Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01157/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01157-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Damon Burse
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

*

The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1157

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Eastern 

v. * District of Missouri.

*

Damon Burse, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: September 14, 2004

Filed: September 20, 2004 

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, BRIGHT, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Damon Burse pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute five grams

or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Based on Burse’s

earlier Missouri felony drug offense, the district court*

 applied the mandatory

minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (“If any person [violates §

841(a)(1)] after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final, such

person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10

years . . . .”). 

Appellate Case: 04-1157 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/20/2004 Entry ID: 1812883 
-2-

On appeal, Burse challenges the enhancement asserting his conviction on

Missouri drug charge is not final for the purposes of § 841 because the conviction

resulted in a suspended sentence. Burse argues that under federal law, a suspended

sentence is final only after the time for appeal has passed, and that a suspended

sentence is not appealable in Missouri. In United States v. Slicer, 361 F.3d 1085,

1087 (8th Cir. 2004), however, we held a defendant’s earlier suspended sentence for

a felony drug offense under Missouri law was an earlier final conviction for the

purposes of § 841(b). See also United States v. Franklin, 250 F.3d 653, 665 (8th Cir.

1998); United States v. Ortega, 150 F.3d 937, 948 (8th Cir. 1998). Burse

acknowledges Slicer, but contends we should choose to follow another case instead,

United States v. Maxon, 339 F.3d 656, 659 (8th Cir. 2003). Contrary to Burse’s

assertion, we do not believe Maxon applies to this case. In Maxon, we held that

because the time for the direct appeal of the defendant’s North Dakota conviction had

passed when he committed his federal offense, his state offense had become final for

purposes of § 841. We were not presented with the precise issue here, which is

controlled by our decision in Slicer. 

In his pro se supplemental brief, Burse also contends the term cocaine base in

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) is ambiguous, citing United States v. Brisbane, 367 F.3d 910

(D.C. Cir. 2004). Because Burse pleaded guilty to possession with intent to

distribute cocaine base, the precise meaning of the term is immaterial in this case.

Given Burse’s guilty plea, the Government was not required to prove the substance

possessed by Burse was cocaine base within the meaning of the statute. 

Burse also argues the 100-to-1 ratio in cocaine sentencing is irrational.

Although the United States Sentencing Commission, Attorney General Reno, and

Drug Czar McCaffrey recommended modifying the sentencing scheme in 1997,

Congress has not changed the law. Thus, our decisions upholding the ratio’s

constitutionality foreclose Burse’s argument. See United States v. Carter, 91 F.3d

Appellate Case: 04-1157 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/20/2004 Entry ID: 1812883 
-3-

1196, 1197-99 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); United States v. Jackson, 67 F.3d 1359,

1367 (8th Cir. 1995). 

We thus affirm Burse’s sentence.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 04-1157 Page: 3 Date Filed: 09/20/2004 Entry ID: 1812883