Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01648/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01648-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John W. Bloch III
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-1648

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOHN W. BLOCH III,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 12-CR-2 — Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 21, 2016 — DECIDED JUNE 17, 2016

____________________

Before POSNER, EASTERBROOK, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. Defendant John W. Bloch III has 

had three sentencing hearings in four years. He now seeks a 

fourth. Bloch argues he is entitled to such relief because the 

district court committed error in imposing the length and 

conditions of supervised release.

The third time happens to be a charm in this instance

though, as Bloch is not entitled to another sentencing hearCase: 15-1648 Document: 37 Filed: 06/17/2016 Pages: 23
2 No. 15-1648

ing. The district court not only adequately explained its justification for imposing a term of supervised release, it also 

adopted a “best practice” suggested by this court for providing adequate notice to defendants of proposed conditions of 

supervised release and justification for the same. Therefore, 

we affirm the district court’s sentence. 

I. BACKGROUND

Bloch’s journey through the federal criminal system has 

so far included a trial, two appeals, and three sentencings. 

We first recount how his case entered into the system before 

discussing these subsequent proceedings. 

A. Arrest, Indictment, Trial, and Sentencing

In November 2011, police responded to a report of gunfire at an apartment belonging to Bloch’s girlfriend in 

Elkhart, Indiana. An obviously intoxicated Bloch greeted the 

officers who had knocked on the door. The officers asked 

Bloch and his girlfriend to step outside the apartment so 

they could perform a sweep inside to ensure no one was 

hurt. During their sweep, the officers discovered a loaded 

Glock .40 caliber semi-automatic handgun, a SKS assault rifle, and ammunition for the firearms near both guns. 

As the officers proceeded to remove the guns and ammunition from the apartment, Bloch objected to the officers 

removing the firearms, claiming the guns belonged to him. 

Bloch’s status as a convicted felon made his possession of 

those firearms illegal, which prompted the officers to arrest 

him. Bloch continued to demand the return of his firearms, 

even as the police took him to jail.

In January 2012, a grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Bloch for: (1) unlawful possession of a fireCase: 15-1648 Document: 37 Filed: 06/17/2016 Pages: 23
No. 15-1648 3

arm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and (2) 

unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted 

of a domestic-violence misdemeanor in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(9). A jury convicted him on both counts in April 

2012. Three months later, the district court sentenced Bloch

to a total of 138 months’ imprisonment and a 3-year term of 

supervised release. The district court’s sentencing memorandum filed on the same day of sentencing indicates it incorporated the twenty-two conditions of supervised release 

contained in Bloch’s presentence investigation report. 

B. First Appeal and First Resentencing 

Bloch appealed both his conviction and sentence. We upheld the jury’s verdict but remanded for resentencing because his “convictions arose from the same incident of firearm possession, and the only difference between them is the 

disqualified class to which Bloch belonged.” United States v. 

Bloch, 718 F.3d 638, 644 (7th Cir. 2013). As a result, Bloch’s 

two § 922(g) convictions had to be merged—one conviction 

is vacated and merged into the other—because “a person

cannot be convicted of more than one § 922(g) crime based 

on a single incident of possession.” Id. at 643–44. 

On remand, the district court sentenced Bloch to 120 

months’ imprisonment in October 2013. The district court 

also imposed a 3-year term of supervised release with the 

same conditions it imposed during Bloch’s first sentencing. 

C. Bloch’s Second Appeal and Second Resentencing

Bloch again appealed, but on this occasion, he only challenged his sentence. According to Bloch, the district court 

miscalculated his sentencing guidelines range by determining that a battery by bodily waste conviction qualified as a 

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crime of violence under U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(1) and 4B1.2(a). 

Even though Bloch had failed to object to the miscalculation, 

the government agreed and joined in a motion seeking an 

order vacating Bloch’s sentence and a remand to the district 

court so he could be resentenced. Agreeing with the government and Bloch, we granted the motion in December 

2014 and issued an order vacating Bloch’s sentence and remanding his case for resentencing.

Prior to Bloch’s March 23, 2015, resentencing,1 the district 

court filed in the electronic docket a document captioned 

“Notice of Proposed Conditions of Supervision.” The document begins by noting that “[s]entencing courts in this circuit must give advance notice of proposed supervised release conditions, and the law concerning supervised release 

conditions has changed since the previous judgments in this 

case.” (citations omitted). The district court then stated that 

it would not “re-impose the conditions originally ordered” 

and proposed “the following 13 conditions, which [it] believe[d] to be less onerous than those originally imposed.” 

After each proposed condition, the district court provided an 

explanation in italics for why it was imposing the condition. 

At Bloch’s second resentencing hearing, the district court 

posed this question to both the government and Bloch: “did 

you get a chance to review the March 18th notice of proposed conditions of supervision, and, if so, do you have any 

objection to any of those proposed conditions?” Both the 

 1 The district court said during sentencing that the order was entered on 

March 18, 2015, which is the date that also appears on the document itself; however, the electronic docket indicates the order was entered into 

it on March 19, 2015. 

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No. 15-1648 5

government and Bloch acknowledged they had received and 

reviewed a copy of the district court’s notice of proposed 

conditions. 

Bloch objected to only one condition, the condition which 

required him to “permit a probation officer to meet the defendant at any time, at home or elsewhere, and shall permit 

confiscation of any contraband the probation officer observes in plain view” (“home-visit condition”). According to 

Bloch, his concern was with the word “elsewhere” and its 

possible infringement on the Fourth Amendment rights of 

people with whom he associates. 

The district court attempted to allay Bloch’s concern with 

the condition by stating the following: 

When I set forth—proposed to provide that the 

probation officer—that you have to permit a probation officer to meet with you at any time, at home 

or elsewhere, my “or elsewhere” didn't suggest 

people’s places where you were not living. The 

idea was that you could—the probation officer 

could make you come to this building to meet with 

you or meet you at a Starbucks or something. I 

would like to maintain that option because it 

doesn't seem like every visit should have to be at 

your home. There should be home visits, but not 

necessarily every visit. So I guess what I would 

propose to do is to provide that you shall permit a 

probation officer to meet you at any time, at home, 

at the Probation Office, or at some public place, and

shall permit confiscation of any contraband the 

probation officer observes in plain view.

Bloch responded by telling the district court that he now

wanted to object to the entire condition. The district court 

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then stated that the “proposed change in language was 

simply to try to improve the comfort level for” Bloch before 

overruling the objection. 

After the district court announced Bloch’s guideline 

range of 84 to 105 months, it proceeded to consider the factors contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and explain its reasoning in relation to several of those factors. Of particular note

was the district court’s discussion of Bloch’s history, including his criminal history and the need for a sentence to protect the public from him. With regard to his history, the district court noted that Bloch had multiple felonies and 

“seem[ed] to be one of those people about whom the law 

should be most serious, as far as possessing firearms.” The 

district court also noted that Bloch had “difficulty complying 

with conditions of supervision” and denied having an alcohol problem, even though his family thought otherwise.

As for the need for Bloch’s sentence to protect the public 

from him, the district court said his extensive criminal history “suggests that [he] pose[d] a far greater risk of future 

criminal conduct than most defendants who pass through 

here do.” And before stating that it planned to impose a 105-

month term of imprisonment, the district court explained 

that “in light of [Bloch’s] history of alcohol abuse and committing crimes while drinking or while having drunk,” it 

could not risk the public’s safety on the chance that Bloch’s 

years of sobriety in prison would make him less likely to recidivate. Anything less, according to the district court, 

would be inappropriate in light of “the seriousness of the 

risk that you pose of future criminal conduct, [and] the risk 

of violent crime.” 

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No. 15-1648 7

The district court also stated that it planned to impose a 

3-year term of supervised release and to incorporate the 

conditions from its March 18 notice of proposed conditions 

of supervision. The district court then asked Bloch if he had 

any objections to the sentence other than his objection to the 

condition allowing for home visits. Bloch responded that he 

did not. To be sure that this was Bloch’s only objection, the 

district court asked him to again confirm his answer, and he 

did. The district court then orally pronounced the sentence 

of 105 months’ imprisonment and 3-year term of supervised 

release, whose conditions it incorporated by reference to the 

March 18 notice.

II. ANALYSIS

In this third appeal, Bloch only challenges his term of supervised release and the conditions associated with it. According to Bloch, the district court committed procedural error when it failed to make adequate findings to support the 

imposition of a supervised release term. With respect to the 

conditions of supervised release, Bloch argues the district 

court committed procedural error by failing to orally pronounce all of the supervised release conditions from the 

bench. Bloch also presents various constitutional and substantive challenges to eight of the supervised release conditions imposed upon him. 

When reviewing challenges to the term and/or conditions 

of supervised release, we do so with the following framework in mind: 

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), a sentencing court has 

discretion to impose appropriate conditions of supervised release, to the extent that such conditions 

(1) are reasonably related to the factors identified in 

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§ 3553(a), including the nature and circumstances 

of the offense and the history and characteristics of 

the defendant; (2) involve no greater deprivation of 

liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in § 3553(a); and (3) are consistent with 

the policy statements issued by the Sentencing 

Commission. Policies emphasized by the Sentencing Commission include deterrence, rehabilitation, 

and protecting the public.

United States v. Armour, 804 F.3d 859, 867 (7th Cir. 2015)

(quoting United States v. Ross, 475 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 

2007)). We review Bloch’s procedural challenges de novo. 

United States v. Baker, 755 F.3d 515, 522 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Substantive challenges to conditions of supervised release have a different standard of review. We review the district court’s imposition of a condition for abuse of discretion,

so long as the defendant objected to it before the sentencing 

judge. United States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 930 (7th Cir. 

2016). When a condition goes unchallenged though, we review the district court’s imposition for plain error. Id.

A. Findings to Support Supervised Release Term

A sentencing court must follow a two-step process. 

“First, it must determine the defendant’s sentencing range 

under the guidelines. Second, it must hear the arguments of 

the parties and conclude by making an individualized assessment of the appropriate sentence based on the [18 

U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 

176, 189 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

Bloch challenges the district court’s performance of the 

second step here. He contends the district court committed 

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No. 15-1648 9

reversible error when it “said nothing to justify its decision 

to impose 3 years of supervised release.” (Appellant Br. at 

14.) Bloch reads our precedent as requiring a district court to 

provide “separate § 3553(a) justifications” for its imposition 

of a term of imprisonment and a term of supervised release

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3853(c). (Appellant Reply at 3.) From 

Bloch’s perspective, any justification that the district court 

provided for its sentence during the hearing was in connection with its decision to impose a term of imprisonment, not 

supervised release. 

We disagree. Contrary to Bloch’s position, the district 

court was not required to provide two separate explanations, 

one for the term of imprisonment and one for the term of 

supervised release. Nothing in the statutes at issue—18 

U.S.C. § 3553 and § 3583—supports Bloch’s strained interpretation. Section 3553(c) states that “[t]he court, at the time 

of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” (emphasis added). Congress used the singular form of “sentence” because at sentencing a district court hands down only one “sentence,” 

which can include a term of supervised release. See United 

States v. Downs, 784 F.3d 1180, 1182 (7th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that one criminal sentence can “consist[] of more than 

one form of punishment”); United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 

828, 837 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Any term of supervised release is 

considered part of the overall sentence.”); Adkins, 743 F.3d at 

192 (our precedent “suggests that terms of supervised release are part of the sentence”). No part of § 3553(c) requires

the district court to bifurcate its consideration, discussion, 

and evaluation of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, which alCase: 15-1648 Document: 37 Filed: 06/17/2016 Pages: 23
10 No. 15-1648

so happens to include all the factors a district court must 

consider in imposing a term of supervised release.2

We have come to the same conclusion before and recognized that a district court need only provide one overarching 

explanation and justification—tethered, of course, to the 

§ 3553(a) factors—for why it thinks a criminal sentence comprised of both terms of imprisonment and supervised release 

is appropriate. Kappes, 782 F.3d at 847 (calling a district 

court’s decision “to discuss [its] reasons for imposing the 

sentence as a whole,” including combining its explanation 

for “the length of custody and supervised release, consistent 

with the relevant § 3553(a) factors” a “reasonable choice”); 

Armour, 804 F.3d at 867–68 (rejecting defendant’s argument 

that “his term of supervised release [was] improper because 

the district court gave no justification for the length of the 

supervised release” and explaining that “[s]upervised release is part of the sentence imposed, so the district court's 

justifications for imposing [a term of imprisonment] also apply to the ... term of supervised release.”) Adopting Bloch’s 

interpretation would be not only impractical but inconsistent 

with our precedent. Indeed, we do not even require the district court to discuss any particular factors in any particular 

fashion when imposing a sentence of incarceration, so long 

 

2 There are only two subsections from § 3553(a) that are excluded from 

the list of factors the district court may consider in imposing a term of 

supervised release. Those subsections excluded are “the need for the sentence imposed—to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense,” 

§ 3553(a)(2)(A), and “the kinds of sentences available,” § 3553(a)(3). See 

§ 3583(c). 

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No. 15-1648 11

as it considers them and provides an “adequate statement of 

reasons, consistent with § 3553(a), for thinking the sentence 

it selects is appropriate.” United States v. Shannon, 518 F.3d 

494, 496 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). 

Here, the district court provided ample justification for 

its sentence, including its imposition of a 3-year term of supervised release. The district court discussed Bloch’s history, 

including his criminal history, and the need for Bloch’s sentence to protect the public from him, which are two factors 

the district court had to consider in determining the appropriate term of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c). In 

so doing, the district court observed that Bloch posed a high 

risk of recidivism, including “the risk of violent crime,” and 

had “difficulty complying with conditions of supervision.” 

As we have observed, “[r]educing recidivism is the main 

purpose of supervised release.” United States v. Siegel, 753 

F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 2014). 

The district court also noted Bloch’s refusal to 

acknowledge a substance abuse problem that his family believes he has, a problem that has led to many encounters 

with law enforcement. That these justifications may also 

form the basis for Bloch’s term of imprisonment is of no 

moment. The district court was under no requirement to 

provide two separate justifications for one criminal sentence. 

See § 3553(c) (“The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state 

in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular 

sentence.” (emphasis added)). 

Bloch argues against our reliance on Armour because he 

says it “misapprehends” United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 

368 (7th Cir. 2015). (Appellant Reply at 3.) He seizes upon a

passage from Thompson in which we explain that § 3583(c)

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requires a district court to state at the sentencing hearing its 

reasons for imposing supervised release based upon the 

§ 3553(a) factors. 777 F.3d at 373. According to Bloch, 

“Thompson never said that by adequately explaining the 

length of a defendant’s prison sentence, a district court necessarily gives a sufficient justification for the length of supervision.” (Appellant Reply at 3.)

It is Bloch, however, who misapprehended Thompson by 

reading too much into this particular passage. That passage 

states that a district court imposing a criminal sentence that 

includes a term of supervised release must provide justification—considering the § 3553 factors—for why it did so. No 

more, no less. 

Thompson at no point suggests that a district court must

give two separate justifications for one criminal sentence.

There, we did not assume the district court’s sentencing justification in those cases related only to its imposition of the 

term of imprisonment, and as a result, remanded the cases to 

reconsider the term imprisonment as well as the term and 

conditions of supervised release. We took this approach because, as we explained in Kappes: 

[T]he custodial and supervised release portions of a 

sentence serve somewhat, though not entirely, 

overlapping purposes, there might properly be an 

interplay between prison time and the term and 

conditions of supervised release. If certain supervised release conditions are vacated, the balance 

struck by the sentencing judge might be disrupted 

to a degree where the judge would wish to alter the 

prison term and/or other conditions to ensure that 

the purposes of deterrence, rehabilitation, and protecting the public are appropriately furthered by 

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No. 15-1648 13

the overall sentence. Accordingly, as we did in 

Thompson, we vacate the entire sentences and remand for a complete resentencing

782 F.3d at 867 (citation and footnote omitted). The relationship and interplay between these components all but requires them to be considered and discussed together in justifying a defendant’s sentence. 

Bloch’s reliance on United States v. Moore, 788 F.3d 693 

(7th Cir. 2015) and Downs, 784 F.3d 1180, is also misplaced. 

In Moore, the district court did not “enunciat[e] its finding 

that a term of supervised release was necessary,” which is 

what lead us to remand the case for resentencing. 788 F.3d at 

696. Here, unlike Moore, the district court enunciated that a 

“three-year supervised release term that was originally imposed [at Bloch’s earlier sentencing] is appropriate.” And, as 

discussed above, the district court explained why he needs 

supervision in light of his past recidivism and substance 

abuse issues. 

As for Downs, Bloch argues the following sentence supports his position: “[The district court] was required, before 

deciding on the length of the defendant’s term of supervised 

release, to calculate the guidelines range and assess its appropriateness as a guide to sentencing the defendant, in light 

of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” 784 F.3d at 

1181. Nothing in that passage is incompatible with our conclusion today or with what the district court did in Bloch’s 

case. The district court here properly calculated the guidelines range, assessed its appropriateness in sentencing the 

defendant, and explained its justification for its criminal sentence through a discussion of the § 3553(a) factors. The district court gave an adequate explanation for its sentence, inCase: 15-1648 Document: 37 Filed: 06/17/2016 Pages: 23
14 No. 15-1648

cluding his term of supervised release, and therefore did not 

commit procedural error.

B. Oral Pronouncement of Supervised Release Conditions 

In Thompson, we expressed a concern that district courts 

in this circuit were not providing defendants adequate notice of the supervised release conditions that the court may 

impose upon them and the reasons for doing so. 777 F.3d at 

377.3 There, we suggested one “best practice” could be for 

the court to “inform the parties of the conditions and the 

possible reasons for imposing them, so that they can develop 

arguments pro or con to present at the sentencing hearing.” 

Id. at 377. We expressed the same concern in Kappes and 

suggested a similar approach. 782 F.3d at 842–43 (stating 

“that it is important [for sentencing judges] to give advance 

notice of the conditions being considered” and suggesting 

that those judges require the reasons for the recommended 

conditions appear in presentence reports).

Thompson’s suggested best practice was the one embraced 

by the district court here. Prior to Bloch’s sentencing, the district court circulated the conditions it proposed to impose 

upon Bloch and the reasons why it planned to impose each

condition. The government and Bloch acknowledged receipt 

of these proposed conditions, and we can infer from Bloch’s 

concerns with the home-visit condition that he had a chance 

to review them. Neither the government, nor Bloch could 

claim lack of notice. It was no surprise then that Bloch did 

 3 We have long required that defendants receive notice of special conditions of supervised release that are “out of the ordinary, and thus unexpected.” United States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733, 736 (7th Cir. 2003). 

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No. 15-1648 15

not object when the district court incorporated those proposed conditions by reference during its oral pronouncement, as Bloch confirmed on two prior occasions that he had 

no further concern with his sentence other than the homevisit condition. 

Typically, in these circumstances, no good deed goes unpunished. Bloch now complains that the district court needed to orally pronounce each and every one of the thirteen 

conditions the district court imposed. While it is true we 

have said that a district court “need[s] to orally pronounce 

all conditions [of supervised release] from the bench,” 

Kappes, 782 F.3d at 862, we did so only because of the rule 

that “when there is a conflict between an oral and later written sentence, the oral judgment pronounced from the bench 

controls,” United States v. Johnson, 765 F.3d 702, 710–11 (7th 

Cir. 2014). As we saw in Johnson, this rule works to prevent 

the practice of district courts imposing supervised release 

conditions that were never pronounced at sentencing. 765 

F.3d at 711. If such conditions are never pronounced at sentencing, then the defendant is deprived of the right of objecting to them. See Kappes, 782 F.3d at 843 (“The goal of providing the parties with advance notice of the conditions at issue 

is to allow the parties to present an informed response.”)

That possible harm is not present in this situation where 

Bloch had a chance to review the supervised release conditions as well as the reasons for imposing them, and he was 

given a meaningful opportunity to object. In fact, Bloch had 

far more opportunity to review and consider objections to 

those conditions than the defendants who have them read 

and imposed upon them at sentencing. 

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16 No. 15-1648

Just as important is that the district court’s approach here 

does not create a situation where the oral sentence conflicts 

with the written judgment filed in the case’s docket after 

sentencing occurs. Neither the government, nor Bloch contends there is any conflict between the March 18 notice of 

proposed conditions, which was orally incorporated by reference, and the written judgment entered. The reason then 

for the rule laid down in Kappes is satisfied, as the oral pronouncement and written judgment do not conflict. Also, of 

equal importance is the fact that the defendant received adequate notice of the proposed conditions. We see no reason 

why a district court cannot follow this approach moving 

forward. The district court could also specifically confirm 

that the defendant waives a formal reading of the conditions 

during the court’s oral pronouncement of the sentence. Sections 3553 and 3583 are not, after all, the court reporter’s 

welfare act. The district court did not commit procedural error in imposing Bloch’s conditions of supervised release by 

incorporating its March 18 notice by reference into Bloch’s 

sentence. 

C. Challenge to the Supervised Release Conditions

Bloch challenges the imposition of eight of the conditions 

of his supervised release, including the imposition of the 

home-visit condition. At his second resentencing, he objected 

to the home-visit condition but no others. We begin by evaluating the government’s argument that Bloch waived his 

right to challenge those other seven conditions. 

1. Waiver as to Seven of the Eight Conditions 

Waiver is “‘when a criminal defendant intentionally relinquishes a known right.’” Armour, 804 F.3d at 865. (quoting 

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No. 15-1648 17

United States v. Brodie, 507 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 2007)). It 

works to “extinguish[] any error and precludes appellate review.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). In addressing waiver 

in the supervised release context, we have articulated the following rule: “[a] response to a general inquiry at the end of 

sentencing, and unaccompanied by either (1) an explicit approval of the condition or (2) a strategic reason to forego the 

argument at the hearing, does not constitute waiver.” United 

States v. Hinds, 770 F.3d 658, 665 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing United 

States v. Farmer, 755 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2014). Applying 

this rule, we have refused to find waiver in the supervised 

release context where the district court asked if there was 

“anything else” at the end of sentencing, Farmer, 755 F.3d at 

853–54, and where the defendant answered “no” to the district court’s “question regarding awareness of legal reasons 

why the sentence should not be imposed,” Hinds, 770 F.3d at 

665. See also United States v. Speed, 811 F.3d 854, 857 (7th Cir. 

2016) (refusing to apply waiver where the judge asked if 

there was “anything unclear or confusing” about the defendants’ sentence, and the defendants said no).

This rule, however, does not work to prevent the application of waiver here. As an initial matter, Bloch cannot claim

lack of notice or surprise at the conditions the district court 

planned to impose, which distinguishes this case from those 

where we refused to apply waiver. See Hinds, 770 F.3d at 665 

(defendant received no advance notice of the special conditions imposed on him); Farmer, 755 F.3d at 852–53 (proposed 

conditions of supervised release were not distributed to the 

government and defendant prior to sentencing). Here, Bloch

acknowledged that he had a chance to review the district 

court’s March 18 proposed notice of conditions. 

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18 No. 15-1648

Bloch also had the opportunity to object to the proposed 

conditions. The district court asked him if he had any objections to the conditions, and he responded that he had only 

one objection—to the condition allowing for home visits.

And Bloch’s decision to single out and object to only one 

condition is the very “[t]ouchstone of waiver,” as it indicates 

“a knowing and intentional decision.” Armour, 804 F.3d at 

865 (quotation marks omitted). In other words, it reflects “a 

strategic reason to forego the argument at the hearing.” 

Hinds, 770 F.3d at 665. While there may not be a good strategic reason for holding back a valid objection to a condition, 

that fact does not render the defendant’s decision any less 

intentional. That is why we require defendants to voice their 

objections to the district court if they wish to preserve them 

for appellate review.

Finally, nothing about the district court’s questioning 

concerning Bloch’s supervised release conditions is vague or 

confusing. Bloch knew that “he could lodge an objection and 

purposefully declined to do so.” United States v. Murry, 395 

F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2005) (applying waiver where district 

court twice asked defendant if he objected to jury instructions, and defendant responded that he did not). Before pronouncing its sentence, the district court asked “assuming 

[Bloch] continues to object to Supervised Release Condition 

10, does the defense have any further objection to the proposed sentence?” Bloch responded that he did not “other 

than [the objection] previously stated.” Bloch undoubtedly 

understood that the district court’s question here applied not 

only to the proposed term of imprisonment but also to the 

proposed conditions of supervised release. And, the district 

court confirmed that Bloch had no further objections to the

proposed sentence. All together, the district court asked 

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No. 15-1648 19

Bloch three times if he had any concerns with the proposed 

conditions of supervised release. Other than objecting to the 

condition allowing for home visits, he said he did not have 

any. 

Therefore, Bloch waived his ability to challenge all but 

the supervised release condition relating to home visits. See 

United States v. Lewis, No. 14-3635, 2016 WL 3004435, at *5 

(7th Cir. May 24, 2016) (finding waiver where “[t]here were 

no surprises in the sentencing hearing related to supervised 

release” and the defendant did not object). 

2. Home Visits

The only condition that Bloch can challenge on appeal

then is the condition allowing the “probation officer to meet 

[Bloch] ... at home or elsewhere” and to confiscate “any contraband the probation officer observes in plain view.” The 

condition generally prohibits the probation officer from conducting such a visit to between the hours of 11 p.m. and 7 

a.m. Bloch argues the imposition of this condition upon him 

is invalid under the Fourth Amendment and that the district 

court abused its discretion in imposing it.4

As to Bloch’s argument that this condition violates the 

Fourth Amendment, we have already considered and rejected the same in Armour. 804 F.3d at 870;5 see also United States 

 

4 While Bloch casts his challenge to this condition as a procedural one, 

we assume his challenge to be substantive in nature, as he admits the 

district court provided some justification for the imposition of this condition. His concern lies with the reasonableness of that justification. 

5 Contrary to Bloch’s assertion in his reply brief, Armour does not rely 

upon a “‘waiver’ case” in supporting its conclusion on this issue. (Appel-

(continued...)

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20 No. 15-1648

v. Carson, No. 15-2899, 2016 WL 2641821, at *1 (7th Cir. May 

6, 2016). We see no reason to revisit our decision and find its 

reasoning applies with equal force here. Supervised release 

conditions may implicate fundamental constitutional rights, 

“so long as those conditions are reasonably related to the 

ends of rehabilitation and protection of the public from recidivism.” Armour, 804 F.3d at 870 (quotation marks omitted). As we describe below, the district court did that here. 

His other principal concern appears to be with the adequacy of the district court’s reasoning in imposing this condition. According to Bloch, the district court failed to expound upon its justification that the home visit can “facilitate the probation officer’s ability to help” him. For example, 

Bloch contends the district court did not properly explain 

how home visits “provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner,” which is a 

factor to consider under § 3553(a). 

Bloch misunderstands what is required to justify the imposition of a discretionary condition of supervised release. 

The district court here provided a more than adequate and 

reasonable explanation for why a home-visit condition was 

appropriate. As a preliminary matter, the district court 

properly incorporated its justification from the March 18 no-

 

(...continued)

lant Reply at 21.) The case relied upon by this court in Armour is United 

States v. Sines, 303 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2002). While we found the defendant 

there waived some of his arguments, we did not apply waiver in the section Armour cited and quoted. Rather, we reviewed the condition at issue 

for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 800–01. 

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No. 15-1648 21

tice into Bloch’s sentencing hearing. This approach gave 

Bloch advance notice of the court’s reasoning for why it 

planned to impose certain conditions, which gave him more 

than enough time to formulate objections. 

The court’s explanation that the home visit would “help”

Bloch makes sense when read in context of the sentencing 

hearing as a whole. We have observed this condition helps 

the defendant “reintegrate into society after his time in prison and to ensure that he is abiding by the conditions of his 

supervised release.” Armour, 804 F.3d at 870. Further, the district court expressed concerns about Bloch’s “difficulty complying with conditions of supervision” during the hearing.

The Supreme Court has recognized that assistance in this 

“decompression stage” is particularly necessary for defendants like Bloch who have demonstrated issues in complying 

with conditions of supervised release. Johnson v. United 

States, 529 U.S. 694, 709 (2000). 

The district court also stated in its March 18 notice that

this condition was necessary to “monitor” and “protect the 

public if the defendant is found to be violating the conditions of release.” We have already concluded such a justification for imposing the home-visit condition is sufficient. See 

Carson, 2016 WL 2641821, at *2 (finding sufficient a “judge’s 

statement that the home-visit condition will enable the probation office to ‘keep watch’ and help enforce the other terms 

of release”). 

There was even more said during the sentencing hearing 

to justify this condition. The district court explained that 

Bloch posed a high risk of recidivism, a risk that was made 

greater by his purported problems with alcohol. Meetings 

with a probation officer then at Bloch’s home or a “public 

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22 No. 15-1648

place” could not only serve to check on Bloch’s sobriety but 

also to see if he was in possession of firearms. The explanations provided by the district court here for this condition no 

doubt are adequate and reasonable.

Finally, we address Bloch’s objection with the district 

court’s use of “or elsewhere” in the home-visit condition at 

the sentencing hearing, even though Bloch did not raise this 

argument on appeal. In United States v. Henry, we expressed 

concern with the use of “or elsewhere” in a similar homevisit condition, as it could allow for a probation officer “to 

pick a location that may be inconvenient for the defendant.” 

813 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2016). Unlike the situation in Henry

though, the district court here provided further clarification 

for what it meant by “or elsewhere.” According to the district court, the term “elsewhere” means a “public place,” 

such as a Starbuck’s coffee shop, or the probation office. 

While not as ideal as the suggestions made for this condition 

in Henry, we believe this explanation provides sufficient 

guidance to the probation officer as to what an acceptable 

meeting place would be. As we said in Kappes, “at some 

point, we must fairly presume [the defendant]’s probation 

officer will apply the conditions in a reasonable manner.”

782 F.3d at 857 (quotation marks omitted). 

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No. 15-1648 23

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

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