Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01610/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01610-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cindy Adams
Plaintiff
City of Redding
Defendant
Kyle Corrigan
Defendant
Edward McGinnis
Defendant
Christopher Staup
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CINDY ADAMS, individually and as 

Personal Representative to the Estate of 

JESSE ADAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF REDDING; KYLE CORRIGAN, 

CHRISTOPHER STAUP, EDWARD 

MCGINNIS, and DOES 4 through 10,

Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-01610-TLN-DMC

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant City of Redding’s (“Defendant”) Motion to 

Dismiss.

1

 (ECF No. 30.) Plaintiff Cindy Adams (“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition (ECF No. 31), 

and Defendant replied (ECF No. 33). For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

///

///

///

1 Plaintiff alleges claims against multiple defendants, but only Defendant City of Redding 

brings the instant motion to dismiss. However, the Court notes the other named defendants have 

not filed a responsive pleading to Plaintiff’s second amended complaint.

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s claims arise from the death of Jesse Adams (“Mr. Adams”). (ECF No. 28.) On 

December 22, 2019, Mr. Adams was stopped by police while driving through the City of 

Redding. (Id. at 4.) During the traffic stop, Defendant Kyle Corrigan allegedly asked Mr. Adams 

for identification and instructed him to put his hands in plain sight. (See id.) Plaintiff alleges that 

despite Mr. Adams’s compliance with the instructions, Defendant Kyle Corrigan shattered Mr. 

Adams’s vehicle window and sprayed pepper spray or mace inside the vehicle. (Id.) This 

allegedly caused Mr. Adams to lose control of the vehicle and collide into a police vehicle 

blocking his path. (Id. at 4–5.) After the collision, Defendant Christopher Staup allegedly 

discharged his firearm, instantly killing Mr. Adams. (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and Mr. Adams’s estate, filed the instant action on August 

11, 2020. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on 

June 16, 2021, alleging various federal and state claims, including two claims for Monell liability 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”). (ECF No. 28.) Plaintiff’s second claim alleges Monell 

liability for unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice and Plaintiff’s fifth claim alleges Monell 

liability for failure to train. (Id. at 6, 18.) Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s second and fifth 

claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 30.) 

II. STANDARD OF LAW

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 

Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th 

Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 

(2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice 

of what the claim . . . is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation and quotations omitted). “This simplified notice 

pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define 

disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 

534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).

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On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. 

Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every 

reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 

Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 

“‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 

relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (internal citation omitted).

Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 

factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). 

While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 

unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 

pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.”). Thus, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences

are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss” for failure to state a claim. Adams v. Johnson, 355

F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the 

plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws 

in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State 

Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more 

than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. This plausibility inquiry is “a 

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his or her] claims . . . 

across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680

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(internal quotations omitted). 

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may consider only the complaint, any exhibits

thereto, and matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 

See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v.

Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998); see also DanielsHall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (the court need not accept as true 

allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice). 

If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to

amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading

could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,

1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995));

see also Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in 

denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). Although a district court should 

freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Rule 15(a)(2), “the court’s discretion to 

deny such leave is ‘particularly broad’ where the plaintiff has previously amended its 

complaint[.]” Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir. 

2013) (quoting Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s second and fifth claims on the basis the factual 

allegations are conclusory, do not rise to a constitutional violation, or do not show a longstanding 

custom or practice. (ECF No. 30 at 2.) 

The Court proceeds by addressing the standard for Monell liability before determining 

whether the SAC states a claim regarding its second and fifth claims. 

A. Legal Standard for Monell Liability

A municipality may not be vicariously liable under § 1983 for an injury caused by its 

employee or agent. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 

(1978). However, a municipal entity can be liable in a § 1983 case premised on: (1) an official 

policy; (2) a “longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure 

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of the local government entity”; (3) the act of an “official whose acts fairly represent official 

policy such that the challenged action constituted official policy”; or (4) where “an official with 

final policy-making authority ‘delegated that authority to, or ratified the decision of, a 

subordinate.’” Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Trevino v. Gates, 99 

F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996).

Additionally, a Monell claim “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but 

must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the 

opposing party to defend itself effectively.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 

631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)).

B. Claim Two: Municipal Liability for Unconstitutional 

Custom/Policy/Practice

Plaintiff’s SAC alleges there is a longstanding custom of failing to enforce the policies in 

the Redding Police Department Policy Manual and she alleges Defendant’s officers failed to 

adhere to twenty department policies because such policies are deficient or not enforced by 

Defendant. (ECF No. 28 at ¶ 30.) Plaintiff further alleges there are twenty-two policies omitted 

from the Redding Police Department Policy Manual that should have been included. (Id. at ¶ 31.) 

Finally, Plaintiff cites to seven prior lawsuits against Defendant to show a longstanding custom or 

practice of using excessive force against individuals who pose no immediate threat of death or 

serious bodily injury. (See id. at ¶ 32.) 

Where the plaintiff seeks to establish a Monell claim based on a longstanding custom, he 

must prove that: (1) he possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) the 

municipality had a longstanding custom which amounted to a policy; (3) the custom amounts to 

deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the custom is the moving 

force behind the constitutional violation. See Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 

(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th 

Cir. 1997)). “The custom must be so ‘persistent and widespread’ that it constitutes a ‘permanent 

and well settled city policy.’” Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). 

“Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be 

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founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has 

become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Id.

Defendant argues the allegations of customs and policies are conclusory. (ECF No. 30-1

at 9–11.) This Court disagrees with Defendant. The allegations are not, as Defendant claims, 

“boilerplate conclusions” regarding excessive force. (See id. at 11.) Plaintiff has alleged specific

policies of Defendant — the rules and performance procedures of the Redding Police Department 

Policy Manual — that were allegedly wrongfully ignored by Defendant’s officers in the incident 

involving Mr. Adams. (See ECF No. 28 at ¶ 30.) Because Plaintiff’s allegations concern specific

policies in the Redding Police Department Policy Manual that Defendant’s officers did not 

follow, the allegations are more detailed than in cases where the policy allegations were too 

insufficiently detailed. See Garcia v. Cnty. of Napa, No. 21-cv-03519-HSG, 2022 WL 110650, at 

*6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2022); see also Johnson v. Shasta Cnty., 83 F. Supp. 3d 918, 931 (E.D.

Cal. 2015) (holding that a list of specific policies was sufficient to state a Monell claim and 

“g[a]ve [the defendant] fair notice to enable it to defend itself”). Thus, the Court finds the SAC 

“contain[s] sufficient factual allegations to plausibly suggest a . . . custom.” Est. of Osuna v. 

Cnty. of Stanislaus, 392 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1174 (E.D. Cal. 2019). 

As indicated, Plaintiff must also show the alleged custom is longstanding, which Plaintiff 

attempts to do by alleging seven prior incidents involving Defendant’s officers that led to 

lawsuits.

2

 (ECF No. 28 at ¶ 32.) Defendant argues the prior incidents are too few and dissimilar 

to the instant case to show a longstanding custom.3 (See ECF No. 30-1 at 18.) In opposition, 

Plaintiff argues that through the prior incidents Defendant has a custom and practice of: (1) using 

excessive force against individuals who pose no immediate threat of death or serious bodily 

2 The Court notes Defendant has indicated one of the prior lawsuits was ultimately 

adjudicated in the defendants’ favor, and Plaintiff does not dispute this. (See ECF No. 30-1 at 18; 

ECF No. 31.) Thus, the Court does not consider that prior lawsuit, Frazier v. Redding Police 

Dept., No. 2:11-cv-01351-AC, when evaluating Plaintiff’s allegations.

3 Defendant requests the Court take judicial notice of the dockets and papers of the prior 

lawsuits. (ECF No. 30-2.) Because judicial notice of the prior lawsuits would not alter the 

Court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss infra, the Court DENIES Defendant’s request as 

unnecessary. 

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injury; (2) shooting these types of individuals or using force so great that results in their death or 

bodily injury; and (3) failing to discipline or retrain these officers as a result of their actions. 

(ECF No. 31 at 16–17.)

The six prior incidents all led to lawsuits being filed over the span of six years. (See ECF 

No. 28 at ¶ 32.) The incidents generally involve allegations of excessive force, with some of the 

incidents involving deadly force. (See id.) Although Defendant argues the lawsuits are 

insufficient because they are composed of allegations and no finding of liability (ECF No. 30-1 at 

17–18), “[p]rior incidents involving lawsuits alone, even those which do not result in a finding or 

admission of wrongdoing, can be sufficient for Monell liability purposes in the face of a motion to 

dismiss.”4 Bagos v. Vallejo, No. 2:20-cv-00185-KJM-AC, 2020 WL 6043949, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 

Oct. 13, 2020); see also McCoy v. City of Vallejo, No. 2:19-cv-001191-JAM-CKD, 2020 WL 

374356, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2020). 

Turning to Defendant’s argument that the prior incidents are too sporadic, the Court 

acknowledges “[t]he line between ‘isolated or sporadic incidents’ and ‘persistent and widespread 

conduct’ is not clearly delineated.” Warkentine v. Soria, No. 1:13-cv-01550-LJO-MJS, 2014 WL 

2093656, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2014). The six prior incidents led to cases being filed between

2013 and 2019, and more specifically, 2013 (one case), 2014 (three cases), 2015 (one case), 2019 

(one case). (ECF No. 28 at ¶ 32.) The Court observes a gap of four years between the most 

recent case and the second most recent case. However, this gap in time is not as significant as the 

gaps in another case where the Monell allegations were found insufficient. See Est. of Mendez v. 

City of Ceres, 390 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1209 (E.D. Cal. 2019); see also Lemus v. Cnty. of Merced, 

No. 1:15-cv-00359-MCE-EPG, 2016 WL 2930523, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2016), aff’d, 711 F. 

App’x 859 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[W]here more than a few incidents are alleged, the determination 

4 While Defendant cites to Hughey v. Drummond, No. 2:14-cv-00037-TLN-AC, 2017 WL 

590265 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2017) to argue allegations of prior wrongdoing are insufficient, this 

Court in Hughey ultimately denied the motion to dismiss the Monell claim. Id. at *5. Thus, even 

though some of the prior incidents identified in Hughey settled before trial, that fact was 

insufficient to cause the dismissal of the Monell claim. Id.

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appears to require a fully-developed factual record.”). Therefore, the Court proceeds to examine 

the factual similarity of the prior incidents to the instant case.

Defendant argues the prior incidents are not sufficiently similar because they did not 

involve a single, fatal gunshot to a driver (ECF No. 30-1 at 20), but the factual similarity

requirement is not as rigorous as Defendant argues. See Ochoa v. City of San Jose, No. 21-cv02456-BLF, 2021 WL 7627630, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2021) (noting the defendants were “too 

granular” in arguing that the prior incidents were factually dissimilar). As stated, the prior 

incidents concern instances of alleged excessive force. (ECF No. 28 at ¶ 32.) Three of the prior 

incidents, like the instant case, allegedly involved deadly force. (Id.; ECF No. 30-1 at 20–21.) 

Additionally, two of the prior incidents allegedly involved officers shooting individuals, including 

one incident involving deadly force. (ECF No. 28 at ¶ 32; ECF No. 30-1 at 20–21.) Moreover, 

the majority of the prior incidents allegedly involved the use of force on individuals that posed no 

immediate threat or were complying with officer commands (ECF No. 28 at ¶ 32; see also ECF 

No. 30-1 at 20–21), which the SAC alleges was the case with Mr. Adams (see ECF No. 28 at 

¶ 16). Finally, the SAC alleges no officer was disciplined or retrained as a result of their actions 

in the prior incidents. (Id. at ¶ 32); see J.M. by & Through Rodriguez v. Cnty. of Stanislaus, No. 

1:18-cv-01034-LJO-SAB, 2018 WL 5879725, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2018).

Thus, the incidents alleged in the SAC are multiple, specific events in which significant 

force was utilized by Defendant’s officers in situations where the force used may plausibly be 

said to have been excessive. J.M. by & Through Rodriguez, 2018 WL 5879725, at *6; see also 

McCoy, 2020 WL 374356, at *4 (finding sufficient factual similarity and noting how the prior 

incidents, like the incident at issue, involved deadly officer shootings). Thus, the Court finds 

sufficient similarity with the prior incidents to allow Plaintiff’s claim to survive the motion to 

dismiss.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second claim 

for municipal liability for unconstitutional custom/policy/practice.5

5 Because the Court finds the allegations in paragraphs 30 and 32 of the SAC sufficient to 

survive a motion to dismiss, the Court need not address Defendant’s arguments regarding 

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C. Claim Five – Failure to Train

The SAC alleges Defendant’s training policies were inadequate and Plaintiff identifies 

twelve areas of allegedly inadequate training. (ECF No. 28 at ¶¶ 52, 54.) Plaintiff also alleges 

examples of Defendant’s longstanding practices or customs by citing the same prior incidents 

discussed supra. (See id. at ¶ 55.)

A failure to train or supervise can also amount to a “policy or custom” sufficient to

impose liability under § 1983 “where a municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant 

respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its inhabitants.” City of Canton, Ohio 

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). The Ninth Circuit has addressed the circumstances under 

which a Monell claim for failure to train can be asserted:

The first is a deficient training program, intended to apply over time 

to multiple employees. The continued adherence by policymakers to 

an approach that they know or should know has failed to prevent 

tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious disregard 

for the consequences of their action — the deliberate indifference —

necessary to trigger municipal liability. Further, the existence of a 

pattern of tortious conduct by inadequately trained employees may 

tend to show that the lack of proper training, rather than a one-time 

negligent administration of the program or factors peculiar to the 

officer involved in a particular incident, is the moving force behind 

the plaintiff’s injury.

Long v. Cnty. of L.A., 442 F.3d 1178, 1186 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

Thus, allegations of prior incidents involving a defendant that resulted in litigation or 

settlement can be sufficient to state a claim for failure to train. See Thurston v. City of Vallejo, 

No. 2:19-cv-1902-KJM-CKD, 2021 WL 1839717, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2021); McCoy, 

2020 WL 374356, at *2–5.

Defendant argues the prior incidents alleged by Plaintiff do not show a failure to train for 

the same reasons that the prior incidents are inadequate to support Plaintiff’s second claim. (ECF 

No. 30-1 at 25.) For the same reasons as with Plaintiff’s second claim, the Court finds the alleged 

paragraph 31 of the SAC. Moreover, as Defendant requests judicial notice of a policy manual in 

connection with the SAC’s paragraph 31 (ECF No. 30-2), the Court DENIES the request as 

unnecessary.

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prior incidents are sufficient to state a claim for failure to train.

6

 See Thurston, 2021 WL 

1839717, at *5; McCoy, 2020 WL 374356, at *4–5.

Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s fifth claim for 

failure to train.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 

(ECF No. 30.) Defendants City of Redding, Kyle Corrigan, Christopher Staup, and Edward 

McGinnis shall file an answer not later than twenty-one (21) days from the electronic filing 

date of this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: November 15, 2022

6 Because the Court finds the allegations of prior incidents are sufficient to cause Plaintiff’s 

claim to survive the motion to dismiss, the Court need not address Defendant’s argument that 

Plaintiff’s other failure to train allegations are conclusory. 

Troy L. Nunley 

United States District Judge

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