Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03094/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03094-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Fletcher
Appellant
John H. Moore
Appellee
Nicholas O'Hara
Appellant
Ramsey County
Appellant
Joyce M. Shockency
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3094

___________

Joyce M. Shockency; *

John H. Moore, *

*

Plaintiffs - Appellees, *

*

v. *

* Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Ramsey County, a Minnesota * District of Minnesota.

municipal corporation; Robert * 

Fletcher, Ramsey County Sheriff, *

in his official and individual capacity; *

Nicholas O'Hara, in his official and *

individual capacity, *

*

Defendants - Appellants. * 

___________

Submitted: March 12, 2007

Filed: July 12, 2007 

___________

Before WOLLMAN, JOHN R. GIBSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

John H. Moore and Joyce M. Shockency brought this § 1983 action against

Ramsey County, Sheriff Robert Fletcher, and Inspector Nicholas O'Hara, alleging

violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by retaliatory employment

actions after Moore ran against Fletcher in the 2002 election and Shockency supported

Appellate Case: 06-3094 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/12/2007 Entry ID: 3328964
-2-

him. The district court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment. Fletcher

and O’Hara appeal from the order denying them qualified immunity; the county also

seeks to appeal. We affirm as to Fletcher, reverse as to O'Hara, and dismiss the

county's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I.

In reviewing an order denying qualified immunity, we "view the facts and draw

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving part[ies]." Scott

v. Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1774 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). John H. Moore

and Joyce M. Shockency were employed as officers in the Ramsey County Sheriff’s

Department. In June 2001 Moore told coworkers that he intended to run against

Sheriff Robert Fletcher in the fall election. Fletcher informed Moore in July 2001

that he was being transferred out of his position as patrol lieutenant and would then

be supervised by Nicholas O'Hara, who was a political supporter and friend of the

sheriff. After Shockency publicly supported Moore's campaign, she was transferred

from her position as sergeant in charge of the midnight patrol shift to a position in the

transportation unit with significantly less responsibility. She was also replaced as

manager of the field training program. 

 Moore was hired as a deputy sheriff for Ramsey County in 1981 and was

promoted twice, attaining the rank of lieutenant and eventually commanding the entire

patrol division. In the latter position he supervised 80 employees and held the highest

job available for his rank. He supervised several units, communicated department

policy to the public, developed enforcement strategies for community policing,

assisted with budget preparation, and composed strategy for long range improvements

of the uniformed patrol division.

In July 2001 Moore told coworker Dennis Flaherty about his decision to run for

sheriff. Flaherty was a supporter of the sheriff. Ten days after Moore's conversation

with Flaherty, Sheriff Fletcher told him he was being transferred out of the patrol

Appellate Case: 06-3094 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/12/2007 Entry ID: 3328964
-3-

division to lead the apprehension division and that thereafter he would work under the

supervision of Inspector Nicholas O’Hara. Fletcher also said, "By the way, I spoke

to Flaherty." From the sheriff's reference to his conversation with Flaherty, Moore

understood that he was being transferred because of his campaign for sheriff. Fletcher

told him that his transfer was due to communication problems with his supervisor,

Undersheriff George Altendorfer, but Moore had never before heard anything about

any communication problem. 

Although Moore remained a lieutenant and retained his basic pay and benefits

after his transfer, he claims he lost overtime pay and access to a take home vehicle.

In January 2002 Fletcher took away his responsibility for leading the apprehension

division and Moore began working with a partner from the unit. In September 2002

Moore was assigned to be O'Hara's executive assistant and was given only

administrative duties. The parties contest who was responsible for this decision.

Moore was the only lieutenant to have served in the apprehension division, and no

other lieutenant was assigned to replace him when he was moved. 

O'Hara and Moore did not get along from the beginning of Moore's transfer to

apprehension. O'Hara criticized Moore for routine actions that were normally not

subject to discipline. He gave Moore dangerous assignments, such as requiring him

"per the sheriff" to execute search warrants alone. He gave Moore inconsistent orders

and then disciplined him for not following some aspect of the orders. In August 2002

O'Hara began requiring Moore and his partner to keep daily logs indicating what they

were doing during the day, even though it was not a step in the disciplinary procedure

and no other officers had been required to do so. After Moore was assigned to serve

as his executive assistant in September 2002, O'Hara told him that he should not leave

the office except for noon lunch. Sheriff Fletcher won reelection in November 2002.

Joyce M. Shockency was hired as a dispatcher in 1977. She was promoted to

deputy sheriff in 1989 and to sergeant six years later. In January 1999 Shockency

Appellate Case: 06-3094 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/12/2007 Entry ID: 3328964
-4-

requested a transfer to the patrol division where she was put in charge of the midnight

shift. As the senior officer on duty she communicated with the afternoon and morning

shifts to resolve all outstanding issues, reviewed all calls and reports, helped officers

prepare for the night shift, processed outgoing mail, worked with dispatch on

paperwork, and monitored deputies in the street by radio. She was also responsible

for coordinating all first responders in times of emergency, coordinating with

surrounding departments, and deciding when it was necessary to contact supervisors.

In addition she developed and implemented the field training officer program, a

"substantial responsibility." Shockency did not have any disciplinary problems.

Fletcher saw Shockency exhibit her support for Moore's candidacy by marching

in a community parade and displaying one of his campaign buttons on her purse. In

the summer of 2002 deputy Don Rindal told his colleague Rick Werdien that

Shockency would be removed from her position after the election and that he hoped

to receive better assignments because of his support for Sheriff Fletcher. Werdien told

Shockency about this conversation in the winter of 2002. Fletcher transferred her to

the midnight transportation unit in January 2003. That post was in a less active unit

which only afforded her the opportunity to do deputy level work even though she had

been serving as a sergeant. She was not allowed to arrest anyone, make a traffic stop,

or assist other officers with law enforcement activities. Her responsibility for the field

training officer program was also taken away, she only supervised one person per

shift, and she kept herself busy by filling the day shift cars with gas. At the time of her

transfer she was told that she was being reassigned because of reorganization priorities

and budget cuts. 

Moore and Shockency sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming Sheriff Fletcher

and Ramsey County violated their First Amendment rights to free speech and

association by transferring them out of their positions and causing them to lose

overtime pay and access to take home vehicles because of their campaign activities.

Moore also brought First Amendment claims against Inspector O'Hara, alleging that

O'Hara demoted him to an executive assistant and improperly disciplined him because

Appellate Case: 06-3094 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/12/2007 Entry ID: 3328964
-5-

of his campaign. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants violated their equal protection

and due process rights by treating their speech differently than that of other employees

and caused them to lose their property rights in their prior jobs by the transfers. 

In his deposition, Sheriff Fletcher testified that Moore was transferred due to

communication problems and Shockency because of reorganization and budget

changes. He added that politics should have no place in employment decisions and

that the transfers were not made for political reasons. He affirmed that Shockency had

never had any disciplinary problems and that her performance had been consistently

good and at times exceptional. The sheriff’s chief deputy, David Metusalem, testified

that Moore and Shockency were not part of Fletcher's management team which

consisted of himself, the undersheriffs, and the department's planning and policy

director. Moore and Shockency were never invited to participate in management

meetings.

Sheriff Fletcher, O'Hara, and the county moved for summary judgment. They

argued that Moore and Shockency held policymaking positions which Sheriff Fletcher

was entitled to fill with officers loyal to him so the transfers did not violate any

constitutional rights and that all claims should be dismissed on the merits. Fletcher

and O'Hara argued in the alternative that they were entitled to qualified immunity on

the First Amendment claims because it was not clearly established that Moore and

Shockency could not be transferred for political patronage reasons. O'Hara claimed

in addition that he was not responsible for Moore's transfers and it was not clearly

established that any other disciplinary action he took toward Moore was an adverse

employment action. 

The district court ruled in favor of the defendants on one claim only. It

concluded that plaintiffs had not shown infringement of a protected property right by

the alleged adverse employment actions. They had not been terminated, and their rank

and pay had not been adversely impacted. Their due process claims were therefore

Appellate Case: 06-3094 Page: 5 Date Filed: 07/12/2007 Entry ID: 3328964
1

The district court did not address the equal protection claims in considering the

motion for qualified immunity, and on appeal the parties have focused their qualified

immunity discussion on the First Amendment claims. 

-6-

dismissed. The court denied summary judgment on the equal protection claims.1

 It

concluded that plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing that defendants had treated

them differently from other employees who had exercised free speech rights and

defendants had not rebutted that showing or offered a nondiscriminatory reason for

their actions. The court also denied summary judgment on the First Amendment

claims, for genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether plaintiffs suffered

adverse employment actions in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights.

It also denied the alternative motion of Fletcher and O'Hara for qualified immunity on

the First Amendment claims without undertaking the two step analysis required by the

Supreme Court, see Scott v. Harris,127 S.Ct. 1769, 1774 (2007); Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 202 (2001), but concluding that the law was clearly established that

defendants were prohibited from retaliating against plaintiffs for their protected

speech. 

Fletcher and O'Hara filed this interlocutory appeal arguing that the district court

erred in not granting them qualified immunity on the plaintiffs' First Amendment

claims. The county seeks to appeal also, arguing that it should have been dismissed

on immunity grounds and that it should be dismissed along with the other appellants.

II.

Qualified immunity protects state officials from civil liability for actions that

"do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known." Sexton v. Martin, 210 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir.

2000). Analyzing whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity is a two step

process, and the threshold question is whether the facts taken in the light favoring the

Appellate Case: 06-3094 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/12/2007 Entry ID: 3328964
-7-

nonmoving party show that the official’s action violated a constitutional right.

 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If that answer is yes, the next question is whether the right

was clearly established so that "a reasonable official would understand that what he

is doing violates that right." Id. Defendants bear the burden of proving that the law

was not clearly established. Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 674 (8th Cir. 1997) (en

banc). We review the denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity de

novo, viewing all evidence in a light favorable to the non moving parties. Gordon ex.

rel. Gordon v. Frank, 454 F.3d 858, 861 (8th Cir. 2006).

It is well established that a government employer cannot take adverse

employment actions against its employees for exercising their First Amendment

rights. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983). The employee's speech rights

are not absolute, for there are competing interests as explained by the Supreme Court

in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), and Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.

563 (1968). Whether speech activity is constitutionally protected is determined by

analyzing whether it relates to a matter of public concern. See Connick, 461 U.S. at

147. If the speech is protected, the public employer's interest in promoting efficiency

is balanced against that of the employee in speaking as a citizen. Pickering, 391 U.S.

at 568. A government employer is not liable for an adverse employment action taken

against its employees for their speech if the government interest outweighs the interest

of the employees in their expressive conduct. Richardson v. Sugg, 448 F.3d 1046,

1062-63 (8th Cir. 2006).

The parties do not dispute that participation in electoral activities is protected

under the First Amendment and that Moore and Shockency were exercising such

rights. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1995) ("the First Amendment has

its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political

office") (citation omitted). They disagree about whether appellees have alleged facts

that show they suffered adverse employment actions in retaliation for their speech

activity. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Changes in employment duties or conditions that

cause material disadvantage to the employee constitute adverse employment actions,

Appellate Case: 06-3094 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/12/2007 Entry ID: 3328964
-8-

but tangential changes do not. See, e.g., Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144

(8th Cir. 1997). Lesser actions than demotion, suspension, and termination can be

adverse employment actions if their cumulative effect causes an employee to suffer

“serious employment consequences” that adversely affect or undermine his position.

Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046,1060 (8th Cir. 1997) (adverse employment

action occurred where plaintiff’s duties were drastically reduced, his personnel file

was “papered” with negative reports, his evaluations were drastically lowered, and he

was required to participate in special remedial training). "A transfer constitutes an

adverse employment action when the transfer results in a significant change in

working conditions." Fisher v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 919 (8th Cir.

2000).

We conclude, taking the facts in the light most favorable to appellees as we

must at this point, that Fletcher retaliated against Moore and Shockency for their First

Amendment conduct by transferring them from supervisory positions into roles with

significantly less responsibility. In Moore's case, he was removed from the highest

position available for his rank where he commanded the entire patrol division and

supervised 80 employees. Though initially transferred to lead the apprehension unit,

he was later demoted to a street officer position, and eventually limited to desk work

as the election approached. His transfer caused him to lose overtime pay and a take

home vehicle. Shockency had been the highest ranking sergeant in patrol and in

charge of the midnight shift. Her supervisory responsibilities were largely eliminated,

she lost responsibility for the field training program and she was not given enough

duties to fill her hours. We conclude that Moore and Shockency have alleged

sufficient facts to show that Fletcher caused them to suffer material changes in their

employment that rose to the level of adverse employment actions. See, e.g., Fisher,

225 F.3d at 919; Kim, 123 F.3d at 1060 (decrease in compensation not required for

adverse employment actions). 

O'Hara argues that he was not responsible for Moore's initial transfer to the

apprehension unit nor for Moore's later transfer to serve as his executive assistant.

Appellate Case: 06-3094 Page: 8 Date Filed: 07/12/2007 Entry ID: 3328964
-9-

Although Moore alleges that O'Hara appointed him as his assistant, the portions of the

record on which he relies do not support his position. That record indicates that

Moore learned about his assignment as executive assistant to O'Hara through a

September 12, 2002 memorandum from Undersheriff John Luey, a member of

Fletcher's management team. Sheriff Fletcher testified that the decision was made by

his management team, which did not include O'Hara, and O'Hara testified that the

sheriff was responsible for the transfer. Although we are to draw all inferences in

favor of Moore at this stage, we cannot adopt a version of the facts that contradicts the

record and infer that O'Hara was responsible for Moore's demotion. See Scott, 127

S.Ct. at 1776. Moore also alleges that O'Hara forced him to execute arrest warrants

alone, but the record shows that these instructions were issued "per the sheriff."

Moore contends in addition that he suffered material changes in his employment when

O'Hara made him record all of his time "on log," ordered him to stay in his office at

all times except for the noon lunch hour, and gave him written reprimands and placed

negative notes in his file for conduct other officers were not criticized for doing.

Whether these additional actions rise to the level of adverse employment actions is a

matter of contention relevant on the second step of the qualified immunity analysis.

Appellants argue that they did not violate appellees' First Amendment rights

because the department interest in efficiency outweighed the employee interest in

protected activities. In order for the Pickering balancing test to be relevant appellants

must have produced evidence to show that the speech of Moore and Shockency

adversely affected the efficiency of the sheriff's department. See Burnham, 119 F.3d

at 678. Appellants assert that they need not show "actual disruption," but only that

"the ordinary or foreseeable effect of the conduct" would be to disrupt department

efficiency, relying on Wright v. Illinois Dept. of Children and Family Services, 40

F.3d 1492 (7th Cir. 1994), quoting Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium, 769 F.2d

1251, 1258 (7th Cir. 1985). Although law enforcement predictions of disruption are

due some deference, the Pickering balancing test only need be conducted if a

government employer has produced evidence of workplace disruption. See, e.g.,

Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, Mo., 64 F.3d 389, 398 (8th Cir. 1995) (bare

Appellate Case: 06-3094 Page: 9 Date Filed: 07/12/2007 Entry ID: 3328964
-10-

allegations that speech negatively impacted workplace efficiency insufficient to reach

Pickering balancing test); Buzek v. County of Saunders, 972 F.2d 992, 997 (8th Cir.

1992); Burnham, 119 F.3d at 680 (no qualified immunity since defendant offered no

evidence of disruption). 

Qualified immunity cannot be based on "a simple assertion by the employer

. . . without supporting evidence" of the adverse effect of the speech on workplace

efficiency. Grantham v. Trickey, 21 F.3d 289, 295 n.4 (8th Cir. 1994). Here,

appellants failed to support their claim that the workplace was disrupted by the

protected activities of Moore and Shockency. Nothing in Fletcher's deposition

testimony suggests that Moore's campaign disrupted the department's efficiency, and

Fletcher himself testified that Moore was transferred because of his communication

problems and Shockency for budget concerns and reorganization priorities. Fletcher

points to Moore's deposition testimony that coworkers in the apprehension unit tried

to provoke him, but this evidence was insufficient to show disruption within the

department. The circumstances here are similar to those in Pickering, where

allegations of disruption were not established by supporting evidence. Pickering, 391

U.S. at 571; see also; Powell v. Basham, 921 F.2d 165, 167 (8th Cir. 1990). 

Fletcher and O'Hara are entitled to qualified immunity if at the time of their

actions the applicable law was not clearly established such that a reasonable officer

could have known that his actions violated the constitutional rights of Moore and

Shockency. See Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1989). It

was clearly established that deputies to the sheriff were free to speak on matters of

public concern without fearing adverse employment actions. Powell, 921 F.2d at 167;

Buzek, 972 F.2d at 997. Showing that this right is clearly established in the abstract

is not enough, however; a "particularized" showing must be made that a "reasonable

officer would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Runge v. Dove,

857 F.2d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1988), quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987). 

Appellate Case: 06-3094 Page: 10 Date Filed: 07/12/2007 Entry ID: 3328964
-11-

We first address whether a reasonable officer would have known in 2002 that

the actions taken by O'Hara amounted to constitutional violations. Moore argues that

O'Hara criticized him in writing and placed reprimands in his file for routine actions

which other officers were allowed to do without criticism, ordered him to record how

he spent all of his time, and required him to stay in the office except for lunch at noon.

For the unconstitutionality of an action to be clearly established, the “unlawfulness

must be apparent." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. The law defining adverse employment

actions is fact intensive, and there are no clear guidelines between demotions,

suspensions, or terminations at one end of the spectrum and conduct at the other end

which is not actionable, such as general hostility. While O'Hara's treatment of Moore

diminished his job satisfaction it was not significantly more severe than exhibiting

general hostility which is insufficient to be an adverse employment action. See, e.g.,

Hughes v. Stottlemyre, 454 F.3d 791, 797 (8th Cir. 2006). We conclude that O'Hara

is entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established that the

actions he took toward Moore had employment consequences serious enough to

amount to adverse employment actions. 

Fletcher argues that it was not clearly established that the transfers were

constitutional violations because Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), creates an

exception that protects his decisions. Under Branti, a government employer can take

adverse employment actions against employees for protected First Amendment

activities if they hold confidential or policymaking positions for which political

loyalty is necessary to an effective job performance. Id. at 518. Some other circuits

have determined that deputy sheriffs held policymaking positions and could be

transferred for political reasons, but these cases are not controlling here because they

turned on state law provisions in different jurisdictions. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Medford,

119 F.3d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (intent of North Carolina general

statutes controlling); Terry v. Cook, 866 F.2d 373, 377 (11th Cir. 1989) (Alabama law

defines the relationship between sheriff and deputy sheriff).

Appellate Case: 06-3094 Page: 11 Date Filed: 07/12/2007 Entry ID: 3328964
-12-

The issue "is not whether the label 'policymaker' or 'confidential' fits a particular

person," but whether political loyalty is an "appropriate requirement for the effective

performance of the public office involved." Branti, 445 U.S. at 518; Elrod, 427 U.S.

at 351, 373 (chief deputy sheriff not a policymaker even though he supervised

numerous employees); Bauer v. Bosley, 802 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1986) (political

loyalty necessary for legal advisor to elected clerk of court); Barnes v. Bosley, 745

F.2d 501, 505 (8th Cir. 1984) (political loyalty not necessary for employee performing

only administrative duties).

Under Minnesota law the positions held by Moore and Shockency are in the

classified service and are not based on political affiliation. Minn. Stat. §§ 383A.281,

383A.288. They are subject to open application and examination. Id. In contrast to

these positions, the sheriff's chief deputy, three principal assistants, and the sheriff's

personal secretary are in the unclassified service which permits discharge without

cause with no right to a grievance appeal. Minn. Stat. § 383A.286. Ramsey County

officials may not require classified service employees to contribute to campaign funds,

or discipline them or retaliate against them if they choose not to contribute. Minn.

Stat. § 383A.297. In addition, Minnesota statute §211B.09 prohibits public officials

from using "official authority or influence" to compel employee participation in

political activities or to "impose or enforce additional limitations on the political

activities of [their] employees." The right of public employees to be free from coerced

participation in political activity reasonably includes the right to participate willingly

in the political sphere. The relevant Minnesota statutes were published and available

to appellants, and the legislature's intent not to permit retaliation for political reasons

was clearly expressed. 

Moore and Shockency were also protected by a collective bargaining agreement

that prohibited appellants from discriminating against them for their political beliefs

and from disciplining or discharging them except for "just cause." See Minn. Stat. §

383A.294 (defined as "failure to perform assigned duties, substandard performance,

misconduct, insubordination, and violation of written policies and procedures"). They

Appellate Case: 06-3094 Page: 12 Date Filed: 07/12/2007 Entry ID: 3328964
-13-

were two of many chief deputies in the department, and the record does not suggest

that either of them had a close, exclusive relationship with the sheriff which

necessitated confidentiality. Cf. Billingsley v. St. Louis County, 70 F.3d 61, 64 (8th

Cir. 1995) (reasonable for legislator to require political loyalty from only

administrative assistant). Chief deputy Metusalem testified that Fletcher excluded

Moore and Shockency from management meetings with his closest associates while

policy was developed.

For these reasons, we conclude a reasonable official would not have thought

that Moore and Shockency held policymaking positions and could not have

reasonably relied on that exception in taking adverse employment actions against

them. We conclude that the law on these issues was clearly established, and the

district court did not err in concluding that Fletcher was not entitled to qualified

immunity.

III.

Ramsey County seeks to appeal the denial of its motion for summary judgment.

It claims it was entitled to summary judgment under Monell v. Dept. of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), and argues that this court has jurisdiction over its

appeal. A denial of summary judgment based on a Monell defense is not an

appealable order under Swint v. Chambers County Commission, 514 U.S. 35, 43

(1995), unless the defense is intertwined with a qualified immunity defense. Eagle v.

Morgan, 88 F.3d 620, 628-29 (8th Cir. 1996). Ramsey County argues that we have

jurisdiction because its liability is premised upon Fletcher's liability as a final

decisionmaker for it so the county cannot be held liable if he is entitled to qualified

immunity. Given our conclusion that Fletcher is not entitled to qualified immunity,

we need not consider the county's "inextricably intertwined" argument. See Kincade,

64 F.3d at 394. We conclude that we have no jurisdiction to address the county's

immunity defense on this interlocutory appeal.

Appellate Case: 06-3094 Page: 13 Date Filed: 07/12/2007 Entry ID: 3328964
-14-

IV.

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court denying Sheriff Fletcher

qualified immunity on the First Amendment claims of Moore and Shockency, reverse

its order denying O'Hara qualified immunity on Moore's First Amendment claim,

dismiss the county's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

_________________________

Appellate Case: 06-3094 Page: 14 Date Filed: 07/12/2007 Entry ID: 3328964