Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01725/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01725-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
JoAnn Buytendorp
Appellee
Extendicare Health Services
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Donald P. Lay assumed permanent disability retirement status

on January 3, 2007, and died on April 29, 2007. This opinion is being filed by the

remaining judges of the panel pursuant to 8th Cir. R. 47E.

2

The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1717/1725

___________

JoAnn Buytendorp, *

*

Appellant/Cross-Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District of

* Minnesota.

Extendicare Health Services, Inc., *

*

Appellee/Cross-Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: November 15, 2006

Filed: August 17, 2007

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, LAY1

 and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

JoAnn Buytendorp appeals the district court’s2

 grant of summary judgment in

favor of her employer, Extendicare Health Services, Inc. (“Extendicare”), in this

diversity action under the Minnesota Whistleblower’s Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 181.931 to

181.935 (“the Act”). Extendicare cross-appeals the district court’s denial of a motion

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3

Although Buytendorp also alleges she was denied advancement opportunities

in 2003 and 2004, she fails to present evidence sufficient to create a triable question

of fact regarding Extendicare’s hiring practices and the filling of open positions during

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requesting permission to amend a scheduling order to permit a motion for sanctions

against Buytendorp’s counsel. We affirm.

I. Background

A. The Parties and the Allegedly Illegal Practices

Extendicare is a for-profit healthcare company that operates long-term care,

skilled nursing, assisted living, and shorter-term rehabilitation facilities in Minnesota

and other states. It is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in

Wisconsin. Extendicare receives reimbursement payments from various payor

sources, including Medicare, Medicaid, and private sources. The reimbursement rate

Medicare pays to Extendicare is substantially higher than the rates paid to Extendicare

by the other sources.

Buytendorp began working for Extendicare upon graduation from college in

1989. Between 1989 and mid-1996, she completed additional course work, obtained

an administrator’s license, and held a series of positions of increasing authority at

Extendicare. On July 1, 1996, she became the temporary administrator of an

Extendicare facility, Trevilla of New Brighton. In December 1996, Extendicare made

Buytendorp the permanent administrator at Trevilla. She worked in this capacity until

2004, when Extendicare terminated her employment. 

Buytendorp alleges that she received no adverse performance reviews and was

denied no raises nor opportunities for advancement prior to 2003. She alleges

Extendicare terminated her employment because she complained about, and refused

to participate in, practices she believed to be illegal.3

 The objectionable practices

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the relevant window of time. It is not clear which decisionmakers were responsible

for filling positions Buytendorp allegedly desired, nor is it clear that Buytendorp’s

complaints had been communicated to any such decisionmakers. Accordingly, we do

not discuss these allegations further.

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related generally to discrimination in the admission and treatment of patients based

on payor source. She alleges Extendicare held rooms open for higher-paying

Medicare patients, held Medicare patients longer than necessary, moved non-Medicare

patients to less desirable rooms to make desirable rooms available for Medicare

patients, and cut staffing to levels that were adverse to the patients’ interests, all

purportedly in violation of federal law, state law, and Medicare guidelines.

Buytendorp states that there was some emphasis within Extendicare to

maximize the admission and retention of Medicare patients dating back to 1996 but

that she was neither instructed nor pressured to participate in practices she believed

to be illegal until the 2003-04 time frame. According to Buytendorp, the atmosphere

changed in late 2002 when Extendicare hired Laurie Bebo as a vice-president for the

region that included the Trevilla facility. According to Buytendorp, Bebo

aggressively pursued an increase in the number of Medicare patients and aggressively

pursued cost-cutting measures. Under Bebo, Buytendorp states that she and other

employees noticed a strong emphasis on profitability that they believed impeded the

provision of good patient care. Buytendorp describes the work atmosphere under

Bebo as one of pressure to increase the number of Medicare patients by whatever

means possible. Buytendorp also describes a number of specific policies that she

characterizes as designed to maximize the admission and retention of Medicare

patients to the detriment of patients covered by other payor sources. Buytendorp

alleges that these policies, even if not facially illegal, served as a framework that

permitted and concealed payor source discrimination.

Regarding the general atmosphere of pressure, Buytendorp states that Bebo

instituted a target Medicare patient quota for each facility, known as a payor mix or

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Medicare census. Administrators’ compensation was linked in part to meeting the

quotas for their facilities. Bebo and the area director of clinical reimbursement, Jim

Hendricks, held weekly conference calls with facility administrators and nursing

directors who failed to meet their quotas. Buytendorp states that Hendricks would

belittle and yell at staff who failed to meet a Medicare census. 

Regarding specific policies, Buytendorp first identifies a policy she calls the

“two-beds” policy. The Trevilla facility had some rooms in a rehabilitation wing that

contained only two beds per room and that were more spacious than rooms in a

separate long-term care wing that contained three beds per room. The two-bed rooms

also had a greater number of amenities such as cable television. Buytendorp describes

the three-bed rooms as undesirable and hard to market, with the middle beds of the

three-bed rooms being particularly unattractive to potential patients. Buytendorp

states that, in 2003, Bebo directed her to keep beds available in the two-bed rooms for

Medicare patients, even if it meant turning away Medicaid or private source-payor

patients. This policy also required Buytendorp to move non-Medicare patients out of

the desirable rooms and into three-bed rooms if a Medicare patient called to be

admitted. Buytendorp alleges that this practice of discriminating against patients

based on payor source was in violation of Minnesota law. 

A second specific policy Buytendorp identifies is the “green light” or “green

flag” admissions policy. In theory, this policy was designed to streamline the

admissions process and make it easier for facilities to deal with hospitals that released

patients to Extendicare. The green flag policy was designed to permit any staff

member to automatically admit new patients who had certain, enumerated diagnoses.

Buytendorp states that, in practice, the green flag policy favored Medicare patients

and changed over time into a policy that prohibited the rejection of Medicare

admittees. Buytendorp claims the policy first changed to require a regional nurse’s

approval before admission could be denied to a prospective Medicare patient,

regardless of the facility’s ability to handle the patient’s needs. Later, even regional

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nurses and facility administrators could not approve such denials, and only Bebo

could approve the rejection of a Medicare patient.

The third policy Buytendorp identifies is the Healthtrac program. In theory, this

was a program for tracking patient progress that was intended to minimize the number

of patients who were prematurely released and subsequently forced, following injury

or relapse, to return for further or different care. Buytendorp alleges that, in practice,

Healthtrac came to be used only with Medicare patients and became one of many tools

Extendicare used to improperly and unnecessarily lengthen the stays of high-paying

Medicare patients. Buytendorp alleges that she was directed to use the Healthtrac

program and to take other measures to convince Medicare patients to extend their

stays beyond any medically necessary length. Buytendorp admitted in her deposition,

however, that she is not a physician nor is she qualified as a physician to determine

what treatment is and is not medically necessary.

B. The Alleged Whistleblowing

Buytendorp states that Bebo announced the two-beds policy during a

conference call “some time in 2003.” Buytendorp immediately believed that the

policy illegally discriminated against patients based on payor source, but she did not

voice her concerns to Bebo out of fear of retaliation. Buytendorp implemented the

policy and believed herself to be acting in violation of the law whenever she had open

beds and turned away prospective patients from non-Medicare payor sources.

Buytendorp claims that within two weeks of Bebo’s announcement of the policy,

Buytendorp “voiced [her] opinion to [Buytendorp’s] direct supervisor, Craig Eddinger

and . . . felt that was sufficient.” Buytendorp claims that she specifically told

Eddinger, “It’s illegal to discriminate against payor sources in the State of Minnesota.

And that we can’t hold beds open for Medicare patients.” Buytendorp did not

complain directly to Bebo, nor did she ask Eddinger to communicate her concerns to

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Bebo. Buytendorp stated that she had hoped Eddinger would pass her complaints

along, but that she was reluctant to talk directly to Bebo out of fear of retaliation.

 

Buytendorp did not follow up with Eddinger on the two-beds policy because

the Trevilla facility met its Medicare census or quota and “stayed there for quite some

time,” and therefore, Buytendorp did not participate in the conference calls with Bebo

and Hendricks that were designed to address Medicare census shortfalls. In

Buytendorp’s deposition, when counsel asked her about reporting the two-bed policy,

the following exchange took place:

Counsel: Let me ask you, when you say we were at budget, do

you mean Trevilla of New Brighton?

Buytendorp: Correct.

Counsel: Those conference calls continued though with other

facilities?

Buytendorp: I assume so. I didn’t [keep] track of other people’s

census.

Counsel: And so it didn’t concern you that other facilities might

be violating the law?

Buytendorp: I was very happy with the way the facility was running

and I just kept working hard at my own facility, I didn’t

think of others.

Counsel: So since your facility was on budget and you weren’t on

conference call you dropped the issue, is that correct?

Buytendorp: Correct.

Upon further questioning, Buytendorp stated that she met her medicare census

and was not required to go back on conference calls until November 2003, when

Trevilla failed to meet its Medicare census. At that time, she continued to implement

the two-beds policy in an effort to increase the number of Medicare patients at

Trevilla. She described one conference call in particular in which various

administrators were asked what they were doing to meet the Medicare census goals

at their facilities. During the call, Buytendorp explained how she was moving nonAppellate Case: 06-1725 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/17/2007 Entry ID: 3342487
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Medicare patients to the middle beds of the undesirable three-bed rooms and keeping

other beds open for Medicare patients. According to Buytendorp, she was praised by

supervisors when she explained this practice. 

Buytendorp made no further statements to Eddinger about her concerns. She

does not know if Eddinger shared her comments with any other persons at

Extendicare, and she presented no evidence to suggest that Eddinger shared her

concerns with other employees or supervisors. Buytendorp states that Eddinger

expressed no dissatisfaction with her performance and gave her “a really good

review.” Buytendorp did not complain directly to Bebo about the objectionable

policy, call the corporate compliance phone line, nor complain to any superiors in

writing or via email. Extendicare submitted an affidavit from Eddinger in which

Eddinger denies Buytendorp’s allegation that she complained to him about the twobeds policy being illegal. Eddinger moved to a different position at Extendicare

shortly after Buytendorp made her comments to him and left the company entirely in

late 2003.

Also in November 2003, Hendricks came to Trevilla to conduct training on the

Healthtrac system. At that time, Buytendorp spoke privately with Hendricks and told

him she believed it was illegal to treat Medicare patients differently than other patients

and hold patients longer than necessary. Buytendorp stated that Hendricks attended

meetings every month for three months, and each time, she privately expressed to him

her concern over the illegality of the discriminatory practices and patient retention

practices. Throughout this time, Buytendorp continued to implement the

objectionable programs at Trevilla. Extendicare submitted an affidavit from

Hendricks in which Hendricks denies that Buytendorp complained to him about

perceived illegal practices. 

In December 2003, Bebo and human resources manager Io Shug met with

Buytendorp and Lisa Boje, the manager of nursing at Trevilla, to address issues

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related to general census numbers and nursing labor costs. Buytendorp does not

allege that this meeting was related to Medicare census numbers or payor source

discrimination. Rather, Bebo and Shug discussed Buytendorp’s and Boje’s failure to

adequately control nursing costs at a budgeted level commensurate with the facility’s

overall census or occupancy. According to Buytendorp, “It was a threatening

meeting, it basically said you need to fix this or you'll be terminated.” Buytendorp

admits that the nursing costs were not adequately under control at Trevilla at the time

of this meeting, and she does not suggest that the meeting to address this issue was

inappropriate. Buytendorp alleges only that, based on her characterization of past

practices at Extendicare, this area of concern would not typically have been grounds

for termination.

In January 2004, Buytendorp attended a meeting with Wally Lavonavich, the

area comptroller in charge of finances and budgets for Extendicare in Minnesota and

Wisconsin. Buytendorp talked to Lavonovich one-on-one and said, “Wally, I believe

we are, or it is illegal that we are practicing this admissions policy.” She also told him

“it was illegal that we’re holding patients longer than is medically necessary.”

According to Buytendorp, Lavonavich responded by laughing and saying, “We’re a

big company, I’m sure this would have been brought up by now if that was true.”

Extendicare submitted an affidavit from Lavonavich in which Lavonovich denies that

Buytendorp complained to him about any perceived illegal practices.

Buytendorp states that Sue Cullen replaced Eddinger as her immediate

supervisor at the end of February 2004. Cullen was from Canada, and Buytendorp

claims to have been concerned that this new supervisor might not be familiar with

applicable U.S. and Minnesota laws and regulations. During an introductory meeting

that took place “probably in the first couple of weeks in March,” Buytendorp took the

opportunity to tell Cullen that she believed the two-beds policy comprised illegal

discrimination based on payor source. Buytendorp also told Cullen that the separate

practice of “increasing the length of stay on Medicare patients and keeping them in

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the facility when it was not medically necessary was also illegal and breaking the law

on federal guidelines for Medicare.” Regarding the Healthtrac program and other

efforts to keep Medicare patients in-house for as long as possible, Buytendorp admits

that she participated in carrying out the policies. Extendicare submitted an affidavit

from Cullen in which Cullen denies that Buytendorp ever complained to her about any

perceived illegal practices.

During Buytendorp’s deposition in this matter, counsel for Extendicare

questioned her about her interactions with Cullen and Hendricks and about carrying

out the policies at Trevilla that Buytendorp found objectionable. Buytendorp

consistently characterized the policies as directives she was instructed to follow. The

following exchange took place:

Counsel: Now, at some point did you stop your facility, stop

violating these two laws that you were telling me about?

Buytendorp: No, we did, we followed the directive.

Counsel: That’s what I’m trying to get at, you followed the

directive all the way up to and including the time of your

termination?

Buytendorp: Correct.

On April 12, 2004, during a brainstorming meeting that included Buytendorp,

Hendricks, Cullen, and administrators from other facilities, those in attendance were

expected to suggest methods by which Extendicare could obtain and retain Medicare

patients. Buytendorp alleges that she sat conspicuously mute at the meeting and that

she, again, pulled Hendricks aside and voiced her concern to him that it was illegal to

extend the stays of Medicare patients. Following the meeting Hendricks expressed

dissatisfaction with Buytendorp’s performance and met with Cullen behind closed

doors. After the closed-door meeting, Cullen met with Buytendorp and “was visibly

upset and said she was very disappointed in [Buytendorp].” On April 14, 2004,

Cullen placed Buytendorp on a performance improvement plan with one month to

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meet stated goals. The performance improvement plan or probation plan listed areas

of concern that Buytendorp concedes were legitimate areas of concern where she was

underperforming. For example, in relation to the control of labor costs and a failure

to meet overall facility census goals, Buytendorp stated in her deposition, “I was not

at budget for these areas, correct. . . . Our census was low and I had not adjusted the

appropriate nursing hours.” Buytendorp identifies other concerns as being unfounded,

however, and as relating to the implementation of illegal policies. For example,

Buytendorp stated, “The area where it said you had to increase your length of stay and

attend the Medicare meetings and be an active part of it, that I felt was being

fraudulent and illegal and I wasn’t going to do that.” 

C. The Termination

Buytendorp did not meet the goals set out in the performance improvement

plan. Cullen stated in an affidavit that she made the decision to terminate Buytendorp

and intended to meet with Buytendorp on May 17 to terminate her employment. That

meeting was not scheduled, however, because Cullen learned that Minnesota state

investigators were conducting an audit of the Trevilla facility. This audit resulted in

the discovery of twenty-nine safety violations of varying levels of severity, and Cullen

received an oral report of these violations on Friday, May 21, 2004. Cullen set a

meeting for the morning of Saturday, May 22. 

Cullen stated in an affidavit that when she arrived on Saturday morning,

Buytendorp had already packed personal belongings in a box. Cullen claims to have

told Buytendorp that she was being terminated because she failed to meet the goals

in the performance improvement plan and because of the number and severity of the

safety violations identified by the state. Buytendorp alleges that she had not packed

her personal belongings before Cullen arrived, but rather, was getting organized for

the meeting with Cullen. Buytendorp alleges that Cullen did not offer reasons for the

termination other than stating that Buytendorp was not “administrator material.”

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Buytendorp does not contest the fact that the state conducted an inspection that

revealed safety violations. Instead, Buytendorp alleges that the state authorities were

overly aggressive and overly critical and that they broke with past practice by listing

certain violations individually whereas past reports had grouped violations together.

Buytendorp argues that this resulted in an inflated number of violations in the May

2004 inspection report and an amplification of the appearance of risk to patients.

After her termination, Buytendorp brought this retaliation action in state court

and Extendicare removed the case to federal court. Buytendorp alleged that

Extendicare denied her opportunities for advancement and ultimately fired her in

retaliation for whistleblowing and for refusing to participate in allegedly illegal

activity. Extendicare moved for summary judgment on Buytendorp’s claim under the

Act and on a separate state law claim for negligent supervision. The district court

granted summary judgment in favor of Extendicare on both claims. The court found

that Minnesota’s own courts had interpreted the Act to require an official or formal

report of wrongdoing before an employee could enjoy protection under the Act and

that Buytendorp’s repeated comments to her superiors at Extendicare did not qualify

as official or formal reports. The district court noted the availability of a mechanism

to make such reports (a corporate compliance hotline) and Buytendorp’s failure to

utilize that mechanism. The district court also noted that Buytendorp failed to make

any written complaints, email any complaints, or make notes regarding the alleged

illegalities or complaints. Buytendorp appeals the grant of summary judgment on her

whistleblower claim but not her claim for negligent supervision.

In the court below, a dispute arose in which counsel for Extendicare accused

counsel for Buytendorp of improperly attempting to influence a witness and making

misrepresentations to the court. Counsel for Buytendorp accused counsel for

Extendicare of improperly withholding documents that had been requested during

discovery. Extendicare eventually moved to amend a scheduling order to permit the

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The Honorable Franklin L. Noel, United States Magistrate Judge for the

District of Minnesota.

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filing of a motion for sanctions against Buytendorp’s counsel. A magistrate judge4

denied the motion and Extendicare appealed to the district court. The district court

affirmed the magistrate judge’s denial of the motion, and Extendicare appeals to our

court.

II. Discussion

The Act prohibits adverse actions against employees who make good faith

reports to their employers about actual or suspected illegal conduct. Minn. Stat.

§ 181.932(a). The Act also prohibits adverse actions against employees who make

good faith reports regarding violations of health care standards that “potentially

place[] the public at risk of harm.” Minn. Stat. § 181.932(d). Finally, the Act

protects employees who refuse to participate in practices when there are objective

reasons to believe the practices are illegal. Minn. Stat. § 181.932(c). Buytendorp

asserted below and maintains on appeal that she was terminated for making good faith

reports and for refusing to participate in illegal practices. She admitted, however, that

she implemented the identified practices through the time of her termination. As such,

there was no refusal to participate. See Gundacker v. Unisys Corp., 151 F.3d 842,

847-48 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding a grant of summary judgment under subsection (c)

of the Act where an employee failed to prove a refusal to participate). To the extent

Buytendorp bases her refusal-to-participate claim on her silence at the April 2004

meeting, we find her arguments to be without merit. Sitting quietly at a planning

session while actually implementing objectionable policies does not comprise a

refusal to participate. Accordingly, we focus our analysis on her claim under

subsections (a) and (d) of the Act.

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We analyze Minnesota whisteblower claims using the procedural framework

of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). See Hitchcock

v. Fedex Ground Package Sys., Inc., 442 F.3d 1104, 1106 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying

the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas to claims under Minn. Stat.

§181.932). Under McDonnell-Douglas, the initial burden is on the plaintiff to

establish a prima facie case. Rothmeier v. Inv. Advisers, Inc., 556 N.W.2d 590, 592

(Minn. App. 1996). A prima facie case consists of (1) conduct by the employee that

is protected by the Act, (2) an adverse employment action directed at the employee,

and (3) a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action. Id.

If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a burden shifts to the employer to

articulate a legitimate reason for the adverse action. Id. at 592-93. The ultimate

burden of proof then rests with the plaintiff to prove that the proffered reason is

merely a pretext and that retaliatory animus motivated the adverse action. Id. at 593.

Protected conduct under subsection (a) of the Act is the making of a “good

faith” report. Minn. Stat. § 181.932(a). To be a protected report, a complaint must

be formal or presented “in an essentially official manner.” Janklow v. Minn. Bd. of

Exam’rs for Nursing Home Adm’rs, 536 N.W.2d 20, 23 (Minn. App. 1995) (defining

a good faith report as “conduct [that] amounts to relating or presenting concerns in an

essentially official manner”). In addition, “to constitute whistle-blowing . . . a report

[must be] made for the purpose of exposing an illegality and [must not be] a vehicle,

identified after the fact, to support a belated whistle-blowing claim.” Obst v.

Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 202 (Minn. 2000). In other words, “[i]n

determining whether a report of a violation or suspected violation of the law is made

in good faith, we look beyond the content of the report and consider the employee’s

purpose in making the report.” Gee v. Minn. State Colls. and Univs., 700 N.W.2d

548, 555 (Minn. App. 2005). “Whether a plaintiff made a report in ‘good faith’ is a

question of fact. Nevertheless, [the] court may determine as a matter of law that

certain conduct does not constitute a ‘report.’” Rothmeier v. Inv. Advisers, Inc., 556

N.W.2d 590, 593 (Minn. App. 1996) (internal citations omitted). 

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Extendicare argues that application of the formality or “essentially official

manner” requirement is a simple matter: because Buytendorp failed to make or

memorialize her complaints in writing or present them electronically or through the

company’s corporate compliance hotline, she cannot meet the formality requirement.

We do not agree with Extendicare’s assertion that the contours of the formality

requirement are this simple and well-defined. Although Minnesota’s courts have

interpreted the statute as containing a formality requirement, neither the statute nor the

caselaw interpreting the statute contains an express requirement that reports be in

writing. Similarly we find no Minnesota cases standing for the proposition that an

employer may dictate the sole method for communicating complaints about illegal

conduct. The rationale for a formality requirement, like the rationale for a good faith

requirement, is clear: to prevent after-the-fact claims of retaliation based on a dearth

of evidence and unsubstantiated allegations. See Obst, 614 N.W.2d at 202. The

contours of the formality requirement, however, remain cloudy. 

Assuming that Buytendorp satisfied the formality requirement, it is not clear

that her repeated statements were made in a good faith effort to expose an illegality.

Arguably, “[h]er reports merely expressed her dissatisfaction with [the employer’s]

conduct and policy, and there is no evidence in the record to suggest that her purpose

in reporting was to expose an illegality.” Hitchcock, 442 F.3d at 1106; see Fjelsta v.

Zogg Dermatology, 488 F.3d 804, 808-09 (8th Cir. 2007) (affirming a grant of

summary judgment under the Act where an employee’s claimed report was not made

for the purpose of exposing an illegality). Here, Buytendorp readily admits that she

refrained from complaining to Bebo out of fear of retaliation. In general, we believe

that whistleblowers are employees who make good faith reports in spite of the risk of

retaliation, not those who avoid such risk.

Nevertheless, we need not decide this case based on the subtleties of

Minnesota’s good faith reporting requirement and the difficult question of whether

Buytendorp’s complaints and subjective motivations qualify her as a whistleblower

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under the Act. Rather, we may assume for the purpose of our analysis that

Buytendorp’s repeated statements to multiple superiors satisfied both the good faith

and formality requirements discussed in Minnesota’s cases. Buytendorp’s case fails,

instead, because Extendicare proffered legitimate reasons for Buytendorp’s

termination—a failure to control labor costs, maintain facility census, and meet state

safety standards—and Buytendorp presented insufficient evidence to create a jury

question as to whether these proffered reasons were merely pretexts. 

In describing the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, we have

stated:

[T[he actual evidentiary burden that a plaintiff must meet at the prima

facie stage [is] “minimal.” Where the evidence used to establish a prima

facie case meets this minimal burden but is not strong, that evidence,

standing alone, may be insufficient to sustain the plaintiff’s case at the

final stage of the burden-shifting analysis. Conversely, where the

evidence of causation for purposes of establishing a prima facie case is

quite strong, it may be sufficient, standing alone, to prove a defendant’s

liability without resort to further evidence. 

Stewart v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 196, 481 F.3d 1034, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying

the burden-shifting framework in the context of a statutory disability discrimination

claim) (internal citations omitted). Here, Buytendorp’s prima facie case is not strong,

and she does not challenge the veracity of Extendicare’s assertions regarding her

census, her prior failure to control labor costs, or her receipt of a poor review from the

state. Rather, she alleges these issues were not the true motivation for Extendicare’s

adverse action. Against this backdrop, Buytendorp may not rely solely upon her

prima facie case. Rather, she must present evidence of pretext that is sufficient to

create a triable question of fact when “viewed in light of the employer’s justification.”

Logan v. Liberty Healthcare Corp., 416 F.3d 877, 881 (8th Cir. 2005) (“An

employee’s attempt to prove pretext requires more substantial evidence than it takes

to make a prima facie case because unlike evidence establishing a prima facie case,

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evidence of pretext and retaliation is viewed in light of the employer’s justification.”)

(quotations and alterations omitted).

Buytendorp primarily argues that temporal proximity between her termination

and the April 2004 meeting supports an inference of retaliatory animus. “An

inference of a causal connection between a charge of discrimination and [an adverse

employment action] can be drawn from the timing of the two events, but in general

more than a temporal connection is required to present a genuine factual issue on

retaliation.” Arraleh v. County of Ramsey, 461 F.3d 967, 977 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal

citations omitted, alteration in original). Here, two of the stated rationales for the

termination were Buytendorp’s failures to maintain facility census and control labor

costs. These were performance issues that Bebo raised in the December 2003 meeting

where Buytendorp admits Bebo threatened termination. Buytendorp has presented no

evidence suggesting Bebo was aware of her complaints, and Buytendorp admits that

she specifically avoided making complaints to Bebo. Cullen renewed this

performance concern with the performance improvement plan in April 2004. Given

these undisputed facts, it would not be reasonable to characterize this proffered

rationale as a last-minute, negative response to protected conduct. Cf. Turner v.

Gonzales, 421 F.3d 688, 697 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that an inference of pretext was

permitted where a decisionmaker generated a negative, unscheduled performance

review two months after a favorable, regularly scheduled review and five days after

receiving notice of the employee’s protected conduct). Further, Cullen met with and

terminated Buytendorp the day after Cullen learned of the state inspection which

exposed a large number of safety violations. Given these facts, temporal proximity,

if anything, lends support to Extendicare’s position rather than Buytendorp’s. 

Buytendorp also argues that because Cullen admits to having made the decision

to terminate her prior to the state inspection, and because Extendicare now points to

the safety violations as a rationale for her termination, Extendicare is waffling and

appears to be offering post hoc, pretextual rationales for her termination. See Kobrin

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v. Univ. of Minn., 34 F.3d 698, 703 (8th Cir.1994) ( “Substantial changes over time

in the employer’s proffered reason for its employment decision support a finding of

pretext.”). As further support for this argument, Buytendorp points to her own

assertion that Cullen failed to offer any explanation on the morning of the termination,

other than saying Buytendorp was not “administrator material.” For summary

judgment purposes, we must ignore Cullen’s contrary assertion that Buytendorp had

packed her personal belongings in a box prior to termination and that Cullen explained

the proffered reasons to Buytendorp at termination.

We need not ignore undisputed facts, however, nor must we recognize

unreasonable inferences. We do not believe reasonable jurors could infer pretext from

these alleged inconsistencies. Buytendorp argues neither that the inspection results

were a fabrication nor that Extendicare was responsible for the state inspectors’

actions. Moreover, Cullen’s statement as described by Buytendorp is fully consistent

with Extendicare’s proffered rationales, albeit less specific. Here, an additional,

uncontested, legitimate reason for termination arose between the time that Extendicare

made the decision to terminate and the time the Extendicare actually terminated

Buytendorp. See Freeman v. Ace Tel. Ass’n, 467 F.3d 695, 698 (8th Cir. 2006). On

these facts, reference in subsequent litigation to the additional rationale does not

permit an inference of pretext. 

Finally, Buytendorp argues that the state’s report was infirm and that

Extendicare’s treatment of other administrators proves that Extendicare singled her

out for retaliation. We fail to appreciate how the state’s election to conduct an

aggressive inspection relates to Extendicare’s motives. Also, as to the treatment of

other administrators, there is not sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude any such

administrator was so similarly situated that differential treatment could support an

inference of retaliatory intent.

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 Buytendorp may well have presented evidence sufficient to create a question

of fact as to whether Extendicare conducted its business in an objectionable manner.

That is not the question that matters for the purpose of the present retaliation claims.

See Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 781 (8th Cir.1995) (holding

the federal courts do not “sit as super-personnel departments” that provide general

oversight and re-examine business decisions). The relevant question is whether a

reasonable jury could find that Extendicare’s proffered reason for the termination was

a mere pretext to mask retaliatory animus. Summary judgment was appropriate

because Buytendorp failed to present sufficient evidence to submit this question to a

jury.

Regarding Extendicare’s cross-appeal, we have carefully reviewed the record

and find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling on the motion to amend

the scheduling order. Miss. River Revival, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 319 F.3d

1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 2003) (standard of review).

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

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