Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-00931/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-00931-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hagit Habash
Plaintiff
Odeh Habash
Plaintiff
Student R.A.
Plaintiff
West Contra Costa Unified School District
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STUDENT R.A., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WEST CONTRA COSTA UNIFIED 

SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-0931-PJH 

ORDER RE CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is an appeal pursuant to the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act

("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq., and California Education Code § 56505(k), of a 

decision by an administrative law judge ("ALJ") in a "due process" proceeding before the 

Special Education Division of the California Office of Administrative Hearings ("OAH"). 

Plaintiffs are Student R.A., by and through his Guardian Ad Litem, Hagit Habash; 

his mother, Hagit Habash; and his father, Odeh Habash. Defendant is the West Contra 

Costa Unified School District (“the District"). Both sides filed petitions with the OAH for a 

due process hearing, and the ALJ ruled against plaintiffs and in favor of the District. 

The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment came on for hearing before this 

court on June 10, 2015. Plaintiffs appeared by their counsel Frances Kaminer, and the 

District appeared by its counsel Kimberly Smith. Having read the parties’ papers and 

carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, the court hereby 

DENIES plaintiffs’ motion and GRANTS the District’s motion.

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THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT

In enacting the IDEA, Congress sought to “ensure that all children with disabilities 

have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special 

education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them 

for further education, employment, and independent living;” to "ensure that the rights of 

children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected;" and to "assist 

States, localities, educational service agencies, and Federal agencies to provide for the 

education of all children with disabilities[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)-(C). 

“To accomplish these objectives, the federal government provides funding to 

participating state and local educational agencies, which is contingent on the agency's 

compliance with the IDEA's procedural and substantive requirements.” Anchorage Sch. 

Dist. v. M.P., 689 F.3d 1047, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. 

Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir.1993). State statutes, and regulations enacted 

pursuant to those statutes, also apply in IDEA cases. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 

U.S. 176, 203 (1982); Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir. 1994). 

The IDEA's primary goal of assuring that all disabled children have a “free 

appropriate public education,” or “FAPE,” that meets their unique educational needs, is 

achieved through the development of an individualized education program (“IEP”) for 

each child with a disability. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414; Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1469. The IEP is 

crafted by an “IEP Team” that includes a student's parents and teachers, representatives 

from the local educational agency, and where appropriate, the student. 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1414(d)(1)(B). The IEP must include various items, such as “a statement of the child's 

present levels of academic achievement and functional performance,” “a statement of 

measurable annual goals, including academic and functional goals,” and “a description of 

how the child's progress toward meeting the annual goals . . . will be measured.” Id.

§ 1414(d)(1)(A). Local educational agencies must review, and where appropriate revise, 

each student's IEP at least annually. See id. § 1414(d)(4)(A).

To meet the continuing duty to develop and maintain an appropriate IEP, the 

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school district must assess or reassess the educational needs of the disabled child. Id.

§ 1414(a), (b); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56320, 56321. The school district must conduct a 

reassessment of the special education student not more than once a year, but at least 

once every three years. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(B); Cal. Educ. Code § 56381(a)(2). The 

district must also conduct a reassessment if the district “determines that the educational 

or related service needs, including improved academic achievement and functional 

performance, of the child warrant a reevaluation.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(A)(i); see also

Cal. Educ. Code § 56381(a). 

A reassessment requires parental consent. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(3); Cal. Educ. 

Code § 56321(c), § 56381(f). A school district must develop and propose a 

reassessment plan. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(1); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56321(a), 56381(f). If 

the parents do not consent to the plan, the district can conduct the reassessment only by 

showing at a due process hearing that it needs to reassess the student and is lawfully 

entitled to do so. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D); 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(c) (2008); Cal. Educ. 

Code § 26321(c), § 26381(f), § 56501(a)(3), § 56506(e). However, a parent who wishes 

that his/her child receive special education services under the IDEA must allow 

reassessment if conditions warrant. Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 

1315 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The IDEA also incorporates extensive procedural safeguards for the benefit of the 

disabled child and his/her parents, including the opportunity to review records; the right to 

be notified of any changes in identification, evaluation, and placement of the student; and 

the right to file a due process complaint regarding their child's education. See 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1415(b)-(h). Such complaints may lead to mediation or an appearance at an impartial 

due process hearing conducted by a hearing officer. See id. at § 1415(e)-(f); see also

Anchorage, 689 F.3d at 1054. 

Due process hearings are limited to “any matter relating to the identification, 

evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate 

public education to such child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A). In California, due process 

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hearings are conducted by the OAH, a state agency independent of the Department of 

Education. M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 681 F.3d 1082, 1085, 1092 (9th Cir.2012). A 

party dissatisfied with the outcome of a due process hearing may obtain further review by 

filing a civil action in state or federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). 

The IDEA does not require school districts to give special education students the 

best education available or to provide services and instruction to maximize their potential; 

rather, it requires only that school districts provide a “basic floor of opportunity that 

includes access to specialized instruction and services that are individually designed for 

the student and provide educational benefit.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198-201, quoted in

Anchorage, 689 F.3d at 1057-58. As long as a school district provides a student with a 

FAPE, it can select the methodology for its program and services. Id. at 208. Thus, if a 

district’s program is designed to meet a student’s unique needs, provide some 

educational benefit, and comport with the IEP, and if it is offered in the least restrictive 

environment, the district should be found to have offered a FAPE, even if the parents’ 

preferred programs may have resulted in greater benefit. Id. at 207-08; Gregory K., 811 

F.2d at 1314.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Student R.A. (“Student”), who is currently 13 years of age, resides within the 

District. He has received a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder, and was found eligible 

for special education services in 2005. Administrative Record (“AR”) 1329, 1601. 

Student’s IQ is above average, but because of his disability, he suffers several-year 

development delays in social skills, verbal skills, and academics. AR 1329-1368, 1601. 

Over the years, his educational program has included services in the areas of applied 

behavioral analysis (“ABA”), speech and language (“SL”), socialization, and occupational 

therapy (“OT”), due to his unique needs. AR 1601. His last triennial assessment prior to 

the events related here was in 2008. AR 1809-10, 3186.

In May 2010, Student’s parents (“Parents”) and the District resolved a dispute over 

Student’s education by entering into a Final Settlement Agreement and Release (the 

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“Settlement Agreement.”). AR 862-75. Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement 

Agreement, the District agreed to fund a home-based program of services approved by 

Parents, for the 2010-2011, 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 school years, during which time 

District staff would not assess or provide direct services to Student. AR 862-75, 3969. 

Since the time of the May 2010 Settlement Agreement, Student has not attended 

any of the District’s schools. AR 1601. He has received all his educational instruction 

and services through the in-home program funded by the District. AR 1601. In this 

program, he has been schooled using a program that was developed and supervised by 

his mother (“Mother” or “Dr. Habash”). AR 1601, AR 3170-73. Plaintiffs allege that this 

program employed ABA techniques 100% of the time and was implemented one-on-one 

by a credentialed ABA-trained certified teacher chosen by Dr. Habash. See Cplt ¶ 15; 

see also AR 1601. 

The Settlement Agreement provided that the District was to complete a triennial 

reevaluation of Student in spring 2013, to determine his special education needs for the 

following school year, and that the assessment plan would include (but not be limited to) 

a psychoeducational assessment and behavioral assessment. AR 871. The District also 

agreed to contract for and fund an SL (including social skills) evaluation and an OT 

assessment, “to be conducted by the District’s choice of NPA [nonpublic agency] 

provider.” AR 871, 1601-02. 

Parents agreed that their signature to the Settlement Agreement constituted 

“consent for the District’s conduction of [the] evaluations, including contracting for and 

funding the NPA evaluation,” and that “[n]o other assessment plan shall be required.” AR 

871, 1602. They further agreed to “make Student available for these assessments in his 

current educational placement and a District site, including, but not limited to, observation 

of Student.” AR 871, 1602. At the conclusion of the assessment process an IEP meeting 

was to take place as required under the IDEA, and the District was to make an offer of 

services and school placement. The District agreed to convene the triennial 

review/annual IEP Team meeting on or before May 1, 2013. AR 871, 1602. 

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On November 15, 2012, Steven Collins, Director of the District’s Special Education 

Local Plan Area (“SELPA”), sent Parents a letter and an Assessment Plan, notifying them 

of Student's upcoming triennial reevaluation. AR 878, 1281-82. The Assessment Plan 

noted the specific areas to be evaluated, including academic achievement, health, 

intellectual development, language/speech communication development, motor 

development, social/emotional development, adaptive/behavior development, and 

processing skills, and also provided the title of the examiner proposed for each area. AR 

878, 1282. 

The Assessment Plan indicated that Student’s language/speech communication 

development would be evaluated by the Speech and Language Pathologist as well as by 

the School Psychologist. AR 878, 1282. The School Psychologist would be involved in 

assessing Student in all identified assessment areas, with the exception of the health 

assessment, which would be done solely by the District’s nurse. AR 878, 1282. 

Specifically, as reflected in the Settlement Agreement, Student’s social skills functioning 

would be evaluated through the SL assessment and the District’s psychoeducational

assessment. AR 1602.

The letter also included a Notice of Reassessment (Three-Year Routine 

Reevaluation), a parent rating scale and developmental and social history form to be 

completed by Parents, and a copy of the Procedural Safeguards. AR 877, 1283-1300.

Mr. Collins requested that Parents sign and return the Assessment Plan, so their 

consent could be provided to the assessors. AR 1281. Parents did not sign and return 

the Assessment Plan as requested. Instead, on November 17, 2012, Dr. Habash 

e-mailed Mr. Collins, stating that she and Student’s father would "abide by the settlement 

agreement" and would make Student "available to be assessed by District chosen 

professionals in spring 2013." AR 879, 1492, 3400.

On January 9, 2013, Dr. April Jourdan, the District School Psychologist assigned 

to conduct the psychoeducational and behavioral portions of Student’s triennial 

reevaluation, telephoned Dr. Habash to schedule Student’s assessments. AR 891, 1545, 

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1697, 1700, 1716. Dr. Jourdan is highly qualified and experienced in conducting triennial 

assessments. AR 1567-68. She holds a B.S. in psychology, an M.A. in counseling, a 

Ph.D. in counseling and human development, and a Pupil Personnel Services Credential 

in school psychology and school counseling, and is a diplomat of the American Board of 

School-Neuropsychology, a board certified behavior analyst, and a licensed educational 

psychologist. AR 1567, 1782-83. 

Dr. Jourdan has completed specific training in social communication, emotional 

regulation, transactional support (SCERTS) model, verbal behavior milestones 

assessment and placement program (VB-MAPP), treatment and education of autistic and 

related communication handicapped children (TEACCH), and autism diagnostic 

observation schedule (ADOS) among others. AR 1567, 1783-84. She has also conducted 

approximately 400 psychoeducational evaluations, approximately half of which were 

evaluations of students with autism, as well as hundreds of behavioral evaluations, 

including of students with autism. AR 1784, 1789. She was familiar with Student, as she 

had completed an autism assessment of him in 2008. AR 1698-99; 1809-10. 

Dr. Habash and Dr. Jourdan exchanged e-mails on January 9 and 10, 2013, 

regarding potential dates to begin the assessment, the location of the assessment, the 

assessments that might be used on the first day of testing, and whether Dr. Habash could 

observe the assessment. AR 891-95, 1545, 1548-49. In one of her initial e-mails to Dr. 

Jourdan on January 9, 2013, Dr. Habash asked where the testing would be conducted and 

what tests would be administered, and stated, "I request to be in attendance while testing 

is taking place." AR 1549-50. Dr. Jourdan responded, "Although you can wait outside of 

the room where I will be testing [R.A.], you cannot be present during the testing. Our 

standard procedure is to have parents wait outside of the testing room." AR 1549. In 

response, Dr. Habash stated, "I will be willing to wait outside as long as you use a onesided mirrored room, where I can observe (and hear) my child being tested. Please let me 

know when you find such an arrangement in proximity to our hometown." AR 1549. 

The following day, January 10, 2013, Dr. Habash stated in another e-mail, "It is my 

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intent to participate in my child's testing, without interfering with the testing process itself," 

and repeated her request that the testing be conducted in a room with a one-way mirror 

that would allow her to both see and hear the testing. AR 895, 1548. In response, Dr. 

Jourdan offered to conduct the testing at Cameron School where Dr. Habash could 

observe through a window but would not be able to hear the assessment. AR 894. Dr. 

Habash did not accept this offer, and in another email to Dr. Jourdan on January 10, 

2013, reiterated the request to both see and hear the assessment. AR 895, 1548.

On January 14, 2013, Mr. Collins sent Dr. Habash a letter explaining that the 

District would not grant her request as her presence would alter the testing environment 

and affect the accuracy of test results. AR 880. He stated that 

[t]esting at a District site is, in part, to see how [Student] functions in a 

District setting with District staff, which does not include the parent. 

Testing is between the assessor and the child. Your presence watching 

and listening to testing sessions would alter the testing environment and 

affect the accuracy of test results. The District does not agree to limitations 

on its assessment of [Student]. However, in an effort to be collaborative, 

the District offered to assess [Student] at Cameron School, where it is 

possible to visually observe the testing sessions. 

AR 880, 3791. 

Dr. Habash sent a letter to Mr. Collins on January 16, 2013, again requesting to 

fully observe (see and hear) the assessment, but not responding to the Cameron School 

offer. AR 881-83,1494-96. Dr. Habash stated that she feared the District had 

misunderstood her request, asserting that she had not requested to be inside the testing 

room, had not requested to alter the testing environment, and had not requested to affect 

the accuracy of the testing, but rather had simply requested to be present, outside the 

testing room, but in a position to see and hear everything that was happening inside the 

testing room via a one-way mirror through which Student could not see her observing the 

testing. AR 883. She claimed that she was not denying the District's request to assess 

Student, but was simply requesting to observe the testing in a way that would not 

interfere with it. AR 883. She stated that in past assessments outside of the District she 

had always been permitted to observe the testing through a one-way mirror. AR 883. 

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In response, the District reiterated its Cameron School offer in an e-mail dated 

January 24, 2013. AR 1497. The parties continued to exchange e-mails over the next 

two weeks. Dr. Habash continued to ignore the District's offer, and to insist that she be 

permitted to both see and hear the assessment. AR 1499-1502. On February 8, 2013, 

she stated in an e-mail to Mr. Collins, 

It is my understanding that the District is denying Parent full observation 

(i.e., watching and listening) of the psychoeducational assessment, the 

District is offering to be done by the District’s school psychologist. . . . As the 

District is aware of, I have not requested to be present in the testing room, 

but only outside, observing through a one-way mirror. The District would 

not answer my question for whether it has such a room on its premises that 

is available for testing.

AR 1504. 

In the same e-mail, Dr. Habash stated, “I wish to add a social cognitive 

assessment, in addition to the other assessments the District assessors already 

contacted Parent for, in order to cover this area of major deficit.” AR 1504. In addition, 

she requested an explanation for the District’s request for an IQ test, claiming that an IQ 

test was unwarranted because “my child has no diagnosis of mental retardation.” AR 

1504-05. 

On February 11, 2013, Mr. Collins again extended the Cameron School offer by 

letter and e-mail. AR 884-85, 1301-02, 1506. In the letter, Mr. Collins reminded Dr. 

Habash that the assessment was being conducted pursuant to the terms of the May 25, 

2010 Settlement Agreement, and that pursuant to that Agreement, the District was 

entitled to conduct a psychoeducational and behavior evaluation of Student, and also to 

select and fund SL and OT assessments by NPA providers. AR 884, 1301. 

Mr. Collins noted that the Settlement Agreement provided that the Agreement itself 

constituted consent for the District to conduct those assessments, and that the family had 

agreed to make Student available for those assessments in his current educational 

placement and at a District site. AR 884, 1301. He stated that the District was entitled to 

conduct its triennial assessment of Student using the assessments and methods that the 

assessors, in their professional opinion, believed to be appropriate. AR 884, 1301. He 

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stated that the District would not accept additional conditions on the evaluation process, 

and added that if Dr. Habash were dissatisfied with the assessments after they were 

completed, she could at that time exercise her rights as delineated in the Notice of 

Procedural Safeguards and Parents’ Rights. AR 884, 1301. 

Mr. Collins stated further that the District was not willing to amend the Settlement 

Agreement to include a social cognitive assessment, as it believed the assessments 

described in the Agreement were sufficient to provide the IEP team with the information 

required to develop an appropriate program for Student. AR 885, 1302. He reiterated 

that if Dr. Habash disagreed with the assessments or results after they were completed 

and presented to Student’s IEP team, she could exercise her Parent’s rights at that time, 

but added that the District was under no obligation to provide her with an explanation for 

every test or assessment procedure the District assessors chose to use. AR 885, 1302. 

Mr. Collins emphasized that Dr. Habash watching and listening could alter the 

testing environment and affect the accuracy of test results. AR 1506. Mr. Collins then 

stated that if Dr. Habash did not contact Dr. Jourdan by February 15, 2013, to set up the 

remainder of Student’s testing schedule, the District would assume that Dr. Habash did 

not intend to allow the District to conduct any further assessments of Student. AR 1506. 

In response, Dr. Habash did not comment on the District's explanation as to why 

she could not be present for the assessment, but instead simply repeated her request 

that the testing occur in a room with a one-way mirror with sound where she could see 

and hear the testing take place. AR 1507. Dr. Habash subsequently admitted she did 

not contact Dr. Jourdan as requested. AR 3449. 

Almost four weeks later, on March 9, 2013, Dr. Habash returned the BASC II 

rating scale1provided to her by Dr. Jourdan. AR 1534. Dr. Jourdan responded by 

offering to schedule a time to complete the psychoeducational and behavioral 

 

1

 The BASC II rating scale is a tool used in the behavioral and emotional 

assessment of a child. AR 1724-25. 

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assessments. AR 1534. Dr. Habash stated that she would refrain from discussion at that 

time and directed Dr. Jourdan to contact her employer as the parties were in due 

process. AR 1534. Dr. Jourdan interpreted this response to mean that Dr. Habash 

would no longer communicate with her and would not make Student available for 

assessment. AR 1853-54; see also AR 1892-95. 

However, Dr. Habash contacted the District again on March 18 and 20, 2013, 

reiterating her request that the District assess Student in a room where she could both 

see and hear the testing. AR 886, 1511-12. Mr. Collins once again responded offering 

the Cameron School option and requesting that Dr. Habash contact Dr. Jourdan to 

schedule the assessment. AR 1511. 

On April 18 and 19, 2013, Dr. Habash forwarded progress and assessment reports 

prepared by herself and Student’s home-school teacher, consisting of over 800 pages, to 

Mr. Collins. AR 1611, 3299, 3825, 3828. Mr. Collins printed the reports and provided 

them to Ora Anderson, the District’s Director of Special Education, for consideration by 

the IEP Team. AR 3828, 3961, 3975-76. Just prior to the IEP meeting on April 24, 2013, 

Dr. Habash also forwarded to Ms. Anderson proposed English language arts and applied 

math goals she wished to have incorporated into the IEP. AR 1523.

Student’s annual and triennial IEP Team meeting was convened by the District on 

April 24, 2013, and was concluded on May 21, 2013. The purpose of the meeting was to 

comply with the Settlement Agreement and to ensure that Student had an IEP in place at 

the start of the 2013-2014 school year. AR 1329-1368, 3973. Ms. Anderson was the 

administrative designee for the two IEP meeting sessions. AR 3971. As the 

administrative designee, Ms. Anderson was part of the IEP Team, helped make decisions 

about program services and placement, facilitated the scheduling of meetings, and sent 

out meeting notices. AR 3972. 

The April 24, 2013, meeting lasted two or three hours. AR 2973, 3395, 3715, 

3979-80. In addition to Ms. Anderson and Dr. Habash, the meeting was attended by 

Barbara McIntyre (General Education Teacher), Cathy Sanchez-Corea (Special 

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Education/Full Inclusion Teacher), Dr. April Jourdan (District School Psychologist and 

Behaviorist), Jennifer Marie Ogar (Speech and Language Pathologist), Rosalind Brown 

(District Special Education Program Specialist), Shannon J. Riehle (Student’s home 

school teacher), and Marion McLean (neutral facilitator). AR 1337-1338, 1610, 2972-73, 

3621, 3973, 3980-82, 4262. Elizabeth Bianchi Isono (Occupational Therapist), who had 

conducted the OT assessment of Student, was not present at the April 24, 2013 meeting 

because of a scheduling conflict. AR 3607-08. 3982-83. 

The psychoeducational and behavioral assessments were never completed due to 

Parents’ refusal to make Student available for those assessments, and only the SL and 

OT evaluations were complete at the time of the April 24, 2013 meeting. AR 1336, 1890-

91, 1902, 3974-75. While the members of the IEP Team reviewed Ms. Ogar's SL 

evaluation and discussed goals, they did not review the OT report, as Ms. Isono was not 

present at the meeting. After the SL discussion, Ms. Anderson suggested that the 

meeting participants take a break to review Dr. Habash’s reports before they were 

presented since the full IEP Team had not had a chance to review them. AR 1337, 3990. 

Dr. Habash was not agreeable to this suggestion. AR 3990-91. Instead, Dr. Habash and 

Ms. Riehle immediately presented information from the reports to the Team. AR 1337, 

1902, 2973, 3297-98, 3991. 

Dr. Habash actively participated in the IEP meeting process. AR 1337-1338, 

1920, 2973, 3622, 3983. In addition to discussing the hundreds of pages of data she had 

provided, she asked questions, provided input, and expressed her concerns about 

Student’s assessments. AR 1336-37, 1920-21, 3622, 3983. Her input and reports were 

also discussed and considered by the Team. AR 1336-37, 1906-07, 3983, 4265. A 

follow-up Team meeting was scheduled to discuss any further questions regarding the 

proposed SL goals, to allow the team sufficient time to read the Parent reports and 

proposals, to discuss the OT report with Ms. Isono (who had been unable to attend the 

April 24, 2013 meeting), and to complete the IEP process. AR 1337, 3720-21, 3991-92. 

The follow-up meeting was originally scheduled for May 9, 2013. AR 3992. On 

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May 4, 2013, Dr. Habash sent an e-mail asking Ms. Anderson and Mr. Collins to explain 

“the purpose of the IEP you have requested for May 9, 2013,” and telling them to send 

her “the agenda of the proposed meeting” by Monday, May 6, 2013. AR 1525. On May 

8, 2013, Dr. Habash informed the District that she would be unable to attend the IEP 

Team meeting, and stating that she would not give permission for the District to hold the 

meeting in her absence. AR 1526-27, 3996. The meeting was rescheduled to May 21, 

2013. AR 1527, 3996. 

On May 17, 2013, Dr. Habash sent yet another e-mail in which she asserted that 

the District had “decided not to assess” Student, and that it had not answered her 

“repeated offer to assess” Student before the upcoming IEP. AR 1513. In response, Mr. 

Collins sent a letter on May 20, 2013, in which he emphasized that the District had been 

attempting to complete the psychoeducational and behavior assessments since January 

2013 and had consistently offered to conduct the assessments at Cameron School, but 

that Dr. Habash had refused the offer because of her insistence that she be permitted to 

hear the assessments as well. AR 1377. Mr. Collins again explained that the conditions 

Dr. Habash sought to impose were not acceptable as they could alter the testing 

environment and affect the validity of the test results. AR 1378. Dr. Habash responded 

to the letter via a brief e-mail on May 20, 2013, stating that she disagreed with the District 

and claiming that the District had decided not to complete the assessments, after her 

“repeated offers to avail [Student] for completion of the assessments.” AR 1514. 

Prior to the May 21, 2013 continuation meeting, Ms. Anderson sent the members 

of the IEP Team, including Dr. Habash, a copy of the agenda and the draft goals that 

would be presented. AR 1528-30. The May 21, 2013, Team meeting lasted three or four 

hours. AR 3317, 3628. During the meeting, Dr. Habash presented additional information 

regarding Student’s home-school program. AR 1338-39, 1902, 4014-15. The IEP Team 

then discussed the District's proposed goals and objectives in which the goals were 

reviewed and input was received by various Team members, including Dr. Habash. AR 

1338-39, 3317, 3627, 4017, 4297. 

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The meeting participants also discussed a variety of placement options for 

Student. AR 1338-39, 4021, 4304-05, 4307. These options included a District fullinclusion program; placement in a District special day class; continuation of the homebased program; 1:1 instruction on a public school site with access to “ABA-trained typical 

peers” for social thinking and “lunch bunch” as requested by Parents; Star Academy, a 

nonpublic school; and Anova Center for Education ("Anova") School, another nonpublic 

school. AR 1338-40, 1915-17, 3640, 4022-27, 4304-07. The discussion regarding 

placement options and services lasted between sixty and ninety minutes and all 

members of the IEP Team participated, although Dr. Habash insisted that Ms. Anderson 

speak last. AR 1338-39, 3331, 3484-86, 3626, 4021-23, 4305, 4353-54. 

When it was her turn to provide input regarding a possible placement, Ms. 

Anderson expressed concerns about Student’s ability to transition directly from an 

isolated home program to a public school setting, and she suggested Anova because, 

after considering the information from Parents and the IEP team members, she believed 

it would best suit Student’s needs. AR 1339-40, 4026-28. Ms. Anderson testified that 

she had contacted Anova in January or February 2013 to collect general information 

about the school regarding its enrollment process, the type of student it works with, and 

what services it offers, as the District had several students that it was considering for 

placement there. AR 4028-30. 

Anova is a certified non-public school designed to serve students who are living 

with autism, ADHD-specific learning disabilities, speech and language impairments, and 

other disabling conditions recognized by the state of California in a setting that is 

primarily academic in nature. AR 2609. The middle school program at the Anova 

Concord campus where Student would be enrolled would have between 8-10 students, 

and Student would be provided with both individual and small-group instruction, as 

needed. AR 1627.

Andrew Bailey, Anova’s founder and Executive Director, testified at the due 

process hearing that Anova’s student population comprises approximately 70 per cent 

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autistic students, and about 30 per cent students with learning disabilities, speech and 

language impairment, attention deficit hyperactive disorder, and other disorders. AR 

2611. He also testified that of the students on the autistic spectrum, all are highfunctioning, “if not Asberger’s” (a diagnosis he stated no longer exists under the DSM-5). 

AR 2612. 

Ms. Anderson recommended placement in a nonpublic school environment, and 

Anova in particular, because the program is in a small, controlled setting; all staff are 

trained in ABA methods, which were being utilized with Student in his home program; 

Student would be with same age peers, both neurotypical and other students with varying 

degrees of autism, throughout the school day; the program has a strong social skills 

component; the program can be individualized to meet a particular student's needs; 

related services are available on site; and the program has a strong academic 

component. AR 1440-41, 2609, 2611, 2640, 4026, 4033-4037. 

At the due process hearing, Mr. Bailey reviewed the IEP developed during the 

April 24, and May 21, 2013 IEP Team meeting and concluded the that goals, program 

and placement described could be appropriately implemented at Anova. AR 2607. Also 

at the due process hearing, various Team members concurred that Anova would be an 

appropriate placement for Student, particularly as a transitional placement between his 

home-based program and eventual placement in a public school program. AR 1918 (Dr. 

Jourdan), 3672 (Ms. Ogar), 4040 (Ms. Anderson), 4315, 4343 (Ms. Brown). Some Team 

members also expressed concerns that the transition from a home-based program to a 

full inclusion program, in which Student would be in general education for the length of 

the school day or different type of classroom on a public middle school campus, would be 

too difficult considering his sensitivity to noise and lack of familiarity with a school setting 

for several years. AR 1919 (Dr. Jourdan), 3729-32 (Ms. Ogar), 4138 (Ms. Anderson), 

4315 (Ms. Brown). 

Team members testified that they considered the programs being recommended 

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one program in a separate classroom on a public school campus with an ABA-trained 

teacher and interaction with ABA-trained peer mentors for approximately one hour per 

day – were too restrictive for Student. AR 1918-19 (Dr. Jourdan), 3645-46 (Ms. Ogar), 

4111 (Ms. Anderson), 4318-19 (Ms. Brown). Some expressed concern that Student 

required on-going, direct interaction with peers, which could not be achieved in a one-onone setting either at home or in a separate classroom on a public school campus. AR 

1339 (IEP Meeting Notes), 1918-19 (Dr. Jourdan), 3645-46 (Ms. Ogar), 4111 (Ms. 

Anderson), 4318-19 (Ms. Brown). 

Based on the discussion at the IEP Team meeting, which included a review of 

multiple placement options by all members of the IEP team, the District offered 

placement at Anova. AR 1329-30, 4026. The District concluded that Anova appeared to 

be the best school for addressing the concerns of the IEP Team and Parents regarding 

Student’s social skills and need to socialize, and because it had staff trained in ABA 

methods. AR 4026-27. The District also offered individual SL therapy for 30 minutes, 

two times per week; OT consultation for 60 minutes monthly; and special education 

transportation. AR 1329-30. 

Parents did not agree that Anova was an appropriate placement for Student. AR 

1340, 1367-68. According to an e-mail dated June 5, 2013, Dr. Habash requested on

May 31, 2013 that she be provided with a guided tour of Anova. AR 1515. The District 

arranged for her to visit Anova on June 20, 2013, but on June 10, 2013, before the 

scheduled visit, she sent Mr. Collins an e-mail stating that she had “talked to Anova” that 

day, and “realized that their ACE School does not fit my child’s needs.” AR 1516. Thus, 

she requested that the District cancel the upcoming visit. AR 1516. However, she 

continued to send e-mails to Mr. Collins with questions regarding transportation (for 

Student) to Anova, and regarding Anova’s student composition. AR 1517-10, 1521-22. 

She also sent e-mails to Mr. Bailey at Anova in which she asked questions about the 

program. AR 2680-81. 

Mr. Collins sent Dr. Habash an e-mail on July 13, 2013, again offering to arrange 

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for a visit to Anova so that she could obtain answers to her questions by observing the 

program and speaking with staff. AR 1521. Dr. Bailey testified that Parents did 

eventually visit the school, in July 2013, at which time they asked questions of Mr. Bailey 

and looked at the classrooms, and Mr. Bailey explained the next steps in the referral and 

intake process. AR 2680-82. 

Parents ultimately rejected the District's May 21, 2103, placement offer and have 

not consented to any part of the IEP. Parents filed a due process complaint on behalf of 

Student on March 27, 2013, and the District filed two due process complaints, on April 9, 

2013, and June 17, 2013. All three cases were consolidated on June 29, 2013. An open 

due process hearing was held before ALJ Adeniyi A. Ayoade of the OAH, over 12 days in 

September-October 2013. 

Parents and Student argued that the District denied Student a FAPE by failing to 

complete the triennial assessments that it had previously agreed to conduct pursuant to 

the May 2010 settlement agreement between the parties, and thus failing to have or write 

“measurable present levels of performance” and “appropriate goals” in his triennial IEP. 

Parents and Student argued further that the District denied Student a FAPE by offering 

him a placement that was not the least restrictive environment, because he could benefit 

from a full-inclusion program in a public school setting, and because Anova, the 

placement offered by the District, had no typically developing peers. Finally, Parents and 

Student asserted that in failing to consider the recommendations of Dr. Habash and Ms. 

Riehle, and failing to sufficiently discuss the placement offer at the IEP Team meetings, 

the District predetermined Student’s placement, thereby denying him a FAPE. AR 1600.

The District argued that it had been unable to complete the triennial 

psychoeducational and behavior assessments of Student because Parents had insisted 

that Mother be allowed to both see and hear the assessments. The District asserted that 

it was entitled to complete the assessments of Student without any conditions or 

restrictions, and that Student was not entitled to independent evaluations in the areas of 

social skills and speech and language, at public expense, because it had not been 

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allowed to complete its triennial reassessment of Student, and because its SL 

assessment of Student was appropriate. The District argued that its IEP placement was 

the least restrictive environment, as it was designed to meet and address Student’s 

unique needs and provide educational benefit, based on the information available 

regarding Student at the time the IEP was developed. The District asserted that there 

was no evidence the offer was predetermined, and that it had complied with all relevant 

laws, substantively and procedurally, and that Parents were allowed to provide input and 

meaningfully participate in the IEP development process prior to the District’s making the 

offer. AR 1600. 

On December 2, 2013, the ALJ issued a written decision, finding in the District’s 

favor, and against Student, on all issues. AR 1597-1643. The ALJ ordered Parents to 

make Student available, within 30 days of the date of the decision, for the 

psychoeducational and behavior assessments pursuant to the May 2010 Settlement 

Agreement or the November 15, 2012 Assessment Plan. AR 1642. The ALJ further 

ordered the District to complete its assessments of Student and to hold an IEP team 

meeting within 60 days of the date of the order. AR 1643. The ALJ directed that at the 

IEP, the District must review the results of the assessments, and make all appropriate 

revisions to the Student’s IEP, including placement and services. AR 1643. Finally, the 

ALJ ordered that if Parents failed to present Student for the assessments as ordered, the 

District would have no further obligation to provide a FAPE for Student. AR 1643. 

Plaintiffs did not make Student available, and the District was unable to complete 

the assessments. Plaintiffs filed the present action on February 28, 2014. Each side 

now seeks summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

The IDEA provides that “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision” 

reached through the state administrative hearing process “shall have the right to bring a 

civil action with respect to the complaint . . . in a district court of the United States.” 20 

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U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). A challenge under the IDEA may be procedural or substantive, or 

both. J.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431, 432-33 (9th Cir. 2010). When 

analyzing whether a school district provided a student a FAPE, the court must first 

consider “whether the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act.” Doug C., 

720 F.3d at 1043; see also J.W., 626 F. 3d at 432. Second, the court must determine 

“whether the IEP is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational 

benefits.” Doug C., 720 F.3d at 1043; see also J.W., 626 F.3d at 432-33. A state must 

meet both requirements to comply with the obligations of the IDEA. Doug C., 720 F.3d at 

1043; see also R.B., 496 F.3d at 938 (reviewing court considers a school district’s 

procedural compliance with the IDEA before reaching the IEP’s substance).

While the petitioning party bears the burden of proof at the administrative level, 

Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 57 (2005), the party challenging an 

administrative decision in federal district court has the burden of persuasion on his or her 

claim, J.W., 626 F.3d at 438 (citing Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396 

(9th Cir. 1994)). In such actions, the court receives the administrative record, hears any 

additional evidence, and issues a decision based on the preponderance of the evidence. 

J.W., 626 F.3d at 438 (citing R.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 937 

(9th Cir. 2007)). “[C]omplete de novo review of the administrative proceeding is 

inappropriate.” Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2007). 

In exercising its power of independent review, the court should give “due weight” 

to judgments of educational policy, and should not substitute its own notions of sound 

educational policy for those of the school authority which it reviews. Deference to an 

administrative officer is appropriate in matters arising under the IDEA “for the same 

reasons that it makes sense in the review of any other agency action – agency expertise, 

the decision of the political branches to vest the decision initially in an agency, and the 

costs imposed on all parties of having still another person redecide the matter from 

scratch.” Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir.1995) 

(quoting Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).

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However, “judicial review in IDEA cases differs substantially from judicial review of 

other agency actions, in which courts generally are confined to the administrative record 

and are held to a highly deferential standard of review.” Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1471. In IDEA 

cases, courts give “less deference than is conventional” in the review of administrative 

decisions. Id. at 1472. However, “[t]he amount of deference accorded the hearing 

officer's findings increases where they are ‘thorough and careful.’” Capistrano, 59 F.3d at 

891; see Anchorage, 689 F.3d at 1053. Where the administrative record shows that the 

hearing officer’s findings are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, “the court is 

free to accept or reject the findings in part or in whole.” Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1311 

(citation omitted), quoted in Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1474; see also Ash v. Lake Oswego Sch. 

Dist., 980 F.2d 585, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In the present case, the court finds that the ALJ’s decision was comprehensive 

and thorough. The court has independently reviewed the evidence and confirmed the 

ALJ’s references to the record, and gives considerable deference to his factual 

determinations. See Capistrano, 59 F.3d at 891.

 B. The Parties’ Motions

Plaintiffs argue that the District denied Student a FAPE by failing to complete the 

psychoeducational and behavioral assessments it agreed to in the May 2010 Settlement

Agreement; by failing to offer placement in the least-restrictive environment in the April 

24, 2013 and May 21, 2013 IEP; and by predetermining Student’s placement and failing 

to consider the recommendations of his IEP Team members who were in attendance at 

the IEP team meetings of April 24, 2013 and May 21, 2013. 

The District argues that it did not fail to offer Student a FAPE, and that it is entitled 

to complete its triennial psychoeducational and behavior assessments of Student absent 

parental consent and without parentally-imposed conditions or restrictions. 

1. Failure to complete psychoeducational and behavioral assessments 

Plaintiffs contend that the District denied Student a FAPE by failing to complete 

the psychoeducational and behavioral assessments, as agreed in the May 2010 

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Settlement Agreement and the November 15, 2010 Assessment Plan. 

Plaintiffs assert that the District’s failure to conduct the agreed-upon assessments 

constituted a breach of the Settlement Agreement. They argue that it was incumbent on 

the District to set a time, place, and date for the assessments, and that the District’s 

refusal to allow Mother to fully “participate” in the assessments by seeing and hearing 

them was unreasonable because Mother made clear that she would do nothing to alter 

the testing environment. They contend that the District’s claim that Parents would not 

have produced Student for the assessments was “pure speculation.” 

They assert further that the District’s refusal to permit Mother to see and hear the 

assessment was unlawful, in that it violated 34 C.F.R. § 300.501(b)(1) (“The parents of a 

child with a disability must be afforded an opportunity to participate in meetings with 

respect to . . . [t]he identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the child.”). 

Finally, they contend that the California Department of Education permits parents to fully 

observe (see and hear) the administration of assessments at its state-funded Diagnostic 

Centers, which they believe supports their position that Mother’s demand was 

reasonable. 

The ALJ found that Student failed to meet his burden on this issue. AR 1641-42. 

The ALJ found that the assessments were not completed because Parents did not permit 

the District to complete them, and did not otherwise make Student available for the 

assessments without the parentally-imposed condition that Mother be allowed to see and 

hear the assessments. AR 1630, 1632, 1641. The ALJ found further that Student had 

failed to establish that the District violated any law or legal obligation to Student or 

Parents by refusing to allow Mother the ability to observe the District’s assessment of 

Student. AR 1630-31. 

The ALJ found that the evidence showed that District had denied Parents’ request 

to observe the assessment due to its concerns about test validity and integrity, its longstanding policy and procedures for assessments, and overall concerns that the testing 

environment would be altered by Mother’s presence, which might then affect the validity 

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of the assessment results. AR 1631. Conversely, the ALJ found that Student had not 

shown that the District’s position, policy, and practices were either unreasonable or 

unlawful. AR 1631. 

In ruling that the District could conduct the assessments, the ALJ specifically 

concluded that the demand to observe the assessments amounted to imposition of 

improper conditions or restrictions on the assessments, as to which the District had no 

obligation to accept or accommodate. AR 1632. In addition, the ALJ found that the 

District had met its burden of showing that it was entitled to complete its triennial 

assessments of Student absent parental consent and without parentally imposed 

conditions or restrictions. AR 1634-35. 

The court agrees with the decision below. The District did not deny Student a 

FAPE by failing to complete the psychoeducational and behavior assessments, because 

Parents would not consent to the assessments. The record shows that Parents made it 

clear to the District that they would not produce Student for the assessments unless the 

District gave in to their demand that Mother be allowed to fully observe (see and hear) 

the administration of the assessments. 

The court finds that parents’ condition that they be allowed to see and hear the 

assessment was unreasonable, and they effectively withdrew their consent by insisting 

on that condition. The ALJ accurately concluded that the District’s failure to complete the 

required assessments was caused by Parents’ interference and denial of consent, and 

that the request to observe the assessment amounted to the imposition of improper 

conditions or restrictions on the assessments, which the District had no obligation to 

accept or accommodate.

At the due process hearing, the only reason that Mother could articulate for 

wanting to observe the assessments was to ensure “the integrity” of the assessments’ 

results. By contrast, the District established that it was a long-standing and wellsupported District policy and procedure to preclude parental observation of assessments, 

and that its policy was based on concerns that the observation might alter the testing 

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environment and affect the validity of the assessments’ results. 

Plaintiffs have provided no legal authority granting them the right to observe either 

the psychoeducational or behavior assessment, and likewise provided no evidence that 

the District violated any law or obligation by refusing to allow Mother to observe the 

assessments. The regulation cited by plaintiffs is to no effect here, as it mandates only 

that parents be afforded an opportunity to participate in meetings “with respect to” 

assignments. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.510. It does not impose a requirement that parents 

be allowed to participate in the actual assessments or evaluations of students, as 

plaintiffs claim. Moreover, the references to Student’s Mother being permitted to observe 

assessments by another assessor (and the references to the practice at the Diagnostic 

Center) are not relevant to the issue whether the District is legally required to permit 

Parents to see and hear every assessment it conducts. 

Finally, plaintiffs’ argument that Mother never refused to produce her son and that 

the District is speculating when it claims that she would not have produced him is 

specifically contradicted by the record. As detailed above, Dr. Jourdan sent Dr. Habash 

an e-mail on January 9, 2013, stating that she wanted to arrange a time to assess 

Student and offering the dates of January 14 or 16, 2013. That same day, Dr. Habash 

responded, but ignored the proposed dates and made clear that she would agree to 

schedule the assessment only if the District accepted her condition: “I will be willing to 

wait outside as long as you use a one-sided mirrored room, where I can observe (see 

and hear) my child being tested. Please let me know when you find such an 

arrangement in proximity to our hometown. We will be able to continue our scheduling 

from there.” Dr. Jourdan reasonably interpreted this e-mail to mean that Dr. Habash 

would make Student available for assessments only if her condition was met. 

Subsequently, on February 11, 2013, the District sent an e-mail advising Dr. 

Habash that if she did not contact Dr. Jourdan by February 15, 2013, to set up the 

remainder of Student’s testing schedule, the District would assume that Dr. Habash did 

not intend to allow the District to conduct any further assessments of Student. Based on 

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this, Dr. Habash’s silence clearly communicated to the District that she was refusing to 

produce Student for the assessments. 

Plaintiffs’ argument that the District should have set a time and date for the 

assessments in the hope that Student would show up is illogical, as there is no evidence 

indicating that Parents were ever willing to produce Student. Parents made no effort to 

schedule the assessments despite the District’s numerous attempts, and they made it 

clear that they would not produce Student unless the District met their demand. Dr. 

Jourdan initially provided proposed dates, but instead of accepting one of the dates or 

proposing alternative ones, Dr. Habash stated that scheduling could continue only after 

the District agreed to her condition. 

In an effort to compromise, the District offered Dr. Habash the opportunity to 

watch, but not hear, the assessments through a one-way mirror (even though no such 

requirement was imposed by law), and even repeated this offer numerous times in letters 

and e-mails. However, Dr. Habash repeatedly ignored the District’s communications, and 

refused to contact Dr. Jourdan to set up a time to complete the assessments. For this 

reason, it would have been pointless to unilaterally schedule assessments and reserve 

people’s time and other resources when completion was unlikely. 

Thus, the ALJ reasonably found that “Parents inappropriately refused to allow [the] 

District to complete its triennial assessments.” The ALJ ordered that the District shall “be 

allowed to conduct its assessments of Student in all areas of suspected disability,” 

without interference. 

The court finds further that the District has met its burden of showing it was 

entitled to complete its triennial assessments of Student absent parental consent and 

without parentally-imposed conditions or restrictions. The evidence shows that at all 

times, the District was attempting to complete Student’s assessments to provide him with 

the special education services to which he is entitled. 

A school district is required to conduct a reevaluation if it “determines that the 

educational or related services needs, including improved academic achievement and 

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functional performance, of the child warrant a reevaluation.” 20 U.S.C § 1414(a)(2)(A)(i), 

Cal. Educ. Code § 56381(a). Such reassessments must occur at least once every three 

years unless the parents and the school district agree that a reevaluation is not 

necessary. 20 U.S.C § 1414(a)(2)(B), Cal. Educ. Code § 56381(a)(2). 

In the present case, Student had not been evaluated since 2008. Per the 

Settlement Agreement, the District and Parents agreed to extend the three-year period 

and allow the District to reevaluate Student in 2013 instead of 2011. Thus, in 2013, five 

years after the District’s last assessments, a reevaluation was necessary for the District 

to make accurate determinations regarding Student’s current educational placement and 

needed special education services. Furthermore, both the Settlement Agreement and 

the Assessment Plan show that the District was entitled to complete the assessments. 

While it is true that Parents did not sign the Assessment Plan, the ALJ was correct in 

finding that the District could move forward with the assessments because it was required 

to conduct a triennial assessment.

The court finds that because the District has no obligation to accept or 

accommodate Parents’ demand to see and hear the assessments as they are 

administered, there is no impediment to the District proceeding to complete both the 

psychoeducational and behavior assessments without any parentally imposed conditions 

and restrictions.

2. Failure to offer placement in LRE

Plaintiffs assert that the District denied Student a FAPE by failing to offer 

placement in the least restrictive environment (“LRE”) when placement was offered at 

Anova in the IEP Team meeting session in May 2013. Plaintiffs contend that Anova was 

not the LRE because all the students at Anova are disabled, with the majority on the 

autism spectrum. They argue that in such an environment, Student would be deprived of 

contact with typically developing peers with whom he could learn to socialize. 

The ALJ found that Student failed to meet his burden on this issue. AR 1641. The 

evidence showed that the IEP Team discussed and considered various placement 

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options for Student, and determined that the District could not meet Student’s needs in a 

general education setting. AR 1622-23. Because Student had been in a home-school 

program for three years, during which time he had not socialized with others outside his 

home, and because of the concerns expressed by Student’s mother, sister, and homeschool teacher about Student’s sensitivity to noise, and also because of the large number 

of goals included in his IEP, the Team concluded that a public school setting would not 

be the optimal placement, at least during the period of time when Student would be 

transitioning from the home-school environment. AR 1623. The ALJ found no evidence 

that Student was ready for, or otherwise able to meaningfully participate in, a general 

educational setting, with or without supplementary aids and supports, and that indeed, 

Parents were requesting one-on-one placement in a single-student classroom. AR 1624. 

Analyzing the four factors in the least restrictive environment analysis, see

Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1984), the 

ALJ concluded that Student would not benefit from general education or other public 

school placement because his sensory issues would interfere with his ability to access 

the curriculum and receive academic benefit; that there was no evidence that Student 

would receive any non-academic or social benefits from full-time placement in a regular 

education class, and neither party believed such placement would offer any nonacademic benefit to Student; that Student’s presence might have a negative impact on 

the other students in a general education setting, because Student is used to structured 

learning environment, and becomes disruptive on occasions to express his disagreement 

or displeasure or frustration; and that no evidence had been presented regarding the cost 

of educating Student in a regular class classroom with appropriate services, as compared 

to the cost of educating him in the District’s proposed setting. AR 1624-26. 

The ALJ concluded that Anova was the LRE for Student, because its small-class 

setting could meet Student’s academic needs, and notwithstanding the lack of typically 

developing peers, it could provide Student with educational benefit in the area of social 

skills development, as he would have an opportunity to learn and practice his social skills 

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in a more naturalistic setting and with his peers at Anova. AR 1626-29. By contrast, the 

ALJ found, the evidence did not show that Student would receive meaningful social 

benefit from placement in a public school setting. AR 1626-28. 

The court agrees with the decision below. The District did not deny Student a 

FAPE by failing to offer him placement in the LRE. Under the IDEA, school districts look 

at a “continuum of services” to determine the best program to meet the individual 

student’s unique needs. See Poolaw v. Bishop, 67 F.3d 830, 835 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 

34 C.F.R. §300.551(a)). The question whether to educate a disabled child in a regular 

classroom or in a special education environment is an individualized, fact-specific inquiry, 

and the IDEA’s preference for mainstreaming must be balanced against its requirements 

that schools tailor programs to the specific needs of each disabled child. Id. at 836; see 

also J.W., 626 F.3d at 448. 

The education of a disabled child should take place in the least restrictive 

environment. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (“To the maximum extent appropriate, 

children with disabilities . . . are [to be] educated with children who are not disabled. . . .”). 

However, “[w]hile every effort is to be made to place a student in the least restrictive 

environment, it must be the least restrictive environment which also meets the child's IEP 

goals.” County of San Diego v. Cal. Special Educ. Hearing Office, 93 F.3d 1458, 1468 

(9th Cir. 1996). In determining whether an offered placement is the LRE, courts in the 

Ninth Circuit consider the factors articulated in Rachel H. 

Here, the evidence presented shows that Student would not benefit academically 

from a general education or other public school placement, because his environmental 

and sensory issues would interfere with his ability to access the curriculum. Nor is there 

any evidence that such a placement would offer any non-academic benefit to Student. 

Moreover, there was evidence that until Student had achieved some facility with social 

skills, his presence might have a negative impact on other students in a general 

education setting. See Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1404. The offered placement was in a 

nonpublic school where Student would be educated in small classrooms and receive 

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specialized instruction, including social skills training. Plaintiffs have presented no 

evidence from the record from which the court could conclude that Anova is not the LRE. 

While it is true that not all the assessments were completed as of the time of the 

IEP Team meeting, the evidence presented at the due process hearing showed that 

plaintiffs’ preferred placement of one-on-one instruction by an ABA-trained teacher (in a 

single-student classroom) with lunchtime socialization with volunteer “lunch bunch” of 

typically developing peers, see AR 1339-40, 1624, 3346, 4022-24, 4317-19, and possible 

future gradual exposure to typically developing peers, would be significantly more 

restrictive than the placement offered at Anova, as it would constitute an isolated one-onone environment where Student would remain all day with his teacher, seeing other 

students only during a brief lunch period.2

As noted above, from 2010 until the time of the IEP meeting, plaintiff had been 

educated at home, in isolation, with his mother, his teacher, and occasionally his sister as 

his social contacts. His teacher Ms. Riehle testified that he was taken out only about four 

times in three years. AR 2948-51. Ms. Brown, the District’s Program Specialist, who has 

attended over 550 IEPs, testified that the one-on-one instruction proposed by Dr. Habash 

was more restrictive than Anova because it would restrict Student from the peer 

interaction that takes place within the classroom, and he would be separated from his 

peers. AR 4318-19. Similarly, Dr. Jourdan testified that the one-on-one environment

would prevent him from working on social skills through interaction with other people. AR 

1918-19. Ms. Ogar, the speech therapist, testified that Student could not achieve speech 

goals with only occasional peer interaction. AR 3645-46. Accordingly, because Student 

would not receive the benefit of regular social skills training and would have his speech 

goals hindered, plaintiffs’ desired placement cannot be considered the LRE. 

Dr. Habash and Student’s home-school teacher Ms. Riehle generally agreed that 

full-time placement in a general education classroom would not be the proper placement 

 

2 Moreover, plaintiffs failed to show that it would be feasible to implement a program of 

lunchtime socialization by a group of ABA-trained student “volunteers.”

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for several reasons. Dr. Habash stated that Student was very sensitive to noise and 

crowds and that he could not be in a classroom with lots of other children. AR 1622, 

1339, 4354. Both Ms. Riehle and Ms. Isono agreed with Dr. Habash that noise was a 

concern. AR 1622, 1339, 3028. Ms. Riehle even noted that she would have to warn 

Student of impending noise such as the sharping of a pencil. AR 1621, 1338. 

Members of the team also had a serious concern regarding Student’s ability to 

transition from a home based program to a public school campus considering Student’s 

individual goals and the services needed. AR 1624, 1339, 1919, 3731-32. Ms. Riehle 

noted that a general education setting would be challenging due to all the different 

service providers. AR 1622, 1339. In addition, plaintiff’s older sister testified that she did 

not think that Student would be ready for a general education placement for one or two 

years. AR 1339. Based on this, the District contends that mainstreaming in a general 

education setting was never considered a viable option.

The evidence shows that the placement at Anova would address the concerns 

regarding Student’s noise sensitivity, his inability to be in a class with numerous students, 

and the difficulty he may have transitioning out of a home-based program, in that Anova 

provides a small and controlled environment and structure with classes of no more than 

seven to nine students. AR 2638. In addition, all teachers at Anova are trained in ABA, 

which satisfies Mother’s demand in that regard. AR 2640, 2658-59, 4033, 4212. 

“[T]he IDEA accords educators discretion to select from various methods for 

meeting the individualized needs of a student, provided those practices are reasonably 

calculated to provide him with educational benefit.’” R.P. v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist., 

631 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2011)). Under the circumstances, the fact that the District 

did not agree with Mother, and the fact that the District felt that the placement at Anova 

was the best place for Student, at least for the period following the April/May 2013 IEP 

Team meeting sessions, does not amount to a denial of a FAPE. 

3. Improper predetermination of placement 

Plaintiffs contend that the offer of placement at Anova was “predetermined” and 

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thus resulted in denial of a FAPE. They assert that the “consensus” of the IEP team was 

for placement in Student’s own classroom with a one-to-one ABA trained teacher; that 

the offer of Anova preceded the completion of the IEP; that the District did not know if 

Anova would take Student at the time the offer was made; and that no representative of 

Anova was present at the IEP meeting, as required under 34 C.F.R. § 300.325. 

The ALJ found that Student failed to meet his burden on this issue. AR 1640. The 

ALJ found no evidence that the District had decided on its offer prior to the IEP meeting, 

and to the contrary, found that the District had complied with the procedures set forth in 

the IDEA, particularly with regard to providing Parents with an opportunity to fully and 

meaningfully participate in Student’s IEP meeting. AR 1629, 1640. Moreover, the ALJ 

found, the evidence showed that all of Student’s IEP Team members participated and 

were able to express their views and make recommendations, and there was no 

evidence that the District failed to consider the recommendations of the Team members 

who had knowledge of Student. AR 1629-30, 1640. The ALJ added that the fact that the 

District did not offer the placement that Parents wanted did not mean that the District had

predetermined Student’s placement. AR 1630.

The court agrees with the decision below. “Predetermination occurs when an 

educational agency has made a determination prior to the IEP meeting, including when it 

presents one educational placement option at the meeting and is unwilling to consider 

other alternatives.” Z.F. v. Ripon Unified School Dist., 2013 WL 127662, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 

2013) (citation omitted). A school district may not arrive at an IEP team meeting with a 

“take it or leave it” offer. J.G. v. Douglas County School Dist., 552 F.3d 786, 801, n.10 

(9th Cir. 2008); Z.F., 2013 WL 127662, at *6. “Courts in [the Ninth] Circuit have rarely 

found that a school district’s predetermining a student’s IEP rises to the level of a 

redressable violation of the IDEA procedures.” Z.F., 2013 WL 127662 at *6.

With regard to plaintiffs’ claim that placement at Anova was contrary to the Team 

“consensus” that Student belonged in a general education full-inclusion environment with 

special services and typically developing peers, this misrepresents the record, as there 

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was no consensus that Student would be best served by isolating him in his own 

classroom with a one-to-one teacher as plaintiffs proposed. Indeed, the evidence shows 

that most of the IEP Team was against a one-on-one placement. It appears to have 

been Mother alone who requested the isolated one-on-one instruction for most of the 

school day, with a social/lunch group during the lunch break. AR 1339-40, 1624, 3346,

4022-24, 4047-48, 4317. Members of the Team criticized this option, as Student had for 

three years been isolated in a home program and needed to move into an environment 

where he could work on social skills with peers. See, e.g., AR 4046-47 (Ms. Anderson). 

For example, Ms. Brown, the District’s Program Specialist, testified that the oneon-one approach is “restricting [Student] from being provided the peer interaction that 

takes place in a classroom, and you’re separated from the rest of the kids.” AR 4318-19. 

She opined that Parents’ recommendation of a lunch time socialization program (with 

“volunteer” ABA-trained students) was not sufficient because overall it was a very 

restrictive placement. AR 4319. She also noted that a one-on-one placement on a public 

school campus would be a noisy environment – something that Student’s Mother 

acknowledged was problematic. AR 4319, 4354. 

The school psychologist, Dr. Jourdan, expressed that it was critical for Student to 

work on his social skills and interact with other people as part of his educational program, 

and she explained that “the critical areas are developing his social skills and him learning 

how to interact with other people. I think direct teaching of these skills is important, but I 

also think you need to be having the exposure with other people to learn social skills 

instead of just learning those skills in isolation.” AR 1918-19. She was clear in her 

opinion that placement on a public school campus was not appropriate. AR 1919. 

The speech pathologist, Ms. Ogar, testified that Student needed to be in a 

classroom with other students to achieve his speech goals, and that she did not think that 

having one-on-one instruction with occasional peer interactions would be sufficient. AR 

3645-46. The District’s Director of Special Education, Ms. Anderson, testified that she 

had the support of the team – with the exception of Student’s Mother – when Anova was 

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specifically suggested. AR 4040-47. 

Second, with regard to whether the offer of placement preceded the completion of 

the IEP and the development of goals, the evidence shows that the Anova was properly 

offered and discussed. Predetermination involves the question whether the school 

district is exhibiting a “take it or leave it” position with the parents and refusing to consider 

options and have open discussions with the team. Here, the record reflects that a 

substantial period of time was spent discussing Student’s program, with participation by 

Mother. AR 1338-40, 1915-17, 3331, 3484-86, 3640, 4021-27, 4304-07, 4353-54. The 

IEP meeting was convened over two days. In fact, the meeting was adjourned and 

reconvened so that the entire team could review the extensive reports prepared by 

Mother and his teacher. AR 902-50, 1336-67. 

Plaintiffs assert that the draft goals were not appropriate, although they cite no 

support for this claim. They also contend that the draft goals were set too high and still 

required revision, citing testimony by Ms. Anderson, who recalled discussion at the IEP 

meeting about “modifying the goals so that these things would be at [Student]’s reading 

level.” Ms. Anderson also testified, however, that the general consensus was that the 

goals required some revision, or “tweaking,” but with some input from Ms. Riehle; but that 

before the placement was offered, when Ms. Brown had a conversation with Ms. Riehle 

asking for her input, Ms. Riehle offered no input, so there was no revision. AR 4188-92.

As for plaintiffs’ contention that the offer was predetermined because the District 

did not know if Anova would take Student, and no Anova representative was present at 

the IEP meeting as required under 34 C.F.R. § 300.325, this assertion does not support a

finding of predetermination, as not having a representative from the school at the IEP 

meeting would support the conclusion that no decision regarding placement had been 

made in advance of the meeting. Further, a careful reading of the regulation shows that 

where a representative of the nonpublic school cannot be present at the IEP meeting, the

agency can ensure full participation in other ways. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.325(a)(2). 

Here, there was no procedural violation that amounted to a denial of FAPE. After 

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making the offer, the District arranged for Parents to meet with Anova personnel so that 

any questions or concerns could be addressed. Parents visited Anova on July 18, 2013. 

AR 4028-31; 4056; 2680-81. Mr. Bailey (Anova’s Director), Ms. Anderson, and Parents 

all met to discuss the program at which time Parents were able to ask questions (which 

they did) and visit several elementary and secondary classes. AR 4028-29; 4056-58; 

2681. In total, Parents spent approximately two hours at Anova, at which point Mr. Bailey 

advised that the next step would be to review records and meet Student. AR 2680-82; 

4056; 4059. However, there is no evidence that Parents ever made arrangements for 

Student to come visit the school AR 2682; 4059. 

Even where there is a technical procedural violation of the IDEA such as the 

absence of an IEP team member, this alone will not result in a denial of FAPE; there 

must be the loss of educational opportunity or serious infringement on a parent's 

participation. See W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 

F.2d 1479, 1484 (9th Cir. 1992), superceded by statute on other grounds, 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1414(d)(1)(B). 

Here, it is clear from the record that the placement decision was not presented to 

Parents without any consideration of their opinions and input on the matter. Rather, there 

is substantial evidence in the record of an interactive and dynamic process between the 

parents and the various IEP team members regarding multiple topics, including several 

options for placement. 

In particular, the evidence shows that Parents had the opportunity to meaningfully 

participate in the IEP process. Parents were provided with the information to be 

discussed at the meetings, including the goals, assessment reports, and meeting 

agendas. AR 1528-30, 3294, 3317, 4012-14. During both meetings, Dr. Habash was 

able to ask questions of team members, raise concerns, discuss goals, and present her 

own progress reports. AR 1336-37, 1920-21, 2973, 3297-98, 3327-29, 3622, and 3983. 

In addition to considering Dr. Habash’s input, the District considered the

information presented by the other IEP team members. AR at 1336-40. For example, at 

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both meetings, Ms. Riehle, Student’s in-home teacher, was given the opportunity to 

present her reports regarding Student’s in-home school program and his progress. AR 

1337-39, 2973-74, 4016. She also provided the team with recommendations regarding

placement, services, and accommodations for Student. AR 1339, 2977, 4273. 

Likewise, Ms. Ogar, the SL assessor, and Ms. Isono, the OT assessor, presented 

their findings, contributed to the team discussions, and helped develop Plaintiff’s IEP. AR 

1336, 1338-39, 3621. Ms. Ogar testified that the discussion of the goals drove the 

discussion regarding placement and that the team discussed where those goals and 

services could be best met. AR 3628. Student’s sister also presented her observations 

during the second IEP meeting. AR 1339-40. 

Plaintiffs cite to no evidence showing that the District did not consider all of the 

information available including the substantial reports presented during the two lengthy 

IEP meetings. Accordingly, the court finds that the ALJ correctly determined that the 

District’s placement decision was not predetermined, and upholds his decision on that 

issue. Not all procedural irregularities deny a child a FAPE; rather, a child is denied a 

FAPE when “procedural inadequacies . . . result in the loss of educational opportunity, or 

seriously infringe the parents' opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process.” 

R.B., 496 F.3d at 938; W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484. Under that standard, plaintiffs have not 

established that the District denied Student a FAPE. 

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the District’s motion is GRANTED and plaintiffs’ 

motion is DENIED. The court AFFIRMS the decision of the ALJ on all issues raised in 

the appeal.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 17, 2015

__________________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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