Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05197/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05197-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Appellee
Nadia Youkelsone
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 14, 2011 Decided November 8, 2011

No. 10-5197

NADIA YOUKELSONE,

APPELLANT

v.

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, AS RECEIVER OF 

WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-01278)

Nadia Youkelsone, pro se, argued the cause and filed the 

briefs for appellant.

Joseph Brooks, Counsel, argued the cause for appellee. 

On the briefs were Colleen J. Boles, Assistant General 

Counsel, Lawrence H. Richmond, Senior Counsel, and Jaclyn 

C. Taner, Counsel. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. 

Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: TATEL and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

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PER CURIAM: Plaintiff Nadia Youkelsone carried a 

mortgage on her New York house. In 2001, Washington 

Mutual Bank (“WaMu”) acquired the note and mortgage and 

then assigned it to Federal National Mortgage Association 

(“Fannie Mae”). Thereafter, Youkelsone’s home went into 

foreclosure, WaMu failed, and the Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation (“FDIC”) became its receiver.

In 2009, Youkelsone brought this action against the

FDIC, which, for purposes of this litigation, stands in 

WaMu’s shoes. Youkelsone alleges that WaMu “owned 

and/or serviced the mortgage,” Am. Compl. ¶ 10, and that it 

engaged in wrongful conduct in the foreclosure’s aftermath—

for instance by delaying in providing closing documents, id.

¶ 99, and making misrepresentations to the Bankruptcy Court, 

id. ¶ 110. 

The FDIC moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. But never

reaching that issue, the district court sua sponte dismissed the 

complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) on the ground that Youkelsone 

lacked standing. Youkelsone appeals.

The FDIC now argues that we lack jurisdiction to hear 

this appeal because Youkelsone’s notice of appeal was 

untimely. The district court entered its final order on March 

10, 2010, leaving Youkelsone until May 10 to file a notice of 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) (“When the United 

States or its . . . agency is a party, the notice of appeal may be 

filed by any party within 60 days after the judgment or order 

appealed from is entered.”). Three days before that deadline, 

on May 7, Youkelsone requested an extension of time and 

attached a proposed notice of appeal to her motion. The 

district court extended the deadline until June 10, and 

Youkelsone filed her notice of appeal on that date. 

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Unfortunately for Youkelsone, the district court’s order ran 

afoul of Rule 4(a)(5)(C), which limits any extensions to thirty

days, meaning that the last permissible day would have been

June 9—the day before Youkelsone filed her notice. The

FDIC, however, never challenged the notice’s timeliness in 

the district court, nor did it raise the issue in its appellate 

brief. But because timing can affect this court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction, we raised the issue on our own initiative and 

ordered supplemental briefing.

Youkelsone argues that Rule 4(a)(5)(C) is not 

jurisdictional because it lacks a statutory basis. Alternatively, 

she argues that her May 7 proposed notice, filed well before 

Rule 4(a)(5)(C)’s thirty-day deadline, served as a “functional 

equivalent” of a notice of appeal. See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 

244, 248–49 (1992) (“If a document filed within the time 

specified by Rule 4 gives the notice required by Rule 3, it is 

effective as a notice of appeal.”). We need not reach the latter 

argument because we agree with Youkelsone that the Rule 

4(a)(5)(C) time limit is a claim-processing rule, not a 

jurisdictional bar, and that the FDIC forfeited its timeliness 

objection. 

“Only Congress may determine a lower federal court’s 

subject-matter jurisdiction.” Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 

452 (2004). Accordingly, only timing rules that have a 

statutory basis are jurisdictional. See United States v. Byfield, 

522 F.3d 400, 403 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (holding 

that Rule 4(b) “is not jurisdictional because it was judicially 

created and has no statutory analogue”). As noted above, Rule 

4(a)(5)(C) limits extensions of Rule 4(a)(1) time periods to 

thirty days. Although the authority to extend the time 

available to file an appeal is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2107, 

Rule 4(a)(5)(C)’s thirty-day limit on the length of any 

extension ultimately granted appears nowhere in the U.S. 

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Code. Rule 4(a)(5)(C)’s thirty-day limit is thus a claimprocessing rule. Cf. Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 

1145 n.9, 1146 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (distinguishing Rule 

4(a)(6) and Rule 4(a)(1)(A), which both implement a statute, 

from 4(a)(1)(A)(vi), which “has not been made jurisdictional 

by statute” and is thus a claim-processing rule). Objections 

based on claim-processing rules “ ‘can . . . be forfeited,’ ” id.

at 1146 (quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 456), and the FDIC

concedes, as it must, that it has forfeited any argument that 

Youkelsone’s late filing was improper given that it “did not 

challenge the timeliness of the notice of appeal.” FDIC’s

Supp. Br. 3. Timeliness thus poses no bar to our considering

Youkelsone’s appeal.

In the alternative, the FDIC urges us to affirm the district 

court’s dismissal on the grounds of standing. According to the 

district court, Youkelsone failed to allege causation and 

redressability, as her “alleged injuries depend not only on 

Washington Mutual’s alleged involvement . . . but also on the 

independent intervening actions of Fannie Mae.” Youkelsone 

v. FDIC, No. 09-1278, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2010).

We disagree. Youkelsone alleges actions by WaMu that 

themselves caused her injury, and those actions—for which 

she seeks damages—injured her regardless of the possible

involvement of other parties in the foreclosure. “[A]n award 

of damages would obviously redress [her] injuries.” Ord v. 

District of Columbia, 587 F.3d 1136, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

Youkelsone thus has standing to bring this suit. 

The FDIC argues that if we find that Youkelsone has

standing, we should nonetheless affirm the district court 

because Youkelsone failed to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6). But because the district court never addressed the 

complaint’s sufficiency, we think it best to leave it to that

court to address the issue in the first instance.

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The decision of the district court is reversed and the case 

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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