Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-19-07014/USCOURTS-caDC-19-07014-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
El-Sayed Dahman
Appellant
Embassy of the State of Qatar
Appellee
State of Qatar
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 19-7014 September Term, 2019 FILED ON: MAY 12, 2020

EL-SAYED DAHMAN,

APPELLANT

v.

EMBASSY OF THE STATE OF QATAR AND STATE OF QATAR,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:17-cv-02628)

Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, RAO, Circuit Judge, and SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit 

Judge

J U D G M E N T

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for 

the District of Columbia and on the briefs and arguments of the parties. The Court has 

afforded the issues full consideration and has determined that they do not warrant a 

published opinion. See D.C. CIR. R. 36(d). It is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the district court be affirmed for 

the reasons stated in the memorandum accompanying this judgment.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk 

is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of 

any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See FED. R. APP. P.

41(b); D.C. CIR. R. 41(a)(1).

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

Daniel J. Reidy

Deputy Clerk

USCA Case #19-7014 Document #1842297 Filed: 05/12/2020 Page 1 of 5
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El-Sayed Dahman v. Embassy of the State of Qatar and State of Qatar

No. 19-7014

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff El-Sayed Dahman appeals the dismissal of his complaint against the 

Embassy and the State of Qatar on grounds of forum non conveniens. We conclude

that any error in the district court’s analysis was harmless and that the court did not

abuse its discretion, so we affirm.

Dahman began working at the Embassy of the State of Qatar as an accountant in 

1995. He was soon promoted to Director of the Accounting Department under the 

terms of an employment contract. Those terms stated that the employment contract 

would expire when Dahman turned 64 years old, which he did in February 2011. 

Dahman nonetheless continued to work in his position until he was terminated by the 

Embassy in January 2016. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued 

Dahman a right-to-sue notice on a charge of age discrimination, over the Embassy’s 

objection.

Dahman filed the present suit against the Embassy and the State of Qatar, 

alleging unlawful age discrimination under both the Age Discrimination in Employment 

Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634, and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code 

§§ 2-1401.01 to -1404.04. The Embassy and the State of Qatar did not respond to the 

complaint, nor did they make an appearance to oppose Dahman’s eventual motion for

default judgment. The district court granted the motion as to liability and scheduled a 

hearing to determine damages. Three days before the damages hearing, the 

defendants appeared and requested a continuance so that they might raise certain legal

defenses. The district court granted a continuance over Dahman’s objection. The 

defendants then moved to vacate the default judgment and dismiss the complaint on 

multiple grounds.

The district court vacated the default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b)(6) and dismissed Dahman’s complaint on grounds of forum non 

conveniens. Dahman v. Embassy of Qatar, 364 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3, 9 (D.D.C. 2019). 

Under the two-step approach set out in Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District 

Court, 571 U.S. 49 (2013), the district court first determined that Dahman’s claims were 

governed by a mandatory arbitration clause in his employment contract that dictated

Qatar as the place of arbitration. Dahman, 364 F. Supp. 3d at 5, 8. The court then 

concluded that Dahman had not carried his burden to show that the public interest 

overwhelmingly disfavored enforcing that forum-selection clause. Id. at 9. Dahman 

raises a number of issues on appeal.

Dahman first contends that Rule 60(b) was an inappropriate mechanism for 

vacating the district court’s default judgment. Rule 60(b) provides grounds for relief 

from “a final judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Since the court had yet to determine the 

damages to which Dahman was entitled, he argues the default judgment as to liability

was not “final” within the meaning of that Rule. But to the extent that the court should 

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have relied on its inherent power to reconsider interlocutory judgments or on another 

Rule, any such error was harmless. A movant under Rule 60(b)(6) must demonstrate 

“extraordinary circumstances” to justify relief from a final judgment. Salazar ex rel. 

Salazar v. Dist. of Columbia, 633 F.3d 1110, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 

omitted). The Rules governing revision of interlocutory judgments, by contrast, permit 

relief “for good cause,” Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 843 F.3d 958, 

966 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c)), and “as justice requires,” Cobell v. 

Jewell, 802 F.3d 12, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted) (describing 

standard under Rule 54(b)). Those standards are less demanding than the 

requirements governing relief from final judgments, see Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 

831, 835–36 (D.C. Cir. 1980); cf. Cobell, 802 F.3d at 25, and Dahman does not 

challenge the district court’s general conclusion that the defendants’ forum non 

conveniens argument, if meritorious, satisfied the more demanding Rule 60(b)(6) 

standard. Any error in relying on that Rule was therefore harmless.1

Turning to the district court’s forum non conveniens analysis, Dahman argues 

that the court conflated the initial question of the enforceability of the arbitration clause

in his employment agreement with the subsequent step of weighing the public interest 

factors, contrary to our intervening decision in Azima v. RAK Investment Authority, 926 

F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. 2019). In Azima, we stated that when a court considering forum non 

conveniens dismissal is faced with an applicable and mandatory forum-selection clause, 

it should presume the clause to be legally valid and enforceable. Id. at 874. That 

presumption applies absent a strong showing that, inter alia, enforcing the clause would 

be unreasonable and unjust, enforcing the clause would contravene a strong public 

policy of the present forum, or trial in the preselected forum would be so gravely difficult 

that the plaintiff effectively would be deprived of his day in court. Id. at 874–75. For 

example, a forum-selection clause is unenforceable if the preselected forum “is 

substantially deficient—for instance, because it is effectively inaccessible or unable to 

afford the plaintiff any relief.” Id. at 875 (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 

235, 254 & n.22 (1981)). But if a forum-selection clause is applicable, mandatory, valid, 

and enforceable, we explained, a court need not go on to consider whether the 

preselected forum is “available, adequate, or best for the parties’ private interests.” Id. 

In sum, Azima makes clear that arguments about the ability of the preselected forum to 

provide the plaintiff with relief go to the question of enforceability; they are irrelevant 

once a forum-selection clause is determined to be enforceable.

In Dahman’s case, it is not clear that the district court’s approach differed

materially from the one we set out in Azima. In any event, our review of the 

enforceability question is de novo, id. at 876, and Dahman did not present enough 

1

Dahman argues that a remand is required nonetheless because under Rule 55(c)—in 

his view, the rule most relevant to this case—a district court is required to consider a 

defendant’s willfulness in allowing a default and the prejudice to the plaintiff if the default is 

vacated. See Gilmore, 843 F.3d at 966. True enough, but the “good cause” standard of Rule 

55(c) is to be applied in light of all the circumstances of an individual case, see id., and in 

applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens the district court necessarily took into account 

the private and public interests at stake. See Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 62, 64, 66 n.8.

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evidence to overcome the presumption that the forum-selection clause in his 

employment agreement is enforceable. Dahman contended that enforcing the clause 

would contravene the District’s public policy of eliminating age discrimination because 

Qatar would not vindicate his claims. In support of that latter assertion, Dahman said 

that “Qatari law or policy, as articulated to Mr. Dahman by Embassy officials and 

supported by Mr. Dahman’s Local Employment Contract with Defendants, supports the 

mandatory retirement of its citizens over the age of 64.” J.A. at 77. He also claimed

that the defendants’ conduct would not be held to “the same high standard of social 

justice” as it would in the District. J.A. at 74. But those statements, without more, do 

not establish that Qatar will leave Dahman entirely without a remedy, especially when it 

is conceivable that the arbitral panel dictated by the employment agreement could apply 

U.S. law to the present dispute. Cf. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 

Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636–37 & n.19 (1985). Nor do the inconveniences to Dahman of 

arbitrating in Qatar demonstrate that he effectively will be deprived of his day in court. 

Dahman did not make the “strong showing” required to render the forum-selection 

clause unenforceable. Azima, 926 F.3d at 874 (internal quotation omitted).

We have no trouble concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

when weighing the public- and private-interest factors. Given the enforceable forumselection clause in Dahman’s employment agreement, the private-interest factors 

weighed entirely in favor of Qatar as the preselected forum. Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 64. 

Dahman thus had the heavy burden of demonstrating that the public-interest factors 

alone overwhelmingly disfavor the dismissal. See id. at 67. Dahman argued that 

litigating his claims in the District would present few administrative difficulties or choiceof-law issues, but he pointed to only one public-interest factor as disfavoring arbitration 

in Qatar: the District’s interest in keeping localized controversies that turn on the 

District’s law in the District’s courts. That is a legitimate interest, see Azima, 926 F.3d at 

880, but it is not enough on its own to tip the scales, much less render the district court’s 

conclusion an abuse of discretion.2

Dahman’s remaining arguments lack merit. He contends that the district court 

abused its discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the question of 

enforceability. As noted above, however, Dahman presented scant evidence that would

warrant an evidentiary hearing, and he also never requested one. Dahman next 

contends that the defendants waived their right to enforce the arbitration clause in the 

employment agreement by failing to raise it prior to filing their Rule 60 motion. The 

premise of that argument is simply false: the defendants asserted their rights under the 

arbitration clause in the proceedings before the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission. Dahman now raises a new argument that the arbitration clause was not a 

material term of the employment agreement and thus it did not survive once he turned 

64, when the agreement was said to expire according to its express terms. That 

2

Dahman complains that the district court did not discuss these specific public-interest 

factors and contends that a remand is therefore required for the court to reweigh the privateand public-interest factors in the first instance. Even if that were so, there is no need to remand 

where, as here, the outcome of the interest analysis is so clear that a contrary ruling would 

constitute an abuse of discretion. See Azima, 926 F.3d at 880.

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proposition is debatable, see Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 66, but we decline to consider it as 

it was raised for the first time on appeal. See Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. Dist. of 

Columbia, 602 F.3d 431, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Dahman additionally asks us to deem 

the defendants’ forum non conveniens motion as untimely on equitable grounds. But 

we have permitted a foreign state to raise an arbitration-clause defense more than a 

year after entry of a default judgment, explaining that “it is important that [a foreign 

state’s legal] defenses be considered carefully and, if possible, that the dispute be 

resolved on the basis of . . . all relevant legal arguments.” Practical Concepts, Inc. v. 

Republic of Bolivia, 811 F.2d 1543, 1552 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (internal quotation omitted); 

see id. at 1545, 1551. Thus even if we were inclined to draw an equitable line at some 

point, Dahman’s case, with less than three months between the default judgment and 

the defendants’ Rule 60(b) motion, would not be the appropriate occasion.

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