Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-03320/USCOURTS-ca10-15-03320-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tommie Perris Crawford
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

TOMMIE PERRIS CRAWFORD, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 15-3320 

(D.C. No. 2:15-CV-09291-CM) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before KELLY, McKAY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Tommie Perris Crawford, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se,1

 seeks a 

certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 60(b) motion. Crawford also seeks leave to proceed on appeal in forma 

pauperis (IFP). We deny Crawford’s request for a COA, deny his IFP motion, and 

affirm. 

 *

 After examining Crawford’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the 

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The 

case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment 

is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, 

and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value. See 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 Because Crawford appears pro se, we liberally construe his pleadings. 

Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1067 (10th Cir. 2009). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

May 24, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 15-3320 Document: 01019626263 Date Filed: 05/24/2016 Page: 1 
2 

Crawford was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of 

Minnesota and is currently incarcerated in the United States Penitentiary in 

Leavenworth, Kansas. Crawford initiated this civil proceeding in state court by filing 

a petition to enforce a “Satisfaction of Judgment.” R. vol. 1, 8-9. Crawford identified 

the plaintiff in the purported in rem proceeding as “a foreign state and international 

organization” and sought release of that organization’s property—i.e., Crawford—

under a theory of immunity. Id. The government removed the case to federal court 

and sought dismissal. 

The district court construed Crawford’s petition as an attack on his federal 

sentence. The court first noted that if Crawford intended to file a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

motion he should have done so in the district that imposed his sentence. The court 

then pointed out that, in limited circumstances, a federal prisoner may challenge the 

legality of a federal sentence in the district of incarceration under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

The court recognized that Crawford didn’t invoke either § 2241 or § 2255 in his 

petition. The court nevertheless concluded that even if it construed the petition as one 

seeking relief under § 2241, Crawford failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to 

such relief. The court ultimately dismissed Crawford’s claim as legally frivolous.2

 

 2

 The district court should have immediately screened and dismissed 

Crawford’s claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Plunk v. Givens, 234 F.3d 1128, 

1129 (10th Cir. 2000). Section 1915A’s screening process “applies to all prison 

litigants, without regard to their fee status, who bring civil suits against a 

governmental entity, officer, or employee,” and is “to be applied sua sponte and as 

early as possible in the litigation.” Id. (quoting Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d 

Cir. 1999)). 

Appellate Case: 15-3320 Document: 01019626263 Date Filed: 05/24/2016 Page: 2 
3 

Crawford then filed a Rule 60(b) motion seeking relief from the district court’s 

dismissal order and asserting for the first time that he should be allowed to proceed 

under § 2241(c)(4) because his remedy under § 2255 was ineffective and inadequate. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (permitting a federal prisoner to apply for relief under 

§ 2241 only if § 2255 remedy “is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his 

detention”); Abernathy v. Wandes, 713 F.3d 538, 547 (10th Cir. 2013) (explaining 

that § 2255 remedy “has been found to be ‘inadequate or ineffective’ only in 

‘extremely limited circumstances’” (quoting Caravalho v. Pugh, 177 F.3d 1177, 1178 

(10th Cir. 1999))). 

The district court construed the Rule 60(b) motion as one seeking relief under 

§ 2241 through § 2255(e)’s “savings clause,” concluded Crawford failed to 

demonstrate that the remedy provided by § 2255 was inadequate or ineffective 

merely by asserting such a motion would be time-barred or potentially subject to 

filing restrictions in the district of his conviction, and denied relief. The district court 

also denied Crawford’s motion to proceed IFP on appeal. 

Crawford renews his request for leave to proceed IFP on appeal, and asks us 

for a COA to appeal the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion. For the following reasons, 

we deny both requests and affirm the district court’s ruling. 

We decline to issue a COA because Crawford doesn’t need one. The district 

court construed Crawford’s Rule 60(b) motion as a § 2241 application and 

determined Crawford failed to demonstrate he could invoke § 2255(e)’s “savings 

clause” to attack the validity of his federal sentence under § 2241. A federal prisoner 

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4 

doesn’t need a COA to appeal a final judgment in a § 2241 case. Eldridge v. 

Berkebile, 791 F.3d 1239, 1241 (10th Cir. 2015). And we affirm the district court’s 

ruling because we agree that Crawford hasn’t demonstrated—simply by asserting his 

ability to file a § 2255 motion is barred by timing or filing restrictions—that his case 

presents one of those “rare instances” in which a federal prisoner may use § 2241, 

rather than § 2255, to attack the validity of his federal sentence. Sines v. Wilner, 609 

F.3d 1070, 1073 (10th Cir. 2010); see, e.g., Haynes v. Maye, 529 F. App’x 907, 910 

(10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (noting fact that § 2255 motion is time-barred doesn’t 

render § 2255 remedy inadequate or ineffective); Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 

727 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“It is the inefficacy of the [§ 2255] remedy, not a personal 

inability to utilize it, that is determinative, and appellant’s difficulty here is simply 

that his circumstances preclude him from invoking it.”). 

Finally, we deny Crawford’s IFP motion because his appeal is clearly 

frivolous. See DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting 

that to succeed on IFP motion, movant must show “a reasoned, nonfrivolous 

argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal”). 

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge 

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