Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10152/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10152-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shawn Rice
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SHAWN RICE, AKA Shawn Talbot

Rice,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-10152

D.C. No.

2:09-cr-00078-

JCM-GWF-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SHAWN RICE, AKA Shawn Talbot

Rice,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-10186

D.C. No.

2:10-cr-00520-

JCM-GWF-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 9, 2014*

San Francisco, California

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

 Case: 13-10152, 01/22/2015, ID: 9391144, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 1 of 12
2 UNITED STATES V. RICE

Filed January 22, 2015

Before: Carlos T. Bea, Sandra S. Ikuta,

and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Hurwitz

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed convictions for conspiracy, money

laundering, and failure to appear, but vacated the sentence

and remanded for resentencingand recalculation ofrestitution

and forfeiture.

The panel held that although the district court should have

acted more promptly in granting the defendant’s request to

appear pro se, the district court did not violate the defendant’s

Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. 

The panel held that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment

rights were not violated at a March 6, 2009, initial appearance

and arraignment on the conspiracy and money laundering

charges, which proceeded precisely as if the defendant were

representing himself with the assistance of standby counsel.

The panel wrote that even assuming that some delay in

addressing the defendant’s March 6 self-representation

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 13-10152, 01/22/2015, ID: 9391144, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 2 of 12
UNITED STATES V. RICE 3

request can be attributed to the defendant’s failure to appear

for a pretrial conference, the district court, which did not

conduct a Faretta hearing until July 28, 2009, and in the

interim struck a dozen pretrial motions because they were not

filed by counsel, should have taken up the self-representation

request more expeditiously.

The panel held that the district court’s actions during the

July 28 initial appearance and arraignment on the failure-toappear charges ensured that there was no constitutional

violation. The panel explained that the district court, when

granting the defendant’s request to proceed pro se, placed the

defendant in the same situation on July 28 as would have

obtained had his Faretta motion been granted on March 6 by

inviting him to refile all motions, extending the time to file

motions to a date to which the defendant stipulated, and

giving him more time to prepare for trial than he would have

had otherwise.

The panel found no violation of the defendant’s statutory

right to a speedy trial.

In light of the government’s concession that the district

court improperly based the sentence, restitution, and

forfeiture on a loss amount that included money laundered

before the defendant joined the conspiracy, the panel

remanded for resentencing and recalculation.

 Case: 13-10152, 01/22/2015, ID: 9391144, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 3 of 12
4 UNITED STATES V. RICE

COUNSEL

William H. Gamage, Gamage & Gamage, Las Vegas,

Nevada, for Defendant-Appellant.

Daniel G. Bogden, United States Attorney, Elizabeth O.

White, Appellate Chief, Adam Flake, Assistant United States

Attorney, Las Vegas, Nevada, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

HURWITZ, Circuit Judge:

The central question in this appeal is whether the district

court denied Shawn Rice his Sixth Amendment right to selfrepresentation. Although the district court should have acted

more promptly in grantingRice’s request to appear pro se, we

find no constitutional violation. We also reject Rice’s

argument that the district court failed to comply with the

Speedy Trial Act. We therefore affirm Rice’s convictions. 

However, because the government concedes error in

sentencing and in calculating restitution and forfeiture, we

vacate Rice’s sentence and remand for further proceedings.

I.

On March 3, 2009, Shawn Rice was indicted in the

District of Nevada for conspiracy to commit money

laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) and money

laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(A). Rice’s

initial appearance and arraignment were on March 6, 2009. 

During that proceeding, Rice and the magistrate judge

engaged in the following colloquy:

 Case: 13-10152, 01/22/2015, ID: 9391144, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 4 of 12
UNITED STATES V. RICE 5

THE COURT: All right. All right, now, with

regard to Mr. Rice. Mr. Rice, do you have

money for a lawyer?

DEFENDANT RICE: Your Honor, I’m a

full-time rabbi, so no I don’t have money for

a lawyer, nor will I be hiring one.

THE COURT: Nor will you be hiring one?

DEFENDANT RICE: That’s correct. If Mr.

Kimbrell [the federal public defender assigned

to the initial appearance] wants to assist

today, he seems like a great guy and doing a

great job here, but other than that, after this, if

he wants to – if you want to assign him as

standby counsel, that’s fine with me, but other

than that I’ll be –

THE COURT: All right. Well, that –

DEFENDANT RICE: – representing myself.

THE COURT: – that determination will also

be made at another time. We don’t have time

today to go into all of that.

Did you sign this financial affidavit today?

DEFENDANT RICE: I can’t read it from

here, but I assume that –

THE COURT: All right. This is the affidavit

that Mr. Kimbrell –

 Case: 13-10152, 01/22/2015, ID: 9391144, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 5 of 12
6 UNITED STATES V. RICE

MR. KIMBRELL: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: – was using and wrote on this

form when he asked you a number of

questions about your financial circumstances.

MR. KIMBRELL: Yes, I just informed him,

I recognize the form as the one that I did

provide him. I can –

THE COURT: All right. So when you

answered Mr.Kimbrell’s questions about your

financial situation, did you answer him

truthfully and completely?

DEFENDANT RICE: Yes.

THE COURT: Very well.

Now based on the affidavit that I have here, it

appears that you do not have the financial

wherewithal to retain an attorney.

Now I recognize you indicated that you would

like to represent yourself and that

determination as Isay will be made at another

time.

But based on this affidavit, the Court will

appoint Michael Kimbrell to represent you at

this time, at least for today’s purposes, and

until such time as the Court makes a

determination as to whether or not you should

be allowed to represent yourself.

 Case: 13-10152, 01/22/2015, ID: 9391144, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 6 of 12
UNITED STATES V. RICE 7

Rice then pleaded not guilty and addressed the court at length

regarding pre-trial release. Kimbrell also made a presentation

regardingRice’s bail status, and the magistrate judge released

Rice on his own recognizance pending trial on May 14, 2009.

On June 22, 2009, the court issued a bench warrant for

Rice’s arrest because he failed to appear for a pretrial status

conference. On July 28, 2009, during Rice’s initial

appearance on the bench warrant, the magistrate judge

conducted a hearing and granted Rice’s request for selfrepresentation. Before then, Rice had filed 12 pretrial

motions pro se. The district court had stricken these motions,

citing District of Nevada Local Rule IA 10-6, which prohibits

pro se filings by represented parties. After granting Rice’s

request to represent himself, the court invited Rice to refile

the motions, and the parties stipulated to extend the deadline

to do so. Rice represented himself throughout the balance of

the proceedings in the district court and refiled several, but

not all, of his previous motions.

After Rice once again failed to appear for a pretrial

hearing, calendar call, and trial, he was indicted on four

counts of failure to appear. He was arrested and returned to

Nevada, and the charges then pending—one conspiracy

charge, 13 money laundering charges, and four failure to

appear charges—were consolidated for trial.

Rice represented himself at a two-day bench trial. The

court found him guilty on all counts and sentenced him to 98

months incarceration. The court also ordered restitution of

$95,782 and forfeiture of $1,290,000. This appeal followed.

 Case: 13-10152, 01/22/2015, ID: 9391144, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 7 of 12
8 UNITED STATES V. RICE

II.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the

Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” In Faretta v.

California, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth

Amendment right to counsel encompasses the right to selfrepresentation. 422 U.S. 806, 819–20 (1975). Rice argues

that he was denied the right to self-representation between

March 6, 2009, the date of his initial appearance and

arraignment, and July 28, 2009, when the court granted his

Faretta motion.

We start from the premise that the right to counsel applies

at all critical stages of prosecution. See Marshall v. Rodgers,

133 S. Ct. 1446, 1449 (2013); Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77,

80–81 (2004). And, we assume that the right to selfrepresentation applies to all proceedings to which the right to

counsel applies. See United States v. Gerritsen, 571 F.3d

1001, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A defendant therefore has two

correlative and mutually exclusive Sixth Amendment rights:

the right to have counsel, on one hand, and the right to refuse

counsel and represent himself, on the other.”); see also Tovar,

541 U.S. at 87–88 (applying Faretta analysis to a defendant’s

uncounseled guilty plea because a “plea hearing qualifies as

a ‘critical stage’”). We also recognize that “the right to

counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment applies at the

first appearance before a judicial officer at which a defendant

is told of the formal accusation against him and restrictions

are imposed on his liberty.” Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty.,

554 U.S. 191, 194 (2008).

But, we nonetheless conclude that Rice’s Sixth

Amendment rights were not violated at the March 6, 2009

 Case: 13-10152, 01/22/2015, ID: 9391144, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 8 of 12
UNITED STATES V. RICE 9

initial appearance and arraignment. Although the magistrate

judge deferred ruling on Rice’s self-representation request,

the initial appearance and arraignment proceeded precisely as

if Rice were representing himself with the assistance of

standby counsel. Rice entered his own plea of not guilty and

expressly consented to the participation of “standby counsel.”

The magistrate judge allowed Rice to argue at length about

release terms, and counsel simply added a few points of

support. Rice was therefore not deprived of “control over his

own defense.” McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 182

(1984) (“Participation by counsel with a pro se defendant’s

express approval is . . . constitutionally unobjectionable.”).1

What occurred thereafter was more problematic. “Once

a defendant makes an unequivocal request to proceed pro se,

the court must hold a hearing—commonly known as a

Faretta hearing—to determine whether the defendant is

knowingly and intelligently forgoing his right to appointed

counsel.” United States v. Farias, 618 F.3d 1049, 1051–52

(9th Cir. 2010). Although Rice clearly requested to represent

himself on March 6, the district court did not conduct the

Faretta hearing until July 28, and in the interim struck a

dozen pretrial motions because they were not filed by

counsel. Even assuming that some delay in addressing the

issue can be attributed to Rice’s failure to appear for the

pretrial conference, the district court should have taken up the

self-representation request more expeditiously. See

Raulerson v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 966, 970 (1984)

(Marshall, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari)

(“[O]nce a defendant affirmatively states his desire to

proceed pro se, a court should cease other business and make

1 Moreover, the magistrate judge did precisely what Rice personally

requested—he released him on his own recognizance.

 Case: 13-10152, 01/22/2015, ID: 9391144, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 9 of 12
10 UNITED STATES V. RICE

the required inquiry. . . . Delay in holding a hearing after the

right is unequivocally asserted undermines that right by

forcing the accused to proceed with counsel in whom he has

no confidence and whom he may distrust.”); Buhl v. Cooksey,

233 F.3d 783, 794 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Once Buhl properly

asserted his right to proceed pro se the trial court was

obligated to undertake an appropriate inquiry under Faretta

. . . .”); Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607, 612 (5th Cir.

1982) (en banc) (stating that a trial court may not “unduly

defer a ruling on a firm request by defendant to represent

himself”); see also McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 174 (noting that

a defendant’s right to self-representation “plainly

encompasses” the right “to make motions”).

Rice contends that the delay in taking up his selfrepresentation request and the striking of his motions violated

the Sixth Amendment and resulted in structural error. The

Supreme Court has found denial of the right of selfrepresentation to be structural error because it deprives a

defendant “a fair chance to present his case in his own way,”

McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177 & n.8, thus undermining “the

fairness of a criminal proceeding as a whole,” United States

v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2149 (2013).

But, we find no Sixth Amendment violation in this record

as a whole. The district court’s actions during the July 28

initial appearance and arraignment on the failure-to-appear

charges ensured that there was no constitutional violation. 

When the court granted Rice’s request to proceed pro se, it

invited him to refile all motions and extended the time to file

motions to a date to which Rice stipulated, some three months

away. And, trial was set for February 22, 2010; Rice thus had

more time to prepare for trial than if his motion had been

 Case: 13-10152, 01/22/2015, ID: 9391144, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 10 of 12
UNITED STATES V. RICE 11

granted at the original March 6 initial appearance and

arraignment.

In short, the district court reset the game clock on July 28,

placingRice in the same situation as would have obtained had

the magistrate judge granted the Faretta motion at the March

6 appearance and arraignment. Rice thus received precisely

what the Sixth Amendment guarantees, “a fair chance to

present his case in his own way.” McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177. 

Because there was no Sixth Amendment violation, there was

no structural error. See Carroll v. Daugherty, 764 F.3d 786,

789–90 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding no structural error when the

alleged error “has already been corrected” by the trial court);

United States v. Lee, 760 F.3d 692, 695 (7th Cir. 2014)

(holding that denial of a defendant’s right to represent himself

at a pre-trial suppression hearing was cured by remanding for

a “re-do” of the hearing).

III.

We also find no violation of Rice’s statutory right to a

speedy trial. The Speedy Trial Act requires trial to

“commence within seventy days from the filing date . . . of

the information or indictment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). If a

defendant is absent on the trial date and a “subsequent

appearance before the court on a bench warrant or other

process . . . occurs more than 21 days after the day set for

trial,” the 70-day clock begins to run anew at the subsequent

appearance. Id. § 3161(k)(1).

Rice failed to appear for his original trial date. His next

appearance before the district court was on January 19, 2012. 

See id. Rice’s trial began 186 days later on July 23, 2012. Of

that period, 132 days were excluded because Rice stipulated

 Case: 13-10152, 01/22/2015, ID: 9391144, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 11 of 12
12 UNITED STATES V. RICE

to continue the trial from March 13 to July 23, 2012. Thus,

Rice’s trial began 54 non-excludable days after his January

19, 2012 appearance, well within the 70-day statutory limit.

IV.

“[I]n the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity . . .

acts and omissions . . . that were part of the same course of

conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of

conviction” are included in the calculation of a defendant’s

base offense level. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)–(2). However,

“[a] defendant’s relevant conduct does not include the

conduct of members of a conspiracy prior to the defendant

joining the conspiracy, even if the defendant knows of that

conduct.” Id. § 1B1.3, cmt. 2. The government concedes that

the sentence, restitution, and forfeiture imposed bythe district

court were based on a loss amount that included money

laundered before Rice joined the conspiracy. In light of this

concession, we remand for resentencing and recalculation of

restitution and forfeiture.

V.

For the reasons above, we AFFIRM Rice’s conviction,

but VACATE his sentence, and REMAND to the district

court for resentencing and recalculation of restitution and

forfeiture.

 Case: 13-10152, 01/22/2015, ID: 9391144, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 12 of 12