Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03326/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03326-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Ashcroft
Respondent
Antonio Reyes-Vasquez
Petitioner

Document Text:

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The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3326

___________

Antonio Reyes-Vasquez, *

*

Petitioner, *

* Petition for Review of an Order

v. * of the Immigration & Naturalization

* Service Board of Immigration Appeals.

John Ashcroft, Attorney General *

of the United States of America, *

*

Respondent. *

___________

Submitted: November 18, 2004

Filed: January 25, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN and HEANEY, Circuit Judges, and HOLMES,1

 District Judge.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Antonio Reyes-Vasquez petitions for review of the determination of the

Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that he is not

entitled to cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). He asserts, however,

that we may not reach the merits of his claim until the BIA issues a reasoned opinion

because, he argues, the BIA’s affirmance without opinion procedure is

unconstitutional under separation of powers principles. We hold that our precedent

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We deny as moot the petitioner’s motion for stay of removal, subject to

petitioner’s right to renew it if necessary, based on the Government’s representation

that an administrative stay of removal is in place pending our disposition of this

appeal. We deny as untimely his motion for stay of voluntary departure. See Rife v.

Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 2004).

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To be eligible for cancellation of removal, an alien must be “physically present

in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately

preceding the date of such application,” must be “a person of good moral character,”

must not have been convicted of certain offenses, and must show that his removal

“would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a member of his

immediate family who is a citizen or lawful permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. §

1229b(b)(1)(A)-(D).

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answers the constitutional question. We grant his petition as to the cancellation of

removal issue and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.2

I.

Reyes-Vasquez, a native and citizen of Mexico, first entered the United States

illegally from Mexico on April 1, 1984. He returned to Mexico for about two weeks

in August 1990 to attend to his ailing grandfather. He attempted to reenter the United

States on September 15, 1990, and was arrested by the United States Border Patrol.

He testified that the Border Patrol locked him in a cell for several hours and then put

him “back over the line again” without telling him that he would otherwise have to

go before a judge. Later that day, he successfully reentered the United States

illegally. He remained in the Chicago area until 1999, when he moved to Minnesota.

He received a notice to appear, initiating removal proceedings, on March 20, 2000.

Reyes-Vasquez conceded that he was removable, but applied for relief in the form of

cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A).3

 The IJ found ReyesVasquez credible and stated that Reyes would have been entitled to cancellation of

removal except for the fact that his voluntary return to Mexico in 1990 interrupted his

period of continuous physical presence in the United States and caused it to be less

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The regulation states that the Board member assigned a case “shall affirm” if

he finds that certain criteria are met and that he “shall not include further explanation

or reasoning” but shall state that “[t]he decision below is, therefore, the final agency

determination.” 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(e)(4).

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than the statutorily required 10 years. Reyes-Vasquez was denied cancellation of

removal on that basis. The BIA issued a summary affirmance on August 22, 2003.

Reyes-Vasquez and his wife have three sons, one of whom is a United States

citizen and suffers from learning disabilities. 

II.

A.

As our precedent makes clear, the BIA’s choice to use the affirmance without

opinion procedure does not affect our ability to review this case. Reyes-Vasquez

argues that the procedure, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2003),4

 is an unconstitutional

violation of separation of powers principles. We have rejected prior challenges to the

procedure, grounded in due process concerns, and conclude that the present challenge

presents no novel issues and must also fail. See Dominguez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d

678, 680 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the IJ’s decision satisfies the requirement set

out in SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1947), that an agency must set forth

the grounds for its conclusions). 

Reyes-Vasquez’s separation of powers claim fails because nothing in the

challenged regulation changes the relationship between the three branches of

government, for the regulation merely adjusts intra-agency procedures. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.1 (establishing the organization, jurisdiction and powers of the BIA). The

Attorney General, a member of the executive branch, acts within his authority

delegated by Congress when he creates and interprets regulations to accomplish his

immigration management task. See 5 U.S.C. § 301 (stating that the head of an

executive department “may prescribe regulations for the government of his

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department, the conduct of its employees, the distribution and performance of its

business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and

property.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (assigning the duties to the Attorney General in the

immigration context, including duties to establish regulations, review immigration

proceedings and “delegate such authority” as he deems necessary). The Attorney

General therefore acts within his authority when he delegates intra-agency to

accomplish the duties given to him by Congress. Whether multiple layers of

independent review and analysis at the administrative level are necessary is therefore

a due process question, not a separation of powers question, and is controlled by our

precedent. See Loulou v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 706, 708 (8th Cir. 2003); Dominguez,

336 F.3d at 680.

B.

An alien may apply for relief in the form of cancellation of removal if he meets

the requirements set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). We conclude that we have

jurisdiction to consider Reyes-Vasquez’s contention that the IJ improperly found him

ineligible for such relief. Although the decision to grant cancellation of removal is

a discretionary act by the Attorney General that we may not review, 8 U.S.C. §

1252(a)(2)(B); Halabi v. Ashcroft, 316 F.3d 807, 808 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam),

we may consider the predicate legal question whether the IJ properly applied the law

to the facts in determining an individual’s eligibility to be considered for the relief.

See Morales-Morales v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 418, 421-22 (7th Cir. 2004); MirelesValdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 216-17 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that the continuous

presence requirement “is a nondiscretionary determination because it involves

straightforward statutory interpretation and application of law to fact”). In doing so,

we give substantial deference to the agency’s interpretation of immigration statutes.

See Alfolayan v. INS, 219 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir. 2000). Here, the IJ did not exercise

discretionary authority because he determined that Reyes-Vasquez was ineligible for

the relief. The IJ concluded that Reyes-Vasquez met all the requirements except one:

he had not “been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of

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not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such application.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(b)(1)(A). As indicated above, the IJ stated that if Reyes-Vasquez had met

the ten-year requirement, “the Court would grant this application for cancellation of

removal.”

An alien’s continuous period of physical presence in the United States may be

cut off or broken in several ways. It stops accruing when an alien receives a notice

to appear from the INS. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1). It is broken if the petitioner has

committed certain crimes or “has departed from the United States for any period in

excess of 90 days or for any periods in the aggregate exceeding 180 days.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(d)(2). Our case law establishes that it is also broken “when an alien

voluntarily departs under threat of deportation.” Palomino v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 942,

944 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding reasonable the BIA’s interpretation in In re RomalezAlcaide, 23 I. & N. Dec. 423 (2002)).

In this case, it is clear that Reyes-Vasquez was not out of the country more than

90 days, as he returned to Mexico for only about two weeks to visit his ailing

grandfather. The principal question we must resolve, therefore, is whether ReyesVasquez’s experience at the border in 1990 constituted voluntary departure “under

threat of deportation” so as to legally break his continuous period of physical

presence in the United States. We conclude that the record is insufficient to establish

that such a voluntary departure occurred.

As indicated above, voluntary departure under threat of deportation is the form

of departure that breaks continual presence. See Palomino, 354 F.3d at 944; MoralesMorales, 384 F.3d at 426. That language implies that there is an expressed and

understood threat of deportation. When an alien is legally permitted to depart

voluntarily, he should “leave[ ] with the knowledge that he does so in lieu of being

placed in proceedings” and therefore has no legitimate expectation that he may

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reenter and resume continuous presence. In re Romalez-Alcaide, 23 I. & N. Dec. 423,

429 (2002) (en banc). 

“There is a significant difference between . . . the Border Patrol simply turning

[the alien] back at the border and voluntary departure under threat of removal

proceedings.” Morales-Morales, 384 F.3d at 427. In cases in which a finding of a

break in continuous presence has been upheld, the threat of deportation was expressed

and understood by the alien. See Palomino, 354 F.3d at 943 (INS officials “gave

[Palomino] the option of voluntarily departing or facing formal administrative

deportation proceedings”); Mireles-Valdez, 349 F.3d at 214 (Mireles-Valdez “agreed

to accept an administrative voluntary departure; and was returned to Mexico without

having proceedings brought against him”); Vasquez-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 343 F.3d 961,

969 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (Vasquez-Lopez was arrested, admitted

deportability, requested voluntary departure, and was escorted to Mexico by the

Border Patrol), amending 315 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). The alien is unlikely to

have understood the threat and its consequences, however, if the record fails to

establish that any communication about the possibility of deportation occurred and

the alien credibly testifies that he was simply released back over the border. See

Morales-Morales, 384 F.3d at 427 (noting Morales-Morales’s testimony that the

Border Patrol “just took me, threw me around, and turned me back”).

In 1990, the U.S. Border Patrol had the authority to grant voluntary departure

to an alien “[w]ho is a native of a foreign contiguous territory” such as Mexico. See

8 C.F.R. § 242.5 (1990). Voluntary departures, which are formal and legally binding

grants, were commonly documented in an alien’s file, see Deportation Officer’s

Handbook, Immigration and Naturalization Service (Handbook), Ch. 1, ¶ 1-4 (1986),

even though extensive docket control was not necessary for cases involving

immediate departure. Id. at ¶ 1-2 (noting that I-274/274A and “satisfactory

departure” cases do not require docket control). The Handbook stated:

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Notably, the current versions of these documents make the requirements of

documentation and communication more clear, noting the need to establish that the

alien “was fully aware of the terms and conditions attached to the grant.” Detention

and Deportation Officers’ Field Manual Ch. 11.8 (2002) (Field Manual). The

Department of Homeland Security regulation states that “[e]very decision regarding

voluntary departure shall be communicated in writing on Form I-210, Notice of

Action—Voluntary Departure. Voluntary departure may not be granted unless the

alien requests such voluntary departure and agrees to its terms and conditions.” 8

C.F.R. § 240.25 (2004). In addition, the Field Manual clarifies that:

[i]t is most important that arresting officers understand and

communicate to aliens being granted voluntary departure that failure to

depart under the terms given will not only result in the alien being

placed in removal proceedings, but will also preclude him or her from

receiving any grant ov voluntary departure for a period of 10 years, . . . .

It is essential that no voluntary departure period be granted without

issuance of Form I-210 (Rev 4/1/97) and that the affected alien be made

aware of and agree to the terms of such a grant.

Field Manual Ch. 11.8 (emphasis in original).

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When an alien has been granted voluntary departure and removed at

Government expense, care should be taken to leave written evidence in

the alien’s file indicating the date of removal and the cost of the

removal. Form I-274/274A has a portion devoted to this at the bottom

of the form. Cases, other than I-274/274A cases, should have a memo

to the file indicating the above information.

Id. at ¶ 1-4.5

 If no government expense was involved, however, a “satisfactory

departure” was often just “noted on the reverse of the alien’s Form I-94" and not

otherwise recorded. See Detention and Deportation Officers’ Field Manual,

Department of Homeland Security, Ch. 11.8 (2002) (noting that the practice was

common prior to 1997).

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At oral argument, the government cited Form I-213 (“Record of Deportable/

Inadmissible Alien”) as proof of Reyes-Vasquez’s voluntary departure. See A.R. 510.

Special Agent Michael Diaz filled out the form after Reyes-Vasquez was arrested for

driving while intoxicated in March 2000. The agent’s notes on the form, presumably

based on an interview with Reyes-Vasquez, summarize Reyes-Vasquez’s 1990 border

arrest in the following terms: “[s]ubject read his administrative rights outloud and

states that he understood them. Subject requested a voluntary return to Mexico.” The

information in this document, if acknowledged by Reyes-Vasquez to be correct and

if further developed with respect to the rights that he was advised of, might support

a finding that Reyes-Vasquez’s September 5, 1990, return to Mexico did indeed

constitute a voluntary departure that broke his continue presence in this country. As

it is, however, under the standard we have articulated above, the form alone does not

override Reyes-Vasquez’s credible testimony to the contrary.

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We conclude that before it may be found that a presence-breaking voluntary

departure occurred, the record must contain some evidence that the alien was

informed of and accepted its terms. When viewed in the light of this requirement, we

believe that the facts of this case are more analogous to the facts in Morales-Morales,

384 F.3d 418, than Palomino, 354 F.3d 942. Reyes-Vasquez credibly testified that

he was detained by the Border Patrol but did not go before an IJ and was not told that

he would have to go to court. He stated only that he was briefly detained,

fingerprinted, and placed on a bus heading back into Mexico, from where he

reentered the United States again that very evening.6

 Lacking any further details

regarding the circumstances under which Reyes-Vasquez returned to Mexico, the

record is insufficient to support a finding that Reyes-Vasquez knowingly agreed to

administrative voluntary departure under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (1990) and was made

aware that he would otherwise face removal proceedings.

If Reyes-Vasquez was “simply returned to the border” without voluntarily

departing under an expressed threat of deportation or removal proceedings, his

departure did not constitute a break in his continuous physical presence. See

Morales-Morales, 384 F.3d at 428. Accordingly, we remand to the agency for

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specific factual findings on that question and for further proceedings consistent

therewith.

______________________________

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