Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03055/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03055-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Deborah J. Ferguson
Appellee
Southwestern Life Insurance Company
Appellant
Summit National Life Insurance Company
Not Party

Document Text:

" 

FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

OCT 16 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

DEBORAH J. FERGUSON, } 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

SOUTHWESTERN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, } 

) 

Defendant-Appellant, ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

SUMMIT NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 

) 

Defendant. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 89-3055 

(D.C. No. 87-2432-0) 

(D. Kansas) 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN,** 

District Judge. 

Dr. Robert Ferguson died as a result of self-inflicted 

gunshot wounds. Under the terms of his life insurance policies, 

issued by Southwestern Life Insurance Company (Southwestern) and 

Summit National Life Insurance Company (Summit), his beneficiary, 

plaintiff Deborah J. Ferguson, was precluded from recovering the 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** The Honorable A. Sherman Christensen, 

States District Court for the District 

designation. 

Senior Judge, United 

of Utah, sitting by 

Appellate Case: 89-3055 Document: 010110059646 Date Filed: 10/16/1990 Page: 1 
full value of the policies if the death resulted from "suicide, 

whether sane or insane." Following Dr. Ferguson's death, 

plaintiff filed claims with Southwestern and Summit for payment on 

the policies. Relying on the "suicide, sane or insane" exclusions, Southwestern and Summit denied liability. 

Plaintiff then brought this action against Southwestern and 

Summit for the full face value of the policies. The case 

proceeded to trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of 

plaintiff finding that the suicide exclusions were not triggered 

because Dr. Ferguson did not appreciate the physical consequences 

of his act of self-destruction. Southwestern and Summit then 

filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict which was 

denied. Only Southwestern has appealed. 

On appeal Southwestern contends that the district court (1) 

erred in denying its motions for a directed verdict and judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict, (2) deviated from the applicable law 

in instructing the jury, and (3) improperly admitted lay opinion 

testimony. Based on our review of the record on appeal, the parties' appellate briefs, and the relevant case law, we reject 

Southwestern's first and third arguments, but we find 

Southwestern's challenge to the jury instructions persuasive. 

At the close of the trial, the district court, relying on 

Kansas law, instructed the jury as follows: 

In order for defendants to prevail in this lawsuit, 

they must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 

Dr. Ferguson committed "suicide" within the meaning of 

the life insurance policies' exclusions. Defendants 

have the burden of proving that Dr. Ferguson appreciated 

the physical consequences of his acts when he took his 

own life. 

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Appellate Case: 89-3055 Document: 010110059646 Date Filed: 10/16/1990 Page: 2 
; 

You are instructed that, whether Dr. Ferguson committed "suicide" so as to exclude coverage under the 

defendants' life insurance policies depends upon whether 

he appreciated the physical consequences of the act 

which caused his death at the time he took his life. If 

he did, then he committed "suicide," and the exclusions 

are enforceable, and plaintiff cannot recover the 

proceeds of the policies. If he did not, then he did 

not commit "suicide" and plaintiff would be entitled to 

recover the proceeds of the policies. 

R. Vol. One, Tab 132 at 10. Southwestern has argued that this 

instruction is erroneous because it did not explain that the 

suicide exclusion was still enforceable under Kansas law even if 

Dr. Ferguson was deranged at the time he shot himself. See Brief 

of Appellant at 35. In Southwestern's view, the instruction 

allowed the jury to equate insanity with an inability to 

appreciate the physical consequences of an act. Id. at 42. 

In reviewing Southwestern's challenge to the jury instruction, we consider the instructions as a whole to determine whether 

they "'state the law which governs and provided the jury with an 

ample understanding of the issues and the standards applicable.'" 

Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 862 F.2d 242, 246 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting 

Ramsey v. Culpepper, 738 F.2d 1092, 1098 (10th Cir. 1984)). "'The 

appellate standard of review to be applied by the court is clear: 

an error in jury instructions will mandate reversal of a judgment 

only if the error is determined to have been prejudicial, based on 

a review of the record as a whole.'" Big Horn Coal Co. v. 

Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1259, 1271 n.19 (10th Cir. 1988) 

(quoting Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 895 (10th Cir. 

1984)). 

Applying these principles, we agree with Southwestern's arguments. It is clear under Kansas law that a mental derangement 

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Appellate Case: 89-3055 Document: 010110059646 Date Filed: 10/16/1990 Page: 3 
does not preclude application of a suicide exclusion if the 

decedent is still shown to have performed the self-destructive act 

with an understanding of its physical nature and consequences. 

Muzenich v. Grand Carniolian Slovenian Catholic Union, 119 P.2d 

504, 507-08 (Kan. 1941). Thus, under Kansas law, in cases such as 

this where accident is out of the question, a jury must determine 

difficult issues regarding a decedent's state of mind, and must 

make critical distinctions regarding the degree of a decedent's 

mental derangement. Indeed, in order to find "suicide" under 

Kansas law, the jury must be satisfied that the decedent had a 

particular state of mind akin to the criminal law concept of 

intent. Conversely, in order to find no suicide and thus avoid 

the suicide exclusion, the jury must find that the decedent was so 

deranged as to have been unable to form an intent to commit a 

self-destructive act. See Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 696 

P.2d 1308, 1325 (Cal. 1985) (Mosk, J., dissenting); Nielsen v. 

Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 596 P.2d 95, 98 (Idaho 

1979). 1 Thus, it is not enough, for instance, to find that the 

decedent was psychotic and totally out of touch with reality 

because he shot himself under the delusion that God appeared to 

him and commanded him to do it. In such a circumstance the self1 We thus respectfully disagree with the district court in this 

case, which stated that in its view the question of sanity or 

insanity was a "red herring." R. Vol. Five at 580. Much of 

plaintiff's case was devoted to establishing that Dr. Ferguson was 

so extremely deranged when he took his own life that he could not 

have appreciated what he was doing. What the jury needed to 

understand, however, is that Dr. Ferguson could have been 

"insane," yet still appreciated the consequences of his act of 

self-destruction and therefore committed suicide under Kansas law. 

"Insanity," in the sense that a jury might understand the term, 

and "suicide" under Kansas law are not mutually exclusive. 

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Appellate Case: 89-3055 Document: 010110059646 Date Filed: 10/16/1990 Page: 4 
destruction was still intended, albeit by a deranged mind. In a 

case not involving the potential for a purely accidental death, 

the degree of derangement necessary to avoid a suicide clause must 

be so great as to amount to having blacked out entirely, or 

consist of a delusion so severe that the decedent thought he was 

doing something different from what he was in fact doing, e.g., 

shooting at a target or a deer rather than himself. 

In this case, there was evidence presented indicating that 

Dr. Ferguson may have been deranged at the time he shot himself, 

but none of the jury instructions explain the distinctions the 

jury was required to make between the varying degrees or aspects 

of any mental disorder Dr. Ferguson may have had. The district 

court rejected Southwestern's supplemental instruction to the 

effect that a suicide exclusion provision in a policy "is enforceable even if the insured is so insane at the time he takes his 

life that he does not understand the moral character of his acts." 

R. Vol. One at Tab 121 (citing Hart v. Modern Woodmen, 57 P. 936 

(Kan. 1899)). 2 In our view, the potential for confusion of the 

jury was considerable. Indeed, the fact that the jury asked the 

district court for additional instruction on the meaning of the 

terms "appreciate" and "physical consequences" in the challenged 

instruction indicates that it was confused on how it was required 

to assess Dr. Ferguson's state of mind. See R. Vol. One at Tab 

133. While we do not hold that the Southwestern's proposed sup2 Even plaintiff's proposed instructions included a reference 

to insanity: "Under Kansas law, it is essential to constitute 

suicide, even of an insane person, that he must be conscious of 

his act and have in mind an idea of self-destruction." R. Vol. 

One at Tab 117. 

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Appellate Case: 89-3055 Document: 010110059646 Date Filed: 10/16/1990 Page: 5 
plemental instruction was the only means by which to avoid such 

confusion, we do conclude that the instructions given were 

inadequate and incomplete. 3 

Accordingly, the judgment against Southwestern is REVERSED, 

and the case is REMANDED for a new trial. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

3 For example, the Kansas Supreme Court in Muzenich approved an 

instruction which included the language of plaintiff's proposed 

instruction and went even further in explicating the relationship 

between insanity and the state of mind necessary to support a 

finding of suicide. See Muzenich, 119 P.2d at 507. 

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