Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-02998/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-02998-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne Barnhart
Defendant
Timmy Dunlap
Plaintiff

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Timmy Dunlap, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Jo Anne Barnhart, Commissioner of the

Social Security 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 05-2998-PCT-MHM

ORDER

Plaintiff Timmy Dunlap ("Plaintiff" or "Mr. Dunlap ") seeks judicial review of the

Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") decision denying his claim for disability insurance

benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

I. Procedural History

On August 15, 2003 Plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income

benefits asserting an onset date of May 31, 2002. (Transcript ("Tr.") 53-57). The Plaintiff

later amended his onset date to October 8, 2003, at which time he was 50 years old. (Tr.89).

Plaintiff's application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr.27-38). Plaintiff

requested a hearing and on August 26, 2004, the ALJ conducted a hearing. (Tr.182-207).

Attending the hearing were Plaintiff, his counsel and a vocational expert. (Id.). On July 19,

2005, the ALJ rendered his decision finding Plaintiff not "disabled." (Tr.11-21). Plaintiff's

request for review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council was denied. (Tr.5-7).

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this Court on September 27, 2005. (Dkt.#1). 

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Hypertriglyceridemia involves an elevated triglyceride concentration in the blood.

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II. Background Facts

A. Plaintiff's Medical History

At the time of the hearing in front of the ALJ, Plaintiff was a 51-year old man

weighing 189 lbs. and 6 foot, 1 inches tall. (Tr. 187). Plaintiff worked for twelve years in

the auto body industry (Tr. 189) but stopped working in 1998. (Tr.190). Plaintiff reportedly

stopped working because of back problems suffered during work and problems with his heart

set off by paint fumes. (Tr. 191). 

On December 1, 2003, Plaintiff was examined by Tomas B. Rios, M.D. (Dr. Rios),

a consultative examining physician for the state agency. (Tr. 105). Plaintiff's chief

complaints at the time were underlying heart problems and chronic back and leg pain. (Id.).

Dr. Rios found that Plaintiff's heart complaint was "descriptive of isolated bouts of premature

ventricular contractions" and were benign in presentation. (Tr.107). Dr. Rios also found that

the back pain reported by Plaintiff was "mechanical in nature" as there was no nerve root

irritation and no accompanying spasm on the back. (Tr. 107A). Dr. Rios diagnosed a history

of cardiac arrhythmia, mechanical back pain and hypertriglyceridemia1

 and stated that

Plaintiff "should be precluded from activities that require repetitive bending or stooping."

(Tr.107,107A). 

On February 13, 2004, at the request of the state agency, Valentine G. Birds, M.D.

("Dr. Birds"), based upon his treatment of Plaintiff, stated that he treated Plaintiff at his

office since January 5, 2004 for the following reasons: (1) Hyperlipidemia, (2) Lumbar and

Paraspinal Myofasitis, (3) Smoker, (4) Dysinsulinism with Hypoglycemic episodes, (5)

Borderline Myocardial Ischemia, (6) Recurrent artrial flutter, (7) Depression, (8)

Hypertension, (9) Anxiety, and (10) Chronic emotional dysfunction. (Tr.109). Dr. Birds

noted Plaintiff to be a patient "with a poor prognosis for improvement and is guarded for

significant recovery without intensive psychotherapy and social support." (Id.). 

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"Severe" is defined as [e]xtreme impairment of ability to function. (Tr.149). 

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On December 20, 2004, Plaintiff's physician, Michael Bauder, M.D. ("Dr. Bauder")

performed a medical assessment regarding Plaintiff's ability to do work related activities.

(Tr.147-149). Dr. Bauder concluded that Plaintiff could sit for four hours, stand for two

hours, walk for three hours and spend a total of three hours on his feet during an eight hour

work day. (Tr.147). Dr. Bauder further concluded that Plaintiff could occasionally to never

lift eleven to twenty pounds and could occasionally lift up to six to ten pounds as well as that

Plaintiff could not use both his feet for pushing or leg controls and could not squat, crawl or

climb. (Tr.147-48). Dr. Bauder also concluded that Plaintiff's activities were limited by

"severe" pain.2

 (Tr.149). 

On March 24, 2005, Plaintiff was examined by Bradley Nicol, M.D. ("Dr. Nicol") for

lower back and leg pains. (Tr.151). Dr. Nicol noted that Plaintiff's MRI revealed only "mild

degenerative changes of the lumbar spine with no acute disc herniation and no fracture or

kyphosis." (Tr.152). Dr. Nicol concluded that Plaintiff did not need surgical intervention and

would not benefit from steroid injections. (Id.). Dr. Nicol noted that Plaintiff had tried

physical therapy in the past and that Plaintiff did not want to pursue that route as well as

recommended that Plaintiff "wean himself off the narcotic medications." (Id.). 

On May 3, 2005, Plaintiff was referred to Steve Heeland, M.D. ("Dr. Heeland") for

evaluation of his lower back pain. Dr. Heeland recorded that Plaintiff rates his pain level "as

anywhere from a 3 to a 8 and overall a 4 on a VAS scale of 0 to 10." (Tr.159). Dr. Heeland

noted that no radiculopathy was indicated. Dr. Heeland recommended steroid injections and

"core stabilization therapy" to treat Plaintiff's mild to moderate lumber degenerative disc

disease. (Tr.161). 

B. Hearing Testimony

At the hearing before the ALJ on June 1, 2005, Plaintiff as well as the vocational

expert Mark Kelman ("Mr. Kelman") offered testimony. (Tr.183-207). Plaintiff testified

regarding his back and heart conditions. For instance, Plaintiff testified that when standing

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on concrete, he could only stand for two hours at a time without severe back pain and could

hardly sit after that point. (Tr.195). Plaintiff further testified that he could sit for three hours

at a time and probably could lift five to eight pounds, but nothing heavier. (Tr.195-96).

Plaintiff related his daily activities which included helping his wife around the house and

some yard work. (Tr. 197). Plaintiff described his back pain level at a four or a five, but that

it "really hurt" him if he over did himself and sometimes experienced shooting pain. (Id.).

During the hearing, several hypotheticals were posed to Mr. Kelman, the vocational

expert, regarding Plaintiff's work ability. For instance, the ALJ posed the following question

to Mr. Kelman:

Well, let's assume that we have a person who is 51-years old, who has a

limited 9th-grade education, who is able to do light exertional level work,

which means the person could lift up to 20 pounds occasionally, and lift 10

pounds on a more frequent basis; and the job would be unskilled. There would

be postural limitations, so there'd be no crawling or crouching or climbing or

squatting or kneeling; and there would be lower extremity limitations, so

there'd be no use of the legs or feet pushing or pulling of foot or leg controls;

and the job would offer a sit/stand option so that the employee could alternate

between sitting and standing and still perform the job functions. Now, are

there jobs that would fit that hypothetical that exists in the state and national

economy?

(Tr.203-04). 

Mr. Kelman responded that such jobs did exist in such circumstances at both

sedentary and light levels, including positions in assembly or production, gate-guard work,

select cashier positions, fuel island employee and parking lot cashier. (Tr.204). Mr.

Kelman's opinion changed when added to the hypothetical were frequent breaks and high

absenteeism to the point that the person would not be able to work. (Tr.205). Moreover, Mr.

Kelman opined that if the person suffered from severe pain or if the Plaintiff's testimony as

to his limitations were accepted, then there would be no work available. (Tr.206). 

C. The ALJ's Conclusion

In his decision, the ALJ found the Plaintiff not "disabled" within the meaning of the

Social Security Act. The ALJ found that the Plaintiff possessed impairments of "low back

and bilateral leg pain, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, a history of cardiac arrythmias,

situational depression and situational anxiety," but none were severe enough to meet one of

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the impairments listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. (Tr.16). The ALJ noted

the findings of Dr. Rios, and specifically that the Plaintiff should be precluded from activities

that require bending and stooping. (Tr.17). However, the ALJ gave little weight to the

findings of Dr. Bauder regarding Plaintiff's ability to sit for only four hours, stand or walk

for no more than three hours and that Plaintiff was severely limited by pain. (Id.). The ALJ

stated in pertinent part:

neither a limitation to less than an eight-hour workday nor a severe limitation

due to pain is supported by the medical evidence, which shows only mild

degenerative changes of the lumbar spine with no acute disc herniation and no

fracture or kyphosis and further shows that nerve conduction study revealed

no radiculopathy. ... In conclusion, the objective medical evidence supports a

conclusion that although the claimant would be precluded from performing his

past relevant medium work, he would be able to perform light unskilled work

with a sit/stand option, as further described below. 

(Tr.17-18). 

The ALJ further rejected Plaintiff's testimony as to the severity of his impairments

noting in pertinent part:

First, the testimony of the claimant is not fully credible concerning the severity

and extent of his limitations. Neither the severity nor the extent is supported

by medical evidence of record. Second, his amended alleged onset date is

October 8, 2003, and his last earnings are shown on his earnings record as

being in 1999. There is no indication that he even attempted to find lighter

work than he had done in the past, and unskilled work if he had trouble reading

orders in his past work as he alleged in Exhibit 3E. Third, with regard to his

activities of daily living, he reported that he took care of his own personal

needs. He cooked, shopped, helped with the housecleaning, took short walks,

fed the dogs and watched television. He was able to drive a car. (Exhibit 3E).

The objective medical evidence fails to support a reason why the claimant

would have significant limitations in his ability to perform activities of daily

living.

(Tr.18). 

The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff possessed the residual functional capacity to

perform light unskilled work with a sit/stand option. (Tr.18). Specifically, according to the

ALJ, Plaintiff could lift and/or carry ten pounds frequently and twenty pounds occasionally

and was unable to crawl, crouch, climb, squat or kneel and was unable to use his lower

extremities for pushing or pulling. (Id.). Based upon this residual functional capacity and

the testimony of the vocational expert, although Plaintiff could not perform his past work,

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the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform jobs existing in the state and national

economy and was, therefore, not "disabled." (Tr.21).

III. Standard of Review

This Court must affirm the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by substantial

evidence and free from reversible legal error. Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir.

1990). Substantial evidence means "more than a mere scintilla" and "such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Clem v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 328, 330 (9th Cir. 1990).

In determining whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the Court considers

the record as a whole. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413

(9th Cir. 1993). If there is sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s determination, the Court

cannot substitute its own determination. Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir.

1990). Where evidence is inconclusive, "questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts

in the testimony are functions solely of the [Commissioner]." Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d

639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). Therefore, if on the whole record before the Court, substantial

evidence supports the Commissioner’s decisions, this Court must affirm. Hammock v.

Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

An ALJ determines an applicant’s eligibility for disability benefits through the

following five stages:

(1) determine whether the applicant is engaged in "substantial gainful

activity;"

(2) determine whether the applicant has a "medically severe impairment or

combination of impairments;"

(3) determine whether the applicant’s impairment equals one of a number

of listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges as so severe

as to preclude the applicant from engaging in substantial gainful

activity;

(4) if the applicant’s impairment does not equal one of the "listed

impairments," determine whether the applicant is capable of performing

his or her past relevant work;

(5) if the applicant is not capable of performing his or her past relevant

work, determine whether the applicant "is able to perform other work

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in the national economy in view of his [or her] age, education, and

work experience."

Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-41 (1987) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b)-(f)). See

20 C.F.R. § 416.920. At the fifth stage, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner.

Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993). 

IV. Discussion

Plaintiff argues reversible error as to the following three areas of the ALJ's findings:

(1) the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Bauder; (2)

the ALJ improperly rejected the credibility of the Plaintiff; and (3) the ALJ improperly set

Plaintiff's residual functional capacity without citing its source. 

A. ALJ's Rejection of Dr. Bauder's Findings Regarding Work Limitation

and Pain

With respect to ground one of Plaintiff's argument, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ

erred in rejecting certain limitations found by Dr. Bauder as to Plaintiff's residual functional

capacity assessment and existence of "severe" pain. (Tr.147-49). Plaintiff further contends

that Dr. Bauder's findings are "somewhat substantiated" by the statement by Dr. Birds on

February 13, 2004, that Plaintiff possessed a "poor prognosis for improvement" and was

"guarded for significant recovery without intensive psychotherapy and social support." (Tr.

109). In opposition to Plaintiff's argument on these points, the Commission contends that the

ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence. For instance, the Commissioner

correctly notes that even though Dr. Bauder, a treating physician, found Plaintiff to have

significant residual functional limitations such as the ability to only sit for four hours, and

be on his feet for only three hours of an eight hour work day (Tr.147) as well as "severe"

pain, the ALJ was not obligated to accept such findings as long as there were specific and

legitimate reasons for doing so, based on substantial evidence in the record. Thomas v.

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). The Commissioner argues that no other

physician found such drastic limitations and relies on other medical evaluations of Plaintiff.

For instance, the Commissioner notes that Dr. Nicol, on March 24, 2005 found Plaintiff to

lack any acute disc herniation and that surgery or steroid injections were not appropriate. (Tr.

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152). In addition, the Commissioner notes that Dr. Hellman's findings revealed no

radiculopathy and that Plaintiff had rejected steroid injections. (Tr.161,194). Moreover, Dr.

Rios, in December of 2003, found Plaintiff's chest complaints to be isolated and benign and

Plaintiff's back pain to be "mechanical in nature." (Tr.107, 107A). 

In reviewing the record, the Court is in agreement with the Commissioner that the

ALJ's decision rejecting Dr. Bauder's stated limitations is supported by substantial evidence.

Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, the ALJ provided the requisite specific and legitimate

reasons regarding the ALJ's rejection of Dr. Bauder's findings as to Plaintiff's residual

functional limitations and pain. Thomas 278 F.3d at 957. For instance, the ALJ addressed

at length the evidence supporting a contrary conclusion to that of Dr. Bauder. The ALJ noted

that Dr. Nicol's evaluation of Plaintiff on March 24, 2005, with the benefit of a recent MRI

exam, indicated only mild degenerative changes in the lumbar spine with no acute disk

herniation. (Tr.17, 152). Notably, Dr. Nicol concluded that Plaintiff was not in need of

surgical intervention or steroid injections. (Tr.152). In addition, the ALJ cited the findings

of Dr. Heeland's examination on May 3, 2005, which indicated no radiculopathy.

(Tr.17,161). Moreover, Dr. Rios' examination on December 1, 2003, suggested Plaintiff's

back pain to be "mechanical in nature" with no finding of nerve root irritation or

accompanying spasm. (Tr.17, 107A). These findings are all clearly contrary to Dr. Bauder's

findings with respect to significant limitations as to Plaintiff's ability to work an eight hour

day and accompanying "severe" pain. The Court is conscience of the fact that treating

physicians, such as Dr. Bauder, are entitled to receive greater deference than those of

examining physicians, but such deference does not preclude the rejection of a treating

physician's findings where there are specific and legitimate reasons in the record to rebut it.

In this case, the ALJ has met his burden in rejecting the stated limitations found by Dr.

Bauder as the ALJ supplied the requisite specific and legitimate reasons supported by

substantial evidence in the record. See Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984)

("[w]here medical testimony is conflicting ... it is the ALJ's role to determine credibility and

to resolve the conflict.").

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B. ALJ's Rejection of Certain Aspects of Plaintiff's Credibility

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff's credibility as to

the severity of his symptoms including his pain testimony. In opposition, the Commissioner

contends that the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff's credibility and that the ALJ provided

specific "clear and convincing" reasons justifying this decision.

"[O]nce the claimant produces objective medical evidence of an underlying

impairment, an adjudicator may not reject a claimant's subjective complaints based solely on

a lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain. Bunnell

v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citing Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d

1403, 1407 (9th Cir.1986)). "Unless, there is affirmative evidence showing that the claimant

is malingering, the Commissioner's reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony must be

'clear and convincing'" Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Lester

81 F.3d at 834. "[T]he ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence

undermines the claimant's complaints." Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. 

In the instant case, there is no dispute that Plaintiff suffered from underlying objective

impairments, including low back and bilateral leg pain and cardiac arrythmias. (Tr.16). In

addition, there does not appear to be any evidence of malingering, nor does the

Commissioner advance such an argument, therefore the issue is whether the ALJ provided

the requisite "clear and convincing" reasons rejecting Plaintiff's credibility. As noted above,

the ALJ articulated three main reasons rejecting Plaintiff's credibility. First, the ALJ

concluded that the medical evidence simply did not support Plaintiff's limitations. Second,

the ALJ discounted Plaintiff's credibility due to the amending of his onset date from May 31,

2002, to October 8, 2003, the lack of any earnings statement from Plaintiff since 1999, and

the omission of any evidence suggesting Plaintiff had tried to locate other work. Third, the

ALJ noted that Plaintiff's daily activities were not indicative of disabled status. For instance,

the ALJ noted Plaintiff cooked, shopped, assisted with housecleaning, took walks and was

able to drive a car. (Tr.18). 

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The Court finds that the ALJ's explanation discounting Plaintiff's credibility regarding

his alleged limitations suffices to meet the ALJ's obligation. As noted by the Commissioner,

the ALJ is permitted discretion in citing relevant factors discounting a Plaintiff's credibility.

See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346-47 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting relevant factors to

include the nature, duration, location, onset, intensity of pain; functional restrictions and

claimant's daily activities.); see also SSR 96-7p. In articulating the relevant factors discussed

above, the ALJ has provided the requisite "clear and convincing" reasons discounting

Plaintiff's credibility. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that

"credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ."). The ALJ's decision provides a

thorough analysis of the medical record regarding the nature and severity of Plaintiff's

limitations and pain. In addition, the ALJ has reasonably doubted Plaintiff's credibility based

upon a potential lack of motivation and Plaintiff's daily activities. While, reasonable minds

may differ as to the ALJ's determination, the Court's inquiry is limited to determining

whether the requisite "clear and convincing" reasons have been supplied. The Court finds

that the ALJ has complied with this obligation.

C. ALJ's Determination of Plaintiff's Ability to Perform "Light" Work

Lastly, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly imposed his own finding that

Plaintiff could perform "light" work with a sit/stand option as opposed to "sedentary" work.

In support of this position, Plaintiff again cites the limitations found by Dr. Bauder as to

Plaintiff's ability to perform work related activities. (Tr. 147-49). However, the Court finds

that the ALJ did not error in finding Plaintiff to possess the residual functional capacity to

perform "light" unskilled work with a sit/stand option. (Tr.18). As noted by the

Commissioner, it was the obligation of the ALJ to formulate such an assessment in this case.

See 20 CFR § 416.946(c). Although Dr. Bauder provides the only specific work related

assessment of Plaintiff in the record, as explained above the ALJ has provided the requisite

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record in rejecting

such findings, such as contrary medical records from several examining physicians. (Tr.17).

Moreover, the ALJ has provided the requisite "clear and convincing" reasons rejecting

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Plaintiff's testimony regarding certain limitations as to his ability to work. (Tr.18). Although

Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment of Plaintiff, the

Court's inquiry is limited only to whether the ALJ's assessment is well supported by

substantial evidence in the record. The Court finds that the ALJ's determination is supported

by the requisite substantial evidence. (Tr.107, 107A, 152, 159). 

V. Summary

The Court finds that the ALJ properly discounted the stated limitations offered by Dr.

Bauder as well as Plaintiff's credibility as to the severity of his symptoms. In addition, the

ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment is supported by substantial evidence in the

record. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion for summary judgment.

(Dkt.#13).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendant’s Motion for summary judgment.

(Dkt.#17).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 27th day of March, 2007.

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