Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00908/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00908-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Felix Estrada
Petitioner
Kathleen Prosper
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FELIX ESTRADA,

Petitioner,

v.

KATHLEEN PROSPER,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 06-00908 AWI DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

 BACKGROUND

Following jury trial in the Stanislaus County Superior Court, Petitioner was convicted of

first degree burglary. He was sentenced to 25 years to life plus 10 years for two prior serious

felony enhancements. 

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On May 28, 2003, the California Court of

Appeal, affirmed the judgment, but remanded for re-sentencing on the enhancements. (Lodged

Doc. No. 1.) 

On June 24, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. 

(Lodged Doc. No. 6.) The petition was denied on August 13, 2003. (Lodged Doc. No. 7.)

After re-sentencing, Petitioner filed another appeal. On October 4, 2004, the California

Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, but modified the amount of Petitioner’s fines. (Lodged

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Doc. No. 2.)

On November 4, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme

Court. (Lodged Doc. No. 10.) On December 15, 2004, the California Supreme Court denied the

petition. (Lodged Doc. No. 11.)

 On March 3, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Stanislaus

County Superior Court. (Lodged Doc. No. 12.) The petition was denied on March 23, 2004. 

(Lodged Doc. No. 13.) 

On August 9, 2004, Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

Stanislaus County Superior Court. (Lodged Doc. No. 14.) The petition was denied on

September 1, 2004. (Lodged Doc. No. 15.) 

On March 2, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate in the California Court

of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. (Lodged Doc. No. 16.) The petition was denied on March

25, 2004. (Lodged Doc. No. 17.) 

On February 24, 2005, Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. (Lodged Doc. No. 18.) The petition was

denied on March 4, 2005. (Lodged Doc. No. 19.)

On July 20, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. (Lodged Doc. No. 20.) The petition was denied on May 17, 2006. (Lodged

Doc. No. 21.)

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on June 26, 2006, in

the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division. 

(Court Doc. 1.) Respondent filed an answer to the petition on December 27, 2006, and Petitioner

filed a traverse on February 23, 2007. (Court Docs. 15, 20.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS

 On March 11, 2001, at approximately 12:00 p.m., Joshua and Ross Ballard, along with

their friend Kirk Tobler took several children to the park. Joshua left the side door of the garage

that connected to the house open, and the wooden gate which leads to that side door was not

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28 Joshua Ballard testified that there is a “green” garbage can that sits just outside the gate, but that the can 1

was empty. (RT 132-134.) 

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locked. (RT 33-34, 40.) The trash cans were sitting between the gate and the street. (RT 1

34.) Prior to leaving the house that day, Joshua noticed that his drill was in the garage. (RT 35.) 

He estimated that the value of the drill was $250. 

 Approximately four hours later, as they were driving home from the park, Joshua and

Ross saw a large Hispanic male about two blocks from their home riding a small pink bicycle

and carrying what appeared to be their drill. (RT 36, 56-57, 59.) When they got home, they

discovered that the drill was missing from the garage. (RT 35, 37.) They all got back into their

cars and drove around looking for Petitioner. (RT 37, 49, 61.)

They observed Petitioner sitting in the park with the drill case and a case of sockets right

next to him. (RT 37, 41, 43, 49, 57, 62.) The socket set belonged to Joshua’s father and had also

been taken from the garage. (RT 41-42.) Petitioner started to run when he saw the individuals

getting out of their cars; the three men chased after Petitioner and tackled him to the ground. (RT

38, 48, 63.) During the struggle, Petitioner tried to stab Tobler with a screwdriver that had been

taken out of the Ballard’s garage and subsequently bit Tobler on the arm. (RT 38, 43-44, 47, 58.) 

The police were contacted, and Officer David Watson, responded as he was already at the park

when the incident occurred. (RT 47, 68.) Deputy Watson observed Petitioner on the ground

with three men on top of him. (RT 69.) 

Defense

Petitioner testified in his own defense. Petitioner stated that he was home on March 11,

2001, when a homeless man named “Brandy,” came by and told him that he had seen some items

thrown into a garage, and where he could locate the items. (RT 74-75, 79-80.) As Petitioner and

his wife had salvaged items in the past, he decided to go look for the items. (RT 74-76, 80-81.) 

Petitioner rode his daughters bicycle to the location and found two boxes in a “green” trash can

outside the gate of the Ballard residence. (RT 76-77, 88; see RT 132-134.) He took the items,

without looking to see what was inside, and rode the bicycle to the park to watch a soccer game. 

(RT 77, 89-90, 95.) Petitioner also stated that he did not look inside the boxes while at the park

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28 On cross-examination, Petitioner admitted that he was convicted of robbery in 1990, and for a felony in 2

1986 and a felony in 1983. (RT 87-88.) 

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because he was watching the soccer game and therefore did not know that he had a drill. (RT 90.) 

Petitioner stated that he found the screwdriver in the street. (RT 91.) Petitioner stated that after

the soccer game was over and as he got onto his bicycle to ride home, he was attacked by three

men. (RT 77, 86, 90.) Petitioner bit one of the men’s arms because he was having difficulty

breathing. (RT 79.) Petitioner stated the men twisted his arm, choked him, and threatened to kill

him. (RT 85.) 

Petitioner’s wife, Annette Meras, testified that she had known Petitioner for 20 years, had

two children with him and the two were living together on March 11, 2001. (RT 99-100, 103.) 

She stated that the two would often find abandoned items and salvage them to sell at yard sales. 

(RT 100-101, 104.) She saw Petitioner talking to Brandy at their home on March 11, 2001. (RT

107-110.) Petitioner was not able to give the last name or address for Brandy. (RT 92.)

Rebuttal

Deputy Watson testified that Petitioner told him that Brandy told Petitioner there were

some tools sitting in front of a house near the garbage cans. (RT 116-117, 120, 122.) Petitioner

told Deputy Watson that he felt guilty for taking the tools because he was not a thief and he

intended to return the items. (RT 118, 122.) Petitioner told the Deputy that he had never stolen

before in his life. (RT 118.) 2

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered

violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises

out of the Stanislaus County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this

Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).

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On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997; Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997) (quoting

Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct.

1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant

petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

B. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus

will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade,123 S.Ct.1166 (2003) (disapproving of

the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1175 (citations

omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

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criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual

findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115

S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day,

110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997).

C. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner raises several instances in which he contends that counsel was ineffective. 

Specifically, Petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to investigate the facts of the case, failed

to interview prosecution witnesses, failed to use an effective investigator, failed to prepare him to

testify and was negligent in calling him to testify, failed to adequately cross-examine Deputy

Watson, was negligent in calling Annette Meras as a witness, failed to object to an unsupported

instruction, failed to object to prosecutorial misconduct, and failed to give an effective closing

argument. 

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established for the

purposes of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Canales v. Roe,

151 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9 Cir. 1998.) In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective th

assistance of counsel, the court must consider two factors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9 Cir. 1994). First, th

the petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient, requiring a showing that

counsel made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by

the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and must identify counsel’s

alleged acts or omissions that were not the result of reasonable professional judgment

considering the circumstances. Id. at 688; United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348

(9 Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential. A court indulges

th

a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

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professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Sanders v.

Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9 Cir.1994). th

Second, the petitioner must show that counsel's errors were so egregious as to deprive

defendant of a fair trial, one whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The court must

also evaluate whether the entire trial was fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s

ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1345; United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1356,

1461 (9 Cir. 1994). More precisely, petitioner must show that (1) his attorney’s performance

th

was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, and, unless prejudice is presumed, that

(2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would

have been different. 

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before

examining the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2074 (1984). Since it is necessary to prove

prejudice, any deficiency that does not result in prejudice must necessarily fail. 

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the “unreasonable

application” prong of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Weighall v. Middle, 215 F.3d

1058, 1062 (2000). With this standard in mind, the Court turns to each of Petitioner’s claims. 

1. Failure To Investigate The Facts Of The Case

Petitioner claims counsel failed to investigate or pursue the possibility that an accomplice

or actual perpetrator was involved in the crime, despite counsel’s belief that others were

involved. Petitioner’s claim is unfounded and without merit.

At trial, Petitioner testified that he grabbed two boxes from the garbage and took the

items to the park to watch a soccer game. (RT 77.) Petitioner stated that a man named “Brandy”

told him where the items were in the garbage. (RT 75.) He claimed that he did not know what

was actually inside the boxes that he took. (RT 77-78.) 

Petitioner’s claim is nothing more than a conclusory allegation. Petitioner does not allege

facts to demonstrate that counsel was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. 

Specifically, beyond his mere allegation, Petitioner does not present evidence as to what facts his

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 As Respondent points out, in the petition, Petitioner states that he testified he retrieved the items from a 3

gray garbage can. However, the portion of the record to which he cites, identified the green trash can. Accordingly,

as does Respondent, the Court assumes that Petitioner meant to refer to the green, not gray, garbage can.

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trial counsel failed to investigate or discovery, nor has he demonstrated any basis upon which he

was prejudiced. As such, Petitioner’s claims is simply unfounded, and insufficient to support a

basis for relief under § 2254. See Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246, 1255 (9 Cir. 1996) (defendant th

“fail[ed] to explain what compelling evidence additional interviews would have unearthed or to

explain how an investigation of aggravation evidence would have negated the evidence of the

multiple gunshot wounds.”); Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1042 (9 Cir. 1995) (“Absent th

an account of what beneficial investigation into any of these issues would have turned up,

[defendant] cannot meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.”).

The state courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

2. Failure To Interview Prosecution Witnesses

Petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to interview prosecution witnesses to

determine the relevancy of a photograph that depicted the side of the Ballard’s house and a green

trash can. Petitioner reasons that the prosecution was able to elicit testimony from him on crossexamination that he retrieved the items from the green can when, in fact, it was the black trash

can. The prosecution presented rebuttal testimony with established that the green trash can was 3

never used. Petitioner contends that trial counsel should have interviewed the prosecution

witnesses, to prevent his inaccurate testimony. Petitioner’s claim is senseless.

Petitioner’s claim appears to be that had he known the Ballard’s did not use the green

garbage can, he would not have testified that he retrieved the items from that can. At trial,

Petitioner was under oath to tell the truth, and he surely cannot claim that he wished to base the

accuracy of his testimony on another witness’ testimony. If Petitioner was unsure about the color

of the trash can, he should have testified that he did not recall which trash can it was. 

Petitioner has not, and cannot, demonstrate that counsel was deficient or prejudicial. 

Counsel cannot be faulted for failing to seek information that would assist Petitioner in being

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more accurate in his testimony of which he has first hand knowledge. Counsel reasonably should

be able to rely on the fact that Petitioner knew the color of the trash can from which he retrieved

the stolen items, and if Petitioner was unsure he would have testified to such. 

3. Failure To Use An Effective Investigator

Petitioner contends that counsel failed to investigate and locate two witnesses who could

have bolstered his credibility and established his innocence. Petitioner claims that he told

defense counsel’s investigator that “Brandy” could be located at a certain gas station or spot near

the freeway or river where the homeless often camped. Petitioner also claims that a woman, who

was located two houses south of the incident, observed him digging through the garbage can. 

Petitioner’s claim is without merit.

Petitioner offers no evidence as to the identity of “Brandy” or the “woman” he contends

observed him digging through the garbage. Nor does Petitioner identify that their testimony

would have been sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, or that they were in fact

willing to testify on his behalf. Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 532 (9 Cir. 1990); see also th

United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 1406, 1409 (9 Cir. 1989) (holding that where defendant did not th

indicate what witness would have testified to and how such testimony would have changed the

outcome of the trial, there can be no ineffective assistance of counsel). In addition, the absence

of affidavits from these witnesses strongly negates Petitioner’s claim. Howard v. O’Sullivan,

185 F.3d 721, 724 (7 Cir. 1999) (“failure to submit supporting affidavits from [the] potential th

witnesses would severely hobble [the petitioner’s] case.”) The state courts’ determination of this

issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent. 

4. Failure To Prepare Petitioner To Testify

Petitioner contends that counsel failed to review the circumstances of his case and prepare

him to testify. Petitioner claims that he should not have been allowed to testify because he was

unable to “adequately or convincingly articulate himself.”

Petitioner’s claim fails on the merits. Petitioner fails to allege how counsel failed to

prepare him to testify and how the failure affected the outcome of his trial. Petitioner does not

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contend that he did not testify freely on his own will or that counsel forced him to testify. 

Petitioner merely contends that counsel failed to advise him of the inconsistencies between his

testimony and that of other witnesses. If this is so, it appears that Petitioner claims he would

have changed his trial testimony on the basis of the other witnesses testimony. Counsel surely

could not have been deficient for failing to assist Petitioner in giving inaccurate (and potential

perjured) testimony. 

Moreover, the undisputed evidence established that Petitioner was in possession of the

stolen items and the victims identified Petitioner as the individual they caught with the stolen

property. Through his testimony, Petitioner attempted to offer an explanation as to why he was

at the Ballard residence and in possession of the stolen property. The fact that the jury

discredited Petitioner’s testimony, is insufficient to establish that counsel was ineffective. Given

the strong evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, he simply cannot establish that counsel’s was deficient

for allowing him to testify, or that he was prejudiced thereby.

5. Failure To Adequately Cross-Examine Deputy Watson

Petitioner contends that counsel failed to cross-examine Deputy Watson regarding his

failure to investigate the information Petitioner gave him about “Brandy.” As a consequence,

Petitioner contends that potential exculpatory evidence remained undiscovered. 

At trial, Deputy Watson testified that Petitioner stated that Brandy told him where he

could locate the tools. (RT 117.) Watson asked Petitioner to provide the location of Brandy, and

Petitioner stated that he did not know Brandy’s last name or an address for him. (RT 117-118.) 

Petitioner has simply failed to provide any basis upon which counsel could have crossexamined Watson about his failure to investigate. Because Petitioner was unable to provide a

last name, much less an address for Brandy, there was simply no way for Deputy Watson to

locate Brandy. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective for not crossexamining Watson, is simply unfounded and without merit.

6. Negligent In Calling Annette Meras As A Witness

Petitioner contends that the testimony by Annette Meras discredited his credibility

because she provided testimony that the tools found in Petitioner’s possession were the same

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brand name items they had at home. Petitioner testified that he did not know what the items in

the box were. 

Petitioner’s claim is without merit. Petitioner overlooks the fact that Annette Meras

testified that she and Petitioner would salvage items from trash cans. (RT 100-101.) This

testimony was vital to Petitioner’s defense that he took the items from a trash can. Further,

Petitioner mis-characters the testimony by Meras. She testified that she would not be able to

recognize the tools if they were in a closed case because they did not have a case for their tools. 

(RT 115.) This did not conflict with Petitioner’s testimony that he grabbed two boxes from the

garbage and did not know the contents. (RT 77.) Petitioner has simply failed to demonstrate that

counsel was deficient or that he was prejudiced. More specifically, as Respondent submits, if

anything, if believed, Meras’ testimony provided some credibility to Petitioner’s implausible

explanation. The state courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

7. Failure To Object To An Unsupported Instruction

Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective for allowing the jury to be instructed with

CALJIC 2.52 and 2.15. For the reasons discussed infra, Petitioner’s claim fails as both

instructions were properly given. Because the instructions were proper, Petitioner has not, and

cannot, demonstrate that counsel was deficient or that he was prejudiced. Accordingly, the state

courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. 

 8. Failure To Object To Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner contends that counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s improper argument

regarding the screwdriver during closing presentation.

At trial, Joshua Ballard testified that during the struggle with Petitioner in the park,

Petitioner attempted to use a screwdriver, one of the stolen items, to try to poke it into Kirk. (RT

43-44.) Ross Ballard believed that Petitioner had a screwdriver in his hand, but he did not

remember seeing it during the struggle. (RT 65.)

During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the two brothers were credible

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because they did not change their testimonies to match each other. (RT 154.) She also argued

that the inconsistencies in their recollections of the incident were minor. (RT 154.) The

prosecutor reasoned that Petitioner was not charged with assault and therefore any

inconsistencies as to whether he attempted to use a screwdriver during the struggle was simply

irrelevant to the burglary charge. (RT 154.) 

The prosecutor’s argument was entirely proper, and there is simply no basis upon which

counsel could have objected. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is without merit.

Petitioner further claims that counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s improper use of

the photograph of Kirk Tobler’s injury. He claims he acted in self-defense and the prosecutor

mis-stated the evidence. 

At trial, the victims testified that they wrestled Petitioner to the ground and held him

down until the police came. (RT 58, 65.) The evidence also established that during the struggle,

Petitioner bit Kirk Tobler in the arm. (RT 159.) During closing argument, the prosecutor

presented the jury with a photograph depicting the injury to Kirk’s arm. (RT 159.) The

prosecutor argued that Petitioner bit hard enough to break the skin because he wanted to get

away. (RT 159.) 

Petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct is without merit. By

presenting the photograph to the jury, the prosecutor simply showed the jury the injury which the

two witnesses had previously testified to. In fact, Petitioner did not dispute that he bit Kirk, he

only disputed the reason for doing so. Petitioner claimed that he was acting in self-defense when

he bit Kirk. (RT 84-85, 170-171.) Both the prosecutor and Petitioner were equally allowed to

argue their theories of the case, of which both took advantage. Accordingly, the prosecutor did

not engage in misconduct, and defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object. The state

courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. 

 9. Failure To Give Effective Closing Argument

Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective in the presentation of his closing

argument. Petitioner’s claim is meritless.

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Petitioner contends that counsel failed to rebut the prosecutor’s contention that “[t]he

evidence seems to suggest that [Petitioner] made more than one trip into the garage[.]” (RT 156.) 

Petitioner claims that counsel should have rebutted this allegation with the fact that it was

“Brandy” who actually committed the burglary. Contrary to Petitioner’s contention, defense

counsel argued that there was no evidence that Petitioner was actually in the garage. (RT 167.) 

In addition, counsel argued that “Brandy” told Petitioner about the abandoned items in the

garbage. (RT 167-168, 171.) Petitioner provides no factual support for his contention that

counsel should have argued “Brandy” actually committed the burglary. To present such evidence

had the potential to damage Petitioner’s credibility given that his defense was that “Brandy” told

about the abandoned items, and no evidence supported the fact that Brandy actually committed

the burglary. In fact, Petitioner was the one found in possession of the stolen items. As a result,

counsel cannot be faulted for failing to argue a theory that was not supported by the evidence and

contradicted the evidence before the jury. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is without merit. 

Petitioner further contends that counsel invited the jury to disbelieve his testimony.

Petitioner mis-characterizes counsel’s argument. Counsel argued, reasonably so, that even if the

jury discounted Petitioner’s testimony, “what did the People have?” (RT 167.) Counsel

presented the argument that the prosecution had simply failed to meet its burden of proof beyond

a reasonable doubt. By presenting such argument, counsel provided an avenue for the jury to

find Petitioner “not guilty” even if they did not believe his testimony. Petitioner’s claim is

simply without merit, as counsel fulfilled his obligation of arguing that the prosecution had failed

to meet its burden of proof. 

10. Abuse Of Discretion In Denying Petitioner’s Marsden Motion

Petitioner contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his Marsden

motion. Petitioner contends that he and counsel had communication problems. Petitioner fails to

provide any factual support for his contention of the communication problems, nor does

Petitioner establish that he was prejudiced as a result of such communication problems. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim fails under Strickland, and the state courts’ determination of this

issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

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precedent.

D. Instructional Error

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with both CALJIC No.

2.52 and 2.15. As a result, Petitioner contends that his rights to due process and trial by an

impartial jury. 

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a claim

cognizable in a federal habeas corpus action. See, Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72

(1991). To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show

that the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates

due process. See, id. at 72. Additionally, the instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation,

but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. Id. The

court must evaluate jury instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a

component of the entire trial process. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982)

(citing Henderson v, Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)). Furthermore, even if it is determined

that the instruction violated the petitioner’s right to due process, a petitioner can only obtain

relief if the unconstitutional instruction had a substantial influence on the conviction and thereby

resulted in actual prejudice under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710

(1993) (whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict.). See Hanna v. Riveland, 87 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9 Cir. 1996). The burden of th

demonstrating that an erroneous instruction was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral

attack on the constitutional validity of a state court's judgment is even greater than the showing

required to establish plain error on direct appeal." Id. 

1. CALJIC No. 2.52

Petitioner contends the trial court erred in giving CALJIC 2.52 because the word “flight”

was not defined for the jury. Petitioner argues that to the average person, “flight” means “any

attempt to get away.” More specifically, Petitioner argues that the dictionary, the word “flight”

means “an act or an instance of fleeing,” and the word “flee” means “to run away (from).” 

Petitioner contends the evidence did not establish that he ran from the victims in the park. 

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Petitioner presented this claim via state habeas corpus petitions, which were summarily

denied on the merits. (Lodged Doc. Nos. 14, 15, 18-21.) The court looks to the last reasoned

state court decision as to the basis for the state court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911,

918 (9 Cir. 2002) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991)). Where, as here,

th

the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its

conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas

corpus relief is available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9 Cir. th

2000). 

At trial, the court instructed the jury with CALJIC 2.52 as follows:

The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a

crime, or after he is accused of a crime, is not sufficient in itself to

establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, may be considered

by you in the light of all other proved facts in deciding whether a

defendant is guilty or not guilty. The weight to which this

circumstance is entitled is a matter for you to decide.

(CT 77; RT 150.) 

Petitioner is in essence arguing that the word “flight” is ambiguous and had the potential

to confuse the jury. As Respondent submits, there are likely several definitions of the word, and

it certainly implies more than just an attempt to get away. Nonetheless, even if the word is

considered to be ambiguous, Petitioner’s claim is without merit. 

The evidence produced at trial established that Petitioner tried to run from the victims at

the park. Joshua Ballard testified that when Petitioner saw him get out of the car, Petitioner ran,

and Joshua, Ross, and Kirk, chased him. (RT 37-38, 49-51, 54.) In addition, Ross Ballard

testified that Petitioner “started to sort of run but didn’t,” and they chased after Petitioner. (RT

58.) Ross testified that Petitioner was walking backwards for a while and also testified that they

ran after Petitioner when Petitioner started running. (RT 63.)

Based on the evidence presented to the jury, it simply cannot be said that there was a

reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the flight instruction in an unconstitutional manner. 

The evidence amply supported the finding that Petitioner ran away from the victims in the park. 

Moreover, even Petitioner testified that, at the park, when he saw people coming towards him, he

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tried to leave. (RT 77, 86.)

Moreover, CALJIC 2.52, did not prevent the jury from finding that Petitioner did not

engaged in “flight” after the burglary. CALJIC 2.52 specifically states that flight may be

considered, if proved. Therefore, the jury was free to conclude that there was not flight or,

alternatively, if it found there was flight, to accord little or no weight to this fact. See CALJIC

No. 2.52. 

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of CALJIC No.

2.52. See McMillian v. Gomez, 19 F.3d 465, 469 (9 Cir. 1994) (claim regarding instruction on th

flight did not raise genuine federal constitutional issue); Houston v. Roe, 177 F.3d 901, 910 (9th

Cir. 1999) (the flight instruction was not prohibited by clearly established United States Supreme

Court precedent under AEDPA); Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1131-1132 (9 Cir. 2002) th

(the court’s failure to modify the flight instruction to recite petitioner’s excuse was not error

because the instruction did not prevent the jury from considering the excuse). 

2. CALJIC No. 2.15

Petitioner contends that by instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 2.15, the trial court

lessened the prosecution’s burden to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner argues

that the jury could have found him guilty of burglary if there was only “slight” corroborating

evidence. Petitioner also contends that the instruction allowed the jury to convict him even

though he had satisfactorily explained his possession of the recently stolen property.

 Petitioner presented this claim on direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal and

California Supreme Court on direct review. (Lodged Doc. Nos. 1, 6.) Because the California

Supreme Court’s opinion is summary in nature, however, this Court "looks through" that

decision and presumes it adopted the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal, the last state

court to have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n. 3,

111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (establishing, on habeas review, "look through"

presumption that higher court agrees with lower court's reasoning where former affirms latter

without discussion); see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n. 7 (9 Cir.2000) (holding th

federal courts look to last reasoned state court opinion in determining whether state court's

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rejection of petitioner's claims was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law

under § 2254(d)(1)). 

At trial, the court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.15, which states, in relevant part,

as follows:

If you find that a defendant was in conscious possession of recently

stolen property, the fact of that possession is not by itself sufficient

to permit an inference that the defendant is guilty of the crime of

burglary or receiving stolen property. Before guilt may be inferred,

there must be corroborating evidence tending to prove defendant’s

guilt. However, this corroborating evidence need only be slight,

and need not by itself be sufficient to warrant an inference of guilt.

(CT 76; RT 149-150.) 

The California Court of Appeal rejected the claim relying on prior court precedent in

People v. Hernandez, 34 Cal.App.4th 73, 81 (1995). (Lodged Doc. No. 1, at 4.) In Hernandez,

the Court of Appeal held that CALJIC 2.15 creates only a permissive inference, that the jury was

free to either credit or reject based on its review of the evidence, and the instruction therefore

does not relieve the State of its burden to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (Lodged

Doc. No. 1, at 4.) The Hernandez court held that because the instruction creates only an

inference that may or may not be drawn from the evidence, it did not serve to modify or lessen

the ultimate burden of proof. Id. (Lodged Doc. No. 1, at 4.) 

The Court of Appeal also rejected Petitioner’s claim that the instruction allowed a

conviction despite the fact that he had provided an explanation for possessing the stolen items. 

(Lodged Doc. No. 1, at 4.) First, the Court clarified that the relevant inquiry is not whether the

jury could have believed Petitioner’s story, but whether sufficient corroborating evidence of the

burglary existed. (Id.) The Court concluded:

[G]iven the suspicious circumstances surrounding [Petitioner’s] possession of

recently stolen items, i.e., his proximity to the garage, his attempted flight, his

inconsistent statements as to whether he knew the items he possessed were tools,

and his implausible explanation for how the tools came into his possession, the

jury had ample corroborating evidence to find beyond a reasonable doubt that

[Petitioner] committed burglary.

(Lodged Doc. No. 1, at 4.) 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate entitlement to relief under § 2254. As the state

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 This finding is supported by the plain language of the instruction which states that “conscious possession 4

of . . . stolen property is not itself sufficient to permit an inference that the defendant is guilty of the crime of robbery

or burglary.” CALJIC No. 2.15.

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appellate court properly determined that CALJIC No. 2.15 creates only a permissive inference

that does not improperly shift the burden of proof, the instruction is constitutional as long as it 4

can be said with substantial assurance that the inferred fact is more likely than not to flow from

the proved fact on which it is made to depend. Hanna v. Riveland, 87 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9 Cir. th

1996). 

 Here, there was corroborating evidence to establish Petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. Petitioner himself testified that he rode a bicycle to the Ballard residence. (RT 76-77,

82.) He testified that he grabbed two boxes from the garbage, and then took the items to the park

to watch a soccer game. (RT 77.) Petitioner stated that while at the park when he saw people

coming toward him, he attempted to leave. (RT 77, 86.) Petitioner’s explanation for possessing

the stolen items was simply implausible. Petitioner claimed that a man named “Brandy,” (with

an unknown last name and address) told him where he could locate the items in the garbage. 

However, Petitioner claimed that he did not know what was inside the box, and did not know

why he was attacked by the men in the park. (RT 77-78.) 

Given the evidence established at trial, the jury could, and did, reasonably conclude that

Petitioner was guilty of burglary, and there is simply no reasonable likelihood that the jury

applied CALJIC No. 2.15 in an unconstitutional manner. 

E. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by implying that he had

been convicted of the crime charged on four separate prior occasions. Petitioner also claims that

the prosecutor mis-stated the evidence in her closing argument.

Petitioner presented this claim to the state courts via state petition for writ of habeas

corpus, which were denied summarily. (Lodged Doc. Nos. 19, 21.) The court looks to the last

reasoned state court decision as to the basis for the state court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297

F.3d 911, 918 (9 Cir. 2002) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991)). Where, th

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as here, the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its

conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas

corpus relief is available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9 Cir. th

2000). 

A habeas petition will be granted for prosecutorial misconduct only when the misconduct

“so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” 

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 171, 106 S.Ct. 2464 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1871 (1974)); see, Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d

815, 843 (9 Cir. 1995). To constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct th

must be “of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” 

Greer v. Miller, 485 U.S. 756, 765, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 3109 (1987) (quoting United States v.

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (1985)). Under this standard, a petitioner must show that

there is a reasonable probability that the error complained of affected the outcome of the trial -

i.e., that absent the alleged impropriety, the verdict probably would have been different.

1. Prosecutor’s Questioning As To Prior Felonies Was Not Misconduct

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking questions

regarding his prior felonies to insinuate that he had committed the charged act on prior occasions. 

At trial, the prosecutor asked Petitioner, “is it true that in 1990 you were convicted of

burglary in this county?” (RT 87.) Defense counsel objected, moved to strike, and requested a

sidebar. (Id.) After the sidebar, the prosecutor clarified and stated that she had misspoken and

asked Petitioner if he was convicted of robbery in 1990. (Id.) The prosecutor then proceeded to

question Petitioner regarding the other prior felony convictions, but the identity of the actual

offenses were not disclosed. (RT 87-88.) 

There is no showing that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in questioning Petitioner

regarding his prior felony convictions. Although the prosecutor initially misspoke regarding his

1990 conviction, by misstating that it was for burglary instead of robbery. The prosecutor

subsequently clarified the misstatement. Defense counsel appropriately objected to the

questioning regarding the 1990 conviction, however, there is no record of any objection as to the

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other prior felony convictions. (RT 87-88.) Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to sustain his

burden of demonstrating that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, let alone that there is a

reasonable probability that the error complained of affected the outcome of the trial. As such,

Petitioner’s claim fails on the merits, and the state courts’ determination of this issue was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

2. Closing Argument

Petitioner claims the prosecutor misstated the evidence by showing the jury a photograph

of Kirk Tobler’s injury during her closing argument. Petitioner contends that he acted in selfdefense and prosecutor engaged in misconduct by arguing anything different. Petitioner contends

that he was not able to confront and cross-examine Kirk Tobler because he did not testify at trial.

In a related claim, discussed supra under section C, subd. (8), Petitioner claimed that

defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s presentation of the

photograph depicting the injury to Kirk Tobler’s arm during closing argument. For the reasons

discussed herein, Petitioner has failed to establish that the prosecutor committed misconduct by

presenting the photograph. To recap, the prosecutor simply showed the jury an exhibit of which

two witnesses had already identified as the injury Petitioner inflicted on Kirk Tobler. In fact,

Petitioner did not dispute that he bit Mr. Tobler, but only disputed the reason for doing so. (RT

84-85, 170-171.) Both the prosecutor and Petitioner were allowed to present and argue their

theories of the case. 

Petitioner’s claim that he was denied the opportunity to cross-examine Kirk Tobler is

unfounded, as the prosecutor did not present any testimony or statements made by Tobler, and

there can be no resulting cross-examination violation. The state courts’ determination of this

issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent. 

F. Insufficient Evidence

Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of

burglary. 

The Stanislaus County Superior Court rejected this claim on the ground that Petitioner’s

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petition failed to reveal sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case for relief. (Lodged Doc.

No. 15.) 

The law on insufficiency of the evidence claim is clearly established. The United States

Supreme Court has held that when reviewing an insufficiency of the evidence claim on habeas, a

federal court must determine whether, viewing the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from

it in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could find the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 

Sufficiency claims are judged by the elements defined by state law. Id. at 324, n. 16. 

Contrary to Petitioner’s contention, sufficient evidence supports his conviction. The

victims testified that as they drove home from the park, they observed a Hispanic male riding a

pink bicycle with a drill in his hand that looked familiar. (RT 36, 56-57.) After looking in their

garage, they discovered that their drill was missing. (RT 36-37, 57.) Both Joshua and Ross

Ballard testified that they kept their tools in the garage, and not in the garbage can. (RT 35-37.) 

The victims observed Petitioner in the park with their drill and a case of sockets. (RT 37, 57-58.) 

When Petitioner saw them get out of their car, Petitioner ran, and they chased and eventually

tackled him. (RT 37-38, 49-51, 54, 58, 63.) 

In addition, Petitioner testified that he rode a bicycle to the Ballard residence, obtained

the two boxes from the garbage can, and then went to the park to watch a soccer game. (RT 76-

77, 82.) While at the park, when Petitioner observed the people coming towards him, he tried to

leave, but was attacked and apprehend. (RT 77, 86.) 

Based on the above evidence, a rationale trier of fact could, and did, find beyond a

reasonable doubt that Petitioner committed the burglary. The state courts’ determination of this

issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent as established in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

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This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 10, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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