Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-03037/USCOURTS-caDC-11-03037-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tyrone Hines
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 11, 2012 Decided October 2, 2012

No. 11-3037

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

TYRONE HINES,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cr-00150-1)

Matthew Gardner Kaiser, appointed by the court, argued

the cause for the appellant. 

Suzanne Grealy Curt, Assistant United States Attorney,

argued the cause for the appellee. Ronald C. Machen, Jr.,

United States Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III and John P.

Mannarino, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on brief. 

Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant United States Attorney, entered

an appearance.

Before: HENDERSON and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Appellant

Tyrone Hines was convicted of one count of bank robbery and

two counts of attempted bank robbery and was sentenced to

concurrent terms of 132 months on each count. He challenges

his conviction on the grounds that the district court erred in

failing to hold a competency hearing and in extending the

thirty-day deadline for indicting a defendant following arrest

under the Speedy Trial Act (STA, Act), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 et

seq. He also challenges his sentence, asserting the district

court erroneously increased his offense level for obstruction

of justice pursuant to section 3C1.1 of the United States

Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) based on a statement he

made at a pre-trial suppression hearing, which the court found

to be deliberately false. Notwithstanding the able and

vigorous advocacy of Hines’s appellate counsel, we affirm

Hines’s conviction and his sentence.

I.

Hines was arrested on March 9, 2010 and charged in a

criminal complaint with the March 4, 2010 attempted robbery

of a BB&T Bank branch in Washington, D.C.1

 A magistrate

judge denied Hines’s motion for release from custody and

committed him to government custody, concluding there were

“no conditions that [he] could set that would reasonably

assure [Hines’s] appearance or that he would not commit new

crimes if released, and he should be detained pending trial.” 

Detention Mem. at 4, United States v. Hines, Cr. No. 10-150

(D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2010). 

Under the STA, the government must indict a defendant

within thirty days after his arrest, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), and try

him within seventy days after the indictment, id.

§ 3161(c)—except that a pre-trial detainee, such as Hines,

1

All dates are in 2010 unless otherwise noted.

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must be tried within ninety days after he is first detained, id.

§ 3164(b)2

—all subject to the exclusion of “periods of delay”

as authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h). On April 7 and May

4, a magistrate judge granted joint motions filed by Hines’s

then-counsel and the government seeking two separate,

successive thirty-day “interests-of-justice” continuances to be

excluded from the STA calendar pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(7), which lists as one of the periods which “shall be

excluded in computing the time within which an information

or an indictment must be filed, or in computing the time

within which the trial of any such offense must commence”:

2

The STA provides in relevant part:

(b) Any information or indictment charging an individual

with the commission of an offense shall be filed within

thirty days from the date on which such individual was

arrested or served with a summons in connection with such

charges. . . . 

(c)(1) In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered,

the trial of a defendant charged in an information or

indictment with the commission of an offense shall

commence within seventy days from the filing date (and

making public) of the information or indictment, or from the

date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of

the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date

last occurs.

18 U.S.C. § 3161(b)-(c); and: 

The trial of any [detained person who is being held in

detention solely because he is awaiting trial] shall

commence not later than ninety days following the

beginning of such continuous detention . . . . The periods of

delay enumerated in section 3161(h) are excluded in

computing the time limitation specified in this section.

Id. § 3164(b).

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Any period of delay resulting from a continuance

granted by any judge on his own motion or at the

request of the defendant or his counsel or at the

request of the attorney for the Government, if the

judge granted such continuance on the basis of his

findings that the ends of justice served by taking

such action outweigh the best interest of the public

and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period

of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the

court in accordance with this paragraph shall be

excludable under this subsection unless the court sets

forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in

writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice

served by the granting of such continuance outweigh

the best interests of the public and the defendant in a

speedy trial. 

The stated purpose of each exclusion motion was to allow

ongoing plea negotiations to continue and the second motion

sought as well “an opportunity to complete a mental health

evaluation.” Joint Mot. to Exclude Additional Time Under

the Speedy Trial Act, United States v. Hines, Cr. No. 10-150

(D.D.C. Apr. 30, 2010). Together, the two continuances

extended the indictment deadline to June 7. Shortly after the

second motion was filed, however, Hines informed his

counsel that he did not want a plea offer and, upon being so

notified, the government proceeded with the indictment. On

June 3, the grand jury returned an indictment charging Hines

with three counts: (1) robbery of a Citibank branch on

February 26; (2) attempted robbery of a Bank of America

branch on March 4; and (3) attempted robbery of the BB&T

Bank branch on March 4 (all in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2113(a)).

Hines was arraigned on June 16 and pleaded not guilty. 

At the arraignment, the district court asked Hines’s counsel

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about the nature of the two STA exclusions, in particular

whether they applied to both the thirty-day indictment

deadline and the additional ninety-day trial deadline or only to

the former. Counsel responded that she did not believe her

client “specifically agreed to any exclusion of time, other than

the exclusion of time within which to indict him” and that he

“was excluding time within which the Government would

have to indict him to give [her] an opportunity to present to

him the best plea offer.” Tr. of Arraignment at 8, 10, United

States v. Hines, Cr. No. 10-150 (D.D.C. June 16, 2010). She

also informed the court the mental health evaluation

mentioned in the second motion to exclude “was at [her]

request,” was “still an ongoing process” and “was done for the

purposes of trying to convince the Government to give

[Hines] a better plea offer.” Id. at 7. Concluding the matter

was not “as clear-cut as it might be,” the court indicated it

would examine the record further and invited counsel to file a

written explanation of her position. Id. at 9. Later during the

proceedings, counsel informed the court that Hines had

“expressed dissatisfaction with her representation.” Id. at 22. 

After questioning Hines about his willingness to proceed with

his current counsel, and explaining to Hines that appointing

new counsel would delay the case, the court agreed to look

into finding new counsel to represent him. On June 21, the

district court conducted a status hearing at which new counsel

represented Hines. The government moved to exclude from

the STA calendar the period from June 26 to July 7 to make

up for the delay caused by changing counsel.3

 Hines agreed

to the exclusion. 

3

The government explained that “previous defense counsel was

prepared to file [certain motions] on the 26th and new defense counsel

understandably needs until July 7th.” Tr. of Status Hr’g at 20, United

States v. Hines, Cr. No. 10-150 (D.D.C. June 21, 2010).

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On July 19, Hines moved the court for release pending

trial, asserting “a violation of his rights under the [STA].” 

Mot. to Recons. Def.’s Bond at 1, United States v. Hines, Cr.

No. 10-150 (D.D.C. July 19, 2010). According to the motion,

Hines’s first lawyer “excluded the time to indict [Hines], but

did not exclude the time to bring [him] to trial” so that “[t]he

ninety-day (90) period for [Hines] to go to trial tolled on

Monday June 7, 2010 and therefore [he] should be released

pending his trial.” Id. at 2. The district court denied the

motion on the ground that a continuance under section

3161(h) “appl[ies] both in calculating the time within which

an indictment must be filed under section 3161(b) as well as

in calculating the time within which a trial must begin under

either section 3161(c)(1) or section 3164(b).” Mem. Order at

6, United States v. Hines, Cr. No. 10-150 (D.D.C. July 30,

2010) (citing U.S.C. §§ 3161(h), 3164(b)). 

In a July 30 hearing, Hines informed the court that he and

his second lawyer were experiencing “irreconcilable

differences,” Tr. of Status Hr’g at 23, United States v. Hines,

Cr. No. 10-150 (D.D.C. July 30, 2010), but ultimately agreed

he was “satisfied” and would “work with” his lawyer, id. (ex

parte) at 7. Nonetheless, on August 23, his lawyer filed a

motion to withdraw as counsel, citing “irreconcilable

differences which have resulted in the parties[’] inability to

discuss the case.” Mot. to Withdraw as Counsel for Def. at 1,

United States v. Hines, Cr. No. 10-150 (D.D.C. Aug. 23,

2010). At the hearing on the motion, Hines recited various

objections to his lawyer’s representation. Despite its

skepticism of Hines’s complaints, the court agreed to appoint

new counsel.

Meanwhile, at an August 8 evidentiary hearing on

Hines’s two motions to suppress, the court had asked Hines’s

second lawyer if a mental evaluation had ever been

performed. Counsel reported that it had but “they did not find

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that there were any issues that rose to the level of not being

competent.” Tr. of Mot. Hr’g at 5, United States v. Hines, Cr.

No. 10-150 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2010). The court concluded

“there didn’t appear to be any competency issues” and

counsel agreed. Id. at 8.

At a status hearing on August 11, the court denied the

motions to suppress, in part because it discredited Hines’s

claim that he was interviewed and confessed on March 10,

rather than on March 9, as the government witnesses and

other evidence indicated. Hines, she observed, “could be

confused or decided based on his own legal research that he

could raise an issue to get his confession suppressed by

changing the timing.” Tr. of Status Hr’g at 18, United States

v. Hines, Cr. No. 10-150 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2010). At the

hearing, the court again observed—this time in the context of

Hines’s Miranda rights waiver—that the mental health

evaluation had not raised any competency issues with him. 

At an August 30 status hearing, Hines’s third

lawyer—who had just been appointed—reported that the first

defense counsel had agreed to obtain a written assessment

from the psychologist who had assessed Hines’s mental health

and stated that his brief conversations with Hines had not

raised any competency concerns with him.

Hines’s criminal trial began on October 26. The

government presented overwhelming evidence of Hines’s

guilt—including his confession to all three offenses, his

identification by one of the tellers, his image on bank

surveillance tapes and his fingerprints on a note demanding

$5,000 from the BB&T Bank teller. Hines elected not to

present any evidence. The jury retired to deliberate shortly

after 3:00 p.m. on October 27 and around noon the next day

returned a verdict of guilty on all three counts of the

indictment.

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Hines was sentenced on March 30, 2011. Expressly

adopting the pre-sentencing report, the court calculated a

Guidelines sentencing range of 140 to 175 months, based on a

criminal history of V and an adjusted offense level of 29,

including a two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice

premised on the court’s factual finding “by clear and

convincing” evidence at the August 11 status hearing that

Hines’s suppression hearing testimony regarding the date of

his interview and confession “was false” and Hines

“deliberately lied.” Tr. of Sentencing Hr’g at 21, United

States v. Hines, Cr. No. 10-150 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2011). The

court then sentenced Hines to concurrent terms of 132 months

on each count, to be followed by a three-year period of

supervised release, and ordered him to pay three $100 special

assessments and restitution of $5,000.

Hines timely appealed his conviction and sentence.

II.

 We address Hines’s three grounds for appeal separately.

A. Speedy Trial Act

First, Hines contends the district court should have sua

sponte dismissed the indictment because he was not indicted

within thirty days after his arrest as required under the STA,

18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). In particular, Hines argues that the two

thirty-day continuances the court ordered when it granted the

joint motions by Hines and the government were not properly

subtracted because the court did not set out in the record 

adequate “reasons for finding that the ends of justice served

by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best

interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial”

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Accordingly, he

asserts, his “rights under the Speedy Trial Act were violated”

and “the indictment against him should be dismissed.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 48. We need not decide the propriety of the

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two continuances because, under 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2),

Hines waived his right to dismissal by failing to move to

dismiss the indictment before his trial commenced.

In construing section 3162(a)(2)’s waiver provision, we

“[p]roceed[] as we must from the fundamental canon that

statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute

itself.” United States v. Hart, 324 F.3d 740, 745 (D.C. Cir.

2003) (quotation marks omitted). Section 3162(a) provides:

(a)(1) If, in the case of any individual against

whom a complaint is filed charging such individual

with an offense, no indictment or information is filed

within the time limit required by section 3161(b) as

extended by section 3161(h) of this chapter, such

charge against that individual contained in such

complaint shall be dismissed or otherwise dropped. 

In determining whether to dismiss the case with or

without prejudice, the court shall consider, among

others, each of the following factors: the seriousness

of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the

case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a

reprosecution on the administration of this chapter

and on the administration of justice.

(2) If a defendant is not brought to trial within

the time limit required by section 3161(c) as

extended by section 3161(h), the information or

indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the

defendant. The defendant shall have the burden of

proof of supporting such motion but the Government

shall have the burden of going forward with the

evidence in connection with any exclusion of time

under subparagraph 3161(h)(3). In determining

whether to dismiss the case with or without

prejudice, the court shall consider, among others,

each of the following factors: the seriousness of the

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offense; the facts and circumstances of the case

which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a

reprosecution on the administration of this chapter

and on the administration of justice. Failure of the

defendant to move for dismissal prior to trial or

entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall

constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under

this section.

18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). Although the

italicized waiver language appears only in subsection (a)(2)

(addressing tardy-trial dismissals) and not in subsection (a)(1)

(addressing tardy-indictment dismissals), as we observed in

United States v. Bittle, 699 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the

waiver provision may well apply to both subsections. See

Bittle, 699 F.2d at 1207 n.15 (“Perhaps the provision in

subsection (a)(2) governs subsection (a)(1) because the

provision refers to ‘section’ rather than ‘subsection,’ but we

need not decide this issue.” (emphases added)); cf. United

States v. Taylor, 497 F.3d 673, 676 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

(“[U]nder § 3162(a)(2), a defendant’s failure to ‘move for

dismissal prior to trial’ constitutes waiver of § 3161(c) claims. 

It is unclear whether [the defendant’s] motion to dismiss

based on a separate provision [§ 3161(b)] suffices to avoid

waiver.”). Since Bittle, three of our sister circuits have so

construed the waiver language. See United States v.

Spagnuolo, 469 F.3d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 2006) (“Applying the

normal rules of statutory construction leads us to conclude

that the motion and waiver provision of § 3162(a)(2) also

applies to § 3162(a)(1) speedy indictment claims, because

‘section’ must refer to all of § 3162, and not just to the

paragraph in § 3162 where the motion and waiver provision

was (improvidently) located.”); United States v. Brown, 287

F.3d 684, 687–88 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e conclude that Brown

waived his right to appeal the speedy trial issue when he

failed to seek a dismissal of the indictment prior to trial.”

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(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2))); United States v. Gamboa,

439 F.3d 796, 803–04 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing 18 U.S.C.

§ 3162(a)(2) and concluding defendant waived his right to

raise a speedy-indictment issue on appeal by failing to move

for dismissal on that ground before trial in district court);

United States v. Lewis, 980 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A

defendant seeking to dismiss a case for a claimed violation of

the STA’s speedy indictment provisions must move for

dismissal prior to trial (although not necessarily before

indictment) or he waives his right to dismissal under

§ 3162(a)(1)” (emphasis in original)), abrogated on other

ground by Bloate v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1345 (2010). 

We do so now as well. 

 The Congress “ordinarily adheres to a hierarchical

scheme in subdividing statutory sections,” which scheme

uses, successively, “subsections” (e.g., “(a)”), “paragraphs”

(e.g., “(1)”), subparagraphs (e.g., “(A)”) and “clauses” (e.g.,

“(i)”). Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50,

60-61 (2004). Elsewhere in the STA, the Congress used its

customary language. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(2) (“The

sanctions of section 3162 apply to this subsection.”), (h)(3)(B)

(“For purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph . . . .”),

(h)(7)(B)(iv) (referring to “clause (ii)”) (emphases added). 

Thus, had the Congress intended to limit the waiver provision

to dismissals for untimely trials only (and not extend it to

untimely indictments as well), we would expect the statute to

read: “Failure of the defendant to move for dismissal prior to

trial or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall

constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this

paragraph”—or perhaps even “under this subsection,” see

Bittle, 699 F.2d at 1207 n.15. As written, however, the

language provides for waiver of the right to dismissal under

the entire section, including dismissal both for an untimely

indictment and for an untimely trial. Accord Spagnuolo, 469

F.3d at 44.

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The literal construction of the waiver provision (applying

to both (a)(1) and (a)(2) dismissals) is also supported by its

legislative history. The House of Representatives Report on

the 1975 House bill that enacted section 3162—and it was the

House bill that was subsequently enacted by both chambers of

the Congress—appears to treat indictment and trial dismissals

identically, requiring that in either case the defendant file a

motion to dismiss and providing that he waives the right to

dismissal if he does not so move before his trial begins:

Dismissal with prejudice

In the event that the time limits of the bill,

subject to the various exclusions, are not met, the

court on motion of the defendant may dismiss the

complaint, information or indictment against the

individual. This sanction applies to both the period

between arrest and indictment and between

indictment and trial. The effect of a dismissal would

be to bar any future prosecution against the

defendant for charges arising out of the same

conduct. Dismissal with prejudice would apply to

those offenses which were known or reasonably

should have been known at the time of dismissal. A

defendant must move to dismiss the case prior to

trial, entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or

he waives the right of dismissal with prejudice on

grounds that the requirements of this legislation

were not met. [Section 3162(a)].

H.R. Rep. No. 93-1508, at 23 (1974), reprinted in 1974

U.S.C.C.A.N. 7401, 7416 (emphases added).

Moreover, applying the waiver to section 3162(a)(1)

dismissal is also consistent with the waiver provision’s

purpose. The United States Supreme Court has observed that

section 3162(a)(2) 

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serves two unrelated purposes. First, § 3162(a)(2)

assigns the role of spotting violations of the Act to

defendants—for the obvious reason that they have

the greatest incentive to perform this task. Second,

by requiring that a defendant move before the trial

starts or a guilty plea is entered, § 3162(a)(2) both

limits the effects of a dismissal without prejudice (by

ensuring that an expensive and time-consuming trial

will not be mooted by a late-filed motion under the

Act) and prevents undue defense gamesmanship.

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 502-03 (2006)

(footnote omitted). These same two purposes apply equally to

dismissal of an indictment under section 3162(a)(1). Without

the waiver provision, a defendant has no incentive to police

the government’s compliance with the STA’s indictment

deadlines. More importantly, without the waiver constraint a

defendant may freely game the system by rolling the dice on a

trial and then seeking a section 3162(a)(1) dismissal for

failure to timely indict—if he is unhappy with the

result—putting the prosecution and the court through the time,

effort and expense of a trial that may subsequently be mooted

at the defendant’s whim. See Spagnuolo, 469 F.3d at 44 (“The

Act created incentives both for compliance by the government

and for enforcement by defendants. It would be odd to use a

different set of incentives for the two situations of speedy

indictment and speedy trial. Under both, a defendant must

move promptly, or waive his rights.”).

Applying the waiver to tardy-indictment dismissals is

also consistent with other provisions of the Act, which

generally (but for the different deadlines for each) treat

indictments and trials identically. Significantly, for example,

the STA treats an exclusion under section 3161(h) as having

the same effect on both the time for indictment and the time

for trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (“The following periods of

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delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which

an information or an indictment must be filed, or in

computing the time within which the trial of any such offense

must commence: . . . .” (emphasis added)). Given the

Congress’s gamesmanship concern, we see no reason it would

have foreclosed a trial-time challenge once a trial begins,

while freely allowing through appeal an identical challenge to

the exclusion as applied to the time for indictment. 

Hines raises a single argument in his reply brief opposing

the government’s waiver assertion. He urges that finding

waiver would be contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in

Zedner. There, the Court concluded that a defendant had not

effectively waived his right to a speedy trial when, at the

district judge’s urging, he signed “a blanket, prospective

waiver of his rights under the Act,” waiving them “for all

time.” Zedner, 547 U.S. at 492, 494 (quotation marks

omitted). The Court reasoned that the STA “was designed

with the public interest firmly in mind” and “[t]hat public

interest cannot be served, the Act recognizes, if defendants

may opt out of the Act entirely.” Id. at 501. Thus, the Court

explained, “[a]llowing prospective waivers would seriously

undermine the Act because there are many cases—like the

case at hand—in which the prosecution, the defense, and the

court would all be happy to opt out of the Act, to the

detriment of the public interest.” Id. at 502. Waiver under

section 3162(a)(2), however, is not prospective but

retrospective, is authorized under the Act and is consistent

with its policies. See id. (“The sort of retrospective waiver

allowed by § 3162(a)(2) does not pose a comparable danger

because the prosecution and the court cannot know until the

trial actually starts or the guilty plea is actually entered

whether the defendant will forgo moving to dismiss. As a

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consequence, the prosecution and the court retain a strong

incentive to make sure that the trial begins on time.”).4

Accordingly, we conclude that under section 3162(a)(2)’s

waiver provision, Hines waived his right to seek dismissal

under section 3162(a)(1) based on an untimely indictment.5

B. Competency Hearing

Hines next challenges the district court’s failure to order

a competency hearing ex mero motu. We review the district

court’s failure to so order for abuse of discretion. United

States v. Jones, 642 F.3d 1151, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United

States v. Perez, 603 F.3d 44, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 

“A defendant has a right to a competency hearing ‘if

there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may

presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect

rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is

unable to understand the nature and consequences of the

4

Under this reasoning, we cannot uphold the interests-of-justice

exclusions solely on the ground that Hines himself voluntarily

approved them—we would also have to examine the adequacy of the

district court’s findings supporting the exclusions. See Zedner, 547

U.S. at 500-01 (“The purposes of the Act also cut against exclusion on

the grounds of mere consent or waiver. If the Act were designed

solely to protect a defendant’s right to a speedy trial, it would make

sense to allow a defendant to waive the application of the Act. But the

Act was designed with the public interest firmly in mind.”).

5

Apart from the parties’ waiver discussions, Hines asserts that his

second lawyer was ineffective in failing to move for dismissal based

on the untimely indictment at the same time he moved for Hines’s

release under 18 U.S.C. § 3164(c). Given the facts in this case,

counsel’s failure to move for dismissal was not “outside the wide

range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).

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proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.’ ” 

Jones, 642 F.3d at 1159 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a)). 

“Competence to stand trial requires ‘sufficient present ability

to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational

understanding and . . . a rational as well as factual

understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ” United

States v. Klat, 213 F.3d 697, 702 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

(quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960))

(internal quotation marks omitted). The district court had no

reason to believe Hines lacked such competence. Among the

factors a court must consider are “a defense attorney’s view

about the competence of her client” and “the professional

evaluation of a psychologist.” Jones, 642 F.3d at 1160 (citing

Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 178 n.13 (1975)). Here the

court considered both factors and reasonably found they

provided no basis to question Hines’s competence. 

Hines’s first counsel gave no indication she thought him

incompetent to stand trial. Although she requested a mental

health evaluation, she did so only “for the purpose of trying to

convince the Government to give [Hines] a better plea offer.” 

Arraignment Tr. at 7.

Hines’s second lawyer informed the court that he had

talked to the person who performed the evaluation and

reported “they did not find that there were any issues that rose

to the level of not being competent.” Aug. 8, 2010

Suppression Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 5. The court responded: “I

guess from my perspective the evaluation indicated there

didn’t appear to be any competency issues. . . . [I]s there an

issue that needs to be raised at this point in the context of . . .

his competency now . . . ?” Id. at 8. Counsel replied: 

I don’t believe so, Your Honor. I think that—the

only thing that I can say is that I think there are times

when I thought I might have had that sense, but in

more and more dealing with [Hines], it’s not my

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impression that he has a competency issue, but I’m

not an expert. But to the extent that I can say, I think

that the more that I’ve dealt with [Hines], the more I

have a better understanding of some of the things

that he raises and why, and some of the adamancies,

for lack of a better word, therefrom. . . . But not that

I can say at this point, to the point where I’d say, oh,

he has a competency issue where he doesn’t

appreciate what’s going on.

Id. The Court then stated: “So, it sounds as if the evaluation

that [Hines’s first counsel] did doesn’t raise an issue, and you

in dealing with him, which his competency really to a large

degree comes up to what does he understand, can he

participate, defend himself, et cetera.” Counsel responded:

“Right.” Id. at 8-9. A few days later at the status hearing

denying Hines’s motions to suppress, the court observed that

Hines had been “examined by a psychologist at the request of

the defense counsel” and “[t]he findings show no competency

issues which would reflect on whether any mental incapacity

to interfere with his understanding his rights.” Aug. 11, 2010

Status Hr’g Tr. at 26. 

Finally, during the first status hearing after he was

appointed counsel, Hines’s third lawyer told the court that his

“brief discussions” with Hines had not “raised a concern with

[him] that . . . there [was] anything going on that ha[d] a

bearing on his ability to communicate with counsel or to

effectively assist in structuring a defense.” Tr. of Status Hr’g

at 4, United States v. Hines, Cr. No. 10-150 (D.D.C. Aug. 30,

2010). At the sentencing, moreover, the lawyer assured the

court: “I’m not . . . requesting of the Court any kind of

forensic evaluation of [Hines] at this point. I do believe he’s

competent.” Sentencing Tr. at 3. All of the foregoing

evidence supports the court’s repeated opinion that Hines

presented no competency issues. 

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Hines offers three grounds for rejecting the trial court’s

competency determination: (1) Hines was previously found

not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) in a Virginia state

criminal prosecution; (2) he stated he had been diagnosed as

bipolar, apparently in 2009; and (3) his “conduct throughout

th[e] case leaves little doubt that he was unable to assist

counsel.” Appellant’s Br. at 26.

Regarding the NGI verdict, it came to light only after trial

and, as the district court observed, Hines’s lawyer in the

Virginia case had objected to the NGI verdict and the Virginia

judge had “made no findings” about it. Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at

4. Tellingly, the fact of a NGI verdict suggests the Virginia

court considered Hines competent at the time of his trial

(whatever his mental condition at the time of the crime). 

Thus, the mere fact of the NGI verdict says nothing about

competence vel non at the time of his trial in October 2010.

Moreover, whether or not an accurate bipolar diagnosis

may have been made in 2009, as Hines asserted, the recent

July 2010 mental health evaluation Hines’s first lawyer

requested expressly “ruled out any bipolar disorder.”

Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 38. 

Finally, Hines’s conduct leading up to trial displayed an

awareness of the proceedings’ nature and significance and he

took an active (if sometimes misguided) role in his defense. 

As the court observed, Hines “had ideas and some of them

may be fixed, but [he is] entitled to have [his] own ideas.” 

Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 7. Even if ill-advised, his proposed

defense strategies did not create reasonable cause to believe

him incompetent to stand trial. See Perez, 603 F.3d at 48

(“Although [the defendant] may have held dubious legal

views and pursued an inadvisable strategy, none of this

provided reasonable cause for the district court to question his

competence to stand trial. As the Seventh Circuit has

recognized, ‘persons of unquestioned competence have

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19

espoused ludicrous legal positions, but the articulation of

unusual legal beliefs is a far cry from incompetence.’ ”

(quoting United States v. Alden, 527 F.3d 653, 660 (7th Cir.

2008))).6

C. Obstruction of Justice Enhancement

Finally, Hines asserts the district court improperly

imposed a 2-point enhancement for obstruction of justice

based on its finding that he deliberately misrepresented that he

was not interviewed until March 10, 2010 when in fact he was

interviewed and confessed on March 9, 2010. We reject this

contention as well. 

Hines argues that the district court’s finding at the March

30, 2011 sentencing hearing that he “deliberately lied” about

the date of his interview, Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 21, is

inconsistent with its earlier statement at the August 11 status

hearing that Hines “could be confused or decided based on his

own legal research that he could raise an issue to get his

6

We reject outright Hines’s suggestion that the district court was

required to conduct a competency simply because it “questioned” his

competency to stand trial. Appellant’s Br. at 25. The court asked

about Hines’s mental state solely because one of the STA exclusion

motions sought time for a mental health examination—which Hines’s

counsel acknowledged was a strategic move intended to secure a more

favorable plea offer. Neither the fact of the examination nor the

court’s consequent inquiry regarding Hines’s mental health manifested

a reasonable cause to believe he was not competent to stand trial. See

Perez, 603 F.3d at 47-48; 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). To the contrary, the

court made clear that it found that Hines presented no “competency

issues,” Aug. 8, 2010 Suppression Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 8, and, given all of

the evidence cited supra, this determination was not an abuse of

discretion.

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confession suppressed by changing the timing.”7 Aug. 11,

2010 Status Hr’g Tr. at 18. Not so. As the court explained at

sentencing, it made no finding of intent at the earlier hearing:

So, as part of my Court findings, I didn’t conclude or

make a finding one way or the other about his intent

or motivation for the false testimony, it was

immaterial at that time. I did make a finding I didn't

believe him by not crediting his testimony. All of the

evidence pointed to and supported March 9th as the

correct date. And even his own videotaped statement

supported March 9th as the date, and I made that

finding at the hearing for suppression.

Sentencing Hr’g at 20. At sentencing, however, when it came

time to make a finding on a U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 obstruction of

justice enhancement, the court made an express finding “by

clear and convincing” evidence that Hines’s testimony

regarding the date of the confession “was false” and that

Hines “deliberately lied.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 21. In so

finding, the court noted that at the status hearing (the

7

The court found it particularly significant that Hines had “done

. . . legal research” regarding the timing of his statement. Sentencing

Tr. at 22. The court “observed his demeanor” at the suppression

hearing and found that “he knew exactly what he was saying and why

he was claiming it was March 10th and not March 9th.” Id. The court

explained at the August 11 status hearing:

As the defendant testified, he had done legal research. He

testified that from arrest to the time of the statement it had

to be from three to six hours but not more than eight hours. 

The Court would note that from arrest to statement, in D.C.

Superior Court, the time limit is three hours, in Federal

Court it is six hours for the confession to be admissible, if

it’s voluntary and conforms to other requirements.

Aug. 11, 2010 Status Hr’g Tr. at 18-19.

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transcript of which the court had reviewed before sentencing),

when asked about his videotaped interview and confession,

Hines “repeatedly stated, quote: I remember it was the 10th.

Unquote. Quote: I remember it was the l0th because I was

arrested on the 9th. Unquote.” Id. The court added: “He

never states he was confused, he can’t recall or equivocates in

any way. He makes a very definitive statement that the

interview was on March 10th.” Id. at 21-22. The court’s

finding of fact is “to be affirmed unless clearly erroneous.” 

United States v. Davis, 635 F.3d 1222, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 

Given the testimony on which the court relied, its finding is

not clearly erroneous.

For the foregoing reasons, Hines’s conviction and

sentence are affirmed.

So ordered.

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