Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01479/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01479-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Greene
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-1479

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Western

* District of Missouri.

William Greene, *

* 

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 16, 2007

Filed: January 30, 2008

___________

Before BYE, BOWMAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

William Greene appeals the eighty-seven month sentence imposed following

his guilty plea to possessing with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of cocaine

base. Greene argues the district court improperly applied a presumption of

reasonableness to the applicable guidelines range. We vacate Greene's sentence and

remand for resentencing.

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I 

On May 17, 2006, Greene was indicted for possession with intent to distribute

more than fifty grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(A). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Greene entered a plea of guilty on the single

count of the indictment. An initial presentence investigation report ("PSR")

concluded Greene's advisory guideline range was 108 to 135 months, based on an

adjusted offense level of 31 and a criminal history category of I. The report noted,

however, that Mr. Greene faced a ten year statutory minimum sentence that overrode

the low-end of this range. 

Following concerns over the adequacy of Greene’s counsel, the court appointed

the Federal Defender Office to represent Greene. Shortly thereafter, Greene submitted

to a proffer interview with the government and became eligible for a safety valve

reduction. This adjustment eliminated the ten year statutory minimum and reduced

Greene’s advisory range to 87 to 108 months. 

At sentencing, Greene requested a sentence below the applicable guidelines

range based on the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Specifically, Greene

requested a more lenient sentence based on (1) the Sentencing Commission’s

conclusions regarding the disparity between the penalties for cocaine powder and

cocaine base, (2) his age, (3) his medical condition, (4) his prior counsel's deficient

representation, and (5) his work record. At the time of sentencing, Greene was sixty

years old and was suffering from several health-related problems, including diabetes

and hypertension. In addition, Mr. Greene was recovering from a heart attack he

suffered in 2004. 

The district court noted under current Eighth Circuit law it had very limited

discretion in varying from the advisory guideline range. With respect to the

circumstances in this particular case, the court concluded Eighth Circuit precedent

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precluded it from imposing a downward variance from the low-end of the advisory

range. The court made clear, however, if it had the opportunity it would have imposed

a lower sentence based on United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The court

expressly stated in its Statement of Reasons it did not impose a downward variance

from the low-end of the advisory range because it believed it was precluded from

doing so under "current Eighth Circuit precedent." Sent. Tr. at 17. The court then

sentenced Greene to 87 months, the low-end of the applicable guidelines range.

II

Before reaching the merits of Greene's appeal, we must address the

government's motion to dismiss. After oral argument the government filed a motion

to dismiss Greene's appeal based on a waiver provision in Greene's plea agreement.

We hold the government waived this argument and, therefore, deny the government's

motion.

This Court routinely enforces the doctrine of waiver and declines to address

arguments a party fails to raise in its opening brief. See, e.g., Hailemichael v.

Gonzales, 454 F.3d 878, 886 n. 3 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Akeyo v. O'Hanlon, 75 F.3d

370, 374 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1996) ("As a general rule, we do not address arguments raised

for the first time in a reply brief. . . .")); United States v. Applied Pharmacy

Consultants, Inc., 182 F.3d 603, 609 (8th Cir. 1999).

Here, the government did not raise the waiver argument at sentencing in

response to Greene's request for a sentence outside the applicable guidelines range.

Nor did it raise the argument in its appellate brief. Indeed, the government's brief

expressly stated there was no plea agreement. It was not until oral argument that the

government, for the first time, suggested Greene's plea agreement foreclosed him from

seeking a sentence outside the applicable guidelines range. Because the record makes

clear the government waived this argument, we decline to address it here. See

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Latorre v. United States, 193 F.3d 1035, 1037 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1999) (declining to

address whether appellant's appeal was precluded by a waiver provision in the

appellant's plea agreement because the government had failed to raise the issue in the

district court or in the appeal). Instead, we proceed to the merits of Greene's claim.

III

This court reviews a district court's sentence determination under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. The United States Supreme Court recently clarified the scope of

our review:

[T]he appellate court . . . must first ensure that the district court

committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or

improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as

mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence

based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the

chosen sentence–including an explanation for any deviation from the

Guidelines range. Assuming that the district court's sentencing decision

is procedurally sound, the appellate court should then consider the

substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an

abuse-of-discretion standard. 

Gall, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). See also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100

(1996) ("The abuse-of-discretion standard includes review to determine that the

discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.").

According to Greene, the record demonstrates the district court interpreted this

court’s binding precedent to require application of a presumption of reasonableness

to the applicable guidelines range and to preclude a variance in the absence of

extraordinary circumtsances. As the Supreme Court made clear in Rita v. United

States, 127 S.Ct. 2456 (2007), the presumption of reasonableness is an appellate

presumption and "the sentencing court does not enjoy the benefit of a legal

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presumption that the Guidelines sentence should apply." Id. at 2465. See also United

States v. Wilms, 495 F.3d 277, 282 (6th Cir. 2007) (reversing and remanding

defendant's sentence due to the district court's imposition of a presumption of

reasonableness in violation of Rita); United States v. Foreman, 436 F.3d 638, 644 n.1

(6th Cir. 2006) ("[A] district court's job is not to impose a 'reasonable' sentence.

Rather, a district court's mandate is to impose 'a sentence sufficient, but not greater

than necessary, to comply with the purposes' of section 3553(a)(2). Reasonableness

is the appellate standard of review in judging whether a district court has

accomplished its task."). 

The record in this case makes clear the district court applied a presumption of

reasonableness to the applicable guidelines range. At sentencing, the district court

stated, "I do not believe based on current Eighth Circuit law that I am permitted to do

a variance in this case. However, if I had an opportunity to do a variance based on

Booker, I would have done so." Sent. Tr. at 17. The district court also said it would

await the Supreme Court’s decision in Rita "to figure out whether I have some

discretion or whether really I’m pretty much bound by the federal sentencing

guidelines unless there's something that they haven't taken into account." Id. at 19.

In light of Rita, the district court's application of a presumption of a

reasonableness was a significant procedural error. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. The

district court imposed the sentence, not as a result of the district court's assessment of

the relevant factors and determination of the minimally adequate sentence, as required

by § 3553(a), but as a direct consequence of the court's incorrect conclusion it was

bound by Eighth Circuit precedent to accord the guidelines range presumptive weight.

See Koon, 518 U.S. at 100 ("A district court by definition abuses its discretion when

it makes an error of law.") (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,

403-05 (1990)).

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1

We find, and the government does not disagree, Greene raised a timely

objection during sentencing and, therefore, preserved his challenge. 

2

We note at resentencing, the district court "may consider the disparity between

the Guidelines' treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses" in making a

determination whether "a within-Guidelines sentence is 'greater than necessary' to

serve the objectives of sentencing." Kimbrough v. United States, ___ S.Ct. ___, 2007

WL 4292040, *5 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2007).

-6-

Further, we do not believe this error was harmless.1

 The government bears the

burden of proving the district court's error was harmless and must show that no "grave

doubt" exists as to whether the error substantially influenced the outcome of the

proceedings. United States v. Cullen, 432 F.3d 903, 905-06 (8th Cir. 2006) (citations

omitted). The record makes clear had the district court properly exercised its

discretion, it would have found that the relevant factors and purposes compelled a

sentence below the advisory Guidelines range. Sent. Tr. at 17 ("[I]f I had an

opportunity to do a variance based on Booker, I would have done so."). Given the

record, we conclude the error substantially influenced the outcome of the proceedings

and, therefore, was not harmless. 

IV

Accordingly, we vacate Greene's sentence and remand for resentencing

consistent with this opinion.2 

______________________________

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