Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00560/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00560-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paul Augusto
Defendant
City of Fairfield
Defendant
Tanya Creal
Plaintiff
Chuck Timm
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

TANYA CREAL,

NO. CIV. S-06-560 WBS PAN (JFM)

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE

STATEMENT AND MOTION 

TO DISMISS IN PART

CITY OF FAIRFIELD, PAUL

AUGUSTO, CHUCK TIMM, DOES 1-

10,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Pending before the court are defendants City of

Fairfield and Paul Augusto’s motion for a more definite statement

under Rule 12(e) and motion to dismiss in part under Rule

12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the court denies

defendants’ motions. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

According to the allegations of the complaint, on April

20, 2004, plaintiff was driving a 1987 Cadillac De Ville when she

was stopped by defendant Chuck Timm, a member of the Fairfield

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Police Department. (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 13, 14.) When plaintiff was

asked to present her license and identification, she handed

defendant Timm her temporary driver’s license from the California

Department of Motor Vehicles. (Id. ¶ 15.) After contesting the

validity of plaintiff’s proffered license, defendant Timm was

allegedly assisted by defendant Augusto in restraining and

physically assaulting plaintiff with excessive force. (Id. ¶¶

16-20.) Defendants allegedly continued to restrain plaintiff

even after she informed them that being restrained caused her

great pain because of pre-existing spinal injuries. (Id. ¶ 19.) 

Subsequently, upon placing plaintiff in the back of the police

vehicle, defendant Augusto allegedly made threatening and

racially discriminatory comments to her. (Id. ¶ 21.) 

It is further alleged that while plaintiff and

defendants were presumably en route to the police station,

defendant Augusto stopped the patrol car, removed plaintiff from

the vehicle, and physically assaulted plaintiff once more,

including striking her in the face and in the head. (Id. ¶¶ 23-

25.) Defendant Augusto then transported plaintiff to an

emergency room, upon the recommendation of another officer who

had arrived at the scene. (Id. ¶ 26.) On March 14, 2006,

plaintiff filed a complaint on the basis of these allegations

against defendants Timm and Augusto and against the City of

Fairfield. (Id.) 

This court previously granted defendants’ motion to

dismiss in part by ordering the dismissal of plaintiff’s First

and Fifth Amendment claims. The court additionally granted the

motion for a more definite statement in part by ordering

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plaintiff to clarify whether her claims arise under federal or

state law. 

Plaintiff has now filed a First Amended Complaint on

July 12, 2006, in which she alleges both federal and state

claims. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1-2.) Plaintiff alleges violations

of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and her rights

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (id. ¶ 1), and additionally alleges the

following state law claims against all defendants: battery,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent

infliction of emotional distress. (Id. ¶¶ 6-8.) The remaining

state law claims allege assault as to defendant Paul Augusto and

defendant City of Fairfield, and respondeat superior as to the

City of Fairfield. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 8.) 

Defendants now renews their motion to dismiss and for a

more definite statement, arguing that the First Amended Complaint

fails to (1) clearly state how state tort law claims may become

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, (2) state a cause of

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (3) state the allegations

sufficiently for defendants to be able to raise the defense of

qualified immunity, and (4) properly allege causes of action

against defendant City of Fairfield under state tort law.

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss

At the pleading stage, the plaintiff need only set

forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2);

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &

Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). A complaint need

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only “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). A plaintiff “is not required to state

the statutory or constitutional basis for his claim, only the

facts underlying it.” McCalden v. Cal. Library Ass’n, 955 F.2d

1214, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Haddock v. Bd. of Dental

Exam’rs of Cal., 777 F.2d 462, 464 (9th Cir. 1985) for the

proposition that a complaint “should not be dismissed if it

states a claim under any legal theory, even if the plaintiff

erroneously relies on a different legal theory”). Consequently,

on a motion to dismiss, the court accepts the allegations in the

complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of

the pleader. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Cruz

v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). 

The court does not, “however, necessarily assume the

truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the

form of factual allegations.” W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643

F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Maljack Prods., Inc. v.

Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 52 F.3d 373, 375 (D.C. Cir.

1995) (noting that courts “are not to accept inferences drawn by

[plaintiffs] if they are unsupported by the alleged facts, nor

[should they] accept purely legal conclusions masquerading as

factual allegations”). “[A] simple declaration that defendant’s

conduct violated the ultimate legal standard at issue . . . does

not suffice.” Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 692 (2d Cir. 2001). 

Still, the court may not dismiss for failure to state a claim

“unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

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relief.” Van Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir.

2002) (emphasis added).

Defendants first contend that plaintiff does not allege

a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights or her rights under §

1983. Taking the facts in plaintiff’s complaint as true for the

purposes of this motion to dismiss, the violations of plaintiff’s

rights alleged appear to be based on her arrest and the use of

excessive force during her arrest. “In addressing an excessive

force claim brought under § 1983, analysis begins by identifying

the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the

challenged application of force.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 394 (1989). When an “excessive force claim arises in the

context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it

is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of

the Fourth Amendment.” Id. Plaintiff’s factual allegations

provide detailed conduct that could form the basis for Fourth

Amendment violations, and therefore are not “inferences . . .

unsupported by the alleged facts, nor . . . purely legal

conclusions masquerading as factual allegations.” Maljack

Prods., Inc, 52 F.3d at 375. Thus, plaintiff’s factual

allegations clearly support a Fourth Amendment claim and,

relatedly, a claim under § 1983. See McCalden, 955 F.2d at 1223

(noting that the complaint need not “state the statutory or

constitutional basis for [the] claim, only the facts underlying

it” and concluding that a complaint should not be dismissed for

failure to state a claim under § 1983 when the plaintiff

“explicitly mention[ed] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the first paragraph

of his complaint, which [wa]s incorporated by reference in his

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fourth claim”).

Defendants also contend that plaintiff does not

sufficiently allege a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment

rights. “The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct

discriminating on the basis of race.” Washington v. Davis, 426

U.S. 229, 238 (1976). Here, plaintiff has alleged that defendant

Auguosto made racially discriminatory comments and threats to her

and committed assault and battery on her person. These facts are

sufficient to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. See

United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 174 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting

that even “consensual encounters and searches based solely on

race may violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment”). 

Defendants additionally move to dismiss the tort claims

against the City of Fairfield, arguing that a city may not be

sued in tort absent statutory authority permitting such a suit.

“Under the California Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.),

‘a public entity is not liable for injury arising from an act or

omission except as provided by statute.’” Hoff v. Vacaville

Unified Sch. Dist., 19 Cal. 4th 925, 932 (1998). Yet § 815.2 of

the California Government code provides for respondeat superior

liability as follows: “A public entity is liable for injury

proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of 

the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act

or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a

cause of action against that employee . . . .” Thus, the City of

Fairfield may be liable to plaintiff if its employees committed

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torts against plaintiff, which is the basis for plaintiff’s

allegations here. See Hoff, 19 Cal. 4th at 933 (concluding that

a school district would be liable if its employees’ actions

towards the plaintiff sounded in negligence). Therefore,

defendants’ motion to dismiss must be denied on this ground as

well. 

B. Motion for More Definite Statement

Defendants also move for a more definite statement

under Rule 12(e). “If a pleading to which a responsive pleading

is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot

reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party

may move for a more definite statement before interposing a

responsive pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). “Motions for a

more definite statement are viewed with disfavor and are rarely

granted because of the minimal pleading requirements of the

Federal Rules. Parties are expected to use discovery, not the

pleadings, to learn the specifics of the claims being asserted.”

Sagan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 (C.D. Cal.

1994); see also Advanced Microtherm, Inc. v. Norman Wright Mech.

Equip. Corp., No. 04-02266, 2004 WL 2075445, at *12 (N.D. Cal.

Sept. 15, 2004) (“Motions for more definite statement are proper

only where a complaint is so indefinite that the defendant cannot

ascertain the nature of the claim being asserted.”). 

In support of their motion for more definite statement,

defendants contend that they cannot determine the nature of

plaintiff’s claims and seek a “clear, unambiguous accounting” of

the allegations against them. (Defs.’ Mot. for More Definite 

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Statement and Mot. to Dismiss 8.) Plaintiff has clearly alleged

the factual basis for her claims, the defendants to whom they

apply, and also states relevant legal theories. Thus, the

complaint allows defendants to ascertain the nature of the claims

against them, and the motion for a more definite statement will

be denied. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to

dismiss the First Amended Complaint be, and the same hereby is,

DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion for a

more definite statement be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 

DATED: September 18, 2006

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