Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06137/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06137-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Bill Eric Willis
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

Uoited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 2 9 1991 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

BILL ERIC WILLIS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-6137 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. NO. CR-90-05) 

M. Jay Farber, Assistant United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma (Timothy D. Leonard, United States Attorney, with him on 

the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Gary w. Briggs, Lacy & Briggs, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Attorney 

for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before BRORBY, BARRETT,.and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Appellant pled guilty to the charges of being a Felon in 

Possession of a Firearm, 18 u.s.c. §922(g)(l), and Possession of 

an Unregistered Firearm, 26 u.s.c. §5861(d). The indictment 

described the crimes as occurring on or around November 30, 1989. 

The district court sentenced the defendant to 37 months 

imprisonment with supervised release to follow. In sentencing the 

Appellate Case: 90-6137 Document: 010110016429 Date Filed: 01/29/1991 Page: 1 
defendant, the court took into account the undisputed fact that 

the gun was discharged in a drive-by shooting which, apparently, 

also resulted in a state conviction for aggravated assault. In 

determining the criminal category for the gun possession charges, 

the district court turned to what was then §2K2.2 of the preNovember 1, 1989 sentencing guidelines. In the defendant's 

particular case, the point value for the first count would 

normally have been 12 and for the second count, 16. However, the 

district court enhanced the defendant's sentence -- in order to 

reflect the use of the firearm in aggravated assault -- by 

applying the cross reference listed at subsection (c)(l) and 

thereby enhancing the criminal category to 20. 

The defendant appeals his sentence by claiming that 1) if the 

district judge had used the correct version of the Sentencing 

Guidelines no enhancement could have occurred; 2) that enhancing 

his sentence to reflect the state crime of aggravated assault is a 

misapplication of the guidelines because it essentially results in 

the Sentencing Commission exceeding its authority to make criminal 

categories for federal crimes only; and 3) that the enhancement 

for the drive-by shooting constituted double jeopardy as the 

defendant was already sentenced in state court for aggravated 

assault. 

We disagree with all three assertions and treat them in 

order. 

I. Whether the Correct Version of the Guidelines Was Used 

The defendant claims that in finding a criminal category of 

20 rather than 16, the district court used the cross reference 

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provided by the superseded, pre-November 1, 1989 version of the 

Sentencing Guidelines. That version read: "If the defendant used 

the firearm in committing or attempting another offense, apply the 

guideline for such other offense or §2Xl.1 (Attempt or 

Conspiracy), if the resulting offense level is higher than that 

determined above." See §2K2.2(c)(l) of the pre-November 1, 1989 

Sentencing Guidelines. (Emphasis added). The defendant argues 

that because his crime, indictment, and sentence all occurred 

after November 1, 1989, he should have been sentenced under the 

newer version of the Guidelines which does not include the "for 

such other offense or" portion of the cross reference. See Suppl. 

Authority of Appellant at 1. 

We agree with the defendant that because the crime, 

indictment, and sentencing all occurred after November 1, 1989, 

the correct version of the Guidelines to be applied .to the 

defendant's case is the one that became effective on November 1, 

1989. However, the change that defendant noted which took place 

between the two versions -- the deletion of the phrase "for such 

other offense, or" -- does not assist defendant. Both versions 

call for cross reference to §2Xl.1 and through that section the 

court is directed to §2A.2.2 ("Aggravated Assault"). Although the 

defendant was not convicted, and is not here being sentenced, for 

aggravated assault, §2K2.l(c)(2) requires that he be sentenced for 

his firearm convictions by application of the sentence that would 

have been imposed for whatever underlying offense conduct he 

committed with the illegal firearm if that would lead to a greater 

sentence. 

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The defendant claims "[n]othing in the language of §2Xl.1 

achieves the result obtained at sentencing[, i.e., the enhancement 

for the gun's use in aggravated assault]." See Suppl. Authority of 

Appellant at 2. Defendant makes this assertion presumably because 

§2Xl.1 is entitled "Attempt, Solicitation or Conspiracy ... " and in 

this case the gun was actually used for an assault. However, we 

are not limited to the title of §2Xl.1, particularly where the 

statutory scheme only references §2Xl.1 as a conduit to direct the 

court to the underlying offense. Indeed, section §2Xl.l(a) 

instructs the court to look to "[t]he base offense level from the 

guidelines for the object offense .... " This precise issue was 

presented to the Seventh Circuit in United State v. Madewell, 917 

F. 2d 301 ( 7th Cir. 1990). ·The court there concluded that the 

cross reference to §2Xl.1 requires that when a defendant uses an 

illegal firearm to commit other offense conduct that he be 

sentenced according to such other offense conduct even though his 

conviction is only for the unlawful possession of firearms. Id. at 

306. We agree with that analysis. 

Therefore, in a case where the gun illegally possessed was 

used in an aggravated assault, the district court correctly turned 

to the aggravated assault provisions of §2A2.2, where it found a 

base level of 15, plus 5 for the gun's discharge -- totalling to 

20 offense points. Cf. United States v. Smith, 910 F.2d 326, 329-

30 (6th Cir. 1990) (referring to commentary to §2K2.1 of the preNovember 1, 1989 sentencing guidelines in holding that §2K2.2 of 

the guidelines apply to state crimes as well as federal); United 

States v. Perez, 897 F.2d 751, 752-53 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming 

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enhancement under pre-November 1, 1989 guideline for aggravated 

assault conviction); United States v. Shinners, 892 F.2d 742, 743 

(8th Cir. 1990) (same). 

Therefore, no error was committed in the district court's 

sentencing that cross referenced the sentence which would have 

been imposed for aggravated assault. 

II. Whether Enhancement for a State Crime is a Misapplication 

of the Guidelines or Exceeded the Commission's Authority 

Defendant argues that the district court's use of the state 

offense of aggravated assault to enhance his firearms sentence was 

"not a proper application of the guideline .•.. [because s]uch an 

application is beyond what was intended by the Commission .... 

Further, such an application is beyond the scope of authority 

granted to the Commission by Congress." See Appellant's Br. at 6. 

Defendant argues that it is objectionable to "use ••• a crime 

directly punishable only under state law in determining the 

offense level," see Appellant's Reply Br. at 1, because it 

impermissibly exceeded the Congressional mandate to "authorize[] 

the sentencing of 'a defendant who has been found guilty of an 

offense described in any federal statute.'" See Appellant's Br. at 

6, quoting, 18 u.s.c. 3551(a) (Emphasis added.) 

Most of the cases which have dealt with the cross references 

have not addressed this issue, see Madewell, supra; United States 

v. Pologruto, 914 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1990); Perez, supra; Shinners, 

supra. However, one case, United States v. Smith, supra, did 

address the same argument defendant raises here. In Smith, supra, 

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the government had argued that the defendant's possession, and use 

in a state crime, of a sawed-off shotgun exposed the defendant to 

enhancement for aggravated assault through the pre-November 1, 

1989 §2K2.2(c) cross reference. There, 

[t]he district court rejected the enhancement argument 

of the government with the observation that the cross 

reference provisions of§ 2K2.2 [now consolidated into 

§2K2.l] apply only to a federal offense of aggravated 

assault and not to a state offense of aggravated 

assault." Id. at 329. 

The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that 

[t]he language of the guideline, the policy behind the 

guidelines, the commentary to other related guidelines, 

the definition of relevant conduct and the other cases 

that have considered the question all indicate that the 

cross reference applies to state as well as federal 

offenses. Id. at 330. 

We find the Sixth Circuit's conclusion correct. Congress has 

not, through the cross reference clause, federalized a state 

crime. Instead, the cross reference merely allows the sentence 

for the charged crime -- in this case illegal gun possession to 

reflect the reality of the crime. For instance, we think it 

obvious that the culpability -- and the resultant punishment 

of a person who passively possesses a gun is different than the 

person who possesses that same gun but also uses it in a drive-by 

shooting. The reality of this truism is reflected in the current 

cross reference at §2k2.l(c)(2) which, contrary to what defendant 

claims, is really no different than other methods of sentence 

enhancement resulting from the commission of state crimes. For 

instance, the defendant has conceded that it would be appropriate 

for the district judge to enhance his sentence with the state 

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crime by either increasing his criminal history category or by 

using it as grounds for an upward departure. 

We think it natural, therefore, that the Sentencing 

Guidelines should provide a method of enhancing offense points as 

well. Additionally, we cannot conclude that the Sentencing 

Commission exceeded its congressional mandate. To the contrary, 

the Commission has simply authorized the sentence of "a defendant 

who has been found guilty of an offense described in a federal 

statute" in order to reflect the defendant's true degree of 

culpability. See 18 u.s.c. 3551(a). 

III. The Double Jeopardy Claim 

Having decided the first two issues against the defendant, 

his claim of being put in double jeopardy need not detain us long. 

The government is correct that "two separate sovereigns are 

involved, the State of Oklahoma and the United States of America." 

See Appellee's Br. at 11. We agree that the law "is well settled 

that a federal court can prosecute and punish an individual for 

the same crimes originally brought in state court." Id. See also 

United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) ("[A]n act 

denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is 

an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be 

punished by each. " ) • 

We AFFIRM. 

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