Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02011/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02011-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Matthew Henry Leppa
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2011

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Matthew Henry Leppa, *

*

Defendant-Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: November 14, 2006

Filed: December 11, 2006

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, LAY and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

LAY, Circuit Judge.

Matthew Henry Leppa appeals the sentence imposed by the district court. We

reverse.

BACKGROUND

On May 10, 2005, Leppa was charged by indictment with several controlled

substance violations stemming from a marijuana growing operation. Pursuant to a

plea agreement, Leppa pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to manufacture fifty or

more marijuana plants, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 849. The plea agreement

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Leppa’s guidelines range of supervised release of two to three years was

modified by operation of the three-year statutory minimum for his offense. See USSG

§ 5G1.1; 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).

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contemplated a sentencing range of 36 to 47 months of imprisonment, and a statutory

minimum term of at least three years of supervised release.

Prior to sentencing, a presentence report (PSR) was prepared. It calculated a

sentencing range greater than the parties anticipated due to Leppa’s criminal history.

Consistent with the plea agreement, however, the PSR stated that Leppa’s guidelines

range of supervised release was three years.1

At sentencing, the government moved for a departure based on Leppa’s

substantial assistance, see USSG § 5K1.1, but the district court denied the motion. It

did, however, grant a departure based on the overstatement of Leppa’s criminal

history, see USSG § 4A1.3, p.s., for a resulting guidelines range of 46 to 57 months.

The court sentenced Leppa to a term of 46 months of imprisonment, to be followed

by four years of supervised release. The court provided no explanation whatsoever

for deviating from the guidelines and imposing four, rather than three, years of

supervised release.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Leppa contests the imposition of a term of supervised release greater

than recommended by the guidelines. At the outset, we must consider our standard

of review. Leppa did not at any time raise an objection to the four-year term, which

would typically limit our review to plain error. United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543,

550 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). He argues, however, that the court’s “lack of notice

itself undermined the defense’s meaningful opportunity to object.” (Def’t Br. at 8.)

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At least one circuit has declined to employ the plain error doctrine when

reviewing an increased supervised release term that neither party sought or anticipated

and which the district court imposed without notice. See United States v. CortesClaudio, 312 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 2002). Respectfully, we reject this approach and

rather adhere to our traditional, limited review of unpreserved errors consistent with

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). We agree with the First Circuit that the

timing of a sentencing court’s pronouncement of sentence makes correction of “last

minute” errors difficult. Nonetheless, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a)

permits a court to correct clear sentencing errors within seven days of sentencing.

Thus, even if the timing of the error makes a contemporaneous objection impractical,

a defendant’s timely Rule 35 motion would alert the sentencing court to the error in

the first instance and provide it the opportunity to correct itself. See, e.g., United

States v. Ellis, 417 F.3d 931, 933 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding a claim of sentencing error

to be preserved where defendant first raised it by way of a Rule 35(a) motion). Leppa

made no such motion here, nor did he take any action to alert the district court of the

error he now contends was obvious on its face. Accordingly, we decline to treat his

claim of error as if it were preserved, and instead review for plain error. Under this

standard, Leppa must show: (1) an error; (2) that was plain; (3) that affected his

substantial rights; and (4) that, if left uncorrected, would result in a miscarriage of

justice. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-34 (1993); Pirani, 406 F.3d at 550.

It is undisputed that the guidelines call for three years of supervised release for

Leppa’s offense, USSG § 5D1.2(a)(2), yet the district court imposed four years

without prior notice or any explanation for the higher sentence. Leppa and the

government quarrel about whether the increased term ought to be construed as a

departure or a variance from the guidelines. Our review of the record leads us to

conclude, however, that it is neither: the district court’s sentence appears to simply

reflect a mistake.

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At Leppa’s hearing on his guilty plea, the district court told Leppa that he was

subject to a three- to five-year guidelines term of supervised release. This, of course,

was wrong. In its Statement of Reasons accompanying Leppa’s sentence, the district

court repeated this mistake, again erroneously determining his guidelines range of

supervised release to be three to five years. In this document, the district court also

affirmed its belief that the sentence it imposed was within the guidelines range.

Moreover, at the sentencing hearing, there was no discussion whatsoever concerning

increasing Leppa’s term of supervised release beyond his guidelines range, by way of

either a departure or a variance. Thus, we are of the firm belief that the district court

simply misapprehended Leppa’s guidelines range of supervised release. This was a

plain error, satisfying the first two elements of Olano.

We now turn to whether Leppa was prejudiced by the error, that is, whether it

affected Leppa’s substantial rights. United States v. Nahia, 437 F.3d 715, 716-17 (8th

Cir. 2006). To do so, he must show a “reasonable probability” that if not for the error,

he would have received a more favorable sentence. Pirani, 406 F.3d at 552. We find

he has carried this burden. The sentence imposed was outside of the range

recommended by the guidelines, something which may only be realized by way of a

departure or a variance. While these two vehicles for “outside the guidelines”

sentences differ in some respects, both require some basis for the district court’s

deviation to appear on the record. See generally USSG § 5K2.0, p.s. & comment.;

United States v. Bueno, 443 F.3d 1017, 1023-24 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v.

Rivera, 439 F.3d 446, 447-48 (8th Cir. 2006). In that respect, this record is lacking.

As we have made clear, there is a “range of reasonableness” in which

sentencing courts may choose to fashion a just punishment, United States v. Saenz,

428 F.3d 1159, 1165 (8th Cir. 2005), and a one-year increase in an offender’s term of

supervised release may well fall within that range. That, however, is not the question

before us. Instead, we must ask whether Leppa has shown a likelihood that he would

receive a more lenient sentence if the error was corrected. The error here, as noted

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Recently, a panel of our court left uncorrected an error resulting in the payment

of an additional $100 special assessment, in recognition that not every additional

punishment erroneously imposed is “‘serious enough . . . to be described as a

miscarriage of justice and thus constitute plain error.’” United States v. Bailey, ___

Fed. App’x ___, 2006 WL 3373050, at *2 (8th Cir. Nov. 22, 2006) (unpublished per

curiam) (quoting United States v. McCarter, 406 F.3d 460, 464 (7th Cir. 2005)).

There is a considerable qualitative difference, however, between a $100 assessment

wrongly imposed and the restraint on a person’s liberty.

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above, was the district court’s apparent misapprehension of the guidelines range. By

all indications, the district court believed it was imposing a guidelines sentence, and,

indeed, there is no evidence to support the view that it would deviate from a

guidelines sentence in this respect absent the error. Because the correct guidelines

sentence of supervised release is three years, Leppa has demonstrated he was

prejudiced by the erroneous imposition of a four-year term.

Lastly, we consider whether leaving the error uncorrected will result in a

miscarriage of justice by seriously affecting “‘the fairness, integrity or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 (quoting United States

v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)). Leppa’s period of supervision was

erroneously increased by a full year. If, during that period, Leppa were to violate the

conditions of his supervised release, he would be subject to yet another term of

imprisonment and an increased term of supervised release. See generally USSG

§ 7B1.1-5, p.s. Given this impingement on his liberty, “we have no trouble in

concluding that the error would result in a miscarriage of justice if left uncorrected.”

United States v. Spigner, 416 F.3d 708, 713 (8th Cir. 2005); accord United States v.

Comstock, 154 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 1998) (“easily conclud[ing]” that a sentencing

error which resulted in the imposition of seventeen additional months of imprisonment

seriously affected the fairness of the defendant’s sentencing proceedings). We thus

exercise our discretion to correct the error.2

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Because the error in this case concerned the district court’s application of the

guidelines, we express no opinion on whether a four-year term of supervised release

would be reasonable. United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1017 (8th Cir. 2005).

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the district court’s imposition of a

four-year term of supervised release, and remand for resentencing consistent with

this opinion.3

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