Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-05118/USCOURTS-caDC-15-05118-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sally Jewell
Appellee
Mackinac Tribe
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 7, 2016 Decided July 19, 2016

No. 15-5118

MACKINAC TRIBE,

APPELLANT

v.

SALLY JEWELL, U.S. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:14-cv-00456)

Michael J. Walleri, pro hac vice, argued the cause for 

appellant. With him on the briefs was Ryan C. Posey.

Nicholas A. DiMascio, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department 

of Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the 

brief were John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General, Mary 

Gabrielle Sprague, Attorney, and Matthew Marinelli, 

Attorney.

Before: BROWN, GRIFFITH and PILLARD, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM. 

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

USCA Case #15-5118 Document #1625439 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 1 of 13
2

PER CURIAM: Plaintiff-Appellant Mackinac Tribe brought 

an action in federal district court to compel the Secretary of 

the Interior to convene an election allowing the Tribe to

organize under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 

U.S.C. § 476(a). Although the Mackinac Tribe does not 

appear on the Secretary’s list of federally acknowledged tribes

and has not been acknowledged through the Secretary’s Part 

83 process, see 25 C.F.R. pt. 83, the group alleges it is 

federally recognized for IRA purposes because it is the 

historical successor to a tribe the federal government 

previously recognized via treaty. The district court reserved 

the question of whether acknowledgment through Part 83 is a 

necessary prerequisite for tribal organization under the IRA, 

finding instead that the Mackinac Tribe failed to exhaust its 

administrative remedies by first seeking acknowledgment 

through the Part 83 process. We agree and affirm the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment. 

I

To appreciate the Mackinac’s claim, we must look far 

back into our Nation’s history. Between 1785 and 1855, the 

United States entered into numerous treaties with a group of 

Native Americans known as the Ottawa and Chippewa 

Nation. These people were located in Michigan and 

comprised several autonomous tribes linked by similar culture 

and shared language—of which the Mackinac were one. For 

ease of administrability, the government referred to and 

negotiated with these tribes collectively as the “Ottawa and 

Chippewa Nation of Indians.” See, e.g., Treaty with Ottawa 

and Chippewa, 7 Stat. 491 (Mar. 28, 1836). An 1836 treaty, 

however, singled out the Mackinac Tribe (then referred to as 

the Michilimackinac) to create a temporary five-year 

reservation for its bands. See id. Art. 3. 

USCA Case #15-5118 Document #1625439 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 2 of 13
3

Two decades later, the federal government encountered 

resistance when it tried to negotiate collectively with this 

group of bands. The various groups insisted on negotiating 

independently and further demanded the government dissolve 

the Ottawa and Chippewa Nation. See Treaty with the Ottawa 

and Chippewa, 11 Stat. 621, Art. 5 (July 31, 1855). As part of 

an 1855 treaty, the government agreed to dissolve the Nation. 

Id. Relevant to this litigation, the government also 

purportedly set aside two land withdrawals for the exclusive 

use of the Mackinac Tribe. Twenty years later, though, the 

Secretary of the Interior terminated all federal services to the 

Mackinac.

Most recently, in 2011, several Mackinac groups 

consolidated to conduct an election under the IRA. To 

qualify for benefits under the IRA, tribes must meet certain 

conditions set by federal law. “The most important condition 

is federal recognition, which is a ‘formal political act 

confirming the tribe’s existence as a distinct political society, 

and institutionalizing the government-to-government 

relationship between the tribe and the federal government.’” 

California Valley Miwok Tribe v. United States, 515 F.3d 

1262, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF 

FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.02[3], at 138 (2005 ed.)). The 

definition of “recognition” has evolved over time but 

historically the United States recognized tribes through 

treaties, executive orders, and acts of Congress. See Harry S. 

Jackson III, Note, The Incomplete Loom: Exploring the 

Checkered Past and Present of American Indian Sovereignty, 

64 RUTGERS L. REV. 471, 478 (2012). In 1871, Congress 

abolished the practice of treatymaking after several tribes 

allied themselves with the Confederacy during the Civil War 

and the military advantage of the treaties declined. See id. at 

476 & n.28. However, treaties that had been entered into 

prior to 1871 were still recognized. See 25 U.S.C. § 71.

USCA Case #15-5118 Document #1625439 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 3 of 13
4

In 1934, Congress codified its treatment of Indian tribes 

through the IRA. The IRA defines the term “Indian,” in part,

to “include all persons of Indian descent who are members of 

any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” 

25 U.S.C. § 479 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has 

interpreted the phrase “now under Federal jurisdiction” to 

refer only to tribes that were under federal jurisdiction in 

1934—the time of the IRA’s enactment. See Carcieri v. 

Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 382–83 (2009). The Court has not

analyzed the meaning of the word “recognized” nor has it 

determined whether recognition must have existed in 1934. 

Recognition by the federal government proceeded in an 

ad hoc manner, even after the passage of the IRA, with the 

Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) reviewing petitions for federal 

recognition on a case-by-case basis. Muwekma Ohlone Tribe 

v. Salazar, 708 F.3d 209, 211 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Finally, in 

1978, Interior promulgated Part 83 of its regulations under the 

IRA (also known as the Federal Acknowledgment Process), 

which set out uniform procedures through which Indian 

groups could seek formal recognition. A group seeking 

recognition under Part 83 must submit a petition to Interior 

documenting certain criteria, including whether it has been 

identified as an American Indian entity on a “substantially 

continuous basis” since 1900; whether it comprises a “distinct 

community;” whether it has historically maintained “political 

influence or authority over its members;” and whether its 

membership “consists of individuals who descend from a 

historical Indian tribe.” See 25 C.F.R. § 83.11(a)-(c), (e). If a 

group successfully petitions, it is added to the list of federally 

recognized Indian tribes published by Interior. See 25 U.S.C. 

§ 479a-1. 

With respect to tribal organization, the IRA directs: “Any 

Indian tribe shall have the right to organize for its common 

USCA Case #15-5118 Document #1625439 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 4 of 13
5

welfare, and may adopt an appropriate constitution and 

bylaws.” 25 U.S.C. § 476(a). In 1981, Interior promulgated 

specific regulations governing this process in Part 81 of its 

regulations. See 25 C.F.R. pt. 81. Part 81 states, in broad 

terms, that any Indian tribe “included on” the list of federally 

recognized tribes or “eligible to be included” on that list can 

call for an election under the IRA.1

 See 25 C.F.R. § 81.1(w)

(2014). Interior is obligated to hold such an election—

assuming the tribe qualifies—within 180 days of receipt of a 

tribal request. 25 U.S.C. § 476(c)(1)(A). If a majority of the 

adult members of a tribe vote to ratify the constitution, then 

Interior must approve the document unless it violates federal 

law. Id. § 476(d)(1). 

In August 2011, the Mackinac Tribe submitted a petition 

for a Part 81 election to the Secretary of Interior. The 

Secretary refused to conduct the election. The Tribe then 

brought an action in federal district court seeking declaratory 

and mandamus relief; specifically, it asked the court to 

declare it a federally recognized Indian tribe and to order the 

Secretary to conduct an election under the IRA. The 

Secretary filed a motion to dismiss, arguing (in relevant part) 

that the Mackinac were not a federally recognized tribe for 

IRA purposes because they had not gone through the Part 83 

acknowledgment process and therefore had failed to exhaust 

their administrative remedies. The district court converted the 

motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and 

ruled for the Secretary. 

 1 Notably, while this litigation was pending, Part 81 was amended

to alter the definition of a “tribe” for election eligibility purposes. 

“Tribe” is now defined to mean any tribe “listed in the Federal 

Register . . . as recognized and receiving services” from BIA. 25 

C.F.R. § 81.4. Both parties in their briefing rely on the old Part 81 

definition—which was in effect at the time the Mackinac petitioned 

the Secretary—so we cabin our discussion to the earlier provision.

USCA Case #15-5118 Document #1625439 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 5 of 13
6

In doing so, the court below declined to answer whether 

recognition under Part 83 is a necessary precursor to receiving 

an election under Part 81. The district court instead found the 

Tribe had to exhaust its administrative remedies by availing 

itself of the Part 83 process first. We review de novo the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment, Colbert v. Potter, 

471 F.3d 158, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2006), and we affirm. 

II

The district court applied our closest precedent. In James 

v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, we held 

that, as a matter of prudential exhaustion, a group of Indians 

seeking to be acknowledged by the Secretary as a federally 

recognized tribe must first attempt to gain that 

acknowledgement through the Part 83 process. 824 F.2d 

1132, 1136–37 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In Muwekma Ohlone Tribe 

v. Salazar, we followed James and made clear that a tribe 

seeking to be acknowledged by the Secretary must pursue the 

Part 83 process even if the tribe claims, as the Mackinac Tribe 

does here, that it has previously been recognized by the 

federal government. 708 F.3d 209, 218–19 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 

The Mackinac Tribe seeks relief different from what the 

tribes in James and Muwekma Ohlone sought—a secretarial 

election under the IRA rather than inclusion on the 

Secretary’s list of federally acknowledged tribes—but the 

rationale of those cases has persuasive force here as well. The 

Mackinac Tribe contends that, because it is a recognized tribe, 

it is eligible for a secretarial election. But no branch of 

government has determined whether the plaintiff Mackinac 

Tribe currently qualifies as a recognized tribe or as the tribe 

that was recognized in 1855.

USCA Case #15-5118 Document #1625439 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 6 of 13
7

Our decisions in James and Muwekma Ohlone teach that, 

when a court is asked to decide whether a group claiming to 

be a currently recognized tribe is entitled to be treated as such, 

the court should for prudential reasons refrain from deciding 

that question until the Department has received and evaluated 

a petition under Part 83. James gave good reasons for that 

restraint. Congress delegated to the Secretary the regulation 

of Indian relations and affairs, see generally 25 U.S.C. § 2, 

including authority to decide in the first instance whether 

groups have been federally recognized in the past or whether 

other circumstances support current recognition. James, 824 

F.2d at 1137. The administrative exhaustion requirement 

honors that delegation. It also protects the autonomy of the 

agency that has the expertise to make (and correct) such 

determinations, preserves judicial resources, and better tees 

up disputes for eventual judicial review. See id. at 1137–38; 

see also United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 

253 F.3d 543, 550 (10th Cir. 2001) (following James to 

conclude that “exhaustion is required when, as here, a 

plaintiff attempts to bypass the regulatory framework for 

establishing that an Indian group exists as an Indian tribe.”). 

Those prudential considerations apply to this case.

As the district court did, we reserve the question whether 

a group must be recognized to be eligible to organize under 

the IRA and whether that recognition must be marked by the 

group’s appearance on the Secretary’s list of federally 

recognized tribes. In view of that reservation, we must 

acknowledge that our holding gives us some pause. If federal 

recognition is not a prerequisite to organization, requiring 

exhaustion via the lengthy and expensive Part 83 process 

unnecessarily imposes a potentially formidable hurdle on 

tribes seeking the Secretary’s assistance to organize. We 

decline, however, to order the Secretary to call and conduct an 

election to ratify the Mackinac Tribe’s constitution under 

USCA Case #15-5118 Document #1625439 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 7 of 13
8

§ 476 of the IRA. We read the Mackinac Tribe’s complaint 

as seeking a writ of mandamus. Mandamus is only available 

in extraordinary circumstances when the plaintiff has a “clear 

and indisputable” right, and review by other means is not 

possible. Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the District of 

Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004). Given the interplay 

of recognition, acknowledgment, and organization, there is 

some question whether the Mackinac Tribe has a right to a 

secretarial election. Even assuming the Mackinac Tribe has a 

“clear and indisputable right,” we decline the requested 

mandamus because review will be possible after the Mackinac 

Tribe has completed the Part 83 procedure. See W. Shoshone 

Bus. Council v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1052, 1059 (10th Cir. 1993). 

III

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment is 

Affirmed.

USCA Case #15-5118 Document #1625439 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 8 of 13
1

BROWN, Circuit Judge, concurring: Patience may be a 

virtue but there’s nothing virtuous about the administrative 

delays the BIA has routinely forced recognition-seeking 

Indian tribes to endure. “At present day, a federal 

acknowledgment petition can be over 100,000 pages long and 

cost over $5 million to assemble; the BIA estimate time for 

completion of the review is 30 years.” See Harry S. Jackson 

III, Note, The Incomplete Loom: Exploring the Checkered 

Past and Present of American Indian Sovereignty, 64 

RUTGERS L. REV. 471, 497 (2012). That means a case worker 

could start the review process her first day at BIA and retire 

with her full pension before ever completing it. That’s 

appalling.

The Part 83 process begins when a tribe’s governing 

body submits a letter of intent to the Assistant Secretary of the 

BIA. The agency then publishes the requisite public notices 

and begins an administrative file for the tribe—now 

considered a “petitioner.” At this point, it is incumbent on the 

petitioning tribe “to provide enough historical documentation 

to satisfy the seven criteria established by [Part 83] to 

determine if the tribe is a ‘political and social community that 

is descended from a historical tribe.’” Id. Answering this 

question is admittedly a nuanced and time-consuming 

process, requiring agency expertise. By the end, the 

administrative record tends to range “in excess of 30,000 

pages to over 100,000 pages.” Barbara N. Coen, Tribal Status 

Decision Making: A Federal Perspective on Acknowledgment, 

37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 491, 495 (2003). 

Mindful of the intensity of this task—and the agency’s 

unique capacity for completing it—I agree that exhaustion 

should be required here, but I do so hesitantly. I believe we 

would be remiss to treat this as a run-of-the-mill case of 

administrative exhaustion. Exhaustion might reasonably take

USCA Case #15-5118 Document #1625439 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 9 of 13
2

months—maybe years—but certainly not generations. For 

instance, the resolution of an IRS appeal may take “anywhere 

from 90 days to a year” depending on facts and 

circumstances. What You Can Expect From Appeals?, IRS

(May 23, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/individuals/what-canyou-expect-from-appeals. An individual appealing the 

termination of her disability benefits can expect that appeal to 

be decided “in as little as four weeks or as long as twelve 

weeks.” How Long Does A Social Security Disability 

or SSI Appeal Take?, SOC. SEC. DISABILITY RES.

CTR., http://www.ssdrc.com/disabilityquestions2-46.html (last 

viewed July 8, 2016). And in 2015, it took the EEOC, on 

average, “10 months to investigate a charge.” What You Can 

Expect After You File A Charge, EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM.

(last viewed July 8, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/employees

/process.cfm. Compare this with the Cowlitz Tribe of 

Washington’s experience with the acknowledgment process: 

the tribe first petitioned the government for recognition in 

1975 and only received it in 2000—twenty five years later. 

See Sarah Washburn, Note, Distinguishing Carcieri v. 

Salazar: Why the Supreme Court Got It Wrong and How 

Congress and Courts Should Respond to Preserve Tribal and 

Federal Interests in the IRA’s Trust-Land Provisions, 85 

WASH. L. REV. 603, 629 (2010). Requiring exhaustion in this 

context asks far more of tribes like the Mackinac than it does 

in our usual administrative cases.2 

 2 It is worth mentioning that “exhaustion is not required when 

unreasonable administrative delay would render the administrative 

remedy inadequate.” Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 138 F.3d 746, 750 

(8th Cir. 1998); see also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575 

n.14 (1973) (nothing that when administrative remedies are deemed 

inadequate it is “[m]ost often . . . because of delay by the agency”); 

Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 591–92 (1926) 

(holding a petitioner “is not required indefinitely to await a decision 

of the rate-making tribunal before applying to a federal court for 

USCA Case #15-5118 Document #1625439 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 10 of 13
3

The acknowledgement process also requires tribes to 

sacrifice more than just time. “Volumes of documentary 

support are required of petitioners chronicling the genealogy, 

ethno-history, and political life of the group seeking 

recognition.” Gerald Carr, Origins and Development of the 

Mandatory Criteria Within the Federal Acknowledgment 

Process, 14 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 1 (2013). Indeed, 

“[t]he creation of the documents alone has been estimated to 

take between two-and-a-half and five years.” Alva C. Mather, 

 

equitable relief”). Tribes languishing in the Part 83 process have 

occasionally sought relief under this “unreasonable delay” doctrine. 

For instance, in Muwekma Tribe v. Babbitt, the district court 

granted mandamus relief to the Muwekma Tribe—which entered 

into the Part 83 process in 1989 and had yet to receive a 

determination as of 2000. 133 F. Supp. 2d 30, 32–33 (D.D.C. 

2000). In doing so, the court analyzed the factors we laid out for 

assessing unreasonable delay in TRAC v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. 

Cir. 1984), and concluded that factors like the decision’s slow pace 

and the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced warranted 

relief. See Muwekma Tribe, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 36–41. It may 

seem, then, that the Mackinac Tribe could avail itself of this 

judicial remedy once it enters into the Part 83 process, assuming it 

experiences a similar delay. However, a more recent case from our 

circuit calls even that potential avenue for relief into question. In 

Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, we 

emphasized that Part 83 delays were “attributable, at least for the 

most part, to a shortage of resources addressed to an extremely 

complex and labor-intensive task.” 336 F.3d 1094, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 

2003). We therefore remanded to the district court to consider 

whether such “competing priorities” rendered the delay reasonable 

in context, specifically whether the tribe was being treated 

differently than others and whether the agency was working on the 

matter. See id. at 1101–02. As the Mashpee court noted, a 

“problem stemm[ing] from a lack of resources” is “a problem for 

the political branches to work out.” Id. at 1101. Unfortunately for 

the Mackinac Tribe, Congress has yet to heed this call.

USCA Case #15-5118 Document #1625439 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 11 of 13
4

Comment, Old Promises: The Judiciary and the Future of 

Native American Federal Acknowledgment Litigation, 151 U.

PA. L. REV. 1827, 1840 (2003). The burden falls to the tribe 

to “hire an array of experts: anthropologists to validate the 

existence of a current tribal community, genealogists to trace 

tribal ancestry, and lawyers to oversee the process.” Id. “On 

average, tribes have paid between $300,000 and $500,000 for 

the creation of their petition” and some have paid “more than 

a million dollars for their documentation.” Id. 

Beyond tangible investments like time and money, the 

process is also emotionally draining. To be acknowledged, 

tribes must reveal “their members’ personal stories and the 

community’s history to a federal agency,” with that 

information then becoming part of the public record. Id. at 

1141. For some tribes, “disclosing information about their 

community life violates their traditions and results in 

considerable emotional loss when this information is revealed 

to individuals outside the tribe.” Id. And the passage of time 

can ultimately preclude a tribe from obtaining necessary 

documentation, particularly when important tribal leaders 

“who may have been able to provide necessary first-hand 

information to federal investigators” die while the tribe’s

petition is pending. Id. 

One would hope, given the significant amount of 

resources required to navigate this bureaucratic morass, that 

the process itself would at least be sound. But the process has 

been criticized—including by a Government Accounting 

Office report—for its “lack of transparency,” for the 

regulations’ “vague[ness],” and for the “improper[] influence” 

that gaming concerns exert on the agency. Roberto Iraola, 

The Administrative Tribal Recognition Process and the 

Courts, 38 AKRON L. REV. 867, 892–83 (2005). What’s more, 

it seems the vast majority of tribes that were already federally 

USCA Case #15-5118 Document #1625439 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 12 of 13
5

acknowledged would be unable to meet the current Part 83 

standards. See Jackson, supra, at 507 (noting that, in 2010, 

the BIA recognized “72% . . . of currently recognized federal 

tribes could not successfully go through the [Part 83] process 

as it is being administered today”). 

Despite my significant concerns about both the length 

and the integrity of this process, I agree that the Mackinac 

Tribe must at least try to exhaust its administrative remedies 

in this context—which is far outside the judiciary’s 

wheelhouse. Still, we are reminded today that Justice 

Douglas’s words ring as true now as they did nearly half a 

century ago: “The bureaucracy of modern government . . . is 

slow, lumbering, and oppressive.” Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 

309, 335 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 

USCA Case #15-5118 Document #1625439 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 13 of 13