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Parties Involved:
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3669
Appellee
Robert A. Petzel
Appellant
Eric K. Shinseki
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 9, 2012 Decided March 8, 2013

No. 11-5359

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,

AFL-CIO, LOCAL 3669,

APPELLEE

v.

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS AND ROBERT A. PETZEL,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cv-01722)

Andrea McBarnette, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were Ronald C. 

Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant 

U.S. Attorney.

Martin R. Cohen argued the cause and filed the brief for 

appellee. David A. Borer entered an appearance.

USCA Case #11-5359 Document #1424103 Filed: 03/08/2013 Page 1 of 13
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Before: HENDERSON and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: The American 

Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3669 

(“the Union”), asserted unfair labor practice charges against 

the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) on behalf of two

nurses at a VA medical center. The VA determined that the 

charges were covered by the nurses’ statutory right of 

“collective bargaining” but that they “ar[ose] out of . . . 

professional conduct or competence” within the meaning of 

38 U.S.C. § 7422(a)–(b). Therefore, the VA decided that the 

charges were excluded from review by the Federal Labor 

Relations Authority (“FLRA”). The Union brought suit, 

alleging that the VA misread its statutory authority. The 

district court granted summary judgment in the Union’s favor,

and the VA appeals. Because we agree with the district court

that the VA’s decision erroneously interpreted its statutory 

authority, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Framework

The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations 

Statute (“FSLMRS”) governs federal labor relations and is 

codified in title 5, chapter 71 of the U.S. Code. See 5 U.S.C. 

§§ 7101–35. FSLMRS gives federal employees various labor 

rights, including the right “to form, join, or assist any labor 

organization . . . freely and without fear of penalty or 

reprisal,” the right “to act for a labor organization in the 

capacity of a representative,” and the right “to engage in 

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collective bargaining.” Id. § 7102. To protect these rights, 

FSLMRS authorizes the FLRA to adjudicate unfair labor 

practice complaints based on rights protected by FSLMRS. 

See id. §§ 7104, 7118. 

A separate statutory scheme governs the labor rights of 

VA medical professionals, including “[r]egistered nurses.” 38 

U.S.C. § 7421(b)(5); see id. §§ 7401–74. Under this scheme, 

“[n]otwithstanding any law, Executive order, or regulation, 

the Secretary shall prescribe by regulation the hours and 

conditions of employment and leaves of absence of” VA 

medical professionals. Id. § 7421(a). In Colorado Nurses 

Ass’n v. FLRA, we held that this statute gave the VA 

Secretary “unfettered discretion to issue regulations 

concerning the working conditions of” VA medical 

professionals and released the VA from any mandatory 

collective bargaining obligation. 851 F.2d 1486, 1492 (D.C. 

Cir. 1988). Following Colorado Nurses, Congress passed the 

Department of Veterans Affairs Labor Relations Improvement 

Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-40, title II, § 202, 105 Stat. 187, 

200 (“VA Act”), which provides in relevant part:

Except as otherwise specifically provided in this title, 

the authority of the Secretary to prescribe regulations 

under section 7421 of this title is subject to the right of

Federal employees to engage in collective bargaining 

with respect to conditions of employment through 

representatives chosen by them in accordance with 

chapter 71 of title 5 (relating to labor-management 

relations).

38 U.S.C. § 7422(a). Thus, Congress extended a right of 

collective bargaining to VA medical professionals, but it 

imposed three limitations on this bargaining right:

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Such collective bargaining (and any grievance 

procedures provided under a collective bargaining 

agreement) in the case of [VA medical professionals] 

may not cover, or have any applicability to, any matter 

or question concerning or arising out of (1) 

professional conduct or competence, (2) peer review, 

or (3) the establishment, determination, or adjustment 

of employee compensation under this title.

Id. § 7422(b). The VA Act gives the Secretary of Veterans 

Affairs exclusive authority to decide whether one of these 

limitations applies, see id. § 7422(d), though the Secretary can 

delegate this authority to the Under Secretary for Health, as 

he did here. This appeal turns on the meaning of the phrase 

“collective bargaining” in the VA Act.

B. Factual and Procedural Background

This case arose following a December 12, 2007, 

arbitration hearing in which the Union challenged the 

termination of a VA respiratory therapist. During the hearing, 

a VA nurse named Anita Krehnke testified in support of VA 

management. Two VA nurses and Union members, Barbara 

Galle and Karen Rafter, then allegedly testified that 

Krehnke’s performance as a nurse was substandard. A VA 

Medical Center (“VAMC”) staff attorney reported to the 

VAMC’s Nurse Executive, Christine Lund, that Galle and 

Rafter so testified. After receiving this report, Lund began an 

investigation into whether Galle and Rafter violated VAMC

policy by failing to notify VAMC management that another 

nurse was providing substandard care. On December 18, 

2007, Lund sent letters to Galle and Rafter advising them of 

their VAMC and state law reporting obligations and asking to 

discuss their allegations against Krehnke. The letters 

informed Galle and Rafter “that failure to report [substandard 

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practice] is grounds for disciplinary action.” Lund later met 

with both Galle and Rafter and sent them a follow-up letter 

stating that she had “no substantive findings” regarding their 

allegations about Krehnke’s conduct. 

On January 10 and 11, 2008, the Union filed two unfair 

labor practice charges (“ULPs”) with the FLRA against the 

VAMC, alleging that Lund’s requests to meet and her 

references to disciplinary action constituted reprisal for Galle 

and Rafter’s testimony on behalf of the Union during the 

arbitration hearing. VAMC responded to the ULPs, arguing 

that it had a duty to investigate allegations of substandard 

patient care. VAMC also requested that the VA Under 

Secretary for Health issue a 38 U.S.C. § 7422(d) 

determination that the ULPs arose out of “professional 

conduct or competence” and were thus excluded from 

collective bargaining under § 7422(b). In response, the Union 

offered three arguments: First, the Union claimed that the VA 

Under Secretary lacked legal authority to make a § 7422(d) 

ruling here because the ULPs did not involve a “collective 

bargaining” or “grievance procedure” issue within the 

meaning of § 7422(b). Instead, the Union argued, the ULPs 

were based on the employees’ “right to form, join, or assist 

any labor organization.” 5 U.S.C. § 7102. Second, the Union 

argued that the arbitration matter did not involve 

“professional conduct or competence” under § 7422(b). 

Third, the Union attacked the factual basis for VAMC’s 

request by providing a declaration from one of the Union’s

attorneys stating that Galle and Rafter’s testimony was 

focused on Krehnke’s demeanor and work ethic, not on her 

competence. 

The VA Under Secretary issued a decision on September 

2, 2008, holding that the ULPs arose out of professional 

conduct or competence. After the Union brought suit seeking 

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reversal of the Under Secretary’s decision, the district court 

vacated that decision, concluding that “the Under Secretary 

failed to address [the] threshold legal issue” of whether he had 

“authority to apply any § 7422(b) exclusion in the first place.” 

American Federation of Government Employees Local 3669 

v. Shinseki, 648 F. Supp. 2d 87, 93 (D.D.C. 2009) (internal 

quotation mark and brackets omitted). The court remanded to 

the VA “for a determination as to whether the charges filed by 

the [Union] with the [FLRA] qualify as ‘collective 

bargaining’ or ‘grievance procedures provided under a 

collective bargaining agreement’ within the meaning of 

§ 7422(b).” Id. at 94–95. 

 

On remand, the Under Secretary determined that the 

ULPs both qualified as collective bargaining and arose out of 

professional conduct or competence, except to the extent that 

VAMC management’s letters to and meetings with Galle and 

Rafter addressed issues other than their and Krehnke’s 

professional conduct. FLRA lacks authority to review the 

VA’s determination or to exercise jurisdiction over ULPs that 

the Under Secretary excludes from collective bargaining 

pursuant to § 7422(d). See, e.g., United States Department of 

Veterans Affairs, Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Asheville, 

N.C., 57 F.L.R.A. 681, 683 (Jan. 31, 2002). Therefore, the 

Union filed a complaint in the district court under the 

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) alleging, among other 

things, that the Under Secretary’s determination was outside 

the scope of his statutory authority. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C). 

The VA moved for dismissal, and the Union and the VA filed 

cross motions for summary judgment. 

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 

the Union on the § 706(2)(C) count of its complaint, 

concluding that “the Under Secretary erred in determining 

that the Union’s unfair labor practice charges relate to matters 

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of ‘collective bargaining’ as that term is used in the FSLMRS 

and 38 U.S.C. § 7422.” American Federation of Government 

Employees Local 3669 v. Shinseki, 821 F. Supp. 2d 337, 350 

(D.D.C. 2011) (“Local 3669”). The VA Act only permits the 

Under Secretary to exclude certain matters from “collective 

bargaining (and any grievance procedures provided under a 

collective bargaining agreement).” 38 U.S.C. § 7422(b). The 

court explained that “alleged violations of the right to form, 

join, or assist a union without reprisal do not necessarily 

implicate the right to engage in collective bargaining,” and in 

this case, the ULPs were not based on a failure to engage in 

collective bargaining. Local 3669, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 349. 

The court granted summary judgment in the Union’s favor, 

holding that the Under Secretary “exceeded his statutory 

authority” by excluding the ULPs under § 7422(b). Id. at 

350–51. The VA appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary 

judgment. Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 780 (D.C. Cir. 

2012). Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party 

“shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact” and that it “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Here, the relevant facts are not in 

dispute. The APA requires us to “hold unlawful and set aside 

agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . in 

excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or 

short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). The VA

contends that the Under Secretary’s decision excluding the 

ULPs was within his statutory authority because the phrase 

“collective bargaining” should be read broadly to encompass 

all labor rights. Because we agree with the district court that 

“collective bargaining” has a narrower meaning and does not 

include the ULPs at issue, we affirm.

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As always, we begin with the text of the statute. See 

Milner v. Department of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1264 

(2011). Because we conclude that “Congress has directly 

spoken to the precise question at issue” and that the text is 

unambiguous, our analysis also ends with the text. Chevron 

U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 

U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 38 U.S.C. § 7422(a) provides:

Except as otherwise specifically provided in this title, 

the authority of the Secretary to prescribe regulations 

under section 7421 of this title is subject to the right of 

Federal employees to engage in collective bargaining 

with respect to conditions of employment through

representatives chosen by them in accordance with 

chapter 71 of title 5 (relating to labor-management 

relations) [i.e., the FSLMRS].

Chapter 71 of title 5, in turn, defines “collective bargaining” 

as 

the performance of the mutual obligation of the 

representative of an agency and the exclusive 

representative of employees in an appropriate unit in 

the agency to meet at reasonable times and to consult 

and bargain in a good-faith effort to reach agreement 

with respect to the conditions of employment affecting 

such employees and to execute, if requested by either 

party, a written document incorporating any collective 

bargaining agreement reached.

5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(12). We do not accord Chevron deference 

to the VA’s interpretation of the FSLMRS because the VA 

does not administer that statute. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 

842. The VA does not dispute that the ULPs at issue are

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outside the scope of the FSLMRS’s definition of collective 

bargaining: the Union’s filing of ULPs based on the right to 

assist a labor union, 5 U.S.C. § 7102, does not fall within

FSLMRS’s right to bargain. 

Instead, the VA asserts that § 7422(a) does not import by 

reference FSLMRS’s definition of collective bargaining. 

Citing the “rule of the last antecedent,” the VA argues that “in 

accordance with chapter 71 of title 5” only relates to how 

employee representatives are chosen. See Barnhart v. 

Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (“[A] limiting clause or 

phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the 

noun or phrase that it immediately follows . . . .”). We note 

initially that the VA failed to raise this argument until its 

reply brief. Thus, the VA waived any challenge to the district 

court’s determination that “§ 7422 incorporates the term 

‘collective bargaining’ as that term is used in the FSLMRS.” 

Local 3669, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 346; see Wayneview Care 

Center v. NLRB, 664 F.3d 341, 352–53 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 

Even were this argument not waived, the last antecedent 

rule “is not an absolute and can assuredly be overcome by 

other indicia of meaning.” Barnhart, 540 U.S. at 26; see also

2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, STATUTES AND 

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.33, at 491 (7th new ed. 

2007) (“Where the sense of the entire act requires that a 

qualifying word or phrase apply to several preceding . . . 

sections, the word or phrase will not be restricted to its 

immediate antecedent.”). Here, the better interpretation is 

that § 7422(a)’s reference to the FSLMRS modifies the entire 

description of the collective bargaining process. First, this 

interpretation explains why Congress referenced the entirety 

of “chapter 71 of title 5,” most of which has nothing to do 

with how employee representatives are chosen. Cf. Ratzlaf v. 

United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140–41 (1994) (stating that 

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“[j]udges should hesitate” to treat statutory language 

“essentially as surplusage — as words of no consequence”).

 

Second, the parenthetical that immediately follows the 

reference to the FSLMRS, “(relating to labor-management 

relations),” likewise suggests that the reference should be read 

to encompass the entire description of the collective 

bargaining process. Third, Congress could have placed a 

comma before “through representatives” if it wanted the 

FSLMRS reference to qualify only how representatives are 

chosen. Fourth and finally, our past cases have uniformly 

treated § 7422(a)’s reference to the FSLMRS as modifying its

entire collective bargaining description. See American 

Federation of Government Employees Local 446 v. 

Nicholson, 475 F.3d 341, 345 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“38 U.S.C. 

§ 7422(a) gives VA medical professionals the right to bargain 

according to the rules set out in chapter 71 of title 5, subject to 

limitations specifically provided in title 38.” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)); National Federation of Federal 

Employees Local 589 v. FLRA, 73 F.3d 390, 392–93 (D.C. 

Cir. 1996) (“In 1991 Congress granted [VA medical 

professionals] the right ‘to engage in collective bargaining’ in 

accordance with chapter 71 of title 5.”).

The VA points to no statute, dictionary, case, or other 

source of meaning that defines collective bargaining as 

encompassing all labor rights. Even if § 7422(a) had no

explicit reference to the FSLMRS, including its definition of 

collective bargaining, we consider it highly unlikely that 

Congress intended to create ambiguity in light of the clear 

definition of collective bargaining elsewhere in labor law. 

For example, the National Labor Relations Act defines 

collective bargaining in a manner similar to the FSLMRS, 

calling collective bargaining 

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the performance of the mutual obligation of the 

employer and the representative of the employees to 

meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 

respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 

conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 

agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 

execution of a written contract incorporating any 

agreement reached if requested by either party.

29 U.S.C. § 158(d); see 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(12). This 

definition accords with the semantic meaning of “collective 

bargaining”: “negotiation for the settlement of the terms of a 

collective agreement between an employer . . . and a union,”

or “any union-management negotiation.” WEBSTER’S THIRD 

NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 445 (1981). 

 We have consistently distinguished between the limited 

collective bargaining right provided by § 7422 and labor 

rights more broadly. In Local 589, we stated that “Congress 

has gradually extended some of the protections in chapter 71 

of title 5 to VA medical personnel, for example . . . by 

granting all VA medical personnel limited collective 

bargaining rights in 1991.” 73 F.3d at 395 (emphases added). 

Similarly, in United States Department of Veterans Affairs, 

Washington, D.C. v. FLRA, we differentiated the “right to 

negotiate collective bargaining agreements, or to administer 

such agreements through grievance arbitration procedures” 

from “other rights protected by the FSLMRS, including ‘the 

right to form, join, or assist a labor organization without fear 

of penalty or reprisal.’” 1 F.3d 19, 21 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 

(quoting United States Department of Veterans Affairs, 

Veterans Administration Medical Center, San Francisco, 

Cal., 40 F.L.R.A. 290, 301 (April 19, 1991)); cf. FLRA v. 

United States Department of the Treasury, Financial 

Management Service, 884 F.2d 1446, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 

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(referring to “collective bargaining” as a “process” of 

“contract negotiation”); id. at 1461 (Sentelle, J., concurring) 

(distinguishing between “collective bargaining” and “other 

representational activities”). Finally, the VA’s interpretation 

does violence to the statutory text. It would be nonsensical to 

read the phrase “engage in collective bargaining with respect 

to conditions of employment,” 38 U.S.C. § 7422(a), as 

“engage in labor rights with respect to conditions of 

employment.”

Given the clear definition of collective bargaining, we

hold that the district court correctly held that the VA Under 

Secretary lacked authority under § 7422(d) to exclude these

ULPs from the FLRA’s jurisdiction. The VA acknowledges 

— indeed, argues — that the phrase “collective bargaining” 

should be read the same in § 7422(a) and § 7422(b). As we 

have shown, “collective bargaining” in § 7422(a) has a 

narrow definition focused on negotiating a labor agreement, 

so “collective bargaining” in § 7422(b) has the same narrow 

meaning. The VA also relies on legislative history, but that 

reliance is fundamentally flawed. Legislative history cannot 

create ambiguity in a clear statutory text. See Milner, 131 S. 

Ct. at 1267. 

Congress’s intent is clear. “If the intent of Congress is 

clear, that is the end of the matter.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 

842. A necessary predicate to holding that a § 7422(b)

exception to collective bargaining applies is that collective 

bargaining is at issue. Filing ULPs based on an alleged 

violation of the right to assist a labor organization does not

inherently implicate the right to bargain collectively. 

Therefore, the Under Secretary’s decision excluding the ULPs

exceeded his statutory authority. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).

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We emphasize the limited scope of our holding. We 

are not ruling on the merits of the Union’s claim on behalf of 

the two nurses. Our decision bears only on the Secretary’s 

authority under 38 U.S.C. § 7422(d). Many issues remain 

unresolved. For example, it remains possible that VA 

medical professionals are not entitled to the full panoply of 

labor rights protected by the FSLMRS, but like the district 

court, we express no opinion on that issue. Local 3669, 821 

F. Supp. 2d at 350 n.8; see also Local 589, 73 F.3d at 394

n.11 (“[W]e have no occasion to address whether VA medical 

personnel would have title 5 rights in the absence of a 

regulation.”). Our holding today neither prohibits the VA 

from litigating this issue when the FLRA adjudicates these

ULPs nor prevents us from deciding the issue in an 

appropriate case.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district 

court is

Affirmed.

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