Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01098/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01098-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Central Louisiana Electric Company, Inc.
Intervenor for Respondent
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Respondent
Louisiana Energy and Power Authority
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 22, 1998 Decided April 24, 

1998

No. 97-1098

Louisiana Energy and Power Authority,

Petitioner

v.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,

Respondent

Central Louisiana Electric Company, Inc.,

Intervenor for

Respondent

On Petition for Review of Orders of the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Milton J. Grossman argued the cause for petitioner, with

whom Wallace Edward Brand was on the briefs.

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Timm L. Abendroth, Attorney, Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission, argued the cause for respondent, with whom

John H. Conway, Deputy Solicitor, was on the brief.

John T. Stough, Jr., and Thadd A. Prisco were on the brief

for intervenor Central Louisiana Electric Company, Inc.

Before: Williams, Henderson and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: The Federal Power Act requires

that all rates demanded by public utilities for the transmission or sale of electric energy be "just and reasonable." 16

U.S.C. s 824d(a). Where there is a competitive market, the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) may rely on

market-based rates in lieu of cost-of-service regulation to

ensure that rates satisfy this requirement. Cf. Elizabethtown

Gas Co. v. FERC, 10 F.3d 866, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing "just and reasonable" rate requirement of Natural Gas

Act). Under its precedents, the Commission approves applications to sell electric energy at market-based rates only if

the seller and its affiliates do not have, or adequately have

mitigated, market power 1 in the generation and transmission

of such energy, and cannot erect other barriers to entry by

potential competitors. See, e.g., Heartland Energy Servs.,

Inc., 68 FERC p 61,223 at 62,060 (1994); Louisville Gas &

Elec. Co., 62 FERC p 61,016 at 61,143-44 (1993).

Without holding an evidentiary hearing, FERC approved

an application by Central Louisiana Electric Company

(CLECO) to sell electric energy at market-based rates. Louisiana Electric & Power Authority (LEPA), a competitor and

customer of CLECO, challenges that approval as arbitrary

and capricious, arguing that CLECO does in fact have market

__________

1 FERC defines market power as a seller's ability to "significantly influence price in the market by withholding service and

excluding competitors for a significant period of time." Citizens

Power & Light Corp., 48 FERC p 61,210 at 61,777 (1989).

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power.2 LEPA's express concern is that by leaving CLECO's

rates unregulated, the Commission has freed CLECO to use

predatory pricing 3 to lure away LEPA's customers.

CLECO, on the other hand, argues that LEPA's "true motive" is not to prevent predatory pricing, but rather "to force

CLECO to sell ... at a higher price, so that LEPA itself can

sell at a higher [noncompetitive] price without losing load to

CLECO." Our review is limited to determining whether

FERC's decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. FERC, 883 F.2d 117, 120 (D.C. Cir.

1989) (quoting 5 U.S.C. s 706(2)(A)). Because the Commission's approval of CLECO's application for market-based

rates was none of these, we deny the petition for review.

I

FERC interposes a threshold objection to LEPA's petition,

asserting that LEPA is not a party "aggrieved" by the

Commission's order and hence not entitled to petition for

judicial review under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.

s 825l. A party is "aggrieved" under this statute if it satisfies both the constitutional and prudential requirements for

standing. See Liquid Carbonic Indus. Corp. v. FERC, 29

F.3d 697, 701-04 (D.C. Cir. 1994); cf. Moreau v. FERC, 982

F.2d 556, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (interpreting similar language

in Natural Gas Act). As the Supreme Court recently has

restated, the three constitutional requirements are:

__________

2 LEPA does not challenge FERC's general policy of permitting market-based rates in the absence of market power.

3 The Supreme Court has stated that "[p]redatory pricing may

be defined as pricing below an appropriate measure of cost for the

purpose of eliminating competitors in the short run and reducing

competition in the long run." Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado,

Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986). The Court has left unresolved the

appropriate measure of such "cost." See id. at 117-18 n.12; Brooke

Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,

222-23 & n.1 (1993). Here, LEPA variously describes the predatory pricing about which it is concerned as pricing below "incremental

cost" and as pricing "substantially below costs."

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(1) that the plaintiff have suffered an "injury in fact"--

an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest which is (a)

concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent,

not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) that there be a causal

connection between the injury and the conduct complained of--the injury must be fairly traceable to the

challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of

the independent action of some third party not before the

court; and (3) that it be likely, as opposed to merely

speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1163 (1997). The prudential requirement relevant here is that "the interest sought to

be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone

of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute" in

question. Id. at 1167.

LEPA counters that it is in fact a party "aggrieved" by the

Commission's order. It alleges that it will be injured by the

increased price competition from CLECO that will flow from

FERC's unlawful lifting of regulatory controls. And in support of its contention that such pricing will be predatory,

LEPA asserts a history of oligopolistic collusion in which

CLECO participated, alleges a relatively recent example of

predatory pricing by the oligopoly, and presents an expert's

opinion that the oligopoly will continue to exercise substantial

market power.

FERC did not contest in its brief, and at oral argument

explicitly conceded, that as a competitor and customer LEPA

comes within the zone of interests of the Federal Power Act

and hence has prudential standing to challenge the grant of

CLECO's application. The Commission contends, however,

that LEPA has failed to satisfy the "injury in fact" requirement for constitutional standing. More specifically, it contends that LEPA's injury remains "conjectural or hypothetical" because LEPA has not demonstrated that predatory

pricing, as opposed to lower competitive pricing, "will occur"

under CLECO's new tariff. LEPA must wait to sue, FERC

argues, until it actually is injured by predatory pricing on the

part of CLECO.

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But LEPA will be injured by increased price competition

from CLECO regardless whether that pricing turns out to be

predatory, as LEPA warns, or simply competitive, as CLECO

promises.4 Such injury gives LEPA an "actual" and "imminent," rather than "conjectural or hypothetical," interest sufficient to establish injury in fact. Moreover, that injury also

satisfies the other two constitutional requirements not contested here: it is fairly traceable to FERC's decision freeing

CLECO to price at market-based rates; and it would be

redressed by a favorable decision of this court vacating

FERC's order. See Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners

Ass'n v. Economic Regulatory Admin., 822 F.2d 1105, 1108

(D.C. Cir. 1987).

We repeatedly have held that parties suffer constitutional

injury in fact when agencies lift regulatory restrictions on

their competitors or otherwise allow increased competition.

See, e.g., MD Pharm., Inc. v. DEA, 133 F.3d 8, 11 (D.C. Cir.

1998) ("increased competition represents a cognizable Article

III injury") (quoting Liquid Carbonic, 29 F.3d at 701); Old

Town Trolley Tours, Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit

Comm'n, 129 F.3d 201, 202 (D.C. Cir. 1997); First Nat'l Bank

& Trust Co. v. National Credit Union Admin., 988 F.2d 1272,

1275 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 899

F.2d 1250, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Investment Co. Inst. v.

FDIC, 815 F.2d 1540, 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 620-21 (1971). The

lifting of such restrictions alone is generally sufficient, and we

have not required litigants to wait until increased competition

actually occurs. As we said in Associated Gas Distributors,

__________

4 There is, of course, another possibility: if the asserted oligopoly truly does have market power, it could price above rather than

below the competitive price--the typical concern of classical oligopoly theory. See generally Paul A. Samuelson & William D.

Nordhaus, Economics 532-36 (12th ed. 1985); Donald S. Watson,

Price Theory and Its Uses 413-41 (3d ed. 1972). Under this

scenario, LEPA-as-competitor would be helped rather than harmed

by FERC's decision, and hence would not suffer injury; LEPA-ascustomer, on the other hand, would be injured. No party urges this

scenario here, however.

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"petitioners sufficiently establish their constitutional standing

by showing that the challenged action authorizes allegedly

illegal transactions that have the clear and immediate potential to compete with the petitioners' own sales. They need

not wait for specific, allegedly illegal transactions to hurt

them competitively." 899 F.2d at 1259 (emphasis added).

Accord Panhandle Producers, 822 F.2d at 1108 (competitors

will suffer injury in fact from agency order permitting increase in gas supply because "such an increase in supply is

likely to depress the prices that [competitors] can secure").

None of this renders irrelevant the plausibility of LEPA's

claim that predatory pricing will result from FERC's decision. But whether that pricing is likely to be predatory or

simply competitive is a question that goes to the merits of

FERC's decision to permit market-based rates and not to

constitutional standing.5 As we discuss below, LEPA's alle-

__________

5 Theoretically, it is also the kind of question that could be

relevant to prudential standing. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a

Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1014 n.2 (1998) (citing National R.R.

Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.

453, 456 (1974), for the proposition that "the merits inquiry and the

statutory standing inquiry often 'overlap' "). It is plain that the

antitrust laws, for example, "were enacted for the protection of

competition not competitors." Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-OMat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (internal quotation omitted).

But the same cannot be said about the all-pervasive regulatory

schemes of the Federal Power Act and similar statutes. See

Panhandle Producers, 822 F.2d at 1109 (holding that competitors

have standing to challenge importation order under Natural Gas

Act, and noting difference from standing under antitrust laws); see

also National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust

Co., 118 S. Ct. 927, 933 (1998) ("competitors of financial institutions

have [prudential] standing to challenge agency action relaxing statutory restrictions on the activities of those institutions"); Associated Gas Distribs., 899 F.2d at 1259 (prudential standing of competitors under Natural Gas Act); Regular Common Carrier Conference

v. United States, 793 F.2d 376, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("competitive

injury is included within the zone of interests protected by the

Interstate Commerce Act"). Here, FERC does not dispute that

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gation that FERC's decision will lead to predatory pricing,

like its claim that a company with as much market power as

CLECO should not be freed of price regulation, is the core of

LEPA's argument that FERC's order was arbitrary and

capricious, and hence unlawful. A party need not prove that

the agency action it attacks is unlawful, however, in order to

have standing to level that attack.6 As we said in Claybrook

v. Slater, 111 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1997), "[w]hether a

plaintiff has a legally protected interest (and thus standing)

does not depend on whether he can demonstrate that he will

succeed on the merits. Otherwise, every unsuccessful plaintiff will have lacked standing in the first place." To be sure,

claims that are "entirely frivolous," Steel Co. v. Citizens for a

Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1014 n.2 (1998), or have "no

foundation in law," Claybrook, 111 F.3d at 907, are insufficient to establish standing. LEPA's allegations, however,

cannot be characterized as frivolous, and FERC does not

suggest otherwise.

Nor are LEPA's claims unripe under our decision in Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (NIPSCO) v. FERC, 954 F.2d

736 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In that case, NIPSCO challenged a

__________

both concerns, predation and competition, come within the zone of

interests of the Federal Power Act.

6 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (holding that the

"core component" of constitutional standing is that "plaintiff must

allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly

unlawful conduct ...") (emphasis added); Old Town Trolley, 129

F.3d at 202 (petitioner does not have to prove the public interest

claim required to defeat a competitor's entry on the merits in order

to pass the threshold of standing); Associated Gas Distribs., 899

F.2d at 1258 ("Those who must compete with allegedly illegal

commercial transactions have Article III standing to challenge a

regulatory order authorizing the transactions.") (emphasis added);

In re Thornburgh, 869 F.2d 1503, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("the

[redressability prong of the standing] test assumes that a decision

on the merits would be favorable"); see also Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at

1014 n.2 ("[t]he Article III requirement of remediable injury in fact

... except with regard to entirely frivolous claims ... has nothing

to do with the text of the statute relied upon"); id. at 1011, 1013.

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FERC order approving an open-access transmission tariff for

a neighboring utility, contending that open-access transmissions through that utility would put additional stress on

NIPSCO's own facilities. We accepted FERC's interpretation of its order as approving "merely the concept and outline

of open-access but [not as giving] ... final authorization to

conduct any open-access transactions." Id. at 738, 740. On

that basis, we held NIPSCO's claims "premature" and not

ripe. Id. at 740. We indicated, however, that "NIPSCO's

claims probably would be ripe" if "the orders [had] authorize[d] [the neighboring utility] to provide open-access service

without further FERC action." Id. at 738. In this case,

FERC clearly has authorized CLECO to sell power at

market-based rates "without further FERC action." FERC's

order permitted CLECO's market-based tariff "to become

effective on October 8, 1996," subject only to certain revisions

it ordered CLECO to make within 15 days. Central Louisiana Elec. Co., 77 FERC p 61,020 at 61,074 (1996).7 The

revisions were made, see LEPA Br. at 4, the order is effective, and CLECO is now free to compete with LEPA at

market-based rates. Hence, there is nothing premature

about LEPA's challenge.8

II

Although LEPA has standing and its claims are ripe, its

case fails on the merits. In approving CLECO's application,

__________

7 FERC's order also requires CLECO to report market-based

transactions, as well as "change[s] in status that would reflect a

departure from the characteristics the Commission has relied upon

in approving market-based pricing." 77 FERC p 61,020 at 61,074.

That the Commission may subsequently act on such reports does

not render LEPA's current challenge unripe. Any such subsequent

agency action would involve a new proceeding.

8 Cf. Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 173, 177-

80 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (rejecting FERC argument that it was "premature[ ]" for the court to consider whether the agency's approval of

cost-recovery provisions would have an anticompetitive effect because affected parties could still challenge recovery of such costs in

particular cases).

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the Commission concluded that CLECO lacked market power

in the generation of electric energy, and that by filing an

open-access transmission tariff (discussed further below),

CLECO mitigated its market power over transmission.

LEPA first challenges FERC's definition of the relevant

market for generation.9 We need not review that extended

challenge here, however, because even if LEPA's showing

were strong enough to overcome the deference due FERC's

expert judgment on the matter, cf. National Aviation Trades

Ass'n v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 420 F.2d 209, 213-14 (D.C.

Cir. 1969) (deferring to Civil Aeronautics Board's definition of

product market), the issue is essentially moot. LEPA does

not dispute that even under its own definition of the relevant

market, CLECO's market share is still too low (8.7%) to

justify a finding of disqualifying market power under FERC's

precedents, see Louisville Gas, 62 FERC p 61,016 at 61,146

(finding that market shares of less than 20% are low enough

to demonstrate lack of market power), or to suggest that

CLECO has sufficient market power to engage in predatory

pricing, see Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479

U.S. 104, 119 n.15 (1986) (noting that 20.4% market share is

probably insufficient to sustain predatory pricing, and citing

authorities indicating that 60% or more would be necessary).

Because under any definition CLECO lacks sufficient market power on its own, LEPA is compelled to argue that

CLECO is part of an oligopoly that controls 86% of the

market. LEPA asserts that the members of the oligopoly

have refrained from competing for each other's customers in

the past, are unlikely to compete in the future notwithstanding changes in the regulatory environment, and hence provide

__________

9 LEPA argues that the Commission's market analysis was

flawed because it did not separately evaluate generation dominance

in the market for requirements power, which it defines as "power

sold by bulk suppliers to retail distributors with a complete assurance of availability." Central Louisiana Elec. Co., 77 FERC

p 61,020 at 61,072.

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the market structure necessary to support predatory pricing.

FERC rejects this assertion as "broad and unsubstantiated."

Central Louisiana Elec. Co., 78 FERC p 61,089 at 61,325

(1997) (order denying rehearing). That characterization

seems appropriate. The only evidence LEPA advances to

support its claim is the affidavit of an economics expert. See

Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 54-94. But the expert's theoretical

conclusion that the relevant market is dominated by a "tight

oligopoly" whose members do not compete with each other is

concededly based entirely on undocumented assertions of

historical fact by LEPA's former general manager. Cf.

Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

509 U.S. 209, 242 (1993) ("When an expert opinion is not

supported by sufficient facts to validate it ..., it cannot

support a jury's verdict."). Moreover, although the expert

characterizes the market structure as a tight oligopoly, he

does not address whether that structure's components are

sufficient to satisfy the specific prerequisites for successful

predatory pricing--indeed, he does not mention the prospect

of future predatory pricing at all. Cf. id. at 226 ("Determining whether recoupment of predatory losses is likely requires

... a close analysis of ... the structure and conditions of the

relevant market."). And while LEPA filed a complaint in a

separate FERC proceeding asserting a past instance of predatory pricing, the administrative law judge who heard the

case rejected LEPA's claim, see Central Louisiana Elec. Co.,

70 FERC p 63,015 (1995), and the facts of that proceeding are

not before us. Given the well-recognized difficulties faced by

an oligopoly attempting to coordinate a predatory pricing

scheme among multiple firms, see Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at

227-28, and the absence of any evidence from LEPA addressing those difficulties in the specific context of the market at

issue here, we find reasonable FERC's conclusion that there

are no market-power considerations that should bar

CLECO's application to sell at unregulated rates. See generally K N Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1295, 1303 (D.C.

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Cir. 1992) (acknowledging "substantial deference" owed to

FERC "in matters predictive and economic").10

We also find reasonable FERC's further argument that

even if CLECO had participated in oligopolistic behavior in

the past, the Commission's new open-access transmission

rules have transformed the competitive environment. Those

rules seek to break a utility's monopoly over the transmission

of electric power by requiring that the utility permit wholesale sellers to transmit power over its facilities under the

same terms and conditions as the utility itself transmits

power. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open

Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public

Utilities ("Order No. 888"), 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,540-42

(1996).11 Thus, competitors outside the current, alleged oligopoly will now be able to transmit power into CLECO's

territory on nondiscriminatory terms. Whatever may have

been their past practices, FERC believes that this change

renders it unlikely that "energy suppliers will decline to

participate in the emerging competitive markets." Central

Louisiana Elec. Co., 77 FERC p 61,020 at 61,073. This is the

kind of reasonable agency prediction about the future impact

of its own regulatory policies to which we ordinarily defer.

See Michigan Pub. Power Agency v. FERC, 963 F.2d 1574,

1580 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("agencies are afforded wide deference

in predicting the likelihood of future events"); Environmental Action, Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d 1057, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1991)

__________

10 We also note petitioner's statement at oral argument that

Entergy, Inc., the largest member of the alleged oligopoly with a

70% market share, already has received FERC approval to price at

market rates and that LEPA, pursuant to a settlement, will not

challenge that approval. LEPA has not explained how FERC's

approval of market rates for CLECO (with only an 8.7% market

share) would materially affect the likelihood of predation under

these circumstances.

11 Order No. 888 has been challenged in petitions for review

filed with the Second Circuit, which recently ordered the litigation

transferred to this Circuit. See New York v. FERC, No. 97-4034

(2d Cir. Feb. 26, 1998). The validity of Order No. 888 is not before

us in this case.

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("it is within the scope of the agency's expertise to make such

a prediction about the market it regulates, and a reasonable

prediction deserves our deference notwithstanding that there

might also be another reasonable view"); Michigan Consol.

Gas, 883 F.2d at 124 ("Making predictions is clearly within

the Commission's expertise and will be upheld if rationally

based on record evidence.") (citations and internal quotations

omitted).

Indeed, in the context of LEPA's fears of predatory pricing, this change in the competitive environment is particularly

potent. It means that CLECO will not be able to price below

cost to drive LEPA out of business, and then rely on the

forbearance of its oligopoly partners to allow it to recoup its

predatory losses by pricing supracompetitively. However

much those partners might be willing to cooperate (which

would itself require a difficult allocation of present losses and

future gains), they will be unable to prevent other potential

competitors from transmitting power into the area if prices

become supracompetitive. Yet, without an expectation of

successful recoupment, a rational seller is unlikely to undertake a course of predatory pricing. See Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-89 (1986).

Finally, FERC notes that should the Commission's sanguine predictions about market conduct turn out to be incorrect, LEPA can file a new complaint for any abuses of market

power that do occur. See Central Louisiana Elec. Co., 77

FERC p 61,020 at 61,073. While this escape hatch might be

insufficient if LEPA had shown a substantial likelihood that

FERC's predictions would prove incorrect,12 it provides an

appropriate safeguard against the uncertainties of FERC's

prognostications where there has been no such showing.13

On the record before us, the likelihood is that competition and

consumer welfare will be enhanced rather than undercut by

__________

12 See Cajun Elec., 28 F.3d at 177-80; Michigan Pub. Power,

963 F.2d at 1581.

13 See Environmental Action v. FERC, 996 F.2d 401, 410 (D.C.

Cir. 1993); Michigan Pub. Power, 963 F.2d at 1579-81.

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the ability of CLECO to sell at market-based rates, and

hence the direction in which FERC has chosen to err, if it

errs at all, seems perfectly reasonable. Cf. Cargill, 479 U.S.

at 122 n.17 ("because cutting prices in order to increase

business often is the very essence of competition ... mistaken inferences [of predatory conduct] ... are especially costly") (internal quotation omitted); Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at

224 ("unsuccessful predation is in general a boon to consumers"); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Antitrust Policy in the New

Electricity Industry, 17 Energy L.J. 29, 34-41 (1996).

III

We also reject LEPA's allegation that it was arbitrary and

capricious for FERC to approve CLECO's application without first holding an evidentiary hearing. In general, the

Commission must hold an evidentiary hearing "only when a

genuine issue of material fact exists, and even then, FERC

need not conduct such a hearing if [the disputed issues] may

be adequately resolved on the written record." Cajun Elec.

Power Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 173, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

(internal quotations and citations omitted). We will reverse

FERC's decision to deny an evidentiary hearing only for an

abuse of discretion. See id.

Contrary to LEPA's claims, this is not a case like Cajun

Electric, where the record revealed a substantial factual

dispute as to whether a FERC-approved tariff truly mitigated

a utility's monopoly power, see id. at 175, and where the

Commission "ignored this important question" and "failed to

adequately explain its approval," id. at 180. Here, FERC

neither ignored LEPA's concerns about market power, nor

failed to explain adequately why they did not carry the day.

Moreover, because LEPA conceded that even under its definition of the relevant market, CLECO by itself did not

possess market power, the only arguably disputed material

fact was whether CLECO was a member of a historical

oligopoly capable of supporting a predatory pricing scheme.

That assertion may well have been so unsubstantiated as to

justify a decision on the written record. See Michigan Pub.

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Power, 963 F.2d at 1583 (FERC "need not launch a full

investigation just because a party cries 'anticompetitive behavior' "). But regardless of its validity, that claim, too, was

rendered nonmaterial by FERC's conclusion that the advent

of open-access transmission tariffs made such historical conduct a poor predictor of future competitive behavior. That

left only the question whether FERC's own prediction about

the competitive future was reasonable. And in light of the

considerations discussed in Part II above, that was an issue

the Commission could readily resolve against LEPA on the

written record. Cf. id.; Louisiana Ass'n of Indep. Producers

& Royalty Owners v. FERC, 958 F.2d 1101, 1113-14 (D.C.

Cir. 1992).

In sum, we find neither FERC's approval of CLECO's

market-based tariff, nor its decision to render that approval

without an evidentiary hearing, arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, we deny LEPA's petition for review.

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