Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01043/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01043-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
Intervenor
National Whistleblower Center
Petitioner
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Respondent
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 6, 1999 Decided November 12, 1999

No. 99-1002

National Whistleblower Center,

Petitioner

v.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission and

United States of America,

Respondents

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company,

Intervenor

Consolidated with

No. 99-1043

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Stephen M. Kohn argued the cause for petitioner. With

him on the briefs was David K. Colapinto.

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Marjorie S. Nordlinger, Attorney, United States Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, argued the cause for respondent.

With her on the brief were Karen D. Cyr, General Counsel,

John F. Cordes, Jr., Solicitor, E. Leo Slaggie, Deputy Solicitor, Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, United

States Department of Justice, and Mark Haag, Attorney.

David R. Lewis and James B. Hamlin were on the brief

for intervenor.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Wald and Williams,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Wald.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Williams.*

Wald, Circuit Judge: This appeal involves the dismissal by

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC" or "the Commission") of a petition by the National Whistleblower Center,

a citizens' group ("Whistleblower"), to intervene in the first

ever license renewal proceeding for a nuclear power plant, in

this instance Calvert Cliffs. The NRC issued a referral order

to an Atomic Safety Licensing Board ("Board") which prescribed a streamlined procedure for the proceeding, including

a shortened time period for Whistleblower to file its contentions. In the referral order, NRC for the first time also

adopted a stringent interpretation of the "good cause" standard in its published rules for extending prescribed time

limits, to henceforth require a showing of "unavoidable and

extreme circumstances." See NRC Rules of Practice for

Domestic Licensing Proceedings and Issuance of Orders, 10

C.F.R. s 2.711 (1999). When Whistleblower asked the Board

for an extension of time to file its contentions, the Board

denied its request, applying the "unavoidable and extreme

circumstances" standard, and the NRC affirmed the decision.

The NRC subsequently dismissed Whistleblower's petition

when Whistleblower failed to file contentions within the

NRC's deadline.

__________

* Judge Williams' dissent will be filed at a later date.

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Because we conclude that the "unavoidable and extreme

circumstances" test is effectively an amendment of the Commission's regulations made without notice and comment required by the Administrative Procedure Act, we vacate the

Commission's decision dismissing the petition to intervene

and remand to the agency to consider Whistleblower's motion

for an extension of time under its prior interpretation of the

"good cause" standard. Recognizing that much progress has

been made in processing the Calvert Cliffs renewal application since a year ago when the contested events occurred, we

require only that the Commission provide Whistleblower with

a meaningful opportunity to submit its contentions. If Whistleblower can show "good cause"--under the Board's prior

interpretation--for its original request for an extension of

time to file contentions and the contentions satisfy the agency's other published criteria, the agency must allow Whistleblower to participate meaningfully in the license renewal

process.

I. Background

On July 8, 1998, the NRC published a Notice of Opportunity for a Hearing in the Federal Register permitting any

interested person to intervene in the proceeding regarding

the license renewal application of the Baltimore Gas & Electric Company ("BG&E") to continue to operate the Calvert

Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. The Notice of Receipt of the

application was published in late April but the application was

not accepted for docketing until May 19. Whistleblower filed

a petition to intervene on August 7. The July 8 hearing

notice contained what the Commission later referred to as

"ambiguous" language paraphrasing sections 2.714(a)(3) and

2.714(b)(1) of its published regulations to the effect that any

petitioner to intervene could amend a petition or supplement

contentions1 not later than fifteen days before the first pre-

__________

1 A contention is a specific issue of law or fact which a petitioner

seeks to have litigated at a hearing. Under NRC rules, a contention must include a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to

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hearing conference. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., Calvert

Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2; Notice of Opportunity for a Hearing Regarding Renewal of Facility Operating

License, 63 Fed. Reg. 36,966, 36,966 (1998); 10 C.F.R.

s 2.714(a)(3), (b)(1). On August 19, however, the NRC referred the petition to intervene to an Atomic Safety and

Licensing Board and gave "guidance" to the Board on how to

conduct the proceeding. Among other things, the referral

order directed the Board to adopt a streamlined schedule for

the hearing. Significantly, the order directed that "the Licensing Board should not grant requests for extensions of

time absent unavoidable and extreme circumstances." Joint

Appendix ("J.A.") at 28. Two days later, Whistleblower filed

with the Commission a motion to vacate the referral order as

contrary to the Commission's regulations prescribing extensions of time for "good cause" and allowing contentions to be

filed fifteen days before an initial prehearing conference. See

10 C.F.R. ss 2.711(a), 2.714(a)(3), (b)(1). The Commission

denied the motion on the ground that it has authority to

shorten the time for filing contentions under section 2.711,

and that limiting extensions to "unavoidable and extreme

circumstances" merely gives content to the general "good

cause" standard.

On August 20, the Board issued an initial prehearing order

requiring Whistleblower to file its contentions by September

11, 1998, and scheduled the first prehearing conference for

the week of October 13, later specifying October 15. In

short, Whistleblower was required to file its contentions

within three weeks after the prehearing order and thirty-four

days before the prehearing conference. In addition, the

Board reiterated that any motion for an extension of time

must "demonstrate 'unavoidable and extreme circumstances'

that support permitting the extension."

__________

tion of its bases; a short statement of the facts or expert opinion

which are intended to support it, together with references to the

specific documents and sources upon which the petitioner will rely

to establish the facts or opinion; and sufficient information to show

that a genuine dispute exists between the intervenor and the

applicant on a material issue. See Rules of Practice for Domestic

Licensing Proceedings and Issuance of Orders, 10 C.F.R.

s 2.714(b)(2) (1999).

The day after the Board's initial prehearing order, Whistleblower filed a motion to extend the time for filing contentions

until mid-November. Whistleblower based the motion on its

need to retain experts to review the application and to

provide necessary technical input, the complexity of the

three-volume relicensing application and the fact that this

proceeding would inevitably involve novel issues since it was

the first nuclear power reactor license renewal proceeding

ever. A week later, on August 27, the Board rejected petitioner's motion for an extension of time, stating that Whistleblower failed to meet its burden of establishing "unavoidable

and extreme circumstances" justifying an extension. Whistleblower petitioned the Commission for interlocutory review

of the decision and on September 17 the Commission issued

an order moving the deadline for contentions to September

30--subsequently extended to October 1 because of a Jewish

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Holiday. The Commission explained its action by saying that

Whistleblower might not have anticipated such an early date

for filing contentions since the language in the July 8 notice

stated that under section 2.714(b)(1), petitioners could file

contentions not later than fifteen days prior to the first

prehearing conference. However, the Commission expressed

general satisfaction with the Board's streamlined agenda for

the relicensing procedure, concluding that the Board acted

reasonably in setting an earlier date for filing contentions

than its published rules provided and in refusing to extend

the time for filing, and reaffirmed the "unavoidable and

extreme circumstances" test. In light of the Commission's

action, the Board subsequently rescheduled the initial prehearing conference for November 12. This meant that Whistleblower had to file its contentions forty-two days before the

prehearing conference, instead of fifteen days as set out in

the Commission's rules.

On October 1, the due date for filing its contentions under

the Commission's reprieve, Whistleblower filed a status report and a motion to vacate and reschedule the prehearing

conference. The status report identified the experts that

Whistleblower had retained, the "areas of concern" in the

application the experts were studying, and recited various

alleged defects and omissions in BG&E's license renewal

application. In the status report and the motion to vacate,

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Whistleblower included numerous references to its argument

that it had "good cause" for an extension of time. In addition, Whistleblower asserted in its motion to vacate that the

Board and Commission improperly and prejudicially applied

the stringent "unavoidable and extreme circumstances" test

in rejecting its motion for enlargement of time. However,

Whistleblower specifically stated that the status report was

not to be regarded as its contentions.

On October 13, Whistleblower filed its "first supplemental

set of contentions." Whistleblower indicated that it retained

the right to supplement its petition to intervene as provided

in the Commission's published rules and that it was filing the

contentions without prejudice to its October 1 motion to

vacate and reschedule the prehearing conference. The filing

contained two contentions, one alleging that the renewal

application was incomplete and must be withdrawn or summarily dismissed and another alleging that the application

failed to meet aging and other safety-related requirements.

However, Whistleblower did not allege specific facts to support these contentions, but rather referred to the Requests

for Additional Information filed by the NRC staff ("RAIs")2

as setting forth the bases for each contention. On October

16, the Board concluded that Whistleblower had neither

submitted contentions by the October 1 deadline nor demonstrated that the October 13 contentions met the late-filing

standards of 10 C.F.R. s 2.714(a);3 accordingly it dismissed

Whistleblower's petition to intervene.

__________

2 A Request for Additional Information is a demand by the NRC

staff for important information not present in a license application.

During a review of any application by the staff, an applicant may be

required to supply such additional information. See 10 C.F.R.

s 2.102(a). An application may be denied if an applicant fails to

respond to a request for additional information within 30 days from

the request or any other time specified. See id. s 2.108.

3 Even if contentions are filed after a deadline for filing, they can

nonetheless be admitted as late-filed contentions. Late-filed contentions are admitted if the presiding officer makes a finding that

the contentions satisfy a balancing of factors: good cause for failure

to file on time; availability of other means to protect the petitioner's

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The Commission on December 23, 1998 affirmed both the

Board's decision to reject the motion for an extension of time

and to dismiss the petition. The Commission said that the

Board had "good cause" to shorten the normal time provided

in the written regulations for filing contentions because a

shorter deadline would make the prehearing conference more

meaningful by allowing the Board and Whistleblower to consider the NRC staff's answer to the proposed contentions

prior to the scheduled date of the conference. The Commission once again approved the Board's use of the "unavoidable

and extreme circumstances" test to reject Whistleblower's

motion for an extension of time. It reasoned that the test

was a "construction of 'good cause' " intended as a "reasonable means of avoiding undue delay in this important license

renewal proceeding, and for assuring that the proceeding is

adjudicated promptly." J.A. at 345-46.

II. Analysis

The nub of this controversy is whether NRC's new interpretation of a published regulation amounts to an amendment

of the regulation requiring notice and comment under the

Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. s 551(5) (1994).

Whistleblower argues that the Commission departed from its

own published rules when it rejected Whistleblower's motion

for an extension of time to file contentions as failing the

"extreme and unavoidable circumstances" standard instead of

continuing to use the "good cause" standard applied in all

previous requests for extensions. The Commission responds

that the "unavoidable and extreme circumstances" test is

merely an interpretation of the good cause standard, and an

agency is entitled to deference in construing its own regulation. We conclude, however, that the Commission's new

interpretation of "good cause" so fundamentally modifies that

__________

interest; whether a petitioner's presence will help develop a sound

record; whether petitioner's interest will be adequately represented

by existing parties; and the extent to which a petitioner's participation will broaden the issues or delay the proceeding. See 10

C.F.R. s 2.714(a)(1), (b)(1).

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standard, as previously interpreted by the agency, that it

constitutes an amendment, requiring notice and comment.

A. The Incompatibility of the "Good Cause" and "Unavoidable and Extreme Circumstances" Standards

The NRC's published regulations provide that "not later

than fifteen days prior to the holding ... of the first prehearing conference, the petitioner shall file a supplement to his or

her petition to intervene that must include a list of contentions which petitioner seeks to have litigated in the hearing."

NRC Rules of Practice and Procedure for Domestic Licensing

Proceedings and Issuance of Orders, 10 C.F.R. s 2.714(b)(1)

(1999). However, a different provision of the same Rules

provides: "whenever an act is required or allowed to be done

at or within a specified time, the time fixed or the period of

time prescribed may for good cause be extended or shortened

by the Commission or the presiding officer." Id. s 2.711(a)

(emphasis added).4 When Whistleblower filed a motion for

an extension of time, the Board followed the directives of the

Commission's referral order and applied the "unavoidable and

extreme circumstances" test in rejecting the motion. Whistleblower alleges that the "unavoidable and extreme circumstances" test amounts to an amendment of section 2.711 and

is therefore invalid because it was not adopted through notice

and comment.

A basic tenet of administrative law is that an agency's

interpretation of its own regulations is given " 'controlling

weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the

regulation.' " Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S.

504, 512 (1994) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,

325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). However, an equally wellestablished administrative law principle provides that an

agency may not adopt an interpretation of its own regulation

which either contradicts the plain meaning of the regulation,

see Ohio Power Co. v. FERC, 954 F.2d 779, 783 (D.C. Cir.

__________

4 Moreover, 10 C.F.R. s 2.714(b)(1) provides that "additional time

for filing" a supplement to contentions may be granted based on the

same balance of factors for admitting late-filed contentions. 10

C.F.R. s 2.714(a)(1), (b)(1).

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1992) ("[N]o deference is owed an interpretation at odds with

the plain meaning of the text."); Guard v. NRC, 753 F.2d

1144, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting that "high regard" of

deference to NRC interpretation of its own regulation "is

appropriate only so long as the agency's interpretation does

no violence to the plain meaning of the provision at issue");

Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 711 F.2d 370, 381

(D.C. Cir. 1983) ("[W]hen an agency's interpretation of its

own rules flies in the face of the language of the rules

themselves, it is owed no deference."), or fundamentally

changes the agency's own prior interpretation of the regulation. See Hudson v. FAA, -- F.3d --, --, No. 98-1295, 1999

WL 798067, at * 4 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 8, 1999) (noting that

" '[o]nce an agency gives its regulation an interpretation, it

can only change that interpretation as it would formally

modify the regulation itself: through the process of notice

and comment rulemaking.' ") (quoting Paralyzed Veterans of

Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997));

Alaska Prof'l Hunters Ass'n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1035

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (striking down new agency interpretation

that was contrary to advice given for 30 years by its Alaska

office and informal agency statements as an effective amendment of FAA regulations); National Family Planning and

Reprod. Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 239-40 (D.C.

Cir. 1992) (striking down a Department of Health and Human

Services interpretation of its own regulation to allow Title X

physicians to counsel abortion as a method of family planning

contrary to earlier interpretation by agency barring all Title

X personnel from discussing the possibility of abortion). The

reason behind this ban on radical reinterpretation of published regulations is that "to allow an agency to make a fundamental change in its interpretation of a substantive regulation

without notice and comment would undermine those APA

requirements." Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586; see

also Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 100

(1995) (concluding that notice and comment rulemaking would

be required if an agency were to effect "a substantive

change" in its regulations by adopting a new position inconsistent with its existing regulations). This principle applies

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whether the agency adopts the fundamental change in interpretation in a purported policy statement, interpretative rule

or adjudication. See, e.g., Syncor Int'l Corp. v. Shalala, 127

F.3d 90, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (reinterpretation advanced in

FDA publication labeled a notice and referred to in its text as

a policy statement); Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 588

(interpretative rule); Caraballo v. Reich, 11 F.3d 186, 195

(D.C. Cir. 1993) (Department of Labor "interpretative" statement expounded in the course of an adjudication).

While "good cause" appears at first blush an exceedingly

flexible term (some might say a near-empty vessel, waiting to

be filled), there are limits to its meaning and to the concept it

represents. The Supreme Court itself recognized this recently. See Jones v. United States, -- U.S. --, --, 119 S. Ct.

2090, 2098 (1999) (holding that phrase "good cause" in 18

U.S.C. s 3593(b)(2)(C), which provides for impaneling a new

jury in a sentencing hearing if the trial jury has been

discharged for good cause, "cannot be read so expansively as

to include the jury's failure to reach a unanimous decision").

Furthermore, this court has held that even though a word in

an agency rule may not have a precise meaning, an agency's

interpretation of the word is invalid if it is far removed from

the recognized meaning of the term. See C.F. Communications Corp. v. FCC, 128 F.3d 735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

(concluding that while the word "premises" does not have a

single fixed meaning, that "does not convert the word into a

sort of Rorschach test, permitting the Commission to read

into the word anything it pleases" and rejecting as plainly

erroneous agency interpretation divorced from term's established definition).

Section 2.711 does not itself define "good cause," but the

history of the regulation makes clear that its purpose was to

give the Commission flexibility to alter the time limits in its

proceedings when that course would not unfairly prejudice

the parties. In 1962, when the agency amended the precursor to section 2.711, it explained that it was "designed to

expedite proceedings without sacrificing the fair and impartial

consideration of the issues." Revision of Rules, 27 Fed. Reg.

377, 377 (1962). In 1972, the Commission codified section

2.711 in its present form and included a specific finding that

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section 2.711 allowed modifications of time limits "in appropriate cases, where it would not prejudice a party." Restructuring of Facility License Application Review and Hearing Processes, 37 Fed. Reg. 15,127, 15,129 (1972). Clearly, a balance

of the Commission's administrative convenience and fair opportunities for parties to participate meaningfully in its proceedings was intended.

And indeed, the NRC has in the past consistently interpreted good cause for extending or shortening time to file contentions as the presence of a "good reason" why either the

parties or the Commission desire changing normal time

schedules. See, e.g., In re Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co.

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), 18 N.R.C. 1400,

1401 (1983) ("Section 2.711 permits the Board to reduce time

limits where there is a good reason to do so."); United States

Dep't of Energy Project Management Corp. Tenn. Valley

Auth. (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), 17 N.R.C. 158,

162 (1983) (construing 10 C.F.R. s 2.714(a)'s requirement of

"good cause" for failure to file on time as "good reason"); In

re Virginia Elec. & Power Co. (N. Anna Power Station,

Units 1 & 2), 4 N.R.C. 98, 101 (1976) (same); In re Duquesne

Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2), 7 A.E.C.

959, 968 (1974) (same). Neither party here disputes that the

new "unavoidable and extreme circumstances" test for "good

cause" requires a significantly stronger showing than a "good

reason" for an extension of time to file a contention. There

can be little doubt that the "unavoidable and extreme circumstances" test inevitably reflects a significant change from the

Commission's prior interpretation of the "good cause" standard; as such, it falls under the doctrine that when an agency

has given a regulation an authoritative interpretation, and

later significantly changes that interpretation, it has effectuated an amendment of that rule which will be invalid unless it

gives notice and comment. See Alaska Prof'l Hunters, 177

F.3d at 1034; Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586; see also

Syncor, 127 F.3d at 94-95 (noting that a modification of an

interpretation of an agency rule "will likely require a notice

and comment procedure").

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The Commission's rejection of Whistleblower's asserted

justifications for an extension of time--the need for its experts to study the voluminous application to formulate contentions and the novelty and complexity of issues raised by the

application in the context of the first license renewal proceeding for a nuclear power plant--is also inconsistent with prior

NRC cases in which the Commission has granted extensions

of time based on the complexity of the issues involved or the

need to give experts time to review an application, or both.

See In re Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Indep. Spent Fuel

Storage Installation), No. 72-22-ISFSI, 1997 WL 687737, at

*3 (N.R.C. Oct. 7, 1997) (granting extension of time for filing

contentions based on need of party to provide its experts with

additional time to review application and the length and

complexity of the application); In re Northern Ind. Pub.

Serv. Co. (Bailey Generating Station, Nuclear 1), 12 N.R.C.

191, 217 (1980) (finding good cause to treat as timely contentions filed after deadline due to the short time for preparation

set by Prehearing Conference Order as well as the complexity

of the newly-filed contentions); In re Commonwealth Edison

Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), 6 A.E.C. 827, 827 (1973)

(finding good cause under section 2.711 for an extension of

time for filing exceptions and supporting briefs for appeal of

decision due to the length of the initial decision and the

number and complexity of the issues involved). Indeed, our

court has held that an agency has an obligation in an adjudication to follow, distinguish, or overrule its own precedent

and we have not hesitated to strike down agency action when

it fails to meet this obligation. See Steger v. Defense Investigative Serv. Dep't of Defense, 717 F.2d 1402, 1406 (D.C. Cir.

1983) (reversing Merit Systems Protection Board decision to

deny attorney's fees which disregarded without explanation

factors used in prior Board decisions for determining if

attorney's fees are appropriate); Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 872, 882 (D.C. Cir.

1979) (refusing to enforce NLRB interpretation of "employee" and "independent contractors" in 29 U.S.C. s 152(3)

which did not explain inconsistency with most recent NLRB

opinion on subject). When Whistleblower offered reasons for

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an extension of time similar to those which the Commission

has approved in the past, the Board rejected them out of

hand and the Commission affirmed the Board's decisions,

using the "unavoidable and extreme circumstances" test without explaining or distinguishing its own prior precedent approving such reasons as qualifying for "good cause". At no

time did the Commission ever address its own prior interpretation of "good cause" in circumstances like this one when a

party asks for more time to have its experts review material

in a complex case. Moreover, the Commission in this case

seems to have effectuated a result entirely different from its

prior cases where it found that reasons for delay similar to

those encountered by Whistleblower constituted "good cause"

for an extension of time.

This court has long held that an agency may not use its

interpretative powers to " 'constructively rewrite [a] regulation' or 'effect a totally different result.' " Sentara-Hampton

Gen. Hosp. v. Sullivan, 980 F.2d 749, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1992)

(quoting National Family Planning and Reprod. Health

Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). This

case is not dissimilar to both Alaska Professional Hunters

and Syncor. In Alaska Professional Hunters, we invalidated

a Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") interpretation of

its own rules to treat hunting guides who flew clients to and

from hunting sites as commercial operators contrary to the

prior interpretation of those rules given as advice to guides

by the FAA's Alaska Region office for more than thirty years

and informal statements by the agency that guides were

noncommercial operators. See 177 F.3d at 1035-36. Similarly, in Syncor we held invalid 1995 Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") guidelines which interpreted the registration

provisions of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act

("FFDCA") to apply to positron emission tomography

("PET") radiopharmaceuticals because they differed from

1984 FDA guidelines which stated that nuclear pharmacists

using the process by which pharmacies compound PET radiopharmaceuticals were not required to register under the

FFDCA. See 127 F.3d at 95-96. Like the FAA in Alaska

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Professional Hunters and the FDA in Syncor, the NRC in

this case has adopted an interpretation that effects a totally

different result for a motion for an extension of time premised upon the need to give experts time to review an application and to address novel and complex issues from that which

would have occurred under the prior "good cause" standard.

Another indicator that the Commission was significantly

changing the usual meaning of "good cause" when it adopted

the "unavoidable and extreme circumstances" test is that it

did not apply the same test to determine if its own reduction

of the normal time allotted to intervenors to file contentions

was valid. Curiously, the Commission made no mention of

the "unavoidable and extreme circumstances" standard when

it shortened intervenor deadlines "for good cause" in order to

expedite proceedings. The Commission concluded that it had

"good cause" to do so because the alteration of the time frame

would permit both the Board and Whistleblower to consider

the NRC staff's answer to the proposed contentions prior to

the scheduled date of the prehearing conference whereas

under the NRC's published rules the staff's answer would not

be due until the day of the conference. Surely such a reason

does not qualify as an "unavoidable and extreme circumstance" and the Commission never said it did. In the absence

of any explanation of the differing ways in which it interpreted the same phrase depending on whose interests were at

stake, it appears that the Commission was amending the test

for the intervenors only, even though the rule itself makes no

such distinction.

Additionally, we note that the Commission has commonly

employed standards similar to "unavoidable and extreme

circumstances" elsewhere in its rules, yet has never suggested that they are the same as "good cause." For example, the

Commission has interpreted "special circumstances" in its

rule allowing a complete waiver of a rule where "the application of the rule ... would not serve the purposes for which

the rule or regulation was adopted," 10 C.F.R. s 2.758, to

mean that a waiver will only be granted in "unusual and

compelling circumstances." Public Serv. Co. of N.H. (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), 30 N.R.C. 231, 235 (1989);

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Public Serv. Co. of N.H. (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), 29

N.R.C. 234, 239 (1989); In re Northern States Power Co.

(Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 1), 5 A.E.C. 25,

26 (1972). The Commission has also interpreted its rule

allowing interlocutory review of an order only if it "[t]hreatens ... immediate and serious irreparable impact which ...

could not be alleviated through a petition for review of the

... final decision," or "affects the basic structure of the

proceeding in a pervasive or unusual manner," 10 C.F.R.

s 2.786(g), as allowing such review only "in the most compelling circumstances." In re Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore,

Okla. Site), 40 N.R.C. 55, 59 (1994) (citing In re Pacific Gas

& Elec. Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 &

2), 8 N.R.C. 406, 410 (1978)). However, we are not aware of a

single prior instance in which the NRC has described or

interpreted "good cause" as requiring "unusual," "extreme,"

"unavoidable" or "compelling" circumstances.

There may be good reason for this omission. "Good cause"

does not ordinarily convey a meaning of "unavoidable and

extreme circumstances." Virtually every dictionary published

around the time that section 2.711 was amended to its present

form defined "good cause" as a legally sufficient cause that is

reasonable under the circumstances. See, e.g., Webster's

Third New International Dictionary 978 (1976) ("cause or

reason sufficient in law: one that is based on equity or justice

or that would motivate a reasonable man under all the

circumstances"); Black's Law Dictionary 623 (5th ed. 1979)

("substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse. Legally

sufficient ground or reason ... cause as would compel a

reasonably prudent person ... under similar circumstances

... that cause that to an ordinary intelligent man is a

justifiable reason for doing or not doing a certain thing");

Ballentine's Law Dictionary 527 (3d ed. 1969) ("substantial

reason, a legal excuse ... legal cause ... reasonable cause").

In contrast, "unavoidable and extreme" has a quite different

meaning. Although some definitions of "unavoidable cause"

might conceivably fit within the meaning of "good cause," see,

e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 1366 ("a cause which reasonably

prudent and careful men under like circumstances do not and

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would not ordinarily anticipate"); Ballentine's Law Dictionary 1311 ("a cause which reasonably prudent and cautious

men under like circumstances do not and would not ordinarily

anticipate"), we think the additional requirement that the

circumstances be "extreme" as well as "unavoidable" takes it

into a different realm of outlier causes rather than reasonable

causes. See, e.g., 5 Oxford English Dictionary 618-19 (2d ed.

1989) ("Outermost, farthest from the centre ... opposed to

moderate ... Of a case, circumstance, supposition: Presenting in the utmost degree some particular characteristic ...

the utmost point or verge ... an end ... the utmost imaginable or tolerable degree of anything"); Black's Law Dictionary 528 ("[a]t the utmost point, edge or border; most

remote. Last; conclusive. Greatest, highest, strongest, or

the like."); Webster's Third New International Dictionary

807 ("existing in the highest or the greatest possible degree;

... most severe; most stringent ... going beyond the limits

of reason, necessity or propriety ... situated at the farthest

possible point from the center"); Ballentine's Law Dictionary 447 ("Outermost; utmost"). These dictionary definitions make the difference between the two standards apparent: whereas "good cause" would allow an extension of time

in situations not due to negligence that would ordinarily cause

delay, the "unavoidable and extreme circumstances" standard

would allow extensions only in the most extraordinary situations. The transfer from the reasonable to the most unusual

results in a significant reduction of a litigant's ability to

obtain an extension of time to file contentions.

While we conclude that "unavoidable and extreme circumstances" is a fundamental modification of the Commission's

"good reason" definition of "good cause" requiring notice and

comment, we acknowledge that the term "good cause" itself

initially affords the agency a great deal of flexibility and

discretion to decide its content under individual circumstances.5 Given the expertise and experience of the NRC

__________

5 The meaning of "good cause" may also be substantially influenced by congressional intent in providing for a "good cause"

exception. See, e.g., Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 969 F.2d

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with licensing, it is most favorably situated to make such a

determination through the reasonable balancing of agency

and intervenor interests that is inherent in the term "good

cause"; and its judgment will in the vast majority of cases be

upheld. It can for instance require a greater showing of need

for an extension of time in cases where the Commission's

need to expedite proceedings significantly outweighs a party's

need for more time. However, this flexibility does not include authority to constructively amend a "good cause" standard by adopting an interpretation that departs radically

from its own precedent, without notice and comment, and

which it applies only to third parties, not to itself.

B. Prejudice to the Petitioner to Intervene

Only if there is prejudice to a challenging party can agency

action be invalidated under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. s 706

("[D]ue account should be taken for the rule of prejudicial

error."); see also Fried v. Hinson, 78 F.3d 688, 690-91 (D.C.

Cir. 1996) (citing American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight

Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 539 (1970)). The Commission argues that

even if it applied the wrong standard to Whistleblower's

motion for an extension of time, Whistleblower was not

harmed by this error because the contentions it ultimately

submitted were patently deficient under NRC regulations

governing the specificity of contentions. See 10 C.F.R.

s 2.714(b)(2). The contentions Whistleblower submitted did

not set forth any specific grounds for its allegations and

merely referred to NRC staff RAIs for their bases. The

NRC has consistently held that mere references to RAIs are

__________

1141, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that the APA "good cause"

exception to notice and comment requirement of agency rulemaking

was intended by Congress "to be narrowly construed" and limited

to "emergency situations"); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA,

716 F.2d 915, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same); American Fed'n of Gov't

Employees v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (deriving

"emergency situations" test from Senate Report). But cf. Bjella v.

McPeters, 806 F.2d 211, 216 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that "good

cause" exception to sanction for late-filed transcripts in Judicial

Conference Report was not incompatible with individual court plan

allowing exception only in "unusual or extreme circumstances").

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insufficient to meet the specificity requirements under 10

C.F.R. s 2.714. See Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing

Proceedings--Procedural Changes in the Hearing Process, 54

Fed. Reg. 33,168, 33,171 (1989) (noting that the Commission

rejects the argument that "petitioners not be required to set

forth facts in support of contentions until the petitioner has

access to NRC reports and documents"); In re Sacramento

Mun. Util. Dist. (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station),

36 N.R.C. 135, 136 (1992) (holding that the attempt to incorporate by reference the questions asked by the staff concerning environmental report fails to comply with the Commission's pleading requirements).

Even though Whistleblower ultimately submitted contentions on October 13 that were deficient under the Commission's specificity requirements, we think it was nonetheless

prejudiced by the Commission's use of the "unavoidable and

extreme circumstances" test to deny its requests for extensions at two earlier points in the proceeding. First, the

extension which Whistleblower originally requested in August

would have moved the time for filing contentions back two

months. The Commission's decision to grant Whistleblower

an extension to September 30th did little to remove any

prejudice from the Board's denial of its earlier request because by the time it was granted, Whistleblower had only two

weeks left in which to file. Additionally, it reinforced the

Board's use of the "unavoidable and extreme circumstances"

test. We cannot know whether Whistleblower's original request for a two month extension would have been granted in

full under the good cause standard. At the very least, it is

strongly possible that Whistleblower would have received the

extension because it had asserted factors which had been

approved by the Commission in the past as sufficient to

justify good cause for an extension. See, e.g., In re Northern

Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. (Bailey Generating Station, Nuclear 1),

12 N.R.C. 191, 217 (1980) (finding good cause to treat as

timely contentions filed after deadline due to the short time

set for filing contentions in the Order Setting the Prehearing

Conference and the complexity of the newly-filed contentions).

As the Status Report and Motion to Vacate and Reschedule

the Initial Prehearing Conference filed by Whistleblower on

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October 1 demonstrate, Whistleblower continued to assert

throughout the aborted proceeding that the "unavoidable and

extreme circumstances" test was improper, thereby adequately preserving the issue that it never had time to prepare

adequate contentions. Moreover, although the October 13

contentions were inadequate, Whistleblower clearly indicated

on the face of the contentions that it desired to preserve its

objection that it needed more time (the contentions were filed

"without prejudice to Petitioner's October 1, 1998 Motion to

Vacate"). J.A. at 225 n.1. Formally, Whistleblower labeled

its October 13 set of contentions a "first supplemental set of

contentions," specifically asserting its right to file contentions

up until fifteen days before the prehearing conference as set

out in 10 C.F.R. s 2.714(b)(1). Therefore, Whistleblower

preserved its argument that the Commission improperly used

the "unavoidable and extreme circumstances" test to deny its

motion for an extension of time even as it filed contentions on

October 13.

Whistleblower was obviously scrambling to come up with

the most specific contentions it could within the short time it

had to file. Significantly, Whistleblower actually submitted

additional information to the Board on October 16, the day

the petition to intervene was finally rejected. If the "good

cause" standard had been used to adjudicate Whistleblower's

motion to extend the time for filing contentions until midNovember, Whistleblower by that time would likely have

submitted sufficient information to support an adequate contention. In sum, the strong possibility that Whistleblower

would have been granted an extension until mid-November

had the "good cause" standard been applied and that it could

have by that time submitted adequate contentions is sufficient

to show prejudice. See Presbyterian Med. Ctr. of the Univ.

of Penn. Health Sys. v. Shalala, 170 F.3d 1146, 1151 (D.C.

Cir. 1999) (concluding that prejudicial error exists if there is a

possibility that the error would have resulted in some change

in the final outcome) (citing Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down

Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1983));

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1031 n.27 (D.C.

Cir. 1978) (concluding that prejudicial error exists "[I]f [agency] action is improper, and if we cannot be sure that the

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Agency would have reached the same conclusion" if it acted

properly).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the order of the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission denying the National Whistleblower Center's petition to intervene and dismissing the

hearing in connection with Baltimore Gas and Electric Company's license renewal application for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. We remand to the agency to determine

whether Whistleblower had "good cause" for an extension of

time to file contentions under the interpretation of "good

cause" the Commission had employed prior to the Calvert

Cliffs application. If National Whistleblower Center meets

that standard and if it subsequently files adequate contentions before a new deadline, the Commission must allow it an

opportunity to meaningfully participate in the remainder of

the proceeding.

So ordered.

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