Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02919/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02919-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Kristofek
Appellant
Thomas Scully
Appellee
Village of Orland Hills
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-2919

DAVID KRISTOFEK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

VILLAGE OF ORLAND HILLS, a municipal corporation,

and THOMAS SCULLY, individually and in his official 

capacity,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 11 CV 7455 — Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 11, 2016

____________________

Before POSNER, FLAUM, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. While working as a part-time police officer for the Village of Orland Hills, David Kristofek 

cited and arrested a driver for several car-insurance-related 

infractions. Following a flurry of phone calls between the 

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2 No. 14-2919

driver’s mother, several local politicians, and Thomas Scully, 

the Village’s chief of police, the driver was released and the 

citations against him were voided. Several months later, 

Kristofek participated in a police training session that involved two hypothetical instances of official police misconduct. Based on these hypotheticals, Kristofek became concerned that official misconduct may have occurred involving 

the voided citations. After Kristofek shared this concern with 

two other officers and with the FBI, Scully fired him. 

Kristofek sued Scully and the Village, and the district 

court granted their motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Kristofek claims that the district court erred in holding 

that his statements to his colleagues and the FBI about the 

voided citations were not protected under the First Amendment. We agree. Kristofek was speaking as a private citizen 

about a matter of public concern, and his interest in speaking

outweighed Scully’s interest in promoting efficiency within 

the department. Kristofek also claims that the district court 

erroneously held that the Village was not liable for Scully’s 

actions under Monell v. New York City Department of Social 

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). But the district court correctly 

rejected Kristofek’s Monell claim, since Scully did not possess 

the requisite authority to unilaterally fire Kristofek or to set 

departmental firing policy. So we reverse the district court’s 

judgment relating to Kristofek’s First Amendment retaliation 

claim against Scully, but affirm it as to Kristofek’s Monell 

claim against the Village.

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No. 14-2919 3

I. BACKGROUND

A. Arrest and Citations

In September 2010, the Village of Orland Hills, Illinois

(Village) hired Kristofek as a part-time probationary officer. 

At the time, Kristofek was also working part time as an officer for the police department in Lemont, Illinois. While

working for the Village in November 2010, Kristofek ran the 

license plate of a car that was being driven by Alonzo Marshall (Alonzo), a young black man. Kristofek discovered that 

the car’s registration was suspended due to a lack of insurance and initiated a traffic stop. (The legality of this stop is 

not at issue on appeal.) After Alonzo was unable to provide 

proof of insurance, he was cited for driving with suspended 

license plates and for failing to provide proof of insurance. 

He was placed under arrest by Kristofek and transported to 

a police station by two other officers—Joseph Johnston and 

Ross Ricobene.

Between the commencement of the traffic stop and the 

arrest, Alonzo called his mother, Carol Marshall (Carol). 

Carol was working as a bus driver in neighboring Rich 

Township, and had previously worked as a trustee in 

Matteson, Illinois (which is located within Rich Township). 

After Carol got off the phone with Alonzo, she called Timothy Bradford, a friend who was a trustee for Rich Township, 

and complained about Alonzo’s arrest. This led to a series of 

phone calls between several area public officials. 

Bradford called Village Mayor Kyle Hastings, who in 

turn called Village Police Chief Thomas Scully. Hastings 

gave Bradford’s phone number to Scully, who then spoke 

with Bradford about Carol’s complaints. After getting off the 

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phone with Bradford, Scully called Deputy Police Chief Michael Blaha and briefly discussed the arrest. (The parties

dispute the content of the discussion.) After the call, Alonzo 

was released, the citations were voided, and a letter was sent 

to the County Clerk identifying the citations and advising 

that they had been voided. Scully argues that this was done

to protect the officers and the Village from a potential lawsuit. Kristofek claims, however, that Blaha told him that the 

incident involving Alonzo was not Kristofek’s fault and 

“was above and beyond you and me.”

In February 2011, a handgun was discovered in the 

backseat of Kristofek’s squad car after Kristofek had returned the car to the station and gone off-duty. Kristofek 

admitted that the gun was likely in the car when he returned

it and offered to resign. But Scully refused to accept the offer, stating in an email, “DO NOT submit your resignation as 

I will not accept it ... . You’re a good police officer Dave and 

we will learn from this experience.”

B. Kristofek’s Termination

In early April 2011, Kristofek participated in an online 

training session through the Lemont Police Department. The 

session included two Q&As instructing that official misconduct occurs if a supervisor allows an arrestee in police custody at a station to leave, confiscates the related paperwork, 

and declines to forward it to the County Clerk or the State’s 

Attorney. Kristofek believed these hypotheticals to be similar to the incident involving Alonzo, and became concerned 

that official misconduct had occurred for which he could be 

punished. He consulted with an attorney and was advised to 

bring the matter to the FBI’s attention. Kristofek also expressed his concerns to Johnston and Ricobene—the two ofCase: 14-2919 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 24
No. 14-2919 5

ficers who took Alonzo to the police station after he was arrested—and asked them to help him report the matter to 

outside law enforcement. After both officers rebuffed Kristofek’s request, he contacted the FBI.

Ricobene informed Scully about Kristofek’s remarks, 

prompting Scully to reach out to Johnston for corroboration.

(The parties dispute whether Scully was informed that Kristofek had consulted with an attorney and that Kristofek believed the officers’ knowledge of the voided citations might

constitute official misconduct.) Scully then met with Village 

Administrator John Daly to discuss Kristofek’s comments

and to recommend that Kristofek be fired. Daly agreed with 

Scully’s recommendation but first wanted him to meet with 

Kristofek and confirm the content of Kristofek’s statements.

Scully asked Kristofek to meet him in his office. Kristofek 

described the online training scenarios he had viewed and 

said that they suggested official misconduct had occurred in 

connection with Alonzo’s voided citations. Kristofek claims 

that he also told Scully that he had recently met with the FBI 

to discuss the incident. (The FBI and U.S. Attorney’s Office 

later investigated the matter and decided not to take action.) 

After Kristofek declined Scully’s offer to submit a resignation letter, Scully fired him. In the ensuing days, Scully prepared a “notice of termination” that stated Kristofek was being fired because he had “contacted several members of this 

agency, telling them that the Chief of Police was a criminal 

and was going to be indicted,” and had “accused the Village 

of being corrupt.” The February handgun incident was not 

referenced.

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6 No. 14-2919

C. Legal Proceedings

Kristofek sued Scully and the Village, alleging that his 

termination violated the First Amendment and Illinois state 

law. The district court dismissed Kristofek’s First Amendment claim and remanded the remaining claims to state 

court. But we reversed, finding that Kristofek’s complaint 

adequately pled that his speech related to a matter of public 

concern (notwithstanding his apparent self-interested motivation in avoiding potential punishment), and that Scully 

possessed enough authority over hiring and firing to state 

(albeit barely) a Monell claim. See generally Kristofek v. Vill. of 

Orland Hills, 712 F.3d 979 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Kristofek I”).

On remand, the parties conducted discovery and filed 

cross motions for summary judgment. The district court 

granted the defendants’ motion and denied Kristofek’s motion. In doing so, the court rejected Kristofek’s claim against 

Scully on several grounds: Kristofek had failed to speak on a 

matter of public concern; the police department’s interests in 

promoting efficient and effective public service outweighed 

his interest in expressing his speech; his speech was made 

with a reckless disregard for the truth; and his speech did 

not cause his termination because Scully was not aware of 

his contact with the FBI when Scully fired him. The court also concluded that Scully was entitled to qualified immunity. 

In addition, the court rejected Kristofek’s Monell claim 

against the Village on the grounds that Kristofek’s constitutional rights had not been violated, and that he had failed to 

demonstrate that Scully had policymaking authority over 

firing. This appeal followed.

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No. 14-2919 7

II. ANALYSIS

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and construe all factual inferences in Kristofek’s favor as “the party against whom the motion under 

consideration is made.” Hess v. Reg-Ellen Mach. Tool Corp., 

423 F.3d 653, 658 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Summary

judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine 

issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Alexander 

v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d 972, 978 (7th Cir. 2014).

A. District Court Improperly Rejected First Amendment Retaliation Claim Against Scully

In order to prove a First Amendment retaliation claim, a 

public employee must show: (1) his speech was constitutionally protected; (2) this speech was a cause of his employer’s 

action; and (3) he suffered deprivation as a result. Wackett v. 

City of Beaver Dam, Wis., 642 F.3d 578, 581 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The parties do not dispute that Kristofek 

suffered an adverse employment action and instead focus on 

the first two factors. We conclude that the district court erred 

in finding in Scully’s favor as to each factor on summary 

judgment. 

1. Kristofek’s Speech Was Protected

“For a public employee’s speech to be protected under 

the First Amendment, the employee must show that (1) he 

made the speech as a private citizen, (2) the speech addressed a matter of public concern, and (3) his interest in expressing that speech was not outweighed by the state’s interests as an employer in promoting effective and efficient 

public service.” Swetlik v. Crawford, 738 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 

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8 No. 14-2919

2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We 

consider each of these factors in turn. 

a. Speaking as Private Citizen

The Supreme Court has instructed that “when public 

employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, 

the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 

communications from employer discipline.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). However, that speech does 

not lose protection simply because it “concerns” or is “acquired by virtue of [the citizen’s] public employment.” Lane 

v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2014). Rather, the speech itself 

must “ordinarily [fall] within the scope of the [plaintiff]’s 

duties.” Id. To determine the scope of a public employee’s 

official duties, we look not only to the applicable job description but also to unwritten responsibilities that the employee 

is expected to perform. E.g., Renkin v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 

773–74 (7th Cir. 2008); Vose v. Kliment, 506 F.3d 565, 570–71 

(7th Cir. 2007). In addition, we must be especially careful in 

concluding that employees have spoken pursuant to their 

official duties when the speech concerns allegations of public 

corruption. That’s because:

It would be antithetical to our jurisprudence to 

conclude that the very kind of speech necessary to prosecute corruption by public officials—speech by public employees regarding 

information learned through their employment—may never form the basis for a First 

Amendment retaliation claim. Such a rule 

would place public employees who witness 

corruption in an impossible position, torn beCase: 14-2919 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 24
No. 14-2919 9

tween the obligation to testify truthfully and 

the desire to avoid retaliation and keep their 

jobs.

Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380; see also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 

661, 674, (1994) (plurality opinion) (“Government employees 

are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies 

for which they work.”).

We find that Kristofek’s statements to Johnston, Ricobene, and the FBI were not made pursuant to his official duties. According to Kristofek, his responsibilities as a parttime police officer involved traffic enforcement and placing 

calls for public service and officer back-up. The fact that 

Kristofek’s statements bore some relation to the subject matter of his job is not dispositive. For the speech to lack constitutional protection, it must constitute “‘government employees’ work product’ that has been ‘commissioned or created’ 

by the employer.” Chrzanowski v. Bianchi, 725 F.3d 734, 738 

(7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422). Here, Scully 

points to no evidence demonstrating that Kristofek was responsible for pursuing or voiding citations, or for determining when and under what circumstances arrestees could be 

released. Compare Renkin, 541 F.3d at 773 (concluding that 

university professor who complained about university’s 

proposed use of grant funds spoke as a public employee, 

since administering the grant “aided in the fulfillment of his 

acknowledged teaching and service responsibilities”), with 

Nagle v. Vill. of Calumet Park, 554 F.3d 1106, 1123–24 (7th Cir. 

2009) (concluding that officer’s statements concerning police 

chief’s proposed staffing reductions at a union meeting were 

made in his capacity as a union representative, not as a police officer).

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10 No. 14-2919

Scully argues that Kristofek was “doing what was expected of him and what he was generally paid to do” when 

he shared his concerns about the voided citations with Johnston and Ricobene and with the FBI. In support, he cites 

General Order 2.10, which instructs officers who believe they 

have received “an unlawful, unjust, or improper order” to 

submit a written report to the police chief. But Scully does 

not claim that Kristofek received an order from Scully, 

Blaha, or anyone else to void the citations and release 

Alonzo. So Kristofek had no duty to report under General 

Order 2.10. Compare Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 597–98 

(7th Cir. 2007) (finding that police officers’ statements to one 

another and to an assistant district attorney about their superiors’ possible harboring of a fugitive were not made as 

private citizens, since the officers had a duty to apprise one 

another of information pertinent to ongoing investigations, 

and to work with district attorneys to present criminal 

charges), with Chaklos v. Stevens, 560 F.3d 705, 712 (7th Cir. 

2009) (finding that public employees who complained about 

anti-competitive practices were speaking as private citizens, 

in part, because their complaints were not submitted to the 

state attorney general or chief procurement officer as directed by state statute). So Kristofek was speaking as a citizen to Johnston, Ricobene, and the FBI.

b. Speaking About Matters of Public Concern

For speech to be constitutionally protected it must also

involve a matter of “public concern.” City of San Diego, Cal. v. 

Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004) (per curiam). “Speech deals with 

matters of public concern when it can be fairly considered as 

relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to 

the community, or when it is a subject of legitimate news inCase: 14-2919 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 24
No. 14-2919 11

terest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and 

concern to the public.” Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453

(2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

When undertaking public-concern inquiries, we examine the 

“content, form, and context” of the statements at issue. Craig 

v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. 277, 736 F.3d 1110, 1115–16 (7th 

Cir. 2013) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 

(1983)). While none of the three factors is dispositive, content 

is the most important. Milwaukee Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n v. 

Clarke, 574 F.3d 370, 377 (7th Cir. 2009).

The content of Kristofek’s statements—that Alonzo’s citations were voided and that he was released solely on account of political favoritism—clearly involves a matter of 

public concern. See, e.g., Miller v. Jones, 444 F.3d 929, 936 (7th 

Cir. 2006) (“Our cases have consistently held that speech alleging government malfeasance addresses matters of public 

concern in its substance.”); cf. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425 (“Exposing governmental inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of considerable significance.”). In addition, Kristofek’s 

statements to Johnston and Ricobene that he was considering contacting outside law enforcement are also protected. 

See Belk v. Town of Manaqua, 858 F.2d 1258, 1262–63 (7th Cir. 

1988) (concluding that municipal employee’s threat to file a 

grievance revealing that two municipal positions were being 

unlawfully held by a single individual involved a matter of 

public concern); cf. Kristofek I, 712 F.3d at 984 (“Any reasonable person would understand that a report to the FBI could 

potentially result in widespread changes to police practices 

in Orland Hills.”).

The form and context of Kristofek’s statements also 

demonstrate that the statements touched upon a matter of 

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12 No. 14-2919

public concern. We “look at the point of the speech in question” and ask whether it was “the employee’s point to bring 

wrongdoing to light” or to “raise other issues of public concern, because they are of public concern.” Kokkinis v. Ivkovich, 

185 F.3d 840, 844 (7th Cir 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We have repeatedly observed that although “a statement born of pure personal interest does not 

constitute a public concern, a mere personal aspect of the 

speaker’s motivation will not defeat the entire speech.” Miller, 444 F.3d at 937; cf. Marshall v. Porter Cnty. Plan Comm’n, 

32 F.3d 1215, 1219 (7th Cir. 1994) (observing that “[i]t is often 

the case that those who speak out are also involved in personal disputes with employers and other employees”). We 

previously held that Kristofek’s complaint adequately pled 

that his speech involved a matter of public concern. Kristofek 

I, 712 F.3d at 984–86. But because that decision rested solely 

on the pleadings, we must revisit the issue in light of the 

record as a whole. Gustafson v. Jones, 290 F.3d 895, 907 (7th 

Cir. 2002) (“Gustafson II”).

By reaching out first to Johnston and Ricobene, and then 

to the FBI, Kristofek “explicitly and formally sought to alert 

a greater audience of the possible harm at issue.” Miller, 444 

F.3d at 937 (finding protected speech where police officer 

complained about police chief’s actions to several separate 

entities including civilian oversight board). The fact that 

Kristofek’s pre-FBI statements were made privately and separately to two fellow officers, by itself, does not affect their 

protected status. As noted above, Kristofek informed them 

that he believed official misconduct may have occurred involving the voided citations and that he was considering reporting the matter to an outside law-enforcement agency. 

This “created a ‘communicative element’ putting the listenCase: 14-2919 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 24
No. 14-2919 13

er[s] on notice that a matter of public concern [was] being 

raised.” Miller, 444 F.3d at 936; see also Spiegla v. Hull, 371 

F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that employee who initiated a private conversation with a superior about alleged 

misconduct involving other employees spoke about a matter 

of public concern, in part, because the employee “did not intend that the conversation would be kept confidential”).

It does not matter that Kristofek was motivated, at least 

in part, by self-interest. It is undisputed that Kristofek was 

concerned about being punished somehow if the details surrounding the voided citations came to light. But as noted 

above, he did not merely express to Johnston and Ricobene 

his concerns about being punished. He also took clear steps 

to alert outside law enforcement that official misconduct 

may have occurred and encouraged others to do so. See Kristofek I, 712 F.3d at 986 (“[I]f an objective of the speech was 

also to bring about change with public ramifications extending beyond the personal, then the speech does involve a matter of public concern.”).

Critically, the record does not suggest that a reporter, investigator, or anyone else was inquiring into the matter 

which might have alerted Kristofek that potential punishment was eminent. Moreover, Kristofek did not rush to alert 

others about his concerns immediately after the training session concluded; rather, approximately two weeks passed before he contacted the FBI, thus indicating that selfpreservation was not the sole motivating force. See Marshall,

32 F.3d at 1219 (holding that employee’s complaints about 

failure to perform required building inspections were constitutionally protected, since the employee’s charges “were 

communicated as office concerns, not as concerns that affectCase: 14-2919 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 24
14 No. 14-2919

ed only [plaintiff]”); see also Kristofek I, 712 F.3d at 986 (emphasizing the importance of “distinguish[ing] between the 

secret intent of the speaker and the objective of the speech”).

c. Pickering Balancing Favors Kristofek

In order for Kristofek’s speech to be constitutionally protected, he must show that his interest, “as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern” outweighs the police department’s interest, “as an employer, in promoting the 

efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568

(1968). We consider the following factors in balancing an 

employee’s free-speech interests against an employer’s management interests:

(1) whether the speech would create problems 

in maintaining discipline or harmony among 

co-workers; (2) whether the employment relationship is one in which personal loyalty and 

confidence are necessary; (3) whether the 

speech impeded the employee’s ability to perform her responsibilities; (4) the time, place 

and manner of the speech; (5) the context in 

which the underlying dispute arose; (6) whether the matter was one on which debate was vital to informed decisionmaking; and (7) 

whether the speaker should be regarded as a 

member of the general public.

Greer v. Amesqua, 212 F.3d 358, 371 (7th Cir. 2000); see also 

Graber v. Clarke, 763 F.3d 888, 896 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that 

the seven factors need not all be addressed in turn). With respect to the first two factors, the disruptive nature of an emCase: 14-2919 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 24
No. 14-2919 15

ployee’s speech is so important in the context of law enforcement that a government employer is allowed to consider both the actual and the potential disruptiveness. Lalowski 

v. City of Des Plaines, 789 F.3d 784, 791–92 (7th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Kokkinis, 185 F.3d at 846) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Nevertheless, when a public employee’s speech 

has touched upon a matter of “strong public concern,” the 

government employer typically must “offer particularly 

convincing reasons to suppress it.” Gustafson v. Jones, 117 

F.3d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Gustafson I”).

Scully makes no reference to Kristofek’s conversation 

with the FBI when discussing Pickering balancing, so we 

treat this issue as waived. While Scully focuses solely on 

Kristofek’s statements to Ricobene and Johnston, he does not 

claim that these statements actually undermined department 

efficiency. Nor could he, since he testified in a deposition 

that he was unaware of “any concrete way that anything that 

David Kristofek said interfered with the actual operations of 

[Scully’s] police department.” Instead, Scully argues that the 

police department’s interests trumped Kristofek’s because 

Kristofek’s statements “ha[d] the potential to undermine

Scully’s ability to maintain discipline and authority.” We 

disagree.

For one, Scully makes no effort to explain precisely how

Kristofek’s statements were potentially disruptive. See Gustafson II, 290 F.3d at 910 (“First Amendment rights cannot be 

trampled based on hypothetical concerns that a governmental employer never expressed.”). In addition, the record indicates that Kristofek’s statements to Johnston and Ricobene 

were measured and succinct, and that Kristofek had no 

plans to speak with anyone else in the department or the 

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16 No. 14-2919

public. Compare Graber, 763 F.3d at 896 (finding that officer’s 

interests outweighed police department’s, in part, because 

his statements were “brief” and “calm” and because the other officers present “testified that [plaintiff] did not interfere 

with their staffing duties”), with Kokkinis, 185 F.3d at 846 

(concluding that police department’s interests outweighed 

officer’s, where officer’s televised statements “caused embarrassment to his superiors and co-workers, who “believed 

that his appearance cast a negative light on the department 

and made the department look like a ‘bunch of clowns’ in 

the eyes of the surrounding communities”). 

Scully contends, in conclusory fashion, that Kristofek’s 

allegations were “baseless” and “unsubstantiated.” But Kristofek need not “prove the truth of his speech in order to secure the protections of the First Amendment.” Gazarkiewicz 

v. Town of Kingsford Heights, Ind., 359 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 

2004) (quoting Chappel v. Montgomery Cnty. Fire Prot. Dist. 

No. 1, 131 F.3d 564, 576 (6th Cir. 1997)). “Rather, speech of 

public importance only loses its First Amendment protection 

if the public employee knew it was false or made it in reckless disregard of the truth.” Id.

Scully has failed to meet this high bar. He ignores the obvious similarities between the events surrounding the voided citations and the Q&A’s from the online training session. 

He also ignores the fact that before Kristofek spoke with 

Johnston and Ricobene, Kristofek consulted with an attorney 

who suggested that he contact the FBI. To be sure, the FBI 

and U.S. Attorney’s Office ultimately declined to take action 

after completing their investigation. However, the investigation report does not indicate that Kristofek’s factual recitation to FBI officials was flawed, or that his concerns were 

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No. 14-2919 17

wholly lacking in merit. Moreover, while Johnston and 

Ricobene declined to assist Kristofek in reaching out to the 

FBI, there is no indication that they told Kristofek that his 

suspicions were based on misinformation or would cause 

problems within the department. 

We recognize that a police department employee could 

pose a serious threat to department discipline and harmony 

if he openly and repetitively claimed that top-ranking department officials have been complicit in political corruption—particularly if such claims had little-to-no grounds for 

support. But this is not such a case. Kristofek’s belief that official misconduct may have occurred within the highest 

ranks of the police department represented a matter of 

strong public concern, and one that was communicated discreetly to the FBI and to two coworkers who were involved 

with the matter. His interest in making this speech was paramount.

2. Factual Dispute Exists Regarding Causation

Although we find that Kristofek’s speech was constitutionally protected, his retaliation claim cannot survive unless 

he can show that his First Amendment protected speech 

caused his termination. On appeal, Scully does not contend 

that the statements to Johnston and Ricobene were unrelated 

to his termination, so we treat this issue as waived. Instead, 

Scully argues that his communication with the FBI was not a

cause of his termination. We find, however, that a genuine 

factual dispute precludes summary judgment in Scully’s favor on what is admittedly a very close issue. 

Parts of the record suggest that Kristofek’s communication with the FBI did not play a role in his firing. Perhaps 

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18 No. 14-2919

most notably, Scully informed Kristofek in an inter-office 

memo that he was being terminated based on statements he 

had made to “several members of this agency.” In addition, 

Scully testified that according to Johnston and Ricobene,

Kristofek had not told them that he (Kristofek) had spoken 

with anyone outside the department, including attorneys, 

about the matter. 

Other parts of the record, however, suggest that Kristofek’s communication with the FBI was a motivating factor. 

For one, Scully may have known that Kristofek had consulted with an attorney, and that Kristofek was considering 

reaching out to an outside law-enforcement agency. In his 

depositions, Kristofek testified that he told both Johnston 

and Ricobene that they could be implicated in the purported 

official misconduct, and asked them if they would be willing 

to report anything they knew. He also testified that he told 

Ricobene that his brother-in-law had done work with the Attorney General’s office, and that he might contact him. 

This all is critical because it is undisputed that both Ricobene and Johnston informed Scully about the substance of 

their communications with Kristofek. Indeed, in an interoffice memo to Scully, Johnston noted that Kristofek said “he 

consulted with an attorney if he could get charged for any of 

the members of the police administration voiding a valid arrest,” and that “it would not hurt to ask the ASA”—

presumably an Assistant State’s Attorney—about the issue. 

In addition, Kristofek claims that shortly before terminating 

him, Scully asked if he had contacted the FBI and that Kristofek responded that he had. So Scully’s termination decision could have been based on a belief that Kristofek was either considering or had decided to contact the FBI. Cf. Belk, 

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858 F.2d at 1264 (reversing grant of summary judgment in 

government employer’s favor when employee had alleged 

that she was fired in retaliation for threatening to file grievance, and remanding for determination as to whether threat 

was motivating factor in her termination).

In addition, other parts of the record suggest that Scully 

communicated his termination decision to Kristofek only after Kristofek referenced his FBI communications. Kristofek 

testified that Scully had asked him whether he had reported 

the issue with the FBI, that he had said yes, and that Scully 

fired him later in the meeting. (In his deposition, Scully 

could not recall whether he had asked Kristofek at their termination meeting if Kristofek had contacted any outside 

agencies such as the FBI.) Given the fact that Daly had

agreed with Scully’s termination recommendation subject to 

corroboration from Kristofek, a factfinder could conclude 

that Scully’s final decision to fire Kristofek was based, at 

least in part, on the fact that Kristofek had actually contacted 

the FBI.

3. Scully Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity

Scully argues that even if he violated Kristofek’s constitutional right to speak out about possible political corruption, 

he is nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity. “In determining qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage, 

the court asks two questions: (1) whether the facts, taken in 

the light most favorable to the plaintiff, make out a violation 

of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that constitutional 

right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Hobgood v. Ill. Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d 635, 648 (7th Cir. 

2013) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).

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20 No. 14-2919

We have “long recognized that an employer may not retaliate against an employee for expressing his views about 

matters of public concern.” Gorman v. Robinson, 977 F.2d 350, 

355 (7th Cir. 1992). However, we typically conduct qualifiedimmunity inquiries by focusing on the “specific context in 

the case,” rather than on a “broad general proposition.” 

McGreal v. Ostrov, 368 F.3d 657, 683 (7th Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, “general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning, and in [certain] instances a general constitutional rule already identified in the 

decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific 

conduct in question.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) 

(citation omitted).

As discussed above, Kristofek has adequately demonstrated that Scully terminated him in retaliation for speaking 

out about potential political corruption involving senior officials within the police department. In addition, it was clearly 

established at the time of Scully’s actions that the First 

Amendment prohibited retaliating against a public employee because he had spoken with colleagues and with the FBI 

about public corruption. See, e.g., Hobgood, 731 F.3d at 648 

(observing that it was clearly established that “the First 

Amendment prohibited ... terminating a public employee

because he had helped another employee pursue a lawsuit 

aimed at uncovering and proving public corruption”); Valentino v. Vill. of S. Chi. Heights, 575 F.3d 664, 678 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(“Terminating a government employee for speaking out 

against corruption in her workplace is surely contrary to 

clearly mandated public policy (the intersection of the First 

Amendment and the public’s right not to be defrauded by its 

government) ... .”); Spiegla, 371 F.3d at 937 (holding that employee who initiated a private conversation with a superior 

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No. 14-2919 21

about alleged misconduct involving other employees spoke 

on a matter of public concern); Gorman, 977 F.2d at 356

(holding that government officials were not entitled to qualified immunity on claim that employee was fired in retaliation for contacting FBI about crimes by other public employees). So Scully is not entitled to qualified immunity on Kristofek’s First Amendment retaliation claim.

B. Monell Claim Against Village Fails

Under Monell, a municipality like the Village may be liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations caused by “(1) 

an express municipal policy; (2) a widespread, though unwritten, custom or practice; or (3) a decision by a municipal 

agent with ‘final policymaking authority.’” Darchak v. City of 

Chi. Bd. of Educ., 580 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2009). Only the 

third approach is at issue here.

An official with decisionmaking responsibilities on firing 

matters is not always a policymaker under Monell; the official must possess “final decisionmaking authority.” Valentino, 575 F.3d at 675–76. And this authority must concern setting policy for hiring and firing, not merely the act of hiring 

or firing itself. Kujawski v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Bartholomew 

Cnty., 183 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999). With an eye toward 

the applicable state statutes, rules, and regulations as well as

the relevant customs and practices, we inquire into: “(1) 

whether the official is constrained by policies of other officials or legislative bodies; (2) whether the official’s decision 

on the issue in question is subject to meaningful review; and 

(3) ‘whether the policy decision purportedly made by the 

official is within the realm of the official’s grant of authority.’” Valentino, 575 F.3d at 676 (quoting Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 448 (10th Cir. 1995)); see also Vodak v. City of 

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22 No. 14-2919

Chi., 639 F.3d 738, 748 (7th Cir. 2011) (asking whether the decisionmaker “was at the apex of authority for the action in 

question” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Here, Scully lacked the requisite independent authority 

to fire officers. As a part-time Village police offer, Kristofek 

was subject to a one-year probationary period that was to 

end in September 2012—approximately five months after he 

was fired. See ORLAND HILLS, ILL., CODE § 35.019(A). Although Village Code permitted Scully to fire officers within 

this probationary period, the power to do so was subject to 

the Village Administrator’s consent. See id. § 35.019(C) (“If at 

any time during the probationary period, the supervisor or 

department head, with the concurrence of the Administrator, 

determines that the service of the employee has been unsatisfactory, the employee may be separated from service without the right to appeal.” (emphasis added)); id. § 35.019(D) 

(“During or at the end of the probationary period, the employee may be dismissed at any time by the department 

head with the approval of the Village Administrator ... .” (emphasis added)).1

The decision to terminate Kristofek’s employment was 

made in accordance with § 35.019. It is uncontested that 

Scully and Daly (the Village Administrator) met to discuss 

Kristofek shortly before he was terminated. Scully testified 

that he “recommended” that Kristofek be terminated, and 

that Daly agreed (assuming Kristofek subsequently confirmed his official-misconduct statements). Daly not only 

 1 The Village Code occasionally uses “Administrator” in place of 

“Village Administration.” Neither the Code itself nor the parties’ briefs 

suggest that this difference is relevant.

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No. 14-2919 23

confirmed this account, but also testified that he had “always” been advised about employee terminations before 

they occurred. In addition, shortly after he terminated Kristofek in person, Scully sent a memo to Daly confirming that 

the termination had occurred. Such an action appears to us 

unnecessary if Scully had actually had the final say. So Kristofek has failed to show that a genuine factual issue exists 

regarding Scully’s ability to unilaterally fire police officers.

Kristofek argues that even if Scully needed Daly’s approval to terminate Kristofek, Daly consented “with full 

knowledge Scully was terminating Kristofek for his speech 

regarding corruption.” Monell liability, he claims, would attach on this basis alone. Kristofek may be referencing the 

“ratification” theory, under which a plaintiff “must allege 

that a municipal official with final policymaking authority 

approved the subordinate’s decision and the basis for it.” 

Darchak, 580 F.3d at 630 (quoting Baskin v. City of Des Plaines,

138 F.3d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation mark 

omitted). Even if we assume Daly believed that Kristofek

should have been fired in retaliation for his speech, the ratification theory does not help Kristofek.

As a threshold matter, Kristofek does not state or even 

imply that Daly possessed final authority to set firing policy.

So the ratification theory fails on that ground alone. Instead, 

Kristofek contends that Scully possessed this authority. But 

that claim lacks support under Illinois law. The Village police department’s policies and procedures manual directs the 

police chief to “plan, organize, staff, direct, and control the 

personnel and resources of the Department.” The references 

to “staff[ing]” and to “control[ling] the personnel,” according to Kristofek, demonstrate that Scully possessed policyCase: 14-2919 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 24
24 No. 14-2919

making authority regarding officer firing. But this overlooks 

the fact that the Village Board is tasked with approving the 

policies and procedures by which police officers were 

bound. ORLAND HILLS, ILL., CODE § 32.067 (“All personnel of 

the Village Police Department, both sworn and non-sworn, 

are bound by the rules and regulations, and policy and procedures manual as promulgated by the Police Department 

and approved by the Village Board.” (emphasis added)). So, 

while Scully may have exercised authority over the enforcement of the policies and procedures the Village Board approved—particularly if they did not involve hiring and firing—he did not possess final authority over policy creation.

III.CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part, 

REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. In addition, we will direct that 

the matter be reassigned to a different district judge pursuant to Circuit Rule 36.

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