Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03072/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03072-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert J. McCarthy
Petitioner
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ROBERT J. MCCARTHY,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3072

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DA-1221-09-0725-W-1, DA-1221-10-0078-W1.

______________________ 

Decided: January 14, 2016

______________________ 

PAULA NAOMI DINERSTEIN, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, Washington, DC, argued for 

petitioner. 

MICHAEL ANTON CARNEY, Office of the General Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, 

argued for respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G.

POLISUK. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, LOURIE and WALLACH, Circuit 

Judges.

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2 MCCARTHY v. MSPB

PROST, Chief Judge. 

Robert McCarthy, who was formerly employed as a 

supervisory attorney for the United States International 

Boundary and Water Commission (the “Commission” or 

the “USIBWC”), appeals from a denial by the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) of his motion to reopen

his appeal. For the reasons discussed below, this court 

affirms. 

BACKGROUND

A 

The circumstances giving rise to this appeal are 

summarized in part in our decision McCarthy v. International Boundary and Water Commission: U.S. and Mexico, 

497 F. App’x 4 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (unpublished). We provide 

facts relevant to the issues here below.

USIBWC Commissioner Bill Ruth hired McCarthy as 

a full-time, supervisory attorney for the Commission 

beginning January 18, 2009. Between June and July, 

2009, McCarthy prepared four legal memoranda (two on

June 19, one on July 14, and one on July 20) challenging 

certain activities at the Commission as “gross mismanagement” and contrary to existing law. McCarthy’s 

memoranda also attacked certain officers as lacking “core 

competencies.” 

On July 28, 2009, McCarthy submitted a report titled 

“Disclosures of Alleged Fraud, Waste and Abuse” to the 

State Department Office of Inspector General (“OIG”), as 

well as other federal agencies. The report stated, “I have 

previously made the Commissioner aware of the matters 

disclosed herein, and I have provided legal advice with 

respect thereto.” J.A. 171. It specifically identified both 

June 19 memoranda, but did not identify the July memoranda. That same day, McCarthy sent an email to the 

USIBWC’s Commissioner Ruth informing him that he had 

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MCCARTHY v. MSPB 3

“report[ed] allegations of fraud, waste and abuse (and 

suspected criminal activity).” J.A. 182.

On July 31, 2009, Commissioner Ruth terminated 

McCarthy’s employment. In support of his decision, 

Commissioner Ruth cited McCarthy’s 

continued failure to support me or other members 

of the executive staff in a constructive and collegial manner as evidenced in [his] memoranda of 

June 19, 2009, ‘Legal Requirements for Information Management’, June 19, 2009, ‘Legal Requirements for Separation of Budget and Finance 

Responsibilities’, July 14, 2009, ‘Opinion on the 

Draft Internal Audit Program Directive and Manual’, and July 20, 2009, ‘Comments on Proposed 

Directive Management System’ . . . .

J.A. 183.

B 

On August 1, 2009, McCarthy filed a complaint with 

the Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”), alleging whistleblower retaliation. His complaint identified his report to 

OIG, but not the legal memoranda, as protected activity. 

At the time, this was consistent with existing precedent, 

which held that reports made in the course of an employee’s normal duties and reports made to a supervisor about 

a supervisor’s conduct were not protected under the 

Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 

103 Stat. 16 (codified at various sections of 5 U.S.C.)

(“WPA”). See Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 

1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001). On August 21, McCarthy 

submitted an additional “Statement in Support of Complaint for Reprisal, Appeal and Stay Request” to the OSC 

which discussed his whistleblowing complaint in more 

detail. This statement did not explicitly identify the legal 

memoranda, but discussed similar topics. Compare J.A. 

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209–23 (August 21 statement), with J.A. 152–81 (legal 

memoranda). 

The administrative judge issued an initial decision on 

April 9, 2010, concluding that McCarthy had not been 

retaliated against. The Board affirmed the administrative judge’s initial decision on August 5, 2011, and we 

affirmed on October 15, 2012. McCarthy, 497 F. App’x at

16. 

McCarthy petitioned for rehearing on November 29, 

2012. Petition for Panel Rehearing, Rehearing En Banc, 

McCarthy, 497 F. App’x 4 (No. 11-3239), ECF No. 2. 

While McCarthy’s petition was still pending, Congress 

enacted the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 

2012 (“WPEA”), which became effective December 27, 

2012. Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465-76 (codified as 

amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 6 U.S.C. § 133, 

31 U.S.C. § 1116, 50 U.S.C. § 401a). Both parties recognize that, under the WPEA, McCarthy’s four legal memoranda could be protected disclosures. Compare Opening 

Br. 31–32, with Responsive Br. 31; see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f). 

On June 26, 2013, the Board decided Day v. Department 

of Homeland Security, No. DC-1221-12-0528-W-1, 2013

WL 3204514 (M.S.P.B. June 26, 2013), which held that 

§ 101 of the WPEA could be applied retroactively to 

pending cases. The parties do not dispute that the WPEA 

could be applied retroactively here. Compare Opening Br. 

14, 24–25, with Responsive Br. 28. McCarthy did not 

raise the WPEA’s change in law while his petition for 

rehearing was pending.1

1 At oral argument, McCarthy explained that he did 

not raise WPEA’s change in law while his petition was 

pending because the Board had not yet decided Day. 

Thus, in his view, it was unclear that the WPEA could be 

retroactively applied to his case.

 

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MCCARTHY v. MSPB 5

We denied McCarthy’s petition for rehearing on February 13, 2013. McCarthy v. Int’l Boundary & Water 

Comm’n: U.S. & Mex., No. 11-3239 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 13, 

2013). McCarthy petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme 

Court on May 13, 2013, which was denied on October 7, 

2013. McCarthy v. Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n: U.S. 

& Mex., No. 12-1364 (Oct. 7, 2013). 

On October 25, 2013, McCarthy filed a motion to reopen his appeal with the Board, seeking reinstatement and 

“other appropriate relief.” J.A. 132. After the Board did 

not respond, on December 1, 2014, McCarthy petitioned 

this court for a writ of mandamus directing the Board to 

issue a decision. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, In re 

McCarthy, No. 2015-118 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 1, 2014), ECF No.

1. While McCarthy’s mandamus petition was pending, on 

January 8, 2015, the Clerk of the Board sent McCarthy a 

letter informing him that the Board would not reopen his 

case. We denied McCarthy’s mandamus petition on 

January 29, 2015, electing to instead construe his petition 

as a timely petition for review, which is the appeal now 

before us. 

DISCUSSION

A 

This court’s review of decisions by the Board is limited. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9), we may only hear “an 

appeal from a final order or final decision of the” Board. 

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) (2012). A threshold question, then, 

is whether the Clerk’s January 8 letter constitutes a “final 

order or final decision” that may be reviewed by us.

Section 1201.113 of 5 C.F.R., titled “Finality of decision,” provides in relevant part:

The initial decision of the judge will become the 

Board’s final decision 35 days after issuance. Initial decisions are not precedential.

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(a) Exceptions. The initial decision will not become the Board’s final decision if within the time 

limit for filing specified in 1201.114 of this part, 

any party files a petition for review or, if no petition for review is filed, files a request that the initial decision be vacated for the purpose of 

accepting a settlement agreement into the record.

(b) Petition for review denied. If the Board denies 

all petitions for review, the initial decision will become final when the Board issues its last decision 

denying a petition for review.

(c) Petition for review granted or case reopened. If 

the Board grants a petition for review or a cross 

petition for review, or reopens or dismisses a case, 

the decision of the Board is final if it disposes of 

the entire action.

The reviewability of Clerk letters from the Board is 

not an entirely new question to us. In Haines v. Merit 

Systems Protection Board, 44 F.3d 998, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 

1995), we found that a pro forma letter from the Clerk 

denying repetitive motions to reopen was not a “final 

order or final decision” under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113, and 

thus not reviewable. We reasoned that “the letter was 

merely an administrative response by the Clerk to 

Haines’s third informal letter request that the Board 

reopen her appeal and reconsider its final decision on its 

own motion. The Clerk had been delegated the authority 

to make such responses by the Board and was performing 

only a ministerial function in this regard.” Id. 

While we need not decide the reviewability of Clerk 

letters generally, we conclude that, at least in the circumstances of this case, where a Clerk letter denies a first 

motion to reopen, Haines does not apply. As we previously noted, Haines appears to have involved repetitive 

motions to reopen. In re McCarthy, No. 15-118, slip op. at 

2 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 29, 2015). Because of this, the situation 

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MCCARTHY v. MSPB 7

only required an “administrative response” which could be 

dispensed by a “ministerial function.” Haines, 44 F.3d at 

1000. By contrast, McCarthy’s motion to reopen had not 

been previously considered by the Board as it involved an 

intervening change in law. In effect, then, the Clerk 

letter announcing the Board’s denial of his motion announced a substantive decision which had a real impact 

on McCarthy’s interests. The nature of this decision is 

akin to a “final order or final decision,” not an “administrative response,” and should be construed as such. This 

court’s jurisdiction should not turn on the manner in 

which the Board chooses to announce its decision, and it 

would elevate form over substance to hold otherwise.

The Board’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. While it is true that existing statutes and regulations do not specifically state that a Clerk letter is a “final 

order or final decision,” see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7701(e)(1)(B), 

5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.113, 1201.117(c), they also do not prohibit it from being so. Indeed, they are silent as to the form 

these documents may or may not take. Id. Thus, characterizing a Clerk letter as a “final order or decision” does 

not conflict with existing law.

Accordingly, we are not deprived of jurisdiction simply 

because the Board issued its denial of McCarthy’s motion 

to reopen in letter form.

B 

This case presents a second jurisdictional hurdle: even 

if the Clerk letter in this case qualifies as a “final order or 

decision,” we may not hear this case if the Board’s decision on McCarthy’s motion to reopen a case is not itself 

reviewable. In past cases, we have acknowledged that is 

an open question. See, e.g., Zamot v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 

332 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that whether 

we have the authority to review a Board decision regarding reopening is “an issue the court has left open”); Nelson 

v. FDIC, 83 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Assuming, 

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without deciding, that we may review the Board’s decision 

not to reopen an appeal on its own motion . . . for an abuse 

of discretion, we discern no such abuse . . . .”).

“Congress rarely intends to prevent courts from enforcing its directives to federal agencies” and there exists 

a “strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.” Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 

1645, 1651 (2015). Nevertheless, before review may be 

had, “a party must first clear the hurdle of § 701(a).” 

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985). Section 701(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedures Act

(“APA”) precludes judicial review where “agency action is 

committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 701(a)(2). This is a “very narrow exception” that applies 

in “those rare instances where ‘statutes are drawn in such 

broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.’” 

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. 402, 410 

(1971) (quoting S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 26 (1945)); see also 

Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830 (“[R]eview is not to be had if the 

statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise 

of discretion.”). In addition, § 701(a)(2) more likely applies if an “agency decision not to enforce often involves a 

complicated balancing of a number of factors which are 

peculiarly within its expertise.” Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831.

The only statutory acknowledgement of the Board’s 

authority to reopen cases appears in 5 U.S.C. § 7701(e)(1), 

which provides:

(e)(1) Except as provided in section 7702 of this title, any decision under subsection (b) of this section shall be final unless— 

(A) a party to the appeal or the Director petitions 

the Board for review within 30 days after the receipt of the decision; or

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MCCARTHY v. MSPB 9

(B) the Board reopens and reconsiders a case on 

its own motion.

The Board, for good cause shown, may extend the 

30-day period referred to in subparagraph (A) of 

this paragraph. One member of the Board may 

grant a petition or otherwise direct that a decision 

be reviewed by the full Board. The preceding sentence shall not apply if, by law, a decision of an 

administrative law judge is required to be acted 

upon by the Board.

The Board argues that the “broad and standard-less 

language” of § 7701(e)(1)(B) is sufficient to bring cases 

such as this, where the Board denies a motion to reopen, 

within the prohibition of § 701(a)(2). Specifically, the 

Board notes that this statute neither authorizes motions 

to reopen, nor does it lay out a standard by which such 

motions should be judged. It contrasts this to statutes 

governing motions to reopen in other contexts, such as 49 

U.S.C. § 10327(g),2 which sets forth the Interstate Com2 Section 10327(g) of 49 U.S.C. provides: 

(g)(1) The Commission may, at any time on its 

own initiative because of material error, new evidence, or substantially changed circumstances— 

(A) reopen a proceeding;

(B) grant rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration of an action of the Commission; and

(C) change an action of the Commission.

An interested party may petition to reopen and 

reconsider an action of the Commission under this 

paragraph under regulations of the Commission.

(2) The Commission may grant a rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration of an action of the 

 

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merce Commission’s authority to reopen prior decisions

and which the Supreme Court has found reviewable in 

certain circumstances. Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. 

Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 284 (1987). 

The Board’s reliance on § 7701(e)(1)(B) is misplaced. 

Section 7701(e), the broader provision in which 

§ 7701(e)(1)(B) appears, is a provision which sets forth 

conditions under which a decision of the Board can be 

considered final. Its reference to “the Board reopens” is 

simply that—a reference to reopening such that it can set 

forth how reopening impacts a decision’s status (e.g., final 

or not final). Unlike 49 U.S.C. § 10327(g) (the Interstate 

Commerce Commission provision cited by the Board), this 

is not a provision focused on reopening procedures, nor 

the Board’s authority to act in this way. Therefore, it 

makes sense that § 7701(e)(1)(B) would not fully set forth 

legal standards or address motion practice—this was not 

the purpose of this provision and an attempt to do so 

Commission that was taken by a division designated by the Commission if it finds that— 

(A) the action involves a matter of general transportation importance; or

(B) the action would be affected materially because of clear and convincing new evidence or 

changed circumstances.

An interested party may petition for rehearing, 

reargument, or reconsideration of an action of the 

Commission under this paragraph under regulations of the Commission. The Commission may 

stay an action pending a final determination under this paragraph. The Commission shall complete reconsideration and take final action by the 

120th day after the petition is granted.

 

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MCCARTHY v. MSPB 11

could render the remainder of the provision confusing. 

Given this context, it would not be reasonable to infer an 

intent to “commit to agency discretion by law” from 

§ 7701(e)(1)(B)’s passing reference to “the Board reopens.” 

See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166–67 (1970) 

(“[J]udicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved 

person will not be cut of [sic] unless there is persuasive 

reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.”); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 

(1967), abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99

(1977) (“[O]nly upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing 

evidence’ of a contrary legislative intent should the courts 

restrict access to judicial review.”). We decline to do so 

here. 

We also do not think that the fact that Congress has 

otherwise been silent as to the Board’s authority to reopen a case is sufficient to pull this case within the realm 

of § 701(a)(2). The mere absence of a statute spelling out 

the details of how an agency should carry out a particular 

action does not mean that that action has been wholly 

committed to agency discretion. Indeed, the Supreme 

Court has found agency decisions—including decisions to 

not reopen a case—reviewable under the APA, even in the 

absence of specific statutory directives. See, e.g., Dunlop 

v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 573 (1975), overruled on other 

grounds by Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving, 

Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen & Packers v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 549–50 (1984) (Secretary of 

Labor’s decision to file certain civil actions was judicially 

reviewable in absence of statutory prohibition); Data 

Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 158

(1970) (ruling by Comptroller was judicially reviewable in 

absence of statutory indication that review was precluded); see also INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 451 (1985)

(refusal to reopen suspension proceeding reviewable 

despite absence of statutory mechanism for reopening). 

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What remains, then, is the “strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.” Mach Mining, LLC, 135 S. Ct. at 1651. In the specific facts before 

us here, where the Board issued a decision on a motion to 

reopen that is premised on a change in law, we find that 

review is appropriate under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The 

Supreme Court has held: 

Though the agency’s discretion is unfettered at 

the outset, if it announces and follows—by rule or 

by settled course of adjudication—a general policy 

by which its exercise of discretion will be governed, an irrational departure from that policy (as 

opposed to an avowed alteration of it) could constitute action that must be overturned as ‘arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion’ 

within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 

INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996). This is 

precisely the case here: the Board has established a 

practice of entertaining motions to reopen which, although not codified in statute, are governed by regulations 

and substantially settled case law. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. 

§§ 1201.117, 1201.118; Anthony v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 

70 M.S.P.R. 214, 219 (1996); Moss v. Dep’t of the Air 

Force, No. CH-1221-97-0313-B-1, 1999 WL 398739 

(M.S.P.B. June 11, 1999), aff’d sub nom. Moss v. Dep’t of

the Air Force, 230 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Most notably, the Board has held that reopening “may be appropriate where there is clear and material legal error, and a 

conflict between the holding of the decision and a controlling precedent or statute, either because of an oversight or 

a change in the controlling law between the date of the 

original decision and the reopening request.” Olson v. 

Dep’t of Agric., No. CH-3443-00-0857-I-1, 2002 WL 

1289867 (M.S.P.B. June 3, 2002). 

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Accordingly, we hold that, at least in the case of a 

Board decision on a motion to reopen that is premised on 

a change in law, we have jurisdiction to review, generally 

applying the “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 

or otherwise not in accordance with law” standard under 

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Whether we have jurisdiction to 

review decisions on motions to reopen that are premised 

on other grounds, or the Board’s decision to reopen a case 

sua sponte, are issues we need not reach, and we decline 

to do so here.

C 

Having found the Board’s denial of McCarthy’s motion 

to reopen reviewable under the APA, we next consider 

whether the Board erred in denying McCarthy’s motion. 

We conclude that it did not.

As an initial matter, we note that the Board did not 

specify in its January 8 letter the bases under which it 

denied McCarthy’s motion to reopen. This potentially 

raises concerns under Chenery, which generally prohibits 

courts from upholding agency decisions on grounds other 

than those actually relied upon by the agency. See SEC v. 

Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943) (“[A]n administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon 

which the agency acted in exercising its powers were 

those upon which its action can be sustained.”) However, 

even under Chenery we may, in appropriate circumstances, “affirm the agency on grounds other than those relied 

upon in rendering its decision, when upholding the agency’s decision does not depend upon making a determination of fact not previously made by the agency.” In re 

Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Killip v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 991 F.2d 1564, 1568–69 

(Fed. Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 

also Fleshman v. West, 138 F.3d 1429, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 

1998) (quoting Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 95 F.3d 

1094, 1099–1102 (Fed. Cir. 1996)) (“[T]he [Chenery] 

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doctrine does not prohibit a reviewing court from affirming an agency decision on a ground different from the one 

used by the agency if the new ground is not one that calls 

for ‘a determination or judgment which an administrative 

agency alone is authorized to make.’”). Because, as we 

explain below, we can affirm the Board’s decision on 

precisely such grounds—a lack of jurisdiction based on 

application of a statute (5 U.S.C. § 1214) to undisputed 

facts (McCarthy did not identify the legal memoranda in 

his submissions to the OSC)—there is no Chenery concern 

here. 

The Board’s jurisdiction is not plenary, but is limited 

by statute. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a). A petitioner bears the 

burden of establishing that the Board has jurisdiction by 

a preponderance of evidence. Serrao v. Merit Sys. Prot. 

Bd., 95 F.3d 1569, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing 5 C.F.R. 

§ 1201.56(a)(2)).

McCarthy’s case is an individual right of action 

(“IRA”) appeal, which the Board has jurisdiction to hear 

under 5 U.S.C. § 1214. However, before an aggrieved 

employee can file an IRA appeal, he must first seek 

corrective action from the OSC. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3)

(“Except in a case in which an employee, former employee, 

or applicant for employment has the right to appeal 

directly to the Merit Systems Protection Board under any

law, rule, or regulation, any such employee, former employee, or applicant shall seek corrective action from the 

Special Counsel before seeking corrective action from the 

Board.”). 

In assessing whether an employee has exhausted his 

OSC remedies, we look to his OSC complaint, as well as

written correspondence concerning his allegations. Serrao, 95 F.3d at 1577; Benton-Flores v. Dep’t of Def., No. 

DC-1221-13-0522-W-1, 2014 WL 3748419 (M.S.P.B. July 

31, 2014). “We require that the employee ‘articulate with 

reasonable clarity and precision [before the OSC] the 

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MCCARTHY v. MSPB 15

basis for his request for corrective action under the WPA’ 

to allow OSC to effectively pursue an investigation.” 

Miller v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., No. 2015-3054, 2015 WL 

4681015, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 6, 2015) (quoting Serrao, 95 

F.3d at 1577); see also Knollenberg v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 

953 F.2d 623, 626 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (requiring a “sufficient 

basis to pursue an investigation which might have led to 

corrective action”). “The Board’s jurisdiction over an IRA 

appeal, assuming the employee does not have an independent right to appeal directly to the Board, is thus 

limited to those issues that have been previously raised 

with OSC.” Miller, 2015 WL 4681015, at *6.

Applying these principles here, we find that McCarthy 

has not sufficiently exhausted his OSC remedies with 

respect to the legal memoranda. McCarthy’s OSC complaint only identifies his July 28 report to the OIG and a 

July 29 disclosure to Congressman Reyes. It makes no 

mention of his legal memoranda. Given this, the OSC’s 

“basis to pursue an investigation” was only these two 

disclosures and the circumstances surrounding them, 

such as whom these disclosures were made to, the Commission’s awareness of these disclosures, and how they 

related to the events that led to McCarthy’s termination. 

This did not provide the OSC with a “sufficient basis to 

pursue an investigation” with respect to McCarthy’s legal 

memoranda—these were different disclosures, made to 

different people, at different times. 

Moreover, the case that McCarthy presented to the 

OSC in 2009 substantially differs from the case he presents now. In 2009, McCarthy’s legal memoranda were 

not considered protected disclosures under the WPA; 

thus, the OSC would have had no basis to investigate the 

legal memoranda and develop findings related to these 

disclosures. What McCarthy presents now is in essence a 

different case, and the OSC has not had an opportunity to 

“effectively pursue an investigation” with respect to these 

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circumstances. Thus, McCarthy has failed to satisfy 

§ 1214(a)(3)’s exhaustion requirement.

McCarthy nonetheless argues that he has exhausted 

his OSC remedies because his August 21 statement

discussed the substance of his legal memoranda. J.A.

206–27. We disagree. As discussed, this submission was 

provided and subsequently evaluated against the backdrop of the WPA: the legal memoranda were not protected 

disclosures and the OSC would have had no basis to 

“effectively pursue an investigation” with respect to them.

Next, McCarthy argues that “the Board and this court 

have already considered the import of the legal memoranda.” Reply Br. 15. It is not clear to us that McCarthy’s 

selective excerpts show that the Board or this court has 

done so. Regardless, the consideration that the Board or 

this court would give to the legal memoranda on appellate 

review is not necessarily the same consideration that the 

OSC would give in the first instance, and cannot be 

substituted for it.

McCarthy also argues that the exhaustion requirement only applies to the content of whistleblowing disclosures, and that existing case law does not require that he 

correctly affix legal labels to these facts. We agree that 

the focus of the exhaustion requirement is on substance; 

however, McCarthy has not satisfied this requirement 

here. Neither his OSC complaint nor his August 21 

statement identifies the legal memoranda with sufficient 

specificity or context to allow the OSC to effectively 

investigate his claims. Unlike Briley v. National Archives 

& Records Administration, 236 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 

2001), cited by McCarthy, this is not simply a case where

McCarthy is presenting a “more detailed account of [his] 

whistleblowing activities” to the Board than he did to the 

OSC, but otherwise made submissions to the OSC that 

“contain[ed] the core of [his] retaliation claim” and “gave 

the OSC sufficient basis to pursue an investigation.” 

Case: 15-3072 Document: 35-2 Page: 16 Filed: 01/14/2016
MCCARTHY v. MSPB 17

Instead, the core substance of McCarthy’s complaint has 

shifted from a single disclosure to the OIG (which, at best, 

was at least in part cumulative of a nebulous collection of 

previous disclosures) to four distinct legal memoranda

provided to specific individuals at specific times. 

We find, then, that McCarthy has not exhausted his 

OSC remedies with respect to the legal memoranda. This 

rendered the Board without jurisdiction to hear his case

under 5 U.S.C. § 1214. 

The Board did not err in dismissing McCarthy’s appeal and we affirm the Board’s decision. We note that 

McCarthy remains free to pursue a complaint with the 

OSC with respect to his four legal memoranda, as there is 

no statutory time limit for filing a request for corrective 

action with the OSC. Augustine v. Dep’t of Justice, 50 

M.S.P.R. 648, 652 (1991).

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Each party shall bear their own costs.

Case: 15-3072 Document: 35-2 Page: 17 Filed: 01/14/2016