Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-04052/USCOURTS-ca10-94-04052-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Larry D. Richards
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH OCT 11 1995 

PATRiCK FISHER 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Cl8k 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. No. 94-4052 

LARRY D. RICHARDS, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-168-A) 

Wayne T. Dance, Assistant United States Attorney (Scott M. Matheson, Jr., United States Attorney, with him on the briefs), Salt 

Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Loni F. DeLand, McRae & DeLand, Salt Lake City, Utah, for 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BALDOCK, Circuit Judge, and VAZQUEZ, 

District Judge.* 

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge. 

*The Honorable Martha Vazquez, District Judge, District of New 

Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-4052 Document: 01019280689 Date Filed: 10/11/1995 Page: 1 
In the present action, Mr. Richards filed a motion to modify 

his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582{c) (2). In so doing, he 

relies upon amended commentary to the sentencing guidelines which 

excludes waste water from the definition of "mixture or substance" 

for purposes of weighing methamphetamine. The district court 

granted the motion and reduced Mr. Richards' sentence from 188 

months to 60 months. On appeal, the government concedes that the 

commentary changed the applicable guideline range but asserts that 

the commentary cannot alter the definition of "mixture or 

substance" for purposes of the statutory minimum sentence. The 

government thus contends that Mr. Richards' sentence remains 

subject to a statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months. We 

affirm. 

I. 

In 1989, Mr. Richards pled guilty to possession with intent 

to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 

841(a) (1). The statutory penalty provision and the relevant 

sentencing guideline provide two possible methods for measuring 

methamphetamine for sentencing purposes: the weight of the pure 

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drug or the weight of the "mixture or substance" containing a detectable amount of the drug. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1);1 U.S.S.G. 

§ 201.1.2 Mr. Richards possessed 28 grams of pure methamphetamine, which was combined with waste water to form a mixture 

weighing 32 kilograms. Rec., vol. IV at 14. Consequently, the 

court sentenced him to 188 months of imprisonment and five years 

of supervised release.3 

Mr. Richards challenged that sentence on three separate occasions. First, he filed a motion to vacate the sentence pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied. Then he 

filed a second motion under section 2255. The district court 

granted this motion, but we reversed on appeal, holding that the 

second petition constituted an abuse of the writ. United States 

1 Section 841(b) (1) (A) (viii) provides a mandatory minimum of 10 

years imprisonment for persons violating section 841(a) who 

possess "100 grams or more of methamphetamine ... or 1 kilogram 

or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount 

of methamphetamine." 

Section 841(b) (1) (B) (viii) mandates a minimum sentence of 

five years for a person convicted under section 841(a) possessing 

"10 grams or more of methamphetamine ... or 100 grams or more of 

a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of 

methamphetamine." 

2 The Sentencing Guidelines determine sentencing levels based 

on the quantity of the drugs. In addition, they provide that 

"[i]n the case of a mixture or substance containing ... methamphetamine, use the offense level determined by the entire weight 

of the mixture or substance, or the offense level determined by 

the weight of the ... methamphetamine (actual), whichever is 

greater." U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c). 

3 The court classified Mr. Richards at a level 38 under the 

Sentencing Guidelines because the total weight of the mixture containing the methamphetamine was 32 kilograms. 

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v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369 (lOth Cir. 1993). His latest avenue of 

attack is 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2), which allows a district court to 

modify the prison term of a defendant "who has been sentenced to a 

term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has 

subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission . " 

In the current motion, Mr. Richards alleged and the district 

court agreed that the amended commentary to section 2Dl.l of the 

sentencing guidelines mandates that his sentence be reduced from 

188 months to 60 months. The commentary now provides that 

"[m]ixture or substance does not include materials that must be 

separated from the controlled substance before the controlled substance can be used. " U.S. S. G. § 2Dl. 1, comment. n. 1. The amended 

commentary became effective on November 1, 1993, and the Sentencing Commission expressly made it retroactive. U.S.S.G. § 

lBl.lO(c). The commentary lists "waste water from an illicit 

laboratory" as an example of a substance that cannot comprise a 

"mixture or substance." U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l, comment. n.l. 

The government concedes that this amended commentary is applicable to Mr. Richards. It does not contest his assertion that, 

under the guidelines, his sentence must be based on the amount of 

pure methamphetamine and that his sentencing level must therefore 

be reduced from a level 38 to an 18. The government asserts, however, that the Sentencing Commission's decision to exclude waste 

water from "mixture or substance" does not alter the definition of 

that phrase in the statutory context. Claiming that we have construed section 841(b) to include waste water as part of a "mixture 

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or substance,n the government maintains that Mr. Richards remains 

subject to a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 

ten years, which trumps the guideline sentence. 

We review de novo the district court's interpretation of 

statutory provisions and the sentencing guidelines. See United 

States v. Agbai, 930 F.2d 1447, 1448 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

II. 

The government bases its argument on the notion that amended 

commentary to the sentencing guidelines cannot change the established judicial interpretation of a statute. Although we agree 

with this assertion, it is irrelevant to our inquiry because we 

disagree that we have definitively construed the statute itself to 

include waste water in its definition of 11mixture or substance. 11 

The amended commentary may therefore instruct our interpretation 

of the statute. 

The government asserts that the Sentencing Commission does 

not have authority to supersede our precedent interpreting 11 mixture or substance 11 for purposes of section 84l(b). See United 

States v. Neal, 46 F.3d 1405, 1409 (7th Cir. 1995) (en bane), 

petition for cert. filed (U.S. May 2, 1995) (No. 94-9088 CFY) 

( 11 The Commission is without authority to override [Supreme Court 

precedent] . 11 ); United States v. Palacio, 4 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 

1993) ( 11 [0]nce we have construed [a] statute, we will not 

reinterpret it in the absence of new guidance from Congress. 11 ), 

cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1194 (1994). This argument rests on the 

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assumption that we have precedent authoritatively construing 

section 841 (b) . 

In Neal, the Seventh Circuit held that an amended sentencing 

guideline prescribing a presumptive per dose weight of LSD4 did 

not alter the interpretation of section 84l(b) established in 

Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991). Neal, 46 F.3d at 

1408-09. Chapman construed section 84l(b) to include the weight 

of blotter paper containing 11 hits 11 of pure LSD in the measurement 

of a 11mixture or substance. n 500 U.S. at 461. Citing Chapman, 

the Sentencing Commission itself recognized that its new approach 

to measuring LSD for guideline purposes 11 does not override the 

applicability of 'mixture or substance' for the purpose of 

applying any mandatory minimum sentence." U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l 

backg'd; see also United States v. Boot, 25 F.3d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 

1994) ("[W]e conclude that Congress simply acquiesced in the 

restrictive reach of Amendment 488 duly noted by the Commission in 

application note 18."). 

4 On November 1, 1993, the following amendment to the 

Commentary of Sentencing Guidelines became effective: "Because 

the weights of LSD carrier media vary widely and typically far 

exceed the weight of the controlled substance itself, the 

Commission has determined that basing offense levels on the entire 

weight of the LSD and carrier medium would produce unwarranted 

disparity among offenses involving the same quantity of actual LSD 

(but different carrier weights), as well as sentences 

disproportionate to those other, more dangerous controlled 

substances, such as PCP. Consequently, in cases involving LSD 

contained in a carrier medium, the Commission has established a 

weight per dose of 0.4 milligram for purposes of determining the 

base offense level." U.S.S.G., App. C, Amendment 488 (1994). 

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Likewise, the Second Circuit in Palacio held that the sentencing guidelines' amended definition of "cocaine base" did not 

alter its conflicting statutory interpretation of the same term 

established in United States v. Jackson, 968 F.2d 158 (2d Cir.), 

cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 664 (1992). See Palacio, 4 F.3d at 154-

55. Recognizing that the amended commentary would be 

authoritative in determining base offense levels under the 

guidelines, the court noted that its own interpretation of the 

statute in Jackson was binding for purposes of determining the 

mandatory minimum where "our initial construction of [the] statute 

[was] solely the result of an independent judicial interpretation 

of a statutory term." Id. at 154. 

We agree that amended commentary to the sentencing guidelines 

cannot alter any prior, independent construction of section 84l(b) 

we may have made. However, we have never specifically interpreted 

the statute apart from the guideline to require the inclusion of 

waste water in its definition of "mixture or substance." 

The government concedes that we have interpreted "mixture or 

substance" only in the context of section 2Dl.l of the sentencing 

guidelines. Aplt. Br. at 16; see United States v. Killion, 7 F.3d 

927 (lOth Cir. 1993) (weight of waste by-products may be used to 

calculate base offense level under section 2Dl.l), cert. denied, 

114 S. Ct. 1106 (1994); United States v. Dorrough, 927 F.2d 498, 

502 (lOth Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Callihan, 915 F.2d 

1462 (lOth Cir. 1990) (same). It argues, however, that because 

"' [m]ixture or substance' as used in [section 2Dl.l] has the same 

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meaning as in 21 U.S.C. § 841," U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l comment. n.l, we 

have implicitly settled the statutory issue as well. We are not 

persuaded. 

In Callihan and Dorrough, we construed "mixture or substance" 

in section 2Dl.1 of the guidelines without any reference or citation to the statute or its construction, merely relying on the 

Sentencing Commission's admonition that "if any mixture or compound contains any detectable amount of a controlled substance, 

the entire amount of the mixture or compound shall be considered 

in measuring the quantity." Callihan, 915 F.2d at 1463 (quoting 

U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l, table n.* (Oct. 1987)); see also Dorrough, 927 

F.2d at 502 (relying on Callihan). 

We later were faced with determining 

whether the United States Supreme Court decision, 

Chapman v. United States, ___ u.s. ___ , 111 S.Ct. 1919, 

114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991), supersedes the Tenth Circuit's 

earlier position that the weight of waste products that 

are the by-product of a drug manufacturing process but 

that contain a detectable amount of a controlled 

substance may be used in calculating a defendant's base 

offense level under § 2Dl.l of the guidelines. The 

district court, citing United States v. Dorrough, 927 

F.2d 498, 502 (lOth Cir. 1991), and United States v. 

Callihan, 915 F.2d 1462, 1463 (lOth Cir. 1990), ruled 

that the weight of unusable waste by-products containing 

a detectable amount of P-2-P are to be included for 

sentencing purposes under the Guidelines. Killion, 788 

F. Supp. at 1167. Killion, however, maintains that the 

district court erred in including the weight of waste 

by-products in calculating his sentence because Dorrough 

and Callihan were decided prior to and were effectively 

overruled by Chapman. 

Killion, 7 F.3d at 929. We held that the Supreme Court's recent 

interpretation of section 841 in Chapman did not overrule Callihan 

and Dorrough. Id. at 934. Noting a split among the circuits, we 

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acknowledged the majority of those courts had held that Chapman 

and its emphasis on the marketability of the blotter paper mandated that "sentencing calculations under § 2Dl.l may not be based 

on the weight of mixtures containing unusable, unmarketable materials."S Id. at 932 (citing United States v. Acosta, 963 F.2d 551 

(2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. 

1992); United States v. Jennings, 945 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1991); 

United States v. Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1993); United 

States v. Robins, 967 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. 

Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231 (11th Cir. 1991)). Recognizing, 

however, that we were "bound by the precedent of prior panels 

absent en bane reconsideration or a superceding contrary decision 

by the Supreme Court," id. at 930, we joined the First and Fifth 

Circuits in "expressly declining to overrule precedent" to the 

contrary where Chapman '"did not speak'" to the issue. Id. at 933 

(quoting United States v. Walker, 960 F.2d 409, 412 (5th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 443 (1992)). We held that the narrow 

holding in Chapman regarding the weight of an LSD carrier medium 

did not affect our "clear precedent" construing section 2Dl.l to 

include waste by-products. Id. at 934. Rather than interpret the 

5 The six circuits adopting this approach reasoned that "it is 

logical to include the weight of materials that are marketable or 

facilitate the marketability of the drug in question, and to exclude the weight of materials that do not." United States v. 

Killion, 7 F.3d 927, 932 (lOth Cir. 1993). Those courts also 

based their interpretation on the fact that Congress, in enacting 

section 841, "'was concerned with mixtures that will eventually 

reach the streets-- consumable mixtures.'" Id. (quoting United 

States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 999, 1006 (3d Cir. 1992)). 

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statute, Killion merely rejected the notion that the Supreme 

Court's interpretation of the statute in a different context 

required us to change our prior construction of the guideline. 

Moreover, Killion expressly stated that "[i]t is the Guideline we 

are construing." Id. at 935. We believe a fair reading of 

Killion is that it was construing section 2Dl.l as required by 

prior Tenth Circuit cases, not making a definitive judicial 

interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(B). Thus, we have not 

independently and authoritatively construed the term "mixture or 

substance" for purposes of section 841; we merely followed the 

Sentencing Commission's prior interpretation via its guideline. 

Because we have not ourselves separately interpreted "mixture 

or substance" for statutory purposes, we are now faced with this 

task. "Our job in construing statutes is to effectuate the intent 

reflected in the language of the enactment and the legislative 

process . " State of Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 916 

F.2d 1486, 1494 (lOth Cir. 1990). Although a combination of 

methamphetamine and waste water seems to fit within a dictionary 

definition of "mixture," we are not required to "'produce a result 

demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.'"6 

United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 

6 "Thus it is not enough for the judge just to use a 

dictionary. If he should do no more, he might come out with a 

result which every sensible man would recognize to be quite the 

opposite of what was really intended; which would contradict or 

leave unfulfilled its plain purpose." Learned Hand, How Far Is a 

Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?, in The Spirit of Liberty 103, 

106 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1952). 

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(1989) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors. Inc., 458 U.S. 

564, 571 (1982)); see also NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 288 

(1957). The Court said in Lion Oil Co.: 

If the above words are read in complete isolation from 

their context in the Act, such an interpretation is 

possible. However, "In expounding a statute, we must 

not be guided by a single sentence or member of a 

sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, 

and to its object and policy." Moreover, in Mastro 

Plastics we cautioned against accepting a construction 

that "would produce incongruous results." 

Id. at 288 (quoting Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 

285, 286 (1956) (citations omitted). 

We follow the approach of the Chapman Court, which looked for 

Congress' intent in both section 841's language and the 

legislative history. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 460-61. The Court 

found that Congress "adopted a 'market-oriented' approach to 

punishing drug trafficking," which punished according to the 

quantity distributed "rather than the amount of pure drug 

involved." Id. at 461. Accordingly, Chapman found that "a 

carrier medium . . . used to facilitate the distribution of the 

drug" was rationally included in the weight used to determine 

punishment. Id. at 466. Here, Chapman's recognition of Congress' 

"market-oriented" approach dictates that we not treat unusable 

drug mixtures as if they were usable. 

Five circuits have distinguished between usable and unusable 

drug mixtures in interpreting "mixture" for purposes of section 

841 and section 2D1.1. See United States v. Acosta, 963 F.2d 551, 

554 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[E]ven though the cocaine/creme liqueur may 

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fall within the dictionary definition of 'mixture,' the 

legislative history convinces us that the weight of the creme 

liqueur must be excluded."); United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 

999, 1007 (3d Cir. 19 92) ("We find that the usable/unusable 

differentiation adopted by the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh 

Circuits, rather than the First Circuit approach, best follows the 

reasoning in Chapman."); United States v. Jennings, 945 F.2d 129, 

136 (6th Cir. 1991) ("[I] nterpreting the statute to require 

inclusion of the entire [mixture] for sentencing in this case 

would both produce an illogical result and be contrary to the 

legislative intent underlying the statute."); United States v. 

Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192, 1196 (7th Cir. 1993) ("To read the statute 

or Chapman as requiring inclusion of the weight of all mixtures, 

whether or not they are usable, ingestible, or marketable, leads 

to absurd and irrational results contrary to congressional 

intent."); United States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231, 1236 

(11th Cir. 1991) ("The Court in Chapman found that a plain meaning 

interpretation of "mixture" does not create an irrational result 

in the context of LSD and standard carrier mediums; however, in 

the present case it would be irrational for the court to fail to 

distinguish between usable and unusable drug mixtures .... "). 

See also United States v. Palacios-Molina, 7 F.3d 49, 53-54 (5th 

Cir. 1993) (holding waste liquids in which cocaine was transported 

not a "mixture," and distinguishing prior Fifth Circuit 

authority). But see United States v. Mahacha-Onofre, 936 F.2d 

623, 625-26 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1009 (1991); United 

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States v. Sherrod, 964 F.2d 1501, 1509-10 (5th Cir. 1992); United 

States v. Beltran-Felix, 934 F.2d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 1991). 

This usable/unusable distinction has been applied by two circuits 

in the context of methamphetamine in waste water, see Jennings, 

945 F.2d 129; United States v. Newsome, 998 F.2d 1571 (11th Cir. 

1993), and by two circuits in the context of cocaine waste water, 

see Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192; Palacios-Molina, 7 F.3d 49. 

This interpretation of "mixture or substances" for statutory 

purposes also permits us to refer to the guideline definition and 

"adopt a congruent interpretation of the statutory term as an 

original matter." Palacio, 4 F.3d at 154. Congress created the 

Sentencing Commission in 1984 and charged it with the task of 

"'establish[ing] sentencing policies and practices for the Federal 

criminal justice system.'" Stinson v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 

1913, 1916 (1993) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 991(b) (1)). Commentary 

promulgated by the Commission is authoritative "unless it violates 

the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or 

a plainly erroneous reading of, [the relevant] guideline." Id. at 

1915. Because of its sweeping authority and "significant 

discretion" in sentencing matters, Mistretta v. United States, 488 

U.S. 361, 377 (1989), we may draw on the Commission's 

interpretations of federal sentencing standards when endeavoring 

to reach our own interpretation of a sentencing statute. 

The Sentencing Commission specifically addressed the current 

issue in its amended commentary to section 2D1.1, clearly excluding the weight of waste water from the measurement of a "mixture 

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or substance." U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 comment. n.1. The commentary 

provides: 

Mixture or substance does not include materials that 

must be separated from the controlled substance before 

the controlled substance can be used. Examples of such 

materials include the fiberglass in a cocaine/fiberglass 

bonded suitcase, beeswax in a cocaine/beeswax statue, 

and waste water from an illicit laboratory used to manufacture a controlled substance. 

Id. The above examples mirror the facts of Killion and two First 

Circuit cases upon which it relies. Killion, 7 F.3d at 933 n.10. 

In addition, the Sentencing Commission specifically stated its 

intent to resolve the inter-circuit conflict when it expressed its 

reasons to Congress for amending the commentary. See 58 Fed. Reg. 

27148, *27155 (1993); Killion, 7 F.3d 927 (waste water); United 

States v. Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir.) (cocaine/fiberglass 

bonded suitcase), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 484 (1992); United 

States v. Restrepo-Contreras, 942 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1991) 

(cocaine/beeswax statue), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1066 (1992). In 

fact, Killion itself recognized the possibility that the amendment 

pending before the Commission would soon resolve the issue.? 

7 We thus noted in Killion: 

We do not address and leave open for consideration the 

possibility that the split among the circuits with 

respect to this question has been addressed by the 

United States Sentencing Commission. See 58 Fed. Reg. 

27-148 (1993) (to be codified at U.S.S.G. App. c, no. 

484 (proposed May 6, 1993)). In the event that the 

Commission chooses to give previously sentenced 

defendants the benefit of a new Guideline it is not our 

intention by this opinion to foreclose Killion from 

seeking appropriate relief. 

7 F.3d at 931 n.6. 

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7 F. 3d at 931 n. 6 (citing 58 Fed. Reg. 27, 148 (1993) (to be 

codified at U.S.S.G. App. C, no. 484) (proposed May 6, 1993)) .a 

Adopting an interpretation opposite of the Sentencing 

Commission for purposes of applying the statutory mandatory 

minimum would lead to unnecessary conflict and confusion. We have 

recognized the importance of harmonizing the statutory penalty 

provisions and the sentencing guidelines. See United States v. 

Shewmaker, 936 F.2d 1124, 1128 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 

U.S. 1037 (1992); see also United States v. Shorthouse, 7 F.3d 

149, 152 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The statutory scheme of sentencing, 

including the [g]uidelines, must be construed harmoniously as a 

whole."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1838 (1994). Furthermore, 

because the statutory mandatory minimum automatically becomes the 

guideline sentence when it is greater than the maximum of the 

applicable guideline range, see U.S.S.G. § 5Gl.l(b), allowing 

waste water to comprise a "mixture or substance" under the statute 

would effectively nullify the Commission's policy choice.9 In 

8 Indeed, when we rejected Mr. Richards' second habeas petition 

as an abuse of the writ, we noted his argument that "a proposed 

amendment to the sentencing guidelines will retroactively apply to 

exclude the weight of the waste products in determining his sentence." United States v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369, 1372 n.l. We 

then stated, "If the amendment does become effective and the 

Sentencing Commission does apply it retroactively, Richards may 

have a remedy under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2) ." Id. 

9 In establishing the Sentencing Commission, Congress "sought 

reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed 

by similar offenders." U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Part A.3 (policy 

statement) . 

In adopting the new commentary, the Commission attempted to 

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light of this persuasive authority, we hold that section 841 does 

not include the weight of waste by-products in the measurement of 

a "mixture or substance." 

Citing United States v. Mueller, 27 F.3d 494 (lOth Cir. 

1994), the government suggests that we must construe the mandatory 

minimum statute as it would have been construed at the time of 

sentencing, before the Sentencing Commission clarified the definition of "mixture or substance." We interpret Mueller as foreclosing us from reducing a sentence below a mandatory minimum but not 

mandating how the mandatory minimum statute will be interpreted. 

In Mueller, an LSD case, we were bound by Chapman's interpretation 

of the mandatory minimum statute.lO Id. at 496. Here, we are 

free to interpret the statute as an issue of first impression. We 

are not required to interpret a statute in accordance with an 

outdated guideline and in conflict with the current, applicable 

guideline. We thus construe "mixture or substance" in section 841 

to be consistent with the guideline commentary as revised. In so 

implement this policy by eliminating highly disparate sentences 

for the same quantity of drugs. For example, prior to the new 

commentary, if the beeswax statue and the acrylic suitcase contained the same amount of cocaine but the suitcase weighed considerably more, the defendant with the suitcase would receive a much 

higher sentence. Under the new commentary, the defendants would 

be classified in the same sentencing range. If we adopt a conflicting interpretation of "mixture or substance," the mandatory 

minimum would still impose a significantly higher sentence on the 

defendant with the suitcase. See also Chapman v. United States, 

500 U.S. 453, 458 n.2 (1991) (detailing disparate sentences 

imposed under Chapman) . 

10 We have held that Chapman was deciding only the LSD issue. 

Killion, 7 F.3d at 934. 

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doing, we join the majority of our sister circuits in adopting 

Congress' market-oriented approach to drug sentencing as 

articulated in Chapman. 

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

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United States v. Richards, No. 94-4052. Baldock, Circuit Judge, 

dissenting. 

I am unable to join the majority's interpretation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841's terms 11mixture or substance 11 in the instant case. 

The majority concludes we are free to interpret § 841 as an issue 

of first impression because: (1) we have not previously done so; 

and (2) the Supreme Court's interpretation of 11mixture or 

substance .. for purposes of § 841 in Chapman v. United States, 500 

U.S. 453 (1991) applies only to LSD cases. Op. at 16 n.lO. I 

conclude we are bound by the Supreme Court's authoritative 

interpretation of 11 mixture or substance 11 in all of § 841. See 

Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461-62. Further, the majority's statutory 

analysis is flawed because it contravenes settled rules of 

statutory construction. I therefore respectfully dissent. 

I. 

In Chapman, the Supreme Court defined the terms 11mixture or 

substance 11 for purposes of § 841. Specifically, the Court 

confronted the question whether the weight of blotter paper 

containing LSD or the weight of pure LSD alone should be used in 

determining a defendant's eligibility for a mandatory minimum 

sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (B) (v). Under 

§ 84l(b) (1) (B) (v), a defendant is subject to a mandatory minimum 

five year term of imprisonment if he, inter alia, distributes 11 1 

gram or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable 

amount of 11 LSD. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (B) (v) (emphasis added). 

The Supreme Court had to determine, therefore, whether the blotter 

paper and LSD distributed by the defendants constituted a 11 mixture 

or substance" for purposes of the statute. 

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The Court noted that, in addition to LSD, § 841 uses the 

terms "mixture or substance" in connection with a number of 

controlled substances, but does not define the terms. The Court 

therefore recognized that § 841 repeats the phrase "mixture or 

substance" numerous times, including in reference to 

methamphetamine. Although the Supreme Court interpreted "mixture 

or substance" in the context of a case involving LSD, it 

interpreted a statutory phrase used throughout § 841. Analyzing 

§ 841 using time-honored principles of statutory construction, the 

Court concluded that because the statute did not define "mixture 

or substance," the words had to be given their ordinary meaning. 

The Court determined: 

A "mixture" is defined to include "a portion of matter 

consisting of two or more components that do not bear a 

fixed proportion to one another and that however 

thoroughly commingled are regarded as retaining a 

separate existence." Webster's Third New International 

Dictionary 1449 (1986). A "mixture" may also consist of 

two substances blended together so that the particles of 

one are diffused among the particles of the other. 9 

Oxford English Dictionary 921 (2d ed. 1989). 

Chapman, 500 U.S. at 462. 

Applying these definitions, the Court concluded that blotter 

paper and LSD constitute a "mixture" under the plain meaning of 

that term because the LSD crystals are diffused among the fibers 

of the blotter paper. Id. Because the blotter paper and LSD 

weighed 5.7 grams, the defendants distributed 11 1 gram or more of a 

mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of" LSD. As a 

result, the defendants were subject to § 841(b) (1) (B) (v) 's 

mandatory minimum five year term of imprisonment. 

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The Supreme Court therefore defined the terms "mixture or 

substance" in § 841 using a familiar tool of construction: the 

plain language of the statute. In so doing, the Court 

authoritatively determined that the words "mixture or substance" 

wherever appearing in § 841 have their ordinary dictionary 

meanings. Thus, for purposes of § 841, a "mixture" is "two 

substances blended together so that the particles of one are 

diffused among the particles of the other." Chapman, 500 U.S. at 

462 (citing 9 Oxford English Dictionary 921 (2d ed. 1989}}. 

Applying the plain meaning of "mixture" set forth in Chapman 

to the instant case, waste water and methamphetamine constitute 

"two substances blended together so that the particles of one are 

diffused among the particles of the other." Id. Waste water and 

methamphetamine, therefore, constitute a "mixture or substance" 

for purposes of § 841. See id. Defendant possessed a thirty-two 

kilogram mixture of waste water and methamphetamine, containing 

twenty-eight grams of pure methamphetamine. Thus, Defendant 

possessed "1 kilogram or more of a mixture or substance containing 

a detectable amount of methamphetamine." 21 U.S.C. 

§ 84l(b} (1} (A} (viii}. Defendant is therefore subject to a 

mandatory minimum sentence of ten years. Id. Because the 

statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum 

sentence under the applicable guideline range, Defendant must be 

sentenced to a minimum ten years imprisonment. U.S.S.G. 

§ 5Gl.l(b}; see United States v. Campbell, 995 F.2d 173, 175 (lOth 

Cir. 1993} ("Statutes trump guidelines where the two conflict."} . 

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The majority, however, concludes that Chapman does not 

control the instant case. Specifically, the majority asserts that 

in United States v. Killion, 7 F.3d 927 (lOth Cir. 1993), cert. 

denied, 114 S. Ct. 1106 (1994), we held that Chapman "decid[ed] 

only the LSD issue." Op. at 16 n.9. This conclusion misreads 

Killion and consequently rejects controlling Supreme Court 

precedent. 

In Killion, government agents found 66.3 grams of a yellow 

liquid containing 52.9 grams of Phenyl-2-Propanone ("P-2-P") and 

17.5 grams of a dark brown substance containing an unquantifiable 

trace of P-2-P at defendant's house. Thus, the agents found a 

total of 83.8 grams of a substance containing P-2-P. The 

defendant pled guilty to manufacturing 83.8 grams of P-2-P. In 

computing the defendant's base offense level under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2Dl.l, the district court included the entire 83.8 gram weight 

of the yellow liquid and dark brown substance. The defendant 

challenged the district court's computation of his base offense 

level, contending that the court erroneously included the weight 

of unusable waste by-products in the yellow liquid and dark brown 

substance in determining his base offense level. The court 

rejected the defendant's challenge, citing Tenth Circuit precedent 

and holding that the entire 83.8 gram weight should be used 

because the yellow liquid and dark brown substance contained a 

"detectable amount" of P-2-P. Id. at 931. 

On appeal, we noted that our precedent construed § 2Dl.l as 

requiring the entire weight of a mixture containing a detectable 

amount of a controlled substance be used in determining a 

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defendant's base offense level. The defendant urged us to 

reconsider our position in light of Chapman. Specifically, the 

defendant contended Chapman adopted a "market-oriented" approach, 

whereby a defendant is punished only for usable, marketable parts 

of a drug mixture. We refused to depart from our precedent, 

however. We concluded that Chapman's "market-oriented" approach 

discussion1 was specifically directed to the LSD sentencing issue 

before the Court. 

Contrary to the majority's assertion, however, we did not 

conclude that Chapman's plain meaning interpretation of "mixture 

or substance" was limited to LSD cases. Id. at 931, 934. 

Instead, we noted that the Court "analyzed the meaning of the term 

'mixture or substance' in 21 U.S.C. § 841"--i.e., for purposes of 

the entire statute. Id. at 931 (emphasis added). Thus, the 

majority's conclusion that "[w]e have held that Chapman was 

deciding only the LSD issue," op. at 16 n.10, is overbroad and 

erroneous as applied to the instant case. As a simple reading of 

1 In Chapman, the Court noted that: 

Congress adopted a "market-oriented" approach to 

punishing drug trafficking, under which the total 

quantity of what is distributed, rather than the amount 

of pure drug involved, is used to determine the length 

of the sentence. To implement that principle, Congress 

set mandatory minimum sentences corresponding to the 

weight of a "mixture or substance containing a 

detectable amount of" the various controlled substances, 

including LSD. It intended the penalties for drug 

trafficking to be graduated according to the weight of 

the drugs in whatever form they were found--cut or 

uncut, pure or impure, ready for wholesale or ready for 

distribution at the retail level. 

Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461 (citation omitted). In Killion, we held 

that the Court's "market-oriented" approach discussion applied 

only in the context of the LSD question before the Court. 

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Killion demonstrates, we have already recognized that Chapman sets 

forth the controlling definition of the terms "mixture or 

substance" wherever they appear in § 841. See id. at 931. 

Because the majority misreads Killion, it fails to apply 

controlling Supreme Court precedent in the instant case and 

thereby reaches the wrong result. 

II. 

In addition to ignoring controlling precedent, the majority's 

interpretation of § 841 contravenes elementary principles of 

statutory construction. In interpreting statutes, our first and 

primary task is to "determine congressional intent, using 

'traditional tools of statutory construction.'" NLRB v. United 

Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (quoting 

INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 u.s. 421, 446 (1987)) (emphasis 

added). We examine the plain language of the statute. Phillips 

Petroleum Co. v. Lujan, 4 F.3d 858, 861 (lOth Cir. 1993). We 

assume that Congress' intent is expressed in the ordinary meaning 

of the words it uses. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, 

Inc., 469 u.s. 189, 194 (1985). Thus, when the statute does not 

define particular terms, the terms "must be given their ordinary 

meaning." Chapman, 500 U.S. at 462; see also Bartlett v. Martin 

Marietta Operations Support, Inc., 38 F.3d 514, 518 (lOth Cir. 

1994) ("The court is obliged to give terms their plain meaning 

whenever possible."). We give "full effect" to the plain meaning 

of the words chosen by Congress. United States v. Turkette, 452 

U.S. 576, 593 (1981). "[W]e will not restrict the plain meaning 

of the language chosen by Congress absent 'clearly expressed 

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legislative intent to the contrary.'" Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 

1544, 1555 (lOth Cir. 1995) (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580). 

"The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in 

the 'rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute 

will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of 

its drafters.'" United States v. Ron Pair Enters .. Inc., 489 U.S. 

235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. Ocean Contractors, Inc., 458 

U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). If Congress' intent is clear from the 

statutory language, we give effect to that intent, our inquiry is 

complete, and we do not turn to an agency construction. Chevron, 

U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 

(1984). 

Applying these principles, we first examine the plain 

language of § 841. Because § 841 does not define the terms 

11 mixture or substance, 11 they 11 must be given their ordinary 

meaning. 11 Chapman, 500 U.S. at 462. Moreover, we must give 11 full 

effect 11 to the plain meaning of § 841's terms 11mixture or 

substance 11 and not restrict their plain definitional scope unless 

we: (1) find clearly expressed congressional intent to the 

contrary, Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580; or (2) conclude that this is 

a 11 rare case 11 where a literal application of § 841's terms "will 

produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its 

drafters ... Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242. 

The majority concludes this is a 11 rare case 11 where a literal 

application of § 841's terms will produce a result demonstrably at 

odds with Congress' intentions. The majority, therefore, must 

demonstrate that Congress did not intend § 841 to convey its 

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literal meaning--i.e., instead of "a mixture or substance 

containing a detectable amount of" a controlled substance, the 

majority must show that Congress really intended § 841 to read "a 

[usable] mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of" a 

controlled substance. To support its contention that the word 

"usable" should be read into the statute, the majority cites 

Chapman's discussion of the legislative history to § 841. 

Specifically, the majority reasons that "Chapman's recognition of 

Congress' 'market-oriented' approach dictates that we not treat 

unusable drug mixtures as if they were usable." Op. at 11. 

In Chapman, the Court examined the legislative history to 

§ 841 and concluded that Congress adopted a "'market-oriented' 

approach to punishing drug trafficking." Chapman, 500 U.S. at 

461. The Court noted, however, that under the "market-oriented" 

approach adopted by Congress "the total quantity of what is 

distributed, rather than the amount of pure drug involved, is used 

to determine the length of the sentence." Id. (citing H.R. Rep. 

No. 99-845, pt. 1, 11-12, 17 (1986)) (emphasis added). Based upon 

its review of the legislative history, the Court concluded that 

Congress intended "penalties for drug trafficking to be graduated 

according to the weight of the drugs in whatever form they were 

found--cut or uncut, pure or impure, ready for wholesale or ready 

for distribution at the retail level." Id. (emphasis added). 

Thus, the Court recognized that Congress adopted the 

market-oriented approach because the reality of drug-trafficking 

is that drugs are often combined with other substances in a 

mixture. Congress intended to punish drug offenders who possess 

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large quantities of drug mixtures more severely. Neither the 

Court, nor Congress, however, gave any indication that drug 

offenders should be sentenced for the total quantity of only 

usable drug mixtures. Thus, to the extent the circuit court cases 

cited by the majority draw a usable/unusable (marketable/ 

unmarketable) distinction in interpreting § 841, their reading is 

not based in Chapman or in accord with clearly expressed 

congressional intent.2 

An examination of Chapman and its discussion of the 

"market-oriented" approach reveals the Court did not find 

legislative history restricting the plain meaning of § 841's terms 

"mixture or substance" to "usable" drug mixtures. The majority 

opinion in this case fails to identify legislative history 

2 The majority seeks to buttress its reading of § 841 by citing 

to other circuits that have drawn a usable/unusable distinction in 

applying § 841. See United States v. Acosta, 963 F.2d 551, 554 

(2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Rodriquez, 975 F.2d 999, 1007 (3d 

Cir. 1992); United States v. Jennings, 945 F.2d 129, 136 (6th Cir. 

1991); United States v. Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192, 1196 (7th Cir. 

1993); United States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231, 1236 (11th 

Cir. 1991). None of these cases, however, cite language in § 841 

or its legislative history that expresses that Congress intended 

to limit the plain definitional scope of § 841's terms "mixture or 

substance" to usable drug mixtures. Instead, these cases limit 

the plain scope of § 841 to usable drug mixtures on the grounds 

that Congress intended uniformity and proportionality in 

sentencing and therefore could not have intended unusable drug 

mixtures to be punished under § 841 because of the absurd results 

that follow from such a conclusion. See, ~, Acosta, 963 F.2d 

at 554. 

The Supreme Court, however, rejected the argument that 

"mixture or substance" should be read to exclude carrier mediums 

to avoid illogical results in Chapman. See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 

458-59. Moreover, the analysis in Acosta and the other cases is 

flawed because it is not the function of the judiciary to re-write 

congressional statutes to fit our conception of what is the best 

or right sentencing policy. Congress is aware of the sentencing 

discrepancies that may follow from its sentencing scheme and will 

rectify those discrepancies if it so chooses. 

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evidencing such congressional intent. Indeed, the Supreme Court 

noted in Chapman after examining § 841's legislative history that, 

under the "market-oriented" approach, Congress intended to punish 

drug traffickers for the "total quantity" of drugs distributed "in 

whatever form they were found." Id. (emphasis added). Chapman's 

discussion of the "market-oriented" approach, therefore, 

demonstrates the fallacy of the majority's conclusion that 

Congress intended to limit the plain meaning of the terms "mixture 

or substance" to "usable" drug mixtures. The legislative history 

to § 841 underscores the congressional intent expressed in the 

plain language of the statute to punish drug traffickers for the 

"total quantity" of drugs distributed "in whatever form they [are] 

found." Id. Accordingly, Congress provided no restrictions on 

the phrase "mixture or substance" in § 841(b). See 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b). Thus, the discussion in Chapman of § 841's legislative 

history and Congress' "market-oriented" approach contradicts the 

majority's restrictive interpretation of § 841 in this case. 

Because there is no record of congressional intent to 

otherwise restrict the plain definitional scope of § 841's terms, 

we apply the terms in accord with their plain, dictionary 

meanings. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 462; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580. 

Under the plain meaning of "mixture," waste water and 

methamphetamine constitute "two substances blended together so 

that the particles of one are diffused among the particles of the 

other." Chapman, 500 U.S. at 462 (quoting 9 Oxford English 

Dictionary at 921) . Waste water and methamphetamine therefore 

qualify as a "mixture or substance" for purposes of § 841 because 

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the particles of the methamphetamine are diffused among the 

particles of the waste water. As a result, Defendant possessed 32 

kilograms of a "mixture or substance containing a detectable 

amount of methamphetamine." 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1) (A) (viii). He 

is therefore subject to § 841's mandatory minimum ten years 

imprisonment. Because the statutorily required minimum sentence 

is greater than the maximum sentence under the applicable 

guideline range, Defendant must be sentenced to a minimum ten 

years imprisonment. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b); Campbell, 995 F.2d at 

175. 

III. 

Instead of applying time-honored principles of statutory 

construction and focusing on congressional intent, the majority 

applies a novel method of construction called the "congruent" 

approach, which focuses on the sentencing commission's intent. 

Op. at 13. Under this "congruent" approach, the majority 

interprets the term "mixture or substance" in § 841 to exclude 

waste water in order to conform to sentencing guidelines 

commentary. In so doing, the majority ignores congressional 

intent, which is clear from the plain language of § 841, and 

essentially allows the Sentencing Commission to interpret a 

federal statute. This approach abdicates our uniquely judicial 

task to "say what the law is," Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 

(1803), and is flawed in several respects. 

First, if congressional intent is clear from the face of a 

statute, we simply apply the statute in accord with that intent 

and do not reference the views of an agency. Chevron, 467 u.s. at 

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842-43. Moreover, in any event, deference to commentary 

promulgated by the Sentencing Commission is unwarranted because 

commentary is not the Commission's construction of a statute that 

it administers. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (court defers to 

agency construction of statute that it administers when 

congressional intent is unclear) . Commentary performs three 

functions: (1) it interprets the guidelines and explains their 

application; (2) it suggests circumstances warranting departure 

from the guidelines; and (3) it provides background information to 

the guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7. As such, commentary is "akin 

to an agency's interpretation of its own legislative rules." 

Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1919 (1993). 

Commentary does not, however, interpret federal statutes. See 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7. Thus, while commentary is authoritative and 

binding with respect to the meaning and application of the 

guidelines, Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1919, it is not authoritative 

as to the meaning of a federal statute and is therefore entitled 

to no deference by this court in statutory interpretation. See 

Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 2055 (dissent's assumption that the 

sentencing guidelines are relevant to the interpretation of a 

federal criminal statute is "dubious"); United States v. Palacio, 

4 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 1993) (" [U]nless the Sentencing 

Commission is construing its own authority as an agency . . . its 

view of the substantive meaning of a criminal statute is unlikely 

to be entitled to any deference."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1194 

(1994). 

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Second, the majority's interpretation of "mixture or 

substance" under its "congruent" approach ignores settled canons 

of construction and defies common sense. Under the majority's 

rationale, "mixture or substance" has one meaning for LSD cases 

(Chapman) and another meaning for methamphetamine cases (the 

Sentencing Commission's views). Under elementary maxims of 

construction, however, "[w]e must presume that words used more 

than once in the same statute have the same meaning." Boise 

Cascade Corp. v. United States EPA, 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 

1991) (citing Sutherland Stat. Const. §§ 46.05, 46.06 (4th ed. 

1984)). The majority points to nothing in the statute, its 

legislative history, or interpretive case law to indicate that 

Congress intended the words "mixture or substance" have different 

definitions in different subsections of § 841. Indeed, an 

eclectic definitional scheme, whereby an identical phrase means 

what the dictionary says in one section of § 841 and what 

guideline commentary says in another, cannot be what Congress 

intended. 

Third, the majority's central focus on the "congruent" 

approach and sentencing commission intent in interpreting § 841, 

instead of on settled principles of statutory contruction and 

congressional intent implicates separation of powers concerns. 

Principles of statutory construction ensure that the courts, in 

exercising their unique role to declare what the law means, 

properly focus upon ascertaining the intent of Congress. Contrary 

to the majority's approach, it is not the will of the Sentencing 

Commission--"an independent commission in the Judicial Branch of 

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the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)--or of this court, that 

holds paramount importance in statutory interpretation. Instead, 

it is the intent and will of Congress--the democratic body 

representing the will of the people--that counts. By applying 

principles of statutory interpretation, we ensure that we 

interpret and apply statutes in accord with congressional intent, 

regardless of what we think the statutes should say, and thus 

properly respect the unique roles of Congress and the federal 

courts in our trilateral system. 

In sum, by following Chapman or applying time-honored 

principles of statutory interpretation, the majority would reach 

the same and right result--i.e., it would apply the plain meaning 

of "mixture or substance" to the facts and conclude Defendant is 

subject to a mandatory minimum ten years imprisonment. Instead, 

the majority disregards Supreme Court precedent and contravenes 

principles of statutory construction. The net effect of the 

majority's decision results in the phrase "mixture or substance" 

in § 841 having one meaning in LSD cases and another meaning in 

methamphetamine cases. It will be interesting to see how "mixture 

or substance" will be defined in the six other subsections of 

§ 841(b) (1) (A), which deal with heroin, cocaine, PCP and other 

controlled substances. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b) (1) (A) (i)- (iv), 

(vi), (vii) . 

Because the district court erred by failing to sentence 

Defendant to a minimum of ten years imprisonment in accord with 

the applicable statutory mandatory minimum under 

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§ 841(b) (1) (A) (viii), I would reverse. I therefore respectfully 

dissent. 

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