Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01454/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01454-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Omar Ghaith
Defendant
Scott Johnson
Plaintiff
Azizur Rehman
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

AZIZUR REHMAN and OMAR 

GHAITH,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-01454-MCE-AC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Through this suit, Plaintiff Scott Johnson (“Plaintiff”) sought damages and 

injunctive relief against Defendants Azizur Rehman and Omar Ghaith (collectively, 

“Defendants”) for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12101, et seq., and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (“Unruh 

Act”). Plaintiff had encountered various physical barriers when attempting to access 

Defendant Ghaith’s store on Defendant Rehman’s property in Sacramento, California. 

On July 8, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, awarding 

injunctive relief and statutory damages in the amount of $8,000. ECF Nos. 50, 51.

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Plaintiff now moves for attorney’s fees, ECF No. 52, and that motion is GRANTED 

in part. Plaintiff is entitled to $12,775 in attorney’s fees and $2,585.54 in litigation 

expenses.1

STANDARD

Both the ADA and Unruh Civil Rights Act permit the prevailing party in disability 

access litigation to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Section 12205 of the 

ADA authorizes a court, in its discretion, to “allow the prevailing party, other than the 

United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses and costs.” 

42 U.S.C. § 12205. “[A] prevailing plaintiff under a statute so worded ‘should ordinarily 

recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award 

unjust.’” Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983)). Furthermore, violations of the 

Unruh Civil Rights Act entitle a plaintiff to “any attorney’s fees that may be determined by 

the court.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.

“A reasonable fee is that which is ‘sufficient to induce a capable attorney to 

undertake the representation of a meritorious civil rights case.’” K.M. ex rel. Bright v. 

Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 78 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1297 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Perdue v. 

Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010)). The court calculates the amount of 

attorney’s fees by calculating a “lodestar” and “multiplying the number of hours 

reasonably spent on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” McCown v. City of 

Fontana Fire Dep’t, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009). The appropriate number of 

hours includes all time “reasonably expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved in 

the same manner than an attorney traditionally is compensated by a fee-paying client for 

all time reasonably expended on a matter.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 431. However, in 

 

1 Because oral argument would not have been of material assistance, this matter has been 

submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g).

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calculating the lodestar, “the district court should exclude hours ‘that are excessive, 

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’” McCown, 565 F.3d at 1102 (quoting Hensley, 

461 U.S. at 434). Although district judges “need not, and should not, become greeneyeshade accountants,” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011), the court should provide 

some indication of how it arrived at its conclusions, see Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 

534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008) (“When the district court makes its award, it must 

explain how it came up with the amount.”).

As a general rule, in determining the lodestar figure, “the court should defer to the 

winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend 

on the case.” Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112. However, the party seeking an award of 

attorney’s fees bears the burden of producing documentary evidence demonstrating “the 

number of hours spent, and how it determined the hourly rate(s) requested.” McCown, 

565 F.3d at 1102. Then the burden shifts to the opposing party to submit evidence 

“challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts 

asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits.” Ruff v. Cty. of Kings, 

700 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1228 (E.D. Cal. 2010).

Because the lodestar figure is presumptively reasonable, “a multiplier may be 

used to adjust the lodestar amount upward or downward only in rare and exceptional 

cases, supported by both specific evidence on the record and detailed findings by the 

lower courts that the lodestar amount is unreasonably low or unreasonably high.” Van 

Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations 

omitted).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff seeks $29,514.50 in attorney’s fees and $2,585.54 in litigation expenses. 

Other than generally alleging that the fees are grossly excessive, the only specific 

objection Defendants pose to the requested fees is that Plaintiff is not entitled to recover 

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costs for an expert witness and court reporter copies. Defs.’ Opp., ECF No. 57, at 5-6. 

Defendants fail to mount any concrete challenge to billed tasks for which reimbursement 

is sought.2 However, the Court finds that the hourly rates sought by Plaintiff are 

excessive. 

A. Reasonable Hours

Defendants contend that the fees are grossly excessive because Plaintiff 

employed eight attorneys and sought only $4,000-8,000 in statutory fees. Defs.’ Opp., 

ECF No. 57, at 5. Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive. “A district court may not set 

the fee based on speculation as to how other firms would have staffed the case.” 

Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1114. Since this is the only argument advanced as to the 

reasonableness of the time spent in litigating this matter, Defendants’ challenge on that 

basis is rejected.

B. Reasonable Rates

Although Defendants do not specifically contest the hourly rates, the Court finds 

that the hourly rates sought by Plaintiff’s attorneys—ranging from $400-595—are 

excessive. In similar cases involving the same plaintiff and law firm, this Court found 

Mark Potter’s $350 rate unreasonable; now Potter requests a hourly rate of $595. See

Johnson v. Kamboj LLC, No. 2:14-cv-00561-MCE-AC, 2016 WL 1043719, at *3 (E.D. 

Cal. Mar. 16, 2016); Johnson v. Bourbon Prop., LLC, No. 2:14-cv-02949-MCE-AC, 2019 

WL 1426340, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2019). Instead, the Court found $300-325 per 

hour to be reasonable and granted attorney’s fees on that basis. Id. The Court here 

finds that a reasonable rate for Potter is $325 per hour. See Bourbon Prop., 2019 WL 

1426340, at *3; Johnson v. Warren, No. 2:14-cv-1497-MCE-AC, 2019 WL 1773518, at *2 

(E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2019).

The Court also finds that Phyl Grace’s $500 rate is unreasonable. However, 

because Grace has practiced for over 22 years with the last decade exclusively focused 

 

2 Defendants primarily argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney’s fees because he is a 

“professional plaintiff.” Defs.’ Opp., ECF No. 57, at 1. The Court finds this argument meritless, and it 

played no role in the Court’s decision.

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on disability access litigation, the Court finds $300 per hour to be appropriate. See

Warren, 2019 WL 1426340, at *2; Johnson v. Brunk, No. 2:14-cv-01277-MCE-EFB, 2019 

WL 3778711, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2019).

Rates charged by less experienced associates, however, are also excessive. 

Plaintiff seeks $450 per hour for three associates (Dennis Price, Amanda Seabock, and 

Isabel Masanque) and $400 per hour for another three associates (Sara Gunderson, 

Elliot Montgomery, and Prathima Reddy Price). See Decl. of Mark Potter, ECF No. 52-1, 

at 3-6. In Kamboj, this Court found rates of $150 for these attorneys reasonable, since 

“[c]ourts in the Eastern District have regularly approved hourly rates of . . . $150-175 for 

associates” and their experience made rates “at the lower end for associates” proper. 

2016 WL 1043719, at *3 (alterations in original) (first quoting Estrada v. iYogi, Inc., 

No. 2:13-cv-01989-WBS-CKD, 2016 WL 310279, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2016); then 

quoting Johnson v. Wayside Prop. Inc., No. 2:13-1610 WBS AC, 2014 WL 6634324, at 

*8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2014)). For similar reasons, the Court finds hourly rates of $175 

reasonable for these attorneys in this case.

Pursuant to the Court’s above modifications, the appropriate lodestar award in 

this case is $12,775:3

Potter: 14.4 x $325 = $4,680

Grace: 4 x $300 = $1,200

Price: 8.6 x $175 = $1,505

Masanque: 5.2 x $175 = $910

Seabock: 13.8 x $175 = $ 2,415

Gunderson: 11.4 x $175 = $1,995

Montgomery: 0.4 x $175 = $70

Given the “strong presumption . . . that the lodestar figure represents a 

reasonable fee,” Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) 

 

3 Plaintiff seeks to recover attorney’s fees for Prathima Reddy Price but none of the activities on 

the billing statement are attributed to her. Because the Court could not determine what work she 

completed, no fees were awarded to her. 

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(citation omitted), and since neither Plaintiff nor Defendants seek a multiplier or reduction 

of the lodestar, no further adjustment to the lodestar is warranted.

C. Litigation Expenses

Plaintiff also seeks $2,585.54 in litigation expenses. Defendants challenge the 

costs for an expert witness ($1,660) and court reporter copies ($285). Defs.’ Opp., ECF 

No. 57, at 5-6. Such costs are recoverable litigation costs, and therefore, Defendants’ 

challenge is rejected. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205; Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1058 

(9th Cir. 2002) (finding § 12205 authorizes the award of expert witness fees). Plaintiff’s 

requested litigation expenses are reasonable and awarded in full.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons provided above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, ECF 

No. 52, is GRANTED in part. Defendants shall pay Plaintiff $12,775 in attorney’s fees 

and $2,585.54 in litigation expenses for a total of $15,360.54. The Clerk of the Court is 

directed to file an amended Judgment which not only requires Defendant Rehman to 

make the subject property compliant with the ADA and awards the sum of $8,000 in 

statutory damages (as previously adjudged on July 8, 2019) but also requires payment 

of the aforementioned fees and expenses of $15,360.54.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 18, 2020

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