Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_05-cv-01071/USCOURTS-ared-4_05-cv-01071-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kellie Hallman
Plaintiff
Social Security Administration
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

KELLIE HALLMAN Plaintiff

v. 4:05CV01071 SWW/HDY

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner, Social

Security Administration, Defendant

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

INSTRUCTIONS

This recommended disposition has been submitted to United States

District Judge Susan Webber Wright. The parties may file specific

written objections to these findings and recommendations and must

provide the factual or legal basis for each objection. An original

and two copies of the objections must be filed with the Clerk no

later than eleven (11) days from the date of the findings and

recommendations. A copy must be served on the opposing party. The

District Judge, even in the absence of objections, may reject these

proposed findings and recommendations in whole or in part.

DISPOSITION

Plaintiff, Kellie Hallman, has appealed the final decision of

the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration to deny her

claim for Disability Insurance benefits and Supplemental Security

Income, based on disability. Both parties have submitted appeal

briefs and the case is ready for decision.

Case 4:05-cv-01071-SWW Document 18 Filed 07/25/06 Page 1 of 11
2

The Court's function on review is to determine whether the

Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the

record as a whole and free of legal error. Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d

185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997); see also, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial

evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.

389, 401 (1971); Reynolds v. Chater, 82 F.3d 254, 257 (8th Cir.

1996).

 In assessing the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must

consider evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's decision as

well as evidence that supports it; the Court may not, however,

reverse the Commissioner's decision merely because substantial

evidence would have supported an opposite decision. Sultan v.

Barnhart, 368 F.3d 857, 863 (8th Cir. 2004); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d

1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993).

"Disability" is the "inability to engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A "physical or

mental impairment" is "an impairment that results from anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable

by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

Plaintiff alleged disability based on ulcerative colitis,

Case 4:05-cv-01071-SWW Document 18 Filed 07/25/06 Page 2 of 11
 1The Hon. Wendell C. Fowler.

 2There had been a previous hearing and adverse determination by

the ALJ, but the Appeals Council remanded for further development.

(Tr. 200-02)

3

inflammatory bowel syndrome, stress, hemorrhoids, asthma and migraine

headaches. (Tr. 85) The Commissioner found that she was not

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The only

issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner's decision that

Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act is supported

by substantial record evidence.

After conducting an administrative hearing, the Administrative

Law Judge1 (ALJ) concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a

disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time

through March 22, 2005, the date of his decision. (Tr. 19) On June

28, 2005, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for a review

of the ALJ's decision, making the ALJ's decision the final decision

of the Commissioner. (Tr. 6-8) Plaintiff then filed her complaint

initiating this appeal. (Docket #2)

After consideration of the record as a whole, the Court finds

that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial

evidence.

Plaintiff was 34 years old at the time of the supplemental

hearing.2 (Tr. 284) She is a high school graduate and completed

training as a Certified Nurse Assistant. (Tr. 91, 284) She has past

work experience as a cashier, nurse’s aide and receptionist. (Tr.

Case 4:05-cv-01071-SWW Document 18 Filed 07/25/06 Page 3 of 11
4

14, 76-79, 86)

The ALJ considered Plaintiff's impairments by way of the

required five-step sequential evaluation process. The first step

involves a determination of whether the claimant is involved in

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i);

416.920(a)(4)(i) (2004). If the claimant is, benefits are denied,

regardless of medical condition, age, education or work experience.

Id. at §§ 404.1520(b); 416.920(b).

Step 2 involves a determination of whether the claimant has an

impairment or combination of impairments which is “severe” and meets

the duration requirement. Id. at §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii);

416.920(a)(4)(ii). If not, benefits are denied. Id. A “severe”

impairment significantly limits a claimant’s ability to perform basic

work activities. Id. at §§ 404.1520(c); 416.920(c).

Step 3 involves a determination of whether the severe

impairment(s) meets or equals a listed impairment. Id.,

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If so, and the duration

requirement is met, benefits are awarded. Id.

If the claimant does not meet or equal a Listing, then a

residual functional capacity assessment is made. Id.,

§§ 404.1520(4); 416.920(4). This residual functional capacity

assessment is utilized at Steps 4 and 5. Id.

Step 4 involves a determination of whether the claimant has

sufficient residual functional capacity to perform past relevant

work. Id., §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv); 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If so,

Case 4:05-cv-01071-SWW Document 18 Filed 07/25/06 Page 4 of 11
5

benefits are denied. Id.

Step 5 involves a determination of whether the claimant is able

to make an adjustment to other work, given claimant's age, education

and work experience. Id., §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v); 416.920(a)(4)(v) .

If so, benefits are denied; if not, benefits are awarded. Id.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since her alleged onset date, July 31, 2002. (Tr.

18) He found that Plaintiff had “severe” impairments, degenerative

joint disease, migraine headaches, gastritis and reactive airway

disease, but that she did not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that met or equaled a Listing. (Tr. 18-19) He judged

that Plaintiff’s subjective allegations were not borne out by the

overall record and not fully credible. (Tr. 19)

The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional

capacity for a significant range of light work. Id. He determined

that she had no past relevant work. Id. He correctly noted that,

once Plaintiff was determined to have no past relevant work, the

burden shifted to the Commissioner to show a significant number of

jobs within the economy that she could perform, given her residual

functional capacity, age, education and past work. (Tr. 18)

Based on the testimony of a vocational expert witness in

response to a hypothetical question, the ALJ found that there were a

significant number of jobs in the economy which Plaintiff could

perform, notwithstanding her limitations, for example, inspector and

security guard. (Tr. 19) Consequently, the ALJ concluded that

Case 4:05-cv-01071-SWW Document 18 Filed 07/25/06 Page 5 of 11
6

Plaintiff was not disabled. Id.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s credibility determination was

flawed. (Br. 6-10) 

The absence of an objective medical basis which supports

the degree of severity of subjective complaints alleged is

just one factor to be considered in evaluating the

credibility of the testimony and complaints. The

adjudicator must give full consideration to all of the

evidence presented relating to subjective complaints,

including the claimant's prior work record, and

observations by third parties and treating and examining

physicians relating to such matters as:

1. the claimant's daily activities;

2. the duration, frequency and intensity of the pain;

3. precipitating and aggravating factors;

4. dosage, effectiveness and side effects of

medication;

5. functional restrictions.

The adjudicator is not free to accept or reject the

claimant's subjective complaints solely on the basis of

personal observations. Subjective complaints may be

discounted if there are inconsistencies in the evidence as

a whole. 

Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d at 1322 (emphasis in original).

There is little objective support in the record for Plaintiff's

claim of disability. No evaluations showed medical conditions that

were disabling. Furthermore, inconsistencies between the medical

evidence and Plaintiff's subjective complaints gave reason to

discount those complaints. Richmond v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 1141, 1443

(8th Cir. 1994). 

Given the inconsistencies in Plaintiff's statements, the lack of

Case 4:05-cv-01071-SWW Document 18 Filed 07/25/06 Page 6 of 11
7

medical evidence in support of Plaintiff's allegations, the type of

medications taken, the failure to seek more treatment, Plaintiff's

daily activities, her poor work record, her functional capabilities

and the lack of restriction placed on Plaintiff by her physicians,

the ALJ could rightly discount Plaintiff's subjective complaints.

See, e.g., Dunahoo v. Apfel, 241 F.3d 1033, 1038 (8th Cir. 2001) (ALJ

may discount complaints inconsistent with the evidence as a whole);

Dodson v. Chater, 101 F.3d 533, 534 (8th Cir. 1996)(after full

consideration of all evidence relating to subjective complaints, ALJ

may discount complaints if there are inconsistencies in evidence as

a whole). 

In a Disability Supplemental Interview Outline dated October 25,

2002 (Tr. 75), Plaintiff indicated that she groomed without

assistance; did laundry and dishes and changed sheets; she shopped

for groceries (Tr. 71); she prepared meals, including sandwiches and

frozen dinners for up to three and a half hours at a time; she

counted change; she did not drive or attend church (Tr. 72).

However, at both hearings she testified that she drove some. (Tr.

272, 273, 292) She also testified that she went to church. (Tr.

272, 293) She took her three children to a movie. (Tr. 294) She

testified that she had migraine headaches on a daily basis, yet,

according to Plaintiff’s Appeal Brief (Br. 6-7), she only complained

to her doctor of headache twice after her alleged onset date in 2002

(Tr. 127, 129), twice in 2003 (Tr. 159, 160), twice in 2004 (Tr. 226,

Case 4:05-cv-01071-SWW Document 18 Filed 07/25/06 Page 7 of 11
 3It appears that this visit pertained to hair loss rather than

headache.

8

2613) and once in 2005 (Tr. 260). It does not appear that she ever

told her doctors that she was suffering from daily migraine

headaches. 

Despite her allegations of significant side effects from her

medications, she had never asked her doctors to prescribe different

medications. (Tr. 295) There is no evidence that Plaintiff

complained of any side effects of her medications with any doctor, so

the ALJ was justified in rejecting that claim. Hajek v. Shalala, 30

F.3d 89, 92 (8th Cir. 1994); see Barrett v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1019,

1023 (8th Cir. 1994); Richmond v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 1441, 1444 (8th

Cir. 1994); Ownbey v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 342, 345 (8th Cir. 1994). She

also testified that she could not recall any restrictions her doctors

had placed on her. See Hensley v. Barnhart, 352 F.3d 353, 357 (8th

Cir. 2003)(no functional restrictions on activities is inconsistent

with claim of disability); Depover v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 563, 567

(8th Cir. 2003)(ALJ may consider absence of such opinion by treating

physicians); Baldwin v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549, 557 (8th Cir.

2003)(none of claimant’s independent physicians restricted or limited

his activities); Tennant v. Apfel, 224 F.3d 869, 871 (8th Cir.

2000)(absence of physician ordered restrictions). 

Perhaps most damaging to Plaintiff’s claim that she was unable

Case 4:05-cv-01071-SWW Document 18 Filed 07/25/06 Page 8 of 11
 4The ALJ noted that Plaintiff had worked, but determined that the

jobs did not last long enough to amount to substantial gainful

activity. (Tr. 18) 

9

to work was the fact that she did work after her alleged onset date.4

She testified that she worked as a substitute teacher during 2003.

(Tr. 285) She worked as a receptionist for a tax preparation firm in

2004. (Tr. 286) She worked for four months. Id. It was full-time

work. (Tr. 267-68) Apparently she had worked at that firm during

tax season since 1998. (Tr. 286) Plaintiff’s work activity during

the period that she alleges disability supports the ALJ’s conclusion

that she was not disabled. See Dunahoo v. Apfel, 241 F.3d 1033, 1039

(8th Cir. 2001)(seeking work and working while applying for benefits

inconsistent with complaints of disabling pain); Ostronski v. Chater,

94 F.3d 413, 418 (return to past work undercuts complaints of

inability to perform any work); Roe v. Chater, 92 F.3d 672, 677 (8th

Cir. 1996)(actual activities, including work, incongruous with

contention that cannot work); Comstock v. Chater, 91 F.3d 1143, 1147

(8th Cir. 1996)(work activity belies claim of disabling pain); Cruze

v. Chater, 85 F.3d 1320, 1324 (8th Cir. 1996)(active lifestyle and

performance of odd jobs tend to prove claimant can work); Piepgras v.

Chater, 76 F.3d 233, 236 (8th Cir. 1996)(wide range of activities,

including working two days a week, supports finding of no

disability); Bentley v. Chater, 52 F.3d 784, 786 (8th Cir.

1995)(seeking work incompatible with disability); Naber v. Shalala,

22 F.3d 186, 188 (8th Cir. 1994)(intention to work tends to prove

Case 4:05-cv-01071-SWW Document 18 Filed 07/25/06 Page 9 of 11
10

ability to work); Starr v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1006, 1008 n.3 (8th

Cir. 1992)(even though not substantial gainful activity, work

activity determinative of capacity for work); Thompson v. Sullivan,

878 F.2d 1108, 1110 (8th Cir. 1989)(any work during claimed

disability may show capacity for substantial gainful activity).

The ALJ's credibility analysis was proper. He made express

credibility findings and gave reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s

subjective complaints. E.g., Shelton v. Chater, 87 F.3d 992, 995

(8th Cir. 1996); Reynolds v. Chater, 82 F.3d 254, 258 (8th Cir.

1996); Hall v. Chater, 62 F.3d 220, 224 (8th Cir. 1995). 

It is not the task of this Court to review the evidence and make

an independent decision. Neither is it to reverse the decision of

the ALJ because there is evidence on the record which contradicts his

findings. The test is whether there is substantial evidence in the

record as a whole which supports the decision of the ALJ. E.g.,

Mapes v. Chater, 82 F.3d 259, 262 (8th Cir. 1996); Pratt v. Sullivan,

956 F.2d 830, 833 (8th Cir. 1992).

There is ample evidence on the record as a whole that "a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the] conclusion"

of the ALJ in this case. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401; see

also Reutter v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 2004). The

Commissioner's decision is not based on legal error.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the final determination of the

Commissioner be affirmed and that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed

Case 4:05-cv-01071-SWW Document 18 Filed 07/25/06 Page 10 of 11
11

with prejudice. 

DATED this 25 day of July, 2006.

 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 4:05-cv-01071-SWW Document 18 Filed 07/25/06 Page 11 of 11