Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00086/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00086-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carlos M. Gutierrez
Defendant
Homer T. McCrary
Plaintiff
National Marine Fisheries Service
Defendant
Russ M. Strach
Defendant

Document Text:

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOMER T. MCCRARY, No. 2:06-cv-0086-MCE-KJM

Plaintiff,

v.

CARLOS M. GUTIERREZ, in his

official capacity as Secretary

of Commerce, the NATIONAL

MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, and

RUSS M. STRACH, in his

official capacity as Assistant

Regional Administrator of the

Protected Resource Division of

the Southwest Region of the

National Marine Fisheries

Service,

Defendants.

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Case 2:06-cv-00086-MCE -KJM Document 42 Filed 06/23/06 Page 1 of 8
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All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the 1

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.

2

Through the instant action, Plaintiff Homer T. McCrary

(“Plaintiff”) challenges the listing of a particular subset of

coho salmon under 16 U.S.C. § 1533 of the Endangered Species Act

(“ESA”), Defendants Carlos Gutierrez, United States Secretary of

Commerce, the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NFMS”), and

Russ M. Strach, NFMS Assistant Regional Administrator of the

Protected Resources Division of the Southwest Region (hereinafter

collectively referred to as “Defendants” unless otherwise noted)

now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on grounds of improper

venue pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3).1

Alternatively, Defendants request that this lawsuit be

transferred in the interests of justice in accordance with 28

U.S.C. §§ 1404 and 1406. As set forth below, while the Court

cannot conclude that venue is technically improper, it

nonetheless finds that the balance of convenience weighs

overwhelmingly in favor of adjudicating this matter in the

Northern District. Consequently Defendants’ transfer request

will be granted.

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Case 2:06-cv-00086-MCE -KJM Document 42 Filed 06/23/06 Page 2 of 8
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3

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint in this matter states

unequivocally that “this suit concerns the lawfulness of listing

as an “endangered species” a tiny, emphemeral, artificiallyintroduced, and hatchery dependent subset of the overall coho

salmon species presently found in rivers and streams south of San

Francisco, California.” (Am. Compl., ¶ 4). The Amended

Complaint is equally clear in contending that Plaintiff, an

individual owning land and timber interests along the California

coast south of San Francisco, has suffered economic loss as a

result of the ESA listing of the coho salmon species in question. 

(Id. at ¶ 1). Plaintiff is alleged to reside in Davenport,

California, a community located in Santa Cruz County. He 

presented a petition to delist the coho salmon species identified

above, and commenced the instant action after that petition was

dismissed by NMFS. Plaintiff, in bringing this action, asserts

that NMFS’ actions in that regard were arbitrary and capricious

and/or contrary to law in violation of the Administrative

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A) and 706(2)(D). 

 Plaintiff has filed suit in the Eastern District solely on

grounds that Russ M. Strach, an Assistant Regional Administrator

for the NMFS and a named Defendant in this action, has an office

in Sacramento. While Defendant Strach concedes that his office

is indeed located within the Eastern District, he states that

only the Assistant Administrator of Fisheries in Silver Spring,

Maryland has authority to make listing decisions under the ESA.

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4

That individual has not delegated that authority to others and,

according to Strach, Strach’s job is simply to coordinate

research, develop analyses, and make listing recommendations. 

(Id. at ¶¶ 4-5).

STANDARD

28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) provides that civil actions against

federal officers and agencies like Defendants herein may be

brought:

“in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the

action resides, or (2) a substantial part of the events or

omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a

substantial part of property that is the subject of the

action is situated, or (3) the plaintiff resides if no real

property is involved in the action.”

In addition, the ESA includes a venue provision that allows suits

brought under its citizen suit provisions to be filed “in the

judicial district in which the violation occurs.” 16 U.S.C. §

1540(g)(3)(A). The ESA provision supplements the general venue

statute. See Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Babbitt, 1994 SL 90586,

*2 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 1994 (“the statute permits - but does not

require - a lawsuit to be brought in the judicial district in

which the violation occurs.”).

If venue is improper, a district court may either dismiss

the action or, if it deems appropriate in the interest of

justice, transfer the action to a district in which it could have

been brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). 

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5

Moreover, even if venue is technically proper, under 28 U.S.C. §

1404(a) a federal district court may transfer an action it

determines may be more conveniently tried elsewhere:

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the

interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil

action to any other district or division where it might have

been brought.”

The court has broad discretion in determining whether the

factors enumerated in § 1404 mandate transfer under the

particular circumstances present in each case. E.& J. Gallo

Winery v. F.& P.S.p.A., 899 F. Supp. 465, 466 (E.D. Cal. 1994). 

Motions to transfer should not be liberally granted (Stewart

Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988)), with the

burden of establishing a need to transfer falling squarely on the

moving party. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Savage, 611

F.2d 270, 279 (9th Cir. 1980). Whether venue should be

transferred in any given case depends on “individualized, caseby-case consideration of convenience and fairness.” Van Dusen v.

Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964).

Unless the balance of convenience is strongly in favor of

the defendant, plaintiff’s choice of forum should generally not

be disturbed. E.& J. Gallo, 899 F. Supp. at 466. The balance of

convenience must clearly weigh in favor of transfer is

plaintiff’s choice of venue is to be disturbed, and transfer is

not warranted if the result is merely to shift inconvenience from

the one party to the other. Harris v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger

Corp., 979 F.Supp. 1052, 1053-54 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 

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6

In order to meet its heavy burden in demonstrating inconvenience,

affidavits or declarations may be required. E.& J. Gallo, 899

F.Supp. at 466.

ANALYSIS

Defendants claim that venue premised on Defendant Strach’s

residence is improper because he lacks any decision making

authority in this matter and is consequently not a properly named

party. Because even Mr. Strach appears to concede that he plays

some role in the decision making process at issue (see Strach

Decl, ¶ 5), however, and because it appears undisputed that

Strach resides in Sacramento, this Court cannot conclude on the

basis of the record before it that Mr. Strach’s residence is

insufficient to establish venue within the Eastern District. 

Hence this lawsuit is not subject to dismissal for improper venue

under either Rule 12(b)(3) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

Defendant’s alternative request that venue be transferred

under § 1404(a) is nonetheless abundantly justified. Plaintiff

does not dispute that the coho salmon species targeted by his

delisting petition are located in the Northern District of

California and do not exist in the Eastern District of

California. It is further undisputed that Plaintiff himself

resides in the Northern District, and that his land and timber

interests allegedly affected by NMFS’ decisions are also within

the Northern District. 

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7

Finally, the Strach declaration indicates that the NFMS’

scientific response to the petition was developed by NFMS

scientists located in its Santa Cruz Laboratory, a facility

situated in the Northern District. (Strach Decl., ¶6). Hence

the subject matter of this lawsuit (the coho salmon subspecies)

is located in the Northern District, the alleged injury occurred

to interests within the Northern District possessed by a Northern

District resident, and the basis for the challenged decision

appears to have been formulated in large part within the Northern

District. These facts overwhelmingly demonstrate that the

appropriate venue for this matter is the Northern District of

California, and utterly eclipse any tenuous connection this

lawsuit may have to the Eastern District by virtue of Defendant

Strach’s location in Sacramento, particularly since Strach was

not the decision maker in the listing decision and appears at

most to have been only in a position to have made a

recommendation in that regard. While Plaintiff’s choice of venue

is ordinarily entitled to deference, that choice simply cannot be

maintained given the circumstances surrounding this case. See

Carolina Cas. Co. v. Data Broad. Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1044,

1048 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (deference to plaintiff’s choice of forum

is “substantially reduced where the plaintiff’s venue choice is

not its residence or where the forum lacks a significant

connection to the activities alleged in the complaint”).

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Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 2

the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D.

Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

8

CONCLUSION

The Amended Complaint in this matter shows on its face that

the balance of conveniences tips strongly in favor of litigating

this matter in the Northern District. The Declaration of

Defendant Strach further underscores that conclusion, and through

this motion Defendants have met their burden of proof in showing

that the interests of justice merit transfer. Accordingly,

Defendants’ Motion, to the extent it requests transfer of venue

under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), is GRANTED. This case is transferred 2

to the United States District Court for the Northern District of

California. Defendants’ alternative request that this action be

dismissed entirely for improper venue is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 22, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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