Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03085/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03085-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Warren L. Pindell
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 14, 2003 Decided July 25, 2003

No. 01-3085

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

WARREN L. PINDELL,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cr00216-01)

Steven J. McCool, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for appellant.

David B. Goodhand, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Thomas J.

Tourish, Jr., and J. Patrick Rowan, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #01-3085 Document #762792 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 1 of 15
2

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and EDWARDS and

GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: In 1999, defendant Warren Pindell was an officer of the Metropolitan Police Department of

the District of Columbia, working a prostitution detail on

Georgia Avenue, N.W. By 2001, Pindell’s law enforcement

career was over. In March of that year, a federal jury

convicted him of, among other things, depriving thirteen men

of their civil rights by robbing them while they were apparently soliciting the services of prostitutes. The defendant’s

modus operandi was as follows: After a would-be customer

picked up a prostitute in his car, Pindell would follow the pair

to the location where the transaction was to take place. Soon

thereafter, the defendant, dressed in his police uniform, would

approach the driver’s side of the car and question the man,

usually demanding to see some identification. He would then

order the victim out of the car and take his cash. Pindell

often threatened his victims with a gun or billy club, handcuffed them, and went through their jackets and pants pockets searching for additional cash. Several victims reported

that Pindell wrote down their personal information in a small

notebook.

The district court entered judgment against the defendant

on the jury’s verdict and sentenced him to a total of 262

months’ incarceration. Pindell now appeals, contending that

much of the evidence used against him at trial was the fruit of

illegal searches and seizures, and that the district court made

a variety of trial errors. We find all of Pindell’s arguments to

be without merit, and affirm the judgment of the district

court.

I

On December 13, 1999, Victor Zelaya reported to the police

that he had been robbed in the early hours of that day after

picking up a woman on Georgia Avenue. Zelaya told Detective Anthony Paci that he and the woman were interrupted by

a man ‘‘dressed as a police officer,’’ who ordered Zelaya out of

USCA Case #01-3085 Document #762792 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 2 of 15
3

the car, pointed a gun at his head, forced him to kneel, and

took approximately $250 from him. 2/26/01 Tr. at 14. Zelaya

also told Paci that, during the robbery, the assailant had

written down personal information in a ‘‘notebook like the

police use.’’ Id. at 24; see 2/1/01 Tr. at 12.

Two weeks later, on December 28, Osman Dainkeh reported that he had been the victim of a similar robbery the day

before. Dainkeh told Detective Paci that he had picked up a

prostitute on Georgia Avenue, driven a short distance away,

and stopped the car. Soon thereafter, a police officer approached, forced him out of the car at gunpoint, handcuffed

him, and searched his wallet and coat. The officer stole $500,

a white gold chain, Dainkeh’s driver’s license, and his alien

registration card (‘‘green card’’). The prostitute, Wygenia

Jones, provided a description of the robber that Detective

Paci believed matched Pindell; she then picked Pindell’s

picture out of an array of nine photographs. The next

morning, the police showed the earlier victim, Zelaya, a photo

array that included Pindell’s picture, and Zelaya identified the

defendant — with ‘‘a hundred percent’’ certainty — as the

person who had robbed him on December 13. 2/26/01 Tr. at

35–36.

On December 29, 1999, on the basis of Dainkeh’s complaint,

Detective Paci applied for a warrant to search Pindell’s car

for a ‘‘green card and driver’s license [in] the name of Osman

Dainkeh, cash money in the amount of approximately $500, a

white gold chain, a dark blue police uniform, and any other

evidence of a violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 242.’’ Appellant’s

App. at Tab 8, Tab 11. In support of the warrant, Paci

submitted an affidavit that set forth the details of the Dainkeh robbery. A U.S. Magistrate Judge in the District of

Columbia issued the requested warrant, and Paci proceeded

to execute it that afternoon. While doing so, the detective

noticed a notebook on the back seat of Pindell’s car, lying

next to a police uniform. The notebook was similar in size to

those used by D.C. police officers, and its exposed front page

was inscribed with Pindell’s name and the date ‘‘11-12-99.’’

Paci seized the notebook, and detectives later used the information it contained to connect Pindell to the Dainkeh robUSCA Case #01-3085 Document #762792 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 3 of 15
4

bery, to locate other victims, and to link Pindell to additional

crimes.

Also on December 29, Detective Elbert Griffin applied to a

U.S. Magistrate Judge in Maryland for a warrant to search

Pindell’s home. That application listed the same items specified in the car warrant, and was based on a nearly identical

affidavit. The magistrate authorized the warrant. Prior to

the search, Detective Paci briefed Detectives Griffin and

Pamela Williams regarding the relevance of certain items

including, in particular, jewelry, identification cards, and notebooks. With regard to the latter, Paci advised the detectives

that a victim had reported seeing Pindell taking notes in a

notebook during the December 13 robbery, and that victims’

names might therefore be written in such notebooks.

Inside a plastic garbage bag in Pindell’s basement, Detective Williams found several small notebooks that were large

enough to conceal a driver’s license or currency, and that she

regarded as of the type typically used by police. She flipped

through the notebooks and, after discovering that they contained personal information including names, dates, phone

numbers, and addresses, she seized them. Meanwhile, Detective Griffin searched another part of Pindell’s basement,

where he located a backpack that he examined for the items

listed in the warrant. Inside the pack, Griffin discovered a

partially completed Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)

Form 251 that described the ‘‘stop and frisk’’ of an individual

named Joe Wicks. 2/20/01 Tr. at 33. Griffin seized the form

because the event described was ‘‘similar’’ to the robbery

recounted in the affidavit. Id. at 36.

After concluding these searches, the detectives continued

their investigation into Pindell’s activities. They ultimately

discovered a total of fourteen robberies. The fourteenth

victim, an MPD auditor named Joseph Wicks, identified the

defendant as the man who, dressed in a police uniform with a

name tag marked ‘‘Pindell,’’ had interrupted Wicks and a

woman in a car off Georgia Avenue. Pindell ordered Wicks

out of the car, put a gun to his head, and pulled the trigger —

producing a ‘‘loud click.’’ 2/28/01 Tr. at 130. Wicks resisted

USCA Case #01-3085 Document #762792 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 4 of 15
5

Pindell’s efforts to handcuff him, and the defendant finally

called for police assistance. 2/28/01 Tr. at 125. When other

officers arrived, they let Wicks go.

On July 11, 2000, a grand jury issued a superceding indictment, charging Pindell with thirteen counts of depriving

individuals of their civil rights while armed, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 242; thirteen counts of armed robbery, in violation

of D.C. CODE §§ 22-2901 and 22-3202; and one count of

assaulting Joseph Wicks with a dangerous weapon, in violation of D.C. CODE § 22-502. The district court denied Pindell’s motion to suppress the items seized from his car and

home as well as evidence derived from those items. The case

proceeded to trial, at which all of Pindell’s victims — as well

as several prostitutes and his former girlfriend — testified

against him. The government also introduced into evidence

the notebooks and MPD form that the police had seized from

Pindell’s basement and car. Inside the notebooks were personal details regarding all thirteen of the victims named in

the civil rights counts.

Pindell took the stand in his own defense, testifying that,

although he had stopped each of the victims for engaging in

prostitution, he had never robbed any of them. He also

proffered two witnesses who testified that a man named

‘‘Boo’’ Farrow had been robbing prostitutes’ customers during the same period. The jury convicted Pindell on all

counts, with the exception of one of the civil rights counts, as

to which it found Pindell guilty of a lesser included charge.

We address Pindell’s appeal of the denial of his motion to

suppress evidence in Part II. In Part III, we consider the

defendant’s claim that the district court committed a number

of trial errors.

II

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we examine the district court’s legal conclusions de novo, but apply a

‘‘clearly erroneous’’ standard to its underlying findings of fact.

See United States v. Hill, 131 F.3d 1056, 1059 n.2 (D.C. Cir.

1997); United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551, 1553 (D.C. Cir.

1993).

USCA Case #01-3085 Document #762792 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 5 of 15
6

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides that

‘‘no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported

by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place

to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.’’ U.S.

CONST. amend. IV. The Amendment’s particularity requirement effectively prohibits the issuance of ‘‘general warrants.’’

Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 478, 480 (1976). Pindell

contends that the warrants issued in this case violated the

particularity requirement because of the catch-all phrase that

came at the end of each warrant’s list of specific items to be

seized:

[A] green card and driver’s license [in] the name of

Osman Dainkeh, cash money in the amount of approximately $500, a white gold chain, a dark blue police

uniform, and any other evidence of a violation of Title 18

U.S.C. § 242.

Appellant’s App. at Tab 8, Tab 11 (emphasis added). Pindell

argues that the phrase ‘‘any other evidence of a violation of

Title 18 U.S.C. § 242’’1

 is simply too broad to be regarded as

‘‘particularly describing the TTT things to be seized.’’ U.S.

CONST. amend. IV.

We have no doubt that had the warrants merely authorized

the seizure of ‘‘evidence of a violation of Title 18 U.S.C.

§ 242,’’ they would indeed have been impermissibly broad.

But that phrase did not stand alone, and instead came in the

same sentence as, and at the conclusion of, a quite specific list

of items to be seized. That list constrained the interpretation

of the last phrase, making it reasonably clear that the warrants did not authorize the seizure of evidence of just any

violation of § 242, but rather of evidence relating to such a

violation in connection with Osman Dainkeh.

The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Andresen v. Maryland. There, at the end of a long list of specifically described documents concerning a particular fraudulent

real estate scheme, the warrant added the phrase ‘‘together

1 Title 18 U.S.C. § 242 makes it a crime to willfully deprive a

person of his legal or constitutional rights under color of law.

USCA Case #01-3085 Document #762792 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 6 of 15
7

with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at

this [time] unknown.’’ Andresen, 427 U.S. at 479. The Court

noted that the catch-all phrase was ‘‘not a separate sentence,’’

but instead appeared at the end of a list of specific items. It

concluded that the term ‘‘crime’’ in the catch-all phrase had to

be read in the context of the preceding items, and that, when

so read, the phrase clearly referred to other evidence of that

particular scheme. Id. at 480–82. On the basis of this

reading, the Court held that the warrant was not impermissibly general. Id. at 481–82.

Andresen is not completely on all fours with Pindell’s case,

because the seizure list in Andresen was preceded by an

introductory clause that described the listed items as ‘‘pertaining to’’ the sale of a particular real estate lot. See id. at

480 n.10. In Pindell’s case, by contrast, the relationship

between the items listed and the robbery of Osman Dainkeh

must be inferred from the fact that Dainkeh’s green card and

driver’s license were among the listed items. Nonetheless,

Andresen establishes the principle that a warrant’s catch-all

phrase must be read in light of the items that precede it, a

principle further supported by the canon of construction

known as ejusdem generis (‘‘of the same kind or class’’). See

Washington State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 123 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2003) (describing ejusdem generis as an ‘‘established interpretative canon[ ]’’ dictating that ‘‘where general words follow specific

words TTT, the general words are construed to embrace only

objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the

preceding specific words’’ (alterations omitted)). Reading the

Pindell warrants in accordance with that principle, we conclude that they were sufficiently particular to satisfy the

strictures of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v.

Young, 745 F.2d 733, 758–59 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding a warrant

sufficiently particular despite ‘‘boilerplate language’’ authorizing the seizure of any ‘‘other evidence’’ of a drug conspiracy,

because that language ‘‘followed a list of more specific items

to be seized, and could be construed only in conjunction with

that list’’); United States v. Thompson, 495 F.2d 165, 170

(D.C. Cir. 1974) (construing the term ‘‘records’’ in the context

USCA Case #01-3085 Document #762792 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 7 of 15
8

of other items listed for seizure in order to avert ‘‘raising the

specter of a ‘general warrant’ ’’).2

Because the warrants were valid, the seizures of the notebooks and MPD form were lawful if those items were within

the category of ‘‘any other evidence of a violation of Title 18

U.S.C. § 242’’ relating to Osman Dainkeh. We pretermit

discussion of this issue, however, because the parties do not

address it. Instead, the parties dispute a related ground for

validation of the seizures, the so-called ‘‘plain view’’ doctrine.

In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court held

that when the police have a valid warrant ‘‘to search a given

area for specified objects, and in the course of the search

come across some other article of incriminating character,’’

they may seize it if it is ‘‘immediately apparent to the police

that they have evidence before themTTTT’’ 403 U.S. 443, 465–

66 (1971); see Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 374–76

(1993); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134–37 (1990). As

just discussed, the warrants issued in this case were valid,

and the police were therefore lawfully inside Pindell’s house

2 Each warrant’s catch-all phrase would also be effectively constrained if it were construed by reference to the attached affidavit.

Although there is no dispute that the affidavit was presented to

each magistrate and attached to each warrant, Pindell contends that

we may not use it to limit the warrant because the only mention of

the affidavit on the warrant’s face was in preprinted ‘‘boilerplate.’’

In support, he cites United States v. Maxwell, in which this circuit

held that ‘‘in order for an affidavit to be viewed as limiting the

scope of a warrant, the warrant must TTT contain ‘suitable words of

reference’ evidencing the magistrate’s explicit intention to incorporate the affidavit,’’ and that preprinted language like that used here

is insufficient. 920 F.2d 1028, 1032–33 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The

government concedes that Maxwell is indistinguishable from this

case, and that this panel is without authority to overturn that prior

decision. Appellee’s Br. at 27 n.7; see United States v. Kanchanalak, 192 F.3d 1037, 1038 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Thus, although at

least one court has taken a path different from that of Maxwell, see

United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1116–17 (2d Cir. 1993), we

cannot rely on the affidavit to constrain the language of the

warrants.

USCA Case #01-3085 Document #762792 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 8 of 15
9

and car when they conducted their searches. Pindell disputes

the applicability of the plain view doctrine, however, on the

ground that it was not ‘‘immediately apparent to the police

that they ha[d] evidence before them’’ when they came upon

the notebooks and MPD form. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466.3

The meaning of the ‘‘immediately apparent’’ requirement

has been the subject of some debate within the Supreme

Court. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741 (1983) (plurality opinion) (‘‘[T]he use of the phrase ‘immediately apparent’

was very likely an unhappy choice of words, since it can be

taken to imply that an unduly high degree of certainty as to

the incriminatory character of evidence is necessary for an

application of the ‘plain view’ doctrine.’’). Disputes over its

meaning arise primarily in cases in which the police have had

to conduct additional examinations in order to determine the

import of an object. See Horton, 496 U.S. at 136–137;

United States v. Garces, 133 F.3d 70, 75–76 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

It is clear that the requirement is satisfied, however, where

the officers had ‘‘probable cause’’ to believe that an item was

incriminating ‘‘without the benefit of information from any

unlawful search or seizure.’’ Garces, 133 F.3d at 75.4

 And

because the touchstone is probable cause, see United States v.

Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that

‘‘the incriminating nature’’ of an item was ‘‘immediately apparent’’ where ‘‘the police officers had probable cause to

3 Pindell also contends that the plain view doctrine is inapplicable

because the warrant applications did not list the notebooks even

though the police knew of their relevance at the time they sought

the warrants. Such a claim, however, is foreclosed by the Supreme

Court’s decision in Horton v. California. See 496 U.S. at 138–42

(upholding the seizure of weapons used in an armed robbery,

notwithstanding that, although the officer expected to find the

weapons, his warrant application only listed the proceeds); see also

United States v. Hill, 19 F.3d 984, 989 (5th Cir. 1994).

4 See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375 (indicating that the ‘‘immediately

apparent’’ requirement is satisfied if the police have ‘‘probable cause

to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without

conducting some further search of the object’’).

USCA Case #01-3085 Document #762792 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 9 of 15
10

believe that [it] contained evidence of a crime’’),5

 a ‘‘seizing

officer need not ‘know’ or have an ‘unduly high degree of

certainty’ as to the incriminatory character of the evidence

under the plain view doctrine.’’ United States v. CastorenaJaime, 285 F.3d 916, 924 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Brown, 460

U.S. at 741). To the contrary, ‘‘[a]ll that is required is a

‘practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence

is involved.’ ’’ Id. (quoting Brown, 460 U.S. at 742).6

Pindell argues that the detectives lacked probable cause to

believe that the notebooks and MPD form constituted or

contained evidence of a crime. He points out that the officers

did not see the names of Dainkeh or Zelaya inscribed in the

notebooks or on the form, and that they did not yet know that

many of the other names contained in the documents were

those of victims of similar crimes. But such certainty was not

required. At the time he conducted the search of Pindell’s

car, Detective Paci had already interviewed Zelaya, who had

told him that Pindell had been dressed as a police officer and

had recorded personal information in a notebook. When Paci

found a notebook lying next to a police uniform in Pindell’s

car, he had probable cause to believe that it was the same

notebook that Pindell had used to record that information just

two weeks before.7

 At a minimum, he had probable cause to

5 See also Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 69 (1992) (holding

that a seizure was lawful under the plain view doctrine where there

was ‘‘probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity’’); Brown, 460 U.S. at 733, 742–43 (holding that the criminality of

a knotted, opaque ‘‘party balloon’’ found in plain view during a

traffic stop was ‘‘immediately apparent’’ because the officer had

probable cause to believe that the balloon contained an illegal

substance).

6 See United States v. Jones, 187 F.3d 210, 220 (1st Cir. 1999);

United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 724 (10th Cir. 1992); United

States v. Rutkowski, 877 F.2d 139, 142–43 (1st Cir. 1989).

7 See United States v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019, 1032 (4th Cir. 1985)

(holding that the seizure of a notebook containing names, numbers,

and figures during the execution of a warrant for marijuana was

justified by the plain view exception in light of the officer’s knowledge ‘‘that drug dealers customarily kept records of their drug

USCA Case #01-3085 Document #762792 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 10 of 15
11

believe that the notebook could have evidentiary value because it might contain a chronology of Pindell’s daily whereabouts.

Moreover, because it was by then clear to Detective Paci

that Pindell had committed at least one other similar robbery,

it was also reasonable for him to believe that the notebook

might include information regarding other crimes that could

be relevant in proving the offenses already under investigation. Indeed, in Andresen, where the Supreme Court sustained a warrant on the ground that it sought evidence

relating to the fraudulent transfer of a particular piece of real

estate, the Court also upheld the seizure of documents pertaining to other lots on the ground that the investigators

‘‘reasonably could have believed that the evidence specifically

dealing with another lot TTT could be used to show [the

defendant’s] intent with respect to’’ the specified lot. 427

U.S. at 483. As we discuss in Part III, evidence of other

robberies would likewise have been admissible at a trial for

the robbery of Zelaya or Dainkeh alone, pursuant to Federal

Rule of Evidence 404(b).

For the same reason, we conclude that Detectives Griffin

and Williams had probable cause to seize the notebooks and

MPD form that they discovered in Pindell’s house. The

detectives had been briefed by Detective Paci regarding the

particulars of the Zelaya and Dainkeh robberies, including

the fact that Pindell had used a notebook to record personal

information during the former crime. When Detective

Williams flipped through the notebooks to see whether they

contained the currency and identification cards specified in

dealings’’); United States v. Hillyard, 677 F.2d 1336, 1341–42 (9th

Cir. 1982) (holding that police investigating a scheme to transport

stolen vehicles and alter their identification numbers could seize a

notebook and logbooks found in plain view in a stolen truck, because

‘‘it was reasonable for the officers to suspect’’ that they ‘‘contained

relevant entries in TTT regard’’ to the scheme); see also Hill, 19

F.3d at 989 (holding that ‘‘[a]s soon as the agents saw the check

stubs, they were justified in believing that they were useful as

evidence of a money structuring offense,’’ even ‘‘without removing

the rubber bands and inspecting the stubs individually’’).

USCA Case #01-3085 Document #762792 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 11 of 15
12

the warrant,8

 she discovered names, dates, addresses, and

other personal details. At that point, she had probable cause

to believe that the information contained therein might constitute evidence of crimes similar to those she was investigating.

The same was true of the incident description visible on the

face of the MPD form discovered by Detective Griffin. We

therefore conclude that the district court properly denied the

motion to suppress because the seizures were lawful under

the plain view doctrine.

III

In addition to pressing his Fourth Amendment claim, Pindell asks that we consider three claims of trial error. We do

so only briefly, because we perceive little merit in them.

First, Pindell contends that the court erred by admitting

two kinds of ‘‘other crimes’’ evidence pursuant to Federal

Rule of Evidence 404(b). Although Rule 404(b) bars the

admission of evidence ‘‘of other crimes, wrongs, or acts TTT to

prove the character of a person in order to show action in

conformity therewith,’’ it permits the admission of such evidence ‘‘for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence

of mistake or accident.’’ FED. R. EVID. 404(b). We review a

claim that a district court improperly admitted evidence

under Rule 404(b) solely to determine whether the court

abused its discretion. See United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d

923, 926–27 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

Prior to trial, the government sought and received the

district court’s permission to introduce testimony from two

prostitutes — each of whom witnessed a robbery charged in

the indictment — that Pindell had previously paid them to

engage in sexual acts. The government offered this evidence

because it showed the prostitutes’ familiarity with Pindell,

8 Pindell does not contend that this action constituted an unlawful

search. See United States v. Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 1069–70 (7th

Cir. 1990) (holding that under a warrant for seizure of cocaine,

police were authorized to search through notebooks or any other

items in which drugs might be concealed).

USCA Case #01-3085 Document #762792 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 12 of 15
13

and hence ‘‘their ability to identify’’ him. 12/20/00 Tr. at 481.

Pindell’s identity as the uniformed robber was plainly at issue

in the trial, and particularly so because Pindell proffered

defense witnesses who testified that a man named ‘‘Boo’’

Farrow had been robbing prostitutes’ customers during the

relevant period — implying that the prosecution witnesses

had mistaken Farrow for Pindell. Since Rule 404(b) expressly permits the admission of ‘‘other crimes’’ evidence to prove

identity, the district court did not err in admitting the testimony. See Washington, 12 F.3d at 1134–35.

The government also informed Pindell before trial that it

intended to introduce testimony by his former girlfriend that,

on May 10, 1999, Pindell had told her that he had been

robbing prostitutes’ customers, and that he would hurt her if

she told anyone. Because it was unclear whether this statement related to the particular robberies with which Pindell

was charged, the government offered the testimony as ‘‘other

crimes’’ evidence under Rule 404(b). The district court properly admitted the statement pursuant to that rule for the

purpose of proving Pindell’s intent to rob the prostitutes’

customers and to rebut the suggestion that he was present at

the scene of the robberies by mistake or accident. See Old

Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997); United

States v. Long, 328 F.3d 655, 661–62 (D.C. Cir. 2003); United

States v. Crowder, 141 F.3d 1202, 1208–09 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en

banc); United States v. Latney, 108 F.3d 1446, 1448 (D.C.

Cir. 1997).9

Second, Pindell contends that the district court erred by

denying his motion to sever the charges against him into (at

9 We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in determining, under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, that

the probative value of the Rule 404(b) evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Crowder, 141

F.3d at 1210. That conclusion is further supported by the fact that

the district court took ‘‘caution to guard the space between the

permissible and impermissible inferences by instructing the jury to

consider the evidence only for its proper purpose.’’ United States

v. Mitchell, 49 F.3d 769, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

USCA Case #01-3085 Document #762792 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 13 of 15
14

least) thirteen separate cases, one for each of the robberies.

See 2/20/01 Tr. at 79–80 (requesting that ‘‘all robbery counts

be severed from one another’’); FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 (‘‘If the

joinder of offenses TTT in an indictment TTT appears to

prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may

order separate trials of counts TTT or provide any other relief

that justice requires.’’). In United States v. Levi, we held

that ‘‘[t]he decision of a district court to deny a defendant’s

motion to sever offenses may generally be reversed only upon

a finding of clear prejudice and abuse of discretion,’’ and that

a ‘‘finding of prejudice is logically precluded if, had the counts

been tried separately, the evidence concerning each count

would have been admissible in the trial on each other count.’’

45 F.3d 453, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks

omitted). In Levi, we found that ‘‘the modus operandi in all

of the [nine charged] robberies was strikingly similar — the

perpetrator used similar notes, made similar statements and

gestures, wore similar clothing, and robbed banks TTT in the

same general area of the city.’’ Id. Because the ‘‘evidence

concerning all of the robberies would surely have been admissible in the trial for each of the other robberies,’’ we concluded that ‘‘there was no prejudice, and the district court did not

abuse its discretion in denying’’ severance. Id. at 455–56

(citing FED. R. EVID. 404(b)).

Levi is indistinguishable from this case. Indeed, Pindell’s

is virtually a textbook case for the application of Rule 404(b),

because in each of the robberies charged, the assailant employed virtually the same modus operandi: each robbery

occurred within blocks of Georgia Avenue, and all within the

same nine-month period; each victim had just picked up a

prostitute; in each instance the assailant was dressed as a

police officer; in each case the robber silently walked up to

the victim’s car, ordered him to get out, and took his cash;

and, after each offense, the robber let both the victim and the

woman go. The evidence of each robbery would thus have

been admissible under Rule 404(b) in the trial of each of the

others, and the defendant therefore suffered no prejudice

from their joinder.

USCA Case #01-3085 Document #762792 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 14 of 15
15

Finally, Pindell challenges an in-court identification of him

made by victim George Bashonga. Pindell alleges that the

identification was the product of an impermissibly suggestive

out-of-court lineup that followed (by several months) Bashonga’s review of a photo array. We have examined both the

photo array and a videotape of the lineup, and find nothing

impermissibly suggestive about either one. See Washington,

12 F.3d at 1134. In particular, we reject Pindell’s contention

that the lineup was suggestive because he was assigned the

same ‘‘number’’ in the lineup as in the photo array. In fact,

the photographs in the array were not numbered at all, and

their arrangement — three lines of three photos each, as

compared to the lineup’s single line of eight men — was such

as to make the designation of an individual’s ‘‘number’’ in the

photo array indeterminate. We therefore find no merit in

Pindell’s objection to his identification by Bashonga.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there was no

error in any of the challenged decisions of the district court.

The judgment of that court is therefore

Affirmed.

USCA Case #01-3085 Document #762792 Filed: 07/25/2003 Page 15 of 15