Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01720/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01720-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gloria Henry
Respondent
Tracy Elizabeth Kaufman
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California

Tracy Elizabeth Kaufman,

Petitioner,

vs.

Gloria Henry,

Respondent.

No. Civ. S 01-1720 DFL PAN P

Findings and Recommendations

-oOoPetitioner, a prisoner without counsel, challenges the

sentence imposed for convictions for violating California law. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent opposes. Petitioner filed no

traverse.

In 1997, Kaufman lived with her boyfriend, Joseph Engle, and

her five children. CT. 67. Both Kaufman and Engle were addicted

to methamphetamine. CT. 76. On April 26, 1997, Engle repeatedly

submerged the youngest child in water until she finally “was not

herself.” CT. 69-70. Emergency personnel found Engle and

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another man giving Kaufman’s two-year old daughter cardiopulmonary resuscitation. CT. 83. Two days later the child died.

CT. 69.

Police investigation revealed that from August 1, 1996,

through April 26, 1997, Kaufman and Engle had been abusing and

molesting Kaufman’s children. The state charged Kaufman with

murder, felony assault on a child, five acts of willful cruelty

to a child, 15 willful lewd and lascivious acts upon a child

under the age of 14 and four false imprisonments. RT. 19-20; CT.

24.

Kaufman entered pleas of guilty to ten lewd and lascivious

act upon a child under the age of 14, five acts of willful

cruelty to a child and three false imprisonments in exchange for

a maximum of 92 years’ imprisonment and dismissal of the other

charges. RT. 17-32. 

The trial judge sentenced petitioner to consecutive terms

totaling 72 years and eight months of imprisonment. RT. 45-65;

CT. 94-99.

Petitioner appealed. The appellate court affirmed in a

reasoned decision, but remanded for re-sentencing because of a 

state-law error. The following is the court’s decision

rejecting petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim:

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Defendant contends the aggregate sentence imposed

in this matter constitutes cruel and unusual punishment

under both the state and federal constitutions. 

However, because defendant failed to raise the issue

below, it is waived. (People v. Kelley (1997) 52

Cal.App.4th 568, 583.)

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1 Although we have concluded the matter must be remanded for

resentencing, section 667.6, subdivision (d), mandates full consecutive

terms for the 10 sex offenses. Hence, any new sentence imposed is not

likely to be much shorter than that imposed originally. The same cruel

and unusual punishment issue is therefore likely to reappear.

3

The contention also has no merit.1 The Eighth

Amendment to the federal Constitution “‘forbids only

extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate”

to the crime.’” (People v. Cartwright (1995) 39

Cal.App.4th 1123, 1135.) A punishment also may violate

the California Constitution if “it is so

disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted

that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental

notions of human dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8

Cal.3d 410, 424.) Lynch suggests three areas of focus: 

(1) the nature of the offense and the offender; (2) a

comparison with the punishment imposed for more serious

crimes in the same jurisdiction; and (3) a comparison

with the punishment imposed for the same offense in

different jurisdictions. (Id. at pp. 425-427.)

Disproportionality need not be established in all three

areas. (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 487,

fn. 38.)

Defendant contends all three areas of focus

demonstrate the disproportionality of the sentence

imposed in this matter. Regarding the offense and the

offender, defendant argues the crimes were not planned

or premeditated and, while she did fail to protect her

children, defendant “was a battered woman who had no

proclivity to aid, much less commit, any such offenses

until Mr. Engle came into her home.” According to

defendant: “Engle even had [defendant] locked in her

room for most of the time on the day [defendant’s]

child died” and she “immediately sought help for her

children upon the first contact with police after

Engle’s actions resulted in the death of her child.” 

Defendant argues her age also militates against the

long sentence imposed because she “will be, to say the

least, toward the very end of her life before she is

released.”

Regarding the other factors, defendant argues the

sentence imposed is “on a par with” those imposed in

more heinous sex offense cases in this state. She

points out in particular that Engle will be eligible

for parole “far sooner than” defendant. Defendant

argues her sentence “stands in stark contrast . . . to

the term of 25 years to life commonly authorized and

imposed on those who commit or aid and abet a murder

with far more premeditation than is present here and

with far more serious prior records.” (Original

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italics.) Finally, defendant argues that “under

section 667.6, sex offenders in California ‘will be

subject to some of the longest sentences in the

country.’”

Defendant’s characterization of the offenses and

the offender in this instance is premised on a onesided view of the information contained in the

probation report. Much of this information came from

defendant’s own self-serving statements. However, the

remainder of the report paints a more disturbing

picture. Originally, defendant denied any wrongdoing

in the abuse of Rebecca which eventually led to the

child’s death. Later, she gave different, conflicting

descriptions of the incident. Only when confronted

with stress analyzer test results suggesting she was

not being completely truthful did defendant admit she

was present when the child was held under water several

times by Engle.

More importantly, defendant admitted to four

incidents of false imprisonment and 10 incidents of

lewd and lascivious conduct perpetrated on Matilda, all

of which defendant aided and abetted, and five

incidents in which her children either were “beaten

with whips or submerged under water in ice cold baths”

with defendant’s knowledge and failure to do anything

to prevent it.

Regarding the molestations, Matilda described

incidents in which Engle “put her to sleep” by

injecting her with methamphetamine or making her drink

it. Matilda would later wake up with her underwear off

and Engle lying next to her naked. Engle forced

Matilda to put her mouth on his penis and to put her

hand on his penis and “go up and down.” On another

occasion, Engle threatened to kill Matilda or her

mother and then forced Matilda to stay in his bedroom

while he and defendant engaged in sex. Another time,

defendant put a blindfold on Matilda and had Matilda

put her mouth on his penis and had sexual intercourse

with her. Engle had sexual intercourse with Matilda on

several occasions, during one of which defendant was

present and holding Matilda’s hand. On one occasion,

defendant kept Matilda home from school so Engle could

have sex with her because defendant thought this would

improve defendant’s relationship with Engle. When

Matilda resisted Engle’s advances, defendant tried to

talk her into cooperating and even “slapped Matilda in

the face and told her to shut up.” Engle had defendant

apply fingernail polish and makeup to Matilda to “get

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2

 Since Kaufman did not appeal the new sentence she has not

exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); While the

court recognizes respondent has not waived the exhaustion requirement,

the court is statutorily authorized to deny relief without requiring

Kaufman to exhaust. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), (3). 

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her in the mood.” Later, defendant watched as Engle’s

hips thrust up and down on top of Matilda.

Regarding defendant’s assertion that she

immediately sought help for her children after the

death of Rebecca, this stands in stark contrast to her

failure to take the advice of social workers, school

officials and Child Protective Services workers who had

made contact with her about her children. It was only

when a death occurred and the police got involved that

defendant began to cooperate with authorities.

Defendant aided and abetted 19 separate offenses

against the children whose ages ranged from 2 to 11. 

Defendant was the one person to whom those victims

should have been able to look for protection and

safety. Instead, they were used as pawns in

defendant’s quest to satisfy her drug craving and

improve her relationship with her chosen mate.

While it is true Engle may be eligible for parole

before defendant, the anomaly in this is not that

defendant’s punishment is too harsh but that Engle’s

may be too lenient. We will not speculate as to why

Engle was permitted to plead guilty to only a few of

the 35 offenses charged. Suffice it to say that under

the extreme facts of this case, we find nothing in the

sentence imposed which is either grossly

disproportionate to the crimes committed (People v.

Cartwright, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1135) or is so

disproportionate to the crimes that it shocks the

conscience and offends fundamental notions of human

dignity (In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 424).

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California

Supreme Court which summarily denied the petition.

On remand the trial court vacated the original sentence and 

sentenced Kaufman to consecutive terms totaling 72 years’

imprisonment. 

Kaufman did not appeal the new sentence.2

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This court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state

court’s determination of petitioner’s claim was contrary to or an

unreasonable application of federal law as clearly established by

the United States Supreme Court or was based upon an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. A decision is contrary to clearly established federal law

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if it

applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts

materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but

nonetheless reaches a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 413-14 (2000). A decision involves an unreasonable

application of federal law if the state court identifies the

correct governing legal principle but applies that principle to

the facts of the prisoner’s case in a manner that is “objectively

unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). “Clearly

established federal law” is defined as the holdings of the United

States Supreme Court existing when the state court issued its

decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Circuit law is “persuasive

authority” for purposes of determining whether a state court

decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. 

Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2003); Duhaime v.

Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999). Where the state

court summarily denies the petition without comment, the district

court will look to the last reasoned state decision on the issue. 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991). If none exists, the

district court must independently review the record to determine 

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whether the state ruling was contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. Delgado v. Lewis, 

223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000).

Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct; 

the presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing

evidence and this court may not grant a writ upon a claim

dependent upon a determination of the facts unless it finds the

state court decision was based upon an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state

court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). 

Petitioner was sentenced to serve ten six-year terms for

committing lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of

14, four years for one act of willful cruelty to a child, four 16-

month terms for four other acts of willful cruelty, and four

eight-month terms for four false imprisonment for a total of 72

years and eight months. Each of the prison terms imposed was

within the statutory range and Kaufman does not challenge any

particular term of years. See Cal. Pen. Code §§ 273a(a), 288(b),

236, 237 (West 1998). Instead, Kaufman claims the consecutive

terms of imprisonment totaling 72 years constitutes cruel and 

unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

Federal law mirrors the state law relied upon by the state

appellate court. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). The

state court’s determination of petitioner’s claim was not contrary

to or an unreasonable application of federal law as clearly

established by the United States Supreme Court nor was ot based

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upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence. 

For these reasons, I hereby recommend petitioner’s

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States 

District Judge assigned to this case. Within 20 days after being

served with these findings and recommendations, petitioner may

file written objections. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” 

The district judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings

and recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: September 8, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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