Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-03059/USCOURTS-caDC-10-03059-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nancy Conde Rubio
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Submitted December 1, 2011 Decided May 4, 2012

No. 10-3059

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

NANCY CONDE RUBIO,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:07-cr-00248-2)

Anthony D. Martin, appointed by the court, was on the brief

for appellant.

Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese

III, John P. Mannarino, Anthony Asuncion, and Michelle P.

Brown, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee. 

Before: GARLAND and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Appellant Nancy Conde Rubio

pled guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign

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terrorist organization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). 

She now asks that we vacate her sentence and remand the case

for a new arraignment. Finding no error in the district court’s

acceptance of her plea, we affirm the judgment of conviction.1

I

Rubio was a member of the Fuerzas Armadas

Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), a Colombian guerrilla

organization that the State Department has designated as a

foreign terrorist organization pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1189. The

FARC regards American citizens as military targets, and has

murdered and taken them hostage in Colombia. Statement of

Facts at 1-2 (J.A. 71-72).2

Rubio was involved with the FARC’s “1st Front,” which

operated in the rural and jungle states of Meta, Guaviare, and

Vaupes. The 1st Front distributed cocaine to narcotics

traffickers in exchange for money, weapons, and equipment. Id.

at 2. Rubio -- at one point the fourth-ranking member of the 1st

Front -- was responsible for the logistical and material supply

network. Id. at 4. One critical piece of that network was the

communications system she put in place, since there was no

telephone service in the remote areas where the 1st Front

operated. Id. at 3. Less than a year after Rubio physically left

the 1st Front -- but while she was still providing assistance with

the communications network -- the Front took three Americans

1

This case was considered on the record from the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia and on the briefs filed by

the parties. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. CIR. R. 34(j).

2

The Statement of Facts was offered by the government to

support the factual basis for the guilty plea. Statement of Facts at 8. 

Rubio signed the statement, acknowledging its truthfulness. Id. at 9.

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hostage and held them for two years until they were rescued by

the Colombian military. Gov’t Mem. in Aid of Sentencing at 3

(J.A. 17). According to the government, the network put in

place by Rubio enabled the FARC to maintain custody of the

hostages. Id.

On September 25, 2007, a federal grand jury in the District

of Columbia returned a three-count indictment against Rubio

and several others. Rubio was charged in two of the three

counts. Count 1 charged her (and others) with conspiracy to

provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist

organization, while Count 2 charged her (and others) with the

substantive offense of providing material support, both in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). Indictment at 2-21 (Supp.

App. Tab 1 at 2-21). The third count, in which Rubio was not

named, charged the defendants with hostage taking, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 1203. Id. at 22-23. On January 31, 2008, the

Colombian military arrested Rubio in the city of Cucuta,

pursuant to a provisional arrest warrant lodged by the United

States with the Colombian government. She was extradited to

the United States on September 19, 2009.

In March 2010, Rubio entered into a plea agreement with

the United States Attorney’s Office. Among other things, she

agreed to enter a plea of guilty to Count 1 of the indictment, and

the government agreed to dismiss Count 2. Plea Agreement

¶¶ 1, 11 (J.A. 80, 83). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), the parties agreed that the appropriate

sentencing range would be 132 to 144 months. Id. ¶ 7. That

rule provides that a plea agreement may specify that the

government will “agree that a specific sentence . . . is the

appropriate disposition of the case.” FED. R. CRIM. P.

11(c)(1)(C). “[S]uch a recommendation or request binds the

court once the court accepts the plea agreement.” Id.; see

United States v. Jones, 642 F.3d 1151, 1154 n.1 (D.C. Cir.

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2011). Rubio, whose native language is Spanish, was provided

with both English and Spanish versions of the agreement. See

J.A. 80, 86.

Accompanied by counsel and an interpreter, Rubio appeared

in district court on March 17, 2010 to enter her guilty plea. In

taking the plea, the court followed the dictates of Rule 11,

asking questions to ensure (inter alia) that the defendant

understood her rights, the consequences of waiving those rights,

and the nature of the charge to which she was pleading. Tr. of

Plea Hr’g at 3-7 (Mar. 17, 2010) (J.A. 94-98); see FED.R.CRIM.

P. 11(b)(1). The court also ensured that there was a factual basis

for the plea and that it was voluntary. Tr. of Plea Hr’g at 8-9,

11; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2), (3). Finally, the court

explained that, because the plea was of the type specified in

Rule 11(c)(1)(C), if the plea were accepted the court would “be

bound by th[e] guideline range you’ve agreed to of 132 to 144

months in prison,” and would “have to sentence you within that

guideline range.” Tr. of Plea Hr’g at 8; see FED. R. CRIM. P.

11(c)(1)(C), (4). After assuring itself that Rubio understood, the

court accepted her plea. Thereafter, on June 15, 2010, the court

sentenced Rubio to 138 months’ imprisonment, the middle of

the range upon which the parties had agreed. Tr. of Sentencing

at 9 (June 15, 2010) (J.A. 118). On June 24, Rubio filed a notice

of appeal, seeking to have her sentence vacated.

II

Rubio contends that her constitutional rights were violated

because (1) she did not enter into her plea knowingly and

intelligently, and (2) she did not receive Spanish translations of

all the documents in the case. We address these contentions in

order.

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1. Rubio does not argue that, in taking her plea, the district

court failed to comply with any of the requirements of Rule 11. 

Rather, she appears to contend that the plea was obtained in

violation of due process. See McCarthy v. United States, 394

U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (holding that, if a plea is not “voluntary

and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process

and is therefore void”); see also Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S.

175, 183 (2005). Rubio acknowledges that she did not object to

the validity of her plea on this or any other ground in the district

court. Both she and the government believe that, as a

consequence, her appeal can succeed only if she establishes

plain error. Appellant Br. 2-3; Gov’t Br. 9-10. We need not

address the standard of review, however, because there was no

error -- plain or otherwise -- in the proceedings in the district

court. As we discuss below, there is no reason to accept Rubio’s

contention that she did not “knowingly and intelligently” plead

guilty. Appellant Br. 10.

The core of this contention is that “she did not understand

what was taking place at the time of the signing of the plea

agreement or during the Court proceedings” because her first

language is Spanish. Appellant Br. 12. The facts contradict this

claim. The record contains a Spanish translation of the plea

agreement that was given to Rubio, J.A. 86-91, and at the plea

hearing her attorney informed the judge that: 

I hired an interpreter/investigator to assist me in this

case, and we went through the English version of the

plea agreement and the statement of facts. I then had

it interpreted into Spanish, and then we went to [the

jail], we reviewed it in Spanish with [Rubio], and so

what she signed today is identical to what she has

agreed to.

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Tr. of Plea Hr’g at 9-10. Moreover, a Spanish-language

interpreter was present at the plea and sentencing hearings and

translated each hearing as it proceeded. Id. at 2; Tr. of

Sentencing at 9. At the plea hearing, the court and counsel again

went over the plea agreement with Rubio. Tr. of Plea Hr’g at 9-

10. She told the court that she understood it, had no questions

about it, and agreed to it. Id. at 11-12.

Rubio also maintains that she did not understand “her right

to correct inaccuracies in the stipulation of facts” presented to

the court. Appellant Br. 10. Again, the record contradicts her. 

The district judge conducted a careful colloquy on precisely this

issue. He first asked Rubio whether it was her signature on the

last page of the stipulation. Tr. of Plea Hr’g at 11. After she

told him (through the interpreter) that it was, the judge next

asked whether she had gone “over that carefully” with her

attorney. Id. After she said that she had, the judge then asked

whether the stipulation represented “what really happened,” and

whether she was “in fact, guilty of this offense.” Id. The latter

two questions plainly gave Rubio an opportunity to correct any

inaccuracies. Instead, she answered “yes” to each. Her attorney

then stated, “for the record,” that he had “gone through the

Statement of Facts with her,” it “was interpreted into Spanish for

her, and she reviewed it and we discussed those facts.” Id. at 12.

Rubio further claims that, “right up to the time of

sentencing,” she thought she would receive “a significant

departure from the [sentencing] guidelines” based on her

cooperation. Appellant Br. 13. This claim is simply not

credible. The plea agreement stated that both she and the

government agreed “that the appropriate sentence for the offense

. . . is: a sentencing range of 132 to 144 months.” Plea

Agreement ¶ 7. The Spanish translation of the agreement set out

that range in boldface. J.A. 88. The agreement made clear that,

because this was to be a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea, that disposition

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would be included in the court’s judgment if the court accepted

the plea. Plea Agreement ¶ 7. And it expressly stated that “the

Government is not obligated and does not intend to file any

downward departure sentencing motion under Section 5K1.1 of

the Sentencing Guidelines” for assistance to the authorities. Id.

¶ 9. Rubio signed an acknowledgment “that absolutely no

promises, agreements, understandings, or conditions have been

made or entered into in connection with my decision to plead

guilty except those set forth in this plea agreement.” Id. at 6.

At the plea hearing, the court was careful to tell Rubio: 

“Ordinarily I have authority to sentence you to something more

severe or less severe than the guidelines, but in this case,

because you have agreed upon a guidelines sentence with the

government, I will have to sentence you within that guideline

range.” Tr. of Plea Hr’g at 8 (emphasis added). She said she

understood. Id. Consistent with this understanding, at the

sentencing hearing Rubio’s counsel asked the court to sentence

her to 132 months, the bottom of the agreed-upon range. Tr. of

Sentencing at 8. The court then asked Rubio whether she had

“anything you’d like to say.” Id. at 9. Had she truly believed,

“up to the time of sentencing,” that she would receive a

significant departure from that range, this would have been the

time to disagree with her counsel’s recommendation for a

sentence within the range. Instead, she said that she had nothing

more to say. Id. Thereafter, the court sentenced her to 138

months, the midpoint of the range to which she had agreed in the

plea agreement. Id.

Finally, we note that Rubio told the court that she had had

adequate time and opportunity to discuss the case with her

attorney, and that she was satisfied with his representation. Tr.

of Plea Hr’g at 3. Nor has she alleged ineffective assistance of

trial counsel on appeal, where she is represented by a different

attorney. Accordingly, under all of the circumstances, there is

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simply no basis for concluding that Rubio’s plea was not made

knowingly and intelligently. Cf. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,

56 (1985) (holding, with respect to a habeas petition, that “a

defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel ‘may

only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty

plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel’” was

not “‘within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in

criminal cases’” (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258,

267 (1973); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970))).

2. Rubio’s second contention is that “Equal Protection” and

“Due Process” required the government to provide her with

Spanish translations of “all charging documents, discovery

[documents] and plea agreements,” as well as of the “presentence report.” Appellant Br. 14, 17. There is no doubt that

this claim, which she also did not raise below, may be reviewed

solely for plain error. See United States v. Simpson, 430 F.3d

1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2005); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). Once

again, the standard of review makes no difference to our

disposition. 

This Circuit has held that a criminal defendant does not

have a constitutional right to written translations into her native

language of all court documents. See United States v. Celis, 608

F.3d 818, 840-41 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also United States v.

Gonzales, 339 F.3d 725, 729 (8th Cir. 2003). Rather, whether

to order translations is entrusted to the district court’s discretion,

based on a consideration of whether the defendant needs them

to understand the evidence and charges against her, and to assist

in her own defense. Celis, 608 F.3d at 841. In this case, both

the plea agreement and the agreed-upon statement of facts were

translated into Spanish. The latter contained a seven-page

“summary of the government’s evidence in support of [the]

defendant’s guilty plea.” Statement of Facts at 8. Rubio stated

that she had discussed it with her attorney, “fully underst[oo]d”

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it, “acknowledge[d] its truthfulness,” and “accept[ed] it without

reservation.” Id. at 9. In addition, at the plea hearing the district

court (through the interpreter) carefully went over the count of

the indictment to which she was pleading guilty, Tr. of Plea

Hr’g 5-7, which she said she understood, id. at 7.

Rubio never asked the district court for translations of any

other documents, and even now does not specify any document

that, if translated, would have affected her ability “to make a

knowing and intelligent decision regarding the plea offer.” 

Appellant Br. 18. Accordingly, we conclude that the district

court did not abuse its discretion, let alone commit plain error,

in failing to order sua sponte the translation of additional

documents.

III

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is

Affirmed.

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