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Parties Involved:
Donna Becraft
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 24, 1997 Decided July 8, 1997 

No. 96-3098

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DONNA BECRAFT,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 96cr00120-01)

Evelina J. Norwinski, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for the appellant. A.J. Kramer, Federal 

Public Defender, and Amy Seidman, Assistant Federal Public Defender were on brief.

Eileen F. Sheehan, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for the appellee. Eric H. Holder, Jr., United 

States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Thomas C. Black and 

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Miriam M. Smolen, Assistant United States Attorneys, were 

on brief.

Before: GINSBURG, SENTELLE and HENDERSON, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: On April 29, 

1996 appellant Donna Becraft entered a guilty plea to one 

count of interstate transportation of stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. The Information alleges that 

Becraft unlawfully transported from the District of Columbia 

to Maryland 11 checks totaling $37,854.25the proceeds from 

one of four schemes Becraft employed to defraud her employer, the Institute of International Economics (Institute), of 

$108,844.75 over a five-year period. On August 8, 1996 

Becraft was sentenced to twenty-four months' imprisonment 

to be followed by three years of supervised release. She 

appeals her sentence insofar as it reflects an upward adjustment for abuse of a position of trust under section 3B1.3 of 

the United States Sentencing Guidelines (guidelines), primarily on the ground that she did not occupy a "position of trust" 

at the Institute within the meaning of section 3B1.3. We 

defer, as we must, to the district court's application of section 

3B1.3 and affirm the abuse of trust adjustment.

The Congress has expressly directed that in reviewing 

sentences the court "shall give due regard to the opportunity 

of the district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, 

and shall accept the findings of fact of the district court 

unless they are clearly erroneous and shall give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the 

facts." 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Kim, 23 F.3d 513, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("Congress 

crafted a trichotomy: purely legal questions are reviewed de 

novo; factual findings are to be affirmed unless 'clearly 

erroneous'; and we are to give 'due deference' to the district 

court's application of the guidelines to facts."). We have 

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1The court explained: "A district judge's determination that a 

given set of facts constitute [sic] 'obstruction of justice' (as the 

guidelines use that term) or involve [sic] more than minimal planning, will typically not be exactly replicated in any other case. And 

therefore there is less reason to insist on the uniformity that a 

question of law typically requires." 23 F.3d at 517 (citing Pierce v. 

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 562 (1988)). 

described the statutory "due deference" standard as "presumably ... meant to fall somewhere between de novo and 

'clearly erroneous,' a standard of review that reflects an 

apparent congressional desire to compromise between the 

need for uniformity in sentencing and the recognition that the 

district courts should be afforded some flexibility in applying 

the guidelines to the facts before them." Id. at 517. Under 

this standard we "should not ask whether we would decide 

the issue the same way but rather provide something akin to 

the review we give administrative agency determinations of 

such mixed questions." Id. (reviewing district court's determination that undisputed facts constituted "more than minimal planning" under guidelines § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A)).1 We have 

already applied the due deference standard to the district 

court's determination that a particular set of facts constitutes 

abuse of a position of trust. See United States v. Broumas,

69 F.3d 1178, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert denied, 116 U.S. 1447 

(1996); United States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d 947, 954 (D.C. Cir. 

1997) (citing Broumas). We do so again here.

The record establishes that between 1990 and 1995 Becraft, 

who was hired as the Institute's office manager in 1985 and 

assumed the responsibilities of marketing director in 1994, 

employed various schemes to defraud her employer. Specifically, she prepared and submitted to the Institute (1) 11 false 

purchase orders in 1990 and 1991 for office supplies, for which 

the Institute issued $4,370 in checks that Becraft herself 

cashed; (2) 22 travel expense reports in 1993 and 1994 for 

$57,320.50 worth of discount airline tickets that Becraft falsely claimed to have purchased with her own credit card for 

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bursed her; (3) 11 phony purchase orders in 1994 and 1995 

for $37,854.25 worth of prepaid postage and stationery, for 

which the Institute issued checks that Becraft deposited in 

her own bank accounts; and (3) fictitious orders in 1994 and 

1995 for $1.2 million worth of Institute publications, for which 

Becraft received $9,300 in performance raises and bonuses. 

Based on these facts, the district court stated:

Well, I will first find that the defendant did occupy a 

position of trust and that she abused her position of trust 

in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission 

of the offense. I think that her position as Director of 

Marketing and Publication is the most clear to the Court, 

because in that position she was manipulating the publication sales figures so that she received performance 

bonuses and pay increases based on fictitious sales figures that she was manipulating. But, in addition, I think 

as an office manager, in the position she was in, that was 

itself a position of trust. And certainly the position she 

held facilitated the concealment of the offenses that she 

committed.

Sentencing Transcript at 16. Given the "due deference" 

standard discussed above, and the closeness of the question 

with which it was presented, we do not believe the district 

court committed reversible error in its application of the 

language of section 3B1.3 and its commentary to the facts 

here.

Guidelines § 3B1.3 provides: "If the defendant abused a 

position of public or private trust, or used a special skill, in a 

manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense, increase by 2 levels." The guidelines 

commentary explains:

"Public or private trust" refers to a position of public or 

private trust characterized by professional or managerial 

discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary judgment that is 

ordinarily given considerable deference). Persons holding such positions ordinarily are subject to significantly 

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2The commentary further notes that the adjustment would apply 

to "an embezzlement of a client's funds by an attorney serving as a 

guardian" and to "the criminal sexual abuse of a patient by a 

physician under the guise of an examination." U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 

application note 1. 

3Apparently the deputy director did instruct Becraft in March 

1994 to stop charging airline tickets on her own credit card, see

Presentencing Report at 3, but she continued to submit expense 

reports and to receive payment therefor until September 1994. 

less supervision than employees whose responsibilities 

are primarily non-discretionary in nature.

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 application note 1. Thus, for example, the 

adjustment properly applies to "a bank executive's fraudulent 

loan scheme" but "would not apply in the case of an embezzlement or theft by an ordinary bank teller." Id.2 Becraft 

contends the district court misapplied section 3B1.3 because 

she necessarily lacked the requisite "professional discretion" 

to occupy a position of trust. We disagree.

Although Becraft was under the nominal supervision of the 

Institute's deputy director, to whom she submitted her documentation for approval, she nevertheless exercised at least de 

facto final authority over her own ordering and marketing 

activities. The deputy director permitted Becraft to determine which purchases should be made and accepted her 

decision without question.3It was largely because of the 

complete trust he reposed in her, and the carte blanche he 

granted her, that Becraft was able to execute and conceal her 

various frauds over so long a time. In addition, after she 

became marketing director, Becraft apparently acquired extensive authority over sale of the Institute's publications, 

including control of the sales reports which she was able to 

manipulate to conceal her inflated book orders. All of this 

suggests that throughout the relevant period Becraft was, as 

the guidelines commentary contemplates, "subject to significantly less supervision than employees whose responsibilities 

are primarily non-discretionary in nature" and that her position can reasonably be described, in the commentary's words, 

as "characterized by professional or managerial discretion 

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4The West panel rejected the government's argument "that West 

occupied a position of trust because his position as president of his 

own courier company conferred upon him substantial managerial 

discretion in the performance of his duties" toward either bank 

involved in the first job. 56 F.3d at 221. The panel concluded that 

"West's title of president" should "carry no special weight" because 

(1) "West was entrusted with checks in his capacity as a simple 

courier, not in his capacity as president" and (2) "the Government 

offered no proof that the original contract between appellant and 

the bank may have suggested the existence of any real discretionary component to West's job." Id.

5

It is also noteworthy that the West panel reviewed the district 

court's determination de novo without according it the deference 

required under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). See 56 F.3d at 219 ("Whether 

West abused a position of trust within the meaning of section 3B1.3 

is a question of law that we review de novo.") (citing United States 

v. Smaw, 993 F.2d 902, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). 

(i.e., substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily 

given considerable deference)."

In arguing for reversal, Becraft relies heavily on this 

court's decision in United States v. West, 56 F.3d 216 (D.C. 

Cir. 1995), which reversed an abuse of trust adjustment 

applied to a defendant who had worked as a courier for two 

different clients. For one client, West, while president and 

sole employee of his own courier company, was hired to 

transport checks from one bank to another, but instead 

converted them to his own use. For the other client, West, 

while employed by another courier company, was instructed 

to pick up items from lockboxes, from which he later stole 

credit card receipts that he used to process fraudulent credit 

transactions. There can be no question that West's employment as a courier was entirely ministerial with, as the court 

noted, "almost no discretion whatsoever." 56 F.3d at 221. 

He was simply charged with delivering items from one place 

to another.4In contrast, Becraft occupied a trusted supervisory position within the Institute entailing substantial spending and reporting authority (which she abused).5

For the preceding reasons, we defer to and uphold the 

district court's determination that Becraft occupied a position 

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6We summarily reject Becraft's claim that she did not abuse her 

position "in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or 

concealment of the offense," as required by section 3B1.3, given 

both the extensive paperwork she created to conceal all of her 

frauds and, perhaps more important, her manipulation of the sales 

records. 

of trust within the contemplation of section 3B1.3.6 The 

judgment of the district court is therefore

Affirmed.

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GINSBURG, Circuit Judge, dissenting: In United States v. 

West we rejected the very argument that the Government 

now advances and the court now acceptsthat the two-level 

increase in a defendant's base offense level under § 3B1.3 of 

the Sentencing Guidelines should apply "merely because [the 

defendant] is entrusted with valuable things and has little or 

no supervision while performing his or her duties." 56 F.3d 

216, 221 (1995). In West we explained that the adoption of 

such a theory "would stretch the abuse-of-trust enhancement 

to cover endless numbers of jobs involving absolutely no 

professional or managerial discretion, in clear contravention 

of the plain language of the commentary to section 3B1.3." 

Id. Indeed, the commentary to § 3B1.3 makes it clear that 

an upward adjustment for abuse of trust is inapplicable to any 

position that is not "characterized by professional or managerial discretion"such as the positions of "an ordinary bank 

teller or hotel clerk"because an employee in such a position 

is not "ordinarily ... subject to significantly less supervision 

than employees whose responsibilities are primarily nondiscretionary in nature." U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, comment. (n.1). 

The commentary focuses upon positions that do involve substantial professional or managerial discretion; for example, 

the adjustment "would apply in the case of an embezzlement 

of a client's funds by an attorney serving as a guardian, a 

bank executive's fraudulent loan scheme, or the criminal 

sexual abuse of a patient by a physician under the guise of an 

examination." Id.

By the court's present reasoning, however, any employee 

who is in fact trusted by his or her employer may receive an 

abuse-of-trust upward adjustment regardless whether the 

type of position occupied by the defendant would "ordinarily" 

be one of trust. Like a bank teller or hotel clerk, Becraft did 

not hold a position "that is ordinarily characterized by professional or managerial discretion." On the contrary only her 

supervisor, Tom Bayard, had authority to approve purchase 

orders and reimbursement requests and to sign checks. Yet, 

as the Court recounts, Bayard

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permitted Becraft to determine which purchases should 

be made and accepted her decision without question. It 

was largely because of the complete trust he reposed in 

her, and the carte blanche he granted her, that Becraft 

was able to execute and conceal her various frauds over 

so long a time.

Ct. Op. 5. This is correct; the record indicates that Becraft's 

frauds were easily detectable. Bayard received monthly reports from the office of IIE's Comptroller that would have 

enabled him to detect any discrepancies between sales and 

receivables. Bayard was negligent, however, in supervising 

Becraft, perhaps because he and Becraft enjoyed a close 

personal relationship. At Becraft's sentencing counsel for 

IIE reported that after conducting an internal investigation 

"we were left with the impression" that Bayard felt "let down 

by someone he had so trusted." Indeed, Bayard committed 

suicide a few days after Becraft's frauds were discovered.

Thus, the court errs in characterizing Becraft's position as 

"a trusted supervisory position within the Institute entailing 

substantial spending and reporting authority." Ct. Op. 6. To 

the contrary: Becraft supervised no one; it was only due to 

her own supervisor's complete failure to supervise her that 

she was able to take advantage of a position that would 

ordinarily have entailed little or no discretionary authority. 

His dereliction of duty does not somehow transform her 

position into one that is not "ordinarily" subject to significant 

supervision. See United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1192 

(3d Cir. 1994) (enhancement not applicable to defendant able 

to commit bank fraud only because bank manager did not 

conduct routine background check on defendant); United 

States v. Helton, 953 F.2d 867, 869-70 (4th Cir. 1992) (enhancement not applicable to cashier in charge of reimbursing 

employees for travel or purchase orders who was able to 

commit fraud only because of lax supervision); cf. United 

States v. Ragland, 72 F.3d 500, 503 (6th Cir. 1996) (enhancement not applicable to bank customer service representative 

who "was not authorized to exercise any meaningful discretion").

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We have previously cautioned that expanding the range of 

positions "characterized by professional or managerial discretion" may render the term "so boundless as to be meaningless." United States v. Smaw, 22 F.3d 330, 332 (1994) 

(reversing application of abuse-of-trust enhancement to timeand-attendance clerk). I fear that today's decision will have 

just that effect; henceforth, the operative question will no 

longer be whether the defendant occupied a position "characterized by professional or managerial discretion (i.e., ... 

[one] that is ordinarily given considerable deference)," but 

instead whether the defendant, regardless of the nature of his 

or her position, was closely supervised. Because that is not 

what the Sentencing Guidelines require, I respectfully dissent.

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