Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02312/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02312-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John F. Stobaugh
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-2312

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

John F. Stobaugh,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

Western District of Missouri.

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Submitted: March 17, 2005

 Filed: August 25, 2005

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Before RILEY, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

John F. Stobaugh (“Stobaugh”) pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in

possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The

district court1

 sentenced Stobaugh to 110 months’ imprisonment. Stobaugh appeals

his sentence, arguing that the Government breached his plea agreement during his

sentencing hearing and that the district court erred in calculating his criminal history

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points and in applying the cross-reference in United States Sentencing Guidelines §

2K2.1(c). Stobaugh also contends that his sentence, pronounced under mandatory

Sentencing Guidelines, violates United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). For

the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

I. Background

On December 23, 2003, Stobaugh pleaded guilty to a one-count indictment that

charged him with being a convicted felon in possession of a “loaded Mossberg 12

gauge pump shotgun” in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The plea

agreement as originally negotiated stated that, “[i]n addition to the Mossberg 12

gauge shotgun located in the defendant’s bedroom, a total of 58.84 grams of

methamphetamine and 9.11 grams of marijuana were located in the defendant’s

garage.” The plea agreement also contained the following provisions: 

9. The defendant understands the United States will provide to the

Court and the United States Probation Office a government version of

the offense conduct. This may include information concerning the

background, character, and conduct of the defendant including the

entirety of the defendant’s criminal activities. The defendant

understands that these disclosures are not limited to the count to which

the defendant pled guilty. . . . The United States further reserves its

right to make any recommendations it deems appropriate regarding the

disposition of this case, subject only to any limitations set forth in this

Plea Agreement.

10. With respect to the application of the Sentencing Guidelines to this

case, the parties agree as follows: 

a. The applicable Guideline section for the offense of conviction

is U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. 

b. The base offense level is 14. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(6). 

c. [The government will file a motion stating that Stobaugh is

entitled to a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility

under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.]

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. . .

e. The defendant understands [that the guidelines estimate] does

not bind the Court or the United States Probation Office . . . .

. . .

11. There are no agreements between the parties with respect to any

Sentencing Guideline issues other than those specifically listed in

paragraph 10, and its subsections and paragraph 5 [stating that the

government would recommend a sentence at the low end of the

applicable guidelines range as determined by the court]. The parties

agree that the guideline calculations set forth in paragraph 10 are only

estimates and do not bind the parties. As to any other issues which may

be found to exist, the parties are free to advocate their respective

positions at the sentencing hearing.

At Stobaugh’s change-of-plea hearing, Stobaugh and the Government agreed

to strike the reference to the methamphetamine and marijuana from the factual

stipulation. The plea agreement was otherwise unaltered. When the district court

inquired for the record why the plea agreement was in Stobaugh’s best interests,

Stobaugh’s counsel replied, “In addition to the anticipated benefits of receiving a

reduction for acceptance of responsibility, there is also an agreement in the plea

agreement that the government will recommend a sentence at the low end of whatever

applicable guideline range is determined.” The district court accepted the plea

agreement.

The United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation

Report (“PSR”). The PSR listed as relevant conduct that Stobaugh possessed with

intent to distribute 58.81 grams of methamphetamine found in his garage during his

arrest, and that he possessed the firearm in connection with that offense. Therefore,

the PSR recommended that the district court apply U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c). Under §

2K2.1(c), a defendant’s offense level is determined by applying U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1 to

the connected offense if the resulting offense level would be higher than the base

offense level found in § 2K2.1(a). For a connected offense of possession with intent

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to distribute methamphetamine, § 2X1.1 requires the offense level to be calculated

under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. Applying § 2D1.1 to the 58.81 grams of methamphetamine

with the specific offense characteristic of possession of the firearm, the PSR

calculated Stobaugh’s offense level to be 28. Subtracting two levels for acceptance

of responsibility and one level for timely notification of his intent to plead guilty

pursuant to § 3E1.1, the PSR recommended that Stobaugh’s total offense level should

be 25. Stobaugh filed an objection to the application of the § 2K2.1(c) crossreference and the findings supporting it.

Prior to sentencing, the Government informed Stobaugh that it intended to have

a witness present at Stobaugh’s sentencing hearing to support the PSR’s

recommendations regarding § 2K2.1(c). In response, Stobaugh filed a “Motion to

Enforce the Plea Agreement.” In that motion Stobaugh argued, “For the government

to present evidence of a base offense level higher than it stipulated to in the plea

agreement is a violation of the contractual nature of the plea agreement.” The motion

requested the district court to “specifically enforce Paragraph 10 of the plea

agreement.” 

The Government secured the presence of a law enforcement officer at

Stobaugh’s sentencing hearing to testify in support of the PSR’s finding that

Stobaugh possessed the firearm in connection with a drug offense. The district court

began the sentencing hearing by considering whether the presentation by the

Government of evidence that would support the application of the § 2K2.1(c) crossreference offense level of 28 would breach the plea agreement’s specific reference to

the § 2K2.1(a) base offense level of 14. Without expressly resolving that question,

the district court decided to preempt the Government from initiating any arguments

to support the cross-reference by ordering the Government to present the witness at

the court’s direction. Stobaugh objected that because the Government arranged on

its own initiative to have the witness present, the district court would not really be

hearing the evidence on the court’s own initiative. The district court gave Stobaugh

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the option of rescheduling the sentencing hearing. However, the district court stated

that it would need to hear evidence regarding the PSR’s findings on the

methamphetamine and other indications of drug trafficking regardless of how or when

the witness was produced. Stobaugh elected to continue with the hearing.

After the presentation of evidence supporting the application of the § 2K2.1(c)

cross-reference, the district court decided to follow the recommendation of the PSR.

With a resulting total offense level of 25 and a criminal history category of VI,

Stobaugh was sentenced to 110 months’ imprisonment, the low end of the applicable

guidelines range. On appeal, Stobaugh argues that the presentation of evidence

supporting the § 2K2.1(c) cross-reference breached his plea agreement and that the

breach entitles him to resentencing before a different district court judge. Stobaugh

also contends that the district court erred in calculating his criminal history points and

in applying the cross-reference. Finally, Stobaugh argues that he should be

resentenced in light of Booker.

II. Discussion

A. Breach of the Plea Agreement

Stobaugh contends that the presentation of evidence supporting the § 2K2.1(c)

cross-reference offense level of 28, rather than the § 2K2.1(a) base offense level of

14, breached his plea agreement. We disagree.

We review issues pertaining to the interpretation and enforcement of a plea

agreement de novo. United States v. Has No Horses, 261 F.3d 744, 750 (8th Cir.

2001). “Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and should be interpreted

according to general contract principles.” United States v. DeWitt, 366 F.3d 667, 669

(8th Cir. 2004). “[W]here a plea agreement is ambiguous, the ambiguities are

construed against the government.” United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890 (8th

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Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting Margalli-Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345, 353 (8th Cir.

1995)). Any promise made by the Government that constitutes a significant part of

the defendant’s inducement or consideration for making the plea agreement must be

fulfilled to satisfy due process. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971);

United States v. Van Thournout, 100 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1996).

Stobaugh argues that our decision in DeWitt compels us to find a breach in this

case. In DeWitt, the Government and the defendant stipulated to a specific drug

quantity in the plea agreement, indicating their agreement to hold the defendant

responsible only for that amount. 366 F.3d at 668-70. We held that the Government

breached the plea agreement when it initiated the presentation of evidence for the

purpose of attributing to the defendant a greater drug quantity. Id. Although the plea

agreement entitled the government to offer evidence of uncharged relevant conduct,

we held that such a general provision could not be read to override the specific

provision to recommend only a certain total drug quantity for guidelines calculation

purposes. Id. Furthermore, in United States v. Thompson, 403 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir.

2005), published after oral arguments were completed in the instant case, we relied

on DeWitt to find a breach where the plea agreement specified a base offense level

of 14 under § 2K2.1(a), but the Government advocated application of the § 2K2.1(c)

cross-reference at the sentencing hearing—a situation very similar to the one before

us today. Thompson, 403 F.3d at 1039-41.

In contrast to DeWitt and Thompson, however, the language of the plea

agreement in the instant case permitted the Government’s actions at the sentencing

hearing. Stobaugh’s proffered reading of the plea agreement—that it prevented the

Government from advocating any offense level higher than the § 2K2.1(a) base

offense level of 14 specified in Paragraph 10—is not reasonable. Paragraph 11 of the

plea agreement states that the “parties agree that the guideline calculations set forth

in paragraph 10 are only estimates and do not bind the parties” (emphasis added). No

similar language was cited in the plea agreements in DeWitt or Thompson. There can

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In addition, the parties could have entered into a plea agreement pursuant to

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), which, upon acceptance by the

district court, would have bound not only the parties, but also the district court, to any

unqualified stipulations regarding the defendant’s base offense level. See United

States v. Martinez-Noriega, No. 03-3648 (8th Cir. Aug. 1, 2005); Thompson, 403

F.3d at 1039-40 & n.1. 

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be no clearer language to show that the Government was not bound to the § 2K2.1(a)

base offense level of 14. 

Furthermore, Paragraph 9 of the plea agreement states that information about

“the entirety of the defendant’s criminal activities” would be provided to the district

court and would “not [be] limited to the count to which the defendant pled guilty.”

Unlike the plea agreement in DeWitt, the plea agreement in this case does not contain

a more specific provision that conflicts with the Government’s general authority

under the plea agreement to present evidence of relevant conduct. Absent a

conflicting provision, Stobaugh cannot successfully challenge the Government’s

decision to present to the district court the very information contemplated in

Paragraph 9 of his plea agreement. 

Finally, we note that Stobaugh’s counsel stated for the record that Stobaugh

received as consideration for entering into the plea agreement “the anticipated

benefits of receiving a reduction for acceptance of responsibility” and the

Government’s agreement to “recommend a sentence at the low end of whatever

applicable guideline range is determined.” If Stobaugh understood the plea

agreement to guarantee that the Government would not advocate for any upward

adjustment to the § 2K2.1(a) base offense level for his other relevant conduct, we

think this would have been cited as an important benefit. The parties were free to

negotiate a plea agreement under which they were bound to certain stipulations, but

in this case they did not.2

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We conclude that the Government’s presentation of evidence supporting the

§ 2K2.1(c) cross-reference offense level of 28, rather than the § 2K2.1(a) base offense

level of 14, did not breach Stobaugh’s plea agreement.

B. Application of the U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c) Cross-Reference

Stobaugh next argues that the district court erred in applying the crossreferencing provision of § 2K2.1(c). We disagree.

We review the district court’s factual findings regarding the application of §

2K2.1 for clear error. See United States v. White, 354 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 2004).

The cross-reference provision of § 2K2.1(c) provides, “(1) If the defendant used or

possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with the commission or attempted

commission of another offense apply – (A) § 2X1.1 . . . in respect to that other

offense, if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined above

. . . .” (emphasis added). To be “in connection with” the commission of another

offense under § 2K2.1, “the firearm must have some purpose or effect with respect

to the drug trafficking crime [and] must ‘facilitate, or have the potential of

facilitating,’ the drug trafficking offense.” United States v. Martinez, 258 F.3d 760,

762 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Regans, 125 F.3d 685, 686 (8th Cir.

1997)). 

Stobaugh argues that the district court clearly erred in relying upon Missouri

Highway Patrol Sergeant Mike Rogers’s (“Sergeant Rogers”) testimony to conclude

that Stobaugh possessed the gun in connection with methamphetamine trafficking.

Stobaugh’s mother and son both testified that Stobaugh has suffered from paranoid

schizophrenia and post-traumatic stress disorder since being shot in 2000 and that he

possessed the gun because he needed it to feel safe. 

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Relying upon police reports and interviews with two officers that executed the

search warrant on Stobaugh’s home, Sergeant Rogers testified that after his arrest,

Stobaugh confessed that he sold drugs, including methamphetamine, from his

residence. Stobaugh told the officer who interviewed him after his arrest that third

parties often “fronted” him methamphetamine, which he diluted for sale, and that he

hid the “rock methamphetamine” when he saw law enforcement approaching his

home. Sergeant Rogers also testified that while executing the search warrant on

Stobaugh’s home, officers seized methamphetamine and marijuana paraphernalia,

58.84 grams of methamphetamine, a closed-circuit monitor with three cameras, a

radio scanner that received police frequencies and the Mossberg 12-gauge which

Stobaugh pleaded guilty of possessing. 

The district court noted that personal protection and safety may have been part

of Stobaugh’s motivation for possessing the gun. Nevertheless, the district court

found that Stobaugh possessed the gun in connection with his possession with intent

to distribute methamphetamine because the gun had the potential for facilitating the

drug trafficking. Given Sergeant Rogers’s testimony and the strong connection

between drug trafficking and firearm possession, we hold that the district court did

not clearly err in that finding. See Martinez, 258 F.3d at 762 (noting that the

enhancement is based in part on “the increased risk of violence whenever guns are in

the possession of persons engaged in committing drug felonies”).

C. Criminal History Calculation

Stobaugh argues that the district court erred in crediting him certain criminal

history points because the evidence of the underlying convictions used by the district

court did not bear “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy”

as required by U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3. We disagree.

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Stobaugh objected to the fact of one of these convictions. He also claimed that

the other two were the same conviction and should only produce one criminal history

point. Thus, although Stobaugh objected to convictions that produced 9 criminal

history points, even if the district court had sustained all of his objections, his

criminal history total would have been reduced by only 8 points.

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The PSR attributed 13 criminal history points to Stobaugh. Six of those points

resulted from convictions Stobaugh received in the State of Connecticut. Because the

State of Connecticut destroys physical records of convictions after 10 years, the only

available evidence of the convictions were assorted computer records, which the

probation officer provided to the district court at Stobaugh’s sentencing hearing.

Many of the records were booking sheets, some were prison records and some of the

records provided “some court documentation.” Three other criminal history points

resulted from three Missouri convictions for driving while intoxicated.3

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probation officer provided the district court uncertified docket sheets relating to these

convictions but did not provide certified copies of judgments or charging papers. The

probation officer considered all of these records a “collateral response” to Stobaugh’s

objections to the convictions. 

We review a district court’s factual findings related to guidelines calculations

for clear error. United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1016-17 (8th Cir. 2005). To

resolve a defendant’s factual objections related to the application of the guidelines,

the district court may consider “relevant information without regard to its

admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the

information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.”

U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3; see also United States v. Fleck, 413 F.3d 883, 894 (8th Cir. 2005).

While certified records are generally sufficient to prove prior convictions, United

States v. Simpson, 94 F.3d 1373, 1381 (10th Cir. 1996), they are not necessary. See

United States v. Roach, 164 F.3d 403, 414 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that police

department records and computer records from a clerk’s office were sufficient to

prove prior convictions where the defendant challenged only the veracity of the

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records, not that he was convicted of the crimes); United States v. Herndon, No. 95-

3274, slip op. at 2-3 (8th Cir. Mar. 8, 1996) (unpublished per curiam) (holding that

a probation officer’s testimony was sufficient to establish prior juvenile conviction

for which the records were sealed). 

 In this case, the district court reviewed numerous, and sometimes duplicative,

records concerning each of Stobaugh’s prior convictions. Although the records were

not certified copies of judgments against Stobaugh, they were from state agencies and

authorities, and they represented the most accurate records those agencies could

provide at the time. See Roach, 164 F.3d at 414 (“Absence of records underlying a

conviction is not enough to create a presumption of invalidity.”). Contrary to

Stobaugh’s assertions with regard to his DWI convictions, the records create no

ambiguities as to the identity of each separate offense, the date of adjudication and

the punishment that resulted. Under these circumstances, we hold that the district

court did not clearly err in relying on these records and assigning Stobaugh 13

criminal history points.

D. Booker Arguments

Stobaugh argues that he is entitled to resentencing because his sentence was

pronounced under mandatory Sentencing Guidelines in violation of United States v.

Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). Stobaugh’s plea agreement, however, contained the

following waiver: “The defendant agrees not to appeal or otherwise challenge the

constitutionality or legality of the Sentencing Guidelines.” We have held that an

identical provision waives a defendant’s ability to raise an argument under Booker on

appeal “even if the parties did not anticipate the Blakely/Booker rulings.” United

States v. Young, 413 F.3d 727, 729 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Fogg,

409 F.3d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 2005)). Thus, Stobaugh waived any argument relating

to Booker, and we do not consider his arguments on appeal.

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Nonetheless, Stobaugh argues that even though his waiver was knowing and

voluntary, enforcing the waiver would cause a miscarriage of justice. See Andis v.

United States, 333 F.3d 886, 891 (8th Cir. 2003). In particular, Stobaugh contends

that enforcing the waiver would be a miscarriage of justice because the district court

sentenced him to an illegal sentence. See id. at 891-92 (noting that the miscarriageof-justice exception to appeal waivers includes the right to appeal illegal sentences).

Even after Booker, however, a sentence is not illegal for purposes of this exception

unless it exceeds the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction. Young, 413

F.3d at 730. The statutory maximum for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is 10

years’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). As Stobaugh was sentenced to only

110 months’ imprisonment, his sentence was not illegal and enforcing his appeal

waiver is not a miscarriage of justice.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we affirm Stobaugh’s sentence.

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