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Parties Involved:
Cheryl Estelle Graham
Appellee
Linda L. Petrino
Appellant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I L E D 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT United Stat.es Co!lrt~f Appeals 

In re: CHERYL ESTELLE GRAHAM, also 

known as Cheryl Maclin, also known 

as Cheryl Miller, 

Debtor. 

LINDA L. PETRINO, 

Appellant, 

v. 

CHERYL ESTELLE GRAHAM, also known 

as Cheryl Maclin, also known 

as Cheryl Miller, 

Appellee. 

Tenth C1rcu1t 

OCT 11 1991 

~ ROBERT L. HOECKER 

> Clerk 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 91-1062 

) (D.C. No. 90-Z-1791) 

) (D. Colo.) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

* 

The case is therefore ordered 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-1062 Document: 010110090801 Date Filed: 10/11/1991 Page: 1 
Appellant appeals from the district court's affirmance of a 

bankruptcy court order granting Debtor's Motion to Remove Trustee 

for cause, pursuant to 11 u.s.c. § 324. On appeal, Appellant 

argues, inter alia, that because the issues forming the basis for 

the Debtor's motion were moot, the bankruptcy court should have 

dismissed the motion as moot, rather than grant the motion. We 

agree, and reverse the district court's affirmance. 

Appellant served as trustee in the Chapter 7 bankruptcy of 

Debtor. Appellant sent a letter to Debtor's counsel agreeing to 

withdraw her Motion to Dismiss in this case and a similar motion 

in another case in exchange for Debtor's counsel's withdrawal of 

his objection to her attorney's fees application in yet another 

bankruptcy case. Based on the letter, Debtor filed the motion to 

remove Appellant as trustee. After the motion was filed and a 

hearing on the motion was set, Appellant resigned from her duties 

as trustee in this and other bankruptcy cases. The United States 

Trustee accepted her resignation. 

Thereafter, the district court held a hearing in which the 

parties and the United States Trustee presented argument. After 

the hearing, the bankruptcy court entered an order holding that 

Appellant's offer constituted improper conduct and cause for 

removal pursuant to S 324. Concluding it was in the best 

interests of the Debtor, all parties in interest and the 

bankruptcy process, the bankruptcy court removed Appellant from 

this case and all pending cases, except those in which a no asset 

report or final report had been filed. In addition, the 

bankruptcy court ordered the United States Trustee's office to 

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Appellate Case: 91-1062 Document: 010110090801 Date Filed: 10/11/1991 Page: 2 
remove Appellant from the list of approved trustees in Chapter 7 

matters. 

The district court affirmed the removal, after recognizing 

that the action of the bankruptcy judge was moot and the appeal 

was moot. The district court's affirmance was based on a finding 

of no clear abuse of discretion by the bankruptcy court. 

On appeal, Appellant argues that Debtor's motion was rendered 

moot by her resignation before the bankruptcy hearing on the 

Motion to Remove Trustee, the United States Trustee's acceptance 

of the resignation, and the appointment of a successor trustee. 

Appellant also argues that there is no reasonable expectation that 

she will serve as trustee in this case or any other cases 

previously assigned to her. 

The exercise of judicial power depends on the existence of a 

case or controversy. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 

(1974). "[I]t is the duty of the courts to decide actual 

controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and 

not to give advisory opinions on moot questions or abstract 

propositions." In re King Resources Co., 651 F.2d 1326, 1331 

(10th Cir. 1980). 

Claims, however, are not moot where they are capable of 

repetition, yet evade review. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 

147, 149 (1975). The capable of repetition yet evading review 

doctrine is limited to situations where the challenged action is 

too short in duration to be fully litigated and there is a 

reasonable expectation that the same action will occur again. Id. 

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Appellate Case: 91-1062 Document: 010110090801 Date Filed: 10/11/1991 Page: 3 
Because there is no demonstrated probability or reasonable 

expectation that Appellant will engage in similar conduct in the 

future,TM Society of Professional Journalists v. Secretary of 

Labor, 832 F.2d 1180, 1185 (10th Cir. 1987), there is no showing 

that Appellant's conduct is capable of repetition. Appellant's 

resignation as trustee in this case and all other cases in which 

she was acting as trustee caused the motion for removal to become 

moot. Cf. In re Jim's Garage, 118 B.R. 949, 949-50 (Bankr. E.D. 

Mich. 1989)(bankruptcy court denied motion to remove as moot due 

to contemporaneous resignation of trustee). 

Accordingly, we conclude the district court erred in 

affirming the bankruptcy court's order granting Debtor's motion 

for removal. The judgment of the United States District Court for 

the District of Colorado is REVERSED. The action is REMANDED to 

the district court for vacatur of the bankruptcy court's order and 

for remand to the bankruptcy court for dismissal of the motion for 

removal as moot. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 91-1062 Document: 010110090801 Date Filed: 10/11/1991 Page: 4