Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01192/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01192-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Home Depot
Defendant
Christopher Smith
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CHRISTOPHER SMITH, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

HOME DEPOT, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:24-cv-01192 DAD AC (PS) 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Plaintiff is proceeding in this matter pro se, and pre-trial proceedings are accordingly 

referred to the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(21). This case was removed from 

Sacramento County Superior Court on April 24, 2024. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff filed a First 

Amended Complaint on May 21, 2024. ECF No. 6. On June 4, 2024, defendant Home Depot 

moved to dismiss. ECF No. 10. The motion was taken under submission. ECF No. 11. Plaintiff 

opposed the motion (ECF No. 14) and defendant replied (ECF No. 16). Plaintiff submitted an 

additional exhibit, consisting of a printout of the definition of “hostile work environment.” ECF 

No. 17. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends defendant’s motion to 

dismiss (ECF No. 10) be GRANTED and the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6) be DISMISSED 

with leave to amend. 

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I. Background 

 A. The Complaint 

 Plaintiff filed his complaint, entitled “Complaint for Damages for Libel,” in state court on 

January 29, 2024. ECF No. 1 at 13-21. The complaint alleged that defendant Home Depot 

slandered plaintiff by calling him a pimp and a sugar daddy, and telling plaintiff’s peers to watch 

him so that he wouldn’t “rub off” on new coworkers. ECF No. 1 at 14. Plaintiff alleged that 

defendant’s words were defamatory because he has been a married man for 24 years, and the 

words were used to defame and slander plaintiff’s character. Id. Plaintiff alleged that because of 

defendant’s conduct he was subjected to a “hostile work environment, character assassination, 

humiliation, [and] job gratification.” Id. Plaintiff alleged that he was suspended for a “false 

threat” of which he was later found to be innocent. Id. 

 Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the “sole cause of action for 

libel should be dismissed because (1) it is barred by the [one year] statute of limitations; and (2) 

the alleged defamatory statements are unactionable opinion.” ECF No. 4 at 3. In response to the 

motion to dismiss, plaintiff submitted a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). ECF No. 6. On the 

form complaint document, plaintiff checked a box indicating that the basis for jurisdiction is 

“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as codified, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.” ECF 

No. 6 at 4. Under “Statement of Claim” plaintiff checked the boxes for “Unequal terms and 

conditions of my employment” and “Retaliation.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff stated that he received the 

requisite Notice of Right to Sue Letter form the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on 

November 23, 2023 (id. at 6) and attached a copy of the Notice (id. at 8). The FAC does not 

contain any narrative statement of facts. 

B. Motions to Dismiss 

 Defendant moves to dismiss the FAC, arguing that it (1) it is barred by the statute of 

limitations, and (2) it fails to state any facts to support a claim for relief. ECF No. 10 at 3. 

II. Analysis 

A. Legal Standards Governing Motions to Dismiss 

“The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal 

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sufficiency of the complaint.” N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 

1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901 

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than a 

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 

sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). It is insufficient for the pleading to contain a statement of facts that 

“merely creates a suspicion” that the pleader might have a legally cognizable right of action. Id. 

(quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-35 (3d ed. 

2004)). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. 

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court “must accept as true all of the 

factual allegations contained in the complaint,” construe those allegations in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Erickson v. Pardus, 

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 

960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3055 (2011); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 340 (9th 

Cir. 2010). However, the court need not accept as true legal conclusions cast in the form of 

factual allegations, or allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice. See 

Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981); Sprewell v. Golden State 

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.), as amended, 275 F.3d 1187 (2001). 

Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Pro se complaints are construed liberally and may 

only be dismissed if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support 

of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 

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2014). The court’s liberal interpretation of a pro se complaint, however, may not supply essential 

elements of the claim that were not pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992). A pro se 

litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend, 

unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 

F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 

B. Statute of Limitations 

Before a plaintiff can file a Title VII civil action, he must file a timely charge of 

discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Zipes v. Trans World 

Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). By statute, a plaintiff has ninety days from his receipt of 

the EEOC’s right-to-sue letter to file a Title VII claim. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). This ninetyday period operates as a statute of limitations. Scholar v. Pacific Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 266-67 (9th 

Cir.1992). Therefore, if a plaintiff fails to file his Title VII civil action within the ninety-day 

period, this action is barred. Id. at 267. A statute of limitations defense may be raised by a 

motion to dismiss when the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint. Von 

Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Defendant argues that because the FAC alleging employment discrimination under Title 

VII was filed on May 21, 2024, plaintiff missed the 90-day window in which to sue, which ran 

from November 16, 2023 and ended on February 15, 2024. ECF No. 6 at 8. While defendant 

does not dispute that plaintiff’s initial complaint, filed in January of 2024, was filed within the 

right to sue window, defendant argues that the FAC does not relate back to the original complaint, 

and thus, the Title VII claim is time-barred. ECF No. 16 at 3. 

Defendant’s contention that the FAC does not relate back to the original complaint is not 

persuasive. Pursuant to Rule 15(c)(1), an amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the 

original pleading when the amendment asserts a claim that “arose out of the conduct, transaction, 

or occurrence set out – or attempted to be set out – in the original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 

15(c)(1)(B). Defendant argues that the FAC does not relate back to the original pleading because 

the original complaint “asserts one claim for defamation” and “does not assert any claims or facts 

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relating to employment discrimination.” ECF No. 10 at 5-6. A review of the original complaint 

reveals that it does not clearly list any causes of action. Instead, it presents a series of factual 

allegations stating that plaintiff experienced name-calling and harassment, that he was subject to a 

hostile work environment, and that was retaliated against for complaining to leadership. ECF No. 

1 at 14. The FAC, to the contrary, contains no supporting facts whatsoever but asserts two causes 

of action: a Title VII claim of retaliation and a Title VII claim of unequal terms and conditions of 

employment. ECF No. 6 at 5. It is not readily apparent that the FAC is unrelated to the facts in 

the original compliant. To the contrary, the original complaint and the FAC appear to arise out of 

a common nucleus of facts, but the FAC’s lack of factual support makes it impossible to discern 

whether this is the case. The court liberally construes the pro se plaintiff’s pleadings and declines 

at this juncture to find that the FAC is barred by the 90-day statute of limitations. 

C. Failure to State a Claim 

As stated above, the FAC does not contain any supporting facts, and therefore fails to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to 

discriminate against any person with respect to “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 

employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-2. To state a claim for either racial or gender discrimination under Title VII, 

plaintiff must plead: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his position; 

(3) he experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside 

his protected class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse 

employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination. Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of 

Arizona, Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff’s FAC does not contain any of the 

necessary information, and therefore the undersigned must recommend that the motion to dismiss 

be GRANTED. However, plaintiff is a pro se litigant, and as such should be given leave to file 

an amended complaint that cures the defects in the FAC. 

III. Leave to Amend 

 Leave to amend is appropriate in this case. Plaintiff is informed that the Second Amended 

Complaint must contain a short and plain statement of plaintiff’s claims. The allegations of the 

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complaint should be set forth in sequentially numbered paragraphs, with each paragraph number 

being one greater than the one before, each paragraph having its own number, and no paragraph 

number being repeated anywhere in the complaint. Each paragraph should be limited “to a single 

set of circumstances” where possible. Rule 10(b). Forms are available to help plaintiffs organize 

their complaint in the proper way. They are available at the Clerk’s Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor 

(Rm. 4 200), Sacramento, CA 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms. 

 The amended complaint must not force the court and the defendants to guess at what is 

being alleged against whom. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming 

dismissal of a complaint where the district court was “literally guessing as to what facts support 

the legal claims being asserted against certain defendants”). The amended complaint must not 

require the court to spend its time “preparing the ‘short and plain statement’ which Rule 8 

obligated plaintiffs to submit.” Id. at 1180. Importantly, the amended complaint must not refer 

to a prior pleading in order to make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. An amended 

complaint must be complete without reference to any prior pleading. Local Rule 220. This is 

because, as a rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Pacific Bell Tel. 

Co. v. Linkline Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 456 n.4 (2009) (“[n]ormally, an amended 

complaint supersedes the original complaint”) (citing 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & 

Procedure § 1476, pp. 556 57 (2d ed. 1990)). Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 

alleged. 

IV. Pro Se Plaintiff’s Summary 

 The Magistrate Judge is recommending to the District Judge that your First Amended 

Complaint be dismissed, but that you be given the opportunity to file a Second Amended 

Complaint. You may file an objection to this recommendation within 21 days if you wish to do 

so. If the District Judge issues an order adopting these recommendations, you will have 30 days 

from the date of that order to file a Second Amended Complaint that explains what happened to 

you, and why it violated the law. 

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V. Conclusion 

 Accordingly, the undersigned recommends as follows: 

1. That the motion to dismiss at ECF No. 10 be GRANTED; and 

2. That the First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6) be DISMISSED for failure to state a 

claim; and 

3. That plaintiff be granted leave to amend and provided 30 days to file a Second Amended 

Complaint. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty-one days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id.; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a 

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez 

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: October 2, 2024 

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