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Parties Involved:
Wendall Gilliam
Appellant
Thomas J. Mikulecky
Appellant
George Oates
Appellant
William C. Powell
Appellee
Ruth Stephens
Appellant
The City of Bartlesville, Oklahoma
Not Party

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

WILLIAM C. POWELL, ) 

) 

Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 

1 ,. FILED 

,Jillrcd States Court of Aprv.- J,· 

'r•~..._-1-l r· . Z--"'a ,;, I ( :,:_;) I ,'. 1'.''.1''-

DEC 1 5 1989 

ROBERT L. I-IOECKER 

Clerk 

) No. 88-1907 

V • ) 

) 

THOMAS J. MIKULECKY, GEORGE . ) 

OATES, RUTH STEPHENS.AND ) 

WENDALL GILLIAM, ) 

) 

Defendants/Appellants. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 86-C-654-C) 

Jon B. Comstock of Rosenstein, Fist & Ringold, Tulsa, Oklahoma 

(Jerry A. Richardson with him on the brief) 1or Defendant/ 

Appellant. 

M. Claire McNearney, of Chapell, Wilkinson, Riggs & Abney, Tulsa, 

Oklahoma, (Bill M. Shaw was on the brief) for Plaintiff/Appellee. 

Before HOLLOWAY Chief Judge, HENLEY* and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable J. Smith Henley, Senior Judge, United States 

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-1907 Document: 010110279753 Date Filed: 12/15/1989 Page: 1
Plaintiff was discharged from his position as a full-time 

fire fighter. He then brought suit alleging, among other things, 

that defendants violated his right not to be deprived of his 

property interest in employment without due process because they 

did not accord him the pretermination hearing he believed he was 

entitled to under Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 

U.S. 532 (1985). Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming 

that they were protected from suit by qualified immunity. The 

district court denied that motion and-defendants appealed. 

Because we believe def~ndants' actions were shielded by qualified 

immunity, and that they are entit:j.ed to summary judgment on that 

issue, _we reverse. 

BACKGROUND 

The following facts are not controverted. Plaintiff William 

c. Powell was employed as a regular full-time fire fighter for the 

City of Bartlesville, Oklahoma. He was also an active memb~r of 

Local 2721 of the Internatiorial Association of jire Fighters (''the 

Union"). Upon returning fro~ vacation in June 1986, de~endant 

George Oates, the Bartlesville Fire Chief, was informed that 

Powell and other members of the Union had met with Bill Eden, the 

Fire Chief of Ramona, Oklahoma, and with Harold C. Young, the 

Assistant Fire Chief of Ochelata, Oklahoma. Oates contacted Eden 

and Young to discuss those meetings,_ and was told that Powell had 

requested that they keep the Ramona and Ochelata Fire Departments 

from responding to any calls for mutual aid from th~ City of 

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Bartlesville until all off-duty Bartlesville firemen are first 

called back to work for overtime wages. Oates considered Powell's 

conduct an improper attempt to interfere with the City of 

Bartlesville's authority to establish a mutual aid policy, 

endangering the safety of the citizens of Bartlesville. 

Oates advised defendant Mikulecky, the Bartlesville City 

Manager, and defendant Ruth Stephens, the Personnel Director for 

the City of Bartlesville, of his investigation into Powell's 

conduct and recommended that Powell be terminated. 1 Oates then 

conferred with Steve Andrew, Bartlesville's labor attorney, to 

determine whether there was "just cause'' to terminate Powell and 

to determine the proper piocedure to follow. After conferring 

with Andrew, Oates obtained conditional authorization from 

Mikulecky to discharge Powell if Powell admitted discussing mutual 

aid to the City of Bartlesville with Eden and Young. Dist. Ct. 

Op. at 2-3. 

On June 24, 1986, Oates conferred with Powell following a. 

negotiation session between ~epresentatives of the City of 

Bartlesville and the Unfon. Oates asked Powell if he had met with 

the fire chiefs of Ramona and Ochelata while Oates was on 

vacation. Powell said "yes.'' Oates asked Powell if Powell and 

.others had asked them not to sign a mutual aid agre~ment. Powell 

1 Plaintiff has also named Wendall Gilliam, Bartlesville's 

Assistant Fire Chief, as a defendant to this action. Plaintiff 

alleges, .and defendants deny, that Gilliam played a role in Oates' 

dischatge of Powell. See R. Doc. 48 at 11 (Defendants' Brief in 

Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment); R. Doc. 61 at 8 

(Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment). 

However, we need not resolve this dispute. because, as discussed 

below, we hold that the defendants' discharge of Powell was 

protected by qualified immunity. 

3 

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_responded: "in the form that we had heard it would be, yes." 

R. Doc. 48 at 8 (exhibit G. at 17) (Defendants' brief in support 

of their motion for summary judgment); R. Doc. 61 at 5 

(Plaintiff's response to defendants' motion for summary judgment). 

At that point, Oates informed Powell that he was discharged, 

effective immediately. R Doc. 48 at 9 (Defendants' brief in 

support of their motion for summary judgment); R. Doc. 61 at 5 

(Plaintiff's response). 2 Oates asked Powell if anyone else was 

involved. _Powell responded that he was not going to say anything 

else until he spoke with ~is attorney. Appellee's Br; at 11._ 

Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between the 

City of Bartlesville and the Union, the Union. filed a grievance on 

behalf of Powell on June 25, 1986. After defendants Oates and 

Mikulecky denied Powell's grievance, the matter was submitted to 

arbitration. 

According to the terms of the collective bargaining 

agreement, once a neutral arbitrator is selected, a hearing has to 

be called within ten days of the arbitrator's appointment. Both 

the Union anc;l the Employer must receive writte-n notice of the time 

and place of the hearing at least seven days in advance. Although 

the hearing fs to be informal, all relevant documentary evidence 

may be received into evidence. Additionally, the arbitrator has 

2 In his brief, Powell "denies.that he asked Ramona's Fire Chief 

and Ochelata's Assistant Fire Chief not to sign the mutual aid 

agreement which was proposed by the City of Bartlesville." 

Appel lee's Br. at pg·. 6. However, in his response to defendants 

motion for summary judgment, Powell admitted that he responded to 

Oates' questions as described above. R. Doc. 61 at 5 (Plaintiff's 

response to defendants'- motion for summary judgment). 

4 

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the power to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production 

of any other relevant evidence. 

On November 10, 1986, after conducting a hearing in the 

manner described above, the arbitrator sustained Powell's 

grievance, finding that Powell had been dismissed without "just 

cause" as required under his employment contract. R. Doc. 11 

(exhibit A at 9-10). The arbitrator ordered that Powell be, 

reinstated to his former position with full back pay and benefits. 

The City complied with that order. R. D9c. 11, 17. 

Powell then brought this action under 42 u.s.c. § 1983. 

Powell alleged that defendants, all employees of the· Gity of 

Bartlesville acting under color of state law and withln the scope 

of their employment, deprived him of property and liberty without 

due process of law and violated his First Amendment rights of 

freedom of speech and freedom of association. The district court 

granted defendants' motions for summary judgment on Powell's First 

f,mendment claims and his clai~ of deprivation of a liberty 

interest. Hqwever, the district court refused to grant summary 

judgment' on Powell's claim of deprivation of a property interest 

without due process and defendants' qualified immunity defense to 

that claim. Defendants now appeal the district court's order 

denying their motion for summary judgment on the ground of 

qualified immunity. 

5 

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DISCUSSION 

1. Appealability of Denial of Motion for Summary Judgment Based 

on Qualified Immunity 

Although an order denying summary judgment is not generally 

appealable as a final judgment, the Supreme Court has explained 

that the.entitlement provided to the government by qualified 

immunity "is an immunity from suit rather. than a mere defense to 

liability; and like absolute immunity,· it is effectively lost if a 

case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. . . Accordingly, 

0e hold that a district court!s denial of a claim of qualified 

immunity, to the· extent that it turns on an issue of law-, is an 

appealable 'final decision' within the meaning of 12 u.s.c. § 1291 

notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment." Mitchell v. 

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 530 (1985) (emphasis in original); see 

also Eastwood v. Dept. of Corrections of the State of Oklahoma, 

846 F.2d 627, 629 (10th Cir. 1988). Thus, we proceed to decide 

whether defendants' motion was properly denied. 

2. Summary Judgment Standards and Procedures When Qualified 

Immunity is Rais~d as a Defense 

"In an attempt to balance the need.to preserve an avenue for 

vindication of constitutional rights with the desire to shield 

public officials from undue interference in the performance of 

their duties as a result of baseless claims, the Court [has] 

6 

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adopted an objective test to determine whether the doctrine of 

qualified immunity applies." Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, 

Inc., v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 645 (10th Cir. 1988). The test 

for qualified immunity is whether defendants violated "clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

10asonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 

1J.:::i. 800, 818 (1982). "If the law at that time was.not clearly 

established, an official could not reasonably be expected to 

anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be 

said to 'know' that the law forbade conduct not previously 

identified as unlawful." Id. The qualifi~d immunity defense 

"provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or 

those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 

335, 341 (1986). 

Because of the important values protected by qualified 

immunity, the procedures to be followed when this particular 

affirmative d~fense is raised diffei from .those applicable to mos~ 

other affirmative defenses. Once a defendant raises the defense 

of qualified immunity as a defense to an action, ~[t]he plaintiff 

carries the burden of convincing the court that the law was 

clearly established." Pueblo Neighborhood, 847 F.2d at 645. 3 

The plaintiff must "come forward with facts or allegations 

3 The court in ~ueblo Neighborhood relied on the earlier decision 

of this court in Lutz v. Weld County School Dist No. 6, 784 F.2d 

340 ( 10th Cir. 1986). "' A plaintiff who seeks damages for 

violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the 

defendant official's qualified immunity only by showing that those 

rights were clearly established at the time of the conduct at 

issue.'" I'd. at 343 (quoting Davis v .. Sche-rer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 

(1983)). 

7 

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sufficient to show both that the defendant's alleged conduct 

violated the law and that the law was clearly established when the 

alleged violation occurred." Id. at 646. Only after plaintiff 

has shown a violation of a clearly established right does the 

defendant assume the normal burden of a movant for summary 

judgment of establishing that no material facts remain in dispute 

that would defeat her or J:iis claim of qualified immunity. See id. 

Thus, unless and until the plaintiff is able to make the requfred 

showing that defendant's conduct violated a "clearly established" 

right, the government official· i_s prope-r ly spared the burden and 

expense of proceeding any·further. 

The "plaintiff·must do more than identify in the abstract a 

dlearly established right and allege that the defendarit has 

violated it." Pueblo Neighborhood, 847 F.2d at 645. The Supreme 

Court has cautioned that the test for qualified immunity should 

not be applied in such a general way as to render the qualified 

immunity defense unavailable as a practical matter. "The contours 

of the right [that has ailegedly been violated] must be 

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand 

that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. 

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). In this case, the only 

relevant question.is whether the "contours" of the pretermination 

proct:dural due process rights annqunced in Cleveland Board of 

Education v. Loudermill; 470 U.S. 532 (1985), and applied in lower 

court cases interpreting that decision, were "sufficiently clear" 

that a reasonable official would understand that terminating 

8 

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Powell without a more elaborate hearing than that which he 

received violated those procedural rights. 

The district court held that "at the time.of plaintiff's 

temporary dismissal, it had been 'clearly established' that an 

employee who possesses a property right in his employment has the 

ri~ht to procedural due process prior to termination, 

tu-wit: notice and an opportunity to present his side of the 

story. 11 Dist. Ct. Op. at 6 (emphasis in original). While we 

agree wi~h the district court's description of Powell's due 

process rights under Loudermill, we do not believe that Powell has 

satisfied his burden ·of sho~ing that the defendants' conduct 

violated the "clearly'established'' contours of those due process 

rights. 

We note that the distri~t court, in refusing to grant summary 

judgment on the qualified immunity claim, stated in general terms 

that there were material "controverted facts." Dist. Ct. Op. at 

7. However, the district court did not indicate with any 

specificity what material facts it believed were in dispute .. In 

his brief, Powell argues that the factual issue in dispute is 

"Whether Defendants' Reliance Upon Advice of Counsel That The 

Procedures Utilized To Dismiss Powell Were Constitutionally 

Adequate Was Objectively Legally Reasonable.~ Appellee•~ Br. 19. 

As stated, this is not~ f~ctual dispute, but rather is a legal 

question of whether counsel's advise was objectively reasonable in 

light of the prevailing law. In any event, that is not a material 

issue because the existence of qualified immunity in this case 

does not turn upon the quality of defendant's legal advise, nor 

9 

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upon an inquiry as to whether the defendants relied upon that 

advice. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-19. 

Rather, as discussed below, the question of qualified 

immunity in this case turns merely upon comparing the 

pretermination hearing that was, in fact, accorded to the 

plaintiff against the .kind of pretermination hearing that 

plaintiff was entitled to under Cleveland Board of Education v. 

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1984). ·Because we hold that the 

plaintiff .has not ·carried his burden of showing that the 

pretermination-hearing he was accorded violated "clearly 

established •.. constitutional rights of which a reasonable 

person would have known," Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 ( 198.2), the 

defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the 

issue of qualified immunity. 

3. Powell's Due Process Rights Under Loudermill 

In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 

( 1985), James Loudermill, a security .guard employed by the 

Cleveland, Ohio Board of Education, was fired for dishonesty in 

filling out his job application. Id. at 535. He was not given 

any opportunity to respond to the dishonesty charge or to 

challenge his dismissal prior to his termination. Id. Under 

section i24.34 of Ohio law, Loudermill could be terminated only 

for cause and was entitled to administrative review of the 

· dismissal. Id. After losing his appeal to the Cleveland Civil 

Service Commiss~on, Loudermill filed a suit in federal district 

court challenging the constitutionality of§ 124.34 because it did 

10 

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not provide employees the opportunity to respond to charges 

brought against them prior to discharge. Id. at 536. The 

district court dismissed for failure to state a claim on which 

relief could be granted. Id. A divided panel of the Court of 

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that a 

pretermination hearing was required to satisfy due process. Id. 

at 537. 

The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit and held that ''a 

balancing of the competing interests at stake" made evident the 

need for "some form of pretermination hearing.'' Id. at 542. The 

Loudermill Gourt considered the follo\'?ing competing interests of 

Loudermill and the Board of Education in ~rriving at its decision: 

(1) the ~mployee's interest in retaining his employment; (2) ·the 

government's interest in "the expeditious removal 6f 

unsatisfactory employees and the avoidance of administrative 

burdens"; (3) "and the risk _of an erroneous termination" of an 

employee. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542-43. 

Based on these competing interests, the ·Loudermill Court held 

that a ''hearing" was necessary prior to termination of.~ public 

employee, though not an elabo~ate proceeding~ Id. at 545. In 

describing the type of pretermination hearing required, the Court 

was careful to point out that· "the pretermination hearing need not 

definitively resolve the propriety of the discharge.'' Id. 

Rather, the central purpose of the pretermination hearing is 

merely to serve as "an initial check against mistaken decisions 

essentially a determination df whether there are reasonable 

ground~ to believe that the charges against the employee are true 

11 

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and support the proposed action." 

46. 

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-

The pretermination hearing is merely the employee's chance to 

clarify the most basic misunderstandings or to convince the 

employer that termination is unwarranted. The pretermination 

hearing is intended to supplement, not duplicate, the more 

elaborate post-termination hearing. Because the post-termination 

hearing is where the definitivi fact-finding occurs, there is an 

obvious need for more formal due process protections at that. 

~oint. To duplicate those protections at the pretermination stage 

would cause unnecessary delay and expense while diffusing the 

responsibility for the ultimate decision to terminate an employee. 

The idea of conductin~ two identical hearings runs counter to 

traditional principles of adjudication. 

Rather than prescribe a particular format for pre~ermination 

hearings that ~ust be followed in each instance, the _Loudermill 

Court emphasized that ''[t]he essential. requirements of due process 

are notice and an opportunity to respond'' and that "[t]he 

tenured public employee is entitled to oral or writt~n notice of 

the charges against him, an _explanation of the employer's 

evid~nce, and an opportunity to present ·his side of the story .. 

To require more than this prior to termination would intrude 

to,an unwarranted extent on the government's interest in quickly 

removing an unsatisfactory employee." Id. (citations omitted). 

The pretermination procedure afforded Powell by defendants 

accorded with the requirements established in Loudermill. Powell 

received oral notice of the charge against him when Oates 

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confronted him face-to-face after the June 24, 1986, negotiation 

meeting between the City and the Union. Oates asked Powell if he 

lud met with the fire chiefs of Ramona and .Ochelata while Oates 

was gone. ·Powell said "yes." Oates asked Powell if Powell had 

asked them not to sign a mutual aid agreement. Powell responded: 

"in the form that we had heard it would be, yes." That 

conv~rsation was, itself, the notification of the charges against 

him. At that time, Powell had an opportunity to rebut that charge 

but chose instead to admit to it. 

Powell alleges .that he was not given adequate notice of the 

investigation Oates had conducted or of the evidence that had been 

gathered against him. However, we believe that Oates' questions 

to Powell provided Powell with sufficient notice of the 

allegations against him.· When Oat~s asked Powell ii he had met 

with the fire officials from the neighboring towns and encouraged 

them not to sign the proposed mutual aid agreemehts, that was 

adequate to put Powell on notice that Oates was concerned with his 

actions. Although Oates did not tell Powell the basis for his 

suspicions, Powell does not allege, not _is there evidence in the 

record indicating, that Powell could not have asked Oates for the 

basis of his questioning. In any event, because Powell admitted 

to the allegations, the basis for Oates' questions 

became irrelevant .. Nothing in Loudermill_ suggests, nor do we 

hold, that a public employee is entitled to some type of 

"pre-notification notice" of the charges against her or him. 

Likewise, Loudermill does not imply that, in conducting the 

13 

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pretermination hearing, there must be a delay between the "notice" 

and the "opportunity to respond" accorded to the public employee. 

Powell also argues that he was not afforded an opportunity to 

explain his side of the story relating to the meeting with Chiefs 

Eden and Young. As an initial matter, we note that it was Powell 

who ended the conversation with Oates once Oates had informed him 

that he was ~oing to be terminated. Powell refused to respond to 

Oates' further ·inquiries about who else- might have been involved 

until he talked with his attorney. Appellee·•~ Br. at 11. Thus, 

Powell at that time chose not to exercise his opportunity to 

attempt to persuade Oates not to terminate him. 

More importantly, ·once Powell admitted to asking the other 

.Fire Chiefs not to sign the pr6posed ~greement, an opportunity for 

further explanation would not have contributed to the prevention 

of an erroneous termination. As discussed above, the primary 

purpose of the due process rights established in Loudermill is to 

guard against the erroneous termination of public employees. In 

this case, because Powell admitted that he requested that Eden and 

Young.not enter into a proposed mutual aid agreement with the City 

of Bartlesville, the pretermination hearing afforded Powell by 

Oates was ample to ensure against a mistaken decision to discharge 

Powell. 

Because the Loudermill Court's holding concerning the 

adequacy of a minimal pretermination hearing rested "in part on 

the provisions in Ohio law for a full post-termination hearing," 

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546, we evaluate briefly the posttermination procedures in this case. Pursuant to the collective 

14 

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bargaining agreement, Powell's claim of unlawful discharge was 

submitted to binding arbitration. Powell had a chance to call 

~itnesses and introduce evidence on his behalf at that 

arbitration. That arbitration was a sufficient protection against 

a wrongful or erroneous discharge is demonstrated by the 

arbitrator's decision ordering Powell's reinstatement with full 

back pay. Therefore, like the Loudermill Court, we conclude that 

in this case "all the process that is due is provided by a 

pretermination opportunity to respond, coupled with posttermination procedures." Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547-48. 

LQwer court interpretations of Loudermiil further demonstrate 

that defendants' discharge of Powell did not violate the ''clearly 

established'' contorir~ of Poweil's' pretermination rights to due 

. ' 

process of law. At the time Powell was terminated, three courts 

of appeai had interpreted Loudermill to permit abbreviated 

pretermination hearings similar ~o that which Powell was afforded. 

Riggins v. Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska, 790 

F.2d 707 (8th·Cir. 1986); Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827 (1st 

Cir. 1985); Kelly v. Smith, 764 F.2d 1412 (11th Cir. 19~5)~ 

In Kelly v. Smith, 764 F.2d 1412 (11th Cir~ 1985), Kelly, an 

employee of a city utility department, was discharged after a 

face-to-face confrontation with his supervisor in which he refused 

to work "standby" hours a~ required. Id. at 1413 .... The supervisor 

had confronted Kelly and asked why he had not responded to a 

standby call. id. Kelly replied that he was not scheduled to 

work standby that week and that due to other obligations he would 

be unable to work standby for the rest of the week. · Id. After 

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the supervisor informed Kelly that he would be terminated unless 

he agreed to work standby, "Kelly still declined to work standby 

and left the worksite." Id. Subsequently, Kelly was orally 

informed of his termination. Id. 

Kelly brought an action against the city in district court 

alleging that his discharge was a denial of due process. Id. The 

district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city, and 

Kelly appealed. Id. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that 

the face-to-face meeting provided sufficient notice and 

opportunity to respond to satisfy the pretermination due process 

requirements of Loudermill. Id. at 1414-15. 4 The court pointed 

out that, although Kelly had a chance to respond to the 

supervisor's charge, his primary response ·was that he was not 

scheduled to work standby for the rest of the week. Id. at 1414. 

Kelly continued to refuse to work standby even after the 

supervisor, who was in charge of scheduling, informed Kelly that 

he was indeed scheduled for standby. Id. at 1415. 

The court concluded that the supervisor "certainly had 

'reasonable grounds io believe the charges against the employee 

are true and support the proposed action'" because he had actually 

4 However, the court in Kelly reversed the district court's 

conclusion that Kelly had been afforded adequate post-termination 

procedures. Id. at 1416. Th~ court emphasized that, under 

Loudermill, "the assurance that a full evidentiary hearing will be 

forthcoming is one of the primary reasons for allowing the 

abbreviated pretermination procedures." Id. at 1415. The court 

concluded that an informal conference thatKelly had with the city 

manager after the supervisor terminated him did not satisfy that 

requirement. Id. at 1415. Powell, unlike Kelly, did have the 

benefit of a post-termination arbitration hearing. Nevertheless, 

the Kelly court's reasoning remains persuasive as to the adequacy 

of the pretermination hearing afforded Powell. 

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heard the employee's refusal to work standby hours. Id. at 1415 

(quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 54~). Because Kelly did not 

avail himself of the opportunity to renounce his refusal to work 

standby and thereby retain his job, the.court was satisfied "that 

there were adequate pretermination procedures to serve 'as an 

initial check against mistaken decisions. 111 Id. (quoting 

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545). 

In Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1985), 

Brasslett, the Fire Chief for the town of Orono,. Maine, granted a 

local television station an interview to discuss the fire fighting 

capabilities of the Orono fire department. Id. at 830. During 

triat interview, Brasslett stated that all but one of the 

dep~rtment's fire trucks was disabled. Id. at. 831. ''Prior to the 

- . interview, two firemen had placed signs bearing the word 'Sunkist' 

on one of the two disabled fire trucks in the station. Those 

signs appeared on the broadcast of the interview." Id. The 

interview generat~d a great deal of adverse publicity. Id. at 

831-32. As requested by the Town Manager, Brasslett submitted a 

formal letter of apology and explanation. Id. at 832. 

Shortly thereafter, the town council held an informal meeting 

to discuss the incident. Id. Brasslett and the Town Manager 

attended this meeting. Id. Brasslett was asked some questions by 

the council, and the council asked the Town Manager if he was 

considering disciplining Brasslett. The Town Manager indicated 

that he would make his decision after further study. Id. 

The next day, after reviewing a tape of the Brasslett 

interview, as well as materials related to past misconduct 

17 

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contained in Brasslett's personnel file, the Town Manager met with 

Brasslett. Id. The two men met for approximately one hour and 

discussed the interview and the past misconduct. Id. After 

discussing the possible disciplinary actions that might be taken 

against Brasslett, the Town Manager concluded the meeting by 

informing Brasslett that he would be dismissed. Id. The 

following day, Brasslett received a letter from the Town Manger 

informing him of the reasons for the dismissal and the grievance 

procedure available to him. Id. at 832-33. 

After unsuccessfully challenging his dismissal through the 

grievance procedures, Brasslett brought suit, arguing that his 

discharge deprived him of his procedural due process rights. Id. 

at 833. The district court rejected Brasslett's argument and held 

that the one-hour pretermination conference, in conjunction with 

the Town's grievance mechanisms, was constitutionally adequate 

proceclure. Id. On appea.l, the Court of Appeals for the First 

Circuit held that 

Loudermill is dispositive of [Brasslett's] procedural 

due process argument. In his one hour conference with 

Manager Cota, Brasslett was notified of the possibility 

of discharge and was afforded an ample opportunity to 

defend his actions and rebut any erroneous allegations. 

Accordingly, we uphold the district court's findings on 

this issue. 

Id. at 836. 

In Riggins v. Board of Regents of the Univer.si ty of Nebraska, 

790 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1986), the Eighth Circuit held that the 

dismissal of a custodian, Riggins, comported with due process even 

though she was only provided an informal meeting in which to rebut 

charges of insubordination. Id. at 710-11. Riggins had an 

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unidentified problem with her co-workers that resulted in her 

transfer to a different custodial shift in a different building. 

Id. at 708-09. Riggins called her supervisor to ~earn of her new 

assignment. Id. at 709.· Her supervisor allegedly told her that 

he and another supervisor wished to meet with her. Id. She 

responded by refusing to meet with both of them together. Id. 

According to the supervisor, when he confronted her at work, she 

again refused to meet with both supervisors and walked a~ay from 

him. Id. 

The two supervisors subsequently met with Riggins, and her 

supervisor informed her that she was being suspended indefinitely; 

Id. At that meeting, Riggins had an opportunity to read the 

supervisor's report. Id~ At Riggins' r~quest, the supervisor 

included in his report the fact that Riggins had refused to meet 

with the two supervisors together. Id. 

A few days later, Riggins met with the division mapager to 

di~cuss the supeivisor•~ report. Id. That meeting lasted just 

over an hour and a half. Id. At the meeting, Riggins had an 

opportunity to tell her version of the incident and of an earlier 

meeting in which she alleged that the two supervisors had shouted 

at her. Id. Riggins and the division manager also· discussed her 

prior work history. Id. 

After talking with Riggins, the division manager met with the 

two supervisors and decided that Riggins was not telling the truth 

about the incident of insubordination or the earlier meeting in 

which she alleged that the supervisors had shouted at her. Id. 

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He wrote Riggins a letter notifying her of her permanent 

termination. Id. 

Riggins did not avail herself of the formal post-termination 

grievance procedures. Instead, she filed an action in federal 

district court challenging her discharge as a deprivation of due 

process. Id. at 709-10. The district court ruled that "the 

pretermination notice and hearing afforded to Riggins were not 

constitutionally inadequate." Id. at 710. The Eighth Circuit 

affirmed, holding that Riggins had received sufficient notice of 

the insubordination charge against her, and an adequate 

opportunity to respond to that charge, in the two meetings with 

her superiors. Id. at 710-11. Although Riggins argued that she 

did not receive sufficient notice because she was unaware the 

division manger intended to discuss her prior work history, the 

court reasoned that this was not a significant part of the 

meeting. The trial court ruled that Riggins had adequate notice 

to respond to the chaige of insubordination because she ''certainly 

knew [the meeting] would be about the insubordination inciident." 

Id. at 709. The Eighth Circuit affirmed -that ruling. Id. at 711. 

The court in Riggins was satisfied that, beca~se formal posttermination grievance procedures were available to Riggins, the 

abbreviated pretermination procedures were constitutionally 

sufficient under Loudermill. 

Kelly, Brasslett and Riggins.together demonstrate that 

defendants provided Powell a constitutionally sufficient 

pretermin~tion hearing. Kelly established the constitutionality 

of a.preterminatiori hearing that consisted entirely of a brief 

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face-to-face conversation with a supervisor. The supervisor's 

witnessing of the insubordination at that meeting sufficiently 

guarded against the possibility of_ an erroneous termination. In 

this case, because Powell admitted to the act forming the basis 

for the charge against him, the face-to-face pretermination 

hearing was likewise sufficient to prevent an unwarranted 

termination of Powell. 

Although the pretermination ~earing ~fforded the plaintiff in 

Brasslett was longer than the meeting ·between Powell and Oates, 

Brasslett, like Kelly, recognized that nothing in Loudermill 

requires that there be delay between the notice of·a charge and 

the public employee's opportunity to respond. In Brasslett, the 

plaintiff was apprised of the allagation against him and the 

possibility of termination during the pretermination meeting. In 

this case, Oates' question~ served to notify Powell of the charge 

against him. Although Oates did not inform Powell of the 

t~rmination until after Powell had admitted his interference with 

the proposed mutual aid agreements, it was Powell who ended the 

pretermination meeting at that point rather than trying ·to 

persuade Oates that termination was unwarranted . 

. In contrast to Kelly and Brasslett, the pretermination 

meetings in Riggins were more extensive. However, in Riggins 

there was a factual dispute about the basis _of the insubordination 

charge that was absent in Kelly, Brasslett, and this case. 

Therefore, Riggins does not support Powell's argument that he was 

deprived of "clearly established" due process rights .. 

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In Kelly, Brasslett and Riggins the holdings affirming the 

constitutionality of the abbreviated pretermination hearings, as 

in Loudermill, were premised in part upon the available posttermination grievance procedures. The record in this case 

establishes that the post-termination arbitration procedure for 

grievances available to Powell was also sufficiently 

comprehensive. 

·At a bare minimum, Kelly; Brasslett and Riggins together 

created sufficient support for the constitutionality of 

defendants' conduct that defendants could not have known that 

their actions violated "clearly established" law. Our research 

has not disclosed· any post-Loudermill cases decided prior to the 

time of Powell's termination suggesting that defendants should 

have known that Powell was entitled to greater pretermination 

procedures than those that were provided to him. 

Although w~ have concluded that the manner in which 

defendants discharged Powell did n6t violate his rights under 

Loudermill, it is because Powell has not satisfied his burden as 

plaintiff of demonstrating that defendants' conduct in discharging 

him violated the "clearly established" contours of his 

pretermination due process rights under Loudermill and its pro~eny 

that we hold that defendants are immune from suit in this case. 

See,~, Feliciano-Angulo.v. Rivera-Cruz, 858 F.2d 40, 43-44 

( ls t Cir. 1988) ( recogni z-ing qualified irnrnuni ty where no violation 

of due ~rocess occurred under the "clearly istablished'' l~w of 

Loudermill); Raffucci Alvardo v. Sonia Zayas, 816 F.2d 8lff, 820-22 

(1st Cir. 1987) (same). Defendants are entitled to summary 

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judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the district court's 

May 25, 1988 order is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED with 

instructions that the district court enter summary judgment for 

defendants in accordance with this opinion. 

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