Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05115/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05115-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
SSA
Defendant
Georgia Tinker
Plaintiff

Document Text:

AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

GEORGIA TINKER PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 05-5115

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Georgia Tinker, appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court.

On June 27, 2006, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 10). Plaintiff now moves for an award

of $2,818.70 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 15.75 attorney hours work before the court

at an hourly rate of $156.00, 5.35 paralegal hours at an hourly rate of $65.00 and $13.95 in

expenses. (Doc. # 11-12). The defendant has filed a response, expressing no objection to this

award. (Doc. # 13).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986).

Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a

sentence-four judgment reversing theCommissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case

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for further proceedings is a prevailing party. After reviewing the file, we find plaintiff is a

prevailing party in this matter. 

The Commissioner does not oppose the award of a reasonable attorney's fee under the

EAJA, does not object to the hourly rate requested by plaintiff’s counsel for attorney’s fees and

does not dispute the number of hours expended by counsel. (Doc. # 13). The court construes this

lack of opposition to the award of a reasonable fee as an admission that the government's

decision to deny benefits was not "substantially justified." 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required

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to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularlywhen the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

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the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Plaintiff's attorney requests an award under the EAJA at $156.00 per hour, for the15.35

attorney hours which he asserts were devoted to the representation of plaintiff in this court. The

party seeking attorney fees bears the burden of proving that the claimed fees are reasonable.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 437. 

Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per hour - the maximum

statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase in the cost of living

or a special factorsuch as the limited availability of qualified attorneys justifies a higher fee. 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not automatic and remains

at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1989). In

Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the hourly rate may be

increased when there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living sufficient to justify

hourly attorney's fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the Consumer Price Index.

Plaintiff's counsel has attached a summary of the Consumer Price Index as an exhibit (Doc. # 12)

and has presented evidence of an increase in the cost of living. 

The Commissioner has not raised an objection to the hourly rate requested. We note,

however, that an award based upon an hourly rate of $150.00 per hour, reflecting an increase

in the cost of living, will result in consistent hourly fee awards in cases in Arkansas. See

Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir.1990). Thus, based upon the above factors,

we find that an appropriate hourly rate for the award of attorney's fees in this case is $150.00 per

hour.

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We next address the number of hours plaintiff's counsel claims were spent working on

this case. Plaintiff’s counsel requests a total of 5.35 paralegal hours for worked performed on

this case. We find that the paralegal hours submitted on June 17, 2005, July 5, 2005, July 6,

2005, July 11, 2005, September 6, 2005, September 8, 2005, October 24, 2005, February 24,

2006, June 9, 2006, June 14, 2006 (prepared response to report and recommendation), and July

3, 2006, could have been performed by support staff. Granville House, Inc. v. Department of

HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir.1987) (work which could have been completed by support staff

is not compensable under the EAJA). Therefore these hours are not compensable under the

EAJA. Accordingly, 1.75 paralegal hours must be deducted from the total compensable time

sought by counsel.

Finally, counsel seeks reimbursement for $13.95 in expenses incurred with regard to the

postage. Such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA and we find $13.95 to be a reasonable

award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).

Based on the above, we recommend awarding plaintiff's attorney fees under the EAJA

for: 15.35 attorney hours at an hourly rate of $150.00 per hour, 3.60 paralegal hours at an hourly

rate of $65.00 and $13.95 in expenses, for a total attorney's fee award of $2,550.45. This amount

should be paid in addition to, and not out of, any past due benefits which plaintiff may be

awarded in the future. The parties have ten days from receipt of our report and

recommendation in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The

failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact.

The parties are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de

novo review by the district court.

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

6

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

Dated this 13th day of September 2006.

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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