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Parties Involved:
Larry L. Rogers
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

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Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

LARRY L. RCGERS, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

ORDER 

Filed February 12, 1991 

No. 89-3217 

Before McKAY, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and COOK,* District Judge. 

* The Honorable H. Dale Cook, Chief Judge, United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Upon consideration of appellant's petition for rehearing, the 

court grants rehearing limited to the severance issue. Further, the 

court is filing an opinion on rehearing today. 

Entered for the Court 

Appellate Case: 89-3217 Document: 01019726094 Date Filed: 02/12/1991 Page: 1 
OPINION ON REHEARI NG 

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Temb Circuit 

F~B 12 1991 

UNITED STATES· COURT OF APPEALS .ROBERT L HOECKER 

TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

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Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 89-3217 

LARRY L. ROGERS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the Un1ted States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 89-20018-02) 

Jill M. Wichlens, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Michael G. 

Katz, Fede ral Public Defender and Frances Smylie Bro~~ . Assistant 

Federal Public Defender, with her on the brief), Denver, 

C9lorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Julie A. Robinson~ ·Assistant United States Attorney (Benjamin L. 

Burgess. Jr., United States. Attorney, with her on the brief) , 

Kansas City , Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee . 

Before McK.oCiY, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and COOK,* 

Judge. 

COOK, District Judge. 

Larry L. Rogers petitioned this Court for rehearing on the 

ground that the Court#s opinion, issued on December 19, 1990 (to 

* The Honorable H. Dale Cook, Chief Judge, United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by 

designation. 

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Appellate Case: 89-3217 Document: 01019726094 Date Filed: 02/12/1991 Page: 2 
be reported at 921 F.2d 1089), failed to address an issue which 

Rogers raised in a~~ supplemental brief. Rogers claimed the 

district court's denial of his severance motion was an abuse of 

discretion and a violation o f his right to a fair trial unde r the 

Sixth Amendment. We granted Rogers' petition for rehearing to 

consider the severance issue which we inadvertently did not 

address in our previous opinion. 

Rogers initially sought to sever only Count 3 of the 

indictment. However, at a hearing before the district court on 

1989, Rogers orai~y moved for a complete severance of 

from that of his co- defendant. William J. Moore. 

March 27, 

his trial 

Roge rs alleged the same grounds for severance in his motion that 

he alleges here on appeal. Rogers sought to use at trial an 

affidavit by Moore, purporting to exculpate Rogers. or in the 

alternative, to offer Moore's exculpatory 

Rogers' involvement in the charged crimes. 

that the evidence of Moore's alleged 

testimony concerning 

Rogers also alleged 

cocaine dealing and 

possession of weapons would be prejudicial to Rogers, thereby 

denying him a fair trial. 

By written order of March 30, 1989, the district court 

denied Rogers' motion, finding that limiting instructions to the 

jury could counteract any potential prejudice to Rogers from 

evidence pertaining to Moore. The district court also recognized 

that the jury could compartmentalize the evidence as it related 

to Rogers and Moore in dealing with Count 3 of the indictment, in 

which Rogers was not named. The district court found Rogers had 

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not met the burden of showing the need for severance. 

Rogers then filed a second motion for severance on April 13, 

1989, alleging again the necessity fo r Moore's exculpatory 

tes timony. The district court held a hearing on May 24, 1989 on 

that motion. In the hearing , counsel for Moore stated that Moore 

would testify for Rogers if severance were granted, but only if 

Moore was tried first. Rogers submitted Moore's exculpatory 

affidavit for the district court's in camera review. The 

district court found the affidavit to be primarily conclusory in 

nature, and denied Rogers' second motion for severance , finding 

that Rogers again had not demonstrated a need for severance. ~ 

R. Supp. VI. 

In considering this issue, we note that the district court 's 

decision c~nying a motion for severance will not be disturbed on 

appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion. United States 

y . Mabry, 809 F . 2d 671. 682 (10th Cir. 1987) . "Severance is a 

matter of discretion, not of r ight, and the defendant bears a 

heavy burden of demonstrating prejudice to his case." l.d. In 

United Statee v. McConnell, 749 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1984 ), we 

considered the following factors to be relevant to a severance 

motion when the defendant claims he needs a co-defendant 's 

testimony : 1) the likelihood that the co-defendant would in fact 

testify at the movant's severed trial and waive his Fifth 

Amendment privilege; 2) the signifi cance of the testimony in 

r elation to the defendant 's theory of defense; 3) the exculpatory 

nature and effect of such testimony ; 4) the likelihood that the 

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co-defendant's testimony would be impeached; 5) the extent of 

prejudice caused by the absence of the testimony; 6) the effect 

of a severance on judicial administration and economy; and 7) the 

timeliness of the motion. ~- at 1445. 

In applying that analysis here, we question first whether 

Rogers' motion was timely. Rogers' motions for severance were 

made before trial as required by F.R.Cr.P. 12(b)(5). However, 

was also dependent upon a 

Moore was unconditionally 

the timeliness of Rogers' motion 

showing to the district court that 

willing to testify on Rogers' behalf. 

to t estify for Rogers was conditioned 

first. ~ R. Supp. VI, p. 8. Our 

Ld. Moore's willing ness 

upon Moore ' s being tried 

examination of the record 

finds no unconditional commitment from Moore, prior to trial, to 

testify for Rogers. 

We concede that Moore's affidavit or exculpatory testimony 

would be significant in supporting Rogers' defense theory that he 

was merely present at Moore's apartment at the time of the search 

warrant's execution, and that he had no knowledge of the cocaine 

or weapons in the apartment. In fact, Moore did testify at the 

joint tri al, and attempted to exculpate Rogers, testifying that 

Rogers n ever sold any of Moore's cocaine or handled any weapons 

while at Moore's apartment. However, Moore's testimony 

conc erning Rogers' involvement was contradicted by several 

witnesses. Three witnesses testified that whenever they went to 

Moore's apartment to purchase cocaine, Rogers always would answer 

the door. These witnesses also testified that they had bought 

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Appellate Case: 89-3217 Document: 01019726094 Date Filed: 02/12/1991 Page: 5 
cocaine from Rogers while Moore was away from the apartment. One 

of the witnesses testified that Rogers had answered the apartment 

door with a gun in his hand. Moore's testimony also lacked 

substance, amounting to little more than his assertion that 

Rogers had no involvement in the charged crimes. 

Finally, we fail to see that a severance would have promoted 

judicial efficiency or economy in this case. The government 

would have put on the same witnesses and used the same exhibits 

in a severed trial for Rogers as it would have used in Moore's 

trial. 

Rogers alleges that his joint trial with Moore enabled the 

government to "exploit" the evidence of Moore ' s drug-related 

activities, to Rogers' prejudice.~ To establish that the 

district court abused its discretion in not granting a severance, 

Rogers must show that actual prejudice resulted from the denial. 

United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 667-68 (10th Cir. 1989). 

Rogers' contentions of prejudice are primarily concerned 

with the negative "spillover" effect that hearing testimony 

concerning Moore's drug activities would have on the jury. In 

Cardall, we held that a complaint of the "spillover" effect from 

the evidence that was overwhelming or more damaging against the 

~ Rogers also alleges in his supplemental brief that the 

evidence never directly connected him to the drugs and weapons 

seized in Moore's apartment during the execution of the search 

warrant. Rogers raised the same argument on appeal in alleging 

that the evidence was insufficient to connect him to the charged 

crimes. We considered that argument in our previous opinion and 

found the evidence was sufficient to support Rogers· conviction. 

We are similarly unpersuaded here in considering that argument in 

relation to the severance issue. 

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co-defendant than the movant is insufficient t c· warrant 

severance. ld. at 668 (quoting United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 

862, 870 (lOth Cir. 1986)) . 

The district court gave limiting instructions and 

specifically indicated that the jurors must consider individually 

the charges against each defendant and the evidence pertaining 

thereto, "leaving out of consideration entirely any evidence 

admitted solely against the other defendant." R. I, #69. In 

Cardall, we viewed a virtually identical limiting instruction as 

proper in preventing prejudice to the moving defendants from 

evidence introduced against their co-defendants. 885 F.2d at 

668 . 

In conclusion, we find that Rogers failed to carry his 

burden of demonstrating the need for severance. Our review of 

the record finds no abuse f discretion by the district court in 

denying Rogers' motion for severance. We therefore AFFIRM as to 

this issue. 

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