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Parties Involved:
Bernhardt Industries
Appellant
Warren Dill
Appellee

Document Text:

.. 

.. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

WARREN DILL, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

United State. Court. nf Appeals 

Terrth Gi:·\ '!' ' t 

AUG 14 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECK.:.:..R 

Clerk 

v. 

BERNHARDT INDUSTRIES, a North 

Carolina corporation, 

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No. 89-1271 

(D.C. No. 87-F-1994) 

(District of Colorado) 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, MOORE, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

Mr. Warren Dill brought this action against Bernhardt Industries, his former employer. Mr. Dill claims that he was terminated as a sales representative for Bernhardt on account of his 

age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 

u.s.c. SS 621-34 (1988). The jury returned a verdict finding that 

Bernhardt had violated the ADEA, but that the violation was not 

willful. The jury awarded no damages. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-1271 Document: 010110132057 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 1 
• Mr. Dill moved for judgment granting front pay or reinstatement, for a partial new trial limited to damages, and for 

attorneys' fees and costs. Bernhardt moved for judgment on the 

statute of limitations or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The district court denied Mr. Dill's motion for a partial 

new trial and both of Bernhardt's motions. The district court 

granted Mr. Dill's motions for front pay and for attorneys' fees 

and costs. 

Bernhardt now appeals the denial of both its motions. 

Additionally, Bernhardt challenges the admission of certain evidence at trial. Finally, Bernhardt claims that the court erred in 

awarding front pay, or that the award was excessive. 

I. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 

The trial court's ruling on the applicability of a statute of 

limitations is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. Trustees 

of Wyoming Laborers Health and Welfare Plan v. Morgen & Oswood 

Constr. Co., 850 F.2d 613, 617 (10th Cir. 1988). Bernhardt did 

not request that the statute of limitations issue be submitted to 

the jury. On appeal it argues only that (1) it was entitled to 

summary judgment as a matter of law, and (2) even if there were 

facts to be decided, the trial court was clearly erroneous. 

In reviewing both issues, the facts and reasonable inferences 

to be drawn from them must be construed against Bernhardt. See 

Ewing v. Amoco Oil Co., 823 F.2d 1432, 1437 (10th Cir. 1987) (in 

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reviewing ruling on summary judgment motion, court must view 

record in light most favorable to opposing party); Anderson v. 

City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985) (if district 

court's account of evidence is plausible, appellate court may not 

reverse even though convinced it would have weighed evidence differently). In its order denying summary judgment the trial court 

set out its view of the applicable law, the facts, and the inferences to be drawn as follows: 

Actions under ADEA must be filed within two years of the 

date the action accrues, or, if the violation is willful, within three years of the date the action accrues. 

29 u.s.c. Sections 626(e) and 255(a). The cause of 

action accrues when the employee receives notice oftermination. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 

(1980); Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 (1981) (per 

curiam). . 

Here, plaintiff was not actually terminated until 

January 1, 1986. He was not given formal notice of that 

termination until January 8, 1986. Defendant contends, 

however, that Mr. Dill actually received notice oftermination as early as some time in the fall of 1984. 

Defendant presented the testimony of Mr. Alex Bernhardt, 

Bernhardt's president, that he instructed Mr. Lawrence 

Erwin to inform Mr. Dill that he would be terminated at 

the end of the following year. Defendant also presented 

the testimony of Mr. Erwin through deposition. Mr. 

Erwin testified that he "suggested [that Mr. Dill] begin 

looking for other lines as it was my opinion he would 

not be able to keep this territory beyond the end of 

1985." He testified that he did not actually tell Mr. 

Dill that he was fired. Mr. Erwin's statements fall far 

short of the notice needed to cause an age discrimination cause of action to accrue. An equivocal statement 

that action may be taken in the future is not notice of 

termination. EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F.2d 

211, 219-20 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. den., 469 U.S. 820 

(1984); Verschuuren v. Equitable Life Assur. Society of 

U.S., 554 F. Supp. 1188, 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Any 

action taken by Bernhardt in the fall of 1984 was far 

from clear, and was equivocal and tentative. This is 

made even more clear through letters [that] were sent to 

Mr. Dill by Mr. Erwin and Mr. Gregory Barrett ...• 

These letters were sent to Mr. Dill on December 20, 1984 

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and January 8, 1985 respectively, and each encouraged 

Mr. Dill to make more sales during 1985. 

Mr. Bernhardt also testified that he spoke with Mr. 

Dill in April, 1985, and told Mr. Dill that if he did 

not choose to resign at some future point, his employment would be terminated. Mr. Bernhardt sent a letter 

to Mr. Dill on April 25, 1985 .... The letter states 

that Bernhardt was "willing to wait until the end of 

1985 to accept your resignation if this proves what is 

in your own personal best interest," and that it was 

"wisest now for us to plan to go our separate ways." 

The letter did not inform Mr. Dill of conclusive termination nor did it inform Mr. Dill of when he would be 

forced to leave Bernhardt's employment. Again, these 

communications were not effective notice of termination, 

since they spoke in terms of actions which may have been 

taken in the future. Furthermore, Bernhardt sent two 

memorandums in December, 1985, which stated that Mr. 

Dill would be resigning his position later .•.• The 

court's review of the evidence at trial indicates that 

Bernhardt had been requesting that Mr. Dill resign in 

April of 1985, but did not actually terminate him until 

it became clear that he would not resign. Bernhardt did 

not actually make it clear that Mr. Dill was being terminated until January 8, 1986. Plaintiff filed his 

charge of discrimination with the EEOC on January 30, 

1986, well within the 180-day statute of limitations of 

29 u.s.c. Section 626(d)(l). Plaintiff filed this 

action on December 31, 1987, within the two year statute 

of limitations for non-willful ADEA violation of 29 

u.s.c. Section 255. 

Dill v. Bernhardt Ind., No. 87-F-1994, Order at 5-8 (D. Colo. Aug. 

3, 1989). 

We agree with the trial court's statement of the applicable 

law. Viewed on appeal from the proper appellate perspective, we 

are persuaded that the trial court's recitation of the facts supporting the plaintiff's position are supported by the record and 

that the inferences the court has drawn from those facts are plausible. 

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' 

• II. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 

We may find error in the denial of a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict "only if the evidence points but one way 

and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences supporting the 

party for whom the jury found; we must construe the evidence and 

inferences most favorably to the nonmoving party." Zimmerman v. 

First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 848 F.2d 1047, 1051 (10th Cir. 

1988). Bernhardt argues that Mr. Dill presented insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the legitimate reasons articulated for 

Mr. Dill's termination were mere pretext for age discrimination. 

Bernhardt claims that Mr. Dill was terminated because of his 

inability to get along with customers and declining sales. Mr. 

Dill showed, however, that he was replaced by a younger employee 

whose sales had declined more sharply than Mr. Dill's. Despite 

Bernhardt's justifications for their action in retaining the 

younger man, the finder of fact could reasonably have inferred 

from this evidence that Bernhardt's articulated legitimate reasons 

were pretextual. 

Mr. Dill also presented testimony from a former employee who 

has been forced to retire in violation of the ADEA. Bernhardt 

argues that admission of this testimony was reversible error, and 

that without this evidence, the jury could not reasonably have 

found pretext. Bernhardt objected to the testimony as being 

irrelevant, because it occurred four years earlier under a mandatory retirement policy which was no longer being enforced. It 

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also objected that the testimony was prejudicial and should be 

excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 403. However, past discriminatory 

practices can be relevant evidence of pretext. See Colon-Sanchez 

v. Marsh, 733 F.2d 78, 81 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 

(1985). Therefore, we cannot say that the district court abused 

its discretion by admitting the challenged testimony. Furthermore, even without this testimony, we have already pointed out 

other evidence from which a jury could reasonably have inferred 

pretext. Therefore, the district court correctly refused to disturb the verdict of the jury. 

III. FRONT PAY 

The ADEA gives the district court broad power "to grant such 

legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the 

purposes of this chapter •. " 29 u.s.c. S 626(b) (1988). 

This court has held that this broad grant of power includes the 

power to grant front pay in lieu of reinstatement. EEOC v. 

Prudential Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1172-73 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985). 

Bernhardt argues that the district court improperly awarded 

front pay to Mr. Dill, or, if the grant of front pay was proper, 

the amount was excessive. Bernhardt asserts that the awarding of 

front pay was an abuse of discretion because it is inconsistent 

with the jury's factual finding that Mr. Dill suffered no loss of 

pay up to the time of trial. As Mr. Dill points out, Bernhardt 

did not make this argument below. In fact, Bernhardt took the 

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• 

• opposite position in its response to Mr. Dill's post-trial motion 

for reinstatement or front pay. At that stage of the proceeding, 

Bernhardt wished to avoid reinstatement and conceded that front 

pay was the appropriate remedy. Bernhardt never argued below, as 

it does here, that the trial court was required to deny front pay 

because the jury found that Mr. Dill had suffered no back pay damages. Bernhardt simply argued for a smaller award. Because 

Bernhardt's argument against any award of front pay is raised for 

the first time on appeal, we will not address it. 

The trial court awarded $94,118.00 in front pay. Bernhardt 

argues that Mr. Dill should receive no more than $13,925.00. The 

amount awarded by the court reflects the difference between the 

salary Mr. Dill would have earned at Bernhardt and the salary he 

will earn at his present employment over a projected working life 

of five years. Bernhardt argues that the figure representing 

future salaries at Bernhardt was too high and the working life 

expectancy was too long. However, sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the court's finding as to the proper 

amount of front pay, and we therefore affirm it. 

The order of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

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