Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-19-02171/USCOURTS-ca7-19-02171-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael F. Jones
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 11, 2020

Decided May 11, 2020

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

No. 19-2171

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL F. JONES,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 18-CR-40077-JPG

J. Phil Gilbert,

Judge.

O R D E R

Michael Jones pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to distribute 

methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and four counts of distributing 

methamphetamine, id. § 841(a)(1). The district court sentenced him as a career offender, 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), to a within-guidelines term of 262 months in prison and five years of 

supervised release. Although his plea agreement contained a broad appeal waiver, 

Jones filed a notice of appeal. His appointed attorney asserts that the appeal is frivolous 

and seeks to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Jones has responded. 

See CIR. R. 51(b). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses the issues 

that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. Because counsel’s analysis 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 19-2171 Document: 28 Filed: 05/11/2020 Pages: 2
No. 19-2171 Page 2

appears thorough, we limit our review to the subjects she discusses, along with those

Jones has identified in response. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).

Counsel states that she communicated with Jones and confirmed that he does not 

wish to withdraw his guilty plea, so she properly refrains from exploring the adequacy 

of the plea hearing or the voluntariness of the plea. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 

348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel next considers whether Jones could challenge his career-offender status 

or his within-guidelines sentence, but rightly concludes that these arguments would be 

precluded by the appeal waiver in his plea agreement. In it, Jones expressly waived his 

right to “seek modification of, or contest any aspect of, the conviction or sentence in any 

proceeding,” reserving only the right to appeal a sentence imposed above the 

guidelines as determined by the court and to bring a claim for ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Neither exception to the waiver applies here: Jones was sentenced within the 

guidelines range, and he states in his response that he wishes to challenge counsel’s 

effectiveness in a collateral attack, not on direct appeal. Jones also proposes challenging

his career-offender designation on the ground that two of his predicate offenses do not 

qualify as “controlled substance offenses” under § 4B1.1(a)(3), but that argument is 

foreclosed by the waiver. Because an appeal waiver “stands or falls with the guilty 

plea” (and as we noted, Jones does not wish to challenge his guilty plea), we must

enforce the waiver here. See United States v. Gonzalez, 765 F.3d 732, 741 (7th Cir. 2014).

Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

Case: 19-2171 Document: 28 Filed: 05/11/2020 Pages: 2