Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-04441/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-04441-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gregory Duncan
Defendant
J. Fratkin
Defendant
Robert Horel
Defendant
Joseph Kravitz
Defendant
Jose Luis Morales
Plaintiff
R. Pimentel
Defendant
Donald Pompan
Defendant
Sue Risenhoover
Defendant
J. Wolf
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

JOSE LUIS MORALES,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ROBERT HOREL; MAUREEN McLEAN;

J. WOLF; SUE RISENHOOVER;

JOSEPH KRAVITZ; DR.GREGORY

DUNCAN; DR. J. FRATKIN; DR.

DONALD POMPAN; R. PIMENTEL; and

Does 1-4, 

Defendants. /

No. C 08-4441 PJH (PR)

ORDER GRANTING

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

This is a civil rights case filed pro se by a state prisoner. The defendants who have

been served have moved for summary judgment, plaintiff has opposed the motions, and

defendants have filed replies. The motions are ready for decision. 

BACKGROUND

In his complaint plaintiff contends that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his

serious medical need for orthopedic surgery on his injured right knee. In its initial review

order the court dismissed plaintiff’s claims against defendants Horel, McLean, Kravitz, and

Pimentel for failure to state a claim. Service was ordered on Pompan, Wolf, Risenhoover,

Fratkin, and Duncan. Pompan, Risenhoover and Duncan have been served and have

moved for summary judgment. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show

that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

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to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may

affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury

to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Nissan

Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). When the moving

party has met this burden of production, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial. If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to

show a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party wins. Id.

II. Standard for Medical Claims

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment's

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104

(1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

A determination of "deliberate indifference" involves an examination of two elements:

the seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant's response

to that need. Id. at 1059. 

A "serious" medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could

result in further significant injury or the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. The

existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an

individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

indications that a prisoner has a "serious" need for medical treatment. Id. at 1059-60. 

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps

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to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The prison official must not only

“be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

harm exists,” but he or she “must also draw the inference.” Id. If a prison official should

have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175,

1188 (9th Cir. 2002).

III. Motion for Summary Judgment by Pompan and Risenhoover

No material evidentiary facts are in dispute, although the parties disagree about the

conclusions to be drawn from them.

A. Dr. Pompan

Plaintiff’s right knee “locked up” on May 12, 2003, when he was playing handball. 

According to the notes of the doctor who saw him that day, plaintiff’s knee had been locking

up for some time, and had been doing so more frequently prior to May 12. This time

plaintiff was unable to get it to return to normal movement, so he was seen by the medical

department. A doctor who is not a defendant diagnosed a “torn meniscus.” He ordered

palliative treatment and an orthopedic consultation. 

Defendant Pompan is a board-certified orthopedic surgeon. His first contact with

plaintiff was when he examined him on June 17, 2003. Dr. Pompan noted that plaintiff had

a full range of motion in the knee, diagnosed a “probable lateral-meniscal tear and a

possible Anterior-Cruciate-Ligament tear.” Decl. Pompan ¶ 3. He recommended an MRI. 

The MRI was performed on July 24, 2003. Id. at Ex. B. The radiologist reported “[n]o

definite meniscal tear. A focus of altered signal in the posterior horn of the lateral meniscus

is thought to represent degenerative signal change with only a low probability of a tear.” Id.

 No ligament damage was found. Id. 

Dr. Pompan says in his declaration that because the MRI did not show a definite

meniscus tear, he decided on conservative treatment with knee-strengthening exercises. 

Id. at ¶ 4. He noted in the medical record that if plaintiff still had pain in six weeks he would

consider arthroscopic surgery. Id. Dr. Pompan saw plaintiff again on October 7, 2003, and

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because he complained of continued pain, diagnosed a “likely” meniscal tear. Id. at ¶ 5. 

He recommended arthroscopy and submitted a request for service form to authorize it. Id.

Plaintiff was transferred to Pelican Bay State Prison on December 10, 2003. Dr. Pompan

did not see him after October 7.

Although plaintiff contends in his opposition that he is an avid sports fan and has

seen on television reports of athletes receiving prompt arthroscopic surgery on damaged

knees and returning to competition quickly, this is not sufficient to generate a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether Dr. Pompan was deliberately indifferent in electing

conservative treatment. Particularly considering the indecisive nature of the MRI – in fact, it

deprecated the possibility of a torn meniscus – Dr. Pompan’s election of conservative

treatment was appropriate, and by asking the MAR to approve arthroscopic surgery, he

took the necessary steps to see that the injury was treated once diagnosed. On the

undisputed facts Dr. Pompan was not deliberately indifferent.

B. Nurse Risenhoover

Defendant Risenhoover is a nurse practitioner at Pelican Bay State Prison. She saw

plaintiff on February 19, 2004, for his complaints of knee pain. Decl. Risenhoover ¶ 4. She

advised him to avoid strenuous exercise and gave him an order for insoles to cushion

impact on his knee. Id. That same day she also asked the Medical Advisory Review

committee, which reviews requests for medical care and makes recommendations, to refer

plaintiff to an orthopedist. Id. 

Risenhoover next saw plaintiff on April 30, 2004, for his complaint that his knee was

“locking up.” Id. at ¶ 5. His complaints at this visit, at least as recorded in Risenhoover’s

notes, were relatively mild – for instance, he said that his knee was not swelling, and that

the problem did not interfere with his ability to “rest or sleep.” Id. 

On June 9, 2004, plaintiff saw orthopedist Dr. Lau; after that, on June 22, 2004,

Risenhoover saw him because his knee had locked up for three hours. Id. at ¶ 7. She

advised him to avoid strenuous exercise that would stress his knee. Id. Risenhoover then

saw plaintiff on July 12, 2004, July 23, 2004, August 20, 2004, September 20, 2004,

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November 10, 2004, December 17, 2004, and February 18, 2005, the last visit being three

days after he had the arthroscopic surgery. Id. at ¶. ¶ 8-14. In this period the MAR

requested more information about the frequency of the knee locking, plaintiff visited

orthopedists Lau and Duncan, the MAR approved arthroscopic surgery, Dr. Duncan gave

plaintiff a steroid injection to palliate the problem, a new MRI was performed, and the

surgery itself was performed. Id.

It is apparent from this recitation that Risenhoover saw plaintiff frequently, obtained

referrals to the appropriate specialists, and took the steps necessary to gain approval for

the arthroscopic surgery he wanted and needed. On the undisputed facts, she was not

deliberately indifferent.

IV. Motion for Summary Judgment by Duncan

Dr. Duncan was the orthopedist who operated on plaintiff’s knee. He has filed a

separate motion for summary judgment. Dr. Duncan saw plaintiff on October 27, 2004, and

recommended arthroscopic surgery. Decl. Duncan ¶ 4. On November 24, 2004, while

awaiting approval, Dr. Duncan gave plaintiff a steroid injection. Id. On December 8, 2004,

the surgery having been approved, Dr. Duncan obtained informed consent of plaintiff for

the surgery; it was performed on February 15, 2005. Id. Dr. Duncan has also provided the

declaration of Dr. John Toton, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, in which Dr. Toton says

that Dr. Duncan’s care of plaintiff was appropriate, well within the standard of care, and not

indifferent. Decl. Toton.

On these undisputed facts, Dr. Duncan was not deliberately indifferent. His motion

for summary judgment will be granted.

V. Discovery Issue

In his opposition to Dr. Duncan’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiff says that

Dr. Duncan has not responded to discovery requests and cites cited Rule 56(f) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows a court to continue or deny a motion for

summary judgment if the non-movant is unable to procure materials necessary to resist the

motion. In his reply, Dr. Duncan says that he in fact answered plaintiffs two sets of

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interrogatories, and provides a declaration by counsel and copies of certificates of service

to support that contention. Plaintiff has not asked permission to file a response to Dr.

Duncan’s contention that he did in fact answer the interrogatories, so the court must

conclude that Dr. Duncan is correct. There thus is no need to continue or deny the motion

to allow discovery. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motions for summary judgment (documents

19 and 24 on the docket) are GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Wolf and

Fratkin are DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to obtain service. 

The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 26, 2010. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

P:\PRO-SE\PJH\CR.08\MORALES4441.MSJ.wpd 

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