Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-21-04447/USCOURTS-ca4-21-04447-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jonathan Lynn Jenkins
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-4447

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

JONATHAN LYNN JENKINS, a/k/a Max,

 Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Raleigh. James C. Dever, III, District Judge. (5:18-cr-00451-D-1)

Argued: September 19, 2023 Decided: November 26, 2024 

Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Benjamin wrote the opinion, in which Chief 

Judge Diaz and Judge Wilkinson joined. 

ARGUED: Joseph Bart Gilbert, TARLTON LAW PLLC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Lucy Partain Brown, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States 

Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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DEANDREA GIST BENJAMIN, Circuit Judge:

Jonathan Jenkins appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress a video 

confession he claims violated Fed. R. Evid. 410 and Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(f), the denial of 

his motion to exclude expert testimony about sex trafficking in violation of Fed. R. Evid.

403, and the reasonableness of his sentence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. 

I.

A federal grand jury indicted Jenkins on charges of conspiracy to commit sex 

trafficking by force, fraud, and coercion and of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 1591(a), (b)(2) and 1594(c) (Count One); sex trafficking by force, fraud, and coercion 

of a minor and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a), (b), and 2 (Count 

Two); sex trafficking of a minor and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 1591(a), (b)(2), and 2 (Count Three); use of the internet to promote an unlawful business 

enterprise and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1592(a)(3) and 2 (Count 

Four); and possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 

924 (Count Five). Jenkins’ nephew and codefendant, Antoine Lamar Wallace, was also 

charged in Counts One through Four. The Government alleged Jenkins and Wallace sex 

trafficked young women and girls. Jenkins pled not guilty. Wallace, however, pled guilty 

to sex trafficking and testified at trial against Jenkins.

Prior to trial, Jenkins moved to suppress “statements” he contended were protected 

plea discussions under Fed. R. Evid. 410 and Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(f), but which the 

Government characterized as a voluntary confession. The district court denied Jenkins’ 

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motion. As a result, at trial the Government introduced into evidence a two-hour videotape 

where Jenkins allegedly admitted to the charged conduct. 

Prior to trial, Jenkins also moved to exclude, under Fed. R. Evid. 403, 702, and 703, 

the Government’s proposed expert witness, Dr. Sharon Cooper, a forensic and 

developmental behavioral pediatrician. The court likewise denied that motion, and Dr. 

Cooper testified at trial. 

After a week-long trial, a jury convicted Jenkins on all counts. The district court

sentenced Jenkins to life on Counts One, Two, and Three, to be served consecutively; 60 

months’ imprisonment on Count Four, to be served concurrently to Counts One, Two, and 

Three; 120 months’ imprisonment on Count Five, to be served concurrently to Count Four; 

and 5 years supervised release on Counts One, Two, and Three and 3 years supervised 

release on Counts 4 and 5, all to run concurrently. After the district court entered an 

amended judgment on August 11, 2022, Jenkins timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 

II.

Jenkins contends that admission of the videotape violated Fed. R. Evid. 410 and 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(f) and denied him a fair trial. Assuming without finding the district 

court erred in admitting the videotape, the error was harmless. The evidence the 

Government put forth to establish Jenkins’ guilt was extensive and compelling. We repeat 

much, though not all, of it here. The following is based on testimony from Jenkins’ victims, 

Wallace, and law enforcement.

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A.

Wallace began pimping in the fall of 2014. Wallace was inexperienced, however, 

and enlisted Jenkins—fresh out of jail for second degree murder—for help. The sex 

trafficking conspiracy involved five main prostitutes/victims, though others came and 

went. Two were 17 years old. 1 The operation lasted almost a year.

Jenkins initiated victims into his sex trafficking conspiracy with a “test.” This 

meant forced sex with him and his nephew. Working hours were “[a]ll day, every day.” 

E.g., J.A. 345, 369, 561. If a victim was menstruating, Jenkins had her “stick a makeup 

sponge up there” and keep working. J.A. 345. Jenkins set the rules and prices for “dates,” 

served as “security,” and took all money for himself and his nephew. J.A. 344–45, 672.

Jenkins required his victims “to be the perfect bitch.” J.A. 370. This meant calling 

Wallace “Daddy,” cleaning his house, and taking care of his children. J.A. 369–70, 761. 

It also meant, when in public, walking only at Wallace’s sides and opening all doors before 

he could touch them. The punishment for disobedience was being choked out, punched in 

the chest, “or whatever type of punishment they felt was feasible at the moment.” J.A. 370.

Jenkins marketed the victims on Backpage, a classifieds website used mainly for 

finding prostitutes. Though sometimes the victims assisted him, Jenkins wrote and posted 

the ads himself.

1 J.R. (nickname “Jazzy”) and B.H. (nickname “Princess”) were seventeen years 

old. The jury did not find, however, that Jenkins acted “knowing or in reckless disregard 

of the fact . . . that [Princess] had not attained the age of 18.” Appellee Br. at 12. 

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Prostitution took place at a several locations, including hotels and, later, an 

unfurnished duplex Jenkins and Wallace rented. Victims initially slept on the floor. 

Jenkins and Wallace later bought them air mattresses to see clients and sleep on. Jenkins

also lived with the victims and had sex with them when he felt like it. 

Jenkins blew hot and cold to control his victims.

2

 Upon joining, Jenkins treated his 

victims with care, or even romantically, buying clothes or telling them they were pretty. 

But he also physically controlled them. Jenkins dictated the sex acts the victims offered. 

This included anal sex, which he taught and tried out with them first. The victims also had 

to ask Jenkins for food, transportation, and hygiene items, including condoms. Wallace, 

for his part, made victim B.H. tattoo herself with his initials in an infinity symbol. 

As the “security” or “enforcer” of the group, Jenkins hit, punched, choked, or 

threatened the victims. For example, B.H. saw Jenkins choke out victim J.R. “until her 

eyes rolled to the back of her head.” J.A. 404. Victim M.J. heard Jenkins “beat [victim 

A.H.] and water board[] [her] baby” while A.H. screamed “get off me” and her baby cried. 

When A.H. returned, her face was swollen, bruised, and teary. Her son was red-faced and 

crying. J.A. 495–96. Likewise, after A.H. called Wallace by name instead of “Daddy,”

Jenkins “with a backhand, with a fist[,] struck her in the face . . . and then just kept striking 

her in the shoulder and the chest area” as A.H. screamed and Wallace’s son looked on. 

J.A. 729. 

2 This practice of luring victims with romance and alternating affection and violence

is common and well-documented. See Michael J. Frank & G. Zachary Terwilliger, GangControlled Sex Trafficking, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 342, 376-382 (2015).

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Jenkins made it known he carried a gun. J.A. 388. Jenkins and Wallace also had 

gang ties and made sure the victims knew it. The victims knew that if they “ever left” 

Wallace, he would “try to get [them] found.” J.A. 573–74, 706.

Jenkins claimed spiritual powers over his victims. He professed to the victims that

they were his servants, and he and Wallace gods. Jenkins performed ritual sex acts on his 

victims and claimed he could read their thoughts. Jenkins blamed a spirit that inhabited 

him, “Obed,” for the violence he inflicted on the victims. J.A. 398, 770. Once, Jenkins

choked B.H. and J.R. to the point of unconsciousness. Regarding J.R., he choked her with 

such force that her feet left the ground. J.A. 408–09, 605–06. Jenkins then made a “circle 

around [B.H. and J.R.], talking in his real crazy language,” before telling the girls that if 

either stepped outside the circle, she would die. J.A. 409, 606, 773.

The Government also introduced a voluminous amount of text messages Jenkins 

sent to his victims and nephew. B.H. testified about texts relating to arranging dates. J.A. 

354–55. In one message, Jenkins stated that B.H. should tell her client that if he “Fs up 

my S,” Jenkins would “slit his throat.” J.A. 356. In other messages, Jenkins directed B.H.

to post ads on Backpage advertising “blow job[s].” J.A. 356–57. B.H. also testified about 

specific text messages where Jenkins and “Obed” threatened her for actions Jenkins felt 

were out of line with “the universe” Jenkins conceived himself god of. J.A. 393.

J.R. testified to texts with Jenkins about being required to work non-stop and taking 

prostitution calls “at 2:00 o’clock in the morning.” J.A. 559–60. J.R. also testified to text 

messages where Jenkins called her “[m]y beautiful wife” and her belief that Jenkins would 

marry her one day. J.A. 564.

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R.H. testified that even after leaving the prostitution ring, Jenkins texted her. 

Jenkins believed R.H. was “stealing” clients and Jenkins implied he was going to visit her 

aunt’s house “to come find [R.H.].” J.A. 681–82. When R.H told him not to “go to my 

people’s house,” Jenkins responded that he “was under the impression that you wanted to 

see us, seeing that you reached out to our clientele. But I’m more than willing to put petty 

difference to the side if you remove the lies ASAP.” J.A. 682. R.H. testified this message 

scared her and that this was when Jenkins posted “a picture of me giving oral sex on my 

Facebook.” J.A. 682–83. Further, after R.H. denied taking clients and told Jenkins to 

“please not call my phone anymore,” he responded “[w]e have no problem coming 

wherever you are.” J.A. 693.

Wallace also testified about his text messages with Jenkins. Wallace confirmed he 

and Jenkins communicated via text message “during the time that [they] worked together”

and that Exhibits 56A through 56I—which were entered into evidence—were the messages 

in question. J.A. 739–40. Some of Wallace and Jenkins’ texts document prostitution dates

while others comment on certain victims’ physical appearances. Others discuss Jenkins’ 

threats to victims who attempted to leave the group or Jenkins’ requirements that the 

victims “clean [Wallace’s] house.” J.A. 752, 759. The Government showed Wallace one 

of Jenkins’ texts where he stated that “[t]heir job is to lay there and take it,” to which 

Wallace testified that Jenkins believed the victims “had to do what he asked of them 

sexually.” J.A. 761. 

Over time, and under harrowing circumstances, each victim except J.R. left the 

group. Leaving, however, did not mean being “out.” For example, as noted above, after 

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R.H. left, Jenkins sent her “threat[ening]” text messages and publicly posted a picture of 

her performing oral sex on her social media. J.A. 683–84, 754. And after B.H. escaped 

with the help of her most loyal client, Jenkins went to the client’s home and shot at him. 

In mid-January 2016, local law enforcement arrested Jenkins and his nephew and 

searched the duplex. Among other things, law enforcement found a shotgun Jenkins had 

brought into the house that morning, a “private dance pole kit,” the book Pimpology, A.H.’s 

family photo and ultrasound image, a shopping list of menstrual products, and paperwork 

in Jenkins’ name. Jenkins was charged with state crimes, and later the federal crimes here.

B.

“When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, [the Court] review[s] the 

factual findings for clear error and the district court's legal determinations de novo.” United 

States v. Elsheikh, 103 F.4th 1006, 1013 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Khweis, 

971 F.3d 453, 459 (4th Cir. 2020)). A district court’s admission of evidence is reviewed 

for abuse of discretion. Id.

Both Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 and Fed. R. Evid. 410 bar admission of “a statement made 

during plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority if the discussions did 

not result in a guilty plea or they resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty plea.” Fed. R. Evid. 

410(a)(4); Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(f); (incorporating by reference Fed. R. Crim. P. 410). 

“Because Rule 410 is an exception to the general principle that all relevant evidence is 

admissible at trial, ‘its limitations are to be construed narrowly.’ ” United States v. Stevens, 

455 F. App'x 343, 345 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-4019) (citing United States v. Roberts, 660 

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F.3d 149, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2011)). To make its assessment, courts assess whether “the 

defendant exhibits a subjective belief that he is negotiating a plea, and that belief is 

reasonable under the circumstances.” United States v. Cowan, 96 F.3d 1439 (4th Cir. 1996) 

(table); United States v. Robertson, 582 F.3d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). 

Statements voluntarily made “after a plea agreement has been reached cannot be 

considered statements made ‘in the course of plea discussions’ within the meaning of the 

exclusionary rule[].” E.g., United States v. Hare, 49 F.3d 447, 450 (8th Cir. 1995). 

Here, after his initial appearance, Jenkins asked to speak to the assistant district 

attorney without his lawyer. The assistant district attorney obliged and, along with a local 

detective, met Jenkins and filmed the encounter. In Jenkins’ view, these discussions were

inadmissible under Rule 410 because they were negotiations that never resulted in a plea 

bargain—this despite the fact Jenkins appears to have first waived his rights under the 

Fourth and Sixth Amendments and later made incriminating statements. Jenkins contends 

admission of the videotape was prejudicial because the Government mentioned it at trial 

and played audio clips from it in its closing arguments. Jenkins asserts the videotape’s 

admission substantially swayed the jury and that he is entitled to a new trial. The 

Government disagrees and contends Jenkins reached a plea bargain with the assistant 

district attorney, rendering the videotape’s admission proper. 

We need not decide whether the above discussions bore a plea bargain or stalled at

negotiation. Assuming without finding Rule 410 was violated, any error admitting the 

videotape was harmless.

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“To prove a nonconstitutional error harmless, . . . ‘the Government must 

demonstrate that the error did not have a ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury's verdict.’ ” United States v. Ibisevic, 675 F.3d 342, 349–50 (4th Cir. 

2012) (quoting United States v. Curbelo, 343 F.3d 273, 278 (4th Cir.2003)). An appellate 

court does not inquire into whether absent the error “sufficient evidence existed to convict,” 

but whether “we believe it ‘highly probable that the error did not affect the judgment.’ ” 

United States v. Madden, 38 F.3d 747, 753 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting R. Traynor, The Riddle 

of Harmless Error 34–35 (1976)). Thus, we must be able to “say, with fair assurance, after 

pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the 

judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” United States v. Byers, 649 F.3d 197, 

211 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)). We 

have identified three factors in making this determination: “(1) the centrality of the issue 

affected by the error; (2) the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error; and (3) the 

closeness of the case.” United States v. Ince, 21 F.3d 576, 583 (4th Cir. 1994). 

Factors 1 and 2 favor Jenkins. The videotape concerned Jenkins’ guilt and the 

charged conduct. And because the district court admitted the videotape, it did not 

“mitigate” any error. See United States v. Nyman, 649 F.2d 208, 212 (4th Cir. 1980) (noting 

“no steps were taken to mitigate an error whose existence was not recognized”). But the

“single most important factor in a nonconstitutional harmless-error inquiry,” the closeness 

of the case, does not favor Jenkins. See Ibisevic, 675 F.3d at 353 (quoting Ince, 21 F.3d at 

584). In fact, this last factor sinks his case.

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Given the evidence admitted at trial, only some of which we have described above, 

we can say with fair assurance, and without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, 

that the jury’s verdict was not substantially swayed by the error. See id. at 350. The 

evidence at trial was one-sided. Law enforcement, Jenkins’ victims, and his coconspirator

and nephew Wallace testified against him. The evidence established the sex trafficking 

conspiracy Jenkins ran with Wallace, Jenkins’ possession of a firearm, and the violence he 

inflicted on his victims. Jenkins’ response was weak. Jenkins called an investigator and a 

few law enforcement witnesses who, he argues, showed certain victims gave prior 

inconsistent statements. The jury saw the videotape only after the victims gave their 

testimony and Wallace had taken the stand. In context, admission of the videotape was 

cumulative, and we do not believe the jury was substantially swayed by it. Cf. United 

States v. Williams ̧ 61 F. App’x 847, 849 (4th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-4432(L)) (holding that 

because codefendant “clearly implicated” appellant in charged conduct, any error in 

admitting appellant’s involuntary statements was harmless); United States v. Patterson, 

150 F.3d 382, 386 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting “the testimony of a co-defendant standing alone 

and uncorroborated is sufficient to sustain a conviction”). 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. 

III.

Next, we turn to Jenkins’ claim that the district court abused its discretion by 

admitting Dr. Cooper’s testimony, which Jenkins argues went beyond the facts of his case. 

“We review a district court’s decision to qualify an expert witness, as well as the admission 

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of such testimony, for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Garcia, 752 F.3d 382, 390 

(4th Cir. 2014). “A court abuses its discretion if its decision is guided by erroneous legal 

principles or rests upon a clearly erroneous factual finding.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Under Fed. R. Evid. 702:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help 

the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of 

the case.

A district court must ensure “that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable 

foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.” Belville v. Ford Motor Co., 919 F.3d 224, 

232 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 

597 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]n expert’s testimony is relevant if it 

has a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry,” and it is reliable if it is “based on 

scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge and not on belief or speculation, and 

inferences must be derived using scientific or other valid methods.” Id. (cleaned up).

“We apply a ‘highly deferential’ standard of review . . . and a trial court’s ‘decision 

to admit evidence over a Rule 403 objection will not be overturned except under the most 

extraordinary circumstances, where that discretion has been plainly abused.’ ” United 

States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 132 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Udeozor, 515 

F.3d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 2008)). “We have emphasized that relevant evidence should only 

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be excluded under Rule 403 ‘when there is a genuine risk that the emotions of a jury will 

be excited to irrational behavior, and this risk is disproportionate to the probative value of 

the offered evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Siegel, 536 F.3d 306, 319 (4th Cir.

2008)). 

We reject Jenkins’ challenge that Dr. Cooper’s testimony violated Rule 403. The 

district court properly allowed Dr. Cooper to testify broadly about the “typical human 

trafficking experiences of its victims and the common behaviors of traffickers.” United 

States v. Warren, 774 F. App’x 778, 782 (4th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-4562). Prior to testifying, 

the Government had called Jenkins’ victims, who spoke about how they were recruited, 

their relationships with Jenkins and Wallace, Jenkins’ and Wallace’s requirements, and the 

violence encountered while in the group. Much of Dr. Cooper’s testimony related directly 

to this evidence and gave it context, which was important because the culture and dynamics 

of sex trafficking are “not the subject of common knowledge.” United States v. Taylor, 

239 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2001). For these reasons, we have previously permitted 

“broad[]” expert testimony about the “typical human trafficking experiences of its victims 

and the common behaviors of traffickers” to “give context to the victim’s testimony.” 

Warren, 774 F. App’x at 782. Such testimony “aid[s] the jury in better understanding some 

of the concepts and events described by the victim and in assessing the victim’s 

credibility.” Id. Without it, “the jury would have no way of determining whether the 

victim’s experiences were common, unique, or implausible.” Id. 

Other circuits have held the same and affirmed the use of experts, including Dr. 

Cooper. See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 946 F.3d 591, 596–97 (D.C. Cir. 2020) 

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(noting Dr. Cooper’s extraordinary qualifications and holding that counsel was not 

ineffective by only partially challenging her testimony); United States v. Carson, 870 F.3d 

584, 590–91 (7th Cir. 2017) (describing how Dr. Cooper helped the jury understand sex 

trafficking). Just last year, we affirmed the district court’s decision to permit Dr. Cooper’s 

testimony in a sex trafficking case, noting “the weight of authority supports [this] position” 

and citing many cases “in which courts have upheld the admission of expert testimony on 

the culture of sex trafficking and the psychology behind it.” United States v. Jennings, 860 

F. App’x 287, 288–89 (4th Cir. 2021) (No. 20-4432) (collecting cases). 

At bottom, the district court carefully balanced the probative value of Dr. Cooper’s 

testimony against the potential for unfair prejudice and correctly found that the challenged 

testimony was relevant and admissible, and that the probative value of the testimony was 

not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Therefore, we affirm admission of Dr. 

Cooper’s testimony.

IV.

Finally, Jenkins contends his sentence is unreasonable. 

We review a defendant's sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion 

standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Under the Gall standard, a 

sentence is reviewed for both procedural and substantive reasonableness. Id. at 51. In 

determining procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the district court properly 

calculated the defendant’s advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, let the parties argue for 

an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and sufficiently 

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explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49–51. If a sentence is free of “significant 

procedural error,” then we review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account 

the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51. We apply “a presumption of reasonableness 

to a sentence within or below a properly calculated [G]uidelines range.” United States v. 

Vinson, 852 F.3d 333, 357 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). This 

“presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when 

measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at 357–58 (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Jenkins contends his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district 

court’s explanation for it is inadequate. Jenkins argues the district court (1) did not explain 

how the § 3553(a) factors shaped its sentencing decision; (2) did not articulate why Jenkins 

was immune to other means of deterrence; and (3) did not engage counsel about the merits 

of Jenkins’ arguments. Jenkins contends his sentence is substantively unreasonable 

because of his age at sentencing (48 years old), his efforts to rehabilitate himself through 

education, and the disparity between his life sentences and Wallace’s 156-month sentence. 

Before the district court, Jenkins argued that he had been abused as a child, that 

despite this abuse he had graduated high school, went to college, and briefly played 

professional football. Jenkins then mentioned that after getting out of prison for seconddegree murder, he took a few community college classes about electrical work. Jenkins 

concluded that given the above, a sentence below the bottom of the Guidelines range was 

appropriate. When pressed “Why?”, Jenkins’ counsel reiterated, “Again, abuse in the 

home growing up; an attempt to better himself through education and schooling to get out 

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of that impoverished, abusive upbringing. . . . Those are the ultimate points we make for a 

sentence below 210 months.” J.A. 1386. 

We reject Jenkins’ argument that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable. 

Jenkins’ arguments at sentencing were cursory. Even so, the district court considered them

and rejected the contention Jenkins was entitled to a downward variance for “[attending 

college and playing football] when you were in your twenties” when “[a]ll of the events 

that I’m here to sentence you for today took place after you had served a serious sentence 

in state prison.” J.A. 1397–98. In context, nothing more than this brief explanation was 

required. See United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 518 (4th Cir. 2017). Jenkins’ contention

that the district court did not address the § 3553(a) factors is equally spurious—the 

sentencing hearing transcript shows the opposite. 

Last, we find that Jenkins’ sentence was substantively reasonable. Jenkins total 

earned offense level was 51. Because 43 is the maximum level a defendant can score, 

Jenkins’ level was adjusted down to 43, still resulting in a guidelines range of life. As 

noted before, the district court addressed the § 3553(a) factors on the record to justify its 

sentence, emphasizing the offense conduct and Jenkins’ history and characteristics. 

Jenkins’ sentence, which was within his guidelines’ range, was not substantively 

unreasonable. See Vinson, 852 F.3d at 357.

Put simply, the offense conduct here was abhorrent. Jenkins sold girls’ and young 

women’s bodies for personal gain and physically abused them in the process. Jenkins’ 

contention that there is an unwarranted disparity between his sentence and Wallace’s is

baffling. Where Wallace had no prior felony convictions, Jenkins had recently been 

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released from serving a sentence for murder. And unlike Jenkins, Wallace pled guilty, 

accepted responsibility, and cooperated with the Government, testifying against Jenkins. 

The contrast between Jenkins’ and Wallace’s sentence is not arbitrary. So, we affirm 

Jenkins’ sentence. 

V.

The Government’s evidence against Jenkins at trial was overwhelming and onesided. The sentence the district court imposed on Jenkins was severe, but well-earned. The 

jury conviction and judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.

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