Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00644/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00644-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Orlando Creswell
Petitioner
Gary Swarthout
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ORLANDO CRESWELL,

Petitioner,

 v.

GARY SWARTHOUT, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C-14-0644 TEH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS; DENYING

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Orlando Creswell, a California prisoner, has filed this

pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 challenging a judgment of conviction from Santa Clara County

Superior Court. Respondent was ordered to show cause why the

petition should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer and

Petitioner has filed a traverse. For the reasons set forth below,

the petition is DENIED.

I

On October 30, 2009, Petitioner and his co-defendant Raul

Mata were convicted by a jury of multiple offenses related to

several violent robberies which they committed. Docket No. 1 at 2

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and People v. Creswell, No. H038097, 2013 WL 2361011, at *1 (Cal.

Ct. App. May 30, 2013). With the addition of recidivist

enhancements, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 50 years to life

with a consecutive sentence of 31 years. Docket No. 1 at 2 and

Creswell, 2013 WL 2361011, at *1. Petitioner appealed the

conviction and sought habeas relief. People v. Mata, et al., Nos.

H035445 and H036777, 2011 WL 3652528 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2011),

as modified on denial of reh’g Sept 16, 2011. On August 19, 2011,

the appellate court upheld the conviction but remanded the case for

a court trial on his prior convictions and for resentencing. 

Creswell, 2013 WL 2361011, at *1. The remittitur issued on November

18, 2011 and was filed by the trial court on November 21, 2011. Id.

On March 16, 2012, the trial court found that the prior convictions

were true and imposed the same sentence as before. Mata, 2011 WL

3652528. Petitioner appealed the trial court’s decision and the

appellate court denied the appeal, Creswell, 2013 WL 2361011; and

the California Supreme Court denied review, Docket No. 8, Ex. J. On

February 12, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition. 

II

The following relevant factual background is taken from

the California Court of Appeal’s May 30, 2013 order denying the

appeal:

We filed our opinion on August 19, 2011 (People v. Mata et

al., H035445 [nonpub. opn.]), and a modification on

September 16, 2011. On November 16, defendant appeared

for trial and asked for a Marsden2 hearing. The trial

court agreed to continue the matter until November 30 “for

Marsden and court trial. [¶] Assuming that the Marsden

isn’t granted, we’ll do the court trial on that day.” At

this point, defense counsel offered: “Although there may

be issues from that that would prevent you from going

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forward with the court trial.” And the trial court

agreed: “It’s possible. I want to put it on for both just

for efficiency purposes. And we’ll see whether we can go

ahead or not depending on the outcome of the Marsden or

anything else.” The trial court’s minute order records

the continuance to November 30 for “Marsden/Court Trial”

and denotes that defendant was “serving sentence.” 

Fn 2: People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (right

to discharge appointed counsel for inadequate

representation and substitute another appointed

counsel).

On November 18, 2011, we issued our remittitur, and the

trial court filed it on November 21. On November 23, the

trial judge’s clerk signed a “request for action” form for

the trial judge’s “review and instruction” that

essentially informed the trial judge of the reversal and

the remand for trial. On November 30, defendant appeared

in court with his counsel. There is no reporter’s

transcript of the proceedings. The trial court’s minute

order indicates that the hearing on the Marsden motion was

taken off calendar. There is no record of the trial’s

disposition except the notation that “DEFENDANT ORDERED TO

RETURN TO CALPATRIA STATE PRISON NO LONGER NEEDED.”

On February 7, 2012, the trial judge signed the

request-for-action form and ordered a hearing set for

February 17. At the hearing, defendant moved to dismiss

the allegations on the ground that 91 days had passed

since our remittitur and there was no good cause for the

delay. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion:

“Except that’s why it got on record, it was defense

request at that time. So that nullifies that argument. I

made sure he got on record. It was defense request for

continuance.” Defendant nevertheless offered:

“[Defendant] would politely respond he was not under the

jurisdiction of this court and therefore could not waive

such rule and the court didn’t have the authority to waive

that rule, therefore he would again request that the

charge be dismissed or allegation be dismissed in the

interest of justice.” To this, the trial court repeated:

“Denied and it was also his request on record personally. 

That negates any timeliness issue. I need to set a date

when you’re going to be ready on your court trial on the

priors. [¶] ... [¶] ... The only thing I’m going to

litigate is the court trial which we tried to do in

November but he delayed it through his request that there

was something pending in the Supreme Court.” It then set

trial for March 16. 

At trial, defendant repeated his motion to dismiss, and

the trial court detailed the following: “Here’s my time

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table I have here, it’s similar to yours. We brought him

back November 16th and he requested a Marsden. We then —

and he was asking for some time to prepare. [¶] On

November 30th we set the next court date for the Marsden

and possibly the court trial and it reads in our minute

order ‘Marsden/Court Trial set on 11–30 on 1:30.’ It was

represented on record that the defendant indicated that

through his attorney that he was still on appeal, there

was a new appeal and that we could not go forward and

there was an agreement on record that by the attorneys and

then the court to not go forward because he believed he

still had a valid appeal pending. [¶] I got that

agreement on record and then everybody agreed to have him

ordered returned to Calipatria State Prison until the

matter was settled. [¶] ... [¶] ... It was that it

was at defense request not to proceed with the Marsden or

court trial on 11–30 which was after the remitter [sic]

was issued. [¶] And therefore the defense delayed it in

their own, on their own by asking not to proceed and it be

sent back.” 

Defendant later added the following: “And that was the

hearing that was set on November 30th at 1:30 in this

department and on that date [defendant] withdrew his

request for a Marsden and the matter was taken off

calendar. [¶] [Defendant] did not waive any time as to

when the matter should be heard pending issuance of the

remitter [sic]. In fact, I heard from his appellate

attorney, he told me that there may be some action on the

appeal, don’t do anything on the case until we’ve heard

that. [¶] So soon after November 30th I realized or I

received word from [defendant’s] attorney that the

remitter [sic] had issued. But in no way does any request

that we made on November 30th or in our opinion comprise a

waiver of that 60 day statutory period.”

People v. Creswell, 2013 WL 2361011, at *1-*3.

III

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) amended § 2254 to impose new restrictions on federal

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habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the

state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams

(Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the

‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also

be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the

“unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was

“objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. Moreover, in conducting

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Petitioner calculates the delay by counting the days from the

date when the remittitur was issued by the appellate court, rather

than from the date the trial court filed the remittitur. 

2

Petitioner also argues that the state court incorrectly

applied section 1381 of the California Penal Code to his situation. 

Docket No. 1 at 9 and Docket No. 9 at 3. This is a state law claim

and therefore not cognizable in federal habeas. Federal habeas

relief is unavailable for violations of state law or for alleged

error in the interpretation or application of state law. See

Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 861-62 (2011). 

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its analysis, the federal court must presume the correctness of the

state court’s factual findings, and the petitioner bears the burden

of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). As the Court explained: “[o]n federal habeas

review, AEDPA ‘imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating

state-court rulings’ and ‘demands that state-court decisions be

given the benefit of the doubt.’” Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct.

1305, 1307 (2011). 

When applying these standards, the federal court should

review the “last reasoned decision” by the state courts. Avila v.

Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). In Petitioner’s

case, the last reasoned decision addressing the claim in the instant

petition is the California Court of Appeal’s May 30, 2013 opinion.

With these principles in mind regarding the standard and

scope of review on federal habeas, the Court addresses Petitioner’s

claim.

IV

Petitioner argues that the 91-day1

 delay after the

remittitur violated his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth

Amendment.2 The California Court of Appeal denied his speedy trial

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claim as follows:

“California has enacted a series of statutes, commencing

with Penal Code section 1381, which are a construction

and implementation of the California Constitution’s

speedy trial guarantee (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15). 

[Citation.] ‘No affirmative showing of prejudice is

necessary to obtain a dismissal for violation of the

state constitutional speedy trial right as construed and

implemented by statute. [Citation.] Instead, “an

unexcused delay beyond the time fixed in section 1382 of

the Penal Code without defendant’s consent entitles the

defendant to a dismissal.”’” (People v. Villanueva

(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 411, 422 (Villanueva).) 

Section 1382, subdivision (a)(2), provides, in pertinent

part, that the trial court “unless good cause to the

contrary is shown, shall order the action to be dismissed

... [i]n a felony case, when a defendant is not brought

to trial ... within 60 days ... after the filing of the

remittitur in the trial court.” “‘Good cause within the

meaning of section 1382 exists, for example, when the

delay beyond the statutory period is caused by the

conduct of the defendant or occurs for his or her

benefit....’” (Villanueva, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p.

424.) Section 1382, subdivision (a)(2), specifically

codifies this concept by providing that “an action shall

not be dismissed” if (1) the defendant enters a general

waiver of the 60–day requirement, or (2) the defendant

“requests or consents to the setting of a trial date

beyond the 60–day period.” (§ 1382, subd. (a)(2)(B).) 

Defendant argues that “There is no substantial evidence

the delay was caused by [him] as the court mistakenly

found.” According to defendant, the trial court had no

jurisdiction to proceed on November 16, 2011, because the

remittitur had not yet been issued, “The minutes [of

November 30] reflect no motions for continuance or

otherwise on that date,” and the trial court “did not

intend or try to proceed with the trial” on November 30.3

He concludes that “there was no legitimate basis for the

delay” between the filing of the remittitur and trial. 

Defendant’s analysis is erroneous. 

Fn 3: Defendant places significance upon that “There

was no reporter and no prosecutor.” However, a

reporter presumably would have been summoned had the

Marsden hearing proceeded and a prosecutor

presumably would have been summoned had the trial

proceeded after the Marsden hearing.

One the most familiar rules of California appellate

procedure is that the decision of the trial court is

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presumed to be correct. The existence of error “‘”is

never presumed, but must be affirmatively shown....” ... 

‘[A]ll presumptions and intendments are in favor of the

regularity of the action of the lower court in the

absence of a record to the contrary.’” (People v.Green

(1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 991, 1001, quoting People v.Clifton

(1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 860, 862; In re Raymundo B. (1988)

203 Cal.App.3d 1447, 1452; see People v.White Eagle

(1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1523, quoting People v.Garcia

(1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 191, 198 [“We must indulge in every

presumption to uphold a judgment, and it is defendant’s

burden on appeal to affirmatively demonstrate error—it

will not be presumed.”]; People v.Nitschmann (1995) 35

Cal.App.4th 677, 684 [“Error is never presumed and

appellant has the burden to show error.”].) This rule

requires us to conclude, in the absence of an affirmative

showing to the contrary, that the trial court did the

right thing for the right reasons.

In the present context this means that, we must indulge

in the presumption that official duty is regularly

performed. (Evid. Code, § 664.) Defendant bears the

burden of overcoming this presumption of regularity and

must affirmatively show that official duty was not

regularly performed. (Id. § 606.) If the record is

ambiguous, we must resolve the issue against the

appellant. (People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th

524, 549.) 

Defendant’s challenge is based on the supposition that

the trial court unilaterally ordered the trial off

calendar or simply forgot about the trial after it

ordered the Marsden motion off calendar. But this

presumes that the trial court failed to perform its

official duty to hold a trial on the allegations — a

trial that the court unambiguously set for November 30,

2011. Defendant cites no support for his supposition in

the record and merely speculates that the trial court

overlooked the scheduled trial. Defendant therefore

fails to carry his appellate burden. 

In any event, the record can be interpreted to show that

no error occurred. 

At the hearing on February 17, 2012, the trial court

recalled that, at the Marsden hearing, defendant had

requested a trial continuance because there was something

pending in the Supreme Court. And, at trial, the trial

court recalled that, at the Marsden hearing, defense

counsel represented that there was no jurisdiction to

proceed because the case was still on appeal. Responding

to the court’s trial recollection, defense counsel

conceded that, at the Marsden hearing, he supposed from

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defendant’s appellate attorney that the remittitur still

had not issued (remittitur supposition).4

 Thus, the

trial court’s recollection that defense counsel had a

remittitur supposition at the Marsden hearing is

consistent with counsel’s concession that he had a

remittitur supposition at the Marsden hearing. Since the

trial court knew of counsel’s remittitur supposition on

February 17, the inference is compelling that counsel

communicated his remittitur supposition to the trial

court before February 17. And, since the hearing before

February 17 was the Marsden hearing, the inference is

equally compelling that counsel communicated his

remittitur supposition at the Marsden hearing. Thus, the

record supports that, at the Marsden hearing, defense

counsel communicated his remittitur supposition to the

trial court either by merely representing that the case

was still on appeal, requesting an off-calendar

disposition because the case was still on appeal, or

objecting to trial because the case was still on appeal. 

In any form, counsel’s communicated remittitur

supposition at the Marsden hearing was the equivalent of

a request for or consent to the setting of a trial date

beyond the 60–day period. 

Fn 4: In this appeal, defendant concedes that the

trial court also “appears to have been unaware

[that the remittitur] had already happened.”

We nevertheless observe the following.

 “The 60–day period [of section 1382] applies only ... 

when the accused is not otherwise incarcerated.... In

all instances where the accused is incarcerated, the

90–day provisions of sections 1381 and 1381.5 apply.” 

(Sykes v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 83, 89, fn. 6.) 

Relying on Sykes, the People make a convincing argument

that the governing statute in this case is section 1381

rather than section 1382. Section 1381 applies

“[w]henever a defendant has been convicted, in any court

of this state, of the commission of a felony ... and has

been sentenced to and has entered upon a term of

imprisonment in a state prison ..., and at the time of

the entry upon the term of imprisonment ... there is

pending, in any court of this state, any other

indictment, information, complaint, or any criminal

proceeding wherein the defendant remains to be

sentenced.” In such a case, the People are required to

bring the defendant to trial within 90 days after the

defendant “shall have delivered to [the] district

attorney written notice of the place of his or her

imprisonment ... and his or her desire to be brought to

trial ... unless a continuance beyond the 90 days is

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requested or consented to by the [defendant], in open

court....” (§ 1381.) 

In other words, when a defendant is already serving a

prison sentence, the defendant’s statutory entitlement to

a speedy trial depends upon the defendant’s written

assertion of that right. 

“Whether Penal Code section 1381 applies in this instance

appears to depend upon the meaning of the word ‘other’ in

the phrase ‘any other indictment, information, [or] 

complaint’; specifically, whether ‘other’ includes other

charges arising out of the same information which led to

the sentence on which the defendant was imprisoned. 

While research has disclosed no authority addressing the

issue, People v. Jacobs (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 246, which

found no equal protection violation in the different

treatment of defendants subject to Penal Code section

1381 and those subject to Penal Code section 1382, is

instructive. [¶] ‘[T]he persons described in the

respective statutes are not in like circumstances. 

Section 1382 applies to persons who are not currently

serving time as defined in section 1381. Essentially,

section 1382 applies to persons awaiting trial who are

either out on bail while awaiting trial or who are

bailable, or who are serving misdemeanor sentences of

less than 90 days. While both sections contemplate a

speedy trial [citation], the danger of suffering

imprisonment during delay is not present where a person

is already incarcerated as provided in section 1381. 

[Citation.] We perceive also that a person who is

undergoing a prison sentence may prefer not to go to

trial while a prisoner because of the possibility that

his status as such a prisoner might prejudice his trial. 

We apprehend, too, that there may be other tactical

reasons why a prisoner may not desire to be tried for the

new charge while serving time. In any event the law

grants such a prisoner his options. He may seek an early

trial by making a demand for trial as prescribed by

section 1381 or he may elect to defer the making of such

demand until he deems it expedient to do so.’” 

(Villanueva, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 423, fn. 12.) 

Under this rationale, because our reversal did not affect

defendant’s convictions on the substantive offenses and

theoretically allow for bail, defendant was imprisoned

because of his convictions and his speedy trial rights

were defined by section 1381, not section 1382. His

failure to assert his speedy trial rights by requesting a

trial on the enhancement allegations eliminates any

burden on the People to bring the allegations to trial. 

(But see People v. Martin (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 573, 575

[“when a conviction is affirmed but remanded to the trial

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court to give the People an opportunity to prove the

alleged ‘priors,’ that upon the filing of the remittitur

Penal Code section 1382, subdivision 2 applies” — dictum] 

(Martin).)5

Fn 5: The seeming holding in Martin was dictum

because the principle was not at issue. The

defendant in Martin had successfully moved under

section 1382 to dismiss remanded allegations, and

the People had filed an amended information for the

purpose of bringing the allegations to trial. The

trial court then dismissed the amended information. 

On appeal from the order dismissing the amended

information, “The People [did] not contend that the

[section 1382] dismissal ... was erroneous.” 

(Martin, supra, 87 Cal.App.3d at p. 577.)

People v. Creswell, 2013 WL 2361011, at *3-*5.

A speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed the

accused by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution and imposed on

the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967). No per se rule

has been devised to determine whether the right to a speedy trial

has been violated. Instead, courts must apply a flexible

“functional analysis,” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972),

and consider and weigh the following factors in evaluating a Sixth

Amendment speedy trial claim: (1) length of the delay; (2) the

reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right;

and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Doggett v. United States, 505

U.S. 647, 651 (1992); United States v. Lam, 251 F.3d 852, 855 (9th

Cir.), amended, 262 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2001). None of the four

factors are either a necessary or sufficient condition for finding a

speedy trial deprivation. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. They are

related factors and must be considered together with such other

circumstances as may be relevant. Id. The Ninth Circuit considers

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the second factor, i.e., the reason for the delay, the “focal

inquiry.” United States v. King, 483 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2007)

(citing United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 877 F.2d 734, 739-40

(9th Cir. 1989)). 

After applying the four Barker factors to Petitioner’s

case, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to show that

his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated. 

Petitioner has not shown that the state court decision was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the state

court proceeding. Simply put, there is nothing in the record that

indicates that the delay was due to trial court error. The record

indicates that the trial court intended to hold the court trial on

November 30, 2011. Docket No. 8-1 at 5. In addition, the trial

court’s recollection that defense counsel sought a continuance of

the court trial on November 30, 2011 is supported by evidence in the

record. Specifically, defense counsel conceded at the court trial

that he did not learn that the remittitur had issued until after the

November 30, 2011 hearing, and that at the time of that hearing, the

appellate attorney informed defense counsel that there might be some

action on Petitioner’s appeal. Creswell, 2013 WL 2361011, at *3. 

Accordingly, the state court reasonably concluded that the delay was

caused by Petitioner, which weighs against finding a violation of

Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. See, e.g.,

King, 483 F.3d at 976 (delay due to defendant’s request for

continuance weighed “heavily” against finding a Sixth Amendment

violation). 

Moreover, Petitioner has also failed to show that the

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state decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, federal law. Petitioner’s court trial on his prior

convictions was delayed 91 days due to Petitioner’s request for a

continuance because his appellate counsel incorrectly assumed that

the remittitur had not issued and that there was no jurisdiction for

the trial court to proceed. Although Petitioner claims that he did

not request a continuance and that the trial court only considered

the Marsden issue at the November 30, 2011 hearing, Petitioner

provides no evidence in support of his claim and the Court must

defer to the state court’s determination of the factual issues. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Finally, there is no evidence that the

delay resulted in actual prejudice to Petitioner. The trial was on

Petitioner’s prior convictions and relevant only for the purposes of

recidivist enhancements on his sentence. The delay did not result

in oppressive pretrial incarceration or impair Petitioner’s defense

regarding the truth of his prior convictions. United States v.

Gregory, 322 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Actual prejudice is

typically demonstrated in three ways: ‘oppressive pretrial

incarceration, anxiety and concern of the accused, and the

possibility that the [accused’s] defense will be impaired.’”)

(alteration in original) (citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654). This

claim is denied.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED.

Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. See

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner

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has not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor has Petitioner

demonstrated that “reasonable jurists would find the district

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may not

appeal the denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court

but may seek a certificate from the Court of Appeals under Rule 22

of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of the

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of

Respondent and against Petitioner, terminate any pending motions as

moot and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED 02/18/2015 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\TEH\HC.14\Creswell 14-644 deny habeas.wpd 

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