Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-23-03023/USCOURTS-caDC-23-03023-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Russell Dean Alford
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 18, 2023 Decided January 5, 2024

No. 23-3023

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

RUSSELL DEAN ALFORD,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:21-cr-00263-1)

Deanna Lee Oswald, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were 

Kevin L. Butler, Federal Public Defender, Northern District of 

Alabama, and Tobie J. Smith, Appellate Attorney.

Eric Hansford, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause 

for appellee. With him on the brief were Chrisellen R. Kolb, 

Elizabeth H. Danello, and Michael Romano, Assistant U.S. 

Attorneys.

Before: HENDERSON and PAN, Circuit Judges, and 

ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: A jury 

convicted Russell Alford of four misdemeanors stemming from 

his role in the U.S. Capitol protest on January 6th, 2021, for 

which he received a sentence of twelve months’ incarceration. 

He appeals to challenge the reasonableness of his sentence and 

the sufficiency of the evidence to support two of his 

convictions, both of which charged him with engaging in 

“disorderly or disruptive conduct.” The trial evidence indicated 

that, during Alford’s brief time within the Capitol, he was 

neither violent nor destructive. Nevertheless, we affirm his 

convictions because a jury could rationally find that his 

unauthorized presence in the Capitol as part of an unruly mob 

contributed to the disruption of the Congress’s electoral 

certification and jeopardized public safety. We likewise affirm

Alford’s sentence. The district court acted within its discretion 

in imposing a within-Guidelines sentence after weighing the 

competing circumstances. 

I.

A.

On January 6, 2021, the Congress and Vice President Mike 

Pence met to certify the winner of the 2020 presidential 

election pursuant to the Electoral Count Act, 3 U.S.C. §§ 1–

22.1 The Capitol was closed to the public and the U.S. Capitol 

Police formed a security perimeter around the building 

consisting of interlocking bicycle racks and mesh fencing.

Signs posted around the perimeter read “Area Closed.”

That afternoon, however, a mob broke through the 

perimeter, tore down the barricades and clashed with police. 

1 We draw the following description of the facts from the trial 

record. 

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Members of the mob entered the Capitol through broken 

windows and then threw open the doors to their compatriots. 

Ultimately, the mob delayed the electoral certification by 

several hours. Both the Senate and the House recessed shortly 

after 2:00 p.m. and did not resume until 8:00 p.m. that night 

after law enforcement secured the building.

Alford was among those who entered the Capitol. He and 

a friend traveled from Hokes Bluff, Alabama, to attend the rally 

that President Donald Trump held on the morning of the 6th.

Alford remained at the rally through President Trump’s speech 

and then followed the crowd moving toward the Capitol. As he 

neared the building, he walked past “Area Closed” signs and 

overturned barricades into the restricted area.

Shortly after 2:00 p.m., Alford reached the Capitol near the 

Upper House Door, which is reserved for the use of Congress

members only. He stood nearby as more than twenty police 

officers worked to secure the steps leading up to the door. He 

then moved further around the building and watched events

unfold outside a different door for approximately half an hour 

before returning to the Upper House Door.

When Alford returned to the Upper House Door, there 

were no longer police present. He climbed the steps as other 

rioters knocked on the doors to attract the attention of rioters 

already inside the building, who then threw open one of the 

double doors that make up the Upper House Door. This 

triggered a shrill, continuous security alarm that sounded 

throughout Alford’s time in the building. Alford paused outside

to upload a photo of the rioters to social media that he captioned 

“Patriots,” and then walked into the Capitol. Dozens of others 

streamed in before and after him.

Alford remained inside the Capitol for approximately 

thirteen minutes. As he entered, he turned and unsuccessfully 

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attempted to open the other double door. He then walked 

further into the Capitol through a metal detector, setting off its 

alarm. While inside, he mostly stood to the side and observed. 

He filmed protestors chanting “stop the steal” and pounding on 

a door that led to the floor of the House, behind which sheltered 

dozens of Congress members.

Police arrived within about ten minutes of Alford’s entry 

and began physically and verbally directing the crowd back out 

through the Upper House Door. Alford initially moved further 

down the hallway before turning and making for the exit. Only 

one of the double doors was open and Alford stepped to the 

side by the closed door as others filed out past him. Alford 

remained there for about two minutes filming the departing 

crowd with his phone, watching as roughly fifty people exited 

through the open door next to him. He left once someone 

managed to open the second double door.

B.

Alford was charged with four misdemeanors: entering or 

remaining in a restricted building in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

1752(a)(1) (Count One); disorderly or disruptive conduct in a 

restricted building in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(2)

(Count Two); disorderly or disruptive conduct in the Capitol 

Building in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(D) (Count 

Three); and parading, demonstrating or picketing in a Capitol 

Building in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(G) (Count 

Four). He exercised his right to a jury trial and was ultimately 

convicted on all counts.

As relevant here, Alford moved for a judgment of acquittal 

on Counts Two and Three, contending that there was 

insufficient evidence to prove that he had engaged in 

“disorderly or disruptive conduct.” The district court denied the 

motion, reasoning that “Mr. Alford’s mere presence inside the 

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Capitol disturbed the public peace or undermined public 

safety” and that “his presence was an aspect of the disorder and 

disruption of the Capitol.” Trial Transcript at 747:16–17, 

748:8–9, United States v. Alford, No. 21-cr-0263. It sentenced 

Alford to serve the statutory maximum for each count

concurrently, resulting in a sentence of twelve months’ 

imprisonment followed by twelve months’ supervised release.

II.

Alford raises two issues in this appeal: the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support his convictions on Counts Two and 

Three and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We 

review the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of 

acquittal de novo. United States v. Sitzmann, 893 F.3d 811, 821 

(D.C. Cir. 2018). In so doing, we ask “whether, after viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). We must respect “the right 

of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence and 

draw justifiable inferences of fact.” United States v. Clark, 184 

F.3d 858, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). 

We review the substantive reasonableness of Alford’s 

sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 51 (2007). Our review is “quite deferential,” meaning that 

it is an “‘unusual case’” in which the district court abuses its 

discretion. United States v. Knight, 824 F.3d 1105, 1111 (D.C. 

Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). Moreover, where, as here, the 

sentence falls within the range of the Sentencing Guidelines, 

we “appl[y] a presumption of reasonableness.” United States v. 

Parks, 995 F.3d 241, 248 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

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III.

Alford contests whether there was sufficient evidence for 

the jury to convict him of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(2) and 

40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(D). The former prescribes up to one 

year of incarceration for whoever 

knowingly, and with intent to impede or disrupt 

the orderly conduct of Government business or 

official functions, engages in disorderly or 

disruptive conduct in, or within such proximity 

to, any restricted building or grounds when, or 

so that, such conduct, in fact, impedes or 

disrupts the orderly conduct of Government 

business or official functions.

18 U.S.C. §§ 1752(a)(2), (b)(2). The Capitol qualified as a 

“restricted building” on January 6th because Vice President 

Pence was present to oversee the electoral certification. See id. 

§ 1752(c)(1)(B) (defining “restricted building or grounds” as 

“any posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted area . . . of a 

building or grounds where the President or other person 

protected by the Secret Service is or will be temporarily 

visiting”). 

The second statute is specific to the Capitol. It provides 

that 

[a]n individual or a group of individuals may 

not willfully and knowingly . . . utter loud, 

threatening, or abusive language, or engage in 

disorderly or disruptive conduct, at any place in 

the Grounds or in any of the Capitol Buildings 

with the intent to impede, disrupt, or disturb the 

orderly conduct of a session of Congress or 

either House of Congress. 

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40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(D). A violation is punishable by up to 

six months’ incarceration. Id. § 5109(b). 

For both convictions, the issue is whether a jury could 

conclude that Alford’s conduct, which was neither violent nor 

destructive, was “disorderly or disruptive.” Alford contends 

that these statutes reach only conduct that is inherently 

disruptive or disorderly, unlike his assertedly quiet and brief 

foray into the Capitol. We disagree. We first discuss the proper 

scope of “disorderly or disruptive conduct” before explaining 

why Alford’s narrow interpretation is mistaken. Finally, we 

address why a rational jury could conclude that Alford’s 

conduct was disorderly, disruptive or both. 

A.

“In addressing a question of statutory interpretation, we 

begin with the text.” Eagle Pharms., Inc. v. Azar, 952 F.3d 323, 

330 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). We give words their 

plain, everyday meaning unless the Congress “employs a term 

of art,” in which case “‘it presumably knows and adopts the 

cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in 

the body of learning from which it was taken.’” F.A.A. v. 

Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 292 (2012) (quoting Molzof v. United 

States, 502 U.S. 301, 307 (1992)). 

“Disorderly conduct” is one such term of art. It is the 

modern successor to the common-law offense of breach of the 

peace and so it carries that history with it. See 3 J. Ohlin,

Wharton’s Criminal Law § 37.2, at 139 (16th ed. 2021) (“Most 

states have replaced the common-law offense of breach of the 

peace with the offense called disorderly conduct.”); 2 Model 

Penal Code and Commentaries § 250.2 cmt. 1, at 325 (1980)

(recognizing breach of the peace as the “analogous offense” at 

common law of disorderly conduct). Black’s Law Dictionary

gives its definition as “[b]ehavior that tends to disturb the 

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public peace, offend public morals, or undermine safety” and 

provides a cross-reference to “Breach of the Peace.” Disorderly 

Conduct, Black’s Law Dictionary 292 (7th ed. 1999) (listed 

under “Conduct”).

2 “Breach of the Peace,” in turn, is defined 

as “[t]he criminal offense of creating a public disturbance or

engaging in disorderly conduct, particularly by an unnecessary 

or distracting noise.” Id. at 182; see also United States v. 

Elmore, 108 F.3d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1997) (recognizing the 

definition of disorderly conduct from Black’s as “adequate . . . 

for purposes of federal law”).3 The offense of disorderly 

conduct traditionally extends not only to acts that would 

constitute a breach of the peace at common law “but also [to] 

conduct tending to corrupt morals, to endanger health or safety, 

or simply to annoy other members of the community.” 2 Model 

Penal Code § 250.2 cmt. 1, at 325; see also 27 C.J.S.

Disorderly Conduct § 2 (Aug. 2023 Update) (recognizing that 

“[t]he term ‘disorderly conduct’ is a broader term than ‘breach 

of the peace’”). 

These definitions are nebulous but time has given them 

concrete contours in two ways important here. First, it is wellestablished that whether conduct qualifies as disorderly 

depends on the surrounding circumstances. Courts consistently 

observe that “whether a given act provokes a breach of the 

peace depends upon the accompanying circumstances,” 

making it “essential that the setting be considered.” United 

States v. Woodard, 376 F.2d 136, 141 (7th Cir. 1967); see also 

2 Another treatise defines “disorderly conduct” as “any words 

or acts which tend to disturb the peace or endanger the morals, safety, 

or health of the community, or of a class of persons.” 27 C.J.S.

Disorderly Conduct § 2 (Aug. 2023 Update).

3 Other authorities have similarly interpreted “breach of the 

peace” as “a crime defined to include any behavior that disturbed or 

tended to disturb the tranquility of the citizenry.” 2 Model Penal

Code § 250.2 cmt. 1, at 325.

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Biddle v. Martin, 992 F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Whether 

particular conduct is disorderly therefore depends not only on 

the conduct itself but also on the conduct’s unreasonableness 

in relation to the surrounding circumstances.”). Legal treatises 

agree. 27 C.J.S. Disorderly Conduct § 2. And the Supreme 

Court has taken the same approach, focusing its interpretation 

of a state’s breach-of-the-peace provision on the defendants’ 

conduct “in the circumstances of these cases.” See Garner v. 

Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 174 (1961).

This circumstances-sensitive approach tracks common 

sense. A lone hiker on a mountaintop can sing at the top of his 

lungs without disturbing a soul; a patron in a library cannot. It 

is entirely appropriate to clap and cheer when a keynote 

speaker steps to the podium but to do so once the room has 

fallen quiet and he has begun to speak would ordinarily be 

disruptive. Thus, in determining whether an act is disorderly, 

the act cannot be divorced from the circumstances in which it 

takes place. 

Second, it is equally clear from caselaw that even passive, 

quiet and nonviolent conduct can be disorderly. The Supreme 

Court has recognized that a breach of the peace can occur “by 

passive conduct likely to cause a public disturbance,” Garner, 

368 U.S. at 173–74, and we have likewise observed that 

“[p]eople blocking traffic at a critical intersection may breach 

the peace as fully as those who hurl stones,” Wash.

Mobilization Comm. v. Cullinane, 566 F.2d 107, 116 (D.C. Cir. 

1977). In fact, disorderly conduct statutes typically encompass 

“obstructing a lawful assembly or meeting” and “congregating 

with others in a public place and refusing an official order to 

disperse,” both of which can be done peacefully and passively. 

3 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 37.2, at 143–44 (footnotes 

omitted). A sit-in protest, for instance, may impede the 

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operations of the targeted organization as effectively as a 

vandal. 

In sum, we think the Congress intended to incorporate 

these principles when it criminalized “disorderly conduct.” 

Accordingly, we need not delineate the outer boundaries of its 

definition to conclude that it extends at least this far: conduct 

is disorderly if, viewed in the circumstances in which it takes 

place, it is likely to endanger public safety or create a public 

disturbance.

Unlike disorderly conduct, “disruptive conduct” is not a 

term of art and has only its plain meaning. When the two 

provisions here were enacted in 1967 and 1971,4 the adjective 

“disruptive” carried the same familiar meaning that it does 

today: “causing or tending to cause disruption.” 1 Webster’s 

Third New Int’l Dictionary 656 (1966). And “disrupt” meant 

“to throw into disorder or turmoil” or “to interrupt to the extent 

of stopping, preventing normal continuance of, or destroying.” 

Id.; see also Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 366

(1984) (defining “disrupt” as “to throw into disorder” or “to 

interrupt the normal course or unity of”). 

Whether particular conduct is disruptive is also a contextsensitive inquiry. The Supreme Court has observed that 

whether conduct “disrupts or is about to disrupt normal school 

activities” should be made “on an individualized basis, given 

the particular fact situation.” See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 

408 U.S. 104, 119 (1972). Similarly, in interpretating a statute 

that prohibited making “a harangue or oration” in the Supreme 

Court, we concluded that the statute’s focus was on actions 

“that tend to disrupt the Court’s operations.” United States v. 

Bronstein, 849 F.3d 1101, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Our analysis 

4 See Act of Oct. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-108, 81 Stat. 275, 

276 (1967); Pub. L. No. 91-644, § 18, 84 Stat. 1880, 1891–92 (1971).

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reasoned that disruptive actions are those that are inappropriate 

or plainly out of place for the time or setting. See id. For 

instance, we explained that neither a lawyer making an oral 

argument nor a tour guide’s presentation to tourists would 

qualify as disruptive because each is an accepted part of the 

High Court’s operation. Id. But we held that it was disruptive 

for members of the audience during oral argument to interrupt 

the proceedings with speeches and singing. Id. at 1104–05, 

1111. Our Bronstein holding demonstrates that the everyday 

meaning of “disruptive” centers on an action’s tendency, taken 

in context, to interfere with or inhibit usual proceedings. 

B.

Alford argues that “disorderly or disruptive conduct” must 

be given a far more restrictive scope. He contends that the 

statutes reach only “inherently disorderly or disruptive 

conduct” and thus his mere presence in the Capitol on January 

6th cannot qualify. Appellant’s Opening Br. 29. He suggests 

that this interpretation is required to avoid reading the two 

adjectives out of the statute. He observes that § 1752(a)(2) 

already requires the disruptive or disorderly conduct to “in fact, 

impede[] or disrupt[] the orderly conduct of Government 

business” and so it would be redundant to interpret the actus 

reus of “disorderly or disruptive conduct” as focusing on the 

effect of the conduct rather than the nature of the conduct

independent of its effect.

This argument is misplaced for several reasons. To begin 

with, almost no conduct is always and innately disruptive or 

disorderly. Even the most quintessentially disruptive acts, ones 

involving violence and loud noises, are appropriate in some 

circumstances. Screaming is not disruptive at a football game. 

Punching is not disruptive in a boxing ring. Even discharging a 

firearm in a courthouse is not disruptive if done by a security 

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officer to protect the court. See Bronstein, 849 F.3d at 1109. 

Alford provides no touchstone for determining when conduct 

is inherently disruptive or disorderly. 

Nor is it apparent that focusing on the likely effect of an 

action yields surplusage in § 1752(a)(2), as Alford contends. 

An action can have a disruptive effect and yet not succeed in 

hindering a governmental proceeding. For instance, someone 

clicking a pen repeatedly during a Senate hearing may be acting 

disruptively, but if the hearing nonetheless proceeds smoothly,

the clicking will not have “in fact, impede[ed] or disrupt[ed] 

the orderly conduct of Government business.” In that scenario, 

§ 1752(a)(2)’s actus reus and its harm element both carry 

independent meaning even without restricting the actus reus to 

inherently disruptive conduct. 

Finally, to the extent that the statutory elements do overlap 

to some degree, we note that the canon against surplusage is 

only a presumption, one that can be overcome by other 

interpretive considerations. See Bronstein, 849 F.3d at 1110. 

As discussed, “disorderly conduct” is best understood as a term 

of art and courts consistently look to circumstances to 

determine what is disorderly. The Congress uses such terms 

intending to adopt their traditional meaning. See Morissette v. 

United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (“[W]here Congress 

borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal 

tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably 

knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each 

borrowed word.”). To allow a presumption against superfluity 

to displace the most natural reading of the text would be 

inappropriate here.

Alford puts forward one other textual argument for 

narrowing the scope of “disorderly or disruptive conduct” but 

it is also unconvincing. Turning to the text of § 5104(e)(2)(D), 

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he argues that because the statute prohibits “utter[ing] loud, 

threatening, or abusive language, or engag[ing] in disorderly or 

disruptive conduct,” the canons of ejusdem generis and 

noscitur a sociis require limiting “disorderly or disruptive 

conduct” to actions similar to the specified prohibitions. 

Neither canon has application here, however. Ejusdem generis 

is the principle that “when a general term follows a specific 

one, the general term should be understood as a reference to 

subjects akin to the one with specific enumeration.” Ali v. Fed. 

Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 223 (2008) (quotation 

omitted). It typically involves the use of a catchall phrase after 

a list of specific terms, see id. at 223–24, but here there is 

nothing of the kind. The conjunction “or” separating the 

statute’s two prohibitions shows that they are not connected. 

Each stands alone with its own verb and its own objects. 

Nor does noscitur a sociis—a word is known by the 

company it keeps—apply here. This canon “avoid[s] ascribing 

to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its 

accompanying words, thus giving unintended breadth to the 

Acts of Congress.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 543 

(2015) (quotation omitted). But for the canon to apply, the 

group of words must share “a relevant common attribute,” Ali, 

552 U.S. at 225, or “a common feature to extrapolate,” S.D.

Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Env’t Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 380 (2006). 

No such common attribute or feature exists here. The statute 

simply puts two different prohibitions side by side without 

providing the context clues needed to link one to the other

substantively. See id. at 379 (rejecting the argument that, 

without more, “pairing a broad statutory term with a narrow 

one shrinks the broad one”). 

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C.

We must decide whether any rational jury could have 

found that Alford’s conduct on January 6th was “disorderly or 

disruptive.” Under a proper understanding of those terms, as 

discussed above, the answer is yes to both.

A rational jury could conclude that Alford’s actions were 

disruptive because his presence in the Capitol contributed to 

the Congress’s multi-hour delay in completing the electoral 

certification. There was ample evidence for the jury to 

conclude that Alford knowingly entered the Capitol without 

authorization: he walked past numerous “Area Closed” signs, 

stood by as rioters in the building threw open the non-public 

Upper House Door, walked into the Capitol despite a shrill 

security alarm and then passed through a metal detector 

without undergoing any security screening. A police officer 

testified at trial that each unauthorized individual posed a 

security hazard and that the Congress could not resume its 

business until the entire building was cleared and checked for 

threats like lurkers or explosives. Alford’s entry into the 

Capitol—alongside dozens of others—directly contributed to 

the Congress’s need to recess to ensure the safety of its 

members. Indeed, entering the Capitol as part of a crowd rather 

than as a lone individual magnified the disruptiveness of his 

presence. Each additional person, no matter how modestly 

behaved, increased the chaos within the building, the police’s 

difficulty in restoring order and the likelihood of interference 

with the Congress’s work. 

For similar reasons, a rational jury could conclude that 

Alford’s actions were disorderly because, viewed in the context 

of the day’s events, they “tend[ed] to disturb the public peace, 

offend public morals, or undermine safety.” See Black’s Law 

Dictionary at 292. As discussed, Alford’s unauthorized 

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presence in the Capitol as part of large and unruly group 

jeopardized the safety of the Congress as well as the police on 

the scene. It is also clear that the rioters created a widespread 

public disturbance. Alford played a part in that by adding to the 

crowd and by attempting to open the closed half of the door 

through which he entered the Capitol to allow more people 

inside. 

Alford paints himself as a passive observer, and, granted, 

his conduct does not rise to the level of culpability of many of 

his compatriots. But he made a deliberate choice to join the

crowd and enter the Capitol when he was plainly not permitted 

to do so. The jury was not required to view Alford’s actions in 

isolation as though he were the only one at the Capitol that day. 

It was entitled to interpret Alford’s actions in light of the 

circumstances. Those circumstances manifest that there was 

sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

IV.

Alford also argues that the district court abused its 

discretion in sentencing him to twelve months’ imprisonment. 

He contends that his sentence is disproportionate to the 

sentences of other January 6th misdemeanants, who typically 

accepted plea deals and received sentences that ranged from 

probation to a few weeks’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(6) (instructing district courts “to avoid unwarranted 

sentence disparities among defendants with similar records 

who have been found guilty of similar conduct”). His sentence, 

he argues, is more in line with those of defendants convicted of 

felonies and he attributes the disparity to the fact that he 

exercised his right to trial and to the poor fit between the 

“letter” of the Sentencing Guidelines and his actual conduct.

Alford fails to meet the high bar to show an abuse of 

discretion. To begin with, he concedes that his sentence falls 

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within the Guidelines’ recommended range of ten to sixteen 

months. His within-Guidelines sentence is accordingly entitled 

to a “presumption of reasonableness,” meaning that it “will 

almost never be reversed on appeal as substantively 

unreasonable.” United States v. Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089, 

1092 (D.C. Cir. 2008). This is particularly true if the defendant 

“alleges an unwarranted [sentencing] disparity” because the 

Guidelines are designed precisely to prevent disparity. United 

States v. Otunyo, 63 F.4th 948, 960 (D.C. Cir. 2023). Thus, 

“[t]he best way to curtail ‘unwarranted’ disparities is to follow 

the Guidelines, which are designed to treat similar offenses and 

offenders similarly.” Id. (quoting United States v. Bartlett, 567 

F.3d 901, 908 (7th Cir. 2009)). 

Moreover, there are material differences between Alford’s 

situation and the January 6th misdemeanants who received 

lesser sentences. Alford’s decision to exercise his right to trial 

meant that he did not receive a sentencing reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility, as he likely would have had he 

pleaded guilty. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) (providing a two-level

sentencing reduction if the defendant “clearly demonstrates 

acceptance of responsibility for his offense”); United States v. 

Jones, 997 F.2d 1475, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc) (“The 

Guidelines explicitly tell judges that they normally should deny 

the two-point reduction to a defendant who does not plead 

guilty.”). Alford was entitled to put the government to its 

burden of proof, but electing to do so meant foregoing benefits 

that other defendants obtained by striking plea bargains. See 

United States v. Lopesierra-Gutierrez, 708 F.3d 193, 208 (D.C. 

Cir. 2013) (“That some defendants pled guilty while others did 

not provides a perfectly valid basis for a sentencing 

disparity.”); see also United States v. Mejia, 597 F.3d 1329, 

1344 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (affirming a sentence as reasonable 

where the disparity in sentences between two co-defendants 

was “entirely explained” by one defendant receiving an 

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“acceptance-of-responsibility reduction for his having pleaded 

guilty”). 

Alford also received a sentencing enhancement because he 

provided misleading testimony at trial. The district court found 

that his testimony, although falling short of “deliberate 

falsehoods,” was nonetheless “disingenuous” and “not . . . 

entirely candid” or “truthful.” Sentencing Transcript at 38:24–

39:4, Alford, No. 21-cr-0263. Alford “mischaracterized some 

of [his] actions and motivations” in order to downplay his 

culpability.5 Id. at 38:1–2. Accordingly, he received a twolevel sentencing enhancement because he “willfully obstructed 

or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the 

administration of justice with respect to the investigation, 

prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction.”

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Alford conceded below that the

enhancement was proper and he does not contest its application 

on appeal. It was not unreasonable for the district court to 

conclude that Alford warranted a sentence greater than other 

January 6th misdemeanants because he was ineligible for the 

acceptance-of-responsibility reduction and brought upon 

himself the penalty of a two-level enhancement through his 

testimony.6

5 For instance, Alford testified that he traveled to Washington 

D.C. to “enjoy [himself], take some pictures, enjoy some likeminded people.” Trial Transcript at 806:3–4, Alford, No. 21-cr-0263. 

He also claimed not to notice the signs and barricades restricting 

access to the Capitol and claimed not to know that he was not allowed 

inside. Id. at 807:9–808:14, 849:13–15. And he stated that, once in 

the Capitol, he was just “being a sightseer in D.C.” Id. at 821:22.

6 For this reason, we see no indication (contrary to Alford’s 

suggestion) that the district court punished Alford for exercising his 

right to a jury trial. The district court expressly stated that it was “not 

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And even if there were some degree of sentencing 

disparity, that is only one factor among many that district 

courts must balance when sentencing. Section 3553 instructs 

district courts to consider, for example, the circumstances of 

the offense, the characteristics of the defendant, the seriousness 

of the offense, the need for deterrence and the protection of the 

public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). These factors are “vague, 

open-ended, and conflicting,” which is why their balancing is 

left firmly to the discretion of the district court. Gardellini, 545 

F.3d at 1093. Here, the district court conscientiously addressed 

the § 3553 factors and weighed several in Alford’s favor. The 

court credited Alford’s lack of a criminal history and the fact 

that he was neither violent nor destructive. But it also noted 

indicators of Alford’s lack of remorse and the need for further

deterrence. This balancing of competing considerations is 

consistent with our “narrow and deferential” review in this 

area. See id. at 1090. 

In short, we cannot say that the district court’s sentence, 

which was not only within the Guidelines but on the lower end 

of the range, constituted an abuse of discretion. To warrant 

reversal, the district court must clearly overstep its bounds. It 

did not do so here. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (“The fact that the 

appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a 

different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify 

reversal of the district court.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is affirmed.

So ordered.

going to penalize” Alford for going to trial. Sentencing Transcript at 

42:1, Alford, No. 21-cr-0263.

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