Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-04086/USCOURTS-ca10-92-04086-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Raymond P. Cabututan
Appellant
Quinn D. Hunsaker
Appellee

Document Text:

FIL_ .J 

United States Coe " L of Appea!r 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Cir~uit 

RAYMOND P. CABUTUTAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

QUINN D. HUNSAKER, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

TENTH CIRCUIT MAR O 1 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-4086 

(D. Utah No. 92-CV-136 ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, Circuit Judge, BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, and 

EBEL, Circuit Judge.** 

This case comes before us on the district court's 28 U.S.C. 

§1915 (d) dismissal of the appellant's civil rights claims under 

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1981, 1985(3) and 1986. 1 We affirm the 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34 (a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

1 Subsequent to the filing of this appeal, the appellant has 

filed in this court a Motion for Voluntary Dismissal. He requests 

that we dismiss his claim without prejudice, representing that the 

defendant, Quinn Hunsaker, was found dead sometime between January 

14th and January 22, 1993 . He seeks dismissal without prejudice 

so that he can file a subsequent complaint with his coconspirators 

in the underlying case. 

The appellant's motion is denied. In its dismissal of the 

complaint under§ 1915 (d), the lower court reached the merits of 

Appellate Case: 92-4086 Document: 010110176495 Date Filed: 03/01/1993 Page: 1 
district court's order as to the appellant's Section 1981, 1985 (3 ) 

and 1986 claims but remand for further proceedings with respect to 

the appellant's Section 1983 claim. 

On October 26, 1989, the appellant, Raymond P. Cabututan, was 

arrested and charged with second degree murder, aggravated 

assault, and threatening or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or 

quarrel. The appellee, Quinn D. Hunsaker, acted as a public 

defender and represented the appellant at trial in Box Elder 

County, Utah. The appellant was convicted and is currently 

incarcerated at the Utah Central Correctional Facility in 

Gunnison, Utah. 

On February 12, 1992, the appellant filed this prose civil 

rights action in the United States District Court for the District 

of Utah. He alleges that the appellee violated his constitutional 

' ' h f ' h' ' 1 2 rights int e course o representi ng im at tria. The district 

the appellant's claims and therefore, as the case comes befo re us, 

dismissal of the complaint without prejudice is inappropriate. 

Furthermore, the case is not rendered moot by the death of the 

defendant as his estate may still be liable for any constitutional 

violations. Accordingly, we remand to the district court for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. However, we 

note for the appellant's instruction that upon remand the merits 

of his claims are reopened and the district court may at that time 

entertain a motion to dismiss without prejudice should the 

appellant choose to renew his motion there to dismiss his 

complaint . 

2 Among the appellants claims are that the appellee failed to: 

request a venue change in light of pretrial publicity, request a 

new jury after he was informed of prejudicial remarks made by some 

jurors, impeach or object to the testimony of contradictory 

eyewitnesses, object to violations of the exclusionary rule, keep 

out perjured testimony, move for a racially balanced jury, or move 

for a new trial. In addition, the appellant claims the appellee 

was "related through marriage" to the state's attorney, 

represented some of the jurors as a private attorney, refused to 

argue self-defense as the appellant requested, and incompetently 

directed his appeal. 

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court referred the action t o a magistrate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636 (b) (1 ) (B) . The magistrate issued a Report and Recommendation 

on March 20, 1992, advising that the complaint should be dismissed 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (d ) . The appellant subsequently filed 

objections to the magistrate's report. The district court adopted 

the magistrate's Report and Recommendation in ful l on April 21, 

1992. 

Under 28 U.S.C. §1915 (d ) , a claim is to be dismissed only if 

it is found t o be "frivolous or malicious. 113 We review the 

dismissal of an action under 28 U.S.C. §1915 (d) for an abuse of 

discretion. LaFevers v. Saffle, 936 F . 2d 1117, 1118 (10th Cir. 

1991). "Whenever a plaintiff states an arguable claim for relief, 

dismissal for frivolousness under §191S(d) is improper, even if 

the legal basis underlying the claim is incorrect." McKinney v . 

Oklahoma, 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1991) . 4 

I . The Claims Under 42 U.S . C. §§ 1981, 1985(3) and 1986 

The district court properly dismissed the appellant's claims 

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(3) and 1986. The appellant failed 

to allege any racial or class based discriminatory animus as 

3 28 U. S.C. § 1915 provides with respect to in forma pauperis 

proceedings that "[t]he court ... may dismiss the case i f 

satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. " 

4 The appellant appears before us prose and accordingly we 

construe his pleadings liberally. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 

(1980); Meade V. Grubbs, 841 F .2d 1512, 1526 (1 0th Cir. 1988 ) . 

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required by §1981, 5 General Building Contractors v. Pennsylvania, 

458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982) (cited in Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 

1240, 125 0 (10th Cir. 1992)), and §1985(3), Griffen v. 

6 Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). In addition, the 

appellant's §1986 claim was correctly dismissed because there can 

be no liability for failing to prevent a civil rights conspiracy 

under §1986 where there is no valid claim of conspiracy under 

§1985 (3 ). Taylor v. Nichols, 558 F.2d 561, 568 (10th Cir. 1977). 

II. The Claim Under 42 U.S.C . § 1983 

The magistrate recommended, and the district court ordered, 

the dismissal of the appellant's §1983 claims because they 

concluded that "[a]n attorney acting as a public defender in a 

criminal case does not act under color of state law within the 

meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1983." The magistrate cited Polk County v. 

Dodson, 454 U. S. 312 (1981) and Brown v. Chaffee, 612 F.2d 497 

(10th Cir. 1979). While this statement of the law is generally 

5 Further, as the magistrate noted, the appellee's actions that 

form the basis of the appellant's claims were not prohibited by 

§1981. Section 1981 guarantees to all citizens the equal right 

"to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence , 

and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for 

the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white 

citizens." Appellant here did not allege actions violative of 

these proscriptions. 

6 There are only three references to race in the complaint. 

First, the appellant described himself as being of "Asian/ 

Philippeno [sic]" heritage. Second, the appellant alleges that he 

informed the appellee of racial remarks that jurors had made to 

him. Third, the appellant complains that no minorities were 

empaneled on his jury. None of these references suggest that the 

appellee acted with any racial or class-based discriminatory 

animus. 

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correct, the district court failed to note the more recent Supreme 

Court case of Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984) in which 

i t was held that 

public defenders are not immune from liability in actions 

brought by a criminal defendant against state public 

defenders who are alleged to have conspired with state 

officials to deprive the §1983 plaintiff of federal 

constitutional rights. 

In the instant c ase, the district court failed to consider 

the appellant's claims of a conspiracy between the appellees and 

the prosecuto r in determining whether the appellee was acting 

under color o f state law. 7 This court has spoken to the level of 

proof necessary t o establish state action by asserting a 

conspiracy between private defendants and state officials. A 

court must proceed with caution when considering the pre-trial 

dismissal of conspiracy allegations in civil rights proceedings 

because of the difficult nature of the proof involved. Fisher v. 

Shamburg. 614 F . 2d 156, 162 (10th Cir. 1980) . However, "mere 

conclusory allegations with no supporting factual averments are 

insufficient; the pleadings must specifically present facts 

7 The prosecutor is a state actor who is entitled to immunity 

for actions taken in his official capacity. Imbler v. Pachtrnan, 

424 U.S . 409, 420-29 (1976). Accordingly, if the appeLlant is 

determined to have alleged sufficient facts to establish a 

c onspiracy between the appellee and the prosecutor, the appellee 

can be found to have acted under color of state law for purposes 

of Section 1983. See Tower, 467 U.S . at 923. 

The appellant, in order "to show discrimination and 

conspiracy in the action," alleged that the prosecutor and the 

appellee: (1 ) were related through marriage; (2) had or were 

representing members of the jury in unrelated legal matters; (3) 

knew of and allowed perjured testimony to be admitted at trial; 

(4) knew of and failed to object to violations of the exclusionary 

rule; and (5 ) knew of the pretrial publicity but failed to move 

for a change of venue. 

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tending to show agreement and concerted action." Sooner Products 

Co. v. McBride, 708 F.2d 510, 512 (10th Cir. 1983). "The standard 

is even stricter where the state officials involved in the 

conspiracy are immune from suit." Id. at 512. As we set out in 

Norton v. Liddel, 620 F.2d 1375, 1380 (10th Cir. 1980), the 

plaintiff must demonstrate "the existence of a significant nexus 

or entanglement between the absolutely immune state official and 

the private party in relation to the steps taken by each to 

fulfill the objects of their conspiracy." 

III. Conclusion 

Since the court failed to consider whether the appellee 

conspired with the prosecutor to deny the appellant his 

constitutional rights, we find that it abused its discretion in 

dismissing the Section 1983 claim. Accordingly, we REMAND for the 

district court to reconsider its dismissal of the appellant's 

Section 1983 claims in light of this opinion. In all other 

respects the district court's order is AFFIRMED . 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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