Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00340/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00340-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dennis L. Parker
Plaintiff
Yuba County Water District
Defendant

Document Text:

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28 This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENNIS L. PARKER, )

) 2:06-cv-340-GEB-KJM

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

YUBA COUNTY WATER DISTRICT, )

)

Defendant. )

)

Pending are cross motions for summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action in which Plaintiff alleges under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 that Defendant violated his procedural due process

rights when terminating Plaintiff from his employment position (“due

process claim”). 

BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff began working as the General Manager of the Yuba

County Water District (“the District”) in 1984. (Def.’s Statement of

Undisputed Facts (“Def.’s SUF”) ¶ 3.) After approximately six months,

the District changed his work status to “permanent.” (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) 

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28 The standards for summary judgment are well known and need not 1

be repeated here.

2

Plaintiff took a disability leave of absence from work in June of

2005. (Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed Facts (“Pl.’s SUF”) ¶ 10.) 

Plaintiff’s physician extended Plaintiff’s disability leave until

December 15, 2005. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff’s physician provided a

letter to the District outlining proposed accommodations for Plaintiff

before he could return to work and stating he would release Plaintiff

to return to work with or without the accommodations. (Id. ¶ 19.) 

The District Board voted in a closed session to end Plaintiff’s

employment with the District on December 8, 2005. (Id. ¶ 20.) After

his termination, Plaintiff brought this action against the District

asserting inter alia claims of discrimination, a denial of his

procedural due process rights, and various state law claims. (Pl.’s

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13-23.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Procedural Due Process1

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on his due process

claim, arguing he had a “constitutionally protected property right in

his continued employment” and that Defendant fired him “without

providing the minimum due process required by law.” (Pl.’s Mot. at

2:8-9, 3:25-26.) Defendant also moves for summary judgment on this

claim arguing Plaintiff had no property interest in continued

employment with the District since he was an at-will employee, and

therefore, “Plaintiff ha[d] no due process right to be heard at the

time of his termination.” (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mot.”)

at 2:19-22.)

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3

A “procedural due process claim hinges on proof of two

elements: (1) a protectible liberty or property interest . . . and (2)

a denial of adequate procedural protections.” Foss v. Nat’l Marine

Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff asserts he had a protectible property interest

because he had an employment contract with the District which provided

he could only be terminated for good cause. (Pl.’s Mot. at 5-6.)

Defendant contends Plaintiff had no property interest in continued

employment because “Plaintiff held his position pursuant to a statute

which made him ‘at will’ and the law clearly holds that status can

never be changed.” (Def.’s Opp’n at 7:23-24.) 

“[I]t is well settled in California that public employment

is not held by contract but by statute and that, insofar as the

duration of such employment is concerned, no employee has a vested

contractual right to continue in employment beyond the time or

contrary to the terms and conditions fixed by law.” Miller v. State

of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 808, 813 (1977); see also Watson v. Dep’t of

Rehab., 212 Cal. App. 3d 1271, 1287 (1989); Kemmerer v. County of

Fresno, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1426, 1432 (1988). “Indeed, the statutory

provisions controlling the terms and conditions of civil service

employment cannot be circumvented by purported contracts in conflict

therewith.” Miller, 18 Cal. 3d at 813. 

Plaintiff’s position as general manager was created by

California Water Code section 30542, which states “[t]he general

manager . . . shall . . . receive the compensation determined by the

board and shall serve at its pleasure.” “A public employee serving at

the pleasure of the appointing authority-whether he be a ‘permanent’

employee . . . or any other kind of public employee serving on this

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Plaintiff did not specify whether his hostile work environment 2

claim was brought under Title VII, the California Fair Employment and

Housing Act, or some other state statute. (See Pl.’s First Am. Compl.

¶ 21.) The Court assumed in its last summary judgment Order that this

claim was based on state law. (Sept. 14, 2007, Order at 2 n.1.) A

complaint is required to include “a short and plain statement of the

grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint does not allege a basis for

federal jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim and

therefore, it is deemed alleged under state law. 

4

basis-is by the terms of his employment subject to removal without

judicially cognizable good cause.” Bogacki v. Bd. of Supervisors, 5

Cal. 3d 771, 783 (1971). 

Since California law holds that Plaintiff’s position was

governed by statute and not by contract, Plaintiff was merely an “at

will” employee. When employment is at-will under California statutory

law “the claimant has no property interest in the job.” Portman v.

County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993). Therefore,

“[a]n action under the Due Process Clause cannot lie for [Plaintiff’s]

termination.” Id. at 905. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment is granted and Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

II. Remaining State Law Claims

Defendant moves for dismissal of Plaintiff’s state law

claims since no federal claims remain. (Def.’s Mot. at 8:12-15.) 

Plaintiff does not respond to this argument.2

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), when all federal claims are

eliminated before trial, the decision can be reached whether

supplemental jurisdiction should continue being exercised over

remaining state law claims. Les Shockley Racing, Inc. v. Nat’l Hot

Rod Ass’n, 884 F.2d 504, 509 (9th Cir. 1989). “[W]hen deciding [this

issue], a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, . . .

the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” 

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City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997). 

However, “[i]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are

eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered . . .

will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the statelaw claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7

(1988); Wade v. Reg’l Credit Ass’n, 87 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 1996)

(“Where a district court dismisses a federal claim, leaving only state

claims for resolution, it should decline jurisdiction over the state

claims and dismiss them without prejudice.”). “Needless decisions of

state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote

justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed

reading of applicable law.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383

U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Therefore, Plaintiff’s state law claims are

dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) as of the

date on which this order is filed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 14, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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