Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00820/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00820-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Respondent
Matias Velazquez
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Matias Velazquez, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

United States of America, 

Respondent.

No. CV-11-00820-PHX-RCB

ORDER 

 Currently pending before the court is the Amended Report and Recommendation 

of the United States Magistrate Judge Lawrence O. Anderson (“R & R”) (Doc. 18), 

“find[ing] that petitioner [Matias Velazquez] is entitled to error coram nobis relief.” R & 

R (Doc. 18) at 18:8-9. Timely objections were filed by the respondent, the United States 

of America (Doc. 19). The petitioner did not file a response to those objections as the R 

& R permitted, however. See R & R (Doc. 18) at 18:25-26. For the reasons set forth 

herein, the court rejects the recommendations, and denies the petitioner’s “Motion to 

Vacate Plea of Guilty & Set Aside Judgement [sic]/Motion for Expungement” (“Mot.”) 

(Doc. 1). 

Background 

I. Factual & Procedural 

A. Criminal Proceedings 

 On August 15, 1997, represented by criminal defense attorney Jose de la Vara, the 

petitioner pled guilty in this federal district court to a one count information charging him 

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with conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 286.1 Response 

to Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Plea of Guilty and to Defendant’s Motion for 

Expungement (“Resp.”), exh. 11 thereto (Doc. 10-1) at 2-5: and exh. 16 thereto (Doc. 

10-1) at 17-24. Among other things, while managing a tax preparation business, as part 

of a rapid return program, the petitioner knowingly prepared and filed false federal 

income tax forms, claiming an Earned Income Credit for non-qualifying clients. Id. at 3-

4; see also Mot. (Doc. 1), exh. 1 thereto (Doc. 1-1) at 13-14, ¶¶ 1-2. This program 

generated fees for not only the tax business, but also a bonus for petitioner for each rapid 

refund return prepared by his office. Id. at 3; see also Mot. (Doc. 1), exh. 1 thereto 

(Doc. 1-1) at 14, ¶ 3. 

 In the plea agreement, which the parties “approv[ed] and accept[ed]” on August 

15, 1997, of the total tax loss of $285,180.00, the parties stipulated to a “total loss 

attributable to” the petitioner of “$95,121.00.” Mot. (Doc. 1), exh. 1 (Doc. 1-1) thereto at 

15:14 (emphasis omitted); and at 9:13-16, ¶ 3(g). Recognizing that it was “fully within 

the Court’s discretion whether it follow[ed] this recommendation, as part of that plea 

agreement, the United States agreed to “ask the Court to recommend to the Immigration 

and Naturalization Service (“INS”) that the [petitioner] not be deported . . . for his 

involvement” in the criminal activity to which he pled guilty. Id. at 9-10, ¶ 3(h)(2). 

 During the August 15, 1997, waiver and change of plea hearing, in response to the 

court’s explicit inquiry as to whether the petitioner understood that it was within the 

court’s discretion whether or not to follow the United States’ recommendation that he not 

be deported, he responded, “Yes.” See Resp. (Doc. 10), exh. 16 thereto (Doc. 10-1) at 

 

1

 In its entirety, that statute reads as follows: 

 Whoever enters into any agreement, combination, or conspiracy 

 to defraud the United States, or any department or agency thereof, 

 by obtaining or aiding to obtain the payment or allowance of any false, 

 fictitious or fraudulent claim, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 

 not more than ten years, or both. 

18 U.S.C. § 286. 

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18. At that time, the petitioner also confirmed the accuracy of the factual basis for his 

plea. Id. at 47-48. Prior to pleading guilty, the court inquired as to whether the 

petitioner had any questions of the court, his lawyer, or the Government’s lawyer; he did 

not. Id. at 48. The petitioner then plead guilty “because [he] [was] guilty[.]” Id. at 49. 

 At his June 14, 1999, sentencing, where the petitioner was again represented by 

counsel, after granting a “substantial” downward departure, this court sentenced the 

petitioner to four years of probation. Id., exh. 17 thereto (Doc. 10-1) at 27:13; 27:18-19. 

As a “special condition of probation, the court ordered that “if deported, the [petitioner] 

shall not reenter the United States without legal authorization and the permission of this 

court.” Id. at 30:16-18. The court “elected to decline to make the recommendation 

without prejudice[,] . . . mean[ing] that if inquiry is made, the Court may reconsider its 

determination when it makes such recommendation.” Id. at 32:9-12. 

 To support his motion, the petitioner filed a terse affidavit, wherein he avers that: 

 1. [He] read the Motion . . . and agree[s] with its factual contents. 

 

 2. When [he] entered into [his] plea agreement . . . , [he] was 

 not aware that this type of conviction would have precluded 

 [him] from remain[ing] in the United States with his family. 

 3. [H]ad [he] known that this conviction would result in 

 automatic deportation, [he] most likely would have tried to 

 work out a different plea agreement with the government, which 

 would not have resulted in [his] deportation, or, [he] would have 

 taken the matter to trial.” 

Mot. (Doc. 1), exh. 3 thereto (Doc. 1-3) at 2:14-22, ¶ ¶ 1-3. 

 

 The United States’ response includes a declaration from the petitioner’s attorney, 

more fully discussed herein, outlining his representation of the petitioner from the time of 

initial appearance through his sentencing. Suffice it to say for now that attorney de la 

Vara did not “tell [the petitioner] that his conviction would result in automatic 

deportation.” Resp. (Doc. 10), exh. 24 thereto (Doc. 10-1) at 68, ¶ 6. 

B. Immigration Proceedings 

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 The petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico who has been a lawful permanent 

resident, but not a citizen or a national, of the United States either since November 21, 

1989, or December 27, 1989. Id., exh. 18 thereto (Doc. 10-1) at 37; exh. 22 thereto (Doc. 

10-1) at 60. On January 17, 1996, prior to his guilty plea, the petitioner completed an 

Application for Naturalization, with the assistance of a non-attorney representative from 

Chicanos Por La Causa. Id., exh. 18 thereto (Doc. 10-1) at 40. After determining that his 

federal guilty plea rendered him “ineligible” to apply for naturalization, on April 17, 

2002, the petitioner formally withdrew that Application. Id., exh. 19 thereto (Doc. 10-1) 

at 43. 

 On August 8, 2007, four years after the completion of his probation sentence, the 

petitioner filed a second Application for Naturalization, with the assistance from 

American Beginnings, a Yuma, Arizona organization. Id. exh. 20 (Doc. 10-1) thereto at 

55. At his September 10, 2008, interview for that Application, the petitioner disclosed 

his fraud conviction and probation sentence. Id. at 52 and 54. Given his June 14, 1999, 

sentencing, “it was found” that the petitioner “was convicted of an aggravated felony[, ]” 

and was thus be “removable from the United States.” Id. exh. 21 (Doc. 10-1) thereto at 

57-58. On November 2, 2010, petitioner’s second Application for Naturalization was 

denied. Id., exh. 20 (Doc.10-1) thereto at 45. 

 Thereafter, on November 8, 2010, given his prior conviction, the Department of 

Homeland Security served upon the petitioner, by regular mail, a Notice to Appear on an 

undetermined date and time for removal proceedings. Id., exh. 22 (Doc. 10-1) thereto at 

60-61. The basis for removal, according to that Notice was: 

 petitioner’s “convict[ion] of an aggravated felony as 

 defined in section 101(a)(43)(M) of the Act, a law relating to 

 an offense that (i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the 

 victim or victims exceeds $10,000; or (ii) is described in The 

 Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Section 7201 (relating to tax evasion) in 

 which this revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000. 

Id. at 62. By letter of the same date, the INS advised the petitioner of the denial of his 

second Application for Naturalization, and further advised him that he had been placed 

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in removal proceedings. Id., exh. 23 thereto (Doc. 10-1) at 64-66. 

C. Petitioner’s Motion 

 Prior to the petitioner’s placement in removal proceedings, on March 31, 2010, in 

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), the Supreme 

Court held “that the Sixth Amendment requires an attorney for a criminal defendant to 

provide advice about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea.” Chaidez v. 

United States, --- U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 1105, 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013). Almost 12 

years after his sentencing, nearly eight years after the completion of his probation, and 

exactly one year after Padilla, on March 31, 2011, the petitioner filed the present motion. 

In moving to vacate his guilty plea, the petitioner claims that he was not properly advised 

of the serious immigration consequences of his guilty. In particular, heavily relying upon 

Padilla, the petitioner contends that he should have been advised that his guilty plea 

would result in “presumptive[], or, virtually mandated deportation[.]” Mot. (Doc. 1) at 

5:17. In light of the foregoing, the petitioner argued that his guilty plea did not: (1) 

comply with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), 

because the record does not “affirmatively show” that his “plea was intelligent and 

voluntary[,]” Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 925, 958 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation 

omitted); and (2) did not comport with Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 11 because it was not knowing, 

voluntary, and intelligent. The third basis for the petitioner’s motion is an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim against attorney de la Vara under Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), Padilla, and United States v. 

Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Padilla, 130 S.Ct. 

1473. Alternatively, the petitioner requested expungement of his criminal record 

 The United States’ first responds that the petitioner is not entitled to relief under 

28 U.S.C. § 2255 because he is no longer in custody. Next, arguing that he has not 

provided any authority for so doing, the United States challenged the petitioner’s request 

for expungement. Then, construing the petitioner’s motion as seeking coram nobis relief, 

the United States contended that such relief is not available because he did not show valid 

reasons for delay in seeking such relief in that he “knew from the very beginning that the 

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criminal conviction could have immigration consequences.” Resp. (Doc. 10) at 7:22-23 

(citation omitted). Further, the United States contended that the petitioner did not show 

“error of the most fundamental character[]” because his counsel did provide effective 

assistance by “recogniz[ing] that the conviction could create problems for [the 

petitioner], [and] . . . d[oing] his best to mitigate those consequences[.]” Id. at 9:24-25 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In making this argument, the United 

States asserts that the petitioner’s counsel’s “actions were reasonable” because at the time 

the immigration consequences of the petitioner’s guilty plea “were unclear[]” because “it 

was an open question whether his crime could be classified as an ‘aggravated felony’ for 

deportation purposes because the loss amount was not an element of the offense.” Id. at 

9:19 and 9:4-6 (citations omitted). 

 Additionally, the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not viable, 

the United States contends, because he did not show prejudice, the second prong of such 

a claim. Lastly, the United States argues that laches bars the petitioner’s claim for 

coram nobis relief because it is prejudiced due to the delay such relief given that it does 

not have “witness statements or copies of the documentary evidence[.]” See Supplement 

to Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion (Doc. 13) at 1:25-26. 

 Conceding the inapplicability of section 2255 relief, the petitioner nonetheless 

asserts that his motion was timely because the relevant time did “not start to run . . . at 

least until after” the March 31, 2010, Padilla decision. See Reply (Doc. 16) at 2:11-12. 

As to the expungement issue, the petitioner also concedes that his cited authority is not 

directly on point, but persists in arguing that “federal courts have the equitable power and 

thus the ability to expunge criminal convictions when justice requires.” Id. at 2:17-18. 

Addressing his purported delay in filing this motion, the petitioner retorts that the 

relevant time frame is not when he became aware of the general “’immigration 

consequences’” of his guilty plea, but rather, when he became aware of “automatic 

deportation[,]” which came much later. Id. at 3:10-11. Further, contrary to what the 

Government asserts, the petitioner maintains that when he pled guilty, it was settled that 

the crime to which he pled was an aggravated felony, which would result in automatic 

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deportation. 

II. Report & Recommendation 

 At the outset, agreeing with the United States, the Magistrate Judge found that 

because the petitioner is no longer in custody, he is not entitled to § 2255 relief. R & R 

(Doc. 18) at 4:25-5:5. The Magistrate Judge thus went on to consider whether the 

petitioner may be entitled to coram nobis relief. In so doing, the Magistrate Judge did not 

consider, or even mention, the petitioner’s arguments based upon Boykin, 395 U.S. 238, 

and Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 11 

 In recommending the granting of coram nobis relief, the first issue was whether 

the petitioner “asserted a valid reason” for not earlier seeking such relief. R & R (Doc. 

18) at 9:11. Although “the mere possibility of immigration consequences . . . w[as] 

discussed at the time of his plea,” the Magistrate Judge found that the petitioner had a 

valid reason for the delay in filing his motion because “there is no dispute [he] was never 

advised that his plea agreement would result in mandatory deportation.” Id. at 7:17-20. 

Additionally, in finding that the petitioner had a valid reason for delay, the Magistrate 

Judge noted that Padilla, 130 S.Ct. 1473, the primary basis for petitioner’s motion, was 

decided on March 31, 2010, only a year prior to the filing this motion. 

 The Magistrate Judge discounted the United States’ argument that it sustained 

prejudice due to the petitioner’s delay in filing this motion. Pointedly noting that the 

Government did not address the issue of any claimed prejudice between November 2010, 

when the petitioner asserts he first learned that his guilty plea would result in automatic 

deportation, and March 2011 when he filed this motion, the Magistrate Judge found it 

“unlikely that the Government’s records regarding the criminal” prosecution would have 

been more complete in the fall of 2010 than they were in March 2011. R & R (Doc. 18) 

at 9:7. 

 Preliminarily, relying upon United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630 (3rd Cir. 2011),2

 

2

 The Magistrate Judge was operating under the mistaken assumption that at the time, 

“[t]he Third Circuit [wa]s the only circuit court to have issued on ruling on whether Padilla applies on 

collateral review.” R & R (Doc. 18) at 12:21-22, n. 3 (emphasis added). Actually, at that time, at least 

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as well as lower courts within this Circuit, and because the parties did not dispute the 

retroactivity of Padilla, the Magistrate Judge applied Padilla retroactively. See id. at 

12:21-28, n. 3. Ultimately, the Magistrate Judge found that defense counsel’s 

performance was “deficient” because “[u]nder Padilla and Kwan, Petitioner should have 

been advised of the mandatory immigration consequences of his guilty plea.” Id. at 17:8; 

and 16:28-17:1. Continuing with his analysis of the ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim, the Magistrate Judge found that the petitioner “was prejudiced by counsel’s 

deficient performance because, had [he] been advised that his plea would subject him to 

mandatory deportation, he would have proceeded to trial.” Id. at 18:4-6. Concluding, 

the Magistrate Judge recommended granting coram nobis relief to the petitioner and that 

he be “retried within sixty (60) days of an order adopting this [ R & R].” Id. at 18:13-14. 

The Magistrate Judge further recommended granting a certificate of appealability. 

However, because he recommended granting coram nobis relief, the Magistrate Judge did 

not address the petitioner’s alternative argument requesting expungement of his criminal 

record. 

III. Objections 

 Maintaining that the petitioner has not demonstrated: (1) “valid reasons for [the] 

delay” in filing his writ of coram nobis; (2) “defective representation” by his counsel; nor 

(3) “prejudice[,]” the United States is seeking de novo review of the R & R’s contrary 

legal conclusions. See Objection to R & R (“Obj.”) (Doc. 19) at 1:18. Additionally, the 

United States objects to certain factual findings in the R & R. There is no need to delve 

into each of those objections at this juncture, because, as will be seen, there has been an 

intervening change in law which significantly alters the analysis herein, and, for the most 

part, renders these objections unnecessary. 

 As mentioned earlier, the Magistrate Judge did not consider the petitioner’s 

arguments that his guilty plea violated Boykin, 395 U.S. 238, and Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 11. 

By the same token though, the petitioner did not file any objections to the R & R, 

 

two other Circuit Courts had held to the contrary: Padilla does not apply retroactively. Chaidez v. United 

States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011); and United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2011). 

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although he was entitled to do so. Therefore, he is deemed to have abandoned those 

arguments and there is no need to consider them. See Green v. City of New York, 2010 

WL 148128, at *13 (E.D.N.Y.) (defendants “essentially abandoned” arguments by failing 

to object when the Magistrate Judge did not address those arguments in the R & R), aff’d 

on other grounds without pub’d opinion, 403 Fed.Appx. 626 (2nd Cir. 2010). 

IV. Chaidez v. United States 

 After the filing of the R & R and the United States’ objections thereto, the 

Supreme Court rendered its decision in Chaidez, 133 S.Ct. 1103. Applying the 

retroactivity principles of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 

334 (1989), and finding that Padilla “announced a ‘new rule[,]’” the Supreme Court 

unequivocally held that “Padilla does not have retroactive effect.” Chaidez, 133 S.Ct. at 

1105. In so holding, Chaidez abrogated Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, which was the primary 

basis for the Magistrate Judge’s decision to apply Padilla retroactively in this case. In 

any event, after Chaidez there is no doubt that “defendants whose convictions became 

final prior to Padilla cannot benefit its holding.” Chaidez, 133 S.Ct. at 1113. 

 “Because it appear[ed] that the [petitioner’s] conviction . . . was final before the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla, and because Padilla is the primary basis for the 

[petitioner’s] request for relief[,]” this court ordered the filing of supplemental briefs on 

the issue of “the impact of” Chaidez, 133 S.Ct. 1103, “if any” upon the R & R and the 

United States’ objections thereto. Ord. (Doc. 20) at 5:5-8. 

 From the petitioner’s viewpoint, although Chaidez “affects some” of the 

Magistrate Judge’s analysis, it does not “change the recommended relief.” Memorandum 

of Law Re: Chaidez v. United States (Doc. 21) at 2:4-5 (emphasis omitted). That is 

because, Padilla aside, the petitioner maintains that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kwan, 

407 F.3d 1005 “provides the necessary legal authority” to grant him coram nobis relief. 

Id. at 1:10-11 (emphasis omitted). The Government counters that to the extent that the R 

& R relied upon Padilla to conclude that defense counsel’s performance was deficient, 

those portions “must . . . be rejected in light of Chaidez.” Government’s Response to 

Defendant’s Memorandum of law Re: Chaidez v. United States (“Gov.’s Resp.”) (Doc. 

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22) at 1:23 (citation omitted).3 Admitting that it had not previously raised the issue of 

whether or not Kwan should be applied retroactively,4

 the Government asserts that like 

Chaidez, 133 S.Ct. 1103, the 2005 Kwan decision “announced a new rule[.]” Id. at 1:26-

27. Therefore, the Government strongly suggests that that the petitioner cannot rely upon 

Kwan to collaterally attack his plea agreement. To the contrary, the petitioner contends 

that Kwan did not establish “any new law[,]” but simply “reiterated and recognized” that 

“affirmative misrepresentation regarding immigration consequences was considered as 

ineffective assistance of counsel.” Reply (Doc. 23) at 2:11; and 2:21-22 (citation 

omitted). 

Discussion 

I. Standard of Review 

 The Federal Magistrate Judge Act “distinguishes between nondispositive matters 

under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and dispositive matters heard pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(B)” with respect to, inter alia, the standard of review. See United States v. 

Abonce–Barrera, 257 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir. 2001). “Generally, non-dispositive motions 

are subject to review under the clearly erroneous or contrary to law standard, 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(A); and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a), whereas dispositive motions are subject to de 

novo review. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3).” Gamez v. Ryan, 2013 

WL 1897132, at *3 (D.Ariz. 2013). “Dispositive matters specifically embraced by [28 

U.S.C.] § 636(b)(1)(B) include ‘applications for posttrial relief made by individuals 

convicted of criminal offenses[,]’” such as petitioner Velazquez. See Magee v. Rowland, 

764 F.Supp. 1375, 1376 (C.D.Cal. 1991) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)). Thus, the 

governing standard of review here is de novo. 

 Under that standard, “’[a]lthough a de novo hearing is not necessary, the district 

court must arrive at its own independent conclusion about those portions of the 

3

 The court observes that the Government cited to portions of the original R & R, which 

was amended; but, it is the amended R & R, not the original, which is the subject of this order. 

4

 Notably, the petitioner did not “formally object[]” to the United States raising the issue of 

Kwan’s retroactivity at this point. Reply (Doc. 23) at 2:28, n. 1. 

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magistrate judge's findings or recommendations to which a party objects.’” United States 

v. Soto-Valdez, 2013 WL 5297142, at *3 (D.Ariz. 2013) (quoting Olson v. Lemos, 2008 

WL 782724, at *1 (E.D.Cal. 2008) (citing, in turn, United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 

614, 616 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3) (“The district judge must 

determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly 

objected to.”); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“A judge of the court shall make a de novo 

determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or 

recommendations to which objection is made.”) Consequently, “this ‘reviewing court 

[is] not defer[ring] to the’” recommendation to grant the petitioner’s request for a writ of 

coram nobis, but instead is “‘freely consider[ing] the matter anew, as if no decision had 

been rendered below.’” Id. (quoting Dawson v. Marshall, 561 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir 

.2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis omitted)). Engaging in de 

novo review makes eminent sense for the additional reason that Chaidez, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 

changed the legal landscape with respect to Padilla, a case which was at the core of the 

recommendation that petitioner be granted coram nobis relief. 

II. Writ of Coram Nobis 

A. Legal Standards 

 “The writ of error coram nobis5 affords a remedy to attack a conviction when the 

petitioner has served his sentence and is no longer in custody.” Estate of McKinney v. 

United States, 71 F.3d 779, 781 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted) (footnote added). 

“Specifically, the writ provides a remedy for those suffering from the lingering collateral 

consequences of an unconstitutional or unlawful conviction based on errors of fact and 

egregious legal errors.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). A court’s authority 

to issue a writ of error coram nobis derives from the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). 

 

5

 Coram nobis, literally, means “[b]efore us[]” and “refers to the sovereign[.]” Black’s 

Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Historically, the writ of coram nobis refers to “[a] writ of error taken 

from a judgment of the King’s Bench.” Id. That writ “is an ancient common-law remedy designed ’to 

correct errors of fact.’” United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 910, 129 S.Ct. 2213, 173 L.Ed.2d 1235 

(2009) (quoting United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 507, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954)). As will 

be seen, however, “in its modern iteration coram nobis is broader than its common-law predecessor.” Id. 

at 911. 

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Matus-Leva v. United States, 287 F.3d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 “Both the Supreme Court and [the Ninth Circuit] have long made clear that the 

writ of error coram nobis is a highly unusual remedy, available only to correct grave 

injustices in a narrow range of cases where no more conventional remedy is applicable.” 

United States v. Riedl, 496 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 2007). “[C]haracteriz[ing] the writs 

as an ‘extraordinary remedy[.]’” according to the Supreme Court, they “should be granted 

‘only under circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice.’” Id. (quoting 

United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 52274 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed.2d 248 (1954)). 

Similarly “describ[ing] the writs as extraordinary,” in the Ninth Circuit’s view, they 

should be “used only to review errors of the most fundamental character, . . . and fill[ing] 

a very precise gap in federal criminal procedure.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). 

 Since 1987, the Ninth Circuit has employed the same four element framework for 

deciding whether to grant the writ of error coram nobis: 

 [A] petitioner must show the following to qualify for 

 coram nobis relief: (1) a more usual remedy is not 

 available; (2) valid reasons exist for not attacking the 

 conviction earlier; (3) adverse consequences exist 

 from the conviction sufficient to satisfy the case or 

 controversy requirement of Article III; and (4) the 

 error is of the most fundamental character. 

Id. (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 604 (9th Cir. 1987)). “Because 

these requirements are conjunctive, failure to meet any one of them is fatal.” MatusLeva, 287 F.3d at 760 (citation omitted). Only the second and fourth elements are in 

dispute here. 

B. More Unusual Remedy Not Available & Adverse Consequences 

 The first and third Hirabayashi elements require no discussion. The United States 

conceded the existence of both. Resp. (Doc. 10) at 6:24-26. The Magistrate Judge found 

that the petitioner satisfied both. R & R (Doc. 18) at 6:13-19; and 9:15-22. And, there 

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are no objections to those findings. In sharp contrast, however, the parties vigorously 

dispute whether the petitioner has satisfied the second and fourth Hirabayashi elements -

- the existence of “valid reasons for not attacking the conviction earlier” and the existence 

of “error of the most fundamental character.” See Riedl, 496 F.3d at 1006 (citation 

omitted). 

C. Assumptions 

 As to the second Hirabayashi element, for the sake of argument, the court is 

assuming that the petitioner has met his burden of “affirmatively demonstrat[ing] valid 

reasons why”6

 he did not earlier challenge his guilty plea and sentence. See Rianto v. 

United States, 2012 WL 4863793, at * 6 (E.D.Cal. Oct. 12, 2012) (citing Hirabayashi, 

828 F.2d at 604) (emphasis added). 

 Additionally, the court will assume arguendo that, as the petitioner argues, when 

he pled guilty to and was sentenced for, defrauding the Government in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 286, the terms of the relevant immigration statutes, i.e. 8 U.S.C. § 

101(a)(43)(M)(i)7

 and 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii),8 were “unambiguous and made 

 

6

 This is a generous assumption given the scant factual record on the timeliness issue. 

Conspicuously absent from the petitioner’s affidavit is any mention of why he delayed in filing this 

motion. The petitioner did aver that he has read “the Motion . . . and agree[s] with its factual contents.” 

Mot. (Doc. 1), exh. 3 (Doc. 1-3) thereto at 2:14-15, ¶ 1. Even if that bare assertion amounted to an 

affirmative demonstration of the relevant facts, it does not assist the petitioner. That is because his 

motion is silent as to whether he had a valid reason for the delay. The unsworn allegations in his reply, 

such as that at an unspecified time during his second attempt to obtain citizenship, “he was finally advised 

as to the automatic deportation nature of his conviction[]” are not sufficient to meet his burden of proof 

on this issue. See Reply (Doc. 16) at 3:15-16. 

 Moreover, given that the petitioner’s attorney representation of the petitioner ended after 

the 1999 sentencing, understandably, his declaration does not shed any light on the delay issue. See 

Resp. (Doc. 10), exh. 24 (Doc. 10-1) thereto at 68, ¶ 2. Despite these deficiencies, as set forth above, the 

court has given the petitioner the benefit of the doubt on this issue. 

7

 That statute provides that “[a]s used in this chapter --- [t]he term ‘aggravated felony’ 

means - - - an offense that – involves fraud of deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds 

$10,000. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). 

8

 Section 1227, enumerating “[c]lasses of deportable aliens” provides in relevant part that 

“[a]ny alien . . . in and admitted to the United States shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be 

removed if the alien is within one or more of the following classes of deportable aliens: . . . [a]ny alien 

who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 

1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 

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Petitioner’s deportation presumptively mandatory as a result of his plea.” See United 

States v. Krboyan, 2011 WL 2117023, at *10 (E.D.Cal. May 27, 2011); but see United 

States v. Leger-Monegro, 2014 WL 1785067, at *5 (M.D.Pa. May 5, 2014) (citing cases) 

(“The Padilla majority favorably cited Justice Alito’s concurrence explaining that it is 

not often clear whether a crime is covered by 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).”) 

 Lastly, the court will assume arguendo that, as the petitioner urges, the Ninth 

Circuit’s 2005 decision in Kwan, 407 F.3d 1105, applies retroactively in this case.9

 

9

 There is some authority, albeit outside this Circuit, to support this assumption. In Kwan, 

adopting the Second Circuit’s view in United States v. Couto, 331 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2002), the Ninth 

Circuit held that “where . . . counsel has not merely failed to inform, but has effectively mislead, his client 

about the immigration consequences of a conviction, counsel’s performance is objectively unreasonable 

under contemporary standards for attorney competence.” Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1015. Reasoning that Couto 

“did nothing more than apply the age-old principle that a lawyer may not affirmatively mislead a 

client[,]” in Kovacs v. United States, 744 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2014), the Second Circuit applied Couto 

retroactively even though it “was decided the year after Kovacs’ 2001 conviction became final.” Id. at 

50. 

 Although Kovacs lends support to the assumption of retroactively applying Kwan here, 

the court is keenly aware that in this Circuit it “remains an open question whether a petitioner . . . whose 

conviction was final in the Ninth Circuit before . . . Padilla can still rely on . . . Kwan to bring an 

ineffective assistance of counsel based on an allegation that his lawyer affirmatively mis[]a[d]vised him 

about the immigration consequences of a plea and resulting criminal conviction.” United States v. 

Ifenatuora, 2013 WL 3283634, at *9 (E.D.Cal. June 27, 2013), adopted by United States v. Ifenatuora, 

2013 WL 5348221 (E.D.Cal. Sept. 23, 2013). In considering the possibility that Kwan survives Chaidez, 

the court in Ifenatuora explained: 

 [T]he Supreme Court in in Chaidez did not say or indicate in any 

 way that Padilla abrogated, overruled or otherwise nullified the 

 holding in Kwan. To the contrary, the Supreme Court in Chaidez 

 mentions Kwan as one of a minority of decisions that had applied 

Strickland to a lawyer's advice on the immigration consequences 

 of a conviction before Padilla and said that those cases ‘recognized 

 a separate rule for material misrepresentations . . . . That limited rule 

 does not apply in Chaidez's case.’ 

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Continuing, the Ifenatuora court opined that “[b]y the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Chaidez

then, it is arguable that Kwan’s ‘separate rule’ survives Chaidez precisely because it is separate and not 

subsumed by Padilla.” Id.; contra Chavarria v. United States, 739 F.3d 360, 364 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(“determin[ing] that the distinction between affirmative misadvice and failure to advise does not 

somehow evade the non-retroactivity of Padilla[]”). In Ifenatuora, because the issue was “an academic 

one[,]” the court declined to reach it and found that the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

had no merit. Id. The issue of Kwan’s viability after Chaidez is pending before the Ninth Circuit in the 

appeal of Ifenatuora. See United States v. Ifenatuora, No. 13-16991, Answering Brief of the United 

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 Even with the advantage of three assumptions just outlined, the court is unable to 

find that petitioner has met his burden of showing that he is entitled to the “highly 

unusual remedy” of a writ of coram nobis. See Riedl, 496 F.3d at 1005. That is because, 

as fully discussed below, Kwan, which now necessarily is the sole legal basis for the 

petitioner’s request, is wholly distinguishable from the present case. 

D. Error of the Most Fundamental Character 

 Ineffective assistance of counsel will satisfy the fundamental error requirement for 

coram nobis relief. Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1014 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Mett, 65 

F.3d 1531, 1534 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that “[a]n individual no longer in custody 

may employ the rarely-used writ of coram nobis to make a Sixth Amendment assistance 

of counsel attack on his conviction”). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim, the petitioner must establish the by now familiar two-prong test set forth in 

Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “First, the defendant must show that counsel's 

performance was deficient.” Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “Second, the defendant must 

show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. It is incumbent upon 

the petitioner to satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test; otherwise, his ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim fails. See id. “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never 

any easy task.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 371, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (citations omitted). 

 a. Deficient Performance? 

 “Strickland 's first prong requires that ‘the defendant . . . show that counsel's 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Murray v. Schriro, 

745 F.3d 984, 1011 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052). 

“[T]he relevant inquiry. . . is not what defense counsel could have pursued, but rather 

whether the choices made by defense counsel were reasonable.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). In making this inquiry, the Supreme Court has recognized 

that “[c]ounsel must have ‘wide latitude . . . in making tactical decisions,’ and [that] 

‘[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential.’” Hedlund v. 

 

States (Doc. 14-1) at 47. That appeal is not yet fully briefed. The appellant’s reply is due June 19, 2014, 

and oral argument has not yet been set 

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Ryan, 2014 WL 1622765, at *13 (9th Cir. April 24, 2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052). As the Strickland Court explained: 

 A fair assessment of attorney performance requires 

 that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting 

 effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances 

 of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the 

 conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 

 Acknowledging the “difficulties inherent in making th[is] evaluation, a court must 

indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Consequently, “the 

burden to ‘show that counsel’s performance was deficient’ rests squarely on the 

defendant[.]” Burt v. Titlow, --- U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 10, 17, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013) 

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). “The challenger's burden is to 

show ‘that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 

‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.’” Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Petitioner Velazquez has not met this heavy burden 

 Post-Chaidez, at this juncture and as earlier noted, Kwan is the only legal authority 

for the petitioner’s argument that his counsel’s performance was deficient under 

Strickland. In United States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit 

“held that an attorney’s failure to advise a client of the immigration consequences of a 

conviction, without more, d[id] not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under 

Strickland.” Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1015. Kwan provided the “more” where the defense 

counsel did “not merely fail[] to inform, but . . . effectively misled, his client about the 

immigration consequences of a conviction[.]” Id. Kwan specifically “asked [his] 

counsel whether pleading guilty would cause him to be deportable, and counsel chose to 

advise him.” Id. at 1015-1016 (emphasis in original). Kwan’s counsel “assured Kwan 

that . . . deportation, . . . ‘was not a serious possibility.’” Id. at 1008. The Ninth Circuit 

found this assurance “grossly inaccurate” given the change in law between the time 

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Kwan pled guilty and his sentencing. Id. at 1016. When Kwan pled guilty, he “was 

potentially eligible for various downward adjustments that, if granted, could reduce his 

sentence to less than one year[,]” also potentially avoiding deportation. Id. In the 

interim, however, the definition of an aggravated felony was changed, which meant that 

Kwan “had pled guilty to an offense that would almost certainly cause him to be 

deported.” Id. at 1009. 

 Despite “counsel[’s] represent[ing] himself as having expertise on the immigration 

consequences of criminal convictions[,]” the Ninth Circuit pointed out that he “either 

failed to keep abreast of relevant and significant changes in the law or failed to inform 

Kwan of those changes’ effect on the deportation consequences of Kwan’s conviction.” 

Id. at 1016. Either way, “counsel never advised Kwan of the options that remained open 

to him prior to sentencing, and counsel never informed the sentencing judge that a 

sentence only two days shorter than the sentence ultimately imposed would enable Kwan 

to avoid deportation and remain united with his family.” Id. Based upon the foregoing, 

the Kwan Court held that “counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and 

me[]t[] the first prong of the Strickland test.” Id. at 1017. 

 Again, operating under the assumption that Kwan applies retroactively in this 

case, the record facts are a far cry from the fairly egregious facts in Kwan. The 

petitioner avers, as mentioned earlier, that “[w]hen [he] entered into [his] plea agreement, 

[he] was not aware that this type of conviction would have precluded [him] from 

remain[ing] in the United States with [his] family.” Mot. (Doc. 1), exh. 3 (Doc. 1-3) 

thereto at 2:16-18, ¶ 2 (footnote added). There is a critical omission from the petitioner’s 

affidavit, however. Nowhere does he specifically aver, or even hint at the possibility, that 

his defense counsel “affirmatively” or “effectively” misled him as to the immigration 

consequences of his guilty plea, as Kwan requires. See Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1008; and at 

1015. 

 Likewise, the unsworn allegations in the petitioner’s motion do not in any way 

advance his argument that his attorney’s performance was deficient under Kwan. In his 

motion, the petitioner alleges “lack of information” in that “[h]e was not properly advised 

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of this presumptively, or, virtually mandated deportation which would inevitably result” 

from his plea of guilty. Mot. (Doc. 1) at 5:27; and at 5:16-18. Likewise, the petitioner’s 

motion alleges that his attorney “failed to properly advise [him] as to [the petitioner’s] 

imminent deportation based on a conviction of this nature.” Id. at 7:19-20. As is 

abundantly clear, however, Kwan requires far more than a mere lack of information to 

sustain an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Vazquez-Villanueva v. United 

States, 2013 WL 5176800, at *3 (W.D.Wash. Sept. 12, 2013) (Kwan did not support an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim where petitioner contended that his counsel 

“never” provided him “any information about the immigration consequences of a guilty 

plea”). 

 The petitioner’s unsubstantiated assertion that he “was actually provided with 

incorrect information [or “misinformation”], as to his chances of remaining in the United 

States notwithstanding this type of conviction[]” id. at 5:21-23; and 27, also is not 

sufficient to bring his ineffective assistance of counsel claim within the ambit of Kwan. 

See United States v. Guillen-Reyes, 2009 WL 3061985, at *5 (S.D.Cal. Sept. 24, 2009) 

(ineffective assistance of counsel claims “fails because it is unsupported by the record . . . 

in that [the] Petitioner provide[d] no evidentiary support to show defense counsel 

affirmatively misled him[]”). Similarly unavailing is the petitioner’s bald assertion that 

not just his counsel, but also the United States and this court gave him “a false realistic 

belief that he had . . . some opportunity to remain lawfully in the United States, when . . . 

he did not[.] See id. at 5:24-25 (citation omitted). Tellingly, to support this assertion the 

petitioner merely cites to his affidavit, which does not in any way elucidate upon this 

supposedly “false realistic belief[.]” See id. at 5:24. Furthermore, the evidence belies 

this unsupported assertion. At his plea hearing, the court pointedly asked the petitioner 

if he had “any questions that [he] wish[ed] to ask [the court] or [his] lawyer or the 

prosecutor” for the United States. Resp. (Doc. 10), exh. 16 thereto (Doc. 10-1) at 22:9-

11. The petitioner responded, “No.” Id. at 22:12. 

 Attempting to show that Kwan governs here, relying upon this attorney’s 

declaration, the petitioner claims that his attorney made a “critical error” in “that he 

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believed this conviction would have been considered ‘a crime of moral turpitude[,]” [] for 

which the JRAD [Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation] procedure, . . . , may 

have applied.” Reply (Doc. 16) at 4:25-27. Attorney de la Vara did “recognize[]” that 

petitioner’s “crime could have immigration consequences.” Resp. (Doc. 10), exh. 24 

thereto (Doc. 24-1) at 68, ¶ 5. He also declares that he “knew” that petitioner’s crime 

“could be classified as a crime involving moral turpitude[.]” Id. Although attorney de 

la Vara spoke with the United States “about these concerns,” he did not speak with the 

petitioner. See id. Moreover, there is no mention in attorney de la Vara’s declaration, or 

elsewhere in the record of the possibility of the JRAD procedure here. That is 

understandable given that “in 1990[,]” well before petitioner Velazquez’s plea and 

sentencing, “Congress entirely eliminated . . . the JRAD provision[.]” See Padilla, 559 

U.S. at 362, 130 S.Ct. 1473. 

 Regardless, attorney de la Vara’s does “not recall discussing with [the] petitioner 

whether the criminal conviction would be classified as an aggravated felony[,]” a fact 

which is uncontradicted. See Mot. (Doc. 10), exh. 24 thereto (Doc. 10-1) at 68, ¶ 4. 

Under these circumstances, the petitioner’s attorney did not affirmatively mislead him, as 

did Kwan’s attorney. It is also noteworthy that unlike Kwan’s attorney, attorney de la 

Vara did not “represent himself as having expertise on the immigration consequences of 

criminal convictions.” See Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1016. Accordingly, even if attorney de la 

Vara was mistaken as to whether the petitioner’s crime was one of moral turpitude or an 

aggravated felony, there is nothing in the record that he advised petitioner of this. Quite 

simply, “[w]ithout evidence that [petitioner’s attorney] gave incorrect advice or evidence 

that he failed to give material advice, [the petitioner] cannot establish that his 

performance was deficient.’” See Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 17 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). That is because, as the Burt Court admonished the Sixth Circuit, “[i]t 

should go without saying that the absence of evidence cannot overcome the ‘strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance.’” Id. 

 The other record evidence is similarly lacking and, indeed, belies the petitioner’s 

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unsubstantiated allegations in his motion. As with the petitioner’s affidavit, not 

surprisingly, attorney de la Vara’s declaration does not suggest in any way that he 

“affirmatively” or “effectively misled” the petitioner as to the immigration consequences 

of his pleading guilty. See Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1008; and 1015. Attorney de la Vara was 

aware that the petitioner “was a Mexican citizen with lawful immigration status in the 

United States, and that his main concern was . . . to remain in the United States with his 

family.” Resp. (Doc. 10), exh. 24 thereto (Doc. 10-1) at 68, ¶ 3. Attorney de la Vara 

explains that the United States “did agree . . . to ask the Court to recommend to the . . . 

INS that [the petitioner] not be deported as a result of the conviction.” Id. at 68, ¶ 5. 

The plea agreement reflects this recommendation. See Mot. (Doc. 1), exh. 1 thereto 

(Doc. 1-1) at 9-10, ¶ 3(h)(2). Not only that, during the plea hearing, the court reiterated 

that the United States could be making such a recommendation, reminding him that it 

was “within [the court’s] discretion whether to follow this recommendation, which means 

[the court] can choose to follow it and make the recommendation to INS or [it] can 

choose not to follow it and not make a recommendation to INS[.]” Resp. (Doc. 10), exh. 

16 thereto (Doc. 10-1), at 18:13-7. Continuing, the court explicitly asked the petitioner 

whether he “underst[oo]d that[,]” and he responded, “Yes, sir.” Id. at 18:17-18. 

 In keeping with the foregoing, attorney de la Vara did inform the petitioner “that it 

was up to the INS whether he would be deported, but that in [de la Vara’s] experience, 

the INS usually followed the Court’s recommendation about deportation.” Id., exh. 24 

thereto (Doc. 10-1) at 68-69, ¶ 6. Attorney de la Vara did “anticipate[] that this 

[recommendation] would likely allow [the petitioner] to stay in the United States[,]” but, 

he did not tell the petitioner that. See id. at 68, ¶ 5. Instead, he candidly “told” the 

petitioner, that he “could not guarantee what the INS would do, even with the Court’s 

recommendation.” Id. at 68, ¶ 6. Moreover, although the petitioner’s attorney “did not 

believe . . . that the [petitioner’s] guilty plea or criminal conviction . . . would necessarily 

result in deportation[,]” id. at 68, ¶ 4, he “did not promise [the petitioner] that he would 

not be deported[.]” Id. And, in fact, the plea agreement recites, among other things, that 

no one made any promises to the petitioner in exchange for his plea of guilty. See Mot. 

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(Doc. 1), exh. 1 thereto (Doc. 1-1) at 16:20-25. Not insignificantly, the plea agreement 

further indicates that the petitioner was “satisfied that [his] defense attorney ha[d] 

represented [him] in a competent manner[,]” and that the petitioner was “fully capable of 

understanding the terms and conditions of th[at] . . . agreement.” Id. at 17:16-19. 

 As the foregoing readily shows, the present case stands in sharp contrast to Kwan, 

who directly asked his lawyer, who “represented himself as having expertise on the 

immigration consequences of criminal convictions[,]” whether his guilty plea would 

render Kwan deportable, and his lawyer effectively misled him. See Kwan, 407 F.3d at 

1016. Petitioner Velazquez did not specifically inquire of his lawyer as to the 

immigration consequences of his guilty plea. Far more importantly, however, is that 

attorney de la Vara did not, in any way, effectively or affirmatively mislead the 

petitioner. Nor did attorney de la Vara represent to the petitioner that he was an expert in 

the immigration consequences of criminal convictions, as did Kwan’s attorney. In sum, 

“judg[ing] the reasonableness” of attorney de law Vara’s conduct, viewed at that time, 

the court simply cannot find that he acted “outside the wide range of professionally 

competent assistance.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This is all the 

more so taking into account that in the pre-Padilla world in which the petitioner’s counsel 

was operating, criminal defense counsel, such as Mr. de la Vara, had no duty to expressly 

advise a client of the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction. See Padilla, 

559 U.S. at 365, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (internal quotation marks, citation and footnote omitted) 

(recognizing that in 2008, and prior thereto, “[t]he Kentucky high court [wa]s far from 

alone in [it]s view[]” that “collateral consequences are outside the scope of representation 

required by the Sixth Amendment, and, therefore, the failure of defense counsel to advise 

the defendant of possible deportation consequences is not cognizable as a claim for 

ineffective assistance of counsel[]”). 

 b. Prejudice? 

 Having found that the petitioner has not met his burden of showing that his 

attorney’s performance was deficient under the first prong of Strickland, the court could 

end its inquiry here. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“[T]here is no 

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reason for a court . . . to approach the [Strickland] inquiry in the same order or even to 

address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing 

on one.”) However, because the United States expressly objects to the prejudice finding 

in the R & R, as part of its de novo review, the court will proceed to address prejudice -- 

the second Strickland prong. 

 “Strickland’s second prong requires that “[t]he defendant . . . show that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.’” Murray, 745 F.3d at 1011 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). “A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “In the context of a plea, a petitioner satisfies the prejudice prong 

of the Strickland test where ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’” 

Smith v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 986 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 

52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985)). Put differently, a petitioner “must 

convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational 

under the circumstances.” See Padilla, 559 U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (citing Roe v. 

Flores–Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480–81, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000)). 

Petitioner Velazquez is unable to make that showing. 

 The petitioner claims that his lawyer’s supposedly deficient performance 

prejudiced him because “he is now facing deportation and separation from his family.”10 

Mot. (Doc. 1) at 8:23-24. Acknowledging the use of “hindsight,” the petitioner avers, as 

set forth at the outset, that if he had “known that his conviction would result in [his] 

automatic deportation, [he] most likely would have tried to work out a different plea 

agreement with the government, which would not have resulted in [his] deportation, or, 

[he] would have taken the matter to trial.” Id., exh. 3 thereto (Doc. 1-3) at 2:19-22, ¶ 3. 

 

10 The petitioner has not shown that he has actually been ordered to be deported, only that 

he was notified by letter dated November 8, 2010, that he was “currently in removal proceedings” and 

those proceedings had “not been terminated.” Resp. (Doc. 10), exh. 23 thereto (Doc. 10-1) at 66. 

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In his reply, the petitioner posits that “[a]s to prejudice, one must always speculate.” 

Reply (Doc. 16) at 5:3. Even if the court agreed with that supposition (which it does not), 

speculation is not a substitute for demonstrated prejudice. 

 The sole predicate for the Magistrate Judge’s finding of prejudice is the 

petitioner’s averment that had he “been advised that his plea would subject him to 

mandatory deportation, he would have proceeded to trial.” See R & R (Doc. 18) at 18:4-

6. The United States objects to this conclusion as it is based on the petitioner’s affidavit 

only, and does not account for other contradictory record evidence. Further, the United 

States contends that the petitioner “cannot show prejudice because he cannot show how 

his chances for avoiding deportation could have been any better.” Obj. (Doc. 19) at 3:4-

5. 

 The United States’ position is well-taken. The “mere allegation that [the 

petitioner] would have insisted on going to trial is insufficient to establish prejudice.” 

Berkey v. United States, 318 F.3d 768, 772 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted); see also United States v. Jazquez-Diaz, 2009 WL 249430, at *5 

(D.Ariz. Feb. 2, 2009) (citing Key v. United States, 806 F.2d 133, 139 (7th Cir. 1986)) 

(“To meet the second prong of the Strickland test, . . . , Movant’s assertion that he would 

not have pleaded guilty must be more than a mere allegation.”) This lack of evidence is 

particularly glaring given, as the United States points out and the R & R did not mention, 

that petitioner’s attorney “believed the evidence against [him] was strong, and [he] did 

not believe that [the petitioner] had any viable trial defenses.” Resp. (Doc. 10), exh. 24 

thereto (Doc. 10-1) at 69, ¶ 7. The petitioner offers nothing to counter his attorney’s 

assessment. For example, he has not shown “how he might have been able to avoid 

conviction or what specific defenses or evidence might have been available to him at 

trial.” See Jazquez-Diaz, 2009 WL 249430, at *5. What is more, as the petitioner’s 

attorney explains, the United States “did not offer [the petitioner] a plea agreement to any 

other offense to help him avoid immigration consequences[,]” another piece of evidence 

which the R & R omits. See Resp. (Doc. 10), exh. 24 thereto (Doc. 10-1) at 68, ¶ 5. 

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 The petitioner strongly implies that when he pled guilty, he faced a stark choice 

between pleading guilty and being deported or going to trial and avoiding deportation. A 

trial would not have eliminated completely the possibility of deportation, however. As 

the court soundly reasoned in Jazquez-Diaz: 

 While it is true that by insisting on trial [the petitioner] 

 would have retained a theoretical possibility of 

 evading the conviction that rendered him deportable 

 and excludable, it is equally true that a conviction following 

 trial would have subjected him to the same 

 immigration consequences and, likely, a longer sentence. 

Jazquez-Diaz, 2009 WL 249430, at *5. This reasoning applies with equal force here. 

Finally, while certainly not dispositive, the court cannot overlook the fact that ultimately 

the petitioner received a “substantial downward departure[]” to a four year term of 

probation, rather than a prison sentence which would have been the result of a conviction 

at trial. See Resp. (Doc. 10), exh. 17 thereto (Doc. 10-1) at 27:13. 

 In sum, engaging in de novo review persuades this court that petitioner Velazquez 

has not shown, as he must, “that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been 

rational under the circumstances.” See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (citation 

omitted). As a result, just as with his claim of deficient performance under Strickland, 

the petitioner has not met his burden of showing prejudice under Strickland. 

 Because petitioner Velazquez has shown neither deficient performance by his 

counsel, nor prejudice, his ineffective assistance of counsel claims fails. Thus, 

necessarily, he has not shown error of the most fundamental character – an essential 

prerequisite to obtaining coram nobis relief. 

III. Expungement 

 As part of its de novo review, the court will briefly address the petitioner’s 

alternative argument seeking expungement of his criminal record. Necessarily the 

Magistrate Judge did not address this argument because he recommended granting the 

petitioner his primary relief under the writ of coram nobis. 

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to have the court completely expunge his criminal record in this case. In opposing 

expungement, the United States asserts that the two cases upon which the petitioner is 

relying are easily distinguishable. While that is a valid point, there are two more 

compelling reasons for denying expungement here. 

 The first is that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner’s 

expungement motion, which is based solely upon equitable considerations. See United 

States v. Crowell, 374 F.3d 790, 796 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted) (district court 

lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant’s claim which fell into “the category of [a] 

solely ‘equitable’ claim for expungement[]”) That is because “[t]he ancillary jurisdiction 

of the federal court is ‘limited to expunging the records of an unlawful arrest or 

conviction, or to correcting a clerical error.’” United States v. Davis, 2014 WL 935355, 

at *3 (C.D.Cal. March 10, 2014) (quoting United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1014 

(9th Cir. 2000)). Second, petitioner Velazquez was not successful in getting his 

conviction vacated. Therefore, he is not entitled to seek expungement of his criminal 

record. See id. (“Having been lawfully convicted, if [the defendant] wishes to expunge 

his records of conviction, she must first obtain a judgment that her conviction was 

unlawful.”); see also 28 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 672.02[e] 

(3d ed. 1999) (“[I]t is only after the underlying conviction has been vacated that a 

successful defendant can seek expungement[.]”) The petitioner “cannot use a motion for 

expungement to make an ‘end-run’ around recognized post-convictions remedies[.]” Id. 

(citation omitted). Accordingly, the court finds no merit to the petitioner’s alternative 

argument seeking expungement of his criminal records. 

IV. Certificate of Appealability 

 Finally, because the certificate of appealability (“COA”) “requirement does not 

apply to coram nobis proceedings[]” such as the present one, there is no need to grant a 

COA here; and the court declines to adopt the R & R’s recommendation to do so. See 

Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1009. 

Conclusion 

 Having reviewed the Amended Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate 

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Judge (Doc. 18), and the United States’ objections thereto (Doc. 19), the court hereby 

rejects the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner Matias Velazquez’s “Motion to 

Vacate Plea of Guilty & Set Aside Judg[]ment/Motion for Expungement” (Doc. 1) is 

DENIED, terminating this case. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment 

accordingly. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall furnish a copy of this 

order to Magistrate Judge Anderson. 

 Dated this 16th day of June, 2014. 

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