Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-19-07031/USCOURTS-caDC-19-07031-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
3E Mobile, LLC
Appellant
Global Cellular, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 19-7031 September Term, 2019

FILED ON: JANUARY 22, 2020

3E MOBILE, LLC,

APPELLANT

v.

GLOBAL CELLULAR, INC.,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:14-cv-01975)

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, TATEL, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

J U D G M E N T

This appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia’s judgment 

and findings of fact and conclusions of law was considered on the record and on the briefs of the 

parties. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. R. 34(j). The court has afforded the issues full 

consideration and has determined that they do not warrant a published opinion. See D.C. Cir. R. 

36(d). It is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the district court be affirmed.

This appeal arises out of a contract dispute between Global Cellular, a retail company that 

sells mobile phone cases largely sourced from Chinese manufacturers, and 3E Mobile, a products 

supplier based in China. 3E purchased a competitor of Global’s that had previously sued Global 

for copyright infringement. When 3E then settled the claim with Global, Global and 3E entered 

into a separate manufacturing agreement that sought to have 3E act as either a manufacturer or 

middleman between Global and its Chinese suppliers, taking advantage of a Chinese intracountry tax credit and passing on the savings to Global. Pursuant to the manufacturing 

agreement, Global would send monthly payments to 3E, which would serve as credit for Global 

placing “orders” with 3E. 

Following months of miscommunication and no successful orders, Global ceased paying and 

the parties cross-sued for breach of contract. After a three-day bench trial, the Magistrate Judge, 

USCA Case #19-7031 Document #1825024 Filed: 01/22/2020 Page 1 of 2
in a thorough and well-reasoned opinion, concluded that the manufacturing agreement lacked a 

definition of “order,” an essential term, and was therefore unenforceable. See 3E Mobile, LLC v. 

Glob. Cellular, Inc., 2019 WL 1253455, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2019). On appeal, 3E advances a 

single argument: that the manufacturing agreement was not a standalone contract because it was 

inextricably bound up with the settlement of the original copyright claim and therefore “order” 

was not, in fact, an essential term. We reject this challenge.

The magistrate judge correctly concluded that the manufacturing agreement was a 

standalone contract. Both the manufacturing agreement and the settlement agreements contained

integration clauses. Under Pennsylvania law, which the parties agree governs the manufacturing 

agreement, “[a]n integration clause stating the parties mean the writing to represent their entire 

agreement is a ‘clear sign’ the writing represents the entire agreement,” Solar Innovations, Inc. v. 

Plevyak, No. 1110 MDA 2012, 2013 WL 11272849, at *6 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 20, 2013), and

“two contracts may be construed together to represent a complete transaction. . . only . . . where 

two contracts exist, and where one contract does not provide for a complete representation of the 

intent of the parties,” Lenzi v. Hahnemann Univ., 445 Pa. Super. 187, 197–98 (1995). Applying

this precedent and crediting the testimony of two individuals at Global, the Magistrate Judge

found it was “not plausible” that the parties intended for the two contracts to form a single 

transaction. On appeal, “the district court’s findings as to the parties’ intent are reviewed 

deferentially, i.e., reversed only for clear error,” United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 

945 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1998), and we perceive no error—let alone clear error—in the Magistrate 

Judge’s finding. 

Construing the manufacturing agreement as a single contract, the Magistrate Judge also 

correctly concluded that “order” was an essential but undefined term of the manufacturing 

agreement, and the contract was therefore void. All of 3E’s obligations hinged on Global placing

an “order” for products, and 3E nowhere offers a coherent definition of the term. Because 

“Pennsylvania law requires that a plaintiff . . . must establish . . . the existence of a contract, 

including its essential terms,” Courier Times, Inc. v. United Feature Syndicate, Inc., 300 Pa. 

Super. 40, 54 (1982), 3E cannot demonstrate that an enforceable contract existed. See 

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33 cmt. a (1981) (“If the essential terms are so uncertain 

that there is no basis for deciding whether the agreement has been kept or broken, there is no 

contract.”). 

The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after 

resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. 

P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. R. 41.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

Daniel J. Reidy

Deputy Clerk

USCA Case #19-7031 Document #1825024 Filed: 01/22/2020 Page 2 of 2