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Parties Involved:
Jean C. Lawler
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐1496

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

JEAN C. LAWLER,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 08‐CR‐197‐14‐JPS — J.P. Stadtmueller, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 16, 2015 — DECIDED MARCH 16, 2016

____________________

Before MANION, KANNE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Jean Lawler pleaded guilty to

distributing heroin and conspiring to possess heroin with

the intent to distribute it. The district court found, by a pre‐

ponderance of the evidence, that Lawler sold the heroin that

killed one of the conspiracy’s customers. On that basis, in

determining Lawler’s Guidelines‐recommended sentence,

the court followed U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(2), which applies if

“the offense of conviction establishes that death ... resulted

Case: 15-1496 Document: 30 Filed: 03/16/2016 Pages: 8
2 No. 15‐1496

from the use of the [heroin].” That was erroneous. Lawler’s

“offense of conviction”—distributing heroin and conspiring

to possess heroin with the intent to distribute it—does not

“establish” that a death resulted. Therefore, we vacate Lawl‐

er’s sentence and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case were fully described in United States

v. Walker, 721 F.3d 828, 831–33 (7th Cir. 2013). Relevant here,

Lawler was charged along with thirty other defendants in a

single‐count indictment that described a large‐scale heroin‐

distribution conspiracy that led to the overdose deaths of

five people. “Lawler was a low‐level member of the conspir‐

acy” who “purchased relatively small quantities of heroin ...

to resell to others and for personal use.” Id. at 831.

Lawler pleaded guilty to distributing heroin and conspir‐

ing to possess heroin with the intent to distribute it, in viola‐

tion of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and

846. The applicable statutory sentencing range is 10 years to

life. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). The statutory minimum is in‐

creased to 20 years if death results from the use of the hero‐

in. Id. The Sentencing Guidelines also recommend a longer

sentence when death results, increasing the base offense lev‐

el if “the offense of conviction establishes” that death result‐

ed. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(2).

Lawler’s plea agreement stated that the government

would argue that Lawler was subject to both the 20‐year

statutory minimum and the increased base offense level be‐

cause she sold the heroin that led to a particular death—that

of Jeffrey Topczewski. Lawler disagreed and reserved her

right to contest those issues. At sentencing, the district court

found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Lawler sold

the heroin that killed Topczewski, so it applied the 20‐year

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No. 15‐1496 3

statutory minimum. We affirmed because the court’s find‐

ing—applying a preponderance‐of‐the‐evidence standard—

was supported by sufficient evidence. See Walker, 721 F.3d at

841–42. The Supreme Court vacated Lawler’s sentence in

light of Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), which

held that any fact that increases the statutory minimum sen‐

tence must be found beyond a reasonable doubt. Lawler v.

United States, 134 S. Ct. 2287 (2014) (mem.).

On remand, the government conceded that the 20‐year

statutory minimum did not apply because it had not been

proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Lawler sold the her‐

oin that killed Topczewski. But the government maintained

that Lawler’s base offense level should be 38, under U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1(a)(2). The district court agreed. That decision had a

significant consequence: Lawler’s Guidelines‐recommended

range soared from 15–21 months to 168–210 months. In part

due to her substantial assistance to the government, see 18

U.S.C. § 3553(e); U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, Lawler was sentenced to

98 months in prison.

II. ANALYSIS

Lawler’s argument is simple: she was not convicted of

causing Topczewski’s death, so § 2D1.1(a)(2)—which by its

text applies only when the “offense of conviction establish‐

es” that death resulted—does not apply. We review the dis‐

trict court’s interpretation of the Guidelines de novo. United

States v. Woolsey, 535 F.3d 540, 549 (7th Cir. 2008).

The first part of Lawler’s argument—that she was not

convicted of causing Topczewski’s death—is certainly cor‐

rect. It is true that Lawler’s indictment referenced

Topczewski’s death. But that is also true of thirty other de‐

fendants who were charged in a single count describing a

large‐scale conspiracy that resulted in five deaths. We al‐

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4 No. 15‐1496

ready held that the combination of this indictment and a

plea of guilty (to distributing heroin and conspiring to pos‐

sess heroin with the intent to distribute it) did not prove that

any particular defendant was responsible for any particular

death. Walker, 721 F.3d at 836–38; see also id. at 841–42 (dis‐

cussing the evidence connecting Lawler to Topczewski’s

death, rather than drawing conclusions from the indictment

and guilty plea). The government conceded that it did not

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Lawler caused

Topczewski’s death, and Lawler explicitly disputed that fact

in her plea agreement.1 So the death is not part of her convic‐

tion. See Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 887 (2014)

(“Because the ‘death results’ enhancement increased the

minimum and maximum sentences to which Burrage was

exposed, it is an element that must be submitted to the jury

and found beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

The next question is whether § 2D1.1(a)(2) applies when

death is not inherent in the conviction but the district court

finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that death result‐

ed. Lawler says no, relying on the provision’s text. Im‐

portantly, numerous Guidelines provisions turn on the actu‐

                                                  1 This distinguishes Lawler from defendants who pleaded guilty to

drug crimes that resulted in death. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 706

F.3d 728, 729 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Johnson agreed to plead guilty to Count

One of the Indictment charging him with distribution of heroin resulting

in death.”); Vigneron v. United States, No. 03‐C‐3575, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

20852, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2003) (rejecting an argument similar to

Lawler’s because the court “did not determine by a preponderance of the

evidence that petitioner’s distribution of drugs resulted in a death—

petitioner pled to this fact”).

Case: 15-1496 Document: 30 Filed: 03/16/2016 Pages: 8
No. 15‐1496 5

al consequences of the defendant’s “offense.”2 In contrast,

§ 2D1.1(a)(2) looks only to what is “establishe[d]” by the de‐

fendant’s “offense of conviction.”3  

The Guidelines make clear that “offense of conviction”

and “offense” have different meanings. Specifically, § 1B1.1

n.1 defines “offense” to mean “offense of conviction” plus

“all relevant conduct.” And “relevant conduct” means “all

acts and omissions ... that occurred during the commission

of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense,

or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or respon‐

sibility for that offense[.]” § 1B1.3(a). Together these provi‐

sions show that: (1) “offense of conviction” does not include

                                                  2 See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1 cmt. n.2 (where the “offense created a

substantial risk of death ... to more than one person”); § 2B1.1(b)(15)

(where the “offense involved ... the conscious or reckless risk of death”);

§ 2B5.3(b)(6) (same); § 2B3.2 cmt. n.7 (where the “offense involved the

threat of death ... to numerous victims”); § 2B5.3 cmt. n.5(D) (where the

“offense resulted in death”); § 2K1.4 (a)(1)–(2) (where the “offense ...

created a substantial risk of death”); § 2K1.4(c) (where “death resulted,

or the offense was intended to cause death”); § 2L1.1(b)(6) (where “the

offense involved intentionally or recklessly creating a substantial risk of

death”); § 2N1.1 cmt. n.1 (where the “offense posed a substantial risk of

death ... to numerous victims”); § 2P1.3(a)(1) (where the “offense was

committed under circumstances creating a substantial risk of death”);

§ 2Q1.2(b)(2) (where the “offense resulted in a substantial likelihood of

death”); § 2Q1.3(b)(2) (same); § 2Q1.6(a)(3) (where the “offense involved

reckless disregard to the risk that another person would be placed in

danger of death”).

3 A 1989 amendment changed § 2D1.1(a)(2)’s base offense level from

“38, for an offense that results in death” to “38, if ... the offense of conviction

establishes that death ... resulted...” (emphasis added). Also, subsection

(a)(2)’s language is repeated in subsections (a)(1), (a)(3), and (a)(4). So the

differences between § 2D1.1(a)(2) and the numerous provisions of the

Guidelines listed in footnote 2 appear to be intentional, not inadvertent.

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“relevant conduct”; and (2) “offense of conviction” is nar‐

rower than “offense.” See United States v. Rebmann, 321 F.3d

540, 543–44 (6th Cir. 2003) (reaching this conclusion after tex‐

tual analysis); United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 157 n.7

(3d Cir. 2001) (same); see also United States v. Blackwell, 323

F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2003) (same, in the context of a dif‐

ferent Guideline provision). The district court appears to

have agreed, stating that the “offense of conviction includes

only what [Lawler] was convicted of, conspiracy to possess

with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin”

and that “a reasonable person could say the offense of con‐

viction does not involve the death enhancement.”

The district court went on, however, to state that

§ 2D1.1(a)(2) “is an enhancement for relevant conduct and not

an element of the offense” (emphasis added). That was erro‐

neous. The text states that the “offense of conviction”—

which, as we just discussed, does not include “relevant con‐

duct”—must “establis[h]” that death occurred. That’s the

case only when death is an element of the crime that is ad‐

mitted by the defendant or proven beyond a reasonable

doubt. This conclusion, based on the text, is the one reached

by the circuit courts that have squarely addressed the issue.

See Rebmann, 321 F.3d at 543–44 (“[A] careful reading of the

express language of § 2D1.1(a), along with other provisions

and explanations contained in the Guidelines Manual, con‐

vinces us that the death‐resulting sentencing enhancement

set forth in that provision is not based on relevant offense

conduct to be determined by a preponderance of the evi‐

dence, but rather is tied expressly to the substantive offense

of conviction under the statute. As a result ..., the death re‐

sulting enhancement applies only when the elemental facts

supporting the ‘offense of conviction’ establish beyond a

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No. 15‐1496 7

reasonable doubt that death resulted from the use of the con‐

trolled substance.”); Pressler, 256 F.3d at 157 n.7; United States

v. Greenough, 669 F.3d 567, 573–75 (5th Cir. 2012).4

The government urges that even after Alleyne a district

court can consider “relevant conduct,” found by a prepon‐

derance of the evidence, when selecting a sentence within

the permissible statutory range. That’s true but irrelevant to

the issue at hand, which is simply the correct interpretation

of § 2D1.1(a)(2). Nothing we say today prevents a sentencing

court, when determining a defendant’s ultimate sentence,

from considering the fact that death resulted. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(1) (directing courts to consider “the nature and cir‐

cumstances of the offense”); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5) (directing

courts to consider the Sentencing Commission’s policy

statements); U.S.S.G. § 5K2.1 (policy statement advising that

“[i]f death resulted, the court may increase the sentence

above the authorized guideline range”).

                                                  4 The Greenough court wrote that some circuits had “sentenced indi‐

viduals in a manner that would imply” a different interpretation of

§ 2D1.1(a)(2). 669 F.3d at 574 (citing United States v. Shah, 453 F.3d 520

(D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Rodriguez, 279 F.3d 947 (11th Cir. 2002);

United States v. Deeks, 303 F. App’x 507 (9th Cir. 2008)). Even that meas‐

ured statement was too strong. Shah and Rodriguez involved defendants

who pleaded guilty to causing death. Shah, 453 F.3d at 522; Rodriguez, 279

F.3d at 951–52. (Shah unsuccessfully sought to withdraw his plea and

Rodriguez made the legal argument that § 2D1.1(a)(2) should not apply

because the death might have been avoided if bystanders had inter‐

vened.) And the unpublished Deeks opinion never discusses whether

§ 2D1.1(a)(2) requires death to be an element inherent in the crime, nor

did the defendant raise that argument—he merely challenged the factual

finding that death resulted. In short, these opinions are not on point and

we are not aware of a reasoned opinion from another circuit court that

conflicts with our holding.

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8 No. 15‐1496

Lawler’s textual arguments are strong and the govern‐

ment’s responses are not. We join the Third, Fifth, and Sixth

Circuits in holding that § 2D1.1(a)(2) applies only when a

resulting death (or serious bodily injury) was an element of

the crime of conviction, proven beyond a reasonable doubt

or admitted by the defendant. Not so in Lawler’s case.

III. CONCLUSION

We VACATE Lawler’s sentence and REMAND for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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