Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01551/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01551-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Commerce
Respondent
Pamela J. Holmes
Petitioner
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PAMELA J. HOLMES,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________ 

2016-1551

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. PH-0752-16-0076-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: July 8, 2016

______________________ 

PAMELA J. HOLMES, Montgomery, AL, pro se. 

CALVIN M. MORROW, Office of the General Counsel, 

Merits Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, for 

respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G. POLISUK.

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, MOORE, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

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2 HOLMES v. MSPB

Pamela J. Holmes (“Holmes”) seeks review of the Merit Systems Protection Board’s (“the Board”) decision 

dismissing her appeal for lack of jurisdiction without a 

hearing. Holmes v. Dep’t of Commerce, PH-0752-16-0076-

I-1, 2015 WL 8971876 (M.S.P.B. Dec. 10, 2015). Specifically, the Board found that Holmes was not an employee 

under the relevant statute and, as such, did not have 

jurisdiction to appeal an adverse action to the Board. For 

the reasons explained below, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

Holmes was appointed to a full-time position in the 

competitive service as a Supervisory Survey Specialist for 

the Department of Commerce’s (“the agency”) Bureau of 

the Census, Philadelphia Regional Office, on December 

15, 2014 for a term that was “NTE [not to exceed] 

12/12/15.” Standard Form (“SF”) 50, Notification of 

Personnel Action, Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 14. The SF-50

that notified Holmes of her new position explicitly noted 

that the “position is temporary.” Id. And, further, that 

“temp employees serve under appts limited to 1 year or 

less & are subject to termination at any time w/o use of 

adverse or reduction-in-force procedures.” Id. 

Prior to her temporary employment at the agency, 

Holmes served as a Medical Support Assistant for the 

Department of the Army for a number of years. See 

Holmes, 2015 WL 8971876, n.4. There was a ten day gap 

between her employment with the Department of the 

Army and her temporary appointment with the Department of Commerce. Id. On October 26, 2015, Holmes was 

issued a notice of termination, indicating that her employment with the agency would be terminated on October 30, 2015 “due to unacceptable conduct.” J.A. 16. In 

particular, the notice pointed to Holmes’ alleged “failure 

to pay [her] Government-Issued Credit Card.” Id. Because it was not “in the best interest of the government to 

retain [her] in the Federal service,” and in order “to 

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HOLMES v. MSPB 3

promote the efficiency of the service,” the Assistant Regional Director terminated her employment. Id.

Holmes timely appealed the termination action to the 

Board, which issued an Order to Show Cause why the 

case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See 

Holmes, 2015 WL 8971876. Holmes responded that the 

Board had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Id. She also challenged the stated reason 

for why the agency removed her in the first place, claiming “that the agency did not apply the Douglas Factors 

and violated her due process rights under the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.” Id. She also requested a jury trial. Id. The agency 

responded that the Board “lacked jurisdiction under 

Chapter 75 because the petitioner did not meet the definition of an ‘employee’ in 5 U.S.C. § 7511.” Appellee Br. 3.

On December 10, 2015, the administrative judge issued its initial decision, agreeing with the agency that the 

Board lacked jurisdiction over the action because the 

petitioner did not meet the applicable definition of an 

‘employee’ in 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1). [JA3–4.] In particular, the administrative judge found that Holmes’ “temporary position . . . does not satisfy the definition of an 

employee pursuant to § 7511(a)(1)(A)(i),” and that 

“[n]either 28 U.S.C. § 1331 nor 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides 

an independent source of Board jurisdiction.” [JA4–5.] 

The administrative judge, therefore, dismissed the appeal.

Because neither party filed a petition for review, the 

administrative judge’s initial decision became the final 

decision of the Board on January 14, 2016. Holmes timely 

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4 HOLMES v. MSPB

petitioned this court for review,1 and we have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

By regulation, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that the Board has jurisdiction. 5 C.F.R. 

§ 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A); see Lazaro v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 666 F.3d 1316, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The jurisdiction of the Board is not plenary, but is “limited to those 

areas specifically granted by statute or regulation.” 

Garcia v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 437 F.3d 1322, 1327 

(Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Antolin v. Dep’t of Justice, 895 

F.2d 1395, 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). 

The term “employee” is the statutory trigger for an 

appeal to the Board from an adverse action, such as a 

disciplinary removal, and is defined in 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7511(a)(1). That statute defines the term “employee” as 

“(A) an individual in the competitive service (i) who is not 

serving a probationary or trial period under an initial 

appointment; or (ii) . . . who completed 1 year of current 

continuous service under other than a temporary appointment limited to 1 year or less.”

Holmes does not qualify as an employee under 

§ 7511(a)(1). She does not meet the requirements of the 

§ 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii) because she is a temporary employee 

who has served less than one year. And, although she 

meets the literal terms of § 7511(a)(1)(A)(i), she is “an 

individual in the competitive service who [wa]s not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment,” we have held that a literal reading 

 

1 Holmes filed a supplemental brief and memorandum requesting oral argument on June 14, 2016. App. 

Pet. 16-1551, ECF No. 19. Although late-filed, we consider the arguments made therein for purposes of this appeal, though we did not grant oral argument.

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HOLMES v. MSPB 5

interpreting A(i) to cover temporary employees “would 

render [A(ii)] superfluous and thus violate the rule of 

construction that a statute should not be interpreted in a 

way that renders one of its parts inoperative.” Forest v. 

Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 47 F.3d 409, 412 (Fed. Cir. 1995)

(discussing the analogous section 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C), 

which applies to individuals in the excepted service, 

instead of the competitive service, as here, which is governed by 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)); see also Antolin, 895 

F.2d at 1397 (“Under the plain language of the statute, 

even when an individual serves a series of temporary 

appointments of one year or less, that individual does not 

become an employee for the purpose of § 7511(a)(1).”); 

Horner v. Lucas, 832 F.2d 596, 597 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“To 

be an ‘employee’ the statute mandates that [the appellant] be serving in continuous employment in a nontemporary appointment at the time of the adverse action.”)

The Board has similarly held that “a temporary appointee who lacks the requisite length of service to satisfy 

subsection (A)(ii) does not have adverse action appeal 

rights merely because he or she meets the literal terms of 

subsection (A)(i).” Johnson v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 

No. PH-0752-04-0193-I-1, 2005 WL 1999582 (M.S.P.B. 

Aug. 12, 2005). See also Fish v. Dep’t of the Navy, 29 

M.S.P.R. 595, 598 (1986) (appellant did not meet the 

definition of an “employee” even though he had eight 

consecutive temporary appointments of one year or less).

Holmes argues that her previous experience with the 

Department of the Army satisfies the requirements of the 

statute as she has “exceeded 3 years of Federal Service 

successfully and meets the definition of a federal service 

employee.” Appellant Br. 4. But “[p]revious service in a 

non-temporary post, which is followed by new temporary 

positions, is irrelevant under the statute.” Horner, 832 

F.2d at 597. Moreover, the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) guidelines define current continuous emCase: 16-1551 Document: 24-2 Page: 5 Filed: 07/08/2016
6 HOLMES v. MSPB

ployment as: “a period of employment or service immediately preceding an adverse action in the same or similar 

positions without a break in Federal civilian employment 

of a workday.” 5 C.F.R. § 752.402(b) (emphasis added). 

Holmes’ 10-day hiatus between working for the Department of the Army and commencing her term at the Department of Commerce renders her ineligible for current 

continuous employment status. Because Holmes’ currently appeals from an adverse action taken against her as a 

temporary employee who has served for less than one 

year, the Board does not have jurisdiction to hear Holmes’ 

complaint.

Finally, as before the administrative judge, Holmes 

raises a number of additional concerns before this court. 

These include the administrative judge’s failure to consider the twelve Douglas factors, see Douglas v. Veterans 

Admin., 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (1981), her due process rights 

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the 

OPM Guidelines. But because the Board lacks jurisdiction to hear Holmes’ petition, we cannot address the 

merits of these arguments. 

CONCLUSION

Holmes appeals the Board’s dismissal of her petition 

for lack of jurisdiction. Because we agree that the Board 

does not have jurisdiction, we affirm. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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