Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03295/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03295-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation
Defendant
Nancy Lendall
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NANCY LENDALL, an individual,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CHASE MANHATTAN MORTGAGE

CORPORATION, a New Jersey corporation,

and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-03295 WHA

ORDER DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR JURY TRIAL AND

VACATING HEARING

INTRODUCTION

In this diversity action for breach of contract and fraud, plaintiff Nancy Lendall moves

for a jury trial pursuant to FRCP 81(c). Plaintiff failed to make this request in a timely fashion

and has therefore waived her right to a jury trial. Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff was a retail-loan officer for defendant Chase Manhattan Mortgage Company. 

On June 13, 2005, plaintiff sued Chase in Superior Court of the State of California for the

County of Contra Costa. Her complaint contained causes of actions for breach of contract and

fraud. There was no mention in the complaint of a jury trial.

Case 3:05-cv-03295-WHA Document 25 Filed 01/19/06 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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On August 16, 2005, defendant removed this matter to federal court. Months passed and

plaintiff made no demand for a jury trial. On December 14, 2005, eight days prior to the initial

case management conference, counsel for both parties met. At this meeting, plaintiff’s counsel

apparently was alerted of a possible waiver of plaintiff’s right to a jury trial due to failure to

comply with the time limits in FRCP 81(c). The following day, nearly four months after

removal, plaintiff filed the instant motion to have this matter tried before a jury.

ANALYSIS

Waiver of the right to a jury trial is governed by FRCP 38(d), which dictates that the

“failure of a party to serve and file a demand as required by this rule constitutes a waiver by the

party of trial by jury.” FRCP 39(b) offers possible relief for a delinquent party, providing that

“notwithstanding the failure . . . the court in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a

jury of any and all issues.” 

The deadline for a jury-trial demand in FRCP 38 is modified in the context of removal

cases by FRCP 81(c), which provides that “a party entitled to trial by jury under Rule 38 shall

be accorded it, if the party’s demand therefor is served . . . within 10 days after service on the

party of the notice of filing of the petition.” This rule further “provides two possible avenues

around waiver in removal cases.” Lutz v. Glendale Union High Sch., 403 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th

Cir. 2005). First, a party is “entitled to a federal jury trial had she made a proper jury request

under state law before the case was removed.” Ibid. Second, a party “would not have had to

request a jury trial after removal if her state complaint already contained a jury demand that

would have satisfied.” Id. at 1064.

Plaintiff admittedly did not comply with the ten-day rule in FRCP 81(c), having filed the

instant motion nearly four months after removal. As to the first exception, plaintiff did not

make a proper request under state law before removal. Plaintiff explains that California law

does not require a jury demand until a case is set for trial, which this matter never was. This

point is inapposite. The application of the first exception is straightforward. If plaintiff did not

make a demand in state court then she cannot rely on the exception.

Case 3:05-cv-03295-WHA Document 25 Filed 01/19/06 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiff also cannot satisfy the second exception under FRCP 81(c), as her complaint

itself did not contain a jury demand. It is true that courts must “‘indulge every reasonable

presumption against waiver’ of the jury trial right.” Lutz, 403 F.3d at 1064 (quoting First Aetna

Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)). This presumption permits courts in certain

instances to decipher a jury request from a pleading where no separately-captioned demand is

made but where the body of the pleading refers to a jury trial. Ibid. Nevertheless, “[w]hat we

do insist on is that the jury demand be sufficiently clear to alert a careful reader that a jury trial

is requested on an issue.” Ibid. Here, plaintiff’s complaint makes no mention of a jury. No

demand for a jury trial, therefore, may be gleaned from the complaint. Plaintiff has waived her

right to trial by jury.

As noted above, FRCP 39(b) grants courts the discretion to provide relief from waiver of

the right to a jury to a delinquent party. Our circuit has made clear, however, that the discretion

under this rule is very limited. See Pac. Fisheries Corp. v. H.I.H. Cas. & Gen. Ins., Ltd., 239

F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 944 (2001). In the context of a nonremoval case, the Pac. Fisheries opinion held that courts may not “grant relief when the failure

to make a timely demand results from an oversight or inadvertence.” Ibid. In another nonremoval case, the circuit’s opinion found that even a “good faith mistake as to the deadline for

demanding a jury trial establishes no more than inadvertence, which is not a sufficient basis to

grant relief from an untimely jury demand.” Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080,

1087 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Plaintiff’s counsel’s attempt to avoid waiver by falling on his sword is, therefore,

unavailing. Plaintiff’s counsel asserts that he mistakenly believed that no demand for a jury

trial was necessary until plaintiff’s first federal pleading was filed. Plaintiff provides no

authority from our circuit suggesting that the standards applicable to FRCP 39(b) differ in the

context of removal cases. Instead, plaintiff merely points to one opinion from another district

finding that untimeliness, where not prejudicial, should be tolerated. Johnson v. Dalton, 57 F.

Supp. 2d 958, 960 (C.D. Cal. 1999). The Johnson court admitted, however, that it was so ruling

“[d]espite suggestions in Ninth Circuit opinions that the Court does not have discretion.” Ibid. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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* Plaintiff also tries to rely on FRCP 6(b), a general provision allowing enlargement of time for acts

required by the rules, as the governing standard for her motion. The rules, however, provide the more specific

provision for granting relief from waiver of trial by jury in FRCP 39(b). A delinquent party, therefore, must

seek relief from waiver under FRCP 39(b).

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As articulated in the opinions cited above, the rule of limited discretion under FRCP 39(b) is

not a mere “suggestion” by our circuit. This order will not depart from the weight of this

authority. Our circuit has left no doubt that an oversight such as plaintiff’s counsel made does

not justify relief from waiver.*

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for a jury trial is DENIED. Finding further

argument unnecessary, the hearing on this motion is hereby VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 19, 2006 WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-03295-WHA Document 25 Filed 01/19/06 Page 4 of 4