Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01103/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01103-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Georgallis Holdings, LLC
Appellee
Oakville Hills Cellar, Inc
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

OAKVILLE HILLS CELLAR, INC., 

dba DALLA VALLE VINEYARDS,

Appellant

v.

GEORGALLIS HOLDINGS, LLC,

Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1103

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in No. 

91211612.

______________________ 

Decided: June 24, 2016

______________________ 

JAMES SCOTT GERIEN, Dickenson Peatman & Fogarty, 

Napa, CA, for appellant. 

WARREN L. DRANIT, Spaulding McCullough & Tansil 

LLP, Santa Rosa, CA, for appellee. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, MOORE, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 

Case: 16-1103 Document: 27-2 Page: 1 Filed: 06/24/2016
2 OAKVILLE HILLS CELLAR, INC. v. GEORGALLIS HOLDINGS, LLC

Oakville Hills Cellar, Inc. (“Oakville”), doing business 

as Dalla Valle Vineyards, appeals from the decision of the 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) 

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“the Board”) dismissing its opposition to an application filed by Georgallis 

Holdings, LLC (“Georgallis”) to register a MAYARI mark

for use on wine. See Oakville Hills Cellar, Inc. v. Georgallis Holdings, LLC, No. 91211612, 2015 WL 4573202

(T.T.A.B. July 16, 2015) (“Opinion”). Because substantial 

evidence supports the Board’s finding that Oakville’s 

registered mark MAYA and Georgallis’s applied-for mark 

MAYARI are sufficiently dissimilar, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Georgallis filed an application at the PTO, seeking to 

register the mark MAYARI in standard characters for use 

on wine in International Class 33. Oakville opposed the 

registration, alleging that Georgallis’s mark would likely 

cause confusion with Oakville’s previously registered and 

used mark MAYA in typed form, which is equivalent to 

standard characters, also for use on wine in International 

Class 33. Opinion at *1 & n.2.

The parties argued, and the Board evaluated, the following DuPont factors: (1) the similarity or dissimilarity 

of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, 

connotation, and commercial impression (“the first 

DuPont factor”); (2) the similarity or dissimilarity of the 

goods as described in an application or registration or in 

connection with which a prior mark is in use (“the second 

DuPont factor”); (3) the similarity or dissimilarity of trade 

channels (“the third DuPont factor”); (4) the conditions 

under which and buyers to whom sales are made (“the 

fourth DuPont factor”); (5) the fame of the prior mark; 

(6) similar marks in use on similar goods (“the sixth 

DuPont factor”); (7) the absence of actual confusion; 

(8) the right to exclude others from use; (9) the extent of 

potential confusion; and (10) other probative facts, here, 

Case: 16-1103 Document: 27-2 Page: 2 Filed: 06/24/2016
OAKVILLE HILLS CELLAR, INC. v. GEORGALLIS HOLDINGS, LLC 3

federal labelling requirements applicable to wine. Id. at 

*2–8; see also In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 

F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (listing factors relevant to 

the likelihood of confusion determination). 

The Board found that the second, third, and fourth 

DuPont factors favored a finding of likelihood of confusion, Opinion at *2–3, but that the first DuPont factor 

favored a finding of no likelihood of confusion, id. at *3–6. 

The Board also found the remaining DuPont factors that 

it analyzed to be neutral. Id. at *6–8.

Specifically, for the second DuPont factor, the Board 

found the goods at issue to be “identical,” despite “a 

substantial difference in price” and other “differences in 

the specific nature of the wines” sold by Oakville and 

Georgallis.* Id. at *2. The Board reasoned that “[i]n the 

context of an opposition proceeding, the question of registrability of an applicant’s marks must be decided on the 

basis of the identifications of goods set forth in the application and registration at issue.” Id. Because Georgallis 

“has requested a registration applicable to all kinds of 

wine in all price ranges,” and because Oakville’s registration “covers use of its mark on all kinds of wine,” the 

Board found the second DuPont factor to weigh in favor of 

a finding of likelihood of confusion. Id. Likewise, the 

Board found the third and fourth DuPont factors, namely, 

the similarity of trade channels and the sophistication of 

buyers, to weigh in favor of a finding of likelihood of 

confusion. Id. at *3.

Turning to the first DuPont factor, the similarity or 

dissimilarity of the marks in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression, the Board found that 

* The evidence shows that Oakville’s wines cost between $175 and $365 per bottle, whereas Georgallis’s 

wines have been offered at $25 per bottle. Opinion at *3.

 

Case: 16-1103 Document: 27-2 Page: 3 Filed: 06/24/2016
4 OAKVILLE HILLS CELLAR, INC. v. GEORGALLIS HOLDINGS, LLC

the marks at issue, MAYA and MAYARI, “are visually 

similar only in part.” Id. at *6. The Board noted that 

MAYA and MAYARI share the initial four letters. Id. at 

*4. But the Board found “no reason to perceive any 

separation, visual or otherwise, between the MAYA- and 

-RI portions” of MAYARI because “[t]he letters RI, alone, 

have no relevant meaning, providing no reason for a 

customer to view the mark logically as MAYA plus RI, 

rather than as a single unitary expression.” Id. The 

Board also rejected Oakville’s argument that “the bottle 

label [bearing the mark MAYARI] will inevitably appear 

to read ‘MAYA’ at certain orientation relative to an observer,” reasoning that “the likelihood of such a mistake 

remains a matter of speculation, absent evidence regarding the occurrence or regularity of mistakes of this sort.” 

Id.

As to sound, the Board found “nothing in the record to 

indicate how MAYARI would be pronounced.” Id. While 

acknowledging that MAYA could be pronounced the same 

in those marks, the Board “consider[ed] the possibility 

that MAYARI might be pronounced with the emphasis on 

its second or third syllables, and that the -YAR- syllable 

might be salient.” Id. The Board thus found that “no 

evidence show[ed] that [the marks] would be pronounced 

alike, and they may well be pronounced quite differently.” 

Id. at *6. 

Regarding meaning, Oakville argued that both marks 

are female given names and the names of goddesses. Id.

at *5. In particular, Oakville contended that Maya is a 

female name of Latin origin and the name of a Hindu 

goddess, whereas Mayari is a female name of Filipino 

origin and the name of a Filipino goddess. Id. Oakville 

also presented evidence to show that Mayari appears on 

an Internet list of Filipino names under the rubric of 

“Gods, Goddesses and Deities of the Philippines” and on 

certain websites that discuss Tagalog myths. Id. 

Case: 16-1103 Document: 27-2 Page: 4 Filed: 06/24/2016
OAKVILLE HILLS CELLAR, INC. v. GEORGALLIS HOLDINGS, LLC 5

But the Board was not persuaded that “customers 

would be aware of the more esoteric meanings of the 

marks.” Id. at *6. Rather, the Board agreed with Georgallis and found that “most customers would likely perceive MAYA as a female personal name or the name of the 

pre-Columbian civilization” and “perceive MAYARI as a 

coinage without meaning.” Id. The Board reasoned that 

“customers would likely find the term MAYA to be somewhat familiar, while finding MAYARI unfamiliar.” Id. 

Overall, the Board found that “the marks create significantly different commercial impressions.” Id. The Board 

therefore found the first DuPont factor to weigh against a 

finding of likelihood of confusion. Id.

For the sixth DuPont factor, similar marks in use on 

similar goods, Georgallis submitted third-party registrations and applications for the registration of MAYAformative marks for beverages, mostly beverages other 

than wine. Id. at *7. But the Board gave “little weight” 

to that evidence, reasoning that third-party registrations

“are not evidence that the marks are in use.” Id. The 

Board thus found this factor to be neutral. Id.

Balancing the relevant DuPont factors, the Board noted that the parties’ goods are identical and would travel 

through the same trade channels to the same classes of 

customers, some of whom would exercise no more than an 

ordinary degree of care in selecting the goods; but that the 

marks are visually similar only in part, are only possibly 

similar in their pronunciation, and would likely be perceived to have different meanings and overall commercial 

impressions. Id. at *8. The Board therefore concluded 

that “the marks are sufficiently different that . . . confusion is not likely.” Id. Accordingly, the Board dismissed 

Oakville’s opposition. 

Oakville timely appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(B).

Case: 16-1103 Document: 27-2 Page: 5 Filed: 06/24/2016
6 OAKVILLE HILLS CELLAR, INC. v. GEORGALLIS HOLDINGS, LLC

DISCUSSION

We review the Board’s legal conclusions without deference and its factual findings for substantial evidence. 

In re Pacer Tech., 338 F.3d 1348, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

“Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla’ and 

‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would 

accept as adequate’ to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting 

Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

Likelihood of confusion is a question of law based on 

underlying findings of fact. In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 

F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We assess a likelihood 

of confusion based on the factors set forth in DuPont. 476 

F.2d at 1361. “The likelihood of confusion analysis considers all DuPont factors for which there is record evidence but ‘may focus . . . on dispositive factors, such as 

similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods.’” 

Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 

1164–65 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Han Beauty, Inc. v. 

Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 

Oakville argues that the Board’s finding of insufficient similarity between MAYA and MAYARI is unsupported by substantial evidence. According to Oakville, the 

Board overlooked record evidence of the marks’ similarities in appearance, pronunciation, meaning, and overall 

commercial impression. Specifically, Oakville argues that 

MAYA dominates both marks, and that the suffix -RI in 

MAYARI is of minor import as a distinguishing element, 

particularly with the registered mark MAYA entirely 

subsumed within the leading portion of MAYARI, which 

could cause confusion between Oakville’s MAYA wine and 

Georgallis’s MAYARI wine. Oakville contends that the 

visual similarity between the marks is exacerbated by the 

applied-for mark being in standard character form, not 

limited to any particular style. Oakville also argues that 

the Board engaged in unsupported speculation regarding 

Case: 16-1103 Document: 27-2 Page: 6 Filed: 06/24/2016
OAKVILLE HILLS CELLAR, INC. v. GEORGALLIS HOLDINGS, LLC 7

potential pronunciations of the marks, while acknowledging the lack of record evidence on pronunciation.

Moreover, Oakville emphasizes on appeal that both

marks are derived from the female name Maya: MAYARI 

is a portmanteau of the names of Georgallis’s owner’s 

daughters, Maya and Arianna, whereas MAYA is the 

name of Oakville’s owner’s daughter. Oakville notes that 

the marks are also the names of goddesses. Oakville thus 

argues that the Board erred in finding that MAYARI has 

no meaning and that a consumer would not view MAYARI 

as MAYA plus RI. Furthermore, Oakville argues that 

both marks are arbitrary in relation to wine and thus that 

any difference in meaning would be lost on consumers 

given the similarity in appearance and sound. 

Additionally, Oakville argues that the conditions for 

purchase are ripe for confusion, given that the parties are 

selling identical goods via the same channels of trade, 

including in bars under noisy and chaotic conditions. 

Finally, Oakville argues that, as the prior user, any doubt 

should be resolved in its favor, and that the Board’s 

decision undermines the value and protection of federally 

registered marks.

Georgallis responds that the Board correctly declined 

to dissect MAYARI into MAYA and RI, an element with 

no meaning, and instead found that consumers would 

perceive MAYARI as a unitary whole and a coined term. 

According to Georgallis, the Board properly considered 

the marks in their entireties and found that MAYA is 

familiar to U.S. consumers as a reference to the Mayan 

culture and as a popular female given name, whereas

MAYARI is unfamiliar to U.S. consumers, not having 

appeared in the top 1000 baby names for the past century

based on searches of the “Popular Baby Names” website of 

the Social Security Administration. Georgallis contends 

that the Board correctly found that the unfamiliar 

MAYARI is readily distinguishable from the familiar 

Case: 16-1103 Document: 27-2 Page: 7 Filed: 06/24/2016
8 OAKVILLE HILLS CELLAR, INC. v. GEORGALLIS HOLDINGS, LLC

MAYA, and based on that, correctly concluded that 

MAYARI is not confusingly similar to MAYA even when 

both marks are used on wine.

Georgallis further argues that, if we were to vacate or 

reverse the Board’s finding on the first DuPont factor, we 

should also vacate its finding on the sixth DuPont factor, 

similar marks in use. Appellee’s Br. 21–22. According to 

Georgallis, the Board erred in deciding to give little 

weight to the evidence of third-party registrations. Rather than finding the sixth DuPont factor to be neutral, 

Georgallis contends, the Board should have found the 

sixth DuPont factor to favor a finding of no likelihood of 

confusion. Additionally, Georgallis argues that Oakville 

is estopped from asserting that MAYARI is confusingly 

similar to MAYA in light of prosecution statements made 

in a related application, where Oakville argued that 

MAYA was distinct from MAYAN. 

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the 

Board’s finding that the marks at issue are sufficiently 

dissimilar as to appearance, sound, meaning, and commercial impression. In determining similarity or dissimilarity, the marks must be compared in their entireties. 

While there is no dispute that MAYA is understood by 

consumers as a word with established meanings, that

simple fact alone does not create a basis for dissecting 

MAYARI into MAYA- and -RI. Here, the Board properly 

found that there is insufficient evidence that consumers 

would perceive MAYARI as MAYA- and -RI. As the Board 

noted, “[t]he letters RI, alone, have no relevant meaning, 

providing no reason for a customer to view the mark 

logically as MAYA plus RI, rather than as a single unitary 

expression.” Opinion at *4 (emphasis omitted). Moreover, just like “Maya,” “may” and “ma” are also familiar 

words in the English language. Even assuming that 

consumers were to dissect MAYARI into separate components, Oakville failed to demonstrate to the Board why 

Case: 16-1103 Document: 27-2 Page: 8 Filed: 06/24/2016
OAKVILLE HILLS CELLAR, INC. v. GEORGALLIS HOLDINGS, LLC 9

the dissection would be “MAYA-RI,” not “MAY-ARI” or 

“MA-YARI.”

We also agree with Georgallis that the Board did not 

err in finding that “no evidence show[ed] that [the marks] 

would be pronounced alike, and they may well be pronounced quite differently.” Id. at *6. The parties do not 

dispute that there is no record evidence on how MAYARI 

might be pronounced. Oakville’s interpretation of how 

MAYARI might be pronounced is based solely on its 

dissection of the mark into MAYA- and -RI. On appeal, 

Oakville relies heavily on Georgallis’s admission that it 

coined the term MAYARI to honor the daughters of its 

owner, Maya and Arianna. But the record shows that this 

information is only available to the public through Georgallis’s website, and there is no evidence that consumers 

would be generally aware of the origin of the MAYARI 

mark. Consequently, this fact could not have affected 

how consumers pronounce MAYARI. Even assuming that 

consumers were aware of the mark’s origin, there is no 

evidence that they would emphasize “Maya” in pronouncing MAYARI. As the Board noted, it is possible that 

“MAYARI might be pronounced with the emphasis on its 

second or third syllables, and that the -YAR- syllable 

might be salient.” Id. at *4. The Board thus did not err 

in finding that the marks “are only possibly similar, in 

part, in their pronunciation.” Id. at *8.

Moreover, substantial evidence supports the Board’s 

finding that MAYA is a familiar word, whereas MAYARI 

has no recognized meaning to U.S. consumers. In particular, Georgallis submitted evidence that Maya is a recognized female name and has several salient meanings as 

shown by dictionary definitions. Georgallis also submitted evidence that Mayari has not appeared among the top 

1000 baby names for the past century based on its searches of the Social Security Administration website. In 

contrast, Oakville submitted evidence that Mayari is a 

baby name, but that evidence consisted of an Internet list 

Case: 16-1103 Document: 27-2 Page: 9 Filed: 06/24/2016
10 OAKVILLE HILLS CELLAR, INC. v. GEORGALLIS HOLDINGS, LLC

of Filipino names; Oakville did not submit any evidence 

that U.S. consumers would generally understand Mayari 

to be a common female name. Oakville also submitted 

evidence from the Internet to show that Mayari is the 

name of a goddess in Tagalog mythology. But, again, 

there is no evidence that this information is generally 

known to U.S. consumers. The Board thus did not err in 

rejecting “the more esoteric meanings” proffered by Oakville, id. at *6, and in finding that “most customers would 

likely perceive MAYA as a female personal name or the 

name of the pre-Columbian civilization” and “perceive 

MAYARI as a coinage without meaning,” id. 

Accordingly, the Board correctly found that the unfamiliar MAYARI is distinguishable from the familiar 

MAYA, and that the marks, considered in their entireties, 

are dissimilar as to appearance, sound, meaning, and 

overall commercial impression. We also conclude, on this 

record, that the Board did not err in balancing all relevant DuPont factors and in determining that the dissimilarity of the marks was sufficient to preclude a likelihood 

of confusion. As we have held, “a single DuPont factor 

may be dispositive in a likelihood of confusion analysis, 

especially when that single factor is the dissimilarity of 

the marks.” Odom’s Tenn. Pride Sausage, Inc. v. FF 

Acquisition, L.L.C., 600 F.3d 1343, 1346–47 (Fed. Cir. 

2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see 

also Kellogg Co. v. Pack’em Enters., Inc., 951 F.2d 330, 

333 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“We know of no reason why, in a 

particular case, a single DuPont factor may not be dispositive.”).

We are also unpersuaded by Oakville’s argument that 

the Board’s decision undermines the value and protection 

of federally registered marks. As indicated, Oakville has 

failed to demonstrate any reversible error in the Board’s 

factual findings regarding the first DuPont factor and in 

determining that Georgallis’s applied-for mark was not

confusingly similar to Oakville’s registered mark. And it 

Case: 16-1103 Document: 27-2 Page: 10 Filed: 06/24/2016
OAKVILLE HILLS CELLAR, INC. v. GEORGALLIS HOLDINGS, LLC 11

is not a violation of any policy of protecting trademarks to 

dismiss an opposition to the registration of marks that are 

not confusingly similar. 

We have considered the remaining arguments, but 

find them unpersuasive. We therefore conclude that 

substantial evidence supports the Board’s factual findings 

underlying the first DuPont factor, and that the Board did 

not err in determining, based on the record evidence, that 

there was no likelihood of confusion. Because we affirm 

the Board’s finding as to the first DuPont factor in favor of 

Georgallis, which resolves the present appeal, we need 

not address Georgallis’s arguments regarding the sixth 

DuPont factor and prosecution estoppel.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of 

the Board dismissing Oakville’s opposition.

AFFIRMED

Case: 16-1103 Document: 27-2 Page: 11 Filed: 06/24/2016