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Parties Involved:
Alabama State University
Appellee
Jennifer Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12692

____________________

JENNIFER WILLIAMS, 

an Individual, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ALABAMA STATE UNIVERSITY, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cv-00048-ECM-KFP

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12692

Before WILSON, BRASHER, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff Jennifer Williams voluntarily resigned from her 

$135,000 position as the Athletic Director at Alabama State 

University to accept a position with another organization. After 

Williams’s resignation, the University advertised and hired 

Dr. Jason Cable at a $170,000 salary, which was more than 

Williams’s pay in the same job. Williams sued the University and 

its Board of Trustees (together, the “University”), alleging

violations of the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), the Clarke-Figures Equal 

Pay Act (“CFEPA”), and Title IX of the Education Amendments 

Act of 1972. Ultimately, the district court granted summary 

judgment in favor of the University, which Williams now appeals. 

After review and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND1

Williams has a master’s degree in athletic administration and 

worked primarily in marketing and development before coming to 

the University. After completing her education, she served as the 

Assistant Director of Development in the Athletics Department at 

DePaul University from 2009 to 2012. Then, from 2012 to 2016, 

1 “[F]or summary judgment purposes, our analysis must begin with a 

description of the facts in the light most favorable to the [non-movant].” Lee 

v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1190 (11th Cir. 2002). We accept these facts for 

summary-judgment purposes only. See Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie 

Pension Fund, 17 F.3d 1386, 1400 (11th Cir. 1994).

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23-12692 Opinion of the Court 3

Williams was the Associate Athletic Director for Development at 

North Carolina A&T State University. 

In 2016, Williams began working at the University—a 

member of the Southwestern Athletic Conference (“SWAC”). She 

was initially recruited to come to the University as the Deputy 

Director of Intercollegiate Athletics, with a salary of $95,000. In 

that role, Williams was responsible for all day-to-day operations for 

the University’s Division I programs, including 18 different sports, 

and for oversight, policy development, budget, and personnel 

management for various athletics programs. Williams was 

designated as the “Senior Woman Administrator.” This

designation was given to the highest-ranking female in the athletic 

department and carried no additional compensation. 

From October 2017 through October 2018, Williams filled 

in as the University’s Interim Athletic Director at a salary of 

$125,000. In that role, Williams managed and supervised the 

University’s 18 sports programs, including 60 coaches, 20 staff, and 

more than 350 student athletes; administered a $15,000,000 budget; 

and brought in $1,500,000 in revenue. Williams continued as the 

designated Senior Woman Administrator. 

In October 2018, Williams applied for, and was appointed as,

the University’s Athletic Director. The job posting listed the salary 

at $125,000 with the following minimum qualifications:

Candidates should have a minimum of a master’s 

degree, preferably in sports management or sports 

administration, or an MBA, and at least five years of 

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-12692

experience in major leadership posts in sports 

administration and management. The successful 

candidate must have thorough knowledge of NCAA 

rules and regulations and demonstrated experience in 

leadership, budgeting, and personnel management in 

athletics. He or she must also be able to demonstrate 

a commitment to diversity, including gender equity 

among student athletes, office personnel and 

coaching staff. 

(Emphasis added). This $125,000 salary was the same salary earned 

by the two previous Athletic Directors, Melvin Hines and Stacy 

Danley, both of whom were male. 

The University’s president, Dr. Quinton T. Ross, Jr., 

delegated the selection process to Dr. Kevin A. Rolle, Chief of Staff

at the University. Williams had only two years of experience (both 

at the University) in the direct management and administration of 

an athletics program—not the required five years. Nonetheless, 

Dr. Rolle determined that her previous years working in athletic 

marketing and development could be credited to satisfy the 

five-year minimum in the job posting. 

Dr. Rolle offered Williams the Athletic Director position, 

and she accepted—but requested a $135,000 annual salary and 

incentives based on teams’ performances. Dr. Ross approved the

higher salary of $135,000 and the incentive awards, neither of 

which were previously given to a University athletic director. No 

previous male Athletic Director at the University had received 

more than $125,000. 

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23-12692 Opinion of the Court 5

One year into her tenure as Athletic Director, Williams

requested a raise, explaining that she was the third-lowest-paid 

athletic director in the SWAC. Although not receiving a raise, 

Williams did receive a $5,000 one-time re-signing bonus and an 

additional incentive award in 2019. 

In May 2021, Williams announced her departure for a 

position at a different organization, and the University “issued a 

press release regarding her new position and threw her a going 

away party at the [University] Stadium.” 

Upon Williams’s resignation, the University again posted a 

job listing to solicit candidates for the Athletic Director position. 

As before, Dr. Ross deputized Dr. Rolle to run the search. They 

decided that, this time, they wanted “to hire a true executive for 

athletics, someone with more years of administrative experience 

and if possible someone with a doctoral level degree.” 

Accordingly, the University posted different job requirements2

with more years of leadership experience and with a “negotiable” 

salary: 

Candidates should have a minimum of a master’s 

degree, preferably in sports management or sports 

administration, an MBA or terminal degree and at least 

seven to ten years of experience in major leadership posts in 

sports administration and management. The successful 

candidate must have thorough knowledge of NCAA 

rules and regulations and demonstrated experience in 

2 The job description remained the same as it was when Williams was hired. 

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6 Opinion of the Court 23-12692

leadership, budgeting, and personnel management in 

athletics. He or she must also be able to demonstrate 

a commitment to diversity, including gender equity 

among student athletes, office personnel and 

coaching staff.

(Emphasis added). 

Dr. Rolle selected Dr. Jason Cable as the top applicant, and 

the University hired him effective August 16, 2021. Dr. Cable has 

a master’s degree in Secondary Education and a Ph.D. in Higher 

Education Administration. 

Dr. Rolle determined that Dr. Cable had approximately 

13 years of progressive management and leadership experience in 

athletic administration. Dr. Cable’s relevant management and 

leadership experience included: one year as the Associate Athletic 

Director at Livingstone College; a little less than one year as 

Assistant Athletic Director for Compliance/Game Day Operations 

at Savannah State University; over two years as Senior Associate 

Athletic Director and one year as Assistant Director of Compliance 

at Jackson State University; and four years as Assistant Vice 

President for Athletic Compliance and Academic Services at Alcorn 

State University. Importantly to the University, Dr. Cable also had 

two years of experience as Senior Associate Commissioner for 

Administration at SWAC, the conference in which the University 

competes. 

In contrast, Williams had just two years of athletic 

management and leadership experience—one year as the 

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23-12692 Opinion of the Court 7

University’s Interim Athletic Director and one year as its Deputy 

Director. Williams’s other experience primarily involved working 

with development and fundraising and external affairs. In addition, 

Dr. Cable’s resume included another four years in lesser roles in 

college athletics. 

Dr. Cable requested a starting salary of $170,000 with 

various incentives. To recruit and secure Dr. Cable, the University 

agreed to his salary request, given Dr. Cable’s terminal degree and 

his many years of management and leadership experience in 

athletic administration roles. The University also agreed to certain 

performance-based incentives related to student-athlete academic 

achievements but denied Dr. Cable’s request for additional 

incentives tied to fundraising benchmarks. 

Even at a salary of $170,000, Dr. Cable was the 

third-lowest-paid athletic director in SWAC, just as Williams had 

been in the role. During his tenure at the University, Dr. Cable 

received one raise, as part of a University-wide six percent salary 

increase for all employees. 

Williams then filed suit against the University, alleging that 

it violated the EPA, the CFEPA, and Title IX. Williams alleged that 

she (a woman) was paid less than Dr. Cable (a man) for performing 

substantially the same job. The disparity in wages, Williams 

alleged, was due to her sex, in violation of both the EPA and the 

CFEPA. Similarly, Williams alleged that the University’s conduct 

violated Title IX because the terms, conditions, and benefits of 

Williams’s employment were adversely affected based on her sex. 

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-12692

The University moved for summary judgment. The 

University presented evidence that its decision to pay $170,000 to 

Dr. Cable was based on factors other than sex—namely, 

Dr. Cable’s extensive leadership and management experience in 

athletics administration and his education with a terminal degree—

as permitted under the EPA and the CFEPA. 

The district court granted summary judgment in the 

University’s favor. This timely appeal followed. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment 

de novo. Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2019). 

In doing so, “we view all the evidence and draw all reasonable 

inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 

Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 

2014). Summary judgment is proper when the evidence, viewed in 

this light, “presents no genuine issue of material fact and compels 

judgment as a matter of law in favor of the moving party.” Id.

(quoting Owusu-Ansah v. Coca-Cola Co., 715 F.3d 1306, 1307 (11th 

Cir. 2013)). We may affirm a grant of summary judgment “if there 

exists any adequate ground for doing so, regardless of whether it is 

the one on which the district court relied.” Fitzpatrick v. City of 

Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1117 (11th Cir. 1993).

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23-12692 Opinion of the Court 9

III. DISCUSSION

A. The EPA—Baker v. Upson Regional Medical Center

The EPA prohibits wage discrimination on the basis of sex 

and “forbids the specific practice of paying unequal wages for equal 

work to employees of the opposite sex.” Miranda v. B & B Cash 

Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1526 (11th Cir. 1992); 29 U.S.C. 

§ 206(d)(1). We analyze EPA claims under a two-step framework. 

Baker v. Upson Reg’l Med. Ctr., 94 F.4th 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2024). 

First, the plaintiff must make her prima facie case by 

demonstrating “that an employer pays different wages to 

employees of opposite sexes ‘for equal work on jobs the 

performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and 

responsibility, and which are performed under similar working 

conditions.’” Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195

(1974) (quoting § 206(d)(1)). 

Once the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, the 

burden shifts to the employer to prove that the difference in pay is 

justified by one of the EPA’s four exceptions: (1) “a seniority 

system”; (2) “a merit system”; (3) “a system which measures 

earnings by quantity or quality of production”; or (4) “a differential 

based on any factor other than sex.” Baker, 94 F.4th at 1317

(quoting Brock v. Ga. Sw. Coll., 765 F.2d 1026, 1036 (11th Cir. 1985)); 

see also § 206(d)(1). These exceptions are affirmative defenses for 

which the defendant bears the burden of proof. Corning Glass 

Works, 417 U.S. at 196-97; Gosa v. Bryce Hosp., 780 F.2d 917, 918 

(11th Cir. 1986). 

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B. The CFEPA

Like the EPA, the CFEPA prohibits employers in Alabama 

from “pay[ing] any of its employees at wage rates less than the rates 

paid to employees of another sex or race for equal work,” unless 

the difference in wages is based on a seniority system, a merit 

system, a system that measures earnings by quantity or quality, or 

“a differential based on any factor other than sex or race.” Ala. 

Code § 25-1-30(b). Although neither this Court nor Alabama’s 

highest court has yet opined on the CFEPA, the statutes are 

materially identical as they relate to gender-based pay disparity. 

The EPA provides:

No employer having employees subject to any 

provisions of this section shall 

discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of 

sex by paying wages to employees in such 

establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he 

pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such 

establishment for equal work on jobs the 

performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and 

responsibility, and which are performed under similar 

working conditions, except where such payment is 

made pursuant to[:]

(i) a seniority system; 

(ii) a merit system; 

(iii) a system which measures earnings by 

quantity or quality of production; or 

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23-12692 Opinion of the Court 11

(iv) a differential based on any other factor 

other than sex.

29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). Similarly, the CFEPA provides:

An employer, including the state or any of its political 

subdivisions, including public bodies, may not pay 

any of its employees at wage rates less than the rates 

paid to employees of another sex or race for equal 

work within the same establishment on jobs the 

performance of which requires equal skill, effort, 

education, experience, and responsibility, and 

performance under similar working conditions, 

except where the payment is made pursuant to any of 

the following:

(1) A seniority system.

(2) A merit system.

(3) A system that measures earnings by 

quantity or quality of production.

(4) A differential based on any factor other than 

sex or race.

Ala. Code § 25-1-30(b).

We therefore conclude—in the absence of any guidance 

from Alabama’s state courts, which would otherwise control—that 

it is appropriate to analyze a CFEPA claim similarly to an EPA 

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12 Opinion of the Court 23-12692

claim.3 And, as we described above, that analysis comprises a 

two-step framework under which the plaintiff first demonstrates a 

prima facie case and the defendant then bears the burden of 

proving an affirmative defense. See Baker, 94 F.4th at 1317.

C. Williams’s Prima Facie Case

To establish a prima facie case under the EPA and the 

CFEPA, a plaintiff must show that an employer pays different 

wages to people of opposite sexes for equal work. Corning Glass 

Works, 417 U.S. at 195. Williams has met that bar here by showing 

that Dr. Cable, a man, was paid more money to perform the same 

job that Williams, a woman, had just vacated. Though the 

University “does not concede” that Williams established a prima 

facie case for her EPA and CFEPA claims, it also has not disputed 

as much either—here or before the district court. 

Concluding that Williams has made a prima facie showing, 

we proceed to the University’s affirmative defense. 

D. The University’s Affirmative Defense

Once the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, the 

burden shifts to the employer to prove that the difference in pay is 

justified by one of the EPA’s four exceptions. Baker, 94 F.4th at 

1317; see also § 206(d)(1); Ala. Code § 25-1-30(b). The application of 

any of these exceptions is an affirmative defense for which the 

defendant bears the burden of proof. Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. 

3 The parties appear to agree that this is the correct approach. 

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23-12692 Opinion of the Court 13

at 196-97. The University invokes the fourth of the EPA’s 

affirmative defenses—any factor other than sex. 

Here, Dr. Rolle’s unrebutted affidavit establishes that, in 

selecting Dr. Cable as the top applicant for the Athletic Director 

position, the University considered his Ph.D. in Higher Education 

Administration and his over 13 years of progressive management 

and leadership experience in athletic administration as well as his 

service as the Senior Associate Commissioner of the SWAC, in 

which ASU’s athletic teams compete. Dr. Cable had well over ten 

years in leadership roles in athletic administration: he previously 

worked as an Associate Athletic Director (1 year), an Assistant 

Athletic Director for Compliance (2 years), a Senior Associate 

Athletic Director (2 years), an assistant to an Athletic Director

(2 years), an Assistant Vice President for Athletic Compliance

(4 years), and as Senior Associate Commissioner of the SWAC 

(2 years). 

The “factor other than sex” exception applies when a pay

disparity “results from unique characteristics of the same job; from 

an individual’s experience, training, or ability; or from special 

exigent circumstances connected with the business.” Glenn v. Gen. 

Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1988); Miranda, 975 F.2d 

at 1533 n.18 (“Factors such as experience and education operate as 

a defense to liability rather than as part of a plaintiff’s prima facie

case under the Act.”). Even subjective “business reasons” may be 

sufficient so long as they are susceptible to some objective 

evaluation. See Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 955-56 (11th Cir. 1995);

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14 Opinion of the Court 23-12692

Fowler v. Blue Bell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting, 

in a Title VII case, that “[t]he reason that the defendant offers in 

this case, although somewhat subjective, is not so incapable of 

objective evaluation as to render it inadequate to meet the 

defendant’s burden of rebuttal”). 

Dr. Rolle also attested that, when Dr. Cable asked for 

$170,000 as his salary, “[t]he salary was accepted given his terminal 

degree and his years of experience and serving in specific athletic 

administrative roles.” These qualifications aligned with the 

University’s stated goal of hiring “a true executive for athletics, 

someone with more years of administrative experience and if 

possible someone with a doctoral level degree.” Moreover, the 

University’s goals were reflected in the heightened job 

requirements and preferences that were added to the job posting 

immediately after Williams resigned and before Dr. Cable applied. 

Under our caselaw, the University’s affirmative defense is 

sufficient. Dr. Cable’s higher education levels and many years of 

leadership posts and management experience are legitimate 

business reasons to justify a higher salary. See, e.g., Kidd v. Mando 

Am. Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 1205 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding, in a failureto-promote context, that it was “objectively reasonable” for an 

employer to promote a male employee who had auditing 

experience over a female employee who did not, even though the 

female employee had more managerial experience, a broad 

accounting background, and stronger educational credentials); 

Schwartz v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 954 F.2d 620, 623 (11th Cir. 1991) 

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23-12692 Opinion of the Court 15

(holding that “outstanding service to the university, administrative 

duties, publications, research, supervision of doctoral students, and 

performance” were factors “not based on sex and . . . sufficient to 

sustain an employer’s burden to show that the salary disparity does 

not result from sex discrimination”). 

We recognize that Williams argues that the job did not 

require a doctoral degree and that Dr. Cable’s Ph.D. was not in an 

athletics-related field. She is right, of course, that the job did not 

require a terminal degree. Rather, it presented a terminal degree 

as one of three ways to satisfy the educational requirement: (1) “a 

master’s degree, preferably in sports management or sports 

administration,” (2) “an MBA,” or (3) “[a] terminal degree.” 

Nonetheless, there is no dispute that Dr. Cable had a terminal

degree, and the job posting does not specify what field in which 

that terminal degree should be. That Dr. Cable had a terminal 

degree, among other things, was a legitimate “factor other than 

sex.” See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).

Second, Williams argues that most of Dr. Cable’s work

experience, including his job at SWAC, was not related to the 

Athletic Director job. We disagree. As outlined above, Dr. Cable 

had over ten years of leadership experience in athletic management 

and administration at several universities and organizations. 

Williams, on the other hand, had only two years of relevant 

experience. She had worked for one year as a Deputy Athletic 

Director and one year as an Interim Athletic Director, but her 

previous seven years of experience were in development and 

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16 Opinion of the Court 23-12692

marketing, mainly involving fundraising and external affairs. 

Williams acknowledged that these development positions, in 

which she was “working directly with money” and “overseeing 

external [affairs],” did not provide her with the skill sets she would 

need to be an Athletic Director. 

Notably too, in addition to Dr. Cable having more years of 

relevant experience than Williams, his particular experience as the 

second-in-command of the administration of SWAC—the 

conference in which the University is a member, consisting of a 

dozen member institutions and 18 sports competing at the 

Division I level—was another legitimate factor other than sex 

supporting the decision to pay Dr. Cable his requested salary. This 

is especially true given Dr. Cable’s experience overseeing 

compliance programs and services while at the SWAC. This is not 

a case where two employees worked the same job 

contemporaneously, but one where the University met the salary 

demands of a more experienced leader for the job in order to secure 

him.

In sum, we hold that the University carried its burden by 

presenting evidence of objective and legitimate factors other than 

sex for the pay differential. Accordingly, we conclude that the 

University was entitled to summary judgment on Williams’s EPA 

and CFEPA claims.4

4 We are not persuaded by the dissent’s reliance on a few comments in 

Williams’s deposition (cited in her appellate brief) about her midriff by a Board 

of Trustees member and vague comments about her body by Dr. Rolle that 

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E. Williams’s Title IX Claim

After appellate briefing concluded in this appeal, this Court 

decided in Joseph v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia

that Title IX “does not provide an implied right of action for sex 

discrimination in employment.” 121 F.4th 855, 860, 867 (11th Cir. 

2024) (explaining that although Title IX provides an implied right 

of action for students who complain of sex discrimination by 

schools that receive federal funds, the Supreme Court had “never 

extended the implied private right of action under Title IX to claims 

of sex discrimination for employees of educational institutions.”).

In her supplemental brief addressing Joseph’s impact on her 

Title IX claim, Williams urges us not to apply Joseph because, she 

Williams even admits: “I wouldn’t say verbatim.” Interestingly, in her 

opposition to summary judgment in the district court, Williams’s brief did not 

mention these comments, as was her burden to do as the non-moving party. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (requiring a party asserting a genuine dispute of 

material fact to “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record, including 

depositions . . . .”). 

In any event, some of these alleged comments occurred even before Williams

became the Interim Athletic Director and had no apparent connection to her 

selection and pay as the Athletic Director. In addition, Williams does not 

attribute the “shapely” comment, cited by the dissent, to Dr. Rolle. Moreover

Dr. Rolle’s alleged statement that she “should be happy making the money 

that [she was] making” as Athletic Director must be read in context of the 

record. As Dr. Rolle attested, Williams lacked experience, such that the 

University had to agree to liberally credit three years of her arguably 

non-qualifying experience in order to hire her for the Athletic Director 

position in the first place. The alleged observation that Williams should be 

happy is not surprising or gender-based in the context of this particular case.

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18 Opinion of the Court 23-12692

contends, it was wrongly decided. This we cannot do. Under our 

prior-panel-precedent rule, we are bound to apply Joseph, and thus

we affirm the grant of summary judgment to the University on 

Williams’s Title IX claim. See United States v. Sneed, 600 F.3d 1326, 

1332 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[A] prior panel’s holding is binding on all 

subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined 

to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court 

sitting en banc.”); see also Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1302-03 

(11th Cir. 2001) (rejecting an “overlooked reason” exception to the 

prior precedent rule).

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s order 

granting summary judgment in favor of the University on all 

Williams’s claims.

AFFIRMED.

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23-12692 WILSON, J., Dissenting 1

WILSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The majority finds that Alabama State University and its 

Board of Trustees (collectively, the University) met their burden 

under the Equal Pay Act (EPA) and the Clarke-Figures Equal Pay 

Act (CFEPA) to show that their decision to pay the current Athletic 

Director, Dr. Jason Cable, substantially more than the former Athletic Director, Jennifer Williams, was based on any factor “other 

than sex.” But the majority dismisses evidence of derogatory, sexbased remarks made to Williams by male colleagues. These remarks make it impossible to conclude at the summary judgment 

stage that sex “provided no basis for the wage differential.” Mulhall 

v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 590 (11th Cir. 1994). Because Williams should have had the chance to present this evidence to a jury, 

I respectfully dissent.

It is the jury’s role to weigh evidence, not ours. “If reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed 

facts, then a court should deny summary judgment.” Miranda v. B 

& B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992). 

For the University’s part, it presented an affidavit from its Chief of 

Staff, Dr. Kevin A. Rolle, that it sought to fill the vacancy from Williams’ departure with a “true executive for athletics.” To the University, this apparently meant someone with “more years of administrative experience and if possible someone with a doctoral 

level degree.” When Dr. Cable requested a $170,000 salary, the 

University readily agreed. To justify the $35,000 pay increase from 

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2 WILSON, J., Dissenting 23-12692

Williams’ role, the University credited Dr. Cable’s years of experience and doctorate in higher education administration. 

But Williams testified at her deposition about comments by 

University leadership about her body, such as Dr. Rolle remarking 

that she was “shapely” and a Board of Trustees member suggesting 

that she should wear clothing exposing her “midriff” to increase 

donations to the University. Williams also described a situation 

where she presented information to Dr. Rolle about gendered pay 

imbalances for female athletic directors and asked for a raise. Dr. 

Rolle responded that she “should be happy” making the money she 

was making. Williams took this to mean that she should be happy 

with her pay because she is a woman. 

To meet its burden for an EPA affirmative defense, “the employer must show that none of the decision-makers . . . were influenced by gender bias.” Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1078 

(11th Cir. 2003). Based on these comments, I would not so quickly 

conclude that no decisionmakers were influenced by gender bias. 

Two of these instances involved Dr. Rolle, the decisionmaker 

tasked with hiring and negotiating the salary for the athletic director position and who Williams approached for a raise. A gendered 

comment—by a decisionmaker, during a conversation about pay, 

and in a case about an employer’s motivations in setting pay—can 

be direct evidence of discrimination. See Harris v. Pub. Health Tr. of 

Miami-Dade Cnty., 82 F.4th 1296, 1301 (11th Cir. 2023) (per curiam).

And evidence of sex discrimination or bias would allow a 

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23-12692 WILSON, J., Dissenting 3

reasonable jury to conclude that Williams’ sex contributed to the 

$35,000 differential between her pay and Dr. Cable’s. 

This court should have let a jury decide whether the University paid Williams less for the same job because she is a woman or 

whether the difference stemmed solely from Dr. Cable’s education 

and experience. A jury might have rightly found either way, but that 

was their call to make. I respectfully dissent.

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