Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00431/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00431-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Leprino Foods Company
Defendant
Kirk Lund
Plaintiff

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

KIRK LUND, NO. CIV. S-06-0431 WBS KJM

Plaintiff,

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR

v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

LEPRINO FOODS COMPANY; and 

DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Kirk Lund brings this action alleging

wrongful termination in violation of California Labor Code

sections 1102.5 and 6310, and common law wrongful termination

contrary to public policy. Jurisdiction exists pursuant to the

uncontested diversity of the parties. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332,

1441(b). Defendant Leprino Foods Company (“LFC”) now moves for

summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Leprino Foods Company

Defendant LFC is a corporation organized under, and

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1 These individuals include Ted Babkowski, Director of

Maintenance Operations, Robert Garcia, Director of Technical

Services and Environmental Operations, and Jim Winningham,

Corporate Safety Manager. (Krein Decl. ¶ 8.)

2

headquartered in, Denver, Colorado. (Not. of Removal ¶ 6.) LFC

manufactures cheese and whey products at plants throughout the

country, including its facility in Tracy, California. 

(Declaration of Joel Krein ¶ 2.) Each LFC facility possesses a

complex ammonia refrigeration system that is an integral part of

the manufacturing and storage of LFC’s products. (Id. ¶ 6.) Due

to LFC’s use of anhydrous ammonia, their operations are regulated

by various federal, state, and local laws, including the Clear

Air Act and the Occupational Health and Safety Act (“OSHA”). 

(Id.) LFC has implemented policies and procedures to ensure

compliance with these regulations. (Id. Exs. A, B.)

At the corporate level, LFC has a team of individuals

designated to ensure compliance with, and provide guidance on,

LFC’s environmental and safety programs. (Id. ¶ 8.)1 At the

local level, each facility employs a Safety Supervisor, whose

primary purpose is to ensure that the facility is in compliance

with applicable laws. (Id. ¶ 10.) Specifically, the Safety

Supervisor must maintain the facility’s statutory safety plans,

provide and track employee training, investigate and report on

accidents and chemical spills, oversee the facility’s response

teams, maintain documentation and signage, complete various

regular reports, maintain action plans for items to be addressed,

and proactively address any other safety issues that arise. (Id.

¶¶ 6, 9, Ex. A at p. 5, Ex. B at p.4.)

///

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2 At the time plaintiff was hired, Daryl Larson was the

Plant Manager. In mid-June, 2004, Larson left the company, and

Krein took over as Acting Plant Manager.

3 Federal law requires reporting a release of ammonia

greater than 100 pounds. 40 C.F.R. § 355, Appendix A. State law

requires a telephone call reporting all “significant spills or

threatened releases,” and a subsequent written follow-up report

within seven days if the amount exceeded federal reportable

quantities (i.e. 100 pounds). (Def’s Req. for Judicial Notice

Ex. 1.) 

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), the court may

take judicial notice of documents “capable of accurate and ready

determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned.” Accordingly the court will grant

defendant’s request for judicial notice of the two documents on

the state Emergency Services’ website. See Hendrickson v. eBay,

3

B. Plaintiff Lund

On October 13, 2003, LFC hired plaintiff as its Tracy

facility Safety Supervisor. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff’s direct

supervisor was Tracy Human Resources Manager Vasco Raposo, who

reported to Plant Manager Joel Krein.2 (Krein Decl. ¶ 5.) 

Plaintiff’s responsibilities included ensuring compliance with

state and federal safety requirements, identifying unsafe working

conditions, making recommendations to fix them, and at times

interacting with, and reporting incidents to, various outside

governmental agencies. (Lund Depo. 73:7-18, 820:25-821:2, 92:5-

93:6 698:2-13.)

As part of those responsibilities, plaintiff assisted

in the preparation of reports related to accidents at the Tracy

facility, by investigating and documenting any incidents

involving a release of hazardous chemicals. (Id. 741:25-743:4) 

Plaintiff was required to notify the corporate office of any

release or exposure incident that could require a report to

government agencies.3 (Id. Ex. A at p. 6, Ex. B at pp. 2-3.) 

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Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Caldwell v.

Caldwell, 420 F. Supp. 1102, 1105 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 2006).

4

Plaintiff, as well as all others who served on incident

investigation teams, was also required to fill out internal

“Process Incident Investigation” (“PII”) forms detailing the

incident, underlying causes, and recommendations for avoiding

similar accidents in the future. (Krein Decl. ¶ 25; Lund depo.

745:12-19.) Plaintiff did so on many occasions throughout his

employment. (Id.)

C. November 17, 2004 Incident

On November 17, 2004, approximately seven pounds of

ammonia was accidentally released when a contractor opened a

valve with his foot. (Lund Depo. 351:4-352:3.) After the valve

was closed, and various safety precautions taken, plaintiff, as

well as Plant Engineer Reed Azevedo and Maintenance Manager

Daniel Hudspeth notified the corporate office and spoke with

managers about the release. (Id. 716-721.) They determined that

notification to the National Warning Center was not necessary,

because the release was less than 100 pounds, but that they would

notify the State Warning Center and the San Joaquin Office of

Emergency Services (“OES”). (Id.) 

Pursuant to their policy, LFC assembled an incident

investigation team (of which plaintiff was a member) tasked with

investigating the incident, and preparing a PII form and

memorandum of their findings and recommendations. (Id. 734:12-

735:19.) Plaintiff also prepared a state “Emergency Relase

Follow-Up Notice Reporting Form,” but LFC ultimately concluded

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4 LFC uses a performance rating scale from zero to four,

2.0 representing the bare minimum of meeting expectations. 

(Krein Depo. 83:23-84:11.)

5

that written follow-up was not required because the leak was

under 100 pounds. (Id. 785:12-23, 787:24-788:9; Krein Decl. ¶

26.) Accordingly, the form was never submitted. (Id.)

During the course of the investigation into the

November 17, 2004 ammonia release, plaintiff learned that there

has been a caustic leak several weeks prior. (Id. 658:25-

659:19.) Plaintiff sent an email to Plant Engineer Azevedo,

seeking details of the incident. (Id. Ex. 23.) Azevedo

explained that there had been a leak due to failure in piping,

but that the caustic material had stayed contained, gone into the

company’s own process sewer, and was neutralized in the company’s

wastewater system. (Id.) Accordingly, no further action was

taken.

D. Plaintiff’s Termination

On October 31, 2004, plaintiff’s supervisor Raposo

began plaintiff’s annual performance review process. (Raposo

Depo. 48:19-24.) On November 16, 2004, Raposo sent Krein an

email with proposed performance ratings and salaries for

employees in the plant. (Raposo Depo. 95:16-96:15; Krein Decl. ¶

19.) Raposo recommended a performance rating of 2.09,4 and a

salary increase of 1.5% for plaintiff, both well below average. 

(Krein Depo. 83-84.) After reviewing Raposo’s proposed

evaluation, Krein advised Raposo that he wanted him to take

stronger action, and that while the decision was ultimately

Raposo’s, Krein would support a termination decision. (Raposo

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Depo. 23:21-24:20, 97:10-100:8; Krein Depo. 12:11-13:1, 24:7-

25:4, 42:19-14.)

Raposo subsequently modified plaintiff’s performance

review, arriving at an overall performance rating of 1.67. 

(Raposo Depo. 96:16-97:24; Krein Depo. Ex. 24.) On December 3,

2004, Raposo met with plaintiff in his office, reviewed the

performance issues, and informed plaintiff of his decision to

terminate his employment. (Lund Depo. 820:2-14, Ex. 35; Raposo

Depo. 20:6-21:6.) On November 10, 2005, plaintiff filed a

complaint in the Superior Court of California, for the County of

San Joaquin, which was subsequently removed to this court on

March 1, 2006. (Notice of Removal.) The complaint alleges three

causes of action against LFC: 1) violation of California Labor

Code § 1102.5(b); 2) violation of California Labor Code 6310; and

3) common law wrongful termination in violation of public policy. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 22-29.) Defendant removed the case based on diversity

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). (Not. of Removal.) 

On April 30, 2007, defendant filed this motion for summary

judgment on all claims.

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of

the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

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reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that

negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving

party cannot provide evidence to support an essential element

upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the

non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own

affidavits, or by ‘the depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file,’ [and] designate ‘specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The non-movant “may not rest upon the

mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135,

1137 (9th Cir. 1989). However, any inferences drawn from the

underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to

the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

B. Labor Code Sections 1102.5(b) and 6310

The “rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies is

well established in California jurisprudence . . . .” Campbell

v. Regents of the Univ. Of Cal., 35 Cal.4th 311, 321 (2005). The

essence of that rule is that “where an administrative remedy is

provided by statute, relief must be sought from the

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administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the courts

will act.” Id. (quoting Abelleira v. Dist. Court of Appeal, 17

Cal.2d 280, 292 (1941)). Exhaustion of administrative remedies

is a “jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts,” not a

matter of judicial discretion. Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, 24

Cal.4th 61, 70 (2000); Palmer v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 107

Cal.App.4th 899, 904 (2003) (same, in the context of FEHA);

George Arakelian Farms, Inc. v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 40

Cal.3d 654 (1985) (same, in the context of challenging an adverse

labor board decision); Abelleira, 17 Cal.2d at 293 (citing Myers

v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938) (National

Labor Relations Board); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S.

210 (1908) (rate orders); Porter v. Investors’ Syndicate, 286

U.S. 461, 468 (1932) (investment commissioners and permit of

investment company); United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161

(1904) (immigration and the powers of the Secretary of Labor);

Gorham Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 266 U.S. 265 (1924) (tax

board); et al.). 

Plaintiff’s first two causes of action allege

violations of California Labor Code sections 1102.5 and 6310.

(Compl. ¶¶ 22-27.) Section 1102.5(b) protects from retaliation

an employee who discloses information to a governmental agency of

his employer’s violation of a statute or law. Section 6310

protects from retaliation an employee who makes a “bona fide oral

or written complaint . . . of unsafe working conditions or work

practices in [their] employment or place of employment.” Both of

these statutory schemes contain remedial provisions allowing for

the filing of a complaint before the California Labor

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Commissioner pursuant to California Labor Code section 98.7. 

Cal. Lab. Code §§ 98.6(b), 6312. The fact these administrative

remedies are neither mandatory nor exclusive does not abrogate

the exhaustion requirement. See Neveu v. City of Fresno, 392 F.

Supp. 2d 1159, 1179-80 (E.D. Cal. 2005); Campbell, 35 Cal.4th at

333. 

This court previously addressed whether administrative

remedies must be exhausted in the context of a different

retaliation statute, holding that section 98.7 does not mean that

employees may “immediately file civil suits based on the

provisions of the Labor Code in lieu of first pursuing the

provided administrative remedies when the substantive Labor Code

provision at issue . . . does not explicitly authorize a direct

civil suit as an alternative to the use of administrative

procedures.” Gutierrez v. RWD Techs., Inc. 279 F. Supp. 2d

1223, 1227 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (in the context of California Labor

Code section 230, which prohibits retaliation against employees

who must take time off of work for jury service). While the

specific labor code provisions at issue were different, the

court’s prior analysis is directly on point, explaining why its

conclusion must follow from “(1) the general rule that exhaustion

of administrative remedies is required before a statutory claim

can be brought; (2) the statutory framework encompassing section

98.7; and (3) the public policies underlying the exhaustion

requirement.” Id. at 1228.

Thus, in order to bring a claim under section 1102.5 or

6310, plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies. See

Neveu, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 (holding that plaintiff’s claim

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under section 1102.5 must be dismissed for failure to exhaust);

Campbell, 35 Cal.4th at 333 (holding that plaintiff’s statutory

claims, including a claim under section 1102.5, should have been

exhausted before proceeding to suit); Smedley v. Capps, Staples,

Ward, Hastings and Dodson, 820 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Cal. 1993)

(holding that plaintiff’s claim under section 6310 must be

dismissed for failure to previously file a complaint with the

Labor Commissioner). Plaintiff has not alleged that he pursued

any administrative remedies prior to filing suit. (Compl.) 

Accordingly, the court will grant summary judgment for defendant

on plaintiff’s first and second causes of action. See Campbell,

35 Cal.4th at 232 (“[T]he policy considerations which support the

imposition of a general exhaustion requirement remain compelling

. . . . The logic holds even when no internal damage remedy is

available, or a plaintiff seeks only money damages, so that

resort to the courts is inevitable.”).

Plaintiff cites to a recent decision by Judge England,

Paterson v. Cal. Dep’t of Gen. Svcs., which he contends directly

contradicts Neveu. 2007 WL 756954, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8,

2007). Paterson, however, is easily distinguishable. In

Paterson, Judge England noted that the California court in

Campbell did create an exhaustion requirement, but held that

because the plaintiff filed claims with the DFEH and EEOC with

respect to the same conduct underlying her § 1102.5 claim, she

effectively exhausted her administrative remedies. Id. The

court reasoned that, contrary to Neveu (which seems to imply that

a plaintiff must file suit specifically with the Labor

Commissioner), a plaintiff merely has to exhaust her

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5 Plaintiff also cites several California cases which he

argues represent California courts’ abrogation of the exhaustion

requirement. However, in the California case upon which Lund,

and the cases cited by Lund, rely, the court upheld plaintiff’s

claim alleging common law wrongful termination, despite

plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Hentzel

v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 293 (1982). Thus, in

finding that plaintiff’s complaint was not foreclosed by Labor

Code section 6310, the court merely held that the exhaustion

requirement could not abrogate previously existing remedies at

common law. See Leibert v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 32 Cal. App.

4th 1693, 1704 (1995); Smedley, 820 F. Supp. at 1231 n.4 (noting

that, while section 6310 preempts an unexhausted statutory claim,

it does not preempt a common law cause of action for retaliatory

discharge) (citing Hentzel, 138 Cal. App. 3d 290). Statutory

remedies, however, may be so foreclosed. See Campbell, 35

Cal.4th at 232.

11

administrative remedies in some manner (in that case via the DFEH

and EEOC). Id. at *7 n.5. Paterson did not abrogate the

administrative remedy exhaustion requirement recognized in Neveu. 

It merely clarified that any number of avenues may be used to

exhaust them in addition to the filing of a complaint with the

Labor Commissioner. In the present case it is undisputed that

Lund did not pursue any administrative remedies and thus has

failed to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.5

C. Wrongful Termination

Even though plaintiff has not exhausted his

administrative remedies under the California Labor Code, he may

still maintain a common law claim of wrongful termination in

violation of public policy. See Hentzel, 138 Cal. App. 3d at

303-304; Stevenson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 16 Cal.4th

880, 905 (1997) (“An employee’s post-termination failure to

exhaust administrative remedies has no bearing on whether the

termination violated the public policy expressed through the

statutory prohibition . . . .”). In order to prevail on a claim

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of wrongful termination, plaintiff must prove he was fired

because he engaged in conduct protected by public policy that was

1) fundamental, 2) firmly established, 3) beneficial to the

public, and 4) embodied in a constitutional or statutory

provision. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1256

(1994). 

When a plaintiff “relies upon a statutory prohibition

to support a common law cause of action for wrongful termination

in violation of public policy, the common law claim is subject to

statutory limitations affecting the nature and scope of the

statutory prohibition.” Stevenson, 16 Cal.4th at 904. In this

case, plaintiff has predicated his common law wrongful

termination claim solely on defendant’s alleged violation of

Labor Code sections 1102.5 and 6310. (Compl. ¶ 29.) Therefore,

in order for plaintiff to succeed, 1) he must establish a prima

facie case of retaliation, 2) defendant must provide a

legitimate, nonretaliatory explanation for its acts, and 3)

plaintiff must show this explanation is merely a pretext. Patten

v. Grant Join Union High School Dist., 134 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1384

(2005) (citing Akers v. Country of San Diego, 95 Cal.App.4th

1441, 1453 (2002)).

1. Prima Facie Retaliation

For a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of

retaliation, he must show that 1) he engaged in a protected

activity, 2) his employer subjected him to an adverse employment

action, and 3) there is a causal link between the two. Patten,

134 Cal.App.4th at 1384 (retaliation claim predicated on a

violation of 1102.5); Muller v. Automobile Club of S. Cal., 61

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Cal.App. 4th 431, 451 (1988) (retaliation claim predicated on a

violation of 6310). In large part, the facts of the case are not

disputed. Defendant argues that, as a matter of law, plaintiff

cannot satisfy the first prong because his actions were not

protected under either statute.

a. Labor Code § 1102.5

As noted above, Labor Code section 1102.5 prevents an

employer from retaliating against an employee for disclosing a

potential statutory violation or noncompliance to a governmental

agency. Specifically, Section 1102.5(b) provides that:

[a]n employer may not retaliate against an employee for

disclosing information to a government or law

enforcement agency, where the employee has reasonable

cause to believe that the information discloses a

violation of state or federal statute, or a violation

or noncompliance with a state or federal rule or

regulation.

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s oral reports to the San Joaquin

OES and State Warning center were merely part of his job

responsibilities and that there was nothing “illegal” about the

spill he reported. Plaintiff counters with the assertion that he

“believed the November 17, 2004 ammonia release was a violation

of the law given that the incident involved a chemical listed in

40 C.F.R. § 355 Appendix A . . . .” (Pl.’s Opp’n to Def’s Mot.

for Summ. J. 14-15.) Thus, even if defendants did not break the

law by releasing the ammonia, plaintiff argues that his “belief”

that they did is sufficient to make his actions protected. 

Indeed, a plaintiff bringing a wrongful termination claim need

not prove that defendant actually violated the law, but merely

that plaintiff was fired for his “reasonably based suspicions.” 

Green v. Ralee Engineering Co., 19 Cal.4th 66, 87 (1998).

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6 When asked if he had ever reported instances of illegal

conduct observed during his employment at LFC, plaintiff only

mentioned incidents involving 1) speeding in a company vehicle,

2) harassment, and 3) assault. (Lund Depo. 807:23-808:2.) No

mention was made of his purported report of “illegal” activity to

the San Joaquin OES and State Warning Center.

14

The evidence on record, however, does not support

plaintiff’s assertion. First, plaintiff now contends that he

believed the spill was a “violation of the law pursuant to 40 CFR

335 Appendix A and [42 U.S.C. Section 9603(a)].” (Pl.’s Opp’n to

Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 14-15). These statutes do contain

various notification requirements for hazardous chemical spills,

but only when a spill is more than 100 pounds. 40 C.F.R. § 355,

Appendix A. Plaintiff was aware, almost immediately after the

spill was detected, that only seven (7) pounds of ammonia had

been released, perhaps even less. (Lund Depo. 717:8-12.) 

Plaintiff admitted that he was well aware that the federal

reportable quantity for ammonia was 100 pounds. (Lund Depo.

36:2-7; 344:13-345:10; 657:25-658:24). Plaintiff’s bare

assertion of a belief that the spill violated these two statutory

provisions simply cannot be squared with his prior admissions

that he knew the spill was below reportable quantities.6

Moreover, even if the spill had been greater then 100

pounds, the statutory provisions which plaintiff contends were

violated do not contain any language supporting plaintiff’s

assertion. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 15 (citing

40 C.F.R. § 355, Appendix A and 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a))). These two

provisions are part of an extensive statutory scheme that seeks

to “protect and preserve public health and the environment by

facilitating the expeditious and efficient cleanup of hazardous

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7 The situation might be different if, for example,

defendants released a reportable quantity of ammonia (i.e. over

100 pounds) and failed to report the spill as required by

statute. Such conduct would likely constitute a statutory

violation. Thus, if plaintiff had informed a government agency

about defendants’ (hypothetical) failure to report, his conduct

would be protected by the whistle-blower statute, California

Labor Code 1102.5. Simply reporting a spill does not rise to

this level.

15

waste sites.” U.S. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d 1224, 1240 (9th

Cir. 2005). Nothing in the statutory sections cited by plaintiff

makes illegal the spill that occurred on November 17, 2004. 

Plaintiff himself explained that it is noncompliance with the

notification provisions that may subject a business to penalties,

not the release of the substance itself.7 (Lund Depo. 347:23-

348:1; 657:23-24.) Accordingly, plaintiff’s oral report of the

November 17, 2004 spill to the San Joaquin OES and State Warning

Center was not protectable conduct under Section 1102.5(b).

Plaintiff raises in his opposition, for the first time,

an allegation that defendant also violated California Labor Code

section 1102.5(a) by creating a policy that prevented plaintiff

from disclosing 1) a follow-up written report, which he believed

to be legally necessary and 2) any information about the caustic

leak several weeks earlier that he learned of during his

investigation. Plaintiff, however, provides no evidence of such

a policy. While it is true that a follow-up written report was

not submitted, plaintiff admits that no one at LFC ever told him

not to. (Lund Depo. 786:22-24; 787:24-788:9.) In fact, it was

at the request of LFC officers that plaintiff and Azevedo

prepared the draft written report. (Krein Decl. ¶ 25; Azevedo

Depo. 28:18-29:19.) Moreover, the only evidence regarding an

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8 The court also notes that it is improper for

plaintiff, in an effort to defeat summary judgment, to raise a

new claim at this late stage. Wasco Prods. v. Southwall Techs,

Inc., 435 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff’s complaint

contains no such factual allegations, nor any reference to this

particular statutory provision. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-15, 22-24) (quoting

only 1102.5(b)).

16

investigation into the prior caustic leak is a single email

scheduling a team meeting, which was not sent to Krein or Raposo,

and makes no mention of a belief that the leak was reportable. 

(Raposo Deop. Ex. 51.) There is no evidence that plaintiff was

in any manner prevented from submitting any information, had he

wished to do so. Plaintiff’s mere assertion that he planned to,

but anticipated being prevented from doing so, is insufficient.8

b. Labor Code § 6310

California Labor Code section 6310 provides that an

employer may not:

discharge or in any manner discriminate against any

employee because the employee has . . . [m]ade any oral

or written complaint to the division, other

governmental agencies having statutory responsibility

for or assisting the division with reference to

employee safety or health, his or her employer, or his

or her representative. 

Cal. Lab. Code 6310(a)(1). Defendant contends that plaintiff’s

investigation and report of the November 17, 2004 release cannot

legitimately be classified as a “complaint.” The court agrees.

Plaintiff presents no evidence to support his assertion

that the Process Incident Investigation Form filled out after the

November 17, 2004 spill constitutes a “complaint about unsafe

working conditions.” Such factual allegations are absent from

the complaint, and plaintiff (until his opposition to the present

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9 It is telling that in the roughly twenty pages of

plaintiff’s lengthy deposition testimony about the PII form from

the November 17, 2004 incident, neither the word “complain” nor

the word “complaint” appears a single time.

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motion) fails to characterize it as such.9 When asked whether he

made any complaints about his safety at work, plaintiff noted

general incidents (brought to his attention by others) about a

slippery hallway floor, security issues for the building and

parking lot, and the partial amputation of an employee’s finger,

but nothing about the November 17, 2004 spill. (Lund Depo.

801:23-807:22.) The only mention of the November 17, 2004

incident in the context of workplace safety is a brief reference

to a finding by the PSM investigation team evaluating the

incident (of which plaintiff was a member) that the contractor

who initially caused the spill was standing in a precarious

position, and could have fallen 16-18 feet. (Lund Depo. 814:15-

22.)

The undisputed evidence shows that being a member of

these investigation teams, and filling out these standard PII

forms, were several of plaintiff’s basic job responsibilities,

tasks he performed on more than ten separate previous occasions. 

(Lund Depo. 741:16-20; 742:5-6; Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Statement

of Facts ¶¶ 10-11 (“Undisputed”).) Courts addressing this issue

have made clear that the hallmark of protected action under a

retaliation statute is that plaintiff assert a right adverse to

the company. See McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1486

(10th Cir. 1996) (refusing to find an employee’s actions

protected by a retaliation statute because plaintiff “never

crossed the line from being an employee merely performing her job

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as personnel director to an employee lodging a personal complaint

. . . .”); Claudio-Gotay v. Becton Dickinson Caribe, Ltd., 375

F.3d 99, 102-103 (1st Cir. 2004) (same); cf. Frazier v. United

Parcel Service, Inc., 2005 WL 1335245, *13 (E.D. Cal. 2005)

(distinguishing McKenzie, because the plaintiff in Frazier

“assert[ed] a right adverse to the company--he refused to obey an

order because he was concerned about the safety of his

vehicle.”). Plaintiff provides no evidence that his report on

the November 17, 2004 incident was anything other than a part of

his regular duties. Instead, the evidence indicates that filling

out the PII forms after an accidental release was not even

something plaintiff did of his own initiative, but something he

was told to do by management. (Lund Depo. 742:21-23.) 

Plaintiff’s concessions that filling out the PII report was part

of his job responsibilities as ordered by management cannot be

reconciled with his current assertion that he raised a

“complaint” about “work safety issues” that should be protected

under section 6310.

The sole response offered by plaintiff to show that the

PII report was a “complaint” is that he had “a difficult time

convincing Defendant corporate officers and management” to orally

report the spill to the San Joaquin OES and State Warning Center,

an assertion echoed by counsel at oral argument. (Lund Decl. ¶

11.) The undisputed evidence, however, does not support this

contention. Shortly after the November 17, 2004 release,

plaintiff, Plant Engineer Azevedo, and Maintenance Manager

Hudspeth telephoned the corporate office to “provide them with

the information that [they] had available” about the spill. 

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(Lund Depo. 716:9-11.) During that call, Corporate Safety

Manager Winningham asked “why it was necessary to call the San

Joaquin [OES] and the State Warning Center.” (Id. 718:20-21.) 

Plaintiff, as well as Azevedo and Hudspeth, responded with an

explanation of why they believed the California reporting

requirements necessitated the phone call, at which point the

conversation moved on to other concerns. (Id. 718:21-719:10.)

There is no indication that Winningham or anyone on the phone

call told plaintiff not to call the San Joaquin OES and State

Warning Center. (Id.) Nor is there any evidence that management

offered any resistance to the explanation proffered, either in

that phone call or later. (Id.) Mere assertion, in the face of

contrary evidence, cannot save a claim at the summary judgement

stage. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Valandingham, 866 F.2d at 1137. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s participation in preparing the PII

reports does not constitute protected conduct under section 6310.

Plaintiff raises for the first time in his opposition a

claim that his participation on the PSM investigation team also

constitutes protectable conduct under 6310(a)(3). Section

6310(a)(3) prohibits retaliation against an employee who

“participated in an occupational health and safety committee

established pursuant to Section 6401.7.” Plaintiff, however, has

presented no evidence that the PSM investigation team qualifies

as a “occupational health and safety committee” under Section

6401.7. First, the statute specifically provides that such a

committee may be established as a part of the “employer’s injury

prevention program.” Cal. Lab. Code 6401.7(f). Other than mere

assertion and a general comparison of the purposes of the two

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10 As noted above, it is also improper for plaintiff to

raise a new claim in an effort to defeat summary judgment. 

Wasco, 435 F.3d at 992. Plaintiff’s complaint contains no such

factual allegations, nor any reference to this particular

statutory provision. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-15, 25-27) (quoting only

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committees, plaintiff can point to no evidence that the committee

formed after the November 17, 2004 incident was pursuant to LFC’s

injury prevention program, let alone whether such a program

exists. 

Moreover, section 6401.7 dictates that the California

Standards Board shall create criteria by which to evaluate an

employer’s “occupational health and safety committee,” and only

those which meet the criteria qualify under the statute. Cal.

Lab. Code 6401.7(e)(1),(f); 8 Cal. Admin. Code § 3203(c) (setting

forth the criteria). Plaintiff has provided no evidence that his

PSM investigation team met these criteria. See Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 323 (a motion for summary judgment should be granted, even if

the movant provides no affidavits or evidence, if the movant

demonstrates to the court that the “nonmoving party has failed to

make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case

with respect to which she has the burden of proof”). In fact,

the only evidence contradicts such a conclusion, as qualifying

committees must “meet[] regularly, but not less than quarterly”

and “review[] results of the periodic, scheduled worksite

inspections.” 8 Cal. Admin. Code § 3203(c)(1), (3). It is

undisputed that the PSM investigation team was created solely to

investigate the November 17, 2004 incident. (Lund Depo. 720:12-

13; 720-729.) It did not meet regularly, nor did review periodic

inspection results.10 (Id.)

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6310(a)(1)).

11 Because the court grants defendant’s motion for summary

judgment on all three claims, it need not address the issue of

punitive damages.

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III. Conclusion

Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his statutory remedies

under California Labor Code sections 1102.5 and 6310. 

Accordingly, summary judgment is proper as to these two causes of

actions. Campbell, 35 Cal.4th at 333. This does not preclude

plaintiff’s common law wrongful termination claim as a matter of

law. See Hentzel, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 303-304. However,

plaintiff has also failed to show that his conduct constitutes

“protected activity” under either statute, and thus has failed to

make out a prima facie case of retaliation. Patten, 134

Cal.App.4th at 1384. Accordingly, this court will grant

defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this claim as well.11

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion for

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

DATED: June 19, 2007

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