Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-92-01397/USCOURTS-caDC-92-01397-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Train Dispatchers Association
Petitioner
CSX Transportation, Inc.
Intervenor
Interstate Commerce Commission
Respondent
National Railway Labor Conference
Amicus Curiae
Railway Labor Executives' Association
Movant
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 6, 1993 Decided June 28, 1994

No. 92-1397

AMERICAN TRAIN DISPATCHERS ASSOCIATION,

PETITIONER

v.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION AND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

RESPONDENTS

CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.,

INTERVENOR

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Interstate Commerce Commission

Michael S. Wolly argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner. Erick J. Genser and Thomas

A. Woodley entered appearances for petitioner.

John J. McCarthy, Jr., Associate General Counsel, Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"),

argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Robert S. Burk, General Counsel, and

Henri F. Rush, Deputy General Counsel, ICC. Robert J. Wiggers, Attorney, U.S. Department of

Justice, entered an appearance for respondents.

William G. Mahoney argued the cause for movant-intervenorRailwayLabor Executives'Ass'n. With

him on the briefs was John O'B. Clarke, Jr.

James S. Whitehead argued the cause for intervenor CSX Transportation, Inc. and amicus curiae

National Railway Labor Conference. With him on the brief were Richard T. Conway, Ralph J.

Moore, Jr., and James D. Tomola.

Before WALD, BUCKLEY, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BUCKLEY.

BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge: The American Train Dispatchers Association ("Union"), a union

of railroad employees, petitions for review of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission

exempting CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSXT") from provisions of the collective bargaining

agreement ("CBA") between the Union and CSXT. Under its authority to oversee railway

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consolidations, the ICC granted the exemption as a follow-up to its 1980 approval of CSXT's

acquisition of several railroads. The exemption allows CSXT to transfer train dispatching work

performed by four employees at its Corbin, Kentucky, property to itsfacility in Jacksonville, Florida,

where non-union management employees will absorb the work. The Union claims that the four union

employees were entitled to follow their jobs to Jacksonville and that the work transfer was

unnecessary and beyond the scope of the 1980 approval of CSXT's acquisitions.

We affirmthe ICC's decision but rely on different grounds. The ICC failed to inquire whether

the work transfer deprivesthe four employees of any "rights," "privileges," or "benefits" in the CBA,

an inquiry required by our recent decision in Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. United States, 987

F.2d 806 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Executives"). Because the Union has conceded that no rights, privileges,

or benefits were infringed, however, we see no reason to remand. In addition, we agree with the

Commission's determination that the work transfer stemmed from the 1980 approval of CSXT's

acquisitions and was necessary to effectuate them.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Scheme

The railroad industry emerged from World War I in a precarious condition. Norfolk &

Western Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers, 111 S. Ct. 1156, 1158 (1991). As a consequence, in

1920 Congress passed legislation to encourage railway consolidations that would enhance economy

and efficiency in the industry. Id. at 1158-59. In its current form, this policy appears in Chapter 113

of the Interstate Commerce Act ("ICA"), which authorizes the ICC to examine, condition, and

approve railway mergers and consolidations. 49 U.S.C. § 11301 et seq.

ICC approval of a consolidation frees railroad companies from various legal constraints. In

particular, section 11341(a) of the ICA provides, in pertinent part:

A carrier, corporation, or person participating in that approved or exempted

transaction is exempt from the antitrust laws and from all other law, including State

and municipal law, as necessary to let that person carry out the transaction, hold,

maintain, and operate property, and exercise control or [sic] franchises acquired

through the transaction.

49 U.S.C. § 11341(a) (emphasis added). In Norfolk & Western, the Court held that "the term "all

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other law' in § 11341(a) includes any obstacle imposed by law," including "the substantive and

remedial lawsrespecting enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements." 111 S. Ct. at 1166. The

Court declined to decide, however, the issue whether "the scope of the immunity provision [i.e.,

section 11341(a)] is limited by § 11347, which conditions approval of a trans-action on satisfaction

of certain labor-protective conditions." Id. It is this issue that confronts us here.

Section 11347 is intended to insulate railroad workers from the jolts of the corporate

restructuring sanctioned by the ICC. It provides:

When a rail carrier is involved in a transaction for which approval is sought ... the

[ICC] shall require the carrier to provide a fair arrangement at least as protective of

the interest of employees who are affected by the transaction as the terms imposed

under this section before February 5, 1976, and the terms established under section

405 of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. [§] 565).

49 U.S.C. § 11347. This provision incorporates by reference two sets of standards. The first is "the

terms imposed under this section before February 5, 1976." Before that date, the Washington Jobs

Protection Agreement of 1936 ("WJPA") governed labor-management negotiations over workers'

rightsin railway consolidations. CSX Corp.ControlChessie Sys., Inc. and Seaboard Coast Line

Indus., Inc., 6 I.C.C.2d 715, 732-33 (1990). In Executives, where section 11341(a) did not apply,

we adopted the ICC's view that the history of negotiations under the WJPA shows "that arbitrators

were authorized ... to make certain changesto CBAs." 987 F.2d at 813. Thus, we found that "it was

reasonable for theCommission to interpret the reference in § 11347 to the pre-1976 terms as carrying

forward into the present version of § 11347 its authority to change CBAs." Id.

We went on to note, however, that the second set of standards incorporated by reference in

section 11347, section 405 of the Rail Passenger Service Act, limits the power to override CBAs.

Id. at 813-14. Section 405 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) A railroad shall provide fair and equitable arrangementsto protect the interests of

employees....

(b) Such protective arrangementsshall include ...such provisions as maybe necessary

for ... the preservation ofrights, privileges, and benefits ... to such employees under

existing collective-bargaining agreements....

45 U.S.C. §§ 565(a), (b) (emphasis added). Construing this language, we commented:

The statute clearlymandatesthat "rights, privileges, and benefits" afforded employees

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under existing CBAs be preserved. Unless, however, every word of every CBA were

thought to establish a right, privilege, or benefit for laboran obviously absurd

proposition§ 565 (and hence § 11347) doesseem to contemplate that the ICC may

modify a CBA.

Executives, 987 F.2d at 814 (footnotes omitted).

To implement section 11347, the ICC has devised a package of arbitration procedures and

employee benefits, known as the New York Dock conditions, see New York Dock

Ry.ControlBrooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 360 I.C.C. 60, 84-90 (1979), aff'd sub nom. New York

Dock Ry. v. United States, 609 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1979), that apply to most types of railway

transactions. Among other things, the New York Dock conditions require the rail carrier to

compensate dislocated employees who cannot find other work or whose replacement jobs pay lower

wages. 360 I.C.C. at 86-89.

In addition, section 4 of the conditions provides, in pertinent part:

Each transaction which may result in a dismissal or displacement of employees or

rearrangement of forces, shall provide for the selection of forces from all employees

involved on a basis accepted as appropriate for application in the particular case and

any assignment of employees made necessary by the transaction shall be made on the

basis of an agreement or decision under thissection 4. If at the end of thirty (30) days

there is a failure to agree, either party to the dispute may submit it [to arbitration].

360 I.C.C. at 85.

B. Factual and Procedural History

In 1980, the ICC approved the first of a series ofmergers and acquisitionsthat enabled CSXT

to expand its rail capacity. See CSX Corp.ControlChessie Sys., Inc. and Seaboard Coast Line

Indus., Inc., 363 I.C.C. 521 (1980), aff'd sub nom. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees v. ICC,

698 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1983). Among others, CSXT acquired the Louisville & Nashville Railroad,

including its property in Corbin, Kentucky. Twenty-two train dispatchers worked at the Corbin

facility, all members of the Union. CSXT was bound by the CBA between the Union and the

Louisville & Nashville Railroad.

In 1987, CSXT proposed to centralize all train dispatching activitiesfor locomotives, known

as "power distribution," at its property in Jacksonville, Florida. On January 9, 1988, CSXT and the

Union agreed on the details for shifting dispatching operations from Corbin to Jacksonville. In

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accordance with New York Dock, the agreement provided for compensation and other benefits for

the affected Corbin employees.

The agreement, however, did not cover four employees who held the rank of "Assistant

Chief/Power." The CBA's "scope" provision defined the duties of these four employees to include

the movement of trains on a Division or other assigned territory, involving the

supervision of train dispatchers and other similar employees; to supervise the

handling of trains and the distribution of power and equipment incident thereto; and

to perform related work.

Petitioner's Appendix at 13. In the railroad industry, "scope provisions ... commonly are regarded

as defining jurisdiction and job "ownership'which prohibit the transfer of work fromemployees under

one agreement to employeeseven in the same craftunder another rules agreement." Southern

Ry. Sys. and Am. Ry. Supervisors Ass'n, WJPA Docket No. 141 (1966), quoted in CSX

Corp.ControlChessie Sys., Inc., and Seaboard Coast Line Indus., Inc., 6 I.C.C.2d at 734.

On February 12, 1988, CSXT notified the Union that it would abolish the four Assistant

Chief/Power positions and that non-union, management personnel in Jacksonville would assume the

dispatching work. The Union objected and claimed that the CBA entitled the four employees to

follow their jobsto Jacksonville. Pursuant to section 4 of NewYork Dock, the partiessubmitted their

dispute to arbitration.

The arbitrator approved CSXT's transfer of the dispatching work of the four Assistant

Chiefs/Power to Jacksonville and ruled that the four employees were limited to the same New York

Dock benefits that the other Corbin dispatchers had received. On September 15, 1989, the ICC

affirmed. CSX Corp.ControlChessie Sys., Inc. and Seaboard Coast Line Indus., Inc., Finance

Docket No. 28905 (Sub-No. 23).

The ICC rejected the Union's argument that the arbitrator lacked the power to modify the

CBA between the Union and CSXT in order to permit the work transfer. Id. at 4. Relying implicitly

on its authority to fashion labor-protective conditions undersection 11347, the ICC asserted that the

history of arbitration under New York Dock and its precursor, the WJPA, showed that arbitrators

could override CBA provisions to the extent necessary to allow the rail company to carry out an

approved transaction. Id. at 5-6.

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The Union petitioned for review in this court; but before briefing, the Supreme Court handed

down the Norfolk & Western decision, which ruled that section 11341(a) empowers the ICC to

override CBA provisions. Because the Norfolk & Western Court reserved several questions,

includingwhethersection11347 limited the ICC's override authority, we remanded the petition, along

with three other cases, to let the ICC addressthe issuesremaining after the SupremeCourt's decision.

The three other cases, in which public comments have been solicited, are still before the ICC.

See CSX Corp.ControlChessie Sys., Inc. and Seaboard Coast Line Indus., Inc., 1992 I.C.C.

LEXIS 233 (Nov. 3, 1992). In the instant case, however, the ICC did not invite comments from the

public or further submissions from the parties; and on August 13, 1992, the Commission reaffirmed

its 1989 decision approving CSXT's transfer of the dispatching work to Jacksonville. CSX

Corp.ControlChessie Sys., Inc., and Seaboard Coast Line Indus., Inc., 8 I.C.C.2d 715 (1992).

Instead of invoking section 11347 and the history of New York Dock arbitration, however, the 1992

ruling rests solely on the ICC's authority to modify CBAs under section 11341(a). Id. at 718. For

example, the decision notes:

While the arbitrator ruled against the union, he did not specify whether he was doing

so because: (1) there was no impediment preventing the transfer of work or (2) there

was an existing impediment (due to an existing contract or the [Railway Labor Act]

or both) but that it was necessary to override the obstacle(s).... We will assume that

either the existing contract or the RLA or both, would have barred the transfer unless

some other provision of law overrode the barrier(s).

In light of [Norfolk & Western], there is no longer any dispute that under §

11341(a) the Commission may exempt approved transactionsfromcertain laws,such

as the RLA and collective bargaining agreements ... that would prevent the

transactions from being carried out.

Id. at 720.

II. DISCUSSION

We must first dispose of a motion to intervene in support ofthe petition to review filed by the

Railway Labor Executives' Association ("RLEA"), a voluntary, unincorporated association of the

chief executive officers of the major rail labor unions. CSXT urges us to deny the motion because

RLEA did not participate in the proceeding before the ICC. The statute that governs our review of

ICC orders provides, in pertinent part:

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The agency, and any party in interest in the proceeding before the agency whose

interests will be affected if an order of the agency is or is not enjoined, set aside, or

suspended, may appear as parties thereto of their own motion and as of right....

Communities, associations, corporations, firms, and individuals, whose interests are

affected by the order of the agency, may intervene in any proceeding to review the

order.

28 U.S.C. § 2348 (1988). This provision, which was enacted in 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat.

623 (1966), is virtually identical to its predecessor in the Judicial Review Act of 1950.

We construed the predecessor provision in Montship Lines, Ltd. v. Fed. Maritime Bd., 295

F.2d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1961), where we held that " "parties in interest in the proceeding before the

agency' " could intervene as a matter of right and that, in addition, we had discretion to permit

intervention by "parties "whose interests are affected by the agency's order.' " Id. at 152 (quoting 5

U.S.C. § 1038 (repealed)). Thus, even assuming that RLEA is not entitled to intervene as of right

here, we may allow it to intervene as a discretionary matter. We choose to do so in this case because

of RLEA's undisputed assertion that our decision will have strong precedential impact on three cases

pending before the Commission in which it has submitted comments. If RLEA is not permitted to

intervene here, its ability to protect its interests in the underlying proceeding may be impaired. Cf.

Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (noting that under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 24(a),

"stare decisis principles may in some cases supply the practical disadvantage that warrants

intervention as of right" and permitting state banking commissioner to intervene in case of first

impression, because "the first judicial treatment of this question[ ] would receive great weight"); see

also Auto Workers v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 217 n.10 (1965) ("The Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, of course, apply only in the federal district courts. Still, the policies underlying

intervention may be applicable in appellate courts.").

CSXT also contendsthat RLEA lacks Article III standing to intervene. We need not address

this argument because RLEA raises the same issues as the Union, which plainly has standing to

champion the interests of the four Corbin employees, who are all Union members. See Hunt v.

Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1977). "[I]f one party has standing

in an action, a court need not reach the issue of the standing of other parties when it makes no

difference to the merits of the case." Executives, 987 F.2d at 810 (likewise pretermitting issue of

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RLEA's standing where all but one of its arguments matched those of petitioner who had standing);

see also Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. ICC, 999 F.2d 574, 577 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (same).

Accordingly, we grant RLEA's motion to intervene without deciding whether it has Article III

standing.

Turning to the merits, we confront the issue reserved by the Supreme Court in Norfolk &

Western: What restraints, if any, does section 11347 impose on the ICC's authority under section

11341(a) to override CBA provisions? In Executives, we held that section 11347 shieldsthose CBA

provisions that create "rights, privileges, and benefits" from the ICC's override power. Although

section 11341(a) did not apply to the transaction before us in that casea lease of rail lines and

trackage rights, 987 F.2d at 813, we did not restrict our interpretation of section 11347 to that

particular type of transaction. Indeed, section 11347 does not admit of any such limitation; it applies

to leases, consolidations, mergers, acquisitions, and various other types of railway transactions,

including the work transfer in this case. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 11347, 11344, 11345, 11346; see also

987 F.2d at 813. Thus, our holding in Executives applies with full force where, as here, sections

11341(a) and 11347 overlap.

In Executives, we remanded to let the ICC define the "rights, privileges, and benefits"

language of section 405 of the Rail Passenger Service Act and determine if the CBA provisions

involved in that caserates of pay, rules, and working conditionscame under the protection ofthat

statutory rubric. 987 F.2d at 814. The ICC has not yet rendered a ruling in the remanded

proceeding. In the instant case, the ICC's 1992 decision issued seven months before Executives and

does not address whether the transfer of dispatching work treads upon any rights, privileges, or

benefitsin theCBA. Indeed, the decision relies exclusively on section 11341(a) for override authority

and declines even to consider whether there are any specific CBA impediments to the work transfer.

8 I.C.C.2d at 720. Nor can the ICC fall back on its discussion of section 11347 in the 1989 decision

because that decision concludes that arbitrators may annul any CBA provision that blocks a rail

consolidation, a view that conflicts with the Executives holding that certain contractual provisions

are immutable. 987 F.2d at 814.

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Unlike the Executives court, however, we need not remand because it is clear that the work

transfer infringes no "rights, privileges, [or] benefits" in the CBA. A remand is unnecessary where,

as here, the outcome of a new administrative proceeding is preordained. See NLRB v. WymanGordon, 394 U.S. 759, 766-67 n.6 (1969) ("[i]t would be meaningless to remand" where "[t]here is

not the slightest uncertainty as to the outcome of a[n] [agency] proceeding"); D.C. Fed'n of Civic

Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1247 n.84 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("we agree that a remand would be

academic if the agency would inevitably arrive at the same result").

At oral argument, the Union's counsel conceded that New York Dock empowers arbitrators

to override scope provisions in CBAs; by implication, he admitted that the scope clause assigning

power distributionwork at Corbin to the Assistant Chiefs/Power did not create any"rights, privileges

[or] benefits." He insisted, however, that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by stripping the

employees of a contractual "right" to bid on the work in Jacksonville.

But in a brief filed after oral argument, CSXT denied that the four employees had a right

under the CBA to bid on vacant positions in Jacksonville and asserted that the only CBA provision

overridden by the arbitrator was the scope clause. Although the Union filed a brief responding to

CSXT's post-argument submission, it does not challenge these statements. Instead, the Union argues

that section 4 of the New York Dock conditions entitles the four employees to follow their work to

Jacksonville. Section 4 requires that "[e]ach transaction which may result in a dismissal or

displacement of employees ... provide for the selection of forces from all employees involved on a

basis accepted as appropriate for application in the particular case...." 360 I.C.C. at 85. The Union

chargesthat the arbitrator violated this provisionbyfailing to select employeesfromboth Jacksonville

and Corbin to perform the transferred work.

We disagree. Section 4 does not provide a formula for apportioning the "selection of forces."

Instead, it frees the hand of the arbitrator to fashion a solution that is "appropriate for application in

the particular case." In this case, existing management employees will absorb the transferred work;

CSXT does not need additionalworkers. We thus cannot say that the arbitrator abused his discretion

by selecting forces solely from Jacksonville. See Chicago & North Western Transp.

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Co.Abandonment, 3 I.C.C.2d 729, 736 (1987) (ICC accords substantial deference to arbitrators'

decisions on issues of causation, calculation of benefits, and factual questions), aff'd sub. nom. Int'l

Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. ICC, 862 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1988). As the work transfer impinges on no

"rights, privileges, [or] benefits" in the CBA, it satisfies section 11347.

We turn next to the ICC's application of section 11341(a). Section 11341(a) exempts

"approved ... transaction[s] ... fromthe antitrust laws and fromall other law ... as necessary to let [the

railway] carry out the transaction." 49 U.S.C. § 11341(a). In Norfolk &Western, the SupremeCourt

reserved the questions whether the action challenged in that casethe carrier's proposed

consolidation of locomotive dispatching functions in the wake of an acquisition approved by the

ICCwas "necessary" to implement the acquisition and whether it was part ofthe original "approved

transaction." 111 S. Ct. at 1162-63, 1166.

Continuing where Norfolk & Western left off, the ICC in its 1992 decision focused on the

"necessity" and "approved transaction" predicates ofsection11341(a). It decided that "the "necessity'

predicate is satisfied by a finding that some "law' (whether antitrust, [the Railway Labor Act], or a

collective bargaining agreement formed pursuant to the [Railway Labor Act] ) is an impediment to

the approved transaction." CSX Corp.ControlChessie Sys., Inc., and Seaboard Coast Line

Indus., Inc., 8 I.C.C.2d at 721. Thus, it ruled, CSXT was "exempted from any provisions of the

collective bargaining agreements ... that might bar the immediate consummation of the transfer of

dispatching functions." Id. at 723. Addressing the "approved transaction" language, it concluded that

"[t]he approval of a principal transaction extends to and encompasses subsequent transactions that

are directly related to and fulfill the purposes of the principal transaction," id. at 722, and thus that

the transfer of power distribution work flowed from the 1980 approval of CSXT's acquisitions. Id.

at 720.

In its opening salvo against these findings, the Union contends that the ICC lacksjurisdiction

to determine whether a transaction is "necessary" or whether it is incident to the original "approved

transaction." The Union's only real ammunition, however, is a single sentence in a footnote in Justice

Stevens' concurrence in Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270

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(1987): "The idea of having parties repeatedly return to the ICC for decisions on the necessity of an

exemption is without basis in the statutory scheme, and would clearly not mitigate the delay and

confusion surrounding consolidations." Id. at 300 n.14.

Thissentence issomewhat ambiguous because Justice Stevens also notesthat "[a]ny tribunal

that is faced with a claim that a party is violating some "other law' has the responsibility of

determining whether an exemption is "necessary ...,' " id. at 300 n.13, and because his main point is

that the ICC is not required to make a "necessity" finding when it approves the original transaction.

Id. at 295-98.

In any event, we made clear in Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. ICC, 883 F.2d 1079 (D.C.

Cir. 1989), modified on other grounds and reh'g denied, 929 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1991), that "the

ICC may consider a question of exemption, and make the "necessity' determination [under section

11341(a)], when the issue is properly before it." Id. at 1082. We can discern no reason why the ICC

should not have equal authority to make the "approved transaction" determination. A recent Ninth

Circuit decision supports our view that the ICC has jurisdiction to make such findings. See Railway

Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 7 F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 1993) (ICC has

exclusive authority to clarify scope of merger approvals and determine necessity under section

11341(a)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1298 (1994).

The Union next attacksthe ICC's necessity finding on the merits, arguing that the four Corbin

employees were capable of performing the work in Jacksonville and that there was thus no need to

give it to non-union employees. This argument misapprehends the standard for necessity. In

Executives, we held that to satisfy the "necessity" predicate for overriding a CBA, the ICC must find

that the underlying transaction yields a transportation benefit to the public, "not merely [a] transfer

[of] wealth from employees to their employer." 987 F.2d at 815. In other words, the benefit cannot

arise from the CBA modification itself; considered independently of the CBA, the transaction must

yield enhanced efficiency, greater safety, or some other gain.

Technically, Executives articulated the necessity standard for section 11347 rather than

section 11341(a), which did not applyin that case. Both provisions apply here, however, and because

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section 11347 "on itsface provides more, not less, generouslabor protection than does § 11341(a),"

987 F.2d at 814, we need not decide if a different standard would suit a case where section 11341(a)

applied but section 11347 did not.

In light of Executives, the ICC's assertion in its 1992 decision that "the "necessity' predicate

is satisfied" whenever a CBA is "an impediment" to a transaction clearly misstates the necessity

standard. Nonetheless, the record reveals transportation benefits from CSXT's proposed work

consolidation sufficient to pass the Executives test; thus a remand is unnecessary. See WymanGordon, 394 U.S. at 766-67 n.6. As the ICC's decision notes, the arbitrator found that centralizing

power distribution functions at a single location would facilitate power allocation decisions for

CSXT'sfar-flung rail network. The arbitrator also found that CSXT had employed non-union power

distribution dispatchersin Jacksonville "for a long time," which belied any suggestion that CSXT was

seeking the transfer to usurp union work; indeed, he dismissed the specter that CSXT was engaging

in "union busting." Thus, the work transfer was "necessary," for it yielded transportation efficiencies

and was not aimed solely at abrogating a CBA provision.

Finally, the Union assailsthe ICC'sruling that the work transfer wasincident to the "approved

transaction"CSXT's 1980 acquisitionsunder section 11341(a). The Union contends that the

ICC's definition of "approved transaction" is overbroad and that the Commission never envisioned

a transfer ofwork fromunion to non-union employees when it approvedCSXT's acquisitionsin 1980.

We find reasonable the ICC's view that the section 11341(a) exemption for "approved ...

transaction[s]" extends to subsidiary transactions that fulfill the purposes of the main control

transaction. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-45

(1984) (court may not substitute its own construction of ambiguous statutory provision for

reasonable interpretation by agency where agency is entrusted to administer statute). The NewYork

Dock conditions define "transaction" as "any action taken pursuant to authorizations of this

Commission on which these provisions have been imposed." 360 I.C.C. at 84 (Art. I, § 1(a)). The

ICC adopted this definition at the urging of labor unions, who insisted that labor protections must

extend not only to workers displaced by the main control transaction but also to those displaced by

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later, related restructurings. Id. at 65. Heeding this plea, the ICC noted: "[T]he broad definition [of

"transaction'] is necessary in the types oftransactionsfor which approval isrequired under 49 U.S.C.

[§] 11343 et seq., because the event actually affecting the employees might occur at a later date than

the initial transaction, yet still pursuant to our approval...." Id. at 70. The ICC's elastic construction

of "approved transaction" in this case mirrors this settled understanding.

Moreover, the ICC's 1980 approval of CSXT's acquisitions contemplated the possibility of

future worker dislocations: "It is certainly possible that as the two systems mesh their operations,

additional coordinations may occur that could lead to further employee displacements." CSX

Corp.ControlChessie Sys., Inc., and Seaboard Coast Line Indus., Inc., 363 I.C.C. at 589.

Despite these potential disruptions, the ICC approved the deal, noting that "[w]e believe that [the

NewYork Dock conditions] will adequately protect those employees now identified as affected by the

consolidation as well as those who may be affected in the future, but are not now identified

specifically." Id.

We have no reason to believe that the work transfer in this case is anything but one of the

"additional coordinations" the ICC had in mind. Indeed, as the ICC's 1992 decision notes,

"coordination of locomotive power is precisely the type of action that might reasonably be expected

to flow fromthe [1980] controltransaction,"CSXCorp.ControlChessie Sys.,Inc., and Seaboard

Coast Line Indus., Inc., 8 I.C.C.2d at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted), because the very point

of many mergersisto capture efficienciesfrom centralization of function. Finally, consistent with its

1980 approval, the ICC granted New York Dock benefits to the four Assistant Chiefs/Power in both

its 1989 and 1992 decisions.

III. CONCLUSION

Although Executives hassuperseded some of the language in the ICC's decision, we deny the

petition for review because the ICC clearly had the authority to approve the work transfer and

because the transfer was necessary and incident to CSXT's 1980 acquisitions.

So ordered.

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