Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-08-03913/USCOURTS-ca7-08-03913-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Gipson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued December 15, 2009

Decided January 4, 2010

Before

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 08‐3913

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

ROBERT L. GIPSON,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of

Wisconsin.

No. 08‐CR‐37‐C‐01

Barbara B. Crabb,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Robert Gipson pleaded guilty to possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute

it, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and the district court imposed a within‐guidelines sentence of 78

months’ imprisonment.  On appeal Gipson argues that the district court failed to give

adequate consideration to his mental condition as a mitigating factor under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a).  We affirm Gipson’s sentence.  

In January 2008 a confidential informant tipped off law‐enforcement agents that

Gipson was selling crack in Madison, Wisconsin.  According to the informant, Gipson

traveled regularly to Chicago to buy the drug, which he repackaged for individual sale and

stored in the basement of a Madison apartment building.  Based on the tip, officers

orchestrated two controlled purchases of crack from Gipson and arrested him shortly

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 08‐3913 Page 2

thereafter.  Officers found marijuana and crack in the glove box of Gipson’s car and 108

individually wrapped packages of crack in his pocket.  They later uncovered—hidden

behind insulation in a basement wall of the Madison apartment building linked to

Gipson—more crack and prerecorded currency from the controlled buys.

After determining that the offense conduct included 38.74 grams of crack, the

probation officer calculated a base offense level of 28.  See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(6).  A three‐

level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and a criminal‐history category of III

produced a guidelines imprisonment range of 70 to 87 months.  

At sentencing Gipson argued that the court should consider as mitigating factors his

physical and mental impairments.  Gipson had a brain tumor removed when he was 13, and

he reported that he has suffered seizures once a week ever since. Gipson also has a history

of mental illness.  In 2004, during a court‐ordered competency evaluation in a previous

proceeding, the psychiatrist noted that Gipson demonstrated “delusional and paranoid”

behavior and diagnosed him as a cocaine abuser with schizoaffective and bipolar disorders.

Gipson initially was declared incompetent to stand trial in that case, but he improved with

medication and later was found competent to continue with the proceedings.  By that time,

however, the government had dismissed the charge (possession with intent to distribute

crack).  When Gipson underwent a fresh competency evaluation in this case, he again was

diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder and cocaine abuse, as well as borderline intellectual

functioning.  After he was prescribed medication, the psychiatrist determined that his

schizoaffective disorder was “in remission with pharmacotherapy” and concluded that he

was competent to face the proceedings.

Gipson argued at sentencing that his health conditions—schizoaffective and bipolar

disorders, seizures, and low‐level mental functioning—are a “limiting dynamic force that he

is dealing with when he makes [the] judgment to be a drug dealer.”  Gipson did not

elaborate or present evidence to support his contention that these illnesses played a role in

the commission of his crime.  Rather, he argued generally that the court should take his

impairments into account under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and impose a below‐guidelines

sentence.  

The district court declined.  The court acknowledged that Gipson has “some

problems, physical and mental” but noted that he nevertheless had “managed to cut a wide

swath as a drug dealer.”  After concluding that a sentence in the middle of the guidelines

range was “reasonable and no greater than necessary” to hold Gipson accountable, protect

the community, provide Gipson the opportunity for rehabilitative programs, and achieve

parity with similarly situated offenders, the court sentenced him to 78 months’

imprisonment.

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We review sentences for reasonableness, using an abuse‐of‐discretion standard.

United States v. Deloney, 578 F.3d 690, 692 (7th Cir. 2009).  A sentence within the properly

calculated guidelines range is presumed reasonable on appeal.  United States v. Mendoza, 576

F.3d 711, 723 (7th Cir. 2009).  Nevertheless, we must be confident that the district judge gave

individualized attention to the § 3553(a) factors and adequately considered the defendant’s

nonfrivolous arguments for a below‐guidelines sentence.  See United States v. Williams, 553

F.3d 1073, 1084‐85 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 129 S. Ct. 2452 (2009); United States v. Miranda, 505

F.3d 785, 792‐93 (7th Cir. 2007).

On appeal Gipson argues that the district court abused its discretion when it rejected

his assertion that his medical/mental conditions warranted a below‐guidelines sentence.

Mental and physical impairments are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a

below‐guidelines sentence is warranted.  U.S.S.G. §§ 5H1.3, 5H1.4; see Miranda, 505 F.3d at

792 (explaining that concept of downward departure is obsolete post‐Booker, but that

departure guidelines may still be applied by way of analogy in analyzing § 3553(a) factors).

An “extraordinary physical impairment,” however, may be a reason for a lower sentence,

U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4; United States v. Poetz, 582 F.3d 835, 838 (7th Cir. 2009), and so may a

defendant’s significantly reduced mental capacity, if it contributed substantially to the

commission of the offense, U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13; United States v. Jackson, 547 F.3d 786, 795 (7th

Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1538 (2009).  

We have recognized severe mental illness, including schizoaffective disorder, as a

ground for a sentencing discount because it may reduce the need for deterrence or

punishment and thus render a long term of imprisonment less appropriate. See United

States v. Anderson, 547 F.3d 831, 832 (7th Cir. 2008); Miranda, 505 F.3d at 792‐94.  In Miranda,

for example, we remanded for resentencing when the district court failed to address the

defendant’s arguments for a below‐guidelines sentence on the basis of diminished mental

capacity despite evidence that the defendant’s schizophrenia and auditory hallucinations

were the primary force driving him to commit the crime.  Miranda, 505 F.3d at 787‐89, 794.

See also Williams, 553 F.3d at 1084‐85 (remanding where district court failed to address

defendant’s arguments that his reduced intellectual capacity made him more susceptible to

manipulation by his brother, the ringleader of the criminal activity); United States v.

Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 676‐80 (7th Cir. 2005) (remanding where district judge made no

mention of diminished mental capacity as possible mitigating factor despite evidence that

defendant’s long history of psychiatric illness and alcohol and marijuana abuse made him

more prone to commit the crime).  On the other hand, we have declined to remand on the

basis of the district court’s terse rejection of a diminished‐capacity sentencing argument

when that argument was undeveloped or lacked a factual basis.  See Jackson, 547 F.3d at 795‐

96.

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In this case, Gipson presented no evidence that his impairments contributed

substantially to the commission of the offense.  He argued generally that his mental illness

affects the “soundness of the judgment that leads him to criminal activity,” but did not

explain why his medical condition made him more likely to sell drugs.  Indeed, the doctor

who performed Gipson’s most recent competency evaluation noted that his psychiatric

history was “unremarkable” until 2003, yet his drug convictions date back as far as 1993.

Moreover, Gipson did not raise any specific arguments that his mental illness reduced the

need for deterrence or that incapacitation was unnecessary in light of the fact that his

schizoaffective disorder was in remission with proper medication.  See Miranda, 505 F.3d at

793.  

Although the district judge could have said more, the record sufficiently confirms

that the court gave meaningful consideration to Gipson’s arguments.  The court

acknowledged that Gipson suffered from physical and mental impairments but implicitly

concluded that they had not played a role in the commission of the offense.  In considering

the § 3553(a) factors, the court noted that prior sanctions had not deterred Gipson from

criminal activity, that he had demonstrated significant finesse as a drug dealer, and that the

relevant conduct used to calculate his offense level likely was extremely conservative in

light of a statement from his female companion that she had accompanied him on several

hundred drug sales.  Given Gipson’s vague argument for mitigation—which was

unsupported by any evidence demonstrating the link between his mental illness and his

drug dealing—the district court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors was not unreasonable.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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