Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-01216/USCOURTS-caDC-06-01216-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
National Labor Relations Board
Petitioner
New York Center for Rehabilitation Care, Inc.
Respondent
New York Rehabilitation Care Management, LLC
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 7, 2007 Decided October 30, 2007

No. 06-1162

NEW YORK REHABILITATION CARE MANAGEMENT, LLC AND

NEW YORK CENTER FOR REHABILITATION CARE, INC.,

PETITIONERS

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with

No. 06-1216

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application for

Enforcement of an Order

 of the National Labor Relations Board

Morris Tuchman argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioner.

Usha Dheenan, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board,

argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were

Ronald E. Meisburg, General Counsel, John H. Ferguson,

Associate General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy

Associate General Counsel at the time the brief was filed, and

Jill A. Griffin, Supervisory Attorney. Meredith L. Jason and

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Ruth E. Burdick, Attorneys, entered an appearance.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and ROGERS and

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: New York Rehabilitation Care

Management, LLC and New York Center for Rehabilitation

Care, Inc. (together “the Company”) petition for review of a

decision and order of the National Labor Relations Board

finding that they violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National

Labor Relations Act (“the Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (1). The

principal issue is whether the Board abused its discretion in

vacating a union certification and ordering a new representation

election. The Company contends that the Board erred by

considering issues beyond the scope of a representation

proceeding. Under the unusual circumstances involved, we find

no abuse of discretion by the Board in revoking the union

certification and ordering a new election in a representation

proceeding notwithstanding the extant collective bargaining

agreement (“CBA”). Accordingly, because the Company’s

other defenses to its conceded refusal to bargain with the union

that prevailed in the second election fail, we deny the petition

and grant the Board’s cross application for enforcement of its

order. 

 

I.

Prior to 2002, the Company operated Lyden Care Center

(“Lyden”), a 114-bed skilled nursing facility in New York City.

For more than twenty years, Local 1199, New York’s Health

and Human Service Employees’ Union, Service Employees

International Union (“Local 1199”) represented Lyden’s

employees.

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On November 15, 2001, the Company submitted an

application to the New York Department of Health to open the

New York Center for Rehabilitation Care (“NY Center”), a new,

280-bed skilled nursing facility to be located a few blocks from

Lyden, stating that it intended to close Lyden and transfer its

patients to the new facility. The application stated that the

Company anticipated that NY Center would be at eighty percent

occupancy within twelve months. The Company estimated that

it would need approximately 300 on staff once NY Center

reached capacity. To effectuate this plan, the Company intended

to increase the number of staff as patients arrived, hoping to

transfer staff from Lyden to NY Center when Lyden closed.

When Local 1199 attempted to obtain information about NY

Center and any plan to transfer its member-employees to the

new facility, the Company provided none.

On January 25, 2002, Local 300S, Production, Service and

Sales District Council, United Food and Commercial Workers

Union (“Local 300S”) filed an election petition with the Board

to become the collective bargaining representative for

employees at NY Center. Neither the Company nor Local 300S

provided the Board with any information about Local 1199’s

interest in the election, notwithstanding Local 1199’s lengthy

representation of Lyden’s employees. Nor did they inform the

Board of the Company’s plan to expand significantly NY

Center’s workforce in the near future. Under the terms of a

stipulation between the Company and Local 300S, only those

employed at NY Center on January 12, 2002 would be eligible

to vote. As of that date, NY Center had forty-one employees,

thirty-seven of whom had worked less than eight hours. Despite

being a skilled nursing facility, only fourteen of the eligible

employees held jobs involving patient care, all fourteen of

whom stopped working at NY Center the week before the first

patient arrived. Following an election held on February 22,

2002, the Regional Director of the Board certified Local 300S

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as the representative of NY Center employees. On April 26,

2002, three days before NY Center opened its doors, the

Company and Local 300S entered into a four-year CBA. Lyden

closed on October 9, 2002, transferring one hundred patients and

seventy-seven employees to NY Center, and by October 16,

2002, NY Center had more than 200 employees, only twelve of

whom had been eligible to vote in the February 22 election. 

On October 25, 2002, Local 1199 filed a petition with the

Board to invalidate Local 300S’s certification and hold a new

election. The Board considered Local 1199’s petition in a

representation proceeding, rather than an unfair labor practice

proceeding. Following a four-day hearing, the Regional

Director found that: (1) the two entities petitioning for review

constitute a single employer under the Act, (2) the Company and

Local 300S had failed to notify the Board about Local 1199’s

interest in the representation election, and (3) the employees

voting in the February 22, 2002 election did not constitute a

“substantial and representative” complement of the “reasonably

foreseeable future workforce” of NY Center. The Regional

Director therefore revoked Local 300S’s certification because it

“was not the lawful . . . representative of NY Center’s

employees at any time” and “[t]o permit the election results to

stand would be contrary to the Act’s guarantee that employees

have the right, of their own choosing, to select or reject a

bargaining representative.” The Regional Director declined to

apply the contract bar doctrine and ordered NY Center to hold

a new election with both Local 300S and Local 1199 on the

ballot.

Local 1199 won the second election, held on March 11,

2004, by a vote of 200 to 5. According to an affidavit the

Company proffered to the Regional Director, Local 1199

representatives had stood at the entrance to NY Center on

election day, distributing hats, T-shirts, and pins to employees,

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and providing coffee and food. The Company filed objections

to the election on March 23, 2004 based on Local 1199’s

electioneering, asking the Board to set it aside. The Regional

Director overruled the Company’s objections on May 20, 2004

and certified Local 1199 as the collective bargaining

representative of employees at NY Center. When the Company

appealed, the Board declined to review the Regional Director’s

determination, finding that the Company had raised “no

substantial issues” with respect to the election. NY Center

nonetheless refused to bargain with Local 1199. When Local

1199 complained, the Board commenced an unfair labor practice

proceeding. The Company conceded that it had refused to

bargain with Local 1199, but contended that Local 1199’s

certification was invalid. Prior to the Board’s decision, but after

the Company’s refusal to bargain, Local 1199 disaffiliated from

the AFL-CIO. 

By decision and order of July 29, 2005, the Board granted

summary judgment, finding that the Company’s refusal to

bargain with Local 1199 violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the

Act. The Board concluded that all issues raised by the Company

with respect to Local 1199’s certification were, or could have

been, raised in the underlying representation proceeding and that

the Company offered neither to adduce newly discovered

evidence nor to show any special circumstances that would

require the Board to reexamine its decision to certify Local

1199. Affirmatively, as a remedy for the violation, the Board

ordered the Company to bargain with Local 1199, to embody

any understanding reached in a signed agreement, and to post

copies of a remedial notice. The Board denied the Company’s

motion for reconsideration, which argued that an issue of fact

existed as to whether Local 1199, after its disaffiliation from the

AFL-CIO, remained the same union that employees had chosen

as their representative. The Company now petitions for review,

raising anew the objections it had raised to the representation

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proceeding and the second election, and the unfair labor

practices proceeding. The Company, however, has not

challenged the Board’s determination that the two entities

petitioning for review constitute a single employer under the

Act. 

II.

In addressing the Company’s several challenges to the

Board’s decision and order, the court does so cognizant that the

Board has “broad discretion ‘to assess the propriety and results

of representation elections,’” AOTOP, LLC v. NLRB, 331 F.3d

100, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting N. of Mkt. Senior Servs., Inc.

v. NLRB, 204 F.3d 1163, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 2000)), and to

establish “procedure[s] and safeguards necessary to insure the

fair and free choice of bargaining representatives by

employees,” NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946).

“Our review of the Board’s factual conclusions is ‘highly

deferential,’” Perdue Farms, Inc. v. NLRB, 144 F.3d 830, 834

(D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting LCF, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 1276,

1281 (D.C. Cir. 1997)), and its findings of fact are conclusive if

“supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as

a whole,” 29 U.S.C. § 160(e); see Perdue Farms, 144 F.3d at

834-35.

A.

The Company challenges the Board’s procedures in

ordering a new election, contending that the Board may impugn

a CBA only in an unfair labor practice proceeding and not in a

representation proceeding. The procedure followed by the

Board, the Company continues, improperly circumvented the

six-month statute of limitations applicable to unfair labor

practice proceedings. See 29 U.S.C. § 10(b). The Board

proceeded in two steps: First, the Board revoked Local 300S’s

certification because the union and the Company failed to notify

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the Board of Local 1199’s interest and because a substantial and

representative complement of employees did not exist at the

time of the first election. Second, the Board ordered a new

election, declining to apply the contract bar doctrine because it

found that Local 300S had never been validly certified as the

representative of NY Center employees. We find that the Board

did not abuse its discretion by adjudicating these issues in a

representation proceeding. 

The Board has stated that “unfair labor practice issues as

such” can only be adjudicated in an unfair labor practice

proceeding. All County Elec. Co., 332 N.L.R.B. 863, 863 (2000)

(emphasis added). Thus, in Texas Meat Packers, Inc., 130

N.L.R.B. 279 (1961), the Board concluded that it could not

properly consider in a representation proceeding an allegation

that an employer had committed an unfair labor practice under

Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Here, however, the issues the Board

considered in revoking Local 300S’s certification were

fundamentally representation election issues, namely the

Company’s failure to notify the Board of Local 1199’s interest,

see U.S. Chaircraft, Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. 922 (1961), and the

premature election because a substantial and representative

complement of employees did not exist, see Gilmore Motors,

Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 1672 (1958). The Company and Local 300S

invoked the Board’s election procedures to certify Local 300S

as the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative; the

Board could permissibly use the same proceedings to undo an

improper election. See A.J. Tower, 329 U.S. at 330.

Contrary to the Company’s position, the Board’s decision

not to apply the contract bar doctrine in a representation

proceeding is consistent with the Act and with Board precedent,

even though the Board relied upon facts beyond the four corners

of the CBA, namely the facts that justified revoking Local

300S’s certification. The Board has previously resolved the

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applicability of the contract bar doctrine in representation

proceedings, see General Extrusion Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1165

(1958), and doing so here did not resolve any unfair labor

practice issues. The Board’s Outline of Law and Procedure in

Representation Cases also makes clear that the Board may find

an exception to the contract bar doctrine in a representation case,

even on the basis of facts beyond the four corners of a contract.

NLRB,An Outline of Law & Procedure in Representation Cases

(“NLRB Outline of Law & Procedure”) ch. 9 (2005), available

at http://www.nlrb.gov/publications/manuals. Neither the

Outline nor General Extrusion, and certainly nothing in the Act,

requires that a union always pursue an unfair labor practice

charge in order to overcome a contract bar. See NLRB Outline

of Law & Procedure ch. 9, § 9-212; see also General Cable

Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962). 

The Company has cited no authority to the contrary.

Although the Company characterizes General Extrusion as “not

permit[ting] the litigation in a representation (contract bar) case

of the issue of whether a company is in normal operation,”

Petitioner’s Br. at 15, that decision does not announce such a

blanket rule. Further, General Extrusion considered the

circumstances under which the number of those employed at a

company at the time a CBA is entered into can justify ordering

a new election despite that CBA. 121 N.L.R.B. 1165, 1166-67.

Here, the Board considered the number of those employed at NY

Center at the time of the first election to determine whether to

revoke Local 300S’s certification. Its decision not to apply the

contract bar flowed from that revocation decision. As the Board

counsel correctly stated at oral argument, the circumstances of

this case are unusual and the Board’s action seems entirely

justified. We accordingly hold that the Board did not err

procedurally by deciding in a representation proceeding not to

apply the contract bar doctrine. 

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Although the Company also contends in its reply brief that

the Board offered an inadequate explanation for its decision not

to apply the contract bar doctrine, we decline to entertain this

contention; in order to prevent the “sandbagging” of another

party, “we have generally held that issues not raised until the

reply brief are waived.” See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of

Wash. v. EPA, 86 F.3d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The

Company’s initial brief included a heading regarding whether

the Board adequately explained its decision, but its brief

addresses only the Board’s procedures. “It is not enough merely

to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving

the court to do counsel’s work.” Schneider v. Kissinger, 412

F.3d 190, 200 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v.

Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990)); see FED. R. APP. P.

28(a)(9).

B.

The Company’s other defenses to its conceded refusal to

bargain with Local 1199 also do not support granting the

Company’s petition. 

The Company contends that the circumstances surrounding

the first election did not justify the revocation of Local 300S’s

certification. The record before the Board indicated two

independent grounds for the revocation: failure to give proper

notice and the absence of a substantial and representative

complement of employees at the time of the first election. As

the Board points out, by failing to address the failure to give

proper notice issue in its opening brief, the Company has

forfeited any right to challenge either the Board’s finding that it

failed to notify the Board of an interested party or the Board’s

conclusion that this warranted revocation of Local 300S’s

certification. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wash., 86 F.3d

at 1221.

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The Company further contends that the Lyden employees

should have been accreted to Local 300S. According to Board

precedent, an accretion is defined “as ‘the addition of a

relatively small group of employees to an existing unit where

these additional employees share a sufficient community of

interest with the unit employees and have no separate identity.

The additional employees are then properly governed by the

unit’s choice of bargaining representatives.’” Safety Carrier,

Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. 960, 969 (1992) (quoting Safeway Stores,

Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 918, 924 (1981)). The Board applies its

accretion doctrine “restrictively, so as not to tread too heavily on

the right of employees to choose their own collective bargaining

representative.” Local 627, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v.

NLRB, 595 F.2d 844, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see Passavant Ret.

& Health Ctr., Inc., 313 N.L.R.B. 1216, 1218 (1994). The

Company would have the Board foist a new representative,

Local 300S, on employees who have long been represented by

Local 1199 even though the Board has revoked its certification

for failure to notify the Board of Local 1199’s interest. The

Company has pointed to no authority requiring the accretion of

a smaller unit into a larger one once the Board has determined

that the larger unit lacks a representative, and, as explained, the

Company has not adequately challenged the underlying

revocation. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion by the

Board in declining to apply the accretion doctrine.

The Company’s objection to the Board’s summary

disposition of its objections to the second election also lacks

persuasive force. A party seeking to overturn a Boardadministered election bears a heavy burden. See Kwik Care Ltd.

v. NLRB, 82 F.3d 1122, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Board

regulations permit a Regional Director to dispose of objections

to an election without a hearing unless “the regional director

concludes [the objections] raise substantial and material factual

issues.” 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(d). Board precedent permits

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electioneering on the day of a representation election so long as

it does not occur in a no-electioneering zone or while the

employees are standing in line to vote, and so long as it does not

substantially impair the employees’ free choice. See Overnite

Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 140 F.3d 259, 269-70 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

Absent evidence of a quid-pro-quo or coercive behavior, the

Board has concluded that the provision of food and campaign

propaganda does not taint an election. See id. at 269; NLRB v.

Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 132 F.3d 1001, 1005-06 (4th Cir.

1997); R.L. White Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 575, 576 (1982). 

Here, the Company’s paltry evidentiary offering provides

an insufficient basis to show that the Board was required to hold

an evidentiary hearing. See Amalgamated Clothing Workers of

Am. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 818, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Boston

Insulated Wire & Cable Co., 259 N.L.R.B. 1118, 1118 n.3

(1982), enforced, 703 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1983). The Company’s

allegations involve conduct outside the polling area or any noelectioneering zone and its evidence – a one-page affidavit by

one employee and a proffer of testimony by an unnamed second

– failed to provide details, including how many employees were

involved and what was said to them and did not allege that Local

1199 distributed paraphernalia or food as rewards. The Board

reasonably could conclude that such evidence does not raise

“substantial and material factual issues.” 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(d);

see AOTOP, 331 F.3d at 103. The cases cited by the Company

are distinguishable; for example, in Nathan Katz Realty, LLC v.

NLRB, 251 F.3d 981, 991-93 (D.C. Cir. 2001), union agents

were within a no-electioneering zone and employees had to pass

by in order to vote. In Owens-Illinois, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 1235,

1235-36 (1984), the gifts provided by the union had the

appearance of rewards for favorable votes in a close election. In

summarily rejecting the Company’s objections, then, the Board

acted both consistently with its precedent and reasonably. 

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Finally, the Company contends that the Board erred in

refusing to reconsider its decision that the Company had a duty

to bargain with Local 1199 after the union disaffiliated from the

AFL-CIO. According to the Company, the union’s disaffiliation

changed its identity so that new Local 1199 was not the Local

1199 that won the election. The court need not address this

issue because the Company does not challenge the alternative

ground on which the Board relied, namely that the disaffiliation

occurred after the Company refused to negotiate.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review and grant the

Board’s application for enforcement of its order.

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