Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-05412/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-05412-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Karen Gascon
Plaintiff
Kaiser Permanente
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KAREN GASCON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

KAISER PERMANENTE,

Defendant. /

No. C 19-05412-WHA

ORDER DISMISSING

COMPLAINT

INTRODUCTION

In this action for discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, plaintiff has filed an in

forma pauperis application and complaint. A separate order granted plaintiff’s application to

proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons set forth below, this order finds the complaint does

not comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and is therefore DISMISSED.

STATEMENT

Kaiser Permanente hired Karen Gascon in or around November 2012. In May 2016,

Rebecca Tran, a Kaiser human resources consultant, allegedly asked Gascon to resign or

otherwise be terminated. Gascon requested a grievance procedure, but none took place. 

Thereafter, Tran allegedly entered into a verbal agreement with Gascon in which she agreed

that Gascon would have a clean record, could use Kaiser for a referral, and could “come back

anytime.” Because of this agreement, Gascon agreed to resign (Dkt. No. 1 at 8–10). 

Case 3:19-cv-05412-WHA Document 5 Filed 11/20/19 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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After resigning, Gascon applied to work at other Kaiser branches. Those branches

denied her application, however, and “informed [her] that because [she] was ‘terminated’ by

Kaiser San Francisco, [her] records indicate that [she is] not eligible for rehire.” She has also

been unable to use Kaiser as a referral. Gascon has attempted to resolve this issue with human

resources, but to no avail. In May 2019, she filed charges under Title VII for discrimination

and retaliation with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 

Gascon alleges Kaiser knew of her health issues, had her “observed”for mental disorders, and

ultimately forced her to resign because of her race, her disability, and her questioning of Kaiser

procedure (Dkt. No. 1 at 8–10). The EEOC closed the file due to it not being timely brought,

but issued her a notice for a private right to sue. Gascon timely filed the instant action, and the

undersigned granted her application to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order (Dkt. Nos.

1, 4). 

ANALYSIS

Federal courts are required to dismiss a case filed in forma pauperis if the court

determines at any time that the action is frivolous, fails to state a claim, or is directed against a

defendant who is immune. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Title VII provides that claimants such as

Gascon must file a charge of discrimination or retaliation with the EEOC within 180 days of the

alleged discriminatory or retaliatory act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). The 180-day limit serves as

a judicial statute of limitations as well, generally barring subsequent suit on incidents occurring

prior to the 180-day period. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). 

In her complaint, Gascon alleges Kaiser engaged in a discriminatory and retaliatory

manner toward her, ultimately forcing her to resign in May 2016. These alleged acts, however,

fall far outside the statute of limitations. After her resignation, Gascon had 180 days to file

charges with the EEOC. Instead, Gascon filed in May 2019, three years after her resignation

and approximately 915 days after she needed to file charges with the EEOC by. Thus, Gascon’s

suit will be time-barred unless her complaint alleges the statute of limitations was tolled. For the

reasons set forth below, this order holds the complaint alleges neither equitable estoppel nor

equitable tolling.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.

Although Gascon’s complaint does not expressly mention “equitable estoppel,” it

pleads facts pertaining to the principle and so this order will address it. Equitable estoppel

focuses primarily on the actions taken by the defendant in preventing a plaintiff from filing suit. 

See Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 1981). A finding of equitable

estoppel rests on the consideration of a non-exhaustive list of factors, including (1) the plaintiff’s

actual and reasonable reliance on the defendant’s conduct or representations, and (2) evidence of

improper purpose on the part of the defendant, or of the defendant’s actual or constructive

knowledge of the deceptive nature of its conduct. Ibid. Our court of appeals has recognized

that “equitable estoppel ‘comes into play if the defendant takes active steps to prevent the

plaintiff from suing in time, as by promising not to plead the statutes of limitations’” or “when

the employer misrepresents or conceals facts necessary to support a discrimination charge.” 

Santa Maria v. Pacific Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Cada v. Baxter

Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450–51 (7th Cir. 1990)). 

In the instant action, Gascon states that she only agreed to resign after Tran, a Kaiser

HR consultant, entered into a verbal agreement with Gascon stating she would have a clean,

favorable record, she could use Kaiser as a referral, and she could come back anytime. 

Gascon relied on this agreement and applied to other Kaiser branches, but was thereafter

informed that she was ineligible for rehire. She has also been unable to use Kaiser as a referral. 

The complaint implies Tran’s misrepresentations delayed Gascon from filing a charge with the

EEOC.

These alleged misrepresentations, however, are not enough. To start, the possibility of

being rehired and the ability to use Kaiser as a referral may have operated as incentives not to

file charges against Kaiser, but those possibilities did not mask the underlying discrimination

claim Gascon now seeks to bring. Moreover, if a misrepresentation is to equitably estop Kaiser

from asserting the statute of limitations, Gascon’s reliance on it must have been reasonable. 

Naton, 649 F.2d at 696. Once Gascon discovered she could not use Kaiser as a referral and

would not be rehired by Kaiser, however, any continued reliance on those representations

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became unreasonable. Gascon does not give an exact date for that discovery, but she discusses

at length the number of Kaiser branches and other medical groups she applied to after her

resignation, all of whom rejected her based on her ineligibility for rehire or lack of referral. 

She emphasizes that she called and emailed Tran within the first year to resolve these issues,

and further notes that if she had not been deemed ineligible for rehire, she “would have gotten a

job easily, as within same month of [her] termination.” Thus, the complaint indicates Gascon

discovered the falsehood of these alleged representations within a year of her resignation. 

Even if the statute of limitations tolled until a year after her resignation, however, Gascon still

waited two years to file her charges with the EEOC — approximately 550 days after the deadline

to file. It was unreasonable to continue to rely on those representations for those two years, and

that unreasonable reliance cannot be said to have equitably estopped the statute of limitations. 

2. EQUITABLE TOLLING.

 Equitable tolling may be applied if, despite all due diligence, a plaintiff is unable to

obtain vital information bearing on the existence of her claim. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht,

327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946). If a reasonable plaintiff would not have known of the existence of

a possible claim within the limitations period, then equitable tolling will serve to extend the

statute of limitations for filing suit until the plaintiff can gather what information she needs. 

Santa Maria, 202 F.3d at 1178.

Gascon believes Kaiser discriminated against her based on her race and disability

and retaliated against for engaging in protected activity. Viewing the facts in the light most

favorable to Gascon, however, they show that she knew or should have known of the possible

existence of these claims as early as the day she was fired. Gascon states in her complaint: 

“during around the time of termination, the management [knew], that I had health issues . . . I

believe that the management retaliated against me because, I started questioning my previous

fact finding meetings, asking for a written statement for each fact finding meetings . . .”

(emphasis added). She further mentions that at some point Kaiser “placed [her] under

‘observation’ for mental disorders.” Based on Gascon’s own complaint, then, Gascon knew or

reasonably should have known of the possible existence of a discrimination or retaliation claim

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within the limitations period. She did not need to spend three years confirming Kaiser would

not rehire her before bringing this suit. 

To summarize, neither equitable estoppel nor equitable tolling saves this complaint

from falling far outside the statute of limitations. Because the complaint fails under 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(e), it must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 20, 2019. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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