Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-10219/USCOURTS-ca9-15-10219-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Henry Lo
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

HENRY LO,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-10219

D.C. No.

3:14-cr-00442-WHO-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

William Horsley Orrick III, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 13, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed October 5, 2016

Before: Richard R. Clifton and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit

Judges, and Royce C. Lamberth,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Ikuta

* The Honorable Royce C. Lamberth, United States District Judge for

the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. LO

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s restitution order

and forfeiture money judgment, both in the amount of

$2,232,894, in a case in which the defendant pleaded guilty

to three counts of wire fraud and mail fraud. 

The panel held that the circumstances surrounding the

signing and entry of the plea agreement support the

conclusion that the defendant entered into the agreement

knowingly and voluntarily.

The panel rejected the defendant’s challenges to the

enforceability of the appeal waiver as to the restitution order. 

The panel held that the plea agreement provided sufficient

information from which the defendant could have derived an

accurate estimate of the amount of restitution for which he

was liable, and rejected the argument that the restitution order

is an illegal sentence.

The panel rejected the defendant’s challenges to the

enforceability of the appeal waiver as to the forfeiture order. 

The panel explained that one can validly waive the right to

appeal a forfeiture order issued as part of the sentence

regardless of whether the plea agreement provides the

defendant with a reasonably accurate estimate of the amount

of forfeiture or whether the defendant was given adequate

notice before a district court determined that amount. 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. LO 3

Rejecting the defendant’s arguments as to why the forfeiture

order constitutes an illegal sentence as to which the appeal

waiver is ineffective, the panel held:

(1) that the defendant received sufficient notice of the

forfeiture order;

(2) that because the government sought a money

judgment, not a forfeiture of specific property, the

government was not required to follow the procedures

applicable to its seeking of “substitute property” under

21 U.S.C. § 853(p) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(e); 

(3) that forfeiture is not statutorily limited to amounts

traceable to the three counts to which the defendant pleaded

guilty – i.e., his three specific uses of the wires or mail – but

rather covers property, obtained by the defendant directly or

indirectly, as a result of the commission of the mail fraud or

wire fraud offense, which necessarily includes the fraudulent

scheme as a whole; and

(4) that the forfeiture order did not violate Apprendi v.

New Jersey.

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4 UNITED STATES V. LO

COUNSEL

Martha Boersch (argued), Boersch Shapiro LLP, Oakland,

California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Meredith Osborn (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Barbara J. Valliere, Chief, Appellate Division; Brian J.

Stretch, United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s

Office, San Francisco, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

Henry Lo appeals the district court’s imposition of a

restitution order and a forfeiture money judgment, both in the

amount of $2,232,894, as part of his sentence for three counts

of wire fraud and mail fraud to which he pleaded guilty. The

district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because Lo validly

waived his right to appeal, and none of the exceptions to such

waivers are applicable, we dismiss this appeal.

I

On August 19, 2014, Henry Lo was indicted in district

court for two different schemes to defraud: wire fraud in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and mail fraud in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1341.

According to the indictment, Lo worked for Absolutely

New, Inc. (ANI), a consumer goods company headquartered

in San Francisco, from 2007 until 2010. Lo “knowingly and

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UNITED STATES V. LO 5

with intent to defraud” devised and executed “a scheme and

artifice to defraud ANI” that involved several different uses

of the wires. From January 2008 until September 2010, Lo

used about $1,300,000 from ANI bank accounts to purchase

cashier’s checks, and either deposited them in his personal

account at the brokerage firm Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., or

used them to make payments on his personal line of credit at

Wells Fargo bank. In late 2010, Lo gained access to one of

ANI’s bank accounts, and from December 2010 until

February 2012 (after Lo left the company), he directed almost

$240,000 from that account into his own American Express

account. From January 2010 to February 2012, Lo caused

ANI to transfer around $550,000 to Lo’s PayPal account. 

Finally, Lo also used a debit card linked to ANI’s bank

account to pay about $30,000 of his personal expenses. In

total, Lo stole more than $2,000,000 from ANI.

The indictment detailed specific acts that constituted use

of the wires to further Lo’s scheme to defraud. Counts 1

through 12 recited specific instances (including the date and

the dollar amount of the transfer) when Lo caused electronic

payments from an ANI bank account to be made to Lo’s

American Express account through American Express’s

computer servers. Count 1 alleged that Lo made an

“[e]lectronic payment in the amount of $26,750.00” on

January 4, 2011. Counts 13 through 24 recited twelve

additional instances when Lo caused electronic payments

from his PayPal account to be transferred to one of his bank

accounts. Count 13 alleged a “[t]ransfer in the amount of

$2,000.00” on January 26, 2010.

The indictment also charged Lo with mail fraud, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. According to the indictment,

from March 2013 to June 2013, Lo “knowingly and with the

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6 UNITED STATES V. LO

intent to defraud” executed a scheme to steal money from his

girlfriend, A.W. Lo persuaded A.W. to let him prepare her

tax returns, and then convinced A.W. to pay her estimated

taxes to the IRS by writing checks totaling more than

$125,000 to a Schwab account in the name of Lo’s wife. In

connection with this scheme, Lo forged confirmation

statements from Schwab which confirmed that her checks

would be sent to the IRS on A.W.’s behalf. He sent these

statements through the mail to A.W.

As with the wire fraud charges, the indictment also

detailed the acts that constituted use of the mail to further

Lo’s scheme to defraud. Counts 26 through 29 recited four

specific instances (including the date and the dollar amount)

of forged confirmation statements from Schwab. Count 26

alleged: “Statement purporting to confirm Schwab’s wire

transfer of $50,000.00 to the IRS on behalf of A.W.” on

April 2, 2013.

The indictment contained a forfeiture allegation under

18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), stating

that if convicted, Lo would forfeit to the United States

“property constituting, and derived from, proceeds the

defendant obtained directly and indirectly, as the result of

those violations, including, but not limited to, the following

real property or personal property.” The listed property

included one piece of real property and identified funds in

various bank or brokerage accounts. The forfeiture allegation

also stated that if any of the listed property was unavailable

as a result of an act or omission by Lo, “any and all interest

the defendant has in other property” would be forfeited to the

United States under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p).

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UNITED STATES V. LO 7

On November 20, 2014, Lo entered into a plea agreement

with the government, in which he agreed to plead guilty to

Counts 1, 13, and 26 of the indictment. Lo admitted he was

guilty of the elements of both wire fraud and mail fraud,

including that he knowingly participated in a scheme or plan

to defraud. He also agreed that the maximum penalties

included restitution and forfeiture.

In section 2 of the plea agreement, Lo agreed to the truth

of the facts underlying his conviction. Among other things,

Lo specified the precise dollar amount of funds he had stolen

as part of his schemes to defraud. He admitted that he

transferred $239,053 of ANIfunds into his American Express

account as part of the wire fraud scheme, that he transferred

payments totaling $564,311 to the PayPal account that he

controlled, that he used ANI funds to purchase $1,356,777 in

cashier’s checks that he deposited into his personal accounts,

and that he made $30,330 in purchases using an ANI debit

card for his personal expenses. Lo also agreed that he

induced A.W. to write more than $125,000 in checks to a

Schwab account in his wife’s name as part of the mail fraud

scheme. In total, Lo admitted to defrauding ANI and A.W. of

at least $2,315,469.

The plea agreement included Lo’s agreement to give up

the rights he would otherwise have if he chose to proceed to

trial. Section 4 of the plea agreement also contained an

appeal waiver, which stated:

I agree to give up my right to appeal my

convictions, the judgment, and orders of the

Court. I also agree to waive any right I have

to appeal any aspect of my sentence, including

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8 UNITED STATES V. LO

any orders relating to forfeiture and or

restitution.

In Section 9, Lo agreed “to pay restitution for all the

losses caused by all the schemes or offenses with which [he]

was charged in this case,” and he further agreed that

restitution “will not be limited to the loss attributable to the

counts to which [he is] pleading guilty.” He continued, “I

agree that the Court may order and I will pay restitution in an

amount to be set by the Court, but in no event less than

$1,700,000 to ANI and $46,189.54 to A.W., less any amounts

paid by me to ANI or A.W. after the date of this Agreement.” 

He also agreed that “any fine, forfeiture, or restitution

imposed by the Court . . . will be immediately due and

payable and subject to immediate collection by the

government.”

Before sentencing, the government made an application

for a preliminary order of forfeiture. Its application stated

that Lo’s thefts from ANI and A.W. totaled at least

$2,323,971, and accordingly that amount was subject to

forfeiture.

At his change of plea hearing on November 20, 2014, the

district court engaged Lo in a detailed colloquy as required by

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Lo

stated that the plea agreement was voluntary and that he

understood and agreed to its terms. Further, Lo stated that he

understood that the terms in the plea agreement “are merely

recommendations” to the court, and that the court could

impose a sentence that was more severe than he anticipated,

without letting him withdraw his plea. During the course of

the Rule 11 colloquy, Lo reaffirmed several times his

understanding that the district court could impose a sentence

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UNITED STATES V. LO 9

that was different or more severe than he had been told. Lo

admitted that he had engaged in schemes to defraud both ANI

and A.W. and that he had fraudulently obtained over $2.2

million. Lo stated that he understood that the court would

order restitution of at least $1,700,00 to ANI and at least

$46,190 to A.W.

The court also addressed the appeal waiver and asked Lo:

Now, do you also understand that under some

circumstances you or the government would

have the right to appeal any sentence that I

impose, but because of the agreement that

you’ve entered into in entering a plea of guilty

you will have waived or given up your right to

appeal or collaterally attack all or part of your

sentence?

Lo responded “yes” to this question.

At the conclusion of the sentencing proceedings, the

district court sentenced Lo to 70 months imprisonment. The

district court interpreted the government’s forfeiture

application as seeking a money judgment, and ordered a

forfeiture money judgment in the amount of $2,232,894. The

district court also ordered Lo to pay $2,232,894 in restitution

to ANI and A.W. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the district

court dismissed the remaining counts. Lo timely appealed.

II

Before addressing Lo’s claims, we must first address the

government’s argument that Lo waived his right to appeal

any aspect of the sentence by agreeing to an appeal waiver in

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10 UNITED STATES V. LO

his plea agreement. “We review the question whether a

defendant has validly waived his statutory right to appeal de

novo.” United States v. Nguyen, 235 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th

Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by United States v.

Rahman, 642 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2011). We also

review the district court’s interpretation of statutes and the

federal rules de novo. See United States v. Mancuso,

718 F.3d 780, 798 (9th Cir. 2013). Factual findings are

reviewed for clear error. United States v. Alcaraz-Garcia,

79 F.3d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1996).

A

Plea agreements, including appeal waivers, are essentially

contracts that we interpret according to contract principles. 

United States v. Gerace, 997 F.2d 1293, 1294 (9th Cir. 1993). 

“This customary reliance on contract law applies to

interpretation of an appeals waiver within a plea agreement,

and we will generally enforce the plain language of a plea

agreement if it is clear and unambiguous on its face.” United

States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2005),

overruled on other grounds by United States v. Jacobo

Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). As a

general rule, “[a] waiver of appellate rights ‘is enforceable if

(1) the language of the waiver encompasses his right to

appeal on the grounds raised, and (2) the waiver is knowingly

and voluntarily made.’” United States v. Medina-Carrasco,

815 F.3d 457, 461 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Jeronimo,

398 F.3d at 1153). “We will enforce a valid waiver even if

the claims that could have been made on appeal absent that

waiver appear meritorious, because ‘[t]he whole point of a

waiver . . . is the relinquishment of claims regardless of their

merit.’” Id. at 462–63 (alterations in original) (quoting

Nguyen, 235 F.3d at 1184).

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UNITED STATES V. LO 11

We begin with the question whether the appeal waiver

was knowingly and voluntarily made. United States v.

Michlin, 34 F.3d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1994). In making this

determination, we look “to the circumstances surrounding the

signing and entry of the plea agreement to determine whether

the defendant agreed to its terms knowingly and voluntarily.” 

United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir.

1996). A district court is required to inform the defendant of

“the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right

to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence,” see Fed. R.

Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N), and we have held that similar

procedures are “sufficient to find a knowing and voluntary

waiver,” United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 987 (9th Cir.

2009) (quoting Baramdyka, 95 F.3d at 844).1 The failure of

a court to do so, however, is not plain error where evidence

in the record shows that the defendant waived appellate rights

knowingly and voluntarily. See id. (holding there was no

plain error in failing to comply with Rule 11(b)(1)(N) given

the otherwise “diligent colloquy” and the defendant’s

“written assurances that he adequately reviewed the terms of

the plea agreement”); see also United States v. Ma, 290 F.3d

1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding there was no plain error

in failing to comply with Rule 11(b)(1)(N) where “[t]he

whole record” disclosed that the defendant knowingly and

voluntarily waived her right to appeal). As a general rule, if

the plea agreement “is voluntary, and taken in compliance

1 The requirement that the court advise the defendant of the terms of

any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal was added to

Rule 11 in 1999. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N) (formerly Fed. R.

Crim. P. 11(c)(6) (1999)). To the extent our decisions considering preamendment colloquies indicate that a district court need not inform the

defendant of the terms of an appeal waiver, see United States v. Anglin,

215 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. DeSantiagoMartinez, 38 F.3d 394, 395 (9th Cir. 1992), they are no longer good law.

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12 UNITED STATES V. LO

with Rule 11, then the waiver of appeal must be honored”

because “waivers of appeal must stand or fall with the

agreement of which they are a part.” United States v.

Portillo-Cano, 192 F.3d 1246, 1250 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

While a defendant must waive the right to appeal

knowingly and voluntarily, the defendant need not be aware

of possible grounds of appeal. See United States v. NavarroBotello, 912 F.2d 318, 320 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding an

appeal waiver as knowing and voluntary because the

defendant “knew he was giving up possible appeals, even if

he did not know exactly what the nature of those appeals

might be”). Further, a defendant can validly waive appeal

rights without being informed of the severity of the sentence

that will be imposed; indeed, we have upheld waivers where

the defendant’s counsel inaccurately informed the defendant

of the plea’s consequences, as long as the inaccuracy was not

a “gross mischaracterization.” See Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at

1155–57; see also United States v. Guillen, 561 F.3d 527, 529

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (“An anticipatory waiver — that is, one

made before the defendant knows what the sentence will be

— is nonetheless a knowing waiver if the defendant is aware

of and understands the risks involved in his decision.”). In

short, where the plea agreement itself is valid, see PortilloCano, 192 F.3d at 1250, and the defendant “is aware of his

right to appeal . . . and . . . expressly waives that right,” the

appeal waiver is knowing and voluntary, DeSantiagoMartinez, 38 F.3d at 395.

If we determine that the appeal waiver is knowing and

voluntary, the second step is to “focus . . . upon the language

of the waiver to determine its scope.” Baramdyka, 95 F.3d at

843. “The scope of a knowing and voluntary waiver is

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UNITED STATES V. LO 13

demonstrated by the express language of the plea agreement.” 

United States v. Leniear, 574 F.3d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Anglin, 215 F.3d at 1066). Because we construe

plea agreements according to the principles of contract law,

anyambiguities in the contract language are construed against

the drafter, which in this case is the government. Anglin,

215 F.3d at 1065–67. Where the appeal waiver is valid, it

will bar a defendant from bringing a number of possible

claims that fall within its scope, including claims that the

district court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s

motion to withdraw his guilty plea, see Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at

1154, that the district court incorrectly applied the Sentencing

Guidelines, see Medina-Carrasco, 815 F.3d at 462; Michlin,

34 F.3d at 901, that the district court lacked personal

jurisdiction over the defendant, see Baramdyka, 95 F.3d at

844, and that the district court abused its discretion in

imposing a special geographical condition of supervised

release, see United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 980, 987

(9th Cir. 2009), among others.

Nevertheless, we have carved out a number of exceptions

to the rule that a defendant can waive the right to appeal

various claims. See United States v. Bibler, 495 F.3d 621

(9th Cir. 2007). Among other exceptions, we have held that

“a waiver of the right to appeal would not prevent an appeal

where the sentence imposed is not in accordance with the

negotiated agreement.” Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 321;

United States v. Martinez, 143 F.3d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir.

1998). We have also held that “[a] waiver of the right to

appeal does not bar a defendant from challenging an illegal

sentence.” Watson, 582 F.3d at 977; United States v. Gordon,

393 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2004). We defined “illegal

sentence” in this context to mean “one not authorized by the

judgment of conviction or in excess of the permissible

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14 UNITED STATES V. LO

statutory penalty for the crime.” United States v. Vences,

169 F.3d 611, 613 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1153 n.2

(cataloguing exceptions to appeal waivers).

We have also developed a special notice requirement for

appeal waivers relating to restitution orders, holding that in

order for that waiver to be valid a defendant must be “given

a reasonably accurate estimate of the amount of the restitution

order to which he is exposed” at the time the defendant agrees

to waive the appeal. See United States v. Tsosie, 639 F.3d

1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2011). The development of this notice

requirement is relevant to our analysis. “[U]ntil 1982

restitution could not be imposed as a separate component of

a federal criminal sentence, but only as a condition of

probation pursuant to the Federal Probation Act of 1925.” 

Catharine M. Goodwin, Looking at the Law: The Imposition

of Restitution in Federal Criminal Cases, Fed. Probation,

Dec. 1998, at 95, 95. The Federal Probation Act (FPA),

18 U.S.C. § 3651, repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II,

§ 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (1984), allowed restitution

only “for actual damages or loss caused by the offense for

which conviction was had.” 18 U.S.C. § 3651. Despite this

narrow language, we held that a court could order restitution

for additional amounts if the defendant stipulated to those

amounts in a plea agreement and the “plea bargain is fully

explored in open court.” Phillips v. United States, 679 F.2d

192, 194 (9th Cir. 1982).

In 1982, Congress enacted the Victim and Witness

Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663–3664, which for

the first time authorized restitution as “a separate component

of a federal criminal sentence,” Goodwin, Looking at the

Law, supra, at 95, and not just as a condition of probation. 

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UNITED STATES V. LO 15

Applying the precedent developed in the FPA context to this

new context, we held that a court could order restitution only

for: (1) “actual damages” as judicially determined, but only

after notice to the defendant; (2) an amount stipulated to in a

plea agreement2; or (3) the amount “alleged in the counts of

the indictment for which the conviction is had.” United

States v. Parrott, 992 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1993). In light

of Parrott’s formulation of this rule, we subsequently

concluded that a court exceeded its authority in ordering

restitution for an amount that was neither clearly stipulated to

in a plea agreement nor based on a judicial determination of

actual damages after adequate notice to the defendant. United

States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1999).

In 1996, Congress enacted another restitution statute, the

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C.

§ 3663A (the statute at issue in this case), to require

restitution for certain crimes. We continued applying the rule

we had developed in Parrott to this new statute. See Gordon,

393 F.3d at 1048; Tsosie, 639 F.3d at 1217. In Gordon, a

defendant agreed to pay approximately $14.5 million in

restitution, but the court ordered the defendant to pay

restitution totaling over $27 million. The court ordered the

higher amount of restitution without giving prior notice to the

defendant. We held that the defendant’s waiver of his right

to appeal the restitution order was not enforceable because

the defendant “lacked sufficient notice to waive his right to

appeal.” 393 F.3d at 1050. Similarly, in Tsosie, the plea

agreement contained an appeal waiver and provided that the

2 A 1990 amendment to the VWPA expressly provided that a court

could order such an amount. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3) (“The court may

also order restitution in any criminal case to the extent agreed to by the

parties in a plea agreement.”).

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16 UNITED STATES V. LO

defendant would make restitution as determined by the court. 

639 F.3d at at 1216. At sentencing, the district court ordered

the defendant to pay $31,994 in restitution to the victim’s

mother. Id. at 1217. No prior notice had been given to the

defendant. We held that because the defendant’s plea

agreement did not set forth “a reasonably accurate estimate of

the amount of the restitution order to which he is exposed,”

id., the defendant lacked sufficient notice to waive his right

to appeal the restitution order, and therefore the appeal waiver

was unenforceable with respect to the restitution amount, id.

at 1218. We explained that “some precision in the plea

agreement is necessary to have a knowing appeal waiver” in

the restitution context because “there is neither a statutory

limit nor any guidelines covering the amount of restitution

orders.” Id. at 1219. Further, the amount of restitution may

“depend on a request or submission by a third party,” the

defendant may be unable to predict whether there will be a

request for restitution or the amount of such a request, and

therefore a defendant may plead guilty “believing that he will

not owe any restitution, when, in fact, the sky is the only limit

to his potential exposure.” Id.

B

We now apply these principles to Lo’s argument that the

appeal waiver does not bar his appeal of either the restitution

order or the forfeiture order.

As a preliminary matter, the circumstances surrounding

the signing and entry of the plea agreement support the

conclusion that Lo entered into the agreement knowingly and

voluntarily. The district court reviewed the plea agreement

thoroughly during the Rule 11 colloquy, which included

bringing the appeal waiver to Lo’s attention. The court also

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UNITED STATES V. LO 17

warned Lo that the sentence could be greater than he had

been told. As a general rule, these factors indicate that the

plea agreement was voluntary and in compliance with Rule

11.

3

In addition, the scope of Lo’s appeal waiver clearly

includes restitution and forfeiture; it states “I also agree to

waive any right I have to appeal any aspect of my sentence,

including any orders relating to forfeiture and or restitution.” 

Under these circumstances, the appeal waiver is enforceable

absent an applicable exception.

Accordingly, we turn to Lo’s arguments that a number of

different exceptions are applicable here. We begin with his

claim that the appeal waiver does not bar his appeal of the

restitution order because the plea agreement did not give Lo

“a reasonably accurate estimate of the amount of the

restitution order to which he is exposed” at the time he agreed

to the appeal waiver, Tsosie, 639 F.3d at 1217, and therefore

his waiver was not knowing and voluntary. We disagree. 

Our examination of the plea agreement shows that it provided

sufficient information from which Lo could have derived an

accurate estimate of the amount of restitution for which he

was liable. The plea agreement directly identified the

minimum amount of restitution Lo would be obliged to pay: 

Lo agreed “that the Court may order and I will pay restitution

in an amount to be set by the Court, but in no event less than

$1,700,000 to ANI and $46,189.54 to A.W., less any amounts

paid by me to ANI or A.W. after the date of this Agreement”

3

In his reply brief, Lo argues that the appeal waiver is invalid because

the district court failed to apprise him of forfeiture at the plea colloquy in

violation of Rule 11. Because Lo did not raise this argument in his

opening brief, it is waived. See Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc.,

127 F.3d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1997) (declining “to address an argument

raised for the first time in the reply brief”).

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18 UNITED STATES V. LO

(emphasis added). The plea agreement defined the additional

amounts of restitution that Lo would be obliged to pay. It

first stated that Lo would “pay restitution for all the losses

caused by all the schemes or offenses with which [he] was

charged in this case,” and that restitution “will not be limited

to the loss attributable to the counts to which [he is] pleading

guilty.” It set forth the exact amount of losses caused by each

of Lo’s fraudulent schemes. In total, the plea agreement

stated that Lo had defrauded ANI and A.W. of $2,315,469. 

Accordingly, the plea agreement provided a reasonably

accurate estimate of the amount of restitution to which Lo

was exposed, and therefore his appeal waiver was knowing

and voluntary.

Lo next argues that his appeal waiver does not bar him

from challenging the restitution order because “the sentence

imposed is not in accordance with the negotiated agreement,”

Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 321. According to Lo, he

agreed to pay only $1,700,000 to ANI and $46,190 to A.W.,

and the restitution order issued by the district court exceeded

that amount. The plain language of the plea agreement belies

this argument; the agreement clearly states that the

$1,700,000 and $46,189 amounts were the minimums that Lo

would have to pay rather than the maximum agreed-upon

restitution amount. The district court’s imposition of a larger

amount of restitution was not in conflict with the plea

agreement.

Finally, Lo argues that he may challenge the restitution

order because it is an illegal sentence. See Watson, 582 F.3d

at 977. According to Lo, the government presented no

evidence that the amounts at issue constituted losses to a

victim that were directly caused by Lo’s offenses, and

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UNITED STATES V. LO 19

without such evidence, the court may not impose a restitution

order under the MVRA.

Again, we reject this argument. An award of restitution

is illegal only if it is not authorized for the offense at issue or

is in excess of the amount allowed by statute. Vences,

169 F.3d at 613. In this case, the award of restitution was not

only authorized but in fact mandatory. Under the MVRA, a

district court must order a defendant who has committed

specified offenses, including “any offense committed by

fraud or deceit,” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii), to make

restitution to the victim of the offense. United States v.

Anderson, 741 F.3d 938, 951 (9th Cir. 2013). A “victim” is

defined as “any person directly harmed by the defendant’s

criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or

pattern.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). Lo was convicted of wire

fraud and mail fraud, which are included in the class of

offenses for which restitution must be ordered. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii); United States v. Thomsen, — F.3d —, 

2016 WL 4039711, at *12 (9th Cir. July 28, 2016) (mail

fraud); United States v. Booth, 309 F.3d 566, 575–76 (9th Cir.

2002) (wire fraud). Further, Lo agreed in the plea agreement

that ANI and A.W. were directly harmed by Lo’s wire fraud

and mail fraud schemes.4 Under the facts admitted by Lo,

4

In the factual basis for the plea agreement, Lo admitted that he made

the following unauthorized transfers: he “caused $239,052.76 of ANI

funds to be paid to [his] American Express account” for his personal

expenses; he “caused ANI to make payments totaling $564,310.54 to a

PayPal account” that Lo registered and controlled; he used ANI funds to

purchase $1,356,777 in cashier’s checks that he deposited into his

personal accounts; and he used an ANI debit card to make unauthorized

personal purchases totaling $30,330. Lo also admitted to causing A.W.

to pay more than $125,000 in personal checks to Lo’s Schwab account,

believing the funds were being sent to the IRS.

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20 UNITED STATES V. LO

both ANI and A.W. constituted “victims” of his scheme to

defraud.

Nor was the restitution award in excess of the amount

allowed by the MVRA. The offenses here, mail fraud and

wire fraud, each contain the element that the alleged acts be

completed in furtherance of a scheme to defraud.5 The

MVRA provides that “in the case of an offense that involves

as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal

activity,” restitution is owed to “any person directly harmed

by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the course of the

scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). 

Accordingly, when the crime of conviction is mail fraud or

other crime requiring proof of a scheme, a court is authorized

to order restitution “on related but uncharged conduct that is

part of a fraud scheme,” and is not limited to “the harm

caused by the particular counts of conviction.” Thomsen, —

F.3d at — , 2016 WL 4039711, at *12 (emphasis omitted)

(quoting In re Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada,

785 F.3d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)) (applying

this rule to mail fraud); see also Booth, 309 F.3d at 575–76

(reaching the same conclusion with respect to wire fraud).

Here, Lo pleaded guilty to mail fraud and wire fraud, and

agreed that the conduct alleged in each count of conviction

furthered either the scheme to defraud ANI or the scheme to

5 The essential elements of a wire fraud offense are “(1) the existence

of a scheme to defraud; (2) the use of wire, radio, or television to further

the scheme, and (3) a specific intent to defraud.” United States v. Jinian,

725 F.3d 954, 960–61 (9th Cir. 2013). Similarly, the essential elements

of a mail fraud offense include: (1) a scheme to defraud; (2) materiality of

the statements made in furtherance of the scheme; (3) an intent to defraud;

and (4) use of the mails. United States v. Woods, 335 F.3d 993, 997 (9th

Cir. 2003).

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UNITED STATES V. LO 21

defraud A.W. Lo also agreed that the restitution order for his

offenses would include all losses caused by the two

fraudulent schemes as a whole. Lo acknowledged that his

fraudulent conduct, including the specific acts alleged in the

counts that were dismissed, directly harmed ANI and A.W.,

and agreed that the dollar amounts specified in the plea

agreement represented the losses ANI and A.W. had suffered

as a result of his schemes. Accordingly, the plea agreement

itself establishes that the transfers of funds from ANI and

A.W. to Lo constituted losses to victims directly caused by

Lo’s fraudulent schemes. Lo again admitted these factual

allegations at his change of plea hearing. Therefore, the

district court did not err in ordering restitution for all losses

caused by the schemes to defraud, and the order was not

illegal.

III

We now turn to Lo’s challenges to the forfeiture order. 

Although a valid appeal waiver would normally bar Lo’s

challenge, Lo claims that two exceptions to the general rule

are applicable.

A

Lo first argues that the notice requirement applicable to

restitution orders is equally applicable to forfeiture orders,

and therefore his waiver of the right to appeal the forfeiture

order was unenforceable because the plea agreement did not

give Lo “a reasonably accurate estimate” of the amount of

forfeiture to which he was exposed. We disagree. As our

prior discussion indicated, we based our rule in the restitution

context on statutory language allowing restitution only for

“actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which

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22 UNITED STATES V. LO

conviction was had,” 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (repealed), and

subsequent interpretations requiring restitution amounts to be

judicially determined after notice to the defendants, Parrott,

992 F.2d at 917, or to be a “reasonably accurate estimate”

stipulated to in the plea agreement, Tsosie, 639 F.3d at 1217. 

There is no analogous statutory history limiting forfeiture to

“actual damages or loss,” and the forfeiture statutes at issue

here are much broader than the relevant restitution statutes. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (providing that “[a]ny property,

real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from

proceeds traceable to” various offenses specified in the

statute “is subject to forfeiture to the United States”); see also

United States v. Newman, 659 F.3d 1235, 1241 (9th Cir.

2011) (“Criminal forfeiture is . . . separate from restitution,

which serves an entirely different purpose.”).

Further, our rationale for creating an exception unique to

restitution orders is not applicable to forfeiture orders. See

Tsosie, 639 F.3d at 1219. Unlike restitution, criminal

forfeiture does not depend on contingent requests and

submissions by third parties that may be impossible to

predict. Id. Rather, the government must notify the

defendant of its intent to seek forfeiture by including an

allegation in the indictment or information, and if the

defendant is convicted, the court must order forfeiture of all

proceeds that constitute or are derived from the offense. See

28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), 18 U.S.C. § 981; see also Newman,

659 F.3d at 1239. “[T]he district court must impose criminal

forfeiture in the amount of the ‘proceeds’ of the crime.” Id.

Under the forfeiture statutes, a defendant can predict both the

application of forfeiture and its amount. Therefore, an appeal

waiver can validly waive the right to appeal a forfeiture order

issued as part of the sentence regardless of whether the plea

agreement provides the defendant with a reasonably accurate

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UNITED STATES V. LO 23

estimate of the amount of forfeiture or whether the defendant

was given adequate notice before a district court determined

that amount. This rule is consistent with the general rule,

outside the restitution context, that a defendant maywaive the

right to appeal without knowing the severity of the sentence

that may be imposed. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1155. We

therefore decline to apply Tsosie’s restitution-specific rule to

the appeal of a forfeiture order.

B

Second, Lo raises four arguments as to why the forfeiture

order constitutes an illegal sentence to which the appeal

waiver is ineffective: (1) the government did not provide the

notice required by statute; (2) the court did not follow the

procedure required to seek forfeiture of “substitute property”

pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(p); (3) the amount of the

forfeiture order exceeded the amounts associated with his

counts of conviction; and (4) the forfeiture order violated

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). We consider

each argument in turn.

1

Lo’s first argument is that the forfeiture order is not

authorized by statute because the government did not provide

sufficient notice that it was seeking a forfeiture money

judgment.

To evaluate this claim, we begin by considering the

statutory framework for forfeiture orders. Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2461(c), if a person is charged with a criminal offense for

which forfeiture is authorized, “the Government may include

notice of the forfeiture in the indictment or information

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24 UNITED STATES V. LO

pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” If the

government provides such notice of the forfeiture in the

indictment, and the defendant is subsequently convicted of

the offense that gives rise to the forfeiture, “the court shall

order the forfeiture of the property as part of the sentence in

the criminal case pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure . . . .” Id.

The federal rule referenced in § 2461(c) is Rule 32.2 of

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Newman, 659 F.3d

at 1242. Rule 32.2(a) sets forth the requirements for notice

of forfeiture. It provides that a court may not enter an order

of forfeiture unless the indictment or information contains

notice that the government will seek forfeiture. Fed. R. Crim.

P. 32.2(a). However, “[t]he indictment . . . need not identify

the property subject to forfeiture or specify the amount of any

forfeiture money judgment that the government seeks.” Id. 

Rule 32.2 also specifies how the court shall order the

forfeiture of property. The government has several options:

it can “seek the forfeiture of specific property, or the

government may seek a money judgment.” Newman,

659 F.3d at 1242. “If the government seeks a personal money

judgment, the court must determine the amount of money that

the defendant will be ordered to pay.” Fed. R. Crim. P.

32.2(b). In addition, where propertyconstituting the proceeds

of an offense cannot be obtained, the government may seek

“substitute property” as allowed under Rule 32.2(e) and

21 U.S.C. § 853(p).

Section 2461 also references 21 U.S.C. § 853, and states

that the procedures in that statute “apply to all stages of a

criminal forfeiture proceeding” except for an exception that

is inapplicable here. Section 853(p) provides a procedure for

the forfeiture of substitute property: pursuant to this section,

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UNITED STATES V. LO 25

“if any property described in [§ 853(a), defining property

subject to forfeiture], as a result of any act or omission of the

defendant,” either cannot be located or has been transferred

to a third party, placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court,

substantially diminished in value, or commingled with other

property, see 21 U.S.C. § 853(p)(1)(A)–(E), the court shall

order forfeiture of “substitute property,” defined as “anyother

property of the defendant, up to the value” of the original

property subject to forfeiture. 21 U.S.C. § 853(p)(1), (2).

Although 28 U.S.C. § 2461 does not expressly reference

18 U.S.C. § 981, we have held that “§ 2461(c) permits the

government to seek criminal forfeiture whenever civil

forfeiture is available and the defendant is found guilty of the

offense.” Newman, 659 F.3d at 1239. Therefore, where the

government includes a criminal forfeiture allegation pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. § 981 and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), forfeiture is

authorized under § 981 even though that section typically

governs civil, rather than criminal, forfeiture. Newman,

659 F.3d at 1239–40. Section 981(a)(1)(C) provides that

“[a]ny property, real or personal, which constitutes or is

derived from proceeds traceable to . . . any offense

constituting ‘specified unlawful activity’ (as defined in

section 1956(c)(7) of this title), or a conspiracy to commit

such offense,” is subject to forfeiture.6“Proceeds” is defined

6

18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) does not directly reference 18 U.S.C.

§ 1341 or 18 U.S.C. § 1343, but does so indirectly. The section states that

property derived from proceeds traceable to an offense constituting

“‘specified unlawful activity’ (as defined in section 1956(c)(7) of this

title)” is subject to forfeiture. Id. Section 1956(c)(7) defines “specified

unlawful activity” in part as “any act or activity constituting an offense”

listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Section 1961(1), in turn, lists both mail

fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, among other

offenses. See also United States v. Silvious, 512 F.3d 364, 369 (7th Cir.

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26 UNITED STATES V. LO

in part as “property of any kind obtained directly or

indirectly, as the result of the commission of the offense

giving rise to forfeiture, and any property traceable thereto,

and is not limited to the net gain or profit realized from the

offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2)(A).

Having reviewed the statutory framework, we now turn to

Lo’s argument that the court exceeded its authority in issuing

a forfeiture order because Lo was not given the notice

required by 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) and 18 U.S.C.

§ 981(a)(1)(C). According to Lo, the indictment’s forfeiture

allegation was deficient because it stated that if convicted, Lo

would forfeit property “including, but not limited to,” a list of

specified real and personal property, and did not state that Lo

would be subject to a money judgment. We disagree. The

forfeiture allegation met the requirement in 28 U.S.C.

§ 2461(c) that the government “include notice of the

forfeiture in the indictment or information pursuant to the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” It also met the

requirement of Rule 32.2(a), that the indictment contain

“notice to the defendant that the government will seek the

forfeiture of property as part of any sentence in accordance

with the applicable statute.” The additional information in

the forfeiture allegation that the property Lo would forfeit

included, but was not limited to, specific property did not

cause the notice to be insufficient for purposes of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2461 or Rule 32.2(a). The government is not legally

required to notify a defendant that it is seeking a money

judgment; indeed, Rule 32.2(a) states that the government

“need not identify the property subject to forfeiture or specify

2008); United States v. Foley, 508 F.3d 627, 635 (11th Cir. 2007); United

States v. Jennings, 487 F.3d 564, 585 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v.

Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 200 (3d Cir. 2006).

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UNITED STATES V. LO 27

the amount of a money judgment.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)

(emphasis added). Because Lo was not entitled to

notification that the government was seeking specific

property, the government’s decision to seek a money

judgment instead of the listed property does not render the

government noncompliant with the statute. In any event, we

disagree with Lo’s argument that the allegation’s failure to

specify that the government might seek a money judgment

made it misleading, given that the allegation made clear that

forfeiture was “not limited to” the property listed in the

indictment. We conclude that Lo received sufficient notice

of the forfeiture order.

2

We next turn to Lo’s argument that the government was

required to seek forfeiture of “substitute property” pursuant

to 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) and follow the procedures set forth in

that statute, and that its failure to do so made the forfeiture

order illegal. Again, this argument fails. As explained in

Newman, the procedural and substantive requirements of Rule

32.2(e) and § 853(p) apply “before the court may order the

forfeiture of substitute property.” Newman, 659 F.3d at 1242. 

But where the government does not seek substitute property

under Rule 32.2(e), but seeks only “a money judgment as a

form of criminal forfeiture under Rule 32.2(b),” those

requirements are inapplicable. “When the government seeks

a money judgment, Rule 32.2(b) does not permit the court to

do anything other than ‘determine the amount of money that

the defendant will be ordered to pay,’ which is specified by

statute.” Id. at 1242. Lo attempts to distinguish Newman on

the ground that the defendant in that case had agreed to a

money judgment in his plea agreement. See id. at 1238. 

Newman did not rely on that fact; instead, it relied solely on

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28 UNITED STATES V. LO

the text of 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) and Rule 32.2 to conclude that

forfeiture money judgments and forfeiture orders of specific

property are subject to different procedural requirements. Id.

at 1242.

Here the government sought a money judgment, not

forfeiture of specific property, in its application for a

preliminary order of forfeiture. Therefore, under Newman,

the government was not required to follow the procedures

applicable to its seeking of substitute property. See 659 F.3d

at 1242–43.

3

Lo argues next that the district court’s forfeiture order

was an illegal sentence because the amount of forfeiture is

statutorily limited to proceeds that constitute or are derived

from the counts to which he pleaded guilty, Counts 1, 13, and

26. The proceeds associated with those two acts of wire fraud

and one act of mail fraud, as set forth in the indictment, added

up to $78,750. Lo therefore argues that the district court’s

forfeiture order of $2,232,894 exceeded its statutory

authority.

The Seventh Circuit rejected an almost identical argument

in United States v. Venturella, 585 F.3d 1013, 1016–18 (7th

Cir. 2009). In that case, the government alleged that the

defendants committed mail fraud by fraudulently obtaining

government benefits in two different mail fraud schemes (the

first scheme was comprised of counts 1–26, and the second

scheme was comprised of counts 27–30). For each of the two

schemes, the indictment first gave the factual background and

explained the overall scheme. It then provided “a chart that

specifies the mailings corresponding with each count, which

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UNITED STATES V. LO 29

the defendants made ‘for the purpose of executing’ the

fraudulent scheme.” Id. at 1017. The indictment also

included a forfeiture charge under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(c)

and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) of $114,313 for the first scheme,

and $301,491 for the second scheme. Id. The defendants

entered into a plea agreement and pled guilty to one of the

counts which specified a mailing involving $478. The other

charges were dismissed pursuant to the agreement. Id. at

1016. On appeal, the defendants claimed that the extent of

their criminal forfeiture must be limited to the amount

associated with the count of conviction, or $478.

The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument. First, it noted

that the indictment associated each individual mailing with

the overall scheme. In light of this structure, the court

concluded that each count included the entire scheme to

defraud the government, “and each mailing was a separate act

in furtherance of that scheme.” Id. at 1017. By pleading

guilty to one count of mail fraud that included the entire

fraudulent scheme, the defendants in effect pleaded guilty to

the entire mail fraud scheme. Id. Second, the Seventh Circuit

provided a close analysis of the relevant forfeiture statutes,

and concluded that “contrary to the defendants’ claims,

forfeiture is not limited solely to the amounts alleged in

the count(s) of conviction.” Id. As the Seventh Circuit

explained, “18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) authorizes forfeiture for

‘[a]ny property, real or personal, which constitutes or is

derived from proceeds traceable to’ the commission of certain

specified offenses, including mail fraud,” and “18 U.S.C.

§ 981(a)(2)(A) defines ‘proceeds’ as ‘property of any kind

obtained directly or indirectly, as the result of the commission

of the offense giving rise to forfeiture, and any property

traceable thereto, and is not limited to the net gain or profit

realized from the offense.’” Id. (alteration in original). The

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30 UNITED STATES V. LO

court concluded that “[t]he plain language of section

981(a)(1)(C) along with the expansive definition of

‘proceeds’ indicates that the statute contemplates the

forfeiture of property other than the amounts alleged in the

count(s) of conviction.” Id. The court therefore held that a

forfeiture amount of $114,313 was proper. Id. at 1017–18.

We agree with the Seventh Circuit’s statutory analysis,

and conclude that it is equally applicable here. The language

of the forfeiture statute broadly makes forfeitable any

property, obtained by the defendant directly or indirectly, as

a result of the commission of a mail fraud or wire fraud

offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(A). The

offenses here, mail fraud and wire fraud, each contain the

element that the alleged acts be completed in furtherance of

a scheme to defraud. See United States v. Jinian, 725 F.3d

954, 960–61 (9th Cir. 2013) (wire fraud); United States v.

Woods, 335 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2003) (mail fraud). 

Because the proceeds from a mail fraud or wire fraud offense

include funds obtained “as the result of the commission of the

offense,” and the commission of such a mail fraud or wire

fraud offense necessarily includes a fraudulent scheme as a

whole, the proceeds of the crime of conviction consist of the

funds involved in thatfraudulentscheme, including additional

executions of the scheme that were not specifically charged

or on which the defendant was acquitted. See United States

v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 117–18 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating

that, “[w]here the conviction itself is for executing a scheme,

engaging in a conspiracy, or conducting a racketeering

enterprise,” the proceeds for purposes of forfeiture include

the proceeds of “that scheme, conspiracy, or enterprise”); see

also United States v. Hasson, 333 F.3d 1264, 1279 (11th Cir.

2003) (holding, for purposes of forfeiture, that “[i]n

determining what transactions involved the proceeds of mail

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UNITED STATES V. LO 31

and wire fraud, the jury was not restricted to the three

substantive counts of wire fraud on which it returned a guilty

verdict” and could consider evidence of fraud adduced in

support of an additional money laundering count).

In this case, the indictment charged Lo with a scheme to

defraud ANI of more than $2,000,000 through use of the

wires. Each individual count included both the scheme to

defraud and a specific use of the wires as an act in furtherance

of that scheme. The same is true with respect to the scheme

to defraud A.W. of more than $125,000 through use of the

mails: each individual count included the scheme to defraud

and identified a specific use of the mail in furtherance of that

scheme. Under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2)(A), the “proceeds”

from Counts 1, 13, and 26 to which Lo pleaded guilty include

all funds obtained “as the result of the commission” of those

offenses. Because the commission of those wire fraud and

mail fraud offenses necessarily involved execution of the

relevant fraudulent schemes, see Jinian, 725 F.3d at 960–61;

Woods, 335 F.3d at 997, the court was authorized to order

forfeiture of the funds obtained from those schemes,

including from the additional executions of the schemes

alleged in the indictment and admitted in the plea agreement. 

See Venturella, 585 F.3d at 1017.

In arguing that he should be held responsible only for

amounts traceable to his three specific uses of the wires or

mail, Lo relies on United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d

511 (9th Cir. 1998). This reliance is misplaced. In GarciaGuizar, the government executed search warrants at the

defendant’s storage locker, and seized sixteen packages of

marijuana and a bundle of cash (amounting to $43,070) in a

brown paper bag. Id. at 515. Some $4,300 of the cash in the

bag had serial numbers showing them to be “pre-recorded

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32 UNITED STATES V. LO

government funds from . . . the methamphetamine sales.” Id.

The government sought the entire bag of cash as the

“proceeds” the defendant “obtained, directly or indirectly” as

the result of the drug offenses. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1). The

defendant was convicted and the jury returned a verdict that

the entire bag of cash was subject to forfeiture. We reversed,

holding that the government had proven only that the $4,300

was proceeds of the conduct for which the defendant was

actually convicted. Id. at 519. Lo argues that by analogy,

only the amounts traceable to the three counts to which he

pleaded guilty, i.e., his three specific uses of the wires or

mail, are subject to forfeiture.

We disagree. Garcia-Guizar is inapposite because in that

case, the government was not seeking a money judgment, but

rather took the position that the bag of cash found in the

locker was the proceeds of the drug offenses. But the

government produced no evidence that anything other than

the $4,300 in bills with prerecorded serial numbers

constituted the proceeds of a drug offense. Nor did the

government seek a money judgment on the grounds that the

proceeds of the defendant’s drug offense amounted to

$43,070. By contrast, in our case, the government established

the amount of proceeds subject to forfeiture and sought a

money judgment, and so need only prove that the dollar

amount constitutes the proceeds of the wire and mail fraud

offenses. See Newman, 659 F.3d at 1242; see also

Venturella, 585 F.3d at 1018 (finding that Garcia-Guizar did

not require that a money judgment be limited to the

individual transaction amounts specified in the counts of

conviction).

The district court therefore did not err in ordering a

forfeiture money judgment in the amount of proceeds that Lo

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UNITED STATES V. LO 33

obtained as a result of his two fraudulent schemes. Nor did

the district court clearly err in calculating that total to be

$2,232,894, where the plea agreement, as well as the

Presentencing Report, victim impact statements, and other

evidence submitted as part of the district court’s three

sentencing proceedings all supported that amount. See

Newman, 659 F.3d at 1244 (“The district court may rely on

factual statements in the plea agreement.”).

4

Lo next contends that the district court’s forfeiture order

was illegal because it violated Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000). According to Lo, the amount of a

forfeiture order is a fact that increases his penalty, and

therefore must be determined by the jury. We reject this

argument.

In Apprendi, the Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of

a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a

crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Id. at 490. The Court later clarified that Apprendi applies to

criminal fines in Southern Union Co. v. United States. 132 S.

Ct. 2344, 2350 (2012).

But the Supreme Court had previously developed a

different rule applicable to forfeiture orders. In Libretti v.

United States, the Court ruled that “the right to a jury verdict

on forfeitability does not fall within the Sixth Amendment’s

constitutional protection.” 516 U.S. 29, 49 (1995). We

recently considered whether Apprendi and Southern Union

had abrogated Libretti, and concluded that Libretti was still

good law in the context of criminal forfeiture. See United

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34 UNITED STATES V. LO

States v. Phillips, 704 F.3d 754, 769–70 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Phillips’s holding was clear: “there is no constitutional ‘right

to a jury verdict on forfeitability’ in a criminal forfeiture

proceeding.” Id. at 769 (quoting Libretti, 516 U.S. at 49); see

also United States v. Christensen, — F.3d —, 2015 WL

11120665, at *44 (9th Cir. July 8, 2016) (“We have held that

there is no constitutional right to have a jury decide

forfeiture.”). Every other circuit to consider whether Libretti

has been abrogated agrees. See id.; United States v. Simpson,

741 F.3d 539, 559–60 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v.

Sigillito, 759 F.3d 913, 935 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v.

Fruchter, 411 F.3d 377, 380–82 (2d Cir. 2005). We have

likewise concluded “that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

32.2 does not require a jury determination for forfeiture in the

form of a personal money judgment, which is what the

government obtained here.” Christensen, — F.3d at —, 2015

WL 11120665, at *44.

Although Lo attempts to distinguish these cases on the

ground that his forfeiture order was not limited to the

amounts alleged in the counts of conviction, we have already

rejected this argument, because the forfeiture statute

authorizes forfeiture of the proceeds from his fraudulent

schemes. Cf. Fruchter, 411 F.3d at 384 (rejecting an

Apprendi challenge to a similar forfeiture order for amounts

associated with the overall racketeering scheme for which the

defendant was convicted). Accordingly, we reject Lo’s

argument that the forfeiture order here violated Apprendi.

IV

We conclude that Lo entered into an enforceable appeal

waiver, that neither the restitution order nor the forfeiture

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UNITED STATES V. LO 35

order is illegal, and that Lo has not raised any other exception

that would permit us to consider his appeal.

DISMISSED.

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