Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00172/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00172-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Raul Morales
Respondent
Kenneth James West
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

On February 7, 2022, Petitioner Kenneth James West (“Petitioner”) a state prisoner proceeding 

pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1). On March 27, 2024, Petitioner filed the 

operative second amended petition and a motion to appoint counsel. (Docs. 37-38). 

Background and Procedural Posture

On May 21, 2018, Petitioner was convicted in Fresno County Superior Court for multiple sex 

offenses against minors. (Docs. 20-1; 38 at 1). On August 6, 2018, Petitioner was sentenced to an 

indeterminate state prison term of 165 years to life. Id. 

KENNETH JAMES WEST, 

Petitioner,

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:22-cv-00172-KES-CDB (HC)

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION 

TO APPOINT COUNSEL

(Doc. 37)

ORDER LIFING STAY

(Doc. 33)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

DISMISSING IN PART PETITIONER’S 

SECOND AMENDED PETITION

(Doc. 38)

30-DAY DEADLINE

Clerk of the Court to Substitute Named Respondent

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Petitioner appealed the judgment of the trial court on the grounds that it violated the ex post 

facto clauses of the United States and California Constitutions, that the trial court erroneously imposed 

consecutive sentences upon Petitioner, and in the alternative, that Petitioner had received ineffective 

assistance of counsel for his trial counsel’s failure to object to consecutive terms. (Doc. 20-2). On 

December 11, 2020, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. (Doc. 20-5). Petitioner 

sought a petition for review to exhaust state remedies to the Supreme Court of California in which he 

raised the same arguments as below. (Doc. 20-6). On February 24, 2021, the Court denied the 

petition for review. (Doc. 20-7).

On February 7, 2022, Petitioner commenced the instant action with his original petition for 

writ of habeas corpus and a motion to appoint counsel. (Docs. 1-2). Petitioner filed a second motion 

to appoint counsel on February 22, 2022. (Doc. 8). The following day, the Court denied Petitioner’s 

motions as he had not demonstrated appointment of counsel was necessary at that stage of the 

proceedings. (Doc. 11). On February 23, 2022, the Court issued an order finding the petition failed to 

state any cognizable claim for relief and directing Petitioner to file a first amended petition. (Doc. 12).

On March 15, 2022, Petitioner timely filed a first amended petition. (Doc. 14). The Court 

issued an order directing Respondent the Attorney General of the State of California (“Respondent”) 

to file a response to the petition on May 23, 2022. (Doc. 16). On July 22, 2022, Respondent filed a 

motion to dismiss asserting that Petitioner’s claims were unexhausted and separately lodged state court 

records in support of its motion. (Docs. 19, 20). On August 11, 2022, Petitioner filed a response to 

the motion to dismiss and a third motion to appoint counsel. (Docs. 22-23). The Court denied 

Petitioner’s third motion to appoint counsel on September 27, 2022. (Doc. 25). 

On November 30, 2022, the Undersigned issued findings and recommendations to grant 

Respondent’s motion to dismiss Petitioner’s first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus without 

prejudice and to extend to Petitioner leave to amend. (Doc. 27). The Undersigned found Petitioner 

failed to exhaust his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, as well as several of Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See id. at 4-5 (“Petitioner has not argued before the highest 

state court his trial counsel failed to subpoena and call witnesses, failed to discredit and/or impeach a 

witness, failed to use certain evidence, and failed to let Petitioner testify.”). The Undersigned 

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determined Petitioner had exhausted an ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding his trial 

counsel’s failure to object and argue for concurrent terms. Id. at 5. However, Petitioner’s amended 

petition contained only a generalized claim that counsel “refused to object to the sentence” and failed 

to state a cognizable federal claim. Id.

On December 19, 2022, Petitioner filed objections to the Undersigned’s findings and 

recommendations. (Doc. 28). On March 7, 2023, the Honorable District Judge Ana de Alba issued an 

order adopting the November 30, 2022, findings and recommendations. (Doc. 29).1 The Court found 

“[t]he Magistrate Judge [had] appropriately suggested dismissing the petition without prejudice so that 

Petitioner can amend the petition, and, if desired, request a stay of the petition in this [C]ourt in order 

to exhaust claims in state court.” Id. at 2.

Thereafter, on March 29, 2023, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the 

Fresno County Superior Court. (Docs. 35; 38 at 66-71). Petitioner raised ineffective assistance 

counsel claims for his trial counsel’s: (1) failure to properly object to the statute of limitations; (2) 

failure to present expert witness testimony favorable to Petitioner’s defense; (3) failure to appraise 

Petitioner of relevant discovery in regard to expert witness testimony; (4) mishandling witness 

testimony; and (5) failure to secure witnesses or object/respond by cross-examination to potential 

witness perjury. (Doc. 38 at 68, 100-03). Further, Petitioner claimed his trial counsel “made 

prejudicial comments in regard to the case,” was hostile, and biased. Id. at 68, 103. Petitioner claims 

his reliance on a hostile counsel for his trial and sentence was a violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and 

Eighth Amendment rights. Id.

In his state court petition, Petitioner also raised a claim of judicial abuse of discretion. Id. 

Specifically, Petitioner asserted the “judge permitted [the] case be brought past [the] statute of 

limitations ... refused to grant [Petitioner] new attorney despite multiple Marsden complaints,” and 

“imposed an excessive ‘death’ style sentence.” Id. at 69, 103-06.

On March 31, 2023, Petitioner filed a motion to stay this federal habeas proceeding to permit 

him to raise his unexhausted claims in the state court. (Doc. 30). Respondent did not file an 

1 On December 1, 2023, the Honorable District Judge Ana de Alba was elevated to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. (Doc. 34). 

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opposition to Petitioner’s motion for stay. On April 21, 2023, the Undersigned issued findings and 

recommendations to grant Petitioner’s unopposed motion for stay. (Doc. 31). The Undersigned found 

a Rhines stay was appropriate and that the instant proceedings should be stayed and held in abeyance 

pending exhaustion of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims in state court. Id. at 3-5 (citing Rhines v. 

Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005)).2 On May 5, 2023, Petitioner filed a “notification of compliance 

of order to timely file a petition in California state court.” (Doc. 32).

On June 2, 2023, the Fresno County Superior Court denied Petitioner’s petition for writ of 

habeas corpus. (Docs. 35 at 1; 38 at 72-78). On July 14, 2023, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus to the Fifth Appellate District, Court of Appeal of the State of California. (Docs. 35 at 

1; 38 at 26). On July 19, 2023, the Court of Appeals denied without prejudice the petition. (Doc. 38 

at 26). The Court of Appeals found Petitioner had failed to provide a complete record of his efforts to 

seek review and exhaust judicial remedies and failed to set forth his claims for relief with adequate 

specificity. Id.

On August 3, 2023, Petitioner filed a request for an extension time to file a petition and a 

request to appoint counsel. (Docs. 35 at 1; 38 at 27-28). The Court of Appeals issued a reply to 

Petitioner’s request on August 10, 2023. (Docs. 35 at 1; 38 at 29). The Court of Appeals noted 

Petitioner’s request did “not qualify as either an appeal or writ [and the] court cannot consider and 

decide it and is returning it to you unfiled.” (Doc. 38 at 29). On October 23, 2023, Petitioner filed a 

renewed petition for writ of habeas corpus to the California Court of Appeals. (Docs. 35 at 1; 38 at 

19-25). Petitioner requested “all grounds presented to the lower court ... in conjunction with [his] 

previously submitted appeal ... be considered as a whole.” (Doc. 38 at 21, 30-65). The Court of 

Appeals denied the petition on December 27, 2023. (Doc. 38 at 25).

On January 10, 2024, Petitioner filed a petition for review to the Supreme Court of California. 

(Docs. 35 at 1; 38 at 16). On March 12, 2024, the Supreme Court of California denied the petition for 

review. (Doc. 38 at 18). 

2 On June 30, 2023, District Judge de Alba issued an order adopting the April 21, 2023, 

findings and recommendation. (Doc. 33). The Court ordered that the proceedings be held in abeyance 

while Petitioner exhausted his claims in state court and directed Petitioner to file a motion to lift the 

stay after the state court’s resolution of his unexhausted claims. Id. at 2.

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Motion to Appoint Counsel

On March 27, 2024, Petitioner filed a fourth motion to appoint counsel to this Court using what 

appears to be a form, “fill-in-the-blank” template. (Doc. 37). Petitioner asserts he cannot adequately 

represent himself. Id.

As this Court previously has advised Petitioner (see Docs. 11, 25), there is no absolute right to 

appointment of counsel in federal habeas proceedings. See, e.g., Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 

1196 (9th Cir. 1986); Anderson v. Heinze, 258 F.2d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1958). However, the Criminal 

Justice Act authorizes the appointment of counsel at any stage of the proceedings for financially 

eligible persons if “the interests of justice so require.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). To determine 

whether to appoint counsel, the “court must evaluate the likelihood of success on the merits as well as 

the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues 

involved.” Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983).

Moreover, the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts require

the Court to appoint counsel: (1) where discovery is authorized on a showing of good cause and 

counsel is deemed “necessary” to facilitate effective discovery; or (2) when the court has determined 

that an evidentiary hearing is warranted for the disposition of a petition. See Habeas Rules 6(a) and 

8(c). 

The Court finds Petitioner has not demonstrated that appointment of counsel is necessary or 

warranted at this stage of the proceedings. The legal issues involved are not extremely complex, and, 

as set forth further herein, Petitioner does not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits such 

that the interests of justice require the appointment of counsel at the present time. The Court has 

reviewed Petitioner’s filings in state court that he has made a matter of record in this proceeding and 

concludes he is capable of articulating his claims in the light of their relative complexity. The Court 

will consider appointing counsel to represent Petitioner if the Court later finds good cause to permit 

discovery or if the Court decides that an evidently hearing is needed in this matter. Accordingly, the 

Court will DENY Petitioner’s motion to appoint Counsel.

///

///

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Petitioner’s Second Amended Petition

On March 27, 2024, Petitioner filed the instant second amended petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. (Doc. 38).

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires the Court to make a preliminary 

review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court should summarily dismiss a petition “[i]f 

it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not 

entitled to relief in the district court...” Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990)

(quoting Rule 4). The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the Court may dismiss a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s 

motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed.

Petitioner’s second amended petition purports to show he exhausted state judicial remedies. 

See generally (Doc. 38). A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his 

conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1). The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the 

initial opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982). A petitioner can satisfy the 

exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider 

each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995). 

Here, Petitioner alleges he raised to the Supreme Court of California the claims for relief he 

brings in his federal petition for habeas corpus. (Doc. 38 at 4). On the face of the petition and from 

the attached exhibits, it appears Petitioner’s claims have been exhausted. 

Petitioner names the “Attorney General of the State of California” as Respondent. Id. at 1. 

Previously, this Court advised Petitioner that the proper respondent for this action is the warden of the 

facility in which Petitioner is housed. (Doc. 27 at 1, n. 1) (citing Brittingham v. United States, 982 

F.2d 378, 379 (9th Cir. 1992)). To reiterate, a petitioner seeking habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 must name the state officer having custody of him as the respondent to the petition. Rule 2(a) 

of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996); 

Stanley v. California Sup. Ct., 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994). Normally, the person having custody 

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of an incarcerated petitioner is the warden of the prison in which the petitioner is incarcerated because 

the warden has “day-to-day control over” the petitioner. Brittingham, 982 F.2d at 379; see Stanley, 21 

F.3d at 360. The chief officer in charge of the state penal institutions is also appropriate. Ortiz, 81 

F.3d at 894; Stanley, 21 F.3d at 360. Petitioner fails to name the proper respondent. Therefore, the 

Court will direct the Clerk of Court to substitute Raul Morales, acting warden at Valley State Prison, 

as Respondent in this matter. See (Doc. 19 at 1, n.1).

Next, the Court addresses Petitioner’s federal claims. The scope of habeas corpus is prescribed 

by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), as follows:

“The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an 

application for a writ of habeas corpus [on] behalf of a person in custody pursuant to a 

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”

(emphasis added); see Rule 1 to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District 

Court. The Supreme Court has held that “the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in 

custody upon the legality of that custody...” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).

 To succeed with a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Petitioner must demonstrate that the 

adjudication of his claim in state court:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases also requires that 

the petition: 

(1) specify all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner; (2) state the facts supporting 

each ground; (3) state the relief requested; (4) be printed, typewritten, or legibly handwritten; 

and (5) be signed under penalty of perjury by the petitioner or a person authorized to sign it for 

the petitioner under 28 U.S.C. § 2242.

 

Here, Petitioner raises the following claims: (1) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in 

violation of the Sixth Amendment; (2) that he received a “gross [and] unfair sentencing imposed by 

court” in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and (3) that he was deprived of his rights under the 

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Fourteenth Amendment in connection with the state courts’ treatment of the statute of limitations. Id. 

at 5, 7-8.

Petitioner appears to have stated a cognizable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in 

violation of the Sixth Amendment. (Doc. 38 at 5, 68-69, 100-04). Specifically, Petitioner describes 

how his trial counsel failed to raise objections, present witnesses, mishandled discovery and did not 

appraise Petitioner of relevant discovery. Id. at 100-03. Petitioner also argues he filed multiple 

Marsden motions to remove his “hostile attorney,” but the state court refused. Id. at 103-04. 

However, it is not clear from the face of the petition whether Petitioner is entitled to relief on his 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

Next, Petitioner asserts his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because he was 

brought to trial after the statute of limitations had expired. Id. at 100, 103-05. Petitioner argues the 

trial court “abused its discretion by even allowing oral argument as to why prosecution should be 

permitted to bend the statute.” Id. at 103.

On June 2, 2023, the Fresno County Superior Court denied Petitioner’s petition for writ of 

habeas corpus. (Doc. 38 at 72-78). The Court acknowledged Petitioner’s claim that the judgment 

against him was void because the charges were filed after the statute of limitations had expired. Id. at 

73. The Court rejected Petitioner’s argument, finding that counts 1, 2, and 4 through 12 were not 

subject to a statute of limitations, and that counts 15 and 16 were charged within the applicable statute 

of limitations. In its opinion, the Court reasoned:

In determining the maximum sentence for a violation of a statute, the court must take into 

account any alternative sentencing schemes for a violation of the statute that the prosecution 

has charged. Penal Code section 667.61 is an alternate penalty scheme that, when charged, 

defines the length of imprisonment for the substantive offense of violating Penal Code section 

288, subdivision (a) [citation omitted]. The former Penal Code section 667.61 provided that a 

person who was convicted “in the present case or cases” for violations of Penal Code section 

288, subdivision (a) against more than one victim “shall be punished by imprisonment in the 

state prison for life and shall not be eligible for release on parole for 15 years” [citations 

omitted].

As petitioner was charged with counts 1, 2, and 9 through 12 for violating Penal Code section 

288, subdivision (a), the counts dealt with three different victims, and the prosecution alleged 

that Penal Code section 667.61 applied to all counts, the court finds that counts 1, 2, and 4 

through 12 were subject to the alternative sentencing scheme created in Penal Code section 

667.61. Therefore, while violations of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) are generally 

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subject to a maximum 8-year prison term, in this case, since counts 1, 2, and 4 through 12 were 

subject to the alternative sentencing scheme created in Penal Code section 667.61, subd. (b), 

the maximum sentence that could have been imposed for counts 1, 2, and 4 through 12 was a 

15-year- to-life prison term [citations omitted].

Penal Code§ 805(a) provides that, for the purpose of determining the applicable statute of 

limitations, “[a]n offense is deemed punishable by the maximum punishment prescribed by 

statute for the offense, regardless of the punishment actually sought or imposed.” 

Consequently, pursuant to Penal Code section 805, subdivision (a), Penal Code section 799 

actually sets out the statute of limitations applicable to counts 1, 2, and 4 through 12: 

“Prosecution for an offense punishable by death or by imprisonment in the state prison for

life ... may be commenced at any time.” Accordingly, under the terms of Penal Code section 

799, the prosecution of counts 1, 2, and 4 through 12 “may be commenced at any time.” 

Hence, when the prosecution of counts 1, 2, and 4 through 12 commenced on August 15, 2015, 

those counts were not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Moreover, this court notes 

that counts 15 and 16 were not time-barred when the felony complaint was filed. 

Consequently, petitioner's first claim fails to state a prima facie case for relief.

Id. at 73-75.

The Undersigned finds Petitioner has failed to establish a due process violation because his 

challenge to the applicable state statute of limitations is beyond the purview of this Court in federal 

habeas proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d); see also Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010) (“it is 

only noncompliance with federal law that renders a State's criminal judgment susceptible to collateral 

attack in the federal courts”) (emphasis in original); Woodward v. Diaz, No. 2:12-CV-2168 JAM DAD 

P, 2013 WL 5934412, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2013) (petitioner’s claim that prosecution for lewd 

and lascivious acts with children was barred by the state statute of limitations is “simply not 

cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding”); Iturralde v. Atchley, No. 2:22-cv-00272 DJC KJN P, 

2023 WL 4353777, at *17-18 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 5, 2023) (“the state court concluded that the state’s 

prosecution of petitioner was timely under California’s statute of limitations. It is axiomatic that a state 

court’s interpretation of state law is binding on a federal habeas court”), adopted 2024 WL 102616 

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2024); Loeblein v. Dormire, 229 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[A] state court’s 

failure properly to apply a state statute of limitations does not violate due process or, indeed, any other 

provision of the Constitution or a federal statute.”). Petitioner’s mere citation to the Fourteenth 

Amendment and vague allegations of due process, are insufficient to convent his state law claim into a 

federal issue. See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that petitioner 

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may not “transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due 

process.”).

“To establish a due process violation based on an alleged error under state law, a federal 

habeas petitioner must show that the state court’s erroneous ruling was so arbitrary that it rendered his 

trial fundamentally unfair.” Woodward, 2013 WL 5934412, at *10 (citing Holley v. Yarborough, 568 

F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009)). Here, as summarized above, the state court’s consideration of 

Petitioner’s statute of limitations challenge was well reasoned and sufficiently considered and applied 

the applicable California state statutes. See People v. Perez, 182 Cal. App. 4th 231, 27-42 (2010) 

(discussing appliable California Supreme Court case law and holding that that application of the 

alternate penalty scheme allowing for a life sentence under the “One Strike Law,” Penal Code § 

667.61, determines the applicable statute of limitations). In light of this, Petitioner has not satisfied 

the high standard of demonstrating arbitrariness by the state court to sufficiently plead a due process 

claim. Therefore, the Undersigned will recommend Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment claim be 

dismissed.

Petitioner also argues his Eighth Amendment rights were violated because a “gross [and] 

unfair sentencing [was] imposed by [the] court”. (Doc. 38 at 7). A criminal sentence that is grossly 

disproportionate to the crime for which the defendant was convicted violates the Eighth Amendment’s 

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1983). 

“Strict proportionality between crime and sentence” is not required. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 

957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing inter alia Solem, 463 U.S. at 288, 303). Rather, the 

Eighth Amendment “forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” 

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 128-

29 (9th Cir. 1992) (“We conclude that Justice Kennedy’s view that the eighth amendment “forbids 

only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime” is the ‘rule’ of Harmelin.”). 

Therefore, with the exception of capital cases, successful Eighth Amendment challenges to the 

proportionality of a sentence have been “exceedingly rare.” Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272

(1980); see Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 775 (9th Cir. 2004).

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The Supreme Court has cautioned federal courts to be reluctant to review legislatively 

mandated terms of imprisonment for crimes “concededly classified and classifiable as felonies.” 

Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982). In addressing an Eighth Amendment claim, the Court 

begins with a threshold comparison between “the gravity of the offense and the severity of the 

sentence.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60 (2010). The Court will conduct a detailed analysis 

only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison leads to an inference of disproportionality. 

Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 584 (9th Cir. 1996). “Generally, so long as the sentence imposed does 

not exceed the statutory maximum, it will not be overturned on eighth amendment grounds.” United 

States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 576 (9th Cir. 1990).

Petitioner claims his conviction is cruel and unusual and is more than a convicted murderer 

would receive. Id. at 104. Petitioner states his sentence is “extremely imbalanced and 

disproportionate to the offense and it is a virtual [life without parole] sentence.” Id. at 104-05. But 

beyond these conclusory statements, Petitioner offers no other facts to indicate that his sentence is out 

of step with his offenses. The Fresno County Superior Court’s rejection of Petitioner’s sentencing 

claim on habeas review relied in part on this same ground: “petitioner has failed to allege any factual 

basis establishing that his sentence is grossly disproportionate.” (Doc. 38 at 77). 

Petitioner was convicted of eleven separate counts of committing a lewd act upon three 

separate victims under the age of 14, and two counts of committing a lewd act upon a child when the 

defendant was at least 10 years older than the child. (Docs. 20-1; 38 at 1, 73) (citing Cal. Pen. Code §

288(a), (c)(1)). Under Cal. Pen. Code § 667.61’s alternative sentencing scheme, “a defendant 

convicted of section 288 violations against multiple victims is subject to a sentence of life 

imprisonment” and such offenses are to run consecutively. Iturralde, 2023 WL 4353777, at *17

(citing Perez, 182 Cal. App. 4th at 239-40); Cal. Penal Code § 269(b), (c). Here, Petitioner was 

sentenced to 15 years to life on each of his counts for a total of 165 years to life. (Docs. 20-1; 38 at 1). 

The Undersigned finds that this sentence is not grossly disproportionate, but rather consistent with

other courts’ imposition of sentences involving child molestation. See, e.g., Norris v. Morgan, 622 

F.3d 1276 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a single 

conviction resulting from a brief touching of the victim’s genitalia over clothing where the petitioner 

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had one previous conviction for child molestation); Zimmer v. Stewart, 57 Fed. Appx. 729 (9th Cir. 

2003) (“51-year sentence for three counts of child molestation and three counts of sexual abuse is not 

grossly disproportionate”); Harmless v. Martel, No. 2:14-cv-00223-JKS, 2020 WL 977421, at *8-9 

(E.D. Feb. 28, 2020) (finding 725-years-to-life sentence for multiple counts of child molestation as a 

repeat offender was not grossly disproportionate); Carranza v. McDowell, No. SA CV 21-00874-PSG 

(DFM), 2023 WL 3493708, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2023) (145-years-to-life sentence for multiple 

sexual offenses committed against two children not grossly disproportionate).

Further, the United States Supreme Court has upheld lengthy sentences for offenses less 

serious than those committed by Petitioner. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70, 74-77 (2003) 

(concluding that two consecutive 25-years-to-life sentences with the possibility of parole imposed for 

petty theft offenses did not violate the Eighth Amendment); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1002, 1009 

(concluding that petitioner’s sentence of life imprisonment without parole for his crime of possession 

of more than 650 grams of cocaine did not violate the Eighth Amendment). Against these cases, 

Petitioner’s 165 years to life sentence for multiple sexual offenses committed against children is not 

one of the rare cases in which a threshold comparison of the offenses and sentences leads to an 

inference of disproportionality. Therefore, the Undersigned will recommend Petitioner’s Eighth 

Amendment claim should be dismissed. 

Conclusion and Order

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, it is HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Petitioner’s motion to appoint counsel (Doc. 37) is DENIED.

2. The stay of this action (Doc. 35) is LIFTED.

3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to substitute Raul Morales, acting warden at Valley 

State Prison, as Respondent in this matter.

The Undersigned FURTHER RECOMMENDS:

1. Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment claim be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

2. Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and 

3. In the event the assigned District Judge adopts these Findings and Recommendations, 

Respondent shall file a response to Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims within 

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60 days of the date of service of the District Judge’s order. See Rule 4, Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases; Cluchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469, 1473-1474 (9th Cir. 1985) (court has 

discretion to fix time for filing a response). A response can be made by filing one of the 

following:

A. An answer addressing the merits of the petition. Respondent SHALL include with 

the answer any and all transcripts or other documents necessary for the resolution of the 

issues presented in the petition. See Rule 5, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Any 

argument by Respondent that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted a claim SHALL be 

made in the answer but must also address the merits of the claim asserted.

B. A motion to dismiss the petition. A motion to dismiss SHALL include copies of all 

Petitioner’s state court filings and dispositive rulings. See Rule 5, Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases. 

4. If Respondent files an answer to the petition, Petitioner may file a traverse within THIRTY 

DAYS of the date Respondent’s answer is filed with the Court. If no traverse is filed, the 

petition and answer are deemed submitted at the expiration of the thirty days;

5. If Respondent files a motion to dismiss, Petitioner SHALL file an opposition or statement of 

non-opposition within TWENTY-ONE DAYS of the date Respondent’s motion is filed with 

the Court. If no opposition is filed, the motion to dismiss is deemed submitted at the expiration 

of the twenty-one days. Any reply to an opposition to the motion to dismiss SHALL be filed 

within SEVEN DAYS after the opposition is served.

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These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty days after 

being served with these findings and recommendations, Petitioner may file written objections with the 

Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of 

rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 

923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 14, 2024 ___________________ _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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