Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00963/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00963-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gregory A. Cabral
Plaintiff
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY A. CABRAL,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-0963-KJN

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security

(“Commissioner”) denying plaintiff’s application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI, respectively, of the Social 

Security Act (“Act”).1 In his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff principally contends that 

the Commissioner erred by finding that plaintiff was not disabled from January 1, 2009,

plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date, through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (ECF No. 17.) 

The Commissioner filed an opposition to plaintiff’s motion and a cross-motion for summary 

judgment. (ECF No. 24.) No optional reply brief was filed. 

 

1

This action was initially referred to the undersigned pursuant to E.D. Cal. L.R. 302(c)(15), and 

both parties voluntarily consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge for all 

purposes. (ECF Nos. 7, 11.) 

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For the reasons discussed below, the court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment, GRANTS the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and enters 

judgment for the Commissioner. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on March 21, 1978, has at least a high school education, is able to 

communicate in English, and previously worked as a landscape gardener, performing both outside 

landscape labor and recordkeeping/billing work.

2

 (Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 28, 48-52.) 

On August 10, 2010, and August 26, 2010, at the age of 32, plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI,

respectively, alleging that his disability began on January 1, 2009, and that he was disabled 

primarily due to hip, lower back, and leg impairments. (AT 20, 91-92, 96-97, 158, 165, 179.)

3

 On 

December 10, 2010, the Commissioner determined that plaintiff was not disabled. (AT 20, 100-

04.) Upon plaintiff’s request for reconsideration, that determination was affirmed on May 3, 

2011. (AT 20, 105-10.) Thereafter, plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law 

judge (“ALJ”), which took place on April 5, 2012, and at which plaintiff, represented by a nonattorney representative, and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. (AT 20, 42-90.) 

In a decision dated May 24, 2012, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had not been under a 

disability, as defined in the Act, from January 1, 2009, plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date,

through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (AT 20-29.) The ALJ’s decision became the final 

decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review on 

January 23, 2014. (AT 9-11.) Thereafter, upon receiving an extension of time to file a civil 

action from the Appeals Council (AT 1), plaintiff filed this action in federal district court on April 

18, 2014, to obtain judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. (ECF No. 1.) 

 

2 Because the parties are familiar with the factual background of this case, including plaintiff’s

medical and mental health history, the court does not exhaustively relate those facts in this order. 

The facts related to plaintiff’s impairments and treatment will be addressed insofar as they are 

relevant to the issues presented by the parties’ respective motions.

3 Regardless of the alleged disability onset date, SSI is not payable prior to the month following 

the month in which the application was filed. 20 C.F.R. § 416.335. 

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II. ISSUES PRESENTED

On appeal, plaintiff has raised the sole issue of whether the ALJ improperly rejected 

plaintiff’s testimony concerning his own symptoms and functional limitations. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “The 

court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Summary of the ALJ’s Findings

The ALJ evaluated plaintiff’s entitlement to DIB and SSI pursuant to the Commissioner’s 

standard five-step analytical framework.4 As an initial matter, the ALJ noted that plaintiff met the 

 

4 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the Social 

Security program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to disabled 

persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in part, as 

an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). A parallel 

five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. See 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-

42 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation:

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the 

claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, proceed to step 

three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate.

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insured status requirements of the Act for purposes of DIB through December 31, 2013. (AT 22.) 

At the first step, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity

since January 1, 2009, plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date. (Id.) At step two, the ALJ found

that plaintiff had the following severe impairment: status post total right hip arthroplasty. (Id.) 

However, at step three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff did not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of an impairment listed in 

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AT 24.) 

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed plaintiff’s residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) as follows:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to 

perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 

416.967(a) except occasionally climb ramps, stairs, kneel, stoop,

crawl, and crouch, occasionally walk on uneven terrain, avoid 

climbing ladders/ropes/scaffolds and working at heights, and 

requires an option to sit or stand.

(AT 24-25.) 

At step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. 

(AT 27.) However, at step five, the ALJ determined, based on the VE’s testimony, that,

considering plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that existed in 

significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could perform. (AT 28-29.) 

 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meet or 

equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the 

claimant is automatically determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past relevant work? If so, the 

claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to perform any 

other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id. 

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Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined 

in the Act, from January 1, 2009, plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date, through the date of the 

ALJ’s decision. (AT 29.)

B. Plaintiff’s Substantive Challenges to the Commissioner’s Determinations

As noted above, plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected plaintiff’s testimony 

concerning his own symptoms and functional limitations. 

In Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals summarized the ALJ’s task with respect to assessing a claimant’s credibility:

To determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective 

pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step 

analysis. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 

presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 

symptoms alleged. The claimant, however, need not show that her 

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of 

the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could 

reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom. Thus, the 

ALJ may not reject subjective symptom testimony . . . simply 

because there is no showing that the impairment can reasonably 

produce the degree of symptom alleged. 

Second, if the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence 

of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about 

the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so. . . .

Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035-36 (citations and quotation marks omitted). “At the same time, the 

ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability benefits would 

be available for the asking....” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 

“The ALJ must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 

693 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 

1999)). In weighing a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ may consider, among other things, the 

“‘[claimant’s] reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in [claimant’s] testimony or 

between [her] testimony and [her] conduct, [claimant’s] daily activities, [her] work record, and 

testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the 

symptoms of which [claimant] complains.’” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 

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2002) (modification in original) (quoting Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 

1997)). If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the 

court “may not engage in second-guessing.” Id. at 959.

As an initial matter, the court observes that the ALJ here did not entirely discredit 

plaintiff’s testimony. Indeed, based in part on plaintiff’s testimony regarding his pain, the ALJ 

limited plaintiff to a reduced range of sedentary work, which was more restrictive than any of the 

medical opinions in the record. (AT 24-27.) Nevertheless, to the extent that the ALJ discounted 

plaintiff’s testimony regarding the severity of his symptoms and functional limitations, the ALJ 

provided several specific, clear, and convincing reasons for doing so.

The ALJ properly relied on the medical opinions of the consultative examiners and state 

agency physicians to find plaintiff not completely credible. (AT 23, 26.) 

On November 18, 2010, plaintiff was personally examined and evaluated by consultative 

examiner and orthopedic specialist, Dr. John Simmonds. (AT 276-80.) Dr. Simmonds’ 

examination was generally normal, except that plaintiff had difficulty rising on toes and heels 

more predominantly on the right, a noticeable right antalgic gait, and decreased and painful range 

of motion of the right hip with pain along the trochanteric site and along the anterior thigh. (AT 

278-79.) However, Dr. Simmonds also documented that plaintiff did not use assistive devices or 

braces for normal ambulation and observed that:

The claimant does not appear to be in acute or chronic distress. The 

claimant is able to move about the office freely and slowly, without 

any assistance, and is able to get onto and off the examination table 

and assume a supine position without any assistance or difficulty. 

The claimant is noted to be seated on the examination table in 

apparent comfort throughout the interview and evaluation process.

(AT 278.) An examination of plaintiff’s lower back revealed no tenderness, no evidence of 

increased muscle tone or spasm, and normal range of motion, with negative straight-leg raising 

tests bilaterally. (Id.) Dr. Simmonds diagnosed plaintiff with degenerative joint disease of the 

right hip (probable avascular necrosis) and opined that plaintiff could nevertheless push, pull, lift, 

and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; walk and stand for 4-6 hours per day, 

with no assistive device required for ambulation; sit without restriction; and occasionally bend, 

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kneel, stoop, crawl, crouch, walk on uneven terrain, climb ladders, and work at heights. (AT 

279.)

Subsequently, on December 10, 2010, state agency physician Dr. Jaituni reviewed 

plaintiff’s records and opined that plaintiff was capable of performing light work with some 

occasional postural limitations. (AT 202-06.) 

Based on diagnoses of avascular necrosis and severe degenerative joint disease of the right 

hip, plaintiff then underwent a total right hip replacement on February 3, 2011. (AT 25, 218-19.) 

A few months after the surgery, state agency physician Dr. Resnik reviewed plaintiff’s records 

and also opined that plaintiff was capable of performing light work with some occasional postural 

limitations. (AT 255-57.)5

Even though the ALJ, in considering the record as a whole, ultimately determined that 

plaintiff was more limited, and assessed a more restrictive RFC than consultative examiner Dr. 

Simmonds and the state agency physicians, their opinions nonetheless undermine plaintiff’s 

allegations of symptoms and functional limitations to a disabling degree.

The ALJ also permissibly relied on the medical records and treatment notes to discount 

plaintiff’s testimony. (AT 27.) According to his treating physicians, plaintiff did well during his 

hospitalization for the hip replacement surgery in early February 2011, and “ambulated quite 

nicely.” (AT 217.) At a subsequent February 23, 2011 visit, plaintiff “was able to walk onto and 

off of the HOPE van without aid, sitting erect without discomfort.” (AT 238.) Additionally, at a 

June 8, 2011 visit, plaintiff was noted to be “able to rise to and from a sitting position without 

difficulty. Able to walk up and down the stairs without pain.” (AT 273.) Finally, at a January 

23, 2012 visit, plaintiff was noted to have right hip tenderness and “mild pain w/motion,” but had 

no lumbar spine tenderness, with normal mobility and curvature. (AT 269.) To be sure, “after a 

claimant produces objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, an ALJ may not 

reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a lack of medical evidence to fully 

 

5 On April 19, 2011, plaintiff was also personally evaluated by consultative psychologist Dr. 

Michael Maguire, who diagnosed plaintiff with some mild depression and anxiety symptoms 

related to his hip replacement, and who did not assess any mental functional limitations. (AT

240-43.) 

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corroborate the alleged severity of pain.” Burch, 400 F.3d at 680 (citing Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 

F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991)). However, while lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole 

basis for discounting plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, it is nevertheless a relevant factor 

for the ALJ to consider. Id. at 681. Thus, the ALJ properly considered any inconsistencies 

between plaintiff’s testimony and the medical records. 

Furthermore, the ALJ reasonably referenced plaintiff’s limited treatment, which appears 

inconsistent with the disabling symptoms and functional limitations alleged by plaintiff. (AT 26-

27.)6 Apart from the February 2011 hip replacement surgery, there is no documentation of any

further surgery, pain injections, or chiropractic care in the record. (AT 27.) Plaintiff received 

physical therapy immediately after surgery, but nothing further since that time. (AT 26, 66.) 

Notably, plaintiff also testified that, during an incarceration for possession of crystal meth in 

2009-2010, he had declined the recommended treatment of Ibuprofen for his pain, because he did 

not like the feeling of swallowing a pill. (AT 56-60.)7 After his release from jail in June of 2010, 

plaintiff first sought treatment for his hip in August of 2010 when he filed for Social Security 

disability benefits. (AT 61-62.) 

Finally, the ALJ properly found that plaintiff’s activities were inconsistent with his 

allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations. (AT 27.) “While a claimant need not vegetate 

in a dark room in order to be eligible for benefits, the ALJ may discredit a claimant’s testimony 

when the claimant reports participation in everyday activities indicating capacities that are 

transferable to a work setting...Even where those activities suggest some difficulty functioning, 

they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict 

 

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The court is cognizant of the fact that plaintiff was homeless for large portions of the period at 

issue. However, the record here indicates that plaintiff had access to medical services, up to and 

including surgery. Thus, it does not appear that the limited treatment in this case resulted from an 

inability to access medical care. Regardless, even if plaintiff’s access to medical care were 

limited, the ALJ also provided several other specific, clear, and convincing reasons for 

discounting plaintiff’s testimony.

 

7 Until a few months prior to the administrative hearing, plaintiff used marijuana a couple of 

times a month and drank about a beer a day. However, it does not appear that plaintiff used these 

substances for pain control—according to plaintiff’s testimony, he used marijuana only when he 

had the opportunity and drank alcohol out of boredom. (AT 78-80.) 

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claims of a totally debilitating impairment.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112-13 (citations and quotation 

marks omitted); see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005) (ALJ properly 

considered claimant’s ability to care for her own needs, cook, clean, shop, interact with her 

nephew and boyfriend, and manage her finances and those of her nephew in the credibility 

analysis); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (ALJ’s 

determination regarding claimant’s ability to “fix meals, do laundry, work in the yard, and 

occasionally care for his friend’s child” was a specific finding sufficient to discredit the 

claimant’s credibility). 

Here, the ALJ observed that plaintiff could cook, do his laundry, take out the trash, and go 

grocery shopping for about 30 minutes. (AT 27, 72-73.) Plaintiff testified that he did not use an 

assistive device for ambulation, and no problems with sitting were observed when plaintiff filed 

his disability applications. (AT 27, 68-69, 185.) Also, plaintiff testified that he had a work 

assignment as a trustee while in jail in 2009-2010, during which he “pretty much controlled, ran, 

cleaned, fed the whole one side of the jail,” although he had to work by himself due to the fact 

that other prisoners gave him a hard time because he was “handicapped.” (AT 58-59.) In light of 

those activities, the ALJ rationally concluded that plaintiff was capable of at least sedentary work, 

especially with a sit-stand option added. (AT 27.) 

To be sure, the record may contain some contrary evidence, suggesting that plaintiff’s 

activities were more limited. However, it is the function of the ALJ to resolve any ambiguities, 

and the court finds the ALJ’s assessment to be reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. 

See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming ALJ’s credibility 

determination even where the claimant’s testimony was somewhat equivocal about how regularly 

she was able to keep up with all of the activities and noting that the ALJ’s interpretation “may not 

be the only reasonable one”). As the Ninth Circuit explained:

It may well be that a different judge, evaluating the same evidence, 

would have found [the claimant’s] allegations of disabling pain 

credible. But, as we reiterate in nearly every case where we are 

called upon to review a denial of benefits, we are not triers of fact. 

Credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ...Where, as 

here, the ALJ has made specific findings justifying a decision to 

disbelieve an allegation of excess pain, and those findings are 

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supported by substantial evidence in the record, our role is not to 

second-guess that decision.

Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989).

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, the court concludes that the ALJ’s decision was free from prejudicial error and 

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY 

ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17) is denied. 

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 24) is granted.

3. Judgment is entered for the Commissioner.

4. The Clerk of Court shall close this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 29, 2015

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