Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01617/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01617-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cal-Trans
Defendant
Victor Tagle
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR TAGLE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CAL-TRANS,

 Defendant.

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1:14-cv-01617---BAM 

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff Victor Tagle (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil action against Defendant Cal-Trans. Plaintiff initiated this action on 

October 3, 2014, and consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge on 

October 20, 2014. (Docs. 1, 7.) 

On June 30, 2015, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and dismissed it with leave to 

amend. (Doc. 16.) On July 13, 2015, Plaintiff filed a document entitled “Notice of Motion.” 

Although styled as a motion for the collection of past due wages and damages, it appears to be 

Plaintiff’s attempt to address the deficiencies identified by the Court in the initial screening 

order. (Doc. 17, p. 3.) The Court therefore construes the motion as Plaintiff’s first amended 

complaint, which is now before the Court for screening. 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

Case 1:14-cv-01617---BAM Document 19 Filed 08/17/15 Page 1 of 6
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1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or 

malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 

1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 

(2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge 

unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 

sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); 

Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility 

that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short 

of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks 

omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff initiated this action while incarcerated at High Desert State Prison and brings 

suit against the California Department of Transportation (Cal-Trans) for employment 

discrimination and recovery of lost wages. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff states that he 

clearly specified the facts that led to his situation. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges as follows:

While working as Heavy Equipment Mechanic, at Cal-Trans, Bishop, California’s 

shop, the petitioner based on his background (Hispanic), and the experience that 

the petitioner has, on the said job, the petitioner [illegible] the jealousy of his coworkers, including Mr. Nelson. [¶] At the 6 months review, the petitioner was 

accused by Mr. Nelson, of “talking bad about Mr. Nelson in Spanish! ... over the 

phone!” Therefore, the petitioner was suspended without pay, and he got stranded 

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at Bishop, Ca., with his family. [¶] Immediately, the petitioner called the union 

representative, [illegible] he said [illegible], was; unable/unwilling to provide 

help, although the union wages, were deducted out of the petitioner’s wages. [¶] 

The petitioner stayed at Bishop, for a few months, waiting for the “arbitration 

hearing,” hearing no news [illegible]. The petitioner went back to dwell at Las 

Vegas, but . . . he called the attention of “wrong people,” ending up with his tools, 

cloths, and furniture stolen. 

(Doc. 17, pp. 3-4.)

Plaintiff further alleges:

Unfortunately, due to this conflict, the petitioner got behind on all monetary 

issues, [losing] his home as well. [¶] While at Las Vegas, the petitioner was 

looking for a “job,” but the prospect[ive] employers, told the petitioner, that “he 

lost his job, at Cal-Trans, due to his personality!” [¶] Several months later, the 

petitioner was told to “attend a hearing” at Fresno, Ca in regard his “suspension.” 

On the said hearing he was told that he was the one who harassed Mr. Nelson. 

However, the woman, who claimed to be a “Judge,” said: I had, my wages 

awarded, and Mr. Nelson, never did show up. The petitioner went back to Las 

Vegas, and never heard of Cal-Trans, [illegible], he tried to contact them at the 

beginning. 

(Doc. 17, pp. 4-5.)

Plaintiff also alleges:

The petitioner was wrongfully accused by Mr. Nelson of “Speak, bad about him, 

in Spanish!” due to jealousy. [¶] The petitioner was wrongfully suspended, on 

those bases, by Cal-Trans, since: [¶] To speak, in Spanish, is not prohibited on 

Cal-Trans premises, on break time!. [¶] If the petitioner was speaking in Spanish, 

what bases, Mr. Nelson had, to say it was about him, since there is a language 

barrier, by him being a Caucasian man!, only “hear and say!”, was the reason of 

the suspension . . . and the petitioner’s background. [¶] The woman who 

identified herself as a “Judge said the [illegible] would have his wages!, (due 

wages!). [¶] The petitioner, can’t recall, the date on which he was called to the 

said “Hearing.” [¶] Furthermore, the petitioner tried to contact “Cal-Trans” to 

obtain, the said information, but so far is not an answer. [¶] The court, is 

requesting to “Amend” the said complaint, but not add anything new!. [¶] 

Nothing has been added, all is the same factual events. The petitioner can’t 

remove, anything, since this is what happened. [¶] The [loss] of his house, and 

expenses, was due to negligence of said Cal-Trans officials, and negligence of 

Mr. Nelson, not to mention, the lack of action, from Cal-Tran’s union, 

representative, who the petitioner, was paying to!. 

(Doc. 17, pp. 5-6.)

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III. Discussion

Plaintiff’s amended complaint again fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

and fails to state a cognizable claim. To assist Plaintiff, the Court provides the pleading and 

legal standards that appear relevant to his claims. 

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). As 

noted above, detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are 

not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–557; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

Although Plaintiff’s complaint is short, it lacks sufficient factual allegations to state a claim 

for relief. Specifically, Plaintiff’s complaint lacks important details, such as dates and 

information regarding the arbitration hearing and purported award of lost wages. Absent this 

factual information, the Court cannot determine whether Plaintiff states a cognizable claim or, 

more importantly, whether this Court maintains jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. Although 

Plaintiff has attempted to amend his complaint, he has been unable to cure this deficiency. 

B. Section 1983

Insofar as Plaintiff attempts to bring a damages claim against Cal-Trans pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, he may not do so. The State of California and the Department of Transportation

have absolute immunity from suit under section 1983. E.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. 

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900 (1984); Buckwalter v. Nevada Bd. of Medical 

Examiners, 678 F.3d 737, 740 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012). Further, “[s]tate agencies (such as Caltrans) 

are not ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983, and are therefore not amenable to suit under that 

statute.” Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of 

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). 

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C. Title VII – Employment Discrimination

To the extent Plaintiff is pursuing a discrimination action pursuant to Title VII of the 1964 

Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, et seq, he must establish federal subject matter 

jurisdiction. See Cerrato v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 976 (9th Cir. 

2009) (Congress has abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to Title VII claims). 

To establish such jurisdiction for a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must exhaust his remedies by filing 

an administrative charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(EEOC) before commencing an action in federal court. B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d 

1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002); Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 2001). As 

with his original complaint, there is no indication that Plaintiff has complied with the exhaustion 

requirement.

D. State Law – Wrongful Termination and Negligence

Insofar as Plaintiff attempts to bring a state law action for wrongful termination in violation 

of public policy, he may not do so. Such claims against a state agency are barred pursuant to 

California Government Code section 815, which grants immunity to public entities unless 

otherwise provided for by statute, because there is no express statutory authority allowing for 

public entity liability. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 815(a); see also Haack v. California Dep’t of Corr. 

and Rehab., 2012 WL 570353, *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012) (plaintiff could not maintain claim 

for wrongful termination in violation of public policy against state agency); Moore v. California 

Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 2011 WL 2433355, *8-9 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 13, 2011) (same); Scott v.

Solano Cnty. Health and Soc. Servs. Dep’t, 2008 WL 3835267, *18 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2008)

(same). 

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to pursue tort claims under California law for negligence, 

the Government Claims Act requires exhaustion of those claims with the California Victim 

Compensation and Government Claims Board, and Plaintiff is required to specifically allege 

compliance in his complaint. Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal.4th 201, 208-09 (Cal. 

2007); State v. Superior Court of Kings Cnty. (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239 (Cal. 2004); Mabe 

v. San Bernardino Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2001); 

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Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995); Karim-Panahi v. 

Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff has failed to allege such 

compliance or any facts excusing such compliance. 

IV. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to 

state a cognizable claim. Despite being provided with the relevant pleading and legal standards, 

Plaintiff has been unable to cure the deficiencies of his complaint. Further leave to amend is not 

warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 

complaint is HEREBY DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. 

All pending motions, if any, are terminated. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 17, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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