Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-02666/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-02666-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rosemary Ndoh
Respondent
Edgar Enrique Velasquez
Petitioner

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDGAR ENRIQUE VELASQUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROSEMARY NDOH,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-02666-HSG 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Re: Dkt. No. 1

Pending before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

See Dkt. No. 1. Petitioner Edgar Velasquez challenges the validity of his state court sentence. 

Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments, the Court DENIES the petition.

I. BACKGROUND

A. State Court Proceedings

On March 1, 2013, Petitioner pled no contest to forcible oral copulation upon a child under 

Cal. Pen. Code § 288a(c)(2)(B); forcible lewd acts upon a child under Cal. Pen. Code § 288(b)(1); 

and four counts of lewd acts upon a child under Cal. Pen. Code § 288(a). See Dkt. No. 9-1 

(“Clerk’s Transcript” or “CT”) at 114–20; Dkt. No. 9-2 (“Reporter’s Transcript” or “RT”) at 5–6.

1

 

He further admitted enhancement allegations that he had substantial sexual conduct with a child 

under the age of 14, Cal. Penal Code § 1203.066(a)(8), and that he was at least 16 years old at the 

time he committed the offenses, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 707(d)(1). See CT at 114; RT at 4–5. 

At the time of Petitioner’s plea, the court confirmed his understanding that the maximum sentence 

 

1 All references to exhibits are to those submitted by Respondent in support of the answer, see 

Dkt. No. 9, unless otherwise indicated. The Clerk’s Transcript and Reporter’s Transcript are, in 

turn, from the underlying state proceedings and similarly filed in support of Respondent’s answer. 

See id.

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was twenty years. RT at 3.

The sentencing hearing was held that same day. See CT at 114. During the hearing, the 

victim’s father, Serafin Del Torro, assisted by an interpreter, made a personal statement. See RT 

at 6–9. Mr. Del Torro stated:

Before saying that I want to say in reference to this case, so that you 

may understand what this has affected me—my daughter [the victim, 

Jane Doe], she was born in Mexico. Before she was born, my wife 

had a lot of pregnancy issues.

I asked her on many occasions to have an abortion. She never wanted 

to. So when she was being born, the doctors had told me that she was 

a girl. I didn’t know that she was a girl.

I had told three doctors—the gynecologist, the anesthesiologist—that 

I didn’t want a girl. The reason was because I knew as a child that 

my sister had been raped two times. My father had tried to rape her 

when she was a child two times.

And I knew as a child that my father had tried to abuse of his own 

sister. My own mother suffered physical, emotional abuse from my 

father, who abandoned us when I was three or four years old. My 

mother was so sick that my neighbor or would take of us. She would 

breast feed me.

I also learned that she, who had been like my mother, had been raped 

when she was eight or 12 years old. None of these people received 

punishment ever.

When this happened with my daughter, I had many problems. I lost 

two houses. My oldest son, he knows that he was drugged and raped. 

Nobody helped me. Nobody helped him. Nobody helped my wife.

When I found out about my daughter, I know that he owes something 

to my daughter and to all women, to all the women that I love so 

much. The only thing I asked him was to get away from my home. 

One or two times I kicked him out of the house also. He was like a 

son to me because I loved him very much.

I think on one time I gave him a guitar as a gift because he was a 

friend of my son’s. I didn’t want to cause any more harm to his 

parents or to him; but I owed something to my daughter and to all 

women.

When I made the report and before my daughter received 

psychological help, we were taking care of her because she tried to 

kill herself five or ten times. She wouldn’t sleep; and neither would 

we.

I was checking up on her every two or three times during the night. I 

lost weeks without sleeping to take care of her. Two times we found 

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her in the bathroom with scissors trying to cut her veins.

When—what happened to my son, I never received help because I 

wanted my wife and my son to see that I was strong. I was trying to 

recover when this happened with my daughter. Even so, I haven’t 

asked for psychological help because—I thought I could take more of 

this; but it’s too much.

I want to—this paper—it says “emotional impact, economic, and a 

recommendation for sentencing.” I don’t think you can ever repay 

me for what my daughter has suffered; so I didn’t have to fill it out. 

Economic—(crying) I don’t ask for anything economic. Who is 

going to pay me? His parents? They’re suffering as I am.

I only ask of you to do what you need to do. I don’t ask for anything 

else. I see many cases like these where the people say “I forgive him.” 

I don’t forgive you. I will never forgive what you did to me. I loved 

you very much.

I’m sorry—that’s all I have to say. My wife did not want to fill out 

this paper for respect to his family; and even though I respect them—

don’t wish them anything bad—I had to come. I had to let them know 

what had happened to us. And I would want to know what would 

they put down on this paper. That’s all.

Id. at 7–9. The victim, although not present, also wrote—and the court read aloud—that “[s]ince 

this incident I have been suffering from depression. I have trouble being around and getting along 

with people.” Id. at 9–10. Petitioner’s counsel then urged the court to impose a six-year sentence, 

arguing in mitigation that Petitioner was only 17 at the time of the crimes; cooperated with police; 

understood, once he was older, the impact of his actions on the victim; had no other priors; and

had since become employed and married. Id. at 11–13.

The court sentenced Petitioner to a total of eight years in state prison. See CT at 114, 119–

20; RT at 13–18. In doing so, the court explained:

All right. I have listened carefully to Mr. Del Torro. He in particular 

was an incredibly moving witness. I am aware that [Petitioner] has 

many loving family members out here who care for him very much.

One of the reasons this came to me with a reduced posture is I am also 

aware of the fact that many youth at the age of 17 make all sorts of 

mistakes in their lives and they don’t grow and mature until they are 

pretty much in their mid 20’s. That was one of the factors that brought 

this from what originally was brought to me somewhat as a 12 year 

case to somewhere between six to eight years. And six would be half 

of what the People offered.

But I really did want to hear from the victim’s family. I wanted to 

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know the impact. The impression I had – and I don’t blame the 

defense attorney, but the impression I had was that the victim was 

sympathetic to the defendant, didn’t want to see him go to prison; and 

I almost got the sense that there was not the severe damage

that he had caused.

In listening to Mr. Del Torro it is clear – and should have been obvious 

to me even without the testimony – that a ten year old child – and she 

was a child – should never have been treated in this way. And having 

that mark – when we speak of a 17 year old being youthful, a child 

that is hurt at ten is still wounded at 50.

There is not a time in her life that she will forget this, that it won’t 

mark her in some ways – in the way that she relates to trusting other, 

particularly men; in the way she relates as a mother if she has a 

daughter. The way Mr. Del Torro spoke so poignantly about the 

wounds that he saw when he learned other women that he loved had 

been raped – and this child, even if she hears of a rape at 20, 30, or 40 

will recall hers.

RT at 15–16. When asked by the court, Mr. Del Torro confirmed that the victim’s attempted 

suicide was due to the sexual abuse. Id. at 9. Following the sentence, Petitioner’s counsel stated 

that “this is the first we have heard of any suicide attempts by the victim. I believe them to be 

true; but it is in fact the first time the family or I have heard that.” RT at 18.

On appeal, Petitioner claimed that (1) the sentencing court acted unreasonably in imposing 

the eight-year sentence; and (2) alternatively, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a 

continuance. Dkt. No 9-4, Ex. D at 18–21. On December 9, 2014, the California Court of Appeal 

affirmed Petitioner’s conviction in an unpublished opinion. Dkt. No 9-5, Ex. E at 27–31. In 

rejecting Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim, the Court of Appeal 

reasoned:

Appellant next contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

either request a continuance to investigate the father’s statements or 

attempt to neutralize his statements through the presentation of 

information demonstrating bias, a motion to strike irrelevant portions 

of his statement, or cross-examination. We disagree.

For purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 

“[p]rejudice is shown when there is a ‘reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.’” (In re Thomas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1249, 1256.) 

Appellant has not shown any reason to doubt the victim’s father’s 

statements about the impact of appellant’s crime on Jane Doe. As

shown above, this fact influenced the trial court’s exercise of its 

sentencing discretion. Appellant has failed to demonstrate a 

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reasonable probability that any investigation, cross-examination, or 

other conduct by trial counsel would have resulted in a different 

sentence.

Appellant also notes trial counsel advised appellant against making a 

statement at the sentencing hearing. The record indicates the 

statement appellant wished to make was to the victim’s father. Trial 

counsel told the court: “[Appellant] has expressed his desire to make 

an apology statement. I told him that would have to come at a different 

time through writing or therapy. I didn’t think it was an appropriate 

time for him to address the father. He would like to do so.” Again,

appellant has failed to show prejudice resulting from any deficient 

performance. The trial court was aware of appellant’s remorse. There 

is no basis to conclude the sentence would have been any different 

had appellant apologized to Jane Doe’s father at the sentencing 

hearing.

Id. at 29–31.

Petitioner filed a petition for review, raising the same claims as on appeal. Compare Ex. D 

at 18–21, with Ex. E at 18–24. The California Supreme Court summarily denied review on 

February 18, 2015. See Ex. E at 2 (“The petition for review is denied.”). Petitioner did not pursue 

state collateral review.

B. Habeas Proceedings

The instant petition was filed on May 17, 2016. See Dkt. No. 1 (“Pet.”). Petitioner sought 

two grounds for relief: First, Petitioner claimed he was denied his right to due process under the 

Fourteenth Amendment when the sentencing judge imposed “an eight year prison sentence based 

on the unreliable and unsubstantiated statement of Jane Doe’s father.” Pet. at 14–19. Second, and 

in the alternative, Petitioner claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of 

counsel when he failed to request a continuance following the father’s statements in order to 

ascertain their veracity. See id. at 7–8. The Court compared the instant federal habeas petition 

with the petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court and determined that Petitioner 

had failed to exhaust his due process claims. See Dkt. No. 18 at 2–5. The Court, therefore, 

directed Petitioner to determine whether he wanted to proceed with the single, exhausted IAC 

claim, or dismiss the action in its entirety and return to state court to exhaust all claims. See id. at 

5–6. Petitioner elected to dismiss the unexhausted due process claim and proceed in this action 

with only his IAC claim. See Dkt. No. 19. Petitioner’s pending habeas petition therefore contains 

a single claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

“in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that 

he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a).

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the 

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state courts adjudication 

of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it 

“applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases,” or if it 

“confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] 

Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 

405–06. “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if 

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s 

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its 

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law 

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411.

Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to the Supreme Court’s 

jurisprudence. “[C]learly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions 

as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. “A federal court 

may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the 

precedent from [the Supreme Court] is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 

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(2003).

The state court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of the 

state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803–04 (1991).

2

 Because, as noted above, the 

California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner's petition for review, the California Court 

of Appeal was the highest court to have reviewed the claims in a reasoned decision. It is therefore 

the Court of Appeal’s decision that this Court reviews herein.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner contends that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to seek a continuance

to evaluate the veracity of the statements made by the victim’s father, Mr. Del Torro, to the court

during sentencing. Alternatively, Petitioner contends that defense counsel could have, even 

without seeking a continuance, (1) presented information regarding Mr. Del Torro’s bias as the 

victim’s father; (2) asked the court to strike irrelevant portions of Mr. Del Torro’s testimony; or 

(3) cross-examined Mr. Del Torro regarding his testimony. See Pet. at 7. Specifically, Petitioner 

posits that Mr. Del Torro’s testimony regarding the victim’s multiple suicide attempts led the court 

to sentence Petitioner to eight—rather than six—years in prison, and that his counsel “did 

nothing” to prevent this. See Pet. at 19–20.

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of 

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The benchmark for judging any 

claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning 

of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Id. 

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, a petitioner must 

 

2 Although Ylst was a procedural default case, the “look through” rule announced there has been 

extended beyond the context of procedural default. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 n.3 

(9th Cir. 2005). The look through rule continues as the Ninth Circuit held that “it is a common 

practice of the federal courts to examine the last reasoned state decision to determine whether a 

state-court decision is ‘contrary to’ or ‘an unreasonable application of’ clearly established federal 

law” and “it [is] unlikely that the Supreme Court intended to disrupt this practice without making 

its intention clear.” Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir.), as amended, 733 F.3d 794 

(9th Cir. 2013).

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establish two things:

First, he must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an 

“objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687–88. This 

requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 

“counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 687. The relevant inquiry is not what 

defense counsel could have done, but rather whether the choices made by defense counsel were 

reasonable. See Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998). Judicial scrutiny of 

counsel’s performance must be highly deferential, and a court must indulge a strong presumption 

that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. See 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 196 (2011) (“Strickland 

specifically commands that a court must indulge [the] strong presumption that counsel made all 

significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” (quotation omitted)). 

Moreover, “[i]n assessing an attorney’s performance, a reviewing court must make every effort to 

eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s 

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” 

Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1094 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted).

Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, i.e., 

that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.

This Strickland framework for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is 

considered to be “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis. See Daire v. Lattimore, 812 F.3d 

766, 767–68 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Cullen, 563 U.S. at 189. Nevertheless, a “doubly” 

deferential judicial review is appropriate in analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

under § 2254. See Cullen, 563 U.S. at 190; Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 88–89 (2011) 

(same); Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 122 (2011) (same). The general rule of Strickland, i.e., to 

review a defense counsel’s effectiveness with great deference, gives the state courts greater leeway 

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in reasonably applying that rule, which in turn “translates to a narrower range of decisions that are 

objectively unreasonable under AEDPA.” Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir. 

2010). When § 2254(d) applies, “the question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. 

The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s

deferential standard.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105.

Here, Petitioner fails to show how defense counsel’s decision not to challenge Mr. Del 

Torro or the veracity of his statement to the court constituted deficient attorney performance or 

unsound legal strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. To the contrary, the record indicates that 

defense counsel’s choice not to seek additional time to question or otherwise attack the veracity of 

the statement was based on “professional judgment” and “strategic choices.” Id. at 681. 

Petitioner’s counsel strategically relied on Petitioner’s remorse and acceptance of his actions as a 

mitigating factor during sentencing. See RT at 11–13. Defense counsel urged the court to impose 

a lower sentence by emphasizing that Petitioner fully cooperated with police and confessed to the 

crimes, at times in even more detail than the victim recalled. See RT at 11–12. Defense counsel 

further explained that seven years later, and as an adult, Petitioner “realize[d] the actual impact on 

the victim” and “the amount of damage that he was doing to her” in a way he did not at age 

seventeen. Id. at 12. Thus, challenging Mr. Del Torro’s statement—and by extension, the trauma 

to the victim—may ultimately have been detrimental to Petitioner and the length of his sentence. 

Cf. Parker v. Scott, 394 F.3d 1302, 1322 (10th Cir. 2005) (reasoning that defense counsel did not 

provide ineffective assistance of counsel when he decided not to challenge the veracity of a child 

victim’s statement because “rebuttal of this testimony is not necessarily helpful or necessary to 

[the criminal defendant’s] defense”).

The Court has carefully reviewed the record and finds no evidence that counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional 

norms. Because Petitioner “cannot even establish incompetence under the first prong,” the Court 

need not address the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 

737 (9th Cir. 1998). But as the California Court of Appeal explained, even if counsel had sought a 

continuance here, Petitioner has not provided any reason to believe that the father’s statement was 

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in fact inaccurate. Mr. Del Torro’s explanation that the victim attempted suicide because of the 

abuse is corroborated by the victim’s own statement, in which she said she suffered from 

depression as a result. See RT at 9–10. Indeed, defense counsel noted after sentencing that he 

believed Mr. Del Torro’s representations to be true. See RT at 18. In a single sentence in his 

petition, Petitioner alludes to the fact that he sought to address Mr. Del Torro during sentencing 

but his defense counsel advised him against doing so. See Pet. at 19. Yet as the California Court 

of Appeal found, the record is clear that Petitioner merely intended to apologize to Mr. Del Torro. 

See RT at 13. The trial court, however, was already aware of Petitioner’s remorse before 

sentencing. Id. at 11–13.

And even if defense counsel could have otherwise neutralized Mr. Del Torro’s statement

(e.g., through cross examination or demonstrating bias, as Petitioner suggests), Petitioner already 

admitted to the egregious acts against the victim. As the state court explained, “it should have 

been obvious . . . even without the testimony – that a ten-year-old child – and she was a child –

should never have been treated in this way.” RT at 15–16. The court further noted the enduring 

impact of Petitioner’s conduct: “There is not a time in her life that she will forget this, that it 

won’t mark her in some ways – in the way she relates to trusting other, particularly men; [and] in 

the way she relates as a mother if she has a daughter.” Id. And the so-called “bias” of the father 

of a young girl who was the victim of sexual assault would be obvious to the sentencing court. In 

short, the court’s explanation indicates that it was Petitioner’s conduct and the age of the victim 

that directed its sentencing choice.

In sum, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. The state 

court’s denial of the ineffective of assistance claims did not result in a decision that was contrary 

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by 

the Supreme Court. Nor was the state court’s denial of this claim based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. Federal habeas relief is denied on this claim.

B. Certificate of Appealability

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court 

that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of 

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appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Case, Rule 11(a). A judge shall grant a certificate of 

appealability “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard.

Id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the 

showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that 

reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable 

or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

Here, Petitioner has not made such a showing, and, accordingly, a certificate of 

appealability will be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court DENIES the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and DENIES a

certificate of appealability. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent and close the 

case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/27/2019

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

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