Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-03444/USCOURTS-ca8-09-03444-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ricardo Jose Tamariz-Cazeres
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-3444

___________

United States of America, * 

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Southern District of Iowa

Ricardo Jose Tamariz-Cazeres, *

* [UNPUBLISHED] 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 16, 2010

Filed: May 21, 2010

___________

Before BYE, JOHN R. GIBSON and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

A jury convicted Ricardo Jose Tamariz-Cazeres (“Tamariz-Cazeres”) of one

count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, see 21 U.S.C. § 846, and two

counts of distributing methamphetamine, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Tamariz-Cazeres

appeals the district court’s1

 denials of his motions for judgment of acquittal and for

a new trial, as well as his sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.

1

The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa.

Appellate Case: 09-3444 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/21/2010 Entry ID: 3667012
On November 4, 2008, law enforcement officers stopped Seth Chambers and

found a large sum of cash in his possession. Chambers revealed that he was planning

to use the cash to pay off an existing debt for methamphetamine he had purchased

from “Ricardo,” whom he later identified as Tamariz-Cazeres. Chambers agreed to

cooperate with law enforcement and act as a confidential informant. Over the next

few weeks, Chambers engaged in a series of controlled purchases of

methamphetamine from Tamariz-Cazeres. Chambers would call one of the cell phone

numbers he had for Tamariz-Cazeres, and they would meet in the parking lot of a local

Walmart. During most of the controlled purchases, Tamariz-Cazeres’s older brother,

Ismael, actually handed the drugs to Chambers. These exchanges culminated in

Chambers’s purchase of eight ounces of methamphetamine on December 3, 2008,

after which Tamariz-Cazeres was arrested. Following his arrest, Tamariz-Cazeres told

law enforcement that his role that day was to “watch over” the drug transaction.

At trial, Chambers, testifying as part of a plea agreement, described the details

of these exchanges. Law enforcement officers who observed and videotaped the

transactions corroborated his testimony. In addition, Ismael, also testifying as part of

a plea agreement, confirmed that Tamariz-Cazeres was the one who arranged the

meetings. Tamariz-Cazeres’s defense focused on the fact that he has a nearly

indistinguishable twin brother, Ricardo Manuel Tamariz-Cazeres (“Ricardo Manuel”). 

Ricardo Manuel was in fact present during some of the transactions, and his car was

used in the first controlled transaction. None of the officers observing the controlled

transactions could identify which twin was present during the exchanges, though

Chambers testified that he could distinguish the twins based on Tamariz-Cazeres’s

eyebrow ring. Tamariz-Cazeres was the twin arrested after the final controlled

purchase; Ricardo Manuel was not present during this transaction, as he was working

at the time. Rejecting the argument that the wrong twin was on trial, the jury

convicted Tamariz-Cazeres on all three counts. Tamariz-Cazeres faced a mandatory

minimum sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment and an advisory sentencing

guidelines range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. Although Tamariz-Cazeres

-2-

Appellate Case: 09-3444 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/21/2010 Entry ID: 3667012
sought a 120-month sentence, the district court sentenced him to the bottom of his

guidelines range, 151 months’ imprisonment.

Tamariz-Cazeres first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his

convictions and that therefore the district court erred in denying his motion for

judgment of acquittal. “We ‘review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Reversal of a conviction is

proper only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Pliego, 578 F.3d 938, 941 (8th Cir. 2009)

(quoting United States v. Kent, 531 F.3d 642, 651-52 (8th Cir. 2008)), cert. denied,

558 U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 1109 (2010). 

The Government presented more than sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury

to convict Tamariz-Cazeres on each of the three counts. Chambers testified that he

could distinguish the twins and that Tamariz-Cazeres was involved in each of the

transactions. The Government also presented evidence linking the phone number

Chambers called to arrange the methamphetamine purchases to Tamariz-Cazeres. 

While Tamariz-Cazeres argues that Chambers’s testimony was unreliable, a jury’s

credibility determinations are “virtually unassailable on appeal,” United States v.

Vickers, 528 F.3d 1116, 1120 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Alama, 486

F.3d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir. 2007)). Tamariz-Cazeres argues that this is the rare case

where “no reasonable person could believe the incriminating testimony,” United

States v. Watson, 952 F.2d 982, 988 (8th Cir. 1991). Given the corroborating

testimony of the officers and Ismael, along with Tamariz-Cazeres’s own statements

confirming his role in distributing the methamphetamine, we reject this argument. 

Tamariz-Cazeres next challenges the denial of his motion for a new trial. “We

review a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion.” 

United States v. McClellon, 578 F.3d 846, 857 (8th Cir. 2009). “When faced with a

motion for a new trial, unlike a motion for judgment of acquittal, a district court is

-3-

Appellate Case: 09-3444 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/21/2010 Entry ID: 3667012
permitted to weigh the evidence and judge witness credibility for itself in determining

if there may have been a miscarriage of justice such that a new trial is required.” 

United States v. Samuels, 543 F.3d 1013, 1019 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S.

---, 129 S. Ct. 1921 (2009). “Motions for new trials based on the weight of the

evidence are generally disfavored.” United States v. Campos, 306 F.3d 577, 579 (8th

Cir. 2002). 

We reject Tamariz-Cazeres’s argument that a miscarriage of justice has

occurred in this case. Tamariz-Cazeres was arrested in a Walmart parking lot,

immediately after a sale of methamphetamine to Chambers took place there. TamarizCazeres admitted to police officers that he was there to “watch over” the transaction. 

Although Chambers and Ismael testified as part of a plea agreement, TamarizCazeres’s argument about their credibility “is no more compelling on the issue of a

new trial than it was on the issue of judgment of acquittal.” See United States v.

Hawkins, 548 F.3d 1143, 1149 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Samuels, 543 F.3d at 1019-

20), cert. denied, 556 U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 2757 (2009). “The defense took full

advantage of the opportunity to discredit [the] testimony, and the jury was free to

believe all, part, or none of it.” Id. Moreover, Chambers’s and Ismael’s testimony

was consistent and was corroborated by testimony from the law enforcement officers

who videotaped the transactions. Furthermore, the vehicle present at most of the

transactions was registered to Tamariz-Cazeres and returned to his home afterwards. 

The evidence is not “so lacking in probative force that a new trial is warranted,” see

United States v. Davis, 534 F.3d 903, 913 (8th Cir. 2008), and therefore the district

court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.

Turning to his sentencing, Tamariz-Cazeres first argues that the district court

improperly denied his request for a mitigating role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. 

“[W]e review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its application of

the guidelines de novo.” United States v. Barker, 556 F.3d 682, 689 (8th Cir. 2009). 

Tamariz-Cazeres argues that, “he was, at best, a delivery man acting at the behest of

-4-

Appellate Case: 09-3444 Page: 4 Date Filed: 05/21/2010 Entry ID: 3667012
his siblings.” Appellant’s Br. at 25. Even if we were to accept his characterization

of his role, “[n]umerous decisions have upheld the denial of minor role adjustments

to defendants who served as middlemen . . . because those participants play a critical

role in illicit drug trafficking by directing prospective buyers to sellers who wish to

remain hidden from public view.” United States v. Deans, 590 F.3d 907, 910 (8th Cir.

2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases). At a minimum, TamarizCazeres played precisely this “middleman” role: Chambers would call him to arrange

transactions, and Tamariz-Cazeres would facilitate those transactions with Ismael. 

“[M]erely showing the defendant was less culpable than other participants is not

enough to entitle the defendant to the adjustment if the defendant was deeply involved

in the offense.” United States v. Payne, 377 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated

on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1112 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

United States v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1177, 1182 (8th Cir. 2003)). The district court did not

err in denying the reduction.

Finally, Tamariz-Cazeres argues that his 151-month sentence was substantively

unreasonable. “Whether a sentence is reasonable in light of § 3553(a) is reviewed for

abuse of discretion. A sentencing court abuses its discretion if it fails to consider a

relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives significant weight

to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only the appropriate factors but

commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.” United States v.

Watson, 480 F.3d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted). “We

presume a sentence within the guidelines range is reasonable and the burden is on a

defendant to show his sentence should have been lower considering the factors

enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Bolden, 596 F.3d 976, 984 (8th

Cir. 2010). We find no abuse of discretion here. The district court discussed the

factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and Tamariz-Cazeres does not argue that the

district court considered any inappropriate factors at his sentencing. Rather, TamarizCazeres again argues that, compared to his brothers, his conduct was relatively minor

and that he therefore should receive a lower sentence. However, the district court

-5-

Appellate Case: 09-3444 Page: 5 Date Filed: 05/21/2010 Entry ID: 3667012
addressed this argument and found it unpersuasive, and the court’s conclusion that “a

sentence at the bottom of the range is fully sufficient to address all sentencing

considerations in this case” was not an abuse of discretion. Tamariz-Cazares’s

sentence was not substantively unreasonable.

We therefore affirm the denials of Tamariz-Cazeres’s motions for judgment of

acquittal and for a new trial, along with his sentence.

______________________________

-6-

Appellate Case: 09-3444 Page: 6 Date Filed: 05/21/2010 Entry ID: 3667012