Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-08-04118/USCOURTS-ca4-08-04118-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellant
Darnell Anthony Young
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 08-4117

DARNELL ANTHONY YOUNG, a/k/a

DJ Nelly Nell, a/k/a Nelly,

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 08-4118

DARNELL ANTHONY YOUNG, a/k/a

DJ Nelly Nell, a/k/a Nelly,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.

(1:06-cr-00491-WDQ-1)

Argued: May 11, 2010

Decided: June 28, 2010

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and

AGEE, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published

opinion. Chief Judge Traxler wrote the opinion, in which

Judge Niemeyer and Judge Agee joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: William A. Mitchell, Jr., BRENNAN, SULLIVAN & MCKENNA, LLP, Greenbelt, Maryland, for

Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Tonya Kelly Kowitz, OFFICE OF

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland,

for Appellee/Cross-Appellant. ON BRIEF: Alexander Zeno,

Washington, D.C., for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Rod J.

Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Jason M. Weinstein,

Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for

Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

OPINION

TRAXLER, Chief Judge:

Darnell Young was convicted of drug-related charges and

received a within-Guidelines sentence of 136 months’ imprisonment. Young appeals his convictions and sentence, and the

government cross-appeals the sentence imposed by the district

court. We reject Young’s challenges, but we agree with the

government that the district court erred when it concluded that

the drug-quantity determinations made by the jury prevented

the court from finding a different quantity at sentencing.

Accordingly, we affirm Young’s convictions, vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing.

I.

After a lengthy investigation, the government in October

2006 indicted Young on various drug and weapons charges,

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alleging that Young was part of a conspiracy to distribute

cocaine that operated from 1999 through 2004. On November

1, 2006, the government obtained a warrant authorizing

Young’s arrest. After the warrant was issued, the government

ultimately determined that Young lived in a townhouse in

Owings Mills, Maryland.

On November 6, 2006, federal law enforcement agents

established surveillance of Young’s townhouse to determine

if he was there and could be arrested. The agents watched a

silver SUV park near the townhouse and saw a man later

identified as Errol Wynter approach the house. Wynter

knocked on the door and the door was quickly opened. While

Wynter was inside the townhouse, the agents checked the

license plate number of the SUV and learned that it was titled

to a car dealership associated with someone known to law

enforcement as "Clive," who was believed to be Young’s

cocaine supplier. After about five minutes, Wynter emerged

from the townhouse carrying a red plastic bag. Agents

stopped Wynter shortly after he left the townhouse and found

in the vehicle five cell phones and the red plastic bag, which

contained approximately $40,000 packaged in bundles. The

agents seized the money and allowed Wynter to leave. 

Shortly after Wynter was stopped, the agents obtained a

key to Young’s townhouse from the complex’s leasing office

and then proceeded to Young’s townhouse. The agents repeatedly knocked loudly on the door and announced themselves

as police. When Young did not answer the door after approximately twenty seconds, an agent used the key and opened the

door. When the agents entered, they saw Young on the stairs,

which were adjacent to the front door. Young did not comply

when the agents ordered him to lie on the floor, so the agents

forced him to the ground, removed a loaded gun from the

waistband of his pants, and handcuffed him.1

1Young testified at the suppression hearing that he heard banging at his

door but did not hear the police announce themselves. When he heard the

banging at the door, Young took his gun from a box in his bedroom,

loaded it, and put it in his waistband before going downstairs. 

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The kitchen was just a few feet away from where the officers entered the house, and an open plastic bag was on the

kitchen island in plain view. The agents could see into the bag

and saw that it contained two brick-shaped items composed of

a white powder that appeared to be cocaine. The agents then

applied for a search warrant, and they waited at the house for

the warrant. After receiving the search warrant, the agents

searched the house and found two kilograms of cocaine in the

plastic bag in the kitchen, approximately three kilograms of

cocaine in the washing machine, $17,000 in cash, and seven

cell phones and chargers. One of those cell phones had been

used only from October 12, 2006, through November 4, 2006

—two days before Young was arrested. That phone had been

used to make and receive calls from only one number, a number that belonged to one of the cell phones seized from Wynter. 

The day after Young was arrested, the government obtained

a superseding indictment, changing the end-date of the conspiracy to on or about November 6, 2006, the date of Young’s

arrest, and adding Wynter as a co-defendant, who by then had

been identified as cocaine supplier "Clive." Although the

indictment alleged a seven-year conspiracy, the government at

trial focused only on the relationship between Young and

Wynter and only presented evidence recovered from Young’s

house on November 6, and from Wynter when he was stopped

on November 6 and when he was arrested two days later.

Wynter eventually pleaded guilty, and Young proceeded to

trial.

At trial, Young sought to suppress the evidence seized from

his house, arguing that the agents did not properly knock and

announce their presence before entering his townhouse to execute the arrest warrant. The district court denied the motion,

concluding that the officers complied with the knock-andannounce requirements before entering the house and saw in

plain view the cocaine on the kitchen counter when they

entered.

4 UNITED STATES v. YOUNG

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The jury convicted Young of conspiracy to distribute

cocaine, see 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West 1999), and distribution

of and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, see 21

U.S.C.A. § 841(a) (West 1999), but acquitted Young of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime,

see 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c) (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). By way

of a special verdict form, the jury concluded that, as to both

the conspiracy and substantive drug counts, at least 500 grams

but less than five kilograms of cocaine were involved.

The presentence report prepared for Young’s sentencing

concluded that Young was involved in the distribution of at

least 50 but less than 150 kilograms of cocaine. After applying two offense-level enhancements, the PSR determined that

Young’s total offense level should be 40, which, when combined with Young’s category I criminal history, yielded an

advisory sentencing range of 292-365 months.

At the sentencing hearing, the government sought to present evidence to establish that Young was involved in the distribution of between 90 and 100 kilograms of cocaine. The

district court, however, announced its intention to sentence

Young based on the drug quantity found by the jury, not the

quantity recommended in the PSR. The court stated that

because the jury had concluded beyond a reasonable doubt

that the case involved at least 500 grams but less than five

kilograms of cocaine, the court was not free to increase

Young’s punishment within the statutory maximum by concluding, under a lower standard of proof, that a greater quantity of drugs was involved. To preserve an adequate record for

appeal, the court permitted the government to proffer its drugquantity evidence, and the court made a finding that the proffered evidence would have established that Young’s offenses

involved between 90 and 100 kilograms of cocaine.

Based on the jury’s drug-quantity determination, the district

court set Young’s base offense level at 30. The court added

a two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm, but

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rejected the government’s request for a two-level obstruction

of justice enhancement, for a total base offense level of 32.

With Young’s category I criminal history, the advisory

Guidelines sentencing range was 121-150 months, and the

district court sentenced Young to 136 months. If the district

court had accepted the drug quantity established by the government’s proffer, Young’s offense level would have been 38

and his advisory sentencing range would have been 235-293

months.

II.

We first consider Young’s various challenges to his convictions and sentence.

A.

Young contends that the district court erred in denying his

motion to suppress the evidence seized from his townhouse.

The warrant for Young’s arrest gave police the authority to

enter his house to effect the arrest, provided that they had reason to believe he was present in the house. See Payton v. New

York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980) ("[F]or Fourth Amendment

purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in

which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the

suspect is within."). Young does not contend that the arrest

warrant was invalid, or that the police lacked reason to

believe he was inside the house. Instead, Young argues that

the evidence should be suppressed because the police when

executing the arrest warrant failed to properly knock and

announce their presence before entering his house.

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable

searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. One element of the reasonableness inquiry is the requirement that

police knock, announce their presence, and wait a reasonable

time before entering a house to execute a search or arrest war6 UNITED STATES v. YOUNG

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rant. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995). This

constitutional requirement is reflected in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3109,

which provides that an officer "may break open any outer or

inner door or window of a house . . . to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused

admittance." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3109 (West 2000); see United

States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 882 (4th Cir. 1994).2

Although an officer may not forcibly enter unless he has been

refused admittance, such a refusal need not be expressly made

—"the refusal may be constructive or reasonably inferred

from the circumstances." United States v. Gallegos, 314 F.3d

456, 459 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The officers in this case did knock and announce their presence before entering the townhouse. Young, however, contends that the twenty seconds the officers waited before

entering the townhouse was not long enough for them to infer

that they had been refused admittance. According to Young,

the agents should have waited a minimum of two minutes

before entering his house. We disagree.

"[A] constructive refusal occurs, giving police the right to

enter by force, where the occupants do not admit the officers

within a reasonable period of time." Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). Because the ultimate question is the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct, there can be no bright-line

rule establishing the length of time that police must wait to

enter after announcing their presence. The reasonableness of

the delay varies with each case and depends on the totality of

the circumstances. See United States v. Lipford, 203 F.3d 259,

270 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Ward, 171 F.3d 188,

193-94 (4th Cir. 1999).

2While section 3109 refers only to search warrants, its standards govern

the execution of arrest warrants as well. See Miller v. United States, 357

U.S. 301, 308-09 (1958); United States v. Alejandro, 368 F.3d 130, 133

(2d Cir. 2004). 

UNITED STATES v. YOUNG 7

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Implicit in the district court’s conclusion that the agents

complied with the knock-and-announce requirements is the

factual determination that the twenty-second wait was reasonable. We cannot conclude that the district court clearly erred

in that regard. See United States v. Wardrick, 350 F.3d 446,

451 (4th Cir. 2003) ("In considering a district court’s denial

of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de

novo."); Ward, 171 F.3d at 194 (reviewing for clear error district court’s finding that agents waited a reasonable time after

knocking and announcing before entering); United States v.

Banks, 10 F.3d 1044, 1057 (4th Cir. 1993) (reviewing explicit

and implicit factual findings for clear error). Young himself

testified at the suppression hearing that the townhouse was

relatively small, and the agents had just observed Young

promptly answer the door when Wynter knocked. Under these

circumstances, we believe the agents could reasonably infer

after twenty seconds that they had been effectively refused

admittance to the townhouse. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 436 F.3d 1045, 1049 (8th Cir. 2006) ("[E]ntry into the residence of a drug trafficking suspect, ten seconds after

knocking and announcing at a reasonable evening hour, was

constitutionally reasonable."); United States v. Pennington,

328 F.3d 215, 221 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding no knock-andannounce violation where officers forcibly entered defendant’s residence eight to ten seconds after announcing their

presence); United States v. Spriggs, 996 F.2d 320, 323 (D.C.

Cir. 1993) (finding fifteen-second wait sufficient to satisfy the

requirements of the knock-and-announce rule). The district

court therefore did not err in concluding that the agents complied with their knock-and-announce obligations.3

3

In Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006), the Supreme Court

held that suppression is not an appropriate remedy for knock-andannounce violations occurring in the execution of search warrants. The

government contends that Hudson applies to knock-and-announce violations arising from the execution of arrest warrants, see United States v.

Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194, 201 (1st Cir. 2006) (concluding that Hudson

applies in the context of an arrest warrant), while Young argues that there

8 UNITED STATES v. YOUNG

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Young also contends that the evidence should have been

suppressed because the police used the arrest warrant as a pretext to search his house. According to Young, the police had

ample opportunity to arrest him outside his house in the days

before they executed the arrest warrant, and on the day of the

arrest they could have simply waited for him to come outside.

Young thus argues that the police used the arrest warrant as

a pretext to get inside the house where they could search for

drugs, and he contends that the evidence found in his house

should therefore be suppressed.

This argument is without merit. Whether or not the agents

executing the warrant hoped there might be evidence in plain

view once they entered the house, their subjective motivations

are irrelevant to our Fourth Amendment analysis. See Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) ("An

action is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, regardless

of the individual officer’s state of mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action. The officer’s

subjective motivation is irrelevant." (citation, internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). The arrest warrant gave

the agents the right to enter Young’s house, and the agents

properly executed that warrant and saw drugs in plain view

when they entered. Those drugs provided probable cause for

the agents to obtain a search warrant, and execution of that

warrant led to the discovery of other evidence. Because

Young does not challenge the validity of the arrest warrant or

the subsequently issued search warrant, there is no basis to

suppress the evidence found in his house.

B.

Young also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conspiracy conviction. According to Young, the

are different considerations present in arrest-warrant cases that counsel

against an extension of Hudson. Given our conclusion that the agents complied with the knock-and-announce requirements, we need not consider

whether Hudson applies in cases involving the execution of arrest warrants. 

UNITED STATES v. YOUNG 9

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government’s evidence at most showed the existence of a

buyer-seller relationship between Young and Wynter, which

Young contends is insufficient to show the existence of a conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Mills, 995 F.2d 480, 485

(4th Cir. 1993) (noting that evidence showing a buyer-seller

relationship is not alone enough to establish a drugdistribution conspiracy).

"A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence

faces a heavy burden," United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233,

245 (4th Cir. 2007), because the jury’s verdict "must be

upheld on appeal if there is substantial evidence in the record

to support it," id. at 244 (emphasis added). "[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept

as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Our review

is thus limited to determining whether, "viewing the evidence

and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the

light most favorable to the [g]overnment, . . . the evidence

adduced at trial could support any rational determination of

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 863.

The evidence presented at trial established that Young was

in possession of almost five kilograms of cocaine, a quantity

that clearly was large enough to permit the jury to conclude

that the drugs were intended for distribution. See United

States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 878 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Intent

to distribute may be inferred from the quantity of drugs possessed."). Young and Wynter were each in possession of a

large amount of cash, which could be rationally viewed by the

jury as evidence of their involvement in a drug-distribution

scheme. See United States v. Fisher, 912 F.2d 728, 731 (4th

Cir. 1990) ("The large amount of cash found in Fisher’s possession . . . is additional circumstantial evidence of his

involvement in narcotics distribution."). The evidence that

Young was in possession of multiple cell phones, including

one that was used only to call and receive calls from one of

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Wynter’s many cell phones, could likewise be viewed by the

jury as evidence of a drug-distribution conspiracy involving

Young and Wynter, particularly since a government expert

testified at trial that drug dealers frequently use different cell

phones to make and receive calls from their supplier, their

customers, and their families. The government’s evidence

thus established much more than a mere buyer-seller relationship between Young and Wynter, and the evidence was more

than sufficient to support Young’s conviction for conspiring

to distribute cocaine. See United States v. Reid, 523 F.3d 310,

317 (4th Cir. 2008) ("[E]vidence of continuing relationships

and repeated transactions can support the finding that there

was a conspiracy, especially when coupled with substantial

quantities of drugs."); United States v. Yearwood, 518 F.3d

220, 226 (4th Cir.) ("[E]vidence of [a buyer-seller] relationship, when combined with evidence of a substantial quantity

of drugs . . . would support a reasonable inference that the

parties were coconspirators." (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 137 (2008).

C.

Finally, Young raises various challenges to his sentence. As

to two of his claims (his claim that a district court does not

have the authority to increase a sentence beyond the statutory

minimum by making its own findings of fact and his claim

that a district court should not be able to enhance a sentence

based on acquitted conduct), Young acknowledges that the

claims are foreclosed by circuit precedent. He makes no substantive arguments on those claims but merely seeks to preserve the issues for possible en banc review, and we need not

address those claims.

The one argument that Young does substantively address,

however, is also foreclosed by precedent. According to

Young, requiring sentencing courts to consider the factors set

out in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2010)

creates a mandatory sentencing scheme that is functionally

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identical to the mandatory Guidelines system that the

Supreme Court in Booker concluded violated the Sixth

Amendment. Young therefore argues that the post-Booker

sentencing procedure likewise violates the Sixth Amendment.

Consideration of the § 3553(a) factors is mandated by

Supreme Court precedent, see, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552

U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007), and we are not at liberty to disregard

Supreme Court precedent. Young must therefore direct his

argument to the Supreme Court, not this court. 

III.

We now turn to the government’s cross-appeal challenging

the sentence imposed by the district court. The government

argues that the district court erred by concluding that the

jury’s drug-quantity finding prevented the court from determining that the drug quantity for sentencing purposes was

higher than the amount found by the jury. The government

contends that the jury’s finding established the maximum sentence Young was eligible to receive under the statute but did

not otherwise affect the district court’s authority to find facts

as necessary to fix the sentence within that statutory maximum. We agree.

Under section 841, the minimum and maximum sentences

available for drug offenses increase as the quantity of drugs

increases. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) (setting minimum sentence of 10 years and maximum sentence of life

imprisonment for cases involving five kilograms or more of

cocaine); id. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) (setting minimum sentence of

five years and maximum sentence of 40 years for cases

involving 500 grams or more of cocaine); id. § 841(b)(1)(C)

(setting no minimum sentence and maximum sentence of 20

years for cases involving unspecified quantities of a schedule

II controlled substance). The drug-quantity thresholds set

forth in § 841 are elements of the "aggravated drug trafficking

offense[s]." United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 156 (4th

Cir. 2001) (en banc). Thus, unless the drug-quantity threshold

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is alleged in the indictment and found by the jury, the conviction is not for an aggravated drug-trafficking offense and the

defendant may not be sentenced to more than the 20 years

authorized by § 841(b)(1)(C). See id. at 156-57 ("[I]n order to

authorize the imposition of a sentence exceeding the maximum allowable without a jury finding of a specific threshold

drug quantity, the specific threshold quantity must be treated

as an element of an aggravated drug trafficking offense, i.e.,

charged in the indictment and proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt." (footnote omitted)); United States v. Webb,

545 F.3d 673, 677 (8th Cir. 2008) ("[I]f the government

wishes to seek a sentence that exceeds the statutory sentencing range for an indeterminate amount of drugs, then it must

charge the facts giving rise to the increased sentence in the

indictment and must prove those facts to the jury beyond a

reasonable doubt." (internal quotation marks and alteration

omitted)), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2021 (2009).

The indictment in this case alleged that Young’s crimes

involved more than five kilograms of cocaine. The jury, however, found Young guilty of lesser-included offenses involving less than five kilograms of cocaine but more than 500

grams. The jury’s drug-quantity finding therefore established

40 years as the maximum sentence that could be imposed on

Young. But beyond establishing the maximum sentence, the

jury’s drug-quantity determination placed no constraint on the

district court’s authority to find facts relevant to sentencing.

In order to select a sentence within a jury-verdictauthorized maximum sentence, the district court must make

relevant factual findings based on the court’s view of the preponderance of the evidence. When making those factual findings, the district court may consider acquitted conduct, so

long as the court determines that the conduct was established

by a preponderance of the evidence. This judicial fact-finding

was a critical part of the sentencing process before Booker,

and it remains a critical part of the process after Booker. See

United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir. 2008)

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(explaining that post-Booker, "[s]entencing judges may find

facts relevant to determining a Guidelines range by a preponderance of the evidence, so long as that Guidelines sentence

is treated as advisory and falls within the statutory maximum

authorized by the jury’s verdict"), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950

(2009); United States v. Perry, 560 F.3d 246, 258-59 (4th

Cir.) ("It has long been established that sentencing courts may

consider acquitted conduct in establishing drug amounts for

the purpose of sentencing, so long as the amounts are established by a preponderance of the evidence. And, we reject

Perry’s assertion that this point is no longer valid in light of

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)." (citations

omitted)), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 177 (2009); see also Rita

v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 352 (2007) (noting that "many

individual Guidelines apply higher sentences in the presence

of special facts, . . . [and that] [i]n many cases, the sentencing

judge, not the jury, will determine the existence of those

facts").

By determining that the evidence presented at trial established that Young’s crimes involved between 500 grams but

less than five kilograms of cocaine, the jury in this case effectively acquitted Young of involvement with the distribution of

more than five kilograms. The district court was free to consider, as it would with any other acquitted conduct, whether

the government could establish a higher quantity under a preponderance of the evidence standard. See Webb, 545 F.3d at

677 ("[A] district court may impose a sentence based on a

drug quantity determination greater than that found by the

jury so long as the sentence does not exceed the statutory

maximum of the convicted offense and the district court’s calculation is supported by sufficient evidence."); United States

v. Florez, 447 F.3d 145, 156 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting defendant’s claim that the district court erred by attributing 10-30

kilos of heroin to the defendant for sentencing purposes when

the jury found the defendant was only involved with 3-10

kilos of heroin, noting that "judicial authority to find facts relevant to sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence sur14 UNITED STATES v. YOUNG

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vives Booker" (internal quotation marks and alteration

omitted)).

To the extent that Young suggests the government was

estopped from establishing a higher drug quantity at sentencing because it elected not to present that evidence at trial, the

argument is without merit. The government at sentencing

properly sought to establish as relevant conduct the total

quantity of drugs attributable to Young. "Relevant conduct"

under the Guidelines, of course, often includes a broader

range of conduct than the conduct underlying the offense of

conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328,

339 (4th Cir. 2003). This is particularly so in drug cases,

where relevant conduct is defined to include "all acts and

omissions . . . that were part of the same course of conduct

or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction."

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2).

The government’s decision to limit the evidence it presented at trial necessarily affected the jury’s drug-quantity

determination, but that trial decision did not tie the hands of

the government, or the district court, at sentencing. There is

no requirement that the government present its relevant conduct evidence at trial, nor is the district court at sentencing

bound by the evidence presented at trial when determining

drug quantity or other relevant conduct. See United States v.

Shonubi, 998 F.2d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Determining drug

quantity is a task for the sentencing court, and in performing

that task it is not bound by jury findings or evidence presented

at trial, but may consider any reliable proof." (citation omitted)); cf. United States v. Butner, 277 F.3d 481, 487 (4th Cir.

2002) ("In determining the loss amount, a sentencing court

may consider relevant conduct that has not been charged and

proven at trial, if it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence at sentencing."). The government therefore was entitled

to establish Young’s relevant conduct through evidence that

had not been presented at trial, and the district court was obligated to consider that evidence (so long as the evidence was

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reliable) for purposes of calculating Young’s advisory sentencing range. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (stating that a defendant’s offense level "shall be determined on the basis of" the

offense of conviction and relevant conduct (emphasis added));

United States v. Hayes, 322 F.3d 792, 802 (4th Cir. 2003)

(noting that "a court has no discretion to disregard relevant

conduct" when calculating offense level); see also United

States v. Wilkinson, 590 F.3d 259, 269 (4th Cir. 2010) ("[A]

sentencing court may give weight to any relevant information

before it, including uncorroborated hearsay, provided that the

information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its

accuracy.").

Because the jury’s drug-quantity finding established the

maximum sentence that could be imposed but did not otherwise constrain the district court’s authority to make factual

findings as necessary to select the appropriate sentence from

within the range authorized by the jury’s verdict, the district

court erred by concluding that it was bound by the jury’s

drug-quantity finding. Young does not contend that any error

in this regard is harmless, nor would the record permit such

a conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572,

576 (4th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that procedural sentencing

errors are subject to review for harmlessness). As previously

discussed, the district court permitted the government to proffer its evidence showing the higher drug quantity. The court

stated that the proffered evidence would have established

Young’s involvement with between 90 and 100 kilograms of

cocaine and that the court "would have accepted that testimony." J.A. 671. If the district court had recognized its

authority to consider the drug quantity established by the government’s proffer, Young’s advisory sentencing range would

have been 235-293 months—almost double the 121-150

month sentencing range used by the district court. The district

court imposed a sentence within the lower range, without giving any indication that it would have imposed the same sentence even if it were not bound by the jury’s drug-quantity

determination or that a sentence within the higher Guidelines

16 UNITED STATES v. YOUNG

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range would have been too high. Under these circumstances,

we cannot conclude that the district court’s error in applying

the Guidelines did not affect the court’s selection of the sentence imposed, and we therefore cannot conclude that the

error was harmless. See United States v. Harris, 597 F.3d 242,

261 (5th Cir. 2010) ("A procedural error made during sentencing is harmless if the error did not affect the district

court’s selection of the sentence imposed."). We must therefore vacate Young’s sentence and remand for re-sentencing.

IV.

To summarize, we find no error in the district court’s determination that the agents when executing the arrest warrant

complied with the knock-and-announce requirements of the

Fourth Amendment, and we reject Young’s claims that the

evidence seized from his townhouse should have been suppressed. We conclude that the government presented sufficient evidence to sustain Young’s conspiracy conviction, and

we reject Young’s various challenges to his sentence. On the

government’s cross-appeal, however, we conclude that the

district court erred by viewing the jury’s drug-quantity determination as precluding the court from finding a higher quantity for sentencing purposes. Because the district court’s error

was not harmless, we hereby vacate Young’s sentence and

remand for re-sentencing.

AFFIRMED IN PART, 

VACATED IN PART,

AND REMANDED

UNITED STATES v. YOUNG 17

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