Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00046/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00046-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Noe Gandara-Soto
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION RE: SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

JAMES R. CONOLLY

Assistant United States Attorney

501 I Street, Suite 10-100

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 554-2700

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

NOE GANDARA-SOTO,

 Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:19-CR-0046-MCE

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

ORDER

DATE: April 9, 2020

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

COURT: Hon. Morrison C. England, Jr.

 

This case was set for a status conference on April 9, 2020, and continued to May 7, 2020, on the 

Court’s on motion, citing the interests of public health and safety, and excluding time under the Speedy 

Trial Act, pursuant to General Order 611. The parties now request that the Court continue the status 

conference to June 11, 2020. To the extent it is needed, this stipulation supplements the basis for 

exclusion of time under General Order 611 and requests that the Court also exclude time under Local 

Code T4, for the reasons set forth below. 

On March 18, 2020, this Court issued General Order 612, with reference to General Order 611, 

which together permit District Judges to continue all matters scheduled to occur before May 1, 2020, 

until a date after that, and to exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act. These General Orders were

entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

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2 STIPULATION RE: SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER

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openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id.

at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering and ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either 

orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—the General Order requires specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances 

are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of 

justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a 

speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets 

forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice 

served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in 

a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Order excludes delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

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3 STIPULATION RE: SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER

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STIPULATION

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 9, 2020, and then continued to 

May 7, 2020, at 10:00 a.m., on the Court’s own motion. 

2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference to June 11, 

2020, and to exclude time between April 9, 2020, and June 11, 2020, under Local Code T4, in addition to 

the exclusion of time pursuant to General Order 611.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that has produced the discovery associated with 

this case including, among other things, investigative reports, photographs, as well as audio and 

video recordings. 

b) Counsel for defense desires additional time to consult with his client, to review 

the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review 

discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with his client, to prepare pretrial 

motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial.

c) Defense counsel believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance 

would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account 

the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 9, 2020 to June 11, 2020, 

inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] 

because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants’ request on the basis of 

the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest 

of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

///

///

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4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: April 7, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ JAMES R. CONOLLY

JAMES R. CONOLLY

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: April 7, 2020 /s/ JESSE I. SANTANA

JESSE I. SANTANA

Counsel for Defendant 

NOE GANDARA-SOTO

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 13, 2020

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