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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Jonus L. Wheeler
Appellant

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-2785

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JONUS L. WHEELER,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:06-CR-30073-SMY — Staci M. Yandle, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED JANUARY 7, 2016 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 26, 2016

____________________

Before RIPPLE, WILLIAMS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Appellant Jonus Wheeler pled guilty in 2006 

to possessing a firearm as a felon, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), 

and was sentenced to 108 months in prison followed by 36 

months of supervised release. Ten months after he was released from prison and began serving the term of supervision, the government sought revocation, see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e) and (g), alleging that Wheeler had tested positive 

for (and thus possessed) marijuana four times, missed nine 

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drug-treatment sessions, and twice failed to submit a monthly supervision report. After Wheeler admitted the allegations, the district court revoked his supervised release and 

imposed 21 months of reimprisonment to be followed by 

another 12 months of supervised release. Wheeler filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed attorney asserts that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

There is no constitutional right to counsel in a revocation 

proceeding where, as here, the defendant admits violating 

the conditions of his supervision and neither challenges the 

appropriateness of revocation nor asserts substantial and 

complex grounds in mitigation. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 

U.S. 778, 790–91 (1973); United States v. Boultinghouse, 784 

F.3d 1163, 1171–72 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Eskridge, 

445 F.3d 930, 932–33 (7th Cir. 2006). Thus the Anders safeguards do not govern our review of counsel’s motion to

withdraw. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 554–55 

(1987); Eskridge, 445 F.3d at 933. We may affirm “if we determine that the appeal, though not frivolous, is also not 

meritorious.” Eskridge, 445 F.3d at 933.

We invited Wheeler to comment on counsel’s motion, but 

he has not responded. See Cir. R. 51(b). Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the nature of the case and addresses 

the potential issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. The analysis in the brief appears to be 

thorough, so we focus our review on the subjects that counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 

(7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 

(7th Cir. 1996).

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No. 15-2785 3

Counsel first notes that Wheeler does not want to challenge the revocation of his supervision, and thus the lawyer 

properly refrains from discussing whether Wheeler’s admissions to the charged violations were knowing and voluntary. 

See United States v. Wheaton, 610 F.3d 389, 390 (7th Cir. 2010); 

United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–72 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel next discusses whether Wheeler could raise an 

appellate claim about the calculation of his reimprisonment 

range. Wheeler did not object to the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guideline Chapter 7 policy statements, so our review would be limited to plain error. See

United States v. Pitre, 504 F.3d 657, 661, 664 (7th Cir. 2007); 

United States v. Harvey, 232 F.3d 585, 587 (7th Cir. 2000).

At Wheeler’s revocation hearing the district court said 

that his reimprisonment range would be 21 to 27 months.

(Wheeler’s criminal history category is VI, and the court 

found that his possession of marijuana constituted a Grade B 

violation because he already had a conviction for a drug offense, see 21 U.S.C. § 844(a); United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 

1150, 1154 (7th Cir. 2001).) But the district court did not say 

specifically that the reimprisonment range was subject to a 

statutory maximum of 24 months given that the underlying 

§ 922(g)(1) offense was a class C felony. See 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 924(a)(2), 3559(a)(3), 3583(e)(3); U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1, 7B1.4(a), 

(b)(3)(A). Counsel thus questions whether Wheeler could 

argue that the district court was misinformed about the true 

range when deciding on the appropriate term of reimprisonment. 

But as appellate counsel points out, the prosecutor noted 

that 24 months was the statutory maximum in recommending a term of that length. The probation officer also had 

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alerted the district court in writing that 24 months was the 

maximum. The court said nothing suggesting a misunderstanding about the statutory maximum, and the court even 

referred to 18 U.S.C. § 3583, which defined that maximum, 

when announcing the 21-month term. Thus, on this record 

Wheeler could not make a meritorious claim that the district 

court was misinformed about its options. See Pitre, 504 F.3d 

at 663–64 (district court did not err when it did not explicitly 

state reimprisonment range during revocation hearing).

Counsel also considers but rightly rejects an argument 

that the new term of supervised release is unlawful or plainly unreasonable. The 12-month term is less than the statutory maximum of 15 months (based on the 36 months of supervised release authorized for Wheeler’s underlying conviction, less the 21 months of reimprisonment ordered on 

revocation). See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2) & (h). The term imposed also is within the policy-statement range of up to 15 

months. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(g)(2). The district court explained that a new term of supervised release was justified 

based on factors in § 3553(a), including Wheeler’s violations 

during the initial period of supervised release, his significant 

substance-abuse issues, and the need for supervision to assist with his reintegration into society. The court also fully 

explained the need for a special condition authorizing treatment for drug and alcohol abuse, given Wheeler’s lengthy 

history of using alcohol, cocaine, and marijuana. We would 

not find the new term of supervised release to be plainly unreasonable. See United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 404–05 

(7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Neal, 512 F.3d 427, 438 

(7th Cir. 2008).

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Counsel does not mention two standard conditions of 

supervised release that we have criticized as vague. First, we 

have said that language requiring Wheeler to notify his probation officer of any “change . . . in employment” leaves unclear whether this condition applies only to “changing employers or also includes changing from one position to another for the same employer at the same workplace.” United 

States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 379 (7th Cir. 2015). Second, 

the condition prohibiting Wheeler from leaving the judicial 

district without permission “improperly imposes strict liability” because it lacks a scienter requirement. United States v. 

Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 849–50 (7th Cir. 2015). That being said, 

we have no reason to believe that Wheeler wishes to challenge these conditions, as counsel has not identified them as 

potential issues and Wheeler has not responded to the Anders brief. See United States v. Bryant, 754 F.3d 443, 447 

(7th Cir. 2014). If Wheeler later perceives these conditions to 

be problematic after he begins serving the term of supervised release, he will be free to seek modification under 

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). United States v. Neal, 810 F.3d 512, 518

(7th Cir. 2016).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the 

appeal is DISMISSED.

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