Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01281/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01281-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Maytag Corporation
Defendant
Armida Richina
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ARMIDA RICHINA,on behalf of

herself and all others

similarly situated,

NO. CIV. S 05-1281 MCE KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MAYTAG CORPORATION, a Delaware

Corporation,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Through the present class action suit, Plaintiff Armida

Richina ("Plaintiff") alleges that Defendant Maytag Corporation

(“Defendant”) violated California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act,

California Civil Code section 1750 et. seq., California’s Unfair

Business Practices Act, California Business and Professions Code

section 17200 et. seq., and has otherwise engaged in Fraudulent

Concealment and Nondisclosure.

///

Case 2:05-cv-01281-MCE -KJM Document 45 Filed 10/27/05 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

2

Defendant removed the suit to this Court claiming this Court

has jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of

2005 (“CAFA”). Plaintiff now seeks to have her suit remanded to

the state court. For the reasons set forth more fully below,

Plaintiff’s motion seeking remand is granted.1

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff purchased a Maytag oven on or about September 1,

1993. In March 1998, Plaintiff alleges that her oven showed an

F-1 error. She engaged a repairman to remedy the issue, but he

was unable to confirm the F-1 error. In or about March 1999,

Plaintiff began to hear a beeping noise emitting from her oven. 

The unexpected beeping continued and would sometimes occur in the

middle of the night. To relieve the problem, Plaintiff would

often unplug her oven. Plaintiff again tried to have a

professional address the defect to no avail. Plaintiff then

brought this action in state court alleging that Defendant

engaged in unfair business practices and otherwise fraudulently

concealed the potential of encountering the foregoing problems. 

Plaintiff is suing on her own behalf and on behalf of all those

similarly situated California residents. 

Plaintiff filed her complaint in the California Superior

Court on November 16, 2004. She filed a first amended complaint

on December 23, 2004. 

Case 2:05-cv-01281-MCE -KJM Document 45 Filed 10/27/05 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

On February 18, 2005, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005

("CAFA") was enacted by Congress. On May 5, 2005, the Superior

Court overruled in part and sustained in part Maytag's demurrer

to Plaintiff's complaint with leave to amend. On May 25, 2005,

Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint.

STANDARD

A defendant may remove any civil action from state court to

federal district court if the district court has original

jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Generally,

district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions in

two instances: (1) where there is complete diversity between the

parties, or (2) where a federal question is presented in an

action arising under the Constitution, federal law, or treaty. 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. 

The removing party bears the burden of establishing federal

jurisdiction. Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389,

1393 (9th Cir. 1988). Furthermore, courts construe the removal

statute strictly against removal. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v.

Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d

564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). If there is any

doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance, remand

must be granted. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. Therefore, if it

appears before final judgment that a district court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded to state court. 

28 U.S.C. § 1447©).

///

Case 2:05-cv-01281-MCE -KJM Document 45 Filed 10/27/05 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

The district court determines whether removal is proper by

first determining whether a federal question exists on the face

of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint. Caterpillar, Inc. v.

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). If a complaint alleges only

state-law claims and lacks a federal question on its face, then

the federal court must grant the motion to remand. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1447(c); Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. Nonetheless, there are

rare exceptions when a well–pleaded state-law cause of action

will be deemed to arise under federal law and support removal. 

They are “ . . . (1) where federal law completely preempts state

law, (2) where the claim is necessarily federal in character, or

(3) where the right to relief depends on the resolution of a

substantial, disputed federal question.” ARCO Envtl. Remediation

L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Quality of Mont., 213 F.3d

1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000)(internal citations omitted).

If the district court determines that removal was improper,

then the court may also award the plaintiff costs and attorney

fees accrued in response to the defendant’s removal. 28 U.S.C. §

1447(c). The court has broad discretion to award costs and fees

whenever it finds that removal was wrong as a matter of law. 

Balcorta v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1106

n.6 (9th Cir. 2000).

///

///

///

///

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-01281-MCE -KJM Document 45 Filed 10/27/05 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

ANALYSIS

On February 18, 2005, Congress enacted CAFA to ease the

diversity jurisdiction requirements for certain class action

suits. The express purpose of CAFA is to “benefit society by

encouraging innovation and lowering consumer prices” and “by

providing for federal court consideration of interstate cases of

national importance under diversity jurisdiction.” See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1711 n. (b)(2)-(3). Under CAFA, a federal court may exercise

original jurisdiction over “...any civil action in which the

matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000,

exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in which

any member of a class or plaintiffs is a citizen of a State

different from any defendant....” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). 

Defendant has removed this action to federal court on the ground

that this Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to CAFA.

The parties concede that were this claim brought by

Plaintiff today, it would properly be before this Court. In

addition, both parties agree that CAFA, by its express terms,

applies only to actions commencing “on or after the date of

enactment of the Act.” See Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 9, 119 Stat. 4,

14 (2005). The issue before this Court is whether Plaintiff’s

second amended complaint, filed after the enactment of CAFA,

commences a new action for purposes of subject matter

jurisdiction.

///

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-01281-MCE -KJM Document 45 Filed 10/27/05 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

1. Recommencing the Action

Plaintiff urges that CAFA does not confer subject matter

jurisdiction in this action because this suit was filed before

the effective date thereof and CAFA only applies prospectively. 

Defendant rebuts that Plaintiff's May 25, 2005, second amended

complaint recommenced her cause of action, subsequent to the

effective date of CAFA, thereby establishing jurisdiction.

Defendant reasons that the superior court granted a demurrer

on Plaintiff’s claim which, Defendant contends, had the effect of

destroying Plaintiff’s existing pleading. Accordingly, Defendant

argues, the filing of Plaintiff’s second amended complaint

recommenced an entirely new action based on an entirely new legal

theory. Defendant cites Lillian Cohen v. The Superior Court of

the City and County of San Francisco in support of its argument. 

244 Cal. App. 2d 650 (1966). In Cohen, the court declared that

“[i]t is well settled that if the pleading is such that all of

its parts are interdependent, constituting one complete and

connected statement of a cause of action or defense, the effect

of an order sustaining a demurrer to it is to leave no pleading

on file.” Id. at 655. 

While Cohen does generally announce that the effect of an

order sustaining a demurrer is to extinguish the existing

pleading, the court’s pronouncement is rather narrower than

Defendant accedes. The Cohen rationale does not apply to every

instance of a demurrer being sustained. In fact, the Cohen rule

only applies when a complaint is amended in matters of substance

as opposed to matters of form. Id. at 656. 

Case 2:05-cv-01281-MCE -KJM Document 45 Filed 10/27/05 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Although Defendant states that Plaintiff’s second amended

complaint provided a completely new basis for her claims of

fraudulent concealment, a brief review of the record reveals

quite the contrary. Not only did Plaintiff’s claim for

fraudulent concealment survive Defendant’s demurrer, it has

remained substantively constant from Plaintiff’s first filing to

her last. Pl.’s Compl. at 10; Pl.’s Amended Compl. at 11; Pl.’s

Second Amended Compl. at 12.

In light of Plaintiff’s consistent claim that Defendant

fraudulently concealed defects in its products, Defendant’s

argument that Plaintiff’s second amended complaint provides a

completely new basis for relief and therefore commences a new

action is unavailing. The Court finds that Defendant has failed

to meet its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to remand is granted.

2. Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiff is seeking to recover the attorney’s fees she

accrued in moving for remand. Attorney’s fees are proper when

removal is wrong as a matter of law, even though the defendant's

position may be "fairly supportable." Hofler v. Aetna US

Healthcare of Cal., Inc., 296 F.3d 764, 770 (9th Cir.

2002)(internal citations omitted).

Plaintiff avers that she is entitled to her attorney’s fees

because Defendant sought removal despite its knowledge that CAFA

did not apply ex post facto. Plaintiff’s argument distorts

Defendant’s position. 

Case 2:05-cv-01281-MCE -KJM Document 45 Filed 10/27/05 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Defendant has never argued that CAFA is retroactive; rather,

Defendant singularly contends that Plaintiff’s second amended

complaint recommenced her action rendering it subject to CAFA

and, ultimately, subject to this Court’s jurisdiction.

Although this Court has concluded that Plaintiff’s motion to

remand should be granted, Defendant’s removal was not defective

as a matter of law. Defendant advanced a factually, as opposed

to a legally, vacillant argument. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

request for attorney’s fees is denied.

CONCLUSION

This Court finds that no federal question exists on the face

of Plaintiff’s complaint nor does Plaintiff’s second amended

complaint cause this Court to acquire jurisdiction under CAFA. 

Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and

Plaintiff’s motion to remand this case is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 26, 2005

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-01281-MCE -KJM Document 45 Filed 10/27/05 Page 8 of 8