 

to warrant this enhancement. This includes the 

defendant's proffer made to the U.S. Magistrate Judge, 

Ronald C. Newman, in which the defendant requested 

pretrial release because he had never sold or delivered 

any drugs at any time. In addition, based on Agent 

Kanatzar's testimony today, the court finds the 

defendant provided a materially false statement to a law 

enforcement officer that significantly impeded the 

prosecution of the instant case as it relates to two of 

the codefendants. The court finds his statements to be 

material because . . . if believed, they would tend to 

influence or affect those issues before the court. 

Rec., vol. IV, at 87-88. Relying on United States v. Urbanek, 930 

F.2d 1512, 1515 (lOth Cir. 1991), Mr. Pelliere argues on appeal 

that the district court erred because the statements upon which 

the court relied were simply an example of the "exculpatory no." 

In Urbanek, we held that the sentencing judge committed clear 

error by enhancing the defendant's sentence for obstruction of 

justice on the basis of statements that "amounted to nothing more 

than a denial of guilt or an 'exculpatory no.'" Id. We pointed 

out that the guidelines specifically prohibit a sentencing court 

from using such statements to enhance a sentence under section 

3Cl.l, citing to the commentary that states: 

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Appellate Case: 94-3061 Document: 01019279286 Date Filed: 06/13/1995 Page: 5 
This provision is not intended to punish a defendant for 

the exercise of a constitutional right. A defendant's 

denial of guilt (other than a denial of guilt under oath 

that constitutes perjury) , refusal to admit guilt or 

provide information to a probation officer, or refusal 

to enter a plea of guilty is not a basis for application 

of this provision. In applying this provision, the 

defendant's testimony and statements should be evaluated 

in a light most favorable to the defendant. 

Commentary, Application note 1, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (emphasis added). 

The presentence report describes the statements upon which 

the government and the court relied as follows: "During an 

interview with U.S. Customs Agent Jim Kanatzar following his plea 

in this case on October 1, 1993, Pelliere denied ever selling any 

drugs at any time. In addition, the defense attorney also made 

this proffer to the Court during a detention hearing before the 

Magistrate Judge." Rec., vol. V, at 23.1 The testimony of Agent 

Kanatzar at the sentencing hearing likewise demonstrates that the 

statements made to him which he felt hindered his investigation 

were no more than denials of guilt or refusals to provide 

information. See rec., vol. IV, at 45, 48, 49. For example, 

Agent Kanatzar testified: "He didn't provide any information so 

it hindered my investigation." Id. at 48. Moreover, the district 

court said only that "defendant provided a materially false 

statement to a law enforcement officer that significantly impeded 

1 The government presented no evidence that these statements 

were made under oath and constituted perjury. 

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Appellate Case: 94-3061 Document: 01019279286 Date Filed: 06/13/1995 Page: 6 
the prosecution of the instant case as it relates to two of the 

codefendants, id. at 88, without naming the codefendants. 

On this record, we simply must hold that the government 

failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. 

Pelliere obstructed justice in the manner asserted by the 

government to the sentencing court. Because denials of guilt or 

refusals to talk cannot serve as the basis for an obstruction of 

justice enhancement, the district court erred in enhancing Mr. 

Pelliere's sentence under section 3Cl.l. 

III. 

The presentence report originally recommended a three-level 

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(b) based on Mr. Pelliere's role 

in the offense as a manager or supervisor of criminal activity 

that involved five or more participants or was otherwise 

extensive. In so doing, the report relied on information from 

witnesses who described Mr. Pelliere as second-in-charge behind 

Marcos Torres and who stated that Mr. Pelliere took over 

supervision of the operation during the time Mr. Torres was in 

Panama. Mr. Pelliere filed objections to the report, pointing out 

that other witnesses, including an undercover agent, had 

identified Mr. Scott-Sanjur, a named coconspirator in the 

conspiracy count, as the person who was second-in-command and who 

took over for Mr. Torres. 

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During the sentencing hearing, the probation officer who 

prepared the report testified that he was relying on information 

provided by Agent Kanatzar. Mr. Pelliere relied on reports of 

witness interviews tending to establish that Mr. Scott-Sanjur's 

role in the conspiracy was as Mr. Pelliere described it and 

tending to show that Mr. Pelliere's role was that of a middleman 

or delivery man. Agent Kanatzar in turn testified that he was 

relying on statements by other witnesses whom he believed to be 

more credible. None of the witnesses relied upon by either side 

appeared at the hearing; all of them apparently took some part in 

the criminal activity, some pled, some testified before the grand 

jury, and some were granted immunity. 

In determining that Mr. Pelliere's sentence was subject to 

enhancement under section 3Bl.l(b) for his role in the offense, 

the district court stated: 

Although [defense counsel] does point out several 

statements that were given to law enforcement officers 

regarding the defendant's role as well as the role of 

Scott Sanjur, the government has been able to produce 

grand jury testimony from three individuals that state 

that the defendant was second in command. The court 

does not feel that the exact hierarchy structure need be 

established in this case; however, the court does 

believe that the defendant did occupy some type of 

supervisory role in this illegal activity. Whether he 

was second in command only part of the time and Scott 

Sanjur part of the time is not absolutely critical to 

the determination. The court finds that the defendant 

did occupy a managerial or supervisory role and a threepoint enhancement is warranted under the provisions of 

USSG 3(b)l.l(b) .... 

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Appellate Case: 94-3061 Document: 01019279286 Date Filed: 06/13/1995 Page: 8 
Rec., vol. IV, at 85-86. On appeal, Mr. Pelliere argues that the 

evidence does not establish his role as manager or supervisor. 

Enhancement under section 3Bl.l(b) applies to a defendant who 

11 exercised some degree of control or organizational authority over 

someone subordinate to him in the drug distribution scheme. 11 

United States v. Roberts, 14 F.3d 502, 524 (lOth Cir. 1993) 

(citing United States v. Reid, 911 F.2d 1456, 1464 (lOth Cir. 

1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1097 (1991)). We review the 

district court's fact findings under the clearly erroneous 

standard and the application of the guidelines de novo. Id. at 

522-23. In Roberts, we pointed out that 11 ' [i]n enhancing a 

defendant's sentence based on his role in the offense, a district 

court must make specific factual findings as to that role.' 11 Id. 

at 522 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1184 (2d 

Cir. 1993)). We further pointed out that when a district court's 

findings 11 do not fulfil the specific criteria mandated 11 by section 

3Bl.l, a reviewing court may not supply those specifics on the 

basis of the prosecutor's statements at sentencing, the probation 

officer's response to the defendant's objections to the 

presentence report, or other evidence in the record. Id. at 523. 

As quoted above, the district court concluded that it did not 

need either to accept the hierarchy proposed by the government or 

determine whether Mr. Pelliere was second-in-command at least part 

of the time in order to decide whether an enhancement was 

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Appellate Case: 94-3061 Document: 01019279286 Date Filed: 06/13/1995 Page: 9 
warranted under section 3Bl.l. Although the court nonetheless 

concluded that an enhancement was proper, it articulated no 

specific findings to support its decision. Here, as in Torres, 

"appellate review of the propriety of applying this serious 

enhancement is hindered by the absence of a clear picture of the 

reasoning employed by the sentencing court." Torres, 1995 WL 

242649, at *13 (footnote omitted). Findings are not adequate if 

"they do not constitute evidence of decision-making authority or 

control over a subordinate necessary to conclude [the defendant] 

was a supervisor or manager." Roberts, 14 F.3d at 524. The 

court '·S failure to make those findings here has left our appellate 

review to "flounder in the 'zone of speculation.'" United States 

v. Slater, 971 F.2d 626, 633 (lOth Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 

Specific fact findings are particularly vital in this case. 

The grand jury testimony the government introduced on the control 

issue related mainly to the activities of Marcos Torres and was 

hearsay. Moreover, some of this evidence was directly 

contradicted by the report of undercover agent Angel Cruz stating 

that a reliable informant told him Scott-Sanjur was second-incommand and that other informants told him Scott-Sanjur took over 

when Torres was arrested. See rec., supp. val. II, gov't ex. 1. 

We recognize that the district court may use reliable hearsay 

testimony in determining an appropriate sentence. See United 

States v. Roach, 978 F.2d 573, 576 (lOth Cir. 1992); U.S.S.G. § 

6A1.3(a); see also United States v. Reid, 911 F.2d 1456, 1464 

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Appellate Case: 94-3061 Document: 01019279286 Date Filed: 06/13/1995 Page: 10 
(lOth Cir. 1990) (hearsay statement cannot be used in sentencing 

absent some minimal indication of reliability other than mere 

allegation). Here, however, the court did not specify what 

particular hearsay statements it was relying upon, nor did it make 

any assessment of reliability. 

Moreover, because the use of hearsay in sentencing raises due 

process concerns, "the defendant [must] be given adequate notice 

of and an opportunity to rebut or explain information ~hat is used 

against him." United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1181 

(lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1038 (1990). The lack of 

specificity here frustrates both Mr. Pelliere's ability to 

challenge the sentencing court's determination on appeal and our 

ability to undertake a meaningful review. 

In sum, we conclude that the district court erred in 

enhancing Mr. Pelliere's sentence under section 3Cl.l for 

obstruction of justice. We further conclude that the court failed 

to make adequate fact findings with respect to enhancement under 

section 3Bl.l based on Mr. Pelliere's role in the offense. We 

therefore remand to the district court to vacate Mr. Pelliere's 

sentence and resentence in light of this opinion. 

REVERSED and REMANDED. 

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