Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01731/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01731-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James A. Thomas
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-1731

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JAMES A. THOMAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

No. 1:11-CR-22-TLS — Theresa L. Springmann, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 24, 2016 — DECIDED MARCH 8, 2016

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit 

Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. James Thomas pleaded 

guilty to possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and 

was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment—a term below 

the Guideline range of 292 to 365 months for someone with 

his criminal history who distributed as much cocaine as he 

did. His appeal does not contest the length of his sentence 

but does maintain that the procedure the judge used to arCase: 15-1731 Document: 35 Filed: 03/08/2016 Pages: 7
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rive at the sentence violated the Due Process Clause of the 

Fifth Amendment.

The district judge arrived at the sentence after a multistep procedure that the parties agree is the norm in her 

court:

1. The probation officer prepared a presentence report, which was given to counsel. Fed. R. Crim. P. 

32(d), (e).

2. Counsel for both the defendant and the prosecution submitted written responses, outlining areas 

of agreement and disagreement with the probation officer’s conclusions and recommendations. 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(f). Counsel also made recommendations about the appropriate sentence. 

Thomas objected to the PSR’s calculation of relevant conduct (the quantity of cocaine for which he 

was accountable); he also requested a sentence 

lower than the Guideline range.

3. Next the judge held a telephonic conference to 

discuss how to proceed. At this conference, defense counsel and the prosecutor agreed that no 

witnesses would be called at sentencing. Thomas’s 

lawyer withdrew all objections to the PSR’s calculation of the Guideline range but maintained his 

request for a below-Guideline sentence.

4. Counsel promptly filed papers memorializing the 

positions they had taken during the telephonic 

conference.

5. Two days after the telephonic conference—and a 

week before the date set for sentencing—the disCase: 15-1731 Document: 35 Filed: 03/08/2016 Pages: 7
No. 15-1731 3

trict court issued a short opinion that both summarized the extent of consensus at the conference 

(for example, the parties’ agreement that evidence 

would not be presented on the day of sentencing) 

and tentatively approved Thomas’s request for a 

below-Guideline sentence. The judge wrote that it 

was appropriate to sentence Thomas as if the 

Guideline range were two levels lower than the 

one the PSR had calculated (i.e., as if the range 

were 235 to 293 months). The judge mentioned 

Thomas’s age as the principal reason for this reduction. He was 67 at the time, and the judge 

thought him a reduced recidivism risk after a 

lengthy sentence, even though his record (and his 

age at the time of the offense) demonstrate that he 

is a career criminal. The opinion stressed that the 

conclusion is tentative and that the sentence 

would be set only after proceedings in court.

6. With the defendant present, the judge listened to 

arguments from counsel, heard allocution from 

Thomas (Rule 32(i)(4)), and pronounced a sentence of 235 months’ imprisonment. Neither

Thomas nor his lawyer asked the judge to reconsider anything covered in her opinion of a week 

prior, though they did ask for a sentence lower 

than 235 months. The judge also sentenced Thomas to eight years of supervised release, subject to 

nine conditions. These conditions had been proposed by the PSR, and Thomas did not object to 

any of them in writing (step 2), at the telephonic

conference (step 3), or at sentencing.

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In this court, Thomas contends that steps 3 and 5 violate 

the Due Process Clause, principally because he was not present during these stages. He does not contend that the district judge departed from Fed. R. Crim. P. 32, which specifies 

requirements for sentencing. Nor does he contend that the 

judge violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)(3), which requires the 

defendant’s presence at sentencing. Thomas was in court, 

and exercised his opportunity to address the judge personally, on the day of sentencing, and the judge’s earlier opinion 

(step 5) specified that nothing it contained was definitive.

As far as we have been able to discover, no federal court 

ever has held or even suggested that there is anything problematic about a telephonic conference to discuss what issues 

need resolution in open court, or that a judge is forbidden to 

resolve on paper issues that can be resolved in advance of 

sentencing. Rule 43(b)(3) says that a defendant’s presence is

not required for the consideration of legal issues. Judges 

regularly hear argument and rule on issues such as the sufficiency of the indictment (Rule 12(b)(3)(B)) and contested 

matters such as discovery (Rule 16) outside the defendant’s 

presence.

The Due Process Clause covers civil litigation as well as 

criminal proceedings (it deals with deprivations of “life, liberty, or property”), and no one believes that a judge violates 

the Due Process Clause in a civil suit by receiving submissions from counsel (step 3) or issuing tentative opinions 

(step 5). Indeed, civil cases can be finally resolved under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 without the litigants ever seeing the judge. Criminal defendants are entitled 

under the Due Process Clause to be present when that is essential to “a fair and just hearing”, United States v. Gagnon, 

Case: 15-1731 Document: 35 Filed: 03/08/2016 Pages: 7
No. 15-1731 5

470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985), but representation by counsel suffices when presenting legal arguments to a judge and discussing what issues require hearings. Criminal defendants also 

enjoy protection under the Public Trial Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment, but at oral argument Thomas’s lawyer disclaimed any reliance on the Sixth Amendment.

If the conference (step 3) was problematic, what are we to 

make of the distribution of the presentence report (step 1) 

and counsels’ written submissions (steps 2 and 4)? Thomas 

was not present for any of those steps either. He was, however, represented by counsel, and he has not contended that 

his lawyer disobeyed any of his instructions concerning 

what arguments to advance or withdraw. If counsel may

make arguments on paper (step 2), what sense would it 

make to forbid discussion of those submissions (step 3) to 

see whether an evidentiary hearing was essential? This court 

heard oral argument from counsel without Thomas’s presence; as that procedure is compatible with the Due Process 

Clause, why would the telephonic conference not be?

We don’t understand how, even in principle, a defendant 

could be present for the preparation of the opinion (step 5), 

something the judge did in chambers over the course of 

hours or days. If the judge may prepare such an opinion in 

chambers, as she may, see United States v. Burton, 543 F.3d 

950, 953 (7th Cir. 2008), what could be wrong with releasing

that opinion through the clerk’s office a week before sentencing? A judge could delay release until sentencing begins and 

the defendant is in court, but that would harm rather than 

help the defense. Releasing the opinion a week earlier allows 

both the defense and the prosecution to tailor their presentations to the judge’s thoughts. No surprises means not only a 

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presentation more helpful to the judge but less potential 

need to recess the sentencing (grant a continuance, in lawyer-speak) to deal with surprises.

More than that: Thomas does not contend that it would 

violate the Due Process Clause for a judge to think the propositions contained in the opinion. No judge arrives at sentencing with an empty head. The opinion issued at step 5 

gives both sides potentially valuable information about the 

judge’s thoughts without compromising the need to keep the 

judge’s mind open to new information. See United States v. 

Dill, 799 F.3d 821, 825 (7th Cir. 2015). Similarly, oral argument in a court of appeals allows counsel to hear judges’ tentative thoughts and to address them before it is too late. We 

cannot conceive how the Due Process Clause would forbid a 

judge to notify counsel about thoughts entertained on the 

way to decision.

The Due Process Clause requires notice and an opportunity for a hearing. See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 

(2006). The procedure the district judge used gave Thomas

more notice than Rule 32 requires, and more opportunities to

be heard than Rules 32 and 43 require. It eliminated any dispute about the terms of supervised release, which have bedeviled district courts (and this court) in recent years. See, 

e.g., United States v. Orozco-Sanchez, No. 15-1252 (7th Cir. 

Feb. 26, 2016); United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 

2015). The early announcement of an inclination to deduct 

two offense levels allowed everyone to prepare for a focused 

argument on just where in the 235- to 293-month range the 

sentence should fall, without extinguishing the prosecutor’s 

opportunity to argue for a sentence higher than 293 months 

or the defense’s opportunity to ask for fewer than 235 

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No. 15-1731 7

months. Both sides used that opportunity. The procedure 

made everyone better off. Philosophers and economists 

might call it a Pareto-superior, if not a Pareto-optimal, approach to sentencing. Other district judges may deem it worthy of emulation; it is enough for us to call it constitutional.

AFFIRMED

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