Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00589/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00589-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeane Dekelver
Defendant
John Hua
Plaintiff
Richard W. Wieking
Defendant

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JOHN HUANG,

NO. CIV. S-07-0589 WBS

Plaintiff,

ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

v.

RICHARD W. WIEKING, JEANE

DEKELVER, 

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff John Huang brought this action for damages,

based on allegations that his termination by defendants violated

his due process and equal protection rights guaranteed under the

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendants

now move to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Beginning on November 29, 1999, until his subsequent

termination on November 14, 2006, plaintiff was employed by the

United States District Court for the Northern District of

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An adverse action may be appealed either via the 1

Employee Dispute Resolution (“EDR”) Plan for the Northern

District, or, when there are allegations of discriminatory

treatment, the “Grievance and EEO Policy” contained in the Human

Resources Manual for the Clerk’s Office for the Northern

District. (Garchik Decl. Exs. A, B.) The EDR Plan contains an

“Election of Remedies” clause, which specifies that if an

employee appeals an adverse action, he “must elect either (a) the

EDR Plan or (b) the grievance/adverse action appeal procedures .

. .” (Garchik Decl. Ex. A, Chapter VIII, §2.G.) An employee may

not utilize both. (Id.)

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California (“Northern District”) as a Deputy Clerk and Financial

Technician. (Compl. 2.) Defendant Richard Wieking is the Clerk

of the Court, and defendant Jean DeKelver, plaintiff’s superior,

serves as the Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”) Unit Supervisor. 

(Id.)

As a member of the “excepted service” of the civil

service (5 U.S.C. § 2103(a)), Huang’s employment was governed by

the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”), an elaborate

remedial statutory scheme which establishes the rights and

benefits of civil service employees. Pub. L. No. 95-454. In the

event that an “adverse action” is brought against a civil service

employee, the employee may pursue an appeal of that decision via

one of two detailed appeals procedures, whereby the decision is

reviewed by a mediator, the Clerk of the Court, and/or the Chief

Judge. (Garchik Decl. Ex. A Chapter 19.) 1

On October 20, 2006, plaintiff was served with a Notice

of Adverse Action from defendant DeKelver, which informed him of

his immediate termination. (Pl’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss 3.) 

The notice advised him that he was being terminated based on

unacceptable performance in 1) his ability to focus on work

without constant supervision, 2) his ability to work

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independently, 3) his ability to function at the level required,

and 4) his attendance. (Garchik Decl. Ex. C at 1 (Notice of

Adverse Action).)

On October 27, 2006, plaintiff responded to defendant

Wieking with a memo, objecting to DeKelver’s Notice of Adverse

Action and requesting an appeal. (Pl’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss

3.) Wieking responded by letter to plaintiff on November 1,

2006, informing him that a hearing date for his appeal had been

set for November 9, 2006, pursuant to the “Grievance and EEO

Policy” procedures in Section 19.6.A of the Human Resources

Manual. (Id.) On November 9, 2006, Wieking held an

administrative hearing, which was attended by plaintiff and

plaintiff’s counsel, as well as DeKelver, CJA Administrator Pat

Harris, Administrative Manager Anita Bock, and Human Resources

Supervisor Beverly Keh-Hoy. (Garchik Decl. Ex. C at 23 (Wieking

letter to Huang).) After considering all the facts, Wieking

issued a letter on November 14, 2006, which explained his

determination that the Adverse Action was valid and plaintiff’s

termination was to become effective immediately. (Id. at 64.) 

On November 21, 2006, plaintiff sent a letter to Ms.

Keh-Hoy, reiterating his belief his termination was in violation

of fair and equal employment guidelines and arguing that the

decision rendered by Wieking was merely a pretext for

perpetuating this unlawful discrimination. (Id. Ex. D at 1

(Charge of Employment Discrimination.) The letter contained a

complaint form filled out by plaintiff, which sought resolution

of his dispute under the EDR plan. (Id.) On November 27, 2006,

Ms. Keh-Hoy responded to plaintiff’s letter, informing him that

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pursuant to the EDR Plan’s “Election of Remedies” provision,

Huang’s hearing (which constituted an appeal under the Clerk’s

Office adverse action appeal procedures) meant he was ineligible

to also file a complaint under the court’s EDR Plan. (Id. at 5.)

On February 13, 2007, plaintiff filed a first amended

complaint against defendants, alleging that 1) his termination

violated his Fifth Amendment right to equal protection under the

law, and 2) the subsequent grievance procedures employed by

defendants violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process. 

(First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).) Plaintiff seeks damages for

lost wages and benefits, as well as costs of suit. (FAC 5.) 

Defendants argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

over plaintiff’s claim and/or that the complaint fails to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

& 12(b)(6).

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the

allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the pleader. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). The

court may not dismiss for failure to state a claim unless “it

appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Van

Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Dismissal is appropriate, however, where the pleader fails to

state a claim supportable by a cognizable legal theory. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

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1988).

In general, the court may not consider material other

than the facts alleged in the complaint when ruling on a motion

to dismiss. Anderson v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir.

1996). However, the court may consider materials of which it may

take judicial notice, including matters of public record. Mir v.

Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); Fed.

R. Evid. 201(b) (defining the scope of judicial notice); see also

Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distribs., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir.

1986), abrogated on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan

Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991) (“A court may take

judicial notice of ‘records and reports of administrative

bodies.’”) (quoting Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. S. Cal. Gas

Co., 209 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir. 1953)). Because the additional

materials submitted by plaintiff in opposition to this motion

(the Grievance and EEO Policy, the EDR Plan, and the

administrative record of plaintiff’s termination) are part of the

public record, the court may properly consider them here.

B. Fifth Amendment Bivens Action

In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971), the Supreme Court held that

a violation of the Fourth Amendment by a federal agent while

acting under the color of his federal authority may give rise to

a cause of action for damages. The Court reasoned that, while

the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly provide a cause of

action for damages resulting from unconstitutional conduct, it is

well settled that when “legal rights have been invaded, and a

federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such

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invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make

good the wrong done.” Id. at 396 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.

678, 684 (1946)). The court subsequently extended the Bivens

cause of action to apply to violations of the Fifth Amendment as

well. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979).

However, in both Bivens and Passman, the Supreme Court

recognized that creating such a remedy was proper only because 1)

there was no “explicit Congressional declaration” that a person

with plaintiff’s injury could not recover damages, and 2) there

were “no special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of

affirmative action by Congress.” Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97;

Passman, 442 U.S. at 245-47. Conversely, when the “design of a

Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it

considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional

violations in the course of its administration,” a judicially

created remedy is not appropriate. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487

U.S. 412, 423 (1988) (refusing to allow a Fifth Amendment Bivens

action for allegedly discriminatory administration of Social

Security benefits, because “Congress is the body charged with

making the inevitable compromises required in the design of a

massive and complex welfare benefits program”) (citing Bush v.

Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368 (1983))). Accordingly, when there are

“indications that congressional inaction has not been

inadvertent,” both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit refuse

to create a Bivens action. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 423; Moore v.

Glickman, 113 F.3d 998, 994 (9th Cir. 1997).

In Blankenship v. McDonald, the Ninth Circuit

considered whether a Bivens action would be proper in the context

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of an employee covered by the CSRA. 176 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir.

1999). The court observed that “[t]he CSRA contains an

‘elaborate remedial system that has been constructed step by

step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations

. . . .’” Id. at 1195 (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 388). 

Accordingly, because there was “no inadvertence by Congress in

omitting a damages remedy against supervisors whose work-related

actions allegedly violated a subordinate’s constitutional

rights,” the court held that “the CSRA precludes a Bivens remedy

. . . .” Id. (quoting Saul v. U.S., 928 F.2d 829, 840 (9th Cir.

1991)) (noting that in the area of federal employment, Congress

was better equipped to strike the balance between employees’

interests in remedying constitutional violations and competing

government interests of efficiency, morale, and discipline). 

This case is indistinguishable from Blankenship --

plaintiff’s employment and corresponding remedial measures are

governed by the CSRA, which unequivocally precludes a Bivens

action as a matter of law. This same conclusion has been reached

by every circuit court that has addressed the question. See

Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Lombardi v.

Small Bus. Admin., 889 F.2d 959, 961 (10th Cir. 1989); Feit v.

Ward, 886 F.2d 848, 854-56 (7th Cir. 1989); Volk v. Hobson, 866

F.2d 1398, 1403 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d

223, 228-29 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Pinar v. Dole, 747 F.2d 899, 910-12

(4th Cir. 1984); Braun v. United States, 707 F.2d 922, 926 (6th

Cir. 1983); Broadway v. Block, 694 F.2d 979, 985 (5th Cir.

1982)).

In opposition to the present motion, plaintiff argues

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Notably, brief review of the administrative record 2

reveals that plaintiff’s termination was reviewed by Judge

Phyllis J. Hamilton, the Chair of the Court Personnel Committee.

(Bock Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 2.)

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that, regardless of the prohibition against Bivens actions, his

termination was constitutionally defective because it never

received adequate judicial review. Plaintiff cites to 28 U.S.C.

§ 751(b), which indicates that employees such as plaintiff are

subject “to removal by the clerk with the approval of the court.” 

28 U.S.C. § 751(b) (emphasis added). At the hearing on the 2

motion, counsel for plaintiff argued that this statute entitled

plaintiff to review of his termination by a judge acting in his

or her judicial capacity exercising full powers under Article III

of the United States Constitution. However, when pressed by the

court, counsel was unable to cite to any authority, based in

either case-law or statute, which supports this assertion. 

Just because a statute provides for certain procedures,

it does not follow that any party who feels aggrieved because

those procedures were not properly followed may bring an

independent action for damages. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532

U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.

v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979)). Without explicit action by

Congress creating a private right of action, “a cause of action

does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how

desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible

with the statute.” Id. (citations omitted). Section 751(b) sets

out the authority of the clerks of court to appoint and remove

clerical assistants and employees. There is no suggestion that

the inclusion of the words “with the approval of the court” was

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Plaintiff cites a single district court opinion from 3

the District of Connecticut, which held that a Bivens action

could be maintained, despite the existence of the CSRA, because

the defendants in that case completely precluded the plaintiff

from pursuing the CSRA statutory remedies. Rauccio v. Frank, 750

F. Supp. 566 (D. Conn. 1990). Rauccio, however, is directly

contradicted by Ninth Circuit law, which clearly holds that “the

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intended to confer a private right of action on anyone. To the

contrary, most likely that language was included simply to

reaffirm that the judges, and not the clerk, retain ultimate

authority over the workings of the court.

The Second Circuit in Dotson v. Griesa (wherein the

court found that, like in Blankenship, the CSRA precluded a

Bivens action) engaged in a comprehensive analysis of the

remedies available to a judicial employee, and held unequivocally

that judicial review was not a right afforded employees such as

plaintiff. 398 F.3d at 163-65. The court explained that, while

the CSRA provides a right of judicial review for some civil

service employees, those that Congress intentionally excepted

from such protections have no such right. Id. The Dotson court

reiterated the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v.

Fausto, which found that “[t]he comprehensive nature of the CSRA,

the attention that it gives throughout to the rights of

nonpreference excepted service employees, and the fact that it

does not include them in provisions for administrative and

judicial review . . . combine to establish a congressional

judgment that those employees should not be able to demand

judicial review for the type of personnel action covered by that

chapter.” U.S. v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 448-449 (1988). 

courts.3

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CSRA precludes even those Bivens claims for which the act

prescribes no alternative remedy.” Saul, 928 F.2d at 840

(emphasis added); see also Moore v. Glickman, 113 F.3d 988, 994

(9th Cir. 1997); Kotarski v. Cooper, 866 F.2d 311, 312 (9th Cir.

1989); Blankenship, 176 F.3d at 1195.

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Put simply, when a statutory remedial scheme exists (as

it does here with the CSRA), an aggrieved employee may not bring

a Bivens action for damages, even if the employee believes the

scheme was improperly implemented. When Congress has legislated

to create (or not create) employee remedies in a particular area,

it is not the place of the judiciary to allow a Bivens action and

inquire into the proper administration of those remedies. 

Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 423; Moore v. Glickman, 113 F.3d 988, 994

(9th Cir. 1997). If this court were to engage in such an

inquiry, and expose judicial clerks and supervisors to individual

liability for their employment decisions, it would severely

undermine the “inevitable compromises” behind the delicately

balanced CSRA statutory regime crafted by Congress. Schweiker, 

487 U.S. at 429.

III. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s Bivens action for damages, alleging

violations of his Fifth Amendment rights stemming from his

termination and subsequent appeal thereof, is precluded as a

matter of law by the statutory remedial scheme of the CSRA. See

Blankenship v. McDonald, 176 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 1999). The

complaint therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted.

///

///

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to

dismiss be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED;

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint and action

herein be, and the same hereby are, DISMISSED.

DATED: May 30, 2007 

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